UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

All Together Now: The Successes and Failures of Community Building in Xenophon's *Anabasis*

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

by

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2024

The Dissertation of Kevin Westerfeld is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically.

University of California San Diego

2024

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my wife, who's unending patience and willingness to listen to countless stories about the Cyreans made this possible, and only cost me $40. She never failed to remind me that τά καλλίστα χαλέπα.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee for their help and guidance through this process. Throughout my academic career I have benefited from each of them in so many ways. I am especially grateful to Dr. Denise Demetriou, without whose tireless efforts in reading and rereading the many drafts that this went through, I could never have completed this project. Her patience, compassion, and generosity of spirit are exemplars for me in all my professional and personal endeavors. I could not have hoped for a better advisor. I would also like to thank Dr. Edward Watts, who met with me for the first time in the Spring of 2014 and helped me plot a course into the Graduate Program at UCSD. His advice and his support for my efforts to return to school after so many years away made my graduate career possible. I could not have gotten here without him. Dr. Nancy Caciola gave me some of the best advice I got in Graduate school and taught me how to focus my time effectively. Dr. John W.I. Lee wrote the book that inspired me to return to school and through the breadth of his research interests, taught me that ancient historians are not constrained by any one time or place and that I should let my interests guide me wherever they lead. Finally, I am especially grateful to Dr. Page duBois, whose kindness and sincere humility from someone so accomplished in her field are a source of constant admiration for me. I am deeply indebted to all of them.

I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students in the Ancient Cohort of the History Department at UCSD who accepted me wholeheartedly and always made me feel as though I belonged, in particular Jonathan Martin, and Amanda Tarkington who were exceptionally kind and welcoming to me when I first arrived here and helped me overcome the many doubts I experienced. I am especially grateful to Jamie Marvin who shared my adventures

in Athens and has always known how to make me laugh. I am very lucky to have her as my friend.

I would also like to thank Dr Lee Brice and Dr Georgia Tsouvala who introduced me to Greece and whose mentorship opened up a whole new world to me.

I am grateful to the faculty and staff at the American School for Classical Studies in Athens where much of this dissertation was written. I am especially indebted to Dr John Penniman who kept me grounded and focused during my time in Greece and always knew the best restaurants.

I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Geisel Library, especially Erik Mitchell who supported my time in Athens and Sharon Garcia for her patience, perspective, and encouragement through some of the most difficult parts of this.

Finally, I would like to give a special thanks to Matt Crum, who shared every step of this journey with me. His support and friendship have given me practical instruction in how to build a strong community.

VITA

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California San Diego, 2024

Professor Denise Demetriou, Chair

All Together Now: The Successes and Failures of Community Building in Xenophon's *Anabasis*," analyzes several of the most common strategies for community building employed by the Greeks of the Classical Period. It considers the ways in which religion, Panhellenism, ethnic identity, and factionalism affect the creation and preservation of a community. To study these phenomena in community building, I use Xenophon's *Anabasis*, a firsthand account of ten thousand Greek mercenaries who fought in a Persian civil war in 401 BCE, and who, after the death of their Persian patron, were forced to band together and fight their way 1000 miles back to mainland Greece. As a truly cosmopolitan assembly of Greeks, made up of men from cities throughout the Greek world, the successes and failures of the Ten Thousand in establishing what

amounts to a civic community provide a unique insight into the most common strategies and devices employed in fostering communal bonds across a diverse group, and the practical limits to which these could be employed. My research shows that despite those in the army sharing many broad cultural similarities, such as the belief in a shared pantheon of gods, or an awareness of common ancestors, any unity achieved among the soldiers through appeals to their cultural similarities or shared heritage were often short-lived and needed to be reiterated time and again. While this observation shows us the limits of mobilizing these phenomena across the larger Greek world of the early fourth century BCE, it also sheds light on the ways in which communities in general, not just in antiquity, develop and fall apart. In this way, we find that religion and shared ancestry are particularly useful in creating identities that allow for the organization of a community, but self-interest and sub-ethnic distinctions are powerfully corrosive, and if left unchecked, they can destroy any unanimity gained through this common identity.

INTRODUCTION: THE COMMUNITY OF THE CYREANS

"The ties of belonging that constitute the collective identity of a community do not preclude conflict."

– Gerard Delanty[1]

After the death of the rebellious Persian prince, Cyrus the Younger, at the Battle of Cunaxa outside of Babylon in the fall of 401 BCE, the ten thousand Greek mercenaries he had hired to fight with him suddenly found themselves in a terribly dangerous situation.[2] They were nearly one thousand miles from the Greek mainland, facing a hostile army that outnumbered them seven to one, with no food on hand and no supply line available to them. The story of their survival as recounted by the Athenian philosopher and historian Xenophon, who was a general in the mercenary army and an eye-witness to their struggles, has captivated the imaginations of readers for millennia and given students of history a unique glimpse into the ways Greeks thought about themselves and the others they encountered in the lands around them. After failing to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal from Persian territory, the Greeks were forced to fight their way through hundreds of miles of hostile country, over the Armenian mountains in winter, with the aim of reaching the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor where they hoped they could get aid from the Greek colonies which had been settled there. Having reached the city of Cotyora in the spring of 400 the army held an assembly to determine what their next course of action should be. During the assembly it was suggested that the army split up, with one part traveling by sea, and

[1] Delanty 2010: 28
[2] All dates are BCE unless otherwise indicated.

another marching by land as they tried to make their way along the Black Sea coast back toward Greece. Xenophon, upon hearing this suggestion, rose to address the army and explained to the soldiers that their survival depended on their unity.

> "For I hold this opinion: that being many joined together, just as you are now, you will have both honor and what you need to survive, for in strength lies the opportunity to take away the possessions of the weaker; but let yourselves get separated and your force broken up into small parts, and you would neither be able to obtain food to live on nor would you safely escape. I think, therefore, just as you do, that we should set out for Greece, and that if it does happen that any man stays behind or is caught deserting before the entire army is in a place of safety, he should be brought to trial as a wrong-doer. And whoever is of this opinion,' he continued, 'let him raise his hand.' Up went every hand.[3]

In this speech Xenophon states plainly to the soldiers that their unity is paramount to their survival, and it is clear from the army's reaction, voting to prosecute deserters, that they recognize the merit in his warning. Nor is this the only time in the *Anabasis* that Xenophon stresses how important it is for the army to remain united. He mentions it in his negotiations with the ambassadors of Sinope.[4] He warns the army against the danger to their safety posed by factional strife when they select a single commander.[5] Even the Persian prince Cyrus, warned the army that if they fought amongst themselves, his own Persian levies would cut them down.[6] In spite of these warnings and the obvious danger that a reduction in their cohesion would mean to their fighting capacity, the unity of the army was often in doubt.[7] In fact, just a few days after

[3] All references are from the *Anabasis* unless otherwise indicated, and all translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 5.6.32-3, οὕτω γὰρ γιγνώσκω· ὁμοῦ μὲν ὄντες πολλοὶ ὥσπερ νυνὶ δοκεῖτε ἄν μοι καὶ ἔντιμοι εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια· ἐν γὰρ τῷ κρατεῖν ἐστι καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων· διασπασθέντες δ' ἂν καὶ κατὰ μικρὰ γενομένης τῆς δυνάμεως οὔτ' ἂν τροφὴν δύναισθε λαμβάνειν οὔτε χαίροντες ἂν ἀπαλλάξαιτε. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἅπερ ὑμῖν, ἐκπορεύεσθαι εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ ἐάν τις μέντοι ἀπολιπὼν ληφθῇ πρὶν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ εἶναι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα, κρίνεσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς ἀδικοῦντα. καὶ ὅτῳ δοκεῖ," ἔφη, "ταῦτα, ἀράτω τὴν χεῖρα.
[4] 5.6.13.
[5] 6.1.29.
[6] 1.6.16.
[7] See Castillo 2020: 18.

Xenophon's warning about the dangers to their safety contained in factional strife quoted above, the army broke apart along ethnic lines and more than 800 of them, one tenth of the remaining army, were killed while they were raiding the countryside.[8] The inability of the army to maintain its unity in the face of these warnings may strike readers of the *Anabasis* as surprising and bring to mind several questions, which are not entirely obvious or easily understood: why was it so difficult for the Cyreans, or mercenaries of Cyrus, to foster and maintain a sense of community when their very survival was tied so closely to their ability to be a unified group? How did different aspects of Greek culture affect the ability of the Cyreans to form a community? What can modern theories of community development, such as the Psychological Sense of Community (PSOC) model, reveal about the difficulties the army faced in building and maintaining their community?

This project will examine many of the situations confronted by the army throughout the campaign, and their responses to them, to consider how these various incidents affected the army's ability to form a community. To do this, it will consider the ways in which four aspects of Greek culture affected the ability of the Cyreans to build and maintain their community. Specifically, it will look at the way religion, Panhellenism, that is the belief that Greeks should join together because they share ancestry and a cultural history, *stasis* or factional strife, and ethnic distinctions affected the community of the army. Each of these phenomena were present in all Greek communities at that time, and each affected the cohesion of those communities in complex and interdependent ways. From this evaluation I will show that the unity gained through their shared religious practices, shared cultural experiences, and their overarching Hellenic identity was generally insufficient in overcoming the dilution to cohesion caused by the

[8] The Arcadian and Achaean dead are described in 6.3.5. The census of the army at Cerasus found 8,600 soldiers, 5.3.3. See also Roy 1967: 319; Lee 2007: 69.

heterogeneous ethnicity of the community. Moreover, because each of the different cultural aspects that the Cyreans could have used to try and foster a more robust sense of community worked interdependently with their understanding of their own ethnic identities, the heterogeneity of the group limited the effectiveness any of these was able to have.

Although armies have command structures and hierarchies of authority that are not present in most communities, and many Greek communities had social and civic institutions that were not present in the army, there is much in the organizational and demographic makeup of the army that closely mirrors what is found in Greek communities of the period. Like most Greek communities in the fifth and fourth centuries whose populations included a diverse assembly of indigenous citizens, migrants, and enslaved peoples who came from many different places, spoke many different dialects, and were perhaps even of a different ethnicity, the army was made up of people from cities throughout the Greek world. Although it is true that more than half of the army came from the Peloponnesus, these people came from cities and regions all across the peninsula, and with the exception of the 700 Spartans under Cheirisophus none of them were officially representing their cities.[9] In addition to Peloponnesians, there were men from the rest of mainland Greece, Thrace, the islands in the Aegean, the Ionian coast of Asia Minor, Sicily, and southern Italy.[10] In addition to these, there were camp followers and attendants, captive women and boys, and slaves who had been brought with the army when it set out, one of whom found himself back in his native land from which he had been taken years before along the southern coast of the Black Sea, as the army marched through that region.[11]

[9] Xenophon does not explicitly state this in the *Anabasis* when Cheirisophus arrives (1.4.3), but rather makes the assertion in the *Hellenica* 3.1.1-2, as does Diodorus 14.19.5.
[10] For a breakdown of the 66 individuals named in the *Anabasis* and their homeland see Roy 1967: 303-6.
[11] The man was a peltast who reported that he had been a slave in Athens and was originally taken from the land of the Macrones near the Black Sea coast in northwestern Anatolia. Because he was still conversant in his native language he volunteered to act as an intermediary between the army and the Macrones, 4.8.4-8.

In addition to having demographic similarities to many Greek communities, the basic social and political structures within the army also were similar to those that one could find in most Greek communities at the start of the fourth century. Scholars have observed that while the army was organized into contingents led by the different generals, the primary social unit for the common soldier was the small group called *suskenoi* or tent-mates. In his investigation of the common soldier's experience on the campaign, John Lee showed that the *suskenoi* served as the primary social and logistical nexus within the community of soldiers.[12] These groups of perhaps a dozen men, divided the responsibilities for the acquisition of resources such as food or firewood amongst themselves and then pooled those resources to share with the group. Hyland reinforced Lee's observations about the importance of the *suskenoi* by an analysis of the desertion of one of these bands after the death of the generals at the hands of the Persians.[13] The structure and function of the *suskenoi* revealed in the *Anabasis* is remarkably similar to the basic unit of Greek communities, the *oikos*, or household. This was the extended family living together that was often similar in size to the *suskenoi*, and included the parents, children, and household slaves.[14] Just as a large community of Greeks would have been made up of many households, the community of the army was composed of scores of *suskenoi* who relied on their members for their basic needs. One difference between the *poleis* and the community of the army may be that the reliance on small, fairly independent groups, to provide for many of the daily necessities of life on the campaign seems to have created a decentralized distribution of obligations that may have more easily facilitated factional divisions in the army.

[12] Lee, John WI. *A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis*. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[13] Hyland 2010: 238-53; the death of the generals appears in 2.5.31-2; the desertion of Nicharcus and his company is reported at 3.3.5.
[14] Macdowell 2009: 15-7.

Just as in the cities of Greece, the political structures within the army created a public space for debate and the administration of justice that were essential components of a Greek community. While there were a variety of political systems in use within the Greek cities, they all shared a few common features that were also present in the community of the army. Nussbaum in his seminal work on social organization in the *Anabasis* showed that as the campaign went on, the partnership between the generals and the assembly that not only created the cohesion of the community, but also enabled its function as a military force, was predicated on the basis of citizenship and not compulsory military discipline.[15] His analysis showed that the creation of a public space in which the assembly of soldiers could consent to their participation in the community was a prerequisite to the authority of the generals and allowed the administration of justice and the maintenance of discipline. Recently Durnerin has argued that much of the cohesion of the community in the *Anabasis* can be attributed to the pay given to the mercenary soldiers.[16] She sees the debt between the leaders and the troops they hire as one of the principal bonds unifying the Cyreans. Other scholars, such as Hornblower, have also noted the increasingly democratic character of the decision-making process.[17] Yet, as this project will show, the more the Cyreans felt free to participate in the governing of their community, the more competing objectives created space for dissent and division, which matches what we often find in other Greek communities of the time.

As a truly cosmopolitan assembly of Greeks, made up of men from cities throughout the Greek world, the successes and failures of the Ten Thousand in establishing what amounts to a civic community provide a unique insight into the most common strategies and devices

[15] Nussbaum 1967: 19.
[16] Durnerin 2022: 67.
[17] Hornblower 2004: 243-63.

employed in fostering communal bonds across a diverse group, as well as the practical limits to which these could be employed. Because the army was composed of men whose civic, ethnic, and religious identities were so varied, the methods by which they were able to create a community can provide an insight into how these features of their identities functioned in a large heterogeneous group. This insight should then be able to tell us something of the relative value of these facets of their culture across the larger Greek world of the early fourth century. That is to say, because the army of the Ten Thousand was, on the one hand, cosmopolitan in its demography and, on the other hand, an *ad hoc* community without a formal constitution, it was forced to operate within the framework of broadly popular traditional norms in order to function as a community. Without any foundation based on a traditional way of living together or conducting civic issues – as would have been present in almost any other Greek community of the time – the Cyreans needed to enact civic policies and organize themselves socially in ways that were acceptable to the majority of the soldiers. These policies could not be based on the social or civic tradition of any particular city or region if those traditions would preclude the majority of soldiers from consenting to abide by them. As such, the *Anabasis* can serve as a window into the components and concerns that not only guided relations within the community, but also guided the construction and maintenance of that community, and the observations gained from an analysis of this community should help us understand in general terms the factors that influenced and affected communities throughout the Greek world.

Although Xenophon has, at times, been criticized as an unreliable source, there are still many ways in which the current project can make use of the *Anabasis* in spite of these concerns. Throughout most of history, Xenophon enjoyed a high reputation as a thinker and historian, with

many ancient writers praising Xenophon as one of the greatest philosophers and historians.[18] Yet nineteenth century scholars thought he provided inaccurate histories and wrote in a style lesser than that of Herodotus and Thucydides.[19] Today, most scholars acknowledge that there are times when Xenophon may have a specific agenda in his writing, yet they are still able to make use of what he provides, arguing that Xenophon does not appear to outright lie in his texts. The *Anabasis* falls into this category, and is thought by most scholars to be a sort of curated collection of true events organized by the author. One agenda that many scholars have noted in the *Anabasis* is its effort at apology.[20] Many of the incidents described in the *Anabasis* not only cast Xenophon in a favorable light, they also frame Cyrus as a person worthy of associating with. This presentation of the Persian prince was likely due to the negative reception Xenophon's time with the Cyreans had in Athens. Still, most scholars do not believe that Xenophon fabricates or invents a fiction in his account, as that would have damaged the credibility of the work and undercut its usefulness as an apology. Instead, Xenophon steers the reader's attention only

[18] Polybius, Cicero, Tacitus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Quintilian, Aulus Gellius, and Longinus all consider Xenophon one of the greatest philosophers and historians. For a discussion of Xenophon's reception in classical sources see Tuplin 1993: 21-28; See also Naden 2001: 3-4.

[19] The drop in the scholarly opinion of Xenophon as compared to Thucydides and Plato started with Niebhr in 1827. Then Grote: 1850: v.3.155, praised Xenophon's oratory in, v.3.528-9, but lamented his oligarchic sentiments at, v.3.597. Abbott 1888: v.3.427-40, noted that Xenophon repeatedly omits descriptions of events and references to documents that are present in other accounts. See also Hadzsits 1908: 215.; McKay 1953: 7; Gray 1980: 306-26; Against Buckler 1999: 397 who notes "Im Vergleich mit « Hellenica Oxyrhynchia », Pausanias und Plutarch erweist sich Xenophon (*Hellenika* 3, 5, 3) als die verlässlichste Quelle bezüglich der Ereignisse von 395 (In comparison with "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia", Pausanias and Plutarch, Xenophon (*Hellenica* 3, 5, 3) proves to be the most reliable source regarding the events of 395)." Finally, Cawkwell 1963: 94-5, calls Xenophon's account of the breaking of the Common Peace in 374 ""tendentious"" and "more proper to a politician's attack than to a history." Starting in the second half of the twentieth century scholars found new ways to use Xenophon. Erbse 1966:485-505 challenged the nineteenth century view of Xenophon as a second-rate historian when compared to others such as Diodorus Sicilus. Strauss 1970: I, utilized Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* to build a more complete and nuanced understanding of Socrates than one gets through only reading Plato. Then, Higgins 1977:99-128 used Xenophon's history to analyze the place of the individual in the ancient Greek *polis*. Dillary 1995: 5-7, lays out his argument that one cannot separate Xenophon the philosopher from Xenophon the historian, which underpins his analysis of the *Hellenica* as a didactic text. Finally, establishment of a regular conference series on Xenophon in Liverpool that opened a number of new interpretative approaches to Xenophon's works.

[20] For Apologia in the *Anabasis* see: Stylianou 2004: 73; Parker 2004: 137; Whitby 2004: 216-7; Sordi 2004: 75-6; Brennan 2012: 308; Brennan 2022: 72; and Azoulay 2004: 289, who begins his paper by stating plainly, "Xenophon's *Anabasis* is a work of apologetics."

toward those aspects of the story he is interested in featuring. Rop, in his analysis of Xenophon's description of the battle of Cunaxa, gives an insight into the ways in which Xenophon uses focalization to call the reader's attention on particular actions while eliding or ignoring events that do not support the message underlying his narrative.[21] In this project I will largely side-step the difficult task of determining Xenophon's authorial intent, and instead will attempt to contain my analysis to the actions as they are reported in the narrative. Since Xenophon does not appear to outright lie or fabricate in his accounts, what he includes can still be useful in determining how different events affected the community of the army, especially if those events are corroborated with other accounts whenever possible.

Communities in Ancient Greece

The community of the army in the *Anabasis* was functionally similar to the different types of communities found in Greece at the time and provided the soldiers with many of the same essential needs that philosophers of the time, who wrote extensively on community and social/political organization, argued a community must furnish to its members. At the start of the fourth century, when the events described in the *Anabasis* took place, the Greeks recognized and participated in many different forms of community. The most basic of these was the household or *oikos* (οἶκος) mentioned above. This was often little more than an extended family and a few slaves or domestic workers.[22] Moving up from the household in both size and complexity of organization the ancient Greeks recognized villages, towns, and the *polis* as all being different kinds of communities. While each of these communities could be an autonomous civic body, the smaller villages and towns were often joined to and sublimated under the larger civic community of the *polis*, which served as the nexus of community for most Greeks in the early fourth century.

[21] Rop 2013: 31-6.
[22] For a discussion of the evidence for the demographics of the ancient Greek household see: Trümper 2010: 32-52.

Although the *polis* was the primary political community in Classical Greece, there were supra-*polis* communities that existed as well. Associations made up of any number of *poleis* were a common feature of Greek social and political life, and were organized in a variety of ways. At the start of the fourth century the most persistent and important of these was the political/military alliance known as a *symmachia* (συμμαχία). This was an offensive and defensive alliance, and was the fundamental basis for the hegemonic leagues of the fifth century such as the Spartan alliances, commonly known as the Peloponnesian League. Similar to these alliances were the amphictyonic leagues (ἀμφικτυονία) which were originally collections of neighboring settlements that were often organized around religious centers such as the famous Delphic Amphictyony. Finally, *koina* (κοινά) were alliances between *poleis* that were becoming increasingly prevalent in the first half of the fourth century. These were regional organizations whose political structure operated with varying federal arrangements that conferred some degree of shared citizenship (συμπολιτεία) to the individuals living within those *koina*. Even though the members of the army came from cities throughout the Greek world they appear to have shared equally in the citizenship of the army, especially after the death of Cyrus, when the army took on an increasingly democratic character.

The community of the army was functionally similar to these other kinds of communities, and satisfied the same needs for its members. At their most fundamental level the purpose of these communities was to provide things which could not be easily accomplished by an individual citizen or single settlement. Aristotle, in his *Politics* says that a community must provide food, practice arts and crafts, give military security, provide material wealth, establish religious worship, and provide a means for justice between men.[23] He then discusses what he

[23] Aristotle, *Politics* 1328b6-1328b15; Lavas 1974: 32.

sees as the hierarchy of Greek communities (κοινωνία) and argues that they all aim toward membership in a *polis*, since a *polis* is the most complete - and therefore best - iteration of the various partnerships in which humankind engages. In fact, he claims that the ability to engage in partnership, and form community is the defining characteristic of humankind.[24] Moreover, the impulse to form these partnerships is present in all men by nature. According to Aristotle, each of us has a natural need to join in association with others where the utility of others creates a means by which we can identify with one another and "extend our being out to them" in the first foundational steps toward community.[25] He further observes that none of us are self-sufficient. Rather, through these associations not only are our basic needs, such as food, shelter, and security most readily met, but ideals such as justice can only exist in a shared association with others. We are each compelled into partnerships and associations with others that unlock aspects of our humanity not available to any individual. Plato gives a similar explanation for the origins of community. In the *Republic*, Socrates says that *poleis* come into being because no individual is self-sufficient, but each of us lacks many things.[26] This principle of shared need that underlies the creation of communities is expressed again and more fully in a later Platonic dialogue, the *Laws*. In this dialogue, an unnamed Athenian argues with a Spartan and a Cretan about the role that the government plays in meeting the shared needs of its citizens. After debating what the purpose of a *polis* is, they agree that the driving force behind the creation of communities is to cultivate a place where one can live the best life for a human being, one that is secure and harmonious, and they further agree that this life can only be achieved through a cooperative

[24] Aristotle distinguishes humans from other social animals such as bees by noting that humans are the only gregarious animal with the power of speech (beyond the ability to produce sound that indicates pain or pleasure) and the perception of right and wrong, or good and bad. For a critique of the nature of the *polis* in Aristotle see: Trott 2014: 124-32.
[25] Ludwig 2020:72.
[26] Plato, *Republic* 369b.

engagement with others.[27] Thus, for the philosophers the inability of an individual to meet their most basic needs compels the cooperative investment in a relationship with others.[28]

For the community of the *Anabasis*, security was the most crucial of the needs that their association provided to its members, as the speech of Xenophon quoted above indicates. Without security nothing else would have been possible for the Cyreans. In fact, it is hard to imagine that they would have been able to leave the battlefield of Cunaxa if they had laid down their arms as the herald of the Great King, Phalinos, had commanded them.[29] Security was also one of the main goals of the *koina* that were becoming popular at the time, as settlements were realizing the benefits that a larger, extended community would mean for their defense.[30] The community of the army also made it possible for the soldiers to feed themselves. This could be done by raiding either as a group or in smaller bands, or by entering into contracts with other groups such as when the army fought with the Mossynoeci or in the service of Seuthes.[31] There were artisans and skilled practitioners traveling with the army who tended to the needs of the soldiers such as doctors who could treat their wounds and artisans who made many of the crafted handiworks necessary for good living such as shoes whenever those worn by the soldiers became damaged or wore out.[32] The army provided the troops with material wealth in the form of regular pay as mercenaries, or when they sold captives to the slavers.[33] It established religious worship and furnished a means for the soldiers to engage with the divine as when the army promised, and

[27] Plato, *Laws* 652d-626c.
[28] Cohen 1993: 302.
[29] 2.1.8.
[30] Mackil 2013: 60.
[31] The army collectivizing the food captured on raids appears at 6.6.1-2; Descriptions of the food stuffs captured when the army fought allied with the Mossynoeci is reported in 5.4.27-9; Seuthes promises to feed the army at 7.3.10.
[32] Doctors are reported treating the wounded in 3.4.30; Xenophon describes soldiers making shoes from fresh oxhides at 4.5.14.
[33] The money from the sale of captives is divided among the soldiers in 5.3.4.

then performed, a sacrifice to Zeus the Savior, or when the Arcadians were permitted to celebrate the festival in honor of Lykaion Zeus.[34] Finally, it provided a means for justice as when the generals were put on trial and fined for poor performance during the campaign, or when Xenophon had to answer the charge of hybris before the assembly of the army.[35] Although the army had been assembled as a fighting force to help put Cyrus on the throne, to the average soldier it quickly became a community that provided what the soldiers needed in order to live a good life but could not provide on their own. In this way, the functioning of the army as a community would have been recognizable to all Greeks at that time in terms of its purpose and practice.

To properly evaluate the community of the Cyreans, it will be helpful to first consider which kind of community the army constituted. The processes which defined and maintained the different kinds of community varied depending on their size and the complexity of their social organization. For example, the features that defined and united an *oikos* were profoundly different than those which defined and united an amphictyony, and yet both performed all of the necessary roles which were expected of a community. While it is true that the army did not inhabit a specific territory, most scholars believe the army was functionally similar to a *polis*, and it has frequently been observed that the army of the Ten Thousand was in many respects a *polis* on the march.[36] The similarity of the army to a *polis* means that for most members of the

[34] The army Vows to sacrifice to Zeus the Savior at 3.2.9; The Arcadians celebrate the Lykaian in 1.2.10.
[35] The generals are fined for poor performance in 5.8.1; Xenophon responds to the charge of hybris at 5.8.2-12.
[36] For the army as a *polis* on the march: Dalby 1992: 17; Hornblower 2004: 244; Ma 2004: 336 describes the Cyreans as post-*polis* on the move. The army was so large in fact, when measured by the number of voting citizens, that is men who were able to vote in the assembly, the army of the Ten Thousand would have been one of the largest *poleis* anywhere at that time, a fact that Xenophon was aware of as he tried several times to convince the army to found a colony along the Black Sea coast. For comparison of citizen population sizes, Aristotle says in the *Politics* (1270a.30-40) that Sparta had less than 1000 Spartiate citizens at that time. Yet even going back to the height of Spartan power at the time of the Persian invasion in 480, Herodotus at 9.28.2 states that there were only 8,000 Spartan citizens. For a discussion of the citizen population in Sparta during the Classical period, see Doran 2018: 24-31. Xenophon's colonial ambitions appear in 5.6.15-8; 6.4.14.

army, the community of soldiers would have filled a familiar role in their lives, as the vast majority of those living in a Greek community were citizens or resident aliens of a *polis*.[37] That is to say that they were a member of a nominally autonomous state that was typically centered in a fortified urban location and had control of a hinterland around it.[38] This familiarity would have allowed members of the army to easily see themselves as all members in a recognizable form of community.

While the community of the army may have resembled a *polis* to most of the soldiers, modern readers will likely notice many similarities between the Cyreans and a nation state. In his seminal work on the rise of nationalism, Benedict Anderson defined a nation as "an imagined political community… inherently limited and sovereign."[39] Although the concept of a nation as it is commonly understood is a relatively modern invention, the definition which Anderson proffers is accurate in its description of the army of the Ten Thousand. They were an imagined community because their size meant that no individual member of the army could know all, or even most, of the other members, yet each understood himself as related by their membership in the community. The community was limited, because even allowing for camp-followers and acquired attendants, it had a finite membership. It was sovereign because through the assembly of soldiers the army possessed authority to engage with other communities and political entities, to maintain its membership through expulsion or capital punishment, and to act as its own agent. Finally, it was imagined *as* a community because regardless of the initial loyalties or ambitions that drew each soldier to join the expedition, a comradeship existed between the soldiers that

[37] The other type of settlement that was seen in Greece, far less common by the fourth century, was the *ethnos*, a collection of villages organized around a shared tribal identity. The Aetolian *ethnos* described by Thucydides was typical of this sort of settlement. See Sealy 1976: 19 for a discussion of *ethne* in the Classical Period.
[38] See Pomeroy 2012: 9-10.
[39] Anderson 1983: 5-6.

made them willing to sacrifice their lives for collective goals. As an imagined community, the idea of the community existed independently of any individual member of the army so that any one person or small group could leave or return to the army, as the Spartan Dexippus or the *mantis* Silanus did without affecting the idea of the army as a collective that others could experience and participate in.[40] Furthermore, knowledge of every individual within the community was not necessary for membership. Rather, people could interact with the *idea* of the community, just as members of a modern nation can understand themselves to be part of a relational community organized around a shared identity that exists as an abstraction that is not dependent upon the individual's experience of the community.

Psychological Sense of Community

Recent work in the social sciences, especially by psychologists and scholars studying behavioral sociology, has done much to further our understanding of the dynamics that drive the creation and maintenance of communities. These scholars have helped clarify the different ways in which communities can be organized and the conditions necessary for their preservation. They observe that we live in many non-overlapping communities and that these can be organized around a specific location (territorial), or a shared experience (relational).[41] This understanding grew out of the work of Henri Tajfel in the 1970s. His Social Identity Theory looked at the ways in which in-group / out-group dynamics allow for the delimitation of community boundaries. Briefly, it states that people often form in-groups – self-preferenced groups which are formed around invented discriminatory characteristics, many of which can be completely arbitrary.[42] These groups create a strong bias against an out-group that serves to help define the in-group. As

[40] Dexippus took a ship that had been given into his command and fled from the army (5.1.15), only to return to the army (6.6.5). Silannus is mentioned as having abandoned the army in 6.4.13.
[41] Fisher 2002: 8-9; Brodsky 2002: 328-9.
[42] Tajfel 1970: 102.

Tajfel noted, "a group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived as having common characteristics or a common fate *only* because other groups are present in the environment."[43] Those out-groups serve to define the in-group by a process of opposition. We see this dynamic play out repeatedly in the *Anabasis*, with the Greeks contrasting their own shared experiences against an out-group of others whose differences clarify and strengthen the criteria for membership in the community. Sometimes those groups were non-Greeks, and sometimes the Greeks drew distinctions between sub-groups within their own community.

The universality of the in-group / out-group phenomenon described by Tajfel has been reinforced by its convergence with recent discoveries in the field of neurology. Scientists using brain imaging have shown that our neural networks and the architecture of our brains contribute to this phenomenon.[44] They have found that our brains are structured to create in-groups that not only recognize and reward belonging to that group, but also create a devaluation and dehumanization of the out-group by a process of homogenization of members in the out-group.[45] This process of identity construction through opposition allowed the Cyreans to define their community and the sub-groups contained within it.

Having gained insight into the ways in which communities are defined and circumscribed, psychologists next set to work understanding how communities are made cohesive and maintained over time. Building on the work of Tajfel, McMillan and Chavis developed the Sense of Community, or Psychological Sense of Community (PSOC) as a model

[43] Tajfel 1974: 72. Emphasis mine.
[44] Kubota 2012: 5.
[45] Brosch 2013: 2. For a summary of the contributions which Evolutionary Sociology is making in understanding the origins of these processes, see: Turner and Maryanski 2012: 31 where the authors note "The biggest imperative for a low-sociality and weak-tie ape trying to survive away from the protection by the forests in the open, predator ridden savanna would be to form more cohesive groups. And hence, natural selection went to work on what it was given: a rather large array of neurologically based behavioral capacities that could, if enhanced, increase tie strength and sociality among those species of apes that became humans' hominin ancestors."

for determining the psychological aspects that facilitated the creation and maintenance of communities everywhere. From its initial proposal in the 1980s PSOC has become the dominant model used by psychologists and social psychologists studying communities. It holds that there are four essential features for the creation of a sense of community within a population. These are: belonging or membership within the community; input, that is the belief that a member has the ability to affect outcomes within the community; integration, in which an individual's skills form a value to the community; lastly, a shared emotional connection, where a person feels good about participating in a joint effort and enjoys the acceptance of other team members.[46] Though each of these psychological states are experienced at an individual level by the members of the community, they are in fact aggregate variables present within the community itself.[47] That is to say, the relative presence or absence of these features within a community as a whole strongly correlates to, and is predictive for, the overall cohesion of the community. If members are able to access feelings of belonging or are able to feel as though they have influence within the community, those communities will be more resilient and cohesive than communities in which membership is so circumscribed that parts of the community cannot access a sense of belonging, or where segments of the population are systematically disenfranchised and cannot contribute to the health and direction of the community.[48]

While the use of PSOC as a model for an investigation into the community of the Cyreans is possible because it can be applied to any form of community regardless of when or where it exists, it is worth noting that one of the main advantages of PSOC for the current investigation is that it works equally well in describing the strength of a community that is either

[46] McMillan and Chavis 1986: 9-14. See also: Mannarini 2020: 623-4; Bruhn 2005: 15; Fisher 2002: 10-3.
[47] Hill 1996: 433.
[48] Cameron 1999: 79-89.

territorial or relational. Because the Cyreans were constantly on the move and were never in any location long enough to develop the attachments necessary to create a territorial community, theirs was almost entirely a relational community.

For the Cyreans, input, that is, the ability to contribute to decisions made on behalf of the community, seems to be consistently present for the members of the group. Xenophon records a number of assemblies through the course of their march back to Greece, and there does not appear to be any restriction on who can speak, or what they can discuss. For example, at the end of Book V Xenophon reports that several of the generals were fined by the assembly of the army for poor performance, and he himself is accused of hybris by a muleteer.[49] Both of these events are good evidence that the community of the army allowed its members – even those who were not part of the infantry or peltasts and only performed logistical or organizational tasks such as the muleteer – input by which they could affect the character and course of their community. The generals may have had the authority to command during battle, but the ability for members of the community to accuse them of poor performance or acting badly so that they could be censured and fined shows both the limits of their authority within the community and the reasonably high amount of input the members had in the decision-making process for the community. Moreover, the troops appear to have been able to move from one contingent to another within the army, as happens when nearly 2,000 soldiers from the contingents of the Arcadian generals Xenias and Pasion forsook those commanders and joined the contingent of the Spartan general Clearchus.[50] The ability of the soldiers to affect the direction of the army and to arrange their associations

[49] 5.8.1-12. The muleteer's exact status within the army presents a challenge to modern scholars. While the muleteer explicitly states that he is a free person and not a slave, it is unclear whether he was part of the fighting units of the army, and in which capacity he would have fought. He further states that at the time of the incident he was not a hoplite, but he may have been one earlier and been reduced from that role for various reasons. He denies being a peltast which would suggest that he was an archer, though Xenophon confuses this issue by occasionally referring to all non-hoplite troops as peltasts. For a discussion of the status of the muleteer see: Philips 2016: 21-2.
[50] 1.3.7.

within that community indicates that input was a feature of the community that was accessible to all its members.

The three remaining elements of PSOC, belonging, integration, and affective or emotional connection are at various times present within the entire community, while at other times they are seen most strikingly as features within different sub-groups within the army. These sub-groups seem to have been present throughout the campaign yet their distinction within the larger community was only emphasized at different points, such as when two of the contingents nearly came to blows, or when the Arcadian and Achaean members of the army were singled out as their own faction during the dissolution of the army at Heraclea.[51] When these three elements of PSOC are found to be prominent features of the sub-groups within the community of soldiers, the cohesion of the army as a whole is challenged, and the safety of the community is imperiled. For, although these elements are not mutually exclusive and can be simultaneously experienced by members of both the macro-community and the sub-group contained within it, when emphasis is placed on membership in the sub-group a hierarchy of communities is created that preferences the group which produces the elements of PSOC most prominently.[52]

The four aspects of Greek culture considered in this project (religion, Panhellenism, *stasis,* and ethnicity) each affect the PSOC of the army and the sub-groups within it in complex ways. Religion and Panhellenic rhetoric generally increase the elements of PSOC. Both create a strong sense of belonging by clearly identifying members through the exclusion of an out-group, and both promote an affective connection where members can feel good about their participation

[51] The report of the two contingents nearly coming to blows is at 1.5.12-7; The dissolution of the army is reported at 6.2.9-12.
[52] Hunter and Riger 1986: 65; see also Wiesenfeld 1996: 341-2.

in the community. They differ, however, in the amount of input they allow. While religion provides only a brief opportunity for input from most of the members – notably, when the assembly of soldiers votes to offer sacrifice to Zeus the Savior and to tithe part of their plunder to Artemis and Apollo – Panhellenic rhetoric functions through a sense of obligation that is negotiated based on a shared Greek heritage, so that when members of the army agree to abide by decisions that are couched in dialogue steeped with Panhellenic ideals, they are at each instance choosing to fulfill the obligations incurred through an acceptance of their shared heritage.[53] This choice, simultaneously confirms their membership within the larger community of Hellenes, and at the same time allows members to feel good about meeting the obligations that membership in that community confer.

Ethnicity plays a complicated role in the community of the army. At times, religion, Panhellenism, and *stasis* each function interdependently with notions of ethnicity or ethnic identity. For example, Panhellenism requires the acceptance of an overarching and shared ethnic identity – that of Hellenes – for it to create the obligations that members of that community are expected to follow. Similarly, the army's decision to sacrifice to Zeus the Savior allows the members of the army to share equally and without restriction in the protections offered by the god. Yet ethnic considerations that are independent of religion, Panhellenism, and *stasis* also affect the PSOC of the community. In fact, the Cyreans are able to reinforce their own Hellenic identity through comparative opposition with outside groups such as the Persians and many of the other peoples the army came into contact with on their march back from Cunaxa. While this process – especially when the out-group is perceived as a threat – has been found to strengthen the boundaries that separate the two groups and promote internal cohesion, the presence of

[53] The army votes to sacrifice to Zeus the Savior and to tithe to Artemis and Apollo at 3.2.9.

several distinct ethnic subgroups within the army significantly dilutes the cohesion achieved through this process.[54]

Unlike religion, ethnicity, and Panhellenism, all of which could function as a unifying force within the community of the army, *stasis* – almost by definition – has a negative effect on the PSOC of the community. The decision to analyze how *stasis* affected the community of the army comes about because it was a feature of nearly every Greek community at the time, and appears in the community of the army as well. Moreover, an analysis of the incidents of *stasis* will allow for an exploration of the ways religion, ethnicity, and Panhellenism work interdependently to affect the community of the army. The prevalence of factional strife and its acceptance as an unavoidable feature of Greek culture causes an increase of PSOC elements within the sub-groups of the army and is harmful to the cohesion of the community as a whole. In fact, while there are moments of individual competition that are presented as improving the *esprit de corps* of the army – such as when four of the *lochagoi* (captains) strove against one another to be the first to assault a stronghold of the Taochians – the competition between many of the senior officers for a greater share of command divided the army into factions that regularly strained the cohesion of the community, and in the worst instance, caused the dissolution of the army.[55] As we will see in the chapter on *stasis,* all four elements of PSOC are strongly present in the factions, making these sub-groups cohesive and robust so that their members are often willing to support the policies favored by the faction at the expense of the well-being of the macro-community of the army.

[54] Stephan 2015 268-70; Mannarini 2017:182.
[55] The lochagoi compete to assault the stronghold at 4.7.8-12.

With this framework in mind, it is now possible to turn to an investigation of the different aspects of Greek culture and how they affected the Cyreans' ability to build and maintain their community, starting with how religion affected the community of soldiers.

Chapter 1: RELIGION

At the beginning of Book 3 of the *Anabasis*, sometime around January 400 BCE, as the army was marching back toward the Greek mainland under a truce and in the company of a large part of the Persian army, Xenophon describes the desperate mood among the soldiers when news of the murder of their generals during a meeting with the Persian Satrap Tissaphernes had reached them.[56] They were still hundreds of miles from the Greek mainland, without a reliable means to feed themselves, having lost nearly all of their high ranking commanders, and there was a sizable Persian force camped no more than a few miles away.[57] He notes that many of the soldiers did not return to their tents or seek out their messmates, rather they simply laid down wherever they chanced to be, unable to sleep, longing for their homes, wives, and children, believing that they would never see them again.[58] After falling into a brief sleep, Xenophon reports that he was awakened by a dream and resolved to do what he could to prepare the Greeks for whatever the dawn would bring them. Quickly assembling the army, Xenophon made a series of speeches designed to unite the soldiers in the belief that they could overcome the crisis brought about by the sudden loss of their leaders with a Persian army nearby.[59] He briefly discussed the tactical and logistical difficulties they must overcome, but the main focus of his argument centered around the religious implications of their situation. He called the Persians

[56] For the dating of events on the campaign I am following those proffered by Brennan and Thomas, whose argument for a "late" start of the campaign is the most persuasive. See Brennan and Thomas 2021: 405-12.
[57] 2.4.10 Xenophon states that because of mistrust between them, the two armies regularly made camp separately, with a parasang or more between them. A parasang is a Persian distance of roughly 30 stade, or 3 and a half miles. Given that Xenophon states at 2.5.33 that one of the survivors of the massacre, Nikarchos an Arcadian, who ran back to the Greek camp to warn them what had happened, had himself been injured and was holding his intestines in his hand as he ran to them, it is unlikely that the camps were any greater distance apart. The severity of his injury would have limited the distance he could have gone.
[58] 3.1.3.
[59] Xenophon's speeches, 3.2.7-32.

oath-breakers, saw auspicious omens around them, and got the army to swear a vow of sacrifice to Zeus the Savior, who would deliver them to safety. The army responded to these observations with a show of tremendous unity, all of them together making obeisance to the god. Then in a further demonstration of the depth of their piety, the army began to sing the *paean*, the song of triumph that is a hymn to the god Apollo, and vowed to sacrifice when they have reached safety. Following this, they acted decisively, burning their excess baggage and crossing the Zapatas River at night, slipping away from the Persian army.

Xenophon's decision to try and pull the soldiers out of their despair by emphasizing the religious aspects of their plight was entirely successful. Nor is it surprising that by utilizing the religious significance of their situation he was able to both unify and motivate the soldiers. Given that religious faith is reinforced by symbols and rituals that are imbued with power and significance through a cultural conditioning that begins at a very early age and is strengthened through both a repetition of cyclical rituals that recur at regular times on the calendar, as well as specific rituals that mark an individual's passage through life, almost no other feature of Greek daily life would have been as effective in creating the bonds of community. These symbols and events increase the PSOC within the communities in which they occur by creating strong feelings of belonging and affective connection among the members of the community. Anyone who participates in a religious rite can immediately understand themselves as a member of a clearly defined and limited community. Because the rituals rely on a shared knowledge and belief, the symbolic language necessary for participation in a religious rite confers membership to the community, while simultaneously excluding the uninformed. Moreover, because the soldiers could believe that they were sanctioned and supported by the divinity, their affective connection to the group was increased, and they could experience an emotional bond with the

community that was rooted in their shared faith.[60] By appealing to the religious implications of their situation, Xenophon was able to thoroughly unite the Greek army toward a single purpose, resolving the despair that proceeded from the murder of their generals, and he was able to boost their morale by pointing out that while the Persians were oath-breakers, the Greeks had divine sanction. In fact, the ability for religious rites and rituals to create bonds of unity can be seen happening at a neurological level. Neuropsychologists studying the mechanisms underlying religious development have found evidence to support the PSOC implications for religious unity among the Cyreans. They note that when religious rites are simultaneously experienced by groups of individuals, the conditioned association of evoked emotions with specific cognitive schema creates a cultural community bound in motivation, as well as belief.[61] These findings help explain why Xenophon's claim of an auspicious omen, and his appeal for a communal vow of sacrifice to the god elicited an immediate response from the soldiers to coalesce around the familiar and powerful rituals associated with these circumstances. The sudden recognition of the emotionally powerful bond shared among the soldiers that these rites highlighted lifted the spirits of the army and united them around a communal purpose.

Although Greek religion had myriad local variations and particularisms, there was a shared pantheon of important deities that was recognized throughout the Greek world, which allowed all the soldiers to participate in the religious life of the army.[62] Moreover, there was a flexibility to Greek religion that allowed for competing, and at times incongruous, aspects to be attributed to the same god. Along with this pantheon there was a shared set of religious beliefs and practices that were common to all Greeks. These include a belief in the importance of omens

[60] Koehn 2023: 2-3; Kiesling 2006: 147-8.
[61] Alcota 2005: 341.
[62] See: Mikalson 2010: 31-52; Delforge and Pironti 2015:39-48; Kindt 2023: 1-27; Rutherford 2010:43-54 for an excellent discussion of how the twelve Olympian gods were canonized.

and divination, the recognition of a common mythic past, and an understanding of the fundamental role that sacrifice plays in maintaining relationships between mortals and the divine.[63] All these religious phenomena are present in the *Anabasis*, and affect the building of community in various ways. Indeed, the vow that the army swore to Zeus the Savior the night their generals were killed relied on a shared understanding of the reciprocity and exchange of *charis*, or favors, that is an essential part of the relationship between gods and humanity.[64] Later, belief in a shared mythic past allowed Xenophon to claim *syngeneia*, or shared kinship, with the Thracian king Seuthes, which helped the two men set aside some of the distrust that had been growing between them.[65] These common beliefs and practices allowed the army to unite through their shared membership in a defined community and through an affective connection that was based on a belief that the gods sanctioned their community and its actions.

In the *Anabasis*, religion helps build community through three principal mechanisms. By far, the most frequently mentioned of these is divination, which helped make dissension within the community easier to mitigate by legitimizing the decisions of the army's commanders. This includes divination obtained through sacrifice as well as the reading of other omens and portents. Seers were frequently consulted as the army struggled to know what course to adopt during moments of difficulty or uncertainty. The second way in which religion helped build a community among the Cyreans was through the acceptance of common ritual or religious based-practices such as religious festivals and contests, among the diverse population. Finally, the adoption of two members of the shared pantheon of important deities, Apollo and Artemis, as the

[63] A brief summary of the importance of omens and divination see: Johnston 2015: 477–90; See Fowler 2015: 195–210 for a summary of the importance of collective mythic tradition in Greece; For a discussion of the role between sacrifice and the divine see Naiden 2016: 463–76 and Polinskaya 2023: 312-5 where she discusses the significance of the inscription on *IG* I 987 lines 6-7: θύεν τῶι βουλομένωι ἐπὶ / τελεστῶν ἀγαθῶν.
[64] See Larson 2016: 40-7.
[65] Claim of *Syngeneia* appears at 7.2.31. See also Parker 2004: 138-9.

patron deities of the army, to whom a tithe of their profits were promised was another way in which a community was constructed based on common religious practices.

Divination

Divination was a common practice across all Greek communities, including armies on campaign and civic communities of every size. States routinely consulted oracles such as those at Delphi and Dodona for guidance in moments of crisis such as when there was the threat of war, or a natural disaster such as a plague or famine.[66] Yet they also sought guidance over questions of proper religious practice, or for questions relating to the establishing of a colony, and a seer was an essential member of a colonial expedition whose importance in certain situations rivaled that of the *oikist,* or colony founder.[67] Individuals also regularly consulted the gods through divination. In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon explains when it is appropriate to consult the gods, and what kinds of questions one can ask.[68] While discussing the charges brought against Socrates by the Athenians, Xenophon (through Socrates) observes that whenever a person can use their reason and be confident in the outcome, they should do as they think best. Yet, when the consequences of their actions are in doubt, they should consult the gods.[69] Then, in the *Cyropaedia,* Xenophon further clarifies the mechanism by which the Greeks believed divination worked. In the text, as Cambyses is giving advice to his son, he cautions him that obedience to divine guidance is essential. He explains that "the gods, being eternal, know all things, both those that have been, and those that are, and what from each of these will come to pass. And for those men consulting them, to those who are propitious they reveal both what it is necessary to

[66] See Bowden 2005: 130 for a good list of reasons why the Athenians consulted the oracle at Delphi.
[67] Foster 2017: 77 claims that the under-reporting of the presence of seers on colonial expeditions in the sources was the result of the seer's rivalry in authority with the oikist, who needed to be viewed as divinely sanctioned.
[68] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.1.6-8.
[69] Socrates gives the same advice to Xenophon in the *Anabasis*, when Xenophon asked whether he should accept Proxenos' invitation to join the campaign of Cyrus, but Xenophon strangely only asks the oracle which of the gods he should pray to in order to have a successful journey. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 3.1.5.

do and what is necessary to not do."[70] Thus, according to Xenophon, the belief that the gods are able to know not only all that has happened, but also all that will happen is the fundamental principle on which Greek belief in divination is situated. Yet, access to this information is not universally available. As Xenophon states, only those who are favored by the gods will have the future revealed to them. In this way, the most common course of action for someone who wished to consult the gods was to use an oracle or a seer, who would serve as an intermediary to the divine.[71]

Perhaps the most striking and illuminating example of how divination affected the building of community within the army takes place In Book 6, after the army had reached Calpe Harbor on the southern coast of the Black Sea.[72] The army had only recently been reunited after a contingent containing most of the Arcadian and Achaean soldiers had broken away from the rest of the army to pursue its own goals. When it became clear that no ships would be coming for them and they would need to continue their journey by land, they offered sacrifice with a view to their departure. This was a standard practice for armies on campaign, and seems to have been regularly practiced by the Cyreans.[73] This time however, the omens proved unfavorable to their journey, and they did not go out that day. Some in the camp accused Xenophon of inducing the *mantis,* or seer, to keep them there so that while they were there, he might convince them to found a colony in that place. A *mantis* was a regular member of nearly every ancient Greek

[70] Xenophon, Cyropaedia, 1.6.46. "θεοὶ δέ, ὦ παῖ, αἰεὶ ὄντες πάντα ἴσασι τά τε γεγενημένα καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὅ τι ἐξ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται, καὶ τῶν συμβουλευομένων ἀνθρώπων οἷς ἂν ἵλεῳ ὦσι, προσημαίνουσιν ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ οὐ χρή." See also Agrimonti 2016: 202-3.
[71] For oracles see: Stoneman 2011: 19-25; Dillon 2017: 324-92; Morgan 1990: 153-90; Parker 2011: 265-72; Burkert 1985: 114-8. For seers see: Flower 2008: 22-72; Foster 2017: 13-22; Johnston 2008: 109-43; Roth 1982: 219-44.
[72] The episode in question takes place at 6.4.13 - 6.5.4.
[73] See table 1.

army.[74] He was a professional religious figure, (though in the *Anabasis,* Xenophon reports that he himself was always present at the sacrifices and was not unfamiliar with the seer's art), who was hired by the leading general, and accompanied the army throughout the campaign.[75] Among his other duties, the *mantis* was expected to consult the gods and obtain divine sanction whenever the army was beginning a new endeavor. These included embarking on a campaign, leaving camp to continue marching, and, in particular, before advancing into battle.[76] The *mantis* could also be called for at any number of unique situations, such as whether to accept an offer of alliance or even if an individual god is angry at any member of an army.[77] There were usually two ways in which the *mantis* would read the omens on campaign. The first was by inspecting the victims, or *hiera,* of a sacrifice for any irregularities or imperfections in their organs, particularly the liver. The second was by *sphagia*, or analysis of the blood flow from an animal's cut throat.[78] While inspection of *hiera* was a relatively common practice used for obtaining divine sanction for any number of situations, *sphagia* was often performed in specific circumstances, such as the taking of oaths, or when an army was crossing a river or the sea.[79] Its

[74] Roth 1982: 171. For a discussion of the role of the *mantis* in military campaigns see especially: Pritchett 1974: 47-90; see also: Parker 2000a: 299-314; Flower 2008: 153-187; Johnston 2008: 116-118; Jameson 1991: 200-13.
[75] The extent to which Xenophon might have actively performed the readings himself is difficult to tell from the text. He states explicitly that he was always present at the sacrifices and that he was not unfamiliar with the seer's art. Yet because of his choice to refer to himself in the third person in the *Anabasis*, he frequently writes something similar to "ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ ἐθύετο Ξενοφῶν" (Xenophon sacrificed with a view toward an expedition) (5.4.9). This phrasing is too vague to know if Xenophon is reading the results of the sacrifice himself, or if he is only causing the sacrifice to be performed by one of the *manteis* who were traveling with the army. Xenophon records four *manteis* by name in the *Anabasis*, and there were likely more as each general would typically bring their own *mantis* with them on campaign.
[76] Parker 2016: 128. See also Burkert 1985: 267 who observes that war is so fraught with death it "may almost appear as one great sacrificial action."
[77] Examples of each of these in the *Anabasis*: 5.5.2-3 the Tibarenians offer an alliance to the Greek army as they approach their borders, and the generals who were hoping to plunder their territory consult the *mantis* before replying to the offer. When the omens prove unfavorable to any attack, the alliance is accepted. Then, 7.8.3, while performing a sacrifice to Apollo, Xenophon is informed by the *mantis* Eucleides that Zeus Meilichius (Zeus the Merciful) is upset with him, causing Xenophon to sacrifice a whole swine to Zeus the Merciful the next day.
[78] See Flower 2008: 159-61: Parker 2000: 307-8: Parker 2011 154-6: Foster 2017: 17; Larson 2017: 74-5, Burkert 1985: 112=3.
[79] Jameson 1991: 200-2; Parker 2011: 155-7.

primary utility on campaign seems to have been in the few moments prior to a battle, as a general was deploying his troops.[80] *Sphagia* performed at the battle-line was the final consultation with the god whether the engagement should proceed and a favorable result was then quickly relayed along the line to strengthen the morale of the army as they prepared to engage the enemy.

In response to the accusations against him, Xenophon made the next day's sacrifice public and invited anyone who might be a *mantis* to participate in it. Still, the omens were unfavorable, and Xenophon tried changing tactics. Instead of inquiring about their homeward expedition, he sacrificed with a view to an expedition to secure provisions for the army, which by this time were running dangerously low, and Xenophon reports that men were coming to him because they were out of food.[81] Again, the omens failed, and on the third day of waiting, Xenophon called the soldiers together to discuss their options. They offered reasons why the sacrifices might be failing, and Xenophon suggested that there may have been enemies close by and if they got prepared for battle the sacrifices might prove favorable. Yet again, the omens were unfavorable.

The way in which this incident unfolds shows how divination functions as a tool for the building of community through the maintenance of social organization.[82] When the first expedition was delayed by the unfavorable omens, and some accused Xenophon of orchestrating the outcome to promote the idea of founding a colony in that spot, Xenophon invited everyone to witness the next day's sacrifice. Moreover, he asked anyone with experience as a *mantis* to view the proceedings themselves. This shows one way in which divination can provide a check on

[80] For a discussion of the comparative differences between *hiera* and *sphagia* see Flower 2008: 162-3.
[81] Johnston 2008: 127 questions how many times it was permissible for someone to sacrifice asking the same question, hoping for a different answer.
[82] Flower 2008: 2008: 74; Bowden 2005: 158-9; Larson 2017: 74-5; Parker 2005: 115; Parker 2000b: 78 who notes that for a group, "consultation acts as a kind of referral to binding arbitration."

those in positions of authority.[83] Xenophon justified his decision to delay their expedition by citing the failed sacrifice. If Xenophon was following the recommendation of the *mantis* honestly, and not pressuring him to falsify the outcome of the sacrifice in order to keep the army there as some had suggested, then Xenophon's actions ceded some of his authority to the divine. Yet, if Xenophon was trying to manipulate the sacrifice in some way, then opening the next sacrifice to the public provided a fair degree of oversight to his actions so that any attempt to misrepresent the outcome of the sacrifice would be subject to review by the group.[84] In general scholars hold that divination strengthens community bonds by mitigating the responsibility for failure from those leading, and sharing it with the group at large who, at least ostensibly, supported the action as it was divinely sanctioned.[85] By anchoring his justification for his actions on an external event, Xenophon's ability to act unilaterally was at the very least diminished, and some authority within the group was transferred to the divine. This transfer of authority shifted accountability away from the leadership of the army, lessening the chances for dissent from the group.

This incident also reveals the process by which divination can contribute to the building of community by facilitating consensus around the meaning of an omen and over what the appropriate response should be. When the sacrifices continued to prove unfavorable, Xenophon called an assembly to discuss the reasons for their continued failure. Possible causes were discussed and debated among the group with an aim toward a consensus for what actions they should take to resolve the issue. Debates about the meaning of a sacrifice provide the opportunity for input by members of the group, one of the four PSOC conditions that are essential for

[83] Eidinow 2007: 30.
[84] Some scholars have seen this as an attempt by Xenophon to falsify the omens and keep the army in Calpe Harbor in hopes of convincing them to start a colony. See Dürrbach 1893: 379 and Meyer 1902: 190.
[85] Burkert 1983: 43.

creating a sense of community. By allowing members of the group to have a voice in a debate over actions that will affect them, the sense of community for those members is strengthened, and their commitment to the group is reinforced. Moreover, through the process of debate, the group had achieved a consensus that shared the responsibility for any potential failure among a broad section of the population, mitigating the potential of communal strife in the event of their defeat. Finally, after the repeated failures by the army to secure omens that would permit an expedition to set out, a Spartan general named Neon took it upon himself to lead a contingent out and secure food for the army. He brought two thousand men with him, which must have seemed like a formidable force. Yet while they were securing supplies at a nearby village, they were attacked by the Persian cavalry of Pharnabazus, five hundred men were killed, and the rest fled, taking refuge on the heights. When word reached Xenophon about the battle and the trapped contingent, he offered sacrifice by *sphagia* and set out to rescue the others.[86] Interestingly, Xenophon does not explicitly record the outcome of the *sphagia*, but it must have been acceptable. Given how much they had already suffered by obeying the results of the previous sacrifices, it is hard to imagine that they would suddenly abandon those practices in such a rash manner. Xenophon was able to rescue Neon and his troops, and after returning to the camp, they spent the rest of that night under arms, prepared for an attack. Finally, the next day they sacrificed to undertake an expedition, and the omens were favorable at last.

The levels of uncertainty, privation, and danger that the army underwent to abide by the recommendation of the *manteis* reveals a high degree of community support for their shared cultural institutions.[87] If there had not been support for the practice of divination that comes from

[86] See Dillon 2017: 226 for a discussion of Xenophon's choice for *sphagia* here, noting that he treated the incident as though it were a moment of battle.
[87] See Pritchett 1974: 80 who describes their ordeal and argues that the failure of Neon's expedition was due to his disregard for the omens.

a shared belief in the cultural practices of the group, there is little reason to think that they would have accepted such a difficult recommendation for as long as they did.[88] The soldiers at Calpe Harbor stayed hungry and bottled up on the beachhead for days waiting for the signs to be propitious because they all shared in the same fundamental belief about the nature of the world, and by mutually adhering to the recommendation of the *manteis*, they created a reciprocal relationship that both defined their membership in the group and at the same time validated it. They individually acted in a way that was consistent with their own personal system of beliefs, but because the group at large followed the same system of beliefs, they were able to see themselves as members of the community united around those shared actions. In this case membership in the community required some significant hardships on the part of many individuals, and their willingness to accept those hardships indicates the degree to which they accepted the beliefs of the community, as well as the strength of their own commitment to their membership in the group.

In addition to its social-functional role in creating community, divination also contributes to the building and maintenance of community by creating a sense of belonging among the individuals within the collective, whose value as individuals is increased through the consultation with the divine. Belonging is one of the principal PSOC elements necessary for the creation of community. Divination creates belonging by offering a shared response to moments of difficulty or danger. For example, when a group agrees to seek the advice of a god in response to a crisis, the individual is able to calculate the risk to themselves within a framework of mutual obligations and expectations. Acceptance and understanding of these mandates help to support

[88] See Bowden 2004: 233 who argues that this incident is an example of the gods providing practical advice for Xenophon as he had cultivated a relationship with them through regular sacrifice "in good times as well as bad…"

and maintain the values and institutions of that culture.[89] By sharing in the values of the culture, individuals create a psychological reciprocity with those who abide by those same beliefs, and they recognize themselves as members within a group that is defined by those beliefs. Moreover, divination increases the value of individuals within the group, by acting as a checking mechanism for those in positions of authority so that they are (ostensibly at least) not acting unilaterally on issues that might require consensus.[90] The individual's knowledge that there exists a process by which those in authority could have their power limited, and subsequently shared with the group raises the value of the individuals within the group since they are at moments equal members in authority.

By analyzing how and when the Cyreans sacrificed, we can see the ways in which divination helped maintain the community of the army, even as the circumstances around them changed. Xenophon records thirty-six incidents of sacrifice by members of the army during the campaign.[91] Of these, thirty are sacrifices accompanied by divination. Four of the remaining sacrifices are performed at festivals or celebrations, and no mention is made of any divine inquiry. The final two are sacrifices performed to propitiate the divine. In one, Xenophon sacrifices a whole swine to Zeus Meilichios after having been told by the *mantis* Eucleides that the god was unhappy with him. In the other, the Greeks take the unusual step of sacrificing "to the wind," hoping to lessen the force of the gales that had been pushing the snow into great drifts as they marched through the mountains in Armenia. *Sphagia* is mentioned as being the method of sacrificial inquiry in five of the thirty cases. As expected, these all take place at moments of

[89] Eidinow 2007: 21. See also Parker 1985: 298 who states that the decision to seek divine guidance implies an obligation to act in accordance with the will of the god.
[90] Morgan 1990: 153.
[91] See table 1. Note that this list does not include Xenophon's sacrifice at Delphi prior to setting out with the army in which he was trying to determine what gods he should sacrifice to in order to have a successful journey at 3.1.6.

duress, when there is little time to prepare a burnt offering, such as at the start of battle, or when the army is trying to move quickly, as they did when they used a feint to cross a river in Armenia.

The relative increase in the frequency of divination with sacrifice in the later books of the *Anabasis* reveal how divination functioned as an instrument of social reinforcement, in particular as a tool to help legitimize leaders and their decisions as the army becomes increasingly democratic. Sacrifice is only recorded four times in the first three books, but is recorded thirty-two times in the remaining four books. In Book I, while they were still under the command of Cyrus, there was little uncertainty surrounding questions of leadership, or questions about what course of action the Greeks should take. It may be that Cyrus sacrificed with a *mantis* regularly, but Xenophon makes little mention of it. After the death of Cyrus, when the Greeks have a greater uncertainty about their course of action should be, the incidents of consultation with the divine markedly increase. Yet, there is a curious lack of divination recorded in Books 2 and 3, at a time when the Greeks were faced with tremendous uncertainty about their future, and about what actions they should take. There are a few possible explanations for this. It may be that Xenophon simply did not record sacrifices that were regularly taking place. Though if this is the case, why did he record so many that took place in the later books? It is inexplicable that he would suddenly change the character of his narrative by leaving out sacrifices early, only to record so many later. It may be that Xenophon was not aware of the sacrifices taking place at those times, since – in Book 2 at least - he is not yet one of the generals of the army. Yet Xenophon states explicitly in Book 5 that he is always present at the sacrifices.[92] Moreover, in

[92] Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.4.9.

Book 3 he is one of the generals elected to lead the army and yet he only records a single sacrifice taking place.

The most likely explanation for the increase of sacrifice with divination we see in the later books is that divination is being used as a tool for the maintenance of social order as the character of the army changes. In the later books, the army becomes increasingly egalitarian and democratic, and divination is practiced more regularly in order to help maintain the community within the army as the military command structure erodes.[93] Evidence for the changing character of the army can be seen throughout Books 4, 5, and 6, as more and more general assemblies are called in which the soldiers are given an increasing voice in determining the overall goals and short-term actions of the army. For example, book 5 ends with a number of the generals, including Xenophon, being placed on trial by the assembly of soldiers for their performance as commanders. Three of the generals were fined, and Xenophon was forced to defend himself against the charge of hybris.[94] Book 6 records a rebellion by the Achaean and Arcadian soldiers who were unhappy about the decisions the generals were making regarding the army's financial conditions, and decided to break out on their own under new commanders.[95] As was discussed above, one of the principle functions of divination in a group setting is that on the one hand it creates a sense of belonging among the members of the group through a shared recognition of the cultural norms that the group abides by, and on the other hand, serves as a check on authority so that the group is assured that their safety and interests are being considered. The increased concern for the decisions of those in authority demonstrated by the trials of the generals, and the Arcadian rebellion that takes place in Book 6, suggest that there may have been a greater need

[93] See Dillary 1995: 77-90 for a discussion of this section of the text in which the army is characterized as a *polis* moving from a utopia and falling into dissension.
[94] 5.8.1-2.
[95] 6.2.4-12.

for the generals to openly cede some of their decision making to a higher authority in an attempt to placate an unhappy assembly of soldiers, and foster a greater sense of community among the group. Nearly half of all the recorded sacrifices with divination occur in Book 6. In it, Xenophon records twelve sacrifices accompanied by divination, twice as many as are recorded in Book 7, and three times as many as recorded in Book 5. Two of the sacrifices mentioned are direct questions concerning who should be the overall commander of the army, suggesting that there are deep concerns over questions of authority at this stage of the campaign.

Table 1 Sacrificing and Divination in the *Anabasis*

Event	Words Used	Where	Action Recommended	Outcome	Person Performing
Cyrus Pays the 3k Darics to Silanus	θυόμενος	1.7.18	Silanus predicted the king would not fight within 10 days	True prediction	Silanus Mantis
Cyrus tells Xenophon to report favorable omens and victims	καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ σφάγια καλά	1.8.15	Tell the Troops (so they will know to fight	They Fight	Unknown
Clearchus is summoned to see a victim after Cyrus' death	θυόμενος	2.1.9 - 2.2.3	Do not go against the King but join with the Friends of Cyrus	They join Ariaeus and Clearchus is taken as General because he demonstrates leadership	Unknown
Army sacrifices before setting out for Carduchia	ἐθύσαντο	3.5.17	They sacrificed so that they could set out as soon as they were ready	Unknown	Unknown
Generals sacrifice before crossing the river out of Carduchia	ἐθύαντο τὰ ἱερὰ καλὰ	4.3.9	The omens were favorable for a crossing of a dangerous river and Xenophon had a dream omen as well	A ford is found and the army crosses safely Xenophon pours a libation	Unknown

Table 1 Sacrificing and Divination in the *Anabasis*

Event	Words Used	Where	Action Recommended	Outcome	Person Performing
Sacrifices are offered to the River in Armenia	ἐσφαγιάζοντο εἰς τὸν ποταμόν	4.3.19	The σφαγία are favorable	They cross successfully into Armenia	Mantis
Sacrifices are offered to the wind in Armenia	σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ ἀνέμῳ	4.5.4	Sacrifice is suggested to lessen the harsh winter winds	It seems clear to everyone that the violence of the wind abated	Someone of the Manteis
Sacrifices are offered before attacking the Taochians	θυόμενος	4.6.23	Sacrifice is offered before battle with the Taochians	Cheirisophos led the Greeks in the taking of a difficult mountain pass	Cheirisophos is stated
Prayers are offered before battle with the Colchians	εὔχεσθαι	4.8.16	The generals announce to the troops they are to pray before the attack	They quickly defeat the Colchians	All the troops
Sacrifices are offered at Trapezous in fulfillment of their vow to Zeus the Savior	ἀποθῦσαι	4.8.25	The army gives thank offerings and has festival games	In fulfillment of their vow	All the troops
The Manteis announce that Omens are good before an attack on the Drillae	τοῖς ἱεροῖς πιστεύσας	5.2.10	Xenophon trusts the favorable victims	The omens are right and a difficult decision is made easier for Xenophon	Manteis
Dedications are made to Apollo and Artemis in fulfillment of their vows to tithe the gods	δεκάτην, ἀνάθημα	5.3.4	The army fulfills its vows to the gods	Xenophon dedicates an offering to Apollo at Delphi and builds a temple at Scillus	Xenophon and the army
Sacrifices return favorable omens before attacking the Mossynoecians	θύσαντες ἐπεὶ ἐκαλλιερήσαντο	5.4.22	The omens were favorable for attacking the Mossynoecan fortress after having been defeated the previous day	The Greeks secure the fortress	Unknown

Table 1 Sacrificing and Divination in the *Anabasis*

Event	Words Used	Where	Action Recommended	Outcome	Person Performing
Sacrifices are offered to determine if the Tibarenians could be attacked after they had offered friendship	ἐθύοντο and καταθυσάντων	5.5.2-3	The omens are unfavorable again and again	The Greek accept the offer of friendship	All the Manteis
Sacrifices and festivals with games are held	ἔθυσαν καὶ πομπὰς ἐποίησαν κατὰ ἔθνος	5.5.5	All The Greeks celebrate and sacrifice when they reach Cotyora	The Greeks had processions and contests κατὰ ἔθνος	Unknown (3rd person plural is used on the verb)
Xenophon sacrifices near Sinope about founding a colony	ἐθύετο	5.6.16	Xenophon sacrifices to learn whether he should approach the army about a colony	Silanus Mantis tells the army what Xenophon is planning and Xenophon must defend himself	Xenophon
Xenophon rhetorically asks how shall we offer glad sacrifices	ἡδέως θύσομεν	5.7.32	Xenophon tells the assembly about the attack of the ambassadors and says the Greeks must behave better	The assembly agrees to punish the wrong doers	All the troops
Cattle are sacrificed before a feast with the Paphlagonians	θύσαντες	6.1.4	Cattle are sacrificed as part of a feast to celebrate a treaty with the Paphlagonians	They celebrate	Unknown
Xenophon sacrifices to Zeus Basilaus about taking command	ἐθύετο	6.1.22	Xenophon asks the same god that gave him the omen when he first took a share of command	The oracle is unfavorable and Xenophon rejects the offer	Xenophon
Xenophon Sacrifices to Heracles the Leader for guidance	θυομένῳ	6.2.15	Xenophon wants to leave the army and sacrifices to find out if he should but the signs are unfavorable	Xenophon stays with the army after it splits	Xenophon
Xenophon's Division offers prayers before battle	προσευξάμενοι	6.3.21	Xenophon's Division doesn't sacrifice before battle, but offers prayers	The division is successful in rescuing the Arcadians	Xenophon's division

Table 1 Sacrificing and Divination in the *Anabasis*

Event	Words Used	Where	Action Recommended	Outcome	Person Performing
Xenophon offers sacrifice prior to an expedition to retrieve the Arcadian dead	ἐθύετο	6.4.9	Xenophon sacrifices to learn whether an expedition is supported	The troops gather the Arcadian dead after their reunification	Xenophon
The Army sacrifices to set out form Calpe Harbor	ἐθύοντο οἱ στρατηγοί	6.4.13	The Army wants to depart but the signs aren't favorable	They are forced to wait	Arexion the Arcadian
The Army repeatedly sacrifices to set out form Calpe Harbor	θυομένῳ	6.4.16	Xenophon invites everyone to see the sacrifices but they are still unfavorable	The army must still wait, though the army is angry	Unknown
Xenophon sacrifices 3 victims to get permission to get provisions from Calpe Harbor	ἐθύετο	6.4.19	Xenophon sacrifices just seeking to get provisions for the army but all the omens are unfavorable	The army must still wait, though the army is angry	Xenophon
The desperate army sacrifices Oxen to seek omens to get provisions	ἐθύοντο	6.4.22	The whole army gathers round when the sacrifice is made but the signs are still unfavorable	Neon ignores the omens and takes 2000 troops out to a defeat	Cleanor at the urging of Xenophon
Xenophon sacrifices an oxen to rescue Neon	σφαγιασάμενος	6.4.25	Xenophon asks to go save the troops in a new sacrifice	The outcome of the sacrifice is curiously not stated, but Xenophon leads the rescue	Xenophon
Xenophon sacrifices again to set out from Calpe Harbor	ἐθύετο	6.5.2	Xenophon sacrifices to start to expedition and the signs are favorable	The army is able to ride out and begin to gather and bury the dead from Neon's forray	Arexion the Parrhasian
Sacrifice is offered before battle with Spithradates and the troops of Pharnabazes	σφαγιάζεται	6.5.8	Sacrifices are offered as soon as the enemy is sighted	The Greeks are able to defeat the King's forces	Arexion the mantis of the Greeks

Table 1 Sacrificing and Divination in the *Anabasis*

Event	Words Used	Where	Action Recommended	Outcome	Person Performing
Xenophon invokes the outcome of the day's earlier sacrifice to embolden the generals to a plan	τά τε ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καλὰ οἵ τε οἰωνοὶ αἴσιοι τά τε σφάγια κάλλιστα	6.5.21	Xenophon reminds the generals of their favorable omens and sacrifices to embolden them	The Greeks are able to defeat the satrap's forces	ibid
Cleander undertakes sacrifices for his journey	ἐθύετο	6.6.35	Cleander sacrifices before traveling back to Byzantium	Unknown	Undertaken by Cleander
Cleander sacrifices to take command of the army	θυομένῳ	6.6.36	Cleander sacrifices multiple victims but gets unfavorable results for leading the army back to Greece	He departs and wishes them well on their journey	Undertaken by Cleander
Coeratadas the Theban offers sacrifice to assume generalship of the army	ἐθύετο	7.1.37	Coeratadas obtains unfavorable signs the first time he sacrifices to take command of the army	He comes back the next day with provisions for the army and tries to sacrifice again	A mantis of Coeratadas
Xenophon sacrifices to learn if he should lead the army to Seuthes	ἐθύετο	7.2.15	Xenophon having been warned he was about to be siezed and sent to Pharnabazus sacrifices to take the army to Thrace	The sacrifices are favorable	Xenophon
Xenophon sacrifices to learn if he should take the army to Thibron	ἐθύετο	7.6.44	Seutheus was cheating the army and Xenophon trying to find the best course asked if they should go with Thiberon	They went with Thiberon	Xenophon
Xenophon sacrifices to Apollo	ἔθυε	7.8.3	Xenophon at a regular sacrifice learns from Eucleides that Zeus the Merciful is upset with him	He sacrifices to Zeus and has success and money after that	Xenophon and Eucleides

Table 1 Sacrificing and Divination in the Anabasis

Event	Words Used	Where	Action Recommended	Outcome	Person Performing
Xenophon sacrifices to Zeus the Merciful to appease him	ἐθύετο	7.8.5	Xenophon sacrifices a whole swine in the custom of 'his fathers' to appease Zeus	The omens are favorable and that day he is given money and success	Xenophon
Xenophon sacrifices to determine if he should attack the Persian Asidates	ἐθύετο	7.8.9	Xenophon sacrifices to learn if he should attack	The omens are extremely favorable	Xenophon and Basias the Elean mantis
Xenophon sacrifices captured sheep to learn if he should march through Lydia, leaving Asidates	θυσάμενος	7.8.20	Xenophon trying to withdraw sacrifices to see if he should march far through Lydia to avoid Asidates	Unreported	Xenophon

The increase in the amount of divination recorded in the later books of the *Anabasis* does not directly indicate an increase in the sense of community within the army, though it does reveal an exceptionally strong acceptance of the shared mandates that helps support and maintain the values and institutions of the culture. Whenever a divination is performed in the *Anabasis* for which Xenophon records the recommended action associated with that sacrifice, the advice of the omen is accepted in every case, except one (when the Spartan general Neon leads the troops out of Calpe Harbor for supplies mentioned above). In twenty-one of the twenty-two sacrifices where the outcome of the sacrifice is either stated explicitly, or its outcome is clear from the actions of the army (e.g. *sphagia* is performed prior to attacking the army of the Taochians, and while the outcome of the sacrifice is not recorded, Cheirisophus immediately leads the troops into battle, giving every indication that the omens had been favorable), the army adheres to the recommendation obtained through the divination.[96] In several of these instances, the outcome of

[96] 4.6.23.

the sacrifice ran directly counter to the stated goals of the commanders, and they were forced to adjust their plans in order to comply with the recommendation from the sacrifice, as when the generals had to abandon their plans to attack the coastal fortresses of the Tibarenians after repeated sacrifices revealed that the gods would not permit war, and they instead accepted offers of friendship from them.[97] The lone incident in which the omens were rejected actually reveals the depth to which the army adhered, or attempted to adhere, to the mandates given through divination. Moreover, it indicates a significant acceptance of the cultural institutions shared by the members of the army. As was discussed above, this acceptance of shared norms and institutions contributes to the sense of community by creating a means for belonging, while divination itself serves as a check on figures in authority. In groups where these conditions are present (and there are no other significant difficulties creating a divisive pressure) the fabric of that community should be strong. That seems to be the case here as well, though it is worth noting that the incident at Calpe Harbor began just two days after the army had reconciled following the departure of the Arcadians and Achaeans and the perceived obligation to adhere to the unity of the group may have been heightened following their reconciliation.

Another incident not only shows how sacrifice and divination can affect the building of community but also reveals how the flexibility of Greek religion allows it to quickly adapt to the needs of the group. In this incident, the Cyreans were marching across a plain that was deep with snow in the mountains of Armenia, and the north wind was blowing hard upon them, so that the snow was piled into deep drifts and many members of the expedition perished.[98] One of the soldiers would later refer to it simply as “the place where we were dying with cold and there was

[97] 5.5.2-3.
[98] 4.5.3-4.

a tremendous amount of snow."[99] As they were struggling to make their way across the plain, one of the *manteis* suggested that they sacrifice to the wind so that they might get some relief. An animal was brought forth, and they performed *sphagia*, cutting the animal's throat, and watching how the blood drained from it. Xenophon reports that afterward, "it seemed clear to everyone that the violence of the wind came to an end."[100] Sacrifice to the winds was not unheard of in Greece at that time.[101] What is noteworthy for the sense of community created in this incident is the immediate change in the perceptions of the force of the wind resulting from the sacrifice. The Greeks had offered a sacrifice, and the god had accepted it in a way that was clear to everyone there.[102] Such a straightforward demonstration of divine favor had to be reassuring to the soldiers who had been suffering from the weather, and though they were forced to camp out on the open plain, the snow had stopped, and the wind had abated. Yet while the individuals of the army must have been grateful for the relief that had come after the sacrifice, the favor of the god was not given to any individual, but rather had been granted to the army as a whole. The *mantis* had sacrificed as a representative of the group, and the god had been propitiated through this collective action. Individuals who had seen the violence of the wind clearly abate through the efforts of the group would have gained a shared emotional connection to the group so that they would have felt good about their participation in such joint efforts. After all, the individual was aware that the group had secured divine favor for them, potentially saving their life. It is easy to understand how that would cause them to create an emotional connection to the group which would foster the creation of a sense of community. Indeed, Xenophon reports

[99] The soldier in question here is the muleteer who accused Xenophon of striking him hubristically. He described it as "ὅπου καὶ ῥίγει ἀπωλλύμεθα καὶ χιὼν πλείστη ἦν."
[100] 4.5.4 "καὶ πᾶσι δὴ περιφανῶς ἔδοξεν λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος."
[101] De-Jonge 2019: 58-60; See also Parker 2011: 74.
[102] See: Beerden 2013: 26-7.

that after the sacrifice, when they reached the halting-place, the men exchanged food and access to fires, sharing what they individually had with one another.[103]

In general, the successful performance of *sphagia* in a moment of crisis seems to have had the effect of boosting the morale of the soldiers, which is why the generals typically performed it as the troops were being deployed, and contact with the enemy was imminent.[104] Nor is it difficult to understand why a successful omen at a moment of crisis would give confidence to those seeking help from the gods. Xenophon repeatedly advises that a good commander must sacrifice regularly and follow the recommendations of the *mantis*. For if the soldiers know that the commander "will never lead them against an enemy recklessly or without the god's approval or in defiance of the sacrifices, all these conditions increase the men's readiness to obey their commander."[105] Since good morale and obedience to commands are essential to the survival of any military unit, knowing that the gods support their cause allows the soldiers to fight with greater confidence. This is precisely why at the start of the battle at Cunaxa the only instruction Cyrus gave to Xenophon was to tell everyone that the omens and the *sphagia* were favorable.[106] In fact, of the five incidents in which *sphagia* are recorded as the method of sacrifice, three are at the start of battle. The outcome of the sacrifice would have then been quickly spread among the troops, just as Cyrus orders Xenophon to do, and hearing that the god favors their action would have raised the confidence and morale of the soldiers. Yet just as was the case when the army sacrificed to the wind, individual soldiers may enjoy knowing that they

[103] 4.5.6.
[104] Pritchett 1974: 58. See also Jameson 1991: 201 who notes that because *sphagia* has an emphasis on death in which the animal is not eaten, the rite is a powerful action.
[105] Xenophon *The Cavalry Commander* 6.6. "ὡς οὔτ' ἂν εἰκῇ οὔτ' ἄνευ θεῶν οὔτε παρὰ τὰ ἱερὰ ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν ἐπὶ πολεμίους, πάντα ταῦτα πιθανωτέρους τῷ ἄρχοντι τοὺς ἀρχομένους ποιεῖ." He also gives similar advice at the beginning and the end of that same text, claiming that the first duty of the commander is to sacrifice and pray to the gods. 1.1; 9.7-9.
[106] 1.8.15.

have been given a divine sanction for what they are doing, but the sanction was given to the group, and the emotional connection that an individual gains when they can take refuge in the protection of the collective increases the sense of community for its members.

Unbidden portents, and omens that suddenly manifest themselves to the observer, unlike divination through sacrifice, where the omens are actively being sought, also had a significant impact on the building of community in the *Anabasis*. These portents and omens could be a number of different phenomena and ranged from the extraordinary to the mundane, including solar and lunar eclipses, meteors that streak across the sky, earthquakes, thunder and lightning, the movement of birds in flight, dreams, sneezes, and chance utterances that were thought to be divinely inspired.[107] Unlike the omens obtained through sacrifice, many of these omens could be read by laypersons and did not require a *mantis* to interpret them.[108] The unmediated access that the soldiers had to these divine messages at times allowed the army to experience a shared revelation as a group, which in turn strengthened the perception of their belonging within the group. An example of this takes place in Book 3, after the murder of Clearchus and the other generals mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Xenophon reports that the army was in a state of despair, and after meeting with the remaining commanders, they called together a general assembly of the army to determine what their next move should be.[109] At the assembly, several of the commanders spoke, invoking the piety of the Greeks as compared to the Persians who the commanders said had broken their oaths.[110] Xenophon then addresses them and continues with this line of reasoning, seeking to inspire the troops by instilling in them the belief that the gods

[107] For an excellent summary of the various kinds of omens and portents see Dillon: 2017: 178-211.
[108] Larson 2017: 73; Beerden 2013: 55-6.
[109] Xenophon *Anabasis* 3.1.46.
[110] 3.2.2-6. See: Basset 2002: 447-61 and Danzig 2007: 37-40 who argue that Tissaphernes' killing of the generals was at some level justified and Waterfield 2006: 120 who takes a more moderate position.

are on their side in the coming fight.[111] As Xenophon was addressing the army, continuing and expanding on the theme of Greek piety that the earlier speakers had begun, a soldier suddenly sneezed as Xenophon said the word σωτηρίας or salvation. Xenophon then writes:

> "When the soldiers heard it, they all with one impulse bowed to the ground in reverence to the god, and Xenophon said, 'it seems to me, gentlemen, since at the moment when we were talking about salvation an omen from Zeus the Savior was revealed to us that we make a vow to sacrifice to that god thank-offerings for salvation as soon as we reach a friendly land; and that we add a further vow to make sacrifices, to the extent of our ability, to the other gods also. All who are in favor of this motion,' he said, 'will raise their hands.' And every man in the assembly raised his hand. Thereupon they made their vows and struck up the *paean*."[112]

The belief that a sneeze coming at a portentous moment was a sign sent from the god dates as far back as Homer, and is prevalent among many ancient peoples, which explains why all the soldiers reacted to suddenly hearing a sneeze at that moment.[113] In this case it is taken by the army to be a clear and self-evident sign from Zeus the Savior.[114] Self-evident portents such as meteors, earthquakes, and lightning - omens that did not require any significant technical knowledge to observe and interpret - could be powerfully persuasive to anyone who witnessed them. The immediate accessibility of the sign allowed a layperson to experience the power of the divinity firsthand. When the soldiers heard the sneeze, they all prostrated themselves in *proskynesis* unbidden by any outside suggestion. In that moment of unity Xenophon suggests

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[111] Zaidman 2005: 105 argues that in this instance piety functions as an instrument of command, as it serves to unite the army against the Persians.

[112] 3.2.9. ἀκούσαντες δ' οἱ στρατιῶται πάντες μιᾷ ὁρμῇ προσεκύνησαν τὸν θεόν, καὶ ὁ Ξενοφῶν εἶπε· "δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐπεὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν λεγόντων οἰωνὸς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἐφάνη, εὔξασθαι τῷ θεῷ τούτῳ θύσειν σωτήρια ὅπου ἂν πρῶτον εἰς φιλίαν χώραν ἀφικώμεθα, συνεπεύξασθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς θύσειν κατὰ δύναμιν. καὶ ὅτῳ δοκεῖ ταῦτ'," ἔφη, "ἀνατεινάτω τὴν χεῖρα." καὶ ἀνέτειναν ἅπαντες. ἐκ τούτου ηὔξαντο καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν.

[113] Homer *Odyssey* 17.541 Telemachos' sneeze is taken by Penelope to be an omen signaling that the suitors will all be killed. Tuplin 2003: 128-9 argues that Xenophon includes this incident as a way of modeling his narrative on Homer; see also: Pritchett 1979:126; Dillon 2017: 201. For a summary of sneezes as omens see Pease 1911: 429-43

[114] Flower 2008: 112.

that they should swear a vow of thank-offerings to Zeus the Savior once they have reached a safe place.[115] In a show of how thoroughly united the omen has made them, Xenophon reports that every man in the assembly raised their hand in agreement to this idea.[116] They then struck up the *paean*, and Xenophon was forced to wait for the song to finish before continuing his speech. Parker notes the role that ritual plays in reinforcing group solidarity, and it is clear from their unified actions that following the omen and Xenophon's interpretation of it, the soldiers have been lifted out of the despair that had seized them earlier, and have been galvanized into a highly cohesive community.[117]

This incident in particular creates many of the psychological conditions which contribute to a sense of community. All of the soldiers, having been promised salvation by Zeus belong to the community and feel good about their participation in the group. Evidence for the latter of these is the *paean* that the soldiers spontaneously perform. They belong to the group because they are all witnesses who received communication from the god promising them salvation, and the vow which they take creates an identity for the group, further defining them as united. It is difficult to quantify the lasting effect of the unity and the sense of community created by this incident. It is true that Xenophon does not record any indication of tensions that would have affected the unity of the army from the time they took the vow standing by the bank of the Zapatas River, until they fulfilled their vow after reaching the Greek city of Trapezous on the Pontic Coast of Asia Minor.[118] Yet, the circumstances in which the army found itself during that part of their journey did not offer much in the way of alternatives to the plan that the army was

[115] For a discussion of Xenophon's role as interpreter of divine signs in the *Anabasis* see: Haywood 2016: 93
[116] Pritchett 1979: 233 discusses this in the context of military vows.
[117] Parker 2004: 141-2.
[118] The army taking the oath is at 3.2.9; they make the sacrifice in fulfillment of the vow at Trapezous at 4.8.25. See also Parker 2004: 141-2.

following. They had made their decision to retreat up-country toward the Black Sea, and during that part of their journey the threats the army faced from hostile forces, harsh weather, and a lack of reliable supplies meant that they had to remain unified and well-disciplined if they were going to have any chance of reaching safety.[119] The fracturing that begins to manifest itself within the community of the army comes once they have reached the relative safety of the Pontic Coast, as the removal of their immediate dangers correspondingly removes much of their obvious course, and discord comes about when they have real choices about what their objective should be. What does seem clear, is that in their moment of crisis, the omen from Zeus lifted the morale of all the soldiers there and gave them a united objective toward which they could aim. Their vow to sacrifice to Zeus the Savior increased the PSOC of the army by creating a cooperative identity to which they all belonged and from which they could all take pleasure in working to fulfill.

Religious Festivals

Religious festivals were an important feature of Greek communities and at times the Cyreans used them effectively to strengthen the PSOC of the community of the army. In general, festivals create community by promoting the active participation of the individual in the various ceremonial activities. This creation of community occurs in several ways. In the most basic way, participation by the individuals in the ritual activity creates on the one hand, cultural continuity so that the individual has a share of the traditions inherited from earlier generations, in some cases creating a continuity spanning thousands of years.[120] While on the other hand, ceremonies that promote active participation, rather than passive appreciation, effectively integrate individuals into the community.[121] Moreover, as Larson has argued in her discussion of the

[119] Laforse 1997: 139.
[120] Burkert 1983: 25.
[121] Martinson 1982: 55.

rituals associated with festivals, the cost of such lavish displays acts as a signal of genuine commitment by the participants, which increases the trust and cooperation among members of the worship group.[122] Greek religious festivals promote active participation by individuals at a number of different moments. The most basic of these is the feast held after the ritual sacrifices. Labadie has observed that the great banquet at the climax of the festival forms an essential moment of a reaffirmation of the cohesion of the community of the men of the city through the sharing of the different parts of the victim.[123] Virtually the entire community would have participated in the banquet, making active participation by the individual all but a surety, and bringing those who would otherwise only be passive observers into active engagement with the community. The use of meat sacrificed to the deity links divination to festivals, though the active character of the community as participants in the banquet, rather than passive receivers of a divine communication, makes the two notably different.

Along with divination, the regular practice of religious festivals also affected the PSOC of the army, as the Cyreans paused along their march to host several festivals in honor of various gods. The importance of Greek festivals in the outward expression of Greek religious life has long been understood. Cartledge sees them as the single most important feature of classical Greek religion in its public aspect.[124] While there are many variations in both the type of festival, and the ritual activities that were performed at them, there are a number of constant features that allow outside festival goers to understand and engage with the celebration.[125] Broadly, festivals were organized around a procession, followed by the sacrifice of a consecrated victim that was then consumed at a great banquet, which was almost always followed by games, hymns, and

[122] Larson 2017 189. See also, Bulbulia and Sosis 2011: 363–388.
[123] Labadie 2014: 219.
[124] Cartledge 1985: 98.
[125] See Parker 2011: 177-8 for a discussion of the different classes of festivals recognized by the Greeks.

dances.[126] Most festivals occurred in regular cycles on fixed days annually, though some took place in two or four year cycles.

The three festivals described in the *Anabasis* were non-cyclic, taking place only a single time each. Of those three, only the celebration of the festival to Lykaion Zeus in July 401 BCE, was patterned after an existing and established event. That festival, which took place not long after the army had been assembled, is the first recorded by Xenophon, though its description is very brief:

> "From there he marched two stages, ten parasangs, to Peltae, an inhabited city. There he remained for three days, during which time Xenias the Arcadian celebrated the Lykaion festival with sacrifice and games; the prizes were golden crowns, and Cyrus himself watched the games."[127]

Despite the brevity of his account, Xenophon is careful to mention that the games were held by Xenias the Arcadian. The festival of Lykaion Zeus is generally regarded as the most important festival in Arcadia.[128] Pausanias, writing many centuries later, writes that although he was able to see the altar of Zeus at the summit of Mt. Lykaion, he did not participate in the festival, which he describes as taking place in secret.[129] This restriction on attendance was not uncommon in Greek religious rites. Many festivals were not open to outsiders, especially those associated with initiation rituals such as the famous Eleusinian Mysteries. Xenophon's brief description does not say whether the sacrifice and the subsequent banquet was limited to Arcadians, as it would have been at Mt. Lykaion. Throughout antiquity, there were many rumors about the Lykaion sacrifice. Theophrastus links the festival to human sacrifice and cannibalism

[126] Schmitt Pantel 2016: 439.
[127] 1.2.10 ἐντεῦθεν ἐξελαύνει σταθμοὺς δύο παρασάγγας δέκα εἰς Πέλτας, πόλιν οἰκουμένην. ἐνταῦθ' ἔμεινεν ἡμέρας τρεῖς· ἐν αἷς Ξενίας ὁ Ἀρκὰς τὰ Λύκαια ἔθυσε καὶ ἀγῶνα ἔθηκε· τὰ δὲ ἆθλα ἦσαν στλεγγίδες χρυσαῖ· ἐθεώρει δὲ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ Κῦρος.
[128] See Burkert 1983: 84-93.
[129] Pausanias 8.38.6-7.

by comparing it to the Carthaginian sacrifices to Moloch, while Plato and Pausanias claim that some of the participants were turned into werewolves.[130] Given that the rumors of lycanthropy persist for centuries, spanning the time from Plato to Pausanias, it is likely that the Arcadians were scrupulous about keeping outsiders from participating in the event. Only in genuine ignorance could such tales persist for so long. Moreover, if the sacrifice hosted by Xenias was only open to Arcadians, it may explain Xenophon's brief recounting of the event. Xenophon does note that Cyrus was a spectator at the games, but it appears that the games portion of the festival were open to outsiders, and Cyrus may have been given special access due to his status.[131]

The celebration of what is typically a segregated, regionally important festival, by the Arcadian general Xenias did not effectively utilize the community building potential that Greek festivals generally embody. Xenophon reports that the Arcadians and Achaeans constituted more than half the army, and Roy estimates the number of Arcadians within the army at the time of the festival at Peltae to be around 4000 of the 10,400 total.[132] To accommodate such a large number of troops, the festival must have consumed a generous amount of resources and been a conspicuous undertaking. If, as it seems likely, the sacrifice and perhaps subsequent banquet were limited to only Arcadians, the exclusion of more than half the army from such a significant event would have doubtlessly had a detrimental effect on overall unity of the army. If access to the festival was restricted, by circumscribing participation in the event the Arcadians likely did harm to the sense of unity that other members of the army would have felt. In fact, one month after the festival, when most of Xenias' troops had joined Clearchus' contingent causing the

[130] Theophrastus in Porphyry *On Abstinence from Animal Food* 2.27; Plato *Republic* 565d; Pausanias 8.2.6
[131] Romano 2019: 27-44 notes that there is a record of an illegitimate son of Ptolemy I who participated in the games as well as an Athenian inscription commemorating their invitation to the games in 215 BCE.
[132] 6.2.10; Roy 1967: 309.

former to desert the army, these same mostly Arcadian troops nearly came to blows with the Boeotian contingent under Menon.[133] Only the intervention of Proxenos and finally Cyrus prevented the Greeks from marching against one another. Xenophon's description of the incident puts most of the blame on Clearchus' heavy-handed discipline, but the willingness of the troops to line up against one another under arms indicates how fragile and divided the community of the army was, with the Arcadians at odds against another sub-group within the community. Moreover, the celebration of such a restricted event as the Lykaia, loaded with powerful regional connections, may have contributed to an increased awareness of their own insular identity among the Arcadians, creating a further disunity among the troops. Indeed, when the army broke apart near Heraclea, the rebels identified themselves by their regional and ethnic character, as Peloponnesians, Arcadians, and Achaeans.[134] It is reasonable to think that a celebration such as this one may have contributed to their understanding of themselves as a discrete community within the army.

A second festival, celebrated when the army reached Cotyora in probably July - August 400 BCE, also appears to have contributed to a strengthening in sub-group identities, therefore limiting the effectiveness of religious celebration in building the bonds across the entire community. Again, Xenophon offers only a brief description of the event, and it is unclear from his account what specific event the festival was supposed to celebrate. Unlike the Lykaia at Peltae, and the festival in honor of Zeus the Savior and Heracles the Leader (discussed below), Xenophon only says that they sacrificed to the gods. In his description of the event, he observes: "there they remained for forty-five days. During this time, they first sacrificed to the gods, and

[133] The defection of Xenias' troops to Clearchus appears at 1.3.7; the Dispute between Clearchus and Menon's contingents is found at 1.5.11-7.
[134] 6.2.10.

by tribe each of the Greeks made festal processions and held athletic contests."[135] The word translated as tribe here is the word event. Another possible translation would be "a people," or even "a nation."[136] It is a grouping of similar kinds, or a number of people living together. In other words, it appears that the Greeks divided themselves into sub-groups and marched in the precession within those divisions. Given that the term *ethnos* was frequently used to designate groups based on their regional origins, it is likely that the Arcadians would have been one grouping, and the Achaeans another, and perhaps the Boeotians would have been another. Or they might have segregated themselves in broader groups, such as Peloponnesians, or even into Dorians and Ionians. The exact nature of the division is less important than that they did separate themselves into distinct groups, so that their particular identities were featured ahead of any homogeneity they could have claimed as either Cyreans, or even simply as Greeks. By emphasizing smaller sub-group identities in the precession, the soldiers celebrated their particularisms when a more inclusive group identity was available to them. Such distinctions would have increased the PSOC associated with the sub-group by the creation of an affective connection to the ethnos at the expense of the unity of the macro-community.

The final festival in this analysis is held by the army when they reach the city of Trapezous, and not only provides the most detailed description, but effectively shows how a Greek religious festival can strengthen the bonds of community among a diverse population. It took place a few months before the festival at Cotyora described above in May of 400 BCE. Xenophon writes that while the army was halted near the Greek city of Trapezous, the army made the sacrifices they had vowed to Zeus the Savior, Heracles the Leader, and the others to

[135] 5.5.5. "ἐνταῦθα ἔμειναν ἡμέρας τετταράκοντα πέντε. ἐν δὲ ταύταις πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔθυσαν, καὶ πομπὰς ἐποίησαν κατὰ ἔθνος ἕκαστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἀγῶνας γυμνικούς."
[136] Brownstone in the 1998 Loeb edition translates ἔθνος as nation. I have moved away from that translation to avoid the potential anachronistic associations.

whom they had sworn offerings.[137] While the vow to Zeus unified the troops as discussed above, the fulfillment of the vow, as well as the others that Xenophon alludes to, would have reaffirmed the sense of belonging and shared emotional connection created when the oath was initially sworn. The army followed that with a series of widely popular athletic contests. Xenophon reports that they held contests for a stadium race, a long race, wrestling, boxing and the pancratium, and observes, "it was a fine spectacle, for there were many who had come down to the contest and, in as much as the comrades of the contestants were looking on, there was a great deal of rivalry."[138] Many of these events were also featured at the Panhellenic festivals such as Olympia.[139] Yet as Pritchett has noted, there was also a practical side to these contests as they were all useful as forms of military training.[140] While Xenophon does say that there were rivalries between the contestants and their comrades, he does not suggest that the rivalries were bitter, or that the events created hard feelings among either the contestants or the spectators. In fact, Xenophon describes the horse races that took place going up and down the steep hill where the altar was located:

> "And on the way down most of the horses rolled over and over, while on the way up, against the exceedingly steep incline, they found it hard to keep on at a walk; so there was much shouting and laughter and cheering."[141]

This description of the members of the army laughing and cheering together shows one way in which religious festivals can create a strong PSOC, creating belonging, input, and affective

[137] 4.8.25. For the vow to Zeus the Savior see 3.2.9. The other vows are not mentioned in the narrative, and the only reference to them is here. See Pritchett 1979: 233.
[138] 4.8.27 καὶ καλὴ θέα ἐγένετο· πολλοὶ γὰρ κατέβησαν καὶ ἅτε θεωμένων τῶν ἑταίρων πολλὴ φιλονικία ἐγίγνετο.
[139] Mann 2020: 102.
[140] Pritchett 1979: 154.
[141] 4.8.28 καὶ κάτω μὲν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐκαλινδοῦντο· ἄνω δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἰσχυρῶς ὄρθιον μόλις βάδην ἐπορεύοντο οἱ ἵπποι· ἔνθα πολλὴ κραυγὴ καὶ γέλως καὶ παρακέλευσις ἐγίγνετο.

connection. Xenophon ends Book 4 with these words, and the reader is left feeling the joy that the soldiers must have experienced at that moment.

The festival created a space in which the soldiers could not only experience membership in the community - as someone who had sworn an oath and shared in the fulfillment of it - but, from Xenophon's description of the event, the festival also created a space in which the soldiers felt good about their own participation and shared in the acceptance of the rest of the community. These essential elements for the creation of a sense of community were not clearly present in the other festivals Xenophon describes. The Lykaia held by Xenias seems to have excluded more than half of the army, and the procession at Cotyora emphasized sub-group identities. There were doubtless many moments of joyful camaraderie at those festivals where an individual's sense of belonging to the community of the army was increased, but each of these were limited at least in a relative way by a divisive element in their execution, so that the festival at Trapezous gives the clearest picture of how Greek religious festivals can contribute to the building and maintenance of community, and Xenophon's description of this event suggests that it was likely highly successful in creating a strong PSOC for the community of the army.

Tithing to the Patron Deities

Finally, the tithing to Apollo and Ephesian Artemis of their profits from the sale of captives at Cerasus reveal how the adoption and patronage of a religious cult can affect the sense of community within that group.[142] In a famous digression within the narrative of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon reveals that the army voted to tithe whatever plunder they were able to secure to two deities, Apollo and Artemis at Ephesus. Following the sale of captives taken during the army's march across Asia Minor, Xenophon reports that the tithe was collected and divided among the

[142] 5.3.4.

generals for safe keeping. Upon his return to Greece, Xenophon used those funds to make a dedication to Apollo at Delphi and constructed a small temple to Ephesian Artemis in Scillus outside of Olympia.[143] Scholars working on the religious life of cosmopolitan communities have found that highly varied groups use religious practice to mediate the absence of certain social institutions, such as demes or phratries, and in the process, allow these communities to create new collective identities through their religious worship. To address some of the shortcomings inherent in the "polis religion" model, scholars began to look at religious practices among groups that lived outside of a *polis* as it is conventionally understood.[144] Recently, Demetriou proposed the term "cosmopolitan religion" to describe the religious practices of the Greeks who lived in the emporion of Naukratis in Egypt.[145] Since Naukratis was a trading post, and its population included a number of itinerant traders, many of the civic identities, such as membership in a deme or phratry, which were mediated by religious practices in a *polis*, were absent from the religious life of its residents. The heterogeneity of the population there offers an opportunity for a close comparison with the Cyreans who also had a diverse population. Accounts from the historian Herodotus and a number of dedicatory inscriptions found at the sanctuaries in Naukratis suggest that the Greek population living there included people from many of the islands in the Aegean as well as some cities in Asia Minor, including: Chios, Teos, Phokaia, Klazomenai, Rhodes, and Mytilene.[146] This diverse population did not restrict worship based on an individual's civic identity as should have been the case according to the "polis religion" model.[147]

[143] 5.3.5-12

[144] *Polis* religion was first proposed by Sourvinou-Inwood in a pair of articles 1988: 259-74 and 1990: 295-322. For challenges to this model see: Burkert 1995: 203; Kindt 2009: 18; Burkert 1985: 276; Bremmer 2021: 11; Price 1999: 115 who observes that the religious practices that occurred outside of civic cults not only give an alternative to the civic cults, but could even offer critiques of them.

[145] Demetriou 2017: 55.

[146] Herodotus 2.178; Demetriou 2017: 53; See also, Demetriou 2012: 128-34.

[147] Sourvinou-Inwood 1990: 299-300.

Rather, the archeological evidence suggests that all the Greeks in Naukratis could use any temple they liked, regardless of their civic origin.[148] By utilizing the mythic traditions shared broadly among the Greeks, the residents of Naukratis crafted an overarching Hellenic identity that could foster the building of community among the Greeks living there. The recognition of this collective identity allowed the diverse Greek population of Naukratis to extend religious participation in the temples and shrines to all Greeks, effectively removing one of the most restrictive barriers to the creation of a Panhellenic community, civic identity. The decision by the Cyreans to tithe their profits to Apollo and Artemis of the Ephesians allowed the cosmopolitan community of soldiers to craft a new shared identity centered around their devotion to the deities in precisely the same way as the residents of Naukratis were able to create a more robust Hellenic identity for themselves.

While Xenophon's description of the sanctuary of Artemis he established at Scillus has long been a source of interest among scholars, his brief remarks concerning how the tithe was established reveal very little about the motivations and expectations of the army related to their tithe. Xenophon states that during their halt at Cerasus, "[t]here also, they divided up the money received from the sale of the captives. And the tithe, which they set apart for Apollo and for Artemis of the Ephesians, was distributed among the generals, each taking his portion to keep safely for the gods."[149] Tuplin has undertaken a systematic analysis of the text, aimed at resolving how the army came to the decision to tithe their spoils to Apollo and Artemis of the Ephesians.[150] In particular he focuses on the question of whether the army voted to tithe to Artemis and Apollo without reference to any specific cult, and the decision to choose Ephesian

[148] Demetriou 2017: 54; See also Demetriou 2012: 135; Malkin 2012: 92-3.
[149] 5.3.4 "ἐνταῦθα καὶ διαλαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἀργύριον γενόμενον. καὶ τὴν δεκάτην, ἣν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ἐξεῖλον καὶ τῇ Ἐφεσίᾳ Ἀρτέμιδι, διέλαβον οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὸ μέρος ἕκαστος φυλάττειν τοῖς θεοῖς."
[150] Tuplin 2004: 253-5.

Artemis was Xenophon's, or if the entire army specifically voted to tithe to Artemis at Ephesus. The brevity of Xenophon's description makes certainty impossible, but my own view is that the choice to tithe specifically to the Ephesian cult of Artemis was made by the entire army, and not just a personal choice of Xenophon's for the somewhat simple-minded reasoning that hers was a famous and powerful cult, and was one of the closest to where the army was fighting. When offering vows for protection, it makes sense to prefer at least one proximal deity that can perhaps be more responsive than another who is further off. In any event, the tithe set aside by the army gave every soldier a share in that patronage, and they could all understand themselves as supporters of the cult regardless of what their civic identity was. That is to say, their shared affiliation with the god allowed for the creation of a broad overarching identity, similar to what the Greeks in Naukratis experienced.

However, the creation of a shared Hellenic identity through their patronage of the gods was not sufficient to maintain the community for an appreciable length of time. The sense of community created by this shared identity appears to have been relatively weak. While shared religious identity is often an exceptionally strong force in the creation and preservation of community, the Arcadian and Achaean secession took place just a few months following the commission of the tithe. The failure of their shared religious identity to keep the Cyrean community intact suggests that the identity created by their shared patronage was too novel or too abstract to sufficiently animate the psychological conditions necessary for the maintenance of the community. Unlike the cosmopolitan community in Naukratis which had access to temples for the practice of religious devotion, the Cyreans gave a portion of their booty to the gods but had no other outward expression of that relationship. If, as scholars suggest, it is ritual that drives the creation of group identities, the Cyrean tithe to Apollo and Artemis was insufficiently

articulated among the soldiers.[151] In other words, although the tithe produced the same ultimate result (i.e. support of the cult of the gods) as devotion at a sanctuary, the tithe provided insufficient opportunity for the performance of repeated individual acts of piety which, when witnessed by the assembly of soldiers, would create and reinforce the communal identity. The feeling of belonging, input, and affective connection were all initially increased by this action, indicating that the PSOC for the army immediately after this action would have been very high. However, as the weeks and months went by, with no way to reinforce these feelings among the members of the army, the initial action was forgotten, and the PSOC that was gained was diminished. Unlike divination, which was continually practiced by the army, and the festivals, which were held several times along their route, the tithe was a unique occurrence that offered no means for the continued expression of the PSOC elements. The soldiers simply gave their money away, and had no other visible reinforcement of their patronage, and so it did little to perpetuate a sense of shared identity among the group.

In sum, religious practice and shared religious identity played an integral part in strengthening the bonds of community at crucial moments for the Cyreans. The army's ability to lift itself out of despair and swear a unified vow to Zeus the Savior after the murder of their generals was a critical moment for their survival, and shows how effective religious beliefs can be in galvanizing even a diverse population like the Ten Thousand. Similarly, the army's reliance on divination to provide guidance at moments of crisis, such as after the death of Cyrus, and at Calpe Harbor make it clear that the institutional practice of divine consultation could, as a social function, reaffirm the relationships between the community and those in authority, and at a

[151] Larson 2017: 194; Sourvinou-Inwood 1990: 305.

personal level, boost morale for the community at large, just as the pre-battle *sphagia* gave assurances to the soldiers, and legitimized the authority of the generals.

In spite of the success in uniting the army at moments of crisis, religion failed, or was underutilized by the army in the long-term maintenance of their community. While the festival at Trapezous seems to have increased PSOC in three key ways, two of the three festivals that were held by the army did little to create or support the unity of the entire army, and, as will be discussed further in later chapters, seem to have contributed to the strengthening of sub-group identities, which may have hurt the development of the overall community. Even the tithing of their booty profits failed to create a long-lasting shared identity among the soldiers that could be used as a basis for the creation of the psychological conditions necessary to build and maintain a community among the Greeks. Only divination, which was regularly practiced by the army, was able to help reaffirm the belonging and affective connection of the group. The others occurred too infrequently to maintain the high PSOC the initial events created. The absence of a mechanism for the regular outward practice and repetition of rituals associated with membership in these rites prevented the reinforcement necessary to sustain the perception of membership among the individuals of the army over the length of the campaign.

Chapter 2: ETHNICITY

When the army finally reached the relative safety of the Black Sea Coast in the late spring or early summer of 400, after having marched more than 900 miles from the battlefield at Cunaxa, over the mountains in Armenia, to the Greek city of Trapezous, many members of the army must have believed that they had been delivered from their ordeal and that their homecoming to Greece was at hand.[152] Yet disagreements about their short-term and long-term goals, their command structure, and even the method of transportation they should take back to Greece began to roil among the Cyreans. In September of that year, as the army was camped outside of the Greek city of Heraclea, roughly one hundred miles east of the city of Byzantium, several of the captains of different companies began to suggest that the generals had not done enough to secure funds for the troops as they were nearing their return to Greece.[153] The captains went among the troops and spread the idea that the generals should demand that the Heracleots give the army a large cash payment. Some said three thousand Cyzicene staters, others said ten thousand. Two of the generals, Xenophon and Cheirisophus, said that the army should not try to compel a friendly Greek city into giving what it did not offer freely. After all, the citizens of Heraclea had already given the army enough provisions to last for more than two weeks.[154] Yet the generals were overruled and the assembly of soldiers voted to send ambassadors to Heraclea with demands for an additional cash payment to the army. In response to this demand the

[152] The Greek arrival at Trapezous occurs at 4.8.22.
[153] This entire incident takes place from 6.2.4-12.
[154] 6.2.4, Lycon claims that the supplies given by Heraclea would not last the army even three days, but Lee (Lee 2008: 68-9) has analyzed Xenophon's description of the items given in hospitality to the army at 6.2.3 and argued that Lycon's claim is inaccurate, and estimated that what Xenophon records the army having been given would feed 8000 men for approximately 18 days. See also Brennan and Thomas 2021: 195.

Heracleots withdrew the market they had set outside the city and barred their gates against the Cyreans.

Xenophon records two captains in particular, Callimachus the Arcadian and Lycon the Achaean, who had advocated for this aggressive plan, and when it failed, they went to the assembly of the army and denounced the generals of the army, saying that the hard work of preserving the safety of the army fell to the Arcadians and Achaeans, while the rewards for their victory had gone to others. They argued that the Arcadians and Achaeans – who Xenophon reports made up more than half of the army – would be better off if they joined together and elected new generals of their own in order to try and enrich themselves as they made their way back home. At which point, the Arcadians and Achaeans from every contingent left their commanders and joined together, and having elected ten new generals to lead them, they seceded from the army and set out on their own. The way in which Callimachus and Lycon were able to quickly create a splinter group from within the community of the army speaks to the power that ethnic identities had among the members of the army, especially regional ethnic identities, such as those belonging to the Arcadians and Achaeans. Yet the choice to prefer their regional ethnic identity came at the expense of a separate and overarching ethnic identity that was also available to the members of the army, that of Hellenes – or Greeks. The decision by the Arcadians and Achaeans to reject any obligations they might have incurred as Hellenes in favor of a sub-Hellenic identity reveal a number of important beliefs that the members of the army had about their ethnicity and how those beliefs affected the ability of the soldiers to form a community.

By the time of the *Anabasis*, most Greeks generally understood themselves to be members of the group – or *ethnos* – known as Hellenes.[155] These were the descendants of the

[155] Hall 2015: 24-5 sees this process having occurred through both an 'aggregative' construction of shared similarities starting in the early sixth century and then increasing in the fifth century through a process of

mythical progenitor Hellen.[156] This shared ancestry served as a unifying aspect of their collective identity, and allowed members of the army to utilize their mutual belonging within the overarching community of Hellenes to make claims based on Panhellenic rhetoric, discussed in the next chapter. Yet, within the overarching Hellenic identity there were distinct subgroups that the Greeks also thought of as an *ethnos*. These included the Arcadians and Achaeans. As well as other ethnic and sub-ethnic groups as well, such as the Dorians, Ionians. The differences within these subgroups – some of which seem to be only regional while others, such as the Dorians and Ionians, were trans-regional, and linguistic similarities seem common in some but not necessarily in others – complicates how the Greeks understood their own ethnic identities. We have already seen how ethnic and sub-ethnic differences among the members of the army affected the wellbeing of the community at various points in the campaign. Ethnic differences were featured when the army celebrated the religious games at Cotyora and paraded by ethnicity (*kata ethnos*). The celebration of the Lykaia may have increased Arcadian awareness of their own insular identity. Ethnic difference allowed Agasias of Stymphalus to denounce Apollonides as a Lydian because of his earrings so that he was driven from the army during the swell of Panhellenic unity that took place after the death of the generals.

The Arcadian and Achaean *ethne* shared several similarities that may have helped the soldiers from those regions form bonds with each other at the expense of other *ethne* represented in the army. While an individual's regional and sub-ethnic identity seems to have been important for nearly all the members of the army, it appears to have been particularly important for the

'opposition.' According to the 9th edition of the *LSJ*, by the Classical period the word *ethnos* commonly meant a number of people living together, a nation, or a people. Yet it was also used to denote other groups such as trade-guilds, tribes, and even groups of animals such as swarms or flocks.

[156] Herodotus 1.56.2; 1.57.3. notes that the Dorians were originally a Hellenic *ethnos* while the Ionians were originally from the Pelasgian *ethnos* and became Hellenic overtime, taking on Greek as their primary language. Hall 1997: 43-4 provides a genealogy of the sons of Hellen as it is presented in Hesiod's *Catalog of Women*, and argues that such constructed genealogies allow for a ranked distribution of Greekness among the different *ethne*.

Arcadians and Achaeans. Both groups had a long tradition of regional particularism, and ethnic sentiments within these two groups were especially strong. The Arcadians had been recognized as a distinct *ethnos* going back to Homer, and elements of their origins appear in the Hesiodic mythography.[157] We have seen how their unique identity was reinforced during the celebration of the festival of Lycaon Zeus at Peltai, and as mentioned earlier, the secession of the Arcadian and Achaean segments of the army may have coincided with the celebration of the Lycaian festival when the Arcadian soldiers would have felt particularly strong feelings of being a distinct community within the larger group.[158] Likewise, the liminal nature of the landscape of Arcadia, being mountainous and difficult to traverse, and the reputation of the Arcadians among the other Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries that they were primitive or that they were acorn eaters, suggests that the Arcadians were seen as different and somehow separate from the other Hellenes.[159] The Achaeans likewise had been making claims for their own ethnic identity since the early sixth century, and may have had such strong feelings of group unity that they formed a federal league some time before the end of the fifth century, in which membership was determined by ethnicity.[160] Additionally, in the most popular traditions, Achaea and Arcadia were the only *ethne* who claimed that they were autochthonous and that their people had always lived in the Peloponnese.[161]

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[157] Homer Iliad 2.603-614; See also: Roy 2019: 243. For a discussion of the Arcadians in Hesiod see: Nielsen 2002: 66-72, and Fowler 2013: 104.

[158] Festival at Peltai appears at 1.2.10. It has been suggested from the dating of events in the *Anabasis* that the timing of the secession took place around the time that the Lycaian would have happened in Arcadia, though Xenophon does not specifically mention the army celebrating it at that time. For dating of the Lycaian festival at Peltai see Thomas and Brennan 2021:406-7; for a discussion of the succession coinciding with the Lycaian festival see Lee 2008: 67 and Lendle 1995: 334

[159] Herodotus 1.66. See also Georges 1994: 164; Skinner 2012: 109.

[160] Claim for an Achaean *ethnos* in Herodotus is at 1.67.2-68.6 and 8.7.31; For evidence for an Achaean *koinon* in the late fifth century see: Morgan and Hall 2004: 475; Freitag 2009: 16; and Mackil 2014: 276 who puts the date slightly later at 389.

[161] Though it is thought that the Achaeans had been displaced from their original land by the Dorian invitations and had taken over the region in the northern Peloponnese that had belonged to the Ionians. Herodotus 8.73; Thucydides 1.2.3. See also Freitag 2009: 22; Pretzler 2009: 89.

Greek ethnic identity – like most identities – was a fluid construction of multiple characteristics whose importance in their contribution to the whole shifted over time and in space. In general, the characteristics that distinguish an *ethnos* from other groups or associations are: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of communal solidarity.[162] While all of these are, in varying combinations, important features of Greek ethnicity, a myth of common descent, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of shared history seem to be especially important in the construction of an ethnic identity among the ancient Greeks.[163] Hall, who has written extensively on this topic, is careful to point out that claims surrounding shared descent are putative rather than actual and are made in consensus. If a group offered a novel claim of descent that had not been made before, as long as other groups interacting with it subscribed to the claim and accepted it as plausible, the group was free to think of themselves as members of that lineage and enjoy whatever standing the new claims conferred. Indeed, Hall suggests that myths of descent were often amended and evolved over time, as may be necessary when one group has to absorb another and a new genealogy must be constructed.[164] He notes that while this concept of ethnicity can be applied to all the Hellenes, it can also be applied to collectives that are trans-regional, regional, and even function at the level of the *polis*.[165] This is how civic identities, such as those belonging to the Athenians, who have a myth of common descent within Attica, could be thought of as ethnic identities.

Utilizing a myth of common descent, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of shared history as the principal requirements of an *ethnos* explains how subgroups such as the

[162] Smith: 1987: 22-29; Heine Nelson 1999: 18-19.
[163] Hall 1997: 25-6; Hall 2002: 9; Hall 2015: 18; Against Hall's definition see: Vlassopoulos 2015: 1-13.
[164] J. Hall 1997: 41.
[165] J. Hall 2015: 19-20; J. Hall 1997: 48-49.

Arcadians and the Achaeans could understand themselves as both ethnically united with other members of the army through their shared identity as Hellenes, and yet also ethnically distinct because they were descended from different branches of the Hellenic genealogy and were associated with specific regions of Greece. In fact, regional and civic identities seem to have been the primary source of personal identity for most ancient Greeks through at least the start of the fourth century, and this certainly seems true for the members of the army.[166] The reason for this may lie in the relative newness of a strong shared Hellenic identity at that time. As many scholars have observed, the Persian Wars at the start of the fifth century provided the Greeks with a new understanding of Hellenicity.[167] In this new way of thinking about themselves, Greek ethnic identity was bound by and defined in opposition to the Persians, who became the outside Other.[168] This self-definition through opposition helped illustrate what characteristics the Greeks shared by showing how different they were from the Persians. Although there had been an understanding among the Greeks of their shared ethnic identity prior to the Persian Wars, scholars note that conflict with Persia acted as a catalyst in the formation of new Hellenic identity, constructed through a comparison with the Persians as outside Others, that the Greeks could use to define themselves as members of an overarching *ethnos*. While a united Hellenic identity was available for the members of the army to utilize in a construction of their personal and individual identities, that identity was relatively nascent, having developed and evolved over

[166] Figueira 2020: 3.
[167] Picard 1980: 115-27; Baslez 1984: 34-40; l.ong 1986: 131-32; Nippel 1990: 36; Castriota 1992: 3; Cartledge 1993: 13,39.
[168] Hartog 1988: 61-111 who discusses the way Herodotus uses all barbarians but especially the Scythians to define Greekness; E. Hall 1989: 16-19; Cartledge 1993: 39-41; Georges 1994: 245; J. Hall 2002: 179-82; Skinner 2012: 3-4; Vlassopoulos 2013: 16-17. Mitchell 2015: 62 sees a Hellenic identity beginning in the sixth century and only being further intensified by the Persian Wars. Against this dating see Malkin 2001:7-9 who sees 'oppositional' identity construction going back far into the Archaic Period.

the previous seventy to eighty years, whereas many of the sub-Hellenic ethnic identities had been in use for many centuries, dating back into the archaic period and probably beyond.

Just as religion was able to increase the PSOC of the community through the creation of a clear sense of belonging that was both limited and defined by a carefully circumscribed membership, ethnicity had the same unifying force. Yet because regional and other sub-Hellenic ethnic identities had a longer and more robust tradition to their membership – membership that had been reinforced through centuries of distinctions in cultic practice, linguistic differences, and even differences in fundamental aspects of social organization such as the different tribal structures of the Dorians and Ionians – feelings of belonging to these subgroups within the army seemed to have created a stronger sense of unity and obligation than the newer Hellenic identity did. That is not to say that appeals to a united Hellenic ethnicity were ineffective, or failed to create membership. Indeed, as will be discussed in the following chapter, there were numerous incidents where membership in the community of Hellenes created bonds of belonging that made their membership in the community clear and conferred obligations to its members. Rather, when situations came about in which membership within one of the sub-Hellenic ethnicities made demands that were at odds with those expected from members in the larger Hellenic community, the belonging in their sub-Hellenic groups would typically take precedence, as happened during the Arcadian and Achaean secession.

As we have seen, so much of what goes into creating a community is centered around feelings of belonging. Because members of the Arcadian and Achaean contingents came from areas that were geographically next to one another – Achaea was just to the north of Arcadia in the Peloponnese – and shared similar beliefs about their origins, and yet were different than the rest of the Greeks around them, it is easy to see how they could feel an affinity that would allow

them to believe that they belonged to a group that was a community within the larger community of the army. Hall notes that membership in a community is not conferred by introspection but rather by establishing the differences which mark the members apart from their peers and their neighbors.[169] It would not take much for the Arcadian and Achaean segments of the army to create their own community by embracing the similarities they shared together which the other soldiers did not. In fact, this shared identity is exactly what Callimachus and Lycon invoke when they claim that the preservation of the army to that point had been the work of the Arcadians and Achaeans. Here is their speech as Xenophon records it:

> The words of these men were that it was shameful that Peloponnesians and Lacedaemonians should be under the command of an Athenian who contributed no troops to the army, and that the hardships should fall to themselves and the gains to others, all despite the fact the preservation of the army was their achievement; for it was, they said, the Arcadians and Achaeans who had achieved this result, and the rest of the army amounted to nothing.[170]

The two captains, in trying to unite a section of the army to break away from the command of Cheirisophus and to follow them, at first tried to invoke the identity of all Peloponnesians, including the Lacedaemonians, and they tried to juxtapose that identity against Xenophon the Athenian. On the surface this could have been an effective appeal by the *lochagoi* since the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies had just won the Peloponnesian War against the Athenians. The rhetorical effect of this initial play on identities was tantamount to asking, "why are we taking orders from this loser?" After all, the Athenians had just lost the Peloponnesian War. Yet in the middle of their sentence, they pivoted away from invoking the Peloponnesian

[169] Hall 2015: 28.

[170] 6.2.10. οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς ὡς αἰσχρὸν εἴη ἄρχειν Ἀθηναῖον Πελοποννησίων καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιον, μηδεμίαν δύναμιν παρεχόμενον εἰς τὴν στρατιάν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πόνους σφᾶς ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ κέρδη ἄλλους, καὶ ταῦτα τὴν σωτηρίαν σφῶν κατειργασμένων· εἶναι γὰρ τοὺς κατειργασμένους Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἀχαιούς, τὸ δ' ἄλλο στράτευμα οὐδὲν εἶναι.

and Lacedaemonian identities and focused instead on the two *ethne*. The reason for this may have been their realization that the overall command had not been given to Xenophon who had twice refused it, but was in fact given to Cheirisophus, the Spartan.[171] Trying to create a Peloponnesian sub-community within the army by the invocation of Spartan identity and then asking that community to reject a Spartan leader would have been politically difficult to accomplish. Instead Lycon and Callimachus changed their tactic and called upon Arcadian and Achaean identity. They then flattered these groups by claiming that it was these groups who had been responsible for the success of the army.

By arguing that it was the Arcadians and Achaeans who undertook all the hardships, while the rewards went to others, Callimachus and Lycon capitalized on several widely held beliefs about the Arcadian people. For it was often said by the Arcadians themselves, that they were the best mercenaries Greece had to offer. Xenophon records in the *Hellenica* the claim of Lycomedes of Mantinea that the Arcadians were the best fighters of Greece and that they sold that skill as mercenaries.[172] The fifth-century comedian Plato wrote that Greeks who struggled for others with success but harvested nothing at home but defeat imitated the Arcadians."[173] By claiming that it was the Arcadians and Achaeans who were responsible for the preservation of the army Lycon and Callimachus made use of a common stereotype about Arcadians – that they fought well as mercenaries – to flatter those members of the army in order to gain their support. This tactic would have helped to create integration, another of the four aspects of PSOC essential to the wellbeing of a community. Then by adding that the rewards which should have gone to the

[171] Xenophon declines overall command at 6.1.26, 6.1.31; Cheirisophus is given command at 6.1.32.
[172] *Hellenica* 7.1.23.
[173] Plato Comicus fr. 99 Edmonds [1957], μαχιμώτατος δ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς ἰδίαν οὐδέπω νίκην ἐνίκησ᾽ ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς αἴτιος νίκης ἐγενόμην ᾽Αρκάδας μιμουμενος. See also:Pirrotta 2009: 229-30; Borgeaud 1988: 21-2; Heine Nielsen 1999: 43.

Arcadians and Achaeans went to others in the army the *lochagoi* were making use of another common stereotype about Arcadians – that they were poor. Although Xenophon claims that most members of the army were not drawn into service by need, but were rather enticed into service by the reputation for generosity of Cyrus, there is reason to doubt his assertion.[174] Roy has estimated that roughly 8% of the male population of Arcadia had joined Cyrus' campaign, with many other Arcadian mercenaries in service elsewhere at that time.[175] He then argues that such a significant amount of emigration into service that was relatively moderate in its pay was likely driven by the men's inability to find a comparable livelihood at home. If poverty had been a primary motivator for many of the troops, the suggestion made by Lycon and Callimachus that the rewards due to them were being given away to others in the army undeservedly would have had a powerful emotional effect. Moreover, their plan to steal money from the Greek cities around them would have seemed more attractive to soldiers whose service was driven by economic concerns.

In addition to these shared similarities, it is difficult to know how much the sheer size of the Arcadian and Achaean segment of the army contributed to their willingness to rally around their ethnic identity and make demands for a greater voice in the direction the army would take. Xenophon reports that these two groups made up more than half the army, and no other *ethnos* seems to have had enough representation to make a bid for control of the army in the way that the Arcadians and Achaeans could.[176] It may be that when Callimachus and Lycon called upon the Arcadians and Achaeans to band together the members of these *ethne* realized how great their majority was, and that no other group would on its own be able to oppose them. A desire to

[174] 6.4.8.
[175] Roy 1999: 348-9.
[176] 6.2.10.

make demands for themselves may have appeared in their minds that was not there before and would not have existed if the option had not been available to them. What does seem clear is that the leaders of the secession, Lycon and Callimachus, were able to utilize the ethnic identities of the two groups to quickly unite this large segment of the army under their new leadership. Xenophon's description of the way that Arcadians and Achaeans who had been serving in different contingents left those groups and joined with the newly established ethnic segment does not record any protests or disagreements about the dissolution of the army.[177] Rather, the entire secession is described in such plain and emotionless terms that the reader cannot help but wonder at the relative weakness of the communal bonds holding the army together.

Cyrean Interaction with Greek Cities

The fracturing of the community along ethnic lines not only demonstrates the strength of these sub-group identities among the diverse population of the army, but it also shows the relative weakness that their shared Hellenic identity had in creating the obligations that form the basis for the bonds of community. A good example of this weakness can be found in the attitudes that many of the Cyreans had toward the Greek cities they encountered during their march. At several points the members of the assembly of the army advocated for sacking Greek cities that had done them no wrong. As was discussed above, at Heraclea the army voted to send ambassadors to the city to demand that the Heracleots pay them up to ten thousand Cyzicenes under the implied threat of an attack from the army.[178] This was after the Heracleots had made a gesture of good will and given the army enough supplies to last them for more than two weeks. Xenophon and Cheirisophus argued against trying to extort money from a friendly Greek city, but were overruled. A majority of the soldiers voted in the assembly to send the embassy and

[177] 6.1.12.
[178] 6.2.5-6.

attempt to pressure the Heracleots. Later in their journey, the army crossed the Hellespont with the promise of employment by the Spartan admiral Anaxibius. Yet once they reached Byzantium, Anaxibius refused to pay them, and he ordered them out of the city telling them to sack the villages of Thrace for their supplies.[179] In response to this sudden turn of events, the army turned back to Byzantium, and breaking through the city gate, prepared to sack the city. Only a carefully reasoned speech by Xenophon prevented the army from turning its frustration upon the citizens of Byzantium. Yet in his speech, Xenophon did not make any appeal to the shared Hellenicity of the Byzantine citizens as the reason the army should not attack them. Rather, he argued that doing so would anger the Spartans, who were still the most powerful force in Greece. Similarly, when the envoys of the Greek city of Sinope complained that the army had been mistreating those living in their colony at Cotyora, Xenophon threatened to ally the army with the Paphlagonian king Corylas who desired to conquer the territory of Sinope.[180] In all of these incidents, very little consideration was given to the shared Hellenicity shared between the army and the cities they were engaging with, and when it was raised, it was always pushed aside in favor of whatever course is perceived to be the most beneficial to the army. The ease with which members of the army were able to disregard the obligations inherent to membership within the community of Hellenes whenever it conflicted with the goals of the army shows the relative weakness of the Hellenic identity when it ran counter to other identities that the Cyreans could call upon.

Instead of relying on their Hellenic identity, civic and regional identity remained the primary source of personal identity among the members of the army, further demonstrating the importance of sub-Hellenic identities to the members of the army. Throughout the *Anabasis*,

[179] 7.1.1-31.
[180] 5.6.22.

when Xenophon gives the name of an individual member of the army, he frequently makes a point of including their local identity along with their name. When he makes use of the person's local identity, he will sometimes refer to them by their civic identity such as Silanus the Ambraciot, or Philoxenus the Pellean.[181] At other times, Xenophon uses a regional identification when referencing members of the army such as Agasias the Arcadian, or Proxenus the Boeotian.[182] This highlighting of an individual's local identity when naming them helps demonstrate the relative weakness of the overarching Hellenic identity among the members of the army. If the Cyreans thought of themselves first and foremost as Hellenes there would be little reason to stress their sub-ethnic local identities as a feature of the individual's name. What would it matter if Proxenos was from Boeotia or that Arystas was from Arcadia since all the soldiers were Hellenes?[183] The persistence of local identity as a feature of an individual's personal identity indicates the relative importance of these local identities.

The flexibility of the Arcadians and Achaeans in choosing to make claims for a unified community for themselves at the expense of others from the Peloponnese shows how an individual's concept of themselves could quickly shift to make use of different aspects of their personal identity. This flexibility suggests that the way in which these identities were accessed was largely situational, and any hierarchy that may have existed in the ranking of these aspects

[181] Silanus: 1.7.18; Philoxenus: 5.2.15.
[182] Agias: 2.5.31; Proxenus: 2.6.16. Pretzler 2009: 93 observes that Xenophon uses the general term 'Arcadian' when the person he is describing is not well known to him, while he uses the civic identity for those closer to him and suggests that this may mean that the Arcadians preferred their first identification in conversation to be their regional identity, and that they only stressed their local identity with their intimates. Xenophon's description of Proxenos by his regional identity, 'Boeotian' may complicate that theory as Proxenos was certainly Xenophon's close friend, or it may be that Proxenos simply used that designation as a matter of personal preference.
[183] Arystas 7.3.23. It is true that some common names might require an additional identifying descriptor to avoid confusion, and a local identity could serve that purpose. Yet, Plutarch, in the *Life of Alexander*, notes that this same situation occurred among the Macedonian officers of Alexander the Great, where two of the generals were named Cleitus. The Macedonians – who possessed a strong sense of their own shared ethnic identity – did not use the men's local identity to differentiate between them, but rather called them Cleitus the Black and Cleitus the White.

of identity was loosely ordered at best, and may not have existed at all.[184] The mechanisms by which the army was able to join together again after its dissolution will be discussed in greater detail in the final chapter. For now, once the secession ended and the army was reconciled, Xenophon states that it was Agasias of Stymphalus who, along with other senior Arcadian soldiers, passed a new decree that if anyone should call for a division of the army again, they should be put to death.[185] Xenophon does not offer any comment on this decree, but one imagines that such a strict law being proposed by some of the most senior and respected Arcadians must have gone a long way toward repairing the damage that had been done to the sense of community by the Arcadian secession. Agasias had been praised on many occasions by Xenophon for his bravery and commitment to the wellbeing of the army and his voice must have added to the sincerity of the reconciliation.[186] Xenophon does not say what role Agasias had in the Arcadian and Achaean secession, or even if he joined the breakaway contingent, but Lee has argued persuasively that given the severe nature of the reconciliation decree it would not be credible for Agasias to have been a ringleader of the secession.[187] Once the Arcadians and Achaeans who had been killed by the Bithynians were collected and buried, and the Arcadians had demonstrated their commitment to the community by the proposal of the reconciliation decree, there are no further reports of any ethnic tensions within the army.

The Ethnicity of Apollonides

Ethnicity and ethnic identity also aided the circumscription of the community of soldiers after the killing of the Greek generals when the captains of Proxenos expelled Apollonides for

[184] Malkin 2011: 18-9.
[185] 6.4.10.
[186] Xenophon praises Agaisas at 3.1.31; 4.7.12; 5.2.15; 6.6.7-21; 7.8.19.
[187] Lee 2008: 70-1.

his Lydian dress and manner of speech.[188] After the killing of the Greek generals by Tissaphernes described in the previous chapter, Xenophon called together the captains from Proxenos' contingent, and spoke to them about what course of action he believed they should pursue to rescue the army from the state of despair it had fallen into. He warned that they must act before the Persians could attack and destroy them. He recommended that they take the lead in rousing the rest of the army, making it clear to them that they were now in open war against the Great king, and there was no possibility of a truce.[189] All of the captains agreed to this course of action except one man named Apollonides, a captain marked for speaking with a Boeotian accent, who argued that the army should attempt to appease the Great King.[190] As Apollonides was explaining his reasoning, Xenophon interrupted and rebuked him for such foolish thinking, arguing that the Greeks will only be saved by the valor of their arms. Xenophon then advised the other captains, "not to admit this man into our ranks, but to deprive him of his captaincy, load him with baggage and use him in this way. For this man both disgraces his homeland and all of Greece, because being Greek, he acts in this way."[191] Xenophon's response to the concerns of Apollonides makes use of a feature of Greek ethnic identity that will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter on Panhellenism. For the purposes of the present discussion the most important point to note in Xenophon's speech is that the Greekness of Apollonides is not in question. Rather, in true Panhellenic fashion, his actions as a Greek were being appraised and he was censured for his behavior. He *should not* have acted in the way he did because he was a Greek, and, because he acted as he did, he shamed his homeland and his fellow Greeks.

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[188] 3.1.26-32.
[189] 3.1.15-18
[190] 3.1.26.
[191] 3.1.30: ἐμοί, ὦ ἄνδρες, δοκεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον μήτε προσίεσθαι εἰς ταὐτὸ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀφελομένους τε τὴν λοχαγίαν σκεύη ἀναθέντας ὡς τοιούτῳ χρῆσθαι. οὗτος γὰρ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καταισχύνει καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ὅτι Ἕλλην ὢν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν.

Following this, Xenophon writes that "Agasias the Stymphalian took up from there and said, 'but this man has neither anything to do with Boeotia, nor with Greece at all, for I see that he has both ears pierced, just as a Lydian.'"[192] The way Xenophon describes Agasias' statement as having been 'taken up' (ὑπολαβὼν) by the Arcadian suggests that this new condemnation is a continuation of Xenophon's own indictment.[193] Yet, Agasias makes a crucial pivot in his argument that sharply breaks from what Xenophon had been claiming. Instead of rebuking Apollonides for actions unbecoming of a Greek, Agasias claims that Apollonides is not a Greek at all and has nothing whatsoever to do with Greece, and he makes this assertion based solely on the fact that Apollonides has his ears pierced, which Agasias says makes him look Lydian.[194] This new line of reasoning fixates on a single ethnic identifier while simultaneously ignoring the Hellenic indicia that Apollonides presented.

There is little doubt that Apollonides was, at least at some level, ethnically different from the Arcadian Agasias (and therefore from more than half the army). His Aeolian dialect, which made him sound Boeotian, meant that he was likely from Lesbos or maybe from the Troad, specifically from the area of Aeolis where a similar dialect to Boeotian was spoken.[195] It is likely that the Greeks living in that area accepted Lydian customs since they would have come into much contact with one another.[196] Yet if that was the custom for the Greeks living by Lydia, the rest of the army did not condone the wearing of earrings for men, as they were seen as unmanly. In fact, the wearing of earrings by men never became broadly accepted, and later writers such as

[192] 3.1.31: ἐντεῦθεν ὑπολαβὼν Ἀγασίας Στυμφάλιος εἶπεν· "ἀλλὰ τούτῳ γε οὔτε τῆς Βοιωτίας προσήκει οὐδὲν οὔτε τῆς Ἑλλάδος παντάπασιν, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν εἶδον ὥσπερ Λυδὸν ἀμφότερα τὰ ὦτα τετρυπημένον.
[193] Huitink and Rood 2019: 93.
[194] Buzzetti 2014: 127-8 observes that Apollonides means son of Apollo, and because he speaks with a Boeotian accent he can be linked to Delphi. This makes Buzzetti wonder if this incident is Xenophon convincing the Ten Thousand to reject the god Apollo who had supported the Persians during Xerxes invasion in 480 BCE. Against this interpretation see Rood 2015: 153-4.
[195] Lane Fox 2004: 204; Ma 2004: 336-7.
[196] Kurtz and Boardman 1986: 62; Vlassopoulos 2013: 141.

Dio Chrysostom and Arrian describe the same attitudes toward the wearing of earrings by men.[197] Indeed, the Lydians themselves were often denigrated by the Greeks as being weak and unmanly.[198] To this end, it is worth mentioning that the captain who denounces Apollonides for wearing the earrings is Agasias the Arcadian. We saw earlier that one of the common characteristics associated with the Arcadians is their martial skill, in particular as mercenaries. The condemnation of Apollonides for effeminate behavior by an Arcadian captain gives an indication how the ethnic identity of soldiers could be expressed within the community of the army. As an Arcadian, it is likely that Agasias would have understood himself as a member of an elite martial subgroup within the army. His rejection of Apollonides for indicia that mark him as a Lydian carries with it the rejection of the martial valor that was the root of Xenophon's complaint. Yet this rejection is rooted in the understood ethnic differences between the Greeks and the Lydian, and is made more apparent because it was delivered by an Arcadian. The complex interplay of ethnicity shows how different subgroups within the army could access their unique identities when it suited their needs, but at the same time they could become gatekeepers of an overarching Hellenic identity.

The Boeotian accent of Apollonides also shows the flexibility of ethnicity in the creation of sub-groups within the community of the army. A shared language is one of the principle characteristics that distinguish an ethnicity from other groups and can be a strong unifying factor for an ethnic group even when other differences are present.[199] As was discussed earlier, Herodotus defined Greek ethnicity by shared blood, religious practice, language, and common customs, but he often states that the shared Greek language is the defining characteristic of

[197] Homer, *Odyssey* 18.297-8; Dio Chrystosom 32.3; Arrian, *Parthica* fr. 46.
[198] Herodotus 1.155-4.
[199] Saïd 2001: 278.

Hellenicity.[200] Isocrates, in a letter to the Spartan king Archidamus, spoke of the Greeks of Asia as speaking our language (φωνῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας) although they had adopted the character (τρόπος) of the barbarian.[201] In each of these incidents, being able to speak Greek appears to be sufficient, or is the most important factor in determining an individual's Greekness. In fact, Isocrates calls the inhabitants of Asia Greeks because they speak Greek, even though he notes that they act or behave as the barbarians do. Yet in the case of Apollonides, his Greekness is called into question because of his earrings and his behavior. His ability to speak Greek, even with a Boeotian accent is treated as thoroughly insufficient to prove his Greekness. Indeed, Agasias explicitly rejects the implication that Apollonides has anything to do with Boeotia specifically, or with Greece generally. While it may be easy for the Arcadian Agasias to treat someone with a Boeotian accent as somehow foreign, the captains that Xenophon had assembled were members of Proxenos' contingent. Xenophon tells us that Proxenos was from Boeotia, and it is likely that he recruited most of his troops from that region.[202] These men at least should have been familiar with a Boeotian accent and accepted anyone who spoke it as not only being Greek, but Greek just like them. The failure of these captains to defend the Hellenicity of Apollonides suggests that while a shared language, and even a shared dialect, is an important characteristic in establishing a shared ethnic identity, it is insufficient on its own – especially in the presence of conflicting characteristics – to define the members of an ethnicity.

Syngeneia

One's ethnicity did not always injure the cohesion, or create tensions, within the community of the army. Shared kinship, sometimes going back into the mythic past, did allow

[200] Herodotus 2.30.1, 2.56.3, 2.59.2, 2.112.1, 2.144.2, 2.153.1, 2.154.2; 3.26.1;4.23.2, 4.52.3, 4.78.1, 4.106, 4.108.2, 4.109, 4.110.1, 4.117, 4.155.3, 4.192.3; 6.98.3; 8.135.3, 8.144. 2; 9.16.2, 9.110.2.
[201] Isocrates 9.8.
[202] Roy 1967: 301; Lee 2007: 46.

the Greeks to create bonds that joined disparate groups or individuals together through understood obligations of behavior toward family. This shared kinship was called *syngeneia*, which roughly translates to kinship. The most famous example of this in the *Anabasis*, occurs when the Thracian prince Seuthes claims *syngeneia* with the Athenian Xenophon as the army is considering entering his service.[203] Xenophon describes the first meeting between Seuthes and the representatives of the army as full of mistrust and suspicions. Xenophon begins the meeting with an elaborate exchange with Medosades, an advisor to Seuthes, in which Xenophon attempts to prove his honesty to the Thracians. When this fails to ease the tensions, Xenophon orders the officers to lay aside their arms as a gesture of good faith. Upon hearing this, Seuthes said that "he would not distrust the Athenians since they were his kinsmen, and he believed that they were well-disposed friends."[204] The kinship that Seuthes refers to had been constructed in Athens to gain the favor of the fifth-century Odrysian king Sitalces, and traced his lineage back through the years to Tereus, the mythological Thracian king who became an ally and eventually the son-in-law of the Athenian king Pandion when he married Procne the daughter of Pandion.[205] It is interesting to note that the historian Thucydides, who himself was descended from Thracian nobility, took time to refute the claim of Tereus' connection to Athens, though his refutation seems to have failed since the son of king Sitalces had been granted honorary citizenship in Athens based on this mythological connection.[206] The credence given to lines of descent rooted in the mythic past allows for the creation of belonging among groups or individuals who may be geographically separated by large distances.

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[203] 7.2.24-30.
[204] 7.2.331 "ἀκούσας ταῦτα ὁ Σεύθης εἶπεν ὅτι οὐδενὶ ἂν ἀπιστήσειεν Ἀθηναίων· καὶ γὰρ ὅτι συγγενεῖς εἶεν εἰδέναι καὶ φίλους εὖνους ἔφη νομίζειν."
[205] For Tereus see Strabo 7.6.1, 9.3.13; Apollodorus 3.14.8-10. See also, Stronk 1995: 190.
[206] Thucydides 2.29; see also Thomas and Brennen 2021: 228, n7.2.31a.

The way *syngeneia* functions in this section of the *Anabasis* is in keeping with what we see of its use in interstate relations at the time.[207] There are numerous references in the literary sources and on inscriptions of the claims for kinship between cities.[208] These claims are sometimes thought to be largely ceremonial, being little more than meaningless courtesies.[209] Yet, during the negotiations between Xenophon and Seuthes we can see the effect that the language of kinship can have in creating a basis for trust founded on the mutual obligations inherent in kinship. Xenophon convinces the Greek officers to set aside their weapons and Seuthes responds with an appropriate gesture of assurance that is based on the understood obligations toward family. The kinship bonds uniting the two leaders are further emphasized when the Greek and Thracian forces choose "Athena" as the watchword between them. As Hall has pointed out in his discussion of Greek ethnicity, claims for a shared kinship are putative. The Greeks were generally accepting of claims of relationships that were rooted in the mythic past and do not seem to have frequently challenged such assertions.

In each of the incidents discussed so far, the fluid nature of ethnic identity allowed the individuals involved some amount of flexibility in their claim of membership within that group. The decision by an individual to assert a particular aspect from their overall ethnic identity involves a complex balance of interests, and is made when the individual perceives an advantage to membership within that group.[210] The Arcadians and Achaeans who seceded from the army chose to advance their local ethnicities over their identity as Peloponnesians or as Hellenes. Each of these identities was available to them to be emphasized when it was advantageous, or at when it was at least appropriate. Agasias was able to vilify Apollonides and remove his captaincy from

[207] Lucke 2000:15
[208] Curty 2001: 49-56.
[209] Parker 2004: 139; against this view see Curty 1994: 698-707.
[210] Morgan 2001: 84.

him by focusing on a single marker that was atypical for Hellenic identity, while ignoring the fact that he spoke a traditional Greek dialect and fought with the army as a hoplite. His earrings had never been an issue prior to his speaking out against Xenophon's plan. Yet, when Agasias wanted to refute that argument, he was able to ignore the Greek ethnic indicia that Apollonides presented and focus on what he believed to be an indication of Lydian ethnicity. Seuthes and Xenophon were able to bypass the cultural, political, and linguistic differences that existed between them and created a relationship based on a distant claim of kinship. This relationship then allowed the Greeks and Thracians to enter into a partnership that had the promise to keep the Greeks gainfully employed and provide for their livelihood – although the partnership never fulfilled that promise. In each of these incidents, the Greeks found their community being affected by the presence of a complex overlay of ethnic identities. These identities allowed the Greeks to see themselves as either belonging to or separate from the large community of the army as situations evolved and realities changed. The importance of local identities among the soldiers made it difficult to cultivate substantial and lasting bonds based on a shared Hellenic identity. In the end, the difficulty that the Greeks experienced in understanding themselves as part of a larger Hellenic ethnicity made the overall unity of the army fragile and left them prone to conflict and dissolution.

Constructing Identity Through Comparison to the Other

Though the Cyreans may have struggled to recognize and appreciate their shared Hellenic identity when they interacted with one another, it often became apparent when they interacted with the many foreign peoples they encountered in their travels. Self-definition through a comparison with an outside Other was not new. In one of the most famous examples of this process, Odysseus lands on the island of the Cyclopes; his account of their culture and mode of

living makes the values inherent in Greek culture distinct in their absence.[211] Scholars have suggested that this scene was a response to the process of identity through alterity that was occurring throughout the Greek world as Greek colonies were being established in lands inhabited by indigenous populations that were culturally very different from the Greeks.[212] Perhaps an even clearer example of this can be found in the historian Herodotus' account of the Scythians – a nomadic peoples living to the north and east of the Greek mainland. In his seminal work on the way in which Herodotus defines Greekness in alterity to the Scythians the French historian François Hartog argued that while Herodotus' *Histories* are sometimes thought to be an ethnographic study of the different people around them, its real aim is to provide a means of self-definition to the Greeks through a comparison of their neighbors.[213] In this way, when Herodotus says that the Scythians are nomadic, he is drawing an emphasis on the importance of civic identity to the Greeks, or when he observes that the Scythians are alone in their practice of drinking wine from the decapitated skulls of their enemies, he is delimiting Greek values of piety, martial honor, and justice, each of which would have been challenged by such an action.[214] By inviting the Greeks to consider the differences of the Scythians, Herodotus is actually demonstrating to the Greeks who *they* are by showing them so clearly who they are not. In the *Anabasis*, many of the encounters the Greeks have with the local inhabitants of the lands they travel through reinforce their Hellenic identity through a similar process of self-definition through opposition.

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[211] Homer *Odyssey*, 9.105-176.
[212] Homer *Odyssey*, 9.116-142. See Malkin 1998: 272 and Morris 1986: 98-100 for a discussion of the island of the Cyclopes as a model for Greek colonization.
[213] Hartog's chapter on the rhetoric of otherness (Hartog 1988: 212-58) gives a thorough description of how this process works.
[214] Hartog's discussion of Scythian nomadism occurs at 1998: 193-206 and his discussion of head hunting takes place at 1988: 156-62.

No incident within the *Anabasis* gives a clearer picture of Hellenic identity through opposition with a foreign Other than the alliance between the Greeks and the Mossynoeci who live along the southern coast of the Black Sea in eastern Paphlagonia. Indeed, Xenophon says explicitly that the Mossynoeci were the most barbarous, and furthest removed from Greek customs, of all the peoples that Cyreans met.[215] He describes their diet, the whiteness of their skin, the fat children of elite citizens painted with pigment as though all these were novel and alien to the Greek way of living.[216] He then said that the Mossynoeci kept trying to have sex in public with the women who were traveling with the Greek army and they often behaved in ways that were opposite of normal expectations, doing in public what others would do in solitude, and if they were alone they behaved as though they were in a crowd, talking, laughing, and dancing alone.[217] Such stark differences in behavioral norms showed in very clear terms the values of the Greek soldiers. They were tanned, toned in body, and private people who were reserved in their public displays. The clear differences in behavior also allowed for the easy creation of an in-group and out-group dynamic. As was discussed in the introduction, this dynamic can provide powerful reinforcement to the cohesion of a community. The Greeks understood their Hellenic identity as entirely separate from that of the Mossynoeci. By this difference, the general affinity among members of the in-group is increased by a corresponding derogation of the out-group.[218] That is to say, the Greeks affirmed their membership in the community and their subscription to its values through the negation of the values and behaviors of the Mossynoeci. All of which helped the Greeks experience a greater sense of belonging and build bonds of community. Though the gains in unity among the soldiers achieved through an awareness of their alterity

[215] 5.4.34.
[216] Description of the Mossynoeci diet is at, 5.4.27-9; white skin is at, 5.4.33; elite children is at 5.4.32.
[217] 5.4.34.
[218] Zhong 2008: 797.

with the Mossyneocians appear to have been relatively short lived. Three months after their campaigns with the Mossyneocians, the Arcadians and Achaeans seceded at Heraclea. The difficulty with reliance on an in-group / out-group dynamic as a means of creating unity is that it requires the continued presence and steady interaction of both groups. Once the army left Mossyneocian territory and lost the persistent reinforcement of their in-group membership, the strengthening of the Greek community was tempered by the limited degree to which they valued their shared Hellenic ethnicity.

While there were several other encounters with foreign behavior that may have helped create a sense of community among the Cyreans by the process of self-definition through opposition, their interactions with the Persians provided the greatest opportunity for the soldiers to define themselves by comparison to an outside group. This is for two reasons: first, the Cyreans had far more contact and interaction with the Persians than any other non-Greek peoples; second, in the mind of many of the Greeks, the Persians were the barbarian *par excellence*.[219] Greek art and literature often depicts the Persians behaving in ways that are antithetical to the Greek ideals of behavior.[220] Many of these are tropes that are repeated time and again, such as Persian effeminacy, or slavishness, or luxurious decadence. While we see some of this in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon actually gives us a more complex picture of Persian behavior and character that complicates the process of self-definition for the Greeks.

Of all the Persians that Xenophon describes, his portrait of Cyrus is the most complex and does not follow the common tropes typically associated with them by the Greeks, suggesting that the Cyreans could not have used their interactions with him to help construct their own

[219] See Francis 1990:3; Cartledge, 1993: 61-2; Morgan 2016: 128.
[220] Miller 1995: 41; Briant 2001: 203-7; Miller 2011: 147-55 who sees the turn toward presenting the Persians as slavish and effeminate, occurring around 460 and persisting through the fifth century.

identities through the process of opposition. Yet there is reason to doubt that the Cyrus Xenophon presents in the *Anabasis* is an accurate depiction of the historic Cyrus. In his eulogy for Cyrus after Cunaxa, Xenophon describes the prince "as the most kingly and most worthy ruler of the Persian since Cyrus the Elder," a figure Xenophon wrote about extensively in the *Cyropaedia*.[221] Like his namesake, Cyrus the Younger was exceptionally generous to his friends, skilled as an administrator, and in direct opposition to what Xenophon says about Tissaphernes, Cyrus was true to his word, and did not break peace with those he had sworn allegiance to.[222] In fact, Xenophon says that "in his judgment no one was regarded with more affection of either the Greeks or the barbarians."[223] Xenophon may have had his own reasons for portraying the prince in such a flattering light, and this may complicate using him as a model of alterity. We know that Xenophon was exiled from Athens and was given an estate at Scillus near Olympia by the Spartans.[224] Though scholars debate the cause of his exile, the likeliest reason was his association with Cyrus.[225] Indeed, early in the *Anabasis*, Socrates warns Xenophon about this possibility when Xenophon asks him whether he should go on the campaign or not.[226] If his exile had been because of his association with Cyrus, Xenophon may have tried to enhance the reputation of the

[221] 1.9.1: ἀνὴρ ὢν Περσῶν τῶν μετὰ Κῦρον τὸν ἀρχαῖον γενομένων βασιλικώτατός τε καὶ ἄρχειν ἀξιώτατος.
[222] Cyrus is portrayed as generous at, 1.9.20-8; as a skilled administrator at, 1.9.19; as faithful to his oaths at: 1.9.7.
[223] 1.9.28: οὐδένα κρίνω ὑπὸ πλειόνων πεφιλῆσθαι οὔτε Ἑλλήνων οὔτε βαρβάρων.
[224] 5.3.7.
[225] Unfortunately, the lack of sources that discuss his exile make it impossible to know exactly when or for what reason Xenophon was driven from Athens. Most scholars prefer the dates of either 399 or 394 as the most likely dates for his exile. Those in favor of an earlier date are: Brennan 2022: 43; Brennan and Thomas 2021: xxiii; Flower 2012: 24; Green 2004: 225; Higgins 1977: 22-23; For a later date see: Badian 2004: 41; Brownson and Dillary 1998: 4; Tuplin 1987: 59-60. The two different dates come from the different possible causes for his exile. In the *Life of Xenophon* 2.51, the third-century CE biographer Diogenes Laertus says that Xenophon was exiled from Athens on account of his favoritism toward Sparta. If this was the reason, it was most likely the result of Xenophon's marching with the Spartan army when they fought against the Athenians at Chaeronea in 394. Yet later in an epigram to that same biography at 2.58, Diogenes Laertus says that Xenophon was exiled because of his friendship with Cyrus. If this was the reason for Xenophon's exile, then the earlier date is likely. While Diogenes Laertius gives conflicting reasons for the exile, later writers, such as Pausanias 5.6.5 and Dio Chrysostom in *Orations* 8.1, state that it was because of his association with Cyrus that the Athenians exiled Xenophon.
[226] 3.4.5.

prince as a way of excusing, or at least explaining his own behavior. By portraying Cyrus as a paragon of leadership, magnanimity, and justice, Xenophon may be giving a tacit justification for his service with the Cyreans, and at the same time repudiating the exile that was pronounced against him. After all, what man would not want to serve with someone who was regarded as the most beloved among either the barbarians or the Greeks? If this is the case, it makes Xenophon's presentation of Cyrus problematic for use as an exemplar of an outside Other by which the Greeks could better understand their own Hellenicity.

One of the most strident claims for Greek superiority over the Persians that the Greeks could use in their creation of a Hellenic identity comes from Cyrus himself. As the army was nearing Babylon, Cyrus called together the Greek generals and captains, and explained to them that he included the Greek contingent in his army because he believed that "they are better and more effective than even a large number of barbarians."[227] He then goes on to extol them to be men worthy of the freedom that they possess, and says that while the numbers in the King's army might be large, he is personally ashamed of what sort of people the Greeks will find the Persians to be.[228] Setting aside the unlikelihood that Cyrus referred to his fellow Persians as barbarians, as Xenophon states, these few sentences contain some of the most common tropes found in references to Greco-Persian relations. In this formulation, Greek freedom is juxtaposed against the presumed slavery of the Persians, while Persian military inferiority is stressed twice. Then, in the next paragraph Clearchus warns Cyrus not to fight in the battle, but to post himself behind the line. Cyrus does not follow this advice, and leading his troops against the center of the King's army, he is killed. This interaction allows Clearchus to become the tragic advisor, a Greek

[227] 1.7.3. ἀλλὰ νομίζων ἀμείνονας καὶ κρείττους πολλῶν βαρβάρων ὑμᾶς εἶναι.
[228] 1.7.4

military figure whose advice is ignored to the detriment of his patron.[229] This is another common trope aimed at showing the superiority of Greek soldiers when compared to the Persians, and could allow the Greeks to construct a more idealized understanding of themselves in comparison to the Persians.

In the short term, these claims of Greek superiority helped bolster the army's morale as conflict with the King was drawing close. Xenophon reports that upon hearing Cyrus' estimation of the forces against them and his own promises of rewards when they achieved victory, many of the men became much more enthusiastic, and passed the report onto others.[230] In the long term, comparisons such as this one helped the Greek army create and maintain a community where membership was defined in specific terms. When Xenophon denounced Apollonides for advocating for supplication to the Great King instead of fighting their way out of Persia, Xenophon labeled Apollonides a disgrace to his native country and to all of Greece for failing to behave as was appropriate for members of the Hellenic community. When Apollonides was quickly driven from the army, the criteria for membership became clearer and the boundaries between the community of the army and those around them became more distinct. The consensus of what constituted the appropriate behavior came from juxtapositions such as the one Cyrus gave to the Greeks. By explicitly claiming Greek superiority in military matters, and tying it to the notion of Greek freedom, anyone who did not act in a manner that promoted those ideals could be disenfranchised and driven from the community.

Yet, even in the *Anabasis*, the descriptions of ethnic differences between the Greeks and Persians did not always follow such pre-scripted presentations. Near the Euphrates River an incident occurred which presented the Persians as a model of Greek values when a wagon got

[229] Rop 2013:39-45.
[230] 1.7.8.

stuck in a muddy and narrow place. Cyrus, concerned that the army had been moving too slowly, ordered those around him to help dislodge it. Xenophon notes that they jumped into the mud immediately, many of them wearing fine clothes and jewelry, and he comments that they seemed to be a "sample of good discipline."[231] By itself this incident does not provide a suitable example of a barbarian Other that the Greeks can use to reinforce what they perceive as the positive aspects of their own Hellenic identity. The usual tropes of Persian softness and luxuriance are not seen in this incident. Even the fine clothing that the nobles are wearing does not allow for a suitable juxtaposition of Greek modesty as the Persians jump into the mud with no regard for their attire, demonstrating that they are both obedient and practical. Yet its place in the narrative makes this incident even more complicated to use as a foil against which the Greeks can reflect on their own identity, for it comes just a week before the contingents of Menon and Clearchus nearly come to blows as the generals wrangled for control of the army.[232] If the Greeks were using the Persians as an out-group to foster feelings of community within the army, these incidents suggest that, at least in the beginning, the process failed. It is the Persians who appear disciplined, dedicated, and united, not the factious Greeks. Indeed, as Cyrus warns Clearchus and the other Greeks who were fighting amongst themselves, that the Persian forces traveling with them will cut them down if the Greeks cannot maintain their unity.[233] This presentation of the Persians as virtuous made the process of unity through alterity especially difficult during the early part of the march.

Tissaphernes, as Xenophon characterizes him in the *Anabasis*, presents a far more useful portrait of a barbarian Other for the Greeks to use in their own self-definition. He is duplicitous,

[231] 1.5.7-8 εὐταξίας ἦν θεάσασθαι.
[232] 1.5.11-17.
[233] 1.5.16.

promising to tell Clearchus the name of the general who had been slandering him, but after luring the Greeks to his tent with that promise, he had them seized and put to death.[234] He is cowardly, leaving the infantry to be routed by the Greeks at Cunaxa while he rode through the Greek peltasts before being outmatched by them and escaping through to the Greek camp.[235] He is impious, having broken his sacred oath to guide the Greeks back to Greece without any trickery while providing a market.[236] Indeed, it is this aspect of Persian character which the Greeks reference when they pull themselves out of despair after the death of the generals. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, Cheirisophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon all make speeches before the army in which they extoll Greek virtues that are compared to corresponding Persian vices. Cheirisophus says that Ariaeus and the rest of Cyrus' Persian army are betrayers, while the Greeks need to show themselves to be good men.[237] Cleanor denounces the Great King as impious and calls Tissaphernes faithless for breaking his oath, before promising that the Greeks would abide by the will of the gods.[238] Xenophon, for his part, makes many of the same claims, and rallies the soldiers around the idea that as pious Greeks they will have an advantage over the treacherous and faithless Medes and Persians.[239] Following these speeches, the army

[234] 2.5.26, 2.5.32.

[235] 1.18.8 ὁ δ' οὖν Τισσαφέρνης ὡς μεῖον ἔχων ἀπηλλάγη, πάλιν μὲν οὐκ ἀναστρέφει, εἰς δὲ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀφικόμενος τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐκεῖ συντυγχάνει βασιλεῖ. Recent scholarship about Tissaphernes' role at Cunaxa has suggested that the flight of the Persian infantry from the Greek forces may have been a tactical feint, especially Wylie 1992: 129-30; Ehrhardt 1994: 1-2; Waterfield 2006: 18; Ropp 2019: 62-53; Brennan and Thomas 2021: 363-5, against Shannahan 2014: 71. If true, Tissaphernes may have been, as Diodorus (14.25.4) and Ctesius'*History of Persia* (19.f24.216) suggest, more important to the success of the battle than Xenophon allows, making his portrait of Tissaphernes as a coward more of a trope than an objective account.

[236] 2.3.26 καὶ ἀδόλως ἀπάξειν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀγορὰν παρέχοντας. Bassett 2002: 447-61 has suggested that the Greeks may have broken their oaths to not raid the country, thereby excusing Tissaphernes' seizure of the Greek generals and captains. However, the oath sworn by Tissaphernes states that he would lead them without fraud which he did not do. To keep his oath, he would have needed to accuse the generals without tricking them into coming to his tent under different pretexts. Xenophon explicitly states in his speech before the army at 3.2.10 that the Persians were perjurers who had broken their oaths.

[237] 3.2.2-3.

[238] 3.2.4-6.

[239] 3.2.9.

was united in their belief that their cause was just and that they would prevail over such a faithless and impious enemy, giving them the courage to burn their excess baggage and attempt to fight their way back home, making this was one of the most effective uses of identity through alterity during the entire campaign.

In the middle of his speech to the army, Xenophon furthers his efforts at identity through alterity and shifts his comparison of Greeks and Persians by considering the implications contained in the adoption of Persian culture by the Greeks. After detailing the tactical advantages of the Greek position and the possibility of securing food through plunder, Xenophon declares that they should attempt to make it back to Greece because he fears that once the Greeks have learned to live in plentiful idleness, consorting with the big and beautiful Median and Persian women and girls, they will forget their way home, just like the lotus-eaters.[240] In the same way that Callimachus, during the Arcadian and Achaean secession, made use of the common belief that the Arcadians were the best mercenaries in that part of the Greek world, Xenophon's exhortation to the soldiers relies on the subscription to a belief about the values shared by all Hellenes. In Xenophon's construction, Greeks take pride in their penury, and see their struggles as badges of honor that they would not discard for a life of ease. As proof of his characterization, he references the lotus-eaters who had to be rescued from falling into indolence and excessive pleasure by Odysseus.[241] In that section of the *Odyssey*, the lotus-eaters give their intoxicating fruit to some of Odysseus' crew who are so overwhelmed by the pleasure of it that they are willing to forsake their journey back to Ithaca, preferring to stay in that far-off country eating the lotus fruit. To prevent this, Odysseus has them forcibly dragged back onto the ship and quickly

[240] 3.2.25 ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή, ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις βιοτεύειν, καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ.
[241] Homer, *Odyssey* 9:82-104.

sets sail. By attempting to abandon their journey home and remain in a foreign land, those members of Odysseus' crew who ate the lotus fruit were in a sense rejecting a part of their identity and choosing a life of pleasure instead. In making this comparison, Xenophon is warning the soldiers against making a similar choice, implying that one of the characteristics of Hellenicity is a willingness to work hard and deny excessive pleasure. Xenophon's use of this story as an analogy to the situation of the army is particularly clever in that it accomplishes two things simultaneously. On the one hand, the Greeks had every reason to expect that their retreat to Greece would be difficult and dangerous. By reminding the soldiers of their shared preference for hardship and struggle Xenophon is conditioning them to collectively embrace that struggle as an elemental part of who they are. On the other hand, he is characterizing the Persians as lazy and hedonistic. This characterization then builds the confidence of the troops as they begin their own homeward journey.

The speeches of Cheirisophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon succeed in rallying the Greek soldiers by boosting their morale based on an understanding of who they were as a people. The army then acted decisively, electing new generals and captains, burning their excess baggage so that they could move more quickly, before making their way across the river where they took up a hollow square formation as the Persian cavalry and peltasts began to attack them.[242] The clear sense of identity and purpose created by these speeches strengthened the overall unity of the army. Faced with almost constant pressure from the Persians, hostile tribes, weather, and privation, the community of soldiers remained strong throughout their march to the Black Sea, and there were no reports of dissent or disunity until the absence of immediate danger and the lack of a clear plan created as space for a few demagogues to rise into prominence. Moreover,

[242] The Cyreans choose new generals at 3.1.47, burn the excess baggage at 3.3.1, and cross the Zapatas River at 3.3.6.

the reinforcement of their Hellenic identity through a comparison with the Persians had given the community of soldiers a means to unite in expectation of specific behaviors. Near the end of his speech, Xenophon proposes that the army adopt a rule that if any soldier is disobedient, those around him must join with the officers in punishing that individual.[243] The soldiers understood that it was incumbent on all of them to act as Odysseus had done, and drag any indolent or soft individual back to the benches to correct their behavior. In this way, the Greeks could rely on the examples of their past to help ensure that they returned home, just as Odysseus had done.

In sum, the different ethnic identities available to the Cyreans allowed them to unify as members of an overarching Hellenic ethnicity, a membership they were able to clearly define and reinforce through a process of alterity with the other peoples they came into contact with during their march. This shared identity was crucial to the Panhellenic obligations members of the community were expected to uphold, and created a set of behaviors that were understood to be a requirement of belonging within the group. This recognition of a shared identity facilitated the creation of one of the principal characteristics of PSOC, belonging. Yet because of its relative newness, the Hellenic ethnic identity available to the members of the army was generally less effective in creating the bonds of community than older particular regional identities. This was particularly evident in the way that the army viewed and treated the Greeks living on the Black Sea coast, attempting to extort money and steal from them with no regard to any obligations arising from a shared ethnicity. Moreover, while a sense of belonging was created among the members of the community through their interaction with the other cultures they encountered on their march, similar feelings of belonging were often easily and more powerfully created within the sub-Hellenic ethnicities of the army who were able to also offer input and

[243] 3.2.31.

integration to their members more easily than could be accomplished in the larger community. Thus, belonging within the army was always going to be at least partly contingent on the sublimation of sub-Hellenic identities in favor of a united Hellenicity, the success of which would vary from one individual to another and in consideration of the fortunes of the community at large.

Chapter 3: PANHELLENISM

When Cyrus gathered together his army of Greek mercenaries and set out from Sardis, the capital of Lydia in May of 401, he told the Greek soldiers that they would be marching against the Pisidians who lived to the west of Caria in Asia Minor.[244] Yet when they had marched well past the land of the Pisidians and reached the town of Tarsus near the Cilician Gates, not far from the border with Syria, the soldiers began to suspect that Cyrus was actually leading them against the army of his brother Artaxerxes, the Great King of Persia. Fearing what a direct attack against the Great King might entail, the Greek section of Cyrus' army balked, and refused to go forward, claiming that they had not been hired to fight against the Great King.[245] When one of the Greek generals, the Spartan exile Clearchus, who Xenophon suggests was the only member of the army who knew Cyrus' plan when they started out, tried to force his contingent of the army to press on, his own men threw rocks and other debris at him so that he narrowly escaped being stoned to death.[246] Clearchus, realizing that he would never be able to force the men to continue their march, decided to follow a different tactic, and delivered a carefully crafted speech that was full of Panhellenic ideals and rhetoric, which was then reported back to the rest of the army. Xenophon claims that Clearchus stood before the troops weeping for a long time before he began to speak. Once he started to address the men, he began by very carefully creating a perceived bond between himself and the rest of his troops by drawing upon their shared identity as Greeks, which he defined in opposition to a foreign Other:

[244] 1.2.1.
[245] 1.3.1.
[246] Xenophon intimates that Clearchus knew of Cyrus' plan at 1.3.1, 1.3.7-9; See also: Hisrch 1985: 23 who holds that Cyrus and Clearchus came up with the plan to manipulate the troops together; Clearchus narrowly escapes being stoned to death at 1.3.2.

> "Fellow soldiers, do not wonder that I bear these present events with difficulty. For Cyrus has become a friend to me, and me an exile from my fatherland, he has both honored me and given me ten thousand darics. And I, having received this money did not set it aside for anything of my own, nor to use for my pleasure, but I spent it on you. First, I made war against the Thracians, and on behalf of Greece I took vengeance on them with you, driving them out of the Chersonese when they wanted to take away the land from the Greeks living there."[247]

When Clearchus addressing his audience as fellow soldiers (ἄνδρες στρατιῶται), he engages in a rhetorical appeal that provides a base of association that he can build upon as he presents his argument. By starting in this way, he acknowledges their shared identity, and calls their membership in the community of soldiers to the front of their thoughts. This association is then further refined when Clearchus claims that he spent the money, which Cyrus had given him to hire troops, on behalf of Greece (ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος), by making war against the Thracians who were trying to displace the Greeks living in the Chersonese. By pointing out his actions here, Clearchus has created an in-group out-group psychological dynamic.[248] This phenomenon of creating in-groups and out groups, was the basis for the PSOC model of community development and maintenance, and is a key component to any understanding of Panhellenic rhetoric. As a brief review, this theory states that people often form in-groups – self-preferenced groups which are formed around invented discriminatory characteristics, many of which can be completely arbitrary. In fact, a study of the in-group dynamic has shown that arbitrarily being included in a group will create a bias for fellow members that drastically changes the perceived rightness of action from other members of the group.[249] These groups create a strong bias against

[247] ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, μὴ θαυμάζετε ὅτι χαλεπῶς φέρω τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν. ἐμοὶ γὰρ ξένος Κῦρος ἐγένετο καί με φεύγοντα ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος τά τε ἄλλα ἐτίμησε καὶ μυρίους ἔδωκε δαρεικούς· οὓς ἐγὼ λαβὼν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἴδιον κατεθέμην ἐμοὶ οὐδὲ καθηδυπάθησα, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐδαπάνων. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Θρᾷκας ἐπολέμησα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐτιμωρούμην μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, ἐκ τῆς Χερρονήσου αὐτοὺς ἐξελαύνων βουλομένους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας τὴν γῆν. 1.3.3-4.
[248] Tajfel 1970: 102.
[249] Molenberghs 2013: 2065-6.

an out-group that serves to help define the in-group. In other words, "a group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived as having common characteristics or a common fate *only* because other groups are present in the environment."[250] Those out-groups serve to define the in-group by a process of opposition. The delineation of a circumscribed membership allows for the categorization of members which is the first step to the creation of PSOC within a community. Whether defined by territory or relationship, knowledge of one's membership in the community is the essential component from which all other aspects of PSOC can be applied.

As Clearchus continues his speech, he pivots from reminding the soldiers of their membership in the community to establishing the behavior expected from those members. After stating how his actions had benefited Greece, he then laments that since the Greeks no longer wish to march with him that he must choose whether to desert them or betray Cyrus' friendship:

> "If what I will do is right, I do not know, therefore I will choose you and with you I will suffer whatever I must. And never will anyone say that I, having led Greeks to the Barbarians, abandoned the Greeks and chose the friendship of the Barbarians. But since you do not wish to obey me, I will therefore follow you and suffer whatever I must."[251]

This part of Clearchus' speech utilizes one of the most fundamental aspects of Panhellenic rhetoric, the perceived mutual obligation attendant to membership in the community of Hellenes. Having created and circumscribed the membership in the community in the first part of his speech he then announces his obligations as a member of that community. He claims that when confronted with a choice between a course of action that will benefit either the Greeks, or an outside Other, it is incumbent on members of the community to choose the course that

[250] Tajfel 1974: 72. Emphasis mine.
[251] εἰ μὲν δὴ δίκαια ποιήσω οὐκ οἶδα, αἱρήσομαι δ' οὖν ὑμᾶς καὶ σὺν ὑμῖν ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ πείσομαι. καὶ οὔποτε ἐρεῖ οὐδεὶς ὡς ἐγὼ Ἕλληνας ἀγαγὼν εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους, προδοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων φιλίαν εἱλόμην, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ οὐ θέλετε πείθεσθαι, ἐγὼ σὺν ὑμῖν ἕψομαι καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ πείσομαι. 1.3.5.

benefits the Greeks, regardless of the consequences to that individual member. Clearchus states that in the absence of a clear mandate indicating which is the best course to follow, Greeks owe allegiance to their fellow Greeks. He does not indicate that there is any rationale for this obligation beyond their membership in the community of Hellenes. In other words, Greeks ought to behave in a prescribed manner – both toward one another, and toward those who are outside of the community – and they ought to behave this way *because* they are Greeks in the community of other Greeks. This obligatory behavior that is predicated on membership in the community is one of the most profound aspects of Panhellenism and is the principal mechanism by which the Cyreans attempted to build community through appeals to their shared Hellenicity. Yet the actions of the Cyreans as well as those of the Greek cities they encounter on their march show that while Panhellenism can be remarkably successful in creating a strong PSOC when the goals of the members are aligned, when members of the community have competing goals the obligations that attend membership in the community are often set aside, and members will pursue their own interests, even when these come at the expense of other Greeks.

Panhellenism is not a term that the Cyreans would have used, rather it is a modern term used by historians to describe the ways in which the ancient Greeks understood themselves to be united by a shared history and similar cultural experiences.[252] These cultural experiences would have been things such as their common ancestry, shared language, and similar way of living including similar cultic practices - an idea most famously expressed by the fifth century historian, Herodotus.[253] While some scholars have focused on the cultural experiences shared by

[252] See Mitchell 2007: xv who notes that no ancient Greek would have used the term to describe anything like the modern understanding of Panhellenism. Indeed, the term itself almost never appears in the corpus of Greek literature that was written by the time the army set out in 401.

[253] Herodotus 8.144; See also: Mcinerney 2001: 57; Hall 1997: 44-7 while Hall notes here that Greek ethnic identity can be understood through claims of putative kinship, shared territory, and shared sense of history, in Hall 2015: 25-6, he concedes that identity through opposition grew in importance through the fifth century. Against this view of

the Greeks as the basis for a Panhellenic community, other scholars have argued that the awareness of their shared cultural similarities was primarily made possible by a process of constructing an identity by opposition to Others that occurred to the Greeks as a result of the Persian wars.[254] Others have argued that there is strong evidence of Panhellenism among the Greeks prior to the fifth century and the Persian Wars.[255] In either event, the requirements for membership in the community of Hellenes certainly evolved as the Greek world continued to grow and spread around the Mediterranean and beyond. Yet, as in any community, membership included not only certain rights, but also obligations to act and behave by expected norms. This was especially true when Greeks were interacting with other Greeks. The exact character and limits of these norms were not fully articulated, and varied over time and from one individual to another. Still, the awareness of a shared cultural similarity, and shared historical experiences allowed Greeks to create bonds of mutual obligation and reciprocal affiliation that could - in the right circumstances - supersede any individual, civic, or ethnic interests.[256]

By the start of the fourth century philosophers and orators began invoking the growing perception of shared, Panhellenic experiences, as the basis for a proposed political unity that would confer responsibilities to each member.[257] In particular, the orator Isocrates championed

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Herodotus see: Gruen 2020: 42-55; Thomas 2001: 213-5 who argue that Herodotus is primarily interested in crafting an Athenocentric legitimization of their empire through his discussion in Book 8 of his *Histories*.

[254] See: Perlman 1976: 5; Green 1996: 6; Hornblower 1991: 13; Flower 2000a: 65-6; Dillery 1995: 54; and Hall 1989: 5-6 who argues that the Greeks constructed their shared identity as Greeks by a comparison between themselves and the Persians, which they then further defined and broadcast through the presentation of themselves in the theatrical productions of the fifth century. Against this view see: Yates 2019: 29-61 who has challenged the common view that the Persian Wars served as a unifying experience for the Greeks, arguing that the monuments which were dedicated in the first few years following the Persian Wars, such as the famed serpent column at Delphi, demonstrate an emphasis on the importance of the contributions from individual *poleis* rather than as a united assembly of Hellenes.

[255] Nagy 1999: 7 argues that Panhellenism began in the Archaic Period with the establishment of the Olympic Games and Delphic Oracle, to which all Greeks could come; Mitchell 2007: 78 finds the origins of Panhellenism in the Archaic period, but notes that the Persian Wars become an essential theme in the construction of a Panhellenic identity.

[256] Thomas 2019: 397.

[257] Plato, *Protagoras* 337 b-d, *Republic* 469c; Aristotle *Politics* 1285a.14-22. See also: Schütrumpf 1972: 6-8.

this idea in speeches such as his *Panegyricus* and in his letters to Dionysius of Syracuse, Philip of Macedon, and the Spartan king Archidamus.[258] In many of these instances, Isocrates calls for a united Greek war against Persia.[259] This use of Panhellenic rhetoric as a call for a united Greek invasion of Persia was so thorough and pervasive through the first half of the fourth century that some modern scholars focus their investigations of Panhellenism solely to its manifestations as a political ideology in which various Greek *poleis* would be joined together in opposition to an external threat, or against a foreign adversary.[260] Yet, even the appeals of Isocrates and others like him for political unity were made through an awareness of the obligations that Greeks have – or should have – toward other Greeks. By calling for a united Greek invasion of Persia, Isocrates was advocating for the cessation of internecine warfare, and his appeal was grounded and justified in the shared membership of the community of Greeks that Hellenicity conferred. The self-reflective awareness that they shared similarities in both their cultural and historical experiences allowed the Greeks to create an overarching community of members whose inclusion was the product of continuous negotiation. This shared membership in the community of Hellenes and its attendant obligations is what Clearchus was able to mobilize in his speech before the army.

As he continued his speech, Clearchus cleverly diminishes the importance of civic association as a salient aspect of identity in the group of Hellenes. By lessening the importance that civic identity had for members of the overarching community of Hellenes, Clearchus was attempting to sublimate the power that obligations to these sub-groups might have if they

[258] Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 173; *Letters* 1.8, 2.11, 3.2, 9.13
[259] Flower 2000b: 93-6.
[260] Low 2018: 455; Flower 200b: 97-8.

conflicted with the overall goals of the community. He continues his speech with an emotionally charged claim about what the army really was to him. He states:

> "For I think that you are to me both a fatherland, and friends and allies, and with you I expect to be honored wherever I am, but being bereft of you I do not think I would be capable either to help a friend, nor to turn away an enemy. Therefore, I will go wherever you will go."[261]

In this part of his speech, Clearchus further defines the group he has created by telling the Greeks they are a fatherland (πατρίδα) to him. This claim helps to solidify the group into a community by pulling upon the shared cultural experiences of a Greek homeland – regardless of wherever the soldiers hearing the speech may have been from. By utilizing their shared heritage and cultural identity Clearchus is able to create a sense of belonging to a community among a group that has little active civic identity to unite it. In other words, because the army was made up of mercenaries, the vast majority of whom were not there representing their *polis*, the assignation of 'fatherland' to the groups provides an imagined civic identity that facilitates the creation of a community. In addition to this, Clearchus' use of πατρίδα also evokes the concept of family. Studies in Evolutionary Psychology have found that people may perceive their nation as an extension of their family, which is why nations are often personified as 'motherland' or 'fatherland.'[262] While it is true that Clearchus is not addressing a nation, (nation is too modern a concept and carries with it an association with a specific territory, which the Cyreans do not have as a primary feature of their understanding of themselves), his application of concept of family to

[261] νομίζω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐμοὶ εἶναι καὶ πατρίδα καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμάχους, καὶ σὺν ὑμῖν μὲν ἂν οἶμαι εἶναι τίμιος ὅπου ἂν ὦ, ὑμῶν δὲ ἔρημος ὢν οὐκ ἂν ἱκανὸς οἶμαι εἶναι οὔτ' ἄν φίλον ὠφελῆσαι οὔτ' ἂν ἐχθρὸν ἀλέξασθαι. ὡς ἐμοῦ οὖν ἰόντος ὅπῃ ἂν καὶ ὑμεῖς οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε. 1.3.6.

[262] Butz 2009: 784: See also Tajfel 1978: 72 who observes "the interrelatedness of people's social identities suggests that people's strong emotional attachments and need to protect their family may transfer to other personally important social identities such as identification with one's nation."

the army as a whole creates an emotional bond for the soldiers that provides a strong sense of belonging and forms the basis for the creation of a community from the disparate parts.

By engaging in a performative demonstration of the proper behavior expected from members of the community, Clearchus strengthens the effectiveness of his Panhellenic rhetoric, as he is able to persuade the troops that he abides by the same behavioral obligations he expects from them. Xenophon reveals that while Clearchus was making a public show of siding with the Greeks, and refusing to meet with Cyrus when he sent for the Spartan general, Clearchus was secretly sending Cyrus notes, promising that he had everything in hand, and telling him to keep sending for him publicly. Many scholars have commented on the skillfulness of Clearchus' manipulation of the troops in this passage.[263] While there is much throughout the speech and the antics of Clearchus that serves to manipulate the soldiers – the creation of a false dichotomy in his choice between being true to the Greeks or false to Cyrus, and his appeal to pity when he says that he will 'suffer what he must' for the choice of the Greeks – his Panhellenic rhetoric is perhaps the most persuasive. By creating a clearly defined space in which the members of the army could access feelings of belonging, Clearchus utilizes the power of Panhellenic rhetoric to create a relatively powerful PSOC. Again, just as he did earlier in his discussion of the Thracians, he creates an in-group of Greeks defined in opposition to the 'barbarians.' He then provides a final justification to the soldiers for their adherence to the behavior expected of members in this group by saying that in the absence of a clear understanding of what is the right action for him, he will choose to be with the Greeks. The effectiveness of this appeal is evident in the subsequent actions of many of the soldiers. Xenophon states that when a report of

[263] Clearchus' note to Cyrus Xenophon is at 1.3.8. For a discussion of Clearchus' manipulation, see: Millender 2012: 383; Laforse 1997: 178-801; Danzig 2007: 32; Roisman 2000: 34-5; Braun 2004: 100-1; Ma 2004: 337; Dillery 1995: 66; Hirsch 1985: 23-5.

Clearchus' speech had been relayed to the rest of the army, more than 2000 troops who had been under the command of two other generals, Xenias and Pasion, Arcadian commanders who had marshaled together 4000 troops from the garrisons in Ionia, left their generals to join with Clearchus' contingent.[264] This realignment of the troops meant that Clearchus had suddenly become the commander of the largest segment of the army. It also demonstrates the power of Panhellenic rhetoric in creating a shared identity that allows for the building of community. The fact that so many soldiers from other contingents came over to serve under Clearchus indicates that his speech and his actions that day struck chords that built bonds of belonging and a shared affective connection with thousands of members of the army – both essential aspects of PSOC.

Having created a strong sense of belonging among the soldiers through his Panhellenic rhetoric, Clearchus further increased the PSOC of the army by giving these troops, and any others who wanted to join in their discussion, input into the course that they should take. Once the soldiers from Xenias and Pasion had joined his contingent, Clearchus assembled them all together and spoke to them about their present situation and the problems confronting them.[265] He began by explaining the shame that he personally felt at having betrayed Cyrus, noting that while Cyrus is the best person to have as a friend, he is equally dangerous to have as an enemy. He then quickly listed the logistical challenges confronting the army without the support of Cyrus, observing that they would struggle to find food, and pointing out that Cyrus had infantry, cavalry, and naval forces at his disposal if they should try to take their supplies by force. When several others spoke and suggested that they elect new generals to lead them since Clearchus did

[264] 1.3.7. This realignment had a terrible effect on the morale of these two generals, and by the time the army reached the Phoenician city of Myriandus on the coast a short time later, they abandoned the campaign 1.4.7. Lee 2007: 50 argues that Cyrus let Clearchus keep Xenias' troops as a reward for delivering the army to him at Tarsus. See also Roisman 1985: 37 who suggests that at least Xenias must have asked for his troops back though Cyrus was unwilling to take them away from the popular and increasingly more powerful Clearchus, which caused Xenias to leave the army shortly afterward.

[265] The debate about their course takes place at 1.3.10-19.

not seem willing to take them back to Greece, Clearchus promised that he would obey whichever commander the army empowered to undertake their withdrawal from Cyrus. Finally, as the reality of their situation began to sink in, and the difficulties that Clearchus pointed to became increasingly apparent, the soldiers voted to send Clearchus to Cyrus to negotiate on behalf of the army. In the end, Cyrus stated that he was not planning to attack the Great King and promised the troops an increase of 50% to their pay.[266] This was enough to appease the men, and they agreed to keep Clearchus in command and follow Cyrus to the Euphrates.

The process by which Clearchus was able to not only compel the soldiers to continue to follow Cyrus, but to increase the size of his contingent of soldiers, shows the effectiveness of Panhellenic rhetoric as a tool for the building of community. By initially presenting his decision to refuse to follow Cyrus as a choice between loyalty to the Greeks or to the barbarians, Clearchus created an in-group / out-group dynamic that allowed for the clear identification of the Greeks as members of the same community. This also established loyalty as an obligatory characteristic of membership in the community, further deepening the bonds which attended membership. Then, by referring to that community as a fatherland he added an emotional component to their membership in the community, creating an affective connection among the heterogeneous and cosmopolitan mercenary army. Finally, by giving the members of the community input into the direction that the army should take, and by his willingness to step aside from his leadership role, Clearchus was able to offer reasonable objections to the army's refusal to follow Cyrus. If Clearchus had gone to the men at the moment they first refused to continue the march and had given those same objections it is highly unlikely that they would have been receptive to them. In fact, as we will see, one of the captains of Proxenos, a man named

[266] Cyrus agrees to pay the army one and a half *Darics* per month in 1.3.21.

Apollonides, is kicked out of the army for pointing out the same problems that Clearchus noted, largely because he did not effectively demonstrate his membership in the community of Greeks when he raised his objections. In this case, Clearchus was able to accomplish his goals by mobilizing the power of Panhellenic rhetoric and creating a space where the members of the army could access three of the aspects of PSOC, giving strong evidence of the effectiveness that Panhellenism had in building community among the Greeks.

Though it is not until after the murder of the Greek commanders by Tissaphernes that it becomes important in creating a sense of community among the members of the army, Panhellenic rhetoric is used as a motivating device at different times throughout the remainder of their march.[267] For example, after Cyrus was killed in the Battle at Cunaxa, the Great King sent a Greek herald from his entourage named Phalios to demand that the Greeks lay down their weapons. Clearchus makes an appeal to Phalios to give them good advice because he is a Greek, promising that if he gives them good counsel his deeds will be reported back in Greece and his reputation will be great when he returns.[268] Later, as the army was delayed leaving Babylonia by the slowness of their Persian escorts, some of the Greek soldiers approached Clearchus and asked him why the Greeks were permitting the Persians to stall and hold them there so long.[269] They claim that Artaxerxes was only gathering up his army, and once he had it assembled, he would seek to crush the Greeks. They argue that Artaxerxes would spend everything he had to defeat the Cyreans, because not doing so would only embolden the rest of the Greek world to come together and attack him – which is exactly the lesson Isocrates took from the success of the Cyreans. Even Cyrus uses Panhellenic rhetoric to raise the morale of his Greek mercenaries. In a

[267] The murder of the commanders appears at 2.5.31-2.
[268] 2.1.15-7.
[269] 2.4.2-4; See also Thomas 2021: 308.

meeting with his Greek generals before the Battle of Cunaxa, Cyrus gave a short speech in which he juxtaposed the bravery and martial superiority of the Greeks when compared to their Persian adversaries.[270] According to Xenophon, Cyrus credits this to the Greeks' freedom, and then exhorts them to fight as men who are worthy of the freedom they possess.[271] In each of these incidents, the character and abilities of the Greeks are held to be the result of a set of shared qualities that both unites them in their possession of these qualities and distinguishes them from the other peoples they encountered. Moreover, in each incident, there is an expectation of behavior that accompanies the acknowledgment of these qualities so that the recognition of their shared Greekness confers certain obligations to behave in specific ways, such as fighting bravely, being loyal, and placing the wellbeing of the Greeks ahead of the barbarians. In this way, Clearchus can tell Phalios that as a Greek he should give his fellow Greeks good and honorable advice, and members of the army can warn the generals that Artaxerxes must make an example of the victorious Greeks before it emboldens the rest of the Greek world to attack him, and Cyrus can exhort the Greeks to fight like men worthy of the freedom that distinguishes them from the Persians they will be facing. In each of these cases, the Greeks are expected to act in a manner that is consistent with the Greeks' understanding of themselves as members of a shared community.

Xenophon's Panhellenic Speech and the Expulsion of Apollonides

Like Clearchus, Xenophon uses Panhellenic rhetoric to great effect in the building of community after the murder of their commanders. As was discussed in the chapter on religion,

[270] 1.7.3-4.

[271] It is difficult to say whether this explanation for the superior fighting skills of the Greeks came from Cyrus, or was Xenophon's own emendation. While it is clear that Cyrus believed in the martial prowess of the Greeks, it is hard to imagine a Persian prince lauding the virtues of freedom in this way. In any event, the description Xenophon provides is useful for the current analysis as it makes clear how the Greeks perceived the obligation of behavior that came from their membership in the community of Hellenes.

once the Greek commanders had been killed, Xenophon describes most of the army as lost in a state of despair, and without any hope or direction.[272] As the evening came on, men threw themselves onto the ground, unable to sleep because of their grief and longing for home. Xenophon looks around at these displays and sees that, although the Persians are likely to attack at daybreak, no one is preparing any kind of defense, or organizing the troops at all.[273] So he takes it upon himself to call a series of meetings to establish new leadership for the army and decide a course of action for them to follow. The first of these speeches is given to the captains of Proxenos, and in it, Xenophon tries to lift the spirits of the men by reframing their situation. The first observation he makes is that the army is no longer bound by their oaths not to pillage the surrounding countryside for provisions.[274] This means that the army is now able to properly feed themselves by matching themselves against the Persians in a fight for those resources, something they had been prohibited from doing under the treaty they had established with Tissaphernes. Xenophon then details what he sees as their advantages in such a contest. He claims that since the Persians have violated their oaths, the gods will favor the Greeks. He then notes:

> "Besides, we have bodies more capable than theirs to bear cold and heat and toil, while our spirits with the gods on our side are braver than theirs. And these men are more vulnerable and liable to die than we are, should the gods give us victory as they did before."[275]

The picture that Xenophon presents is steeped in traditional Panhellenic ideas: the Greeks are presented as hardy, courageous, and righteous, while the Persians are seen as soft, cowardly, and

[272] 3.1.2-3; Rood 2010: 58; and 2015: 100-1.
[273] 3.1.13.
[274] 3.1.19-21; Bassett 2002: 448. In response to Bassett see: Jansen 2014: 125-6. See also O'Connor 2021: 520-3 who argues that the army was not being exploited at the markets provided by the Persians.
[275] ἔτι δ' ἔχομεν σώματα ἱκανώτερα τούτων καὶ ψύχη καὶ θάλπη καὶ πόνους φέρειν· ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ ψυχὰς σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀμείνονας· οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ τρωτοὶ καὶ θνητοὶ μᾶλλον ἡμῶν, ἢν οἱ θεοὶ ὥσπερ τὸ πρόσθεν νίκην ἡμῖν διδῶσιν. 3.1.23. See Mitchell 2007: 130-1.

impious. Of course, Xenophon is trying to inspire the captains by giving the most positive assessment of their situation that he can, but the way in which he does this, by juxtaposing the Greeks with the Persians, increases the PSOC among the captains. By praising the virtuous qualities of the Greeks in comparison to the lack thereof among the Persians, Xenophon creates an in-group / out-group dynamic that circumscribes the members of the community and fosters a sense of belonging by recognizing the features which unite them all.[276] Moreover, the way Xenophon praises and flatters all those who belong to this group provides an affective connection that will allow them to feel good about their membership in the community. The choice of virtues Xenophon lists is also an essential aspect of the way in which he builds up the community of Greeks. By stating that the Greeks are more courageous and hardier than the Persians, Xenophon is creating tacit expectations for the behavior of the soldiers. If they had been considering surrendering, or negotiating further with the Great King, Xenophon's assertions of Greek superiority should, on the one hand, bolster their belief in their own abilities among the members of the army. On the other hand, if anyone should fail to meet the virtues obligated by their membership in the community, an expectation had been established that the other captains could police and evaluate the actions of their fellow soldiers.

The Panhellenic rhetoric in the initial part of Xenophon's speech provided belonging and affective connection, two of the aspects of PSOC that are essential for the establishment of a community. As he continued, he was able to provide the captains with input and integration, the two remaining aspects of PSOC, making the speech highly effective in building a sense of community among the soldiers. Bereft of their generals and many of their captains, Xenophon tells the men to choose new leaders, giving them all input into the community. He then creates a

[276] Leforse 1997: 138 notes that in these three speeches Xenophon's Panhellenic language was not designed to persuade intellectually, but to inspire emotionally.

sense of integration by urging them to utilize their skills, and to "show themselves to be the best of the captains and more worthy to be generals than the generals themselves."[277] This exhortation calls on the captains to contribute to the wellbeing of the community by employing their unique abilities at the highest possible level. By giving the captains a sense of belonging, affective connection, the opportunity to have input into the course the army should take, and by allowing them to integrate their skills as leaders in the community, Xenophon has created a space in which all four aspects of PSOC are readily available for the captains to access as members of the community.

The effectiveness of the PSOC created by Xenophon's speech was immediately made clear when one of the captains, a man named Apollonides spoke up against Xenophon's plan and was at once removed from his command. As was discussed in the preceding chapter, as soon as Xenophon finished his speech, one of the captains of Proxenos, a man named Apollonides, argues that the obstacles the army faces are too great for them to overcome, and the only hope for their survival is to win the King's consent through persuasion. Xenophon interrupts Apollonides as he is listing the difficulties the army would face and reminds him that their generals had just been killed because they gave up their arms and tried to follow the very plan that Apollonides is recommending. Here again is what Xenophon states:

> "It seems to me gentleman, that we should not suffer this man in our company, and depriving him of his captaincy, we should lay packs on his back and use him in this way. For this man dishonors both his fatherland and all of Greece, because he is this way, being a Greek."[278]

[277] φάνητε τῶν λοχαγῶν ἄριστοι καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀξιοστρατηγότεροι. 3.1.24.
[278] ἐμοί, ὦ ἄνδρες, δοκεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτον μήτε προσίεσθαι εἰς ταὐτὸ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀφελομένους τε τὴν λοχαγίαν σκεύη ἀναθέντας ὡς τοιούτῳ χρῆσθαι. οὗτος γὰρ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καταισχύνει καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ὅτι Ἕλλην ὢν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν. 3.1.30.

By expressing a view that was contrary to what a brave and hardy Greek should do, Apollonides called his membership in the community into question. Members were to be identified by the characteristics that Xenophon laid out, and however reasonable Apollonides' objections might be, his recommendation that the Greeks submit to the Persians and try to placate them placed him on the outside of the group at that moment when their emotions were running high. The obstacles and dangers which Apollonides was attempting to enumerate were in fact the same sort of objections that were raised at Tarsus when Clearchus and his men had decided to stay with Cyrus.[279] After all, nothing about the Greek situation had changed with respect to the challenges they faced being in a hostile territory without a reliable means to secure food. Indeed, the situation was worse than at Tarsus because they were even further from Greece and there was now an openly hostile Persian army only a few miles away. But with the murder of their generals, it was clear to nearly all of the Greeks that regardless of the difficulties facing them, any trust that might have existed between the Persians and Greeks was completely lost, and there was no way to reconcile the two camps. This is in part what gave Xenophon's rhetoric such an emotional impact in that moment. There was a clear divide that allowed for the construction of an identity through a comparison to the outside Other. Whatever the Persians were, the Greeks were not, and vice versa. This then formed a stark basis for membership in the community.

The way in which Xenophon increased the PSOC of the group by using the same rhetorical tactics that Clearchus had used at Tarsus helps explain the sudden willingness the captains of Proxenos had for removing Apollonides from his captaincy. Clearchus had been successful in creating an in-group / out-group dynamic that unified the Greeks in opposition to

[279] 1.3.10-19.

the Persians. While Clearchus had made loyalty to the Greek community a defining feature of membership, Xenophon listed martial virtues as essential qualities which every member should possess. By giving an opportunity for others to take command, and not immediately assuming a leadership role for himself, Xenophon gave input to the captains, helping to solidify the commitment to the decisions of the group. Xenophon also created an affective connection by referring to the Greek homeland as their 'fatherland,' just as Clearchus had done when he told the army that they were a fatherland to him. Having established that emotional connection Xenophon then accused Apollonides of bringing shame to their shared home because he was a Greek who was not acting as a Greek should. As soon as Apollonides raised the concerns he had for any defiance of the Great King, it became clear to the other members that he lacked the requisite characteristics necessary for membership in the community. Moreover, according to the dichotomy Xenophon had created, Apollonides was actively shaming them all and their homeland by his actions. With their emotions running high after the murder of their generals, and the fear of a Persian attack that many of them probably felt, Apollonides' failure to embody the characteristics incumbent on members of the community left him suddenly excluded from participation in the community. Had Apollonides, who was raising the same objections as Clearchus, been able to create an affective connection with the captains through an emotional appeal to their homeland, and supported the dichotomy Xenophon proffered, Apollonides might have been able to manipulate the captains just as Clearchus had done six months earlier.

After Xenophon suggested removing Apollonides from their company for his perceived lack of bravery, and therefore lack of Greekness, Agasias, another one of the captains, observed that Apollonides really had "nothing to do with Boeotia or with any part of Greece at all! For I

have noticed that he has both his ears pierced, like a Lydian."[280] Apollonides was then unceremoniously driven out from the army. Many scholars have discussed the implications of this incident, and what it says about Greek attitudes toward difference.[281] What is important in this incident for the current discussion is the timing of Apollonides' expulsion from the army. It comes just as Xenophon had created a sharp distinction between the Greeks and Persians using Panhellenic rhetoric. Accepting the implications of Xenophon's dichotomy meant that anyone who did not display the characteristics associated with the Greeks (bravery, hardiness, righteousness, etc.), did not belong to that group, or rather was not a member in that community. In the judgment of the other captains, Apollonides was not displaying the bravery expected from a member of that community and so he was not able to remain in the community. Again, it did not matter that his objections were the same objections that Clearchus and his troops had laid out when they discussed leaving the army at Tarsus – objections that were seen as reasonable by the army at that time. Nor did it matter that his earrings, the thing that marked him as a Lydian, had apparently not been a problem for the army prior to the creation of Xenophon's new army of Greeks. In fact, it did not even matter that Apollonides was not accused of being a Persian. He was not Greek enough for the new community.[282] By not displaying the characteristics of his fellow members in the all-Greek community, he was shown to be 'Other,' and that was sufficient to deny his membership in the community. It is also important to note that there is little reason to think that the other members of the community would be able to make an emotional connection with someone they viewed as an outsider. When Panhellenism is the rhetorical principle of

[280] "ἀλλὰ τούτῳ γε οὔτε τῆς Βοιωτίας προσήκειοὐδὲν οὔτε τῆς Ἑλλάδος παντάπασιν, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸν εἶδον ὥσπερ Λυδὸν ἀμφότερα τὰ ὦτα τετρυπημένον." 3.1.31.
[281] Lane-Fox 2004: 204; Ma 2004: 336-7; Lee 2007: 72-4; Laforse 1997: 124-5; Flower 2012: 92; Dalby 1992: 21; Seager: 2001: 338; Grethlein: 2012: 27-8.
[282] Roy 1967: 304 suggests that Apollonides was probably an ex-slave.

foundation for a community, Greekness, or at the very least the perception of Greekness, is an essential quality for membership.

Panhellenism After the Death of the Generals

Following this speech, Xenophon made two further speeches that night, the last one demonstrating the broad reach and flexibility Panhellenic rhetoric had in helping to build a community. The first speech was to the remaining generals and captains from all the contingents of the army. In this speech, Xenophon discussed the need for leadership, and the role it would have in rallying the soldiers out of their despair.[283] There is little use of Panhellenic ideas or imagery in this speech; rather it focuses on the steps the commanders should take to revitalize the army and seems aimed at raising the morale of the Greek army. Xenophon explains that it is neither numbers nor strength which wins victory in war, but those whose spirits are more vigorous. In his second speech, which he delivers to the entire assembly of the army, Xenophon shows the flexibility of Panhellenic rhetoric in creating a sense of community among the troops. Soon after he begins speaking, as he is detailing how their hopes for salvation are many and good, he reminds the troops about their past successes against the Persian army. He lists not only their recent victory over the left wing at Cunaxa, but also the success the Greek states had against the armies of Darius and Xerxes when they invaded early in the fifth century.

> "Next, I will remind you also of the difficulties of our own forefathers, in order that you might see how bravery is befitting to you, and how, with the gods, brave men are saved from all dangers. For when the Persians had come and with them a great army to destroy Athens, by themselves the Athenians dared to resist and defeated them."[284]

[283] 3.2.35-45.

[284] ἔπειτα δὲ ἀναμνήσω γὰρ ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς τῶν προγόνων τῶν ἡμετέρων κινδύνους, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὡς ἀγαθοῖς τε ὑμῖν προσήκει εἶναι σῴζονταί τε σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἐκ πάνυ δεινῶν οἱ ἀγαθοί. ἐλθόντων μὲν γὰρ Περσῶν καὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτοῖς παμπληθεῖ στόλῳ ὡς ἀφανιούντων τὰς Ἀθήνας, ὑποστῆναι αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσαντες ἐνίκησαν αὐτούς. 3.2.11.

Reminding the troops of their own recent victory at Cunaxa was an obvious tactic for Xenophon to utilize as he attempted to raise their morale, but linking the success of the Athenians at Marathon to the entire army shows the flexibility of Panhellenic rhetoric in constructing a community. Of the sixty six individuals whose name and civic region is given in the *Anabasis*, only eight are Athenian.[285] All of them are officers serving with the contingent of Proxenos, and unlike those from the other regions most frequently listed, the Spartans, Arcadians, and Achaeans, no Athenian is listed as a common soldier.[286] Moreover, as Xenophon states later in the text, the Arcadians and Achaeans made up more than half of the army.[287] All of this suggests that the Athenians were at best a little less than ten percent of the army, and in all likelihood, the number was much lower than that. Xenophon's claim that "our own forefathers (τῶν προγόνων τῶν ἡμετέρων)" faced the danger and difficulty of fighting the Persians at Marathon does away with concerns about the civic or regional or ethnic identity of most of the army, and permits them to take part in the victory of the Athenians because they are Greek. The army is an imagined community, and the criteria for membership can be limited and adjusted by the consensus of the community. Panhellenic rhetoric allows the community to easily side-step difficult issues such as civic or ethnic identity so that the large group can share in the benefits of a united past.

As he continues this part of his speech, Xenophon shows how Panhellenic rhetoric and Greek religion can work interdependently to help build a sense of community. In his description

[285] Roy 1967: 303-7.
[286] Roy 1967: 307-8 suggests that these men were all well to do Athenians who were unhappy with the newly restored democracy; Laforse 1997: 28 argues that political life for all Athenian cavalrymen was likely unpleasant under the restored democracy given that so many of them had long been oligarchic supporters, and believes this is why Xenophon was looking to leave Athens and do service for Cyrus.
[287] 6.2.10.

of the Athenian victory at Marathon, Xenophon describes how the Athenians swore an oath to Artemis to sacrifice one goat for every Persian killed, but when the battle was over there were not enough goats available to match the number of Persian dead, and so the Athenians vowed to sacrifice 500 goats to the goddess every year from then on.[288] After that he reminds them of the success that the Greeks had against Xerxes and offers as proof of that success, the freedom of the cities in which they were each born, noting that none of them kneel to any person, but only to the gods.[289] By utilizing their shared Hellenic identity, which allows the army to take part in the Athenian victory at Marathon, Xenophon is also able to tie the army to the annual Athenian sacrifices to Artemis.[290] The flexibility of Greek religion further facilitates this building of community through the shared pantheon of Greek gods. Although the sacrifice that the Athenians made was to the cult of Artemis Agrotera, which in Athens had specific associations, the adaptability afforded by the nature of Greek religious worship allowed for local character to be cultivated for a Panhellenic deity in a way that did not necessarily exclude others from that worship.[291] This was why the entire army could agree to tithe to the cult of Artemis of Ephesus as was discussed in the previous chapter. By linking all the members of the army to the Greek victory at Marathon and the subsequent cultivation of the Artemis Agrotera at Athens, Xenophon not only created a positive association that should boost the confidence and morale of the army, he also opened a space in which the members of the community could believe that they were under the protection of the goddess.[292] Just as when the army sacrificed to the wind in Armenia, as was discussed in an earlier chapter, the entire army could take refuge in the protection offered

[288] 3.2.12. See also Purves 2003: 73-5 who argues that Xenophon, writing much later than the battle of Marathon has, through Lydian influence, to some degree assimilated Artemis Agrotera with Artemis of Ephesus.
[289] 3.2.13.
[290] See: Gartziou-Tatti 2013: 92-8.
[291] According to Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 22.2 and Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.20.2 the Spartans also used to sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera particularly before setting out on campaign or before battle. See also Vernant 1988: 230.
[292] Artemis was also worshiped as a savior deity, see Parker 1996: 195 and Solima 1988: 392-4.

to the collective for a sacrifice that they did not personally make. Xenophon's use of Panhellenism to link the entire army to the Athenian sacrifices to Artemis Agrotera, allowed the collective to enjoy the protections afforded to the Athenians. In turn, this feeling of protection allowed the members of the army to form affective connections that helped unify the community through the creation of a key aspect of PSOC.

In the final part of his speech before the entire assembly of the army, Xenophon again draws heavily upon Panhellenic themes in his effort to raise the morale of the army and persuade the soldiers that their position is not nearly as hopeless as it may seem to some of them. Having praised the valor of the soldiers, Xenophon lists the difficulties facing them and one by one explains how they will be able to overcome the things hindering them. He lists many of the peoples they will likely encounter as they march out, and declares to the Greeks that none of those people are better or more capable than they are. He advises that they should act as though they are getting ready to settle in where they are. He claims that if the King believed that they might do this, he would give them guides and hostages and build wide roads to ensure that they would leave his territory.[293] Then, having made his speech he appears to suddenly reconsider what it would mean for the Greeks to settle in that land and adds a final warning to the soldiers assembled there.

> "I really fear, however, that if we once learn to live in idleness and luxury, and to consort with the tall and beautiful women and maidens of these Medes and Persians, we may, like the Lotus Eaters, forget our homeward way. Therefore, to me it seems reasonable and just that first we should return to our families and friends in Greece, and to point out to the Greeks that they are poor by their own choice, for they could see those now at home, living a hard life there as free citizens, come to this place and acquire wealth."[294]

[293] 3.2.23-4.

[294] ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή, ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις βιοτεύειν, καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι εἰκὸς καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι πρῶτον εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους πειρᾶσθαι ἀφικνεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι τοῖς

The meaning behind this enigmatic passage has puzzled scholars for decades. While some have taken it as evidence that Xenophon wants the Greeks to invade Persia - after all, Xenophon says that the poor Greeks could come to that place and acquire riches - others have noted the reference to the Lotus Eaters and argued that Xenophon is warning the Greeks not to lose themselves in the pursuit of wealth and luxuriance.[295] The story of the Lotus Eaters comes from Homer's *Odyssey*. In it Odysseus and his crew are blown off course by the winds for nine days, before they are able to land. There they meet people who eat the honey-sweet fruit of the lotus. When Odysseus sends a few men to talk to them, the Lotus Eaters give lotus fruit to Odysseus' men, who then lose all desire to return home, but only want to sit on the beach and eat the sweet fruit. Odysseus is forced to drag the men back onto the ship and quickly sail away.[296] By using the story of the Lotus Eaters, and saying that he 'fears' that this will be the fate of the Greeks if they settle within the Persian empire, Xenophon is warning everyone who hears that speech that by learning to live in relative idleness and luxury, consorting with the tall women of the Persians and Medes, they may get something pleasant in the moment, but they will forsake their homes and forget who they are as Greeks.[297] Just as he did in his speech to the captains, Xenophon once again makes use of the common perception that the Persians are too soft and luxurious when compared to the poorer but hardier Greeks. This trope, a common Panhellenic theme that is repeatedly found in the literature of the Classical Period, helps to create a shared

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Ἕλλησιν ὅτι ἐκόντες πένονται, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τοὺς νῦν οἴκοι σκληρῶς ἐκεῖ πολιτεύοντας ἐνθάδε κομισαμένους πλουσίους ὁρᾶν. 3.2.25-6.

[295] Supports Panhellenism: Cawkwell 1972: 23-4; Cawkwell 1976: 65; Laforse 1997: 132-34 and Dillery 1995: 62, who admits that it might paradoxically mean the destruction of the Greeks who settle there. Against: Rood 2004: 316; Flower 2012: 181-3 and Ma 2004: 339 who sees the rhetoric in the statement as a way of empowering the Greeks to take command of their situation.

[296] Homer, *Odyssey*, 9.82-104.

[297] For differing views on the Greek soldiers' attitudes toward καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ see: Tuplin 2004: 156; and Lane Fox 2004: 202.

Hellenic identity through alterity with the Persians. Similar imagery can be found in Herodotus, as well as in the epilogue of the *Cyropaedia* in which Xenophon notes the many ways in which the Persians have declined since the days of Cyrus the Great.[298]

The second half of the quoted passage, in which Xenophon points out that the Greeks are poor by their own choice, is also difficult to understand if it is not considered as part of a Panhellenic appeal to raise the morale of the army. If he is afraid that the Greeks will lose their hardiness by learning to live in luxury with the Persians, why does he then suggest that they should bring those who are living a hard life at home to that place and show them that they are impoverished by choice? As some scholars have noted, doing this would result in the destruction of the Greeks, or at the very least a dilution of their identity as Greeks and the loss of what Xenophon feels are some of their best characteristics.[299] The key to understanding this part of the passage is the term πολιτεύοντας, which means 'to be a free citizen.' Xenophon claims that the Greeks are poor by their own choice, for they could see those now at home, living a hard life there as free citizens, come to this place and acquire wealth. Xenophon's use of this term draws a comparison between the Greeks, who in Xenophon's rendition are free to choose how they live, and the Persians, who were thought by most Greeks to be living as slaves. Here again, Xenophon uses another common Panhellenic trope to contrast the Greeks with the Persians to create an overarching sense of their shared Hellenic identity that is grounded in notions of Greek superiority. Similar to the trope about Persian luxuriance, the perception of the Persians as slaves had become an increasingly common stereotype by the end of the fifth century, promoted, at

[298] Herodotus, 9.83.1-3; Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 8.8.9-10, in particular, though the entire epilogue details the perceived degradation since the days of Cyrus.
[299] Dillery 1995: 62.

least in part, by Herodotus, who has many examples of the Persians as slaves in his history.[300] By emphasizing the Greek's ability for self-determination, Xenophon attempts to place a greater value on Greek freedom than on any material treasure that the Persians might possess. In other words, he tells the Greek soldiers that their freedom and self-determination allow them to choose poverty, while the Persians, who may have wealth and luxury, are simply slaves who cannot choose for themselves, and so they are in fact poorer than the Greeks. Xenophon attempts to lift the confidence of the soldiers by utilizing the power of Panhellenic ideals to unite and uplift the army and at the same time, disparages their opponents as categorically beneath them in every way that matters.

An analysis of the actions of the army shows that Xenophon's use of Panhellenic rhetoric and religious ideology were, at least initially, very successful in creating a sense of community among the Cyreans. After Xenophon finished his speech, the army burned their tents and excess baggage and slipped across the Zapatas River.[301] From there, the army began their march upcountry, and aside from an argument about a tactical mistake Xenophon made, and a disagreement between Xenophon and Cheirisophus about the treatment of an Armenian chieftain, Xenophon does not report any significant disruption to the unity of the army until after they reach Trapezous and settle in the Colchian villages more than three months later.[302] It can be difficult to quantify how effective rhetoric of this type is in a complex situation such as the one that faced the Cyreans at this point. If its effectiveness is linked to the cohesion of the army, then there is reason to believe that Xenophon's use of these different appeals was as successful

[300] While there are many examples of this in the *Histories*, perhaps my personal favorite is when Xerxes patiently explains to the exiled Spartan King Demaratus that the Greeks will not fight well *because* they are free, unlike the Persians who fight for fear of their King, and this makes them better than they might naturally be. Herodotus 7.103.3-4 (emphasis mine); See also Gruen 2011: 67-8.
[301] 3.3.1-6.
[302] The disagreement about the Armenian chieftain occurs at 4.6.3; The army's arrival at Trapezous can be found at 4.8.22; For the amount of time marching, see: Thomas 2021: lxv-lxix.

as could be hoped and an extremely robust PSOC was created. Yet in order to give an accurate account of the impact that Xenophon's Panhellenic rhetoric had on the unity of the soldiers, the realities of their situation and how these might have affected the community of the army must also be acknowledged. Once the Cyreans voted to reject any further treaties with the Persians, and to attempt to march out of their territory, there were few other options available to the Cyreans besides marching together toward the Black Sea. Even if they wanted to break apart, they would have all found themselves still traveling together on the shortest route toward safety. Moreover, the immediate danger posed, at first by the Persian forces pursuing them, and later by the Carduchians, meant that their best chance for survival depended on their remaining together. All of this makes assessing the longevity that any Panhellenic rhetoric had in maintaining a sense of community among the soldiers difficult for this part of their march. Still, the way in which the captains of Proxenos deprived Apollonides of his captaincy and drove him from their community suggests that it was a powerful force, at least initially, in uniting the soldiers and motivating them toward collective action. His removal from the community for failing to uphold the newly articulated characteristics expected from the members of the community, even though the issues he raised had been the same issues raised during the mutiny at Tarsus, indicates that it was likely the Panhellenic rhetoric deployed by Xenophon that motivated the captains at that time. Moreover, while the rationale for his removal, that his accent and earrings suggested that he was a Lydian rather than a Greek, may have been a sufficient justification to remove him at that time, although they had apparently never been a problem before throughout the entire march from Sardis, the battle at Cunaxa, and the first part of their retreat upcountry. This sudden concern for characteristics that differentiated members of the army in terms of their Hellenic identity is strong evidence that it was the creation of the community of Hellenes solidified by Xenophon's

Panhellenic rhetoric that drove the concerns of the other captains. Thus, in the beginning, at least, Panhellenic rhetoric unified the soldiers into common action by creating a space in which all four aspects of PSOC were accessible to the members of the community.

Panhellenism Among the Greek Cities of Asia Minor

Although Panhellenic rhetoric was initially successful in creating a strong PSOC among the members of the army, its ability to act as a unifying force seems to have weakened over time and it was only marginally effective as a tool for the maintenance of community. As the army crossed the Zapatas River and made their escape from the heartland of the Persian Empire, they appear to have been thoroughly unified and cohesive. Yet, the situation changed markedly once the army reached the Pontic coast. With a feeling of relative safety returning to the troops, and more options about their route and their short-term goals, the unity among the Cyreans was challenged by these new circumstances. The first incident that shows how things had changed for the Cyreans came about when a Spartan *perioikos* named Dexippus was given command of a warship that had been supplied to the Cyreans by the people of Trapezous so that they could use it to capture other vessels to plunder and then use them for transporting the army back to mainland Greece. Instead of performing the duty that was assigned to him, Dexippus took the warship and immediately deserted the Greeks, sailing out of the Black Sea entirely.[303] However effective the Panhellenic rhetoric used by Xenophon after the murder of the generals had been in creating a sense of community among the soldiers, and lifting them out of their despair to work toward a shared goal, Dexippus at least had found that his own PSOC had diminished to the point that he was able to steal from the community and pursue his own goals at the expense of the other Greeks. Nor was this a lone incident at this stage of their journey. About a month after

[303] 5.1.15.

Dexippus abandoned the army, Xenophon reports that a captain named Clearetus took his messmates and attempted to pillage a friendly town that was occasionally supplying the army with food and other items.[304] They had hoped to raid the town quickly and then steal away from the army on a merchant ship. Yet, the resistance of the town was stronger than they anticipated and many of them, including Clearetus, were killed. Later, some of the survivors of the failed raid managed to attack and kill the ambassadors who had come from the town before they could arrive to discuss the incident with the commanders of the army. Xenophon himself points out to the assembled troops the damage these men did to the safety of the army and to their ability to secure provisions from friendly cities.[305] Along with these incidents of betrayal toward the community, there are several incidents in which the actions of the generals are questioned by the assembly of soldiers and some of them are fined for their poor performance. All these events suggest that whatever sense of community had been built at the Zapatas River was breaking down, allowing individual goals and questions for authority to supersede the wellbeing of the community.

Although its ability to maintain a robust PSOC over time seems to be somewhat weak, Panhellenism could foster the creation of new communities that were previously unrelated and separated by vast distances. With the sense of community slowly dissipating among the Cyreans, the next appeal for unity that made use of Panhellenic ideals did not come from a member of the army, but rather from Hecatonymus, the ambassador sent from the Greek city of Sinope to plead for the safety of their colony Cotyora.[306] The Ten Thousand had marched into the region of Paphlagonia on the southern coast of the Black Sea where Sinope and her colonies were located,

[304] 5.7.13-9.
[305] 5.7.29-33.
[306] Hecatonymus states at the outset that he is an ambassador for Sinope but later it is revealed that he is also proxenos for Corylas at Sinope. For a discussion about the confused nature of this, see Manoledakis 2021: 170.

and had quartered some of their wounded in homes within Cotyora. This was against the orders of the governor of the city and so the Cyreans were compelled to take control of the city gates to ensure that they could retrieve their men whenever they wanted. After introducing himself and congratulating the Cyreans for both their victory over the barbarians, and for making their way through so many difficulties to that place, Hecatonymus makes his request of the army, utilizing their shared Greekness as the basis for his appeal. "Now we claim, being Greeks ourselves, and with you also being Greeks, to receive good treatment and nothing harmful. For we have done nothing ever to begin making trouble for you. These Cotyorites are our colonists and we gave to them this land having taken it from the Barbarians."[307] Hecatonymus asserts that by virtue of their shared Greekness it is proper (ἀξιοῦμεν) for the Cyreans to treat them well, and it would be wrong for them to act badly toward them. Indeed, the term Hecatonymus uses in his claim, ἀξιόω, can mean that it is *required* of the Greeks to act as he is suggesting. He claims that if there is no previous injury that exists between them, there is an obligation for the Cyreans to be on friendly terms with their fellow Greeks, and the basis for this obligation is their shared Greekness. Hecatonymus states that since they are all Greeks, and all things being equal, they have an obligation to be friends. This appeal for unity based on a shared Hellenic identity shows how Panhellenism can act as a basis for community building between Greeks who have no prior history with one another and who come from cities hundreds of miles apart. Once their shared Hellenic identity has been established, the two parties are able to then make claims of obligation from the other, based on their membership in the community of Hellenes. Yet, as the subsequent actions of the Cyreans and the Greek cities on the Pontic coast demonstrate, these obligations are

[307] ἀξιοῦμεν δὲ Ἕλληνες ὄντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ὑφ' ὑμῶν ὄντων Ἑλλήνων ἀγαθὸν μέν τι πάσχειν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν πώποτε ὑπήρξαμεν κακῶς ποιοῦντες. Κοτυωρῖται δὲ οὗτοι εἰσὶ μὲν ἡμέτεροι ἄποικοι, καὶ τὴν χώραν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς ταύτην παραδεδώκαμεν βαρβάρους ἀφελόμενοι. 5.5.9-10.

relatively weak and do not appear sufficiently strong to compel either group to take significant action if that action would go against their own self-interest.

Although both Xenophon and Hecatonymus acknowledge the obligation for fair treatment toward other Greeks incumbent on members of the community of Hellenes, each threatens the other with violence as their negotiation continues, indicating that these obligations are flexible and are not compelling in certain circumstances. As Hecatonymus continues to petition Xenophon for a redress of his grievances on behalf of the city of Cotyora, he makes several further pleas steeped in Panhellenic rhetoric. Yet having begun his appeal by invoking an expectation of good treatment from fellow Greeks, he ends his speech by threatening to form an alliance with the non-Greek Paphlagonians and anyone else to force the Cyreans into compliance: "for we do not think these things to be right. But if you should do them, you will force us to make an alliance with Corylas and Paphlagonia and whosoever else we can."[308] Xenophon responds to this threat by pointing out that the Cyreans could just as easily join with the Paphlagonians against the Cotyorites. Both groups are willing to set aside the acknowledged obligations for good treatment of other Greeks when their own interests are at issue. In fact, Xenophon clarifies the philosophy of the Cyreans toward the Greek cities they have come to:

> "Now since we have come to Greek cities, in Trapezous we purchased the things we needed for they provided us a market, and in return for both the honor they paid us, and the hospitality they showed to the army we honored them in return, and if anyone of the barbarians were their friends, we kept our hands off of them, but to their enemies, against whom they themselves would lead us, we did as much harm as we were able."[309]

[308] ταῦτ' οὖν οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ποιήσετε, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν καὶ Κορύλαν καὶ Παφλαγόνας καὶ ἄλλον ὅντινα ἂν δυνώμεθα φίλον ποιεῖσθαι. 5.5.12.

[309] καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ εἰς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἤλθομεν, ἐν Τραπεζοῦντι μὲν (παρεῖχον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀγοράν) ὠνούμενοι εἴχομεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, καὶ ἀνθ' ὧν ἐτίμησαν ἡμᾶς καὶ ξένια ἔδωκαν τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἀντετιμῶμεν αὐτούς, καὶ εἴ τις αὐτοῖς φίλος ἦν τῶν βαρβάρων, τούτων ἀπειχόμεθα· τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους αὐτῶν ἐφ' οὓς αὐτοὶ ἠγοῖντο κακῶς ἐποιοῦμεν ὅσον ἐδυνάμεθα. 5.5.14.

Xenophon reports that the behavior of the army toward the cities they encounter has changed now that they are in territory that has Greek cities, and the army recognizes their obligation toward the Greek cities in the area. Still, Xenophon admits that the army treated the Trapezuntians well in return for the honor and hospitality they showed the Cyreans. If the Trapezuntians had not provided a market for the Greeks, and had left the army to try and secure supplies by some other method, it is likely that the army would have acted differently toward them and their allies. For example, when the Spartan navarch Anaxibius, who was in command of the Greek city of Byzantium when the army arrived, closed the gates of the city to them, the Cyreans quickly stormed the gates and were prepared to begin plundering the city for not having aided them. Only the timely intervention of Xenophon prevented the city from being sacked by the army.[310] As much as there was an obligation for good deeds and good behavior that was understood to exist between Greeks, in the absence of reciprocity, or even the perception of its absence, those obligations could be easily dismissed.

In contrast to the obligations that existed between members of the community of Hellenes, the conduct of the Cyreans toward the non-Greek Tibarenians reveals a stark absence of any Panhellenic obligations. Just prior to reaching Cotyora, the army passed through Tibarenia, a region inhabited by non-Greek locals who Herodotus claims were subjects of the Persian Empire.[311] When the army reached their borders the Tibarenians sent ambassadors with gifts to the Cyreans asking for friendship with the Greeks, but the generals wanted to plunder their coastal fortresses, and would not accept any gifts from them until sacrifices could be made,

[310] Once the army managed to gain access to Byzantium, they called on Xenophon to use them to accomplish something great, and were only persuaded against harming the city when Xenophon told them doing so would anger the Spartans 7.1.21

[311] Herodotus 3.94. For a clarification of the relationship between Tibareni and their neighbor Cotyora see: Gallo 2015: 50.

to consult the gods whether such an attack would be permitted.[312] It was only after the omens all came back negative, and the seers declared that the gods would not sanction such an attack against the Tibarenians that the Greeks accepted their hospitality. This behavior reveals a sharp contrast between the attitudes of the Cyreans toward Greek and non-Greek cities. In Xenophon's account the behavior of both the Greek cities and the Cyreans indicate that there was an expectation that basic friendly gestures were both obligatory and reciprocated in the normal course of events. In the absence of an acute concern or need by one of the parties, sharing in their Greekness was typically enough to secure good relations with the cities they encountered. For the Tibarenians, it took the intervention of the gods to save them from being attacked.

When the circumstances surrounding the obligations created by Panhellenism included a need or a concern driven by the self-interest of one of the members, that member would often forgo the obligations, again pointing to a shortcoming in the effectiveness of Panhellenism in community building. Perhaps the best example of this can be seen in the behavior of the Cyreans toward the Greek city of Heraclea on the Pontic Coast of Asia Minor. Having secured enough ships to transport the army toward Greece following their arrival at the Black Sea, the army stopped at the Greek city of Heraclea on the coast. When they arrived, the Heracleots provided a market and sent the army gifts of food and drink.[313] Yet, after taking these gifts, several of the captains publicly called upon the generals to demand that the Heracleots give them money in addition to the supplies. Xenophon and the Spartan general Cheirisophus refuse to extort money from a friendly Greek city – one that had met, at least in their eyes, the obligations required by

[312] 5.5.2-5.
[313] 6.2.3, the Heracleots sent the army three thousand *medimni* of barley meal, two thousand jars of wine, twenty cattle and a hundred sheep.

their membership in the community of Hellenes.[314] While some of the members of the army agreed with the two generals, and did not think it right to attack a friendly Greek city, a significant number of soldiers supported the attempt to demand money from the city, and they elected officers to act as ambassadors who would relay these demands to the Heracleots. Upon hearing from these ambassadors, the Heracleots withdrew the market they had set for the Cyreans outside their walls, locked the city gates, and manned the walls. The willingness by so many members of the army to reject the obligations for reciprocity toward a friendly Greek city is strong evidence that the obligations created by Panhellenism failed to create a strong sense of community when there was a competing concern driving one of the parties. The Heracleots had done everything that the Trapezuntians had done to fulfill their obligations as Greeks to the Cyreans, and so the city should have been given the same reciprocity as Trapezius had. Yet once the possibility of securing money was presented to the soldiers, their immediate self-interests overcame any perceived obligation arising out of their membership in the community of Hellenes. Indeed, so many of the soldiers were unhappy with the general's refusal to try and demand money from the Heracleots that the community of the army broke apart into three separate autonomous divisions. Just as when Hecatonymus and Xenophon had each threatened to join with the Paphlagonians against the other, the immediate self-interest of any member of the community of Hellenes seems to easily suspend and supersede the obligations required to fellow members of the community of Hellenes, suggesting that while Panhellenism can be a strong force in the creation of a community, the circumstances in which the Panhellenic rhetoric is deployed will dramatically affect the strength of the bonds created. When the goals and interests of the parties were sufficiently aligned, the strength of the PSOC created by the deployment of

[314] It was Xenophon and Cheirisophos' refusal to attack Heracleia that led, at least in part, to the succession of the Peloponnesian segment of the army 6.2.3, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Panhellenic rhetoric could be remarkably strong, as it was in the case of Apollonides. Yet any failure in the alignment of those interests could have an almost lethal effect on Panhellenism's ability to create a strong PSOC. Moreover, because the circumstances of a community were always changing, the ability of Panhellenic appeals to maintain that community over time diminished as the interests of the group diverged. This helps explain why Panhellenism failed to help hold the army together once they reached the Black Sea and there were suddenly so many more options available to the soldiers. At the Zapatas River there were really very few choices open to them – submit and hope that the Persians would treat them favorably or try to escape out of Persian territory by the shortest possible way. After the killing of the generals many of the soldiers did not trust the Persians to treat them fairly if they surrendered so escape seemed too many to be the only hope. Yet once they reached the Black Sea and there was a multiplicity of real choices open to them, their goals diverged and the effectiveness of Panhellenic rhetoric to inspire unity in the group diminished.

While an abiding self-interest may compel a member of the community of Hellenes to reject their obligations toward another, it may not absolve their behavior in the eyes of the community at large. When the Cyreans had finally crossed over into Thrace in the fall of 400, they were hired as mercenaries by the Thracian king Seuthes.[315] After a harsh winter in service to the king, the Greek army was owed some of its pay. Through an investigation into the missing funds, it was determined that Heraclides, the Greek administrator working for the Thracian King, had stolen some of the funds that were due to the army. When his theft was revealed to them, he was castigated by the soldiers for his actions. Polycrates the Athenian announced to the assembly of the army, "Therefore, if we are wise, we will take hold of him. For this man," he said, "is not

[315] 7.3.14.

a Thracian, he is Greek, yet he is wronging Greeks."[316] Although his theft from the Cyreans could be understood as self-interest by the other Hellenes, that self-interest did not absolve his behavior, or remove the perception of his obligations to the community. Polycrates makes it clear that what Heraclides had done was wrong in two ways: the theft of the funds was wrong on the general principle that stealing from others is wrong, and it was also wrong because the crime that Heraclides was guilty of had been committed by a Greek against other Greeks. The obligations attending membership in the Panhellenic community did not necessarily disappear when confronted by a competing self-interest, rather they persisted throughout, and it was only in the eventuality that they could be enforced that they were consistently articulated. Because circumstances for the Cyreans allowed them to hold Heraclides accountable for his actions, his violation of the obligations to fellow members of the community of Hellenes could be publicly redressed, allowing for at least some reinforcement of expectations inherent with membership in the community. In the same way, when Hecatonymus threatened to betray his obligations to the community, Xenophon reminded him that the same course was available to the Cyreans and his actions against the community could be held to account. Yet, when the city of Heraclea was extorted by a contingent of the army, they had no recourse to redress the violation of their membership in the community of Hellenes, and could only withdraw into the city in the hopes of protecting themselves. The community of Hellenes was created by a tacit recognition of a shared cultural experience that was similar enough for its members to recognize themselves in one another, and to create bonds of obligations to members within the community. Yet the community lacked a defined mechanism for the enforcement of any obligations which

[316] ἢν οὖν σωφρονῶμεν, ἐξόμεθα αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὗτός γε," ἔφη, "Θρᾷξ ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ Ἕλλην ὢν Ἕλληνας ἀδικεῖ." 7.6.41. See also Stronk 1995: 204-5.

membership incurred, and as a result it was not effective in maintaining the bonds of the community in the face of adversity.

In sum, the use of Panhellenism by the army, at times, allowed for the creation and maintenance of a strong sense of community among the soldiers, while at other times, competing interests could limit the effectiveness of Panhellenic rhetoric as a unifying force. Panhellenism itself is a modern term for the way the Greeks used the recognition that their shared cultural inheritance and history together created a large and loosely bound community that conferred some measure of obligation on its members. The exact character of membership in the community and the limits of these obligations were never fully articulated, and varied over time and from one individual to another, yet there seems to be a clear expectation of particular behaviors based solely on membership in the community of Hellenes. Of the four principle psychological mechanisms for creating a sense of community Panhellenism was primarily a way to foster a sense of belonging among the members of the community. It did this by identifying its members as 'all the Hellenes' and then allowed for the limits of that identity to be defined by its members. This was most effectively done through a process of opposition, excluding groups like the Persians, and then crafting an identity that was at least in part understood by acknowledging what it was not - the Greeks were not Persians. This allowed for some flexibility at the margins in determining membership in the community.

In the *Anabasis* we see Panhellenism utilized to help build a community out of soldiers who came from cities all over the Greek world. Clearchus used it with great efficiency in manipulating the reluctant soldiers to keep following Cyrus although they had begun to suspect that he was leading them against the Great King. His deployment of Panhellenic rhetoric – along with some dramatic machinations – was so successful that he brought nearly 2,000 soldiers into

his own contingent. In particular Clearchus was able to create the PSOC elements of belonging and input as he worked to compel the soldiers to stay with Cyrus. Xenophon was also able to use Panhellenic rhetoric to great effect after the murder of the Greek generals. Once he had established a clear divide between the Greeks and everyone else, he used several Panhellenic tropes to help foster an affective connection among the soldiers. The sense of community created by Xenophon's speeches was so strong that when Apollonides questioned the wisdom of Xenophon's plan he was driven from the community for failing to embody the characteristics required for membership.

When the army arrived at the Black Sea coast and began to engage with the Greek cities there, Panhellenic rhetoric was used by members of those Greek cities to try and coerce the army into behaving according to loosely prescribed norms that are expected from members of the community of Hellenes. An indication of the weakness of Panhellenic rhetoric as a compulsory force, especially when members of the community have conflicting goals, came when the Cyreans refused to give into a request from the ambassador Hecatonymus. When the army refused to remove their soldiers from the city gates, he threatened to make an alliance with a non-Greek power to compel the soldiers to behave as the ambassador wished. Xenophon responded to this threat by making a similar threat of his own, further indicating how easily the obligations that came with membership in the community could be set aside when there were conflicting goals for the members. The weakness of Panhellenism was particularly evident in the decision by members of the army to try and extort money from the friendly Greek city of Heraclea, which had already sent the army gifts of food and drink in response to their obligation toward fellow members of the community of Hellenes.

Taken together, these events demonstrate that while Panhellenism does seem to have been effective in at least initially creating a sense of community among the Greeks of the army, it was weak at preserving the unity of the soldiers. Both individuals and larger groups within the community repeatedly followed self-serving policies, even though those policies would often come at the expense of fellow Greeks. Moreover, the obligations that membership in the community conferred on its members were understood - even if they remained only tacit expectations - yet time and again we see Greeks failing to fulfill those obligations, and exploiting members of their own community.

Chapter 4: *STASIS*

In all of the previous chapters, the different aspects of Greek culture that we have looked at had the potential to unite the army through the creation of an increased PSOC, typically by defining membership in a way that allowed for a clear sense of belonging and increasing the affective connection felt by members of the community through integration, that is giving members of the community an opportunity to use their skills to the benefit of the community, and input. This final chapter will present an analysis of several incidents of *stasis* – or factional strife – that occurred within the community of the army and consider how during moments of factional strife, when sub-groups within the community attempted to advance their own objectives, religion, ethnicity, and Panhellenism affected the wellbeing of the community. The decision to analyze these features of Greek culture during moments of *stasis* comes about because *stasis* was a phenomenon of nearly every Greek community at the start of the fourth century and was present in the community of the army as well. Indeed, in the most pronounced example of factional strife that occurred among the Cyreans, the Arcadians and Achaeans seceded from the community of the army and broke off into their own splinter community. While this dissolution of the community that had preserved the soldiers since the battle of Cunaxa provides the most compelling example of the relative effectiveness of these cultural aspects in uniting a community, it also shows the corrosive force that factional strife could have in the communities of Greece. As we will see, because religion, ethnic identity, and Panhellenism could be mobilized by sub-groups within the larger community, their effectiveness in maintaining the macro-community in the face of pressure from factions within the community was severely reduced. The mobilization of the unifying forces of religion, shared ethnicity, and

Panhellenism by sub-groups within the army at the expense of the macro-community reveals an inherent weakness in the ability of these cultural features to act as a unifying force among a heterogeneous population of Greeks. Furthermore, because of the primacy of regional identity, the local distinctions in cultic practice, and the weakness of the bonds of obligation created by a shared Hellenicity, any relatively large heterogeneous Greek community would be vulnerable to disunity should any of these aspects of their culture be exploited by a sub-group within the community. Finally, because factional strife was endemic within the communities of Ancient Greece at this time, this vulnerability would have been a regular feature of Greek communal life at the start of the fourth century.

The *Stasis* of Clearchus and Menon

While the episode of *stasis* that culminated in the Arcadian and Achaean secession was the most destructive to the unity of the community, it was not the only incident that threatened violence among the members of the army, or that resulted in the deaths of some of the soldiers. After Cyrus was killed at the Battle of Cunaxa the Greeks agreed to a truce with the Persians that would allow them to return to Greece without having to fight their way one thousand miles back to the Aegean Sea. When the army reached the Zapatas River on their march home, they were in the company of Tissaphernes and the western Persian army who was escorting them out of Persian territory. Xenophon reports that both the Greek and Persian camps were on their guard, and each was suspicious of the intentions of the other.[317] Eager to lessen the tensions before violence broke out, the Spartan general Clearchus, who Xenophon reports had become the de facto commander of the army after the death of Cyrus, sought an audience with Tissaphernes at his tent. At their meeting, Clearchus reminded the satrap that the oaths the Greeks had taken

[317] This entire incident is at 2.5.1-34.

prevented them from doing harm to the Persians and assured him that he should not give credit to those of the Greeks who were spreading false reports and meeting secretly with the Persians trying to gain control of the army for themselves by slandering Clearchus. Rather, Clearchus said, if Tissaphernes would only tell him the names of those conspiring against him, they would pay the ultimate price. Tissaphernes agreed to reveal the conspirators but said that he would only give out the names in the presence of the Greek captains and generals. Eager to reassert his control over the army and expose those who were conspiring against him, Clearchus promised to bring all the officers of the Greek army to Tissaphernes' tent the next day. Xenophon claims that Clearchus had long suspected that the Thessalian general Menon was trying to undermine his authority and secure overall command of the army for himself, and that he was both forming factions and plotting against him (καὶ στασιάζοντα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα). As has been discussed earlier, when the Greek officers arrived at his tent the following day, Tissaphernes had them seized and put them to death. The sudden loss of their commanders while they were still so deep in hostile territory, and with a large Persian military force so close by, left the army in a state of despair, as Tissaphernes was no doubt expecting. It was only through unexpected resilience, unified action, and no small amount of luck that the Greeks were able to escape from this dangerous situation.

The struggle for power among the generals that left Clearchus blind to the machinations of Tissaphernes, may seem out of place in the usually rigid hierarchy of a military command structure, but when these events are considered as factional struggles within the community of the army, they can be understood as a normal condition of any Greek community. Factional strife, or what the Greeks called *stasis,* had been a feature of Greek cities going back at least into the Archaic Period, and perhaps earlier. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in the 430s,

factional strife had become so endemic that the historian Thucydides claimed practically the whole Greek world was convulsed by *stasis*.[318] Its destructive potential was a pressing concern for the ancient Greeks, many writers from the late fifth and early fourth centuries warned about the dangers of factionalism in their writing. The comic playwright Aristophanes, writing at roughly the same time as Thucydides, ridicules the Athenians about the influence of conspiratorial factions in several of his plays.[319] The philosopher Democritus, alert to its destructive force, observed, "civil strife is an evil to each, for both the winners and losers are similarly ruined."[320] In the *Republic*, Plato warns that a charismatic demagogue might utilize factional strife to overthrow even a democratic city as the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse had done.[321] The concern that each of these authors expresses for the destructive potential that *stasis* could have for the community suggests that factionalism had become a serious problem for many Greek communities. Yet despite these concerns, communities throughout the Greek world allowed the development of competing factions within the citizen population. Indeed, just as these communities, the Cyreans also experienced factional strife that strained the unity of the army and at several points got many of their members killed. This chapter will seek to explain how religion, ethnicity, and Panhellenism affected the community of the Cyreans during moments of *stasis*, and why, in spite of its destructive potential, *stasis* was accepted as an unavoidable feature within the army of the Ten Thousand.

Despite its deceptively straightforward essence, scholars have struggled to reach a consensus definition of *stasis* that accounts for all its aspects. The root of the word *stasis* is the

[318] Thucydides 3.82.1.
[319] Aristophanes, *Wasps* 463-76, 489-94; *Knights* 475-9, 626-9.
[320] Democritus *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 68 B 249: στάσις ἐμφύλιος ἐς ἑκάτερα κακόν· καὶ γὰρ νικέουσι καὶ ἡσσωμένοις. ὁμοίη φθορή.
[321] Plato *Republic* 8.564d-7a.

verb ἵστημι, which means to stand or to set up, and it has been translated into English as 'civil war' 'sedition' 'revolution' and 'faction.'[322] While each of these translations pivots around a similar idea – discord over the governing of a community – they differ substantially in the degree to which the conflict becomes violent. The ambiguity in understanding the term comes about in part because the ancient Greeks used the term *stasis* to denote all of these events, so that civil war, sedition, revolution, and faction are all referred to as *stasis*.[323] For the purposes of this chapter, I take *stasis* to mean factional strife within a Greek community that can breakout into violence, but violence need not be present for *stasis* to occur.[324]

An analysis of the ongoing struggle for dominance between Clearchus and Menon reveals the process by which *stasis* can break out in a community and helps explain how the generals could have been trapped by Tissaphernes. In Xenophon's recounting of the events, the rivalry between Clearchus and Menon that would eventually contribute to both of their deaths began at the city of Thapsacus as the army was about to cross the Euphrates River.[325] Cyrus had revealed his intention to attack his brother in Babylon and was trying to persuade the Greeks to follow him. Menon, sensing an opportunity to win the favor of Cyrus, and to secure rewards for himself and his men, urged his troops to be the first of the Greeks to cross the river, while the rest of the army was still deciding their course. Convinced by Menon's speech, his troops quickly made

[322] See: Skultety 2009: 347; Barnard 1980: 2-4.
[323] Some scholars, such as Barnard 1980: 45, place much emphasis on violence as the defining feature of *stasis* and see it as akin to a war that is either present or absent in a city. While there were many cases in which *stasis* was exceedingly violent, such as the civil war in Corcyra, it was not always so. Indeed, Xenophon acknowledges in the lead up to the Arcadian secession that there were factions (στάσις) in the army that might be lessened if they elected a single commander, but there was no violence among the Cyreans. Xenophon, *Anabasis* 6.1.29: ὅτι ἧττον ἂν στάσις εἴη ἑνὸς ἄρχοντος ἢ πολλῶν.
[324] Lintott 1982: 75-6 is one of the few scholars who emphasizes that *stasis* often occurs without violence; see also Van Wees 2008: 9. Plato, in *Republic* 470b6-7 says that while revolution, sedition, and faction existed in the other cultures that the ancient Greeks encountered, *stasis* was something that only occurred between Greeks and not between Greeks and Persians. He viewed *stasis* as a uniquely Hellenic phenomenon. Xenophon, for example, uses the verb στασιάζω in the *Anabasis* seven times when discussing the disposition of the Greek army, but never uses the word in his description of Cyrus' rebellion against Artaxerxes.; see also Kalimtzis 2000: 17.
[325] The entire episode occurs at 1.4.12-18.

their way across the river before the rest of the army had declared whether they would march with Cyrus or not. Cyrus, seeing what they had done, eagerly followed them, and without ever giving their official approval, the remainder of the army followed across as well. Xenophon reports that Cyrus promised rewards for the troops who had been first across and sent a number of gifts to Menon himself. Prior to this incident, Clearchus had gained recognition as the de facto commander of the Greek troops, and was regarded by Cyrus and the other Persians as honored above the rest of the Greeks.[326] Yet, Menon had steadily secured honors for himself and his troops ever since his arrival at Colossae.[327] After his display at Thapsacus, Cyrus moved Menon's troops to the right wing of the army (the position of highest honor) when the army was under review for the Cilician Queen at Tyriaeum.[328] This rearrangement displaced Clearchus and his troops, who were moved to the left wing. Menon was then given the further honor of escorting the Queen back home through Lycaonia to Cilicia.[329]

The rivalry between Clearchus and Menon described in these incidents not only represents the most common kind of *stasis* found within the community of the Cyreans; it also gives an indication of one of the most common causes of *stasis* throughout the Greek world, intra-elite competition. *Stasis* typically happens along two axes, vertical and horizontal.[330] Vertical *stasis* takes place when factional strife breaks out between groups of different socioeconomic classes. In the Classical Period, vertical *stasis* is most often found in the struggles between oligarchs and democrats. Horizontal *stasis* occurs when there is a struggle for power that takes place between factions within the same socioeconomic class and is typified by intra-

[326] 1.6.5.
[327] Arrival of Menon occurs at 1.2.6.
[328] 1.2.15.
[329] 1.2.20
[330] Phillips 2008: 35-49. See also Buxton 2018: 155.

elite struggles that occur between the most powerful aristocrats of a city.[331] The competition between Clearchus and Menon was an example of horizontal *stasis,* where the commanders competed amongst themselves for greater power and control. The different contingents they commanded became rival factions within the army, competing against one another for the kinds of material and honorific rewards that Cyrus lavished on those who were able to gain his favor. They also behaved just as factions within the cities generally behaved, capitalizing on opportunities to secure resources and greater control when they presented themselves.[332] In this way, the factions within the army were motivated by the same sorts of considerations that motivated factions within the cities of Greece, such as greater prosperity and security for themselves and their benefactor.

When intra-elite competition makes use of supporting factions, communities can quickly become destabilized and violence becomes a real possibility. As the competition between the two commanders and their contingents escalated, the two factions were nearly engulfed by violence and Cyrus was forced to intercede as he attempted to return the army to a more unified condition. Shortly after the crossing of the Euphrates, one of Menon's men got into a dispute with a man from Clearchus' contingent, and Clearchus, deciding that Menon's man had been in the wrong, had him flogged.[333] Later that same day, as Clearchus was riding through Menon's section of the camp, one of Menon's men threw an ax at Clearchus, and several others threw stones, causing

[331] Aristotle, *Politics* 5.1305b 20-40 notes that these axes are not mutually exclusive, and factional strife can occur along both axes at the same time. He observes that socioeconomic struggles can be dynamically interrelated, as happens when a populist member of the aristocracy uses discontent within the *demos* to garner greater power for himself among the elite. Perhaps the most famous example of this took place when Cleisthenes used dissatisfaction within the *demos* to defeat his fellow aristocrat Isagoras by promising reforms that favored the *demos*, though his party had not demonstrated any particular concern for the people prior to that election. See Van Wees 2008: 25.
[332] Buxton 2019: 161.
[333] The entire incident described between Menon and Clearchus takes place at 1.5.11-17. Xenophon is often imprecise in his chronology of events, but this incident likely occurred within two weeks of the crossing of the Euphrates. See Lee 2008: table 1.

the Spartan general to flee to his own troops. The two contingents took up their arms and began to march against one another. Only the sudden arrival and intervention of Proxenos and then Cyrus kept the two sides from coming to blows. Xenophon does not say what began the initial dispute, but Clearchus' decision to summarily flog one of Menon's soldiers strongly suggests that he was interested in asserting his own position of primacy within the command structure ahead of Menon and he used as the instrument of that demonstration one of Menon's troops. For Clearchus, making an example of one of Menon's troops served two purposes: it not only affirmed his position as the most honored of the Greeks, but also reduced Menon to a subordinate position, showing to Menon and the rest of the army that Clearchus had command over all the troops, even those under the command of another general. In this way, Menon's soldier served as a proxy by which Clearchus could broadcast his position as the commander of the Greeks. Clearchus had not read the partisan dynamic between the contingents correctly, and nearly got himself killed by Menon's troops as a result. In response to the incident, Cyrus moved Menon's contingent to the left wing, and placed Clearchus on the right, back to the position of honor, as they marched several stages through Babylon and prepared to meet the army of the Great King.[334]

The tacit acceptance of such a high degree of competition between the commanders of the army is rooted in Greek perceptions about the nature of strife and its role in the community, evidence of which can be found in some of the earliest Greek writing. To understand how the Cyreans may have thought about factional strife, it is helpful to consider how strife had been presented in Greek literature and philosophy. Hesiod, in *Works and Days*, describes the origins of the divine personification of strife (ἔρις), which he says is represented by two beings, each

[334] 1.7.1.

with a different heart.[335] The first of these is an evil kind of strife that fosters terrible war and battle. The other is benevolent and inspires people to outdo their neighbors in great deeds. Hesiod explains that the beneficial strife was made by Zeus for the good of human beings, and can, in the right circumstances, be constructive for the individual and the community. He says that through this kind of strife, potter envies potter, carpenter envies carpenter, and so on. Each of these improve the community through their efforts in competition with those who are around them. This is also true among the Cyreans. Xenophon reports several incidents in which a desire to be best among the captains and lieutenants led to a competition between the soldiers that produced great results for the army.[336] Yet, while individual competition within the army was useful at times, the struggles between the commanders, who were motivated by their own accumulation of power, hurt the unity of the army at several key moments, and left the army fractured so that the contingents nearly came to blows.

Because they also accepted *stasis* as an unavoidable condition in any community, the philosophers of the late fifth and fourth centuries sought to limit the outbursts of violent *stasis* by advocating for the implementation of laws or governing structures that would obtain a harmonious balance of competing interests.[337] Democritus, writing probably at the end of the fifth century, sees at the heart of *stasis* the natural desire for wealth and for competition, which can only be held in restraint by the laws of the community.[338] Like the two kinds of strife mentioned by Hesiod, Democritus holds that the desire to compete with one's neighbor is natural, and in moderation can be healthy. Yet, good laws are needed to hold back the excesses that some are driven to by envy: "the laws would not prevent each man from living in

[335] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 10-27.
[336] 5.2.11-3; 4.3.29; 4.8.27; See also Reeves 2022: 63-75.
[337] Pellegrin 2019: 246.
[338] Democritus *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 68 B 191. See also, Barnard 1980: 23.

accordance with his own powers if each did not harm the other. For envy constitutes the beginning of *stasis*."[339] Plato also seems to have believed that factional divides within a city were a natural impulse of citizens. In the *Republic*, he proposed the creation of a series of institutions within his utopia that would restore a natural balance to the life of the individual citizens so that they would be content within the city at large.[340] Aristotle, in his *Politics*, produced an analysis of *stasis* in the cities of Greece that not only recognized that they were a natural consequence of living in a community, but a necessary feature for the proper establishment of a just *polis*. By looking at constitutions that had failed to survive factional strife in comparison to others which had been able to weather such difficulties, Aristotle recognized that class struggle may sometimes be damaging, but, since it represents the normal basis of political life, it is in no way a pathological phenomenon, and one should not attempt to eradicate class struggle as one would attempt to cure a disease.[341] All of these thinkers believed that factional divisions within the city were a natural consequence of being in a community, and all focused on the establishment of structural limitations built into the accepted behaviors of citizens within the city as a way of keeping those natural factions from degenerating into violent conflict with one another.[342]

When Cyrus interceded in the dispute between the contingents of Clearchus and Menon shortly after the crossing of the Euphrates, and then moved the contingent of Clearchus back to the right wing of his army, he was using his authority as the commander of the army to limit the

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[339] Democritus *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 68 B 245: οὐκ ἂν ἐκώλουν οἱ νόμοι ζῆϝ ε΄καστον κατ᾽ ἰδίην ἐξουσίην, εἰ μὴ ἕτερος ἕτερον ἐλυμαίνετο· φδόνος γὰρ στάσις ἀρχὴν ἀπεργάζεται.

[340] Plato, *Republic* 443d.4-5. See also, Plato, *Republic* 370c where he proposes that the city will achieve harmony and avoid *stasis* by the organization of the city, which will be aimed toward justice; see also Mallet 2017: 92. In *Laws* 682d-e, 683d-e, Plato observes that the goal of good laws is to overcome the dangers of civil war; see also Lutz 2015: 97.See also Dillary 1995: 52; Lintott 1980: 240; Soares 2014: 256, who argues that according to Plato, it is through the balance of the soul of each citizen that political unity may be possible."

[341] Aristotle, *Politics* 5.1.1302.a2-7. See also Pellegrin 2019: 240.

[342] Plato, *Republic* 370c proposes that the city will achieve harmony and avoid *stasis* by the organization of the city, which will be aimed toward justice; see also Mallet 2017: 92. In *Laws* 682d-e, 683d-e, Plato observes that the goal of good laws is to overcome the dangers of civil war; see also Lutz 2015: 97.

competition between the two factions and ameliorate any perception of injustice that may have arisen from his earlier action. He was in effect acting as a lawgiver, and his efforts were an attempt to create a state of *eunomia*. In the lead up to the battle at Cunaxa, Cyrus only had to prevent the outbreak of violence among the Greek contingents until they could engage with the army of the king. His solution of swapping the position of the two contingents in the Greek battle line seems to have been an effective short-term solution to the tensions between the two factions as it gave Clearchus the honor he felt he had earned, and at the same time kept the two contingents separated from one another.[343] It is difficult to know if this solution would have been effective in limiting the outbreak of violent *stasis* among members of the army in the long term.

The death of Cyrus at Cunaxa removed the limits he attempted to set on the pursuit of personal ambitions between the different contingents of the army, and the absence of any structural limitations in the organization of the community allowed competition between the commanders to create disunity that eroded their effectiveness and endangered the entire army. Following the battle and the death of Cyrus, Clearchus assumed the role of lead commander with the general support of the army, though Menon continued to compete with him for a greater share of control over the troops. There had been no formal vote or acclamation of Clearchus as the overall commander. Rather, Xenophon states that the generals and captains did what he directed because they saw that he alone had the necessary experience of command.[344] The lack of a formalized recognition of his authority may have prevented Clearchus from acting as Cyrus had in the prevention of the pursuit of individual ambitions at the expense of the security of the community. Xenophon reports that Menon's efforts to secure more control within the army

[343] Cyrus was in effect exiling Menon from the place of honor within the army. Forsdyke 2005: 266-7 for a discussion of the difficulties that might result from the use of exile in a community.
[344] 2.2.6.

began as soon as word reached the Greek camp that Cyrus had been killed. Menon asked to be assigned to the delegation that the Greeks were sending to Cyrus' Persian lieutenant, Arius, since he was his guest-friend.[345] Yet, when the delegation returned with word that Ariaeus would make the return journey with the Greeks, Menon stayed behind in the company of Ariaeus. Yet, the lack of transparency in Menon's dealings with the Persian nobles created a cloud of uncertainty around his behavior that troubled Clearchus. It was through his relationship with Ariaeus that Menon was able to gain an audience with Tissaphernes without the other Greek officers present, which allowed Clearchus to believe that Menon was attempting to directly undermine his leadership in order to have himself appointed overall commander of the Greeks.

While Xenophon states that the cause of the factional strife that occurred between Clearchus and Menon was the result of Menon's shameless ambition, his explanation does not accurately present the conditions of command that existed among the generals, nor does he seem to give a complete account of Menon's motivations. Instead, Menon's behavior should be understood as an example of normal intra-elite competition that is often the source of *stasis* in communities, rather than it being one bad individual's attempt to gain as much power and control for himself as he could at the expense of the wellbeing of the community as Xenophon suggests. Xenophon states in his eulogy of Menon that the Thessalian very clearly had his heart set on gaining enormous wealth and power, and that he prided himself on his ability to deceive and to slander his friends.[346] Yet, this assessment of Menon does not match what is known about him from other writers and seems at odds with Xenophon's own account. After all, Menon had been hired to serve Cyrus, and his first responsibility was to his patron. So, when Menon urged his men to be the first to cross the Euphrates, he was serving the desires of his employer in a very

[345] 2.1.5.
[346] 2.6.22-3.

effective way.[347] That he and his men were rewarded for their actions only shows that they had done an excellent job for Cyrus, and that Menon had done an excellent job as a commander, securing for his men the favor of the Persian prince. So, while Xenophon's seems to argue that the *stasis* that occurred between the two generals was only due to Menon's enormous ambition, if one approaches these events from the perspective that Menon was acting in accordance with the wishes of Cyrus one can read these events differently.

Comparing Xenophon's portrait of Menon to the picture of him given to us by other contemporary writers further broadens the perspective one can apply to Xenophon's explanation for the cause of the *stasis*. Plato's portrait of Menon is not especially negative. In the dialogue that bears his name, Menon is bested by Socrates in their discussion of virtue, and forced to admit that he does not know what he previously thought he understood. But after admitting his confusion, he continues to seek Socrates' instruction and accepts that there is more for him to learn.[348] He does not reject the wisdom that Socrates possesses as other Socratic interlocutors had done, but aims at his own self-improvement.[349] Ctesias, like Xenophon, also gives a negative portrayal of the Thessalian, and states explicitly that Menon had conspired with Tissaphernes to betray Clearchus.[350] Yet there is reason to doubt the veracity of Ctesias' account, as his source for these events was Clearchus himself, who was taken as a prisoner to the King in Babylon where Ctesias was employed as a royal physician.[351] Ctesias claims that Tissaphernes duped Clearchus through Menon and that Clearchus had gone to his meeting with Tissaphernes against

[347] Grote 1896: vol.8.332 cited the episode as a "breach of communion" when the Greek army needed to be unified, and as evidence of the "selfish and treacherous character of Menon." See also Brown 1986: 389.
[348] Plato, *Meno* 79e-81a. Menon does take a moment in that exchange to tell Socrates that he not only looks like a stingray, but that he has numbed his senses and made it impossible for him to talk, just like one a stingray does. The famously ugly Socrates takes the insult in stride, suggesting that it was delivered in jest.
[349] Not all Socratic interlocutors took being reduced to *aporia* so well. In Plato, *Republic* 354a, Thrasymachus becomes angry at Socrates and abruptly leaves their conversation.
[350] Photius, *Bibliotheca* 72, 44a.22-9.
[351] Brown 1995: 394.

his will. Xenophon contradicts this account and says that Clearchus was eager to go, and that he insisted that the other Greek generals accompany him despite warnings from some of the other Greeks not to trust Tissaphernes.[352] Xenophon, who was present at the meeting in the Greek camp, while Ctesias was not, seems a more credible source here. Rather, Ctesias' description of the events sounds like a defense of his actions by Clearchus given before his execution in Babylon.[353] All of this seems to indicate that Menon was a more complex and morally robust individual than Xenophon alleges, and his attempt to gain a greater control of the army cannot be simply reduced to a failing in his character.

A closer examination of the behavior of the other generals, including Clearchus himself, demonstrates that there was no prohibition against a general attempting to gain a greater share of command within the army, further challenging Xenophon's assignation of blame for the death of the commanders to the Thessalian. Clearchus met the army at Celaenae with one thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, two hundred Cretan archers and forty Thracian cavalry.[354] Xenias the Arcadian had supplied four thousand hoplites recruited from the garrisons of Ionia.[355] Yet when Clearchus made his Panhellenic speech at Tarsus, vowing that he would never choose the friendship of a barbarian and betray the Greeks, two thousand of Xenias' hoplites left their original contingent for that of Clearchus, and no one rebuked him or offered any criticism of his actions.[356] Xenophon mentions the switching of the troops in the narrative without comment. The only indication that such a movement of troops between contingents could have been seen as problematic comes when Xenias and Pasion desert the army at

[352] 2.5.29.
[353] See Brown 1995: 398
[354] 1.2.9; See also Lee 2007: 44-8 for a summation of the organization of the contingents.
[355] 1.2.1-3.
[356] Clearchus' Panhellenic speech is at 1.3.5; Xenias' troops come over to Clearchus' contingent 1.3.7.

Myriandus. Xenophon states that most people believed Xenias left because he was nursing a jealous pride since so many of his troops had gone over to Clearchus and Cyrus had allowed Clearchus to keep them.[357] While Xenias and Pasion may have seen the realignment of their troops as unfair acquisition by Clearchus, it does not appear that a majority of the members of the army had a problem with the troops leaving Xenias' contingent. After all, half the hoplites in Xenias' contingent saw no difficulty in joining Clearchus' contingent, suggesting that there was – at least at that point in the campaign – nothing explicitly mandating troop loyalty.[358] Moreover, if there had been an overwhelming sense that the realignment was problematic, it is doubtful that it would have been allowed to stand. Cyrus needed his army to be as unified as possible under his command, and if the majority of the troops felt as though an injustice had been done, it would have hurt not only the general morale of the troops, but cast a shadow on his legitimacy as commander, neither of which he could abide.[359] Xenophon does not report any disagreements arising from any of these incidents, further suggesting that deployment with a specific contingent was not beyond adjustment if it was warranted. The troops that realigned to Clearchus' contingent must have felt that it was warranted.

By accepting the movement of so many of Xenias' troops into his contingent, Clearchus had suddenly become the general with the largest share of troops directly under his command, and thus gained a more plausible claim for the overall leadership of the army. Everyone could see the reality of the situation, including Menon, who, by his observation of the events, saw that command within the army was not permanently fixed, and factors such as performance or

[357] 1.4.7.
[358] Lee 2007 49-50 notes that Xenias' contingent had just been assembled from the garrisons up and down the coast, and because of this was unlikely to have any distinct identity from which they would feel a deep loyalty to their contingent or commander.
[359] Roisman 1985:37 argues that Cyrus' position with the troops was so weak at this point that he had to let Clearchus keep them, even if he had wanted to move them back under Xenias' command but does not say that this was something that the Persian prince desired.

essential skills could translate into greater control of the army. The awareness of this fact doubtless legitimized Menon's pursuit of power through the horizontal *stasis* in both his mind, and in the mind of Clearchus, which helps explain why the Spartan was so concerned about Menon's machinations with Tissaphernes. If one considers Menon's behavior as an example of normal intra-elite competition, an alternate cause for the *stasis* that occurred between the commanders becomes clear.

While Clearchus was made the de facto commander of the entire army after the death of Cyrus, a formal acclamation of him as sole commander might have limited Menon's ability to challenge the Spartan's authority and thereby limited the avenues for competition between them. Such an arrangement would have brought about a state of *eunomia* within the army. The confirmation of sole authority to Clearchus by the community likely would have empowered Clearchus to reduce the opportunity for others to gain power and influence within the army at his expense. In this way, *eunomia* within the army would have been somewhat different from that within the cities of Greece where monarchical power was highly unusual. Because the cities were structured politically so that power was shared among at least some of the citizens, horizontal *stasis* among the elite was a regular feature there. Moreover, where power was shared among the citizens, efforts at legislating control over such horizontal strife had proven to be only marginally effective.[360] Often the most effective legal process for limiting the effect of power struggles between the elites of a community was the expulsion of one of the parties through exile or ostracism.[361] Yet, as Xenophon made clear to the army in several of his speeches, the ability

[360] Gouščhin 2016: 110-1 points out that when one of the *dunatoi* had the broad support of the people, efforts at legislating control of *stasis* were unsuccessful, as in the case of Peisistratus who used his support in the assembly to circumvent the anti-tyranny legislation Solon had enacted. See also Forsdyke 2005: 96-8 who notes that attempts to alter the process for the election of archons in Solonian Athens were designed to limit intra-elite conflict that was creating violent *stasis* in the city, but failed to limit the influence of the powerful factions.
[361] Forsdyke 2005: 150-2.

of the army to survive was predicated on their strength in numbers, and so the exile of any faction that would lessen their force would have run counter to the overall safety of the community.[362] Instead it was in the interest of the soldiers to find a compromise that allowed all the factions to continue to share in the responsibilities and benefits of the community.

The *Stasis* of the Arcadians and Achaeans

While the *stasis* that came about because of the competition between Menon and Clearchus hurt the cohesion of the Cyreans at different points, the secession of the Arcadian and Achaean contingents from the army is perhaps the best example of how *stasis* could function as a destructive force in the communities of Greece. This incident is another example of horizontal *stasis*. The dispute came about as the army, having reached the Black Sea, was sailing westward along the Pontic Coast toward the city of Byzantium.[363] While they were anchored near the city of Sinope members of the army began to think of ways they could increase the wealth they had gathered for themselves up to that point, and decided that a single overall commander for the army would make them more efficient, and give them the best chance of securing plunder from the regions around them. Xenophon was approached by some of the captains about taking on the role, and after sacrificing with an aim toward that end, found that the omens were against such a move. When the assembly met, and it was clear that the army was ready to elect him overall commander, Xenophon declined their offer, but he did not mention the unfavorable omens at that time. Instead, Xenophon suggested that it would be dangerous for the army to appoint a non-Spartan commander while the army was hoping to secure favors from the Spartans who were in

[362] Xenophon's admonitions for strength in numbers occur at 5.6.13; 5.6.32;
[363]The rationale for the dispute and the different speeches explaining the various positions of those involved occurs between 6.1.17-6.2.12.

control of that part of the world. Then he made a further comment indicating that there had been ongoing factional strife simmering in the army. He said:

> "As to your thought that there would be less factional strife (*stasis*) with one commander than with many, you should know well that if you choose another you will not find me acting factiously (στασιάζω). For I believe that whoever should act factiously (στασιάζω) toward their commander when they are in a war, that man is in rebellion toward his own safety. But if you do choose me, I would not be surprised if you find that someone is angry at both you and at me."[364]

In this passage Xenophon provides a window into the struggle for control of the army that is not easily discernible in other parts of his text. Other than the struggle for command between Clearchus and Menon, there was no mention of factional strife having taken place within the army prior to Xenophon's warning in his speech. Yet his words make it clear that there had been an ongoing issue with factionalism that had become sufficiently detrimental to the overall functioning of the army for soldiers to attempt to mitigate it through what amounts to a change in constitution. The move to a single commander suggests that the army was hoping to break down the distinction that existed between the different contingents, which was the likely source for the factional strife. Xenophon does not tell us whether these tensions were being brought on by the wrangling for greater control by the captains and generals of the different contingents, or whether the tension was coming from the soldiers within different contingents who might be hoping for a greater say in the decision-making process for the army. His remark that if someone else were elected he would not engage in *stasis* makes it seem as though factionalism among the generals was the source of the army's problems, but the events that soon follow indicate that there was a strong level of dissatisfaction among some segments of the army,

[364] 6.1.29. "ὃ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐννοεῖτε, ὅτι ἧττον ἂν στάσις εἴη ἑνὸς ἄρχοντος ἢ πολλῶν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἄλλον μὲν ἑλόμενοι οὐχ εὑρήσετε ἐμὲ στασιάζοντα· νομίζω γὰρ ὅστις ἐν πολέμῳ ὢν στασιάζει πρὸς ἄρχοντα, τοῦτον πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίαν στασιάζειν· ἐὰν δὲ ἐμὲ ἕλησθε, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι εἴ τινα εὕροιτε καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ ἀχθόμενον."

which I will discuss below. The general leading a particular contingent had at his disposal the potential for a ready-made faction with which he could agitate for a greater share in the command of the army. If he reported to his troops that they were deserving of greater representation within the army, which would enable them to get the best assignments, or better access to supplies or living quarters when the army was in a village or town, it is easy to see how those troops would then begin to give voice to that same idea, possibly creating or exacerbating existing grievances that might exist between the contingents. Many of the units already had distinct identities that could have made integration more difficult.[365] Or at the very least, these distinct identities would have allowed for the easy compartmentalization of troops within the army. In fact, later in the *Anabasis*, when the army reached Perinthus in Thrace, Xenophon reports that Neon took eight hundred men and created a separate camp for them away from the others.[366] As the lone remaining Spartan general in the army, Neon was hoping that he would be appointed as sole commander should the army wind up in service to the Spartans in Byzantium.[367] Segregations such as this doubtless would have hurt not only the overall cohesion of the army by limiting the morale that comes with a unified identity, but also would have created tactical difficulties as well. Yet, again, Xenophon does not record any criticism of Neon's decision by other members of the army, nor does he offer any himself, again suggesting that for most Greeks some level of factional self-interest was at least accepted if not expected in Greek communities.

[365] Lee 2007: 48-50 notes that all contingents would have come to the army with a history together that would help create a strong sense of their own identity, with the exception of Xenias' contingent, which helps explain why that contingent broke apart so readily at Tarsus. See also Dillary 1995: 70 who argues that the independence of the separate contingents was strong at the start, but the pressure for survival after the murder of the generals created a sense of unity among the troops that lasted until they reached the Black Sea.
[366] Roy 2004: 281.
[367] 7.2.11.

In place of Xenophon, the army elected Cheirisophus, the Spartan general who had been dispatched from Sparta in response to Cyrus' call for troops to support his campaign, as the sole commander though he was unable to mitigate the rising tension among the different factions of the army and held sole command for just six or seven days.[368] In his acceptance speech before the army he too promised not to engage in *stasis*, giving a further indication of how great a concern factional strife had become for the army. They boarded ships and sailed for two days, reaching the Greek city of Heraclea on the Pontic coast of Asia Minor. When they landed, the Heracleots sent the army gifts of hospitality, including three thousand *medimnoi* of barley meal, two thousand jars of wine, twenty cattle, and one hundred sheep. Yet at their first assembly after receiving these gifts an Achaean Captain named Lycon addressed the army and complained that the generals were not doing more to ensure that the soldiers had sufficient supplies for the next stage of their journey back to mainland Greece, and he wanted them to demand that the Heracleots also give them three thousand Cyzicenes.[369] Then a second man demanded that they give ten thousand. Both Cheirisophus and Xenophon tried to dissuade the army from attempting to extort money from a friendly Greek city, but the army overruled them and elected three envoys who went to the city with their demands. When the Heracleots met with these envoys they promised to consider the matter, but then once the envoys left, they closed off their city and manned the walls, having gathered as much of their property from the country as they could.

In the fallout that occurred once it was reported that the Heracleots had closed off their city, many soldiers accused the generals of somehow ruining their endeavor, and according to

[368] Evidence for Cheirisophus being dispatched from Sparta in support of Cyrus' cause can be found at 1.2.21, 2.6.7-8. See also Millender 2020: 224-6; Lee 2007: 48; Roy 2004: 266; Stylianou 2004: 86-7. Xenophon gives the length of Cheirisophus' sole command at 6.2.12.

[369] See Xenophon ed. Dillery 1998: 434 a *Cyzicene* is an electrum coin issued by the city of Cyzicus. It was the main unit of exchange in the Pontis region, and was worth approximately .25 Attic *drachmas*.

Xenophon the Achaeans and Arcadians began to band themselves together, announcing their grievances to the rest of the soldiers.

> "They declared that it was shameful for Peloponnesians and Lacedemonians to be under the command of an Athenian who was not able to supply any troops to the army, and that to them fell the hard work, while the profit went to others, and that it was by their labor that the army had been saved, that this was the achievement of the Arcadians and Achaeans, and the rest of the army was nothing (though in truth, Arcadians and Achaeans were over half the army)."[370]

Xenophon does not offer any explanation for what caused the Arcadians and Achaeans to suddenly unite in the way that they did. It is clear from the promises of Xenophon and Cheirisophus not to engage in *stasis* that factional divisions had been growing within the army for some time, and as was discussed in the previous chapters, the Arcadians had cultivated something of an independent identity within the army. The secession of the Arcadians took place just a few weeks after the games that were held at Cotyora in March of 400 BCE in which the soldiers paraded in ethnic groups. The parading of the soldiers by ethnic groups certainly would have done little to ease any factional differences that may have been brewing and would have contributed to an increased awareness of their membership in ethnically distinct sub-groups within the army at the expense of their overarching Hellenic identity.[371] Moreover, the claims of the captains that the success of the army was due to Arcadians and Achaeans would have increased the affective connection members of that sub-group felt, believing themselves the saviors of the entire army. At the same time, the Arcadians and Achaeans would have felt an increased sense of integration within their sub-group as it was their hard work and their skill as

[370] 6.2.10 "οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς ὡς αἰσχρὸν εἴη ἄρχειν Ἀθηναῖον Πελοποννησίων καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιον, μηδεμίαν δύναμιν παρεχόμενον εἰς τὴν στρατιάν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πόνους σφᾶς ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ κέρδη ἄλλους, καὶ ταῦτα τὴν σωτηρίαν σφῶν κατειργασμένων· εἶναι γὰρ τοὺς κατειργασμένους Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἀχαιούς, τὸ δ' ἄλλο στράτευμα οὐδὲν εἶναι (καὶ ἦν δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ στρατεύματος Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀχαιοί)" See also Roy 2004: 273, and 1967: 309 who argues that while the Arcadians and Achaeans made up more than half the army, the Arcadians seem to have outnumbered the Achaeans roughly two to one, and Fields 2001: 120-1.
[371] Lee 2007: 67.

soldiers that had secured the success of the army. Each of these would have significantly increased the PSOC within the sub-group, compromising the overall cohesion of the community, and may help explain how the captains were able to break the Arcadians and Achaeans away from the rest of the Cyreans.

Once united, the Arcadians and Achaeans began to demand a greater share of the wealth that was available to the army.[372] Gray has argued persuasively that the rhetoric and posturing of the Arcadians and Achaeans was common to incidents of *stasis* and that their assimilation of the identity of the entire army because they were the majority allowed them to preserve the appearance of unity while in fact destroying the community within the army.[373] Seeing themselves as the saviors of the army they felt fully justified in rejecting the leadership of the commanders, and instead, chose ten generals for themselves, who they must have hoped would work solely in the interest of their own faction.[374] Allowing these segments of the army to choose commanders who would enact policy that more directly supported the goals of the sub-group gave the members of those segments a greater belief in their input, increasing the PSOC of the sub-group by a rejection of the overarching leadership. This action, along with the integration, affective connection, and increased belonging discussed above, would have created an exceptionally robust PSOC within this new contingent. Once the new generals were elected, the army broke into three smaller divisions, with the Arcadian and Achaean division numbering four thousand and five hundred. A division under Cheirisophus had two thousand one hundred troops, and a third division under Xenophon was slightly smaller at around two thousand and

[372] See Dillery 1995: 88.
[373] Gray 2015: 212. See also Nussbaum 1967: 189 who argues that the claims of misuse by the Arcadians and Achaeans bear no apparent relation to the facts and were distortions made to create a sense of indignation among the members of that faction.
[374] Cohen 1995: 31 claims that the desire for recognition of one's superiority lies at the core of the agonistic impulse which produces civil conflict.

fifty soldiers.[375] Each division then made their own immediate plans for continuing their journey westward.

The sudden fracturing of the army that had come so far together, and the lack of any argument against its dissolution recorded by Xenophon seem understated in the narrative.[376] The only authorial comment Xenophon offers is when he notes that with the breakup of the army the supreme command of Cheirisophus came to an end six or seven days after his election.[377] There had been no indication that the Arcadians and Achaeans were sufficiently frustrated with their positions within the army that they would both recognize themselves as an abused faction, and seek to redress their grievances.[378] Furthermore, other than the promises by Xenophon and Cheirisophus not to engage in *stasis*, and the report of the soldiers parading at Cotyora in ethnic groups, there had been no indication that the unity of the army was at risk. Still, by considering the recent changes in the circumstances of the army, it is possible to see how the troops could have fallen into *stasis*.

In general, there appear to have been three new elements to the circumstances of the Cyreans that provided the right conditions for *stasis* to spread through the army. The first, and probably most important, was the lack of any immediate and regular danger. Throughout books three and four, there is very little disagreement among the Cyreans, and Xenophon goes out of his way to state that he and Cheirisophus had only one dispute between them during that time, an argument about a village chief who escaped from the Greek camp when Cheirisophus treated the

[375] 6.2.16. See also Stronk 1995: 61.
[376] Sanders 2021: 183 wonders if Cheirisophus and Xenophon were tired of dealing with their fractious subordinates or intentionally decided to teach them a lesson. While Xenophon does report that Cheirisophus was emotionally defeated by the separation of the army, the suggestion that the two generals tactically decided to accept temporary disunity, expecting disaster to ensue, in strategic pursuit of willing re-unity is unconvincing. Xenophon repeatedly stressed that the army's survival depended on its size, so it is unlikely that he would have invited their destruction on the gamble that if they did survive, they would willingly re-unite.
[377] 6.2.12.
[378] Nussbaum 1967: 189.

man poorly and then neglected to bind him.[379] It is no coincidence that these books record the moments of greatest danger to the army, when unity was essential to their survival. Yet, once the army reached the Black Sea, and found themselves in territory largely controlled by Greek cities, the pressure to remain united to survive lessened, and the opportunity for differences about the direction they should take were able to arise.[380] The second change in circumstance that allowed *stasis* to spread through the army was that for the first time in months, there was a real question about what course the army should pursue. From the moment the Cyreans rejected any attempts to have a treaty with the Persians, their only real goal, (beyond their basic survival) was to march north to the Black Sea coast, so that they would be in Greek territory. Once the army had achieved that goal, there was suddenly the opportunity for a difference of opinion about what their next set of goals should be and what strategies they should adopt to seek those goals. They could attempt to make it to Greece as quickly as possible. Indeed, after Cotyora they were in possession of enough ships that the entire army could sail back to Greece if they wanted. They could attempt to pillage the local tribes and seize as much plunder from the region as possible. They could also offer themselves over for hire to anyone who might be in need of a large, battle-tested army, as Clearchus had done in his negotiations with the Persians after the death of Cyrus, offering to help the Persians quell a rebellion in Egypt.[381] The only real danger they faced would be if they broke up into smaller contingents and attempted to travel separately.[382] With so many new possibilities available to them, for the first time in months, the army faced many real questions about what they should attempt to do with and for themselves.

[379] 4.6.3.
[380] Lee 2007: 67.
[381] 2.5.13.
[382] Roy 2004: 281.

This new atmosphere of relative safety and questions about their objectives brought about the final change to the circumstances of the Cyreans, the sudden emergence of a few ambitious soldiers who sought to gain a greater amount of control of the army for themselves, and then to use the power to enrich themselves and their supporters. Xenophon records two men who positioned themselves as potential leaders of the army and advocated for an aggressive policy that amounted to little more than extorting money from the local Greek cities and giving it to the troops. They are Lycon the Achaean and Callimachus the Parrhasian.[383] Each of them was a *lochagos*, or captain, within the army.[384] When the Heracleots withdrew back into their city after the embassy failed to coerce them into giving money to the army in addition to the food and wine they had already provided, these men began to call upon the Arcadians and Achaeans to choose their own leaders and pursue their own policy.[385] Each man appears to have been known among the soldiers. Callimachus had been singled out by name for his heroism during some of the most difficult fighting for the army, while Lycon had spoken to the general assembly of the army before and had been a vocal opponent to Xenophon's plan for establishing a colony at Calpe Harbor.[386] They were among the trio selected as ambassadors to Heraclea to make demands that the city pay the army. Their success as military leaders, and their attempts to secure money for the army made them very popular among the common soldiers. Indeed, this matches closely with what we know about *stasis* in the early histories of the *polis*, with many of the first tyrants, such as Kypeslus of Corinth, Orthagoras of Sycion, and perhaps most famously, Peisistratus of Athens, rising to power through military service and by their close ties to the army.[387] Lycon in

[383] 6.2.4-8.
[384] Roy 1967: 305.
[385] 6.2.9. See also Roy 1972:.135, and Flower 2012: 197-8 who says that the policy in question was one of greed.
[386] The bravery of Callimachus is at 4.1.27, 4.7.8-17; Lycon deeds are reported at 5.6.27. See also Dillery 1995: 75-6 and Lee 2007: 68.
[387] Andrewes 1956: 36-7; Kagan and Viggiano 2013: 18-20

particular used fear and misinformation in his speeches to the army to help bolster his claims, not unlike a demagogue who was trying to manipulate the citizens of a city.[388] Once the Cyreans had broken into their different divisions, the Arcadian-Achaean faction voted to follow an aggressive policy, and tried to enrich themselves by plundering the coastal cities of Bithynia. After raiding several villages, the Arcadian-Achaean division soon found themselves surrounded by angry Bithynians whose homes they had plundered, and after losing eight hundred men, they opened negotiations for a treaty, before being rescued by the timely arrival of Xenophon's division.

The manner in which the Arcadian-Achaean secession took place reveals that many of the basic conditions that contributed to *stasis* in the cities of Greece - especially before the Peloponnesian War allowed outside forces to weaponize factional strife within the Greek cities - were also present in the community of the army, and up until the dissolution of the army, the trajectory of the factional strife among the Cyreans was typical of factional strife within *poleis*.[389] Amid questions about what their immediate goals should be, and how those goals should be realized, several mid-level leaders from the army sought to increase their own power and standing within the army by fomenting factional strife, in the hopes that their faction would come to a place of dominance within the community. They advocated for greater wealth and reward for their faction and justified their own faction's superiority based on its size and contributions to the wellbeing of the community.[390] This type of horizontal *stasis* typifies the type of *stasis* born out of intra-elite struggles discussed above. These leaders utilized the strength of sub-Hellenic ethnic identities that had been recently reinforced at the religious festivals in

[388] Lycon claimed that the food and wine provided by the Heracleots would not feed the army for three days (6.2.3), but Lee 2007: 68-90 has demonstrated that given the troop strength of the Cyreans at Heraclea, the amount of barley provided alone would have fed the army for eighteen days. Lykon was using fear of privation to help rile up the soldiers.
[389] For *stasis* and the Peloponnesian War see Buxton 2018: 161-4.
[390] See Gray 2015: 212 who argues that given the Arcadian-Achaean division's ethnic solidarity, they could claim a superiority to the previous army community which was a 'quasi-*polis'* only held together by shared interest.

which these groups celebrated their distinct identities. Moreover, because of the relative weakness that Panhellenic obligations held when faced with a competing regional interest, any appeal to their unity through Panhellenic rhetoric would have been ineffective. In this way, the sub-groups within the army were able to use some religious sanctions tied to their ethnic identity to create a faction that they could wield as an instrument to further their own power, while any appeal to the overarching Panhellenic identity of the army lacked sufficient standing to compel behavior that ran counter to their own self-interest.

As further proof that episodes of *stasis* do not necessarily involve violence, when the community of the Cyreans broke apart during the Arcadian and Achaean secession, there was no report of any violence among the soldiers. In many cities of ancient Greece when factional strife became so serious that it resulted in regime change, or significant changes to the constitution of the city, these were often violent events.[391] So the complete dissolution of the community that had preserved and maintained the Cyreans throughout their long ordeal following Cunaxa without even any objections being reported seems unusual and not in keeping with the broad trends associated with such significant internal changes in other Greek communities. The cause for this discrepancy is likely the lack of an established connection to a specific location that had both an intrinsic and an emotional value to the members of the army. Since there was no city where the community had lived for generations, and from which they made their livelihoods, nor was there any need for retribution for past injuries, there was no practical need for violence. Once it was clear that the factions were not able to resolve the differences dividing the community, everyone was free to simply walk away, and only the community itself was lost.

[391] Reiss 2006: 65-88 notes that *stasis* with revolution within the city was often, though not always, accompanied by assassination of political rivals, and gives a thorough catalog of these events through the first three quarters of the fourth century.

Reconciliation After *Stasis*

Finally, the way the Cyreans were able to reestablish their community after the dissolution provides an insight into some of the difficulties communities faced once *stasis* had ended, as well as some of the broad strategies of reconciliation they could employ. In many ways the Cyreans were far more fortunate than most Greek communities that had to reconcile following civil division among their citizens. The absence of violence in the break-up of their community meant that the deep enmities and the need for revenge which was often dangerously exacerbated by violent *stasis* were not present among the soldiers.[392] Furthermore, there had been no seizure of property belonging to any members of the army, the restoration of which often made reconciliation within communities having undergone *stasis* exceedingly difficult to negotiate. Xenophon provides a classic example of the problems this can pose and the deleterious effect it can have on civic unity in his description of the reconciliation of the city of Phlius in the *Hellenica*.[393] The absence of these difficulties among the Cyreans made the reintegration of the different divisions far less problematic than reintegration was in cities that had experienced violent civil war. It also obviated the need to seek punishment for the leaders of the secession since there had not been any spilling of Greek blood that would have constituted a sacrilegious act that required expiation or revenge.[394] Still, once the Cyreans decided to reunify the army they needed to take several steps that were essential to any successful reconciliation: the community had to be restabilized, legitimate rule had to be established, and the independent cohesion of the individual factions that led to the *stasis* had to be at least partially subsumed

[392] Lintott 1981: 16 points out that the need for retribution for killings associated with *stasis* go back as far as Homer, where Book 24 of the Odyssey presents a path toward reconciliation after such killings.
[393] Xenophon's account of the reconciliation is spread throughout the *Hellenica*, of particular interest are: 5.2.8-10, 5.3.10-17, 5.3-21-25.
[394] See Gray 2016: 53-4 on bloodless regime change in ancient Greece.

within the cohesion of the community as a whole to help prevent the recurrence of *stasis* along those same factional lines.[395]

Following a period of *stasis*, Greek communities attempted to bring the different factions of the community into a state of reconciliation, or *diallage* (διαλλαγή). Their aim was to establish a durable civic community that was grounded on the ethical standards of justice, and in the local cultural values. If this could be achieved, the community was said to be in the state of *homonoia*, a oneness of mind, or unanimity.[396] When Xenophon's contingent rescued the besieged Arcadian-Achaean division, he reports that the men were glad to see each other, and greeted one another like brothers.[397] This is not especially surprising given the absence of any violence during the break-up of the army. Though it is important to note that when it was reported to Xenophon that the Arcadian-Achaean division was in danger and besieged by a large Thracian army, Xenophon made a point of convincing his troops that it was in their own self-interest to rescue their beleaguered comrades. He pointed out that any army that could so effectively surround and destroy so much of the Arcadian-Achaean division, could do the same to their own division.[398] After all, the Arcadian-Achaean division had been the largest of the three divisions when the army separated. Xenophon did not assume that the troops of his contingent would automatically believe that it was incumbent on them to rescue those who had left their community. Rather he felt forced to persuade his soldiers that it was in their own interest to save the Arcadians and Achaeans so that they themselves might also be saved. It is difficult to say whether Xenophon's argument was necessary, or whether the soldiers of his

[395] Börm 2016: 15.
[396] Gray 2017: 68 notes that *homonoia* was said of communities following internal strife, while peace, *eirene*, was typically used to designate the absence of war between separate cities.
[397] 6.3.24 ἄσμενοί τε εἶδον ἀλλήλους καὶ ἠσπάζοντο ὥσπερ ἀδελφούς. The image of the men embracing one another is similar to the celebrations that took place when the army finally spotted the sea, and believed that they were saved (4.7.25), arguably their moment of greatest unity in their shared success.
[398] 6.3.13.

division would have gone to rescue their fellow Greeks without needing any additional persuasion. One can imagine that the troops of Xenophon's division may have felt dishonored by the claims of the Arcadians and Achaeans that the army was only kept safe through their efforts.[399] Xenophon's decision to use persuasion does indicate however, that, at least in his mind, the community of the army as a whole was at that time defunct, and could not be assumed as a matter of course.

The three divisions then came together at Calpe Harbor, and they took several steps to reestablish the community and to ensure that it would remain unified going forward. First, they undertook an expedition to go out and bury the Arcadian and Achaean dead. Xenophon reports that when the sacrifices proved favorable for the expedition "the Arcadians followed with the others."[400] By this action, the Arcadians were demonstrating that the community had been restabilized, and the contingents were acting in unity. The army then went out and buried the soldiers from the Arcadian-Achaean division who had been killed. This was an important first step in reestablishing the internal cohesion of the army. Among the Greeks, burial of the dead has a number of specific religious elements to it, and as was discussed earlier in the chapter on religion, there are few aspects of any culture that can create a sense of unity among a group as quickly and pervasively as religion can.[401] The use of a common religious ritual would also increase the PSOC among the entire body of soldiers and would deemphasize the particular identities that had been mobilized during the dissolution of the army. Moreover, public displays of ritual were often used by communities attempting to reconcile following *stasis* since these

[399] See Fisher 2009: 89 for a discussion of how dishonor can be a primary cause of *stasis* and then impede any subsequent reconciliation.
[400] 6.4.9 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἱερὰ καλὰ ἐγένετο, εἵποντο καὶ οἱ Ἀρκάδες.
[401] Stronk 1995: 84 argues that even though this was a grizzly task, observing the funerary rites adds to the *esprit de corps* as it shows everyone that the living care for the fallen.

could function as a catharsis and to restore order within the group.[402] Taken together the public display of a religious ritual would have gone a long way toward revitalizing the integration and affective connection of members of the community.

Back at the camp following the burial of the dead the assembly of troops took steps to reestablish legitimate rule within the army. Xenophon reports that some of the most senior Arcadians, including Agasias the Stymphalian and Hieronymus the Elean passed a resolution that stated, going forward, any man who suggested that the army be divided should be put to death. They furthermore proposed that the army should return to the same organization it had before, and that the previous generals should resume command.[403] There are several ways in which this action affected the reconciliation of the army. First, it was important to the credibility of the reconciliation that the return to the previous command structure was proffered by one of the senior Arcadian officers.[404] Reestablishing legitimate rule was an essential part of the reconciliation of any community post-*stasis,* and because the motion to return to the previous command structure had come from an Arcadian officer, the Arcadians were proactively rejecting their earlier claims for their own commanders and publicly acknowledging the legitimacy of the prior generals. Second, the proposal that it should be a capital crime for anyone to suggest that the army be divided going forward was tantamount to entering a civil contract for the protection of the community. Gray has noted that the public swearing of oaths that ensure the preservation of the community through civil means was common in states that had experienced *stasis.*[405] When the assembly voted to approve the measure, the entire army publicly swore to maintain the

[402] Gray 2016: 57.
[403] Xenophon 6.4.10-11.
[404] Lee 2007: 70 argues that despite having been appointed as one of the envoys to Heraclea it is unlikely that Agasias was a leader in the Arcadian secession since his 'death-for-division' proposal would hardly have been credible if he had. See also Stronk 1995: 61.
[405] Gray 2016: 63 gives as an example the oaths sworn by the citizens of Dikaia following their civil war. See also Driscol 2016:128

community which provided not only the unity associated with the performance of public ritual undertaken by everyone, it also set in place real penalties for subsequent disunity from any faction within the army.

Finally, in order that the Arcadian division be once again subsumed within the army, it was necessary for their independent cohesion to be broken down so that they became less a distinct faction within the army as a whole. It is difficult to know if this took place, and if so, how it was accomplished. Xenophon does not report any further difficulties arising from the Arcadian faction, and the principal leaders of the secession, Lycon and Callimachus are not mentioned again in the *Anabasis*. Lee has pointed out a reality of the Arcadian situation that may have affected their attitudes in regard to their place in the army, since after the events at Calpe Harbor and the loss of eight hundred men meant that the Arcadians and Achaeans were no longer a majority in the army.[406]

In sum, despite the danger it posed to the overall safety of the soldiers, the presence of factions and the *stasis* that occurred among members of the command structure was tolerated as a natural condition of any Greek community. It was largely understood that competition between people and differences in their desires naturally gives rise to separate factions within even the smallest groups. This may help explain why Xenophon does not record any objections from the other officers about the struggle for command that took place between Clearchus and Menon. The factional division of the army that culminated in the Arcadian-Achaean secession was brought on when several ambitious captains used the change in the conditions of the army to try and secure a greater share of the wealth and power that they felt could be had through command of the troops. These men were not unlike demagogues who used specious reasoning and

[406] Lee 2007: 70.

misinformation to create feelings of outrage among the common soldiers toward the generals in command. These captains then created a strong PSOC within the sub-group by appeals to the shared identity of the largest faction of the army. These appeals to their membership within the sub-group allowed the captains to both unite the Arcadians as a discrete entity and to invalidate the contributions of the rest of the army, thereby legitimizing their own goals over any opposing views. The army then dissolved without violence, only to find that without the strength of their combined forces, smaller divisions were vulnerable to attack from the local inhabitants.

Finally, after the loss of some eight hundred men, the separate divisions came back together, and the community of the army was reconciled. For the reconciliation to be successful, the Cyreans had to restabilize the community, reestablish legitimate rule, and lessen the independent cohesion of the breakaway faction so that they could be subsumed within the larger community. The first of these steps took place when the Arcadians and Achaeans accompanied the rest of the army on the expedition to bury their fallen comrades. The shared public ritual that accompanied the performance of the funeral rites showed the group that all the factions were present and united. Following this, a law was introduced by some of the leading Arcadians that was aimed at preserving the unity of the army going forward. This action not only decreased the likelihood of any plans for a future secession, they also served as a self-proclaimed repudiation of the Arcadian-Achaean rejection of the community. In proposing the new legislation, the army was utilizing a familiar tactic, since the public swearing of oaths which in effect criminalized *stasis* were a useful tool for communities that had experienced factional strife. It is difficult to say exactly what steps the army took to lessen the cohesion of the Arcadian-Achaean faction. Xenophon does not discuss any specific measures that might have been aimed at such an end.

Yet the community of the army remained stable for the remainder of the *Anabasis*, and there was no further mention of any ethnic particularisms in the narrative.

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CONCLUSION

When the Spartans sent their general Thibron to Asia Minor in 399 to fight against the Persians, he offered the remaining Cyreans a *daric* per month to join his army and fight against the man who had betrayed their generals, Tissaphernes.[407] Since the campaign had been financially disappointing for most of the soldiers, and the pay rate of a *daric* per month was what they had originally been promised by Cyrus, most of the 5,300 remaining Cyreans joined his expedition.[408] This army campaigned in Asia Minor for the next four years, defeating Tissaphernes in 395 after the Spartan king Agesilaus had replaced Thibron and taken command of the army. When the Spartans recalled Agesilaus after that victory, he brought the army back to Greece with him where it fought for the Spartans at the Battle of Coronea in 394. There is no further mention of the army as a distinct group in any of the sources following this time.[409] Whatever identity the soldiers had cultivated for themselves as members of a unique community was subsumed within the larger Spartan army, or was lost as individual members dropped out of the army, as Xenophon had done after he secured a tidy profit for himself through the capture and ransoming of a Persian nobleman named Asidates.[410] Yet the successes and failures of the Cyreans in building and maintaining a community during their expedition as told by Xenophon, preserves a unique window into how different aspects of Greek culture affected community relations among a heterogeneous population of Greeks.

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[407] 7.6.7

[408] The original rate of pay is discussed at 1.3.21. For an analysis of the size of the army by the end of the *Anabasis* see Brennan 2021: 340-1. Diodorus 14.37.1 says that about 5,000 of the Cyreans joined with Thibron.

[409] Brennan 2021: 264.

[410] 7.8.12-23.

In the broadest terms, what the story of the Cyreans reveals is that none of the aspects of Greek culture investigated here was able to create a persistent sense of community that could withstand the deleterious effects that self-interest and distinctions in religious and ethnic identity had in the agonistic environment of Greek communal life. While it is clear that religion, shared ethnic identity, and the obligations arising out of membership in the community of Hellenes were able to create a strong sense of community among the members of the army for varying lengths of time, none was able to engender a lasting sense of community – especially during moments of factional strife, or when competing personal interests promised significant rewards for the pursuit of goals running counter to those that would support the wellbeing and unity of the community. In the face of these pressures, the Cyreans regularly followed policies that rewarded sub-groups existing within the community of the army or within the larger community of Hellenes, as they did when they allowed the generals to compete for power and command, or when the Arcadians and Achaeans broke from the rest of the army to pursue a policy of personal enrichment, or when the majority of the army voted to extort money from the city of Heraclea. All of this suggests that because of the primacy of regional identity, the local distinctions in cultic practice, and the weakness of the bonds of obligation created by a shared Hellenicity, any relatively large heterogeneous Greek community would be vulnerable to disunity should any of these aspects of their culture be exploited by a sub-group within the community.

While religious events could produce moments of intense PSOC, as they did when Xenophon rallied the soldiers after the death of the generals, the relative infrequency of the events limited their power as a unifying force. Only three religious festivals were recorded throughout the campaign and the tithing to Artemis and Apollo occurred just a single time. While each of these events does seem to have increased, at least temporarily, the PSOC within the

army, there were so few of them that they were incapable of sustaining the belonging, input, integration, and affective connection gained through these interactions. Only divination was practiced with any regularity so that it could reinforce the PSOC of the community during periods of uncertainty in which the unity of the army might be in question. Indeed, the increase in the frequency of sacrifices recorded by Xenophon after the army reached the Black Sea coast suggests that divination was working as a mediating force between those in authority and the assembly of soldiers.

Just as religion was able to increase the PSOC of the community through the creation of a clear sense of belonging that was both limited and defined by a carefully circumscribed membership, ethnicity had the same, limited, unifying force. Regional and other sub-Hellenic ethnic identities had a longer and more robust tradition among their membership that had been reinforced through centuries of distinctions in cultic, linguistic, and social practices. Such distinctions resulted in a stronger sense of unity and obligation to one's local, civic, or regional identity rather than the more recent Hellenic identity. When situations arose in which membership within one of the sub-Hellenic ethnicities made demands that were at odds with those expected from members in the larger Hellenic community, the belonging that individuals felt to their sub-Hellenic groups would typically take precedence.

Panhellenism, likewise, could unify the community of the army yet was also limited. The rhetoric of Panhellenism was mobilized by members of the army, often at critical moments, to create bonds of obligation among the soldiers and between the army and citizens of the Greek cities they encountered. These bonds of obligation were predicated on a shared membership in the community of Hellenes. Yet the actions of the Cyreans as well as those of the Greek cities they encountered on their march show that while Panhellenism and Panhellenic rhetoric can be

successful in creating a strong PSOC when the goals of the members were aligned, when members of the community have competing goals the obligations that attend membership in the community are often set aside, and members pursued their own interests, even when these come at the expense of other Greeks.

Finally, periods of *stasis* – a phenomenon of nearly every Greek community at the start of the fourth century, including the army of the Ten Thousand – put limits on the unity of the community. Indeed, in the most pronounced example of factional strife that occurred among the Cyreans, the Arcadians and Achaeans seceded from the community of the army and broke off into their own splinter community. An analysis of this event shows that because religion, ethnic identity, and Panhellenism could be mobilized by sub-groups within the larger community, their effectiveness in maintaining the macro-community in the face of pressure from factions within the community was severely reduced, thereby limiting the inherent stability of the community. Moreover, because factional strife was endemic to nearly every Greek community, the risk of such an event was considerable.

While religion, ethnicity, and Panhellenism could help construct a community in ancient Greece, the scope of the project thus far has been limited to an exploration of the Cyreans and the community of the army. Yet this analysis reveals several patterns of behavior that persist through much of the fourth century and beyond, and that can be seen affecting community and interstate relations within the militarized anarchic landscape of Greek cities where the absence of a strong hegemonic state created a shifting struggle for dominance among numerous polities. Civic and *polis*-regional identity continued to be the primary focus for most individuals, while the obligations incurred through membership in the large community of Hellenes remained relatively weak. This was especially true at the supra-*polis* level. Religion, ethnicity, and

Panhellenism were used to unite cities for various communal actions, such as federal states (or koina) or administrative bodies like that governing the sanctuary at Delphi, but often failed to preserve those communities when opportunities for members to pursue policies guided by their own self-interest presented themselves.

The Delphic Amphictyony, an ethnically diverse league of a dozen *poleis* organized to oversee the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and the temple of Demeter at Anthela, showcases that just as in the case of the Cyreans, individual members pursued their own goals despite the awareness of shared religious beliefs, even at the expense of the wellbeing of the community of the amphictyony.[411] Indeed, in 356 the Phocians captured and sacked Delphi, a move that prompted the other members of the league to recruit Philip of Macedon to join them in a war against Phocis. When Phocis was defeated in 346 the Phocian delegates were removed from the amphictyony, replaced by the Macedonians. In response to this, the Athenian orator Demosthenes, concerned by the rapid expansion of Macedon into central Greece, made an appeal for Greek unity against the Macedonians that was at least partially understood through ethnic alterity. He labeled Philip a non-Greek barbarian and attempted to use the ethnic difference between the Greeks and Macedonians as a way to unite the Greek cities against him.[412] While some cities did eventually join the cause they were slow to come together in a Panhellenic campaign. The reluctance of the Greek cities to join a Panhellenic venture may lie in the way Macedonian ethnicity was perceived. Unlike the clear ethnic differences between the Greeks and Persians that allowed Xenophon to rally the troops with Panhellenic rhetoric that worked by defining the Greeks in opposition to the Persians, many Greeks did not perceive the

[411] According to Aeschines 2.115, by the middle of the fourth century the members of the Amphictyonic League were the Thessalians, Boeotians, Spartans, Athenians, Perrhaebians, Magnesians, Dolopians, Locrians, Oetaeans, Phthiotians, Malians, and Phocians. See also, Bowden 2003: 70-2.
[412] Demosthenes 9.31.

Macedonians as so ethnically distinct or different from them. Indeed, another Athenian orator, Isocrates, wrote a letter to Philip calling on him to unite the Greeks in a Panhellenic campaign against the Persians.[413] This request from an Athenian to Philip that he should unite the Greeks and lead a Panhellenic campaign indicates that regardless of Demosthenes' claims that the Macedonians were non-Greek barbarians, to at least some Greeks, the ethnic differences between the Greeks and Macedonians were not significant. Indeed, in that same letter, Isocrates claimed that Philip was descended from the Argives.[414] The decision of the Delphic Amphictyony to include Philip as a member shows that while the Macedonians were a distinct ethnicity, they could be accepted as members in a Greek community. Thus, the calls for unity within a community of Greeks were largely unpersuasive, just as the attempts to bolster the PSOC of the community of the Cyrean army had failed in the long term.

Also at this time, another kind of supra-*polis* community, the *koinon*, became increasingly common, allowing cities to join in regional communities that were often organized around shared ethnicity and that maintained common cultic sites. *Koina* were formed in Arcadia, Aetolia, and Achaea. These leagues were able to use the unifying force of shared religion and ethnicity to bring the *poleis* in their regions together in sublimation of their different civic identities and desires. The Arcadian League for example, was formed in the aftermath of the Spartan defeat at the Battle of Leuctra in 371. By 369 nearly all the cities in Arcadia had joined the League.[415] Right away, the member states began construction of a new city that would serve as the seat of the League's new federal government, and they situated it within two miles of the sanctuary to Zeus on Mount Lycaion, the chief religious site for the Arcadians. We have already

[413] Isocrates 5.9.
[414] Isocrates 5.32.
[415] Roy 2012: 135.

seen how strong Arcadian identity was at this time, and the decision to locate their capital in the shadow of their most important religious site should have helped unify the *koinon* into a robust and stable community. Yet the League struggled to determine a unified foreign policy and questions about their alliances with cities outside the League divided the member states so that in the Battle of Mantinea in 362 different cities from the League fought on different sides. The unifying force of shared religion and ethnicity were able to bring the *poleis* of Arcadia together in sublimation of their different civic identities and desires, but as the League attempted to pursue goals that ran counter to the desires of some member states, the pressure to remain unified incurred by their shared identities was insufficient to maintain the cohesion of the community when other goals were possible. In many ways this was similar to the forces that drove the Arcadian and Achaean secession from the community of the Cyreans.

While membership in regional communities or amphictyonies shifted over time and eventually grew to include cities that were outside of their initial regions and whose members were not ethnically related to them, their initial success in organizing their members into a coherent community was boosted by the ability of leagues and amphictyonies to articulate a common identity crafted upon their sharing unique religious practices and shared ethnicity. Indeed, several leagues and the Delphic Amphictyony became politically powerful entities that profoundly affected interstate relations in mainland Greece during the next two centuries. Although the notion of the independent *polis* persisted, the supra-*polis* entities were so successful in providing defensive and economic support for their member cities, that many *poleis* experienced increasing pressure to find ways of cultivating a shared identity that would facilitate the building of community at the supra-*polis* level. This is exactly what Xenophon and other leaders of the Cyreans had attempted to do by appealing to a shared religion, a common Hellenic

identity, and a shared goal of Panhellenic unity. These appeals had only temporary success because regional and local identities and strife put limits on any unity achieved among the community of the army.

The successes and failures in community building experienced by the Cyreans reveal the primacy of local and regional identities among the soldiers that made the long-term preservation of the heterogeneous community especially challenging. Appeals to their shared religious practice and their shared ethnicity were initially effective in fostering the bonds of unity necessary for the creation of a strong psychological sense of community, but did not last long. This pattern also applies beyond the small community of the army fighting for Cyrus. Appeals for unity that were based on a united religious and ethnic identity proved to be remarkably effective in creating a sense of community among Greek *poleis* at different times in their histories. While the unifying force that membership in the large community of Hellenes exerted was never able to unite the Greeks into a single political entity, the supra-*polis* regional associations that were initially predicated on their common religious practice and mutual ethnicity allowed the Greeks to leverage their shared identities in the creation of new communities that were better able to sustain the pressures of the changing world.

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