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Publication Date

2023

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

The Inca Civil War Rediscovered: Architecture, Alliance Building, and Failure  
in the Terminal Days of the Inca Empire (1527-1532)

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for degree Doctor of Philosophy  
in Archaeology

by

Georgi Valeriev Kyorlenski

2023



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2023

## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Inca Civil War Rediscovered: Architecture, Alliance Building, and Failure  
in the Terminal Days of the Inca Empire (1527-1532)

by

Georgi Valeriev Kyorlenski

Doctor of Philosophy in Archaeology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2023

Professor Stella Elise Nair, Co-Chair

Professor Charles S. Stanish, Co-Chair

The Inca Civil War (1527-1532) paved the way for the European invasion of the Andes, devastating the largest American Indigenous empire through tremendous loss of life in battle, political fragmentation, and erosion of the legitimacy of the Inca imperial project. Indeed, this war of succession might be the key to understanding both the formation and the collapse of the Inca state. Its transformative character led the major combatants to build their legitimacy claims via political alliances that allude to the birth of the Inca Empire through the narrative of “return to normalcy” and “return to origins.” Until now, however, the conflict has remained a historical footnote in the grand scheme of the trans-Atlantic encounter.

This dissertation is a multidisciplinary exploration of the Inca Civil War, examining colonial texts, archaeological data, extant architectural remains, and modern scholarship to bring

to the fore one of our first studies that both surveys where the civil war occurred and provides an in-depth study of the key site of Kañaraqay. In doing so, it suggests that crises are critical temporal nodes which offer unique, and perhaps clearest, views of how imperial projects function, as they present acute stresses to the institutions that define them, whether these stresses are overcome or not. As the Inca Empire was built on masterful negotiation between the ruling minority and the various subjugated groups, these political alliances and their stability became critical when the empire was threatened by the combined stresses of internal and external conflict.

Beyond the Andes, this research makes several important theoretical and methodological contributions. It bridges the 1532 gap between disciplines such as archaeology, history, and art history. It, further, offers a view of the nature of empires as networks of alliances, albeit ones built on unequal power, challenging the traditional hegemon-subalternity model. Finally, as the main test case of this dissertation examines the construction of the site of Kañaraqay, it speaks to the relationship between monumental architecture and power, suggesting that large building projects were tools for power acquisition rather than mere reflections of such power.

The dissertation of Georgi Valeriev Kyorlenski is approved.

Dell Upton

Jeremy Ravi Mumford

Charles S. Stanish, Committee Co-Chair

Stella Elise Nair, Committee, Co-Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2023

To Yana and Nina, my most favourite allies.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although my name appears alone on the front page, this dissertation is a product of the efforts, sacrifices, advice, and support of many people. The years that led to it have been incredibly hard and I am grateful that I had the opportunity to complete this work, so I want to extend my gratitude towards those who made it possible.

I must begin by thanking my doctoral advisor Stella Nair for sticking with me for so long. I am grateful for her mentorship and her attention to my professional development beyond this project. I am also thankful for all her hard work on making this dissertation much better than what I could produce on my own. Her own work in Chinchero was initially the inspiration for my exploration of Kañaraqay, while I continue to benefit from her deep knowledge and understanding of the Inca past.

I also thank the rest of my dissertation committee for their feedback: Chip Stanish and his unwavering support for my work even when he did not agree with me or my approach; Jeremy Mumford and his warmth and generosity all the way from Providence in the pre-COVID days of Zoom; Dell Upton for his intimidating breadth of knowledge on the built environment and beyond; and Lothar von Valkenhausen, who just missed on being there in the end.

I am thankful for the support I received from the Fulbright-Hays DDRA program, the Society of Architectural Historians, the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University, the Newberry Library, the Latin American Institute at UCLA, and the Steinmetz Family. They allowed me to live and travel in Peru almost every year in the past decade and to complete all the work involved in this dissertation from digging into early Quechua-Spanish dictionaries at the JCB through documenting the remains of Kañaraqay to studying ceramics at various museums in

the US and Peru. I am also eternally grateful to my wife Yana Rachovska for supporting me financially through this fever dream for years when my doctoral program failed to.

I am forever indebted to José Víctor González Avendaño who has been my most valuable ally in Cuzco. He helped me navigate through the politics of archaeology in the former imperial capital, opening doors at every corner. His assistance was instrumental for my work at Museo Inka, Biblioteca Central DDC-Cusco, as well as at Kañaraqay. Indeed, I have Víctor to thank for discovering one of the most important sources for this project – the Arriola and Bustiza 1999 licenciatura. I have continuously been amazed by his generosity and I am privileged to call him a dear friend and colleague. We are already overdue another flight of beers.

In Cuzco, I would also like to extend my gratitude to José Luis Tovar, Tom Hardy, and Kylie Quave. Thank you to José Luis from the Universidad de San Antonio de Abad del Cusco for enabling my preliminary work at Kañaraqay under the Proyecto Regional de Investigaciones Arqueológicas Lucre. Thank you to Tom for helping me make invaluable connections in Cuzco and for always being incredibly generous with his time and assistance. It is genuinely lovely to know such a collaborative and non-territorial archaeologist in the area. Thank you to Kylie for the professional advice and for the kindness to care about me because of the thinnest Beloit connection.

In Los Angeles, I would like to thank Luz María de la Torre for embracing me into the world of Kichwa and giving me the platform to study the Inca language. I am also grateful to the late Jean-Pierre Protzen upon whose suggestion I first started looking into Kañaraqay and Huascar. Thanks to so many graduate students with whom we suffered, drank, laughed, and worked together in the last few years. This includes my fabulous cohort – Karime Castillo, Brandon Braun, Anna Bishop, Dani Candelora, and Adam DiBattista – who left me all alone in

LA and left to do amazing things; my spiritual little sisters – Louise Deglin and Alba Menéndez Pereda – who can now be free from my venting and can focus on making me proud; my Andean reading group buddies – Lisl Schoepflin and Kevin Hill – who got me through comps.

In Providence, I am thankful for the community that I found at the John Carter Brown Library and especially Stijn van Rossem, Isabel Yaya McKenzie, Jeremy Mumford, Parker VanValkenburgh, and Nick Emlen. Fellowships and research travel are supposed to be lonely and not this much fun. Stay furious, my friends!

None of this would have been possible without my wife, Yana Rachovska. Her continuous support through everything has been nothing short of amazing. She likes California even though I whisked her away from New York City to do this. She made us a home even though I kept flying off for work, including a month after our wedding and while she was pregnant. She made my time in Peru working on this dissertation so much happier climbing mountains, surviving earthquakes, and even herding parents just to be around me. Thank you for keeping me sane, for making all of this worth something, and for making Nina and me the luckiest hotties ever!

Also, thanks to my parents who allowed me to be ever curious, although maybe somebody should have put an earlier stop to this... Thank you to my daughter, Nina, for putting things into perspective and stomping on the keyboard when I work too much.

Finally, thanks to Huascar for being a jerk, to the many authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for writing things down, to the Inca for being awesome, and to the Peruvian people for allowing a Bulgarian to ponder about their past. Anchatan sulpayki!

## VITA

### EDUCATION:

M.A.	Museum Anthropology, Columbia University	2013
B.A.	Anthropology, History, Beloit College (magna cum laude)	2010

### SELECT FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

2022	Fulbright Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad, US Department of Education
2019	Newberry Library Short-Term Fellowship for Individual Research, Newberry Library
2018	John Carter Brown Library Associates Fellowship, John Carter Brown Library, Brown University
2018	Edilia and François-Auguste de Montêquin Junior Scholar Fellowship, Society of Architectural Historians
2016	Early Modern Studies Graduate Certificate Summer Mentorship, Center for 17 <sup>th</sup> and 18 <sup>th</sup> Century Studies, University of California, Los Angeles
2015-18	Steinmetz and Friends of Archaeology Travel Grant, Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, University of California, Los Angeles
2015	Field Research Grant, Latin American Institute, University of California, Los Angeles

### SELECT PRESENTATIONS

2023	“Building Alliances, Return to Origins, and Monumental Failure: Huascar's Royal Estate at Kañaraqay and the Inca Civil War (1527-1532),” Society for American Archaeology 88th Annual Meeting, Portland, OR
2019	“Thinking Outside the <i>Aribalo</i> : Linguistic and Ethnohistoric Insights into Inca Ontology,” Institute of Andean Studies 59th Annual Meeting, Berkeley, CA
2018	“Thinking Outside the <i>Aribalo</i> : Beginnings of an Indigenous Ceramic Typology through Language and Ethnohistory,” John Carter Brown Library, Providence, RI
2013	“Site and Objects Together Again: A Model On-Site Archaeological Museum Against Museum Heterotopia.” Future of Historical Cities in the Context of the “European Capital of Culture” Initiative Conference, Plovdiv, Bulgaria and New York, NY

### PUBLICATIONS

“Machu Picchu.” In *World Architecture and Society: From Stonehenge to One World Trade*, edited by Peter Bonfitto. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2021): 94-99.

“Viral Legacies: Military Response to Covid-19 in Peru and its Sixteenth Century Antecedents.” *Backdirt: Annual Review*, Vol. 47, (2020): 24-29.



## **SELECT TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

### **Instructor, Undergraduate Education Initiatives, University of California, Los Angeles**

Sex and Gender in the Ancient Andes, First Year Writing Seminar (Spring 2023)

LA on Display, First Year Writing Seminar (Spring 2017)

### **Teaching Fellow, University of California, Los Angeles**

Survey of Literature (Enlightenment to the 20<sup>th</sup> Century), Department of Comparative Literature (Fall 2021)

World History (Human Origins to 650CE), Department of History (Fall 2020)

Ancient Egyptian Religion, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures (Spring 2020)

Sex and Gender Cluster First Year Writing Seminar Series, UEI (Fall 2019-Winter 2020)

Medieval Art, Department of Art History (Spring 2019)

Modern Art, Department of Art History (Winter 2019)

Jerusalem: The Holy City, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures (Spring 2018)

Science in Archaeology, Cotsen Institute of Archaeology (Winter 2018)

Culture and Society in Central and Eastern Europe, Department of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Languages and Cultures (Fall 2017)

### **Teaching Associate, University of California, Los Angeles**

LA: The Cluster First Year Writing Seminar Series, UEI (Fall 2016-Winter 2017)

### **Teaching Assistant, University of California, Los Angeles**

Jerusalem: The Holy City, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures (Spring 2016)

Women and Power in the Ancient World, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures (Winter 2016)

Architecture in the Modern World, Department of Art History (Fall 2015)

### **Reader, Department of Art History, University of California, Los Angeles**

Inca Art and Architecture (Spring 2019)

## Chapter 1. The Beginning of the End: Introduction

In the span of just over a hundred years, the Andean world experienced two cataclysmic upheavals with the rapid expansion of the Inca Empire in the fifteenth century and its eventual downfall at the hands of the Spanish invaders a century later. Yet, the popular, non-Indigenous narratives of both events have downplayed the complexities of Indigenous Andeans and their roles in this historical drama. In particular, they have overlooked the importance of local structures of power and alliance-building for the Inca state, which were critical in both its emergence as a major player on the South American continent and its collapse. The simplicity, and in some cases perceived inevitability, of European invasion of the Andes due to Iberian technological superiority traces its roots in the early colonial period and has even influenced academic scholarship. On the other hand, as the largest, Indigenous American empire, the Inca state is often described by scholars as ever-expanding, stable, and centralized.

These simplistic narratives are partially the result of the division along what archaeologist Tamara Bray calls “the Great Temporal Divide” between pre- and post-contact between Europeans and Americans.<sup>1</sup> This ontological rift indirectly suggests that European invasion constituted the defining moment between an indigeneity frozen in time and an explosion of historical processes. As archaeologist Kent Lightfoot contends, such flattening of historical time is not unique in the Andean case but is, instead, common in all places where the first written documents were produced by European colonial settlers.<sup>2</sup> Getting past the pre- and post-contact

<sup>1</sup> Tamara Bray, “Temporal Plurality and Temporal Transgressions: Time and Things in an Early Colonial Period Mortuary Assemblage from Northern Highland Ecuador,” *International Journal of Historical Archaeology*, Vol. 23, (2019): 828.

<sup>2</sup> Kent Lightfoot, “Culture Contact Studies: Redefining the Relationship between Prehistoric and Historical Archaeology,” *American Antiquity*, Vol. 60, (1995): 199-217.

paradigm allows us to understand the complex and fascinating Andean history in which both Inca and Spanish invasions were marked by continuous negotiations, failure, incremental gains, as well as more than a hint of luck. Disease, court intrigues, disruption of the imperial administration, rebelling provinces, and the devastating dynastic civil war were all important factors in the final days of the Inca Empire along with issues of weaponry, tactical knowledge, and army size.

Recent scholarship has already made some significant steps moving away both from the monolithic view of Tahuantinsuyu, as the Inca called their state, and from its utter and complete annihilation in the hands of the European invaders. On one end of the Inca imperial period, (c.1438-1532), scholars of state formation have challenged the unbridled success and the speed of the Inca imperial project, while illuminating the resistance as well as the complex negotiations experienced by different Andean communities.<sup>3</sup> Inca material culture and its great variability between the distant corners of the empire further suggest that negotiation and even cooperation characterized the imperial project better than centralization.

On the other hand, the historian John Hemming's definitive work on the Spanish conquest of the Andes directly challenges the myth of its inevitability.<sup>4</sup> This impressive compilation of virtually all available written sources on the matter offer a glimpse into the complex process of the trans-Atlantic encounter marked by Indigenous resistance, political

<sup>3</sup> Brian Bauer and Alan Covey, "Processes of State Formation in the Inca Heartland (Cuzco, Peru)," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 104, No. 3, (2002): 846-864; Thomas Hardy, *Assembling States: Community Formation and the Emergence of the Inca Empire*, PhD Dissertation, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2019); Steve Kosiba, *Becoming Inka: The Transformation of Political Place and Practice during Inka State Formation*, PhD Dissertation, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2010); Steven Wernke, *Negotiated Settlements: Andean Communities and Landscapes under Inka and Spanish Colonialism*, (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970).

backstabblings, and more than a hint of luck that the Europeans were not expelled. However, Hemming's history begins with the European arrival, specifically at Cajamarca on November 16, 1532 with the clash between Francisco Pizarro and the Inca ruler Atahualpa, who had defeated his half-brother Huascar just mere days earlier in a devastating Inca Civil War. This war of succession largely predetermined Spanish military success in the Andes, yet remains a historical footnote. Indeed, this war of succession might be the key to understanding both cataclysmic upheavals that befell the Andean world in the fifteenth and the sixteenth century. Its transformative character led the major combatants to build their legitimacy claims via political alliances that allude to the birth of the Inca Empire through the narrative of "return to normalcy" and "return to origins."

The claim I make here about the critical importance of the Inca Civil War for our understanding of the Inca Empire both during its height and at its collapsed state relies on a transconquest view of the Andes. Following Steven Wernke's seminal work in the Colca Valley, the term transconquest frames the transition from Inca to Spanish colonial rule in the Andes with a focus on the multitude of continuities, both conceptual and material.<sup>5</sup> The recent growth of historical archaeology in the Andes, as well as the adoption of the transconquest perspective in both history and archaeology have created the conditions to re-examine the fall of the Inca Empire similar to the way its beginnings are constantly rewritten.<sup>6</sup> The crisis that led to the transition to Spanish colonial rule of the Andes is inextricably linked with the erosion of political alliances that defined its Inca rule, which allows us to take a longer view of the terminal Inca

<sup>5</sup> Steven Wernke, "Negotiated Community and Landscape in the Peruvian Andes: A Transconquest View," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 109, No. 1, (2007): 130-152.

<sup>6</sup> Parker VanValkenburgh, "The Past, Present, and Future of Transconquest Archaeologies in the Andes," *International Journal of Historical Archaeology*, Vol. 23, (2019): 1063-1080.

state and to step from the finality and the weight of Cajamarca, but it also makes the study of the crisis in midst of this transition critical to the whole process.

This dissertation is an exploration of the Inca Civil War, examining colonial texts, archaeological data, extant architectural remains, and modern scholarship to bring to the fore one of our first studies that both surveys where the civil war occurred and provides an in-depth study of the key site of Kañaraqay, Huascar's royal estate built during the war. In doing so, it reveals new insights about the complexities of imperial Inca rule and its unraveling during this time of crisis, highlighting a key part of Inca history that must be addressed the history of the Inca Empire and the history of the Iberian invasion of the Andes. It further suggests that crises are critical temporal nodes which offer unique, and perhaps clearest, views of how imperial projects function, as they present acute stresses to the institutions that define them, whether these stresses are overcome or not. As Tahuantinsuyu was built on masterful negotiation between the ruling minority and the various subjugated groups, these political alliances and their stability became critical when the empire was threatened by the combined stresses of internal and external conflict.

## **1. Towards Transconquest Archaeology in the Andes**

Although the role of the Inca Civil War has been overlooked in the transition from imperial Inca to Iberian rule of the Andes, scholars in the past century have produced a vast body of knowledge which is critical for my work on the dynastic war in the 1520s. They have gained insights about Inca history, cultural practices and beliefs, political structures, and policies of conquest and alliance-making, which provide a framework for my examination here. This section

will provide an overview of this body of work, in order to situate the current project into the existing Inca historiography.

The mid-20<sup>th</sup> century saw the production of a number of foundational works of Andean archaeology and ethnohistory. These included work across disciplines and geographic origin including seminal research by American archaeologist John Rowe, French historian Pierre Duviols, Peruvian historians María Rostworowski and Franklin Pease, Dutch anthropologist R. Tom Zuidema, and Ukrainian-American anthropologist John Murra. Although they varied in their theoretical approaches, they mostly shared an interest in large scale questions about the Inca Empire. These included topics like imperial ideology, social institutions, religion, as well as detailed political histories.<sup>7</sup> Seeking to map out the characteristics of Andean cultural practices at large, the result of this era of scholarship is the development of “Lo Andino,” a set of values, practices, and institutions that defined Andean life. Traits included the importance of dualism and reciprocity,<sup>8</sup> the *ayllu* kinship system,<sup>9</sup> the centrality of cloth,<sup>10</sup> the “vertical archipelago” and others.<sup>11</sup> Although refined since then, most of these critical ideas that permeate every aspect of Andean life have been defined in this early era of scholarship.

<sup>7</sup> For example, John Murra, *The Economic Organization of the Inka State*, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1980); Franklin Pease, *Del Tahuantinsuyu a la Historia del Perú*, (Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978); María Rostworowski, “Estructural del Poder: Ideología Religiosa y Política,” *Historia Andina*, Vol. 10, (Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1983); John Rowe, “An Introduction to the Archaeology of Cuzco,” in *Papers of the Peabody Museum of Anthropology and Ethnology*, vol. 27, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1944)

<sup>8</sup> For example, Bruce Mannheim, “The Language of Reciprocity in Southern Peruvian Quechua,” *Anthropological Linguistics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, (1986): 267-273; John Murra, “An Aymara Kingdom in 1567,” *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 15, No.2, (1968): 115-151.

<sup>9</sup> For example, Reiner Tom Zuidema, “Kinship and Ancestorcult in Three Peruvian Communities: Hernandez Principe’s Account of 1622,” *Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Etudes Andines*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1973): 16-33;

<sup>10</sup> John Murra, “Cloth and its Function in the Inca State,” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 64, No. 4, (1962): 710-728.

<sup>11</sup> John Murra, “The limits and limitations of the ‘vertical archipelago’ in the Andes,” *Andean ecology and civilization: An interdisciplinary perspective on Andean ecological complementarity*, Vol. 91 (1985): 15.

Another important contribution of the scholars from this period is the critical engagement with the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century ethnohistoric written sources known as the chronicles. These were not periodic records as their name suggests, but rather complex historical sources written mostly by Spanish authors based on their eyewitness accounts combined with information from Indigenous interlocutors. Their aims ranged from documenting the conquest of the Andes through understanding Indigenous religion to painting the Inca as tyrants to promote Spanish colonial governance. Before the 1980s, these were important sources that helped both to piece together social institutions and to establish historical chronologies of political succession and expansion of the Inca state.

Archaeologists of the 1980s moved from the large-scale design of the Inca Empire based on Andean ideology toward an interest in the variations of the Inca imperial project.<sup>12</sup> Diet, economy, and administrative strategies throughout the empire were revealed to have been highly adaptable to local conditions. While some scholars attributed those variations to imperial top-down design,<sup>13</sup> others saw it as a result of continued negotiations between the local conquered populations and the Inca state.<sup>14</sup> Written sources remained important for these projects, as they provided fully fleshed out models of political, economic, and religious life that were tested against the archaeological record. The result was a much more nuanced view of both materials,

<sup>12</sup> For example, Timothy Earle, Terence D’Altroy, Christine Hastorf, Catherine Scott, Cathy Costin, Glenn Russell, and Elsie Sandefur, *Archaeological Field Research in the Upper Mantaro, Peru, 1982–1983: Investigations of Inka Expansion and Exchange*, Monograph 28, (Los Angeles, CA: Institute of Archaeology Press, 1987); Charles Stanish, “Nonmarket Imperialism in the Prehispanic Americas: the Inka Occupation of the Titicaca Basin,” *Latin American Antiquity*, Vol. 8, No. 3, (1997): 195-216.

<sup>13</sup> Terence D’Altroy and Timothy Earle, “Staple Finance, Wealth Finance, and Storage in the Inka Political Economy,” *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (1985): 187-206.

<sup>14</sup> Christine Hastorf, “The Effect of Inka State on Sausa Agricultural Production and Crop Consumption,” *American Antiquity*, Vol. 55, No. 2, (1990): 262-290.

questioning some of the generalizations made in the historical record, while also providing ideological context for the material data.

The archaeologists and ethnohistorians of the following decade switched from using distinct sources in comparative analyses as checks against each other, treating them as distinct reflections of political performance.<sup>15</sup> Archaeologist Brian Bauer's work on Inca state formation was based on a series of systemic regional surveys that have identified over 1700 Inca sites in the Cuzco region.<sup>16</sup> The survey data suggest that the population of the region grew steadily from the 11<sup>th</sup> to the 15<sup>th</sup> century, reflecting the gradual development of an urban elite in Cuzco that dominated its neighbors challenging the narrative from the written sources that suggested a rapid expansion in the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century. This work promotes the Inca heartland as an important concept and a key framework for Inca studies. More than a mere geographic area surrounds the imperial capital, the heartland was an important political construct that allowed the Inca to expand their population by granting their closest neighbors the status of "Inca of privilege." This was a crucial imperial policy, as the rapid expansion of the Inca state post-1438 suddenly required a large number of people to man the growing Inca administration. The heartland was thus defined by ethnic and geographic boundaries, but also by the status that it lent to its

<sup>15</sup> For example, Brian Bauer, *The Development of the Inca State*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992); Brian Bauer and Charles Stanish, *Ritual and Pilgrimage in the Ancient Andes: The Islands of the Sun and the Moon*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2001); Frank Salomon and George Urioste, *The Huarochiri Manuscript: A Testament of Ancient and Colonial Andean Religion*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991).

<sup>16</sup> Bauer 1992; Alan Covey, Miriam Araoz, and Brian Bauer, "Settlement Patterns in the Yucay Valley and Neighboring Areas," in *Imperial Transformations in Sixteenth-Century Yucay, Peru*, eds. Alan Covey and Donato Amado, 3-17, (Ann Arbor, MI: Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 2008).



inhabitants.<sup>17</sup> Bauer goes as far as to argue that Inca state formation was primarily about the creation of the heartland, which enabled large-scale expansion.<sup>18</sup>

Beyond the imperial heartland, though, the empire worked hard to monumentalize its relationship to the potent Andean landscape that related to their divine mission to rule over the region. Imperial origins were entangled in mythological stories, but also staged through landscape modifications and Inca architecture both in the Pacaritambo region of Cuzco and on the Island of the Sun in Lake Titicaca, the two primary origin places for the Inca. Thus, Inca narratives participated in the creation of Inca history through staged performances rather than passively record the events that they discussed. Since this type of theatricality was an important characteristic of the state that permeated more than its relationship to coding its history, it also applies to the narratives of the terminal days of the empire and the Inca Civil War.

Meanwhile, archaeological research of the Spanish empire in the Andes was in its infancy in the 1990s. Very few projects focusing on it existed and even those that had significant colonial remains often overlooked them.<sup>19</sup> The relative abundance of colonial written sources providing vivid accounts of social life and cultural practices meant they became the primary focus of scholarship and not the comparison between their narratives and archaeological data. The very possibility of the continuity between the Inca and the Spanish imperial projects was lost in this disciplinary divide between archaeology and history along the 1532 dateline. Early efforts to bridge that gap began with Peruvian archaeologist Mercedes Cardenas and Ecuadorian

<sup>17</sup> Brian Bauer, *Ancient Cuzco: Heartland of the Inca*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004); Ian Farrington, *Cusco: Urbanism and Archaeology in the Inka World*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2013).

<sup>18</sup> Bauer 2004, 15.

<sup>19</sup> VanValkenburgh 2019, 1066.

archaeologists Mayo Calvo de Guzman and Bernardo Berdichewsky Scher.<sup>20</sup> However, only in the 1990s historical archaeology was undertaken by a larger group of archaeologists.<sup>21</sup>

The past couple of decades have seen a significant growth of historical archaeology in the Andean region. Archaeologists began to recognize that the political structures of the Inca Empire were rarely totally destroyed by the new European administrators, as previously assumed. Instead, they, as well as their material products were incorporated into the very fabric of the Spanish imperial machine. The royal Inca road system, Qhapaq Ñan became the base of the new Spanish road network.<sup>22</sup> New colonial cities were found atop of Inca way stations.<sup>23</sup> Drinking cups remained a sign of power and status, marked by their materiality and its Andean meaning.<sup>24</sup> The transitive character of these varied material data have given rise to the transconquest perspective that combines the long-standing interest of Andean archaeology in the local experience with a new focus on the continuities and the persistence of Andean cultural practices beyond the 1532 divide.

<sup>20</sup> Bernardo Berdichewsky and Mayo Calvo de Guzmán, *Excavaciones en Cementerios Indígenas de la Región de Calafquén*. (Santiago, Chile: Universidad de Chile, 1972); Mercedes Cárdenas, “Ocupación Española de una Huaca del Valle de Lima: Casa en la Plataforma Superior de la Huaca Tres Palos,” *Boletín del Seminario de Arqueología*, Vol. 5, (1970): 40–49; Mercedes Cárdenas, “Huaca Palomino, Valle de Rímac: Fragmentaria Vidriada Fina con Decoración en Colores,” *Boletín del Seminario de Arqueología*, Vol. 10, (1971): 61–67.

<sup>21</sup> For example, Sonia Guillen Oneeglio, “Identificación y Estudio de los Restos del Virrey Conde de la Monclova en la Cripta Arzobispal de la Catedral de Lima,” *Sequialao*, Vol. 2, (1993): 71–75; Juan Mogroviejo Rosales, *Arqueología Urbana de Evidencias Coloniales en la Ciudad de Lima*, (Lima, Peru: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Instituto Riva-Agüero, 1996); Mary Van Buren, *Community and Empire in Southern Peru: the Site of Torata Alta under Spanish Rule*, (Tuscon, AZ: The University of Arizona, 1993).

<sup>22</sup> Clara López Beltrán, *La Ruta de la Plata: de Potosí al Pacífico: Caminos, Comercio y Caravanas en los Siglos XVI y XVII*, (La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Ediciones, 2016).

<sup>23</sup> Sofia Chacaltana Cortez, “De los Tambos Inca a las Tambarías Coloniales: Economía Colonial, Legislación de Tambos y Actividades Licenciosas de las Mujeres Indígenas,” *Boletín Arqueología PUCP* (Arqueología Histórica en el Perú), Vol. 21, (2016): 89–111.

<sup>24</sup> Thomas Cummins, *Toasts with the Inca: Andean Abstraction and Colonial Images on Quero Vessels*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002)

Transconquest perspectives have led to a number of important insights. Wernke's work in the Colca Valley showed that neither Inca nor Spanish colonialism was unidirectional, but instead were characterized by similar forms of continuous negotiations between locals and conquerors.<sup>25</sup> In the process, instead of a wholesale import of empire in Colca, the local actors were critical in shaping imperial and colonial policies, which characterized the Inca state. At Torata Alta in the Moquegua Valley, historical archaeologist Mary Van Buren has shown how the incorporation of Andean religious practices into the conversion process was a central strategy by the Christian missionaries as well as the viceregal administrators.<sup>26</sup> Historian Jeremy Mumford's work on the Toledan resettlement in the 1570s has traced how Inca administrative institutions remained key for the viceregal regime long decades after conquest.<sup>27</sup> Most importantly, as historical archaeologist Parker VanValkenburgh notes, "we have come to understand these things not as hybrid curiosities that emerged in brief moments of encounter, but as indices of a process of imperial becoming."<sup>28</sup> For that matter, the Inca Civil War did not simply open the path for the Spanish invasion, but rather it was a critical part of a much longer and more complicated process of the fall of one empire, the conquest of another, and the folding of the older into the newer.

<sup>25</sup> Wernke 2013.

<sup>26</sup> Van Buren 1993.

<sup>27</sup> Jeremy Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).

<sup>28</sup> VanValkenburgh 2019, 1070.

## 2. Inca State Formation and Development

Just as the initial expansion of Tahuantinsuyu beyond the Cuzco valley was understood as a transformative event or *pachacuti*, the Inca Civil War was also meant to introduce a new dawn for the state.<sup>29</sup> The idea of renewal, return to normalcy, and return to origins became a critical aspect of the Inca Civil Wars narratives. It, thus, echoed the original formation of the Inca state and its expansion in the century prior to the devastating dynastic war. The following two sections trace the history of the development of the Inca from a small polity in the Cuzco Valley to a regional state first and then to the largest Indigenous American empire.

Since the collapse of the Tiahuanaco and Huari political spheres that dominated the Middle Horizon (600-1000 CE, MH from here on), political and social fragmentation characterized the western half of the South American continent from the dry coastal desert through rugged sierra to the lush cloud forest. The Kingdom of Chimor is the one notable exception, as it quickly filled the vacuum left by the Huari and consolidated almost the entire north coast of Peru region between the 10<sup>th</sup> and the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>30</sup> In the next four centuries, Andean people tended to live in small, dispersed villages that mimicked a social organization based on what Murra termed “the vertical archipelago.” Influenced by the work of economist Karl Polanyi, this model describes the Andean non-market economy that required shared labor and communal land ownership within a familial or other social group determined by the ecological reality of the main food staples of the region – maize, coca, potatoes, llamas –

<sup>29</sup> Literally meaning “turning over/around of time and space” in Quechua, the concept of *pachacuti* referred to cataclysmic events in which time ended and began anew.

<sup>30</sup> Michael Moseley, “Structure and History in the Dynastic Lore of Chimor,” in *The Northern Dynasties Kingship and Statecraft in Chimor*, eds. María Rostworowski and Michael Moseley, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1990) and John Rowe, *The Kingdom of Chimor*, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1948).

requiring different conditions and elevations. This idea that survival in the Andes depends on communal labor persists to this day and is perhaps best understood by the Quechua term *ayni*, a concept of reciprocity and mutualism that at least theoretically governed everything in Andean life from cosmology to daily activities.<sup>31</sup> During this period (called Late Intermediate Period, 1000-1450 CE, LIP from here on), with the exception of the Kingdom of Chimor, polities were relatively small and local, based on kinship, and the rates of intergroup violence were high.<sup>32</sup>

In the valley of Cuzco, at the confluence of the small Saphi and Tullumayo rivers, one of those polities developed by the fifteenth century into a highly stratified state based on an imagination of a divine mandate to rule over the entire Andean region.<sup>33</sup> Partially due to global anthropological interest in the topic and partially due to the relatively short archaeological period of the Late Horizon (also referred to as the Inca imperial period, 1438-1532, LH from here on), questions of state formation have dominated much of Inca studies. Although the early colonial narratives vary greatly, most of them agree that the ninth Inca ruler, Pachacuti, was responsible for the consolidation of the Inca heartland, which triggered the later expansion. The story of Pachacuti's (originally named Inca Yupanqui) ascension to the throne retells of the "Chanka crisis," in which the young leader organized the defenses of Cuzco and saved the city, defying his father, the eight *Sapa Inca* Viracocha, who had fled the city in fear. According to this story, this event elevated Inca Yupanqui's position straight to the very top, as he took the name Pachacuti to commemorate his transformative character in the Chanka crisis, before restructuring

<sup>31</sup> Manheim 1986.

<sup>32</sup> Elizabeth Arkush, *Hillforts of the Ancient Andes: Colla Warfare, Society, and Landscape*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2015); Danielle Kurin, *Bioarchaeology of Societal Collapse and Regeneration in Ancient Peru*, (New York, NY: Springer, 2018).

<sup>33</sup> Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism*, New Studies in Archaeology, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Cuzco, conquering the Inca heartland, and establishing every imperial structure associated with the Inca.

Although Pachacuti was undoubtedly an influential leader, who seems to have triggered the new era of imperial expansion, archaeological data suggest a different version of Inca state formation. Brian Bauer and Alan Covey's extensive survey presented a much longer term view of the Inca heartland that included alliance-building, competition, conflict, and eventual consolidation, which lasted throughout the LIP from about 1000 CE.<sup>34</sup> By the time of initial expansion the Inca had already developed a complex hierarchical administration. Indeed, the state was already navigating complex relationships with the groups of the Inca heartland in a similar fashion to its imperial administration in the provinces further afield.

Recent work on the imperial core has demonstrated that the Inca state was not homogenous and it required "a mosaic of economic installations and sociopolitical linkages to rulers and nobility" that varied greatly according to local conditions.<sup>35</sup> Some regions such as Pisac in the Urubamba valley saw great restructuring in the process of creation of Pachacuti's royal estate there to commemorate his conquest of the local Cuyo group.<sup>36</sup> Other parts of the heartland such as the Paruro region mostly retained their local economies despite imperial incorporation, exemplifying the adaptability of Tahuantinsuyu that is later its major hallmark in the imperial period.<sup>37</sup> Archaeologist Lucas Kellett's survey of the Chanka homeland of

<sup>34</sup> Bauer 1992; Bauer 2004; Bauer and Covey 2002; Alan Covey, "Multiregional Perspectives on the Archaeology of the Andes during the Late Intermediate Period (A.D. 1000-1400)," *Journal of Archaeological Research*, vol. 16, No.3, (2008): 287-338.

<sup>35</sup> Kylie Quave, *Labor and Domestic Economy on the Royal Estate in the Inka Imperial Heartland (Maras, Cuzco, Peru)*, PhD Dissertation, (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University, 2012), 75.

<sup>36</sup> Susan Niles, "The Nature of Royal Estates," in *Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas*, eds. Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 50.

<sup>37</sup> Bauer 1992.

Andahuaylas represents another chink in Pachacuti's armor.<sup>38</sup> His survey recorded a small number of large Chanka sites of the 15<sup>th</sup> century suggesting that their military threat to the Inca must have been strongly exaggerated.

However, the narrative of the *pachacuti* that followed the Chanka crisis remained potent in the terminal days of the empire and the two combatants were likely inspired by their common ancestor, creating their own narratives of legitimacy that linked them to his cataclysmic character. At the same time, as the Inca heartland was the laboratory in which the Inca state was formulated, it remained an important political concept that Atahualpa and Huascar needed to address. Their legitimacy as rulers was predicated not simply on their legitimacy among the Inca nobility of Cuzco, but also on their ability to consolidate the heartland, as a mini-version of the empire. As the two half-brothers envisioned the Inca Civil War as another *pachacuti*, the heartland needed to be reconstituted in the process of recreation.

### 3. The Inca Imperial Expansion

Once the Inca heartland was under the control of Cuzco around the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Tahuantinsuyu began a rapid expansion campaign for the next century that we mostly refer to as the LH. At this point much of the scholarly interest shifts from the developments in the Inca heartland to the conquest and the imperial governance of the provinces.<sup>39</sup> This focus on

<sup>38</sup> Lucas Kellett, *Chanka Settlement Ecology: Hilltop Sites, Land Use and Warfare in Late Prehispanic Andahuaylas, Peru*, PhD Dissertation, (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, 2010).

<sup>39</sup> For example, Bauer and Stanish 2001; Terence D'Altroy, *Provincial Power in the Inka Empire*, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1992); Terence D'Altroy and Christine Hastorf, *Empire and Domestic Economy*, (New York, NY: Kluwer Academic, 2002); Ken Heffernan, *Limatambo: Archaeology, History and the Regional Societies of Inca Cusco*, BAR International Series 644, (Oxford, UK: British Archaeological Reports, 1996); Catherine Julien, "Hatunqolla: A View of Inca Rule from the Lake Titicaca Region," *University of California Publications in Anthropology, Berkeley, California*, vol. 15, (1983): 1-286; Michael Malpass, *Provincial Inca: Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Assessment of the Impact of the Inca State*, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1993); Ramiro Matos, *Pumpu: Centro Administrativo Inka de la Puna de Junín*, (Lima, Peru: Editorial Horizonte, 1994); Craig

the exploits of the state further afield have created a vision of the empire as largely static during the LH. While its military and administrative strategies exhibit great adaptability and flexibility, the heartland is mostly seen as stable. Only very recently archaeological studies have challenged this paradigm attempting to recognize the meaningful change over time during the imperial period in the Cuzco region.<sup>40</sup> Admittedly, these advancements step on the work at the Inca royal estates by architectural and art historians who had already shown how political turmoil in the Inca heartland led to change in imperial policies and institutions.<sup>41</sup> My project completes the genealogy of the private complexes of the Inca rulers, as well as the trajectory of the Inca architectural language, by exploring Huascar's estate at Kañaraqay. Built during the civil war, its location within the heartland, as well as within the landscape, its planning, its architecture, and its ceramic assemblage all point to its role in the conflict, but also to the ways core Inca institutions such as the royal estate were transformed through time.

As they embarked on great expansion that within a century saw them build the largest Indigenous empire, the Inca envisioned themselves as chosen people tasked to bring order to the Andean world. This ideology is reflected in the name of their state, Tahuantinsuyu, the "Four

Morris, "Inka Strategies of Incorporation and Governance," in *Archaic States*, eds. Gary Feinman and Joyce Marcus, 293-309, (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 1998); Craig Morris and Julian Santillana, "The Inka Transformation of the Chincha Capital," in *Variations in the Expression of Inka Power*, eds. Richard Burger, Craig Morris, and Ramiro Matos, 135-163, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2007); Craig Morris and Donald Thompson, *Huanuco Pampa: an Inca City and its Hinterlands*, (New York, NY: Thames and Hudson, 1985); Inge Schjellerup, *Incas y Españoles en la Conquista de los Chachapoyas*, (Lima, Peru: Fondo Editorial de la PUCP, 2005); Steven Wernke 2013.

<sup>40</sup> For example, Kylie Quave, Sarah Kennedy, and Alan Covey, "Rural Cuzco Before and After Inka Imperial Conquest: Foodways, Status, and Identity (Maras, Peru)," *International Journal of Historical Archaeology*, Vol. 23, (2019): 868-892; Brian Bauer, Miriam Araoz, and Thomas Hardy, "The Settlement History of the Lucre Basin (Cusco, Peru)," *Andean Past*, vol. 13, (2022): 149-192.

<sup>41</sup> Stella Nair, *At Home with the Sapa Inca: Architecture, Space, and Legacy at Chinchero*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015); Susan Niles, *The Shape of Inca History: Narrative and Architecture in an Andean Empire*, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1999); Niles 2004; Jean-Pierre Protzen, *Inca Architecture and Construction at Ollantaytambo*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993)



Parts Bound Together” in Quechua, which implies an inextricable link between the four regions, but also a hierarchical order, as the imperial capital Cuzco was placed in the center where the four regions converged. The four sections were Collasuyu, lying mostly south of Cuzco, Cuntisuyu, encompassing the southern coast of Peru and the very northern regions of Chile, Chinchaysuyu, lying mostly north of Cuzco, and Antisuyu, covering the eastern slopes of the Andes and into the Amazon jungle. They seem to have been mapped out before their incorporation into the Inca state, exhibiting the teleological imperial idea of order and Inca domination.

The first place the Inca looked to conquer was not an immediate expansion of the heartland, but rather a targeted campaign in the Lake Titicaca Region. The area had been subject to pilgrimage by the Cuzqueños probably long before they ventured to incorporate it into their state, as they saw it as the place of origin for both the world and the Inca people.<sup>42</sup> It appears that they had even established a considerable presence in the region during the reign of Viracocha perhaps before or right at the very establishment of the expansionist policies.<sup>43</sup> Some Spanish chronicles suggest that the Titicaca polities were unified against the foreign aggressors,<sup>44</sup> while others retell a story where the Lupaca of Chucuito aligned with the Inca to defeat the Colla of Hatun Colla.<sup>45</sup> Archaeological evidence confirms the latter version, but in either case the importance of the lake as the very first place chosen for conquest remains significant.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Bauer and Stanish 2001, 48-50.

<sup>43</sup> Terence N. D’Altroy, *The Incas*, (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 95.

<sup>44</sup> Pedro de Cieza de León, *The Incas of Pedro de Cieza de León*, transl. Harriet de Onis, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960 [1553]), 236-238.

<sup>45</sup> Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, transl. Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996 [1555]): 92-96.

<sup>46</sup> Julien 1983 and Stanish 1997.

The interest in incorporating the Lake Titicaca Basin into the Inca state coincides with the early imperial concerns of the empire. In these initial stages of expansion, the Inca developed a colonial ideology centered around their inherent superiority and status of chosen people to bring order to the Andean world.<sup>47</sup> The architecture of Pachacuti's estates emphasized the relationship between the potent natural world and the Inca state, suggesting that the sacred Andean landscape endorsed the Inca rule over the Andes.<sup>48</sup> Setting his sight on Lake Titicaca was a natural first move to show that these sacred spaces also wanted to participate in the imperial project. As much of the narrative of the Inca Civil War centers around its role for the rebirth of the empire, the link to the Lake Titicaca Basin was key in the construction of the legitimacy of the claimants, harkening back to those early days of the imperial expansion.

The conquest of the Colla had profound consequences for the shaping of Inca imperial strategies of conquest. On the one hand, the Inca were now exposed to a pathway both down to the Pacific coast and to the eastern slopes of the Andes where enclaves of Colla people had settled earlier. On the other, the victory professed the military might of the Cuzqueños and most of the other Lake Titicaca groups, as well as possibly many others in Cuntisuyu, decided to join the Inca project peacefully.<sup>49</sup> From this point on, much of Inca expansion was achieved through skillful propaganda via a combination of boastful stories about the military might of the empire and the Cuzqueños presenting their state as a collaborative project based on traditional Andean

<sup>47</sup> Conrad and Demarest 1984; Carolyn Dean, "The Inka Married the Earth: Integrated Outcrops and the Making of Place," *Art Bulletin*, vol. 89, no. 3, (2007), 508; Niles 2004, 50.

<sup>48</sup> Carolyn Dean, *A Culture of Stone: Inca Perspectives on Rock*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 227; Margaret MacLean, *Sacred Land, Sacred Water: Inca Landscape Planning in the Cuzco Area*, Ph.D. Dissertation, (Berkeley, CA: University of California-Berkeley, 1986); Niles 2004, 60-63; Protzen 1993, 91.

<sup>49</sup> María Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, transl. Harry Iceland, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 69.

ideas of reciprocity. More than a powerful ideological tool, this vision of the empire was put forward due its limited manpower, springing from a small polity to a vast empire within a century. The inability of the Inca to achieve all of its administrative goals forced them to balance their priorities making their territorial control subject to negotiation and compromise.<sup>50</sup> The Inca brought an army and a set of lavish gifts and offered the local leaders a choice. Perhaps the most famous case of the *kuraka* or local leader selecting the latter is the incorporation of the Chincha polity.<sup>51</sup>

By the 1460s, Pachacuti had selected Topa Inca as his heir and the young leader took control of the Inca army. By then the empire controlled much of the south and central Andes as well as most of the Peruvian south coast. This last decade of Pachacuti's reign as well as his son's own time on the throne was marked by a shift in focus from the legitimacy of the imperial project to the maintenance of the relationships between the core and the periphery. Conquest and further imperial governance relied heavily on Andean ideas of complementarity and reciprocity. Local leaders were co-opted through gifts of luxury goods such as fine textiles, shell, and feathers if they complied with the imperial demands, while those who did not were punished harshly.<sup>52</sup> Tahuantinsuyu operated in a nonmarket system very similar to the one described by Marcel Mauss and Marshall Sahlins where lavish gift-giving indebted provincial populations.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Archaeologist Kevin Hill compares the cases of the middle valleys of Cañete and Chincha to argue that the available strategies for the Inca ranged from “a more targeted approaches which limit the proliferation of power and influence,” as was the Chincha case, and “more diffuse regimes of control which are not as effective at concentrating resources at existing hubs of political and economic influence,” as was the Cañete case. Kevin Hill, *Inca Strategies of Conquest and Control: Toward a Comprehensive Model of Pre-Modern Imperial Administration on the South-Central Coast of Peru*, PhD Dissertation, (Los Angeles, CA: UCLA, 2020), 180.

<sup>51</sup> Rostworowski 1999, 70-72.

<sup>52</sup> D'Altroy 2014, 323.

<sup>53</sup> Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*, transl. Jane Guyer, (Chicago, IL: HAU Books, 2016[1925]) and Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, (Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton, 1972).

That debt was repaid by a labor taxation, which labor was in turn used to either support the Inca army through road and way station building and maintenance or producing more luxury gifts to perpetuate the conquest. In the meantime, the Inca were very careful to only require tribute in labor and never in kind in order to retain the “pact of reciprocity.”<sup>54</sup>

The path to Andean domination was not all clear, however, as a number of polities refused the gifts and engaged in combat with the Inca. Coastal chiefdoms such as the Huarco of the Cañete valley or the Collique of the Chillón valley required years as well as great military investment to finally bring them into the fold.<sup>55</sup> Of course, the success of the Inca diplomacy hinged on their military ability to crush such resistance. After defeating the Xauxa of the Upper Mantaro Valley, the state summarily resettled its adversaries, which is corroborated both archaeologically and in the chronicles.<sup>56</sup> These adversary relationships also presented valuable opportunities for looting and personal enrichment for the Inca army generals and the ruler himself. The pivotal victory over the Kingdom of Chimor on the north coast delivered great riches, while it also provided the Inca with important knowledge about metallurgy, fine textile weaving, and pottery production.<sup>57</sup> The incorporation of the wealthy north coast polity signaled the ultimate success of the Inca imperial project, but since the state still lacked the resources for hands-on control, the Inca quickly structured their relationship with the Chimú in the same reciprocal, if asymmetrical terms as the rest of the empire.<sup>58</sup> With the greatest threat under

<sup>54</sup> Murra 1980, 98.

<sup>55</sup> Hill, 2020 and Rostworowski 1999, 73-77.

<sup>56</sup> Cieza, 163 and D’Altroy and Hastorf 2001.

<sup>57</sup> Rostworowski 1999, 77-79.

<sup>58</sup> D’Altroy 2014, 323 and Patricia Netherly, “El Reino del Chimor y el Tawantinsuyu,” in *La Frontera del Estado Inca*, eds. Tom Dillehay and Patricia Netherly, 85-105, (Quito, Ecuador: Fundación Alexander von Humboldt and Editorial Abya-Yala, 1998), 96.

control, the rest of Topa Inca's reign saw vast areas of the Andes from Chile to the south to Ecuador in the north incorporated into the empire.

By the time Huayna Capac ascended to the throne after the death of Topa Inca (c.1493), the Inca state controlled most of the Andean region. This already included the entirety of Cuntisuyu and all the parts of Collasuyu with greater population densities and established polities whom the Inca could control. However, used to mountain warfare in open fields, the Cuzqueños struggled in the jungles of Antisuyu and after several skirmishes by Pachacuti at the very end of his life and later by Topa Inca, abandoned the idea of further penetration east.<sup>59</sup> With the diminishing options for conquest, which was expected of each ruler, Huayna Capac undertook a long-term campaign on the northern frontier. During his time, the state also moved towards a high-intensity control strategy in the northern highlands.<sup>60</sup> Although Huayna Capac added some territories in the Chachapoyas region and on the northern frontier, his reign was marked by the diminishing opportunities for further expansion of the state. By that time, the Inca nobility in Cuzco, especially the corporate groups of royal descendants known as *panacas* had grown in number and in power. Thus, Huayna Capac left the empire at its greatest territorial extension, but also with serious problems stemming from the growing power of the nobility and the inability for future expansion that was expected by each ruler.

#### **4. Inca State Policies and Institutions**

Within a century, the Inca imperial project had reached critical mass, encompassing land from all ecological zones from as far south as the modern city of Santiago de Chile to the modern

<sup>59</sup> Martti Pärssinen, *Tawantinsuyu: The Inca State and Its Political Organization*, (Helsinki, Finland: Societas Historica Finlandiae, 1992), 107-119.

<sup>60</sup> D'Altroy 1992, 71-83.

Ecuadorian-Colombian border in the north. Based on traditional Andean religion and economy, the state relied primarily on labor extraction through co-option of the local elites in the provinces. Communal labor and gift-giving related to *ayni* retained their social and economic function and violence rates dropped, as the Cuzqueños assumed the highest position in the hegemonic hierarchy they created.

Inca spatial thought and practice valued both conceptual and objective, geometric space, even when these overlapped in radically different ways. The empire was divided into four general regions or *suyus*, which although varying dramatically in size, were conceptually equal. Their boundaries are still poorly understood since the Inca did not place great importance on a top-down mapping. Instead, borders of various sizes, from those between plots of land belonging to neighboring communities to those between each *suyu*, were reinstated each year through ritual walking along them.

Another example is the *ceque* system of pathways dotted with shrines or *huacas* that radiated from Corikancha, the “golden enclosure” in Quechua and the most sacred place in Cuzco, mimicking sun rays.<sup>61</sup> However, these lines varied in length, number of shrines, density within each region, as well as shape.<sup>62</sup> Some took the form of a straight line from Cuzco towards a single *huaca*, while others squiggled and zigzagged through the landscape covering many sites over the course of tens of kilometers. Placed on a standard European top-down view map, the concept of the radiating sun rays is lost. Similarly, the idea that Cuzco was built in the form of a

<sup>61</sup> *Huaca* is a complex concept that can refer to anything sacred in the Andes. They are often places, which is why they are most commonly referred to in English as “shrines,” but *huacas* can refer to people, animals, or even events that despite long gone leave a trace of their potency and can still be called *huacas*.

<sup>62</sup> See, Brian Bauer, *The Sacred Landscape of the Inca: The Cusco Ceque System*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1998).

puma<sup>63</sup> appears to be a metaphor, as the plan of the city does not fit the figural representation of an animal. Indeed, anthropologist Tom Zuidema expressed doubt whether this was not a foreign idea in the first place.<sup>64</sup> Inca material culture further suggests a priority of concept over figurality, as it follows the Andean aesthetic of abstraction.<sup>65</sup> Art historian Carolyn Dean further contends that both scholarly and popular interest in the iconic or imagistic represents an attempt to legitimize, normalize, and categorize Inca art as such.<sup>66</sup> Based on anthropologist Sherry Errington's definition of "art by appropriation," she questions the assumed value of Inca objects that exhibit iconicity.<sup>67</sup>

Spatial divisions in Tahuantisuyu often followed geography but also reflected social concerns. Such is the case with the *Hanan* and *Hurin* moieties. Although these are the most common expressions of Andean duality and complementarity, they literally mean "upper" and "lower" in Quechua and suggest both a spatial and an asymmetric relationship between the moieties.<sup>68</sup> Cuzco was also divided into Hanan and Hurin parts, but most scholars disagree on

<sup>63</sup> Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas*, transl. Clemens Markham, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999): 151.

<sup>64</sup> Reiner Tom Zuidema, "The Lion in the City: Royal Symbols of Transition in Cusco," *Journal of Latin American Lore*, Vol. 9, No. 1, (1983): 39-100.

<sup>65</sup> Esther Pasztor, *Thinking with Things: Towards a New Vision of Art*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2005): 204.

<sup>66</sup> Carolyn Dean, "The Trouble with (The Term) Art," *Art Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 2, (2006): 28-29.

<sup>67</sup> Errington divides "art by intention," defined as purposefully made art, and "art by appropriation," or things whose purpose and value might lie somewhere else but are seen as art, as they fit the desires and needs of the Western art market. Categorizing them as art elevates their value, but also legitimizes their collection and exhibition stripped from their cultural contexts. Dean argues that this "recognition of "art" can be seen as an attempt to reconstruct other visual cultures in the image of the colonizing West, different only in ways that render them somehow insufficient." *Ibid*, 27 and Shelly Errington, "What Became Authentic Primitive Art?," *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol, 9, No. 2, (1994): 201-226.

<sup>68</sup> Isabel Yaya McKenzie, *The Two Faces of Inca History: Dualism in the Narratives and Cosmology of Ancient Cuzco*, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2012): 3.

their exact boundaries. Anthropologist Louise Margolies and architect Graziano Gasparini initially suggested that the Portal Belen-Trinfo-Hatunrumiyoc streets on the southern edge of the main plaza divided the city.<sup>69</sup> Archaeologist Ian Farrington argues that the division likely ran just north of Coricancha along the modern Arraniyoc-Zetas streets.<sup>70</sup> His division maps well onto what we know from the ethnohistoric sources. In his narrative of the rebuilding of Cuzco by the ninth ruler Pachacuti, the Juan Diez de Betanzos writes that the Hanan Cuzco lords were allocated lots between Colcampata and Coricancha, while those of the Hurin moiety occupied the lots from the golden enclosure down to Pumacchupan at the confluence of the two rivers.<sup>71</sup> Regardless of the exact placement of the boundary, the primary plaza, Haucaypata dominated upper Cuzco, while its lower counterpart centered around Corikancha.

The first five rulers and their descendants are traditionally believed to have lived in the golden enclosure and thus they were identified with Hurin Cuzco, while the later rulers moved to construct palaces surrounding the plaza and were associated with Hanan Cuzco.<sup>72</sup> The Inca state followed this division with Chinchaysuyu and Antisuyu representing the Hanan side of the empire, while Collasuyu and Cuntisuyu were in the Hurin one.

The Inca understood the world as a series of dualities that are fluid and in constant negotiation between each other. As the Inca imperial project aimed at introducing order to a chaotic world, it was the state's role to preserve the balance in those constant negotiations. The Inca expansion was fueled by an imperial policy in which a corporate group called *panaca*,

<sup>69</sup> Graziano Gasparini and Louise Margolies, *Inca Architecture*, transl. Patricia Lyons, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 46.

<sup>70</sup> Farrington, 251.

<sup>71</sup> Betanzos, 73.

<sup>72</sup> Yaya-McKenzie, 64 and D'Altroy 2014, 188.



consisting of the ruler's children except the heir to the throne inherited his material possessions.<sup>73</sup> In order to prove himself an able leader and to sustain his court, every new ruler was required to conquer new land, over which he could claim ownership and whose production he personally owned. When Huayna Capac, the eleventh Inca ruler or *Sapa Inca*, died in 1527 from a disease of European origin, a catastrophic civil war of succession ensued that set the stage for the arrival of the Spaniards and the second stage of the quick restructuring of the Andean world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>74</sup>

## 5. The War of Two Brothers

The Inca Civil War was fought between two factions supporting Huascar and Atahualpa, two of Huayna Capac's living sons, and their supporting factions. Huascar had established his base in Cuzco, while his father led a military campaign north. Also being son of the *Coya*, the *Sapa Inca*'s principal wife, he saw his position as a deputy and the natural choice as his father's successor.<sup>75</sup> Most among the Inca nobility likely supported Huascar's claim at least in the beginning of the war.<sup>76</sup> In contrast, Atahualpa was based in Quito, as he was a skilled warrior and accompanied Huayna Capac in his military campaign.<sup>77</sup> The semi-professionalized Inca army and all significant Inca generals supported Atahualpa, while Huascar relied on conscripts.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>73</sup> D'Altroy, 177.

<sup>74</sup> The title of the ruler of the Inca state translates into "the only Inca" in English.

<sup>75</sup> Cieza, 52.

<sup>76</sup> Rostworowski 1999, 109.

<sup>77</sup> Cieza, 80; Agustín de Zárate, *Historia del Descubrimiento y Conquista de la Provincia del Perú*, (Lima, Peru: Editores Técnicos Asociados S.A., 1968 [1545]): 60.

<sup>78</sup> Betanzos, 196; Sarmiento, 177.

Atahualpa's smaller but much more experienced and able forces slowly marched towards Cuzco, winning almost every major battle before capturing his brother. His victory, however, coincided with the arrival of a small band of Spaniards in the northern Andes along the coast of what is today Ecuador.

When Francisco Pizarro and his men reached the outskirts of Tahuantinsuyu in 1532, they encountered a land devastated by this violent war and ready for the taking. The massive death on the battleground led to the neglect of core Inca institutions such as the maintenance of roads and way stations, which initially reserved for state agents alone were now left unguarded. The political turmoil of the civil war also presented local elites with new opportunities and many aided the Europeans against their old masters, while others simply chose not to rescue their recent conquerors.

The timing of Pizarro's landing could not have been more advantageous for the European invaders, yet the record the Spanish chroniclers did not mention the death toll of the introduction of European diseases nor the devastating civil war. The Spaniards thought that they toppled an empire as great as that of the Romans at their height and saw Rome on every corner.<sup>79</sup> This was based equally on some genuine similarities between the American and European empires, some cultural misunderstandings, and the conquistadors' personal agenda, boasting of their achievements in order to secure funding and status from the Spanish crown. However, as historian Sabine MacCormack notes, the Roman legacy was claimed by both Indigenous and European actors and it produced varied conclusions about its meaning in the colonial setting.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Sabine MacCormack, "Classical Traditions in the Andes: Conversations Across Time and Space," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, ed. Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 23-64.

<sup>80</sup> In particular, MacCormack argues that Bartolome de las Casas advocated for the restoration of the Inca Empire precisely due to the analogy with Rome (p. 55), while Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa saw the Inca more akin to

The narrative of the great feat of the Conquista remains potent, regardless of whether it is seen as an incredible achievement by a small group of adventurers or a devastating atrocity by a band of mercenaries and religious fundamentalists.

## 6. Inca Royal Estates and the Development of Inca Architectural Language

Royal estates like the one Huascar built at Kañaraqay were critical nodes in the Inca Empire. Thus, to understand Huascar's estate we must first place it within the history of Inca royal estates. Rulers built both urban palaces in Cuzco and private rural retreats.<sup>81</sup> Pachacuti had a palace in the capital called Condorkancha<sup>82</sup> as well as rural estates at Pisac, Ollantaytambo, and Machu Picchu.<sup>83</sup> His successors continued the practice and constructed estates at Chinchero (Topa Inca), Quispahuanca (Huayna Capac), Calca, and Kañaraqay (Huascar).<sup>84</sup>

These private estates constitute a complex site type that includes agricultural land, landscape modifications such as terracing, roads, storage facilities, shrines, public plazas, as well as the private quarters of the Inca rulers. Royal estates were an integral part of the royal economy that supported the ruling class that called themselves Inca.<sup>85</sup> Hence they incorporated the most

Carthaginians in being “treaty-breaking tyrant,” using the same framework of reference to legitimize the Spanish colonial regime in the Andes. Sabine MacCormack, *On the Wings of Time: Rome, the Incas, Spain, and Peru*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

<sup>81</sup> Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, *The First Good Chronicle and Good Government: On the History of the World and the Incas up to 1615*, transl. Roland Hamilton, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2009[1615]): 269.

<sup>82</sup> Bauer 2004: 136 and Bernabe Cobo, *Inca Religion and Customs*, transl. Roland Hamilton, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990[1653]): 55.

<sup>83</sup> See, Dean 2010; John Hyslop, *Inca Settlement Planning*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990); Niles 2004; Protzen 1993.

<sup>84</sup> José Alcina Franch, *Arqueología de Chinchero I: La Arquitectura*, (Madrid, Spain: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1976); Hyslop 1990; Nair 2015; Niles 1999 and 2004.

<sup>85</sup> Niles 2004, 56.

productive land in the Inca heartland as well as massive complexes of storage facilities. While all rural estates housed extensive storage of agricultural and high-priced goods, several different specific forms of storage have been associated with them. At Ollantaytambo, square-shaped chambers referred to as *peñas* were likely used to house potatoes.<sup>86</sup> At Chinchero, store houses called *churacona uasi* preserved large quantities of goods from food to cloth in the vicinity of the royal compound, while smaller versions were found within the royal buildings of the private sector of the site.<sup>87</sup> Agricultural features such as terracing also varied between estates, but were inevitably present. Functional agricultural terraces were found at Moray as a part of Topa Inca's estate at Chinchero<sup>88</sup> as well as on the eastern slopes of Machu Picchu<sup>89</sup> and at Quispihuanca.<sup>90</sup> However, terracing was also used for non-productive reasons such as the creation of theatrical spaces for Inca processions such as the ones at Ollantaytambo, Chinchero, as well as most of the ones at Machu Picchu.

While these private estates of the Inca rulers share the same components, including large public spaces and carved rock outcrops, there is a considerable formal variability between the estates of each *Sapa Inca*. For example, those of Pachacuti's patronage show an affinity to curvilinearity as exemplified by the Torreon at Machu Picchu and the terraces at Pisac. While the circular terraces at Moray exhibit similar interest, the site proper of Chinchero no longer features curved structures. Furthermore, through their multifaceted character these complexes housed

<sup>86</sup> Protzen 1993, 119-121.

<sup>87</sup> Nair 2015, 156-158.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>89</sup> Richard Burger, "Scientific Insights into Daily Life at Machu Picchu," in *Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas*, eds. Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004): 101.

<sup>90</sup> Niles 1999, 135-136.

multiple functions depending on the needs of the state and their patron making the definition of the site type somewhat flexible. Although such flexibility is somewhat expected considering the Inca use of space was not directed by function in general, the royal estates remain the most evident expression of both personal and political concerns of the Inca rulers, which explains the development of the site type in time.

The estates of the ninth *Sapa Inca*, Pachacuti, were built at a time of initial expansion of the empire (c.1440) and are characterized by a preoccupation with professing the legitimacy of Inca dominion. While the grand narrative of his reign attributes virtually every major aspect of the imperial machine to Pachacuti, the consolidation of Tahuantinsuyu was in its early stages and the power of the Inca had not reached its peak.<sup>91</sup> Careful studies of his estates have revealed that his architectural language emphasized the complementary relationship between the Inca and natural forces and their physical manifestation in the form of *huaca*, which was a part of the Inca colonizing narrative.<sup>92</sup> The Cuzqueños viewed themselves as chosen people, who needed to bring order to a disordered, both human and natural, world.<sup>93</sup> Natural features and especially rock outcrops were seen as potent active agents through the live-giving essence called *kamay*.<sup>94</sup> Pachacuti's architectural language attempted to enter into a complementary relationship with it in order to create order together, utilizing the *kamay* instead of imposing his will on it. The result was a strong statement that not only were the Inca bringing order to the world, but the mother earth, *pachamama*, and the other sacred natural forces agreed and aided them.

<sup>91</sup> Bauer 1992, 1.

<sup>92</sup> Dean 2007, 507.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 508; Conrad and Demarest 1984; Niles 2004, 50.

<sup>94</sup> Dean 2010, 4.

Pachacuti's estates utilized careful framing of natural features, the use of water engineering, and impressive coursed stone masonry to enter into a productive relationship with the potent natural world. Framing with the typical Inca trapezoidal windows and doorways was a form of ordering that directed the experience of the built environment, while suggesting that the most important legitimizing factor of Inca rule was the cooperation of the sacred landscape.<sup>95</sup> The intricate waterworks at Machu Picchu and Ollantaytambo represented the special relationship between Pachacuti and the landscape, as his complex hydroengineering was only possible through the compliance of the potent water spring.<sup>96</sup> Inca doorways and windows usually framed sacred mountains, embodying this relationship by juxtaposing worked stone with its natural counterpart.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, rock outcrops were regularly incorporated in Inca walls that weaved around the rock at Machu Picchu.<sup>98</sup> Setting up the potent sacred landscape to participate actively in the Inca architecture, Pachacuti exhibited its endorsement of the imperial project.

Pachacuti's son, Topa Inca, constructed an urban palace called Calispukio and a rural estate at Chinchero.<sup>99</sup> While we know very little about his Cuzco palace, including its precise location in the city, the architecture of its estate was carefully designed to control movement and guide experience. By the time of Chinchero's construction the empire had grown immensely and the concern with the Inca's legitimacy at least in the heartland had waned. Instead, the tenth *Sapa*

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 227; Niles 2004, 60-63; Protzen 1993, 281.

<sup>96</sup> Burger 2004, 100-101 and Protzen 1993, 91.

<sup>97</sup> Dean 2010, 27.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>99</sup> Bauer 2004, 181-183 and Nair 2015, 189.

*Inca* built Chinchero to announce to the Inca nobility his choice of Capac Huari as his successor and to illustrate the power of his will.<sup>100</sup>

Stella Nair's study of the estate has revealed that most of the site was a theatrical staging of the path that the Inca nobility had to take in order to visit the Topa Inca in his new residence.<sup>101</sup> Hiking up to Chinchero from the Urubamba Valley, meeting the grand terraces of the estate, climbing the steep staircase, and finally arriving at the great plaza the visitors continuously experienced the embodiment of the ruler's power. Some aspects of Pachacuti's spatial language, however, persisted in his son's building projects. A number of intricately carved rock outcrops are visible and accentuated on the path to Chinchero to show the sacred rocks' agreement with Topa Inca.<sup>102</sup> However, the focus had moved from the architecture's visual link with the sacred landscape to its control over the bodies of the Inca noblemen who experienced it. Just like his predecessor, though, Topa Inca's royal estate and its architectural language directly embodied its patron's political concerns.

Despite Topa Inca's choice of Capac Huari, he was eventually replaced with Huayna Capac who throughout of his career had to face the fact he only ruled because of the power of his mother. He built a palace in Cuzco named Pumacurco and a rural estate called Quispivuanca at Yucay.<sup>103</sup> Susan Niles' study of his estate have revealed considerable change in his architectural language from his predecessors' in its focus on the man-made and its use of adobe as main material. Quispivuanca's architecture is characterized by Huayna Capac's attempt to profess his

<sup>100</sup> Nair 2015, 171-178.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>102</sup> Jessica Christie, *Memory Landscapes of the Inca Carved Outcrops: From Past to Present*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016): 223-225 and *ibid.*, 48-49.

<sup>103</sup> Bauer 2004, 136 and Niles 1999, 232.

fitness as a ruler through increased scale of construction and strategic positioning of his estate.<sup>104</sup> He first tried to fit within the general narrative of Inca royal estates by choosing a site in between Pisac and Ollantaytambo, literally inserting himself in between the estates of his grandfather.<sup>105</sup> He then moved to carve his own niche by building on a grand scale and emphasizing human conquest over the natural environment.

Coming from the northern frontier of the empire in today's Ecuador, Huayna Capac was knowledgeable in agricultural fields draining techniques and he turned Quispihuana in one of the most productive agricultural regions of the empire.<sup>106</sup> He also built a grand single-story palace bearing some of the typical Inca architecture elements like trapezoidal windows and niches, double-jamb doorways, and thatched gabled roof, that stood some four stories high.<sup>107</sup> The walls of the building had a stone base, but were finished with adobe, a much lighter material that made the height of the building possible. While framing remained an important tool for visual direction throughout the imperial period, Huayna Capac's framing at Quispihuana emphasized the man-made instead of the natural.<sup>108</sup> This change in the use of the architectural gesture that has been an important part of Inca visual language signified his attempt to focus on his achievements as a way to justify his choice as the *Sapa Inca*.

<sup>104</sup> Niles 1999, 133-139 and Niles 2004, 64-67.

<sup>105</sup> Niles 2004, 64.

<sup>106</sup> Niles 1999, 296.

<sup>107</sup> See, Vincent Lee, *The Lost Half of Inca Architecture*, (Wilson, WY: Sixpacl Manco Publications, 1988), Niles 1999 and 2004; Jean-Pierre Protzen, "Inca Architecture," in *The Inca World: The Development of Pre-Colombian Peru, AD 1000-1534*, eds. Cecilia Bakula, Laura Laurencich Minelli, and Mireille Vautier, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000): 193-217.

<sup>108</sup> Niles 2004, 67.



## **7. Organization of the Dissertation**

This dissertation begins with three chapters dedicated to the historical narratives of the Inca Civil War covering both the early colonial written accounts and the recent scholarship on them. After analyzing the narratives of the conflict, I consider how the dynastic crisis of Tahuantinsuyu can be traced in Inca material remains. The following two chapters address the ways ceramics, as the most common material remains of Tahuantinsuyu, have and can be used to characterize the Inca state, especially in a time of crisis such as the Inca Civil War. The final chapter presents a study of Huascar's royal estate at Kañaraqay that considers the role of the site as an embodiment of its patron's personal and political concerns during the war with Atahualpa, as well as the role of construction projects in the context of crisis.

Chapter 2 identifies and discusses the historical sources, both primary and secondary, on the Inca Civil War. It begins with the limited historiography of the conflict and the possible reasons why it has been overlooked in contemporary scholarship. I then turn to the twelve main primary written sources that provide narratives of the civil war, contextualizing them through an examination of their authors' biographies, as well as their place and time of writing and publication. I group the twelve sources chronologically identifying the major waves of Inca history writing in the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, while juxtaposing the contemporary writers' accounts exposing their personal agendas.

Chapters 3 and 4 trace each of the twelve narratives in detail narratively and spatially. Chapter 3 focuses on the early histories produced in the sixteenth century marked by unrest and Indigenous resistance, while Chapter 4 looks at those produced after the arrival of Viceroy Toledo. Although most of these sources are easily accessible, most aspects of the war are poorly understood, including the role of the major combatants, the timing of important movements of

each army, the sizes and origins of the forces of the two brothers, as well as the spatial distribution of major movements and battles. Reading the sources individually and in chronological order illuminates their biases, inconsistencies, and unique contributions, as well as the ways these narratives were built through copying, addition, and erasure. Mapping the narratives onto the Andean landscape offers a path to understanding the spatial and temporal reach of the civil war.

In Chapter 5, I attempt to reconstruct a history of the Inca Civil War by putting the twelve sources in conversation. This allows me to find patterns, both spatial and narrative, that untangle the various inconsistencies so that we may get some clarity of what may or may not have happened between 1527 and 1532. Along with the synthetic narrative of the war, Chapter 4 includes the most comprehensive lists of all major participants in the war, including particular individuals that fought on either side and the various groups of Andean peoples who played important roles in the devastating conflict.

Chapter 6 discusses the role of ceramics in Inca studies. As the most abundant archaeological material, pottery has been the subject of a large volume of literature that spans almost every important question about the Inca past. These include inquiries into the imperial economy,<sup>109</sup> colonialization tactics,<sup>110</sup> social relationships through feasting practices,<sup>111</sup>

<sup>109</sup> E.g. Timothy Earle, "Exchange and Social Stratification in the Andes: The Xauxa Case," in *Empire and Domestic Economy*, eds. Terence D'Altroy and Christine Hastorf, (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2001): 297-314;

<sup>110</sup> E.g. Tamara Bray, "To Dine Splendidly," in *The Archaeology and Politics of Food and Feasting in Early States and Empires*, ed. Tamara Bray, (New York: Springer, 2003): 93-142.

<sup>111</sup> E.g. Justin Jennings and Melissa Chatfield, "Pots, Brewers, and Hosts: Women's Power and the Limits of Central Andean Feasting," in *Drink, Power, and Society in the Andes*, eds. Justin Jennings and Brenda Bowser, 200-231, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009).

ideological issues related to iconography,<sup>112</sup> and so much more. A quick glance at most ceramic assemblages from Inca sites or any museum collection of Inca material illustrates the great variability of Inca pottery, which marks the state's approach to governing through co-option of local practices rather than a wholesale Incanization. The breadth of ceramic studies in the Inca imperial period in the Andes, (or Late Horizon, c.1440-1532 CE, LH from here on) mirrors the diversity of Inca ceramic raw materials, construction techniques, labor organization practices, exchange and consumption practices, as well as their role as identity markers. However, the separation of pottery styles of the LH into imperial Inca and provincial has masked this diversity and has created a vision of the strong, centralized empire, placing these styles on a hierarchical scale. Chapter 6 discusses in detail how the existing body of literature already points to a more accurate characterization of Tahuantinsuyu, even if that is often implied and not directly stated.

In Chapter 7, I consider how we might reconstruct an Indigenous typology of Inca ceramics through linguistics, which foregrounds Indigenous categories of meaning and early written sources that describe how these objects may have been used. Although a complete taxonomy of forms cannot be reached currently, my study gains important insights about Inca ontology and suggests different ways to categorize ceramic material. All current typologies in use rely on morphology as their main ontological parameter with minimal considerations of decoration, while other important parameters such as scale and materiality are yet to be applied.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I not only discuss the evidence but also propose a new way to look at Inca pottery in the imperial core. As the Inca meaning constructed meaning relationally, styles other than the Cuzco-produced imperial one often acted as prestige goods. This would be similar

<sup>112</sup> E.g. Cathy Costin, "Crafting Identities Deep and Broad: Hybrid Ceramics on the Late Prehispanic North Coast of Peru," in *Making Value, Making Meaning: Techne in the Pre-Columbian World*, ed. Cathy Costin, 319-359, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2016).

to the way the state deployed flexible mechanisms of co-opting local power structures in the provinces that materialized in hybrid styles which embodied the negotiation between the conqueror and conquered. In the context of crisis, such as the Inca Civil War, though, provincial styles may have even assumed a dominant position in relation to imperial Inca material. Thus, the crisis allowed various political agents to enter into new negotiations and the hierarchical relationship between their material culture and the imperial one that the Inca used to dictate was broken. This vantage point allows me to see the various pottery styles uncovered at Huascar's royal estate in Kañaraqay, built during the war, and their makers as significant players in the Inca Civil War, the demise of the state, and imminent clash with the Old World.

Chapter 8 uses Huascar's royal estate at Kañaraqay as a test case for the findings in all previous chapters. The spatial and architectural analysis of the site completes the history of Inca royal estate development comparing the site to those of Huascar's predecessors. Here, I build on the work of Jean-Pierre Protzen, Stella Nair, and Susan Niles whose studies of the private complexes of earlier rulers offer a great baseline for comparison.<sup>113</sup> Their research has already shown that Inca architecture was not monolith, but it exhibited marked changes through time even in the somewhat short, archaeologically speaking, Inca imperial period. Similar to other estates, Kañaraqay relies on the architectural tradition of its predecessors, but also bends the Inca architectural language to fit Huascar's immediate needs.

Chapter 8 further details how Kañaraqay embodied its patron's legitimacy narrative of return to origins in the context of the Inca Civil War. This was done through a personal return to Huascar's birthplace coupled with significant gestures to old seats of power in the Lucre and Titicaca Basins. My analysis of the site takes a multiscale approach beginning with the choice of

<sup>113</sup> Nair 2015; Niles 1999; Protzen 1993.

location of the site within the Inca heartland and its relationship with its immediate surroundings, before analyzing its planning and architecture, and lastly considering the lived aspect of the practices that took place at the estate through an analysis of the ceramic assemblage of Kañaraqay. Finally, Huascar's ultimate defeat in the Inca Civil War and the failure of his building campaign speak to the nature of construction projects in the context of crisis and their role for power acquisition. While success stories and traditional "great men" histories usually see monumental architecture as a reflection of power, this "failed man" history offers an alternative view of building campaigns as a whole, as well as of the clash between the Old and the New Worlds.

## Chapter 2. The Forgotten Cataclysm: Historiography of the Inca Civil War

Scholars of the past have long focused on the history of Europeans in the Americas. In the Andes, this took a form of a scholarly fixation with the history of Pizarro and his band that began with their landing in Tumbes on May 16, 1532. However, in the past thirty years, historians have reconsidered this colonial legacy and their work has radically re-written how we understand the arrival of Europeans in the Americas. In the Andes, a robust body of literature has been produced that has reconsidered how we see this encounter covering topics as diverse as religion,<sup>1</sup> gender,<sup>2</sup> identity,<sup>3</sup> architecture and planning,<sup>4</sup> demographic change,<sup>5</sup> and colonial governance.<sup>6</sup> The one

<sup>1</sup> E.g., Caroline Dean, *Inka Bodies and the Body of Christ: Corpus Christi in Colonial Cuzco, Peru*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Sabine MacCormack, *Religion in the Andes: Vision and Imagination in Early Colonial Peru*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Frank Salomon and George Urioste, eds, *The Huarochiri Manuscript: A Testament of Ancient and Colonial Andean Religion*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Karen Graubart, "Indecent Living: Indigenous Women and the Politics of Representation in Early Colonial Peru." *Colonial Latin American Review*, (2000): 213-235; Sara Guengerich, "Capac Women and the Politics of Marriage in Early Colonial Peru," *Colonial Latin American Review*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2015): 147-167; Bianca Premo, "From the Pockets of Women: The Gendering of Mita Tribute in Colonial Chucuito, Peru," *The Americas*, Vol. 57, No. 1, (2000): 63-94; and Irene Silverblatt, *Moon, Sun, and Witches: Gender Ideologies and Class in Inca and Colonial Peru*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

<sup>3</sup> E.g., Jorge Guevara Gil and Frank Salomon, "A Personal Visit: Colonial Political Ritual and the Making of Indians in the Andes," *Colonial Latin American Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1-2 (1994): 3-36; Ward Stavig, "Continuing the Bleeding of These Pueblos will Shortly Make them Cadavers: The Potosí Mita, Cultural Identity, and Communal Survival in Colonial Peru," *The Americas*, Vol. 56, (2000): 529-562.

<sup>4</sup> E.g., Thomas Cummins and Joanne Rappaport, "The Reconfiguration of Civic and Sacred Space: Architecture, Image, and Writing in the Colonial Northern Andes," *Latin American Literary Review*, Vol. 26, No. 52, (1998): 174-200; Stella Nair, "Witnessing the Invisibility of Inca Architecture in Colonial Peru," *Buildings and Landscapes: Journal of the Vernacular Architecture Forum*, Vol. 14, (2007): 50-65;

<sup>5</sup> E.g., Jeremy Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Linda Newson, *Life and Death in Early Colonial Ecuador*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995).

<sup>6</sup> E.g., Gonzalo Lamana, *Domination without Dominance: Inca-Spanish Encounters in Early Colonial Peru*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Steve Wernke, *Negotiated Settlements: Andean Communities and Landscapes under Inca and Spanish Colonialism*, (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2013).

discipline that has mostly not taken part of this reimagining has been archaeology, which until the last decade has focused almost exclusively on the period before 1532.

While now archaeologists have begun to examine materials beyond 1532, very few historians have bridged that gap to study the period before that date. Hence, it is not surprising that some critical periods of Indigenous history, especially prior to 1532, have been almost entirely overlooked. A crucial example is the Inca Civil War and its role in the creation of the new world that came out of the clash between Europe and the Americas. When it is mentioned, it seems to only serve as a foil for scholars studying an earlier or a later period. For example, when historians acknowledged the significance of the state Pizarro found the Inca Empire, they conspicuously focused almost entirely on one aspect – Atahualpa’s death and its Messianic reimagination in the early colonial period as a tool for Indigenous resistance.<sup>7</sup>

Very recent scholarship is beginning to challenge that. For example, in 2022, historians Paula Martínez and José Luis Martínez published a paper discussing the memory of Huáscar in the colonial period and challenging the enduring idea that the trans-Atlantic encounter could be idealized as the clash between Pizarro and Atahualpa.<sup>8</sup> But for the most part, the grand narrative of the trans-Atlantic encounter has remained a relatively straight-forward story of an event that marked the end of the mighty Inca Empire at the hands of the superior Iberian forces.

Fortunately, as this dissertation will show, there is an abundance of evidence, both written and material, regarding the Inca Civil War. The story they tell further transforms how we

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Luis Andrade Leimers, *La Verdadera Historia de Atahualpa*, (Quito, Ecuador: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1978); Marco Curatola, “Mito y Milenarismo en los Andes: Del Taki Onkoy a Inkari. La Visión de un Pueblo Invicto,” *Allpanchis*, Vol. 10, (1977): 65-92; Guillermo Fernández Pozo, "Formas de Resistencia Indígena en el Mundo Andino: El Mito del Inkari", el Mesianismo Andino en las Rebeliones del Siglo XVIII y su Proyección al Siglo XX," *Revista Electrónica Editada por la Asociación Española de Americanistas*, Vol. 16, (2016).

<sup>8</sup> Paulo Martínez and José Luis Martínez, “Una Cadena de Oro: Memorias Coloniales y Contemporáneas sobre Huáscar Inca,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 102, No. 1, (2022): 1-30.

understand both the Inca Empire and the European invasion of the Andes. Surprisingly, many of the primary written sources of this crucial event are readily available, published numerous times in the original and updated Spanish, as well as in multiple other European languages such as English. There are, also, numerous archaeological sites that bear witness to the Inca Civil War, but only very few have been studied and their rich insights have been largely overlooked by the broader field of scholars. This dissertation is a critical intervention in this problematic history and aims to bring to light once again the complexities of this event and the impact it had on Indigenous Andeans and the Inca Empire, and thus, on the arrival and the actions of the Europeans, as well.

In this dissertation, several steps are mapped out in order to take the Inca Civil War out of the shadow. First, we will consider the complicated history of the written sources of the conflict. Second, we will delve into individual narratives. And third, we will put them in conversation. The first three chapters will follow this approach, starting with the historiography of the war between Huascar and Atahualpa here. The following section will review the state of recent scholarship on this devastating conflict. The next few sections will survey the major primary written sources from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These will be divided chronologically from the early accounts of the Spanish invaders through the major phases of Inca history production in the 1550s and 1570s to seventeenth century accounts. Given that these were all Spanish writers engaging in a Spanish genre of writing history, a special section is reserved for the Indigenous contributors whose motivations varied between each other and from their European counterparts. The following Chapter 3 will then follow each of these sources' narrative of the war, before Chapter 4 offers a synthetic narrative putting all the sources in context with each other.



## 1. Scholarship on the Inca Civil War in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Centuries

Neither a single definitive monograph that details the history of the Inca Civil War, nor a set of literature on its complexities exists. Instead, only a handful of articles have been written about this significant event in Inca history.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, other smaller and even less accessible phenomena have received greater attention in Inca scholarship. Examples of such scholarship include the great works of Peruvian historians Franklin Pease and Maria Rostworowski on Inca ideas of property and Andean oral history respectively.<sup>10</sup> Accessibility might also have played an ironic role in the lack of a definitive work on the Inca Civil War. Most of the major primary documents have been readily available in Spanish for centuries and in English for decades. Thus, they are seen as speaking for themselves and historians have focused on unearthing new documentation instead of revising old ones. Some of the most insightful commentaries on the conflict actually appear in the footnotes of the English translations of these sixteenth and early seventeenth century texts instead of as full-fledged academic treatises.<sup>11</sup> Yet the early modern narratives are complex products of their time, which do not simply speak for themselves.

Historian and anthropologist John Hemming's masterful history on the Spanish invasion of the Inca Empire is an excellent example of the potential and limitations of these sources.<sup>12</sup> He offers detailed readings of all of the major primary sources intertwined in a comprehensive history.

<sup>9</sup> E.g., John Rowe, "The Inca Civil War and the establishment of Spanish power in Peru," *Nawpa Pacha*, Vol. 28, no. 1 (2006): 1-9.

<sup>10</sup> Franklin Pease, *La Noción de Propiedad entre los Incas*, Tokyo, Japan: University of Tokyo Press, 1986; Maria Rostworowski de Díez Canseco, *La Muerte del Sol y Otros Cuentos*, Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1996.

<sup>11</sup> For example, Roland Hamilton's notes in Bernabé Cobo, *History of the Inca Empire: An Account of the Indians' Customs and Their Origin, Together with a Treatise on Inca Legends, History, and Social Institutions*, The Texas Pan American Series, translated and edited by Roland Hamilton, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979 or Victor von Hagen's notes on Cieza 1960.

<sup>12</sup> John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970.

A major caveat, however, is that Hemming rarely provides citations and it is extremely challenging to follow the relationship between his various sources. Additionally, the lack of citations forces future scholars simply to trust his scholarship, while it precludes them from building off of it.

In part, answering the call from historian Edmundo Guillen, anthropologist John Rowe was one of the first scholars to dig deep into the texts on the subject.<sup>13</sup> He clearly understood the importance of the civil war for the decline of the Inca Empire and the success of the Iberian invasion. Rowe argued that instead of believing the official history of the European invasion as reported by Pizarro's secretaries, Francisco de Xerez and Pedro Sancho, we needed to take a more nuanced view of the link between the war of succession and the ensuing clash between Europe and the Andes. For the purpose, Rowe consulted the writings of Hernando Pizarro, Juan Ruiz de Arce, Diego Trujillo, Pedro Pizarro, and Pedro Cataño.<sup>14</sup>

These earliest, eyewitness, written accounts provide critical insights into the events of the early 1530s, but they are also rife with profound misunderstanding of Andean culture, landscape, and politics that severely clouded the Iberian authors' accounts. Rowe makes use of later sources such as Juan Díez de Betanzos, Pedro Cieza de León, and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa to offer a concise history of the war in just a couple of pages. Not surprisingly, this lacks any significant detail on the major players, movements, and battles of the conflict. Instead, he, like many US and European-based historians, focused primarily on the effect of the arrival of Pizarro at the end of the war and on the negotiations between Atahualpa and the Europeans. Rowe's work represents an important first step in understanding how the devastation of the Inca Civil War enabled Spanish

<sup>13</sup> Rowe, 2006.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

invasion and subsequent government of the Andes. However, until this dissertation, no scholar has taken the baton from him so far and no comprehensive study on the subject exists.

The most complete recounting of the clash between Huascar and Atahualpa to date appeared in Rostworowski's major work on Inca history, *History of the Inca Realm*.<sup>15</sup> She dedicates two chapter sections to the conflict, one focusing on the roles of the maternal families of the two claimants to the throne and another providing an overview of the colonial sources. Her subsection entitled "The Struggle for the Royal Tassel" maps some of the main developments in the war.<sup>16</sup> Like Hemming, however, Rostworowski provides only general sketches of her sources and relies almost entirely on Sarmiento and Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcaymagua. While her narrative weaves carefully between the various contradictions in the historical record, she includes very little conversation between the primary texts in her work. The entire comparison between divergent versions of the Inca Civil War history is done behind the scenes. The final product is Rostworowski's reconstruction of the events of the civil war rather than a critical juxtaposition of the sources on it. This is understandable, since the primary goal of her book is not the civil war but rather the origin of Inca expansionism and the reciprocal nature of imperial governance. However, the result is a rather limited understanding of the Inca Civil War.

Recently, German historian Kerstin Nowack took this reconstruction a step further imagining what would have happened with the empire should the Spaniards not arrived at this opportune time.<sup>17</sup> Her study represents the most thorough research on the topic, as well as the best

<sup>15</sup> Rostworowski 1999.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 110-134.

<sup>17</sup> Kerstin Nowack, "What Would Have Happened after the Inca Civil War," in *Perspectives on the Inca I*, Tribus Sonderband Special Edition, International Symposium from March 3<sup>rd</sup> to March 5<sup>th</sup>, 2014, eds. Monica Barnes, Ines de Castro, Javier Flores, Doris Kurella, and Karoline Noack, (Stuttgart, Germany: Linden-Museum Stuttgart, 2015):268-289.

cited, referring to almost all of the primary sources discussed later in this chapter. Nowack, however, makes the assumption that the war is well understood and without providing much detail on the event itself, moves on to downplay its significance. Despite acknowledging the unstable character of the state at the time of Huayna Capac's death with little room for further expansion, she argues that without the intervention of the Europeans, the Inca Empire would have course corrected and lasted centuries perhaps in stagnation, but would not have collapsed.<sup>18</sup> This is, though, a somewhat surprising conclusion at the end of Nowack's thorough examination of the multiplicity of reasons for the war, including geographic and political over-extension, lack of cohesion between the state and the provincial co-opted governors, burden of Inca state extractions on the local economy. Indeed, the rapidity and the devastation of the civil war suggest that the empire was on a path to collapse that only got exacerbated by the arrival of Pizarro. The details of the war, i.e. which provinces sent troops to Huascar, or which ones rebelled and aided Pizarro, who acted as military commander for each side, how Atahualpa and Huascar constructed their legitimacy, which provinces were subject to greater violence, are critical for understanding the bigger question of collapse and resilience of the state, but is here once again missing.

Archaeologist Mariusz Ziolkowski applied a comparative approach of the sixteenth and seventeenth century sources on the Inca Civil War in his study of Inca elite politics.<sup>19</sup> The war is once again used as a case study for a larger narrative on internal strife among Inca nobility instead of the focus of systematic study. Ziolkowski argues that the civil war was a manifestation of the long-term rift between the Hanan and Hurin moieties of Inca society, represented by Atahualpa

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 285.

<sup>19</sup> Mariusz Ziolkowski, *La Guerra de los Wawqis: Los Objetivos y los Mecanismos de la Rivalidad dentro de la Elite Inca, siglos XV-XVI*, (Quito, Ecuador: Abya-Yala, 1997).

and Huascar respectively.<sup>20</sup> In his treatment of the conflict then, he details the roles of various important political players in this conflict, including the two combatant's mothers and their families, comparing the varying narratives that each Spanish author provided. Ziolkowski's work provides a detailed and nuanced view of the causes of the conflict, yet it does not venture into the course of the war. Thus, Rowe's, Rostworoski's, Nowack's, and Ziolkowski's works represent a starting point for understanding how the conflict between Huascar and Atahualpa paved the way for the European invasion and set the stage for Spanish colonialism in the Andes. This dissertation picks up where they left off, providing our first, comprehensive look into the evidence and details of the Inca Civil War.

## **2. Ethnohistoric Sources on the Inca Civil War**

Andean scholars often refer to the body of sixteenth and seventeenth century written documents as the Spanish chronicles. These are not chronological lists of events by their participants, but rather narratives that deal with a variety of issues that the Europeans faced in the Andean world.<sup>21</sup> Topics include Inca and Spanish politics, the trans-Atlantic encounter, the history of the Inca Empire, descriptions of the Andean landscape, and descriptions of the flora and fauna among others. A variety of people authored these chronicles including religious and political leaders, soldiers, friars, and, by the early seventeenth century, Indigenous writers, too. Early modern writers often borrowed and copied from each other and although some primary texts have been lost forever, much of the knowledge they contained has been transmitted by other authors.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 320.

<sup>21</sup> Franklin Pease, "Chronicles of the Andes in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008: 11.

As many of these were conceived as histories, this set of documents includes the most complete information on the events on both sides of the meeting at Cajamarca in 1532 and are the most valuable resource for our understanding of the Inca Civil War. Like many primary texts, the early modern authors in the Andes are heavily colored by their authors' personal experiences, agendas, and worldviews, as well as their access to Indigenous knowledge and reliable informants. Although no definitive source list exists, a set of the four or five most comprehensive texts often dominate academic inquiry.

In this dissertation, I rely on twelve sources divided into five groups that both include all texts containing narratives of the civil war and exhibit the historical development of this loose genre of historical writing in the first century post contact. I begin with the early contact accounts dating 1532-1550 produced primarily to record the feats of the European invaders, before moving into the first serious historical works dating from the 1550s. The third group consists of several compilations of Inca history commissioned, often indirectly, by the new Viceroy Toledo in 1569, as a part of his agenda to construct the political legitimacy of Spanish rule in the Andes by painting the Inca as recent usurpers from whom the Europeans freed the region. The final temporal group consists of various accounts dating from the 1580s to the last reliable writer on Inca history, Fray Bernabé Cobo, whose writings were published in 1653. Although further removed in time, these narratives often present the most complete and nuanced accounts as they utilized both living interlocutors and the earlier written documents. Finally, the fifth group of sources gives voice to the Indigenous historians in the Andes who published accounts on Inca history during the same period of about a century after the events of the Inca Civil War. These hail from different ethnic and political backgrounds and did not mean to represent an Inca state or any particular faction's agenda. They are equally biased and purposeful as any of the Spanish accounts, but they often

present distinctly Andean worldviews in clearer and more direct fashion, which merits their separation into their own group here, beyond the recognition of Indigenous participation in the writing of Andean history very early into the historical period, which is important on its own.

### **2.1. Seeing Moors Everywhere: Early Contact Accounts (1532-1550)**

The earliest authors address the journey of Pizarro and his band into the Andes and their invasion of the Tahuantinsuyu. The first account of the initial European invasion was anonymously published and attributed to Cristobal de Mena in Seville in April 1534.<sup>22</sup> Shortly after, in the same year, Francisco de Xerez, Pizarro's personal secretary, published the official report of the events at Cajamarca.<sup>23</sup> However, Xerez was removed from the office as the events were unfolding and he was replaced by Pedro Sancho, who finished his own report also in 1534. Sancho's manuscript was lost and only resurfaced in the nineteenth century.<sup>24</sup>

These early eyewitness accounts represent a challenge for the historian, as they contain very little information about the Andes and the Inca. Despite their authors holding the promise of being active participants in the events they described, these contact histories are full of linguistic, geographic, and temporal inconsistencies. Spelling of toponyms and important actors often presents an immense barrier, especially when coupled with the authors' lack of understanding of the Andean geography. The confusion of these accounts is, of course, somewhat understandable, as their authors were literally encountering a new world that presented them with new wonders daily. Lacking both cultural and linguistic understanding of the landscape they were entering, the

<sup>22</sup> Raúl Porras Barrenechea, *Los Cronistas del Perú (1528-1650) y Otros Ensayos*, Biblioteca Clásicos del Perú, No. 2, (Lima, Peru: Ministerio de Educación, 1986): 601.

<sup>23</sup> Pease, *Chronicles*, 2008: 11.

<sup>24</sup> Pease, *Chronicles*, 2008: 12.

European invaders fell back on an Iberian sense of “the other” by equating what they saw in the Andes with the other cultural clash many of the soldiers had experienced fighting against Al-Andalus back home. Thus, these early accounts speak more to the way the Iberians constructed otherness than to what they encountered on the ground, as llamas were described as camels and horses, places of religious significance as mosques, and political and cultural practices seemed to follow Muslim traditions rather than Andean ones.

### **2.1.1. Francisco de Xerez (1534)**

Francisco de Xerez was Francisco Pizarro’s secretary in the years leading to the capturing of Atahualpa. In addition to being a horseman and soldier in the 1532 expedition, he acted as its scribe from Coaque to Cajamarca. Xerez was the only Spaniard seriously injured in the ambush on Atahualpa, breaking a leg.<sup>25</sup> His account is focused almost entirely on the actions of the Spaniards, as Xerez did not consider Inca history as an important subject. When he wrote about local geography, fauna, or cultural practices, his information is confused and unreliable. As such, his account is illuminative of the grand clash of worlds that occurred at Cajamarca. He compared Andeans to “others” he was more familiar with from the Spanish Reconquista and referred to shrines as “mosques.”<sup>26</sup> Unable to communicate with the local population, Xerez’s toponyms and Inca names are barely distinguishable. An instance when his confusion was illuminative is his reference to Huayna Capac as “Cuzco Viejo,” or Old Cuzco, and Huascar as “Cuzco Joven,” or Young Cuzco, hinting at Huascar’s perceived political legitimacy as rightful ruler in the context

<sup>25</sup> Franklin Pease, “Xerez, Francisco de (1497-?),” in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008: 752.

<sup>26</sup> Francisco de Xerez, *Verdadera Relación de la Conquista del Perú*, edited by Concepción Bravo, (Madrid, Spain: Historia 16, 1985).



of the Inca Civil War.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, it points to an important issue of Inca social organization, namely that the center of the empire was so inextricably intertwined with both the personality of the leader and the capital that both were seen as a singular entity. This explains Atahualpa's interest in setting up a new capital in Quito, based on his presence in the city.<sup>28</sup>

### **2.1.2. Pedro Sancho (1534)**

Pedro Sancho was a foot soldier in Pizarro's company before he replaced Xerez as the future marquis' secretary in 1533.<sup>29</sup> His account took off where his predecessor's ended and recorded the Spanish entering Cuzco. Like Xerez, Sancho was extremely unreliable with Indigenous names of places or people other than Atahualpa and his generals Quizquiz and Chalcochima, whom he knew personally. The whole account has a distinctly positive view of Huayna Capac, while both Atahualpa and Huascar are portrayed in negative terms. This is perhaps a function of Pizarro's attempt to discredit both sides of the Inca Civil War and install a puppet government in Cuzco led by Manco Inca, another of Huayna Capac's sons. It is significant that legitimacy was traced through the last unified ruler of the empire in Sancho's writing, as it illuminates the devastation of the Inca Civil War. The conflict left the Inca state and its elite so torn apart that the only way to construct political legitimacy was to revert back to a time before the war.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>28</sup> Juan Díez de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, transl. Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996 [1555]): 233; Cieza, 182; Bernabé Cobo, *History of the Inca Empire: An Account of the Indians' Customs and Their Origin, Together with a Treatise on Inca Legends, History, and Social Institutions*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979: 164.

<sup>29</sup> Franklin Pease, "Sancho, Pedro (1514?-1547)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008: 630.

Unlike his predecessor, Sancho did not provide an account of the civil war itself, but instead only mentioned it in passing. This probably signifies a further turn in the political strategy of the Spaniards. At first, they thought that having captured the Inca ruler Atahualpa their conquest was effectively over. That got complicated by the civil war and the fact that Huascar seemed to have an even stronger claim. When Xerez was writing, Huascar was still arrested by Quizquiz and Chalcochima, so Pizarro still had a chance to deal with the perceived legitimate ruler, which explains the tweaked second version of Xerez's account. By the time Sancho replaced Xerez, Huascar was already dead and the Spaniards needed another figure to work with. This was clearly a turning point for Pizarro, as on every of the three occasions that Sancho speaks of the civil war, it is to lament that Huascar<sup>30</sup> who was a great friend of Pizarro was murdered by Atahualpa's agents.<sup>31</sup> They turned to Huayna Capac's other sons, Paullo and Manco Inca, but in order to elevate them over Atahualpa and to justify murdering him, they needed to shift the perceived legitimacy back to Huayna Capac. This is reflected in Sancho's writing, which completely forgoes both Huascar and Atahualpa as legitimate rulers, while it also dismisses the civil war by not including an account of its course.

It is somewhat surprising to see so little detail about the Inca Civil War in the writings of the two Pizarro scribes who were eyewitnesses to, and in a way perhaps even active participants in, the conflict itself. However, they provide an important reminder that all of these written documents were produced as political statements. Moreover, it is telling that their power over the narrative of the European invasion has remained so great over the centuries, as their attempt to

<sup>30</sup> Sancho calls him Guaritico.

<sup>31</sup> Pedro Sancho, *An Account of the Conquest of Peru*, transl. Philip Means, (New York, NY: The Cortes Society, 1917 [1534]): 31 and 174.

downplay the role of the Inca Civil War in the European invasion of the Andes has largely persisted in the popular imagination even though Sancho himself recognized that without the civil war, the Iberians would never have been able to enter Cuzco or even get beyond Jauja.<sup>32</sup>

### **2.1.3. Agustín de Zárate (1545)**

In the decade after the initial invasion, the Spaniards discovered more about the Andes, which prompted a greater interest in the history of the land before the arrival of Pizarro. The first attempt at writing a more detailed Inca history, if brief, was done in the 1540s and published in 1555 by Agustín de Zárate.<sup>33</sup> The Spanish king Philip II appointed Zárate a chief auditor of the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1543. After completing his task to examine the royal holdings in the viceroyalty, he returned to Spain in 1545.<sup>34</sup> Zárate remained on the coast during his entire stay in South America and his work is particularly colored by his coastal informants. His history of the Inca lineage contains huge gaps and exhibits a series of misunderstandings of the geography of the highlands. For example, Zárate conflates the Lake Titicaca area, part of the southern quarter of the empire, Collasuyu, with the imperial capital Cuzco hundreds of kilometers away. In his brief treatment of Andean religion, Zárate speaks of Pachacamac and Con as the main creator gods.<sup>35</sup> Notwithstanding that Andean religion did not conceive of potent beings as deities and gods in the

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>33</sup> Pease, *Chronicles*, 2008: 12.

<sup>34</sup> Teodoro Hampe Martínez, “Zárate, Agustín de (ca. 1514-ca. 1590),” in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008: 757.

<sup>35</sup> Zárate, 58-59.

way the Spaniards saw them,<sup>36</sup> Pachacamac is associated with the Peruvian central coast, while Con is related to the iconography of the Peruvian south coast.

Nevertheless, Zárate was the first author to include a brief account of the Inca Civil War. He dedicated the final chapter of his Book I, “The Land of Peru,” to the conflict between Atahualpa and Huascar.<sup>37</sup> Following Xerez and Sancho, he placed the source of political legitimacy in Huayna Capac, attributing most major Inca developments to him. Zárate took a stand in the conflict, however, siding with Atahualpa. He first commented that Atahualpa was his father’s favorite son, alluding to the Inca not practicing primogeniture inheritance.<sup>38</sup> He further placed the blame for the conflict square on Huascar, who was portrayed as the main aggressor at every turn. After the death of Huayna Capac, Atahualpa swore obedience to Huascar and begged him to appoint him governor of the province of Quito, since it belonged to his ancestors.<sup>39</sup> According to Zárate, Atahualpa was born in Quito from a secondary wife of Huayna Capac, while on campaign there. Huascar demanded that his half-brother came to Cuzco and hand over the army in exchange for land and honor, but he could not grant him Quito, as it was a border region.<sup>40</sup>

This idea that the northern frontier was the only path to further expansion appears again in later texts and it is one of the most credible reasons for the war. If what we know about the *panaca* system of inheritance and the expectations of every new ruler to conquer new land is correct, then

<sup>36</sup> See for example, Frank Salomon, *At the Mountains’ Altar: Anthropology of Religion in an Andean Community*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 58-61. Zárate was also the first to tell the story of Huayna Capac commissioning a large golden chain to be made in commemoration of Huascar’s birthday. Zárate further comments that Huascar was named after this object, as his name means “rope” in Quechua (Zárate, 60).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

Huascar would have been effectively blocked from making his own mark on the empire. The Inca had already reached the limits of their military prowess in the Southern Andes by the time of Topa Inca and they continued to struggle in the humid, lower elevations of Antisuyu, so the only possible extensions remained to the north, where familiar terrain and reasonable cultural similarities with local communities promised some success for the Inca mixed tactics of force, intimidation, and gift-giving. It is unclear whether Atahualpa had that in mind when requesting the northern frontier for himself, although there is some evidence that he engaged in further military campaigns in the north.<sup>41</sup> It is possible that his request to remain in Quito as governor was a ploy to undermine Huascar by performing the duties of a ruler, while he still controlled the army of his father, without officially opening a conflict with his half-brother.

## **2.2. Gaining Insight through Quechua: Examinations of Inca History in the 1550s**

A more serious study of the Inca past and their dominion over the Andes developed in the 1550s. The two most significant Spanish writers of this period were Pedro Cieza de León and Juan Díez de Betanzos, whose works remain the definitive primary texts on Inca history. Unlike their predecessors, both authors travelled extensively throughout the Andes and exhibited more nuanced views of Andean cultural practices. Both of them spoke Quechua fluently and their accounts often reflect Andean worldviews that were difficult to comprehend in Spanish. At the same time, a number of authors, most notably Francisco López de Gómara, created compilations from a variety of sources without ever stepping foot in the Andes.<sup>42</sup> These accounts should not be discredited too

<sup>41</sup>Betanzos writes of quashing a rebellion by the Pastos in modern-day Colombia (Betanzos, 200-202), while Murúa's account includes new conquest missions to Quijos and Umbos in northeast Ecuador (Martín de Murúa, *Historia General del Peru*, Madrid, Spain: Dastin Historia, 2001 [1616]: 169.

<sup>42</sup>Pease, *Chronicles*, 13.

hastily, as they had profound impact on the European continent, while they also likely included large corpuses of reliable information. Yet the extensive personal experience of Cieza and Betanzos makes them the premium sources of Inca history of this period.

Cieza was an accomplished author who had written on his journey in New Granada in what is now Colombia.<sup>43</sup> His travel accounts are the definitive early text on a variety of topics there, while his later travels into the Viceroyalty of Peru produced both detailed descriptions of the Andean landscape, flora, and fauna and an examination of Inca history, as well as a thorough account of the Spanish civil wars in which he was a full participant on the royalist side. Despite his clear partisanship in the matters of the colonial administration, his account is not obviously colored by his opinion of the Pizarro brothers and their faction against whom he fought in the 1540s. Further, he was not especially interested in military history as one would expect, often painting in wide brushstrokes the narratives of military campaigns, while devoting much more attention to matters about the Andean geography, flora, and fauna, which clearly made a much more lasting impression on Cieza.

Betanzos was primarily based in Cuzco where he lived with his Inca wife, Cuxirimay Ocllo, one of Atahualpa's secondary wives.<sup>44</sup> His informants were high-ranking members of the Inca nobility and therefore his version of Inca history is often seen as a reflection of the official one in the empire before European contact. Similar to written traditions, however, the Inca oral history tradition was varied with multiple competing versions. In fact, one of the main roles of the *panaca* of a ruler after his death was to retell the stories of his reign, which was a major political

<sup>43</sup> Franklin Pease, "Cieza de León, Pedro de (ca. 1518-1554)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008: 143.

<sup>44</sup> Bruce Mannheim, "Díez de Betanzos, Juan (?-1576)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008: 186.

tool in the arsenal of each of these groups. Betanzos undoubtedly had greater access to Cuxirimay Ocllo's *panaca* version of history, as well as personal motivation to leave a written record of it. Despite these biases, Cieza and Betanzos left the most detailed accounts of Inca history including narratives on the civil war, while also establishing a narrative structure that was later followed by most Spanish writers.

Although the 1550s histories represent a twenty-year leap from the eyewitness accounts of the Inca Civil War by Xerez and Sancho, they also significantly clear the fog of cultural misunderstanding. Both Cieza and Betanzos were immersed in daily Indigenous life by speaking fluent Quechua and entering meaningful personal and professional relationships with Indigenous people, especially Inca. Thus, their accounts not only rid themselves of the Muslim comparison, but exhibit a deep understanding of Indigenous cultural practices in which they were able to participate. Both of these leaps, the temporal, allowing Europeans the necessary time to process the newness of it all, and the linguistic, allowing them to comprehend Indigenous concepts, ontology, and worldview, were critical for the wide gap between their predecessors' accounts and those of Cieza and Betanzos.

### **2.2.1. Pedro Cieza de León (1549-1555)**

Pedro de Cieza de León came to the Andean region in the 1540s after serving as a soldier in New Granada. He travelled both along the coast and in the sierra including the Lake Titicaca region, Charchas in highland Bolivia, and around Cuzco in 1549.<sup>45</sup> There he met with Betanzos, who was writing his history at the same time. It is possible that Cieza used him as an important source for Inca politics and history. He was critical of the treatment of the Indigenous populations

<sup>45</sup> Pease, *Cieza*, 2008: 143.

by the Spanish government in the Andes and had a more nuanced view of Indigenous practices. Cieza also viewed the Inca as highly civilized and noted that such people were easier to colonize, as they already had similar political and social structures to the Spanish ones.<sup>46</sup> This alludes to the adaptability of Inca elites to the legal and political systems imposed on them in the sixteenth century. Cieza was especially interested in genealogy and his work includes important clues to the familial relations of those involved in the Inca Civil War.

### **2.2.2. Juan Díez de Betanzos (1544-1555)**

Juan Díez de Betanzos gained prominence as a Quechua interpreter in the 1540s, before becoming an influential political figure after his marriage to Cuxirimay Ocllo in 1544.<sup>47</sup> Atahualpa's former wife had been baptized as Angelina and was previously forced into an abusive, sexual relationship with Francisco Pizarro, with whom she had two sons. Cuxirimay Ocllo held a central role in Betanzos' history, as she was not only his principal informant, but also the point of access to other sources. As an Inca princess from *Capac ayllu*, the lineage of her great-grandfather and ninth ruler Pachacuti, she was an active participant in inter-*panaca* politics, while Betanzos himself was a significant player in the colonial administration. As a result, his account is completely entangled with both the Indigenous and colonial politics of the 1550s. Betanzos' links to Atahualpa's camp extend to his language as well, as he spoke a northern dialect of Quechua distinct from the Cuzco one.<sup>48</sup> Not surprisingly, his version of the Inca Civil War represented a partisan view depicting Huascar as a drunkard and inefficient leader in contrast with his depiction

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 147.

<sup>47</sup> Mannheim 2008, 186.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 187.



of Atahualpa as an accomplished military general. Nevertheless, the account of the war his *Narrative of the Incas* was the most complete to date, including great details on military strategy, movement of the two armies in space, Inca politics during the war, and provincial alliances.

### **2.3. Creating an Usurper: Inca Histories in the Time of Viceroy Francisco Toledo (1569-1581)**

The arrival of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1569 signaled the beginning of a period of major administrative reform in the Viceroyalty of Peru. It had been over three decades since the fall of the Inca Empire in the hands of Pizarro and his company and yet the Spanish Crown's control of the highlands was still weak and conditioned on the support of the local elites. The leaders, or *curacas*, of each ethnic group that previously constituted a province within Tahuantisuyu had been recognized as natural lords and Spanish land grants were based on their territories and authority. Toledo sought to greatly reduce the power of these Indigenous elites in order to achieve a firmer control of the viceroyalty. One of his main tactics involved a call for the production of Inca histories that would paint the *curacas* as usurpers rather than natural lords.<sup>49</sup> These new, revised histories aimed at justifying Spanish sovereignty in the Andes by presented the Inca as tyrants, thus implying that colonial government was based on a humanitarian mission.<sup>50</sup> Despite its political persuasion and precisely due to its distinct purpose, this body of literature demanded a great level of detail. Moreover, for the first time in the 1570s, Inca history was in the heart of Spanish writing rather than being conceived as a small preamble to the great conquest of Pizarro.

<sup>49</sup> Pease, *Chronicles*: 14.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

Toledo's call for Inca history production, however, did not leave as large a body of literature as one might imagine. The most important of the surviving texts of the period was Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa's *Historia Indica* written in 1572. In 1576, Cristobal de Molina, a parish priest of Cuzco, published his *Relación de las Fabulas y Ritos de los Incas*, which was not original work, but rather a summary of an earlier lost document.<sup>51</sup> Diego Fernandez, El Palentino also published during the first decade of Toledan rule, but his account of the civil war is extremely brief. The 1570s also saw Pedro Pizarro, one of Francisco's cousins who accompanied him in the venture into the Andes, finally publish his *Relación del Descubrimiento y Conquista del Perú*. Although this text primarily deals with the Spanish invasion and the political battles between the Iberians, it is a valuable eye-witness account, adding to Xerez and Sancho. Moreover, Pizarro wrote his account after spending some time in the Andes and his history is much more legible in terms of major actors and movements through the landscape.

### **2.3.1. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa (1572)**

Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa wrote the most extensive and famous history of this period. Viceroy Toledo approved of his *History of the Incas* and sent him back to Spain in 1572 to present it officially to the Spanish king Philip II.<sup>52</sup> Sarmiento arrived in the New World at the age of twenty in 1555, living in Mexico and Guatemala before moving to Peru in the 1560s.<sup>53</sup> He held various administrative posts first for Viceroy Diego López de Zuñiga and later under Viceroy Toledo. Sarmiento was keenly interested in both science and the occult, which he saw as intertwined. He

<sup>51</sup> Pease, *Chronicles*, 14.

<sup>52</sup> Franklin Pease, "Sarmiento de Gamboa, Pedro (1535-1592?)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008: 641.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 640.

had various spats with the Inquisition first in 1564, when he was accused of predicting the old Viceroy's death and again in 1574 for the production of magic rings and palm reading. and finally in 1578.<sup>54</sup> Sarmiento's curiosity into the magical is visible in his version of Inca history, as he was fascinated with Andean religion even as he disparaged it as idolatry. His account covered the twelve *Sapa Incas* from Manco Capac to Huascar and followed the narrative structure established by Cieza and Betanzos in the 1550s.<sup>55</sup> On par with Betanzos' *Narrative of the Incas*, Sarmiento's *History of the Incas* presents one of the most detailed versions of the Inca Civil War.

### **2.3.2. Pedro Pizarro (1578)**

Toledo's call to write Inca histories presented Pedro Pizarro with the opportunity to tell his version of the Spanish invasion. A close relative of Francisco Pizarro and his page, Pedro crossed the Atlantic in 1529 to join the expedition into the Andes.<sup>56</sup> He does not seem to have been present at the encounter in Cajamarca, as at seventeen he was probably too young to fight. His name did not appear on the list of people who shared the treasure received from Atahualpa initially, but Francisco acknowledged his contribution and rewarded him in Cuzco in 1533.<sup>57</sup>

There is no evidence that he kept extensive notes on the events of the initial invasion at the time. Instead, he wrote his account full four decades later, inspired by his indignation at the status of the Iberians and taking advantage of Toledo's plea.<sup>58</sup> Yet, it is remarkable that Pizarro's account

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 641.

<sup>56</sup> Rafael Varón Gabai, "Pizarro, Pedro (ca.1513-1587)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 524.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Porras Barrenechea 1986, 134.

of the Inca Civil War closely resembles that of Xerez, another eye-witness to the events of 1532, although his narrative focuses primarily on the subsequent Spanish civil war for power in the Andes, in which he was an active participant. It is unclear whether Pedro had access to the writings of his cousin's scribe, but the close relationship between them certainly suggests he consulted them, as he embarked on his own writing journey. Although Pizarro shares Xerez's basic structure and minimal detail only including the initial phase of the war that took place in modern Ecuador, his *Relación del Descubrimiento y Conquista de los Reinos del Perú* was distinctly a product of the 1570s.

#### **2.4. Distance Heals Myopia: Post-Toledan and 17th Century Histories (1582-1653)**

After a period of relative silence, a number of influential texts were produced at the turn of the seventeenth century. By then, the conflict between Huascar and Atahualpa was already some seventy years away so their status as primary sources requires some justification. Similar to Pedro Pizarro, El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega wrote his account from memory in 1609, but the information he relayed was based on his childhood in Cuzco in the 1540s. At the same time mendicant friars of a number of different orders compiled histories based on earlier publications coupled with their own observations of Andean cultural and religious practices. The Mercedarian Fray Martin de Murúa borrowed heavily from López de Gómara's writing, while the Jesuit Fray Bernabé Cobo based much of his manuscript on the work of Polo de Ondegardo, which has been lost.<sup>59</sup> Another Jesuit, José de Acosta, wrote one of the most comprehensive treatises of the New World, *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, which covered vast topics of natural history, theology, and history in the Andes and Mesoamerica. Acosta travelled extensively in the Spanish colonies, but also

<sup>59</sup> Pease, *Chronicles*, 15.

based his account on numerous unnamed sources, only directly citing the lost manuscript of Polo Ondegardo, whom he knew personally.<sup>60</sup> Thus, although mostly published in the seventeenth century, this body of work represents research done much earlier.

A new type of writer emerged in the early seventeenth century, the Indigenous writer of Andean history and culture. Like their Spanish counterparts, these authors were the product of their time and context and had agendas of their own. The idea of a singular Indigenous, or for that matter singular Spanish, point of view is flawed to begin with, as the Inca Empire was not a homogenous or even a nation state, but rather a federation of many local groups. These groups had the agency to make alliances or deny their services to either of the two claimants to the throne, or even to manipulate them into fighting. It would be reductive to think of these Indigenous authors as Inca representatives or even as of the Inca state. As we recognize how the personal histories and narratives that informed all the Iberian writers, we should consider that their Indigenous counterparts were also representatives of diverse backgrounds, histories, and experiences. All of them were born, raised, and educated in a post-contact Andean world, which is not to say necessarily a Spanish colonial world, but they are distinct products of this contact moment, just like their Spanish counterparts.

It is indeed somewhat problematic to speak of the Indigenous Andean writers of the seventeenth century as a group of their own, as their backgrounds and agendas varied dramatically. Their separation here is due to their narratives not falling into the chronology of Spanish written sources from the earlier soldier accounts, through the Toledan histories, and to the later clergy interest in Inca culture and history. Instead, they are an eclectic group with Guaman Poma calling

<sup>60</sup> Manuel Marzal, "Acosta, José de (1540-1600)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies. 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 13.

for viceregal reform and restoration of some Inca policies, while Pachacuti Yamqui saw pre-Christian times as dark ages, as his project was primarily to catechize.<sup>61</sup> Although they generally follow the Spanish stylistic and narrative conventions of the time, these authors did not lose their Andean sensibility and their accounts contain numerous insights into Indigenous practices and worldviews that their Spanish counterparts generally lack. This Andean sensibility is not confined to the writing, but also can be seen in the accompanying illustrations of some of the authors.

The works of Pachacuti Yamqui and Guaman Poma are the two most important surviving texts by Indigenous Andeans from the seventeenth century. While it might be useful to think of Garcilaso as a member of this group, his account was written in Spain decades after he left Cuzco and although he tried to rebrand himself as Inca then, this seems to have been a late development and his narrative fits the Spanish trajectory much better.

Pachacuti Yamqui's *Relación de Antigüedades deste Reyno del Pirú* has been, sadly, often dismissed as a problematic source of an almost fanatical religious convert, as its primary aim was to celebrate the introduction of Christianity in the Andes as a victory over the devil worship that preceded. At the same time, his schematic drawing on folio 13v that attempts to show that Christianity represented a natural evolution from Andean religion by exposing, or perhaps fabricating, the links between the two has been widely used by scholars, often uncritically, as a "pure" artifact of Inca religion.<sup>62</sup> Away from religious matters, though, Pachacuti Yamqui offers one of the most detailed accounts of the Inca Civil War, which has often been overlooked.

<sup>61</sup> Rolena Adorno, "Guaman Poma de Ayala, Felipe (ca. 1535-50-ca 1616)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 260 and Pierre Duviols, "Pachacuti Yamqui Salcaymagua, Joan de Santa Cruz (seventeenth century)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 488.

<sup>62</sup> E.g. Sheila Arup, "Symbolic Connexions in Pachacuti Yamqui's Cosmological Diagram," in *Arte, Historia e Identidad en América: Visiones Comparativas, XVII Coloquio Internacional de Historia del Arte*, vol. 1, edited by Gustavo Curiel, Renato González, and Juana Gutiérrez, 115-154, (Mexico City, Mexico: Universidad Nacional

Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala's *El Primer Nueva Coronica y Bien Gobierno* is perhaps the most cited, and even more widely used in academic presentations and as an educational tool, author of this period. Often referred to as a *ladino*, or an Indigenous Andean familiar with European language and religion, by non-Indigenous peoples, he wrote a manuscript dedicated to the Spanish King Felipe III date 14 February 1615 to which he attached his 1,189-page treatise of the problems facing the Viceroyalty of Peru. To illustrate why the Spanish Crown needed to undertake serious reform in the colony, Guaman Poma offers a discussion on a wide variety of topics including history, religion, Andean customs, legislation, agriculture, economic organization, and others. Curiously, his version of the civil war is brief and unreliable, nowhere near the level of detail and Indigenous understanding that is associated with this manuscript. Like Garcilaso, he used the history of the civil war to elevate his own lineage and status, which is an example of how both Spanish and Indigenous people saw the war as an opportunity for advancement.

The temporal distance of all of these sources from the events of the Inca Civil War can be seen as a blessing in disguise here. We already saw how eyewitness accounts failed to live up to their promise when the authors lacked cultural and linguistic understanding of the new world they entered. Unlike Xerez and Sancho, Cobo and Murúa spoke Quechua and worked directly with a diverse group of Indigenous people. They not only had eyes to see beyond the Spanish worldview, but indeed what constituted a European worldview in the Andes had already been affected by the clash with Indigenous cultures. Although they did not directly note it, Cobo and Murúa

Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, 1994), Jan Szeminski, *Un Kuraka, Un Dios y Una Historia: "Relación de Antigüedades de Este Reyno del Pirú" por Juan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salca Maygua*, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1987), Reiner Tom Zuidema, "Segunda Respuesta de Tom Zuidema," in *Saberes y Memorias en los Andes: In Memoriam Thierry Saignes*, edited by Therese Bouysson-Cassagne, 149-154, (Paris, France: Institut de Hautes Etudes de l'Amérique Latine, 1997).

undoubtedly editorialized on Polo and López de Gómara rather than just directly copying. Thus, this set of sources includes both some of the greatest level of detail about the civil war and an increased understanding the way Inca politics functioned within the conflict.

And then there is Garcilaso de la Vega, whose account offers a complete inverse of these issues. The eyewitness character of his account when it comes to the political scene in Cuzco is beyond questioning, but writing his memoirs some six decades later raises questions over how much his memory and the final product were altered through time. Despite leaning heavily on his indigeneity as legitimizing factor, Garcilaso relied on other early modern sources just like Murúa and Cobo did at the time. He consulted the writing of Cieza, El Palentino, López de Gómara, Fernandez de Oviedo, Blas Valera, and Zárate to complement his own memories of the oral histories he heard in the Inca court.<sup>63</sup> Writing as a “mestizo” or a bi-cultural person in Spain relying on his memories and earlier written sources, somewhat ironically make Garcilaso fit well with this group of writers who wrote as Spaniards now more immersed in Andean culture and also relying on earlier sources.

#### **2.4.1. Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua (c.1613)**

Not much is known about Pachacuti Yamqui’s life outside of what he wrote about himself. He claimed that he was from a village between the provinces of Canchis and Cañas southeast of Cuzco, the son of Diego Felipe Condorcanqui and Maria Guayrotari and descendant of the principal lord of the province.<sup>64</sup> He and his entire family were baptized by the very first

<sup>63</sup> José Antonio Mazzotti, “Garcilaso de la Vega, El Inca (1539-1616),” in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 230-231.

<sup>64</sup> Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua, *Relació de Antigüedades deste Reyno del Pirú*, (Lima, Peru: Institut Francais D’Etudes Andines, 1993 [1600]), f.1.



Spaniards and they contributed to the extirpation of idolatry, possibly in relation to Francisco de Avila's campaign. He was educated at a school for *curaca* children where he was probably instructed by a religious order. Pachacuti Yamqui traveled to the Lake Titicaca area and to the highlands of modern-day Bolivia and he was probably fluent in Ayamara, although his account was written in Spanish and Quechua.<sup>65</sup>

*Relacion de Antigüedades* is structured as a history of the Inca Empire, but its main purpose was religious. Pachacuti Yamqui equated Manco Capac's foundation of Tahuantinsuyu with the emergence of an omnipotent creator god he named Viracocha Pachayachachic, although Andean religion had no concept of deity.<sup>66</sup> Viracocha is presented as the Christian God who was first rejected by the followers of Manco Capac who preferred polytheism, but then all successful rulers, such as Pachacuti and Huascar, moved by divine providence, instituted a form of monotheism that was the basis for the easy conversion later.<sup>67</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui's account is quite open about its religious agenda, which has caused it to often be discarded as a useless source on pre-1532 matters. However, a closer examination of his account of the Inca civil reveals it to be extraordinarily detailed.

His personal background is also noteworthy here, as Pachacuti Yamqui came from Collasuyu, a region that did not see battle in the Inca Civil War, but whose allegiance played a key role in it. Both the Canchis and the Cañas sided with Huascar early in the conflict,<sup>68</sup> while

<sup>65</sup> Duviols 2008, 488.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 489.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 490.

<sup>68</sup> Cieza 1960, 85

Colla forces were responsible for the few military victories he enjoyed over Atahualpa.<sup>69</sup> It is unclear whether Pachacuti Yamqui was a Huascar sympathizer, but he certainly painted him in a favorable light. Although the increased level of detail in his writing, might be argued, sheds further light on Huascar's failure both on the battlefield and as a politician, it also allows for his successes to be included in the narrative, small and scattered as they might have been.

#### **2.4.2. Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala (1615)**

Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala was a descendant of a *mitmacona* community from Ayacucho, which was likely resettled from the Huánuco region.<sup>70</sup> He claimed heritage from the Yarovilca *curaca* of Huánuco on his father's side and from the Inca on his mother's, but was based in the dominion of the Lucanas while working on his manuscript. In the 1590s he worked as an interpreter and witness in the proceedings in Ayacucho associated with the Toledan policy of *reducciones*, the resettlement campaign to concentrate local populations in towns in order to govern them more successfully.<sup>71</sup> He was later exiled for falsification of his noble status and false land claims in the area, making long trips to Lima passing through Huancayo, Nazca, and Ica.

The possible links between Guaman Poma and the works of various Indigenous Andean and European intellectuals of the times are numerous, while it is unclear what written or other sources he used. What is certain is his collaboration with Martín de Murúa, whose general

<sup>69</sup> Murúa 2001, 178; Sarmiento 1999, 178; and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f. 41r.

<sup>70</sup> Adorno 2008, 255.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 256.

historical course is mirrored by the Indigenous writer.<sup>72</sup> However, when it comes to the Inca Civil War, the two accounts could not be any more different. Where Murúa's is perhaps the most complete of all Spanish accounts of the war, Guaman Poma's mentions it only in passing providing no clear narrative neither in space nor in time of the course of the war. Yet, his disinterest in military history only highlighted his focus on Andean culture, as he provides critical insights into the interpersonal relationships withing Huascar's court, as well as into questions of material culture and royal insignia.

### **2.4.3. Martin de Murúa (1616)**

Fray Martin de Murúa was a Basque Mercedarian friar who travelled throughout the Andes from 1585 to 1611, living in various communities in short stints.<sup>73</sup> His account includes a number of images that have been sometimes attributed to Guaman Poma. The two men certainly worked together for some time, although it is unclear whether Guaman Poma acted as an informant for Murúa, who is known to have borrowed from popular accounts like that of López de Gómara.<sup>74</sup> Published in 1616 in Madrid, this account is mostly celebrated as the first illustrated narrative including valuable information not only on the Inca noblemen, but also on the *coyas* or Inca queens. Just as the Inca Civil War has been largely overlooked, so has the contribution to its history by Murúa, whose *Historia General del Piru* is perhaps the most detailed and complete account of the war including extensive treatments of all major components of the conflict from its causes to its immediate aftermath and the arrival of the Europeans.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 260.

<sup>73</sup> Juan Ossio, "Murúa, Martín de (?-ca. 1620)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 436..

<sup>74</sup> Pease, *Chronicles*, 15.

#### 2.4.4. El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega (1617)

Garcilaso was the son of the Inca princess Chimpu Ocllo and the Spanish captain Sebastian Garcilaso de la Vega.<sup>75</sup> His mother was the daughter of Topa Huallpa, who was briefly installed by Pizarro as the first vassal *Sapa Inca* to the Spanish crown in 1533. Garcilaso's own rebranding assuming the name "El Inca" has had a long-lasting effect, as he is seen as a member of Inca nobility and his account has long been celebrated in Peru and abroad as the most primary representation of the Inca state. Naturally, no official state history existed, but rather each political faction created and promoted its own version that suited its needs. Being a part of the Topa Inca lineage, who sided with Huascar in the conflict according to Betanzos and Sarmiento, his *Comentarios Reales* are partisan to the eventual loser's narrative.<sup>76</sup> This is a rather rare perspective, as most of Huascar's supporters in the Inca nobility did not survive into the seventeenth century. Garcilaso presents a very different picture of the Inca Civil War, claiming that its entire course was just one swift surprise attack from Atahualpa. He claims that all the other histories only repeat a story fabricated in order to conceal the treachery of the Quiteños.<sup>77</sup> While it would be hard to believe that such conspiracy worked so incredibly effectively, both Garcilaso's narrative and its history of production speak to the power of Inca partisan politics in the creation of history long after the events of the 1530s.

<sup>75</sup> Mazzotti 2008, 229.

<sup>76</sup> Betanzos 1996, 201 and Sarmiento 1999:185.

<sup>77</sup> Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, (Lima, Peru: Fondo de la Cultura Economica, 1991 [1617]): 633.

#### 2.4.5. Bernabé Cobo (1653)

The last early modern writer in this group of Inca historians was Fray Bernabé Cobo, whose work was finished a full century after the Inca war of succession. More a compilation than original history, his narrative is based on the writings of Polo Ondegardo, Pedro Pizarro, Garcilaso de la Vega, Cristobal de Molina, and Luis Jeronimo de Ore, as well as Cobo's own verification through interviews with descendants of the Inca royal lineages.<sup>78</sup> He arrived in Peru at the age of nineteen and spent most of his life in the Andes moving between Lima, Cuzco, Juli, and Arequipa.<sup>79</sup> Although as a Jesuit friar, Cobo was primarily interested in the Andean religious practices, his monumental work included a significant portion on Inca history. It is often unclear what parts of his narrative are borrowed from which of his predecessors, but its account of the civil war includes details such as particular uplifting speeches by military generals. In a way, Cobo's account is a good summation of all primary sources on the conflict between Atahualpa and Huascar and it closely resembles the modern narrative that can be found in recent scholarship on the topic. Because of its comparative character, this history seems to be much less colored by partisan politics, although it would be wrong to assume that Cobo's informants in the seventeenth century were not adept enough in historical rhetoric to present a particular story. Yet, Cobo's work is one of the most balanced histories available and as such it is still especially useful despite its late date.

<sup>78</sup> Roland Hamilton, "Cobo, Bernabé (1580-1657)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900*, edited by Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008): 152.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

## Conclusions

Despite the widespread consensus about the importance of the Inca Civil War to the Spanish invasion and subsequent governance of the Andes, the catastrophic event remains largely understudied. Apart from a brief moment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, historians, as well as the rare archaeologist working with text, have shown little interest in the subject allowing the grand narrative of Pizarro and his men's heroic exploits to remain intact. Despite, or perhaps precisely due to, the accessibility of the primary written sources on the matter, these have often been used in a cursory and uncritical manner by most archaeologists. However, the sixteenth and seventeenth century narratives possess incredible potential for insights both sides of the 1532 divide, especially when understood as complex historical documents produced after, but discussing events before contact.

In this chapter, I surveyed the early modern written source on Inca history produced by Iberian and Indigenous writers in the Andes and briefly explored the histories of their production, authors, and biases. A few important conclusions emerged from this survey. First, these texts can be categorized in several groups temporally, recognizing the major shifts in this body of literature from the blurry vision of the eyewitness accounts of the 1530s, through the importance of immersion and language in the 1550s, to the politically motivated histories of the 1570s. This categorization may further act as a framework for understanding other sources not included here or yet to be discovered.

Second, this survey identified these narratives as ripe for a closer reading with regards to their narratives of the Inca Civil War. Surprisingly, some of the most useful documents were those produced furthest from the events they described as they relied on deeper cultural

understanding and a larger compilation of information, as well as greater Indigenous participation in the production of written documents, by the seventeenth century.

Finally, this chapter summarizes the personal histories, agendas, and biases of the colonial authors and thus provides a lens through which to read their accounts of the Inca Civil War. The following two chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) will engage with this very reading in order to untangle the complex history of this devastated and often forgotten event.

### **Chapter 3. The Inca Civil War in Words and Maps: Narratives of the Conflict from the Sixteenth Century Written Sources**

As discussed in the previous chapter, most Inca scholars refer to the war as if it is a well understood part of Inca history. At the same time, they tend to present the civil war as a pivotal event without considering its details or how it impacts the way we understand the Inca past. For example, archaeologists rarely explore the evidence for this violent time in their excavations and among the landscapes and material objects they study. Most of what we know about the Inca Civil War then comes from the early colonial written sources, whose narratives rely on a range of views, opinions, and evidence. For the Inca Civil War, points of departure include not only author's interpretations such as who initiated the conflict, who had recognized legitimate claim to authority and action, and how the two sides created, used, and severed critical political alliances. Due to the lack of scholarship exploring these texts and the lack of archaeological work on material culture evidence, we have a very cursory understanding of the course of the movements and battles of the Inca Civil War, as well as the role of the combatants involved.

This and the following chapter (Chapter 4) will bring some clarity in terms of the critical sixteenth and seventeenth century writings about the civil war, providing the first in depth look at the complexities of the conflict and the Inca Empire from different perspectives. First, we will focus on the individual narratives of each author building on the relevant information from Chapter 2. This approach provides a critical and wholistic view of each text. Most previous research on the matter has applied a synthetic or comparative approach, which has often picked and chosen specific pieces of information from each author to fit a larger narrative. By focusing on each author's text, the rich details of the war narratives can come back into view and shed



new light on how we see this vital period of Inca history, as well as of the early modern Andes and their reimagination of the Inca past.

Second, we will spatialize each of the written narratives on the civil war through a focus on the physical location of the events discussed. We will use maps to help visualize the movements of Atahualpa and Huascar's forces through the Andean landscape. Such tracing of the spatial dynamics of the conflict is not easy, especially when such vast territory is involved and when many writers were not well versed in the Indigenous landscapes and languages, and thus toponyms. One example of the confusing path that the war took is the battle of Huanacopampa in the province of Cotabambas near Cuzco. Modern scholars who have not studied the texts in details have often misinterpreted this battlefield as the much larger and more famous site of the same name some 1300 km north.<sup>1</sup> Hence the maps in this chapter not only help us better understand the Inca Civil War, but they also provide the first close look at how the dynastic war manifested itself across time and space in the Andes. The maps go beyond simply making visible movements and understanding military tactics. They further help us understand the ways in which Indigenous Andeans understood the landscape and space of the world, which was in the core of many Inca cultural practices, as well as in those enduring until present day.<sup>2</sup> Recently, historian Jeremy Mikecz has shown the great utility of the combination of maps with historical texts in his study of the Spanish invasion of the Andes to illuminate Indigenous

<sup>1</sup> E.g. Roger Atwood, "Inca Power Politics," *Archaeology*, Vol. 73, No. 1, (2020): 48-54; Mariusz Ziolkowski, "The Moon and Planets among the Incas and Other Pre-Hispanic Andean Peoples," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Planetary Science*, (2020).

<sup>2</sup> For Inca architectural spatial practices see Stella Nair, *At Home with the Sapa Inca: Architecture, Space, and Legacy at Chinchero*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015). For contemporary Indigenous spatial practices see Thomas Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History Among an Andean People*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998).

participation and agency.<sup>3</sup> Inspired by his scholarship, I apply his spatial history methodology to the Inca Civil War and thus the events just preceding his own research period.

This and the next chapter (Chapter 4) follow the same organization as Chapter 2, diving the primary sources temporarily into groups, as well as adding the Indigenous authors group at the end. The earliest writings of the 1530s and 1540s provide only cursory narratives of the Inca Civil War that were already discussed in the previous chapter, so the following section will begin with the first serious historical texts on the matter in the 1550s with the works of Pedro Cieza de León. Each author's section includes the commentary on legitimacy and the causes of the war, the course of military movements, and the immediate aftermath of the conflict. After laying down each account in its entirety in this and the following chapter (Chapter 4), so we have a better grasp of the aims and biases of the authors and the specific information they bring forth, the next chapter (Chapter 5) will pull the distinct sources together in a critical way to better understand what these written sources can tell us about the Inca Civil War and where persistent gaps in our knowledge remain.

This chapter discusses the written sources produced in the first fifty years since the European invasion of the Andes that started with the bloody meeting at Cajamarca in November 1532. The first decade of this process was quite chaotic. The Spaniards first attempted to install a puppet Inca government through Manco, who rebelled against his mistreatment by the Pizarro brothers in 1536 and then retreated to Vilcabamba to form the Neo-Inca state by 1537.<sup>4</sup> The Spanish Crown then ruled the Andes indirectly through the *encomienda* or trust system in which

<sup>3</sup> Jeremy Mikecz, "Peering Beyond the Imperial Gaze: Using Digital Tools to Construct a Spatial History of Conquest," *International Journal of Humanities and Arts Computing*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (2017): 39-54.

<sup>4</sup> John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970): 222.

the king entrusted a division or *repartimiento* of Indigenous Andeans and their lands to a Spanish settler who would act in the king's stead.<sup>5</sup> The *encomenderos* were expectedly exploitative, focusing primarily on the extraction of resources, which along with the high death toll from European-borne diseases led to the quick decimation of the Andean Indigenous populations. In 1542, the Crown reorganized its holdings in the Andes under the Viceroyalty of Peru and instituted the New Laws upon calls such as that of Dominican friar Bartolomé de las Casas to end the mistreatment of the Indigenous populations. These new laws did little to prevent such exploitation, while they also angered the Spaniards living in the Viceroyalty. They reverted the *encomienda* system and prevented the *encomenderos* from passing their holdings onto their descendants.<sup>6</sup> The result of the weakened interests of *encomenderos*, economic competition from other Spanish ventures, new tax burdens, and the diminishing populations of Indigenous workers was an economic crisis that by the 1560s required serious attention.

In 1568, Francisco de Toledo became the new Viceroy of Peru inheriting a colonial possession that was both mismanaged and undermanaged. By then the Spaniards largely remained on the coast and themselves relied on intermediaries to conduct business in the mountains. The economic and political turmoil of the first decades of Spanish control of the Andes is reflected in the written histories produced during this period. They exhibit a mix of deep misunderstanding of the Andean landscape and cultures in the very earliest accounts, a lack of curiosity for Inca history in the 1540s, and a new understanding brought by knowledge of Quechua in the 1550s. On the other hand, the histories discussed in this chapter were also the

<sup>5</sup> Jeremy Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012): 28.

<sup>6</sup> Rolena Adorno, *The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007): 132.

closest to the events they covered and likely related the narratives of informants who lived through at least some of those events.

Toledo set out to reform the Viceroyalty of Peru and building its legitimacy was a key issue for him. To repair the image of the Spanish Crown, he sent out a call for the production of Inca histories that depicted them as tyrants and usurpers of power, which in turn painted the Europeans as liberators. Although these histories were written after the arrival of Toledo in the Andes, they were very much a product of the time before his arrival, still reflecting the chaotic nature of the Viceroyalty, as a number of them achieved quite the opposite effect and legitimized Inca dominion of the Andes in the process. Thus, these are included in this chapter, while the written sources produced in post-Toledan Peru will be the focus of the next chapter (Chapter 4).

## **1. Early Contact Accounts (1532-1550)**

### **1.1. Francisco de Xerez (1534)**

Before the more detailed inquiries into Inca history were compiled in the 1550s, the early contact accounts offered little on the Inca Civil War. Pedro Sancho altogether dismissed the event as an unimportant scuffle that merited a mere mention but paled before the Spanish invasion that immediately succeeded it. Pizarro's first secretary, Francisco de Xerez at least offered a narrative of the war, but his version significantly shortened the extent and muted the devastation of the conflict. Naturally, downplaying the importance local politics played into the success of the Spanish invasion fit in the aggrandizing agenda of the official secretary of the mission. Further, Xerez used the Inca Civil War as a tool to delegitimize both camps in order to offer a path to Spanish rule as an arbiter between two potential usurpers. By only recognizing Huayna Capac as

the source of political legitimacy, he provided Pizarro the option to dismiss with both Atahualpa and Huascar and install their other half-brothers as his puppet Inca rulers initially.

Xerez' account of the civil war not only lacks detail, but it further uses brevity as an argument for the little importance Atahualpa's eventual victory carried. Although he seemed to have a good grasp of the time that had passed since Huayna Capac's passing, he claimed that the civil war only occurred in the year prior to the arrival of Pizarro and his party in the Andes, while Atahualpa and Huascar lived peacefully for seven years after the death of their father.<sup>7</sup> During this period the two parties ruled over two distinct regions with capital bases in Cuzco (Huascar) and Tomebamba (Atahualpa), which were divided justly by Huayna Capac.<sup>8</sup> Since this division constituted the last legitimate drawing of the borders in the Andes for Xerez, both Huascar, who started the war with the intention to unify the whole empire under his power, and Atahualpa who eventually did, represented a break with the will of the sovereign and were thus forms of usurpation on their own.

The idea of the illegitimacy of the dynastic war is further strengthened by the lack of enthusiasm among the troops. Initially the two factions exchanges messages, but despite Atahualpa pleading that the Quito province was his just inheritance, Huascar gathered an army and marched north, having murdered his half-brother's messengers.<sup>9</sup> Knowing that the southern army was approaching, Atahualpa burnt down the city of Tomebamba and killed all of its inhabitants.<sup>10</sup> Although it this version of the story, this appears to be somewhat of a warning sign, Xerez then


<sup>7</sup> Francisco de Xerez, *Verdadera Relación de la Conquista del Perú*, (Madrid, Spain: Historia 16, 1985 [1533]): 121.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.





<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 97. Xerez calls Tomebamba Tumipunxa or Tumepomba.

**Map 3.1.**  
**The Inca Civil War**  
 (Xerez, p.98)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Atahualpa march on Cuzco (p.98)
-  Movement

proceeds to treat it as a major battle won by the Quitan forces. One way or the other the trick worked as the word of his destruction of the city spread and after the burning of Tomebamba, Atahualpa faced no opposition and conquered all of Huascar's land easily, eventually reaching and capturing Cuzco (Map 3.1).<sup>11</sup> Concentrating the fighting and the casualties in a single battle, devastating as it might have been, Xerez provides a punctualist view of the Inca Civil War, in which most of the Andes experienced neither direct battle nor conscription. In this version, the conflict hardly rocked the region, but instead only decimated one particular city that was not on Pizarro's path to Cuzco, thus, suggesting that it had little effect on the Spanish invasion.


Later in his account, Xerez retells the story of the war of the two brothers once again. While the second account is just as brief and it again brushes it aside as the source of major political disruption prior to the arrival of Pizarro's company, it presents a different path from Quito to Cuzco. According to Xerez, Atahualpa gathered all the soldiers he could and defeated the incoming army, killing 1,000 of Huascar's men, causing the survivors to flee. When the people of Tomebamba stood in defense of Huascar, Atahualpa burnt the city and killed all of the inhabitants. He wanted to destroy all the towns in the province, but decided to chase his brother instead. Once he reached Cajamarca, Atahualpa set up camp there and sent Quizquiz and Chalcochima with 40,000 men to Cuzco (Map 3.2). There, they captured Huascar and immediately headed back to be at Atahualpa's side, as they heard of Pizarro's arrival.<sup>12</sup> Again, Xerez presents the war as one that only centered around two battles, one in Tomebamba and the other one in Cuzco, leaving the rest of the land happily staying out of conflict. He further minimizes the war by depicting

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 98 and 121.





<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 121.



**Map 3.2.**  
**The Inca Civil War**  
 (Xerez, p.122)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Atahualpa march on Cuzco (p.122)
-  Movement




Atahualpa staying in Cajamarca, which suggests that the war was a minor issue that a couple of captains could manage without the leadership and presence of the *Sapa Inca*. As a whole, Xerez' treatment of the Inca Civil War paints it as a small and unimportant event that happened to precede the Spanish invasion of the Andes but certainly did not have a great effect on, nor did it restructure Inca nobility, political system, or path to legitimacy. This is somewhat understandable since he only had a brief time in the Andes and his mission was to record the Iberian invasion. Glossing over the event that largely enabled Pizarro's success is certainly to be expected from his personal historian.

## **1.2. Agustín de Zárate (1545)**






A decade after the first historic accounts of the Inca Civil War, Agustín de Zárate was the first author to provide greater detail of the movements in the conflict. He is also the first author to suggest that a critical motivation for the hostilities was the idea that the northern frontier was the only path for future expansion in the late Imperial Inca period, which was expected of every Inca ruler. In Zárate's writing Huascar is the main aggressor attacking his brother after refusing to grant Atahualpa the governor of Quito position.<sup>13</sup> However, it is possible that the very request may have been constructed as a provocation, given the position of the province of Quito as the primary base for further incursions north. Since both factions seem to have been recruiting allies by the time they first clashed in Tomebamba suggests that war was perhaps inevitable given the ambitions of the two half-brothers.

<sup>13</sup> Agustín de Zárate, *Historia del Descubrimiento y Conquista de la Provincia del Perú*, (Lima, Peru: Editores Técnicos Asociados S.A., 1968 [1545]): 59.

# Map 3.3. Battle of Tomechaca (Zárate)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Cañari forces
-  Movements

0 50 100 km

Huascar sent a small and mobile army of about 2,000 from Cuzco, who were joined by the *kurakas* of Tomebamba, Chaparras, Paltas, and the Cañari. They were met in Tomebamba by 2,000 experienced warriors and captains came from Quito along with some 30,000 Cañari.<sup>14</sup> After three days of battling, Huascar's forces were victorious capturing Atahualpa at the Tomebamba Bridge (Map 3.3). However, while they celebrated this victory, Atahualpa managed to escape from his prison in a tambo near Quito. According to Zárate, he was aided by a woman who provided him a copper bar that was used to break through the wall of the prison, while Atahualpa himself used to say that he escaped by turning into a snake. Once their leader was free again, the Quitan forces returned to Tomebamba where they won a decisive victory killing all 60,000 of Huascar's men (Map 3.4).<sup>15</sup>


Later texts provide further detail of the several battles at Tomebamba as well as the early success of Huascar's forces and Atahualpa's imprisonment. What is significant to note here is that both factions were relying on a significant number of local soldiers. This puts the legitimacy of both combatants in question, since neither managed to convince the Cañari soldiers to join his respective cause, even as Huascar had the local leaders on his side. Even more importantly, this vignette highlights the importance of alliance building in the Inca Empire and the frailty of these political alliances that needed constant tending and renegotiation. Alliance building was a central mechanism of the way the Inca Empire operated and was a key focus of its ruler, including the two rival brother fighting in the Inca Civil War.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 60.





<sup>15</sup> Ibid.



# Map 3.4. Atahualpa's escape and Battle of Tomebamba (Zárate)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement

0 50 100 km

The crucial role of alliance building can be traced in the actions of Huascar and Atahualpa. For example, one might expect that Atahualpa had a much closer relationship with the Cañari having spent significant time in the area and yet the *kuraka* sided with Huascar. At the same time, local warriors still backed the Quitans in huge numbers, suggesting that the conflict opened the door for renegotiation of the local geopolitical scene including Cañari opportunists going against their own leaders. Alternatively, it is possible that the Cañari involvement on both sides was a tactic aiming to fuel the war between the two Inca brothers in order to destabilize Tahuantinsuyu and to gain independence or favorable standing for the Tomebamba group. This would not be surprising given the Cañari role in the Iberian invasion reflecting their views of the Inca as foreign invaders themselves.<sup>16</sup> By betting on both sides, they all but ensured that they would be due some form of repayment by the eventual victor, while strengthening their position as the empire weakened. Even though Zárate does not speak about these alliances explicitly and his aim is to discredit the importance of the Inca Civil War, their existence in his narrative offers a crucial glimpse into how coalitions of local groups backing their Inca overlords were critical for the health of the empire.

Here in Zárate's version of the story, it appears that Atahualpa saw the matters with Huascar settled, as he embarked on a military campaign in the province of Tumbes with the intent to conquer the Island of Puna.<sup>17</sup> This move builds on Xerez's account claiming that the battle (or battles) at Tomebamba virtually completed the Inca Civil War with the devastation of the city by the semi-professionalized army controlled by Atahualpa. However, Huascar continued to send

<sup>16</sup> Udo Oberem, "Los Cañaris y la Conquista Española de la Sierra Ecuatoriana: Otro Capítulo de las Relaciones Interétnicas en el Siglo XVI," *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, Vol. 63, (1974), 263-274.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

troops north. Seeing this, his half-brother abandoned his plan in Tumbes and moved to Cajamarca, again not facing any resistance there from the local populations, nor from Cuzqueño warriors. In Zárata's telling, it appears that Atahualpa was somewhat surprised that the hostilities were to continue once again suggesting that the war's punctualist character and discrediting its reach.


While at Cajamarca, Atahualpa sent a reconnaissance unit of 5,000, who met serendipitously with Huascar and 700 of his soldiers on a by-way and captured him (Map 3.5). Huascar's army is described as attacking from all sides outnumbering Atahualpa's scouts 30 to 1. Under the threat of killing their leader, however, Huascar's army is said to have returned to Cuzco and he was brought to Cajamarca to Atahualpa as prisoner ending the civil war.<sup>18</sup> Atahualpa's victory is, thus, presented by Zárata as a matter of luck and not of political or military ingenuity. At the same time, once again the reach and devastation of the war is downplayed, as it is confined to a couple of battles at Tomebamba and a chance meeting outside of Cajamarca where bloodshed was avoided.

Similar to Xerez, Zárata simply acknowledged the existence of a civil war immediately prior to the arrival of Pizarro in the Andes, without adding a detailed examination of the extent of the war. One explanation for his lack of interest in the conflict is that he only spent time on the Pacific coast, which was much less affected by it than the highlands. Zárata's main aim seems to have remained the downplaying of the dynastic war as a brief and localized affair in contrast with the sweeping invasion performed by the Europeans. However, he was the first author to propose that the war between the two brothers was caused by Atahualpa blocking Huascar's path to





<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 61.



# Map 3.5. Tumbes, Ayacucho, and Huascar captured near Cajamarca (Zárate)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement

0 100 200 km

expansion north, an idea that was fleshed out later by other writers, but which remains one of the possible main causes of the Inca Civil War.

## **2. Gaining Insight through Quechua: Examinations of Inca History in the 1550s**

### **2.1. Pedro Cieza de León (1549-1555)**

Cieza's version of the Inca Civil War is primarily interested in the question of legitimacy especially as it was expressed by the combatants' origins and the wearing of the royal fringe, *mascaypacha*. Like his predecessors, he only offers details on what was likely a first phase of the war or what I term here as Ecuadorian Phase. Cieza's version presented several significant points of departure from Zárate's earlier history, notably siding with Huascar and claiming he was clement and pious, while Atahualpa was vengeful and ruthless.<sup>19</sup> Cieza saw Huayna Capac as the source of political legitimacy in Peru and attributed to him the proposed split of the empire that Zárate suggested was Atahualpa's idea.<sup>20</sup> Although this account remains short on details beyond the initial conflict in the north, it is the first one to widen the scope of the historical figures who played important roles in the war beyond Atahualpa, Huascar, Chalcochima, and Quizquiz.

When it comes to the two rivals' origins, Huascar is the clear frontrunner to succeed Huayna Capac. Cieza first claims that considering the vastness of the Inca Empire and the difficulty of its governance, Huayna Capac divided the empire into two parts – one from Quito south to the

<sup>19</sup> Cieza 1960, 79.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.



lands of the Quillacingas and Papayanese<sup>21</sup> assigned to Atahualpa and the rest to Huascar.<sup>22</sup> He later suggests that his informants were split on these events and others suggested such division never happened. Huascar was the heir apparent as he was the son of the *Coya*, the primary wife of Huayna Capac, whom Cieza names Chinchá Ocllo.<sup>23</sup> Atahualpa was older and the son of Topa Palla, a woman from Quilaca. He, like Huascar, was born in Cuzco and not as others have suggested in Quito.<sup>24</sup> He further lists nine other sons<sup>25</sup> without mentioning their respective mothers, to illustrate his breadth of knowledge of the royal family and to strengthen his claim for Huascar.

Despite the clear genealogical advantage one brother had, Cieza includes an important discussion on the royal fringe suggesting that the ability to wear it required much more than the right relatives. The Inca understood the role of the *Sapa Inca* as one that fits within a larger sense of community in which everyone understood their position and the duties that came with it. Such community was built on the idea of reciprocity and mutualism embodied by the concept of *ayni* in which these relationships were in constant negotiation and renegotiation. Just as political alliances

<sup>21</sup> The Quillacingas were a group neighboring the Pastos, at the northern frontier of the Inca Empire in modern day Colombia. The Papayanese were a group centered around the Popayan in Colombia. There is no data that Tahuantinsuyu ever extended so far north, but since there is not much distance between the Pasto province and Popayan, it is unlikely that Cieza, who was intimately familiar with Popayan after traveling throughout the region extensively, added the local group erroneously.

<sup>22</sup> Cieza 1960, 52.

<sup>23</sup> Huascar's mother, and Huayna Capac's primary wife, is well-known through a number of sources that almost unequivocally agree on her name being Raua Ocllo. It is unclear how or why Cieza gave her another name, since she does not seem to have been related to any group or faction related to the name Chinchá.

<sup>24</sup> Cieza 1960, 78.

<sup>25</sup> These are Nanque Yupanqui, Topa Inca, Huanca Auqui (who plays an important role in the role according to other sources), Topa Hualpa, Tito, Huaman Hualpa, Manco Inca (who was installed as a puppet ruler by Pizarro before escaping to Vilcabamba to found the Neo-Inca State), Paullu Topa Yupanqui (who succeeded Manco Inca as puppet ruler in Cuzco), and Conono.

at the larger scale kept the empire going, personal relationships on the community level were critical in the legitimacy of the ruler. The *Sapa Inca*'s position required him to fulfill certain expectations such as leading military and building campaigns and the marker of their power to act as rulers was the *mascaypacha*. According to Cieza, it was Huayna Capac's wish for his unnamed uncle to govern the land, but Huascar was advised that if he publicly received the fringe, his authority would be unquestioned.<sup>26</sup> He proceeded to complete all necessary fasts and rituals to receive the *mascaypacha* which was celebrated with great feasts on the great plaza of Cuzco together with the royal *malqui*<sup>27</sup> and a large gold cable which may have given Huascar his colloquial name.<sup>28</sup> This was what triggered Atahualpa's rebellion who consulted with Chalcochima,<sup>29</sup> Acllahualpa, Rumiñahui, Quizquiz, Zopozopanqui, and the governor of the northern region, Illa Tupac, who had betrayed Huascar. They advised him to stand against Huascar as he was regarded as Inca by the army and Huayna Capac's wives, whom Atahualpa took for his own.<sup>30</sup> Cieza further reports that Atahualpa might have received the fringe himself in Tomebamba in preparation for the civil war, although he personally expressed doubts whether this happened.<sup>31</sup> He further suggests that such an act would have been fruitless, since the ritual would have been

<sup>26</sup> Cieza 1960, 79.

<sup>27</sup> Upon their natural deaths, the Inca rulers began a new life as ancestors, while their desiccated bodies were referred to as *malqui*.

<sup>28</sup> Huascar was born Topa Cusi Hualpa Inti Illapa. The authors disagree over the origin of the moniker Huascar, but one version claims that he was named after the great golden rope that his father made upon his birth, as *huasca* means "rope" in Quechua. Ibid., 80.

<sup>29</sup> Called here Calicuchima.

<sup>30</sup> Cieza 1960, 80.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 86.

rendered void by being performed outside of Cuzco.<sup>32</sup> What is clear is that his informants clearly thought that for Atahualpa to be claim legitimacy via his control of the semi-professionalized Inca army, he had to express it through wearing the red fringe.

As Cieza only detailed the Ecuadorian Phase of the civil war, the Cañari played a crucial role in his account.<sup>33</sup> Upon hearing of Atahualpa's decision not to recognize him, Huascar prepared for war, stocking the storehouses with weapons and food, sending a delegation to the Cañari to strengthen their relationship, and naming Atoco as his main general.<sup>34</sup> Atahualpa also attempted to attract the Cañari to his cause after proclaiming Quito "New Cuzco" and commencing plans to build a royal estate at Tomebamba, yet they remained loyal to Huascar.<sup>35</sup> Cieza reports that he heard from "many old and wise Indians" that the issue of building in and around Tomebamba played a significant role in the conflict between the two brothers.<sup>36</sup> Although he fails to elaborate on this point, this passage can be interpreted in line with the idea that the war was a result of Atahualpa blocking Huascar's only available path to conquest north that we already had from Zárate. Of course, another interpretation is that challenging the unique status of Cuzco as the center of the world was forbidden.

The conflict began at Tomebamba where Atoco, with the assistance of the Cañari, defeated Atahualpa's forces and captured their leader (Map 3.6).<sup>37</sup> Cieza reiterates Zárate's story of his

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>33</sup> The Cañari were the principal group of the Cañar region of southern Ecuador. Their principal towns were Ingapirca or Hatun Cañar and Tomebamba in the modern city of Cuenca.


<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.






<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 82.

**Map 3.6. Initial battle in the Cañari lands (Cieza)**




**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Cañari forces
-  Movements



**Map 3.7. Battle of Ambato (Cieza)**



**LEGEND**



Battle



Atahualpa and his forces



Huascar and his forces



Movement

0 100 200 km

prison escape through either him turning into snake or being helped by a woman named Quella, who sneaked a crowbar to Atahualpa.<sup>38</sup> Slipping from his captors, Atahualpa returned to Quito and gathered an army with which he marched south and met Atoco and his forces numbering 40,000 strong near Ambato.<sup>39</sup> His army was led by Chalcochima, Quizquiz, and Ucumari, but it was Chalcochima who made the decisive blow attacking with a battalion of 5,000 men from a nearby hill and killing Atoco (Map 3.7). After the battle, he made a drinking bowl set in gold from Atoco's skull that a Spanish soldier saw him drink from at Cajamarca years later.<sup>40</sup>

After his defeat at Ambato, Huascar called the lords of the Collas, Canchis, Cañas, Chancas, Caranquis, Condesuyu, and many from Chinchaysuyu to gather armies for him against Atahualpa (Map 3.8).<sup>41</sup> On the one hand, this list seems extensive and it is meant to show the breadth of Huascar's reach who could call on a large number of subjugated groups to send soldiers in his army. However, a closer examination shows that most of his support was coming from Collasuyu. Whether this was a matter of Huascar's personal relations with the leaders of these groups or whether this signifies that the war was becoming one of North vs South is unclear. Huascar appointed Huanca Auqui as his general and Ahuapanti, Urco Huaranca, and Inca Roca

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>40</sup> The making of a skull cup in this vignette was not a common practice neither by the Inca, nor in the Andes in general. Instead, it is reminiscent of a practice most associated with the nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppe in the Middle Ages. While there are examples from China, Tibet, and India, the most likely cases that Cieza might have heard of would be the Pecheneg Khan Kurya using Kievan Rus Svyatoslav I's skull as a drinking vessel in the 10<sup>th</sup> century, as well as the various Bulgarian khans and tsars making drinking cups of the skulls of Byzantine emperors after decisive battles in the Middle Ages. The vignette is likely a way a remnant of the early colonial Spanish mindset that equated Indigenous practices with the perceived Orient.





<sup>41</sup> The Collas were the group that gave the name to the southern quarter of the empire – Collasuyu – and resided on the northern shore of Lake Titicaca. The Canchis were a group from the area between Cuzco and Lake Titicaca centered around Sicuani. The Cañas were a group neighboring the Canchis in the Lake Langui basin. The Chancas were a formerly rival group of the Inca from Ayacucho whose defeat by Pachacuti spurred Inca expansion. The Caranquis were a group from the northern Ecuador at the northern frontier of the empire.



Map 3.8. Battle of Cajabamba (Cieza)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement

were named captains. Huanca Auqui marched with his troops north and was joined by some of the survivors of the Ambato battle to number 80,000 strong. He met Atahualpa whose army also numbered about 80,000 in the province of Paltas near Cajabamba.<sup>42</sup> Atahualpa did not participate in the battle, but watched from a small hill.<sup>43</sup> His forces prevailed despite the valiant effort from Huanca Auqui and 35,000 were killed on both sides of the battle.<sup>44</sup>

Here, Cieza's story ends abruptly, as he claims that Atahualpa's march towards Cuzco was cut short by the arrival of the Spaniards, which demanded his immediate attention.<sup>45</sup> Thus, although Cieza's version added critical detail to the battles of the Ecuadorian Phase as we knew it from Zárate and to the list of major figures, it again mirrored earlier accounts and downplayed the full impact of the war. Despite being a soldier himself and participating in the subsequent Spanish civil war between Pizarro and Almagro, Cieza does not seem especially interested in military history. His most important contribution is perhaps the suggestion that the war was triggered by Atahualpa's plans to build at Tomebamba and Huascar's acceptance of the *mascaypacha*, signaling that both men attempted to claim political legitimacy through performance. Building was one of the most important expectations for Inca rulers and an Atahualpa-built complex up north would have undermined Huascar both by fulfilling his own duties and by precluding him from

<sup>42</sup> The location of this battle is somewhat unclear. Although there are two modern day towns of Cajabamba (in Peru and in Ecuador), the description in Cieza speaks of Huanca Auqui not being able to get to Tomebamba and Ecuadorian Cajabamba is north of Cuenca, which disqualifies it. He also mentions that Atahualpa later won many battles marching towards Cajamarca, but Peruvian Cajabamba is further south of Cajamarca. The southern Ecuadorian city of Loja is in the right place and it was previously called Cusibamba. The names are sufficiently similar for Cieza to have made the mistake, while later iMurúa specifically claims that Huanca Auqui retreated to Cusibamba (Murúa 2001: 167).

<sup>43</sup> Cieza 1960, 86.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.



establishing his dominion over the northern frontier.<sup>46</sup> While Cieza's version of the war mostly followed the same path as his predecessors, his contemporary Betanzos presented a much more detailed view of the military movements.

## **2.2. Juan Díez de Betanzos (1544-1555)**

Juan Díez de Betanzos was the first Spanish writer to demonstrate an understanding of Indigenous religion and ideology. His predecessors drew from Iberian traditions erroneously linking Inca political legitimacy with primogeniture, thus placing exceeding importance on Huayna Capac. In contrast, Betanzos presented the Inca Civil War as a conflict between two competing claims not based on birth order. He presents Atahualpa's claim as the stronger one based on his personality and military prowess. He further focuses on the two combatant's mothers, who likely played significant roles in the conflict. Although the previous *Sapa Inca* selected his successor in principle, new rulers had to be confirmed by the Inca nobility and their maternal families were instrumental in the matters of succession.<sup>47</sup> Betanzos recounted that Atahualpa requested to be appointed governor of Quito and sent his brother a gift of exquisite textiles as was the custom.<sup>48</sup> Huascar refused this plea and trampled the clothes in a common Inca ritual signifying Huascar's superiority.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Susan Niles, *The Shape of Inca History: Narrative and Architecture in an Andean Empire*, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1999).

<sup>47</sup> Rostworowski 1999: 106.

<sup>48</sup> Juan Díez de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Inca*, transl. Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996): 192.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

According to Betanzos, Huascar's own mother, Rahua Ocllo, vouched for Atahualpa's true intentions, attempting to prevent the civil war by claiming Atahualpa would never wish to be king in the presence of Huascar.<sup>50</sup> Her pacifying plea was in vain, however, as this angered Huascar, who called her a whore and a lover of Atahualpa.<sup>51</sup> This anecdote follows another in which the heir apparent squared off with his mother. When Huayna Capac's body arrived in Cuzco, Huascar was angered that the mummified Inca controlled too many resources and yelled at Rahua Ocllo that she was secretly plotting for Atahualpa's rebellion.<sup>52</sup> Betanzos is the first to write of such strain on the relationships within the royal court. One explanation is that he had access to much more reliable and knowledgeable informants. However, his clear partisanship also likely skewed his perspective, as he wanted to show that even Huascar's own mother had doubts over his fitness to rule over Tahuantinsuyu.

Women played important roles in Inca kingmaking and mothers were supposed to be the claimants' strongest advocates, so Betanzos attempts to undermine Huascar's legitimacy not through his origin, but through his inability to sustain the support of his own family. For example, Topa Inca's succession was fiercely contested between his sons Capac Huari and Huayna Capac. However, this was less a conflict between two brothers and more a clash of their mothers, Chuqui Ocllo and Mama Ocllo.<sup>53</sup> It appeared the following Inca rules of succession, Topa Inca had groomed Capac Huari and he even built a magnificent royal estate at the home of Chuqui Ocllo in

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 189.

<sup>53</sup> Niles 1999, 89.

Chincheru to profess his selection.<sup>54</sup> However, upon his death, Mama Oello, Topa Inca's primary wife, with the help of her brother Huaman Achachi installed her son to the throne, claiming legitimacy through her *capac* lineage. The royal bloodline that was traced through both parents' lineage back to Manco Capac was an important component of rank in the Inca nobility.<sup>55</sup> While many people in Cuzco held a *capac* status, some were more *capac* than others. This distinction, as well as the role of women as conduits of the royal lineage and as kingmakers remained potent after the arrival of the Europeans in the Andes.<sup>56</sup> Betanzos was acutely aware of these dynamics and the role of women, as his own Inca wife of *capac* status was his primary informant of Inca history. Thus, when Betanzos wrote of the rift between Huascar and Rahua Oello, he was likely directly commenting on the inability of the young ruler to sustain a claim through the support of his mother as his most important ally.

According to Betanzos, Huascar was determined to end the feud quickly so he gathered 6,000 soldiers in Calca under his cousin Cuxi Yupanqui with Hango second in command.<sup>57</sup> They marched north gathering more soldiers from Jauja, Tarma, Pumpu, Huanuco, Huaylas, and Cajamarca at which point 10,000 strong were marching towards Quito effectively starting the war (Map 3.9).<sup>58</sup> In response, Atahualpa mobilized an army of 60,000 and appointed Quizquiz, Chalcochima, Unan Chullo, Rumiñahui, Yucurahualpa, and Urco Huaranga as captains.<sup>59</sup> The

<sup>54</sup> Nair 2015.

<sup>55</sup> Catherine Julien, *Reading Inca History*, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 2000), 30.


<sup>56</sup> Sara Guengerich, "Capac Women and the Politics of Marriage in Early Colonial Peru," *Colonial Latin American Review*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (2015), 147-167.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 195.





<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 196.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 197.

# Map 3.9 Battle of Mochacaxa (Betanzos)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement

0 200 400 km

Cañari played an important role in the early stages of the war as they spied for both sides informing them of their rival's plans. Betanzos suggests that it was upon one of their messages that Cuxi Yupanqui and Hango sped up hearing of the great army that Atahualpa was gathering.<sup>60</sup>

The two armies met at Mochacaxa near Quito.<sup>61</sup> Atahualpa was victorious killing Hango and capturing Cuxi Yupanque. Betanzos suggests that after Atahualpa welcomed him to his camp as his cousin, Cuxi Yupanqui may have switched allegiances.<sup>62</sup> Aguapante, one of Huascar's captains, was one of the few survivors of the Mochacaxa battle. In fact, the battle was so fierce that the bodies of the dead were piled on the descent from Mount Ambato.<sup>63</sup> After destroying his brother's army, Atahualpa returned to Quito, while he sent Chalcochima and Quizquiz with the majority of his forces to follow any retreating troops south. The battle at Mochacaxa Betanzos describes is likely the same encounter as the one at Ambato that Cieza reported. They both end in Atahualpa's victory after devastating losses on both sides and in Atahualpa's retreat to Quito. While this is where Cieza's account ends, Betanzos later recounts further battles in Tomebamba, which seem consistent with Xerez and Zárate, so we should treat this encounter around Ambato as a separate event and an important contribution from Cieza and Betanzos.

Once Atahualpa and Cuxi Yupanque returned to Quito, they learned of a Pastos rebellion in the province of Rata (Map 3.10).<sup>64</sup> Cuxi Yupanque raised a 6,000 men army and left ahead with

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 198.

<sup>61</sup> Betanzos claims the battle of Mochacaxa happened just outside of Quito, which is likely Mocha, as marked on the map here. Although Mocha is some 175km south, it is just outside of Ambato and Betanzos claims that the bones of the killed were piled at Mount Ambato, while Cieza reported the battle to be at Ambato.

<sup>62</sup> Betanzos 1996, 198.

<sup>63</sup> Betanzos calls it Mount Hampato.





<sup>64</sup> Betanzos 1996, 200. The Pastos were a northern frontier group occupying the lands near the Colombian-Ecuadorian border.




**Map 3.10. Pastos Rebellion and Battle of Tomebamba I (Betanzos)**



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement



2,000 of them to Caranqui. When Atahualpa arrived at Caranqui, he brought all the prisoners Chalcochima and Quizquiz captured and put them to work on construction jobs. He destroyed the Pasto rebellion tricking the defenses by leaving a fire in his camp burning after he left it, creating the illusion his army was retreating.<sup>65</sup> He then returned to Caranqui where the palace was already built save for the roof and received the royal fringe in the presence of all lords from Quito and many from Cuzco.<sup>66</sup> According to Betanzos, Atahualpa took the royal name Caccha Pachacuti Inca Yupanqui and also commissioned the creation of a *huanque*, called Incap Guauquin.<sup>67</sup> Betanzos is the sole writer to report these details about the time Atahualpa spent in the north, while Quizquiz and Chalcochima were chasing Huascar's forces in the provinces of Pumpu and Jauja. Given that Cuxirimay Ocllo, then Atahualpa's and later Bentanzos's wife, was likely present at these events, this part is especially credible.

This provides further evidence that simple military victory was not enough for either of the two brothers to claim political legitimacy, as they both received the *mascaypacha* in lavish ceremonies and began building campaigns. Huascar, too, received the fringe in Cuzco and took the royal name Topa Cusi Hualpa.<sup>68</sup> According to Betanzos, Huascar switched from Hanan to Hurin Cuzco intending to form a new lineage similar to the switch from Hurin to Hanan that Pachacuti had made.<sup>69</sup> Such switch can be interpreted as Huascar's attempt to represent the "return

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 203.


<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>67</sup> A *huanque*, literally "brother" in Quechua, was a small, stone figurine that stood in for an Inca ruler. These were individually named and travelled throughout the empire to represent the *Sapa Inca* when he was unavailable. Ibid., 205.





<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 189. Topa Cuxigualpa according to Betanzos.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 194.

**Map 3.11. Battle of Tomebamba II and (Betanzos)**



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement



to origins,” return to stability, as he wanted to fashion himself the inheritor of a long-standing tradition going back as far as Manco Capac, who founded the first Hurin dynasty. To commemorate his new Hurin identity, he commissioned a royal estate be built in Calca in the Urubamba Valley alongside the estates of his predecessors.<sup>70</sup> Huascar also made a *huauque* statue called Caccha Inca and he even sent it along with Cuxi Yupanqui to represent him in the civil war.<sup>71</sup> It is clear that neither of the two brothers relied solely on their success on the battlefield, but rather attempted to build their image of legitimate rulers through lavish ceremonies and building campaigns in line with the Inca tradition.

After the defeat at Mochacaxa, the death of Hango and Atoc, and the imprisonment of Cuxi Yupanqui, Huascar raised an army of 15,000 which met with the surviving Aguapante and another 15,000 Cañari troops under the new command of Huanca Auqui in Tomebamba.<sup>72</sup> Quizquiz and Chacochima arrived and defeated the 30,000 army at Tomebamba triggering a series of events in which they defeated Huascar’s forces, then chased them to the next battle where Huascar had mobilized more troops, only to be defeated again (Map 3.11).

In the first occurrence, 30,000 come to help the retreating army with Llasca from Cajamarca at the helm, but they are again defeated by Quizquiz and Chalcochima. Huascar sent another 30,000 captained by Coritao from Mayo, who met the retreating army at Pumpu (Map 3.12).<sup>73</sup> At the Pumpu bridge, Betanzos writes that Coritao seems to have held off Atahualpa’s forces, but Quizquiz and Chalcochima pretended to retreat only to lure his enemies into an ambush

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 195.





<sup>71</sup> Ibid.


<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 206. Betanzos calls his Guanca Auqui.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 207.

# Map 3.12. Battle of Pumpu (Betanzos)


**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement






# Map 3.13. Battle of Chancha (Betanzos)



**LEGEND**

- Battle
- Atahualpa and his forces
- Huascar and his forces
- Movement



at Chancha<sup>74</sup> and again emerge victorious (Map 3.13).<sup>75</sup> Huascar sent new captains to Jauja, where they raised an army of locals from Yauyo, Angara, and Huanca.<sup>76</sup> As Quizquiz and Chalcochima arrived, they defeated these new forces and then punished the local lords for siding with Huascar.<sup>77</sup>

The next deployment comes with another 30,000 soldiers under Quilisca Auqui, a son of Topa Inca, who was defeated and taken prisoner at Picoy. According to Betanzos, Huascar sent another 50,000 men led by Inca Roca Atao Inca Yupanqui and Chui Yupanqui to Andahuaylas. There they meet with the retreating Huanca Auqui, Aguapante, Atecayqui, Huacso, and Soto, totaling 60,000 warriors as well as 300 Cuzco lords.<sup>78</sup> After the numerous losses, they decide not to engage Quizquiz and Chalcochima directly, but instead they destroy the Vilcas bridge, prompting Atahualpa's generals to go around to Andahuaylas in a roundabout path through the Soras wilderness (Map 3.14). Inca Roca and Huanca Auqui took 40,000 men and went to meet Chalcochima and Quizquiz, while Atecayque and Aguapante took 20,000 soldiers to go to Vilcas and destroy Atahualpa's army supplies.<sup>79</sup> This tactic, too, backfired as Chalcochima and Quizquiz engaged Inca Roca and Huanca Auqui's camp early in the morning catching them unprepared and

<sup>74</sup> It is unclear where this field called Chancha that Betanzos refers to really is, but it needs to be in the immediate vicinity and likely north of Pumpu. Chinche fits this description.

<sup>75</sup> Betanzos 1996, 208.

<sup>76</sup> The Yauyos were a group from the upper Cañete Valley. The Angara were a group situated between Huancavelica and Ayacucho. The Huanca were the principal group of the Mantaro Valley in the region of Junin.


<sup>77</sup> Betanzos 1996, 2009.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 210.


<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.



**Map 3.14.**  
**Chasing Phase**  
**(Betanzos)**



**Map 3.15. Final**  
**Phase (Betanzos)**



winning another decisive battle. Escaping, Huascar's generals met with Atecayque and Aguapante at Apurimac bridge.<sup>80</sup>

Although Betanzos is the first to write about the battles between Quizquiz and Chalcochima and the various forces Huascar mobilized, a version of these events is later corroborated by a number of later sources.<sup>81</sup> For ease of following the complicated and sometimes convoluted paths that the different narratives recounted, I term this part of the conflict the Chasing Phase.

After this devastating series of defeats, Aguapante returned to Cuzco to warn Huascar that Atahualpa's forces were at the Apurimac. He gave a passionate speech at the plaza and scared all the nobility into raising more troops for Huascar.<sup>82</sup> Upon hearing that Atahualpa's forces were just 10 leagues from Cuzco, the *ñacas* or matrons started lamenting not listening to Huascar, who they did not deem a good leader, since he was more accomplished in drinking than in fighting.<sup>83</sup> Even though the nobility did not abandon Huascar and continued to rally behind his cause, Betanzos presents this choice as self-preservation rather than a genuine support for Rahua Ocllo's son. He is the only author to include the female voice in this decision, exposing that even in military action, decision making was not confined to the male leaders.

Betanzos relates that facing the humiliation of Quizquiz and Chalcochima's continuous success, Huascar left Cuzco and for the first time led his forces to Cotabamba bridge, where he

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 218.

<sup>81</sup> E.g. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui, Martín de Murúa, and Bernabe Cobo all recount similar paths at various levels of details.

<sup>82</sup> Betanzos 1996, 219.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 220.



met with Aguapante and Atecayque (Map 3.15).<sup>84</sup> At Cotabamba, Huascar counted 60,000 soldiers and divided them into three squadrons. The first one comprised 30,000 warriors divided into four captaincies between Atecayque, Aguapante, Atauri Machem, and Huanca Auqui, who escaped after their defeat at Vilcas.<sup>85</sup> The second group represented the 25,000 troops that came from Cuzco and was also divided in four captaincies led by Chui Yupanqui, Atao Yupanqui, Huacso, and Soto of the Charcas respectively. The remaining 5,000 men were said to have been divided in two captaincies led by Huascar's brother Topa Atao and his cousin Inca Roca. Huascar himself went with his smaller third group flanked by the other two.<sup>86</sup> Meanwhile, Quizquiz and Chalcochima settled in Curahuasi in the Lucanas province, preparing for the decisive battles ahead in what from here on I refer to as the Final Phase of the civil war.<sup>87</sup>

Learning that Huascar had left Cuzco and settled in Cotabamba, Quizquiz and Chalcochima sent out 500 men on a reconnaissance mission, but they were encountered by Huascar's third army division and killed, exposing the location of Atahualpa's forces.<sup>88</sup> Confident by this mini-victory, Huascar forged ahead. However, he was once again fooled by the experienced tacticians Quizquiz and Chalcochima, who set up an ambush, leaving 6,000 soldiers on his path, while their forces now numbered 100,000 having received reinforcements from Quito.<sup>89</sup> Just before dawn, Huascar encountered the 6,000 pretending to be asleep, and continued excited by the easy victory ahead,

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 221.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 222.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 222.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 224.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 226.

before the ambush swept him and his army with ease, killing Topa Atao. Huascar was injured and had his clothes torn in the battle and after his capture, his tunic was presented to Atahualpa to tread on to complete the symbolic victory later.<sup>90</sup> Then, Quizquiz and Chalcochima put Huascar on a litter and approached the rest of his army trying to trick them into thinking he was coming back victorious. A local Lucana warrior gave them away and Huascar's forces disbanded and fled back to Cuzco effectively ending the war.<sup>91</sup>

This Final Phase suggests that Atahualpa's victory was based primarily on the military prowess of his two generals who continuously outsmarted and outmaneuvered his enemies. Although Betanzos' numbers are unrealistic, the total number of Huascar's forces he lists comes up to some 290,000 strong, while Atahualpa's army is not as closely accounted for, but appears to be about half of that. It is unclear if Betanzos simply reports the numbers he was told or if this is a subtle dig at Huascar suggesting his troops did not fight as valiantly for his cause. Either way, the experience of Atahualpa's generals has become a critical explanatory tool for the success their side, as their semi-professionalized army faced Huascar's mostly conscripted forces that lacked the training and possibly the morale to succeed.

Betanzos' narrative reports that, in the aftermath of the war, Atahualpa consulted the *huaca* at Huamachuco, who told him that his cruelty in the war would lead him to no good.<sup>92</sup> Angered, he destroyed the *huaca* by burning it, but this little vignette reveals that Huascar still harbored

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 227.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 229.

<sup>92</sup> In this case, the *huaca* refers to the oracle of Huamachuco. Oracles have a long history in the Andes and much like their Classical world counterparts, they were often consulted to predict the future or weigh in on important questions of the day. The oracle was often an inanimate object and had priests and caretakers who spoke for the *huaca*. Ibid., 232.



support throughout Tahuantinsuyu. In order to secure his safety, Atahualpa directed his generals to depopulate Cuzco, as he intended to find a New Cuzco in Quito. He then undertook a campaign to quash any possible rebellion by his brother's supporters. It started with the demand that Huascar, his mother Rahuá Ocllo, and his principal wife, Chuqui Huipa are brought to Atahualpa in Cajamarca.<sup>93</sup> Huanca Auqui was captured in Yucay, while the other generals were imprisoned in Cuzco with the exception of Huacso, who managed to escape. In Cuzco, Atahualpa's generals gathered the nobility and offered them a pardon if they proclaimed their obedience to Atahualpa. Otherwise, they would be considered *aucas* or traitors and would be punished as prisoners of war. After this event, even Huasco returned peacefully and agreed to lay down arms.<sup>94</sup>

Having subdued his generals, Atahualpa's people then took to imprisoning all of Huascar's and Huayna Capac's relatives under the direction of Cuxi Yupanqui. He captured Marca Chimbo, Quispiquipi, Suriti, Yunga Ñusta, and Quispi Sisa, daughters of Huayna Capac. He ordered to put stakes on both sides of the road to Taticaca and hanged on them Huayna Capac's daughters, along with Huascar's family and generals, save for Huanca Auqui and a couple of other captains who went to Atahualpa as prisoners.<sup>95</sup> It is interesting that this show of force was done on the road between Cuzco and Lake Titicaca, as it suggests that this is where Huascar's support lied primarily. It is also possible that these were the places that had not yet participated directly in the civil war and so Atahualpa felt they needed a visual reminder of his victory, yet the development of the two factions as north versus south (as well as Hanan versus Hurin) suggests that Collasuyu was still a locus of Huascar's support.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 233.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 239.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 244.

Huascar was then tied and sent to Atahualpa with Huanca Sumari, a captain that Atahualpa trusted.<sup>96</sup> Cuxi Yupanqui was also a part of this delegation and when Atahualpa found himself imprisoned by the Spaniards, he ordered him to murder Huascar, fearing that he might convince Pizarro of his legitimacy. According to Betanzos Cuxi Yupanqui killed Huascar in Andamarca.<sup>97</sup> While other writers claim that Huascar died in the hands of Chalcochima,<sup>98</sup> Betanzos's version confirms his attempt to show the rift between Huascar and the rest of the Inca nobility that had become so large that he was eventually killed by his cousin and former general.

Although distinctly partisan, Betanzos' account of the Inca Civil War was the most complete to date. He was the first author to detail the movements of both armies beyond the Ecuadorian Phase of the war, introducing the Chasing and Final Phases. Although some of the details, including the number of troops fighting on either side, should be used cautiously and more as suggestions than facts, this is the first version that completes the history of the war from its causes to its aftermath without any obvious gaps. Betanzos further offers a glimpse into royal and Inca nobility politics introducing the idea that the civil war could be framed as a Hanan versus Hurin clash. This is a departure from Zárate and Cieza who both suggested that Atahualpa blocking further expansion by Huascar north was in the core of the conflict. Like other writers, however, Betanzos builds on the idea that military and building campaigns, as well as public ceremonies like the *mascaypacha* coronation, went hand in hand as important markers of legitimacy as they

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 245.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 268.

<sup>98</sup> E.g. Pedro Pizarro, *Relación del Descubrimiento y Conquista de los Reinos del Perú*, (Lima: PUCP Fondo Editorial, 1978 [1578]): 43; Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala, *The First New Chronicle and Good Government*, transl. Roland Hamilton. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009 [1615]): 88; José de Acosta, *Natural and Moral History of the Indies*, transl. Edward Grimston. (New York, NY: Burt Franklin, 1880 [1590]): 434.

embodied the masculine identity of the *Sapa Inca*. Even in the *Suma y Naracion*, though, Huascar appeared to have the support of most of the land with the experienced army acting as Atahualpa's primary trump card. Finally, Betanzos offers a rare glimpse into the personal relationships between Inca nobility as he had almost firsthand experience through Cuxirimay Ocllo, even if we may disregard some of the vignettes of Huascar's drunken parties as exaggerations. For a couple of decades, this account remained the unquestioned authority on Inca history including the civil war, before Viceroy Toledo's call for history production in the 1570s.

### **3. Creating an Usurper: Inca Histories in the Time of Viceroy Francisco Toledo (1569-1581)**

#### **3.1. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa (1572)**

Sarmiento dedicates several chapters to the life of Huascar as the final *Sapa Inca* in line with his treatment of the other imperial rulers. He comments that the sovereign was a son of Rahua Ocllo and that his proper name was Topa Cusi Hualpa Inti Illapa, but they called him Huascar because of his birthplace at Huascar-quihar some four and a half leagues from Cuzco.<sup>99</sup> Similar to Betanzos, Sarmiento claims that the civil war was in essence a clash between the Hanan and Hurin moieties of Inca nobility. After the death of Huayna Capac, Atahualpa remained in Quito, which angered the heir apparent. He executed the messengers, who were from the *panaca* of Pachacuti for protecting his half-brother, which led to much animosity between Huascar and all of Hanan Cuzco.<sup>100</sup> Similar to Betanzos, Sarmiento claims that Huascar publicly separated himself from the Hanan moiety due to their support for Atahualpa and declared war as the foundational act of his

<sup>99</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 169. This is consistent with a number of other accounts who claim that Huascar was not born in Cuzco but on the banks of Lake Muina.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

new Hurin dynasty. In line with earlier texts, Atahualpa is said to have sent gifts and proposed a truce, but his brother either had the messengers killed or returned them with torn clothes and cut noses.<sup>101</sup> Atahualpa, however, is not completely faultless in Sarmiento's history, as he is described to have murdered Hango and Atoc, who had gone to Tomebamba to collect Huayna Capac's body.<sup>102</sup>

It appears that the primary cause of the Inca Civil War had changed in the popular imagination by the 1570s. The earlier version of Huayna Capac's division of Tahuantinsuyu which favored Atahualpa and closed Huascar's northern avenues of further conquest was supplanted by the idea that the two brothers represented Inca politics and the clash between the Hanan and Hurin moieties. It is possible that this shift represents the deeper involvement of the Spanish writers with Indigenous populations as well as their greater understanding of local politics. This is supported by the fact that the two major proponents of this claim are Betanzos and Sarmiento, who are two of the most detailed Spanish writers. However, since Betanzos was the first to propose this version, it is also possible that it was invented by Cuxirimay Ocllo post-factum to fit the developing political situation in Cuzco after the arrival of the Europeans. Her belonging to the Hanan moiety automatically placed her in the position to not only be a part of the victorious party, but also of the old, and legitimate, Hanan dynasty, painting Huascar as the usurper of power. In this case, even if Atahualpa himself is seen as the rebel against a formerly legitimate heir, Cuxirimay Ocllo would retain her status, as the Hanan moiety remains the seat of the legitimate government.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 172.

At the time of initial negotiations and before any of the two brothers had made a major move the Huancavilcas rebelled.<sup>103</sup> Atahualpa sent Chalcochima, Quizquiz, Incura Hualpa, Rumiñahui, Yupanqui, Urco Huaranca, and Uña Chullo to put down the rebellion (Map 3.16), before he received word of his brother rejecting his proposal and claiming he was an *auca*.<sup>104</sup> At the same time, Huascar's army was on a conquest mission east at Pumacocha, east of Pacamoros, led by Tambo Usca Mayta and Tito Atauchi.<sup>105</sup> These two incursions serve a double purpose in the text here. They express the initial disinterest on both sides to engage in what would turn into a devastating war of succession and instead they continued with their immediate military agendas. On the other hand, both Atahualpa and Huascar saw these side jobs as opportunities to perform as rulers rather than as unwelcome distractions. This is especially obvious in Huascar's case, as his campaign in the Chachapoyas was unprompted. Further, if he was to be blocked from expanding the empire north by Atahualpa, the natural other path went right to the Pumacocha. As such, these mini-incursions can be seen as posturing by both sides before the big clash ahead and so should not be overlooked.


A side effect of Sarmiento's focus on these early attempts by the two brothers to play *Sapa Inca* and start military campaigns is his relatively short treatment of the Ecuadorian Phase of the war. He writes that the two armies met at Riobamba where Atahualpa emerged victorious from a

<sup>103</sup> The Huancavilca-Manteño culture is well-known and located on the Ecuadorian coast with Huancavilca group occupying the southern part of the zone. It is unclear where the center of that area would have been, so the modern day city of Guayaquil is shown on the map.

<sup>104</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 172.


<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 173. Sarmiento calls them Tampu Usca Mayta and Titu Atauchi. There are several Pumacocha and Pumacochas in Peru, but Sarmiento describes it as east of the Pacamoros. The only one directly east of the domain of the Pacamoros (described by Soledad Castro Ponce, *Yaguarzongos y Pacamoros*, (Quito, Ecuador: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 2002) as just east of Ayabaca south of Tumbes. Murúa (2001: 149) confirms that the Pumacochas Huascar invaded was in the Chachapoyas.

**Map 3.16.**  
**Huancavilcas Rebellion**  
**and Pumacocha**  
**Campaign (Sarmiento)**





**Map 3.17.**  
**Ecuadorian Phase**  
**(Sarmiento)**



battle so bloody that the big heap of bones left behind were left as a memorial that could still be visited at the time of writing in 1570s.<sup>106</sup> This loss prompted Huascar to gather a new army naming Atoc, Hango, Hauychao, and Huanca Auqui as his captain.<sup>107</sup> According to Sarmiento, Huascar was unhappy that his brother had lost many men in the Pacamoros campaign, so he sent Huanca Auqui women's gifts and clothes in an attempt to shame him for not acting in the aggressive role expected by a military Inca man. Sarmiento relates that this gift had an impact and inspired Huanca Auqui to step up and take his army to Tomebamba, where he caught Atahualpa's people unprepared and easily defeated them (Map 3.17).<sup>108</sup> Atahualpa responded by sending out Chalcochima and Quizquiz who destroyed Huanca Auqui's army of 10,000 Chachapoyas with no more than 3,000 surviving the second battle of Tomebamba. This double encounter at Tomebamba and the two sides exchanging victories that Sarmiento presents is consistent with earlier accounts of the Ecuadorian Phase of the war.

After the defeat at Tomebamba, Huanca Auqui retreated to Pumpu<sup>109</sup> with Chalcochima and Quizquiz on his tails initiating the Chasing Phase (Map 3.18), which is largely consistent with Betanzos' version. When Atahualpa's forces arrived at Pumpu, they engaged Huascar's army consisting of conscripted soldiers from throughout the empire and defeated it after a three-day battle.<sup>110</sup> The fleeing Huanca Auqui found an army of Soras, Chancas, Ayamarcas, and Yauyos

<sup>106</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 172.

<sup>107</sup> Here Sarmiento contradicts himself, as he previously wrote that Hango and Atoc were killed by Atahualpa when they went to retrieve Huayna Capac's body. It is unclear which version is more accurate.


<sup>108</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 173.

<sup>109</sup> Sarmiento calls it Bonbon.





<sup>110</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 174.



**Map 3.18. Chasing Phase (Sarmiento)**



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement

waiting for him at Jauja, but they were again defeated and most were killed at Yanamarca trying to escape (Map 3.19).<sup>111</sup> Retreating to Paucaray, Huanca Auqui met with Mayta Yupanqui who replaced him under suspicion that he was secretly in concert with Atahualpa as evidenced by his many defeats.<sup>112</sup> Yet when Mayta Yupanqui met Chalcochima at Ancoyacu, he suffered the same fate.<sup>113</sup>

After Ancoyacu, Sarmiento writes that Mayta Yupanqui fled without stopping to Vilcas and eventually made it back to Cuzco, burning the Apurimac Bridge to stall Atahualpa's generals who were hot on his tracks.<sup>114</sup> In Cuzco, Huascar decided it was time to lead his own forces as his generals kept failing him and he led his remaining army to Cotabamba. There he divided the troops in three – 1) the survivors of Huanca Auqui's forces. 2) a new army of Charcas, Contisuyu, Collasuyu, Chile, and Chuyus<sup>115</sup> under Arampa Yupanqui, and 3) his personal guards that he commanded. If Sarmiento's account is correct, it is significant that at this point, Huascar could only rely on the support from the southern quarter of the empire where he previously mobilized armies from throughout Tahuantinsuyu. In the meantime, Quizquiz and Chalcochima settled in

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. The Soras were a group from south of Andahuaylas in the area around Pampachiri. The Ayamarcas were a group from Pisac in the Inca heartland that were considered Inca by privilege. Although other Yanamarcas exist in Peru (near Cajamarca for example), this one needs to be close to Jauja and the closest is the Yanamarca Valley that drains into the Mantaro River. Murúa (2001: 175) further writes that this Yanamarca is two leagues from Jauja in the direction of Huanuco, confirming the location.

<sup>112</sup> There is another Paucaray in the southern Ayacucho region, but the town of Paucara in Acobamba is along the road to Cuzco between Jauja and Ayacucho, so it must be the one referred to here.


<sup>113</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 174. There are a few Ancos, but the one in Churcampa is very close to Paucara and it is right on the Mantaro, so it makes sense that the bridge Sarmiento refers to was there. Further, Sarmiento claims that it was 20 or more leagues away from Vilcashuaman and although it is almost double that on the road to Cuzco there are no other Ancos.

<sup>114</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 175.


<sup>115</sup> The Charcas were an Aymara-speaking group from Bolivia around Sucre. The Chuyus were a group from Cochabamba in Bolivia.



# Map 3.19. Battles of Yanamarca and Ancoyacu (Sarmiento)



# Map 3.20. Final Phase (Sarmiento)





Curahuasi near the Apurimac Bridge, but since it was destroyed, they took a roundabout path to Cotabamba to engage with Huascar (Map 3.20).<sup>116</sup>

Sarmiento follows Betanzos closely in the Chasing Phase as well as the Final Phase which was fought in Cotabamba. In addition, he provides critical detail of the final days of the conflict. Arampa Yupanqui received news that Atahualpa's forces were passing through a small ravine leading towards Huanacopampa<sup>117</sup> and fought against a squadron led by Chalcochima. Arampa Yupanqui won, killing many including a captain named Tomay Rima. Hearing of this victory, Huascar exclaimed: "the Collas have won this victory. Behold the obligation we have to emulate our ancestors." The captains of this army were Titu Atauchi, his brother Tupac Atao, Nano, and Urco Huaranca. Chalcochima and Quizquiz retreated to Cotabamba and were not followed by Huascar's forces.<sup>118</sup>

Other than the success in the first battle of Tomebamba, which did not last long, this perhaps serendipitous encounter represents the only other victory won by Huascar. It is, therefore, a critical node in the war worth investigating closely. One might think that the leader's personal involvement was the catalyst for the victory, but Sarmiento includes a direct quote that immediately points in another direction. Huascar attributes his success to the Colla, a group from the Lake Titicaca basin who were known for their military prowess, which on its face is surprising as he could have claimed the glory to himself. The follow up makes perfect sense of this decision, though, as he urges his supporters consider this victory as a part of a longer history, constructing

<sup>116</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 177.

<sup>117</sup> Not to be confused with Huanaco Pampa, this small town is directly south of Cotabamba. The battle probably took place somewhere in the Coyllurqui District, but the exact location is unknown.

<sup>118</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 178.

it as a marker of his legitimacy. The Inca often claimed that they arrive in Cuzco from Lake Titicaca, where their ancestor Manco Capac emerged.<sup>119</sup> By suggesting his supporters, especially the Colla who come from the same area, as representatives of the glorious ancestors that founded the empire, Huascar is claiming that his rule would be a symbolic “return to origins” and so a return to long-term legitimacy, which implicates Atahualpa as a simple usurper with a strong army. This evocation of Manco Inca’s origins in Lake Titicaca also matches Huascar’s switch to the Hurin moiety, to which the legendary founder also belonged. It is unclear who supplied Sarmiento with the quote and, of course, it is possible he never uttered those words, but the fact that some forty years later the Spanish historian heard such a story speaks volumes of the power of Huascar’s message.

His propaganda might have been successful fashioning himself a new Manco Capac, but his military strategy failed him time and again. Instead of following the defeated Chalcochima and Quizquiz, Huascar went to Huanacopampa and ordered Topa Atao to finish the job through the same ravine. In the ensuing battle, however, Topa Atao was captured, revealing that his leader was coming with some 5,000 men.<sup>120</sup> This gave Atahualpa’s generals the chance to set up an ambush where Huascar was imprisoned the morning after his brief victory.<sup>121</sup>

Sarmiento’s version of the events in the immediate aftermath of the end of the war follows closely what we already know from Betanzos. Huascar was placed under arrest at Quihuipay, half

<sup>119</sup> Gary Urton, *The History of a Myth: Pacariqtambo and the Origin of the Inkas*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990).

<sup>120</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 179.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 180.

a league from Cuzco.<sup>122</sup> Quizquiz and Chalcochima gathered the Inca nobility there and pardoned them, despite the fact that they supported Huascar and that they crowned him their *Sapa Inca*.<sup>123</sup> Facing the threat of Atahualpa's forces, the *ayllus* or family groups of Cuzco came to Quihuipay and accepted him as the new lord.<sup>124</sup> This included Chuqui Huipa, Huascar's primary wife, and Rahua Ocllo, who denounced him for being cruel, which had led to his downfall.<sup>125</sup> Sarmiento then includes an anecdote in which Rahua Ocllo speaks directly to her son telling him that he deserved all that came to him for he treated all of his relations with cruelty.<sup>126</sup> The quickness with which the Inca nobility, and even his own family, abandoned Huascar in this version of the events follows Betanzos' claim that Huascar was a poor leader, who was abusive to those around him. It is unclear if Sarmiento simply followed his predecessor or if he heard specific stories of Huascar's poor behavior. At any rate, it appears that although his framing of his rule as return to glorious origins may have been successful, his personality undermined it.

Sarmiento then provides great, and gruesome, detail on Atahualpa's campaign to exterminate Huascar's lineage completely. Huascar's wives, including the pregnant ones and those who had recently given birth, were hanged on poles at Jaquijahuana with their children. The pregnant women were cut open and their babies were ripped from their wombs and hanged as

<sup>122</sup> Many historians speak of the Battle of Quipaipan as the location of the decisive end of the Inca civil war, but the location remains unclear, usually only specified as west of Cuzco. Sarmiento and Garcilaso both claim that it was only half a league from Cuzco, so perhaps it is within the modern borders of the city.

<sup>123</sup> Huascar had received the fringe from Apu Chaco Yupanqui and Rupaca (Sarmiento 1999, 181) who claimed they had no choice in the matter, as Huayna Capac had selected Huascar as he was the son of his primary wife (Sarmiento 1999, 183).

<sup>124</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 181.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 182.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 183.

well.<sup>127</sup> All lords and ladies who were friends of Huascar were seized and hanged. Since Topa Inca's *ayllu* sided with Huascar, it was dismantled and Topa Inca's *malqui* was burnt. Over 80 children of Huascar were killed, while all the Cañaris and Chachapoyas who fought for him were ordered to be murdered as well.<sup>128</sup> Huascar's sister wives, Coya Miro and Chimbo Sisa, were also killed after his defeat, but some of his other wives escaped punishment due to them not having his children.<sup>129</sup>

It is unclear why Atahualpa was so ruthless to eliminate all remaining supporters of Huascar, after Sarmiento paints him as a man who was universally despised. One possible explanation is that familial relations were seen as stronger than personal affect and that Huascar's immediate relative still presented some danger to Atahualpa's claim. Sarmiento concludes that once Francisco Pizarro learned that Huascar was the legitimate ruler, Atahualpa ordered his murder. His body was chopped to pieces and thrown in the Yanamayu River which once served as the border between the domains of the two brothers.<sup>130</sup> This happened in 1533 when Huascar was 40-years-old and had reigned for nine years.<sup>131</sup>

Sarmiento's history largely confirms the course of the war we know from Betanzos and earlier writers. In the Ecuadorian Phase, he adds the battle at Riobamba, which might correspond

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 184.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 185.

<sup>129</sup> These included Elvira Chonay (daughter of Cañar Capac), Beatriz Carnamaruay (daughter of Chinchaycocha), Juana Tocto, and Catalina Usica, who married Paullu Topa later.

<sup>130</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 189.

<sup>131</sup> These figures make sense, but we should be cautious when using Sarmiento for *Sapa Inca* reign lengths. In his attempt to paint the Inca as recent usurpers of power in the Andes, he aligned their history with that of the Muslim invasion of the Iberian peninsula, inadvertently extending Inca history several centuries further back. Most early rulers are said to have lived and reigned for well over a century.

to Cieza's Ambato, Betanzos' Mochacaxa, and Xerez and Zárate's first battle of Tomebamba. Sarmiento further complicates the double encounter at Tomebamba that confirms Betanzos' version. In the Chasing Phase, to the battles at Pumpu and Jauja, he adds the massacre at Yanamarca and the conflict at Ancoyacu Bridge. While he follows Betanzos that the Final Phase was centered around Cotabamba, Sarmiento sheds light on the location of the decisive ambush where Huascar was captured, while he also complicates that story by adding Huascar's initial victory with the Colla forces. *Historia Indica* moves away from the story of the ill-advised division of the empire by Huayna Capac and claims that the Inca Civil War was based on Huascar's switch to the Hurin moiety in order to establish his legitimacy. Sarmiento retains that Rahu Ocllo's son was the legitimate heir, but blames his downfall on his poor treatment of the Inca nobility who quickly turn against him and on Chalcochima and Quizquiz's military ingenuity. In most significant debates about the war, Sarmiento aligns with Betanzos.

### **3.2. Pedro Pizarro (1578)**

The central theme of Pedro Pizarro's Inca Civil War narrative is the relationship between Huascar and the Inca nobility. Unlike most authors, Pizarro claims that Atahualpa did not possess superior military power, but rather Huascar's forces sabotaged him.<sup>132</sup> This reflects the time of writing, specifically the Toledan push to portray the Inca as usurpers and yet Pizarro also refuses to downplay the Inca Civil War claiming that without its devastating effect the Spaniards stood no chance against the Inca Empire.<sup>133</sup> The brevity of his account could be attributed to a combination

<sup>132</sup> Pizarro 1978, 206.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.



of his focus on the Spanish affairs of the 1540s in the Andes and the passage of time. In that, it is similar to the writings of Garcilaso de la Vega who also wrote his memories decades later and also downplayed the details of the civil war.

Pizarro argues that the potential split of the Inca Empire between the two brothers was the main reason for the conflict, an idea which dominated before the writings of Betanzos. According to Pizarro, after Huayna Capac's death, Atahualpa demanded that he was appointed governor of Quito. Huascar, counseled by his advisors, sent messages to summon Atahualpa three times fearing that his brother might rebel against him. Atahualpa himself felt threatened by his half-brother and upon the advice of his maternal relatives in Quito decided that war was inevitable, but since he had the most valiant soldiers, he was confident he could win.<sup>134</sup> He gathered his relatives as well as the Cañari, who according to Pizarro joined him. Huascar sent an army to quash the rebellion and the two armies met in Tomebamba (Map 3.21), where Huascar's forces were victorious, taking Atahualpa prisoner.<sup>135</sup> Here Pizarro offers a different version of the prison break from the one we know from Zárate and Cieza. Atahualpa escaped saying that his father, the Sun, had saved him, but Pizarro claims that the Indians could not stay awake after midnight, so Atahualpa simply escaped when the guards fell asleep.<sup>136</sup>


At this juncture, the Pizarro's narrative of the war ends abruptly with the author simply stating that from this point on Atahualpa won every battle easily to end the war. Although he provides no detail on any movements, battles, major players, or tactics, Pizarro justifies omitting large parts of the war by offering an explanation for Huascar's downfall consistent with the image

<sup>134</sup> Pizarro 1978, 50.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

**Map 3.21. Battle of Tomebamba/  
Ecuadorian Phase  
(Pizarro)**



**LEGEND**



Battle



Atahualpa and his forces



Huascar and his forces



Movement

0 200 400 km

of the *Sapa Inca* that we know from Betanzos and Sarmiento. Angered by the power of the *panacas* and perhaps his own dim prospects for imperial expansion and personal wealth, Huascar declared that the royal *malqui* needed to be buried and stripped of their possessions, as they held all the best in his country.<sup>137</sup> Disrespecting, and perhaps even attempting to harm, the venerated ancestors was a critical mistake, as the Inca nobility turned against their leader wholesale to the extent that his generals allowed Atahualpa's forces to conquer them unopposed (Map 3.22).<sup>138</sup> Since the war was fictitious, there is no reason for Pizarro to add any further detail.

Although this narrative is compelling, there is solid evidence that the Inca Civil War was not simply thrown by Huascar's generals. Even without the piles of bones that Sarmiento saw at Ambato or the huge numbers of casualties that Betanzos reported, Pizarro himself admits that the conflict played a crucial role in the European invasion of the Andes.<sup>139</sup> He claims that if Huayna Capac was alive in 1532, Spanish victory would have been impossible, since all the *curacas* adored him.<sup>140</sup> Further, the Spaniards could neither enter, nor win the war with the Inca if the civil war had not just ended, unless more than a thousand Spaniards joined the fight.<sup>141</sup> Thus, although it is unlikely that no battles were fought after that initial clash at Tomebamba, Pizarro's account offers further evidence of the rift between Huascar and the Inca nobility.

A distinct reflection of its production history, the *Relación del Descubrimiento y Conquista de los Reinos del Perú* follows a 1530s course of the Inca Civil War with a 1570s explanation.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.


<sup>139</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 172 and Betanzos 1996, 207-226.

<sup>140</sup> Pizarro 1978, 49.





<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 50.




**Map 3.22.**  
**Quizquiz and**  
**Chalcochima's**  
**march on Cuzco**  
**(Pizarro)**



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement



Writing decades after the conflict, Pizarro does not seem to have consulted the newly available histories such as those of Cieza and Betanzos, nor does he conduct his own investigation similar to theirs. Instead, he presents a brief and incomplete history in the same mold as his fellow invaders Xerez and Sancho. As such, Pizarro's account is the last of a lineage of soldier writers, who mostly failed to show distinct interest in Inca military history. Even during this period, the most detailed and useful histories of the civil war were written by administrators like Betanzos and Sarmiento. The next generation of Spanish writers in the Andes were primarily clergymen who apparently had an easier path to reliable (or at least numerous) informants about Inca history.

## **Conclusions**

The narratives of the Inca Civil War produced in the chaotic first five decades of the European invasion of the Andes lead to several important insights before moving on to the post-Toledan sources. Perhaps the most important one is the critical role that language played in the creation of these documents. The early contact ones exhibit a distinct lack of understanding of the Andean landscape as well as of Indigenous cultural practices. Although they are the closest in time to the events they describe or, in the case of Xerez, they are literally eyewitness accounts of the civil war, these early accounts offer little detail and are muddled in early modern Spanish understanding of adversaries as Muslims. In contrast, the 1550s narratives by Cieza and Betanzos, both of whom spoke fluent Quechua and were invested in Andean practices, provide a greater level of understanding of the conflict, as well as significant details of the movements and the actors involved.

The importance of language should not be overlooked, as it enabled Cieza and Betanzos to reach and record the testimonies of Indigenous informants, who were invaluable for their

narratives. More than just a matter of communication, their understanding of Quechua opened a door to Inca ontology and thus a new understanding of the world crucial for the understanding of the conflict between Atahualpa and Huascar. Language continues to be a valuable tool for our understanding of the Inca Empire today and following Cieza and Betanzos' lead, Chapter 7 will offer a new path to understanding Inca material culture through a linguistic study of its ceramic forms.

Another critical insight from the written sources discussed in this chapter is the gradual character of cultural change in the Andes. While many archaeologists and historians used to split along disciplinary lines right at that 1532 point, the benchmark has been moving continuously. In the past couple of decades it has been well established that until the Toledan reforms in the 1570s Spanish rule in the Andes was minimal allowing for a relative autonomy of Indigenous populations and a certain continuity of their cultural practices. Then, American historian Jeremy Mumford exposed that General Resettlement policy that Toledo instituted had a much smaller impact at first, despite its long-term implications.<sup>142</sup>

Now, looking at the histories produced through the Toledan call whose purpose was to discredit the legitimacy of Tahuantinsuyu, we see that some of them, notably Sarmiento, achieved quite the opposite. This exposes the low level of control that Toledo initially had as by 1572 when Sarmiento published his account the Andean world was still very much divided between the Indigenous populations and the Spaniards. The very inclusion of this set of sources produced in the 1570s in this chapter is an argument for the slow pace of the reforms and for the level of cultural continuity in the region. The implication is that from the 1530s to the 1580s the Andes experienced

<sup>142</sup> Mumford 2012.

a period that is characterized less by transition to a hybridized colonial Peru and more by the co-existence of separate Indigenous Andean and Spanish cultures. This view of the sixteenth century stemming from the written sources fuels the mission of transconquest archaeology to recognize the continuity of Indigenous Andean practices largely untouched by the Europeans for decades beyond 1532.

#### 4. Reformed Narratives:

##### Post-Toledan and Seventeenth Century Histories of the Inca Civil War (1582-1653)

Following Chapter 3's examination of the narratives about the Inca Civil War produced before the Toledan reforms from 1532 to 1582, this chapter examines the rest of the significant written sources which were published in post-Toledan Peru. The reforms instituted by Viceroy Toledo in the 1570s transformed the Andes from a disorganized and unruly territory to one of the most profitable possessions of the Spanish Crown. This also resulted in a much greater impact and reach of European culture in the Andes. Whereas before Toledo most Andeans continued their way of life without much cultural change, save for the introduction of Christianity, after the 1570s the cultural transformation of the broad region began its still ongoing course.<sup>1</sup>

In the twelve years of his reign, Viceroy Toledo instituted a number of reforms focusing on three main issues. First, he began the process of the general resettlement of the Andean Indigenous populations in *reducciones*, towns which would concentrate the dispersed populations and make them easier to govern.<sup>2</sup> Second, he instituted a regularized taxation system in which the exempt *curaca* collected tax for the state from their community, learning from the way the Inca governed their state through the local leaders.<sup>3</sup> Third, Toledo used another Inca

<sup>1</sup> Here I do not mean to diminish the impact of slavery and disease on Indigenous Andean populations, but I only want to highlight the great continuity of Indigenous cultural practices to the present, but especially before the 1580s.

<sup>2</sup> Jeremy Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012): 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.



practice called *mita* that he greatly altered to effectively create a system of forced labor that made sure that the wealth of the mercury and silver mines was directly transferred to the Crown.<sup>4</sup>

Although, as American historian Jeremy Mumford has shown, the immediate success of some of these policies was somewhat exaggerated and the Andes did not transform overnight, the impact of the Toledan reforms was immense and can be seen in Peru and Bolivia to this day.<sup>5</sup> The Viceroyalty of Peru gradually became much more integrated and well-connected. European settlers began to penetrate deep into the Andean mountains as well as into the jungle regions of the Viceroyalty. The result of this new reality is a body of literature on Inca history, and the Inca Civil War in particular, that is different from its predecessors.

By the seventeenth century, Indigenous authors were writing their own versions in the style of European histories. Europeans who continued to produce histories relied no longer on their own, foreign observations or on their unique access to Inca informants, but on a mixture of older texts and new testimony from Indigenous informants, who themselves were products of this new colonial reality. At the same time, Spanish writers became much more intertwined with Andean cultural practices, which is evident in their writing. Bi-cultural writers like El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega were also writing in this period that was marked by a greater understanding and appreciation of Inca history.

At the same time, the sources discussed in this chapter were produced further in time from the events they described and they often relied on earlier writers. However, as the examination of their narratives about the Inca Civil War will show in this chapter, their temporal distance was rarely an obstacle, as the dedication of the seventeenth century historians led them

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

to incorporate multiple sources between Indigenous informant and earlier Spanish writings and the result is the most detailed reports on the conflict between Huascar and Atahualpa.

### 1. Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua (c.1613)

Unlike most other authors Pachacuti Yamqui does not assign direct blame for the start of the Inca Civil War. He has no obvious reason to side with either Huascar or Atahualpa in the first place, but his account carries an air of objectivity that is rare the writing of the time. Like Murúa, Pachacuti Yamqui problematizes the legitimacy debate presenting information on several different aspects of legitimacy such as birthright, performance of rulership duties, and the internal politics of Inca nobility. He is the sole writer to claim that Huascar was not the heir apparent by virtue of his descent from Huayna Capac and Rahua Ocllo. Instead, Pachacuti Yamqui claims that after Huayna Capac died and his body was brought back to Cuzco, Huascar<sup>6</sup> made his *malqui* marry his mother, Rahua Ocllo, in order to legitimize him as the heir to the empire.<sup>7</sup>

What he might have lacked in origin, however, Huascar made up by being politically savvy and performing all the expected rituals in order to secure his position as the next *Sapa Inca*. He gathered all the *curacacona* and councils in Coricancha and pled his case, upon which he was received the royal regalia, including the *capac llauto*, *suntur paucar topa yahuari*, and the *capac uncu*.<sup>8</sup> Huascar prepared a great feast for his coronation giving much livestock, gold, silver, food, and llamas to other lords in order to earn their ballots. At the end of the required

<sup>6</sup> “Inti Topa Cusi Vallpa Huascar Ynga.”

<sup>7</sup> Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua, *Relació de Antigüedades deste Reyno del Pirú*, (Lima, Peru: Institut Francais D’Etudes Andines, 1993 [1600]), f.36v.

<sup>8</sup> Regalia of the ruler: the ruler’s headdress, the royal scepter, and the ruler’s tunic respectively.


year of penance, he gave himself the name Inti Cusi Hualpa Huascar Inca and married his sister Chuqui Huypa Chuquipay.<sup>9</sup> Here Pachacuti Yamqui again departs from the other sources claiming Huascar was quite adept at the political game, gaining the support of the necessary parties by cajoling or even bribing them. This is not the same inadequate ruler, who relied solely on his birthright as Rahua Ocllo's son, we know from other writers. Instead, *Relación de Antigüedades* presents a Huascar who understood the significance of performance, taking great care to execute all the necessary rituals lasting a full year that would secure his ascendance to the throne.

However, Pachacuti Yamqui indicates that there might have been a turn in Huascar's fortunes as a shrewd political leader once he gained the title of *Sapa Inca*. He began by meeting all the *apu curacona* at Pomacanchi, where he made a pact to never remove them from power as long as he reigned (Map 4.1).<sup>10</sup> This pact might explain why for most of the duration of the war, according to most authors, Huascar had the support of local leaders that allowed him to mobilize troops from the entirety of the empire. Co-opting local leaders was a major tactic through which the Inca kept control of their vast empire despite not stationing large armies or sending throngs of administrators to keep the peace, so Huascar was following the playbook here. Further, the location where this declaration took place is significant, as Pomacanchi is located next to a lake on the road between Cuzco and Lake Titicaca. Thus, Huascar is spatially alluding to the Inca origin story, as his re-establishment of the Manco lineage was done on the path between Titicaca and Cuzco, while mimicking the setting visually.

<sup>9</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.36v.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

# Map 4.1. Huascar's pilgrimage to Lake Titicaca (Pachacuti Yamqui)



While Pachacuti Yamqui gives Huascar credit for this wise administrative move as well as for his powerful political theater, he also relates a story that Indigenous Andeans, as well as Europeans, would have found deeply disturbing. In a vignette not shared by any other author, Huascar celebrated this pact at Pomapampa<sup>11</sup> by bringing out all the *acllacona* and making them have sex with llamas, which made his people question his sanity.<sup>12</sup> Whether these events truly transpired as Pachacuti Yamqui described them is somewhat irrelevant. As the author was trained in Jesuit theology, we might think of this story as a version of the biblical one of Sodom and Gomorrah, the two cities destroyed by the Abrahamic god for their wickedness. This would fit into Pachacuti Yamqui's mission to find parallels between Christianity and Andean religion, but it is also the first hint of Huascar's irrational behavior that we hear at length from Betanzos.

Beyond his sexual abuse of young women and animals, Pachacuti Yamqui shares other stories that malign the new ruler. Huascar removed his father's guard and installed in their place 2,000 Cañari and Chachapoyas as his personal guard. After that he began to punish Huayna Capac's captains, decapitating them, since they left Atahualpa<sup>13</sup> in Quito. Other captains he threw in the Arauay and Sanga Cancha jails.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps, he worked quite hard to gain the highest office in the empire, only to greatly mismanage it, which would explain not only the horrific anecdotes we hear about his treatment of women and his family, but also of the gradual abandonment he suffers from his generals and soldiers.

<sup>11</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui refers to the place once as Pomacanche and once as Pomapampa, but it is likely that this is the same place. Pomacanchi is much closer to Cuzco (Pomabamba is in Ancash), so it is probably the place Pachacuti Yamqui meant.

<sup>12</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.37r.

<sup>13</sup> "Ttopa Atao Guallpa"

<sup>14</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.36v.

Underneath this tale of moral and military collapse that reads more like a tabloid than history, Pachacuti Yamqui offers great details and insights into what actually happened in the Inca Civil War. He claims that the Cañari played a critical role in the beginning of the war. When Atahualpa requested that he was appointed governor and captain of the province of Quito, he never meant to claim the double rulership that Xerez and Zárate suggested. However, Urco Colla,<sup>15</sup> the Cañari *curaca*, tricked Huascar by claiming that Atahualpa asked to be named Inca. Atahualpa sent rich gifts to his brother, but in return he received drums made of the skins of his messengers. Huascar acted swiftly and sent Atoc<sup>16</sup> with 1,200 men to imprison Atahualpa and his generals, effectively starting the war on false pretenses.<sup>17</sup> Atahualpa received a message of Atoc reaching Tomebamba, as well as that he carried feminine gifts from Huascar including clothing and pots. Angered, he decided to go to war and summoned all the captains who swore their allegiance to him. Atahualpa gathered all of his father's weapons and 13,000 very strong soldiers and began to call himself Inca, demanding to be carried on a litter.<sup>18</sup>

The role of the Cañari, as narrated by Pachacuti Yamqui, is especially salient for our understanding of the fall of Tahuantinsuyu. The Inca relied heavily on local leaders to do their bidding in the provinces rewarding them handsomely in the process. But this was likely never as clean and simple a process as some early writers suggest. Rather, local leaders also worked to prioritize the needs and concerns of their populace. And in this narrative by Pachacuti Yamqui we see how the Cañari played both sides in this conflict. Huascar tried to get them on his side by

<sup>15</sup> "Orccocolla"

<sup>16</sup> "Guaminca Atoc"

<sup>17</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.37r.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., f.37v.

appointing them as his personal guard, signifying his deep trust in their loyalty and ability. At the same time, Atahualpa probably had a closer relationship with the Tomebamba group, but it must have been a complicated one, since he was the face of the conqueror. It is unclear whether Urco Colla was one of the *curacacona* at Puma Cancha, but it is likely that he received assurances from both claimants that he would remain the leader of the Cañari no matter the outcome of the Inca Civil War. It is unclear exactly what role Urco Colla played, but this narrative illustrates how non-Inca Indigenous leaders may have used their power to influence Inca politics in ways that best suited local needs. A weakened Inca leadership, for example, likely allowed for greater local autonomy. By rapidly expanding their empire, the Inca created a situation in which a strong local leader could play a critical role in Inca politics to the extent that Urco Colla might have set it on a course to its demise.

After resting a few days in Tomebamba, Atoc met Atahualpa at Ambato<sup>19</sup> where Atahualpa's forces, as well as the *mitmacona* and the locals who fought on his side, were easily defeated (Map 4.2).<sup>20</sup> Here Pachacuti Yamqui reveals the grand purpose of this history, claiming that Atahualpa had a vision of baby Jesus, which inspired him to rebuild his forces, appointing Quizquiz and Chalcochima as his generals. Immediately, the Christian vision is proven critical, as they win a second battle at Ambato capturing Atoc and gouging his eyes out.<sup>21</sup> Atahualpa and his army returned to Quito to regroup, while hearing of Atoc's defeat Huascar sent his brother, Huanca Auqui with 12,000 men and the authority to mobilize more along the way. He reached


<sup>19</sup> "Mollohampato"

<sup>20</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.37v.





<sup>21</sup> Ibid.



# Map 4.2. Battles of Ambato I and II (Pachacuti Yamqui)




**LEGEND**





-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement



# Map 4.3. Battle of Quito (Pachacuti Yamqui)



## LEGEND

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement

0 50 100 km

Tomebamba, where he asked the locals for help, once again showing the importance of the Cañari in the Ecuadorian Phase of the war.

When he arrived in Quito, Huanca Auqui was met by Atahualpa and 16,000 of his warriors (Map 4.3). Pachacuti Yamqui claims that during the battle the two men met in secret and agreed to delay the war. Unfortunately, the author gives no reason for this decision. Here the story speeds up, as after the Quito battle, Pachacuti Yamqui reports two more battles at Tomebamba (Map 4.4), after which Huanca Auqui turned away to conquer the province of Pacllas in Chachapoyas. He then clashed with Atahualpa's armies in an unknown battlefield between the Chachapoyas and the Cañari, finally losing after four battles.<sup>22</sup> Atahualpa returned to Quito to punish the Cañari, leaving Chalcochima in charge at Tomebamba.<sup>23</sup>


Despite the lack of particular detail in this version of the Ecuadorian war, we do get a sense of the temporal length of the conflict. Pachacuti Yamqui only speaks of Ambato and Tomebamba as battlegrounds, but although he provides no insight into the movements within these locales, he counts six major battles in the north, the most of any sources. These may correspond to the three distinct clashes in and around Tomebamba that Murúa speaks of, but they seem to be drawn out in time. The anecdote of the agreed delay between Huanca Auqui and Atahualpa further suggests that these six battles were distinct rather than rapid clashes in a single movement of the two opposing armies. The military campaign against the Pacllas in the middle of the Ecuadorian Phase here matches Murúa's suggestion that Huanca Auqui retreated for a

<sup>22</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui speaks of a battle somewhere between the domains of the Cañari and the Chachapoyas, but the exact locations are unclear. I selected Loja following Cieza, who is the only other writer with a battle in this region.





<sup>23</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38r.



# Map 4.4. Battles of Tomebamba I, II, II, and a battle in a field between Chachapoyas and Cañari lands (Pachacuti Yamqui)




**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement





0 50 100 km



**Map 4.5.**  
**Chasing Phase**  
**(Pachacuti Yamqui)**



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement



long period of time before being spurred back to fight Atahualpa by Huascar possibly years after the first clash at Ambato.

After his defeat between the Chachapoyas and the Cañari, Huanca Auqui escaped to Huánuco Pampa and from there to Pumpu,<sup>24</sup> where the Chasing Phase began following a familiar path we know from the other writers (Map 4.5). At Pumpu, the two armies of 100,000 met and after a three-day battle, Quizquiz and Chalcochima emerge victorious although both sides take great casualties, as much as 20,000 on each side.<sup>25</sup> Retreating, Huanca Auqui went to Jauja,<sup>26</sup> where he found a beautiful army that Huascar sent to his aid. The new captain reprimanded Huanca Auqui for fighting like a coward. This new army of 6,000 was, however, again defeated by Quizquiz at Jauja, as it consisted of noblemen who were no match for his soldiers.<sup>27</sup>

Concerned with the continuous defeats, Huascar sent presents to Pachacamac, asking the *huaca* for a favor, and receiving a message of good hope from it. Then, he sent out the Aymaras, Huancas, and Yauyos under his command, which numbered some 200,000 soldiers, to help Huanca Auqui.<sup>28</sup> As Huascar's troops fled Jauja, Quizquiz entered and sent a message to Quito asking for more troops as well. Meanwhile, Huascar received a favorable message from Pachacamac that he will be victorious at Ancoyacu, so he sent out a new captain with 12,000 men there to assist Huanca Auqui. However, Huascar's brother finally betrayed him and switched sides to join Quizquiz and Chalcochima. The new captain managed to hold them off at

<sup>24</sup> "Guanoco" and "Bonbon" respectively.

<sup>25</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38v.

<sup>26</sup> "Xauxa"

<sup>27</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993 f.38v.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

the bridge for a whole month, but was finally defeated, completing the Chasing Phase of the war.<sup>29</sup>

After losing at Ancoyacu despite Pachacamac's prediction Huascar went into a rage and cursed all *huacacona* and the royal *malqui* declaring himself their enemy, claiming he wanted to emulate Mayta Capac.<sup>30</sup> Mayta Capac was the fourth *Sapa Inca* and member of the Hurin dynasty that ruled Cuzco before Pachacuti's reforms. This vignette again hints at Huascar's narrative of his rule representing "return to origins." For one, it is possible that Pachacuti Yamqui mistook Mayta Capac with the legendary first Inca ruler Manco Capac. However, the fourth *Sapa Inca* also fits this narrative as one who solidified the Inca hold of Cuzco against the neighboring groups of the Alcabisas and the Culunchimas who saw him as a foreigner coming from Lake Titicaca.<sup>31</sup> Huascar himself saw his origins on the Island of the Sun, as his first act as a ruler was to travel to Collasuyu to place a gold image of the Sun at the temple there.<sup>32</sup> The banishment of the royal *malqui* may have been a great mistake, but it was part of his plan to represent himself as the inheritor of a long-term tradition of power that Atahualpa lacked. And this tactic seems to have been working at least for a while. Seeing that Quizquiz and Chalcochima kept winning battle after battle and marching south, Huascar sent out a message to the entire empire and so many soldiers answered the call that there was not enough room in Cuzco to house them.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., f.39r.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., f.39v.

<sup>31</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 81-83.

<sup>32</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.36v.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., f.39v.

Meanwhile, Huanca Auqui retreated to Corampa where he left some 1,000 soldiers and went back to Cuzco to apologize to his brother for his failure. After the two of them reconciled, Huascar led his forces out of Cuzco bringing all the *apu curacacona*, *auquicon*, *mancophurin* Cuzcos, and *ayllon* Cuzcos.<sup>34</sup> Fronting the army were the Quihuas and Collas, then followed by Tambos, Chillques, Mascas, Papres, Quichuas, Mayos Tancos, and Quillisches.<sup>35</sup> Finally, at the back were the Chachapoyas and Cañari. Thus, Huascar arrived at Utcupampa on the shores of the Apurimac River with an army covering all the land from Ollantaytambo all the way high up to Huachaca and from Cochabamba through Omasaya (Map 4.6).<sup>36</sup> Here, again, we see the Colla fronting Huascar's army in an attempt to align his reign with the Lake Titicaca Basin as the origin place of the Inca.

Like Sarmiento and Murúa, Pachacuti Yamqui sets the Final Phase of the war as a series of battles around the Apurimac in which Quizquiz and Chalcochima emerge victorious after both sides prevail at times. On the first day, Huascar climbed to the highest peak in Apurimac and when he looked down on the battle, people looked like flour. The battle was so big that it covered an area of twelve by seven leagues.<sup>37</sup> On the second day of the battle, at least 20,000 men died, but the battle was fought from the morning until sundown. On the third day, they had

<sup>34</sup> *Apu curacacona* were the people of the highest administrative office, *auquicon* were the traitors who supported Atahualpa, *mancophurin* Cuzcos were the people from the Hurin moiety associated with Manco, *ayllon* Cuzcos were described as "knights" by Pachacuti Yamqui (1993, f.40r).


<sup>35</sup> The Quihuas were a group from the Cuzco region near Paruro. The Chillques were a group from Vilcashuaman. The other groups are of unclear origin.

<sup>36</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.40r. The Utcubamba in Chachapoyas is much larger today and more well-known, but Pachacuti Yamqui specifically says that this Utcupampa was on the river Apurimac. The only place like this is the Utcupampa on the confluence of Apurimac and Lambrama rivers in Abancay province.


<sup>37</sup> Almost 2,000 km<sup>2</sup>.



# Map 4.6. Battle of Utcupampa I (Pachacuti Yamqui)



# Map 4.7. Battle of Utcupampa II (Pachacuti Yamqui)





breakfast and fought until lunch after which they recuperated.<sup>38</sup> So many men died in the battle that the fields were full of bodies and the land was saturated with blood.

On the fourth day, they fought like madmen and Quizquiz and Chalcochima, now tired and commanding no more than 500 men, gathered their camp in an area with three very high peaks. At dawn, the Collas seeing that their enemies had cowered, surrounded them. The Cañas and Collas set fires around Atahualpa's forces and all 2,000 men from Chinchaysuyu died, while only Quizquiz and Chalcochima escaped injured.<sup>39</sup> Huascar's captains wanted to chase after the fleeing generals, but since it was already dark, their leader did not allow them. Chalcochima and Quizquiz retreated to Cochacasa and united with a force of 600 Huaylaquipas.<sup>40</sup> There they performed a ritual in which they burnt two small fires and seeing that Atahualpa's burnt higher, regained confidence. They came back to Utcupampa with the 600 men at dawn and ambushed their half-asleep enemies (Map 4.7).<sup>41</sup> At the ambush, Huascar's people were just having breakfast, so it was easy for Atahualpa's captains to capture the *Sapa Inca*. Quizquiz, Rumi Ñahui, and Ucumari killed the Camanatas and Lucanas, who were carrying Huascar on a litter, taking him prisoner to Salcantay, effectively ending the war.<sup>42</sup>

Although Pachacuti Yamqui reports that this final encounter happened at Utcupampa, some way removed from Cotabamba, where Sarmiento and Murúa's versions place it, the similarities between the three versions are striking. All three authors claim that Huascar's men

<sup>38</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.40v.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., f.41r.

<sup>40</sup> The Huaylaquipas were a group from Andahuaylas.

<sup>41</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.41v.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., f.42r.

won an important first clash, but failed to chase Quizquiz and Chalcochima, who in turn regrouped and ambushed the *Sapa Inca* capturing him in one decisive final victory. All three writers also provide different details of the battle. Murúa elevates Chalcochima and his sling abilities as the pivotal difference between the two sides, once Atahualpa's force had been chased up a hill.<sup>43</sup> Sarmiento relates the story of Huascar singing the praises of the Colla who had won the first victory in the Final Phase.<sup>44</sup> Then, Pachacuti Yamqui presents a very detailed picture of the different groups represented in the battles that led to Huascar's fall.

Having captured Huascar, Quizquiz and Chalcochima went to Cuzco, but feared entering the city, so they settled at Quipipaypampa. There they summoned the *apu curacacona* and *auquicon*, the noblemen, the *coya*, and Huascar's mother. Among them was Huanca Auqui, who punished all the captains encircling them with 6,000 men. They brought Huascar handcuffed and he insulted them by calling them coca chewers. Quizquiz and Chalcochima asked Rahua Ocllo why his son Huascar did not recognize the lord of the battles Atahualpa, to which Huascar responded that the captains had no place to meddle in this quarrel between himself and his younger brother. He demanded an audience with Atahualpa, but Quizquiz told him that he was not in the position to negotiate and made Huascar drink urine and eat *chilca* leaves.<sup>45</sup> The imprisoned *Sapa Inca* demanded that he was treated appropriately, but Quizquiz and Chalcochima burst into laughter, calling him a crazy fool, for he had brought all this to himself by committing sins to the *huacacona*.<sup>46</sup> Here, again, Huascar's behavior is seen as the

<sup>43</sup> Murúa 2001, 183.

<sup>44</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 178.

<sup>45</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.42r.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, f.42v.

cause of his downfall, after Pachacuti Yamqui earlier suggested he was an apt leader and politician.

Pachacuti Yamqui agrees with the other sources that in the aftermath of the civil war, Quizquiz and Chalcochima went out to exterminate Huascar's lineage. Quizquiz ordered for all his women and children to be slain, as well as all his servants, which would have been 1,500 people. Huascar's "concubines" were at Pumamarca palace then. He, his mother, and an unnamed son of his were brought to Huancauque along with all the *apu curacacona* and 1,000 soldiers to guard them. Meanwhile, Atahualpa met Pizarro at Cajamarca and seeing that he was about to die, he sent out a message to this convoy. Before they could be brought in front of Atahualpa, Huascar, his mother, his son, and his wife were killed at Andamarca.<sup>47</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui's version of the aftermath of the war, while not as gruesome as some of the other sources, fits the narrative that Huascar was killed on the way to Cajamarca in Andamarca, while his entire lineage was annihilated in Cuzco.

Often relegated as a source of limited usefulness due to its religious zeal, Pachacuti Yamqui's *Relación de Antigüedades* emerges as one of the most detailed and useful accounts of the Inca Civil War. Along with Betanzos, Sarmiento, and Murúa, he is the only author to provide critical detail on all aspects of the war from its causes, through all of its phases, and to its aftermath resulting in Huascar's death and Atahualpa's imprisonment by Francisco Pizarro. Further, he is the only author from this group of the Big Four who is an Indigenous Andean. While he has his biases, such as his devotion to Christianity, Pachacuti Yamqui is perhaps the most detailed, and probably accurate, author when it comes to the participation of the different Indigenous actors and their role in the war. Pachacuti Yamqui's focus on the war may be

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., f.43r.

surprising given that it does not fit the major goal of his narrative, but on this particular topic it is high time that he receives the attention he deserves.

## 2. Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala (1615)

Guaman Poma leaves no ambiguity on the question of political legitimacy claiming on multiple occasions that Topa Cusi Hualpa Huascar Inca was the natural leader of Tahuantinsuyu or *Capac Apu Inca*.<sup>48</sup> He was the only legitimate son of Huayna Capac from his primary wife, Rahua Ocllo, while Atahualpa was part of what Guaman Poma calls *auquiconas*, illegitimate sons of the *Sapa Inca*.<sup>49</sup> Other members of this group were Manco Inca and Ninan Cuyochi, whose mother was from Cuzco, Illescas Inca, whose mother was Chuqui Llanto, Paullo Topa, whose mother was Ozeca, Titu Atauchi, whose mother was Lari, Vari Titu, whose mother was Ana Huarque, Inquil Topa, whose mother was from Cañar, Huanca Auqui, whose mother was from Jauja, and Quizo Yupanqui, whose mother was the sister of Capac Apu Guaman Chaua. Huascar was selected by his father, the Sun, and sported all the royal insignia – *uma chuco anas pacra* (a dark blue helmet), the *mascapaycha* (the red fringe), the *champi* (a star-headed club), and the *uallcanca* (a halberd).<sup>50</sup>

Guaman Poma pays close attention to the appearance and clothing of the major players, as they were important indicators of character and status respectively. He claims that Huascar wore a light blue cloak and a blue tunic with a three-*tucapu* design in the middle. He had a long,

<sup>48</sup> Guaman Poma 2009, 7, 12, 55, 62, 66, and 88.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 87. Literally “traitors.”

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

dark face and Guaman Poma describes him as gangly, ugly, and malicious. Huascar's appearance is not simply reported as a matter of fact, but is also used as proof of his bad temper.<sup>51</sup>

Contrasting with the *Sapa Inca* were the women in his life. Rahua Ocllo, the eleventh *Coya*, was beautiful and had abundant hair, which is linked to her wealth and the vast property she owned. She wore a blue and orange *lliclla* and a purple *acsu* with a red *chumpi*. She was very diligent and worked every day. She had two children – Topa Cusi Hualpa Huascar and Chuqui Llanto, his wife.<sup>52</sup> Chuqui Llanto was the twelfth *Coya* and she was beautiful and light complexioned without a blemish. She wore a light blue *lliclla* with a green middle and a green *acsu* with a *tocapu*.<sup>53</sup>

Together with the textual description, Guaman Poma provides a visual representation of Huascar, his mother, and wife. The twelfth *Sapa Inca* is shown in shackles with Chalcochima and Quizquiz either side of him (Figure 4.1). He is wearing a helmet, ear spools, the red fringe, and a tunic with three rows of *tocapucona*, but is barefoot. Inscriptions both on his tunic and under him indicate that he died in Andamarca, while the other inscriptions read “he began to rule and he died,” hinting at his short and uneventful reign.<sup>54</sup> Chalcochima is depicted wearing a military chequerboard tunic and blowing on a trumpet, which may be a nod to the final stand at Quipaypampa. Garcilaso writes that the name of the place was a corruption of “*quepaypa*,” meaning “from my trumpet,” as Atahualpa's forces sounded their trumpets there.<sup>55</sup> Despite being

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 89. “Comenzo a rreynar y murio.”

<sup>55</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 639.



# EL DOZEIMO INGA TOPACUCIGUAL<sup>PA</sup>

GVASCAR

INGA



quisquis ynga

an samarca murio

challcochimaynga

comenso areynary murio-

guascar

Figure 4.1. The Twelfth Inca, Topa Cuci Gualpa Guascar Inca (GKS 2232 Guamán Poma, Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno 1615: 115)



# LA OMI ZEIMACOIA

## RAUA OCELLO



Reyno quito cayanbi guancabitea canari chahapoya

raua

Figure 4.2. The Eleventh Coya, Raua Ocello (GKS 2232 Guamán Poma, Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno 1615: 140)



the prisoner in the scene, Huascar is still afforded the central position of power in the composition. However, the choice of scene and the inscriptions both suggest that his loss to Atahualpa in the Inca Civil War were the definitive events of his life, failing to accomplish anything of more substance.

Rahua Ocllo is also depicted in a tripartite composition with her kneeling in the center, flanked by two women grooming her very long hair indoors (Figure 4.2). The woman on the left is holding a fan made of feathers and is combing her hair, while the woman on the right is washing it with water. All three figures are wearing large belts with *tocapucona* of gradating complexity from the woman on the right to Rahua Ocllo. The inscription reads that the queen ruled over Quito, Cayanbi, Huanca Vilca, Cañari, and Chachapoyas.<sup>56</sup> The choice of places is surprising, since these were all northern frontier lands, while she and her son are often associated with the southern quarter of the empire. It is possible that these were the places her husband conquered and that she inherited upon his death.

Guaman Poma draws Chuqui Llanto inside, framed by a doorway, crying surrounded by parrots and a single servant woman with a feather fan on her right (Figure 4.3). She is sitting on a short stool over a rug, her hands clasped, her head bowed, with tears streaming down her eyes, possibly mourning the death of her husband. The inscription matches Huascar's exactly stating that she died immediately after she began ruling.<sup>57</sup> The choice of scene again suggests that her entire reign was spent in suffering during the civil war, while her husband's heavy loss was the main event that marked their time in power.

<sup>56</sup> Guaman Poma 2009, 107.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 110.

# A LA DOZE NI A COIA

*[Blacked-out text]*



comenso a curynar y murio

chuqui

Figure 4.3. The Twelfth Coya, Chuqui Llanto (GKS 2232 Guamán Poma, Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno 1615: 142)

Guaman Poma does not provide a history of the war itself, but rather just relays several anecdotes in passing. In one, Atahualpa sent costly presents to his brother, but Huascar replied by sending clothes and household items associated with women to humiliate him.<sup>58</sup> Without it being stated, it appears that Huascar's poor behavior and diplomatic skills, as exhibited by this scene, was the cause of the conflict. In another, the ruler is seen getting repaid for his bad treatment of Atahualpa when Chalcochima and Quizquiz fed him llama urine and dog and human feces.<sup>59</sup> These ritual punishments were followed by extermination of his entire lineage in Cuzco, including all of his wives, children, and pregnant women.<sup>60</sup>

Guaman Poma agrees with Betanzos, Murúa, and Cobo that Huascar was killed in Andamarca after a 25-year-long reign. However, this number is unreliable, since elsewhere the author claims that the Indigenous Andean people's life expectancy was 150-200 years, since they lived very healthy lives.<sup>61</sup> There is no evidence for such longevity in the Andes in the sixteenth century, but this exaggeration fits Guaman Poma's critique of the Spanish colonial government claiming people were much healthier under Inca rule.

To claim credibility, the author tells another unreliable anecdote in which upon hearing of the arrival of the Spaniards in Tumbes, Huascar sent out an emissary to greet them and offer peace. This was none other but his second in command, Capac Apu Martín de Ayala, or Guaman Poma's father.<sup>62</sup> Although it is unlikely that Huascar knew of Pizarro's landing before he lost the

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 90. Guaman Poma lists "women's clothing, *chamillcos*, pots, small gold jugs, *acsus*, *llicllas*, *uinchas*, *tupus*, *piñi*, *lirpos*, *ñacchas*, *chumpis*, and *ojotas*."

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>60</sup> Guaman Poma calls them "*auquiconas*" or traitors and "*ñuscacona*" or princesses.

<sup>61</sup> Guaman Poma 2009, 91.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 35.

civil war and there is even less evidence that Martín de Ayala was in any way associated with the *Sapa Inca*, this vignette suggests that even in the early seventeenth century, an association with Huascar was one that established credibility. Although Guaman Poma does not provide any information on the civil war itself, his treatment of the major actors sheds light on how they were seen by, at least some, Indigenous eyes. His focus on clothing, regalia, physical appearance, posture, and ritual help us see Huascar and his family in a new light. Yet, even those new markers still lead to the same conclusion that he was a poor leader who accomplished virtually nothing despite his strong claim.

### **3. Martín de Murúa (1616)**

Like most of the early modern writers, Murúa claims that Huascar was the legitimate ruler before the civil war broke out and he explains his paths to legitimacy in details. Initially, when leaving on his northern campaign, Huayna Capac left Huascar<sup>63</sup> in Cuzco to rule in his stead, but during his illness that killed him, he decided to switch to Ninan Cuyochi in Quito. After Ninan Cuyochi's untimely death from the same illness that befell his father, Huascar was once again in favor with the Inca nobility, as he was seen as the next most loved son left after Huayna Capac's death.<sup>64</sup> Here Murúa hints that the Inca did not use primogeniture succession, but instead all of the *Sapa Inca* sons had the chance to prove themselves worthy to be selected. This once again is in line with the idea that ruling is a distinctly masculine action, where all masculinity is performative. The best performing or the most beloved by the reigning ruler son was seen as the legitimate heir apparent, two paths that were often seen as intertwined.

<sup>63</sup> Murúa uses two names for the ruler - Tupacusi Hualpa and Huascar Ynga.

<sup>64</sup> Murúa 2001, 102.



Of course, performance of expected duties was not the only path to legitimacy and familial relations remained important, especially through the power of each son's mother. Huascar was the son of Rahua Ocllo, who became primary wife of Huayna Capac, after Cusirimay died and left no children.<sup>65</sup> Atahualpa's mother had also died earlier, so Huayna Capac took him to the northern campaign, but left Huascar, Paullo, Manco, and his other children who were not old enough to take up arms yet.<sup>66</sup> It is unclear whether here Murúa attempts to split the two brothers along the two possible paths to legitimacy – Huascar through his mother and Atahualpa through his performance on the battlefield – or whether he is simply reporting these events. Still, this corroborates the general impression from all narratives that Huascar had the bloodline on his side, while Atahualpa's victory was due to him controlling the semi-professionalized Inca army. However, it is also possible that Murúa failed to recognize the Inca model of kinship legitimized by appropriate masculine performance on the battlefield and simply conflated it with the early modern European model in which military victory led to succession without necessarily conferring legitimacy.

At this stage, however, Murúa still claims that there was no conflict, as after his father's death Huascar was crowned in Cuzco with Apu Chalco Yupanqui, a grandson of Viracocha Inca, presiding over the ceremonies.<sup>67</sup> He performed the traditional fast and all rituals associated with his ascendance and continued with making political appointments. He assigned his uncles, Tito Atauchi and Topa Atao, as his fellow governors<sup>68</sup> and Inca Roca, Mano, Vico Huaranca, and Tito

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 127. Rahua Ocllo was also called Pilco Huaco and also had two daughters – Mama Huarcaay and Chuqui Huipa, who became Huascar's primary wife.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>68</sup> "Compañeros de gobierno"

Conde Mayta as his advisors.<sup>69</sup> Continuing with his expected duties as the new *Sapa Inca*, Huascar commissioned the construction of his estate at the place of his birth near Lake Muina, while also seizing Amaru Cancha and Colcampata in Cuzco for his personal residence. Murúa does not comment on whose property they used to be, nor does he suggest that this was an outrageous act.

According to Murúa, Atahualpa remained neutral and accepting of Huascar's rule. There was another attempt at a coup in the capital where Chusqui Huaman started plotting to kill Huascar and Rahua Ocllo in order for Cusi Atauchi to be elevated as ruler.<sup>70</sup> It is unclear if the appropriation of property in Cuzco had anything to do with this plan, but it failed after Huascar learnt about it. Possibly paranoid after this episode, he tricked the captains bringing Huayna Capac's body into entering Cuzco where they were soon executed for not bringing Atahualpa as well.<sup>71</sup> This is when many people lost faith in Huascar and fled Cuzco at night joining Atahualpa in Quito and relaying the news that Huascar needed to be taken down.

Similar to Betanzos and Sarmiento, Murúa tells of Huascar falling out with the Inca nobility including with his own family. Once the festivities for the return of Huayna Capac to Cuzco were finished, Huascar decided to marry his sister Chuqui Huipa on the advice of Inca Roca. Their mother, Rahua Ocllo, unsure of Huascar's fitness to rule refused to give her away, which enraged Huascar who treated his mother with derision calling her very ugly words.<sup>72</sup> This appears to have been purely an act of civic duty on her part rather than a plot, as Huascar was her only son from whose reign she would have personally profited. To curb his mother's disagreement on his


<sup>69</sup> Murúa 2001, 132.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 133.





<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 142.

**Map 4.8.**  
**Chachapoyas**  
**Campaign**  
**(Murúa)**



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement

0 150 300 km



marriage to Chuqui Huipa, he went to Topa Inca's *malqui* and asked him for permission to marry her. The priests who spoke for Topa Inca, Atcayqui Atarimachi, Achache, and Manco accepted his gifts and granted him the permission. To appease his mother, Huascar showered Rahua Ocllo with gifts of gold, silver, cloth, and servants.<sup>73</sup> This episode reveals that Huascar while struggling for the support of his mother, found an ally in the *panaca* of Topa Inca who later sided with him in the war. Murúa complicates the idea that the civil war was a conflict between the Hanan and Hurin moieties, but instead claims that it was a product of the complex inter-*panaca* politics, which probably surrounded every succession.

Unaware of the rebellion that Atahualpa and his supporters were plotting, Huascar started thinking where to lead a military campaign, as was tradition, once the festivities surrounding his coronation and wedding were over. He decided to go to Chachapoyas and sent the traitors Chusqui Huaman and Tito Atauchi to lead the campaign (Map 4.8).<sup>74</sup> It appears that Huascar saw the traitors as capable soldiers from whose abilities he was trying to profit one last time before having to punish them for their indiscretion, although it is possible that the mission was so dangerous that it constituted punishment in its own right. The move towards Chachapoyas described by Murúa is consistent with Sarmiento and departs from the earlier ideas from Xerez, Zárate, and Cieza that the only path to expansion for Huascar was blocked by Atahualpa in Quito. Chusqui Huaman and Tito Atauchi laid siege on the *curaca* of Pumacocha, who eventually conceded. However, when he entered the fortress, Chusqui Huaman got ambushed and killed, prompting Tito Atauchi and Mayta Yupanqui, Huayna Capac's uncle, to arrive from Cuzco and finally conquer Pumacocha

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 143.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 146.

successfully.<sup>75</sup> This greatly saddened Huascar, who was unable to exact his own revenge, nor did he fulfill his mission in the Chachapoyas.<sup>76</sup>

Murúa's narrative suggests that Huascar did not take Chusqui Huaman's threat seriously enough, since the traitor continued to enjoy his military and social status, even if that got him eventually killed. Yet, when Atahualpa requested to be appointed governor of the northern provinces and sent gifts to Rahu Ocello and Chuqui Huipa, Huascar grew suspicious perhaps due to the military force his half-brother commanded. He threw the fine textiles into the fire exclaiming "What does my brother think of me? That we do not have anything here?"<sup>77</sup> Deeply saddened by Huascar's disrespect and bad behavior, Chuqui Huipa secretly sent the message to Atahualpa who decided to rebel against his brother's tyranny upon the advice of Ato and Ullco Colla, the Cañari *curaca*.<sup>78</sup> Although they advised Atahualpa to rebel, the Cañari sent messengers to Huascar in Cuzco to let him know that Atahualpa was dressing like a king and he used his father's litter. Hearing this, Huascar sent Atao who after a long journey arrived in Tomebamba, gathered an army of Cañari, led by Ullco Colla, and left for Quito to arrest Atahualpa (Map 4.9).<sup>79</sup>

Murúa's version of the war preamble is quite striking, as he does not oversimplify the causes of the war like all of his predecessors. He agrees with Betanzos and Sarmiento that Huascar's family, and particularly his female relatives, played a critical role, but he also includes

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 149.


<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 151.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 154.





<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 155.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 156.

# Map 4.9. Battle of Riobamba (Murúa)




## LEGEND

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement





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


# Map 4.10. Battle of Ambato (Murúa)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement



the Cañari deception which was hinted by Zárata and Cieza.<sup>80</sup> The inclusion of Chusqui Huaman's coup and the support Huascar received from Topa Inca's *panaca* further complicate the simple narrative that Huascar was universally hated and Atahualpa's rebellion provided them a way out of his tyranny. Clearly, the conflict was a result of complicated politics including a variety of actors within Inca nobility as well as the leaders of powerful provincial groups. It was perhaps Huascar's weakness as a leader that empowered these other figures to act, but the image presented by Murúa certainly complicates the unidimensional view we had from his predecessors.

As the war began, Atahualpa gathered the people of all groups around Quito including the *mitmacona*, resettled people from other regions, installed by Topa Inca and rallied them to his cause.<sup>81</sup> However, when he met Atao at Riobamba, he was sorely defeated and had to retreat to Quito.<sup>82</sup> Atahualpa encouraged this troops telling them that if they were to surrender much worse was waiting them in the hands of Huascar. According to Murúa, he led his army out of Quito and met with Atao at Ambato (Map 4.10).<sup>83</sup> The battle was fierce and lasted from the morning until nightfall. Many of the bravest soldiers died, but in the end Atao was defeated and captured with the rest of his army retreating to Tomebamba. Atahualpa returned to Quito and used this victory to rally his forces. He tortured Atao to tell him of what was happening in Cuzco and then killed him along with Ullco Colla, by stoning them to death with slings.<sup>84</sup> If Murúa is to be believed, the

<sup>80</sup> Cieza, 82 and Zárata, 60.

<sup>81</sup> Murúa 2001, 158.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.





<sup>83</sup> "Mullu Hampato"


<sup>84</sup> Murúa 2001, 161.



**Map 4.11.**  
**Proposed split of**  
**the Inca Empire**  
**between Huascar**  
**and Atahualpa**  
**(Murúa)**

**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa
-  Huascar
-  Movement





battles at Riobamba and Ambato that earlier seemed like the same conflict, were actually separate events, only no one before him reported all of them at the same time.

After the victory at Ambato, Atahualpa decided not to move against his brother, but stayed in Quito. He had Hualtopa, the Tomebamba *curaca*, send a message to Huascar about the death of Atao. Atahualpa decided that he wanted to divide the kingdom in two and rule over the northern half – from Yanamayo (two days from Cajamarca) to Pasto would be his, while from Yanamayo to Chile would remain Huascar's domain (Map 4.11).<sup>85</sup> Hearing of Atahualpa's division of the country, Huascar was saddened, but saw no option but to fight him, even though he controlled Huayna Capac's army of seasoned soldiers. Huascar appointed his brother Huanca Auqui, as well as Huapanti and Huamayta as his captains and they reached Tomebamba where they gathered more troops from the area.<sup>86</sup> At first Huanca Auqui tried to reason with Atahualpa, but he replied that Huascar was bloodthirsty seeing how he killed Conuno and other of his brothers, so the same was coming for both of them. Huanca Auqui was moved by these words and some say he was working secretly for Atahualpa throwing the following battle on purpose, which echoes Sarmiento.<sup>87</sup>

The two armies met at Tomebamba River at a bridge called Tomechaca (Map 4.12).<sup>88</sup> The battle raged all day with many falling and the night only giving them respite from killing each other. On the next day, they resumed the fighting at dawn with Huanca Auqui prevailing and Atahualpa retreating to a hill called Mullu Toyru (Map 4.13).<sup>89</sup> Huanca Auqui surrounded his

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 162.


<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 163.

<sup>87</sup> Murúa 2001, 164 and Sarmiento 1999, 174.


<sup>88</sup> "Tumichaca"

<sup>89</sup> Murúa 2001, 165. Mullu Tuyru is likely the hill called Turi in the south part of Cuenca.

**Map 4.12.**  
**Battles of Ambato**  
**and Tomebamba**  
**(Murúa)**







**Map 4.13. Three Battles of Tomebamba: Tomechaca, Mully Toyru, and Tomebamba (Murúa)**

forces on the hill and only took a small squadron to attack with and that is where they say he worked with Atahualpa, as his forces were poorly organized. The experienced warriors of Atahualpa managed to break through the siege and prevailed. Huanca Auqui's forces began to withdraw towards Tomebamba.<sup>90</sup> Not wanting to give him a chance to regroup, Atahualpa attacked Huanca Auqui at Tomebamba and easily defeated him. Huanca Auqui fled and reached the valley called Cusi Pampa where he spent three years.<sup>91</sup> Atahualpa entered Tomebamba and settled there. He punished the Cañari for assisting Huascar killing many, even opening pregnant women's bellies to kill their unborn children. Many Cañari fled to Cusi Pampa to join Huanca Auqui.<sup>92</sup>

At this point, the war took a pause, as Atahualpa did not want to fight with Huascar any more, but instead went on a conquest mission to Quijos and Umbos. At the same time, Huanca Auqui sent the news of his losses to Huascar who blamed him and sent him to conquer the Pacamoros. Huanca Auqui destroyed a few villages, but the neighboring Comarcas hit back and even followed him back to Cusi Pampa.<sup>93</sup> It is difficult to account for the temporality of the war and Murúa is the first writer to assign temporal depth by claiming there was a three-year gap between the first set of battles of Tomebamba and the one to follow. This certainly makes sense, since the entire war seems to have taken place over several years, while the Chasing and Final Phases appear to be relatively swift. The Ecuadorian Phase being indeed significantly longer in time would also explain why some of the shorter accounts only report that phase altogether.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 167. Cusi Pampa was the old name of the south Ecuadorian city of Loja.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 168.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 169.

According to Murúa, the next advances in the war were triggered by the same anecdote that Sarmiento reports – Huascar sent Huapanti and Huaca Mayta to Huanca Auqui with gifts of *llicllas* and *acsus*<sup>94</sup>, telling his forces that they should shave, as they acted like women in the war against Atahualpa, which inspired him to attack Tomebamba again.<sup>95</sup> After the long delay, Atahualpa’s forces were unprepared and were easily defeated. Atahualpa, surprised that Huanca Auqui would still fight for Huascar, appointed Quizquiz as his general, since he led Huayna Capac’s forces north, and Chalcochima as his lieutenant because he was very cunning and a genius of tricks.<sup>96</sup> As we know from earlier sources, these appointments initiated the Chasing Phase (Map 4.14), while they were also crucial for the outcome of the war.

The two armies had a great battle at Cusi Pampa. After innumerable losses on both sides, Quizquiz’s larger one was victorious making Huanca Auqui withdraw. At Cajamarca<sup>97</sup> he found 10,000 Chachapoyas warriors that Huascar had sent after he heard of the previous defeats.<sup>98</sup> The new army of Chachapoyas went to meet Quizquiz and fought him at Concha Huayla<sup>99</sup> but were crushed with only 3,000 of them surviving, most of them injured. They retreated back to

<sup>94</sup> Women’s clothing articles.

<sup>95</sup> Murúa 2001, 170. This vignette appears to be a bit of editorializing by Murúa, as there is no evidence that the Andeas grew beards, nor that they shaved, as no Indigenous razors seem to have been recovered archaeologically nor ethnologically. In fact, the Europeans were often distinguished by their facial hair. It is possible that Murúa here simply used an expression that was meaningful to his Spanish audience, but he may have hinted that masculinity that is a prerequisite for Inca power was indicated by the ability to wear a beard, which pointed to the legitimacy of Spanish rule as well.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 171. His other captains were Rumi Ñauí (Ruminauí) from Corca three leagues from Cuzco, Tomay Rima (Tumairima), and Ucumari (Vcumari).

<sup>97</sup> “Caxa Marca”





<sup>98</sup> Murúa 2001, 172.



<sup>99</sup> The exact locations of Concha Huayla is unknown, but Murúa claims this it is between Huancabamba and Cajamarca. While there is neither a lake named Huayla (nor anything similar), nor any other place named Huaylacocha or its derivatives in the specified area, there is a small village called La Huaylla that fits the geographic location.



**Map 4.14. Battles of Cusibamba and Concha Huaylla of the Ecuadorian Phase and Battles of Pumpu and Yanamarca of the Chasing Phase (Murúa)**

**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement





Cajamarca, but then most of them secretly fled to their homelands.<sup>100</sup> Tired of all his defeats Huanca Auqui wanted to return to Cuzco, but when he reached Pumpu,<sup>101</sup> he found an army of Colla sent there by Huascar, which invigorated him. When Quizquiz reached Pumpu, they fought for three days. Huanca Auqui was initially encouraged that they were able to hold off Atahualpa's army, but it had now doubled in number from what Quizquiz brought from Tomebamba, as they were recruiting along the way.<sup>102</sup> Again, they prevailed and chased Huanca Auqui to Jauja.

At Jauja, he once again received sizeable reinforcements of Soras, Chancas, Lucanas, Aymaras, Quechuas, Huancas, and Yauyos were waiting for him.<sup>103</sup> The two armies met again at Yanamarca where at the beginning Huanca Auqui looked to take the lead, but was eventually again defeated by Quizquiz and Chalcochima, retreating to Paucaray, where he rested for a few days (Map 4.15).<sup>104</sup> His enemies did not follow him immediately, as they, too, were tired of the constant fighting. While in Paucaray, another captain named Mayta Yupanqui arrived from Cuzco blaming Huanca Auqui for all the defeats and claiming that he worked secretly with Quizquiz and Atahualpa, since no other explanation was possible for all his misfortunes in battle. This accusation came at a very bad time for Huanca Auqui who had planned to seek an audience with Quizquiz to

<sup>100</sup> Murúa 2001, 173.


<sup>101</sup> "Bonbon"

<sup>102</sup> Murúa 2001, 174.





<sup>103</sup> Lucanas were the principal group from Vilcashuaman, while the Aymara and Quechua people have an unclear ethnic origin. Aymara is a language group that was shared by many, while Quechua refers to a geographic region between the elevations of approximately 2000 to 3500 masl and all groups living in the area could be referred to as Quechua.


<sup>104</sup> Murúa 2001, 175.

Map 4.15.  
Battle of  
Ancoyaco (Murúa)



**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement



seek diplomatic solutions, but feared that such meeting might be seen as the two generals colluding.<sup>105</sup>

Murúa relates that they clashed again at Ancoyacu bridge, where Huanca Auqui held Atahualpa's forces for a month on the other side of the river. One day Quizquiz charged with great boldness and disarmed Huanca Auqui's troops, crossing the bridge. Huanca Auqui retreated to Vilcas, awaiting new orders from Huascar ending the Chasing Phase of the war.<sup>106</sup> The news of the disastrous defeats of his armies deeply disturbed Huascar, who went to Huanacauri to ask the oracle for answers. Even after sacrificing thousands of different animals, he still received unfavorable answer.<sup>107</sup> The Chasing Phase in Murúa follows almost identically that of Sarmiento, but again adds a temporal consideration claiming the siege at Ancoyacu lasted a whole month.

Preparing for the Final Phase of the war (Map 4.16), Huascar gathered, armed, and clothed the most powerful army of all the land at Sacsayhuaman before leaving for Cotabamba. The forces consisting of Collas, Charcas, Chiles, and Cuntisuyu people were placed above Cotabamba towards Omasuyu in an attempt to drive the enemy towards Cotabamba river. Huanca Auqui, Huapanti, and Pacamayta remained low towards the Apurimac bridge trying to climb the Cotabamba hill and encircle the enemy. The Chumbivilcas<sup>108</sup>, Chuys, and Chile people met with

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 176.


<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 177.

<sup>108</sup> The Chumbivilcas were a group from Santo Tomas, south of Cuzco, neighboring the Canchis and the Cañas.



**Map 4.16. Final Phase (Murúa)**



Quizquiz and Chalcochima at Tahuaray.<sup>109</sup> Their captain, Arampa Yupanqui defeated the forces led by Tomay Rima with Huascar's army recording very few losses.<sup>110</sup>

Murúa states that when Huascar heard of the news of Arampa Yupanqui's victory, he was very pleased and proclaimed that this victory of the Collas, Chuys, and Charcas presents an obligation for him to excel like his ancestors. This inspired his brothers Tito Atauchi and Topa Atao, as well as Mano Yuro Huaranca, who divided the troops in three and assumed their positions waiting for Quizquiz and Chalcochima. Huascar got out of his litter and once the soldiers saw him, they played a myriad of war instruments – horns, flutes, snail trumpets, and bones – cheering up preparing for battle.<sup>111</sup> Here, Murúa expands on Sarmiento's vignette after this rare victory for Huascar. He confirms that the Collasuyu forces played an important role, as well as that this fit within his narrative of his return to ancestral glory of the past. Adding to Sarmiento who framed this proclamation as a part of Huascar's switch from Hanan to Hurin, Murúa expands the geographic origin of his supporters to include various parts of Collasuyu and Cuntisuyu, both of which were in the Hurin part of the empire. At the same time, this plan in Murúa's account appears to be a result at least partially of necessity and desperation. Having lost many decisive battles in the north, these were the only domains left from which he could mobilize new troops.

Murúa's treatment of the next and final battle of the Inca Civil War is the most detailed account of any single clash of the two armies in all of the sources. Where Sarmiento simply reports that Quizquiz and Chalcochima ambushed Huascar's forces at dawn when they were unprepared, Murúa goes into great detail. In fact, he claims that Huascar's forces attacked and slowly pushed

<sup>109</sup> The only Tahuaray in Peru is located within the town of Chuquibambilla, which is very close to Huanacopampa in the Cotabambas region where Sarmiento (1999:177) also claims this battle took place.

<sup>110</sup> Murúa 2001, 178.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 179.

Atahualpa's army to a hill. They set fire to the brush and much of the hill burnt including many warriors with those escaping quickly getting slaughtered. Dismantled, Quizquiz and Chalcochima's forces withdrew to the other part of Cotabamba river.<sup>112</sup> Seeing that they were not followed, Chalcochima and Quizquiz decided to return and fight Huascar while he was too content with his recent victory. They caught his army by surprise, crossing the river and descending on a slope called Chinta Capa.<sup>113</sup> Huascar was especially visible in the battle, fighting with his gold and silver weapons from his litter.<sup>114</sup> Chalcochima threw bolas at the soldiers carrying Huascar's litter and thus captured him once he fell off. Huascar's imprisonment made his entire army scatter and retreat the Cuzco bringing the news to Rahua Ocllo and Chuqui Huipa.<sup>115</sup>

After their victory, Atahualpa's generals took upon their campaign to subjugate Huascar's supporters, while annihilating his family. Huanca Auqui and the other Inca nobles gathered to discuss whether to obey Quizquiz and Chalcochima or to gather their forces and fight him. They decided to lay their arms and met them at their camp at Quihuipay where they sat down to show reverence, getting surrounded by the Quizquiz and Chalcochima forces. Huanca Auqui, Huapanti, and Paucar Ushno were arrested for their crimes at Tomebamba, along with Apu Chalco, Yupanqui, and Yarupac, the main priests of the sun, for crowning Huascar with the *mascaypacha*.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 180.

<sup>113</sup> There is no peak in Peru called Chinta or Chinta Capa, but the Chinkana volcano is right next to Chuquibambilla, so it makes sense that this is the hill which Murúa claims Quizquiz and Chalcochima descended to ambush Huascar.

<sup>114</sup> Murúa 2001, 181.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 183.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 185.



They then brought Rahua Ocllo and Chuqui Huipa, abusing them for their involvement with Huascar.<sup>117</sup> When Huascar arrived, Rahua Ocllo turned against him and told him that he deserved all that was coming to him to which Huascar replied that she should leave these matters to men.<sup>118</sup> Quizquiz, Chalcochima, and Rahua Ocllo were discussing the legitimacy of Huascar, when he cried tears of blood and cried out that the civil war was not between Hanan Cuzco and Hunan Cuzco but a personal matter, since he was legitimately appointed by his father.<sup>119</sup> It is unclear why the question of Hanan versus Hurin would have been discussed at this point, but Murúa makes a point to show that Huascar himself believed that the war was a matter between himself and Atahualpa. This does not discredit the larger political context of the war, but instead suggests that Murúa's informants saw Huascar as a poor leader who failed to keep up with the political games in his court.

Chalcochima pardoned all the noblemen and directed them to return to Cuzco. The next morning, Atahualpa's forces killed all the Chachapoyas and Cañari war prisoners in order to repay Ullco Colla's treachery, which pitted the two brothers against each other in the first place.<sup>120</sup> Quizquiz got Chalcochima to round up all of Huascar's women and children, as well as his servants and bring them to Quihuipay. Then they brought out Huascar and slaughtered all of them with him watching. They killed some 80 sons, as well as Huascar's sister Coya Miro, who had two small children, and another sister called Chimpo Sisa. A few of the women escaped the slaughter by virtue of not having borne children of Huascar and being beautiful, so they could be delivered to

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 186.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 188.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 189.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 190. Some were stoned, others were impaled, and yet others were beaten to death.

Atahualpa.<sup>121</sup> His other wives were killed at Chuqui Pampa so that his lineage was completely annihilated. After this, Quizquiz and Chalcochima turned to Topa Inca whose *malqui* was brought out to Rooromoca<sup>122</sup> in the Santo Domingo district, where they burnt it. Then they rounded all the descendants and servants of Topa Inca and also sent them Chuqui Pampa to be slaughtered, but many of the almost 1,000 escaped.<sup>123</sup> Murúa claims that Topa Inca's *malqui* was burned because he was Rahua Ocllo's father and not because his *panaca* sided with Huascar.<sup>124</sup> However, it might be hard to separate those two reasons, as they both point to Topa Inca's family supporting or providing legitimacy for Huascar's claim. Finally, Atahualpa's generals set up a court where they judged all the people who aided Huascar, sentencing some to death and releasing others. This suggests that Quizquiz and Chalcochima conducted a somewhat just court instead of simply brutally eliminating everyone related to Huascar. However, the only people who seem to have survived were not related to the *Sapa Inca*, while his entire lineage was completely destroyed.

Now in Cajamarca, Atahualpa ordered Chalcochima to bring Huascar to him. Francisco Pizarro beat them to Cajamarca, though, triggering a new course of events.<sup>125</sup> Hernando de Soto and Pedro del Barco ran into Huascar, Rahua Ocllo, Chuqui Huipa, Huanca Auqui, Topa Atao, and the other imprisoned brothers of Huascar on their way to Pachacamac in Taparaco. Huascar recognized that they were the strange foreigners people talked about and cried out explaining his situation, pleading to rescue him. Soto and del Barco preferred to rush to Pachacamac, as Pizarro

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 191. These included Elvira Chuna (daughter of Canac Capac), Beatriz Carhuamay Huay (daughter of the Chinchu Cocha curaca), Juana Tocto, and Catalina Usica (mother of Carlos Inca).

<sup>122</sup> Then called Chacara.

<sup>123</sup> Murúa 2001, 192.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 193.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 196.

had sent them there rather than to look for Huascar, although Murúa comments their greed expecting great riches was a more likely reason for not helping Huascar.<sup>126</sup> Afraid that Pizarro might prefer to deal with Huascar, Atahualpa gave a secret order to Chalcochima to murder him and the rest of this party. They were all killed by drowning at Andamarca.<sup>127</sup> Murúa comments that their death represented the end of the original lineage of Manco Capac, hinting at Huascar's narrative that his rule represented a return to the glorious origins of the empire.<sup>128</sup>

Martín de Murúa's narrative is often celebrated for its visual component and for his collaboration with Guaman Poma, but has not been given enough credit for his contributions to Inca history. The most cited early historians are Cieza, Betanzos, and Sarmiento, but *Historia General del Peru* not only covers the same ground as the narratives of the big three, but further adds details in all phases of the Inca Civil War. From the very beginning Murúa presents the most complicated, and likely the most realistic, context in which the conflict between Huascar and Atahualpa arose. He acknowledges Huascar's apparent legitimacy, but also agrees with Betanzos and Sarmiento that his behavior alienated important factions of Inca nobility. Instead of simply deriding the *Sapa Inca* for his diplomatic mishaps, Murúa offers insight into the behind-the-scenes plots including Chusqui Huaman's failed coup as well as Chuqui Huipa's secret messages to Atahualpa. *Historia General* also engages with the possible feud between the Hanan and Hurin moieties concluding that the war was not fought between these two factions but instead its major players used such divisions for their gain. Namely, Huascar attempted to portray himself as the direct descendant of Manco Capac using his Lake Titicaca allies to suggest his rule was based on

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 202.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 203.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 204.

a long-term tradition. Thus, Murúa shows that there was no single cause of the war, but it was rather a product of the pressures of Huayna Capac's untimely death, Huascar's poor leadership, the empire closing in on the limit of its expansion, and the internal politics of Inca nobility.

Building on the earlier writers, Murúa adds further details to the Ecuadorian Phase of the war, granting great responsibility to the Cañari and their leader Ullco Colla.<sup>129</sup> He further distinguishes clearly between the battles of Riobamba and Ambato, which earlier appeared to be the same conflict. The double battle at Tomebamba is again further detailed in the *Historia General*, now as two separate conflicts, one of which was fought over a number of days at three different locales in the Tomebamba area.

The temporal gap of three years that Murúa introduces after the Ecuadorian Phase of the war might explain why other writers only focused on that stage. It is possible that the Chasing and Final Phases of the war took place relatively fast and relatively late in Huascar's reign, while the Ecuadorian Phase was longer in time and thus was more memorable for the informants of other writers. In this scenario, it is also possible that the Chasing and Final Phases might be seen as a part of the Spanish invasion, which would have been closer in time than the Ecuadorian Phase, which many might have thought was the conflict between Atahualpa and Huascar that the Spanish authors were inquiring about.

The Chasing and Final Phases in Murúa's writing follow closely those of Sarmiento's. They are the only two to detail Huascar's victory with Colla forces in the Cotabambas region, as well as his proclamation that this must inspire him to emulate his ancestors. It is possible that Murúa used Sarmiento as a major source, although he does not indicate that explicitly. Yet, his version includes of the Final Phase happens in the same region, but at Tahuaray and not in nearby

<sup>129</sup> Cieza, 82, Murúa 2001, 158, and Zárate, 60.

Huanacopampa, so it is also possible that he recorded a similar story from the same or other informants as Sarmiento.

After again following Sarmiento in reporting the punishment Quizquiz and Chalcochima exerted on Huascar's supporters, Murúa is the only author to spend significant amount of time on the captured ruler's journey to Cajamarca. The meeting with Soto and Barco at Taparaco, Huascar's murder at Andamarca, as well as the subsequent movement of Chalcochima attempting to rally an army for Atahualpa in the Jauja region all present new and valuable information about Huascar's final days.<sup>130</sup> Considering the various contributions detailed here, Murúa's *Historia General* is perhaps the most valuable source for the Inca Civil War and it deserves greater interest and use.

#### **4. Garcilaso de la Vega (1617)**

Although Garcilaso did not show great interest in the Inca Civil War, he spent significant time on Huascar, as he considered him a legitimate *Sapa Inca*.<sup>131</sup> He writes of Huascar's birth which made Huayna Capac so happy that he returned immediately to Cuzco from his military campaign.<sup>132</sup> Garcilaso also comments on the ruler's name, claiming that it was indeed derived from the word for rope, *huasca*, since Huascar's father had commissioned a huge gold chain to be made for his birthday party that lasted some twenty days.<sup>133</sup> The idea for the chain came from a special dance that only Inca men performed by facing each other and holding hands with every

<sup>130</sup> Murúa 2001, 202-208.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 105, 300, and 611.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 561.

<sup>133</sup> Garcilaso also details that Huascar's full name was Inti Cusi Hualpa and that he was Rahua Ocllo and Huayna Capac's only son.

other man creating a chain. Some 300 men danced like that on Huascar's birthday, which inspired Huayna Capac.<sup>134</sup>

Although Garcilaso suggests that Huascar seems to have been groomed to succeed his father, after conquering Quito, Huayna Capac gathered all of his sons there, calling on Huascar to give the Quito region to Atahualpa, since it belonged to his maternal family and since Huayna Capac loved him very much and did not want to see him poor.<sup>135</sup> This further undermines Atahualpa's legitimacy, as he is seen by Garcilaso as someone elevated by his father's love and closeness rather than his own merit and ability. At this point, Huascar agreed and returned to Cuzco, after which Garcilaso claims the two brothers ruled in peace for some four or five years.<sup>136</sup> Atahualpa, however, is not afforded the same biographical treatment here, as Garcilaso did not see him as a true *Sapa Inca*, but perhaps simply a governor of Quito.

According to Garcilaso, it was only after Huascar realized that he was blocked by Atahualpa and unable to make any new annexations, which were required of him as a ruler, that he started plotting to seize the entire Tahuantinsuyu for himself.<sup>137</sup> He sent messengers to Quito asking Atahualpa to confirm as his vassal and to come to Cuzco along with Huayna Capac's *malqui*. Instead, his half-brother appointed Chalcochima and Quizquiz as his generals and gathered an army of 30,000 mostly veteran warriors.<sup>138</sup> Blind to his brother's plans, Huascar only found out of the threat once Atahualpa was some 100 leagues from Cuzco, having marched for over 400

<sup>134</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 562.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 586.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 587.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 629.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 630-631.



leagues. The people of the provinces which Atahualpa's army passed became suspicious, since they were 30,000 strong but no more than 10,000 were expected. They warned Huascar, who sent messages to Collasuyu, Antisuyu, and Contisuyu to gather troops. Atahualpa's people hastened and walked another 40 leagues, so now 20,000 soldiers were at the Apurimac river (Map 4.17).<sup>139</sup>

Without facing any opposition, Atahualpa's army crossed the Apurimac and reached a hill named Huila Kunka six leagues from Cuzco. Huascar's army was growing slowly, as Collasuyu was more than 200 leagues long, Antisuyu was poorly populated, and Contisuyu was the most secluded, but all their *curacas* came with some 30,000 warriors, who were poorly trained since they had not fought in a while. Huascar gathered another 10,000 Inca soldiers<sup>140</sup> and went out west to meet Atahualpa's army. Seeing that delaying will risk their victory, Atahualpa's men hurried and met Huascar at Quipaypan 2-3 leagues west of Cuzco.<sup>141</sup> The battle lasted all day, but lacking the Collas and being inexperienced Huascar's men were defeated by Atahualpa's veteran forces. Huascar attempted to escape with 1,000 men, but was captured and all of his guard killed.<sup>142</sup>

Although Garcilaso only writes of the Final Phase of the war, two important details emerge from his version of the events. First, he attributes Atahualpa's victory to a combination of the experience of Atahualpa's troops and the treachery of their generals. While this is mostly consistent with other writers, Garcilaso's omission of the Ecuadorian and Chasing Phases strengthens the feeling that the Quiteños were unjustified rebels who simply won a single decisive


<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 632.

<sup>140</sup> Here Garcilaso uses the phrase "10,000 of his relatives," which likely refers to the noble status of these troops and their origin in the city of Cuzco or at least in the imperial heartland.

<sup>141</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 633.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 634. Some of Huascar's men were killed by their enemies, while others committed suicide once Huascar was captured.

**Map 4.17. Battle of Quipaypan (Garcilaso)**



battle at Quipaypan to win the war. This both downplays the devastation and the duration of the war and places the blame firmly on Atahualpa, which is consistent with Murúa who was writing his account at the same time. Second, Garcilaso specifically names the Colla as the allies that could have saved Huascar. Although, he could mobilize armies from all corners of Tahuantinsuyu as the legitimate ruler, it seems that only the Colla mattered for his cause. Although the Lake Titicaca people are often lauded for their military prowess, this seems to be a hint towards Huascar's idea that he was a direct descendant from Manco Capac and that he was the representative of the long-term legitimacy that with the association with the Lake Titicaca region.

After Huascar was captured, Garcilaso writes that Atahualpa had 200 of his brothers, uncles, and relatives killed to the fourth degree of relation in order to leave him as the only legitimate successor of the blood line. Before this was done, he did not dare pass Jauja,<sup>143</sup> 90 leagues from Cuzco, remaining behind in Cajamarca.<sup>144</sup> He kept Huascar alive fearing that if he murdered him the other *curacas* would rebel against him. He had his half-brother brought to Sacsayhuaman with a rope around his neck passing through a street lined with his supporters. Those who tried to help him were killed. In front of Huascar, they killed almost all of his captains, *curacas*, and other noblemen who supported him. All the women and children of royal blood were also gathered, while the *acllacona*<sup>145</sup> were taken outside the city and killed slowly by torture.<sup>146</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Garcilaso uses Sausa and Xauxa for Jauja interchangeably.

<sup>144</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 636.

<sup>145</sup> The *acllacona* are usually referred to as “chosen women,” who lived sequestered and worked exclusively for the state producing textiles and *aqha*, maize beer, for the state-sponsored celebrations throughout the empire. They were a major part of Inca colonization of the Andes.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 637.

Garcilaso describes the torture in great detail. The children and women were brought to Yahuarpampa,<sup>147</sup> surrounded by three walls of guards. They were given only raw corn and raw herbs in small quantities and were hung from the trees, some by their hair, some by one or both arms, some by the waist, and some under the arms. Some were given to hold their children until they dropped them to their death. Many of the children died of starvation.<sup>148</sup> It took Atahualpa and his men two and a half years to kill all the royal women and children.<sup>149</sup> Only a few under the age of eleven escaped, among them Garcilaso's mother and his uncle Francisco Topa Inca Yupanqui, as well as two of Huayna Capac's sons – Paullo and Tito.<sup>150</sup> Finally, Atahualpa also punished the royal servants from the towns up to seven leagues from Cuzco who carried the Inca name by privilege given by Manco Capac. Many people were killed, towns burnt, and royal buildings destroyed.<sup>151</sup> Here, Garcilaso appears to hyperbolize the devastation of the war, as he conflates the massacre of Huascar's faction with the wiping out of the entire Inca and Inca-by-privilege population of the heartland. While historical and archaeological data confirm that this was not the case, it is critical here to note that Huascar's support came from across the Inca heartland and, perhaps, particularly from its southern edge, which prompted Garcilaso to directly name the distance of seven leagues.

The image Garcilaso paints of the destruction of Huascar's lineage and the great punishments that especially Inca women and children endured is mostly consistent with earlier

<sup>147</sup> Meaning "field of blood" in Quechua, since this was the place where Pachacuti won the decisive battle against the Chanca that elevated him to the throne.

<sup>148</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 638.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 639.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 640.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 643.

writers. However, unlike his predecessors he has a self-promoting motive, claiming that his relatives were almost the only survivors of Atahualpa's massacre. This automatically elevates his position in the new colonial Spanish regime where those who could prove Inca blood received preferential treatment and could retain their family's property. Going through great lengths to show that almost no such people of royal Inca blood remained puts Garcilaso in a special position. Of course, this does not represent a legal argument since this account was written decades after he had probably already made such a claim. What is unique to the *Comentarios Reales*, however, is the claim that all Inca of privilege groups were severely punished, crucially including the destruction of Inca architecture. One should expect that the affected structures were those built by or owned by Huascar, namely his estates in Calca and Kañaraqay, as well as the palaces in Cuzco called Colcampata and Amaru Cancha.<sup>152</sup> Since we know that many of those survived, including Amaru Cancha and much of Kañaraqay, it appears that this violence towards Huascar's buildings was symbolic and ritualistic, rather than a complete demolition. Even today, some of the buildings at Kañaraqay have extant walls of great height up to over 3m, but a number of singular large blocks that appear to have been toppled from the walls of important structures litter the site, indicating that Atahualpa's faction opted for abandonment and partial ceremonial destruction rather than the annihilation that Garcilaso speaks of. Garcilaso's short account of the Inca Civil War offers little new information on the military movements, but his interest in the aftermath and the annihilation of Huascar's lineage present important questions about the fate of the various complexes associated with the final *Sapa Inca*.

<sup>152</sup> Murúa 2001, 132.

## 5. Bernabé Cobo (1653)

On the question of the major war causes and the legitimacy of Huayna Capac's successor, Cobo makes several somewhat competing claims. He suggests that Ninan Cuyochi's unnamed mother was Huayna Capac's primary wife and not Rahua Ocllo, nor Atahualpa's mother Tocto Ocllo.<sup>153</sup> When Ninan Cuyochi passed away before his father there was no heir apparent. However, then Cobo dedicates the following section to Huascar, who was the eldest son of Huayna Capac and by presumption the heir to the empire. This contradicts most earlier authors who claim that Atahualpa, and perhaps a number of others, was older than Huascar. Amidst this uncertainty, Huascar received the *mascaypacha* in Cuzco and changed his name from Topa Cusi Hualpa in honor of the great golden chain that his father commissioned on the occasion of his birth.<sup>154</sup>

Although Cobo leads his readers to believe that Huascar succeeded Huayna Capac peacefully and by right of his status as the eldest surviving son, he quickly then offers two contrasting stories that he heard. Some of his informants told him that Huayna Capac divided the country between the two brothers, but others claimed it was Quizquiz, Chalcochima, Inca Hualpa, Rumi Ñahui, and the other generals decided to rebel to serve their own interests.<sup>155</sup> Here Cobo hints at the idea that imperial succession was not a matter of primogeniture alone, but rather a complex system in which the Inca nobility selected, if not formally elected, the new *Sapa Inca* upon the suggestion of the old ruler. Since Huayna Capac's old generals knew Atahualpa and

<sup>153</sup> Cobo 1979, 161.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 163.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.



trusted him, they thought that he would serve their interests better, while they could lose their political status under Huascar.<sup>156</sup>

Upon their advice, Atahualpa declared Quito “New Cuzco,” which triggered the civil war. Atahualpa unsuccessfully asked to be appointed by Huascar a lord of Quito, while Huascar unsuccessfully summoned him to Cuzco on three occasions. In the end, Atahualpa proclaimed himself king of Quito and Tomebamba and also received the *mascaypacha*.<sup>157</sup> Cobo quickly abandons the version in which the empire was split amicably by Huayna Capac, suggesting that those who understood Inca politics better would be interested in the generals’ involvement.

Cobo follows Zárata and Pizarro, claiming Huascar was the first to take up arms and his forces defeated Atahualpa at Tomebamba, taking him prisoner (Map 4.18). Atahualpa managed to escape by breaking the wall with a silver bar that was given to him by an important lady that was allowed to visit him.<sup>158</sup> After returning to Quito and gathering his forces, Atahualpa defeated Atoco at Ambato in a fierce battle in which many men, including Atoco, died (Map 4.19). Cobo comments that all provinces except for Quito sided with Huascar, but Atahualpa had a large and experienced army, first settling in Tomebamba and later in Cajamarca.<sup>159</sup>

The Ecuadorian Phase here lacks some of the detail we encounter in Murúa, but it hints at the temporal length of that first part of the war. Before things speed up in the Chasing Phase, Cobo presents a story in which Atahualpa moved slowly through the landscape, perhaps with his whole court and not simply with his army, and settled at a number of locations for what seems significant


<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 164.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.





<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 165.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

**Map 4.18. Battle of Tomebamba (Cobo)**




**LEGEND**

-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement





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


**Map 4.19. Battle of Ambato (Cobo)**




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


-  Battle
-  Atahualpa and his forces
-  Huascar and his forces
-  Movement





**Map 4.20. Battles of Pumpu, Jauja, and Vilcashuaman (Cobo)**



LEGEND	
	Battle
	Atahualpa and his forces
	Huascar and his forces
	Movement

0 150 300 km

spells of time. It is unclear how much time he spent at Ambato and Tomebamba, but there is a palpable sense of a gap between the battle at Amabato and the time Chalcochima and Quizquiz clashed with Huanca Auqui. Cobo repeatedly speaks of Huascar's forces consisting of poorly trained conscripts, whose mobilization might have taken some time, while Atahualpa was likely weighing his options given that he lacked the support of the Inca nobility and most of the local leaders.<sup>160</sup>

Perhaps this time in waiting worked perfectly for Atahualpa, as Cobo reports that Huascar gradually lost the respect of the Inca noblemen. He refused to eat at the main plaza in Cuzco and was rarely seen in public.<sup>161</sup> Considering Cobo's interest in ritual, this sounds like a serious indictment of the *Sapa Inca's* leadership that alienated his supporters over time and presented Atahualpa with the opportunity to strike. When he eventually sent out Quizquiz and Chalcochima, who won every major battle, while the newly appointed Huanca Auqui had to retreat from stronghold to stronghold where he waited for reinforcements (Map 4.20). Along the way, they fought at Pumpu, Jauja, Vilcashuaman, Pincos, Andahuaylas with Atahualpa's generals emerging victorious every single time.<sup>162</sup> This path closely follows the well established Chasing Phase from most other authors.

The Chasing and Final Phases of the war are merged in Cobo's *Historia del Nuevo Mundo*, as its version has Huascar waiting in Cuzco until the very end. Although these last few battles seem to have been much more even perhaps as Atahualpa's forces were getting tired or slowly decreased in numbers, but they still won every single encounter. Quizquiz and Chalcochima next

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 163 and 166.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 166.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

clashed with Huanca Auqui in a field between Curahuasi and Abancay,<sup>163</sup> before another battle at Vilcaconga near Limatambo (Map 4.21).<sup>164</sup> The battle lasted a long time with Huascar's army slowly retreating to Ichubamba, where they finally disbanded and fled back to Cuzco.<sup>165</sup>

Huascar only left Cuzco to meet Atahualpa's army in the field at Quipaypampa about a league from Cuzco (Map 4.22). His forces consisted of warriors from Collao, Contisuyu, Antisuyu, Chunchu, and Mojo<sup>166</sup> and were led by Huanca Auqui with Pasco Inca and Hualpa Roca being "field marshal and sergeant major" respectively.<sup>167</sup> Quizquiz led Atahualpa's forces and Chalcochima and Rumi Ñahui were "field marshal and sergeant major" respectively. Again, we see Huascar relying primarily on troops from Collasuyu, which could be explained with the geopolitical situation, namely that all possible sources of soldiers north of Cuzco were already used up, or with the idea that the *Sapa Inca* aligned himself with the southern quarter in an attempt to portray his reign as return to the mythical origins of the Inca Empire.

Huascar delivered a passionate speech before the battle, but according to Cobo, it failed to inspire his troops in this last stand.<sup>168</sup> It is unclear if this is the same speech that Sarmiento and Murúa report, where the leader sought to draw inspiration from his and his army's association with Manco Capac's origins. If so, unlike Murúa's vivid account of the huge response from the soldiers

<sup>163</sup> "Curaguaci" and "Auancay." Cobo does not provide any further detail and the actual location of the battle in the stretch of 70km between Curahuasi and Abancay is unknown.

<sup>164</sup> "Vilcacunca." Cobo claims Vilcaconga was near Limatambo some 7 leagues from Cuzco, but the location remains unknown.

<sup>165</sup> Cobo claims that Ichubamba was 2 leagues from the starting location of the battle, which is consistent with the location near Limatambo, but Vilcaconga remains unclear.


<sup>166</sup> Chunchu was a derogatory term in Quechua for various groups of the Amazon Basin. The Mojos were a group from Bolivia who lived on both banks of the Mamore River.

<sup>167</sup> Cobo 1979, 167. "Pascae Inca," "Gualpa Roca," "maese de campo y sargento mayor."


<sup>168</sup> Cobo 1979, 168.



# Map 4.21. Chasing and Final Phases (Cobo)



# Map 4.22. Battle of Quipaypampa (Cobo)



the rang around the valley, Cobo reports that the rallying cry was a failure. Instead, he claims that Quizquiz also gave a speech, a shorter and much more inspirational one, after which he led his army to victory.<sup>169</sup> It is unclear whether it was Huascar's failure to inspire his army or Quizquiz's military prowess that won the victory, but the two seem intertwined here.

Once in Cuzco, Quizquiz pillaged the town showing no mercy, sparing only the *acllacona* in the Temple of the Sun. All of Huascar's brothers, sisters, children, kinsmen, along with his servants were put to death, while Tito Atauchi and Topa Atau were taken prisoners.<sup>170</sup> Only a few people managed to escape – brothers who wore plebeian clothing and some daughters of important lords.<sup>171</sup> After Atahualpa extinguished the royal lineage only four women and seven noble Inca men remained.<sup>172</sup> Cobo provides the most concrete account of Huascar's death, as he was killed upon orders from Atahualpa, during his transportation towards Cajamarca just leaving the tambo of Andamarca, 30 leagues from Cajamarca and 3 leagues past a lake called Cocha Conchuco.<sup>173</sup> Betanzos and Murúa also report that the *Sapa Inca* was murdered in Andamarca, while Sarmiento claims his body was thrown in another river, Yanamayu, a little further south on the same road.<sup>174</sup> Similar to Sarmiento, who claims Huascar's body was chopped to pieces, Cobo reports that he was burned, but some people gathered the ashes and venerated them in the same way they did with the

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 169.

<sup>171</sup> These were Elvira Quechonay, Beatriz Caruay Mayba, Juana Tocto, Catalina Usoca (mother of Carlos Inca), and other unnamed ones.

<sup>172</sup> Cobo 1979, 172. These were Ines Guaylas, who married Francisco Ampuetro; Beatriz Quispiquispi, who married Diego Hernandez; the mother of Villacastin; and the grandmother of Pedro de Soto, grandson of Hernando. The men were named Huamantico, Mayta Yupanqui, Topa Hualpa, Manco Inca Yupanqui, Paullu Inca, and two others. The first three were present at Cajamarca at the meeting with Pizarro.

<sup>173</sup> Cobo 1979, 170.

<sup>174</sup> Betanzos 1996, 268; Murúa, 208; and Sarmiento 1999, 189.

royal *malqui*.<sup>175</sup> This would have been consistent with the Inca notion of *camay*, the essence or breath which all potent being, animate and inanimate, possessed. Although Huascar's body was transformed by the flame, it did not lose its *camay* just as the mummified bodies of the other rulers and important ancestors changed physical shape but retained their powers.

Considering his primary interest was in Indigenous culture and religion, Cobo's account of the civil war is surprisingly complete. It adds little new information, but it confirms much of the known path of the war from earlier writers. Further, Cobo is the most detailed writer after Sarmiento when it comes to the relationships of the important actors of the war with their descendants who Cobo met in Cuzco. It is unclear how many of them were his informants, but they certainly lend his *Historia del Nuevo Mundo* an air of credibility. While the Ecuadorian and Chasing Phases of Cobo's version of the war seem in line with the general plan emerging from these sources, this is only the second account after Garcilaso to claim that the final battle was fought at Quipaypampa.<sup>176</sup> While the still unknown location was certainly an important place where Quizquiz and Chalcochima set up camp and conducted their post-war court, it seems unlikely that there was a military clash there. Finally, Cobo's history, although largely based on other written sources, offers some new perspectives, such as Huayna Capac's generals selecting Atahualpa and urging him to rebel against Huascar. This shows that even in the 1650s the memory of the Inca Civil War was very much alive, even if later historians have relegated it to a historical footnote of the Spanish invasion of the Andes.

<sup>175</sup> Cobo 1979, 171 and Sarmiento 1999, 189.

<sup>176</sup> And we know that Cobo used Garcilaso as a source.



## Conclusions

Analyzing each narrative of the Inca Civil War first, before leaping into a comparative approach allows us to see and understand the biases in each text, as well as to appreciate the unique details and layered meanings constructed by each narrative. The reliability and the level of detail of each source in relation to the war does not correspond to the source's reliability in general. For example, among Indigenous writers Guaman Poma is often celebrated for his use of Andean cultural understanding subtly woven into his narrative and drawings to counterbalance his use of a European written tradition. Pachacuti Yamqui, alternatively, is often seen as betraying his Indigenous roots by arguing for Christian conversion of the Andes. Yet when it comes to the civil war, Guaman Poma offers very limited details, while Pachacuti Yamqui provides one of the most extensive accounts. This is understandable when we think of the motivation behind their writing. As Guaman Poma argues that Inca imperial governance was superior to its Spanish counterpart, it makes little sense to shed light on the one big event when the empire was in dire crisis, political alliances were broken, and chaos ensued. Pachacuti Yamqui's, on the other hand, approached military and political history of Tahuantinsuyu as a matter of fact, since it neither hurt nor supported his religious argument.

Similarly, Spanish authors who worked more intimately with Indigenous informants, also relayed their political positions and biases. For example, Betanzos' narrative is heavily partisan due to his wife's Cuxirimay Ocllo allegiance to Atahualpa. Thus, it conspicuously omits any of Huascar's military successes, while retaining a high level of detail on military movements and tactics. Murúa, unlike Betanzos, has often suffered from his association with an Indigenous informant, being relegated to a secondary, Spanish version of Guaman Poma. However, as we

have seen here, while the Ayacuchano chose to skip the civil war, the Basque provided one of the most complete narratives that would have otherwise been overlooked.

The spatial representation of these narratives through maps allows for a deeper understanding of the war both spatially and temporally. Although the Inca had built spectacular roads and were experts in traversing the rugged Andean terrain, movements between Tomebamba and Pumpu, for example, that some authors mention in passing involve a march of almost 2000km. Such movements, while often quickly jumped over in the text, are highlighted on the maps and offer a glimpse of why this war lasted about five years. Plotting the narratives on the map also suggests a much higher level of intensity early on during the Ecuadorian Phase with clashes much closer in both space and time. The gap between the Ecuadorian and the Chasing Phases also poses important questions about whether the two sides entered a prolonged impasse while gathering troops and building their legitimacy cases. With this better understanding of the primary sources and their individual narratives, we can now turn to putting them into conversation and attempting to construct a composite history of the civil war in the following chapter.

## **Chapter 5. Spatializing the Inca State in Crisis: Combatants, Movements, and Sites of Violence and Alliance**

As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the sixteenth and seventeenth century written sources have offered narratives varying in length, detail, and political inflection, based on their own experiences, knowledge, and access to indigenous informants. Once we have understood the individual courses of each narrative, as well as their spatial representation over the land of Tahuantinsuyu, it is possible to put together a history of the Inca Civil War based thoroughly on the written sources. This chapter attempts to reach such a reconstruction and, in the process, entangles the two major factors which influenced the causes, course, and result of the conflict – the inherent superiority of Atahualpa’s professionalized forces and Huascar’s political and ideological move from Hanan to Hurin Cuzco, which allied him with the Collasuyu quarter of the empire but alienated him from the Inca nobility.

The following section of this chapter will deal with the causes of the war – both immediate and long-term. It will delineate the ways both claimant to the throne constructed their respective legitimacies and when Huascar was officially crowned *Sapa Inca*, what led to the war of succession anyway. The next three sections will follow the course of the war through what I have named the Ecuadorian, Chasing, and Final phases of the Inca Civil War. These are equal neither temporally, nor in the level of detail that the written sources have lent them. Instead, they represent the three identifiable separate stages that begin with the initial clashes up north, before Atahualpa’s generals, Quizquiz and Chalcochima, decided to chase the Cuzco faction south, and finally end with the last few battles on the doorstep to Cuzco where Huascar was defeated. The last section of this chapter will deal with the aftermath of the war and how the complete



annihilation of Huascar's family and immediate allies was also a result of his switch from Hanan to Hurin moiety that characterized the war in its entirety.

## 1. The War Begins: Causes and Legitimacy of the Claimants

At the time of his death, Huayna Capac was on a military campaign on the northern frontier of the empire near the modern border between Ecuador and Colombia. Expansion of the state through conquest was a valiant deed that solidified the ruler's memory and glory in perpetuity as well as his major duty and expectation.<sup>1</sup> Huayna Capac's choice to go north was taken after a careful survey of the empire determined that this was the only path viable for further expansion.<sup>2</sup> By this time, Tahuantinsuyu had incorporated virtually all of the Andes and the western coastal deserts, barring those in the extreme south. However, the Inca faced much greater trouble going east down the mountain slopes and into the jungle, where both Pachacuti and Topa Inca had earlier led campaigns and returned emptyhanded.<sup>3</sup> The imperial army that was used to open land warfare was continuously crushed in the selva and although Huayna Capac did venture east sporadically, his only serious option seemed north. This idea is supported by his commitment to the northern campaign where he spent years if not decades based in Quito.<sup>4</sup> This path north soon became an important point of contestation in the civil war.

<sup>1</sup> Susan Niles, *The Shape of Inca History: Narrative and Architecture in an Andean Empire*, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1999): 121.

<sup>2</sup> Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas*, transl. Clements Markham, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999 [1572]): 159.

<sup>3</sup> Bernabé Cobo, *History of the Inca Empire*, transl. Roland Hamilton, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979 [1653]): 135 and 143.

<sup>4</sup> Betanzos (Juan Díez de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Inca*, transl. Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996): 188) claims the campaign took six years, while Cobo quotes ten (1979: 160). Niles (1999: 105) estimates that Huayna Capac stayed in Quito for at least twelve years.

Upon heading north, Huayna Capac left his eldest son from Rahu Ocllo, Huascar, in Cuzco perhaps in preparation for his future succession to the throne.<sup>5</sup> Sarmiento, however, offers two different versions and in one Huayna Capac left other of his sons like Paullo Topa and Manco Inca in Cuzco, while appointing his uncle Huaman Achachi as governor, while in the other Huascar was meant to be instructed by Apu Hilaquita and Auqui Topa Inca.<sup>6</sup> Alternatively, two of the other sons of the ruler, Atahualpa and Ninan Cuyochi, were brought along in the campaign north.<sup>7</sup> Despite each future claimant to the throne going on very different paths in the final years of his father's reign, they both saw their positions as important to their legitimacy.

Although Huayna Capac's death from a disease coming from a faraway continent set unique circumstances, this was not the first time that Inca succession was heavily contested. Indeed, the transition to a new ruler was almost inevitably marked by competition between claimants to the throne and their factions. As these events reshuffled the political status quo in Cuzco, alliances within the nobility were tested or renegotiated with the successful candidate for the throne proving himself by building the most powerful faction.

The Inca used complex rules of succession, without a single marker such as primogeniture dominating them. Inca rulers usually nominated their favorite or most able son, but the nominee then had to go through intense vetting from the Inca nobility and fight off other claimants. Being first born certainly helped, but the political support a claimant could muster, particular through his

<sup>5</sup> Betanzos, 187 and Sarmiento 1999, 160.

<sup>6</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 160. Notably none of them save for Huascar played any role in the upcoming civil war and are not mentioned by any other source from here on.

<sup>7</sup> Betanzos 187 and Sarmiento 1999 161.

maternal family, as well as his perceived ability as a ruler, were much more important.<sup>8</sup> Thus, bloody coups and political intrigues were an integral part of Inca succession way before Atahualpa and Huascar took openly to arms.

In fact, the royal nomination seemed to have meant very little, since every single first choice nominee ended up not succeeding his father. Viracocha Inca had designated Inca Urcon to succeed him and according to Betanzos he was even crowned with the *mascaypacha*, before Pachacuti took over after the Chanka crisis.<sup>9</sup> Topa Inca then succeeded Pachacuti after the first-born Amaru Topa Inca failed to fulfill the expectations of his father.<sup>10</sup> Capac Huari, the next designated successor also failed, even though his father, Topa Inca, went through great lengths to show his support for him and his mother.<sup>11</sup> Eventually, he was ousted by the supporters of Huayna Capac in a coup that was shook the Inca nobility so much that two of his paternal uncles had to act as regents early in his reign.<sup>12</sup>

This history of Inca succession shows that the nomination was nothing more than a façade that projected continuity, while the most important rule of succession revolved around the ability of the heirs and specifically their ability to build political alliances. While the official language behind it might have been about masculinity, military prowess, and effective governance, in every single case the successful claimant managed to elevate his nomination through a network of

<sup>8</sup> María Rostworowski, "Succession, Cooption to Kingship, and Royal Incest among the Inca," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 16, (1960): 417-426.

<sup>9</sup> Betanzos 1996, 28.

<sup>10</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 128.

<sup>11</sup> See Stella Nair, *At Home with the Sapa Inca: Architecture, Space, and Legacy at Chinchero*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015).

<sup>12</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 155.

supporters. This is not to say that the succession rules were completely fictitious. Heirs in training were often tested by various tasks related to governing the empire from military campaigns to settling local disputes. For example, Topa Inca spent many years heading the Inca army through many of its most impressive successes including the defeat of the Kingdom of Chimor on the Peruvian north coast, which some scholars consider a period of co-rulership that ushered the transition from his father's reign.<sup>13</sup> The true test, however, was whether the success of the heir produced support from the various factions of the Inca nobility after the death of the previous ruler. Claimants certainly needed to show ability by administering regions, overseeing ceremonies, and battling enemies, but without the ability to translate those into votes and support, they ended up on the losing side. Again, this does not necessarily betray the spirit of succession rules. Alliance building was in the core of Inca succession perhaps precisely because it was seen as the key to being a successful ruler.

When Huayna Capac fell ill in Quito, he nominated Ninan Cuyochi, giving credence to the latter theory. Facing fewer obstructions than its human carriers, European diseases made their way from Panama, where it appears that smallpox was present as early as 1514, to the Andes by 1524. Before 1532, there were no fewer than three distinct epidemics of hemorrhagic smallpox, smallpox, and measles that may have well halved the Andean population.<sup>14</sup> Sarmiento claims that it was smallpox and measles and took Huayna Capac, while Betanzos describes a leprosy-like skin

<sup>13</sup> María Rostworowski, *History of the Inca Realm*, transl. by Harry Iceland, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 103.

<sup>14</sup> Noble David Cook, *Demographic Collapse, Indian Peru, 1520-1620*, Cambridge Latin American Studies, Vol. 41, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Henry Dobyns, "An Outline of Andean Epidemic History," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, Vol. 37, No. 6, (1963); Linda Newson, "Highland-Lowland Contrasts in the Impact of Old World Diseases in Early Colonial Ecuador," *Social Science & Medicine*, Vol. 36, No. 9, (1993): 1187-1195.

affliction.<sup>15</sup> Garcilaso reports the cause of death as a trembling chill called in Quechua *chucchu* and a fever known as *rupu*.<sup>16</sup> Whatever virus it was, it took Huayna Capac quickly and then Ninan Cuyochi, as well, in another week or so.

Although at that point both Atahualpa and Huascar might have presented legitimate claims, most sources agree that Huascar was the clear choice between the two of them.<sup>17</sup> Only Cobo and, unsurprisingly, Betanzos, offer different versions at the beginning of the war. Cobo claims that since there was no clear heir after the death of Ninan Cuyochi, it was up to the military generals to choose one. Since Quizquiz, Chalcochima, and Rimu Ñahui thought they would lose their political positions if Huascar was to become ruler, they attempted to elevate Atahualpa, who had a weaker claim.<sup>18</sup> Betanzos, alternatively, claims neither had a legitimate claim, since Huayna Capac only had a daughter named Asarpay from his primary wife.<sup>19</sup> Although this might have been true for Cusirimay, an earlier wife of the ruler, most sources related that Huayna Capac officially married Rahua Ocllo and made her his *coya* before he left for Quito.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Betanzos 1996, 184 and Sarmiento 1999, 167.

<sup>16</sup> Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, (Lima, Peru: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1991 [1617]): 600.

<sup>17</sup> Pedro de Cieza de León, *The Incas of Pedro de Cieza de León*, transl. Harriet de Onis, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960 [1553]): 79; Garcilaso, 105, 300, 611; Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, *The First New Chronicle and Good Government*, transl. Roland Hamilton, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2009 [1615]): 7, 12, 55, 62, 66, 88; Martín de Murúa, *Historia General del Perú*. Madrid: Dastin Historia, 2001 [1616]: 131; Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua, *Relació de Antigüedades deste Reyno del Pirú*. Lima: Institut Français D'Etudes Andines, 1993 [1600]: f.36v; Pedro Pizarro, *Relación del Descubrimiento y Conquista de los Reinos del Perú*, (Lima, Peru: PUCP Fondo Editorial, 1978 [1578]): 25;

<sup>18</sup> Cobo 1979, 163.

<sup>19</sup> Betanzos 1996, 188.

<sup>20</sup> Murúa 2001, 102 and 121; Sarmiento 1999, 160.

Initially, Huascar's claim may not have been seriously disputed, since most sources agree he officially succeeded Huayna Capac in Cuzco.<sup>21</sup> Yet, this did not happen without the customary cajoling of the Inca nobility, as Huascar pleaded with all the great *curacas* and councils of Coricancha. He prepared a great feast for his coronation giving much livestock, gold, silver, food, and llamas to other lords in order to earn their ballots.<sup>22</sup> Further, he prepared Cuzco to receive the *malqui* of Huayna Capac by cleaning it thoroughly and covering all facades of buildings with fine cloth.<sup>23</sup> Huascar undertook all appropriate rituals for his ascension – he went to Lake Titicaca in Collasuyu and placed a large gold image of the sun on the Island of the Sun, gathered all *apu curacas* at Puma Cancha and made a pact with them, and at the end of the year of penance, he gave himself the name Inti Cusi Hualpa Huascar Inca.<sup>24</sup>

Upon the advice of Inca Roca, Huascar asked to marry his sister Chuqui Huypa Chuquipay, but their mother, Rahua Ocllo, unsure of Huascar's fitness to rule refused to give her away. Huascar went to Topa Inca's *malqui* and asked him for permission to marry his sister. The priests who spoke for Topa Inca, Atcayqui Atarimachi, Achache, and Manco accepted his gifts and granted the permission.<sup>25</sup> To appease his mother, Huascar showered Rahua Ocllo with gifts of gold, silver, cloth, and servants. They proceeded with the wedding which was held with great festivities. The houses of Topa Inca and Huayna Capac, as well as those of Huascar, were covered in gold, silver, and fine cloth, while Chuqui Huypa received the official name Coya Mama Chuqui

<sup>21</sup> Betanzos 1996, 189; Cieza 1960, 80; Murúa 2001, 131; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f. 36v; Sarmiento 1999, 181.

<sup>22</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.36v.

<sup>23</sup> Murúa 2001, 136.

<sup>24</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.36v.

<sup>25</sup> Murúa 2001, 143.



Huypa Chuquipay.<sup>26</sup> After the wedding, Huascar received the *capac llauto*, *suntur paucar topa yahuari*, and the *capac uncu*, the regal insignia of the office, in Cuzco.<sup>27</sup> Apu Chalco Yupanqui, a grandson of Viracocha Inca, presided over the ceremonies.<sup>28</sup>

The detailed memories of these elaborate and lengthy rituals that Huascar undertook speak of the widespread support of his coronation at the time. The obstacles he faced came in the form of his mother objecting to his marriage rather than from a rival claimant to the throne. Indeed, Murúa reports a plot by Rahua Ocllo and Chusqui Huaman to kill Huascar in order to elevate Cusi Atauchi to the throne, but the plot was thwarted.<sup>29</sup> It might not have been as serious a threat, though, as Chusqui Huaman and Cusi Atauchi remained loyal to Huascar later and were sent to a military mission in Chachapoyas. At the same time, it appeared that the support for Huascar was universal, as the royal wedding turned out to be “the most decadent party that ever was” with attendees from across the Andes, bringing every kind of corn, all kinds of herbs, and meat from parrots, pigeons, herons, hawks, thrushes, eagles, condors, and many other birds, many kinds of fish, both marine and lake, that were fed to Huascar. Additionally, bears, tigers, lions, monkeys, deer, vizcachas, vicuñas, and llamas were brought for the royal couple’s entertainment.<sup>30</sup>

Going back to the idea that Inca rulership was contingent on alliance making, the biggest threat to Huascar’s reign may have been his own character. We have already seen that his own mother was unsure about his marriage to Chuqui Huypa, but various sources throw further

<sup>26</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993 f.36v.

<sup>27</sup> These refer to the royal fringe (*capac llauto*), the royal banner (*suntur paucar topa yahuari*), and the royal tunic (*capac uncu*).

<sup>28</sup> Murúa 2001, 131.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 134-135.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 145.

suspicion on his fitness as a ruler that triggered Atahualpa's march for the throne. Murúa relates that even before Huascar's official ascension, and perhaps still paranoid from the Cusi Atauchi plot, Huascar met with the captains bringing Huayna Capac's body, he tricked them into entering Cuzco only to have them murdered for not bringing Atahualpa.<sup>31</sup> This set a precedent that marked Huascar as a violent leader and Atahualpa as a perceived rival and possible rebel.

Both brothers, though, seem to recognize that alliance making was key for each of their claims. So, in typical Inca fashion, the two brothers attempted to resolve the issue with *ayni* or gift exchange first. Gift-giving was a major component of Inca political life and an important symbol of imperial expansion. Tahuantinsuyu was built on an imperial ideology of inherent Inca superiority and ability to bring order to the world.<sup>32</sup> Thus, military action was not always necessary, so the conquerors often attempted to lure new provinces into the fold with exquisite gifts and the vow of allegiance. The most famous case of the success of this tactic was the incorporation of the Chincha group of the southern Peruvian coast to the empire by Pachacuti.<sup>33</sup> Most commonly fine cloth, these gifts varied in quality which reflected the hierarchical relationship between the giver and the receiver.<sup>34</sup> Reciprocity, as a form of alliance making, bonded both sides with each exchange, while reinforcing status differences, but asymmetry was seen as a sign of aggression.

<sup>31</sup> Murúa 2001, 135 and Sarmiento 1999, 171.

<sup>32</sup> Constance Classen, *Inca Cosmology and the Human Body*, (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1993) and Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism*, New Studies in Archaeology, (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1984).

<sup>33</sup> Cristóbal de Castro and Diego de Ortega Morejón, "Relación y Declaración del Modo que Este Valle de Chincha y sus Comarcas se Gobernaban antes que Oviere Ingas y después q(ue) los Vuo hasta q(ue) los Cristianos Entraron en esta Tierra," *Historia y Cultura*, Vol. 8, (1974 [1558]: 94.

<sup>34</sup> John Rowe, "Standardization in Inca Tapestry Tunics," in *Junius B. Bird Pre-Columbian Textile Conference*, eds. Ann Rowe, Elizabeth Benson, and Anne-Louise Schaffer, (Washington, DC: The Textile Museum, 1979): 240.

To commemorate Huascar's ascension to the throne, Atahualpa sent him gifts of fine cloth and precious stones from Quito. The sources agree that Huascar reacted to them with anger, rejecting the offered alliance. He is said to have trampled the gifts, thrown them in the fire, and sent back drums made of the skins of the messengers.<sup>35</sup> Betanzos, ever the partisan siding with Atahualpa, claims Huascar was drunk as usual and that even when Rahua Ocllo vouched for Atahualpa's true intentions, Huascar replied with disdain: "Just look at this whore who left her lover in Quito and who now sees her possessions and returns for them."<sup>36</sup> Murúa's version, though similar, offers a different inflection, however, suggesting that the gifts did not match the expected status differentiation between the two half-brothers, which enraged the newly crowned *Sapa Inca*, exclaiming: "What does my brother think of me? That we don't have anything here?"<sup>37</sup> Indeed, it is possible that the gift exchange was meant by Atahualpa as a provocation, but what is clear is that his half-brother's reaction reflected his poor relationship with the Inca nobility.

According to Cobo and Pedro Pizarro, Huascar further jeopardized his standing in Cuzco by treating the royal *malqui* with the same disdain he had for Atahualpa. He is said to have proclaimed that the *malqui* needed to be buried and stripped of their possessions. Further, the dead should not be a part of his court, only the living, because the dead had taken over the best of everything in his kingdom.<sup>38</sup> This was such a bold and offensive claim that Pedro Pizarro's

<sup>35</sup> Betanzos 1996, 193; Murúa 2001, 154; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.37r; Sarmiento 1999, 171.

<sup>36</sup> Betanzos 1996, 193.

<sup>37</sup> Murúa 2001, 154.

<sup>38</sup> Bernabé Cobo, *Inca Religion and Customs*, transl. Roland Hamilton, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990): 41 and Pizarro 1978, 54.

omission of the history of the war hinges entirely on this action, claiming that from then on Huascar's generals sabotaged him and allowed Atahualpa to march to Cuzco freely.<sup>39</sup>

While shocking, Huascar's position on the power of the *malqui* becomes less self-destructive considering his view that the empire needed a reset under his rule. Getting more and more pressured by his strained relationship with the rest of the nobility, he constructed a vision of himself as the one to usher Tahuantinsuyu into a new era through a "return to origins". After angering the members of Pachacuti's *panaca* by killing Atahualpa's messengers, who were members of their lineage, Huascar saw Hanan Cuzco, the upper moiety of Inca nobility as his enemies.<sup>40</sup> The capital city, as well as the major parts of the empire, and indeed that Andean world, were divided in Hanan and Hurin complementary parts.<sup>41</sup> Since the time of Pachacuti, the first imperial *Sapa Inca*, the ruler and the *panaca* he instituted had been a part of Hanan Cuzco, while all pre-imperial era rulers were members of the Hurin moiety.<sup>42</sup> Seeing that the rift between himself and the Hanan nobility was insurmountable, Huascar publicly and ritually broke his allegiance with them and re-instituted himself as a Hurin member.<sup>43</sup> Although Murúa and Sarmiento describe a conversation between Huascar and Quizquiz at the end of the war in which the fallen lord declares the war was not between the two moieties,<sup>44</sup> this proclamation appears to be a foundational event. It is on par with Pachacuti switching his allegiance to Hanan Cuzco when he

<sup>39</sup> Pizarro 1978, 54.

<sup>40</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 171.

<sup>41</sup> Terence D'Altroy, *The Incas*, (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2014): 176. Hanan is often translated as Upper and Hurin – as Lower, but these do not always correspond to a geographic or landscape distribution of the lands associated with the moieties in Cuzco or elsewhere.

<sup>42</sup> Betanzos 1996, 69-73.

<sup>43</sup> Betanzos 1996, 194 and Sarmiento 1999, 171.

<sup>44</sup> Murúa 2001, 189 and Sarmiento 1999 184.

began the expansion of the Inca state a century earlier. Further, it returns the locus of Inca power back to Hurin Cuzco where the founder of the royal lineage, Manco Capac, placed it. Thus, through the return to the Hurin moiety and the rejection of the royal *malqui*, Huascar attempted to style himself as a modern Manco Capac, the figure who would usher a new dawn for the Inca step, but also one who steps on centuries of history of power. In relation to him, Atahualpa is constructed as a mere usurper with a powerful army but no political and historic legitimacy.

The fracturing of the alliances between Huascar and the Inca aristocracy provided Atahualpa an opportunity, while the gift debacle gave him the impetus to defy his half-brother. It appears that at first, he was only emboldened to ask for a governor position of the northern frontier. The early modern writers disagree over the logistics of this request. Zárate and Murúa claim Atahualpa had genuine intentions and Huascar was the aggressor sending misleading messages granting the wish.<sup>45</sup> Pizarro and Cieza offer the opposite view that the request for governorship was a ploy to deceive the ruler while Atahualpa organizes a rebellion.<sup>46</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui blames the Cañari *curaca*, Urco Colla, for tricking Huascar that his brother was asking to be named Inca of the north.<sup>47</sup> Yet, Xerez and Garcilaso present a completely different story, in which the request was granted by Huascar and the two brothers lived peacefully for seven or five years respectively.<sup>48</sup> Another version of Atahualpa's governorship of Quito suggests that Huayna Capac had the idea

<sup>45</sup> Murúa 2001, 153 and Agustín de Zárate, *Historia del Descubrimiento y Conquista de la Provincia del Perú*, (Lima, Peru: Editores Técnicos Asociados S.A., 1968 [1555]): 59.

<sup>46</sup> Cieza 1960, 80 and Pizarro 1978, 50.

<sup>47</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.37r.

<sup>48</sup> Garcilaso, 629, Francisco de Xerez, *Verdadera Relación de la Conquista del Perú*, (Madrid, Spain: Historia 16, 1985 [1533]): 121.

to split the empire between his two sons. Both Xerez and Cieza claim Atahualpa was only going to get the northern frontier ruling it from Tomebamba.<sup>49</sup>

This split, however, seems to have been a temporary measure while the two sides were preparing for war. It is unlikely that Huayna Capac had any role to play in such a division of the state, since he had nominated Ninan Cuyochi and apparently had no intentions for either Atahualpa or Huascar to succeed him. It is also possible that Atahualpa genuinely had no further ambitions than governing the northern frontier, but the series of events, such as Huascar's continuous failure in Cuzco, created this new opportunity for Atahualpa. Murúa reports that Chuqui Huypa secretly sent messages to beg him to intervene.<sup>50</sup> The Cañari lord, Urco Colla, also tried to pit the two brothers against each other, in order to free his own people from Inca rule.<sup>51</sup> In addition, according to Cieza, the experienced military generals feared the instability that Huascar generated with this erratic behavior, switch to Hurin, and breakdown with the rest of the Inca aristocracy. On the advice of Quizquiz, Chalcochima, and Rumi Ñahui, Atahualpa declared himself Inca and Quito "New Cuzco," received the royal fringe in Tomebamba, and openly rebelled.<sup>52</sup>

Huascar himself was likely not happy with this arrangement. Although his brother controlled a much smaller area in this temporary territorial division, Atahualpa seems to have held the keys to any future expansion of the empire, as discussed before. Garcilaso makes this point explicitly, claiming that for the five-year period of peace the empire made no significant excursions to conquer new territory and that Huascar only started the civil war once he realized that his path

<sup>49</sup> Cieza 1960, 52 and Xerez 1985, 96.

<sup>50</sup> Murúa 2001, 155.

<sup>51</sup> Murúa 2001, 156 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.37r.

<sup>52</sup> Betanzos 1996, 204; Cieza 1960, 60 and 86; and Cobo 1979, 164.



was blocked.<sup>53</sup> Precluded from performing this critical aspect of the role of the ruler, he was further irate that Atahualpa decided to go on a building campaign in Caranqui and Tomebamba, taking over another critical duty of the *Sapa Inca*. Cieza reports that “many old, wise Indians” told him that the question of building in and around Tomebamba played a considerable part in the disagreement between the two claimants.<sup>54</sup>

Huascar is said to have struck first, but both brothers appear to have played their part in the creation of this crisis. Atahualpa was emboldened by the support from Quizquiz and the semi-professionalized army he led. Although not initially fighting for the royal fringe, he seems to have gradually acted more and more like the Inca ruler of the north rather than a regional governor. For his part, Huascar appears to have squandered his position as rightful ruler by making numerous political blunders in Cuzco. According to the early modern sources, those who initially supported Huascar were starting to look for alternatives. With his new slogan of the return to the glorious origins of the empire that he was going to usher, Huascar needed to enact it through further expansion. Once he found himself blocked by Atahualpa, he went on the attack. The imperial policies required the ruler to keep the expansion in order to keep his legitimacy, but the territories rife for conquering were shrinking. And when that ruler proved to be a poor diplomat, the system broke down. Thus, the spark of the Inca Civil War seems to have been the result of both the private relationship between the two brothers falling out and the geopolitical reality of the expansion bottleneck in Quito. Huascar and Atahualpa’s failure of forming a political alliance that would stabilize the empire was echoed by much of the course of the war, which was marked by the importance of the political alliances of both factions formed behind the two half-brothers.

<sup>53</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 608-609.

<sup>54</sup> Cieza 1960, 73.

## 2. Ecuadorian Phase: North vs South (Table 5.1)

The first stage of the war was fought entirely in what is now Ecuador. These battles received the greatest attention from the early modern historians, although they present various perspectives on how the events unfolded. Cieza claims that he heard so many differing versions that his account just follows the most common one.<sup>55</sup> Somewhat surprisingly, it was the only phase of the war that was reported by the early accounts of the Spanish invaders, despite it being the further removed from them in time. Xerez only writes of Atahualpa burning down Tomebamba and killing all of its inhabitants as retribution for Huascar sending troops north, after which he reached Cuzco unopposed.<sup>56</sup> Zárate provides much greater detail on the same battle numbering the casualties on the Cuzqueño side to 60,000, but then claims a reconnaissance unit serendipitously met with Huascar and 700 of his soldiers on a by-way near Cajamarca and captured him, ending the war soon after Tomebamba.<sup>57</sup> Pedro Pizarro heard there had been just one battle at Tomebamba, but one in which Huascar's forces were victorious and Atahualpa was imprisoned.<sup>58</sup>

This episode represents the first engagement of the two armies. It appears that Huascar sent a small, mobile army<sup>59</sup> led by Atoco who were joined by a much larger group of Cañari at Tomebamba. Together they attacked the rebels somewhere on the road to Quito.<sup>60</sup> Although most

<sup>55</sup> Cieza 1960, 82-87.

<sup>56</sup> Xerez 1985, 97.

<sup>57</sup> Zárate 1968, 60-61.

<sup>58</sup> Pizarro 1978, 51.

<sup>59</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui (1993: f.37r) counts 1,200 soldiers, while Zárate (60) claims they were 2,000.

<sup>60</sup> The sources disagree on the exact place where this battle happened, but their stories all involve a Huascar victory with significant Cañari participation somewhere between Quito and Tomebamba, in which Atahualpa was imprisoned. Cobo (1979: 165) and Pizarro (1978: 51) claim the battle was at Tomebamba, Cieza (1960: 82) does not specify where in the Cañari lands the skirmish happened, Murúa (2001: 160) claims it was near Quito, while Pachacuti (1993: f.37r) writes about it as the first of two battles at Ambato.

**Table 5.1. Ecuadorian Phase**

<b>Xerez</b>	<b>Zarate</b>	<b>Cieza</b>	<b>Betanzos</b>	<b>Sarmiento</b>
		Cañari Lands (82) <b>Atoco (H)</b> def. Atahualpa (A)		
		Ambato (84) <b>Chalcochima, Quizquiz, Ucumari (A)</b> def. Atoco (H)	Mochacaja (198) <b>Atahualpa, Quizquiz, Chalcochima, Unan Chullo, Rumiñahui, Incura Hualpa, Urco Huaranca (A)</b> def. Hango, Atoco, Cusi Yupanqui, Ahuapanti (H)	Riobamba (172) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Hango, Atoc (H)
	Tomechaca (60) <b>Huascar (H)</b> def. Atahualpa (A)			
Tomebamba (97) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)	Tomebamba (60) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)		Tomebamba I (206) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Ahuapanti, Huanca Auqui (H)	Tomebamba (173) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
			Tomebamba II (207) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Llasca (H)	
	Near Cajamarca (61) <b>Recon Unit (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)	<b>Cusibamba (86) Chalcochima, Quizquiz, Ucumari (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui, Ahuapanti, Inca Roca, Urco Huaranca (H)		

Pizarro	Pachacuti Yamqui	Murua	Garcilaso	Cobo
Tomebamba (51) <b>Huascar (H)</b> def. Atahualpa (A)	Ambato I (37v) <b>Atoco (H)</b> def. Atahualpa (A)	Near Quito (160) <b>Atao, Urco Colla (H)</b> def. Atahualpa (A)		Tomebamba (165) <b>Atoco (H)</b> def. Atahualpa (A)
	Ambato II (37v) <b>Chalcochima, Quizquiz (A)</b> def. Atoco (H)	Ambato (161) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Atao, Urco Colla (H)		Ambato (166) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Atoco (H)
	Quito (38r) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)			
		Tomechaca (165) <b>Huanca Auqui (H)</b> def. Atahualpa (A)		
	Tomebamba I (38r) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)	Mullu Toyru (165) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)		
	Tomebamba II (38r) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)	Tomebamba I (165) <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)		
	Tomebamba III (38v) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)	Tomebamba II (171) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima, Rumiñahui, Tomay Rima, Ucumari (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)		
	Lands between Cañar and Chachapoyas (38v) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)	Cusibamba (172) <b>Quizquiz (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)  Concha Huayla (173) <b>Quizquiz (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)		

Table 5.1. Ecuadorian Phase

of his army managed to retreat to Quito, Atahualpa got captured. The local support was critical in this victory, as Cieza credits the Cañari for capturing the opposition's leader, while Murúa claims the local *curaca*, Urco Colla, was one of the two generals to lead Huascar's army.<sup>61</sup> As we saw earlier, Urco Colla may have been pivotal figure in turning the two brothers against each other and in this early stage of the war the Cañari certainly played double agents undermining both sides.<sup>62</sup> After they helped Huascar with this initial victory, local people also helped Atahualpa escape. A woman, named Quella snuck in a metal lever or crowbar that Atahualpa used to break through the prison wall and return to Quito.<sup>63</sup> It seems that the Cañari gamble did not pay off, as Atahualpa treated them as traitors from this point on. After his victories at Tomebamba soon after, he burnt the city to the ground and at the end of the war, ordered for Urco Colla and all Cañari war prisoners to be executed.<sup>64</sup>

Soon after his escape, Atahualpa gathered his forces in Quito and marched south meeting Atoco again in Ambato.<sup>65</sup> By this time the Quito forces were led by Quizquiz, Chalcochima, Unan Chullo, Rumi Ñahui, Incura Hualpa, and Urco Huaranca, while the Cuzco faction had Atoco, Hango, Cusi Yupanqui, and Ahuapanti at the helm.<sup>66</sup> This is described by Cieza as a fierce battle that lasted from morning until nightfall and many of the most valiant soldiers died before

<sup>61</sup> Cieza 1960, 82 and Murúa 2001, 160.

<sup>62</sup> Betanzos 1996, 197.

<sup>63</sup> Cieza 1960, 83 and Cobo 1979, 165. Cieza (1960: 83) and Pizarro (1978: 51) also offer other versions of Atahualpa escape through transforming into a snake (Cieza) or simply escaping at night once the guard fell asleep (Pizarro), but these seem much less plausible.

<sup>64</sup> Murúa 2001, 190 and Sarmiento 1999, 185

<sup>65</sup> Cieza 1960, 84; Cobo, 166; Murúa 2001, 161; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.37v. Sarmiento (1999: 172) reports a battle where Atahualpa defeated Atoco at Riobamba, and Betanzos (1996: 198) lists the same battle at Mochacaja, but Ambato appears to be the most likely locale.

<sup>66</sup> Betanzos 1996, 198.

Chalcochima engineered a surprise attack with 5,000 men from a hillside capturing the generals Atoco and Hango.<sup>67</sup> Only Ahuapanti managed to escape, but the result of the battle was so devastating that the heap of bones it left behind was made into a memorial and could still be seen over four decades later when Sarmiento visited the site.<sup>68</sup> After this decisive victory, Atahualpa did not advance, but instead returned to Quito.<sup>69</sup>

Pachacuti Yamqui relates that after hearing of Atoco's defeat, Huascar sent his brother, Huanca Auqui, who would commandeer his forces from this point until the Final Phase of the war. He is said to have brought 12,000 men from Cuzco with the authority to gather more along the way.<sup>70</sup> The Cañari continued to contribute troops to both sides possibly sabotaging them.<sup>71</sup> Arriving in Quito, he was defeated by Atahualpa and 16,000 of his men, who this time decided to chase after Huanca Auqui leading to a series of battles in and around Tomebamba. The two armies first met at the Tomechaca Bridge where the battle raged all day before darkness offered little respite. The following day, the hostilities resumed at dawn with Huanca Auqui prevailing and Atahualpa retreating to a hill called Mullu Toyru.

This represents the last victory for a while for the Cuzco faction, as they failed to capitalize on this advantage. Huanca Auqui is said to have surrounded Atahualpa on the hill but only took a small squadron to attack him with. Fortunately for Atahualpa, his experienced warriors managed

<sup>67</sup> Cieza 1960, 84 and Murúa 2001, 161.

<sup>68</sup> Betanzos 1996, 198; Murúa 2001, 161; Sarmiento 1999, 172.

<sup>69</sup> Cieza 1960, 84 and Sarmiento 1999, 172.

<sup>70</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38r.

<sup>71</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui (1993: f.38r) suggests the Cañari helped Huascar. Zárate (1968: 60) claims that the majority of Atahualpa's army of 30,000 consisted of locals with only the top commanders being Inca, while the *curacas* of the Cañari, Tomebamba, Paltas, and Chaparras all joined Huanca Auqui.



to break through the siege and prevailed forcing the Cuzco faction back to Tomebamba.<sup>72</sup> Not wanting to give him a chance to regroup, the Quito faction attacked Tomebamba and easily defeated Huanca Auqui, ending the first series of battles in the Cañari lands. The ease of Atahualpa's escape from the Mullu Toyru siege raised some suspicion and many suggested he secretly met with Huanca Auqui and agreed to delay the war.<sup>73</sup> Such betrayal of Huascar is unlikely since his brother continued to lead his forces until much later in the war, but it is possible that a significant delay occurred at this juncture.

Huanca Auqui fled and reached the valley called Cusi Pampa or present-day Loja where he must have spent some significant time. Murúa writes that he settled in Cusi Pampa for three years, while Atahualpa remained in Tomebamba punishing the Cañari.<sup>74</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui does not report an exact time frame, but claims that after retreating Huanca Auqui spent some time conquering the province of Pacllas in Chachapoyas before turning his attention at the rebels once more.<sup>75</sup> This must have taken some time, since apparently he was not successful in his first try and had to return to Cusi Pampa several times.<sup>76</sup> Atahualpa also decided to take other engagements and returned to Quito and from there went on a conquest mission to Quijos and Umbos.<sup>77</sup>

This impasse is only reported by Murúa and Pachacuti Yamqui, but it fits the temporal framework of the war from Huayna Capac's death in 1527 to Pizarro's arrival in 1532. It is unclear

<sup>72</sup> Betanzos 1996, 207 and Murúa 2001, 165.

<sup>73</sup> Murúa 2001, 167 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38r.

<sup>74</sup> Murúa 2001, 167-168.

<sup>75</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38r.

<sup>76</sup> Murúa 2001, 169.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

how long it took for the hostilities to begin, but other than the year-long ritual around Huascar's coronation, the rest of the events seem to have happened at breakneck speed. His fallout with the aristocracy could not have taken years, given that Rahua Ocllo attempted to block his marriage to Chuqui Huypa during that first year of preparation for his ascension. We are also told that Atoco chose a speedy army in order to make it to Quito quickly and then the great battles of Tomebamba were likely fought over days and perhaps weeks rather than years. It would be hard to believe that Huanca Auqui retreated to Cusi Pampa any time beyond 1529 and even then, a three-year gap would still be possible, since the war escalated quickly from that point on.

We could consider these first clashes as precursors to the war, since it appears that neither brother had the impetus to capture and perhaps kill their rival and his forces. It is possible to think of this period as the time Atahualpa considered the governorship of Quito as his rightful position and he only rebelled against his half-brother after years of his blunders in Cuzco. However, it is more likely that the two sides needed time to regroup after the bloody start of the war. The numbers we get from the written sources might be exaggerated, as it is unlikely that upwards of 60,000 men lost their lives at just one of the battles in Tomebamba. Yet, the death toll was devastating for both sides and a break in fighting, especially after an exchange of victories makes sense here.

Once Huascar was ready to resume the war, he sent Ahuapanti and Huaca Mayta to deliver a gift of women's clothes to Huanca Auqui in order to berate him for his earlier losses to Atahualpa.<sup>78</sup> Inspired by the cruelty of this gesture suggesting his inability to perform his masculine duties as a general, the Cuzqueño general attacked Tomebamba for a third time and catching the garrison unprepared there, took the city easily. Surprised that Huanca Auqui would still fight for Huascar, Atahualpa decided to stay in Quito and sent out his forces led by Quizquiz,

<sup>78</sup> Murúa 2001, 170 and Sarmiento 1999, 174.

Huayna Capac's primary general, Chalcochima, who was a master tactician, as well as Tomay Rima, Rumi Ñahui, and Ucumari.<sup>79</sup> These were professional soldiers with years of military experience, while Huascar's forces were mostly inexperienced conscripts. They easily took back Tomebamba in the fourth battle at this site, and possibly the one where they set the city on fire, before chasing the retreating army of the Cuzco faction to their base in Cusi Pampa.<sup>80</sup>

Another great battle was fought at Cusi Pampa, where both sides suffered great losses, but the larger Quizquiz brought from Quito was victorious forcing Huanca Auqui to withdraw from his stronghold.<sup>81</sup> Unlike previous times, though, the Quito faction did not return back to their camp and instead chased after the retreating army. This initiated the second phase of the civil war, in which Quizquiz, Chalcochima, and their army made their way through the Andean landscape winning battle after battle to reach the doorstep of Cuzco.

### **3. Chasing Phase: Quizquiz and Chalcochima's March on Cuzco (Table 5.2)**

The loss of Cusi Pampa was the beginning of the end for Huanca Auqui, who from this moment on was chased by a well-trained and commanded army that defeated Huascar's forces at every turn. This second stage of the war was much quicker than the first one and most sources agree on its general course with few disagreements about battle sites. Huascar did his best to provide his brother with reinforcements, as 10,000 Chachapoyas were waiting for him in Cajamarca, but they were crushed by Quizquiz at Concha Huayla and the 3,000 survivors returned

<sup>79</sup> Murúa 2001, 171.

<sup>80</sup> Murúa 2001, 171 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38r.

<sup>81</sup> Murúa 2001, 172.

to their homelands.<sup>82</sup> The sources relate that tired of all the defeats, Huanca Auqui requested to return to Cuzco, but when he reached Pumpu, he found another army ready to fight for him.

When Quizquiz reached Pumpu, they are said to have fought for three days and although Huanca Auqui was initially encouraged by his ability to hold off Atahualpa's army, he was reportedly chased to Jauja.<sup>83</sup> This was an enormous clash, as the Quito forces had now doubled in number from what Quizquiz brought from Tomebamba, as they were recruiting along the way and both sides numbered 100,000.<sup>84</sup> Surprisingly, Betanzos is the only one to claim that Huanca Auqui enjoyed initial success at Pumpu Bridge before Quizquiz and Chalcochima pretended to retreat, only to set up an ambush at Chancha.<sup>85</sup>

The early modern writers disagree on the origin of the conscripted soldiers, but there is consensus that Huascar continued to enjoy the support of virtually the entire empire, as he kept raising armies throughout the Chasing Phase. Sarmiento reports that the troops in Pumpu represented all corners of the empire, while Murúa claims they were primarily Colla, which invigorated Huanca Auqui.<sup>86</sup> At Jauja, the new army consisted of Huancas, Yauyos, Angaras, Soras, Chancas, Rucanas, Quechuas, and Aymaras who were recruited from coastal and highland communities throughout the Andes.<sup>87</sup> Multiple other groups are reported by various writers that they joined Huascar's cause later on, showing that the empire remained relatively stable under his

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>83</sup> Cobo, 166; Murúa 2001, 174; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38v; Sarmiento 1999, 174.

<sup>84</sup> Murúa 2001, 174 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38v.

<sup>85</sup> Betanzos 1996, 208.

<sup>86</sup> Murúa 2001, 174 and Sarmiento 1999, 174.

<sup>87</sup> Betanzos 1996, 208; Murúa 2001, 175; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.38v.

**Table 5.2. Chasing Phase**

Xerez	Zarate	Cieza	Betanzos	Sarmiento
			Pumpu (208) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Coritao (H)	Pumpu (174) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
			Chancha (208) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Coritao (H)	
			Jauja (209) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Yauyo and Huanca noblemen (H)	Jauja (174) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
			Picoy (210) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Quilisca Auqui (H)	Yanamarca (174) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Yauyos, Soras, Chancas, Ayamarcas (H)
				Ancoyacu (174) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Mayta Yupanqui (H)
			Andahuaylas (218) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Inca Roca, Chui Yupanqui, Huanca Auqui, Atecayque, Huacso, Soto (H)	

Pizarro	Pachacuti Yamqui	Murua	Garcilaso	Cobo
	Pumpu (38v) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)	Pumpu (174) <b>Quizquiz (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)		Pumpu (166) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
	Jauja (38v) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)			Jauja (166) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
		Yanamarca (175) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)		
	Ancoyacu (39r) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. New Captain (H)	Ancoyacu (176) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui, Mayta Yupanqui (H)		
				Vilcashuaman (166) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
				Pincos (166) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
				Andahuaylas (166) <b>Quizquiz,</b> <b>Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)

Table 5.2. Chasing Phase



control. According to Pachacuti Yamqui, Huascar sent out a call for troops and so many showed up that there was not enough room to house them in Cuzco.<sup>88</sup> Yet, the only time the ruler enjoyed any relative success, it was highlighted by the participation of troops from Collasuyu as was the case in Pumpu. It is possible that the Colla were simply more experienced and better soldiers, but it is conspicuous that they are always mentioned in a positive light, pointing to Huascar's ideology of "return to origins". The Colla occupied the lands of the mythical origin of Manco Capac, so their allegiance was crucial politically for him, regardless of their military prowess. The final chapter (Chapter 8) of this dissertation investigates how this very alliance was embodied by Huascar's building campaign in the Lucre basin.

Meanwhile, the early modern sources indicate that Atahualpa's generals Quizquiz and Chalcochima continued their march south. Sarmiento writes that another army was waiting to attack the retreating Huascar's generals at Jauja, but they were again crushed and most were killed at Yanamarca when they tried to flee.<sup>89</sup> Retreating to Paucaray, Huascar's brother and general Huanca Auqui sent a message to the oracle at Pachacamac and asked for a favor, receiving answer that he would be victorious at Ancoyaco nearby.<sup>90</sup> There, however, he was met with another captain from Cuzco, Mayta Yupanqui, who was sent with 12,000 soldiers to replace him, as Huascar suspected by then that his brother had defected.<sup>91</sup> It is unclear who led the ruler's forces, but they managed to keep Quizquiz at Ancoyaco Bridge on the Mantaro River for a month, before

<sup>88</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.39v.

<sup>89</sup> Sarmiento 1999, 174

<sup>90</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.39r.

<sup>91</sup> Murúa 2001, 176 and Sarmiento 1999, 174.

one day Atahualpa's general charged boldly and managed to disarm his enemies crossing the bridge for another decisive victory.<sup>92</sup>

After these several devastating battles in quick succession, the two armies mostly stayed out of each way, as they traveled towards Cuzco. Only Cobo reports three more battles at Vilcashuaman, Pincos, Andahuaylas and finally somewhere between Curahuasi and Abancay, but it is likely that these were small skirmishes, as they did not make it into any of the other accounts.<sup>93</sup> Instead, Quizquiz and Chalcochima made their way to Apurimac Bridge, having to take some detours, as the retreating imperial army tried to sabotage them. First, they burnt the Vilca Bridge, pushing the Quito faction towards the Soras territory and then Huascar's forces destroyed Atahualpa's men's supplies at Vilca slowing them further down. Betanzos claims Atahualpa's army caught up with Huanca Auqui and his 40,000 warriors near Apurimac Bridge and defeated them again.<sup>94</sup> However, once Huascar learnt that Quizquiz was nearing Cuzco at Apurimac, he decided to join the battle himself starting the Final Phase of the war near the imperial capital.

#### **4. Final Phase: Endgame (Table 5.3)**

After the customary rituals, fasting, and consulting of oracles, Huascar led an impressive army including 60,000 soldiers and many noblemen divided in three groups out of Cuzco. The first one consisted primarily of Collasuyu forces, numbered 25,000, and was divided in four captaincies between Arampa Yupanqui, Chui Yupanqui, Huacso, and a *curaca* from Charcas in present-day

<sup>92</sup> Murúa 2001, 176; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993 f.39r.; Sarmiento 1999, 174.

<sup>93</sup> Cobo 1979, 166.

<sup>94</sup> Betanzos 1996, 218.

**Table 5.3. Final Phase**

Xerez	Zarate	Cieza	Betanzos	Sarmiento
			Near Apurimac Bridge (218) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Inca Roca, Huanca Auqui (H)	
			Cotabambas I (224) <b>Huascar, Inca Roca, Topa Atao (H)</b> def. Recon Unit (A)	Cotabambas I (178) <b>Arampa Yupanqui, Tito Atauschi, Topa Atao, Mano, Urco Huaranca (H)</b> def. Chalcochima, Tomay Rima (A)
			<b>Cotabambas II (227) Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huascar, Topa Atao (H)	Cotabambas II (179) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Topa Atao (H)
				<b>Cotabambas III (180) Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)
<b>Cuzco (98) Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)				

Pizarro	Pachacuti Yamqui	Murua	Garcilaso	Cobo
				Between Abancay and Curahuasi (166) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huanca Auqui (H)
	Utcupampa I (40r-41r) <b>Collas, Cañas (H)</b> def. Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)	Tahuaray (178) <b>Arapa Yupanqui (H)</b> def. Tomay Rima, Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)		
		Cotabambas I (180) <b>Huascar, Tito Atauchi, Topa Atao, Manu (H)</b> def. Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)		
		<b>Cotabambas II (182)</b> <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huascar, Tito Atauchi, Topa Atao (H)		
	<b>Utcupampa II (41v-42r)</b> <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima, Rumiñahui, Ucumari (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)			Vilcaonga (166) <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)
			<b>Quipaypan (634)</b> <b>Atahualpa (A)</b> def. Huascar (H)	<b>Quipaypampa (167)</b> <b>Quizquiz, Chalcochima, Rumiñahui (A)</b> def. Huascar, Huanca Auqui, Pasco Inca, Hualpa Roca (H)

Table 5.3. Final Phase

Bolivia.<sup>95</sup> The second one represented the 30,000 survivors of the Chasing Phase, divided in three squadrons and led by Huanca Auqui, Ataurimachem, and Ahuapanti.<sup>96</sup> Huascar joined the third group of just 5,000 commanded by his brother Topa Atao and his cousin Inca Roca.<sup>97</sup>

It is notable that at this point of the war almost half of Huascar's forces came from Collasuyu. A simple explanation of the overreliance on this region would be that this may have been a matter of geography. During the war, the Cuzco faction had raised troops from various provinces following the course of the war from north to south. This ensured the quick and continuous flow of new soldiers in Huascar's army without the delay of them traversing the Andes to reach the battlefields. Once Quizquiz and Chalcochima were at Cuzco's doorstep, though, Huascar had to look for Collasuyu conscripts in order to stop the Quito faction from overtaking the capital.

However, the Colla seems to be the one group that traveled far to aid Huascar in the Inca Civil War. They participated in the very first skirmishes during the Ecuadorian Phase of the war and they appear critical to the Final Phase as well, despite their lands never being realistically threatened to be reached by battle. The Colla were unlikely to have represented all 25,000 of the Collasuyu forces in Huascar's army at this stage, but it appears that their alliance with Cuzco remained strong at least until this instance. Indeed, this first division played a critical role in the Final Phase of the Inca Civil War proving once again the most important allies of Huascar. They were placed above Cotabamba towards Omasuyu in an attempt to drive the enemy towards Cotabamba river, while the second remained low towards the Apurimac bridge trying to climb the

<sup>95</sup> Betanzos 1996, 223 and Sarmiento 1999, 177.

<sup>96</sup> Betanzos 1996, 222 and Sarmiento 1999, 177.

<sup>97</sup> Betanzos 1996, 223 and Sarmiento 1999, 177.

Cotabamba hill and encircle the enemy.<sup>98</sup> This tactic worked and Huascar won his first victory since the one at Tomebamba.

The sources disagree on the location and the length of this battle. Murúa claims this happened at Tahuaray and then at Cotabamba, Sarmiento writes about a ravine towards the village of Huanucopampa, and Pachacuti Yamqui suggests it was at Utcupampa.<sup>99</sup> While Betanzos dismisses this as a minor chink in Quizquiz's armor, Pachacuti Yamqui and Murúa describe a four-day battle with tens of thousands of casualties.<sup>100</sup> He reports that on the final day, after the battlefield was soaked with the blood of the dead, Atahualpa's generals Quizquiz and Chalcochima camped in an area surrounded by three very tall peaks. Seeing this opportunity Arampa Yupanqui and his Colla and Cañas warriors surrounded them with a firewall that killed 2,000 northern soldiers, while the generals escaped injured.<sup>101</sup>

Whether they overdramatize or downplay this victory for the Cuzco faction, the sources agree that it was really won by Colla forces. This time Huascar directly addressed this issue, proclaiming "Behold the obligation we have to emulate our ancestors!"<sup>102</sup> This battle cry perfectly encapsulates his attempt to build legitimacy through association with Collasuyu in an ideology of return to Inca origins. The Colla hailed from Lake Titicaca where, according to one version of the Inca origin story, the first Inca, Manco Capac, emerged with his brothers and sisters before making his way to founding Cuzco. In their support, Huascar saw the symbolic representation of Manco's

<sup>98</sup> Murúa 2001, 178 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.40r.

<sup>99</sup> Murúa 2001, 178; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.40v; Sarmiento 1999, 178.

<sup>100</sup> Betanzos 1996 224; Murúa 2001, 180; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.40r-f.41r.

<sup>101</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.41r.

<sup>102</sup> Murúa 2001, 178 and Sarmiento 1999, 178.



support that proved his legitimacy through the association with long-term Inca power. Having just switched to the Hurin moiety, which spatially also mapped onto Collasuyu, he was diametrically opposed to Atahualpa, a member of Hanan and a rebel coming from the north. The battle cry suggests that Atahualpa could only be an usurper, as he simply represented himself, while Huascar is the rightful inheritor of centuries of tradition coming from Manco Capac and streaming through his Colla army. He, thus, saw his legitimacy not a matter of family and political position, but indeed one of divine calling that obligated him to emulate past triumphs and return Tahuantinsuyu to its original glory. While this vignette speaks to Huascar's claim to political legitimacy through this narrative of "return to origins," it also directly involves an important political alliance that he was cultivating. The two sides, the ideological switch to Hurin Cuzco and Huascar's relationship with the past and the practical relationship with the Colla, were inextricably intertwined in how Huascar approached the civil war.

His generals, however, suffered from poor decision-making and did not capitalize on this early advancement. Instead of attacking to capture Quizquiz and Chalcochima, Atahualpa's generals and troops were allowed to regroup and fight back. Here, again, the sources present differing versions of what happened during this tumultuous time. Murúa writes that the Quito faction caught Huascar's army by surprise, crossing the river and descending on a slope called Chinta Capa. Huascar was especially visible in the battle, fighting with his gold and silver weapons from his litter and was captured easily by the Quito faction.<sup>103</sup> Sarmiento and Pachacuti Yamqui claim that Chalcochima and Quizquiz set up an ambush in the morning catching the *Sapa Inca*, as he was still having breakfast.<sup>104</sup> Betanzos offers a much more complicated version of the Quito

<sup>103</sup> Murúa 2001, 182.

<sup>104</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.41v and Sarmiento 1999, 180.

faction leaving 6,000 soldiers in a ravine and luring Huascar, thinking this was what was left of Atahualpa's army, before getting ambushed by another 100,000 coming from the north.<sup>105</sup> However, it happened, what is clear from the written sources is that the civil war was essentially over with the imprisonment of the *Sapa Inca*, who was brought to Cuzco for questioning, while Atahualpa was making his way there from Tomebamba.

Here, we should acknowledge that this story follows the more detailed sources, compared to Garcilaso and Cobo who write of a final battle just outside of Cuzco at a field called Quipaypan. While this event likely never happened, the reasons behind Huascar's defeat are illuminating. Cobo blames the leader himself for his inability to inspire his troops hinting again at his rift with the aristocracy.<sup>106</sup> Garcilaso, however, claims that the difference in military experience played the crucial role, as Huascar's reinforcements of Colla warriors did not arrive on time.<sup>107</sup> One thing the sources are united on is that Huascar's success was directly linked to his ability to mobilize his alliance with the people of this critical southern quarter. Again, whether this episode actually happened is immaterial, as Huascar lost the war just the same, while the memory of his reliance on the Colla remained remarkably potent for years to make a significant impact on writers such as Garcilaso.

With Huascar in chains and the northern army at the capital's doorstep, the Inca Civil War was effectively over. The written sources indicate that despite his ability to mobilize troops from throughout the empire at the beginning of the war, by the time of his imprisonment Huascar lacked core support in Cuzco to stage any comeback. In the aftermath, his entire family was annihilated

<sup>105</sup> Betanzos 1996, 227.

<sup>106</sup> Cobo 1979, 167.

<sup>107</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 634.

and he was soon killed as well. It appears that the Hurin gamble did not pay off in the end, as all Inca royal *panaca* eventually accepted Atahualpa and his Hanan kin as rightful masters after their military victory and despite their own brutality in the conflict and its aftermath.

## **5. Postbellum – European Arrival and Huascar’s Lineage Extinguished**

Although Atahualpa won the civil war, we get the sense from the written sources that Huascar retained his legitimacy throughout the conflict. He kept summoning new armies from every corner of the empire, despite his tactic of throwing bodies into the fire of battle yielding disappointing results. He engaged in building projects in Calca, commemorating his switch to Hurin Cuzco, despite complaining that there was no land in the Urubamba Valley left for him.<sup>108</sup> Apart from the early plot to install Cusi Atauchi in his place, there does not seem to have been further disruption of Huascar’s rule in Cuzco, despite the numerous reports of his abrasive personality and his poor diplomacy skills that damage his alliance with key members and groups of the Inca aristocracy. Yet, it appears he and his remaining allies might have retained a strong hold of Cuzco, which would explain why Atahualpa never advanced past Tomebamba himself, sending Quizquiz, Chalcochima, and their army after Huanca Auqui. Even after their serial success on the battlefield, the claimant remained in the north Andes in what is now Ecuador far from the imperial capital. Even after capturing Huascar, Quizquiz and Chalcochima feared entering Cuzco, which is why they set up a tribunal at Quipaypampa just outside the city.<sup>109</sup>

Although imprisoned, Huascar still presented a real danger to Atahualpa and his claim to the rulership of the Inca Empire. That is why his generals went through great lengths to

<sup>108</sup> Betanzos 1996 195 and Murúa 2001 153.

<sup>109</sup> Murúa 2001, 185 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.42r.

completely extinguish Huascar's royal lineage and to punish everyone who aided him in the war. Quizquiz and Chalcochima first brought out to Quipaypampa all the Inca noblemen, who had already decided not to fight against them. Huascar's former generals Huanca Auqui, Ahuapanti, and Paucar Ushno were arrested for their perceived crimes at Tomebamba. Religious leaders were also punished if they were seen as Huascar's allies such as Apu Chalco, Yupanqui, and Yarupac, the main priests of the sun, for led the ceremony where Huascar was presented with the *mascaypacha*. However, the rest of the generals and priests were pardoned and released according to the early modern writers.<sup>110</sup> While this last move is somewhat surprising, it likely represents a new attempt to cultivate an alliance between Atahualpa and these important Inca figures in the rebuilding of the empire that was to follow.

The Chachapoyas and Cañari soldiers who supported Huascar and were imprisoned during the battles of the Inca Civil War were not afforded a similar treatment, however. The morning after the nobility returned to Cuzco, Chalcochima and Quizquiz are said to have killed all the war prisoners. The punishment for them allying with Huascar was bloody, as some were stoned, others were impaled, and others beaten to death to repay for the treachery of Urco Colla, who might have pitted the two brothers against each other in the first place.<sup>111</sup>

After exacting revenge on the men, the early modern sources relate that Quizquiz and Chalcochima focused on the women who had betrayed Atahualpa by offering allegiance to Huascar. Pachacuti Yamqui describes this as a tense scene in which they brought out Rahua Ocllo, Chuqui Huypa, and Huascar himself, exchanging insults with him. Huascar called Chalcochima and Quizquiz "coca chewers" and demanded to be treated like the *Sapa Inca* that

<sup>110</sup> Murúa 2001, 185-186.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 190.

he believed he was. Quizquiz, however, is said to have replied that Huascar was not in the position to negotiate and made him “drink urine and eat chillca leaves.”<sup>112</sup> Despite the abuse, Atahualpa kept Huascar alive at the time fearing that if he murdered him many *curacas* would rebel, pointing to the still fragile hold of Cuzco that the Quito faction had at this point.<sup>113</sup> Chalcochima, himself, was tasked to bring the captured leader to Atahualpa, who is said to have been on his way to the capital and was at that time in Cajamarca.<sup>114</sup>

Although Huascar was spared from fear of the repercussions, his family did not face a similar fate. Before leaving north, Chalcochima rounded up all of Huascar’s wives and children and slaughtered them in front of him at Quipaypampa. Murúa writes that they initially murdered 80 of his sons there, as well as Huascar’s sister Coya Miro, who had two small children, and another sister called Chimpo Sisa.<sup>115</sup> The rest of the women and children were brought to a field called Yahuarpampa, meaning the field of blood, where the decisive battle with the Chanka had been fought by Pachacuti. There, they were surrounded by three walls of guards, given only raw corn in small quantities, and tortured. Women were hung from trees by the arms, hair, or the waist and given to hold their babies until they dropped them to their death or until they both died of thirst.<sup>116</sup>

Garcilaso expands the ring of casualties, claiming that 200 of Huascar’s brothers, uncles, and relatives were killed to the fourth degree of relation in order to leave Atahualpa as the only

<sup>112</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.42r-42v.

<sup>113</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 637.

<sup>114</sup> Murúa 2001, 196.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 191.

<sup>116</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 638 and Murúa 2001, 192.

legitimate successor of the blood line and that before this was done, he did not dare pass Jauja.<sup>117</sup> Only a few women who had not had relations with the ruler escaped the slaughter either for being under the age of 11 or for their exquisite beauty.<sup>118</sup> When that was not enough, even the servants that tended to the disgraced *Sapa Inca* were put to death with Pachacuti Yamqui estimating a death toll of 1,500.<sup>119</sup> Garcilaso specifically names the punished servants to have come from the edge of the Inca heartland where Huascar built his royal estate at Kañaraqay and who carried the Inca name by privilege given by Manco Capac.<sup>120</sup> This confirms that other than his immediate relatives, the Muina people of the Lucre Basin were Huascar's closest allies in the Inca heartland, receiving the gruesome family treatment. Topa Inca and his *panaca* were seen as the main threat in Cuzco, as Rahua Ocllo was his daughter, so Quizquiz and Chalcochima destroyed his royal *malqui* by burning it.<sup>121</sup> The descendants and servants of Topa Inca were also sent to be slaughtered, but many of the almost 1,000 escaped.

Such an extensive campaign to annihilate all potential Huascar supporters must have left a significant gap in the Inca nobility, especially considering the huge numbers who died in battle, and yet more who were stricken by the same European diseases that got to Huayna Capac. With the news of the arrival of some strange men in Tumbes coming just days after Chalcochima took Huascar out of Cuzco, Atahualpa decided to stay back in Cajamarca and see what the commotion

<sup>117</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 636.

<sup>118</sup> Cobo, 169; Garcilaso, 640; Murúa 2001, 191. These included Elvira Chuna (daughter of Canac Capac), Beatriz Carhuamay Huay (daughter of the Chíncha Cocha curaca), Juana Tocto, and Catalina Usica (mother of Carlos Inca), as well as Garcilaso's mother and his uncle, Francisco Topa Inca Yupanqui, and Paullo and Manco Inca, two sons of Huayna Capac that played pivotal roles in the early Spanish administration.

<sup>119</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.42v.

<sup>120</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 643.

<sup>121</sup> Murúa 2001, 192.



was all about.<sup>122</sup> But the damage was already done. Despite their profound lack of knowledge of the Andean landscape and the difficulties they faced, traversing the rugged terrain with heavy artillery and horse, Pizarro and his men made their way fast to Cajamarca. Atahualpa's victory had brought uncertainty among the local lords, political alliances were broken or at least in flux, and most simply saw an opportunity to take a day off from supporting the empire that conquered them with the lack of clarity about who controlled it. Or perhaps, after the devastation of a war to which they had to contribute troops and which also brought a wave of a deadly epidemic that further decimated their populations, many local groups simply did not pay that much attention to the band of merry men that came to overturn the greatest indigenous, American empire.

The diligence with which Quizquiz and Chalcochima annihilated Huascar's supporters and Atahualpa's fear of coming even remotely close to Cuzco once again legitimize Huascar and suggest the grip he had on Tahuantinsuyu. Yet, this might have been a result of Atahualpa's paranoia more than any reality. There is no evidence of any significant coups planned in Cuzco, but we do know from the early modern written source that troops and Inca generals sometimes defected during the course of the civil war. For example, Betanzos relates that in the very beginning of the war, after the first battle at Ambato, Cuxi Yupanqui, one of Huascar's closest generals switched his allegiance to Atahualpa.<sup>123</sup> Murúa adds that Huanca AQUI took over, but he was constantly under the cloud of suspicion that he was cooperating with the enemy, as he kept losing battle after battle before he was finally supplanted by Mayta Yupanqui at Ancoyaco.<sup>124</sup> Although, he was also killed in the aftermath of the war, Murúa writes that he was a major figure

<sup>122</sup> Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.42v.

<sup>123</sup> Betanzos 1996, 198.

<sup>124</sup> Murúa 2001, 164 and Sarmiento 1999, 174.

in the negotiations between the Inca aristocracy in Cuzco that resulted in the surrender of the city to Quizquiz and Chalcochima.<sup>125</sup> The Chachapoyas, who were also punished severely for being close allies to Huascar, betrayed him as well, as they secretly fled after the defeat at Concha Huayla in the beginning of the Chasing Phase of the war.<sup>126</sup> Pedro Pizarro goes so far as to suggest that all of Quizquiz and Chalcochima's victories were won through sabotage, after Huascar threatened to bury the royal *malqui* and stole land from them.<sup>127</sup>

Other than the support of Topa Inca due to his relation to Rahua Ocllo, there is no indication that any major figure or faction in Cuzco had particularly good or productive relationship with Huascar. Indeed, even his own family seemed not to like him that much. This shows how shaky Huascar's alliances within the Inca court were and that by the end of the war of succession they were all but destroyed. His mother first questioned his fitness as a ruler, when she refused to give him Chuqui Huypa as his primary wife, according to Murúa.<sup>128</sup> Betanzos reports multiple disagreements between the old *Coya* and the young *Sapa Inca* at the very beginning of the civil war, with Rahua Ocllo vouching for Atahualpa's true intentions.<sup>129</sup> It was not only Betanzos, though, who reported that this relationship had soured by the end of the war. At the tribunal at Quipaypampa, Rahua Ocllo denounced her son for bringing being cruel, which led to his eventual downfall.<sup>130</sup> And then there was the proposed plot to take Huascar down in

<sup>125</sup> Murúa 2001, 185.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>127</sup> Pizarro 1978, 54.

<sup>128</sup> Murúa 2001, 142.

<sup>129</sup> Betanzos 1996, 189.

<sup>130</sup> Betanzos 1996, 220 and Sarmiento 1999, 182-183.

order to supplant him with Cusi Atauchi that allegedly Rahua Ocllo was a major part of.<sup>131</sup> If his own mother did not support Huascar, it is hard to imagine that the rest of the nobility, who had all the reasons to rebel against him after his acts against the royal *malqui* and their *panacas*.

Instead, it appears that the *Sapa Inca*'s only enduring allies were the Muina and the Colla. The latter were responsible for his sporadic military victories, while the former were punished severely at the end of the war, since they were perceived to be his kin. Quizquiz and Chalcochima were weathered generals who commanded experienced warriors, but their almost complete domination on the battlefield is somewhat confounding, especially when we consider the vast numbers of soldiers Huascar was able to summon from virtually every region of the empire. If these armies were truly loyal to their leader, and once they knew the fate of the Cañari at Tomebamba, they would have fought fiercely not only for the one wearing the fringe, but for their own survival. They would also have possessed local knowledge of the landscape that would have given them some advantage over Quizquiz and his forces, but they kept getting crushed on the battlefield, often fleeing to return home. This suggests that neither these conscripts, nor the generals leading Atahualpa's army, saw themselves as Huascar's inherent allies. They were simply caught in the middle of the two brothers.

The Colla were very different. The early modern sources repeatedly show them as critical when Huascar achieved even minor and temporary victory. They held Quizquiz in Pumpu in the only battle of the Chasing Phase that was competitive.<sup>132</sup> The Collasuyu division of the imperial army won the first battle of the Final Phase that almost completely turned the course of the war

<sup>131</sup> Murúa 2001, 133-134.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 174.

in Huascar's favor.<sup>133</sup> Interestingly, Garcilaso blamed the ultimate defeat of the ruler in Cuzco on the lack of Colla forces in the final stand, as they were slowly making their way north.<sup>134</sup> In the end, it does not seem like their support was enough to sway the pendulum of either the war or the public opinion in Cuzco in Huascar's favor.

The critical alliance with the Colla, as well as with the Muina, may have been a key factor in Huascar's controversial switch to Hurin Cuzco. Spatially, the relationship between Collasuyu in the south and Chinchaysuyu in the north, the domain of Atahualpa, matches the relationship between Hurin and Hanan respectively. For Huascar, this may have made sense from a strategic point of view, as he could recruit troops from the south more easily far from Atahualpa's influence and the threat of Quizquiz devastating the lands of the Colla. It also made sense conceptually, as by joining Hurin Cuzco, he was declaring a direct link between himself and Manco Capac, the reputed founder of Cuzco. These actions and narratives were spatially mapped on the landscape, as the Inca believed that Manco arrived from Lake Titicaca, the domain of the Colla. Hence Huascar's presented him as the inheritor of a long-standing tradition of power in Cuzco, supported by the very locus of origin for the Inca. By definition then, Atahualpa was placed by Huascar as his diametrical opposition –Hanan, the north, the usurper, lacking historical legitimacy.

Indeed, this tactic might have worked well for recruiting the Colla, as well as other peoples of Collasuyu, but it might have spelt the downfall for Huascar at the same time. Other groups from the southern quarter between the Inca heartland and the Lake Titicaca Basin, such as the Cañas and the Canchis were among the first supporters of his claim as well as among the last

<sup>133</sup> Murúa 2001, 179; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.40r; Sarmiento 1999, 178.

<sup>134</sup> Garcilaso 1991, 634.

to stand by him.<sup>135</sup> To express his departure towards the place of origin, Huascar built his royal estate at Kañaraqay in the domain of the Muina people on the edge of the Inca heartland. This place represented a personal “return to origins”, as the *Sapa Inca* was born there.<sup>136</sup> The role of this building project in the war will be discussed in Chapter 8, but it is clear that the fate of the Muina and their annihilation in the hands of Quizquiz and Chalcochima was indicative of their full-hearted support for Huascar.

As noted, allying with Collasuyu brought some critical benefits, but it also seems to have created a major tactical hinderance in the war. As eager as the Colla were to support Huascar, they do not seem to have participated in much of the war. Garcilaso suggests that their troops just did not make it in time. Another, simpler, explanation is that their lands and their own wellbeing were never directly threatened by Atahualpa and the war, so they were not as invested in the war as Huascar might have hoped. This makes their lack of urgency to participate in the civil war of their conquerors ever more understandable. While other groups such as the Cañari and the Chachapoyas faced combat and dire consequences for their territories and people, the Colla were situated securely far from direct danger. They likely felt especially safe given that Cuzco lay north, thus between themselves and Atahualpa’s forces heading south. As we have seen with the Cañari and Chachapoyas, local leaders were more than ready to exploit the succession crisis for their own gain, even if not always successfully. Although unlikely that they played double agents like their counterparts to the north, the Colla had little impetus to participate fully in the civil war and every reason to hope that it would lead to the demise of the empire, as it eventually did. Although they bet on the wrong claimant, their stake remained low, which in turn helped to

<sup>135</sup> Cieza 1960, 85 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.41r.

<sup>136</sup> Betanzos 1996, 176; Cobo 1979, 163; Murúa 2001, 125 and 132; Sarmiento 1999, 169

ensure that Huascar's own gambit was an ultimate failure. This weak alliance meant that Quizquiz and Chalcochima sliced through the uninspired armies of conscripts to reach Cuzco and win the war for Atahualpa.

## **Conclusions**

Based on the detailed examination of the causes, the course, and the aftermath of the Inca Civil War from the written sources here, I argue that the dynastic war was defined by two critical factors. First, and already established by the previous studies on the conflict, despite Huascar commanding a much stronger claim of legitimacy for succeeding their father, Atahualpa had control and support from the somewhat professionalized Inca army and the most experienced military leaders. The military advantage of the Quito army is exemplified by the fact that they won 19 out of the 23 battles during the war, while of the four victories for the southerners, two were immediately overturned with devastating defeats the following day. Although Huascar kept throwing ever larger numbers of conscripted warriors, estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands, these men lacked the morale and the leadership provided by Atahualpa's generals Quizquiz and Chalcochima, whose march on Cuzco was never interrupted for more than the one month the two armies engaged each other at Ancoyaco.

Second, I argue that Huascar's switching his allegiance from Hanan to Hurin Cuzco gave him the support of his most important allies, but also alienated others and destined him for ultimate failure. Despite the chaos and confusion that surrounded the death of Huayna Capac and his nominated heir, the written sources mostly agree that Huascar was the clear choice once his father and brother were befallen by a deadly European virus. There is no indication that Atahualpa ever tried to stop his brother's investiture and given that the process involved a royal



wedding, the return of Huayna Capac's *malqui* to Cuzco, as well as rituals and fasts that lasted for a whole year, he clearly had the chance to stake his claim then.

Even after the two brothers clashed initially in the Ecuadorian Phase of the war, there is reason to believe that Atahualpa only wanted to remain in control of the northern territories. After the two armies exhausted each other, there was an impasse that perhaps lasted three full years, in which each party engaged in other military activities elsewhere, suggesting that Atahualpa was not eager to challenge his half-brother for Cuzco and that the *Sapa Inca* remained strong. Some sources even argue that a governorship of Quito was always Atahualpa's ultimate goal and he only responded to Huascar's escalation or indeed felt compelled by his inadequacy.

Initially, Huascar might have felt certain slight from the Inca elites for the succeeding Huayna Capac without being his father's first choice and lacking his overt approval. Like all previous rulers, he likely felt pressure to expand the empire to gain lands that would produce the goods necessary for his dealings as a *Sapa Inca* including making political alliances. Since the northern path towards the present-day Colombian Andes was the most viable path, he seems to have felt blocked in his imperial ambitions by his half-brother in Quito. With the power of the *panaca* in Cuzco ever-present for the *Sapa Inca*, he turned against them by snatching land from them and severely injuring his reputation among the nobility. This might have been an immediate cause for Atahualpa to seize the moment to stake his own claim, but at the very least it determined the ruler's course of action from here on.

The switch from Hanan to Hurin appears to have been done in an attempt to strengthen Huascar's legitimacy through an ideology of "return to origins" that linked him with the founder of Cuzco and the Inca state, Manco Capac, as well as with a different collection of *panaca* in the Inca capital. This would have been a monumental political move similar to Pachacuti's

establishment of Tahuantinsuyu as an empire and Manco's reputed emergence from Lake Titicaca. Except, unlike Pachacuti, who switched the dynasty from a Hurin to a Hanan identity, Huascar was going to return to the lineage of Manco. Thus, he became the antipode of both Atahualpa and the powerful Hanan *panacas* in Cuzco. Atahualpa was from the north, Hanan, and an usurper to the throne, whereas Huascar represented the origin of the state in the south, Hurin, and a successor of the long-term Inca power associated with the origins of the state.

Huascar's switch to Hurin Cuzco may have been a key cause of the war, but it also determined much of its course, as it aligned him with Collasuyu, the southern part of the empire that never fully participated in the war. The Colla sent forces that were critical to his successes, but they never had to risk their territories, which allowed them to engage with the Inca Civil War only when they saw opportunity. And this very well might have been the opportunity to help the empire collapse. Huascar, himself, is recorded to have called for the Inca to emulate their ancestors through the association with a Colla military victory, but that might not have had the desired effect in Cuzco. Most sources agree that the ruler was seen as cruel and unfit for the office and his defiance of the powerful Hanan *panaca* impacted the type of support he received in the war, with multiple reports of generals betraying him and troops fleeing.

The aftermath of the dynastic war was also heavily influenced by Huascar's ideological siding with the Hurin moiety, as his entire lineage was extinguished along with the Muina people of the southern edge of the Inca heartland. The Colla were conspicuously nowhere to be found at the tribunal at Quipaypampa, but the rest of the Huascar's supporters were punished severely. These, again, did not include most of the conscripted armies that heeded his call, nor the Inca nobility that allowed him to continue ruling in Cuzco, save for Topa Inca.

Although Sarmiento and Murúa write that Huascar himself proclaimed that the civil war was not about the Hanan-Hurin divide, it appears that every aspect of the conflict was marked by it.<sup>137</sup> Besides, both sources recounted the captured ruler uttering those words in response to his mother, Rahua Oollo, who was discussing with Quizquiz and Chalcochima that this was the central issue of the war. This political move towards a new Hurin dynasty was enacted through the building of the royal estates in Calca and Kañaraqay. Calca, situated in the traditional locus of Inca pleasure palaces, Urubamba Valley, legitimized Huascar as a part of the imperial lineage, while Kañaraqay established his new Hurin identity, as it was located at the southern end of the Inca heartland. Since there are very little extant remains of Calca today, as it was built over by the modern village of the same name, the final chapter will turn its attention to the remains of Kañaraqay and the way Huascar's building campaign represented his reign and the Inca Civil War.

That so much of this devastating conflict was determined by Huascar's move to Hurin Cuzco reveals an important insight into the way that the Inca Empire operated. The ideological aspect of the switch fueled Huascar's narrative that Atahualpa was a mere usurper with an army who threatened the legitimate ruler directly linked to the origin of Inca power. However, it also had a practical aspect, as it triggered the alliance with the Colla, who were seen as extremely capable and valuable soldiers. This alliance marked most military victories for Huascar, where the Colla helped him to victory, while their absence led to his ultimate defeat, which was portrayed by Murúa and Garcilaso as a result of the Colla not showing up at the final stand in Cuzco.

<sup>137</sup> Murúa 2001, 189 and Sarmiento 1999, 184.

Political alliances, thus, emerge as a critical mechanism for the empire that determined much of the outcome of the Inca Civil War. Instead of the all-conquering, unified, and centralized empire that co-opted local leaders through propaganda and military might, in the context of crisis, we see a state that is dependent on its political alliances. Further, when the continuous renegotiation of these relationships is broken down by the chaos of the war, these alliances begin to crumble and with them the power of the empire. The role that the Cañari played in the Ecuadorian Phase is one example of this, as their lord Urco Colla sought to exploit the dynastic war by playing both sides, weakening the Inca in the process and gaining some measure of autonomy. For much of the war it appears that most of the local groups supported Huascar with troops, but as soon as Atahualpa's army led by Quizquiz and Chalcochima passed through their lands, the relationship with Huascar was severed. In the renegotiation of the alliance between those groups and the Inca, now done by Atahualpa's faction, some of the provinces even sent troops against Huascar.

In light of the course that the Inca Civil War took, we should consider that forming and tending to alliances was one of the most important task of a ruler in order to keep the Inca Empire free of turmoil. The early modern sources report that the Inca themselves often spoke of Tahuantinsuyu as a union in which they were chosen to rule. This has often been discarded as mere propaganda that played on Andean understandings of *ayni* or reciprocal mutualism but led to an asymmetrical relationship benefiting the empire. However, I argue that alliance building and the continuous renegotiation of the terms of this "union," as unbalanced as they may have been, was the core mechanism that best characterized Tahuantinsuyu.

## **Chapter 6. The Illusion of Centralization: The Inca State and its Ceramic Variability**

As we have seen from Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the sixteenth and seventeenth written sources present narrative of the Inca Civil War that characterizes the Inca Empire in a new light. As the dynastic war shook the Andean world, it exposed the frailty of some of Tahuantinsuyu's political alliances, while it highlighted their critical importance in the way the empire functioned. Unlike the relative dearth of historical examination of the Inca state, however, archaeologists have built a solid body of literature on a wide range of topics in the LH. Although the Inca Civil War has not received as much attention, many previous studies, especially those related to pottery, present a great opportunity to test the insights gained from the historical examination of the war in the previous three chapters. We now turn to archaeology in order to bridge the two disciplines in the next three chapters of this dissertation. The present chapter focuses on the historiography of Inca ceramic studies and how they relate to the role of alliance building within the empire. The following chapter (Chapter 7) offers a new way of looking at Inca ceramics through a linguistic study of Inca pottery forms and the ways they relate to ontology. The final chapter (Chapter 8) will directly test the insights from the historical chapters, the linguistic study of Inca ceramic forms, and the previous archaeological work to the royal estate of Kañaraqay built during the Inca Civil War and symbolizing the alliance between Huascar and the Colla as well as his switch to Hurin Cuzco.

Being one of the most durable materials produced in the past in great quantities almost everywhere in the world and being relatively less sought after by looters, ceramics are often our best tool for a glimpse of the past. Pottery has become such an integral part of archaeology that ceramic chronologies are our most common dating method. And then the list of applications for

understanding past societies is endless – from community building with food and drink consumption to migration and trade to ritual use and particular substance association.

The Andean, and in particular the Inca, case is no different. Studies on the imperial economy at the local, regional, and state level are all largely based on exchange of ceramic containers.<sup>1</sup> Pottery has been in the center of much scholarship on the Inca colonization practices through reciprocity with conquered local elites, which were often expressed in pottery construction and consumption.<sup>2</sup> For example, Tamara Bray's inquiry on Inca cuisine is based on a ceramic use derived from morphological analysis of the imperial Inca assemblage, Tim Earle's argument about the Inca economy functioning as a distributive rather than a market or even exchange-based system is based in the change over time of the exchange patterns of two types of ceramic wares, while Justin Jennings and Melissa Chatfield argue that the increased size of ceramic vessels associated

<sup>1</sup> Costin, Cathy. "Production and Exchange of Ceramics," in *Empire and Domestic Economy*. eds. Terence D'Altroy and Christine Hastorf. (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2001): 203-242; Terence D'Altroy, "State Goods in the Domestic Economy: The Inka Ceramic Assemblage," in *Empire and Domestic Economy*, eds. Terence D'Altroy and Christine Hastorf, (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2001): 243-264; Timothy Earle, "Exchange and Social Stratification in the Andes: The Xauxa Case." in *Empire and Domestic Economy*, eds. Terence D'Altroy and Christine Hastorf, (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2001): 297-314; Craig Morris, "The archeological study of Andean exchange systems," *Social Archeology* (1978): 315-327; Craig Morris, "Maize beer in the economics, politics, and religion of the Inka empire," in *Fermented Food Beverages in Nutrition*, eds. C. F. Gastineau, W. J. Darby, and T. B. Turner. (New York: Kluwer Academic Press, 1979): 21-34.

<sup>2</sup> Melissa Chatfield, "Tracing Firing Technologies Through Clay Properties in Cuzco, Peru," *Journal of Archaeological Science*, Vol. 37 (2010): 727-736; Terence D'Altroy and Roland Bishop, "The Provincial Organization of Inka Ceramic Production," *American Antiquity*, (1990): 120-138; Frances Hayashida et al., "Technology and Organisation of Inka Pottery Production in the Leche Valley. Part II: Study of Fired Vessels," *Hyperfine Interactions*, Vol. 150, No.1 (2003): 153-163; Rob Ixer, Sara Lunt, and Bill Sillar, "The use of andesite temper in Inca and pre-Inca pottery from the region of Cuzco, Peru," in *Craft and Science: International perspectives on archaeological ceramics*, ed. M.Martinón-Torres, (Bloomsbury: Qatar Foundation, 2014): 31-38; Leah Minc et al, "Potting Clays and Ceramic Provenance in Northern Highland Ecuador," in *Vessels Explored: Applying Archaeometry to South American Ceramics and their Production*, BAR International Series 2808, ed. by Emily Stovel and Guillermo De la Fuente, 47-66, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Clarisa Otero and Maria Cremonte, "Local Ceramic Technology of the Pucara of Tilcara During the Inka Period (Quebrada of Humahuaca, Argentina)," *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology*, Vol. 33 (2014): 108-118; Cristina Prieto Olavarría, "La producción y función de la cerámica indígena durante la dominación incaica y la colonia en Mendoza (Argentina)," *Intersecciones En Antropología*, No. 13 (2012): 71-87; María Andrea Runcio, "Producción y consumo de vasijas cerámicas en la Quebrada de Humahuaca (Provincia de Jujuy, Argentina) durante el período Inka (1430-1536 DC)," *Boletín Del Museo Chileno De Arte Precolombino*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2012): 61-73.

with maize beer production is indexical of the imperial project, as the large pots allowed for the Inca conquerors to indebt their new subjects by throwing elaborate state sponsored parties.<sup>3</sup>

Despite these advances, there is still very little that we know or agree on when it comes to Inca pottery as a whole. In particular, we lack a clear definition of the extent of the ceramic assemblage, liberally applying terms such as imperial, provincial, rural, hybrid, as well as imitation Inca. The use of these overlapping levels of Inca-ness mimics our need to match social hierarchical layers in our material culture categories. As such, the imperial style is the one that most closely adheres to the general rules of Inca vessel morphology, decoration, and construction technique, and it is likely produced in Cuzco.<sup>4</sup> Alternatively, the provincial style, or rather provincial styles, exhibits some variation, as well as often a level of hybridity with another local style, related to a particular regional condition.<sup>5</sup> Rural Inca was the term proposed by Rivera Dorado to explain the continuity of the Killke style, formerly thought to represent a pre-Inca Cuzco tradition in the Late Intermediate Period (AD 1000-1470, LIP from here on), into the Late Horizon (AD 1470-1532, LH from here on).<sup>6</sup> In a way, the rural Inca style is simply another version of a provincial Inca

<sup>3</sup> Tamara Bray, "To Dine Splendidly," in *The archaeology and politics of food and feasting in early states and empires*, ed. Tamara Bray, (New York: Springer, 2003): 93-142; Earle 2001; Justin Jennings and Melissa Chatfield, "Pots, Brewers, and Hosts: Women's Power and the Limits of Central Andean Feasting," in *Drink, Power, and Society in the Andes*, eds. Justin Jennings and Brenda Bowser, 200-231, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Cathy Costin, "Craftin Identities Deep and Broad: Hybrid Ceramics on the Late Prehispanic North Coast of Peru," in *Making Value, Making Meaning: Techne in the Pre-Columbian World*, ed. Cathy Costin, (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2016), 323; Catherine Julien, "Las Tumbas de Sacsayhuaman y el estilo Cuzco-Inca," *Nawpa Pacha*, Vol. 25-27, 1987-1989 (2004): 1-125; George Miller, "An Investigation of Cuzco-Inca Ceramics: Canons of Form, Proportion, and Size," *Nawpa Pacha*, Vol. 25/27, 1987-1989 (2004): 127-149; John Rowe, *An Introduction to the Archaeology of Cuzco*, (New York: Institute of Andean Research, 1944).

<sup>5</sup> Here I follow Carolyn Dean and Dana Leibsohn's understanding of hybridity as something that is not merely a by-product

<sup>6</sup> Miguel Rivera Dorado, "La Cerámica Killke y la Arqueología de Cuzco," *Revista Española de Antropología Americana*, Vol. 6 (1971), 120.



one, but ironically produced in the imperial core. Finally, scholars have differentiated between the different levels of Inca-ness through quality as well, separating the poorly executed provincial styles as mere imitations.<sup>7</sup> Now, there is clearly a practical utility in separating the large volumes of pottery into groups for analysis, but this particular division is based on the history of Inca investigation rather than some naturally occurring dividing lines in the assemblage. As such, while its aim is to illuminate the imperial mechanisms of government, the imperial-provincial divide obscures the complexity of the relationships between the Inca and their subjects.

Separating the ceramic material associated with the Inca into imperial and provincial implies that Tahuantinsuyu functioned as a rigid hierarchical system of hegemonic control of the provinces by the core. The highly standardized and recognizable imperial style is seen both as a marker of Inca ethnic identity and the state's presence, while the provincial styles represent the gradual enculturation of the conquered populations into the imperial system. Yet both historical and archaeological data suggest that the empire operated largely through complex negotiations with the local populations and through delegating much executive power to local elites.<sup>8</sup> The rapid expansion from a Cuzco-based polity akin to other Andean LIP chiefdoms and early states into the largest empire of the Americas offered a number of challenges. The state now controlled people from dozens of different ethnicities and languages living in a number of different ecological zones.

<sup>7</sup> Tamara Bray, "Encuentros Imperiales: Contingencia Historica, Agencia Local, e Hibrididad," in *La Cerámica Arqueológica en la Materialización de la Sociedad*, BAR International Series 2294, eds. Maria Páez and Guillermo de la Fuente, 59-74. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Cathy Costin, "Hybrid Objects, Hybrid Social Identities: Style and Social Structure in the Late Horizon Andes," in *Identity Crisis: Archaeology and Problems of Social Identity*, eds Lindsay Amundsen-Meyer, Nicole Engel, and Sean Pickering, 211-225, (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2011).

<sup>8</sup> Bray 2011, Catherine Julien, *Hatunqolla, a View of Inca Rule from the Lake Titicaca Region*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Maria Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, *Historia del Tahuantinsuyu*, (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1988); Steven Wernke, *Negotiated Settlements: Andean Communities and Landscapes Under Inka and Spanish Colonialism*. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2013).

Lacking the sheer numbers, the Inca could not station armies throughout the empire to maintain its border, but instead relied on the art of their imperial propaganda that presented conquest as membership lucrative to the local elites. In this context, pottery did signify the Inca presence in the local realm, but such presence was based in negotiation rather than domination.

Thus, Inca ceramics produced both in Cuzco and in the provinces have the power to illuminate the mechanisms of Inca imperialism. In fact, many ceramic studies, both recently and in the more distant past, have pointed exactly to the ways provincial Inca pottery acted as a state tool for embodying the governmental tactics of local elite empowerment through gift-giving, control of raw materials for exacting labor taxation, control of women for maize beer production, and control of form over decoration and construction technology.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the variability of Inca pottery has always been recognized, but a greater push to understand its complexity has only appeared in the past several years.<sup>10</sup> Work challenging the hierarchical relationship between the imperial and provincial ceramic styles covers all aspects of the material from studies on raw materials and technology, through work on production organization and exchange, to projects on ideology, iconography, and identity. These show how, even though we largely still think of the imperial Cuzco-Inca pottery as more Inca than the provincial styles, there is already a body of literature that speaks how both of these styles represent the way the Inca state functioned by expressing the two sides of the negotiation that characterized it.

<sup>9</sup> For example, Costin 2016, D'Altroy and Bishop 1990; Marco Giovannetti and María Páez, "Las Practicas Alfareras tras la Presencia Inkaica: Un Analisis a partir de los Platos del Noroeste Argentino," in *La Cerámica Arqueológica en la Materializacion de la Sociedad*, BAR International Series 2294, eds. María Páez and Guillermo de la Fuente, 101-112, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014; Jennings and Chatfield 2009; Morris 1979.

<sup>10</sup> Bray 2011, Costin 2011 and 2016, Giovannetti and Páez 2011, Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014.

Indeed, we might posit that only a small portion of Inca pottery was made in the imperial Cuzco style. The point this chapter aims to make is not merely that provincial styles represent a gap in our knowledge having been relegated to a secondary status, but rather that we need to rethink the definition of imperial pottery, given that we already know how styles from the imperial core and hybrid styles from the provinces often served the empire in similar ways. Such rethinking involves the reclassification of hybrid styles as Inca styles. Cultural mixing or hybridity has been the focus of much academic attention.<sup>11</sup> In this chapter, my use of the term hybrid follows three strands of how we think of cultural mixing that I contend are most significant for the Inca case.

First, I follow Cathy Costin who argues that rather than thinking of hybrids as imposed by a hegemonic power or as a subversion, we should think of hybridity as “a negotiated response to changing socio-political relations in which all parties have some agency – albeit not always equal.”<sup>12</sup> Given our limited knowledge of how the conquered viewed this new body of ceramic material, although both hegemony and subversion are both plausible explanations, Costin’s suggestion that they represent a negotiated reality seems most robust. While we may not be able to reconstruct the level of success of Inca imperial propaganda in each case that created a mixed object, seeing those objects as a result of this very negotiation points to understanding hybrids as embodiments of the imperial project itself.

<sup>11</sup> See for example, Ana Maria Alonso, “Confronting Disconformity: “Mestizaje,” Hybridity, and the Aesthetics of Mexican Nationalism,” *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 19, No. 4: 459-490; Marisol de la Cadena, “Are Mestizos Hybrids? The Conceptual Politics of Andean Identities,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2: 259-284; Nestor Garcia Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies of Entering and Leaving Modernity*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); John Hutnyk, “Hybridity,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1: 79-102; Matthew Liebmann, “Parsing Hybridity: Archaeologies of Amalgamation in Seventeenth-Century New Mexico,” in *The Archaeology of Hybrid Material Culture*, edited by Jeb Card, 25-49, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2013); Stephan Palmie, “Mixed Blessings and Sorrowful Mysteries: Second Thoughts about Hybridity,” *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 463-482.

<sup>12</sup> Cathy Costin, “Crafting Identities Deep and Broad: Hybrid Ceramics on the Late Prehispanic North Coast of Peru,” in *Making Value, Making Meaning: Techne in the Pre-Columbian World*, edited by Cathy Costin, 319-359, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2016): 320.

Secondly, I follow Mikhail Bakhtin's argument that intentional mixing draws attention to its distinct elements by creating a dialogue.<sup>13</sup> If the Inca imperial project was characterized by alliance building and maintenance, seeing hybrid objects as a dialogue imbues them with the highest level of Incaness. That is to say, hybrid ceramics become the embodiment of the interaction between the Inca and the local realm, which is in itself what the Inca stand for in that same local realm. They become *tinkuys* – an important Indigenous Andean concept of the conjoining of oppositional forces or entities, whose power comes from its very liminality – that are much more potent than foreign Cuzco objects by themselves. While it is not impossible to reconstruct certain hybrids as representations of subversion or hegemony, thinking of them as dialogues matches the Inca imperial ideology that order is created by the mixing of oppositional forces, even if in practice one of those forces held asymmetrical power over the other.

Finally, I echo Carolyn Dean and Dana Liebsohn's concern that in reconstructing the meaning of hybrid objects, we must acknowledge the relationship between our present interpretations and the past, as much as those relationships that created the mixing in the past.<sup>14</sup> Excluding hybrid objects from the imperial Inca ceramic assemblage is, thus, not merely a practical necessity, but rather an epistemological argument in itself. Consequently, the inclusion of hybrids as Inca in this chapter is an argument for the way these negotiated objects were viewed as a result of Inca expansion and so as Inca products. However, I am mindful that this interpretation is not absolute and that hybridity offers further complexity in each individual case. So while I think of hybrid Inca ceramics in this chapter as embodiments of the negotiation between conquerors and

<sup>13</sup> Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), 380.

<sup>14</sup> Carolyn Dean and Dana Liebsohn, "Hybridity and Its Discontents: Considering Visual Culture in Colonial Spanish America," *Colonial Latin American Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (2003): 5-35.

conquered, i.e. the imperial project, other projects might find this approach too generalizing. The inherent complexity of hybrids makes their interpretation rather uncomfortable, for which we need to be mindful that present interpretations serve particular purposes rather than simply reconstructing an objective past.

Considering provincial Inca and hybrid ceramic styles as Inca will have several important consequences. It will allow for the diversity of the material to illuminate the diversity of imperial tactics undertaken throughout the vast empire. It will further challenge the neat narrative of the strong centralized state that controlled the production of standardized pottery, given that the archaeological data already do not support such a narrative. And finally, in the context of crisis, such as the Inca Civil War, it will allow us to see negotiations in the ceramic assemblages beyond a simple decreased level of top-down control. As ceramics embodied the relationships between conquered and conqueror in the provinces, they also represented the complex relationships between the Inca and the Inca of privilege groups in the imperial heartland. Thus, the continuous negotiation of political alliances between the Inca and the local leaders should be visible in the ceramic assemblage.

The next few sections of this chapter will review the body of literature on Inca ceramics that already points, if not explicitly, towards an understanding of how pottery reflected the nature of the Inca state as one characterized by continuous negotiation between the core and the provinces. The first such section will focus on the definition of imperial Inca pottery and the typologies, largely still in use, that create the imperial style, as well as their applicability and drawbacks. It will be followed by a section on Inca ceramic technology and the ways its adaptability in the provinces mirrors the adaptability of imperial tactics. The following section will focus on labor organization of both production and consumption of pottery in the provinces and their implications

for imperial control and local agency. This will lead into a section on ceramic exchange and the function of pottery in the imperial economy, before moving into the last section of this paper, which will deal with the ways ideology and identity are communicated through Inca ceramics on both sides of the conqueror-conquered equation.

## **1. Imperial vs Provincial: The Question of Typology**

Much of the early archaeological scholarship on Inca ceramics was focused on categorization and description. This is certainly not surprising as knowing what we study is the first step of understanding the material culture at hand. We still produce excavation and site reports which essentially do the same – describe in detail both our methodology and the resulting finds – except we now use the typologies established earlier. The five main ceramic classifications that we still largely use in the field were produced between 1915 and 1987 and mostly focus on the Inca heartland, with the notable exception of Meyers' which included material from Ingapirca in Ecuador.<sup>15</sup> Chapter 6 will survey the history of these typologies in detail. For the purposes of the discussion here, however, it is crucial to recognize that all of them followed a similar logic. They all focused exclusively on an imperial style produced in the imperial heartland whose wares were categorized by shape with some considerations of decoration.

There are two important effects of the way all five big typologies are constructed on the ways we look at the Inca ceramic assemblage. First, Inca pottery is divided into imperial and provincial styles. While visually not that distinct, these are two very different styles conceptually,

<sup>15</sup> Hiram Bingham, "Types of Machu Picchu Pottery," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 17 (1915): 257-271; Luis Pardo, "Hacia una Nueva Clasificación de la Cerámica Cuzqueña del Antiguo Perú," *Revista del Instituto Arqueológico del Cuzco*, Vol. 4 (1939): 3-27; Rowe 1944; Albert Meyers, "Algunos problemas en la clasificación del estilo incaico," *Pumapunku*, Vol. 8, (1975): 7-25; Julien 2004.

as the imperial style is considered “true” Inca, while the provincial varieties are relegated to mere imitations. Thus defined, the imperial style comprises a small number of standardized vessel forms that can be divided into seven classes – *aribalos* (more appropriately called *urpus*), narrow-necked vessels, wide-necked vessels, wide-mouthed pots, pedestal pots, plates and bowls, and cups.<sup>16</sup> These vessels were formed by coiling and were fired, presumably at relatively high temperatures judging on the hardness of the vessels, in oxidizing conditions that give them a characteristic reddish orange color.<sup>17</sup> They were further slipped and painted with a limited number of decorative motifs.<sup>18</sup> While Jenaro Fernandez Baca provides an extensive list of variations of both the geometric and the figural design employed in the imperial Inca style, most scholars have agreed that the vast majority of the vessels focus on single digit number of common motifs.<sup>19</sup> These include the vertical and horizontal strings of hatched or concentric rhomboids, the bar and X motif, as well as the so-called “fern” motif,<sup>20</sup> which has been variously interpreted as a representation of

<sup>16</sup> Tamara Bray, “Inca Iconography: The Art of Empire in the Andes,” *RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics*, No. 38: 169; Sara Lunt, *Inca and Pre-Inca Pottery from Cusichaca, Department of Cuzco, Peru*, PhD Dissertation, (London: University College London, 1987); Meyers 1975.

<sup>17</sup> Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, “Catalogue,” in *Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas*, eds. Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Hayashida et al. 2003, 154; Sara Lunt, “The Manufacture of the Inca Aryballus,” in *Recent Studies in Pre-Columbian Archaeology*, BAR International 421, eds. Nicholas Saunders and Olivier de Montmollin, (Oxford: British Archaeological Records, 1988).

<sup>18</sup> Bray 2000,172; D’Altroy 2001, 245.

<sup>19</sup> Bray 2003, To Dine Splendidly; Jenaro Fernández Baca, *Motivos de Ornamentación de la Cerámica Inca-Cuzco I*, (Lima: Librería Studium, 1973); Jenaro Fernández Baca, *Motivos de Ornamentación de la Cerámica Inca-Cuzco II*, (Lima: Librería Studium, 1989), Rowe 1944.

<sup>20</sup> Bray 2000; Fernandez Baca 1973 and 1989; Julien 2004; Rowe 1944.



a fern,<sup>21</sup> the Inca origin story,<sup>22</sup> or death.<sup>23</sup> While this definition is likely accurate, as well as useful, when applied to Cuzco-produced ceramics, it fails to encompass the variability of pottery that was employed by the state. Vessels that did not fit this description and that exhibit different levels of hybridity were used to strengthen alliances both in the heartland<sup>24</sup> and in the provinces.<sup>25</sup> In Collasuyu, other styles such as the Pacajes of the southern Lake Titicaca Basin or Diaguita of northern Chile were used as intermediaries essentially acting as Inca vessels.<sup>26</sup>

The second effect of the typologies in use is the belief that the imperial Cuzco-Inca style is highly standardized into a very low number of recognizable forms. It comprises just some twelve (Rowe) to seventeen (Julien) forms with only three (Rowe) to fourteen (Pardo) major decorative designs.<sup>27</sup> More forms and subforms are elaborated only in Rivera Dorado's twenty-eight forms from Chinchero and Bingham's forty-seven subforms from Machu Picchu, although the latter included a number of markedly non-Inca forms.<sup>28</sup> The provincial style, on the other hand, is so multitudinous and varied that no systematic typology for it exists. Essentially, all variation is attributed to local conditions and is discarded from the imperial style as provincial. All similarity,

<sup>21</sup> Fernandez Baca 1989, Rowe 1944.

<sup>22</sup> Bray 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Catherine Allen, "The Sadness of Jars: Separation and Rectification in Andean Understanding of Death," in *Living with the Dead in the Andes*, eds. Izumi Shimada and James Fitzsimmons, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2015): 304-328.

<sup>24</sup> Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014.

<sup>25</sup> Costin 2011.

<sup>26</sup> Itaci Correa et al, "Contextos alfareros de interacción social: lo local y lo foráneo en el cementerio inca de Quinta Normal," *Revista Chilena De Antropología*, No. 19. (2007): 143-171; Runcio 2012.

<sup>27</sup> Julien 2004; Pardo 1939; Rowe 1944.

<sup>28</sup> Bingham 1915; Miguel Rivera Dorado, "La Cerámica Inca de Chinchero," in *Arqueología de Chinchero 2: Cerámica y Otros Materiales*, (Madrid: Ministerios de Asuntos Exteriores, 1976): 27-90.

on the other hand, is interpreted as strong standardization, which is a feature of strong imperial rule. This mode of thinking makes for a very neat argument that the Inca, who were short in numbers and could not rely on stationing army garrisons throughout the empire, used their highly standardized and therefore recognizable material culture to show presence in the provinces.

As compelling as this argument is, it seems to be missing an essential point about how Tahuantinsuyu operated. While *presencing* was an important government tool for the Inca, it was not the only one.<sup>29</sup> The conquerors entered into complex complementary relationships with local elites to whom they yielded most of the executive power on the provincial and local level.<sup>30</sup> This symbolic relationship was undoubtedly performed through material culture and ceramics in particular as well.<sup>31</sup> What we now discard from the imperial repertoire as provincial styles might be the most important embodiment of how the empire operated, revealing key points of articulation between the Inca and the local elites. Furthermore, the desire to showcase great standardization seems to have introduced a level of technical inaccuracy to some of the typologies. For example, most authors flatten all morphological variations of plates and bowls into one or two basic forms.<sup>32</sup> Based on handle form alone, it is possible to distinguish between four plates and seven bowls (Bingham) or nine separate plate/bowl forms (Rivera Dorado).<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup> By *presencing* I refer to the practice of signifying imperial presence in the local realm via material culture, landscape alterations, architecture, or social restructuring that carries the imperial mark despite the lack of physical presence of imperial administrators, soldiers, or ethnic Inca in the local context. *Presencing* is a tactic often deployed by empires that stretch over large swaths of land and was one of the core modes of governance deployed by the Inca.

<sup>30</sup> Terence D'Altroy, "From Autonomous to Imperial Rule," in *Empire and Domestic Economy*, eds. Terence D'Altroy and Christine Hastorf, (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2001): 325.

<sup>31</sup> See for example, Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014 and D'Altroy and Bishop 1990.

<sup>32</sup> Julien 2004; Meyers 1975; Miller 2004; Pardo 1939; Rowe 1944.

<sup>33</sup> Bingham 1915, 266-267 and Rivera Dorado 1976, 29.

Of course, the implications of a shift towards inclusion of all pottery produced in the Inca state as Inca go way beyond the issue of ceramic categorization. Recognition of the adaptability of the state when it came to ceramic production leads to a recognition that cooperation, albeit an asymmetrical one, was Tahuantinsuyu's *modus operandi*. Further, the Inca were not alone in deploying such tactics, suggesting that they might be a critical part of imperial success, once overextension inevitably creates stresses for the governance of such a large polity. Local cooperation was critical to the Roman government and its stability in Britain, Spain, and Gaul.<sup>34</sup> The practice of pacification and its relative longevity has been dubbed *Pax Romana*, a term that has since been echoed in all corners of the world.<sup>35</sup> Although empires, including the Roman and the Inca, are often built on military prowess, their success and survival depend heavily on cooperation between the metropolis and the periphery. That is not to say cooperation between the sovereign and the populace, but rather a co-option of peripheral leaders who can do the imperial dealings on the ground utilizing vastly different cultural norms to maintain their, and by extension, the imperial power. In the Inca case, scholarship has constructed a vision of imperial rigidity that defines the power of Tahuantinsuyu, but looking closely it is the variability and the local co-option of the imperial project that underline its successes.

To be fair, scholars have been thinking about the complexity of Inca governance for some time now, yet no effort has been made to rethink the classifications that we use in the field. Part of the reason for this is that the analytical mode of American archaeology has moved from description

<sup>34</sup> Thomas Blagg and Martin Millett, "Introduction," in *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, edited by Thomas Blagg and Martin Millett, 1-6, (Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books, 1990), 3.

<sup>35</sup> Including ancient examples such as *Pax Sinica*, referring to the Roman contemporary Han dynasty, and *Pax Tatarica*, referring the Mediaeval Mongol Empire, as well as modern examples such as *Pax Sovietica* and *Pax Americana*, both referring to the dominant geopolitical positions with which the Soviet Union and the United States emerged post-World War II.

to interpretation. We are now, and have been for some time, much more interested in what the meaning of objects can tell us about larger, abstract issues in the past. Those vary in scope from political economy, ecology, and state formation to identity, personhood, and gender. Painstaking analysis of thousands of ceramic sherds in an assemblage in order to only talk about ceramics seems much more boring and unfulfilling. Besides, one might argue that if we have moved on from the particular argument the typologies are making and if they are useful from a practical day-to-day point of view, there is no need for new typologies. However, we return where we started, namely that classifications are the first step of interpretation. How we separate our material in the field has an effect on how we later see patterns in it. To use this practical tool as an analytical hurdle seems hardly productive then.

## **2. Continued Traditions: Inca Ceramic Technology Across the Empire**

Unlike other imperial projects, the Inca Empire did not seek to establish homogeneity in its Andean domain through conversion, cultural, religious, linguistic or otherwise in practice. However, that was not the case for Tahuantinsuyu in theory. The Inca imagined they were given a divine mandate to rule over the world with the purpose of restoring order to it.<sup>36</sup> That order was certainly defined by the conqueror, but it rarely meant a total imposition of the state's will in the provinces. Instead, the state sought the cooperation of local leaders and delegated local executive power to them when possible, in order to concentrate its energy in other place that proved to be less prone to accept the new order.<sup>37</sup> This political model is reflected in the ways social and

<sup>36</sup> Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Dean 2010.

<sup>37</sup> D'Altroy 2001, From Autonomous to Imperial Rule.

material aspects of Inca culture entered the local realm. In particular, Inca ceramics, that is those conforming to the general rules of form and decoration or provincial Inca, entered the provinces as important status goods, but they did not transform the local ceramic technologies.

At both the household and the state workshop levels of provincial Inca ceramic production, there is marked continuity of ceramic technology.<sup>38</sup> This extends to the selection of raw materials, tempering, construction techniques, and firing conditions. Pottery is a relatively heavy material, whose transportation across the rugged terrain of the Andes was increasingly difficult. Of course, Cuzco-produced Inca ceramics show up in all four corners of Tahuantinsuyu, but they are related to special cases of gift giving that solidified political alliances rather than large scale consumption. The same difficulty of transportation over large distances applies to raw materials. Additionally, in keeping with the Inca interest in low investment in local government, the reeducation of local potters into the proper ways of making and Inca pot was seen as too costly and time consuming. Hence the provincial Inca pottery production focused on easier to replicate aspects such as form and decoration. Such departure from the cannon was justified not only by cost effectiveness, however, but also by the fact that these vessels embodied the union between the Inca and the local tradition mixing Inca form with local materials and techniques.

At Pucara of Tilcara, the capital of the Inca province of Humahuaca in Argentina, local and Inca pottery were produced side by side in household workshops.<sup>39</sup> Clarisa Otero and María Cremonte argue that the site continued its function as a house-workshop where domestic and craft activities, including ceramic production and metallurgy, were combined with ritual activities under

<sup>38</sup> Costin 2016; Hayashida et al. 2003; Otero and Cremonte 2014

<sup>39</sup> Otero and Cremonte 2014, 108.

the Inca occupation.<sup>40</sup> The high degree of variation in both forms and surface treatments along with the continuity of local technology traditions show little state interference in local affairs that the authors attribute to the lack of interest in local ceramics and the relationship between local elites and the Inca. The arrival of the Inca brought heightened production activity, particularly metallurgy and stonework, and new ceramic forms that together with the local one formed the Inca-Humahuaca style.

Daily, ritual, and artisanal activities in the workshops took place simultaneously. Maize and camelid meat processing and consumption, clay lumps and tools for ceramic production, hammers, anvils, and molds were all recovered from the space.<sup>41</sup> However, the markers of wealth such as vessels of the Yavi Chicha style, which are found in the residences of both local and Inca elites in the area, were missing from the workshops. Despite the rarity of non-local styles, the ceramic variation is very high. Petrographic analysis, however, showed that all forms share common red pastes, high on chalk and phyllite inclusions.<sup>42</sup> Pucara of Tilcara was thus an important site for metallurgy and local ceramic production, which gave relative freedom to their potters to continue using their traditional production techniques and to keep their large ceramic repertoire. It is important, though, to note that it is precisely the rare non-local Yavi Chicha wares from Jujuy and the Inca-Humahuaca ones that are associated with the elite.<sup>43</sup> If household production technology was left largely intact by the Inca, the resulting products were used to

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 117.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 111.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

represent the state, or more precisely, the physical embodiment of the relationship between the state and the Humahuaca, at the top of the local hierarchy.

Continuity in household production is not especially surprising, but the same technological permanence is exhibited by specialized state ceramic workshops. In the Leche Valley, on the north coast of Peru, Frances Hayashida and her colleagues argue that while Inca and local vessels at two production centers at Tambo Real and La Viña can be distinguished on stylistic grounds, the materials and technology employed in them are almost identical.<sup>44</sup> At both workshops the local potters produced primarily local wares alongside some Inca vessels. Furthermore, the potters applied local techniques to Inca pottery such as the use of vertical press molds instead of the typical highland coiling method.<sup>45</sup> A random selection of two sets of 50 sherds from the local cambered-rim jar and the Inca *urpu* were selected for compositional analysis. In X-ray diffraction (XRD), thin-sections of Inca and local vessels are virtually indistinguishable, both being characterized by large-sized temper of great mineral variety, containing the same temper amounts of 30-40%.<sup>46</sup> Additionally, eight samples (again half local and half Inca) were selected for additional Mössbauer spectroscopy, which showed that both vessel forms were made from the same raw materials.<sup>47</sup> The Inca vessels were fired at slightly higher temperatures (about 1000°C) possibly by firing them higher in the kilns or firing them separately. While the potters followed the Inca instructions for the special care of state-sponsored production, the materials and the techniques for this production were both largely of local origin.

<sup>44</sup> Hayashida et al. 2003, 153.

<sup>45</sup> Frances Hayashida, "Style, Technology, and Administered Production: The Manufacture of Inka Pottery in the Leche Valley, Peru," *Latin American Antiquity*, Vol. 10, No. 4, (1999): 337-352.

<sup>46</sup> Hayashida et al. 2003, 155.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.



The Leche Valley is illustrative of the Inca imperial mechanisms throughout the provinces, while it can be seen as unusual on the north coast, where Inca-style pottery is relatively rare.<sup>48</sup> The reference here is to the imperial style, as a particular provincial variety, the Inca-Chimú hybrids, is common and seems to act as Inca in the local context. These hybrids are produced entirely in the Chimú technical tradition.<sup>49</sup> They are made in molds and shaped through the paddle and anvil technique unlike the coiled imperial Inca vessels. They feature a number of press-molded, paddle-stamped figural designs instead of the common painted geometric ones of the Cuzco-produced pottery. The Inca-Chimú hybrids are reduction fired resulting in the characteristic Chimú-like blackware that is starkly contrasting the oxidized-fired polychromes of the imperial core. However, they come almost exclusively in the *tico* form, the most iconic Inca vessel shape associated closely with the maize beer, *aqha*.<sup>50</sup>

Cathy Costin argues that these vessels represent the body of the Inca ruler dressed in Chimú clothing during his visit to the region.<sup>51</sup> This association with the sovereign makes the hybrid objects explicitly Inca, as they exemplify the co-option of the local elite by the conquerors. Carolyn Dean and Dana Leibsohn have argued against the use of the term “hybrid” as it automatically creates an opposition of us and them with a distinct power differential that leads to assimilation,

<sup>48</sup> Costin 2016, 325; Frances Hayashida, *State Pottery Production in the Inka Provinces*, PhD Dissertation, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995); Izumi Shimada, “Cultural Continuities and Discontinuities on the Northern North Coast of Peru, Middle to Late Horizons,” in *The Northern Dynasties: Kingship and Statecraft in Chimor*, eds. Michael Mosely and Alana Cordy-Collins, 297-322, (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1990).

<sup>49</sup> Costin 2016, 325.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 326. The *tico* is the smaller version of the form known as *urpu* that we have previously referred to as *aribalo*. Although a more detailed analysis of the differences, and their meanings, between these sizes will be provided in the following chapter, here I introduce the term *tico* as these objects come not only in the same shape, but also in the same size associated with the term.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 342.

where the Inca-Chimú vessels attempted to project unity through co-option rather than assimilation.<sup>52</sup> It is likely that among the Chimú these hybrid objects were seen as inherently Inca rather than some provincial imitation and certainly not a Chimú invention. Furthermore, among other north coast groups, the prestige of the Chimú association was a powerful tool for the Inca material to act as status goods similar to the use of Yavi Chicha pottery in Humahuaca as Inca intermediary.<sup>53</sup> Produced by local techniques with local raw material and local labor, all these various provincial styles retained a markedly Inca identity. The distinction between Cuzco and provincially produced Inca wares might be useful in other cases, but when it comes to ceramic technology the hierarchical relationship between the two cannot be justified.

The Inca embrace of technological change is exemplified by the rural Inca or Killke style of the imperial core. Often relegated as a mere precursor to imperial Inca pottery,<sup>54</sup> this style was likely continuously produced simultaneously with the imperial cannon in Cuzco.<sup>55</sup> In her work at Aqnampampa in the Urubamba Valley, Melissa Chatfield argues that Killke potters adopted new technologies but retained their stylistic identity from the LIP through the LH and into the Colonial period.<sup>56</sup> While Killke originated in the LIP, its continuous production and especially its technological adaptation shows it was not a mere precursor of the Inca in the Cuzco core.

<sup>52</sup> Dean and Leibsohn 2003, 6.

<sup>53</sup> Ann Rowe, *Costumes and Featherwork of the Lords of Chimor: Textiles from Peru's North Coast*, (Washington: Textiles Museum, 1984), 15.

<sup>54</sup> Ann Kendall, "Preliminary Report on Ceramic Data and the pre-Inca Architectural Remains of the (Lower) Urubamba Valley, Cuzco," *Baessler Archiv*, Vol. 24, (1976): 41-159; Rowe 1944.

<sup>55</sup> Rivera Dorado 1971.

<sup>56</sup> Chatfield 2010.

Chatfield refired sixty bowl/plate sherds from twelve stratigraphic levels from Aqnapampa at 890°C and looked at the sherds' microstructure to detect maturation temperatures of the clay fabrics in order to evaluate their firing temperature and its relationship to the production technology. Based on these data, four technological phases can be distinguished. Phase 1 (LIP) used open firing under 890°C with fabrics designed for low temperatures and no vitrification.<sup>57</sup> Phase 2 (LH) showed greater control over the firing technology with pots regularly fired to maturity along with a great stylistic diversity. Although the temperature remains under 890°C, the greater control suggests some form of closed firing as in a semi-subterranean structure.<sup>58</sup> Phase 3 (Early Colonial) saw the end of the stylistic diversity and the beginning of fabrics formulated for close firing. The firing temperatures reached or exceeded 890°C and produced a very consistent ware.<sup>59</sup> In Phase 4 (Colonial), the closed firing technology continues, but the consistency is lessened, as high temperature fabrics become accessible to a wider audience.<sup>60</sup> Killke-decorated sherds appear in almost all stratigraphic levels and in all four technological phases, which illuminates the technological adaptability of Killke potters. At the same time, the common relegation of the style to the LIP based on style has obscured its use in the LH and the Colonial periods.

Killke is not just an earlier, less elaborate version of the imperial Inca style, but it is, instead, likely a critical part of the Inca ceramic identity. Rob Ixer, Sara Lunt, and Bill Sillar argue that Cuzco Inca pottery has hybrid origins from the Killke style in decoration and from Lucre in

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 733.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 735.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

technology.<sup>61</sup> While the decorative links between Killke and Inca are well-established,<sup>62</sup> the technological aspects of Inca ceramics point to a different inspiration. Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar apply petrographic comparison of the use of andesite as temper in the fabric of these three ceramic traditions, as both their Killke and the Inca samples come from Cusichaca, while the Lucre ones are retrieved from Choquepukio.<sup>63</sup>

The Killke fabric proved significantly different from the other two traditions. A variety of tempering practices are detected, with diorite and arkose/litharenite being the most common tempering agents, while grog was also present.<sup>64</sup> Andesite does occur in Killke fabrics but as groundmass and not as temper. The authors conclude that Killke ceramics were produced in a number of separate workshops, employing similar technology, but using a variety of possibly local materials.

On the other hand, the Inca samples were all andesite-tempered and only one type of andesite occurred within a single sample.<sup>65</sup> The same applies to the Lucre samples, although they were the smallest number. It is apparent that andesite was known and used in the LIP (both in Lucre and Killke pottery), but the similarities between Inca and Lucre tempers are striking, even if the Inca ones are generally cleaner. Lucre technique of sourcing of andesite as well as its use as temper was a significant element in the creation of Inca ceramics, especially since andesite-tempered

<sup>61</sup> Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014.

<sup>62</sup> Brian Bauer, "The Early Ceramics of the Inca Heartland," *Fieldiana*, Anthropology, New Series, No. 31 (1999): 1-156; Brian Bauer and Charles Stanish, "Killke and Killke-related Pottery from Cuzco, Peru," *Fieldiana*, Anthropology, New Series, No. 15 (1990): 1-17; Rivera Dorado 1971, Rowe 1944.

<sup>63</sup> Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014, 34.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 35-36.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

fabrics were used for all Inca forms. Finally, Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar suggest that as Inca wares were political artefacts, they embodied political alliances and relationships through their composition.<sup>66</sup> Thus, Inca ceramics were the result of the political alliance between Cuzco and Lucre that mixed the Killke decoration on Lucre ware to produce Inca Cuzco pottery. If the imperial style was itself, in a sense, hybrid, it is completely understandable that the tactic of creating mixtures of technological and decorative aspects from Inca and other traditions became a benchmark of the state in the provinces.

As such, technological studies have already illustrated that the rigid definition of Inca ceramics as the imperial Cuzco-produced style obscure the technological adaptability of the state and its creative use of local techniques in the creation of essentially Inca material. Since ceramics are often conceived of as human bodies,<sup>67</sup> it is especially illuminative of the way Tahuantinsuyu functioned that the very fabric of Inca vessels was in most cases of local origin. It is certainly plausible to argue that the conquerors sought to control raw materials out of necessity, but it is hard to avoid the powerful imagery of the very body of the Inca being created by the negotiation between local technology and materials and the imposition of some imperial conventions. This idea is especially powerful if we consider the Cuzco-Inca pottery to be the result of the same kind of negotiation inside the imperial core.

Yet the investment of the empire in the creation of these negotiated objects varied through time and space. In its early days of statehood, when perhaps the most important political task was securing the allegiance of the other groups in the Valley of Cuzco, the mixing of technology and

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>67</sup> We often describe parts of pots as parts of the human body such as the neck, lip, shoulder, and foot in English, Spanish, and Quechua alike. Further, the Inca often “dressed” their vessels in decoration that matched textile decorative motifs, further suggesting that such pots were seen as bodily representations.

style between the Killke and Lucre traditions created a carefully crafted equilibrium of these opposing forces, or a *tinkuy*. Later, when faced with the formidable Chimu state, the Inca yielded a much greater creative focus to its counterpart, using north coast materials, technology, and decoration on Inca shapes. As these were vessels made largely for local consumption, they retained a much more familiar profile, while still embodying the relationship between the conqueror and conquered. In the distant provinces of the south, in Humahuaca, the Inca did not even engage in a hybrid style, but instead used an intermediary, the Yavi Chicha. It is possible that this lower investment is based on the remoteness of the setting from the imperial core, but it is also possible that by this stage of the conquest the Inca were so adept at using mixed material culture to stand in for imperial presence that they simply adopted the Yavi Chicha style. This progression suggests that although the empire used a similar tactic to create powerful *tinkuy* objects when merging the features of two or more ceramic styles to project the unity between conqueror and conquered necessary for the restoration of world order, what these tactics looked on the ground evolved in time and changed due to the differing needs of the state in the different local contexts. However, this evolution was not necessarily influenced exclusively by the Inca state. These so-called “needs of the state” were dictated by the differing relationships with local Indigenous Andean groups. Thus, these *tinkuy* objects represent the negotiations of the terms of the political alliance between the Inca and the local leaders, asymmetrical as they might have been.

### **3. Co-opting Leadership: Organization of Inca Ceramic Production and Consumption**

Besides the embodiment of Inca political co-option of the local elite, a practical key to understanding the reasons for Inca technological adaptability is the organization of ceramic production in the provinces. As is already becoming apparent from the previous examples here,

the Inca did not operate exclusive state-controlled ceramic workshops, nor did they introduce ethnic Inca specialist potters. That would constitute a much greater investment in local affairs than what the state could afford, especially in the early years after the fast expansion from the Valley of Cuzco in the fifteenth century. Instead, Inca rule was based on a promise of mutual fulfillment of obligations relying on the Indigenous Andean concept of complementarity.<sup>68</sup> In this model, the state only required taxation in labor, while their end of the bargain consisted with supplying the necessary conditions, including feeding and housing the laborers, as well as providing the materials, tools, and spaces needed for state production.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, during conquest, the Inca aimed at capturing the sources of raw materials for a variety of crafts including pottery. By controlling the procurement of raw materials, the state completed its obligation to its subjects to provide them in the process creating a demand for labor, while the final products embodied this relationship.<sup>70</sup> State pottery then circled back to the hands of local elites through gifts from the Inca that required the same repayment in the same local labor that produced them in the first place.<sup>71</sup> Naturally, this reciprocal relationship was controlled by the conquerors and had a markedly asymmetric character.

Cathy Costin and Melissa Hagstrum design a model for determining the mode of labor organization through the evaluation of labor investment, standardization, and skill.<sup>72</sup> They argue

<sup>68</sup> Carolyn Dean, "The Inka Married the Earth: Integrated Outcrops and the Making of Place," *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 89, No. 3, (2007), 502-518.

<sup>69</sup> D'Altroy 2001a.

<sup>70</sup> D'Altroy and Bishop 1990, 133.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.

<sup>72</sup> Cathy Costin and Melissa Hagstrum, "Standardization, Labor Investment, Skill, and the Organization of Ceramic Production in Late Prehispanic Highland Peru," *American Antiquity*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (1995): 619-639.



that different type of specialization can be defined as technological profile, which reflects these three key aspects of labor organization.<sup>73</sup> Labor investment refers to the time required for producing a commodity, standardization refers to the homogeneity of the material in shape and decoration, and skill reflects the experience and talent of the maker. The authors distinguish between intentional and mechanical standardization, the former including technological, morphological, and stylistic considerations, while the latter are seen in resource selection, texture and color variation, and firing fluctuations.<sup>74</sup> Eight such technological profiles are proposed, based on four parameters of specialization – context, concentration, constitution, and intensity – defined as spectra within two extremes. Context distinguishes between attached and independent specialists. Concentration describes the spatial relationships between consumers and producers from uniformly dispersed to nucleated. Constitution describes the group size and relationship of the makers from single family to workshops. Intensity describes the relative amount of time dedicated to production from part to full-time investments.<sup>75</sup>

Costin and Hagstrum test this model on the ceramic production in the Upper Mantaro Valley analyzing three local wares – Wanka Red, Base Clara, and Micaceous Self-slip – and the Inca state import. Labor investment was measured by the production step index and Inca vessels score significantly higher than any of the three Wanka wares, with Micaceous Self-slip cooking vessels ranked lowest. Standardization in morphological attributes such as curvature radii determines that all wares were nucleated to a similar degree. Wall thickness and firing core were the basis for the skill determination and both point to greater control of Inca production. Costin

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 620.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 621-622.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 620.

and Hagstrum conclude that local Wanka wares were produced by community specialists, independent household-based producers aggregated at a few communities fitting the community specialization profile.<sup>76</sup> The Inca vessels were made by large number of corvee part-time laborers, possibly local potters mobilized through *mita*, labor taxation, obligation, fitting the nucleated corvee profile.<sup>77</sup>

This system of ceramic production yields great gains for the state with minimum investment. Essentially after initial conquest provinces were kept large self-sufficient by this system, in which local labor and local knowledge produced state pottery with local resources that was then used by the state to demand more labor. The diminished investment is exemplified by the continuous exploitation of local clays for Inca ceramic production in Northern Ecuador despite their technical inadequacy. Leah Minc and her colleagues establish the range of ceramic raw materials in the Imbabura province of Ecuador through an ethnoarchaeological study of six modern day potteries and brick makers in the Caranqui province before performing compositional analysis through instrumental neutron activation analysis (INAA) on 169 sherds and 65 contemporary test clays.<sup>78</sup> Three major sources for the Inca and the local Caranqui wares are identified. The Cotopaxi group has a higher concentration of rare elements, but it is also no associated with neither any of the LH sites in Imbabura, nor with any of the modern clays. The remaining ceramics from Imbabura can be divided evenly between two groups depending on their high or low chromium content.<sup>79</sup> At each site, the majority of Inca samples matches the local clay source, indicating that

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 635.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 636.

<sup>78</sup> Minc et al. 2016.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 58.

vessels were produced locally using the same materials used for the Caranqui wares. For this system to work, however, it is of utmost importance that these provincial Inca ceramics are seen as Inca and nothing less despite their technical or other differences.

At the opposite end of the empire, in Collasuyu, the Inca interference with local ceramic production was even less pronounced. Cristina Prieto Olavarria argues that Viluco pottery from the Mendoza province in Argentina developed under the social, political, economic, and symbolic pressure of the Inca in the region, as it became a symbol of status and identity that acted as visual mediator between local elites and the Inca.<sup>80</sup> She analyses 4413 sherds from domestic contexts and 39 whole pots from funerary contexts from nine sites in the Mendoza valley, determining through petrography five origin families. However, in both cases there were no significant differences between the local Viluco and the Viluco-Inca decorated ceramics. Prieto Olavarria argues that the production was in the hands of local potters, who continued their production traditions, but adopted new visual aspects of Inca pottery during the LH.<sup>81</sup>

She further contends that two separate social levels were at work in this system. At the higher, group level, the potters controlled the visual aspects of the ceramics, related to their vital function as visual mediators in both local hierarchies and the relationship between the Inca and the local elite. At the lower, family level, they transmitted the knowledge of technical choices regarding the selection of raw materials and their sources. While no state production was initiated in Mendoza, the local potters seized the opportunity to create status markers that persisted in the Colonial period through their relationship with the Inca. This is a critical example of the local agency involved in the production of Inca pottery, while on the other hand the Mendoza case

<sup>80</sup> Prieto Olavarria 2012, 71.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

exemplifies the functionality of the state propaganda. Even without establishing state production, without direct control of raw materials, with little imposed standardization the Inca managed to position themselves at the top of the local hierarchy. In the current classification Inca-Viluco pottery would only qualify as a cheap, local imitation Inca, but it essentially acted as a status marker the same way a Cuzco-produced vessels did in other parts of Tahuantinsuyu.

To be sure, the lack of pronounced state control in Mendoza was not only a function of the remoteness of the province, but also of the functioning local system. At the similarly remote Humahuaca in Argentina, where state production was also not initiated and where local potters were also free to imitate Inca forms, no hybrid style developed as status marker.<sup>82</sup> María Andrea Runcio analyses the form and decoration of the ceramic assemblage of fourteen sites in Humahuaca, focusing particularly on the local *pucó* Poma plates with red over black designs and on all Inca-related ceramics. These include not only the imperial Inca style, but also Pacajes, Yavi Chico, and Casa Morada styles, which were imported into the region by the Inca as status goods.<sup>83</sup> The *pucó* Poma plates are encountered at all investigated sites with little to no temporal variation, suggesting that their production and consumption was not altered by the Inca arrival in the region. The Inca-related forms, on the other hand, exhibit significant decorative variability.<sup>84</sup>

Based on the decorative analysis, Runcio argues that the local potters were free to imitate Inca forms and to place local design on them without the intervention of the state as a part of the integration of the province.<sup>85</sup> On the other hand, it was the imported forms, both Inca and Inca-

<sup>82</sup> Runcio 2012.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 66-67.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

related like Pacajes, Yavi, and Casa Morada, that became status symbols in Humahuaca. The continued *puco* Poma tradition and its use in state-sponsored celebrations along with Inca-related ceramics constituted the state's ideological appropriation that allowed the new sociopolitical relationships to materialize. Local decoration on Inca forms, thus, represents the adaptability of Inca power to form these productive relationships with local elites.

These examples again point to an especially relaxed control of local production in Collasuyu and the use of Inca intermediaries. This phenomenon has been explained with the introduction of *mitimaes*, populations resettled by the Inca, who brought with them their own material culture, which became associated with elite status through the Inca involvement in their arrival in the local context.<sup>86</sup> Alternatively, the increasingly greater investment by the state in the Lake Titicaca Basin and its social reordering as a part of its integration into Tahuantinsuyu<sup>87</sup> might have depleted Inca resources in Collasuyu. It is also possible that the use of the Pacajes style from the Lake Titicaca Basin as Inca intermediary had a double meaning acting as a tactic in the Pacajes pacification and trading on the prestige associated with it in other local contexts at the same time. At any rate, the reorganization of ceramic production in the provinces by the state involved mostly the restructuring of the social relationships between conquerors and conquered, while the production largely continued to operate with local materials, labor, and techniques.

If Inca pottery production in the provinces was systemically adaptable to local conditions in order to effectively extract labor from them, consumption of Inca ceramics was confined to

<sup>86</sup> Paola Gonzalez Carvajal, "Arte Visual, Espacio y Poder: Manejo Incaico de la Iconografía Cerámica en Distintos Asentamientos de la Fase Diaguita Inka en el Valle de Illapel," *Chungara, Revista de Antropología Chilena*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (2004): 375-392.

<sup>87</sup> Charles Stanish, "Nonmarket imperialism in the Prehispanic Americas: the Inka occupation of the Titicaca basin," *Latin American Antiquity*, Vol. 8, No. 3. (1997): 195-216.

much more controlled circumstances, but with the same purpose. The imperial forms most commonly distributed throughout the empire had particular associations with the consumption of prestige foodstuffs such as maize and meat.<sup>88</sup> *Aqha* drinking was further an important aspect of ceremonial feasts in the Andes and as such it was an important part of the solidification of the reciprocal relationships between the state and the provinces. However, the importance of corn beer prestations seems to have been much more important in the provinces than in the imperial core, as the form most closely associated with the *aqha*, the *urpu* or *tico*, accounts for over half of the Inca ceramics in the provinces and under a third in the heartland.<sup>89</sup> Justin Jennings and Melissa Chatfield argue that much of the Inca social capital was derived by undercutting the preexisting feasting patterns.<sup>90</sup> In the LIP, most of the maize beer production was done in small vessels in individual households. Thus, feasts became social levelers, where the guests were indebted to the host, who was in turn indebted to a large number of *aqha* providers.<sup>91</sup>

In the LH, the Inca introduced large state-sponsored production of corn beer in the houses of the chosen women, *acllahuasi*, using large brewing equipment.<sup>92</sup> By controlling large-scale *aqha* productions, the Inca could host feasts that included large number of participants who did not bring anything to the table. By creating these unreciprocated gifts, they created a hierarchical system where the local population was indebted and later asked for labor for the empire. This was particularly crippling to women, whose disenfranchisement is seen through their lower maize

<sup>88</sup> Tamara Bray, "Inka Pottery as Culinary Equipment: Food, Feasting, and Gender in Imperial State Design," *Latin American Antiquity*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2003): 3-28; Bray 2003, To Dine Splendidly.

<sup>89</sup> Bray 2003, Inka Pottery as Culinary Equipment, 18.

<sup>90</sup> Jennings and Chatfield 2009.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 220.

<sup>92</sup> Bray 2003, To Dine Splendidly; Jennings and Chatfield 2009.

consumption in the LH despite the fact that maize-based foodstuffs were primarily the result of their labor.<sup>93</sup> Larger state-sponsored production of *aqha* allowed the Inca to both mediate and materialize their relationship with the local people through the presentation of food.<sup>94</sup> This association of Inca pottery with elite foodstuffs and social capital building through these parties solidified the symbolic status of these vessels as status markers. It was the restricted use of Inca ceramics in feasting situations that allowed for less stringent control of production. Once the state vessels occupied a position of power, their production was controlled by the local hierarchical systems, while local ceramic traditions were left intact. Local goods then not only did not pose a threat to the status of Inca pottery, but they also provided the necessary embodiment of the state-related hierarchical differentiation.

As much as the Inca allowed local ceramic production to continue to operate in similar ways as in pre-conquest times, the empire still managed to intrude in the local realm and to at least appear present. In all of the cases discussed here wares associated with imperial control, albeit sometimes administered through intermediaries, were placed atop the prestige hierarchy of pottery. The Inca yielded the power to organize production to the local leaders, since in most places there was already a functioning system of raw materials procurement, specialized potters, workshops, and even wares distribution. As long as the vessels associated with the Inca were distributed in a manner that retained their prestige, there was no need for an imperial disruption of the local system. As with the question of technology, however, the imperial investment of labor organization varied through time and space. In the Upper Mantaro Valley, which was conquered relatively early in the

<sup>93</sup> Christine Hastorf, "Gender, Space, and Food in Prehistory," in *Engendering Archaeology: Women and Prehistory*, eds. Joan Gero and Margaret Conkey, 132-158, (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991).

<sup>94</sup> Bray 2003, Inka Pottery as Culinary Equipment.



Tahuantinsuyu expansion, state-sponsored vessels were produced with local labor in local workshops relatively cheaply, yielding Inca ceramics that could be redistributed to newly conquered local lords elsewhere as a part of the imperial conquest strategy. Later, in Mendoza, the Inca once again utilized local labor and workshops, but produced no Inca imperial style vessels, since their need for pottery gifts in this remote region at the time had dried up.

While these insights might be beyond a study in a single location where the temporal control by absolute dating in the very short LH is unreliable, comparisons between the four corners of the empire again point at change of imperial tactics in ceramic production that follow the logic of the history of expansion. Beyond the initial conquest of the Andes, the continuous re-negotiation of the political status quo which varied greatly through the empire can again explain the diversity of ceramic production under Tahuantinsuyu.

#### **4. Storing Wealth: Ceramic Exchange and the Inca Economy**

The self-sufficiency of the local context created through the production and consumption of Inca ceramics predisposed the economic self-sufficiency that the state fostered. The LIP is generally understood as a time when post-imperial collapse led to political fragmentation marked by increased inter-group violence.<sup>95</sup> Inca expansion certainly was not the peaceful restoration of order they wanted their subjects to believe in, but it resulted in a general pacification of most of the Andean region. In the new conditions of imperial protection, especially with the level of autonomy that the local lords possessed and the ideology of a union rather than empire under Inca leadership, one would expect the appearance of thriving trade. However, upon their incorporation

<sup>95</sup> Elizabeth Arkush, *Hillforts of the Ancient Andes: Colla Warfare, Society, and Landscape*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011); Danielle Kurin, *The Bioarchaeology of Collapse: Ethnogenesis and Ethnocide in Post-Imperial Andahuaylas, Peru (AD 900-1250)*, PhD Dissertation, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 2012).

into Tahuantinsuyu the provinces did not experience shifts in their exchange patterns.<sup>96</sup> Having positioned itself at the individual top of each local hierarchy, the state now controlled the exchange of status goods between the Inca and the local elite without interference in intra-regional trade patterns.

The Inca economy was completely embedded in the state's political machine, so its modern analytical isolation has been problematic.<sup>97</sup> Craig Morris argues that Inca economy operated on two major levels – the household and the state – and pottery has been the main material of the analysis of exchange at both levels.<sup>98</sup> The same reciprocal relationships that governed household-level exchange of ceramics and other goods controlled the state economy.<sup>99</sup> Since this relationship was materialized through gifts from the state to its subjects repaid by their labor, most of the archaeological data are related to the state's preparation for the fulfillment of its obligation to its subjects. The Inca economy was, thus, not market-based and markets are not immediately identifiable in the archaeological record.<sup>100</sup> Therefore, it functioned entirely based on political relationships between the state and the local elite. As is the case with Inca politics, then, the state economy adapted to local conditions in order to create self-sufficiency on a regional level that would allow it to extract labor.

<sup>96</sup> Earle 2001, 312.

<sup>97</sup> Morris 1979, 318.

<sup>98</sup> Costin 2001; D'Altroy 2001; D'Altroy and Bishop 1990; Morris 1979.

<sup>99</sup> Morris 1979, 320.

<sup>100</sup> Earle 2001, 314; Morris, 1979, 324; Stanish 1997, 197.

The lack of market systems in the Inca economy was a key factor that affected the imperial strategies of control of major provincial territories.<sup>101</sup> Charles Stanish looks at the Inca conquest of the Titicaca Basin and argues that the lack of price-fixing mechanisms required greater reliance on labor.<sup>102</sup> The result is that the labor control sought by the Inca dramatically altered local political and economic organization in territories that held important economic resources. Settlement pattern changes in the Juli-Pomata survey indicate that the Inca strategy included four particular tactics – the importation of *mitimaes*, massive population movements within the region, elaboration and provisioning of road systems, and the appropriation of ideological legitimacy from the local elite. Pre-Inca fortified sites were mostly abandoned in the LH, while there was a marked increase in the total number of sites in all areas of the basin as well as a spike in population growth.<sup>103</sup> Additionally, all new major population centers appeared on or in relation to the existing road system in an effort to maximize commodity movement and production, as well as to ensure the rapid movement of the army.<sup>104</sup> The physical reorganization of the region was matched by the Inca ideological investment in the Lake Titicaca Basin. Seeking legitimacy, they devised an origin story providing them with a longstanding link in the area. The large investment by the state in building and maintaining shrines, pilgrimage centers, and other ritual sites in the area was an attempt to create a certain past narrative that legitimized present political action. Similar tactics were used in the integration of Chimú into the empire, where the Inca sought to attach themselves with longstanding ideas of kingship through the application of local decoration on Inca ceramics

<sup>101</sup> Stanish 1997.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 208.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

going back to the Moche state of the Early Intermediate Period (200 BC – AD 800, EIP from here on).<sup>105</sup>

These political motivations behind the organization of Inca economy led Tim Earle to argue that it was not only non-market, but indeed non-exchange.<sup>106</sup> In the Upper Mantaro Valley, at the local level, procurement and exchange of utilitarian and subsistence goods showed no change after Inca conquest, while long-distance trade was limited to goods of high value exchanged in low volumes. The continuity of local production and exchange of utilitarian ceramics rooted firmly in the Xauxa household economy was not only allowed, but was even encouraged by the state.<sup>107</sup> At the same time they restructured both the production and exchange of multi-functional wares that played a political role. Inca ceramics became the only notable import, while there is little to no evidence of inter-provincial trade in the central Andes.

During the Wanka II LIP period, two small ceramic exchange systems were in operation. The first was between Tunanmarca and Umpamalca, where the Umpamalca potters supplies local-style jars in exchange for Tunanmarca Micaceous Self-Slip cooking jars.<sup>108</sup> On the other hand, Hatunmarca did not participate in this exchange and retained self-sufficiency through the second local exchange system. In Wanka III LH period, however, the Inca consolidated the province of Xauxa into a single administrative unit merging both local exchange systems.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Costin 2011 and 2016.

<sup>106</sup> Earle 2001, 314.

<sup>107</sup> Costin 2001.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 230-231.

<sup>109</sup> D'Altroy 2001, *State Goods in the Domestic Economy*, 248.

On the regional scale, during the LIP the major exotic ware came in the form of andesite-tempered wares from the southern part of the Mantaro Valley, perhaps from Patankoto.<sup>110</sup> During Wanka II, elites had much greater access to andesite wares suggesting their involvement in the exchange. In Wanka III, however, there is a 36% drop in andesite-tempered ceramics that coincides with the appearance of Inca pottery.<sup>111</sup> The overall quantity and volume of elite-related ceramics exhibits no change from the LIP to the LH, suggesting no sharp change in social organization of the region. However, the replacement of regional exotic ceramics with Inca ones exemplifies the breakdown of horizontal exchange and the promotion of state-local exchange. While elites continued to be distinguished through their exotic goods, these were now overwhelmingly Inca.

The spatial distribution of Inca pottery further mirrors the political action taken by the state in the region. While Inca vessels were ubiquitous, they never exceeded a quarter of the ceramic assemblage at any compound outside Hatun Xauxa.<sup>112</sup> In fact, local ceramic production, especially for utilitarian vessels, continued largely untouched. This is contrasted by the situation in Hatun Xauxa where some 98% of the LH pottery comes in the imperial style.<sup>113</sup> The concentration of Inca pottery in the administrative center is further mimicked on a smaller level within each site, where preferred access to state pottery was closely related to compound location. Locations associated with elite activities, as well as more elaborate architecture, were associated with not only greater Inca ceramics concentration, but also with smaller vessels for serving rather than for storage. Hatun Xauxa exhibits a higher proportion of jars with rim diameters higher than 30cm,

<sup>110</sup> Costin 2001, 237.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> D'Altroy 2001, *State Goods in the Domestic Economy*, 263.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

indicating a greater emphasis on *aqha* brewing.<sup>114</sup> At the same time, there is little to no evidence of long-distance trade outside the singular Chimú finds along Inca material.<sup>115</sup>

Terence D'Altroy, argues this distribution of Inca pottery in the Upper Mantaro Valley does not represent trade, but instead matches the state's attempt to enter into a relationship with local elites.<sup>116</sup> Provincial Inca ceramics follow closely imperial prescriptions as to visual distinction, control of raw resources, and standardization, suggesting a close management by state officials. The hierarchical distribution of these vessels also suggests Inca redistribution akin to centralization efforts that would allow them to delegate local political power to local elites. Centralization of the region allowed the Inca to now control the production and distribution of status goods, which were exchanged long distance and centered in their administrative seat in Hatun Xauxa, while they further became the only source for exotic goods in the valley. In effect, they promoted self-sufficiency on the provincial level, while they forced production intensification whose fruits they collected. The state economy, therefore, was based on already established precedents of local production and exchange systems, along with the already existent social order to which the Inca attached themselves at the very top.

A similar situation existed at another large regional administrative center in Huánuco Pampa, where Craig Morris agrees with Earle and D'Altroy that pottery exchange cannot be categorized as trade, as it is circulated by the state or its representatives in return for labor.<sup>117</sup> Separate storage facilities worked on separate provision circuits, in which subsistence goods were

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 263.

<sup>115</sup> Costin 2001, 239.

<sup>116</sup> D'Altroy 2001, State Goods in the Domestic Economy, 263.

<sup>117</sup> Morris 1979, 323.

produced and stored at large provincial centers like Huánuco Pampa, while luxury goods circulated from Cuzco to provincial centers through gift-giving.<sup>118</sup> State-controlled *acllahuasi* workshops mainly produced *aqha*, which was used to sponsor large feasts that elicited local labor. Linked to food consumption, pottery production was also seen as a state obligation, although it was completed with local labor. This system is echoed throughout the empire in a number of studies already discussed here.<sup>119</sup> While the relationship is conceived as reciprocal, the state retains power through the control of status goods in this transaction.

Exchange, or more accurately distribution, of pottery in the empire followed similar guiding lines that characterized pottery production and technology. Local continuity was encouraged with the Inca positioning themselves at the top of pre-existing social hierarchy through the control of status goods and *aqha* production, both of which were critical for the establishment of an asymmetrical relationship with the local elites veiled in the language of complementarity. The conquerors achieved this partially through their military victories, the control of raw materials, the control of women through the institution of *acllahuasi*, and the Indigenous Andean understanding of reciprocal political relationships. However, the state propaganda machine promulgated the Inca identity as the legitimate rulers of the Andean region. Much of that identity was materialized by Inca ceramics, imperial and provincial alike, despite their apparent diversity.

The key to the relative success of the Inca propaganda lies in its adaptability to the local conditions in both space and time. The empire encountered different obstacles to governing people from diverse political, organizational, and ecological backgrounds at different times. Its response to these varying conditions, as well as the varying levels of success, was not a monolith one.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 320-321.

<sup>119</sup> For example, Hayashida et al. 2003; Minc et al. 2016; Prieto Olavarria 2012; Runcio 2012.



However, the very fact that Tahuantinsuyu needed to adapt to local conditions suggests that the power of the state was conditioned on a negotiation with the local realm, albeit with a great deal of success for the hegemon. Another important point, however, is that only the success stories of this co-option mechanism get to be categorized as Inca. In cases where the negotiations of the terms of living under the empire did not lead to hybridity, but rather the local ceramic production remained unaltered, the failure of co-option does not necessarily signify failure of conquest. Instead, the terms of Tahuantinsuyu membership were likely different as a result of the political negotiations between the state and the local leaders.

## **5. The Emperor's New Clothes: State Ideology and Identity in Inca Ceramics**

One of the arguments of this chapter is that the imperial Inca style produced in the capital Cuzco was not the only ceramic assemblage in the LH that assumed Inca identity. Furthermore, the provincial styles were understood to represent the state not only in the local context, but they were actively and consciously created by the state to act as its representative. Where the imperial style can only be seen as a marker of hegemony, the mixed provincial pottery has the potential to provide critical insights into how the Inca constructed their identity in complement rather than in opposition with their subjects. Hybrid objects occupy a liminal space between identities and possess the power to illuminate the relationships they embody. Inca hybrids that materialized the policy of local elite co-option by the state were found throughout the empire.<sup>120</sup> With one master stroke they both signified the conquered leaders' belonging to the imperial bureaucracy and their partial foreignness. This way, it is precisely the ceramic tradition of mixing imperial and local

<sup>120</sup> Costin 2011, 319.

characteristic that is the most illustrative of the how Tahuantinsuyu functioned as an empire. To relegate it to a secondary status behind the imperial style is to misunderstand Inca ceramics.

Regardless of production technology or decoration, there is one Inca form that is always associated with imperial presence<sup>121</sup> – the *aribalo* or more appropriately called *tico* or *urpu* depending on its size.<sup>122</sup> The form was intimately related to maize beer, the invaluable source of social capital in the Andes, as it was used for brewing, storing, and possibly even serving *aqha*.<sup>123</sup> It did play an important visual role in presencing the state in the local realm through its relatively high morphological standardization and prominent appearance during state-sponsored feasts. Bray has argued that the *tico/urpu* form was meant to symbolically represent an Inca body or perhaps the body of the *Sapa Inca*, the sovereign, himself.<sup>124</sup> Evidence for this comes from a number of these vessels that feature applique arms, faces, hunchbacks, and other anthropomorphized characteristics, while their decoration and its placement regularly mimics that of Inca textiles.<sup>125</sup> Following Mary Douglas, who contends that the body is a natural symbol for society, Constance Classen suggests that the human body was the main organizing metaphor of Inca cosmology.<sup>126</sup> On the other hand, dress was the ultimate form of expressing one's identity in the Andes and the

<sup>121</sup> Bray 2000 and 2003; Costin 2011 and 2016; Reinaldo Moralejo, et al., “El ajuar como indicador de la presencia Inka en el cementerio Aguada Orilla Norte (provincia de Catamarca),” *Intersecciones En Antropología*, No. 11 (2010): 309-313.

<sup>122</sup> The following chapter will delve deeper into an Inca emic ceramic categorization based on linguistic analysis as well as into the meaningful difference between the two forms. Since other authors discuss them as a single form, this chapter does so as well to follow currently established knowledge about Inca ceramics.

<sup>123</sup> Bray 2003, *Inka Pottery as Culinary Equipment*, 13; Burger and Salazar 2004, 131.

<sup>124</sup> Bray 2000, 173.

<sup>125</sup> Costin 2016, 328.

<sup>126</sup> Constance Classen, *Inca Cosmology and the Human Body*, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993); Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology*, (London: Routledge, 1996).

state observed strict sumptuary laws that required all of its subjects to project their identity through clothing at all times.<sup>127</sup> The hybrid *tico/urpus*, therefore, represented the body of the *Sapa Inca* dressed differently to assume different identities.

This idea of the Inca donning local garb in order to become local and to project legitimacy is corroborated by the fact hybrid vessels invariably come in imperial forms and local decoration.<sup>128</sup> That is to say, the physical body of the Inca (i.e. the ware's shape) was seen as a constant, while his clothing (i.e. the ware's decoration) was easily variable. One particularly interesting example comes from the Peruvian north coast, where a large number of Inca-Chimú hybrid *tico/urpus*, all locally produced and decorated, have been discovered. Costin argues that the Chimú and Inca states were similar in their size when they clashed in the fifteenth century and it is even possible that the coastal power was technologically and politically more complex.<sup>129</sup> It has been suggested that the Inca were strongly influenced by the coastal polity and that they adopted a number of their policies that later became benchmarks of the empire such as the inheritance rules for the heirs to the throne.<sup>130</sup> So it is no wonder that instead of replacing the local tradition wholesale with imperial Inca ceramics, the empire relied on a new, hybrid style which embodied the complementarity that Tahuantinsuyu was imagined to be built on.

The Inca-Chimú hybrids commonly exhibit decoration that relates to Chimú clothing. These include the partition of the vessels into four squares, the use of press-molded birds

<sup>127</sup> Joanne Pillsbury, "Inka Unku: Strategy and Design in Colonial Peru," *Cleveland Studies in the History of Art*, Vol. 7 (2002): 68-103.

<sup>128</sup> Bray 2011; Correa et al. 2011; Costin 2016, 326; Giovannetti and Páez 2011; Dorothy Menzel, *Pottery Style and Society in Ancient Peru: Art as a Mirror of History in the Ica Valley*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

<sup>129</sup> Costin 2016, 232.

<sup>130</sup> Conrad and Demarest 1984; Rowe 1944.

(commonly pelicans) and snakes, and incised volutes and zig-zags, all of which were associated with Chimú royalty in the LIP.<sup>131</sup> The Inca, however, were not content to only exhibit their association with current power and further applied decorative motifs with longer histories of royal patronage going back to the EIP. Zig-zag tunics the hybrid *tico/urpus* wore had a deep history that suggested the longevity of their claim of power on the north coast.<sup>132</sup> These were certainly not the clothes associated with Inca nobility or rulership and Cuzco-produced vessels never carry their decorative motifs. Alternatively, a series of face-necked vessels of the same style depict hunchbacks carrying Chimú royal insignia. Unlike the LIP local face-necked jars, the hybrid ones lack decoration, essentially depicting the local lords naked.<sup>133</sup> This representation has double meaning, on the one hand stripping the local leaders of their identity and on the other placing them in a subservient relationship to the Inca, as hunchbacks commonly served as royal attendants in Cuzco.<sup>134</sup> Looking solely at the imperial assemblage would, thus, obscure the variability of the state's imperial project, exemplified by the ability of the ruler to assume different identities through clothing. These hybrids were constructed intentionally by the Inca administration to visually communicate the legitimacy of their rule in this particular province, as other hybrid styles did the same throughout the empire.

On the south coast of Peru, Menzel found that the most common hybrid in the Ica province was again an Inca form decorated with Ica motifs.<sup>135</sup> These hybrids also most commonly came in

<sup>131</sup> Costin 2016, 334-337.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., 342.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 333.

<sup>134</sup> Burger and Salazar 2004, 136.

<sup>135</sup> Menzel 1976.

*ticos*, plates, and pedestal pots, which Bray argues are also the minimal repertoire and most widely distributed Inca vessels in the provinces.<sup>136</sup> While the smaller-sized *ticos* were made into hybrids, the larger *urpus* retained their imperial Inca style. As Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar argue, the *tico* might have had an important association with the identity of the user, a theory that is supported by the Chimú-Inca case.<sup>137</sup> The Inca-Ica hybrids included various local motifs known from ceramics and textiles alike.<sup>138</sup> These objects acted as markers of different ranks in the local hierarchy, as they exhibited various stages of Incaness.

Another example comes from the northern highland frontier in Ecuador, where Inca-Puruha hybrids are found in the Riobamba-Ambato region. A particularly interesting case is the hybrid faced *puruncu*, ceramic drinking cup, which combines the common Inca shape with head-shaped and faced drinking cups Puruha cups. Bray argues that the *chusna*, a face-necked Inca form, acted as an intermediary between the two cup forms.<sup>139</sup> It was the precedent in the Inca ceramic vocabulary that allowed the concept of faced vessels, although it did not fit the drinking cup function. The face was then translated into a *puruncu* to match the original function of the Puruha form. However, Bray further argues that this hybridization is a sign both of imperial appropriation of the local form and its meaning and a sign of provincial agency, as the Puruha entered into this embodied negotiation with their conquerors.<sup>140</sup> This is a reminder not to privilege imperial production of hybrids over what are called local imitations. The fact that the state operated through

<sup>136</sup> Bray 2003, *Inka Pottery as Culinary Equipment*, 17.

<sup>137</sup> Burger and Salazar 2004, 131.

<sup>138</sup> Menzel 1976, 151.

<sup>139</sup> Bray 2011, 65-66.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

mixed styles allowed these imitations to be produced by local artisans as a means to positions of power. After all, they possessed the raw materials, the technological knowledge, and now the precedent of hybrid Inca styles acting as representatives of the state topping the local hierarchy.

Marco Giovannetti and María Páez argue that role of local agency in the processes of change of provincial Inca pottery is quite potent, even though it is often exhibited through subtle rather than radical change.<sup>141</sup> They follow Homi Bhabha in his theorization of hybridity not as a place for collaboration or assimilation, but rather an arena of negotiation that implies local agency beyond the mere oppression-resistance model. In particular, the authors argue that the incremental change in Inca plate forms in Northeast Argentina is a reflection of the local production of Inca vessels and of the subtle influence of local agency in the creation of hybrid objects.<sup>142</sup>

They examine and compare nine plates and bowls from Peru with thirty-five plates and bowls from nineteen sites from Northeast Argentina, including ten from the *capacocha* burials at Llullaillaco, all of which were identified as Inca. Giovannetti and Páez designate three rim profile groups of which Type 1, the shallow plate, is only encountered in the Peruvian and Llullaillaco sample, while Type 3, the bowl, is only encountered in the local sample. The intermediary deep plate form, Type 2, was produced at both locales representing 19% and 12% of the local and the Peruvian samples respectively.<sup>143</sup> The existence of Type 2 in the Inca vocabulary, even if it were a minority among state-produced plates, allowed the local populations to gradually change the form into the hybrid Type 3 bowl. This change is also related to functionality as the shallow plates were used for serving meat, while the bowls are associated with stews and soups, which were the

<sup>141</sup> Giovannetti and Páez 2011.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 106.

main part of the Andean commoner diet.<sup>144</sup> This study presents a different case from most Inca hybrids that retain the Inca form but dress it in local decoration, showing that power negotiations through pottery production involved local forms as well, even if these were achieved through gradual and subtle changes. That is to say, even when the Inca imperial propaganda worked and the conquerors managed to position themselves at the top of the social order, this did not happen wholesale at one quick swoop around the time of the conquest. Instead, it was a gradual process, despite happening in a relatively short period of time, which further reinforces the idea that diversified propaganda was the key to Inca power to a much greater extent than Inca military prowess. What was won on the battlefield needed time to bed into the local system.

Giovannetti and Páez's study is also a good reminder that we tend to privilege the visual when examining hybrids, assuming that visual differences connote separate identities. However, these are not read by all social actors equally.<sup>145</sup> In this particular case, Type 3 bowls might be seen as inherently Inca or as markedly local in character. Thus, not all state-related social action is an example of the Inca social ingenuity. This is not to say that the Cuzqueños were not masters of their political propaganda, but rather to realize that they relied on such propaganda willingly and knowingly entering into complex negotiations with their subjects and not simply imposing their political will.<sup>146</sup>

Hybrid styles were further used by the Inca to strengthen their relationships with particularly important groups, while these were also deployed to do the Inca bidding in frontier territories particularly in Collasuyu. Itaci Correa and colleagues examine sixteen ceramic objects

<sup>144</sup> Bray 2003, *Inka Pottery as Culinary Equipment*, 9.

<sup>145</sup> Dean and Leibsohn 2003.

<sup>146</sup> Wernke 2013.



from six of the thirteen LH tombs from the Inca cemetery site of Estacion Quinta Normal in Santiago de Chile to argue that the Diaguita group of northern Chile acted as the Inca's intermediary in the area.<sup>147</sup> Of the sixteen examined vessels, eleven are in the local Aconcagua style from its LH phase, one is in the Diaguita style from its LH phase, and four are Inca-Diaguita hybrids.<sup>148</sup> The lack of Cuzco-produced ceramics in any of the tombs suggests that the Inca presence in central Chile was manifested through the presence of Inca-Diaguita ceramics.

The imperial imposition in central Chile is still present through the introduction of Inca forms such as the deep plate and the *tico*. However, those are exclusively decorated with Diaguita motifs or Diaguita-negotiated Inca ones. These hybrid vessels, especially when interned with a majority of local Aconcagua one, are understood as representatives of the fusion of identities in the local realm after Inca conquest of the region. Additionally, it is possible that the state used groups like the Diaguita to represent them in negotiations with groups with which they either had a longer standing relationship or had greater cultural similarities. Other such examples come from the Lluta Valley in northern Chile,<sup>149</sup> as well as the provinces of Catamarca,<sup>150</sup> Mendoza,<sup>151</sup> and Humahuaca in Argentina.<sup>152</sup> The concentration of such examples in the southern frontier also suggests that this tactic might be a result of the overextension of the state that its quick and explosive expansion created. Pressed by their demographic capacity in an increasingly vast and

<sup>147</sup> Correa et al. 2007.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>149</sup> Alvaro Luis Romero Guevara, "Ceramica Domestica del Valle de Lluta: cultura local y redes de interacción Inka," *Chungará*, Vol. 34, No. 2. (2002): 191-213.

<sup>150</sup> Moralejo et al. 2010.

<sup>151</sup> Prieto Olavarria 2012.

<sup>152</sup> Otero and Cremonte 2014; Runcio 2012.

varied empire, the Inca employed a variety of political tactics embodied by the variability of ceramic material associated with their state. Embracing the multifaceted character of Inca ceramics and shedding the rigid definition of the imperial Inca style is paramount for our understanding of the ways the state, embodied by its material culture, functioned.

## Conclusions

Inca material culture has long been described as highly standardized, readily recognizable, and reconstructable, all of which explicitly make it a powerful marker of a strong empire, while implicitly making it unimaginative and boring. This has been the case with pottery,<sup>153</sup> textiles,<sup>154</sup> and architecture<sup>155</sup> alike. To be fair, the motivation behind this understanding of the empire never represented any attempt to downplay Inca ingenuity. Indeed, the idea that standardization equals power only led us to admire Tahuantinsuyu and for its functional success. A very quick glance through any Inca collection, however, should make the believers of this rigid hegemonic state uneasy, as the variety of Inca material culture in all of its forms is invariably stunning. Our fascination with the governance of the largest American empire need not wilt away, but only refocus on its adaptability that led to the same functional success that earlier scholars talked about. That is not to say that we should do away with their work, but rather that we can now shed new light on it, based on our access to new data.

<sup>153</sup> For example, Bray 2003, *To Dine Splendidly*; Craig Morris and Donald Thompson, *Huánuco Pampa: An Inca City and Its Hinterland*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985); Rowe 1944.

<sup>154</sup> For example, Amy Oakland Rodman and Vicki Cassman, “Andean Tapestry: Structure Informs the Surface,” *Art Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (1995): 33-39; John Rowe, “Standardization in Inca Tapestry Tunics,” in *Junius B. Bird Pre-Columbian Textile Conference*, eds. Ann Rowe, Elizabeth Benson, and Anne-Louise Schaffer, 239–64, (Washington: The Textile Museum, 1979).

<sup>155</sup> Graziano Gasparini and Louise Margolies, *Inca Architecture*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); Rowe 1944.

This process has already begun and in the past decade or so new studies have focused on the variability rather than the standardization of Inca material culture from architecture<sup>156</sup> and stonework to pottery.<sup>157</sup> However, as this chapter has attempted to show, the literature on Inca ceramics has been hinting that the key to understanding Tahuantinsuyu on both the large political level and the small personal one has always been in its adaptability. Scholarship on raw materials and ceramic technology has shown that the Inca readily utilized local technology and resources as both ways to decrease investment and as a political tool that represented the reciprocal relationship between them and the co-opted local elites. Studies on the organization of the production and consumption of pottery have demonstrated that the state functioned on local labor it demanded in repayment for the state-sponsored feasts. At those, both the state presence in the local context and its relationship with its subjects was manifested largely through pottery. Work on the imperial economy has shown that once the Inca achieved a position of authority and placed themselves on top of the local hierarchy, they discouraged trade and promoted provincial self-sufficiency that allowed them to extract more labor for the large imperial projects. Finally, scholarship on the state ideology and identity have demonstrated that the Inca willingly and intentionally assumed a variety of identities, embodied by their ceramics, in order to enter into the asymmetric relationship with local elites they presented as complementary and reciprocal. The aim of this work may not have always been to argue for the variability of Inca imperial tactics through pottery, but they all contributed to our understanding of the complexity of the empire, to which our interests have recently turned.

<sup>156</sup> Dean 2010; Nair 2015.

<sup>157</sup> Bray 2011; Giovannetti and Páez 2011; Costin 2011 and 2016.

The result of all of these studies has been the slow erosion of the image of Tahuantinsuyu as the strong, centralized state that rules with an iron fist. Instead, they, albeit collectively more than individually, suggest that the Inca success was mostly based on the state's adaptability to local conditions. Beyond the Andean region, the implication is that the broad geographic extent of empires presents unique stresses to their governments that cannot be solved by military power alone. Even in case of relatively quick collapse, such as Tahuantinsuyu, their success depends heavily on cooperation rather than coercion. Hence the Inca state is better understood as one based on asymmetrical political alliances centered around the power of the Inca in Cuzco.

This chapter also argues against the division of Inca ceramic material into imperial, provincial, and imitation styles. The focus on the limited imperial style is understandable from a practical point of view, as the multitude of the provincial styles presents certain methodological problems. Furthermore, separating pottery produced in Cuzco from that of any particular province certainly has a place in ceramic analysis. However, that comparison is not always readily available and to classify provincial pottery as somehow less Inca or semi-Inca overlooks that ways those styles worked. They not only had the power to represent the state in local affairs, but rather hybrid vessels embodied the relationship between local elites and the state in ways more potent than the imperial style could. On the other hand, provincial Inca ceramics were the product of processes far more complicated than mere imitation or state-imposed hybridity. These vessels embody the constant negotiation and renegotiation of the power relationships between state and the local lords, exhibiting both the power of the empire and local agency. Since this constant state of negotiation based on the convergence of politics, economy, and ideology seems to be the perfect encapsulation of the way Tahuantinsuyu functioned, the provincial styles are in the perfect position to shed light

on the empire. Their relegation to secondary in meaning and significance to the imperial Cuzco style is, thus, hardly productive.

The equation of Inca ceramics with the imperial style from the heartland also violates what seems to be an important aspect of Inca ontology, namely the ability of objects to shift categories based on context. Identity, be it age, gender, or ethnicity, in the Andes and in particular in the LH was relational.<sup>158</sup> Provincial objects that are seen as mere imitations in the capital could become potent imperial representatives in the local context. Strange hybrid vessels transformed into the very body of the *Sapa Inca* when they stepped onto the provincial stage. Our privileging of the visibility of particular features of ceramic objects in our understanding of hybridization can also be problematic.<sup>159</sup> Meaningful differences are not always visually detectable, as in the case of Inca imperial pottery mixing Lucre technology and Killke decoration to express the coming together of the two polities,<sup>160</sup> while not all visual differences are meaningful. We, thus, return to the idea that all archaeological classifications are steps of the interpretation process and have a particular purpose. As such, the separation of the imperial and provincial styles certainly has a place in archaeology as an analytical tool, but the equation of the imperial style with all Inca material remains problematic.

While rethinking how we define Inca ceramic material and its role in the state machine is important for Inca studies, it would also have much larger implications methodologically. History may be better suited to investigate shorter periods of the past than archaeology, but even in places

<sup>158</sup> Classen 1993; Carolyn Dean, “Andean Androgyny and the Making of Men,” in *Gender in Pre-Hispanic America*, ed. Cecelia Klein, 143-182, (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001).

<sup>159</sup> Dean and Leibsohn 2003.

<sup>160</sup> Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014.

that did not develop formal writing systems or when the historical record is sparse, shorter periods remain meaningful. However, the combination of the two methods can be salient, as is the case with Inca ceramics. We lack both detailed historical texts and the ability to date archaeological material to the level precision necessary to understand the processes within the LH in the Andes. However, even when applying the historical process in broad strokes to the material culture recovered, it is possible to understand change over time on a much smaller scale that remains meaningful.

So far, my reference to these “archaeologically short periods” has been to the LH as a whole. However, the same logic may be applied to much shorter periods such as the Inca Civil War, which lasted approximately four years. Just as the contexts of initial expansion presented different obstacles to the imperial government than the contexts of overextension or control of distant provinces, so did the context of crisis after the death of Huayna Capac. Indeed, crises present greater opportunities for blurring the lines of hierarchy. Thus, we need a way into understanding how material culture, and ceramics in particular, offer insights into the negotiations between the Inca and different groups whose status changed during tumultuous periods.

In Chapter 8, we will see through the case of Kañaraqay, how Huascar’s switch to Hurin Cuzco and his interest in allying himself with the Colla resulted in a dramatically different ceramic assemblage from those at the royal estates of his ancestors. Thinking of Colla and Lucre wares as a part of the Inca assemblage allows us to conceive that these were not mere gifts brought and left in the corner unopened, but instead the very tableware that was present at important political negotiations at Kañaraqay. Or perhaps, those were the very objects that enacted an alliance through the powerful gesture of the *Sapa Inca* himself engaging with material of non-Cuzco origin.

## Chapter 7. Rethinking Inca Ceramic Ontology: Towards an Indigenous Typology

The previous chapter argues for the multiplicity of the Inca ceramic assemblage that is overlooked by our artificial division between metropolitan and peripheral styles. However, even if we isolate the Cuzco imperial style for practical reasons of controlling the volume of material for analysis, we still seem to be missing significant pieces of information. In particular, we know very little about how the Inca themselves viewed their ceramic vessels. A major reason for this is that although a number of Inca ceramic typologies exist,<sup>1</sup> they employ mostly the same methodology largely relying on formal analysis with some considerations on decoration and construction.

Classification of archaeological material might seem as an almost automatic, habitual action based on previous knowledge and experience. It is the first task of any archaeological project and the first thing archaeological students learn about. However, classification is the first point of the interpretation process and as such it has great implications on every subsequent step from there on. As William and Ernest Adams aptly note, every typology is created for a particular purpose.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the morphological typologies we have for the Inca material are especially useful for certain questions such as their use in food practices.<sup>3</sup> They seem to fail us,

<sup>1</sup> Miguel Rivera Dorado, "La Cerámica Inca de Chinchero," in *Arqueología de Chinchero 2: Cerámica y Otros Materiales*, (Madrid, Spain: Ministerios de Asuntos Exteriores, 1976): 27-90 ; Hiram Bingham, "Types of Machu Picchu Pottery," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 17 (1915): 257-271; Catherine Julien, "Las Tumbas de Sacsayhuaman y el estilo Cuzco-Inca," *Ñawpa Pacha*, Vol. 25-27, 1987-1989 (2004): 1-125; George Miller, "An Investigation of Cuzco-Inca Ceramics: Canons of Form, Proportion, and Size," *Ñawpa Pacha*, Vol. 25/27, 1987-1989 (2004): 127-149; Luis Pardo, "Hacia una Nueva Clasificación de la Cerámica Cuzqueña del Antiguo Perú," *Revista del Instituto Arqueológico del Cuzco*, Vol. 4 (1939): 3-27; John Rowe, *An Introduction to the Archaeology of Cuzco*, (New York: Institute of Andean Research, 1944).

<sup>2</sup> William Adams and Ernest Adams, *Archaeological Typology and Practical Reality: A Dialectical Approach to Artifact Classification and Sorting*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>3</sup> Tamara Bray, "To Dine Splendidly," in *The Archaeology and Politics of Food and Feasting in Early States and Empires*, ed. Tamara Bray, (New York, NY: Springer, 2003): 93-142.



however, if we are interested in questions of Inca ontology, as they introduce a potentially foreign focus on form.

Creating emic typologies in archaeology has its distinct set of problems. While Peter Wells argues that style is the physical embodiment of a worldview, reading the symbolic communication in archaeology without introducing any intervening biases is easier said than done.<sup>4</sup> Ethnographic examples such as Dorothy Washburn and Andrea Petitto's study on Lau skirts classification based on technique and not style exemplify such biases in practice.<sup>5</sup> Language, and the concept of language ideology in particular, offers one way of navigating the treacherous waters of Indigenous ontologies. Broadly defined as a set of beliefs about language that speakers use to rationalize language structure and use, language ideology offers a link between the implicit and explicit assumptions we make when using language.<sup>6</sup> Looking at language definitions of material culture through this lens can lead us to insights about Indigenous classifications at both the explicit and the implicit level. Indeed, Indigenous typologies based on language have proven to be useful in a variety of temporal and geographic settings.<sup>7</sup>

Without an Indigenous standardized writing system, an attempt at a language-based Inca Indigenous typology might seem futile at first. However, the sixteenth and seventeenth century Quechua-Spanish dictionaries are a fascinating set of documents that contain great insights about

<sup>4</sup> Peter Wells, *How Ancient Europeans Saw the World: Vision, Patterns, and the Shaping of the Mind in Prehistoric Times*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> Dorothy Washburn and Andrea Petitto, "An Ethnoarchaeological Perspective on Textile Categories of Identification and Function," *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology*, Vol. 12 (1993): 150-172.

<sup>6</sup> Michael Silverstein in Paul Kroskrity, "Arizona Tewa Kiva Speech as a Manifestation of a Dominant Language Ideology," in *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory*, eds. Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard, and Paul Kroskrity, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998): 104.

<sup>7</sup> For example, Stephen Houston, David Stuart, and Karl Taube, "Folk Classification of Classic Maya Pottery," *American Antiquity*, Vol. 91 (1989): 720-726 and Julie Hruby, "Mycenaean Pottery from Pylos: An Indigenous Typology," *American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 114, No. 2 (2010): 195-216.

Inca classificatory systems. We now know that the fateful 1532 was not the sharp end date of not only singular Indigenous practices, but also of larger social and cultural systems.<sup>8</sup> This continuity allows us to use these outsider documents as windows into Inca ontology in a way not dissimilar to how we deploy the early modern written sources when investigating Inca history. This comparison is especially salient when we consider the effect that engagement with language had on the genre of the Spanish chronicle in the Andes. As we saw in Chapter 2, the earliest, eye-witness accounts of the New World are riddled with misconceptions that cloud more than illuminate Inca history. The key to repairing this issue was active engagement with language, as later authors who spoke Quechua, beginning with Cieza and Betanzos, exhibit much greater understanding of the Andean world.

Mindful that they are in a way ethnographic in character, constructed by foreigners for particular colonizing and conversion purposes, I use the four earliest dictionaries to argue that form was not the main, and certainly not the only, Inca ceramic classificatory parameter. A combination of linguistic and historic data points to scale and material as the main Inca ontological mechanisms, along with possibly decoration and function. In particular, I explore how the most iconic Inca vessel, the *aribalo*, was seen not as a single form produced in a continuum of sizes, but as at least three distinct forms defined by their sizes – *humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu*. I further explore the importance of material in the definition of vessels, following Tom Cummins' work on wooden and metal drinking cups. Unlike the wooden *keru* and the metal *aquilla*, the ceramic *puruncu* was not a status marker and was relegated to its simple utilitarian function. Similarly, plates and bowls of varying degrees of depth were clustered into singular

<sup>8</sup> Tom Cummins. "Queros, Aquillas, Uncus, and Chulpas: The Composition of Inka Artistic Expression and Power," in *Variations in the Expression of Inka Power*, eds. Richard Burger, Craig Morris, and Ramiro Matos, 267-311, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2007); Jeremy Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

form groups defined by material – *pucu* (ceramic), *meca* (wood), and *mate* (gourd). These cases point to the ways our current form-based Inca ceramic typologies mask important Indigenous ways of material classification and ontology. While, regrettably, it is impossible to reconstruct the full repertoire of Inca ceramics from the early modern dictionaries, several Indigenous form names such as *chusna*, *cauchi*, *chamillco*, *macma*, *manca*, *virque*, and *vichi* should supplement or even supplant our current terminology.

The next section of this chapter will review both the applicability and drawbacks of the current Inca ceramic typologies in use. It will be followed by an overview of the early modern dictionaries and their usefulness as primary sources for Inca ontology. Then, the two main test cases will be presented in the subsequent two sections on the importance of size and material in Inca pottery classification respectively. Those will be followed by a section on the ways different classificatory parameters intersect and the ways objects can shift categories. The last section of this chapter will deal with the more problematic definitions of pottery forms from the dictionaries and their possible application.

## **1. Indigenous Perspectives and Inca Ceramic Typologies Currently in Use**

The previous chapter reviews how the classifications in use today have constructed a narrative that portrays the Inca Empire as a rigid system, which betrays the ways the state functioned through co-option of local leaders. A look into the historiography of these typologies leads to a need of alternative methods for their creation. While morphological and iconography analyses are valuable, a combination of linguistic and historical analyses has the potential to illuminate questions of Inca ontology, even if a comprehensive emic taxonomy remains beyond reach.

The first systematic typology was made by Hiram Bingham based on Machu Picchu material and was almost entirely formal with some consideration of decoration. Excited by the prospect of creating a universal world archaeological language, Bingham relied heavily on preexisting classical ceramic typologies and used Greek names for all Inca vessels vaguely resembling Mediterranean forms.<sup>9</sup> While this concept has been refuted, a notable remnant of this early twentieth century thinking that gave us hyperdiffusionism is the name for the most iconic Inca vessel – the *aribalo*. Ironically, Bingham’s classification was one of the most extensive ones, covering seventeen general forms and forty-seven subforms.

As early as 1939, Luis Pardo tried to stay away from Greek-derived terms and called the *aribalo* form *makas*, even though he did not cite his source for the name.<sup>10</sup> Pardo largely agreed with Bingham’s classification based on form, but wanted to add the decorative element. His typology is a nested one starting with undecorated, monochrome, and polychrome at the highest level and then separating by type of decoration (geometric, zoomorphic, anthropomorphic, phytomorphic or combined) before listing specific decorative motifs.

In the mid-1940s, John Rowe argued that form and decoration were not distinct categories and that they need to be considered together.<sup>11</sup> While this might seem as a monumental leap in understanding how the Inca thought form related to decoration, the resulting typology is very similar to those of Pardo and Bingham. One possible way to explain this coincidence is that form and decoration in Inca pottery are inherently correlated. However, it is also possible that we have misunderstood both categories and that a correlation of two

<sup>9</sup> Bingham 1915, 260.

<sup>10</sup> Pardo 1939, 4.

<sup>11</sup> Rowe 1944, 45.

misunderstood categories creates similar results. Perhaps form and decoration are not even the correct parameters to consider in the first place.

Yet, form and decoration continued to dominate Inca ceramic classifications. Even when there was disagreement with Rowe's typology, as in the case of Meyers working with Ingapirca material in the mid-1970s, formal analysis remained the main classificatory mode. And even when Catherine Julien and George Miller revisited Luis Valcarcel's material from Sacsayhuaman in 1987, they followed Rowe's interest in the intersection between form and decoration.<sup>12</sup> Now, this is not to say that form is not a useful category. It is particularly salient when investigating use due to the close relationship with it. Tamara Bray's work on food practices based on Meyers' typology has proven how effective this approach can be.<sup>13</sup> Neck and spout morphology was certainly adapted to practical considerations related to pouring. Open shapes we used in serving, while closed shapes were appropriate for transportation and storage. What can be problematic, though, lies in the very core of classification, namely that it is done for a particular purpose and that it can never cover every single object.

While no Indigenous typologies of Inca pottery exist, this is not the first project to consider language as the window to understanding Inca ontology. Carolyn Dean used linguistic and historical data to provide critical insights into Inca stonework.<sup>14</sup> Stella Nair looked at architectural form and demonstrated the importance of facture and construction methods as classificatory factors.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, Tom Cummins showed the importance of material for the

<sup>12</sup> Julien 2004; Miller 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Bray 2003, *To Dine Splendidly*.

<sup>14</sup> Carolyn Dean, *A Culture of Stone: Inka Perspectives on Rock*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

<sup>15</sup> Stella Nair, *At Home with the Sapa Inca: Architecture, Space, and Legacy at Chinchero*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015).

construction of drinking cups as wealth goods through an examination of their names.<sup>16</sup> In ceramics, Catherine Allen looked at the term *raqui* describing both a ceramic form and a decorative motif, while have important links to Inca understanding of death.<sup>17</sup> To be sure, we have not abandoned the process, we just now demand a more satisfactory product and language could prove the key to achieving it.

## 2. Primary Sources and Methodology

Although there is much debate about the linguistic landscape of Tahuantinsuyu, it is widely accepted that at the time of Spanish invasion, Quechua was the main administrative language and lingua franca of the Inca state.<sup>18</sup> In this chapter, I follow the sources, the sixteenth and seventeenth century dictionaries, and refer to Quechua as a language and its varieties as dialects.<sup>19</sup> Eleven Quechua-Spanish dictionaries and lexicons were produced in the colonial period (AD 1532-1821), five of which were published in the first century following the conquest.<sup>20</sup> The two most reliable ones are those by Domingo de Santo Tomás, published in

<sup>16</sup> Cummins 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Catherine Allen, “The Sadness of Jars: Separation and Rectification in Andean Understanding of Death,” in *Living with the Dead in the Andes*, eds. Izumi Shimada and James Fitzsimmons, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2015): 304-328.

<sup>18</sup> For example, see Cesar Itier, “La Formación del Quechua Ayacuchano, un Proceso Inca Colonial,” *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Etudes Andines*, Vol. 45, No. 6, (2016): 308; Bruce Mannheim, *The Language of the Inka Since the European Invasion*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991), 6; Alfredo Torero, *El Quechua y la Historia Social Andina*, (Lima, Peru: Universidad Ricardo Palma, 1974): 150.

<sup>19</sup> Quechua, also referred to as Kichwa, Runa Simi, or Inca, is perhaps better understood as a family of closely related languages. However, since the primary sources for this study treat it as a single language, although they were not all based on a single dialect, this chapter will also treat Quechua as such. Of course, regional variability of ceramic terms almost certainly existed, but the similarity between the dictionaries and their ubiquitous use as instructional materials in the Colonial period when Quechua (or likely its Cuzco dialect) remained the main form of communication.

<sup>20</sup> Sabine Dedenbach-Salazar Saenz, “Dictionaries, Vocabularies, and Grammars of Andean Indigenous Languages,” in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900, Volume 1*, ed. Joanne Pillsbury, 236-244 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).

1560, and by Diego González Holguín, published in 1608.<sup>21</sup> Two other documents are also included in this study – the anonymous lexicon produced in 1586 after the Third Provincial Council of Lima decided to promote catechization in the Indigenous Andean languages and the brief dictionary attached to Diego de Torres Rubio’s grammatical work published in 1619.<sup>22</sup> I also consulted the works of Juan Roxo Mexia y Ocon, Juan de Aguilar, Estevan Sancho de Melgar, and Tomás Nieto Polo del Aguila, but their coverage of vessel forms was minimal compared to the earlier four lexicons.<sup>23</sup>

Domingo de Santo Tomás was a Dominican friar who travelled extensively along the Peruvian coast, before participating in the foundation of Universidad de San Marcos, the oldest Peruvian university, and later becoming the bishop of Charcas in today’s Bolivia.<sup>24</sup> His grammar and dictionary were the first set of Quechua linguistic studies in the colonial period. Intended to serve as missionary aids, they were used as the main teaching material of the language before it was replaced by the González Holguín works.<sup>25</sup> However, he states that the Quechua-Spanish vocabulary was aimed at Quechua speakers.<sup>26</sup> The dictionary is made up of a hundred and five

<sup>21</sup> Domingo de Santo Tomás, *Vocabulario de la Lengua General de los Indios del Perú, Llamada Quichua*, (Valladolid, Spain: Francisco Fernández de Córdoua, 1560) and Diego González Holguín, *Vocabulario de la Lengua General de Todo el Perú Llamada Lengua Qquichua, o del Inca*, (Lima, Peru: Francisco del Canto, 1608).

<sup>22</sup> *Anónimo, Arte y Vocabulario en la Lengua General del Perú Llamada Quichua, y en la Lengua Española*, (Lima, Peru: Francisco del Canto, 1614 [1586]); Diego de Torres Rubio, *Arte de la Lengua Quichua*. (Lima, Peru: Francisco Lasso, 1619).

<sup>23</sup> Juan de Aguilar, *Arte de la Lengua Quichua General de Indios del Perú*, (Tucumán, Panama: Instituto de Antropología, 1939 [1690]), Tomás Nieto Polo del Águila, *Breve Instrucción, o Arte para Entender la Lengua Común de los Indios, Según se Habla en la Provincia de Quito*, (Lima, Peru: Imprenta de la Plazuela de San Cristóval, 1753); Estevan Sancho de Melgar, *Arte de la Lengua General del Ynga Llamada Qquechhua*, (Lima, Peru: Diego de Lyra, 1691); Juan Roxo Mexia y Ocón, *Arte de la Lengua General de los Indios del Perú*, (Lima, Peru: Jorge López de Herrera, 1648);

<sup>24</sup> Dedenbach-Salazar 2008, 236.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>26</sup> Santo Tomás 1560, 12.

folios in the Spanish-Quechua vocabulary and seventy-three folios in the Quechua-Spanish one, totaling about ten thousand entries.<sup>27</sup> The entries are usually very short attempting to provide one or two equivalents with very little other explanation. While Santo Tomás did not specify the dialect that he recorded, it is likely a coastal one, considering his history up to the publication year.

Member of one of the most distinguished families in Spain, Diego González Holguín was a Jesuit missionary who arrived in Cuzco in 1581.<sup>28</sup> Until 1586, he worked with Ludovico Bertonio, who wrote the most reliable early modern Aymara dictionary, in the Lake Titicaca basin. Like the other linguists of the time, González Holguín's work was aimed to aid Indigenous conversion into Christianity and his vocabulary included a large number of Christian concepts.<sup>29</sup> His Quechua-Spanish dictionary contains three hundred and sixty-two pages, while his Spanish-Quechua one is composed of three hundred and seventeen pages for a total of about twenty-five thousand entries. Additionally, he also included a number of phrases to document the richness of Quechua expression that make it perhaps the most useful early lexicon of the Inca language. González Holguín recorded primarily the Cuzco dialect, claiming that the principal authors are all Indigenous people, with whom he worked for a number of years.<sup>30</sup>

González Holguín further claims that he used another dictionary as the basis for his work and upon comparison with the *Anónimo 1586*, it becomes clear that he must have used the latter. Led by Jose de Acosta, a number of people worked on this anonymous document that resulted

<sup>27</sup> Dedenbach-Salazar 2008, 237.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 238.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.

<sup>30</sup> González Holguín 1608, 2.



from the Third Provincial Council of 1582-1583.<sup>31</sup> It is made up of a hundred and seventy-three folios with about twelve hundred entries combined. The Quechua resembles closely the modern Ayacucho dialect, but was likely produced in Cuzco.<sup>32</sup> The entries are similar to those of Santo Tomás' lexicon in their brevity and lack of comparative examples.

Alongside González Holguín, another Jesuit priest, Diego de Torres Rubio, became an expert grammarian of both Quechua and Aymara in the early seventeenth century. He first resided in Potosi before moving to Chuquisaca (now Sucre in Bolivia), where he studied Aymara extensively.<sup>33</sup> His Quechua grammar includes a section on kinship terminology and brief Quechua-Spanish (fifteen folios) and Spanish-Quechua (twenty-three folios) lexicons, which only include a handful of ceramic terms. The utility of his work here is in comparison to the rich González Holguín dictionary published just a decade earlier, exemplifying the rapid loss of the variety of Indigenous form names in the seventeenth century.

For this chapter, I worked with original copies of the dictionaries at the John Carter Brown Library (JCB) at Brown University. These included single issues of the Santo Tomás and the González Holguin vocabularies, as well as multiple editions of the *Anónimo* and the Torres Rubio.<sup>34</sup> In most cases the different editions of these vocabularies overlapped completely and I have only used a single edition in the references. However, the charts of terms mentioned in this chapter provide all relevant citation from all editions researched. In my work with these documents, I went through each vocabulary, and its multiple editions, systematically entry by

<sup>31</sup> Dedenbach-Salazar 2008, 237.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 238.

<sup>33</sup> Bruce Mannheim, "Torres Rubio, Diego de (1557-1638)," in *Guide to Documentary Sources for Andean Studies, 1530-1900, Volume III*, ed. Joanne Pillsbury, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 670.

<sup>34</sup> The original 1586 *Anónimo* plus two further editions published in 1603 and 1614, as well as the original 1619 Torres Rubio plus two later editions published in 1700 and 1754.

entry. I have paid special attention to spelling both in Quechua and Spanish, which varies in these early documents, but which sometimes contains important information about dialects and pronunciation. Additionally, one needs to be careful with the translation from early modern Spanish to contemporary English, as meanings have shifted over time. For the purpose of alleviating any translation mistakes, I will provide the original Spanish spelling for each example that I use.

### **3. Thinking Outside the *Aribalo* – *Humihua*, *Tico*, and *Urpú***

The most iconic Inca form, a jar with an elongated, narrow neck, a flaring rim, a conical base, a lug on its pronounced shoulders, and two band-shaped handles vertically attached to body just above the corner of the base, is commonly referred to in the archaeological literature as *aribalo*. Bingham suggested that Andean archaeology stood to benefit from borrowing or adapting some of the classical archaeology terms for the sake of a globally shared archaeological scholarship.<sup>35</sup> His reasoning was based on the formal resemblance between several Inca and Ancient Greek ceramic forms, of which only the *aribalo* has retained its association with the classical form, having an even longer history of use going into the nineteenth century. The first recorded use of the term comes from Adrien de Longperrier, the curator of the antiquities department of the Louvre in 1850, who described an Inca vessel from Ollantaytambo as “easy to confuse” with a Roman aryballos.<sup>36</sup> While the two forms are strikingly different both morphologically and practically, the term persisted.

<sup>35</sup> Bingham 1915, 260.

<sup>36</sup> Adrien de Longperrier, *Notices des Monuments Exposés dans la Salle des Antiquités Américaines au Musée du Louvre*, (Paris, France: Vinchon, 1850), 111.

Since that time, scholars have struggled with the use of this foreign term, varying in distance from the Greek and Roman form through spelling. The characteristic Inca form has been called by various researchers "aryballus,"<sup>37</sup> "aryballo,"<sup>38</sup> "aryballoid,"<sup>39</sup> and in Peru it is commonly referred to as "aríbalo."<sup>40</sup> Yet, several Inca scholars have managed entirely to avoid a specific label for this shape category, using formal descriptive categories.<sup>41</sup> John Rowe openly argued against the use of the misnomer, while Craig Morris and Donald Thompson later echoed its use as inappropriate, yet continued to apply it.<sup>42</sup> Despite these efforts, the utility of using a common, understandable term have resulted in the virtually universal use of the hispanicized term "aríbalo" today. The form is still more widely known as such than its Quechua name, *urpu*.<sup>43</sup>

While disagreement over the name of the form exists, most scholars agree on its morphology and decoration that has been thought to be extremely standardized. Indeed, John Rowe famously proclaimed that the form can be identified and even reconstructed from a single

<sup>37</sup> Ann Kendall, *Everyday Life of the Incas*, (New York, NY: GP Putnam's Sons, 1973), 176 and Sara Lunt, "The Manufacture of Inca Aryballus," in *Recent Studies in Pre-Columbian Archaeology*, ed. Nicholas Saunders and Olivier de Montmollin, BAR International Series 423, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 489.

<sup>38</sup> Luis Guillermo Lumbreras, *The Peoples and Cultures of Ancient Peru*, transl. Betty Meggers, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1974), 234.

<sup>39</sup> Craig Morris and Donald Thompson, *Huánuco Pampa: An Inca City and Its Hinterland*, (London, UK: Thames and Hudson, 1985), 76 and John Hyslop, *Inka Settlement Planning*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), 295.

<sup>40</sup> Jenaro Fernández Baca, *Motivos de Ornamentación de la Cerámica Inca-Cuzco*, (Lima, Peru: Librería Studium, Editores, 1973), 24; Federico Kaufman Doig, *Manual de la Arqueología Peruana*, (Lima, Peru: Ediciones Peisa, 1973), 560; Luis Eduardo Valcárcel, "Sajsawaman Redescubierto," *Revista del Museo Nacional*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1934), 5

<sup>41</sup> Julien 2004; Dorothy Menzel, *Pottery Style and Society in Ancient Peru: Art as Mirror of History in the Ica Valley, 1350-1570*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976); Rowe 1944.

<sup>42</sup> Morris and Thompson 1985, 76 and Rowe 1944, 47.

<sup>43</sup> Cummins 2007, 281.

ceramic sherd.<sup>44</sup> Decoration is also thought to have been governed by a strict set of rules, at least in the Inca heartland.<sup>45</sup> It almost always covers half of the vessel on the shoulder lug side, while the other side is usually decorated with a single line at the base of the neck. Three major motifs involving strings of rhomboids, bar and X, and a fern account for over half of imperial Inca examples.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the inadequacy of this foreign term – one needs to only briefly sample the Roman and Inca material to shake off Longperier’s confusion – its resilience can be attributed to the strong association of both forms with a particular substance. Greek and Roman aryballoi were containers of perfumes or aromatic oils, while the Inca vessels were filled with corn beer or *aqha*, the main alcoholic drink that was served during feasts in the Andes.<sup>47</sup> This is where morphological analysis is particularly useful in the determination of use. Bray argues that the conical base together with the restricted orifice facilitate the mixing of sediments, while the flaring rim enables swift pouring, both of which point to containment of liquids.<sup>48</sup> The placement of the band-shaped handles low on the body of the vessel and the central lug high on the shoulder further suggest a transportation function, as their positioning is ideal for the stabilization of a

<sup>44</sup> Rowe 1944, 47.

<sup>45</sup> Tamara Bray, “Inca Iconography: The Art of Empire in the Andes,” *RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics*, No. 38, (2000), 172.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>47</sup> Jean-Pierre Brun, “The Production of Perfumes in Antiquity: The Cases of Delos and Paestum,” *American Journal of Archaeology*, Vol. 104, No. 2 (2000), 279 and Bray, *To Dine Splendidly*, 111.

<sup>48</sup> Bray 2003, *To Dine Splendidly*, 111.

rope.<sup>49</sup> This is further exemplified by the drawings of the Indigenous early modern author Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala.<sup>50</sup>

While Guaman Poma did not feature many depictions of ceramic vessels, the *urpu* features prominently and is always related to maize beer.<sup>51</sup> The form retained its important association with the precious drink even among the Spaniards in the colonial period.<sup>52</sup> The link is further exemplified by Bray's study of over five thousand vessels from over thirty sites across Tahuantisuyu indicating that this vessel had greater significance for the Inca in the provinces than in the imperial core, comprising over 50% of the pottery in provincial districts and only 29% in the core.<sup>53</sup> It, thus, embodies the importance of *aqha* prestations as a major imperial strategy of building social capital, which the state exchanged for labor.

The Inca economy operated primarily through labor extraction.<sup>54</sup> Unlike the Old World and Mesoamerica, market mechanisms did not exist in the Central Andes.<sup>55</sup> Instead, every imperial subject was taxed by working for the state a certain number of days per year. This system was based on the Indigenous Andean concept of reciprocity, which was the basis of

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala, *El Primer Nueva Coronica y Buen Gobierno* (1615/1616), GKS 2232 4, Royal Library of Denmark, 229.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 246.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 776.

<sup>53</sup> Bray 2003, *To Dine Splendidly*, 124.

<sup>54</sup> Craig Morris, "The Archeological Study of Andean Exchange Systems," *Social Archeology* (1978): 320.

<sup>55</sup> Charles Stanish, "Nonmarket Imperialism in the Prehispanic Americas: The Inka Occupation of the Titicaca Basin." *Latin American Antiquity*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1997), 198.

social hierarchy in many of the imperial provinces before the Inca expansion.<sup>56</sup> The state laborers were only required to provide their labor, while the state supplied the raw materials, tools, and infrastructure needed to complete state projects, while also providing food and shelter. Terence D’Altroy and Roland Bishop argue that Inca military conquest often aimed at controlling raw materials that were then quickly returned to the locals in exchange for their labor and its fruits.<sup>57</sup> By hosting large feasts and serving large quantities of corn beer, the Inca’s reciprocal relationship with their subjects became increasingly asymmetrical. Justin Jennings and Melissa Chatfield argue that since *aqha* production was done on the household level in the preceding Late Intermediate Period (AD 1000-1470), hosts became indebted to individual *aqha* makers, just like guests became indebted to their hosts.<sup>58</sup> The Inca circumvented this leveling mechanism by monopolizing the corn beer production in the special compounds known as “houses of the chosen women” or *acllahuasi*. Increased scale *aqha* production allowed for the Inca to fulfill their obligations towards the local laborers without the burden of reciprocating with the brewers.

The role of corn beer and its container in the Inca imperial project was profoundly gendered. As women were the primary *aqha* brewers both on the household and the state level, they were the most affected by the Inca monopolization. On the one hand, they lost this valuable avenue for political action and on the other, control of women became a critical aspect of Inca

<sup>56</sup> Frances Hayashida, “New Insights into Inka Pottery Production,” in *Andean Ceramics: Technology, Organization, and Approaches*, ed. Izumi Shimada, (Philadelphia, PA: Museum Applied Science Center for Archaeology, University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 1998), 314.

<sup>57</sup> D’Altroy and Bishop 1990: 133.

<sup>58</sup> Justin Jennings and Melissa Chatfield, “Pots, Brewers, and Hosts: Women’s Power and the Limits of Central Andean Feasting,” in *Drink, Power, and Society in the Andes*, eds. Justin Jennings and Brenda Bowser, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2009), 218.

colonization.<sup>59</sup> The conquerors even envisioned a male-female relationship with the conquered provinces, in which the active, civilized, masculine Inca brought order to the passive, feminine local realm in the state of nature.<sup>60</sup> The *urpu* was the material embodiment of all of these processes with its seemingly standardized form and decoration.

If this vessel played such an important role for the Inca state, we certainly should name it correctly. However, this is not merely a trivial question, as the Indigenous names of the form reveal its multifaceted character that reveals the fallacy of relying solely on morphological analysis for Inca ceramic classification. The early modern linguists recorded at least three separate words for the same form differentiated by size, suggesting that the Inca *urpu* was never conceived as a single object. The variation in size of the archaeological examples further strengthens the case that we have conflated several Inca forms into one. This realization offers an exciting glimpse into Indigenous ontology and the importance of size and scale as classificatory category that has important implications for the study of all Inca material culture.

In his Quechua-Spanish vocabulary, González Holguín defines “*vrppu*” as “cantaro muy grande mayor que *ttico*” or “a very large jug, bigger than *ttico*,” implying that the *urpu* and *tico* forms are virtually the same with only the size differentiation.<sup>61</sup> It is also worth noticing that his view is consistent with our modern classifications that conflate the two forms into one. A look at the *tico* definition gives us “*ttico*” as “cantaro mediano mayor que *humihua*” or “a mid-sized jug larger than *humihua*” and “*tico*” as “cantarillo mediano de traer agua” or “a mid-sized jug for

<sup>59</sup> Irene Silverblatt, *Moon, Sun, and Witches: Gender Ideologies and Class in Inca and Colonial Peru*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

<sup>60</sup> Carolyn Dean, “The Inka Married the Earth: Integrated Outcrops and the Making of Place,” *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 89, No. 3, (2007), 502-518.

<sup>61</sup> González Holguín 1608, 359.

carrying water.”<sup>62</sup> The definition of *humihua* provides the only morphological information in this size continuum of *aribalos* that González Holguín built – “cantarillo mediano culli angosto, manual para llear agua o chicha” or “a mid-sized jug with a narrow neck for bringing water or *aqha*.”<sup>63</sup> While it is possible that there was a meaningful functional distinction between a *tico* and a *humihua* exemplified by the word choice between to carry (transportation) and to bring (serving) *aqha*, we need to be mindful not to lend too much power to the early modern linguist. Moreover, *Anónimo 1586* provides the only form name derivative verb, defining “*humihuani*” as “trassegar agua, o cosa de licor en los cataros” or “to carry water or alcohol in a *humihua*.”<sup>64</sup> The link between the form and corn beer is clear, but we cannot make a case for a difference in function between *ticos* and *humihuas*. The Spanish-Quechua side of González Holguín’s dictionary is less useful, as the author has flattened even more forms to fit the Spanish nomenclature. However, size remains the main classificatory parameter, as he defines several forms – *humuhua*, *macas*, *tteco*, *vrpu*, *macma* – as a progression from smaller to larger with the umbrella Spanish term “cantaro.”<sup>65</sup>

Santo Tomás makes a similar distinction defining “*humigua*” as “cantarico pequeño” or “a small jug” and “*vrpo*” as “cantaro muy grande o tinaja” or “a very large jug or jar.”<sup>66</sup> While in his Quechua-Spanish lexicon, he lacks a word for *tico*, in his Spanish-Quechua once he again flattens the tree terms into one, defining “cantaro grande” or “a large jug” as all three “*humigua*,

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 340-341.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 197 (100).

<sup>64</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 173.

<sup>65</sup> González Holguín 1608, 75.

<sup>66</sup> Santo Tomás 1560, 139 and 179.



*tico*, *vrpo*.”<sup>67</sup> The importance of the size in the definition of the three forms, however, is still visible in Santo Tomás, as he adds an additional entry for “cantaro muy grande” or “a very large jug,” whose equivalent is only “*vrpo*.”<sup>68</sup> In a slight contradiction with the previous designation of *humihua* as one of the words for a large jug, he then defines “cantarico mas pequeño” or “a smaller jug” as “*humigua o chuxna*.”<sup>69</sup> The *chusna* is a different form that will be discussed further below. Size is again the parameter that governs the separation of the *humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu*.

The *Anónimo 1586* offers a further distinction between the *humihua* and the *tico* that was already hinted by Santo Tomás. “*Humihua*” is defined as “cantaro pequeñito de indios” or “a small Indigenous jug,” notably not referencing other forms.<sup>70</sup> However, in an obvious progression, “*teco*” is defined as “cantaro mediano mayor que *humihua*” or “a mid-sized jug larger than *humihua*” and “*vrpu*” is defined as “cantaro muy grande mayor que *teco*” or “a very large jug larger than *tico*.”<sup>71</sup> Similar to González Holguín, and perhaps where he borrowed the idea, the *Anónimo 1586* lists a series of form names in a size progression in the Spanish-Quechua vocabulary. Each term – *humihua*, *macas*, *teco*, *urpu* – is defined as larger than the preceding one.<sup>72</sup>

The confusion between the *tico* and the *humihua* remains significant given that archaeologically these objects come in two distinct size group – large, 70cm tall and larger, or

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> *Anónimo 1614* [1586], 173.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 234 and 247.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 307.

*urpu*, and small, 15-25cm tall, or *tico/humihua*. One possible solution is that *humihua* was simply the Aymara alternative to the *tico*.<sup>73</sup> Although debates about the relationship between Aymara and Quechua remain heated, at the very least the two languages came into contact during the LH, during which multilingualism remained practiced despite the political centralization.<sup>74</sup> The definitive Aymara dictionary of the early colonial period was published in 1612 by the Italian Jesuit Ludovico Bertonio in a style similar to González Honguín's including long definitions and even examples of use of dictionary entries in phrases and sentences.<sup>75</sup> Bertonio defines *humihua* similarly as “cantaro pequeño” or “a small jug” in its Aymara-Spanish section<sup>76</sup> and “cantaro algo pequeño” or “a somewhat small jug” in its Spanish-Aymara section,<sup>77</sup> while *tico* does not appear in his vocabulary.

Given the linguistic multiplicity of the Inca Empire and the geographic proximity of Quechua and Aymara, it is not uncommon to see words jump between the two languages in these sources. *Urpu* also appears in Bertonio's dictionary as a translation of the Spanish “cantaro muy grande” or “a very large jug.”<sup>78</sup> However, it is clear that this is a borrowed Quechua word since *urpu* is only given as alternative translation after *makacha*<sup>79</sup> and it does not exist in the Aymara-Spanish section of the vocabulary. On the other hand, *humihua* has deep roots in Aymara, as it also has derivatives such as *humihuatha* meaning “echarle agua” or “to pour

<sup>73</sup> Aymara is the other major native language of the Andes still spoken in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru.

<sup>74</sup> Mannheim 1991, 38.

<sup>75</sup> Ludovico Bertonio, *Vocabulario de la Lengua Aymara*, (Juli, Peru: Francisco del Canto, 1612).

<sup>76</sup> *Ibidi.*, 162.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibidi.*, 114.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibidi.*

<sup>79</sup> The standard Aymara word for a large pot and perhaps the Aymara version of *urpu*. Bertonio 1612, 311.

water.”<sup>80</sup> The Aymara origin of *humihua* does not undermine the above discussion about its potential meaning as a counterpart of the Quechua *tico*, as it might have received new meaning once it entered the new language. However, it is critical to recognize that according to Bertonio, the ceramic category of the jug is once again differentiated by size between *makacha* and *humihua*. Whether this is a long-standing ontological parameter in Aymara or if Bertonio’s work reflects an Inca ontological projection by his informants in Juli is unclear. What remains powerful is that scale and size retained its defining roles even across languages.

Furthermore, size variation in the material record matches the linguistic and conceptual division of these vessels by size. The form ranges from reduced scale versions just some 5cm tall through the “personal-sized” group ranging 15-22cm tall to the large group measuring over 80cm tall and reaching over 1m in height. Scholars have grappled with this issue and, working with Sacsayhuaman material, George Miller encountered “two naturally occurring size clusters.”<sup>81</sup> He argued that the members of the large group were used for storage of maize beer, while the members of the “personal-sized” group were a personal item usually found in burials.<sup>82</sup> Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, based on the Machu Picchu collection at the Peabody Museum, argued that the “personal sized” ones were used for drinking since their decorations are closely related to regional identity, while the large ones were used for storage and transportation.<sup>83</sup>

Although none of the dictionaries provide any measurements, Miller’s distinction of “personal size” vessels of about 20cm height seems to fit the *tico* description in all three

<sup>80</sup> Bertonio 1612, 162.

<sup>81</sup> Miller 2004, 128.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>83</sup> Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, “Catalogue,” in *Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas*, eds. Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 130.

lexicons, as well as González Holguín's *humihua*, while the *urpu* describes the large group. The dominant use of the term *urpu* in the present matches the size of most contemporary vessels of this shape. Burger and Salazar's argument that these were used for drinking is not supported by the linguistic data, nor by the morphology of the object. Instead, the *tico* seems to have acted more like a table pitcher than as a personal drinking vessel, in which case the strong link between decoration and identity they see in the Machu Picchu material is still salient.

To engage the problem with measured size, it is perhaps better to think of the continuum between *humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu* in terms of scale. Andrew Hamilton has already convincingly argued that, based on his work with textiles. For him scale, or relative size, was a relational property that the Inca employed to convey meaning between objects, individuals, and the landscape.<sup>84</sup> A fascinating quote from Fray Bernabe Cobo, one of the most reliable early modern sources on Indigenous practices, proves that the same applied to ceramics:

Nor did they make the same distinctions in earthenware that we use, but speak only of pots (*ollas*) and jugs (*cantaros*), which they differentiate in terms of size (larger and smaller) and decoration (some have been sculpted with figures and designs; small, plane plates (*platillos*); and small shallow plates (*patenas*).<sup>85</sup>

Cobo's recognition of the remarkably different ways the Spanish and the Inca categorized their suggests that just like many other Inca concepts, ceramic form names could be fluid rather than set, supporting the linguists' placement of form names on a continuum. This certainly fits their worldview that was based on individual relationships between objects rather than on rigid categories.

The Inca understood the world as populated by individual entities that existed in tension and possessed the potential to form harmonious partnerships. These are exemplified by the

<sup>84</sup> Andrew Hamilton, *Scale and the Incas*, Ph.D. Dissertation, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2014).

<sup>85</sup> Bernabé Cobo, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo*, (Madrid, Spain: Ediciones Atlas, 1964 [1653], 114. Translation follows Tamara Bray's translation.

enduring concept of *yanantin* through which people in Andes even today understand their environments through several forms of symbolic dualism – ritual, social, and cosmological.<sup>86</sup> The entities forming these harmonious partnerships were often expressed in gendered terms.<sup>87</sup> Yet things and objects were not always explicitly gendered before they were coupled and thus possessed the potential to embody both the male and the female side of the gendered duality. Water, for example, was generally conceptualized as female, but in coupling with the earth in the form of a river, could become male as it exhibited masculine characteristics by ritually inseminating the earth.<sup>88</sup> From Cobo’s explanation of ceramic categorization on a continuum, it stems that the same way an object could take on different gender roles depending on its counterpart, it could also become a *tico* or an *urpu* depending on the context.

There are, of course, practical matters of weight, size, and volume, which explain the clustering that Miller saw in the Sacsayhuaman material. A “personal-size” pot is more likely to be a *tico* than an *urpu* in most cases. However, it is important to retain the emphasis on scale, as objects of liminal sizes would have been especially interesting due to their ability to switch categories. González Holguín’s confusion between *humihua* and *tico* illustrates the closeness in size of the two classifications, as the objects he tested his linguistic knowledge on might have fallen in either category depending on the situation.

It is also critical to recognise the linguistic individuality of the three terms. While the early modern linguists try to impose some referential quality on them in their Spanish-Quechua

<sup>86</sup> Tristan Platt, “Mirrors and Maize: The Concept of Yanantin among the Macha of Bolivia,” in *Anthropological History of Andean Politics*, eds. John Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, 228-259, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 245.

<sup>87</sup> Silverblatt 1987, 47.

<sup>88</sup> Constance Classen, *Inca Cosmology and the Human Body*, (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1993), 13.



Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>humihua</b></p> 	<p>cantarico mas pequeño</p> <p>cantarico</p> <p>cantarico para yr por agua</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 26 (humigua)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 181, 1603 Anonimo 297, 1614 Anonimo 307</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 26</p>
<p><b>tico</b></p> 	<p>cantaro grande</p> <p>cantaro mayor que este (macas)</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 26</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 181; 1603 Anonimo 297; 1614 Anonimo 307 (teco); Gonzalez Holguin 75 (tteco)</p>
<p><b>urpu</b></p> 	<p>cantaro muy grande como tinaja</p> <p>cantaro grande</p> <p>cantaro mayor que este (teco)</p> <p>cantaro mayor que este (tteco)</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 26 (vrpo)</p> <p>Santo Tomas 26 (vrpo)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 181; 1603 Anonimo 297; 1614 Anonimo 307 (vrpu)</p> <p>Gonzalez Honguin 75 (vrpu)</p>

Table 7.1. - Terms related to the aribaloid form in the Spanish-Quechua lexicons

lexicons (Table 7.1), the Quechua-Spanish ones make no such effort (Table 7.2). In Spanish, the forms are defined as a particular size from a central referent – “cantaro” or “jug” – but in Quechua *humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu* do not share any meaning on the morphemic level. So a *humihua* is not merely a small *urpu* and none of the three are merely different sizes of an *aribalo*. Instead, the fact that they merit a distinct name speaks to the Inca linguistic ideology of scale-based classification that makes them categorically distinct objects. A comparative example in English is the size classification between open cylindrical forms, namely a cup is not just a small bucket. Function here is defined by size rather than form alone again creating categorically separate objects. However, the linguistic distinctions do not always signify conceptual ones. In these early modern vocabularies *vaso* and *taça* are used interchangeably to signify drinking cups.

The distinction between *humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu* is strengthened by the fact that Inca possessed the ability to produce referential categories of ceramic forms, but chose not to apply it here. In González Holguín’s Spanish-Quechua lexicon, pots are defined by size as well as material from the base referent “olla” or “pot” defined as “*manca*.”<sup>89</sup> A small pot (“olla chica”) is then defined as “*huchuylla manca*,” literally combining the words for “small” and “pot.”<sup>90</sup> The mid-sized pot (“olla mediana”) is more inventively defined as “*malta manca*,” “*malta*” signifying a two-year old llama lamb.<sup>91</sup> Turning to material, an iron pot (“olla de hierro”) is also defined literally as “*qqellaymanca*,” from “*qqullay*” meaning iron.<sup>92</sup> Despite having this linguistic and conceptual ability to build off of a common referent, the Inca separation of the

<sup>89</sup> González Holguín 1608, 243.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 243 and 220.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 243 and 298.




Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>humihua</b></p> 	<p>cātaro pequeñito de indios</p> <p>cantarillo mediano cuelli angosto, manual para llear agua o chicha</p>	<p>1603 Anonimo 163, 1614 Anonimo 173</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 196</p>
<p><b>tico</b></p> 	<p>cantaro mediano mayor que humihua</p> <p>cantarillo mediano de traer agua</p>	<p>1586 Anonimo 109; 1603 Anonimo 225; 1614 Anonimo 235 (teco); Gonzalez Holguin 340 (tticco)</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 341 (tico)</p>
<p><b>urpu</b></p> 	<p>cantaro muy grande, o tinaja</p> <p>cantaro muy grande, mayor que teco</p> <p>cātaro muy grande mayor que ttico</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 178 (vrpo)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 121; 1603 Anonimo 237; 1614 Anonimo 247 (vrpu)</p> <p>Gonzalez Honguin 359 (vrppu)</p>

Table 7.2. - Terms related to the aribaloid forms in the Quechua-Spanish lexicons



*humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu* suggests that they were distinctly different and points to scale operating ontologically not only between grades, but also between states.

Finally, it bears mentioning that the loss of meaning post contact was a rather rapid process. As early as 1619, Torres Rubio only reports two words referring to the Spanish “cantaro” – “*macma*” and “*puyñu*” defined as a large and a small jug respectively.<sup>93</sup> *Puyñu* appears in the other lexicons as well, but its definitions as a mid-sized jug or as a jug in general obscure its form, function, and material.<sup>94</sup> *Macma* is the term usually related to the Spanish tinaja, a large jug for wine, and referring to both its great size and its function as a storage vessel.<sup>95</sup> Since no morphological information exists for either term, it is relatively safe to assume that both *macmas* and *puyñus* differed from the *aribalo* form, whose varied terms were already lost in the early seventeenth century. Yet Torres Rubio relied on size as the definitive parameter when describing his two jug or jar forms. Scale, however, was not the only classificatory tool for Inca vessels, as material was also an important part of the identity of Inca material culture.

#### **4. Materiality of Drinking Cups – *Quero*, *Aquilla*, and *Puruncu***

The importance of materials and their role in identity creation for the Inca have interested scholars across disciplines and materials. Amy Oakland Rodman and Vicki Cassman argued that the Inca tapestry tunics were conceived as the intersection between their Huari and Tihuanaco predecessors, utilizing Huari iconography and Tihuanaco structure.<sup>96</sup> Rob Ixer, Sara Lunt, and

<sup>93</sup> Torres Rubio 1619, 191 and 197.

<sup>94</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 216 and 307; González Holguín 1608, 75 and 297; Santo Tomás 1560, 26 and 163.

<sup>95</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 183 and 432; González Holguín 1608, 75 and 217; Santo Tomás 1560, 100 and 148.

<sup>96</sup> Amy Oakland Rodman and Vicki Cassman, “Andean Tapestry: Structure Informs the Surface,” *Art Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (1995): 33-39.

Bill Sillar make a similar argument about Inca andesite-tempered pottery borrowing Killke designs and Lucre technology to embody the unity of the imperial core.<sup>97</sup> Carolyn Dean’s work on Inca stonework led to critical insights into material differentiation through the ability of some materials, and stone in particular, to possess *camay*, the life-giving essence.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, she used similar methodology utilizing linguistic and historical data. To return to Cobo, his quote above continues, “The rest of their vessels correspond to the types that the Spaniards usually make from clay, which they made from silver, gold, wood, and dried calabashes.”<sup>99</sup> Other than size, he saw material as the other main classificatory factor of Inca vessels. This is fascinating, since such questions of how form, use, and naming of objects related to each other in the organization of everyday life speak to an ontological register that might have been beyond the interest or capability of understanding for a Spanish missionary at the time. Yet the clarity that Cobo projects implies that these objects were explicitly and unequivocally labelled for him.

Drinking cups present a particularly interesting case for material differentiation, as they were produced in a variety of materials that defined them. In this section, I primarily build on Tom Cummins’ work of Inca drinking cups.<sup>100</sup> He uses two Indigenous terms – *quero* and *aquilla* – to differentiate between virtually the same vessel form executed in wood or metal respectively. Adhering to the concept of linguistic ideology, without directly citing it, Cummins proposes that the two cups are categorically different and proposes that the common use of the word *quero* to describe any cup is inherently problematic similar to the problematic use of *urpu*

<sup>97</sup> Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014.

<sup>98</sup> Dean 2010.

<sup>99</sup> Cobo 1964 [1653], 115. Translation follows Bray’s translation.

<sup>100</sup> Cummins 2007.

as a blanket term.<sup>101</sup> González Holguín's lexicon is especially useful here, as he clearly distinguished between materials of cups in his Spanish-Quechua vocabulary, defining wooden, gourd, silver, and golden cups as "*qquero*," "*mati*," "*aquilla*," and "*ccori aquilla*" respectively.<sup>102</sup>

This ontological differentiation of materials has a profound effect on how the objects were used and on the meanings they took in Inca society. Cummins' main argument revolves around the use of these cups as important markers of wealth for the Inca. Their significance is exemplified by the direct link between the form names and their respective materials. *Quero* is also the word for wood and any wooden object.<sup>103</sup> Calling the wooden drinking cup by the same name isolates it as the definitive and most significant of wooden objects. Similarly, the metal version of the cup, *aquilla*, references silver as well as the moon, both of which are referred to as *quilla*.<sup>104</sup>

A key source for Cummins is Francisco de Ávila's sermon in Quechua on the Fourth Sunday of the Advent, published in 1648, that explains the transient nature of material wealth. In his sermon, Ávila refers directly to the fading memory of the Inca and their lost power. It is significant that the only specific objects that he names are *toccapuccompi* or the fine tapestry-weave textiles with *tocapu* designs and the *quero* and *aquilla*.<sup>105</sup> The specific objects Ávila lists are not accidental by any means. Cummins argues that a syntactic relationship between the *tocapu* textiles and *queros* and *aquillas* existed for the Inca beyond the utilitarian function of these

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 273.

<sup>102</sup> González Holguín 1608, 326.

<sup>103</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 220; González Holguín 1608, 304; Santo Tomás 1560, 162; Torres Rubio 1619, 11.

<sup>104</sup> González Holguín 1608, 298; Santo Tomás 1560, 188.

<sup>105</sup> Francisco de Ávila in Cummins 2007, 272.

objects.<sup>106</sup> They were given as gifts from the Inca to conquered elites, acting as symbolic contracts between conquerors and conquered. In a 1570 testimony, the son of a local leader claimed that his great grandfather received fine textile tunics and drinking cups from Topa Inca, the eighth Inca ruler.<sup>107</sup> These acted as assurance from the sovereign for the peaceful transition of the region into the Inca Empire. Textiles and these cups, thus, formed a bond beyond their utilitarian function or material production. The use of the Indigenous form names here enabled Cummins to illuminate that the *quero* and *aquilla* took upon functions within Inca society beyond their utilitarian one.

Drinking cups in the archaeological record, though, come in three and not just the two mentioned materials. Unable to trace the Indigenous ceramic cup name, Cummins argues that the material of the drinking cup is a significant marker of the user's identity that has a profound effect on the objects visibility in Inca society.<sup>108</sup> As wooden and metal cups were used by the elite, they were remembered by Ávila as markers of wealth. The users of ceramic drinking cups remained voiceless.

While Cummins is right that the Europeans were not much interested in pottery, as exemplified by the early modern sources that rarely mention ceramics, the early modern dictionaries do include the ceramic drinking cup. González Holguín defines "*purunccu*" as "vaso de barro cuelli largo" or "a long-necked ceramic cup," a matching description in both material and form.<sup>109</sup> As with many other entries, his definition matches the *Anónimo 1586* and

<sup>106</sup> Cummins 2007, 277.

<sup>107</sup> Alonso Poma Guala in Cummins 2007, 279.

<sup>108</sup> Cummins 2007, 274.

<sup>109</sup> González Holguín 1608, 296.

both provide one only in their Quechua-Spanish lexicons.<sup>110</sup> The Spanish-Quechua sides of both dictionaries focus exclusively on the cups of greater value, executed in wood, gourd, or metal. The reverse is true for the earliest linguist, Santo Tomás, who defines “ampolla para beber” or “a drinking cup” as “*porongo*,” failing to provide a definition for the Indigenous term in the Quechua-Spanish lexicon.<sup>111</sup> The difference between “vaso” and “ampolla” here is not significant. “Ampolla,” a small, long Spanish vessel or phial, was used by Santo Tomás to convey the more elongated body of Inca drinking cups in comparison with their Spanish counterparts. *Anónimo 1586* and González Holguín make the same provision by using the generic cup term and adding an explanation for the form.

Clearly, the *puruncu* appears to be the ceramic cup of the voiceless masses, but another term complicates matters. *Anónimo 1586* also includes “*pocpu*” defined as “ampolla en el agua” or “a cup of water,” hinting at a possible distinction between the two cups on a basis of substance consumed<sup>112</sup> González Holguín further makes a connection between the two terms defining “*ppucpu*” as “poronquillo, o limeta boqui angosto” or “a small *puruncu* or a small gourd with a narrow neck.”<sup>113</sup> The morphological information is somewhat confusing, since Inca drinking cups were mostly cylindrical with slightly flaring sides and neither had necks, nor narrowed in height. How *pucpus* related to *puruncus* is thus unclear, but it is possible that the relationship was not one in shape but rather in function. All drinking cups were collectively referred to as

<sup>110</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 205.

<sup>111</sup> Santo Tomás 1560, 11.

<sup>112</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 202.

<sup>113</sup> González Holguín 1608, 296.






Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>aquilla</b></p> 	<p>vaso de plata</p> <p>vaso de plata o oro</p>	<p>1603 Anonimo 93, 1614 Anonimo 103</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 25</p>
<p><b>mate</b></p> 	<p>vaso o platos de calabazo para beuer, o comer</p> <p>vaso de calabazo</p>	<p>Gonzalez Holguin 233 (mati)</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 192, 1700 Torres Rubio 208, 1754 Torres Rubio 199 (mati)</p>
<p><b>pucpu</b></p> 	<p>ampolla en el agua</p> <p>poronguillo, o limeta boqui angosta</p>	<p>1586 Anonimo 86, 1603 Anonimo 202, 1614 Anonimo 212 (pocpu)</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 296 (ppucpu)</p>
<p><b>puruncu</b></p> 	<p>ampolla para beuer</p> <p>vaso de barro cuelli largo</p>	<p>Santo Tomas, 162 (porongo)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 89, 1603 Anonimo 205, 1614 Anonimo 215; Gonzalez Holguin 296 (purunccu)</p>
<p><b>quero</b></p> 	<p>vasos de madera para beuer</p> <p>vaso de madera</p>	<p>1586 Anonimo 196, 1603 Anonimo 210, 1614 Anonimo 220</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 304</p>

Table 7.3. - Terms related to cups in the Quechua-Spanish lexicons

*upiana*, a term identical to the verb “to drink,” again suggesting the objects’ fluid nature between their definition as material or functional.<sup>114</sup>

While my study of the sixteenth and seventeenth century dictionaries revealed the ceramic cup term, the power separation between materials is still salient. Faced with a whole new world in the Andes, the very earliest European writers are known for their misrepresentations and misunderstanding of Indigenous cultural practices. It is possible that Santo Tomás failed to recognise the different value of the cup’s material and recorded the most common *puruncus*. By the 1580s, the linguists seem to be acutely aware of the material differentiation, as they now not only provide separate terms for the different materials, but also relegated the *puruncus* to the Quechua-Spanish lexicons (Table 7.3.) targeting the locals. At the same time, the Spanish-Quechua vocabularies (Table 7.4.) provided an almost complete list of cups and materials, focusing on the more valuable, and so more interesting and appropriate for Spanish consumption, *quero* and *aquilla*. We already saw that the European and Indigenous markers of wealth and power were mixed in the colonial period, as exemplified by the Guaman Poma drawing of a local leader, Don Juan Capcha, surrounded by a wine-containing tinaja and an *aqha*-containing *urpu*.<sup>115</sup> By the time of Ávila’s sermon, the Spaniards seem to be well aware of the categorical difference between drinking cups of different material. The work of the early modern linguists, then, suggests an attempt to channel this Indigenous classification along linguistic, racial, and class lines, separating the Quechua-speaking, *puruncu*-using locals from the Spanish-speaking, *quero* and *aquilla*-using foreigners. Recognition of these processes is only possible through the use of Quechua terms and through the recognition of Inca ontology. Thus,

<sup>114</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 246 and 440; González Holguín 1608, 326 and 356; Santo Tomás 1560, 103 and 178; Torres Rubio 1619, 173.

<sup>115</sup> Guamán Poma de Ayala 1615/1616, 776.





Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>aquilla</b></p> 	<p>vaso de plata</p> <p>copa de plata</p> <p>copa de plata, o oro</p>	<p>1603 Anonimo 312, 1614 Anonimo 426; Gonzalez Holguin 440; Gonzalez Holguin 326; 1619 Torres Rubio 173, 1700 Torres Rubio 190</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 190, 1603 Anonimo 306, 1614 Anonimo 316</p> <p>Gonzalez Holquin 89</p>
<p><b>pucpu</b></p> 	<p>ampollas en el agua</p>	<p>Gonzalez Holguin 32 (pokpo pokpo)</p>
<p><b>puruncu</b></p> 	<p>ampolla para beber</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 10 (porongo)</p>
<p><b>quero</b></p> 	<p>vasos de madera para beber</p> <p>copa de madera</p> <p>taça de yndios de madera</p>	<p>1586 Anonimo 196, 1603 Anonimo 210, 1614 Anonimo 220</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 89</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 170, 1700 Torres Rubio 188 (queru)</p>

Table 7.4. - Terms related to cups in the Spanish-Quechua lexicons



the search for the Indigenous terms of Inca vessels is not merely a quest for political correctness or some self-indulgent propriety. The linguistic distinction of drinking cup and the obscuring of their ceramic versions illuminate the power of materiality for the Inca on both sides of the 1532 divide.

## 5. Fluidity of Plates and Bowls – *Pucu, Meca, and Mate*

Material is the defining parameter not only for drinking cups, however, but for all Inca serving vessels. These bowls and shallow plates are second only to *humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu* in number in the archaeological record.<sup>116</sup> The intoxicating properties of maize beer served in *queros*, *aquillas* and *puruncus*, might have made it the centerpiece of state-sponsored feasts, but various foodstuffs were also present at the table served in individual plates and bowls. The current form-based Inca ceramic typologies mostly mask the great variety exhibited by these vessels in size, decoration, and handle morphology clumping them in just a couple of generic bowl and plate categories. The data from the sixteenth and seventeenth century dictionaries suggest that plate form, size, and decoration were all important classificatory parameters for the Inca. However, they operated in a fluid fashion as each took center stage in separate cases. Ironically, the great variety of handle shapes is not reflected in Quechua, while the more subtle distinction between bowls and shallow plates that our current typologies make is indeed meaningful.

The linguistic data suggest a marked difference between shallow plates and bowls on the basis of form. Again, my starting point was the word used in contemporary Quechua to describe plates – *pucu*. Both Santo Tomás and González Holguín define “*pocu*” and “*ppucu*” respectively

<sup>116</sup> Bray 2003, *Inka Pottery as Culinary Equipment*, 16.




Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p data-bbox="197 256 268 280"><b>mate</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 256 789 280">calabaço para comer los yndios</p> <p data-bbox="390 334 968 399">platos o escodillas de cal[a]baças, y la misma calabaça que los cria</p>	<p data-bbox="1041 256 1409 280">Gonzalez Holguin 233 (mati)</p> <p data-bbox="1041 334 1955 399">1619 Torres Rubio 192, 1700 Torres Rubio 208, 1754 Torres Rubio 199 (mati)</p>
<p data-bbox="197 488 268 513"><b>meca</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 488 653 513">platel, plato pequeño</p> <p data-bbox="390 561 590 586">plato de madera</p> <p data-bbox="390 675 558 699">platos chatos</p>	<p data-bbox="1041 488 1367 513">Santo Tomas 151 (mecca)</p> <p data-bbox="1041 561 1965 626">1586 Anonimo 70, 1603 Anonimo 178, 1614 Anonimo 188; 1619 Torres Rubio 192, 1700 Torres Rubio 208, 1754 Torres Rubio 199</p> <p data-bbox="1041 675 1430 699">Gonzalez Holguin 233 (micca)</p>
<p data-bbox="197 797 268 821"><b>pucu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 797 506 821">escudilla</p> <p data-bbox="390 870 737 894">escudilla de palo o de barro</p>	<p data-bbox="1041 797 1755 821">Santo Tomas 161 (pocu); Gonzalez Holguin 296 (puccu)</p> <p data-bbox="1041 870 1787 894">1586 Anonimo 87, 1603 Anonimo 203, 1614 Anonimo 213</p>

Table 7.5. - Terms related to plates in the Quechua-Spanish lexicons

simply as “escudilla” or “a bowl.”<sup>117</sup> The *Anónimo 1586* contributes additional material information defining “*pucu*” as “escudilla de palo o de barro” or “a wooden or ceramic bowl.”<sup>118</sup> When the Indigenous term for bowls transferred to plates is unclear, but the sixteenth and seventeenth century lexicons exclusively refer to *pucus* as bowls both when they define the Quechua and Spanish forms.

While bowls were defined by their form, plates exhibit a much more fluid nature of classification (Table 7.5). González Holguín defines “*micca*” as “platos chatos” or “flat plates,” apparently referring to the plate’s shape, as the same qualifier applied to feet in “*micca chaqui*” is defined as “el ancho de pie o patudo” or “one who has big or wide feet.”<sup>119</sup> Santo Tomás only defines “*mecca*” as “platel, plato pequeño” or “a small plate,” but both the *Anónimo 1586* and Torres Rubio add the material component to their definitions of “*meca*” as “plato de madera” or “a wooden plate.”<sup>120</sup> Turning to the Spanish-Quechua side of the lexicons (Table 7.6) confirms the importance of the material. González Holguín and the *Anónimo 1586* define wooden plates as “*meka*” and “*meca*” respectively. Now, it should be noted that unlike the wooden cup, which is seen as the quintessential wooden object, the wooden plate is rather characterized linguistically by its flatness. Whether *meca* could only refer to a wooden plate or whether the term incorporated all flat plates is unclear, but this term once again highlights the fluidity of Inca categories. *Meca* seems to indicate material in one context and form in another.

*Mate* also occupied a middle ground between shape and material, but unlike *meca* it refers to the material rather than the shape linguistically. All four dictionaries define it as a gourd

<sup>117</sup> González Holguín 1608, 296 and Santo Tomás 1560, 161.

<sup>118</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 213.

<sup>119</sup> González Holguín 1608, 233.

<sup>120</sup> Anonymous 1614 [1586], 188; Santo Tomás 1560, 151; Torres Rubio 1619, 192.




Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>mate</b></p> 	<p>calabaço para comer los indios</p> <p>plato de calabaza</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 25</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 273, 1603 Anonimo 387, 1614 Anonimo 401 (mati); Gonzalez Holguin 268 (mati)</p>
<p><b>meca</b></p> 	<p>platel, plato pequeño</p> <p>plato de madera</p> <p>plato</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 85 (macca)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 273, 1603 Anonimo 387, 1614 Anonimo 401; Gonzalez Holguin 268 (meka); 1754 Torres Rubio 429 (mecca)</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 165, 1700 Torres Rubio 183</p>
<p><b>pucu</b></p> 	<p>escudilla</p> <p>escudilla de barro</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 57 (pocu); Gonzalez Holguin 194 (ppucu)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 220, 1603 Anonimo 336, 1614 Anonimo 346</p>

Table 7.6. - Terms related to plates in the Spanish-Quechua lexicons

and the term is still used both in modern Quechua and in archaeology to signify the material. Santo Tomás defines “*mate*” as “calabaço para comer los yndios” or “a gourd in which the Indians eat.”<sup>121</sup> Torres Rubio also highlights the Indigenous origin of the material defining “*mati*” as “vaso de calabazo, calabazo indico” or “gourd cup or an Indian gourd.”<sup>122</sup> Both González Holguín and *Anónimo 1586*, though, suggest that term can refer to a variety of forms as long as they are made from this material, defining “*mati*” as “vaso o platos de calabazo para beuer, o comer” or “a gourd plate or cup for drinking or eating” and “platos o escodillas de cal[a]baças, y la misma calabaza que los cria” or “gourd plates and bowls or the gourd from which they are made” respectively.<sup>123</sup> Thus, material equalized *mate* gourd plates and cups, while wooden *quero* cups and *meca* plates were separated. At the same time, shape brought *meca* wooden and ceramic plates together, but wooden *quero* and ceramic *puruncu* cups were distinctly different. This fluidity of vessel categories is consistent with the Indigenous worldview in which every object is defined in context. Looking at the world this way, single objects can occupy positions of polar opposites depending on the context in which they are placed.

Thinking along those lines, the linguistic data here are not sufficient to determine whether the same object could jump between categories, but a possibility for a *mate* to be *meca* when flat or *pucu* when deep certainly exists. This fluidity, however, only strengthens the argument that we need to employ multiple classifications of material culture in order to answer the variety of questions about the past that we have. Size and material were certainly significant classificatory parameters for the Inca for the way they assigned meaning to their ceramic and other vessels, but

<sup>121</sup> Santo Tomás 1560, 151.

<sup>122</sup> Torres Rubio 1619, 192.

<sup>123</sup> *Anónimo* 1616 [1586], 186 and González Holguín 1608, 229.

we should not simply switch from a form-fits-all to a size-fits-all mode of understanding Inca material culture.

## 6. Pots, Jars, and Small Noses – Other Quechua Ceramic Terms

The three cases in the preceding sections show the roles of scale and materials in the ways the Inca classified their material culture and pottery in particular. However critical, these might not be the only classificatory parameters. It should be noted that both cases are linked through the association of all vessels included to *aqha*. The maize beer played an important role in Inca religious, political, economic, and daily life and its consumption is related to higher social status. The three *aribaloid* vessels and the drinking cup, even the lowly *puruncus*, are clearly linked with wealth, power, and the state. The Inca state, therefore, had a greater interest and larger investment in the classification of these vessels, while other utilitarian ceramics were less controlled both in their production and in their classification. In this last section of this chapter, I briefly review a number of other form names that appear in the early modern dictionaries and tentatively connect them to Inca forms known archaeologically. These forms do not follow a single ontological mechanism the way *humihuas*, *ticos*, and *urpus* are separated by size. However, it is worth exploring the origin of these terms, some of which are already uncritically used in the academic community.

To continue with the *aqha*-brewing repertoire, before the drink was brought on the table in *ticos* and served in *puruncus*, it was brewed in large, open-mouthed pots. Rowe designated it as Shape E, while Bingham likened it to a hydria, and Pardo refers to this form as an *urpu*.<sup>124</sup> It is also often referred to as *raqui* and Allen has convincingly argued that the term has a particular

<sup>124</sup> Bingham 1915, 265; Pardo 1939, 5; Rowe 1944, 45.

association with death through its fern decoration.<sup>125</sup> The multilayered meaning of the terms, indeed, perplexed the early modern linguists, who notably struggled with its definition. Santo Tomás defines it as a fern, but then provides “*raquimacas*” as “cantarillo pequeño” or “a small jug.”<sup>126</sup> The confusion here is based on our privileging of form as defining parameter, since *raqui* seems to be a decoration category and the fern motif is also common on *ticos* and *urpus*. While the vessel likely became a *raqui* in this context, its utilitarian function points to a different form name - *cauchi*. González Huguin defines “*ccauchi*” as “olla boqui grande para chicha” or “a wide-mouthed pot for corn beer” and “*kauchi*” as “olla grande para cozer chicha” or “a large pot for brewing corn beer.”<sup>127</sup> While Santo Tomás’ “*cauchi*” is simply “olla grande” or “a large pot,” the *Anónimo 1586* again refers to the brewing function of the vessel – “olla grande en que hacen chicha” or “a large pot in which they make corn beer.”<sup>128</sup> Function, decoration, or an entanglement of both categories might have been the basis for distinguishing between a *raqui* and a *cauchi*, which likely shared a common morphology.

One of the main distinctions the early modern linguists made was between cantaros, or jugs, and tinajas, or jars. Inca jars generally come in two forms – a single loop-handled jar, Rowe’s Form B, and a double-handled jar, Rowe’s Form C.<sup>129</sup> Curiously, Pardo refers to both forms as “*rajchi*,” yet another legacy of the mysterious *raqui*.<sup>130</sup> González Holguín defines “tinajon grande” or “a large jar” as “*makma*” and “tinajon boqui ancho” or “a wide-mouthed

<sup>125</sup> Allen 2015.

<sup>126</sup> Santo Tomás 1560, 165.

<sup>127</sup> González Holguín 1608, 55 and 243.

<sup>128</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 115; Santo Tomás 1560, 113.

<sup>129</sup> Rowe 1944, 44.

<sup>130</sup> Pardo 1939, 7.

large jar” as “*virque*.”<sup>131</sup> Santo Tomás corroborates this, defining “tinaja de barro grande” or “a large ceramic jar” as “*virqui o macma*.”<sup>132</sup> It is impossible to tell whether the two terms correspond to the two known forms. There is no linguistic link between the handle number or placement and the difference between “*virque*” and “*macma*” and we have already seen that form is not necessarily the defining characteristic of an Inca vessel. However, we can be fairly certain that these two terms referred to one or both of the Inca jar forms.

Finally, morphology might not have been the main Inca classifying parameter, but is certainly was not devoid of ontological meaning. I earlier mentioned the term *chusna* in relation to the *humihua*. González Holguín defines “*chhusna*” as “cantarillo pequeño de un assa boqui angosto con su cara, o figura” or “a small jug with one handle, narrow mouth, and a face or figure on it.”<sup>133</sup> A variety of face-necked jars have been a part of the ceramic repertoire of a large number of Indigenous Andean cultures spanning almost the entire geographic region and almost all temporal periods. Specifically, a strong relationship between pottery and the human body existed for the Inca who decorated with textile designs and conceived them as political actors.<sup>134</sup> Face-necked jars are usually associated with the contentious Killke style from the Inca heartland rather than with imperial Inca ceramics. Forms fitting the González Holguín description perfectly were recorded by Bingham at Machu Picchu and by Rivera Dorado at Chinchero.<sup>135</sup> Burger and Salazar further classified the Late Horizon face-necked jar from Machu Picchu as a

<sup>131</sup> González Holguín 1608, 317.

<sup>132</sup> Santo Tomás 1560, 100.

<sup>133</sup> González Holguín 1608, 117.

<sup>134</sup> Bray 2000 and Cathy Costin, “Crafting Identities Deep and Broad: Hybrid Ceramics on the Late Prehispanic North Coast of Peru,” in *Making Value, Making Meaning: Tecne in the Pre-Columbian World*, ed. Cathy Costin, (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2016): 319-359.

<sup>135</sup> Bingham 1915, 268 and Rivera Dorado 1976, 29.



provincial variety of another form, but one the existence of a dictionary entry in the seventeenth century speaks to the continuous use if not production of the form and perhaps its belonging to the imperial repertoire.<sup>136</sup>

What is more important here is that the form is defined by its shape and the inclusion of a nose in particular. The *Anónimo 1586* defines “*chusna*” as “nariz pequeña y el que la tiene” or “a tiny nose and one who has a tiny nose,” without making any reference to a ceramic vessel.<sup>137</sup> However, the body-pottery relationship is more complicated, since all three dictionaries define the nose as *cinca*, which is still used in contemporary Quechua. Furthermore, both González Holguín and *Anónimo 1586* list a number of descriptive terms, such as thin, long, or even small, all of which use *cinca* as the referent.<sup>138</sup> It is unclear whether the *chusna* was a form name, whose morphology was translated into a metaphor for a particular facial feature, or whether the form name was derived from its likeness to the human body. What this example, incomplete as it might be, shows is that morphology can remain a salient category for Inca ceramic classification, along with scale and material, and possibly function and decoration. Tables 7.7 and 7.8 summarize all forms discussed in this chapter from the Quechua-Spanish and the Spanish-Quechua lexicons of all works in question respectively.

## Conclusions

Anthropological archaeologists are acutely aware of the dangers of introducing foreign cultural concepts into our fields of study. Furthermore, the study of the past makes us all

<sup>136</sup> Burger and Salazar 2004, 131.

<sup>137</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 174.

<sup>138</sup> *Anónimo* 1614 [1586], 386 and González Holguín 1608, 240.

temporal foreigners and we need to be doubly careful. When it comes to pottery, though, we are oddly comfortable in our privileging of form as the main classificatory characteristic. To be fair, the ubiquity and multitude of ceramic material that make it so useful for our inquiries of the past also make the task of its interpretation incredibly tedious. An easy to understand, learn, and replicate classificatory system is of the essence when excavators have to deal with thousands of ceramic sherds. Relatively rigid categories of form fulfill this need. However, it is critical to see classification of any material as a tool rather than an axiom. Morphological analysis certainly has a place in Inca pottery studies that relate to ceramic function, pottery production technology, or the organization of such production.<sup>139</sup> Formal considerations, however, are not the one-size-fits-all when it comes to Inca ceramics.






A combination of linguistic and historic data points to scale and material as the main Inca ontological mechanisms, along with possibly decoration and function. Privileging form, we have overlooked the difference in scale between *humihua*, *tico*, and *urpu* and have conflated three separate Inca vessels into one. While these three share a common form and possibly a common utilitarian function, their distinction is not merely a matter of using the proper term. Recognition of scale as the categorizing characteristic of these vessels has further implication on their role within the Inca political, economic, and religious life and their relationship to different scales in the Inca imperial hierarchy. Additionally, they exemplify a critical Indigenous ontological mechanism that had an application beyond pottery into other material and immaterial cultural categorizations.


My discovery of the Indigenous name of the ceramic drinking cup, *puruncu*, only strengthens the argument that drinking vessels categorized by material had a particular






<sup>139</sup> For example, Bray 2004; Costin 2001; Ixer, Lunt, and Sillar 2014.

association with wealth, power, and class. The realization of these ontological mechanisms requires linguistic and historical inquiry, but they can quickly and easily be translated into useful archaeological practices. As a study of material culture, archaeology is particularly sensitive to material studies, which have become increasingly more elaborate and more accurate with the contemporary technology. More and more new methods allow us to distinguish between materials, based on geological sourcing, species sourcing, tool and technology of production, among others. The recognition of material as a major classificatory characteristic of Inca pottery and other material culture only lends more saliency to the material science studies.

Admittedly, there is more work to be done, before we can create holistic Indigenous Inca ceramic typologies based on characteristics such as scale. Indeed, such goals might even be unattainable. However, a critical implication of this chapter is that Inca material culture was categorized relationally. Ceramic jugs could become *ticos* or *urpus* if they were smaller or bigger than another jug with the same shape. Plates could shift between *mecas* and *mates* and *pucus* depending on their perceived flatness, which was not universally defined, or whether their user wanted to focus on their material. The fluidity of Inca ontology certainly went beyond ceramic, wooden, metal, and gourd containers, which has important implications for all Inca material culture including architecture and ceramic style, the two main remains at Huascar's royal estate of Kañaraqay analyzed in Chapter 8. It is this very relationality that defines the way the complex played a crucial role in the Inca Civil War.

Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>aquilla</b></p> 	<p>vaso de plata</p> <p>vaso de plata o oro</p>	<p>1603 Anonimo 93, 1614 Anonimo 103</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 25</p>
<p><b>cauchi</b></p> 	<p>olla grande</p> <p>olla grande en q hacen chicha</p> <p>olla boqui grande para chicha</p> <p>olla grande de hazer chicha</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 118</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 17, 1603 Anonimo 105, 1614 Anonimo 115</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 55 (ccauchi)</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 132 (kauchi)</p>
<p><b>chamillcu</b></p> 	<p>puchero de barro</p> <p>puchero</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 151 (chamilico); 1603 Anonimo 125, 1614 Anonimo 135; Gonzalez Holguin 85 (chhamillcu)</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 183, 1700 Torres Rubio 200, 1754 Torres Rubio 176</p>
<p><b>chusna</b></p> 	<p>cātario pequeño</p> <p>cantarillo pequeño de un assa boqui angosto con su cara, o figura</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 139 (chuxña)</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 117 (chhusna)</p>
<p><b>humihua</b></p> 	<p>cātario pequeñito de indios</p> <p>cantarillo mediano cuelli angosto, manual para llear agua o chicha</p>	<p>1603 Anonimo 163, 1614 Anonimo 173</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 196</p>

Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p>macma</p> 	<p>ozça o tinaja mediana</p> <p>tinaja grande</p> <p>tinaja grande, o gran borracho</p> <p>tinajon grande de chicha</p> <p>cantaro grande</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 148</p> <p>Santo Tomas 148;</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 65, 1603 Anonimo 173, 1614 Anonimo 183</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 219</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 191, 1700 Torres Rubio 207, 1754 Torres Rubio 196</p>
<p>manca</p> 	<p>olla</p>	<p>1586 Anonimo 66, 1603 Anonimo 174, 1614 Anonimo 184; Gonzalez Holguin 222; 1619 Torres Rubio 191, 1700 Torres Rubio 208, 1754 Torres Rubio 197</p>
<p>mate</p>  	<p>calabaço para comer los yndios</p> <p>platos o escodillas de cal[a]baças, y la misma calabaça que los cria</p> <p>vaso o platos de calabazo para beuer, o comer</p> <p>vaso de calabaço</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 151</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 68, 1603 Anonimo 176, 1614 Anonimo 186 (mati)</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 233 (mati)</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 192, 1700 Torres Rubio 208, 1754 Torres Rubio 199 (mati)</p>
<p>meca</p> 	<p>platel, plato pequeño</p> <p>plato de madera</p> <p>platos chatos</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 151 (mecca)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 70, 1603 Anonimo 178, 1614 Anonimo 188; 1619 Torres Rubio 192, 1700 Torres Rubio 208, 1754 Torres Rubio 199</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 233 (micca)</p>

Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p data-bbox="197 256 264 282"><b>pucu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 256 506 282">escudilla</p> <p data-bbox="390 331 743 357">escudilla de palo o de barro</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 256 1759 282">Santo Tomas 161 (pocu); Gonzalez Holguin 296 (puccu)</p> <p data-bbox="1039 331 1793 357">1586 Anonimo 87, 1603 Anonimo 203, 1614 Anonimo 213</p>
<p data-bbox="191 451 270 477"><b>pucpu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 451 632 477">ampolla en el agua</p> <p data-bbox="390 526 842 552">poronguillo, o limeta boqui angosta</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 451 1898 477">1586 Anonimo 86, 1603 Anonimo 202, 1614 Anonimo 212 (pocpu)</p> <p data-bbox="1039 526 1451 552">Gonzalez Holguin 296 (ppucpu)</p>
<p data-bbox="174 641 287 667"><b>puruncu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 641 632 667">ampolla para beuer</p> <p data-bbox="390 716 711 742">vaso de barro cuelli largo</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 641 1402 667">Santo Tomas, 162 (porongo)</p> <p data-bbox="1039 716 1934 777">1586 Anonimo 89, 1603 Anonimo 205, 1614 Anonimo 215; Gonzalez Holguin 296 (puruncu)</p>
<p data-bbox="191 868 270 894"><b>puyñu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 868 485 894">cantero</p> <p data-bbox="390 943 585 969">cātaro mediano</p> <p data-bbox="390 1057 600 1083">cantaro pequeño</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 868 1367 894">Santo Tomas, 163 (puiño)</p> <p data-bbox="1039 943 1934 1005">1586 Anonimo 90, 1603 Anonimo 206, 1614 Anonimo 216; Gonzalez Holguin 297</p> <p data-bbox="1039 1057 1948 1118">1619 Torres Rubio 197, 1700 Torres Rubio 217, 1754 Torres Rubio 211 (ppuiñu)</p>
<p data-bbox="191 1209 270 1235"><b>quero</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 1209 743 1235">vasos de madera para beuer</p> <p data-bbox="390 1284 590 1310">vaso de madera</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 1209 1808 1235">1586 Anonimo 196, 1603 Anonimo 210, 1614 Anonimo 220</p> <p data-bbox="1039 1284 1325 1310">Gonzalez Holguin 304</p>








Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>tico</b></p> 	<p>cantaro mediano mayor que humihua</p> <p>cantarillo mediano de traer agua</p>	<p>1586 Anonimo 109; 1603 Anonimo 225; 1614 Anonimo 235 (teco); Gonzalez Holguin 340 (tticco)</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 341 (tico)</p>
<p><b>virqui</b></p> 	<p>ozça, o tinaja mediana</p> <p>cangilon grande, de gran boca</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 177</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 118; 1603 Anonimo 234; 1614 Anonimo 244; Gonzalez Honguin 354 (virqqui)</p>
<p><b>urpu</b></p> 	<p>cantaro muy grande, o tinaja</p> <p>cantaro muy grande, mayor que teco</p> <p>cãtaro muy grande mayor que ttico</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 178 (vrpo)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 121; 1603 Anonimo 237; 1614 Anonimo 247 (vrpu)</p> <p>Gonzalez Honguin 359 (vrppu)</p>

Table 7.7. - Terms related to ceramic forms in the Quechua-Spanish lexicons

Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>aquilla</b></p> 	<p>vaso de plata</p> <p>copa de plata</p> <p>copa de plata, o oro</p>	<p>1603 Anonimo 312, 1614 Anonimo 426; Gonzalez Holguin 440; Gonzalez Holguin 326; 1619 Torres Rubio 173, 1700 Torres Rubio 190</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 190, 1603 Anonimo 306, 1614 Anonimo 316</p> <p>Gonzalez Holquin 89</p>
<p><b>cauchi</b></p> 	<p>olla grande</p> <p>olla grande para cozer chicha</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 80</p> <p>1603 Anonimo 376, 1614 Anonimo 390</p>
<p><b>chamillcu</b></p> 	<p>puchero de barro</p> <p>olla chiquita de tres pies</p> <p>olla de tres pies</p> <p>puchero</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 87 (chamilico)</p> <p>1603 Anonimo 376 (chamillcu), 1614 Anonimo 390 (chamilcu)</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 243 (chhamillcu)</p> <p>1700 Torres Rubio 184 (chamilcu), 1754 Torres Rubio 430 (chhaumillcu)</p>
<p><b>chusna</b></p> 	<p>cantarico mas pequeño</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 26 (chuxña)</p>
<p><b>humihua</b></p> 	<p>cantarico mas pequeño</p> <p>cantarico</p> <p>cantarico para yr por agua</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 26 (humigua)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 181, 1603 Anonimo 297, 1614 Anonimo 307</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 26</p>



Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p>macma</p> 	<p>ozça, vasso de barro</p> <p>tinaja de barro grande</p> <p>tinaja</p> <p>tinajon mayor que todos</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 81</p> <p>Santo Tomas 100</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 304, 1603 Anonimo 418, 1614 Anonimo 432; 1754 Torres Rubio 437</p> <p>Gonzalez Holguin 75</p>
<p>manca</p> 	<p>olla</p>	<p>1603 Anonimo 376, 1614 Anonimo 390; Gonzalez Holguin 243; 1619 Torres Rubio 191, 1619 Torres Rubio 163, 1700 Torres Rubio 182</p>
<p>mate</p>  	<p>calabaço para comer los indios</p> <p>plato de calabaca</p> <p>calabaca</p> <p>calabaca de las Indias</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 25</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 273, 1603 Anonimo 387, 1614 Anonimo 401 (mati); Gonzalez Holguin 268 (mati)</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 143, 1700 Torres Rubio 162 (mati)</p> <p>1754 Torres Rubio 250 (mathe o mathi)</p>
<p>meca</p> 	<p>platel, plato pequeño</p> <p>plato de madera</p> <p>plato</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 85 (macca)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 273, 1603 Anonimo 387, 1614 Anonimo 401; Gonzalez Holguin 268 (meka); 1754 Torres Rubio 429 (mecca)</p> <p>1619 Torres Rubio 165, 1700 Torres Rubio 183</p>

Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p data-bbox="197 256 264 285"><b>pucu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 256 506 285">escudilla</p> <p data-bbox="390 331 617 360">escudilla de barro</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 256 1745 285">Santo Tomas 57 (pocu); Gonzalez Holguin 194 (ppucu)</p> <p data-bbox="1039 331 1808 360">1586 Anonimo 220, 1603 Anonimo 336, 1614 Anonimo 346</p>
<p data-bbox="191 448 275 477"><b>pucpu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 448 642 477">ampollas en el agua</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 448 1507 477">Gonzalez Holguin 32 (pokpo pokpo)</p>
<p data-bbox="174 639 291 669"><b>puruncu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 639 636 669">ampolla para beuer</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 639 1377 669">Santo Tomas 10 (porongo)</p>
<p data-bbox="191 829 275 859"><b>puyñu</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 829 663 859">cantaro generalmente</p> <p data-bbox="390 943 485 972">cantaro</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 829 1976 898">Santo Tomas 26; 1586 Anonimo 181, 1603 Anonimo 297, 1614 Anonimo 307; Gonzalez Holguin 75; 1754 Torres Rubio 381</p> <p data-bbox="1039 943 1640 972">1619 Torres Rubio 144, 1700 Torres Rubio 163</p>
<p data-bbox="191 1060 275 1089"><b>quero</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 1060 741 1089">vasos de madera para beuer</p> <p data-bbox="390 1138 590 1167">copa de madera</p> <p data-bbox="390 1213 709 1242">taça de yndios de madera</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 1060 1808 1089">1586 Anonimo 196, 1603 Anonimo 210, 1614 Anonimo 220</p> <p data-bbox="1039 1138 1310 1167">Gonzalez Holguin 89</p> <p data-bbox="1039 1213 1745 1242">1619 Torres Rubio 170, 1700 Torres Rubio 188 (queru)</p>
<p data-bbox="205 1321 260 1351"><b>tico</b></p> 	<p data-bbox="390 1321 579 1351">cantaro grande</p> <p data-bbox="390 1396 793 1425">cantaro mayor que este (macas)</p>	<p data-bbox="1039 1321 1241 1351">Santo Tomas 26</p> <p data-bbox="1039 1396 1902 1464">1586 Anonimo 181; 1603 Anonimo 297; 1614 Anonimo 307 (teco); Gonzalez Holguin 75 (tteco)</p>



Quechua Term	Spanish Translation	Source (Alternative Spelling)
<p><b>virqui</b></p> 	<p>ozça, vasso de barro</p> <p>tinaja de barro grande</p> <p>tinajon boqui ancho</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 81</p> <p>Santo Tomas 100</p> <p>Gonzalez Honguin 354 (virqqe)</p>
<p><b>urpu</b></p> 	<p>cantaro muy grande como tinaja</p> <p>cantaro grande</p> <p>cantaro mayor que este (teco)</p> <p>cantaro mayor que este (tteco)</p>	<p>Santo Tomas 26 (vrpo)</p> <p>Santo Tomas 26 (vrpo)</p> <p>1586 Anonimo 181; 1603 Anonimo 297; 1614 Anonimo 307 (vrpu)</p> <p>Gonzalez Honguin 75 (vrpu)</p>

Table 7.8. - Terms related to ceramic forms in the Spanish-Quechua lexicons

## Chapter 8. Building Legitimacy, Return to Normalcy: Huascar and the Failure of Kañaraqay

Architecture was a potent avenue for the expression of power of the Inca, similar to other imperial projects. In their seminal work on the Inca built environment, Graziano Gasparini and Louise Margolis defined Inca construction as “architecture of power,” exploring how the imperial form came to be an index and a symbol of imperial domination across Tahuantinsuyu.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the rapid expansion of the Inca state from one of the numerous polities of the LIP to an enormous empire spanning virtually the entirety of the Andean region meant that the Inca could not rely on stationing armies or installing their own governors in every conquered region. Instead, they relied on the co-option of local leaders and on presencing tactics that included the construction of the highly recognizable Inca style buildings that embodied the presence of the empire in the local realm. In the past four decades, scholars have examined the built environment to gain insights into Inca imperial domination both in the heartland and in the provinces.<sup>2</sup>

While imperial installations such as administrative, military, and storage centers throughout Tahuantinsuyu reflect on state action and policy, the private estates of the Inca rulers offer a rare glimpse into their patron’s social, economic, and political agenda. As the *Sapa Inca* inherited the power, but not the wealth of his predecessor, there was an immediate impetus for a

<sup>1</sup> Here I used the terms index and symbol in the Peircean sense, in which indexes are signs that have a direct relationship with the object (Inca masonry was built in the provinces to commemorate their military victories), while symbols have an arbitrary but agreed upon relationship with the object (locals may not have seen Inca construction anywhere else, but coursed stonemasonry stood for Incaness). Graziano Gasparini and Louise Margolis, *Inca Architecture*, transl. Patrician Lyon, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980), 195.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Brian Bauer, *Ancient Cuzco: Heartland of the Inca*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004); Ian Farrington, *Cusco: Urbanism and Archaeology in the Inca World*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2013); Susan Niles, *Callachaca: Style and Status in an Inca Community*, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1987); Adriana von Hagen and Craig Morris, *The Cities of the Ancient Andes*, (New York, NY: Thames and Hudson, 1998).

young ruler to carve out his own estate that would provide him with a lavish residence and productive farmland.<sup>3</sup> Patronage, however, was much more than mere necessity to acquire personal wealth. It was one of the most significant expectations of Inca rulers, as building provided a solid space for commemoration of the ruler during and after his life that would transform him into a venerated ancestor.<sup>4</sup> As such, these complexes presented their patrons the ideal opportunity to encode in space their personal and political agendas. Further, the creation of royal estates was often related to the commemoration of Inca military victories, which interlinked building and imperial expansion, the other major duty of the *Sapa Inca*.<sup>5</sup>

At least since Viracocha Inca, all imperial rulers owned royal estates in the Urubamba Valley some 30 to 60 kms northwest of Cuzco.<sup>6</sup> It is possible that earlier rulers also built such complexes and that these were also built outside of the Inca heartland, but except for Caranqui, where Atahualpa was commissioned to build an estate for Huayna Capac, there is no evidence for other such sites outside the defined heartland region.<sup>7</sup> Since these are some of the most spectacular examples of Inca architecture, the Urubamba estates have been the focus of intense scholarly and tourist interest alike. They have been the source of critical insights into Inca history, colonization strategies, political practices, and the private lives of the imperial patrons

<sup>3</sup> Susan Niles, "The Nature of Royal Estates," in *Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas*, eds. Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004): 50.

<sup>4</sup> Susan Niles, *The Shape of Inca History: Narrative and Architecture in an Andean Empire*, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1999) and Stella Nair, *At Home with the Sapa Inca: Architecture, Space, and Legacy at Chinchero*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015).

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Niles 2004, 49-50.

<sup>7</sup> See, Tamara Bray and José Echeverría Almeida, "The Late Imperial Site of Inca-Caranqui, Northern Highland Ecuador: At the End of Empire," *Ñawpa Pacha*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2014): 177-199.

through analysis of the site's location, layout, materials, construction, and spatial practices.<sup>8</sup>

They have also proven that despite its high standardization, Inca architecture was not static, but instead exhibited important transformations in the century of imperial rule of the Andes that is also evident in other Inca material culture.

During the Inca Civil War, Huascar also constructed two royal estates – at Calca in the Urubamba Valley and at Kañaraqay in the Lucre Basin. Very little remains of Calca, as the Spanish colonial town and then the modern Peruvian district capital village of the same name were built directly on top of the last Inca ruler's complex. On the other hand, Kañaraqay on the shores of Lake Muina presents a great window into the dealings of the disgraced final Inca ruler in the context of the cataclysmic event that brought the empire to its collapse just mere days after its end. Lacking the pomp of its predecessors and built in the shadow of the great Huari centers of Choquepunkio and Pikillakta, Huascar's estate has been largely overlooked, just like the Inca Civil War itself.

Like the royal estates of Huascar's predecessors, Kañaraqay embodied the private and the political concerns of his patron. Built during the war of succession with Atahualpa, though, its location, architecture, plan, and material remains all point to the narrative of "return to origins", on which its patrons attempted to build his legitimacy. Located southeast of Cuzco in direct opposition of the other royal estates in the Urubamba Valley, Kañaraqay stood for Huascar's break with the Hanan nobility and his re-establishment of the Hurin dynasty. Built on the edge of

<sup>8</sup> José Alcina Franch, *Arqueología de Chinchero I: La Arquitectura*, (Madrid, Spain: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1976); Richard Burger, "Scientific Insights into Daily Life at Machu Picchu," in *Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas*, eds. Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004): 85-106; Nair 2015; Niles 1999; Jean-Pierre Protzen, *Inca Architecture and Construction at Ollantaytambo*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993); Alfredo Valencia Zegarra and Arminda Gibaja, *Machu Picchu: La Investigación y Conservación del Monumento Arqueológico Después de Hiram Bingham*, (Cuzco, Peru: Municipalidad de Cuzco, 1992).

the Inca heartland on the road to Collasuyu, it commemorated the alliance between the local Muina, the Colla and Huascar, which was reflected in the lake location, the orthogonal planning, and the ceramic assemblage of the site. Literally at the place of Huascar's birth, this estate linked him with Lake Titicaca, the origin of the legendary founder of the Inca state, and with Pikillacta, the large MH Huari site in the Lucre Basin. These associations painted Huascar as the successor of these long-term seats of power related to Hurin and the south and put him in direct opposition with Atahualpa, from Hanan and the north, who appeared as a mere usurper lacking such ties to deep history of power.

Further, Kañaraqay represents a significant investment on Huascar's part in the context of the Inca Civil War. The considerable effort directed away from the war effort suggests the critical nature of this complex. In general, by symbolizing Huascar's legitimacy through its links to long-term power in the Andes such as Lake Titicaca and Pikillacta, the investment was probably justified as it helped solidify Huascar's power and recruit more soldiers. In particular, Kañaraqay created a space where the alliance with the Colla, and possibly the Muina, could be enacted. Hence Huascar's building campaign directly speaks to the power of political alliances in the governance of the Inca Empire and their continuous importance in times of turmoil.

This chapter takes a gradual approach from the larger to the smaller scale, from the regional to the site level of analysis. The following section will deal with the choice of location for Kañaraqay and will examine it in the context of the Urubamba Valley estates that preceded it to trace the history of the Inca royal estate form and how it was affected by the Civil War. The next two sections will examine the relationships between Huascar's estate and the domains of the two groups he was aligning with – the Muina and the Colla. The earlier section will deal with the planning of Kañaraqay and how it relates to the Inca installations in the Lake Titicaca Basin as

well as the large Huari sites in the Lucre Basin. The following section will explore the relationship between the living quarters of the final Inca ruler and the adjacent principal town of the Muina people, Minaspata. The final section of the chapter will discuss the ceramic assemblage of Kañaraqay and how the practices that took place there relate to the architecture of the estate and the larger issues of Huascar and the Inca Civil War.

### **1. Re-establishing the Hurin Dynasty: Landscape and Choice of Location**

It stands to reason that Huascar's political concerns would also be reflected in his royal estates and there could have been no more pressing concern than his legitimacy in the context of the Inca Civil War. Like his father Huayna Capac and his great grandfather Pachacuti, he first tried to follow imperial tradition and built an estate in the Urubamba Valley, inserting his estate at Calca between those of his father and grandfather. According to Betanzos, this estate commemorated Huascar's switch to Hurin from Hanan Cuzco, but it makes little sense for him to build in the same manner as his Hanan predecessor for this purpose.<sup>9</sup> Murúa claims that at the time construction began at Calca, Huascar had no idea that Atahualpa would rebel in the north.<sup>10</sup> It is more plausible that Huascar began building in the Urubamba Valley in order to fulfill his duties as a ruler but also to physically declare himself a part of that lineage, while it did not hurt to have a nice place of his own in the valley. Then, when the war broke out and he decided to re-establish a Hurin dynasty, he needed to build a new estate to address this new alliance. Perhaps

<sup>9</sup> Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, transl. Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanan, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996 [1555]): 195.

<sup>10</sup> Martín de Murúa, *Historia General del Perú*, (Madrid, Spain: Dastin Historia, 2001 [1616]): 153.



Betanzos simply confused Calca with Kañaraqay, as the other estate the last Inca ruler built certainly embodies the new Hurin identity of its patron.

The choice of location of Huascar's second estate in the Lucre Basin is perhaps its most important gesture representing his switch to the Hurin moiety. Located 33km southeast of Cuzco on the main Collasuyu road following the river Huatanay, Kañaraqay sits directly opposite the Urubamba Valley. Although we lack a precise understanding of the boundaries of the four quarters of the empire and the now called Sacred Valley may also have been in Chinchaysuyu, it was likely part of Antisuyu, as Pisac was directly on the Antisuyu road out of Cuzco. These were the quarters that comprised the Hanan half of Tahuantinsuyu, while Cuntisuyu and Collasuyu, where Kañaraqay was built, made up the Hurin half.<sup>11</sup>

This would not have been a subtle gesture, as Huascar's estate is constructed as far into Collasuyu as possible, on the very edge of the Inca heartland, just a kilometer from the border site of Rumicolca. The heartland was an important physical and conceptual construct that allowed the Inca to expand their population by lending their closest allies and neighbors the status of "Inca of Privilege." It included select communities in the Cuzco, Lucre, and Huaro Basins as well as the Plains of Anta, which were the domain of the Inca (Cuzco), Jaquijahuana (Anta), Ayarmaca (Anta), Muina (Lucre), and Pinahua (Lucre) people.<sup>12</sup> This created a greater manpower of trusted administrators and governors that could be sent to oversee newly conquered regions outside of the Cuzco region, while strict hierarchies were retained within. Although Cuzco has rightfully been the central focus of attention when it comes to the Inca state, it is also important to recognize that the other heartland groups exerted significant power. The Lucre

<sup>11</sup> Terence D'Altroy, *The Incas*, Second Edition, (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2015): 176.

<sup>12</sup> Bauer 2004, 22.

Basin during the Inca Civil War was, thus, not a backwater border area, but an important Inca center.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, Brian Bauer argues that Inca state formation was primarily about the creation of the idea of a heartland that could sustain a large-scale expansion.<sup>14</sup>

Although we do not know the exact borders that defined the construction of the Inca heartland, the Lucre Basin was certainly on its southern border. In Betanzos's description of the repairs that Pachacuti ordered done after his victory in the Chanka crisis, the ninth *Sapa Inca* sent his people from the Pumacchupan where the Tullumayo and the Saphi rivers met in Cuzco to Lake Muina.<sup>15</sup> These repairs were less a physical act of restoration and more a political definition of the Inca heartland that began at the confluence of the two rivers by Coricancha, the most sacred place in the empire, and extended to the domain of the Muina people in the south.

Another approach, taken by Ian Farrington, to define the Inca heartland is to map the extent of important annual rituals that the state sponsored. During the *situa* purification festival that took place on the day of the first moon after the spring equinox in September, Inca soldiers handed over their weapons to the local groups of the four quarters, who ran to the edge of the heartland and washed them in rivers or lakes. The wash points were in the Apurimac near Tilca (Chinchaysuyu), in the Urubamba near Pisac (Antisuyu), in the Apurimac just south of Paruro

<sup>13</sup> See, Gordon McEwan, "The Identity of the Archaeological Cultures Using the Lucre Style and Their Relationship to the Inca," in *The Wari Civilization and their Descendants: Imperial Transformations in pre-Inca Cuzco*, eds. Mary Glowacki and Gordon McEwan, 103-118, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020).

<sup>14</sup> Bauer 2004, 15.

<sup>15</sup> Betanzos calls it Mohina and claims it was four leagues away, which corresponds to the location of the lake in the Lucre Basin about 30km south of Cuzco. Betanzos, 55.

(Cuntisuyu), and in the Urubamba near Urcos (Collasuyu).<sup>16</sup> This definition extends the Inca heartland to Urcos, located some 17km further on the Collasuyu road from Kañaraqay.

However, another practice may have defined the core of the empire differently – the *mayucati* purification ritual in January, in which ashes were tossed into the Huatanay River just off Pucamacchupan in Cuzco. A procession of noble runners followed them down the river to its confluence with the Urubamba River and from there to Ollantaytambo, where the runners turned back to Cuzco.<sup>17</sup> R. Tom Zuidema argues that this ritual was specifically meant to represent the annual re-establishing of the relationship between the Inca and the Inca of Privilege groups as a hierarchical one.<sup>18</sup> The Huatanay makes a turn right in the Lucre Basin before it flows into the Urubamba at Huambutio. If these rivers acted as physical boundaries then Kañaraqay even falls outside this definition of the imperial core. However, it is more likely that they were general guidelines rather than hard boundaries, since the Pinahua and Muina people on either side of the Huatanay in the Lucre Basin seem to have enjoyed similar statuses.<sup>19</sup> Whether Kañaraqay lies close to, at, or beyond the heartland boundaries, it is clear that Huascar did not simply choose a place for his estate on the Collasuyu side of Cuzco. Instead, the location at Lake Muina was meant to be a powerful sign of his return towards the southern quarter where the Manco Capac came from originally.

<sup>16</sup> Ian Farrington, “Ritual Geography, Settlement Patterns and the Characterization of the Provinces of the Inka Heartland,” *World Archaeology*, Vol. 23, No. 3, (1992): 375.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 376.

<sup>18</sup> Zuidema literally claims that the relationship is embodied by the tail of the puma, or Pumacchupan in Quechua, meaning that the privilege that other heartland groups enjoyed stemmed directly from the Inca regal symbol of the puma. R. Tom Zuidema, “The Lion in the City,” *Journal of Latin American Lore*, Vol. 9, 39-100, (1983).

<sup>19</sup> Bauer 2004, 22.

Even if we accept Urcos as the border of the Inca heartland on the Collasuyu road and that Kañaraqay was not pushing the limits of an estate's location, the Lucre Basin choice reinforces Huascar's narrative of "return to origins". Despite being gradually abandoned after construction stopped c. 800 CE, the large Huari administrative center of Pikillacta continued to dominate the area in the sixteenth century, as it still does today.<sup>20</sup> Measuring 1,680 x 1,220 meters or almost two square kilometers, it was a monument to a great power of the past that was undoubtedly recognized by the Inca, as much of their statecraft followed Huari patterns.<sup>21</sup> John Topic proposes that even one of the most iconic Inca architectural feature – the trapezoidal niched wall – was adapted from their Huari counterparts that the Inca saw at Pikillacta.<sup>22</sup> Sitting in plain sight on the opposite side of Lake Muina from Pikillacta, Kañaraqay shares this space with the great site, establishing a visual and spatial relationship with it. This relationship was taken a step further by the planning of Huascar's estate that will be discussed in the following section, but at the very minimum the buildings at Kañaraqay frame views towards the great Huari site in the same way that Pachauti's estates framed sacred mountains and Huayna Capac's estate framed his own achievements. Placing Kañaraqay in a position to enter a dialogue with Pikillacta was a strategic move from Huascar that professed his engagement with long-term structures and seats of power in a way only the true *Sapa Inca* could.

<sup>20</sup> Mary Glowacki, "Dating Pikillacta," in *Pikillacta: The Wari Empire in Cuzco*, ed. Gordon McEwan, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 2005), 123.

<sup>21</sup> Gordon McEwan and Nicole Couture, "Pikillacta and its Architectural Typology," in *Pikillacta: The Wari Empire in Cuzco*, ed. Gordon McEwan, (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 2005), 11; Gordon McEwan, Melissa Chatfield, and Arminda Gibaja, "The Archaeology of Inca Origins: Excavations at Choquepukio, Cuzco, Peru," in *Andean Archaeology I*, eds. by William Isbell and Helaine Silverman, (Boston, MA: Springer, 2002), 288; María Rostworowski, "Los Ayarmaca," *Revista del Museo Nacional (Perú)*, Vol. 36, (1972): 70.

<sup>22</sup> John Topic, "A Sequence of Monumental Architecture from Huamachuco," in *Perspectives on Andean History and Protohistory*, eds. Daniel Sandweiss and Peter Kvietok, 63-83, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1986).

The Lucre Basin was not merely the location of Pikillacta, though, as it played a significant role in the formation of the Inca state. All of the groups of the Inca heartland formed their identity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Huari empire in the LIP, including the Inca in Cuzco and the Muina and Pinahua in the Lucre Basin. As in other Andean areas, evidence suggests that the LIP in the Cuzco region was characterized by increased violence between groups. For the Inca that meant that they often fought with their neighbors until they finally defeated them, for which Pachacuti is often credited.<sup>23</sup> Gordon McEwan, Melissa Chatfield and Arminda Gibaja argue that this event was foundational for the empire, as the incorporation of the Lucre Basin groups, who saw themselves as inheritors of the Huari tradition, legitimized the Inca state and triggered further expansion.<sup>24</sup> This makes more sense than the story often repeated in the early modern writing that Pachacuti transformed the state into an empire after the Chanka crisis, as it incorporates longer term regional politics rather than a spur of the moment heroic deed.

Unlike the Chanka crisis, the incorporation of the Lucre Basin into the Inca state had greater implications on Inca material culture. Rob Ixer, Sara Lunt, and Bill Sillar contend that this marriage of Lucre and Cuzco was also embodied in the imperial Inca ceramic style that combined Kilke forms with Lucre fabric.<sup>25</sup> In the same manner that the Inca later created hybrid styles of local material and production techniques dressed in imperial form and decoration that symbolized the reciprocal relationship between conquered and conqueror, the very imperial style

<sup>23</sup> Gordon McEwan 2020, 115.

<sup>24</sup> McEwan, Chatfield, and Gibaja 2002, 298.

<sup>25</sup> Rob Ixer, Sara Lunt, and Bill Sillar, "The Use of Andesite Temper in Inca and pre-Inca Pottery from the Region of Cuzco, Peru," in *Craft and Science: International Perspectives on Archaeological Ceramics*, ed. Marcos Martiñon-Torres, (Doha, Qatar: Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation, 2014): 38.

itself was created by a similar relationship between the Kilke-producers and the Lucre-producers among the Muina and Pinahua people. Thus, although Cuzco became the center of the empire, its birth can be traced to the Lucre Basin, so Huascar's estate was a return to the imperial origins of the state, as well as a gesture towards Collasuyu and the origins of the Inca.

According to Pachacuti Yamqui, though, the struggle between the Inca and the Lucre Basin groups started as early as the days of Manco Capac.<sup>26</sup> Thus, Pachacuti's conquest of the area was intertwined with the original creation of the Inca state by Manco, whether finalizing it, or perhaps representing a second creation in itself. Huascar returning to the same place during the Civil War signified a third coming of the founder that coincided with the renewal of the Hurin dynasty. The Inca architecture of power that Gasparini and Margolies wrote about relied on theatrical performance that included the political actors, the buildings, the landscape, and the setting both in the core and in the provinces.<sup>27</sup> Arriving at the scene of state and empire creation, Huascar assumed the role of the founder in a third coming of sorts that was solidified and commemorated by the construction of Kañaraqay. Only this time it was a true return to the origin, since Pachacuti switched to the Hanan side of Cuzco.

Of course, this was also a personal "return to origins", as the written sources disagree on the specifics, but they all claim that Huascar was born in the Lucre Basin. Betanzos and Sarmiento claim he was born in a town called Huascar at Lake Muyna and he was named after it.<sup>28</sup> Murúa specifically refers to the construction of an estate by the lake at the place of the

<sup>26</sup> Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua, *Relación de Antigüedades deste Reyno del Pirú*, (Lima, Peru: Institut Français D'Etudes Andines, 1993 [1600]), f.8v.

<sup>27</sup> See, Lawrence Coben, *Theaters of Power: Inca Imperial Performance*, PhD Dissertation, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2012).

<sup>28</sup> Betanzos 1996, 176 and Sarmiento 1999, 169.

twelfth *Sapa Inca*'s birth.<sup>29</sup> It is possible that Kañaraqay's location was indeed called Huascar, but what is more likely is that the ruler identified with his estate so much that he was referred to by the same name. This was a common practice to the extent that all contact accounts refer to Huayna Capac and Huascar as old and young Cuzco, since the body of the ruler was inextricably linked with the capital city.<sup>30</sup> Most sources agree that Huascar's given name was Topa Cusihualpa and yet they mostly refer to him by what appears to be a nickname that identified him as the patron of his royal estate in the Lucre Basin built at the place of his birth.<sup>31</sup>

Another version of the story of Huascar's name recounts Huayna Capac commissioning a huge gold chain to be made to commemorate the birth of his sons Topa Cusihualpa.<sup>32</sup> The chain was so big that many people were necessary to lift it. This event so defined the young heir that he was referred to as Huascar, which means "rope" in Quechua. Murúa reports that he heard stories that after his death, the gold chain was thrown into either Lake Muina or Lake Urcos, while Pachacuti Yamqui was certain it was Lake Muina.<sup>33</sup> The confusion between Urcos and Muina might be related to the confusion of the definition of the Inca heartland boundaries. At any rate, it is certain that the Lucre Basin became inextricably linked to Huascar through his birth, as well as his death, to the extent that the place defined him by name. Even the gold chain that might have also created his moniker eventually belonged in the same place in Lake Muina.

<sup>29</sup> Murúa 2001, 132.

<sup>30</sup> Stephen Houston and Tom Cummins, "Body, presence, and space in Andean and Mesoamerican rulership," in *Palaces of the Ancient World: A Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks, 10th and 11th October 1998*, eds. Susan Toby Evans and Joanne Pillsbury, 359-398, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2004).

<sup>31</sup> Betanzos 1996, 189; Cobo 1979, 163; Murúa 2001, 125; Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.25v.

<sup>32</sup> Cobo 1979, 163 and Murúa 2001, 125.

<sup>33</sup> Murúa 2001, 125 and Pachacuti Yamqui 1993, f.36v.

To return to the definitions of the Inca heartland, in all of them Pumacchupan acts as the edge of Cuzco, from which the heartland extends towards Collasuyu. This was one of the most sacred locations in the empire at the confluence of the Tullumayo and Saphi rivers (resulting in the Huatanay River) that embodied the Andean concept of *tinkuy*.<sup>34</sup> Literally meaning “meeting” in Quechua, the concept represented the power of liminality. As the Inca cosmology was characterized by complementary and reciprocal relationships in balanced couples, the *tinkuy* was the expression of the clash between two things that had the power to create a new, more powerful one. As with other Andean ideas, this was a fluid one that applied to a variety of situations that related to liminality and power. *Tinkuy* could refer to a location, an event, or the very act of creation as children were products of the relationship between their parents. This potential for creation was the reason why Manco Capac founded Cuzco and built Coricancha at the *tinkuy* between the two rivers.<sup>35</sup>

If Pumacchupan was the edge of Cuzco, Kañaraqay stages itself as the edge of the heartland extending towards Collasuyu from where Manco came. Huascar built his estate where the Huatanay turns just before it flows into the Urubamba River, although not directly at their confluence. However, the Coricancha is also not located exactly at Pumacchupan, but in its vicinity, which is enough to sustain the powerful association. This is not to say that Kañaraqay represented a new Coricancha or that it was meant to supplant it in any way, but rather that Huascar’s estate likely evoked the idea of the rebirth through linking with Manco Capac and the location of the *tinkuy*, especially when expressed as a confluence of two rivers.

<sup>34</sup> Stella Nair 2015, 67.

<sup>35</sup> Cobo 1979, 80.



In addition to being located between two rivers, Huascar's estate was given special meaning due to its lake location in the Lucre Basin. Many Inca creation stories begin at Lake Titicaca where the sun and later Manco Capac are said to have emerged from a cave on the Island of the Sun.<sup>36</sup> The lake remained an important node in the Inca Empire, as the state invested in the construction of a series of installations on the islands in the lake as well as at major sites along its shores. Imperial Inca rulers made pilgrimages to the Island of the Sun as a part of their investiture that solidified their relationship to the origin of the empire.<sup>37</sup> As Huascar attempted to style himself as a new Manco Capac, it is no surprise that he decided to build his complex on the shores of a lake in the Inca heartland, one that spatially combined the two most important aspects of the founder's act.

More than simply placing his estate on a lake mimicking Manco's Lake Titicaca creation, Kañaraqay engaged in the act of creation through water management. The Inca used water for both aesthetic and conceptual reasons to profess their relationship to the potent natural environment.<sup>38</sup> Channeling, transporting, and cajoling water into the elaborate fountains were all expressions of the Inca bringing order to the Andes that characterized their imperial ideology. Although no detailed hydrological study of Kañaraqay has been performed, anecdotal evidence at least in the past ten years points to a careful selection of the plot right on the shores of Lake Muina that still exerts control over the powerful natural feature. Several times during the wet season the lake overflows and floods the modern road to the village of Lucre, but Kañaraqay's

<sup>36</sup> Brian Bauer and Charles Stanish, *Ritual and Pilgrimage in the Ancient Andes: The Islands of the Sun and the Moon*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2001): 12 and Gary Urton, *Inca Myths*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1999): 34-37.

<sup>37</sup> Bauer and Stanish 2001, 62.

<sup>38</sup> Carolyn Dean, "Inka Water Management and the Symbolic Dimensions of Display Fountains," *RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics*, No. 59/60, (2011): 22.

buildings, which stand no more than a couple of meters from the waters of the lake even in the driest of times, remain untouched during flooding periods.

The location of Huascar's estate in the Lucre Basin, thus, signifies Huascar's "return to origins" narrative in a number of ways. It evokes the legend of Manco Capac through its lake location, the gesture towards Lake Titicaca and Collasuyu on the southern edge of the Inca heartland, and the act of creation related to the nearby *tinkuy* of the confluence of two sacred rivers. It further evokes the creation of the Inca state itself through the relationship with the Lucre Basin and the old seat of power at Pikillacta. Hence the location of Kañaraqay was a brilliant architectural gesture celebrating the history and power of the Inca Empire. However, it also had a deep, personal significance for this ruler, who was born at the site, as it embodied his own "return to origins." This aided his styling as a new Manco Capac, the Hurin founder of the Inca Empire, as Huascar was to establish a new Hurin dynasty.

## **2. "Return to origins" or a New *Pachacuti*: Kañaraqay's Settlement Plan**

Once Huascar chose the ideal location that would create his image as the founder of the new Inca state through a return to its Hurin roots, he began building the estate that further embodied this narrative in its planning. Like earlier such complexes, Kañaraqay undoubtedly incorporated agricultural land, landscape modifications, storage facilities, public spaces, as well as the living quarters of its patron. While some of these, such as the terraces now designated as the separate site of Escalerayoq, are easily identifiable in the vicinity of the central compound referred to as the site of Kañaraqay. Others, however, are conspicuously missing from the complex. Rock outcrop carvings, large public plazas, and storage facilities in the vicinity were all earlier constructions associated with the primary Muina town of Minaspata. It is possible that

Huascar, pressed by the urgency of the Inca Civil War, could not secure materials, skilled laborers, and specialists for the construction of these royal estate elements. However, it appears that given the primary political motivation of the construction of Kañaraqay, entering into a spatial dialogue with the local Muina people, who saw themselves as inheritors of the Huari imperial tradition, fit Huascar's narrative in the war. That is to say, by the terminal days of Tahuantinsuyu, the royal estate type had evolved from its initial form which manifested the Inca Pachacuti's relationship with the sacred natural world, as he invaded and colonized new regions, through Topa Inca's focus on using architecture to manipulate the Inca nobility in favor of his favorite wife and son, and Huayna Capac's exaggeration of his own accomplishments and architecture due to his insecurity about his legitimacy to the time of Huascar where, I argue, his estate shared important spaces with the urban center of his critical allies in the dynastic war.<sup>39</sup> For the Inca, architecture helped make visible their conceptual and world views, to their political, religious and personal dynamics.

Minaspata has recently been the subject of the Regional Archaeological Investigations Project (PRIA) in the Lucre Basin by the Peruvian Ministry of Culture, while foreign archaeologists have also done extensive research on the site.<sup>40</sup> The focus of this dissertation, therefore, is the site of Kañaraqay that represents the living quarters of Huascar within his larger estate.<sup>41</sup> The first scholarly work at the site was by Peruvian archaeologist Luis Valcárcel, who performed the first official visit of the area in 1934, but he did not perform any research there. In

<sup>39</sup> For the estates of previous rulers see, Nair 2015, Niles 1999 and 2004; and Protzen 1993.

<sup>40</sup> See Thomas Hardy, *Assembling States: Community Formation and the Emergence of the Inca Empire*, PhD Dissertation, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2019) and Brian Bauer, Miriam Araoz, and Thomas Hardy, "The Settlement History of the Lucre Basin (Cusco, Peru)," *Andean Past*, vol. 13, (2022): 149-192.

<sup>41</sup> John Hyslop, *Inka Settlement Planning*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990): 42; Niles 2004, 52; Protzen 1993, 271.

1968, the first clearing of the site was done under the guidance of Peruvian archaeologist Luis Pardo, who also produced a topographic map of the site and basic drawings of the main buildings. In 1994, the National Institute of Culture (INC) undertook excavations at the site related to the regional “Plan COPESCO,” through which the modern road linking the site and the village of Lucre was constructed. Unfortunately, these excavations left no record of their results. In 1995, the INC began work on reconstruction and conservation of the site, but again their results remain unpublished. Fortunately, the same year, Carlos Arriola and Reynaldo Bustinza under the direction of Alfredo Valencia Zegarra completed excavations at Kañaraqay in order to obtain a professional archaeology certificate from San Antonio Abad National University in Cuzco (UNSAAC). Their field report is the primary source of the ceramic data analyzed later in this chapter. Thus, my research on Kañaraqay here represents the most detailed study of the site to date, including the first detailed mapping of the entire site and some of the first drawings of the extant architecture.

Kañaraqay consists of two easily identifiable sectors – a southern one situated along the modern road and a northern one on the very lake shore that is mostly undisturbed. Each sector is composed of single-room rectangular structures laid in long rows. They are separated by narrow (2-3m) spaces between their short, gabled-ended sides. The structures face wider streets (5m) with their long sides and all extant openings face the lake (N). The southern sector has two rows of seven buildings for a total of fourteen, while the northern has three rows of seven or eight for a total of twenty-one extant structures. The two sectors are linked by another three buildings that make up a plan that appears triangular or trapezoidal in shape. Unfortunately, reconstructions have been done on the southern sector, making its architecture unreliable for study. Hence, the focus of my investigation is on the northern, intact sector of the estate.

The structures of the northern sector conform to the standard Inca imperial style with their rectangular shapes, single rooms, battered walls, and trapezoidal doors, windows, and niches and can be categorized as Type 1 or A.<sup>42</sup> Although their dimensions vary slightly, each building measures about 16x9m. As all structures and passages meet at or near 90°, both the walls and the spaces between them form relatively straight lines that extend over 100m on the long side, so that the streets line perfectly with one of the sets of terraces of the Escalerayoq site. I am hesitant to call the plan of the site a grid or even an orthogonal plan, but its regularity merits further investigation.

As Jean-Pierre Protzen noted, Inca settlements often began with a regular architecture-based pattern that resulted in relatively straight streets resembling a grid. This, however, was probably a by-product of the rectangular shape of their structures and compounds rather than a parceling of the land orthogonally.<sup>43</sup> This is visible on flat or relatively flat terrain, as is the case with Kañaraqay. To think of Inca planning in terms of a grid is inherently flawed, since there is no evidence that they conceived of their settlements by laying streets, the spaces between which would be filled with structures. Instead, any Inca settlement shaped up from the architecture or in combinations such as the *kancha*, a compound of more than one unit that often involved an enclosure of several single-room buildings with a central patio.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Stella Nair and Jean-Pierre Protzen, "The Inka Built Environment," in *The Inka Empire: A Multidisciplinary Approach*, edited by Izumi Shimada, 215-232, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015): 218 and Protzen 2000, 200-202.

<sup>43</sup> Jean-Pierre Protzen, "Inca Architecture," in *The Inca World: The Development of Pre-Colombian Peru, AD 1000-1534*, eds. Cecilia Bakula, Laura Laurencich Minelli, and Mireille Vautier, 193-217. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000): 211.

<sup>44</sup> Hyslop 1990, 16-17 and *Ibid.*, 202.

In the Inca heartland, only a handful of sites of great importance exhibit orthogonal planning. Indeed, Cuzco itself formed at least four longitudinal street crosscut by six transverse ones through its rectangular units. However, is also some irregularity in the streets of the capital, as they were bound by the Saphi and Tullumayo rivers, which gave the city a somewhat triangular or trapezoidal pattern. At Kañaraqay, the terrain certainly allowed for both sectors to be laid out parallel to each other, so the angle that they create seems to be intentional. The resulting trapezoidal plan of Huascar's estate perhaps mimics that of Cuzco, albeit on a much smaller scale.

As discussed in Chapter 7, scale was an important ontological parameter for the Inca that could both distinguish an object and link it to one of a different size but similar shape. Andrew Hamilton recently defined scale as “a recursive mode of expression” that allowed for complex links between people, objects, and places to be made by manipulating their size.<sup>45</sup> At the same time, the Inca created replicas of Cuzco throughout the empire in order to serve as what Larry Coben calls “contextual anchors for highly structured performances.”<sup>46</sup> The continuous negotiations between the empire and the local realm were enacted in these theatrical performances within spaces that resembled Cuzco. However, the urban planning, architectural details, and spatial practices acted as presencing devices even when the Inca did not engage in active performing at their stages.<sup>47</sup> The reminder and allusion to Cuzco would have been a powerful reminder of the presence and power of the Inca ruler and his empire.

<sup>45</sup> Andrew Hamilton, *Scale and the Incas*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018): 6.

<sup>46</sup> Coben 2012, 65.

<sup>47</sup> Gasparini and Margolies 1980.

As the Inca replicated sacred spaces for the political needs of the empire, we might think of Kañaraqay as a reduced-scale version of Cuzco with their matching trapezoidal plans with individual buildings taking the shape of *kancha*. As Hamilton notes, reduced-scale objects were conceptualized not as smaller versions, but rather as more concentrated forms of their referents.<sup>48</sup> This idea is based on the Andean concept of *kamay*, or “the generative essence” that sacred objects, people, and place possessed.<sup>49</sup> Reduced-scale versions possessed the same *kamay* as their full-sized counterparts, but packed it ever so tightly within them, often exceeding in importance. This idea certainly worked in Huacar’s favor, although it is hard to imagine that Kañaraqay’s plan did more than refer to Cuzco. We cannot be sure that this was an intentional reference to Cuzco, however, as it might just be a product of standard Inca architecture and planning.

Besides Cuzco, the other sites in the heartland that exhibit some grid-like plans were Ollantaytambo and Calca, which show great regularity of *kancha* patterns which manifest as regular street patterns. They were parts of royal estates and like Cuzco and Kañaraqay were associated with Pachacuti and Huascar respectively. The existence of Calca might suggest simply that the final Inca ruler was interested in a regularly planned estate on a relatively flat plane and placed it at both of his royal estates. However, both of Huascar’s sites use the standard Inca architectural tool kit that was found on most Inca sites. This system began in earnest during the time of his great grandfather, who styled himself as the inventor of every important piece of Inca statehood. Born Inca Yupanqui, the ninth *Sapa Inca* who took the title Pachacuti in order to

<sup>48</sup> Hamilton 2018, 110.

<sup>49</sup> Frank Salomon, “Introductory Essay,” in *Huarochiri Manuscript: A Testament of Ancient and Colonial Andean Religion*, transl. Frank Salomon and George Urioste, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1991): 16.

profess the transformative character of his reign, during which he redesigned Cuzco, triggered the expansion of Tahuantisuyu and instituted most imperial policies. *Pachacuti* was an Inca concept meaning “turning over/around of time/space,” or a cataclysmic event in which time ends and begins anew.<sup>50</sup> According to the account of four native makers of the knotted Inca records or *quipucamayocs*, Huascar’s generals proclaimed it was time for another *pachacuti*.<sup>51</sup> He, thus, appears to model himself after his ancestor, as someone who would usher the Inca into the new world that would be created after the cataclysm of the Civil War.

Outside of the Inca heartland and going back to Gasparini and Margolies’ “architecture of power,” we might expect to find standardized Inca planning dominating important provinces throughout Tahuantisuyu. However, as is the case with virtually all aspects of the state apparatus of the Inca, the empire was dynamic and flexible. In areas where there was a negotiated settlement, the Inca preferred to utilize already existing local practices whenever they were useful and make only enough additions that signified the presence of the Inca and their position at the top of the hierarchical system. It is only in areas that required extensive military operations or at the large administrative centers that the Inca built large installations that show no sign of local architectural influences.<sup>52</sup> Instead, LH sites throughout the Andes and their spatial planning are material manifestations of the negotiations between the local groups and the empire that offer glimpses of how the imperial statecraft worked.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>50</sup> D’Altroy 2015, 2.

<sup>51</sup> Callapiña, *Supno and Other Quipucamayocs*, *Relación de los Quipucamayos*, (Lima, Peru: Biblioteca Universitaria, 1974 [1542]).

<sup>52</sup> Hyslop 1990, 5.

<sup>53</sup> See, Steve Wernke, *Negotiated Settlements: Andean Communities under Inka and Spanish Colonialism*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2013).



In the provinces, these negotiated settlements resulted in orthogonal plans of new Inca installations only in the northern Lake Titicaca Basin. The two most prominent examples are Hatuncolla, the capital of the Colla group, and Chucuito, the capital of the neighboring Lupaca group. Hatuncolla has little extant architecture from the LH, but the grid like street pattern was likely laid out during the time of Inca domination.<sup>54</sup> There are two main roads that run north-south and east-west and meet perpendicularly at the center of the site.<sup>55</sup> Chucuito's orthogonal plan, which fans out from Lake Titicaca possibly to accommodate the sloping terrain, was also built by the Inca.<sup>56</sup> John Hyslop notes that we might call this plan radial, as the streets radiated from the lake creating trapezoidal blocks acting on a visual illusion.<sup>57</sup> Looking out from the plaza, the streets appear straight as one looks towards the horizon. By contrast, when one is on the periphery of the site and looks back towards the plaza, the streets amplify a receding perspective which creates a sharp focus into the plaza. This visual trick amplified the importance of the plaza and thus any activities that took place there, such as those involving the Inca.

The architectural references to Hatuncolla and Chucuito made visible Huascar's alliance with these groups in the Inca Civil War. This is all the more striking when one considers that there are no clear antecedents of orthogonal planning in the Lake Titicaca area before the Inca sites were built. Once this pattern became related to the negotiation between the Colla, Lupaca, and Huascar, it made perfect sense to incorporate it at Kañaraqay where these relationships were

<sup>54</sup> Catherine Julien, *Hatunqolla: A View of Inca Rule from the Lake Titicaca Region*, University of California Publications in Anthropology, Vol. 15, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983): 89-93.

<sup>55</sup> John Hyslop, *The Inka Road System*, (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1984): 120.

<sup>56</sup> Marion Tschopik, *Some Notes of the Archaeology of the Department of Puno*. Papers of the Peabody Museum, Vol. 27, No. 3, (Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum of Anthropology, 1946).

<sup>57</sup> Hyslop 1990, 197.

solidified in the context of the war with Atahualpa. In this case, the fanning of the plan concentrates the attention to the eastern end of the site, as well as the terracing of Escalerayoq. The former might have been where the most important buildings of Kañaraqay were located, especially since the ceramic assemblage, discussed further in this chapter, reveal this is where the negotiation between the local Muina, Colla, and Inca took place. The latter might have been another nod to Pachacuti, whose architectural language focused on the Inca interventions with the sacred Andean landscape.

Radiality was an important concept in Inca administrative center planning at Huánuco Pampa, Pumpu, La Centinela, and Tambo Colorado. There, however, it was not coupled with orthogonality, so these appear not to have been points of reference for Kañaraqay. The highland centers of Huánuco Pampa and Pumpu were organized around a large central plaza from which four quadrants radiate. Although both are built on relatively flat terrain, these quadrants do not form a grid pattern, as their *kancha* units appear to be uniquely arranged, which was a compromise of urban planning that the Inca used in specific provincial sites. Both sites were strictly planned by the Inca to make visible the hierarchical relationships between the Inca and the local populations. The private quarters of Inca elites at both sites were separated from the central plaza by a series of doorways and intermediate plazas.<sup>58</sup> At Huánuco Pampa, the spaces are arranged concentrically from the Inca elite residence at sector IIB3 through the intermediate spaces at sector IIB2 to the plaza.<sup>59</sup> This concentricity instituted, both symbolically and

<sup>58</sup> Ramiro Matos, *Pumpu: Centro Administrativo Inca de la Puna de Junín*, (Lima, Peru: Editorial Horizonte, 1994): 134; Craig Morris, "Enclosures of Power: The Multiple Spaces of Inca Administrative Palaces," in *Palaces of the Ancient World: A Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks, 10th and 11th October 1998*, eds. Susan Toby Evans and Joanne Pillsbury, 299-323, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2004): 308; Craig Morris, Alan Covey, and Pat Stein, *The Huánuco Pampa Archaeological Project: Volume 1, the Plaza and Palace Complex*, (New York, NY: American Museum of Natural History, 2011): 95.

<sup>59</sup> Morris 2004, 306.

physically, the hierarchy from the Inca at the top through the intermediate local elites to the general population. At the same time, the ceramic assemblage at both the public and the inner palatial plaza (sector IIB3) suggests concurrent elaborate feasting with the notable difference of the use of Cuzco-style ceramics by the Inca elites and predominantly local ceramics by the general population.<sup>60</sup> The lack of a pre-existing centralized power in the area required the introduction of such a hierarchical system that would function under the Inca and the spatial organization of the elite sector provided its physical embodiment.

Where such hierarchical system already existed, however, the Inca opted to attach to it and utilize it rather than restructure it anew. At the capital of the Chincha kingdom, La Centinela, the Inca installed a main plaza that featured elite spaces for both the Inca and the Chincha.<sup>61</sup> Local and imperial designs were fused in a ceramic and architectural style that signified the fruitful relationship between the elites of both groups.<sup>62</sup> The Inca palace took a local form of a stepped platform, but was constructed with imperial materials and methods.<sup>63</sup> The private quarters of both Chincha and Inca elites sharing a side entrance from the plaza built by the empire signified the unity of the local and imperial power. Similarly, at Tambo Colorado in the Pisco Valley, the Inca administrative palace and the local elite space at the Easternmost Complex were placed side by side flanking adjacent plazas. However, since the imperial one was much

<sup>60</sup> Morris et al. 2011, 213-214.

<sup>61</sup> Morris 2004, 311.

<sup>62</sup> Dorothy Menzel, "The Inca Occupation on the South Coast of Peru." *Southwest Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (1959): 139.

<sup>63</sup> Morris 2004, 313.

larger, the local leaders who were paired with the conquerors, were continuously reminded of their inferior position.<sup>64</sup>

Unlike the orthogonal plans of the Inca heartland or Lake Titicaca, the radial patterns that drove the design of Inca administrative centers emphasized the hierarchy of space. That they vaguely resemble a grid pattern is owed to the fact that these centers were organized around a central plaza. This division in design practices can be seen most clearly in the fact that the rest of the sites were not orthogonal even when the terrain allowed it. Thus, these designs could not have been Huascar's inspiration, nor his reference points in building Kañaraqay.

As Huascar was looking to build his legitimacy on his relationship to long-term power structures, the orthogonality of his estate also relates to that of nearby Pikillacta. The impressive MH administrative center exhibits great precision in the creation of almost a perfect rectangle despite the steep grade of the terrain over which it was built measuring 90m of elevation change.<sup>65</sup> The site can be divided in four sectors of hundreds of rectangular enclosures with Sector 1 making an almost perfect grid of five rows of fourteen and one (possibly unfinished) row of eleven.<sup>66</sup> Grid planning was typical for the Huari administrative centers such as Viracochapampa, Jincamocco, and Azangaro, away from the imperial capital near Ayacucho, which grew organically.<sup>67</sup> While Huascar might not have been aware of those site, he could not

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 314 and Jean-Pierre Protzen, "Times Go by at Tambo Colorado," *Ñawpa Pacha: Journal of Andean Archaeology*, No. 29, (2008): 232.

<sup>65</sup> McEwan and Couture 2005, 17-18.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>67</sup> William Isbell, "Conclusion: Huari Administration and the Orthogonal Cellular Architecture Horizon," in *Huari Administrative Structure: Prehistoric Monumental Architecture and State Government*, ed. William Isbell and Gordon McEwan, (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1991): 299-300.

have ignored Pikillacta looming large over his estate and the choice to align the buildings at Kañaraqay in straight lines must at least partially be influenced by the nearby Huari giant.

### **3. Returning Home: Architecture at Kañaraqay**

The north sector of Kañaraqay consists of three rows of standard Inca rectangular buildings. As the structures are already arranged in a grid, I adopted the following numbering convention for them: each building is designated an alphanumeric code of sector (north, central, or south), row (north, central, or south), and consecutive number (from west to east). This results in the 23 buildings of the north sector ranging from NN1 in the northeast corner to NS7 and NC8 in the southwest corner of the site (Figure 8.1).

All 23 buildings are made of mortared fieldstone and there is no evidence for any cut-stone masonry on site. All 23 buildings are made of mortared fieldstone and there is no evidence for any cut-stone masonry on site. One of the standard elements of the Inca architectural tool kit was their finely worked, perfectly fitted, mortarless stone masonry, which came in both ashlar and polygonal blocks. It was often found in Inca elite sites such as royal estates. However, the majority of Inca sites were made of other materials and process, from mortared fieldstone masonry to adobe blocks.<sup>68</sup> Kañaraqay was made of mortared fieldstones. Further, the lack of cut-stone masonry can be explained with the disruption that the Civil War caused. We lack direct evidence, but it is not hard to imagine that highly-skilled stonecutters and masons, as well as raw materials, might not have been immediately available to Huascar during the crisis since so many men were sent to the battlefields.

<sup>68</sup> Protzen 2000, 201.

North Sector of Kañaraqay in Plan  
Scale 1:100

20m



Figure 8.1. Plan of the North sector of Kañaraqay

It is possible that Kañaraqay was inspired by the architecture and urban form of Pikillacta, which was also built with mortared field stone.<sup>69</sup> At several locations, notably in structures NC1, NS5, and NS6, there are remnants of a plaster-like material in the interior of the wall niches. In places, this coating appears to have been painted in red, while it was likely the same material used as mortar in the construction of the walls, consisting of mud with some botanical inclusions. Such covering is not unusual even when it was applied on fine-cut fitted stonemasonry such as at Raqchi.<sup>70</sup> Yet, plaster was mostly used by the Inca to hide imperfections, while fine masonry was left exposed. It appears that at least the interiors of Kañaraqay's north sector were mostly covered to hide Huascar's inability to mobilize the best stonecutters or to provide them with the best materials.

As Protzen notes, however, the mortared fieldstone masonry also varied in quality and Kañaraqay fits the definition of the high end of the spectrum.<sup>71</sup> In this version, stones were carefully selected and possibly partially worked to fit predetermined positions. Corners of walls and doorways were strengthened by the use of alternating headers and stretchers, which were larger than the stones in the body of the walls, providing greater stability. Walls also exhibit some coursing, especially in the more carefully designed corner and openings areas, while they also used mortar more sparingly. Coursed walls used fieldstones of similar size and shape or were perhaps somewhat dressed to fit the coursing. The low-end masonry was made of

<sup>69</sup> Mary Glowacki and Gordon McEwan, "Pikillacta, Huaro, and the Wari Presence in Cuzco," in *The Wari Civilization and their Descendants: Imperial Transformations in pre-Inca Cuzco*, eds. Mary Glowacki and Gordon McEwan, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020): 11.

<sup>70</sup> Protzen 1993, 217.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

unworked stones that varied greatly in shape and size, without any anchoring of the corners or coursing, and with haphazard use of mortar.

At Kañaraqay, the quality of the construction increases from west to east, although the thickness of the walls throughout the site is about 90-100cm. The remains of the buildings in the first and second column do not exceed 60cm in extant height, save for building NC1. At first glance, this structure appears to be dominating the site, larger and slightly elevated from the rest of the northern sector, framing a small promontory right behind it. It is also much better preserved than the buildings in its vicinity with wall heights up to 2.5m. However, on closer examination, it becomes clear that a later addition to NC1 merged it with the exterior wall of NN1 to create a much larger structure, or more likely a corral, stretching the measurements of the standard 16x9m building and the 5m street combined to make a 16x15m enclosure. The original remains of the NC1 walls conform to the standard size, however, and the building does not appear to have had a special standing at Kañaraqay.

The rest of the buildings in the western end of the northern sector exhibit little coursing, no use of headers and stretchers at corners, while their walls often meander to form generally parallel, if crooked lines. These structures also use smaller stone and the material appears to be minimally worked in the bodies of the walls. Long stretches of walls are missing and they do not have enough preserved height to determine the location of openings with any certainty, although the location of rubble piles follow the expected pattern of both wall and openings locations.

As we move to the east, the buildings of the third and fourth column are already better preserved and with higher extant walls. They still do not exhibit any significant coursing and only sparingly use headers and stretchers at corners. NC3 and NC4 are noticeably more rectangular than the rest of the structures at Kañaraqay, although the way they appear now might




be a result of the collapsed north-east corner of NC3 and north-west corner of NC4, as well as most of the eastern wall of NC3. The north wall of NC4 also appears to either have been later repaired or have shifted from its base. It is, thus, possible that these buildings originally conformed to the 16x9m proportions that the site was built on. NS3 is the first building (again barring NC1) that exhibits niches on its southern wall, although those are mostly collapsed. NC3 is the first building that has a preserved window opening.

Further east, the buildings of the fifth and sixth column and the central and north row are severely disturbed by the modern wall that was likely mostly built with material from the Inca site. This disturbance makes NC5 appear almost square in shape, while NN6 is mostly destroyed and nothing of NN5 remains.

From this point on, the masonry markedly improves with NS5, NS6, and NC7 being the three best preserved buildings of the sector. At this point but all corners were made of carefully dressed stone that aligned in straight vertical lines and with headers and stretchers that anchored buildings. This allowed for greater stability that also explains why this was the best preserved part of the sector with wall heights averaging close to 2m and reaching over 3m at various places. In the eastern end of the north sector, larger stones were used at the bases of the walls with some coursing evident throughout the height of the walls, but mostly at the base.

NS5 is the first structure to have a clearly detectable doorway, albeit collapsed, while NS6 (Figure 8.2), NN7, NC7 (Figure 8.3), and NS7 (Figure 8.4) all have preserved doorways, all of which face Lake Muina to the north. The window openings also all face in the same direction, numbering between one and three and usually alternating with two doorways on the north wall. All openings are treated the same way as the corners, with dressed stones usually of slightly

Building NS6, N wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 10.05.2022



387

Figure 8.2. Outside elevation of the North wall of Building NS6, Kaňaraqay

Building NC7, N wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 10.05.2022

388




Figure 8.3. Outside elevation of the North wall of Building NC7, Kaňaraqay

Building NS7, N wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 09.05.2022




Figure 8.4. Outside elevation of the North wall of Building NS7, Kaňaraqay

larger size, well fitted with minimal use of mortar making straight lines through headers and stretchers.

The south wall features trapezoidal niches that are mostly standardized in size measuring 65cm in width at the base, 45cm in width at the top, and 95cm of height. These vary in number depending on preservation, but it appears that they were meant to be six, since they were usually spaced at just 2m at the top. At the best-preserved south wall of NC7 (Figure 8.5), there are six niches, while NS5 (Figure 8.6) has three that reach the midpoint of the wall. NS6 (Figure 8.7) only had three as well, but its south wall incorporates a large natural outcrop. The same size and spacing of niches appear on the shorter east and west walls numbering three or four per wall. Most wall only have two extant niches, but the best-preserved east walls of NS5 (Figure 8.8) and NC7 (Figure 8.9) both have three, while both east and west (Figure 8.10) walls of NC6, and NC7's west wall (Figure 8.11) have four. There does not seem to be great care in aligning the niches of the east and west walls, nor of the niches of the south walls with the openings of the north walls. All windows and niches were constructed with dressed stone and featured the typical single-slab lintel that usually covered the entire thickness of the wall and measured some 65-90cm in width hovering over the window or opening prominently.

With the increased quality of construction, natural rock outcrops also become more numerous in the structures as move from west to east. NC4 an NS4 both feature such outcrops, but they are not subtly used with the Inca walls. The one on the western wall of NC4 props the collapsed north part of the wall, protruding sharply inside the building. The south wall of NS4 leans on the large boulder just beyond it, but it does not seem to have been included in the construction. By the time we reach NS6 (Figure 8.7) and NS7 (Figure 8.5), the Inca construction weaves around and hugs the outcrops that become seamless parts of the south wall of each

Building NC7, S wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 05.05.2022




Figure 8.5. Inside elevation of the South wall of Building NC7, Kaňaraqay

Building NS5, S wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 11.05.2022



Figure 8.6. Inside elevation of the South wall of Building NS5, Kaňaraqay

Building NS6, S wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 11.05.2022




Figure 8.7. Inside elevation of the South wall of Building NS6, Kaňaraqay



Building NS5, E wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 11.05.2022

394




Figure 8.8. Inside elevation of the East wall of Building NS5, Kaňaraqay

Building NC7, E wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 09.05.2022





Figure 8.9. Inside elevation of the East wall of Building NC7, Kaňaraqay

Building NS6, W wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 10.05.2022

396



5m

Figure 8.10. Inside elevation of the West wall of Building NS6, Kaňaraqay

Building NC7, W wall  
Kaňaraqay  
Scale 1:50  
GK 11.05.2022




Figure 8.11. Inside elevation of the West wall of Building NC7, Kaňaraqay

structure. As discussed earlier, rock outcrop incorporation was an important feature of long-standing Inca architectural language that emphasized the complementarity of the Inca project with the sacred landscape. By following this convention Huascar perhaps wanted to reiterate his legitimacy by looking the part.

The subtle increase in the quality of construction from east to west matches the trapezoidal plan of Kañaraqay, which visually concentrates on the eastern end of the site. With the south and north sectors merging into the central sector, we might view this node of the site as a *tinkuy*, akin to Pumacchupan in Cuzco. Again, we must be careful comparing the confluence of site sectors to urban planning that followed Inca cosmological understanding, but lacking other evidence, it appears that the eastern end of Kañaraqay and possibly the central sector where Huascar would reside. Unfortunately, this is also the part of the site that is most overgrown with vegetation and appears the most disturbed, so no detailed study of this sector was possible during my investigation of the site in 2022. If the written sources are to be believed, however, that Kañaraqay was destroyed by Quizquiz and Chalcochima in the aftermath of the Inca Civil War, it makes sense that Huascar's home endured the most violence. Further research in this area might more insights about the last Inca ruler. For now, however, it is fair to say that the architecture of his estate is more subtle and subdued than grand and awe-inspiring.

Under the pressures of the Inca Civil War, Huascar took some big swings – he quarreled with the Inca nobility, switched his affiliation to the Hurin moiety, built an estate in an unexpected place to powerfully profess his role as the new “earth changer.” But the likely constraints of the war itself also meant that building such an elite center had its challenges, some of which were insurmountable. Instead of the stunning ashlar and polygonal walls built without mortar, as well as elaborate waterfalls and other exposed water systems that provided visual and

auditory delight, was a somewhat restricted and modest palace by Inca standards. Whereas the site selection and the planning of Huascar's estate was about "return to origins", channeling all the might of the creation, Manco Capac, Pachacuti, the concept of *tinkuy*, and the centuries-long tradition of Huari power in the area, its architecture was about a personal return home. Built at the site of Huascar's birth, Kañaraqay looks nothing more than another Inca site. It is well-built, but not spectacular. It is comfortable, but not extraordinary. Perhaps this was also intended to emphasize that this was a home first and a political center second.

The devastation of the Civil War, again, can explain both Huascar's attempt to find a home where he would be comfortable and his inability to quickly put together a breathtaking estate. However, I see Kañaraqay as a well-calculated, albeit ultimately failed, gambit. Huascar knew that funding, mobilizing the specialized labor required, and building a spectacular estate that would rival those of his predecessors would take time and effort that would both hurt his war effort and his standing with the Inca nobility in Cuzco, with whom he was already on thin ice. And even if he managed to impress the Inca and the *curaca* who would come visit him from the provinces, that would take further more time and investment. Instead, he focused on the big picture, the big gesture, the highly visible. He was bold with the choice of the site and the planning of the estate, which must have had loud reverberations throughout the empire. Abandoning his place among his ancestors in the Urubamba Valley and attempting to align with the Colla, the Muina, and the memory of the great MH powers was an act that required little economic investment, but had much wider impact.

Monumental construction is usually interpreted as a marker of the power of its patrons. This makes sense, since concentrated power in a single person or group enables large-scale construction projects, which require labor and raw materials mobilization, as well as complex

coordination between a variety of specialized labor. However, there seem to be two kinds of monumental projects – those that articulate their political message to the powerful few and those that cast a wider net. I contend that the former kind of projects do, indeed, reflect the already existing power of their patrons, who attempt to retain their position by tending to the elite. Such projects focus on the private spaces where select few could make political and economic decisions, while they are disinterested to appeal to a wider audience that lacks the ability to challenge them. Such is the case with Topa Inca's estate in Chinchero where the most significant spaces were differentiated by restricting access.<sup>72</sup> Levels of restriction defined hierarchies in the Inca administrative centers of Huánuco Pampa and Pumpu, where huge public plazas hosted great theatrical events, but they were only a background onto which the Inca and the local leaders did their negotiations in private.<sup>73</sup> Of course, these are not restricted to Inca or Andean cases. Much of monumental construction in the Roman empire was preoccupied with creating private spaces that defined their elite patrons and even often competed with each other.<sup>74</sup> The Valley of the Kings in Egypt was literally an arena in which the kings of the New Kingdom entered upon their death to battle for eternity over their greatness.<sup>75</sup>

However, the other kinds of large-scale construction projects that focus on a wider audience appear often not to be reflections of their patron's power, but indeed an attempt to gain such power. These are often undertaken at the state formation state or at the beginning of

<sup>72</sup> Nair 2015.

<sup>73</sup> Matos 1994 and Moris et al. 2011.

<sup>74</sup> Edmund Thomas, *Monumentality and the Roman Empire: Architecture in the Antonine Age*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>75</sup> Nicholas Reeves and Richard Wilkinson, *The Complete Valley of the Kings*, (London, UK: Thames and Hudson, 2008).

imperial transformations of states. Before Topa Inca focused on manipulating Inca noblemen's experience through series of restricted spaces, his father Pachacuti undertook projects with high visibility such as Pisac and Ollantaytambo.<sup>76</sup> Naturally, his living quarters and the inner parts of these sites remained highly restricted, but they also featured large landscape modifications that were visible far and wide in the Urubamba Valley. Built in the initial period of Inca expansion, they appealed to a wider audience exhibiting the relationship between the sacred landscape and the imperial project. Similar to Pachacuti's interest in engaging the public, state architecture in the Roman provinces materialized the imperial project by expressing the superiority of the Empire.<sup>77</sup> Before the Valley of the Kings and the elaborate Karnak Temple, in the early stages of the development of Egyptian kingship, the leaders of the first four dynasties of the Old Kingdom built enormous pyramids that solidified their position as divine beings. These were powerful visual markers that could not be missed on the landscape and thus differentiated the builder as a singular individual. As early as the beginning of the Fifth Dynasty in the mid-24<sup>th</sup> century BCE, the focus of monumental construction in Egypt turned from the public expression of power to the private that now focused on elite interaction.<sup>78</sup>

Kañaraqay, with its grand gestures made towards old seats of power in the Titicaca and Lucre Basins and with his subdued private sector featuring decent mortared fieldstone

<sup>76</sup> Protzen 1993.

<sup>77</sup> Ralph Hausser, "Architecture, Performance, and Ritual: The Role of State Architecture in the Roman Empire," in *Proceedings of the Eight Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference, Leicester 1998*, 1-13, (Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books, 1999) and Louise Revell, "Constructing Romanitas: Roman Public Architecture and the Archaeology of Practice," in *Proceedings of the Eight Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference, Leicester 1998*, 52-58, (Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books, 1999).

<sup>78</sup> Miroslav Barta, "Egyptian Kingship during the Old Kingdom," in *Experiencing Power, Generating Authority*, eds. Jane Hill, Philip Jones, and Antonio Morales, 257-283, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2013).



architecture, fits this second kind of monumental construction that is characterized by a gamble for power. We already know that Huscar's gambit did not pay off, as he lost the war with Atahualpa, which also led to his death and the annihilation of his entire lineage. Until now, he has primarily been remembered as the one who lost the Inca Civil War. His estate, however, is a reminder that the reason why we often equate large construction projects with power is that we only look at the successful cases. One reason for that is that the failed ones might have left little to no material remains. Yet, thinking of public monumental works as a form of propaganda allows us to rethink whether they were successful or not, instead of automatically buying the message of the patron.

Here I consider space in general, and the built environment in particular, not as an objective, geometric, measurable entity, but an intermediary in any cultural transaction between humans and between humans and objects. The understanding of spatial relations is essential to the cultural understanding of any relationship. This is especially useful in archaeology, where all inferences about the past are made in context. Sometimes more obvious and other times more subtle, context is inherently a spatial category that requires an understanding of space. Henri Lefebvre argues that space is culturally produced evoking order constructed by interrelations with general cultural meaning.<sup>79</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty similarly defines space as “the universal power of [the] connections [of things].”<sup>80</sup> For Yi-Fu Tuan the human built environment stands as an antipode of nature.<sup>81</sup> While the natural world is open and free as well as unruly and dangerous, a city or a building has the power to lead, to confine, as well as to protect. Spatial

<sup>79</sup> Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, (Malden, MA: Wiley, 1992[1974]): 17.

<sup>80</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013[1945]): 254.

<sup>81</sup> Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place*, (St Paul, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1977): 102.

organization and control are, therefore, the most tangible expression of an ideology. Architecture and planned public space, thus, have the ability not only to embody the cultural reality of its society, but also to further alter such a reality through instituting symbolic order inextricably linked with natural, cosmological, culturally constructed order. Furthermore, Lefebvre assigns one part of his spatial triad, “conceived space,” to the practice envisioned by the designer, acknowledging the potential power of spatial organization in controlling practice.<sup>82</sup> The spatial organization of Kañaraqay carries such potential to suggest, instruct, and limit movement and other spatial practices.

On the other hand, though, no space is ultimately defined by conception only, but instead it is confirmed by practice.<sup>83</sup> Individuals have the power to resist or avoid the suggestions that spatial organization makes through instituting meaningful relationships, even when they abide by such relationships. The most useful way of looking at the relationship between spatial organization and imperial control, therefore, is through the concept of “lived space” as a negotiation between the individualized, phenomenological perception of space and the conception of architects, planners, or the Inca.<sup>84</sup> That is to say, we need to examine the material remains of the practices that took place at Kañaraqay and not merely the conception of these spaces.

Before we turn to the ceramic assemblage of Huascar’s estate in relationship with the conception of the site, it is useful to think of Kañaraqay not merely as space but rather as a place. Lefebvre’s dissatisfaction with objective, *untrue* space, Merleau-Ponty’s claim that we operate

<sup>82</sup> Lefebvre 1992, 38-40.

<sup>83</sup> Michel Foucault, “Space, Power, and Knowledge,” in *The Cultural Studies Reader*, ed. Simon During, (London, UK: Routledge, 1999): 245.

<sup>84</sup> Lefebvre 1992, 40-42.

through our *phenomenological* rather than through our *objective* body, Tuan's reality as being constructed by experience and memory all lead to the idea that practice is performed in place rather than in some hollow space container.<sup>85</sup> Edward Cassey argues that place is primordial to all existence, as nothing happens nowhere – everything happens in place.<sup>86</sup> Space only becomes place through notice and the burden of meaning.<sup>87</sup> All spatial practices are, therefore, an attempt to find the peace and comfort of implacement and to escape displacement.<sup>88</sup> Kañaraqay represents both Huascar's displacement from the sacred Urubamba valley where all of his predecessors built their estates and his attempt at implacement in his birthplace. If placemaking is a quest for knowability and comfort, then the ultimate goal for all placemaking would be the home. Every placemaking is thus either a homecoming or a homesteading.<sup>89</sup> On one hand Kañaraqay is Huascar's ultimate homecoming to the land of his birth and the symbolic return to Inca origins, while on the other it is his most adventurous homesteading project representing his divorce from Hanan Cuzco and his attempt to initiate a *pachacuti*. To understand what kind of a place it was, therefore, we need to examine the practices that took place at Huascar's estate to evaluate his ultimate failure.

<sup>85</sup> Emphasis is mine. Ibid., 1; Merleau-Ponty 2013, 131-132; Tuan.

<sup>86</sup> Edward Casey, *Getting Back into Place*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993): 13.

<sup>87</sup> Tuan 1977, 199.

<sup>88</sup> Casey, 1-40.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 290.

#### 4. Building Alliances: Kañaraqay's Ceramic Assemblage

Huascar appears to have conceived of Kañaraqay as the embodiment of his legitimacy narrative in the context of the Civil War that presented him as the ruler to return the empire to greatness. Given that he lost the conflict with Atahualpa and that his lineage and much of his memory were completely erased, the question of whether the message he wanted to project with this royal estate worked at all. As the most ubiquitous and durable material, ceramics present the best avenue towards insights about the practices that took place at the site. Since ceramic styles were intimately tied to one's identity in the Inca Empire, they also shed light on who participated in those practices as well as who was absent, not invited, or actively excluded.

Since Huascar's legitimacy stemmed not merely from an association with the imperial core and Cuzco, it is imperative not to conflate imperial Cuzco-produced pottery with Inca ceramics at large, as discussed in Chapter 5. As the state deployed flexible mechanisms of co-opting local power structure in the provinces that materialized in hybrid styles or redefinition of local styles as Inca-related and so prestige in character, so it was capable of similar flexibility in the imperial core. The local Lucre style shares significant stylistic similarities to Huari ceramics and can, therefore, be seen as the locus of a long-term tradition of power in the Inca heartland.<sup>90</sup> Considering the importance of the Colla group to Huascar in the context of the Civil War and the significance of the Island of the Sun in Lake Titicaca for Inca imperial legitimacy, it is possible that ceramic styles from Collasuyu became status markers within Kañaraqay.<sup>91</sup> Such styles include Sillustani, associated with the Inca occupation of Hatuncolla,<sup>92</sup> Collao, the dominant

<sup>90</sup> McEwan, Chatfield, and Gibaja 2002, 289.

<sup>91</sup> Betanzos 1996 and Bauer and Stanish 2001, 15.

<sup>92</sup> Julien 1983, 117.

style at the Island of the Sun,<sup>93</sup> Huatasani, the principal style of the northern Titicaca Basin that, together with Collao ceramics, persisted in the Inca period despite the introduction of Cuzco wares,<sup>94</sup> as well as Pucarani, found in the southwest Lake Titicaca Basin,<sup>95</sup> but also in Colla country,<sup>96</sup> and the Island of the Sun.<sup>97</sup> Any or a number of these otherwise non-Inca, or provincial Inca at best, styles might have occupied a different non-foreign status within the activities at Huascar's estate. Although they may be seen as incorporated into the already inclusive imperial realm of ceramic styles, it is also possible that at Kañaraqay they occupied an even higher position and so they lent legitimacy to Huascar rather than the other way around. In this view, Lucre and Lake Titicaca styles did not become Inca, but rather they were allowed to occupy a position of power due to the fluid system of ceramic use by the empire. It is thus imperative that we see Inca pottery not merely as imperial Cuzco-produced wares of power and provincial styles of co-option, but rather as a fluid system of continuous negotiation.

While I conducted my own investigation of the standing architecture of the site, I elected to use previously unanalyzed excavation data from Kañaraqay. Archaeology is inherently a destructive activity and it would not be productive to excavate new material before using the already recovered one in the past. Additionally, this research for this dissertation was done during the height and in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, which made

<sup>93</sup> Bauer and Stanish 2001, 97.

<sup>94</sup> Cecilia Chavez, "Analysis of the Ceramics from the Middle and Lower Rio Huancane Subdrainage, Department of Puno, Peru," in *The Northern Titicaca Basin Survey: Huancane-Putina*, eds. Charles Stanish, Cecilia Chavez, Karl LaFavre, Aimee Plourde, (Ann Arbor, MI: Museum of Anthropology, 2014), 32.

<sup>95</sup> Edmundo de la Vega, *Estudio Arqueológico de Pucaras o Poblados Amurallados de Cumbre en Territorio Lupaqa: El caso de Pucara-Juli*, unpublished Bachelor's Thesis, (Arequipa, Peru: Departamento de Antropología, Universidad Católica Santa María, 1990).

<sup>96</sup> Arkush 2015, 205.

<sup>97</sup> Bauer and Stanish 2001, 95.

engaging in larger team investigations difficult and possibly unethical. In 2022, after Peru reopened for international researchers again, I engaged in a different kind of excavation, tracking down the reports of earlier investigations at Kañaraqay that only exist in single copies in the library of the Ministry of Culture in Cuzco. These reports detail the results of the survey and excavations that were performed on site, but offer no interpretation of the data in them.

In their investigation at Kañaraqay, Arriola and Bustinza recovered pottery stylistically dated to all archaeological periods since the Late Formative (500 BCE – 300 CE) in the Cuzco area, despite the site being constructed during the LH. The styles recovered included Chanapata (Late Formative, 500 BCE – 300 CE), Qotakalli (Early Intermediate Period, 300 – 600 CE), Huari (Middle Horizon, 600 – 1000 CE), Lucre (Late Intermediate Period, 1000 – 1400 CE), Inca (Late Horizon, 1400 – 1532 CE), as well as Collao (Late Intermediate Period, 950 – 1450 CE) from the Lake Titicaca Basin and Spanish Colonial (1532 – 1824 CE).

The Chanapata ceramics conform to the stylistic characteristics described by John Rowe.<sup>98</sup> Their paste is coarse with feldspars, quartz, sand, and a great deal of mica as inclusions. They are orange, black, and gray in color with red to brown spots in the central portions of the reduced ones. Their texture is relatively loose, sandy, and generally porous. Their surfaces are slightly eroded with the internal surfaces exhibiting brushing. They are decorated with very thick incised lines, punctures, and appliques with burnished and slipped sections.<sup>99</sup>

The Qotakalli fragments correspond in general to the style first described by Peruvian archaeologist Luis Barreda Murillo and elaborated by American archaeologist Mary Glowacki,

<sup>98</sup> Rowe 1944.

<sup>99</sup> Carlos Antonio Arriola Tuni and Reynaldo Bustiza Espinoza, *Arqueología de Cañaraqay, Lucre – Cusco*, Licenciatura Thesis, (Cuzco, Peru: Universidad Nacional de San Antonio de Abad del Cusco, 2000): 133.

although they cannot be further categorized into a substyle of Qotakalli.<sup>100</sup> Their paste is relatively coarse with quartz, feldspars, and ground sand inclusions. They are generally cream-colored with the small differences in color depending on the firing as well as the quality of the clay. Their texture is somewhat compact and porous. Their interior surfaces show signs of polishing, but not brushing. Forms include cups with sharp rims, vertical handles, and flat bases. They are decorated with black and red horizontal and parallel lines, rhomboids, and horizontal bands on cream.<sup>101</sup>

The Huari style pottery are identified based on their fine texture and decoration, which conform to the styles of the Middle Horizon empire, as described by American archaeologist Dorothy Menzel.<sup>102</sup> Again, the fragments do not allow for a further identification of a particular Huari style, but they do not appear to fit the local Arahua/Huamanga style common at Pikillacta.<sup>103</sup> Their paste is somewhat fine with feldspar, fine sand, and mica inclusions. They are completely oxidized and orange and brown in color with a generally fine and compact texture. Their surfaces are slipped in orange, vermillion, and gray, while the non-slipped surface is dark orange and brown. Forms include pitchers and pots, decorated with consistent parallel lines, small circles, or representations of camelids in black on the vermillion surfaces or red on the gray surfaces.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>100</sup> Luis Barreda Murillo, "Asimientos Humanos de los Qotakalli del Cuzco," in *Arqueología del Cuzco*, ed. Oberti Rodríguez, 13-21, (Cuzco, Peru: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1982); Mary Glowacki, *The Wari Occupation of the Southern Highlands of Peru: A Ceramic Perspective from the Site of Pikillacta*, PhD Dissertation, (Boston, MA: Brandeis University, 1996).

<sup>101</sup> Arriola and Bustiza 2000, 134.

<sup>102</sup> Dorothy Menzel, "Style and Time in the Middle Horizon," *Ñawpa Pacha*, Vol. 2, (1964): 1-105.

<sup>103</sup> See Glowacki 1996.

<sup>104</sup> Arriola and Bustiza 2000, 135.

Although the Lucre ceramic style is relatively well known colloquially, a comprehensive, formal study on the style is still to be published.<sup>105</sup> The style is linked to Huari artistic traditions and retains certain motifs and techniques associated with the MH.<sup>106</sup> The Lucre fragments at Kañaraqay have a relatively coarse paste with fine sand, mica, and, in rare cases, feldspar and ground andesite inclusions. They are orange, gray, and dark brown in color and have a semi-compact and somewhat porous texture. Both surfaces are treated the same and are orange in the non-slipped vessels and orange, cream, and vermilion when slipped. They correspond to fragments of round vessels with wide openings or conical bases with wall thickness of up to 1cm and likely used for storage. Other than the variety of slips, ranging from white and cream through red and vermilion to brown and black, the Lucre ceramics at Kañaraqay are undecorated.<sup>107</sup>

Arriola and Bustiza distinguish five separate Inca styles – Inca A, Inca B, orange, red, and black – based on decoration. Inca A corresponds to the common “fern” motif, while Inca B corresponds to the common band of concentric rhomboids decoration, and the rest are simply named after their slip color.<sup>108</sup> However, given that the technical characteristics of all five styles are almost identical and that the same level of detail cannot be afforded to the other ceramic styles, grouping the Inca styles in one for the discussion here is sufficient level of detail, since we focus on intergroup relationships. The Inca sample at Kañaraqay has fine paste with a wide

<sup>105</sup> Brian Bauer, Miriam Araoz, and Thomas Hardy, “The Settlement History of the Lucre Basin (Cusco, Peru),” *Andean Past*, Vol. 13, (2022): 161.

<sup>106</sup> Gordon McEwan, Melissa Chatfield, and Arminda Gibaja, “The Archaeology of Inca Origins: Excavations at Chokepukio, Cuzco, Peru,” in *Andean Archaeology I: Variations of Sociopolitical Organization*, eds. William Isbell and Helaine Silverman, (New York, NY: Kluwer Academic, 2002): 295.

<sup>107</sup> Arriola and Bustiza, 136.

<sup>108</sup> For discussion of these common motifs on Inca pottery, see Bray 2000; Fernández Baca 1973 and 1989; Julien 2004; Rowe 1944



range of inclusions like mica, quartz, fine sand, ground basalt, feldspars, and ground andesite. Their texture is fine and compact. The surfaces are brushed and polished with the decorated ones finely burnished to a distinctive shine. They are completely oxidized and orange in color. Forms include vertical handles, flat bases, and various parts of *urpus*. The decoration of the “fern” and the concentric rhomboids motifs are done in black on the orange background.<sup>109</sup>

The Collao ceramics correspond to the Black on Red style of Colla ceramics first described by Marion Tschopik in 1946 and later elaborated by Charles Stanish et al as Inca Collao.<sup>110</sup> These have markedly different pastes from the rest of the assemblage with large granules of quartz in them. They are red to dark brown in color, with some oranges that show uneven firing. The texture of the fragments is coarse and regular. The external surfaces are predominantly red, burnished and polished, while the interior ones are scraped and brushed and gray and brown in color. The represented forms are dominated by plates and jars decorated with black lines.<sup>111</sup>

The colonial ceramics are defined through their production on a potter’s wheel, while the rest of the pottery from Kañaraqay was coiled. These have fine pastes with scarce quartz inclusions, compact and homogenous textures, and are cream in color. The surfaces are mostly slipped and the interiors are burnished showing a combination of Inca and European techniques. The decorations are mostly green on cream and dark cream slips on plates and jars.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>109</sup> Arriola and Bustiza 2000, 137-141.

<sup>110</sup> Charles Stanish, Cecilia Chávez Justo, Karl LaFavre, and Aimee Plourde, *The Northern Titicaca Basin Survey: Huancané-Putina*, Memoirs of the Museum of Anthropology, Vol. 56, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2014); Tschopik 1946.

<sup>111</sup> Arriola and Bustiza 2000, 142.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 143.

During the survey of Kañaraqay, 229 ceramic fragments were collected that mostly corresponded to pitchers, pots, and jars (Table 8.1). Of these, 196 or 86% were Inca and most of them undecorated, body sherds. The spatial distribution of the quantitative relationships between the styles on the surface was even throughout the site, with Inca ceramics dominating the sample across all sectors and no sectors offering any heightened representation of any other styles. The relatively high number of Chanapata ceramics, the oldest represented at Kañaraqay, is somewhat surprising, but they still represent less than 10% of the sample, while most of the other styles were only represented by a handful of sherds. It is important to notice the absence of Collao and Colonial fragments on the ground. This can be attributed to the randomness of the assemblage, especially since a number of styles only yielded single sherds, or it could be explained with these styles being associated only with certain contexts, which will be revealed by the excavations.

Arriola and Bustiza excavated seven units, six of which were located in the southern sector of Kañaraqay, which was reconstructed right after their investigations in 1996. Units 1 and 2 were located inside the same building (E-1) and were 2x1m and 2x2m respectively. Unit 1 was excavated in two layers with the top one's cultural material consisting of 48 fragments being consistent with the surface collection, while the second layer yielded just 18 sherds which were about evenly split between Inca and LIP ceramics. The top stratum was 36cm deep and was associated with the relatively even floor of the building.<sup>113</sup> After 26cm of material in the lower layer, the team reached either bedrock or sterile.<sup>114</sup>

Unit 2, located in the SW corner of the structure, was excavated in three layers. In Layer 1, 109 sherds were recovered dominated by Inca orange-slipped and Lucre undecorated wares,

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 97.

Style	Handle	Base	Rim	Body	Total	Percentage
Chanapata	1		3	17	21	9.17%
Qotakalli		1	1	6	8	3.49%
Huari				1	1	0.44%
Lucre				3	3	1.31%
Inca	7	5	10	174	196	85.59%
Collao						0%
Colonial						0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 8.1. - Surface ceramics collected during the survey of Kañaraqay by Arriola and Bustiza in 1996

each accounting for 28% of the sample. This layer had a depth of 36cm and was full of large stones that might have been part of the structure and mixed soil.<sup>115</sup> The presence of several colonial sherds further suggests that this was a disturbed layer perhaps by looting activity in the Colonial period. The second layer represented the floor of the building at 140cm depth and included 83 ceramic fragments with about 60% Inca, as well as some Lucre and Qotakalli sherds. The third, final, layer below the floor exhibited, as expected, a heightened distribution of earlier ceramics, with the Inca material dropping to 35% and the Lucre and Qotakalli deposits rising steadily from 15 to 22% of the 165 sherds in the layer.<sup>116</sup> At a depth of 199cm, under the foundation fill, two ceramic sherds were laid next to rodent and aquatic bird bones. There was no cultural material under this foundational context.<sup>117</sup>

Units 3 and 5 were both excavated in the interior of structure F-7 and both measured 2x2m. Unit 3 was located in the SE corner of the building and proved to be the most productive unit of the excavations with a total of 931 ceramic fragments. The top stratum of material was excavated at a depth of 40cm and although all local styles are represented in the layer, most notable is the presence of 40 undecorated Huari body sherds that account for the 26% of the 154 fragments.<sup>118</sup> The floor of the building and its associated Layer 2 were encountered at a depth of 60cm. 237 sherds were recovered with Inca undecorated wares dominating the deposit with 42%, although all local styles are again represented.<sup>119</sup> What is significant is that both foreign styles,

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 106.

the Colonial and the Collao of the northern Lake Titicaca Basin, are represented for the first time with 10 sherds each.

Another floor was uncovered just another 10cm under the one from Layer 2 that was full of cultural material, stones, and ash. This, Layer 3, was characterized by the abundance of material numbering 386 sherds in just 10cm of depth.<sup>120</sup> The Inca material dropped to about half the sample, while the Lucre style (now mostly decorated) accounted for a quarter of the deposit here. 73 Collao sherds or 19% of the sample are the third most common style. Given the abundance of decorated ceramics, this floor layer was likely associated with the occupation of Kañaraqay during the reign of Huascar at the height of the royal estate. The heightened representation of Collao and Lucre ceramics signifies that this was a locus of negotiation between the Inca, the local Muina people, and the Colla of the Lake Titicaca Basin. The presence of stones in this burnt layer is related to the destruction of the site by Quizquiz and Chalcochima.

Layer 4 of Unit 3 registered another floor at a depth of 130cm and a hearth measuring 40x60cm.<sup>121</sup> This was probably the original floor of the building that was later filled for the construction of the floor in Layer 3, as the soil below was sterile. The cultural material is comparable to that of the upper stratum with decorated wares of Inca, Lucre, and Collao styles dominating the deposit of 154 sherds. In Layer 4, however, the Lucre material is almost as abundant as the Inca accounting for 38 and 42% respectively,<sup>122</sup> pointing to the Collao-Muina-Inca relationships being codified through communal feasting activities at Kañaraqay as a foundational event for the site and the estate.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 109.

Unit 5 was placed in the middle of structure F-7 that was characterized by the presence of field stone material likely from the destruction of the building. The top layer of the excavation, at a depth of 60cm, was dominated by more lithic material of various sizes that was the result of the collapse of the walls. At 103cm, a floor was encountered and the associated layer contained 208 sherds. Unlike Unit 3, the top stratum only yielded a single Huari fragment, while the Inca material dominated the deposit with 82%, about half of which undecorated.<sup>123</sup> In the following layer, another possible floor was found, which corresponds to Layer 3 of Unit 3. Again, a large pocket of ash with abundant cultural material characterized Layer 2 of Unit 5. In 21cm of depth, 247 pottery fragments were recovered with a similar distribution to the corresponding layer of Unit 3.<sup>124</sup> About half of the ceramics were Inca, one third of which decorated, with Collao and Lucre the other significantly represented styles in the assemblage. The stratum under the floor differed drastically from the upper layers and bedrock was quickly reached. 87 ceramic fragments were uncovered, about three quarters of Inca style and mostly undecorated.<sup>125</sup>

Unit 7 was placed in the middle of structure E-1 and measured 2x1m. The top stratum of the unit was characterized by ash and botanical remains, as well as a possible floor. Its deposit of 41 sherds is dominated by Inca material with 66%, about half of which decorated, while the Lucre style accounted for about a quarter of the recovered fragments.<sup>126</sup> Layer 2 was full of large

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 113.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 120.

rock and only yielded 15 sherds, while the bottom stratum was likely foundational fill and since it contained no cultural material, the excavations were finished in Unit 7.<sup>127</sup>

Units 4 and 6 were the two exterior units placed in the north and south sectors of the site respectively. Unit 6 measured 1x1m and was located 470cm south of the south wall of structure F-2. Two layers were excavated with the top one at 15cm depth and the bottom one at 35cm depth and both layers were dominated by Lucre style ceramics. The upper stratum yielded 120 fragments of which 72 were undecorated Lucre with just 25 total Inca sherds.<sup>128</sup> Interestingly, none of the 27 fragments in the lower stratum were of any Inca style, as they were all from earlier periods.<sup>129</sup>

Unit 4 was the only unit excavated in the north sector of the site, which remains intact until the present moment. It was located next to building C-4 and measured 2x2m. At a depth of 40cm, a context measuring 80x60cm of ash, andesite flakes, ceramic fragments, and calcified bones was encountered. In this context, a part of an Inca plate with camelid bones in it were recovered, along with 51 other fragments.<sup>130</sup> The assemblage contains 73% Inca sherds and a handful of Qotakalli and Lucre fragments as well. The team continued excavating for another 30cm of sterile before ending the excavation of Unit 4.

In total, the excavations at Kañaraqay recovered 2151 ceramic sherds having the same morphological parameters as the ones recovered from the survey (Tables 8.2 and 8.3). As expected, the Inca material dominated the assemblage with 1186 total sherds or 55%, while the

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 121.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 117.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 124.

Unit	Layer	Colonial	%	Inca	%	Collao	%	Lucre	%	Huari	%	Qotakalli	%	Chanapata	%	Marcavalle	%	Misc	%	Total	%
1	I			40	83.3			4	8.3					4	8.3					48	2.2
	II			10	55.5							5	27.8	3	16.7					18	0.8
2	I	5	4.5	52	46.1			30	27.8	3	2.8	9	8.3	9	8.3	1	0.9			109	5.0
	II	1	1.2	50	60.2			14	16.9			13	15.7	5	6.2					83	3.9
	III	2	1.2	58	35.5	2	1.2	37	22.4	20	12.1	35	21.2	9	5.5			2	1.2	165	7.7
3	I			88	57.1			5	3.2	40	25.9	20	13.0	1	0.6					154	7.2
	II	10	4.1	173	73.0	10	4.2	6	2.5	2	0.8	29	12.2	6	2.5			1	0.4	237	11.0
	III	8	2.0	182	47.0	73	18.9	99	25.6	2	0.5	12	3.1	7	1.8			3	0.8	386	17.9
	IV	3	1.9	64	41.6	21	13.6	58	37.7	4	2.6	4	2.6							154	7.2
4	I			35	72.9			8	16.7			5	10.4					4	1.9	52	2.4
5	I			174	82.1	6	2.8	3	1.4	1	0.4	9	4.2	15	7.0					208	9.6
	II			138	55.9	24	9.8	33	13.4	8	3.2	22	8.9	22	6.9					247	11.5
	III			63	72.4			13	15.0	2	2.3	6	6.9	3	3.4					87	4.1
6	I			25	20.8			75	62.5	4	3.3	15	12.5	1	0.8					120	5.6
	II							14	51.9	4	14.8	2	7.4	7	26.0					27	1.3
7	I			27	65.9			10	24.4			3	7.3	1	2.4					41	1.9
	II			4	26.7			7	46.7	2	13.3			2	13.3					15	0.7
<b>Total</b>		<b>29</b>		<b>1183</b>		<b>136</b>		<b>416</b>		<b>92</b>		<b>189</b>		<b>95</b>		<b>1</b>				<b>2151</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 8.2. - Ceramic fragments excavated at Kañaraqay by Arriola and Bustiza in 1996, by unit of excavation



Style	Base	Handle	Neck	Rim	Body	Total	Percentage
Chanapata	2	2	1	13	81	99	4.60%
Qotakalli		5	3	32	143	183	8.51%
Huari		2	4	7	81	94	4.37%
Lucre	3	10		3	397	413	19.20%
Inca	9	37	14	61	1065	1186	55.14%
Collao	1	1	3	5	126	136	6.32%
Colonial		1		4	23	28	1.30%
Marcavalle					1	1	0.05%
Miscellaneous					11	11	0.51%
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>1928</b>	<b>2151</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 8.3. - Ceramics excavated at Kañaraqay by Arriola and Bustiza in 1996, by sherd location on the vessel

styles that characterize the periods before the construction of Huascar's estate at the sites were also represented with 4%, 9%, and 5% respectively for Huari, Qotakalli, and Chanapata styles. Also unsurprisingly the second most common wares were those of the local Muina people who had made their Lucre-style ceramics throughout the LIP and into the Inca occupation of the Lucre Basin. These accounted for 19% of the total assemblage or 413 sherds. While their presence is entirely expected at a site adjacent to the Muina principal town, their distribution paints a much more interesting picture.

Undecorated Lucre ceramics are fairly ubiquitous and are uncovered in every context except in Unit 1 Layer 2 and Unit 3 Layer 1. Some of these, especially in contexts such as Units 2 and 7 where they are mixed with Inca fine pottery, may have been associated with the local servants that tended to Huascar and his family when they lived at Kañaraqay, as such populations would be expected to continue using their own vessels separate from the ones their masters used. In other cases, as at Unit 6 or bottom stratum of several units, these may represent LIP deposits of local Muina people. Finer, decorated Lucre wares, however, are only encountered in building F-7 in both Units 3 and 5 where Muina elites seemed to have participated in a negotiation with the Inca. It is unclear whether these were brought as gifts or were used in practice to enact the pact between Huascar and the local lords, yet their distribution suggests that the local group were involved in Huascar's living quarters in more ways than one.

As a royal estate, Kañaraqay would have been Huascar's place of residence for at least a portion of the year and if Betanzos and the other early modern authors are even somewhat right about his quarrels with the Inca nobility in Cuzco, it might have been much more indeed. It was customary for *curaca* of conquered provinces to make a pilgrimage and bring gifts to Cuzco when they sought audiences with the ruler and those gifts often ended up at the royal estates

where the *Sapa Incas* took those meetings. It was prestigious for those wares to be exhibited in the house of the ruler and even much more so if he used them. At both Machu Picchu and Chinchero, these were often hybrid objects that carried local form and Inca decoration.<sup>131</sup> These embodied the reciprocal relationship between the ruler and the local realm by exhibiting the *Sapa Inca*'s body dressed in local garb.<sup>132</sup> Although we have no evidence of such vessels being used by the ruler himself at any of the royal estates, we can imagine that such occurrence would have been a powerful symbol of the empire itself – the *Sapa Inca* consuming from his own body, as it wore the signs of a provincial identity.

Unlike Machu Picchu and Chinchero, the ceramic assemblage at Kañaraqay does not exhibit a multitude of styles and wares from throughout the empire. This is somewhat expected, given that Huascar's estate was built during the Civil War. The succession crisis probably raised doubt over the importance of the Cuzco pilgrimage and the continuation of the rituals related to the reestablishment of ties between core and periphery. Local *curacacona* might have chosen not to make the trek to the capital simply out of convenience or because they were afraid of the repercussions should Huascar lose the war. And once we know Atahualpa's treatment of everyone who aided his brother in the conflict, this makes all the more sense. One group, and conspicuously only one group, seemingly participated in the ritual, bringing their own ceramics to Kañaraqay.

The only exotic pottery at Huascar's estate are the Collao style ceramics from the northern Lake Titicaca Basin and the Island of the Sun. Although with 136 sherds, these account

<sup>131</sup> Richard Burger and Lucy Salazar, *Machu Picchu: Unveiling the Mystery of the Incas*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004) and Miguel Rivera Dorado, *Arqueología de Chinchero II: Cerámica y Otros Materiales*, (Madrid, Spain: Ministerios de Asuntos Exteriores, 1976).

<sup>132</sup> Costin 2016, 349.

for just 6% of the assemblage, their spatial distribution matched the Lucre decorated ware related to the negotiations with the Inca mentioned earlier. The Collao wares were only uncovered in Units 3 and 5, both in structure F-7, where they accounted for 10% or more in each of the contexts. Further, these are the only Inca contexts where the imperial pottery accounted for under half of the deposit. Finally, these were also the loci of greatest evidence for destruction featuring thick layers of ashes and soot, as well as field stones that match the size and shape of those in the structures.

The combination of the distribution of Collao, Inca, and decorated Lucre wares in structure F-7 and the signs of destruction point to this being the place where the Colla, Muina, and Huascar enacted their alliance during the Civil War, which made it an ideal victim of Atahualpa's wrath. Given the evidence from the written sources that Huascar switched his identity from Hanan to Hurin Cuzco and that the Colla were his main allies in the Civil War, the presence of Collao ceramics confirms that they answered the *Sapa Inca's* call and participated in an event that solidified their alliance. Such an event fits perfectly Huascar's narrative of "return to origins" that lends him legitimacy in the war. As he aligned with the people who represented the origin place of the Inca through the symbolic switch to the Hurin moiety, he ratified this alliance through a meeting at his own place of birth. Whether nobody else was invited or nobody else cared to show matters little, as the activities at Kañaraqay elevated the Colla and Muina as Huascar's main supporters. Since they were also the ones to be punished most severely by Atahualpa and the context in which their material culture shows up at the site exhibits most signs of violence, it appears that this alliance was strong and enduring in the course of the Civil War.

Besides gifts, exotic material made its way to Inca royal estates through the retainer labor they used. The Inca deployed these *yanacona*, who were exempt from taxation and were

deployed to take care of the estate, while they were given some land to tend to their needs.<sup>133</sup> They were often brought from newly conquered provinces that presented problems for the empire and giving them important status by associating them with a royal estate was a way to quell revolts.<sup>134</sup> Recent studies show that these populations were involved in a range of activities at the estate and played an important role in the economy of the Inca heartland despite being foreigners.<sup>135</sup> At Machu Picchu, isotopic analyses of the remains in some of the burials with foreign wares indicated that the buried were likely *yanacona*.<sup>136</sup> However, there is no indication that the Colla would have acted as retainers. Their material culture is only associated with fine Lucre and Inca wares rather than in isolated contexts. Indeed, we might think of the Muina as retainers of sorts, as they likely took care of the estate when Huascar was in Cuzco, since Kañaraqay is adjacent to Minaspata and since contexts such as Units 2 and 7 exhibit undecorated Lucre pottery predominated them during the LH.

If the Colla were *yanacona*, they would have interacted with the Muina in the region, but no Colla material culture was recovered at Minaspata by Thomas Hardy and Jose Victor Avendaño.<sup>137</sup> In their excavations at the Muina center, imperial Inca style potter dominated the

<sup>133</sup> Protzen 1993, 64.

<sup>134</sup> John Rowe, "Inca Policies and Institutions Relating to the Cultural Unification of the Empire," in *The Inca and Aztec States, 1400-1800*, eds. George Collier, Renato Rosaldo, and John Wirth, (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1982): 99.

<sup>135</sup> Kylie Quave, *Labor and Domestic Economy on the Royal Estate in the Inka Imperial Heartland (Maras, Cuzco, Peru)*. PhD Dissertation. (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University, 2012).

<sup>136</sup> Bethany Turner, John Kingston, and George Armelagos, "Variation in Dietary History among the Immigrants of Machu Picchu: Carbon and Nitrogen Isotope Evidence," *Chungará, Revista de Antropología Chilena*, Vol. 42, No. 2, (2010): 515-534.

<sup>137</sup> Hardy 2019.

LH layers with Lucre and Killke ceramics continuing albeit in smaller quantities.<sup>138</sup> Some exotic wares were also recovered but they were extremely rare. Even when these included an Inca-Pacajes rim from the Lake Titicaca Basin, there were no Collao style ceramics at Minaspata.<sup>139</sup> Given their exclusive distribution at the living quarters of Huascar at Kañaraqay, it is unlikely that Colla representative occupied the Lucre Basin for any particularly lengthy spells of time. Instead, the Collao ceramic distribution at the site strongly points to an event where the political alliance between Huascar, the Muina, and the Colla was ratified.

## Conclusions

The Inca Civil War was a transformative event, one that all but paved the way for European invasion of Tahuantinsuyu. Thousands died in battle and even more were taken by the diseases that triggered the war itself. The state roads were left unguarded and many provincial *curacacona* saw the opportunity to aid the invaders in order to weaken the already crumbling Inca control. Then the final *Sapa Inca*, Huascar, was murdered and his entire lineage annihilated, while another former ruler turned ancestor, Topa Inca, met a fiery end to his new life as a *malqui*. Before Atahualpa could go through the ritual ascension to the throne and deal with the growing diplomatic crisis, even before he could visit Cuzco, Pizarro and his men had made their way to Cajamarca. As Bulgakov puts it in *Master and Margarita*, “Annushka has already spilled the oil,” which is to say that the end had already begun for the largest indigenous American empire with the dynastic war.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 445.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 448.

Thus, understanding what happened in the Civil War is critical to understanding the trans-Atlantic encounter of 1532 and beyond. From the narratives of the conflict in the written sources, discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4, it appears that the legitimate heir, Huascar, took the power, but then proceeded to alienate the Inca nobility, which possibly emboldened Atahualpa to challenge him. With his most obvious path for further expansion of Tahuantinsuyu that was expected of the new ruler blocked by his half-brother, his demands for governorship of the north, and his control of the professionalized Inca army, Huascar turned south for allies. That direction offered him a new path to legitimacy through his association with long-term seats of power in the Andes.

Constructing a royal estate at Kañaraqay on the shores of Lake Muina was a powerful expression of Huascar's tactic to present himself as a reincarnation of Manco Capac, who would usher the Inca world into another *pachacuti*. He switched his identity from the Hanan to the Hurin moiety, associated with the founder of the Inca, and chose a location for his new home in the Hurin end of the Inca heartland. The location of his estate embodied the narrative of "return to origins", as it was his place of birth, the location of the solidification of Tahuantinsuyu as an empire through its incorporation of the Lucre Basin, as well as a gesture towards both earlier Andean powers in Huari and Tiahuanaco and the place of creation, Lake Titicaca. The planning of Huascar's private quarters took inspiration from that of Pikillacta and the Inca installations of the important centers in Collasuyu, Hatuncolla and Chucuito, as well as Pachacuti's estates in the Urubamba Valley. In doing so the architecture of his private estate helped link Huascar to the memories and histories of the past glory associated with these leaders and places. Amidst these bold statements, the architecture of Kañaraqay reminded its visitors that this was Huascar's home

through deploying typical Inca techniques and reserving the best quality of construction for his private quarters.

Kañaraqay completes the trajectory of Inca royal estate development, retaining the interest in expressing its patron's political and private concerns, but introducing important changes as well. Built in the chaos of the Civil War when highly specialized labor might have been unavailable, the complex lacks carved rock outcrops or fine cut-stone masonry associated with the site type. Kañaraqay also lacks obvious public spaces, likely sharing them with the adjacent Muina town of Minaspata. The proximity to this large settlement alone merits calling Huascar's estate urban, which is a clear departure from the rural estates of his predecessors. Preoccupied with enacting a political and military alliance with the Muina and the Colla people, Huascar commissioned an estate that focused on expressing his relationship with the Lucre and Titicaca areas, especially as they signified long-term seats of power. This is a change from his father's complex at Quispahuanca that focused on Huayna Capac's personal accomplishments, from his grandfather's complex at Chinchero that created a theatrical experience for the Inca nobility, and from his great-grandfather's estates at Machu Picchu, Ollantaytambo, and Pisac that focused on the interconnectedness between the Inca imperial project and the potent natural environment. Indeed, Kañaraqay retained some of the typical features of royal estates such as the use of rock outcrops in its buildings, framing important views with building openings as well as with straight streets that directed the experience of the site.

Initially, it appears that the place Huascar conceived on Lake Muina was successful, as its ceramic assemblage adds the lived perspective of the activities that transpired there. Both the Muina and the Colla heeded the ruler's call and participated in their ritual and practical enactment of the alliance between them that Huascar sought. Unlike at other royal estates, no



provincial dignitaries other than the Colla visited and participated in events at Kañaraqay. This might have been the *Sapa Inca*'s desire or it might also be interpreted as his inability to attract other allies once Atahualpa started advancing south. With the uncertainty of the Civil War's outcome, the grand narrative of Huascar's "return to origins" that would create a new *pachacuti* ended in failure. His most important allies, the Muina and the Colla, were both situated south of Cuzco and beyond the path of Quizquiz and Chalcochima's army. This protected their lands and towns and although they clearly sent troops to Huascar's cause, and sometimes with great success, they had the luxury of not being fully invested in the dynastic war of their conquerors. It is possible that similar to the Cañari, the Colla also played both sides. They came to Huascar's aid and defeated Atahualpa's army in the very first battle in Ecuador and then at the final stand in the Cotabambas, before withdrawing their support once it became clear that his defeat was inevitable.

Thus, Kañaraqay represents a curious gamble that both worked and failed at the same time. It succeeded in attracting the Colla to Huascar's cause in the Inca Civil War, but it chose perhaps the wrong allies to gamble on in the first place. With its patron and his lineage extinguished, Kañaraqay was destroyed and abandoned, but even today its remain stand some 2-3m tall and continue to defy Lake Muina's seasonal flooding. Although not as spectacular as other such complexes, Huascar's estate was a large construction project that required great investment, planning, and specialized labor. As support for the *Sapa Inca* waned, this project became the definitive statement of his reign. Thus, the ultimate failure of Huascar as a ruler is also partially a failure of Kañaraqay as well. Although it solidified its patron's alliance with the Colla, it was unable to embody his powerful narrative of legitimacy in order to rally the empire behind him.

The failure of Kañaraqay offers a glimpse into the relationship between monumental construction and power. Big projects often reflect the power of their patrons, especially in the cases when they seek to engage a select few who already occupy the high rugs of the political and social hierarchy. However, where such hierarchy does not exist yet or where their patrons seek to break with its traditional structure, large construction projects are better understood as gambles for power than its marker. These are often foundational structures which profess the legitimacy of their patron when successful, masking the possibility of failure. When they fail, they are often unfinished or destroyed soon after, as was the case with Kañaraqay. As Huascar's support in Cuzco was diminishing and he was consummately losing the Inca Civil War on the battleground, his estate in the Lucre Basin was precisely a gamble that aimed at the creation of a foundational center of his new dynasty based on the narrative that he represented long-term legitimacy. Their ultimate failure offer us an alternative lens through which to look at other projects that might have been less successful than they first appear, as well as a way to see architecture as an important agent in the construction of narratives of power and not merely a mirror for the authority of their patrons.

Finally, Kañaraqay's remains paint a picture consistent with the view of the Inca Civil War that we get from the early modern written sources. As Huascar was consummately losing the war with Atahualpa, he relied heavily on his alliance with the Colla and Muina people in order to both project legitimacy and recruit troops. Also consistent with the body of literature of Inca ceramics we saw in Chapter 6, this points to the critical nature of alliance building for the Inca Empire. The idea that Tahuantinsuyu was a union and that the Inca were chosen people to rule over it in order to restore order to the world was more than propaganda. It was the very mechanism through which the empire functioned. In both crises and peacetimes, the Inca state

was characterized by the continuous negotiation and renegotiation of the terms of membership of the conquered provinces. As unfair and asymmetrical as those may have been, their diversity through time and space speak to the adaptability of both the empire and local leaders, as well as the fluidity of their relationship.

Beyond the Inca case, this speaks to the nature of empire as stages for negotiation in which hegemony is not the only possible outcome. In the past couple of centuries empires have often been understood as counterpoints of nation states and have often been equated with some of the most problematic practices in human history such as imperialism and colonialism. However, the inevitability and the virtue of nation states is challenged when one considers that in much of the ancient world empires also stood for stability, lower violence rates, and relative prosperity. This is further supported by the temporal endurance of empires through most of human history. As British-American political scientist Anthony Pagden estimates, “most people throughout history have lived under imperial rule.”<sup>140</sup> Whereas much of the discourse on empires focuses on hegemony and resistance, the Inca case suggests that we might consider empires products of negotiation rather than of inevitable domination.

Notwithstanding the power of the nation as an idea, we might even posit that both nation states and empires are built on negotiations. Identity and inclusivity/exclusivity seem to play an important role in these negotiations. Within nation states, a national identity is formed on the base of both inclusivity (between the ruling class and the populace) and exclusivity (from other nations). As Anglo-Irish political scientist Benedict Anderson points out, these identities may be

<sup>140</sup> Anthony Pagden, “Imperialism, Liberalism, and the Quest for Perpetual Peace,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 134, No. 2, (2005): 47.

imagined and created by the state, but they are also continuously negotiated.<sup>141</sup> The same applies to empires, where identities are built on exclusivity (between the ruling class and the populace) and inclusivity (within the diverse groups within the empire). Thus, the Inca case offers a path to understanding empires not merely as hegemons and imperial subjects not merely as resisting, but as intertwined in continuous negotiations. This should not preclude us from recognizing the devastating historical realities of colonialism and imperialism for many colonial subjects, but rather should allow us to rethink the nation state as the answer to those realities as well as the nature of imperial politics as continuous negotiations and re-negotiations, in which both sides possess, albeit markedly unequal, agency.

<sup>141</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London, UK: Verso, 1983).

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