IN SEARCH OF ABSOLUTE INWARDNESS AND SPIRITUAL SUBJECTIVITY? THE HISTORICAL ANDIDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF SCHUMANN’S ‘NEUE BAHNEN’*

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Abstract — Résumé

Most discussion of Robert Schumann’s 1853 article ‘Neue Bahnen’ focuses on the impact the article had on Johannes Brahms’s later compositional career. Others explore the influence Schumann exerted on Brahms during the time that the two spent together before Schumann’s untimely death and, more specifically, through his ‘Neue Bahnen’ article. Yet, less attention has been given to Schumann’s reasons for writing the essay in the first place. Following Schumann’s retirement as editor of the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik in 1845, Franz Brendel took over the post. The direction of the journal was altered considerably under Brendel’s editorship. Hegel’s influence is indelibly marked on his aesthetic, historical, and critical outlook, whether this is through Brendel appropriating aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, or diverging from it and challenging it.

This article explores the historical and ideological context of ‘Neue Bahnen’. I argue that Brendel’s thinking stemmed from a philosophical mindset as opposed to that of Schumann whose thinking very much stands out as that of a practising musician. I suggest that Schumann’s essay, when viewed from this perspective, can be understood as part of a larger divide that would emerge in Brendel’s Neue Zeitschrift für Musik between those espousing a philosophical approach to music history and music criticism (Franz Brendel and Richard Pohl), and those advocating an approach that emphasises the pre-eminence of the artwork over philosophy and criticism (Theodor Uhlig, Wagner, and Schumann). And more significantly, I argue that ‘Neue Bahnen’ did not emerge in a critical vacuum. Rather, it was a response to a clearly defined and well understood strain in the critical discourse of mid-century.

Key words: Johannes Brahms, Robert Schumann, Karl Franz Brendel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Idealism, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, Theodor Uhlig, Richard Wagner, ‘Neue Bahnen’, Richard Pohl, Aesthetics, Criticism, Philosophy, Hermann Christian Weisse, Tonkünstler-Versammlung, Tonkünstler-Verein, Subjectivity, Objectivity

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Introduction

On 28 October 1853 Robert Schumann published an article on the front page of the *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* titled 'Neue Bahnen'.¹ In it he used extremely evocative language to hail the young composer Johannes Brahms as the long-awaited Messiah of German music, the one the musical world had awaited since Beethoven’s death. The essay followed almost a decade of silence on Schumann’s part in the pages of the journal he himself had founded in 1835. ‘Neue Bahnen’ provoked doubt among Brahms’s earliest critics that he would fulfil the prophecy outlined by Schumann.² And the article has continued to receive a wealth of attention in the Brahms scholarly literature. Most discussions of the topic focus on the consequences of the article for Brahms’s career, both immediately and more long term.³ Other scholars explore the possibility of Schumann exerting an influence on Brahms in the time that the two spent together before Schumann’s untimely death, and more specifically through his ‘Neue Bahnen’ article.⁴ Yet, less attention has been given to Schumann’s reasons for writing the essay in the first place.⁵ Following Schumann’s retirement as editor of the journal in


⁵ The one exception here is Jürgen Thym’s 1984 essay which explores the treatment of Schumann in the journal whilst it was under Brendel’s editorship. See Jürgen THYM, ‘Schumann in Brendel’s *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik*, in *Mendelssohn und Schumann: Essays on Their Music and Its Context*, Jon Finson and Larry Todd, eds (Durham N. C.: Duke University Press, 1984), 21—36. Thym’s focus differs from my own in that his subject for consideration is the evaluation of Schumann the composer under Brendel’s editorship. Whilst I touch on this tangentially, the focus of this article is the historical and ideological context of ‘Neue Bahnen’. As such I give more detailed discussion to Brendel’s appropriation of Hegel, to how Schumann undermined Brendel’s philosophical stance, and I draw attention to the divide that emerged in the early 1850s in the *Neue Zeitschrift* between—to put it bluntly—philosophers and musicians.
1845 it was Franz Brendel who took over the post.\footnote{Karl Franz Brendel (1811—1868) was born in Stolberg (Holz) and died in Leipzig. He studied philosophy with Hermann Christian Weisse, among others (more on this below) and was a piano student of Friedrich Wieck. His studies were initially in Berlin before he transferred to the Bergakademie in Freiberg where he graduated with a dissertation in medical philosophy in 1840. In 1841 he began studying music history in Freiburg, Dresden and Leipzig. At the end of 1844 he began writing for the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, and in 1845 became its lead editor, a position he held until his death in 1868. For further information on Brendel see Robert DETERMANN, *Begriff und ästhetik der »Neudeutschen Schule«* (Baden-Baden: Verlag Valentin Koerner, 1989), 57—70.} As will be explored in detail below, the direction of the journal was altered considerably under Brendel’s editorship. Hegel’s influence is indelibly marked on his aesthetic, historical, and critical outlook, whether this is through Brendel appropriating aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, or diverging from it and challenging it.

This article explores the historical and ideological context of ‘Neue Bahnen’. I argue that Brendel’s thinking stemmed from a philosophical mindset as opposed to that of Schumann whose thinking very much stands out as that of a practising musician. I suggest that Schumann’s essay, when viewed from this perspective, can be understood as part of a larger divide that would emerge in Brendel’s journal between those espousing a philosophical approach to music history and music criticism (Franz Brendel and Richard Pohl), and those advocating an approach that emphasises the pre-eminence of the artwork over philosophy and criticism (Theodor Uhlig, Wagner, and Schumann).\footnote{Although Brendel largely contributed to the positive reception of Wagner’s operas in Germany, we should be wary of mistaking Brendel’s admiration for Wagner’s art with Wagner’s opinion of Brendel as a music critic.} And more significantly, I argue that ‘Neue Bahnen’ did not emerge in a critical vacuum. Rather, it was a response to a clearly defined and well understood strain in the critical discourse of mid-century. A brief introduction to the differing positions of Schumann and Brendel will be useful at this stage before moving on to a more detailed exploration in the discussion that follows.

Schumann’s aim in founding the *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* was to provide a platform for a new generation of musicians who deserved critical acclaim. It was explicitly conceived of as an alternative to the perceived critical indifference of some earlier music journals. Furthermore, for Schumann, the essence of the beautiful in music was the originality of artistic statements, in combination with the avoidance of lifeless mechanics and empty virtuosity. Toward this end, the journal sought to discredit the cult of virtuosity that was gaining prominence in musical circles.\footnote{For an interesting discussion of the phenomenon of virtuosity in German-speaking lands see James DEAVILLE, ‘The Politics of Liszt’s Virtuosity: New Light on the Dialectics of a Cultural Phenomenon’, in *Analecta Lisztiana III: Liszt and the Birth of Modern Europe: Music as a Mirror of Religious, Political, Cultural, and Aesthetic Transformations*, ed. Michael Saffle (Hillsdale, New York: Pendragon Press, 2003), 115—142.}

Throughout the tenure of Brendel as editor the journal changed substantially. With the exception of superficial continuities in the editorial policies of the two,
their approaches to the editorship of the journal are in stark contrast. Brendel continued Schumann’s policy of supporting emerging artists, but he did so exclusively for members and followers of the Neudeutsche Schule of Liszt, Wagner, and Berlioz. Indeed, more and more of the journal’s contributors were in keeping with the aesthetic tendencies of this ‘progressive’ party. Articles on composers outside of this school of composition were printed noticeably less often. At the same time, the journal became more philosophical and scholarly, regularly publishing long, theoretical articles and historical overviews.

Thus, following almost a decade of silence from Schumann in the Neue Zeitschrift, as Jürgen Thym contends, ‘Schumann’s paean to Brahms on the front pages of the journal must have appeared like an exotic bird; a voice like this had not been heard for a long time.’ Brendel himself did not respond to Schumann’s essay; instead, he invited Richard Pohl to deliver the lead article for the New Year’s Day Issue of 1854. The following year he published a series of articles by Pohl (under the pseudonym ‘Hoplit’) called simply ‘Johannes Brahms’. Pohl’s aesthetic stance, as espoused in this assessment of Brahms’s output from opp. 1—9, can be understood to appropriate Brendel’s critical and aesthetic ideology, and can thus be taken as a further official Neue Zeitschrift response to ‘Neue Bahnen’, as well as an official appraisal of the young composer Johannes Brahms. For this reason a discussion of Pohl’s Brahms articles will form the final section of this investigation into the historical and ideological context of Schumann’s ‘Neue Bahnen’.

10 Richard POHL, ‘Zur Eröffnung des zwanzigsten Jahrganges der Neuen Zeitschrift für Musik’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 40 (1854), 1—3. Discussing the founders of the journal, Pohl observed that some had died or abandoned journalism, whereas others were essentially ‘dead for the journal’ because they would no longer support the vital course of progress in German music. See the commentary by John Michael COOPER to his translation of Pohl’s ‘Reminiscences of Robert Schumann (1878)’ in Schumann and His World, 233—267 (234).
Schumann’s Editorial Policy

One of the main tenets of Schumann’s critical agenda, as evidenced in his inaugural statement to the journal in 1835, was that new composers should have a comprehensive training in the form of a thorough knowledge of the works of past masters. According to Schumann, such works should form the foundations upon which new music was built. Schumann was undoubtedly influenced in this regard by Anton Thibaut.12

Schumann cites extracts from Thibaut’s book as an epigraph for a number of issues of the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik,13 and the two share the view that the ‘mechanical technique’ of the recent past is fundamentally ‘unartistic’. In the Spring of 1830, shortly after his acquaintance with Thibaut, Schumann pronounced in his diary that ‘the future should be the higher echo of the past’.14 Moreover, Schumann’s belief that through the study of a ‘classic’ work one could ‘gain strength from the bearing and dignity of it as a whole’ resonates with Thibaut’s writings.15 Schumann’s inaugural statement in the journal read:

Our intentions have been firm from the beginning, and they are quite simple: to be mindful of former times and their contributions, and to point them out as the only pure source at which present artistic endeavour can find renewed strength. Further, we propose to attack the inartistic tendencies of the immediate past, which has nothing to offer by way of compensation except for great strides in mechanical technique. Finally, we wish to prepare the way for a youthful, poetic future, and to speed its realisation.16

This tripartite music-historical credo is rooted in an intense involvement with the music of the past, bolstered by the expectation of a ‘poetic future’, and shaped

12 In his 1825 publication Reinheit der Tonkunst, (On Purity in Art, trans. William Henry Gladstone [London: J. Murray, 1877]) Anton THIBAUT espouses the notion that ‘the groundwork of all true knowledge necessarily lies in the historical study and acquisition of standard works that have come down to us’. He deplores the fact that it is only in music, of all the arts, ‘that an arrogance that disdains all history is the order of the day’, (see A. THIBAUT, On Purity in Art, 1—3) and is firm in his conviction that the past forms ‘the groundwork to all true knowledge’, advocating the procedure of ‘going back to our great ancestors and borrowing from them’. (See A. THIBAUT, On Purity in Art, 59.) For further discussion of Thibaut in relation to Schumann see Mark BURFORD, ‘The Real Idealism of History’: Historical Consciousness, Commemoration, and Johannes Brahms’s «Years of Study»’, PhD Diss., Columbia University (2005), 198—210.


by a critical awareness of the present. Contrary to a mere antiquarian approach to music, Schumann espoused the notion that the study of the work of past masters was not to ‘muster erudite astonishment at every minute detail’, but ‘to trace the expanded artistic means of today back to their sources, and to discover how they can be intelligently employed.’

Hand in hand with such a historical consciousness, in Schumann’s view, must go knowledge of the music of one’s contemporaries. He who neglects to keep abreast of developments in contemporary music ‘must remain in uncertainty with regard to his own relation to the present’.

Brendel’s Editorial Policy

Brendel’s View of Music History

Brendel’s approach to music history is informed by Hegelian philosophy, specifically the dialectical principle of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Brendel was part of a group known as the Left or Young Hegelians (the analogy between ‘left’ and ‘right’ Hegelians being drawn on the seating arrangement of the assembly in the French Revolution). This group, which included such figures as Ludwig Feuerbach, David Friedrich Strauss, Arnold Ruge, Moses Hess, and Bruno Bauer challenged the orthodoxy of Hegel’s Christianity and drew decidedly non-religious consequences from Hegel’s philosophy. Brendel studied with a number of Hegel’s pupils including Hermann Christian Weisse, a philosopher who owed much to Hegel’s dialectical system, but also significantly diverged from it.

17 Ibid., 85.
20 See T. PINKARD, German Philosophy 1760—1860, 310. For an interesting discussion of the Young Hegelians with particular reference to the middle ground between Eduard Hanslick’s idealism and materialism, see M. BURFORD, ‘Hanslick’s Idealist Materialism’, 19th-Century Music 30/2 (Nov. 2006):166—81.
22 Brendel studied with Weisse in Leipzig. Among those with whom he studied in Berlin were Georg Andreas Gabler, H. G. Hatho, and Henrik Steffens. See Peter RAMROTH, Robert Schumann und Richard Wagner in geschichtsphilosophischen Urteil von Franz Brendel (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1991), 47.
For Hegel, the history of art was divided into three periods—the Symbolic (Hegel took ancient Egyptian and Indian art as examples of this), the Classical (exemplified by classical Greek art), and the Romantic (exemplified by Christian, religious art which stresses inwardness). He argued that in the Romantic phase of art the spirit becomes sure of its truth by withdrawing from the external into its own intimacy with itself. In other words, as Terry Pinkard has lucidly expressed it, in Romantic art the focus comes to bear on aesthetic presentations of individuals and their inner lives, with this focus taking art out of the purely religious realm and into the more secular realm. It is on account of this very independence and freedom, however, that Hegel considers art to fail to satisfy the needs of the Weltgeist; it is this independence and freedom that steers romantic art away from the religious, Christian notion of art as attempting to express the inexpressible or to portray the deeper, invisible divinity of things. According to his historical categorisation, art already reached its most perfect form in the Classical period. Thus, late in his career Hegel would write that ‘art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past’. Pinkard disagrees with the widely accepted interpretation of this statement as asserting the end of art; rather Pinkard understands this to mean that ‘we cannot realize what art promises if we continue to seek that goal in the realm of beauty itself’. Rather, ‘art has brought us to the point of self-understanding where we realize that we must step outside of art in order to fulfil that need which art first awakens in us’. Thus, for Hegel, the Weltgeist moved onto philosophy and religion in the Romantic period, and it is in these realms that we may fulfil the needs awoken by music. Therefore, whilst he considered music to be the most romantic of all the arts and thereby to be the purest embodiment of a romantic subjective inwardness or spirituality—owing to its emancipation from dependence on any actual texts or the expression of any specific content—this spirituality was condemned as empty subjectivity because the spirit had moved onto religion and philosophy.

Weisse’s view of art is more optimistic. He designates the Ancient as the first stage of dialectical development; the second stage is the antithesis Romantic, and

23 T. PINKARD, German Philosophy 1760—1860, 297.
26 See for instance S. PEDERSON, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’. Pederson gives the title ‘The End of Revolution — the End of Art’ to her discussion of the subject, alluding to Hegel’s pronouncement on the end of art, and the implications of the death of a vital tradition in the aftermath of the failed 1848 revolutions.
27 T. PINKARD, German Philosophy 1760—1860, 298.
as the third positive synthesising stage the Modern. Weisse viewed the Modern period as not only the culmination of art but also of the Weltgeist in art. Whilst, for Hegel, music’s independence from specific subject matter was a flaw, for Weisse, this very feature made pure instrumental music the purest embodiment of the Modern Ideal. And in contradistinction to Hegel who considered the spirit to have progressed to religion and philosophy in his third dialectical stage, Weisse portrayed the modern period as the culmination of the spirit in art itself. In other words, pure instrumental music was a direct manifestation of the modern ideal in that it already contains beauty as in the nature of the divinity, but through music the independent, autonomous appearance of the divine spirit becomes possible. In referring to pure instrumental music as ‘ein Gottesdienst der reinen Schönheit’ (‘a worship of pure beauty’), Weisse thus restores to music the religious, Christian connotations that Hegel argued it lacked. Following his studies with Weisse, Brendel selected elements from Hegel’s philosophy, Weisse’s adaptation of Hegel, and aspects of the ideology of the young Hegelian movement to form his own history of art and his history of music.

From the time that Brendel took over the editorship of the Neue Zeitschrift, his philosophical and historical articles altered the direction of the journal from what Schumann had envisioned and enacted in his editorship. Brendel’s approach to music history can be understood as a dialectical synthesis of the objective and subjective elements of music. In accordance with Hegel, he considers the ‘subjective’ in music to be the spiritual, the most intimate, private thoughts of the artist that contribute to the Idee of the composer’s music. Quite literally, Brendel understands ‘spiritual’ in this context to mean ‘coming from within’. In other words, it is through the composer’s subjectivity that we witness their uniqueness and individuality. This subjectivity embodies the particular characteristics, spiritual depth, and individuality of the composer. The ‘objective’ in music, on the other hand for Brendel, is the formal structure on which the composer presents the subjective content. In this objective, more technical element of music, the spirit remains hidden to perception.

Brendel considers Beethoven’s contribution to the history of music to lie in his successful synthesis of the subjective and objective elements of music in a manner that he believed to be appropriate to the Zeitgeist; it was for this reason that Brendel considered Beethoven to be a profound composer. Prior to Beethoven, one or other of these elements usually predominated in a given composer’s output, as Brendel


29 Ch. H. WEISSE, System der Ästhetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit, 2 bde. (Leipzig: Hartmann, 1830), 306.

30 For Brendel’s most lucid description of these elements in music criticism, see his inaugural speech in the journal. Franz BRENDEL, ‘Zur Einleitung’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 22 (1845): 1—12.
outlines in his 1845 article ‘Robert Schumann mit Rücksicht auf Mendelssohn- Bartholdy’. He considers the more emotional music of C.P.E. Bach to be subjective, whilst the contrapuntal works of J.S. Bach and Handel are cited as examples of objectivity whereby the techniques of the composers are considered to have become ‘pedantic’ and ‘rigid’. According to Brendel, Beethoven, who was ‘prevailingy subjective’ and ‘entirely dependent upon his own spirituality, withdrew himself more and more into the area of the purely spiritual’ at a time in music history that called for a more subjective approach to composition.

The dilemma for composers following Beethoven was whether to become even more subjective, ostensibly the path that he considers Schumann to have taken, or whether to turn towards a more objective kind of music, the path he considers Mendelssohn to have chosen. ‘In Mendelssohn’s works’, he writes, ‘the musical thought is sometimes inspired by knowledge of its effect, as if from the outside, whereas with Schumann it comes from within.’

Brendel divides Schumann’s output into subjective and objective phases, perceiving the objectivity of Schumann’s later works as the composer emerging from his inwardness. He speaks of a ‘restless, passionate agitation’ giving way to a ‘restrained type of expression, of ‘traditional forms’ that ‘replace the self-gener- ated ones’. Whilst he admires some of these later pieces, he senses that Schumann ‘seems no longer true to himself when he has to step outside of himself’.

The consequence of a one-sided ‘objectivity’ for Brendel is that the composition betrays the fact that the ‘intellect participated significantly’; it impresses itself on the

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33 Ibid., 64.


35 This shift to an ‘objective’ approach, as Brendel described it, was Schumann’s self-declared change in compositional method in the mid-1840s. Schumann himself referred to a ‘new manner’ whereby he ‘composed music in his head rather than letting it out in a white heat.’ The ‘new manner’ is marked by the use of more traditional forms, including large-scale symphonic forms and—as far as compositional process goes—less dependence on improvising at the piano, and a more extensive use of sketches. For further discussion see L. TUNBRIDGE, Schumann’s Late Style, 103—107.

listener, ‘thereby revealing the shortcomings of this direction as well as the erroneous roads to which it can lead’. Brendel doubted either Mendelssohn or Schumann would have a lasting significance for the future of German music, although he held out hope—which stems from his Hegelian background—of Schumann’s former subjectivity and new objectivity giving way to a third, higher stage that would reconcile and unify everything.

Brendel’s View of music Criticism

Brendel’s agenda in assuming the editorship of the journal in 1845 was to establish a new music criticism that could be understood as a synthesis of what had gone before, but would nonetheless distinguish Brendel’s individuality and originality as an editor from that of his predecessor. Music criticism, as Brendel portrays it in his inaugural article, had taken two approaches up to this point. The first was the objective, thoughtful period of the late eighteenth century.

This criticism focussed on rules and theoretical matters at the expense of more spiritual aspects. The second was the enthusiastic, spiritual criticism of the early nineteenth century, as evidenced in the writings of Rochlitz, E. T. A. Hoffmann and (although Brendel does not name him explicitly) Schumann among others. The shortfall of this spiritual approach, as Brendel sees it, is that it deals more with feelings and the critic’s emotional response to the music than it does with musical principles and rules. Brendel now saw fit to unite the two in a third standpoint, a synthesis of such a spiritual approach with objectivity. As we saw earlier, this combination of objectivity and subjectivity (spirituality) had already been achieved in music by Beethoven.

Brendel took music criticism a step further than it had gone before in that he held critical writings up as an integral element in his notion of progress: ‘the essence of today’s art consists above all in its no longer building further and further on given foundations’, but rather ‘in the intervention of theory and criticism between yesterday’s and today’s art, and in our art’s presupposing theory and criticism within itself’. His view of the importance of criticism in this regard stems directly from Hegel’s Aesthetics. Unlike his eighteenth-century predecessors, including Kant, Hegel concentrated on the meaning of a work of art rather than investigating the nature of beauty or aesthetic pleasure. As Pinkard sums it up:
The hero of reflection on art is neither the connoisseur of fine gradations in aesthetic quality, nor the aesthete caught up in the aesthetic experience of the beautiful, but instead the philosopher, the «critic» who reflects on what the meaning of art is, and who thereby contributes more to art’s vocation as formative of a kind of comprehension about what ultimately matters to us.\footnote{41}

Following on from this, Brendel awards critical writings a significance in the progress of music that was formerly unthinkable, declaring that ‘criticism now has the task to participate actively in the course of events, it holds its own independent position in relation to art.’\footnote{42} In other words, criticism would now take a leading role, presenting the current musical situation in the progress of history, and would endeavour to establish the meaning of the most recent works of art for mankind’s consciousness. It was necessary for critics to judge works according to whether they were timely or out-of date. As such, critics could be understood as a necessary guide to composers, allowing them to be in sympathy with their own age, and accordingly to compose works that would express the current Weltgeist.\footnote{43} Indeed, one of the most powerful responses to this controversy, to bring us back to our central argument, was Schumann’s ‘Neue Bahnen’ essay.

Brendel’s response to or divergence from Hegel’s philosophy in his approach to both the history of music and music criticism, as explored to this point, are drawn together in Brendel’s effort to find a common ground for German composers at mid-century. The period before the failed revolutions of 1848 was marked by unrest and an increasing uneasiness on the part of Germans at the disparity between sharing one cultural heritage, thus belonging to one nation, but living in 39 separate states. «Culture», as Wolf Lepenies points out, ‘had remained the catchword by which the Germans tried to distinguish themselves from the rest of the civilised world’. Lepenies contends that this cultural pride, as espoused in the writings of Lessing, Schiller, Hegel, and Wagner, among others, ‘was also the result of political disappointments’.\footnote{44} In times where unification was not yet a political option, it was highlighted all the more as a cultural fact. In this vein, there was a broad liberal Vormärz movement that called out for national unity. Brendel’s frequent call for unity in musical circles in the face of fragmentation resonated with the political situation. He believed that the Germans lacked a common musi-
cal style because composers were out of touch with one another. He believed that musicians needed this unity as in no other realm did he witness such ‘splintering off of viewpoints than in music’.  

The attitude of the respective parties to the works of past masters is exemplary of this fragmentation. Brendel observes that fanatics cling to Mozart, Haydn and Beethoven and refuse to hear anything new. His philosophy of music history rejects such an adherence to the works of past masters. Rather, he views these works as points to be overcome by current composers. This epitomises the task of the critic in Brendel’s system; they would judge whether works were timely or out-of-date, and guide composers accordingly. In borrowing Hegel’s term überwundene Standpunkt (a point to be overcome) for the works of past masters, his intention was to ensure the progress of music without an over-reliance on that which had gone before. Thus, writing in 1848 he proclaimed that it was necessary for composers to pursue ‘new paths’ (neue Bahnen) and to ‘leave the well-beaten tracks’ behind.  

Brendel’s historical and critical outlook was met with resistance by musical commentators writing both in his own journal (including Theodor Uhlig, Wagner, and Schumann as will be explored below), and in other contemporary journals, particularly the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung. In an 1848 article entitled ‘Fortschritt’ (‘Progress’), J. C. Lobe satirised critics who presumed they could guide composers while they themselves could not compose. Lobe feared that musical lawlessness—a result of neglecting the study of past masters, and failing to climb the levels of artistic training—could lead to an inability to distinguish freedom from licentiousness. In this same journal issue, J. Schucht expressed similar concerns in an article that explicitly dealt with Brendel’s Hegelianism: ‘Der überwundener Standpunkt in der Tonkunst’. He argued that while Hegel had established the notion of a Weltgeist being superseded in phi-

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47 As Pederson points out, when Schumann founded the Neue Zeitschrift in opposition to the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung, the two had different musical tastes, but basically the same format and readership. However, under Brendel’s editorship the Neue Zeitschrift became increasingly more scholarly and political. Brendel politicised music in that he sought to promote it as a scientific subject, one that would actively participate in the reform of the nation and could be considered on a par with other scholarly subjects, in an effort to rescue it from its designation as a romantic art which, in the revolutionary years, was tantamount to passive, ineffective escapism. The Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung regularly fought with the Neue Zeitschrift over this politicization of musical matters. By 1848, with the revolutions looming, these journalistic battles were most pronounced. See S. PEDERSON, ‘Romantic Music Under Siege’.  
losophy, for music the idea was ‘preposterous’, as compositions did not become obsolete.\footnote{J. SCHUCHT, ‘Der überwundene Standpunkt in der Tonkunst’, Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 50/33 (16 August 1848): 536—38. This passage quoted and translated in S. PEDERSON, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’, 208. Both these articles appeared in the final year of publication for the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung. This year was marked by almost continuous fighting with the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik. In one of these hostile exchanges, Brendel described the Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung as the journal of the conservative party, and the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik as the organ of the reform movement. See F. BRENDEL, ‘Fragen der Zeit. III. Die Forderungen der Gegenwart und die Berechtigung der Vorzeit’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 29/19 (2 September 1848): 101—102.} Furthermore, Brendel’s historical outlook can be understood as being antithetical to Schumann’s view of the work of past masters that we encountered earlier as the ‘only pure source at which present artistic endeavour can find renewed strength.’\footnote{R. SCHUMAN, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 2/1 (2 January 1835), 3. Translated in Leon PLANTINGA, Schumann as Critic, 99.}

These reservations, however, did not deter Brendel from pursuing his progressive and teleological historical narrative. On the contrary, they provided one side of the dialectic against which he would argue, and an opportunity to present his own views as a synthesis of such opposing views. The principles expressed in his inaugural address of 1845 formed the basis of his critical writings in the journal, and the main tenets of Brendel’s philosophy of music remained steadfast throughout the two decades of his editorship.

Brendel’s reform of the German musical world in the late 1840s was practical as well as academic. He founded a Tonkünstler-Verein which was modelled on national scholarly conferences that were taking place in Germany at the time with local chapters that met throughout Germany.\footnote{This was first discussed in his new year’s address to the journal in 1847. See F. BRENDEL, ‘Ein Vorschlag als Gruß zum neuen Jahr’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 26/1 (1 January1847), 1. See also S. PEDERSON, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’, 227.} Brendel hoped the organisation would help to transform the status of music from what was perceived as mere amusement to that of a science. Just as the wider scholarly community understood their conferences to symbolise and further German unity in the period leading up to the revolutions of 1848, the founding of the Tonkünstler-Verein can be understood in the context of this broader Liberal Vormärz movement in that ‘music and music criticism could actively take part in the reform of the nation’.\footnote{See S. PEDERSON, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’, especially Chapter 6, ‘The Liberal Politics of Vormärz Music Criticism’, 226—267 (227). Also of interest is Burford, ‘Hanslick’s Idealist Materialism’. Burford notes that the scepticism toward idealist philosophy at midcentury was linked to the growing prestige of the empiricism of natural science in the late 1830s and 40s.’ Brendel’s attempt to emphasise the scientific aspects of music can be understood in the context of this Vormärz mindset. Burford continues that ‘many natural scientists believed that the scientific worldview was the surest method of thwarting groundless religious, political, and social authority’. See M. BURFORD, ‘Hanslick’s Idealist Materialism’, the passages quoted are at 167 and 179 respectively. In relation to what Burford refers to as ‘the descent of art from the pure ethereal heights to the rugged terrain of political reality’, pages 166—171 are particularly relevant.} The first
national Tonkünstler-Versammlung took place on August 13 and 14 1847 in the Gewandhaus in Leipzig.53 Meetings proceeded in 1848 and 1849. In the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, however, the Tonkünstler-Versammlung was suppressed. The Tonkünstler-Verein continued to exist until at least 1851, but its activities after this point cannot be traced.54 The meetings resumed in 1859, at which time the political and musical situation was less bleak than that of the revolutionary years.55

The immediate impact of the failed 1848 revolutions on the state of musical life was far-reaching and, according to some commentators, still reverberates today.56 Indeed, immediately following the revolutions there was a decline in the number of large works published, and music criticism also suffered.57 This was not a subsequent prognosis—it was noted with anxiety in the contemporary press. While Brendel’s disappointment was evident, he continued to call for ‘recognition of modern times’ and ‘sympathy for its great ideas’.58

Notwithstanding this (somewhat dejected) optimism, in the years between 1849 and 1853 the implications of the revolutions, and the strenuous work carried out in organising the Tonkünstler-Versammlung, seem to have taken their toll on Brendel. This, coupled with the fact that he wanted to concentrate on his history of music, meant that although he remained editor of the journal, he was not as active in that role as he had been.59 The Zeitgemässe Betrachtungen (‘contemporary observations’), for instance, a regular editorial in which Brendel commented on current issues in musical life, was now frequently contributed by Theodor Uhlig, a critic who took an increasingly prominent role in the journal at this time. Indeed,
Brendel had chosen Uhlig (an avid Wagnerian) specifically to reorient the journal toward Wagner. It was during these years that the Neue Zeitschrift made its transition from being a revolutionary journal to one that advocated Wagner.

Certainly in the years immediately following the revolutions, Schumann’s productivity, and positive reception in the press seemed to be peaking. A number of critics invested in him as the composer of the future, looking to him to lift music out of the demise of the failed revolutions. However, reviews devoted to Schumann competed in frequency with the writings of Uhlig. Following this gradual fall from a position of prominence in German musical life, it was the failure of Schumann’s opera Genoveva in 1850 that saw his popularity plummet and was the cause of his downfall in the journal (and elsewhere). Brendel’s review of this work marked the last major review in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik on this composer. From 1850, Wagner began publishing with increased frequency in the journal. Following Uhlig’s death in January 1853, Brendel’s role as editor became as active as it had been prior to the revolutions. From this point on, the journal was indisputably the party organ for the composers who would become known as the Neudeutsche Schule. It was for Wagner, Liszt, and Berlioz that Brendel now placed his vote of confidence for the future of music. Thus, in October 1853 Schumann published his ‘Neue Bahnen’ article in a journal that bore no resemblance to the one he had founded in 1835. It marked a break in Schumann’s absence in his career as a journalist, and reverberated loudly in the relative silence in the journal on his career as a composer.

60 Brendel explicitly says so in his postscript to J. Rühlmann’s obituary for Uhlig, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 38 (1853): 33—37, quoted in J. THYM, 164, footnote 24.

61 Although Liszt began contributing articles to the journal in the early 1850s, it was not until 1857 that Brendel would emerge as the ardent champion of Liszt in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik. A particularly noteworthy article in this regard is F. BRENDEL, ‘Franz Liszt’s neueste Werke und die gegenwärtige Parteistellung. Die Stellung der Partei’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 47/13 (25 September 1857): 129—133. These critics included Emmanuel Klitzsch and Ernst Gottschald.

62 A very useful chart of these reviews is provided in S. PEDERSON, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’, 255—57. Another interesting discussion of how a number of critics, including Brendel, invested their hopes for the future of music (especially church music) in Schumann is to be found in L. TUNBRIDGE, Schumann’s Late Style, Chapter 2, ‘The Sound of Legend’, 48—74.

63 Brendel gave the opera an equivocal review, while other journals were more scathing. F. BRENDEL, ‘R. Schumann’s Oper Genoveva’, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 33/1 (2 July 1850): 1—4; 33/4 (12 July 1850), 17—18; 27/10 (2 August 1850), 49—50. The Neue Berliner Musikzeitung, for example, explicitly stated that the work was a disappointment, Neue Berliner Musikzeitung 4 (1850), 222.

64 For Uhlig’s obituary in the journal, see J. RÜHLMANN, ‘Theodor Uhlig’ with an afterword by Brendel, Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 38/4 (21 January 1853): 33—37.
Brahms in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik

Neue Bahnen

After almost a decade of witnessing the journal become increasingly supportive of the Neudeutsche Schule, Schumann broke his journalistic silence. On 28 October 1853 he published the article ‘Neue Bahnen’ in which he hailed Brahms as the Messiah of music.66 Schumann did more here than introduce Brahms to the musical world. He also, in no uncertain terms, stipulated that the one chosen to carry on the German musical heritage was to be German. The question of the criteria for national affiliation would become more pressing in 1859 with Brendel’s inauguration of Wagner, Liszt, and Berlioz as the Neudeutsche Schule.67 In this context, Schumann’s concern that the cultural heritage of German art music remain in German hands anticipates the issues at stake for the critics of Brendel’s Neudeutsche Schule toward the end of this decade. Schumann defended this aesthetic outlook by appealing to religion and philosophy. Although these religious aspects of ‘Neue Bahnen’ have been elucidated elsewhere, it is worth revisiting the topic briefly, as this association between nationalist and pietistic thought is central to Schumann’s argument that the one to carry on the cultural heritage of German art be a German.

Constantin Floros and Daniel Beller-McKenna have both drawn attention to the particularly messianic implications of ‘Neue Bahnen’.68 They point to the mixture of biblical and mythological imagery in the essay, a mixture that they note was typical of Romantic writing. The phrases that are understood to resonate with Christian Gospels, and indeed would have been widely understood as such by Schumann’s readership, and particularly by Brahms, are: ‘one who would and must appear’; ‘by whose cradle heroes stand guard’; ‘this is a chosen one’.69 Moreover, Floros points to the fact that Schumann frequently used the nickname »eagle« for Brahms (Adler or Aar70). Eagle had for centuries been a well known attribute for

67 As Taruskin points out, ‘A new conception of nationhood and nationalism had arisen in the wake of Hegel, or rather in the wake of the political activism that Hegel had inspired among the young Hegelians. Germanness was henceforth no longer to be sought in folklore. One showed oneself a German not ethnically but spiritually, by putting oneself in humanity’s vanguard’. R. TARUSKIN, The Oxford History of Western Music: The Nineteenth Century, 422. For an interesting discussion of ‘what may seem to be the patent illogicality of a New German School filled with a Frenchman, a German, and a Hungarian’, see Mary Sue MORROW, ‘Deconstructing Brendel’s New German Liszt’, in Analecta Litziana III: Liszt and the Birth of Modern Europe: Music as a Mirror of Religious, Political, Cultural, and Aesthetic Transformations, ed. Michael Saffle (New York: Pendragon Press, 1998), 157—168.
70 Brahms, of course, was aware of this nickname, as is evident in a number of letters. See for example Brahms Briefwechsel 5: 35, where he writes ‘Der Aar steigt einsam, doch das Volk der Krähen schart sich; gäbe doch Gott, daß mir die Flügel noch tüchtig wachsen und ich einst der andern Gattung zugehöre.’
As Beller-McKenna argues, such striking imagery of destruction and renewal are prominent themes in Revelation, and in apocalyptic literature in general. Consider, for instance, Schumann’s depiction of Brahms appearing on the musical scene ‘fully armed’, with musical compositions ‘like a rushing current, as if in a waterfall, over whose cascading waves peaceful rainbows were drawn’.

Furthermore, aspirations for a German national state, as Beller-McKenna aptly notes, ‘developed from long nurtured nationalistic sentiments in Pietistic thought, and they led to a typically apocalyptic dualism, in which Napoleon and the French were viewed as the personification of ‘evil’ while the German nation represented ‘good’.

Therefore, Brahms and Schumann’s readership would have understood from Schumann’s essay that the ‘one to give the highest expression to the time in an ideal manner’, was to be German, and was to lead German music forward on the path laid out by Bach, Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven. If his introduction to Brahms with such apocalyptic and messianic imagery was not explicit enough to indicate that Schumann thought the German musical heritage should remain in German hands, the list of composers he gave as those who had been neglected in recent years in the journal were mostly German.

The title ‘Neue Bahnen’ was well observed on Schumann’s part. It had become a regular phrase that Brendel used in promoting new music. Schumann’s argument, contra Brendel, appears to be that in order for composers to pursue new paths they need not abandon or ‘leave the well beaten tracks’ behind. Also, for one who was as well read as Schumann, being steeped in the knowledge of German philosophical and literary writings, it cannot have escaped his attention that in his inaugural address to the journal in 1845, Brendel explicitly promoted himself as a young Hegelian, citing a famous quote from the preface to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*: ‘The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk’. Minerva, the Roman goddess of wisdom, was associated with the owl, traditionally regarded as wise and hence a metaphor for philosophy. When Hegel wrote this, he meant that philosophy understands reality only after the event. It

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71 Christian tradition has long connected the authors of the four canonical Gospels with the four ‘living creatures’ that surround God’s throne: Matthew with the human/angel; Mark with the lion; Luke with the ox; and John with the eagle.


74 D. BELLER-McKENNA, ‘Brahms, the Bible, and Post-Romanticism’, 32.


cannot prescribe how the world ought to be.\textsuperscript{77} Yet central to Brendel’s concept of progress was the notion that philosophy, in the form of music criticism, was to prescribe how the musical world ought to be. Such a concept would have been preposterous to Schumann. In one section of ‘Neue Bahnen’, he adapts Hegelian terminology in speaking of one who would ‘give the highest expression to the age in an ideal manner’. The passage merits extensive quotation:

\begin{quote}
I thought, having followed the paths of those chosen ones with the greatest interest, that following this precedent at some point there would and must appear one who would be called on to give the highest expression to the age in an ideal manner, one who would not unfold his mastery to us gradually, but rather, like Minerva, would spring fully armed from the head of Kronus. And he has come, a young blood, by whose cradle heroes and graces have stood guard. His name is Johannes Brahms.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

In choosing to represent Brahms as Minerva, Schumann, arguably, banished Minerva’s owl, returning to the goddess herself (which can be understood in this context as music) the importance she was due, but that had been eclipsed in recent years in the journal in favour of the significance of the owl. In other words, Schumann questions the significance Brendel accorded to his critical writings in 1845, and had put into practice in the pages of the journal since then. For Schumann, Brendel’s philosophy overstepped the mark in guiding present artistic endeavours. Furthermore, just as Hegel’s \textit{Weltgeist} has never found a permanent home, fleeting from the world view of Plato, to Kant, to Fichte, the niche it found in the journal Schumann had founded was tenuous. Banishing philosophy from the role it had been accorded in dictating the progress of music, Schumann presents Brahms as ‘fully armed’, as independent of Brendel’s ‘progress’ of the age, and not reliant on the dictates of Brendel’s philosophy. Thereby Schumann reinstates music in its rightful place, promoting Brahms as the new Messiah of music, and giving due recognition to a list of promising talents that he felt had been overlooked in the pages of the journal.

Schumann would have realised, moreover, that he was not the only one to undermine the Hegelian stance Brendel took in the journal, which was increasingly viewed as an old-fashioned, historical humanistic stance.\textsuperscript{79} During his period as absentee editor, a divide began to be perceptible in Brendel’s journal between the more philosophical writings of Brendel and Pohl on the one hand, and the writings of the more musically skilled Wagner and Theodor Uhlig on the other.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} See S. PEDERSON, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’, 261.
\textsuperscript{80} For further discussion of this divide in the journal see P. RAMROTH, \textit{Robert Schumann und Richard Wagner in geschichtsphilosophischen Urteil von Franz Brendel}, 166—167.
Uhlig condemned criticism as a sign that music had lost touch with its listeners, and envisioned a utopia where there would be no music criticism because music would communicate directly to the people:

> We place our highest pride in the recognition that criticism has a very conditional authority with regard to art, that it must ultimately destroy itself; we also long above all for the conditions of immediacy [Unmittelbarkeit], that must with necessity enter after the destruction of criticism.\(^{81}\)

Expressing similar sentiments, Wagner wrote in an open letter to the editor in 1852 that the fact that he lived in an age of criticism was an indication of how corrupt artistic life had become.\(^{82}\) While he concedes that the goal of a music journal should be to prepare for the artwork of the future, he argues that when this is achieved ‘we will be delivered from critics to artists and art-loving people, and then, honoured friend, you may close your music journal: it dies, because the artwork lives!’\(^{83}\)

‘Hoplit’ on Brahms

Following Schumann’s article, Brahms was to receive no further attention in the *Neue Zeitschrift* until a series of articles written by Richard Pohl in 1855 under the pseudonym ‘Hoplit’.\(^{84}\) This series exemplifies how Brendel’s contributors perpetuated his view of music history. Penned a year and a half after Schumann’s ‘Neue Bahnen’, Pohl charts the composer’s success up to 1855 without actually discussing any of his works. Much can be learnt from these articles about the editorial policy of the journal at this time. Pohl’s concentration on style and on ‘objective expression’ reveals a great deal about Pohl and the thinking that he represents. Moreover Pohl’s discussion is informed by Brendel’s dialectical notion of the subjective and objective elements in music.

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\(^{81}\) T. U. [Theodor Uhlig], ‘Eine Belehrung’, *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* 35/25 (19 December 1851), 275. This translation is taken from S. Pederson, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’, 264.

\(^{82}\) Wagner’s knowledge of Hegel, as Peter Ramroth reminds us, was secondhand and therefore as a practicing musician he would have had limited sympathy for Brendel’s critical outlook. See P. Ramroth, Robert Schumann und Richard Wagner in geschichtsphilosophischen Urteil von Franz Brendel, 162.

\(^{83}\) R. Wagner, Ein Brief an der Redacteur der *Neuen Zeitschrift für Musik*. *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* 36/6 (6 February 1852): 57—63 (63). This translation is taken from S. Pederson, ‘Enlightened and Romantic German Music Criticism’, 265.

Pohl’s articles deal with two main areas: a critique of ‘Neue Bahnen’; and an assessment of where Brahms’s works fit in the current schools of composition, particularly in relation to the consequences for Brahms of being a Schumannianer. Pohl quotes extensively from ‘Neue Bahnen’, and questions the benefit of giving a composer such a public and promising introduction to the musical world at such an early stage in his career, a concern that Brahms himself shared. Pohl admits his wariness in voicing his opinion on Brahms too soon after Schumann’s article in this same journal, and he explains that ‘where personal sympathy is available, caution and restraint in judgement must be exercised all the more’. He had further reservations in making an open judgement on a composer after the publication of just one, or a few works. Indeed, he notes ‘how few opus 1s there are, and were, on which the stamp of genius is so purely and unmistakably printed that one could build a whole future with certainty on it.

Pohl takes a dubious view of Schumann’s motivation in writing the article. He doubts the value of Schumann’s most recent compositions, claiming that in these works the composer is no longer ‘absolutely represented’. In Pohl’s opinion, if Schumann proceeded to create in this manner—‘creating in himself instead of outside of himself’—the ‘future’ of his artistic direction would have been jeopardised. This uncertainty on Pohl’s part in Schumann’s latest compositions echoes Brendel’s position on the composer—as discussed above in relation to the failure of the opera *Genoveva*—and can be understood as part of a general move away from any confidence in Schumann’s significance for the history of music as ex-

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85 Writing to Schumann three weeks after the article was published Brahms admitted that ‘the public praise that you have spent on me will have raised the expectations of the public on my achievements so extraordinarily that I do not know how I can do justice to them to the same degree’. ‘Das öffentliche Lob, das Sie mir gespendet, wird die Erwartung des Publikums auf meine Leistungen so außerordentlich gespannt haben, daß ich nicht weiß, wie ich derselben einigermaßen gerecht werden kann’, Johannes Brahms to Robert Schumann, 16 November 1853, in Clara Schumann—Johannes Brahms: Briefe aus den Jahren 1853—1896, Band I, 1853—1871, ed. Berthold Litzmann (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1927), 1.


87 ‘Weil die Bedeutung einer künstlerischen Individualität, die mit solchem Aufsehen in die Kunstwelt eingeführt wird, nach einem oder nach wenigen einzelnen Werken überhaupt nicht erschöpfend erkannt werden kann. Erst wenn eine größere Reihe von Werken vorliegt, kann man beurtheilen, ob eine Steigerung vorhanden, ein stetiger Fortschritt ersichtlich ist; ob der Machtspruch, den einer unserer hervorragendsten Meister schon vor dem Erscheinen jedes Werkes öffentlich kundgab, durch die Werke selbst hingänglich gerechtfertigt erscheint; und ob die späteren Werke halten, was Opus 1 verspricht’. Ibid., 14.


89 ‘Denn man fühlte wohl, daß Schumann in mehr als einem seiner neuesten Werke nicht mehr absolut zu vertreten sei, und daß, wenn er so fortfahre, in sich hinein, anstatt aus sich heraus zu schaffen, die «Zukunft» seiner Richtung sehr gefährdet sei.’ R. POHL, ‘Johannes Brahms’ III, 262.
pressed in the *Neue Zeitschrift*. Consider, for example, the judgement made by Theodor Uhlig in 1852 that Schumann’s followers were beginning to turn their backs on him ‘because there is »no further progress« to be discerned in his compositions. Schumann has indeed passed his musical peaks and the only thing that can save him from mediocrity is to moderate his output’. In a similar vein, Friedrich Hinrich claimed in 1854 that Schumann’s best days were over.

Pohl conjectures that the need arose for Schumann ‘to incorporate fresh, strong blood into the Schumann family tree’. Thus, it was ‘a single, and deep-seizing fate’ that he found Brahms shortly before he was cruelly carried away from the world of art, ‘at exactly the time of which one could say »That is he who must come!«’. In this sense he suggests that Brahms became ‘a bequest that the noble master left to his pupils and friends’. In more explicit terms, Pohl conjectures that the Schumann party that is represented ever more strongly among young musicians, ‘felt the need to exalt one belonging to their direction in order to provide a prophet of the new times on their side’. For ‘Hoplit’, such a public introduction of Brahms to the musical world, based on such questionable motivation, amounts to ‘well-meant but inappropriate politics’.

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90 As both Sanna Pederson and Laura Tunbridge attest, in the period immediately following the revolutions Schumann’s popularity seemed to be peaking. He was claimed as a ‘democratic’ composer and the rightful heir to Beethoven, claiming the status of a national institution. For further detail see S. PEDERSON, ‘Romantic Music Under Siege’, 57—75, and L. TUNBRIDGE, Schumann’s Late Style, 5.

91 Th. UHLIG, Review of Sonata for Violin and Piano, No. 1 in A Minor, Op. 105, *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* 37/12 (17 September 1852), translated and quoted in Tunbridge, Schumann’s Late Style, 160. Tunbridge further notes that Uhlig’s criticism of Schumann became increasingly cruel in the last year of [Uhlig’s] life to the extent that Brendel admitted in a letter to Schumann of 22 January 1854 that ‘I did not print his really harsh reviews of his work, which did go too far.’ L. TUNBRIDGE, Schumann’s Late Style, 161.

92 Hinrich writes: ‘When we speak of Schumann, we mean the composer of the older works, approximately up until *Peri*. Since then, as can unfortunately no longer be disguised, he has declined, becoming mannered in the most melancholy sense of the word’. Friedrich HINRICH, ‘Zur Würdigung Richard Wagners’, *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* 39/19 (1854): 200. Translated and quoted in L. TUNBRIDGE, Schumann’s Late Style, 4.


95 ‘So wurde Johannes Brahms gleichsam ein Vermächtniß, welches der edle Meister seinen Schülern und Freunden hinterließ, bis er selbst wieder erscheinen würde auf dem Schauplatz der Kunst, dem er plößlich so grausam entrückt wurde’. Ibid., 15.


97 ‘… gutgemeinten, aber verfehlten Politik …’. Ibid., 262.
In relation to the discussion of Brahms’s compositions, apart from Op. 1, he does not refer directly (by title or otherwise) to any of Brahms’s works, nor does he consult any of the scores. This is reminiscent of the philosophical, lofty manner of discussing music that was typical of Brendel’s writings. In this respect these articles are more useful in terms of what they tell us about Pohl’s expectations, and by extension those of the journal, of an emerging artist. Pohl maintains that while Brahms’s music displays ‘skill in form, technical handling of instruments, harmonic boldness and rhythmic diversity’ (all objective elements in Brendel’s dialectical synthesis), these amount to nothing more than prerequisites for every gifted, talented musician, and are ‘to be viewed as still very little, or no progress’. They are an indication, moreover that ‘the individuality is thereby represented, but not yet characterised’, and merely give Brahms a ‘visiting card’ into the world of art. He considers his work at this stage, up to and including the Schumann Variations, Op. 9, to be ‘unequal’, with ‘the invention varying’, and at times assuming ‘a strange appearance’. According to Pohl, Brahms’s output is not consistent because the composer does not deliberate enough. In essence Pohl maintains that Brahms has mastered the technical aspects of his craft, but has not yet arrived at a point where he can express the subjective element of music—that which embodies the spiritual depth of his own individuality. Therefore, he disputes the claim that Brahms came into the world fully armed, suggesting rather that he earned his auspicious introduction ‘not as a qualified, rather as an emerging artist’. His main reservation about Brahms’s music is that it ‘still lacks style, which allows the artistic subjectivity to arrive at objective expression’.

Pohl next turns his attention to a discussion of the consequences for Brahms of following in Schumann’s compositional footsteps. He maintains that ‘a nature such as that of Schumann can exist only once because it is quite final in itself’. Acknowledging that Schumann’s individuality or, what is the same thing in this context, his subjectivity (Subjectivität—that which comes from within) possesses a

98 This is despite a promise in the last article published that one further article would examine Op. 1 to 9 in detail. This article never appeared.

99 ‘Die Formgewandheit, die technische Behandlung der Instrumente, die harmonische Kühnheit, die rhythmische Mannigfaltigkeit, sind Elemente, die jeder begabte, talentvolle Musiker jetzt womöglich schon mit auf die Welt bringen muß, wenn er überhaupt »mit fortkommen«, wenn er beachtet werden, und eine Stellung in der Musikwelt sich gründen will’. R. POHL, ‘Johannes Brahms’ III, 261.

100 ‘… noch sehr wenig oder keine Aussicht, bemerkt zu werden …’. Ibid., 261.

101 ‘Die Individualität ist dadurch wohl vertreten, noch nicht aber charakterisiert’. Ibid., 261.

102 ‘Er hat damit gleichsam nur seine Visitencharte in der Kunstwelt abgegeben’. Ibid., 261.

103 ‘Seine Arbeit wird dadurch ungleich, die Erfindung schwankend, sie erhält zuweilen den Anschein des grillenhaften’. Ibid., 263.

104 ‘Zum Meister fehlte ihm vor allen Dingen noch das Hauperforderniß: der Styl’. Ibid., 262.

105 ‘Sie ist nicht stetig, weil nicht genug überlegt, und vor Allem fehlt ihr noch der Styl, der die künstlerische Subjectivität zum objectiven Ausdruck gelangen läßt’. Ibid., 263.

106 ‘Und daß eine Natur, wie die Schumannische, eben nur einmal vorhanden sein kann, weil sie in sich durchaus abgeschlossen ist’. Ibid., 262.
‘completely unquestionable high worth’, he warns that it will be held in high regard ‘only in its originality, not in imitation’.107 Indicating some expectation in Brahms’s compositional career, he claims that just as each artistic individuality has something inestimable which cannot be emulated, so Brahms also has an element that is particular to him, and that Schumann does not possess, a feature that promises that he will follow ‘his own courses when it is granted to him to attain full development’.108 In this sense he considers Brahms to be ‘no Schumann imitator, rather a Schumannian nature’.109 The two composers, he contends, share ‘that internal brooding and the longing course of the indefinite vagueness that the romantics characterise in such a particular way’.110 Yet, this similarity with Schumann is an element that, in Pohl’s opinion, could impede Brahms’s progress.111 Consequently he sees this progress to be conditional on Brahms’s ability to ‘purge himself of the Schumann consequences’.112 In other words, it is only if Brahms follows his own particular individual essence that he will reach his full potential. Indicating that Schumann’s article carried no special weight in the estimation of the journal he states that if they perceived ‘nothing of a Schumannianer’ in Brahms it would give them reason to consider his future, ‘not however to treat it with special honour’.113 Ultimately reserving his judgement on Brahms, he claims that ‘it is less what he carries out now, as what he promises for the future that draws us to him.’114

107 ‘Wer strenggläubig genug ist, um in Schumann’s Fußtapfen treten zu wollen, oder zu beschränkt, um etwas anders zu können, der bannt sich freiwillig in denselben Cirkel, in den er selbst sich festbannte, nur mit den Unterschied, daß Schumann’s sehr bedeutende Subjectivität einen ganz unzweifelhaften, hohen Werth besitzt, und für die geschichte der Kunst immer behalten wird — aber nur in ihrer Originalität, nicht in der Nachahmung’. Ibid., 262.
108 ‘Wie nun aber jede ächte künstlerische Subjectivität etwas Unberechenbares und nicht Nachzuhmendes enthält, so hat auch Brahms ein Element in sich, das Schumann nicht besitzt, jenes Etwas, das uns verheißt, er werde seine eigenen Bahnen suchen, wenn es ihm überhaupt vergönnt ist, zur völligen Entwickelung zu gelangen — eine Bedingung, deren Erfüllung teilweise von ihm selbst abhängt’. Ibid., 263.
109 ‘Brahms ist kein Nachahmer Schumann’s, sondern eine Schumann’sche Natur’. Ibid., 262.
110 ‘Auch Brahms hat das innerlich Grübelnde und den sehnsüchtigen Zug nach dem Unbestimmten, Nebelhaften, der die Romantiker auf so eigenthümliche Weise charakterisirt’. Ibid., 263.
111 ‘Die Klippen für Brahms liegen also in dem, was seine Ähnlichkeit und Verwandtschaft mit Schumann begründet’. Ibid., 263.
112 ‘Brahms steht nicht außer dieser Gefahr, und hat sich daher wohl zu hüten, nach dieser Seite dem starken Drange seiner Subjectivität nachzugeben und so auch in die Schumann’schen Consequenzen zu verfallen’. Ibid., 263.
113 ‘Es ist weniger das, was er jetzt leistet, als das, was er für die Zukunft verspricht, was uns zu ihm hinzieht. Je mehr es ihm gelingt, sich von der ihm charakteristischen Schumann’schen Natur zu befreien, je energischer er über den, seinem Vorgänger eigenthümlichen Ideenkreis hinausschreitet, desto vielversprechender wird seine Zukunft sein’. Ibid., 263.
114 ‘Sähen wir also in Brahms Nichts einen Schumannianer mehr, so wäre das höchstens ein Grund für uns, seine Zukunft zu bezweifeln, nicht aber, ihn mit besonderer Auszeichnung zu behandeln.’ Ibid., 263.
Conclusion

What Schumann’s and Pohl’s articles on Brahms have in common is that they leave open great expectations for the young Brahms, albeit expectations that would put the composer under severe pressure for many years to come. The aesthetic and philosophical issues at the heart of the critical writings of Brendel, Schumann, and Pohl—at the most basic level issues of musical meaning, and from where this meaning is generated—are a breeding ground for controversy that still confounds scholarship on nineteenth-century music. The ongoing challenge to appropriate aspects of Hegel’s philosophical and aesthetic outlook on the one hand, as evidenced in the writings of Brendel and Pohl, and the effort to assert the independence, authority, and artistic integrity of the artwork in its own right on the other hand, are neatly encapsulated in the ‘Neue Bahnen’ episode.

Ostensibly, Schumann’s reason for writing ‘Neue Bahnen’ was to promote a little-known, twenty-year old composer, who had not yet published any works, to the musical world. However, without diminishing his esteem for the young Brahms, Schumann’s motivation went far beyond promoting the individual he considered worthy to carry on the Austro-German musical legacy. As argued throughout this article, ‘Neue Bahnen’ was a response to a clearly defined and well understood strain in the critical discourse. The broader issue at stake for Schumann was the lack of support for composers who furthered the established paths of their Austro-German predecessors. Schumann considered the works of these composers to be no less valuable and original than those of the composers he witnessed gaining an exclusive foothold in the journal that he himself had founded. In this essay, Schumann subjected Brendel’s editorial policy to public scrutiny, and called into question the extent to which a theory of art stemming from philosophy, as opposed to one stemming from music itself, can dictate the progress of music. His concerns, in this regard, are expressed in a typically elegant manner for Schumann in this letter to Richard Pohl of February 1854, on learning the true identity of ‘Hoplit’:

Are there really two kinds of creativity, one objective and the other subjective? … Let me tell you: these are secrets that cannot be revealed with such miserable words… I am older than you, and through my many years of creating and working can penetrate into these secrets more deeply and clearly. Do not seek them in philosophical expressions or in subtle differences. A fool with a free, inward soul understood more of music than did the shrewdly thoughtful Kant.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{115} Schumann to Pohl, 24 February 1854. Translated by John Michael Cooper in \textit{Schumann and His World}, 261.

U ovom se članku istražuje povijesni i ideologijski kontekst članka 'Novi putevi'. Nastoji se dokazati da Brendelov način razmišljanja potječe iz filozofjske nastrojenosti suprotne onoj Schumanna, čiju misao uvelike karakterizira način mišljenja praktičnog glazbenika. Predlaže se da se Schumannov članak, sagledan iz takvoga motrišta, shvati kao dio široke podijeljenosti u Brendelovu uredivanju časopisa *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* što je nastala između onih koji su prigrli filozofski pristup povijesti glazbe i glazbenoj kritici (Franz Brendel i Richard Pohl) i onih koji su zagovarali pristup koji naglašava prednost umjetničkog djela pred filozofijom i kritikom (Theodor Uhlig, Richard Wagner, Robert Schumann). Još je važnije to što autorka smatra da se 'Novi putevi' nisu pojavili u kritičkom vakuumu, nego da su bili odgovor na jasno određeno i promišljeno djelovanje u kritičkom diskursu sredine 19. stoljeća.