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States of Extraction: The Emergence and Effects of Indigenous Autonomy in the Americas

by

Christopher L. Carter

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

in the

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of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

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Abstract

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Professor Thad Dunning, Chair

From the arrival of the first European settlers, indigenous groups in the Americas have experienced near-constant extraction of their land, labor, and capital, but they have also sometimes been offered greater autonomy over their local affairs. This dissertation explores the emergence and effects of indigenous autonomy. I investigate three central questions. Why do central states grant indigenous autonomy in some cases and not others? Why do native communities sometimes embrace government offers of autonomy and sometimes resist? And how does autonomy shape indigenous groups' long-term access to political representation? To answer these questions, I develop a theory that emphasizes the central explanatory role of resource extraction by state and private actors.

In a first section of the dissertation, I examine the decision by central states to grant indigenous autonomy. I argue that individual incumbents recognize autonomy when two conditions jointly obtain. First, national-level incumbents must view indigenous elites as strategic partners in achieving their central goal of remaining in power; this provides an incentive for incumbents to recognize autonomy. Second, rural elites, who view autonomy as a barrier to their extraction of indigenous land and labor, must be sufficiently weak that they cannot block incumbents from recognizing indigenous autonomy. Once incumbents decide to grant autonomy, the specific form it takes—political or economic—depends on the relative value of indigenous factor endowments. To test this argument, I employ a series of historical and contemporary case studies from the Americas.

In a second section of the dissertation, I examine a key puzzle around indigenous community responses to autonomy. Scholars often argue that autonomy is the central demand of native groups. Yet, in a number of historical and contemporary cases, individual indigenous communities within a given country have resisted central state offers of greater autonomy. I argue that the decision of indigenous groups to embrace or resist autonomy arises from prior experiences with extraction, which may vary across native communities within the same country. Exposure to extraction by the central state generally leads indigenous communities to resist autonomy. Conversely, exposure to extraction by rural elites increases the likelihood that native communities embrace autonomy. I evaluate this argument using historical nat-

ural experiments from Peru and the United States, along with survey data and case studies from Bolivia.

In a final section of the dissertation, I examine how autonomy affects indigenous groups' representation within the state. I argue that economic autonomy undermines indigenous institutions and thereby reduces coordination to achieve political representation. I then argue that political autonomy often lumps disparate indigenous communities together, generating conflict and also undermining native groups' access to political representation. Granting both political and economic autonomy, on the other hand, may increase indigenous groups' access to political representation. I evaluate this argument using archival data, original surveys and experiments with indigenous elites, and natural experiments.

This dissertation develops and tests a theory that seeks to bridge historical and contemporary research on indigenous-state relations in the Americas. As such, it makes several distinct theoretical and substantive contributions. First, it highlights the key role of intra-elite conflict in shaping the decision of central states to extend indigenous autonomy. Second, it builds on a body of work in historical political economy that highlights the key role of extraction and factor endowments in shaping the long-term welfare of indigenous groups. Finally, the project highlights a number of important yet often understudied costs that may arise from autonomy. As I show in the different sections of the dissertation, autonomy may carry benefits for indigenous communities, but it may also increase their vulnerability to extraction by non-indigenous actors and reduce their long-term access to descriptive and substantive political representation.

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Chapter 1

The Paradox of Indigenous Autonomy

Since the onset of colonialism, indigenous groups in Peru have demanded greater autonomy over their political and economic affairs. The 1920 Peruvian constitution represented the first national-level effort to address this demand by offering legal recognition and protection for indigenous groups' chief economic resource: communal land. Javier Prado y Ugarteche, president of the Constitutional Commission, praised this new era of indigenous-state relations, declaring to rousing applause in the Peruvian Congress: "The Indigenous race...who gave its riches and opulence to the [Spanish Crown], extracting metal from the mines, working in the mountains and fields, whose race in the Republic has continued working and laboring in the mines...once and for all will receive legal recognition [for their communal land]."¹ Article 58 of the constitution, which enshrined indigenous groups' right to autonomy, ultimately passed with the support of all seventy-nine congressmen.²

Yet, indigenous groups mostly met this formal offer of autonomy with hostility and resistance. Despite politicians' optimistic rhetoric and extensive government campaigns to inform native groups of their new rights, the overwhelming majority of Peru's 6,000 indigenous communities rejected autonomy.³ By 1930, only 5 percent of indigenous communities had applied for government recognition.⁴ The remaining 95 percent opted to use extra-institutional means to defend their communal land from outside encroachment.

In more recent episodes, indigenous groups in the Americas have similarly resisted government efforts to legally recognize their autonomy. In the 1990s and early 2000s, governments in Bolivia, Canada, and Ecuador granted indigenous communities expanded political autonomy. In Canada, the Inherent Right Policy of 1995 created a legal framework through which indigenous reserves could negotiate with the central government to expand their control over the distribution of programs, goods, and services within their communities. In Bolivia, the 2008 constitution provided a path through which majority-indigenous municipalities could replace municipal governments with traditional indigenous political authorities.

¹Sivirichi (1946: 103).

²Pike (1967: 220-221).

³Davies (1974: 90).

⁴Dobyns (1964).

And in Ecuador, a 2010 legal code allowed indigenous municipalities to collect revenue and distribute resources through longstanding institutions. Despite the purported increase in autonomy presented by these reforms, fewer than ten percent of native communities in the three countries have opted to pursue autonomy.

To be sure, indigenous groups have not uniformly resisted autonomy when central states have offered it. During Guatemala's "golden age of indigenous autonomy" in the mid-nineteenth century,⁵ representatives from native communities across the country flocked to the capital to take advantage of President Rafael Carrera's (1839-1848, 1851-1865) offer to recognize their political institutions.⁶ Similarly, when presented with the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, over two-thirds of native reservations in the United States voted in favor of federal government recognition of their legal and political institutions.⁷

The above variation in indigenous group responses to state offers of autonomy presents a puzzle. Existing scholarship argues that autonomy has been the primary demand of indigenous groups since the onset of colonialism.⁸ In fact, much of this literature assumes a shared indigenous preference for autonomy and then examines cross-national or over-time variation in the *capacity* of groups to achieve this autonomy.⁹ Given the centrality of autonomy in indigenous demand-making, we might expect indigenous communities to eagerly embrace it when offered. Yet, the above examples demonstrate that there is, in fact, heterogeneity in individual indigenous communities' underlying preferences for government-sponsored autonomy.

This unexpected variation raises a series of key questions. Why does autonomy emerge as an option for indigenous groups in some cases and not others, and what form does it take? Why do some indigenous communities embrace autonomy while others reject it? What are the costs of autonomy that might lead indigenous communities to resist? How do previous experiences with the state and other non-indigenous actors shape the cost-benefit calculation around autonomy? And how does the adoption of different forms of autonomy—political or economic—shape indigenous groups' relative incorporation and inclusion into the state?

To answer these questions, I develop a theory that demonstrates the central role of extraction in shaping the emergence and effects of indigenous autonomy. A first part of my argument examines supply-side variation in the decision of central states to recognize different forms of autonomy—if any at all. Existing theories, which attribute the emergence of state-recognized autonomy to explanatory factors mostly operative in the modern era (e.g., democracy, decentralization, robust indigenous movements and organizations), implicitly suggest that indigenous groups should have been unlikely to achieve major policy concessions

⁵La Farge (1940); McCreery (1994: 130).

⁶Under Carrera's new "Indian Code" native communities could convert to indigenous municipalities and thereby replace state institutions with longstanding indigenous ones. Many communities obtained this recognition, including San Juan Ostuncalco (Ebel 1972), Santiago Momostenango (Carmack 1983), Verapaz (King 1974), and Santiago Atitlán (Madigan 1976).

⁷Haas (1947: 14-20).

⁸Caplan (2009: 64); Cojtí Cuxil (1997); Díaz-Polanco (1998); Van Cott (2001); Yashar (1998).

⁹Andolina (2003); Evans (2011b,a); Jackson and Warren (2005); Yashar (2005).

around autonomy in earlier historical periods. Yet, in a number of cases, including Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico, indigenous groups received recognition for their autonomy as early as the mid-nineteenth century.

I argue that central states' decisions to recognize indigenous autonomy are shaped by three factors. First, the strategic importance of the indigenous elite, which may vary across time, dictates the incentives of incumbents to respond to autonomy demands. Strategic allies of the incumbent are more capable of successfully demanding autonomy. Second, the rural elite, which has a material interest in extracting native groups' land, labor, and capital, shapes the cost to incumbents of granting autonomy. A politically strong rural elite can easily thwart the recognition of autonomy. Conversely, the weaker the rural elite, the more comprehensive the autonomy regime granted by central states. Finally, the form autonomy takes—political or economic—depends on the relative value of indigenous factor endowments. When indigenous land is valuable, central states are more likely to recognize political autonomy. When indigenous labor is valuable, central states are more likely to recognize economic autonomy.

When do indigenous communities embrace or resist these central state offers? I argue that indigenous communities generally desire both political *and* economic autonomy, but they have often received only partial autonomy in which the central state recognizes either their political *or* economic autonomy. While indigenous communities may—under certain circumstances—embrace this partial autonomy, they may also resist it because it paradoxically can increase their exposure to certain forms of extraction. I posit that indigenous communities' experience with past extraction perpetrated by both the central state and the rural elite helps determine whether they embrace or resist recognition of different forms of autonomy.

Finally, the long-term political effects of autonomy merit close investigation. Specifically, do autonomy arrangements reduce indigenous groups' representation within the state or facilitate their long-term inclusion? I argue that economic autonomy—through the recognition of indigenous communal land—has the unexpected effect of undermining long-term representation of native groups by eroding longstanding reciprocity institutions. Political autonomy, on the other hand, almost by definition increases indigenous groups' descriptive representation; however, because it is often granted at a higher level than the “community” it lumps disparate groups together, generating conflict and perpetuating marginalization for certain native communities. A potential solution emerges from offering political autonomy at the same hyper-local level at which economic autonomy is also recognized.

1.1 Conceptualizing indigenous autonomy

Indigenous groups are composed of the “living descendants of the pre-contact (generally by Europeans) aboriginal inhabitants.”¹⁰ Native populations continue to constitute a large share of the population in many parts of the Americas (Figure 1.1). In certain regions of

¹⁰Smith (2007: 33).

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, along with Guatemala, northern Canada, and southern Mexico indigenous groups constitute the largest ethnic group.

Yet, “indigenous” is not simply a descent-based ethnic or racial category.¹¹ A key part of the definition also includes a behavioral component: that groups preserve longstanding political, economic, and socio-cultural institutions. In defining the term “indigenous,” the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations notes that these populations “live more in conformity with their particular social, economic and cultural customs and traditions than with the institutions of the country of which they are part.”¹²

Indigenous groups have frequently demanded that governments recognize, protect, and cede more power to these longstanding institutions. Often, these demands are framed in terms of autonomy. As such, autonomy is not a single demand but rather a “list of demands” that correspond to the array of institutions that native groups might want the state to recognize and legitimize.¹³

In this dissertation, I focus on the two general forms of autonomy that indigenous groups have most commonly demanded: political and economic.¹⁴ The first, political autonomy or “self-governance,” involves the formal recognition of indigenous groups’ political institutions and authorities, like community assemblies, tribal chiefs, and councils of elders. Economic autonomy, on the other hand, involves the extension of legal protection for indigenous groups’ chief economic resource—communal land.¹⁵ Most commonly, economic autonomy has emerged when central states grant indigenous groups an inalienable, collectively held title to their communal land.

Figure 1.2 situates autonomy within a broader framework of indigenous-state relations in the Americas. The left side of the diagram outlines one common approach states have taken toward indigenous groups living within their borders: to design new institutions and impose them on indigenous groups. In some cases, central states have deliberately attempted to assimilate indigenous groups, replacing their political authorities with state officials and privatizing their communal lands. A second approach has involved central states segregating indigenous communities into state-created institutions for the purposes of control and cooptation. This has historically been the case with reservations and reserves in Canada, the United States, and Colombia as well as colonial-era “reductions” throughout Latin America.

Autonomy, on the other hand, requires a negotiation between indigenous groups and the state. As such, it is determined not only by the “historical nature of the [indigenous collectivity]” but also “by the political orientation. . .of the state.”¹⁶ Indigenous groups first design institutions that are both consistent with longstanding indigenous traditional practices

¹¹Chandra (2006).

¹²Martínez Cobo (1972: 10).

¹³Polanco (2018: 94).

¹⁴Van Cott (1996); Yashar (2005).

¹⁵These institutions may be considered “economic” because government policies around land have the explicit aim of making land more economically productive (Bauer 2016).

¹⁶Polanco (2018: 95).




Figure 1.1: Indigenous population in the Americas (2015) *Source:* Data compiled by author from population censuses




Figure 1.2: Conceptualizing indigenous governance arrangements

and different from state institutions.¹⁷ Central states then decide which of these institutions they will recognize, if any. In a final step, indigenous groups decide whether to embrace or resist these offers of expanded autonomy.

Central states have often granted only partial autonomy—either political or economic. More rarely, central states have offered wholesale protection for indigenous autonomy, recognizing both political and economic forms. Scholars have commonly labeled these state-led efforts “autonomy regimes.”¹⁸ This language distinguishes universal efforts to extend autonomy to native groups from other, piecemeal and often informal negotiations with individual indigenous communities to recognize autonomy. Table 1.1 lists autonomy regimes that exist currently in the Americas.¹⁹ Importantly, the outcomes presented in the table should

¹⁷Díaz-Polanco (1998: 216).

¹⁸González (2018); Van Cott (2001).

¹⁹This list includes only autonomy regimes that have been implemented by *central* governments, which

Table 1.1: Variation in contemporary indigenous autonomy regimes across the Americas

Country	Type of autonomy
<i>Argentina</i>	None
<i>Bolivia</i>	Political and economic
<i>Brazil</i>	None
<i>Canada</i>	Political
<i>Chile</i>	Economic (very limited)
<i>Colombia</i>	Political
<i>Costa Rica</i>	Political
<i>Ecuador</i>	Political and economic
<i>El Salvador</i>	None
<i>Guatemala</i>	None
<i>Mexico</i>	Political and economic
<i>Nicaragua</i>	None
<i>Panama</i>	Political
<i>Paraguay</i>	Economic
<i>Peru</i>	Economic
<i>United States</i>	Political
<i>Uruguay</i>	None
<i>Venezuela</i>	Political

Note: These outcomes are a snapshot of current autonomy arrangements. The cases have importantly varied across time in the autonomy regimes they have adopted.

be considered a snapshot in time; they do not represent the culmination of a linear march toward—or away from—autonomy. Different administrations within the same country have often adopted opposing policies toward autonomy. In the next section, I outline a theory to explain this intertemporal variation.

1.2 Extractive states and autonomy in the Americas

The decision by central states to extend autonomy has not often been explored in the existing literature. Most historical narratives of indigenous-state relations in the Americas highlight the importance of state and private extraction of native groups' land, labor, and

excludes cases, such as Argentina, where local governments have granted communal land titles to indigenous groups. The list also excludes cases, such as Nicaragua and Guatemala, where a law or constitutional provision for autonomy exists but has never been meaningfully implemented.

capital.²⁰ Colonial and post-colonial states systematically removed indigenous groups from their traditional homelands in the name of economic and social progress.²¹ Large landowners frequently encroached on indigenous land and forced the residents of the land into slavery or debt peonage arrangements.²² Governments mobilized indigenous workers for unremunerated labor on mining and large infrastructure projects.²³ In Latin America, the Spanish Crown and post-independence governments levied a discriminatory head tax—or tribute—on indigenous groups that kept native communities in a condition of perpetual poverty.²⁴

While the above examples highlight indigenous groups' extensive experience with extraction, it is wrong to assume—as scholars often have—that central state policy toward native groups has been dictated solely by a desire to facilitate such extraction. In fact, I illustrate in this dissertation that central states often have had a reason to slow or even stop extraction of indigenous resources.

For politicians, there frequently exists a dual incentive to halt extraction of indigenous groups' land, labor, and capital. First, such action addresses the demands of potentially valuable coalitional allies: native communities and their non-indigenous advocates. Second, thwarting the unrestrained accumulation of indigenous resources by opposition rural elites removes a key threat to incumbents; rural elites could otherwise deploy the wealth obtained through extraction to challenge political incumbents electorally or militarily. It is precisely these cases—in which incumbents possess such a dual incentive to respond to indigenous demands—that gave rise to full autonomy.

However, most commonly, central states have ceded only partial autonomy to native groups. For example, half of the countries in Table 1.1 have recognized either economic or political autonomy. Only three have recognized both types of autonomy. In the historical period, full autonomy was offered even more rarely. While partial autonomy emerged in Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Yucatán (Mexico), Peru, and the United States, full autonomy emerged in only one case: Oaxaca (Mexico). In offering policies that fall short of fully addressing indigenous demands for autonomy, central states open the door for indigenous communities to express opposition to and resist these reforms.

Rural elites, indigenous elites, and central state incumbents

Central state incumbents have an incentive to—at the very least—maintain the military or electoral coalition that brought them to power. These coalitions are composed of various constituencies, which may be based around class, ethnic, linguistic, or geographic identities. Incumbents have an incentive to meet the demands of these constituencies to prevent their

²⁰Extraction is here defined as any process that removes the resources of one group and uses these resources to the benefit of another group.

²¹Gotkowitz (2008: 40); Grieshaber (1979: 120).

²²Reséndez (2016).

²³Bulmer-Thomas (1987: 72);Basadre (2014: 197); Davies (1974: 84); Dell (2010); Schurz (1921: 88); Vaughan and Lewis (2006: 227).

²⁴Caplan (2009: 137); Dumond (1997: 137);Klein (1992); Kubler (1952: 1); Langer (1989: 14); Platt (1987); Van Aken (1981).

defection to a rival politician. They also have an incentive to avoid actions that may mobilize opposition forces against them.

Two societal actors shape the decision of central states to recognize autonomy: indigenous elites and rural elites. Indigenous elites want full autonomy for their communities as a way to improve socioeconomic welfare and achieve greater economic, political, and cultural freedoms. However, such a policy presents a zero-sum outcome for non-indigenous rural elites (e.g., miners, plantation owners, land developers) as it may prevent them achieving their primary goal: predated on indigenous resources to increase their personal wealth. Therefore, the rural elite will often oppose full autonomy.

National-level incumbents therefore face a choice between two competing constituencies. While scholars have frequently highlighted the role of intra-elite divisions in colonial and post-independence state building projects in the Americas,²⁵ they have rarely considered the role of these divisions in shaping government decisions to grant indigenous autonomy.²⁶ For example, in certain periods of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the rural elite was fairly weak as an interest group. During these historical moments, a space opened for other actors to become important allies of the incumbent government.

For incumbents facing a weak and divided rural elite, indigenous groups sometimes emerged as a valuable coalitional ally, even in the immediate post-independence period. This may seem surprising as native populations lacked citizenship and voting rights until the twentieth century in countries throughout the Americas. Even in relatively democratic countries, such as the United States and Canada, indigenous individuals did not receive the right to vote until the 1920s and 1960s respectively. As such, most scholarship considers native groups as relatively passive political actors, except for their sporadic ability to violently rebel against certain policies. Mallon, for example, argues that the experiences of the past five hundred years of indigenous-state relations have demonstrated that “political and ethnic lessons are only learned through blood and suffering.”²⁷

Nevertheless, indigenous groups did sometimes exercise meaningful political power and engage in effective demand-making, even prior to obtaining the franchise. In El Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala, indigenous groups played a key role in the military mobilizations that led prominent regional strongmen, or *caudillos*, to power in the mid-nineteenth century. Incumbents subsequently rewarded this military support with policy concessions. In Mexico, Peru, and the United States, indigenous groups—upon receiving the franchise—and their non-indigenous surrogates served as important electoral constituencies of early twentieth century national and subnational leaders.

The decision of central states to recognize indigenous autonomy requires two conditions to hold. First, indigenous elites must be strategically important allies for incumbent politicians; this generates the *incentive* for central governments to grant autonomy. Indigenous elites can be considered strategically important when they mobilize their communities to

²⁵Gailmard (2017); Garfias (2018); Kurtz (2013).

²⁶But c.f. Dell (2010); Platt (1982) on the role of intra-elite divisions around extraction.

²⁷Mallon (1992: 53).

electorally, militarily, or financially support the incumbent. A second condition must also hold if autonomy is to be recognized: the rural elite must not be politically strong. If rural elite groups are powerful, they can successfully block the extension of indigenous autonomy. Otherwise, an *opportunity* space emerges in which indigenous elites can successfully demand autonomy.²⁸

Full autonomy—political and economic—only emerges in the—historically rare—case that rural elites are especially weak. Otherwise, when rural elites have a moderate degree of political power, partial autonomy emerges. Under these conditions, incumbents must strike a bargain that partly appeases indigenous demands while not going so far as to fully unite the rural elite in opposition to their government. How do incumbents achieve this?

Having decided to pursue partial autonomy, national incumbents decide whether to recognize political or economic autonomy based on a calculation around the relative value of indigenous factor endowments for rural elites.²⁹ When indigenous land is valuable, central governments grant political autonomy, which protects indigenous labor but not the land that rural elites more highly value. When instead indigenous labor is valuable, central governments extend economic autonomy, which protects indigenous land but not their labor. Partial autonomy thus partly addresses indigenous demands without alienating rural elites.

1.3 Explaining indigenous demands for autonomy

As noted by Díaz-Polanco, autonomy involves a bargain between indigenous groups and the state; as such, it is “agreed upon and not merely granted.”³⁰ The first stage in this agreement involves a decision by central states to recognize autonomy. A second stage involves indigenous group responses to autonomy.

Scholars have long considered autonomy to be the central demand of indigenous groups, arising from two key experiences.³¹ First, state and private actors have often extracted indigenous land, labor, and capital. Autonomy—defined as a territorial space within the nation-state where “indigenous norms, authorities, and cultures are allowed to develop *without interference from the state or nonindigenous actors* (emphasis added)”³²—provides the promise of slowing or halting entirely this extraction.³² Second, central states have often lacked the will or ability to establish capacity in the rural areas where indigenous communities persist.³³ As a result, indigenous political and economic institutions have survived and thus present a viable substitute for an absent state.

Yet, because autonomy may have many different meanings, specific autonomy demands are often not formulated by a single organization representing all indigenous groups but rather by individual indigenous communities. The term “community,” which is common to

²⁸Eisinger (1973); Kitschelt (1986); Lipsky (1968); McAdam (2013); Tarrow (1983).

²⁹Engerman and Sokoloff (2012).

³⁰Polanco (2018: 95).

³¹Caplan (2009: 64); Cojtí Cuxil (1997); Díaz-Polanco (1998); McNeish (2013: 237); Van Cott (2001); Yashar (1998).

³²Van Cott (2010: 388).

³³Van Cott (2001: 31).

Table 1.2: Indigenous support for autonomy recognition in the Americas (selected cases)

Country	Law	Type of autonomy	Communities ¹ voting in favor	Total communities
Canada	Canada's Inherent Right Policy of 1995	Political	43	>600
United States	Indian Reorganization Act of 1934	Political	194	280
Bolivia	2009 Constitution & Ley 31 of 2010	Political	15	258
Ecuador	2008 Constitution	Political	4 ^b	>2,000
Peru	1920 Constitution & Supreme Resolution of August 28, 1925	Economic	326 ^c	>6,000s

^a In Canada and the United States, relevant territorial units are “bands” and “reservations,” respectively.

^b As of 2012

^c As of 1930

the literature on indigenous and peasant groups in the Americas,³⁴ refers to any territorially based unit that is governed—formally or informally—through longstanding, indigenous institutions. The boundaries of communities are defined by members often according to longstanding kinship ties, and they may or may not correspond to the indigenous administrative units recognized by governments (e.g., reserves, reservations, communes). Often, there exist hundreds or even thousands of indigenous communities located within a given country. A map of documented indigenous communities in the Americas is presented in Figure 1.3.

These communities have different preferences around autonomy rights. This divergence in preferences around autonomy—and particularly, *partial* autonomy—gives rise to subnational variation in the recognition of indigenous autonomy. Table 1.2 highlights a selection of historical and contemporary cases in which indigenous communities have diverged in their uptake of partial government reforms designed to recognize their autonomy. Systematic data from nineteenth-century efforts to recognize indigenous autonomy in Bolivia, Guatemala, and El Salvador is not available, but historical accounts suggests that indigenous communities in these cases also did not uniformly embrace autonomy.³⁵

Why do indigenous groups sometimes embrace autonomy and sometimes resist it? I argue that indigenous communities are more likely to resist recognition of partial—as opposed to full—autonomy. Yet, there exists variation in the degree of this resistance.

Two factors are important in shaping why indigenous communities resist partial autonomy. First, communities with greater exposure to extraction by rural elites will be more likely to seek and embrace autonomy because these groups are the ones that most need protection

³⁴See, e.g., Wolf (1957).

³⁵Carmack (2014: 101-102); Grieshaber (1977: 196); Lauria-Santiago (1999a: 47-48).




Figure 1.3: Documented indigenous communities in the Americas
Source: Dubertret and Alden Wily (2015)

from extraction. Second, exposure to extraction by the central state—past or present—increases the likelihood that a community will resist autonomy. This is because the central state is not viewed as a credible ally in preventing extraction and may use the extension of one type of autonomy—political or economic—to facilitate certain forms of extraction by non-indigenous outsiders. Economic autonomy, for example may gather indigenous populations into dense communities, which allows rural elites to more easily mobilize native workers for labor on large plantations, or *haciendas*. In Yucatán, Mexico, the recognition of indigenous communal landholding institutions after independence was intended “to [combat] farmhand scarcity and to contain the dispersion of Indians in the forest.” (Gabbert 2019: 37). Political autonomy can also facilitate certain forms of labor and capital extraction. In the colonial and post-independence periods, governments throughout Latin America recognized indigenous political authorities and relied on these officials to collect taxes and tribute levied solely on native communities.³⁶ Hale argues that autonomy “is losing traction as a path towards expansive political change, because it is increasingly entangled with the very structures of dominance that these communities intend to resist.”³⁷ Thus, autonomy rights—particularly when partially extended by a non-credible central state incumbent—may be self-defeating for and therefore rejected by indigenous groups.³⁸

1.4 The representational effects of indigenous autonomy

A key argument in support of autonomy involves the possible gains from legitimizing and empowering indigenous institutions. For example, across a variety of contexts, scholars have found that formally recognizing chiefs,³⁹ tribal councils,⁴⁰ communal landholding arrangements,⁴¹ and deliberative indigenous assemblies⁴² can have important and frequently positive welfare effects. In such cases, traditional, indigenous institutions are thought to be more responsive to local conditions and demands than state ones.

Yet, as discussed above, the effects of partial extensions of indigenous autonomy are complex, even facilitating extraction in some cases. Thus, autonomy may not, in all cases, empower indigenous institutions but can instead lead to their erosion. I argue that partial autonomy generally undermines the persistence of indigenous institutions and thereby, sub-

³⁶Platt (1982).

³⁷Hale (2011: 189).

³⁸Other criteria also play a role in shaping subnational variation in indigenous communities’ uptake of autonomy. In Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, indigenous communities must achieve a certain population threshold to receive state recognition of their political autonomy. Even when conditioning on eligible municipalities and communities, only around 5 percent have sought autonomy. Governments may also use somewhat more arbitrary criteria to decide which indigenous groups will be granted the right to govern themselves. The Lumbee of North Carolina, for example, are the largest American Indian tribe in the eastern United States; yet, the federal government fails to recognize their calls for tribal sovereignty on the grounds that they cannot prove their “continuous tribal existence” Henderson (2019).

³⁹Van der Windt et al. (2018); Baldwin (2013, 2015); Henn (2018).

⁴⁰Murtazashvili (2016); Washburn (1984); Kelly (1975); Mekeel (1944).

⁴¹Cramb and Wills 1990; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997, cf. Place and Hazell 1993.

⁴²Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2014); Hiskey and Goodman (2011).

stantive and descriptive political representation. Economic autonomy, through the titling of indigenous communal land, frees up indigenous community members to pursue production for external markets. In the absence of formally recognized indigenous political institutions, divisions emerge in indigenous communities that erode longstanding institutions of mutual assistance. Over the long-term, the absence of these institutions complicates coordinated indigenous mobilization to achieve political representation.

Political autonomy necessarily increases descriptive representation by empowering and legitimizing indigenous authorities. However, it may reduce substantive representation. Often, states have extended political autonomy by converting existing administrative units, whose boundaries may include many individual indigenous communities. This has created inter-community conflict in the process of defining and administering political autonomy, which has led to the continued political marginalization of small or otherwise weak communities. It has also created coordination problems that have thwarted effective local governance within autonomous units.

1.5 Theoretical and substantive contributions

The theory I develop in this dissertation aims to combine the indigenous politics literature with several other strands of scholarship in historical political economy. First, I draw on theories of intra-elite conflict in the Americas to explain government decisions to recognize indigenous autonomy. Scholars have increasingly noted the importance of conflict between landed elites and central states in shaping state-building and institutional development in Latin America⁴³ and the United States.⁴⁴ My theory highlights the pivotal role of rural elites in constraining central government decisions around recognizing indigenous groups' autonomy rights.

Second, I build on the pioneering work of scholars, such as Engerman, Sokoloff, Urquiola, and Acemoglu,⁴⁵ to illustrate the role of factor endowments in shaping historical institutional development. Specifically, I show that the relative value of indigenous land and labor—as assessed by rural elites—shaped the decision of central states to recognize certain forms of indigenous autonomy and not others as well as the long-term welfare implications of these decisions.

Third, the findings here contribute to a literature on the key role of extractive institutions in shaping the long-term economic prosperity of indigenous communities.⁴⁶ Specifically, the framework I develop in this dissertation highlights the historical legacies of extraction. Specifically, extraction of indigenous land and labor determines the supply- and demand-side emergence of autonomy, which in turn shapes native populations' long-term access to political representation.

⁴³Albertus (2015); Garfias (2018); Kurtz (2013); Soifer (2015).

⁴⁴Gailmard (2017).

⁴⁵Engerman et al. (2002).

⁴⁶Acemoglu et al. (2001); Mahoney (2010); Dell (2010).

Fourth, my theory and evidence provide substantive insights into the potential costs of autonomy, particularly when it is partially extended. I argue that offering either political or economic autonomy alone may increase indigenous groups' exposure to extraction and reduce indigenous groups' access to substantive political representation. However, granting full autonomy—that is, both political and economic—may obviate the challenges that arise when only one is offered.

Finally, beyond indigenous groups in the Americas, the insights from this dissertation may shed light on state-society relations in areas where government institutions have only a limited presence. In his study of the Zomia highlands of Southeast Asia, Scott argues that groups in the region maintain traditional institutions and norms that enable them to “keep the state at arm’s length.”⁴⁷ Like the indigenous groups in this dissertation, these groups seek greater political and economic autonomy over their affairs. However, this dissertation shows that the process of negotiating this freedom is not always clear. Sometimes, accepting state offers of greater autonomy may, in fact, invite more intervention from the state.

1.6 Empirical strategy

To evaluate my argument, I draw on insights from three main country cases in the Americas: Peru, the United States, and Bolivia. Peru serves as the primary empirical case. Throughout, I also draw heavily on evidence from a most-similar case, Bolivia, and a most-different case, the United States. Further, I employ a series of shadow cases, which include Canada, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Ecuador. I draw on evidence from the immediate post-independence period to the present.

For each of the components of this project, there emerge certain empirical challenges that I have attempted to address. The first section investigates the decision by central states to grant autonomy; this analysis requires systematic, cross-country data on indigenous autonomy from the early nineteenth century to the present. However, historians and country experts often focus only on case-specific factors that lead national-level incumbents to extend autonomy to indigenous groups. To confront this issue, I extensively reviewed historical monographs, along with archival data, to identify the universe of cases in which autonomy has been recognized in the Americas. I then used historical political, social, and economic data to investigate within-case variation around why incumbents sometimes extended autonomy and sometimes did not.

The second section of the argument—around demand-side variation in the emergence of autonomy—also presents a series of empirical challenges. Primarily, indigenous communities' exposure to extraction is not randomly assigned. Therefore, experiences with state-led or rural elite extraction may be correlated with observed and unobserved factors that also determine responses to autonomy offers. To obviate this issue, I draw on two natural experiments.

The first natural experiment investigates the effects of the Dawes Act of 1887, which opened up Native American land to privatization. According to the Act, indigenous land,

⁴⁷Scott (2009: x).

once allotted to individual tribe members, would be held in trust by the government for twenty-five years, after which point it could be sold by the indigenous individuals who possessed the land. Often, this process paved the way for opportunistic Western land developers to pick off Native American land, frequently through fraudulent or corrupt land sales. The repeal of the law in 1934—along with the stipulation that land could be sold only after being held in trust for twenty-five years—meant that reservations allotted prior to 1909 were more likely to lose land than those allotted after. Because no one knew the law would be repealed in 1934, allotment within a narrow window of time around the year 1909 can be treated as a natural experiment in which reservations were as-if randomly assigned to rural elite extraction. I then examine how this rural elite extraction shaped reservations' likelihood of embracing partial autonomy through the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.

In a second natural experiment, I examine the effects of state-led extraction on the embrace of partial autonomy by indigenous communities. Specifically, I exploit variation in Peruvian indigenous communities' exposure to unpaid labor conscription by the central government to build a massive road network in the 1920s. Only communities located in certain provinces could be drafted to work on the road. I use a geographic regression-discontinuity design to investigate how this state-led extraction affected indigenous groups' embrace of partial autonomy through the 1925 community recognition statute.

Finally, the third section of the dissertation investigates how autonomy has shaped longstanding indigenous institutions and access to representation. To test this theory, I first gathered data on how reciprocity institutions operate in native communities. This involved extensive fieldwork, participant observation, and one hundred semi-structured interviews with mayors, bureaucrats, and indigenous authorities in Peru and Bolivia. In these interviews, I learned about the role of reciprocity institutions in facilitating cross-community electoral coordination. I then collected systematic data on indigenous institutions and electoral coordination through a survey with over 300 Peruvian indigenous community presidents, which included a conjoint experiment and lab-in-the-field experiment. This evidence showed that 1) reciprocity institutions are more likely to survive in communities that did not historically have a communal title, and 2) these institutions serve as a coordinating device that allow communities to elect coethnic representatives to local government posts. Finally, I analyzed a regression discontinuity design to show that electing indigenous community members to local office increases communities' access to key public goods.

1.7 Plan for the dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 develops a theory of indigenous autonomy. Drawing on theories from historical political economy as well as the literature on state building and state capacity, I argue that the emergence of autonomy can be understood as a bargained outcome between indigenous elites, rural elites, and a central state incumbent. I then argue that the decision to embrace or resist the proposed extension of autonomy emerges from individual indigenous communities' experience with rural elite and central state extraction. I conclude by developing a theory around the long-run effects of

indigenous autonomy, particularly its effects on the persistence of indigenous institutions and coethnic political representation.

Chapter 3 offers an empirical assessment of supply-side variation in central state decisions to offer different forms of autonomy to indigenous groups. The chief focus is the nineteenth and early twentieth century. I draw on insights from the United States, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Mexico. In the later part of the chapter, I use an extended case study of modern Bolivia to show that the argument presented in Chapter 2 may also explain the emergence of autonomy in the contemporary period.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 investigate indigenous community responses to offers of autonomy drawing on two natural experiments from the United States and Peru, as well as qualitative and survey data from Bolivia. Chapter 4 analyzes the effects of rural elite extraction on the embrace of autonomy in the United States. Using as-if random variation in exposure to this private predation, I show that reservations that experienced greater extraction by non-indigenous elites were more likely to adopt the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, which provided partial autonomy to native communities.

In Chapter 5, I use a natural experiment to show that exposure to state-led extraction reduced the number of indigenous communities in a given district that sought autonomy. I then demonstrate that exposure to this extraction increased the likelihood that these communities defended their land through violent mobilization rather than by pursuing formal recognition.

Chapter 6 explores the joint effect of state-led and rural elite extraction in Bolivia. Drawing on evidence from a most-similar case comparison and survey data, I show that while rural-elite extraction appears to increase indigenous community incentives to embrace autonomy, that demand can be thwarted if indigenous groups also experience state-led extraction.

Chapters 7, 8, and 9 investigate the long-run effects of different forms of partial indigenous autonomy. Chapters 6 and 7 use surveys, archival data, and experiments with indigenous leaders in Peru to show that economic autonomy erodes traditional institutions of reciprocity and inhibits access to descriptive and substantive political representation.

Chapter 9 draws on the secondary literature from Bolivia and the United States to highlight how political autonomy can generate conflict among different indigenous communities and thus inhibit groups from achieving substantive political representation.

Chapter 10 concludes by outlining the utility of indigenous autonomy as the orienting concept in a broader research agenda on indigenous-state relations in the Americas and beyond. I apply the argument to understanding relations between the state and Afro-descendant groups, which have also long been the target of extraction and have sometimes demanded autonomy. I conclude with an assessment of the normative meaning and importance of autonomy in contemporary demand-making in multi-ethnic democracies.

Chapter 2

A Theory of Indigenous Autonomy

Indigenous groups have long experienced political and economic marginalization. In response, they have demanded government recognition of their autonomy rights, which they have, perhaps surprisingly, often achieved. In the contemporary period, these successes in achieving autonomy might be attributed to democratization, decentralization, and large-scale indigenous movements and organizations. Yet, even in periods when indigenous groups lacked such favorable conditions, they were often able to achieve government-recognized autonomy. These institutions of autonomy include collectively held communal land titles as well as state-sanctioned indigenous courts, village councils, and tribal assemblies. What explains the emergence of these forms of indigenous autonomy, and what are their long-term effects?

In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework that considers strategic decisions taken by three key actors: indigenous elites, central state incumbents, and rural, non-indigenous elites. Indigenous elites desire improved socioeconomic welfare for their communities, along with expanded authority over their communities' political, economic, and cultural affairs. Central state incumbents prioritize maintaining or expanding their power by rewarding allies and suppressing key threats to their tenure in office. Rural, non-indigenous elites seek to maximize their wealth; in this case, the primary technology that enables wealth accumulation is the extraction of indigenous groups' land and labor.

I argue that central state incumbents extend or withhold recognition of indigenous autonomy based on the relative political power of indigenous and rural elites. The strategic importance of indigenous elites, which can be measured by their ability to mobilize their members to provide electoral or military support for the incumbent, determines the benefit incumbents receive from recognizing autonomy. The ability of the rural elite to exercise instrumental and structural influence determines the cost to incumbents of recognizing autonomy.

Central state incumbents only recognize indigenous autonomy rights when two conditions jointly obtain: indigenous elites are strategically important allies for the incumbent and the rural elite does *not* have substantial instrumental and structural power. The exact form that autonomy takes depends on both the precise level of weakness of the rural elite as

well as the extractive interests of the rural elite.

I then explore subnational variation in the presence of indigenous autonomy. Following an offer from central states to recognize indigenous autonomy rights, individual indigenous communities then decide whether to embrace or resist these offers; the outcome depends on indigenous communities' exposure to extraction by non-indigenous actors. Exposure to rural elite extraction increases the likelihood that a given community will embrace autonomy, while exposure to state-led extraction increases the likelihood of resistance. In the long-term, I show that the recognition of different forms of autonomy has important and lasting effects for the descriptive and substantive representation of indigenous groups.

2.1 Existing explanations

The literature on indigenous-state relations tends to emphasize three factors that determine the emergence of indigenous autonomy. A first set of explanations focuses on the role of successful grassroots mobilization by native groups to demand greater authority. Movements, tribes, and communities with better organizational capacity, financial resources, and expertise have been the most successful in obtaining government recognition of their autonomy rights.¹ A second set of explanations involves the ideological persuasions of government officials: twentieth-century populist and neoliberal governments generally granted more autonomy than contemporary developmentalist governments.² Finally, scholars have examined the role of "negotiating sites," such as constitutions and peace agreements, that emerge in the aftermath of civil conflict or sudden political change; such institutional openings can provide the opportunity space for indigenous groups to successfully demand autonomy.³

These existing explanations, however, face four key limitations. First, most of this research examines the *capacity* of indigenous groups to successfully demand autonomy; often, this work draws heavily on social movement theory. My research, however, attempts to understand the incentives of states and indigenous communities to extend or resist autonomy, respectively. Second, scholars have often focused solely on the contemporary emergence of indigenous authority and in so doing limit their attention to causal factors that have been operative only in recent decades, like plurinational constitutions and national-level indigenous movements. In contrast, I consider the key role of historical factors and experiences, which may remain relevant for explaining the emergence and effects of contemporary forms of indigenous autonomy. Third, notwithstanding certain regional comparisons between highland and lowland areas in Andean South America, most scholarship focuses only on national-level variation in the emergence of indigenous autonomy. This dissertation examines both national and subnational variation in the presence of indigenous autonomy. Finally, the existing research generally treats all forms of autonomy as a single category; as such, it offers limited

¹Andolina (2003); Evans (2011b,a); Jackson and Warren (2005); Yashar (2005).

²Brysk (2000); González (2015); Jackson and Warren (2005); Mayorga (2011); Sieder (2002); Tockman and Cameron (2014); Veltmeyer (2013); Yashar (1999).

³Van Cott (2001). Yashar (1998), however, observes that civil conflict itself tends to undermine indigenous authority.

insight into why different *types* of autonomy emerge. As I show in this dissertation, the form autonomy takes matters for long-term indigenous political and economic welfare.

2.2 The supply-side emergence of indigenous autonomy

In this section, I examine the decision of central state incumbents to recognize indigenous autonomy. I focus on explaining only those cases where autonomy is meaningfully offered—through legal provisions that governments attempt to implement and enforce. I argue that the decision of central states to extend autonomy is shaped by the relative influence of indigenous and rural elites. The potential benefits of autonomy are shaped by the strategic importance of indigenous elites for incumbents. When native leaders hold considerable political influence—often through membership in the governing coalition—central states stand to gain from recognizing indigenous autonomy.

Yet, meeting indigenous elite demands for autonomy may also incur a cost as incumbents are acting against the preferences of the rural, non-indigenous elite, which includes mineral interests, large estate owners, and land developers. For the rural elite, state recognition of indigenous autonomy presents a zero-sum proposition. Rural elites prioritize the extraction of indigenous land and labor as a means of amassing wealth. Native workers can serve as valuable labor on large estates, and indigenous communities sometimes possess agriculturally productive or resource-rich land that is highly valued by agrarian and mineral interests, respectively.

By preventing external intervention in indigenous communities, autonomy thwarts this private predation. If rural elites have limited instrumental and structural power, the costs of acting against their preferences is fairly low; however, if they have substantial power, the costs to alienating them may be quite high.

Autonomy may also shape the incumbent's cost-benefit calculation by enabling or thwarting state-led extraction. For example, incumbents may have an interest in both cultivating indigenous communities' support and extracting those same communities' resources. The former strategy provides military or electoral support for the incumbent while the latter supplies incumbents with financial resources or manpower that can be deployed to maintain, project, and expand power. While autonomy may allow incumbents to achieve both goals—as I discuss below—these two aims may also conflict. In such cases, cultivating the support of indigenous communities will generally take priority over extractive aims.

The benefits of autonomy

Autonomy has long been the central demand of indigenous groups. Indigenous elites, seeking to improve the welfare of the groups they lead, have often lobbied central states to recognize their communities' right to autonomy.

Central states will only address demands for autonomy, however, when there exists a political incentive to do so—specifically, when indigenous elites are strategically important allies of the incumbent. Perhaps surprisingly, indigenous groups often served as a valuable constituency for nineteenth and early twentieth-century presidents in the Americas. In some

cases, indigenous groups mobilized their electoral support behind certain candidates for national office. More commonly, and especially in Latin America, indigenous elites mobilized their communities as military support for aspiring and incumbent national leaders. Central states also had clear incentives to ally with indigenous groups for financial reasons; many post-independence governments faced revenue shortfalls. Low fiscal capacity prevented incumbent governments from effectively monopolizing the use of force within their borders, which provided a threat to the longevity of incumbents. However, through alliances with indigenous elites, incumbents could relatively easily collect revenue in the form of head taxes from native communities.⁴

For presidents who successfully gain power with the support of native populations the extension of autonomy satisfies a demand of a key ally and therefore provides a substantial boost to the incumbent's goal of maintaining power. By meeting indigenous demands, incumbents preempt potential defection from the governing coalition, thus allowing them to maintain control over the regime. When indigenous groups are not a political ally of the incumbent, central states gain little from recognizing the autonomy of indigenous communities.

Autonomy may also offer certain extractive benefits for the central state. Incumbents themselves care about extraction as the accumulation of resources may serve as a means of increasing their tenure in office. The process of recognizing autonomy may generate linkages between indigenous elites and government officials that facilitate state-led extraction.⁵ Additionally, in applying for autonomy from the state, indigenous groups may become more "legible," providing valuable information that can facilitate the government's extractive efforts.⁶ Finally, autonomy may protect indigenous groups from rural elite extraction, which can also serve the incumbent's interest. Autonomy may thwart the unrestrained accumulation of wealth by private actors that could later be deployed to electorally or militarily challenge the incumbent government.

The cost of autonomy

While the benefits of autonomy are determined by the political power of indigenous elites, the costs are shaped by the political influence of the rural elite. This influence depends on the exercise of two closely connected forms of power: instrumental and structural.⁷ First, rural elites may leverage their instrumental power, which is their ability to directly influence politics. In earlier historical moments, individual rural elites deployed their financial resources to amass armies that could violently challenge incumbents who opposed their interests. In later eras, large estate owners often mobilized their rural labor force in support of preferred candidates in elections.⁸

⁴Platt (1982); Thurner (1997); Van Aken (1981).

⁵The dynamics here closely resemble those of indirect colonial rule and contemporary development broker partnerships in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baldwin 2015).

⁶Scott (2020).

⁷Lindblom (1977).

⁸Albertus (2017); Baland and Robinson (2008); Mares (2015: 84).

In addition to instrumental power, rural elites may also rely on a second source of power: their structural influence. When rural elites account for a substantial portion of economic production, their well-being is viewed as closely tied to the success of the national economy more generally. Therefore, to the extent government policies “harm” rural elites, they may also be seen as detrimental to the country’s economic success, which may be closely tied to the incumbent’s own long-term prospects for staying in office.

The instrumental and structural power of rural elites has waxed and waned over time. For example, in the early nineteenth century, landowners were relatively weak in Latin America, as the wars of independence had decimated infrastructure and markets that would have otherwise promoted commercial agriculture. Furthermore, divisions along ideological or regional lines prevented the emergence of a unified rural elite group that could jointly deploy their power.⁹ Yet, by the late nineteenth century, primary product export booms had increased the economic power of rural interests and united them as a class. In the United States, the Civil War and industrialization served to weaken the structural and instrumental power of the rural elite in the South. However, in the Western United States, where the majority of native tribes resided by the end of the nineteenth century, land developers and landowners remained a disproportionately powerful interest group until the urbanization of the western United States in the early twentieth century.

The stronger the rural elite in a given country, the greater the cost of indigenous autonomy as rural elites can mobilize their considerable instrumental and structural power to thwart policies proposed by the central state. In extreme cases, this may involve removal of the incumbent in favor of a politician more willing to represent rural elite demands.

The extension of autonomy

In most cases, central states have refused to recognize autonomy for one of two reasons. First, when the rural elite is strong, they can mobilize their substantial instrumental and structural power to successfully block central state efforts to recognize autonomy. Successfully doing so allows them to engage in extraction of indigenous land and labor. Second, when indigenous elites are in a weak strategic position, central states have no incentive to meet their demand for greater autonomy as doing so does not provide a significant benefit to the incumbent.

There exist two situations in which central states will be more likely to recognize indigenous autonomy. First, when indigenous elites are politically powerful and rural elites are politically weak, central states have an incentive to fully meet indigenous demands for political *and* economic autonomy; doing so allows central states to reap a large benefit at a minimal cost. Second, when indigenous elites are politically strong and rural elites are moderately strong, central states have an incentive to provide only partial autonomy. Even though rural elites are not especially strong, central states are hesitant to risk alienating them by offering full autonomy; disregarding the preferences of rural elites could unite them as a

⁹Often, during this period, political divisions emerged from loyalty to regional strongmen, or *caudillos*. A “network of personal loyalties” tied landowners to particular caudillos (Safford 1985: 371).

Table 2.1: Central state incentives to adopt full autonomy

		Strategic importance of indigenous elites:	
		<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
Structural and instrumental power of rural elite:	<i>Low</i>	Low benefits & low cost <i>Prediction: No autonomy</i>	High benefits & low cost <i>Prediction: Full autonomy</i>
	<i>Moderate</i>	Low benefits & moderate cost <i>Prediction: No autonomy</i>	High benefits & moderate cost <i>Prediction: Partial autonomy</i>
	<i>High</i>	Low benefits & high cost <i>Prediction: No autonomy</i>	High benefits & high cost <i>Prediction: No autonomy</i>

class against the incumbent. Therefore, incumbents may offer a form of *partial* autonomy—either political or economic. This institutional outcome partly meets indigenous demands for autonomy but—as I discuss below—does so in a way that does not generate substantial opposition from the rural elite. Specifically, central states extend autonomy in a way that protects the indigenous resource *least* valued by the rural elite. These predictions are outlined in Table 2.1, which provides the theorized incentives of central states to adopt full autonomy (i.e., political *and* economic).

The logic of partial autonomy

When central state incumbents have decided to recognize indigenous autonomy, they have most often done so in a partial way. Only rarely has the rural elite been sufficiently weak that full autonomy has been recognized. Instead, incumbents often decide to grant either political or economic autonomy. In this section, I argue that in these cases incumbents recognize the form of autonomy that is least opposed by the rural elite.

Political and economic autonomy provide differing degrees of protection for indigenous factor endowments. The two main indigenous resources that rural elites seek to extract are land and labor. Economic autonomy provides protection for indigenous land by providing native communities with a government-enforced and often inalienable, collectively held title. On the other hand, political autonomy, or self-governance, provides protection for indigenous labor in two ways. First, central states often pass laws at the national level that prohibit rural elites from forcing indigenous communities into unpaid labor on large estates. Yet, lacking an official at the local level to enforce, such laws are often ignored. In recognizing indigenous leaders as legitimate political authorities, laws against unpaid labor extraction can be more




Figure 2.1: Factor endowments and partial autonomy: Theoretical predictions

effectively enforced. Second, self-governance often allows indigenous groups to administer their own legal codes and judicial systems. Indigenous groups can thus define and punish crimes perpetrated by non-indigenous individuals against community members. While such courts and legal codes have not been able to adjudicate land disputes between indigenous and non-indigenous actors, they can much more effectively prevent labor extraction.

The form that partial autonomy takes depends crucially on the relative value of indigenous factor endowments to the rural elite. Specifically, when rural elites most value indigenous land, central states will generally extend protection for indigenous labor through political autonomy. Conversely, when rural elites most value indigenous labor, central states will more likely extend protection for indigenous communal land through economic autonomy. By recognizing partial autonomy in this way, central states can achieve a modest political benefit of satisfying a demand from indigenous elites while minimizing the cost incurred from alienating the rural elite.

The above theoretical argument serves to explain why autonomy rarely emerged in the Americas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In many cases, at least one of the following political conditions was present to thwart the emergence of autonomy: a rural elite with substantial structural and instrumental power or an indigenous elite with limited political influence. When, however, indigenous elites were strategically important for the incumbent and rural elites had less substantial structural and instrumental power, autonomy could emerge, albeit in differing forms. Most often, rural elites maintained a moderate degree of political influence, giving rise to only partial recognition of autonomy by the central state; such efforts protected only the indigenous resource—land or labor—that was least valued by the rural elite.

2.3 The demand-side emergence of indigenous autonomy

How have individual indigenous communities responded to offers of autonomy by central states? While some communities—of which there may be hundreds or even thousands within a country—have embraced government offers of autonomy, others have resisted them, giving rise to subnational variation in the presence of these arrangements. In the United States, nearly two-thirds of native reservations adopted the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, an example of political autonomy. Similarly, many Guatemalan indigenous communities sought greater political authority in the 1840s and 1850s. In other cases, indigenous groups have resisted state offers of greater autonomy. In Peru, only five percent of communities initially sought to formalize their communal land when offered the chance in the 1920s, and in Bolivia, Canada, and Ecuador, fewer than ten percent of native communities have sought political autonomy. Variation in the decision to embrace autonomy emerges because the agreements reached by a certain subset of indigenous elites may not represent the interests of all communities—or sometimes even the communities that these leaders purport to represent. This section argues that indigenous communities' decisions to embrace or resist autonomy derive from their experiences with extraction by the rural elite and central state.

As discussed above, extraction plays a central role in shaping the supply-side emergence of autonomy. First, it determines the potential gains from autonomy for the central state. The process of recognizing autonomy can facilitate the incumbent's own extractive efforts by increasing linkages between indigenous elites and the central state. It can also prevent an opposed rural elite from engaging in unfettered extraction, halting an accumulation of wealth that could be deployed to challenge the incumbent. Extraction shapes the costs of central state offers of autonomy as well. Rural elites fear autonomy will thwart their ability to predate on indigenous resources; therefore, when sufficiently powerful, they can mobilize to constrain or block autonomy.

An extractive logic also underlies demand-side variation in the emergence of autonomy. Exposure to extraction by rural elites shapes indigenous communities' *gains* from autonomy. Communities that experience more extraction by rural elites will assign a higher benefit to autonomy, which provides some protection against private predation. Communities that are relatively less exposed to rural elite extraction will assign less weight to this potential benefit of autonomy. Thus, exposure to rural elite extraction should generally increase the likelihood indigenous groups will embrace autonomy offers.

On the other hand, exposure to extraction by the central state determines the *costs* of autonomy for native communities. While much of my attention thus far has been devoted to rural elite extraction, central states may also participate in extraction as a way to achieve mercantilist, capitalist, or developmentalist goals. Exposure to state extraction should not be taken to mean extraction by the incumbent. Often, exposure to extraction predates the incumbent who offers autonomy. Nevertheless, having experienced recent extraction by the state plays a critical role in shaping individual communities' responses to autonomy.

Any attempt by the central state to recognize autonomy may have the hidden goal of

facilitating its own extractive efforts. Thus, accepting autonomy can carry certain risks for indigenous communities. To provide formal recognition for indigenous institutions, central states may send officials and surveyors to collect information on indigenous communities; this information may make indigenous communities more legible to the state and therefore more vulnerable to state-led extraction.¹⁰ Furthermore, the process of recognition may increase ties between state officials and indigenous leaders in ways that ultimately facilitate greater extraction of indigenous resources. The Indian tribute, a colonial-era head tax collected on indigenous subjects in Spanish America, provides one example of such an alliance between indigenous leaders and Crown officials; indigenous leaders were granted authority in exchange for extracting wealth from their community members, which were sent to the Crown.¹¹

Autonomy therefore carries the risk of making indigenous groups more susceptible to state-led extraction. For indigenous communities that have been subject to state extraction, the probability of incurring this cost is judged to be relatively high as state officials are viewed as non-credible. Conversely, communities not affected by state-led extraction are more likely to judge the cost of autonomy to be relatively low. Thus, exposure to state-led extraction should generally increase the likelihood that indigenous groups resist autonomy offers.

There exist roughly four categories of communities: those that experience state and rural elite extraction, those that experience neither type of extraction, and those that experience one type but not another. The predictions around these different types of communities are outlined in Table 2.2. For each of these community types, I assume a status-quo bias; in other words, in the case of offsetting costs and benefits, communities will reject autonomy.¹²

For communities that experience extraction by neither states nor rural elites, both the costs and benefits of autonomy are relatively low. Because of loss aversion, I expect these communities to *weakly* resist autonomy. In other words, when given the opportunity to adopt autonomy, these communities will generally but not uniformly reject autonomy.

For communities that experience both types of extraction, the benefits of autonomy are potentially high, but the costs are also high. Because these communities are also loss averse, these communities will weakly resist autonomy.

For communities that experience extraction by the rural elites but not by the central state, the perceived costs of autonomy are low and the benefits potentially high. Thus, these communities will strongly embrace autonomy. In other words, the highest uptake of autonomy should be observed among these communities. Conversely, for communities that experience extraction by the central state but not by rural elites, the opposite prediction holds. The potential benefits are low and the cost is high, meaning that these indigenous communities will generally have a strong preference against autonomy. These communities should be the most likely to resist offers of autonomy.

¹⁰Scott (2020).

¹¹Platt (1982); Thurner (1993).

¹²Interviews conducted by the author suggest that—independent of their experiences with extraction—most communities are skeptical of central state action and prefer to maintain the status quo.

Table 2.2: Theoretical Predictions: Indigenous Community Response to Autonomy

		Exposure to rural elite extraction:	
		<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
Exposure to state-led extraction:	<i>Low</i>	Low benefits & low cost <i>Prediction: Weak resistance</i>	High benefits & low cost <i>Prediction: Strong embrace</i>
	<i>High</i>	Low benefits & high cost <i>Prediction: Strong resistance</i>	High benefits & high cost <i>Prediction: Weak resistance</i>

Thus, three main factors shape how indigenous groups respond to autonomy offers from the central government. First, exposure to extraction by the rural elite generally increases the likelihood that communities will embrace autonomy. Second, exposure to extraction by the central state generally increases the likelihood that communities will resist autonomy. Finally, there exists a status quo bias among indigenous communities. Due to these three factors, I have argued that indigenous communities will generally resist autonomy unless two factors jointly hold: a community experiences rural elite extraction *and* does not experience extraction by the central state.

Addressing rival explanations

In addition to the theory I present above, there exist potential alternative explanations that merit careful discussion. First, variation in the emergence of indigenous autonomy may be due to the fact that indigenous groups constitute a much larger share of the population—and perhaps electorate—in some countries than in others. For example, larger indigenous groups may be better able to use their demographic and electoral weight to extract benefits, such as autonomy, from the state. Perhaps, the opposite is true, as smaller groups are more capable of collective action.¹³ In the next chapter, however, I show that autonomy often varies within country, across time. Therefore, massive cross-country differences in the demographic weight of indigenous groups cannot alone explain variation in the presence of autonomy.

Second, autonomy may emerge through institutional change (e.g., democracy, decentralization) that allows for improved indigenous representation in politics. For example, the presence of representative institutions may allow indigenous groups to more effectively demand autonomy. As I show in many of the cases in the next chapter, however, central

¹³Olson (1971).

states often offered autonomy prior to indigenous groups achieving meaningful political representation. Furthermore, after the widespread adoption of democracy and decentralization, there still exists cross-national and over-time variation in the presence and type of indigenous autonomy.

Third, autonomy may emerge in response to shifting ideologies and ideas around state control and state building. In the eighteenth-century United States, intellectuals and politicians debated the relative merits of a federal versus unitary state. Similar debates occurred in nineteenth-century Latin America, as newly independent republics vacillated between what might be labeled direct and indirect rule. Thus, autonomy may emerge in response to the centralizing tendencies of particular incumbents. Those that favor more decentralized, federal, or indirect rule may be more likely to recognize indigenous autonomy. In fact, there is no discernible relationship between the state-building ideology of central states and the emergence of autonomy. As I discuss in the next chapter, offers of autonomy emerged under centralizing and decentralizing presidents.

Fourth, the presence of an indigenous president may determine the emergence of autonomy. Perhaps coethnic favoritism, shared experiences, and reduced racial prejudice would make an indigenous president more likely to recognize autonomy than a non-indigenous president. In the limited historical cases in which indigenous individuals obtained national-level executive office, this does not appear to be the case. In the next chapter, for example, I show that indigenous presidents Benito Juárez and Porfirio Díaz presided over a large-scale destruction of native communal lands, while a non-indigenous president, Rafael Carrera, ushered in a “golden age” of indigenous autonomy in Guatemala.

Finally, the emergence of autonomy may be thwarted by weak state institutions.¹⁴ Where institutional capacity is limited, we might expect that states are unable to meaningfully ensure indigenous autonomy; native groups may therefore decide to resist autonomy offers, fearing that a weak state will not offer protection for their longstanding institutions. In reality, however, when governments offered indigenous groups autonomy in very weak institutional contexts, such as nineteenth-century El Salvador, Guatemala, and Bolivia, indigenous groups broadly embraced these offers. Autonomy has also been offered and subsequently rejected by indigenous communities in relatively strong institutional contexts, such as contemporary Canada and—to a lesser degree—the United States in the 1930s.

2.4 Consequences of partial indigenous autonomy

Indigenous groups generally desire autonomy because it empowers and reinforces longstanding institutions that are viewed as viable substitutes for an absent state. As such, autonomy might be expected to improve the quality of local governance and thereby promote indigenous socioeconomic welfare. Yet, as the discussion above highlights, autonomy when partially extended can have important costs; these include making indigenous communities more susceptible to future extractive efforts by the state.

¹⁴Brinks et al. (2019).

In this section, I argue that partial forms of autonomy may have a second, unexpected cost of reducing indigenous groups' access to substantive and descriptive representation. Most of these effects could not have been anticipated at the time that indigenous groups decided to embrace or resist autonomy. In most of the historical cases I consider in this dissertation, indigenous groups could not foresee the decentralization and democratization reforms that would eventually grant them a fuller political voice and thus access to political representation.

Perhaps surprisingly, economic autonomy serves to ultimately erode certain longstanding reciprocity institutions, replacing them with markets. Over the long-term, this erosion of these traditional institutions has reduced indigenous groups' access to descriptive and substantive representation. Political autonomy has generally proven more positive for indigenous groups' *descriptive* political representation but has had more negative effects for their substantive representation.

Legacies of economic autonomy

In this section, I argue that economic autonomy, extended through the titling of communal land, has served as a barrier to indigenous groups achieving political representation. Informally occupying communal land, on the other hand, increases indigenous groups' access to representation. Traditional reciprocity institutions play a central role in explaining this relationship. Perhaps surprisingly, economic autonomy erodes longstanding reciprocity institutions, which undermines indigenous groups' access to political representation.

Reciprocity institutions have long structured the social, political, and economic life of native tribes, kinship groups, and communities in the Americas.¹⁵ These institutions can take one of two forms. First, they may be *individual-to-individual* in which one community member performs a service for another—such as harvesting crops or defending another member's land against invasion from outsiders—with the agreement that the recipient will offer the provider a similarly useful form of future assistance. Examples include *ayni* in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia; *ké'í* among the Navajo in the United States;¹⁶ and *mano vuelta* in Mexico and Central America. A second type of reciprocity institution involves individuals performing a service for their community—such as repairing a road or building a school—in exchange for continued access to communal land. In Andean South America, these institutions are called *minka*¹⁷ and *mita*, while similar institutions called *faena* also exist throughout Latin America. These reciprocal exchanges are not simply norms; rather, they are enforced by indigenous leaders, elders, and councils, who can threaten non-compliers with sanctions such as imprisonment, flogging, and loss of access to communal land.¹⁸

When communal land is informally held, indigenous groups possess a dual incentive to maintain longstanding reciprocity institutions. The insecurity of land tenure poses an existential threat for indigenous groups. As individuals or a group, community members may

¹⁵Polanyi (1944) notes the broader role of reciprocity institutions in shaping pre-capitalist societies.

¹⁶Austin (2009: 145-146).

¹⁷*Minka* is also called *minga* in Ecuador.

¹⁸These explicit punishments are further bolstered by social sanctioning of non-compliers.

encounter non-indigenous farmers, miners, or developers who desire their land. Traditional institutions of reciprocity provide a form of social insurance that may guard against this external threat.¹⁹ Specifically, if one member is threatened, all members may mobilize to defend the land of that member.

A second factor may also account for the positive relationship between informally held communal land and the preservation of reciprocity institutions. Indigenous groups have often possessed land informally as part of an implicit or explicit bargain with the state: indigenous groups pay the government a tax—or tribute—in exchange for the government guaranteeing their access to communal land.²⁰ Communal production is often necessary for native groups to meet this tax obligation, and reciprocity institutions facilitate this production.²¹ Thus, indigenous groups have a clear incentive to invest in and maintain reciprocity institutions absent communal land titles.

Where they are maintained, these reciprocity institutions serve a critical function in facilitating coethnic electoral coordination.²² First, they may limit the number of indigenous candidates who run for office in a given jurisdiction. The existence of reciprocity institutions facilitates turn-taking among communities. Indigenous communities often decide among themselves that a candidate from a given community will run for elective office at the local level. Voters from other communities within that electoral circumscription support the chosen candidate, knowing that their community will have the opportunity to nominate someone from their community in the future; when that person runs, he or she will likewise have the support of other indigenous communities.²³ Without reciprocity institutions, communities could not credibly commit to such turn-taking. In this way, these longstanding institutions—often translated from indigenous languages as “today for you, tomorrow for me”—play a key role in limiting the supply of indigenous candidates who may run and thereby preventing a division of the indigenous vote among many coethnic candidates for elective office.

Reciprocity institutions also facilitate indigenous electoral coordination in a second way. A key challenge for political candidates in electoral democracies involves their inability to credibly commit to fulfilling their campaign promises.²⁴ Voters often do not know how much—if at all—they can trust individual candidates to comply with their stated platforms. The preservation of reciprocity institutions, however, provides a useful commitment device.

¹⁹As Polanyi (1944) notes, reciprocal norms are a “frequent feature of social organization” in traditional societies and “[help] to safeguard both production and sustenance” (47-48).

²⁰Larson (2004); Platt (1982); Thurner (1997).

²¹Golte (1980); Mayer and Alberti (1974).

²²Habyarimana et al. (2006, 2009).

²³Such behavior mirrors national-level “substantive” political pacts that emerged as a way of alternating power among competing parties or “proto parties” in twentieth-century Venezuela (Przeworski 1991: 90). Przeworski notes that a danger of these pacts “is that they will become cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and distribute the benefits of political power among the insiders” (Przeworski 1991: 90). While a potential “danger” in national politics, at the local level, these factors can work to benefit traditionally marginalized indigenous communities—perhaps to the detriment of classically powerful non-indigenous elites.

²⁴Keefer and Vlaicu (2008).

Specifically, candidates from indigenous communities where reciprocity institutions are preserved can credibly commit to reciprocating votes with post-election distributive benefits. The existence of reciprocity institutions thus generates preferences among indigenous voters for candidates who adhere to these institutions. Coupled with their previously stated role in reducing the supply of indigenous candidates, reciprocity institutions coordinate indigenous voters' support around common coethnic candidates for elective office.

Whereas the informal occupation of land reinforces these traditional reciprocity institutions, the extension of communal land titles poses a threat to them. When the central government grants communal land titles, native groups no longer face a shared goal of ensuring group survival. Instead, they can shift attention to either of two tasks that will erode reciprocity institutions.

First, indigenous groups may orient their production toward external markets instead of producing for survival or subsistence as is the case when land is held informally. This marketization of communal land may crowd out incentives by community members to invest in longstanding reciprocity institutions.²⁵ Guillet, for example, observes that reciprocal labor institutions will survive only where "market forces have not yet penetrated sufficiently to make wage labor an efficient and available alternative."²⁶ Reciprocity institutions, which emerge and are maintained in the context of a subsistence ethnic, may therefore erode when individuals respond instead to a profit motive.²⁷

Second, prior to communal land titles being issued, the existence of a shared goal of ensuring survival binds individual members of indigenous groups together. In these contexts, traditional institutions of reciprocity are mobilized to defend indigenous land. Once land security is assured through the receipt of a title, the demand for these institutions is greatly reduced. Furthermore, lacking a common goal of defending communal land, indigenous groups may become internally divided, and conflict may emerge over the exercise of power. These internal divisions will further erode reciprocity institutions. Thus, whereas informally held communal land reinforces reciprocity institutions, titled communal land may undermine them with negative implications for native groups' coordination to achieve political representation.

My theory therefore predicts that informally held communal land will increase indigenous groups' access to political representation. These landholding arrangements preserve traditional institutions of reciprocity, which help native groups overcome commitment problems to mobilize around common coethnic candidates for local office. When elected, indigenous candidates reciprocate this electoral support with distributive benefits. Communal land titles, on the other hand, erode traditional institutions of reciprocity by removing a shared interest in survival that otherwise binds groups together. This failure of reciprocity institutions complicates indigenous groups' ability to coordinate to improve their political representation.

²⁵ As I discuss in the conclusion, however, market integration may also have the positive benefit of increasing indigenous groups' income.

²⁶ Guillet (1980: 158).

²⁷ Migdal (1974); Paige (1978); Scott (1977); Thompson (1971).

A long literature suggests that when candidates from a given ethnic group are elected to political office, their coethnics experience a public goods dividend.²⁸ Yet, research has recently challenged whether this finding holds for particularly marginalized groups²⁹ In the case of indigenous groups, scholars have often observed that the scarcity of government investment in indigenous communities is driven by low levels of indigenous representation, especially in local governments.³⁰ I argue that indigenous group solidarity and the persistence of traditional institutions facilitates the provision of benefits from officeholders to coethnic constituents. Specifically, because of longstanding reciprocity institutions, indigenous mayors know that a gift to an indigenous community today is more likely to be reciprocated with electoral support from that community tomorrow.

Legacies of political autonomy

By definition, political autonomy increases indigenous groups' descriptive representation—at least at the local level. Native authorities receive recognition from the state and gain valuable power over the allocation of distributive benefits. Yet, how does this increased political authority shape indigenous groups' substantive representation?

I argue that political autonomy has generally not improved indigenous groups' substantive representation—as measured by their access to needed public goods and services. Central states have often extended political autonomy to existing administrative units, such as municipalities, reserves, and reservations, which include multiple, diverse native communities. In Oaxaca, Mexico, for example, partial political autonomy was granted at the municipal level.³¹ However, as Figure 2.2 illustrates, many municipalities in Oaxaca had more than one indigenous community.

By forcing diverse communities to decide upon, implement, and administer a single autonomy framework, states encourage one of two outcomes. First, a single community may emerge as dominant, imposing its structures and institutions on the other communities within the autonomous jurisdiction. Second, a patchwork arrangement may emerge where different institutions are adapted from each community.

Either outcome presents challenges to indigenous groups achieving effective substantive political representation. If one community is dominant over the others, it may benefit from autonomy, but smaller or weaker communities will more likely remain marginalized and excluded from politics. In the case where autonomy emerges from a patchwork collection of various communities' institutions, coordination problems may emerge across groups, and a medley of dissimilar institutions may thwart the effective and efficient administration of local governance.

Given that inter-community cleavages nearly always emerge prior to the decision of indigenous groups to embrace autonomy, one might wonder whether these divisions also affect

²⁸Habyarimana et al. (2009, 2006); Alesina et al. (1999).

²⁹Dunning and Nilekani (2013); Kustov and Pardelli (2018); Lee (2018).

³⁰Freire et al. (2015); Hoffay and Rivas (2016); Htun (2016); Peru Comisión Ejecutiva Interministerial de Cooperación Popular (1964); Van Cott (2005).

³¹Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2014).




Figure 2.2: Map of municipalities in Oaxaca, Mexico by number of communities

indigenous communities' initial decision to embrace or resist autonomy. Evidence suggests no association between inter-community conflict and support for autonomy.³² Furthermore, communities within a given area often face a shared external threat from extractive groups, and this threat may unify communities in responses to autonomy. Only later, once autonomy has been embraced, will divisions again emerge in salient ways.

Thus, partial forms of autonomy suffer from a key long-term cost. Both tend to undermine the substantive representation of some or all indigenous communities. The result is a continued underprovision of certain local public goods and key government services in many indigenous communities.

³²Taylor (1980: 58).

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have developed a theoretical framework for analyzing not only the historical emergence of different forms of indigenous autonomy but also their long-term legacies. The theory highlights the primary role of extraction in shaping both the decisions by central states to recognize indigenous groups' right to autonomy and the choice by individual native communities to either embrace or resist autonomy when offered. I argue that the emergence of these different forms of autonomy across contexts has had lasting implications for indigenous groups' access to descriptive and substantive representation. The central theoretical predictions outlined in this chapter are summarized in Table 2.3. In the remaining chapters, I empirically test these predictions. The next chapter offers a qualitative test of the first set of predictions around the emergence of autonomy, drawing on data from a number of historical cases throughout the Americas.

Table 2.3: Summary of testable theoretical predictions

Section of Argument	Testable prediction	Evidence
<i>Extension of autonomy (Supply-side)</i>	When indigenous elites are strategically important <i>and</i> rural elites have low instrumental/structural power, central states generally extend full autonomy.	Within-country historical and contemporary case studies (<i>Chapter 3</i>)
	Partial autonomy: When rural elites most value indigenous land (labor), central states will be more likely to recognize political (economic) autonomy.	
<i>Extension of autonomy (Demand-side)</i>	When indigenous groups experience extraction by rural elites but not by the central state, they are more likely to strongly embrace offers of autonomy.	Natural experiment from the United States (<i>Chapter 4</i>)
	When indigenous groups experience extraction by the central state but not by the rural elite, they are more likely to strongly resist offers of autonomy.	Natural experiment from Peru (<i>Chapter 5</i>)
	When indigenous groups experience extraction by neither (both) rural elites nor (and) the governing incumbent, they are more likely to weakly resist offers of autonomy.	Case studies and survey data from Bolivia (<i>Chapter 6</i>)

Continued on next page

Table 2.3 – *Continued from previous page*

Section of Argument	Testable prediction	Evidence
<i>Legacies of indigenous autonomy</i>	Economic autonomy generally erodes traditional reciprocity institutions and reduces indigenous coordination to achieve descriptive and substantive political representation.	Experimental, survey, archival, and interview evidence from Peru (<i>Chapters 7 and 8</i>)
	Political autonomy generally increases indigenous communities' access to descriptive representation but reduces access to substantive representation.	Qualitative and administrative data from Bolivia and the United States (<i>Chapter 9</i>)

Part I

The Supply-Side Emergence of Indigenous Autonomy

Chapter 3

State Recognition of Indigenous Autonomy: Historical and Contemporary Evidence

In Chapter 2, I outlined a theory to explain when central states recognize indigenous groups' right to autonomy. In this chapter, I evaluate this theory through an analysis of over-time variation in autonomy across a number of historical cases in the Americas. I focus on only those cases where national governments recognized indigenous autonomy *at some point* between the onset of independence—the early nineteenth century for most cases—and the early twentieth century. These include my three central cases—Bolivia, the United States, and Peru—as well as a series of shadow cases: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Ecuador. Careful process tracing within these individual cases sheds light on when autonomy is recognized, how it is recognized, and when it is rescinded. Furthermore, given variation in the sizes of their indigenous populations, colonial experiences, and post-independence political institutions, these cases also offer analytical leverage similar to that provided by a “most-different” case study design.¹ As such, despite substantial variation in many baseline attributes, these cases generally conform to the predictions outlined in the previous chapter.

In addition to the national-level cases, I also analyze two Mexican states. The federal system of government that Mexico adopted upon independence granted enormous power to Mexican states.² Even the national constitution was often subordinated to state constitutions. As such, in the earlier years of the Mexican republic, the theory that I have developed for national governments should extend to Mexico's state governments. I examine two of these states, Oaxaca and Yucatán, both located in southern Mexico, which shared many key traits at the onset of independence. Their populations were overwhelmingly indigenous.³

¹Collier (1993).

²Caplan (2009: 7).

³While Oaxaca's population was 90 percent indigenous in 1806, Yucatán's was 70 percent (Caplan 2009: 15). These states were and remain the Mexican states with the largest indigenous populations (as a percent of total state population).




Figure 3.1: Empirical cases: The supply-side emergence of autonomy

In both states, native groups had received substantial autonomy from the Spanish Crown during the colonial period. Yet, the paths they followed post-independence with respect to indigenous autonomy differed greatly.

Figure 3.1 outlines the evidence I use to evaluate the predictions around the supply-side emergence of indigenous autonomy. As shown in the figure, there are many cases in which the rural elite constitutes a strong interest group, and thus central states do not recognize any form of indigenous autonomy. The two outcomes in the middle of the figure emerge when both indigenous elites are a key strategic ally of the incumbent and the rural elite exercises a moderate amount of structural and instrumental power. The form that autonomy takes—political or economic—depends on the main indigenous resource that rural elites value: land or labor. When rural elites most want indigenous land, incumbents grant political autonomy, and when rural elites most desire indigenous labor, incumbents grant economic autonomy. The bottom of the figure includes the only case in which indigenous groups were granted economic and political autonomy—Oaxaca, Mexico—where rural elites were extremely weak and indigenous elites were valuable allies of the incumbent state government.

3.1 The failure of indigenous autonomy

Throughout the Americas, the post-independence period was often characterized by periods in which central state incumbents refused to recognize indigenous autonomy. Sometimes, like in Peru and the United States, this decision was a continuation of longstanding precedent not to offer policy concessions to native groups. In other cases, including El

Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, Yucatán (Mexico), and Bolivia, incumbents aggressively revoked autonomy that had been granted by previous administrations. In all cases, central state decisions to refuse autonomy to indigenous groups coincided with a period of substantial instrumental and structural power for rural elites.

El Salvador (1881-1931)

In the 1870s, increased demand for coffee united the Salvadoran rural elite to overthrow conservative and pro-autonomy president Francisco Dueñas and install a liberal regime.⁴ This coup initiated a period that Paige calls the “golden age of coffee.”⁵ The increased power of the landed elite in El Salvador gave rise to an assault on indigenous autonomy. Specifically, increasingly high foreign demand for coffee had made land an ever more desirable commodity, and indigenous communities possessed some of the best land for coffee cultivation.⁶ Thus, rural elites’ desire for indigenous communal land grew during this period. In 1881, agrarian interests successfully lobbied the liberal president, Rafael Zaldívar to abolish indigenous communal lands. In his decree Zaldívar argued, “The existence of lands under the ownership of the [indigenous communities] impedes agricultural development, obstructs the circulation of wealth, and weakens family bonds and the independence of the individual.”⁷

Over the next fifty years, most indigenous communal lands were privatized. Native communities were virtually powerless to slow or stop this process. By 1895, over half of the positions in the national legislature were occupied by coffee growers, and between 1895 and 1931, coffee growers held the presidency in El Salvador without interruption.⁸ As Kincaid notes, “[Facing] a relatively homogeneous dominant class in control of a much stronger state...there was no longer any prospect of successful resistance on the part of isolated communities.”⁹

Guatemala (1871-1944)

The late nineteenth century in Guatemala witnessed an increase in the economic power of the rural elite and a concomitant shift away from the previous policy of recognizing indigenous groups’ political autonomy. In the 1860s, the international demand for coffee increased, and Guatemala proved a very hospitable climate for the crop’s cultivation. Between 1860 and 1871, the value of coffee exports grew by over 8600%; coffee had accounted for 1% of Guatemalan exports in 1860, but by the end of the decade the crop accounted for nearly half of all exports.¹⁰ Despite this fantastic growth, landowners felt that the government was hindering the development of commercial coffee production. In their minds, conservative governments had granted far too many concessions to the indigenous peasantry in the

⁴Tilley (2005: 128).

⁵Paige (1998: 14).

⁶Lindo-Fuentes (1990: 131).

⁷Tilley (2005: 128-129).

⁸Paige (1998: 14).

⁹Kincaid (1987: 475).

¹⁰Woodward (2012: 383).

early years of independence. The potential value of indigenous land and labor posed too great an opportunity cost to leave untapped.¹¹ If indigenous resources could be mobilized in service of coffee production, the landed elite could accrue enormous wealth. In 1871, the rural elite united to push the conservatives out of office and demanded the dismantling of protections for indigenous communities. For the next seventy years, the agrarian elite functionally controlled the Guatemalan government and thwarted the emergence of indigenous autonomy.

Ecuador (1861-1930)

Beginning in the 1860s, Ecuador's national policy toward indigenous groups shifted away from a recognition of indigenous autonomy and toward assimilation. Gabriel García Moreno, a conservative, obtained power in 1861 following a two-year civil war. He had achieved power with the help of a highland elite that had been united by opposition to President José María Urvina's liberal administration; for their support, these highland elites received enormous power and influence within García Moreno's administration.¹² Perhaps due to the power of these highland elites, García Moreno "worked to roll back decades of indigenous...autonomies."¹³ Laws passed during his administration allowed state officials to declare indigenous communal lands "vacant" and seize them to sell to private actors.¹⁴ This process of privatizing indigenous communal land continued well into the twentieth century, virtually unabated.¹⁵ As a result of these sustained attacks, today there remain very few indigenous communities in Ecuador compared with Bolivia and Peru (discussed below).

Bolivia (1866-1930)

In the early independence period, Bolivian rural elites experienced a period of economic—and hence political—weakness. By the 1860s, the rural elite—particularly mining interests—regained power and influence within the Bolivian government. The discovery of mercury mines in California reduced the cost of refining silver.¹⁶ These benefits accrued to not only miners but also hacienda owners. The increase in export revenue generated banking credits, which were often invested in large estates to expand agricultural production.¹⁷

As the economic power of the rural elite grew, so did their political influence. Hacienda owners successfully lobbied for the passage of legislation in 1866 that required indigenous individuals to purchase individual titles to their lands within 60 days of the law's passage; those who did not would forfeit their land to the Bolivian state, which would sell plots to

¹¹McCreery (1994: 163).

¹²O'Connor (2007: 15); Williams (2007: 43).

¹³Larson (2004: 113).

¹⁴Henderson (2008: 198); O'Connor (2007: 55, 86).

¹⁵Even when liberals controlled the government between 1897 and 1926, they did not provide indigenous groups autonomy as Urvina had. Instead, they launched legal attacks on the highland elite, seeking to break ties between indigenous workers and the highland estates. The goal of these efforts was to move these workers to the lucrative cacao plantations on the coast (Clark 2007).

¹⁶Langer (1989: 17).

¹⁷Klein (1993: 134).

the highest bidder.¹⁸ Indigenous groups mostly resisted implementation of the law, but the legislation set the stage for a more prominent and effective attack on communal land through a 1874 law that withdrew government recognition of indigenous communal land and issued private titles to those residing on that land.¹⁹ Subsequently, communities experienced a rapid decline in territory and members that would continue well into the twentieth century. Indigenous communities in Bolivia contained about half of Bolivia's land and rural population in 1880, but by 1930, these communities contained "less than a third of both."²⁰

Yucatán (1868-1910)

After obtaining its independence in 1821, Mexico experienced nearly forty years of "continuous war, economic stagnation, and regional fragmentation."²¹ These factors weakened a previously powerful rural elite, preventing them from exercising any meaningful influence in politics. As Coatsworth observes, in newly independent Mexico, "neither landowners nor capitalists can be said to have formed a national governing class."²² Rural elites in the southern state of Yucatán faced this crisis acutely, as I discuss in greater detail later in this chapter.

However, by the mid-nineteenth century, conditions in Yucatán changed; the rural, non-indigenous elite became a more united and powerful interest group as the result of two factors. First, the Caste War (1847-1901), a "race war" between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens, unified landowners as a class against indigenous peasants. Second, cash crops became both increasingly profitable and increasingly concentrated, with henequen increasing from 13.7 percent of Yucatecan exports in 1845 to 70 percent in 1876.²³ The combination of these factors increased the rural elites' strength as an interest group and led to an erosion of indigenous autonomy. In 1868, the Yucatecan state government officially abolished indigenous communal villages.²⁴

Peru (1824-1925)

In the early years of Peruvian independence, the rural elite, particularly the large estate owners concentrated in the north and along the coast, were able to exercise enormous structural and instrumental power over the newly independent Peruvian government. Gootenberg observes that "the circumscribed national state could not escape [hacendado] influence."²⁵ The production of agricultural products in the north met the food needs of those in the capital, Lima, and the government itself was sustained by duties levied on rural exports.²⁶ Urban elites, many of whom worked in milling, lard-making, and artisan leather

¹⁸Klein (2011: 136).

¹⁹Jackson (1994: 74).

²⁰Klein (1992: 152); Klein (1993: 135).

²¹Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur (1987: 15).

²²Coatsworth (1978: 97).

²³Richmond (2015: 38).

²⁴Caplan (2009: 213).

²⁵Gootenberg (2014: 37).

²⁶Gootenberg (2014: 37).

products, developed close economic and social ties with hacendados in the north of Peru.²⁷ The instrumental and structural power of the rural elites only grew as the nineteenth century progressed. Exports increased around 5 percent per year between 1840 and 1878, largely due to growing international demand for Peruvian guano, copper, sheep wool, cotton, sugar, and nitrates.²⁸

As predicted by the theory, the strength of rural elites as an interest group corresponded to an erosion of indigenous autonomy in nineteenth-century Peru. In 1828, the Peruvian central state privatized all indigenous communal land and revoked recognition for indigenous political authorities.²⁹ While continuing to be important for native groups, the indigenous community became “invisible and strange for...legislatures, magistrates, and authorities” who refused to respect or defend any indigenous institutions that were not legally recognized.³⁰ In the seminal Civil Code of 1852, which defined Peruvian law until 1932, there was no mention of Peruvian indigenous communities or their collective rights to hold land.³¹ The adoption of the Code eliminated any remaining protections for indigenous land and further hastened the destruction of native communities.³²

United States (1789-1934)

In its first century and a half of independence, the United States enacted no national-level reforms to grant indigenous groups autonomy. Instead, the federal government nominally extended autonomy through treaties. Yet, the government consistently failed in its treaty obligations, refusing to enforce or even respect the terms of the agreements.³³

The nineteenth-century United States witnessed a high point in the influence of rural, non-indigenous elites. Throughout the nineteenth century, the population of the United States was overwhelmingly rural; in 1900, 40 percent of the US population still lived on farms, and 60 percent lived in rural areas. Agriculture dominated economic production up until 1840, when it accounted for nearly half of total economic output; it remained the most productive economic sector until the 1870s when agriculture, industry, and services each accounted for about a third of economic output.³⁴

National-level legislation in the nineteenth century thus tended to benefit powerful white landowners and settlers at the expense of native communities. Two examples clearly demonstrate this. First, the Indian Removal Act of 1830 resulted in native groups being cruelly and forcibly marched from their traditional lands to territories in the West. The express purpose of this policy was to grant indigenous land to powerful white landowners in

²⁷Gootenberg (2014: 37).

²⁸Bonilla (1985: 550).

²⁹Smith (1982: 78); Stepputat (2009: 77). The communities that survived were those that had purchased a title to their land during the colonial period (Turner 1993: 122).

³⁰Basadre (1961: 1309).

³¹Alterini and Coaguila (2000); Guzmán Brito (2010, 2001); Larson (2004: 154).

³²Davies (1973: 187).

³³Deloria (2018: 32-35).

³⁴Johnston (2012).

INDIAN LAND FOR SALE

GET A HOME
OF
YOUR OWN
*
EASY PAYMENTS

PERFECT TITLE
*
POSSESSION
WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS

FINE LANDS IN THE WEST
IRRIGATED IRRIGABLE GRAZING AGRICULTURAL DRY FARMING

IN 1910 THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR SOLD UNDER SEALED BIDS ALLOTTED INDIAN LAND AS FOLLOWS:

Location	Acres	Average Price per Acre	Location	Acres	Average Price per Acre

001_002_5.17 Advertisement. Library of Congress.

Figure 3.2: 1911 poster advertising the sell of Native American land in the western United States that had been privatized under the Dawes Act.

the South.³⁵ A second policy, the Dawes Act of 1887, purportedly sought to create a group of indigenous smallholders with secure access to *private* property. Specifically, it divided communal land into private parcels, which would be granted to individual tribe members within a twenty-five year period. Yet, most reservation land was arid and not conducive to small-scale farming; large-scale agriculture or ranching were more productive endeavors.³⁶

The law, in fact, served to break up indigenous land for the benefit of wealthy Western developers, who profited off of selling the plots to “land-hungry western settlers.”³⁷ Advertisements from the period touted the ease with which settlers of Western states could acquire “Indian land” (see Figure 3.2).

Thus, until the repeal of the Dawes Act in 1934, the US government frequently undermined indigenous autonomy to appease a powerful rural elite. Certain pockets of autonomy

³⁵Calloway (2011: 267).

³⁶Taylor (1980: 4).

³⁷Greenwald (2002: 5); Otis (2014: 20-22).

did emerge prior to 1870, but these were piecemeal efforts and—likely due to the high value of native land—always recognized political autonomy.³⁸

3.2 The recognition of political autonomy

The cases below support the theory that autonomy generally emerged when three conditions held. First, indigenous elites were strategically important allies of the incumbent. Second, rural elites were not strong enough to block efforts by the incumbent to offer autonomy. Finally, rural elites valued indigenous groups' land more than their labor.

Guatemala (1839-1871)

The first extension of autonomy to indigenous groups in post-independence Guatemala occurred in the 1840s, under the presidency of Rafael Carrera, who effectively ruled Guatemala from 1839 to 1865. Carrera, who had been born to a poor family, assumed power through a revolt against the merchant-planter elite.³⁹ His army consisted mostly of indigenous peasants, and during his tenure in office, he prioritized the interests of native communities, which were key to preserving his delicate hold on power.⁴⁰

Under Carrera's administration, native groups witnessed what scholars have labeled a "golden age" of autonomy.⁴¹ In a series of decrees, Carrera recognized "indigenous municipal and judicial autonomy," reestablished bureaucratic agencies to protect this autonomy, hired interpreters to help indigenous groups interface with state and private actors, and extended political recognition to traditional indigenous leaders, or *gobernadores*.⁴²

Historians have pointed to a number of instances that highlight the effective exercise of this autonomy. In Momostenango, a town in Guatemala's western highlands, a local indigenous couple was executed, purportedly for engaging in witchcraft against another native clan. According to traditional judicial practices in the area, witchcraft was a capital offense, and as a result, the local native tribunal refused to convict the killers. Local white and Ladino⁴³ state officials objected to the decision but ultimately did not intervene to overturn it.⁴⁴ In addition to judicial control, many native communities throughout Guatemala were allowed to replace municipal institutions with traditional indigenous ones; these included San Juan Ostuncalco,⁴⁵ Santiago Momostenango,⁴⁶ Verapaz,⁴⁷ and Santiago Atitlán.⁴⁸

As predicted by my theory, this expansion of autonomy corresponded to a period of unprecedented economic and political weakness for Guatemala's landed elite. The market

³⁸Taylor (1980: 3).

³⁹Woodward (2012: 57,76).

⁴⁰Smith (1984: 202); Woodward (2012: 122).

⁴¹La Farge (1940); Reeves (2006: 190).

⁴²Grandin (2000: 103).

⁴³Ladino is another word for "mestizo," a person of mixed European and indigenous descent.

⁴⁴Carmack (2014).

⁴⁵Ebel (1972)

⁴⁶Carmack (1983).

⁴⁷King (1974).

⁴⁸Madigan (1976).

for Guatemala's primary product exports reached historic lows in the forty years following independence.⁴⁹ The only notable export was cochineal, a red dye produced by insects that feed on nopal cactus,⁵⁰ but this crop had the undesirable trait that it was particularly vulnerable to pestilence and weather events, such as droughts and floods.⁵¹ Weather events in the early part of the century made cochineal a volatile product that produced limited revenue for the country's economic elite. In addition to their limited economic power, the rural elite as a class was highly divided and locked in nearly perpetual regional conflict. Rather than unifying as a class, landowners supported rival regional strongmen, or *caudillos*, resulting in strong internal divisions. This comparative weakness of the rural elite increased the influence of indigenous peasants within the Carrera administration.⁵²

Yet, despite their general weakness, rural elites could still ally with regional caudillos to perhaps take over the state, and Carrera acted carefully to minimize the likelihood of such mobilization. Above all other resources, rural elites wanted indigenous land. McCreery observes, "In nineteenth century Guatemala, as today, land was the chief source of wealth and power for the elite."⁵³ Thus, Carrera did not provide meaningful protection for indigenous land, instead offering political autonomy to indigenous communities.⁵⁴

United States (1934-1945)

Most native reservations are located in the Western United States. As such, national legislators from Western states have long played an active role in shaping policies toward native groups. In the nineteenth- and early-twentieth century, most of these legislators represented the interests of the land-developers, large-scale farmers, and settlers who lobbied for the Dawes Act. In 1870, three-quarters of the population in Western states was rural; by 1930, however, sixty percent of the population resided in cities.⁵⁵ These structural shifts greatly reduced the power of the rural elite. As Evans notes, "[T]he rapid urbanization of the West mid-century led to explosive growth in western representation in the House of Representatives and a shift in political power within the West from rural to urban interests."⁵⁶

A second relevant shift also occurred. When Franklin Roosevelt assumed the presidency, the Indian reform groups and non-indigenous popular sectors that had supported him in the election called for an end to the Dawes Act. A series of reports in the late 1920s had shed light on the abuses perpetrated under the Act, along with the rampant poverty on native reservations.

Consistent with my theoretical predictions, the weakness of rural interests and growing pro-indigenous sentiment among Roosevelt's supporters led in 1934 to the passage of the

⁴⁹Smith (1984); McCreery (1994).

⁵⁰Mahoney (2001: 87)

⁵¹McCreery (1994: 117).

⁵²Smith (1984); Woodward (2012: 125).

⁵³McCreery (2014: 96).

⁵⁴Carrera did send sporadic surveyors out to document indigenous communal lands, but most of these efforts were half-hearted and did not result in the issuance of a formal communal title.

⁵⁵Boustan et al. (2013).

⁵⁶Evans (2019: 4).

Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The IRA, known colloquially as the “Indian New Deal,” limited interference by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the political and judicial affairs of reservations. It also granted tribal governments the right to draft their own constitutions that could include a prominent role for traditional political authorities and institutions. It did not, however, grant indigenous groups a formal communal title to their land; instead, native land would be held in trust by the federal government. Thus, as predicted by my theory, the relatively high value of indigenous land—and low value of their labor—corresponded to a government offer of *political* autonomy.

3.3 The recognition of economic autonomy

As in the case of political autonomy, central states in post-independence Latin America and the United States generally granted *economic* autonomy when indigenous elites were politically strong and rural elites relatively weak. However, unlike political autonomy, economic autonomy emerged when rural elites valued indigenous labor more than indigenous land.

El Salvador (1867-1881)

Between 1850 and 1870, the Conservative politician Francisco Dueñas dominated politics in El Salvador, serving as president four separate times (1851-1852, 1852-1854, 1856, 1863-1871).⁵⁷ Faced with a rural elite divided along regional, ethnic, and sectoral⁵⁸ lines, Dueñas followed the lead of Carrera in Guatemala and courted indigenous groups as a core constituency. During the period, indigenous communities served as the most valuable soldiers in the battle to take over and maintain control of the state.⁵⁹ During this period, indigenous groups saw an expansion of their autonomy.⁶⁰

The design of this autonomy reflected a calculation around indigenous factor endowments. Unlike Guatemala, rural elites in El Salvador had abundant access to land; the Salvadoran government had made extensive efforts to sell off unused public land, or *terrenos baldíos*, throughout the early nineteenth century.⁶¹ Rural elites thus assigned little value to indigenous land and instead sought native groups’ labor. Rural elites lacked workers for their large plantations. The post-independence Salvadoran government had banned forced labor, and the abundant land supply reduced the need for indigenous families to live and work on plantations, or “haciendas.”⁶² This scarcity of hacienda labor in El Salvador made indigenous workers incredibly valuable for rural elites. Consistent with my theory, this context, where labor was highly valued and land was lowly valued, gave rise to economic autonomy for native groups.

⁵⁷Gudmundson (1995: 91).

⁵⁸E.g., between coffee and indigo producers.

⁵⁹Alvarenga Venutolo (1996: 38).

⁶⁰Lindo-Fuentes (1990: 133);Ameringer (1992: 291).

⁶¹Lindo-Fuentes (1990: 131, 141).

⁶²Lauria-Santiago (1999a: 72); Lindo-Fuentes (1990: 41); Lindo-Fuentes (1995: 50); (Paige 1998: 106).

In 1867, Dueñas issued a decree that “provided legal recognition and protection to community based landholdings.”⁶³ More importantly, he enforced these laws, refusing to break up collectively held land even when under great pressure from coffee producers to do so.⁶⁴ While recognizing economic autonomy, Dueñas did not recognize indigenous groups’ *political* autonomy.

Yucatán (1821-1910)

The early years of independence in Yucatán involved the state government recognizing indigenous autonomy, albeit in a partial form. During this period, the state faced a strong, overwhelmingly indigenous population and a potentially rebellious non-indigenous rural elite, which had been weakened by the independence movements. Remarking on this tradeoff, Caplan notes, “[S]tate officials were weary of the potential power of nonindigenous entrepreneurs and yet cognizant of the danger inherent in losing *indígenas*’ support.”⁶⁵ This gave rise to a joint accommodation of indigenous groups and the rural elite. Indigenous groups received autonomy but in a form that also satisfied the interests of the non-indigenous elite.

In the early-to-mid-nineteenth century, sugar and henequen emerged as key cash crops in Yucatán. While land for these crops was abundant in the state, labor was relatively scarce.⁶⁶ To appease the indigenous population without further depleting the supply of labor for the rural elite, the state government of Yucatán offered indigenous groups economic autonomy. Under this system, there existed protections for communal land in indigenous villages, but all political and administrative tasks—outside of official tax collection—resided with local state authorities and institutions.⁶⁷

Ecuador (1851-1861)

Regional conflict dominated politics in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Ecuador. The primary cleavage occurred within the rural elite class, specifically between liberal plantation owners on the coast and conservative hacienda owners in the highlands (“sierra”). The latter had historically been considerably more dependent on indigenous land, labor, and capital. During the early-to-mid-nineteenth century, the coastal elite experienced an economic boom, largely as a result of increased international demand for cacao; between 1831 and 1857, coastal agricultural production grew four-fold.⁶⁸ Conversely, over the same period, highland elites, which had traditionally held economic and political power, experienced a sustained decline in their agricultural production—with total output falling by about forty-five percent.⁶⁹

⁶³Lauria-Santiago (1999b: 501).

⁶⁴Mahoney (2001: 93-94); Lindo-Fuentes (1990: 133).

⁶⁵Caplan (2009: 103).

⁶⁶Gabbert (2019: 35-37).

⁶⁷Caplan (2009: 108).

⁶⁸Van Aken (1981: 450).

⁶⁹Van Aken (1981: 450).

The decline of previously powerful highland landowners paved the way for state recognition of indigenous autonomy. In 1851, José María Urquina, a liberal politician, became president. An ally of the coastal elite, Urquina embraced highland native groups as a way to undermine powerful agrarian groups in the sierra. Urquina thus embarked on a number of pro-indigenous policies during his five-year term, including recognition of indigenous communities' economic autonomy. Specifically, he issued "special titles" to indigenous communal lands, thereby "[reinforcing] the territoriality and legitimacy of the Indian community."⁷⁰ Williams observes that "the sum effect of Urvinista policy was...the reinforcement of indigenous collective rights and community structures."⁷¹ While landlords opposed these policies, they were ultimately too economically and politically weak to mobilize to stop them. Furthermore, particularly in the northern and southern highlands, land was considerably more abundant than labor.⁷² Consistent with my theory, this relative scarcity of indigenous labor corresponded to a recognition of economic autonomy.

Bolivia (1829-1866)

Like many other former colonies in Spanish America, Bolivia's initial years of independence were characterized by economic instability. The rural elite, which consisted mostly of mining interests, were hit particularly hard, experiencing a prolonged period of "decapitalization" that would last until the 1840s.⁷³ A massive decline in silver export revenue not only harmed the mining elite but also left the fiscally starved Bolivian state with little option but to reinstate a colonial-era head tax on indigenous groups. In order to ensure indigenous groups could produce this revenue, however, the Bolivian government had to guarantee their access to traditional communal land, or "communities."⁷⁴

In 1829, Bolivian president Andrés de Santa Cruz, a *caudillo* who counted on substantial support from Bolivian native groups during his ten-year administration, issued a decree recognizing indigenous communal landholdings.⁷⁵ As predicted by my theory, the emergence of this autonomy also corresponded to a period of declining power of the rural elite. Klein observes, "[J]ust as the collapse of the export sector in the seventeenth-century crisis had been a positive aid to the...free Indian communities, the same would occur again in the early nineteenth-century crisis."⁷⁶ For the next three decades, the Bolivian central government issued communal land titles to a number of indigenous communities.

The emergence of economic—as opposed to political—autonomy arises from constraints imposed by the rural elite. Traditional mining interests continued to exercise some influence on the central state—even if to a much lesser degree than in the colonial period. These mines historically valued indigenous labor above all else.⁷⁷ Highland hacienda owners also

⁷⁰Williams (2003: 707).

⁷¹Williams (2003: 703).

⁷²O'Connor (2007: 43).

⁷³Klein (2011: 102).

⁷⁴Platt (1982).

⁷⁵Larson (2004: 212); Perea (2011: 224).

⁷⁶Klein (2011: 104).

⁷⁷Dell (2010)

depended more often on indigenous labor than land.⁷⁸ Thus, the Bolivian government extended communal property during this period, as a way of providing indigenous groups with autonomy while not further eroding the labor supply of rural elites.

Peru (1925-1967)

The early twentieth century witnessed a decline in the power of traditional landed interests. Throughout the nineteenth century, Peru's population was the most rural of all Latin American countries for which data is available.⁷⁹ In the early twentieth century, however, Peru experienced massive rural-to-urban migration. Lima's population grew from 130,000 in 1900 to nearly 300,000 in 1930.⁸⁰ This rapid demographic shift facilitated the rise of a populist politician, Augusto Leguía, who in 1919 became Peru's president through support from the urban sectors. The election of Leguía brought an end to the era of the "Aristocratic Republic," a nearly forty year period in which Peruvian politics was dominated by agricultural and mining interests.⁸¹

The presidency of Leguía, which was initially supported by much of Peru's substantial native population, promised a new era in indigenous-state relations. As part of this plan, Leguía embarked on the first systematic effort to legally register and title Peruvian indigenous communities in 1925. Leguía extended this economic autonomy as a way to meet indigenous demands without alienating the traditional landed elite. Watters observes, "Leguía succeeded in maintaining the delicate position of seeming to advance *indigenista* causes without alienating the Sierra landowners by pushing them too hard."⁸² The form of autonomy that emerged was thus sensitive to the wishes of the rural elite. Until the 1940s, Peru was land abundant but labor scarce, making indigenous workers an incredibly valuable resource for hacendados.⁸³ In this context, Leguía recognized economic autonomy, which protected indigenous land but not their labor.

Thus, as was the case in the United States, indigenous autonomy in Peru did not emerge until the 1920s, largely due to structural trends tied to urbanization that reduced the influence of traditional landed interests. When autonomy did emerge, its form was constrained by rural elite preferences over indigenous resources.

3.4 The recognition of full autonomy

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was extraordinarily rare that incumbents would recognize full indigenous autonomy, that is both economic and political autonomy. The one case where full autonomy was recognized, Oaxaca, Mexico, generally conforms to my theoretical predictions. Specifically, the indigenous elite was strong while

⁷⁸Grieshaber (1977).

⁷⁹Gootenberg (1991: 132).

⁸⁰Mitchell (2016: 54).

⁸¹Bertram (1991: 392).

⁸²Watters (1994: 67).

⁸³Bertram (1991).

the rural elite was especially weak. In this case, the state government had an incentive to grant both political and economic autonomy.

Oaxaca (1821-1910)

In the southern state of Oaxaca, indigenous groups were particularly strong relative to non-indigenous landowners. Immediately following independence, “hacendados [large estate owners] tended to be relatively poor” and characterized by “instability and debt...as [indigenous] communal villages wielded power over them.”⁸⁴ So powerful were indigenous groups in Oaxaca that they achieved the rare combination of political and economic autonomy. Lacking an organized rural elite class, the state government authored an 1825 constitution that recognized both indigenous communal land *and* the right of indigenous groups to select their own local legislatures, or “repúblicas.”⁸⁵

During the nineteenth century, in response to the growing power of rural elites, the central government adopted reforms to eliminate indigenous communal land and replace locally selected indigenous authorities with government-appointed officials.⁸⁶ Perhaps surprisingly, many of these national-level efforts to destroy native institutions were led by an indigenous president who had formerly served as the governor of Oaxaca, Benito Juárez.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, the Oaxacan government, ever responsive to its relatively powerful indigenous communities, successfully thwarted the implementation of these reforms, and indigenous autonomy would continue in Oaxaca until the 1940s.⁸⁸

3.5 Summary of historical case studies

In Guatemala, a period of both relative weakness of the rural elite and strength of indigenous groups corresponded to an extension of partial autonomy to indigenous groups in the mid-nineteenth century. Because rural elites most valued indigenous land during this period, the central state extended political autonomy. When the rural elite regained instrumental and structural power toward the end of the nineteenth century, the government rescinded this autonomy.

As in Guatemala, the mid-nineteenth century in El Salvador was a period of moderate weakness in the rural elite and strength of indigenous elites. However, in El Salvador, the rural elite valued indigenous labor more than native land, and therefore, the central state extended economic autonomy. The end of the nineteenth century witnessed an increase in the rural elite’s structural and instrumental power, leading to a revocation of the partial autonomy that had been previously offered.

In Oaxaca, the rural elite was substantially weak compared to indigenous groups, allowing for the emergence of full autonomy that persisted into the twentieth century. In the

⁸⁴Chassen-López (2010: 106, 303).

⁸⁵Caplan (2009: 69).

⁸⁶Chassen-López (2010: 302-303); Taylor (1999: 182)

⁸⁷Cal y Mayor (2000: 102); (Haake 2007: 94).

⁸⁸Caplan (2009: 179-180).

early-to-mid-nineteenth century in Yucatán, indigenous elites were moderately powerful and the rural elite was somewhat weak, giving rise to partial autonomy. Because indigenous labor was valuable, the state government of Yucatán recognized economic autonomy. By the 1850s, the rural elite had greatly expanded its structural and instrumental power, leading to a revocation of economic autonomy.

In the 1850s, Ecuadorian indigenous groups constituted a strategically important ally of the central government, while rural elites—particularly in the highlands—possessed limited structural and instrumental power. This gave rise to partial indigenous autonomy. Because rural elites most valued indigenous labor, the government extended economic autonomy to the country’s native groups. Once the highland rural elite began to gain instrumental and structural power in the 1860s, however, the government revoked this autonomy.

In the United States, indigenous groups did not become a valuable strategic ally for an incumbent until the Franklin Roosevelt administration, when native groups and particularly their non-indigenous surrogates gained a substantial political voice. This period also corresponded to a moment of relative weakness of rural elites, particularly in the Western United States where the bulk of the native population resided. Thus, the US government offered partial autonomy to indigenous groups. Because indigenous land was highly valued by rural elites, the Roosevelt administration extended political autonomy.

In Bolivia, the decline in power of the rural elite in the 1820s and 1830s, along with the increased strategic importance of indigenous elites, led to the extension of partial autonomy in the early independence period. Because rural elites most valued indigenous labor, economic autonomy was offered. The Bolivian government gradually chipped away at this autonomy in the mid-to-late nineteenth century as the rural elite grew increasingly powerful.

Perhaps surprisingly, the recognition of autonomy in Peru followed a trajectory more similar to that of the United States than to that of neighboring Bolivia. The Peruvian government did not recognize partial indigenous autonomy until the 1920s—a period in which the incumbent found indigenous groups to be important strategic allies and the rural elite had limited instrumental and structural power. Because indigenous labor had higher value than native land, the central state recognized economic autonomy.

3.6 Extension to contemporary Bolivia

In addition to the historical evidence presented above, the theory may also apply to more contemporary cases. For example, in 2008, the Bolivian government recognized indigenous political autonomy.⁸⁹ As predicted by my theory, the decision of the Evo Morales administration to recognize political autonomy emerged from two related conditions. First, indigenous groups proved a strategically important constituency for Morales. Over 75 percent of voters who supported Morales in the 2005 presidential election spoke an indigenous language.⁹⁰ At the inauguration of the 2006 constitutional convention, Morales, flanked by indigenous activists, proclaimed, “The *jacha uru*, the great day, for the indigenous peoples

⁸⁹I devote more attention to this case in Chapter 6 and 9.

⁹⁰Madrid (2012: 52).

has arrived.”⁹¹ Second, the rise of a powerful populist leader, Morales, resulted in a period of relative political weakness for Bolivia’s rural elite.⁹² For centuries, much of the economic power in Bolivia has been located in the eastern lowlands, far from the highland political capital of La Paz, which is situated in the western region of the country. Because he was not beholden to this elite, Morales could propose and pass a constitution that offered indigenous groups political autonomy.

However, as my theory suggests, Morales could not fully ignore the preferences of the rural elite, particularly hydrocarbon and mining interests in eastern Bolivia. The revenue from taxing natural resources proved necessary to fund his developmentalist agenda.⁹³ Thus, while Morales could offer protection for indigenous labor through political autonomy, he did not recognize economic autonomy over native land and, specifically, subsoil rights. As Tockman and Cameron observe, “[D]espite claims by President Morales to support plurinationalism and indigenous rights, he and other senior government leaders have been equally emphatic that indigenous autonomy does not include control over subsurface resources.”⁹⁴ Thus, while Morales promoted political autonomy, he generally did not promote economic autonomy.

3.7 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have provided qualitative evidence in support of the theory I present around supply-side variation in indigenous autonomy. Evidence from the historical cases and contemporary Bolivia generally conform to my theoretical predictions. In the next section of the dissertation, I turn to an exploration of demand-side variation in the emergence of indigenous autonomy. Specifically, I examine how indigenous communities have embraced or resisted government offers of partial autonomy.

⁹¹Postero (2017: 2).

⁹²Kaup (2012: 145-146).

⁹³González (2015); Postero and Fabricant (2019); Veltmeyer (2013).

⁹⁴Tockman and Cameron (2014: 54).

Part II

The Demand-Side Emergence of Indigenous Autonomy

Chapter 4

The Effects of Private Predation

Indigenous Demands for Autonomy in the Depression-Era United States

The theory developed in Chapter 2 suggests that rural elite extraction should generally increase indigenous groups' incentives to embrace partial autonomy when offered. In this chapter, I begin by examining the Dawes Act of 1887, which opened up Native American land to privatization. According to the Act, indigenous land, once allotted to individual tribe members, would be held in trust by the government for twenty-five years, after which point it could be sold by the indigenous individuals who possessed the land. Often, this process paved the way for opportunistic land developers in the West to pick off Native American land through fraudulent or corrupt land sales. To measure the effects of this private predation, I leverage allotment procedures in which I compare reservations allotted just before 1909—which had completed the trust period prior to the Act's 1934 repeal and were thus eligible to be sold—with those allotted in 1909 or later. I show that reservations that experienced greater extraction by non-indigenous land developers were more likely to adopt the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, which provided political autonomy to indigenous groups.

4.1 Rural elite extraction under the Dawes Act, 1887-1934

As discussed in Chapter 3, the adoption of the Dawes Act in 1887 ushered in a period of widespread rural elite extraction. The nominal purpose of the Act was to replace the tribe with the individual as the meaningful unit of political, social, and economic activity and to convert Native Americas into small-holding peasants.¹

The Act required Native American reservations to undergo a process of allotment, which portioned communal land into individual plots. The allotment process occurred gradually

¹Tyler (2001: 95) The law also created a new school system to assimilate Native Americas and replaced traditional tribal leaders with representatives of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Taylor 1984: 19).

between 1887 and 1934 as seen in Figure A1. Once a reservation was allotted, the land was held in trust by the federal government for twenty-five years. After that period, the designated owner of a parcel of land could sell her land or keep it. The rule stipulating the trust period thus meant that some Indian reservations experienced allotment more acutely than others. Specifically, those allotted more than 25 years before the law's repeal in 1934 (i.e., before June 14, 1909) experienced higher levels of privatization than those allotted after.

The Dawes Act—and the period of rural elite extraction that it initiated—greatly reduced the territorial base of indigenous groups. Reservations that were allotted during or prior to June 14, 1909 lost, on average, 47 percent of their land, while those allotted after lost only 6 percent of their land. Figure 4.1 illustrates the clear, steep decline in land loss among reservations allotted after 1908.

Sometimes, this loss of indigenous land was driven by fraudulent land sales engineered by bureaucrats and non-indigenous land developers. In other cases, the members of the reservation drove the privatization of communal land; living in poverty, the prospect of a lump sum payment obtained from the sale of a land plot proved attractive. Carlson, for example, finds that the Dawes Act actually reversed a growing trend of small-scale private agriculture on reservations, which had emerged before 1887, but was stymied once tribal members had an incentive to sell their land.² Overall, indigenous communal land was reduced by two-thirds by the time the Dawes Act was repealed in 1934.

The election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 resulted in a clear change in government policy toward Native American reservations. Unlike previous administrations, Roosevelt was politically allied with neither eastern land developers nor large western landowners who desired reservation land. Along with his Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, an anthropologist sympathetic to the Native American cause, Roosevelt led a successful effort to repeal the Dawes Act in 1934.

4.2 The repeal of the Dawes Act and partial autonomy, 1934-1945

The repeal of the Dawes Act was included in the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934. The IRA, which was colloquially known as the “Indian New Deal,” made communal land on reservations inalienable and extended the political and judicial authority of tribal leaders, while placing limits on interference by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Reservations were given an opportunity to draft a constitution that could include a role for traditional customs and authorities in economics, politics, and society within a geographically delimited tribal area. The Bureau of Indian Affairs would then protect the rights of reservations to these practices and to their customary patterns of landholding. Importantly, however, economic autonomy was not offered, as reservation land legally remained in the possession of the federal government.

²Carlson (1981).




Figure 4.1: Timing of allotment and loss of reservation land

Figure shows the loss of Native American reservation land based on whether the “major” allotment occurred before or after June 14, 1909. 1909 is a key cutpoint because reservations that were allotted in this year or before fulfilled the twenty-five year trust period necessary for privatization before the repeal of the Dawes Act in 1934. Those allotted after this date did not fulfill the trust period and lost comparatively less land.

The US government pushed for passage of the IRA by Congress in response to the destabilizing effects of divided extraction following allotment. A famed study conducted by Lewis Meriam in 1928 had highlighted the disruptive impact of the Dawes Act, suggesting it had resulted in a deeper impoverishment of Indian reservations, more demands of the government, and the development of a “pauper point of view.”³ While the report was not novel in highlighting the negative effects of the native land privatization policies of the US government, it did play a significant role in mobilizing political opposition to the Dawes Act.⁴

Collier’s reason for proposing the IRA was directly tied to his opposition to the Dawes

³Tyler (2001: 119).

⁴Taylor (1984: 20-21).

Act. As he stated in a 1934 meeting with the All-Pueblo Council,

Our starting point is to try to help those Indians who have been destroyed or ruined by the Allotment Act, including those who have still got some land but who are going to lose it unless we can change that arrangement...In the main that means that the Government must buy land and give it to the Indians who have lost their land. The [IRA] Bill sets up an arrangement for buying land for Indians who need land. It directs the Secretary of the Interior to find out the situation of all these Indians, to examine the lands that they need and to go ahead and buy land for them and to help them set up their life on that land.⁵

Collier and the US government's desire to establish the IRA emerged directly from the destructive effects of private predation under the Dawes Act. Yet, the government did not unilaterally impose these agreements on the indigenous population.

Instead, the government allowed individual reservations to vote in 1935 to accept or reject the IRA.⁶ If they voted to adopt, reservations would receive government assistance in reacquiring lost land and reestablishing traditional tribal political and economic institutions. If they rejected, they would continue the path followed under the Dawes Act, which included the possibility of selling and renting their land.⁷ Ultimately, 194 Indian reservations voted in favor of the IRA while 74 rejected it.⁸ These votes to adopt the IRA constitute the primary outcome measure of the empirical analysis that follows.⁹

As hypothesized, there exists a positive correlation between exposure to private predation and indigenous support for the partial autonomy offered by the IRA. Specifically, greater land loss under the Dawes Act is associated with a higher reservation-level vote share for the Indian Reorganization Act. Figure 4.2 plots this relationship. In the next section, I test whether this association reflects a causal relationship using a natural experiment in which exposure to rural elite extraction varies as-if randomly as a result of the timing of allotment.¹⁰

Empirical strategy and estimation

Given the theory I propose above, this extraction of indigenous land by private landowners should increase the likelihood that indigenous reservations seek formal recognition and

⁵Deloria (2002: 179-182).

⁶Congress passed the IRA in 1934, but reservations did not vote on it until the following year.

⁷However, if land had not been allotted by 1934, it would not be eligible for allotment in the future.

⁸Taylor (1980: 164).

⁹To my knowledge, no existing study has examined the universe of reservation-level votes on the IRA as an outcome. Existing studies have instead investigated votes on the IRA among a relatively small subset of reservations (Taylor 1980) or a single reservation (Roschmann 1991).

¹⁰Dunning defines "natural experiments" as including two components: 1) the researcher compares outcomes among units assigned to treatment with those assigned to control and 2) assignment to treatment conditions is as good as random (Dunning 2012: 16). Unlike true experiments, however, treatment assignment is not controlled by the researcher (Dunning 2012: 16).




Figure 4.2: Relationship between exposure to private predation and support for partial autonomy, binned means for reservations (raw data plotted in gray)

protection for their political and economic institutions. To examine this prediction, I leverage a natural experiment where exposure to rural elite extraction is as-if randomly assigned to reservations.

Timing of allotment may be generally confounded by factors that influence future votes on the Indian Reorganization Act. For example, governments may break up rebellious reservations first; the factors that determine the rebelliousness of a reservation may also be correlated with preferences over partial autonomy. Thus, estimates of the causal effect of allotment timing on IRA votes may be biased.

Yet, timing of allotment relative to the year 1909 may be plausibly exogenous within narrow windows of time around that year. In other words, at the time the Dawes Act was passed and allotment began, neither the Native Americans on reservations nor private actors nor the government knew that 1909 was a consequential year, as repeal of the Act would not occur for another twenty-five years. Thus, reservations allotted just before or just after June 18, 1909 should not differ, in expectation, on a number of key baseline attributes. The posed exchangeability of these reservations provides a natural experiment that can be leveraged to determine the effect of divided extraction on later votes for the Indian Reorganization Act.

To analyze this natural experiment, I estimate an OLS regression in which the 1935 reservation-level vote share in favor of the Indian Reorganization Act is regressed on a dummy

indicator for whether the reservation was allotted before June 18, 1909 (coded “1”) or after (coded “0”). The model I estimate for a given reservation, i , is thus:

$$\text{IRA_vote}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{pre1909}_i + \epsilon_i. \quad (4.1)$$

I estimate equation (4.1) using an expanding bandwidth around June 14, 1909 to show how the results change depending on the width of the bandwidth specified.¹¹ Such an approach preserves the natural experiment by showing results close to the threshold but also allows the result to be estimated with greater statistical power as the bandwidth is expanded.

To perform the estimation, I gathered data from all reservations on the dates of “major allotments” as defined by the US Office of Indian Affairs.¹² Data on reservation-level support for the Indian Reorganization Act was obtained from the US congressional record of the debate around the law.¹³ A map of those reservations voting for and against the IRA is presented in Figure 4.3.

Results

This section provides a test of the hypothesis that rural elite extraction increases the likelihood that indigenous communities embrace recognition of their self-governance authority. Specifically, in this empirical case, extraction by private actors during the period of the Dawes Act should increase reservation-level vote share for the Indian Reorganization Act.

Figure 4.4 estimates equation (4.1) across a number of bandwidths, beginning with a two-year window around June 14, 1909 and expanding incrementally to a twenty-five year window. The findings suggest support for the posited positive relationship. Having recently experienced private predation increases a reservation’s support for the IRA by around twenty percentage points, although the statistical significance of this finding varies based on the particular bandwidth examined. Figure 4.4 also analyzes as an outcome a binary indicator for whether a reservation adopted or rejected the IRA. On average, private predation increases the likelihood of adopting the IRA by about 35 percentage points, although within the narrowest windows this increase is closer to 60 percentage points.


Generally, land loss under the Dawes Act increased Native American support for the extension of autonomy offered by the Roosevelt administration. These dynamics can be further explored through an analysis of the historical record, particularly the debates that occurred around adoption of the IRA.

Collier traveled across the country in 1934 and spoke to gatherings of tribal representatives, where he explained and defended the IRA. The minutes of the Plains Congress in South Dakota on March 4, 1934, highlight the divisions among reservations with respect


¹¹Equivalently, the model can be expressed in terms of potential outcomes, where the only random element is assignment to treatment status; estimating the average causal effect under that model is equivalent to β in equation (4.1).

¹²Office of Indian Affairs (1935).

¹³Committee on Indian Affairs (1940).



(a) Voting For



(b) Voting Against

Figure 4.3: Map of IRA Votes for Adoption




Figure 4.4: Effect of rural elite extraction on reservation-level support for IRA

The first panel shows the difference in percentage of reservation “yes” votes on the IRA between the treated and control groups. The second panel shows differences in the probability of adopting the IRA. Here the treatment group is defined as reservations allotted *in or before* June 14, 1909, while those allotted after are considered control. The allotment time frame includes a bandwidth that expands in the years before (and including) and after 1909. For example, the three-year bandwidth compares reservations allotted from June 14, 1909 to June 14, 1911 with reservations allotted from June 14, 1907 to June 13, 1909.

to supporting Collier and Roosevelt's IRA; the reasons for support and opposition often emerged from the reservation's experience with land extraction under the Dawes Act. The Lower Brule Reservation, for example, had lost over fifty percent of its land under the Dawes Act. At the conference, the representative of the Lower Brule Reservation delegation, George Yellow, argued,

With reference to the allotment system that ever since we have been governed by the white people, the white man has been reaching into my pockets and robbing me of everything except the soles of my shoes...the people I am representing are living in conditions that are very deplorable. What I fear is this: That within three or four years from now I will lose all of my holdings and my interests and my property.¹⁴

Yellow, however, voiced his support for the IRA and particularly for Collier, saying "I want to thank these [BIA] officials for bringing to us a gigantic measure which, to me, is very important...I believe that we have a friend that we can stand together with now."¹⁵ In 1935, over two-thirds of the Lower Brule Reservation voted to adopt the IRA. The representative from the Winnebago Reservation, which had also lost significant land under the Dawes Act, expressed similar optimism about the Indian Reorganization Act. He noted,

Politicians changed the good law we had into an allotment law in 1882. We had 300,000 acres of the most valuable agricultural land in the State of Nebraska. Today we have 25,000 acres...I am going to go home with the good news of what I have learned here [about the IRA], that we are not going to be losing anything to try this new deal.

The Winnebago Reservation adopted the IRA in 1935 with the support of over 70 percent of tribal members.

Mr Harvey Cawker, representative of the Pima delegation at the 1934 Southern Arizona Indian Conference in Phoenix, articulated a similar perspective around the positive feelings toward the US government.

The Pima delegation feels that the matter of the bill before us is a bill that we must back up . . . We had the privilege of listening to a man here this morning [A.C. Monohan¹⁶] who knows and has shown you what the result is in the past years, and they want to change that so as to prevent it from further depriving the Indians of the land that they possessed.¹⁷

¹⁴Deloria (2002: 73).

¹⁵Deloria (2002: 73).

¹⁶Assistant to the BIA Commissioner

¹⁷Deloria (2002: 222-223).

Cawker went on to note his faith in the Roosevelt administration to faithfully implement the law saying, “It goes back to the President of the United States and on down to all the officials in Washington and the [BIA] Commissioner and the men who are here with us today. They are interested in you.”¹⁸ Ultimately, 53 of the 68 voters from the Pima reservation opted to adopt the IRA.

Groups that had lost relatively less land under the Dawes Act were less eager to support the IRA. The Cheyenne River and Crow Reservations, for example, had lost around fifteen percent of their combined land to allotment. The two also allied at the Plains Congress to voice displeasure with Collier’s proposed IRA. As the Chair of the Cheyenne River delegation noted, “We feel as though this Bill, while it may be of benefit to some Reservations, will not be of much benefit to the Cheyenne River Reservation as far as land holdings are concerned.”¹⁹ The Chair of the delegation from the Crow Reservation similarly noted, “A new program as I see it takes away from us initiative and private ownership that we all desire so much to possess...I believe the Crow Indians and Cheyenne will fight this Bill to the last measure.”²⁰

In many cases, however, chiefs made it clear they did not speak for their tribes, and that final approval of the IRA would be subject to the will of tribal members. For example, the representative from the Fort Peck tribe made it clear that he was willing to “take a chance” on a new policy, but that the final decision would “be subject to the approval of our people at home.”²¹ Ultimately, the members of the tribe, which had experienced relatively limited land loss under the Dawes Act, rejected the IRA by a two-to-one margin.

The quantitative and qualitative dynamics in this section highlight an important distinction between those reservations exposed to rural elite extraction and those that were not. Overall, greater exposure to private predation encouraged indigenous tribes to pursue government recognition of their political autonomy rights.

4.3 State-led extraction and IRA adoption

As I detail further in the next two chapters, exposure to state-led extraction appears to have increased resistance to the IRA, even among those reservations that had experienced land loss to private actors under the Dawes Act. The Nez Perce tribe of Idaho, for example, lost over half of their land during the Dawes Act period. In a close vote, however, the tribe rejected the IRA. A delegate for the tribe at the 1934 Northwest Indian Conference correctly predicted this resistance, claiming that the government had not complied with previous agreements and had instead taken native land.

My personal opinion is that they are inclined to oppose the Bill. There is one big objection to the Bill: the reason is the Nez Perce claim 18,000,000 dollars in lieu of ceding the Montana hunting grounds to the government. The promises were

¹⁸Deloria (2002: 223).

¹⁹Deloria (2002: 68).

²⁰Deloria (2002: 69).

²¹Deloria (2002: 72).

extended as part of the Indian interests into the treaties with the government in 1855 and the promises that the mountains and rivers would be ours have never been kept.²²

The Navajo tribe of the southwestern United States experienced limited land loss under the Dawes Act but did experience state-led extraction that shaped their preferences over the IRA. Particularly important was the Roosevelt administration's policy to reduce livestock within the Navajo territory. In response to a number of factors, including "depleted vegetation, soil erosion, silt accumulation at the Hoover Dam, expanding herds, restrictions on off-reservation grazing, poor animal quality, and the faltering national economy," the federal government in 1933 began seizing and slaughtering horses, goats, cows, and sheep belonging to the Navajo.²³ In 1934 alone, nearly 150,000 goats and 50,000 sheep were forcibly removed from the Navajo.²⁴

The Navajo Livestock Program has been linked directly to reduced trust in government and lower vote share for the IRA. As Weisiger observes, the Navajo "understood the [vote on the IRA] as a referendum on stock reduction and on Collier himself. Particularly in the eastern and northern jurisdictions of the reservation, where goat reduction had been especially devastating people registered their anger by voting against the IRA."²⁵ The Livestock Reduction Program proved to reinforce preexisting grievances among the Navajo against the federal government. At a meeting with John Collier to discuss the IRA, one Navajo representative, Howard Gorman, argued,

This thing [the IRA], the thing you said that will make us strong, what do you mean by it? We have been told not once but many times this same thing, and all it is is a bunch of lies. What are we going to get in return for placing our votes in favor of the mark? What will become of the old treaties? You have not fulfilled those treaties yet!²⁶

Reflecting on his speech years later, Gorman claimed that his statement was met with great enthusiasm by the other Navajo attending the meeting: "The people were happy and cheering, expressing their appreciation for what I said to Collier."²⁷ Ultimately, the "livestock issue exacerbated existing religious and sectional divisions among the Navajos and resulted in their rejection of the IRA."²⁸ For many decades to follow, the policy generated—and likely continues to generate—"bitterness and anger among the Navajos" toward the federal government.²⁹

²²Deloria (2002: 129).

²³McPherson (1998: 6).

²⁴Aberle (1982: 57).

²⁵Weisiger (2007: 447).

²⁶Roessel and Johnson (1974: 72).

²⁷Roessel and Johnson (1974: 73).

²⁸Taylor (1980: 49).

²⁹Iverson (1983: 23).

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the effects of rural elite extraction on indigenous community demands for partial autonomy. I have shown that exposure to private predation under the Dawes Act led native reservations to more eagerly embrace the political autonomy offered by the Indian Reorganization Act. I have also presented evidence that those reservations that experienced state-led extraction were less likely to embrace the IRA. In the two chapters that follow, I examine more systematically the effects of state-led extraction on the adoption of partial autonomy arrangements in early twentieth century Peru and contemporary Bolivia. Drawing on a natural experiment as well as contemporary data, I show that exposure to state-led extraction has generally increased indigenous communities' resistance to partial offers of autonomy.

Chapter 5

The Effects of State-led Extraction

Indigenous Demands for Autonomy in 1920s Peru

The theory I presented in Chapter 2 predicts that exposure to state-led extraction will increase the probability that indigenous communities both resist autonomy and violently mobilize in defense of their resources. In this chapter, I test this part of the theory. I draw on a natural experiment in which Peruvian indigenous communities were as-if randomly exposed to labor conscription for a 1920s road-building program. As my theory predicts, I show that exposure to this state-led extraction reduced the likelihood that indigenous communities embraced partial autonomy. Such exposure also increased the likelihood that indigenous communities mobilized violently to defend their land, labor, and capital from non-indigenous outsiders.

5.1 State-led extraction under Augusto Leguía

Perhaps the most notable twentieth-century example of state-led extraction in Peru occurred under President Augusto Leguía (1919-1930). Initially, Leguía appeared to be an ally of indigenous Peruvians. He created a land commission, which sought to resolve land disputes between the indigenous and hacienda owners and was headed by a pro-indigenous commissioner, Erasmo Roca.¹ He established an Indigenous Affairs Section within the Ministry of Development, led by Hildebrando Castro Pozo, “one of the most...sincere defenders of Indian rights that Peru has produced.”² And he initially facilitated the development of a prominent indigenous advocacy group, Pro-Derecho Indígena Tawantinsuyo.

Yet, soon after taking office, he became a firm ally of the country’s landed elite. In 1922, the League of Hacienda Owners (Liga de Hacendados) published a pamphlet detailing the danger posed by rebellious indigenous communities in rural areas. As Sáenz noted upon reviewing the pamphlet in 1933, “the writer[s] of the pamphlet, hoping that the Government would use an iron hand and become more severe, exaggerated, and, above all, twisted the

¹Pike (1967: 222).

²Pike (1967: 222).

facts.”³ However, the ploy worked. Leguía dissolved the Roca commission and sent Castro Pozo into exile in 1923.⁴ He then outlawed the Tawantinsuyo committee in 1927, solidifying his clear commitment to the country’s landowning class.⁵

This alliance gave rise to a particularly intensive period of state-led extraction, which was most clearly exemplified by Leguía’s national road-building program.⁶ The road network would be Peru’s first, and Leguía hoped that the roads would eventually replace the extant railroad system, which he saw as a soon-to-be relic.

To build the road, Leguía proposed and eventually facilitated the passage of the *Ley de Conscripción Vial*, or Road Conscription Law. On paper, all males between eighteen and sixty were required to pay a tax to fund road construction, and if they could not afford the tax, they were required to provide two weeks of unpaid labor to build the roads.⁷ Effectively, however, only indigenous Peruvians lacked the ability to pay the tax.⁸ Because of its disproportionate effect on indigenous populations, the road conscription law was colloquially labeled “mita,” after the taxes that had been levied on indigenous labor in the colonial and early republican periods.⁹

Road conscription laws, like Peru’s, were profoundly exploitative. Indigenous workers were forced to contribute far more than their obligation under the law, sometimes working for three months without cash or in-kind payment. Stein notes,

In its original conception the Conscripción Vial law was designed to be a just and expedient way of moving forward on highway construction, but in practice it brought considerable suffering to large sectors of the Peruvian peasantry. Indians were forced to leave their homes and travel many miles over difficult terrain to the construction sites...Generally the workers received little, if any food, and no medical attention; deaths among the “conscriptos” were not uncommon. In order to keep workers on the job, the local authorities often confiscated parts of their clothing and other possessions and returned them only when the work was terminated.¹⁰

Peruvian intellectuals of the time, like José Mariátegui, decried the law as “anti-indigenous,” and senators frequently called for its alteration or abolition given the abuses occurring on the projects.¹¹ Yet, the central government remained unsympathetic. Upon touring parts of

³Sáenz (1933).

⁴Pike (1967: 222).

⁵Klarén (2014: 62).

⁶Chaplin (2015: 65).

⁷Peru was not the only country to implement such a program. Bolivia (Schurz 1921: 88), Mexico (Vaughan and Lewis 2006: 227), and Guatemala (Bulmer-Thomas 1987: 72) also had road conscription programs.

⁸Basadre (2014: 197); Belaúnde Terry (1965: 112); Davies (1974: 84).

⁹Contreras and Zuloaga (2014: 225); Mariátegui (1988: 74); Dell (2010).

¹⁰Stein (1980: 61).

¹¹Davies (1974: 84-85); Mariátegui (1926).

the road, Leguía's Minister of Development, Ernesto Sousa, bluntly said, "The need for the road merits the sacrifice of a few Indian lives."¹²

My theory suggests that state-led extraction, like Leguía's road conscription program, generally leads indigenous communities to resist autonomy. Instead, indigenous groups more often mobilize, perhaps violently, to oppose extraction. This section evaluates this prediction by using as-if random variation in indigenous communities' exposure to Leguía's road conscription program and data on the number of communities seeking formal state recognition.

In determining where to build his road, Leguía decided to follow the route of the Qhapaq Ñan, or Inca Road.¹³ Built prior to the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century, the main part of the road traversed the spine of the Andes from present-day Chile to Colombia. The road effectively linked the disparate and otherwise isolated parts of the Inca empire, allowing the emperor in Cusco to exert effective control.

During the colonial period, the Spanish had little use for the Inca Road, which primarily ran north to south; far more useful were east-west routes that would allow for the transportation of mineral resources from the mountainous sierra to ports. By the seventeenth century, the Inca Road had fallen into disuse with its location and route largely unknown.

Leguía designed a highway that would follow the formerly unknown path of the Inca Road. Using historical documents and a team of archaeologists, Leguía reconstructed the Qhapaq Ñan route. In doing this, Leguía sought to create a unique Peruvian nationalism that would unite the traditional with the modern. As the president himself stated in 1924, "Cusco, in the near future, must be connected by road to Cajamarca, as it was in the time of the Inca."¹⁴ In other words, Cusco, the capital of the Inca empire and located in the south of Peru must once again be linked with the most important Inca city in northern Peru, Cajamarca.

According to the Road Conscription Law, laborers were required to work on only the sections of road that were built in the province where they lived. Workers could not be taken from one province to work in another.¹⁵ Documents from the period (along with the law itself) suggest that workers were never recruited to work in another province.¹⁶ Figure 5.1 provides a map of provinces known to contain a segment of the Inca Road.

My empirical strategy leverages this selection procedure for labor and specifically, a geographic regression-discontinuity design. The "treatment" is defined as exposure to the road conscription program. Because labor was conscripted from only the provinces where the road was built, treatment can be thought of as cluster assigned at the provincial-level with

¹²Kapsoli (1982: 51).

¹³The Inca Road was not, in fact, a single road but a collection of roads.

¹⁴Esquivel (2013: 32).

¹⁵Even district councils, which operated at a level below the provincial council, could often prevent indigenous labor from being taken from their district to work in another (Wilson 2013: 135).

¹⁶Contreras and Zuloaga (2014: 225); Dunn (1925: 79); International Labour Office (1929: 137-138). Note: Provinces in Peru are a second-tier administrative unit. There were around 150 provinces at this time. Districts are the lowest administrative tier. There were about 1,300 at this time. Within districts there existed a mix of recognized indigenous communities, unrecognized indigenous communities, and private land.




Figure 5.1: Qhapaq Ñan Provinces Study Group (1940 borders)

Note: The map depicts the central sierra route of the Qhapaq Ñan along with adjacent “control” provinces in the mountainous sierra. Grey provinces are not included in the study group.

all municipalities (henceforth, “districts”) within a given province receiving either treatment (i.e., being subjected to the Leguía draft) or control. I use distance to a border dividing a Qhapaq Ñan province from a non-Qhapaq Ñan province as the running variable. Because provincial borders were drawn mostly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, long after the Qhapaq Ñan had been mostly lost, potential outcomes should be continuous across the cutpoint (i.e., a given border dividing a Qhapaq Ñan from a non-Qhapaq Ñan province). I do not use the actual location of the road built by Leguía as the treatment because he could in principle have strategically deviated from the location of the Qhapaq

Ñan. Instead, I use the Qhapaq Ñan route as an instrument for the location of the Leguía road, using Intent-to-Treat (ITT) analysis.

To construct the outcome variable—community embrace of partial autonomy—I examine the number of communities in a district that received “recognition” between 1925 and 1940.¹⁷ Leguía not only conscripted indigenous labor to build his road but also embarked on the first systematic effort to register Peruvian indigenous communities in 1925. The process of registration involved indigenous communities requesting and assisting a government surveyor to document their landholdings; once this process had taken place, communities received a formal, collectively held title to their land. Thus, I use the decision to pursue community registration as a measure of indigenous communities’ embrace of central state offers of economic autonomy.

Data collection on the running and dependent variables involved an extensive review of primary and secondary sources. Alberto Regal’s *Los Caminos del Inca*, which compiles information from sixteenth century travel documents, provided information on the location of the Qhapaq Ñan.¹⁸ The 1940 bulletin of the Peruvian Bureau of Indian Affairs (*Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas*) provided data for the years of community recognition, and the 1940 Census offered data on communities that had not been recognized. Distances of districts to provincial borders were calculated by the author using a variety of government-issued maps from the period. Finally, data on road construction under Leguía was collected from four government publications on 1920s road construction.¹⁹

I use this data to estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), specifically, a difference in means at the cutpoint. Equation (8.3) elaborates the central estimand of interest, τ_{LATE} .

$$\tau_{LATE} = E(Y_i(1)|X_i = 0) - E(Y_i(0)|X_i = 0) \quad (5.1)$$

$Y_i(1)$ indicates unit potential outcomes under treatment, $Y_i(0)$ unit potential outcomes under control, and X_i values of the running variable. In this case, $Y_i(1)$ represents the number of communities in a district that would have applied for recognition had they been “assigned” to a Qhapaq Ñan province and thus, to Leguía’s road-building program. $Y_i(0)$ represents the number of communities in a district that would have received recognition had they not been assigned to a Qhapaq Ñan province. X_i represents a district’s distance from a treatment-control border, where zero is the cutpoint.

As long as potential outcomes are continuous across the cutpoint, Equation (8.3) is equivalent to $\lim_{x \uparrow 0} E(Y_i|X_i = x) - \lim_{x \downarrow 0} E(Y_i|X_i = x)$.²⁰ The estimation of τ_{LATE} involves fitting a polynomial regression of order, p , to points on either side of the cutpoint. A kernel weighting function $K(\cdot)$, which is here triangular, assigns higher weight to units closer to

¹⁷Figure A2 shows that there is continuity across the cutpoint in the pre-treatment number of communities. There is also continuity on the total number of communities at the time of treatment ($p = 0.75$).

¹⁸Regal (1936).

¹⁹Ministerio de Fomento (1930); Díez Canseco and Aguilar Revoredo (1929); Peru (1929); Portaro (1930).

²⁰Sekhon and Titiunik (2017).

the cutpoint.²¹ Under the above assumption (i.e. continuity of potential outcomes), the differences in intercepts in the two lines provides an unbiased estimate of the LATE, τ_{LATE} . The estimator, $\widehat{\tau_{LATE}}$, can thus be defined:

$$\widehat{\tau_{LATE}} = \widehat{\beta_{0,+}} - \widehat{\beta_{0,-}}. \quad (5.2)$$

In equation (5.2), $\widehat{\beta_{0,+}} = \bar{Y} - \sum_{j=1}^p \widehat{\beta_{j,+}}(\bar{X})^j$ and $\widehat{\beta_{0,-}} = \bar{Y} - \sum_{j=1}^p \widehat{\beta_{j,-}}(\bar{X})^j$, where $\widehat{\beta_{j,+}}$ and $\widehat{\beta_{j,-}}$ are fitted regression coefficients from a regression of the outcome on the running variable with polynomial order, p . The directional sign in the subscript of the coefficients indicates the subset of data used in the estimation. A positive sign indicates that the equation was estimated using data left of the cutpoint while a negative sign indicates that the equation was estimated using data right of the cutpoint. Different values of p in the proceeding analyses illustrate the robustness of the results to different polynomial-order specifications. For simplicity of interpretation and transparency, I rely primarily on a local linear ($p = 1$) polynomial specification.²² Border-pair fixed effects are used in order to preserve the comparison of units on either side of a shared border.

Three main assumptions are required to identify the effect of road conscription on community recognition. The first can be directly tested: that being assigned to a Qhapaq Ñan province has a strong and significant effect on where the Leguía road was built. The historical record suggests that Leguía indeed endeavored to accurately trace the route of the Qhapaq Ñan. For him, constructing a road in the inhospitable geography of the Andes was an “obsession,” and he greatly desired to build a highway that would once again reunite the great sierra cities of the Inca empire.²³ While the Spanish had found little utility in the Qhapaq Ñan, Leguía viewed it as a symbolic and strategic way to exercise state authority over territory rarely penetrated by the central government. In the appendix (Table A1), I offer a quantitative test of this assumption.

A second assumption, which is the key identifying assumption under the RDD approach, requires the continuity of potential outcomes across borders separating treated units from control units and is not directly testable. In other words, any observed or unobserved confounders should not in expectation vary discontinuously across the treat-control boundary. Provincial boundaries were fluid until 1850, nearly three centuries after much of the Qhapaq Ñan was destroyed through the wars between the Spanish and indigenous groups; it was never rebuilt, and the parts that had not been destroyed quickly fell into disuse.²⁴ Because the location of Qhapaq Ñan was not well known at the time that provincial borders were assigned, districts on either side of a treatment-control border should not—in

²¹As is typically true, the choice of a uniform kernel does not change the finding (Cattaneo et al. 2019: 43). The linear specification of the RDD approximates a local difference in means (Dunning 2012).

²²Cattaneo et al. (2019).

²³Esquivel (2013: 33).

²⁴Esquivel (2013).

expectation—exhibit discontinuous changes in key baseline covariates.²⁵ Balance tests show that districts on either side of the border did not exhibit significant pre-treatment differences on potentially important covariates (Figure A2).²⁶ Sorting may also pose a threat to inference if districts select into or out of Qhapaq Ñan provinces, but there is no evidence of such sorting (Figure A3).

A third assumption requires that a district’s potential outcomes depend only on whether it is in a Qhapaq Ñan province and not whether other districts are “assigned” to a Qhapaq Ñan province.²⁷ The particular concern in this case is that one district’s exposure to extraction may affect the ability or decision of community’s to seek recognition in another district. Individual movement out of communities would not represent a concern for spillovers as individuals must be born in a community to achieve membership. Any movement out of a community is thus part of the treatment but not a threat to the SUTVA assumption as individuals cannot easily relocate from one community to another. Because communities are relatively closed, it is likewise unlikely that there will be communication across communities, even ones that are located in close proximity to one other.

In addition to the above assumptions, a concern may arise that the treatment effect I estimate includes not only the effect of extraction, but also that of exposure to the road network. Existing historical analyses suggest this is not the case and that provinces almost uniformly experienced the market integration effect of the new road network, even those that did not contain a section of the Leguía road.²⁸

The design described above thus provides a method of identifying the key causal effect of interest: the role of state-led extraction in eroding indigenous communities. Specifically, exposure to Leguía’s road conscription should reduce the number of communities in a district applying for formal recognition. Figure 5.2 offers a test of this main hypothesis. At the cutpoint that divides districts from control (left-hand side) and treatment (right-hand side), there is a clear decrease in the number of communities that received recognition during the time of extraction and the decade after.²⁹

Table 5.1 provides a more formal test using the sharp interpretation of the RDD framework. The equations estimated in the table cluster standard errors at the provincial level and include border-pair fixed effects. Districts located in a province that had been exposed to state-led extraction had, on average, two fewer communities recognized between 1925 and 1940. This finding is robust to different polynomial specifications and bandwidth choices.

Thus, as my theory suggests, indigenous communities that are exposed to state-led extraction are less likely to receive community recognition. I argue that this is largely due


²⁵Districts were often “close” to more than one treatment-control border. In these cases, I used the distance from the closest border.

²⁶It is important to note that defining exactly what pre-treatment is in this case is complicated by the fact that pre-treatment may vary based on the date provinces were created.

²⁷This is the non-interference, or SUTVA, assumption.

²⁸Mallon (2014: 277); Zapata et al. (2008: 146). Even communities located a great distance from the main road mobilized communal labor to build dirt paths linking them to the network.

²⁹Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.



Note: Plot shows sharp regression discontinuity estimates. The X-axis provides the distance of a municipality (or district) from a border separating a province containing a portion of Qhapaq Ñan province from a province that does not. The Qhapaq Ñan served as a model for the Leguía road, and indigenous labor was mobilized only from provinces where the road was being built. Positive values of the running variable indicate distance from a control (i.e., non-Qhapaq Ñan) province, while negative values indicate distance from a treatment (i.e., Qhapaq Ñan) province. The Y axis plots the number of communities that received recognition between 1925 and 1940. Linear regression line plotted on either side of the cutpoint. Window shown reflects coverage error rate optimal bandwidth. The number of bins are selected according to a mimicking-variance criteria (Cattaneo et al. 2019) in which bins are constructed such that the variance of each bin approximates the variability of the raw data.

Figure 5.2: RDD estimates: Effect of state-led extraction on institutional recognition

to indigenous community decisions to reject institutional offers proposed by a government that itself participated in extraction. To examine this, I use the same identification strategy as above where Peruvian districts are as-if randomly assigned to experience labor extrac-

Table 5.1: State-led extraction and community recognition (1925-1940)

	<i>Number of communities recognized (1925-1940)</i>			
	MSE bandwidth		CER bandwidth	
	Linear	Fourth-order	Linear	Fourth-order
Conventional	-1.696*** (0.600)	-2.062** (0.896)	-1.876*** (0.673)	-1.836** (0.928)
Bias-corrected	-2.014*** (0.668)	-2.033** (0.944)	-2.061*** (0.715)	-1.826* (0.951)
Observations	366	366	366	366
Observations (left)	125	125	125	125
Observations (right)	241	241	241	241
BW	42.7 km	42.7 km	33.3 km	33.3 km

Note: SEs clustered at province level with border-pair fixed effects *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

tion. However, here I analyze two alternative outcomes: indigenous community mobilization through government institutions and violent mobilization.

To measure within-institution mobilization, I use the documented complaints to the Trusteeship of the Indian Race (*Patronato de la Raza Indigena*) between 1922 and 1930, the period for which the data is available.³⁰ These complaints carry specific accusations with respect to who the target of the complaint was (a landowner or government official) and the reason the complaint was filed. 329 communities filed complaints, and nearly half (153) were against state officials.³¹ Drawing on Kapsoli and Reateguı's (1987) data on these petitions, I code districts based on whether they had at least one community file a petition. I then measure whether exposure to state-led extraction increases the likelihood of a district filing a petition against state officials.

My theory holds that state-led extraction will reduce indigenous communities likelihood of mobilizing through government institutions. Therefore, we might expect that state-led extraction will reduce the probability of communities' filing a grievance through the Trusteeship of the Indian Race. The first two columns of Table 5.2 provide a test of this hypothesis. While the coefficients are negative, the findings are not significant. However, a null result may be informative in this case. While state-led extraction undoubtedly generates more grievances against state officials—and thus in principle could produce a positive treatment effect, absent countervailing forces—it does not increase the probability of indigenous com-

³⁰Fortunately, this also corresponds to the key period of road-building under Leguía who was overthrown in a coup in August 1930.

³¹Kapsoli and Reateguı (1987).

munities pursuing a claim through the state. If anything, it appears to reduce the number of claims.

The theory also suggests that indigenous communities, when exposed to state-led extraction, will be more likely to mobilize violently. Historians have suggested that violent backlashes by indigenous communities against the conscription law were commonplace; most of these uprisings targeted the local authorities in charge of mobilizing indigenous labor and occurred in response to over-extraction and worker deaths.³²

I provide a formal test of this hypothesis using data from Kapsoli (1982) and Kammann (1982) on all documented violent indigenous mobilizations between 1920 and 1963 from several departments in the Peruvian sierra.³³ I link community names with their districts in 1920 and as an outcome use the probability of a district experiencing a violent mobilization by indigenous communities.

The third and fourth columns of Table 5.2 use the same regression discontinuity design as above to formally test whether state-led extraction increased communities' violent mobilization. Consistent with the theory, districts that faced state-led extraction were forty to sixty percentage points more likely to experience a violent mobilization by indigenous communities between 1920 and 1963.

This quantitative evidence comports with existing analyses of the historical record, which find the road conscription law to be the major cause of rebellion in Peru in the 1920s.³⁴ Abuses abounded through the road conscription program. Local authorities forced the indigenous to work far more than their obligation without providing food, shelter, clothing, or the promised payment.³⁵ Furthermore, corruption by local authorities was widespread. Government officials demanded large bribes to issue certificates that recognized indigenous citizens had paid their labor obligation for the year; without these certificates, indigenous citizens could be made to serve again.³⁶ The result was a deteriorating trust in the state—also seemingly evident from the results in Table 5.2—and an increase in extra-institutional forms of indigenous mobilization.

Had the Peruvian government offered a more comprehensive form of autonomy, evidence suggests that indigenous groups may have embraced it. In the southern state of Puno, indigenous groups in the 1910s and 1920s, pushed for greater “political and economic autonomy...to strengthen their political autonomy and cultural identity by reconstructing communal solidarity.”³⁷

Often, these demands for wide-ranging autonomy went accompanied by a call for the central government to end labor extraction through its road conscription program.³⁸ Only when extraction had stopped could indigenous communities trust the state to provide mean-

³²Pereyra (2002: 88-89); Araujo and Paulino (1991: 91).

³³These include Apurímac, Cusco, Puno, Ayacucho, and Huancavelica.

³⁴Araujo and Paulino (1991: 125-127); Pereyra (2002).

³⁵Mallon (2014: 233); Basadre (2014).

³⁶Calisto (1993: 174-175).

³⁷Jacobsen (1993: 342).

³⁸Jacobsen (1993).

Table 5.2: State-led extraction and indigenous community mobilization against state officials (violent vs. non-violent)

	<i>Likelihood of:</i>			
	<u>Non-violent community mobilization (1922-1930)</u>		<u>Violent community mobilization (1920-1963)</u>	
	Linear	Fourth-order	Linear	Fourth-order
Exposure to Labor Conscription ¹	-0.056 (0.085)	-0.016 (0.208)	0.397** (0.170)	0.542** (0.209)
Exposure to Labor Conscription ²	-0.063 (0.095)	-0.013 (0.214)	0.381** (0.183)	0.557*** (0.211)
Observations	686	686	267	267
Observations (left)	323	323	132	132
Observations (right)	364	364	135	135
BW (coverage error rate)	29.96 km	29.96 km	24.01 km	24.01 km

Note: SEs clustered at province level with border-pair fixed effects *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

¹ Conventional coefficients

² Bias-corrected coefficients

ingful autonomy. The powerful pro-indigenous organization, the Tawantinsuyu Committee, declared in a 1920s communique, “We do not want to crush the national institutions, but to stop the abuses and the vicious obstacles to their enhancement.”³⁹

5.2 Conclusions

The findings above lend empirical support to my theory. Communities that experienced state-led extraction were no more likely to pursue their grievances through government institutions and were more likely to violently rebel against the state both during and after the period in which state-led extraction occurs. The latter finding suggests that extraction casts a long shadow over indigenous community mobilization. Once extraction occurs, it is not easy for government officials to reestablish their credibility among indigenous communities. In the next chapter, I examine evidence from a contemporary case, Bolivia, to trace how experiences with extraction by different actors have shaped responses to indigenous autonomy arrangements.

³⁹de la Cadena (2000: 94).

Chapter 6

State and Private Extraction Compared

Indigenous Demands for Autonomy in Contemporary Bolivia

In 2008, the government of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, implemented a new "plurinational" constitution that expanded native peoples' political autonomy. A key provision of the constitution provided for the creation of autonomous municipalities and territories, whereby indigenous groups could replace state officials with indigenous political authorities and institutions. Morales's Minister of Autonomy declared that the new reforms would "definitively break the chains of [indigenous] submission to political, cultural, and colonial powers."¹

While government officials offered optimistic projections around the potential effects of this autonomy, indigenous communities remained skeptical. The government presented native communities and majority-indigenous municipalities with the opportunity to decide internally whether they would apply for autonomous status. Thus far, more than ninety percent have rejected this offer, instead maintaining the status quo.

In this chapter, I explain why some municipalities have embraced partial autonomy in Bolivia while others have resisted it. I begin by outlining how indigenous groups have rejected autonomy in contemporary Bolivia. I then proceed to compare two neighboring municipalities in the department of Cochabamba as a way of illustrating how different experiences with extraction shape indigenous groups' attitudes toward autonomy. I show that even groups that experience rural elite extraction may reject autonomy if also exposed to state-led extraction. I then explore the main mechanism that underlies the relationship between state extraction and demands for autonomy. Using public opinion data, I demonstrate that—perhaps surprisingly—autonomy is most favored by those who have trust in the Bolivian government to protect and promote the interests of indigenous communities.

¹Azcui (2009).




Figure 6.1: Process of adopting political autonomy in Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2010)

6.1 Resisting autonomy in Bolivia

Indigenous communities have rejected the government’s offer of autonomy at four separate stages. In a first stage, indigenous leaders decide whether their community or eligible² municipality will hold a referendum to initiate the process of becoming an *autonomía indígena originaria campesina* (“indigenous originary peasant autonomy,” AIOC). If leaders decide to hold a referendum, a majority of voters must indicate support in order for the process to commence; otherwise, the measure fails. If a majority of voters decide to initiate the process of becoming an AIOC, then a third phase begins in which leaders of the community or municipality draft an autonomy statute. During this phase, statutes must be negotiated with and approved by government officials; a lack of resources and long delays in responses from bureaucrats have led many communities and municipalities to abandon the process.³ If communities and municipalities successfully draft a statute that is approved by the Bolivian government, a referendum is held in which voters decide whether their community or municipality will adopt the statute. If a majority of voters indicate support for the document, the Bolivian government grants the community or municipality autonomous status, and a new indigenous government is established. Figure 6.1 presents the stages of this autonomy adoption—and rejection—in Bolivia.

To illustrate how autonomy has failed at these different stages, we can examine early efforts by indigenous communities to embrace or resist autonomy. In 2009, 180 of Bolivia’s 337 municipalities were eligible for AIOC status; that is, a majority of their population identified as indigenous.⁴ That year, only twelve municipalities held referendums to adopt

²In order for municipalities to apply for AIOC status, a majority of residents must identify as indigenous. Similarly, for indigenous communities, certain population thresholds must be met that vary based on region.

³Tockman and Cameron (2014).

⁴Rousseau and Manrique (2019: 10).




Figure 6.2: Bolivian municipalities that held referendums to adopt AIOC status in 2009 (black) and eligible municipalities (gray)
Source: Albó and Romero 2009

AIOC status, making this the most common phase in which autonomy has been rejected. The locations of the twelve municipalities that began the AIOC process in 2009 are depicted in Figure 6.2.

Ultimately, only three of the municipalities that held referenda in 2009 adopted an autonomy statute and obtained AIOC status: Charaguá, Chayanta, and Chipaya. Thus far, only Charaguá has put into place an AIOC government. The other municipalities that held referendums in 2009 have since rejected autonomy. One municipality, Curahuara de Carangas, voted against starting the autonomy process in the initial referendum. Five municipalities rejected autonomy in the statute-drafting process. Three municipalities voted down autonomy in stage four, when referendums were held to decide on adopting the statute drafted by the deliberative assembly. The paths taken by these municipalities is presented in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Autonomy outcomes among Bolivian indigenous municipalities that held AIOC referendums in 2009

Municipality	Outcome	Stage where autonomy succeeded or failed
Villa Mojocoya	Failure	Stage 4: Referendum to adopt autonomy statute fails (40.6% support)
Tarabuco	Failure	Stage 3: No autonomy statute drafted
Huacaya	Failure	Stage 4: Referendum to adopt autonomy statute fails (41.4% support)
Jesús de Machaca	Failure	Stage 3: No autonomy statute drafted
Charazani	Failure	Stage 3: No autonomy statute drafted
Salinas de Garci Mendoza	Success	Passed with 51% (No government convened)
Pampa Aullagas	Failure	Stage 3: No autonomy statute drafted
Chipaya	Success	Passed with 77% (No government convened)
Totora	Failure	Stage 4: Referendum to adopt autonomy statute fails (29.96% support)
Curahuara de Carangas	Failure	Stage 2: Referendum to initiate process fails (45.1% support)
Chayanta	Failure	Stage 3: No autonomy statute drafted
Charaguá	Success	Passed with 53.3% (Government convened)

6.2 Responses to autonomy in tropical Cochabamba

In this section, I attempt to explain variation in the decision to embrace and reject autonomy. I employ a most-similar case study design in which I compare the experiences of two neighboring municipalities in the Bolivian department⁵ of Cochabamba (Figure 6.3). Both are located in the tropical lowland region of the department, have long been the center of effective peasant mobilization around coca production,⁶ and possess a number of similarities on basic demographic characteristics that might predict a desire to resist or embrace of autonomy (Table 6.2). Yet, the cases differ in their ultimate outcome. While Shinahota adopted AIOC status in 2017, a movement for autonomy never emerged in Villa Tunari. I argue that this divergence in responses to autonomy can be attributed to the municipalities' different experiences with extraction.

The municipalities of Villa Tunari and Shinahota have each experienced extraction by private actors, particularly coca growers and processors. In the 1970s and 1980s, elites from other areas of Bolivia migrated to northern Cochabamba, where both municipalities are located; they began to clear massive forest land for coca cultivation, eager to take advantage of the growing demand for cocaine in the United States. By 1985, between forty and forty-

⁵Bolivian departments, or “departamentos,” are equivalent to US states.

⁶Coca is the primary plant used to produce cocaine.



Figure 6.3: Location of Villa Tunari (larger, northern municipality) and Shinahota within the Cochabamba department (dashed outline), Bolivia

five percent of the world’s coca leaf and coca paste production originated in Bolivia, with 70 percent of this output being produced in the small tropical area of northern Cochabamba.⁷

The influx of elite coca growers into the region has resulted in relations of modern debt peonage between the “cocaleros” (coca growers) and indigenous communities. Bjork-James observes,

[R]elations are not equitable. Instead indigenous people are often dependent, landless laborers in their own land, earning around 20 bolivianos (less than US\$3) to harvest a coca plot or selling their fish or wild meat to colonists for around 300 bolivianos (\approx US\$40) a month.⁸

In addition to taking advantage of indigenous labor, cocaleros have frequently seized indigenous land. In Villa Tunari, a large swath of land known as Polygon 7 holds nine indigenous communities. Within Polygon 7, the government has legalized coca production and thus has paved the way for massive seizures of indigenous land by cocalero migrants.⁹

⁷Healy (1985).

⁸Bjork-James (2020: 138).

⁹Achtenberg (2012b); Morales (2013: 84).

Table 6.2: Basic indicators: Villa Tunari and Shinahota
Source: 2012 Bolivian Census

Indicator	Villa Tunari	Shinahota	National average
Percent indigenous	75%	72.1%	41.7%
Percent Quechua	67.8%	67.7%	18.2%
Percent Aymara	1.6%	1.8%	15.8%
Urbanization rate	12.2%	27.2%	67%
Poverty rate	73.1%	66.8%	44.9%
Unsatisfied basic needs index ¹	96.2	94.2	74.8

¹ Index calculated based on access to “(i) quality of housing material; (ii) number of household members; (iii) access to water and sanitation services; (iv) access to energy services; (v) access to education; and (vi) access to health care” Gigler (2015: 10).

This loss of indigenous land and exploitation of native labor in Villa Tunari, Shinahota, and other parts of northern Cochabamba has generated frequent conflict between indigenous groups and cocalero settlers.¹⁰

My theory posits that this rural elite extraction should increase indigenous demands for partial autonomy. In Shinahota, this appears to be the case. The municipality voted to pursue AIOC status and subsequently drafted a charter that expanded the rights and protections of indigenous groups while offering no clear concessions to the sizable constituency of cocaleros.¹¹ Zambrana Vargas observes that Shinahota’s “diversity and motley social fabric” is not represented by the autonomy statute, which instead focuses mainly on the region’s indigenous population.¹² The autonomy statute ultimately passed in a referendum with roughly two-thirds of voters supporting.

In Villa Tunari, on the other hand, indigenous groups did not demand autonomy, despite similar—or perhaps even greater—exposure to rural elite extraction. I argue that this was largely due to systematic extraction of indigenous land by the central state for a large infrastructure project.

In 2011, the Morales administration launched a program to construct a highway originating in Villa Tunari, which would cut through Isidoro Sécuré National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS).¹³ In March 2012, the thirty six communities holding land in TIPNIS categorically rejected the project, arguing it “would be disastrous and devastating for our land, its ecosystems, and our ways of life as a people.”¹⁴ Native communities launched protests demanding an end to highway construction. These events only hardened Morales’s resolve, as he demonstrated that “national interests in resource extraction would take precedence

¹⁰Delgado (2017); Lorenza Belinda Fontana (2014); Tomaselli (2012).

¹¹Gobierno Autónomo Municipal de Shinahota (2017).

¹²Zambrana Vargas (2017).

¹³Achtenberg (2012a).

¹⁴Sub Central de Pueblos Indígenas: Mojeños-Yurace-Chimane del TIPNIS (2012).

over locally based claims for indigenous autonomy.”¹⁵

The posture of the Morales administration greatly reduced its credibility with native populations, illuminating the government’s “limited ability—or willingness...to enact the promises it had made about representing and protecting indigenous peoples and their lands and customs.”¹⁶ Postero argues that “the controversy over the TIPNIS highway...made it clear that Morales was willing to sacrifice indigenous lands to extractivist development projects.”¹⁷ Indigenous leader, Rafael Quispe, asserts that with the TIPNIS case, “the government has revealed its true identity, its indigenous mask has fallen and revealed its neoliberal face.”¹⁸

Communities directly affected by the TIPNIS road construction felt this betrayal even more acutely, and it appears to have shaped their decisions to pursue AIOC status. Delgado asserts that the TIPNIS conflict is inseparable from broader debates around indigenous autonomy and self-determination.¹⁹ Similarly, Springerová and Vališková observe that extractive efforts, like the TIPNIS highway, are “intrinsically related to the [AIOC] process because they necessarily impact the question of territoriality that represents the most frequent motive for conversion to autonomy.”²⁰

In the municipalities most affected by the TIPNIS road construction, this reduced confidence in the state in general and the Morales administration in particular may be particularly strong. In contrast to Shinahota, which was not directly affected by the TIPNIS highway, Villa Tunari was the first municipality to experience land seizure and road construction. Thus, given my theory, I would expect that a demand for autonomy, which arises from exposure to private predation by cocaleros, will be offset by the reduced confidence in government that comes from exposure to state-led extraction through road construction. This is, in fact, what we observe in Villa Tunari: no concrete movement for autonomy has emerged, and no formal steps have been taken by the municipality to begin AIOC conversion.

Thus, a simple comparison of Villa Tunari and Shinahota provides insights into one key element of my theory. Rural elite extraction, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4, increases the likelihood of pursuing partial autonomy. In the case of Shinahota, indigenous groups may have expected AIOC status to provide additional protection against land and labor seizure by cocaleros. However, if both rural elite extraction and state-led extraction occur within the same municipality, we might expect indigenous groups to reject autonomy. If indigenous groups do not trust the government to provide meaningful autonomy, they will generally not demand it. The case of Villa Tunari supports this logic.

¹⁵Tockman and Cameron (2014: 60).

¹⁶Postero (2017: 131).

¹⁷Postero (2017: 168)

¹⁸(Orellana Candia 2011: 39).

¹⁹Delgado (2017: 375).

²⁰Springerová and Vališková (2017: 114).




Figure 6.4: Bivariate test of mechanism: Confidence in government and autonomy preferences (indigenous respondents only, 2012 Americas Barometer)

6.3 Trust in the state and preferences over autonomy

The Villa Tunari case above suggests that experiences with state-led extraction generally reduce indigenous groups’ trust in government to protect and promote their interests. On the one hand, we might expect that such distrust will increase indigenous communities’ desire for autonomy; indigenous institutions may effectively substitute for unreliable state ones. Yet, my theory suggests precisely the opposite. Because partial forms of autonomy may actually facilitate extraction by the central state or private actors, indigenous communities demand autonomy only if the central state is viewed as a credible partner.

Observational analysis lends support to this prediction. The 2012 Americas Barometer survey in Bolivia asked respondents to indicate their level of trust in the government to promote and protect the rights of the country’s indigenous communities. The survey also asked respondents to indicate whether they believed AIOCs have been positive for the country. Subsetting to include only indigenous respondents, there emerges a clear, positive relationship between confidence in government to protect native communities and support for AIOCs (Figure 6.4).

6.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have investigated variation in indigenous demands for autonomous status in Bolivia through case study and correlational analysis. I have demonstrated that state-led extraction reduces demands for autonomy even when communities are vulnerable to rural elite extraction. I have also provided evidence in support of the positive association between indigenous groups confidence in the government and their attitudes toward autonomy. In the next chapter, I outline how the decision to embrace partial autonomy—outlined in this section of the dissertation—shapes indigenous groups' long-term access to political representation.

Part III

The Effects of Indigenous *Autonomy*

Chapter 7

Economic Autonomy and the Persistence of Indigenous Institutions

In the previous chapters, I have examined variation in indigenous communities' demands for partial autonomy. Yet, how does the decision to embrace or reject autonomy affect the political and economic empowerment of indigenous communities? More precisely, does partial autonomy increase or reduce indigenous groups' access to descriptive and substantive political representation?

Indigenous groups throughout the Americas have historically experienced political exclusion and underrepresentation. Yet, in recent decades, decentralization reforms, electoral quotas, and ethnically based political parties have created institutional spaces through which indigenous groups can achieve coethnic political representation at various levels of government.¹ While some indigenous communities have effectively coordinated to take advantage of these opportunities for greater representation, others have been less successful.

In this and the following chapter, I examine the long-term effects of economic autonomy for the descriptive and substantive representation of indigenous groups. As discussed in previous chapters, economic autonomy involves the extension of formal communal land titles to indigenous groups.² Indigenous groups possess the majority of the world's communal land, and for these groups, the titling of communal land constitutes an essential step toward achieving their "central demand" of full autonomy.³ Importantly for this analysis of long-run outcomes, economic autonomy has not often been revoked by central states. While governments have frequently withdrawn recognition for indigenous political institutions, communal land titles—even those issued in the colonial period—have endured and been generally respected.⁴

In order to achieve political representation, indigenous groups must be able to coor-

¹Hoffay and Rivas (2016); Htun (2016); Madrid (2012); Rice and Van Cott (2016); Van Cott (2009).

²While around twenty percent of the world's land is collectively held, only 55 percent of this land is formally titled (Rights and Resources Initiative 2015).

³Díaz-Polanco (1998); Stavenhagen (2000); Van Cott (2001); Yashar (2005).

⁴Turner (1993).

dinate to support common candidates for elective office. To explain variation in electoral coordination, I place central emphasis on the role of traditional institutions of reciprocity, which are informal, equitable systems of exchange of labor or goods between members of an indigenous community.⁵ These institutions facilitate electoral coordination in two ways. First, indigenous candidates who subscribe to these institutions can more credibly commit to reciprocating electoral support with post-election benefits if they win. Therefore, these candidates will be generally more appealing to indigenous voters. Second, reciprocity institutions facilitate turn-taking among communities in the nomination of candidates for local office. Voters from a given indigenous community will support a candidate from another community, confident that a member of their community will have an opportunity to run for office and will receive similar support in a future election.

In this chapter, I show that communal land titles reduce the demand for traditional institutions and thus complicate indigenous groups' electoral coordination. Formal titles provide a legal guarantee of indigenous groups' access to land, which reduces the need to mobilize traditional institutions to defend that land. Additionally, the legal protection of communal property allows indigenous groups to shift their focus from defending their land to improving agricultural productivity and integrating into markets. While this transition may provide certain private economic benefits, it may also erode traditional institutions of reciprocity.⁶ The decline of these reciprocity institutions complicates indigenous groups' collective mobilization to achieve coethnic political representation, which I show in the next chapter.

I examine this argument drawing on evidence from Peru, where ethnicity is a fairly weak political identity.⁷ In fact, most indigenous citizens identify first as peasants, a legacy of the mid-to-late twentieth-century corporatist regimes that sought to create a unifying class identity.⁸ Nevertheless, most peasants are, in fact, indigenous, in the sense that they speak a native language and maintain longstanding cultural practices and institutions. Additionally, Peru exhibits variation in the key independent variable of interest to this study. Since the colonial period, Peru has featured both formally titled and informally possessed communal landholding institutions, or “communities.” This feature of the Peruvian case allows me to trace how different forms of communal landholding—titled or informally held—have shaped the persistence of traditional institutions and ultimately, political representation.

I evaluate my argument using a multi-method approach that draws on historical and contemporary evidence. I first use an instrumental-variables analysis to show that the colonial-era extension of communal land titles to Peruvian indigenous groups was associated with a long-term decline in the mobilization of traditional institutions of reciprocity, which are called *ayni*, *minka*, or *mita*.⁹ As further evidence that reciprocity institutions were

⁵Wutich et al. (2017a: 480-482).

⁶Polanyi (1944).

⁷Albó (2008, 1991); Degregori (1998); Yashar (2005).

⁸Yashar (1998); García (2005). See Albó (2002) for a description of a similar phenomenon in Bolivia.

⁹This term is also used to denote forced labor during colonial times (see, e.g., Dell 2010). However, some communities of the contemporary period use it as a synonym for reciprocal labor exchange.

less likely to persist in title-possessing communities,¹⁰ I also draw on a lab-in-the-field experiment with over three-hundred indigenous community presidents. I show that reciprocal behavior is more likely to be observed in communities that historically lacked a formal title to their communal land.

7.1 Indigenous communal landholding in Peru

In Peru, longstanding institutions of indigenous authority play an important—but largely understudied—role in shaping political, economic, and social life in rural areas.¹¹ Chief among these institutions are indigenous communities, which are parcels of communally held land that are administered—to varying degrees—by longstanding authorities. Communities are the “oldest institution of [Peruvian] society,”¹² and, while they have been formally called “peasant communities” since the 1960s, they are almost exclusively populated by indigenous citizens. By “indigenous,” I mean individuals who maintain longstanding customs and who speak an indigenous language, such as Quechua or Aymara.

Indigenous communities remain prevalent throughout Peru, controlling around 30 percent of national territory and accounting for roughly 20 percent of the country’s population.¹³ In total, there are over 6,000 indigenous communities, and all but around 15 percent have now been formally recognized. Most of these communities, however, have only recently received communal titles with only about twenty-five percent receiving a title prior to the mid-twentieth century.

These communities are characterized by low-quality soil, unreliable irrigation, limited access to markets, and widespread poverty.¹⁴ Many are located in Peru’s mountainous Andean *sierra*, particularly the southern departments of Puno, Cusco, Arequipa, and Ayacucho. Communities are nested within municipalities—Peru’s lowest administrative tier of government—and often there exist several communities within a given municipality, particularly in the sierra.

Many of Peru’s indigenous communities continue to maintain reciprocity institutions, particularly through *ayni*.¹⁵ *Ayni*, which means reciprocity in the indigenous languages of Quechua and Aymara,¹⁶ obligates community members to make a contribution of labor, or *minka/mita*, to their fellow community members with the expectation that that favor, in some way, will be returned.¹⁷ Unlike communal work parties to produce public works for the

¹⁰The counterfactual communities are those where land was informally recognized. In these communities, reciprocity institutions were more likely to persist.

¹¹Important work has been done on similar institutions, like *usos y costumbres* in Oaxaca, Mexico (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Benton 2017; Eisenstadt 2011).

¹²Mendoza (2002: 8)

¹³Dubertret (2015). Data for Peru is derived from ENAHO 2011 and Censo Agrario 2012.

¹⁴Webb (2013). A dearth of resources has generated conflict over productive resources. In 2012, 24 percent of Peruvian communities experienced conflict over water while 36 percent experienced conflict over land (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 2014).

¹⁵Mannheim (2013: 89-90).

¹⁶Stern (1993: 8).

¹⁷Wutich et al. (2017b); Fonseca Martel (1974a,b); Mayer (2018).

community, or *faenas*, *ayni* involves a person-to-person or household-to-household exchange. For example, a male member of a community may ask others to step in to help him harvest his crops, make needed repairs to his home, or defend his land against invasion by outsiders. Later, others may—and likely will—call on this community member to assist with their labor-intensive tasks.

These institutions are maintained through a complex enforcement system that includes both social sanctioning and explicit punishments.¹⁸ With respect to the latter, non-participation in an *ayni* task may be punished through the levying of a fine, imprisonment in a community jail, public flogging, or—for serial offenders—banishment from the community.¹⁹ Often, the community president or a representative explicitly in charge of communal justice will supervise the punishment.²⁰

While reciprocity institutions persist in most indigenous communities, there has been a notable decline in their mobilization, particularly in those communities most affected by market integration. In my interviews with indigenous community presidents, I was frequently told that the greatest barrier to mobilizing reciprocity institutions in the modern period is the cash economy; if a member has an obligation to provide unpaid labor to the community or one of its members, she prefers to pay her way out of that commitment rather than working for free.²¹ Those who request *ayni*, *minka*, or *mita* for tasks like harvesting crops or building a house also increasingly prefer wage labor to unpaid labor; payment of a wage offers the contracting community member a way of both holding workers accountable and ensuring a more timely completion of the desired task.²²

Some indigenous communities have experienced a greater reduction in their mobilization of reciprocity institutions than others. What accounts for this decline? As I show in the next section, variation in historical possession of a communal land titles has played a key role in determining the fate of these longstanding institutions.

7.2 Communal landholding and reciprocity institutions

Reciprocity institutions operate most effectively when community members prioritize group survival over individual profit. I argue above that informal possession of communal land requires community members to cooperate to ensure the joint survival of their land and their institutions. Communal titles, on the other hand, provides greater security for indigenous communal land, which erodes the joint interest in survival that community members otherwise possess and thereby, displaces traditional reciprocity institutions. This section

¹⁸Estermann (1998: 250).

¹⁹(Mannheim 2013: 90).

²⁰These punishments are taken seriously by community presidents and members, or *comuneros*. In a *faena* I visited in Cusco, the community president was mostly absent as he had gone in search of two absentee *comuneros*.

²¹Interview with community president in Pisac, July 2017, number 47; interview with community president in Huancayo, March 2017, number 29; interview with mayor in Huaylas, April 2017, number 34; interview with community president in Jauja, November 2016, number 12.

²²(Seligmann 1995: 141-142).

explores the effects of these different communal landholding arrangements on longstanding institutions of reciprocity.

Why did some indigenous communities receive a colonial title while others did not? In Peru, a key explanatory factor was indigenous communities' relative exposure to disease. Greater exposure to epidemics encouraged indigenous groups to incur the cost of obtaining a colonial title. Initially, all indigenous communities held their land informally, which required them to pay tribute in exchange for the Crown guaranteeing their access to land. However, when disease outbreaks hit community, the tribute-paying population declined faster than the Crown could reassess community-level tribute obligations. As a result, the per-capita financial burden of the Indian head tax rapidly increased in affected communities until new rates could be calculated. Facing this increased cost of meeting tribute obligations, community leaders sought ways of reducing this burden. Because tribute was assessed only on royally owned land and not on privately owned land, the purchase of a formal title exempted indigenous communities from further tribute payment.²³ Thus, greater exposure to disease generally increased the likelihood that indigenous communities would seek to purchase a title. The simple OLS regression in Table 7.1 provides evidence of a strong, positive, and significant relationship between disease exposure and communities' possession of a colonial-era title.

Above, I asserted that variation in the presence of communal titles explains variation in the presence of reciprocity institutions. In the Peruvian case I discuss here, colonial titles should be associated with a long-term reduction in the mobilization of traditional reciprocity institutions. A key part of this argument involves the persistence and reproduction of colonial-era dynamics, which shape the presence of reciprocity institutions and, thus, long-term collective action capacity of indigenous communities. Yet, why would we expect the effects of sixteenth-century events to persist into the modern period? Importantly, the institutional arrangements created around Peru's indigenous communities during the colonial period proved remarkably enduring. These arrangements not only survived into the post-independence period but also were reinforced following the end of Spanish rule. As Thurner notes, when the Peruvian government enacted a comprehensive land privatization program in the late nineteenth century, communities with a colonial title were mostly protected as they had a legally binding right to their land; communities that had been part of the reciprocal tributary pact, on the other hand, lived under constant threat of their land being seized, and many experienced profound disruption.²⁴ Thus, communities with a colonial-era land title had long-term security to their land, leading to the erosion of reciprocity institutions. Once abandoned, these institutions could not be easily revived. In contrast, communities that lacked these titles experienced a more volatile and insecure access to land that led to the long-term persistence of their reciprocity institutions.

This section empirically assesses how variation in the prevailing form of communal

²³Thurner (1993). All communities had the opportunity to purchase the title to their land from the Crown. Only some, however, deemed this a worthwhile investment.

²⁴Thurner (1997: 51).

Table 7.1: Relationship between disease exposure and communal titles (Indigenous communities)

	<i>Probability of colonial title</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Population lost (binary) ^a	0.088*** (0.018)	
Population change (continuous) ^b		0.114*** (0.034)
Constant	0.013 (0.010)	0.050*** (0.013)
Observations	656	656
R ²	0.018	0.021
F-stat	24.05	11.1
<i>Note:</i> SEs clustered at municipal level in parentheses *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

^a Dummy indicator for whether community lost population.

^b Logged pre-post population ratio.

land possession has affected the long-term persistence of traditional reciprocity institutions. I begin by providing suggestive evidence of a negative association between receipt of a colonial-era communal land title and the long-term persistence of reciprocity institutions. Specifically, I run an OLS regression in which the independent variable is a dummy measure of whether a community received a colonial-era land title and the outcome variable is a three-item index, which measures the number of reciprocity institutions—*ayni*, *minka*, *mita*—a community reports preserving.²⁵

The results of the OLS analysis in Table 7.3 suggest a negative and statistically significant association between possessing a colonial-era land title and the long-term preservation of reciprocity institutions. Having lost population—as opposed to not having lost population—is associated with a 9 percentage point increase in the probability of a community obtaining a colonial title. Similarly, a fifty percent increase in the pre-post population ratio (e.g., losing two-thirds vs. one-half of population) is associated with about a five percentage point

²⁵Both of these measures were obtained through a 2012 census of nearly 5,000 Peruvian indigenous communities. The colonial title measure was validated through archival records.

increase in the likelihood of a community receiving a colonial title.²⁶ However, the existence of many potential confounders complicate analysis of the regression coefficients in Table 7.3 as causal effects.

In an attempt to obviate this issue of confounding, I employ an instrumental-variables analysis. I focus specifically on the effects of possessing a colonial title on the long-term persistence of reciprocity institutions. I estimate the following model,

$$Reciprocity_i = \alpha + \beta_1 ColonialTitle_i + \epsilon_i. \quad (7.1)$$

Here, $Reciprocity_i$ is a discrete indicator for the number of reciprocity institutions—*ayni*, *minka*, or *mita*—a community, i , preserves according to a 2012 census of indigenous communities. $ColonialTitle_i$ is a binary variable, which measures whether a community obtained a colonial-era title, also according to the 2012 census. To estimate this model, in which colonial title is likely endogenous, I employ an instrumental-variables analysis.

As I discussed above, a case-specific determinant of economic autonomy in colonial Peru involved exposure to epidemics, which may be plausibly exogenous to ϵ_i in equation (7.1), an assumption I discuss in more detail below. I therefore use disease exposure as an instrument for indigenous groups' possession of a colonial-era title. To calculate epidemic-related population loss, I analyze a late sixteenth-century outbreak of a series of diseases. Epidemiological evidence suggests that between 1585 and 1591, Peru's indigenous communities were exposed to outbreaks of measles, typhus, influenza, and an unknown "rash-producing disease" (Dobyns 1963: 501-508).

I collect data on population loss during this period from 800 indigenous *repartimientos*, which the Spanish Crown created to organize disparate, remote indigenous groups into geographically concentrated units that would facilitate tribute collection and labor extraction. The creation of these enclaves made indigenous populations of the period similarly susceptible to disease outbreaks; all were exposed to outsiders through contact with Crown representatives, and each had a relatively dense population.

Whether communities lost more or less population was the result of the number of epidemics to which they were exposed. Writing on late sixteenth century epidemics in Andean Peru, Dobyns notes, "[N]o sooner than one disease swept through the susceptible population than another infection of quite a different nature and even greater virulence, and to which the earlier one had conferred no immunity, appeared and produced even greater mortality" (Dobyns 1963: 508). Because different epidemics spread in unique and unpredictable ways, the extent of population loss experienced by a given *repartimiento* may be as-good-as-randomly assigned.

I create two measures of disease exposure based on the *repartimiento*-level tributary population before and after the six-year disease outbreak.²⁷ The first is a ratio of the

²⁶The log-transformation of the independent variable accounts for the differences in the coefficient presented in the table and the interpretation of the coefficient in the text.

²⁷Data was not available for all years in all districts. Data were collected from 1570 to 1585 pre-exposure and from 1592 to 1610 post-exposure.

tributary population pre- and post-epidemic, which I log.²⁸ The second is a binary indicator for experiencing *any* level of population decline.

Because historical repartimiento-level data could not be reliably linked to modern community-level data, I aggregate disease exposure to the municipal level, which is the lowest formal administrative tier of government.²⁹ I thus cluster standard errors at this level, as this is the level of treatment assignment.

An initial analysis simply fits a regression of the outcome—a three-item index of reciprocity institutions (i.e., *ayni*, *minka*, *mita*)—on binary and continuous measures of the disease exposure instrument. The first two columns of Table 7.1 provide these reduced-form analyses. The results demonstrate a strong negative relationship between population loss during the late sixteenth century and long-term preservation of reciprocity institutions. Losing any population is associated with a decrease of about 0.3 units in the three-item reciprocity institutions index. The coefficient on the continuous population-loss measure is also large, negative, and significant.

The relationship observed in these first columns of Table 7.2 may be driven by the impact of disease exposure on the extension of communal titles. Table 7.2 tests this claim by fitting a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. I first regress a binary measure of colonial title—the endogenous regressor—on each of the binary and continuous measures of the instrument. I then fit two linear regressions, which regress the discrete outcome variable on the fitted values obtained from each of the first-stage regressions. Standard errors, as before, are clustered at the level of treatment assignment: the municipality.

Like the reduced-form estimates, the 2SLS estimates are also consistent with the theory. Having a colonial title is associated with a 1.2-unit reduction in the reciprocity institutions index. The coefficients in the second two columns are negative regardless of whether I instrument for the endogenous regressor using a continuous or a binary measure of population loss.

For this instrumental-variables analysis to yield consistent causal estimates, several assumptions are required; in this case, some are more plausible than others. First—and most easily tested from the data—it is necessary to show the existence of a first-stage relationship between the instrument and endogenous regressor of interest, which is here defined as possession of a colonial title. Above, I argued there should be a strong relationship between disease exposure and the presence of a colonial land title. The data suggest that indigenous groups that lost more population to epidemics were also more likely to acquire a title to avoid higher per-capita tribute obligations. The evidence in Table 7.3 is consistent with this assumption; regressions of colonial title on both continuous and dummy³⁰ measures of population loss each yield F-statistics greater than ten (Staiger and Stock 1997).

A second assumption requires that the instrument be statistically independent of observed and unobserved causes of the outcome; in other words, population loss must be

²⁸The distribution is right-skewed with some communities experiencing extreme population loss.

²⁹Multiple communities, which are not formal tiers of government but are formally recognized units of indigenous territorial authority, are located within a municipality.

³⁰Any decline in population is coded as 1.

Table 7.2: IV estimates of the effect of disease exposure on preservation of traditional reciprocity institutions

	<i>Preservation of reciprocity institutions (3-item index)^a</i>			
	Reduced-form		2SLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Population lost (binary) ^b	-0.317** (0.158)			
Population loss (continuous) ^c		-0.433*** (0.149)		
Colonial title (instrumented: binary) ^d			-1.205* (0.626)	
Colonial title (instrumented: continuous) ^e				-1.263** (0.526)
Constant	1.483*** (0.147)	1.355*** (0.081)	0.510*** (0.057)	0.515*** (0.051)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

^a Reciprocity institutions index (3-item: *ayni*, *minka*, *mita*).

^b Dummy indicator for whether community lost population.

^c Logged pre-post population ratio.

^d 2SLS: First-stage regression of title on binary population-loss measure.

^e 2SLS: First-stage regression of title on continuous population-loss measure.

independent of ϵ_i in equation (7.1). This assumption can be partially tested from the data by showing balance on available pre-treatment covariates. Very few covariates exist on repartimiento-level characteristics prior to 1585, but the population measures that do exist suggest balance (Figures 7.1, 7.2). Notably, places with larger populations do not appear to have been more vulnerable to the epidemic. Likely, this is due to the fact that indigenous repartimientos were similarly densely populated due to the manner in which the colonial state created them.

This second assumption, however, cannot be fully tested from the data, and there




Figure 7.1: Balance on pre-treatment covariates: Regression of pre-1585 population measures (raw) on population loss (dummy indicator)
Source: Toledo et al. (1975)

may exist confounding variables that may have, in fact, affected both disease exposure and long-term persistence of reciprocity institutions. Trade integration, for example, may have both made communities more susceptible to the spread of disease through exposure to outsiders and reduced the prevalence of traditional reciprocity institutions by increasing market exposure. The existing data do not allow for a test of balance on trade integration across values of the instrument, making it impossible to evaluate its role as a potential confounder. Evidence, however, suggests that communities that tried to isolate themselves by destroying bridges and roads still experienced a great decline from the disease.³¹

A final necessary assumption proves impossible to validate from the data: that the instrument only affects the outcome through the endogenous regressor. Here, this means that disease exposure only affects the persistence of traditional institutions of reciprocity—the second-stage outcome in the regression analysis in Table 7.2—through the channel of colonial titles. Disease may affect poverty, for example, which may in turn affect the persistence of reciprocity institutions. Thus, perhaps the most reliable of the above findings are the reduced-form estimates, which show, somewhat remarkably, a historical association between sixteenth-century disease environments and the contemporary persistence of traditional reciprocity institutions.

³¹Hemming (1973: 349-350).




Figure 7.2: Balance on pre-treatment covariates: Regression of pre-1585 population measures (proportion of total) on population loss (dummy indicator)

Source: Toledo et al. (1975)

Another potential complication that emerges from the above IV analyses involves the measure of the dependent variable. Depending solely on attitudinal measures of the persistence of reciprocity institutions assigns an enormous amount of weight to a single respondent and their judgment of what a reciprocity institution is. Thus, in the next section I analyze a lab-in-the-field experiment designed to test for behavioral evidence of reciprocity institutions. A heterogeneous treatment effects analysis suggests that—consistent with my theory—traditional reciprocity institutions were more likely to be preserved in places where land was historically held informally.

Communal titles and reciprocity institutions: Lab-in-the-field experiment

To further test how different forms of communal landholding preserve or erode traditional institutions of reciprocity, I conduct an experiment with over three hundred indigenous community presidents in Cusco. A description of this sample is provided in Appendix 2.

Community presidents are officially recognized by the Peruvian state, but they are not formal agents of the state, as mayors and governors are. Instead, community presidents are popularly elected by their members in a manner that is codified in each community's

Table 7.3: OLS regression of reciprocity index on colonial title

<i>Reciprocity Institutions (3-item index)</i>	
Colonial title	-0.104*** (0.031)
Constant	1.178*** (0.010)
Communities	4,993
R ²	0.002
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

constitution. Election may occur by secret ballot, voice vote, or debate in a public assembly. Nearly all community presidents are elders who have fulfilled a number of volunteer positions, or “cargos,” over the course of their lifetimes.³² Once selected for the position of president, they serve one-to-three year terms. During that time, they are responsible for maintaining and administering traditional practices, including reciprocity institutions. Thus, measuring whether presidents themselves subscribe to reciprocity institutions provides valuable insight into whether their communities more broadly preserve reciprocity institutions.

In this section, I examine whether community presidents are more likely to maintain reciprocity institutions when their communities have not possessed a communal land title. To evaluate this question, I use a trust game first proposed by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe.³³ As scholars have noted, the first-mover’s behavior in a trust game measures two key dimensions of reciprocity: “intrinsic reciprocity”—eliciting kindness through kindness regardless of the monetary outcome—and expected reciprocity, which includes a more “selfish” calculation based only on monetary payouts.³⁴ Thus, the experimental game I use provides a behavioral measure of reciprocity institutions to accompany the attitudinal outcome measure employed in the previous section.

In the trust game, presidents were, at the outset, given 3 Peruvian *soles* (approximately US\$1), slightly more than an average hourly wage in rural Peru.³⁵ This amount could be either kept or shared with a partner. Presidents were informed that any money given to their partner would be tripled. Presidents were further informed that their partner would then—as in a traditional dictator game—decide how much money they would return to the

³²These can include a variety of posts ranging from religious festival organizer to justice of the peace.

³³Berg et al. (1995).

³⁴Brühlhart and Usunier (2012); Sobel (2005). Often, trusting behavior emerges from some combination of these two forms of reciprocity.

³⁵Given the data on community president income presented in Appendix 2, this amount of money is expected to be especially significant.

president. A measure of trust, or in this case reciprocity, is thus how much of the 3 *soles* each president originally allocates to—or invests in—his partner.³⁶

Community presidents were randomly assigned to receive certain information about their partner. Approximately half of the respondents were told that their partner was from an indigenous community in Cusco while the other half was told simply that their partner was from Cusco. A potential concern is that telling a respondent that their partner is from a community may signal that the partner is poor, and therefore, the game is measuring the altruism of the respondent as opposed to reciprocity. However, existing scholarship suggests that altruism does not explain “trust-like decisions” in trust games.³⁷

An examination of key pre-treatment covariates for the treatment and control groups shows balance, as expected due to the randomization of the treatment (see Figure A2). For only one of the baseline characteristics is there a significant difference between treated and control groups: whether the respondent is a current or former community president. While there is a higher proportion of current presidents in the treatment group than in the control group, this variable is correlated only weakly with the outcome ($r = 0.02$), and its inclusion as a moderator neither substantively nor significantly changes the results.³⁸

Using the results of this game, differences in means for two experimental outcomes estimate the causal effect of the treatment. The first outcome is the amount given by respondents to their partner, which can take on integer values, 0 to 3. The second outcome is the probability that the president gave something, as opposed to nothing, coded dichotomously as 0 or 1 for each respondent.³⁹

Table 7.4 provides the main results from the experimental game using a regression of the outcome on a dichotomous variable indicating treatment assignment. On average, respondents gave just under half of their allotment (≈ 1.5 *soles*) to their partners. When informed that their partner was from a community, respondents gave around 0.25 *soles*

³⁶I use the male gender pronoun here since 95 percent of community presidents in the sample were male (see Appendix 2). The game was not played live, and attempts were made to avoid deception. Prior to administering the experiment with community presidents, enumerators traveled to a Cusco market, where they had community and non-community members play the game with one another. When the experiment was later implemented among community presidents, partner responses were generated from the pre-recorded responses obtained from the Cusco market. Presidents were never told that the game was being played live.

³⁷Brühlhart and Usunier (2012).

³⁸There is also no theoretical reason to expect presidential status (i.e. current vs. former) to affect the amount given in the behavioral game. The mechanism is not specific to community presidents and should hold more generally for *any* community member. Because there was no theoretical expectation of a relationship, this imbalance is most likely due to chance, and because presidential status was not specified in the pre-analysis plan, I have chosen not include a model with covariate adjustment. The results, however, do not change substantively nor significantly when a covariate for “current/former” is included.

³⁹The latter outcome, unlike the former, was not pre-registered, but upon observation of the surveys by the researcher, it became clear that the difference between consecutive values of the variable may not be equivalent. For example, the choice between giving 0 and 1 *sol* may be quite different than the decision between giving 1 and 2 *soles* and so on. Thus, I also treat the outcome as a categorical variable and test between those who gave something versus those who gave nothing. Both analyses are presented here.

Table 7.4: Effect of community membership on reciprocity

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Absolute amount of gift		Binary measure of giving	
	ITT	CACE	ITT	CACE
Partner is community member	0.246** (0.115)	0.577*** (0.171)	0.117** (0.047)	0.238*** (0.070)
Constant	1.302*** (0.084)	1.130*** (0.108)	0.705*** (0.034)	0.643*** (0.044)
Observations	317	316	317	316
Residual Std. Error	1.022	1.035	0.420	0.424

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

more than they did when they were told only that their partner was from Cusco.⁴⁰ Using a dummy measure of whether the respondent gave either something or nothing to their partner, I also find that respondents were more likely to give when their partner was identified as a community member. Being assigned to play with someone identified as a community member increased the likelihood of giving *something* by nearly twelve percentage points. These results not only hold but become stronger when analyzing the results as a complier average treatment effect, where compliance is measured using a manipulation check question that measures whether respondents remembered that their partner was a community member.⁴¹ Ultimately, these results suggest that there generally exist shared norms of reciprocity among those who reside in indigenous communities.

While the results above suggest a general persistence of reciprocity institutions, my theory predicts variation in the degree of survival of these institutions based on communal landholding arrangements. Specifically, traditional reciprocity institutions should be less likely to persist under communal land titles—as shown in the OLS and IV analyses above—and more likely to persist where land was historically held informally.

Figure 7.3 provides a test of this claim by analyzing heterogeneity in the lab-in-the-

⁴⁰A second treatment was considered that would have given a separate piece of information to respondents since it is possible that simply receiving some information about a partner increases feelings of trust and expected reciprocity. However, the small sample size, coupled with difficulties in finding a “neutral” piece of information led to this idea being rejected.

⁴¹The manipulation check question could be answered as “Yes”, “No”, or “Don’t know.” For the treatment group, a “Yes” response was coded as successful take-up of treatment. For the control group, take-up was coded in two separate ways. A first coding considered “take-up” as having answered *either* “No” or “Don’t know.” Those responses are presented here. A second coding considered take-up as having answered, “Don’t know.” The analysis presented here reflects the first coding, but the results, shown in Appendix Figure A5, remain generally significant when only “Don’t know” is used.

field experiment by communities' historical experience with different communal landholding arrangements. I compare, as above, communities that had a colonial-era title with those that held land informally. For the latter measure, I use an indicator for whether a given community claims possession of land "from time immemorial."⁴² This provides a measure of informal communal land occupation as these communities have never held a formal title to their land. Thus, their persistence has been determined by their ability to weather cycles of cooperation and conflict with the central state.

The results are generally consistent with my theory. For communities with a colonial title, the treatment effect is negative and significant for communities. Presidents of these communities gave, on average, half a *sol* less to partners who were identified as belonging to indigenous communities. For communities that have held their land informally, the treatment effect is instead positive and significant ($p < 0.1$).⁴³ These presidents gave about 0.3 *soles* more to partners identified as belonging to an indigenous community.

Thus, the results of the correlational analysis and the lab-in-the-field experiment suggest that traditional institutions of reciprocity are most likely to persist where communal land is held informally. By contrast, communal titles appear to undermine these longstanding reciprocity institutions.

7.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I used historical data and a lab-in-the-field experiment to demonstrate that economic autonomy appears to erode traditional reciprocity institutions while informal possession of communal land preserves them. In the next chapter, I provide evidence from a conjoint analysis and qualitative fieldwork to show that the preservation of these reciprocity institutions facilitates indigenous groups' coordination around a single indigenous candidate for subnational office. I also analyze a regression-discontinuity design to show that when indigenous candidates are elected, they target important local government resources to indigenous communities.

⁴²As with the colonial title data, I code this variable using responses from the 2012 indigenous community census.

⁴³The analysis presented here uses an ITT analysis. The results estimating a CACE, where compliance is measured by whether the respondent remembered their partner was from a community, can be found in Appendix Table A5.




Figure 7.3: Trust game results: Heterogeneity in ITT estimated effect of community membership on reciprocity by community-level traits

Note: Point estimates with 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Point estimates are coefficients from a regression of the outcome (amount of money—0, 1, 2, or 3 *soles*—shared with partner) on the treatment (partner identified as a community member) with municipal-level fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. Information on community-level variables (e.g., *ayni/minka*, government-determined borders, intra-community conflict) are taken from a 2012 indigenous community census (Cenagro) conducted by Peru’s Ministry of Agriculture.

Chapter 8

Indigenous Institutions and Political Representation

In the preceding chapter, I showed that economic autonomy reduces the persistence of traditional institutions of reciprocity. The present chapter demonstrates the important coordinating role of these traditional reciprocity institutions in achieving descriptive and substantive representation. Using a conjoint experiment with the same community-president sample discussed in the previous chapter, I show that cross-community coordination to elect indigenous candidates to subnational office is more likely to occur in communities that preserve reciprocity institutions. I then use evidence from Spanish and Quechua-language interviews conducted with local indigenous leaders and state officials to explain different patterns of indigenous coordination in two Peruvian municipalities.

The findings offer insights for not only indigenous groups' access to representation, but also for their access to state-provided distributive benefits. Scholars have often observed that the scarcity of government investment in indigenous communities is driven by low levels of indigenous representation, especially in local governments.¹ In a final empirical section, I use a regression-discontinuity design to show that indigenous groups receive more public goods when municipal leaders are themselves indigenous. Therefore, an increase in descriptive representation also corresponds to an improvement in indigenous groups' substantive representation.

8.1 Reciprocity institutions and descriptive representation

Indigenous groups may benefit from electing coethnics to subnational office. To facilitate this, they may coordinate around a shared candidate for local office instead of each clan, kinship, tribal, or communal group supporting its own candidate. I argue above that reciprocity institutions generally facilitate coordination across communities to elect indigenous

¹Freire et al. (2015); Hoffay and Rivas (2016); Htun (2016); Peru Comisión Ejecutiva Interministerial de Cooperación Popular (1964); Van Cott (2005).

candidates to subnational office. Specifically, these institutions strengthen preferences for candidates who are from any indigenous community—regardless of whether they are from the same community as a given indigenous voter. In this section, I evaluate this claim, using a conjoint experiment conducted with community presidents.

For the conjoint analysis, I use the same sample of indigenous community presidents from the lab-in-the-field experiment. In subnational elections, each indigenous community tends to vote as a bloc, and therefore, the preferences of a community president generally reflect well the preferences of the community’s members. Thus, studying the electoral choices of community presidents offers insight into the broader political behavior of the community.

When administering the conjoint, enumerators first reminded presidents of the upcoming 2018 municipal elections. Presidents were then provided with five pairs of hypothetical candidate profiles and asked to both 1) pick which of the two candidates for whom they would vote and 2) rate their likelihood of voting for each of the candidates. The latter comprised a five-point scale, where “1” indicated very unlikely and “5” indicated very likely to support the candidate.

Only four attributes were provided for each candidate to reduce cognitive load for respondents. Attributes included the candidates’ gender, policy platform, party affiliation, and community membership. Through earlier interviews with community presidents, these attributes were determined to be the most important predictors of vote choice.

The main treatment of interest is whether mayoral candidates are members of a community, which is here understood to mean living under an arrangement of territorial authority. Qualitative fieldwork and interviews with community presidents conducted prior to the administration of this conjoint demonstrated a shared understanding of the word “community” to specifically connote an indigenous community. Secondary scholarship also describes the linkage between the word “community” and notions of indigenous territory in Peru.²

Respondents were informed that candidates were from their community, another community, or the district capital. To determine the relative effect of candidates’ community membership on presidents’ vote choice, I follow Hainmueller et al. and estimate an average marginal component effect (AMCE).³ I use a non-parametric estimation strategy for both the discrete choice- and rating-based outcomes. I estimate the following two models.

$$\text{rating}_{ijk} = \theta_0 + \theta_1[\text{community}_{ijk} = 1] + \theta_2[\text{community}_{ijk} = 2] + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (8.1)$$

$$\text{choice}_{ijk} = \theta_0 + \theta_1[\text{community}_{ijk} = 1] + \theta_2[\text{community}_{ijk} = 2] + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (8.2)$$

where rating_{ijk} is the rating assigned by respondent i to profile j on task k . The reference category consists of profiles that identify candidates as being from the district capital, and thus, this baseline is captured by θ_0 . Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.⁴

²Hurtado (2012); Remy (2013).

³Hainmueller et al. (2014).

⁴Hainmueller et al. (2014: 17).

I also estimate models that include all attributes as a way of assessing the relative weight of each of the attributes.⁵

Figures 8.1 and 8.2 offer support for the above prediction. Being a member of a community—whether it is the president’s community or another one—is a strong and significant positive predictor of vote choice.⁶ Receiving information that a candidate was from the same community increased the likelihood that the president supported that candidate by 20 percentage points over a candidate identified as being from the district capital. This information also led to a nearly half-point increase in the likelihood that a president supported the candidate on the five-point scale.

The results also suggest a more general effect of community membership. Receiving information that the candidate was from a different community had a strong, positive effect on presidents’ vote choice. Compared to candidates from the district capital, candidates from different communities than the respondent were 10 percentage points more likely to receive support on the discrete outcome measure and received an extra third of a point on the five-point rating outcome. Ultimately, the results are consistent for both measures.⁷ Community-member candidates—albeit from different communities than that of the respondent—received greater support from community presidents than those from the district capital. As expected, due to the randomization of attribute levels, these results remain unchanged when covariates for attribute levels are included in the regression of the outcome on candidates’ community membership (Table A3).

Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show that community membership is a stronger predictor of vote choice than other attributes. Neither the issues prioritized by candidates nor party affiliation appear to affect vote choice. Only gender emerges as a second significant predictor of vote choice and candidate rating. Perhaps surprisingly given women’s underrepresentation in leadership positions,⁸ community presidents prefer female candidates to male candidates, although the effect is weaker than for community membership.⁹

I argue above that preferences for community-member candidates—particularly those from different communities than the respondent—should be most clearly evident where reciprocity institutions are maintained. Table 8.1 repeats estimation of equation (8.2), this time subsetting to communities where reciprocity institutions are and are not present.¹⁰

Table 8.1 suggests that the presence of reciprocity institutions—*ayni*, *minka*, and *mita*—is associated with stronger preferences for community-member candidates, regard-

⁵Given randomization of attributes, the estimated effects of $\hat{\theta}_1$ and $\hat{\theta}_2$ are the same in expectation for both the simple model and the model with all attributes.

⁶See also Table A3 in the Appendix.

⁷Table A4 further illustrates the close correspondence between the two outcome measures, which is consistent with the findings of (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015: 544).

⁸Empresa Peruana de Servicios Editoriales (2019).

⁹In interviews conducted by the author, community leaders often mentioned that women engage in less corruption than males when elected mayor.

¹⁰As in the instrumental-variables analysis, this data was gathered from the 2012 indigenous communities census based on preservation of *ayni*, *minka*, and *mita*. I then linked this information to the community president conjoint data.




Figure 8.1: Coefficient plot (Rating-based outcome)




Figure 8.2: Coefficient plot (Choice-based outcome)

less of whether they are from the respondent's community or another one. The absence of reciprocity institutions is not associated with a preference for community-member candidates. However, an absence of reciprocity institutions does not inhibit the emergence of in-group favoritism for candidates from the respondent's own community.¹¹

Table 8.1: Conjoint experiment: The effects of candidate community membership on respondent vote choice

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Likelihood of voting for candidate	
	(1)	(2)
From your community	0.211*** (0.034)	0.418*** (0.132)
From another community	0.155*** (0.034)	0.045 (0.09)
Subgroup:	Reciprocity	No reciprocity
Observations	2,080	180
R ²	0.029	0.116
Adjusted R ²	-0.090	0.005
Residual Std. Error	0.522 (df = 1851)	0.500 (df = 159)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Reference category is a candidate from the district capital. Subgroups indicate whether communities, according to the 2012 indigenous community census, reported practicing *ayni*, *mita*, or *minka*, which are reciprocity institutions.

The results from this section suggest that relative to other predictors, indigenous community membership is a particularly strong predictor of community leaders' preferences over candidates for subnational elective office. Even candidates who belong to a different community than the respondent are preferred over those that do not belong to a community. Yet,

¹¹Such preferences may be due to the generalized format of the conjoint; in the abstract, the best possible candidate is one from a respondent's own community as they understand the needs of that community and may even know the president personally. In fact, in post-survey interviews, presidents often expressed that they preferred candidates from their own communities because these individuals were better acquainted with issues facing the community.

evidence for this preference is strongest where reciprocity institutions are present. Absent these institutions, indigenous community presidents do not seem to prefer candidates from communities other than their own, making cross-community coordination to elect coethnic candidates to subnational office more difficult.

The quantitative evidence presented above is consistent with qualitative insights I obtained from two field sites in Peru. The first is the municipality of Urubamba, which has thirty-eight indigenous communities. Based solely on the number of communities, Urubamba seems an unlikely case for indigenous collective action. Yet, given my argument, Urubamba is, in fact, a case in which we would expect indigenous groups to achieve greater political representation.

Only one of Urubamba's communities received a title during the colonial period. Consistent with my theory, this absence of communal titles historically corresponded to a marked persistence of reciprocity institutions; all but three of the thirty-eight communities report practicing *ayni*, and the vast majority report preserving *minka* and *mita*.

According to interviews with municipal officials and community presidents in Urubamba, communities have effectively leveraged these reciprocity institutions to achieve political representation. While the number of communities is large, the presidents of these communities have effectively coordinated to nominate one community-member candidate per election cycle. To determine who will run in a given election as the representative of all communities, community presidents use traditional institutions of reciprocity: the five-to-ten largest communities rotate in nominating one of their leaders to run. A president—and thus, the community he leads—will support the candidate from another community in the current election, knowing that a candidate from his community will be the chosen candidate in a future election. Absent reciprocity institutions, such coordination would be complicated as there would be no guarantee that the community nominating the current candidate would cede that ability in future elections.

Once nominated, the candidate who will represent all of Urubamba's communities faces off against other candidates from the municipal capital, a town of about 3,000 people. If elected, the community-member candidate rewards her bases of support. As a municipal official from Urubamba told me in an interview, "Communities are loyal. They have their [single] candidate and if that candidate is elected, he will give them everything, even if it means doing much less in the capital."¹²

Thus, in municipalities like Urubamba, where communal titles were historically limited, traditional institutions of reciprocity have persisted. These institutions then facilitate cross-community coordination to elect indigenous leaders to subnational posts. Once elected, these candidates target distributive benefits to indigenous communities.

Paccha, a municipality in the department of Junín, has followed a very different pattern from Urubamba. Within the municipality, there are seven communities, which all obtained a formal title to their land, either during the colonial period or in the post-independence period. Consistent with my theory, none of these communities report preserving reciprocity

¹²Author interview, Urubamba, Cusco, October 2016.

institutions. As one community president in Paccha told me, “There is too much concern with buying and selling. No one will do things in the old ways. No one here will work for free.”

The absence in reciprocity institutions coincides with a failure by indigenous communities to coordinate around indigenous candidates for local office. In the 2018 municipal elections, ten candidates ran for mayor of Paccha. Candidates from four of the seven communities ran in the elections, marking a strong contrast with Urubamba where—often—only one community-member candidate runs to represent all thirty-seven communities. In the lead-up to Paccha’s 2018 election, one community president told me, “It will be hard for a community member to win. The votes aren’t there...There’s too much conflict among the communities here.”¹³ He was proven correct a year later when a candidate from the district capital won the mayorship.

Thus, both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that informally held communal land preserves reciprocity institutions, which serve to coordinate communities around shared indigenous candidates for subnational office. Communal titles, on the other hand, may undermine reciprocity institutions; as a result, indigenous groups may find it difficult to electorally coordinate their support for a single coethnic candidate.

Does this increased descriptive representation translate into better distributive outcomes for indigenous groups? In the next section, I investigate this question using a close-race regression-discontinuity design. I show that electing a community-member candidate to municipal office improves indigenous communities’ access to a key local public good: water.

8.2 From descriptive representation to substantive representation

A long literature suggests that when candidates from a given ethnic group are elected to political office, their coethnics experience a public goods dividend.¹⁴ Yet, research has recently challenged whether this finding holds for particularly marginalized groups.¹⁵ In this section, I use a regression-discontinuity design to assess whether indigenous groups experience an increase in their access to public goods following the election of a coethnic mayor.

A fundamental responsibility of Peruvian local governments involves the provision of water. Yet, in many rural areas, access to water remains low. This is particularly true for majority-indigenous areas, which tend to be more remote and difficult to access than non-indigenous areas. Within indigenous communities, leaders frequently cite water quality and availability as the central issues affecting their communities. In a survey with 300 indigenous community presidents, I asked respondents to rank, in order of importance to their community, seven policy areas: water, sanitation, electricity, roads, education, health, and employment. Just under sixty percent (59.1%) listed water as the number-one issue

¹³Author interview. Paccha, Jauja. April 2017.

¹⁴Alesina et al. (1999); Habyarimana et al. (2009, 2006).

¹⁵Dunning and Nilekani (2013); Lee (2018); Kustov and Pardelli (2018).

facing their community. In this section, I analyze whether electing a community member as district mayor improves indigenous communities' access to water.

Testing this prediction involves confronting potential problems of confounding. Specifically, the election of a community member to local office may be related to observed or unobserved causes of indigenous communities' water access. To reduce these concerns, I employ a close-election regression-discontinuity design in which indigenous community members are narrowly elected or not elected to the mayorship of a municipality. I then compare community-level outcomes based on whether a community member barely won the mayorship or barely lost it.¹⁶ The outcome is a three-item index, which tabulates the number of reported water problems in the community according to a 2012 indigenous community census. The index items include problems with payment or water rights, problems with water quality, and problems with water cut-offs.

The empirical strategy involves the estimation of a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), or $\widehat{\tau_{LATE}}$, which estimates a difference in means at the cutpoint. Equation (8.3) elaborates the central estimand of interest, τ_{LATE} .

$$\tau_{LATE} = E(Y_{i,j}(1)|X_i = 0) - E(Y_{i,j}(0)|X_i = 0) \quad (8.3)$$

In this case, $Y_{i,j}$ represents an index of reported water problems for a community j in municipality i . The index, which ranges from zero to three, includes three items: problems with payment or water rights, problems with water quality, and problems of water cut-offs. Lower values of the index thus indicate more desirable outcomes. $Y_{i,j}(1)$ gives the values of the water problems index given a community-member mayor, and $Y_{i,j}(0)$ is the index given a non-community-member mayor. X_i represents the margin of victory for a community-member candidate and is negative when they lose and positive when they win. Estimation follows the same procedure discussed in the analysis of the geographic RDD in Chapter 5. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level because this is the level at which treatment (community-member mayor vs. not) is assigned.

Figure 8.3 provides a test of my theory that electing community-member candidates improves distributive outcomes. In municipalities where a community-member candidate won a close election, there is clear evidence of a decrease in the reported number of water-related issues facing indigenous communities. Table 8.2 provides a more formal test. Across a number of specifications, a victory by a community-member candidate reduces the number of water-related problems by about one-to-two items. In other words, in municipalities governed by a community-member candidates, indigenous communities appear to experience an improvement in their access to water. Thus, greater political representation—enabled by informal land possession and a concomitant preservation of traditional reciprocity institutions—yields gains to indigenous groups' access to distributive benefits.

¹⁶In other words, I subset to municipalities where a community-member came in first *or* second place. Municipalities where community members were both in the top-two positions as well as municipalities where no community member was in either position were excluded.




Figure 8.3: Community-Member Municipal Victory and Reported Incidence of Water Issues (3-item index)

Table 8.2: Community-Member Municipal Victory and Reported Incidence of Water Issues (3-item index)

	<i>Water Problem Index (3 items):</i>			
	MSE bandwidth		CER bandwidth	
	Linear	Fourth-order	Linear	Fourth-order
Community-member mayor (Conventional)	-0.904*** (0.174)	-1.554*** (0.233)	-0.933*** (0.187)	-1.746*** (0.413)
Community-member mayor (Bias-corrected)	-0.844*** (0.0203)	-1.608*** (0.108)	-0.904*** (0.248)	-1.779*** (0.419)
Observations	552	552	552	552
BW	0.013	0.013	0.10	0.10
BW (bias-corrected)	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019

Note: SEs clustered at municipal level

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

8.3 Conclusions

In this chapter, I highlight the important ways in which communal property can negatively affect representational outcomes for indigenous groups. I first used historical data and a lab-in-the-field experiment to demonstrate that communal land titles appear to erode traditional reciprocity institutions while informal possession of communal land preserves them. I then provided evidence from a conjoint analysis and qualitative fieldwork to show that the preservation of these institutions facilitates indigenous groups' coordination around a single indigenous candidate for subnational office. In a final section, I analyzed a regression-discontinuity design to show that when indigenous candidates are elected, they target important local government resources to indigenous communities. Thus, while informal possession of communal land reinforces reciprocity institutions and thereby leads to long-term gains in descriptive and substantive political representation, communal titles have opposing effects.

The theory and evidence presented in this and the preceding chapter make three distinct contributions. First, the findings places certain limits on the expected welfare gains from communal property, particularly for indigenous groups. In this sense, formal titles serve as an impetus driving the transition from a moral economy to a market economy that scholars have long thought to be negative for indigenous peasants.¹⁷ The observed effects of communal land titles should be compounded in contexts where *private* land titles are extended, and thus, land can be bought and sold.¹⁸ Yet, the findings I present do not necessarily suggest that the aggregate effects of formal titles are negative. In fact, secure title may have positive welfare effects on domains outside of the ones I explore here.

Second, this chapter sheds light on the effects of economic autonomy arrangements throughout the Americas. Scholars have noted the individualizing and conflict-increasing effects of agrarian communities in Mexico and Native Community Lands (TCOs) in Bolivia.¹⁹ My argument offers a framework for understanding why this recognition appears to negatively affect indigenous group coordination. Yet, these findings do not suggest that central states should simply ignore indigenous struggles over their land. Instead, central states can attempt to offset the negative implications of communal landholding by creating institutional spaces that guarantee indigenous groups representation at the subnational or national level. The creation of administrative districts within which indigenous groups are granted the power of a municipality have been reasonably effective at improving the substantive representation of indigenous groups in Mexico.²⁰ Ethnic quotas and indigenous parties have also sometimes improved indigenous representation in countries like Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.²¹

Finally, the findings here outline the conditions under which reciprocity institutions, a key mechanism underlying coethnic favoritism, persist or fail.²² Often, scholars describe

¹⁷Migdal (1974); Paige (1978); Scott (1977), cf. Popkin (1979).

¹⁸See Huenchulaf Cayuqueo (1998); Jackson and Warren (2005); Postero and Zamosc (2004); Van Cott (2001); Yashar (1998, 2005) for the negative effects of the privatization of indigenous communal land.

¹⁹Bottazzi and Rist (2012); Eisenstadt (2011).

²⁰Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2014); Magaloni et al. (2019).

²¹Htun (2004); Madrid (2005).

²²Habyarimana et al. (2009).

the transformation, persistence, or erosion of reciprocity institutions as a—perhaps overly—functionalist response to market transformations.²³ My findings offer a way to understand when these institutions endure or wane, due to the presence or absence of communal land titles.

Ultimately, the dynamics around the extension of communal land titles play an important but largely understudied role in shaping indigenous groups' relationship to the state. Existing research largely considers the economic and social effects of these institutions.²⁴ Yet, limited work examines how communal landholding shapes native populations' access to political representation within the state and, therefore, government resources. The research presented here suggests that communal titles may require indigenous groups to engage the state, but it may also—under certain conditions—reduce the ability of indigenous groups to mobilize to achieve representation within the state. Future research may more systematically investigate how other institutional features, like electoral quotas and reservations, ameliorate or exacerbate the negative representational effects of communal property observed in this and the previous chapter.

In the next chapter, I shift my attention to the welfare effects of *political* autonomy, which has mixed effects on indigenous groups' descriptive and substantive representation. While descriptive representation has increased—almost by definition—substantive representation has not and, in fact, has often worsened. Specifically, autonomy appears to reduce both access to public goods and welfare outcomes among indigenous communities. I demonstrate that this negative relationship can be attributed to the design of jurisdictional boundaries around autonomous units. Often, these jurisdictions contain multiple indigenous communities that may not agree on how autonomy should be designed, implemented, and exercised. This gives rise to coordination problems that inhibit the effective provision of public goods and services.

²³Polanyi (1944); Thompson (1971).

²⁴Bottazzi and Rist (2012); Cramb and Wills (1990); Dippel (2016); Sjaastad and Bromley (1997).

Chapter 9

Political Autonomy and Political Representation

In countries where political autonomy has been extended, including Mexico, Bolivia, Canada, and the United States, indigenous political institutions substitute—partially or wholly—for state ones. As a result, native authorities assume key functions, such as budgetary authority to raise revenue and control expenditures, that previously rested with non-indigenous state officials. Yet, does this descriptive representation improve substantive representation for communities that embrace political autonomy? In other words, are indigenous groups more likely to receive the goods and services they most need under political autonomy regimes?

Research has frequently highlighted the welfare benefits of indigenous political institutions, like chiefs,¹ and tribal councils.² The gains to formally recognizing these authorities have been highlighted in the Mexican case, where scholars have found that municipalities that embraced political autonomy in the 1990s have better access to needed public goods than those communities that did not adopt.³

In this chapter, I provide historical and contemporary evidence to highlight the potentially negative effects of political autonomy. I show that many of these negative effects can be attributed to the allocation of autonomy at the incorrect administrative level. In the case of the United States, autonomy was granted at the level of the tribe, which is not a particularly salient level of socio-political organization for indigenous groups. Instead, there exist cleavages within tribes that can be made more salient through autonomy, generating more conflict and less cooperation to administer local governance effectively. I then turn to the case of contemporary Bolivia, where similar problems have emerged in the autonomous municipality of Charagua, where the existence of many individual communities and multiple

¹Van der Windt et al. (2018); Baldwin (2013, 2015); Henn (2018).

²Murtazashvili (2016); Washburn (1984); Kelly (1975); Mekeel (1944).

³Magaloni et al. (2019). Other research, however, suggests that this autonomy in Mexico has reduced political engagement with higher levels of government (Hiskey and Goodman 2011). Fewer intergovernmental linkages may reduce communities' access to transfers.

ethnic groups creates a challenge to effective public goods and service provision.

9.1 Evidence from the Indian Reorganization Act

In the United States, scholars argue that the Indian Reorganization Act worsened key development outcomes, such as per capita income and socioeconomic inequality.⁴ The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) used the reservation structure to extend autonomy to native groups. In other words, autonomy statutes were designed, adopted, and implemented at the level of the tribe. However, allocating political autonomy at the level of the tribe was generally out of step with traditional forms of indigenous socio-political organization. Kroeber observes,

The more we review aboriginal America, the less certain does any consistently recurring phenomenon become that matches with our usual conventional concept of tribe; and the more largely does this concept appear to be a White man's creation of convenience for talking about Indians, negotiating with them, administering them. . . . So are smaller units, whether they be called villages, bands, towns, tribelets, lineages, or something else - and they no doubt varied regionally in kind and in function. On the whole, it was these smaller communities that were independent, sovereign, and held and used a territory. The tribe is the least defined and the least certain in the chain of native socio-political units.⁵

Taylor argues that in this context, “The tribal governments established under the Indian Reorganization Act constituted a totally new and unfamiliar level of organization for many Indian Groups.”⁶ Scholars have linked these processes of forcing indigenous groups together under a common tribal or reservation government to worsened welfare outcomes. Dippel finds that the combination of multiple sub-tribal bands into a single reservation resulted in lower per capita income—compared with reservations that corresponded to a single sub-tribal band.⁷

Grouping disparate groups into a single reservation presents two related challenges. The first involves a coordination problem. Disparate groups with diffuse interest may face a challenge of acting collectively to ensure the needs of all sub-tribal groups are met. Reciprocity institutions, where they persist, may help overcome these issues, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The second challenge involves direct conflict between rival groups living under the same tribal government. This issue proved particularly problematic under the IRA. As Taylor observes, the allocation of authority to reservation-level governments in 1935 served to “[arouse] tensions among communities which had hitherto coexisted in a state of autonomy.”⁸

⁴Frye and Parker (2016).

⁵Kroeber (1955: 313).

⁶Taylor (1980: 65).

⁷Dippel (2016).

⁸Taylor (1980: 65).

In the next section, I explore these dynamics further through an examination of a contemporary and ongoing case of political autonomy. Specifically, I examine evidence from Bolivia's first autonomous municipality (AIOC): Charagua.

9.2 Evidence from Bolivia's first AIOC: Charagua

Charagua's early experiment with political autonomy has been accompanied by a number of challenges in terms of local governance. Bolivia's largest municipality by area, Charagua obtained AIOC status in early 2017, the first Bolivian municipality to do so. Since the conversion, the autonomous government has struggled to maintain pre-existing levels of public goods provisions.

Figure 9.1 draws on municipal-level budget data from 2012 to 2020 to illustrate the dip in public expenditures in Charagua following its adoption of political autonomy. While the total budget increased, the amount spent on goods and services greatly decreased. Expenditures on basic local public goods, such as education, health, sanitation, irrigation, and electricity experienced a clear decline after autonomy adoption (Figure 9.2).

Thus, Charagua's autonomous government has struggled to maintain the same levels of public goods and service provision experienced in the pre-autonomy period. Qualitative evidence suggests that much of this can be attributed to intra-ethnic divisions in the AIOC that have prevented coordination to provide those basic goods and services most needed by indigenous communities. Charagua contains over eighty indigenous communities.⁹ A majority of Charagua's inhabitants belong to one of two rival factions of the Guaraní indigenous group, but members of several other linguistic and tribal groups also inhabit the municipality.¹⁰ In an attempt to account for the region's diversity, the AIOC was divided into six geographic zones, each with its own governing body.¹¹ However, power struggles have subsequently emerged between the executive government in the capital of Charagua and the authorities in charge of these six zones, preempting coordination and thereby effective local governance.¹² As one Charagua resident exclaimed at a 2018 meeting in the municipal capital, "We are worse than before. I want a recall on this autonomy."¹³

In other municipalities in Bolivia, similar issues arise as indigenous groups consider the adoption of political autonomy. The primary path to AIOC status has been through conversion of an already existing municipality. However, municipalities in Bolivia, like Charagua and the Peruvian districts discussed in the previous chapter, often contain multiple native communities that may have few similarities with one another.¹⁴ Through regulations that require contiguity of territory and the preservation of existing municipal boundaries, the Bolivian government has thus made it difficult and in many cases impossible for individ-

⁹Morell i Torra (2015: 123).

¹⁰Postero (2017).

¹¹Augsburger and Haber (2018: 57).

¹²Postero and Tockman (2020: 10).

¹³Stauffer (2018).

¹⁴Tockman et al. (2015); Tockman and Cameron (2014).




Figure 9.1: Ratio of goods and service expenditures to total budget: Charagua, 2012-2020
Note: Dashed line indicates AIOC adoption
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas (2020)

ual indigenous communities to define new geographic units within which they can exercise autonomy.

Several sources of heterogeneity arise within indigenous groups that can complicate coordination to effectively design and implement autonomy. First, indigenous communities often differ from one another along ethnic or linguistic lines. Figure 9.3 highlights this diversity among indigenous groups within Bolivian municipalities. The plot includes an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), which captures “the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different ethnic groups.”¹⁵ I focus only on diversity within indigenous groups and therefore exclude non-indigenous groups. The ELF

¹⁵Alesina et al. (2003: 158-159).




Figure 9.2: Municipal expenditures in Charagua, 2012-2020
 Note: Dashed line indicates AIOC adoption
 Source: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas (2020)

measure I use is calculated for a municipality, j , as:

$$ELF_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N l_{ij}^2,$$

where l is the percentage of speakers of a given indigenous language, i . For this index, higher values indicate greater diversity within indigenous groups. Higher values of the ELF indicate more diversity. As Figure 9.3 illustrates, Bolivian municipalities are often characterized by a great diversity of indigenous groups who may belong to more than 100 tribal or linguistic groups.

However, ethnic and linguistic groupings are but one measure of diversity within indigenous groups. In fact, it might be a conservative measure of this diversity as it masks a significant amount of heterogeneity within given ethnic groups. A number of diverse fac-




Figure 9.3: Bolivian municipalities by ethno-linguistic fractionalization (indigenous groups only, higher scores indicate greater diversity)

tions exist within the major indigenous groups in Bolivia (e.g., Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní). In fact, individual indigenous communities often differ greatly from one another, even if they share a common language and ethnic identity. These cleavages may arise from differences in historical experiences, political interest, engagement with the state, and economic marginalization.

We can see this through a close examination of municipalities in Cochabamba. Simply examining the ELF index leads to the incorrect conclusion that there exists relatively limited diversity among indigenous groups in the state (Figure 9.4). Yet, at the sub-ethnic level, inter-community heterogeneity may exist. For example, municipalities in Cochabamba often contain hundreds of individual native communities (Figure 9.5). Despite sharing a common language and ethnic background, these communities may not coordinate and may experience outright conflict. In fact, inter-community relations in Andean South America have often been characterized by disputes over land and resources. In Peru, for example, nearly two-thirds of communities report conflicts with other communities—compared with

16% experiencing conflict with mining companies and 3% having conflict with the state.¹⁶ Thus, within Bolivian municipalities, ethnic, linguistic, or communal cleavages can give rise to inter-community frictions that can complicate the process of effectively exercising political autonomy.

9.3 Conclusions

In this and the previous chapters, I have examined the way that autonomy, particularly when partially offered, may undermine descriptive and substantive representation. How might governments address these representational issues arising from partial autonomy? One option is to offer full autonomy that first recognizes the economic autonomy of individual indigenous communities and then grants political autonomy at the same level. This full autonomy addresses certain challenges presented by both forms of autonomy. It eliminates the need for cross-community coordination to achieve political representation by recognizing the legitimacy of each community's authorities. This obviates the negative representational effects of economic autonomy, which arise from the erosion of traditional institutions of reciprocity, while allowing indigenous groups to reap the benefits of a communal land title. Full autonomy also allows for the creation of hyper-local governing institutions, which may be more responsive to local needs. However, this approach may create certain challenges, particularly for central governments, which I discuss in greater detail in the following chapter.

¹⁶Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2014: 279).




Figure 9.4: Cochabamba municipalities by ethno-linguistic fractionalization (indigenous groups only, higher scores indicate greater diversity)




Figure 9.5: Cochabamba municipalities by number of indigenous communities

Chapter 10

Indigenous Autonomy: An Empirical and Normative Assessment

Scholars often highlight the benefits of indigenous autonomy. However, in this dissertation, I highlight that autonomy—at least in the forms it has been traditionally offered by states—can prove costly for native groups. In the short-term, it can make them more vulnerable to the central state’s own extractive efforts, and over the long-term, it may reduce access to descriptive and substantive representation, although through different mechanisms, which can be attributed to the way states originally extend autonomy. I traced out this argument in three sections.

In a first section of the dissertation, I analyzed the supply-side emergence of indigenous autonomy. Using cross-national evidence from a number of historical and contemporary cases, I showed that central states recognize autonomy when indigenous elites are strategically important allies of the incumbent and the rural elite is sufficiently weak that it cannot block such recognition.

In a second section, I examined the demand-side emergence of indigenous autonomy, focusing on two historical cases and one contemporary case. I first analyzed the experience of indigenous groups with rural elite extraction in the United States under the Dawes Act. I showed that reservations more exposed to this private predation were more likely to embrace the Indian Reorganization Act, an instance of partial autonomy. I then analyzed the case of Peru to show that exposure to state-led extraction generally increased indigenous communities’ resistance to partial autonomy. Finally, I moved to the contemporary period and used observational data and case studies to show that Bolivian communities exposed to state-led extraction generally resist partial autonomy—even when they also experienced private predation by rural elites.

In a final section, I examined how the embrace or resistance of autonomy shapes the long-term political marginalization of indigenous communities. I used evidence from Peru to show that economic autonomy generally erodes indigenous institutions of reciprocity, undermining long-term efforts of native communities to coordinate to obtain greater substantive and descriptive political representation. I then examined evidence from Bolivia and the

United States to highlight the negative effects of political autonomy for the substantive representation of indigenous groups.

In this chapter, I analyze the empirical and normative implications of the findings presented above. I first examine the application of the findings to Afro-descendant populations and their demands for autonomy. I then discuss where the concept of autonomy may fit into future research on indigenous-state relations. I conclude with a discussion of the normative importance of autonomy.

10.1 Potential extensions to Afro-Descendant groups

Most discussions of autonomy implicitly focus on the demands and rights of native groups. The reasons for this seem clear. Indigenous groups had institutions and territory prior to the arrival of colonizers and settlers. Colonial and post-colonial efforts have disregarded or systematically violated the rights of these groups. Therefore, modern claims for autonomy are an attempt to recover a set of rights and institutions that were violently taken or destroyed by illegitimate invaders.

Yet, the reasons that indigenous groups demand autonomy parallel concerns of other groups. Like native groups, Afro-descendant populations were forcibly removed from their traditional homelands to facilitate extraction by wealthy, white elites. During and subsequent to this extraction, these groups have faced political, economic, and sociocultural marginalization.

For Afro-descendant populations in the Americas, autonomy provides a potential solution to persistent exploitation and poverty. Leaders of African American movements in the United States have sometimes advocated for autonomy. Edwin McCabe in 1889 lobbied for the creation of an “all-black territory...where African Americans could achieve their economic potential and exercise their political rights without interference.”¹ Interestingly, the desired location of this land would have been in the Oklahoma territory seized from Native Americans under the Dawes Act.

Other movements also emerged in the nineteenth century to demand autonomy for African Americans in the United States. In the 1930s, Oscar Brown Sr. attempted to form a “49th state,” which would be majority black and governed by African Americans.² In the 1960s, followers of Malcolm X attempted to found “The Republic of New Africa,” signing a Declaration of Independence that declared African Americas “forever free and independent of the jurisdiction of the United States.” The group advocated the creation of a new country in the southern United States, where African American interests would be better represented.

While these attempts in the United States failed to generate meaningful autonomy for African American citizens, other efforts in the Americas have been relatively more successful. Populations of mixed African and indigenous descent have obtained political autonomy in

¹Jenkins Jr (2015: 242).

²Llorens (1968: 89).

the coastal regions of Nicaragua and Honduras. And in Colombia's 1993 Constitution, Afro-descendant population were granted titles for their collectively held land.³

Thus, autonomy has not been the primary demand of Afro-descendant populations in the Americas, but it has emerged as a possible alternative to generally unsuccessful policies of integration. In a few cases, including Honduras, Nicaragua, and Colombia, central states have recognized the autonomy of Afro-descendant groups.

Yet, this dissertation would predict that Afro-descendant groups might be hesitant to embrace this autonomy due to their experience with extraction by the central state. Specifically, these groups may fear that autonomy will facilitate further seizure of their resources by the government. Evidence from Colombia generally supports this claim. As Katerí Hernández observes, "Afro-Colombians have been dissuaded from pursuing the land title process. . . Afro-Colombian community organizers seeking collective ownership have seen themselves labeled as guerrillas or terrorists and then targeted for violence by a government interested in controlling resource-rich Afro-Colombian areas."⁴ Of course, more systematic research is needed to understand if and how the theoretical predictions from this dissertation may apply more broadly to Afro-descendant groups and their demands for autonomy.

10.2 Whither indigenous autonomy? Conceptual and practical implications

The findings from this dissertation highlight a number of costs around autonomy. Given these potential challenges, how should academics and practitioners proceed? Should autonomy continue to be pursued as a matter of scholarly concern and public policy? In this section, I begin with a discussion of recommendations for future theoretical and empirical work on autonomy before turning to the practical implications of my findings.

A first theoretical issue involves the conceptualization of autonomy in the existing scholarship. The concept has generally become muddled in a way that leads scholars to assert that it has no precise definition and does not correspond to a single concrete policy.⁵ Instead, it is viewed simply as an overarching demand that covers a number of rights indigenous groups may want governments to recognize. Importantly, however, this dissertation shows that partial autonomy can be associated with certain clear policies, such as the recognition of indigenous political institutions or the granting of communal land titles. The existing research seems to imply that the achievement of some of these rights should be preferred to the status quo. I show, however, that this is often not the case. While groups may desire a comprehensive recognition of their political and economic rights, they are more hesitant to accept selective extensions of autonomy. This is especially true among those communities most vulnerable to extraction. Therefore, future research may more carefully delineate that when indigenous groups demand autonomy, some—and often a large—subset

³Hernández (2013: 116).

⁴Hernández (2013: 116).

⁵Polanco (2018).

of native communities may be unwilling to accept offers that fall short of fully meeting the demand.

Relatedly, the distinction between political and economic autonomy has important welfare implications for indigenous communities. Often, scholars focus broadly on autonomy and its effects. Future work might more carefully delineate the way in which different types of autonomy affect indigenous welfare. Further distinctions could, of course, be made by either disaggregating political autonomy or adding further categories, such as cultural autonomy.⁶

The preceding discussion is not intended to minimize the general concept of “autonomy” in studies of indigenous-state relations. In fact, I would argue that it should remain a central and orienting concept. Autonomy—and more precisely what I call “full autonomy”—continues to constitute an important demand of indigenous groups. While rarely recognized in practice, it plays an important role in claim-making and, theoretically, presents itself as one extreme policy outcome of indigenous-state relations—the other such outcome being assimilation.

A final consideration involves the status of autonomy as a matter of good public policy. The findings suggest that—because of the clear costs that autonomy may present—indigenous communities should continue to be given the opportunity to decide whether they will adopt or reject autonomous status. For some communities, partial autonomy may, in fact, be beneficial, particularly those that experience extraction by rural elites but not by central states. Partial autonomy may also have other important effects that are difficult to measure empirically. Indigenous political and economic institutions often have unquantifiable symbolic and cultural importance, and some communities may value the legitimization and recognition of these institutions as highly as their welfare effects. Finally, partial autonomy may lay the groundwork for full autonomy, which as I have argued may reduce political and economic marginalization.

10.3 The future of indigenous autonomy: Normative conclusions

Autonomy has long been the central demand of indigenous groups. The hitherto failure of assimilation and integration policies has highlighted autonomy as a potentially superior option to the status quo. Yet, thus far, government policies around autonomy have been only partial. Furthermore, most efforts continue to employ paternalistic thinking, creating one-size-fits-all solutions that fail to adequately consider the tremendous diversity in indigenous group traditions, preferences, and demands. Little work is done to build the trust and confidence of indigenous communities, and many communities remain doubtful that the central state truly has their best interests in mind. As a result, most proposals around autonomy have been rejected, and when implemented, autonomy has often done little to improve indigenous welfare.

⁶Van Cott (1996), for example, usefully distinguishes between political, economic, and cultural autonomy.

This view of autonomy stands in stark contrast to the predominant narrative from the 1990s and early 2000s around the success of national-level indigenous movements in achieving hard-won gains for increased self-determination. While these movements have unquestionably helped indigenous groups move toward full autonomy, they also risk allowing a single movement or organization to define the policy preferences and demands for a heterogeneous set of native communities.

For autonomy to be successful, governments should generally avoid attempts to fit indigenous autonomy into the logic of existing, state-endorsed administrative and legal structures. States should also be more willing to offer comprehensive forms of autonomy that recognize political, economic, *and* cultural self-determination rights. Limits on this autonomy might be negotiated so that fundamental human, civil, and political rights are not violated. Generally, however, states should play a limited role in defining how indigenous institutions operate. Importantly, this requires state officials to negotiate with individual communities and their authorities. While such a process will command a substantial investment of time and energy from the government, it also carries the possibility of redressing indigenous groups' mounting list of grievances against the extractive efforts of state officials and private actors.

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Appendix A

Appendix 1. Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Timing of allotment under the Dawes Act of 1887 in the United States (cumulative frequency)




Figure A2: Tests of RDD continuity assumption




Table A1: Relationship of Qhapaq Ñan and Leguía Road Construction

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	KM of road built under Leguia	No. of districts with Leguia road
Qhapaq Ñan Province (0,1)	87,256.090*** (9,348.142)	
Number of districts with Qhapaq Nan		0.396*** (0.072)
Constant	72,204.910*** (6,938.842)	0.619*** (0.213)
Observations	726	84
R ²	0.107	0.268
Adjusted R ²	0.106	0.259
F Statistic	87.125*** (df = 1; 724)	29.998*** (df = 1; 82)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Using all the known locations of the Qhapaq Ñan from the time when Leguía built the road, I assign provinces a dummy indicator for whether they contained a section of the Qhapaq Ñan. Data was gathered on the total kilometers of road constructed in each province under Leguía and the number of districts in the province containing a portion of the Leguía road.

Figure A3: Sorting test ($p = 0.773$)




Table A2: Balance on Pre-Treatment Covariates: Lab-in-the-field

Covariates	Mean (Treated)	Mean (Control)	Difference
Head of household	0.98	0.98	0.00 (0.02)
Monthly income (Less than 100 <i>soles</i>)	0.27	0.27	-0.00 (0.05)
Monthly income (between 100 and 600 <i>soles</i>)	0.42	0.43	-0.00 (0.06)
Monthly income (More than 600 <i>soles</i>)	0.31	0.30	0.01 (0.05)
Male	0.95	0.94	0.01 (0.03)
Age	48.30	48.37	-0.07 (1.09)
Education (Primary)	0.73	0.71	0.02 (0.05)
Education (Secondary)	0.39	0.38	0.01 (0.05)
Literate	0.97	0.96	0.01 (0.02)
Farmer	0.62	0.67	-0.05 (0.05)
Business/sales	0.07	0.06	0.01 (0.03)
Laborer (other)	0.06	0.05	0.01 (0.03)
Construction	0.10	0.10	-0.01 (0.03)
Current president	0.64	0.53	0.11 (0.06)
Private landholder	0.77	0.82	-0.05 (0.05)
Resident of communal land	0.17	0.14	0.03 (0.04)
Previous municipal official	0.37	0.44	-0.07 (0.06)
Distance to district capital (< 1 hour)	0.69	0.66	0.02 (0.05)
Observations	169	149	

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses




Figure A4: Trust game results: Heterogeneity in CACE estimated effect of community membership on reciprocity by community-level traits

Note: Point estimates with 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Point estimates are coefficients from a two-stage least squares regression of the outcome (amount of money—0, 1, 2, or 3 *soles*—shared with partner) on the fitted values from a first-stage regression of a manipulation check (the partner was correctly identified as belonging to a community) on the treatment (partner identified as a community member). Municipal-level fixed effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. Information on community-level variables (e.g., *ayni/minka*, government-determined borders, intra-community conflict) are taken from a 2012 indigenous community census (Cenagro) conducted by Peru’s Ministry of Agriculture.

Table A3: Effect of Candidate Attributes on Vote Choice

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Rating		Discrete Choice	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Same community	0.497*** (0.067)	0.496*** (0.024)	0.193*** (0.022)	0.192*** (0.022)
Different community	0.294*** (0.068)	0.295*** (0.024)	0.099*** (0.023)	0.100*** (0.023)
Male	-0.130** (0.055)		-0.056*** (0.019)	
Chief Policy: Water	-0.019 (0.067)		0.004 (0.023)	
Chief Policy: Education	-0.005 (0.068)		-0.001 (0.023)	
Political Party	0.002 (0.055)		-0.017 (0.019)	
Constant	2.949*** (0.072)	2.877*** (0.017)	0.439*** (0.025)	0.403*** (0.016)
Observations	3,091	3,091	2,838	2,838

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A4: Correlation between rating and discrete choice outcome measures

	Rated A more favorably	No difference	Rated B more favorably
Chose A	0.84	0.58	0.04
Chose B	0.16	0.42	0.96

Table A5: Effect of Community Membership on Reciprocity

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Absolute amount of gift	Binary measure of giving
	(1)	(2)
Partner is community member	0.615* (0.323)	0.248** (0.124)
Constant	1.097*** (0.246)	0.634*** (0.095)
Observations	217	217
Residual Std. Error	1.025	0.395

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix B

Appendix 2. Description of Survey Sample: Community Presidents

The survey sample consisted of 321 current and former community presidents in the Peruvian state of Cusco.¹ Districts in Cusco were randomly ordered, and enumerators proceeded down the list visiting every community within each district. There were approximately 5 communities in each district. The locations of communities and names of community leaders were determined through a visit to municipal government offices. Community leaders were then located within communities by enumerators, often through directions provided by community residents. Former presidents were identified in the same manner. A map of the communities surveyed can be found in Figure A1.

Descriptive statistics for the sample can be found in Table A1. This constitutes the first such dataset, albeit limited to Cusco, of community president attributes. Respondents are overwhelmingly male and tend to be middle aged. While the vast majority of current and former presidents are literate, they have relatively low levels of education. They tend to be farmers, who make well below the federally mandated monthly minimum wage (S/.850 or approximately USD 260). Somewhat surprisingly, most claim to reside on private and not communal land. Yet, post-survey interviews with several respondents suggested that land was *de facto*, though not *de jure*, private.

¹The size of the sample was limited by problems in identifying presidents, locating them, and reaching the sometimes remote communities where they live.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of sample

Characteristics	Means	Min	Max
Current president	0.59	0.00	1.00
Male	0.95	0.00	1.00
Head of Household	0.98	0.00	1.00
Resides on private land	0.79	0.00	1.00
Resides on communal land	0.16	0.00	1.00
Age	48.34	28.00	80.00
Married	0.75	0.00	1.00
Primary education	0.72	0.00	1.00
Secondary education	0.39	0.00	1.00
Post-secondary education	0.16	0.00	1.00
Literate	0.97	0.00	1.00
Father's level of education (at least primary)	0.26	0.00	1.00
Number of children	3.73	0.00	10.00
Number of household members	4.52	1.00	11.00
Monthly income (< 100 soles per month)	0.27	0.00	1.00
Monthly income (Between 100 soles and 600 soles per month)	0.42	0.00	1.00
Monthly income (> 600 soles per month)	0.31	0.00	1.00
Farmer	0.64	0.00	1.00
Businessperson	0.06	0.00	1.00
Laborer (other)	0.06	0.00	1.00
Construction	0.10	0.00	1.00
No job	0.02	0.00	1.00
Previous municipal official	0.40	0.00	1.00
Distance to municipality (<1 hour)	0.67	0.00	1.00
Community Size	657.91	3.00	9000.00
Observations		318	




Figure A1: Map of communities surveyed