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Explaining Migration Timing: Political Information and Opportunities

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Abstract

How do migrants decide when to leave? Conventional wisdom is that violence and economic deprivation force migrants to leave their homes. However, long-standing problems of violence and poverty often cannot explain sudden spikes in migration. We study the timing of migration decisions in the critical case of Syrian and Iraqi migration to Europe using an original survey and embedded experiment, as well as interviews, focus groups, and internet search data. We find that violence and poverty lead individuals to invest in learning about the migration environment. Political shifts in receiving countries then can unleash migratory flows. The findings underscore the need for further research on what migrants know about law and politics, when policy changes create and end migrant waves, and whether politicians anticipate migratory responses when crafting policy.

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In 2014, 68,000 Central American children, more than double the previous year, surged across the U.S. border. These children were fleeing crime and gang violence in their home countries. Yet, violence had affected Central America for years and, in some countries, had even subsided.[1] In 2015, more than a million migrants braved the Mediterranean Sea to seek asylum in Europe. The flow greatly outpaced prior years. Yet, as in Central America, violence in Syria was not new. The civil war started in 2011. Given persistent conditions of violence and poverty, how do migrants decide *when* to go?

We examine the timing of migration decisions. Although a large literature exists on *where* people migrate, less is understood about *when* they leave. To the extent academics focus on the timing of outflows, they look at how changes in violence affect flows[2] or use mass flows as exogenous instruments to test the effects of immigration.[3] Yet many migrations involve sharp increases in outflows without violent "sparks." Others focus on how social networks accelerate the pace of flows.[4] However, migrants from nonviolent countries and regions—disconnected from social networks—often leave at the same time as those from more violent regions, leading to the perception of coordinated movements, or a *migrant wave*.

We argue that underlying conditions of poverty and/or violence lead those thinking about migration ("potential migrants") to invest in information. Because potential migrants seek information about migration opportunities, they are highly attuned to changes in the political opportunities provided by both sending and receiving countries, which can spark large outflows. Thus, small changes in policy and political environments can alter decisions about when to migrate.

Studying how migrant waves form is extremely difficult. Migration data are scant, especially at the individual level. Beyond that, as with studies of social movements, identifying

1. Clemens 2017.

2. Shrestha 2017, Clemens 2017, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003.

3. Card 1990, Bhavnani and Lacina 2015, Hangartner et al. 2019.

4. Moretto and Vergalli 2008, Granovetter 1978.

which changes in political opportunity structures lead to waves is a challenge. Instead of testing our argument using cross-national data on migrant flows, we focus on the micro-level processes that drive the timing of migration decisions and can aggregate into waves. Specifically, we examine (1) whether potential migrants invest in information about migration opportunities and how widespread that knowledge is and (2) whether changes in the political environment affect when potential migrants want to leave.

We examine these decisions in the critical case of the migrant wave to Europe in 2015. Europe experienced its largest influx of migrants since World War II starting in 2014, with a substantial spike in September 2015. To understand why this spike occurred, we conducted an original survey and embedded experiment of Syrians and Iraqis both in major transit countries (Turkey and Jordan) and their home countries. Although many migrants faced acute threats that forced them to leave Syria and Iraq, their secondary migration choices to Europe are harder to explain through violence alone. Instead, we find that conditions of violence and poverty are associated with migrants learning more about the political environment and their options. In a survey experiment and focus groups, we find evidence that migrants respond to perceived changes in the political opportunities to settle in Europe. We also find that migrants search for information around major policy events.

These findings suggest a broader mechanism in which violence both has direct effects—pushing some individuals to leave their home country—and indirect effects—leading others to invest in information about their future options. Migrant waves then can form when attentive individuals respond to changes in the policy environment through seemingly coordinated decisions about when to migrate. In this way, migrant waves are analogous to "hot money" flows in international capital markets.[5] Investors are knowledgeable and move their money in response to political events. This responsiveness creates swings in capital flows, sometimes when underlying fundamentals seem unchanged.

Understanding the timing of migration and responsiveness to policies in receiving coun-

5. For instance, Chari and Kehoe 2003.

tries is important due to the political consequences. Hostile political reactions to immigrants are most likely when communities undergo sudden influxes.[6] Indeed, rapid increases in exposure to Syrian refugees are associated with stronger support for far-right parties on Greek islands closer to Turkey.[7] The fact that migrants respond to policy shifts in receiving countries can add fodder to right-wing interpretations of migrants as opportunistic. We emphasize a more nuanced interpretation in which violence creates circumstances in which migrants pay attention to the political environment and respond rationally to information.

It would be necessary to study a much larger set of migrant waves to distinguish the relative role of violence and political conditions in the timing of migrant movements. Our contribution is to highlight that potential migrants are knowledgeable about the international political environment and respond to political cues in a substantively important case. The basic methodology employed here could be replicated elsewhere, building a comprehensive understanding of migrant waves from the micro-level upwards.

Puzzle

In 2015, more than a million migrants crossed into Europe. The sudden uptick exemplifies a *migrant wave*, meaning an elevated level of migration to the same receiving country or region occurring in a narrow period of time. We use the term *migrant wave* to include both events formally classified as refugee crises, as with Syrians, and those that are not, as with Central American minors. Rather than adjudicate these claims, we use a more encompassing term. Waves stand out from historical trends: they involve a temporary boost, which quickly tapers off and returns to the preexisting trend. Figure 1 visualizes a wave: the left panel shows the number of unauthorized entries into Europe between 2008 and 2016 and the right displays asylum applications from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq to Europe from 2000 to 2017. Asylum data are harder to interpret due to lags in filing; nonetheless they reveal an increase in migrant flows in 2015. Crossings and applications then drop off in 2016 and 2017,

6. Hopkins 2010

7. Hangartner et al. 2019.



Notes: Unauthorized crossings are shown in the left panel and asylum applications are shown in the right panel. Border crossing data are from Frontex; asylum data are from UNHCR (2000-07) and Eurostat (2007-17).

Figure 1: The European Migrant Wave

respectively.

Migration decisions are usually modeled through push and pull factors with transaction costs.[8] When examining the timing of migrant outflows, most accounts focus on a *change* in push factors, including violence, human rights violations, and economic conditions.[9] From this perspective, escalating threats drive the timing of migration choices, or as Davenport, Moore and Poe (2003) put it, "sometimes you just have to leave."

Nevertheless, several empirical anomalies emerge. First, while violence and economic deprivation are important background conditions in migration, changes often are surprisingly absent.[10] For instance, violence has plagued Central America for decades and there were no notable increases in violence (as measured by national homicides) before unaccompanied child migrants came to the US in large numbers in 2012.[11] Likewise, no clear escalations in the Syrian civil war or conflict in Iraq can be found to explain the 2015 wave. To see this, the top panel of Figure 2 plots the flow of Syrians entering Europe by sea from the start of the

8. See Massey et al. 1993 for a review.

9. Apodaca 1998, Neumayer 2005, Moore and Shellman 2004, Schmeidl 1997, Shellman and Stewart 2007, Stanley 1987.

10. Portes and Böröcz 1989.

11. Clemens 2017, 9.



Sources: IOM, Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond Database, and IOM (2016*b*) and UNHCR (2016).

Figure 2: The Limited Explanatory Power of Violence in Syria and Iraq

civil war in April 2011 through July 2016 and the UNHCR's monthly death count, the best proxy for violence in Syria. The bottom panel repeats the exercise for Iraq. Data on deaths in Iraq are unavailable so we follow IOM (2016*b*) to identify the most important violent events. Of course, standard statistics may mask local trends and more nuanced threats, such as extortion, food or medical shortages, or conscription, which we examine below. The point is that no particular violent event preceded the migrant wave.

Second, theories focused on violence struggle to explain patterns of secondary migration, meaning decisions to move beyond a safe location. Violence cannot explain why Iraqi or

Syrian migrants chose to leave Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan en masse to reach Europe in 2015 but not earlier. Similar questions about why migrants suddenly leave intermediate destinations have been raised in other contexts like Somalia[12] and El Salvador.[13]

Third, migrant waves often attract individuals from less violent areas. At the peak of the wave, just 44 percent of the migrants arriving to Europe by the Mediterranean route were from Syria. The wave attracted migrants from countries with long-standing, largely unchanged conflicts and economic conditions, such as Afghanistan, Albania, Pakistan, and Kosovo.[14] Germany and Austria even launched advertising campaigns in Afghanistan to stop Afghans from migrating.[15] Analogously, while most child migrants came from very violent municipalities in Central America, some of the least violent municipalities like western Guatemala and northern El Salvador also sent large numbers.[16]

Finally, equally important questions exist about how waves end. The main routes to Europe experienced a lull in 2017, despite continuing violence in Iraq and Syria. If violence and deprivation alone drive migration, outflows should continue. The timing of migration decisions thus presents an empirical puzzle.

Argument and Alternatives

Like many models of migration, we focus on individual-level decisions and consider their macro-level implications. We explain the timing of migration decisions as a two-stage process. First, push factors like violence or poverty lead individuals to invest in information about migration. Stronger push factors lead to greater information investments because the decision to migrate is more pressing. Second, because potential migrants seek information, they are

12. Zimmermann 2009.

13. Stanley 1987.

14. See Eurostat, "Countries of origin of (non-EU) asylum seekers in the EU-28 Member States, 2014 and 2015" at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained>, accessed 16 September 2019.

15. "Austria plans ad campaign to deter Afghans from seeking asylum," *Reuters*, March 1, 2016; "HRW Slams Germany for Trying to Keep Afghans Away from Europe," *Newsweek*, November 18, 2015.

16. Clemens 2017, 9.

attuned to changes in political conditions in receiving countries. We build on Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets (2014) and Neumayer (2004) in stressing that politics and policy affect migrants' decisions. Yet this work focuses on relatively slow-moving variables like citizenship and welfare regimes that cannot explain sudden waves. We instead focus on changes in political opportunities, meaning a formal policy opening or an informal signal that increases the likelihood that migrants will be able to stay in their desired host country.

Waves, then, are most likely to form when the change in political opportunities is substantial, the number of potential migrants is large, or both. Usually, changes in political opportunities for migration are incremental[17] and the number of people who both want to and are organized to migrate in the near term is small. However, conditions of violence, as in Syria or El Salvador, or deprivation, as in Venezuela, result in large populations attentive to the politics of migration. Changes in the political opportunity structure—even relatively small changes—can unleash a wave given a sizable, informed population. Alternatively, large political changes can produce waves, as even those with more limited information learn of the opportunity. In the case of the European migrant wave, we suggest violence caused many people to invest in information (rather than a large change in policy).

Waves may come to an end when a political opportunity closes. Large influxes often provoke political backlashes and policy changes to make migration more difficult. Waves, however, may not have crisp endings. They can see a "second-surge" as migrants rush to enter as opportunities close.

This dynamic is similar to international capital flows: investors make high-stakes decisions and therefore acquire information about where to place their money. Political conditions can send money flying out of a market[18], as even sophisticated investors rely on

17. Peters 2017.

18. Chari and Kehoe 2003, Papaioannou 2009.

rumors[19] and heuristics[20] to make decisions.

In addition to stimulus models, there are two other types of alternative explanations: herds and social networks. A simple herd (or threshold) model occurs when individuals mimic each other, so that the likelihood of a given behavior increases as more individuals engage in it. Granovetter (1978) and Epstein and Gang (2006) include migration as an example of herd behavior. Similarly, Cole and Kehoe (2000) model financial crises and sunspots as a result of the coordination issues in which lenders sometimes blindly follow one another. A simple herd model thus predicts that when more people migrate, others follow.

Bayesian herd models add nuance to this idea. An individual or small group receives an information signal and changes their behavior. Others observing the behavior then update their beliefs, even when they do not receive the same signal, and change their behavior.[21] In the context of migration, individuals see a large outflow and update their views on some aspect of the migratory process, perhaps concluding that conditions in their home country are deteriorating and/or receiving countries are accommodating. This new information leads them to decide to migrate.

Another type of explanation focuses on social networks. Once a critical mass of individuals migrate, they can provide information and support to their friends and family, reducing the costs of migration. These models, however, predict "snowballs"[22] rather than waves in which migration accelerates with no clear end.

These alternative models predict that only a limited number of people have information. We instead suggest that substantial numbers of migrants invest in acquiring information and

19. Fisman 2001.

20. Brooks, Cunha and Mosley 2015.

21. Banerjee 1992.

22. Moretto and Vergalli 2008.

receive and act directly on informational signals.[23] To adjudicate between our argument and alternatives, we therefore explicitly look at the distribution of information in the population, as well as the plausibility that migrants time their moves in response to political conditions or the number of migrants.

Research Design

We focus on decisions about whether and when to leave for Europe by Syrians and Iraqis. The ideal empirical approach would use longitudinal survey data to observe how individuals react to changes in violence, the number of migrants, and the policy environment. Unfortunately, panel data are unavailable and extremely challenging to collect from a population experiencing violence and crossing borders. We instead surveyed individuals at different points of the migration path–at home, internal displacement, and in transit countries.[24] Collecting original survey data allows us to test underlying assumptions about migrants' knowledge and responsiveness to political cues.

We administered our face-to-face survey to Syrians and Iraqis living in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan. Our sample focused on individuals making decisions about leaving their permanent homes and additional moves from Turkey and Jordan or relatively safe areas of Syria and Iraq. We fielded the survey in summer 2016, after the EU's agreement with Turkey to reduce the flow of migrants through Greece. This moment involved tremendous policy uncertainty. The survey included questions about respondents' policy knowledge, desires to migrate, social networks, experiences of violence, and demographic characteristics (see Appendix D). An independent survey firm with gender-balanced teams of Syrian and Iraqi enumerators administered the survey to 1431 respondents in Arabic on smartphones.

Constructing a representative sample of migrants in transit and displaced peoples is not

23. Our argument diverges from much of the literature on refugees as well, which see refugees as relatively uninformed and constrained in their ability to gather information. See Barnett 2011, Carlson, Jakli and Linos 2018.

24. We hoped to conduct a follow-up survey on whether and where individuals ultimately moved, but few individuals provided contact information; among those who did, contact information often had changed.

Figure 3: Map of Survey Sites

feasible. Very basic statistics are available about the nationality and gender of migrants (generally registered by UNHCR affiliates), but even these statistics can be misleading for a population in flux. Internal displacement within Syria and Iraq has made traditional sampling frames like household censuses obsolete.

We instead constructed a high-quality convenience sample by randomly sampling migrants. We chose locations where we were likely to find many Syrian and Iraqi migrants in the case of Turkey and Jordan, and locations that had substantial internally displaced populations and safe access in Syria and Iraq. These included Gaziantep and Istanbul, Turkey; Amman and Mafraq, Jordan; Duhok, Iraq; and al-Atareb and Idlib, Syria (Figure 3).[25]

To select respondents, enumerators used two strategies. In Syria and Iraq, they conducted household surveys, randomizing the first house and then following a skip rule of every fifth unit. Because it is harder to find migrant households in Turkey and Jordan, survey teams rotated among a dozen sites where migrants gather, selecting respondents randomly from those they met in public using a skip rule (every tenth migrant) to create a more representative sample.

Our survey is not representative of the entire migrant population. However, it does offer

25. Appendix B provides details on the site selection and sampling.

a high-quality convenience sample in a complex, violent environment. Compared to many other surveys that rely on snowball sampling, as done by even top international organizations like IOM (2016*a*), every effort was made to randomly select interviewees and capture a snapshot of a migrating population. Reassuringly, our sample is similar in demographics to the UNHCR statistics (Appendix B).

We could not survey in refugee or IDP camps, which might affect our results in two ways. First, individuals outside of camps are able to support themselves so likely are better-off financially. Discussions with experts suggested that this would be an advantage in locating migrants considering secondary moves to Europe, but it means that our sample of respondents may be more able to respond to migration opportunities than the underlying population. Second, the information environment in camps depends on how aid organizations provide information. Migrants may be more susceptible to rumors due to their geographic concentration. We use data on whether our respondents had spent time in camps to probe the ways that knowledge might be acquired in camp environments (and find no significant differences). Still, our findings may not extend to those who *remain* in camps.

The survey included both observational questions and an emphasis framing experiment to understand the mechanisms behind the timing of migration decisions. We complement the survey evidence with, first, focus groups and interviews with Syrian refugees in Istanbul in 2017 and, second, with internet search data.

There is no "smoking gun" in this study. We instead examine four observable implications of our argument and the plausibility of alternative explanations. We expect: Respondents affected by violence, economic deprivation, or closer to making a move should be knowledgeable about the broader policy environment and international politics (H1). Information on political opportunities in a survey experiment should lead potential migrants to make or accelerate their plans to migrate (H2). In focus groups, potential migrants should interpret others' choices about *when* to move to Europe in terms of political opportunities (H3). Finally, real shifts in the political environment should lead to more internet searches to seek

	Location of Survey				Mean
% Correct	Turkey	Jordan	Syria	Iraq	All
Meaning of asylum	53.8	50.8	52.4	41.5	51.5
Asylum in Gulf	98.8	87.8	92.6	54.8	90.1
Resettlement	81.5	86.7	71.6	51.1	75.9
German Chancellor	98.4	59.6	90.7	80.7	86.9
Country Accepting Most	82.3	62.6	90.7	49.6	78.1
Country Accepting Fewest	78.9	62.5	57.1	52.6	65.8
Mean Knowledge	0.82	0.68	0.76	0.55	0.75

Table 1: Political Knowledge

information on migration (H4).

Results

Survey: Observational Data on Political Knowledge (H1)

To test our first hypothesis, we asked closed-choice questions to gauge understanding of the concepts and politics surrounding migration to Europe. Table 1 summarizes the level of knowledge.

First, we asked respondents to choose the meaning of "asylum." This question was the most difficult; roughly half correctly answered the question. Our focus groups suggested that respondents were confused because many received temporary protected status in Turkey, which they called "humanitarian asylum."[26]

Second, we asked which of the countries in the Gulf Cooperative Council offered asylum. Respondents did extremely well on the question, with roughly 90 percent selecting the correct answer of "none." Our qualitative research reaffirmed that migrants were frustrated that "Arab countries closed their borders."[27]

Third, respondents selected which nationals can be resettled under the EU Relocation program. Three-quarters of respondents correctly identified the groups (Syrians and Iraqis)

26. Focus group, Male 46-65, Istanbul, Turkey, August 16, 2017.

27. Focus group, Female 18-25, Istanbul, Turkey, July 26, 2017 and Anonymous Community Leader Nr. 1, Istanbul, Turkey, July 12, 2017.

included in the deal. In focus groups, young men—those most likely to migrate to Europe—were especially knowledgeable about the complicated procedures for resettlement.[28]

Next we asked respondents to name the leader (chancellor) of Germany. Shockingly, almost 90 percent of respondents said Angela Merkel. To put this in perspective, only 68 percent of Iraqis and 41 percent of Jordanians could correctly name their own foreign minister (Arab Barometer 2013). When asked on our survey why he wanted to go to Europe, one young migrant in Turkey even responded, "For Angela Merkel."

Finally, we asked respondents to select which European countries had agreed to accept the most and fewest migrants. The options included Germany, UK, Austria, France, and Hungary. More than three-quarters of respondents said that Germany had agreed to accept the most, the correct answer. We accepted Hungary and, in the wake of Brexit, the UK as reasonable responses for the fewest.

We suggest that violence and deprivation motivate information acquisition. Ideally we would use panel data to test whether information increases as threats evolve. Given data constraints, we probe whether individuals exposed to higher levels of violence or deprivation possess more political knowledge, all else equal. We use an OLS regression, with the average score on the five knowledge indicators as the dependent variable. Model 1, the base model, tests whether experiences of worsening violence and economic conditions are significant predictors of political knowledge. We measure how violence (*Worse Violence*) and access to an index of goods (food, water, electricity, etc.; *Worse Goods*) in respondents' surroundings changed in the previous year (or the year prior to migrating for those in Turkey and Jordan).[29]

We also expect that individuals who are geographically closer to Europe are more knowledgable, as secondary migration choices are more salient. We expect migrants in Turkey to be the most knowledgable, as most migrants attempted to cross the Mediterranean from

28. Focus group, Male 18-25, Istanbul, Turkey, August 9, 2017.

29. Appendix A Table A2 shows that the results are robust to other measures of violence.

Turkey. Individuals in Jordan, followed by Syria, and, then finally, Iraq, should be less knowledgeable as more steps would be involved to reach Europe. Syrians are likely to be more knowledgeable than Iraqis overall since they generally have been exposed to more violence. We include indicator variables for each site location, with Jordan as the base category.

It is possible that individuals acquire additional information in refugee camps. We include an indicator variable for whether individuals reported spending time in a refugee camp (*Camps*).

As control variables, we include a wealth measure based on a principal component analysis (PCA) of current assets (*Wealth*).[30] We also include the highest level of education that the respondent completed (*Education*) and an indicator for gender, as women tend to be excluded from political discussions (*Female*).

An alternative view is that political knowledge varies most with social networks and political engagement, rather than violence. Model 2 therefore includes measures for information sources, namely religious networks and news media. Although our sample is overwhelmingly (92 percent) Sunni Muslim, respondents differ in their religiosity (*Religiosity*).We also measured how often individuals follow the news via radio, television, newspapers, social media, and smugglers (*News*). About half of respondents report television as their main source of information; the remainder rely on the Internet and social media. If social networks drive political information, then having a family member in Europe (*Family*) should be associated with greater knowledge. About half of respondents had a first or second-line family member in Europe. Due to a programming issue, this question only was asked in Turkey and Jordan so is included in a separate model (model 3).

Figure 4 displays the results.[31] All independent variables are rescaled from 0 to 1, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the expected change in average political knowledge from shifting a covariate from its lowest to highest level. Consistent with our theory, individuals

30. The assets included homes, businesses, household appliances and electronics, and vehicles. Appendix A shows that the results are robust to other measures of socio-economic status.

31. Appendix A Table A1 displays the full table.



Figure 4: Correlates of Political Knowledge

who face worse violence and economic conditions invest in political information. Going from no change in violence to substantially worsening violence is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in political knowledge. Individuals in Turkey are the most knowledgable, consistent with the idea that individuals also learn more about policy when they are closer to making choices based on it. Individuals in Syria also are very knowledgable. This result could reflect the extreme levels of violence in Syria or differences in the sample. Because we were confined to survey in safe areas, our Syrian sample comes from rebel-held areas, where political engagement has been high.

Turning to the other variables, spending time in camps has no relationship with political knowledge. Going from primary education to a university degree is associated with an 11 percentage point increase in knowledge. But there is no relationship between wealth and knowledge. Religious networks and following the news are associated with greater knowledge.

Surprisingly, given the importance of social networks to migration, having a family member in Europe has no association with political knowledge. It is possible that family networks

play a limited role in spreading political knowledge, but still matter for more specialized or contextual information. Alternatively, the limited effects of direct-line family may indicate how social media has allowed individuals to keep in touch with a broader range of friends. As one community leader put it, "Today Syrians are so active on social media, you can find information about immigration to any country in WhatsApp and Facebook groups."[32]

Reverse causation is a concern. Individuals who know more may overstate their exposure to violence and deprivation to strengthen their asylum claims. If so, the incentives to overstate exposure to violence and deprivation should be greatest for respondents who believed that the survey was administered by the government or a humanitarian agency.[33] But believing that American researchers conducted the survey has no relationship with stated exposure to violence, though it is associated with reporting more stable access to basic goods and services prior to leaving.[34] It therefore is plausible that respondents shaped their reporting of goods access in the hopes of gaining charity when they thought that a government or aid agency ran the survey. While we cannot rule out that more knowledgeable individuals simply reported more violence to bolster their asylum claims, the evidence is less consistent with this interpretation.

Survey: Experiment on Political Opportunities (H2)

We now turn to our embedded experiment. We cannot manipulate the policy environment in Europe and felt that it would be unethical to provide treatments with a strong chance of changing real migration behavior. We designed an emphasis framing (or priming) experiment to highlight the salience of different aspects of the migration environment, using information similar to what migrants receive in their everyday life. Each treatment was accompanied by

32. Interview with Community Leader Nr. 3, Istanbul, Turkey, July 20, 2017.

33. While we explicitly stated at the beginning of the survey that it was run by American universities, only 52 percent of respondents correctly identified the source at the end of the survey.

34. See Appendix A Table A3.

Short Name	Treatment Text	Accompanying Picture
Control	No information given	No picture
Size	More than a million migrants arrived to the EU in 2015, making it the largest influx of migrants in Europe's history.	
Sympathetic	Size + About two-thirds of the migrants are women and children fleeing conflict.	
Opening	Size + In response, citizen groups in Europe have mobilized to help migrants, and EU member states have increased the number of refugees that they are accepting.	
Hostile	Size + In response, protests have broken out to pressure leaders across Europe to stop the migrant flow, and EU member states are preparing to tighten border controls.	

Notes: Each respondent was shown one photo and read the accompanying treatment text. *Size* and *Sympathetic* used the same image.

Table 2: Experimental Treatments

a picture. Table 2 shows the four treatments.[35]

Our first treatment tested herd migration models. We presented information about the size of the migrant flow to Europe in 2015 and a picture of large numbers of migrants (*size*). All subsequent treatments included this size information, as well as additional details. A second treatment made salient the sympathetic nature of the flow by stressing that the majority of refugees are women and children (*sympathetic*). We strengthened this treatment and emphasized that two-thirds of Syrian refugees are women or children. This fact is true, but ignores that 54% of those that made the trip to Europe in 2015 were men. Third, we tested our political opportunities argument by making salient the sympathetic aspects of European policy towards migrants (*opening*). We highlight the general environment, which is likely a weaker test of our argument than a change in policy, because we were concerned

35. We conducted a focus group with Iraqi refugees in the US prior to fielding the survey to select the images and make the treatments as interpretable as possible.

about the ethics of providing specific policy information that could change actual behavior. Our final treatment emphasizes growing hostility (*hostile*).

After providing each respondent with no information or one of the treatments, we designed multiple survey items to capture the following broad outcomes: (1) *timing of migration*, whether and when respondents expect to migrate and be in the EU; (2) *legal and policy environment*, whether it was becoming more open or restrictive; (3) *border enforcement*, whether the chances of deportation were changing; and (4) *conditions at home*, whether violence and public goods access were deteriorating in the respondent's home country. Table 3 summarizes the outcome concepts, survey measures, and predictions of each theory.

We use the experimental treatments to test the main theories about the timing of migration. A simple herd model implies that size information should increase plans to migrate soon as individuals imitate others. In contrast, if respondents are Bayesian updating, then respondents should plan to move to Europe sooner because the size treatment leads them to think that conditions in their home country are deteriorating or that conditions in Europe (either border enforcement or the policy environment) are improving. The sympathetic treatment serves as an additional test of Bayesian models. An outflow of migrants who are more likely to be welcomed and less likely to make the perilous journey, such as women and children, should lead others to want to migrate sooner, expect a sympathetic environment, and think that conditions in their home country are deteriorating.

If our political opportunity argument is correct, then the open treatment should lead respondents to expect to be in the EU sooner. They also should think that the legal and policy environment is improving and border enforcement is decreasing. Our predictions about political closures are less clear. Information about a hostile environment may deter migrants, leading them not to plan to move to the EU and to foresee deteriorations in the policy environment and border enforcement. However, it also could lead respondents to perceive a last chance to migrate. In this case, respondents would plan to be in the EU soon yet still think that the policy environment and border enforcement are worsening.

Concept	Measures	Predicted Effects
Timing of Migration	Do you think that you will be in an EU country...	Herd (+), Bayesian (+), Opportunity (+), Closure (+)
EU in 1 Month.	...in one month?	
EU in 3 Month.	...three months?	
EU in 6 Month.	...six months?	
Legal & Policy Environment	Do you think that you would eventually...	Herd (·), Bayesian (+), Opportunity (+), Closure (-)
Stay Permanently.	...be allowed to stay permanently in an EU country?	
Stay Thru Conflict.	...be allowed to stay until the conflict ends?	
Bring Family.	...be able to bring family members to join you in the EU?	
Work Permit.	...be given a work permit in an EU country?	
Asylum Next Year.	...have better chances of asylum next year?	
Border Enforcement	Do you think that you would...	Herd (·), Bayesian (+), Opportunity (+), Closure (-)
Deportation Home.	...be deported to your home country if asylum is denied?	
Turn Back.	...be turned back entering Greece?	
Return to Turkey.	...tell a friend his chances of being returned to Turkey will be better or worse next year?	
Conditions at Home	Do you think that ... is getting better, worse, or staying the same?	Herd (·), Bayesian (+), Opportunity (·), Closure (·)
Violence.	...violence in your place of usual residence...	
Goods Acces.	...provision of schools and hospitals...	
Sit. in Turkey.	...conditions for migrants in Turkey...	
Trust.	If you went back, how many friends could you trust to watch a child for the day?	

Notes: Signs indicate the hypothesized direction of the effect of the treatment; (·) is no prediction. The herd model is tested through the *size* treatment; Bayesian models are tested through the *size* and *sympathetic* treatments; our political opportunities model is tested through the *open* treatment and closure is tested through the *hostile* treatment.

Table 3: Predicted Treatment Effects by Theory

Framing or priming experiments work either by making some aspect momentarily available or by increasing the weight that respondents place on a given consideration in their decision process. Such treatments are less likely to work on more informed respondents who already have a frame in mind or strong opinions so they generate counterarguments to opposing frames. Both of these issues likely occurred in our experiment.

The experiment did not have statistically significant effects for the full sample (Appendix A Table A11). As noted, our sample was very knowledgeable, making our treatments less effective. Additionally, fewer respondents than expected actually wanted to migrate to Europe—less than 10 percent of respondents in Syria, 38 percent in Turkey, 32 percent in Jordan, and 41 percent in Iraq—and likely had information counter to our treatments. We therefore focus on the smaller portion of respondents who scored less well on our knowledge index (N=578), as anticipated in our pre-analysis plan.[36] We have roughly equal numbers in each treatment group and balance on pre-treatment covariates in both the full and low-knowledge samples (Appendix A Tables A5–A8).

Figure 5 presents the difference in means for each treatment and the *unadjusted* 95% and 90% confidence intervals from a parametric t-test. We only display results for the outcomes on which we had theoretical predictions, as noted in Table 3. To account for multiple hypothesis testing, we analyze the results using nonparametric combination (NPC).[37] NPC considers the probability of observing the predicted *pattern* of results. Below each graph in

36. Among this group, 27.5% wanted to migrate to Europe.

37. Caughey, Dafoe and Seawright 2017, Caughey 2016.

figure 5 is the p-value for the NPC test on the difference in means.[38] So, for our political opportunity theory, this means observing that the differences in means are positive for the opening treatment on all question items related to the timing of migration, the legal and policy environment, and border enforcement. This procedure takes advantage of the fact that observing multiple predicted effects is less likely to happen by chance than observing a positive difference in means on any particular question.

The pattern of results is consistent with our political opportunity argument and statistically significant under NPC testing, but the treatment effects for individual items are weak. For less knowledgeable respondents, the treatment effects are in the hypothesized direction for eight out of the eleven items but only statistically significant (unadjusted p-values) at the 10% level or lower for four items (see figure 5). The combined results support our argument; the adjusted p-value for the NPC combined test statistic is 0.004 and several robustness checks show similar results.[39]

In contrast, there is little support for the simple herd model. The size treatment did not accelerate plans to migrate. The p-value for the NPC test statistic is 0.226.[40] There is some more support for the Bayesian herd model. If respondents learn from others, then the size and sympathetic treatments should lead them to want to migrate sooner and update their beliefs about conditions at home and abroad. Figure 5 shows that the treatment effects

38. Appendix Table A10 reports the predictions associated with each theory; the observed difference in means and sums between the treatment and control groups; the adjusted p-value; and the p-value of the NPC test statistic from the non-parametric model. P-values are calculated through permutation inference and are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing using general closed testing as in Marcus, Eric and Gabriel 1976. The difference in means calculation drops all observations for which the respondent did not answer all the follow-on questions. The difference in sums is used to account for missing data on some of the questions and produces a nearly exact test of equality of the *observed* responses, under the assumption that responses are missing completely at random (MCAR); Caughey, Dafoe and Seawright 2017, 698. In testing of both treatments for the Bayesian herd theory, we can only calculate the difference in sums since no respondent saw both treatments. We examine the MCAR assumption by testing whether the treatments affect missingness and report the results in Appendix Table A9.

39. We combined the items into indices by each conceptual category (Appendix Tables A12) and by principal components analysis (Appendix Tables A13 and A14) and found similar effects. We also regressed the outcome of each question on the treatment and pre-treatment controls (Appendix Table A15).

40. Results also are insignificant for the sympathetic treatment.



Figure 5: Difference in Means on Theoretically Relevant Dependent Variables

Notes: Difference of means and *unadjusted* confidence intervals reported from a parametric t-test for low-information respondents. Only the dependent variables relevant for each theory are shown and used for the NPC test; the p-value for the NPC test on the observed pattern of results is displayed below each plot. Signs by variables indicate the predicted direction of effects. Positive values mean: desire to move sooner, fewer legal and policy restrictions, less border enforcement, and worsening conditions at home.

largely are in the hypothesized directions but rarely reach statistical significance. Testing for the pattern of responses, the p-values associated with the combined NPC test statistic are barely significant at the 10% level (0.096) for the size treatment and not significant for the sympathetic treatment (0.152). We also ran an NPC test on the joint probability that both the size and sympathetic treatments have positive effects; the p-value is 0.078. Our data thus lend less support to Bayesian herd models than a political opening argument. Nonetheless, given the small sample size and the fact that the pattern of results goes in the right direction, Bayesian herd models merit further research.

Finally, we find little evidence for the hostile treatment. Most effects are incorrectly

signed and close to zero. The NPC p-value for the pattern of results is insignificant (0.767). It could be the case that a hostile environment truly has no effect or already was anticipated by our respondents. However, in light of the opening treatment results and real-world cases, it is plausible that hostility has divergent effects. There are numerous examples of hostile policies causing last-minute surges. For example, 8,000 Venezuelans entered Peru on a single day before visa restrictions took effect in 2019. Yet, anti-immigrant sentiment also is associated with less immigration (Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets 2014). Our sample size is too small to meaningfully test these possibly competing effects; it is an important area for future research.

Qualitative Support for the Experimental Results (H3)

In terms of their *primary* migration decisions, most Syrians and Iraqis said they moved following substantial violence and in haste.[41] But explanations for secondary decisions to reach Europe centered on the policy environment: the most common explanation was that "EU countries were willing to accept more migrants" (54 percent). Far fewer respondents supported herd or social network interpretations that "it became easier to live in Europe once friends and family had left" (13 percent).

We also conducted focus groups and interviews in Istanbul. The conversations were conducted by trained moderators in Arabic, recorded, and transcribed. Focus groups were split by age and gender, with five to seven participants in each.[42] The participants ranged in age from 19 to 67. About a third had only completed primary school, 25% had only completed middle school, another 10% had completed high school, and the last third had at least some college. Men were more educated and more likely to be working (70% of men versus 26% of women). We also conducted in-depth interviews with local Syrian community leaders.

Changes in European policy again were the most common explanation for why migrants

41. About half of our survey sample said they had only days to gather their belongings and 30 percent had only hours.

42. Additional details on participants' recruitment are included in Appendix C, and the anonymous focus group and interview transcripts will be made public with publication.

moved to Europe in 2015. One respondent captured a common idea that the wave started because of the "statements of Angela Merkel, she welcomed the refugees. Also, governments made it easy at that time to go to Europe, they closed their eyes on the refugees' movement."[43] Another community leader explained: "It was all the facilities that Europe gave at that time, especially in Germany where they were welcoming refugees and people needed a safe place to go to, so they went." This was echoed by another community leader, "Europe doesn't usually facilitate immigration procedures. However, the procedures are easy for Syrians now, which made people from Afghanistan for example claim to be Syrians."[44] Others spoke of the importance of a welcoming atmosphere in which receiving countries recognized the difficulty of the Syrian situation. As one community leader explained, "Syrian people wouldn't go [to Europe] if they did not feel that they are accepted. They were saying that they are accepting us in the media, especially Arabic ones, and [journalists] interviewed people saying 'we found home and everything is ready,' and that was encouraging other people to go there."[45] Thus, migrants themselves attributed the timing of the migration to policy changes and a welcoming atmosphere in Europe.

Scaling Up: Policy Changes and Information Searches (H4)

As a final test, we turn to internet search data. Our key empirical prediction is that information-seeking should increase around political opportunities. These effects should be strongest in countries affected by violence and poverty, but we also expect to see "opportunistic joiners," or individuals following these political cues in countries less affected by violence.

The challenge in work on political opportunities is to specify them. We focus on two events that were likely salient to potential migrants. First, the German government an-

43. Interview with Community Leader Nr. 5, Istanbul, Turkey, July 25, 2017.

44. Interview with Community Leader Nr. 3, Istanbul, Turkey, July 20, 2017.

45. Interview with Community Leader Nr. 8, August 21, 2017.

nounced that it would take in 10,000 Syrian refugees in June 2014.[46] Second, and more importantly, Merkel announced that migrants could apply for asylum in Germany even if they entered through another EU member state in August 2015. More broadly, her mantra "we can do this" (*Wir schaffen das*) suggested a welcoming attitude.

To test whether information acquisition increased around these political openings, we analyze Google search data.[47] In our survey, 43 percent of respondents use the internet as their most frequent news source. When our focus group participants were asked how they learned about legal procedures, one group laughed and said, "Google."[48] Google Tends, a publicly available tool, provides information on relative interest in a topic in a given country. A value of 100 represents peak popularity, whereas a value of 50 shows that the term is half as popular.

We examine whether there was an increase in searches for "asylum" and "Germany" conducted in Arabic in Syria and Turkey around these announcements and compare them to searches for "Britain," which we expect generated less interest in the same time period (Figure 6).[49] In Syria and Turkey, we see an increase in interest in asylum around the time of key speeches. The June 2014 announcement only increased interest in Germany. The August 2015 speech prompted some increased interest in other EU countries as well, which is not surprising given that Germany sought a broader EU deal on refugees.[50] We also see

46. "Innenminister wollen mehr Syrien-Flüchtlinge aufnehmen," *Spiegel*, 12 June 2014.

47. One study found a close relationship between internet search results and actual monthly arrivals and asylum applications in Europe; see "The Digital Footprint of Europe's Refugees," Pew Research Center, June 8, 2017. Although search results may have predictive power, we only interpret them as an indicator of interest in a topic.

48. Focus group, Male 18-25, Istanbul, Turkey, August 9, 2017.

49. Since most migrants from Syria and Iraq speak Arabic as their native language, we can identify their interest in migration by examining trends in searches conducted from IP addresses in Turkey using Arabic, as opposed to Turkish. This identification assumption is more complicated in Arabic-speaking countries like Jordan.

50. A possible confounder is that interest in Germany increases around World Cup soccer games (also generating increased searches for popular teams like Brazil and Spain). However, games were not scheduled around Merkel's August 2015 speech so fan speeches cannot explain the timing.



Figure 6: Arabic Internet Searches for Asylum, Germany, and Britain in Syria (left) and Turkey (right). Weekly data from August 2012-August 2017.

a "Brexit" spike in the search data for Britain (with a much smaller spike in interest in Germany that same week).

Second, we compare searches related to "asylum" across different countries. If individuals respond to common policy shocks in destination countries, then the volume of searches by week in diverse places should be positively correlated. In contrast, if citizens respond to local patterns of violence, then there should be little relationship in weekly search trends across countries. We plot the same data on weekly searches for "asylum" in Syria from Figure 6 against "asylum" in Iraq (searched using the Arabic word) and Afghanistan (searched using "migration" in Pashto).[51] The correlation in the volume of weekly searches for asylum in Syria and Iraq is very strong (ρ=0.82) and moderately strong between Syria and Afghanistan (ρ=0.37), despite distinct conflict dynamics. Additionally, we find an increase in searches in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan around Merkel's August 2015 speech signaling a general openness to refugees (Appendix Figure A1). We also examined searches for "asylum" in Kosovo and Iran because citizens from these countries joined the 2015 migrant wave, but faced lower levels of violence and different push factors. The volume of weekly searches in Syria is positively correlated with that in Kosovo and Iran, but the correlation is weak and

51. We use the term "migration" in Afghanistan because it is most similar to the concept of asylum in Pashto and the more precise term "asylum" does not have sufficient search volume for Google to report.

there are no distinct spikes around Merkel's speech. In part, the much lower search volume in Kosovo and Iran makes it hard to draw conclusions (Appendix A Figure A2).

Conclusion

Syrian citizens have experienced escalating violence and dismal economic conditions. This situation fits classic accounts of forced migration in which threats and deprivation spur outflows. However, the timing of mass movement to Europe is harder to explain. Why did Syrians, as well as Iraqis, Afghanis, Pakistanis, and Nigerians, all look to Europe in 2015? More generally, how do we explain the timing of migrant waves?

Existing accounts stress the role of violence in shaping when migrants leave. We investigated an alternative mechanism through which violence affects migration by making individuals attentive to the political environment. While deteriorating conditions cause some individuals to make initial moves, external political signals shape the timing of migration choices and can escalate into waves.

Testing theories of when migrants leave and why they leave in waves is extremely difficult. Like any emergent phenomenon, it is hard to understand how behaviors spread, especially after they occur. We used an original survey of Syrians and Iraqis, including those in transit, internally displaced, and remaining in their homes, to probe migration decisions. Our high-quality convenience sample represents an important effort to learn about a precarious and understudied population. We find a range of evidence consistent with our theory. Potential migrants, especially those affected by violence, are knowledgeable about policy; making salient a welcoming policy environment seems to make less knowledgeable respondents plan to migrate sooner; those involved see political opportunities as the reason migrants left all at once; and internet searches show sharp interest in migration around policy shifts.

A limitation of our study is the weakness of the experimental results. In designing survey experiments, researchers on migration are caught in a bind. They face a decision between strong treatments, which often involve providing new information and exaggerated frames to generate results, and ethical considerations, which err toward using existing information and

subtle frames. Although we expected migrants to be knowledgeable, the extent to which they were surprised us. Thus, although the pattern of experimental results provide some support to our theory of policy responsiveness, the treatment effects on individual items were weak and limited to less knowledgeable respondents. Our theory gained support from the combination of evidence from our descriptive survey questions, focus groups, and internet searches, rather than the experiment alone. Future research is needed to replicate our results with larger samples is necessary, as well as more creative, ethical experimental treatments.

We studied a single (or linked) migration event, raising questions about the generalizability of our claims. Syrians and Iraqis are relatively educated migrant groups with substantial internet connectivity. Further, we could not conduct surveys in refugee camps, which attract migrants without the means to live independently. Poorer, less connected migrants might be less aware of their political environment and less receptive to conditions in receiving countries; although, our internet search data suggest a broader process of information seeking at work. We suggest applying our methodology for understanding the micro-dynamics of the timing of migration decisions to a broader set of cases.

Our results leave open a number of questions. Importantly, respondents only changed their behavior when given information about political opportunities but not when given information about closures. It is possible that this reflects differences in the novelty of information—concerns that the EU members were starting to close their borders were already ubiquitous when our survey was fielded. Alternatively, the effects of policy closures may be ambiguous as some migrants try to rush in, while others take them as signals to stay put. It is still an open question: can hostility to migrants terminate a wave or does it backfire?

Second, what types of political openings trigger movements? Our experimental treatments focused on the general reception of migrants rather than specific asylum policies or enforcement actions. In the observational data, migrants seem to have responded to Merkel's speech, but it's not clear why other policy changes (arguably with larger impacts on migrant treatment) didn't spark movements. Whether the general political environment or specific

policy changes, and of what nature, prompt migration responses is an important direction for future research.

Finally, these results raise questions about how politicians incorporate potential movements into their decision-making. Do politicians act strategically to anticipate the migration response to their actions? We suggest clear reasons why politicians, and even those who are sympathetic to migrants, may prefer to hide their migration policies or send ambiguous signals. For example, the Greek government and international organizations strategically withheld information from refugees in camps.[52] On a policy note, however, we also find clear reasons that politicians may want to publicize their efforts to temporarily resettle migrants. Contrary to popular lore, we do not find that all Syrians and Iraqis want to migrate to Europe. The vast majority want to return to their home countries. Those who do want to migrate prefer to wait for resettlement rather than move illegally. The implication is that faster, larger, and temporary resettlement programs might do much to forestall sudden movements and the smuggling industry. And news of their introduction will travel.

52. Carlson, Jakli and Linos 2018.

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Online Appendices for *Explaining Migration Timing*

Notes about the Appendices

The appendices that follow are intended for online publication. They contain:

- Appendix A: Additional statistical results mentioned in the paper
- Appendix B: Additional details on the survey sampling and demographics
- Appendix C: Additional details on the focus groups and interviews and demographics
- Appendix D: Exact question wording from the survey
- Appendix F: Reconciliation with Pre-Analysis Plan

Appendix A: Additional Statistical Results

This appendix contains additional statistical tests mentioned in the paper.

- Table A1 presents the regression results of political knowledge on covariates with two measures of household wealth.
- Table A2 shows the regression results using different measures of violence.
- Table A3 shows the regression results for whether beliefs about the enumerators shape reported violence and deprivation.
- Table A4 shows the logit models for migration desires to Europe.
- Table A5 presents the balance tests of each treatment against the control treatment for the low-knowledge respondents. It shows that we have balance on most the covariates between each treatment and the control.
- Table A6 presents the balance tests of each treatment against the opening treatment for the low-knowledge respondents. It shows that we have balance on most the covariates between each treatment and opening treatment.
- Table A7 presents the results of a logit regression and an OLS regression of each experimental treatment various socioeconomic and demographic pre-treatment variables. It shows that few pre-treatment variables predict which treatment a respondent saw.
- Table A8 presents the results of a logit regression and an OLS regression of each experimental treatment various socioeconomic and demographic pre-treatment variables for the low knowledge sample. It shows that few pre-treatment variables predict which treatment a low knowledge respondent saw.
- Table A9 tests the missing completely at random assumption on the low knowledge sample.
- Table A10 shows the results of the nonparametric combination tests for difference in sums and means on the low knowledge sample.
- Table A11 shows the results of the nonparametric combination tests for difference in sums and means on the full sample.
- Table A12 shows the results of nonparametric combination tests on the difference of sums and means by indices created by averaging the responses to each question in each theoretical subgroup.
- Table A13 presents the factor loadings for each of the outcome variables from the experiment.
- Table A14 shows the results of nonparametric combination tests on difference of sums and means by indices created by using principal components analysis.

- Table A15 presents the results from OLS regressions of each experimental questions with both the treatments and a host of socioeconomic and demographic controls for the *low information subsample*. It shows that the results largely hold when controlling for these covariates.

- Figure A1 shows the Google search trends for "asylum" in Syria and Iraq and "migration" in Afghanistan.

- Figure A2 shows the Google search results for "asylum" in Albanian for Kosovo and Persian for Iran.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Worse Violence	0.078*	0.072*	0.071*	0.078*	0.072*	0.070*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Worse Goods	0.059*	0.058*	0.009	0.050*	0.049*	0.011
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Wealth	-0.029	-0.037*	-0.065*			
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)			
Education	0.108*	0.104*	0.083*	0.104*	0.100*	0.079*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.014*	-0.009	-0.006	-0.012*	-0.007	-0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religiosity		0.096*	0.116*		0.091*	0.113*
		(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.04)
News		0.060*			0.060*	
		(0.02)			(0.02)	
Family			-0.008			-0.007
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Household Savings				-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.128	0.147	0.084	0.120	0.139	0.068
N	1,106	1,102	690	1,106	1,102	690

Table A1: OLS Regression of Knowledge Index on Violence and other Covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Worse Month	0.057*	0.052*	0.039*						
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)						
Worse Week				0.051*	0.048*	0.037*			
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			
Violence Index							0.025	0.046	0.032
							(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Worse Goods	0.074*	0.072*	0.027	0.082*	0.077*	0.031	0.100*	0.094*	0.036*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Wealth	-0.042*	-0.049*	-0.075*	-0.043*	-0.050*	-0.077*	-0.036	-0.043*	-0.070*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	0.106*	0.102*	0.076*	0.112*	0.106*	0.079*	0.106*	0.101*	0.080*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.016*	-0.011	-0.007	-0.017*	-0.012	-0.008	-0.018*	-0.012	-0.007
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Religiosity		0.097*	0.121*		0.087*	0.111*		0.095*	0.118*
		(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.04)
News		0.067*			0.076*			0.083*	
		(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)	
Family			0.000			-0.000			-0.006
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
R^2	0.112	0.134	0.061	0.108	0.132	0.060	0.095	0.123	0.050
N	1,106	1,102	690	1,106	1,102	690	1,106	1,102	690

Table A2: OLS Regression of Knowledge Index with Alternative Violence Measures

	Worse Violence (Week)	Worse Violence (Year)	Worse Goods
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Enumerator	-0.004	-0.029	-0.158*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Wealth	0.002	0.006	0.009*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Education	-0.139*	-0.038	0.068*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Female	-0.093*	-0.098*	-0.067*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
N	1,127	1,127	1,271
R^2	0.037	0.035	0.078

Notes: *Enumerator* codes whether the respondent believes a university sent the survey enumerators ('1' or whether a government or aid agency sent the survey ('0').

Table A3: Regression of Reported Violence and Deprivation on Beliefs about Who Sent Survey Enumerators

	(1)	(2)
Able to Stay		1.204*
		(0.18)
Worse Violence	0.453*	0.757*
	(0.16)	(0.22)
Worse Goods	-0.708*	-0.662*
	(0.20)	(0.26)
Wealth	-0.229	-1.037*
	(0.25)	(0.35)
Education	-0.393	-1.279*
	(0.23)	(0.35)
Female	-0.129	-0.031
	(0.08)	(0.11)
Syrian	-0.756	-0.847
	(0.47)	(0.67)
Religiosity	-0.797*	0.393
	(0.37)	(0.53)
N	1,129	511
Pseudo-R^2	0.066	0.123

Table A4: Logit Regression of Migration Desires on Ability to Stay and other Covariates

Variable		Treatments				
		Information	Sympathetic	Open	Hostile	Control
% Women		0.4122	0.4188	0.3796	0.3964	0.3964
		(p=0.8)	(p=0.73)	(p=0.80)	(p=1.00)	
Country of Interview	Turkey	0.2366	0.2222	0.1852	0.2072	0.1802
	Jordan	0.1985	0.2479	0.2037	0.2703	0.2432
	Syria	0.3588	0.359	0.4074	0.3694	0.3243
	Iraq	0.1985	0.1709	0.1944	0.1441	0.2523
		(p=0.51)	(p=0.47)	(p=0.51)	(p=0.29)	
Country of Origin	Syrian	0.8077	0.8205	0.7963	0.8545	0.7568
	Iraqi	0.1923	0.1795	0.1944	0.1455	0.2432
		(p=0.34)	(p=0.24)	(p=0.42)	(p=0.07)	
% Some College & Above		0.4275	0.5043	0.5327	0.3964	0.4954
		(p=0.29)	(p=0.89)	(p=0.58)	(p=0.14)	
Age		32.55	31.79	33.09	30.88	33.89
		(p=0.49)	(p=0.30)	(p=0.70)	(p=0.14)	
Religiosity		0.61	0.5977	0.59	0.6	0.57
		(p=0.16)	(p=0.38)	(p=0.74)	(p=0.49)	
Wealth at Home		5.92	5.811	6.14	6.67	6.29
		(p=0.52)	(p=0.38)	(p=0.79)	(p=0.53)	
Wealth Now		5.13	5.27	5.2	4.83	5.59
		(p=0.16)	(p=0.33)	(p=0.25)	(p=0.02)	
Violence Index		0.27	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.3
		(p=0.39)	(p=0.47)	(p=0.08)	(p=0.14)	
Violence Last Week Worse or Much Worse		0.5	0.45	0.48	0.45	0.52
		(p=0.75)	(p=0.38)	(p=0.59)	(p=0.38)	
Violence Last Month Worse or Much Worse		0.63	0.6	0.59	0.55	0.62
		(p=0.82)	(p=0.84)	(p=0.70)	(p=0.36)	
Violence Last Year Worse or Much Worse		0.68	0.62	0.67	0.59	0.62
		(p=0.36)	(p=0.93)	(p=0.48)	(p=0.73)	

Notes: % for categorical variables and means for continuous variables are reported. P-values of the cross-tab for categorical variables and for a t-test for continuous values against the control group are reported in parentheses below.

Table A5: Balance Tests for Experiment (Low Knowledge Sample)

Variable		Treatments			
		Information	Sympathetic	Hostile	Open
% Women		0.4122	0.4188	0.3964	0.3796
		(p=0.61)	(p=0.55)	(p=0.80)	
Country of Interview	Turkey	0.2366	0.2222	0.2072	0.1852
	Jordan	0.1985	0.2479	0.2703	0.2037
	Syria	0.3588	0.359	0.3694	0.4074
	Iraq	0.1985	0.1709	0.1441	0.1944
		(p=0.89)	(p=0.65)	(p=0.70)	
Country of Origin	Syrian	0.8077	0.8205	0.8545	0.7963
	Iraqi	0.1923	0.1795	0.1455	0.1944
		(p=0.55)	(p=0.55)	(p=0.37)	
% Some College & Above		0.4275	0.5043	0.3964	0.5327
		(p=0.11)	(p=0.67)	(p=0.04)	
Age		32.55	31.79	30.88	33.09
		(p=0.75)	(p=0.45)	(p=0.21)	
Religiosity		0.61	0.5977	0.6	0.59
		(p=0.32)	(p=0.70)	(p=0.74)	
Wealth at Home		5.92	5.811	6.67	6.14
		(p=0.69)	(p=0.53)	(p=0.37)	
Wealth Now		5.13	5.27	4.83	5.2
		(p=0.81)	(p=0.83)	(p=0.25)	
Violence Index		0.27	0.28	0.25	0.25
		(p=0.25)	(p=0.25)	(p=0.75)	
Violence Last Week Worse or Much Worse		0.5	0.45	0.45	0.48
		(p=0.80)	(p=0.75)	(p=0.75)	
Violence Last Month Worse or Much Worse		0.63	0.6	0.55	0.59
		(p=0.53)	(p=0.85)	(p=0.59)	
Violence Last Year Worse or Much Worse		0.68	0.62	0.59	0.67
		(p=0.86)	(p=0.52)	(p=0.27)	

Notes: % for categorical variables and means for continuous variables are reported. P-values of the cross-tab for categorical variables and for a t-test for continuous values against the control group are reported in parentheses below.

Table A6: Balance Tests for Experiment (Low Knowledge Sample)

	Control				Information				Sympathetic				Open				Hostile			
	Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS	
Women	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.01	-0.13	-0.11	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.04	-0.00	-0.01	0.16	0.17	0.03	0.03
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Interviewed in Jordan	-0.10	-0.09	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.43^{+}	0.43^{+}	0.07^{+}	0.07^{+}	-0.18	-0.14	-0.03	-0.02	-0.15	-0.16	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Iraqi	0.23	0.19	0.04	0.03	-0.31	-0.25	-0.04	-0.03	0.22	0.25	0.03	0.04	0.11	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.26	-0.26	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.80)	(0.81)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.69)	(0.71)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.69)	(0.69)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Some College +	-0.21	-0.22	-0.03	-0.03	0.12	0.11	0.02	0.02	0.35^{+}	0.36^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.06^{+}	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.02	-0.37^{+}	-0.38^{+}	-0.06^{+}	-0.06^{+}
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.02*	0.02*	0.00^{+}	0.00^{+}	-0.02*	-0.02^{+}	-0.00*	-0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Religiosity	-0.74	-0.76	-0.11	-0.11	0.75	0.80^{+}	0.12	0.13	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.62	0.55	0.10	0.09	-0.63	-0.62	-0.11	-0.10
	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Wealth at home	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.06	-0.00	-0.01	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.08*	0.07	0.01*	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Violence Index	0.87	0.95^{+}	0.12	0.14	-0.51	-0.59	-0.08	-0.09	0.50	0.39	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.15	0.00	0.02	-0.80	-0.80	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Violence (Week Before)	-0.21	-0.22	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00	-0.30	-0.30	-0.05	-0.05	0.57*	0.53^{+}	0.09*	0.08*	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Violence (Month Before)	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.30	0.30	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.07	-0.01	-0.01	-0.19	-0.19	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Violence (Year Before)	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.42	0.41	0.06	0.06	0.25	0.25	0.04	0.04	0.18	0.19	0.03	0.03	-0.56^{+}	-0.57^{+}	-0.11^{+}	-0.11^{+}
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Wealth Now		-0.04		-0.01		0.06		0.01		0.02		0.00		-0.06		-0.01		0.01		0.00
		(0.06)		(0.01)		(0.07)		(0.01)		(0.07)		(0.01)		(0.06)		(0.01)		(0.06)		(0.01)
Constant	-1.77**	-1.73**	0.14	0.15	-1.54**	-1.65**	0.18*	0.17*	-1.59**	-1.63**	0.17*	0.17*	-1.88**	-1.74**	0.13	0.15^{+}	-0.49	-0.52	0.37***	0.37***
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Observations	670	668	670	668	670	668	670	668	670	668	670	668	670	668	670	668	670	668	670	668
R^2			0.02	0.02			0.02	0.02			0.01	0.01			0.01	0.01			0.03	0.03

Notes: Table presents coefficients from logit and OLS regression that attempt to predict the treatment a respondent received from pre-treatment covariates. Few of the coefficients are statistically significant suggesting that the treatments were balanced among these co-variates. p is the p-value of the relevant test statistic for the regression. As can be few of the regressions have an F-statistic or Chi-squared statistic that is statistically different from zero. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A7: Effect of Covariates on Treatment Received (All Respondents)

	Control				Information				Sympathetic				Open				Hostile			
	Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS		Logit		OLS	
Women	-0.48	-0.48	-0.06	-0.06	-0.47	-0.45	-0.07	-0.07	-0.19	-0.17	-0.04	-0.03	0.67^{+}	0.65^{+}	0.10^{+}	0.10	0.43	0.39	0.06	0.06
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Interviewed in Jordan	0.28	0.27	0.03	0.03	-0.54	-0.57	-0.08	-0.09	0.40	0.35	0.07	0.06	-0.08	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.11	0.01	0.02
	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Interviewed in Syria	0.00	0.00	-0.17	-0.17	0.00	0.00	-0.24*	-0.23^{+}	0.00	0.00	-0.15	-0.14	0.00	0.00	0.82***	0.81***	0.00	0.00	-0.25*	-0.28*
	(.)	(.)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(.)	(.)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(.)	(.)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(.)	(.)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(.)	(.)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Iraqi	0.33	0.34	0.04	0.04	-0.07	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.18*	-0.18*	0.66	0.62	0.14	0.13
	(1.30)	(1.30)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(1.20)	(1.28)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(1.17)	(1.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(.)	(.)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.95)	(1.06)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Some College +	-0.53	-0.53	-0.07	-0.07	-0.21	-0.20	-0.04	-0.03	0.52	0.55	0.09	0.10	0.65^{+}	0.64^{+}	0.09	0.09	-0.49	-0.56	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Religiosity	-0.34	-0.31	-0.06	-0.05	0.97	1.10	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.39	0.03	0.06	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.00	-0.90	-1.27	-0.15	-0.20
	(1.02)	(1.03)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.85)	(0.84)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(1.05)	(1.07)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.98)	(1.00)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(1.02)	(1.08)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Wealth at home	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.09	-0.01	-0.02	-0.09	-0.16^{+}	-0.01	-0.03^{+}	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.12	0.23*	0.02	0.04*
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Violence Index	2.06*	2.04*	0.32*	0.32*	-0.54	-0.69	-0.07	-0.09	0.21	0.06	0.04	0.01	-1.76	-1.67	-0.21^{+}	-0.20^{+}	-0.56	-0.27	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.98)	(1.00)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.93)	(0.95)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(1.09)	(1.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(1.00)	(1.05)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Violence (Week Before)	-0.44	-0.44	-0.06	-0.05	-0.10	-0.09	-0.02	-0.02	-0.28	-0.28	-0.05	-0.05	0.73	0.72	0.10	0.10	0.23	0.20	0.03	0.02
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Violence (Month Before)	-0.25	-0.25	-0.03	-0.03	1.71*	1.65*	0.25**	0.25**	-0.08	-0.12	-0.02	-0.02	-0.95^{+}	-0.93^{+}	-0.14	-0.13	-0.46	-0.39	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.63)	(0.62)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.66)	(0.69)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Violence (Year Before)	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.28	-0.27	-0.05	-0.05	0.22	0.19	0.04	0.03	0.36	0.38	0.05	0.06	-0.21	-0.18	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.54)	(0.53)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Wealth Now		0.02		0.00		0.10		0.02		0.14		0.02		-0.06		-0.01		-0.23^{+}		-0.03^{+}
		(0.13)		(0.02)		(0.14)		(0.02)		(0.11)		(0.02)		(0.11)		(0.01)		(0.12)		(0.02)
Constant	-1.77^{+}	-1.81^{+}	0.16	0.15	-1.77*	-1.94*	0.18	0.15	-1.80*	-2.04*	0.13	0.09	-1.79^{+}	-1.70	0.15	0.17	-0.29	0.12	0.38**	0.44**
	(0.94)	(0.98)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.79)	(0.84)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.82)	(0.86)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(1.06)	(1.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.85)	(0.87)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Observations	220	220	221	221	220	220	221	221	220	220	221	221	215	215	221	221	220	220	221	221
R^2			0.04	0.04			0.06	0.06			0.03	0.04			0.08	0.08			0.05	0.07

Notes: Table presents coefficients from logit and OLS regression that attempt to predict the treatment a respondent received from pre-treatment covariates for the low knowledge sample. Few of the coefficients are statistically significant suggesting that the treatments were balanced among these co-variates. p is the p-value of the relevant test statistic for the regression. As can be few of the regressions have an F-statistic or Chi-squared statistic that is statistically different from zero. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A8: Effect of Covariates on Treatment Received (Low Knowledge Sample)

Category	Questions	Information	Sympathetic	Opening	Hostile
Conditions	Violence	0.884	0.904		
at home	Access to goods	0.883	0.675		
	Sit. in Turkey	0.636	0.315		
	Trust	0.933	0.7		
Border	Deportation	0.988	0.621	0.897	0.830
enforcement	Turn back	0.959	0.622	0.908	0.618
	Returned to Turkey	0.890	0.663	0.931	0.198
Timing	EU in 1 month	0.885	0.667	0.713	0.427
	EU in 3 months	0.933	0.7	0.766	0.532
	EU in 6 months	0.883	0.671	0.934	0.077
Legal/ policy	Stay permanently	0.965	0.634	0.897	0.905
environment	Stay until conflict ends	0.982	0.65	0.722	0.913
	Bring family	0.982	0.65	0.722	0.401
	Work permit	0.982	0.65	0.722	0.721
	Receive asylum next year	0.933	0.7	0.766	0.589
	NPC	0.901	0.468	0.714	0.721

Notes: *P-values* are calculated through permutation tests. *NPC* is the p-value of the nonparametric combination test statistic.

Table A9: P-values from tests of MCAR Assumption (Low Knowledge Sample)

		Theory															
		Simple herd					Bayesian herd					Opening			Hostile		
			(information)		(sympathetic)			(information)		(sympathetic)							
Category	Questions	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value
							Difference in Sums										
Timing	EU in 1 month	+	0.716	0.437	5.160	0.327	+	0.716	0.959	5.160	0.840	+	10.494	0.302	+	0.236	0.946
	EU in 3 months	+	3.621	0.339	-1.922	0.610	+	3.621	0.952	-1.922	0.990	+	11.645	0.310	+	-0.842	0.967
	EU in 6 months	+	5.553	0.260	7.897	0.322	+	5.553	0.922	7.897	0.816	+	12.488	0.334	+	10.362	0.880
Legal/ policy	Stay permanently	NP					+	6.644	0.910	6.871	0.856	+	8.451	0.470	-	-9.367	0.978
environment	Stay until conflict ends	NP					+	6.268	0.922	2.843	0.937	+	7.645	0.497	-	-10.561	0.978
	Bring family	NP					+	-1.279	0.959	-3.370	0.990	+	13.919	0.337	-	1.430	0.927
	Work permit	NP					+	8.339	0.817	20.955	0.029	+	-6.460	0.799	-	-7.448	0.978
	Receive asylum next year	NP					+	-6.327	0.959	2.764	0.937	+	4.137	0.606	-	-1.367	0.959
Border	Deportation	NP					+	5.315	0.942	-4.633	0.990	+	11.535	0.386	-	-4.480	0.960
enforcement	Turn back	NP					+	2.181	0.959	5.634	0.871	+	-0.532	0.733	-	-2.380	0.966
	Returned to Turkey	NP					+	1.865	0.959	-5.634	0.990	+	0.532	0.707	-	5.394	0.913
Conditions	Violence	NP					+	4.529	0.952	4.248	0.921	NP			NP		
at home	Access to goods	NP					+	-1.282	0.959	-3.554	0.990	NP			NP		
	Sit. in Turkey	NP					+	0.753	0.959	-2.195	0.990	NP			NP		
	Trust	NP					+	9.623	0.756	6.792	0.871	NP			NP		
	NPC			0.253		0.213			0.133		0.152			0.005			0.721
							Difference in Means										
Timing	EU in 1 month	+	0.006	0.512	0.045	0.311	+	0.016	0.962	0.046	0.854	+	0.087	0.333	+	0.002	0.972
	EU in 3 months	+	0.030	0.324	-0.017	0.689	+	0.032	0.933	-0.026	0.994	+	0.100	0.336	+	-0.006	0.979
	EU in 6 months	+	0.046	0.273	0.069	0.322	+	0.049	0.895	0.061	0.870	+	0.112	0.363	+	0.098	0.896
Legal/ policy	Stay permanently	NP					+	0.056	0.889	0.052	0.889	+	0.083	0.451	-	-0.089	0.985
environment	Stay until conflict ends	NP					+	0.061	0.889	0.025	0.957	+	0.079	0.488	-	-0.092	0.985
	Bring family	NP					+	-0.012	0.970	-0.039	0.994	+	0.142	0.256	-	0.017	0.946
	Work permit	NP					+	0.075	0.806	0.194	0.034	+	-0.065	0.866	-	-0.072	0.985
	Receive asylum next year	NP					+	-0.059	0.970	0.016	0.965	+	0.047	0.586	-	-0.016	0.976
Border	Deportation	NP					+	0.053	0.895	-0.041	0.994	+	0.123	0.339	-	-0.045	0.974
enforcement	Turn back	NP					+	0.018	0.952	0.050	0.907	+	0.009	0.725	-	-0.025	0.978
	Returned to Turkey	NP					+	0.004	0.970	-0.050	0.994	+	0.000	0.788	-	0.043	0.940
Conditions	Violence	NP					+	0.042	0.911	0.033	0.957	NP			NP		
at home	Access to goods	NP					+	0.001	0.970	-0.023	0.994	NP			NP		
	Sit. in Turkey	NP					+	0.008	0.970	-0.014	0.988	NP			NP		
	Trust	NP					+	0.069	0.840	0.051	0.907	NP			NP		
	NPC			0.226		0.210			0.096		0.152			0.004			0.767

Notes: H_a is the hypothesized direction of the effect of the treatment. *Sums* are the difference in the sum between the treatment and control group. The difference in sums is calculated on all respondents who answered that questions. *Means* are the difference in means only for those who answered all of the questions in the group. *P-values* are calculated through permutation tests and have been adjusted for multiple testing using closed testing. *NPC* is the p-value of the nonparametric combination test statistic.

Table A10: Difference of Sums and Means and Nonparametric Combinations (Low Knowledge Sample)

		Theory															
			Simple herd					Bayesian herd					Opening			Hostile	
			(information)		(sympathetic)			(information)		(sympathetic)							
Category	Questions	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value
							Difference in Sums										
Timing	EU in 1 month	+	-1.743	0.853	-3.305	0.864	+	-1.743	0.997	-3.305	0.996	+	5.342	0.767	+	-6.368	0.973
	EU in 3 months	+	-2.706	0.839	-10.524	0.906	+	-2.706	0.997	-10.524	0.998	+	4.888	0.769	+	-7.892	0.973
	EU in 6 months	+	-14.066	0.908	-7.102	0.887	+	-14.066	1.000	-7.102	0.996	+	-8.911	0.880	+	-4.537	0.971
Legal/ policy	Stay permanently	NP					+	-0.765	0.997	-2.174	0.995	+	-4.433	0.868	-	-1.895	0.971
environment	Stay until conflict ends	NP					+	-3.055	0.997	-7.596	0.996	+	-3.357	0.880	-	-3.148	0.968
	Bring family	NP					+	-8.217	1.000	-11.019	0.998	+	3.444	0.792	-	7.120	0.931
	Work permit	NP					+	9.791	0.869	16.928	0.493	+	-0.585	0.859	-	-16.530	0.973
	Receive asylum next year	NP					+	-7.308	1.000	5.424	0.975	+	0.101	0.848	-	-5.074	0.973
Border	Deportation	NP					+	1.754	0.996	-13.471	0.998	+	3.955	0.774	-	3.213	0.936
enforcement	Turn back	NP					+	-7.115	1.000	3.464	0.975	+	-8.075	0.880	-	2.709	0.949
	Returned to Turkey	NP					+	0.046	0.997	7.777	0.932	+	19.445	0.596	-	1.030	0.959
Conditions	Violence	NP					+	2.677	0.994	-0.720	0.987	NP			NP		
at home	Access to goods	NP					+	2.126	0.994	-13.431	0.998	NP			NP		
	Sit. in Turkey	NP					+	7.027	0.957	-3.732	0.995	NP			NP		
	Trust	NP					+	21.264	0.360	11.210	0.877	NP			NP		
	NPC			0.799		0.864			0.538		0.733			0.379			0.844
							Difference in Means										
Timing	EU in 1 month	+	-0.007	0.850	-0.013	0.826	+	0.006	0.988	-0.004	0.995	+	0.015	0.731	+	-0.021	0.967
	EU in 3 months	+	-0.010	0.829	-0.041	0.903	+	-0.010	0.996	-0.046	0.999	+	0.014	0.719	+	-0.031	0.967
	EU in 6 months	+	-0.054	0.921	-0.029	0.880	+	-0.045	0.996	-0.033	0.997	+	-0.040	0.849	+	-0.016	0.963
Legal/ policy	Stay permanently	NP					+	0.002	0.993	-0.015	0.995	+	-0.013	0.828	-	-0.009	0.966
environment	Stay until conflict ends	NP					+	-0.013	0.996	-0.040	0.999	+	-0.013	0.837	-	-0.006	0.965
	Bring family	NP					+	-0.028	0.996	-0.044	0.999	+	0.021	0.715	-	0.030	0.914
	Work permit	NP					+	0.040	0.878	0.070	0.555	+	0.000	0.803	-	-0.069	0.967
	Receive asylum next year	NP					+	-0.031	0.996	0.015	0.968	+	0.005	0.788	-	-0.020	0.967
Border	Deportation	NP					+	0.014	0.973	-0.058	0.999	+	0.027	0.713	-	0.011	0.944
enforcement	Turn back	NP					+	-0.020	0.996	0.021	0.962	+	-0.022	0.849	-	0.006	0.952
	Returned to Turkey	NP					+	-0.005	0.996	0.036	0.900	+	0.078	0.547	-	0.000	0.955
Conditions	Violence	NP					+	0.014	0.976	-0.004	0.995	NP			NP		
at home	Access to goods	NP					+	0.018	0.970	-0.051	0.999	NP			NP		
	Sit. in Turkey	NP					+	0.027	0.933	-0.015	0.995	NP			NP		
	Trust	NP					+	0.079	0.355	0.045	0.819	NP			NP		
	NPC			0.822		0.826			0.428		0.737			0.334			0.840

Notes: H_a is the hypothesized direction of the effect of the treatment. *Sum* is the difference in the sum between the treatment and control group. The difference in sums is calculated on all respondents who answered that questions. *Means* are the difference in means only for those who answered all of the questions in the group. *P-values* are calculated through permutation tests and have been adjusted for multiple testing using closed testing. *NPC* is the p-value of the nonparametric combination test statistic.

Table A11: Difference of Sums and Means and Nonparametric Combinations (Full Sample)

		Theory														
		Simple herd					Bayesian herd					Opening			Hostile	
		(information)		(sympathetic)			(information)		(sympathetic)							
Index	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value
Difference in Sums																
Timing	+	3.297	0.249	3.712	0.211	+	3.297	0.249	3.712	0.253	+	11.332	0.059	+	3.427	0.674
Legal/ policy environment	NP					+	2.001	0.341	0.895	0.386	+	8.746	0.146	-	-4.869	0.875
Border enforcement	NP					+	4.021	0.198	6.985	0.115	+	-2.232	0.684	-	-1.478	0.864
Conditions at home	NP					+	3.261	0.262	1.328	0.402	NP			NP		
NPC			NA		NA			0.127		0.096			0.013			0.674
Difference in Means																
Timing	+	0.031	0.167	0.033	0.210	+	0.032	0.195	0.027	0.297	+	0.100	0.076	+	0.031	0.669
Legal/ policy environment	NP					+	0.020	0.314	0.003	0.493	+	0.095	0.066	-	-0.045	0.864
Border enforcement	NP					+	0.032	0.207	0.065	0.161	+	-0.018	0.663	-	-0.018	0.860
Conditions at home	NP					+	0.030	0.274	0.012	0.414	NP			NP		
NPC			NA		NA			0.096		0.123			0.007			0.669

Notes: H_a is the hypothesized direction of the effect of the treatment. *Sum* is the difference in the sum between the treatment and control group. The difference in sums is calculated on all respondents who answered that questions. *Means* are the difference in means only for those who answered all of the questions in the group. *P-values* are calculated through permutation tests and have been adjusted for multiple testing using closed testing. *NPC* is the p-value of the nonparametric combination test statistic.

Table A12: Difference of Sums and Means and Nonparametric Combinations by indices created by averaging questions (Low Knowledge Sample)

Variable	Conditions at home/ transit	Smugglers	Stay/ work in EU	Be in EU soon	Advice for friends	Border enforcement	Trust	Uniqueness
Stay permanently	-0.10	0.16	0.58	0.09	0.13	-0.02	0.27	0.53
Stay until war ends	0.34	0.10	0.44	0.00	-0.06	-0.34	0.04	0.56
Bring family members	-0.06	-0.03	0.30	-0.03	0.24	-0.63	0.01	0.44
Deported	-0.08	0.00	0.28	-0.07	-0.08	0.44	0.40	0.55
Work permit	0.04	0.00	0.73	0.06	-0.09	-0.03	0.09	0.45
Turned back	-0.11	0.03	0.27	-0.01	0.20	0.62	0.04	0.49
Rescued at sea	0.22	0.03	0.20	-0.07	-0.29	-0.34	-0.31	0.61
Go with smuggler	-0.08	0.86	0.00	0.04	0.00	-0.04	0.03	0.25
Be in EU in 1 month	-0.14	-0.04	0.02	0.75	0.01	-0.13	0.17	0.37
Be in EU in 3 months	-0.02	0.08	0.06	0.80	-0.08	0.11	-0.04	0.32
Be in EU in 6 months	0.05	0.24	0.35	0.54	0.05	0.01	-0.09	0.52
Asylum chance better next year	-0.06	0.18	0.03	0.09	-0.65	-0.02	0.37	0.40
Likelihood of return to Turkey next year	0.25	-0.09	-0.08	-0.02	0.63	0.00	0.14	0.51
Friend should go with smuggler now	-0.05	0.88	0.06	0.07	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.22
Friend should go with smuggler in 6 months	-0.04	0.82	0.06	-0.01	-0.11	0.04	0.01	0.31
Journey will be more dangerous next year	0.44	-0.01	0.07	0.05	0.44	-0.09	-0.24	0.54
Violence at home is getting worse	0.83	-0.01	0.09	-0.03	0.05	-0.09	-0.04	0.29
Access to goods at home is getting worse	0.76	-0.03	0.06	-0.08	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.41
Conditions in Turkey are getting worse	0.66	-0.05	0.00	-0.06	0.21	-0.01	-0.14	0.49
Trust at home	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.07	-0.10	0.03	0.75	0.41
Know anything about Europe	-0.68	0.30	0.19	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.04	0.40
Working within 3 months of arrival in EU	0.04	-0.08	0.40	0.32	-0.36	0.27	-0.16	0.50
Working within 1 year of arrival in EU	0.13	0.10	0.60	0.23	-0.16	0.00	-0.27	0.46
Discrimination in Europe	-0.11	0.10	0.50	0.00	0.20	0.26	0.13	0.60

Notes: To analyze the experimental data, we combine the post-treatment questions into several indices using principal component analysis (PCA) and examine the difference in means across treatments. The PCA analysis revealed seven different factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, which roughly align with the clusters of questions that we created. The use of PCA means that some respondents were dropped from the analysis due to non-response, as only those who answered all the questions after the experiment are included in the PCA. We then used the varimax rotation to yield seven distinct factors. The different factors were named based on the loadings; for example, *Be in EU Soon* loads highly on questions about expectations about whether an individual will be in the EU soon and *Conditions at Home/Transit* loads highly on conditions back home and in transit.

Table A13: Factor Loadings from Principal Components Analysis

		Theory														
		Simple herd					Bayesian herd					Opening			Hostile	
		(information)		(sympathetic)			(information)		(sympathetic)							
Index	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value	Ha	Sum	p-value
							Difference in Sums									
Timing	+	-5.424	0.730	-12.319	0.904	+	-5.424	0.766	-12.319	0.904	+	22.252	0.169	+	-1.309	0.559
Stay/ Work in EU	NP					+	1.281	0.703	0.732	0.815	+	8.594	0.506	-	9.730	0.164
Border Enforcement	NP					+	-3.296	0.766	10.839	0.570	+	-9.625	0.830	-	0.881	0.476
Conditions at home	NP					+	1.017	0.697	15.643	0.438	NP					
Trust	NP					+	10.689	0.489	14.315	0.500	NP					
Friends	NP					NP					NP			+	-8.920	0.840
NPC			NA		NA			0.449		0.107			0.067			0.507
							Difference in Means									
Timing	+	-0.097	0.704	-0.237	0.877	+	-0.097	0.724	-0.237	0.877	+	0.437	0.227	+	-0.025	0.740
Stay/ Work in EU	NP					+	0.023	0.671	0.014	0.776	+	0.169	0.468	-	0.187	0.492
Border Enforcement	NP					+	-0.059	0.724	0.209	0.545	+	-0.189	0.827	-	0.017	0.682
Conditions at home	NP					+	0.018	0.654	0.301	0.398	NP					
Trust	NP					+	0.191	0.487	0.275	0.491	NP					
Friends	NP					NP					NP			+	-0.172	0.797
NPC			NA		NA			0.443		0.113			0.099			0.461

Notes: H_a is the hypothesized direction of the effect of the treatment. *Sum* is the difference in the sum between the treatment and control group. The difference in sums is calculated on all respondents who answered that questions. *P-values* are calculated through permutation tests and have been adjusted for multiple testing using closed testing. *NPC* is the p-value of the nonparametric combination test statistic.

Table A14: Difference of Sums and Means and Nonparametric Combinations by indices created by PCA (Low Knowledge Sample)

	Violence	Goods Access	Sit. in Turkey	Trust	Deportation	Turn back	Returned to Turkey	EU 1 month	EU 3 months	EU 6 months	Stay permanently	Stay thru conflict	Bring family	Work permit	Receive Asylum
Information	0.07	0.03	-0.04	0.05	0.22*	-0.02	-0.16+	0.01	0.15+	0.21*	0.23*	0.07	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Sympathetic	0.01	-0.01	-0.16+	-0.06	0.21+	-0.06	-0.25*	0.06	0.09	0.14	0.12	0.06	-0.00	0.03	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Open	0.09	0.13	-0.08	0.04	0.16	-0.03	-0.09	0.19*	0.28**	0.31**	0.28*	0.20+	0.19+	0.18	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Hostile	0.10	0.01	-0.11	-0.13	0.12	-0.11	-0.13	0.05	0.08	0.17	0.18+	0.17+	-0.05	0.08	0.05
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Women	-0.16*	-0.02	-0.11	-0.10	-0.09	-0.10	-0.04	0.03	0.06	-0.06	-0.12+	-0.07	-0.02	-0.20**	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Interviewed in Jordan	-0.14+	0.00	-0.12	0.29***	0.08	-0.02	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.11	-0.09	-0.21**	-0.16*	-0.30***	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Interviewed in Syria	-0.10	-1.12***	-1.04***	-0.50***	-0.60***	0.48**	-0.64***	0.02	-0.34*	-0.39*	-0.68***	-0.06	0.01	0.10	-0.37*
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Iraqi	-0.36+	-0.27	-0.19	-0.09	0.21	0.51+	0.22	-0.04	-0.11+	-0.29**	0.06	0.19+	0.42***	-0.02	0.25
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.19)
Some College +	-0.06	-0.18**	-0.11+	-0.14*	-0.08	-0.10	0.05	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01**	-0.00	-0.00	0.01+	0.01+	0.01***	-0.00	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Religiosity	0.03	-0.13	-0.28+	-0.30+	-0.49**	-0.33+	-0.08	0.16	-0.15	0.00	-0.14	-0.06	-0.25	-0.22	-0.06
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Wealth at home	0.01	0.03+	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.02+	-0.03+	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth Now	0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.06**	0.06*	0.07**	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Violence Index	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.18	0.13	0.06	-0.05	0.28+	-0.04	0.17	0.55**	0.07	-0.09	0.17	0.06
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Violence (Week Before)	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.16+	0.11	0.07	-0.14	-0.04	0.06	0.01	0.08	0.05	-0.08	0.08	0.14
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Violence (Month Before)	0.11	-0.05	-0.05	-0.11	0.10	-0.05	0.04	0.10	-0.09	-0.01	0.09	0.08	-0.06	-0.08	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Violence (Year Before)	0.21*	0.38***	0.19*	0.15	-0.19+	0.07	0.14	-0.11+	0.07	0.13	-0.15	0.04	0.02	-0.22*	-0.14
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Constant	0.33*	0.17	0.71***	1.22***	0.70***	0.65***	0.90***	0.10	0.32+	0.53**	0.20	0.36*	0.57**	0.76***	0.55**
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Observations	218	218	219	219	218	217	218	219	219	218	217	218	218	218	219
R^2	0.17	0.20	0.15	0.18	0.12	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.15

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A15: Effect of Treatments and Covariates on Experimental Outcomes for Low Knowledge Respondents

	Violence	Goods Access	Sit. in Turkey	Trust	Deportation	Turn back	Returned to Turkey	EU 1 month	EU 3 months	EU 6 months	Stay permanently	Stay thru conflict	Bring family	Work permit	Receive Asylum
Information	0.06	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.16**	-0.10+	-0.08	-0.02	0.04	-0.00	0.03	0.04	0.00	-0.05	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Sympathetic	-0.02	-0.10+	-0.12*	-0.03	0.10	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.05	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Open	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	0.13*	-0.04	0.03	0.06	0.10+	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hostile	0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.03	0.13*	-0.04	-0.06	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.06	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Women	-0.07+	0.01	-0.02	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.05	0.04	-0.00	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	0.03	-0.08*	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Interviewed in Jordan	-0.10*	-0.01	-0.05	0.16***	0.14**	0.17***	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.12*	-0.08	-0.17***	-0.26***	-0.10*	0.09+
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Interviewed in Syria	0.07	-0.89***	-0.89***	-0.71***	-0.56***	0.86***	-0.74***	-0.12+	-0.15*	-0.27**	-0.53***	0.03	0.14+	0.31***	-0.46***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Iraqi	-0.06	0.07	-0.08	-0.01	-0.05	0.13	-0.21	-0.10*	-0.12***	-0.20+	-0.17	-0.00	0.14	-0.34**	0.08
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Some College +	0.01	-0.03	0.07+	-0.16***	-0.09*	-0.01	0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.09*	0.07*	0.02	0.18***	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.00+	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Religiosity	-0.09	-0.04	-0.34***	-0.32***	-0.32**	-0.06	-0.16	-0.00	0.02	-0.11	-0.17	-0.06	-0.05	-0.24*	-0.13
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Wealth at home	0.01	0.02	0.02+	-0.02*	-0.00	-0.01+	0.01	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02+	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth Now	0.02+	0.02+	0.05***	-0.02+	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.06***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Violence Index	0.13	0.13	0.16+	0.05	0.37***	0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.13	0.32**	0.42***	0.15+	0.06	0.35***	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Violence (Week Before)	-0.12**	-0.10*	-0.15***	0.07	0.04	-0.13*	-0.17**	0.07*	0.07+	-0.00	-0.02	0.04	-0.04	-0.12*	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Violence (Month Before)	0.12*	0.09	0.04	-0.02	0.07	0.01	0.01	-0.06	-0.15**	-0.14*	0.01	0.09+	0.07	-0.06	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Violence (Year Before)	0.22***	0.30***	0.16*	-0.06	-0.18**	-0.10	0.05	-0.13*	0.03	0.07	-0.05	0.15*	0.11+	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	0.39***	0.26*	0.54***	1.10***	0.35**	0.54***	0.84***	0.32***	0.23*	0.54***	0.43***	0.44***	0.57***	0.55***	0.48***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Observations	644	642	644	645	645	643	643	644	644	643	648	647	647	643	642
R^2	0.12	0.13	0.18	0.12	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.12	0.09	0.20	0.10

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A16: Effect of Treatments and Covariates on Experimental Outcomes for All Respondents



Figure A1: Internet Searches for Asylum in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, 2012-17

Notes: This figure shows that internet search patterns in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan follow similar trends and spikes around Merkel's speech on 8/15. There are spikes in Iraq and Syria, but not Afghanistan, around her less noted speech on 6/15. This makes sense given that the June 2014 announcement to take 10,000 Syrian refugees should have its strongest effects on interest in migration in Syria because it was specifically limited to Syrians. The August 2015 speech should have affected the interest of those coming from other countries, as it was a more general statement about a commitment to take in refugees and allow them to register first in Germany.



Figure A2: Internet Searches for Asylum in Syria, Iran, and Kosovo, 2012-17

Notes: This figure looks at internet searches for asylum in countries that also saw upticks in migration to Europe in 2015. Unfortunately the low volume of search data in countries like Eritrea and Pakistan made it impossible to replicate the analysis in the full set of countries. Only Kosovo and Iran had sufficient data to register search trends for asylum. The search results are for "asylum" in Albanian for Kosovo and Persian for Iran. As one might expect, the correlations with the Syrian searches drop with distance from conflict and only have a very weakly positive correlation in Kosovo (ρ=0.17) and Iran (ρ=0.11). A small spike may have occurred in Iran around Merkel's speech on 8/15, but it is hard to separate from noise in the data. Kosovo does not seem to have a spike around this speech. However, the search volume is so low in these countries that it is hard to draw conclusions. It is far more clear that there are upticks in searches in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria around Merkel's speech, and positive correlations in information-seeking activities across these countries.

Appendix B: Survey Sampling and Demographics

Survey Sampling and Administration

This research received IRB approval from Yale University under Protocol No. 1602017306. Modification requests were approved to cover the focus groups and qualitative interviews.

We fielded the survey in July and August 2016. The survey was administered by an independent survey firm with offices in Jordan and Turkey. Each interview was conducted face-to-face. The enumerators administered the survey on their smartphones using the Qualtrics online application, or when internet service was unavailable, the Qualtrics off-line application. Due to connectivity problems and enumerator error, some surveys were lost and had to be redone. We surveyed a total of 1431 migrants.

Our survey was fielded after the EU's agreement with Turkey had reduced the flow of migrants through Greece. At the beginning of our study, it was as yet unclear how effective the deal would be at stopping migrants. Data from Frontex shows that crossings in the Eastern Mediterranean had been fairly seasonal, with increasing numbers in June and peaks in July, August, and September (Figure B1). At the start of the survey, then, it was unclear to policymakers, and probably to our respondents as well, whether or not the EU-Turkey deal would be successful or whether illegal crossings would pick up against in their peak season. Nonetheless, we suspected that most respondents knew of the deal and were less interested in attempting to make the trip to Europe.

We conducted the survey in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria in order to compare individuals who remained in their home country and those who migrated to transit countries. Ideally, we would have surveyed migrants from countries that were not affected by the violence in Syria or by ISIL's activities. However, conducting surveys in Afghan, Pakistani, or African languages proved prohibitively complicated. While we would have liked to survey migrants before they made the crossing to Europe (at the "last-foot" site of Izmir, or other Turkish coastal locations), the EU's decision to deport migrants pushed many individuals back to Turkey and forced us to change our survey strategy. The crackdown by Turkish authorities made it impossible to conduct research on Syrians in the coastal region.

The survey was conducted through the last week of Ramadan, the Eid-al-Fitr celebrations, the month of Shawwal, and the month of Dhu al-Qa'dah. During Ramadan, surveys were administered after the sunset meal (between 8 and 12 PM) or in the early morning when energy levels were higher. A potential concern about Ramadan is that respondents are more honest and altruistic. However, the additional honesty associated with Ramadan should be an advantage for survey research. It is unclear how more altruistic behavior would influence responses about past migration choices or future desires. During the month of Dhu al-Qa'dah, warfare is forbidden by the Qur'an, but this was not observed in either Syria or Iraq, and thus is unlikely to affect our survey.

The period when the survey was administered was an unexpectedly eventful time. The survey began just after the bombing of Istanbul's airport on June 28, and was ongoing during attacks on the holy city of Medina on July 5. These attacks may have heightened concerns about terrorism in the region, and ISIS in particular. If anything, these events should have increased desires to migrate. A coup attempt in Turkey on July 15 led us to stop the Turkish survey implementation. It is possible that the Turkish coup would have affected the perception of individuals in other countries about the safety and stability of migration



Figure B1: Seasonal Crossings in the Eastern Mediterranean from Frontex, 2012-2014

through Turkey. Fortunately, we had almost reached our target number of responses in Turkey by that point.

In Turkey and Jordan, we chose survey locations with large known populations of Syrians and some Iraqis. In Turkey, we conducted the survey in Gaziantep, a city about an hour north of the border with Syria, and Istanbul, where many Syrian and Iraqi migrants are known to live or transit through. In Jordan, we conducted our surveys in Amman, the capital, and Mafraq, a city about a half hour south of the Syria border and a half hour from the Zaatari refugee camp. We screened for recent migrants, defined as those who arrived in the last two years (2014-16).

In Iraq and Syria, survey locations were chosen based where there were likely to be many internally displaced persons and where enumerators could safely work. In Iraq, the survey was administered in Duhok, a city in Iraqi Kurdistan about an hour west of the Syrian border and an hour north of Mosul and other areas in Iraq controlled by the ISIL. Finally, in Syria, we conducted our survey in Western-ally controlled areas due to security concerns. About half the sample came from the western suburbs of Aleppo in al-Atareb. When the survey began, this district was considered relatively safe, but Russian air strikes destroyed medical facilities and inflicted heavy damages shortly after the surveys were complete. The other surveys were conducted in Idlib, a city about an hour southeast of Aleppo. Idlib has been outside regime control since 2012, and has experienced extensive aerial bombing and shelling.

In all sites, except for Syria, survey enumerators worked in pairs including both a female and male enumerator to ensure that female participants felt comfortable being interviewed. In Syria, the survey firm could not use female enumerators due to active conflict and restrictions on female movement. Instead, enumerators visited women's centers where they could recruit female respondents and conduct the interviews in safe spaces.

To produce as representative a sample of recent migrants and potential migrants as possible, we relied on random sampling in migrant-heavy neighborhoods. In Turkey and Jordan, survey teams rotated among a dozen sites where migrants gather to create a more representative sample and avoid security problems (especially in Turkey where the government had clamped down on academic research on migrants). We screened for recent migrants, defined as those who arrived in the last two years (2014-16). To locate recent migrants,

we focused on public locations in migrant-heavy neighborhoods. Although public locations where migrants congregate were relatively obvious in Turkey, it made it difficult to locate Iraqis, who are spread through the city and a smaller fraction of the population. Sampling in public areas also was much more difficult in Jordan due to the diffusion of the population. Enumerators therefore sampled outside of coffee shops and local community centers in Mafraq and Amman as a way to locate recent migrants. In both cases, they surveyed every tenth migrant that they met in public areas to avoid snowball sampling.

In Syria and Iraq, security concerns led enumerators to conduct household surveys, randomizing the first house and then following a skip rule of every fifth unit. The enumerators initially surveyed the person who answered the door. This sampling technique, however, resulted in fewer religious women and older respondents. Therefore, enumerators asked to speak to female and older members of the household when possible. This procedure produced a sample closer to the enumerated household population.

Due to some issues with the upload of data from off-line applications, some surveys were recorded as lasting extremely long. The mean recorded survey time was 97 minutes. Once these surveys with unrealistic time spans are dropped from the sample, the mean survey time was 24 minutes. To encourage participation and compensate vulnerable respondents for their time, respondents were offered the chance to participate in a raffle of 100 phone cards, each with $25 of credit. The lottery was administered after we had finished collecting the surveys. Respondents provided their contact information on a separate form to alleviate concerns about a loss of confidentiality.

Finally, respondents were asked at the end of our survey about who sent the survey. Over 35% of individuals correctly identified the universities mentioned in the consent procedures or said "an American university," or "University researchers;" another 6% referred to our survey firm; about 7% thought that the survey had been sent by AFAQ, a development civil society organization in Jordan; and 8% said that they did not know. Only a small number (about 2%) thought that the survey was sent by the UN. Very few respondents mentioned government agencies, including intelligence agencies. Thus, we expect respondents answered fairly honestly, and that concerns about the misuse of information were relatively minimal.

Demographics

Given that there was no preexisting sampling frame, we attempted to use what data exists to evaluate the general representativeness of our sample. The following tables and figures present the demographics of our respondents, their households, and, where possible, compares them to existing data from other sources:

- Table B1 presents the nationality and migration status of respondents by country of interview.
- Table B2 presents the gender distribution of the respondents.
- Table B3 presents the age statistics for our respondents and for all enumerated household members.
- Figure B2 presents the age distributions for respondents and for all household members.
- Figure B3 presents the age distributions by country of interview.

- Figure B4 presents the age distributions by nationality.
- Table B4 presents the household size statistics.
- Figure B5 presents the household size distribution.
- Figure B6 presents the distribution of education of the respondents.
- Table B5 presents the income statistics for our respondents on several different measures.
- Figure B7 presents the income distribution for our respondents.
- Table B6 presents the statistics on religiosity.

	Location of Survey				
Nationality	Turkey	Jordan	Syria	Iraq	Total
Syrian	482	250	447	16	1,199
Iraqi	12	9	1	215	237
Total	494	259	449	231	1436
Migration Status					
Resident	3	32	337	136	512
Internally displaced	0	0	112	95	207
International Migrant	492	227	0	0	719
Total	495	259	449	231	1438

Note: Nationality was measured by asking respondents the country of their "usual residence" prior to any migration. It is highly correlated with a question that asked respondents the country of their citizenship ($\rho = .93$). Individuals are coded as internally displaced if their current residence is not the same as the place that they consider their "usual home," or they have lived at their current residence for less than five years.

Table B1: Nationality and Migration Status of Respondents by Location

Group	% Women	% Men
UNHCR data		
Respondents	32.9	67.1
All surveyed households	49.1	50.9
	Interviewed in Turkey	
UNHCR data	46.8	53.2
Respondents	30.8	69.2
Surveyed households	43.9	56.1
	Interviewed in Jordan	
UNHCR data	50.7	49.3
Respondents	25.6	74.4
Surveyed households	51.2	48.8
	Interviewed in Syria	
WDI population data	49.4	50.6
Respondents	31.0	69.0
Surveyed households	48.6	51.4
	Interviewed in Iraq	
WDI population data	49.4	50.6
Respondents	50.0	50.0
Surveyed households	53.8	46.2
	All Syrians	
WDI population data	49.4	50.6
Respondents	30.0	70.0
Surveyed households	48.1	51.9
	All Iraqis	
WDI population data	49.4	50.6
Respondents	47.2	52.8
Surveyed households	53.6	46.4

Notes: UNHCR data only covers Syrians; from Turkey are as of September 26, 2016 and from Jordan as of September 18, 2016. Data for interviews in Syria and Iraq are the World Bank population figures for 2015 for Iraq and Syria, respectively. World Bank figures for Syria are based on a population of 18.5 million.

Table B2: Gender

Group	Mean	Median	% 0-17	% 18-60	% 60+
Respondents	33.4	30	1.3	78.1	20.6
All surveyed households	24.88	20	41.5	52.9	5.6
		Interviewed in Turkey			
UNHCR data			44.7	51.9	3.3
Respondents	30.8	27.5	0.4	97.0	2.6
Surveyed households	22.61	21	40.5	56.7	2.8
		Interviewed in Jordan			
UNHCR data			51.5	44.8	3.6
Respondents	29.4	27	2.5	97.1	.4
Surveyed households	26.63	20	42.5	52.5	5.1
Group	Mean	Median	% 0-14	% 15-64	% 65+
		Interviewed in Syria			
World Bank data			37.1	58.8	4.1
Respondents	37.0	36.0	0	96.9	3.1
Surveyed households	24.11	20	35.3	60.6	4.1
		Interviewed in Iraq			
World Bank data			41.0	56.0	3.1
Respondents	41.6	45	0	99.0	1.0
Surveyed households	27.19	22	29.8	62.8	7.4
		All Syrians			
World Bank data			37.1	58.8	4.1
Respondents	32.8	29	0	98.3	1.7
Surveyed households	24.32	20	33.8	63.1	3.1
		All Iraqis			
World Bank data			41.0	56.0	3.1
Respondents	39.3	37	0	99.1	0.9
Surveyed households	27.41	22	28.7	64.4	6.6

Notes: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding. UNHCR data only covers Syrians; from Turkey are as of September 26, 2016 and from Jordan as of September 18, 2016. Data for interviews in Syria and Iraq and for all Syrians and Iraqis are the World Bank population figures for 2015 for Iraq and Syria, respectively. World Bank figures for Syria are based on a population of 18.5 million. The age variable did not record properly for Iraqi respondents and is missing for 60 percent of Iraqi respondents.

Table B3: Age Statistics



Figure B2: Age Distribution of Respondents (Top) and All Surveyed Household Members (Bottom)



Figure B3: Age Distribution of Respondents (Top) and All Surveyed Household Members (Bottom) by Country of Interview



Figure B4: Age Distribution of Respondents (Left) and All Surveyed Household Members (Right) by Nationality

Group	Mean	Median	25th Percentile	75 Percentile
All surveyed households	4.01	4	2	6
Interviewed in Turkey	2.94	3	1	4
Interviewed in Jordan	4.32	5	2.5	6
Interviewed in Syria	4.93	5	3	6
Interviewed in Iraq	4.83	5	3	6
Syrians	4.37	4	3	6
Iraqi	4.81	5	3	6

Table B4: Household Size



Figure B5: Distribution of Household Size



Figure B6: Education Levels by Country

	Interviewed in Turkey
Pre-Migration Income Sufficiency	1.7
Pre-Migration Wealth	5.3
Current Wealth	3.9
Current Income	387.05
Pre-Migration Income	509.77
	Interviewed in Jordan
Pre-Migration Income Sufficiency	1.9
Pre-Migration Wealth	7.5
Current Wealth	5.3
Current Income	460.14
Pre-Migration Income	1298.24
	Interviewed in Syria
Income Suficiency	1.3
Current Wealth	4.9
Current Income	283.45
	Interviewed in Iraq
Pre-Migration Income Sufficiency	2.8
Income Sufficiency	1.5
Current Wealth	6.7
Current Income	6263.46

Notes: We measured household income in several ways and attempted to capture both current income and income prior to migrating. First, we asked respondents whether their household income covered their expenses prior to leaving (*Pre-Migration Income Sufficiency*), with responses ranging from "0" (significant difficulties) to "3" (able to save). We also asked this question to respondents who remained at their usual residence (*Current Income Sufficiency*). Second, we asked all respondents to report their current monthly income (*Current Income*) and the currency unit used. We also asked migrants to report their monthly income before they left their home (*Pre-Migration Income*). We standardized monthly income to USD. Third, we asked all respondents whether they own a series of thirteen durable goods (*Current Wealth*) and whether they owned these goods prior to migrating (*Pre-Migration Wealth*). As is standard, we use principal component analysis to create wealth deciles by country. But for the purposes of comparing wealth levels across our interview sites, we report the absolute number of consumer durables here. All residents in Syria were coded as living at their previous residence, even when they had moved recently. As such, respondents were not asked their pre-internal migration income sufficiency.

Table B5: Income and Wealth (Means)



Figure B7: Distribution of Current (Top) and Prior Income (Bottom) by Country (USD)

	Interviewed in Turkey	
Frequency of Daily Prayer	4.1	
Frequency of Attending Friday Prayer	4.0	
Frequency of Reading Quran	3.6	
Appropriate Dress for Women	2.6	
Index of Religosity	3.6	
Agrees Hijab is Unnecessary	35.1	
	Interviewed in Jordan	Arab Barometer in Jordan
Frequency of Daily Prayer	3.9	4.6
Frequency of Attending Friday Prayer	3.6	3.9
Frequency of Reading Quran	3.2	3.9
Appropriate Dress for Women	2.4	
Index of Religosity	3.3	
Agrees Hijab is Unnecessary	49.4	63.1
	Interviewed in Syria	
Frequency of Daily Prayer	4.6	
Frequency of Attending Friday Prayer	3.5	
Frequency of Reading Quran	3.6	
Appropriate Dress for Women	2.9	
Index of Religosity	3.6	
Agrees Hijab is Unnecessary	34.2	
	Interviewed in Iraq	Arab Barometer in Iraq
Frequency of Daily Prayer	4.2	4.6
Frequency of Attending Friday Prayer	3.2	3.2
Frequency of Reading Quran	3.2	3.8
Appropriate Dress for Women	2.3	
Index of Religosity	3.2	
Agrees Hijab is Unnecessary	54.3	33.7
	All Syrians	All Iraqis
Frequency of Daily Prayer	4.3	4.1
Frequency of Attending Friday Prayer	3.7	3.2
Frequency of Reading Quran	3.5	3.2
Appropriate Dress for Women	2.6	2.3
Index of Religosity	3.5	3.2
Agrees Hijab is Unnecessary	37.8	53.2

Notes: The sample is 92 percent Sunni Muslim, with small fractions of Shi'a, Christian, and Yazidi respondents. Compared to the populations, we have fewer Shi'a Muslims than may be expected, especially in Iraq where the majority of the country's population is Shi'a (see, IOM, "Migration Flows from Iraq to Europe," February 2015, p. 5.). We asked four questions to gauge religiosity drawn from the 2012-14 Arab Barometer ($q6101$, $q6105$, $q6106$): the frequency with which the respondent prays daily, attends Friday prayers or Sunday services, and reads the Quran or Bible, as well as what they consider appropriate dress for women. For Christians, the questions read "attending Sunday services" and "reading the Bible." Higher values indicate a greater frequency of religious activity, or support for a stricter form of dress for women.

Table B6: Religiosity

Appendix C: Focus Group and Interviews Sampling and Demographics

To complement our conjoint results, we conducted six focus groups and eight interviews with Syrians in Turkey during the summer of 2017. The focus groups and interviews were conducted by a Turkish survey firm, Ipsos, in Arabic in Istanbul. The focus group participants were recruited in two ways. First, the firm worked with an NGO in the Fatih neighborhood of Istanbul, where most Syrians live, to recruit participants who fit the demographic characteristics (see below). Second, the firm worked with local community leaders in the Western suburbs of Istanbul, where there is the second highest concentration of Syrians, to recruit additional participants who come from a different community. The interviewees were Syrian community leaders identified by asking for references from several NGOs and local contacts. Community leaders had to be referred by multiple contacts to be selected for an interview.

Our six focus groups were conducted with a range of participants. Given the cultural environment, the focus groups were split by gender. We also split the focus group participants by age: 18-25 year olds, 26-45 year olds, and 46-65 year olds. The groups ranged in size from five to seven participants. In general, male and younger participants had more education than female and older participants. Men also were more likely to be working. Participants arrived in Istanbul as early as 2012 and some as late as 2017; the median and modal year of arrival was 2015.

The community leaders were selected to represent diverse figures in the Syrian community. Five were men and three were women, and they ranged in age from 26 to 48. Most were highly educated, with at least some university education. The community leaders included people who work with the Syrian population in their jobs (restaurant and business owners, NGO workers, and so on) and people who volunteer in the community (youth group leaders, choral society organizers, and so on).

Tables C1 and C2 display the demographic characteristics of the participants in the focus groups, and Table C3 shows the characteristics of our interviewees.

Male 18-25	Sex	Age	Education	Work Status	Arrival Year
1	Male	23	Masters	Working	2015
2	Male	19	University	Working	2014
3	Male	21	University	Not working	2015
4	Male	24	University	Not working	2015
5	Male	23	High School	Working	2013

Male 26-45	Sex	Age	Education	Work Status	Arrival Year
1	Male	27	University	Working	2013
2	Male	32	University	Working	2015
3	Male	40	Middle school	Working	2015
4	Male	30	Middle school	Working	2012
5	Male	38	University	Working	2015
6	Male	30	University	Working	2014

Male 46-65	Sex	Age	Education	Work Status	Arrival Year
1	Male	55	Primary School	Working	2015
2	Male	67	Primary School	Not Working	2015
3	Male	67	Primary School	Not Working	2015
4	Male	47	High School	Not Working	2014
5	Male	57	Primary School	Working	2017
6	Male	44	Middle School	Working	2013

Female 18-25	Sex	Age	Education	Work Status	Arrival Year
1	Female	20	University	Not working	2015
2	Female	23	University	Not working	2016
3	Female	21	Middle School	Not working	2015
4	Female	21	Middle School	Not working	2014
5	Female	25	Middle School	Not working	2014
6	Female	25	High School	Not working	2014

Table C1: Focus Group Demographics

Female 26-45	Sex	Age	Education	Work Status	Arrival Year
1	Female	42	Middle school	Working	2015
2	Female	38	Primary school	Working	2015
3	Female	37	Primary school	Working	2014
4	Female	39	Primary school	Working	2013
5	Female	38	Primary school	Not working	2014
6	Female	31	Middle school	Working	2015
7	Female	29	University (had to quit)	Not working	2016

Female 46-65	Sex	Age	Education	Work Status	Arrival Year
1	Female	63	University	Not working	2015
2	Female	47	Primary school	Not working	2015
3	Female	50	Middle school	Not working	2016
4	Female	66	Primary school	Not working	2015
5	Female		Primary school	Not working	2014
6	Female	44	High school	Not working	2014

Table C2: Focus Group Demographics, Con't

ID #	Sex	Age	Occupation	Education
1	Male	42	Human Resources Consultant	University
2	Male	29	NGO Leader, Digital Adviser	University
3	Male	46	Restaurant Owner	University
4	Male	26	Syrian Scouts Leader	Some University
5	Male	34	Bookstore-Cafe Coordinator	University
6	Female	48	Social Worker	University
7	Female	33	Choir Leader	University
8	Female	26	NGO Worker	University

Table C3: Interviewee Demographics

Appendix D: Question Wording

Survey Experiment

Political Knowledge

These questions were used to construct the political knowledge index in Table 1.

- *Meaning of Asylum:* If a person receives "asylum" in an EU country, what does that mean? (mark the one closest to your understanding) *Note*: Due to a coding error, respondents in Turkey and Jordan could check multiple options for the meaning of asylum, whereas those in Syria and Iraq had to select one option. We coded respondents in Turkey and Jordan as selecting the correct answer if they selected b alone, or in combination with c, given that they might have interpreted it as the maximum the individual could stay. Answers that included a or d were marked as incorrect. Due to this difference, we slightly overestimate political knowledge in Turkey and Jordan.
  A. He will be allowed to stay in Europe permanently and live in any country he wants
  B. He will be allowed to stay in Europe permanently but has to live in the country that grants him asylum
  C. He will be allowed to stay in Europe for 1-3 years
  D. I do not know what asylum means

- *Asylum in Gulf:* Do the following countries offer asylum (mark all that apply)?
  A. Saudi Arabia
  B. Kuwait
  C. Qatar
  D. Bahrain
  E. UAE
  F. Oman

- *Resettlement:* People from the following countries can be resettled under the EU Relocation program (mark all that apply)?
  A. Syria
  B. Iraq
  C. Afghanistan
  D. Eritrea

- *German Chancellor:* Who is the political leader (Chancellor) of Germany?
  A. Barack Obama
  B. Angela Merkel
  C. David Cameron
  D. Werner Faymann

- *Country Accepting Most:* Which of these countries has agreed to accept the most migrants?

A. Germany
B. UK
C. Austria
D. France
E. Hungary

- *Country Accepting Fewest:* Which of these countries has agreed to accept the most migrants?

A. Germany
B. UK
C. Austria
D. France
E. Hungary

Violence and Deprivation

These questions were used to measure worsening violence and access to goods in the regressions on the determinants of political knowledge.

- *Worse Violence:* In the year before you left your usual residence, how did the dangers in your neighborhood change? Did they?

A. Get much worse
B. Get somewhat worse
C. Stay about the same
D. Get somewhat better
E. Get much better

- *Worse Month:* In the month before you left your usual residence, how did the dangers in your neighborhood change compared to previous months? Did they?

A. Get much worse
B. Get somewhat worse
C. Stay about the same
D. Get somewhat better
E. Get much better

- *Worse Week:* In the week before you left your usual residence, how did the dangers in your neighborhood change? Did they?

A. Get much worse
B. Get somewhat worse
C. Stay about the same

D. Get somewhat better
E. Get much better

- *Worse Goods:* When you left your usual residence, had your access to these goods gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same compared to the year before? (For each good, select "gotten better," "gotten worse," or "about the same")

A. Food
B. Clean drinking water
C. Safe housing
D. Medical needs
E. Fuel
F. Electricity
G. Television
H. Internet
I. Cellphone/landline
J. Radio
K. Schooling for children

Violence Index: To create the index, we measured a range of threats and counted the number that occurred during the year prior to leaving. Notably, this index does not measure the intensity of exposure, but rather the range of threats that were present.

- *Worse Violence:* Were any of the following types of dangers occurring in your neighborhood in the month when you left? (Mark all that apply)

A. Barrel bombs
B. Air attacks
C. Mortar attacks/shelling
D. Sniper attacks
E. Car or road-side bombs
F. Chemical attacks
G. Forced military conscription
H. Sexual assaults
I. Abductions/disappearances/kidnappings
J. Executions
K. Arbitrary arrests
L. Corporal punishment
M. None of the above

Demographics

We used a variety of approaches to measures socioeconomic status, including measuring consumer durables before leaving, the ability to save, education levels.

- *Wealth:* Do you own/did you own any of the following when you lived at your usual residence (mark all that apply)?

  A. Car or truck
  B. Stove
  C. Oven
  D. Washing machine
  E. Water Heater
  F. Television
  G. Computer
  H. Phone
  I. Internet access at home
  J. House where you lived
  K. Apartment where you lived
  L. A vacation house or apartment
  M. Business or farm

- *Education:* What is your highest level of education?

  A. No formal education
  B. Elementary
  C. Preparatory/basic
  D. Secondary/high school
  E. Vocational/technical school
  F. Some college
  G. Finished college or post-graduate

- *Ability to Save:* I will read you some statements related to your household income before you started to migrate. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income when you were living at your usual residence?

  A. Our household income covered our expenses well and we were able to save
  B. Our household income covered our expenses without notable difficulties
  C. Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced some difficulties in meeting our needs
  D. Our household income did not cover our expenses and we faced significant difficulties in meeting our needs

Religiosity: We created an index of religious practices based on the following questions. We recoded the index so for each question, more religious beliefs are associated with higher values, and the index was rescaled from 0 to 1.

- *Prayer:* Do you pray daily?

  A. Always

B. Most of the time
C. Sometimes
D. Rarely
E. Never

- *Services:* Do you attend Friday prayer or Sunday services?

  A. Always
  B. Most of the time
  C. Sometimes
  D. Rarely
  E. Never

- *Quran:* Do you listen to or read the Quran or Bible?

  A. Always
  B. Most of the time
  C. Sometimes
  D. Rarely
  E. Never

- *Dress:* What is the appropriate dress for women?

  A. Women can dress how they see fit
  B. Women should dress modestly without needing to wear the hijab
  C. Women should wear the hijab
  D. Women should wear the abaya
  E. Women should cover their faces/wear a niqab

Other Demographic Questions:

- *News:* How often do you pay attention to the news, whether on the TV, the radio, the newspaper or the internet now?

  A. Daily
  B. A few times a week
  C. A few times a month
  D. Rarely
  E. Never

- *News Source:* What is the news source you use most frequently to learn about politics/world events now?

  A. Radio
  B. Newspaper
  C. Television

D. Word of mouth from friends and family
E. Internet
F. Word of mouth from smugglers

- *Family:* Do you have a family member currently living in Europe?

  A. Yes, a first line family member (spouse, parent, child).
  B. Yes, a non-first line family member (aunt or uncle, cousin).
  C. No.

Migration Choices, Expectations, and Transit Experiences: We now turn to the variables used to study migrants' desires to go to Europe.

- *Wants Europe:* Do you want to migrate to the EU?

  A. Yes
  B. No

- *Able to Stay:* What do you think the chances are that people like you are allowed to stay in an EU country?

  A. Very good
  B. Good
  C. Bad
  D. Very bad
  E. I don't know

- *Transit Violence:* Did any of the following things happen in the weeks before you left this location? (check all that apply)

  A. Violent acts against other migrants
  B. Violent acts against you or your family
  C. Threats against other migrants
  D. Threats against you or your family

- *Transit Shortages:* Did any of the following things happen in the weeks before you left this location? (check all that apply)

  A. You were unable to get food for your family
  B. You were unable to get medical care
  C. Your children were unable to attend school
  D. You were unable to practice your religion

Survey Experiment: This section includes the full battery of questions asked following the experimental treatments. Outcome questions are listed under the factor for which they have the highest loadings.

- *Manipulation Check 1:* In your personal view, how many migrants do you think will cross into Europe this coming year, that is 2016?

    A. Less than 500,000
    B. 500,000-1.5 million
    C. 1.5-3 million
    D. More than 3 million

- *Manipulation Check 2:* Now, thinking about last year (2015), how do you think the number of migrants that crossed into Europe compares to this year? Were there?

    A. Fewer last year
    B. About the same
    C. More last year

Conditions at home/ transit: The following questions loaded most highly on this factor.

- *Journey will be more dangerous next year:* Thinking of that same friend, how dangerous do you think his trip will be if he tries to cross from Turkey to an EU country next year?

    A. More dangerous than now
    B. Less dangerous than now
    C. About the same

- *Violence at home is getting worse:* Now we want to ask you a few questions about how you think that things are changing in your last usual residence, as well as in Turkey or Jordan. [If at place of usual residence: Now we want to ask you a few questions about how you think that things are changing in your place of usual residence, as well as for people like you who reached Turkey or Jordan]. Do you think that violence in your place of usual residence is getting better, worse, or staying about the same?

    A. Getting better
    B. About the same
    C. Getting worse

- *Access to goods at home is getting worse:* Do you think that the provision of public goods, such as schools and hospitals, in your last usual residence is getting better, worse, or staying about the same?

    A. Getting better
    B. About the same
    C. Getting worse

- *Conditions in Turkey are getting worse:* Do you think conditions for migrants in Turkey are getting better, worse, or staying about the same?

A. Getting better
B. About the same
C. Getting worse

- *Know anything about Europe:* Some people have a very clear sense of what life will be like when they arrive in Europe. Others know very little about life in Europe. How much do you personally think that you know about life in Europe, a lot, a bit or almost nothing?

  A. A lot
  B. Some
  C. Almost nothing

Smugglers: The following questions loaded most highly on this factor.

- *Go with smuggler:* Do you want to attempt the trip to Europe with a smuggler, apply to be resettled from Turkey, or wait at home?

  A. Probably not
  B. Try to get to Europe
  C. Apply to be resettled from Turkey
  D. Wait where you are
  E. Go back to your home (if you have left)

- *Friend should go with smuggler now:* Would you tell a friend in your country of usual residence who has the money to migrate to leave now to try to get to the EU with a smuggler, to apply for resettlement from Turkey or to stay home?

  A. Try to get to Europe
  B. Apply to be resettled from Turkey
  C. Wait at home

- *Friend should go with smuggler in 6 months:* Would you tell a friend in your country of usual residence who will have the money to migrate in six months to try to get to Europe with a smuggler, to apply for resettlement from Turkey, or to stay home?

  A. Try to get to Europe
  B. Apply to be resettled from Turkey
  C. Wait at home

Stay/ work in EU: The following questions loaded most highly on this factor.

- *Stay Permanently:* Do you think that you would eventually be allowed to stay permanently in an EU country?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Stay until war ends:* Do you think that you would be allowed to stay in an EU country until the conflict in your home country ends?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Work Permit:* Do you think that you would be given a work permit in an EU country?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Working within 3 months of arrival in EU:* In your view, if you reach Europe, do you think that you would be working within three months of arriving?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not
  C. I don't plan to look for work

- *Working within 1 year of arrival in EU:* If you reach Europe, do you think that you would be working in Europe within one year of arriving?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not
  C. I don't plan to look for work

- *Discrimination in Europe:* Do you think that you would face discrimination in Europe?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

Be in EU Soon: The following questions loaded most highly on this factor.

- *Be in EU in 1 Month:* Given that plans and circumstances always can change, we want to ask you about the likelihood that you will leave for an EU country in the future. Do you think that you will be in an EU country in one month?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Be in EU in 3 Months:* Do you think that you will be in an EU country in three months?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Be in EU in 6 Months:* And what about in six months?

  A. Probably yes

B. Probably not

Advice for friends: The following questions loaded most highly on this factor.

- *Asylum chance better next year:* Now think of a friend who is trying to migrate to Europe. We want to ask you how you think he will be treated if he tries different migration options at this time next year. Do you think that his chances to receive asylum in an EU country if he crosses with a smuggler will be better or worse if he waits until next year instead of going now?

  A. Probably better
  B. Probably worse

- *Return to Turkey:* Do you think that his chances of being returned to Turkey or his home country if he tries to enter the EU with a smuggler will be better or worse next year?

  A. Probably better
  B. Probably worse

Border Enforcement: The following questions loaded most highly on this factor.

- *Bring family members:* Do you think that you would be able to bring other family members to join you if you settle in the EU?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Deported:* Do you think that you would be deported to your home country if your asylum application is denied?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Turned back:* Do you think that border guards would turn you back if you try to enter Greece?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

- *Rescue at sea:* If a boat capsizes at sea, do you think that someone, such as the coast guard, NATO, or a humanitarian organization, would come to help the passengers?

  A. Probably yes
  B. Probably not

Trust: The following question loaded most highly on this factor.

- *Trust at home:* Now thinking of your last usual residence, if you went back, how many friends do you think you have in your town or city at the moment with whom you could trust to leave a child for the day?

  A. No one
  B. 1-2
  C. 3-4
  D. More than 5

Appendix F: Reconciliation with Pre-Analysis Plan

This appendix describes how our implementation of the survey and its analysis differed from our pre-analysis plan (PAP).

Survey Implementation

Our survey implementation differed from our PAP in the following ways:

- Location changes: (1) We had originally planned to survey in Aleppo, Syria but it was too dangerous to send enumerators to Aleppo by the time our survey was fielded. Our enumerators went to al-Atareb instead. (2) Our enumerators were unable to find enough IDPs in Erbil, Iraq and instead went to Duhok. (3) We had enough resources to go to Mafraq in addition to Amman in Jordan. Mafraq is more rural than Amman and allowed us to gain access to a less urban population.

- Sample changes: We were able to collect data more data in Syria (n=449) than we had originally planned; collected 259 responses in Jordan and 231 in Iraq in line with our target of 250 and 494 in Turkey in line with our target of 500.

- Sampling: In our PAP, we had planned to simply use skip rules. We found that the use of simple skip rules led to an over-representation of younger men in our sample. During the second half of our implementation, we had our enumerators oversample women and older people.

Analysis of the Observational Data

Our analysis of the observational data did not differ from our pre-analysis plan. Below we list our hypotheses from the PAP, whether they were included in this paper or the appendix, and if not, why not.

Our hypotheses:

- Non-Experimental H1: Individuals who have been displaced from their home country for longer will score, on average, higher on our political knowledge questions than those who arrived recently or never left their home countries. **Not included; measured with location instead due to problems with understanding of the displacement question.**

- Non-Experimental H2: Syrians will score, on average, higher on our political knowledge questions than Iraqis because many have contemplated leaving due to the civil war. **See Figure 4.**

- Non-Experimental H3 : Individual who have left on average will score highly on our political knowledge questions. **Not included; measured with location instead.**

- Non-Experimental H4: Individuals who left their homes (or who plan to leave) will follow the news and social media more intensely than those who have not left.**Not included; null results**

- Non-Experimental H5a: While migrants will have experienced violence, on average, they will not describe changes in violence immediately before they left. **Not included.**

Almost all in survey experienced worsening violence. Migrants did not experience *more* violence than non-migrants.

- Non-Experimental H5b: Any changes in violence described will not be that different from those who decided to stay in their home countries. **Not included; all experienced a great deal of violence.**

- Non-Experimental H6a: While migrants will have experienced economic deprivation at home, on average, they will not describe economic conditions as worsening immediately before they left. **Not included. Almost all in survey experienced worsening access to goods.**

- Non-Experimental H6b: While migrants will have experienced economic deprivation at home, on average, this decline will not differ from those who decided to stay in their home countries. **Not included. Almost all in survey experienced worsening access to goods.**

- Non-Experimental H7: Using the migrants? date of departure from their permanent residence and their last transit location combined with data on reported violence in Syria and Iraq, there will not be large increases in violence in the towns where migrants are from in comparison to other areas. **Not included; we could not find accurate subnational data on violence to test.**

- Non-Experimental H8: Migrants had time to gather their possessions and discuss their decisions before leaving, rather than leaving suddenly. **See Footnote 24.**

- Non-Experimental H9: Migrants planning on moving to Europe will not describe worse conditions in terms of violence or economic deprivation than those who plan to stay, or who never left their home country. **See Appendix Table A3.**

- Non-Experimental H10a: Migrants planning on moving to Europe with a smuggler will be more pessimistic about their prospects for getting some form of legal status in Europe. **Not included because so few respondents planned on traveling with a smuggler.**

- Non-Experimental H10b: Iraqis will be more pessimistic about their prospects for getting some form of legal status to be resettled in Europe, and therefore be more likely to want to find a smuggler or return to their home country. **Not included because so few respondents planned on traveling with a smuggler.**

- Non-Experimental H11: Migrants often will report not talking to their immediate family members or withholding information from their social network. **Not included.**

- Non-Experimental H12: Those with and without social networks in Europe will be equally likely to already have tried to migrate to Europe or to have left their home countries. **Not included because so few respondents have attempted a trip to Europe.**

- Non-Experimental H13: In our open ended questions on the reasons for wanting to go to Europe, respondents will mention the political situation in Europe. They also will explain the wave by referencing the political situation in Europe. **See page 22.**

Hypotheses from alternative explanations:

- Non-Experimental Stimulus 1: Migrants will report an increase in violence immediately before they left home. Such increases in violence will not be common among those who stayed behind. **Not included. Both groups suffered a lot of violence.**
- Non-Experimental Stimulus 2: Migrants will report a worsening of economic conditions immediately before they left home whereas non-migrants will not. **Not included. Both groups suffered a lot of deprivation.**
- Non-Experimental Stimulus 3: Data on violent events from other sources will show an increase in violence in the migrants' places of origin immediately before migrants leave but not for non-migrants. **Not included; we could not find accurate subnational data on violence to test.**
- Non-Experimental Stimulus 4 : Migrants will report violence and economic deprivation while in the refugee camps and in transit. **Not Included.**
- Non-Experimental Stimulus 5 : In the open-ended questions, migrants will report worsening violence and economic conditions as the main reasons for wanting to reach Europe, rather than differences in political conditions. **See page 22.**
- Non-Experimental Networks 1: Migrants planning to leave for Europe are more likely to have friends and relatives already living in Europe than those who stay. **Not included.**
- Non-Experimental Networks 1: Migrants will report that their decision to migrate was influenced by the choices of others. **Not included.**
- Non-Experimental Networks 1: In the open-ended questions, migrants will mention social networks in Europe as important influences on their migration decision, and say that the wave is driven by the fact that it is easier to live in Europe once others have made the trip. **See page 22.**

Analysis of the Experiment

As we discussed in the paper, the experiment failed in the full sample because most of our respondents were extremely knowledgable. In our PAP, we noted that:

> As with any survey experiment, the treatments involve making salient different aspects of the migrant wave. We cannot change migrants' actual experiences of collective migration or policy knowledge. The effects of the information that we provide thus likely will vary depending on the respondent's preexisting sense of how many migrants are coming. For information to change migrants' beliefs and behaviors, it must cause migrants to update their priors in some way. (p. 21)

We also included a hypothesis to this effect (H9): "Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave should have larger effects on individuals whose priors begin farthest away from the treatment, and on those who update their beliefs about future migration in the direction of the treatment" (p. 22).

Because of the high levels of knowledge, we presented the results on the low-knowledge respondents in the main body of the text and the results on the full sample in the appendix. The other major difference from the PAP is that we had originally planned to report the effects of the treatments on all 24 question of the survey individually. We now also include the NPC test and created indices and PCA as robustness checks.

Below our the hypotheses from our theory (HX) and the alternatives (AX) and whether or not we found support for them in the low-knowledge sample:

- H1. (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to better (worse) expectations of legal and policy treatment in Europe. **Not supported.**

- H2 (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to better (worse) expectations of legal treatment in Europe only for Syrians, and better (worse) expectations of enforcement probabilities for all groups. **Not supported.**

- H3 (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to better (worse) expectations of legal treatment in Europe only for women with children and Christians, and better (worse) expectations of enforcement probabilities for all groups. **Not supported.**

- H4 (Political Cycle): misnumbered.

- H5 (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to better (worse) expectations of legal treatment in Europe for individual who self-identify with other migrants more than with their local, religious, or national group. **Not supported.**

- H6 (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to less (greater) concern about European border security. **Not supported.**

- H7 (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads migrants to tell their friends to leave for Europe now rather than wait. **Not supported.**

- H8. (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to worse (better) expectations of future legal and policy treatment in Europe. **Not supported.**

- H9. (Political Cycle): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave should have larger effects on individuals whose priors begin farthest away from the treatment, and on those who update their beliefs about future migration in the direction of the treatment. **Supported.**

- H10 (Political Cycle): Information on a sympathetic (hostile) policy reception in Europe leads participants to perceive better (worse) legal prospects. Additionally, those who receive information about a hostile policy response should be more pessimistic legal about prospects for migrants next year and think that their journeys will be more dangerous. **Some support.**

- H11 (Political Cycle): Information that European policy is becoming more (and less) sympathetic will lead migrants to want to leave sooner. **Support for opening but not hostile.**

- H12 (Political Cycle): Information that European policy is going to close in the future will lead respondents to advise friends to leave now, or otherwise not to attempt the journey. **Not supported.**

- H13 (Political Cycle): Information that European policy is going to close in the future will lead respondents to want to leave now rather than wait for resettlement; those who receive the sympathetic treatment should be more likely to wait for resettlement. **Not supported.**

- H14 (Political Cycle): Information that European policy is going to close in the future will lead respondents more likely to benefit from asylum, namely Syrians in Turkey, to want to wait for resettlement; those who are less likely to benefit, namely Iraqis and Syrians outside of Turkey, will be more likely to want to leave with a smuggler. **Not supported.**

- A1a. Bayesian Stimulus: Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to worse (better) assessments of violence, economic, services, and social conditions in home countries. **Not supported.**

- A1b. Networks: Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to better (worse) assessments of what social and economic life will be like in Europe. **Not supported.**

- A2: misnumbered.

- A3. (Stimulus): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads to greater (less) concern about security threats in a migrant's home country. **Not supported.**

- A4 (Competition between migrants): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads migrants to tell their friends to stay home. **Not supported.**

- A5 (Social Networks): Information that more (fewer) migrants are part of the migrant wave leads migrants to tell their friends to leave for Europe in general but will not affect the proposed timing of the migration. **Not supported.**