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Identity Group Allegiance in Civil Wars

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Konstantin Ash

Committee in charge:

Professor David A. Lake, Chair
Professor Barbara F. Walter, Co-Chair
Professor Eli Berman
Professor Clark C. Gibson
Professor Philip G. Roeder

2016

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The Dissertation of Konstantin Ash is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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University of California, San Diego

2016

EPIGRAPH

A noble spirit embiggens the smallest man.

—Jebediah Springfield

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Identity Group Allegiance in Civil Wars

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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Professor David A. Lake, Chair
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This dissertation project looks at how identity groups – groups that share either ethnic, religious or regional characteristics – make allegiance choices at the outbreak of civil conflict. Specifically, I examine whether these groups join the government, the initiating rebel group or pursue self-government. Breaking with much past work on rebel groups that assumes that rebel leaders are autonomous strategic actors, I argue that the choice of whether to ally with the government, the rebels, or neither, can be a function of a non-strategic process: collective resentment toward out-groups. While resentment begins as a top-down mechanism generated by group leaders for personal gain prior to conflict onset, it evolves

into a bottom-up mechanism as it integrates into group identity by the time conflicts begin and shapes collective individual preferences against joining with certain conflict actors. My project tests this argument across several levels of analysis. First, a cross-national statistical analysis shows that groups exposed to either violence or repression are less likely to join with the perpetrator of those actions at conflict onset. Second, the survey experiment in Lebanon links exposure to political messaging to resentment toward either the government or another sectarian group and resentment to individual allegiance preferences. Finally, a case study of Syria during the onset of the current civil war in 2011 and interviews conducted in Arabic with Lebanese political leaders show that leaders' allegiance choices are shaped by the collective resentment of their identity group's members. Together, the results indicate that group allegiance at conflict onset is not an exclusively strategic process, with considerable implications for future conflict research.

Chapter 1

Introduction

> ...as the Assad government turned violent, the village picked a side, its elders said. 'We joined the revolution...The government kills innocent people. We felt no other option but to fight against [Assad].'
>
> *"Defying Common View, Some Syrian Kurds Fight Assad"*
>
> *New York Times, 22 January 2013*

Shortly after protests erupted across Syria against the Ba'athist government, the government passed a decree granting citizenship to hundreds of thousands of ethnic Kurds from the Northern Hasakah province, released hundreds of Kurdish political prisoners and recognized the status of the Kurdish language in both government and school instruction (Al-Jazeera Online 08 April 2011). The concessions largely met the pre-war demands of Kurdish opposition leaders. Nevertheless, as protests evolved into clashes with security forces and eventually civil conflict, Syrian Kurds in the Euphrates Valley, along with local Christians and Yazidis, chose to form a self-governing state called Rojava (van Wigenburg 2013). This scenario touches on a common, but under-explored phenomenon in civil conflicts:

allegiances between identity groups that did not initiate conflict between and either the conflict's initiators or the government.

Civil wars are rarely conflicts between a unitary group of rebels and a similarly unitary government. And during the Syrian Civil War, nearly two dozen distinct identity groups[1] have comprised four distinct coalitions in the conflict.[2] The formation of coalitions composed of diverse ethnic and sectarian interests is not unique to Syria and is observed in other conflicts around the world. However, the determinants of allegiance patterns, at either the group or individual level, remain an open question.

In explaining allegiances at the outset of civil conflict I broach a larger question relating to conflict behavior at both the group and individual levels. Namely, are conflict outcomes a reflection of strategic calculation or emotional sentiment? The dominant perspective in explaining conflict behavior has emphasized, either explicitly or implicitly, that both individuals and groups make conflict-related choices through strategic calculation. Studies highlight the role of financial incentives (Berman, et al. 2011a, Radnitz 2010),[3] social ties (Humphreys & Weinstein 2008) and insecurity (Scacco 2010) in driving individual conflict participation. Work on individual preferences draws from larger group-level research that also assumes that rebellion onset is drawn from strategic preferences. Conflict onset is associated with economic inequality (Gurr 1970, Ostby 2008), political exclusion (Horowitz 1985, Stewart 2008, Cederman, et al. 2011), state weakness (Fearon & Laitin 2003) and political opportunism to gain control of resources or political power (Grossman 1995, Brass

[1]Groups divided across shared ethnic, religious/sectarian or regional cleavages.

[2]Sunni Turkmen and Assyrians (Heras 2013) have joined the rebels, while the Druze (Naylor 2012) and Christian Arabs (Gusten 2013) have sided with the government and the Sunni Kurds in the Euphrates Valley along with local Christian and Yazidis, have chosen to form a self-governing Syrian Kurdistan. In attempting to remain altogether neutral, most Armenians and Circassians have been forced to flee the conflict to original homelands outside of Syria.

[3]Although this convention has been disputed by Blair et al. (2013).

1997, Collier & Hoeffler 2004), all of which are founded on materially-oriented calculations for conflict onset and participation.

The paradigm extends to the study of allegiances in civil conflict, where allegiances are the decisions of identity groups that did not initiate conflict to side with either the conflict's initiators or the government. Allegiance-related preferences have not been widely explored at the individual level, but a path-breaking study by Christia (2012) presents group allegiance decisions as a function of anticipated post-war gains for group leaders.[4] Christia assumes, in line with much other work on conflict (Driscoll 2015, Walter 1997), that leaders are autonomous and strategic actors that are able to choose the outcome that most aligns with their preferences.[5] However, allegiance patterns following the onset of conflict in Syria challenge the assumption of a leader-centric strategic model of allegiance. If applied to the mentioned case of the Hasakah Kurds, Christia's theory suggests that the Hasakah Kurds should join the government. The relative size of the government's coalition declined with the rise of competing rebel groups and, consequently, the regime offered the Kurdish leadership far more concessions than the nascent Free Syrian Army (FSA). In private, Kurdish elites expressed support for siding with the government. The history of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) – the most prominent Kurdish political movement at the time – as an off-shoot of long-time regime-allied Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) from Turkey (Tol April 10, 2012), also suggested that the Hasakah Kurds would ultimately join the regime. However, the PYD and the whole of the Hasakah Kurds ultimately chose self-government in the face of mass anti-regime protests by the Kurdish populace (Allsopp 2014, 193-194). Protests in spite of favorable government concessions suggest that individual preferences relating to conflict allegiance were not universally strategically driven, in tension with much existing work

[4]These gains are shaped by the relative sizes of rebel and government coalitions in an extension of the balancing model from international conflict (Walt 1987).

[5]The assumption is consistent with other work on the subject (Zhukov 2013, Seymour Fall 2014).

on conflict behavior. Given this tension with the existing strategic paradigm, the goal of this project is to explain whether and how non-strategic factors influence identity group allegiance after the onset of civil conflict.

In order to comprehensively analyze the rationale for allegiance after civil conflict onset, this project sets itself apart from existing work on conflict allegiance in four different ways. First, work to explain allegiance in civil conflicts has placed the decision-making capacity for allegiance at the foot of rebel group leaders, assuming that these leaders are strategic actors able to autonomously choose a course of actions for their group to follow(Christia 2012, Zhukov 2013, Seymour Fall 2014), while being largely silent on the role of identity in allegiance decisions or the role that *a priori* organization within identity groups plays in building coalitions after conflict onset. Second, existing work on allegiance assumes that peacetime allegiances between ethnic or religious groups, whether institutionally necessary, as in the case of Lebanon (Cammett & Issar 2010), or more informally ingrained into the political system, as in much of Africa (Arriola 2012), are commonplace across the developing world, implying that identity groups would also play a considerable role at the onset of civil conflict. When looking at actual civil conflicts, all but a few[6] post-Cold War civil wars include actors that are either implicitly or explicitly composed of groups divided among identity-based lines (Cederman & Girardin 2007). Thus, this project takes identity groups – groups divided by either ethnic, religious or regional cleavages – as its primary unit of analysis. Third, works on allegiance have largely treated groups within the context of conflict allegiance as unitary, arguing that group leaders or warlords are the primary drivers for observed allegiance outcomes (Christia 2012).[7]

[6] Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago and Sierra Leone.

[7] Warlords are seen as opportunistically forming coalitions on the basis of potential post-war political control or relative short-term gains. A theory that is steeped in the international relations literature on alliances, which creates a dichotomy between balancing (Walt 1987) and bandwagoning (Powell 1999).

Nevertheless, even if identity groups – groups based on differences in ethnic, religious or regional characteristics – frequently appear to act in unison during conflicts, even the most united groups are prone to both individual and elite-level discord and defection (Kalyvas 2008, Fjelde & Nilsson 2012). Thus, this project takes care to look at both how individual-level preferences on allegiance can be distinct from those of identity groups leaders and how those preferences can then collectively shape the behavior of identity group leaders. Finally, the project looks specifically at allegiance patterns following conflict onset, presuming that preferences for allegiance within groups are most clear when they are unaffected by the course of a particular conflict.

The aim of the project is to explain four potential identity group-level outcomes at the onset of civil conflict: joining the rebelling party, joining the government, establishing a self-governing entity or no collective action at all. There is reason to believe that non-strategic factors influence the prevalence of these outcomes and general decisions related to conflict. From social psychology, it is known that societal beliefs can be shaped by emotions, which define how individuals interpret information with respect to conflict (Bar-Tal 2001, Markus & Kitayama 1994). Emotions are "[episodes] of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism." These changes involve expression, bodily symptoms and arousal and do not necessarily occur as a results of a conscious decision on the part of an individual (Scherer 2001). In this sense, emotions differ from decisions based on strategy, which require either explicit or implicit cognitive deliberation. A particular emotion that has been used to explain conflict preferences and behavior is resentment – active negative emotion as a result of a perceived wrongdoing (Murphy 1982). Namely, resentment can be a key prerequisite for individual

support of a rebellion, shaping community organization during conflict (Petersen 2001). While Petersen's argument focuses on explicit participation in armed conflict, this project will extend the role of resentment to examine conflict allegiance outcomes. Within identity groups, resentment is thought to be generated before the onset of conflict by identity group leaders, who personally benefit from emphasizing resentment toward an out-group (Petersen 2011). Once conflict begins, individuals become averse to joining an allegiance partner, whether government or initiating out-group, toward which they feel resentment. This would suggest a rather paradoxic mechanism, as the actions of leaders before conflict potentially limit their ability to join with a preferred ally after conflict begins.

The relationship between active negative emotion and both conflict allegiance preferences and outcomes is tested at the individual, leader and group levels. First, a large-N analysis that includes original geospatial data on identity groups in conflict areas around the world examines the relationship between prior instances of repression and intergroup violence and conflict allegiance outcomes at the group level. However, the mere presence of past instances of repression and violence, while predictive at the group level, is not sufficient to explain why individual members of an identity group collectively support a particular allegiance, especially when looking at both the Syrian Civil War and survey experimental evidence from Lebanon. The latter shows that identity group political leaders activate feelings of active negative emotion toward either the government or another identity group and that individual preferences toward allegiance are significantly shaped by the direction of this active negative emotion. The onset of civil war in Syria, on the other hand, shows that once individuals feel resentment toward a particular party in a conflict, political leaders not only lose the ability to sway group members to a resented side, but face dire consequences, such as loss of authority or even assassination for deviating to a party

that they had previously built resentment toward. The presence of such an accountability mechanism regarding conflict allegiance is also confirmed through interviews with Lebanese politicians. Thus, by examining both the individual and leader levels, the mechanisms of the group-level empirical relationship are uncovered and verified. The next section examines alternative explanations for allegiance outcomes drawn from varying schools of international relations and comparative political research and evaluates their capacity to explain the conflict allegiance. Then, the chosen theoretical approach is expounded in more detail, followed by a detailed plan for the dissertation.

Possible Approaches to Explaining Conflict Allegiance

Before fully outlining the theoretical approach that is thought to best explain conflict allegiance in the following chapter, other paradigmatic approaches are assessed as to their fit in explaining the phenomenon. Problems are identified in applying each paradigm and discussed in detail within each sub-section.

Ethnic Ties

In many seminal within and between-country studies of civil conflict onset, ethnic identity is held as more important than other bonds. This implies that when predicting ethnic allegiance, shared ethnic ties among identity groups that are otherwise divided by region or religion would lead to an increased likelihood of allegiance. Elevation of ethnicity above other forms of identity partly stems from the essentialist approach, which underscores historical links, drawn from colonial rule, that drive increased salience of

ethnic identity in the short term (Horowitz 1985).[8] Groups that share a common ethnic background are generally known to collaborate politically in cross-border affairs, especially in the case of diasporas (King & Melvin 1999, Shain 2007). Moreover, authors that look at the transnational links between conflict actors often prioritize ethnic bonds as being particularly strong motivating forces in the support that rebellions receive from foreign sources or neighboring states (Cederman, et al. 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to expect ethnic ties to supersede other identity dimensions in the formation of identity group allegiances.

Nevertheless, there is also considerable evidence that ethnic bonds alone are not sufficient to foment ties across other identity dimensions. Many civil conflicts around the world, and particularly in the Middle East, take place within rather than between ethnic groups, with ethnic Arabs fighting on both sides of the Syrian Civil War, ethnic Tajiks fighting on both sides of the Tajik Civil War, and even ethnic Bosnians taking two different positions, depending on region, during the Balkan Wars.[9] It is immediately clear that ethnic bonds are not sufficient drivers of allegiance at conflict onset and that many conflicts involve ethnic groups that are divided along another dimension of identity, such as region in the Tajik and Bosnian cases and sect in the Syrian case, that is more salient in generating conflict. To some extent, this observation undermines assertions that cross-cutting cleavages are pacific in nature and that sharing a dimension of identity is likely to decrease the likelihood of conflict between two groups (Baldwin & Huber 2010a). Instead, the observed cases support a view that identity groups divided on at least one dimension of identity are essentially atomized and make independent decisions for conflict allegiance. The rationale for this reasoning is expanded in Chapter 3. Thus, while the potential mobilizing effect of ethnicity

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[8] Although, the essentialist approach has recently come under considerable scrutiny from scholars that emphasize that salience of a particular identity division is variable and often driven by political forces, known as constructivists (Posner 2004, Varshney 2003, Wilkinson 2004, Chandra 2004).

[9] See appendices of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for more detailed descriptions of each of these cases

across other identity characteristics is tested in Chapter 4, it will not be the main theoretical focus of the project.

Bargaining

The bargaining approach to conflict is simple and has been paradigmatic in the study of conflict over the past two decades. The bargaining model of war is fundamentally grounded in an anarchic international system where states must interact through bargaining and there are few, if any, credible third parties to enforce agreements. The model posits that conflict should not occur as long as the bargaining space is divisible, there are costs, both sides can gauge their opponent's capabilities and neither side can foresee defecting to obtain a better outcome in future bargaining periods (Fearon 1995). The logic behind bargaining and conflict can also be applied to alliances, positing that identity groups, like states, benefit from pooling their resources, improve bargaining outcomes and credibility of signals of capabilities and resolve (Morrow 1994, Fearon 1997).

However, the framework is unlikely to explain internal conflict and, more specifically, conflict allegiance, due to numerous empirical hurdles. First, the assumption of anarchy, which serves as the motivation for bargaining over adjudication at the international level does not appear to hold at the sub-national level when considering the potential onset of civil war. States, unlike the international system, have a means to adjudicate disputes: the government. Government could theoretically always settle conflict between two internal parties through credible agreements or revealing capabilities. On the other hand, agreements with the government should never credible, as the non-governmental party must submit to the government's monopoly over the use of force within their boundaries (Herbst 2000).

Given the latter scenario, the bargaining model would suggest that conflict should always happen between the government and non-governmental actors.

Constant conflict is obviously not observed. When conflict does occur, it seems to be initiated by politically excluded groups (Ostby 2008, Stewart, et al. 2008, Cederman, et al. 2010b) that have been left out of the bargaining arena altogether. Even taking the ability to apply the bargaining model application to internal conflict as given, it is difficult to reconcile the role of alliances in the model compared to those in actual conflict. One could imagine that governments form political alliances as a way of deterring uprisings in the same way as states do in deterring other states, reflecting theories of interstate alliances. Nevertheless, as seen in Chapter 5 with the example of Syria, the alliances formed after the outbreak of conflict seemed to reflect little of the pre-onset political situation in Syria. Thus, it is questionable whether either modes of credibility or signals of resolve are reliable given the apparent collapse of many pre-war allegiances at conflict onset. The lack of allegiance stability points to a different mechanism, rather than the bargaining framework as being applicable to explaining allegiance patterns among identity groups at conflict onset. Moreover, given that both resolve and credibility are only indirectly quantifiable, they would be exceedingly difficult to convincingly test at the group, leader or individual level.[10]

Anarchy and Alliances

While bargaining between nation-states is said to be a consequence of an anarchic international system, alliances between states have been posited as an institutional solution to the lack of a central authority in an international system. Fundamentally, interstate

[10]There is also considerable evidence from psychology that individuals do not behave rationally under many and that psychological explanations do a better job of explaining many behaviors than rational choice (Mercer 2005).

alliances are intended to commit each party to support the other in the case of war against either party and to signal this commitment to potential attackers (Morrow 2000). Most interpretations of alliance formation patterns propose that the power distribution within either the whole of the international system or a particular region plays a principal role in determining which countries form alliances, as there is evidence of both countries seeking stronger partners, or bandwagoning (Powell 1999) and weaker partners to collaborate against an already powerful force (Walt 1987). Defensive alliances are fundamentally designed to prevent war (Leeds 2003) and alliances should only lead to war when one ally drags others into a conflict based on open commitments or when states don't balance against a growing threat in the hope that others will handle it (Christensen & Snyder 1990). While there has already been an application of the alliance framework to civil conflict – arguing that parties in civil wars balance their loyalties as conflict progresses according to the relative power alignment of the warring sides – the framework has focused on events during civil conflicts, rather than at their onset, when the dynamics are most volatile (Christia 2012).

In spite of this application, it is not clear whether the framework for international alliances is applicable to allegiance patterns during civil conflicts. Fundamentally, the formation of ties between groups after conflicts begin are not *per se* alliances, as they are neither intended or capable of preventing conflict. Conflict has already begun, which is why this project uses the more broad term: allegiance. Sides in a civil conflict, especially at onset, rarely behave as a presumably hierarchical state-like entity and would have considerable difficulty signaling such an effect, making it questionable how identity groups would trust one another under such a scenario. As expanded in Chapter 5, the Syrian government had successfully co-opted all major legal and illegal Sunni Muslim Arab political entities in the years leading up to conflict outbreak, marginalizing the Muslim Brotherhood and effectively

making the Sunni Ulama (clerical body) an arm of the state. Nevertheless, the co-optation of leaders did not reflect the potential direction of allegiance of the Sunni Arab populace, as some initiated conflict against the state and yet others disavowed leaders loyal to the regime to join the uprising. In essence, while political alliances before conflict signal some collaboration between identity groups, the collaboration is typically among leaders and does not extend to the population at large, leaving the possibility that groups that are political allies at peacetime become adversaries after rebellion begins. Finally, it is questionable whether capabilities can be accurately gauged by any party at conflict onset to formulate an idea about prospective allies' capabilities. Without being able to gauge these capabilities, groups are not sufficiently informed to engage in either balancing or bandwagoning. Ultimately, this calls the applicability of the state-level alliance framework to civil conflict onset into question for the sheer number of potential violations to the fundamental definitions of state-level alliances.

Distributive Politics

If relative power distribution is not sufficient to explain allegiances during civil conflicts, it is possible that distributive politics, especially the ability of competing sides in a civil conflict to distribute goods and services to identity groups and their supporters could be driving allegiance patterns. Work on distributive politics is founded on the assumption that politicians face a trade-off in their ability to win support through either passing public policies that are beneficial to society at large or distributing particularistic benefits (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). The latter, known as clientelism, particularly defines politics across the developing world and serves as a mechanism for governments to gain support from traditional leaders in many identity-based communities (Bayart 1989). The distribution of either goods

or the capacity to obtain goods has been crucial for many governments in co-opting potential opposition movements, especially in the Middle East (Lust-Okar 2005, Blaydes 2011), while the desire for income, or at the very least the lack of opportunity cost due to poverty has been shown to be a driving factor in joining a rebel group at the individual level (Humphreys & Weinstein 2008).

Thus, it would be plausible that either governments or rebel groups competed for allegiances with offers to distribute benefits to identity groups whose support they want in a civil conflict. In fact, attempts have been observed in conflicts ranging from the Shining Path's insurgency in Peru (Huston 1988), to the previously mentioned efforts of the Assad government in Syria to recruit Sunni Kurds to its side (Allsopp 2014). Nevertheless, it is the lack of success of these efforts at yielding willing compliance that underscores the ineffectiveness of distribution of goods or political influence alone as an explanatory variable for allegiance. In Peru, distribution of public services to local indigenous peoples was coupled with brutal repression of dissent that did not signal a balanced relationship between the rebels and their constituents. Assad's efforts ultimately failed, with the Kurds pursuing self-government. And the distributive politics explanation seems to fail to explain the rise of self-governing entities in resource-poor or non-self sustaining areas, such as Ajaria or Somaliland and a comparable lack of self-government choice among group in resource-rich areas, indicating that material incentives alone may not be driving group decision-making. In fact, while leaders of identity groups would likely benefit from the wealth or influence gained from a purely particularistic mode of allegiance and be able to distribute the goods to some supporters, it is unlikely that distribution of goods alone would be sufficient to exercise control over members of an entire identity group without another factor that supplements loyalty among identity group members.

Norms and Ideology

Within the international system, informal modes for appropriate behavior can emerge between some nation-states that allow for cooperation that remedy the state of anarchy (Wendt 1992), with enforcement of the norm of sovereignty serving as the principal example of such a process (Fazal 2007). Applied to sub-national interaction, ideological bonds could be particularly well-suited to unite identity groups in civil conflicts, as they already manifest benefits in fostering discipline among fighters and decreasing proclivity for violence (Sanin & Wood 2014). But, while ideology may carry benefits at fostering loyalty at the individual level, it is not clear that allegiance takes place along ideological, rather than identity-based lines in many civil conflicts; especially since the end of the Cold War, when fighters could be united by their allegiance to either communist or capitalist causes. Certainly, there are post-Cold War conflicts that divide purely along ideological lines, such as the Algerian Civil War, which pitted the secular military government against Islamist rebels, with allegiance defined by ideological support for the Islamist movement, rather than ethnic identity.

However, conflicts such as the Algerian Civil War are few and far between and new conflicts since the end of the Cold War have had a much less ideological and much more ethnic or sectarian character. Moreover, groups whose leadership has adopted ideologically similar positions have not been particularly prone to fighting together. For instance, groups ascribing to Arab nationalism in Syria and Iraq have done so in the context of loyalty to a very specific identity group: Alawite Arabs in the case of Syria and Sunni Arabs in the case of Iraq, showing that essentially the same ideology can be co-opted by diametrically opposed sectarian interests that ultimately fight one another. Additionally, groups that seem to have an ideological motivation also couch their opposition in identity-based frames. While the insurgency in East Ukraine appeared to be an uprising against joining the European Union

from a region that stood to lose out, at least in the short term, to Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, the rhetoric of the insurgents was foremost couched in Russian ethnic identity. On the other side, the pro-European Union forces firmly positioned themselves as anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalists. It follows that while ideological fielty can certainly generate allegiances in conflict or even allegiances among identity groups, it has become a much less frequent source of bonds since the end of the Cold War, as absent an overlying global ideological struggle, many movements have found ethnic or sectarian appeals to be a more effective mobilizing tool, leaving some ideologically similar groups diametrically opposed to one another. Thus, while potentially still relevant, ideological bonds will not be a theoretical focus of this project.

Resentment and Accountability within Identity Groups

Reviewing five potential explanatory threads for allegiance during civil conflict shows that many existing potential explanations for conflict allegiance, whether they would present actors as purely strategic or not, are not sufficient to explain allegiance outcomes and preferences. Instead, an approach is taken that specifically incorporates the possibility of non-strategic allegiance preference formation at the individual level, reflecting the theorized structure and decision-making in identity groups. While the theory is presented in detail in Chapter 2, it is summarized in this section as a way of distinguishing it from the approaches presented above.

To understand the means through which active negative emotion – resentment – affects conflict allegiance outcomes and preferences, it is necessary to analyze the environment in which decisions take place: the identity group. Identity groups are formed based on a social category in which individuals are eligible to be members, qualify for membership on

the basis of some shared attributes and then form myths around association based on both subjective and objective elements (Chandra 2006). Within the group there are only a select few group members that have the ability to influence the opinions, attitudes, beliefs and motivations of group members, termed leaders (Valente & Pumpuang 2007). These individuals are presumably able to convince members, particularly during civil conflict, that their collective interests are best served by joining a particular side and in some group members fighting alongside other participants of the conflict from that side to some collective end. Given the weight of the decision to join a conflict, it should not be assumed that group members will follow blindly what their leaders instruct on conflict, and such blindness is neither reflected in peacetime interactions or in, later specified, empirical evidence of conflict. The latter is explained in more detail in later chapters, but the former is clear from works on identity politics. Specifically, identity group leaders rarely maintain their positions through institutional or ancestral legitimacy and need clientelist goods to maintain even short-term support among their constituents (Cammett 2014, Radnitz 2010). However, the provision of goods alone is likely not sufficient to maintain loyalty, as clientelism can emanate from many different leader candidates. Thus, the crucial mechanism for elevating leaders to a status above their competitors becomes the perception of being the protector of the group, which leaders activate through emphasizing past instances of either government repression or intergroup violence against the group. The emphasis forms a collective memory of the violence and develops into a collective active negative emotion, or resentment, against the perpetrating actor. While resentment binds individuals to group leaders, it also constrains leader behavior, as resentment sentiment becomes ingrained in members' consciousness as part of their collective identity over time (Mackie, et al. 2008) and members feel the need to rectify resentment sentiment once conflict begins (Petersen 2011). Thus, a recursive account-

ability mechanism emerges where leaders obtain support from members through fostering resentment, but are themselves bound not to deviate from their past pronouncements. Put together, this explanation successfully takes account of the internal mechanisms to preserve power within an identity group, coming closer than existing avenues to explaining both individual allegiance preferences and group-level allegiance outcomes.

Plan for Dissertation

The dissertation examines the proposed question through a theoretical chapter that details the theory and five subsequent empirical chapters, closing with a brief conclusion. The chapters are designed to cumulatively address the subject of allegiance across levels of analysis, with focus on outcomes at the group, individual and leader levels. The second chapter expands the theoretical approach presented in the previous section. Specifically, it outlines the internal workings of identity groups, with the assumption that group membership is neither fixed nor easy to change. Within this environment, it is argued that some members of identity groups take advantage of the mobilizational advantage that salient identity cleavages offer in order to obtain political and personal gain. Nevertheless, the competition for positions of authority within identity groups necessitates that leaders make an effort to secure support from the membership collective, either through distributing particularistic goods and services or through establishing themselves as protectors of the identity group against outside threats. Whereas the former is available to most aspiring leaders, the latter can give one leader an advantage over competitors and is most sought out. The position of protector is obtained through a response against violence by other identity groups or repression through stoking resentment against the perpetrating actor. As mentioned in the above section, while resentment is a powerful tool that binds individuals to group leaders, it

also creates a powerful force against allegiance with the resented actor if conflict were to erupt. The potential outcomes and mechanisms for the theory, in addition to a formalization, are also outlined in the second chapter.

The third chapter presents a more detailed conceptualization of the unit of analysis: the identity group. This novel term encompasses cleavages across ethnic, religious and regional lines, with the expectation that these geographically identifiable divisions allow for sufficient conceptualization and data gathering within the framework of the unit of analysis. The chapter outlines the rationale for such a division and the reason for exclusion of other potentially relevant cleavages, such as class or ideology. After justifying the inclusion criteria, the chapter develops a novel geographic data-set of identity groups in each country that has experienced civil conflict since 1990. The intent of the data-set is to capture all groups within these countries that are divided along ethnic, religious/sectarian and/or regional lines and to allow for data-generation based on the geographic distribution of these groups. The data-set, produced from a combination of existing and author-generated sources of information is validated through three case studies that establish the groups from the data are both tangible entities and have historical significance in a country's political and social environment.

The fourth chapter applies the framework from the previous chapter to gather data on identity groups at the time of conflict outbreak as a way of explaining group-level patterns of allegiance in identity-based conflicts since 1990. With the unit of analysis being the identity group, historical data and news sources are culled to deduce the behavior of each non-initiating identity group of a civil conflict at the time of outbreak. Two group-level factors are predicted to drive allegiance outcomes for identity groups: political exclusion and previous conflict with the initiating identity group. It is posited that each present leaders with

opportunities to utilize either repression or intergroup violence in order to ascend in status of an identity group. Repression is not necessarily less likely for politically included groups, but less likely to be exploited by political leaders given those leaders' likely connections to the perpetrating government. Additional predictor variables are derived using geographic data and ArcGIS. The results, which also incorporate the geographic positions of groups to one another, show that politically excluded groups are more likely to join the rebels than the government, while groups that have previously engaged in conflict with the initiator of a rebellion are more likely to pursue self-government.

The fifth chapter expands on results from group-level patterns of allegiance by looking at tangible outcomes in a specific case of conflict onset: the Syrian Civil War in 2011. The case study examines the rationale behind the allegiance outcomes observed in specific identity groups in Syria after conflict outbreak. There is special focus on the role that previous rhetoric on both repression and violence by other parties played in the decisions of leaders to align with either the rebels or the government or to pursue self-government. Also covered is the extent to which leaders were punished by constituents for deviating from the prevailing preferences of the group against a particular side and the degree that anticipation of punishment shaped both actual leader responses and the way leaders conducted themselves leading up to a decision. The case of Syria shows that leaders that had previously stoked resentment against their preferred allegiance partner were likely to either delay their decision and ultimately choose not to side with the resented side, or lost support for siding with the resented actor and faced grave consequences.

The sixth chapter examines how individual preferences for allegiance are shaped by affiliation with identity-based political groups, in a test of the mechanisms of resentment and its ties to political affiliation in societies stratified by identity. The chapter describes a survey

experiment carried out in Lebanon in 2014. Lebanon is chosen due to its nearly unique status as a country that has sufficient tension to make the likelihood of civil onset plausible to individual respondents while being sufficiently safe and conflict-free for administration of a survey. Lebanon also has a political system that is highly stratified along confessional lines, with four major confessions: Christians, Druze, Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims, dictating political competition in the country and political parties organized almost exclusively along sectarian lines. The aim of the survey experiment is to gauge support among members of confessions for their group joining a civil conflict initiated by another confession. Based on the theory, resentment against either the government or the initiator should predict either increased or decreased likelihood of allegiance with the rebelling group, respectively. Evidence shows that resentment toward the initiating group is mitigated by political party support. As expected feelings of resentment toward the government make respondents more likely to support their group joining a rebellion, while feeling that a group's leader is a threat to the country makes respondents more likely to join the government.

The seventh chapter provides further evidence of the accountability mechanism for identity group leaders at the outset of conflict through interviews of Lebanese political leaders from across the country's political spectrum. Political party leaders in Lebanon behave similarly to conceptualized identity group leaders as Lebanese political competition is structured largely based on identity and many political parties or leaders essentially serve as thinly veiled vehicles for political organization of religious confessions. Accordingly, most political competition takes place within, rather than across confessional groups. Interviews largely reveal the same mechanisms for maintaining constituent support for their leadership through clientelism and more definitively through maintaining a perception of defending the confession against external threats. Moreover, political leaders largely acknowledge that

both their peacetime and wartime interaction with other confessions will be structured, to an extent, according to their previous statements on those confessions or political groups, rather than their personal preferences at either the present or some future time.

Finally, the eighth chapter provides a conclusion for the project, with a discussion of the policy implications for the findings and potential directions for future research. The findings have concrete implications for the academic study of conflict as they provide evidence across multiple levels of analysis of the role of non-strategic emotional factors in influencing conflict behavior and group level outcomes.

Chapter 2

Assumptions and Theoretical Model

The previous chapter laid out the goal of this project: to explain identity group allegiance outcomes at the onset of civil war. While existing work on conflict onset largely treats conflict actors as dichotomous, belonging to either the government or the rebels, recent conflicts such as the Syrian Civil War underscore the coalitional nature of each side and the possibility for alternative formations. The Syrian Civil War alone points to four potential identity group reactions to conflict: to join the rebels who initiate the conflict, as Sunni Turkmen and Assyrians (Heras 2013) have done, to join with the government like the Druze (Naylor 2012) and Christian Arabs (Gusten 2013), to pursue self-government like Sunni Kurds in the Euphrates Valley (van Wigenburg 2013) and finally, to take no collective action in the face of conflict like Syria's Armenians or Circassians, who have mostly fled the country. While some effort has been made to explain allegiances during the Syrian Civil War and other conflicts, much like most studies of conflict, group leaders are assumed to be autonomous strategic actors in deciding allegiance. There is sufficient evidence from the case of Syria, presented in both Chapters 1 and 6 to suggest that leaders are not autonomous and group level decisions are influenced by non-strategic factors. The theory presented in

this chapter postulates that active negative emotion – a non-strategic factor – is one of the principal drivers of conflict allegiance preferences at the individual level and choices at the group level.

This chapter has two aims: 1) to hypothesize on the roots of group-level allegiance outcomes that are generalizable across countries and 2) to use information gleamed from those patterns to explore the role of individual preferences in group decision-making. The theory for identity group allegiance developed in this chapter draws on everyday political interactions within identity groups to explain both individual and group allegiance preferences. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first briefly outlines the unit of analysis for the group-level component of this project ahead of a more detailed explanation of the justification and sources of the identity group as a geographic unit in Chapter 3. The second section outlines the choices faced by identity groups, examines why only some cleavage groups are capable of reacting to the incidence of civil conflict and the determining factors for this pattern. The third and fourth sections look at preferences of individual group members and group leaders, respectively, in regard to allegiance after a conflict has broken out. The implications for group-level and individual-level preferences that follow from their preferences are presented in the fifth and sixth sections, respectively. Taken together, this chapter will show how interactions within identity groups drive group-level outcomes through collective active negative emotion observed at the beginning of civil conflicts.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis to be used for the group-level components of this study is the identity group. This terminology is not novel, but, for purposes of this project, is founded in integrating analysis of three cleavages that are empirically associated with divisions between

two sides in a civil conflict: ethnicity, religious confession and region. The distinction is used because these three cleavages are, above all others, sufficiently geographically identifiable to be captured as distinct geographic areas and observed as the key divisions among combatant groups during civil conflicts in various past studies analyzing identity-based conflict. A list of identity groups is generated from geographic distinctions along ethnic, religious and regional lines to create polygon maps of identity groups within the same country. The polygon maps are then used to extract geographic data to reflect the space they occupy. The specific rationale for this approach and the methods used to obtain maps of the three categories of identity groups and then to join those maps are shown in the following chapter. In addition, Chapter 3 provides examples from several countries in the data that validate the existence and salience of the identity groups that are derived using the sampling technique.

Identity-based divisions are salient in some parts of the world, but not on others. Thus, the theoretical analysis of this study is inherently limited to areas where identity groups are politically salient entities – essentially, where political divisions mirror those based on identity characteristics. Necessarily, this selection of cases excludes most consolidated democracies,[1] which have neither sufficient identity-based divisions, nor have experienced a period of large-scale political violence since the end of the Second World War. Thus, the bulk of the countries where the identity group unit of analysis is tractable are semi-democratic and autocratic and led by individuals that are less constrained in their behavior by the general populace, but face a greater incentive to distribute political and material goods to small influential groups that keep the leaders in power (Svolik 2012). Narrowing the coalition of goods recipients increases the likelihood of protest and political opposition from the excluded portion of the population. The response to opposition mobilization may be a

[1]Where consolidation is the full commitment of major societal actors to participation in the democratic crisis and simultaneous renunciation of extra-electoral tactics (Gunther, et al. 1995)

form of acquiescence and accommodation to some groups (Weingast 1997, Magaloni 2010), but must also include some repression, or the use of physical sanctions for deterring or imposing costs on opposition to a government policy (Goldstein 1978, Davenport 2007), for opposition groups. Together, this creates a political environment where the government systematically carries out acts of repression against political actors in a way that can be construed as an identity-based attack and, as seen later in the chapter, can shape allegiance preferences before conflicts begin.

Group Cohesion and Composition

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, identity groups face more than the two obvious options at the outbreak of a civil conflict. Groups can not only join rebels or the government, but also have an option to create a self-governing entity that sits apart from both combating sides. All three of these postures require an active stance from an identity group; either through mobilization in support of one side of a conflict or, as in the case of most Sunni Kurds in Syria, a generation of state-like entities that create a quasi-government within the borders of a country that is experiencing civil conflict.

The theoretical intent of this study is to focus on the decisions made by mobilized groups to actively participate in conflict. Nevertheless, there remains a fourth possible outcome where groups do not mobilize for conflict at all, either opting to avoid the negative costs of conflict or, more likely, being unable to mobilize due to internal constraints against choosing an alternative course of action. While explaining the behavior of these groups is not the primary focus of this project, their motivation and internal structure is useful for illustrating allegiance behavior as a whole. Fundamentally, unless groups are united and definitively fighting for one side, they are not sufficiently reliable partners for either the

rebels or government to entrust with political power. A non-cohesive side runs the risk of infiltration by non-aligned members from the same group, decreasing their value as an ally and making a lack of collective action on the part of a group devastating to that group's potential gains at the end of a conflict. Victorious parties are simply unwilling to grant concessions to groups that are not seen as doing their fair share in winning a war. For instance, in accusing Kurdish parties of not sufficiently participating in the Syrian uprising, Syrian National Council (SNC)[2] member Samir Nashar suggested that if Kurdish parties continued to seek dialogue with the regime, "[their] stance will certainly have consequence after the fall of the regime" (Allsopp 2014, 196).

Even more dangerously, non-mobilized identity groups leave themselves open to the possibility of violence from all parties during a civil conflict. These parties see non-aligned groups as a target for conquest because of their lack of commitment and can use selective violence as a way of dominating groups, rather than engaging them in cooperation (Kalyvas 2006). While there are examples abound of non-affiliated groups caught in the crossfire of conflict, a recent example from Syria particularly emphasizes the consequences of passive neutrality. Circassians in villages along Syria's Golan Heights were faced with a choice when fighting between fleeing rebels and the government spread to their region in 2012: choose a side or remain neutral. "We are neutral. [We are] neither with the regime, nor the opposition. Please go away and don't drag our village into your war," said one village elder. Neither side listened. The Free Syrian Army seized his village and the Syrian army followed and shelled Circassian villages. Dozens of Circassians, including that elder were killed. Many houses were destroyed and most of the population was forced to flee (TAŞTEKİN November 19, 2012). Neutrality in civil conflict is rife with negative

[2]The umbrella rebel political organization during the first year of the Syrian Civil War.

consequences, from displacement and exploitation by either side, to death, as seen in the case of Syria's Circassians. Moreover, even if groups are far away from areas of contestation, they may stand to benefit from pledging allegiance to a particular side as a way of avoiding the perception that the group is trying to subvert a particular cause.

The potential for conquest by one active party in a civil war and a lost opportunity to improve or maintain an identity group's status compound to increase insecurity among group members. The insecurity translates into fear, or anxiety over a real or perceived danger, from the collective. As insecurity evolves into fear, individuals have a lower barrier of entry into conflict (Staub & Bar-Tal 2003) and would pressure group leaders into choosing a side in the civil conflict as a unified force. If leaders disobey, they face the possibility of a loss of prestige and ultimately their position within their identity group. However, only some groups are ultimately able to mobilize toward collective action. In the next section, group cohesion is not only shown to be a prerequisite for mobilization to any of the three *active* states of allegiance, but that the adverse consequences of non-participation in a conflict lead all cohesive groups to choose a side in a civil conflict.

Variation in Identity as a Determinant of Group Cohesion

The nature of group cohesion is best explained by variation within the internal political environment of identity groups. Specifically, the project's unit of analysis reveals patterns in identity group cohesion – ability to mobilize for collective action – by looking at all potential conflict actors at the ethnic, confessional and regional levels. While cohesion may seem like an obvious prerequisite for allegiance with a side in a civil conflict, it has another, more important, role in elucidating a relationship between identity group members and leaders that will play a larger role as this argument develops. Group cohesion varies most

fundamentally because membership in an identity group does not automatically translate into a strong connection to that group's well-being. Individual ascription with an identity group, essentially "any social category in which an individual is eligible to be a member" (Chandra 2006), varies considerably within and across groups. A degree of identity is fixed; to the extent that individuals cannot change their native language, skin color, appearance or familial ties. Nevertheless, a second component of identity, the social aspect that individuals project to others, can vary based on the degree that an individual ascribes with any of his/her identifiable features (Fearon 1998).[3]

While some aspects of identity are more difficult to change than others, it should not be assumed that factors such as ethnicity are fixed as salient in the minds of individuals (see (Horowitz 1985)). In general, an individual's emotional connection to a group is contingent on ascription with that group (Mackie, et al. 2004). Moreover, ascription to identity groups varies under even the most polarizing instances of political violence (Varshney 2003). Individuals' identity also varies with their ethnicity, religious affiliation or region of residence, even in conflict environments. This is underscored by widespread individual defections across combating sides in civil wars (Kalyvas 2008, Fjelde & Nilsson 2012) showing that identity with one's ascriptive group during political conflict is still not fixed at its maximal capacity. Thus, collective identity must be built, even nurtured, if it is to be politically useful. It may, instrumentally, be constructed as a result of either economic or political discrimination with economically disadvantaged groups building an identity to claim a more advanced position in a national economy (Gellner 1983). Under these circumstances, strong links between an individual and a group can provide group members with a large stake in that group's success or failure and can overcome problems of collective

[3] This has been termed as the "Janus" faced model: one part of identity is internal and limited by genetics and history, while the other part is instrumental and shaped by social forces (see (Laitin 1997)).

action, especially when faced with an urgent problem that necessitates a response (Fireman & Gamson 1979). At this stage, identity may become an extension of the psychological self, with members appraising objects and events in terms of their implications to their group (Mackie et al. 2008).[4] Thus, while strong bonds can provide groups with better ways of mobilizing for collective action, they should not be taken as given, but as variables depending on characteristics of that group's members' ability to work together toward a collective goal.

While individuals that strongly identify with their group may converge in terms of their emotional profile (Seger et al. 2009), they still may not have the ability to galvanize an entire group toward collective action. These members are generally limited in the extent of their connections with other members and disseminate information or influence decision-making across an entire membership body. Only a select few group members, termed leaders, are sufficiently connected to the identity group's network and have the ability to influence the opinions, attitudes, beliefs and motivations of other group members (Valente & Pumpuang 2007). Leaders can access the opinion of a broad spectrum of individuals and channel those preferences into cohesive group action. Such action can include political violence, as leaders can convince reluctant members that their service to the group can serve both individual and collective interests (Petersen 2001). Additionally, while institutional facilitation is not necessary to galvanize group members, institutions are capable of structuring interaction withing groups, giving leaders avenues to mobilize members of an identity group (Roeder 2007). Together, these two classifications: strongly ascribing members of identity groups and identity group leaders make up the arena within which group decisions are made.

[4]The latter concept, known as intergroup emotional theory (IET), posits that individuals develop emotional characteristics relating to their group distinct from the characteristics that define them as a person (Seger, et al. 2009).

Applying the dynamic of political interaction within groups yields the first prediction from this chapter. As mentioned, all groups have a pull toward mobilization at the outset of a conflict and all would participate if they could, either due to the potential for future political and economic gains from a new post-war arrangement or to avoid losses at the hands of the groups that have already mobilized. The characteristics of cohesive groups make them most suited to mobilize relative to other groups in a country. The pull from members to participate in conflict is sufficient to generate action and a unified leadership stands to execute those demands. As such, it is expected that all cohesive groups will choose a mobilizational course of action for a rebellion. It follows that:

Hypothesis 1. *Identity groups with higher levels of collective identity and a unified leadership structure are more likely to act in response to a rebellion.*

Once faced with only a choice to take a particular mobilizational action, both leaders and members generate preferences for each potential choice. There are three remaining choices: 1) to actively support the initiating party of a rebellion, by sending a group militia to fight on its side or by providing the rebels with either financial support or matériel, 2) to side with the government, making a similar choice to provide militias to assist government forces, to continue or begin providing the government with tax revenues after the war has begun and to engage in the government's political system and 3) to choose self-government, where identity group leaders monopolize their own authority, choosing to establish a separate governing entity for their group where they hold all political power, providing no tribute to either the government or the rebels throughout the course of the conflict. To clarify the last choice, self-government does not represent a war of secession from the government, but a declaration of non-alignment with both the pro-rebel and pro-government coalitions that involves the creation of a quasi-state and military that seek to actively avoid conflict. Put

together, the allegiance choices represent unordered options from which leaders of cohesive groups must choose based on a combination of their own and member preferences. The interaction between those preferences is described in the following section.

Identity Group Structure and Leader Accountability

Before discussing how choices for the remaining three outcomes are made, it is necessary to further describe the underlying interactions between group leaders and members. It is these interactions that will ultimately shape allegiance outcomes at both individual and group levels. As mentioned, identity groups are composed of sets of individuals, some with more influence over the opinion of the group than others. Those with the most influence – leaders – have a position within the identity group that gives them a unique opportunity to achieve personalistic gains. Specifically, leaders obtain discrete political and material gains from a group's advancement in a state's political process. If an identity group is included in a governing coalition, the leaders will take the primary political positions in representing that group and all of the material rewards that come from holding office, after subtracting the benefits they have to distribute as patronage to group members (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). The benefits from office are especially far-reaching if leaders choose self-government, allowing themselves to establish an autonomous fiefdom within their territory. Thus, I posit that leaders most value **political power** and seek to maximize it through the mobilization of group members toward collective action. At the same time, the leaders' position remains tenuous and threatened from other competitors to their position that seek similarly lucrative payoffs. Thus, leaders always look for new ways to build loyalty from constituents and to secure their position. In this section, I describe the mechanisms leaders use for group loyalty, why collective emotion is the most preferred means to securing

leader positions and how subsequent deviation from established collective resentment can undermine leader positions in the future, affecting leaders' ultimate choice of allegiance at conflict onset.

The identity and background of group leaders that emerge often varies widely based on the developmental stage of the group and country they reside in. Generally, more economically developed countries with a longer history of political competition, or at the very least of institutional development, have more structured interaction within identity groups. In these cases, institutional standing, either as head of a political party, as in the case of Saleh Muslim of Syria's Kurdish Union Party (PYD) – the de facto leader of Syrian Kurdistan – or as president of an autonomous region, like Ajaria's Aslan Abashidze, who had been leader of the autonomous region under Soviet authority and had sufficient opportunity to galvanize his position as leader of Sunni Geogrians in the area (Derlugian 1998), allows for consolidation of authority within a group. As will be seen in Chapter 7, many Lebanese political leaders, while operating within the confines of highly stratified political parties, also fall back on their familial roots to re-enforce their position of authority within a community. In an extreme case, part of the support for Druze leader Emir Talal Arslan rests on his family's historical lineage, traced back to the 6th Century Lakhimid Dynasty. Moreover, in less institutionalized societies, leaders can emerge without elite or institutional backing, but to the same level of authority, by capitalizing on authority gained in the community from organizational actions on behalf of individuals. For instance, while Laurent Kabila, the leader of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's anti-Mobutu, Armed Forces for Democratic Liberation (AFDL), had been leader of several communist rebellions in the past, he had been forced to flee abroad after the failure of the 1978 Shaba rebellion. Nevertheless, his position of influence provided him with a leadership position in the AFDL upon his

return and facilitated the mobilization of his Baluba ethnic group toward membership in the AFDL (Banks, et al. 2003).

More often than not, institutional, ancestral or influential legitimacy is not sufficient for identity group leaders to maintain their positions and material inducements are required to secure member loyalty. Networks of patronage to provide either clientelistic goods or services to a set of constituents can translate into future mobilization for a leader's cause (Radnitz 2010). As such, political parties representing the country's various sects, rather than the government, can become the primary source of welfare and social service provisions as a way of securing the loyalty of constituents against competing co-religious parties (Cammett 2014). However, even patronage networks may be insufficient in garnering mobilization in the face of competing economic or political interests, especially since most leaders have the means to establish such networks. In turn, identity group leaders turn to exploiting the mechanisms of collective emotion toward emphasizing their status as the sole protector of the group against external threats. In particular, leaders find resentment – active negative emotion as a result of real or perceived wrongdoing (Murphy 1982) – as a useful tool toward fomenting and sustaining their own relevance within the minds of strongly motivated group members. In a political sense, resentment is active negative emotion targeted specifically toward another group that is perceived to be dominant without a right to be in that superior position, which does not require repeated violent re-enforcement to remain relevant on the minds of constituents (Petersen 2011, 39-40, 61). The conceptualization presented here, nevertheless differs from Petersen, who divides the roles of emotion in conflict across numerous specific emotions, such as anger, pride and fear, in addition to resentment. In the case of this project, resentment is a shorthand term for active negative emotion, a catch-all term for fear, anger, hatred and other emotions associated with arousal

and negative sentiment (Scherer 2005). Other categories that vary along the positive/negative and high/low arousal dimensions, like passive negative emotion and positive emotions, are also relevant and explained in more detail in Chapter 6.

Leaders use resentment strategically to cement their position as principal protectors of group interests in the minds of members. This perception transforms leaders from mere sources of patronage to true protectors of group culture and status in the face of external aggression that stand head-and-shoulders above their competitors for their position. In order to cement their protector status, identity group leaders rely on calling on past instances of political repression or intergroup violence or even fomenting instances of intergroup violence that create perceptions that an identity group must fight external enemies. [5] Resentment toward particular out-groups or the government then shapes individual preferences and group choices at conflict onset.

While leaders can ascend to the status of group protector through the cultivation of collective resentment, resentment remains tied to the out-group that is targeted, rather than the leader that emphasized a particular instance of violence. As resentment becomes a part of a collective consciousness, there arises a need to rectify this resentment at conflict onset (described in more detail in the following section) and leaders' allegiance choices can prove fatal to their ability to hold their position. Specifically, when leaders' choices go against the collective resentment that has been built up in identity group members, members lose faith in the leader as a source of information and, given the availability of patronage from competitors, no longer recognize the leader's authority. And while community leaders cannot be voted out of office in the same vein as democratic leaders, their path from authority can be far more swift in the form of being ostracized or even assassinated for

[5] These violent events, often riots or spates of direct fighting, ingrain divisions between groups and create collective memories of violence among group members that strengthen the position of otherwise marginal identity group leaders (Brass 1997, Wilkinson 2004).

perceived betrayal. Two examples highlight the potential for leader removal in the face of unpalatable choices. First, returning to the case of the Hasakah Kurds from Chapter1, in 2011, the Syrian government attempted attract Syrian Kurds to the government's side by granting citizenship (a long-standing demand) to non-citizen Kurds and recognizing Kurdish culture as autonomous in Syria. While Kurdish politicians had been negotiating for decades to this effect, the clear collective resentment to siding with the government shown by many protesting Kurds and years of anti-government mobilization effectively prevented Kurdish leaders from seriously considering the offer (Allsopp 2014). In another case, identity group leaders did accept self-interested offers in spite of opposition from their constituents. The United States built a formidable opposition to Sunni militants by providing direct payments to Sunni tribal elders to oppose the militants and form the pro-government Sons of Iraq militia and the Awakening Councils. While the plan helped to subdue violence in the province by funneling money and political positions to Sunni tribal leaders from 2007 to 2011 (Berman, et al. 2011b), the situation unraveled after the US Army withdrew in 2011. New elders became reluctant to work with an increasingly oppressive Shia-dominated government, while members of the Awakening Councils were assassinated by either the government or the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)[6], leading to a return to an anti-government posture from the surviving Sunni leaders (Kitfield 2014). Based on these divergent outcomes, it is safe to say that many leaders, anticipating backlash and seeing the strength of collective memory of past violence, acquiesced to this choice driving their alignment with a particular side of a conflict. Taken together, leaders and members compliment one another. Leaders provide organization and mobilization that advances the

[6]Later known as the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the Islamic State (IS).

well-being of the group and members provide support for leaders' actions, as long as those actions are reflective of their collective will.

Individual Member Preferences

Each member of a cohesive group has preferences for an allegiance choice, either joining the government, the rebels or self-government. These preferences are determined by a combination of individual and group-level gains from a particular choice and past experience with the other groups that represent either side of the ongoing conflict. The costs and benefits vary from person to person and are not of particular interest theoretically, as collective memories of past conflict emphasized by identity group leaders overwhelms other allegiance preferences. The goal of this section is to trace how individuals are influenced by identity group leaders to feel resentment toward and out-group and how that resentment can then influence preferences for group-level conflict allegiance at conflict onset.

Memories of prior injustice that underlie resentment can target the government through emphasis of instances of repression or target another identity group through emphasis of instances of violence between the in-group and out-group. Repression by the government and past instances of violence perpetrated by members of the rebel coalition serve as strong forces against siding with perpetrators of those instances of violence. Aversion against allegiance with a certain party is not driven solely by the past incidence of violence. Most identity groups face repression or violence at one point or another in their history and individual memories of this repression or violence can easily fade without re-framing and reenforcement. Only when such reenforcement and framing comes from identity group leaders, do events such as government repression or intergroup violence take hold in the collective memory of group members. As mentioned in the previous section, iden-

tity group leaders benefit from emphasizing certain events to generate a collective emotional response from group members. To create a response that strengthens in-group emotions, leaders require an out-group target. Aversion toward the target creates negative stigmas around interaction with the target and strengthens the mutual bonds of group members and their respect for the leader (Petersen 2011, 56-57). Nevertheless, mobilizing collective emotions against an out-group necessitates references to actual prior events that generate the out-group desired resentment. As such, when instances of violence or repression occur from certain out-groups, leaders instrumentally frame these events as attacks against an identity group and embed them into collective memories through repeated references.

The memory of prior injustice is framed in a way that reflects a desired emotional connection with an event (Zerubavel 2004). Leaders present a version of events that views the group favorably and frames victims as kin and unjustly persecuted compatriots of the rest of the group (Bar-Tal 2007). Over time, leaders refer to these memories as a sign of an out-group threat that, in turn, foments an in-group mentality. Past experiences of collective violence generate a perception of a persistent threat for the future and shape reactions to current challengers (Baumeister & Butz 2005). Thus, for cohesive groups with strong leaders, both government repression and intergroup violence, regardless of the circumstance, can evolve into being perceived as attacks on the group and its strongly ascribing individual members. Once indoctrinated, collective memories are shared by strongly ascribing members of a collective group and translate into collective emotions in reference to an out-group. As past repression and violence highlight the injustices experienced by in-groups at the hands of an out-group (while maintaining a pacific outlook in the short term), they generate resentment among strongly ascribing members of the out-group perpetrators of the remembered event.

For an individual, repeated references to past events create endemic resentment against the perpetrating party of violence or repression. Individuals associate the event and the corresponding resentment with a group's myths and consciousness, seeing it as aggression against their group and a threat to their future well-being. Resentment operates under the surface of the collective consciousness as long as an identity group remains outside of the shadow of a conflict. Resentment also elevates leaders that are perceived as having stood up for group rights to the status of heroes. However, once the opportunity presents itself in the form of conflict onset, members of an identity group will desire to redress intergroup disparities represented by resentment through collective action against the perpetrating actor (Petersen 2002). In the case of both repression and intergroup violence, members feel as if they have personally experienced repression or violence because of the strong perception of community established by collective memory and feel strong resentment toward the perpetrator of either repression or violence.

As such, sentiment can warp preferences against a leader's preferred allegiance partner when conflicts do erupt. Contrary to the original intention of group leaders, indoctrination of collective memories that fuel resentment toward a particular group or the government define the group in greater terms than the leader itself for its members, preventing individuals that feel resentment from being swayed toward joining a side which they have been indoctrinated to see as the enemy. While leaders are seen as defenders of group interests, their deviation and support for the resented out-group is intolerable to group members and results in their loss of status. Thus, group members do not tolerate allegiance with a party that they hold responsible for the subjugation or suffering of their identity group; even if it meant a superior likelihood of post-war gains for overall group well-being. It follows that resentment can dictate individual preferences, preventing individual support

for resented governments or conflict-initiating identity groups in nearly all cases in spite of what may be materially or politically beneficial for a given group. These theoretical claims are restated formally in Appendix A.

Individual-Level Implications

At the level of individual group members, several empirical regularities are required to verify that resentment is indeed framed by political leaders and then impacts allegiance preferences at the individual level. Most basically, members of identity groups that are more exposed to political rhetoric that emphasizes a particular out-group or the government as an in-group's enemy should be more likely to feel resentment. Political association represents a first step on the process to forming allegiance preferences as a result of fundamentally political actions taken by identity group leaders, rather than the mere incidence of repression or intergroup violence. It follows that:

Hypothesis 2. *Individuals who are more exposed to political messaging should be more likely to express feelings of active negative emotion toward an out-group.*

It is from this point at the individual-level that resentment is likely to translate into support or opposition of civil conflict. Individuals that are connected to identity group leaders through either patronage or political party membership should also experience stronger indoctrination to collective memories of either the government or a particular identity group and thus be more likely to feel strong preferences about civil conflict allegiance after its onset. The resentment should then form *ex ante* allegiance preferences in those individuals that are exposed to identity leaders' rhetoric. Given feelings of resentment, individuals would likely oppose any measure that leads them to ally with the government if they feel

negative emotions toward the government or the initiating group if they feel negative emotion toward that group. If follows that:

Hypothesis 3. a*: Individuals are more likely to support a rebellion against the government by another identity group if they feel active negative emotion toward the government.*
b*: Individuals are less likely to support a rebellion against the government by another identity group if they feel active negative emotion toward that group.*

Leader Preferences

Following individual preferences for allegiance and their expected outcomes, the preferences of leaders are presented. Discussed first is what leaders would prefer, followed by the way in which their preferences are influenced by the collective membership of their identity group. As mentioned in previous sections, the benefits from political office or patronage override potential individual-level gains for group leaders. By seeking to advance their political power, leaders desire joining either the side where they are most relevant politically or the side that gives them the greatest likelihood of winning and actually obtaining a more beneficial position after the war ends. Benefits could include formal political power, such as institutional positions for the leader or his/her patronage network or direct financial benefits. A move toward self-government can give leaders the greatest autonomy and material rewards possible, whether from office or clientelistic deals that come with the position. This last option is not without risks. While disengagement and secession may help groups avoid bearing the brunt of the costs of war, it could also have devastating consequences if the conflict's eventual winner or foreign governments choose to reabsorb the

seceded entity into the original state through the use of force, as seen in the UN's assistance of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's re-conquest of Katanga in 1963.

It is tempting to place the logic of bargaining within the context of electoral institutions (Riker 1964, Shapley & Shubik 1954) [7] to explain the formation of coalitions at the outset of civil conflict on the basis of leader self-interest alone. Nevertheless, as the coalition bargaining logic assumes a bargaining space for coalitions under conditions of decision rules and stable institutions, its application to a civil conflict is problematic. First, civil conflicts lack a decision rule for being settled. Even if the vast majority of a population supports a given side, a more organized or determined opponent could successfully overthrow the government or wrest territorial concessions from the center. Thus, there is no magic threshold where a party is guaranteed victory. Second, without stable institutions to facilitate bargaining, the environment is highly uncertain. It is not known whether the fortunes of one side may improve or decline from day-to-day or week-to-week[8]. As such, joining the best paying side or the side with the most followers may not be a feasible or palatable option for most groups; assessments of the strength of a given side may be unreliable and agreements with either side may not be credible in even the medium term. Coupled with pressure from group members to make a decision, group leaders may not be able to distinguish between the capabilities of conflict combatants or to negotiate the best post-government arrangement before making a decision.

Thus, in lieu of attempting to choose the winning side or positioning a group as the crucial coalition partner, political leaders would prefer to join the side that sees them and

[7] The canonical Sharpey-Shubik Index emphasizes that decisive swing groups hold more power in coalition bargaining rather than relatively more powerful groups in predetermined positions. There are various other definitions of power that allow for different coalition formations from Karlsson or March which focus more on constraining the outcomes of others and several extensions across multiple stages or institutional bodies.

[8] The swing from potential military strikes against the Syrian government for their use of chemical weapons by the United states, to those weapons' destruction and eventually to the United States' tacit support of the Syrian government in their fight against the Islamic State in the course of a year is an apt example.

the constituency they bring as important to the success of the movement. Here, relative constituency size, operationalized by the total population count of an identity group, serves as a rough proxy for political power in a movement. While a larger constituency may bring more capacity to draw fighters and political influence, the receiving party (government or rebel group) is potentially threatened in its position by a group that is relatively larger than their existing coalition, groups that would make up the plurality in a coalition are excluded from potential coalition arrangements altogether. In absolute terms, group leaders prefer joining the coalition where the leaders' group would make up the greatest percentage of the total constituency without being in the plurality (Christia 2012). Not only does the side where the constituency would be larger maximize the potential political influence that group leaders can gain after the war, it increases the importance of their side to the relative success of the overall movement that they have joined, selecting the option that is least likely to betray them at a future point, either during or after the conflict. Even though a fully credible commitment against violence is difficult to achieve in the fog of conflict (Walter 1997), by maximizing their constituency's weight within the overall coalition of either the rebels or the government, leaders insure that their value as coalition partners is put to its best use and the likelihood of defection is minimized.

If some leaders lack a political advantage for joining either the rebel or government coalition, they may be able to take advantage of a favorable institutional and political environment and declare a self-governing entity. For instance, political entrepreneurship was a deciding factor for the occurrence of a brief period of *de facto* independence for the Georgian enclave of Ajaria. Known as 'Muslim Georgia,' Ajaria is home to a minority Sunni Muslim population. Ajarians speak a dialect of Georgian that differed from the rest of the country. The region had been granted considerable *de jure* autonomy during Soviet rule.

The government mechanisms behind autonomy gained increased relevance upon Georgia's independence and descent into civil war. During the Georgian civil war, Aslan Abashidze, a prominent Muslim who had converted to Christianity, seized power in the region and kept it out of the wider conflict, using the existing reins of power to establish *de facto* independence for the enclave (Derlugian 1998). As seen in Ajaria, there are conditions for self-government that make it a superior alternative to joining with either the rebels or the government. Existing mechanisms of power and geographic concentration both incentivize leader secession, especially when their constituency is either too large or not large enough to affect changes in the ruling coalition.

While the preferences of leaders for conflict allegiance are underpinned by strategic motivation, their decisions are not without constraint. Leaders may be the ultimate decision-makers when it comes to choosing a certain path in a civil conflict, but their choices are ultimately bounded by the preferences of the group member collective. As mentioned in the previous section, individual members who feel resentment as a direct result of previous indoctrination against a particular conflict actor are averse to joining the resented actor's side. It follows that the collective manifestation of such resentment, while no longer absolute, can undermine leaders' ability to side with their most preferred choice of allegiance partner. In cohesive groups, where indoctrination is likely to be most widespread, the feeling of collective resentment could be nearly absolute as repeated references make resentment against the perpetrating party of violence or repression endemic among most members of cohesive identity groups. As time passes, resentment becomes ingrained in a group's myths and consciousness – essentially becoming greater than the leaders that had emphasized the events in the first place – as long as government authority is unchallenged. At this stage,

leaders may be pushed toward a non-preferred choice as a result of emotional, rather than rational, considerations.

While leaders rely on galvanizing group members around collective memories of past repression or violence to increase their authority in peacetime, resentment paradoxically contributes to their own inferior choice-set when faced with conflict.[9] This inferior outcome follows from the reality that leaders cannot sway resentful individuals to support the resented side at conflict onset. Simply put, identity group leaders cannot successfully contradict the rhetoric that built resentment among their members. By contradicting their declaration of the government or an out-group as a threat, leaders set themselves up to lose out on their one comparative advantage over rivals that can provide the same patronage to group members, leaving them subject to a loss of authority and occasionally violence as a cost of their choice. As the amount of resenting members as a percentage of the whole of leader constituents increases, leaders' own preferences to join a resented side lose persuasiveness and they must acquiesce to the preferences of group members if they hope to retain a following. To this effect, leader's preferences for political gain are constrained by the emotions they ingrain in constituents before conflict onset.

The presence of collective resentment has implications for leader behavior at conflict onset. Self-interested leaders prefer to take proactive stances, allying with the side that offers them the best political payoff. However, the risk of negative consequences for siding with a resented out-group forces leaders to take reactive stances, waiting for their constituents to concretely emphasize their preferences (in most cases against joining the resented side) until making a decision. The dangers of making a proactive choice to side with a resented group were emphasized earlier in this chapter: leaders that go against their constituents are likely to

[9] Ultimately, while leaders may want to avoid rupturing the potential for allegiance with a potentially beneficial conflict ally, it is likely that the likelihood of short and medium-term benefits trumps the potential losses from non-allegiance in the low-probability incidence of civil conflict.

lose their positions of relevance in the community and even stand to lose their lives. Reactive stances can also come from leaders who prefer self-government, but opt to hear offers from one or both sides of the conflict: upon seeing that neither allegiance is palatable (or that one offer is less palatable than self-government and the other side is resented), leaders may choose to pursue self-government by declining to choose a side and preferring that their group insulate itself through a well-defined proto-government structure. The choice of self-government is not available to all identity groups. Groups that are dispersed over wide, non-connected geographic space lack institutional mechanisms that are necessary to quickly form an administrative structure for self-government. Nevertheless, the tactic holds considerable benefits, including the formation of a military apparatus that resembles an organized state's armed forces and can be used as a deterrent against intervention of both rebel and government forces. As with the individual-level preferences and outcomes, the theoretical claims made in this section are restated formally in Appendix A.

Group-Level Implications

The theoretical assertions presented in the previous two sections generate a set of empirical implications at both the group and the individual levels. This section will address the group-level patterns, which are tested in Chapters 3 and 4 and elaborated in Chapter 5. The combined theoretical drivers for individuals and leaders imply that two forces drive allegiance choice at the group level: relative size of the identity group to the government and the rebel coalition, which speaks to leaders' preferences for political gains, and a collective memory of either government repression or intergroup conflict with the rebellion's initiating party, which speaks to the consequences of negative emotions stoked by leaders before conflict onset. The two predictors vary in importance: the presence of a collective memory

of repression or violence is likely to override any potential gains from siding with a given party in a civil war as leaders' ability to dictate allegiance is constrained by the collective and cohesive preferences of individual members. As such, a history of repression or intergroup violence represents a direct effect on group allegiance:

Hypothesis 4. **a***:Groups with collective memories of government repression are less likely to join a government.*
b*:Groups with collective memories of intergroup violence with an initiating party to a civil conflict are less likely to join a rebellion.*
c*:Groups with collective memories of both government repression and intergroup violence with an initiating party to a civil conflict are more likely to pursue self-government.*

The remaining group level predictor, relative group size to the active parties in a conflict is, thus, conditional on the existence of collective memories within groups. If collective memories exist within groups, then at least one and at most two options for allegiance will be severely impeded for group leaders. Thus, any effect of relative group size is conditional on the absence of collective memories. Additionally, since active sides in a conflict do not want to be dwarfed by their allegiance partners, groups that are larger than either the government or rebel coalition in terms of constituency size are unable to side with that particular constituency, again conditioning the effect of relative group size on the absolute size of the group. The implications from this are, as follows:

Hypothesis 5. *Groups that lack collective memories of repression and do not possess constituencies that are larger than either the government or the rebel coalitions are:*

- *are more likely to join the government if they are larger, relative to the initiator of a rebellion.*

- *are more likely to join an ongoing rebellion if they are larger, relative to the size of the government coalition.*

- *and are more like to pursue self-government if they are small relative to both the rebel and government coalitions.*

Moreover, a special implication is required for decisions to pursue self-government, as an extra parameter: existing levels of institutional capacity through peacetime experiences with self-government and strength should also either increase or decrease the likelihood of groups' pursuing self government. It follows that:

- *and are more likely to pursue self-government if groups have access to existing institutional mechanisms for self-governance.*

It should be noted that, given the presence of any collective memories of violence about one or both sides or any coalitions that have smaller constituencies than the group in question, the deciding leader loses political benefits from pursuing an allegiance with that group. As such, the decision calculus of the leader is merely reformatted to decide between the remaining choices. Following these arguments, the assertions presented in this chapter are tested, first on a sample of civil conflicts since 1990 using group-level data across countries on the allegiance patterns after civil war initiation.

The individual-level hypotheses drawn from these theoretical implications yield themselves to testing through a survey experiment that can accurately measure individual preferences for conflict participation through a list-experimental design and assess individuals' attitudes toward the government and other identity groups through randomized priming components. The survey experiment is conducted in Lebanon. Lebanon is chosen not only because of its history of conflict and interconfessional tension but because the current

environment of constant tension between Lebanese religious sects reflects the intermediate periods before most civil conflicts begin, making conflict participation a plausible choice for many individuals. Because of this prolonged intermediate state, Lebanon is likely to be the only country in the world where the mentioned individual-level hypotheses could be tested. Chapter 6 will present results from the survey and integrate the results into the afore-mentioned group-level hypotheses. Then, Chapter 7 will outline interviews with Lebanese political leaders that aim to explain the processes that formulate decision-making at the leader-level and bridge the group-level and individual-level components of the analysis.

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This chapter, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the material. Ash, Konstantin. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this material.

Chapter 3

A New Data-set on the Geographical Composition of Identity Groups

The previous two chapters laid out this project's motivation and theoretical suppositions. To review: the purpose of this project is to explain the allegiance choices made by identity groups in the wake of civil conflict onset. The topic, previously unaddressed from an identity group perspective, frames organization of rebel and government sides (and potentially of self-governing entities) in a civil conflict as a decision taken collectively by identity group members and leaders as a means of advancing or preserving their status within a country. The decision to choose any side is theorized to be a capacity issue, with groups that lack strongly ascribing members or collective leadership being unable to act collectively. However, the decision to take a particular side or to form a self-governing entity is a product of leader and member preferences: leaders desire to join the side that gives them the most political benefits, but are constrained by group members' active negative emotion toward a particular side, which are born collective memories of violence or repression. Resentment, a means for consolidating authority for the very same leaders during peacetime, serves as a

barrier to aligning with a party that is a known perpetrator of violence or repression against the identity group, even if such an allegiance ultimately offers more benefits to a group.

To establish that a pattern of identity group allegiance exists across countries and regions, a group-level cross-national test is employed for allegiance choice toward a particular side after the onset of a civil conflict. Before such a test can be conducted, the unit of analysis: the identity group, must be defined and operationalized in a way that allows for statistical testing at the identity group level. The intent of the following sections is to derive such definition of 'identity groups' and to use a combination of existing and self-generated data to map the geographic positions of identity groups in each country that has experienced civil conflict onset since 1990.[1] The first section focuses on developing a suitable definition based on past work on identity and examination of the types of identity-based conflicts have taken place across history. The second section discusses how geographic data was generated with regard to both past studies and novel methods. The third section examines the produced maps and tests their validity against qualitative work in three countries across three regions noted for their overlapping identity cleavages. After some potential challenges to the accuracy of the mapping technique are noted and addressed, the process is deemed sufficiently valid for the maps to be used as both data-generating constructs and units of analysis in the large-N study described in the following chapter.

[1] As will be seen in chapter 4, many sources of geographic data, including data on population and wealth are constrained by a limited time-series scope. Given the possibility that prior conflict can influence regional wealth differences or population concentrations, only conflict onset from after the year when the first data on all geographic measures is available can be included. This still allows for analysis of 37 countries and 55 conflict onsets.

Defining Identity Groups

Identity is not an entirely fixed concept. There are countless “[social categories] in which an individual is eligible to be a member" (Chandra 2006). And while individual ascription to each category varies, a degree of identity is fixed. Individuals find it difficult to alter their native language, skin color, appearance or familial ties and may also struggle to change their cultural instincts, speech patterns or religious affiliation. Nevertheless, the social significance of a given identity can vary based on the degree of individual ascription with each of his/her identifiable features (Fearon 1998). This contributes to the characterization of identity as ‘Janus-faced’ with one part constrained by genetics and history and the other shaped by social forces (Laitin 1997).[2] This mode of understanding identity allows for the environment described in Chapter 2. While individuals are, to an extent, tied to their identity group, the efforts of leaders in emphasizing individual ascription still matter in terms of both political mobilization and ultimately, mobilization toward civil conflict.

The different ascriptive choices for individuals create the possibility of cross-cutting identity cleavages, where groups of individuals share an identity along several dimensions, but differ along others (Dahrendorf 1959). It has been widely postulated that sharing these characteristics, whether they are religion, ethnicity or geographic location, mitigate the risk of social conflict among political groups (Powell 1976).[3] An assumption of much of this work is that identity characteristics fade in and out of relevance for groups of individuals as a result of overlapping cleavages. For instance, extra-ethnic ‘cousinage’ relations in

[2]This sums up the constructivist view of identity to which this work subscribes. Nevertheless, there remain alternative perspectives at the extremes that ethnic identity, in particular, is an ancient and essential trait that shapes current issues (Geertz 1963, Horowitz 1985) or that identity is purely instrumental and used opportunistically as a tool by elites to galvanize individuals around a collective cause (Bates 1983) (see (Varshney 2003) for a more detailed discussion on this subject).

[3]Whereas the risk of social conflict is generally thought to be exacerbated by identity cleavages. Diversity in identity, especially in ethnicity, is found to impede distribution of public goods (Alesina, et al. 1999, Baldwin & Huber 2010b) and increase the likelihood of clientelism and patrimonial behavior (Easterly & Levine 1997).

Mali are found to build political trust and subsume politicization of ethnic characteristics (Dunning & Harrison 2010). There are both theoretical and functionalist problems with such an assumption. While cross-cutting cleavages may allow for increased cooperation between distinct groups of people, they do not, as scholars implicitly posit, write away the importance of the cleavage that is being cross-pressured away to the extent that it becomes irrelevant. The very same Mali described by Dunning and Harrison as being a prime example of cross-pressure's mitigating effect on ethnic conflict experienced multiple rebellions from ethnic Tuaregs throughout the 1990s and the early 21st Century (Hicks 2012). A different stance, taken in this project, is that overlapping cleavages segment identity along multiple dimensions, leaving members of these segmented groups free to align with other segmented groups across any given identity dimension. In other words, groups that share ethnic identity and differ across religion are not assumed to be giving in to the salience of one characteristic over another, but to make a choice to cooperate politically with another distinct identity group. The importance of treating groups that vary along some, but not all, identity characteristics as separate also has functional benefits. Assessing identity characteristics under a scenario where a single identity characteristic is deemed salient can be difficult; while ethnicity may be most relevant in Kenya, it is nearly insignificant in Lebanon, where the vast majority of the population is ethnically Arab, but affiliates with numerous religious sects. Even in countries where ethnicity is relevant, salience can vary widely across geographic space (Chandra 2004) or time based on changes in a country's political incentive structure (Reilly 2001, Posner 2005). Thus, measures of identity along one dimension can prove unreliable representations of actual identity divisions in a country at any particular time.

In order to move away from a unidimensional measure of identity, it is necessary to capture multiple dimensions of identity within the same unit of analysis. Taking advantage of cross-cutting cleavages, overlapping divisions from ethnicity, religion and in-country geographic region are used to measure groups that are distinct based on differences in some identity characteristic, but not in another. The identity group in this project is defined as a social category where individual members share ethnicity, religious affiliation and reside in the same geographic region.

The definition of identity groups requires two basic assumptions. The first is that cross-cutting cleavages, rather than changing the salience of a given identity in the minds of group members, create separate identity groups on the basis of each distinct identity dimension. This means members of ethnic groups that reside in different regions of a given country or ascribe to different religions will not be assumed to be members of the same groups that are subject to 'cross-pressure,' but members of different identity groups whose common ethnicity may make them more likely to cooperate.[4]. The existence of cross-cutting cleavages alone should not be taken to mean that a formal identity group exists at every regional or religious sub-level of ethnicity, or vice versa. It may be that identity groups have, in peacetime, found themselves cooperating with other groups to such an extent that no noticeable distinction can be made between two or more groups. Moreover, it may be that ethnicity or religion or region are in no way salient for a particular group and merely act as 'latent' or unobserved features in the daily affairs of an identity group, but hold the potential to become relevant in the future. Based on this second possibility, I posit that the cleavage mechanism in place represents a latent mechanism for viable agency on the part of the identity group, rather than a complete assimilation of groups into one another.

[4]For instance, such a distinction allows for a division of Iraqi Arabs according to ascription to Shia and Sunni Islam, while adding an additional dimension of cooperation for Sunni and Shia Kurds in the north of the country.

Depending upon circumstances it may be that cross-cutting cleavages of a given group based on any of the three listed characteristics have the potential to manifest themselves.

The use of religion, ethnicity and region as defining identity features brings up the second assumption: that these are the three principal identity dimensions that are salient for mobilization to fight in a civil conflict. The inclusion of these dimensions is somewhat uncontroversial. Ethnic conflict has been a documented phenomenon across scholarly work on civil wars (Horowitz 1985, Cederman et al. 2011) and conflict based on religious divisions within either the same or different ethnic groups (Kalyvas 1999, Reynal-Querol 2002) and based on regional distinctions (Ostby, et al. 2009) have also been widely studied. Nevertheless, the exclusion of other potential dimensions of identity, such as ideology, may be somewhat more controversial. Part of the rationale for excluding ideology, in particular, is functional; ideological divisions are generally not clearly definable within a geographic space and exist within each respective community. Moreover, ideological dimensions may have substantial overlap with identity group ascription as identity group leaders instrumentally rely on certain ideological positions as a way of galvanizing political support (Gates 2002). A second identity cleavage: class, may also be a valid cross-sectional cleavage, but is similarly omitted for functional reasons. While class differences are occasionally geographically distinguishable within identity groups, it is also common that relatively wealthy and impoverished individuals encompass largely the same space, making them largely indistinguishable given the measurement technique of this study. Class is more appropriately studied as a within-group independent variable, where perceptions of either individual or group-level inequality can be modeled to predict conflict behavior, rather than as a unit of analysis for that behavior. Given these agreed upon dimensions for identity, the next step is to operationalize the divisions and is discussed in the following section.

Generating Geographic Data

Generating data specific to identity groups is a fundamental necessity of assessing their propensity to join a civil conflict. Naturally, there are no readily available statistical records with global coverage at the identity group level. As such, the geographic space occupied by different identity divisions is mapped, the divisions are used generate a list of identity groups and data is then extrapolated specific to the groups that occupy a particular space using a Geographic Instrument System (GIS). The GIS program to be used in this study, ArcGIS, can be used to compile interactive maps of geographic space, positioned according to a global coordinating system to precise latitude and longitude coordinates, known as shapefiles. The shapefiles that reflect the spaces occupied by identity groups can then be used to extract data from rasters – geocoded image files that possess numerical values for each of their cells. Thus, through geocoding of identity group borders, data can be generated at the identity group level for many common indicators including economic activity, distance to a country's capital and population.

The technique of generating geographic data to represent identity groups is not novel to studies of civil conflict. In their Ethnic Power Relations data-set, (Wimmer, et al. 2009) use 'politically relevant ethnic groups' as the base unit for examining how political exclusion of ethnic groups influences the onset of ethnic conflict, choosing to omit any ethnic group which does not have a nationally representative organization that claims represents its interests. The approach is problematic as it omits groups that may not have the capacity to mobilize or may mobilize without the presence of a nationally representative organization. A selection effect cannot be avoided unless religious and regional divisions are also included in any statistical analysis. Moreover, the EPR data itself makes several questionable inclusions in terms of its definition of ethnic groups, especially in predominantly Arab countries. For instance, in Iraq,

Syria and Lebanon, confessional groups (Shia and Sunni Muslims, Christians and Alawite Muslims) are coded as distinct ethnic groups, rather than a consistent coding of the ethnicity of the individuals in each confessional group. Other salient divisions along confessional lines within ethnic groups are not highlighted by the data-set in other regions of the world (i.e. Christian and Muslim Yoruba in Nigeria). As a whole, the data excludes numerous actual groups, often reducing country cases to only two or three cumulative'ethnic' groups, making an analysis of allegiance in conflict difficult, if not impossible. In short, while the best effort to date to map and gather data on identity groups, the EPR suffers from several shortcomings that can be improved upon with this new unit of analysis. In using a more precise measure of identity groups, rather than politically relevant ethnic groups, the project is better able to capture allegiance behavior and divergent allegiance choices within what Wimmer et. al. define as 'politically relevant ethnic groups.' In Appendix B, side-by-side comparisons of the three validation country cases are shown to illustrate the superior breadth and geographic accuracy offered by this chapter's data generating technique.

Using some of the EPR's techniques as a primer, a two-stage process is followed to obtain a valid and exhaustive map of identity groups for the countries of analysis.[5] The first stage is illustrated in figure 3.1 using Syria as an example. First, three different sets of polygonal shapefiles representing ethnic, religious and regional cleavages within a country are generated and then overlapped with one another. A geocoded map of the world's ethnic groups already exists in the form of the Georeferenced Ethnic Group (GREG) data-set (Weidmann, et al. 2010), which adds georeferencing to maps that have already been put together from the Soviet *Atlas Narodov Mira* (Bruk, et al. 1964), which categorized and

[5] Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Macedonia, Moldova, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Yemen.



Figure 3.1: Representation of Data-Generating Process of Identity Group Maps for Syria

mapped ethnic groups around the world.[6] Maps of the religious compositions of the countries in the analysis are obtained from non-georeferenced maps generated by Michael Izady at the Gulf/2000 Project at Columbia University (Izady 2013). The maps include details on division within Islam across sects throughout the Muslim World. They are manually georeferenced by the author in order to conform to a geographic coordinate system based on borders and landmarks on the map through manual entry of latitude and longitude control points. After the maps reflect the geographic coordinate system of the overall project,[7] they

[6]The shapefile is updated to include post-1991 borders for the countries of the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Yemen.

[7]World Geodesic System (WGS)_84

are converted to shapefiles and merged with their respective national shapefiles of ethnic groups.

Finally, since no proprietary data is available for regional cleavages, an alternative method of deriving regional concentrations of individuals within countries is devised. The method employs geographic data on population density in a given cell of a map (University Center for International Earth Science Information Network 2011). When that density exceeds fifty persons per square kilometer, it is converted into a polygon. Polygons that are either contiguous or within 50 kilometers of one another are considered self-sustaining regions.[8] The assumption of this method is that regional cleavages are defined by a gap in populated areas between distant spaces that increases the difficulty in which individuals can interact with others, thereby making it more difficult to form a community across gaps in populous areas. This reflects the idea that regional cultures develop as a product of shared historical experiences (Ellison 1991), with the potential for identities to develop separately of ethnic, linguistic or other types of cleavages (Barrington 2002).

After each layer of shapefiles for the three identity dimensions is obtained, the shapefiles are merged to create a map with of distinct groups that are divided along ethnic, religious and/or regional lines. From this merged grouping, a preliminary, or raw, list of identity groups is obtained and validated in the next section. The full scope of this output across all countries in the data is shown on Figure 3.2. For the purpose of this project, only countries that are needed for the large-N analysis in the next chapter are included in the data-set. The method does allow for full global coverage for future application. The next

[8]The division of 50 persons per square kilometer is adapted as a median to obtain distinct geographic areas without limiting the clusters analyzed to just cities (as obtained with a threshold of greater than 75 persons per square kilometer) or creating large population clusters that do not have distinctive boundaries (as obtained when using a threshold below 25 persons per square kilometer).

section describes the process under which the products of the merger are validated and presents three country cases as evidence of the validity of the data.



Figure 3.2: Full Scope of Identity Group Data Coverage

Data Validation

The second component to generating a polygon shapefile map of identity groups that is suitable for data extraction is validating the groups that have been generated through the overlapping maps of within-country ethnic, religious and regional divisions, as described in the previous sections, exist as entities in the real world. While geographic divisions are generally sufficiently noticeable to be confirmed as real,[9] it is possible that maps generated from GIS create ethno-religious groups that do not exist in reality by mistakenly attributing

[9]While groups that vary in geographic region may be considered as highly similar, regional differences generally provide for enough of a distinction in identity to generate what are considered, in practice, separate identity groups

religious affiliations to ethnic groups, which their members do not actually possess. To account for that potential fault, a somewhat controversial, albeit likely reliable data source is employed: the Joshua Project[10] – an evangelical Christian group with the goal of converting the world's population to evangelical Christianity, which keeps account of the religious composition of most of the world's ethnic groups by country through access to census and other on-the-ground reports. Ethno-religious groups that are not found in the project's data-base (or have a fraction under 5% of believers of total believers in the ethnic group), but appear on the map, such as Armenian Sunni Muslims in Georgia or Orthodox Christian Tajiks in Tajikistan are merged into the dominant religious category of their respective ethnic group.

The validation process presented above only scratches the surface of establishing the existence and salience of the identity groups in this study. In order to further validate the identity groups generated from the aforementioned two processes, three in-depth analyses of specific countries and their identity groups are presented in the next three sub-sections by comparing the list of identity groups generated from the maps in each country to detailed ethnographic and historical accounts on identity groups and their sources. The goal of this comparison is to ensure that groups on the list exist, and are, to some capacity, distinct within the context of sub-national politics in the country of analysis, having the capacity to make independent political decisions from one another. This form of validation is representative of the steps undertaken for the remaining countries in the analysis.

[10]http://www.joshuaproject.net/

Syria

The first case presented for in-depth validation is Syria. Syria is a Middle Eastern republic that has been embroiled in civil conflict since 2011. The conflict and the prior political divisions have undertaken ethnic, religious and regional overtones that are described in more detail in Chapter 5. The identity group map generated through the GIS mapping procedure is shown on figure 3.3 with a corresponding legend and list of groups on table 3.1. There are a total of 19 identity groups that mostly reflect distinctions across regional and religious, in addition to ethnic, divisions. The dynamic of different and salient divisions within Islamic sects in the same ethnic group is reflected across other countries throughout the Middle East, the Balkans and South Asia. The goal of this section is to highlight the relevance of each generated identity group within Syrian politics and society.

The ethnic composition of Syria, like most countries in the Middle East, is predominantly Arab with a notable Kurdish minority and smaller minorities of Armenians, Assyrians, Circassians and Turkmen. There are also substantial populations of Christians, Yazidis and various Muslim sects that cross-cut these ethnic divisions (Syria 2012). Despite being a one-party state under the rule of the Assad family, the vast majority of the 19 generated identity groups have attained some degree of distinct political mobilization since independence and thus warrant their inclusion as distinct entities on the map. Most prominent among identity groups are Alawite Muslims, who dominate the Syrian government in terms of both the military and political appointments. Hafez and later Bashar Al-Assad assured their rule was secure for almost 40 years by elevating members of the Alawite sect to positions of power within the Syrian state. While Alawites primarily reside along Syria's Mediterranean coast and the mountains immediately to the east of the coast, communities have developed in Damascus as Alawites with close ties to the Assad government settled there (Syria's Alaw-



Figure 3.3: Identity Groups in Syria

ites & persecuted sect 2012). Alevi Islam is a close spiritual cousin of Alawi Islam and is practiced in Syria among some Turkmen speakers along the northern border with Turkey. While Alevis closely align with Alawite Arabs politically and support the Assad government, they are politically distinct for their lack of comparable representation in Syrian politics (Gettleman August 4, 2012).

While Syria has been a one-party state during its recent history, other political organizations, largely based around identity, were able to function since the ascent of the Ba'ath Party in 1963 and the Assad family in 1970. These organizations underscore the independent political relevance of other identity groups. Chief among those entities is the Sunni ulama, the body of Sunni Muslim clerics and scholars in Syria. While not inherently

Table 3.1: Identity Groups in Syria: Names and Legend

	Arabs	Alawite Islam		Alawite Arabs
	Arabs	Christianity	Damascus	Christian Arabs Damascus
	Arabs	Christianity	Euphrates	Christian Arabs Euphrates
	Arabs	Christianity	Mediterranean Coast	Christian Arabs Mediterranean
	Arabs	Druze Islam	Damascus	Druze Arabs Damascus
	Arabs	Druze Islam	Mediterranean Coast	Druze Arabs Mediterranean
	Arabs	Ismaili Islam		Ismaili Arabs
	Arabs	Sunni Islam	Damascus	Sunni Arabs Damascus
	Arabs	Sunni Islam	Euphrates	Sunni Arabs Euphrates
	Arabs	Sunni Islam	Mediterranean Coast	Sunni Arabs Mediterranean
	Armenians			Armenians
	Assyrians			Assyrians
	Circassians	Sunni Islam	Damascus	Sunni Circassians Damascus
	Circassians	Sunni Islam	Mediterranean Coast	Sunni Circassians Mediterranean
	Kurds	Sunni Islam	Euphrates	Sunni Kurds Euphrates
	Kurds	Sunni Islam	Mediterranean Coast	Sunni Kurds Mediterranean
	Kurds	Yezidi Islam		Yezidi Kurds
	Turkmen	Alevi Islam		Alevi Turkmen
	Turkmen	Sunni Islam		Sunni Turkmen

political, the ulama became a political entity as political Islam evolved into a more prominent force in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. The ulama itself is divided regionally, with the Grand Mufti residing in Damascus, while more prominent Sharia Law scholars are headquartered in universities along the Mediterranean Coast region, especially in Allepo and in Dier al-Zur, along the Euphrates River. When the Muslim Brotherhood's uprising against the Ba'ath party broke out in 1979, the Damascene ulama was more supportive of the status quo and allowed for the region's Sunnis to stay out of the rebellion, while the Brotherhood flourished in Aleppo, Homs and Hama, with members of the Aleppo ulama

heavily influential in the revolt (Pierret 2011). The regional breakdown not only reflects the divisions of Sunni Arabs indicated on the map, but the economic divisions of the country. Of nine 'Agro-cities' (Van Dusen 1972) points out three key regions for the distribution of agricultural goods: the South, which is comprise of Qunaytara, Suwayda, Dir'a and Damascus, the northwest, of Hama, Homs, Latakia and Aleppo and Dayr al-Zur in the Northeast, largely reflecting the regional divisions generated by the map for Sunni Muslim Arabs.

Sunni Kurds make up Syria's largest minority ethno-religious group and share the far northeast with Assyrians, along with smaller population centers along the Turkish border stretching to the north and northwest of Aleppo – largely in agreement with the identity group map (Cafiero 2012). Political organizations among Kurds are largely divided between two major regions: the Jazira province in the Northeast of the country,[11] and the Kurd Dag region to the North of Aleppo.[12] Kurdish politics and nationalism developed at a different pace across these two regions and their division continues to permeate into the politics of today. The Jazira province was home to more fervent separatist demands by local Kurds and Christians during the period of French colonial administration. On the other hand, the Kurd Dag region fielded a less moderate and more aggressive anti-French campaign behind the religious Muroud movement. After independence, the divisions persisted as the Kurd Dag region remained more prominent supporters of international Kurdish parties, such as the Turkish (Kurdish People's Party) PKK and the Iraqi (Kurdish Democratic Party) KDP, while the Kurds in the Jazira region were more aligned with the Ba'athist government (Allsopp 2014). The salience of this cleavage continued to be evident during the outset of the civil war as Kurds from the Kurd Dag fought with the rebels while the politically organized

[11] Euphrates region on the map.
[12] Mediterranean Coast region on the map.

Jazira region eschewed allegiance with either side and formed a quasi-state in northeast Syria under the rule of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) (Khaddour & Mazur 2013). The regional political distinctions are supported by the separation of the two Kurdish groups across two regions on the map. Finally, while most Kurds are Sunni Muslims, a small minority ascribe to a pre-Islamic faith known as Yazidism (Allison 2004). Up to 50,000 followers of Yazidism reside in the Hasakah province. Rural and depoliticized under the Ba'athist regime, the Yazidi identity has resurged as the more numerous Sunni Kurds looked to build a coalition against Islamist Sunnis and confirm their inclusion as a separate entity from Sunni Kurds on the identity group map (Glioti 2013b).

Kurdish areas in the Euphrates region are also home to several other minority groups that have developed distinct political organizations. Assyrians, Armenians and local Arab Christians have traditionally aligned with Kurds on some matters, such as a joint project for Kurdish-Christian autonomy during the French occupation in the 1930s (Allsopp 2014, 58-61). Nevertheless, the movement fizzled and in other times, Christians have opposed Kurdish issues, such as granting citizenship to Hasakah Kurds, for fear of losing citizenship themselves (Allsopp 2014, 173). Most of Syria's remaining Christians are Arabs and reside around areas of Damascus, Aleppo and in the rural mountainous areas along Syria's Mediterranean coast (Bayley & Bayley 2002). Much like the case of Sunni Muslims, there are some salient divisions between Christians in Damascus – the seat of the Syrian Greek (Rum) Orthodox Church – and areas surrounding the capital known as the 'Valley of the Christians' and Aleppo, Latakia, Homs and Hama, where most Christians actually reside. The divide is also political; while most Christians benefited substantially from the relative religious tolerance under Ba'ath Party rule, urbanized Christians in the Mediterranean Coast areas tend to be more foreign-oriented and less supportive of the

regime than the rural Christians of Rif Damashq, who have remained staunch Ba'ath loyalists (Abu Shakra September 1, 2013). Taken together, the political autonomy of Arab Christians along the three regions delineated by the map corresponds with regional political divisions of Sunni Arabs and Kurds and warrants inclusion of the three regional divisions of Arab Christians as distinct identity groups.

Traditional Twelver Shia are rarely found in Syria, but there is a small population of Ismaili Shia Arabs in Eastern Hama province dating back centuries to the Assassins' Guild, particularly in the city of Salamiya. Under the Ba'ath Party and even before the 1982 coup, Ismailis in the city were affiliated with communist parties, such as the Communist Labor Party, the office of Riad al-Tukr (a communist leader) and the Democratic Ba'ath Party (an early rival party of the ruling Ba'ath led by Salah Jadid). Salamiya was also one of the few non-Sunni cities that participated in early anti-regime protests – although, there is muted support for the government in the civil war (Williams November 18, 2013) – generally displaying Ismaili political independence from the Alawite Arabs that comprise key positions in the central government.

Significant Circassian communities also exist both in Aleppo and Damascus and in villages bordering the Golan Heights and northeast of Aleppo around Manbij; the village locations conforming to the two concentrations of Circassians on the identity group map (Jaimoukha 2001). The population in the Golan Heights served as keepers of order for the Ottoman Empire during their rule of the region, ensuring that no uprisings took place among local Armenians, Kurds or Beduin. They continued to serve in the security apparatus, but were slowly marginalized by the Ba'athist regime (TAŞTEKİN November 19, 2012). The Circassians from the Mediterranean Coast region around Manbij were more politically active for nationalist causes, rather than the pro-Ba'athist causes in the run-up to Syrian

independence and had been part of a separate, more recent wave of Circassian migrants that settled in Manbij after the 1879 Russo-Turkish War (White 2011), indicating political independence between the two regionally distinct groups.

Most Druze adherents are of Arab ethnicity and live in the mountainous Jabal-al-Druze region to the southwest of Damascus, although there are other, smaller communities in Syria's northern Idlib province, at the Turkish border, and bordering the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. While the latter community is less organized, the Jabal Al-Druze is known for its staunch independence from government authority, having conducted an insurgency for independence in the pre-independence period (Landis 1998). The Idlib Druze are less numerous and traditionally less politically independent, lacking a distinct political history until the civil war, when they broke with Jabal al-Druze and sided with the rebellion (rebels deny "forced conversion" reports December 28, 2013).

Finally, a large Sunni Turkmen population occupies numerous villages around major Syrian cities within reach of the Mediterranean coast, including Homs, Aleppo, Jazira and Hama (Commings 2004). Subjected to assimilationist policies by the Ba'ath party, Turkmen were forced to learn and speak Arabic and to adapt Arab customs, leading some parts of the historical Turkmen community to assimilate into the more general Sunni Arab population. Few political organizations, beyond often persecuted cultural solidarity groups, such as the Bayir Bucak Turks Cultural and Solidarity Association, were able to emerge in this period after a relatively prosperous period for Turkmen under both the Ottoman and French occupations of Syria (Foundaton 2012).

The distinct political histories of each of the identity groups shown on the map shows that the technique used to extract identity groups produces not only valid geographic

locations for the obtained groups, but filters groups in such a way so as to produce groups that are mostly politically relevant and distinct within the history of the Syrian polity.

Tajikistan

The second case presented for validation, Tajikistan, is a former Soviet republic that gained independence in late 1991. From 1992 to 1997, the country experienced a brutal civil war, initially pitting Tajiks against one another and evolving into a conflict between the central government in the capital, Dushanbe and mostly Pamir Tajik Islamist warlords in the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan (Smith 1999). The identity group map generated through the GIS mapping procedure is shown on figure 3.4 with a corresponding legend and list of groups on table 3.2. Absent religious or regional divisions, only ethnic groups are reported as full names on table 3.2. The overlapping salience of region, religion and ethnicity largely reflects the composition of other post-Soviet countries in the data-set.

The history and political development of Tajikistan confirms the political salience of many of the groups highlighted by the map, or at least their distinctness in Tajikistani society. While the country of Tajikistan is largely an invention of Soviet policies of ethnic division and "korenisatsya" – empowering local ethnic groups as a way of dividing possible collective movements of rebellion against Soviet rule along religions or collectively ethnic (i.e. Turkic or Slavic) lines – its origins rest in the division between Turkic and Persian-speaking peoples in Central Asia. The latter dominated the Emirate of Bukhara, which ruled over parts of modern day Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan from the ancient city of Samarkand, first as an independent entity and then as a protectorate of Tsarist Russia in 1873 (Bergne 2007, 33). Under the Emirate, the first major politically relevant identity distinction emerged with discrimination and violence by the predominantly Sunni Muslim

Emirate against Ismaili Pamiri Tajiks[13] in the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan region to the east of the Tajik Valley (Bergne 2007, 37), leaving the group with a separate political identity expressed on the map.

A clear distinction between Turkic-speaking Uzbeks and Persian-speaking Tajiks did not emerge until Soviet rule in 1920. A reorganization of Central Asian territories in 1924 eliminated the Bukhara emirate and divided Central Asia according to linguistic groups.[14] At first, Tajikistan was divided among three autonomous regions within the larger Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic: the Khojand (later Leninobod) and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) and the remaining territories of the Tajik ASSR. Political divisions allowed politicians to organize local communist parties around these regional organs of power until the three ASSRs were merged into the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (TSSR) in 1929. The communist party was especially well-developed in Khojand (Leninobod), cementing decades of domination of the Tajik SSR in terms of leadership appointments for the region (Bergne 2007, 40-56).

The divide between Northern (Leninobod) and Southern Tajiks was further complicated by the development of Dushanbe as the capital of the TSSR. Previously a small village, it developed at a rapid pace when it was declared the capital upon the TSSR's formation. Tajiks from throughout Central Asia, especially Samarkand and Bukhara - former centers of the Bukharan Emirate now in Uzbekistan - emigrated to the city in droves. A railroad was built that boosted the city's connection with the rest of the USSR, eventually becoming home to Tajikistan's educated elite (Kassymbekova 2013). Forced migration from areas neighboring Dushanbe, especially from around Garm to cotton-producing regions around

[13]Since Pamir Tajiks speak an amalgamation of six similar languages (collectively known as 'Mountain Tajiks'), they are separated into their respective linguistic groups (Parya, Sanglechi-Ishkashimi, Shughni, Wakhi and Yazgulyam) in Ethnologue. They are also part of the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam, while most of the remaining Shia in Tajikistan belong to the more mainstream Twelver sect (Karagiannis 2006).

[14]Kazakhs, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks each received their own republic within the Soviet Union.



Figure 3.4: Identity Groups in Tajikistan

Kulyab in the South also created tension between locals and the migrant workers from the Dushanbe region (Ferrando 2013). The tensions ultimately culminated with violence between migrants and locals at the outset of the Tajik Civil War in (Sodiqov 2013).

Ultimately, geography and timing of autonomy generated three distinct concentrations of Tajiks in the Northern Leninobod region, around the capital and in the agricultural south. Region retained political salience as appointments to head the Tajik communist party came from the more politically developed northern base, the more educated and Russian-oriented population remained in Dushanbe and the southern region around Kulyab provided the country's economic engine (Tunçer-Kılavuza 2009). The divisions came to a head during the Tajik civil war, when Dushanbe Tajiks led a rebellion against Leninobod domination. During the war, Kulyab's Tajiks sided with Leninobod and ultimately put down the rebellion under the leadership of Emoliali Rakhmon – primarily on the basis of the highlander vs. valley cleavage that had developed between migrants in Kulyab from

Table 3.2: Identity Groups in Tajikistan: Names and Legend

Color on Map	Ethnicity	Religion	Region	Full Name
	Arabs of Middle Asia			Arabs of Middle Asia
	Kazakhs			Kazakhs
	Kirghis	Shia Islam		Shia Kirghis
	Kirghis	Sunni Islam		Sunni Kirghis
	Pamir Tajiks			Pamir Tajiks
	Russians			Russians
	Tajiks	Shia Islam		Shia Tajiks
	Tajiks	Sunni Islam	Dushanbe	Sunni Tajiks Dushanbe
	Tajiks	Sunni Islam	Leninobod	Sunni Tajiks Leninobod
	Tajiks	Sunni Islam	South	Sunni Tajiks South
	Uzbeks	Sunni Islam	Dushanbe	Sunni Uzbeks Dushanbe
	Uzbeks	Sunni Islam	Leninobod	Sunni Uzbeks Leninobod
	Uzbeks	Sunni Islam	South	Sunni Uzbeks South
	Yaghnobis			Yaghnobis

Garm in the Dushnbe region. After the war, power shifted decisively to Rakhmon's network in the South (Dudoignon 2013). Together, the political distinctness of the three regions: Leninobod, Dushanbe and Kulyab is reflected in the map with the separating of ethnic Tajiks along these regional lines.

Tajikistan's ethnic divisions also stem from Soviet planning. Pre-Soviet identity in the region was fluid with many individuals retaining bilingual ability between Uzbek and Tajik and alternating between the two identities. Definite borders allowed for crystallization and literacy in just one of the languages, solidifying identity across Central Asia's socialist republics. Nevertheless, some populations of Uzbeks remained in each of the politically salient regions of Tajikistan (Bergne 2007, 108-112). While Tajikistan's Uzbeks are generally more united in their political affiliation across regions than Tajiks, variation emerged during the civil war with more explicit support for the pro-government forces by southern

Uzbeks (Fumagalli 2007). Similarly, smaller and less politically salient groups of Kazakhs, Russians[15] and Kyrgyz remain scattered throughout the country. These groups, however, are not particularly active in Tajik politics. Put together, the political salience of identity across regional and ethnic division throughout Tajikistan's history shows the relevance of the groups displayed on the map generated through the identity group mapping process, validating both the groups displayed on the map and their respective positions.

Nigeria

Nigeria is the final case presented for validation. A large multi-ethnic, religiously diverse society, Nigeria has experienced two insurgencies since the mid-2000s: one by Ijo rebels from the Niger Delta and a more brutal insurgency by the Islamist group Boko Haram in the North. The identity group map generated through the GIS mapping procedure is shown on figure 3.5 with a corresponding legend and list of groups on table 3.3. Nigeria is home to a large amount of ethnic groups, which, with religious divisions, subsume any potential tertiary regional cleavages. In other words, the major regions - the North and South are homelands to entirely distinct ethno-religious groups with no cross-cutting regional cleavages. As such, no regional cleavages are recorded and this section focuses primarily on validating the locations and political importance of ethnic and religious groups. This lack of super-ethnic regionalism is a fairly common occurrence across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Nigeria is home to up to 450 ethnic groups and potentially as much as 450 distinct spoken languages, depending on how strict distinctions for language are (Okehie-Offoha 1996). Nevertheless, the *Atlas Narodov Mira* appears to only record the largest, most

[15] As seen on the map and in Ethnologue, Russians are largely concentrated in urban areas.



Figure 3.5: Identity Groups in Nigeria

geographically distinct groups, leaving only 27 distinct areas representing 55 groups [16], rather than giving an exhaustive account. While a clear shortcoming, there is an advantage to this feature, as particularly small groups may not have substantial enough coverage to generate data or may be able to make independent conflict decisions. Moreover, it is an improvement over the five groups identified by the EPR (described in Appendix B). The shortcoming, among others, is addressed in more detail in the next subsection.

There are also three major religious confessions in Nigeria: Christianity, Shia Islam and Sunni Islam. These, according to the generated map, largely conform to regional divisions: Christianity in the south and Niger Delta region, Shia Islam in the North, Northwest

[16] Some groups that occupy the same geographic space are assigned the same position in the Atlas

Table 3.3: Identity Groups in Nigeria: Names and Legend

Color on Map	Ethnicity	Religion	Full Name
	Angas		Angas
	Bade		Bade
	Barba		Barba
	Bini		Bini
	Birom and Jarawa	Christianity	Christian Birom and Jarawa
	Birom and Jarawa	Sunni Islam	Sunni Birom and Jarawa
	Buru, Bata and Terra		Buru, Bata and Terra
	Busa		Busa
	Bute		Bute
	Chamba		Chamba
	Ewe		Ewe
	Fulbe	Shia Islam	Shia Fulbe
	Fulbe	Sunni Islam	Sunni Fulbe
	Hausa	Shia Islam	Shia Hausa
	Hausa	Sunni Islam	Sunni Hausa
	Ibibio		Ibibio
	Ibo		Ibo
	Ijo		Ijo
	Jukun and Idona		Jukun and Idona
	Kambari		Kambari
	Kanuri		Kanuri
	Katab		Katab
	Mandara		Mandara
	Mumuye		Mumuye
	Nupe	Christianity	Christian Nupe
	Nupe	Sunni Islam	Sunni Nupe
	Shoa-Arabs		Shoa-Arabs
	Songai		Songai
	Tiv		Tiv
	Yoruba	Christian	Christian Yoruba
	Yoruba	Sunni Islam	Sunni Yoruba

and center of the country, especially around Sokoto and Kano, and Sunni Islam to the North-east and Middle Belt areas. While the religion is not noted when groups are overwhelmingly adherents to one of three of the mentioned faiths, any divisions within groups are highlighted in the following section.

Despite the mentioned omissions, the listed ethnic groups on the identity group map correspond well to external accounts of their locations and, for the most part, have mobilized politically in the past (as described in the following sections), indicating their existence as independent political actors in Nigeria. The four most politically prominent ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria are the Hausa, the Fulani (Fulbe), the Kanuri and the Tiv. There are also numerous minor groups, such as the Songai, the Kambari, the Busa, the Nupe, the Birom and Jarawa, the Bade, the Madari, and the Shoa-Arabs. The Angas (or Ngas), are known for being the dominant ethnic group on Nigeria's central Jos Plateau (Wambutda 1991). The Bade live primarily in Yobe state, in the northeast of the country (Lewis 2009), while the Barba, or Bariba, live in the far west of Kwara state on the border with Benin (Stokes 2009, 55). The Busa, sometimes considered a part of the Barba reside in roughly the same area in Kwara state (Olson 1996). The Katab reside in Nigeria's Kaduna state, along the central portion of the country's Middle Belt (Olson 1996, 277). The Birom and Jerawa peoples are grouped together in the *Atlas* and they are somewhat related, but separate ethnic groups living in Nigeria's Middle Belt, specifically on the central Jos Plateau. They are generally grouped together because of their collective late conversion to Christianity and some Northern members of the group still adhere to Sunni Islam (Smedley 2004). Another two groups that are placed into one region by the *Atlas* are the Jokum and Idoma, who collectively live along the northern Niger Delta in the Eastern Middle Belt (Agbara 2011). Similarly, the Bura, Bate and Tera peoples are also grouped together, probably as they are

part of the same linguistic group: the Bui-Mandara. Bui-Mandara speakers are generally concentrated in far Western Nigeria, along the border with Cameroon (Newman 1977). The Tiv represent one of Nigeria's largest ethnic groups and their homeland stretches from across the Middle Belt of Nigeria, through the plain of the basins of the Benue, Katsina Alaa and Cross rivers, eventually stretching from the Middle Belt to the border with Cameroon in the far southeast of the country (Mbaatyo 1996). The Nupe live in two neighboring river valleys, the Niger and Kaduna, with the Tiv to the southwest and the Niger separating the Nupe from the Yoruba to the west (Kolo 1996). The Kambari are concentrated in west-central Nigeria, especially in Kwaea state and neighbor the Yoruba to the south and the Hausa and Fulbe, among others, to the North and East (Yakan 1999, 396). The Kanuri, on the other hand, reside in Nigeria's northeast, bordering Lake Chad along with another, smaller population of Shoa-Arabs, and the Nigerien border in the Borno state. Their primary settlement is the city of Maiduguri (Olson 1996, 272). The Mandara, while mostly found in Cameroon, also reside along the border with Cameroon in the northwestern Borno state, while another small group, the Mumuye occupy a small cluster of the central Gongola state along the eastern Middle Belt (Olson 1996, 365, 409).

The two most politically relevant ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria are the Fulbe, also known as the Fulani, and the Hausa. The Fulbe, are diverse in the regions that they occupy, ranging from the Admawa and Yawure states on the eastern border of Nigeria with Cameroon to the northeastern cities of Yoal, Bauchi, Kano and Hadija (Moses 1996). The Hausa compliment the Fulbe as predominant groups in the north of Nigeria, with the population of Hausa highest in the north and northwest of the country, but with some representation further south on the Jos Plateau (Khaleel 1996). While both ethnic Hausa and Fulbe are historically and predominantly Sunni Muslim, Shia Islam has rapidly expanded

its influence in Nigeria over the course of the past 30 years and now accounts for up to 10 million believers in Nigeria, mostly among Hausa and Fulbe. The spread of Shia Islam is attributable to the Iran-backed Islamic National Movement, which, while not specific to an ethnic group has particularly taken root among the Hausa in Sokoto and Kano states (Zenn 2013).

Most of the Northern groups consist of dense kinship networks that underlie society, which is indelibly fused with political leadership, while some larger ones – the Hausa, Fulbe, Nupe and Kanuri – tend to have political roles confined to certain societal sectors. The remaining groups lack a formal tradition of political stratification and are largely decentralized or lie on some middle ground, such as the Birom and Jarawa, where they are made up of a confluence of numerous stratified villages or even smaller ethnic groups that share common language and customs. When English colonialism descended on Nigeria, these leaders were empowered by the colonial authorities as a form of indirect rule. Before independence, political parties in Northern Nigeria emerged as extensions of traditional authority. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) evolved out of a network of primarily teachers in Kano backed by traditional authorities in Sokoto, while the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) evolved parallel to the NPC from educated Fulbe in Jos. Before these groups became political rivals on opposite ends of the Northern Nigerian political spectrum, several regional parties also sprung up across the region. The Bornu Youth Movement (BYM) formed as an outlet for Kanuris dissatisfied with Hausa domination of local politics. Similar reactions against the Hausa and Fulbe took place among the Jokun and Idoma and the Tiv, eventually uniting to form the Middle Belt Peoples' Party (MBPP). Finally, Muslim Yoruba in the lower Middle Belt province of Ilorin, also chafing under pressure of the Hausa and Fulbe formed the Ilroin Commoners' Party. Although,

over time, pre-independence party politics consolidated around the NBC and NEPU, with ethnic competition taking place for patronage, particularly in ethnically heterogeneous areas (Dudley 1968). In short, politics of Northern Nigeria functions on a hierarchical level where major ethnic groups ally to form political movements and then jockey for power and patronage distribution to their networks, thus underscoring the relevance of the mentioned ethnic cleavages and their independence in decision-making from other identity-based or political forces.

The South and East of Nigeria is dominated by mostly Christian ethnic groups. The Bini, or Edo, people make up the majority of the population of Nigeria's southern Edo state, including the capital, Benin City (Levy 2004). Similarly Bute, or Bafou, also live along the border and extend further into Cameroon (Stokes 2009, 88). Just to the south is the homeland of the Chamba, who also live along the Cameroon border, but in Adawan state (Olson 1996, 125). Ibibio are known to mostly occupy the southern Akwa Ibom state, particularly along the Kwa Iboe river's estuary, as it flows into the Atlantic Ocean (Etuk 1996). The Ibo live just north of the Ibibio, surrounding the Niger Delta region to the North of the country. It is from this region that they were responsible for orchestrating the ultimately doomed Biafra secession attempt from Nigeria from 1967 to 1970 (Stokes 2009, 55-58). The Ijo, or Ijaw, reside primarily at the mouth of the Niger River Delta with the Atlantic Ocean. Mostly indigenous farmers and fishermen, they have recently come into conflict with multinational oil companies that work to extract petroleum from the Delta (Olson 1996, 236). Finally, the Yoruba occupy the southwest of Nigeria, known as Yorubaland, including Nigeria's largest city, Lagos, and share some space at the border with the Ewe, who are traditionally most prevalent in neighboring Togo and Benin, but also reside along the Beninese border in southwest Nigeria (Sadiku 1996). The religious divisions of the Yoruba (Christianity in

the South of Yorubaland and Sunni Islam to the North) (Laitin 1986) are highlighted on the identity group map with clear and distinct polygons for Christian Yoruba along the Atlantic coast and Muslim Yoruba further to the North.

The predominantly Christian Southern ethnic groups in Nigeria have also evolved into politically distinct entities from one another. The first political parties emerged from Lagos, the main trading center and home to the Yoruba ethnic group, prior to independence and formed around the religious cleavage within the Yoruba: mostly provincial and Muslim Yoruba supported the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), while urban and mostly Christian Yoruba supported the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) (Sklar 1963). Initially, the Ibo (Igbo) formed a nationally-oriented political party, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) that led the first post-independence government. However, a military coup in 1966, the deaths of Igbo politicians and thousands of civilians led the Igbo, in a coalition of Southeastern ethnic groups that included the Ibibio and the Ijaw to secede and form the short-lived Republic of Biafra (Anber 1967). Thus, much like in the North of the country, Southern identity groups are independent entities that organize politically through inter-identity coalitions to form national political groups.

While Nigeria's ethnic divisions make for distinguishable hierarchies for the country's ethnic groups, some religious divisions, such as within the Yoruba, are still politically relevant. A review of Nigeria's political history has shown that Yoruba Sunnis and Christians, along with other divided groups, are clearly divided, politically autonomous and have been correctly included in Nigeria's identity group map.

Other Potential Challenges to Accuracy

Several other previously unmentioned factors could call the representative accuracy of the identity group mapping technique into question. Foremost, the identity group map is generally not granulated well enough to pick up variation in identity groups within highly concentrated urban areas. Instead, the tendency of the maps is to represent urban areas as being home to only one or two major identity groups (Lagos, for example, is firmly labeled as a Christian Yoruba city in Nigeria[17]). This is potentially problematic, because the lack of granulation can simultaneously bias both included and excluded identity groups. The solution, while imperfect, would be to presume that the error increases as the amount of urbanized space in a given group's area increases and to incorporate group percentage of urban population or urban geographic area into the error structure of any statistical model that uses the identity group data, which is explicitly done in Chapter 4.

A second potential challenge to the accuracy of identity group representation has been the mentioned overrepresentation of larger groups on the map of ethnic groups and the merging of several 'similar' ethnic groups into one polygon. This issue is largely unresolvable. Ethnic composition of a country is fundamentally dependent on the definition of ethnic group that is used by the coders, in this case Soviet anthropologists from the 1950s and 1960s. Languages and dialects may be closely linked and definitions highly subjective. Moreover, while more ethnic groups could be distinguished in a country, it is not certain whether these groups are related to such an extent that they are the same or not salient relatives of their larger counterparts. However, the GREG data is the best and most finely-tuned data-set available. As seen in Appendix B, the Ethnic Power Relations data aggregates ethnic groups to even larger degrees at the cost of considerable precision.

[17]While Christian Yoruba make up a majority of the population, internal migration has made Lagos a multi-ethnic and multi-religious city in recent years.

A final challenge to the accuracy of identity group representation is the potential for extreme overlap of geographic distributions of religious populations. While some countries, like Lebanon, have very well defined confessional boundaries as a result of years of polarization during a civil war, a pre-civil war environment is likely to contain less definite religious divisions, both within and outside of the Middle East. There are few mapping solutions to this issue as the Gulf/2000 maps are the only comprehensive source of maps on religious distributions around the world. However, the weightiness of the issue may not have much statistical bearing. If the bias is to map majority groups as representing a region, it is likely that bias is universally toward majority groups in any particular area and would not create a systematic problem. Moreover, given the geographic validation of many of the spaces occupied by distinct religious groups in the cases mentioned in this chapter, this is unlikely to be a large-scale issue.

Conclusion

Put together, the identity group mapping procedure presented in this chapter generates a new, more inclusive way of analyzing identity group divisions, especially within geographic space, than previous ventures. This technique stands up to various aggregate and in-depth qualitative validation procedures that show that the groups that it generates represents real identity cleavages that have been identified by qualitative researchers of identity specific to the countries in the analysis. And while there are some potential accuracy challenges, their resolution allows this unit of analysis to be used as the unit of analysis of the large-N project in the next chapter and as the baseline for qualitative analysis of the Syrian conflict in Chapter 5. In the next chapter, the geographic positions of identity groups,

along with the list itself, are used as the means to generate data and the unit of analysis, respectively, for a large-N analysis of group-level allegiance outcomes since 1990.

Chapter 4

Patterns of Identity Group Allegiance during Civil Wars since 1992

The preceding chapters outline a theoretical mechanism which yields predictions on behavior of identity groups at the onset of civil conflicts and a measurement of the unit of analysis in geographic space that can be utilized to generate geographic data for features of the unit of analysis: the identity group. The next step is to the group-level implications of the theoretical model using this data on identity groups. By uncovering the patterns that drive group-level outcomes, tests that can gain insight into the individual and leader-level behavior within identity groups can be conducted to derive the outcome group-level outcome.

The goal of this chapter is to outline and carry out a concrete empirical test of the determinants of identity group allegiance at the group level, looking at conflicts initiated between the years of 1990 and 2013. [1] The intent is to test the several group-level hypotheses that were proposed in the theory chapter: predicting that identity groups that have experienced government repression would join the rebels, groups with experience of

[1] As necessitated by data availability.

violence by the rebellion's initiator would join the government and groups with memories of both would prefer self-government. Absent these experiences, relative group size would determine allegiances with groups joining relatively larger coalitions without exceeding the total size of each respective coalition. Finally, previous institutions of autonomy would support the decision to pursue self-government among identity groups in response to conflict onset.

This chapter is intended to test these assertions, to operationalize the concepts presented in each hypothesis in a way that allows both past violence and repression and relative size and to use the operationalized variables to construct a statistical model that examines the relative merits of each hypothesis against a set of competing explanations. After outlining the rationale for each operationalization and the statistical model, the results of the statistical analysis are presented with a set of robustness checks. The results show guarded confirmation for the collective memory hypothesis in determining allegiance, with its predictions substantially stronger than those of the relative coalition size and other competing explanations. Nevertheless, the group-level analysis does not yield insight into how decisions for allegiance were made and the role of individuals and leaders in these decisions, which is examined in the next three chapters.

Allegiance Outcomes

The goal of this chapter is to explain the choices made by identity groups at the outset of civil conflicts. The introduction to this project has already reviewed the ways which previous authors and schools of thought have tried or would try to explain this phenomenon. Thus, further in-depth review of prior work is omitted from this chapter. Instead, the broad design of the empirical test and the outcomes of interest are presented in this section. In

order to understand the nature of conflict allegiance in each of the analyzed cases of this study, an in-depth analysis of case-specific sources was undertaken to examine the reactions of non-initiating identity groups to civil conflict outbreak. The appendix shows the product of this analysis with vignettes that describe the allegiance choices of each identity group for each conflict in the analysis. From this empirical evidence, a total of four potential allegiance outcomes for non-initiating identity groups were observed: no collective action, joining the government, joining the rebels and self-government. This framework largely reflects the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 2.

These choices are multiple and unordered, indicating that the distribution of errors that the quantified outcomes would likely take is multinomial. To assess such a distribution, a base case is required from which to examine deviations in the patterns.[2] There are two natural base cases from the total of four: no collective action and joining the government. It can both be said that groups have not taken collective action at the outset of conflict and that before the conflict, identity groups were all *de facto* government supporters by virtue of not rebelling against the government. Because of this, both perspectives will be undertaken when conducting a statistical analysis of the outcomes.

In terms of actual group behavior, not taking collective action is an umbrella term that encompasses identity groups whose members do not participate in conflict at all, participate, but do so without coordination with political leaders, and groups that divide, with some leaders backing the government and others backing the rebels. While these choices appear to differ enough for it to be problematic to place them together, each option is ultimately united by the inability of leaders to organize their groups toward collectively participating in

[2]By convention, the base case in multinomial models is usually the more numerous case, however, analysis dictates that the base case be chosen in a way to examine deviations from a particular allegiance choice.

a conflict and the rationale for an inability to organize should be determined by a joint set of properties. This factor is emphasized in the second chapter.

Groups that are able to organize toward conflict have three options. First, identity groups can join the government, either by continuing to pay government taxes and to serve in the armed forces, or by supporting the government effort through pro-government militias (Carey, et al. 2013). We observe examples of this across a wide range of civil conflicts, but it is most notable in Syria, where the pro-government Shabiha militia includes Christian and Druze brigades and during several recent Congo conflicts where the DRC army was supported by the Hema-dominated Mai Mai militias in pitched battles against Tutsi-dominated rebel groups. The second option is to join the rebel group that has initiated violence against the government. Again, this sort of action can be conducted along two different paths: either through directly integrating into the rebelling identity group, as Katangan Luba and Lunda joined the anti-Mobutu AFDL in the Congo or by creating a parallel, but affiliated rebel group that specifically represents the identity group in question, as Ethiopian Oromo and Somalis did in their joint fight against the Mengistu regime with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Finally, identity groups can choose self-government, which involves neither supporting the government, nor the rebel alliance, but creating a parallel state-within-a-state that functions outside both government and rebel authority, as a way of protecting identity group interests by actively keeping it out of harm's way. Examples of such efforts abound from post-Soviet conflicts, with civil war autonomy efforts by the Gagauz in Moldova, Sunni Georgians in Ajaria and, for a short period, Volga Tatars during the First Chechen war (Ross 2000). However, the phenomenon is not limited to these conflicts with a recent and prominent instance of self-government among Sunni Kurds in the Syrian Civil War.

The challenge of any empirical test of the determinants of these group-level choices is to adequately conceptualize the factors that affect group-level decision-making as choices are being made. While ideal, a direct test of the relationship between collective active negative emotion and group level outcomes is not possible for lack of a suitable direct measure of active negative emotion at the group level. Instead, a probabilistic test of the likelihood that a set of factors that represent potential active negative emotion and a set of alternative hypotheses is employed in this chapter. Based on results from a set of measures that theoretically relate to active negative emotion, using either repression or past identity conflict, more precise tests of the foundations of resentment and allegiance outcomes are devised at the individual level where the specific paths of the relationship between collective memory of conflict and civil war allegiance is more precisely identified.

Data Operationalization and Sources

The data takes the shape of the identity group-conflict-year unit of analysis, spanning 55 conflicts across 37 countries that began between 1990 and 2013. A list of identity groups across ethnic, religious and regional cleavages within each country of analysis is obtained using the method described in Chapter 3. The limitations in geographic data necessitate this confined time range. As will be seen in this section, geographic population data that must be used to establish group size is only available from 1990. This data is crucial toward operationalizing variables on relative coalition size and intergroup income inequality. While it is possible to employ measures from 1990 to analyze conflicts that began before these years, such an analysis would be substantially biased, given the shifts in population distribution and wealth that are likely to take place as a result of even minor civil conflict.

As both the dependent and independent variables comprise a set of concepts that have not yet been not concretely operationalized, the rest of this section is devoted to justifying the operationalization of the variables in the quantitative analysis relative to their theoretical constructs, as presented in Chapter 2.

Identity Group Allegiance

A fundamental component of this study is the operationalization of the dependent variable of the analysis: the specific decision taken by each of the identity groups at the outset of a civil conflict. The novelty of the unit of analysis makes the use of an off-the-shelf measure of allegiance outcomes impossible. The measure of allegiance is created to reflect the unranked, categorical outcome products that are described in the previous section. Groups have the potential to initiate, join the government, join the rebels, pursue self-government or take no collective action at all at the outset of any given conflict.

To identify the choices made by each group, conflict narratives and media reports were culled for information on what identity group initiated a given conflict, the subsequent composition of rebel, government, non-aligned coalitions and which groups did not mobilize in any capacity. Given the detail of the process, specific coding rules are outlined in the appendix. Moreover, for purposes of transparency and replicability, the appendix also contains detailed narratives that describe allegiance in 22 of the 55 conflict-years of analysis and presents sourced justification for a group's coded choice in each of these conflicts. Once coded, the initiating group in each conflict is dropped for that conflict-year, as that particular identity group is not capable of making an allegiance choice. The appendix also presents a full table of conflicts and their initiating parties.

Independent Variables

The independent variables in the quantitative analysis represent several constructs that are theorized to influence identity group allegiance in Chapter 2. They are presented in the next two sub-sections with potential confounds and other controls left to the third sub-section. The analysis takes advantage of the flexibility offered by geographic data analysis, using ArcGIS to extract data and quantify averages or sums of a particular indicator within the borders afforded by the identity group maps presented in Chapter 3.

Group Cohesion

The first hypothesis posited that only cohesive groups could theoretically mobilize to join any side in a civil conflict. Testing group cohesiveness directly is a daunting task, as it involves numerous distinct facets that could constrain mobilization. Instead, an effort is undertaken to find a proxy measure that encompasses general challenges to both mobilization and cohesive leadership. Cohesiveness is operationalized alternatively using two measures of territorial and population dispersion of an identity group. It is hypothesized that more dispersed groups in terms of territory and population will have a harder time building united leadership and mobilizing for conflict.

The formula to generate a cohesiveness measure from any geographic space is obtained from a previous study (Weidmann 2009). Territorial dispersion is assessed by the number and area of distinct clusters that comprise the geographic space occupied by an identity group, again using Chapter 3's geographic borders. The more clusters there are, and the larger each cluster is in area with respect to the largest cluster, the more a group is considered dispersed. Territorial dispersion is calculated by the sum of the squared

proportions of the area of each cluster to the group's total area, where A is group area and a_i is cluster area:

$$T = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\frac{a_i}{A})^2 \quad (6)$$

Population dispersion requires a more complex calculation to both account for relative population and relative distance between two individual clusters within a given group. The more populous individual clusters are and the further apart they are, the higher the group's population dispersion is registered. This is operationalized by dividing the sum of the product of the squared population proportions of two clusters and the log of the minimal distance between the two clusters by the sum of the product of the squared proportions. The process is shown mathematically in the following formula where P if group population, p_i and p_j are individual populations for a cluster and $d(c_i, c_j)$ are geodesic distances between each respective cluster:

$$S = \frac{\sum_{i,j \in 1...N, i<j} (\frac{p_i}{P})^2 * (\frac{p_j}{P})^2 * log(d(c_i, c_j))}{\sum_{i,j \in 1...N, i<j} (\frac{p_i}{P})^2 * (\frac{p_j}{P})^2} \quad (7)$$

It is expected that cohesive groups are less dispersed in terms of population and territory and thus more likely to mobilize for conflict.

Collective Resentment

The cornerstone of the theory of identity group allegiance is that collective resentment on the basis of past conflict or repression serves to galvanize identity group members against a particular allegiance choice by the whole group. Leaders of cohesive groups use the occurrence of some violent intergroup conflicts or government repression as a way of consolidating their authority over a group through active negative emotion against out-groups that perpetrate violence or repression and gaining more stable footing as the perceived defender of the identity group. Once conflict begins, resentment toward the

perpetrating group grows beyond leader's control, creating overwhelming sentiment against allegiance with the resented actor. Fearing their removal, leaders mostly accede to the preferred allegiance choice of group members. The implication from this process is that groups that collectively feel resentment as a result of government repression are more likely to join the rebels, those with resentment as a result of intergroup conflict with the identity group initiating the conflict are likely to join the government and those with both types of resentment prefer self-government.

While an ideal group-level study would include an operationalization of collective resentment from either repression or violence against a particular group or the government, such a measure would be extremely difficult to obtain; either requiring precise, yet uniform survey data across 37 countries or hand-coding that is subject to confirmation bias, measurement error and other reliability problems. Instead, a deductive approach is taken by using outcomes, rather than sentiments, as a way of linking collective resentment and conflict allegiance. Because there are two distinct processes that determine resentment – one for the government and one for other identity groups – two different measures must be employed to operationalize collective resentment.

To operationalize collective resentment toward the government, a measure of political exclusion is used from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data-set (Cederman et al. 2010b). Political exclusion for identity groups, in the form of either being powerless in government or being actively discriminated against is not an explicit measure of the concept. The measure is utilized because being politically excluded is more likely to motivate identity group leaders to use repression as a galvanizing factor against the government. As leaders are dually motivated by benefits of national office and in-group patronage networks, being included in the government in some capacity is, in itself, profitable. Nevertheless, leaders

still face competition from others in their group for the position. While galvanizing the in-group against the government for repression that it has perpetrated may be tempting to included leaders, it is likely to alienate the government and terminate a stream of benefits. Excluded leaders do not face the same constraint. Thus, while both politically included and excluded groups may face repression from the government, leaders of excluded identity groups should be far more likely to use the incidence of repression to galvanize supporters against the regime for their own benefit. It follows that excluded groups would then be less likely to join the government when conflict begins.

The EPR data-set is limited to "politically relevant ethnic groups" according to their status within a government in a given year. As such, an extension is required based on the sources used to code allegiance patterns to the full set of identity groups in the data-set. There are eight possible categorizations in the data-set: Monopoly, dominance, senior partner, junior partner, regional autonomy, separatist autonomy, powerless and discriminated. The last two are of particular interest as they represent groups left entirely out of the government structure without having acted upon the condition.[3] Given this condition, leaders of powerless and discriminated groups are actively excluded from the government and have more to gain from using a collective resentment against the government as a galvanizing element. The relatively innate extremity of discrimination relative to powerlessness warrants its inclusion as a higher ordinal value in the analysis than powerlessness with discriminated groups receiving a value of '2' and powerless groups receiving a value of '1.' The rest of the groups are assigned a null value for having ties with the government.

[3] Powerless groups are defined as those whose "elite representatives hold no political power at either the national or the regional level without being explicitly discriminated against." Discriminated groups are those whose "group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination, with the intent of excluding them from both regional and national power. Such active discrimination can be either formal or informal."

The second operationalization of the collective resentment hypotheses connects to collective resentment against the initiating party of a rebellion. Intergroup violence comes in two forms: intergroup conflict outside of the boundaries of a civil conflict (i.e. spontaneous riots or organized violence between two identity groups) or intergroup violence as part of allegiances during past civil conflicts (i.e. Banyaruanda (Tutsi) fighting against the Hema Mai Mai militias during the Second Congo War). Data on the former is available from the Non-State Violence data-set (Sundberg, et al. 2012), while the latter is coded by the author based on allegiances in prior conflicts. Understandably, the lack of data on religious or regional groups, omits some intergroup violence from the analysis, but this omission is classified as no violence and should simply make it more difficult to find the hypothesized effect, adding increased validity to any effect that is found. To capture the possible diminishing effect of past violence with a conflict initiator, the operationalization of past intergroup violence takes the form of an inverted indicator of the number of years that have passed since violence occurred so that 1 is the greatest value and more time since intergroup violence has a diminishing effect. Much like the case of the previous two variables, it is expected that leaders of cohesive groups take advantage of intergroup violence to build collective resentment against the perpetrating out-group. As such, groups with more recent experiences of intergroup violence with conflict initiators are more likely to join the government. In regard to self-government, groups that have jointly experienced repression and recent violence should be most likely to pursue self-government with an added likelihood of pursuing self-government for those groups that already had institutional autonomy at peacetime.

Relative Coalition Size

Another major potential explanatory variable for allegiance is the relative size of either the rebel or government coalition. As theorized in Chapter 2, and by Christia (2012), the size of rival coalitions will matter for groups that lack collective resentment toward either the government or the initiating party of the rebellion, but remain capable of collective action. As leaders are assumed to be unconstrained from their membership collective, they can pursue the most beneficial allegiance possible by seeking to join the side where their group's population would provide a larger share of the constituency, thereby allowing the leader to attain a more prominent position in the coalition. However, groups cannot join coalitions when they are absolutely larger than either the government or initiator, as this brings a risk of displacement of the other coalition partner from the leadership to either the government or the initiating rebel group. To an extent, this operationalization is derived from (Christia 2012), with the caveat that it is at the group, rather than country level.[4]

There should be an independent and joint effect from this theoretical assertion, with groups that are relatively larger in population to the groups comprising the government coalition[5] more likely to join the government and groups relative larger compared to the rebellion's initiator more likely to join the rebels. Moreover, the difference between the two proportions should also be significant as groups closer to the rebels in terms of population than the government should join the rebels and vice versa.

The relative coalition size variable is operationalized through geographic population counts available from SEDAC's GPW data-set (University Center for International Earth Science Information Network 2011). The dataset reports counts of population within a one

[4] Christia (2012) looked at the relative size of coalitions within civil wars in her empirical analysis, but did not look at the relationships between specific groups.

[5] All groups in the EPR data that fall under the categories of monopoly, dominance, senior partner, junior partner, and regional autonomy.

square kilometer quadrant of space with global coverage. The population counts are added based on the geographic borders of identity groups, creating cumulative counts of population for each group and allowing for the creation of proportions across the measures. Absolute proportions for rebel coalitions simply involve dividing the count for an identity group I by the size of an initiating rebel group R:

$$\text{if } I < R \qquad S_R = I/R \tag{3}$$

$$\text{if } I > R \qquad S_R = 0$$

Similarly, the absolute government coalition size reflects the previously stated theoretical assertions and is the quotient of an identity group's population and the population of groups that are represented in the government prior to the start of the conflict:

$$\text{if } I < \sum G \qquad S_R = I/\sum G \tag{4}$$

$$\text{if } I > \sum G \qquad S_R = 0$$

Finally, the difference between the two proportions creates a united measure where the identity group finds the government coalition to be more beneficial if the value of D is positive and the rebel coalition if the value of D is negative:

$$D = S_G - S_R \tag{5}$$

There should be an independent and joint effect from this theoretical assertion, with groups that are relatively larger in population to the groups comprising the government coalition[6] more likely to join the government and groups relative larger compared to the rebellion's initiator more likely to join the rebels. Moreover, the difference between the two proportions should also be significant as groups closer to the rebels in terms of population than the government should join the rebels and vice versa. Thus, it is expected that when, D

[6] All groups in the EPR data that fall under the categories of monopoly, dominance, senior partner, junior partner, and regional autonomy.

takes a positive value, an identity group is more likely to join the government. Conversely, identity groups would be more likely to join the rebels when D takes a negative value.

Other Potential Explanatory Factors

Beyond the mentioned explanatory factors, several other variables could plausibly influence some facet of allegiance. For example, if an identity group has regional autonomy, it may be more likely to pursue self-government when a conflict begins as the institutional mechanisms for secession already exist in the group's governing structure. It follows that groups coded as having regional autonomy in the Ethnic Power Relations data-set modification mentioned earlier in this section should be more likely to pursue self-government at the outset of conflict.

Another possibility is that common identity cleavages with the initiator drive allegiance. Accordingly, three variables that describe whether a given identity group has overlapping ethnic, religious or regional characteristics with the conflict initiator are added to the models. Additionally, a measure of the minimum distance between an identity group and the conflict initiator, generated in ArcGIS, is also alternatively included as an independent variable and a spatially lagged variable, depending on the model. This particular distance measure should account for the challenges that allegiance poses across large geographic distances.

Relative economic deprivation across groups has recently returned as an important explanatory variable in explaining conflict onset (Ostby et al. 2009, Cederman et al. 2011). The theory behind these assertions is that groups that are relatively and systematically deprived of wealth are more likely to initiated conflicts [7]. This conclusion implies that

[7] Although, Cederman et. al. (2011)also find that relatively wealthier, but politically excluded groups are also more likely to rebel

relatively poorer groups should be more likely to join rebellions at their outset, as well. To gauge economic wealth across identity groups within countries, the G-Econ data-set, which maps the relative wealth of the world's landed areas onto a set of geocoded rasters (Nordhaus, et al. 2006), is used to create a measure of intergroup gross cell product deviation standardized with SEDAC's measures of population density and alternatively include logged and squared log versions for the concept in the statistical models.

Finally, three fairly standard geographic measures for group-level studies of civil conflict: average distance from the capital city, percentage of population residing in urban areas relative to total population and group population as a percentage of total population, are extracted through ArcGIS and included in the models. Like the mentioned population data, each source of data is finely granulated and is taken at either the sum or mean within the borders delineated within the generated identity group maps. The first is extracted using the PRIO-GRID data-set, which geocodes the distance of all the world's landed areas to the capital of the country to which that area belongs (Tollefsen, et al. 2012), and is expected to decrease the likelihood of joining the government as the distance increases. The next variable is also extracted from SEDAC's global population data-set and standardized by total group population. It is expected that larger groups are naturally more likely to mobilize toward collective action. The urban population reflects the dividend of the total urban population of a group and the group's total population. The former measure is extracted from the SEDAC global population data-set, using a shapefile of the world's urban areas divided into groups to isolate the urban spaces that are occupied by each of the identity groups in the data and calculate the number of urban residents for each identity group (for International Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University, et al. 2011). This

urban population count is then divided by the total population measure described in this passage. Summary statistics for all included variables are presented on table 4.1

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables

Dependent Variable

Allegiance Choice	Frequency	Percentage
No collective action (0)	555	45.94
Government (1)	393	32.53
Rebels (2)	171	14.16
Self-Government (3)	33	2.73

Independent Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Political Exclusion	.7321888	.6357363	0	2
Intergroup Wealth Inequality	-.3018899	1.226029	-7.290047	3.191256
Time since Conflict with Initiator	.041112	.1550616	0	1
Relative Coalition Size	-.1036121	.3060779	-1	.9603068
Group Population	.0456283	.0990989	0	.7437941
Regional Autonomy	.0978541	.2972448	0	1
Territorial Dispersion	.7275853	.2906062	.0222776	1.000346
Population Dispersion	3.740419	2.390338	0	8.142239
Distance to Capital	930.2327	1110.926	19	6868.933
Same Region as Initiator	.5098712	.5001172	0	1
Same Religion as Initiator	.4918455	.5001482	0	1
Same Ethnicity as Initiator	.0841202	.2776872	0	1
Distance from Initiator	994.1949	1344.274	0	7781.93
Pct. of Population Urban	.0416261	.1194153	0	1

Statistical Models

Allegiance choice is a categorical outcome with four values, naturally requiring a multinomial, non-linear regression model for inferential analysis. The primary model for this study is the multinomial logit, a regression model that allows for the assessment of the likelihood of a category being chosen in place of at least two others. The multinomial logit is an extension of the standard logistic regression, which assesses the predictors of the

likelihood of a binary outcome with Bernoulli-distributed error structures. Instead of looking at two-way predictions, the multinomial logistic model analyzes categorical variables in terms of the relationship of a given choice to a base outcome[8]. The coefficients that the model produces can be interpreted as the likelihood that a unit change in a given variable produces a corresponding change in the likelihood of an outcome occurring in relation to the base outcome (McFadden 1973). A principal assumption of the multinomial logit is independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) or that adding or removing categories from the regression model will not alter the results of the remaining choices in relation to the base case (Hausman & McFadden 1984). When the assumption is violated, such as in the case of voting models (Alvarez & Nagler 1998) [9], a multinomial probit model, which relaxes the assumption, is more appropriate. Implicitly, it is not apparent that allegiance choice functions as voting, with choices made more deterministically and without explicit reference to other possibilities in the aggregate. Generalized Hausman-McFadden specification tests conducted after each multinomial logit confirm that the IIA assumption is not violated.

In order to clarify the effects of the independent variables on allegiance choice, logistic regression models are also presented. Conducting multiple dichotomous tests on categorical variables rather than one test in the form of a multinomial logit will produce substantially different (although not necessarily biased) results because two different likelihood functions are employed by the models (Agresti 2002, 273). Moreover, the structure of multiple logistic models and multinomial logits are fundamentally different and essentially tell two different stories. The former measure an absolute relationship between taking a particular choice and any other choices, while the latter measures several different likelihoods of choices relative to a particular base outcome. Thus, the logits are included as a

[8] By convention, the most numerous choice.

[9] Although, this claim has come under increased scrutiny (Dow & Endersby 2004).

different specification to show absolute predictors of a particular allegiance choice, rather than relative likelihoods.

Bayesian Spatial Random Effects

Data where observations are distributed across space tend to exhibit spatial autocorrelation, where observations from units that are geographically proximate have similar values and certain patterns of correlation tend to cluster in space (Gledistch & Ward 2008). The presence of spatial autocorrelation introduces bias into the residual error structure of frequentist models by failing to account for significant spatial relationships. The most common solution for residual autocorrelation is the addition of spatially correlated effects through a Bayesian hierarchical model. The effects would take into account the adjacency of neighboring units in an observation through a conditional autoregressive model and a spatially-defined error term (Besag, et al. 1991). The particular model employed here, developed by (Leroux, et al. 1999), uses a Gibbs sampler and Metropolis steps based on a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation. Because of computational complexity for multinomial models, only the binomial specification for the likelihood of each allegiance outcome is used. Finally, to ease convergence, priors from a linear model without spatial autocorrelation are utilized in each iteration of the study.

Selection Bias

One final specification concern in the statistical analysis is selection bias. It is possible that some groups that initiate conflict specifically time their conflict initiation to correspond to a favorable allegiance environment, which would, in turn, grant undue favor to several key predictors in the model. While there are several different model specifications

for testing selection bias in multinomial logistic regressions (Bourguignon, et al. 2007), the structure of the data makes implementing these models rather difficult. Time-series data begins in 1990, ruling out the inclusion of six conflicts and severely truncating the selection stages of seventeen others that begin within five years of the start of the data. With almost half of the cases missing or severely truncated, a selection model would itself be biased in terms of selection and is omitted from the analysis.

Results

The results of the frequentist analysis are presented first, on tables 2-4. Table 4.2 presents results from a multinomial logit with the base case as “No collective action.” Thus, the coefficients jointly reflect the probability of taking any collective action over taking none and the likelihood that a given group pursues a particular choice of action above no action at all. Nevertheless, a particular direction or significance should not be viewed as a sign of absolute significance over a joint set of choices as the multinomial logit is not designed for such a conclusion to be drawn from the coefficients alone.

The results from table 4.2 show, primarily, that groups that act cohesively are driven to do so as a result of indicators that relate to the collective memory hypothesis. Identity groups that were, in some capacity, institutionally a part of the government are more likely to join the government or to pursue self-government than to take no collective action (1.5 and 0.75 times more likely, respectively). In terms of experiencing prior conflict with the conflict’s initiating identity group, groups that more recently experience prior conflict with the initiator are more likely to take any choice over no collective action, including joining the rebel group itself, although at a substantially lower rate. This result, above all, likely relates to the fact that groups that have mobilized for conflict in the past are more likely to

Table 4.2: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Allegiance Choice from 'No collective action'

	Government (1)	Rebels (2)	Self-Government (3)
Political Exclusion	-3.267***	0.292	-1.374*
	(0.414)	(0.337)	(0.644)
Intergroup Wealth Inequality	0.047	-0.014	0.226
	(0.082)	(0.106)	(0.205)
Time since Conflict with Initiator	3.457**	1.832*	5.168*
	(1.230)	(0.906)	(2.116)
Relative Coalition Size	0.121	-0.015	-0.912
	(0.317)	(0.444)	(0.466)
Group Population	4.324	3.436	1.623
	(2.298)	(2.787)	(3.473)
Regional Autonomy	-0.405	2.848***	1.408
	(0.531)	(0.679)	(0.741)
Territorial Dispersion	-0.080	0.171	0.332
	(0.312)	(0.446)	(1.204)
Population Dispersion	0.041	0.055	0.175
	(0.041)	(0.062)	(0.113)
Distance to Capital	0.001*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pct. of Population Urban	0.866	-0.577	-2.673
	(0.581)	(0.882)	(3.124)
Same Region as Initiator	-0.405	0.529	-0.230
	(0.394)	(0.455)	(0.777)
Same Religion as Initiator	-0.194	0.520	-0.214
	(0.226)	(0.290)	(0.385)
Same Ethnicity as Initiator	0.641	2.101***	0.399
	(0.603)	(0.421)	(1.148)
Distance from Initiating Group	-0.001**	-0.002***	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.663**	-1.985**	-2.624
	(0.563)	(0.648)	(1.343)
Group-Conflicts		1152	

Note: 'No collective action' is used as the base category. Standard Errors clustered at the conflict level. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

mobilize for it again and not necessarily contradictory to expected theoretical predictions. Several additional results stand out: groups that have regional autonomy are, above all, more likely to join the rebels when taking collective action, while groups that are geographically

closer to the conflict's initiating party are likely to join either the government or the rebels, rather than not mobilize at all, indicating a geographic effect on mobilization that is seen more expansively in the following results.

Table 4.3: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Allegiance Choice from 'Government'

	No collective action (0)	Rebels (2)	Self-Government (3)
Political Exclusion	3.262***	3.582***	1.909**
	(0.415)	(0.410)	(0.645)
Intergroup Wealth Inequality	-0.032	-0.036	0.217
	(0.079)	(0.113)	(0.184)
Time since Conflict with Initiator	-3.439**	-1.594	1.754
	(1.239)	(1.010)	(1.776)
Relative Coalition Size	-0.166	-0.204	-1.072*
	(0.324)	(0.416)	(0.454)
Group Population	-4.508*	-1.150	-3.308
	(2.298)	(1.141)	(2.538)
Regional Autonomy	0.387	3.237***	1.768**
	(0.532)	(0.664)	(0.657)
Territorial Dispersion	0.116	0.299	0.468
	(0.304)	(0.484)	(1.128)
Population Dispersion	-0.042	0.015	0.131
	(0.041)	(0.062)	(0.120)
Distance to Capital	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Same Region as Initiator	0.445	0.982*	0.263
	(0.387)	(0.453)	(0.885)
Same Religion as Initiator	0.198	0.695*	-0.009
	(0.229)	(0.340)	(0.434)
Same Ethnicity as Initiator	-0.682	1.390**	-0.373
	(0.605)	(0.515)	(1.201)
Distance from Initiator	0.001**	-0.001***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Constant	-1.737**	-3.764***	-4.439***
	(0.552)	(0.576)	(1.267)
Group-Conflicts		1152	

Note: 'Government' is used as the base category. Standard Errors clustered at the conflict level. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 4.3 shows results from an alternative specification of the multinomial logit in the previous table with allegiance with the government as the reference category. This allows for the examination of the results relative to joining the government, rather than taking collective action and may more accurately reflect the choice faced by groups than the outcomes from using the conventional base category. The results in the first column are essentially mirror images of the first column in table 4.2, as they still describe the choices of groups moving between 'no collective action' and government support, but the other two columns present new results. When faced with a choice of joining the government or the rebels, groups are more likely to join the rebels when they are institutionally excluded from the government, geographically closer to the initiator or share one or more identity characteristics with the rebellion's initiators. In regard to pursuing self-government instead of siding with the government, self-governing groups are generally more institutionally excluded (although at a lower rate than groups that join rebellions) and more likely to have had some regional autonomy before conflict. Groups also pursue self-government when the difference between the relative size of the government is smaller and there is a greater likelihood of either parity between the two parties or an advantage in coalition size for the rebels.

For the most part, multinomial logistic results show support for the collective resentment hypothesis above others, with some notable deviations. The logistic regressions on the absolute likelihood of making one choice, presented on table 4.4, extend this pattern. Results for choosing no collective action strongly imply that territorial and population dispersion are subsumed by geographic distance from conflict and centers of power in predicting mobilization in civil war. Groups that are further from the initiator of a conflict, further from the capital and do not share ethnicity with the initiator are less likely to mobilize. On

Table 4.4: Logistic Regressions of Allegiance Choice

	No coll. action	Government	Rebels	Self-Gov.
Political Exclusion	1.666***	-3.286***	1.314***	-0.038
	(0.372)	(0.379)	(0.230)	(0.369)
Intergroup Wealth Inequality	-0.034	0.043	-0.013	0.203
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.101)	(0.153)
Time since Conflict with Initiator	-3.069**	1.646	-0.148	2.901*
	(1.127)	(1.611)	(0.604)	(1.287)
Relative Coalition Size	0.161	0.267	0.085	-0.854
	(0.333)	(0.282)	(0.404)	(0.448)
Group Population	-4.910	2.500**	0.891	-2.964
	(3.053)	(0.970)	(1.208)	(3.102)
Regional Autonomy	-0.811	-1.404**	2.589***	1.351*
	(0.445)	(0.483)	(0.625)	(0.598)
Territorial Dispersion	-0.070	-0.169	0.009	0.333
	(0.296)	(0.305)	(0.417)	(1.153)
Population Dispersion	-0.072	0.023	0.016	0.148
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.105)
Distance to Capital	-0.000*	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pct. of Population Urban	-0.193	1.086*	-1.065	-3.291
	(0.584)	(0.503)	(0.887)	(3.343)
Same Region as Initiator	0.062	-0.431	0.778	0.053
	(0.357)	(0.393)	(0.416)	(0.734)
Same Religion as Initiator	0.028	-0.294	0.588*	-0.145
	(0.205)	(0.244)	(0.282)	(0.378)
Same Ethnicity as Initiator	-1.842***	-0.227	1.721***	-0.471
	(0.528)	(0.517)	(0.307)	(1.023)
Distance from Initiator	0.001***	-0.000	-0.002***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.934	1.586**	-3.312***	-4.453***
	(0.500)	(0.502)	(0.529)	(1.120)
Number of Observations	1152	1152	1152	1152

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the conflict level. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

the other hand, dispersion measures were not significant across any specification; further emphasizing the need for geographic controls. With respect to other significant findings, groups are also less likely to mobilize when having been excluded institutionally from the government and as more time passes since a conflict with the initiator of a rebellion.

While not definitive, the combined frequentist results lend support to the collective resentment hypothesis. Institutionally excluded groups are more likely to join the rebels and less likely to join the government. While experiencing a recent conflict with the rebellion's initiator is less significant, overall, the directions of coefficients when it is significant reveal some apprehension among groups to join rebellions led by their former adversaries, opting for self-government or no collective action, but not necessarily to explicitly side with the government and vice versa. Competing hypotheses find far less support. Intergroup wealth inequality is never a significant predictor. Relative coalition size is also a mostly insignificant predictor of allegiance. Sharing ethnicity with the initiator does predict allegiance with the rebels, but so does sharing religious identity.

Bayesian Regression Results

The credible intervals produced by the Conditional Autoregressive Regression (CAR) model are shown in Figure 4.1. Some independent variables associated with geographic distance, including distance from capital and initiator measures, and that had an abundance of zero values, including the same ethnicity, religion and region as enumerator measures were removed to assist in convergence. For the most part, the results do not deviate from the findings of the frequentist models. While the credible intervals of the spatial random effect, ρ, are not discernible on the graph, they are above zero for each of the models and do not overlap with zero at any point, indicating that adjacency to other like units in space does make identity groups more likely to take allegiance outcomes similar to those groups, essentially indicating that allegiance choices cluster in space. Finally, given the lack of deviation from the frequentist models in the binomial case, it is relatively safe to assert that the multinomial results would also not deviate from the inclusion of spatial random effects.



Figure 4.1: Leroux et. al. (1999) MCMC Binomial CAR Model Results

Alternative Specifications

In addition to the presented basic specification of the statistical analysis, several alternative specifications can further elucidate the highlighted relationship between collective memory of violence and allegiance choice or serve as robustness checks. The first alternative

specification relates to the coalition size hypothesis. While the difference in coalition size variable in formula 5 was not significant, it could be that the raw coalition size variables in formulas 3 and 4 have some effect on allegiance. Including coalition sizes separately produces two separate significant effects. Consistent with expectations of the coalition size hypothesis , groups that are smaller relative to the government coalition are less likely to act collectively. Nevertheless, group act out of character by opting for self-government even though they are larger in size relative to the rebel coalition and would stand to benefit from joining a side – contradicting the coalition size hypothesis. The full results are shown on Table 4.5.

The second alternative specification expands on the collective resentment hypothesis in regard to self-government. Specifically, the hypothesis stated that the presence of collective resentment toward both the government and conflict initiator would drive support for self-government. This implies an interaction between political exclusion and recent prior intergroup conflict. As it stands, the model in the previous section did not incorporate this effect. As such, an interaction term is added to model, which multiplies political exclusion and past intergroup violence. The results, shown in , reveals some support for the collective resentment hypothesis. Introducing the interaction leads to positive coefficients on both the political exclusion and past violence variables. However, jointly interpreting the main and marginal effects reveals that groups that are both politically excluded and have recently experienced intergroup conflict are not significantly more likely to pursue self government. In short, the interaction is important, but only for demonstrating the independent effects of both intergroup conflict and political exclusion. The absence of the interaction also appears to have contributed to the presence of the relationship between rebel coalition size and

Table 4.5: Multinomial Logit Regression of Allegiance Choice: Alternate 1

	No coll. action (0)	Rebels (2)	Self-Gov. (3)
Political Exclusion	3.244***	3.560***	1.886**
	(0.416)	(0.416)	(0.635)
Intergroup Wealth Inequality	-0.034	-0.053	0.178
	(0.085)	(0.116)	(0.198)
Time since Conflict with Initiator	-3.402**	-1.624	1.755
	(1.163)	(1.022)	(1.779)
Proportion to Rebel Coalition	-0.382	-0.149	0.960*
	(0.370)	(0.467)	(0.422)
Proportion to Government Coalition	-2.661**	-1.448	-0.330
	(0.974)	(0.927)	(1.943)
Group Population	-1.687	0.377	-3.747
	(1.740)	(1.483)	(3.342)
Regional Autonomy	0.383	3.219***	1.841**
	(0.521)	(0.671)	(0.665)
Territorial Dispersion	0.147	0.252	0.391
	(0.309)	(0.479)	(1.146)
Population Dispersion	-0.041	0.011	0.127
	(0.039)	(0.060)	(0.116)
Distance to Capital	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Pct. of Population Urban	-0.633	-1.273	-3.567
	(0.596)	(0.767)	(3.237)
Same Region as Initiator	0.483	0.957*	0.170
	(0.399)	(0.455)	(0.945)
Same Religion as Initiator	0.279	0.760*	-0.028
	(0.231)	(0.340)	(0.414)
Same Ethnicity as Initiator	-0.544	1.489**	-0.283
	(0.588)	(0.514)	(1.214)
Distance from Initiating Group	0.001**	-0.001***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Constant	-1.614**	-3.567***	-4.237***
	(0.578)	(0.581)	(1.214)
Group-Conflicts		1152	

Note: 'Government' is used as the base category. Standard Errors clustered at the conflict level. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

self-government in the first alternative specification, as the addition of the interaction renders the effect insignificant.

Table 4.6: Multinomial Logit Regression of Allegiance Choice: Alternate 2

	No coll. action (0)	Rebels (2)	Self-Gov. (3)
Political Exclusion	3.269***	3.592***	2.779***
	(0.470)	(0.457)	(0.551)
Intergroup Wealth Inequality	-0.027	-0.035	0.145
	(0.085)	(0.113)	(0.162)
Time since Conflict with Initiator	-5.067*	-2.816	4.431*
	(2.383)	(2.374)	(1.722)
Collective Memory Interaction	1.179	0.707	-4.448*
	(2.031)	(2.188)	(1.753)
Proportion to Rebel Coalition	-0.359	-0.118	0.763
	(0.375)	(0.465)	(0.421)
Proportion to Government Coalition	-2.804**	-1.627	-0.730
	(0.976)	(0.926)	(2.145)
Group Population	-1.882	0.110	-5.743
	(1.774)	(1.548)	(4.651)
Regional Autonomy	0.366	3.212***	2.573***
	(0.551)	(0.695)	(0.672)
Territorial Dispersion	0.209	0.350	0.464
	(0.300)	(0.480)	(1.190)
Population Dispersion	-0.038	0.015	0.129
	(0.040)	(0.061)	(0.125)
Distance to Capital	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Same Region as Initiator	0.566	1.072*	0.556
	(0.399)	(0.455)	(0.794)
Same Religion as Initiator	0.309	0.778*	0.145
	(0.241)	(0.351)	(0.437)
Same Ethnicity as Initiator	-0.554	1.482**	-0.181
	(0.608)	(0.529)	(1.276)
Distance from Initiator	0.001***	-0.001**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Constant	-1.712**	-3.739***	-5.227***
	(0.584)	(0.587)	(1.169)
Group-Conflicts		1152	

Note: ‘Government’ is used as the base category. Standard Errors clustered at the conflict level. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

The final specification takes account of a potential measurement issue: urban areas are not well covered by the mapping technique used to generate identity groups, making groups with more urban coverage more susceptible to error. In cases with more urban areas,

there is a higher likelihood that other groups are actively present in the area, in addition to the identity group of interest. As such, a model where, instead of including percentage of urban population as an independent variable, it is held constant at one as an offsetting variable to insure errors are shaped by its effect. The results are shown on Table 4.7. The only major difference in the findings helps the collective resentment hypothesis as groups that had more recently experienced intergroup violence with the rebels become less likely to join the rebels at conflict onset than to join the government. The significance indicates that failure to reject the null hypothesis in previous models had been influenced measurement error, rather than actual null effects.

Conclusion

The large-N results largely conform to the expectations of the theory chapter at the group level. Coalition size and traditional measures of political grievances, such as intergroup wealth inequality, do a poor job of predicting allegiance patterns, suggesting a pattern different from both existing explanations of conflict allegiance and onset. As expected, institutional exclusion, and to a lesser extent, previous instances of violence with conflict initiators, motivate identity groups' allegiance choices (the latter becoming evident only when accounting for error in measurement of identity groups introduced by urbanization). The results are largely unchanged when considering several alternative specification and adding spatial random effects to account for the contiguity of identity groups to one another. While the results provide an important test for the theory, which underscores its validity at the group level, the mechanisms of the collective resentment theory remain untested. Political exclusion is merely a proxy for situations where leaders would be more likely to use repression as a way of galvanizing resentment. In order to test

Table 4.7: Multinomial Logit Regression of Allegiance Choice: Alternate 3

	No coll. action (0)	Rebels (2)	Self-Gov. (3)
Political Exclusion	3.622***	3.929***	2.399***
	(0.260)	(0.298)	(0.457)
Intergroup Wealth Inequality	-0.018	-0.045	0.195
	(0.090)	(0.105)	(0.193)
Time since Conflict with Initiator	-3.514***	-1.731*	1.394*
	(0.870)	(0.767)	(0.711)
Relative Coalition Size	-0.369	-0.345	-1.176
	(0.421)	(0.505)	(0.765)
Group Population	-5.548***	-1.876	-4.347
	(1.629)	(1.441)	(3.742)
Regional Autonomy	0.811	3.666***	2.435***
	(0.430)	(0.469)	(0.638)
Territorial Dispersion	0.352	0.414	0.606
	(0.425)	(0.516)	(0.798)
Population Dispersion	-0.029	0.018	0.144
	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.111)
Distance to Capital	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Same Region as Initiator	-0.038	0.459	-0.189
	(0.312)	(0.344)	(0.488)
Same Religion as Initiator	0.292	0.832**	0.168
	(0.233)	(0.272)	(0.429)
Same Ethnicity as Initiator	-0.958*	1.153*	-0.590
	(0.470)	(0.454)	(1.103)
Distance from Initiating Group	0.000*	-0.001***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.855***	-3.744***	-4.612***
	(0.520)	(0.646)	(1.001)
Group-Conflicts		1152	

Note: Government' is used as the base category. Pct. of Urban Population's coefficient held constant at one. Standard Errors clustered at the conflict level.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

the rest of the theory, it is necessary to draw down and test outcomes at the individual and leader level, allowing for an examination of why certain choices of allegiance were made and in which way leaders are constrained in making those choices. This is presented in the three chapters that follow.

Chapter 5

Identity Group Allegiance during the Syrian Civil War

Introduction

Having shown a statistical connection between political exclusion and identity group allegiance choices at the outset of conflict, Syria is presented as a case study that explicitly connects the theorized predictor of allegiance, a collective memory of resentment against a preferred allegiance partner, to allegiance outcomes. The case underscores the role of prior political priming and individual resentment in shaping allegiance patterns in the civil war that broke out in 2011. The Syrian case is not only an excellent example for topical reasons, but for the way in which the country's eclectic mix of ethnic, religious and regional divisions broke down to form three distinct conflict coalitions at the onset of the war in 2011. Since the theory is limited to conflict onset, there is no special focus on subsequent allegiance developments, such as the fragmentation of rebel groups and the invasion of

Eastern Syria by Iraq-based insurgents from the Islamic State or the eventual coalescence of Sunni Kurdish regional groups into a singular self-governing entity.

Identity Groups in Syria



Figure 5.1: Identity Groups in Syria

Chapter 3 identifies Syria's 19 identity groups and their sources of political distinction in detail. A brief summary of that discussion will be provided here. Figure 5.1 reproduces the identity group map from Chapter 3. The majority of Syria's citizens are Sunni Arabs, making up around 60% of the population and residing in each of the three major regions in the country: Damascus, the Mediterranean Coast and the Euphrates River. The remaining 40% of the population are divided between 16 identity groups of varying sects and ethnicities. Alawites make up about 10% of the population, of which nearly

all are Arab. Various denominations of Christians, make up another 10%. The Christian population is divided along ethnic lines and while the majority are Arab, there are minorities of Armenians and Assyrians. The Arab Christian population is also divided regionally, with major concentrations in each of the three major regions. Ismaili Arabs make up a significant concentration of people in the mountainous regions around Hama and around 1% of the total population. Ethnic Kurds, who are primarily Sunni Arabs are scattered across two regions in the North of Syria, and with a minority of Yazidis, make up around 9% of the population. Druze, a mostly Arab religious minority, make up between 3-4% of the population and live in either the Jabal Al-Druze in the Damascus region and Idlib province in the North. Finally, Circassians are similarly divided between the Northern Aleppo province and the Golan Heights in the South (Factbook 2014, Völker 2005). As per the unit of analysis in the study, it should not merely be the ethnic or sectarian groups that have agency in making allegiance decisions, but any group with a distinct ethnic, regional and/or religious identity. Accordingly, Druze Arabs around Jabal al-Druze are treated as a different group than Druze Arabs around Idlib.

Expected Outcomes

The theory laid out in Chapter 2 yields several predictions for how the allegiance patterns in Syria's conflict should develop. The basic argument is that groups that can make a united choice to join either the initiator of civil conflict, the government or to create or participate in a self-governing entity will do so for a collective fear of losing out on potential gains and of exploitation from both sides of the conflict. Choices of allegiance are made based on a combination of rational self-interested decisions that will most benefit leaders and reactive decisions to a non-rational collective distaste for allegiance with one or more parties

in the conflict. Broadly, this means that identity group leaders' decisions will be constrained by the composition of both sides of the conflict and whether the political leadership of an identity group had previously stoked resentment in its members against either or both of the sides for political gain.

Given this dynamic, several outcomes are expected for both identity group leaders and the groups themselves. Foremost, politically unorganized groups with divided leadership or without clear political leadership at all, should not make any allegiance choice. While some members may fight for one or both sides of the conflict, there should be no organized decision to join a side. As seen in Chapter 2, in the case of the Golan Heights Circassians, this is likely to lead to undesirable consequences, such as group displacement, exploitation and violence from both sides of the conflict.

Of groups whose leaders are capable of choosing a side, decisions to align should be made by leaders in two ways: proactively and reactively. Proactive leaders make allegiance decisions before receiving signals of how members of the group believe the group should act – essentially in their own self-interest. Reactive leaders take their members' reactions to conflict circumstances into account and respond to more immediate pressure from those members. Absent major resentment by many group members toward the leaders' preferred side, there shouldn't be much difference in outcomes from proactive and reactive leaders. However, if there is underlying resentment toward one party in the conflict, then proactive leaders that go against the wishes of their member collective will suffer the consequences of losing their authority in the community and even being targeted for assassination.

At the group level, outcomes should align to levels of pre-war popular resentment against either the government or the initiator of the conflict: Sunni Arabs from the Mediterranean Coast region, particularly in the cities of Homs, Alleppo and Hama. Resentment

toward one side should lead groups to join the other; resentment toward both should lead groups to pursue self-government. Absent resentment, decisions to join a side will be contingent on the positions of group leaders to obtain either short term or longer-term gains, as explained in Chapter 2. Given these predictions, the rest of the chapter will describe the first days of the Syrian Civil War and assess whether the actual allegiance patterns of the conflict conform to the expected outcomes.

Political Leadership and Resentment before 2011

Table 5.1: Identity Groups, Resentment, Leader Choice and Outcomes

Identity Group	Resent. Target	Leader Choices	Allegiance Outcomes
Damascus Christian Arabs	None	Grigorious Tabe: Join Government	Join Government
Damascus Druze Arabs	Rebels	Clergy: Join Government	Join Government
Damascus Sunni Circassians	None	No clear leadership	No collective action
Damascus Sunni Arabs	Government	Said al-Buti: Join Government	Join Rebels
Euphrates Christian Armenians	None	Tashnaq Party: No action	No collective action
Euphrates Christian Assyrians	Government	Syriac Union Party: Self-Government	Self-Government
Euphrates Christian Syria Arabs	None	No unified leader: Join Government	Self-Government
Euphrates Sunni Kurds	Government	Salih Muslim: self government	Self-Government
Euphrates Sunni Arabs	Government	Multiple leaders	Join Rebels
Euphrates Yezidi Kurds	Government	Integrated into Kurdish parties	Self-Government
Mediterranean Coast Alawite Arabs	None	Bashar al-Assad: Join Government	Join Government
Mediterranean Coast Alevi Turkmen	None	Integrated into Alawite politics	Join Government
Mediterranean Coast Christian Arabs	None	Archbishop Jeanbart:Join Government	Join Government
Mediterranean Coast Druze Arabs	Rebels	Sweida elders/Walid Jumblatt: Join Rebels	Join Rebels
Mediterranean Coast Ismaili Arabs	None	Arab Socialist Party: Join Government	Join Government
Mediterranean Coast Sunni Circassians	None	No clear leadership	No collective Action
Mediterranean Coast Sunni Kurds	Government	Kurd Dag elders: Join Rebels	Join Rebels
Mediterranean Coast Sunni Arabs	N/A	Riad al-Asaad: Initiate Rebellion	Initiate Conflict
Mediterranean Coast Sunni Turkmen	Government	Turkmen cultural groups: Join Rebels	Join Rebels

Table 5.1 provides a primer to follow the remainder of this chapter, which will lay out the development of resentment by particular groups, the actions taken by identity group leaders at the outset of conflict and the allegiance outcomes that followed those actions. To preview the findings, all cases of resentment resulted in joining a coalition that did not contain the resented party and while this resentment was mostly directed at the government, it shows the potential role of resentment in superseding leader preferences, when present.

To trace the sources of resentment, it is necessary to explore Syria's political history with respect to each of the 19 identity groups. These historical summaries are presented for the remainder of the section, taking care to highlight specific instances of resentment directed against either the government or initiators of the conflict with respect to each group. Syria's current patterns of political leadership trace their origins to French-occupied Syria following World War I. Threatened by multiple revolts from a united front of Syrians across both ethnic and sectarian lines (including Druze, Alawites and Sunnis along with Kurds), the French administration employed a divide and rule strategy in the protectorate to weaken Arab nationalism. The administration provided autonomy to minorities, giving Lebanese Maronites an independent state and autonomy to Alawites and Druze, preventing the spread of nationalism to the autonomous areas (Fildis 2011). Alawites and Druze also received preferential treatment on the part of the French. Each group gained a preferred position in education, administrative positions and military training within the colonial regime, while Syria's nationalist elements were suppressed and increasingly forced into becoming a purely Sunni Arab movement (Robinovich 1979). While a nationalist government took over after independence, decades of instability, including an aborted union with Egypt followed, culminating in a coup that brought the secular Ba'ath party to power in 1963 and a subsequent coup that brought Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite Air Force colonel and a member of the previous Ba'ath party junta, to uncontested power in 1970.

Under the Assad's new Alawite-dominated Ba'ath party, identity group affairs took on several patterns. Favoring secularism over Islamism, the Ba'athists clashed with the Islamist-leaning Muslim Brotherhood throughout the 1970s, culminating in a full-on revolt in 1980 and the indiscriminate shelling of rebel-held Hama by government forces in 1982

that effectively ended the insurgency (Lafevre 2012). The Sunni ulama's[1] political influence was substantially co-opted by the regime after 1982 and exiled members of the Brotherhood were also, eventually, brought under the regime's yoke under an amnesty program. However, the advent of new media, such as the Internet and satellite television, allowed for a return of Islamist politics to the country. The most prominent voice of the more confrontational Islamists was Hama-born Adnan al-Arur, who broadcast anti-Shia and ostensibly anti-regime programs from Saudi Arabia. The broadcasts emphasized the repression against political Sunni Islam by the Ba'athist regime. As a result of his agitation, al-Arur was lauded by protesters and revolutionaries at the onset of the Syrian uprising (Pierret 2011, 234-238). As shall be seen in the next sub-section, clerics like Adnan al-Arur exposed and marginalized prominent domestic scholars, such as Sa'ad al-Buti and Ahmad Hassun, who had remained loyal to the government as protests and, ultimately civil conflict, broke out.

While Sunni political leadership was either co-opted or forced into exile after 1982, Kurdish political parties, nominally outlawed under the Ba'athist regime, gained legitimacy within their community and slowly built a negotiating posture with the government. Nevertheless, their illegality hampered collective organization, leading to fragmentation among political factions and an absence of any contentious action against the regime. Unlike in Turkey and Iraq, Kurdish groups were not able to establish an armed rebellion against the government. However, in 2004, the regime turned its weapons on protesters in the northeastern city of Qamishli, killing over 100 and displacing thousands. While the Kurdish political parties were largely paralyzed by the uprising's aftermath, a growing online presence for youth movements allowed for a cultivation of anti-regime sentiment as a result of the massacre. In the wake of the massacre, previously fragmented Kurdish parties were able

[1]The ulama is the body of Sunni religious scholars in Syria. The scholars have considerable political, in addition to religious, influence.

to channel outrage to forming a national consciousness among Syrian Kurds, especially in the northeastern Hasakah province where the uprising took place. Protests were organized and new leaders were even able to participate in informal negotiations with the government to demand increased rights for Kurds, citizenship for hundreds of thousands of stateless Kurds in the Hasakah province and recognition of the Kurdish language and its use in education parallel to Arabic (Allsopp 2014, 190-194).

Unlike the case of Lebanon, Syrian Arab Christians were not formally empowered by the departing French colonial administration. Nevertheless, Arab Christians did enjoy relatively high political status under the Ba'ath Party. The party's founder and first Secretary-General , Michel Aflaq, was Greek Orthodox and affiliation with the Ba'ath Party was particularly strong among Greek Orthodox Christians in Syria. Even though Arab Christians were tolerated and even appointed to high positions within the party and the Assad cabinets, promotions were on an individual level and only to high-level positions, leaving Arab Christians underrepresented in functional government positions and ultimately unable to organize politically as a group (Van Dam 2011). The impetus for political organization thus fell to various Churches, ranging from the Greek Orthodox to the Melkite Catholic and Apostolic divinities within Syria (Mousa 2012).

Much like Arab Christians, Armenian political organization was restricted under both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad. After independence, the Tashnaq party emerged in both Lebanon and Syria, holding a close affiliation with the Armenian Apostolic Church. Restrictions on Armenian culture and private education grew after the Ba'ath coup of 1963. Nevertheless, a thaw began under the Assad family and Armenian representatives were given seats in the People's Assembly and allowed to continue Armenian language education, conditional on maintaining a rigorous pro-Ba'ath curriculum. In tune with the compromise, the Tashnaq

party and other formal political organizations were banned and political association was primarily directed through churches and affiliated associations (Migliorino 2006).

Assyrians, Christians who speak a variant of the ancient Aramaic language, were, like the Kurds, subject to Arabization policies under the Ba'ath party, but with little of the conciliation that was provided to Armenians. By 2005, anti-regime sentiment in the Jezira had culminated in an alliance between local Syriac-speakers and Kurds in signing the of the Damascus Declaration and the foundation of the Syriac Union Party, which sought recognition for Aramaic speakers in northeastern Syria. The Assad government responded with a mix of co-optation and coercion, arresting party members, but recognizing Aramaic language education in some villages in 2008 (Al-Tamimi 7 December, 2012).

The Druze had played an outsized role in Syrian politics during the French Mandate, leading a revolt against colonial rule in the mid-1920s. After independence, the rule of Adib Shishakli initiated a period of forced integration of Druze into the larger nationalist Syrian state, as they were perceived to be the most potent threat to Shishakli's rule. The forced integration left the Druze politically and economically marginalized, but also mindful of the threat posed by Sunni nationalist rule (Landis 1998). Druze military officers supported the coup that brought the Ba'ath party into power, but were marginalized and largely purged from the army in the in-fighting that led up to Hafez al-Assad's ascension. Nevertheless, the Assad regime privileged minorities and allowed Druze, as was the case with many other minorities, to hold a fairly advanced position in the regime and retain traditional leadership in the form of community elders (Gambill March 2013).

Ismailis were members of another Shia sect that was considered one of the major components to the colonial 'government by minorities,' albeit making up only about 1% of the Syrian population. Concentrated in the mountains around Hama province and the city

of Salamiya, Ismailis had been associated with communist and socialist dissenter parties that had agitated and were subsequently repressed by the Ba'athist regime in the 1980s and 1990s. While this historic animosity sparked demonstrations against the Assad government in the early days of the uprising, the demonstrations never materialized into participation in the rebellion (Williams November 18, 2013).

While the Ba'athist regime tolerated political activity among some minorities, others were either brutally suppressed or failed to form any cohesive political movements. Chief among the former groups were Sunni Turkmen, who had originally migrated to mountainous areas of Hama province under the Ottoman Empire in the 1800s. After Syria's independence and especially under the Ba'athist regime, their status in Syria was increasingly marginalized. Fearing that Turkey would incite Turkmen against the Syrian government as retaliation for Syria's support of the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Assad government engaged in a brutal Arabization campaign where Turkmen were forced to adapt the Arabic language and abandon Turkish culture (Foundaton 2012). Thus, organization around the unique customs of the group was limited to a few cultural organizations before the outbreak of the civil war. Three other identity groups also lacked political organization at the onset of conflict: Circassians in both the Golan Heights and around the Northern city of Manbij, while politically distinct, maintained no united political leadership in each respective region (TAŞTEKİN November 19, 2012), while Kurdish Yazidis had become increasingly integrated into Kurdish political movements in the Jezira region by the start of the civil war (Glioti 2013b).

Put together, there are numerous identity groups which held pre-war resentment against either the government or the rebels at the outset of conflict. Sunni Arabs in each of the country's regions had been activated with outside calls for uprising that highlighted

the previous massacres against the Muslim Brotherhood uprising thirty years before. Kurds, especially those in the Hasakah province, were similarly activated by politicians that sought to attain a unified role at the helm of Kurdish political parties by emphasizing the Qamishli massacre of 2004. Assyrians had suffered political marginalization for decades and elites similarly used the massacre to form the Syriac Union Party and foment anti-government sentiment. While Turkmen political organization was fairly weak at the onset of conflict, cultural groups had helped stoke considerable resentment against government Arabization policies, which presented an existential threat to Turkmen in Syria. Other groups tended to do better under the Assad regime and their political leaders acquiesced, rather than generated resentment toward the government. In the case of the Druze, this even meant generating suspicion of Sunni Arabs for the treatment the Druze received under a previous regime. Thus, the adeptness with which leaders can cull some part of recent history can bolster their position within a particular group. The next section shows how leaders react in both the presence and absence of resentment once conflict has erupted.

Were Leaders Proactive or Reactive?

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the behavior of leaders at the outset of conflict can indicate both the role that resentment has in shaping their decisions and the extent to which resentment binds leaders against making particular allegiance choices. Leaders are expected to be proactive when they are acting in their own self-interest to obtain or maintain political influence. Absent any major resentment by a leader's constituency, he/she has no fear of adverse consequences for taking a self-interested stance as clientelistic networks will ultimately disseminate a flow of income to key supporters. On the other hand, leaders are reactive when individuals have been activated to be emotionally averse

to a side that it is in their own interest to join. Here, leaders respond to the actions of their members, encouraging them down the eventual path of either rebellion, self-government or government support, until ultimately taking the plunge themselves. Finally proactive leaders who take positions in direct contrast to the collective memory of their identity group, risk being ostracized and even killed for their deviation.

The case of the Damascene ulama shows the consequences of taking both proactive and reactive postures when dealing with a group, the Damascus Sunni Arabs, that have been activated to feel anti-government resentment. The Sunni Arab experience in Syria was shaped by the unsuccessful Muslim Brotherhood revolt in the late 1970s and 1980s. The revolt was concentrated in the urban areas of Northern Syria, culminating in the devastating shelling of Hama in 1982. Many Brotherhood members were forced into exile, but some clerics continued antagonizing the regime based on its repressive violence from abroad. The leaders that stayed or returned were co-opted by the regime and integrated into its ruling apparatus (Lafevre 2012).

Among the leaders who stayed loyal to the regime and emphasized dialogue, rather than conflict, was Said al-Buti, a prominent scholar in the Damascene ulama and friend to the al-Assad family. It was, in part, through his influence, that the Damascene ulama and Damascene region stayed out of the Muslim Brotherhood revolt in 1982. However, in 2011 his influence did not have the same effect. Al-Buti and like-minded Sunni cleric Asaad Hassun emphasized the need for negotiation with the regime as protests and eventually regime repression took place. Other scholars within the Damascene ulama took more reactive postures and declared support for the protesters' demands after evaluating the situation for months, emboldening further collective action and eventually rebellion among Sunni Arabs in the Damascus region (Qureshi 2012). Once the revolution took hold and

protests turned to insurgency, it was the radical Adnan al-Arur that was being lauded while al-Buti had largely lost his influence. Al-Buti's loyalty to the regime cost him a widespread following (he was a world-renowned scholar of Islam) and eventually his life, as he was killed in a suicide attack on a Damascus mosque in 2013 (Pierret 2014).

Most Kurdish leaders also struck a reactive posture. While protests by youth opposition groups flooded the streets of Kurdish cities, the leadership was being courted by both the rebels and the government. The government offered citizenship to hundreds of thousands stateless Hasaka Kurds, repeal of repressive laws put into place after the Qamishli massacre and recognition of Kurdish culture and language to appease the Kurdish parties. On the other hand, discussions with the opposition ended at an impasse as the SNC refused to renounce the planned successor state to the Ba'ath regime as a fundamentally Arab state. While many Kurdish leaders showed a preference for taking the government's offers in private communications,[2] they stayed away from explicit cooperation with either side, instead creating a unified Kurdish front under the Kurdish National Council (KNC) that would eventually, joined by Democratic Union Party (PYD), evolve into the self-governing entity of Rojava seen today. Much like the case of the Damascus Sunni Arabs, dissenting proactive leaders like Meshaal Temmo, who joined the Arab opposition, were killed soon after their declarations (Allsopp 2014, 197-210).

Leaders with little to fear from past resentment could afford to take proactive stances that ensured their most beneficial outcome would come to pass. Archbishop Gregorious Tabe of the Syrian Catholic Church didn't mince words in 2011 when declaring that, "The demonstrators are nothing but terrorists...no law can ever satisfy everyone – there are always 10 percent who are sacrificed." Fellow church leaders shared his views, releasing statements

[2] The Syrian government had been a patron of the PYD's parent organization in Turkey, the PKK for decades.

that largely reflected the Assad government's talking points on the uprising (Berbner November 30, 2011). Unlike Sunni and Kurdish communities, few Arab Christian youths had taken to the streets to protest, the community coming together under the consensus that while the Assad government was autocratic, it looked out for the interests of Christians and provided more certain source of support than a rebellion led mostly by religious Sunni Muslims. The Assad government had also co-opted church leaders, allowing churches special status and Christianity, as a whole, a place on par with Islam in Ba'athist society making the decision to support the government in the Church leaders' best interests (Mousa 2012). With Christian support for the SNC concentrated abroad and no resentment toward siding with the government, there was simply no domestic movement that could threaten Arab Christian leaders, resulting in their proactive positioning.

The Druze leaders of the southern Jabal al-Druze region faced a choice similar to Arab Christians; the Assad regime had been beneficial to them personally and while there had been more protests against the government that in Christian communities, the protests were far more muted than in Sunni areas. Druze clergy denounced the protest movement and discouraged members of the community from taking part, continuing a unified anti-rebellion stance after the armed conflict began in earnest (Gambill March 2013). A smaller Druze enclave in the Northern Idlib province faced a different choice. The elders here had close ties to neighboring Sunni villages rather than the government and had not stoked resentment against Sunni Arabs in the same way as clergy in Jabal al-Druze. Rather than becoming a small and hopeless enclave of government support in solidly rebel territory, the Druze of Jabal al-A'ala opted to become a rebel sanctuary. Contributing to this support for the rebellion were the close ties of the Northern Druze to Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who has openly advocated Assad's overthrow (Bar September 8, 2012). Thus, much like

Christian leaders, the absence of major constituent resentment against either the government in the case of Druze in Jabal al-Druze or the Sunni rebels in the case of Jabal al-A'ala led to a proactive formulation of policies that held the most benefits for identity group leaders.

Finally, some groups with little prior political organization within Syria struck a reactive posture because they needed time to organize. Constrained by pre-war Arabization policies, Turkmen political organizations and militant groups formed soon after the rebellion began in early 2012. The political groups had their origins in both existing Turkmen cultural societies and in foreign support from Turkey, where anti-Assad stances among the Turkmen and the perception of Assad as an existential threat was institutionalized (Orhan 2013). Thus, while the reactive stance was necessary, it also represented a desire of leaders to wait while nascent Turkmen protest movements and military formations galvanized around the anti-Assad cause.

Each example from the Syrian conflict paints a similar picture. In cases where leaders take positions that are at odds with the prevailing emotional sentiment of their constituents, they suffer a loss of support from their community and, in several cases, are targeted for assassination. Leaders whose preferences may not align with their constituents' resentment otherwise wait and observe the extent of consequences for taking a particular stance, ultimately choosing a less preferred option rather than risking a loss of authority or death. The examples from Syria illustrate that the accountability mechanism within identity groups to remove leaders works best among groups whose members have come to resent the side taken by a dissenting leader. The next section outlines the explicit allegiance choices made by identity groups at the onset of conflict, which are then connected to collective memories and other potential justifications in the final section.

Outbreak of Violence and Allegiance Patterns

As the previous section linked leaders to pre-conflict resentment, this section goes further, outlining the allegiance outcomes produced by the Syrian conflict and the extent to which those outcomes reflected pre-existing collective resentment by identity group members. The first sparks of conflict in Syria originated in the southern city of Dara'a, where the arrest of four teenagers for painting anti-government graffiti precipitated large-scale protests in the city in March of 2011. The protests quickly spread to the restive North and East and even to Latakia, the cradle of the Alawite minority in the country. The government responded to violence with brutal repression. Police and military forces shot into crowds and tanks were soon brought into cities such as Homs and Hama to quell demonstrations in what became extensive siege operations. The widespread deaths of protesters only fed the uprising as, much like in past instances of failed repression in Iran (Rasler 1996), funerals for dead protesters brought out more demonstrators. Moreover, as violence between armed protesters and the military increased, the armed forces faced more and more defections from Sunni Arab soldiers and officers, especially in May and June of 2011. As desertions mounted, Colonel Riad al-Asaad announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army to bring down the regime on July 29, 2011. Defections continued throughout the year and the FSA began to stage coordinated attacks against regime positions late in 2011 from its base across Syria's northern border in Turkey and had overrun and held several towns in Homs and Idlib provinces for prolonged periods of time (Holliday December 2011).

Thus, the onset of the insurgency began in what the map terms the Mediterranean Coast region, initiated by Sunni Arabs. They are designated as the initiators of the conflict from this point. Once the uprising escalated into civil conflict, sectarian rifts quickly shattered the apparently egalitarian coalition that had formed during the protests. These

rebel fighters were quickly joined by Sunni Arab armed movements in the South of Syria, primarily around Dara'a and the Damascus suburbs and in the Euphrates region around Raqaa and Dayr al-Zour. This is consistent with the expectations of the theory, as resentment toward the government's actions in Hama in 1982 had been used extensively to stoke anti-regime sentiment prior to the uprising. Sunni Tukmen, especially those in the mountain regions of Latakia province, also joined the fight on the side of the rebels, taking over local mountain areas and engaging the Syrian Army in skirmishes (Mashi 2012). Similarly, the Turkmen resentment for government Arabization policies appear to have played a role in driving this allegiance pattern. Initially rebel brigades were local and only formally integrated under a loose coalition of the Free Syria Army.[3]

Alawites who had protested against the Assad government largely returned to the fold once fighting began (al Qalish August 10, 2012). The same effect was seen in Ismaili communities in the North, where fear of a Sunni-dominated government nearly completely eroded opposition support (Williams November 18, 2013), although this doesn't appear to be a result of long-standing resentment. Christians in Damascus and the North, having been given what was termed 'token' representation in the Syrian National Council (SNC), also largely sided with the regime for fear of losing the considerable political status and religious freedom they held under the Ba'ath Party(Berbner November 30, 2011) and a return to the Sunni-dominated rule of the 1950s that was characterized by persecution of Christians throughout Syria (Van Dam 2011). Concerned with defending their own communities, Syria's Druze split along geographic lines. The Druze in Jabal al-Druze formed a pro-government militia, the Jaysh al-Muwahhideen (Jawad 2013), while Druze in the Northern Idlib province largely sided with the rebels, either integrating into the Free Syria Army or

[3]Later in the conflict, the FSA would give way to an influx of foreign and Islamist fighters under the banner of the Islamic Front, the Mujahedeen Army, the Nusra Front and the Islamic State.

forming their own militia offshoot of the FSA called the Sweida Revolutionary Military Council (Dehghanpisheh February 8, 2013). This outcome likely presents the foremost challenge to the theory as there had been resentment toward Sunnis in power in both Druze communities for the actions taken by the Arab nationalist governments of Syria in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the sheer numerical disadvantage for Druze in Jabal al-A'ala may have driven their allegiance with the Sunni Arab militias.

As mentioned in the previous section, Syria's Kurds were faced with a choice at the outset of the conflict: to join the government that had repressed their culture and identity, but offered new concessions, or a rebellion that did not acknowledge their right to organize. Kurdish political parties, more organized in the Jazira region declined both offers. Instead they opted to use institutions behind the Kurdish National Council and the Democratic Union Party to create their own government in the Jazira region, declaring a self-governing state of Rojava in early 2012 (Allsopp 2014). On the other hand, locals in the Kurd Dag region, closer to rebel strongholds around Aleppo took a more independent and proactive stance, directly joining with the rebels and fighting against the government in the first year of the conflict (Chivers January 22, 2013). Assyrian Christians in the Jazira region have formed their own militias out of the Syriac Union Party, called Sutoro, as a means of self-defense for Assyrian parts of the now, mostly Kurdish-occupied province (Al-Tamimi 11 November, 2013). The allegiance between Assyrians and Kurds in maintaining self-government in the Jazira is founded in their mutual distaste for both the regime and the opposition. Both groups were denied political and language rights and were repressed under the Ba'ath party rule to the point of establishing substantial political parties on the backs of these events. Nevertheless, both also bristle that the opposition denies recognition of the "Assyrian people"

and seeks to continue the Arab domination seen under Assad (Glioti 2013a), choosing self-government over siding with the rebels.

Finally, two ethnic minorities in Syria have expressly declared neutrality in the conflict. While small numbers of Armenians joined the pro-government Shabiha militias, Armenian religious leaders staunchly declared their neutrality in the conflict (Armstrong 1 October, 2012). As such, up to a quarter of Armenians in Syria had fled to either Lebanon or Armenia itself in the first two years of the conflict (Malek 11 December 2012). Circassians, lacking political organization under the regime have also remained unmobilized across both of the regions that the minority occupies, with many opting to migrate to Turkey or even back to their ancestral homeland in Russia's Caucasus mountains (TAŞTEKİN November 19, 2012), with this latter case expressing the expected connection between organization and collective action at conflict onset.



Figure 5.2: Allegiance Outcomes in Syrian Civil War

Discussion

The allegiance patterns at the onset of Syria's civil conflict underscore the role of prior resentment among group members in determining the coalition allegiances in the cases of several identity groups. While the groups that joined the opposition or pursued self-government were nearly always excluded from the Ba'athist political process, dominated by Arab members of the Alawite sect, the more precise determinant of conflict allegiance was the presence and direction of resentment among group members toward one prospective ally. The presence of such resentment had a mediating effect on group leaders as it forced many leaders to take reactive postures to the spontaneous outbreak of protest against the regime and to the political stances of the regime opponents in the Syrian National Council. The case of Sunni clerics in Damascus was particularly salient. Having sided with the government during the 1982 Muslim Brotherhood uprising, the ulama had ensured that the region did not join the northern-led rebellion. Nevertheless, as the Brotherhood-in-exile spread news of the slaughter in Hama, increasingly so with the rise of the Internet, the ulama found it harder to defend the government or to stay the hand of protesters during the 2011 uprising. As the government deployed the army to quash yet another uprising, many members of the ulama reacted to the situation on the ground and encouraged opposition to the regime. The few that didn't, like Saad Al-Buti, were eventually targeted by opposition forces and assassinated, consistent with the side assertion of the theory that leaders that stray from the prevailing winds of change are either marginalized or altogether eliminated.

The position of Syria's Sunni Kurds reflects another instance where fomenting resentment in the past drives leaders to take reactive postures during conflict outbreak. Kurdish leaders from both the Northeastern Jazira region and from the Northwestern Kurd Dag region avoided making explicit decisions against allegiance. Both regional groups

received tempting offers from the government, but were reluctant to join the government camp. Kurdish political parties had not only been founded on seeking independence from Syria, but on the basis of defending Kurdish language rights and eventually Kurdish people themselves from government oppression. After the massacre of Qamishli in 2004, major Kurdish parties were among the signatories of the Damascus Declaration that demanded democratic reform and led to further regime repression. Thus, at the outset of the rebellion, Kurdish political movements had generated enough anti-government animosity among their constituents that a 180-degree turn to an allegiance with the government would have been impossible, making the choices of either self-government in the Jazira or siding with the rebels for the Kurd Dag Sunni Kurds clear.

Finally, decisions made by Arab Christians reflect a third category of proactive leaders that respond to an absence of resentment toward their preferred side. These leaders, already titularly aligned with the Assad regime only needed to continue their cooperation in order to retain their status within their communities and their benefits from the regime. Defection would have meant uncertainty given both success of the rebels and the composition of rebels as a mostly Sunni Muslim force that appeared unlikely to deviate as much power to religious minorities had it come to power. Moreover, the lack of substantial participation Arab Christians in anti-government demonstrations signaled to leaders that their decision would not be negatively received by most group members.

While some of the theory's predictions bear out, the case of Syria makes it clear that resentment is not the exclusive force directing conflict allegiance. Small groups surrounded by active members of one of the coalitions, such as the Druze in the Northern Jabal al-A'ala region, aligned with with the party from which they had experienced previous instances of repression, violence or political exclusion and had crystallized into resentment before the

conflict. Nevertheless, the costs of aligning against groups that otherwise surrounded the Jabal al-A'ala Druze and taking a precarious military position may have been high enough to go against historical animosity. While there are other cases of allegiances that appear to come as a result of geographical convenience, such as Arab Ismailis and Alawites or Sunni and Yazidi Kurds, there was no resentment between the two groups beforehand and overall allegiance is not likely to cluster in space, with Assyrians joining the self-governing Kurds rather than the pro-government Arab Christians in the Jezira province.

As a whole, this chapter provides recent case evidence for the predicted outcomes and mechanisms of the theory presented in Chapter 2. Generating resentment against a potential allegiance partner in order to gain prominence as the defender of an identity group can ultimately prevent allegiance with that partner, as seen with Damascus Sunnis and Sunni Kurds, whose group members turned against the Assad regime *en masse*. Absent resentment for leaders' preferred allegiance partner (and potentially coupled with resentment toward another partner in the coalition), leaders act decisively and proactively to join their preferred coalitions and ensure loyalty to a cause that will presumably benefit them most in the short and long term – as seen with Arab Christian and Jabal al-Druze leaders. A delayed reaction to conflict can also be expected when pre-conflict political organization for an identity group was so limited that time is needed to both organize the identity group and mobilize for conflict, as in the case of Syria's Sunni Turkmen. Put together, Syria's conflict adds an extra layer to the large-N findings in chapter 4 – it is not merely politically excluded identity groups that are more likely to join rebellions or to pursue self-government, but groups whose leaders have fomented resentment to the government prior to conflict onset. The findings lend further support to the portrait of strategic leaders that are constrained by non-strategic preferences of their identity group's collective membership. The next chapter provides more

in-depth individual-level evidence from Lebanon that not only confirms the presence of resentment as a major individual-level factor in determining allegiance, but the link between resentment and feelings of group political exclusion.

Acknowledgments

This chapter, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the material. Ash, Konstantin. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this material.

Chapter 6

Resentment and Individual Allegiance Preferences in Lebanon

Introduction

In the preceding chapters, the theoretical mechanisms for civil conflict allegiance at the leader and individual level were outlined with implications for both at the group level. It was theorized that identity group leaders foment out-group resentment to attain the position of group protector during peacetime, but that collective resentment, not leader agency, fuels individual preferences for conflict allegiance, determining allegiance choice when present. These group level implications were tested, validated and illustrated in the previous two chapters. Large-N statistical analysis of civil conflict onsets since 1990 showed that politically excluded groups were more likely to side with the rebels and groups that previously experienced violence with the conflict's initiator were more likely to side with the government. Then, a more explicit link to resentment was made through an examination of allegiance choices at the outset of the Syrian Civil War, which connected resentment,

leader behavior and group level outcomes. This chapter is a direct follow-up and tests the determinants of individual preferences on conflict allegiance. The individual-level test takes the form of a survey experiment in Lebanon. The test is designed to connect emotional framing mechanisms used by identity group leaders against either the government or other identity groups to individual willingness to support their community joining an ongoing rebellion. In line with the theoretical assertion derived from Petersen (2002), it is also expected that identification with a political party (themselves strongly oriented around a particular sect), will make individuals more likely to express active negative emotion toward either the government and or leaders of other identity groups. In turn, both of these politically mitigated sentiments should affect individual preferences for their community joining an ongoing conflict: those who feel resentment toward the government should be more likely to favor joining a rebellion while those who feel resentment toward leaders from the initiating identity group should be less likely to support joining the rebellion. Results that support the role of emotions in shaping allegiance preferences will further lend support to the theory's assertion that non-strategic mechanisms play a large role in determining allegiance preferences at the individual level and allegiance outcomes at the group level.

Most prior 'on-the-ground' analysis of conflict participation has been conducted either well after or during a given conflict (Humphreys & Weinstein 2008, Mironova 2014, Scacco 2010). Nevertheless, post-hoc surveys of individual behavior during conflicts are fraught with potential biases, including the possibility of misrepresenting one's true behavior during conflict or simply the incorporation of feelings accumulated during or after conflicts to explain initial participation in or support for political violence. If respondents that have participated in or even supported conflict had sub-consciously changed their beliefs, it is unlikely that their true initial preferences would be revealed in a post-hoc survey; even if

respondents were not intentionally misrepresenting their past beliefs. Additionally, while it would be advantageous to measure potential participation in conflict, the focus of this project is individual support for group participation; a largely different question that is expected to predict the general social pressure on potential fighters (Petersen 2001), rather than explicit participation. Thus, it is more beneficial to the study of allegiance at conflict initiation to survey individuals in an environment where the outbreak of anti-government violence is possible, even likely, in the near future, without that conflict taking place. Moreover, given that this study revolves around identity groups, an environment where many identity groups lived without one dominant group would also be preferable.

Lebanon was chosen because it fit both criteria for case selection. While the country's civil conflict ended in 1990, the neighboring conflict in Syria inflamed tensions between the various sectarian groups in the country and often boiled over into low-level violence. Thus, Lebanon closely resembles a country the brink of civil conflict without violence actually taking the shape of a civil war. The composition of sectarian groups in the country also yields a fertile environment for predicting potential allegiance preferences. In spite of an ongoing demographic shift toward Muslims, the increased salience of the sectarian division between Shia and Sunni gives Lebanon four large and distinct confessional groups that could form coalitions in a civil conflict: Christians, Sunni, Shia and Druze. The next section fully explains the rationale for such a choice.

Following the description of the Lebanese case, a survey experiment is utilized to measure individual paths to allegiance choices across Lebanon's confessions. The main purpose of the survey necessitates that rather than using representative sampling, the sampling takes place within areas known to have high concentrations of each of Lebanon's four major confessional groups: Christians, Druze, Sunni and Shia. In order to identify

individual preferences for allegiance with particular groups, an augmented list-experiment design is employed with several checks against power limitations and floor, ceiling and design effects. The question of allegiance is paired with several questions that establish individual's levels of ascription to their community in terms of both political and general community participation and several other questions that determine individual emotions toward the government.

The findings reveal that those who feel resentment toward the government are more likely to support their confession joining an ongoing rebellion. Multivariate models confirm the relationship between resentment and allegiance outcomes and also show that the perception of threat about the leader of an initiating party of a rebellion, in turn, leads to decreased support for joining the rebellion. Nevertheless only resentment toward other confessions is connected to political participation, calling the universality of political determination of active negative emotion toward a government or initiator into question.

Lebanon: Politics and Survey Environment

Ideally, individual preferences for allegiance would be measured during or immediately after the outbreak of civil conflict. However, it is likely that individuals who have recently experienced onset in post-war societies may have been sufficiently influenced by post-onset events to change their recollection of pre-conflict attitudes, biasing responses. Taking this issue into account, Lebanon – a country that has not experienced civil conflict in 25 years – is an excellent case for evaluating individual level preferences for conflict allegiance. The country is safe enough for administering a survey while sufficiently conflict-prone for allegiance-related questions to not only be plausible, but reflect the actual considerations of respondents. The politics of the country also facilitate framing of hypothetical conflicts as

identity-based, as Lebanon's sectarian divisions are formalized through the distribution of seats in Parliament and the National Pact.[1] The former, based on a constitution drawn with French support granted Lebanese Christians a fixed 55-45 majority in the Parliament with further sub-divisions for various sects of Islam and Christianity, while the latter apportions governing positions according to confession. The Taif Agreement that ultimately ended the Lebanese Civil War apportioned additional seats to give Christians and Muslims even shares in the Parliament.

Lebanon's recent political history is sufficiently volatile to make many potential coalition choices plausible to respondents. A civil war from 1975 to 1990 primarily pitted Christians against Muslims and Druze, but also had numerous periods of fighting within each camp (Evron 2013). Lebanon's politics are currently divided between the pro-Syrian March 8 coalition, composed primarily of pro-Syrian Christians and predominantly-Shia Hizbollah and Amal Movement and the pro-Western March 14 coalition, comprised of the primarily-Sunni Future Movement and pro-Western Christian parties.[2] While there have been brief episodes of violence between the two coalitions, most prominently on the streets of West Beirut in May of 2008, they offer little clues as to the collective allegiance preferences of any confession. For instance the PSP sided with the Future Movement against Hizbollah during the conflict, only to defect to the March 8 coalition in 2011 (Makzoumi 2010).

The time in which the survey was administered, April and May of 2014, also makes the subject of conflict allegiance plausible to respondents as Lebanon had undergone a resurgence of low-level violence in the preceding years. Terrorist attacks alternatively

[1]The National Pact is an informal agreement where the President of the Lebanese republic is always from the Maronite Christian sect, the prime minister is always to be Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament is always Shia, to divide the major executive sources of power among the three largest sects (Suleiman 1967).

[2]The primarily-Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) tends to alternate support of the two coalitions, initially supporting March 14 until 2011, when the party shifted to supporting the March 8 coalition and then withdrew support from both coalitions in favor of a unity government in 2013 (Dakroub 2013).

targeted pro-Syrian rebel and pro-Syrian regime neighborhoods and frequent fighting was seen between warlords in Tripoli's predominantly Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh and predominantly Alawite Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods. Moreover, direct violence from the Syrian conflict frequently spilled over across the border with Syria, bringing gun battles or rocket strikes to Lebanese border towns. In effect, there was a significant risk of escalation and sectarian civil conflict (Amrieh 2014) that would have been on the minds of survey respondents.

Identity Group Leaders in Lebanon

The characterization of resentment against the initiating party of a civil conflict requires the assumption that the leaders of certain political parties are also leaders within a particular confession. Identifying who identity group leaders are in Lebanon is also crucial to the linkage between individual-level responses and leader preferences in Chapter 7. As mentioned, Lebanon's electoral system incentivizes sectarian differentiation and inter-confessional cooperation once representatives have been elected. It follows that, while many Lebanese political leaders claim their parties reach across confessions, actual support among constituents is highly stratified along religious lines. Table 6.1 shows party identification across confessions taken from a question that asked respondents to name the party they supported most in the Lebanese parliament. In terms of raw numbers and percentages across parties and confessions, it is clear that individual support for all of Lebanon's major political parties originates from one particular confession, with only the fairly minor Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) drawing its support fairly evenly from two sectarian groups.

Interviews with Lebanese political leaders reveal a similar pattern. While the Progressive Socialist Party, for instance, aspires to be a national party for leftist causes (and has a history of this status before the civil war), a member of its leadership council admits

Table 6.1: Party Identification by Confession among Lebanese Adults

Party	Christian	Druze	Sunni	Shia
Islamic Group	0	0	20	0
Lebanese Forces	92	0	10	1
Kataeb	28	0	1	0
Amal Movement	0	0	0	156
Hizbollah	8	0	16	187
Free Patriotic Movement	102	0	5	2
Progressive Socialist Party	2	207	0	2
Lebanese Democratic Party	0	33	1	1
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	1	13	1	17
Marada Movement	11	1	5	1
Future Movement	3	1	156	1
Other/DK/No Affiliation	263	255	295	142
Total	510	510	510	510

Note: Respondents were asked: ”Which party do you support most in the Lebanese Parliament?” without being given any additional options or choices.

that PSP president Walid Junblatt’s status as a leader in the Druze community is the party’s primary means of attracting constituents. Similar admissions are made by a member of the leadership council of the Amal Movement in regard to Shia Muslims and Amal leader Nabih Berri and Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. An advisor to the leader of the mostly Druze Lebanese Democratic Party (LDP) even admitted that while the LDP was allied with Hizbollah in Parliament, it was unlikely that their position in a hypothetical conflict would differ from their rival for Druze support, the PSP, as Druze tended to unite in times of trouble. As such, the analysis here treats certain political party leaders as political leaders of Lebanese confessions, assuming that it is their respective messages that shape the emotional disposition of their constituents toward both the government and other confessional groups in Lebanon and that those messages are targeted toward the confession as a constituency, rather than the public, as a whole.

Survey Design, Implementation and Expectations

The survey experiment was conducted through questioning 2,040[3] Lebanese adults during April and May of 2014. It was carried out by Information International S.A.L., a Lebanese survey firm based in Beirut. The survey was exclusively in the Lebanese dialect of Arabic. The firm was employed because it offered unparalleled access to areas under control of Hizbollah within Lebanon.[4] Hizbollah is a highly secretive political party and militia that operates parallel to the Lebanese government in parts of South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley and becomes suspicious if unmonitored or unapproved activities are conducted on its territories by foreign organizations. Thus, an affiliation with Information International was pursued in the interest of enumerator safety.

As will be described more clearly in subsequent sections, the framing of the question designed to capture allegiance preferences required that the sect of a potential allegiance partner be embedded into the question before the actual administration of the survey. As such, it was crucial to know *a priori* what sect respondents belonged to so that their assigned allegiance partner was not from their own sect. This led to the adoption of a blocking design (Imai, et al. 2008) along confessional lines. To identify respondents' confessions, sampling was conducted only in areas where confessional ascription is known to be highly concentrated within one group rather than in one representative sample. Four evenly distributed samples of Christian, Druze, Sunni and Shia respondents were gathered from areas known to have extremely high concentrations of a particular sect. Areas with near-absolute or absolute concentrations of a particular confession were determined based on the results of the 2009 parliamentary elections, which report voter turnout according to

[3] A total of 2,040 respondents answered questionnaires. 24 additional respondents were excluded because they identified themselves as Syrians and were thus ineligible based on the criteria of the survey. 301 additional individuals that were approached declined to be interviewed.

[4] The majority of areas definitively occupied by Shia Muslims.

confession at the third-level (municipal or nahiyah) level (Saad 2009).[5] Using the electoral results as a baseline, only municipalities where all voters belonged to the confession to be sampled were deemed eligible to be included in the survey. The approach allowed for tailored versions of questionnaires based on respondent confessional affiliation to be distributed on the basis of where the survey was conducted. To account for the possibility of erroneous sampling, a question on the survey allowed respondents to self-identify their confession. Those that reported belonging to another confession were removed from the analysis. As enumerators were locally recruited and identified with the same confession as the intended sample, they also assisted in confirming respondents belonged to the same confession as enumerators. There were a total of four levels of randomization in the survey. Balancing tests are presented in the appendix.

Sampled Areas in Survey

Sampled areas relative to the groups in Lebanon as a whole are shown in Figure 6.1. While only nine of Lebanon's 26 districts were sampled, the districts represent approximately 60% of Lebanon's population. The excluded districts were either in mixed districts, such as Jbeil or Zahle or in areas that were difficult to access or dangerous due to suspicion or violence, such as Arsal, Akkar and Hermel in the North and primarily Shia districts in the South.

As mentioned, only nahiyat, or municipalities, where all registered voters were reported to be from the same confession were sampled. 510 respondents were sampled

[5]It should be noted that individuals living in a certain municipality could be registered in another part of the country, as voting registration location is inherited from the individual's father. While it is not likely members of one confession move to an area where only members of another confession live, respondents were asked if they had recently (within five years) moved to their current neighborhood and where they moved from. Those that moved from homogeneous areas known to contain another confession were removed from the analysis.



Figure 6.1: Districts Sampled during Survey and Lebanon Religious Composition (Izady 2013)

from each of Lebanon's four major confessional groups. In part, the technique was used in response to peculiarities in Lebanon's demographics: due to high sensitivity of the subject, a census has not been carried out since 1932 and non-census based samples of

respondents vary widely in their calculations of the distribution of confessions.[6] Thus, a truly representative sample or a weighted representative sample was not possible.

The purpose of the remainder of this section is to report the precise locations from which respondents were drawn. The samples were not drawn in a representative fashion from each confession's homogeneous zones of population due to limitations on the caza that could be sampled as a result of security concerns along the Syrian and Israeli borders. Of the remaining available caza, sampled nahiyat were chosen from caza with no heterogeneous nahiyat (or nahiyat homogeneous to another group) as a matter of first preference, in order to ensure confidence in identification of respondent confessions before the administration of the survey. Within an individual caza, an effort was made to draw respondents from nahiyat proportional to the registered voting population, as reported by election results from that caza. The number of individuals sampled within a nahiya or neighborhood was determined in accordance with Information International, who maintain an updated database of nahiya-level population data. Of the 510 questionnaires distributed to Christian-concentrated areas, 170 were distributed to the city of Jdeideh and surrounding Christian areas of the Metn Governorate,[7] 170 to the city of Jounieh and surrounding Christian areas of the Keserwan Governorate, and 170 to the Christian areas of the Achrafiyeh quarter of the city of Beirut and the neighboring municipality of Furn El-Chebbak in the Ba'abda Governorate. Of the 510 questionnaires distributed to Druze-concentrated areas, 256 went to the Druze nahiyat of the district of Aley and 254 to the Druze nahiyat of the district of the Chouf. Of the 510 questionnaires distributed to Sunni Muslim-concentrated areas, 170 were distributed to the city of Saida (Sidon), 170 to the city of Tripoli and 170 to the Tareeq El Jdideh

[6]For instance, a CIA-conducted survey claims the distribution to be 40% Christian, 27% Shia, 27% Sunni and 6% Druze (United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2012), but other estimates vary widely with Shia as high as 40% of the population and Christians as low as 20%.

[7]Where governorates are second level administrative areas that are alson known as 'caza.'

neighborhood in the Mazraa area of the city of Beirut. Of the 510 questionnaires distributed to Shia Muslim-concentrated areas, 418 were distributed to the Shia Muslim areas of the Dahieh El Janubieh of Beirut in the Governorate of Baabda, 56 to the Shia Muslim areas of the city of Baalbek, and another 36 to Shia concentrated areas in Beirut.

While it may appear that the study only samples from homogeneous parts of the country, anecdotal evidence suggests homogeneity is a relative concept in Lebanon. At the nahiya-level, homogeneous towns or neighborhoods may directly border heterogeneous areas or homogeneous areas occupied by other confessions, such as the West Beirut neighborhood of Tareeq El Jdideh and borders the Shia neighborhoods of Basta Tahta to the North and Ghobayri to the West and the Christian neighborhood of Mathhaf to the Northeast. All of these neighborhoods except Basta Tahta were sampled in the survey because they contain homogeneous nahiyat. Nevertheless, their proximity makes it likely that their residents have considerable interaction with one another. It follows that, given the compact nature of Lebanon's geography, especially in urban areas, it is unlikely that homogeneous nahiyat differ much from heterogeneous nahiyat.

Once neighborhoods or towns were identified for sampling, several strategies were employed to ensure randomization within those areas. First, streets were randomly selected from satellite maps. Canvassers were instructed to enter every fifth house or apartment building on the street and to alternatively choose either odd or even apartment numbers once inside an apartment building. Once in the household, enumerators asked to speak to the individual with the most recent date of birth in a private area of the household to prevent selection into the survey. To avoid bias from convenience sampling at a particular time,

enumerators made efforts to return to households where individuals that were selected were not present at times when those individuals were available.[8]

Capturing Civil War Allegiance

The dependent variable of the study is support for one's confession entering into a conflict that has already been initiated by another group. Expressing support for participating in a conflict against the government is a highly sensitive outcome and thus unlikely to receive truthful answers from a large sub-section of respondents when asked directly. Instead, a question using the item count technique (also known as a list experiment) is employed to indirectly ask respondents about their allegiances were a conflict to break out. The item count technique was originally developed to survey sensitive topics in an accurate manner. Respondents are randomly placed into two groups. Both groups are asked a question or given a scenario and then given a list of three to five potential responses. Respondents are asked to only tell enumerators how many of the responses they find acceptable, rather than any direct questions relating to the choices. The 'control' group is given a list of only non-sensitive choices, while the 'treatment' group is given an additional response representing the sensitive choice. A simple difference in means returns a confidence interval of the percent of respondents supporting the sensitive choice (Droitcour, et al. 1991).

Individual preference for conflict allegiance was assessed by an item count response question. The question presented respondents with a scenario that described the outbreak of civil conflict in a very similar manner to the actual outbreak of conflict in neighboring Syria in 2011[9] and a list of choices on how to respond. The choices, other than the sensitive item,

[8] Approximately one-third of the total sample was drawn from these subsequent visits.

[9] It also related to an actual event in Lebanon's history, when Hizbollah demonstrators were massacred by the Lebanese Army in 1993.

were chosen to minimize floor and ceiling effects[10] – tests for these effects are presented in the appendix. The order of the choices was randomized with the sensitive choice never being placed first or last to avoid ordering effects. While there was a slight difference in the way in which the question was asked across treatment and control group (respondents in the control group were asked which choices they preferred, respondents in the treatment group 'how many,' in line with an existing technique for multivariate analysis of list experiments (Corstange 2009)[11]) there does not appear to be a significant design effect – difference across non-sensitive responses across treatment and control group – based on a set of tests conducted in the appendix. Finally, as a way of alleviating respondent fatigue in list experiments, respondents were given copies of the list experiment question inside transparencies and provided dry-erase markers to personally write down, and then erase their response (Kramon & Weghorst 2014). The English version of the question is reproduced below:

> Imagine this fictional scenario. A peaceful demonstration taking place in (name of location)[12][13] and the state[14] uses force to disperse this demonstration. The demonstrators are fired upon and many die. Members of the community in (area) have taken up arms against the perpetrators.

---

[10]Floor effects occur when the respondent would honestly support all non-sensitive items and the sensitive item, but, feeling that reporting support for any choice would break anonymity and identify his/her support for the sensitive choice, answers zero, depressing mean findings. Ceiling effects occur when respondents would honestly answer in the affirmative for all non-sensitive choices and disguise their preference for the sensitive choice to avoid answering affirmatively for all choices and revealing their preferences. Both lead to a depression in the difference between treatment and control groups (Glynn 2013).

[11]Ultimately, the more efficient technique was utilized (Blair & Imai 2012). Results did not change across techniques.

[12]Three locations were assigned to the three possible initiating confessions. Each was universally known as being a major neighborhood populated by members and leaders from that confession. The Achrafiyeh district of Beirut was given as the Christian location, home to the Christian Kataeb party and a prominent center for wealthy Christians. The Haret Hraik neighborhood in the suburbs of Beirut was given as a proxy for a Shia initiation as this is the location of the headquarters of Shia political stalwarts Hizbollah. Finally, the Tareeq El-Jdideh neighborhood in Beirut was given as a proxy for Sunni conflict initiation as it is known as a Sunni neighborhood in the city and home to several anti-government Sunni clerics.

[13]The locations were randomized based on the confession of the respondent (Christians could receive Sunni or Shia locations, Sunnis could receive Christian or Shia locations and so on).

[14]The Arabic word دولة was used for 'state.' A discussion of why this represents the state as an entity to respondents on the basis of responses in other parts of the survey is included in the appendix.

Which of the following actions would you want your community to take in response? (For when sensitive choice not asked)
How many of the following actions would you want your community to take in response? (For when sensitive choice asked)

- Denounce violence by all participants of the clash.
- Support government forces in trying to restore public order.
- Demand an investigation of the situation and for the perpetrators of the killings to be held accountable.
- Organize a peaceful demonstration against violence.
- *Join with residents of (area) and also take up arms against the perpetrators.*

Only the final choice is asked when the individual is in the 'treatment group.' Respondents had an equal likelihood of being in either the treatment or the control groups. General references to confession were omitted altogether as the Arabic word for confession: *taa'ifeh* (طائفة) is associated with sectarian strife in Lebanon. Instead, confession was referred to with the euphemistic term 'community' (*mujtam'a* (مجتمع)). Reasons for why it is safe to assume that community most closely brings up thoughts of sect in the minds of respondents are discussed in the appendix.

A simple difference in means between the treatment group mean number of preferred responses and the control group mean number of preferred responses provides results for the entire sample respondents who answered the questions. The results from the allegiance question reveals that 48.6% of respondents (with +/-5.6% margin of error) would prefer their group join a hypothetical civil conflict initiated by another Lebanese sect. While these results alone serve little inferential benefit, they do reveal that around half of respondents, across confessions would support a form of civil conflict allegiance given this hypothetical situation. Figure 6.2 shows the results subset across confession with little significant differentiating effects, except for the propensity of Christians to support allegiance at a somewhat higher

rate than other groups. Further testing for whether the list experimental design successfully picks up preference for a sensitive outcome based on variation in confession and conflict initiator is conducted in the appendix.

Figure 6.2: Difference in Means Results from List Experiment Treatment and Control Groups (Bars are 95% confidence intervals).



Capturing Resentment

The primary variable hypothesized to predict support of allegiance with either the government or an initiating identity group, is out-group resentment of a prospective allegiance partner. It is also hypothesized that this resentment stems from emphasis of repression or intergroup violence by identity group leaders. Political emphasis of certain past events is not uncommon among Lebanese political movements. Parties often highlight targeted assassinations in the civil war and more recent battles with Sunni militants in Saida and Tripoli as a way of conveying an out-group threat and simultaneously shoring up their own support. In order to operationalize resentment, it needs to be captured along distinct

dimensions in relation to either the government or the sect that initiates conflict in the list experimental question presented to respondents. The next two sub-sections outline each operationalization and how feeling resentment relates to political involvement.

Emotional Sentiment Toward the Government



Figure 6.3: Classification of Emotions Relating to the government based on the Geneva Emotion Wheel 3.0 (Scherer 2013).

Resentment toward the government is captured through an open-ended question asking respondents for three to five words about their feelings toward the government. The structure allowed for classification of individual emotions into several categories that included resentment and then analyzed the outcomes in either unordered or ordered fashion. Emotions were classified based on a system that arrays emotions across two dimensions: positive/negative and high/low arousal (Scherer 2005). The position of an emotion is based on self-reported ratings from aggregated survey responses of position of emotions along

the plane. The product is the Geneva Emotion Wheel (see Figure 6.3).[15] Responses fit into four categories, three of which are located directly on the wheel (positive emotion, passive negative and resentment – active negative emotion toward the government),[16] while a fourth, grievances relating to corruption or injustice that stop short of expressing explicit resentment is separated because it is not considered an expression of emotion. Responses were coded after translation from Arabic.[17] Table 6.2 presents results of the classification and overlaps. From the table, it is evident that, while expressing grievances and feelings of resentment have considerable overlap for the total sentiment of a respondent, there is comparatively little overlap with government support of the the grievance and resentment dimensions. Full coding information for emotional sentiment toward the government is described in the appendix.

Table 6.2: Classification of Emotional Sentiment of Respondents (N=2040)

Sentiment	Total	Also Positive	Also Grievance	Also Resentment
Passive Negative	684	X	X	X
Positive	184	X	22	5
Grievance	968	22	X	134
Active Negative (Resentment)	364	5	134	X

Note: There is one respondent who expresses all three sentiments.

In addition to a dichotomous variable for resentment, dichotomous measures for positive emotions toward the government and grievances toward the government are included in any multivariate specification.[18] An ordered measure can also be generated to capture the

[15]The third and most recent version is used as a baseline for coding. The classifications have been verified independently of the wheel's authors (Sacharin, et al. 2012).

[16]Where -1 is positive emotion toward the government. 0 is low arousal (passive) negative emotion toward the government. 2 is high arousal (active) negative emotion toward the government. The remaining category, grievances toward the government (1), are not emotions and are not classified on this scale.

[17]Translation was conducted by the author and independently, by a native speaker of Lebanese Arabic that specializes in English-Arabic translation. Any disputed terms were discussed and the optimal term was employed in English.

[18]Passive negative emotion is treated as the base category

scale of negative emotion that individuals feel toward the government. Several assumptions are made to rank sentiment about the government. Of the four categories, it is uncontroversial that expressing support for the government should take the lowest position on a scale of negative government sentiment and expressing resentment or grievances are stronger negative feelings than passive negative emotion. A more controversial assumption is that grievances are a weaker negative emotion than resentment. Nevertheless, such a ranking is consistent with existing work that underscores that grievances are only salient for collective action when they are activated through resentment (Petersen 2001, Petersen 2002). As such, it is assumed that grievances neither constitute nor are sufficiently intense relative to resentment. Thus, when a ranked measure of negative emotion toward the government is employed, those only supporting the government are assigned -1, those expressing passive negative emotion are assigned a zero, those expressing grievances, but not resentment are assigned 1 and those expressing resentment assigned 2.

With resentment operationalized, it is possible test for a link between political mobilization and anti-government resentment. If leaders are, in fact, fomenting resentment for political purposes, those who are more involved, both politically and in their community as a whole, should be more exposed to political messaging and more likely to feel anti-government resentment. Four questions on the survey capture political involvement: one on party support described in the appendix, a measure of grievance specificity and two questions on community participation. The second measure was derived from a question asked of a randomly assigned set of half of the respondents, stratified within existing levels of randomization, on what they thought was the worst government policy for their community. Responses were open-ended and were coded dichotomously for grievance

specificity. Those that named a specific policy[19] (469 of 1,024) were given a value of one. Detailed information on responses to the question and how they connect to perceptions of the state are included in the appendix. Community involvement was measured by two questions. One on how frequently a respondent participates in community events and a second on how many activities, from a list of common community activities, the respondent had engaged in over the past year.[20]. Additionally, controls were included for demographic factors, such as age and education, and for feelings of economic and political deprivation, the latter at the group level. To assess political exclusion, individuals were asked to compare their community's representation in Parliament to others on a Likert scale (more information on these types of questions is provided in the appendix).

Due to the different structure of resentment as an outcome variable, two different models are used. A multinomial logistic regression looks at dimensions of negative sentiment toward the government in an unordered way to assess the relative distance of each negative emotion for the government relative to support. An ordered probit model is used for the ranked version of the negative emotions variable. The results, shown on Table 6.3, are broadly similar across both models. Generally, there is little support for political involvement as a predictor of anti-government resentment. While respondents who name a specific negative anti-government policy are sometimes more likely to feel resentment, the effect is not consistent across the models. Neither party support or participation in community events are consistently associated with negative emotions about the government. One effect is consistent throughout the models: perceived political exclusion is a positive and significant predictor of both resentment relative to government support and negative emotion toward

[19]Where a specific policy is a concrete government-related course of action, rather than general expressions that the government does not do anything or answers such as "I don't know" and"'Nothing."

[20]These activities were participation in a demonstration, a festival, a group prayer, a social event, organization of a festival and volunteering for children's activities.

Table 6.3: Predictors of Resentment and Negative Emotion Toward the Government

	Resentment	(M. Logit)	*Negative Emotion*	(O. Probit)
Party Support	0.086	-0.305	0.046	0.055
	(0.263)	(0.360)	(0.060)	(0.100)
Freq. of Participation	-0.128	-0.233*	-0.034	-0.038
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Variety of Participation	-0.058	0.284	0.007	0.042
	(0.171)	(0.196)	(0.038)	(0.043)
Female	0.133	-0.134	0.018	-0.021
	(0.244)	(0.358)	(0.070)	(0.092)
Income	-0.003	-0.018	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.154)	(0.144)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Education	-0.335*	-0.194	0.067*	0.059
	(0.149)	(0.223)	(0.030)	(0.045)
Age	-0.017	0.012	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.0122)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Personal Economic Deprivation	0.340*	0.294	0.042	0.036
	(0.126)	(0.161)	(0.035)	(0.044)
Worst Policy Prime	-0.022		-0.043	
	(0.160)		(0.042)	
Fraternal Political Deprivation	0.357*	0.523*	0.078*	0.106*
	(0.114)	(0.073)	(0.023)	(0.034)
Grievance Specificity		0.652		0.211*
		(0.391)		(0.088)
Constant (M. Logit)	-2.185	-3.420*		
	(1.241)	(1.731)		
Cut-Point 1			-0.732	-0.550
			(0.369)	(0.448)
Cut-point 2			0.404	0.644
			(0.321)	(0.377)
Cut-point 3			1.599*	1.844*
			(0.322)	(0.381)
Number of Respondents	1451	722	1566	787

Note: Standard errors clustered by confession and survey area. Positive emotion toward government is base outcome in multinomial logits. Cut-points represent movement from support to negative sentiment to grievance to resentment of the government. * $p<0.05$.

the government culminating in resentment. While this result potentially links to political involvement through the connection between political exclusion outcomes at the group level shown in Chapter 4, it should not be expected that feelings of fraternal political deprivation

among individuals relate directly (or at all) to actual outcomes. Thus, while there is some suggestive evidence for a relationship between political messaging and resentment toward the government, it is not sufficient to confirm the earlier-stated hypothesis.

Resentment toward the Initiator: Threat from Potential Ally

Resentment toward sects that could be initiators of a conflict is more difficult to measure directly in Lebanon. Individuals are unlikely to express direct animosity toward another sect as part of a general social norm against open sectarianism that has developed since the end of the civil war. Nevertheless, several underlying mechanisms can be exploited to obtain a measure of animosity toward other confessional groups and their leaders. A question on the survey directly asked respondents about which politician respondents felt was the greatest threat to Lebanon's security from a list of five politicians representing each major confession.[21] It is expected that identifying a leader as a threat is founded in an aversion to that leader's sect and is itself politically motivated.

Table 6.4: Connection Between Leader Threat and Party Identification

	No Party ID	Party ID	Total
Does not name Leader	644	181	825
Names Leader	278	937	1215
Total	922	1118	2040

Note: 11.992 Odds ratio of one positive outcome predicting the other (Fisher's exact $P < 0.0001$).

Table 6.4 shows that the connection between seeing a particular Lebanese political leader as a threat and political party support is extremely strong, with few respondents seeing leaders as threats without political affinity and vice versa. A weaker, but nonetheless

[21] Samer Geagea and Michel Aoun as joint Christian representatives (due to internal divisions in the political leadership of Lebanese Christians), Saad Hariri for Sunni Muslims, Walid Jumblatt for Druze and Hassan Nasrallah for Shia Muslims.

significant effect is found for when a respondent names a political leader as his/her most trusted source of information in the community.[22] Both results show strong support that the association between political messaging and out-group resentment. The difference between the results predicting political association either out-group or government resentment is notable, and potentially reflects the greater role of sectarianism in Lebanese society.

In order to convert the leader threat measure into a variable for predicting support for conflict participation, an interaction of feeling that a leader of a particular sect is a threat to Lebanon's security and the confession of the group initiating a conflict within the list-experimental question is utilized. The main effects are included in each model with the interaction term being a dichotomous variable representing respondents who feel that the leader of a particular confession is a threat and receive a question where that confession initiates a civil conflict.

Other Potential Explanatory Factors

Many of the other potential explanatory factors for individual support of group conflict participation have already been explained in previous sections. Political involvement and community participation, along with being given a priming question that asks one to identify the government's worst policy should all predict support for joining a rebellion, consistent with earlier stated theoretical assertions. Stronger feelings of relative deprivation, both individual and fraternal,[23] are also expected to predict conflict allegiance support (Gurr 1970). Questions capturing deprivation on the survey asked individuals to compare

[22] Question was open-ended, asking for the title of the individual who the respondent trusts the most as a source of information about the community. Specific details on coding for the variable are available in the appendix. Odds ratio for predicting positive outcome was 1.711 (Fisher's exact $P < 0.0001$).

[23] Social psychology differentiates feeling personally deprived relative to other individuals and feeling that one's group is deprived relative to other groups (Runciman 1966).

their situation or their group's situation to other individuals or groups in Lebanon in terms of economic well-being and are reproduced in full in the appendix.

Bivariate Results

Figure 6.4: Differences in Means for Resentment Measures in Control and Treatment Groups of List Experiment

Although anti-government resentment is an observational, rather than a causally identified measure and threat from a potential conflict initiator is an interaction term that requires main effects to be properly interpreted, bivariate results can illustrate whether there are clear significant relationships between resentment and individual allegiance preferences before moving to more rigorous statistical analysis. Figure 6.4 shows results from differences in means of both anti-government resentment and initiator threat measures when

disaggregated across treatment and control groups. A differentially higher mean value for anti-government resentment or lower value for initiator threat would be consistent with the theory: resentment toward the government makes respondents more likely to support joining with a rebellion, while resentment toward the initiator makes respondents less likely to support joining the rebels. The results for the former measure show the expected effect, with a significantly higher mean number of choices from those feeling anti-government resentment. The effect is not significant at the 0.1 level for initiator threat, but respondents ultimately do report a lower mean of acceptable choices in the treatment group when feeling that the conflict-initiating sect's leader is a threat. Figure 6.5 shows differences-in-differences from control to treatment groups across each measure of resentment. Once again, anti-government resentment leads to significantly higher (58% to 46%) support for joining a conflict. While the difference from control to treatment group for those who feel the resentment toward the initiating out-group is comparatively lower than those who do not, that difference is not significant. Nevertheless, given the observational nature of one measure and the fact that the second is needs to be jointly interpreted, it is necessary to use a multivariate specification to obtain more robust results.

Multivariate Results

An adjusted logit specification has been developed for multivariate analysis of list experiments (Corstange 2009, Blair & Imai 2012). A non-linear least squares specification using the modified logit link was employed in this study (Imai 2011). The specification is a two-step model where the treatment and control group cases are analyzed separately with the treatment group serving as a second stage model that accounts for errors in the first stage. The independent variables are identical across both stages. The results from two second



Figure 6.5: Difference in Differences of List Experiment results across levels of resentment

stage iterations of the model are seen in Table 6.5. Both ordered and unordered measures of government sentiment are presented as the main independent variables of interest.

The multivariate results show strong support for the second hypothesis of the study. Both anti-government resentment and ordered negative sentiment culminating in resentment makes individuals more likely to support their sect's allegiance with another confession that has initiated conflict against the government. Resentment makes respondents about 84% more likely to support joining anti-government conflict, while a one unit increase in negative sentiment makes individuals around 40% more likely to support anti-government conflict participation. On the other hand, the perception that the leader of the initiator of a conflict is a threat to security makes individuals about 85% less likely to support their group joining the rebellion. In addition to the main effects, grievances also seem to play a role in supporting group conflict allegiance, with individuals who feel that their group's economic situation is worse than that of other groups being more likely to support joining ongoing anti-government movements. The multivariate results corroborate and expand on

Table 6.5: Second Stage Non-Linear Least Squares Regression of Conflict Allegiance Support

	Coefficient (1)	S.E.	Coefficient (2)	S.E.
Negative Government Sentiment	0.382*	(0.169)		
Resentment Sentiment			0.786*	(0.371)
Support Sentiment			-0.372	(0.517)
Grievance Sentiment			0.132	(0.292)
Initiator Threat	-0.873*	(0.424)	-0.906*	(0.425)
Age	-0.016	(0.014)	-0.016	(0.014)
Education	0.023	(0.195)	0.026	(0.195)
Income	-0.102	(0.154)	-0.088	(0.154)
Female	0.361	(0.285)	0.368	(0.286)
Frequency of Participation	0.038	(0.098)	0.029	(0.098)
Variety of Participation	0.076	(0.203)	0.103	(0.204)
Party Support	0.476	(0.359)	0.478	(0.359)
Worst Policy Prime	-0.463	(0.277)	-0.446	(0.278)
Question Order	-0.336	(0.279)	-0.343	(0.278)
Personal Economic Deprivation	-0.362*	(0.179)	-0.361*	(0.177)
Group Economic Deprivation	0.362*	(0.147)	0.365*	(0.147)
Constant	1.821	(1.511)	1.680	(1.532)
Residual Error	0.731		0.731	
Number of Observations	803		803	

Note: Confession-level and initiator-level fixed effects included in the model. Dummy variables for main effects of threat according to confession also included in model, but not shown. * $p<0.05$.

the bivariate findings, with expected effects for both facets of resentment on the likelihood of supporting one's confession in joining an ongoing conflict. Additional results, described fully in Appendix D, reveal a direct effect of initiator threat on backing one's confession to support the government in the control group, validating the relationship expressed in the main model.

Conclusion

Taken together, results from the survey experiment show that a large segment – possibly a majority – of Lebanese citizens would support their confession's joining an ongoing civil conflict. Multivariate analysis of the list experiment reveals that Chapter 2's individual-level hypotheses are largely confirmed. Preference for an allegiance choice by individuals is driven by individual emotions of resentment, themselves politically exacerbated, toward either the government or a side that initiates a given conflict. While some materially determined indicators, such as the belief that one's confession is worse off in relation to others, also drive conflict allegiance, the findings underscore the role of emotional predictors in shaping individual allegiance preferences – in line with the non-strategic explanation laid out throughout the project. In the next chapter, large-N results from chapter 4 and survey results from this chapter are bridged by interviews with leaders of Lebanese political parties on both their political usage of emotion and the potential that emotional reactions leave their control in times of crisis.

Acknowledgments

This chapter, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the material. Ash, Konstantin. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this material.

Chapter 7

Agency during Crisis: Interviews with Lebanese Political Leaders

Previous chapters of the dissertation have presented a theory of allegiance formation that stems from the interaction between identity group leaders and members. Allegiance choice during conflict is first determined by group cohesion and then, the extent to which group members collectively feel active negative emotion – resentment – toward potential allegiance partners. A large-N analysis of civil conflicts since 1990 showed group-level measures of resentment: political exclusion and intergroup violence with civil war initiator to be strong predictors of allegiance. The findings were supported through a case analysis of the Syrian Civil War and a survey experiment in Lebanon that showed that individual resentment drove allegiance preferences. The last step in a comprehensive test of the theory is a leader-driven perspective on allegiance. The theory predicts that leaders will utilize resentment toward either the government or other identity groups as a response to either violence or repression in order to obtain support from in-group members in light of within-group competition. Then, at the beginning of a conflict, it is predicted that the resentment

will constrain leader choices in forming allegiances those resented identity groups or the government. Given that most, if not all political forces, were included in a unity government at the time of these interviews, it would be unlikely that any political party admits to either the use or effect of resentment against the government during the interviews.

While an ideal supplement to testing the two above assertions would have been individual-level data of the presence of an accountability mechanism at conflict onset, such a prompt was omitted to avoid an explicitly sectarian air to the survey and because individual-level results would not likely to reflect the predictions of the theory, which hinges on leader's expectations rather than actual outcomes. As such, interviews with representatives of Lebanon's ten major political parties across all four of the major confessions were conducted. The interviews were divided into three sections on how parties retained support from constituents, relationships with other parties (ostensibly, confessions) and reactions to the onset of a conflict-like crisis in Lebanon. The structure of the interviews, the responses, along with secondary source information are laid out in the sections that follow. The responses of party representatives largely conformed to that of the theoretical predictions.

Political Parties and Leaders in Lebanon

As described in the previous chapter, Lebanon's political system is centered around competition within confessions. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of seats from the previous election according to political party and the distribution of interviews that were conducted by the author, while Table 7.2 then reproduces a table from Appendix D, which shows the confessional divide of political party support among Lebanese respondents. In essence, power is shown to be distributed rather evenly among the confessions, yet parties clearly only compete for votes within rather than between confessional constituencies. All parties

but the SSNP have definitive constituencies within only one confession by wide margins. For instance, the Amal Movement and Islamic group lacked any supporters outside of the Shia and Sunni sects, respectively. Other parties had very low levels of support among other confessions, showing clear difference toward sectarianism.

Table 7.1: Distribution of Seats in Parliament by party in 2009 elections

Party	Seat Share	No. of Interviews
March 14 Coalition	**68**	**5**
Future Movement	28	0
Progressive Socialist Party	11	1
Lebanese Forces	6	2
Kataeb	5	1
Social Democrat Hunchakian Party	2	0
Armenian Democratic Liberal Party	1	0
National Liberal Party	1	0
Democratic Left Movement	1	0
Islamic Group	1	1
March 14 Independents	10	0
Independents	**3**	**0**
Tripoli Solidarity Bloc	2	0
Non Affiliated	1	0
March 8 Coalition	**57**	**5**
Free Patriotic Movement	19	1
Amal Movement	13	1
Hizbollah	13	0
Marada Movement	3	2
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	2	0
Ba'ath Party	2	0
Tachnag Party	2	0
Lebanese Democratic Party	2	1
Solidarity Party	1	0

Source: National Democracy Institute Election Report (2009).

Consistent with the expectations of the consequences of identity-based diversity on clientelism (Besley 2005), Lebanon's political parties should use primarily particularistic appeals to constituents across the board (Cammett 2014, Cammett & Issar 2010). Moreover,

Table 7.2: Party Identification by Confession among Lebanese Adults

Party	Christian	Druze	Sunni	Shia
Islamic Group	0	0	20	0
Lebanese Forces	92	0	10	1
Kataeb	28	0	1	0
Amal Movement	0	0	0	156
Hizbollah	8	0	16	187
Free Patriotic Movement	102	0	5	2
Progressive Socialist Party	2	207	0	2
Lebanese Democratic Party	0	33	1	1
Syrian Social Nationalist Party	1	13	1	17
Marada Movement	11	1	5	1
Future Movement	3	1	156	1
Other/DK/No Affiliation	263	255	295	142
Total	510	510	510	510

Note: Respondents were asked: ”Which party do you support most in the Lebanese Parliament?” without being given any additional options or choices.

given that competition is limited to the confession, leaders should also make appeals that stoke resentment as a way of increasing their standing as the sole defender of a particular confessions security, in addition to being a provider of welfare. Given the competition within confessions for political support, it is expected that the use of resentment is most evident among sects where there are at least two viable and competing options for sectarian votes – specifically, Christians, Shia and Druze. Nevertheless, the overall expectations of either the use of resentment to increase political support, nor its effect on leader behavior should differ. The next section presents the structure of the interviews used to evaluate both how Lebanese political leaders gain and maintain support and their hypothetical reaction to the outbreak of civil conflict.

Structure of Interviews

Participants for interviews were recruited through contacting local and national offices of Lebanese political parties. An interview was requested with an individual that makes decisions within the party apparatus, usually the general-secretary, if one existed. Attempts were made to interview leaders from parties with three or more seats in the Lebanese Parliament and several key parties that did not meet the threshold, but had support within their confessions that was not reflected in seat counts, such as the Lebanese Democratic Party or the Islamic Group. Of the parties that were contacted, interviews could only not be obtained with the Future Movement and Hizbollah, despite repeated efforts to do so. Interviews were conducted in either English, when party leaders had sufficient fluency or Modern Standard Arabic. Of the individuals that were successfully recruited,[1] most were either in the position of general-secretary, former ministers or advisers to the leader of the political party in question.

The questionnaire, presented in full in Appendix E, was structured into three parts: questions about party's mode of attracting constituents, its relationships with other parties and sects during peacetime and its potential relationships with other parties and sects at a time of political and social crisis in Lebanon – intended to be a euphemism for impending civil conflict.[2] In the first section, interview subjects were asked about their party's relationship with its constituents, their core platform, the types of services the party provides,[3] and what demographic of constituents are usually attracted to participate in party functions. The second section asked subjects about their party's relationship with other parties in the Parliament. Specifically, subjects were asked whether their party interacts with members

[1] Names are excluded per request of interview subjects
[2] The scenario was made explicit if leaders expressed misunderstanding of the prompt
[3] A euphemism for clientelist provision in Lebanon.

from a historically rival sect (i.e. Druze and Maronite Christians or Sunni and Shia) and if there was any party that they would not cooperate with. This line of questioning was designed to extract a baseline for political resentment sentiment toward another confession by the interviewed party. Finally, in the third part of the interview, subjects were asked to imagine a hypothetical crisis (that closely resembled what would occur if Lebanon's 2008 crisis had escalated to civil conflict) and to respond to a set of questions on how the party would align. Specifically, subjects were asked whether they would expect their party to most closely cooperate with other parties that represented their confession or their current political alliance in the Lebanese Parliament. Finally, as the final question of the third section, subjects were asked whether they would not be able to cooperate with any political group or confession in times of crisis, in particular the group that they had mentioned earlier as a non-viable partner during ordinary political times. The following sections describe the general pattern of responses from the 10 interviews, focusing particularly on the means that political leaders use for maintaining support in their movements and the way in which they respond to hypothetical outbreaks of civil conflict.

Tactics for Gaining Support

The existence of past conflict, either during the civil war, the Syrian occupation or post-occupation political crises, in addition to the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict should provide leaders with ample possible material to stoke resentment against either the Lebanese state or another sect for political gain. However, the nature of the Lebanese political system and interviews show a different reality: most political parties foremost use clientelism as a way of attracting supporters. Clientelism is a widely reported by party leaders under the guise of 'providing services.' It was common to claim that parties had to

provide services because the state was unable, either through weakness or corruption, to provide public services to its citizens.

However altruistic political leaders claim to be, the services that their parties provide are generally reliant on political support for their party. Broadly, political parties focus on healthcare, education and employment as means of maintaining political support. Parties that cater to less well-off constituents, such as the Shia-based Amal Movement or the Sunni-oriented Islamic Group, focus on provision of basic amenities. Catering to the impoverished South of Lebanon, Amal focus on construction of hospitals, schools and roads and provision of electricity and clean water for constituents in the South.[4] The Islamic Group similarly focuses on education, construction and maintenance of hospitals and clinics and youth activities, along with maintenance of religious institutions – but, most credibly of the mentioned parties – does not limit use of these services to their electoral constituents. [5] Christian and Druze parties, which cater to relatively wealthier constituents, remain oriented toward healthcare, education and jobs, but target higher-income voters. The PSP, for instance, builds small health clinics in the fairly mountainous areas and heavily Druze areas of Jabal al-Druze and Aley.[6] Christian parties are even more targeted, providing supporters with free check-ups through doctors who are members of the party or access to hospitals.[7] Education also plays a major role in service provision. Parties with wealthier constituents play a particularly large role in college admissions, giving supporters scholarships[8] or gaining admissions to universities based on a quota set aside for political supporters of the party.[9] Finally, the ministries assigned to a party while in government also serve as sources of

[4]Interview with president of the General Council of the Amal Movement, March 11, 2014
[5]Interview with the director of the political office for the Islamic Group, April 21-22, 2014.
[6]Interview with General Secretary of the PSP, February 26, 2014.
[7]Interview with General Secretary of Women's sector of the Marada Movement, April 23, 2014
[8]Interview with General Secretary of the PSP, February 26, 2014.
[9]Interview with General Secretary of Women's sector of the Marada Movement, April 23, 2014

patronage. Parties can gain members from professional degree holders and then provide them with jobs in the ministries they hold[10] or generally use their connections in other ministries to either curry favors for constituents, exchanging favors with other ministry holders.[11]

While patronage should be expected to engender loyalty, there are only limited practices to indoctrinate party members among most interviewed parties. Some parties organize professionals as a means of creating a network of supporters across large swathes of highly-educated communities.[12] Other parties have strong ties to the labor sector and make efforts to recruit working class and unionized members.[13] Yet, actual indoctrination is limited and while those in leadership positions are often required to take classes on a party's ideological position and how to comport themselves, this is only a recent innovation. Thus, it is likely that, while interconfessional loyalty is easy to secure, clientelism alone does not facilitate utmost loyalty among constituents among parties vying for support within a given confession.

Nevertheless, there is limited evidence to support the explicit use of active negative emotion by Lebanese political parties toward political organizations that represent another confession to foster support among constituents. Only the Lebanese Forces (and to a lesser extent, the Kataeb) cite their opposition to Hizbollah as the principal reason for their support among their constituents.[14] Most other political parties stress their willingness to have open dialogue with most political parties, even in spite of opposition of their constituents. This is the case with the Islamic Group's occasional dialogue with Hizbollah, which occurs in

[10] Interview with General Secretary of the Free Patriotic Movement, February 14, 2014.

[11] Interview with adviser to the president of the Lebanese Democratic Party, April 1, 2014.

[12] Interviews with General Secretary of the Free Patriotic Movement, February 14, 2014 and with General Secretary of Women's sector of the Marada Movement, April 23, 2014

[13] Interview with head of the Labor sector of the Lebanese Forces, February 19, 2014.

[14] Interview with adviser to Samer Geagea, president of the Lebanese Forces, April 22, 2014.

spite of constituent opposition due to Hizbollah's involvement in the Syrian Civil War.[15] The lack of dialogue that does exist is an extension of geopolitical circumstances, such as the lack of communication between the Future Movement and the Marada Movement since 2005,[16] which is attributable to the close relationship of Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh to Bashar al-Assad, widely held responsible for ordering the assassination of Future Movement founder Rafik Hariri. Similarly, the anti-Sunni stances taken by Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement impede any formal relations with Sunni political parties, such as the Islamic Group. In other cases, such as that of the leader of the primarily Druze Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Junblatt, his status as protector of the Druze appears to be firmly entrenched based on his performance in defending Druze interests during the Lebanese Civil War. This was acknowledged by a leader within the rival Lebanese Democratic Party, who [17] Finally, in some instances, active negative emotion was evident from the tone of the interview, as one representative from the Marada movement went on a lengthy monologue condemning Lebanese Forces leader Samer Geagea for his role in the deaths of Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh's brother and nearly forty others during the Ehden Massacre in 1978. This raw and emotional sentiment was underscored by an indignation of the killing of small children "in their crib."[18] Naturally, the absence of members of the two main rivals in the political system: Hizbollah and the Future Movement influence these responses as these parties' mutual antagonism would have likely manifest as a means of attracting supporters. Nevertheless, while some active negative emotion is used to establish political support by many Lebanese political movements, interparty rivalries are generally not explicitly highlighted by party leaders as means of attracting followers.

[15] Interview with the director of the political office for the Islamic Group, April 21-22, 2014
[16] Interview with director of the political sector of the Marada Movement, May 28, 2015.
[17] Interview with adviser to the president of the Lebanese Democratic Party, April 1, 2014.
[18] Interview with General Secretary of Women's sector of the Marada Movement, April 23, 2014

Responses to Conflict Outbreak

While active negative emotion did not appear to be a widespread tool of attracting support on the surface, political leaders may simply want to avoid bringing it up as the most prominent reason for their support or to avoid the appearance of openly stoking sectarian resentment. Thus, the prospective reactions of political leaders to a crisis that compromises the authority of the state would be telling. Each interview subject was asked about their party's reaction in such a crisis, particularly the extent to which cooperation would increase between parties from the same confession and the extent to which parties could deviate from their existing alliances in the Lebanese Parliament (used as proxies for potential active negative resentment toward another party). Ultimately, due to the similarity of the crisis to that of 2008 and the political climate at the time of the interviews in both Lebanon and Syria, it was assumed by most interview subjects that the emerging conflict would be between Sunni and Shia political forces, likely between the Future Movement and Hizbollah.

The responses were mostly diplomatic, but revealed some trepidation for going against established active negative sentiment among constituents, especially in the case of the Lebanese Forces. For instance, both the Lebanese Democratic Party and the Islamic Group stressed that they would attempt to mediate any crisis, as they did in 2008, when the LDP was instrumental in cooling tensions between Junblatt and Hizbollah, while the Islamic Group was instrumental in facilitating the signing of the Doha Accord to end the crisis. Mediation would especially play a role if the crisis involved conflict between either the PSP and Hizbollah or the Future Movement and Hizbollah, respectively.[19] Nevertheless, agency on the part of some groups appears to be compromised during crises, as acknowledged by the LDP and the PSP. Because Junblatt is seen as the leader of the Druze, it would not be likely

[19] Interviews with with the director of the political office for the Islamic Group, April 21-22, 2014 and with adviser to the president of the Lebanese Democratic Party, April 1, 2014

for most Druze to follow the path of the LDP in supporting Hizbollah or remaining neutral during a crisis. On the other hand, while this was not considered by the PSP leadership, it may be likely that given active negative emotion toward Hizbollah over its support for the Assad regime,[20] Junblatt would not be able to swing the Druze to support Hizbollah in a conflict. This was demonstrated by a loss of support by Junblatt during the period of political allegiance with Hizbollah between 2011 and 2013.

The Lebanese Forces also demonstrated some trepidation toward joining Hizbollah, even if such an allegiance was necessary to preserve the unity of Christian political forces. A lower ranked member insisted that supporters would revolt and throw out Samer Geagea if he joined with the Shia militia,[21] while a higher ranked member was more diplomatic, insisting that Christians would never join with Hizbollah in general and would maintain a united front against the group.[22] Overall, it appeared that sufficiently strong positions against other confessions, at least in the case of Hizbollah, would ultimately prevent leaders from taking sides with the group, even if Hizbollah presented a higher probability of post-conflict gains or ensured unity among members of their confession in supporting one particular side in a civil conflict.

Discussion

The interviews ultimately lend more tepid support to the expected responses of leaders to civil conflict than hoped. While there is some evidence that leaders in the Lebanese political system explicitly use resentment as a means of distinguishing themselves

[20]Hafez Al-Assad being widely held responsible for the assassination of Walid Junbaltt's father Kamal in 1978.

[21]Interview with head of the Labor sector of the Lebanese Forces, February 19, 2014.

[22]Interview with adviser to Samer Geagea, president of the Lebanese Forces, April 22, 2014.

among a crowded field of intraconfessional contenders, missing interviews from two major political parties and potentially social desirability bias against admitting open sectarianism limited the strength of the responses with respect to the use active negative emotion. Even in responses to conflict outbreaks, most parties preferred to remain diplomatic and only in a few cases were prior instances of active negative emotion as a result of past violence against their sect seen as an impediment to an allegiance choice at a time of conflict. Regardless, these few cases show some additional backing for the leader-level hypotheses in Chapter 2. It is expected that, given a greater likelihood of civil conflict and, perhaps, broader sample of interview subjects, the use and effect of resentment against a prospective ally would become more clear in the interview responses.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation has been to explain the allegiance patterns of identity groups at the outset of civil conflicts. This has been done while speaking to a larger debate in international relations on the foundations of conflict behavior at both the individual and group level. Across numerous levels of analysis, the findings reveal that an identity group's choice for joining a particular side at the outside of a civil conflict is, at least in part, driven by active negative emotion against one party in the conflict by the individual membership collective of the identity group. The finding is supported by results from group-level allegiance outcomes, a case study of allegiance outcomes and leader behavior during the early days of the Syrian Civil War, a survey experiment of Lebanese adults regarding their preferences for their confession's behavior at the outset of a hypothetical conflict and interviews with members of the Lebanese political elite regarding their reaction to the same type of hypothetical conflict, especially given the possibility of joining previously identified antagonists within the Lebanese political arena. To conclude the dissertation, this section provides a discussion of the contributions to academic and policy research that these findings have provided.

Academic Contributions

The finding makes a substantial contribution to the understanding of conflict within international relations and the study of conflict, in particular. While the role of emotion in relation to conflict has been considered in the past, it has been done from a unidimensional perspective. Scholars have underscored the role of leaders in shaping emotions of individuals within ethnic groups toward participation in conflict. Nevertheless, such a view has hampered the potential application of collective emotion at the individual level as a predictor of other conflict outcomes. The logic being that, if leaders influence individual emotions, it should be leaders' decisions that ultimately drive conflict outcomes, not the emotions themselves. Nevertheless, the findings from the survey experiment have shown, at best, conditional support for leader-driven formation of active negative emotion among respondents, calling such a deterministic relationship into question. Moreover, evidence from across multiple levels of analysis reveals that active negative emotions among group members actually holds leaders accountable and constrains the choices leaders can make while still maintaining broad support within their identity group.

The finding that identity group leaders are held accountable by group members, who are beholden to a non-rational process – active negative emotion – calls a common assumption in conflict studies into question. As mentioned, these studies assume that rebel leaders, in particular, are autonomous rational actors, being able to make choices on behalf of their group without constraint from group members and according to a cost-benefit analysis conducted by the rebel leaders. The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that this is simply not the case. Leaders very well may be driven by some form of cost-benefit analysis in determining their preferences, but those preferences do not become outcomes without any input from group members. If a collective of group members feel active negative

emotion toward an allegiance partner that a group leader joins, the leader stands to lose those members as supporters and risk being targeted by members of the identity group that he/she previously led for betraying the group and effectively defecting to an enemy side.

Given the challenges to existing work on conflict, the findings of this dissertation have several implications for future research. Fundamentally, assumptions that group-level conflict outcomes are dictated by the preferences of leaders alone are called into question. Overall, the assumption does not appear to be justified regarding what is likely an empirical question that should be treated as such by future studies. Future research on conflict would also do well to evaluate the effects of active negative emotion on other forms of individual-level conflict behavior, such as protest participation and active participation in armed conflict. There is also room to evaluate the individual emotional sources of conflict behavior empirically, perhaps using a modified technique from this study. While this study was constrained in such an analysis due to the low frequency of individual emotional outcomes, there is room to link future empirical work at the individual level to theories developed by Petersen (2000) on conflict participation – looking at anger, hatred, disgust, fear, etc. as separate predictors of individual level violence – with potential extensions to the group level.

There are also implications for studies of identity-based conflict. Far too often, ethnicity is conflated with either religion or other forms of identity in analyzing either conflict or other political outcomes. The distinction that this study brings using the identity group terminology seeks to end this conflation by clearly differentiating ethnic groups from religious groups and regional groups and allowing for each of these three categorizations to overlap, making for a novel definition of identity within geographic space and a quantifiable unit of analysis that can be utilized in future identity-related work in political science.

Finally, and most basically, the findings have implications for future research on conflict allegiance. Specifically, the level of analysis in studies of allegiance, not clearly defined until now, should take the form of an identity group, a well-distinguished, yet broad designation for actors within a burgeoning conflict scenario. Moreover, the scope of potential allegiance choices has been expanded, based on observed phenomena from actual conflicts, beyond the dichotomous distinction between government and rebel sides. Additionally, a clear theoretical link is established between allegiance outcomes at the group level and collective preferences at the individual level, which suggests that conflict outcomes, as a whole, and allegiance outcomes in particular, should not be examined as solely individual or group level processes, but as two-level phenomena. Taken together, this dissertation has called rationalist assumptions of conflict behavior into question and encourages scholars to incorporate non-strategic approaches into both the theoretical and empirical stages of their research, while providing additional avenues of research to work on conflict allegiance and identity politics.

Policy Implications

In addition to the modifications the findings from this dissertation suggest to existing approaches to the study of civil conflict, there are also several implications for policy-makers working in both conflict prevention and resolution. The effect of active negative emotion at the individual level on group-level phenomena suggests that allegiances in civil wars may not be formed easily through mere placation or accommodations of identity group leaders through material means. Underlying active negative emotion among constituents could not only hamper the choices leaders have, but displace those leaders that choose to ally with a particular side by taking on material incentives. This is particularly salient for contemporary

Syria, where a unified coalition against the Islamic State has failed to emerge as a result of longstanding active negative emotions between Kurds and Shia Muslims in Iraq, Kurds and the Alawite government in Syria and that same government and the primarily Sunni rebels in Syria's northwest. Ultimately, when threatened from a mutual adversary, these sides failed to coordinate in any more than tacit ways, hemmed in by active negative emotion toward one another among their core constituents.

It follows from the presence of active negative emotion that conflict resolution should not focus solely at the elite level. While settlements may be palatable to leaders, their identity group compatriots may simply ignore or be unwilling to go along with a peace agreement regardless of material incentives. This could result in splintering and spoilers that ultimately doom any peace process. It is important for conflict resolution professionals to alleviate active negative emotion against the opposing side in conflict among constituents before any elite settlement is made.

Finally, the findings underscore the importance of early intervention for preventing conflict. Ultimately, if active negative emotion toward a particular side builds up years and decades beforehand, the recipe for either conflict or allegiance during conflict already exists and is merely waiting for a trigger. If policy-makers seek to reduce the likelihood of conflict, it may be necessary to intervene in peaceful societies with escalating rhetoric and prevent escalation into full-blown civil war. However, more research is needed on the specific steps that can be taken to reduce resentment sentiment among individual members of an identity group.

Appendix A

Appendix Materials for Chapter 2

Both individual and leader preferences can be restated formally to derive the hypothesis mentioned in the main article. Both of the formalizations are shown below.

Formalization of Individual Preferences

Restated formally, individual-level preferences show similar outcomes. There are three potential alliance outcomes: joining the rebels (utility of which is represented by U_R), joining the government (utility of which is represented by U_G) and self-government (utility of which is represented by U_{SG}). The outcome of "No collective action" occurs at the group-level when either individuals or leaders collectively have differing preferences for allegiance AND act upon those preferences, resulting in a lack of group cohesion.

Both members and leaders have unique individual utilities and costs for each action (I_R, I_G, I_{SG} and C_R, C_G, and C_{SG}, respectively). These represent individual-specific costs and benefits (not related to political position) to participating in conflict for a particular side. Benefits can include personalistic incentives provided for an individual to fight for a particular side, such as direct transfers from the government or public services that would

otherwise not be provided had the individual joined another side, while costs would be potential lost gains for the individual in terms of salary, access to services or personal well-being from choosing a particular side. It is assumed that no I_i is ever greater than C_i or that no one wants to fight for the group on any side without being influenced by political leaders.

Another parameter G_i represents individual gains from group well-being as a result of a specific alliance choice. It is multiplied by a scalar $Identity$ for both members and leaders, which determines the relevance of group-well being for the individual. An individual is considered to have strong identity when $I_i < G_i * Identity$.

A final parameter, $Res_i \in (0,1)$ represents resentment. It can only take a value along a spectrum of zero to one, representing degrees of resentment toward a particular group or government, where zero represents individuals who experience absolute resentment toward a particular party in a conflict and 1 for those who absolutely do not. The assumption is that the degree in which individual negative emotions reduce the utility of a particular choice is relative, creating a spectrum of individuals who want conflict and a varying effect of collective emotion on overall utility. Taken together, these parameters produce two equations for member preferences for joining a rebellion or the government after conflict onset:

$$U_{Ri} = (I_{Ri} + G_{Ri} * Identity) * Res_{Ri} - C_{Ri}$$

$$U_{Gi} = (I_{Gi} + G_{Gi} * Identity) * Res_{Gi} - C_{Gi}$$

where U_{Ri} if $U_{Ri} < U_{Gi}$ and U_{Gi} if $U_{Ri} > U_{Gi}$

if $U_{Ri} = -C_{Ri}$ or $U_{Ri} = I_{Ri} - C_{Ri}$ and $U_{Gi} = -C_{Gi}$ or $U_{Gi} = I_{Gi} - C_{Gi}$, then member prefers SG.

Members cannot act collectively if all of their group members' utilities do not align. Comparative statics reveal that resentment is the primary driving mechanism of individual behavior.

One or both allegiance options are eliminated at the individual level for resentful individuals, leaving the most palatable choices to be relative appraisals of individual and group utility from choosing a particular course of action.

Formalization of Group Preferences

As with the individual-level model, the group-level theoretical assertions from the perspective of the leader are formalized. Two additional parameters appear in the maximization model for leaders with a modification for one of the hold-over parameters from the model for individuals. The modification comes from the aggregation of resentment from the individual level, converting the dichotomous variable into a probability where $Pr(Res_i) \in (0,1)$ is the likelihood that any one member of a given group has incurred repression/violence enough to feel resentment. This measure essentially amounts to a measure of the proportion of group members that feel resentment. More repression is likely to lead to more individuals who feel resentment.

The additional parameters are the utility from political power for leaders from a given alignment Pol_l, which includes potential future gains from the victory of a given side in conflict or short and medium term benefits that are transfered directly to leaders in exchange for their political loyalty, utility from an existing government position U_{Gov} and the proportion of a leader's constituency to either the government's or the rebels $\frac{Pop_g}{Pop_{R/G}}$. If the proportion is greater than 1, then the value reverts to zero as the possible ally rejects allegiance with the larger party. Finally, S is a scalar of local institutional strength.

Taken together, this creates a revised utility function for leaders where political power and the possibility of resentment drive their allegiance choice:

$$U_{Rl} = (I_{Rl} + G_{Rl}) + (\frac{1}{Pr(Res_{Ri})}) * (\frac{Pop_g}{Pop_R}) * Pol_{Rl} - C_{Rl}$$

$$U_{Gl} = (I_{Gl} + G_{Gl}) + (\frac{1}{Pr(Res_{Gi})}) * (\frac{Pop_g}{Pop_G}) * Pol_{Gl} + U_{Gov} - C_{Rl}$$

$$U_{SGl} = (I_{SGl} + G_{SGl}) + S * Pol_{SGl} - C_{SGl}$$

Maximized, the largest utility becomes the choice that leaders choose to pursue on the wake of civil conflict. Comparative statics reveal that a lower probability of resentment and a higher proportion of the population relative to allegiance partner – approaching parity – will increase the utility of alliance with a given side. Similarly, prior institutional strength at the local level, has a similar effect, increasing the likelihood of secession. In short, these represent the three most relevant parameters at the group level and it is expected that changes in each parameter should produce changes in observed allegiance outcomes.

Appendix B

Appendix Materials for Chapter 3

The following section compares the author-generated identity group data-set maps with the maps generated by the GeoEPR (Ethnic Power Relations) data-set by (Wimmer et al. 2009, Cederman, et al. 2010a). The purpose of the appendix is to reflect on both the limited coverage provided by the GeoEPR maps and the advantages of the improved coverage provided by the identity group data-set in regard to precisely identifying and assessing the actors in both past and ongoing civil conflicts in each of the three countries examined in chapter 3's cases: Syria, Tajikistan and Nigeria. For each case, two maps are presented side-by-side: the first showing the identity group data and the second the EPR data. The composition of each map is then briefly discussed in relation to ongoing or past conflicts in each respective country.

Syria

The maps on Figure B.1 show a stark contrast in coverage between the identity group map and the GeoEPR data. Beyond the obvious ability to factor in regional differences of the identity group map, there appear to be numerous other advantages over the GeoEPR



Figure B.1: Comparisson of Identity Group (top) and EPR data for Syria

map. The GeoEPR map appears to give no wieght at all to Kurdish populations as described in Chapter 3, either in the Kazira province around Qamishli or in the Kurd Dag region north of Allepo. On the other hand, Christian regions either in the Jazira province, around Allepo and Hama or along the Euphrates river are overrated in the GeoEPR map, while Druze territory in Jabal al-Druze is understated. The identity group map paints a more complex picture of Syria's mediterranean coast and surrounding cities, giving space to Turkmens, Christians, Armenians, Circassians and Alawites, rather than a straight-forward combination of Alawites Christians and Sunni Arabs.

If examining the Syrian conflict, the GeoEPR would be unable to capture the complex inter-identity dealings that have emerged as the conflict has developed and are described in Chapter 5. There would be no room for the Kurdish automous region in the North of the country, to capture support of Euphrates region Sunni Arabs for the Islamic State or to fully understand the intricate allegiances that have emerged around Idlib, Hama, Homs and Allepo over the past three years. The identity group map, as described more clearly in chapter 5, is designed specifically to do so in an accurate and effective way.

Tajikistan

Figure B.2 shows a comparison between maps generated for Tajikistan. Again, the contrast is stark. Here, the regional divisions among Tajiks are missing in the GeoEPR data, but would be crucial to explaining either politics in Soviet or Post-Soviet Tajikistan, as it has not been just Tajiks but Northern Tajiks (before the fall of the USSR) and Southern Tajiks (after the fall) that have dominated politics in the country. The GeoEPR map also omits a distinction between Pamir Tajiks and ordinary Tajiks in the Gorno-Badakhshan Province. The distinction is similarly crucial in understanding one of the divisions that led

to the outbreak of the Tajik Civil War and to the insurgency that has continued at a low level in the Badakhshan region since the war's official end in 1997. Without the precision of the identity group data-set, the GeoEPR is left without an understanding of what was an identity conflict, but is not captured as such by the data.

Nigeria

Figure B.3 shows a comparison between maps generated for Nigeria. Since Nigeria's identity group map is largely a reflection of its ethnic composition (with the exception of some religiously divided ethnic groups such as the Yoruba), the main issue comes with the exclusion of most of Nigeria's major ethnic groups. The GeoEPR data includes five distinct groups: The Igbo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Tiv and Yoruba and one blanket group named "Hausa-Fulani + Muslim Middle Belt." The identity group map provides more detail by filling in the missing geographic space with additional groups, by disaggregating the Muslim Middle Belt groups into their constituent parts (Hausa, Fulane, Nupe, etc.) and by accounting for religiously divided ethnic groups such as, most prominently, the Yoruba.

The identity group map carries considerable advantages in regard to the current Boko Haram war in Nigeria. As members of the Kanuri group have been instrumental in initiating the conflict (Campbell 2013), the GeoEPR map would be unable to explain the sources of the Boko Haram conflict, as it treats Muslim groups within Nigeria as a unitary actor and omits any recognition of the Kanuri at all. In reality, since the Boko Haram conflict is a conflict within Nigeria's Muslim population (pitting Sunni Fulbe/Fulani and Kanuri against primarily Hausa), the identity group map does a superior job of appropriately capturing the composition of the Boko Haram insurgents and ethnic groups that have chosen to side with the government on the matter.



Figure B.2: Comparisson of Identity Group (top) and EPR data for Tajikistan



Figure B.3: Comparisson of Identity Group (top) and EPR data for Nigeria

Discussion

Looking at three recent conflicts and comparing the identity group maps and the GeoEPR maps shows, without much contention that the superior coverage and detail provided by the identity group maps across three diverse regions of the world is able to channel maps into more precise measurements of data regarding civil war initiators and participants. More importantly, it is clear that it would be nearly impossible to conduct a complete study of conflict allegiance had the GeoEPR data been employed in this project.

Appendix C

Appendix Materials for Chapter 4

Allegiance Coding Process and Detailed Cases

The following appendix section contains detailed information on the process through which conflict allegiance among various identity groups within a country was determined and detailed narratives justifying the coding in each case of conflict onset that were coded within the data.

Coding Process

Before coding conflict allegiance, it is necessary to establish the identity group that initiates a civil conflict, either through the first outburst of violence after mobilization or by being the first political force to actively take arms against a government. Narratives of conflict and media reports were culled to find the group that first initiated conflict and the composition of that group in terms of ethnic, religious and regional members. After this group was obtained, it was necessary to find all subsequent groups that also took arms against the government while the initiating group was conducting its campaign and in some

way coordinated with the initiating group or simply provided either military or material support to the rebel organization already formed by the initiating actor. If no evidence of either material, organizational, or military support for the initiator is found and a group does not take arms against the government, it is not coded as having joined the rebellion.

Groups that do not join the rebellion fall into three categories: those that join the government, those that pursue self-government or those that take no collective action in the conflict. In the first case, groups that are already included in the institutional structure of the government before the conflict begins are coded as supporting the government [1] unless they actively dissociate themselves from the government in terms of supporting the rebels, or, in some capacity withdrawing from the government institutional structure by actively rejecting government authority or to provide material or military aid (in terms of members of the military from this identity group, payment of taxed or adherence to authorities within the central government). On the other hand, groups that are not part of the government institutional structure in terms of political representation or membership in the leadership structure of the military are only coded as supporting the government if they begin making overt contributions to the government anti-rebel effort in terms of fighters, material support or providing a military aid through a militia that exists outside of the government, but fights for its cause [2].

Groups are coded as pursuing self-government under two circumstances: one, if a group actively declares the geographic region it occupies to be independent of government authority without explicitly taking up arms against the government and then creates or reinforces institutions independent of the central government, especially creating independent

[1] In terms of EPR coding (Cederman et al. 2010b), these would be groups that are coded as dominant, having a monopoly on power, junior partners, senior partners or having regional autonomy, which while separating themselves from the government, is still dependent on government support to maintain legitimacy

[2] This is exemplified by Druze and Christian militias in Syria or Songhai fighters in Mali

self-defense forces, [3] or two, if a group refuses to accede to the institutional charter of the central government at a time of conflict [4].

Finally, groups that take no collective action effectively accept the status quo before a conflict, take contrasting sides in a conflict, or leave the country en masse. All three actions, while contrasting to a degree share a lack of coordination that prevents an individual group for pursuing the interests of the identity group in a united voice. Groups that are politically excluded from the government before conflict onset and make no effort to either collectively assist the government or the rebels or form parallel institutional structures are essentially considered, by elimination of possible actions, to be taking no collective action. Moreover, groups whose members leave the country as refugees lose viability as political players within the dynamics of a conflict. Finally, groups that splinter, siding with both the rebels and the government or with another entity face a similar problem of coordination and also cannot be considered to be acting collectively. The coming sections describe the coding decisions undertaken for each conflict examined in the quantitative study in detail on a case-by-case basis. The conflicts are presented alphabetically by country and then chronologically.

Albania 1997

Albania's civil conflict stemmed primarily from economic strife and political turmoil that followed the fall of the country's communist dictatorship in 1990. Economic problems naturally emerged from the transition process, but were exacerbated by individual investments in several get-rich-quick pyramid schemes. By 1996, over two-thirds of the

[3]This reflects the path taken by Sunni Kurds in the Euphrates region of Syria or the Sunni Georgians in the Ajaria region of Georgia

[4]Reflecting the behavior of the Volga Tatars in Tatarstan in 1994 in refusing to sign the Federation Charter of the Russian Federation as Chechen secessionists fought Federal troops

country's population had placed their savings in such schemes, including the country's major banks and ruling political party. At the same time, political problems also emerged as the ruling Democratic Party (PDS) began a drift toward autocratic policies, culminating in an electoral boycott and accusations of electoral fraud from the opposition in 1996.[5] The PDS itself was heavily dependent on funds from the pyramid schemes. But, in January 1997, holding companies began going bankrupt and closing their offices leading to widespread demonstrations and financial panic. Soon, the northern-based government had lost control of the South, especially in the city of Vlora with armed mobs taking control. Rebels in the South organized for an invasion of the capital, only to be halted by a multinational peacekeeping force (Elsie 2010). Given the strength of regional cleavages above religious cleavages[6] ((Blumi 2006), rebels primarily drew their ranks from the south across religious lines, while Albanians from all faiths in the North and Tirana continued to support the PDS government. There is no evidence of mobilization on the part of other smaller ethnic minorities of Serbs, Macedonians and Aromani.

Burundi 1993

The assassination of the first elected Hutu (Barundi) president, Melchior Ndadaye, by army soldiers in October 1993, set off numerous massacres against Tutsi (Banyaruanda) civilians across the country. In tandem with the massacres, which ultimately amounted to a genocide, several former rebels and Hutu politicians coalesced to form the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD). The group started its rebellion from the Tanzania border in the Kumoso region, joined by Hutus fleeing Rwanda the next year to organize a full-scale uprising against the Tutsi-dominated government (of Peace & Research 2013a).

[5] http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2001_96.htm.
[6]hristianity, Shia Islam and Sunni Islam.

Central African Republic 2001

The background of the 2001 attempted coup and subsequent civil war involved the increased concentration of power in the hands of President Ange-Felix Patasse, his Gbaya (Ngiri) ethnic group and their Sara (Bagirmi) and Mbum supporters. This came at the expense of the ethnic Yakoma (Sere-Mundo), who had considerable representation in the country's army, including chief of staff, Francois Bozize (of Democracy Human Rights & Labor March 2003). The coup was spearheaded by former president Andre Kolingba, but failed to wrest power in its initial stage. Subsequently, Bozize and fellow Yakoma defectors from the army fled the country and used Chad as a staging ground for an invasion in 2002, ultimately wresting power from Patasse in 2003 (of Peace & Research 2013b). There was no other apparent ethnic mobilization either for or against the government during the conflict.

Central African Republic 2005

While Bozize coming to power was intended to be temporary and followed by elections in 2004, the elections were widely seen as rigged as Bozize won by a large margin. Some supporters of former President Andre Patasse, mostly ethnic Sara (Bagirmi) from the Northwest of CAR, took arms against the government in 2005 under the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD). The rebellion was not only in direct response to Bozize's election, but to a general feeling of helplessness at the hands of bandits in the area. Similarly, a rebellion in the Northeast of the country in 2006 was also founded on insecurity-fuelled feeling of deprivation of government services (of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network June 2009). Ethnic Gula (Tama) had come under attack from Sudanese nomads in the previous years, but received little government assistance. While the Sudanese government offered them reparations, their

animosity toward thee Bozize government led to the formation of the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), which, while dominated by Gula, also included ethnic Arab and Muslim Bemba fighters as part of a broader movement for Muslim rights in the CAR (Watch Sep 2007). Moreover, the UFDR and APRD initially cooperated on their rebellions, but ultimately broke apart over Gula attacks on ethnic Sara in the Northwest [7]. Much like Bozize's rebels, the government evolved into being dominated by the Yakomo with support of the Gbaye people (Gourdin Oct 2013). There is no evidence of further ethnic mobilization for the conflict.

Central African Republic 2009

A peace settlement ended conflicts with the APRD and the UFDR in 2007, but defections from the government and Gula attacks in the Northwest spurred the creation of the The Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) in 2009. The CPJP was led by Charles Massi, a former minister in the Bozize government who had defected to the UFDR (of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network June 2009). The group was primarily composed of Runga (a Muslim Bemba sub-group), who had formed to defend against UFDR attacks in CAR's Northeast. Ultimately, though, after the collapse of several cease-fires the UFDR (and, as such, the Gula/Tama, and Sudanese Arabs), several other Muslim-led rebel groups and Mboum from Northern CAR joined a rebel alliance known as Seleka (Watch Sep 2013). The composition of the government remained largely identical to previous iterations of conflict, with Sere-Mundo (Yakoma) and Gbaya (Ngiri) support for the Bozize regime, until its fall in 2013. There is no evidence of further ethnic mobilization for the conflict.

[7] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ufdr.htm.

Cote d'Ivoire 2002

Until the early 1990s, the Ivory Coast was West Africa's most prosperous and stable country, attracting immigration and remaining ethically and religiously harmonious under the rule of independence-era leader Felix Houphouet-Boigny. After Houphouet-Boigny's death, the economic and political stability of the country began to unravel. Economic austerity policies necessitated multiple changes in policy and precipitated in measures that discriminated against Northerners and immigrants from Southern politicians. A coup was staged in 1999 with the intent of returning to consensus rule, but reforms were not made after the election of Laurent Gbagbo in 2000 (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2013a). In September of 2002, amidst escalating tension between political parties, Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI) rebels launched an uprising in the North of the country. The conflict, contrary to media speculation was not forged explicitly along religious or regional lines. While the MPCI primarily consisted of Northern Muslim Malinke (Mandingo) and Senoufo (including the Lobi and Kulango), it also included Sunni Akan members as its fighters and political leadership (Watch August 2003b). Two other rebel groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Ivorian Movement for the Greater West (MPIGO) formed in the west of the country later that year. While MPIGO consisted mostly of foreign fighters, the MJP fought for assassinated General Robert Guie and were primarily comprised of Mano (Mende) ethnic partisans. These groups clashed with pro-government Bete (Gbagbo's group) and Gere. Other supporters of the regime including Christian Akan in the south and Lagoon ethnic groups along the Atlantic Coast (Skogseth November 2006). There is no evidence of mobilization from either the far northern Fulbe or the Western Bantu speakers.

Cote d'Ivoire 2010

The 2002 conflict ended in stalemate with the rebels in control of 60% of the country's territory in the North and the government continuing to rule from the South. An internationally mediated agreement led to elections in 2010 that were won by opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara. Nevertheless, Gbagbo supporters decried the results and forced the mostly pro-Gbagbo Constitutional Court to nullify the outcome and to declare Gbagbo the winner. The rebels quickly re-organized in the North, and, with the help of new allies in the South, invaded and overthrew Gbagbo in a matter of months (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2013a). The ethnic composition of the rebels and of government supporters was largely unchanged, save for a change of allegiance from the Akan and Lagoon groups as a result of a political deal between the New Forces and Felix Houphouet-Boigny's former party, Parti democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) to unseat Laurent Gbagbo (of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network 18 May 2005a).

Democratic Republic of the Congo 1996

Named Zaire at the time, the DRC was beset by economic collapse after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, civil war and genocide in neighboring Rwanda led to an influx of mostly Hutu refugees into the country. Having supported the deposed Hutu (Barundi) government, Zaire's president Mobutu Sese Seko backed the refugees as they clashed with Tutsis (Banyaruanda) native to Zaire, known as the Banyamulenge. Additionally, the Banyamulenge had engaged in long-standing clashes against indigenous Bakomo and Bakonjo, to which the government had also turned a blind eye (of Humanitarian Affairs Sep 1997). Abandoned by Mobutu, the Banyamulenge formed self-defense forces to protect

against Hutu attacks that soon evolved into the anti-government Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) (of Peace & Research 2013c). The group was quickly joined by existing former rebel fighters from the former breakaway region of Katanga, including Marxist rebel leader Laurent Kabila, who were predominantly from the Bemba, Luba and Lunda ethnic groups (Banks et al. 2003). Additional support was provided by other formerly defunct rebel groups, including the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Zaire (MRLZ), which was a coalition of ethnic groups from South Kivu that included the Barega and Bashi (Turner 2007), the Bakuba (Bahunde) Mai Mai hired by the AFDL to fight the government in Kivu (McCalpin 2002) . On the other side, Mobutu's government was a liberalizing one-party-state with power still highly concentrated in Mobutu's own Ngbandi ethnic group, with support from pro-government Gbaya and Mba groups and from the Bakongo, whose religious leaders were close to the Mubutu government (Berkeley August 1993) [8]. In regard to the remaining ethnic groups in the DRC, there is no evidence that any substantially mobilized to either join or fight against the rebels.

Democratic Republic of the Congo 1998

The ethnic coalition underlying the AFDL and its allies quickly unraveled after Laurent Kabila took power in Kinshasa, the DRC's capital. Once Kabila took power, he turned on former Banyamulenge allies and restored the discriminatory policies of the Mobutu regime against them, reflecting concerns about Rwandan influence in Congolese society. In August 1998, Banyamulenge rebels reconstituted under the banner of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). In addition to the Banyamulenge, the RCD also included former pro-Mobutu fighters, especially from his Ngbandi ethnic group. In September 1998,

[8] Mobutu's adopted ethnic group, the Bangala also supported him and clashed with the rebels as they neared Kinshasa (of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Oct 1997).

a second rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) was formed in the Equateur province by telecommunications tycoon Jean-Pierre Bemba and primarily drew support from the Mongo ethnic group (of Peace & Research 2013c), with additional recruitment among the Ngombe and Bangala (of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network Dec 2005b).

In addition to assistance from numerous regional powers [9], Kabila's government relied on support from his own Baluba ethnic group from the Katanga province, Bakuba, Barega and Bakomo Mai Mai fighters in the South Kivu province (see (Spittaels & Hilgert 2010)) and Hutus (Barundi), both from Congo and in the form of refugee-formed rebel groups fighting Tutsi-dominated governments in Rwanda and Burundi (of Peace & Research 2013c). In addition, Kabila found renewed support from former backers of Mobutu from ethnic groups in and around Kinshasa, including the Bakongo and the Bateke and from his local Katanga in the form of the Bemba (Group Dec 2000).

A third front in the conflict opened as the government lost authority in the Ituri region on the Ugandan border of the DRC. With waning central government authority in Northeast Congo, numerous militias emerged to fill the power vacuum. Initially, the Hema (Banyoro) and related peoples in the region sought institutional autonomy, but clashed with the Lendu (a sub-group of the Mangbetu) farmers by extension of long-standing land disputes. Conflict broke out when Hema gained power in a new regional government, with the blessing of Uganda, and attempted to seize land from the Lendu (of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network Nov 1997). Absent any government influence, both groups fought one another with an increasingly fragmented cadre of rebel groups until the end of the civil war (Watch July 2003a).

[9] Including Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola and Zambia.

Other instances of self-defense were also prevalent. Abandoned by the government in the North, the Azande formed self defense units to defend against Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks (Spittaels & Hilgert 2010). There is no remaining evidence of mobilization from any other ethnic group, making it likely that the remaining groups suffered under occupation from one of the many pro-rebel or pro-government forces during the conflict.

Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006

The peace agreement that ended the bloody Second Congo War called for the integration of Congo's numerous armed forces with the national army. One commander of the RCD, Laurent Nkunda, was particularly threatened by this as it could have led to his arrest and initiated a wave of defections from the armed forces among mostly Banyaruanda soldiers. The forces of this new group, the Military Counsel for the People's Defense (CNDP) found support among the Banyaruanda, who had come under increasing attack from Hutu (Barundi) militias that had also failed to disarm and formed the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) (of Peace & Research 2013c). Once the conflict was underway, the.parties largely mobilized against the rebels with the Congolese Army being backed by the FLDR and regional Mai Mai militias that once again represented the Bakuba, Barega and Bakomo groups of the Kivu provinces (Group Oct 2007). The conflict was largely confined to the Kivu regions with no mobilization outside of the regions in either support or opposition of the rebels.

Democratic Republic of the Congo 2012

The Congolese civil war resumed in the Kivu region after the failure of the 2009 peace agreement with the CNDP. While the threat from Hutu militias had largely been

contained by 2012, the DRC government decided to arrest former CNDP general Bosco Ntaganda. In response, Ntaganda and hundreds of Bumalenge soldiers defected and formed the M23, named after the supposedly failed March 23 agreement between the DRC and CNDP (of Peace & Research 2013c). Much like the previous rebellion, conflict actors from self-defense groups also took arms, but unlike previous iterations, these Hutu, Hunde (Banyoro), Barega and Bakomo Mai Mai groups sided against both the government and the rebels in an effort to expel Ruanda speakers from Kivu altogether (Group Oct 2012). The government's composition of supporters otherwise remained similar to the previous conflict in 2006. Also like the 2006 Kivu conflict, the conflict was largely confined to the Kivu regions with no mobilization outside of the regions in either support or opposition of the rebels.

Ethiopia 1992

The end the Ethiopian Civil War in 1990 displaced the communist Derg government and the previously dominant Christian Amhara from power in favor of the Tigray-led Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which supported a federal structure for Ethiopia. Upon the end of the conflict, the new federal constitution had little of the promise of the federal state envisioned by the rebels, giving nominal powers to the regions and largely retaining the existing unitary state structure with Meles Zenawi and the TPLF at the helm. The Oromo (Galla) were the first to rebel, leaving the government after the 1992 elections and re-starting insurgent activity [10]. At the same time, the Somali-dominated Ogaden region, was flooded by Islamist fighters from Somalia, and a violent government response. By early 1994, the ruling Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), had split, with one faction resuming an

[10] While most Oromo are Muslims, the revolt took an ethnic, rather than a religious tone, with both Muslim and Christian Oromo joining the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (Gnamo 2002).

anti-government struggle. A similar turn of events occurred in Afar, where Afar (Danakil) leaders, dissatisfied with the new constitution, returned to violence under the banner of the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) (of Peace & Research 2013d). By 1997, informal coordination between the three groups became formal as they joined forces as part of the Oromo-Somali-Afar Liberation Alliance, with the goal of establishing an Islamist state in Ethiopia. This goal largely kept Amhara, whose governing role was substantially marginalized by the TPLF, away from rebellion and in support of the government (at Risk Project 2004) [11].

In regard to other groups, the Anuaks and Nuer, while both seeking autonomy and antagonistic toward one another, remained loyal to the government during the uprising, with the Anuak-dominated Gambella People's Liberation Movement in strong support of the TPLF (Dereje 2006). A similar arrangement was agreed to with the Agau, who became an autonomous minority within the Amhara region (Tesfaye 2002). The Sidamo, while divided politically through the introduction of a rival party by the TPLF and denied autonomy, remained supportive of the government's efforts (Aalen 2011). The TPLF pursued a similar strategy against the Berta People's Liberation Movement (BPLM), dividing ad purging the group and then absorbing a pliant version of the party into the larger EPLDF. The Koma, who live roughly in the same region, were even worse off receiving little representation. Neither mobilized against the state during the uprising (Markaris 2011). Most ethnic Kunama in pre-1992 Ethiopia ended up in and have not mobilized in Tigrinya, but retain support of the government, while Arabs and a small number of Murle along the Sudanese border also showed no mobilization during the uprising.

[11] Along the same lines, Muslim Amhara have also sided with the government, favoring ethnic, rather than religious connections.

Indonesia 1999

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) had previously organized an anti-government insurgency against the Suharto government in 1990, but was largely suppressed and destroyed as a fighting force within a few years. After the fall of the Suharto regime in the center, GAM reconstituted to seek independence for the majority-Achinese people in northern Sumatra in 1999 (of Peace & Research 2013e). While Indonesian politics was traditionally dominated by the Javanese, 1999 saw autonomy granted to traditionally restive islands of Papua and Borneo and the various ethnic groups therein. Nevertheless, while Suharto had been toppled the previous year, the Javanese ruling class remained firmly in control of central power leading up to the presidential elections of 1999. While the fall of Suharto brought unrest to Western Papua, West Timor and direct attacks against the Chinese community, no concerted effort was made by any of these communities to rebel against the state (Suryadinata 2002). It follows that a vast majority of the observed identity groups in Indonesia are coded as not having taken part in any collective action, either in support or opposition of the rebels, with communities in Western Papua and Western Timor seeking self-government at the outset of the conflict.

Mali 1990

Lack of economic opportunity and political exclusion led many Tuaregs to leave Mali and Niger for work in Algeria or Libya in the midst of a drought in the Sahel region. However, an economic downturn as a result of falling oil prices in the 1980s led those nations to expel Tuareg migrants and force a return to their home country. These retrning Tuareg had intermingled with the Tuareg serving in armed forces in North Africa, particularly in Qadaffi's Islamic Legion. Returning Tuareg began to protest for increased economic rights,

leading to massacres in Niger and Tuareg movement into Mali. The rebellion began with the formation of the MPLA (Movement for the Popular Liberation of Azawad) in order to free captives in a police station. The conflict soon escalated into the formation of four total rebel groups, one representing the Arab minority in Azawad (Krings 1995). The conflict remained confined to the north for most of the year and was settled, after substantial military losses by the government, in January of 1991 (of Peace & Research 2013f). No other groups in other regions of the country had an opportunity to mobilize, with government supporters consisting primarily of Mandinka ethnic group, with support from the Fulbe (Peul) who had helmed the single-party regime of Moussa Traore for the past 20 years (Dickovick 2008).

Nepal 1996

The Nepalese Civil War began as a Maoist uprising in the northwest of the country. The uprising was precluded by a lugubrious transition from absolutist to constitutional monarchy, political exclusion of the Maoists from government and general concentration of political and economic power in the capital and the country's lower hill regions (of Peace & Research 2013g). The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)'s leadership mostly consisted of upper-caste Nepalese, who felt excluded from the Hindu-dominated monarchy, but recruited heavily from rural mountain ethnic groups including the Gurkhas (Kumaonis and Sunwars), Magars, Tharus, Limbus and Tamangs, who made up most of the Maoist fighting force [12]. The government, increasingly isolated in the vast rural and mountainous parts of the country, relying on the support of urban Newars and southern Biharis and Bengalis to reinforce its Hindu-speaking royalist base (Savada 1991). There is no evidence of mobilization from some of the more remote Northern Himalayan ethnic groups, such as the Bhotias,

[12] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/upf_nepal.htm.

Gurungs, Kiratis, Sherpas and Tibetans. While, Maoist forces eventually occupied these areas, members of these ethnic groups were largely captives to the Maoist social order rather than supporters of the movement (Pettigrew 2013).

Niger 1991

The population in and outflows that precipitated the Tuareg uprising in Mali also affected the start of the uprising in Niger in 1991. The Air and Azawad Liberation front (FLAA) staged attacks against the Nigerien government in the fall of 1991, evolving into a full-scale conflict until the end of hostilities and a negotiated settlement in 1993 (Krings 1995). The government was largely backed by a Garma/Songhay oligarchy that had been in power since independence and had only begun democratize to broaden the coalition toward including Hausa in 1991 with a conference on democratization and multi-party politics in October of that year (Khaleel 1996). Nevertheless, in the wake of the Tuareg uprising, the country's other groups did not mobilize substantially to help the Nigerien cause.

Niger 1994

The rebellion of Nigerien Tuaregs coincided with a similar rebellion in Mali 1990. A peace deal was signed in 1993 between several Tuareg rebel groups and the government, but quickly fell apart. While the previously dictatorial Nigerien government underwent democratic transition, the situation for Tuaregs did not improve and they reconstituted their forces to call for increased federalism for the North of the country. At the same time, ethnic Toubou in eastern Niger, pressured by attacks from refugees from Chad, formed their own rebel force to seek federalism for Eastern Niger from the center in 1994 (of Peace &

Research 2013h). The Toubou were joined by ethnic Arabs and Kanuri in the Lake Chad region (Idrissa & Decalo 2012). Nevertheless, Arab militias in Tuareg-populated areas sided with the government and created self-defense militias that committed several atrocities against the Tuareg population (for Tuareg in Niger (Date of retrieval: 14/03/29) 2006b). The Nigerien government, while democratizing around an inclusive coalition of Fulani, Hausa, Gurma and Songhai, refused to accede to demands for federalism despite Niger's overall shift to pluralism at the time, leading to a resumption of the dormant Tuareg conflict (Ibrahim 1994).

Niger 1997

A 1995 peace settlement ended Niger's 1994 conflict in 1995, but was not durable. The army, dominated by old-guard Gurma and Songhai, overthrew the democratic regime in 1996, quickly losing trust of former combatants and causing the peace deal to unravel. Tuareg factions formed the Union of the Forces of the Resistance Army (UFRA) in the North of the country, while Toubou rebels joined with Libyan Arabs in the east to resume the conflict as the Armed Revolutionary Forces of the Sahara (FARS). The UFRA and FARS ultimately joined in a formal alliance, conducting joint attacks in 1997 against the government (of Peace & Research 2013h). By this point, the government had come to be composed of the victors of the military coup, who, while led by Hausa Ibrahim Baré Mainassara mostly from the Gurma and Songhai ethnic groups that had come to dominate Nigerien politics before democratization (International July 2008). Nevertheless, there is no evidence of either Hausa, Fulani or Kanuri ethnic groups supporting either side of the conflict during 1997.

Niger 2007

While Niger had returned to nominal democratic rule by 2007, the pluralistic party system remained dominated by Hausa political entities, with few opportunities for participation for minority groups other than the traditionally empowered Gurma and Songhai (Basedau & Stroh 2012). In light of this, the Niger Justice Movement (MNJ) formed as a way of demanding decentralization, as agreed upon in the 1995 peace agreement, and an increased share of revenues from the country's lucrative uranium exports. While the group was Tuareg-led, it included Toubou, Fulani, Arab and Gola members (of Peace & Research 2013h). There is no evidence of substantial Kanuri participation in this conflict.

Nigeria 2004

Following the institution of Sharia law in mostly Muslim Northern Nigeria, numerous riots broke out in religiously mixed cities across the country's Middle Belt. Following the riots, fundamentalist Muslim groups formed, including Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, which separated themselves from society, drawing inspiration from the Afghan Taliban. Attempts to evict the group turned to violence and led the group to demand the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Yobe state, the home to the group's dominant ethnicity, the Kanuri. While the rebellion did not spread to other Muslim areas and was put down by the end of the year, another rebellion began in the south in the summer of 2004 (of Peace & Research 2013i). The rebellion was staged by the predominantly Ijo Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, which, disgruntled with economic deprivation in the midst of Nigeria's oil fields, demanded self-determination for the Ijo from the federal government. The movement was short-lived and ended with a settlement between the rebels and the government (Persson 2014). It is not known if the two movements would have coordinated if they had been active

for a longer period of time, but the latter is coded as joining the former, on the basis of similar self-determination demands. Given the relatively low magnitude of the conflict, government and collective action options are assigned on the basis of the general coding rules set out at the outset of the appendix.

Nigeria 2009

Following the dissolution of Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in 2004, there was a lull in organized violence across Nigeria for several years until a successor group emerged in 2009. At first, this group, known as Boko Haram [13], emerged from remnants of the short-lived Ahlul Sunna Jamaa rebellion and merely served to advocate the formation of an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria. After the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, at the hands of security forces in 2009, the group quickly went underground and took arms against the Nigerian government in late 2009 (Watch 2012). The group's mission is ostensibly for the promotion of a Sunni Muslim caliphate in West Africa, however its supporters are not universally representative of ethnic groups that have Sunni Muslim believers. Much like Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, the leadership of Boko Haram is drawn from the Kanuri ethnic group, corresponding to the location of the group's homeland in Northeast Nigeria. However, substantial percentages of its members are either from the Fulani ethnic group, making up a Boko Haram splinter group named Ansaru (Campbell 2013). In addition to the Fulani, Boko Haram also draws in supporters from smaller Northeastern groups: the Mandara, the Shoa-Arabs and the Songhai (on Armed Violence December 2008). Given the group's radical Sunni Islamist ideology, most Christian ethnic groups support the Yoruba-led government

[13] Or, as the group refers to itself: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad.

[14]. Remaining Sunni groups in the more traditional Northwest, including the Hausa, have also sought to preserve the/ status quo and have sided with the government. And, while the Shia in both Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are largely opposed to Boko Haram's practices, they have shown no evidence of mobilization toward either side (Rustad 2008).

Republic of Congo 1993

The Republic of Congo transitioned from being a one-party Marxist state to a multi-party system after the end of the Cold War. However, conflict broke out following the country's first legislative elections in 1993. With Marxist president Denis Sassou-Nguesso losing the country's first presidential elections to Pascal Lissouba. Heading into the legislative elections, the country's three major political forces were largely reflections of ethnic and regional divisions. The ruling Union Panafricaine pour la democratie sociale (UPADS), drew support from president Lissouba's Nibolek province, especially from the Bateke group, the Mouvement congolais pour la démocratie et le développement intégral (MCDDI) relied on support from the southern Bakongo (including the Lari and Vili subgroups), and Sassou-Nguesso's Congo Workers' Party (PCT) relied on the Bobangi and Bangala (Mboshi) for support. Allegations that the elections, won by UPADS, were rigged, led to the outbreak of conflict. The MCDDI created its own militia, the Ninjas, to fight against the army and the pro-government Cocoyes. The PCT soon joined the rebels with their own Cobras militia (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2013b). While the smaller Kouyou (Bakele) group was also from the north of the country, they remained on the side of the government for the duration of the crisis and Bakele leader, Jean-Pierre Thystere Tchicaya, made an explicit pact with Lissouba (Magusson & Clark 2005). There is no

[14] Save for the Ijo, who have largely remained unmobilized and continue to periodically attack oil company interests in the Niger Delta (Persson 2014)

evidence of additional mobilization on the part of any other ethnic group in the country during this conflict.

Republic of Congo 1997

With upcoming elections, the government attempted to disarm the PCT's Cobras rebels, leading to a recurrence of conflict. This time, rather than join the rebellion, the MCDDI's Ninjas joined the governing coalition with.their leader becoming prime minister [15]. In the face of overwhelming odds the Cobras managed to unseat Lissouba in a matter of months, setting off a longer conflict with Sassou-Nguesso as president (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2013b). There is no evidence of additional mobilization on the part of any other ethnic group in the country during this conflict.

Republic of Congo 2002

The war of 1997 raged for two more years until a peace accord was signed. While the formerly pro-Bateke/Bakele Cocoye militia largely demobilized, the Ninjas, now called the Ntsiloulous and led by quasi-cult leader Pasteur Ntoumi, who now represented the Bakongo continued to hold considerable territory (Themner 2011). Intending to disarm the group, Cobras militia members entered their territory, sparking a year-long conflict (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2013b). There is no evidence of additional mobilization on the part of any other ethnic group in the country during this conflict with only the Mboshi government fighting Bakongo rebels.

[15]The Bakele continued supporting the government (Magusson & Clark 2005).

Sierra Leone 1991

Sierra Leone's political competition is framed between ethnic groups in the North and the South. The Northern groups, helmed by plurality Temne and Limba ruled under the government of the All-People's Congress until 1991, with Limba holding most of the important government positions. Demonstrations against the one-party state came to a head in 1991, the same year that the RUF (Revolutionary United Front), led by Libyan-trained and Liberian-allied Foday Sankoh, invaded the south of the country (for Temne in Sierra Leone (Date of retrieval: 14/12/25) 2006a). The composition of the rebel groups and the government reflects the allegiance patterns at the outbreak of conflict largely reveal group allegiance patterns despite a lack of coherent ideology on the part of the RUF. The RUF was led by a Tembe, Sankoh, while drawing a majority of their fighters from the Mende ethnic group and minorities from the Temne and Kisi. The army, on the other hand, drew more support from the ruling Limba, the Kono and the northern Mandingo (Humphreys & Weinstein July 2004). The remaining ethnic groups in the country, owing to the RUF's brutality, generally sided with pro-government forced or local militias against the foreign-backed RUF. Major tribal forces from the Mende, Temne and Kono ethnic groups formed the Civillian Defense Forces (CDF), which represented the government's local-led response against the RUF (Notholt 2010).

South Sudan 2013

South Sudan gained formal independence from Sudan in July 2011. Sporadic conflict in the first two years of independence led to the eruption of full-scale civil war in 2013. Some of the rebel Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA), mostly ethnic Nuer led by Peter Gadet, laid down their arms and joined the government in 2011, while others,

mostly ethnic Murle and a separate force of ethnic Shilluk (Northern Lwo), continued to fight until a cease-fire in 2013 . In late 2013, South Sudan's Ethnic Nuer vice president, Riek Machar, Nuer army defectors and groups of Nuer militias began a rebellion against the Dinka-led government after Machar was dismissed from the government (of Peace & Research 2013j). They were joined by Gadet's mostly Nuer faction of the SPLA (rebel Riek Machar 'controls key state' December 21, 2013), but not by ex-rebel Murle and Shilluk factions, which sided with the government (Survey March 2014a). The rebellion started when an attempted coup associated with Machar led to a purge of Nuer from positions of power in favor of Dinka. Machar fled the capital and coordinated an uprising in the North. Moreover, once fighting started, the government experienced defections from the Bari ethnic group, most notably from general Alfred Lado Gore, who also recruits defectors from the Moru ethnic group (Survey January 2014b) and, most likely, from the Lotuko.[16] On the other hand, Sudanese Arabs and the North Sudanese government have sided with the South Sudanese government to maintain oil flows through Sudanese pipelines (Sudan & agree to protect oilfields January 2014). While this conflict has only recently begun and further identity alignments may take place, there is no evidence, at the time of this writing, of further collective action by any other South Sudanese identity groups.

Conflict Onsets and Initiating Groups

Table C.1: Conflicts of Analysis

Country	**Year**	**Initiating Group**
Albania	1997	South Shia Albanians

Continued on next page

[16]http://mondediplo.com/2014/02/03southsudan.

Table C.1 Conflicts of Analysis (continued)

Country	**Year**	**Initiating Group**
Azerbaijan	1993	Northwest Shia Azerbaijanis
Azerbaijan	1995	Northwest Shia Azerbaijanis
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	Eastern Christian Serbs
Burundi	1993	Kumoso Barundi
Central African Republic	2001	Christian Sere-Mundo
Central African Republic	2005	Muslim Tama
Central African Republic	2009	Muslim Banda
Chad	1997	Christian Sara
Chad	2005	Muslim Tama
Cote d'Ivoire	2002	Sunni Mandingo
Cote d'Ivoire	2010	Sunni Mandingo
Croatia	1992	Adriatic Christian Serbs
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1996	Banyaruanda
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1998	Banyaruanda
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2006	Banyaruanda
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2012	Banyaruanda
Egypt	2011	Sinai Sunni Arabs
Ethiopia	1992	Muslim Galla
Eritrea	1993	Tigre
Georgia	1992	Central Georgia Christian Ossetes
Indonesia	1999	Achinese

Continued on next page

Table C.1 Conflicts of Analysis (continued)

Country	**Year**	**Initiating Group**
Iran	2004	Tabriz Sunni Kurds
Iraq	2004	Tikrit Sunni Arabs
Liberia	1997	Animist Mende
Libya	2011	Benghazi Sunni Arabs
Macedonia	2001	Shia Albanians
Mali	1990	Tuaregs
Mali	1994	West Sahara Arabs
Mali	2007	Tuaregs
Mali	2012	Tuaregs
Moldova	1992	Transnistria Russians
Nepal	1996	Nepalese
Niger	1991	Tuaregs
Niger	1994	Tuaregs
Niger	1997	Tubu
Niger	2007	Tuaregs
Nigeria	2004	Sunni Kanuri
Nigeria	2009	Sunni Kanuri
Pakistan	2004	Punjab Sunni Afghans
Republic of Congo	1993	Bakongo
Republic of Congo	1997	Bobangi and Bangala
Republic of Congo	2002	Bakongo

Continued on next page

Table C.1 Conflicts of Analysis (continued)

Country	**Year**	**Initiating Group**
Russia	1994	Chechens
Russia	2007	Chechens
Senegal	1992	Christian Diola
Serbia and Montenegro	1998	Sunni Albanians
Sierra Leone	1991	Temne
South Sudan	2013	Nuer
Syria	2011	Mediterranean Coast Sunni Arabs
Tajikistan	1992	Dushanbe Sunni Tajiks
Thailand	2003	Muslim Malays
Uzbekistan	1999	Faranga Valley Sunni Uzbeks
Yemen	1994	Aden Sunni Arabs of Yemen
Yemen	2004	Zaidi Arabs of Yemen

Appendix D

Appendix Materials for Chapter 6

Balancing Tests of Randomization Levels

A total of four levels of randomization were used in the survey: one for the list experiment, one for the initiator of conflict in the hypothetical scenario in the list-experiment prompt, one for the priming question on worst government policy and a final level on the order in which the main list experiment question and another list experimental question on direct support for group conflict initiation were presented. To establish whether the samples were random across each level of randomization, logistic regressions are conducted with confession level fixed effects on a set of demographic factors to see if any factor predicted randomization and would thus signal a randomization failure. Table D.4 shows the results of the models for each level of randomization with no significant predictors of any level, save one minor effect on a measure of community participation, assuring a degree of balance on observable co-variates in terms of randomization.

Table D.1: Balancing Tests of Randomization Levels in Survey Experiment

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Age	-0.007	-0.004	0.000	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	-0.093	-0.041	-0.090	-0.080
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Income	0.040	0.028	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Education	0.004	0.072	-0.048	-0.017
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Frequency of Community Participation	0.014	0.046	0.012	-0.060
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Variety of Community Participation	0.047	-0.049	0.026	-0.165*
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Length of Residence	-0.054	-0.001	-0.079	0.202
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.117)
Constant	12.964	7.418	0.091	-3.927
	(8.419)	(8.420)	(8.405)	(8.427)
Number of Observations	1726	1726	1726	1726

Note: Confession-level fixed effects included in model. * $p<0.05$.

Tests of List Experiment Design and Validity

Table D.2: Frequency of Responses to List Experimental Question on Allegiance

Reported Acceptable Choices	Control	Treatment
0	0	0
1	842	493
2	130	392
3	20	109
4	2	11
5		7

As mentioned in the main body of the text, list experiments face numerous validity issues that may impede their benefits or the ability to conduct multivariate tests. First, the design of the list experiment question may elicit a different response for the control items in the treatment group than in the control group. Naturally, this would call the degree to

which there is significance as a result of the treatment case into question. This is known as a design effect (Blair & Imai 2012). The possibility of a design effect is especially great in the ‘listit’ design as the list experiment question is asked in slightly different ways of the treatment and control groups [1] There are two ways to rule out a design effect. First, looking at the raw changes in differences between treatment and control groups could shed anecdotal light on any depression in non-sensitive outcomes in the control group. These are shown in Table D.2. If there was a design effect, there would be many respondents reporting only one acceptable choice in the control group and then a disproportionate jump to three in the treatment group. However, when looking at the raw data, the decrease in respondents reporting one acceptable choice from the treatment to control is comparatively small, from 842 to 493, representing an approximately 42% drop, lower than the overall difference in means for the remaining cases. It follows that the number of individuals choosing one in the control group and then choosing the sensitive item is small compared to the control group, at least anecdotally indicating that respondents in the control group did not disproportionately choose one acceptable non-sensitive choice when they would have otherwise chosen more than one had they been in the control group.

A formal way to rule out design effects is a specific test has been developed by Blair et. al. (2012). Table D.3 shows a table of probabilities that a given respondent is in one particular group and the standard errors for those probabilities. If a sensitive choice were to have no effect on the non-sensitive alternatives in the treatment, it would display no significant (at $\alpha < 0.05$) probabilities of occurrence at higher values, reflecting few if any jumps from an answer of one acceptable option to three and so forth, making the cumulative p-value of no design effect below the same threshold. From the results on Table D.4 in

[1] Respondents are asked ‘which’ choices they prefer in the control group and ‘how many’ they prefer in the treatment group.

reference to the list experiment in this study, it is clear that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of not having a design effect. The cumulative p-value is 0.186 and individual probabilities of the treatment effect also exceed 0.05.

Table D.3: Test for Allegiance Question Design Effects (Blair et. al. 2012)

	Coefficient	Standard Error
p_i(y = 0, t = 1)	0.0000	0.0000
p_i(y = 1, t = 1)	0.3625	0.0195
p_i(y = 2, t = 1)	0.1049	0.0116
p_i(y = 3, t = 1)	0.0160	0.0045
p_i(y = 4, t = 1)	0.0070	0.0026
p_i(y = 0, t = 0)	0.0000	0.0000
p_i(y = 1, t = 0)	0.4855	0.0158
p_i(y = 2, t = 0)	0.0247	0.0156
p_i(y = 3, t = 0)	0.0044	0.0063
p_i(y = 4, t = 0)	-0.0050	0.0030

Note: P-value of sensitive choice having a design effect is 0.186462.
y is the number of choices reported by respondent. t is 1 when respondent was in treatment group, 0 when respondent was in control group.

A second test that validates the design of the list experiment involves floor and ceiling effects. As mentioned in the body of the paper, the former occur when responses are so uncontroversial that negative responses to all choices are likely and answering the treatment response in the negative or the affirmative would amount to revealing preferences for respondents. Ceiling effects occur when answering in the affirmative for all control choices is likely, thus ensuring that an affirmative answer for the treatment response would also reveal respondent preferences by giving an affirmative answer to all choices including the treatment (Kuklinski, et al. 1997). Thus, respondents distort their answer downward to avoid revealing preferences. Both floor and ceiling effects distort outcomes and are avoided by designing control lists with answers that are, in some capacity mutually exclusive or unlikely to be answered together, while being likely to be answered individually. There

are simple tests for both. The likelihood of floor effects is measured by the proportion of zero responses in the control group. The likelihood of ceiling effects is assessed through the difference in proportions of answers at high values of list responses. For instance, if the difference in means is negative with a higher proportion of control responses choosing all choices compared to treatment respondents, ceiling effects are likely (Glynn 2013).

Table D.4: Ceiling Tests of Allegiance Question

Number of Responses:	0	1	2	3	4	5	Sum
Treatment Group	0.000	0.487	0.38	0.108	0.011	0.007	
Proportion at least:	1.000	1.000	0.513	0.125	0.018	0.007	
Control Group	0.000	0.847	0.131	0.020	0.002	0.000	
Proportion at least:	1.000	1.000	0.153	0.022	0.002	0.000	
Difference in means	0.000	0.000	0.360	0.103	0.016	0.007	**0.486**

Note: Percentages displayed. Sum represents cumulative difference in means between treatment and control.

Floor effects are easily dismissed for this study. There are no zero responses in either the control or treatment categories. Ceiling effects are also unlikely. Proportions across number of responses are shown in Table D.4. The differences in cumulative proportions remain positive for the entirety of cases, with small numbers of control respondents choosing either the full set or high numbers of any set.

Connecting Community to Confession

The survey experiment's design makes it highly probable that members of a particular confession were sampled by drawing samples from areas where only members of that group are known to reside. The underlying reasoning for using this technique is based on the sensitivity of direct questions on confessional affiliations in surveys for many Lebanese respondents. This sensitivity also required that mentions of confession be omitted from

survey questions altogether, replacing them with the euphemistic term 'community.' While it is implicitly likely that most respondents in a small compact society with extremely salient sectarian divisions, such as Lebanon, understood the term community to mean sect, it is possible that some individuals interpreted it to mean their local regional community rather than their sect. Qualitative interactions with Lebanese individuals reveal that community should suggest sect to respondents. In addition, to evaluate the performance of this word, it was used in a series of questions relating to relative deprivation of respondents' communities to other communities in Lebanon. Specifically, it is expected that economic and political deprivation of 'communities' will be strongly related to feelings of government importance of the community's religious beliefs relative to others. The assumption of this relationship is that the latter question, making a more explicit connection between religion and community, directs individual responses toward sectarian community, rather than any other possible interpretation of the word community and that a strong correlation with other questions on deprivation that are similar in subject and also use the word community would indicate that the sectarian definition had been in respondents' minds all along.

Four total questions on relative group outcomes and representation were asked on the survey, including the question on religious beliefs. Each was followed by a Likert Scale response from 1 to 5. The exact text of the questions and response choices is reproduced below:

Relative Group Economic Situation

Comparing your community to other communities in Lebanon, do you think your community's economic situation is:

- Very Good
- Good
- Average
- Below Average

- Poor

Relative Group Political Representation
Comparing your community to other communities in Lebanon, do you think your community's interests are represented in the Lebanese Parliament:

- Very Good
- Good
- Average
- Below Average
- Poor

Relative Government Importance of Group
Comparing your community to other communities in Lebanon, do you think the government values your community's economic well-being:

- Very Highly
- Highly
- Average
- Not very much
- Not at all

Relative Government Value for Religion
Do you think that the Lebanese government's level of importance for your community's religious beliefs compared to the religious beliefs of other communities is:

- Very High
- High
- Average
- Not very much
- None

As the responses to each questions are arrayed on a five point Likert scale, they are fairly comparable to one another. Table D.5 shows correlations of the correlations of each of the questions for the full sample of respondents who answered all four questions. The table shows that while not as strongly correlated as the deprivation measures are to one another

(ranging from .45 to .55),[2] the religious belief question has up to a .42 correlation with the remaining questions, indicating a high amount of overlap for interpretations of community as religion in the whole of the sample.

Table D.5: Correlation Matrix of Deprivation Questions

Variable Names	Econ. Wellbeing	Pol. Rep.	Imp. Econ.	Imp. Religion
Economic Status	1.0000			
Political Representation	0.5690	1.0000		
Importance of Economic Status	0.4557	0.5120	1.0000	
Importance of Religion	0.2749	0.3064	0.4176	1.0000

Note: 1589 total observations in sample.

Categorizing Emotional Sentiment

Respondents were asked a question to capture their emotional sentiment as related to the government, specifically to name 3 to 5 words that describe their feelings about the government. Nearly every respondent stated at least one word or phrase in response. After translating the responses from Lebanese Arabic with the assistance of a native Lebanese Arabic speaker,[3] the responses clearly fit into three emotional categories derived from the Geneva Emotion Wheel (Scherer 2005, Scherer, et al. 2013): positive emotion toward the government, passive negative emotion toward government and active negative emotion toward the government, also termed resentment, and one non-emotional category that invovled naming specific grievances about the government. Active negative emotion-related words were coded in consistency existing works in prospect theory and emotions in social psychology (TenHouten 2007, Scherer et al. 2013). Individuals were coded as expressing

[2]The higher correlations may be explained by the close association of economic wellbeing in the first and third questions and the even closer association of political representation and government importance for economic wellbeing in the second and third listed questions.

[3]The author and the translator translated text to Arabic separately and then spoke together in regard to conflicts in the translation.

resentment if they used the words anger, aversion, discontent, disgust, disdain, disrespect, dissatisfaction, hatred, hostility, revulsion, resentment or toxicity to described their feelings toward the government, explicitly threatened the government with violence or used a hostile profanity against it. Words relating to grievances were coded in relation to conceptualizations of inequality, fairness and deprivation (Sullivan, et al. 2012). The remaining two categories were derived from words either directly listed on the Geneva Emotion Wheel as either positive or passive negative or synonymous with those words, as determined by the author. A sample of the categorization of the sentiments is presented on Table D.6.

Table D.6: Sample of Coding of Responses to Feelings About State Question

Positive	Passive Negative	Grievance	Resentment
(Support) اؤيدها	(Absent) غياب	(Biased) منحازي	(Anger) غضب
(Respect) إحترام	(Exasperating)مستفزة	(Unjust)ظالمة	(Aversion) نفور
(Compassion) أعطف	(There is no state) ما في دولة	(Broken) مفككة	(Disgust) قرف
(Good) منيح	(Shame) خجل	(Cheating) غشيمة	(Repulsion) اشمئزاز
(Positivite) ايجابية	(Failure) خيبة	(Corrupt) فاسدة	(Hatred) الحقد
(Love) محبي	(Bad) سيئة	(Dereliction) التقصير	(Vile) حقيرة
(Sympathy) تعاطف	(Embarrassing) محرج	(Disorder) لا نظام	(Toxic) مسمة
		(Taking advantage) مصلحة	(Hostility) حقد
		(Prejudiced) متحيزة	(Disrespect) استهتار
		(Fraudulent) محتالة	(Shit) زفت

Grievance Specificity and Perception of the State

As mentioned in the main article, individuals were randomly assigned a question asking them to name the worst policy that the Lebanese state had enacted toward their community in the past few years. While this variable did not have a direct effect on either allegiance or onset preferences, or emotional composition toward the government, the administration of the treatment generated an additional measure based on responses to the question. Thus, it was possible to measure the extent to which individuals' grievances toward the government were tied to specific policies implemented by the state. There are two advantages

to examining this variable. First, it sheds a light into how individuals perceive the state in Lebanon. Specifically, that the state is not seen as a sectarian entity, but as a mechanism for, often inadequate, delivery of public services, ranging from infrastructure to national and local security. Second, the extent to which individuals can name a specific grievance toward the government can reveal information about the extent to which respondents were exposed to prior political messaging, with the expectation that those exposed to political messaging would be more likely to relate specific grievances against the government.

Table D.7: Sample of Coding of Responses to Worst Policy Prime Question

Non-Specific Grievance	Specific Grievance
(Nothing) لا شيء	(Sale of Land) بيع الأراضي
Neglect and Chaos) الإهمال والفوضى	(Disrepair of roads) عدِم تصلِيح الطرقات
(Hasn't done anything well) ما عملت شيئ منيح	(Landfill and events of Abra) شندفلل ند نتس ف ابر
(Not involved) لا مشاركة	(No housing for refugees) عدم تَنظيم سكن للاجئين السوريين
(Vacuum) الفراغ	(Entrance of Syrian workers) دخول العمال السوريين
(Lack of attention to the area) عدم الإهتمام بمنطقتنا	(Water rationing in the summer) تقنين المياه بالصيف
(Has forgotten us) نسيتنا	(Electricity rationing) تأنين الكهرباء
(I don't know) لا أعرف	(Parking meters) عدادات وقوف السيارات
(All government does is bad) كل شيئ سيئ بتعملو الدولة	(Sabotaged electricity and sewage) كله خربان كهرباء ونفايات
(Lack of respect for its people) عدم إحترام شعبها	(Haphazard construction) البناء العشوائي

Table D.7 shows a sample of the responses provided to the worst policy prime question classified along the lines of specificity. Foremost, it is clear that the grievances that individuals expressed were not associated with sectarian bias by the state, but actual problems in public service delivery or negative policy outcomes. Moreover, the specificity of grievances implies a more heightened political awareness on the part of respondents who identify specific policies, either relating to media exposure or participation in discussions of these issues.

Coding of Leader Question

One of the independent variables was derived from an open-ended question on the survey described in the main section of the article: “Please name the title of the individual you trust the most to disseminate information about the state and interests your community.” The implication of this question is that the person that individuals trust the most to give them information about their community would be considered a ‘leader’ in that community if that person was not a direct member of the respondent’s family or local friendship network (Costenbader & Valente 2003). Politicians fit this description, and as primary providers of patronage in communities, they were singled out from the larger group of respondents.

Table D.8: Sample of Coding of Leader Trust Question

Non-Political Titles	Political Titles
إبتي (My son)	* مسؤول حزب أمل (Officials from Amal Movement)
زوجتي (My wife)	* وليد بيك (Walid Bey [Jumblatt])
أخي (My brother)	نائب المنطقة (MPs of the area)
صاحب المحل (Owner of the [corner] shop)	رئيس المنطقة (Leader of the area)
حالي (My aunt)	المختار (Mukhtar [local representative])
* إبن أختي (My nephew)	الجنرال عون (General [Michel] Aoun)
* زوجة أبي (My step-mother)	* حزب (Party)
* مدير المدرسي (Principal of the school)	زعيم السياسي (Party chieftains)
* الحلاق (The barber)	الشيخ (Sheikh)
لا أثق بأحد ينفسي فقط (No one, only myself)	الإعلام (The Press)

Starred items were only stated once.

Responses were written by enumerators directly as respondents stated them and entered into Microsoft Excel files by coders from Information International. There were a total of 258 unique responses to the question among the 2,040 respondents that were asked. Each was categorized as having named a political leader or having not named a political leader and then coded by the author from the original Arabic text. Of the unique titles, 126 were deemed non-political to 132 that were deemed political. Due to the sheer number of words, only a sample is reproduced on Table D.8 for reference with both original Arabic text and English translations. There is a clear distinction seen in the table, with non-political

titles belonging to family members or non-political members of the community, such as school officials, shop-owners and barbers. Political titles clearly relate to political leaders, such as Michel Aoun, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, or Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist party, or otherwise relate to positions within Lebanon's political leadership, such as political parties, representatives, religious leaders or the press, which is primarily run by private, but nearly always, sectarian and partisan interests (Cochrane 2007).

Confession and Initiator Difference-in-Differences Effects

While differences in means did not yield significant results across either confession or conflict initiator in predicting allegiance, employing a difference in difference design that incorporates all eight variations in confession and initiator pairings may yield more significant findings. This design can point to significant differences between both main effects of confessions from one another in terms of support for rebellion or the government or within group shifts based on random assignment of initiator groups. Taken together the model can yield face validity to the outcomes within the context of Lebanese politics.

The results are shown on Table D.9. While most of the fixed effects are not significant, the signs on the main confession effects for allegiance point to a stronger likelihood for Christians to pursue allegiance than other groups. On the other hand, there is a consistent main effect for Druze respondents as they are less likely to favor allegiance and significantly less likely to support the government, indicating a degree of support for self-government, which makes sense given the Druze relatively isolated geographic location. Finally, while most differential confession and initiator effects are not significant, Sunni respondents remain more likely to join the government, given the option that their group join with a Sunni rebellion, consistent with the current atmosphere of Sunni-Shia tensions across

Table D.9: Confession and Initiator Difference-in-Differences Models

	Coefficient (1)	S.E.	Coefficient (2)	S.E.
Sunni	-0.511	(0.507)	-0.368	(0.483)
Shia	-0.638	(0.493)	0.125	(0.350)
Druze	-0.431	(0.441)	-1.800*	(0.385)
Sunni Initiator	-0.287	(0.479)	-0.063	(0.312)
Sunni and Shia Initiator	-0.530	(0.504)	0.559*	(0.165)
Shia and Sunn Initiator	0.477	(0.672)	0.265	(0 .352)
Druze and Sunni Initiator	-0.220	(0.595)	0.364	(0.392)
Constant	0.479	(0.367)	-1.057*	(0.197)
Residual Error	0.764			
Number of Observations	1007		1016	

Note: First model is non-linear least squares predicting support for group joining ongoing rebel. Second model is logit predicting support for the government (non-sensitive choice). * $p<0.05$.

the Muslim World. However, it is surprising that the effect is not reciprocated by Shia respondents toward Sunni initiators.

Direct Test for Support for Joining the Government

While the multivariate list-experiment model provides evidence for being less likely to support a rebellion due to feeling that one's prospective ally is a threat to Lebanon's security, it does not capture the likelihood of joining the government , especially since three of the four non-sensitive choices did not represent explicit desire for one's group to support the government. As such, the true preference for joining the government may be depressed when examining the findings of just the treatment stage of the list experiment. Fortunately, the way in which the list experiment question was asked allows for analysis of individual responses given by members of the control group. In line with the 'listit' technique (Corstange 2009), respondents in the control group were asked which of the choices they preferred in the list experimental question, in place of how many choices

they preferred. Functionally, this allows for analysis of which respondents indicated they would support the government restoring order, in spite of government violence – a strong endorsement of support for the government in the nascent conflict.

With support of the government among control group respondents as a dependent variable, the identical independent variables as in Table 6.5. Results are shown on table D.10. Initiator threat is also significant in this specification. Feeling that the leader of a prospective ally's confessional group is a threat makes respondents about 46% more likely to join the government. Corroborating the results in earlier models, a one unit shift along a five point scale of fraternal political deprivation make on approximately 45% less likely to join the government – the reverse of the list experiment model. The results of initiator threat are even stronger in respondents that received the worst policy prime treatment, although the standard errors markedly increase due to the decreased sample size. Looking at the models from the previous two tables together, resentment toward a particular group or the government appears to provide individuals strong incentives against supporting their group's allegiance with that party during the outbreak of a civil war, largely agreeing with both theoretical and earlier results.

Preferences for Conflict Onset

In order to compare allegiance preferences to preferences for group conflict onset, respondents were asked an additional list experiment question on whether to respond to violence against one's own group by taking up arms against the state. The question was asked either immediately before or immediately after the question on allegiance.[4]. Respondents were randomly assigned the sensitive option in exactly one question. This was done

[4] The order was randomized

because of the similarity of the two questions could have altered responses by individuals who received the sensitive choice in both questions and feared revealing their preference by either increasing or decreasing the number of options they found acceptable. The text of the question is reproduced below:

> Imagine this fictional scenario. A peaceful demonstration taking place in your neighborhood and is dispersed by the state through force. The demonstrators are fired upon and many of them die.
>
> Which of the following actions would you want your community to take in response? (For when sensitive choice not asked)
> How many of the following actions would you want your community to take in response? (For when sensitive choice asked)
>
> - Hold a candle-lit vigil for the victims.
> - Gather money to compensate the families of the victims.
> - Demand an investigation of the incident to hold the perpetrators accountable.
> - Organize a peaceful demonstration on the day of the funeral.
> - *Respond in a violent way and take up arms against the perpetrators.*

Comparing how the predictors of allegiance performed when applied to the list-experimental question on conflict onset will shed some light as to whether the predictors of allegiance are distinct from onset preferences. Table D.11 shows results from an identical analysis to that of the multivariate analysis of allegiance, with the exception of allegiance-specific co-variates. The results are clear: none of the variables that are significant in predicting allegiance have a corresponding effect on onset. While the lack of substantive findings in regard to this question is disappointing, it also clearly highlights that the processes for decision-making for allegiance and, in particular, the role of resentment, may not translate to mechanisms for onset.

Table D.10: Logistic Regression of Government Preference among Control Group Respondents

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Negative Government Emotion	0.025		
	(0.118)		
Resentment Sentiment		0.006	-0.029
		(0.212)	(0.226)
Support Sentiment		-0.169	-1.754
		(0.394)	(0.877)
Grievance Sentiment		-0.031	0.046
		(0.218)	(0.338)
Initiator Threat	0.452*	0.461*	0.790*
	(0.199)	(0.193)	(0.297)
Worst Policy Prime	-0.044	-0.043	
	(0.142)	(0.142)	
Grievance Specificity			0.499*
			(0.231)
Age	-0.012	-0.012	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Female	-0.407*	-0.409*	-0.403
	(0.192)	(0.199)	(0.334)
Income	-0.020	-0.020	-0.084
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.150)
Education	0.248*	0.248*	0.446*
	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.205)
Party Support	-0.290	-0.288	-0.136
	(0.266)	(0.272)	(0.550)
Frequency of Participation	0.113*	0.113*	0.144
	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.129)
Variety of Participation	0.043	0.041	-0.085
	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.192)
Personal Economic Deprivation	0.221*	0.219*	0.303
	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.157)
Fraternal Economic Deprivation	-0.500*	-0.501*	-0.516*
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.171)
Fraternal Political Deprivation	0.064	0.063	0.226
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.145)
Constant _cons	0.892	0.959	-0.487
	(0.892)	(0.903)	(1.272)
Number of Observations	766	766	393

Note: Confession-level and initiator-level fixed effects included in the model. Dummy variables for main effects of threat according to confession also included in model, but not shown. * p<0.05.

Table D.11: Second Stage Non-Linear Least Squares Regression of Conflict Onset Support

	Coefficient	S.E.
Resentment Sentiment	-0.631	(0.522)
Support Sentiment	-0.385	(0.591)
Grievance Sentiment	0.181	(0.378)
Age	0.016	(0.017)
Education	0.233	(0.263)
Income	-0.006	(0.209)
Female	-0.284	(0.377)
Frequency of Participation	-0.213	(0.149)
Variety of Participation	0.092	(0.277)
Party Support	0.271	(0.395)
Worst Policy Prime	0.141	(0.360)
Question Order	0.398	(0.362)
Personal Economic Deprivation	0.205	(0.200)
Group Economic Deprivation	-0.002	(0.174)
Constant	-4.877*	(2.293)
Residual Error	0.855	
Number of Observations	815	

Note: Confession-level fixed effects included in the model. * $p<0.05$.

Appendix E

Appendix Materials for Chapter 7

Table E.1 is a list of the questions asked to Lebanese Political Leaders in interviews. The questions are divided into three categories: representation, relationships with other political parties and reactions to crisis/conflict outbreak and were asked in the order that they are presented in the table.

Table E.1: Interview Questions asked to Lebanese Leaders

Representation
Describe your role in your party. To what extent do you influence decision-making? How and when do you interact with constituents of your party?
Describe the relationship between your party and its constituents (likely voters).
Of all your party's positions, which political position do your think is the most effective in attracting voters to your party? What active participants in party events (demonstrations) or volunteers? Do you consciously emphasize this issue?

Continued on next page

Table E.1 Interview Questions asked to Lebanese Leaders (continued)

If your party's constituents overwhelmingly supported a political position that you and your party currently opposed, would your party change its stance?

What kind of services does the party/your office provide independent of the government?

How can constituents participate in party affairs? Who usually joins? How do you keep track of their opinions?

When do constituents look for support from the party the most? Which constituents are more likely to seek out party guidance or support at this time?

Relationship with other parties

To what extent do you/your party cooperate with parties (other MPs) from the (a rival sect) community in Lebanon, but of the opposing alliance in the Lebanese Parliament? [If there are none, then of the same alliance and confession]

Is there a party that your party would absolutely not cooperate with? Why?

Is there a time when ties with parties from the (a rival sect) community are stronger than ties with your alliance in the Lebanese Parliament? Does your party ever

Continued on next page

Table E.1 Interview Questions asked to Lebanese Leaders (continued)

support policies that favor your confessional background over your alliance's wishes?
Crisis
Think back to a political/social or economic crisis that Lebanon has faced in the past few years where government authority was compromised. It doesn't have to be something specific.
What do you feel is your party's role in this type of situation?
Does your cooperation/coordination with other parties increase/decrease? Which ones? Your alliance or the (a rival sect) community? What form of cooperation take place?
To what extent do you take into account constituent views in deciding a course of action during crises?
If constituents voiced an opinion in unison, would you follow it? What if it conflicted with your personal beliefs? Explain your answer. Why?
Would your constituents' opinion determine cooperation/coordination with other groups? Can you think of any groups that your constituents would absolutely not want to cooperate with in times of crisis?

The questions reflect the goals of the interviews to discuss how politicians maintain support and interact with both constituents and other parties in ordinary times and times of conflict.

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