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The 'African Colonists' of Montevideo: New Light on the Illegal Slave Trade to Rio de Janeiro and the Río de la Plata (1830–42)

Alex Borucki

New archival evidence from Montevideo reveals a twofold operation that brought enslaved Africans to Rio de Janeiro in the era of the illegal slave trade. This pattern emerged after the negotiation of the only – and largely unsuccessful – Anglo-Brazilian treaty against this traffic (1826) and the independence of Uruguay from Brazil (1825), which led to the foundation of the Uruguayan state in 1830. This operation also disguised the shipment of African slaves, mainly children, to Montevideo as 'colonists' in order to avoid both the constitutional ban on the slave trade as well as the British cruisers patrolling the Atlantic.

One of the most important measures to end the transatlantic slave trade took effect in 1830, when Brazil and Britain implemented an agreement to end the vast Brazilian slave trade. Shortly after this treaty, mysteriously empty Portuguese vessels came to Montevideo, the capital of the *Estado Oriental del Uruguay*, located on the northern bank of the Río de la Plata.¹ Local newspapers suspected that they were part of the slave trade to Rio de Janeiro, and that these activities violated the prohibition of slave trading in Uruguay, where the patriotic government had outlawed the transatlantic slave trade in 1825. The British consul in Montevideo took note of some of these ships and denounced them as slavers, which were en route to Brazil. However, the well-known list of slave voyages published by the British Foreign Office in 1845 recorded these ships as disembarking slaves in Montevideo rather than Rio de Janeiro.² In fact, these ships were part of a twofold operation which brought slaves to Brazil and also disguised the shipment of Africans to Montevideo as 'colonists' to avoid the ban on the slave trade in Uruguay.

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Brazilian slavers rushed to bring in as many slaves as possible prior to the formal closure of the slave trade in 1830. They also began to experiment with various strategies to stave off expected British intervention. A few slave merchants planned to introduce 'free African colonists' into Brazil immediately after the expected ending of the traffic. They wanted to buy slaves in Africa, free them, and then embark them for Brazil, where these Africans would work in order to pay for their manumission and the cost of the transatlantic passage. Here, the term 'colonists' designated a sort of indentured immigrant who worked in their place of destination to pay for their transportation. Through this operation, slavers anticipated being able to elude British naval patrols, since Africans would arguably have been travelling voluntarily.³ British consular representatives in Brazil pointed out to the British government that it would be difficult to impede such a disguised slave trade.⁴ The British Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen considered this matter purely a subterfuge to continue the slave trading; consequently, he warned the Brazilian government that all Brazilian vessels carrying groups of Africans to the country, either slaves or colonists, would be treated as violations of the treaty of 1826 against the slave trade.⁵ However, Brazilian slavers applied this plan in neighbouring Uruguay, which became independent after the Argentine–Brazilian war (1825–28).

In Uruguay, the local government contracted with Brazilian merchants to bring 'African colonists' in 1832–34. The merchants paid a large sum for the licence to introduce these 'colonists,' who had to be younger than 16 years. Once in Uruguay, the agents sold the right to the work of the 'colonists' to cover the expenses of the travel plus benefits. This was a ruse that allowed the arrival of African children in Montevideo in order to serve as slaves. In Montevideo, the contradictions between the status of children and colonists arose soon after the time of this operation. In addition, Brazilian slave traders employed the subterfuge of the 'African colonists' of Montevideo to defend their case in Anglo-Brazilian Courts of Mixed Commission when the British or Brazilian navy captured slave ships while intending to disembark slaves in Brazil.

My goal in this article is to depict a new trend of illegal traffic to the most active region of slave importation in the Americas – Rio de Janeiro – and shed light on the arrival of the last generation of Africans to Montevideo. In effect, this essay clarifies how political developments during and after the independence of Uruguay affected the slave traffic to the Río de la Plata and Southern Brazil from the late 1820s to the 1830s. During the mid-1830s, many empty slave ships employed Montevideo as a port of call, but few of them arrived in Montevideo with slaves carried directly from Africa. Rather, these vessels disguised their involvement in the Brazilian slave trade by sailing to Montevideo either before going to Africa for slaves or after illegally disembarking slaves in Brazil.

First, this paper reassesses the rebirth and expansion of the slave trade to Rio de Janeiro via Montevideo, and the ratio of the vessels and slaves imported through Montevideo in comparison with the traffic direct from Africa to Rio de Janeiro. Second, this article examines the continued introduction of slaves to Montevideo under the description of 'African colonists'. Both branches were shaped by the

process of abolition of the slave trade and slavery in Uruguay. There, the delays in passing serious measures against the slave trade and the failure to enforce the existing laws against it permitted the arrival of slaves during the 1830s under the designation of 'African colonists'.

The ascendancy of Britain in the South Atlantic, and the subsequent influence of its anti-slavery policy in the region, determined both this new pattern of slave-trading to south-east Brazil and the arrival of 'African colonists' to Montevideo. The new inflow of enslaved Africans also complicated the initial relationships between Britain and Uruguay in unexpected ways. While the arrival of 'African colonists' generated revenues for the first government of Uruguay, it also helped to obstruct a loan from London that the second government saw as central to its own survival.

From the seventeenth century, Rio de Janeiro had served as the centre of smuggling from Brazil to the Río de la Plata.⁶ One of the most active divisions of illegal commerce was slave trading. During the late eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth centuries, the Río de la Plata received slaves directly from Africa and also from Brazil.⁷ This commerce was not only significant to the local Spaniards, but also to the Brazilians and Portuguese located on both sides of the south Atlantic.⁸ The independence movement in the Río de la Plata interrupted this branch of the slave trade. After 1810, what became Uruguay was under the overlapping control of first, the colonial Spanish regime, second, the revolutionary government of Buenos Aires, third, the local leadership of José Artigas, and fourth, a Portuguese-Brazilian occupying force. This territory experienced almost continuous warfare from 1810 to 1830, when the Uruguayan state was created. After Uruguayan independence, the relationship between Montevideo and the southern Brazilian slave trade developed a new organisational structure. What we will see is that when the Brazilian slave trade became illegal, after 1830, Brazilian slave traders refashioned the connection with their Spanish-speaking neighbours to the south.

The Slave-trade Route Montevideo–Rio de Janeiro

We turn first to the slave trade to Rio de Janeiro. The aftermath of Brazilian independence was connected to the first measures against this traffic. Given that Rio de Janeiro was the main destination for African slaves in the Americas, the British anti-slavery policy first targeted Brazil. This dispute touched every aspect of the relationship between Brazil and Britain.⁹ The decade of the 1830s was critical for the Brazilian slave trade because of the aforementioned convention of 1826, which aimed at halting the traffic by 1830. Since the Brazilian slave traders assumed that this treaty would be effective, they severely curtailed and disguised their operations in the early 1830s.

Nineteenth-century British anti-slavery policy was an amalgam of international treaties, navy patrols, Courts of Mixed Commission, and payments to foreign governments.¹⁰ Treaties between Britain and other countries assured the right of mutual inspection of the other's vessels for each of the contracting nations. The navy of each party was entitled to capture and bring to Courts of Mixed Commission vessels engaged in slave trading under the flag of either party.¹¹ These tribunals functioned

from 1819 to 1871, and the only Anglo-Brazilian courts were in Rio de Janeiro and Sierra Leone. They comprised two judges, one of each contracting party, who adjudicated the vessels. Each country appointed one arbitrator, who made the final decision in case of disagreement between the judges. The condemned ship was sold, but this sentence did not affect the liberty of her owner, captain and sailors. In some cases, the former owner of the ship repurchased the condemned vessel in the subsequent auction and resumed slave-trading activities.

Among the subterfuges used to avoid condemnation by the Anglo-Brazilian Courts of Mixed Commission, captains of slave ships pretended that they were conducting 'African colonists' between Portuguese colonies of Africa, when they were captured by British or Brazilian navy patrols enforcing the treaty of 1826.¹² Six vessels brought to the Court of Mixed Commission of Rio de Janeiro declared that they were conducting 'African colonists' – not slaves – to Montevideo during 1834–35. The ships *Dois de Março*, *Santo Antonio*, *Duquesa de Bragança*, *Aventura*, *Amizade Feliz*, and *Angelica* all offered this explanation.¹³ In Rio, the Court condemned three of the vessels and restored three, which demonstrates the validity of this subterfuge for ships subjected to measures against the slave trade. All six cases resulted in disagreement between the Brazilian and the British judge of the Commission, which meant that an arbitrator, chosen by lot, had to make the final decision. As was usual in cases of disagreement, the Commission either condemned or restored the vessel, depending on the English or Brazilian nationality of the arbitrator. The six vessels claimed Portuguese nationality and a Uruguayan destination on the basis of documents produced in Angola, Brazil and Uruguay.

The six vessels captured at Rio de Janeiro were part of a major operation that involved Montevideo in the Brazilian slave trade. The British consul at Montevideo, Thomas S. Hood noted the arrival of eighteen Portuguese vessels between November 1832 and March 1835. He identified these empty ships as slavers since they came to Montevideo, from Angola mostly, after disembarking slaves on the Brazilian coastline.¹⁴ According to Hood, they arrived in Montevideo to be refitted and then continued their voyage toward Rio de Janeiro. All of these vessels flew the Portuguese flag and had clearances from Portuguese authorities in Africa. Hood stated that they were really Brazilian ships disguised in this manner to evade the British patrols. Table 1 uses the reports of Hood, the books of entry and departure of vessels into the port of Montevideo, and the *Voyages Database* to depict the relative importance of the new route for slave ships to Rio de Janeiro during the years 1834–36. The calculations suggest that between 1831 and 1839, 12 per cent of the massive influx of slaves to the major remaining slave market of the Americas, Rio de Janeiro, arrived on vessels that passed through Montevideo, although in 1834 and 1835 perhaps the majority of voyages in the Rio de Janeiro traffic did so. During these two years both British and Brazilian navies upheld the treaty by capturing slave ships, but during the following two years the Brazilian government took no further enforcement measures, which permitted the resurgence of slave arrivals direct to Rio de Janeiro from 1837 onward. Overall, in the years 1831–39, the vast majority of the enslaved Africans arrived in 1838 and 1839, when slave trade activities almost reached the figures of the period pre-1831.

Table 1 The slave traffic to Rio de Janeiro 1831–39: Vessels and imputed slaves arriving via Montevideo compared with vessels sailing direct from Africa

Year	Arriving in Rio de Janeiro via Montevideo		Arriving in Rio de Janeiro direct from Africa		Total arriving in Rio de Janeiro	
	Slaves	Ships	Slaves	Ships	Slaves	Ships
1831	—	—	565	1	565	1
1832	720	2	116	2	836	4
1833	444	1	1,121	3	1,565	4
1834	4,102	11	471	4	4,573	15
1835	5,656	14	2,328	10	7,984	24
1836	4,749	12	11,319	32	16,068	44
1837	2,829	7	34,851	77	37,680	85
1838	904	2	40,899	94	41,803	96
1839	—	—	46,914	111	46,914	111
Total	19,404	49	138,584	334	157,988	383

Source: The figures of slaves disembarked were computed from Stephen Behrendt, David Eltis, Manolo Florentino, and David Richardson, *Voyages: The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (forthcoming online) and Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo ex-Archivo General Administrativo, Montevideo (hereafter abbreviated as AGN-AGA), Libro 346, 1829–35; Libro 103, 1835–38; Libro 555, 1835–40; Libro 373, 1841–43.

We now turn to the main characteristics of the Montevideo–Rio de Janeiro route. The 49 voyages recorded as stopping at Montevideo had different African provenances and destinations from the 334 that sailed directly to Rio de Janeiro. Of the 49, 40 came from or declared Angola (mainly Luanda) to be the place of origin and five more were from Mozambique (including Quelimane and Lourenço Marques). One declared São Tome as port of origin, two claimed to be from Cape Verde (where slave trading was forbidden), and another ship had an unknown African origin. The ratio 8:1 between West-Central Africa and south-east Africa among the 49 shows a stronger link with West-Central Africa, specifically with Angola, than is the case for vessels sailing direct to Rio de Janeiro. In the direct trade, the ratio of the vessels from West-Central Africa to those of south-east Africa reaches a maximum 6 to 1 in 1826, but during the massive surge in slave imports to Rio in the following four years, this ratio declined to 2:1 by 1830. In 1838, another peak year for the volume of the slave trade to Rio, the ratio between these two zones was 4:1 in favour of West-Central Africa.¹⁵ Perhaps the high participation of Angola in the slave route through Montevideo indicates that the Brazilian slave traders who operated in Luanda were chiefly responsible for the design of this subterfuge against British anti-slavery policy.

The main route of the 49 slavers shown in Table 1 was to sail from Angola or Mozambique, and then furtively disembark Africans on the coast of the Rio de Janeiro province outside the recognised ports.¹⁶ Afterwards, the ships would sail to Montevideo to be refitted and gain clearance to sail into the port of Rio de Janeiro after acquiring Uruguayan documents and legal cargo. Slave traders designed this route to hide the African origins of the voyage previous to the vessel's sailing into the port of Rio de Janeiro. However, it should be pointed out that not all the 49

vessels followed this route. Three began their slave voyage in Rio de Janeiro, and then stopped at Montevideo, before continuing on to Africa. Another three vessels came from Africa, disembarked slaves on the coast of Rio, stopped at Montevideo, and then gained clearance to sail to Africa rather than Rio. These three voyages seem to have been organised in Angola instead of Rio de Janeiro.

The seasonal pattern of voyages using Montevideo in these ways is quite pronounced and confirms the real activities of the vessels. Of 45 vessels which called into port at Montevideo after disembarking slaves, 31 had made the transatlantic passage from September to January, arriving in Montevideo between November and March. This seasonality corresponded both with the direction of the South Atlantic winds and the seasons within the Angolan interior. First, the north easterlies that blow from Africa to Brazil move south from the equator during the southern summer, and the westerlies that blow in the opposite direction accordingly shift south toward the Antarctic.¹⁷ Slave-ship departures from Luanda dropped from May to June when Antarctic storms move northwards into the route of slave vessels. Second, the Angolan rainy season made the inland travel of slaves to the coast difficult between January and April, and contributed to reduced slave departures during May and June.¹⁸ Clearly, this route between Angolan ports and Montevideo followed the seasonal patterns of the south Atlantic slave trade.

Scattered information about the enterprises and networks behind these voyages hinges on the connections with some individuals who had brought slaves to Rio de Janeiro direct from Africa, and with the Brazilian merchants in Montevideo. Only three captains appear twice in the sample of vessels using Montevideo as port of call. We know the identity of only 27 ship's owners, three of whom were proprietors of more than one slave vessel. This fact parallels certain features of the slave trade of Rio de Janeiro, where many owners conducted occasional slave voyages and a few owners had a major presence in the trade before 1830.¹⁹ Information on consignees brings out some connections with family networks in Rio de Janeiro and links with the earlier internal slave trade between that port and Montevideo during the Brazilian rule. We know the identity of the consignee for 18 voyages, for 10 of which was Manuel da Costa Guimarães. At least 16 individuals with the surname Guimarães engaged in the slave trade of Rio de Janeiro between 1811 and 1830. Family networks were important in conducting this traffic.²⁰ Manuel da Costa Guimarães contracted with the Uruguayan government to introduce 'African colonists' to the country in 1832. Another consignee in Montevideo, Antônio Castro de Queirós, shipped 141 slaves from Rio de Janeiro to that port during the Brazilian rule in the mid 1820s.²¹ Manuel Gonçalves da Costa, another consignee, introduced 73 slaves in Montevideo in 1826–27. These fragmentary data thus link some consignees of the slave ships of the 1830s with the Brazilian merchant community of Montevideo.

Geopolitical reasons also led Brazilian slave traders to prefer Montevideo as a port of call during the first years of the illegal slave trade. Uruguayan independence made Montevideo the nearest foreign port to Rio de Janeiro. Buenos Aires, on the other shore of the Río de la Plata, could not provide Brazilian slavers with the same security, given the British ascendancy there and the stronger anti-slave trade policy of the local

authorities. In March 1837, the government of Buenos Aires confiscated the Brazilian vessel *Eloisa* before her departure to Montevideo and Africa.²² Her consignee at Montevideo was Manuel Gonçalves da Costa. After having arrived from Rio de Janeiro, this ship had proceeded to construct additional decks. By the time of her intended departure from Buenos Aires, the *Eloisa* carried shackles, 80 to 90 empty casks, gunpowder, medicines, textiles, money and great quantities of rice, beans and farina. All these items implicated the vessel in slave trading. The government not only seized this ship, but also prohibited her captain and pilot from serving on board vessels arriving and departing from that city. Such sanctions were never applied to empty slave vessels coming to Montevideo.

Despite the complicity of the Uruguayan authorities, the Montevideo–Rio de Janeiro slave trade route did not develop in total secrecy. The route had features that made it appear unusual to Uruguayan eyes. While Salvador and Rio de Janeiro had commercial ties with Africa, Montevideo's lack of those ties made the arrival of ships from Africa stand out. Early in 1835, the newspapers of Montevideo and Buenos Aires debated the real purpose of these voyages.²³ While the latter argued that these vessels secretly were disembarking slaves on Uruguayan shores, the former asserted that they were merely involved in slave trading to Rio de Janeiro. The nationality of these ships also appeared odd. Since its Spanish colonial heritage and its recent subjection to Brazil, Montevideo had had strong commercial ties with Rio de Janeiro. After the establishment of Uruguay, many Brazilian vessels arrived in Montevideo in the normal course of the trade. By contrast, no Portuguese vessels came into this port prior to the first arrival of empty slave ships in 1832, despite the heavy presence of Brazilian ships.²⁴

The British consul in Montevideo, Thomas S. Hood, certainly tried to interrupt the Montevideo–Rio de Janeiro route by pressing the Uruguayan authorities to take strong action against these vessels. His effort resulted only in the government requiring quarantine for empty ships coming from Africa. This measure did little to impede their arrival and departure since the Uruguayan government never detained these ships despite their well-known slave trade activities.²⁵ Hood also believed that a few Montevidean vessels owned by Uruguayans tried to introduce slaves in Brazil via this strategy.²⁶ The concerns of the British Foreign Office regarding slave trader use of Montevideo in 1853, after the final closure of the Brazilian traffic, are relevant here. British consuls in the Southern Brazilian ports and Montevideo suspected that slave ships came to the Uruguayan coast adjacent to Brazil to disembark Africans from where they were introduced into Brazil by land. Despite several investigations in Montevideo and the Atlantic coast of Uruguay, there was no certain proof of such activities.²⁷

The Slave Trade and the Birth of Independent Uruguay

We now turn to explore the proposal of the 'African colonists' in Uruguay and its application. After the fall of the Spanish colonial regime, British imperial policy in the Río de la Plata sought both the maintenance of a status quo of peace and commerce as well as

the end of the slave trade. Britain conducted active negotiations with Argentina and Brazil during the Argentine–Brazilian War that led to the independence of Uruguay. Even as these discussions among British, Brazilian and Argentine diplomats took place, enslaved Africans continued arriving in the South Atlantic, and not just in Rio de Janeiro. The last shipments of slaves to Buenos Aires direct from Africa reached port as a consequence of this war, for the government of Buenos Aires issued privateering commissions against Brazilian ships. Since colonial times it was common for the authorities of Buenos Aires to issue licences of privateering against Portuguese, French or English enemies during wartime. The Argentine–Brazilian war coincided with the peak of slave arrivals to Brazil in 1826–1830, induced by the treaty of 1826. As a result, these privateers introduced more than 1700 slaves from captured ships as ‘apprentices’ to Buenos Aires, where the transatlantic slave trade was prohibited.²⁸ Table 2 shows that the majority of the captives came from only four ships.

The privateers of Buenos Aires captured trade slaves in eight ships, four of which were actually slavers conducting transatlantic voyages. While 19 privateers seized 182 crew slaves in 39 different vessels, the privateer *Presidente* captured two slavers on the same voyage carrying a total of 700 Africans. Therefore, slave crew, who were in almost every captured Brazilian ship, were just a small fraction of the slaves captured by the privateers.

After the Argentine–Brazilian War, the foundation of Uruguay as an independent country led to measures inimical to the slave trade and slavery, typical of the early Spanish American republics.²⁹ However, political and economic issues ensured a pattern unique to Uruguay. In 1825, the provisional Assembly had prohibited the slave trade and passed a free womb law in the country. At that moment, Montevideo and Colonia del Sacramento remained under Brazilian rule and, thus such laws had no real effect in the two towns. Both measures were included in the Uruguayan constitution of 1830.³⁰ The ending of the slave trade to Uruguay was merely a declaration of intent, given that slaves who entered the country in the company of their masters were permitted, and procedures to regulate the arrival of such slaves had yet to be created. The records of Rio de Janeiro show that at least 201 slaves were shipped from that port to Montevideo between 1830 and 1833, after the constitutional ban

Table 2 Slaves seized by the privateers of Buenos Aires, 1826–28

Captured vessels and year of seizure	Trade slaves captured	Slave crew members captured	Total of all slaves captured
São Jose Diligente (1826)	380	—	380
Bom Jesus / Golphino (1828)	700	—	700
Adamastor (1828)	357	—	357
All other ships combined (1826–28)	97	182	279
Total	1534	182	1716

Source: Liliana Crespi, “Negros apresados en operaciones de corso durante la guerra con el Brasil (1825–28)” *Temas de Asia y Africa* 2 (1994): 109–22.

Note: The same privateer captured the *Bom Jesus* and *Golphino*.

of the trade.³¹ The arrival of Brazilian and Argentine refugees due to regional conflicts provided the perfect cover for an illegal coastal slave trade. Apart from a dozen exceptional cases where authorities took actions, there are no systematic data on the arrival of these small groups of slaves illegally introduced from 1830 to 1841, just one year prior to the abolition of slavery in Montevideo.³²

Governmental reluctance to enforce the anti-slave trade constitutional measures did not mean that public opinion was openly pro-slavery. Montevidean newspapers did not assume a pro-slavery stance; indeed, the slave trade was systematically attacked in the press. Newspapers friendly to the continued inflow of masters and slaves depicted Brazil, Cuba and the South of the United States as the main centres of economic progress in the Americas.³³ They portrayed the arrival of Brazilian slaves with their masters as vital to the progress of Uruguay because of the severe shortage of labour in the country. They claimed that the newly arrived slaves would eventually be free because of the Uruguayan anti-slavery laws, and that these slaves would enjoy the 'mild' treatment that Uruguayans gave to slaves. This standpoint parallels the attitude of the government, which made public declarations against this traffic but privately signed contracts to introduce 'African colonists'.

Political and commercial networks between Brazilians and Uruguayans facilitated the continuance of the slave trade toward Montevideo. The first President of Uruguay, Fructuoso Rivera, had been the Military Commander of the countryside during most of the Brazilian occupation – up to the beginning of the war of independence. Other prominent figures of the first Uruguayan government had been active supporters of the Brazilian annexation and influential members of the local commerce.³⁴ They previously might have known the Brazilian merchants that made the proposal for the 'African colonists'. Such links would facilitate the understanding between the government and the slave traders that led to the introduction of these Africans.

Peace brought renewed economic growth and, as a result, increased demand for slave labour in Uruguay. Rising exports of hides and jerked beef ensured that slaughter houses, ranches and urban construction could not function without additional labour. Slave societies such as Brazil and Cuba were the markets for jerked beef, whereas England and France were the main importers of hides. Moreover, civil wars in Buenos Aires and Rio Grande do Sul, competitors in the exportation of hides and jerked beef, further increased the demand for labour in Uruguay during the 1830s.³⁵ The burgeoning external market and the internal reconstruction of the country drove economic growth. Without free or slave laborers, the new country could not trade. In this context, the continuation of a small slave trade with Brazil and the last arrival of slave vessels directly from Africa are hardly surprising.

Slaves were a significant part of sparsely populated Uruguay. In 1829, it is probable that 74,000 people lived in the country, 14,000 of whom lived in Montevideo. The following year, a governmental census of four quarters of the inner city, *Ciudad Vieja*, counted 9660 inhabitants. This census did not register free blacks, but the slave population constituted 25 per cent of *Ciudad Vieja*.³⁶ The black population in Montevideo were Africans who had been brought to the city during the colonial period and the Luso-Brazilian occupation or were the descendants of these groups. According to

Andrés Lamas, the population of Montevideo was 23,404 in 1835, of which slaves comprised 25 per cent. Lamas stated that 566 Africans arrived in the country as 'colonists' in 1834, and that 4540 more entered between 1835 and 1842: 2740 males and 1800 females.³⁷ The local demand for labour, the relatively easy access to the Brazilian slave trade and even to the African coast meant that the inflow of new slaves continued almost up to the abolition of slavery itself, a very unusual chronology in the wider Atlantic world.

Ever since the colonial period, slave trading generated both profits to slavers and revenues to governments. This was well known to the first Uruguayan government and its creditors. Domingo Vázquez and Teodoro Villaça made loans to the government and arranged the first shipments of 'African colonists' to the country.³⁸ We find no concrete link between these men and the abovementioned proposal to introduce these 'colonists' to Brazil in 1829. Three years later, the Uruguayan Secretary of Finance, Lucas Obes, approved the contract with Vázquez and Villaça.³⁹ The latter paid 30,000 pesos to the government in return for the right to introduce 650 'African colonists'. Vázquez and Villaça were allowed to embark 150 Africans over the quota to compensate for the expected mortality on the voyage. The proposal submitted by the contractors stated that these 'colonists' had to be younger than 16 years and at least 40 per cent were to be female. Once in Uruguay, the agents sold the right to the work of the 'colonists' to cover the expenses of the travel plus benefits. The 'colonist' had to work for 12 years for the person that bought that right. The price of a 'colonist' younger than 8 years old was 200 pesos and those 8 years and older cost 225 pesos, but there were claims that they were sold in fact for 300 and 400 pesos.⁴⁰ In 1834, Manuel da Costa Guimarães underwrote another agreement in which he offered 42 pesos to the government for each African disembarked, all of whom were to be younger than 13 years old.⁴¹ Table 3 lists the five vessels that disembarked 'African colonists' in Montevideo as well as the two others that were prevented from doing so.

In Montevideo, the Police Department kept a register listing the name of each 'colonist' and his or her patron. This list was the only official document that referred to the condition of the Africans as 'colonists'.⁴² This book registered only 220 Africans since the majority were sold simply as slaves.⁴³ Less than one fifth of these Africans were actually processed under the 'colonist' system, underlining the enslaved status of these so-called colonists.

The age of these Africans is another peculiarity of this traffic and contradicted their status of 'colonists'. Tables 4 and 5 show the gender and age of the majority of the Africans disembarked by the ships *Aguila I* and *Delfina*. More than 50 per cent of the first group constituted children between 8 and 9 years old. We have no data on 40 per cent of these Africans because they were sold before the Police registered them. Both ships might have carried some adult slaves since these tables do not include 98 slaves from the former and 57 from the latter. In the case of *Delfina*, at least 70 per cent of the slaves were under 12 years old.⁴⁴ In addition, they were predominantly boys, which inflicted the gender requirements of the contract.

British sources confirmed the high ratio of very young Africans on other shipments to Montevideo. In 1834, Thomas S. Hood reported on the disembarkation of the ship

Table 3 Shipments of ‘African colonists’ to Montevideo, 1833–35

Date of arrival	Ship	Place of disembarkation	Africans	Agents
25 Oct. 1833	Aguila I	Montevideo (Santa Lucía)	239	Platero
14 Feb. 1834	Río de la Plata	Maldonado	*450	Vázquez and Villaça
4 April 1834	Porfia	Montevideo	*300	Vázquez and Villaça
28 Dec. 1834	Río de la Plata	Captured by the British Navy and landed in Rio de Janeiro	-	Vázquez and Villaça
30 Jan. 1835	Esperanza Oriental	Montevideo (Buceo)	350	Guimarães
16 Mar. 1835	Delfina	Maldonado	**251	Vázquez and Villaça
13 June 1835	Paquete Africano (a) Cesar Augusto	No disembarkation permitted, redirected to Brazil	—	Guimarães
Total			1590	

Notes:*Hood claimed that 450 and 300 Africans, respectively, were landed by the *Río de la Plata* and *Porfia*, whereas the police records registered only 336 and 164. The Police figures could be explained by mortality of the Africans, previous sales, and bribery.

**The government seized the Africans and allocated them as ‘apprentices’ in Maldonado.

Sources: IUP, Vol. 14, Sessions 1836, Class B, 82–3, 149. María Díaz de Guerra, *Documentación relativa a esclavos del Departamento de Maldonado* (Montevideo: IMCO, 1983), 40–4; AGN-AGA, Libro 938, Libro de Colonos Africanos, 1833–35.; *El Universal*, 2 Nov. 1833, 3; *El Estandarte Nacional*, 4 Feb. 1835, 3; *El Nacional*, Montevideo, 13 June 1835: 2.

Porfia that ‘These slaves (principally children) were landed openly, and are now publicity exhibited for sale, in a mart recently established at the gates of the city’.⁴⁵ The following year, he described the Africans brought by the vessel *Esperanza Oriental* as ‘principally children from eight to twelve years old’.⁴⁶ The Africans found in the last voyage of the *Río de la Plata*, which was confiscated by the British Navy, were overwhelmingly children: 269 boys and 179 girls, or 85 per cent of 522 surviving Africans.⁴⁷ The high proportion of children on these shipments matches the trends of the last period of the Brazilian and Cuban slave trade, when children and male adults were predominant. Children were more involved in the last and illegal period of the slave trade to Rio de Janeiro than in any region throughout the Atlantic World, and the case of the ‘African colonists’ to Montevideo is consistent with this trend.⁴⁸

This essay does not clarify definitively the debates of the significant ratio of children embarked in slave vessels during the nineteenth century, but the evidence of the

Table 4 Age and gender of 141 Africans disembarked by the ship *Aguila I*, 1833

Age	8–9 years	14–18 years
Gender		
Female	56	6
Male	68	11

Source: AGN-AGA, Ministerio de Gobierno, Caja 848 (list of 141 out of 239 Africans disembarked in Santa Lucía), 2 Nov. 1833.

Table 5 Age and gender of 194 Africans disembarked by the ship *Delfina*, 1835

Age	4–7 years	8–11 years	+12 years
Gender			
Female	18	25	12
Male	76	58	5

Source: Diaz de Guerra, *Documentación*, 44.

'African colonists' can help us to address some questions.⁴⁹ One of the issues at stake is whether or not African or New World developments led to this increase of child ratios. If the transatlantic slave trade mirrored the internal variations of the African slave trade, then the reasons of this change were located in Africa. However, New World developments – such as the prohibition but continuance of the slave trade – might have contributed to augment the number of children entering this traffic. Paul Lovejoy has recently reviewed the literature on children and the transatlantic slave trade by focusing in the Bight of Benin.⁵⁰ He reveals cases in which some slave vessels embarked a shipment consisting entirely of enslaved women and children just prior to the nineteenth century. Regarding that century, Lovejoy points out that labour on Brazilian coffee plantations might have contributed to this increase in children, since children could have been employed then in picking coffee beans. In addition, this New World development might have occurred just as critical changes happened in the slave trade within Africa.

British anti-slave trade patrolling in the Atlantic led slave traders to test new tactics regarding the purchase, credit and sales of slaves. Lovejoy suggests that loading slave vessels with children allowed for so-called tight packing and also diminished some costs of controlling slaves on board.⁵¹ We may note that the strategy of buying as many slaves as quickly as possible might have led to this increase in child ratios as far as children were readily available in the markets along the African coast.

The records of one of the vessels that shipped 'African colonists' are telling about the timing and procedure of slave purchases on the Angolan coast. Before her capture by the British Navy, the brigantine *Rio de la Plata* had embarked 552 Africans. The Brazilian slavers in charge of that ship bought 74 slaves in Benguela, 35 in Novo Redondo, 100 in Luanda and 343 in Ambriz. They began the purchase of slaves in late August of 1834, and they ended it in late November of that year.⁵² The activities of these slavers were not carried out hastily; they stopped at four Angolan ports to fill the brigantine with a very large cargo of enslaved Africans. It is not clear if this slow pace in slave purchasing was a feature or an anomaly of the Angolan slave trade in this period. Overall, David Eltis and Stanley Engerman point out that this rise of children among slave cargoes was particularly pronounced in West-Central Africa, which was the main region of supply of slaves for south-east Brazil.⁵³ A larger pool of case studies on nineteenth-century Angola is essential to cast light on this dilemma.

That the African 'colonists' were children did not raise eyebrows in the Montevideo press. The analysis of how the press depicted this make-up of cargoes would fill

another article, but at least we must point out that this issue only appeared after the end of term of the government that contracted with the Brazilian slave traders. Articles against this make-up began appearing in the press soon after January 1835, when a new administration took office. Among those writings was a hearing of the House of Representatives in which a member claimed the following:

Let's suppose that an honorable Representative goes to London, driven by his patriotic zeal for the growth of our industry, but impeded by a lack of the necessary proletarian population to work. There, he negotiates with thieves and buys hundreds of English children. Then he returns to the port of Montevideo saying they were colonists because the government has contracted with him for their freedom after their arrival to Uruguay.⁵⁴

We now turn to explain how the plan of the 'African colonists' shaped the relations between Great Britain and Uruguay. The British consul, Thomas S. Hood, predicted that this question would complicate the negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Uruguay, which British merchants in the Río de la Plata demanded from 1829 on.⁵⁵ At the end of 1834, the British government sent Hamilton C.J. Hamilton to Montevideo to negotiate a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation, and another anti-slave trade pact.⁵⁶ When Hamilton arrived in Uruguay, he found that a provisional administration had replaced the government responsible for the contracts of 'African colonists', and the new government rescinded the contracts. The press of Montevideo denounced the situation of these 'colonists' only after the new government was in office. The partisan nature of this denunciation is clear since the new administration used the case of the 'African colonists' to put the government of Rivera in a bad light.⁵⁷

The end of this traffic came about as a result of both British involvement and a new Uruguayan government. Beginning in March 1835, President Manuel Oribe was in office, and one of his goals was to enforce the Uruguayan prohibition of the slave trade, as a part of the general application of the constitutional measures. Two of the last ships that tried to disembark Africans in Montevideo had no success. The British Navy confiscated the brigantine *Río de la Plata* and sent it before to the Anglo-Brazilian Court of Mixed Commission in Rio de Janeiro, while the Uruguayan authorities withheld permission for the ship *Paquete Africano* (alias *Cesar Augusto*) to disembark Africans. This vessel subsequently departed from Montevideo to Brazil due to the impossibility of selling slaves in that port, as well as the impending arrival of a British ship that was coming from Buenos Aires.⁵⁸ While no more Africans were to be introduced in Uruguay under the rubric of 'colonists', the issue of the 'African colonists' would loom over the Anglo-Uruguayan relationships for seven more years as the British pursued additional treaties to encourage commerce and suppress the slave trade.

The British representatives had mixed feelings about the new Uruguayan authorities since the latter combined opposition to the slave trade with a reluctance to sign a treaty with Great Britain. On 27 June 1835, after the departure of the ship *Paquete Africano* from Montevideo, Hood declared with enthusiasm that the government led by Manuel

Oribe had committed to strict policies against the slave trade.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the Uruguayan authorities refused to sign a treaty against the traffic. According to Hamilton, the prospect of an English loan was the only reason the authorities were at all interested in a treaty against the slave trade. For their part, Uruguayan sources pointed out that the disagreements were caused by the one-sided commercial terms that Britain intended to impose on Uruguay.⁶⁰ These negotiations were a complete failure initially, but nevertheless, they were resumed by the British Minister in Buenos Aires in 1836.

The Anglo-Uruguayan treaty of commerce was interwoven with the agreement against the slave trade, which was signed in July 1839 after some British concessions. Only after exchanging the ratifications of this agreement (January 1842) did Uruguay and Britain sign a treaty of commerce – in August 1842. The Uruguayan government ratified the latter in March 1843, much more quickly than the former.⁶¹ The treaty against the slave trade had gone two years without ratification, during which period the Uruguayan authorities tried to obtain additional financial concessions from the British. The recent payment of £12 million to British slave-owners as part of the process of abolishing slavery in the British dominions no doubt raised the expectations of the Uruguayan authorities.

The connection between the slave trade and future economic support from England was clear as early as 1835, when the government of Oribe sent Juan F. Giró to London and Madrid to negotiate on their behalf. In London, Giró sought to obtain a loan to balance the public finances.⁶² *The Times* published a hostile report on Uruguay after the arrival of Giró, underscoring the Uruguayan national indebtedness and the permissive policy toward the slave trade. No English investor would buy the bonds of a country known for its fiscal irresponsibility as well as its involvement in the slave trade. The response, probably written by Giró, explained that only an extreme labour shortage had induced the previous government to allow arrivals from Africa in Uruguay, and that the new administration had rejected further contracts for 'African colonists'.⁶³ These attempts at obtaining a loan from London failed during the mid-1830s, and this added to the pressure on a government already facing uprisings fomented by former President Rivera.⁶⁴

The prospect of financial help from England remained a major preoccupation of the Uruguayan elites. A new government took office in 1838, after a coup led by Fructuoso Rivera. In 1840, the Foreign Secretary of Uruguay José Ellauri informed the British Foreign Office, that the Legislative assembly wanted compensation for the brigantine *Río de la Plata* before ratifying the treaty against the slave trade. In fact, Ellauri asked the Foreign Office for a payment not only to the proprietors of the *Río de la Plata*, but to the Uruguayan government as well. Thus, the same members of the administration that had signed the contracts of 'African colonists' now wanted British compensation for cancellation of those agreements.⁶⁵ The ratification of the Treaty occurred mainly because the government urgently needed the help of Britain in the war against the Governor of Buenos Aires, Juan M. de Rosas and his ally Manuel Oribe.⁶⁶ However, Uruguayan authorities still pursued compensation even after exchanging ratifications in April 1842.⁶⁷

Conclusion

The case of the 'African colonists' illustrates both the continuity and renewal of commercial networks between the Portuguese and the Spanish colonial Empires in the South Atlantic. These networks had allowed the legal and illegal introduction of both goods and enslaved Africans to the colonial Río de la Plata. Such bonds would continue well into the nineteenth century, since they made possible the arrival of slaves in Rio de Janeiro, just as the British anti-slavery policy and the Brazilian government were trying to curtail this traffic in the mid 1830s. Slave traders channelled their voyages through the Río de la Plata in order to supply the illegal slave trade to Rio de Janeiro. However, they also supplied enslaved Africans to the newly created Uruguay. In doing so, they established a dual slave trading operation that together brought about major slave landings to Rio de Janeiro and scattered shipments to Montevideo.

While geographical circumstances and the political environment of the region permitted the operation of the Rio de Janeiro–Montevideo slave route, these same factors also eventually guaranteed that this route would not survive long. Yet, British actions against this route could not by themselves bring it to a halt. Uruguayan authorities eventually enforced the anti-slave trade national laws by impeding the arrival of 'African colonists', but at no point did they obstruct the arrival and departure of Portuguese slavers en route to either the Brazilian or African coast. Had the Brazilian government enforced the restrictions against this traffic more rigorously after 1830, the Montevideo–Rio de Janeiro slave route might well have survived beyond 1840.

The arrival of 'African colonists' went against the anti-slavery trend of events in the Río de la Plata. First, the outbreak of the wars of independence and civil wars drove local governments to conscript slaves, and ultimately to promise freedom to black conscripts as they created black battalions. Second, British pressure on these early republics was significant since they needed both international recognition and external financial support. Third, the rhetoric of the revolution and the participation of slaves in these wars contributed to a powerful momentum against slavery. Small wonder that there was no open pro-slavery party during this period in the Río de la Plata. Both the slave trade and slavery had become ideologically unacceptable due to domestic and international factors in mainland Spanish America. Moreover, the 'African colonists' of Montevideo were the last slaves brought to the republics of mainland Spanish America direct from Africa.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

- [1] The Río de la Plata region consists of the Province of Buenos Aires (Argentina), Uruguay and the hinterland connected through the Paraná and Uruguay rivers. *Banda Oriental* was the name

- given to the northern bank of the Río de la Plata by the people of Buenos Aires during the late colonial period. After the revolution of 1810, this region was called *Provincia Oriental*. The Luso-Brazilian occupation (1817–28) denominated this territory *Provincia Cisplatina*. The first designation of independent Uruguay was *Estado Oriental del Uruguay*, but it was called *Estado Oriental* during most of the nineteenth century. Its inhabitants were called *Orientales*. For the sake of clarity, I call Uruguay the *Estado Oriental* and Uruguayans *Orientales*.
- [2] Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers*, 1845, XLIX. Philip D. Curtin accepted these misleading entries as genuine slave arrivals in Montevideo. Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave trade: A Census* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969): 249.
 - [3] British National Archives, Foreign Office 84 (hereafter abbreviated as BNA, FO 84/95), Aberdeen to Aston, 7 Dec. 1829; BNA, FO 84/112, Pennell to Aberdeen, 23 Jan. and 30 April 1830.
 - [4] BNA, FO 84/95, Pennell to Aberdeen, 30 April 1830.
 - [5] BNA, FO 84/95, Aberdeen to Aston, 7 Dec. 1829.
 - [6] Zakarías Moutoukias, *Contrabando y control en el siglo XVII* (Buenos Aires: CEAL, 1988); Fernando Jumar, *Le Commerce atlantique au Río de la Plata 1680–1778* (Paris: unpublished Ph.D. thesis, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2000); Fabrício Prado, *A Colônia do Sacramento: o extremo sul da América Portuguesa* (Porto Alegre: Fumproarte, 2002).
 - [7] Elena F.S. de Studer, *La trata de Negros en Río de la Plata durante el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires: University of Buenos Aires, 1958).
 - [8] Joseph Miller, *Way of Death. Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730–1830* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988): 486 and 493–496.
 - [9] Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970); David Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987): 214. Jeffrey Needell, 'The Abolition of the Brazilian slave trade in 1850: historiography, slave agency and statesmanship', *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 681–711.
 - [10] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 86.
 - [11] Leslie Bethell, 'The Mixed Commissions of the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the nineteenth century', *Journal of African History* 7, no. 1 (1966): 79–93.
 - [12] Jaime Rodrigues, *De Costa a Costa. Escravos, marinheiros e intermediários do tráfico negreiro de Angola ao Rio de Janeiro (1780–1860)* (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia das Letras, 2005): 179–184.
 - [13] *Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers. Slave trade* (hereafter abbreviated as IUP) (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969), Vol. 14, Sessions 1835, Class A, 143–144, 148–149, 155–157, Sessions 1835, Class A, 268, 288.
 - [14] BNA, FO 84/141, Hood to Palmerston, 10 Feb. and 10 May 1833. Thomas S. Hood was appointed Consul in Montevideo in 1823, during the Brazilian rule. From 1830 to 1843, Hood was General Consul in Uruguay. José P. Barrán, Ana Frega and Mónica Nicolielo, *El Cónsul Británico en Montevideo y la Independencia del Uruguay* (Montevideo: University de la República, 1999).
 - [15] Stephen Behrendt, David Eltis, Manolo Florentino and David Richardson, *Voyages: The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database* (forthcoming online).
 - [16] Most of these ships illegally disembarked slaves in Maçacé, Marica and other ports.
 - [17] Miller, *Way of Death*, 318–322.
 - [18] Manolo Florentino, *Em costas negras. Uma história do tráfico de escravos entre a África e o Rio de Janeiro (séculos XVIII e XIX)* (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia das Letras, 2002): 233.
 - [19] *Ibid.*, 151.
 - [20] *Ibid.*, 205 and 255. Antônio Guimarães was among the top three slave traders after this traffic became illegal. Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 151.
 - [21] João Fragoso and Roberto Ferreira, *Tráfico de escravos e relações comerciais no Sudeste do Brasil: primeira metade do século XIX* (Rio de Janeiro: Inst. de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada – University. Federal de Rio de Janeiro, 2000) [Database].

- [22] BNA, FO 84/225, Arana to Mandeville, 29 April 1837.
- [23] *El Universal*, Montevideo, 10 Jan. and 3 Feb. 1835: 2.
- [24] Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo ex – Archivo General Administrativo, Montevideo, (hereafter AGN–AGA), Libro 346, 1829–35; Libro 103, 1835–38; Libro 555, 1835–40; Libro 373, 1841–43.
- [25] BNA, FO/206, Hood to Palmerston, 29 Feb. 1836.
- [26] BNA, FO 84/206, Hood to Bart, 14 June 1836.
- [27] IUP, Vol. 40, Sessions 1854, Class B, 346–352; Antonio Limpo de Abreu, *Relatório da Repartição dos Negocios Estrangeiros apresentado a Assembleia Geral Legislativa* (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Universal de Laemmert, 1854), Annex on slave trade; *Diario de Senadores de la Cámara de Senadores de la República Oriental del Uruguay* (Montevideo: Tipografía La España, 1882), Vol. 5, 156.
- [28] Liliana Crespi, 'Negros apresados en operaciones de corso durante la guerra con el Brasil (1825–1828)', *Temas de Asia y Africa* 2 (1994): 109–122.
- [29] George R. Andrews, *Afro-Latin America 1800–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 57.
- [30] *Actas de la Asamblea General Constituyente y Legislativa del Estado* (Montevideo: Tipográfica de la Escuela Nacional de Artes y Oficios, 1897), Vol. 2, 181–182, 252–253; Vol. 3, 41–43.
- [31] Fragoso and Ferreira, *Tráfico de escravos*.
- [32] In January of 1841, five vessels tried to introduce no more than 12 slaves each to Montevideo. Alex Borucki, Karla Chagas, and Natalia Stalla, *Esclavitud y trabajo. Un estudio sobre los afro-descendientes en la frontera uruguaya, 1835–1855* (Montevideo: Pulmón, 2004): 24–27.
- [33] *El Indicador*, Montevideo, 6 April 1832: 2.
- [34] Juan Pivel Devoto, *Historia de los partidos políticos en el Uruguay* (Montevideo: Cámara de Representantes, 1994): 53–60.
- [35] Lucía Sala, Rosa Alonso, *El Uruguay comercial, pastoril y caudillesco* (Montevideo: EBO, 1986), 49.
- [36] Oscar Villa, Gerardo Mendive, *La prensa y los constituyentes en el Uruguay de 1830* (Montevideo: Biblioteca Nacional, 1980): 85 and 146.
- [37] Horacio Arredondo, 'Los apuntes estadísticos del Dr. Andrés Lamas', *Revista del Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay* 4, no. 1 (1928): 25–27 and 56.
- [38] Sala and Alonso, *El Uruguay*, 1989, Vol. 2, 185 and 208.
- [39] *El Universal*, 7 Feb. 1835: 2.
- [40] AGN–AGA, Libro 938, Libro de Colonos Africanos, 1833–35. *El Estandarte Nacional*, Montevideo, 26 Jan. 1835: 3.
- [41] Juan Pivel Devoto, 'Prologo', in Francisco Bauzá, *Estudios sociales y económicos* (Montevideo: Clásicos Uruguayos, 1972): xvii–xviii.
- [42] *El Universal*, 7 Nov. 1833: 3.
- [43] AGN–AGA, Libro 938, Libro de Colonos Africanos, 1833–35.
- [44] María Díaz de Guerra, *Documentación relativa a esclavos del Departamento de Maldonado* (Montevideo: IMCO, 1983): 44–47.
- [45] IUP, Vol. 14, Sessions 1835, Class B, 83.
- [46] BNA, FO 84/182, Hood to Wellington, 16 Feb. 1835.
- [47] IUP, Vol. 23, Sessions 1843, Class B, 475. The list included 94 men.
- [48] Mary Karasch, *Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1850* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987). See David Eltis, 'Fluctuations in the Age and Sex Ratios of Slaves in the Nineteenth-Century Transatlantic Slave Traffic'. *Slavery & Abolition* 7, no. 1 (1986): 257–272; David Eltis and Stanley Engerman, 'Was the Slave Trade Dominated by Men'. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 23, no. 2 (1992): 237–257; and 'Fluctuations in Sex and Age Ratios in the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1663–1864'. *Economic History Review* 46, no. 2 (1993): 308–323.
- [49] See the dossier of *Slavery & Abolition* 'Children in European Systems of Slavery' of August 2006.

- [50] Paul Lovejoy, 'The Children of Slavery – The Transatlantic phase'. *Slavery & Abolition* 27, no. 2 (August 2006): 197–217.
- [51] *Ibid.*, 207.
- [52] Arquivo do Palácio de Itamarati (Archive of the Brazilian Foreign Office), Rio de Janeiro, Lata 28, Maço 1, Pasta 2, List of slave purchases, 24 August 1834.
- [53] Eltis and Engerman, 'Fluctuations in Sex and Age Ratios in the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1663–1864'.
- [54] *El Estandarte Nacional*, 10 March 1835: 2.
- [55] BNA, FO 84/160, Hood to Palmerston, 15 Jan. 1834.
- [56] IUP, Vol. 14, Sessions 1836, Class B, 81.
- [57] *El Estandarte Nacional*, 26 Jan. 1835: 3; 27 Jan. 1835: 2–3; 28 Jan. 1835: 3; 3 Feb. 1835: 2.
- [58] IUP, Vol. 14, Sessions 1836, Class B, 149.
- [59] *Ibid.*
- [60] BNA, FO 84/182, Hamilton to Palmerston, 23 July 1835. Juan Pivel Devoto, *Contribución documental sobre nuestras relaciones diplomáticas y comerciales con Gran Bretaña*. (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1933).
- [61] República Oriental del Uruguay, *Tratados y Convenios Internacionales* (Montevideo: IMPO, 1993): 102–106.
- [62] Pivel Devoto, 'Prologo', xxxi.
- [63] *The Times*, London, 27 Oct. 1835: 2; and 31 Oct. 1835: 1.
- [64] Britain would become the main source of capital to Uruguay during the last third of that century, after the era of Brazilian hegemony over Uruguay in 1851–70. Peter Winn, 'British Informal Empire in Uruguay in Nineteenth Century', *Past & Present* 73 (1976): 100–126.
- [65] IUP, Vol. 20, Sessions 1841, Class D, 47.
- [66] *Actas de la Honorable Cámara de Representantes de la República Oriental del Uruguay* (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1905) Vol. 4: 41.
- [67] IUP, Vol. 23, Sessions 1843, 472.