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Galustian, Abelina

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Orienting the Politics of Images:

The Armenian Role in Orientalizing Near Eastern Photography, 1850-1930

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Art History

by

Abelina Galustian

Committee in charge:

Professor Bruce Robertson, Chair

Professor Laurie Monahan

Professor Richard Wittman

December 2021

The dissertation of Abelina Galustian is approved.

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Richard Wittman


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Laurie Monahan


_____

Bruce Robertson, Committee Chair


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Orienting the Politics of Images: The Armenian Role in Orientalizing Near Eastern
Photography, 1850-1930

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ABSTRACT


Orienting the Politics of Images:

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by


Abelina Galustian


The aim of this study is to show that Orientalism is produced by an intersection of
multiple discourses, combining social, political, material and imaginative processes,
and that the work of Armenian photographers, seen in proper perspective,
represents not just another interesting manifestation of Orientalism, but a means
with which to approach the entire issue of Orientalism anew and to amass the
floating particles of untouched, yet flagrant information, towards a more
satisfactory model for its understanding.
Armenians, as outsiders within an Islamic world, were always outside the power
structures of the communities within which they lived and worked (in this study,
particularly Cairo, Jerusalem and Istanbul). Armenian photography studios, active in
these major cities from the 1850s onwards, provided the images that undergirded the
Orientalist production of European artists. A study of these photographers and
photographs suggests the ways in which no simple binaries operated within the
construction of Orientalism.

Vita of Abelina Galustian

Education

2021  Ph.D., History of Art, University of California, Santa Barbara

2007  M.A., History of Art, University of California, Santa Barbara

2002  M.F.A., Studio Arts (2002), California State University, Los Angeles

1997  B.A., Fine Arts, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona


Selected Art Exhibitions

2017  She Loves, Honeypot Gallery, Los Angeles, CA

2011  Reflections on the Gulf War, Al Marsam Al Hur, Kuwait City, Kuwait

2010  Abelina Galustian: Re-Orienting the body, Academy of Fine Arts, Yerevan, Armenia

2006  The Veiled Series, Women's Center Gallery at UCSB, Santa Barbara, CA

2004  Sightless Sites, Galerie Jérôme de Noirmont, Paris, France

2003  feminine, feminist, female, Studio Soto, Boston, MA

      Opening the Veil, Ferdowsi Art Center Gallery, Kish, Iran

      Women Talking Back, an underground crypto-feminist art exhibition, Tehran, Iran

2002  Quoting the Orientalists, Adamson-Duvannes Galleries, Los Angeles, CA

      Politicking the Canvas, Klagsbrun Gallery, New York

2001 Women of War, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL

2000 Las Poderosas, Museo de las Californias, Tijuana, Mexico

      Re-figuring the Body, The Great Hall gallery, OCAD University, Toronto, ON

1998  Furniture by Women, California College of the Arts, Oakland, CA

  Organized Chaos, Kellogg Art Gallery, Cal-Poly Pomona, CA

1997  If Objects Could Talk, Winterthur Museum, Winterthur, DE


CONFERENCE PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS

2012    "Armenian Photographers in Africa," Institut du Monde Arabe: Paris, France

2010    "Armenians, Assyrians, and the End of the Ottoman Empire," Chair & Discussant, Middle East Studies Association: San Diego, CA

"The Substance of Orientalism in Visual Representation,"  International Conference on the Armenian Diaspora: Boston University, MA

2009    "Armenia of the Armenians?" Chair: Yerevan State University, Armenia
"Orientalism and its Layers,", Armenian Academic Association's International  Conference: Yerevan, Armenia

2008    "The Shapes and Colors of Orientalism," Columbia University: New York

2006    "Representing the Middle East in Western Mainstream Media," Zayed University: UAE


INVITED LECTURES

2013  "Decolonizing Art: A Global Perspective,"  State Center for the Arts Tijuana, Mexico

2012  "Delinking from the Colonial Matrix of Power," Universidad Autonoma de Baja California: Baja California, Mexico

"The Beginnings of Photography in the Middle East," Arab Image Foundation: Beirut, Lebanon

"Photography in the Middle East," American University of Beirut: Lebanon

2011  "Diasporic Identities," Hebrew University of Jerusalem

2009  "Orientalism in Visual Representation," Pepperdine University: Malibu, California

"The Media and Orientalist Representations,"  University of California: Santa Barbara

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION


  By the middle of the nineteenth century, Armenian photographers had begun to

open photo studios all over Western Asia, Eastern Mediterranean, and Northern

Africa.  In the early 1850's, for instance, Yessai Garabedian, who was also the

Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem, ran the first photography workshop in the Middle

East.  Soon after, Gabriel Lekegian, based in Cairo, became a prolific photographer

in Egypt and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), eventually holding the

official title of Photographer to the British Army of Occupation (BAO).   By the late

nineteenth-century a great many Armenian photographers were running reputable

studios, acquiring reputations for pre-eminence in the field, and producing much-

admired images that gained wide circulation and had a powerful shaping influence

on popular – especially European and American – conceptions of the Middle East,

contributing in an important way to the phenomenon we know as Orientalism.[1]

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[1] Anne Elizabeth Dymond, Vojtěch Jirat-Wasiutyński, *Modern Art and the Idea of the Mediterranean* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 231.  For further reports on the achievements of the Armenian pioneers in Middle Eastern photography also see, Eyal Onne's quantitative results in *Photographic Heritage of the Holy Land* (1980), and Institut Du Monde Arabe's *L'Orient des photographes arméniens* (2007).  For detailed accounts on G. Lekegian see, Perez, *Focus East*, 191; Barry Iverson, "The Pictures of Garo Balian's Work: Photography in Egypt at the Turn of the Century," in *Garo Balian: An Ottoman Court Architect in Modern Egypt* (Cairo, 1994), 2-3; Nicolas Monti, *Africa Then: Photographs, 1840-1918* (New York: Knopf, 1987), 167; Ken Jacobson, *Odalisques & Arabesques: Orientalist Photography 1839-1925*

Some of the most famous orientalist images in Western art, such as Jean-Leon

Gerome's *The Snake Charmer*, which was later used as the cover illustration of

Edward Said's book on *Orientalism*, are dependent on photographs taken by

Armenians.[2]  Despite the growing interest in nineteenth-century orientalist

photography,  art historians have only slowly begun to examin the connection and

impact that indigenous photographers had, not just on orientalist photography but on

the very structure of Orientalism itself.  The interest begins with the approach to

Orientalism developed by Edward Said in his groundbreaking book of 1978.[3]  Said

was responsible for establishing the phenomenon of Orientalism as an object of

academic interest, for "putting it on the academic map," so to speak, and for

analyzing many of its essential features; the importance of his influence is proved

by the fact that the subsequent development of Orientalism studies has unfolded

largely as a critique of his work.  Yet even the best critiques of Said by scholars of

visual culture -- such as those of Homi Bhaba, David Prochaska, Roger Benjamin,

Reina Lewis, Linda Nochlin, among many others -- persist in seeing orientalist

images as a straightforward function of the West's perception of its own

superiority.[4]  They remain true, in other words, to one of the defining tenets of

(Quaritch, 2007), 249-250; Engin Özendes, *Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1919*
(Haşet Kitabevi, 1987), 51.

[2] Ken Jacobson, *Odalisques & Arabesques: Orientalist Photography 1839-1925* (Quaritch, 2007),
68–70.

[3] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st Vintage Books ed (New York: Vintage, 1978).

[4] The specificities and particularities the following thinkers can be located in: Homi K. Bhabha,
*The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 72. David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French:
Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Roger
Benjamin, David Prochaska, and Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, *Renoir and Algeria*
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).  Reina Lewis, *Gendering Orientalism: Race,*

Saidian Orientalism; the privileging of a strong distinction between Self and Other. In contrast, the study proposed here draws upon other critical approaches to demonstrate that such a polar model is inadequate and due for fundamental revision. Its aim is to show that Orientalism is produced by an intersection of multiple discourses, combining social, political, material and imaginative processes, and that the work of Armenian photographers, seen in proper perspective, represents not just another interesting manifestation of Orientalism, but a means with which to approach the entire issue of Orientalism anew and to amass the floating particles of untouched, yet flagrant information, towards a more satisfactory model for its understanding.

This dissertation thus aims to expose something of the fundamental structure of Orientalism by addressing the work of Armenian photographers in its historical context. Several interrelated questions are posed. First, what were the circumstances that caused Armenians to embrace photography with such enthusiasm so as to establish a dominant position in the field? Second, in what ways did commercial and political interests direct the work of Armenian photographers? Third, by what means did the "Armenian Question" and Armenian identity itself unify the resourcefulness of Armenian photographers, official and un-official, as well as the tour guides and dragomans with whom they were often associated?[5]

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*Femininity and Representation* (London: Routledge, 1996), 109–121. Linda Nochlin, "The Imaginary Orient," *Art in America* 71, no. 5 (May 1983): 118–31.

[5] Towards the end of nineteenth century, the predicament of the Ottoman Armenians became notorious on the platform of international politics, widely known as the "Armenian Question." Great European powers took special interest in the question to assert influence in the Empire's internal policy. Those who held an "official" photographer's status worked for the government or royal court. They commonly operated photography studios and workshops they owned based on

Fourth, how orientalist values permeate and express itself in the photographs themselves?  To what extent, for instance, might a Western patriarchal fantasy have become a conscious or unconscious guiding principle for Armenian photographers?

The current situation of Orientalism can be likened to a typewriter or word-processing keyboard; it takes only one mislaid key to change the entire feature of operation in a text. This misplacement not only disarranges the meaning of words but also disturbs the rest of the functioning keys, which only generates distorted typescripts. Orientalism is not much different from the above analogy.  If we are to extract its accurate definition, then we must work with a "complete keyboard" of reliable accounts.

Because Orientalism is such a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, embracing all aspects of culture, the implications of such a study extend beyond the history of art and even "visual culture" studies as we usually think of them.  It has implications for all aspects of culture and thus has the potential to make an impact on a range of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, literary studies, gender studies, identity theory, postcolonial and subaltern studies.  In so doing, the present study is also intended to demonstrate how powerful a conceptual tool a properly critical approach to the visual arts can be.

*Said and his Critics*

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either shared investments or solely-held enterprises.  The "un-official" photographers were freelancers and controlled other primary occupations to supplement their profession(s).

Said saw Orientalism as an expression of European and American imperialism and almost all its constitutive features as driven by the imperialist project. Beginning with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt at the very beginning of the nineteenth century,[6] he interprets European engagements with the East as governed by a desire for domination and control, and while this powerful thesis has been part of what makes his account appealing and persuasive to many readers, it has also seemed to many overly simplistic. His approach posits a singular and consistent brand of Western dominance throughout all its epochs in history, underestimating the ways in which Western motives and methods changed over time, counting the role of non-Westerners in that process.

Among the most articulate critics of Said's ahistorical and monolithic conception of Western imperial power are Aijaz Ahmad, James Clifford, Wael B. Hallaq, John Mackenzie, Dennis Porter, and Robert Young.[7] All these scholars have emphasized the ways in which Said's argument has inadvertently essentialized the entire West,

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[6] Although some scholars have suggested that Orientalism's beginnings can be traced back to the Early Dynastic period of Mesopotamia (2900 B.C.E.), for the sake of this particular argument I adhere to Said's time-frame of academic and artistic Orientalism that began with Napoleon's Egyptian expedition. To better understand the malleability of Orientalism, I will look at prior works by revisiting Joseph Spence who introduced "orientalism" as his "new word" in his 1726 *Essay on Pope's Odyssey*. The term has been used with different approaches at different times and until today, especially in Near Eastern Universities (including Armenia) it is still being used to name the field of "Oriental Studies."

[7] Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (London: Verso, 1992), chap. 5. John MacKenzie, *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), chap. 1. James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 255–276. Wael B. Hallaq, *Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). Dennis Porter, "Orientalism and Its Problems," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory*, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, 1st edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 150–161. Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1992), 126–132.

while applying an ahistorical form of discourse analysis. One of Ahmad's long lists of objections on Said's "generic" approach to Orientalism prompted this observation:

But what is remarkable is that with the exception of Said's own voice, the only voices we encounter in the book are precisely those of the very Western canonicity which, Said complains, has always silenced the Orient. Who is silencing whom, who is refusing to permit a historicized encounter between the voice of the so-called 'Orientalist' and the many voices that 'Orientalism' is said so utterly to suppress, is a question that is very hard to determine as we read this book. It sometimes appears that one is transfixed by the power of the very voice that one debunks.[8]

Indeed, Said's argument depends on the remarks of important actors associated with the imperial powers. Britain's Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, for example, includes in one of his bold statements that: "We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know any other country."[9] Statements from such figures of authority became verification for Said that Western Imperialist control depended on what Michel Foucault had described in terms of the relation between knowledge and power. Also sensitive to the ways in which attitudes toward the East were reinforced by the work of Western writers, Said discussed the works of distinguished figures such as Gérard de Nerval, Théophile Gautier , Gustave Flaubert, Benjamin Disraeli, and

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[8] Ahmad, *In Theory*, 172–173.

[9] Said, *Orientalism*, 38.

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François-René de Chateaubriand.  Their writings, he insists, have acted as "considerable support" in promoting a "perverse vision of the Orient."[10]  He thus reduces the motives of all the writers to the same single one, and as equally the instruments of imperialism and the essentialist discourse of Self and Other.  In Ahmad's estimation, this oversimplification does violence to the variety of imaginative responses characteristic of orientalist writers and artists.

Ahmad also insists that Orientalism was already being critiqued by Eastern scholars long before Said,[11] but because they operated outside of the Western institutions, they did not receive the scholarly attention they deserved.[12]  Even while admitting Said's exceptional erudition and his suitably powerful style of communication, Ahmad emphasizes Said's position as an elite North-American scholar.

It seems as though Ahmad blames Said for belonging to the upper echelons of Western academia, and for posturing in such a way as to obfuscate his Arab voice.[13] Ahmad forgets that Said is first an Eastern scholar, and although he may be "shaped

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[10] Ibid., 99 and 180.

[11] See, for example, Abdul Latif Tibawi, *English-Speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism* (Geneva: Islamic Centre, 1965).  Also, Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and Its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism* (London: F. Cass, 1977).

[12] Ahmad, *In Theory*, 176.

[13] Ahmad has critiqued Said for not addressing the diverse voices of Eastern scholars (speaking on the same Orientalist objectification of the Other) in *Orientalism*. Criticisms of Said's success as a worldwide esteemed intellectual, which Ahmad hinted to have reached supposedly by posturing in Western intellectual spaces, are rather absurd.  While I do agree with Ahmad that Western contemporary methodologies can distort and limit our scholarly direction, his assessment to discredit some of Said's exemplary range of scholarship has more to do with his own posturing in the face of academic predictors of his erudite capabilities.

by" both Eastern and Western educational institutions, his position does not brand him as a pure Western academic, and he is no less Palestinian for the ability to adjust his academic voice in dealing with issues bearing upon the discourse of power.[14]  Said's theoretical difficulties, according to Ahmad, point to inconsistencies between his humanism and his use of Foucault's methodological framework, which establishes a "regime of truth" to control power and knowledge.[15] This issue, and its relevance to Armenian photography, will be dealt with at greater length in Chapter Three.

British historian of imperialism, John M. Mackenzie, refutes Said's binary model, offering a different view that allows for more variation of motives and strategies.  MacKenzie reproves Saidian critics of Orientalism as "too procrustean" in creating and upholding "a monolithic and binary vision of the past."[16]  He lists a host of structural and cultural forces that demonstrate Orientalism to be "endlessly protean" and he makes perhaps his most important point in commenting that, "the artistic record of imperial culture has in fact been one of constant change, instability, heterogeneity and sheer porousness."[17]  By addressing these gaps in

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[14] In commenting on Edward Said's work, educational theorist, Michael Apple argued, "Authors are not mechanically determined by ideology or class, or history.  However, authors are very much in the history of their societies, "shaping and shaped by that history and their social experience." Michael W. Apple, *Cultural Politics and Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996), xxii.

[15] Aijaz Ahmad, "Between Orientalism and Historicism," in *Orientalism: A Reader*, ed. A.L. Macfie (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 290.  For further discussion of the "regime of truth" see, Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 131–132.

[16] MacKenzie, *Orientalism*, 215.

[17] Ibid., 208.

Orientalism's knowledge, MacKenzie comes close to identifying some of the

critical events that have given Orientalism its "protean" shape, but he goes too far in

the opposite direction, seeming to assume at several points that art can be entirely

separated from the imperialist agenda, that artists can operate independently of

political, social, and economic pressures.  For Mackenzie, the widespread

phenomenon of artistic Orientalism is "solely to further the western arts" and to

enhance "intercultural relations."[18]  His premise asserts that "No true art can ever be

founded upon a perpetual parade of cultural superiority, an outpouring of imperialist

(sexist/racist) bile."[19]  MacKenzie might be accused of having missed, or just

ignored, W.E.B. Du Bois' famous statement "all art is propaganda" when he made

his claim.[20]  Justified by his assertion of a highly protean manifestation in Oriental

aesthetics, there might be some truth to MacKenzie's statement, but to assume that

art has had no role in legitimating the narrative of empire is naïve.[21]

In her critique of Said's totalizing idea of Orientalism, Lisa Lowe reminds us that

"Orientalism is a tradition of representation that is crossed, intersected and engaged

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[18] Ibid., 215.

[19] Ibid., 213.

[20] W.E.B. Du Bois, "Criteria of Negro Art," *The Crisis* 32, no. 6 (1926): 290.

[21] The late American political scientist, Murray Edelman, closely examined how works of art became the "shapers of political beliefs" and "the fountainhead from which political discourse" generated.  Frequent observation proves, according to Edelman, "art and ideology ensure that there is no immaculate perception.  By the same token, there can be no politics without art and ideology." For further details see Murray Edelman, *From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 2–4.
Through her sociological perspective, Janet Wolff's opinion echoes Edelman's perspective in that "art always encodes values and ideology" and "is never innocent of the political and ideological processes" regardless of its independent approach to that art's discourse. Janet Wolff, *The Social Production of Art* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 143.

by other representations."[22] Some of the key considerations that Lowe calls into the foreground concern the heterogeneity of counterhegemonic interests and of multiple representations among and within class, race, language, and social relations of human subjectivity in Ottoman Turkey. Lowe's heated contention, highlighting the heterogeneity of "different 'fronts' in which the struggles of cultural politics, feminism or anticolonialism may take place,"[23] neglects to mention the empire's largest non-Muslim minority population -- the Armenians – who have often operated in a carefully calculated way within prevailing hegemonic structures. Much of what may be typically assumed to an oppressed group of people-unpeople, to use an Orwellian term[24]-- may actually be the complex intersection of resistance tied to socio-political machinations, and is designed to persuade the Euro-American forces to be the accomplices of the Armenians in defeating the Ottoman overlordship.

Another important critique of Said's model comes from the direction of gender studies. The challenging practice of including women's role in Orientalism's paradigm is two-fold: to combine Western women's travel accounts about the Orient and to examine the ways in which "Oriental women" enter into the exotic sceneries of Eastern promise. Eighteenth-century French literature expert,

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[22] Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), ix.

[23] Ibid., 197.

[24] Circa early sixteenth-century, the term Unpeople has been used as a transitive verb (to depopulate). In his book *1984*, George Orwell appropriates the term as a noun (a person or people ignored or rendered unimportant and invisible). See George Orwell, *1984*, Mass Paperback Edition (Signet, 1962). I borrow the latter format in my methodological framework to better illustrate some of the "unseen" realities.

Madeleine Dobie, offers her criticism of a main aspect missing in Said's essay: "none [of Orientalism's critics] has examined the figure of the Oriental woman as a central category of Orientalist representation or asked why over the last three centuries Oriental sexuality has occupied such an important place in the European imaginary."[25]  The Oriental woman in languid poses, as in slave and harem scenes, are not always what they seem, pure projections of Western fantasy.  For instance, a late nineteenth-century albumen print features on the front a woman's portrait, entitled in French, "Dame Turque" (Turkish woman) with Pascal Sebah's signature imprint.  On the back, in Armenian writing, is an inscription.  It is not clear to whom it was addressed, since part of the writing has deteriorated.  The readable portion, however, includes the following: "…to have their attention and willingness to listen to our plight, even if we have to use our own women as bait."[26]  These words suggest that the Armenian dominance of photography in the Middle East was in part used to lure in Western visitors to the region and to do so, at least in some cases, in order to achieve a political aim.  This strategy is not much different from current practices in advertising.  We have become familiar with women's images shown standing next to or resting on flashy cars.  Sociologist Diane Barthel-Bouchier

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[25] Madeleine Dobie, *Foreign Bodies: Gender, Language, and Culture in French Orientalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 3.

[26] The photo is in the collection of photography dealer Ibrahim Ozkan, in Istanbul's Beyoğlu district (historically known as Pera).  I am grateful to Mr. Ozkan for showing me the photo and allowing me to photograph it.  Pascal Sebah had several photo studios, including "El Chark Societe Photographic" that opened in 1857.  The photographer's name has confused those who have grouped him with the French Orientalists.  But Sebah's Armenian background resulted in adding to the Armenian monopolization on the new profession of photography.  For more information on Sebah see, Engin Özendes, *From Sébah & Joaillier to Foto Sabah: Orientalism in Photography* (Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 168–179.  Several sources mention Armenian women trying to pass as Turkish women in order to fulfill the image of Oriental stereotypes.

highlights how advertisements suggest sexual pleasure and escape by pointing to the object of pleasure: "The car is an extension of the male that conquers and tames the (female) road […]. The car becomes the ultimate love when […] it promises to combine power, 'muscle,' with finesse."[27] In the context of nineteenth-century Middle-East, Armenian photographers implemented a strategy similar to today's sexist advertisements that portray women as objects and seductresses. The end-result of both past and current strategic attempts of luring in the "customer" is to sell the final product. For the Armenian photographers, the strategy had a political purpose: to get Westerners to "listen to our plight."

Concern over problems arising from the idea of essential identity and "authentic voice" lie behind recent developments in the theory of Orientalism. The conceptual models cultivated in Orientalism have once been applied to the study of other non-European cultures. While it must be the concern of any serious scholar of orientalism to create the best theoretical tools possible, there is a danger in recent work of losing touch with historical specificity and hence of a return to the very ahistorical quality for which Said has been criticized. Two of the more active approaches that continuously appear within the discourse involve academics who have helped set the mold of the Saidian template of Orientalism, and intellectuals who have jumped ahead into the forefront to insist on the need for "post-Orientalism" or "after-Orientalism" orientation.[28] In recent years, however,

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[27] Diane Barthel, *Putting On Appearances: Gender and Advertising* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 174.

[28] Some of the recent popular titles include "New-Orientalism", "Modern-Orientalism", and "Post-Modern Orientalism".

especially from the beginning of the twenty-first century to today, scholarship has been so preoccupied with attempts to develop a more universal theoretical model of Orientalism, that it has disregarded the complexity of the essence of Orientalism.[29] The contribution in Hamid Dabashi's post-orientalist text, for example, supervenes in time, but his rhetoric can be more suitable for (re)occurring concepts in Orientalism (without the attached indicators).[30] It is particularly disturbing that so much of what passes for post-orientalism maintains the character of Saidian-Orientalism or at least it does not hold ensuing features of posteriority to qualify for a hyphenated construction. Such a theoretic strategy not only fails to expose the inadequacy of its own approach, it reinforces the weaknesses of Said's model.

While acknowledging the importance of Orientalism's unsettled engagement with all forms of academic practice, the improper calibration of its theory by some scholars and the institutionally sanctioned authority that gives them legitimacy to make specific claims on public memory, will not be dealt with any detail here, as it would go beyond the scope of the current study. The argument to be made here is that due attention to the Armenian role in the formation of Orientalism serves as a critical tool with which to carry the study of orientalism further by a more in-depth probe of purposefully guarded and concealed hard evidence. The problems I address in this examination entail the core of my argument on the oversight of

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[29] In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States, on September 11, 2001, Orientalism rose again in visual displays that evoke some of the branches of earlier Orientalist fascination with spectacle. The corporate mainstream media in the U.S. saw the subsequent "war against terror" not only in terms of dollars but also as a means of control within a broader political agenda.

[30] Hamid Dabashi, *Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008).

Armenian communities that have been amongst the leading forces to shape the concept of Orientalism.  According to my research, it is this blind spot of unpeopled-Armenians that has remained imperceptible from Orientalism's formulation until now.  Said mentions the Armenians only once.[31]  Although he was born in West Jerusalem and spent much time there as a child and young man, he must have never noted the many Armenian photo studios that housed countless Orientalist prints.  Many of them still exist and many of the prints they offer were produced by the fathers and forefathers of their current owners.[32]  Since Cairo, where Said spent years as a university student, also contains many such shops, he missed a similar opportunity there.[33]

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[31] Said, *Orientalism*, 316–317.  Said's only mention of Armenians is a quotation taken from Bernard Lewis's essays "The Revolt of Islam" (1964) and "The Return of Islam" (1976).  In both accounts Lewis bunched Armenian and Greek Orthodox churches that had been damaged in Cairo's anti-imperialist riot in 1945, affirming his opinion, not about Armenian or Greek Orthodox churches, but to fallaciously proclaim that Islam is an anti-Semitic ideology. While Said rightly describes Lewis's detached scholarship as "sarcastic" and "polemical", this type of scholarly treatment relating to the Armenians is common and anticipated.  For the academicians engaged with the Armenian subject, especially, the tradition of scholarly disrespect and neglect are commonplace in most presumed erudite arenas.  In the above example we can pose a question whether it is more ailing to erroneously make mention of a peoples, as insignificant that mention may be, from an indecent scholar or to be omitted (deliberately, unintentionally, or unknowingly) by a world esteemed intellectual.

[32] Among the most famous is Kevork Kahvedjian's Elia Photo Service on Al Khanka St. in Jerusalem's Christian Quarter.  In his book, Daley comments of the "black and white prints of the Middle East that are as exotic and beautiful today as they were on the day they were taken."  See Paul Daley, *Armageddon: Two Men on an Anzac Trail* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2011), 112.  Also see Kevork Kahvedjian, *Jerusalem Through My Father's Eyes* (Elia Photo Service, 1998).

[33] For Said's early life and education:  Edward W. Said, *Out of Place: A Memoir* (New York: Vintage, 2000); Amritjit Singh and Bruce G. Johnson, eds., *Interviews with Edward W. Said* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2004). Also see, Van Leo and Pierre Gazio, *Portraits of Glamour* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1997); Maria Golia, *Photography and Egypt* (London: Reaktion Books, 2009); Lynn Love, "The Pictures Between," *Saudi Aramco World* 52, no. 1 (2001): 33.

Armenian photographers were thus exceptionally prominent among those who shaped the images of the "East". It is not clear why or how Said managed to leave out or to miss altogether the participation of Armenian photographers in the construction and production of Orientalist representations. Perhaps his personal focus on the Palestinian predicament limited his vision. Said who has explored the depths and complexities of Orientalist representations missed the very roots of this phenomena that propagated in the "interiors" of his community.[34] We can also reason that the historical experience of power relationships that has always existed between the dominating (Western) and the dominated (Eastern) nations obstructed Said's accustomed view from seeing the unaccustomed cause and effect correlation in the arena of Orientalism.[35]

Nor did Said pay as much attention to his textual sources as he might have. Most of the orientalist figures whom he discusses were accompanied on their journeys in the East by Armenian interpreters and photographers. Gerard de Nerval, for example, who Said discusses, was assisted by an Armenian draughtsman, painter, lithographer, etcher and photographer who not only interpreted verbally the backwardness of the Orientals but also demonstrated his interpretation of an Orient

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[34] The term 'interior' has a distinct significance for the Palestinians. The original association with 'interiority' was to designate the Palestinian inhabitants in the presence of interdictory regions of Israel. Today, the word's connotation has extended to Arabs living in the Arab world with an 'insider' determination to lead a life free from Western imperialism. See, Edward W. Said, *After the Last Sky*, ed. Jean Mohr (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 51–52.

[35] Imperialism continues to be one of the Western world's most controversial and long-lasting negative legacies. Few historians will disagree, however, that the political, economic and cultural dominance of the West are the chief agents that "cause" the "effect" in the Eastern hemisphere. In the case of Orientalism, Armenian machinators played a significant role in manipulating and to a greater extent reversing the cause-effect locations.

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he wanted Nerval to see.[36]  Similarly, Gustave Flaubert, gave emphasis in the

records of his travels to his involvement with the Armenians, at times ridiculing the

"pour Turkish pashas" for their grotesque pretenses while giving high praise to

Nubar Bey, an Armenian dragoman to the pasha, with his "Latin-Quarter [Parisian]

air about him."[37]

Why did Said not see that the distribution of an idea of the Orient was brought

about in large part by easterners themselves, and perhaps in an especially significant

way by Armenians.  Not only that, but that the Armenians had political motives of

their own, arising from centuries of history along with their current plight.

Orientalism is not the product of a simple confrontation between the Western "Self"

and the Middle Eastern "Other," but a much more complicated negotiation,

involving intermediaries whose positions between West and East have been far from

stable.  Armenian ethnicity, itself a strategic formation affected by a long history, is

further complicated by the diasporic condition in which these photographers found

themselves.  Although the importance of Armenians in the dissemination,

popularization and technical development of photography in the Middle East has

begun to receive limited scholarly attention, the deeper cultural significance of their

achievement has yet to be recognized.  The Saidian model of Orientalism has been

an obstacle to that deeper understanding and appreciation.

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[36] Briony Llewellyn, *The Orient Observed: Images of the Middle East from the Searight Collection* (London: Victoria & Albert Museum, 1989), 104.  Also see, Julia Ballerini, *Photography Conscripted: Horace Vernet, Gerard de Nerval and Maxime Du Camp in Egypt* (New York: City University of New York, 1987), 229.

[37]Gustave Flaubert, *Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour: A Narrative Drawn from Gustave Flaubert's Travel Notes & Letters* (New York: Penguin, 1996), 77.

*Conclusion*

Previous scholarship about Armenian photographers, some of it quite recent and informed by an awareness of orientalist criticism, has given only limited attention to the issue of Armenian ethnic identity in its diasporic condition. The Armenian photographer is often classified as Arab, Turk or "Palestinian-Christian." Armenians used names like Abdullah (from Abdullahians or Abdulian) and Saboungi ('soap-maker' in Turkish) that further camouflaged their Armenian origin. In response to their forcible dislocation, Armenians produced another category of dislocation: a self-imposed discipline that allowed them to obtain a measure of agency and self-determination. Unable to manage their identity in their host-lands, they could indirectly manage -- define and delimit – the character of the host lands by manipulating Others' representations. Photography thus became not only a vital instrument of cultural survival, but a source of tactical weaponry that at times served more effectively than traditional military mechanisms.

In their studies of Middle Eastern photography, David Proschaska, Sara Graham-Brown, Beth Baron, Susan Meiselas, Jens Kroger, Stephen Sheehi, Nancy Micklewright and Abigail Solomon-Godeau have all made valuable contributions,[38]

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[38] David Prochaska, "L'Algérie Imaginaire: Jalons Pour Une Histoire de L'iconographie Colonial," *Gradhiva*, no.7 (1989): 29-38; Sarah Graham-Brown, *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women of in Photography of the Middle East, 1860-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); ---. *Palestinians and their society, 1880-1946* (New York: Quartet Books, 1980), 5-14; Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Susan Meiselas, *Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History* (Random House, 1997), 10-13; Jens Kröger, "Ernst Herzfeld and Friedrich Sarre," in *Ernst Herzfeld and the Development of near Eastern Studies, 1900-1950*, ed. Ann C. Gunter and Stefan R. Hauser (Boston: Brill, 2005); Stephen Sheehi, "A Social History of Early Arab Photography or a Prolegomenon to an Archaeology of the Lebanese Imago," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39, no. 02 (2007): 177-208; Nancy Micklewright, A *Victorian Traveler in the Middle East: The Photography*

but each is limited in a way that exposes the weaknesses of the fundamental assumptions on which they are based.  Beth Baron discusses Orientalist photographers in Egypt and mentions several of Armenian origin, but does not distinguish them from Egyptian locals.[39]  Susan Meiselas and Jens Kröger came close to discover a political motivation in the orientalist photographs produced by Antoin Sevruguin, but failed to recognize them as the work of an Armenian and even sometimes credited them to someone else.  The acknowledgment due to Sevruguin's importance was omitted in numerous missionary records and travelogues that would widely be distributed in the late nineteenth century through the dawn of the twentieth century.[40]  Still, both Meiselas and Kröger went only so far as they found necessary to reveal that Sevruguin's photographs should have been given due recognition.[41]

An alternative form of scholarly negligence is the praise given to the rank of photographers that have an Armenian background, but never consider whether their Armenian identity had an impact on the images they produced.  Stephen Sheehi, developing an argument also suggested by Suraiya Faroqui, advances the idea of a

*and Travel Writing of Annie Lady Brassey* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2003); and, Solomon-Godeau, Abigail. "A Photographer in Jerusalem, 1855: Auguste Salzmann and His Times". *October* 18 (1981): 91–107.

[39] Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 85.

[40] Susan Meiselas and Martin van Bruinessen, *Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History* (New York: Random House, 1997), 10–11. Also, Jens Kröger, "Ernst Herzfeld and Friedrich Sarre," in *Ernst Herzfeld and the Development of near Eastern Studies, 1900-1950*, by Ann C. Gunter and Stefan R. Hauser (Boston: Brill, 2005), 48.

[41] Friedrich Sarre purchased Sevruguin's impressive collection of photographs, which included a series of ruins in Iran's regions.  In 1910 Herzfeld and Sarre's *Iranische Felsreliefs* was published with the omission of Sevruguin's name that was credited to Sarre instead.

"claimed ownership of modernity" among the "new bourgeoisie from the subaltern classes," but he limits his argument by insisting that the purpose of this ownership claim is simply to obtain economic, social, and cultural privileges according to the classic model of social climbing.[42] Sensitive as he is to the complexity of the dynamics involved, it is evident that he underestimates the range of strategies developed among photographers and other artists to secure their Armenian identity and political aims.

A significant limitation and weakness of Said's interpretation is profoundly indicative of his insensitivity to the role of Armenians is his idea that German Orientalism should be seen as just a mild duplication of British, French and later American Orientalisms.[43] Said based his claim on the absence of German colonial interests in the Middle-East. German Orientalism was exempted in Said's investigation for the lack of political impetus or for the absence of a "protracted, sustained national interest in the Orient" that did not seem feasible without established colonies in the Middle East.[44] During the first two-thrids of the nineteenth century especially, German Orientalism assumed the same "texts, myths, ideas, and languages almost literally gathered from the Orient by imperial Britain

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[42] Stephen Sheehi, "A Social History of Early Arab Photography or a Prolegomenon to an Archaeology of the Lebanese Imago," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39, no. 02 (2007): 178. Also see, Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 251; and Stephen Sheei, *The Arab Imago: A Social History of Portrait of Photography, 1860-1910* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

[43] Said, *Orientalism*, 19.

[44] Ibid.

and France."[45]  But in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,

German relations with the Ottoman Empire grew into a solid bond that led to

Turkey entering the first world war on the side of Germany, a craftier and quieter

form of an imperialist project.[46]  Germany helped to train the Turkish troops that

would eventually participate in the slaughter of Armenians, culminating in the

systematic genocide of 1915, and rewarded them with German military honors.[47]

German Orientalism thus played a critical role in giving birth to anti-Armenian

sentiment in the Ottoman era.

German Orientalism expert Rachel MagShamhráin argues that Orientalism does

not have to be a "monodirectional phenomenon radiating out from the West onto a

passive Eastern object, but rather […] something that can also emanate from the

East."[48]  Still, by confusing the Armenian for the Turk, she fails to recognize the

degree of responsibility that Armenians might be said to bear for creating the

attitudes that helped lead to genocide.[49]  The leading scholar on the subject of

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[45] Ibid. Contrary to Said's certainty that Britain and France hold the "intellectual authority over the Orient within Western culture," German Orientalism was thriving before the seventeenth century. Todd Curtis Kontje, *German Orientalisms* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 39.

[46] Rachel MagShamhráin, "Displacing Orientalism: Ottoman Jihad, German Imperialism, and the Armenian Genocide," in *Encounters with Islam in German Literature and Culture* (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 2009), 159.  Despite the growth of scholarly criticism on German Orientalism, MagShamhráin is one of the few scholars who has written about Anti-Armenian German Orientalism.

[47] Vahakn N Dadrian, *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity* (Watertown, Mass.: Blue Crane Books, 1996), xiv.  The Black Eagle medallion was the highest honor given to member of ruling houses, military officials and selected worthy figures.

[48] MagShamhráin, "Displacing Orientalism: Ottoman Jihad, German Imperialism, and the Armenian Genocide," 145.

[49] MagShamhráin's ability to uncover the possibilities of Orientalism being applied by the East to itself is a big leap from previous scholarly assertions in the field.  When analyzing two subaltern

Turko-Armenian conflict, Vahakn Dadrian, has pointed out that the Armenian Genocide is also a "German responsibility," but omits mentioning the Armenian responsibility and their Orientalistic activities that gave rise to a fortified Turko-German brotherhood.[50] These issues are still extremely sensitive.  My attempts to enter the state archives in Armenia and Armenian controlled institutions in other countries only got me far enough to be given firm lectures on "national consequences to consider" and that I should avoid political questions that are socially classified as conflictual to the Armenian question altogether.  When I was invited to share my research findings about some of the more undisclosed activities of the Armenian elites in Ottoman Turkey, namely, of the Armenian women's strategic maneuvers against the Ottoman administration, my talk was interrupted with violent verbal attacks by the head of the department of Oriental Studies at Yerevan State University.[51]

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groups, however, MagShamhráin's ability to uncover the reality falters with the weaker subaltern group's (the Armenians) ability to possess the same effective agency towards the Turks that she claimed for the Turks to have employed towards the Germans.

[50] Dadrian, *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide*, 7.  While Said offers a benign perspective of Germany's colonialist endeavors in the Middle East, Dadrian argues that not only were there much earlier imperialist activities by the Germans, but the "colonialist thrust of which the 'Berlin-Baghdad' imagery was emblematic" followed a more potent and actual colonialism.

[51] My talk, "Orientalism and its Layers," was forcefully interrupted by Garnik Asatryan who chaired the international conference titled "The Turkic World, the Caucasus, and Iran: Civilizational Crossroads of Interactions." Organized by Yerevan State University's Armenian Academic Association (ARMACAD). Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, July 10-12, 2009.

**Chapter II:  Topics, Purposes and Methods**

The multidisciplinary emphasis in this study has helped to disclose a clearer and a more solid understanding of the defining elements in Orientalism.  The integration of different disciplinary perspectives has expounded some of the core approaches in the arena of Orientalism, and has often revealed a prevailing mindset comprised in each of its cognitive maps.  Each disciplinary perspective has added a new angle in considering evidence, but what constitutes as legitimate evidence, however, can be recognized not just in the overlapping intersections where it crosses, but in having a view and access to a range of heights and depths of that crossing which a multidisciplinary approach provides.

The myriad categories that exist in Orientalism today are too many to meaningfully list in just one document.  Hence, I begin my analysis by using the publication that still continues to have the strongest and most widespread impact in the field.  More than four decades later, Edward Said's analysis of *Orientalism* continues to generate interpretations of theoretical and methodological arguments and counter-arguments. Accordingly, in this study, I place Said's *Orientalism* as a central comparative site between the early stages of Orientalism and the "post" stages that became popular, especially, after the tragedies of the September 11, 2001 attacks.[52]  The premise of Said's argument is not an exaggerated analysis which his critics have so fervently disputed.  Said was able to find and (re)place some of the major pieces of what constitutes the puzzle pertaining to Orientalism, but the picture he gathered is still

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[52] In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States, on September 11, 2001, Orientalism rose again in visual displays that evoke some of the branches of earlier Orientalist fascination with spectacle.  The corporate mainstream media in the U.S. saw the subsequent "war against terror" not only in terms of dollars but also as a means of control within a broader political agenda.

incomplete without the main portion that was lost in front of his Western-influenced eyes. Said establishes how the European phenomenon of Orientalist discourse takes shape with leading personalities and their grandiose comments. Britain's Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, for example, includes in one of his bold statements toward Egypt that: "We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know any other country."[53] Statements from these notable figures of authority became verification for Said that Western Imperialist control depended on, what Michel Foucault has described, the episteme of knowledge and power. But to see these notable Western figures as imperialists justifying a colonial rule through Orientalism is to ignore the fact that most notables of Said's mention, namely Lord Cromer, Lord Byron, T.E. Lawrence, and Sir Richard Burton were accommodated during their visits to the Middle East by Armenian guides and dragomans that not only translated daily dialogues but also interpreted the Orient (as they saw fit to their Armenian ethno-national agenda).[54]

Through the complexity of Armenian machinations, Orientalism became a Eurocentric discourse by propagandizing a supreme brand of Christianity to which they belong. In addition, Armenia has the distinction of being the very first Christian nation (301 A.D.) to formally accept the new faith that has served their rationalization of homophily with Western nations. The Christian propaganda contributed to the perception of Western forces against the "Muslim savages" that congested the Armenian population amid the Turks, Persians and Arabs. The indirect promulgations practiced by the Armenians, especially with their motto

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[53] Said, *Orientalism*, 38.

[54] For some of the examples in Egypt see, Kapoïan-Kouymjian, *L'Égypte Vue Par des Arméniens (XIe-XVIIe siècles)*, 4. Also see, Reid, *Whose Pharaohs?*, 60–61. For examples outside Egypt see Delisle and Woodsworth, *Translators Through History*, 255.

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"save a Christian nation," became an alternate strategy that played a far more important role than following combative dispositions in plotting armed rebellions.[55]

Said's subconscious scholarly blinders have contributed to Orientalism's misperceptions in several ways, most notably in the way he passed over the system in which Europeans came to "know" the "Orient." In his attempt to highlight examples of imperialistic attitudes practiced by European administrators, Said addresses the approaches of Lord Cromer, Robert Curzon and Arthur Balfour in their means of "surveying a civilization."[56] Once again, Said overlooks the political power exercised by the Armenian commissioners in their host countries and misses the realpolitik factors that have led their methods to inform and shape the "interests" of the West. He therefore erroneously privileges the supposed self-directed and un-influenced West with agenda-setting power over the Orient, not realizing the political shadings that originate from the Armenian influence.

Said has widely considered the perception of an imagined Orient in Western representations. In his investigation of Orientalist discourse, Said includes the works of Gérard de Nerval, Théophile Gautier, Gustave Flaubert, Benjamin Disraeli, and François-René de Chateaubriand whose works have acted, according to Said, as "considerable support" to achieve a "perverse vision of the Orient."[57] The infinite imaginations of Orientalist writers operated within limiting essentialist parameters and the only way Said

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[55] I continue to emphasize the triumphal possibilities of well-organized subaltern political tactics, which show that regardless of limited national resources, certain marginal groups have been able to achieve that which hegemonic forces with significant material advantages have proven to be ineffectual. For further information on military (in)effectiveness, especially when considering dominant powers see Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds., *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Standford: Standford University Press, 2007).

[56] Said, *Orientalism*, 32.

[57] Ibid., 99 and 180.

could make sense out of their creative restrictions, is to contribute this system of understanding towards an imperialist social knowledge. Orientalism's paradigm would have been much different if Said explored those aspects of history involving Armenians, which he must have deemed inconsequential, to realize that most of the Orientalists of his mention were accompanied by Armenian interpreters and photographers. Gerard de Nerval, for example, was assisted by an Armenian draughtsman, painter, lithographer, etcher and photographer who not only interpreted verbally the backwardness of the Orientals but also demonstrated his interpretation of an Orient he wanted Nerval to see.[58] Gustave Flaubert on the other hand recorded his travels with heavy mention of his involvement with the Armenians and at times ridiculing the "poor Turkish pashas" for their grotesque presence while giving high praises to Nubar Bey, an Armenian dragoman to the pasha, with his "Latin-Quarter [Western] air about him."[59]

The Armenian influence in Western literary expressions become noticeably transparent particularly when the capacity of French and British writers, who have practiced their highly imaginative and creative voices in Orientalizing the East, come to a standstill in the presence of Armenian subjects. The descriptive content about the Armenians sound very similar to the accounts given by the Armenians themselves. It is the kind of portrayal that derives from Armenian machinators in upholding a form of national thought into opposition to absolutistic attempts of the Ottoman Empire and other Eastern forces that have the capacity to take possession of its peoples.

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[58] Llewellyn, *The Orient Observed*, 104. Also see, Ballerini, *Photography Conscripted*, 229.

[59] Flaubert, *Flaubert in Egypt*, 77.

The confidence behind Western essentialist convictions that have been expressed through

intellectual and aesthetic means may likely stem from Other epistemic approaches that try to

reach a sameness to a Western hegemonic presence.  In the case of the Armenians, this

approach became a silent code of self-presentation--a code that prompted a certain level of

diplomatic performativity, both materially and ideologically, to secure the demographic and

political interests of the Armenian core nation.  It was this silent code that "Orientalist

specialists," such as the Ottoman- Armenian, Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson, who stood in

the forefront of welcoming Western European visitors, used to establish the characteristics of

an Orient that excluded the Christian Armenians.[60] Hence, the Ontological Orientalism that

established the canonical authority of an Oriental image that was created by Western imperial

forces becomes weakened and necessitates further questioning.[61]  Additionally, this

foundational cannon annuls Said's premise that Orientalism tells us more about the

Orientalist than about the Orient.  The proposition is correct as it stands, but the constructed

assumption that the Orientalist is the Euro-American entity is a one-dimensional view that

restricts the discovery of Orientalism's realities.  Perhaps the closest analogy that best

describes the concatenation of Armenian photographers' Ontological Orientalism is Walt

Whitman's famous acknowledgment of Emerson's creative influence to "find himself," "I

was simmering, simmering, simmering; Emerson brought me to a boil."[62] Similarly,

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[60] Gelder and Moor, *Eastward Bound*, 141.

[61] I do not claim that the ontology of Orientalism (Eastern or Western) is an independent phenomenon limited to the empirical and theoretic lines I trace.  I merely try to show that contextual interpretations of the Orient produce very different outcomes in relation to their reference frames.  A Napoleonic sponsored image of Egypt's desert scenes, for example, is not perceived the same way as the sexually charged prints of staged Orientals in Armenian-owned and -operated photography studios.

[62] Quoted in Henry Seidel Canby, *Walt Whitman*, *An American* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943), p. 120.

Orientalism simmered in the exotic ports of the twentieth century B.C.E. Persian Gulf regions;[63] it simmered through the Greek prism of Herodotus as the Persians were seen as the Other of Greco-Roman culture;[64] it simmered during the Middle Ages when Western Christians imagined the Orient as a mystic eschatological location; it simmered in Francois Bernier's *Voyages*;[65] it simmered in Montesquieu's views of Oriental despotism; it simmered in Karl Marx's criticism of Oriental socio-economic immobility; it simmered with the writings and translations of Antoine Galland, Jean Chardin, Denis Diderot; and the list of Orientalists does not begin or end here.  Orientalism has long been simmering, simmering, and simmering; Armenian machinators brought it "to a boil." While some may think that this is a bold claim, it is not a bold claim at all.  I need to remind readers that if a similar claim was made in regard to a dominant force "bringing it to a boil" then perhaps the reception would have been much different.

## A.  *Analysis of Scholarly Literature*

Said approaches his theory and argument of Orientalism by focusing on three main components that inform his treatment of this expansive and complex phenomena.  The interdependent aspects he emphasizes begin with: 1) the academic discipline of Oriental society and culture; 2) the style of thought that is "based upon an ontological and

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[63] Allison Karmel Thomason, *Luxury and Legitimation: Royal Collecting in Ancient Mesopotamia* (Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 215

[64] Nanquette, *Orientalism Versus Occidentalism*, 14.

[65] Bernier, *Voyages de François Bernier*.  These are accounts more about Bernier's Orient rather than an objective regard for the Mideast.

epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'"; and 3) The type of representations that serve Western corporate institutions by "authorizing views of it."[66] All three descriptions, according to Said, offer a range of mechanisms to aid colonial rule. The complexity that Said tries to illustrate in Orientalism's far-reaching apparatus for control over the Orient becomes fragmentary in its coverage, not only because it is missing a major component (the Armenian factor), but also because it posits to singularize a brand of Western dominance throughout all its epochs in history. In all Orientalism's complexities, Said underestimates the temporal and spatial scales that constitute non-Western systematic patterns of influence and psycho-political aspects of myth that have entered and exited Orientalism's structure far before Napoleon's invasion of Egypt.[67]

Said's recipes of Orientalism opened criticism to numerous interdisciplinary connections and new insights that continue to test his theory. Scholars have challenged Said's view that places the Western forces at the center of progress, power and control while sidelining subaltern (gender and racial) approaches that challenge dominant knowledge. In his critique of Said, British historian of imperialism, John M. MacKenzie, refutes his binary characterization, offering a different view that is less political and more variant in its expressions of popular Orientalism. MacKenzie lists a host of structural and cultural forces that demonstrate Orientalism as "endlessly protean" and reproves Saidian critics of Orientalism as "too procrustean" in creating and upholding "a monolithic and binary vision

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[66] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st Vintage Books ed (Vintage, 1978), 2–3.

[67] Although some scholars have suggested that Orientalism's beginnings can be traced back to the Early Dynastic period of Mesopotamia (2900 B.C.E.), for the sake of this particular argument I adhere to Said's time-frame of academic and artistic Orientalism that began with Napoleon's Egyptian expedition.

of the past."[68]  MacKenzie perhaps makes his most important point in commenting, "the artistic record of imperial culture has in fact been one of constant change, instability, heterogeneity and sheer porousness."[69]  By addressing these gaps in Orientalism's knowledge, MacKenzie comes close to pinning some of the critical events that have given Orientalism its "protean" shape.  But Mackenzie limits his observation by taking his criticism at the opposite end of the spectrum. Some of his objections hint that artists are too creative and humanist to partake in an imperialist agenda.  For Mackenzie, the widespread phenomenon of artistic Orientalism is "solely to further the western arts" and to enhance "those intercultural relations."[70]  His ongoing premise asserts that "No true art can ever be founded upon a perpetual parade of cultural superiority, an outpouring of imperialist (sexist/racist) bile."[71]  MacKenzie must have skipped over W.E.B. Du Bois' famous statement "all art is propaganda" when he made his claim.[72]  Justified by his assertion of a highly protean manifestation in Oriental aesthetics, there might be some truth to MacKenzie's statement, but to assume that art has had no role in legitimating the narrative of empire is naive.[73]

The late American political scientist, Murray Edelman, closely examined how works of art became the "shapers of political beliefs" and "the fountainhead from which political

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[68] John MacKenzie, *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester University Press, 1995), 215.

[69] Ibid., 208.

[70] Ibid., 215.

[71] Ibid., 213.

[72] W.E.B. Du Bois, "Criteria of Negro Art," *The Crisis* 32, no. 6 (1926): 290.

[73] Armenian photographers played a central role in pushing their constructed images of the Orient that were widely used by Western artists as main references.  This subject will be further discussed in chapter 4.

discourse" generated.[74]  Thus, in shaping the beliefs of an exotic Orient, contrary to

MacKenzie's positive resonance of Orientalist aesthetics, Western artists became, in reality,

tools for transmitting and furthering the Armenian agenda.[75]  Frequent observation proves,

according to Edelman, "art and ideology ensure that there is no immaculate perception.  By

the same token, there can be no politics without art and ideology."[76]  Through her

sociological perspective, Janet Wolff's opinion echoes Edelman's perspective in that "art

always encodes values and ideology" and "is never innocent of the political and ideological

processes" regardless of its independent approach to that art's discourse.[77]

Orientalism as a discourse continues to generate politically-fused responses in relation

to gendered experiences under colonialism.  The task of including women's accounts in

Orientalism's paradigm is two-fold: to combine Western women's travel accounts about the

Orient and to examine the ways in which "Oriental women" enter into the exotic sceneries of

Eastern promise.  Eighteenth-century French literature expert, Madeleine Dobie, offers her

criticism of a main aspect missing in Said's essay: "[N]one [of Orientalism's critics] has

examined the figure of the Oriental woman as a central category of Orientalist representation

or asked why over the last three centuries Oriental sexuality has occupied such an important

place in the European imaginary."[78]  The Oriental woman in languid poses, slave and harem

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[74] Murray Edelman, *From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions* (The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 2.

[75] In later chapters, this study draws attention to the political dimensions of Armenian artistic machinations and examines the political intentions of the original pictorial program that engendered the alleged Western Orientalist art.

[76] Edelman, *From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions*, 4.

[77] Janet Wolff, *The Social Production of Art* (New York University Press, 1993), 143.

[78] Madeleine Dobie, *Foreign Bodies: Gender, Language, and Culture in French Orientalism* (Stanford University Press, 2001), 3.

scenes are not always what they seem. This assertion derives from my research in Istanbul's

Beyoğlu district (historically known as Pera) when I met an antique photography dealer,

Ibrahim Ozkan, who was generous enough to let me photograph the front and back of a late

nineteen-century albumen print. The image was of a woman's portrait, entitled in French,

"Dame Turque" (Turkish woman) with Pascal Sebah's signature imprint. There were other

portraits of Turkish women in the large pile of photographs, but this particular one contained

writing in Armenian on the back side. It is not clear to whom it was addressed, as part of the

writing has deteriorated. The readable portion, however, includes the following: "to have

their attention and willingness to listen to our plight, even if we have to use our own women

as bait." [79] These words suggest that the Armenian monopoly of photography in the Middle

East was in part used to lure in Western visitors to the region. This scheme is not much

different from current uses of gendered practices in automobile sales. We have become

much too familiar with women's images shown standing next to or resting on flashy cars.

Sociologist Diane Barthel-Bouchier best describes this scenario in a metonymic example that

can be mapped across several gendered domains, including Orientalist images of women.

She highlights how advertisements suggest sexual pleasure and escape by pointing to the

object of pleasure: "The car is an extension of the male that conquers and tames the (female)

road […]. The car becomes the ultimate lover when […] it promises to combine power,

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[79] Pascal Sebah had several photo studios, including "El Chark Societe Photgraphic" that opened in 1857. The photographer's name has confused those who have grouped him with the French Orientalists. But Sebah's Armenian background resulted in adding to the Armenian monopolization on the new profession of photography. For more information on Sebah see, Engin Özendes, *From Sébah & Joaillier to Foto Sabah: Orientalism in Photography* (Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 168–179. Several literary documentations have mentioned Armenian women trying to pass as Turkish women in order to fulfill the image of Oriental stereotypes.

'muscle,' with finesse."[80]  In the context of nineteenth-century Middle-East, Armenian photographers implemented a very similar model as today's blatantly sexist advertisements that portray women as objects and seductresses.  The end-result of both past and current strategic attempts of luring in the "customer" is to sell the final product. For the Armenian photographers, the final product came in the form of a master-plan imbued with ideological and aesthetic content.

The Armenian aim was to gather as many Western travelers as they could attract to the Eastern regions, which in turn, provided the setting for the multilingual Armenian tour guides and photographers to gain the kind of leverage needed to exert influence on Western perceptivity.  Hence, the photo-induced tourist providers were able to propagate a cluster of signs that enforced Oriental stereotypes and at the same time ensured that the enlightened group of Christian Armenians was a separate entity stuck in the midst of their backward Others.[81]  Furthermore, having Western tourists visit the East accelerated the circulation of two kinds of messages: the Muslim *Oriented* East and the Christian East of the Armenians. It was much more effective to spread the plight of the Armenians firsthand -- a tactic used to influence the tourists into recognizing and commiserating with the Armenian difficulties in the region – rather than trying to circulate their message through indirect sources.[82]  The presence of Western visitors meant that their (Armenian) tour guides could implement a performativity of Western attributes in order to show contrast between different "types" of

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[80] Diane Barthel, *Putting On Appearances: Gender and Advertising* (Temple University Press, 2010), 174.

[81] In later chapters I will address specific approaches used by Armenian guides in their master manipulations by addressing the documentations of Western travel writers and artists who were guided by the Armenian lens.

[82] The "indirect sources" refer to religious missionaries, human rights organizations, political cooperatives, diplomatic affiliates, academics and individual activists who aimed to spread the plight of the Armenians.  More on this subject will be thoroughly discussed in chapter 4.

natives residing in the Middle East. Consequently, the Armenian guides made sure that the

tourists' appetite for astonishment in Orient's sublime spaces and its cultural (stereotypical)

associations were fulfilled. It was through the collaboration with the tourists themselves that

Armenian guides were able to manipulate Oriental stereotypes and to allot a Westernized

profile to their own group.  The photographers, tour guides, interpreters and tourists all have

contributed to what Jean Baudrillard has termed symbolic "sign values."[83] Images of "La

Dame Turque" and other categorical stereotypes of the Oriental woman became a constructed

sign value that tempted foreign visitors to take possession of her Oriental aura and to be

enticed to buy photographs (among other objects) that refer to the quality and sensation of

that aura.


 *B. Physiognomy and Passing*

On one hand, Western visitors arrived to the Orient to satisfy their needs for escaping

mundane realities; on the other hand, they acquired remembrances or a "cluster of signs" that

enabled them to relate and connect with the native group that had been more akin to their

familiar standards of cultural norms.  It was precisely this familiarity that prompted the

Western visitor to trust and to believe the fabricated representations expressed by their

Armenian guides and to discredit some of the vital truths recounted by the Muslim Orientals.

Social theorist David Hesmondhalgh substitutes the term "symbolic creativity" for the word

"art" to highlight the importance of how the producers of cultural objects have manipulated

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[83] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation* (University of Michigan Press, 1994), 6.  Also in, Jean
Baudrillard and Sylvère Lotringer, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities* (Semiotext(e), 2007), 64.

the symbols creatively to a degree that they have become the chief mediators of socio-cultural and political change.[84]

Armenian cultural producers of "signs" often negotiated with the master planners of Armenian political machinators in terms that reinforced their mutual recognition. Continuing in this gendered arena, Armenian women were positioned at the socio-political intersection between consumerism and diplomacy. It was in this intersection that Armenian women became a decisive and central part of the production of signs deployed by their men who turned a blind eye to their traditional customs that strictly regulated Armenian women's chaste roles. The view of Armenian woman's honor and chastity was often relinquished and strict codes were softened to allow for actions that aimed to gain political advantages. At this intersection that signifies a tactical site for Armenian ethno-politics, Armenian women achieved an unexpected mode of agency that allowed them to not only use their bodies as signs of negotiable commodity but to also become the operators of those signs. In other words, Armenian women re-shaped the circulation of commodities by becoming the very signs they dispersed for all foreign eyes to see.[85] In manipulating their appearance so as to exert some control over the perception of Western visitors, they were able to alter the fluid and multilayered identities of their Others into androcentric signs. As such, the Armenian represents the Other through the self; a self that had to be concealed in order to reveal a fabricated Orient, but in truth, it was the Armenian who had to be revealed in order to

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[84] David Hesmondhalgh, *The Cultural Industries*, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE, 2007), 4–5.

[85] In this scenario, the capability of Armenian women's ability to "pass" as the exotic Other overturns the institutionalized view that sees passing as a negation of subjectivity and denial of one's race. For a closer look on the traditional approach to "passing" see Anna Camaiti Hostert, *Passing: A Strategy to Dissolve Identities and Remap Differences* (Vancouver: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), 12.

conceal the real picture of the Near East. To the Armenian machinators, the dangerous practice of manipulating the visual was a mere peccadillo that became a necessary step to implement seductive forms of political operability under Ottoman conditions.

Joan DelPlato is one of the few art historians to address Armenian women's ability to deceive Western visitors and artists by "passing" as Georgian, Circassian, Persian or Turkish.[86] But DelPlato does not pursue the issue of passing any further, since Armenian women were, after all, thrown into the seraglio pile along with women from other ethnic groups. Armenian women, however, were not one of many in the batch of Sultan's harem, as they became influential conspirators for their grand strategic national objectives. DelPlato's research acknowledges that "stereotypically, Armenian women 'do not take kindly to slavery and are difficult to manage' […] unlike Circassian women who, some writers claim, went [to the harem] gladly."[87] The politicized identity of Armenian women has confused the distinguishable signs that seemingly fit the domains of the Oriental. It is not surprising, therefore, that scholars in the field of Orientalism often faced a puzzling situation between facts and the interpretation of the Armenian subject. In revisiting her example, DelPlato noted that Armenian women were most often identified as Circassians, but the conflicting detail in her passage describing the "difficult to manage" Armenian and the "willing Circassian" confused her point that the willing Circassian women could have actually been Armenian.

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[86] Joan DelPlato, *Multiple Wives, Multiple Pleasures: Representing the Harem, 1800-1875* (Vancouver: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), 42.

[87] Ibid.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, mythology became cohesive with ethno-national

sentiments of belonging that mobilized the Ottoman Armenians around their nationalist

agendas.[88] Among the more repetitive narratives retrieved from the past was the "Pure and

Spotless Goddess" Anahit, known also as the "Mother of Chastity" and the benefactress of

all people.[89] She was likened to the Roman Diana, which was yet another way to attach

associations to the Europeanized facets of civility. Anahit thus exemplifies the

characteristics of the ideal woman. Her chastity signifies the purity of Armenia that must

guard herself from intruders. Finally, Anahit's "spotlessness" served to specify appropriate

responses to sexual fecundity among women. In fact, Armenian women partaking in the

political master plan did emulate Anahit's "spotlessness" by simply removing the tainted

"spots" they so deceitfully acquired and placing them on their Others. It was precisely the

(re)applicability of these defiled "spots" that made it easier for Armenian women to draw in

the kind of attention and attentiveness needed from Western sources to establish various

kinds of oppositions against Ottoman authorities. When Armenians enacted the myth central

to Anahit's glorified purity, it was a national self-image that was being promoted to influence

their chances of appearing more effective in the eyes of Western leaders. In other words, the

Anahitian symbolic enactment offered the Armenians with a capacity to codify the national-

self alongside Western ideals. If Lord Bryce had known about the invisible "spots" that had

been treacherously amassed in the names of their Muslim neighbors, he would perhaps never

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[88] Mardiros Harootioon Ananikian, *Armenian Mythology: Stories of Armenian Gods and Goddesses, Heroes and Heroines, Hells & Heavens, Folklore & Fairy Tales* (Indo-European Publishing, 2010), iv. Ananikian highlights some of the writers who laid the foundation of the scientific treatment of Armenian mythology.

[89] Louis Angelo Boettiger, *Armenian Legends and Festivals* (University of Minnesota, 1920), 26. Also in *The New Armenia* (New Armenia Publishing Company, 1918), 120.

have declared that the Armenians "constitute the most civilized and progressive and producing element in the environment in which they live.[90]

The famous French phenomenological philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, approached the role of perception in understanding the world through the metaphysical, epistemological and phenomenological perspectives. He has provided ways of thinking about human discernment, which he claims are often flawed: 'No thing, no side of a thing, shows itself except by actively hiding the others, denouncing them in the act of concealing them. To see is as a matter of principle to see farther than one sees, to reach a latent existence. The invisible is the outline and the depth of the visible. The visible does not admit of pure positivity any more than the invisible does."[91] Merleau-Ponty's thought connects with the psychological methodology utilized by Armenian producers of culture, especially in the structure of performance by women's signifying practices. A clear example of the consequences formed by these practices can be seen in John Richardson Auldjo's accounts of his visit to Constantinople. Amid Auldjo's many occupations and talents, writing and painting seemed to have provided concepts that dealt with reality and helped to interpret his view of the world. He had always wanted to personally partake in the aesthetic arena of Orientalist painting with the intention that he was going to find the most beautiful Oriental woman in the Ottoman Empire. When in Constantinople, Auldjo tried to quickly sketch some of the local women around the neighborhood, but much to his astonishment, the local women reacted by spitting in his face. Auldjo was running out of hope of finding the

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[90] James Bryce and Garo Pasdermadjian, "Armenia and Her Claims," *The Armenian Herald* 1, no. 4 (March 1918).

[91] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, Richard C. McCleary, trans. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 20–21.

ultimate Oriental beauty or any type of Oriental woman who would pose for him, until the

owner of a boardinghouse in Pera, Madame Giuseppino Vitale, invited Auldjo to her house

and "gave him the opportunity" to be introduced to a beautiful Turkish lady.[92]  Auldjo

described her as the "perfect specimen of Oriental beauty" and persuaded her to pose for him

without her veil.  Auldjo's fascination with this Turkish beauty was echoed passionately in

his journal entry:

> Her eyes and eyelashes were intensely black; though I suspect the latter were
> stained of a dye deeper than the natural one.  Her complexion was beautifully
> fair, with the slightest tint of carnation suffused over the cheek.  Her lips!
> sweet lips! 'that make us sigh even to have seen such.'  Her glossy hair, which
> was bound with a kalemkeir or painted handkerchief, representing a whole
> parterre of flowers, fell in loose curls upon her shoulders, and down her back:
> she wore a short black velvet jacket, embroidered with gold lace; trowsers of
> sky blue silk; an under-jacket of pink crape, and one of those beautiful
> transparent shirts which ravish the beholder, and 'half reveal the charms they
> fain would hide.'  A magnificent Persian shawl encircled her waist, which had
> nature's own form, never having been compressed by the cruel bondage of
> stays.[93]

Shortly after Auldjo's visit to the Ottoman Empire, English travel writer, Julia Pardoe,

discovered through her investigation that Auldjo's Turkish-Oriental beauty was not a Turkish

girl; she was Armenian.  In her close observations of Ottoman women from different ethnic

groups, Pardoe remarked on Auldjo's Oriental beauty:

> Not the least lovely among them is the fair girl who, in a spirit of frolic,
> consented to be presented to an English traveler, (Mr. Auldjo) as a Turkish
> lady, but whose style of beauty is perfectly dissimilar from that of the nation
> which she personated; the dark eyes, the henna-tipped fingers, and the
> costume, which is essentially the same as that of the harem, were, however,
> quite sufficient to deceive an unpracticed eye; and the lively Armenian, to
> whom I was introduced at my express desire, tells the tale of her successful

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[92] John Auldjo, *Journal of a Visit to Constantinople, and Some of the Greek Islands in the Spring and Summer of 1833* (London: Green & Longman, 1835), 159.

[93] Ibid., 160.

> deceit with a self-complacency and enjoyment perfectly amusing. Had she more mind, and less *embonpoint*, an Armenian beauty would be perfect![94]

Pardoe must have misread the Armenian girl's "spirit of frolic" since it was a different kind of game she was playing. Some scholars consider Julia Pardoe as one of the forerunners of the feminist historians during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[95] Yet, Pardoe's approach appears not only chauvinistic but also carries with her a Western-centric view of how the Armenian girl should have behaved. Pardoe's approach requires the assumption that to "frolic" and to become "self-complacent" is to be a mindless devotee of self-indulgent, superficial, recreational pastimes. What she overlooked, however, was the fact that it takes a sharp mind to seem mindless. Elizabeth Ann Robertson, an expert in gender and religion in Middle English literature, best clarifies this experience by highlighting subversive methods that give a woman's voice legitimacy and power, but the final reach of her voice, "is restricted by categories that define a woman as mindless."[96] It is highly probable that Pardoe's impression of the Armenian girl obeying Mr. Auldjo's wishes to "present her," is inaccurate.[97] It is rather more feasible that Mr. Auldjo himself unsuspectingly consented to illustrate the Oriental beauty.[98] When Pardoe commented that

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[94] Julia Pardoe, *The City of the Sultan and Domestic Manners of the Turks, in 1836* (London: H. Colburn, 1838), 161.

[95] Karen O'Brien, *Women and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 217.

[96] Elizabeth Ann Robertson, *Early English Devotional Prose and the Female Audience* (Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1990), 75.

[97] A body of literature and archival evidence suggest that Mr. Auldjo's experience was not isolated. It was not unusual for Armenians, especially Armenian women, to perform the backward Oriental. Their display of Orientalism was an intrinsic part of yoking themselves to the Western dominant forces. A more comprehensive account on this subject will be examined in chapter four.

[98] The political machinations of the Armenians involved strategies of representation, which utilized the normalizing of the Oriental body through material constructions.

the Armenian girl's beauty is "dissimilar from that of the nation," she forgot that the

Armenian girl was presenting herself in the absence of her tainted "spots" and possibly

escalating the performance of her Armenianness. If Pardoe's idea of "nation" is the Turkish

women, we need to remember that if it was not for the stark similarities of their

physiognomic features, Armenians would not have the need to go through such exertions in

order to make themselves distinguishable from the Turks.


## C. *Messianic Hope and Faith-Based Politics*

Armenian "types" were not restricted only to the letter-press. The "Armenian woman

type" became a popular category with a slightly different audience. While the stereotypical

images of Oriental women in sexualized spaces (baths, harems, slave-markets) circulated

"for the creatures of a [Western] male power-fantasy," the repetitive images of Armenian

women in Western(ized) dress, usually depicted holding a book to show elegance and

eruditeness, were circulated among Euro-American social reform organizations and national

administrative forces. One of the more noticeable examples was instituted by Armenian

women's crypto-diplomatic groups that targeted their efforts to benefit from the U.S. based

WCTU (Woman's Christian Temperance Union) in spreading the Armenian message. It was

a message that was distributed, according to the historian Ian Tyrrell, by showing contrasting

images of the cultured Armenian and the lecherous and violent Turk, which "homogenized

the [Turkish] enemy as a subhuman 'Other.'" Even Henry Morgenthau expressed that

"Armenian girls represent a high type of womanhood and the Young Turks, in their crude,

intuitive way, recognized that the mingling of their blood with the Turkish population would exert a eugenic influence upon the whole."

Victoria Rowe, a leading Armenian women's historian, notes that Armenian women conveyed multiple visions of their role to construct the outsider's view of their distinctiveness "in order to create an active and visible role for women in the formation of their national identity." The Armenian woman must have placed the stamp of Goddess Anahit on every foreign visitor's psyche, especially the visitors with political influence. Samuel Sullivan Cox was mesmerized by everything Oriental, but his observation, by quoting De Amicis, of an Armenian woman showed a class of its own: "'The crowd passes in great waves, each one of which is of a hundred colors, and every group of persons represents a new type of people. Whatever can be imagined that is most extravagant in type, costume, and social class, may there be seen within the space of twenty paces and ten minutes of time. Behind a throng of Turkish porters, who pass running and bending under enormous burdens, advances a sedan-chair, inlaid with ivory and mother of pearl, and bearing an Armenian lady.'"[99]

Ambassador Cox's observation of the Armenian woman as an "Anahitian" equivalent served as a garment of purity and of Christianness among the "crowds that pass in great waves." Novelist Nancy Kricorian best describes the Armenian women's purity by emphasizing that "all unmarried Armenian women and girls are virgins, even the one who are not."[100] It is likely that Cox would have agreed with the French travel writer, Charles Pertusier, in his claim that "the Armenian women are generally correct by principle, and

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[99] Samuel Sullivan Cox, *Diversions of a Diplomat in Turkey* (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1893), 387.
[100] Nancy Kricorian, Zabelle, Grove Atlantic, New York, 2009, p. 24.

perhaps also by disposition.  Their most marked characteristic is an excessive devotion."[101]

Most Euro-American observations that have come close to the Armenian women's "charms,"

describe women's devotion to their Armenian identity, family and notion of home that are

valued not only at the individual level, but also at the national level.

    Armenian women's intimate involvement in creating their "spotless" public profile had a

huge impact on attracting foreign powers to intervene by pressuring the Ottoman Sultanate to

implement reforms.  The fervent lawyer and diplomat, James Watson Gerard, actively

promoted U.S. support for Armenia by demanding that "the cause of Armenia is not to be

denied.  For centuries, chained under Turkish barbarism, they have kept alive the flame of

Christianity."  It was the promotion of this "Christian flame" -- a repeated religious rhetoric –

that was employed as a political resource to justify Armenian political agendas.  Christian

sisterhood became a unifying motivator in encouraging solidarity with the Armenians.  In a

letter addressed to the president of the BWTA (British Women's Temperance Association),

Lady Isabella Caroline Somerset, it was reported that the "Armenian Women of

Constantinople" voiced their human plight and their quest to mobilize with an international

feminist community that would bring Armenian women's predicaments to the attention of

Western forces.  Sisterhood as a survival tool was an effective strategy that encouraged

Somerset to launch a rescue fund for the Armenians.  According to the modern British

historian, Michelle E. Tusan, "for Somerset, helping Armenian women was inextricably

linked to the elevation of English womanhood."[102]  Infused by the hermeneutic key to true

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[101] Charles Pertusier, *Picturesque Promenades in and near Constantinople and on the Waters of the Bosphorus* (London: Sir Richard Phillips and Co, 1820), 124.
[102] Michelle E. Tusan, "Humanitarian Journalism: The Career of Lady Isabella Somerset," in F. Elizabeth Grey, ed., *Women in Journalism at the Fin-de-Siècle: Making a Name for Herself*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 84.

Christianity, English womanhood shaped the idea that Armenia ought to be the moral responsibility of Britain. The pressure from Armenian women's activism and Somerset's influence pushed the Salisbury government to intervene in 1896. While the WCTU and the BWTA sponsored some of the Armenian refugees to immigrate to the United States and Europe, Lord Salisbury was unable to break through the diplomatic obstacles, as he did not want to "risk the peace of Europe." In a letter written on July 18, 1895 to Britain's Prime Minister, William Ewart Gladstone, the colonial administrator and first Baron Stanmore, Arthur Hamilton-Gordon, expresses his concerns for the Armenian condition: "I trust the Armenian Question may not be lost sight of. Salisbury himself has not any love for the Turks, but there are many of his friends and followers who will do their best to hinder any effective interference." Exactly one year later, on the wake of the Armenian bloodbaths, Gladstone responded: "What a horrible business the whole Armenian question is. The worst of it is that so few people seem to care about it, or even to care to know about it." The Armeno-Western Christian sisterhood had already opened a new path of diplomacy in the midst of complicated involvements within patriarchal power politics that wanted to have a tyrannical hold of their nationalistic goals. At the least, the intersubjective sisterhood efforts undermined the excessive exercise of control by traditional politics, recognizing that defiant challenges by subordinate groups can act to save a few more lives.

Several postcolonial feminist scholars have critiqued the absence of a gendered analysis in Edward Said's *Orientalism*. Sara Mills, Reina Lewis, Lisa Lowe, and Meyda Yeğenoğlu are among the notable critics to analyze the travel writings of Western women. They all put a strong emphasis on exposing the inconsistencies offered in women's perspectives within colonial discourse. Sara Mills, who identifies herself as a Marxist feminist, explains that

women's texts often do not neatly fit the theoretical framework of colonial discourse. Mills criticizes several theorists who "lack an overall perspective of the role of women's travel texts and the discourse of Orientalism, since they insist on treating these women's texts as expressions of personal endeavor and individualism rather than as part of a larger enterprise." Mills' focus on the need to begin taking Western women's accounts seriously, pushed Oriental women's dialectics to take a backseat to Western feminist methods and opinions. One of her main concerns involve questioning "how these women managed to have their work published, or why they were and are still read to such an extent." Mills explains that the acceptance of women's texts of the Orient "simply call on notions of vicarious pleasure on the part of women readers not able to go on such expeditions themselves."[103] Mills must have been unaware of her contradictory argument recorded above. On one hand, she claims women's texts do not accommodate the homogeneity of Orientalism, and on the other hand, the masculinist approaches that women themselves incorporated in their travel writings promoted the need for women's accounts of the Orient.

Like Mills, Reina Lewis suggests that without Western women's texts, Orientalist discourse compromises the validity and accuracy of its field. Lewis' account of a more valid illustration of the Orient vis-à-vis women's writings may have certain feminist nuances, but the overall structure of Orientalism does not differ much from men's depictions of the Other. My own disposition runs parallel to Meyda Yeğenoğlu's claim that "Western women, as the excluded other of Western men, nevertheless occupy a masculine position in relation to

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[103] Reina Lewis and Sara Mills, *Feminist Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2003, p. 25

Oriental women."[104]  The deeper complicity with a masculinist imaging of sexuality in the

Orient, allowed for woman's writings to, in Yeğenoğlu's words, "unveil Muslim women in

the name of liberation."[105]  The homogeneous continuity involved in Orientalism's genealogy

can be difficult to disrupt when its dominant trajectory (from an external Euro-American

gaze) limits our understanding of the dynamics involved in the phenomenon.  In her attempt

to subvert Said's totalizing idea of Orientalism, Lisa Lowe has persistently reminded us that

"Orientalism is a tradition of representation that is crossed, intersected and engaged by other

representations."[106]  Some of the key considerations that Lowe called into the foreground

concern the heterogeneity of counterhegemonic interests of multiple representations among

and within class, race, language, and social relations of human subjectivity in Ottoman

Turkey.  Lowe's heated contention that highlights the heterogeneity of "different 'fronts' in

which the struggles of cultural politics, feminism or anticolonialism may take place,"

neglects to mention the empire's largest non-Muslim minority population – the Armenians –

who have themselves operated by putting opposition into a supportive place within its

hegemonic structure.[107]  Much of what may be typically assumed to an oppressed group of

unpeople, is actually the complex intersection of hegemonic resistance tied to socio-political

machinations, and is designed to persuade the Euro-American forces to be the accomplices of

the Armenians in defeating the ruling Ottoman leadership. In simple words, what is coded as

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[104] Meyda Yeğenoğlu, *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), ix.

[107] Ibid., 197.

Euro-American Orientalism is the very calculated strategy of Armenian machinators in an attempt for a systemic takeover of territorial control.

### D.  (Dis)orienting Orientalism

The critical engagements with Edward Said's work instigated brutal attacks on his Orientalist epistemology.  One of the major criticisms that appeared repeatedly questioned Said's absolutist viewpoint of the Western discourse on the Orient. Aijaz Ahmad, James Clifford, Dennis Porter, and Robert Young have been among the most vocal critics to problematize Orientalism's ahistorical and monolithic conception of imperial power.  All four critics have emphasized the ways in which Said's argument has inadvertently essentialized the entire West, while applying ahistorical means of selective discourse analysis.  One of Aijaz Ahmad's long lists of objections on Said's "generic" approach to Orientalism prompted this observation:

> But what is remarkable is that with the exception of Said's own voice, the only voices we encounter in the book are precisely those of the very Western canonicity which, Said complains, has always silenced the Orient.  Who is silencing whom, who is refusing to permit a historicized encounter between the voice of the so-called 'Orientalist' and the many voices that 'Orientalism' is said so utterly to suppress, is a question that is very hard to determine as we read this book.  It sometimes appears that one is transfixed by the power of the very voice that one debunks.[108]

Ahmad not only questions Said's monolithic and ahistorical understanding of a structure called the Orient, but also disputes that Orientalism was already being critiqued by Eastern

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[108] Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (London: Verso, 1992), 172–173.

scholars prior to Said's text.[109]  It is because of their positionality outside the West, Ahmad

claims, that Eastern scholars who addressed the same Orientalist issues prior to Said's

*Orientalism* could not receive the scholarly attention they deserved.[110]  Ahmad's bias of

Said's positionality as a North-American elite scholar, although significant on many levels,

does not supplant Said's exceptional erudition and his suitably powerful style of

communication.

In commenting on Edward Said's work, educational theorist, Michael Apple argued,

"Authors are not mechanically determined by ideology or class, or history.  However, authors

are very much in the history of their societies, 'shaping and shaped by that history and their

social experience.'"[111]  It seems as though Ahmad is scolding Said for belonging to the upper

echelons of Western academia, and for posturing in an intellectual locus that obfuscates his

Arab voice.[112]  Ahmad forgets that Said is first an Eastern scholar, and although he may be

"shaped by" both Eastern and Western educational attainments, his position as an elite

scholar does not brand him as a pure Western academic, and he is no less Palestinian for the

ability to gage his academic voice to level with multi-dimensional tones in its representation

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[109] See for example, Abdul Latif Tibawi, *English-speaking Orientalists: A Critique of Their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism* (Geneva: Islamic Centre, 1965).  Also, Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and Its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism* (London: F. Cass, 1977).

[110] Ahmad, *In Theory*, 176.

[111] Michael W. Apple, *Cultural Politics and Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996), ix.  Apple borrowed the quotation from Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1994), xxii.

[112] Ahmad has critiqued Said for not addressing the diverse voices of Eastern scholars (speaking on the same Orientalist objectification of the Other) in *Orientalism*. Criticisms of Said's success as a worldwide esteemed intellectual, which Ahmad hinted to have reached supposedly by posturing in Western intellectual spaces, are rather absurd.  While I do agree with Ahmad that Western contemporary methodologies can distort and limit our scholarly direction, his assessment to discredit some of Said's exemplary range of scholarship has more to do with his own posturing in the face of academic predictors of his erudite capabilities.

of the discourse of power.  Nonetheless, Ahmad continues to discredit Said's theoretical

framework for being so deeply grounded in Western intellectual traditions.

Said's theoretical difficulties, according to Ahmad, point to inconsistencies between

his use of humanism and Foucault's methodological framework that establishes a "regime of

truth" to control power and knowledge.[113]  The use of Foucault's Discourse theory, Ahmad

explains, is itself "inseparable from Nietzschean anti-humanism and anti-realist theories of

representation."[114]  British postcolonial theorist, Robert Young, describes that Orientalism's

ambivalent oscillation between the Foucauldian discursive formations and Said's humanistic

position transpire in contradiction, and "that anti-humanist Orientalism was the product of a

humanist culture suggests a complexity that Said seems unwilling to address."[115]  Said

appropriates, or more accurately, misappropriates Foucault's stance on humanism by using

the very Western classical humanistic thought to criticize Euro-American representations of

the Orient.[116]  James Clifford, a historian of cultural anthropology, has developed his critique

along the same lines as Ahmad's and Young's observations, calling Said's humanist

perspectives disharmonious with Foucault's theories on the subject.  Said's strategically

selective application of Foucault's theory, especially in the arena of representation, caused

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[113]Aijaz Ahmad, "Between Orientalism and Historicism," in *Orientalism: a Reader*, ed. A.L. Macfie
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 290. For further discussion on the "regime of truth" see Michel
Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon, 1980),
131–132.

[114] Ahmad, *In Theory*, 164.

[115] Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1992), 131.

[116] Foucault rejected the notion of humanism and its universal ideals that measure the standards of human
interests.  For Foucault, humanism is a form of normalized domination and suppressed inadequacies.  Aijaz
Ahmad describes Foucault to be "possibly the most rigidly anti-Humanist writer of our time." (p.286, in
"Between Orientalism and Historicism").

critics to attack his practice of "repeating the very structures that he censures."[117]  Both

Clifford and Young took issue with Said's refusal to offer an alternative to the phenomenon.

They recognize that Said distanced himself from pursuing an alternate theoretical model

against Orientalist knowledge for the mere reason that the Orient is a pure Western

construction and therefore does not require his retort towards motive-driven criticisms.

Six years after *Orientalism*'s publication, however, Said acknowledged his critics'

concerns about the absence of alternative forms of knowledge by posing the question

(unanswered in his 1978 text) of "how knowledge that is non-dominative and non-coercive

can be produced in a setting that is deeply inscribed with the politics, the considerations, the

positions, and the strategies of power."[118] Said acknowledges also that the notion of "non-

coercive knowledge is deliberately anti-Foucault," and candidly remarks that his work is not

always conceived in the Foucauldian vein: "I was already aware of the problems of

Foucault's determinism, his Spinoza quality where everything is always assimilated and

acculturated.  You can already see it at the end of *Discipline and Punish*.  *Orientalism* is

theoretically inconsistent, and I designed it that way: I didn't want Foucault's method, or

anybody's method, to override what I was trying to put forward."[119] Foucault's conceptual

framework of discourse and episteme served well for Said when mapping his political

emphasis of Oriental stereotypes (tropes, metaphors and repetitive themes) in Western

representations.  But Said soon detached himself from Foucault's line of anti-humanist

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[117] Young, *White Mythologies*, 127.  A similar claim is made by James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 271.
[118] Edward W. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," *Cultural Critique* no. 1 (October 1, 1985): 91.

[119] Edward W. Said, *Power, Politics, and Culture*, Gauri Viswanathan, ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2005), 80.

reasoning that bare his concern with the ways power operates through social structures, but showed no interest in making attempts to change it.[120]

For Foucault, the idea of humanism is the justification of power. He does not try to challenge this paradox; he simply affirms it. In a 1977 interview, Foucault professed: "In short, humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes the possibility of power being seized. The theory of the subject (in the double sense of the word) is at the heart of humanism and this is why our culture has tenaciously rejected anything that could weaken its hold upon us."[121] Foucault's assessment on the entry of power in humanistic constructions leaves no room for freedom or resistance.[122]

It is this point of theoretic departure that leads Said to present a telling passage in *Orientalism*'s new preface: "Yet unlike Michel Foucault, to whose work I am greatly indebted, I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like *Orientalism*."[123] Said's attempt to clarify his position away from Foucault's "passive and sterile"[124] approach to power was, yet again, met with hostile criticism. But now, the discussion of a serious

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[120] Edward W. Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 220–221.

[121] Michel Foucault, "Revolutionary Action: 'Until Now'," in *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 221–222.

[122] Contrary to Foucault's somewhat sterile view of how power operates, Said makes it clear that knowledge is not limited to the notion of an "all-pervasive power." It can serve also as an emancipatory product to intervene and interrupt all forms of tyranny and domination. While Said's position is to bring about justice, Foucault believes that without the ability to destroy power, justice will only help recompose other modes of power.

[123] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 25th Anniversary Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 23.

[124] Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, 121.

theoretical assessment seems to have vanished with, perhaps, not well-intentioned strategies

to reduce Said's ideological distancing from Foucault into a feminizing *quadre*. Said's

critics could not help but fall into the trap of binary thinking that led them (and us) far from

theoretical usefulness. The widespread binaristic underpinnings that Said's loud-voiced

critics seemed to have relied on, involve psychoanalytic associations that draw on hierarchies

implicit in male/female oppositions. Said's critical qualification of Foucault was received

contemptuously in the widely held accounts of those who gendered their claim by situating

Said as female (possibly a femme fatale gold-digger) who used his "feminized" Oriental

predisposition to seek Foucault's intellectual (Western-male) resources to achieve his end

goal.

In his support for Clifford's disparagement of Said, Hamid Dabashi puts it more

directly by reaffirming: "What Clifford was in effect saying was that Said takes from

Foucault what he wants (dismantling representation) and then abandons him when Foucault

becomes a theoretical troublemaker (disallows the critic to assume the authorial position of

an omniscient narrator)."[125] Dabashi's paraphrased statement can easily suggest that Edward

Said maintains a feminine position taken from the clichéd narrative of the "woman [Arab-

Other; Said] who left him [power/knowledge; Foucault] for a richer man [deconstruction,

difference; Derrida]," or, for the sake of Dabashi's argument, "she left him because he was

too possessive" (not allowing space for the theorizing of resistance).[126] The criticism of

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[125] Hamid Dabashi, *Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 93.

[126] Edward Said maintains that Foucault "fails to realize that where there is power, there is resistance, and resistance implies a change for the better," in Abdirahman A. Hussein, *Edward Said: Criticism and Society* (London: Verso, 2004), 199.

Said's handling of Foucault unfolds rather psychopathologically, making the subject of Orientalism secondary to the stirring spectacle of Said-Foucault histrionics that transpire in the minds of critics.

British historian, writer, and Arabist, Robert Irwin, gives his own interpretation by claiming that Said pursued Foucault as a "master to think with," only making use of his theory when it was "convenient to be a Foucaultdian."[127] Cultural critic, Mustapha Marrouchi, joins this discussion through his text, entitled "Counternarratives, Recoveries, Refusals," which employs an inquisitorial approach to probe Said's sincerity towards his intellectual partnership with Foucault.  Marrouchi's conspicuous questioning of Said's strategic motives suggests the need to scrutinize the notion of "how far is Said indebted to Michel Foucault, a social critic and philosopher he both admired and disposed of?"[128]  Such a question might lead us to ponder why Marrouchi would be so curious to seek a response in this matter and how is his interrogative mode fit for a critical perusal of Said's work? Perhaps Marrouchi's approach is comparable to the other critics mentioned earlier in attributing Said's feminized-Oriental *dis*position to his Westernized erudite position (that would have otherwise not been reached without Foucault's masculinized-Western intellectual impact).  What Said's critics are implying, in a sense, is this notion of a "gold-digger's" temporary admiration for affluence (Foucault's intellectual wealth) that made it possible for Said to reach his own intellectual *jouissance*.

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[127] Robert Irwin, *Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism and Its Discontents* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2006), 289–290.

[128] Mustapha Marrouchi, "Counternarratives, Recoveries, Refusals," *Boundary 2* Vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 209.

Edward Said had a comeback to his critics' coded doublespeak. In an interview with Anne Beezer and Peter Osborne for *Radical Philosophy,* a UK-based journal, Said clarified the view of his position and with confidence admitted: "I won't say I abandoned Foucault, but I'd say I'd gotten what there was to be gotten out of Foucault by about the time *Discipline and Punish* appeared, in the mid-1970s."[129] Said's surprisingly blunt affirmation could possibly stand for his own doublespeak in response to his critics. If Said had complied to his feminized position as his critics had placed him, his unapologetic rejoinder demonstrates that to a certain extent, the supposed "gold digger" symbolizes an archetypal emblem of triumph thrown at a Western male-dominated world.

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[129] Said, *Power, Politics, and Culture*, 214.

### III. What is Known as Orientalism?

The pressing need to rationalize the events, tropes and issues that identify Orientalism from an established origin is to err in the direction of hindering the constitutive validity of its hermeneutics. Many of the claims made in literary criticism regarding the usefulness of knowing the onset of Orientalism, do not serve much as a basis for an epistemic process towards the truth, but more so, they serve to define the Western dominant nations' sense of themselves. In the course of this chapter, I will attempt to resituate what we "know" about Orientalism within an Armenian context.

Edward Said points to Aeschylus' Persians as the point of inception for the construct of Orientalism, but for a more tangible foundation of the phenomenon, he chose Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, in 1798, and subsequent Napoleonic recruitment of "experts" that encoded the "real Orient". Some claim that the viability of Orientalism as we understand it today was led by Silvestre de Sacy who instigated more Western specialists to generate works on Islamic studies, than did the Muslim scholars. Yet others insist on the claim that German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is the main "point of departure" of Orientalism since he has proclaimed the Orient as the children of history[130] and that Eastern civilizations have an "unhistorical history".[131] While these assertions of a beginning phase can be justified on their own merit, the locus of each claim, where the magnitude of Orientalism's supposed original birth-site has caused reverberations, are more or less running on a similar scale of impact within the scope of Orientalizing agendas. It is, therefore, a more plausible

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[130] Teemu Ruskola, *Legal Orientalism* (Harvard University Press, 2013), 42–45. Ivan Kalmar, *EarlyOrientalism:Imagined Islam and the Notion of Sublime Power* (Routledge, 2013), chapter 8.
[131] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (G. Bell and Sons, 1902), 112.

idea to leave Orientalism's origin to the origin itself, wherever and whenever that may be. Determining a specific site for Orientalism's genesis is not only a problematic undertaking, but some scholars maintain that it can easily be an Orientalist mission. Cultural critic, Ziauddin Sardar, rightly observes that taking on this kind of mission– the pressing need to locate a beginning or an onset of division– is a Western self-conscious need to "demonstrate the Otherness of the Orient, its separation from the Western birth" that pursues not so much the origin of Orientalism, but more accurately, the origin of Western imperialist thought.[132] Sardar expressed his view of Western self-consciousness in a crisis that "demanded the creation of a conception of the Orient that would permit its palpable threat to the entire edifice of Western understanding to be distanced, denigrated and placed beyond, in the outer darkness where it belonged."[133]   Introducing yet another point of inception, "the history of Orientalism begins with the history of Islam" argues Sardar.[134] Palestinian Arab historian, Abdul Latif Tibawi, holds the same position as Sardar when he claims that "from the beginning, the roots of Judeo-Christian hostility to Islam were seen in the Qur'an."[135]  These anti-Islamic aggressions that were formulated in Orientalistic understanding of epistemological (intellectual/doctrinal), and political spheres, facilitated Western predatory practices of Orient's religio-cultural materials to construe difference in a totalistic manner. All these "inceptions" have in common the stark division of Self and Other or at times we find the (Western) Self within the Other as is the case of the Americas in the age of Exploration.  The imperial interpretation of America as the "extreme West" was rooted in

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[132] Sardar Ziauddin, *Orientalism* (McGraw-Hill International, 1999), 17.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Abdul Latif Tibawi, "English-Speaking Orientalists," *The Islamic Quarterly* 8 (1964): p.25.

Christian cosmology, which gave Western Europeans a psychological advantage over Other peoples.[136] The two Iberian monarchies, Portugal and Spain, protected their so-called discoveries through papal influence and decree that granted the two countries lands already discovered in the New World.[137] The Orient, according to cultural anthropologist Walter Mignolo, was an invention of Pope Alexander VI Borgia. In 1494, the papal line of demarcation appropriated the planet by dividing it into Indias Occidentales and Indias Orientales.[138] At Tordesillas, Spain, diplomats for the two countries met and signed the treaty that divided the entire non-Christian world between the Spanish and Portuguese imperial interests.[139] The Treaties of Tordesillas and later Saragossa (1529) initiated "the historical foundations of global linear thinking, the pillars of Western civilization, and the imperial march of modernity and coloniality."[140] Mignolo claims that it is on the basis of this division that the French, Dutch, and English were able to build their own empires.[141] The

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[136] Western Europeans had no doubt that Christianity was the only true faith. It was their belief that non-Christians had no real right to the lands on which they lived. Furthermore, the colonists associated the darker skin tones of Native Americans with paganism as a way to justify their "rights" to the confiscated goods from the nonbelieving Others. For documentation on the sense of Western European superiority see, Nashid Al-Amin, *True Myth: Black Vikings of the Middle Ages* (Trafford Publishing, 2013), 313.

[137] The Papacy was the only state which possessed a "worldwide" authority.

[138] With the stroke of a pen, Pope Alexander VI created an imaginary line dividing the world on a north-south axis in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

[139] The bull *Inter caetera* came before the Treaty of Tordesillas. Issued by Alexander VI on May 3, 1493, the first InterCaetera was not satisfactory to Portugal as it gave Spain the trading monopoly that Portugal had spent decades developing. The Treaty of Tordesillas of the following year gave further precedence to Portugal. It placed the line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, which was at least 600 miles further west than the earlier papal line of demarcation. For further details see, Ronald H. Fritze, *New Worlds: The Great Voyages of Discovery, 1400-1600* (Praeger Publishers, 2002), 121.

[140] Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, Latin America Otherwise: Languages, Empires, Nations (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2011), 78.

[141] Between 1488 and 1522, seafarers sailing for Portugal and Spain performed three novel feats aided by a maritime revolution. They located a water route to India, uncovered a new world across the Atlantic, and sailed around the globe for the first time. The Spaniards and Portuguese divided much of the globe between them. This gave each kingdom exclusive control of trade over one half of the world until 1562 when the flow of trade shifted. French, English, and Dutch monarchs encouraged privateers who preyed on Spanish and Portuguese mercantilism and by the late sixteenth century the English gained "command of the sea" under such daring captains as Francis Drake, John Hawkyns, Walter Raleigh, and Martin Frobisher. For more detail on commercial trade shifts see, Cathal J. Nolan, *The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000-1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 701.

Iberian commercial system revolutionized patterns of trade, undermined systems of other governments, and transformed societies to such an extent that the effects of colonization are still felt generations later.

The Peruvian specialist in Latin American literature and culture, Sara Castro-Kláren, gives a comprehensive critique of Orientalism by analyzing several theoretical positions that intellectuals have already implemented in epistemic "delinking".[142]  Mignolo joins Castro-Kláren in monitoring the sequential development of interlocutors' dialogic implementation that unfolds hidden differences within the trajectory of the world system.  In the Andean region, political theorist José Carlos Mariátegui, laid the foundation of decolonization between 1920 and 1930.[143]  Mariátegui's work focused on the indigenous agrarian class problem and the reconceptualization of what creates race. In the 1950s, the Mexican historian and philosopher Edmundo O'Gorman contributed to the de-centering of hegemonic epistemology with his key argument that America was not discovered but invented.[144] O'Gorman refers to the New World as a contraption of imperial inventions that promulgated European (cultural, economic and political) ideologies.  The voyages of exploration made Western Europe the center of the world.[145]  They opened most of the world to European

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[142] For more on the concept of "delinking" see also, Samīr Amīn, *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (Zed Books, 1990). Sara Castro-Klaren, *A Companion to Latin American Literature and Culture* (John Wiley & Sons, 2013). Also in, Walter D. Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America* (John Wiley & Sons, 2009).

[143] Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, 55.

[144] O'Gorman observes that the Americas were not just "discovered" in 1492 but were "invented" by Western imperial ambitions.  O'Gorman begins his chapter with an epigraph from Martin Heidegger's invention of a concept: "Only that which has been conceived can be seen; but that which has been conceived is that which has been invented."  Edmundo O'Gorman, *The Invention of America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History* (Greenwood Press, 1972).  Also, Edmundo O'Gorman, *La invención de América: Investigación Acerca de la Estructura Histórica del Nuevo Mundo y del Sentido de Su Devenir* (Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2006).  See origin, Martin Heidegger, *Aus Der Erfahrung Des Denkens* (Pfullingen, Neske, 1954).

[145] "'Western Europe' did not begin to occupy the 'center' until the emergence of the 'Indias Occidentales' (later called America and even later, Latin and Anglo America) in the Christian European consciousness." See, Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America*, 2009, 35.

political and cultural influences. Western civilization placed high value on individual

enterprise, competition for profit, the scientific method, and technological advances, which

motivated Europeans to explore, conquer, plunder, and colonize much of the world beyond

Europe. Between the 1960s and the 1970s, the contribution of Peruvian sociologist Anibal

Quijano provided an anticolonial framework exposing racialized socio-political orders and

Western epistemic monopoly that continue to exist in the absence of a formal colonial

apparatus. Quijano calls this epistemic control the "coloniality of power." He posits:

> Racism and ethnicism were initially produced in the Americas and then expanded to
> the rest of the colonial world as the foundation of the specific power relations between
> Europe and the populations of the rest of the world. After five hundred years, they still
> are the basic components of power relations across the world. Once colonialism
> becomes extinct as a formal political system, social power is still constituted on criteria
> originated in colonial relations. In other words, coloniality has not ceased to be the
> central character of today's social power.[146]

Based on the same principles as Quijano's argument against capitalistic "coloniality of

power" in racial Othering, the Argentine-born theorist and a founder of the Latin American

philosophy of liberation school,[147] Enrique Dussel, attempts to unmask forms of ideology

that camouflage social reality and puts it at the service of the Western European political,

economic, and cultural center of the world.[148] Dussel coined the term "transmodernity" to

direct a non-Eurocentric critical dialogue as a way to achieve liberation in a pluriversal (as

opposed to a universal), non-hegemonic Western perspective. The decolonial framework

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[146] Translated from Anibal Quijano's text in; Ramon Grosfoguel, "Race and Ethnicity or Racialized Ethnicities? Identities within Global Coloniality," *Ethnicities* 4, no. 3 (2004): 326.

[147] The Filosofía de la Liberación (FL) arose in Argentina in 1973 in which Enrique Dussel questioned the legitimacy of *Latinidad* in a dependent and dominated culture. Dussel has been a political refugee in Mexico since 1975 and he became a Professor of Ethics at Mexico's National University (UNAM) in 1976 where he currently teaches critical theory.

[148] Dussel has pointed out that reality should be viewed from the particular history of peoples that can redesign philosophy around the concept of the Other. Enrique D. Dussel, *Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and Liberation Theology* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

that has entered into a pluriversal transmodern epistemic project, works to interrupt

intellectual and political asymmetries within coloniality or, using Quijano's complete term,

the colonial matrix of power.  The term "decoloniality," according to Mignolo, is part of a

triad composed of modernity/coloniality/decoloniality (MCD).[149]  Modernity and coloniality

are modes of knowing that are concealed behind the grandiose rhetoric of a singular

European modernity and civilization psychologized in a space for salvation from which the

dark side of modernization is omitted.  Mignolo demonstrates that "there is no modernity

without coloniality, that coloniality is constitutive of modernity,"[150] and argues that Saidan

Orientalism:

> Coincided with the second stage of modernity as an interimperial transformation of capitalism and the modern/colonial world system with England and France expanding toward Asia and Africa.  This is also the moment in which "modernity" and "modernization" began to make a difference in an emerging Latin America composed by several nations gaining independence from Spain and Portugal.[151]

The claim here is that coloniality is linked to Orientalism from the establishment of sixteenth

century "Indias Occidentales."  In other words, Orientalism can be seen as the mirror image

of Occidentalism and without it Orientalism cannot exist.  Latin Americanist scholars have

established that the postcolonial methods of resistance to Western domination were shaped

by postmodern thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Francois Lyotard, and

Edward Said.  The process of decoloniality, however, was marked by the achievement of

political delinking during the Cold War years. It was during this transition that decolonial

interventionists challenged the Western models of democracy, rationalism, individual

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[149] Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, 54.
[150] Walter D. Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America* (John Wiley & Sons, 2009), xiii.
[151] Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton University Press, 2012), 55.

enterprise and progress.  While Mignolo is firm in relating the distinct points of origin of the

postcolonial and the decolonial projects, he acknowledges "that both walk in the same

direction, following different paths."[152]  It is these different paths, namely Said's

*Orientalism*, that have led to mixed reactions among Latin American intellectuals. Mignolo

calls it a reverse déjà vu of the European invention of the West Indies after the

"discoveries".[153]  In earlier pages of this chapter, Castro-Klaren and Mignolo examined the

genealogy of South American and the Caribbean historical inquiries that have led to the

propagative capacity of new socio-political directions.  The decolonial responses to

Occidentalisation of "pueblos originarios" (indigenous peoples of the Americas) viewed

Occidentalism as the necessary condition of Orientalism.  Castro-Kláren noted the two

overlapping approaches in Said's and O'Gorman's claims:

> On the one hand, the thesis advanced in *Orientalism* seemed similar to the claims
> made in O'Gorman's own thesis on the "invention" – the non-referential disposition
> of the epistemological object – of America by the historiography of the sixteenth
> century.  Said's sweeping inquiry was a brilliant investigation of Europe's invention
> of the Orient as its nineteenth-century other, and it rang surprisingly familiar themes
> of scholars in the Latin American field.  Reading *Orientalism* produced in students of
> Latin America "the shock of recognition," an effect that postcolonial theory claims,
> takes place in the consciousness of postcolonial subjects as they assess their
> experience of coloniality in comparison with other colonial subjects."[154]

Mignolo brings forth another issue to Castro-Kláren's assessment by claiming that "in Latin

America nobody was paying attention to Said."[155] There was overriding importance of other

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[152] Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, 55.
[153] Ibid., 56.
[154] Sara Castro-Klaren, "Posting Letters: Writing in the Andes and the Paradoxes of the Postcolonial Debate," in *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate* (Duke University Press, 2008), 131.  Also cited in, Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, 56.
[155] Walter D. Mignolo, "Citizenship, Knowledge and the Limits of Humanity" (The Second Symposium: Deorientalizing Citizenship?, The Open University, London, November 12, 2012).

issues that remained on the agenda of resistance.  The problems and issues confronted by

indigenous societies during the post-modern period were, as Mignolo recounts:

> The problems of development, the problems of dictatorship (the agenda issue), the problems faced by the Theology of Liberation, there was the question of dependency theory, etc., *Orientalism* was out of the picture, but what concerned us was Occidentalism not Orientalism.[156]

The argument that O'Gorman advanced in his work became popular in Said's *Orientalism*

twenty years later.  O'Gorman's critical framework is based on Occidentalism while Said's is

based on Orientalism, but both make the same claims about Western hegemony. Said

unveiled the Orientalist invention that occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries, much like O'Gorman's analysis of the sixteenth century "invention of America."

Both trajectories work towards dismantling/delinking the entrenchment of totalitarian

ideologies, and both are apparatuses of repression– one from above (Orientalism)– the other

from below (Occidentalism), and together they form the symbolic order of the "big Other."[157]

Informed by a much longer entanglement with colonial exploitation of Native Americans

and the enslavement of Africans, Venezuelan anthropologist Fernando Coronil expands on

the "shock of recognition" by positing that Occidentalism is "not the reverse of Orientalism

but its condition of possibility."[158]  Not only did Orientalism serve to establish the superior

rationality of the Occident, it ingrained a deep psychological complex of inferiority in the

unconscious of the non-Western Others.  The internalized oppression that keeps the

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[156] Ibid.

[157] In the protocols of race, Jacques Lacan develops Freud's theory of self-perception within the symbolic register and argues that the symbolic order is an effect of language, governed by lack.  In the Introduction to Kristeva's *Desire in Language,* 6-7, Leon Roudiez gives a more precise explanation of the symbolic order by attributing "the establishment of sign and syntax, paternal function, grammatical and social constraints, symbolic law" that create semiotic dispositions.

[158] Fernando Coronil, *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela* (University of Chicago Press, 1997), 14.

colonized in a chokehold maintains its grip through a systemic framework of power and control. The "shock of recognition" has been repeatedly mentioned in the ethics of Latin American literary criticism, but drawing the parallel of Orientalized indigenous inhabitants in the "extreme West" with the nineteenth century accounts of Orientalism rarely provides a mutual framework of colonial awareness in Saidian Orientalism. The supportive reasons for this dissociation is not so much because the initial "shock of recognition" is absent in the treatment of non-Latinist accounts on Orientalism. The more crucial reason for this disjunction is produced by incongruous understandings of the relationship between Orientalism and Occidentalism.

The majority of postcolonial scholars claim that Occidentalism and Orientalism are two sides of the same coin and are often reversible phenomena.[159] Their approach satisfies the claim to a certain degree, but the reality is much more complicated than they suggest. If we are to use the coin metaphor in our comparison, the better explanation would be that although the front and back of the coin are the same size, it is the side of Occidentalism that determines the thickness and density of the entire sphere. The process of the above comparison can be less reversible when measuring Occidentalism's power of the Western model/modernity and the colonial evil that reproduces colonization. No matter how vehemently colonized peoples respond to the West by expending modes of decoloniality, the "epistemic reconstruction" seems to be far from reach.[160] Despite the decolonial methods

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[159] The most widely accepted and commonly utilized definition of Occidentalism is based on a set of equivalent discourses in difference. According to Arab Occidentalist, Hassan Hanafi, Occidentalism can be seen as a counter-opportunity to define the West from a non-Western world view in the East. See, Hassan Hanafi, "From Orientalism to Occidentalism," in idem, *Islam in the Modern World: Vol II Tradition, Revolution, and Culture* (Cairo: Dar Kebaa Bookshop, 2000): 395-409.

[160] For Anibal Quijano, it is not just the span of economic and milito-diplomatic domination that supports the hegemonic production of the Western model of modernization. The main site that implores methods of "reconstruction" dwells in the epistemic nucleus (Eurocentrism), which according to Quijano, is the very site

exercised in the daily lives of the colonized, escaping the strong grip of its socio-

psychological ramifications thwarts the full view of a pluriversal epistemology of the future.

Occidentalism is not a mere projection of indigenous Eastern presumptions on the West as

many scholars maintain. Furthermore, it is erroneous to claim, as most scholars have made,

that Orientalism is a reciprocal Occidentalism. No matter how distorted the perceived image

of the West is through the Eastern lens, it is the deeply rooted psychological bearing of that

view that reinforces a perpetual impression of the quality in which the self and other reside.

The "I" and "Other" in Occidentalism have completely different connotations than they do in

Orientalism. Regardless of Occidentalism's attempts to manipulate the view of the West in

order to gain tactical advantages for its Eastern self, the Othering of the Occidental is not just

a simple act of distancing what is non-self, but an attempt to negotiate through the

psychoanalysis of race with what is unconsciously deemed as the big-Other (the West).[161]

The most salient feature pertinent for questioning the supposed mutual traits of

Occidentalism and Orientalism is the difference of their (socio-psychological) qualities that

make the Othering process uneven and non-reciprocal. If we employ Jacques Lacan's

approach of our roles in the symbolic order, rarely will the Western entity ask the Eastern

Other, "Why am I what you say I am?"[162] The Lacanian redevelopment of this question was

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that fortifies and maintains legitimization of colonial power. For more on Quijano's approach in his "epistemic reconstruction," see Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality and modernity/rationality," *Cultural Studies*, vol. 21 ([1989] 2007).

[161] The "big Other" guarantees the symbolic efficiency of power. It is used to indicate language, law, the state, religion and other people encountered symbolically through their effects on the subject (me). It is through this symbolic order that our identities become conceivable.

[162] The "you" in this context, stands for the "big Other". The controversial Slovenian philosopher and one of the most thought-provoking figures in political and cultural criticism, Slavoj Žižek, draws on Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of the big Other (grand Autre) to further the argument of subject formation. Žižek adds that the self begins to know "itself" when articulated (or hailed) by ideological master signifiers that confront the subject with a symbolic mandate; Žižek calls this interpellation by the big Other. See, Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, (Verso, 1989), 113.

borrowed from Jacques Cazotte's novel, *Le diable amoureux* and introduced it in the Italian expression, "che vuoi?" ["What do you want?"], which, in turn, within the framework of psychopolitics, can be posed as "What does the Other want from me?" With this alienating unconscious position, Lacan added another layer to articulate the symbolic subject by inverting the Cartesian Cogito: *I think, therefore I am not*.[163] It is within this dislocative symbolic order in which the subject is in a constant search for the language that always resides outside the self.[164] Each side of the Orient/Occident divide projects the ontologically stable "presence" or the "big Other". That is, each side is motivated by the continuous need to satisfy its drive that defines the Lacanian *jouissance* of being in and for itself (in the realm of pure enjoyment and satisfaction).[165] It should be made clear, however, that because of the socio-symbolic position, the Eastern subject's unconscious response tends to grapple more with the enigma of the Other's *jouissance*: "What does this Western-other want of me?" As the Orient attempts to protect its subject's right to *jouissance*, the Occident serves to prevent any subject that may possibly trespass into his monopoly on *jouissance*. It is this structure of fantasy that grounds the Other's alterity and supports racist discourses. The French psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller elaborates on how the condition of *jouissance* operates on the grounds of racism:

> In racism, it is precisely a question of the relation to an Other as such, conceived in its difference. And it does not seem to me that any of the generous and universal discourses on the theme of 'we are all fellow beings' have had any effectiveness

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[163] Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection*, tr. A. Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 195.

[164] For Lacan, once we enter language, we are detached from the Real and live in accordance to the laws of the symbolic that introduce an alienating divide between being and meaning. To think as a subject, therefore, is to identify oneself as object within language.

[165] The Lacanian psychoanalyst and film theorist, Joan Copjec, explains that "*jouissance* constitutes the being as unique, cut off from others and his environment, thrown into an absolute solitude where the other is the stranger." In this case, it is language alone that conveys the promise of "being in" satisfaction of one's drive – a drive that is generated by repeated failures. See, Joan Copjec, *Umbr(a): Incurable*, (Umbr(a) Journal, 2006), 30.

concerning this question.  Why?  Because racism calls into play a hatred which goes precisely towards what grounds the Other's alterity, in other words its *jouissance*.  If no decision, no will, no amount of reasoning is sufficient to wipe out racism, it is indeed because it is founded on the point of extimacy of the Other.  […]  Racism is founded on what one imagines about the Other's *jouissance*; it is hatred of the particular way, of the Other's own way, of experiencing *jouissance*.[166]

Miller's critical take on the link between social and psychic reality directs us to see the deeply compelling schemas that affect action ("grounding the Other's alterity/*jouissance*") and its ends (the Other's *jouissance* becomes perceived as the theft of our own *jouissance*).[167] Within this interpellation into ideology, "extimacy" designates the real within the symbolic. What we deem as intimate to us is simultaneously outside of us. Joan Copject best describes the impact of this anxiety-ridden intimate exteriority which all at once reject and internalize as "they are in us, that which is not us".[168] As such, the extimacy of the Other is always tied to the instability of the subject's identity to him/herself.  It is in this imaginary register of extimacy that Lacan expressed, "at the heart of my assent to my identity to myself, it is he who stirs me".[169] This extimate structure that wishes to abject that internal Otherness is what conditions the notion of *jouissance*. In Copjec's words, it is finding oneself face-to-face with "*jouissance* [that] makes me me, while preventing me from knowing who I am."[170]

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[166] Jacques-Alain Miller, "Extimacy", in *Lacanian Theory of Discourse*, ed. Mark Bracher *et al*., (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 79.  In his speech, Miller thoroughly elaborates on another key concept of Lacan's neologism termed "extimacy" to express the opposition between inside and outside the social formation.

[167] The causes of racism and xenophobia, according to Lacan, are attributable to the illusion of fear that the Other has access to abundant enjoyments, which they have stolen from us.  Power is centered on the lost *jouissance* of the Other.  This is why power aims to reclaim the *jouissance* that once belonged to the subject or the nation and was stolen by the Other. Thus, "what we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us".  For more of Žižek's assessment on the theft of *jouissance* see, Slavoj Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology* (Duke University Press, 1993), 203.

[168] Joan Copjec, "Vampires, Breast-Feeding and Anxiety," *October* 58, Rendering the Real (Autumn, 1991), 35.

[169] Jacques Lacan*, Ecrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1977), p. 172.

[170] Joan Copjec, "May '68, the Emotional Month," in *Lacan: The Silent Partners*, edited by Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 2006) 90-114; 95.

While both the West and the Orient seek a sense of wholeness within their intersubjective order of the symbolic, the 'Othering' process is visibly lopsided. The caliber of "stirring" that takes place in Lacan's phrase ("he who stirs me") depends on who the "he" is in a signifying system of the unconscious and the rules governing that system. The drive of Western unconscious fantasies supports a completely different political framework of power than its binary counterpart. For the extimate object (the Orient), the view of the Other (the West) is not just another Other, but a significant-Other, and in most cases, a big-Other. This unconscious grand figure has the imaginary ability to cover the "effete" of Oriental existence with– to borrow words from Sanjay Srivastava– "the 'progressive' ethos of an efflorescent Occident." [171] If we switch our position to the West as the extimate object, the view of the Other (the Orient) is just another insignificant/inferior Other, and in most cases, it holds the site of primitive beauty– that of the exotic small– Other. This unconscious small-figure is known in Lacanian terms as the "*objet petit a(utre)*", the site of an imagined Oriental treasure, which the West yearns to possess. Why is this comparison important in the context of psycho-political analysis? One reason is that using psychoanalysis as a methodological backdrop of socio-political critique, while it is a powerful guide to understand the mechanisms by which the engagement between interacting "subjects" are analyzed, if not careful with the openness of its formula, it has the potential to distort.[172] An example of this

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[171] Sanjay Srivastava, *Constructing Post-Colonial" India": National Character and the Doon School* (Routledge, 2005), 56.

[172] Both the phenomenological and the psychoanalytic processes of acquiring knowledge are based on openness. In phenomenology this value has been formulated in terms of "back to the things themselves" to closely and faithfully adhere to the phenomenon in an unpresupposing way as possible. For a more detailed explanation regarding the field of psychoanalysis and its phenomenological basis see, Gunnar Karlsson, *Psychoanalysis in a New Light* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

distortion can be seen in Joshua Paul Dale's account of the "self" and "Other".  Dale suggests that the Lacanian approach to,

> The symbolic constructs like the West and the Orient may both, in various times and in various ways, take on the role of the big Other for a subject.  In a crucial sense, then, the West and the Orient are the same: they are both consensual hallucinations maintained by people on both sides of the divide.[173]

Critics who claim that both the West and Orient take on the role of the big Other in the same manner fail to realize that regardless of how big the Orient's big Other gets, the West's big Other is always bigger.  The patriarchal symbolic authority of the Orient has been, and continues to be, in crisis. When the paternal figure of a nation collapses, not only do the nation's men function as empty fathers in the Orient's imaginary, but, according to Žižek, they give "rise to a new figure of the Master [the West] who is simultaneously our common peer, our 'neighbor,' our imaginary double." [174] An example of this can be seen in the 2003 flawed elections in Armenia when the opposition decided to protest after losing and ran into the arms of the United States seeking intervention in the election fraud. This does not mean or imply that the protective care of the Western paternal big Other is absolute.  Despite the imperfections of the Occidental father, it is his symbolic authority that issues and withdraws meaning from circulation; it is he who enables the subject's entry into the symbolic order. The Indian-born American journalist and author, Fareed Zakaria, makes the claim that the "Western world in general, and the United States in particular, can help enormously.  The United States is the dominant power in the Middle East; every country views its relations with Washington as the most critical tie they have."[175] When one's own (Eastern) symbolic

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[173] Joshua Paul Dale, "Cross-Cultural Encounters through a Lateral Gaze," in *After Orientalism: Critical Entanglements, Productive Looks*, ed. Inge E. Boer (Rodopi, 2003), 66.
[174] Slavoj Žižek, *In Defense of Lost Causes* (Verso Books, 2009), 87.
[175] Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (Revised Edition)* (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 151.

authority disintegrates, even the most die-hard, radical anti-Western resistance groups will consider U.S./EU material support to strengthen their internal control.[176] Just one of many recent examples of this anti-Western resistance groups' reliance on the Western big Other's protection was demonstrated in the Syrian conflict during which the United States "voiced" support for opposition forces.[177] When less muscular national bodies collapse, as applied in the above example, they are reconstituted with a more resilient big Other, confirms political expert Charlotte Heath-Kelly, who continues to describe this adaptation in a form that exists "only between the destruction of one social fantasy and the retroactive insertion of another 'big Other'."

It is important to emphasize again that the readily accepted view of the Orient and the Occident as two sides of the same coin is highly problematic and contradictory. The psychological predicament of the Orient, as demonstrated in previous pages, can be seen as a result of the constitutive side of modernity that emerged from the colonial encounter, and rendered coloniality as the hidden side of the very modernity that bolstered the Euro-Westcentric superiority.[178] Orientalism's and Occidentalism's surface features resemble one another in that they both employ mechanisms at work (visual representations, music, literature, etc.) to stereotype the Other and they both have the imaginary need to request recognition from the agency (the big Other) whose gaze they both try to impress. When we investigate their internal features, however, what differentiates them is the site of the symbolic logic of "absolute monarchy" (the placeholder in the field of the big Other). While

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[176]"According to the Iranian media, the Syrian conflict was a result of terrorist activity, funded and sponsored by Western powers." For detailed testimonies see, Amin Saikal and Amitav Acharya, *Democracy and Reform in the Middle East and Asia: Social Protest and Authoritarian Rule After the Arab Spring* (I.B.Tauris, 2013), 113.
[177] The "voiced" support came in the form of political and material backing. For more details see, Edward Newman and Karl DeRouen, Jr., *Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars* (Routledge, 2014), 316–317.
[178] Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*, 162.

the Occident sees the Western paternal symbolic authority as his big Other, the Orient's

absolute authority is found not in the enlarged image of the Eastern Father, but located in the

stable "presence" of the Western big Other.  Though the constructs of Orientalism and

Occidentalism may seem homologous, they lack bilateral symmetry. Yet many scholars

continue to erroneously project that the defining character of Orientalism/Occidentalism is

located in their identical reversibility, ignoring the incompatible dichotomies generated by

the bigger Other (the West).[179] To read the East/West as mirror images of each other would

ignore the facts of the West's economic, political, and cultural dominance.  Hence, it would

not be inaccurate to claim that Orientalism is not Occidentalism's reverse but the very

continuation– the second name– of Occidentalism. [180] The claim I make here is thus also

consistent with Coronil's view put forward earlier in this chapter that backs the notion of

Orientalism as the condition of Occidentalism's possibility; not its reverse.[181]

Adding yet another dimension to this critique, some scholars insist on treating the

East/West dichotomy as a receding occurrence.[182]  Hamid Dabashi, for example, makes the

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[179] The East/West dichotomies, while interrogated and problematized by scholars, continue to operate not just on their concocted stereotypes *by* the more dominant entity, but it is *for* the dominant entity that these stereotyped dichotomies have devised  both the West's and the East's participation to mobilize their difference. Fernando Coronil best explains the above prescription by saying; "While any society may produce stereotypical representations of cultural difference as part of its own self-production, what is unique about Occidentalism is that it entails the mobilization of stereotypical representations of non-Western societies as part of the West's self-fashioning as an imperial power." See also, Coronil, *The Magical State*, 14.

[180] Among the scholars advocating the reversibility of Orientalism/Occidentalism are;  Sadik Jalal Al-Azm, "Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse," *Khamsin* 8 (1981): 5–26., Ismail Talib, "After the (Unwritten) 'Postcolonial' in Southeast Asia: What Happens Next?," in *The Silent Word: Textual Meaning and the Unwritten*, ed. Robert Young, Kah Choon Ban, and Robbie B. H. Goh (Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1998), 63., Mehrzad Boroujerdi, "Sharqshenasi Varouneh [Orientalism in Revers]," *Kiyan* 53 (Esfand 1375/March 1997), pp. 22-31, also see, "Gharbzadegi va Sharqshenasi-ye Makous [Westoxication and Orientalism in Reverse]," *Iran Nameh* Vol. 8, No. 3, (Tabestan 1369/Summer 1990), pp. 375-90., Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "The Social Uses of the Past: Recent Arab Historiography of Ottoman Rule," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 14 (1982), 199.

[181] Coronil, *The Magical State*, 14.

[182] Some scholars maintain that the Orientalism/Occidentalism divide is fading with the accelerated globalization and hybridization. Scholars making this claim include, Tariq Ramadan, *Islam and the Arab Awakening* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 144.; Leslie Sklair, "Competing Conceptions of Globalization,"

bold and unjustified claim that the "Orient no longer exists to be Orientalized."[183]  Just like

the "two-sides-of the-same-coin" analogy, it would thus be quite erroneous to perceive the

continuity of global hegemony of the West as being dissolved and conformed into a

seemingly universal political model.  Dabashi's persistent assertion on the ideological

East/West positioning follows the notion that upholds:

> 'The West' now no longer exists.  It ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall.  With the
> end of 'the West' also ended all its binary oppositions, particularly 'the Orient,' all
> having dissolved into an amorphously globalized universe.  'The West versus the
> Rest' is no longer the term of global operation of either the capital or the cultures it
> keeps producing to sustain its legitimacy […].[184]

In a post 9/11 era, where Orientalism became the main component intended to legitimize

American intervention in the Middle East and allowed for Western powers' imperialistic

aggression against many non-Western countries, it would be valid to say that the basis of

Dabashi's argument is unfounded and incorrect.  Orientalism, I claim, has never been more

in demand than it is today.  More than ever, in fact, Orientalism functions with more

sophisticated strategies driven by faster, cheaper, more powerful, and easily available high

technology internet, film, radio and satellite television networks to propagandize difference.

It could even be argued that the representations of the Orient/Occident dichotomy have never

been sharper and more disjoined as they are at the present.

### A. Forms of Representation

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*Journal of World-Systems Research* 5, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 148.; Hamid Dabashi, *Corpus Anarchicum:
Political Protest, Suicidal Violence, and the Making of the Posthuman Body* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 118.
[183] Dabashi, *Corpus Anarchicum*, 118.
[184] Ignaz Goldziher and Hamid Dabashi, *Muslim Studies*, ed. S. M. Stern, trans. C. R. Barber (New Brunswick,
N.J: Aldine Transaction, 2006), Ixxviii.  Also in, Hamid Dabashi, *Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in
Time of Terror* (Transaction Publishers, 2008), 105.

The recent digital revolution has produced state-of-the-art software that makes it possible to tweak and modify images and has changed the way live (on-location) news is produced. With a touch of a button, recorded realities can change into propagandistic "truths," presenting the kind of "facts" that are made to inculcate the audience as the producer sees fit. The misrepresentations (fabricated comments, concocted scenes, etc.) that take place in our news media are not a secret. Countless books have been written to expose the distorted representations of the Middle East in broadcast and print coverage, but nevertheless, the gimmicks that technology provides seems to work in an elusive and influential manner.[185] The post 9/11 misrepresentations in Western mainstream media appear to have worked quite well, especially, for the U.S. military campaign that embarked on a humanist mission to "free" Afghan women from their coercive settings. While Laura Bush used the president's weekly radio slot to justify a military invasion of Afghanistan for the "noble" cause of liberating Afghan women, images of subservient Afghani women in their prison-like burqas were repeatedly circulating in the media. In the newsroom, another set of images began to play in the American psyche; the stark contrast between the Western anchorwoman reporting on the claims of the "degraded Oriental woman" is proof that the East/West dichotomy in representations is far from diminishing. According to media specialist Radha Hegde, "the media coverage of the veiled Muslim women waiting to be saved reached a feverish pitch after the US attacks on Afghanistan in 2001."[186] The same media tactics were employed with respect to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. "Mass media images of veiled Middle

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[185] Among the books that expose the serious misrepresentations in mainstream media are: Scott Bonn, *Mass Deception: Moral Panic and the U.S. War on Iraq* (Rutgers University Press, 2010). Bob Kohn, *Journalistic Fraud: How the New York Times Distorts the News and Why It Can No Longer Be Trusted* (Thomas Nelson Inc, 2003).

[186] Hegde Radha, *The Routledge Companion to Media and Gender*, ed. Cynthia Carter, Linda Steiner, and Lisa McLaughlin (Routledge, 2013), 96.

Eastern women," writes art historian Prita Meier, "are circulating at an unprecedented volume since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq."[187]   Once again the Islamic veil not only made a(n) (re)appearance in the Western mainstream media, this time it flooded its news divisions (radio, print, and internet) with headlines such as "Unveiling news coverage of Muslim women,"[188] or "Lifting the veil" that has been expansively featured in popular news channels in 2003.  The Western focus on the veil as a marker of the East/West divide has been and still is obsessive when constructing concepts of Otherness.  Taking a Lacanian approach that frames the veil as *objet petit a* (or object-cause of desire),  it becomes a way for Western entities to fetishize women's coverings as a potent symbol of their exotic yet dangerous identities that fail to meet the big Other's Symbolic mandate, causing the perpetual anxiety for the existence of the veiled subject.[189] As Meyda Yeğenoğlu argues, "Western feminists desire to lift the veil of the Oriental woman in the name of 'liberating' her reflects the historical, cultural, psychical, and political obsessions of the culture that produced Western women."[190] The veil has exceeded all the other Orientalist tropes in marking the boundaries between private and public, which serve the sites of a strong political emblem and of the fantasies that breed both repulsion/anxiety and allure/desire.[191] "No single

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[187] David A. Bailey, Gilane Tawadros, and Prita Meier, "Veil: Veiling, Representation and Contemporary Art," *African Arts* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2004): pp. 11–12.

[188] Julie Posetti, "Unveiling News Coverage of Muslim Women: Reporting in the Age of Terror," *The International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, Communities and Nations* 7, no. 5 (2007): 79.

[189] As noted by media studies expert, Hugh S. Manon, "[…] for Lacan, the crucial object for the human subject is the *objet a*, which the subject experiences as a structure of partition, veiling, or inaccessibility." See, Hugh S. Manon, "Beyond the Beyond: CGI and the Anxiety of Overperfection," in *Zizek and Media Studies: A Reader*, ed. Matthew Flisfeder and Louis-Paul Willis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 194.

[190] Meyda Yegenoglu, *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12.  Yeğenoğlu argues that Western women occupy a masculine position in relation to Oriental women.

[191] Žižek best translates Lacan's notion of anxiety as it "occurs not when the object-cause of desire is lacking; it is not the lack of the object that gives rise to anxiety but, on the contrary, the danger of our getting too close to the object and thus losing the lack itself.  Anxiety is brought on by the disappearance of desire."  Slavoj Žižek, *Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture* (MIT Press, 1992), 8.

item of clothing," to quote Sarah Graham-Brown, "has had more influence on the Western image of Middle Eastern women than the veil."[192] As a signifier of not just Muslim women but a homogenized sign of all Middle Eastern women, the veil has functioned and continues to serve as a critical site for constructing and endorsing a dualistic view of the irrational, untrustworthy, emotional, and oppressive Orient and the progressive, levelheaded champions of the Occident. Therefore, contrary to the scholars who may think that oppositions between the "West and the rest"[193] has faded, "in many ways it has just begun," as exclaimed by Edmund Burke and David Prochaska.[194] The Middle East continues to live under the veil of racial stereotypes that are ultimately in the service of Western powers. For the scholars that continue to pose the question, "Isn't Orientalism over?" Burke and Prochaska respond emphatically to this inquiry:

> In the post 9/11 United States, the debate over Orientalism is far from over. […] Today the United States peers at the Middle East through Orientalist spectacle. Their special properties miraculously filter out historical context and complexity, the better to spotlight the supposedly essential cultural features of Middle Eastern culture that make 'them' hate 'us.' Seen through an Orientalist lens, causality is reversed, and morality is readily assigned to the Good Guys.[195]

This critique of Orientalism intersects with the broad intellectual effort to argue and to decode discourses of power that are based on relationships of domination. While scholars such as Dabashi, Ramadan and Sklair come to the conclusion that Orientalism has dissipated into history, centuries-old tropes of the mysterious East find their way back to repeat all the stereotypical Orientalist clichés of the past in the present-day. Orientalism continues to rise

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[192] Sarah Graham-Brown, *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East, 1860-1950* (Columbia Univ Pr, 1992), 134.

[193] This widely used phrase is borrowed from Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Open Road Media, 2014).

[194] Edmund Burke III and David Prochaska, eds., *Genealogies of Orientalism: History, Theory, Politics* (University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 1.

[195] Ibid.

again in visual displays that evoke the earlier Orientalist fascination with spectacle.[196] The

corporate mainstream media in the U.S. saw the subsequent "war against terror" not only in

terms of dollars but also as a means to control within a broader political agenda of projecting

Otherness and alterity on Middle Eastern peoples.[197]  Today's more subtle and perilous forms

of re-Orientalism and its accompanying modes of representation that follow the old colonial

models, are pervasive in contemporary mainstream media.[198]

　Capitalizing on the curiosity of Western audiences about the Middle East, the mass media

has strategically framed issues that aroused this curiosity further.  The media, however, does

not act alone in constructing these frames of Otherness.  Many groups seeking to influence

public discourse, from all sides of the political and economic spectrum, including book

publishers, art galleries, museums, cultural institutions and the film industry have adopted

strategies to "promote knowledge."

　Far from increasing public knowledge of the Other, the formation of information and

attitudes created by image-makers leads to distorted conclusions which strengthen feelings of

anxiety and curiosity that go back to the early days of Orientalism. Topics of a political

nature, that are generally ignored in the areas of animation and cartoons, are crucial examples

of how essentialist concepts are mobilized in the unconscious imaginary and shrouded in

colonialist ideology.  Disney's Orient, argues Edward Ziter, "was no less dangerous than the

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[196] Examples are discussed in Melani Mcalister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 198–265.

[197] Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (Vintage, 1997), 107–108.  Also see, Yahya R. Kamalipour, *The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997).

[198] The term "re-Orientalism" was coined by Lisa Lau to show the transparency of coloniality within the postcolonial subject.  See,  Lisa Lau and Ana Cristina Mendes, *Re-Orientalism and South Asian Identity Politics: The Oriental Other Within* (Routledge, 2012).  Also see, Lisa Lau and Om Prakash Dwivedi, *Re-Orientalism and Indian Writing in English* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 3.

one [Orient] depicted by the news media the year earlier."[199] The making of Disney's animated film *Aladdin* (1992) is the quintessence of Orientalism par excellence. It not only epitomizes every stereotypical Oriental trope, but the process in which the animation was actualized employed orientalist strategies. One such example that revives naturalized essentialism of an unchanged Orient(alism) is the use of the photograph references that were supplied for Disney's animators. The Iranian-born layout assistant for Aladdin's project, Rasoul Azadani, was asked to deliver photographs of his hometown of Isfahan to inspire the local-artists on the architectural details of Persian designs.[200] Azadani's 1,800 photo-references later served as a regimented substitute for the magical land of "Baghdad." The directors, Ron Clements and John Musker, found that the appearance of the Persian architectural vocabulary to better fit the colorful graphics of the animation and thus closer to the Oriental imaginary than the colors and textures of the metropolis in Iraq. In other words, they found Isfahan, a city in central, Iran to be more "Arabian" than the vernacular of Baghdad's buildings. Being motivated by Persian miniatures and Arabic calligraphy, Aladdin's visual designer Richard Vander Wende, favored the idea of a homogenized architectural idiom of the Orient to manipulate a "more active presence" as Aladdin's fictional Agrabah city.[201] The various forms of Orientalist tropes are ubiquitous throughout the whole film. Starting with a Gérômesque type Oriental tiger (Rajah, Jasmine's pet) to the harem-like draped confines where princess Jasmin awaits to be "saved" by Aladdin. The animation not only captures the visual details of what is assumed as Oriental, but also

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[199] Theater and Drama historian, Edward Ziter, is referring to the Western news coverage of the Gulf War. See, Edward Ziter, *The Orient on the Victorian Stage* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 196.
[200] John Culhane, *Disney's Aladdin: The Making of an Animated Film* (Disney Editions, 1993), 100. Rasoul Azadani was the only Easterner working with Aladdin's artistic crew.
[201] Ibid., 101.

provides a musical backdrop with racist lyrics that later caused an outcry from the Arab-American community.  The protest to remove the opening theme song of Aladdin pressured Disney to make some changes to the original version, but the final result was not much different between the cinema release and the video release from: "Where they cut off your ear if they don't like your face, it's barbaric, but hey, it's home," to "Where it's flat and immense and the heat is intense, it's barbaric, but hey, it's home."[202]  These lyrics accompany racist representations to reproduce the usual xenophobic clichés.  The villainous characters were all portrayed with ethnic features, presented with beards, hooked noses, heavy accents, and darker skin tones. The genial characters of Jasmine and Aladdin, on the other hand, were depicted with Anglicized features, American accents and lighter skin tones. This physical valuation of race invests meaning in, what sociologist Margaret Hunter calls "racial capital," that ultimately derives from the value given to certain racial identities. Jasmine and Aladdin become the embodiment of the West; they are the "good guys" that fit into the symbolic order of the big Other.  The message of this animation was none too subtle; darker-skinned individuals with accents become a patent of negative associations while the advantage of being light-skinned with a crisp delivery of English/American accents offers an ethnic option to pass in the world of "white privilege."[203]   In the aftermath of the Gulf-War, *Aladdin* magnified the stereotypes of specific racist representations that inhabited in our news broadcasts. The medium's innocence in this animated feature fortified the misrepresented signs of the racialized lives in the Gulf regions, and in sharp contrast, the publicized signs of

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[202] Howard Ashman is the lyricist for Aladdin's theme song.  The original stanza begins with: "Oh, I come from a land/From a faraway place/Where the caravan camels roam./Where they cut off your ear/If they don't like your face/It's barbaric, but hey, it's home."
[203] In 2002, Glendale and Los Angeles community colleges offered accent reduction courses to improve English language clarity.  The course description in Glendale College's catalogue disparagingly read; "reduce your accent for a chance to win better jobs, and greater advancement opportunities in your personal life."

the Gulf War prepped Aladdin's Orient with the "realities" of a "barbaric" Middle East. Although all representations that explicitly depict the negative aspects of a people (militants with firearms, poverty stricken zones, domestic violence, etc.), instead of representing them in a balanced portrayal of their positive attributes (cultural heritage locations, local crafts, traditional cuisine, etc.), will continue to reinforce the distorted realities that authorize wider cultural typifications.[204]

## B. Cartoon Wars

It is difficult to ignore the symbolic power of cartoons and caricatures. Some of these humorous sketches have had the command to influence public opinion and reflect the mood of society. They are strategic messages designed to express viewpoints on social value and, due to their rhetorical qualities, cartoonists rely on audience feedback to create meaning. The late communications scholar and originator of Symbolic Convergence Theory (SCT), Ernest Bormann, observed that "the political cartoon functions as an indicator of a shared fantasy, or narrative that already exists in the minds of readers, to some extent."[205] The aim of a shared fantasy/narrative is to remove the exclusionary dichotomies of racial thinking and to soften nationalist hostilities in an arena where alternative accounts coexist. The publication of controversial cartoons that appeared in Denmark's largest daily newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*

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[204] To better understand how images operate in a digital age, the renowned French theorist Jean Baudrillard explored the effects of media portrayals of the Gulf War that were depicted in virtualized footage on our TV screens. It is an example of what Baudrillard highlights as the "exchanging war for the signs of war," referring to images from past conflicts in the region that are broadcasted as instant reality. In Baudrillard's view, media tactics did more to actualize the war, than the actual war itself. Jean Baudrillard, *The Illusion of the End* (Stanford University Press, 1994), 62. Also in, Jean Baudrillard, *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* (Indiana University Press, 1995).

[205] In Janis L. Edwards, *Political Cartoons in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Image, Metaphor, and Narrative* (Taylor & Francis, 1997), 32. Bormann argues that the symbolic cues in political cartoons or inside jokes, serve as triggers that touch the common group consciousness and stimulate a set of emotions and meanings around a shared fantasy. See, Ernest G. Bormann, *The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the American Dream* (SIU Press, 2000), 6.

in 2005, was enough to show that not all minds share the same social imaginary narratives. Among the twelve offensive editorial cartoons that had been published, to probe the limits of free speech, the most notorious of them depicts Prophet Muhammad wearing an ignited bomb in his turban and the other portrayed him outside heaven's gate telling the fast approaching suicide bombers to "Stop, stop, we ran out of virgins!"[206] Without going into details of the cartoons, the crux of the controversy was yet another revival of Orientalism's essentializing procedures. The blasphemous cartoons that have been created to associate Islam with terrorism were received more as hate-speech rather than free-speech. The inflammatory and provocative rhetoric in these single-framed images promoted more of a distortion than clarification within the dichotomizing strategies of "us vs. them" discourse. The strong, visceral reactions that were caused by a seemingly harmless medium resulted in violent demonstrations, burning of Danish embassies, massacres, arrests, diplomatic tensions and boycotts that recharged further disquiet over the years that followed.[207] In 2006, the French satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* republished the offensive *Jyllands-Posten* cartoons under the title "Muhammad overwhelmed by the fundamentalists" that further reawakened Muslim anger.[208] Disputes over the Danish cartoons intensified when more media networks began to broadcast and republish the inflammatory drawings. Orientalism's underpinnings that code the implications of these caricatures continue to mobilize the construction of an Orient that is allegedly embroiled in resentment of the West

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[206] According to political philosopher, Norman Daniel, "it was the Islamic Paradise, which, more than any other theme, summed up the Christian notion of Islam". In, Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Oneworld Publications, 2009), 172.

[207] The 2005 cartoon crisis was renewed in 2010 when one of the cartoonists survived assassination attempts in his home.

[208] Despite the lawsuits against Charlie Hebdo's controversial cartoons, the newspaper continued to publish newer materials that mocked Islam. The newspaper's office was attacked multiple times in 2011, 2012, and the horrid attack of January 7, 2015 that resulted in the death of twelve staff members.

(Occidentalism). The cartoon controversy more accurately reflects the symbolic and

communicative capacity of how the Christian West sees Islam. Slavoj Žižek is well aware

that:

> The Muslim crowds did not react to the Muhammad caricatures as such. They
> reacted to the complex figure or image of the *West* that they perceived as the attitude
> behind the caricatures. Those who propose the term 'Occidentalism' as the
> counterpart to Said's 'Orientalism' are right up to a point: what we get in Muslim
> countries is a certain ideological vision of the West which distorts Western reality no
> less, although in a different way, than the Orientalist vision distorts the Orient. What
> exploded in violence was a web of symbols, images and attitudes, including Western
> imperialism, godless materialism, hedonism, and the suffering of Palestinians, and
> which became attached to the Danish cartoons.[209]

Whether it is a frame-by-frame animation sequence or a single-framed cartoon, it is the frame

of mind that frames the Other in the process of validating its ethical and ideological ideals.

In Žižek's view, it is the attitude of how one's identity is perceived in the big-Other's frame

of reference that gives meaning to a (uni)versal cultural, social and economic definiteness.

This definiteness is what reinforces events such as "Everybody Draw Muhammad Day" as a

result of Comedy Central's cartoon episodes "South Park" which had received threats for

satirizing the Prophet Muhammad dressed up as a bear.[210] The incident only resulted in a

wider global spread of newer and more provocative cartoons of Prophet Muhammad and

Islam. In May 2010, The Mail and Guardian (M&G) published a strip from famed South

African political cartoonist Zapiro (Jonathan Shapiro) depicting the Prophet Muhammad on a

psychiatrist's couch complaining that Islam has no sense of humor.[211] This publication

triggered yet another immediate backlash of objection and anger amongst Muslim

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[209] Slavoj Žižek, *Violence* (Profile Books, 2009), 51.
[210] The *South Park* episode-'200' aired in April 2010, prompting the network to remove the notorious cartoon animation from subsequent airings after receiving death threats. As a result, *South Park* fans organized "Everybody Draw Muhammad Day" on Facebook, which received over 10,000 drawings of the Prophet Muhammad.
[211] The cartoon was Zapiro's response to "Draw Muhammad Day" on Facebook.

communities that condemned Zapiro's drawing. South Africa's Muslim Judicial Council along with South Africa's department of communications advised the editors of the magazine to withdraw the cartoon.[212] Nevertheless, the international uproar against the publishers had already intensified in the aftermath of past cartoon controversies that visually produced a redundant binary logic of "friend-or-foe" beacons to demarcate absolute polarization. After a mass boycott of the weekly publications, the CEO of The Mail and Guardian met with Muslim leaders in Johannesburg to issue a public apology and to solicit the help of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), calling on the community not to boycott the newspaper.[213]  On the same day the M&G's apologetic statement was being released, the stubborn persistence of an Orientalist imaginary was launched on the big screen in the famous blockbuster movie *Sex and the City 2*.  In many ways, this film rendered more of a racist Othering than Zapiro's cartoon, but there was no hesitation to publicize the cinematized spectacle of racial difference in the very magazine that had just made a plea to be forgiven for its "particular" interpretation of Muslim identities.[214]

### C. Orientalist Cinematics

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[212] The Government of the Republic of South Africa published an open letter in response to the London-based Guardian Media Group who own The Mail & Guardian weekly newspaper.  The letter highlighted that "While the Constitution and the government of South Africa promote freedom of expression, artists should ensure that they do not infringe on the rights of others, and that they build cohesion, dignity and respect rather than undermine these imperatives." To view the complete letter, see South Africa's Government website at https://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-releases/media-statement/government-appalled-by-zapiro-cartoon.

[213] While many began to cancel their magazine subscriptions, interest in the Zapiro cartoon debate escalated with traffic volumes doubling on the Mail & Guardian Website.  See full article in, Verashni Pillay, "M&G Meets with Muslim Leaders," *The M&G Online*, accessed April 6, 2014, http://mg.co.za/article/2010-05-26-mg-meets-with-muslim-leaders/.

[214] Andrew Pulver, "Sex and the City 2: Rise of the Critic-Proof Movie," *The M&G Online*, accessed March 20, 2014, http://mg.co.za/article/2010-05-29-sex-and-the-city-2-rise-of-criticproof-movie/.

Some scholars describe the feature film, *Sex and the City 2* (2010), as "one of the most Orientalist and racist films of recent times."[215]  Still others, such as movie critics, have gone so far as to codify its genre as "hardcore Orientalism."[216]  The mise–en–scène of this film is imbued with every Orientalist trope imaginable.  In fact, there are far too many Orientalist clichés in this cinematic production to be considered here in detail, but I will limit the discussion to a few aspects of the movie.  An Arabian Sheikh arranges an all-expense paid royal visit to the Emirates for four New York-based American girlfriends. In discussing their plans for the trip, one of the members of the group (Carrie Bradshaw) began to envision verbally the details, "I've always been fascinated by the Middle East. You know, desert moons, Shahrezad, magic carpets..." At that moment her friend's young daughter finished the line of thought she had so mesmerizingly started, and exclaimed in an excited voice, "Like Jasmine and Aladdin?"  Carrie replied assuredly, "Yes, sweetie! Just like Jasmine, but with cocktails."[217] Carrie's romance with the Orient is more than just a firmly etched Western thought of Eastern exoticism. It is deeply imbedded in the unconscious creating an illusion already inscribed in the way we see things.[218]  The romanticized cathexis of Orientalist trajectories sustain a distinct essence of pleasure elicited in the imaginary dis-identification of Others.  It is what the renowned activist writer, Richard Wright, calls "a habitual kind of thinking," in which this dis-identification of a people is "conditioned by the reaction of human beings to a concrete social environment."[219] It is the "representation of that

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[215] Raka Shome, *Diana and Beyond: White Femininity, National Identity, and Contemporary Media Culture* (University of Illinois Press, 2014), 167.

[216] Contois Emily, *Travel Films Week: 'Sex and the City 2': Hardcore Orientalism in the Desert of Abu Dhabi*, Movie Review, (May 2010). http://www.academia.edu.

[217] Michael Patrick King, *Sex and the City 2*, Romantic comedy (Warner Bros. Pictures, 2010).

[218] Here, I'm referring to the socially learned perceptions that guide our interpretations of Others.

[219] Richard Wright, *Black Power: Three Books from Exile: Black Power; The Color Curtain; and White Man, Listen!* (Harper Collins, 2010), 21.

representation" which establishes a system of what Sigmund Freud described as

*Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* (a binary signifier that introduces mechanisms of alienation).[220]

Lacan further defines Freud's notion of *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* as a "unary signifier [that]

emerges in the field of the Other and represents the subject for another signifier."[221] The

place of perception that creates representations in which meaning is transmitted from an

unconscious source to a "conscience collectif," is the very mechanism that produces and

preserves the illusion of a coherent diegetic world through which we come to

(mis)understand the Orient.[222]

From the moment the women enter the Sheikh's private jet, they are surrounded by an

array of luxurious goods in their individual suites. As the aircraft makes its transition from

the West to the East, their association as self-governing liberated Western women begins to

resemble more a participation in of an Oriental women's serai as they laze in reclined

positions on the jet's private loungers.[223] Upon reaching Abu Dhabi, each of the women

receives her own private chauffeur and butler who assist in getting each woman situated in

the Sheikh's palatial hotel. The men attending to these women were not the traditional

butlers in charge of receiving and servicing guests; they were man-slaves who remind us

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[220] Michel Arrivé, *Linguistics and Psychoanalysis: Freud, Saussure, Hjelmslev, Lacan and Others* (John Benjamins Publishing, 1992), 139. A more direct definition of *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is the capacity of interpreting meaning through systems of ideational representatives or "representational representatives".

[221] Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* (W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 218.

[222] The term "conscience collectif" or "collective conscience" was coined by Emile Durkheim to define the sentiments and credences that are common to members of a group/society, and that mutually reinforce a collective conscience.

[223] We are witnessing a scene that recalls the sensational harem narratives of Western women enjoying the status and luxuries of Eastern cultures. The women in this movie are surrounded by Eastern hospitality and given a lavish and prodigal display of exquisite accommodations. On a different but connected note, the earlier accounts of Western women being kidnapped and sold into an imperial harem are not myths; however, the romanticizing stereotypical notions of the harem tend to falsify the circumstances of Western women's daily experiences.

more of the Orientalist Eunuchs attired in arabesque-designed uniforms. When Carrie

awakened for her late-night glass of milk, she found her servant standing adroit ready to take

her order. As a South Asian migrant employee in the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, he had to be

a loyal worker and forfeit his personal social experiences in order to send funds to his family

residing two-thousand kilometers away. Just like the eunuch, he became the embodiment of a

(symbolically) castrated attendant, taking orders from a Western woman in the feminine

bedchambers. The butler's castrated embodiment allegorizes several race and gender

dialectical binaries between his and Carrie's characters: feminized-man/masculinized-

woman, poor/wealthy, servant/master, and forced to mimic the colonizer's cultural habits to

survive/enjoy mimicking Eastern cultural habits for diversion.  This scene provides an

important space to explore the politics of colonialism in "a new Middle East" that continues

to execute similar forms of imperialism in the name of globalization.[224]

Many are infuriated by the way Eastern men are depicted in the film.  Journalist and

author, Eric Deggans, observed that the project "was savaged for turning men in the United

Arab Emirates into cartoonish *Lawrence of Arabia* throwbacks."[225]   With the exception of a

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[224] Several scenes in the movie mention Abu Dhabi as "a progressive city of culture" and "a new Middle East."
In the midst of all the aural and visual Orientalism, this movie's only close-to-truth application, surprisingly, is
the recognition of the Indian migrant's position in U.A.E.  Inter-Orientalism plays a big role in the
popularization of this "new Middle East".  Political scientist, Alisha Ticku, observed in her study that "the
combination of national mythologies of cultural anxiety and popular discourses about their [South Asian] home
countries 'backwardness,' these workers are given separate [substandard] social, political, economic and legal
regulations that are justified through national discourses of exalted citizens.  In this way, the subcontracting of
responsibility means that the state is able to utilize and exploit the labor of this underclass of workers by
shifting the responsibility onto  sending governments, foreign companies and individuals operating in the
U.A.E., without recognizing structural and systemic systems of oppression operating at the global, national and
community level." For Ticku's complete study see, Alisha Ticku, "Dubai Dreams: Exploring National
Constructions of 'Citizen' and 'Migrant-Other' in the UAE," in *Documenting the Undocumented: Redefining
Refugee Status: Center for Refugee Studies 2009 Annual Conference Proceedings*, ed. Veronica P. Fynn
(Universal-Publishers, 2010), 87.
[225] Eric Deggans, *Race-Baiter: How the Media Wields Dangerous Words to Divide a Nation* (Macmillan, 2012),
112.

few characters, all Eastern subjects speak English, adopting fake Arabic accents that sound more like the villains in Disney's *Aladdin* animation. Relying upon an essentialist view of Eastern identities, the director affixes a set of collective characteristics that propound a deterministic approach, which serve as the basis for a misguided reality. "How exotic!" proclaims the character of Samantha Jones after hearing some of the locals speak in their foreign accents. Their linguistic intonations function as meaning-carriers that link associations from one sign system (audial) to another (visual). Hollywood is full of actors specialized in "exotic accents" of the Middle East, waiting to represent the Other.[226] According to author and psychiatrist, Sharon Packer, "exotic accents […] added mystery to movies but linked foreign accents with double-dealing and sinister intent."[227] The alien accents, nevertheless, add to the codification and reinforcement of Orientalism's recognizable signs and symbols.

The transition to the next sequence displays an overdose of Oriental topography, filled with camel rides on the golden sands of the Arabian Desert, an air conditioned Bedouin tent furnished with jewel-colored silk cushions set around low oriental tables, extravagant spreads of exotic food and sweets served on gold and silver trays, and, in the midst of all the Orientalist decadence, the four girlfriends in their Orientalized attire (flowing robes, harem pants, headdresses) revel in a variety of Eastern hospitality rituals. This romantic fascination with Oriental bedazzlement is a long-continued pastiche that regenerates a fetishistic system of signification. Stuart Hall describes this phenomenon of racial fetishism as one that "takes

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[226] The authors confirm that exotic accents and personification of the Other are frequent Hollywood practices. It is not so much on the merit of being able to closely perform the Other's character that gets the actor "the part," but the ability to reenact a preconceived idea of the Other is what results as a successful casting project. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media* (Routledge, 2014), 191.
[227] Sharon Packer, *Movies and the Modern Psyche* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007), 112.

us into the realm where fantasy intervenes in representation; to the level where what is shown or seen, in representation, can only be understood in relation to what cannot be seen, what cannot be shown."[228] It replaces the absent object "for some dangerous and powerful but forbidden force."[229] The fetish is a valuable concept for analyzing the gaze as a preeminent exercise of power that dominates the Other's spectacularized body and serves as a guarantor for someone else's pleasure. It is a way to naturalize the "eye of power," which is an enabling device that defines a racializing epistemology revolving around cultural entitlements.[230] This reveals how "Otherness" of people is developed for dominant interests through, what Foucault describes as, an "examination and insistent observation".[231] The power to control the gaze renders the power to authorize interpretations that codify the object in the gaze. Philosopher, David M. Levin, gives a straightforward explanation of the repeated admonition to gaze-based systems by stating simply that "the power to see, the power to make visible, is the power to control."[232] Without the control of power, the "power to control" would less likely be able to manipulate the overdetermined visions of the Other's function as strategic racial signs. The sociocultural meanings that draw upon symbols of race, classify ideological codes that operate as a signifying system of principles to produce and transmit certain shared beliefs. Social attitudes and practices are informed by this shared information, or what Foucault calls "the production of knowledge" that legitimatizes

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[228] Stuart Hall, ed., *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, 1st ed. (Sage Publications & Open University, 1997), 266.
[229] Ibid.
[230] The phrase "eye of power" is a Foucauldian-ascribed meaning that emphasizes power through a "trapped visibility" which gives the beholder the feeling of authority over the sights that manifests his/her voyeuristic desires. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (Random House LLC, 1980), 146–165.
[231] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012), 44.
[232] David Michael Levin, *Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision* (University of California Press, 1993), 7.

normative frameworks. Categories of difference have created racial hierarchies that have shaped dominant and subordinated societal structures, which in turn create the ideal forum that enables voyeuristic involvements in Other lives. The pleasures of Orientalist voyeurism function as the principle operative in *Sex and the City 2* whereby it generates the experience of scopophilic spectatorship outside the film's frame. The commercialization of the movie led to consumerist eroticization of an Orientalized Middle East, which infiltrated Western pop culture through magazines, fashion, music, tourism and a variety of entertainment sources.[233] All these sources have jointly participated in fabricating the displays that indicate our personal worth and thereby designed the need to create artificial objects of desire. Of all the schemes by which Orientalism is restaged, none is more boldly designed to captivate consumers with its promise to deliver gratification and elevation than tourism. Film-induced tourism, especially, is a strong motivator for people to visit certain sites.  For this reason alone, governments encourage filming on their land as a marketing strategy to promote tourism within their local communities.[234] In this way, the new technologies of motion picture and tourism merge to fabricate a new generation of attractions.

### D. Racial Tourism

Travel to exotic distant lands is an added advantage in its stimulating impact on the construction of Orientalism. In his "Essay on Exoticism," the early twentieth-century French

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[233] On tourism and fashion see, Eloise Parker, "Sex and the City 2's Exotic Adventure," *OK! Travel Magazine*, June 7, 2010, 50–55.  Hilary Moss, "Patricia Field Walks Us Through The 'Sex And The City 2' Wardrobe, Reveals Actual Cost," News, *The Huffington Post*, (May 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/27/patricia-field-walks-us-t_n_591320.html. According to Billboard Magazine, The notable Orientalized soundtracks popularized by the movie are; "Kidda" by Natasha Atlas and "Divas and Dunes" by Aaron Zigman; In, Record Charts, "Billboard's Top 200," *Billboard*, 2010, 43.
[234] Sue Beeton, *Film-Induced Tourism* (Channel View Publications, 2005), 10.

theorist, Victor Segalen, regarded the tourist industry to be a superficially garnished mise-en-scène of exotic desire.[235] In Segalen's view, the travel industry not only produces the specific sites of tourism, but also stages the tourist with a prescribed dose of fetishized narratives that possess "powers" and "mystery" inherent in commodities. Segalen's argument prompted a criticism on Pierre Loti's "false exoticism" of his 1879 novel, *Aziyadé,* which placed Loti in the position of a tourist who endorsed "cheap" Orientalist impressions rather than the serious author that ought to serve his readers with an uninfluenced assessment of the truth. The deceptiveness in Loti's Oriental settings with its associations to tourism was demonstrated quite conclusively in Segalen's text; "*D'autres, pseudo-Exotes (les Loti, les touristes, ne furent pas moins désastreux. Je les nomme les Proxénètes de la Sensation du Divers).*"[236] ["Of other pseudo-exotes (the Lotis, the tourists, were no less disastrous. I call them Procurers of the Sensation of difference."]Loti's perversion, as scrutinized by Segalen, created "disastrous" consequences of the real in cultivating his artificial fetish for Others' bewitching appearances. The fetishistic fascination often ascribed to decadent exoticism of the Orient becomes a traveler's motif, setting a tone of mystery and pleasurable anticipation to fantastical imaginings of what true satiation may be like.

The promotion of tourism in today's digital age has the capacity to blur the distinction between what is real and what is an illusion of appearances. Thus Jean Baudrillard affirms, that we live in an age of excessive reproduction of reality that becomes "hyper-real".[237] For

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[235] Victor Segalen, *Essai sur l'exotisme* (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1999).

[236] Ibid., 111., also in Victor Segalen and Henry Bouillier, *Oeuvres complètes de Victor Segalen, tome 2* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 755. My own translation of this passage reads: "Others subscribe to pseudo-exotic settings (the Lotis, the tourists, were no less disastrous. I call them Procurers of the Sensation of difference.")

[237] Jean Baudrillard coined the term "hyper-real" to describe the way in which the media reduced reality to models of illusion and simulation.

Baudrillard, the process of reproducibility negates reality to the point that illusion is no longer possible.[238] That is, the real is no longer the origin; rather, it is the copy of a copy that loses site of the real.  In Baudrillard's words, "the real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced. [...] The hyperreal transcends representation [...] only because it is entirely in simulation."[239]  The endless reduplication of signs is today the predominant mode of reality arrogating itself the authority to replace presumed originals. The material practices of social imagination continue to replicate old forms of wish-fulfilling images into new forms of fetishized, heavily imagistic and phantasmagoric marvels by means of, what Walter Benjamin calls, "wish-images".[240] Through these depictions, "the emblems return as commodities"[241] and acquire "phantom-like objectivity"[242] to authenticate congealed images of Others. American filmmaker and scholar, Wheeler Dixon, explains the extent to which the spectacle in these wish-fulfilling images penetrates everyday life:

> …the links between public consumerism of images […] and the needs of the imagistic/material entertainment marketplace, and the desire, above all, of the public to possess, through multiple exposures and serial repetition, the essence of the person whom they admired and/or emulated in life, and consequently enshrined in death.[243]

In addition to Dixon's account, we must also include the function of fantasy, which defines the subject's desire to "possess" the "essence" of these fetishized objects.  The collective reality that shapes the world of myth and wish-images is rooted in the collective unconscious.

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[238] "la stratégie du réel Du même ordre que l'impossibilité de retrouver un niveau absolu du réel est l'impossibilité de mettre en scène l'illusion. L'illusion n'est plus possible, parce que le réel n'est plus possible." Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacres et simulation*, Édition: Editions Galilée (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1985), 36.
[239] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, trans. Phil Beitchman, Paul Foss, and Paul Patton (New York City, N.Y., U.S.A: Semiotext, 1983), 146–7.
[240] Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Harvard University Press, 1999), 943.
[241] Walter Benjamin, "Central Park," trans. Lloyd Spencer, *New German Critique* 34 (Winter 1985): 49.
[242] Karl Marx, *Capital Volume I* (England: Penguin Classics, 1976), 128.
[243] Wheeler W. Dixon, *Disaster and Memory: Celebrity Culture and the Crisis of Hollywood Cinema* (Columbia University Press, 1999), 19–20.

It is only through the form of fantasy-images, according to Jungian theory, that the libido of a collective unconscious enters into consciousness.[244] By incorporating Lacanian psychoanalysis, with an interdisciplinary approach, Žižek refers to the symbolic/semiotic construction of fantasy as the main source in which reality is managed.[245] The repetitive interpenetration, of old and new fantasy-motifs, produces legitimacy in what we deem real, or, in the words of film critic and author, James Hoberman, "reality, that is, as we desire it to be and as it shall inevitably become." In this regard, the symbolic order is vested in the ideological constructs of fantasy to produce, reproduce and regulate social reality.

Let us make clear, once again, that wish-images associated with enchantment are not just the product of desire alone, as Dixon has opined, rather, it is through the structure of fantasy that desire can take form. The political economy of Orientalism in cultural industries and mass media reinforce ideological fantasy constructions that offer imagined social orders. It is these social orders that establish ideological rationalizations to reactivate old stereotypes onto new essentialising layouts. In Roland Barthes's well-known observation, the above systems reinstate "this disease of thinking in essences, which is at the bottom of every bourgeois mythology of man (which is why we come across it so often)."[246] Once again, fantasy shapes the way the bourgeoisie uphold myths that formulate the contours of their nation's hierarchical policies and practices. Fantasy bolsters ideological and economic politics by establishing the ceaseless drive of consumerism in order to sustain power and control over its buying public. The notable Slovene philosopher and psychoanalyst, Renata Salecl, gives us a

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[244] Peter Homans, *Jung in Context: Modernity and the Making of a Psychology* (University of Chicago Press, 1995), 107.

[245] Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (Verso, 2008), 33–34.

[246] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (Macmillan, 1972), 135.

clear view of the mechanisms that govern our perceptions through fantasy politics:

"…politics without fantasy, without modes of enjoyment manipulated in the place of the

surmise of political discourse, is an illusion."[247]  Salecl's predicament here is that our own

fantasies must be protected from being "dismantled" in order to be free from institutionalized

fantasy politics. We have to hone our own political fantasies, not for the purpose of replacing

what is already there, but to act as shields of protection from swallowing the fantasies fed to

us by the dominant institutionalized forces.  Our fantasies are the main defense against the

powers that try to frame our role in society. We need our "golden fantasy", as a necessary

component, not only to survive, but to escape the imprisonment of master-myths that seek to

exert control of our views.[248] Through his psychoanalytic inquiry, Sydney Smith elucidates

the importance of this "golden fantasy" in substantiating the claims that constitute human

subjects: "To give up the fantasy is to give up everything, to lose the primary source of

comfort […] It is as if the fantasy provided a self-definition: without it there is no existence

and the world becomes a place without hope."[249] Smith's investigation underpins Salecl's

account of fantasy as the mediator between the symbolic and the real, which leads her to

reflect on the need for "modes of enjoyment" or a "golden fantasy" as means of preventing

the "surmise of discourse" to convert into pure illusion.  In the political discourse of

Orientalism, especially, it is important to discern how the terms "fantasy" and "illusion"

operate. While both terms can seem coextensive and inextricably intertwined, their

substitution can fail to uncover truths in epistemic contexts.  To fully recognize the

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[247] Renata Salecl, *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Ideology after the Fall of Socialism* (Routledge, 2002), 141.
[248] Sydney Smith, "The Golden Fantasy: A Regressive Reaction to Separation Anxiety," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 58 (1977): 311–24.  Smith uses the term "Golden Fantasy" to describe a "wish to have all of one's needs met in a relationship hallowed by perfection", p.311.
[249] Ibid., 311.

complexity of the terms, let us look at their ideological orientation.  Through fantasy, we can acquire illusion, but though illusion, fantasy cannot develop, it can only generate fiction.  The main component of fantasy is the free play of creative imagination, whereas illusion is linked to deception and misinterpretation.  Fantasy has the possibility to materialize and enter into the realm of permanence. Illusion, on the other hand, is a temporary trick to power; it misleads our perception until discovered. To further articulate the correlation of these near synonymous terms, Žižek makes explicit that "fantasy does not mean an illusion that masks reality. Rather, it is fantasy which structures reality itself."[250]

There are many different approaches to the relationship of fantasy and illusion where imagination comes to play. For Emmanuel Kant, imagination is an active cognitive faculty that mediates between intuition and thought and has the capacity to be analyzed in its own right.[251] For Carl Jung, however, it is fantasy that holds the key to imagination.  Fantasy, according to Jung, "has its own irreducible value, for it is a psychic function that has its roots in the conscious and the unconscious alike, in the individual as much as in the collective."[252] Jung's regard for fantasy is so high, he vowed that "developing fantasy means perfecting our humanity."[253] Many contemporary thinkers agree that the distinction between fantasy and imagination is an unstable one.[254]  Nevertheless, some modern scholars embrace the Kantian theory where imagination occupies a more significant role (than fantasy),  while others back the Jungian philosophy, which views fantasy as the principal creative function that influences

[250] Slavoj Žižek, "Fantasy as Political Category: A Lacanian Approach," *Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society* 1.1 (Fall 1996): 79.
[251] John H. Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* (University of Chicago Press, 1992), 69.
[252] Carl Gustav Jung, *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung: Complete Digital Edition* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 290.
[253] Carl Gustav Jung, *C. G. Jung Speaking: Interviews and Encounters* (Princeton University Press, 1987), 40.
[254] Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, *Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown* (Routledge, 2011), 72.

the imagination.  Of particular importance for discourse in the context of racial tourism and its semiotics, the notable anthropologist, Arjun Appadurai, has coined his own terminology for "hyper-real-wish-images" of a new digital era he calls "mediascapes".[255] According to Appadurai, these mediascapes "constitute narratives of the Other" that deliver a space of fantasy, turning it into a primer for the desire of Orientalistic social practices.[256]  In diagnosing the facets of mediascapes' structure, Appadurai takes a Kantian approach in drawing a sharp distinction between fantasy and imagination.  His description is inconsistent with the Lacanian/Jungian psychoanalyst thinkers in a perspective that suggests;

> …the idea of fantasy carries with it the inescapable connotation of thought divorced from projects and actions, and it also has a private, even individualistic sound about it. The imagination, on the other hand, has a projective sense about it, the sense of being a prelude to some sort of expression, whether aesthetic or otherwise.  Fantasy can dissipate (because its logic is so often autotelic), but the imagination, especially when collective, can become the fuel for action.[257]

To judge a psycho-philosophic term by its "sound" may not always produce correct results. It is not clear as to why Appadurai considers fantasy to be an individualistic undertaking, particularly, since the production of collective fantasy begins with children's activities.[258]

Social psychologist and philosopher, Émile Durkheim, has written extensively on the power

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[255] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity Al Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 35.  Appadurai coined the term "mediascape" to describe the new digital capabilities that "produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, and film-production studios), which are now available to a growing number of private and public interests throughout the world, and to the images of the world created by these media.  These images involve many complicated inflections, depending on their mode (documentary or entertainment), their hardware (electronic or preelectronic), their audiences (local, national, or transnational), and the interests of those who own and control them."
[256] Ibid., 36.
[257] Ibid., 7.
[258] The specialists in children's literature, Iona and Peter Opie, have observed that "much collective fantasy is produced by children."  Children are eager to participate in fantasy play (mainly due to its less restrictive structure) that continues on to adolescents and adulthood through socially shared references (jokes, stories, film and animation, photographs).  For more of their observations see, Iona Opie and Peter Opie, *Children's Games in Street and Playground* (Floris Books, 2013).

of fantasy in fashioning the collective human consciousness.[259]  In most cases, when

Durkheim contemplates the notion of a conscience collective, he attributes it to fantasy, and

therefore, it is not surprising that some scholars paraphrase the Durkheimian conscience

collective as the "fantasy collective" they understand it to be.[260] Appadurai views fantasy as

an escapist fiction divorced from any reality and dismisses the possibility that imagination, as

Jung proposed, is given liberation through fantasy.[261]  The idea that fantasy "can dissipate"

because of its "autotelic" nature seems largely unfounded and arbitrary, and perhaps based

solely on Appadurai's alignment with an abstract reasoning over socially negotiated visual

judgments. While Appadurai insists that fantasy is "autotelic," many thinkers and scholars

adhere to the popular and widely used phrase– "solipsistic imagination"– that describes a

self-bound, ego-centered, isolate dimension of imagination's realm.  In Jung's study,

imagination has a solipsistic and independent symbol-producing capacity.[262] In addition,

contrary to Appadurai's belief that fantasy is dissipative, it is imagination that occupies a

transitional role of bridging what is, with what is becoming.[263] Imagination is a product of

fantasy and so are collective illusions that may broaden new avenues of productivity, or,

severely distort the sense of "realities" that create the realities of our world.  For the task of

clarifying the unstable distinction between fantasy and imagination, it is essential to make

clear the discrepancies among the varying theoretical perspectives that continue to provoke

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[259] Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (Courier Corporation, 2012), 70.

[260] Adam Possamai, *Religion and Popular Culture: A Hyper-Real Testament* (Peter Lang, 2005), 92.  Among others, Possamai is one of the notable scholars that substitutes Durkheim's collective consciousness for "fantasy consciousness".

[261] Carl Gustav Jung, *Jung on Active Imagination* (Princeton University Press, 2015), 14.

[262] Andrew Samuels, *Passions, Persons, Psychotherapy, Politics: The Selected Works of Andrew Samuels* (Routledge, 2014), 198.

[263] Studies on transitional imagination are documented in,  Alan Bass, *Interpretation and Difference: The Strangeness of Care* (Stanford University Press, 2006), 118.  See also, Richard Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination* (Routledge, 2002), 120.

discussion between scholars.  The aforementioned inconsistencies are beyond the scope of

this project, however, the scholarly consensus, in a wide range of disciplines, suggests that

"fantasy is considered the highest form of imagination."[264]

The layers of sensory imagery (symbols that appeal to the five senses and transport the

viewer/reader to a new setting) contribute to the internal sensory modes of fantasy and

imagination that repeat compulsively, sometimes more vividly, the prior sensations (fed to us

by the "empire of signs") onto new sceneries.[265] The content of sensory modes may appear

peripheral in determining our internal position monitored by external referents, but enables

us to apprehend the complexities and consequences of each sensory contact. The well-known

contributions of The Frankfurt School theorists, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, for

example, pursued the instrumentalisation of fantasy in symbolic repertoires that further the

interests of capitalist elites, and to mobilize the "culture industry".[266]  The logic of repetition

carries *fancy* forms of inescapable circularity to commodify social patterns in our cultural

sector.[267]  Through this cyclical market, consumer enslavement turns into its final form of

"shiny barbarism" that manipulates and exploits its influences over the public masses.[268] The

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[264] Guangfei Yang, *Multidisciplinary Studies in Knowledge and Systems Science* (Idea Group Inc (IGI), 2013), 82.  Also see, Richard Mathews, *Fantasy: The Liberation of Imagination* (Routledge, 2012), 57.

[265] I borrow the phrase "empire of signs" from Roland Barthes's book of the same title. Barthes uses the phrase to identify the "grammar" that underlies the "sign-worlds" of mass culture, especially, where non-Western cultures come into question.  See also, Roland Barthes, *Empire of Signs*, trans. Richard Howard (Hill and Wang, 1982).

[266]The catchphrase "culture industry" was first used in (1947) Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, vol. 1 (Continuum, 1972).  Prior to their coined expression, "mass culture" was the set phrase that described the profit motive of all forms of representation that superseded the "entire culture like a mould" (p.6-7).

[267] The term "fancy" that derives from its alternative spellings from "fantsy" or "phantsy," is used here to designate modes of imagination and fantasy.

[268] The British cultural critic, Herbert Richard Hoggart, coined the phrase "shiny barbarism" to document how common populations are entrapped in superficial consumerism that are guided by the market of control systems. For Hoggart's discussion on "shiny barbarism" see, Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (Transaction Publishers, 1957), 147.

preferences and tastes that determine consumer choices are often pursued under the sway of

unconscious priming.[269] The advertised object is not the main goal of consumerist market

productions, rather, for the producer of commodities it is the very formation of people

themselves (apropos of ideology) and their choice-making capacities that becomes a crucial

aim for the dominant modes of cultural reproduction to thrive.  To assess the wider impact of

mechanisms that prime the consumer, Adorno remarks:

> Cultural entities typical of the culture industry are no longer *also* commodities, they
> are commodities through and through. […] Ultimately, the culture industry no longer
> even needs to directly pursue everywhere the profit interests from which it originated.
> These interests have become objectified in its ideology and have even made
> themselves independent in the compulsion to sell the cultural commodities which
> must be swallowed anyway.[270]

I will add to Adorno's viewpoint that the consumer does not only have the willing-ness to

"swallow," but has the *need* to "swallow" what is fed to him/her from the insatiable hand of

consumerism that can never fully satisfy.  The means of production only intensify consumer

needs without satisfying the desires that it is meant to fulfill.  The truth is, according to

Baudrillard, "not that 'needs are the fruits of production', but that the system of needs is the

product of the system of production."[271]  The capitalist system of the culture industry is

defined by its function of securing a sense of freedom and individuality within the force of

consumption. It is this illusory individuality that inculcates behaviors suitable to maintain the

logic of commodity.  As such, Orientalism becomes a commodity fetish and enabler of an

attractive cultural "label" that transforms Otherness into a consumable object.  The

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[269] According to Andrew Sneddon's study, it is through the use of images that the consumer's subconscious in primed.  Sneddon Argues that images "are not consciously noticed by viewers but which nevertheless are detected by our sensory apparatus." See in,  Andrew Sneddon, *Autonomy* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 182.
[270] Theodor W. Adorno, *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture* (Routledge, 2005), 100.
[271] Jean Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures* (SAGE, 1998), 74.

ideological dimensions of consumerism, explains sociologist Steven Miles, want consumers

to:

> Experience what might be described as 'pseudo-sovereignty'. The individual's experience of consumerism is therefore clearly a balancing act between structure and agency. […] The consumer is offered a veneer of sovereignty and maximizes his or her personal freedom within the veneer provided, despite a tacit acceptance that consumerism is a more powerful beast than any one individual at any one time.[272]

The consumerist "veneer" provides a sense of "pseudo-sovereignty" in choice-making

individuals and simultaneously programs them to follow mindlessly an unending list of

conformist behaviors that uphold the system. The dominant centers of mass culture continue

to produce forms of consumerist objects linked to symbols (e.g., a trip to Abu Dhabi as the

object is linked to desert moons, Shahrezad, magic carpets as its symbols) that indoctrinate

the controlled masses into social conformity and subordination. Drawing on Marxist theory

that makes up the capitalist value system, Baudrillard reframes the market term "exchange

value" into "symbolic exchange" value to define itself beyond codified measures of value

alone. Hence, capitalist economic exchange, Baudrillard argues, is possible only through

seduction and simulation of a symbolic order. It is where meaning of exchange exceeds

utility or "use-value," and relies mainly on transmitting the socio-psychological aspect of the

valuables as an intangible "currency" that manipulates perception. In Baudrillard's words,

"there is no symbolic 'value,' there is only symbolic 'exchange,' which defines itself […]

beyond value and code."[273]

   In the context of racial tourism, especially where Orientalism is a main component, the

symbolic exchange value *is* the use value, in that it functions like a physical dependence on

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[272] Steven Miles, *Consumerism: As a Way of Life* (SAGE, 1998), 156.
[273] Jean Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (Telos Press Publishing, 1981), 125.

narcotics. The "euphoria of Orientalism", after all, has been widely mentioned in written

works that range from classic nineteenth-century travel books to contemporary postcolonial

discourse.[274]  In introducing Eugene Fromentin's fascination with the Orient, for example,

the renowned travel writer Sarah Anderson explains how the West's love affair with the

Orient continues to be a favored narcotic:

> The Orient would now and forever represent a place where one could lose himself,
> enraptured by and intoxicated with an idealized otherness, a comforting *lieu d'extase*
> (place of ecstasy) equal to the delight of a drugged euphoria– 'to have done with life
> through a voluptuous suicide.'[275]

The striking textual parallels between Anderson's reading of Fromentin and the many

accounts of travelers, novelists, historians, and ethnographers, past and present, give us a

glimpse into their portrayal of an intoxicating Orient through its central metaphor of opiates.

Intermeshed with drugs as Orient's symbolic representation, it is not unlikely that

Orientalism's addictive experience first begins with a recreational consumption of

experiential novelty objects. In his memoirs, the late nineteenth-century French painter,

Narcisse Berchère, recounts the exultation with which he experienced the Eastern desert in

Egypt.  It was through "the enticing allure of something new, the elation of a traveler's

existence, and the sheer bliss of the unexpected" that got him hooked on this "secret

*jouissance*".[276] With the frequent recreational use of the resonant phrase "everything

Oriental," tolerance develops to the Eastern aura and the joyful rush requires higher and

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[274] Among the writings that describe the Orient as a "euphoric" or drug-like stimulant include, Eugene
Fromentin, *Between Sea and Sahara: An Orientalist Adventure* (Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004), xvii., John
Marlowe, *Cromer in Egypt* (Paul Elek Incorporated, 1970), 176.Malek Alloula, *Colonial Harem* (University Of
Minnesota Press, 1986), 29., Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination,
1945-1961* (University of California Press, 2003), 104.
[275] Fromentin, *Between Sea and Sahara*, xvii.  The book's introduction is written by Sarah Anderson who
herself is a travel writer of the well-known series of *Anderson's Travel Companion*.
[276] Lynne Thornton, *The Orientalists: Painter-Travellers* (ARC PocheCouleur, 1994), 30.  Originally in,
Narcisse Berchère, *Le désert de Suez: cinq mois dans l'isthme* (Hetzel, 1863), 243.

higher doses of Orientalist participation to recapture the impact of *jouissance* from its initial

experience. It is this recapturing in Sir Thomas Moore's 1856 Oriental romance of *Lalla*

*Rookh* that the historian, Roderick Cavaliero, designates as "intoxicated by the

voluptuousness of his imagination."[277] Moore was not alone in his Orientalist elation, "The

place intoxicates one" is how the British artist, Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon labeled her

Algerian experience (which also occurred in 1856).[278] Ninety-three years later, Hester Burton

retraced Bodichon's Orientalist lure by publishing one of her letters that reinforced the

"weird" substance of Algiers as "one of the most intoxicating places under the sun. There is

no doubt of it."[279]  Bodichon's promise of this Orientalist intoxication does not stop with

Burton's publication.  In their book entitled *Visual Culture and Tourism*, cultural geographer

David Crouch and art historian Nina Lubbren illustrate how Bodichon's *Algeria* made its

way to tourist materials that promise "ocular delights and pictorial offerings," waiting to be

consumed.[280] Today's travelers aspire to experience the moments of rapture that the Moore-

esque and Bodichonian accounts have pledged. Consequently, the force of seductive tourist

advertising continues to aestheticize intoxication with the use of Orientalist visual and textual

narratives as a powerful method of linking consumption to blissful transcendence.

Other views of an "intoxicating Orient" used for promotional purposes, especially in

tourism, were popularized in the Romanticist escape of the Norwegian poet and song writer,

Vilhelm Krag.  In his 1893 *Sange fra Syden* [Songs from the South], Krag reveals his

Orientalist notion of Eastern opulence and decadent rapture, confirming:

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[277] Roderick Cavaliero, *Ottomania: The Romantics and the Myth of the Islamic Orient* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 158.

[278] Quoted in Deborah Cherry, *Beyond the Frame: Feminism and Visual Culture, Britain 1850 -1900* (Routledge, 2012), 75.

[279] Hester Burton, *Barbara Bodichon, 1827-1891* (J. Murray, 1949), 83.

[280] David Crouch and Nina Lübbren, *Visual Culture and Tourism* (Berg, 2003), 45.

The Orient's wine in my cup!
The singing of the sun, the roaring of the waves –!
Oh, I am so deeply intoxicated,
Dizzy and wild and mad with happiness.[281]

The feature that makes Krag's verses "so much better" than the works of his Norwegian colleagues, according to early-twentieth-century psychologist and author Hermione Ramsden, is "its oriental coloring, which was the cause of admiration."[282]  In her critical study of Danish and Norwegian travelogues, literary expert Elisabeth Oxfeldt, reveals Krag's mention of his deep admiration for Orientalism to "bring back some sunshine to our overcast literature, – If only we […] got a bit of Oriental glowing colors."[283] Perhaps, this is what the English poet, Edward FitzGerald, had in mind when he published an English translation of Jámí's Persian allegory, *Salámán and Absál* in the popular (Oriental-inspired) year of 1856. Three years later, the first edition of 75 quatrains from *The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám*'s epigrammatic approaches to Persian wisdom and mysticism were printed with FitzGerald's own interpretive twist.[284]  One of the outstanding reviews of Khayyam's interpretation, written in 1913 by Helen Cornelius,  captured the passion and appetite in which "FitzGerald found in the vast accumulation of the Persian of Omar Khayyam material for a poem after his heart's desire.  There were glowing oriental colors, imagery of strange new charm, and ancient proverbs full of pregnant suggestions."[285]  A common thread underlying the above

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[281] Translated in, Elisabeth Oxfeldt, *Nordic Orientalism: Paris and the Cosmopolitan Imagination 1800-1900* (Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 195–196.
[282] Hermione Ramsden, "The New Mysticism in Scandinavia," ed. James Knowles, *The Nineteenth Century* 47 (June 1900): 288.
[283] Vilhelm Krag's expression quoted in,  Elisabeth Oxfeldt, *Journeys from Scandinavia: Travelogues of Africa, Asia, and South America, 1840-2000* (U of Minnesota Press, 2010), 60.
[284] Several contemporary authors and translators of Persian works have argued that FitzGerald's interpretation evokes an Orientalized presentation of Omar Khayyam and the "East".  In, Franklin Dean Lewis, trans., *Rumi: Swallowing the Sun* (Oneworld Publications, 2013), ix., Also see, Garrett G. Fagan, *Archaeological Fantasies: How Pseudoarchaeology Misrepresents the Past and Misleads the Public* (Psychology Press, 2006), 259.
[285] Helen Cornelius, "Our Epicurean Eclogue," *The Occident* 66 (December 1913): 170.

applications can be discerned, namely, in the consistent reference that is made to the weird/strange, intoxicatOr(ient), Eastern sun, and "glowing Oriental colors". Each of these underlying themes foments the need for an escape from the mundane and familiar everydayness. Through these semiotic encounters with Other cultures, fantasy displaces reality and emerges as the main conceptual signifier of that reality. Through Orientalism's fantastical aperture, the subject is able to subvert the mundaneness of everyday life not just by escaping, but by escaping the escape itself where fantasies are replaced with novel fantasies. It is this realm of "intoxication" that emboldens the need to seize the symbol of desire and utilize the above Orientalist formulas to polish the lackluster– borrowing the famous Hegelian formulation– "prose of the world". When Vilhelm Krag pursued the luminosity of the "Orient's sunshine" as an attempt to add radiance onto the "overcast" of Norwegian literature, it was not only a simple call for escape from the conventions of life. Paradoxically, while his Orientalist "intoxications" helped to evade mundane-quotidian life, it was simultaneously also meant to confront the vacuity that encapsulated his social condition and left him with something deeper unaddressed and unlived.

Let us recapitulate the above by approaching Orientalism from an angle governed by the human condition. The excessive use of the term "intoxicated" in Orientalist portrayals of Eastern sites is a small indication of a pressing need to transcend the ordinariness of daily limitations and experience deeper, more purposeful levels of reality. That is not to say that the "purpose" of that "reality" may not result in imperialistic wishes to dominate and control the Other. There are at least two elements of the human condition relative to Orientalism's disorienting impact that can be specified: The positive side of "fulfillment" (the attainment of fantasy, inertia, indulgence, *jouissance*, etc.) and the negative side of "escape" (the evasion

of disappointments, despondency, monotonous quotidian life, etc.).  Although this is a

qualitative study, this is not an unusual claim, especially, in light of reception/transmission of

Orientalist literary and visual representations that both (negative/escape and

positive/fulfillment) sides of cognition have kept the business of Orientalism in the "reality"

of reality (reality as a virtual and hyperreal appearance).  It is for this very reason that early

twentieth century Orientalist novels are still being reprinted to meet the enduring popular

demand in the West.  Recent trends in literature suggest that the reading interests of the new

consumer generation are repeated to the same extent as the generations before in trying get a

hold of Orient's magical aura.  The demands in reprints, for example, continue for Martha

Pike Conant's *The Oriental Tale in England*, making yet another comeback in its seventh

volume.  It is clear from Conant's writing, that she too, has been transfixed by the Oriental

tones and textures.  The descriptions of her Oriental experience bring back the much sought-

after essence "with a cumulative force of one slight stroke of oriental imagery after another

[…that] stimulates the imagination."[286]  It is helpful to add Baudrillard's theory to broaden

Conant's view of ways in which "cumulative Oriental forces" that can "stimulate the

imagination," also tend to "simulate" it.  By simulating Orientalist passions in either visual or

print narratives, the reader is rewarded with intoxicative modes of pleasure that can be

stretched into external "realities" of the world.  Simulations have convincing effects on the

senses and constructions of reality.  Reference to Baudrillard reveals that the act of

simulation is "to feign to have what one doesn't have. […and] threatens the difference

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[286] Martha Pike Conant, *The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century* (Columbia University Press, 1908), 114.  The reprint of volume seven has been released in early 2014, and the release of the Classic reprint (original version) took place towards the end of 2012.

between the 'true' and the 'false,' the 'real' and the 'imaginary'."[287]  Turning to Žižek's

observation of the "real," we find parallels to Baudrillard's views, especially in the treatment

of the virtual world that blurs our realities. Taking a stance to readjust Gilles Deleuze's idea

of the virtual, Žižek goes one step further to introduce the idea of *the reality of the virtual*

(which in Lacanian terms, is the Real).[288]  Žižek argues that *virtual reality* is a weak

expression in revealing all the functions of its blurring capacity. The former expression, on

the other hand, carries with it "real effects and consequences" that reveal more of the

structure's instrumentality.[289]  From a Žižekian standpoint, in order for the "real" to be

operative, it has to remain virtual.  The virtual dimension, in other words, has its proper

reality that grounds the materiality of fantasy into the lasting dimension of actuality, or, in

Žižek's words, "reality is actual only as virtual".[290] Quite feasibly, it is through the virtual

that the "prose of the world" can transcend into supernatural realms, or, at the very least, it

can amend the prosaic experiences of the human condition.  The nineteenth-century German

philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer echoes his own pessimism of life's realities by

highlighting Francesco Petrarca's distraught expression of the human condition that

constantly tarnishes happiness, "*Mille piacer non vagliono un tormento*" [A thousand

pleasures do not compensate for one torment].[291] It is unlikely that both Schopenhauer and

Petrarch believed that life's gratifications are revoked by a single torment. Rather, it is more

pertinent to say that the satisfaction of desire resulting in happiness is, particularly for

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[287] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (University of Michigan Press, 1994), 3.
[288]  Slavoj Žižek, *Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences* (Routledge, 2012), 3.
[289] Ibid.
[290] Ben Wright, *Manufacturing Reality: Slavoj Zizek and the Reality of the Virtual*, Documentary, (2006).
[291] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2 (Courier Corporation, 2012), 576.  The literal translation is "A thousand pleasures are not worth one torment."

Schopenhauer, only an illusory and transient negation of suffering.  This last point leads us to consider the similarities of Schopenhauer's outlook on the laws that govern our reality based on appearances, and Žižek's concept of the reality of the virtual that chooses to see only an abstract image of the real, to synthetically maintain appearances of contentment, and to reach for "intoxicative" pleasures that are quickly extinguished, leaving only a deeper dissatisfaction for not being able to attain (and maintain) one's wants.  Schopenhauer concerned himself with the meaninglessness of the human condition and argued that "nine-tenths of mankind live in constant conflict with want, always balancing themselves with difficulty and effort on the brink of destruction."[292]  For Schopenhauer, everything in the world is fundamentally united by the "will to live" guided by "blind" forces of a motiveless "will" that lies (in both senses of the term) in our most basic urges.[293]  It is the seduction by the will that mankind's "conflict with want" leads to boredom and suffering. The only escape from this miserable circumstance, according to Schopenhauer, comes from self-denial or the arts (namely music).  Therefore, it should not be a surprise that Schopenhauer's "will" has led him to "negate" life's boredoms and sufferings through one of the many arts, focused, on Romantic Orientalism.[294]  In tracing the roots of major thinkers, historian Arthur Herman, found that "Schopenhauer is a good example of how the spell of Orientalism in the early nineteenth century could transform a thinker's life."[295]  Eastern influences inspired

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[292] Ibid., 2:584.

[293] Ibid., 2:466.  Depending on the context, Schopenhauer uses the term "will" in many ways, but in our discussion, "will" can be used as psychoanalysts use "drive" and as general philosophers use the phrase "the laws of Nature" to indicate a pure energy or force of nature that has no driving direction, and yet permeates everything in the phenomenal world.

[294] Schopenhauer's "will" can be explained further as irrational, blind and meaningless that forces the subject in unfulfilledness, and deficiency.  The only way to achieve freedom from the will is to outwit itself through the "experience of art".

[295] Arthur Herman, *The Idea of Decline in Western History* (Simon and Schuster, 2010), 131.

Schopenhauer to write about an imagined Hindu India that fetishized Vedic spirituality and romanticized ancient Oriental mystic wisdom. Imbued with essentialist sensibilities, Schopenhauer's views shaped and strengthened portrayals of the Orient that attracted a considerable share of avid followers who subscribe to his thoughts. Under Schopenhauer's influence, Paul Deussen, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Müller, A.W. Schlegel, and Friedrich Rückert, to name just a few, became fascinated with Romantic Eastern thought, which was mostly rooted in the Orientalist desire of reconnecting with ancient sites and its "authentic" beings or in Schopenhauerian terminology– to revisit the "natural man".[296]

In a study of Joseph Conrad's writings, Edward Said posits that Schopenhauer's psychological influence "deeply impressed" Conrad's reasoning by combining "fictional representation and philosophic thought into an invisible whole."[297] It is through the Schopenhauerian dilemma, suggests Said, that Conrad's closeness to the German arch-pessimist can be considered.[298] This philosophical dilemma unfolds on the basis of dual-forms of Will and representation (conative/ cognitive, subject/object, observer/observed, knower/known) that creates, in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, an identification with another self– validating oneself only in the perception of the Other. In this relativization of representation we are offered the essential nature of reality instilled by a direct copy of the Will itself that in turn symbolize what Schopenhauer called the "world as will". The belief that the world and existence have no justification outside the aesthetic sphere had a great influence on Nietzsche's first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), that links him with

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[296] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, vol. 3 (K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1906), 314.
[297] Edward W. Said, *Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography* (Columbia University Press, 1966), 102 and 139.
[298] Ibid., 13.

Schopenhauer's unresolved tensions between "will" (primordial desires) and "idea" (Phenomenal manifestation).  In a similar dual construction based on ancient Greek mythology, Nietzsche develops the notion of the Dionysian state of consciousness that symbolizes intoxication, passion and ecstasy on the one hand and the Apollonian dream state that relates to detachment, creative illusions and desirable, but contrived, intellectual imagery on the other.  Nietzsche, however, modified Schopenhauer's dualities by fusing the vacillating Apollonian-Dionysian forces that generate dialectical movements and transform reality into Attic tragedy (a vital tool for the presentation of the Other).[299] This aesthetic formula, from which Nietzsche gained inspiration towards an artistic renewal (uniting music, drama, poetry and audience) in a "tragic spirit," came from Richard Wagner's aesthetic ideals in a synthesis of the arts.  It is from this Wagnerian *Gesamtkunstwerk* [total artwork] that art becomes its own world and serves to intoxicate and inspire beyond all forms of "decadence".[300]   The pleasure obtained from the spectacle of an all-embracing art form (Dionysian rhythms and Apolline Drama) transforms and molds society into a mystical communal union. Nietzsche's description of the "Dionysiac rapture" closely resembles "physical intoxication" (*Rausch*) that determines the ways:

> Dionysiac stirrings arise either through the influence of those narcotic potions of which all primitive races speak in their hymns, or through the powerful approach of spring, which penetrates with joy the whole frame of nature.  So stirred, the individual forgets himself completely.[301]

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[299] Ancient Greek Literature specialist, Edith Hall, rightly points out that "Attic tragedy played a crucial role in inventing the barbarian as 'Other' to the Greek, marking the onset of European Orientalism analyzed by Edward Said."  Hall's analysis as located in, Rush Rehm, *The Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy* (Princeton University Press, 2009), 236.

[300] Nietzsche's notion of decadence covers a vast and complex field of physiological deficiencies (philosophy, language and religion as parts of an organism/system) in a sociocultural framework.  Nietzsche leans on Socratic Ethics (which uses reason to change the *expression* of decadence) to demonstrate that other forces can subvert the order of reason.

[301] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals* (Doubleday, 1956), 22.

Within this grand metaphysical system, the aesthetic vision of reality revels in appearances, exploited by art's symbolic potential that has become the opium of the people. The ethnographic fantasy of Nietzsche's "primitive races," in this case, has more of a libidinal connotation. In many of his writings, Nietzsche has made references to the "races of nature" with animalistic impulses and primitive drives that demand a release through the Dionysian mechanism for self-forgetfulness.

German Romantics were particularly drawn to Orientalism for its appeal in offering resignation to life and celebrating the life spirit.[302] Eastern influence became a way to reject the Enlightenment conceptions of practical reasoning and an effective means "to free themselves from Judeo-Christian fetters."[303] Many Wagnerian romantics sought Orientalism's aesthetic and spiritual escape to find psychological states of *Rausch*. Among the many German Orientalists, Ludwig Tieck, proclaimed in a letter to Friedrich Schlegel that all thought and poetry of the human spirit "stems from India without exception."[304] Illusion and fantasy are for Tieck, critical players in reviving the human spirit by surrendering the self "to the beautiful madness of the poet; that the soul, after this intoxication, willingly surrenders itself anew to the enchantment, and the playing fantasy is not awakened from its dreams by any sudden and offensive surprise."[305] The Orient, for Tieck and his contemporaries, was an important mythical location (as illustrated in his Orientalist texts, *Al-Mansur* and *Abdallah*) required for losing the individual self as a means

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[302] Paul Kuritz, *The Making of Theatre History* (Pearson Education, 1988), 254.

[303] The composer and musicologist, Joscelyn Godwin, echoes the words of Leon Poliakov to describe how Orientalism reflected the struggle of the German Romantics to escape. See, Joscelyn Godwin, *Arktos: The Polar Myth in Science, Symbolism, and Nazi Survival* (Adventures Unlimited Press, 1996), 38.

[304] Quoted in, Sara Eigen and Sara Eigen Mark Joseph Larrimore, *The German Invention of Race* (SUNY Press, 2012), 169.

[305] Ludwig Tieck's quotation in, Frederick Burwick, *Illusion and the Drama: Critical Theory of the Enlightenment and Romantic Era* (Penn State Press, 2010), 63–64.

to attain aesthetic and otherworldly pleasures.  Under the influence of German Orientalism, much effort has gone into creating a persuasive system of reasoning to justify the abandonment (self-forgetfulness) of reason itself.  Moreover, German Romantics, with all the theories and rhetoric supporting primitivist Orientalism, are not much different than the rest of Western Orientalists for their zealous need to take delight in the mysteries of selfless ecstasy. Both sectors (German and rest of the West) drew on a variety of philosophical sources to substantiate their Othering fixation, but together, they have practiced the same rudimentary engagements of fetishizing a fictionalized Orient. A closer look into the exotic art and literature of Western Orientalists reveals a formulaic representation of foreign cultures. The literary depictions of mystic intoxication have creatively justified Otherworldliness in Pierre Loti's compelling language creatively, in the same manner as they have in Vilhelm Krag's poems, or Nietzsche's Attic tragedy.  To make this point clear, we may draw on a simple, but close analogy of a different type of intoxicatory substance: the sparkling wine. While only wines coming from the designated Champagne region in northeastern France can be called champagne, the Italian Prosecco or the German "Sekt" are sparkling wines with no less powerful hallucinatory effects that take "advantage of romantic myth and magic."[306]  In the same way, the aura of Orientalism's splendor has been intricately cultivated in different regions (e.g., French, German, Italian schools of thought). The bottle, or the philosophy, that contains the sparkling wine may have distinct labels, but its purpose is to prevent the magical bubbles from escaping. After the wine has been consumed not many

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[306]According to Rätsch and Müller-Ebeling, "The alcohol in champagne is not the only reason for its special erotically stimulating effects.  The famous bubbles in the glass, as well as the cultivated atmosphere and aura of luxury surrounding champagne, contribute substantially to its legendary reputation." More on the *Gesamtkuntswerk* of sparkling wine can be found in, Christian Rätsch and Claudia Müller-Ebeling, *The Encyclopedia of Aphrodisiacs: Psychoactive Substances for Use in Sexual Practices* (Inner Traditions / Bear & Co, 2013), 389.

would mind if the source of their intoxication derives from a French Champagne or a German Sekt as they are all feeling the effects of the same spirits. Today, Orientalism has become part of something larger that encompasses not just Orientalist schools of thought, but also a grand scale *Gesamtkunstwerk* fusing film, popular culture, and tourism with verbal and non-verbal art forms. This metaphysical system moves beyond aesthetic pleasures to introduce the complex art of, borrowing the words of postcolonial literary expert, Peter Dunwoodie, "projection, recognition, and repetition," that has turned Orientalist "fantasy into reality, and [that has] imbued reality with all the qualities of hallucination!"[307]

It is through these all-encompassing art forms that the Wagnerian *Gesamtkunstwerk* has become the heartbeat of mass tourism and the illuminator of Orientalism. In its dynamic aesthetic framework, each sense reinforces the other, thus creating a consumer's emporium to arrive at a multisensory experience of capturing the pleasures of foreign sights. In their team-based study towards the functionality of spatial designs that construct perceptional elements, Svabo and Larsen, Haldrup and Bærenholdt give a perfect example of an Orientalist *Gesamtkunstwerk*. They illustrate their results from a "Bedouin Night Trip" (taken in 2007) in Sharm el Sheikh's Sainai Desert tourist site:

> The tour slowly enters into a blended geography of fiction and fact: myth and materiality. […] we approach the 'Bedouin desert camp', which turns out to be a concrete and steel construction, with makeshift shelters, carpets, cushions and low 'Bedouin-style' tables, and dismount the camels. A mint tea welcomes us and seductively wraps us in the 'different' fragrances and flavors, a bonfire is lit and flutes and drums entertain with an Oriental soundscape, perfect for dancing with the Bedouins and mind-travelling while gazing into the flames. The 'drama' of the Bedouin Night Trip then enables an embodied imagination of 'difference'. Such 'sensuous geographies' enable tourists to take possession. By exposing oneself to 'different' moves, scents, flavors, sights and sounds, the tourist can enjoy and engage in 'difference' by incorporating it. Camel riding through the desert, Bedouin dances, belly dancing lessons and laid-back evenings at *shisha* cafes are all rich and colorful

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[307] Peter Dunwoodie, *Writing French Algeria* (Oxford University Press, 1998), 78.

components of a fantasized Orient materialized in embodied performances. Thus, they are illustrative of tourism's entangled and blended geographies of the virtual and material, the fantasized and 'the real', the embodied and the poetic.[308]

To ensure consistent reinforcement of Orientalism's "fantastic realism," a replica of Sharm El Sheikh's Bedouin excursion can also be found in the dunes of Dubai's Bab Al Shams Desert Resort (literal translation from Arabic means "gateway to the sun"). Here, it is appropriate to convey my own study, considering that my personal experience turned into a research process. In a 2006 global academic conference held under the patronage of Her Highness Sheikha Fatima Bint Mubarak, delegates from eighty-seven countries were invited to participate in Zayed University's Women as Global Leaders program in Abu Dhabi. The opening of the conference took place in a lavish auditorium where Queen Rania of Jordan was to give the welcoming speech. As the delegates entered the hall, the burners of *oud* (oil extracted from Aloeswood) and *bakhoor* (incense), perfumed the vast area with clouds of "exotic" aura (opined a professor from Idaho State sitting next to me).[309] By the time the opening session was over, more remarks had been made about the "mysterious" and "sensual" scents of the Arabian Oud than they did about the Queen's speech.[310] Some of the Middle Eastern women from the region, however, found it highly ill-suited for a space of an

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[308] Connie Svabo et al., "Experiencing Spatial Design," in *Handbook on the Experience Economy*, ed. Jon Sundbo and Flemming Sørensen (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 320–321.

[309] U.K. based perfume consultant, Nathalie Grainger, describes "the charms of the Middle East with the sensual Al Oudh [Oud oil]. Al Oudh explores slightly darker aromas with its natural woods and rich leathery spices wrapped in oud, rose, candied dates and incense." In, Nathalie Grainger, *Quintessentially Perfume* (Quintessentially Publishing, 2011), 107.

[310] Delegates from the United States, especially, commented on the "mesmerizing effects" and "sultry aroma" of the Oud scent. The term "exotic," however, was the main adjective used to express their fascination with the fragrance.

academic gathering to have "such a distracting essence."[311] It was nevertheless an experience that had enraptured many of the attendees.

On the third day of the program, all the delegates were taken for an hour-long bus ride deep into the dunes of Dubai's Bab Al Shams Desert fort. The results that were submitted by Svabo and Larsen, Haldrup and Bærenholdt, mirror my own field observations. The planners had arranged our desert arrival at a time when we could witness the golden sand glisten during sunset. Against the vibrant colors of the setting sun, we could see the silhouettes of a caravan of camels accompanied by their herders and a group of "Bedouins" on their Arabian horses galloping through the glittering dunes. We were greeted with a traditional Bedouin sword dance upon our entrance into the fort, while a "Bedouin falconer" approached the entering guests to pose for pictures. A section of the fort dedicated to "Bedouin handicrafts" (embroidered cloths, carpets, hand beaded wearables, tribal jewelry, etc.), was especially popular with women, namely, North American women, who found the "authentic Arabic designs" to be "captivatingly breathtaking".[312] Yet, another enchanting area that attracted Western women is the henna tattoo artistry of "Bedouin" women's traditional swirling designs.[313] What was astonishing about the comprehensive fictional space was not only the Indian immigrant from Bangladesh who postured as the Arab Bedouin falconer, or the Pakistani men from Karachi and Hyderabad posing as the authentic camel herders and sword dancers, or the women from Ukraine and Bulgaria who tried to pass as Arab belly-dancers, or

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[311] During the intermission, a group of Saudi educators from the region of Najd commented on the inappropriateness of having incense in an intellectual setting.

[312] One of the delegates held up a hand-beaded cloth to show everyone in the room her appreciation for the "authentic Arabic craftsmanship," and blurted aloud in her Midwestern English accent, "captivatingly breathtaking!" When I asked the salesman (an immigrant from India, dressed in local Bedouin garb) why he didn't tell the woman that the designed cloth is Indian made, he replied; "I don't want to lose a sale."

[313] In interviewing the Henna artists, they verified my own observation that almost all the women seeking henna tattoos are "from America or Europe" (both women spoke English).

the henna artists from New Delhi playing the parts of local Bedouin women, and it certainly

was not the tribal artifacts from Afghanistan, Turkey, Nepal and India that were displayed as

authentic Bedouin handicrafts, but most astonishing was the way in which the highly

educated delegates from the Western regions (some who are Ivy League professors) fell

under the spell of Orientalism.[314]   The" total art-work" of Orientalist theatrics did not only

amplify at the Bab Al Shams, or, what I call, the Arabian Nights-style theme park.  The

"actual performance" in the dunes relies on all the previous strategies and arrangements that

create the perfect timing (e.g. arrival during the desert sunset), not only for the events to take

place, but to maximize the phantasmagoric effects of these events that create the "will"

towards a multisensory Orientalist utopia par excellence in the expressive domain of the

*Gesamtkunstwerk*.

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[314] These descriptions are extracted from my field notes on interviews and observations that took place in March 13, 2006.

## IV. Elastic Identities: The Armenians

> I have always perceived the Armenians to be a people whose tragic historical fate has been imprinted on the outlook and behavior of each individual.  And when an Armenian smiles, you can always see in their eyes a shadow of sadness.[315]

Despite a long history of study, considerable debate still exists about the origin of the Armenian people.  Some scholars rely on the estimates of fifth-century BCE historian, Herodotus, who claimed that the Armenians were a "colony of the Phrygians" from the Thracian region of Asia Minor.[316]  Yet some other scholars insist that the Armenians are the native inhabitants of historic Armenia.[317]  One area of agreement for most scholars, nonetheless, is the description of the Armenian people as "one of the most ancient civilizations in the world".[318]  In Biblical history, Armenia can be traced to the twenty-fourth century BCE, when Noah's Ark was presumed to have landed on Mount Ararat (now Turkey).[319]  But it is through material history that researchers deciphered the earliest known reference to the Armenians by the Persian king Darius the Great.  In the sixth century BCE, the Achaemenid King Darius at Bisutun enumerated the names of countries that had "fallen into [his] hands" and *Armina* (Armenia) is among the twenty-one countries carved into stone

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[315] The Leningrad choreographer Boris Eifman made this observation about the Armenians.  Quoted in Harlow Robinson, "The Caucasian Connection:  National Identity in the Ballets of Aram Khachaturian," in *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Routledge, 2013), 30.

[316] Herodotus and William Beloe, *Herodotus: Translated from the Greek, with Notes and Life of the Author* (London: Jones & CO., 1830), 340. Most Western historians today adhere to the Greek notion that the Armenian people are of Thracian origin.

[317] The historical land of the Armenians, at its zenith stretched from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and from the Mediterranean to Lake Urmia in what is now Iran.

[318] The phrase "Armenians are an ancient people" has become a commonplace expression that further sets the tone in presenting the historical and symbolic dimensions of the Armenian people.

[319] Mount Ararat is the highest location in the kingdom of Urartu that survived from ca. 860 to 585 BCE and is usually referred to as the first kingdom of the Armenians.  In Babylonian texts, the word *Ura-Stu* is used to denote the Armenians. In, Jamie Stokes, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East* (Infobase Publishing, 2009), 53. Also in, Benjamin Edidin Scolnic, *If the Egyptians Drowned in the Red Sea Where Are Pharaoh's Chariots?: Exploring the Historical Dimension of the Bible* (University Press of America, 2005), 38.

in cuneiform script.[320] For administrative purposes, Darius divided his newly expanded

empire into twenty-three governorships or provinces.[321] Each province was assigned a

"protector of the kingdom" called *satrapies* that were mostly ruled by princes of the king's

family or Persian nobles.   Armenia occupied the thirteenth satrapy of the empire and was

mainly ruled by the native Armenian *satrap* Yervanduni (or Orontes) Dynasty.[322] The loyalty

of Yervanduni's membership in the Persian Empire, softened the Achaemenid rulers'

impudence of interfering with Armenian customs, and as a result, their internal

administrative structure, was more or less led under the guidance of an independent

Armenian imperative.[323]

By the early-fourth century BCE, as the Achaemenid Empire came to an end, the

Yervanduni (Orontid) Dynasty arose to an independent Armenian kingdom.  After the death

of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE, the kingdom of Armenia was divided into three semi-

independent portions:[324] the tiny kingdom of Sophene in what is now eastern Turkey;

Armenia Major or Greater Armenia, located northeast of the Euphrates River on the high

Eastern Anatolian Plateau of Asia Minor; and Armenia Minor or Lesser Armenia was located

in the south-east of Asia Minor, west of the Euphrates River. In a post-Alexandrine Seleucid

Empire, the Armenians regained full control over the first independent Armenian kingdom

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[320] H. C. Rawlinson, *The Persian Cuneiform Inscription at Behistun, Deciphered and Translated, with a Memoir*, 1846, 197.

[321] George A. Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People: (from Ancient Times to the Present)*, Fourth (Mazda Publishers, 2005), 21.

[322] We do not have sufficient evidence to verify Yervanduni's Armenian ancestry with any reliable assurance.

[323] Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars*, First Edition (Columbia University Press, 2006), 35.

[324] The Greek Seleucids became the successors to the Achaemenids in the region, and in 312 BCE its administration was entrusted to two Armenian generals; Artashes I ruled Armenia Major and Zareh (Zariadras) ruled the tiny area of Sophene.  In the second century BCE, the Romans defeated the Seleucids, and the two Armenian rulers revolted against an already declining Seleucids.

established in 190 BCE.[325] The Roman power led by General Pompey eventually subdued

Armenia's extension of control that stretched from the Caspian to the Mediterranean and

from Transcaucasia to Palestine (including lands that are part of modern Georgia and

Azerbaijan).

In 66 BCE, King Tigran II "the Great" was forced to relinquish several regions from his

possession, including all of Syria, and become a client state of Rome. While the right to

imperial succession remained symbolically with the Armenian royal family, Armenia became

a tributary to Rome. They had to negotiate their way of national life under the duress of

Roman supremacy, yet when it came to practicing their traditional ethnic customs,

Armenians did so without any impositions. In other words, Armenia's position was purely

strategic in serving as a buffer state between Parthia and Rome and was brought to

submission if any trace of political power was exposed. Both the Romans and Parthians tried

to extend control over Armenia as a necessary scheme to the safety of their empires.[326] After

the death of Tigran II in 55 BCE, Armenia found itself in the middle of broader global

politics as Rome and Parthia systematically and politically strategized to gain control of Asia.

From this point on, the Armenian national identity seesawed back and forth between Eastern

(Persian) and Western (Roman/Greek) lifestyles over the centuries. After the Sassanid

Persians emerged as the most powerful empire throughout most of the Middle East and

Central Asia, the Eurasian political specialist Svante Cornell makes clear that, "Armenia

gravitated closer to the Persian orbit. This enabled the Armenians to install a royal dynasty

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[325] By c.94-55 BCE, all three Armenias were united by Tigran or Tigranes the Great, who expanded the Armenian Kingdom from Mesopotamia to Syria and Cilicia. This kingdom lasted for almost 500 years until General Pompey defeated Tigranes in battle in 66 BCE.

[326] Armenia was much more akin to Parthia than to Rome. They both shared Zoroastrianism and similar cultural traditions. The Romans never really trusted the position of Armenia as a "buffer state" due to the similarities Armenians had with the Persians.

of their own, that of the Arshakunis (279-428 CE)."[327]  The Arshakuni (Arsacid) dynasty, as

the client kingdom under the rule of the Sassanians, survived for two centuries, but not

without constant oscillation between the Roman and the Persian expansions of influence over

Armenia.  The intimidating pressures from Armenia's powerful neighbors wore down the

peace and prosperity they once enjoyed during the reign of Tigran the Great.  There was also

another dimension that exasperated the self-regard of Armenianness that urgently needed to

be addressed.  One of the leading scholars on Christianity in Asia, the late Samuel Hugh

Moffett, has drawn attention to the fact that "Armenia was the focus of unending trouble with

Persia.  It had always been more oriental than Greek or Roman. Traditionally, despite its

fierce pride in its own independence, it had come to be regarded as […] more a Persian than

a Roman client-kingdom."[328]

By the beginning of the fourth century, Armenians whet their pride and their identity by

staking a claim in being the first nation to adopt Christianity as its official state religion.[329]

The newly embraced religion had profound political implications throughout Armenian

history. The religionizing of a people, who were spread across the plains and mountains of

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[327] Svante Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus* (Routledge, 2005), 49.

[328] Samuel Hugh Moffett, *A History of Christianity in Asia, Vol. I: Beginnings to 1500* (Orbis Books, 2014), 24.

[329] The highly embellished and fantastical accounts according to the tradition began with Gregory the illuminator, who received his Christian training (c.288 CE) in Cappadocia (now Kayseri, Turkey) and returned to his native land to undertake missionary work. During the reign of King Trdat III, St Gregory served him as a faithful advisor but refused to partake in the King's idol-worshiping celebrations.  When Trdat discovered that Gregory is a Christian convert, he imprisoned him for thirteen years in the bottom pit of Khor Virap [deep dungeon] (situated on a hill in the Ararat plain).  While Gregory was slowly perishing in his prison cell, a group of virgins had come to Armenia to flee persecution of Christians by the Romans.  King Trdat saw the breathtakingly beautiful Rhipsime and decided that he had to have possession of her.  When Rhipsime refused his advances, King Trdat became so enraged that he killed the whole group of visiting virgins.  Divine punishment soon turned King Trdat into a wild boar. Not long after, the King's sister, Khosrovidukht, receives a holy message in her dream that only Gregory the Illuminator can cure her brother.  Miraculously Gregory was still alive when Khosrovidukht released him from the deep dungeon and King Trdat was completely cured.  In 301 CE, Trdat himself proclaimed Christianity the official state religion, and Gregory became Bishop (Katholicos) of Caesarea.

Armenia, not only reanimated a distinct national consciousness, but it further extended the formations of powerful ethnic symbols. The leadership of Armenia decided to solidify its people's collective consciousness by teaching them to read the Christian Gospels.[330] The Armenian monks began with the attempt to use a set of letters proposed by a certain Syrian bishop named Daniel, but soon discovered that the alphabet was unteachable and flawed.

After the partition of Armenia (387 CE) between Theodosius' Byzantium and Shapur III's Sassanid Persia, the church (Katholikos Isaac) and the crown (King Vramshapuh) urgently ordered a learned monk, Mesrop Mashtots, to create the Armenian alphabet. The reasons why the alphabet sent by the Syrian Bishop was flawed, explained Mesrop Mashtots to the court was because, "it's too much like Syriac and Hebrew; it has hardly any vowels" and could not express the distinctive sounds of the Armenian language.[331] The "golden era" of Armenian literature began by around 405 CE when Mesrop Mashtots developed thirty-six characters of the Armenian alphabet (two more characters are added in the twelfth century). Without delay, a literary translation campaign was organized to interpret patristic texts from Old Aramaic, Syriac and Greek. In addition to sacred literatures, notable writings of famous Greek philosophers, historians and scientists were not only translated into Armenian, but also systematically placed under a scholastic method in a wide-ranging enterprise of public schools that taught theological, philosophical, and scientific doctrines using the new Armenian script. The experts of Translation Studies, Jean Delisle and Judith Woodsworth note that, translations of the world's masterpieces into Armenian;

> [...] Also led to the production of original works, various genres written in a broad range of disciplines: history, geography, mathematics, astronomy, cosmography and

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[330] The Bible and Christian literature were available in Greek and Syriac Aramaic.
[331] Val Ross, *You Can't Read This: Forbidden Books, Lost Writing, Mistranslations, and Codes* (Tundra, 2009), 42.

medicine. Thanks to the efforts of Mesrop and Isaac, Armenia was in a position not only to build up its own intellectual capital but also to make a unique contribution to civilization at the crossroads of East and West.[332]

The Armenian language, particularly in its written form, is unquestionably the most visible method to symbolize the links between identity and cultural unity. This is true for all cultures that possess a unique written language system. Asian language specialist, Florian Coulmas, posits, "writing systems are the most tangible part of a language, often being the subject of emotional attachment and other irrational attitudes."[333] It is perhaps through irrational attitudes and imaginary domains of society's symbolic forces that create the illusion of a national unity in the face of disintegration. Written language is particularly durable in the way it serves to build bridges that transmit a group's distinct ethnic consciousness. Karl Marx himself related language to the vital element of a social being's consciousness and for the preservation of a people's national character. Marx's theory of practical social life describes a dialectical relationship between language and people:

> Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men.[334]

Language is a critical portion of social beings in the way that it shapes the reality of individuals no less than the way individuals shape language. Without the experience of "practical consciousness" that creates the reality of a shared awareness, the existence of a distinct ethnic consciousness would unlikely be able to occur. The development of a uniform ethnic culture is inextricably bound up with a practical language/consciousness that,

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[332] Jean Delisle and Judith Woodsworth, *Translators Through History* (John Benjamins Publishing, 2012), 8.
[333] Florian Coulmas, "The Future of Chinese Characters," in *The Influence of Language on Culture and Thought*, ed. Robert Leon Cooper and Bernard Spolsky (Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 241.
[334] Karl Marx, *Karl Marx on Society and Social Change: With Selections by Friedrich Engels* (University of Chicago Press, 1973), 10.

in the Armenian context, metamorphosed into a clear ethno-religious collective identity.  The

establishment of symbolic forms, namely the Armenian alphabet and religion, anchored deep

in the subconscious of its people a unifying force that bolstered a sense of rootedness,

making it effective to safeguard the Armenian culture when it came under attack from the

Arabs beginning in 640 CE.[335]  The Armenians endured turbulent vicissitudes under the

Byzantine forces and Arab domination for the next two hundred years.[336]

By the early seventh century, the Christian Armenian Church was able to detach its

biblical scholarship from the influence of the Roman church and gain its own canonical

independence of Gregorian (Miaphysite/Jacobite) religiosity.[337]  The Armenians were able to

peacefully continue their religious practices and operate with some degree of autonomy

under the Umayyad caliphate.[338]  By the end of the seventh century, the cordial rapport

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[335] The Armenian chiefdoms or *nakharars* maintained their autonomy under Byzantine and Arab imperial
overlords.  The dynastic territories of *nakharars* were spread at the crossroads of East and West in mountainous
refuges.  Each *nakharar* had a private brigade and lived in a royal castle in his "minor kingdom". These self-
contained Armenian domains proved to be resilient when invaders tried to eliminate their people. The
geographic divisions that dispersed the *nakharars* in a fragmented landscape became one of the crucial reasons
why the Armenian people have survived bloody repressions carried out by their Eastern and Western neighbors.
[336] The Armenians became a significant addition in the administration of both the Byzantine state (several
Byzantine emperors were Armenian) and the Arab empire. In 623-627 Heraclius raised new (Armenian
battalion) recruits to defeat the Persian cavalry and reestablished Armenia to the Byzantines; but the struggle
that followed the Arab conquest (640-650), left the Armenians in the hands of the Caliphate, who granted them
virtual autonomy provided that they pay taxes to their appointed resident Arab governors or the *ostikan*.
[337] The Armenian Church is labeled monophysite due to its ethno-political considerations of rejecting the
Christological decisions, which asserts the dual nature of Jesus Christ– that Christ is the equivalent perfect in
God-head and also the one in the human form – a doctrine made at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Although
the Armenian Church reflects both Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic sensibilities, they designated
themselves "anti-Chalcedonian," which according to renowned Armenian historian, George A. Bournoutian; "It
is likely that the Armenian bishops, witnessing Byzantine control over Western Armenia, feared that the
powerful religious hierarchy at Constantinople would eventually engulf their Church.  The apostolic tradition of
the Armenian Church had long been challenged by the Greeks, who claimed that sine the Greek bishop of
Caesarea had ordained Gregory the Armenian Church was subordinate to the Patriarch of Constantinople.  The
Persians, at the same time, were extending tolerance to Nestorians and other heretical Christian groups.  By
affirming both a unique doctrinal position and their apostolic tradition, the Armenians not only maintained their
national Church but also appeased the Persians." In, Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*,
62.
[338] The Umayyad dynasty of Arab tribes ("Rightly Guided Caliphs"), expanded the Islamic Empire towards
Africa and the Iberian Peninsula to the West, and extended their power from Damascus all the way to Central

between the Armenians and the Muslim caliphs came to a standstill when the Armenian chieftains rebelled against repressive policies ordered by the Umayyad governor of Armenia, Muhammad ibn-Marwan, who, in turn, confined several Armenian *nakharars* [nobility or chiefs of Armenian clans] and "gathered them in one place and burned them alive."[339] Muhammad ibn-Marwan's brutal disposal of the Armenian nobles presents an important warning to its people's vigilance of the framework within which a dispersed body of *nakharars* would be able to support their administrative expectations in the future. Through skillful diplomacy and able leadership, the *nakharars* from nearby districts carefully maintained a neutral stance until the Abbasid infiltration in 750.

The Abbasid Caliphs overthrew their Umayyad predecessors and changed the character of the Muslim Empire by preaching a strict respect for the Qur'anic rules. The finances of the Empire were maintained by severe taxation and ultimately led to frequent revolts by different groups, including rebellions led by several groups of the Armenian *nakharars*. Despite the past violence carried through by ibn-Marwan that prompted the *nakharars* to re-examine their diplomatic strategies, once again, in the midst of being crushed by exorbitant taxation under the Abbasid rule, some of the prominent princely Armenian families tried hastily to overthrow the Muslim overlords. The political discretions of Ashot Bagratuni led him to caution his fellow *nakharars* to refrain from infuriating the Caliphs until a more strategic plan of recovery could be developed amongst the Armenians. The pride and prestige of the Mamikonian, Rshtuni and Gnuni *nakharars* rejected Bagratuni's advice and

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and South Asia. The Umayyads were also responsible for building the Dome of the Rock, Islam's holiest site in Jerusalem.
[339] Robert G. Hoyland, trans., *Theophilus of Edessa's Chronicle: The Circulation of Historical Knowledge in Late Antiquity and Early Islam* (Liverpool University Press, 2011), 195.

engaged in forceful actions against the Abbasids that ultimately resulted in their victory turning to a defeat. In Bournoutian's words, "The Armenian defeat at Bagrevand in 775 cost the lives of most of the ruling generation of *nakharars* and critically weakened a number of Armenian houses" that would never be able to recover from their losses.[340]

The Abbasids reached their imperial highpoint under the fifth caliph, Harun al-Rashid (786-809), who tried to change the country's demographics by building Arab settlements in western Armenia. They came close to colonizing Armenian lands when, in the ninth century, after the death of Harun al-Rashid, the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad began to decline and fragment to the point of having to withdraw their factions from Armenia and the Caucasus.

Already Ashot Bagratuni's keen tactics in demonstrating his loyalty to the Arabs and careful negotiations in the diplomatic sphere (both internally with the *nakharar* rivals and externally with the Arabs and Byzantines) won him the legitimacy to rule.[341] The Arabs appointed Ashot as the governor of Armenia and awarded him the title "Prince of Princes," which was also endorsed by the Byzantine Emperor Basil I. The Bagratuni Dynasty lasted 160 years (885-1045), leaving behind a cultural legacy of cities that flourished with splendors of art and architecture. Ani, the capital of the Bagratunis thrived as the legendary "city of a thousand and one churches," which used to be the nucleus of the Armenian ethos. Today, Ani's crumbling ruins are symbols of a more intangible legacy that play a major role within the Armenian psyche, especially in the politics of being and belonging.

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[340] Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 76. The region of Bagrevand was situated in old Armenia between Lake Van and Arax River.

[341] To avoid confusion, the name *Ashot* was given to the presiding Bagratuni princes from 685; Ashot III "the Blind" (732-750); Ashot IV *Msaker* (Meat-eater) was appointed governing prince of Armenia by Harun al-Rashid (804). The Bagratuni kings with the same name include; Ashot I "the Great" (885-890); Ashot II "the Iron" (914-928); and Ashot III "the Merciful" (952-977).

The Kingdom of Armenia survived until the eleventh century, when the recently

Islamized Seljuk Turks swept westward from Central Asia into the Armenian highlands.  The

Middle East and the Caucasus saw major political, sociological, and demographic changes

after the Seljuk sultans invaded Persia, ended the Arabian domination of the Islamic world

with the capture of Baghdad (1055), pillaged and occupied Armenia (Ani in1064 and Kars in

1065), vanquished the Byzantines at Manzikert near Lake Van (1071), and eventually

occupied a large part of Syria, Egypt, and Palestine.

The nucleation of Armenian communities dispersed during the Seljuk period.  By the

twelfth century, the region's racial composition rapidly changed, as Armenian Islamization

(forced and voluntary) set the way of reconciling to a new Armeno-Turkish demographic

reality.  Based on Robert Bedrosian's findings;

> Despite conversion by some, most Armenians remained true to their own distinctive
> form of Christianity.  This fact, coupled with the reality of an Armenian majority in
> eastern Asia Minor, led to a certain 'Armenization' of the Seljuks. Not only did
> Armenians of different faiths -- Apostolic, Orthodox, Muslim – constitute the bulk of
> the population in eastern Asia Minor during the Seljuk domination, but fairly quickly
> an Armeno-Turkish community came into existence through intermarriage.[342]

Armenians exercised syncretistic tactics with the aim of, not only, concealing their Christian

practices and beliefs, but as political opportunism for those seeking to gain rank, reputation

and power by attaching themselves to the dominant Seljuk rule.  The intermixing of crypto-

Armenians with the Muslim groups, in many cases, led to a blurring of boundaries between

that which belongs to the Armenian customs and that which pertains to the Turkic and the

Arabic traditions.  Armenians became skilled at juggling, synthesizing and choosing

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[342] Robert Bedrosian, "Armenia During the Seljuk and Mongol Periods," in *The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Times, Volume I: The Dynastic Periods: From Antiquity to the Fourteenth Century*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 250.

identities and shifting alliances on a socio-political basis. An example of the above

manipulations can be located during the crusades in the beginning of the thirteenth century,

when King Leo (Levon) of Cilician Armenia fought to seize Antioch.[343]  A study by John J.

Robinson shows that "the struggle of Leo of Armenia to take control of Antioch had turned

into a power game that made a mockery of morality.  Leaders switched loyalties, switched

religions, made alliances with traditional enemies, and readily resorted to murder."[344]

### A.  The New Armenia: 1080-1375

Some historians regard the period of mass migration of Armenians to Cilicia (between the

Mediterranean Sea and Taurus mountains) as a separate branch of Armenian history.[345]

Among the many Armenian groups that settled in the southern part of the Anatolian

Peninsula, modern-day Turkey, two factions of *nakharar*s; the Rubenids and the Hetumids,

had the readiness to assume power over the Eastern Roman province of Cilicia.  Between the

two rival chiefdoms, the Rubenid negotiations resulted in Ruben I, to represent an

independent principality, which in 1080 he called "New Armenia".[346]  It was, however,

during the reign of Levon/Leo II (1186-1219), that "New Armenia" (also called "Maritime

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[343] Cilician Armenia (or Lesser Armenia in southern Asia Minor) was a Christian state independent of Byzantium since 1172. Its prince, Leon (Levon of the Rubenids), had won recognition as king from the chancellor of the Roman emperor Henry VI (past German king) and the papal legate in 1198, and was instrumental in creating close ties with the West in hopes of an independent Armenian state vis-à-vis Western military assistance.  He created close alliances with the Knights Templars and the Teutonic Knights, who supplied military protection for one another against the Seljuk Turks. After 1254, both Antioch and Cilician kingdoms became vassals of the Mongol empire.

[344] John J. Robinson, *Dungeon, Fire and Sword: The Knights Templar in the Crusades* (M. Evans, 1992), 231.

[345] Stokes, *Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East*, 55.  Also expressed in, Jacob G. Ghazarian, *The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia During the Crusades: The Integration of Cilician Armenians with the Latins, 1080-1393* (Psychology Press, 2000), 19.  Armenians began migrating to Cilicia in masses starting from the mid- eleventh century onwards.

[346] Under Ruben's skillful mediations, his son, Constantine I, became the next ruler of Armenia. The migration of Armenian military elites to Cilicia made it easy for Constantine I to establish his kingdom's cavalry and infantry archers, and during the first crusade in 1099, the Armenians brought with them militaristic forces and supplied the Western crusader camps with tactical and material help.

Armenia" or "Little"/ "Lesser" Armenia) reached the status of a kingdom.[347] During his rule,

Levon/Leo/Leon II extended his territory, built a more secure infrastructure that gave the

region added protection, established trade through maritime mercantilism, making the

Cilician kingdom of Armenia the epicenter of commercial activity, which greatly benefited

from its new geography to land and coastal trade routes.  The Armenian merchants began to

have an effective control of trade networks in their (Armenian) mercantile communities

based throughout Europe and Asia.[348]  Turning to the work of historian, Eliyahu Ashtor, one

finds "there can be little doubt that the trade route of the Italian merchant republics with

Little Armenia was a major artery of international trade in the Mediterranean," especially,

after the papal ban on trade with Egypt.[349]  Under the strict pontifical embargo against

Alexandria, trade simply passed into the Christian hands of Armenian merchants.[350] Perhaps

the most famous of the Venetian merchants that frequented the ports of Armenia are Niccolò

Polo and his brother Maffeo, who in 1271 set out for sail again, this time taking with them

Niccolo's seventeen-year-old son, Marco. The accounts taken from Marco Polo's memory

(by Rusticello da Pisa) of his lengthy travels begin with Armenia:

> The truth is that there are actually two Armenias, a Greater and Lesser.  The lord of
> Lesser Armenia is a king who maintains good and just government in his country
> under the suzerainty of the Tatars.  […] On the seacoast lies the town of Ayas, a busy
> emporium.  For you must know that all the spices and cloths from the interior are
> brought to this town, and all other goods of high value; and merchants of Venice and

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[347] The price of the new Armenian kingdom came with the submission to the rule of the Roman Church and its creed.

[348] Armenian fleets had ports in Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Marseille, Barcelona, Portugal, Tangier, Alexandria, Beirut and individual Armenian merchants had traded in the Indian Ocean as early as the twelfth century.  For more information see, Edward A. Alpers, *The Indian Ocean in World History* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 91.

[349] Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Middle Ages* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 44.

[350] After the Armenians adhered to the Roman church in 1198, they especially benefited from the Papal embargo, as they became the mediators of commercial exchanges between the East and the West.  There were several strategic trade bans that include the Third Lateran Council in 1179 (forbade military goods to Muslim countries), in 1250 more restrictions on trade in Muslim lands, and the presumed "strict embargo period" of 1320-45 against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt.

Genoa and everywhere else come here and buy them. And merchants and others who wish to penetrate the interior all make this town the starting-point of their journey.[351]

The importance of Ayas' location continued to guarantee the survival of Lesser/Little Armenia in the face of recurring threats and disasters.[352] And, as Marco Polo confirmed, Armenia was indeed the starting-point of departure for the caravans that traveled to the interiors of the Middle East and for maritime-trade travel to Egypt, Syria, and Palestine.[353] The ceaseless commercial journeys to Venice made Italian the language of commerce in the Levant. While many merchants in the region conducted business in the Italian language, it was specifically the Armenians who took the lead as "Head-Terjuman" or dragomans that offered services for their multilingual skills.[354] Lesser/Little Armenia's mercantile activities and concomitant Westernization led to lasting socio-cultural changes. As early as the twelfth century, traditional forms of the Armenian ethnic dress were transformed into a more "progressive culture" as the Western dress (and Western behavioral patterns activated by that dress) became the norm for Lesser Armenia's locals. Not only did the nobility of Cilician Armenians begin to adopt and advocate European ways of working and living, they also wanted to diplomatically revive their own older heritage by intermarrying with the Western

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[351] Marco Polo, *The Travels* (Penguin UK, 1974), 55.

[352] Other articulations used for Ayas include, Lajazzo, Ajas, Laias, Layas or Chaucer's Lyas. The Ayas port on the coast of Lesser Armenia was, for a period, protected by the Mamluks to ensure the maritime routes would be "free from exposure to a large-scale sea-borne attack." In, Shai Har-El, *Struggle for Domination in the Middle East: The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485-91* (BRILL, 1995), 52.

[353] Dorothee Metlitzki, *The Matter of Araby in Medieval England* (Yale University Press, 2005), 127.

[354] James Mather, *Pashas: Traders and Travellers in the Islamic World* (Yale University Press, 2009), 101. Also see, John P. McKay et al., *A History of World Societies Volume B: From 800 To 1815* (Macmillan, 2014), 512. The term *tarjoman* derives from the Arabic meaning interpretation or translation and not "interpreter" or "translator" as The Encyclopedia Britannica wrongly explains). The same root occurs in Persian (*tarjomeh*), Hebrew (*targum*), Turkish (*tercüman*), Uzbek (*tarjimon*), and in Armenian (*targman-ogh*). One mistake many authors have made with the plural form of the term is to write it as "targo**men**" instead of targomans. The ending "-men" distorts the complete meaning of the word. Overall, the term dragoman applies to polyglot translators between European and Eastern languages, and must conjointly assume the roles of mediators, diplomats, consultants, cultural brokers and guides.

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nobility and royalty to achieve superior prestige, power and fame for generations to come.[355]

Having adhered to a Western feudal system, instead of a *nakharar* system, Cilicia's

Armenian kingdom was further weakened when the Templars futile attempts to dislodge

Muslim forces from the Holy Land instigated the decline of the Byzantine Empire.[356]

In defiance of their own ethno-religious distinctiveness, the newly Romanized Armenian

faction came to feel that the Pope was using military waves of religious enthusiasm mainly to

increase the political power of the papacy.  In May 1291, Mamluk troops under the

leadership of the Sultan of Egypt, defeated the Christian Crusaders, captured Jerusalem, and

sieged Acre (just south of Lebanon, today in Israel), marking the end of calls for crusades.

After this turbulent period, the Armenian merchants in Ayas continued to fairly prosper in

commercial trade, but the protection they once received from their Western allies began to

diminish as the Church succumbed to dwindling funds. Just a few years prior to the last

crusade, Hetum II (son of King Levon/Leo, who was now the ruler Cilicia) offered

submission to Rome, which further influenced and pressured the Armenians to become

"Latinized" by recognizing the pope of Rome as their main spiritual leader.[357] The union of

the Armenian and Roman Churches resulted in an internal split that proved unacceptable to

most Armenian people. Hence, tensions developed along the religio-political line within

Armenian communities in Cilicia to reconsider their embodiment of Armenianness, which

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[355] The Rubenids came to have a long line of European genealogy through intermarriage. Among the alliances are; Arda of Armenia, who became the first queen consort of the Kingdom of Jerusalem after marrying the French Baudouin de Boulogne or Baldwin I in 1097.  Their union helped to carve-out more Armenian territory in Jerusalem.  Eventually the crown of Armenia was united with the French Lusignan Dynasty and continued to strategically integrate the Cilician Rubenid and Hetumid Armenians with other European houses (e.g., the marriage of King Leo's daughter, Isabella I/Zabel I to Andrew of Hungary). By the time of Levon V, the last king of Armenia (1307), the Armenian identity became considerably westernized.
[356] The Armenian nakharar system represents an endogamic society in which the ruling force establishes advantages between the leader and his clan and did not have the same contractual relations as the European feudalism.
[357] Christopher J. Walker, *Visions of Ararat: Writings on Armenia* (I.B.Tauris, 2005), 4.

often entails their unique Christian pedigree, and to call for resistance against Hetum II's pro-Western attainments. Centuries of championing the Armenian national "purity" and pride of an ethnic foundation began to dilute as the Rubenid Dynasty had married into European nobility and the throne would be eventually transferred to the French royal House of Lusignan.[358]

In questionable negotiations with the Catholic Church to secure his political position, Hetum II eventually generated serious social and political instability from the interior that also made the kingdom vulnerable to external threats. Under the intense pressures of the people's rebellion and lack of defensive assistance from the Pope, Hetum II abdicated his impotent throne in 1293 and sought refuge in a monastery as a Franciscan monk. As the palace found more stability during his brother Toros I's short reign (1293-1295), Hetum II reappeared on the throne to advocate Armeno-Mongol collaborations.[359] The Armenian King was certain that, this time, the Mongols would be willing to ally themselves with the Christian forces to fight against the Egyptian Mamluks. During this time, the Mongol tribes had fallen into their own internal struggles that created tensions between securing economic revival and political acceptance from the surrounding tribes. The Mongolian Khanates eventually saw a crucial advantage in sharing the same religion and consolidating their power with Muslim forces. Foreseeing the greatest chance of prosperity under the Islamic Empire, the Mongol ruler, Ghazan Khan, who was baptized and raised as a Christian, converted to the

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[358] Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties Through the Nineteenth Century* (University of California Press, 1963), 16. The Cilician-Armenian era is especially known for the fact that the Armenian royal dynasty intermarried with the Latin feudal families since the beginning of the crusades (e.g., Baldwin I and Baldwin II married Armenian women, as did many other Frankish lords who settled in north Syria).

[359] In 1253, Hetum II's grandfather, Hetum I, met with the leader of the Mongols, Mangu Khan, to work out a strategic alliance with the powerful tribes and proselytize them. The Khan needed more time to consider the matter, but he signed a friendly treaty, granting protection and freedom to the Armenians of Cilicia.

Shiite branch of Islam in 1295.[360] By the time Hetum II reached Maragha (East Azerbaijan province in Iran) to meet with Ghazan Khan, the Armenian hope of returning to national triumph all but evaporated with the new construction of State power that was quickly evolving into the sovereign of Islam.[361] Left with little choice, Hetum II turned to the Byzantine capital for negotiations of a new security alliance, albeit, the Armenians still continued to actively participate in Mongol expeditions regardless of the Khanates' new Muslim identity.[362]

While both Hetum and Toros endeavored to build a rapport with Emperor Andronicus II Palaeologus in Constantinople, a third brother, Smbat (1297-1298) usurped the Armenian throne with the help of Pope Boniface VIII and Katholicos (Armenian Patriarch) Grigor VII.[363] On their return to Cilicia, Smbat had Toros strangled and partially blinded Hetum during captivity. A fourth brother, Constantine/Kostandin, supplanted Smbat, took over the title in 1298 and released Hetum. But, the saga did not end here: after gathering strength and tactical support for one year, Hetum II returned to the Armenian throne and managed to exile both Constantine and Smbat to Constantinople.[364]

The internal power struggles and Hetum II's intermittent absences from his Chair weakened the position of Lesser Armenia's domain. Adding to the cacophony of the times, many discontented Armenians continued to resent Cilicia's pro-Western leadership, which

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[360] Christian A. Van Gorder, *Christianity in Persia and the Status of Non-Muslims in Iran* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 82.

[361] Simon Payaslian, *The History of Armenia* (Macmillan, 2007), 95.

[362] Seta B. Dadoyan, *The Armenians in the Medieval Islamic World: Armenian Realpolitik in the Islamic World and Diverging Paradigms -- Case of Cilicia*, vol. Two (Transaction Publishers, 2013), 186.

[363] A study by Ani Atamian Bournoutian shows that, "Hetum's strongly and openly pro-Roman sentiments no doubt were a factor in his overthrow." Ani Atamian Bournoutian, "Cilician Armenia," in *Armenian People From Ancient To Modern Times*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, vol. I (St. Martin's Press, New York, 2004), 287. Smbat aligned his Armenianess more with the Eastern sphere, and managed to link himself to the Mongols by a matrimonial alliance.

[364] Ibid.

further destabilized the Crown's already shaky position. Seta Dadoyan has drawn attention

to the fact that "most of the [Armenian] clergy and some of the nobility were consistently

pro-western, [while] the eastern camp was always broader and included large popular

factions as well."[365] It may seem harmless or even effectual for the dominant Armenian

nobility-clergy class to play politically motivated games that closely align with the attributes

of Western progress (vs. "Oriental stagnation" as some Armenian elites were convinced to

hold true). But, historical experience has shown that the socio-ethical hollowness underneath

the shiny surface of the seeming Western progress often evolves into political instability and

degeneration (noticeably, in the Armenian context).

The increased disillusionment and alienation of the Armenian people with the leaders

claiming to represent them resulted in growing popular disintegration, fragmentation and

internal conflict. The power struggles between the Armenian royalty, and the internal social

disorder linked to ideological debates (East/West identity disputes), rendered the country

vulnerable to invasion from outside.[366] In 1307, while Lesser Armenia was slowly falling to

the sultans of Egypt, Hetum II's younger brother, Oshin, was subsequently crowned king.

Oshin's pro-Western orientation was greater than the previous Europhile Armenian kings.

His resolute efforts towards further Western integration by Latinizing the Armenian Church,

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[365] Seta B. Dadoyan, *The Armenians in the Medieval Islamic World: Medieval Cosmopolitanism and Images of Islam*, vol. Three (Transaction Publishers, 2013), 7.

[366] From 1301-1305 the Egyptian army launched multiple attacks in Cilician Armenia until king Hetum II fought them to a temporary standstill. Once again, Hetum abdicated his position and left the throne to his nephew Levon III; although he would periodically make an appearance (with his monastic habiliment) to co-rule. In 1307, Hetum II and Levon III, together with forty Cilician noblemen made a final attempt at a Mongol alliance against the Mamluks. In the course of the meeting with the Mongol emir at Anazarba (Anavarza), all forty-two Cilician nobles were killed. A study by David Bundy points to Arab and Persian sources that suggest; "the Armenians got caught trying to play the Mongols off against the Egyptians to avoid paying tribute." See, David Bundy, "Religion and Politics in the Reign of Het'um II," in *Armenian Perspectives: 10th Anniversary Conference of the Association Internationale Des Études Arméniennes, School of Oriental and African Studies, London*, ed. Nicholas Awde (Psychology Press, 1997), 93. Also see, Bournoutian, "Cilician Armenia," 288. And in, Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 101.

and adopting practices of the Roman liturgical formularies, were met with fierce objections

by the Armenian people who protested that Armenian ethnicity was at stake. The work of

Ani A. Bournoutian best depicts the following outcomes from King Oshin's rule:

> In a bid for European military assistance, two Armenian Church councils were held, at
> Sis in 1307 and at Adana in about 1316, at which a number of Armenian clergy and
> nobles formally agreed to conform to Roman liturgical and doctrinal practice, including
> recognition of the pope. There rose to the surface intense anti-Roman sentiment, which
> soon became a general anti-Western reaction. King Oshin was poisoned in 1320.[367]

After Oshin's death, his only son Levon IV (1320-1341), with all the more pro-Western

alignment, married Constance of Sicily, daughter of Frederick III and widow of Henry II of

Cyprus.[368] By promoting numerous Frenchmen to high offices of Cilician government and

implementing a pro-Western style administration, Levon caused an ethno-national storm that

destabilized the Armenian identity. In attempt to guard the survival of their distinctiveness

and Armenian pride, the populace engaged in the ultimate act of collective resistance by

ensuring Levon's IV's death in 1341. This brought an end to the Rubenid-Hetumid dynasty,

but Cilicia's rulership continued to rest in the hands of the Lusignan monarchs. It was

already bad enough, for the populace, to suffer the control of pro-Western Armenian kings,

let alone having to acquiesce being governed by a member of the Franco-Armenian

aristocracy. Nonetheless, as the only legitimate contenders for the Armenian throne, the

heirs of the Rubenid dynasty assumed control of Cilicia. In 1342, Guy de Lusignan, who

acquired the name Constantine/Gosdantin II, was unlike the other Westernized kings; rather,

he *was* the first Western king of Lesser Armenia.

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[367] Bournoutian, "Cilician Armenia," 288.
[368] Vahan M. Kurkjian, *A History of Armenia* (IndoEuropeanPublishing.com, 2014), 210.

Initially, the new king attempted to please the Armenian subjects by representing himself through Eastern characteristics (manners, customs and clothes).[369] However, negotiations with the Pope to Latinize Armenian Christianity revealed the true nature of Constantine II's mission, which once again infuriated the Armenian people and ended with his assassination in 1344.[370] The inadequate rule of the Lusignan dynasty continued for three more decades. Each Lusignan royal approached the Armenian throne with a unique strategy to win over people's trust, while simultaneously preserving the same Westernizing objective in trying to broker deals that did not fully support the interests of the majority. Yet, each time, the public's sharp loss of political trust in their leaders led to increased cynicism, especially when the religio-political intentions of the Lusignans appeared to be inconsistent with the national orientation of the Armenian people.[371] If the ruling elite did not defend and maintain the most sacred needs of the Cilicio-Armenian majority, the situation was usually followed by the overthrow of authorities that menaced Armenian interests.[372]

The deepening disintegration of Cilicia's Armenian kingdom continued with internal contradictions that opened the door to repeated attacks by the Egyptian Mamluks. In the midst of Little/Lesser Armenia's violent disruptions, the next in succession to the throne,

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[369] Ani A. Bournoutian has drawn attention to Guy de Lusignan's name change as part of his diplomatic scheme to "please his Armenian subjects" by assuming "the more Eastern, though Greek, name of Constantine." Bournoutian, "Cilician Armenia," 288. Furthermore, according to Byzantine historian, Cécile Morrisson, the imperial name of Constantine was used more as a generic compromise to maintain some neutral fluidity between the Eastern and Western spheres. Cécile Morrisson, "Thirteenth-Century Byzantine 'Metallic' Identities," in *Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean After 1204*, ed. Judith Herrin and Guillaume Saint-Guillain (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011), 137.

[370] In addition to the Westernizing negotiations with the Pope, based on Christopher J. Walker's study, Constantine II was a "latinizer" and "surrounded himself with French speakers, and Europeanized his court." See, Walker, *Visions of Ararat*, 7.

[371] According to Diarmaid MacCulloch, both classes of the Armenian peasantry and hierarchy were furiously opposed to "Uniate" with the Roman papacy. Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years* (Penguin, 2010), 273.

[372] The Lusignan kings of Cilician Armenia continued with the reigns of Constantine III (1344-1362), Constantine IV (1364-1373), and Levon/Leo V (1363-1364: first reign) (1374-1375: second reign).

Levon V, came to position rather hurriedly (1374) to seek the protection of European forces. During this uncertain period, however, the powers on which Levon V relied were not prepared to consider extreme measures to safeguard Cilicia's Armenians. Hence, Armenia's only allies were its impregnable fortresses that withstood the Mamluk onslaught and that extended the survival of the Little Kingdom until its final attack.[373] Outnumbered by their opponents in 1375, the Cilician capital of Sis was captured by Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'ban's Mamluk campaign, bringing a final end to the last Armenian kingdom.

After the fall of Cilicia, many Armenian families, namely the merchants and nobles, immigrated to France, Holland, Italy and Poland.[374] Along with the finality of Cilicia, King Levon V became the last of the Armenian branch of the Lusignan dynasty after being captured and taken to Cairo by the Sultan. After seven years in captivity, Levon V was released when Juan I of Castilla paid his hefty ransom and granted him lordship of Madrid. According to the *Crónicas de los reyes de Castilla* [Chronicles of the Kings of Castile], while in captivity, Levon V devised tactics to send a messenger with his plea to "Don Juan Primero," asking him for help in finding a way to save a fellow Christian king from the barbarous hands of Jesus Christ's enemies.[375] King Juan was clearly affected by Levon's Christian approach to the degree that within a short time he conveniently procured the lordship of the newly liberated king from Cairo's bastille. Levon V of Armenia soon became

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[373] Kristian Molin, *Unknown Crusader Castles* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 144.

[374] Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 102.

[375] Cayetano Rosell, ed., *Crónicas de los reyes de Castilla* (en la imprenta de D. Antonio de Sancha, 1877), 69. *"E el Rey de Armenia, que fincara en la prision del Soldan, enviara pedir esfuerzo é ayuda á los Reyes Christianos , porque se catase alguna manera para le sacar de aquella prisión tan dura como estaba en poder de enemigos de la fé de Jesu-Christo."*

León I de Madrid (1383) and in order to express his gratitude for King Juan's generosity, he rebuilt much of the deteriorating Castle of Alcazar for the next two years.[376]

By 1385, upon the bestowal of an enormous pension and living accommodations in Saint-Ouen castle by the French King Charles VI, Levon V/ León I, moved to France on a renewed hope that he could influence the recovery of Cilicio-Armenia's kingdom.  Conducting diplomatic maneuvers in hopes of merging the Armenians with the Western forces, Levon met King Charles's royal councilor, Philippe de Mézières, who offered Levon political support (using propagandized writings) to facilitate an Anglo-French rapprochement. Peace between France and England was a crucial requirement to win back the Eastern lands that had been lost to the Mamluks, and Levon's operatives were determined to organize a new Crusade to materialize his master plan.

In January 1386, Levon met with King Richard II to negotiate peace and friendship between the two European rivals.[377] Through Levon's mediations, contact between the French and English courts was established and both parties showed interest in readjusting their positions to benefit from collaborative efforts.  The meeting in the English court led to tactical disagreements and unsatisfactory terms between the two powers that brought negotiations to a standstill and the hope of an alliance soon dissolved. Although Levon carried with him a deep-seated disappointment over the failed negotiations, his psycho-religious tactical diplomacy as "peacemaker" resulted in receiving a substantial lifetime pension from both Kings of France and England.[378]  After Levon V's death in 1393, an

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[376] Jesús Callejo, *Un Madrid insólito: guía para dejarse sorprender* (Editorial Complutense, 2001), 40.  Also in, Jules Stewart, *Madrid: The History* (I.B.Tauris, 2012), 17.

[377] Lynn Staley, *Languages of Power in the Age of Richard II* (Penn State University Press, 2005), 103.

[378] Thomas Mortimer, *A New History of England*, vol. 1 (Wilson & Fell, 1764), 633.

Armenian burial service was held, courtesy of the French royals, and his palatial tomb was later placed in the basilica of Saint Denis.[379]

## B. Continuation and Endurance: The Armenian Trade Diaspora

In the beginning of the late fourteenth century, the Turco-Mongol conqueror, Timur Lang or Tamerlane, began to wipe out of existence towns and villages, and he conquered expansive regions across central Asia, including Armenian communities that survived in enclaves of mostly Muslim communities.[380] After the fall of Cilicia and Tamerlane's destruction of most Eastern regions, a further growth in the mass immigration of the Armenian indigenous populations not only transformed the disposition of their modes of survival, but also the caliber of much of their host-lands. George Bournoutian's study shows; "So strong was the Armenian presence in the Crimea that by the first half of the fifteenth century, the area was sometimes referred to by Europeans as 'Maritime Armenia.'"[381] And, in Poland, Armenians became the largest and richest diaspora community, which drew King Casimir's attention to recognize their contribution to commerce.[382] By the early seventeenth century, Armenian merchant communities reached peak levels of importance in trade and

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[379] Kurkjian, *A History of Armenia*, 226.

[380] By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans expanded from Anatolian provinces into Constantinople and asserted their control over these territories. Pockets of Armenian communities continued to live in Eastern Anatolia, and all throughout what is modern day Turkey. In Alexander Vasiliev's translation from Russian, he notes that some scholars (Th. Uspensky) believe that "the Turks in 1453 acted with more mildness and humanity than the crusaders who had seized Constantinople in 1204."Alexander A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324–1453* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), 653.

[381] Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 247.

[382] Armenians held their reputation as the richest diasporic community between 1356 and 1604. King Casimir the Great, recognizing the importance of the Armenian presence in Poland, granted the Armenians the right to follow their own traditions. For more statistics see, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Ian A. Skoggard, *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World* (Springer Science & Business Media, 2005), 38. According to Bournoutian, "Armenians had their own guilds in Poland and were considered by the Poles to be excellent artisans. Armenian jewelers, painters, and weavers were especially well regarded. Their merchants played a major role in the trade with Russia, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire." In, Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 247.

commerce throughout Western Europe, South and Central Asia, all the way to the Far East.

The superiority of the Armenian merchants in their host countries came to zenith with such a

potent capacity that the local citizens complained to their Governments and obliged them to

place limitations on the Armenian commercial monopoly.[383] The City Council's proscription

of ships to transport Armenians in Marseille is well known as one such case.[384] Nonetheless,

for the same reasons that King Casimir of Poland was pleased with the commercial activities

of the Armenians, the same became determinant for the French Cardinal, Armand du Plessis

Richelieu and the Minister of Finance, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who gave preference to the

Armenian community over other émigrés.[385]

Learning about the industriously prosperous people, the Persian King Abbas I or Shah

Abbas the Great, established his kingdom's financial prosperity by forcefully uprooting a

flourishing merchant colony of the Armenians in Julfa (on the left bank of the river Araxes,

present-day Azerbaijan) and transplanting them to the Safavid capital of Isfahan. In order to

establish a "homely" continuity between their past and present settlements, Shah Abbas

named the exclusive domicile of the Armenians, New Julfa. The new mercantile hub of

Armenians became a "unique part of the diaspora," highlights G. Bournoutian, as they

became important actors in the Safavid political administration and managed the main sectors

of Iran's financial industry.[386] Bournoutian's study reveals that the privileged positions of

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[383] The Armenians established "business houses" in Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai, giving them more control over their trade. The export of raw silk, especially, was an Armenian monopoly. In, John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000* (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2010), 119. By the seventeenth century, the protective laws that gave the Armenian merchants free access to the port of Marseilles had to be restricted due to their overwhelming success. Nonetheless, close economic ties continued with France.
[384] Junko Thérèse Takeda, *Between Crown and Commerce: Marseille and the Early Modern Mediterranean* (JHU Press, 2011), 96.
[385] Ibid.
[386] Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 209.

the most prominent Armenian merchants of New Julfa further strengthened their

organizational capacity in the development of:

> Trading companies, which competed with the Levant, East India, and Muscovy companies, and established businesses in Kabul, Herat, Qandahar, Marseilles, Venice, Genoa, Moscow and Amsterdam, and in cities of Sweden, Poland, Germany, India, China, Indonesia and the Philippines.[387]

By the eighteenth century, Armenian merchants had established permanent settlements in

most trading centers of the world and formed their own intercontinental networks.[388] The

multilingual knowledge created by the maritime trade helped the Armenian merchants to

push cultural boundaries and forge diverse and multiple loyalties across space (both in

commerce and statecraft). Ottoman historian, Suraiya Faroqhi, has drawn attention to the fact

that "it was easier for Armenian merchants to enter and travel in the Ottoman Empire since,

as non-Muslims, they probably seemed less 'suspicious' to the sultan's officials."[389]

Armenian merchants "spoke half a dozen languages and were comfortable in both Islamic

and Christian lands," which made it less difficult to gain the trust of the heads of commerce

in Europe and Asia.[390]  Turning to the early-globalization expert, Arturo Giraldez, one finds

that Armenian merchants lent their services when "authorities in the Philippines exercised

rigorous surveillance against European vessels."[391] The port of Manila was accessible only to

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[387] Ibid.
[388] Levon Khachikian, "Le Registre D'un Marchand Arménien En Perse, En Inde et Au Tibet (1682-1693)," *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 22, no. 2 (1967): 231–78.
[389] Suraiya N. Faroqui, "Trading Between East and West:  The Ottoman Empire of the Early Modern Period," in *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, ed. Pascal Firges et al., The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, volume 57 (Leiden, the Netherlands ; Boston: Brill, 2014), 24.
[390] Sebouh Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (University of California Press, 2011), 66.
[391] Arturo Giraldez, *The Age of Trade: The Manila Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 114.  To quote from Giraldez's findings on the same page, "Father Casimiro Diaz wrote in 1718 about a *huerta* (house of recreation) in the vicinity of Manila built by an Armenian merchant at a cost of 100,000 pesos.  As an indication of their commercial relevance, there was a quarter reserved for Armenians in Manila when their ships were in port."

merchants of Asian origin, highlights Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, and European trade was made possible under Armenian cover.[392]  One of the leading specialists in early international trade, Edward Alpers, emphasizes that at "the very edge of the Indian Ocean world Armenians pioneered trade to Manila," and developed their enterprise in lavish goods, namely diamonds from Golconda (near Hyderabad, India).[393] "Armenians and merchants have been synonymous words in India," reveals the early twentieth-century historian Mesrovb Jacob Seth, and because they have been a "great commercial body in Hindustan," the Mughal Emperor Akbar encouraged the profit-making community to settle and invest in India.[394] In the sixteenth century, a large part of the trade diaspora settled in Agra, and the Emperor not only gave the Armenians "first place merit" in the region, as Krishna Dutta points out, but in 1562 he also "took as queen an olive-skinned Armenian, Mariam Zamani."[395]

In the same year, Emperor Akbar approved Mariam's kinfolk to build the first church in Agra. Mariam, herself, was an astute businesswoman with "vigorous trading interests" and a knack for public diplomacy in multilateral settings.[396]  Although the wives and concubines in Akbar's Imperial harem were thoroughly monitored by royal edicts and had restricted access to the outside world, Mariam's contribution to India's socio-economic development became much too important to limit her governance in the public realm. Mariam Zamani's personal splendor and leadership qualities made her the chief Empress of the Mughal Empire, granting

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[392] Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, "No Diaspora Network Is an Island: Collaboration and Competition between Trade-Diaspora in the Early Modern Period," in *Diaspora as a Resource: Comparative Studies in Strategies, Networks and Urban Space*, ed. Waltraud Kokot, Christian Giordano, and Mijal Gandelsman-Trier (LIT Verlag Münster, 2013), 163.

[393] Alpers, *The Indian Ocean in World History*, 92.

[394] Mesrovb Jacob Seth, *Armenians in India, from the Earliest Times to the Present Day: A Work of Original Research* (Calcutta: Asian Educational Services, 1937), 167, and 325.

[395] Krishna Dutta, *Calcutta: A Cultural History* (Interlink Books, 2008), 74.

[396] Fergus Nicoll, *Shah Jahan* (Penguin Books India, 2009), 72.

her rights to issue court documents, appoint men (mostly Armenians) to important

governmental positions, and the flexibility to invest her profits in strengthening the collective

position of maritime merchants until she became a substantial ship-owner.

In 1605, her son Jahangir (imperial name) succeeded his father and became the fourth

Mughal Emperor of India. He granted the Armenians religious freedom and special

privileges or immunities. By the seventeenth century, Armenians held the highest

administrative positions in India and were given formidable degrees of power.[397]  It was not

just trade that the Armenians promoted; their aspirations for an independent statehood

continued to be a pressing priority that required diplomatic resources.  The Armenian

magnates believed they would have a historic opportunity to reach their national goal by

accepting England's promise of political backing within Europe.[398]  To achieve their merit,

the Armenians made a considerable diplomatic investment by securing rights for the British

to receive Mughal estates in Calcutta, and attain trading privileges.[399] Without the influential

services of the Armenian diplomat-merchant, Israel Sarhad, attempts to gain a foothold in

India would have been, many scholars agree, inaccessible to inexperienced feet of the British

East India Company.[400]

The Armenians had a well-organized merchant lobby with prominent mercantile

networks.  As Abhay Kumar Singh points out, "routes and voyages could only be decided

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[397] Anne Basil, *Armenian Settlements in India, from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (Calcutta: Armenian College, 1969), 55.

[398] Paul Grant-Costa and Elizabeth Mancke, "Anglo-Amerindian Commercial Relations," in *Britain's Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c.1550–1850*, ed. H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 373.

[399] Kapil Raj, "Mapping Knowledge: Go-Betweens in Calcutta, 1770-1820," in *The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820*, ed. Simon Schaffer (Science History Publications, 2009), 115.

[400] Asiya Siddiqi, *Trade and Finance in Colonial India, 1750 - 1860* (Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), 99. Also discussed in, Nitish K. Sengupta, *Land of Two Rivers: A History of Bengal from the Mahabharata to Mujib* (Penguin Books India, 2011), 207.

upon after consultation with Armenian maritime and commercial leaders."[401]  The ability for

the Armenians to successfully influence vital maritime commercial decisions, opined

Fernand Braudel, comes from the trade manual of Lucas of Vanand, a meticulous Armenian

print-master, who published the reference book in 1699 by the given commission of "Sire

Peter" or Petros of Julfa.[402]  The book was intended to be used by "merchant brothers", who

belong to the [Armenian] nation.[403]  It is likely that in this context, Petros's "nation" refers

not so much to a common place of birth, but preferably a common system, which enroots a

united "we-ness" in the global world of Armenian networks within continuous circuits of

shared information among themselves.  Their centralized system of commerce financed both

cultural and religious institutions and gave rise to the solidarity of an Armenian peoplehood.

The influential work of social anthropologist, Jeremy Boissevain, shows that ethnic solidarity

is a crucial component in commercial development, as it plays a decisive role in gathering

information and gaining access to important resources through extensive use of one's ethno-

social capital.[404]

By mobilizing their cultural wealth for economic and political ends, "the merchant

princes" became central actors in enriching the Armenian symbolic value to international

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[401] Abhay Kumar Singh, *Modern World System and Indian Proto-Industrialization: Bengal 1650-1800* (Northern Book Centre, 2006), 431.
[402] Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century: The Wheels of Commerce* (University of California Press, 1982), 156.  See also, Ruquia K. Hussain, "The Armenian World: Trade in the Seventeenth Century," in *Webs of History: Information, Communication, and Technology from Early to Post-Colonial India*, ed. Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Sinha, and Barnita Bagchi (Manohar Publishers, 2005), 113.
Based on Braudel's notes (p.617), the complete title of the trade manual (translated) is: "Treasury of measures, weights, numbers and currencies of the entire world; or knowledge of all kinds of weights, measures and currencies which govern trade throughout the whole world, brought together… by the humble luminary Lucas of Vanand, at the expense and at the request of Sire Peter, son of the Xac'atur of Julfa.  Printed thanks to and with the consent of the most great and sublime doctor and holy bishop Thomas of Vanand of the house of Golt'n.  In the year of our Lord 1699, 16 January, At Amsterdam."
[403] Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century*, 156.
[404] Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions* (St. Martin's Press, 1974), 145.

audiences.  The tightly knit social structures amid Armenian mercantile ports, and their

unfaltering embeddedness to a codified national goal, had decisive effects on the

achievements of Armenians around the world. The research of psycho-political sociologists,

Alejandro Portes and Margarita Mooney, make it thus possible "to speak of bounded

solidarity and enforceable trust at this level [of internalized norms and values], focusing on

its effects for the entire community [as imaginary it may be] rather than for its individual

members."[405]  Engendered by different stages and forms of diasporic dispersion, Armenian

tradesmen became greatly versatile residents in their transglobal network nation. Borrowing

the words of historian Charles Parker, "Armenian merchants had developed uncanny

expertise in dealing with a wide range of people from various cultural backgrounds."[406]

The merchants and religious leaders jointly promoted strategic networks through their

immense influence and together they became a prevailing engine of political power.  The

nineteenth-century English clergyman and rector of the East India Company College, Charles

Webb Le Bas, posits:

> Of the Armenian Christians, it has been remarked, that they are eminently qualified
> for the office of extending the knowledge of Christianity throughout the East.  'They
> are to be found in every principle city of Asia; they are the general merchants of the
> East, and are in constant motion from Canton to Constantinople.'  They have,
> immemorially, had the character of an industrious and enterprising people; and what
> is a much higher praise, they have always been distinguished for an inflexible
> adherence to their faith, and a steady resistance to religious oppression, whether
> inflicted by Papists or Mahometans.  They have never formed any considerable
> settlement without building a church; and they have, accordingly, a church at each of
> the three capitals of British India, Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, besides others in
> the interior of the country.  They are supplied with ministers from their own

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[405] Alejandro Portes and Margarita Mooney, "Social Capital and Community Development," in *The New Economic Sociology: Developments in an Emerging Field*, ed. Mauro F. Guillen et al. (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 312.

[406] Charles H. Parker, *Global Interactions in the Early Modern Age, 1400–1800* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 84.

establishments in Persia, and are frequently visited by bishops, accompanied by archdeacons, sent by the Patriarch of Edchmiatzin.[407]

The Armenian clerics acted as assiduous advocates of ethno-national planning and institutionalizing a sense of "ownership". They achieved myriad nation-building tasks that include: ingratiating powerful constituencies, especially to the Vatican; politicking with notables and power brokers from dominant countries; manipulating important benefactors for resources; managing schools and special training workshops; and, to borrow from the account of Armenian art historian Vrej Nersessian, they were instrumental in establishing "printing houses in Venice (1509), Paris (1537), Constantinople (1567), Rome (1579), New Julfa (1636), Amsterdam (1660), Livorno (1670) and many other capitals."[408]

Charles Le Bas' notation on the "distinguished" Christianity of the Armenians has its relevance, but many contradictions that presented itself in my study have given me a standpoint to confront notions of identity and authenticity within the Christian framework that applies to the Armenians. On the surface, most Armenians pride themselves on their ancient origins and unique liturgical contributions. In a documentary interview, His Holiness Karekin II, supreme patriarch and Katholicos of all Armenians, affirmed that "as early as fifth century, the Christian faith had so penetrated the essence of being Armenian that an Armenian would say, Christianity was the color of his skin and that it was inseparable from his identity."[409] Within the psyche of Armenian people's "web of significance," it is crucial to italicize the culture's "historical facts," as stated by Herzig and Kurkchiyan, "so that the

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[407] Charles Webb Le Bas, *The Life of the Right Reverend Thomas Fanshaw Middleton, D.D.: Late Lord Bishop of Calcutta* (London: C.J.G. & F. Rivington, 1831), 89–90. Le Bas quoted from Dr. Claudius Buchanan's notes from the Minutes of the Bengal Government, May 28, 1807. Built in the fourth-century A.D., the Mother Cathedral of Holy Edchmiatzin or Etchmiadzin in Agharshapat, Armenia, is the world headquarters of the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church.
[408] Vrej Nersessian, *The Bible in the Armenian Tradition* (Getty Publications, 2001), 32.
[409] Andrew Goldberg, *The Armenians: A Story of Survival*, Documentary, (2001).

words 'Christian', 'first' and 'unique' are embedded in the core of Armenian mentality."[410]

Perhaps it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the words "first" and "unique" operate with higher precedence than that of "Christian". After Cilicia's collapse, especially, the "we" feeling derived from the unique fusion of language and physiognomy was the strongest defense exercised by the protagonists in Armenian history. If Christianity is the color of Armenian people's skin, as expressed by His Holiness Karekin II, then the color of Christianity, in the Armenian context, must be the color of camouflage. It is this disguise of the Armenian position that allowed for liquid mobility in different arenas (physical, ideological, economic, socio-political and linguistic) of the world. When, for example, the successful Armenian maritime merchant, Philippos of New Julfa traveled in the Baltic ports, he managed to metamorphose into a Germanic-speaking persona, identified as Philip von Zagely. During his travels, Philippos operated as Philip de Zagly duke of Kurland (now Liepāja, Latvia), and in France he was the French-speaking Compte Philippe de Saghli or Siry.[411] The fluctuation of Phillipos' identities accompanied a whole set of calculated enactments that, in addition to possessing a strong foreign language proficiency of countries in which he had trading bases established, he also had extensive political knowledge, which helped to secure commercial toll freedom and special rights in his mercantile domains.[412] Philippos' performance added yet another layer to his ability to pass as one of the non-Armenian locals around the globe, and at times this entailed fictive and strategic conversions

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[410] Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchiyan, *The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity* (Routledge, 2004), 3.

[411] Roberto Gulbenkian, "Philippe de Zagly, Marchand Arménien de Julfa, et L'établissement Du Commerce Persan En Courlande En 1696," *Revue Des Etudes Arméniennes* Nouvelle série, no. VII (1970): 361–426. Also discussed in, Philip D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 202–203.

[412] Rudolph P. Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600-1730* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 201.

to other religions. In Italy, he was known as the trustworthy Catholic merchant Filippo di Zaghli.[413] While in Persia, Philippos turned to Shi'ism and transformed to Imam Kuli Beg in attempts to gain favor by fraternizing with officials. Furthermore, in pursuit of attaining negotiation leverage in the Arabian territories, he also converted to Sunni Islam and basked in passing as the Arabic speaking Husayn beg Talish.[414]

Philippos was far from being an isolated case in the history of Armenian mercantile operations. The myriad of Armenian traders were mostly "self-styled plenipotentiaries," to borrow the descriptive expression of Philip Curtin.[415] They were not only the main transmitters of communication to the Armenian network-nation, but their patronage played a vital role in safeguarding the core of their Armenianness. **Physiognomic Portrayal(s): The Features of Ethno-Politics**

By the early part of the sixteenth century, in the Ottoman Empire, Armenian merchants and officials continued to prosper under the administrative structure of the *millet* [national] governance system, which regulated the establishment of communities on the basis of religious and ethnic identity. This institutionalized system reinforced the position of the Armenian Patriarchate and the cohesion of the ethnic Armenian population. Towards the eighteenth century, wealthy and influential men formed the *amira* [Aristocrat] class within the Armenian millet structure. The Armenian economic elite had absolute control over the Patriarchate and provided a certain degree of political leadership to the Armenian communal

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[413] Claude Mutafian, *Roma-Armenia* (De Luca, 1999), 305.
[414] Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran*, 200.
[415] Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*, 202.

institutions.[416] Eventually, the *amira*s established strong links to the top leadership of the

Ottoman government. Again turning to G. Bournoutian, one finds that:

> Some of the wealthiest *amiras* were moneylenders to the sultan and, as such, had
> great influence at court. As a social elite they were permitted to wear clothes
> reserved only for Ottoman grandees and to ride horses, both privileges usually denied
> to non-Muslims. They supported charities and financed the education of many who
> would later become major Armenian leaders. One historian has identified some 166
> *amiras* belonging to 77 different families. Members of the Duzian, Balian and
> Dadian *amira* families held, respectively, the positions of director of the imperial
> mint, chief imperial architect and superintendent of the gunpowder mill.[417]

The strong influence of the *amira*s, who were most willing to fraternize with the Turkish

governing body, reached a level of homophylous legitimacy unparalleled to all other ethnic

groups in the Ottoman Empire. Although the Armenians were not the only group with

polyglot-linguistic expertise and passable (East-West) physiognomy, they were by far the

most versatile in performing the physiognomic and pathognomic qualities of both Eastern

and Western languages.[418] It was usually the Armenian interpreters being celebrated for their

skillful performativity in foreign languages. When the Ottoman government appointed

dragomans in foreign embassies and consulates in the region, special recognition was

frequently given to the Armenians. The "considerable distinction" achieved by the Armenian

dragoman, Mouradgea d'Ohsson, of the Swedish Embassy in Istanbul, is one of many

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[416] Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Indiana University Press, 1993), 19.

[417] Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, 190.

[418] *Pathognomy* is the study of gestural language concerned with facial expressions and the reflections of emotions. "*Pathognomic*" is often confused with "*pathognomonic*", which is a disease or pathological disorder. The term was popularized when Thomas Holcroft translated the sentimentalist view of Johann Kaspar Lavater's *Essays on Physiognomy* (1789). Lavater, a Swiss theologian and poet, defined *pathognomy* as "The study of man's passions and his visible but impermanent facial expressions." For more details see, Johann Caspar Lavater, Thomas Holcroft, and G. Gessner, *Essays on Physiognomy: For the Promotion of the Knowledge and the Love of Mankind* (C. Whittingham, 1804), 18–21.

examples of the far-reaching linguistic flexibility that this "exceptional" ethnic group utilized.[419]

There can be little doubt that the process of seeking out and actively matching their developed traits to the characteristics of host nations' native inhabitants, especially in Ottoman Turkey, shaped an ethno-social homophily with the Armenian networks.  The fluent and flawless delivery of foreign language performance exercised by the Armenians, owes much to the Armenian alphabet of thirty-eight letters. The celebrated Armenologist, Roberta Ervine, has drawn attention to the fact that the "eight vowels of Armenian, alone and in combination are sufficient to reproduce every sound which it is possible for the human mouth to make."[420]  The early eighteenth century British physician, Charles Leigh, was captivated by the "great variety of pronunciation" among the Armenians, who have become "complete masters" of languages and "yet their variety of elocution is so great," that they can communicate with diverse groups of illuminati.[421]

While the Greeks also attained prominence as translators in Ottoman foreign relations offices, their phonological inflection and elocution in remote languages were shown to have limitations associated with the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet.[422] The nineteenth-century orthography expert, Charles William Wall, wrote extensively on the limiting range of

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[419] Mona Baker and Gabriela Saldanha, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies* (Routledge, 2009), 551.
[420] Roberta Ervine, "Yovhannes Erznkac'i Pluz's Compilation of Commentary on Grammar as a Starting Point for the Study of Medieval Grammars," in *New Approaches to Medieval Armenian Language and Literature*, ed. Joseph Johannes Sicco Weitenberg (Rodopi, 1995), 159.
[421] The complete quote reads: "their variety of elocution is so great, that should he discourse the different sorts of people from the different parts of that country, he would scarce be able to apprehend their common [non-erudite and argot] conversation." Charles Leigh, *The Natural History of Lancashire, Cheshire, and the Peak, in Derbyshire : With An Account of the British, Phoenician, Armenian, Greek and Roman Antiquities* (University of Oxford, 1700), 82.
[422] Angeliki Malikouti-Drachman, "New Approaches to Some Problems of Greek Phonology," in *Themes in Greek Linguistics*, ed. Irene Philippaki-Warburton, Katerina Nicolaidis, and Maria Sifianou (John Benjamins Publishing, 1994), 33–42.

phonemes that restrict a Greek translator's proper intonation of certain foreign words (especially in Semitic languages).[423]  In addition, Wall expressed his concern towards the Greek translators that have followed the common practice of using less accurate substitutions for the words they are unable to pronounce.  In one of Wall's examples, it is noted that; "The Greek translator was unable exactly to express the first syllable of *Yerushalem*, and substituted for it *Hie*."[424]  Nonetheless, when it came to the validation of diplomatic trust on certain delicate political negotiations, the Ottoman imperial *divan* confided more in the Greek than the Armenian dragomans.[425] Though, with native proficiency in Greek (among other languages) and parallel physiognomy, it was not difficult for Armenian translators to be contracted into Greek agencies as "Greek" dragomans.[426]

By the nineteenth century, Armenian translators reached a new level of formidable strength with their linguistic armament.  Much the same as any type of armament, whether conceptual or material, a strategic management system should be incorporated to safeguard national objectives.  Among various reasons that pressed for a more stealthy political performance on the part of Armenian tacticians, two of the more substantial, albeit fractional,

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[423] Charles William Wall, "An Essay on the Nature, Age, and Origin of the Sanscrit Writing and Language," in *The Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy*, vol. 18 (Dublin and London: The Royal Irish Academy, 1837), 79.

[424] Ibid.

[425] Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (BRILL, 2004), 111.

[426] It was especially easy for the Armenians with Greek names, who immigrated to Constantinople from Athens, to assume a Greek identity.  The performativity to pass as someone else was not unique only to the Armenians. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, many Greeks assumed Armenian identities in order come to the U.S. with the support of The Armenian Relief Committee's funds. Among the many Greeks passing with a new Armenian identity, Avvraam Elia Kazanjoglou (later Joe Kazan) was one of them.  Seventeen years later, Joe Kazan made it possible for his nephew's easy entry to the United States. Adopting his uncle's name, Elia Kazan became a very important American cultural icon as Hollywood and Broadway's "golden boy." Although Kazan has revealed the truth about his Greek ethnic identity, often the media and critics have mistakenly called him "the Armenian director."  For a theoretic reading of Kazan's post-ethnic trauma see,  Yiorgos Kalogeras, "Translating Ethnicity from Fiction to Film," in *Imagined Identities: Identity Formation in the Age of Globalization*, ed. Gonul Pultar (Syracuse University Press, 2013), 153. Also see, Jopi Nyman, "Are Armenians White?  Reading Elia Kazan's America, America," in *Post-National Enquiries: Essays on Ethnic and Racial Border Crossings* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 72.

incentives kept appearing in my research. One is the complex strategic planning to avoid any suspicion or detection of the growing political strength within Armenian networks. The other is a prominent operating role of the network's internal "outsiders," who engaged covertly in finding political secrets that pertained (directly or indirectly) to the Armenians.[427] An example of this political performance can be found in the calculating efforts of Panayotes Constantinides, a supposed "Greek bookbinder" who worked in the Muslim quarter of Constantinople.[428] When the American Board missionaries, Harrison Dwight and William Goodell, reached Constantinople in 1831, it was Panayotes, who "called to see" Mr. Goodell, "and gave him an unexpected welcome."[429] This was the kind of welcome that turned into a strong brotherly rapport, and as a result Panayotes became Goodell's personal "translator, dragoman, counselor, and helper".[430]

Through Panayotes' connections, Dwight and Goodell commissioned some of the best Armenian scholars to "render essential aid" as translators of religious tracts.[431] During their missionary work in other regions of the Middle East (Lebanon, Jerusalem, Syria, Egypt, etc.), Goodell and Dwight relied mostly on Armenian and sometimes "Greek" dragomans to

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[427] By assuming other people's ethnic identity, Armenians could "engage covertly" as Greeks or Levantines, or any ethnic group that the Armenian body had the morphological capacity to perform.

[428] William Goodell and Edward Dorr Griffin, *Forty Years in the Turkish Empire: Memoirs of Rev. William Goodell* (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1883), 160. During my research at the National Library in Yerevan, Armenia, I came across some literature reflecting Armenian translators in Ottoman Turkey. Looking through the material, my attention was redirected to some of the Greek, Persian and Arabic names belonging to the Armenian translators. The Greek name Kyrios Panayotes Constantinides, meaning Kyrios [lord] and from Pangia or Panayia [Mary, the mother of Jesus], was included in the document with a short description that read, "Armenian scholar, diplomat, translator from Greece." Dr. William Goodell, the American missionary, assigned the name "Kyrios" to address Panayotes. In, "Names of Armenian Translators during the Ottoman Era" (Armenian National Library, 1925).

[429] Goodell and Dorr Griffin, *Forty Years in the Turkish Empire*, 160.

[430] Ibid.

[431] William Goodell and Isaac Bird, "Palestine Mission: Various Laborers in This Field," Twelfth Annual Meeting (Springfield, Massachusetts: The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1831), 87.

represent their proselytizing message in diverse communities.[432] Having had the experience

to observe the "native proficiency in speech" from Greek, Jewish, and Armenian translators,

Dwight and Goodell concluded, "knowledge of the Armenian language, then, seems to be

indispensable in order to labor to the best possible advantage among them [translators]."[433]

The discrepancies that exist between the American missionaries (or any other foreign

religious/diplomatic group of campaigners) and the Armenian translators combine forms of

visible and invisible (silent) religio-political obfuscation that need to be considered. The

invisible segment of crypto-Armenians was necessary to defuse the political threat of the

visibly flourishing Armenian *millet*. It must be noted that the intense networking of the

Armeno-political actors, coordinated their strategies with explicit reference to teleological

planning.[434]  As mentioned earlier, the Armenian polity functioned in two realms; the

(visible) "in-group" or the insiders that mostly consisted of the *Amira* class (e.g., church

leaders, moneylenders, merchants, etc.), and the (invisible) insider "out-group" of crypto-

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[432] Julius Richter, *A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East* (Edinburgh and London: Revell, 1910), 107.

[433] William Goodell and Harrison Gray Otis Dwight, *The Missionary Herald: The Proceedings at Large of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, vol. 28 (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1832), 397.

[434] The German philosopher, Baron Christian von Wolff, introduced the philosophy of Teleology in 1740. Wolff's teleology holds the belief that all things have an inherent purpose or a final cause guided by their designs (somewhat building on the pre-established account of Aristotle's teleological theory of potentiality). The term itself has been used in different contexts with a wide array of differing views and meanings. The conception of political teleology, to which I refer in my work, appeared towards the nineteenth century. Teleology in the political arena, likewise, has produced differing views and meanings. In the course of my research, I encountered a number of early nineteenth-century accounts of Armenian individuals who incorporated similar descriptions of their diplomatic assignments. The constant reappearance of specific terms suggests that these accounts came from interconnected principles.  The terms, (from the standard Armenian transliteration)   *c'ragrowm* [course of action/schema/codification], *her'ankar* [far-seeing/reaching image], *her'apatke'r* [far-seeing/reaching picture] *naxamtac'wac'*[prefigure/fore-conception] all used within a political context, aim towards the teleological model of action that resonates most with Max Weber's methodology. Discussed in Habermas' essay, "Max Weber proceeds from the teleological model of action in which an individual subject or a group has a set purpose and chooses the means suitable for realizing it.  The success of the action consists in bringing about a condition in the world that fulfills the end purpose set.  To the extent that this success depends on the conduct of another subject, the agent has to dispose of the means that instigate the desired conduct on the part of the other." In, Jürgen Habermas and Frederick G. Lawrence, *Philosophical-Political Profiles* (MIT Press, 1985), 171.

Armenians who assumed *otdar* or *o'tar* [the Armenian word for 'other'] identities. Perhaps the latter are among the pioneers of what the famed psychiatrist, Robert Lifton, later described as "shape-shifters" with multiple identities and a strong inclination to be protean.[435] In a documentary interview, Lifton commented:

> In the case of the Armenians, somewhat like the Jews, they've been survivors for all of their existence, so the word survival takes on a very great power– the idea of remaining alive in the face of powerful threats of extinction. In a way, every group identity is special, but the Armenians may have their own very special way of being special; that combination of being the earliest Christian nation, and being surrounded by alien forces and carving out with enormous difficulty some sense of themselves as a people.[436]

Going back to the teleological component that fostered the notion of invisi(a)bility, the purposeful enactments of other identities in preserving some sense of the self came with an implicit numbing element in its design. It was the sort of design that enabled the required normativity in maintaining one's concept of self through psychological survival. A study by the psychologist, philosopher and Middle-East expert, Thomas McNamara, determines that only through psychological survival can self-concept be maintained, "which means maintaining the whole cultural value system that is at the core of the self-concept, thus preserving and transmitting the collective wisdom of the tribe [or ethnic group]."[437] Part of the Armenian collective wisdom was (and to some extent continues to be) the motivational commitment to keep alive their symbolic ethos of Armenianness, namely "Christian", "first" and "unique" that provides its members with psychological fortitude to conduct oneself in situations of "fallenness", to borrow the expression of Martin Heidegger, and to safeguard

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[435] Robert Jay Lifton, *The Protean Self: Human Resilience in an Age of Fragmentation*, 1st ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1999).
[436] Goldberg, *The Armenians*.
[437] Thomas Edward McNamara, *Evolution, Culture, and Consciousness: The Discovery of the Preconscious Mind* (University Press of America, 2004), 172.

the national dream for the revival of their ancient kingdom– a return to Armenia's greatness.[438]

The contradictions posed by the previously-mentioned invisible or internal-outsider activity system, transpired in Panayotes Constantinides' complex juggling act of pursuing objectives for the greater good of the Armenian network-nation as a whole. The inconsistencies within cultural protocols and class etiquette, in terms of implicit rules of behavior and codes of conduct in rank/race relations, invite these follow-up questions: In an Ottoman system where lower class members are required to behave ritualistically reverential towards people of higher standing, why would Panayotes, a "Greek bookbinder" have the assuredness to overstep the codes of class etiquette and send boldly for the American missionary to meet with him?[439] Assigned with a new name, "Kyrios" Panayotes "became at once a valuable assistant to Mr. Goodell in the schools and in the work of translation."[440] Panayotes' elaborate translations in Armenian beg a much larger issue: what qualifies a Greek, skill-based bookbinder from the Muslim section of the Empire, to suddenly be trusted as Goodell's personal dragoman, religio-political adviser, and interpreter of texts?[441] Another way of framing this this question is, why was this Greek scholar and polyglot, with a strong command of Armenian, laboring over binding Islamic books?

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[438] Heidegger also uses "falling prey" (Verfallen), and "entanglement" to express the *geworfenheit* [thrownness] into a world that leaves no room for a truthful self-reflection. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh and Dennis J. Schmidt (SUNY Press, 2010), 169.

[439] The nineteenth century Ottoman bookbinders, along with carpenters, servants, weavers, etc., were considered among the lower class members of the Empire.

[440] Goodell and Dorr Griffin, *Forty Years in the Turkish Empire*, 160. Dr. Goodell assigned "Kyrios" (the Greek word for 'Lord' ) as the new name for Panayotes Constantinides. Also see, footnote 114.

[441] In addition to being an eloquent linguist in both Eastern and Western languages, a dragoman must have cogent knowledge of foreign institutionalist frameworks essential for political advising.

Furthermore, why in the competitive world of translators and dragomans, who were primarily Greek and Armenian, would Panayotes try to vehemently amass only Armenian scholars and linguists in his group?[442] We can quickly answer these questions by assuming that Panayotes was Greek, and had a great affinity for the Armenians and their language. It is possible that Panayotes used his influence for the good of the Armenians, and intervened with William Goodell to situate Armenian operatives within a larger network of evergetic connectivity. Such was the case when Panayotes persuaded Goodell to employ his Armenian cohorts, Hovahaness Der Sahakian and Senakerim (or Sennacherim) Der Minassian to advance the cause of "Protestant Enlightenment" in the Orient.[443]

To adequately answer the aforementioned questions, however, we are not obliged, in this case, to locate all the pieces of the puzzle to form a complete picture when we have enough of the right pieces from the available facts to reflect sensibly upon a valid depiction. As specified earlier in my notation, only one source mentions Panayotes' Armenian ethnicity; all the other sources refer to Kyrios Panayotes as "a Greek".[444] The bigger piece of the puzzle, however, is found in Goodell's unsettled and equivocal remarks. Six years after Panayotes' death in 1861, Goodell, described his long-serving dragoman as "a converted Greek, after his removal to Constantinople in 1831."[445] Goodell's double entendre in using the expression

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[442] In the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, it became a necessary survival practice for ethnic groups to compete for rights, privileges, and strategic resources.

[443] William Goodell, "Letter from Mr. Goodell, Dated Feb. 1, 1834," in *Missionary Herald: The Proceedings at Large of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions*, vol. 30 (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1834), 366.

[444] Refer to footnote 114.

[445] William Goodell, "Translators of the Bible at Constantinople," *The Missionary Herald* 63 (1867): 380.

"converted" may well be a discursive exposure of the Armenian who became Greek, which I argue, had little to do with Panayotes' conversion to the Protestant faith.[446]

Goodell must have had insights into the Armenian body politic to confide in his colleague, Daniel Temple, about the "network of reform-minded" Armenians: "The less people in general know of our operations, so much the better.  We keep as much as possible behind the curtain, & push others forward".[447]  The Armenian network, however, had a different kind of reform in mind.  Some of the appointed members of the network, whom Goodell construed as pretenders "were beginning to style themselves" as 'evangelicals,' and all of them had their own motives for accepting Protestantism.[448]  After establishing important contacts in the West, particularly in the United States, both Sahakian's and Minassian's true personal ambitions became evident.  The work of critical race theorist and historian, Paul Harris, reveals that, for Minassian, specifically, it could have been a long awaited opportunity to abandon his Protestant mission and theological studies in pursuit of an American education in medicine.[449]  Furthermore, Minassian "discovered that the Episcopalian church was more congenial to his Armenian sensibilities than the Congregational."[450]

Sahakian, on the other hand, used his Western connections as a basis for effective Armeno-national action.  His mission to advance an educational institution recognized by the

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[446] Goodell's statement is at odds with the data presented in his other reports.  It is highly unlikely that these reported events of 1831 are all accurate.  They include: the "removal" of Panayotes from Greece to Constantinople, working with the Muslim Guild as a bookbinder while simultaneously being trained to evangelize Protestantism under the guide of Peshtimalian (the Armenian head teacher of the patriarchal church), attaining fluency in Turkish and Armenian, becoming fully assimilated and familiarized in the Ottoman socio-political arena, working for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), persuading the American missionaries to hire his Armenian friends, interpreting religious texts, guiding missionaries in their dealings with foreigners and becoming a Protestant among other deeds.

[447] Quoted in, Paul William Harris, *Nothing but Christ: Rufus Anderson and the Ideology of Protestant Foreign Missions* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 53.

[448] Ibid.

[449] Ibid., 55.

[450] Ibid.

Armenian Synod and secure his ties with the *amira* class was far more critical than the evangelical movement.[451]  Consequently, it should not be surprising to learn that Dwight, who was considered the "father of the Armenian mission," remarked: "these brethren are still Armenian, and I trust they will remain so.  I see no reason why we should wish them to become anything else."[452]

There have been many influential Armenian ringleaders that endorsed the Protestant campaign, and many more opportunities for the American Board of Commissioners to question their evangelical honesty.  The proliferation of leading Armenian actors on the political stage of "faith" diplomacy became a necessary stratagem to gain trust among the American missionary leaders, and to influence embeddedness with their Western counterparts on the bases of homophily. My claim here is that resourceful institutions in the United States are far less likely to support movements toward national self-determination than when the movement takes the shape, in this instance, of a homophylous Protestant niche.

Drawing on a shared system of the Protestant faith, the Armenian group constructed a coded category of "relational embeddedness" relevant for ingratiation tactics.[453]  The American missionaries made it easy for the Armenian masterminds to manipulate a mutuality of religious interests and/or goals.[454] Their attempts to impress and encourage the American

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[451] Harrison Gray Otis Dwight, *Narrative of the Work of God among the Armenians of Turkey* (New York: Baker and Scribner, 1850), 55.

[452] Hiram Collins Haydn, *American Heroes on Mission Fields: Brief Missionary Biographies* (American tract society, 1890), 16.

[453] Relational embeddedness (a term build on Granovetter's concept of "tie strength") provides the basis of social mechanism to draw on critical strategic actions that allow for one group to influence and shape the socio-economic and political decisions of a support-giving group.   Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1360–80. Also in, Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited," *Sociological Theory* 1 (1983): 201–33.

[454] The Armenians supplemented the Protestant traditions with a liturgical structure that accorded with their particular Armeno-Gregorian prescriptions for worship. In 1844, Horatio Southgate, the well-traveled

Board's willingness and commitment to give access to, and control over important resources became sufficient assurance for the Armenian tacticians to bypass certain political obstacles by shifting ground. The faith-based negotiations that took place between the "reformed" Armenians and the American missionaries did not go unnoticed. In his close observation of the Armenians, the English Vicar and travel writer, Charles Boileau Elliott, perceived the Armenians to be "mild, peaceable, and diligent, but proud, vindictive, dishonest, and immoral."[455] Regardless of their suspicious activities, the considerable efforts wielded by the Armenians reinforced the established ties with their American associates to such a high degree that compelled Dwight to proclaim: "Let them have the power as well as the form of godliness, and with all my heart I would say, let them remain Armenians still."[456]

Returning to our earlier questioned deliberations on the invisible and visible forms of politicking, we can conclude that through the scope of political teleology, the Armenian masterminds designed a sophisticated plan of consonance and unity from the very material of their unbounded fragmentation. Through their diasporic engagements, many Armenians honed their wide-ranging linguistic and cultural resources to create a more malleable space within which to negotiate their revolving and performative identities as mechanisms of power. Furthermore, their passable physiognomy became a powerful tool for widespread

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missionary from the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America (PECUSA), criticized the dishonest practices of the ABCFM by confronting "that a Congregationalist or Lutheran must never appear as a clergyman, for fear of doing the very dishonest thing of *concealing* their character! And to avoid the *concealment*, they must be content modestly to waive their claims to be *clergymen*!" Horatio Southgate, "Bishop Southgate and Episcopal Missions," in *The New Englander*, vol. 3 (New Haven, Connecticut: A.H. Maltby, 1845), 262.

[455] Charles Boileau Elliott, *Travels in the Three Great Empires of Austria, Russia, and Turkey* (London: R. Bentley, 1838), 465.

[456] Harrison Gray Otis Dwight, "Constantinople: Journal of Mr. Dwight," in *The Missionary Herald*, vol. 34 (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1838), 462.

socio-political pursuits, especially in covert attempts to manipulate perceptions and direct behaviors necessary to secure Armeno-national measures.

The deception tactics implemented by Panayotes as a crypto-Armenian, or intergroup outsider, provided strategic advantage over the American administrators within the Board of Commissioners. The late senior analyst for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Cynthia Grabo, revealed that all groups are "vulnerable to deception, even those whose officials are sophisticated practitioners of the art themselves."[457] It is probable that Panayotes' encroachment in the Muslim quarter, as a bookbinder, was to examine potential impacts arising from the Ottoman state-backed efforts apropos of the Armenian *millet*.[458] Political attainments across different spheres made it necessary for invisible agents (as in the case of Panayotes' first meeting with Goodell) to defy the codes of class etiquette, especially, when one's true rank is that of a diplomat and not a bookbinder.

While carefully concealing their Armeno-national aims, the aforementioned active and determined efforts to manipulate the perceptions of both allies and opponents became a method of, and an essential process that allowed the Armenians to live with the hope to thrive. It was Omar Bradley, the eminent American military commander, who said: "We are given one life, and the decision is ours whether to wait for circumstances to make up our mind, or whether to act, and in acting, to live."[459] If George Eliot had stood next to Bradley

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[457] Cynthia M. Grabo and Jan Goldman, *Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning* (Maryland: University Press of America, 2004), 129.

[458] It was not unusual for Armenian informers to enact other people's identities in order to attain much-needed information to make politically astute choices.

[459] Omar Nelson Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (Rand McNally, 1978), 384. Bradley's dictum has been widely used in motivational books and speeches to inspire people to "act" in the sense of movement towards positive achievements. In the context of Bradley's discussion, the intended meaning stands for acts of military deception tactics that the commander implemented during the devastating wars he fought systematically and lived to recount. Nonetheless, most military experts would agree that military strategy is a game of deception. For more information on forms of deception, see especially, "Military Deception in Peace and War," p. 310 and

when this edict was expressed, there is little doubt that Eliot would have acknowledged it with her own witticism by reintroducing (a character from the novel Daniel Deronda) Sir Hugo's opinion that "there is no action possible without a little acting."[460]  In the case of the Armenians, the circumstances required more than "a little acting" to manipulate perceptions. Their activities resembled a Machiavellian plan of self-determination that deemed; "Force without fraud is not enough […] but fraud alone certainly will be enough."[461]  Nevertheless, Machiavelli himself emphasized that artful constructions of deception must be treated as a provisional transaction of political expediency and not a stimulus for permanent practice.[462] According to Machiavelli, deception and manipulation are instrumental means to an end for which they are justifiable when performed for the public welfare.[463]  The justified "ends" that the Armenian politickers were hoping would someday excuse their imposturous means, became the norm of their political activity -- an end in itself.

## C.  The Mekhitarists of San Lazzaro: the Domain of Dissimulation

The active players in Armenian nationalist politics always welcomed Western missionaries to their communities in Muslim host lands.  When the Christian proselytizers arrived in Ottoman Turkey, with the desire to convert their Muslim subjects, acquisitive

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"Strategic and Operational Deception," p.361. in, Michael I. Handel, *War, Strategy and Intelligence* (Routledge, 2012), pt. 2.

[460]An equally fitting remark is Deronda's reply to Sir Hugo's comment: "One may be obliged to give way to an occasional necessity".  George Eliot, *Daniel Deronda* (Wordsworth Editions, 1996), 317.

[461] Niccolò Machiavelli, *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, trans. Allan Gilbert, vol. 1 (Duke University Press, 1989), 357.

[462] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. David Wootton (Hackett Publishing, 1995), 52.

[463] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Wisdom of Niccolò Machiavelli* (Wilder Publications, 2007), 372, 528.  And, Machiavelli, *The Prince*, xxx.

Armenians, who had their own mission to fulfill, greeted them.[464]  The Armenian political

teleologists configured themselves into the most resourceful missionary groups, namely,

Protestants and Catholics.  The ability to form strong homophylous ties with Western

missionaries enabled Armenians to establish much needed social capital to demonstrate to the

Euro-American powers that, they too, possess elements of the Western "character," which

belong to the spiritual estate of Christianity. And because they have been deeply invested in

Western spiritual and material aspects of life, Armenians could form a constitutive sameness

of the Western "we".  Through this great "we," Armenians attempted to mobilize and push

(Western leaders) for political accommodation.  It should not be a great surprise, then, that

Western missionaries were accused of being involved in nationalist movements of the

Armenians.[465]

  The process of constructing a collective efficacy  with Western missionaries was not a

new undertaking for the Armenian change-agents.  There are thousands of scenarios that

recount engagements similar to those of Goodell's Armenian associatesThe Panayotes of

eighteenth century Venice, for example, was a person many know today as a household word

for womanizer:"Casanova".[466]  With his multidimensional plasticity, Giacomo Casanova has

had many names and faces presented to the public and sometimes even to himself.  In a study

of Fr. Ghevond Alishan's records on Armenian genealogies, Sona Haroutyunian, a specialist

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[464] The work of Khalaf shows that Western missionaries "came in direct contact with Armenians" and "of all native communities, Armenians were regarded as singularly qualified to be the recipients of divine grace". Furthermore, Khalaf points out that given "the improbability of converting Muslims directly, Armenians could well become their [Western missionaries'] targets."   Samir Khalaf, *Protestant Missionaries in the Levant: Ungodly Puritans, 1820-1860* (Routledge, 2012), 144.

[465] Eleanor Harvey Tejirian and Reeva S. Simon, *Conflict, Conquest, and Conversion: Two Thousand Years of Christian Missions in the Middle East* (Columbia University Press, 2013), chap. 7.

[466] Kept in the Municipal Archives, the Collection of data from the *censimento della popolazione di Venezia* [Population Census of Venice] shows the originators of the surname Casanova belonged to several Armenian families.  In addition, the records of Mekhitarist Abbot Alishan show four generations of Armenians holding the name Casanova.

in Armeno-Venetian history, found that the original bearers of the surname Casanova, derived from the *Noradunkian* [new-house] Armenian family from Constantinople.[467] It was a common practice for Armenian immigrants in Venice to change or Latinize their names in order to attain the same advantages and be absorbed into the cultural space of the Venetians.[468] Another important clue about Giacomo Casanova's genealogy can be found in his correspondence with the Venetian Consul in Trieste, Marco de Monti.[469]

The Venetian State Inquisitors appointed Marco de Monti to spy on the Armenian Mekhitarists in an attempt to discourage the polyglot monks from establishing a commercial position with their Triestine rivals.[470] Disappointed and vexed for not understanding the spoken language of the Mekhitarists, Marco de Monti's remaining option was to entrust an Armenian-speaking candidate with proven abilities to carry on the assignment. On February 9, 1773, Marco de Monti writes: "*…mi hanno prestato motivo di chiamare, l'indicato Casanova […] di appagare la mia particolare curiosita, rilevandomi le intenzioni dei noti monaci armeni…"* […they (the Mekhitarists) have given me reason to call for, the indicated Casanova …to fulfill my particular curiosity, in disclosing the intentions of the notable Armenian monks…][471] After the long awaited approval from the State Inquisitors, Casanova

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[467] Tanner Boyajian, *Casanova: The Great Chameleon*, Documentary, (2012), pt. 14:39, interview with Dr. Sona Haroutyunian. One of the most important figures in modern Armenian cultural history, was the Mekhitarist priest, Ghevond Alishan (1820-1901), who was a prominent scholar in history, linguistics and philology. Fr. Ghevont/Ghevond's other names include, Léonce, León and Leo; Nahapet/Nahabed (his pen name).

[468] Ibid. pt. 17:37, Haroutyunian exposes the Italian names that were changed from their Armenian origins .

[469] Paolo Preto, *I Servizi Segreti di Venezia. Spionaggio e Controspionaggio ai Tempi della Serenissima* (Il Saggiatore, 2010), 526. For more information on Marco de Monti's letters to Casanova see, Casanova Giacomo, *Historia Della Mia Fuga Dalle Prigioni Della Republica Di Venezia Dette Li Piombi* (Milano: Alfieri e Lacroix, 1911), sec. XXIII – XXV. The original version of Casanova's twelve-volume memoirs is written in French entitled: *Histoire de Ma Vie*.

[470] The Mekhitarists were among the main sources of competitive advantage in Venice's print trade.

[471] Giacomo, *Historia Della Mia Fuga Dalle Prigioni Della Republica Di Venezia Dette Li Piombi*, pt. XXIII.

wrote to de Monti accepting the position of informer.[472]  The newly appointed agent became

an active spectator, capable of not only understanding their "secret" conversations, but also

pursuing negotiations between the Venetian authorities and the Mekhitarists.[473]

Casanova's memoirs are not just narratives that recount events from his life, they are also

revealing stories that reflect his inner search for an encounter with a deeper sense of the self.

This becomes evident in Casanova's dialogic biography when he speaks of his "nostalgia" in

being among the Armenian monks.[474]  Casanova's unconcealed enthusiasm for the Armenian

presence became all the more transparent when he continued to visit the Mekhitarists

regularly after the state-assigned mission had been finalized.[475]

The example of Casanova's memoir is in no way meant to distract from the main

questions of this study.  Rather, I use this example to illustrate valuable complexities of the

Armenian experience that derive from existential phenomenological insights.  Consequently,

it is through these insights that we can begin to bridge the absences and limitations in

Orientalism's scholarship.

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[472] Ibid. pt. XXIV.  The notation reads: "Giacomo Casanova scrive al de Monti accettando di diventar suo informatore", p.441.

[473] In his memoirs, Casanova writes: *"Voici de quoi il était question: Quatre moines arméniens avaient déserté du couvent de Saint- Lazare de Venise, las qu'ils étaient de supporter la tyrannie de leur abbé [...] ils étaient allés à Vienne demander asile et sûreté, promettant de se rendre utiles à l'Etat, en établissant à leurs frais une imprimerie en établissant à leurs frais une imprimerie en langue arménien"* ["Here is what it was all about: Four Armenian monks had deserted the convent of St. Lazarus in Venice, they were tired of supporting the tyranny of their abbot […] they went to Vienna to apply for asylum and security, with the promise to be useful to the state by establishing an Armenian press …"]; Giacomo Girolamo Casanova de Seingalt, *Memoires, Ecrits Par Lui-Meme*, vol. 12 (F. A. Brockhaus, 1838), 302.  The Austrian Government was quick to grant the Armenian monks citizenship with special privileges, especially, after discovering the amount of wealth they brought with them to invest in Trieste (one million florins; the approximate equivalence to thirty-nine million U.S. dollars today).  After their split, the Mekhitarists in Venice were left with 400,000 Ducats (equivalent to approximately sixty-five million U.S. dollars today).

[474] Ibid. 12:304.

[475] Giacomo Casanova, *The Memoirs of Jacques Casanova*, trans. Arthur Machen, 1894, chap. XVIII; 4327.

### V. Shaping the Eastern Interiors: The Armenian Practice of Photography

During my participation in a three-month consortium seminar on Orientalist photography, I was given a short opportunity to explore the Pierre de Gigord and Ken Jacobson collections of images.[476] A number of names kept appearing in both collections; the most prominent being Abdullah, Gülmez, Phébus, Sébah, Bonfils, among various others. It was not until several years after the completion of this specialized seminar that I became aware that these simulated Turkish, Greek and French names had been successfully appropriated by Armenian photographers for their own shared purposes.[477]

Though it may seem peculiar to go through an entire series of seminar discussions without any serious mention of Armenian photographers, the occurrence of this unintended disregard is itself an indication of a systemic institutional effect.[478] Even challenging rigorously the discursive fields of power over material and historical "reality," our collective attempts to dissolve the ideological opacity in hopes to locate new questions became demonstrably

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[476] The 2009 Getty Research Institute (GRI) Consortium Seminar was taught by Professor Ali Behdad from UCLA's Department of Comparative Literature, along with the combined efforts of active contributors involving Mary Roberts, Nancy Micklewright, Esra Akcan, John Tagg, Stephen Sheehi and several others. The course was entitled, "Contact Visions: Orientalism, Photography and the Middle East."

[477] Here, the phrase "Shared purposes" alludes to strategies that strengthen the political and social will of Armenian photographers' integration with their host nation's authorities. In the case of Maison Bonfils, for example, it was the shared enterprise of Abraham Guiragossian (officially took over ownership of the name in 1894) with Lekegian, Saboungi, and Sarrafian who developed what came to be known as "the most frequently cited photographer of the Middle East." George Gilbert, *The Illustrated Worldwide Who's Who of Jews in Photography* (New York, NY: George Gilbert, 1996), 108.

[478] During the span of our consortium seminar, more than half a dozen expert presenters on Orientalist photography gave "in-depth" published accounts on Orientalist photography, but none mentioned the role of Armenian proponents in any important way. It is this systemic institutional effect that protects the canon-as-is and limits us from recognizing the right questions to ask within the narrow space of intellectual hegemony. For a deeper understanding of socio-institutional constraints in areas of fixed canonicity, see John Guillory, *Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation* (University of Chicago Press, 1993), 264.

ineffective.  It is not as if our shared insights lacked critical reflec'xion to perlustrate the

underlying structures of established sign systems.[479]  Nor did we seem to lack self-reflective

alternatives to pseudo-positivist codification of visual materials that were often found

compressed into predetermined ideological categories. Nonetheless, our professed critical

preparedness tended to refract undetectably towards a more standard methodological precept

to legitimize our views.[480] This is especially true when it came time to analyze the content of

visual materials. We unwarily gave prominence to the semiotics (*Spectrum*) of the

photograph, and the question of authorship (or *Operator*-ship) became (and remained)

secondary.[481]  More importantly, we failed to recognize the dynamic nature of contextual

influences and the interplay between and across the complex layers of contradictions in

history.

Scholarly discernment involves more than just satisfying the appropriate standards for the

field. Despite the plethora of critical methodologies exerted to narrow the gap between text

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[479] The virgule between the 'c' (reflection) and the 'x' (reflextion) is to emphasize the process of interpretation. What starts out as self-reflective criticality eventually shifts over into or is replaced by reflexive questioning. The goal of this process is parallel to what sociologist authors, Clegg and Hardy, describe as "to find ways of seeing which act back on and reflect existing ways of seeing".  See,  Stewart R. Clegg and Cynthia Hardy, *Studying Organization: Theory and Method* (SAGE, 1999), 435.

[480] In this setting, particularly, the adherence to "standard methodology" has only produced "standard" if not sub-standard interpretations.  The complexity of expressing our research materials, as evidenced by the results of the group's scholarship, only prompted a regression that led to a "safe zone" of accepted applications based on pre-defined subject categories.  That is, the alterity of materials, especially, impelled senior researchers to adhere to conventional "textbook" formulations for reliable validity. And while it has been noted by research-knowledge-experts: "no study conforms exactly to a standard methodology; each one calls for the researcher to adapt the methodology and methods to the uniqueness of the setting", this scenario has proven not only unique, but its eccentricity is enough to render efforts in "adaptability" moot. Quotation from, Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1994), 5.

[481] The bulk of our seminar discussions involved detailed readings of photographs based on Barthesean critical assessments and other Poststructuralist methods of semiological meaning-producing processes.  The methodological supplements of Roland Barthes' famous tri-partition  measuring "photographic knowledge": The *Operator* is the photographer, the *Spectrum* is the photograph's details and the *Spectator* is "ourselves". Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (Hill and Wang, 1980), 9.

and (pictorial) context in photography of the Near East, our attempts fell short of lifting the

repression embedded in our epistemological unconscious.[482] Our consortium's underlying

assumptions, which stem from "approved" systems of influence can, and have passed for

"factual knowledge", especially as it relates to the (ir)relevancy of certain ethnic identities.

A soft, but crucial example of this is when I learned that most titles of the images in our

study have been devised by Getty's Special Collections staff.[483]   While these concocted titles

serve a practical purpose, it became increasingly noticeable how the attitudes and viewpoints

of the collection's examiners were fueled (directly or indirectly) by the headings of

photographs. Additionally, more often than not, the nomenclature of portrayals seemed to

hold more power than the images themselves.[484] The produced titles became surrogates that

helped the photographs claim presence.  Recognizing the command of language in titles and

how it contributes to forming specious knowledge, is just another form of control that

connects dominant interpretations to subordinate representations.[485]  This scenario draws a

sharp parallel of the account given by the eminent French semiotician and philosopher, Louis

Marin, who describes the impact of ideological positioning in titling Other depictions:

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[482] Even with the methodological framework of critical internationalist/cosmopolitanist approach, our research efforts only provided misgivings and uncertainty from the very images that continue to shape the field of non-Western photography.

[483] The cataloger or "name-giver" gains authority over the "named" (photographs). Titles appear as innocent "identification tags" to some, but closer to verity, titles are an integral part of the image and commonly serve to give emphasis to the visual composition.

[484] A possible violation of objectivity is when GRI's devised titles would routinely be used as anchors from which the consortium approached a rigid consensus.

[485] If we approach this phenomena with the inclusion of the crypto-Armenian socio-political players, then the statement will reasonably require a re-reading that will change our view from "dominant interpretations to subordinate representations" and direct it towards "*subordinate* interpretations to *dominant* representations".

*La présentation représentative est prise dans la structure dialogique d'un destinateur et d'un destinataire, quels qu'ils soient, auxquels le cadre fournira un des lieux privilégiés du "faire savoir" du "faire croire", du "faire sentir", des instructions et des injonctions que le pouvoir de représentation, et en représentation, adresse au spectateur-lecteur.*

[The representability of representations is taken in the dialogical structure of a sender and a recipient, whoever they are, to whom the framework will provide one of the privileged places of "making known", "making people believe", "making people feel", to emplace instructions and injunctions that the power of representation, and in re-presentation, addresses to the viewer-reader.][486]

My insistence on treating critically the process of identification is multifold, one of which is the urgent need to confront false ontologization of Orientalist works based on taking liberties with nomenclature.[487]  Within these folds, there exists obvious discrepancies between the imprimatur of institutional authority over indexical designation of Orientalist photographs and the deep-hidden Armeno-historical accounts that draw together fragments of evidence whose association is easily overlooked.   In the absence of recognizing the unique capacity of political subjects among the Armenian diaspora, indexical designations in Orientalist images not only emerge as ratified insights on spectators through a "process that escapes them", but also eludes stable readings, which then introduce irreparable disturbances in the field.[488]

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[486] Louis Marin, *De La Représentation*, ed. Daniel Arasse (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 348.

[487] Without epistemological foundations, especially when it concerns ethnographic objectivity, ontologizing visual materials is not only problematic, but it also turns into an endless chase of complete knowledge within a system of fragmented scholarship.

[488] In his essay, "Marx and Humanism", Althusser describes the ideological operations in a system of representation, which "are perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects and they act functionally on men via a process that escapes them." the discussion first appeared in the *Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A.*, June 1964.  In a later essay on the same subject, Althusser elaborates that the system of representations "is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live." Louis Althusser, "Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London: New Left Books, 1971), 155.

A fitting description that highlights the semiological system's proclivity for omission, comes from the late political theorist, Ernesto Laclau, who finds ideology as an inculcated system of representations that conceal and distort genuine interests of socio-political agents.[489] In short, scholarly validity in the realm of Orientalism (visual and beyond) poses an epistemological problem with conceptual, moral, cultural and relational implications. And while the popular success of Orientalist scholarship seems to be advancing in high literary establishments, the endlessly renewed criticism of the subject is meaningless without uncovering the epistemic essential components.

At the end of our consortium, the senior researchers published the "first in-depth cultural study of the works of European and non-European photographers active in the Middle East and South Asia".[490] By incorporating the collective power into unpacking the "indivisible link between art and politics", culminated in sustaining popular expectations of Orientalistic thought patterns at times and subverting them at others. Their claim to "venture well beyond earlier interpretations of such photography", eventualized, at least in the bulk of their examination, to only go as far as their longstanding mental map of Orientalism's landscape.[491]

Among the most problematic aspects of evaluation can be found in the work of Nancy Micklewright, a self-described Islamic art historian. She begins by comparing the image types in Gigord's and Jacobson's collecting practices, noting the overlap in photographers and prints, but puzzled by contradictory features that characterize the works. Unable to avoid

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[489] Ernesto Laclau, "The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology." *MLN* 112, no. 3 (1997): 297-98.

[490] Quoted from the book's abstract in, Ali Behdad and Luke Gartlan, eds., *Photography's Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial Representation* (Getty Reasearch Institute, 2013).

[491] Ibid.

the formal incoherence in the charged zones of Orientalist photographs, Micklewright's reliance on fixed planes of embodied signification of race left her confused as to why there are "more of North African and Egyptian subjects than of Anatolian" in Ottoman-based photographs.[492] Here, Micklewright, as do most others, glossed over the crucial opportunity to step outside the unending spiral of semiosis wherefrom the signifying chains of unconscious association derive.[493] It would not be unexpected for overcoded Oriental signifiers to leave a deep psychological imprint on scholarly discourse, and thus ensure platitudinal interpolations that safeguard formulaic trappings in the field. The practical epistemic question required to reveal critical dimensions of a complicated framework would simply be to follow the global networking ties in Armenian history. To answer Micklewright's question, dictating the phenotypic racial characteristics of Ottoman Orientals by assigning stereotypes to homogenize a certain typecast, became the very systematic expertise within crypto-Armenian (image producing) networks.

Crypto-Armenian photographers resisted the ordering logic of detection by intervening in and revising of Others' local contexts for their own socio-political gains. Micklewright missed an essential point about the Armenian (and not Ottoman as she labels them) photographers' collaborative process of depicting intentional formal messiness by means of

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[492] Nancy Micklewright, "Alternative Histories of Photography in the Ottoman Middle East," in *Photography's Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial Representation*, ed. Ali Behdad and Luke Gartlan (Getty Reasearch Institude, 2013), 76.

[493] Semiosis (a term coined by Charles Sanders Peirce) applies to the process of meaning-making, and defined by American semiotician, Charles W. Morris, who gave emphasis to the "effect [of the sign-vehicle] on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to the interpretant." The full definition can be located in Morris' 1938 book *Foundations of a Theory of Signs*, p.3. In Lacanian theory, the "chains of unconscious association" or the aleatory nature of associations carry ideological meanings within the material memory of the signifying chain. Lacan, Jacques., Fink, Bruce. *Ecrit: The first complete edition in English* (United Kingdom: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. 371.

creative semiosis.[494]   In her eye-opening statement, Micklewright expresses her

unanticipated revelation of the "Ottoman" photographers who "were obviously able to create

such compositions, and their subjects knew what was required of them as the photograph was

made."[495]  She gave great emphasis to the "involvement" of a Doctor Pechedimalji, a

presumed Ottoman subject and member of the Imperial Medical Society of Constantinople,

who "designed" and "manufactured the portrait pages" in a leather bound photo album of  the

Comité Central Du Croissant Rouge (Red Crescent Society).[496] Moreover, Micklewright's

descriptive tone exposed some of the perplexing intricacies of portraits in the album that

were "far removed from Istanbul" or "farther afield" comprising a group of subjects in

Erzurum.[497]  Micklewright's complete disregard of complex identities in Armenian

constituents kept her from realizing the racial predicaments that could have prompted a more

quantifiable reading of the album's visual content. Awareness, in this case, requires a process

of reckoning with the dynamics of ethnic Armenian identities needed to question particular

forms of aesthetic experience.  It is this awareness that leads to understanding the radicality

of being Armenian. Veiled under the Turkic name of "Pechdimaldji" (methodical worker),

the Doctor was yet another socio-political actor with links to the Mekhitars in Venice who

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[494] The semiotics of racialized visual practice became a key aspect that afforded some essential sameness.  It provided a singular code that applied to the whole of the socio-racial field.

[495] Micklewright, "Alternative Histories of Photography in the Ottoman Middle East," 82.

[496] Ibid., p.83.  The album dates from 1877 to 1878.

[497] The largest city in northeastern Anatolia and a busy center of Armenian-operated commerce, Erzurum was mainly inhabited by Armenians.

not only financed Pechdimaldji's medical degree, but also sponsored the elaborate album of

Micklewright's questioning.[498]

[498] Masson, "L'histoire de L'Inoculation Variolique Armenienne," *Bulletin de l'Academie de Médecine* 90 (1923): 109. A detailed account of Dr. Pechdimaldji's background is recorded in Hrand Gangruni's "*Հայ հեղափոխութիւնը Օսմանեան բռնատիրութեան դէմ, 1890-1910" [The Armenian Revolution against Ottoman Dictatorship: 1890-1910]*,(G. Doniquian et Fils, Beirut, Lebanon), p. 313.