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Authors:

**Eric Masanet^{1,2}, Arman Shehabi³, Nuoa Lei¹, Harald Vranken⁴, Jonathan Koomey⁵
and Jens Malmodin⁶**

¹ Department of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern University

² Department of Chemical and Biological Engineering, Northwestern University

³ Energy Analysis & Environmental Impacts Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

⁴ Faculty of Management, Science & Technology, Open University of the Netherlands & Radboud University

⁵ Special Advisor to the chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute

⁶ Ericsson

**Energy Analysis and Environmental Impacts Division
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory**

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Eric Masanet^{1,2*}, Arman Shehabi³, Nuo Lei¹, Harald Vranken⁴, Jonathan Koomey⁵, and Jens Malmudin⁶

¹ Department of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern University

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⁴ Faculty of Management, Science & Technology, Open University of the Netherlands & Radboud University

⁵ Special Advisor to the Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute

⁶ Ericsson

* email: eric.masanet@northwestern.edu

Author contributions

All authors contributed equally to the conception and design of this critique, and to the preparation and review of the manuscript. Masanet, Shehabi, Lei, and Vranken led the analytical components of this critique.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing financial or non-financial interests.

Data availability

The authors declare that all data supporting the findings of this critique are available within the article, its Supplementary Information file and at <https://github.com/emasanet/Bitcoin-analysis>.

Bitcoin mining is becoming an increasingly energy-intensive process^{1,2,3} whose future implications for energy use and CO₂ emissions remain poorly understood. This is in part because—like many IT systems—its computational efficiencies and service demands have been evolving rapidly. Therefore, scenario analyses that explore these implications can fill pressing knowledge gaps, but they must be approached with care. History has shown that poorly constructed scenarios of future IT energy use—often due to overly-simplistic extrapolations of early rapid growth trends—can do more harm than good by spreading misinformation and driving ill-informed decisions.^{4,5,6} Indeed, the utility of an energy demand scenario is directly proportional to its credibility, which is typically demonstrated through careful attention to technology characteristics and evolution, analytical rigor and transparency, and designing scenarios that align with plausible future outcomes.

Regrettably, the Bitcoin CO₂ emissions scenarios presented in the recent Mora et al. article⁷ lack such credibility and should not be taken seriously by the research and policy communities. We arrived at this conclusion by replicating in detail Mora et al.'s methods, which revealed numerous flaws in the design and execution of their analysis as documented in the Supplementary Information. We describe the five most significant issues below.

First, the use of transactions as the driver of future Bitcoin emissions is questionable, given the tenuous correlation between transactions and mining energy use. It is well established that energy use is driven by the computational difficulty of blocks mined¹⁻³, whereas the number of transactions per block has no effect on block mining difficulty. Indeed, the authors themselves calculate 2017 Bitcoin energy use and emissions based on block difficulty, not number of transactions (Supplementary Eq. 1). Without explanation or justification, the authors switch to transactions as the driver for projecting emissions in all future years, undermining the consistency of their calculations and the integrity of their projections.

Second, all three Bitcoin adoption scenarios designed by Mora et al. represent sudden and highly improbable departures from historical trends in Bitcoin transactions, whose annual growth ranged from 1.3x-2.3x over the preceding five years.⁸ Specifically, Mora et al. assume that Bitcoin transactions—which totaled 104 million in 2017, representing a mere 0.03% of global cashless transactions—would abruptly leap to 78 billion by 2019 in the fast scenario (a 750x increase in only 2 years), to 11 billion by 2020 in the median scenario (a 108x increase), and to 8 billion by 2023 in the slow scenario (a 76x increase). All three adoption scenarios follow steep logarithmic growth trajectories thereafter, which are conspicuously inconsistent with historical trends (Supplementary Fig 4), and which mathematically can only lead to large near-term emissions increases. The authors base their scenarios on adoption rates

of 40 “broadly used” technologies whose social utilities vary widely and bear little resemblance to that of Bitcoin. The authors never explain why such comparisons are valid, nor do they justify the plausibility of the very abrupt changes in Bitcoin transaction levels and growth trajectories associated with their resulting scenarios. Hence, these scenarios should not be taken seriously.

Third, Mora et al. applied outdated values for mining rig efficiencies and electric power carbon intensities, which inflated their estimated 2017 Bitcoin energy use and CO₂ emissions values considerably. When estimating the direct electricity use of Bitcoin mining, the authors erroneously included many old and inefficient rigs in their selection pool that were no longer economically viable in 2017 (Supplementary Fig 5), betraying a lack of understanding of current mining equipment and economics. Furthermore, Mora et al provided equal weighting when selecting a rig from their pool as the sole rig type to mine a block, thus over-representing slower inefficient rigs and creating scenarios that require physically impossible rig counts. When we excluded unprofitable rigs in our replicated analysis, Mora et al.’s model produced an estimate of 28 TWh in 2017 (Supplementary Fig 6), which is one fourth of their original estimate of 114 TWh. Furthermore, they applied 2014 carbon intensities (g CO₂/kWh) to calculate 2017 emissions, ignoring non-negligible grid decarbonization improvements in the intervening years (Supplementary Fig 7),⁹ even though sufficient data existed at the time of their study for reasonable estimates of 2017 carbon intensities.^{10,11} Applying more reasonable 2017 electricity use and carbon intensity values in their model produced an estimate of 15.7 MtCO₂e, far lower than their original estimate of 69 MtCO₂e.

Fourth, by analytical design, Mora et al. applied 2017 per-transaction energy use and CO₂ emissions values in all future years, multiplied by annual transactions (Supplementary Eq 2). This decision effectively held both mining rig efficiency and grid carbon intensities constant for the next 100 years (Supplementary Fig 7). This dubious choice ignores the dynamic natures of mining rig and power grid technologies and violates the widely-followed practice of accounting for technological change in forward-looking energy technology scenarios. In acknowledging their static grid intensity assumption, they point to at least one reference containing credible grid intensity outlooks¹⁰ but failed to utilize them. Estimating the future energy efficiency of mining is certainly difficult, but the authors never explain why they simply ignored this important scenario consideration, nor do they justify how assuming static mining efficiency for 100 years—when mining rigs have evolved monthly¹— can lead to any useful insights.

Fifth, in constructing their slow, median, and fast adoption scenarios, Mora et al. committed key errors when analyzing adoption rates within their 40-product comparison pool.¹² Namely, when replicating their analysis, we discovered that, for many comparison products, they designated the first available data point as the first year of product usage. For example, the authors designate the first year of usage for electric power as 1908, at which point U.S. household adoption had climbed to 10% (Mora et al. Fig. 1b). Yet Thomas Edison began offering electric power to (far fewer) U.S. households in Manhattan in 1882, over two decades earlier.¹³ By omitting the initial low-adoption years of US market availability for numerous technologies, their scenarios were biased toward inaccurately steep near-term adoption trajectories in all three cases. When we replicated their analysis using more reasonable estimates of the first year of technology usage, their own methods produced slower adoption curves, particularly in the median and slow growth scenarios (Supplementary Fig 8).

To assess how these last three analytical flaws affected Mora et al.'s projections, we replicated their original scenario analysis (Fig 1a), and then applied reasonable corrections in stepwise fashion. We first applied the 2017 per-transaction Bitcoin carbon intensity we obtained by excluding unprofitable rigs (Fig 1b). We then utilized weighted-average grid intensities based on mining locations assumed by the authors, including grid intensity evolution based on IEA outlooks that reflect current and announced national power policies in mining locations (Supplementary Fig 7) (Fig 1c). Finally, we applied our calculated adoption curves in all three scenarios (Fig 1d).

The results show that, had the authors avoided the key errors we described above, their own study design would have yielded much different, and far less alarming, projections of future Bitcoin carbon emissions. That said, we find the study design itself sufficiently flawed—e.g., use of transactions as driver, comparisons to 40 unrelated technologies, ignoring rig evolution—that such corrections alone are not enough to salvage the authors' approach. On these bases, we argue that the Mora et al. scenarios are fundamentally flawed and should not be taken seriously by researchers, policymakers, or the public.

Given the highly dynamic and unpredictable nature of Bitcoin markets and mining demand—e.g., Bitcoin transactions and exchange values dropped steeply in 2018—developing credible scenarios of cryptocurrency emissions remains an important challenge for the research community. While Mora et al. likely had the right motivations, to be useful, such scenarios must be approached with more rigor and greater analytical care.




Figure 1: Comparison of Bitcoin CO₂ emissions projected by the Mora et al. model: (a) our replicated analysis showing close agreement with the authors' results; and the model's projections after first (b) removing unprofitable rigs in the base year (median scenario only), then (c) accounting for evolution of the electric power grid in mining locations (median scenario only), and finally (d) correcting errors in their stated adoption scenario approach.

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Supplementary Information

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Eric Masanet^{1,2*}, Arman Shehabi³, Nuoa Lei¹, Harald Vranken⁴, Jonathan Koomey⁵, and Jens Malmudin⁶

¹ Department of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern University

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⁴ Faculty of Management, Science & Technology, Open University of the Netherlands & Radboud University

⁵ Special Advisor to the Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute

⁶ Ericsson

* email: eric.masanet@northwestern.edu

In this document we show that the analysis by Mora et al., which predicts that Bitcoin mining alone can increase global warming by more than 2° C in 11 to 22 years, is fundamentally flawed and should not be taken seriously by researchers, policymakers, or the general public.

Hereafter we refer to Mora et al. as “the authors.” We first document our replication of the authors’ original methods and results in Sections I, II, and III, elaborating on several methodological problems we encountered during the process. Next, in Sections IV-VIII, we discuss in depth five major flaws related to the authors’ study design and execution. As part of these discussions, we apply our replicated model to demonstrate that, had the authors avoided some key analytical errors, their own model would have produced significantly lower carbon emissions trajectories that invalidate their original alarmist predictions.

I. Replication of 2017 CO₂ emissions estimate

We first replicated the authors’ 2017 Bitcoin CO₂ emissions estimate, based on the R script they provided as their model. We generalize their calculation approach as follows (using our own notation):

$$C_{2017} = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{E_i H_i G_i}{3.6 \cdot 10^6} \quad (1)$$

The variable C_{2017} is Bitcoin’s global carbon emissions quantity in 2017, expressed in units of grams of CO₂ equivalents (g CO₂e). E_i is the energy efficiency of the mining rig assigned to solve block i , expressed in units of joules of direct electricity use per hash (J/H). The authors assign rigs randomly (i.e., with equal probability) to each block from a list they provide in their Supplementary Information (SI) Table 1. H_i is the expected number of hashes required to solve block i , which is calculated by multiplying its difficulty by 2³². G_i is the regional CO₂ intensity of grid electricity generation (g CO₂e/kWh), which the authors assign depending on which pool solved block i as documented in their SI Table 2. The denominator

converts direct electricity use from joules into kWh (1 kWh = $3.6 \cdot 10^6$ joules). The results are summed over $n = 55,864$ blocks, the total number solved in 2017.

Our replication of the authors' code generated an expected 2017 global Bitcoin CO₂ emissions value (C_{2017}) of 69 Mt CO₂e (18.8 Mt C), which is identical to the authors' result, and an expected 2017 global Bitcoin direct electricity use value of 114 TWh. The latter value was not reported by the authors.

II. Replication of future CO₂ emissions projections

Next we attempted to replicate the authors' future projections of Bitcoin CO₂ emissions. The authors did not provide code or explicit formulae for replicating their projections. Therefore, we had to rely on the authors' qualitative methodological descriptions and their results graphs to generalize their projection approach mathematically as follows (using our own notation):

$$C_j = T_{2017} f_j \hat{C}_{2017} \quad (2)$$

The variable C_j is Bitcoin's global CO₂ emissions quantity in future year j (g CO₂e). T_{2017} is the total number of global cashless transactions in 2017 (314.2 billion), which the authors assume will remain constant for all future years j . The variable f_j is the authors' assumed fraction of global cashless transactions attributable to Bitcoin in year j . \hat{C}_{2017} is Bitcoin's average per-transaction carbon emissions intensity (g CO₂e/transaction) associated with solving all blocks in 2017.

We note that the authors calculate C_j each year by randomly selecting combinations of blocks that had already been solved in their estimation of 2017 Bitcoin CO₂ emissions (as described in Section I) until total Bitcoin transactions in year j are fulfilled. This procedure is repeated 1,000 times. This approach effectively delivers an expected per-transaction CO₂ intensity in each year j that is very similar to the simple quotient of 2017 expected carbon emissions (69 Mt CO₂e) and 2017 total Bitcoin transactions (103.7 million). This quotient has a value of $\hat{C}_{2017} = 665$ kg CO₂e/trans (181 kg C/trans).

Therefore, we use this constant \hat{C}_{2017} value for analytical efficiency in our results replication, given that the authors use transactions as their future emissions driver (i.e., activity variable) in Eq. 2. In doing so, we arrive at very similar CO₂ emission projections to those of the authors, as discussed below.

The authors construct three different scenarios for f_j , which they provide over a 100-year projection period, based on their adoption rate analysis of 40 different "broadly adopted" technologies. Our replication of the authors' Bitcoin CO₂ emissions projections, which were generated using Eqs. (1) and (2) and the authors' values for f_j , are shown in Supplementary Fig. 1.


Before comparing our replicated results to those of the authors, three caveats are required:

1. The authors' lack of transparency prevents precise comparisons. The authors did not provide their numerical projection results; instead, they only provided one projection results figure with coarse axis scales (their Fig. 1c). This lack of transparency makes exact replication impossible. Therefore, we checked the general accuracy of our replication by comparing our results to their Figure 1c and to the number of years stated by the authors until cumulative Bitcoin CO₂ emissions would exceed 231.4 Gt C (the authors' lower 2° C warming threshold).
2. The authors' base year, and its associated cumulative CO₂ emissions, are unclear. Without explanation or explicit acknowledgement, the authors appear to have chosen 2020 as the base

year for projections in their Fig. 1c, even though they had earlier estimated 2017 Bitcoin CO₂ emissions. Furthermore, and again without explanation, the authors appear to have assumed a cumulative global anthropogenic CO₂ emissions value of around 585 Gt C in 2020 (which we estimated via direct measurement of Fig. 1c), to which they cumulatively add projected Bitcoin CO₂ emissions over time in each scenario. Yet, in their paper, the authors also state that cumulative global anthropogenic carbon emissions had already reached 584.4 Gt C in 2014, six years earlier. This is a glaring analytical inconsistency that we could not reconcile when replicating the authors' projections.

3. The authors' Bitcoin adoption values are opaquely labeled and incongruous. We encountered several difficulties interpreting the authors' data for Bitcoin adoption (f_j), which they provided in a downloadable file for three different scenarios: median, lower25, and upper75. These three scenarios are represented in the paper as typical, slow, and fast adoption pathways, respectively. The authors label the year of each adoption value (f_j) ordinally, starting with a value of 2, while their emissions projection results are labeled by calendar year starting in 2020. They do not explain which ordinal year corresponds to which calendar year in their results, nor do they provide an ordinal year 1. Furthermore, the authors provide several negative values of Bitcoin adoption (f_j)—specifically, for ordinal year 2 in the median scenario and for ordinal years 2-5 in the lower25 scenario—which are physical impossibilities and incongruous with current (albeit small) Bitcoin adoption levels. They do not explain these negative adoption values, which are also clearly visible in their Fig 1b, which appears to start in ordinal year 2. In light of these documentation deficiencies, we attempted to establish correspondence between their Figs 1b and 1c (via Eqs 1 and 2) and concluded that the authors most likely assigned ordinal year 3 to calendar year 2020 in their analysis and simply ignored years with negative Bitcoin adoption values in each scenario, even though Bitcoin currently has a positive (albeit small) market penetration and will continue emitting CO₂ until 2020 in any scenario. The authors' failure to provide numerical results and explanations of ordinal years and negative values make it impossible to verify our conclusions about the authors' intentions in these figures. However, these conclusions do enable us to replicate the authors' results quite accurately.

With these caveats in mind, our replicated results in Supplementary Fig. 1 show similar carbon emissions trajectories for all three scenarios compared to the authors' Fig 1c. Our results also replicate the authors' calculations indicating that cumulative Bitcoin CO₂ emissions cross the 231.4 Gt C threshold in 2028, 2033, and 2039 in the Upper75, median, and Lower25 scenarios, respectively. However, the aforementioned methodological issues already raise serious questions about the credibility of the authors' analysis.




Supplementary Figure 1. (a) Our replicated Bitcoin CO₂ emissions projections using the authors’ data and model; (b) the authors’ Bitcoin CO₂ emissions projections, as shown in their Figure 1c.

III. Replication of Bitcoin adoption scenarios

To better understand the basis for the authors’ steep growth trajectories in all three scenarios they considered, we also replicated their derivation of Bitcoin adoption values in each scenario based on their stated comparison to 40 “broadly adopted” technologies. To do so, we obtained the same source data used by the authors^{1,2} and replicated their comparative analysis, first by normalizing all adoption data in the same manner as the authors, then by constructing regression curves for the median, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile of the technology adoption ranges each year. Our replicated median, lower25, and upper75 adoption curves are shown in Supplementary Fig. 2, which are in close agreement with those of the authors in their Fig 1b (repeated below for convenience).

Our replication also revealed a likely error in the authors’ representation of data contained in their Fig. 1b. Namely, the rapidly rising trendline labeled “credit card” appears to be based on adoption data for debit cards in the original source², not credit cards.

This error is notable, in that many readers of the Mora et al. paper may look to credit cards as the most appealing comparison product among the 40 in the authors’ pool—given that early credit cards represented a disruptive new transaction technology—and form opinions about Bitcoin’s future adoption potential on this basis. However, credit card usage in the United States followed a more gradual adoption path than that shown in the authors’ Fig. 1b. Specifically, the first universal U.S. credit card (Diner’s Club) was introduced in 1950³ and by 1970 (20 years later) the fraction of U.S. families holding credit cards had risen to 50%⁴, whereas the authors’ (mis)labeled adoption curve implies that credit cards grew much faster, penetrating around 80% of U.S. households in a similar time period.



Supplementary Figure 2. (a) Our replication of the authors’ Bitcoin adoption scenarios; (b) the authors’ original Bitcoin adoption scenarios as shown in their Figure 1b.

Next, we discuss two major study design flaws that became apparent to us during the process of replicating Mora et al.’s methods and results.

IV. The use of transactions as an energy demand driver is questionable

As summarized in Eq. 2, the authors project Bitcoin’s future CO₂ emissions in each scenario using transactions as the emissions driver—i.e., the activity variable—in all future years. We consider this approach as a fundamental study design flaw, since it is well known that the electricity consumed, and hence the CO₂ emitted, by Bitcoin mining does not depend on the number of transactions but, rather, on the difficulty and number of blocks mined.^{5,6,7}

The pace at which blocks are mined is kept constant at around 6 blocks per hour. The difficulty parameter in the mining algorithm is adjusted every 14 days to maintain this pace. An increasing number of transactions will therefore not cause an increase in the number of blocks. Instead, this will cause that individual blocks will include more transactions. The effort to mine a block is however independent of the number of transactions in the block.

Indeed, the authors themselves calculate 2017 Bitcoin energy use and emissions based on block difficulty, not number of transactions (Eq. 1). Without explanation or justification, the authors switch to transactions as the driver for projecting emissions in all future years, undermining the consistency of their calculations and the integrity of their projections.


To illustrate this flaw, let’s assume that all 314.2 billion cashless transactions in 2017 would be Bitcoin transactions. Then in the authors’ approach this takes about 159 million blocks (considering that one block contained on average about 1,974 transactions in 2017).⁸ This implies mining at a pace of 18,170 blocks per hour—three orders of magnitude greater than the established fixed pace of 6 blocks per hour—which betrays a lack of understanding of how real-world mining works. In contrast, in the above example, transactions would be increased on average to 5,977,930 per block, keeping the pace nearly

constant at 6 blocks mined per hour. Hence, blocks will become much larger, which will cause scalability issues, mainly in communication latency, but it would not necessarily increase mining effort.

V. The authors' Bitcoin adoption scenarios are implausible


As evident in Eq. (2), the authors' future Bitcoin CO₂ emissions estimates are sensitive to their design of adoption scenarios (f_i). The authors' typical, slow, and fast adoption scenarios are plotted in Supplementary Fig 1b, which paints a seemingly unavoidable future of sudden and rapid Bitcoin adoption. Mathematically, the authors' use of steep logarithmic growth curves in all scenarios can only result (see Eq. 2) in large near-term increases in Bitcoin's carbon emissions, even in the slowest adoption scenario.

The authors implicitly justify steep future growth by pointing to rapid historical (2009-2017) growth in global Bitcoin transactions (the authors' Supplementary Figure 1), which they model using a power function. However, 2018 data (most of which were available prior to publication of the authors' study) expose the well-documented danger of simply extrapolating past trends into the future: global Bitcoin transactions fell by 22% in 2018⁹. Therefore, in 2018, as shown in Supplementary Fig. 3, the authors' power model already overestimates global Bitcoin transactions by a factor of 2. This discrepancy underscores why readers should be wary of any future energy/carbon emission projections based on simple extrapolation of early rapid growth trends, especially for information technology (IT) systems, whose efficiencies and service demands can evolve quickly.^{10,11,12}



Supplementary Figure 3. Annual global Bitcoin transactions (2009-2018) with the authors' historical (2009-2017) power model extended to 2018.

Upon initial observation, the steep upward slope of the authors’ historical power model (Supplementary Fig. 3) might seem visually coherent with the steep initial upward slopes of the authors’ future adoption scenarios (authors’ Fig 1b). However, when these data series are plotted together on the same scale—i.e., billions of transactions—major inconsistencies emerge. As shown in Supplementary Fig. 4, the authors’ own historical power model follows a much flatter future trajectory in the near-term compared to the Bitcoin transactions assumed by the authors in their scenarios, all three of which abruptly switch to significantly steeper trajectories at their outset.



Supplementary Figure 4. Comparison of historical (2009-2017) Bitcoin transactions and the future Bitcoin transactions associated with the authors’ power model and their three adoption scenarios. Note: Due to negative initial values and missing data for 2018 (see Section II), the authors’ three scenarios have different start years and are represented here with different styles than in previous graphs for clarity.

Moreover, in the first year of each of the authors’ scenarios, implausibly massive jumps in Bitcoin transactions would be required to bridge the gaps compared to present-day totals. In 2017, global Bitcoin transactions totaled 104 million, or a mere 0.03% of global cashless transactions.¹³ In the authors’ scenarios, however, the following must happen:

- by 2019 (i.e., only 2 years later), Bitcoin adoption must jump to:
 - 78 billion transactions in the fast scenario, which represents a:
 - 750x increase compared to 2017, and a
 - 280x increase compared to their power model extrapolated to 2019
- by 2020 (3 years later), Bitcoin adoption must jump to:
 - 11 billion transactions in the median scenario, which represents a:

- 108x increase compared to 2017, and a
 - 29x increase compared to their power model extrapolated to 2020
- By 2023 (5 years later), Bitcoin adoption must jump to:
 - 8 billion transactions in the slow scenario, which represents a:
 - 76x increase compared to 2017
 - 9x increase compared to their power model extrapolated to 2023

The authors do not address the above numerical disconnects that exist between present-day Bitcoin transactions, those implied by their power model, and those required in the first years of each future scenario. Nor do the authors justify the plausibility of the very abrupt changes in adoption trajectories and transaction levels associated with their scenarios. Implicitly, the authors require the reader to “suspend disbelief” in accepting scenarios that are numerically inconsistent and historically implausible, yet they provide no evidence why one should do so.

We find these implausible scenarios to be another fundamental study design flaw.

VI. Use of outdated mining rig efficiency and grid carbon intensity values

When replicating the authors’ 2017 Bitcoin energy use and CO₂ emissions estimate (see Section I), we found that they applied outdated values for mining rig efficiencies and electric power carbon intensities, which inflated their 2017 energy and emissions results considerably.

When estimating the direct electricity use of Bitcoin mining, the authors erroneously included many old and inefficient rigs in their selection pool that were no longer economically viable in 2017, betraying a lack of understanding of current mining equipment and economics. Supplementary Table 1 lists the pool of mining rigs constructed by the authors, from which they randomly assigned rigs (i.e., with equal probability) to solve blocks in 2017 via Eq. 1. The authors claim they have included “only hardware that is economically profitable by modern standards;”¹³ however, they offer no explicit definition of what they mean by “economically profitable” or “modern standards.”

Here we demonstrate that the authors included in their pool many old, computationally-slow, and energy-inefficient rigs that had little chance of being “economically profitable” in 2017. To aid in our assessment, we first compiled best available estimates of the release date for each of the 62 models in the authors’ mining rig pool.²⁴⁻⁵⁴ Our estimated release dates are shown in Supplementary Table 1, which indicates that the authors included models released as early as January 2013, or five years prior to the end of the authors’ reference year (2017).

Next, we compiled historical data on the number of daily blocks solved, their associated difficulty levels, the Bitcoin award per solved block, the transaction fees collected, and the average Bitcoin market value for the period 1-Jan-2013 to 30-Nov-2018.^{8,14}

Using these historical data, we then computed the nominal value of daily mined blocks as follows:

$$V_k = N_k(T_k + B_k)M_k \quad (3)$$

The variable V_k is the total value of blocks mined in day k (nominal USD \$), N_k is the number of blocks mined that day, T_k is daily average transaction fee (BTC/block), B_k is the daily mining reward (BTC/block), and M_k is the daily average Bitcoin market value (\$/BTC).

1 **Supplementary Table 1. The authors' mining rig pool with our best estimates of rig release dates**

Bitcoin computing hardware	Hashrate (GH/s)	Energy efficiency (GH/J)	Estimated rig release date (mm:dd:yy)
TerraHash Klondike 16	5	0.156	01/01/13
Avalon Batch 1	66	0.106	01/19/13
Avalon Batch 2	82	0.117	01/30/13
Avalon Batch 3	82	0.117	01/30/13
Bitmine Avalon Clone 85 GH	85	0.131	05/25/13
Metabank	120	0.706	05/31/13
TerraHash DX Mini (full)	90	0.141	06/17/13
BFL 500 GH/s Mini Rig SC	500	0.185	06/18/13
TerraHash DX Large (full)	180	0.141	06/18/13
TerraHash Klondike 64	18	0.142	06/18/13
BFL SC 25Gh/s	25	0.167	06/26/13
BFL SC 50 Gh/s	50	0.167	06/26/13
HashFast Baby Jet	400	0.909	09/13/13
HashFast Sierra	1200	0.909	09/13/13
KnCMiner Mercury	100	0.400	10/01/13
BFL Single 'SC'	60	0.250	10/10/13
KnC Saturn	250	0.833	10/11/13
BPMC Red Fury USB	2.5	1.000	10/19/13
KnC Jupiter	500	0.833	10/26/13
BFL SC 5 Gh/s	5	0.167	11/21/13
HashBuster Micro	20	0.870	12/08/13
AntMiner S1	180	0.500	12/30/13
KnC Neptune	3000	1.429	01/01/14
Spondooliestech SP30	4500	1.500	01/01/14
ROCKMINER R3-BOX	450	1.000	01/01/14
CoinTerra TerraMiner IV	1600	0.762	01/29/14
HashFast Sierra Evo 3	2000	0.909	03/07/14
NanoFury NF2	4	0.800	03/23/14
AntMiner S2	1000	0.909	05/21/14
BTC Garden AM-V1 310 GH/s	310	0.957	05/23/14
ROCKMINER R-BOX	32	0.711	05/28/14
ROCKMINER Rocket BOX	450	0.938	06/15/14
Spondooliestech SP10	1400	1.120	08/18/14
ROCKMINER R-BOX110G	110	0.917	09/09/14
Black Arrow Prospero X-1	100	1.000	09/23/14
BFL Monarch 700 GH/s	700	1.429	09/25/14
AntMiner S4	2000	1.429	09/25/14

Bitcoin computing hardware	Hashrate (GH/s)	Energy efficiency (GH/J)	Estimated rig release date (mm:dd:yy)
AntMiner S3	441	1.297	09/27/14
Black Arrow Prospero X-3	2000	1.000	10/08/14
Klondike	5	0.156	10/15/14
ROCKMINER R4-BOX	470	1.000	10/20/14
ROCKMINER T1 800G	800	0.800	12/03/14
AntMiner S5	1160	1.966	12/22/14
Spondooliestech SP20	1700	1.545	12/22/14
Spondooliestech SP35	5500	1.507	01/01/15
Twinfury	5	1.305	02/19/15
AntMiner S5+	7720	2.247	08/14/15
AntMiner S7	4730	3.909	08/30/15
Avalon6	3500	3.241	02/08/16
Spondooliestech SP31	4900	1.633	04/01/16
Avalon 721	6000	6.000	11/01/16
AntMiner R4	8700	10.296	02/01/17
Avalon741	7300	6.348	03/01/17
Ebit E9+	9000	6.923	09/08/17
Ebit E9	6300	7.143	09/14/17
WhatsMiner M3	12500	5.682	11/14/17
Avalon761	8800	6.667	12/13/17
Avalon821	11000	9.167	12/20/17
Ebit E9++	14000	10.526	01/01/18
AntMiner S9	14000	10.448	11/01/17
Antminer T9+	10500	7.332	01/01/18
Ebit E10	18000	11.111	02/01/18

2

3 Next, for each of the 62 rigs in the authors' selection pool, we calculated the electricity use that would
4 be necessary if that rig were assigned to solve the blocks in each day k , following the mathematical
5 approach in Eq. 1. Finally, we divided the nominal mined block value (V_k) by the electricity use that
6 would have been required for a given rig to solve those blocks (kWh), and did so for all days in our
7 analysis period.


8 Supplementary Fig. 5 plots our computed nominal mined block value per kWh expended ($\$/kWh$) for all
9 62 rigs. This metric expresses the maximum mining value that could be extracted per kWh expended
10 during mining; when operating costs per kWh expended ($\$/kWh$) exceed this value, mining cannot be
11 profitable. Operating costs include the costs of electricity, equipment depreciation, labor, and other
12 costs incurred during mining. While empirical data on operating costs are scarce, several published
13 estimates suggest that $\$0.05/kWh$ is a reasonable current minimum value, with electricity typically
14 comprising the largest share of operating costs.^{7,15}

15 In Supplementary Fig. 5, we color code rigs of different efficiency classes, indicate the numbers of rigs
16 that fall into each class in the authors' selection pool, and start each rig's data series on its estimated
17 release date. We also indicate the typical $\$0.05/kWh$ threshold on the plot; rigs whose data series fall
18 below this threshold in a given time period would not be considered profitable, because nominal mined
19 block value earned per kWh expended would not exceed operating costs.


20 It can be seen that many of the older, less energy-efficient rigs that were included in the authors'
21 selection pool—while profitable when first introduced several years ago—by 2017 would be profitable
22 only at implausibly low operating cost levels. For example, in 2017, many of the lowest efficiency rigs
23 included by the authors (i.e., the blue-shaded rigs with efficiencies less than 0.3 GH/J) could have only
24 been profitable with operating costs less than $\$0.01/kWh$, which is much lower than even the cheapest
25 documented rates for mining electricity costs alone.^{15,16,17}

26 In other words, many of the rigs included in the authors' selection pool were not "economically
27 profitable by modern standards" in the authors' own reference year (2017), and should, therefore, have
28 been excluded from their analysis. In Supplementary Fig. 6, we plot the effects of excluding old, energy-
29 efficient rigs from our replicated analysis at different assumed levels of operating cost. For each
30 monthly period in 2017, we reran our original replication but excluded any rigs from the selection pool
31 that would not have been profitable at various operating cost levels. We summed these monthly results
32 to arrive at total direct Bitcoin electricity use estimates in 2017.

33 It is clear from Supplementary Fig. 6 that inclusion of old, energy-efficient rigs in the authors' analysis
34 resulted in an inflated 2017 direct electricity use estimate. Even if the authors had excluded rigs that
35 were not profitable at implausibly low operating costs of $\$0.01/kWh$, their 2017 electricity use estimate
36 would have dropped nearly in half, from 114 TWh to 62 TWh, while their 2017 CO₂ emissions estimate
37 would have dropped from 69 Mt CO₂e to 38 Mt CO₂e. At the generally-accepted minimum operating
38 cost level of $\$0.05/kWh$, the authors' 2017 electricity use and CO₂ emissions estimates would have
39 dropped much further, to 28 TWh and 17 MtCO₂e, respectively. These latter values are more consistent
40 with other published estimates of Bitcoin's 2017 direct electricity use and related carbon emissions,
41 which include only the newer, faster, and more energy-efficient rigs that were likely to be profitable in
42 2017.⁵⁻⁷ Indeed, looking at Supplementary Fig. 6 from left to right, one can clearly see how, as rigs get
43 older, they are invariably pushed out of profitability as newer, more efficient rigs emerge.



Supplementary Figure 5. Nominal mined block value per kWh expended for the 62 mining rigs included in the authors' selection pool




1

2 **Supplementary Figure 6. Mora et al. model estimates of 2017 Bitcoin electricity use and CO₂ emissions**
 3 **when unprofitable rigs were excluded from their selection pool, at different operating cost**
 4 **assumption levels.**

5 Furthermore, the authors applied 2014 carbon intensities (g CO₂/kWh) to their 2017 electricity use
 6 estimates, ignoring non-negligible grid decarbonization improvements in their assumed mining locations
 7 during the intervening years (Supplementary Fig 7). This was done even though sufficient data existed at
 8 the time of their study for reasonable estimates of 2017 carbon intensities.^{18,19,20} Supplementary Fig. 7
 9 plots the location-weighted average grid CO₂ emissions intensity from 2000-2016 (historical), with
 10 forward-projections from 2017 to 2060 from the IEA’s central outlook (based on current and announced
 11 national policies in assumed mining locations). From this figure, it’s clear that, by using 2014 carbon
 12 intensities, the authors arrived at a higher 2017 CO₂ emissions value than if they had used available data
 13 for 2017 carbon intensities.

14 To assess the effects of the authors’ use of outdated rig efficiencies and grid carbon intensities, we
 15 applied our replicated Mora et al. model to estimate 2017 Bitcoin CO₂ emissions using more reasonable
 16 assumptions. Based on the assumption that \$0.05/kWh represents the global average minimum Bitcoin
 17 mining operating cost—and excluding rigs that did not yield nominal mining revenues per kWh
 18 expended exceeding \$0.05/kWh in 2017—the authors’ model yielded an estimate of 28 TWh
 19 (Supplementary Fig. 6). We then multiplied this value by a location-weighted carbon intensity that was
 20 9% lower than the authors’ 2014 value, to capture the technological progress that occurred between
 21 2014 and 2017 (Supplementary Fig. 7). We arrived at a 2017 Bitcoin CO₂ emissions estimate of 15.7
 22 MtCO₂e, which is far lower than the authors’ original estimate of 69 MtCO₂e.

23 Therefore, we determined that, had the authors not erroneously included outdated rig efficiencies and
 24 grid carbon intensities, their own model would have estimated substantially lower 2017 energy use and
 25 CO₂ emissions values, invalidating their original results.



26
 27 **Supplementary Figure 7. Location-weighted average electric power direct carbon intensity using**
 28 **historical (2000-2016) and projected (2017-2060) data available at the time of the authors’ study. Also**
 29 **shown is the level of direct carbon intensity locked into the authors’ estimates by assuming static**
 30 **2014 carbon intensity values. Location-weighted average assumes the following percentages of 2017**
 31 **Bitcoin electricity use by region, according to the locations assigned by the authors to each solved**
 32 **block: China (62.2%), U.S./China average (9.3%), U.S. (3.9%), global average (17%), Georgia, Finland,**
 33 **and Iceland (5.3%), U.S./E.U. average (0.1%), India (2.3%), and Sweden (0.1%).**

34
 35 **VII. Holding both mining rig efficiency and grid carbon intensity constant in all future years**

36 As evident in Eq. 2, the authors applied their 2017 per-transaction CO₂ emissions values in all future
 37 years, multiplying them by annual transactions to obtain future CO₂ emissions trajectories for each
 38 scenario. This was done by sampling solved blocks from their 2017 analysis until the required
 39 transactions in each future year were fulfilled. In other words, they did not vary the mining rig pool
 40 options in future years; for example, the pool of rigs they used to solve blocks in 2050 was the same
 41 pool of rigs they used to solve blocks in 2017. Moreover, the authors state explicitly that they did not
 42 consider any changes over time to the power grids in each assumed mining location. These decisions
 43 effectively held both mining rig efficiencies and grid carbon intensities constant for the next 100 years.

44 This dubious choice ignores the dynamic natures of mining rig and power grid technologies and violates
45 the widely-followed practice of accounting for technological change in forward-looking energy
46 technology scenarios.

47 Estimating the future energy efficiency of mining is certainly difficult, but the authors never explain why
48 they simply ignored this important scenario consideration, nor do they justify how assuming static
49 mining efficiencies for 100 years—when, historically, mining rigs have evolved monthly with respect to
50 their hashrates and energy efficiencies— can lead to any useful insights. And, in acknowledging their
51 static grid intensities assumption, they point to at least one available reference containing credible grid
52 intensity outlooks,²⁰ but failed to utilize these data. The fallacy in keeping grid carbon intensities
53 constant at 2014 levels can clearly be seen in Supplementary Fig. 7, which shows a widening gulf over
54 time between the authors’ static assumption (in red) and that of the prevailing outlook (the IEA’s ETP
55 2017 Reference Technology Scenario, in green) for the authors’ assumed mining locations.

56 We consider the authors’ decisions to hold both mining rig efficiencies and grid carbon intensities
57 constant to be fatal flaws of their analysis, and conspicuously out of step with established best practices
58 for IT energy analysis and long-term energy scenario modeling.²¹ And, because the authors significantly
59 overestimated 2017 Bitcoin energy use and CO₂ emissions by using outdated rig and carbon intensity
60 data, it follows that their decision to lock in these 2017 values in all future years led to inflated CO₂
61 emissions projections as well.

62 Therefore, we assessed how the authors’ own model would have yielded different results had they: (a)
63 at least excluded unprofitable rigs from their 2017 pool; and (b) used available data sources to account
64 for projected changes in grid carbon intensities in their assumed mining locations. We applied our
65 replicated model to first generate scenarios assuming 2017 CO₂ emissions of 15.7 MtCO₂e (based on a
66 global average minimum operating cost of \$0.05/kWh, as discussed in Section VI), as shown in
67 Supplementary Fig. 9b. To these results, we then applied changes in the location-weighted grid carbon
68 intensity from 2017 to 2060, using available data from the IEA’s central outlook based on current and
69 announced national policies in each mining location (Supplementary Fig. 9c).

70 The results show that, had the authors applied more reasonable values in their analysis—even
71 maintaining the flawed assumption of holding 2017 mining rig efficiencies constant, but at more
72 economically plausible levels—their own model would have delivered much different projections
73 compared to their original results.

74 **VIII. Improper execution of the 40-product comparison analysis**

75 Lastly, our replication of the authors’ 40 technology comparison (see Section III) revealed errors that
76 biased their results in favor of steep initial growth trajectories. While the scientific community may be
77 justified in questioning the authors’ comparison of Bitcoin to a seemingly arbitrary mix of technologies
78 that vary widely in their social utility, here we focus only on errors committed by the authors executing
79 their own stated methods.

80 In constructing their scenarios, the authors state that “the first year of usage for each technology was
81 set to one, to allow comparison of trends among technologies,” which is the approach we followed in
82 our replicated analysis (Supplementary Fig. 2). For each technology, the authors equated “first year of
83 usage” with “first year since introduction,” as evident in their Fig 1b. However, in our replicated

84 analysis, we discovered that, for many technologies, the authors erroneously assumed that the first
85 nonzero value available in the source data represented the first year of *actual* technology use.

86 For example, the authors designate the first year of usage for the automobile as 1915, at which point US
87 household adoption was already 10%. However, the modern automobile was invented in the late
88 1890s, with mass production starting in the United States around 1901.²² Similarly, the authors
89 designate the first year of usage for electric power as 1908, at which point US household adoption had
90 also climbed to 10%. Yet Thomas Edison began offering electric power to customers in Manhattan over
91 two decades earlier, in 1882.²³ We found similar discrepancies for other technologies in the authors'
92 comparison pool, which are documented in Supplementary Table 2.


93 By erroneously assuming that the first available adoption number in the source data represented the
94 first year of technology availability, the authors omitted the initial low-adoption years of US market
95 availability for numerous technologies. Mathematically, these omissions biased the authors' scenarios
96 toward inaccurately steep near-term adoption trajectories in all three cases.

97 To illustrate this point, we repeated the authors' approach using more realistic values for the first year
98 of technology usage obtained from the literature,⁵⁵⁻⁸³ as summarized in Supplementary Table 2.
99 Adoption rates in the initial years were estimated using linear interpolation. We also removed three
100 duplicative entries from the authors' 40 product comparison pool (computers, refrigerators, and
101 washing machines) and NOx controls (the rapid adoption of which was driven by regulatory mandates,
102 not market demand), as noted in the table.

103 Our adjusted median, lower25, and upper75 curves are shown in Supplementary Fig. 8, which were
104 based on the best-fitting regression models for each data series. It can be seen that more realistic
105 estimates for the first year of technology use, and a more coherent comparison pool drawn from the
106 same data sources, would result in a fast scenario (i.e., upper75) with less aggressive logarithmic growth
107 and median and slow (i.e., lower25) scenario curves that are demonstrably less steep in the near term
108 than those constructed by the authors.

109 To assess how the authors' errors in their own scenario derivations affected their results, we reran our
110 replicated emissions projection once again using the adjusted Bitcoin adoption scenarios in
111 Supplementary Fig. 8. The results are plotted in Supplementary Fig. 9d. By correcting the authors' own
112 scenario analysis as the last step in the cascade of corrections we discuss, we show that their model
113 would have now projected CO₂ emissions trajectories that would not have crossed the 2°C threshold
114 until between 2075 to 2110.

115




116

117 **Supplementary Figure 8. The authors' Bitcoin adoption scenarios based on more realistic first year of**
 118 **usage estimates within the technology comparison pool.**

119

120



121

122

123 **Supplementary Figure 9: Comparison of Bitcoin CO₂ emissions projected by the Mora et al. model: (a)**
 124 **our replicated analysis showing close agreement with the authors' results; and the model's**
 125 **projections after first (b) removing unprofitable rigs in the base year, then (c) accounting for evolution**
 126 **of the electric power grid in mining locations, and finally (d) correcting errors in their stated adoption**
 127 **scenario approach.**

Supplementary Table 2. Authors' selected versus more reasonable first year of usage values for comparative technologies

Technology	Authors' assigned first year of usage (YSI = 1)	Actual first year of usage (YSI = 1)	Initial years of availability omitted by the authors
Automatic transmission	1951	1939	12
Automobile	1915	1901	14
Cable TV	1968	1948	20
Cellular phone	1994	1984	10
Central heating	1920	1892	28
Colour TV	1966	1954	12
Computer	1992	Duplicate	-
Dishwasher	1922	1922	-
Disk brakes	1966	1963	3
Dryer	1950	1938	12
Ebook reader	2009	1998	11
Electric Range	1933	1908	25
Electric power	1908	1882	26
Electronic ignition	1977	1963	14
Flush toilet	1860	1860	-
Freezer	1950	1947	3
Home air conditioning	1957	1931	26
Household refrigerator	1931	Duplicate	-
Internet	1993	1991	2
Landline	1903	1885	18
Microcomputer	1984	1984	-
Microwave	1975	1955	20
Nox pollution controls	1990	1990	-
Podcasting	2006	2003	3
Power steering	1951	1951	-
RTGS adoption	1970	1970	-
Radial tires	1972	1967	5
Radio	1925	1921	4
Refrigerator	1925	1918	7
Running water	1890	1833	57
Shipping container port inf.	1964	1955	9
Smartphone usage	2011	2000	11
Social media usage	2005	1997	8
Stove	1900	1900	-
Tablet	2010	1992	18
Vacuum	1922	1908	14
Washer	1920	1907	13
Washing machine	1930	Duplicate	-
Water Heater	1933	1904	29
Debit card	1995	1984	11

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