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On Lyrical Spectatorship: Invocation and Intermedial Encounters in the 1920s and Beyond

Author
Schneider, Simona Eva

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On Lyrical Spectatorship: Invocation and Intermedial Encounters in the 1920s and Beyond

by

Simona Eva Schneider

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of the

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Committee in charge:

Professor Anne Nesbet, Chair

Professor Judith Butler

Professor Charles Altieri

Professor Niklaus Largier

Professor Juan Nicolás Pedro Rodriguez

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Abstract

On Lyric Spectatorship: Strategies for the Cross-Cultural Encounter in Film

by

Simona Eva Schneider

Doctor of Philosophy in English

with a Designated Emphasis

in Film & Media

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Anne Nesbet, Chair

This dissertation proposes a new theoretical account of spectatorship in a lyric mode in cinema and present case studies of how media actualize self-authentic participation and imagination. My study begins with the 1920s silent cinema and traces a tradition of gestures in the video installations by contemporary artists. Drawing upon spectatorship studies, lyric theory, cultural studies, enunciation theory, theories of gender and performativity, and Frankfurt School media theory, I show how formal techniques such as apostrophe, the address of inanimate objects, and the use of deixis serve as interfaces to animate and transform the subjectivity of the spectator. I argue that this approach necessitates seeing media as "documents" for actualization, performance, translation, and adaptation. Furthermore, the lyric offers a space for self-authentic enunciation in early cinema that resurfaces as the "real" in a post-truth digital age.

Through the ethical potential of invocatory gestures found in lyric poems, this inquiry considers the historical material conjunctures at moments of their recording and projection. It takes an openness and receptivity to be central values of that which the lyric documents and generates. This project seeks to answer the invitation by reaching back towards the 1920s. The chapters hinge on Russian, Soviet readers and spectators, whose viewing practices actualize Weimar Germany and 19th century America. As the poet-spectators sought to translate their experience of watching a film into a poem or a poem into a film, they worked across languages, media, and national contexts, in what are also acts of adaptation. These new works crucially retain "lyric gestures" of address in their contingency upon their immediate environments, enlarging our awareness of immanent existential circumstances.

The resulting effects of this lyric mode in film, I argue, are the construction of a 1) collective interiority – by which I mean, a general atmosphere and tone of longing, quite often elegiac, and 2) an aspectual reflection – a play with rhyme and puns that stand in for points of contact and points of departure between the presence of the image and the absence of words, between the natural world of poetic cycles and structures and the artificial human one of narrative and history.

Poetry, which addresses things, allows us to imagine something other than an "ideal spectator," interpellated spectator. The address of an object can be an opening for people without the status of the human whether within or because outside of a particular social, cultural, or ideological system of values. It is humanizing because it recognizes speech that is not necessarily usually recognized as "human" within human speech. When objects are animated by intention (cathexis of desire and longing not personified, anthropomorphized), even the commodity becomes particular rather than something with exchange value. The stage of exchange value creates this for the commodity while pointing to the frame in order to change it from situation to circumstance, which the lyric does best. Thinking of a film as a set of objects (even the actors are objects in Brecht's epic theater) allows for crystallizations and for holding configurations. Sometimes faces hold whole configurations. However, by the last chapter, disfiguration becomes a resistant gesture. The hand over the face.

for my parents
and for the Benjamins

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Prelude

I don't think one is always predisposed towards poetry; the whole notion of distinguishing and, if you will, labeling things is not a matter of defining them so much as a matter of giving a clue to the frame of mind which you bring to them. In other words, what are you going to be watching as this unrolls? What are you going to be listening for? If you're watching for what happens, you might not get the point of some of the retardations because they're concerned with how it happens.

—Maya Deren "Poetry and Film: A Symposium"[1]

During a panel called "Poetry and the Film" held in New York at Cinema 16 on October 28, 1953, Willard Maas, who moderated, opened the session by saying that the name of the panel is ambiguous. No doubt, much of the title's ambiguity can be attributed to the conjunction in the title that creates a paratactic relation between two media. Furthermore, both media employ parataxis, the placement of clauses or phrases side by side without subordination, as a fundamental compositional strategy. In pointing out the ambiguity, Mass invited each of the panel members to comment upon aspects that connected both media. The panelists each came to the question from different angles: Maya Deren, the quintessential experimental filmmaker and doyenne of the New York avant-garde known for films in which she plays the protagonist, proposed a spatial metaphor, arguing that film has "horizontal" and "vertical" dimensions.

The "vertical" plumbs the depths of mood and feeling, while the horizontal corresponds with narrative progress. While this study finds Deren's intervention compelling, it further insists that these moments operate counterintuitively in that the periodic vertical action of lyric expression creates a horizontal basis for relation rather than the hierarchical set of meanings the allegory offers. Arthur Miller, the playwright with growing ties to Hollywood, sees the two media as having what he calls a "physiological" similarity co-extensive with dreaming. Importantly, he also points to the absence of the Greek chorus and its comment on the action in modern drama, suggesting that this position is taken up otherwise, in the dramatic action but also in the spectator. Dylan Thomas, the Welsh poet who also wrote screenplays, mined his memory and offered an intuitive sense of poetry in film from his childhood viewing of UFA (Universum Film-Aktien Gesellschaft) films. Parker Tyler, a scholar of underground cinema, emphasizes montage and "creating ideas through images." These responses serve as one overview of ways of approaching the conjuncture of cinema and poetry. The symposium title invites each of the participants to express the points of similarity in the two media. This project accepts Maas' invitation to consider this question.

The present study investigates and proposes to look in further detail at that which Deren's observation intimates—that watching poetry in film requires an attentiveness to not only the poetics of making but the poetics of watching and listening for small openings.

[1] Willard Maas, "Poetry and the Film: A Symposium," *Film Culture*, no. 29 (1963): 56.

Introduction

Within these pages, I offer a methodology of lyrical spectatorship by following compelling examples of those who read and view other works with an attention to specific tropes of the lyric: gestures, arrangements, modes of address, and the encounters they produce. As poems and filmmakers, they translated, mediated, and interpreted these readings into films and poems hinging upon their lyrical aspects. It is my hope that my own work functions as a translation and that it proves as imaginative, creative, and analytical in response to theirs as theirs have been in response to the works they interpret through art. In the spirit of seeing them as a "real translation," I look through the lens of the translator at the "original" and offer yet another translation into critical language.[2] As Walter Benjamin writes in "Task of the Translator" (1921-1923), his introduction to a German edition of Charles Baudelaire's *Tableaux Parisiens* (1861)*,*

> A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more fully.[3]

A lyrical spectatorship can negotiate between these two positions, in questioning what occurs in the encounter between the "ideal reader" and an alternative, even if imaginative, one.

For spectatorship studies, Judith Mayne has advocated that a certain amount of self-awareness of one's role as "ideal spectator" when faced with the institution of film as it intersects with one's role. This role is carved out through personal engagements in response to broader social and historical institutions would serve the profession. In many ways, it is the tension and negotiation between these roles that lyric spectatorship engages.

> The recognition that we are all complicitous [with the position of the "ideal reader/spectator" the text seeks to make us into] to some extent (and the 'some' is clearly what needs to be investigated) does not mean that alternative positions are impossible. Rather, that recognition would make it possible to speak of readership or spectatorship not as the knowledge the elite academic brings to the people, nor as a coded language that can only be deciphered by experts, but as a mode of encounter."[4]

Mayne goes on to say that this encounter can occur between the researcher-interpreter-scholar responsible for "decoding" the "ideal" and those "empirical subjects" that the researcher is studying who offer the researcher divergences and detours to stand in for her own. In a sense, I am studying "empirical" spectators who put themselves at precisely these crossroads. They know they are

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[2] This method dovetails with recent moves in adaptation studies away from matters of summation against the standard of fidelity to the original and become more interested in seeing adaptations as iterations within their historical context. In particular, see Glenn Jellenik, "The Task of the Adaptation Critic," in *Adaptation in Visual Culture: Images, Texts, and Their Multiple Worlds*, ed. Julie Grossman and R. Barton Palmer (Springer, 2017), 37–53. The turn appears throughout the edited volume.

[3] Walter Benjamin, *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926*, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2004), 260.

[4] Judith Mayne, *Cinema and Spectatorship* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 86.

complicitous in the spectacle's interpellation and yet prime themselves to see and offer oblique alternatives, alas, more and less bleak within their various historical contexts. In expressing and performing their readership, they show how the initial text already paved the way for their interventions through what I identify as a lyric mode.

In this sense, these empirical spectators are examples of "emancipated" spectators that respond to works through their attentiveness to and re-performance of lyric gestures. This activity is not wholly opposed to receiving dogmatic messages intended to set them free (as in Brecht's conception of the epic theater). These gestures often invoke the one presumed not able to hear, absent, or the non-human. They risk their sanity, their own status as a person under the going definitions—the need to be recognized by another human at the going rate—by talking across languages; they wager, anyway, that their calls will be heard.

Taking hearing momentarily as a metaphor, it offers an important challenge, too, to the binary between passive and active spectators. We say "passive listening," but we hear things all the time without intending, which seems to render that formulation redundant. Yet, it is a less common cliché, at the least, to be invested, to believe what one hears, than it is to believe what we see. In his polemic against the artificial binary between "passive" and "active spectator, *The Emancipated Spectator* (2016), Jacques Rancière writes,

> The spectator also acts, like the pupil or scholar. She observes, selects, compares, interprets. She links what she sees to a host of other things that she has seen on other stages, in other kinds of place. She composes her own poem with the elements of the poem before her. She participates in the performance by refashioning it in her own way [5]

Rancière deliberately invokes an art form outside the theater and cinema that itself foregrounds the act of expression because he is most interested in the emancipation that arises from reconfiguring and indeed performing what and how one sees. The lyrical spectator is neither active nor passive in this sense; they are an actor who moves through the medium as if it were a landscape with prominent lookouts communicating with other "forests of signs" (Baudelaire) and sensorially fertile valleys. He asserts that the spectator mixes contrasting modes of discourse, lyric and narrative, placing the poem that the spectator writes and the story that she tells together in paratactic sequence (for those are two different "sciences"—lyricology and narratology; words and "storyworlds)."[6]

Rancière's argument promotes the participatory gesture of composition and the *act* of expression. This stance is different from either endorsing leaving one's distance as spectator to participate in the energies and actions underway (Artaud) or emphasizing the distance of standing outside as a judge to feel empowered to participate in society more ethically outside the theater (Brecht). For Rancière, both models continue a tradition of thinking of the theater as a "self-suppressing medium," which purely reproduces the gap that it is meant to suppress in its mediation. Even if we read this process as dialectical, we miss understanding the formation of an immanent community, because we miss ourselves in the picture just as we miss the picture that must, by these dialectical models, always be overcome. The lyric, then, is an immanent picture of a relation—it is a composite of two positions

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[5] Jacques Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2011), 13.

[6] Storyworlds is becoming the favored term for transmedial fiction, those texts that include the franchises of the initial story in merchandise and in other media as well as texts that can include fan feedback and fan fiction. See Ryan and Thon 2014.

and the gaps between them. They are preserved not as things to be overcome but as a measure of the world, specifically of its desire, through its "translation and countertranslation" without an attitude of hierarchies.[7] A lyric embraces the distance necessitated by absence, whether it be physical or metaphysical (as in the opacity of the other) and registers that distance through desire; as such, it speaks by interweaving two places at once through the two acts, composing and performing.

Rancière has in mind that composing is a deliberate, meditative, and usually solitary act of arranging elements. In contrast, the act of expressing requires a shared presence in two places at once—the time of the event and the time of its relation, which thus immanently coincide in the now. Like William Wordsworth, perhaps, whose now well-worn "spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling recollected in tranquility" from the preface to *Lyrical Ballads* (1798) still functions if our imagination of relative somatic tranquility includes the movie theater. In Rancière's account, a spectator composes a poem when watching a film. That small gesture is a kind of resistance and activity to combat long-held notions of the spectator as passive and the maker as master. If we take Wordsworth's "power feelings" to include "the daily shocks and conflicts of civilization,"[8] it is also a way of mediating but staying alive, rather than numb, to such shocks. He wields his theory against the too readily accepted identification of seeing with passivity, and theater with community, and similarly the binary oppositions of collective and individual, image and living reality, and self-possession and alienation.

I would add to his list of false oppositions ones from the ongoing discussion in film about the categories of documentary and fiction, which have fostered a quixotic search for mechanisms that "access" or "transmit" unmediated reality. The paradox of privileging one technique over the other becomes obvious when juxtaposing similarly vehement claims about the truth value of the long, observational shot of slow cinema, on the one hand, and its opposite in terms of movement and foregrounding of the presence of the camera, the handheld camera of cinema verité. The paradox of the debate has led to self-awareness and techniques foregrounding precisely that artifice of mediated facticity or the "claim to the real" through a range of techniques.[9] A description of that which one sees opens up the possibility of studying the points of touch between these binaries through the mechanisms of art and invention and to new alignments and overlapping relations to the real—the realms that hold our attention or distract us, rendering this binary inoperative as well.

The lyric comes alive through its expression and engages the spectator, not upon a predetermined or agreed upon moral or ethical conceit but rather by allowing the subject (or object) to be recognized as a desiring being. It welcomes a recognition of the facility by which words mean through the rendering, the failure of mimesis to communicate the focus of attention. These moments of failure might be termed moments of innervated distraction (in the emotional sense) when the shared figures

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[7] Jacques Rancière, *Film Fables*, trans. Emiliano Battista, Translation edition (London ; New York: Berg Publishers, 2006), 20.

[8] Walter Benjamin, *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 4: 1938–1940*, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2006), 21.

[9] For more discussion about binaries and their claims to objectivity and naturalism, see Minh-Ha 1990, 80. For a discussion of post-reality debates see Minh-Ha, "Documentary Is/Not a Name"; Erika Balsom, "The Reality-Based Community," *E-Flux*, no. 83 (June 2017), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/83/142332/the-reality-based-community/. Balsom's provocative opening, "Have you heard that reality has collapsed?" draws the age-old debate together with the timely challenge that "fake news" poses to our ability to believe in certain media's relation to reality. She argues that in view of the possibility that fake news can "make" the new reality, empiricism, film as evidence, and some Enlightenment values deserve a second thought

of attention become dispersed and reenter a plurality of self-aware community through this *shared* dispersion of attention by which each spectator-viewer has some part of a puzzle.[10]

The debate over "who owns the lyric," reborn with the turn of this century, occurs in tandem with debates about who owns poetry, what is considered a "good poem" and the boisterous and incomplete imperative to include minority voices in the academy, particularly in English Departments. In a paper entitled "After the Critique of Lyric" (2008) on the "New Lyric Studies" for a special section of the PMLA Journal, Rei Terada rounds up the papers presented at the 2006 convention and describes the "present maturity of lyric studies." In her summation, this state of affairs arose when papers took connections between the lyric and other media and forms "for granted." She writes, "The lyric zone of electrification is dissipating along with belief in the autonomy of the lyric object and in the specialness of the lyric mode."[11] In her summation, it is as if the lyric object itself protested its hermeticism through its very nature: "Hermeneutic descriptions of the disunity of the lyric object prepare the […] generic openness, since the momentum of such descriptions carries beyond lyric as a genre and beyond literature altogether."[12] Part of the "electrification" remains, however, though in a more productive if just as contested form, in an identification of a lyric, a mode or a circumstance [13] that exceeds the object itself, but out of which the object nonetheless is able to emerge.

Much work has been done in New Lyric Studies to show how, far from being exceptional and residing at an exceptional distance, lyric has a genealogy in other "media" or written forms and genres, and is continuous with them. Virginia Jackson's historicization of the lyric and her notion that the 20th century has seen a "lyricization of poetry" introduces a necessary corrective—it also provides an opening. Her scholarship has pointed out how the lyric can itself be an allegorical way of reading, an artificial genre title bestowed upon poems that are deemed lyric as a mark of transcendent quality by an exclusive elite (the accusation against New Criticism). Jackson's solution is to radically historicize upon which various supports and within what contexts that which we now think of purely as lyric was composed and performed.[14] Jackson's approach could eliminate genre distinction entirely, except that the editors responsible for this process also have a range of conventions in mind. If the lyric is not generally mimetic, it might be mimetic of the lyric before it, for instance. For Jackson, the implication of this historicization is to question the lyric as a category and to be skeptical of the ways in which the category imposes a single "ideal" form on a diversity of media, in Jackson's case on Emily Dickinson's letters.

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[10] "Distraction is related to the expression of two planes of language represented simultaneously or alternately, the plane of the subject in a here-and-now, or discourse, and the plane of an absent or nonperson in another time, elsewhere, or story"Margaret Morse, "An Ontology of Everyday Distraction: The Freeway, The Mall and Television," in *Virtualities: Television, Media Art, and Cyberculture* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998), 110.; "Fragments of a vessel that are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way a translation, instead of imitating the sense of the original, must lovingly and in detail incorporate the original's way of meaning, thus making both the original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part of a vessel" Benjamin, *SW 1*, 260. Edouard Glissant's metaphor of a tapestry of interwoven, opaque threads is also a beautiful version, even if the traumatized and precarious aspects of each thread are less immediately recognizable Edouard Glissant, *Poetics of Relation*, trans. Betsy Wing (1990; repr., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

[11] Rei Terada, "After the Critique of Lyric," *PMLA* 123, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 196.

[12] Ibid., 195-6.

[13] Dominique Rabaté, *Figures du sujet lyrique* (Paris, France: Presses universitaires de France, 1996).

[14] Virginia Jackson, *Dickinson's Misery: A Theory of Lyric Reading* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013).

On the other hand, Culler endorses Ralph Cohen's "process theory of genre," which takes into account historical transformations of the genre "while appreciating continuities." This study takes the difficult but adamant stance that these two views, often seen as diametrically opposed, are indeed reconcilable. One can concede Jackson and Prins' points and yet still agree that the lyric is a transtemporal mode if not category. In fact, Jackson and Prins' arguments show us how other media can be lyric, and their lyric aspects can be underlined by a reading practice that focuses on the salient transtemporal qualities of the lyric.

As an afterthought which I would like to take as fundamental, Culler adds that the lyric genre is actually constructed by poets who constantly innovate on pre-existing forms precisely to create a sense of authenticity because of the insufficiency of rote or dead modes of expression to *relay* "real" subjective experience in the present. In the first and second chapters, we see how this relay from a pre-existing form to an innovation literally adds color and other senses impossible within the media specificity of the black and white, silent world of the early film. Nonetheless, if it "enhances" these moments in a quite self-determinedly long lyric poem (a libretto), it does so by taking the relay from desires gestured at in the medium.

In the chapters that follow, there are similarly two intertwined moves. One is to identify lyric gestures and mise-en-scène in film as quasi-allegorical moves that deflate the transcendental necessity of allegory and the authority and authenticity it promises. The second is to see how their performance (and the particular assets and limitations of the media of their performance) shapes mimetic lyric expressions in film.

Genre or Mode?: Lyricism, the Lyrical, and the lyric not as a genre of film but as a mode of watching

I do not wish to say that lyric is a genre of film[15], a claim that would be difficult to make since the lyric might be considered a "weak" genre or even an anti-genre. The lyric can be an incursion on another genre, and something may be lyric through an amalgamation of qualities or family resemblances, and thus the lyric can be considered an adjective describing a film as a mode within a

[15] One previous definition of "The Lyrical Film," a pronounced *genre* of film, is P. Adams Sitney's in *Visionary Film*. His describes an avant-garde tradition he locates as having begun with Stan Brakhage and is quite literally about the film being made by a poet, writing, albeit with light, in the first person: "The lyrical film postulates the film-maker behind the camera as the first-person protagonist of the film. The images of the film are what he sees, filmed in such a way that we never forget his presence and we know how he is reacting to his vision. In the lyrical form there is no longer a hero; instead, the screen is filled with movement, and that movement, both of the camera and the editing, reverberates with the idea of a person looking. As viewers we see this mediator's intense experience of seeing." This description stands true for even Dr. Mabuse. One difference here is that we still have a hero, or an anti-hero. We also still apparently have a plot and representational objects. The other is in the shift towards lyric spectators. What do we see that is in line and out of line with the director. What completes the circuit of the lyric? Sitney writes that Brakhage's films work with flattened space like Abstract Expressionist Painting. This development makes it an interesting parallel development from Mabuse's Realist Expressionist strand and use the lyric mode. For Sitney also uses the term "lyrical mode" and by that in the context of Brakhage he means: "Finally, the film-maker working in the lyrical mode affirms the actual flatness and whiteness of the screen, rejecting for the most part its traditional use as a window into illusion," P. Adams Sitney, *Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde, 1943-2000* (1974; repr., Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 160.

genre. In my overall study of the *lyric mode*[16] in film, I look at the way film can employ lyric tropes such as apostrophe and deixis as means to establish a particular kind of authenticity that goes beyond the indexical truth of the photographic medium and becomes ever more relevant in the era digital. The lyric is a mode in film that acknowledges the audience as a potential "you who emerges" without the fetishistic desire that comes with the omniscient and protected position because in relation. In this case, a figure on-screen simultaneously performs its embodied objectivity-as-objecthood and absence. It holds a space for the viewer but makes space for them as what we might call an "écouteur."[17] It holds a position and affect, an objective correlative to the spectator's. In the case of the crystal, that object is seemingly limpid but is actually opaque and self-reflective, a starting point for encounters with the self in the present of story, history, and expectation. With "lyric spectatorship," I offer a lyric mode of film and a poet's position of watching that is neither spectator nor viewer. The crystal is its metaphor and objective correlative.

The lyric mode proposes to understand what occurs to the spectator as a series of metaphors (that which "carries over") rather than as allegory (or "speaking otherwise"). Like the actor, the small word "as" and its imaginative expansion into "as if" allows the spectator to travel on a hinge between the world on screen and a circumstance from their own lived experience in which a similar set of emotions operated or were suppressed.

"Lyrical" has been used as a modifier to emphasize a particular quality of genres not necessarily considered "lyrics" such as the ballad or the ode that over time those other genres, and even other media, have become part of the history of the lyric and contributed to its defining features. I do not significantly distinguish between lyric and lyrical as both can be used as adjectives, and poetry is also sometimes interchangeable. William Wordsworth's (and Coleridge's) "Lyrical Ballads," an experiment that sought "to ascertain how far the language of conversation in the middle and lower classes of society is adapted to the purpose of poetic pleasure."[18] Their project is very similar to Miriam Hansen's "Vernacular Modernism" as she finds films that incorporate and even celebrate modernity in their own vernacular rather than nostalgically seek a more "classical" past. May this project take itself as equally experimental without the classism, though the changing relationship of lyric to class is certainly relevant to the unfolding history of film and reflected in the works I discuss here. Admittedly, in Wordsworth and Coleridge, poetic and lyric are used more or less interchangeably. Lyricism has a mottled history that can be pejorative when the lyric is misinterpreted as an ahistorical category or used instrumentally to signify quality. It is particularly on these false uses of the term that I wish to put pressure in my readings.

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[16] On modes (by contrast with genres), Alastair Fowler writes, "a mode announces itself by distinct signals, even if these are abbreviated, unobtrusive, or below the threshold of modern attention. The signals may be of a wide variety: a characteristic motif, perhaps; a formula; a rhetorical proportion or quality." Alastair Fowler, *Kinds of Literature - An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes* (1982; repr., Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2002), 107. Part of Fowler's distinction draws on the difference between a genre name used as a noun or an adjective, the adjective being used most often for modes. We see this principle at work in numerous reviews by members of the popular press wherein specific films (especially independent or world cinema) are described as "lyrical." Lyric is itself an adjective for something lyre-like or song-like and lyrical is a secondary adjective that has come generally to mean musical.

[17] I propose this word hesitantly as its form echoes that of the "voyeur" but so, too, does "auditeur," which, because of the "English" auditor, sounds both more passive and financial. "Écouteur" also means "an earphone" in French, a reminder of the apparatus itself and the false objectivity of even that apparatus, which picks up specific registers and frequencies depending on the maker's target source.

[18] William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Lyrical Ballads*, ed. Michael Schmidt, 1st edition (London: Penguin Classics, 2007).

Then why offer the more specific genre term "lyric" when "poetic" has been in use to describe for cinema since it was claimed for rather different film traditions in the 1960s by Pier Paolo Pasolini and Stan Brakhage, among others? Pasolini famously coined the phrase "Cinema of Poetry" at a conference in the '60s, adamantly distinguishing it from Brakhage's and other's experimental American cinema by making sure to underscore that he had in mind narrative rather than avant-garde poetry.[19] Not to mention, there is a robust tradition of early silent films that advertise their own status as "dramatic poems" and take pre-existing poems as their structure. For example, take *Mania: The Story of a Cigarette Factory Worker* (Eugen Illés, DE 1918)*, A Man There Was* (Victor Sjöjström, SW 1920), and *A Fool There Was* (Frank Powell, US 1915), based on a Rudyard Kipling poem, the last of which was a blockbuster in its day.

Outline of chapters

The first chapter takes seriously the notion of the document as a category separate from the filmic genre of the documentary to propose a way of considering authenticity that applies to fiction, documentary, and perhaps most relevantly to those many films that fall in-between. The indexical status of the photographic image, traditionally what gives documentary a "veridical stamp"[20] of evidentiary authenticity, takes on a figurative meaning in the lyric mode, focusing more on the absence of the thing pointed towards rather than the proof that it is there. Reading how analysis of Fritz Lang's *Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler* (1922) has tended to attempt to "decode" the allegory of the film or find a premonition in the repressed psychological trauma of Germany between the two world wars, I find that some viewers instead see the film as a contemporaneous document.

One contemporaneous viewer, a queer Russian poet, Mikhail Kuzmin saw the film and imagined an Orphic speaker. Traveling into the film, as if it were hell (through what Lang called the lens of "the power of evil"), Kuzmin proposes what the film might look like through the power of love by focalizing on the main love interest. Though I do propose uncovering some repressed desires, the main thrust of my readings is in locating moments that open up to the particular reader and invite them to participate through its gestures of invitation, de-framing the theatrical context, and apostrophes that prove more open than Mabuse's interpellations. In doing so, as Kuzmin shows, the film pens a world that is yet unwritten rather than pre-ordained within the "hell" that Mabuse creates. Kuzmin and his orphic speaker motivate a "queer" reading of Mabuse's visual fixations at the same time as he brings his belief in platonic anamnesis into a strange but productive encounter within the Plato's cave of the movie theater, further challenging the project of a search for an original, ideal, or fully stable subject-object-spectator of desire. The fluidity of media allows for subtle shifts under the shock of the spectacle. The lyric self-consciously draws attention to the medium's material limitations through the use of deixis in the service of media transcendence. In this sense, it paves the way for digital acts of authenticity, which I will explore in the conclusion. It is a way of speaking that also cedes its place in a kind of self-effacement and deferral towards the other to whom it speaks.

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[19] P. Adams Sitney, *The Cinema of Poetry*, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Patrick Rumble and Bart Testa, eds., *Pier Paolo Pasolini: Contemporary Perspectives*, 1 edition (Toronto ; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1994); Pier Paolo Pasolini, *Heretical Empiricism*, 2nd English ed. edition (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, LLC, 2005).

[20] Michael Renov, ed., *Theorizing Documentary*, AFI Film Readers (New York: Routledge, 1993), 29.

While the poet performs such possibility through invocatory gestures and mise-en-scene but also through figuration in the first chapter, this occurs primarily through the film's own apostrophe and figuration in the second. In both chapters, it occurs through the display of media's limits, its own inability to reach out, touch, coerce, grasp, and fix. However, it also raises the stakes of such gestures, and the resonances between Kuzmin's invitation and John Keats' "This Living Hand" allow us to consider the ethics of fixation, animation, and the interrelational authenticity that the lyric announces in lieu of reified authenticity and the hierarchical authority in the exchange value of the allegorical.

The second chapter stays with the previous chapter's texts to consider the role of the performance and the actor and of the mise en scène. The actor's withholding of any trace of consciousness (Mill and Metz) of the spectator in tandem with the intimate mise en scène that lyric requires serve to evoke theater within the cinematic, both to foreground the ideology of the apparatus and suggest that the historical context, while very much the situation at hand, is also but a set for the affective circumstance. These elements shape the lyric spectator's ability to participate in the world at hand. Through ways of identifying the lyric as that which occurs in a closed room, as "overheard," I compare these qualities with the definitions of spectacle, exhibitionist film, and the conceptions within enunciation theory of the ways that films "communicate" to juxtapose these with the lyric utterance. The chapter further considers how the lyric can itself function within the logic of allegory (a seeming oxymoron or contradiction in terms) in the way that the lyric can be an arrangement of the world into a set of immanent relations and a crystallization and at the same time a *mise-en-abîme* of that world that de-frames. The main act of the lyric, then, becomes self-authentication through the workings and operation of epideixis. Rather than relying on the photographic medium's indexicality, it uses deixis (pointing) to call into question the status of the real through the values it manifests.

Finally, I look at the way the figure is used within the film alongside the use of stereotypes and archetypes and suggest it is used in the same manner as the technique of apostrophe in lyric poetry. In the scene of a lyric performance (a man playing a lute to two women) re-performed in dada-esque style wherein a crystal carafe stands in for the spectator. The crystal materializes as a metaphor (like the window, mirror, and frame) for a reading of the cinema as a crystallization and invocation with the help of Kuzmin's last lines. Even if the "actor," like the speaker of the poem, is in control of the lyric utterance, the address and the act of self-translation between languages (German, English, Russian, and even Arabic) and between media, even if they cannot ultimately be shared, makes express that it longs to be heard and thus reveals a vulnerability—a dependence upon the world of aspectual resemblance and fleeting but constantly renewed recognition. I follow up on the question of the actor as spectator in the video supplement that serves as my chapter four.

Something of this friction-filled version exists within Lang's film. Esfir Shub and S. M. Eisenstein's re-edit of the film, which survives only in screenplay form, provides a further test case for the idea that mise en scène can be as temporally and interpretively open as editing.[21] Their re-edit is allegorical and ideological, attempting to conform the film specifically to Soviet ideology. However, that attempt inevitably exceeds its intention. Their edit dismisses Dr. Mabuse as a central character

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[21] The title, *Golden Putrefaction* or *Gilded Rot* (*Pozolochennaia gnil'*, Позолоченная гниль), was actually the same as the subtitle of another film, Vladislav Starevich's *Sashka-naezdnik* (1917) Alexandr Deryavin, "Introduction to Guilded Rot. Screenplay in 6 Acts. (Позолоченная Гниль. Кино-Пьеса в 6-Ти Частях)," *Kinovedcheskie Zapiski* 58 (2002), http://www.kinozapiski.ru. Deryavin suggests that there was an ongoing theme of drugs as a corrupting force in the West in Soviet film. In one film with a screenplay by Osip Brik called *Opium* (1929), opium-smokers are connected with religion rendering Karl Marx's famous dictum into the plot of the film.

pulling all of the strings and focuses on the lived time of the corruption the film displays as ongoing in the west. This case study will return as a limit case against which to test this chapter's hypothesis.

Chapter Three expands the gestures of invocation in chapter three to the realm of montage and anaphora. Dziga Vertov's film *A Sixth Part of the World* follows Walt Whitman's *Salut au monde* in its desire to catalogue activities and nations. The film culminates in the opaque and non-human figure of the icebreaker "Lenin." This metaphor for the type of personhood necessitated in new Soviet works upon the physical characteristics of the ship, its double "skin" between which the "exterior" environment echoes and comingles with the "interior" hold of the ship. The frozen screen or layer between them must crack to become passable, turning viewer and viewed into one continuum and one fluid nation. Thus, reading Vertov against his own insistence on a mechanical-eye that offers an objective perspective, I argue that in *A Sixth Part of the World* (1926), the anaphoric structure of address without definitive beginnings and endings of lines doubles the direction of the address and vacillates ambiguously between the subjective gazes of the people in the image. The voice of the communist state apparatus supposedly gathers them together under one nation even as the scenes of encounter occur in so many elsewheres. Vertov's film shows that the collisions occur between two different imaginaries. Vertov uses Walt Whitman's Transcendentalist lyric, what Helen Vendler has called his address to an "invisible listener," the "reader in futurity,"[22] as a means of apostrophizing a new Soviet unity in plurality through the metaphor of the icebreaker. Vertov replaces Whitman with an Icebreaker.

Both the film and the poem make a similar attempt at epic scale and objectivity through the rhetorical tool of the catalogue that results rather in a complicity between subjective and objective, or the newly forming American or capitalist apparatus, driven to create an imaginary of a global community through both the rhythms of diverse rituals and networks of trade routes. Via industrialization, specifically along the routes of the railroad and steamship, the global public is formed as marketplace. The readership or, in cinematic modernity, the spectatorship of either poem or film, constitutes an entity willing and able to take a shape that contains the voices of all the characters through the perspective of an appraising camera whose viewpoint is similarly opaque. The opacity of the final identification in both cases emphasizes the uncertainty, precarity, and fleeting nature of subject formation. In the first, this identity lies not only with an icebreaker but also with the breaking ice, and the second case, with natural elements that constitute and dissolve just as quickly, such as vapor and winds. Though the camera eye may be objective, editing renders it immediately subjective in relation to the images around it as the lyric spectator relates the image to an order of events, a network of gazes, or that render it contingent and relative.

A video portrait, *Georgia in Twelve Acts* (submitted as a supplementary file), presents practice-based research in the form of a film that further explores the concerns about acting and translation in Chapter Two. This video portrait of the actress Georgia Moll, who played a translator in Jean-Luc Godard's *Contempt* (*Le Mépris* 1963), and of the personae she embodied in life and in art, function as a **fourth chapter**. In creating this moving image portrait, I take into account the way the "portrait" in chapter one serves as "larger than life" and can still accommodate a form of question and response. In that film, the translator is transparent, crucial to the plot, graphic (in the subtitles), aural, embodied, and emotionally opaque. The film unsettles the assumed derivative or secondary status as Moll sometimes "translates" before the line has been spoken. Conceived of as a portrait of

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[22] Helen Vendler, *Invisible Listeners: Lyric Intimacy in Herbert, Whitman, and Ashbery* (Princeton University Press, 2005), 1.

a lyrical spectator or to provoke the spectator to see character as facets of the actor and participant in the movies, the video is made in the spirit of practice-based research and coproduction. It moves through eras in different media (black and white photography, film, VHS, and digital) by spending time with Moll in her home and in landscapes where personal memory and historical significance are intertwined. The female characters Georgia played, as flat, archetypical, and exoticized as they often were, begin to be rounded out by her particular life and qualities. As "her life" is presented subjectively though clearly directed at a particular addressee (the filmmaker, in English), there is no attempt at objectivity, omniscience, or exhaustiveness. The fictional elements from her films themselves become memories continuous with others. Newspaper clippings also incorporate events in her private life. One intention of the film was to presents clips from her films as well as new scenes to marry her voice to the images but not necessarily the content of that voice to the content of the images. Georgia's voice was often dubbed in her Italian films, and she claims her accent is neither Italian nor German but "her own;" that her voice is "foreign" in every language. In seeing the actress at different times in her life, we also get the sense that there is no original Moll. Throughout and inseparable from her particular trajectory, a set of values emerges.

The anti-genre of the 'essay film' frames the video's 'genre' and makes a distinction between lyric mode and the category of the essay film, for which it could be mistaken.[23] The video revisits films that Moll was in based on an encounter with her. In the camera's invocation of her, the apparatus is also invoked through the re-performance and decontextualization of the third-person narratives and dialogue of her characters and her persona as an actress. In this process, there is a self-reflection on the part of the apparatus on the act and desire of spectating at the same time as Moll acts as a subjective lens that intercepts, redirects, and recontextualizes such desires within her own narrative.

In as much as the lyric is associated with subjective voicing, we must make a distinction between the "Essay Film," also known for its subjective voice, and the "lyric mode in film," though they share many qualities. In describing the essay film, Timothy Corrigan has written about the difference between the essay and the lyric, strangely grouping the lyric with the narrative by virtue of representation and coherent subjectivity: "Whereas representational practices such as those of the novel or lyric poetry, generally speaking, recuperate and organize public space through the finished frameworks of a coherent and determining subjectivity, essays tend willingly, and often aggressively, to undermine or disperse that very subjectivity as it becomes subsumed in the world it explores."[24] Here Corrigan attempts to distinguish the essay from the lyric. But the lyric has its own form of unmaking the subject and un-finishing the frame, for example, through its address to another, it opens the frame, sometimes inviting another voice into the same poem.

In the 20th century, but certainly, historically as well, the lyric did not necessarily offer a single subjectivity. When Sappho's speaker calls for Aphrodite in "Ode to Aphrodite," she doesn't just address Aphrodite or report what Aphrodite told her but rather allows Aphrodite to speak and

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[23] Of essay films about actors, *The Three Disappearances of Soad Hosni* (2011, dir. Rania Stephan, Egypt) most uses a lyric mode combining various dialogue from the films Soad Hosni acted in to invoke recurrent themes without voiceover commentary from the director. *From the Journals of Jean Seberg* (1995), *Rock Hudson's Home Movies* (1992), and *I, Dalio* (2015), in particular, of Mark Rappaport's films all have some lyric aspects although the essayistic predominates. For instance, the made-up journals from the point-of-view of Seberg communicate the actress' subjective voice on her own life and work but employ direct address of the camera and are interested in more discursive, persuasive messaging. *The Shipwrecker* (Der Havarist) dir. Wolf-Eckart Bühler, 1984, West Germany) uses a similar technique of having an actor read (in this case real) memoirs but without the direct address and is more successfully lyric.

[24] Timothy Corrigan, *The Essay Film: From Montaigne, After Marker*, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19.

address her in turn: "Who is now abusing you, Sappho? Who is/Treating you cruelly?" before offering principles about love that stress reciprocity and balance:

> For if she flees, soon she will pursue.
> If she refuses gifts, rather will she give them.
> If she does not love, soon she will love
> even unwilling.[25]

Whether this is "ventriloquism" or serving as a "proxy" (activities that potentially extend the lyric), the initial subjectivity entails a splitting of the subject in order to comfort and have some distance from the self. It is an attempt to embody an objective view on the "I," the lyric has its own form of unmaking the subject, by process of twinning (or doubling) and then by twining in song. In other words, there is a subsuming and absorption but with a difference intact. The sense of the speaker's subjectivity is troubled by the very organization of the world that they attempt and the subsequent overwhelming nature of that world on the subject. There is a joining of subject and world that dissolves the speaking subject into a relation of gesture, expression, and process and then the return via sovereignty of interpretation. This multi-faceted interface with the world is similar to that of the essay.

In Corrigan, the "Essay Film," through its elaboration, becomes a distinct anti-genre that troubles the boundaries of other genres, with characteristics such as the filmmaker's addition of a discursive voice-over and/or exploration through the idiosyncratic editing logic that follows a focused topic such that an argument or proposition emerges. Corrigan has made a valiant attempt at avoiding definition and rather claims his chapters "act out specific engagements in my experience of certain films and intellectual positions."[26] In the first person, he admits that "[w]riting about the essayistic and essay films requires, I found, more self-consciousness than is typical of scholarly and historical writing."[27] Both lyric and essay might be said to resist genre definition equally through the associative freedom and necessity of first-person engagement.

My project to experiment with the lyric mode resonates with the latest approaches to recognizing and reading "essay films," which self-consciously point out that the genre is an anti-genre, a combination of different genres and media. I read lyric as inherently liminal, in-between, polyvalent, and interested in creating relation between discourses, most notably by questioning and emptying evaluations that cultural narratives can provide to leave empty space around them for reassessing. In addition, there are technical forms poetry does love, such as indirect address, iteration, and cyclicality that aid in the aforementioned endeavor and which I will call lyric when they do.

Finally, reading Moll's oeuvre of films lyrically does not efface their narrative characteristics; after all, lyric poems tell stories, too. Rather, I argue, it is a change in accent from situations to circumstances. When the lyric arises, however ephemerally, it might be in an indirect address, a polyvalent, or a misdirected signifier. But these moments can have a profound effect, unsettling the narrative premise of a film and drawing attention to an audience that is not so much implied or anticipated as it is invited to see otherwise. Even within its resistance to being genericized, the lyric shares many qualities with the essay inasmuch as they are both associated with subjective voicing. Much of the lyric's resistance to genre-fication (most certainly a type of gentrification, where the text's value goes

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[25] Sappho, *If not, winter: fragments of Sappho*, trans. Anne Carson (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 5.
[26] Ibid., 9.
[27] Ibid., 8.

up once it is recognized solidly–such is the argument against New Criticism) comes from the insubordination of individuals rising up against categorization, delimitation, and fixation.

A **concluding chapter** follows the notion of disfiguration as crystallization in the "after effects" (the "post") of lyric seeing and overhearing into the digital. I consider how the lyric denaturalizes both the landscape and the face in a digital, global context where indexicality is always in question and authenticity, though even more highly sought after, is clearly an effect. The poet-spectator's ethical responsibility is to invoke the past in the reframing of community with respect to ecological crisis and ongoing local and proxy wars in the Middle East. Through Jalal Toufic and Franz Fanon's summation of the ethical imperatives of the poet and filmmaker towards the past and tradition especially in contradistinction to nationalisms of all kinds, I read the disfiguration in these works as a continuation of the projects in the main body of the dissertation to host a community through a plurality of lyrical spectators.

In the first thread I tease out a displaced return to political ecologies I raise in the third chapter with Vertov in John Akomfrah's *Nine Muses* (2010), "a 'sorrow song' or 'song cycle'" wherein the German Romantic trope of the *Rückenfigur* (figure seen from behind) is invoked through Afro-Caribbean migrant bodies who face away from the camera to whiteouts and ice in a melting Alaska. The Pan-Africanism of Serfaty's world merges with blackness as a theory in the white northern landscape that signifies to the ex-slave both as freedom and radical alterity. The landscape and soundscape function as opacities interwoven with the blues and bodies in colorful outdoor sportswear. Along with Whitman and Vertov, the video documents the pitfalls and promises of historical and figurative icebreaking from the point of view of one of those saluted by Whitman, Vertov, and Serfaty, but one that inhabits melancholy attests to the ethical limits in combining spatial and industrial expansion and forward progress and more adamantly resists them. In a second thread, I trace "This Living Hand" into the disembodied computer cursor (here shaped as a Mickey Mouse-like white-gloved hand). In Ali Cherri's triptych installation, "My Pain is Real" (2010), this virtual hand defaces the artist's face with wounds the artist culled from newspaper photographs and layered on in Adobe After Effects. The face watches itself as layers of skin reveal raw flesh and bruises. The face returns to health through the wave of the hand, a magic trick on loop. Both a scene of subjective viewing and representation of subjection, Ali Cherri's triptych installation, "My Pain is Real," engages with the self-alienation of media and the lyric as a hospitable interface.

1/The Film Document: Lyric Gestures and the Invocation of Authenticity

Lyric Authenticity and the Document

The first two chapters consider upon what ground a media object presents itself as an authentic document on its terms. That is, how does the media object resist, avoid, sneak around, or otherwise wriggle its way out of or simply ignore becoming subject to societal hierarchies, historical narratives, and other kinds of *faits accomplis*. The lyric provides a set of compelling answers as a document for performance and accentual improvisations. This lyric document actualizes encounters in multiple temporalities and between unexpected subjectivities in the making. In watching for a lyric mode in cinema, the spectator takes the materiality of media seriously as both fact and support for the imagination. Through analysis of a twelve-act film and a twelve-part poem cycle written in response, this chapter traces the suspense of suspense. It shows how these moments of lyric utterance create a dialogue between circumstances socially, culturally, or linguistically incapable of communicating. In creating space for such happy tarrying together, the lyric opens categories of presence that normative or dominant narrativity cannot support.

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> ...[B]its that have seemed to me... Now this is a bit of poetry. They might have been in the UFA films… that I saw as a child.
>
> —Dylan Thomas, "Poetry and Film: A Symposium"[28]

What techniques are available to the film to ensure its "authenticity"? *Dr. Mabuse, the Gambler* (Dir. Fritz Lang 1922) offers itself readily to the most common metaphors for the cinema—as realist window looking onto Weimar-era Berlin, as a framed allegory whose formal aspects trace power relations that hold true today, and as mirror of the subconscious of its time period.[29] Lang notably spoke about the film as a "document of its time,"[30] an assertion that several early critics have reprised in their analysis, taking the term seriously enough, in Siegfried Kracauer's case, to first espouse and then retract the term as an appropriate way of reading the film. Lang's claim for the film's status of document and Kracauer's disavowal suggest that the document relies on two temporalities for its unfolding. This description of the film makes it into a hybrid—both figurative (a reflection) and a record—in a docu-fiction hybridity.

Lyric compositional techniques provide an answer to the previous question. They afford the spectator a process of becoming through a series of invocations rather than imagining or appealing to a ready-made "ideal" spectator. This chapter takes lyric authenticity as a model for Lang's understanding of the document, that which is at once the registration of an act and a script for

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[28] Maas, 56.

[29] Fritz Lang, *Dr. Mabuse, Der Spieler: Ein Bild Der Zeit* (Uco-Film, 1922). I will refer to this, the first film in the trilogy of Dr. Mabuse films, as simply *Mabuse* throughout.

[30] Fritz Lang, "Kitsch—Sensation—Culture and Film," in *The Promise of Cinema: German Film Theory, 1907–1933*, ed. Anton Kaes, Nicholas Baer, and Michael Cowan, trans. Alex H. Bush (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016), 212.

performance. It represents a temporal suspension between the past and a future in which a subjectivity deliberates. They allow a way of understanding a particular kind of "authenticity" in media, whether cinematic or written, as document that both registers fact and can be the basis for an act since it relies on an immanent subjectivity. The lyric document needs no veridical stamp from outside or from a mimetic verisimilitude as its operation traces "pure subjectivity" in an existential situation that has the potential to be public in being overheard and repeatable.

These gestures of invocation include indirect address, apostrophe, editing patterns of question and response, and moments of suspension. Against allegorical interpretations that seek to read the film through its psychological, ideological, and teleological models, the lyric mode of spectatorship supports spectatorial presence by emphasizing "pure subjectivity." Questions of existential ethics unsettle filmic displays of reified authenticity. In casting himself as a spectator of the film, Kuzmin makes other viewers aware of recurrences and iterations and shows that the lyric might be mimetic of itself but can also change in response to and migrate into new media. By building up contexts for both the film and for Kuzmin's poem, this chapter seeks to show how lyric gestures registered in their times and how they arrive in "ours" by creating configurations and gathering conjunctions both familiar and spontaneous.

Revisiting multiple paradigms for thinking about the experience of readership/spectatorship including allegory, psychological reflection and communication, the chapter revisits Lang's claim to documentality as a way to imagine its future performance. It enlists a poem by Mikhail Kuzmin, written as a document of his experience of watching and as a script for a performance of that viewing. Looking through the lyric lens of the poem fosters an attention to the film's techniques for actualization at the moment of its performance/projection—despite being a recorded and reproduced medium. Looking at the way that Sergei Eisenstein and Esther Shub re-edited and learned from Lang's film also allows one to see that which remains open to the subjective within these interpretations. Seeing how the lyric mode obviates the film's own immediate contexts in order to foreground the existential ethical and moral values and stakes inherent in its situation, it becomes clear that the film welcomes both a contemporary spectator from a different cultural or geographic context—a future spectator who is also the film's "spectator-in-the-making."

The Film as "Document" and "Authentic Reflection"

The paradigm of authenticity arises frequently in tandem with the mirror metaphor, which usually connotes a distorted view with an aspect of truth. In the whole of her book *The Haunted Screen*, Lotte Eisner applies the concept of authenticity twice, both times in reference to *Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler*, and each time in a very different way. The first describes the way film critics at the time of its release embraced the film as an "authentic reflection" of their reality.[31] The second time, she cites Lang's attention to details, a common realist technique for creating verisimilitude, and the precision of editing, specifically its creation of suspense through "the quasi-simultaneity of events."[32] In the first instance, the stamp of authenticity comes from outside the film, through an empirical study of the film's reception by critics local and contemporaneous to the film's creation and who therefore would know if it was true to its context:

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[31] Lotte H. Eisner, *The Haunted Screen: Expressionism in the German Cinema and the Influence of Max Reinhardt (L'Écran Démoniaque)*, trans. Roger Greaves (1952; repr., Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2008), 240.
[32] Ibid., 245.

> The Berlin critics, more sagacious than we today, saw in this film, which to us seems to fall half way between reality and fantasy, something quite different. For Lang had given the first part the sub-title 'Image of our Times'. And the critics of 1922 recognized the unflattering but authentic reflection of their own day, of the inflation of the mad lost years when every vice and passion was rife.[33]

The two uses of the term "authentic" are indicative of a tension between the ways that document and fiction, non-fiction and allegory, communicate. Furthermore, her account borrows Lang's rhetoric as the film as "a kind of document on the early twenties when people tried at all costs to forget the disasters of the war and the poverty of the immediate post-war period."[34] Associating the authentic with both "reflection" and "document" points to the problem of spectatorship in time. Two different audiences are seemingly at odds with each other; for a certain audience at a particular time, it was an "authentic reflection" and for a different audience, presumably any audience including us today, it is a "kind of document." The two characterizations lead to divergent readings, the first psychological and the second taking the film to be both a fact and a support for an act.

There may be more bridges between mirror and opaque fact, between metaphor and document, and between reception by an audience then and now, than are typically acknowledged. Indeed, these aspects and temporalities co-exist in "quasi-simultaneity" as do certain scenes in the film, in part thanks to Lang's cinematic techniques.

In the two cases, the double-edged descriptions relying on the existential opacity of photography as an index of reality and on the metaphor of the cinema as mirror[35] intermingle and echo Lang's own discourse about the film. Lang describes his craft as follows:

> Naïve sensational films, such as American Wild West films, show us contemporary people in fairy-tale primitivism of sensibility. The film as a document of its time (a genre for which Mabuse was only an earthbound forerunner) shows contemporary man—or rather, must show him—with the kind of excess I attempted to show in *Die Nibelungen*. Not a man from 1924; rather, the man from 1924. For man, represented as a concept, must be larger than life in his sensibility and actions, even if he is small and shabby. He requires a pedestal of stylization, just as bygone centuries do. We do not erect monuments on flat asphalt. To make them striking, we elevate them over the heads of passersby.[36]

Lang makes a claim for the film as a document but as an abstract and excessive, stylized one. While a document is a physical object that plays a direct part in or is direct evidence, "man, represented as a concept" refers to propositional space, one that evidently speaks across time "just as bygone

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[33] Ibid., 240.

[34] Ibid.

[35] The mirror metaphor for film is one of three commonly cited ones including the frame and the window. The frame structures the world and is equated with formalism; the window shows the world as though unmediated and is tantamount to realism; the mirror signifies the imaginary, a distortion that can be assimilated. Formally speaking, the frame is associated with montage techniques and the window with the long take. The mirror metaphor reconciles modernist and classical techniques while recognizing the spectator as a part of the perceptual equation. For an extended account and complication of these metaphors in a phenomenological vein that gives the film object its own agency, see Vivian Sobchack, *The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). See also Charles F. Altman, "Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Discourse," in *Movies and Methods: Vol. II*, ed. Bill Nichols (1975; repr., University of California Press, 1976), 523.

[36] Lang, "Kitsch," 212.

centuries do." The film is at once figural, plastic, and abstract, thus both of a historical moment and timeless. Mabuse has a "pedestal of stylization" even while he is "earthbound"; he remains both indexically linked to a specific reality by the photographic medium and elevated a "concept."

In the film's secondary title, "An Image of Our Times" ("*Ein Bild unserer Zeit*"), the word *Bild* invites us to see the film as a symbol, figure or likeness, where the ambiguous and deictic "our" indicates that this *Bild* shares a world with the director and with the reader/spectator, here transformed into a transtemporal collective plural, a "we." Deixis in the subtitle grounds this film in a particular time, the time of its projection where the projection is its performance. While the *Bild* is potentially timeless or essential and implicitly invites an allegorical reading, Lang's insistence that the film is "earthbound" by contrast to the mythological *Die Nibelungen* (1924) and his appeal to the "document" limit that reading. *Mabuse* actually featured the same actor as *Die Nibelungen*; Paul Richter first played the naïve American playboy and son of a wealthy industrialist before he played the national folk hero Siegfried, provoking a reading of those to roles as though parallel melodies in different keys.

Lang's "ideal screenplay" invokes the category of art to discuss a screenplay that pursues an address to its contemporaneous audience. For Lang, however, the film itself must provide a reflection through a particular instance of a principle. In *Film-Kurier*, Lang stated, "The fusion of poetic visions, painting, and music. The screenplay must be a contemporary work of art that has something essential to say to its time, something beyond base sensationalism. In *Dr. Mabuse* this was the power of evil, which held up a mirror to a corrupt era." "The power of evil" holds the mirror but never quite settles into Dr. Mabuse as its neat personification, perhaps at least in part because Mabuse never settles into himself as a character. He is all attitude. The evil here is manifold, including greed and lust. In many ways Mabuse seems less committed to these pursuits as fatal flaws though than he does to acting and to the roles he plays. Likewise to the different discourses he must speak all the while speaking directly of the power of evil, leading one to think that his main assault is to unify and flatten those discourses despite the Tower of Babel, to "pass" anywhere, in any milieu, race, and perhaps most revolutionarily, in every class.

In Lang's expansive and mixed metaphors, the symbolic mirror joins with the work of art as enunciation, while what it has to say—and how—remains ambiguous. It would seem that the screenplay can speak to its audience but, in the film, this address occurs through the reflection. Indeed, the question of whether a film can "speak to" an audience and how it can avoid "speaking for" dispossessed viewers by providing a distorted image of them over which they have no control have both been particularly productive questions. Mabuse has been viewed by some scholars as the epitome of an enunciator who is also an agent of dispossession in his impersonations. In other words, he speaks for others. At the same time, his caricatured nature makes his attempts at dispossession, and in particular his failures, more salient. Theatricality brings these efforts and defeats to the forefront of spectatorial consciousness, potentially liberating the very spectators supposedly held in thrall of his powers.[37]

Reading *Dr. Mabuse* as document and as allegory, I demonstrate how the film uses a lyric mode of enunciation to reach and speak towards the audience attending its projection, seeking to invoke

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[37] See Nikolaj Lübecker's *The Feel-Bad Film* for a compelling argument about the way a theatrical performance of the masterful address effects a self-irony that destabilizes the interpellator-interpellated, master-slave relationship. His example is Lars von Trier's *The Five Obstructions* Nikolaj Lübecker, *The Feel-Bad Film*, 1 edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 41–42.

them as co-creators of its continuously re-newed timely "performance." It seeks to be a document like an "ideal screenplay:" This is not an archival document but a basis upon which two players can recompose a social relation within an indifferent circumstance and in this way be like poetry, which "makes nothing happen: it survives."[38]

Taking a poem for a screenplay attracted Lang's contemporary F.W. Murnau for the possibility of improvisation within this survival—film as a recorded performances that would both actualize conjunctures and leave them authentically intact. "Mein ideales Manuskript" was a column in which journalist Eduard Jawitz spoke with leading directors. Lang's statement appeared with one from F.W. Murnau in *Film-Kurier* 6, no. 72 and 74 (March 24 and 26, 1924), who also invoked poetry:

> The ideal screenplay (understood as an ideal challenge, not an ideal form overall) would be a kind of film poetry that would artistically force the director to act solely according to the intentions of the writer, at least where no improvisation is possible. If the director can operate freely without violating the poetry, perhaps even using improvisation to reach a high level for the first time, then it is the director who is the author.[39]

Counterintuitively, if the director follows the poetry to such an extent that improvisation, i.e. invention in the moment, also does not violate the poetry, then the director becomes the author. In a sense, attention to the circumstances—existential possibilities and limitations—in the "now" makes the director, or potentially the spectator, the author. This understanding of an author resonates with definitions that exist of the auteur insomuch as it describes the process of a director struggling within and against a system (see Andrew Sarris and Peter Wollen). However, in film poetry the poet-author it is not so much in a struggle with the institutional context but with an existential circumstance ascertainable through improvisation. See the screenplay of Carl Mayer's screenplay for Murnau's *Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans* (1927) for an example of his ideal screenplay, which looks like minimalist or conceptual poetry.

Seen from the Present as a Premonition

> There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism—Benjamin, "On the Concept of History"

In his 1947 book *From Caligari to Hitler*, Siegfried Kracauer writes of the films of the Weimar Era as reflecting the national psyche between the two World Wars and wrestles indecisively with Lang's idea of the film as "a document." He quotes the Decla-Bioscop brochure published for the premiere and points out its wishful depiction of Dr. Mabuse as a kind of document of its time based on the idea that he would not have been possible before and "will not be possible any more in 1930—let us hope so, one should like to say."[40] For the brochure and for Kracauer, the persona Dr. Mabuse's possibility only at a particular time period makes the first *Dr. Mabuse* film a document. However, as

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[38] W.H. Auden's famous phrase from the second section of "In Memory of W.B. Yeats." The sentence, rarely quoted in full, puts emphasis on the *how* of happening and on the paradoxically comforting and familiar *indifference* of the natural and the "belief" still possible in the "raw." Several aspects of the work discussed in the dissertation, especially in Chapter Three and in the conclusion, take up ecological stakes of the modernist and post-modern lyric mode.

[39] Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau, "My Ideal Screenplay," in *The Promise of Cinema: German Film Theory, 1907–1933*, ed. Anton Kaes, Nicholas Baer, and Michael Cowan, trans. Christopher M. Geissler (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2016), 498–99.

[40] Qtd. in Seigfried Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film* (1947; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 84.

Kracauer points out, though the model of tyranny was specific enough for the Decla-Bioscop brochure to claim it was a document, the brochure was unfortunately wrong about his further impossibility as the character came back in two more parts of the trilogy. Indeed, the nervous "let us hope" is warded as though a nervous talisman and registers a fear, a warning. Perhaps also in service of Mabuse's historical particularity, both the brochure and the German poster [*Figure 1*] employ the mixed rhetoric of the film as a portrait: "But with regard to the year 1920 he is a bigger-than-life portrait…," the brochure continues; as a portrait, the shabby man on the pedestal is isolated and total in this representation.

Figure 1 Original German Poster, an Expressionist portrait (left). Original Russian poster: Dr. Mabuse as Suprematist "concept" by Kazimir Malevich.[41] "To make them striking, we elevate them over the heads of passersby" (Lang).

Dr. Mabuse as an exaggerated representation, a mirror of the unconscious, prevails in visual and written para-texts but the notion of the document continues to pose a problem for Kracauer, who sees the need to revise his adoption of Lang's characterization of the first film as a document after seeing the second one (*The Testament of Dr. Mabuse*, 1931).[42]

Kracauer finds the need to relativize the first instance of Mabuse only once it is no longer an isolated instance. Initially, Kracauer concludes of the film that, "It is by no means a documentary film, but it is a document of its time."[43] However, just two pages later, he revises and, in a sense, gives more weight to Lang's qualified and ambiguous claim by retracting it. The cause is the second film, which reveals to him that, in comparison with the second, the first is "not so much a document

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[41] In comparison to the German film poster, Malevich's Suprematist rendering interprets and pursues the "power of evil," making it both more abstract and Christian. Though Suprematism and shapes like "The Black Square" have long been read as non-representational and non-symbolic, the poster for *Mabuse* distinctively uses a pair of upside down crosses on which Mabuse's name hangs. By contrast, the black circle serves as an opaque signifier offering presence but no ready mirror reflection.

[42] *The Testament of Dr. Mabuse*, which Anton Kaes argues was meant to be a reminder of the "unabated presence of trauma in German society" was not shown in Germany until 1951, 20 years after completion. See Anton Kaes, *Shell Shock Cinema: Weimar Culture and the Wounds of War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 210. Kaes' reading follows up on Kracauer's diagnosis of the film as symptomatic unresolved conflict that foreshadowed World War II.

[43] Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler*, 82.

as one of those deep-rooted premonitions which spread over the German postwar screen."[44] Kracauer again resorts to the mirror metaphor for the second film, however, accounting for the "resuscitation" of the character in the second part of the trilogy by his ability to "mirror the obvious Mabuse traits of Hitler."[45] In changing the document to a premonition, Kracauer falls into the trope of Christian typology that Jameson disparages in *Allegory and Ideology,* "for in its Biblical form it is a kind of prophecy. The fulfillment of the 'type; is the foretelling of the future, Moses being fulfilled by Jesus," here Mabuse fulfilled by Hitler.[46] Kracauer ultimately prefers the mirror metaphor for the second film even as the second implicitly takes the place of the first film as document, hopefully, before the third film in the Mabuse Trilogy was made in 1961.

The seriality of Mabuse on the contrary takes the film out of the realm of the allegory that would only connect him to another plane of meaning.[47] Tom Gunning asserts the similarity of the serial and of the series as both "additive rather than being based on the resolution of a central conflict." Adherence to either of these forms, however, is complicated by Mabuse's personae. Though he unites all of the villains, different in each circumstance, his personae nonetheless wreak a diversity of havoc and exploit a variety of forms of control. While Inspector von Wenck is the more consistent character, he does not come in until later. This internal structure causes it to have more affinity with poetic structure than with narrative serials or series films. Serial television and the internal structure of time in what is called the "season"[48] can be thought as adhering to a dominant mode of poetry, and the 12-act structure of the film resonates more with stanzas than with dramatic forms.

The series nonetheless renders Mabuse historical, a reading that necessitates Kracauer's backwards narrativization and relativization from the present, and yet it also makes him continuous with that present. Yet for Kracauer, even in becoming historical, it does not merit the status of document. Indeed, Kracauer's project is to rewrite the history of Weimar cinema as unfolding, perhaps inevitably, into the reality Hitler created, and to insist on the historical specificity of those films. In reframing the film from a document to a premonition, he writes history from his present, in itself unsurprising. However, he also says that it was not a lone example or unrepeatable. Seeing the film as a document of *our* time necessitates seeing the persistent relevance of the object's documentality rather than insisting that the status of a document would relegate it to a bygone time whether or not that past time can be subsumed by teleology, dialectical thinking, or psychologizing into the present.

What Kracauer might have amended later when he disagrees with himself is not that *Mabuse* is no longer a document but that calling it a document does not mean that it remains sealed off in the past as a singular proof of something. That the first *Mabuse* and Mabuse himself remain in the past seems woefully naïve to him later given the evolution of totalitarianism and mechanisms of perceptual control and manipulation, which continue to our day, as many scholars have taken up in their work on the film.

In Kracauer's revised meditations, Mabuse's persona embodies mirror reflections of the unconscious and of an ideology. The document becomes more aligned with the mirror since the second film's exaggerations match up with what Kracauer calls the "Mabuse traits of Hitler," while the first film loses its status as a document to become a premonition—a foreboding, unconscious intuition

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[44] Ibid., 84.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Fredric Jameson, *Allegory and Ideology* (London : New York: Verso, 2019).
[47] Tom Gunning, *The Films of Fritz Lang: Allegories of Vision and Modernity* (London: British Film Institute, 2000), 89.
[48] See Sean O'Sullivan, "Broken on Purpose: Poetry, Serial Television, and the Season," *Storyworlds: A Journal of Narrative Studies* 2, no. 1 (2010): 59–77.

relative to the present. Kracauer travels between unstable metaphors for the cinema, from portrait to reflection to transparent window into the unconscious of a repressed past as premonition, and ultimately groups this film with others for its use of the imaginative frame and expressionist stylization alongside realist representation. Noticeable throughout Kracuaer's reading is that the notion of the document does not quite work as a metaphor like the mirror, frame, or window.

As stable, reliable, and unmetaphorical as a "document" would sound, it turns out to be more slippery than a single one of the three metaphors, because it lends itself to being activated in the present. In a caption to a film still for *Dr. Mabuse, the Gambler*, Kracauer notes the "Interpenetration of realistic and expressionist style, betraying the close relationship between Mabuse and Caligari"[49] before moving on to *Waxworks* (*Das Wachsfigurenkabinett* 1924, his last example of what he calls "imaginary tyrant films." Coincidentally, *Waxworks* features a poet as its main protagonist. The poet makes the wax figures come to life through three stories. More than a bridge to another paradigm, the lyric mode in cinema activates the document through a familiar aspect that is rendered uncanny through the lyric's animation of the indexical trace left of life imprinted in wax or the mechanical one recorded by the photograph.

The Uncanny Document

Most recent scholarship has predominantly painted Mabuse as an allegory for changing technologies of control and enunciative power associated with the beginnings of modernity up to the present. Unlike Kracauer, Jonathan Crary dismisses the notion that the film is interested in how a charismatic figure frames the emotional life of the group. Rather he sees Mabuse as an allegory for a "diverse technology of influence": "The protean Mabuse, in his multiple masks and guises, becomes a principle of flexible and versatile power, rather than a figuration of totalitarianism."[50] Lang's "Concept" becomes "principle" within the metaphors of mirror and frame brought together in the portrait; a concept acts as a sign and its frame a formalist principle. Crary recognizes Mabuse as a "system of spectacular power, whose strategies are continually changing but whose aim of producing 'docile' subject remains relatively constant."[51] In his numerous displays, he thus partakes in capitalism's incessant bids for our attention through changing perceptual fields from the proto-ticker space of the stock exchange blackboard, to hypnotic conjuring on stage, to operating parasitically off of a cabaret and casino. He and his chosen environments raise distraction to new levels allowing for a co-option of attention, what Crary calls a "regime of reciprocal attentiveness and distraction."[52] As Crary notes, many of these attractions (the roulette wheel, the stock quotes) exert an added influence by way of new pacing and rhythms.

Allegorical readings of how Mabuse's character stands in for protean forms of the alliance between power and the medium itself continue into the early 21st century. The farther away the film gets from its time period, the more scholars remark how the film still "speaks" to "us" today, to recap Lang's rhetoric, for we are still distracted, interpellated and addressed by it. These analyses appropriately morph into a conversation about authorship, taking up the fundamental problem of determining and preserving authorial intentionality and authenticity in the digital age. Danny Snelson argues that, as

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[49] Kracauer, 85.
[50] Jonathan Crary, "Dr. Mabuse and Mr. Edison," in *Art and Film since 1945: Hall of Mirrors* (Los Angeles: Museum of Contemporary Art, 1996), 272.
[51] Ibid., 271.
[52] Ibid., 265.

the forefather of the digital, Mabuse represents the destabilization of authorship inherent in media. As a proto-digital phenomenon, Mabuse anticipates his own transcoding, reconfiguration, degeneration, and multiple platforms, troubling and destabilizing any notion of authorship. Though Mabuse might be considered a metaphor for media instead of power, or media as power, Snelson follows Crary insofar as that power now becomes origin-less and dispersed. Mabuse "reveals a wild tale of manipulative versioning" before it comes to exist in internet culture's space of sampling, segmenting, uploading and downloading. Snelson takes a cue from Marshall McLuhan to show how Mabuse best embodies the notion that the "content of a digitized film can only be the character of digital technology itself."[53] He points to digital "ghosting"[54] in a close-up of a deck of cards as evidence of authorial loss of control:

> Mirroring the opening scene of absolute directorial control of identity cards, the digital disappearing act of this fated card metonymically figures the loss of enunciatory power in the film on every level. Reduplicated by any number of moments in the digitized film, a close reading of '*Dr. Mabuse'* online reveals a revised message of remediated symbols and transcoded allegories in the insane context of unforeseeable transformation.[55]

What Snelson draws out is the difficulty of taking a position as a viewer when the film cannot reliably have one. In his account, the film speaks to us as it becomes a meta-commentary on its own loss of meaning and becomes pure form.

Snelson relates to the fact that an authorless technology enunciates the film more than the film and the film's author enunciate; Mabuse's and Lang's (and Mabuse's as Lang's) enunciation "is instead subsumed by the delirious logic of technological modernization and media historical circumstance"[56] In attempting to have it both ways, Snelson's argument follows the slippery slope of the death of the author by technological superstructures that "supersede agency" and the automated self-generating and infinite algorithmically serial "suggestions" of auto-play to its logical extreme. He claims that the film preconceives its digitization and serialization on YouTube. However, that serialized structure can also be read as a poetic, repetitive, if baroque structure, which is perhaps more telling of the YouTube structure and the film's possible critique of it. "What does a user see when watching *Dr. Mabuse* stretched out serially across thirteen YouTube videos?" [57] Snelson, a poet, asks. Yet, his argument about the loss of the importance of detail rings true even on a simpler level than the one his elaborate allegory allows. Watching on a small screen or in a pixelized version means missing the details, one aspect of the film to which Lotte Eisner attributed its authenticity. It is precisely attention to those details that reveals that what Snelson calls the "unforeseeable transformation" is also "encoded" into the film. Mabuse is a warning and a challenge to each viewer to be prepared for that "unforeseeable transformation" through the cultivation of the equivalent of Benjamin's

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[53] Danny Snelson, "Reveal Source Code: The Thousand Platforms of Dr. Mabuse — DSS, 2010-13," Aphasic Letters, February 23, 2018, http://aphasic-letters.com/mabuse/essay.html#_ftnref12.

[54] A process by which images disappear due to the digital algorithm which only changes the display when it registers moving pixels. When the pixels move too quickly the image disappears for a moment as the algorithm does not register the subtle variation and takes a moment to regenerate the entire image.

[55] Snelson, "Reveal Source Code"

[56] Ibid.

[57] Geoffrey G. O'Brien responded by writing poems. His *People on Sunday* takes its structure from the film divided into 15-minute YouTube clips, the limit of time YouTube allowed per clip in 2010, the time of his writing.

"intensified presence of mind."[58] But what kind of presence of mind does Mabuse foster? Benjamin was fascinated by what he in 1928 called "a vanished and misunderstood form of art: allegory."[59]

In 1925, in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* (*Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels*), Benjamin seeks to save "the allegorical" from the destiny of signifying within an authoritative plane such as the religious one that would grant it transcendent meaning. Instead, what are otherwise analogues become equivalencies through that which George Steiner, in his introduction to Benjamin's *Habilitationsschrift*, calls his "uncompromisingly personal, even lyrical statement."[60] Steiner uses lyrical to mean the apotheosis[61] or flashing up of the personal. Benjamin, interested in the process of creating the work of art, describes how a certain kind of creation relies on the allegorical to essentialize the particular from the general and not the other way around (following a quotation from Goethe) kills the artwork; the allegorist holds a dead object, "incapable of emanating any meaning or significance of its own."[62] But this is only if one sees allegory as an illustration of one other thing. In describing the "baroque work of art," Benjamin vilifies it for wanting only to endure, to be eternal, to forever have a frame such as "dedications, prefaces, and epilogues,"[63] around it that locks them in place. While the more interesting for him is allegory as "a form of expression,"[64] as he puts it, that is intimate, mysterious, and open. "Any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else," he writes,

> With this possibility a destructive, but just verdict is passed on the profane world: it is characterized as a world in which the detail is of no great importance. But it will be unmistakably apparent, especially to anyone who is familiar with allegorical textual exegesis, that all of the things which are used to signify derive, from the very fact of their pointing to something else, a power which makes them appear no longer commensurable with profane things, which raises them onto a higher plane, and which can, indeed, sanctify them.[65]

In the same breath as he dismisses the importance of details, he wins their significance back since they, too, are elevated in a second sanctified plane through their unspecified "pointing to something else," through the gesture itself, not by predetermined meaning. When Lang says he wishes to put his "shabby" character on a pedestal, he is alluding to the unspecified allegorical plane (potentially of all art). The style of that allegory is expressionist with its resonances of the Baroque that Benjamin identified: "For it is common practice in the literature of the baroque to pile up fragments ceaselessly… to take the repetition of stereotypes for a process of intensification."[66] Mabuse appears as stereotype upon stereotype and ends as that opaque and shabby man without Lang's pedestal. This state is completed by his inevitable decay at the end of the film when he descends into madness and sheds all of his façades. Though Benjamin never wrote about *Dr. Mabuse*, if we apply Benjamin's

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[58] Benjamin, *SW 4*, 281.
[59] Benjamin, *SW 1*, 78.
[60] George Steiner, "Introduction," in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. John Osborne (London; New York: Verso, 1998), 15.
[61] "*Blitzt auf*," literally "flashes up." Howard Eiland, "On Walter Benjamin's 'Origin of the German Trauerspiel'" (Program in Critical Theory, UC Berkeley, February 11, 2020).
[62] Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama (Ursprung Des Deutschen Trauerspiels)* (1925–1963; repr., London; New York: Verso, 1998), 184.
[63] Ibid., 181.
[64] Ibid., 162.
[65] Ibid., 175.
[66] Benjamin, 178.

theory, Mabuse would be a thought that has become an allegory reified into ruins.[67] The detail, the profane, is elevated and sanctified. Mabuse's "overexaggerated make-up" cakes off under the magnifying lens of the big screen, what in the Baroque could be symbolic or treated as simply picturesque in the case of Mabuse is, by the end, only a pile of dead orientalist or racist objects, in a basement, a kind of archive that can no longer be actualized and transformed by his gaze.

"A Representation of Some Fact," an "Inscription of an Act"[68]

If "document" cannot be neatly reconciled with a traditional understanding of allegory it finds easier comradery with Benjamin's formulation. It cannot be the product of one author or describe a film under conventional auteur theory as it is inherently heterological and intersubjective. As Maurizio Ferraris writes, "A strong document is not monological, and it is not the objectivization of an individual spirit, but it is rather the potentially public registration of an act that concerns at least two persons…"[69] Ferraris asserts that an artwork is like a document in that it has the qualities of being a kind of act, not primarily descriptive but rather "representative" and "performative":

> It is not intended to be a bearer of knowledge, even though it can incidentally also do that; but it aims to produce effects, which is what often happens with the attestation of an act… these features are to be found in artworks, where the representative as well as the performative rather than the descriptive are to the fore.[70]

Ferraris distinguishes between "strong" and "weak" documents by calling "strong" ones precisely those that act as well as bear knowledge. "Weak" ones leave evidence, for instance, fingerprints or even a diary in prison that registers despair count as such. Under his definitions, an artwork is a "strong" document and differs from these in its actualization of the knowledge presented. This kind of document prompts the question of what such an actualization entails. Since these factors must "act" and be put into play with the viewer who is made part of a "lyric circumstance" that which is an "enunciation articulated in the transparent present and nonetheless connected with the instant as with the place that occasions it. Of the circumstance, the lyric poem maintains the aspect of conjuncture, of the moment or situation that is more or less veiled… the circumstance is, in the same gesture, marked and exceeded by the lyric poem."[71]

One critical move seeks to authenticate the film not as a clue in a trail of historical events or an early allegory of a techno-logic with which we are still grappling but rather for its very contemporaneity. This approach might be more in line with advertisements for which Kracauer did not account. One called the film "an archive" and another reportage declared the year 1922 and the era more generally as actors in the film[72] These advertisements move to authenticate the film as a document under Ferraris' definition in that they register both the way the film records and the way it "acts" with its

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[67] See my discussion of Kuzmin's poem "*Germaniia*" ["Germany" (1923)] for a description of Mabuse as ruins below.
[68] Maurizio Ferraris, *Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces*, trans. Richard Davies (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 250.
[69] Ibid., 268-69.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Rabaté, *Figures*, 71.
[72] Bernard Eisenschitz, *Fritz Lang au travail* (Paris: Cahiers du Cinéma, 2011), 37.

contemporaries. This leaves the question of how it continues to serve as a document and, through the deictic, potentially acts with an "us" today.

Noël Burch explores the aspects of the film that render it contemporary with his own time, however removed from its original one, seeking to explain or identify the ways in which it speaks of its time but arrives in ours.

> [Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler] has always seemed to me to occupy a strategic position in film history. This impression originally stemmed from a very simple observation: in all of silent cinema, this film seemed to be the first — the earliest — to address itself directly to "us" today, insofar as we are all "average spectators." I am referring to a phenomenon which is difficult to analyze in and for itself, but which has been confirmed time and again on the occasion of student screenings in both Europe and America."[73]

He goes from sociological-ethnographic observation to formal conclusion, admitting that the formal techniques that render the film contemporary are difficult to pinpoint. Burch begins his "Notes on Mabuse" that it is the most contemporary narrative structure before the Hollywood Studio System takes effect and the fullest expression of cinematic narrative syntactical convention, in particular for three reasons: "the preciseness of its dramatisations, the subtleness of its characterisations and the multilayered density of its script."[74] Though the phrase he uses, "address itself directly to 'us' today," might seem abstract or about its use of now codified conventions of cinema, later in the same essay he probes a "question and response" structure in the editing that makes the film open out to the off-screen and refer to its frame in ways similar to the way the lyric does. This particular capacity for address offers another way of understanding the way actualize makes its topic of inquiry. This critical move authenticates the film through its continuing ability to address us.

This reading of the film addressing itself "directly" dovetails with Lang's vision for the film as "having something essential to say to its time;" Historically specific enunciation is distinct from but not entirely exclusive of a "space" of communicative enunciation. Tom Gunning dubs Dr. Mabuse "Grand Enunciator," making reference to the work of Raymond Bellour, Christian Metz, and to enunciation theory overall; specifically he is interested in Mabuse's (and Lang's) obsession with networks for communication, their efficiency, and the way that Mabuse manipulates that efficiency. In a meta-reading, Gunning identifies him with the cinematic apparatus itself, and gives for evidence the Sandor Weltmann scene where Mabuse as his persona Weltmann makes the audience hallucinate an exotic scene in order to claim that Lang's "drama of vision remains more dialectical than the pure enthrallment of the spectator."[75] Inasmuch as Mabuse himself is an alter-ego for the director, this reading can be interpreted as a desire to uncover the ways in which the filmic medium works on the spectator's fantasies. Gunning makes a claim about mastery out of Eisner's enthusiasm for parallel editing with pocket-watches, which both mirrors and is only possible thanks to the "temporal precision" of modernity embodied in devices and infrastructures such as the railway.[76] Gunning claims that Mabuse's control extends to information, like that of a "skilled author or dramatist."[77] He continues: "Mabuse's comfortable fit within the systems of modernity does not undermine the obvious fact that he manipulates these systems with force and violence. But rather than undermining

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[73] Noël Burch, "Notes on Fritz Lang's First Mabuse," *Cine-Tracts 13* 4, no. 1 (1981): 23.
[74] Burch, "Notes on Fritz Lang's First Mabuse," 2.
[75] Gunning, *The Films of Fritz Lang*, 112.
[76] Ibid., 98.
[77] Ibid., 102.

them, he relies upon their smoothly-functioning calculability."[78] Rather than this trait making Mabuse akin to an author or novelist, however, this brings him closer to the speculator, in other words the theorist, in an imaginary place where theories always play out consistently in literature.[79]

If allegory is the predominant mode of the film, then Dr. Mabuse is fittingly the master of allegory where writing has become too homogenous, symbols rote, and certain methods of interpretation already foregone conclusions. The *Oxford English Dictionary* connects speculation with its ancient Greek root *θεωρία* meaning a constellation of concepts including, "the action of viewing" and "spectacle." In Hellenistic Greek, speculation, interchangeable with theory (*θεωρός*), sees the spectator as equivalent to "the sending of state ambassadors." Definitions include, "a methodical intellectual construct which is used to explain a great number of facts or phenomena" (1610) and "purely abstract knowledge of a subject, as opposed to practical, empirical knowledge" (1656). As Gunning points out, Mabuse manages to control the world as long as its empirical functioning matches its theoretical efficiency. Even psychology, which actually efficiently accounts for human inefficiencies in the form of trauma, the death-drive, and wish fulfilment, has its own efficiencies in its manner of telling these stories as inevitable. Indeed, Dr. Mabuse succeeds in hypnotizing the state inspector into very nearly driving himself off a cliff, presumably because he, too, is a subject of the imperialist state, and in this sense is like the train schedule. One scholar suggests that the invocation of Tsi-Nan-Fu, the old German imperial transcription for Jinan, a Chinese town implicated in the late colonial expansion under Emperor Wilhelm II, is a trauma-triggering device used by Mabuse to induce frailty in Inspector von Wenck, possibly even suggesting that von Wenck served as a soldier prior to becoming an inspector.[80] However, Dr. Mabuse's ability to control other kinds of subjects falters throughout, which accounts for comedy in the film.

Failure of communication throughout and the elaborate allegory of masterful centralized enunciation leave room for lyric utterance and its structure of invocation, represented in the editing structure of question and response. Mabuse remains deaf and dumb to another editing structure in the film that would have him be the one addressed by other characters, what Burch calls a question and response structure.

The question and response structure opens outwards and invokes the presence of that outside the frame; it acts as apostrophe and invocation. A mention of Dr. Mabuse in one scene makes him appear in the next, Burch points out. Part of the justification for these edits comes from the attributes of Mabuse, whose character has an omniscient quality based on psychological control that he tries to solidify in the trilogy increasingly through technology, yet when Mabuse appears, he does not seem to know that he was just invoked and does not respond directly. He appears as a specimen or an embodiment of the thing invoked, more attitude and sensory-evaluative model, than character. His ignorance contributes an ambiguity to the notion of omniscience. Narratively, the edit would seem to imbue Mabuse with the power to know when others talk about him. However, remarkably, he does not *act* as if he has heard. Lang thus shows himself to be more omniscient than the evil Mabuse and reveals Mabuse's limitations. His question-response editing model sets up an internal dialogue between scenes fundamentally different in logic from Mabuse's manipulative powers of

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[78] Ibid., 104.
[79] "Speculation, n." In *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, March 20, 2020.
[80] Daniel Heinrich Wild, "The Writing on the Screen: Images of Text in the German Cinema From 1920 To 1949" (Dissertation, University of Pittsburg, 2006), 129.

cause and effect, for instance when his face appears superimposed over a chaotic and crashing stock market.

Dr. Mabuse's murder of Hull further weakens the narrative logic of cause and effect. Dr. Mabuse ostensibly kills Hull for his money less than half-way through after pretending to be an old school chum. Burch suggests that the murder as a necessary plot point remains debatable in view of Mabuse's all-powerful mind-control and that it is understandable only on a non-narrative, paratactic and symbolic level.[81] Beyond the question-response logic of the editing, the ambiguity of omniscience is picked up internally in the scenes through their unsettled point of view and temporality.

Raymond Bellour, like Burch, also used the style of notes in an essay on the film in "On Fritz Lang," presumably because the paratactic structure of notes lends itself to the episodic narrative of *Dr. Mabuse, the Gambler*. In Bellour's essay, he comments on the "weighty and decisive ambiguity" in the interaction between directorial vision and the POV of the characters:

> The position of an author is defined by the relationship which he maintains with his characters. In the film, one form of this relationship rests on the systems of vision which the pictures reveal: how the author fragmentarily indicates and encloses the viewpoint of his characters within the continuity of his own viewpoint constitutes the viewpoint of the film. Minnelli, for example, generally remains external to what he shows; Hitchcock, inversely, makes the clearly defined vision of his characters a part of the system of his own vision. In this regard Lang himself shows a weighty and decisive ambiguity.[82]

This ambiguity allows the existential situation to emerge more fully since the director takes neither the point of view of the characters nor an objective, omniscient point of view but rather weaves between points of view in one "pure subjectivity," which is the circumstance of the lyric.

Mise en scène and the Camera's Subjective Point-of-View, But Whose ?

Throughout the scholarship, there is a keen attention to mise en scène and how it presents itself to Lang's camera's ambiguous point of view.[83] This viewpoint calls to the viewer to question who is seeing and to place herself into a subjectivity that comes in and out of "purity"—half in the fictional realm and half as ourselves. However, sometimes it is precisely the viewpoint that establishes the fiction. Burch claims that the film sometimes answers the question with Mabuse himself, but as Mabuse does not register that he has seen, this is an incomplete and unsatisfactory answer, and

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[81] Burch, "Notes on Fritz Lang's First Mabuse," 2–3. Burch recognizes the counterargument that the murder could be interpreted as simply a retributive measure against Hull once Hull sets the State Prosecutor Von Wenk onto Mabuse's trail. However, Mabuse does not seem to hold such personal grudges and I tend to concur here with Burch as he dismisses it.

[82] Raymond Bellour, "On Fritz Lang," *SubStance* 3, no. 9 (1974): 28. First published in *Le Livre des autres* (1971).

[83] The standard definition of mise en scène in film (as it comes from theater) is: "staging an action in front of a camera" Frank Kessler, *Mise en scène*, Kino-Agora 6 (Montréal: caboose, 2014). Following "*staging the event* for the camera" (David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, *Film Art: An Introduction*, 6th ed (New York: McGraw Hill, 2001), 156. [original emphasis]) can just as well be reversed, for instance in a documentary context, to say "the action staged or framed by the camera" or "the action as it unfolds for the camera" since mise en scène can refer to the intentional staging or to the results and its effects.

perhaps reflects more on those invoking Mabuse than on Mabuse himself. Thus, Mabuse cannot be the sole owner of the gaze. As Raymond Bellour writes:

> [Lang] keeps the point of view in perpetual hesitation; for the event, whether it is foreshadowed or has already occurred, always seems linked to something else whose force is arresting even though one does not know how to delimit it but which could not be sustained alone. The film plays subtly on an incessant disequilibrium by means of this dissymmetrical expectancy. This flagrant and deliberately abstract waiting in a shot (a visual and narrative sign) marks all of Lang's work. Its principle is simple. It is a matter of a fixed long shot with three terms: two actions which separate a dead time. A character goes out of the shooting angle; the camera remains facing the set; a second character enters the shooting angle by an- other entrance (this could be -- though it rarely is -- the same character who returns, and by the same entrance).[84]

Bellour's description of a common suspension of action in Lang's films draws attention to the way in which the temporality of the event is elongated and made into an intersubjective encounter that is incommensurable.

The term "dissymetrical expectancy" can easily describe the lyric utterance, which calls out to another who cannot reply. The apostrophe, likewise, finds a common objective correlative, T.S. Eliot's term in "Hamlet" (1919) for an object that evokes, or in this case embodies, a particular emotion, or a "space" within which two subjects can meet, again within the elongated temporal suspension of the poem.[85] Bellour's attention to form is part of a more general move in the 1960s and '70s French film theory to pay greater attention to form and its description through a theory of enunciation.[86] Here what is at stake is the invocation of time itself and with its invocation, its self-authentic expression. Rather than being the communication of time passing within the world of the plot for specific communicative purposes, dissymmetrical expectancy seems more like an utterance of time, an invocation of the time shared between the film world and the spectator's.

For the documentary, Malin Wahlberg has argued the importance of the *invocation of lived time*, which, through her phenomenological approach, she shows has affective impact. This invocation can occur through "the creative possibilities of framing, extending, freezing, or fragmentizing the filmed event or gesture."[87] Her provocation asks the scholar to treat the mise en scène and gesture in cinema with an attention to the present of the performance in documentary, in particular. It is another way of paying attention to the way the recorded event structures time within the 'emplotment' or *syuzhet*.

> Looking back at film theories influenced by existential phenomenology, time measurement accords with a common theme of lived time in moving images, which perhaps has less to do with transcendence than with the cinematic invocation of a temporal dimension. For example, this invocation of lived time is

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[84] Bellour, "On Fritz Lang," 32.

[85] Thomas Stearns Eliot, "Hamlet," in *Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot*, ed. Frank Kermode (1919; repr., New York: Harvest Books, 1975), 45–49.

[86] Stephen Jenkins notes that Bellour's and other's turn towards form and "the space of enunciation" comes from a desire, as in Peter Wollen's *politique des auteurs*, to distinguish the position of the work from the position of the director. He writes, "Bellour insists on the need for close examination of formal devices because it is questions of form which are repressed from the person Lang's discourse" Stephen Jenkins, *Fritz Lang: The Image and the Look* (London: British Film Inst, 1981), 26.

[87] Malin Wahlberg, *Documentary Time: Film and Phenomenology* (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2008), 25.

> evident in the recorded sound of heartbeats and in the cinematic representation of the passing or halting of time.[88]

The mise en scène carries some of the same qualities as the editing in its ability to create such a circumstance insofar as it can invoke the spectator into the scene as a conscientious viewer in the 'lived time' of the film. This temporality would be wholly unlike a friction-less system whereby Dr. Mabuse is sutured in as a foregone conclusion to every question.

Allegory as "a Form of Expression"

I was lucky enough to first see *Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler* on the big screen in a digital copy and then, years later in 2018, to see its latest restored 35mm film print.[89] Between those two viewings and ever since, I have watched the film on YouTube. It was upon the big screen viewing that I noticed details confirming my early suspicions that *Dr. Mabuse* was more immanence than allegory. These details support and further the inquiries of Burch and Bellour into the film's invocatory elements and temporality of *suspension* that bristles against its more expected mode of *suspense*. In particular, I was able to see a painting that ironically pictures, even allegorizes, the non-allegorical expressive mode of the lyric—an explicitly Romantic scene of a lyric in the moment of its performance. Doubled in a displaced mise-en-abîme, the off rhyme draws two planes of meaning that would otherwise be separated as the profane and the sacred into relation. This internal reflection eliminates its hierarchy, leaving intact a lyric model of relation to the performance.

These details "spoke to me" but not in the ways that Crary, Snelson, or even Gunning described. Indeed, it wasn't Mabuse "speaking," nor was it Lang, but the film itself, through the use of gestures, camera angles, mise en scène, edits, and timing. I also remembered the Russian poet Kuzmin's late romantic lyric poem-cycle, *New Hull (Novyi Gul'*, *Новый гуль*, 1924), and his address of the film and his confidence that he held the key to partially clarify relationships within the film.[90] As I analyze the poem, I will show how Kuzmin helps us see the lyric mode of the film. As the film's hero "Hull" becomes the poem's beloved, he also transforms into *Gul'*. As the poem plays on the way that the aspirated "h" of the hero's name is transliterated into the hard "g" sound in the new context, parallel to Kuzmin's play on the morphological visual changes throughout the film highlight the structure and themes of the film.

Kuzmin attended a screening of Fritz Lang's original cut of the 12-act film in St. Petersburg, Russia, on January 23, 1923 at least three times, writing the 12-part lyric poem *Novyĭ Gul'* from February 19 to March 31st, almost exactly one year later. The title refers to Hull, the naïve young American playboy protagonist and hero, in a sense, though Dr. Mabuse kills him in the fourth act. He appears early on in the film as a greenhorn, a newbie in licentious Weimar German social circles but one whose reputation as the owner of a large fortune precedes him. It has 12 vignette-like parts while the film has 12 acts [*Figure 2*.]

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[88] Ibid., 26.

[89] I first saw the film on digital at The Swedenborg Society, London, on July 30th, 2013, in a program of all three films selected by the writer Iain Sinclair on the occasion of Sinclair's 70th birthday. I saw the 35mm print on Sunday, February 17th, 2019, at the Pacific Film Archive in Berkeley.

[90] I came across a re-issue, a facsimile chapbook of the original edition (published in an edition of 1,000 copies) of the poem cycle, in Moscow, Russia, in a bookstore across from the Maiakovskii Museum a month before I saw *Dr. Mabuse* for the first time.

Figure 2 Cover of Mikhail Kuzmin's *Novyi Gul'* (1924) (left) and Mikhail Kuzmin, ca. 1911 (right). Kuzmin commissioned the vignette-style drawing for the work by Dmitry I. Mitrokhin. The drawing with vignettes, or scenes surrounding the lyric hero, dressed much like Kuzmin and in an uncannily similar position.

Otherwise, formally, the long poem conforms to the genre of the Orphic lyric. The speaker ventures into an underground world (here the cinema) and attempts to retrieve his departed beloved. In the end, the speaker fails to bring the beloved back from the dead but is haunted by the image of the lover in his failure to do so. The poem employs a variety of traditional meters such as dimeter, trimeter, and tetrameter, which change from stanza to stanza. A rhyme scheme varies depending on stanza length, which itself moves from quartets to quintets alternating with quartets, to octets and nine-line stanzas and monolithic stanzas in parts 4 through 6. The poem displays typical neoclassical and romantic imagery alongside modernist imagery.[91]

Kuzmin thought of himself as spectator who had been simultaneously interpellated and invoked by the film and as an interpreter of the film. He dedicates the poem to historian Lev Rakov, an acquaintance whom Kuzmin found to resemble not only Paul Richter in his guise as Hull, but another personal acquaintance, his former lover Vsevolod Kniazev [**Error! Reference source not found.**]. The effect of dedicating the book to Rakov and the addition of "new" to Hull decenters the character Hull of the story by doubling him in at least two opposing directions, one–life and the other–poetry. The actor's resemblance is one is a series of resemblances, most recently his dead

[91] The Soviet critic Viktor Pertsov deemed the cycle too old-fashioned for its "calm cheerfulness of personal life" while Kuzmin's friends were relieved that it had less of the "Khlebnikovism" of his other recent poems and had greater "intimacy and transparency" but found the poem's allusive quality too oblique John E. Malmstad and Nikolaĭ Alekseevich Bogomolov, *Mikhail Kuzmin: A Life in Art* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 319.

lover Kniazev, and his recent love interest(s). Of Rakov, he wrote in his journal of October 10, 1923, before seeing the film, "resembles Kniazev in some way."[92] The poem cycle is almost an early example of fan fiction. However, rather than writing a "new episode" or "ending" in the third person, Kuzmin's address resurrects the dead in a parallel literary present, a palimpsest of memory that holds the potential for another outcome and, most of all, to create new resonances in the present world.

Kniazev, a poet and soldier, shot himself in 1913 at the age of 20. The suicide was reportedly because of unrequited love for Olga Glebova, the future wife of Sergei Sudeikin. However, in Akhmatova's poem, she blames Kuzmin for the young poet's death. Kuzmin was thus doubly blocked from publicly mourning Kniazev in his small community, even outside of any homophobia in the larger society. Anna Akhmatova wrote of Kniazev with reference to the amorous pentacle (for it was more than a triangle, including Sudeikin, Glebova, Kuzmin, Akhmatova, and Alexander Blok, with whom Kniazev is said to have seen Glebova before he committed suicide) in her *Poem Without a Hero* (*Poema bez geroia*).[93] The poem does not have a hero because the would-be hero (Kniazev) died out of emotional weakness and not during a physical struggle or in battle, though he was a soldier. In that poem, she accuses Kuzmin of not mourning Kniazev's death with her: "Old Cagliostro is fooling around/That most elegant Satan/Who does not weep for the dead with me/Who does not know what conscience means/And why it exists."[94] Despite her allegations of callousness, Kuzmin continued to be obsessed with the young poet, basing his more famous *A Trout Breaks the Ice* on the affair as late as 1929. The actor Paul Richter, the actor in the role of Hull and infamously a heartthrob especially beloved by gay men, provided Kuzmin with the opportunity to mourn Kniazev's death in a larger context. Richter also played Siegfried, the epic proto-Aryan hero in Lang's *Die Nibelungen* (1924).[95] He is an ideal analogue to Kuzmin's beloved and, because Hull dies publicly, he can be mourned publicly.[96]

The appearance of an actor that resembled Kuzmin's lover on screen offers him a way to work through publicly, in a mass hallucination, what had been intimate and personal and disavowed publicly. Kuzmin was an openly gay man in pre-Soviet Russia, which opened him to criticism in early Soviet Russia. He published what is widely considered the first gay novel in Russia, *Wings*, in 1906. Unlike some contemporaries who fled the newly Red Russia for émigré existence in Paris, or who were eventually deported to Siberian gulags, Kuzmin stayed after the revolution. Though his work continued to grow and change, it was not appreciated by the new Soviet culture. However, he

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[92] Qtd. in Mikhail Ratgauz, "Kuzmin—Kinozritel," *Kinovedcheskie Zapiski [Film Studies Notes]*, no. 13 (1992).

[93] Anna Akhmatova famously blamed Kuzmin and Olga Sudeikina for causing the soldier and poet Kniazev's suicide on March 29, 1913, at the age of 22. For Akhmatova in her anti-epic poem about Kniazev, *Poem without a Hero* [*Poema bez geroia*], he cannot be a hero as he died out of emotional weakness and not during a struggle or in battle. By some accounts, Kniazev broke off relations with Kuzmin when Sudeikina apparently instrumentalized him, claiming to reciprocate his love for her but then denying him. About dating the poem: Akhmatova worked on the poem between 1940-1943 and finished it in Tashkent where she resided after she was evacuated from St. Petersburg in the Blockade Period. However, she returned to the poem several times and expanded it to twice its original length up until 1965 (she died in March 1966.)

[94] Qtd. in Martin Green and John Swan, *Triumph of Pierrot: The Commedia Dell'Arte and the Modern Imagination* (Penn State Press, 2010), 39–40.

[95] See Kaes, *Shell Shock Cinema*, 138.

[96] Robert Tobin argues that there were often hints of exoticism and homoeroticism in Goethe and the literature of the late Romantic period and that each relied on a phantasmatic desire Robert Tobin, *Warm Brothers: Queer Theory and the Age of Goethe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). The public mourning of a gay partner was a ritual that in America, for instance, was not possible until far into the AIDS epidemic.

also was not heavily persecuted and remained in Leningrad in a communal apartment where he died in 1936 of pneumonia. Perhaps most urgently, he felt the targeting of homosexual activity the Bolshevik regime started to implement at the time he was writing *Novyi Gul'*. Lenin's death on January 21, 1922, caused a struggle to fill the void in power and diary entries from January and February show Kuzmin was not at all hopeful about the future leadership. He wrote in his journal that he was worried about censorship and the raids that had begun on "dens of iniquity," allegedly including brothels employing sailors from the Red Navy base at Kronshtadt.[97]

Ratgauz's essay on Kuzmin, the film spectator, posits and explores Kuzmin's belief in the possibility of "'reading' personal messages in the cinematographic text."[98] Ratgauz argues that "the transfer of romantic dramaturgy into a theatrical space attracts Kuzmin because it allows the synchronous deployment of cultural and biographical meanings, their instantaneous intersection and a diversity of reactions right down to the aggressiveness of the theatrical realism in the auditorium." The two paratextual gestures (the dedication and the footnote), however, offer existential circumstances from the poet's life rather than the context that the theatrical stage provides. They appear to fix the text's meaning as Benjamin warns that allegories do, however, while one anchor humbly promises a hermeneutic activity that will elucidate in a subjectively limited fashion, the other anchor locates the poem in the author's personal memory and returns names to imaginative and affective spaces outside of the diegetic and allegorical.

This latter gesture calls attention to the indexical image's iconicity, and to iconicity's susceptibility to resemblance in excess of the allegorical. The poem could be read as a *poème à clé* (like the *roman à clé*); instead the poem diverts this reading through the film, asking the reader to read it as an allegory for the film and for his personal memory at once, a basically impossible task. The film cannot be read as a *film à clé* for Kuzmin's love affair since Kuzmin did not make it, and yet this is the activity suggested by accepting the paratextual frames' promise to partly fix the film's allegorical meaning subjectively. Reciprocally, however, the paratextual promise of the poem is that the film acts as a key for the poem.

The poem takes its speaker's vocation as transmedial both in content and in form; his mixing of genres (scholarly, interpretative commentary, pedagogical, cinema criticism, and lyric poetry) speaks to the ways in which Kuzmin's lyric is continuous with other genres and media,[99] with the second of the framing mechanisms announcing its intention to act as a kind of film criticism, inviting us to think what film criticism in the form of a poem offers. How might it help us see the lyrical qualities of the cinema? A footnote to the first lines of the poem gives this reason for the poem:

> Hull (*Gul'*) and the hypnotist Mabuse are characters [*deĭstvuiushchie litsa*, действующие лица] in the famous cinematographic picture Dr. Mabuse. Their reciprocal interrelation [*vzaimnootnoshenie*] is partially clarified [*otchasti vyiasniaet'sia*, отчасти выясняеться] in the given [*dannogo,* данного] poem.[100]

In this footnote to the poem, "given" (*dannyĭ*, данный) modifies poem it annotates and signifies in both senses of the word given; as in English, the word has two meanings: the past participle of to

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[97] Malmstad and Bogomolov, *Mikhail Kuzmin*, 322.
[98] Ibid.
[99] On the "montage" quality of *Hull's Strolls*, see Malmstad and Bogomolov, *Mikhail Kuzmin*, 319–20.
[100] Mikhail Alekseevich Kuzmin, *Novyĭ Gul' (Новый Гуль)* (Sankt-Peterburg: Academia, 1924). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

give, as in that which is present, and something to be taken as "fact."[101] The double-meaning of the word returns the reader to the realm of the text as "document," an idea to which Lang steered his audiences at the beginning of this meditation. The annotation of the "given" poem-cum-document belongs to the realm of the academic interpretation or perhaps signals a journalistic mode like the film review. Kuzmin may have written the poem this way in response to the observations as Tynianov makes in an issue of *Russian Contemporary* (*Русский современник*) on the current state of poetry the same year as *Novyi Gul'*. Tynianov's diagnosis of the state of poetry extended the following year to a pronouncement of poetry's imminent death and irrelevance: "The reader of the more recent formation scrupulously avoids poetry, as wares that have aged too much, and plunges into prose… (Entirely recently, the reader somehow started going around both poetry and prose…He immediately goes to chronicles, reviews, opinion.")[102] Kuzmin combines the principles of his "Emotionalism" with a film review. Though the annotation ends, it does so by announcing thereafter that the poem in its entirety constitutes an annotation to the film.

This second paratextual gesture, a rare one for a lyric poem at the time, claims the lyric to be an appropriate form for film analysis. This paratextual footnote marks the printed poem aware of and utilizing the conventions of its printed support. T.S. Eliot had included footnotes in his pioneering *The Waste Land* (1922) just two years before. Yet, Kuzmin also insisted in a letter to V. V. Ruslov, April 29, 1924, on singing the cycle accompanied by music, even before it was entirely finished, making it into one of his librettos, evidencing the importance of the performance aspect of the poem.[103] The performance and sung nature of the poem opens the reading of the poem to ways in which Kuzmin mimicked the film's visual tropes such as the iris shot, for instance in a stanza in which he executes a generic blazon with the only specific characteristic the overuse of the vowel "o" and, in singing, the way it exaggerates and calls attention to his own mouth.

Finally, the poem states its interest in a "reciprocal interrelation" of Edgar Hull (Paul Richter), and "the hypnotist Mabuse"(Rudolf Klein-Rogge). Promising only a "partial" clarification, a kind of chiaroscuro criticism, the poem signals its own unwillingness to definitively separate good from evil and to speak from an omniscient position.

Fluidity and Density: "A *Warm* Hand Reaches Out to You"

In his poem, Kuzmin emphasizes the fluidity of particular densities of media at the very points where two modes of expression, as two languages, cannot touch. In what I am reading as a lyric address to the film, he hones in on and apostrophizes the scene of water [*Figure 3*] as the site of a unified desire for contact and a potential for re-writing the film's premonitions and foregone conclusions.[104]

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[101] See also Rei Terada's use of "given" "in the Kantian sense, meaning appearances that present themselves and the laws and limits that produce them"—for her they are "a figure of the largest fact—not directly perceivable through Kantian critique" Rei Terada, *Looking Away: Phenomenality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno*, 1st edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009), 2.

[102] Yuri Tynianov, *Permanent Evolution: Selected Essays on Literature, Theory and Film*, trans. Ainsley Morse and Philip Redko (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2019), 168. The poem's title, however, belongs to the realm of poetry, evoking Ezra Pounds famous injunction to "make it new."

[103] Gleb Morev, ed., *Mikhail Kuzmin i Russkaia Kul'tura XX Veka* (Leningrad: Sovet po istorii mirovoi kul'tury AN SSSR, 1990), 188.

[104] I contrast this with a scene in the Loge of theater, which emphasizes sight, and in which the poem's first uncertainties multiply.

Unwritten—wet river	Не писанная - мокрая река,
Unghostly—strong oak helm	Не призрачный - дубовый крепкий руль,
Jasmine scent floats from yonder…	Жасминный дух плывет издалека...
Then day's rays kindle into fire	И разгорается заря, пока
While Hull (*Gul'*) won't stop smiling…	Не перестанет улыбаться Гуль...
In love all doubt's dissipation.	В любви расплавятся сомненья.
One spring, one craving!	Одна весна, одно влеченье!
Extended as an invitation,	Протянута, как приглашенье,
A warm hand reaches toward you.	К тебе горячая рука.[105]

But from where does Kuzmin's speaker reach? Kuzmin's negations in the first line followed by dashes in verse resemble the one he uses in his footnote: "Hull and the hypnotist Mabuse—characters (literally, "operative" or "active faces") in the famous cinematographic picture." The dashes in both verse and footnote mark the place where the present tense of the verb "to be" would be.[106] "To be" itself suggests a one-to-one relation that Kuzmin suspends and elides through the dash. Admittedly, the scene in the film is on open water larger than a river and Inspector von Wenck awakens in a small vessel's hull, not quite a strong oak helm. The poem proceeds, then, by recording what is not visible, what is not there, but what the spectator imagines from the components that are.

Figure 3 Question and response editing cuts between Inspector von Wenck awakening (The title of Act V is "The Awakening" (*Das Erwachen*). He awakens in the *hull* of a boat that Mabuse's henchmen launched into the open, hands extended and grasped.

[105] The last two of four stanzas in the first part of the poem were written before the "proem" introduction. I do not claim that they are definitively about this scene but that they correspond in their use of lyric gestures and thematically in conjunctures of elements, if not entirely affectively.

[106] In Russian, the present tense does not conjugate and is simply implied by the juxtaposition of two nouns. The dash is neither conventional nor unnecessary but is sometimes used in this way.

We can see Kuzmin seeks to make way for the filmic image as something conjured out of possibility, out of the "unwritten" and "unghostly," that is, what is neither history nor a foregone cyclical return of an old haunting, in favor of immanence and materiality. It avoids the simplistic mastery of relation that an operation such as interpretation[107] or monetary valuation promises when it says "this thing stands for/is that." Both instances of "is" replaced by "—" draw a connection without an equation; they allow us to see shared aspects and "invite" us with a warm hand to give that relation meaning. The line puts the larger portion and thus weight of the line on the material *quality* of the nouns that represent embodied form.

Twice in the first lines of the excerpt above, through the pressure of the negation and the dash, adjectives resolve into opaque, physical objects with unquestionable material properties (wet river and strong helm). The single horizontal stroke signifies an ambiguous network of meaning; paratactical (non-causal) temporal logic, aspectual similarity, and full equivalence co-exist in balance, physically creating distance separating two elements (potential and material) but also binding them. The first image asks the reader to imagine the unwritten, also the not-yet-written as a fluid, as-yet-unbroken stream. The second reference to a helm ushers in the notion of agency and free will.[108] The lines are not end-stopped but imply a suspension that the ellipsis in the third line manifests, creating both friction and flow within the stanza. The new concept, here translated as "unghostly," connotes a return to opacity after canceling out a kind of projection or transparency. Ghostly and transparent are etymologically related by way of the root word *zrak*, sight or vision, and differ in prefix and stress. "Ghostly," *prízrachnyi* evokes *prozráchnyi*, literally, see-through, pellucid. Importantly, the stress falls differently; the letters align visually and sonically revealing the relation between the two words but the difference of the vocal stress on the first syllable versus the second somewhat obscures that relation, since "transparent' (*prozráchnyi*) would not fit within the exacting iambic pentameter.[109] To insist through cryptography that *transparent*, "(dis)appears" in the poem, a negation of the ghostly, allows the transparency of film to stand as materiality. Transparency is the material quality of film, while ghostliness is the metaphorical meaning assigned to it.[110] This transparency can then signify otherwise. Drawing attention to the projection as an overlay, a calque upon another "reality" allows for the exploration of "reality" itself as a superimposition or double-image of the mind's projections.

Undead Possibilities, Ethical Nudges

Kuzmin's poem puts film's tropes into conversation with the lyric by recognizing the minute gestures of the scene as an iteration of a romantic tradition. The poem fragment above marks this moment, highlighting the qualitative and material contingency of rational investigation on passion and

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[107] I am referring primarily to psychoanalytic interpretation of the kind Sigmund Freud pioneered in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 1899.

[108] Compare free will with the will to power that Dr. Mabuse exhibits. Kuzmin picks up on the language in the intertitles, for instance, one of the intertitles pronounces: "There is no love, only desire! There is no happiness, there is only the will to power" Eisenschitz, *Fritz Lang au travail*, 32. Whereas, Kuzmin writes "In love all doubt's dissipation./One spring, one craving."

[109] Onomatopoetically, vocally, transparent (*prozráchnyi*) has the stress in the middle of the word, emphasizing "sight" that sees through the middle rather than the ghostly (*prízrachnyi*), which has its stress on the prefix emphasizing the "before" of sight or something that preempts and precludes it.

[110] Cryptography is a reading practice by which one can hear a ghostly network of words behind a word without attributing authorial intent. John Shoptaw, "Lyric Cryptography," *Poetics Today* 21, no. 1 (March 1, 2000): 221–62.

sincerity with the line: "A warm hand reaches toward you,"[111] which echoes John Keats' famous line from the fragment "This Living Hand" that is itself full of deixis pointing everywhere and nowhere, "—see here it is—/I hold it towards you." In Keats, the reader is threatened and forewarned:

> This living hand, now warm and capable
> Of earnest grasping, would, if it were cold
> And in the icy silence of the tomb,
> So haunt thy days and chill thy dreaming nights
> That thou would wish thine own heart dry of blood
> So in my veins red life might stream again,
> And thou be conscience-calm'd—see here it is—
> I hold it towards you.[112]

Keats' poem ends with the line, "see here it is — I hold it toward you," a gesture of reaching out and never touching, asking to be held perhaps but also menacing. Unwritten (*ne pisannyi*) in its parallel syllogistically with "unghostly" comes to connote not quite living but not quite dead, perhaps undead, because unfixed in language. Like Keats' hand, Kuzmin's hand reaches from that undead place. The river (the medium, the ray, etc.) is wet, fluid, still slippery with possibility until it hits the screen or the poem.[113] What haunts in Keats figures as an invitation in Kuzmin. What Keats' masterful speaker declares immanent comes across more gently and suggestively in Kuzmin. Keats' poem's speaker creates an interdependency both between reader and speaker and between (the) life and death (of the poem) and invokes the reader's conscience, convincing the reader that they would willingly give their own life for the other through a haunting that is as pervasive and obsessive as mind-control. On the other hand, Kuzmin wishes to make a connection at once transmedial and transcultural, pointing to the surface itself of the medium as a dense present that can be touched in a moment of transduction, embodied translation.

The gesture of invitation that ends the second stanza echoes and makes singular the many hands on the dock in the film that create a kind of chain of hands to catch and rescue von Wenck from being endlessly adrift on open water. It reaches across space within the film world and from the film world out to the poetic speaker. In the same scene, the recently unconscious inspector grabs the hand of a man who offers it to him at the dock and gets back on solid ground. The line also alludes backwards in time to a haunting Romantic poem fragment, "This Living Hand…," which John Keats wrote in the margins of the manuscript for the long poem "The Cap and Bells." In this poem, the speaker

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[111] "Warm" (*goriachaia*) here could also be translated as "burning" in the sense of "ardent" if read as a participle rather than an adjective.

[112] This is a fragment written in the margins of a work Keats was writing for money. Some do not read the piece as a serious effort on his part and use for evidence the fact that he considered publishing it under a pseudonym. However, publishing it under a pseudonym works conceptually with the disembodied hand; both gestures free him from authorship. Others take the haunting atmosphere as a premonition of his own untimely death (he did know that he was sick with tuberculosis when he wrote it.)

[113] Both the unwritten and the unghostly describe the ways in which a phenomenon asserts its will: the water cannot be controlled by a screenplay: the unghostly, or the present material object has, in its opacity, an assertion of will and presence. The Lumière Brothers' "first film" *Small Boat Leaving Port* (*Barque Sortant du Port*, 1895), in which a boat fails to leave the image before the film runs out due to incoming waves, showcases the impossibility of "scripting" nature.

claims his own hypothetically dead hand newly sprung to life with the reader's blood coursing through it.

Endlessly Adrift

Lang himself "resurrects" Hull, a figure for the lyric, by transfiguring him by following the logic of two media beyond that of narrative film; one medium is water and one the other is English itself, linguistic and literal. In both media, the appearance of a rowboat, or hull of a boat is overdetermined just at the moment before Hull must be killed. The subject Hull is transfigured through other material media into an object but the affective quality that Kuzmin's poem underscores as associated with Hull remain consistent. The film gives the spectator two options: identify with the dummy or identify with the way of seeing that Hull represents. As the inspector appears in the boat, we may choose to identify with the inspector in the hull, perhaps himself the representative of the "New Hull." And Kuzmin himself is a detective/theorists partially clarifying —like a detective. Indeed, Many critics have noted that we may be meant to identify with von Wenck as a detective as a role model but that he is compromised and humanized as he flirts lecherously with Countess Told. I thus suggest that a role model detective lies somewhere outside of the film and that it is alluded to through the lyrical gestures described here.

In an equal and opposite move, however, Kuzmin's personal memory becomes part of the collective dream that is the cinema, which alienates him from his own memory. Miriam Hansen has described Benjamin's concept of the optical unconscious as accompanying his belief in film as "a medium in which human 'self-alienation can be put to a highly productive use.'"[114] This reversal that leads "from self-recognition to self-alienation might be productive for creative work and the self-realized claricism" and "emotionalism" that Kuzmin sought in his earlier manifestos. Kuzmin wrote two manifestos about Emotionalism, "Declaration of Emotionalism"(1923) and "Emotionality as a Basic Element of Art" (1924).[115] The first defines Emotionalism rather vaguely as, "the recognition that the essence of art is *to produce a unique and inimitable emotional effect by means of transmission—in a unique and inimitable form—of a unique and inimitable emotional perception.*"[116] However vague this insistent tautological formulation may seem at its core, it is clearly and perhaps counterintuitively against reproductive technologies.[117] He writes that the work of the artist was singular and unique and that the work of the spectator was unique and emotional. The second describes art as against abstraction and automatism:

> This is because the meaning of [emotionalism] is to be located in the howl, the scream against mechanization, automation, dismemberment and disanimation of

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[114] Hansen, Miriam Bratau. "Benjamin's Aura" *Critical Inquiry*. Winter 2008, 40. See also T.S. Eliot, for whom the cinema reminded him of the "impersonality," of media encouraging him to find it in his poetry.
"The point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is that the poet has, not a 'personality' to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways." T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent." *The Sacred Wood.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921.
[115] Kuzmin's manifesto on the importance of clear images, "On Beautiful Clarity" (*O Prekrasnoj Iasnosti*), *Apollon*: 4, 1910, greatly influenced to the Acmeist movement.
[116] Mikhail Alekseevich Kuzmin, *Mikhail Kuzmin Selected Writings*, ed. Michael A. Green and Stanislav Shvabrin (Lewisburg: Bucknell Univ Pr, 2005), 231.
[117] The tautological insistence brings Gertrude Stein's "Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose" to mind, from "Sacred Emily" (1913).

> life, against the technological civilization that has led to war and to the horrors of capitalism—it is in the name of the soul, of humanity, of fact and the individual instance. A revolt against abstraction and ideology on the one hand, against crass deification on the other. A revolt against method and canon. What kind of continuation of Cubism is this—Cubism, deriving, bone of bone, flesh of flesh, from the entire mechanical pre-revolutionary culture.[118]

The reproductive mechanism of film signals for Kuzmin the loss of the intimacy and proximity. And yet he spies in Cubism a kinship that he describes as quite fleshy. He seems torn when trying to distinguish between art that breaks with mechanization and dismemberment but finds himself able to maintain inspiration from the resurrection and aspectual dismemberment of the dead Kniazev (and the pre-revolutionary moment) through his melancholic attachment to Rakov. Rakov could be considered a reproduction of some aspect. Furthermore, the idea of "machines that give birth to more machines" becomes a Soviet dream, as we shall see in the next chapter. His cry for a primal scream or "howl" of emotionalism is a call for a voice to accompany the silent counterpart of film or the *gul* (roar or buzz) of machines. It is not accidental that here I have used so many words for "howl" and have used so many prepositions, "a call for a voice" and "a cry for a scream"—machines can buzz in unison but only the human can do a call and response. This singular voice that rises above a polyphonic hum describes the medieval song category of the "descant."

I do not wish to suggest that lyric is inherently connected to touch, though William Addison Waters has done so brilliantly, relating the very possibility of touch to a subjunctive tense within the lyric.[119] Of Keats' fragment's final line, Waters (whose name's meaning is not lost in this context) writes,

> We are, in other words, caught in an anaphoric muddle. The reader is left (possibly without noticing the fact) with a cloudy sense of whether it is the living hand or the dead one that the poem tries to hold toward us; and if the poem does succeed in haunting us, we can find the origin of that haunting in our uncertainty (carefully prepared by the poem's grammar) as to whether the crucial shape in the poem is living or dead.[120]

Keats makes a long set of conditionals, a subjunctive clause, converge with an immanence consolidated in a hand, "see here it is" through a series of deictic words ("this," "now," thy," etc.), that is, words that need the accompanying embodied gesture of pointing to signify. The poem reminds us that we will all die inevitably even though the idea is constructed in the conditional, and that the living might wish to die if they had another's dead body (for which the hand is a synecdoche) on their conscience. The poem pairs a series of opposites: living/dead, warm/cold, nights/days, thou/I, now/then, manifesting the principle of reversibility, the interface of which in the poem is the hand, which could be interpreted as the poem itself or the reader's hand that the writer has occupied.[121] The interchangeability of the (poetic) object for the human hand (and thus

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[118] Kuzmin, *Selected Writings*, 237.

[119] William Addison Waters, *Poetry's Touch: On Lyric Address* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Laura Marks has also consistently argued cinema's privileged relation to touch Laura U. Marks, *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2000).; Laura U. Marks, *Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). See also Jennifer M. Barker, *The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

[120] Waters, *Poetry's Touch*, 147.

[121] The subjunctive intersubjective relation is elsewhere called the "hypothetical form of what in religion is called the 'I-Thou' relationship" Northrup Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* qtd. in Culler 2009, 886.

body) is striking here as it posits the simulation not of a situation but of a human relation that is first and foremost reliant on relationship with one's capacity to imaginatively give life to other objects.

This reversibility is at the very center of touch. If the living hand begins as the reader's hand, then, through the process of reading the poem, the reader lulls and absolves the guilt-ridden hand. Absolution of guilt comes to stand in for animation and granting life. By allowing it to be replaced with the dead one, which the author has suggested the reader would wish to give up so that the poem's may enter. In other words, one regains one's own hand if one has subscribed to reading "this living hand" as one's own from the beginning and thus consented to imagine one's own death and rebirth as the other. The poem suggests a sacrifice of one's own life such that another can survive but that other is ultimately the self, as one is still left with a living, or perhaps, undead hand once the poem ends. There is no claim to direct touch—only a "toward" at the end—a direction of the flow of life (of blood) from one to another. Taken on its own, without a referent, the reaching towards is an empty gesture of authenticity but when it reaches out rather than points, it opens itself up to being authenticated by a response from another "authentic subject" and transcending its own objectification. This situation is of reaching towards without ever touching or touching as a transcendent or ontological activity. The gesture of pointing, in the filmic index or of deixis in the linguistic one, indicates an object; the indexical act in itself is not mimetic and if anything, it points to the failure of mimesis that occurs here through the indication of the mimetic object.

What happens when poetry reaches toward the cinema, i.e., when a poetic speaker reaches towards an element of the cinematic screen? What happens when cinema reaches towards poetry? In a mise-en-abîme, both media openly obviate their own referentiality in a gesture that rather becomes an invitation, opening a space for the spectator's own "sensation" or authenticity of feeling and experience that is at least potentially pre-symbolic. In Kuzmin's revision of Keats, there is still the ambiguity of what kind of *Gul'* is smiling (whether it is Edgar Hull or Dr. Mabuse), since the scene crosscuts with Mabuse, in fact. Though the mood in the film is more gloomy and sinister, as in the Keats, Kuzmin changes the mood by reframing the hand as warm. In the two preceding stanzas, nature is green and smells of jasmine. Fully experiencing this clearing in multiple dimensions, Kuzmin invokes three senses that escape the cinema's dominion over sight, here directly aligned with Mabuse's surveilling vision and commanding speech of the intertitles : the auditory, the olfactory, and the tactile, as we have seen above.[122]

Lyric Authenticity and the Emptying of the "Authenticity" of the Communicative Act

In his 1964 treatise on the emptying out of authenticity, Adorno focuses on the "objective" and "communicative" forms in which the "authentic" arrives at a primary activity. He proposes it has an actual effect on social life by virtue of solidifying hierarchies and imbuing certain agents with the power of "truth": "Prior to any consideration of particular content, this language molds thought. As a consequence, that thought accommodates itself to the goal of subordination even where it aspires to resist that goal. The authority of the absolute is overthrown by absolutized authority."[123] For

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[122] This effect can occur, too, in contrapuntal montage, for instance in a voiceover that is not illustrative of the image. For example, see Hollis Frampton's (*nostalgia)* (1971) or Jean Eustache's *Les photos d'Alix* (1980). The juxtaposition of text and image creates a negative space, an "unwritten" and "unghostly" space, out of which sensation can emerge.
[123] Theodor W. Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity (Jargon Der Eigentlichkeit: Zur Deutschen Ideologie)*, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (1964; repr., Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 5.

Adorno, "the jargon of authenticity" exists in the same realm as Benjamin's term "aura."[124] Benjamin proposed this sacred word just at the moment when its sacred content was evacuated and "impossible to experience."[125] It is interesting, then, to see it in the 1960s as a way of describing this film, following Lang's claims to the film's documentality. "Absolutized authority" cannot be the meaning behind the "authentic reflection" of which Eisner writes, as a reflection by its very nature is both reified *and* incomplete, it cannot be absolutized. Authenticity purports to describe what comes from a "whole man," while Adorno points out that "the language [of "true" statements] itself– through its generality and objectivity already negates the whole man, the particular speaking individual subject: the first price exacted by language is the essence of the individual."[126] Language that purports to be objective, in other words, i.e., propositional language, destroys the individual.

Lang's film precisely thematizes and reifies the "language" of different kinds of "objective" language, total authenticity, and authority in the character of Mabuse, who is himself purely antagonistic. The "concept," as Lang calls him, and the authority of "Mabuse" is reified. Mabuse communicates with cards of all kinds, photographs, poker cards, *cartes de visite*, and business cards, all forms of reified authenticity.[127] However, within the film, the relay of these reified communications of authenticity break down as messages are left unreceived or unanswered. Aside from the first trick-shot, a superimposed view of Mabuse's face over the abandoned stock market floor after a panic, which effectively equates Mabuse's untouched and unaffected "whole" image (shown as a monumental bust) with the chaos of unstable markets in a propositional phrase, the film shows Mabuse constantly seeking to be the cause of some effect. What underscores this desire, however, is that his power is diminished in acts of communication. Beyond language, gesture, is foregrounded as primarily communicative yet dependent on relation. In one of the first scenes, Mabuse faces the camera as he hands a note over his shoulder without looking back, believing his assistant to be there to receive it [*Figure 4*].

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[124] Walter Benjamin, *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1927-1934*, ed. Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
[125] Adorno, *Jargon of Authenticity*, 9.
[126] Ibid., 14.
[127] For more on the history of identity cards and reified authenticity, see Valentin Groebner, *Who Are You?: Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe*, trans. Mark Kyburz and John Peck (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 2007).

Figure 4 Mabuse passes an image back but Spoerri leaves him hanging. The spectator might "take" the card by imagining the image upon it but that projection from the "mind's eye" of Mabuse disappears during the suspension.

He is not, and the message remains in suspension; the fact that Mabuse faces the camera but does not break the fourth wall makes this gesture into an indirect address, a variant of the "hand reaching out to you." The suspension foregrounds the exchange that must occur and the viewer is implicitly faced with the choice of whether to accept the message. A preceding "pure" subjective shot unattached from any particular subjectivity and therefore directly in and of the viewer's already delivered the message of what "lies in the cards—as a kind of table of contents for the film, the inevitable narrative about to unfold and, with it, an unavoidable fate. This shot will be discussed further on. However, the concern here is with the receiver's position in the rear. The cards, which picture faces of characters, lie face down; the shot does not intimate which particular card he holds and it is left to the viewer's imagination. The cards serve as floating signifiers and as he holds the card in the rear and imbues it with what he sees in the off-screen frontal space slightly askew from the audience, the spectator herself appears as the medium and the message. Rather than helping mobilize the plot, the spectator is invoked into immanence.

In its non-reconciliation of the objectivity of language and the individual, Adorno warns that the jargon of authenticity becomes violently *einsatzbereit*, a modern paramilitary term for "mobilized." It is easily instrumentalized; "The perpetual charge against reification" reified.[128] He makes an analogy with dramatic technique that it "falls under Richard Wagner's definition of a theatrical effect as the result of an action without agent, a definition which was directed against bad art."[129] Scenes such as the ones above foreground the friction in the message and, in that suspension, the agents on both sides appear in the flesh. Otherwise, the message is delayed or misunderstood, or is outright

[128] Adorno, *Jargon of Authenticity*, 10.
[129] Ibid., 9.

nonsense. Such is the case for several animated intertitles and superimpositions which suggest themselves as partway between utterance and hallucination such as, "Tsi-Nan-Fu" and "Melior," both of which are original to the movie and do not appear in the novel. They operate suggestively during the hypnosis scenes but their meaning remains indefinite.[130]

Jargon in this sense refers to a disembodied notion of fate without the Greek or Roman gods. By reifying them, the film makes imperfect "gods" of the humans behind every action. In his 1957 essay, "On Lyric Poetry and Society," Theodor Adorno speaks of the possibility for non-violent reconciliation between the subject and the "objective" or "other" medium of language in "the subject's own voice." He writes:

> [L]anguage itself speaks only when it speaks not as something alien to the subject but as the subject's own voice. When the 'I' becomes oblivious to itself in language it is fully present nevertheless; if it were not, language would become a consecrated abracadabra and succumb to reification, as it does in communicative discourse. But that brings us back to the actual relationship between the individual and society. It is not only that the individual is inherently socially mediated, not only that its contents are always social as well. Conversely, society is formed and continues to live only by virtue of the individuals whose quintessence it is…In the lyric poem the subject, through its identification with language, negates both its opposition to society as something merely monadological and its mere functioning within a wholly socialized society. But the more the latter's ascendancy over the subject increases, the more precarious the situation of the lyric becomes.[131]

As Adorno shows, the lyric exists on a spectrum. Communicative discourse is functional and necessitates the social frame in order to complete its function. The antagonistic subject likewise necessitates the societal frame against which their antagonism is expressed. The privileged space of the lyric is the dialectical sublimation of these two stances in language. The equivalent of this relationship between subjective and objective voice in cinema would have to occur through the gaze of the camera, which frames the profilmic, that which comes before the camera, through different means. Those "omniscient" or "objective" camera styles presumably seeking merely to communicate what is going on to further the plot reify the world as fact. Those that are subjective from the point of view of a character, are meant to further suture the viewer into the fantasy by offering one of many positions within that world, still as a communicative act through which to understand "monadological" character thought processes, motives, etc., within and in tension, "inherently

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[130] If its Latinate root is exploited, then perhaps it represents the perpetual quest for improvement and the desire for something more than what one has. Another possibility is a reference to the dematerialization value through Fordism, inflation and speculation that was destabilizing the heavily indebted, post-Treaty of Versailles Germany in 1922, which is a phantom of the plot of the film and of the figure of Mabuse. Even if only a slant-rhyme by coincidence, the detective's hallucination of the name "Melior," reminds one of [Carl] Melchior's statements. Melchior, who negotiated the treaty said in 1923, reflecting on the period of economic and political destabilization, "As a result of these privations, social dislocation through the submersion of our best circles, namely the educated middle class, and finally through the feeling of hopelessness and national despair, a condition of general nervous excitement has set in […] Among us, eight or nine of every ten men is suffering from nervous illness" Niall Ferguson, *Paper and Iron: Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation, 1897-1927* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 432.

[131] Theodor W. Adorno, "Lyric Poetry and Society ("Redeüber Lyrik Und Gesellschaft)," in *Notes to Literature*, trans. Sherry Weber Nicholsen, vol. 1 (1957; repr., New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 65.

antagonistic" to that world, which is itself antagonistic.[132] However, those that reveal themselves to be subjective but not from the point of view of any character within the story world draw attention to the language, in "the subject's own voice," and suspends one between the poles of the subject in/with/against the world through language and the instrumentalization and reification of that same world.

Building up these contexts is one methodological way of creating other speculative stages for the film that show the lyric's precarity and constant possible slippage into psychology, plot, and allegory as Adorno avows. The construction of contexts allows the reader to see the moments of pivot between context and circumstance, between observation and invocation, that the lyric mode performs and, in its performance, really makes possible.

Is That the Lyric, "Or is That You?"

The lyric is not about the self-enclosed nature of the object but rather the subjective nature of the object (where mise en scène intervenes with objecthood). When the poem has a speaker (i.e. what is understood as a subjectivity) it is then about the relationship between the individual subject and the objective conditions and that subjectivity's formation in relation — not the context but the objective conditions and the subject's continuous existence with those other elements.[133] How does one put the subjective in relation with the objective? How does the individual correspond with the document? In Bellour's account of "dissymetrical expectancy" above, he gives the example of the dead time between one character leaving the scene and another entering without the camera moving at all. In this example, the camera sees as a third-person, omniscient narrator all the way through. This technique certainly suspends the time of the communicative mode of plot and leaves one with the language of the camera and the world as one. However, in Lang, there are other instances, notably in *M* (1931), where the camera mimics the subjective first-person POV while the detective scans a room for clues. As the camera's viewpoint fixates on a trash basket, it remains fixed there, only to have the same detective meant to be the owner of the view walk into the frame, making the first-person shot into a third-person, omniscient one, that is still heavily embodied based on its previous movement and its continuity. However, the third person shot is imbued with the quality of the subjective that came before it, even more so because there is no edit and it is part of one continuous shot. The viewer sees that the camera is a subjective shot, even when it purports to be omniscient.

P. Adams Sitney has described a different kind of suspension in viewpoint based on editing in his inventory of rhetorical gestures in film that he calls poetic. One of the most compelling is the zeugma he identifies in Dmitry Kirsanoff's *Ménilmontant* (1926), whose lyric equivalent might be either an enjambment or a shifting pronoun as we see in Kuzmin. A poetic, because pronominal and thus subjective ambiguity arises in the suspense of a countershot that would reveal from whose point of view the camera is showing the scene [134]. Do I see what the protagonist, "she," sees? Or do I see as a first-person? "I" see, where the "I" of the spectator is very much intertwined with the "I" of the protagonist? The effect of that strategy, Sitney argues, is that it confronts the viewer with their

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[132] Ibid., 65.
[133] Martin Heidegger's notion of "dwelling" in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking"(1951) and fourfold relations inform this notion of the "poetic" human or Dasein. See Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (1971; repr., New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2013).
[134] P. Adams Sitney, *The Cinema of Poetry*, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

own projected expectations, in this case very much aligned with the character's at that moment, and then breaks the projection. The omission or at least suspension of a point-of-view shot allows the spectator to become a character, who is very much aligned but not identical with the character they suppose is behind the camera. Their gaze performs in the guise of a persona and then performs as itself in comparison. This non-identical alliance is very similar to the one of lyric speaker and lyric poet. In *Mabuse,* the spectator is asked to inhabit the viewpoint that was supposed to be Mabuse's, the omniscient one that is the classical view of the camera's perspective when its primary purpose is the communication of story. However, here this omniscience is tainted and subjectivized by its association with Mabuse's supposed one.

The omniscient camera is thus still a persona the spectator is made wary of putting on, an event akin to Adorno's description of what happens in the lyric occurs. Adorno writes, "...in acquiring self-consciousness as a literary language, in striving for an absolute objectivity unrestricted by any considerations of communication, language both distances itself from the objectivity of spirit, of living language, and substitutes a poetic event for a language that is no longer present."[135] When Adorno writes "absolute objectivity" here, one can also understand it as a subjective objectivity.[136] The identification of the camera with the character's viewpoint as a necessity for communicating story ceases and an identification with an absolute (but not omniscient) point of view, with seeing more generally, begins abruptly. Thus, as in *M*, the inspector himself comes under inspection and the image takes on the quality of inspecting outside of the framework of the narrative and the theatrical context rather than communicating what the inspector in the story sees.

A similar shift in Kuzmin's poem moves the third person description to second person address. Precisely the first-person speaker's uncertain relation to the addressee undermines any similarity with the interpellative mode. The first lines of the poem in the introductory section, which Kuzmin wrote last and bear the lines that Kuzmin footnotes, initially display a third-person omniscient narrative distance from the film, providing a neutral summary of the story itself and transitioning to an account of the strange occasion of *uznavanie* (recognition) for the visitation of the muse. A lyric encounter, however, occurs when Kuzmin directly addresses not the entire discourse but a character who by all rights of the classical narrative formula should not be able to hear him.

The American, the young Hull {*}
Was killed by Doctor Mabuse
He so resembles… Perhaps that's the rule
That prompted the muse?
For I had completely forgotten
What sort he was on screen!
…
I recognize everything… there he sits
(or is that You?) in the loge.
Mabuse looks in from afar…

You took your head in your hands… Lord!
infatuation, trysts, casino…
But the gunshot was predetermined long ago
Американец юный Гуль {*}
Убит был доктором Мабузо:
Он так похож... Не потому ль
О нем заговорила муза?
Ведь я совсем и позабыл,
Каким он на экране был!

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[135] Adorno, "Lyric Poetry and Society," 44.
[136] The phrase "subjective objectivity" has been used by and about independent documentary filmmakers such as Jonas Mekas in his essay "The Diary Film" and about Albert and David Maysles to describe their approach, see Jonathan B. Vogels, *The Direct Cinema of David and Albert Maysles* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 8. James Blue describes this stance as "alert passivity" and "self-effacement." (qtd. in Vogels).

Все узнаю... вот он сидит
(Иль это Вы сидите?) в ложе.
Мабузо издали глядит...

Схватились за голову... Боже!
Влюбленность, встречи, казино...
Но выстрел предрешен давно.

Kuzmin rhymes "Muse" with "Mabuse" and thus, through the internal acoustic properties and coincidence of language appears through another kind of logic (sonic) to rival Mabuse in its ability to control and "sing" the world (rather than narrate or dictate). Kuzmin harnesses the destabilizing power of the muse and the muse's "point of view," the logic of which is "resemblance," which allows for the poet's "recognition." The appearance of the muse in the poem is motivated by the same resemblance (though in the materiality of language rather than in the physical embodiment) to which he attributes the speaking of the muse. The allegorical reading that Kuzmin sets up through remarking on the resemblance between the Mabuse and the muse is interesting to trace, as well, (and I will do a bit further on in my discussion of Mabuse as anti-lyric).

Kuzmin writes first a statement and then, hesitating, a question, that turns the third person narration and a posture of omniscience into the knowledge that comes from anamnesis, or having been in the scene before. "I recognize everything," he writes. His knowledge, practically speaking, may come from repeated viewing of the film but this repeated viewing, he also recognizes, has formed him as a subject through negation.[137] This knowledge produces the capacity for the address of the omniscient in a personal vein, which is nonetheless filled with uncertainty: " I recognize everything… there he sits/(or is that You?) in the loge." The loge onscreen is in a theatrical world but Kuzmin strips away the loge and sees the "you" in the theater's cinematic representation.[138] The ethical stakes of this reframing strategy are rather large, as this takes the fictional, filmic world, that world on screen, out of its purely theatrical dimension and places it on par with the poet's world. The poet, knowing himself to be constructed by the narrative, wishes to bridge the mythical chasm of "unrelation."[139] With the invocation of a beloved who cannot hear or see him, here figured as a simple pawn in Mabuse's game (not un-ironically sitting in the place of a spectator, in the Loge). In a sense, Kuzmin addresses himself represented on screen and emphasizes how the camera aids in the interactivity of the lines of site in the loges.

This set up where the audience space is connected by the camerawork without priority given to the spectacle on the stage is akin to late-eighteenth century French experiments in "lyric theater." In "Architectural Visions of Lyric Theater and Spectatorship in Late-Eighteenth-Century France," Downing A. Thomas writes,

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[137] We might understand this account of subject formation as "bad conscience," or internalization, i.e. a "passionate attachment to *prohibition,* which is itself figured as "turning back on oneself." This process is at the heart of the Orpheus myth, which Cavarero discusses at length in Cavarero, *Relating Narratives.* For a discussion of the account in Freud and Nietzsche, see Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford University Press, 1997), 69. This account of subject formation is relevant to the discussion of "This Living Hand" as well.

[138] See Evgenii Bauer's *Daydreams* (*Gryozy* 1915) for a theatricalization of such an instance where the spectator "falls into" the theater piece when he believes he recognizes his dead wide Yelena on stage. The camera enacts his point of view by reframing the stage in a medium shot, isolating the actress from the theatrical frame. The camera cuts from a long shot to a medium shot, interspersed with the audience member shifting in his seat to single himself out and peer closer. The medium shot excludes both social and dramatic context and leaves only existential, circumstantial context. The film follows through on the complete repercussions of this kind of reframing in the theater where the theatrical frame is still there and immediately continuous with the viewer's world. In the cinema spectator's experience, however, such a relationship is purposefully invoked, nurtured, and encouraged in the lyric mode.

[139] Cavarero, *Relating Narratives*, 99.

> The architects of the lyric theater began to emphasize the horizontal space of the stage and moved to create an inclusive, circular space for the audience, bringing the spectator into closer contact with the stage and altering the relationship between spectators...[T]he move to eliminate the *merveilleux* [the supernatural, usually in the vertical space, such as floating angels] in the lyric theater, together with the new conception of the theatrical experience implicit in this move, favored the architectural creation of a self-reflexive public space. However, as it appeared in designs by Louis-Étienne Boullée and Charles de Wailly toward the end of the century, this public space became increasingly closed, over-determined, and uninhabitable. Cochin's plan sought to make the space of the stage and that of the audience converge...Cochin's project marks a desire for a high degree of intervisibility and intercommunication among spectators. Architects and theorists complained about the division that the loges and their decor inflicted upon the unity of the theatrical space.[140]

In the spirit of the horizonal, Kuzmin's address to "you" could be construed as an address to the reader. In addition, it implicitly asks the reader to admit or at least entertain their identification with the blond hero while the poet performs a parallel identification with the anti-hero Mabuse. Though architects complained about obstructions, those very objects also populate the world in Lang's loge and, rather than simply announcing themselves as the furniture of verisimilitude, offer another layer of uncertainty. A defamiliarizing lampshade, for example, is precisely that which partially obscures and while cannot be turned into symbol, what is not yet stage scenery definitively lying "in tatters."[141]

Kuzmin's intervention shows how Mabuse's hypnotic and objectifying gaze might be understood to be a repressed homosexual desire. Indeed, within the story of the film, Mabuse does display a need to be recognized in order for his plan to work. One begins to question whether needing to be recognized is a greater need than the need to control. Mabuse's gaze is a prototype for the widely applicable theory of the "male gaze" in cinema, associated with the voyeur and the fetishistic objectification of the female body. However, here Mabuse's gaze objectifies Hull. Kuzmin's poem reframes Mabuse's third-person, that is, unimplicated gaze—"There he sits"—, by aligning himself with it, as he comes to embody a gaze that is parallel to Mabuse's but quickly pivots to a second-person address —"(or is that you?)—that is in relation. Reading the film from the strong transposition of the gaze into Kuzmin's lyric speaker's infatuation with Richter allows this aspect of Mabuse's own gaze to come to the fore and for the mood and erotic charge of Mabuse's frustrated desires (which he himself frustrates by constantly disguising himself). Furthermore, Kuzmin's second person address interrupts the third person or omniscient narration aligned with Mabuse's initially all-pervasive gaze that is more strictly aligned with story and discourse, exposing the discourse precisely in order to allow for a horizontal relation between individuals rather than the hierarchical interpellation of the passive viewer into an ideological order or suture into a fantasy in which the viewer has no specific position, a non-position complicated by the properties of the photographic, a claim to which we will return.

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[140] Downing A. Thomas, "Architectural Visions of Lyric Theater and Spectatorship in Late-Eighteenth-Century France," *Representations* 52 (October 1, 1995): 55–57.

[141] See *Figure 18* "Binocular" seeing in the loge scene of *Dr. Mabuse*.

Bridging the Mythical Chasm of "Unrelation"

There is something even more ambiguous than a lyric's subjective or objective attitude,[142] which is also hinted at in the nature of the document as an object that is a performative act made by two or more people. This condition of being between subjective and objective is true of the camera's POV, too[143] – the position of an observer, witness, or overhearer[144], someone positioned obliquely from the main action but still "meant" by it. This position's subjectivity is not defined only by either of the visual or verbal address (as the spectator would be sutured into either an omniscient or subjective POV by a combination of editing and camera movement). This can also happen in editing and through delayed temporality or with "dissymmetrical expectancy." However, it can be invoked simply through the mise en scène without need of editing or camera movement by what I will here call the apostrophic situation or circumstance. In *Dr. Mabuse*, the "invocation" of the spectator's evaluative faculty occurs through mise en scène and a feeling that remains in the spectator rather than being re-appropriated by the image. This residing in the spectator whether conducted temporally or in through mise en scène (often both), becomes important, especially in light of the ways in which, through interpellation and suture, that fascism and its charismatic leaders operate by stirring up emotion and then stream-lining it through their own "authenticity."

Judith Butler takes up Adriana Cavarero's assertion that the address of the omniscient third person and of the narrative itself turns that narrative into discourse but the narrative itself cannot hear this address. Instead, another individual might. Butler writes that this address is necessary as a precondition of self-knowledge and self-narration, asserting, "The moment the story is addressed, it assumes a rhetorical dimension that is not reducible to a narrative function, and further that address, as non-narrative, is nevertheless what supports narrative itself."[145] It is clear that the act of addressing the screen gives the viewer agency, even if the screen cannot hear but that address, from any position, allows the story to go on, nonetheless exposing the other subjects of the narration and establishing different temporalities without the same foregone conclusion as the narration's.

This observation brings to the fore the primary existential condition of exposure, a physical, visual and relational sense of being that seems at the heart of the difference between the lyric and the cinematic as the metaphor of exposure presumes visuality. However, language also has the ability to expose, and a logic of resemblance governs the formation of the subject and its subjection to "language" in both. As Butler writes, "The possibility of the 'I,' of speaking and knowing the 'I,' resides in a perspective that dislocates the first-person perspective whose very condition it

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[142] For a specifically German history of the classification of the lyric as subjective or objective and for the ways in which these two designations have been used outside of genre delineations, i.e. the lyric can be both objective and subjective, see René Wellek, "Genre Theory, the Lyric, and Erlebnis (1967)," in *The Lyric Theory Reader: A Critical Anthology*, ed. Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014). Wellek signals and concludes that "*Erlebnis* became the shibboleth of German poetic theory," and defining lyric by terms related to *Erlebnis* such as "subjective, presence, *Stimmung* (atmosphere)—only bring the critic to "a complete impasse" (50). Wellek does not acknowledge how these aspects of *Erlebnis* change with time and form and thus might still provide a useful overall paradigm for the lyric. For an account of the "experience economy," its relation to noir film and the failure of experience (i.e. *Erlebnis*) in the cinema (including its dialectical restitution into *Erfahrung* in modernity) see Thomas Elsaesser, "Between Erlebnis and Erfahrung : Cinema Experience with Benjamin," *Paragraph* 32, no. 3 (November 1, 2009): 292–312.

[143] This idea is elaborated upon in Chapter Two and in the writings of Dziga Vertov on the Kino-Eye.

[144] Later, I propose an "écouteur," signaling our privileging of the "voice" over the gaze of a "voyeur"

[145] Judith Butler, "Giving an Account of Oneself: A Critique of Ethical Violence," *Diacritics* 31, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 34.

supplies."[146] Addressing the screen is tantamount to pointing out the necessity that inherent in language and language-use is the fact that language precedes one, as does the story here that has "long been written"(as above) or here "predetermined long ago." The "I-You" address includes the story within it but actualizes it. Butler asks "We are not mere dyads on our own, since our exchange is mediated by language, by conventions, by a sedimentation of norms that are social in character. So how are we to understand the impersonal perspective by which our personal encounter is occasioned and disoriented?"[147] The question relies on the personal encounter's need of the use of deictic markers such as "this" and the pronoun "I," which "in its very substitutability, undercuts the specificity it seeks to indicate."[148] For Butler, this very fact ushers in a plurality of temporalities of norms by which the subject seeks to make itself recognizable in narration, and likewise, just as many possibilities for narrating a single subject. "I live a vector of temporalities," she writes, and this plurality, for which the condition of singularity is "the fact of exposure," itself constitutes a "we." Kuzmin creates his "we" with the "you" he addresses on screen, the future victim of Mabuse's gaze, and seeks to create that relation outside of the temporality (predetermined) of that external gaze. He does so through sensorial details and evocative memory and through the gesture of reaching out, that is, outside of the laws to which their mutual purely visual exposure are subject under Mabuse's gaze.

Configurating Gesture, I : Sitting on the Fourth Wall

Figure 5 "I ordered Hawasch and Spoerri for 6 o'clock… Why aren't they here yet--!?" Dr. Mabuse addresses his assistant but faces dummy heads on his dressing table. They "sit on the fourth wall," intercepting a direct address. The intertitles have "signs of orality" (Chion).

The most obvious interpellation Mabuse performs on screen is of his minions but this address is also overheard by the audience, and in our place onscreen, dummy heads. In the above image, [*Figure 5*] in the beginning of the fifth act just after he has gassed Inspector von Wenck and awaits the news of his status, we see him in such a scene. Here he first turns to face the door and yells for "Whisky"

[146] Ibid., 23.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid., 25.

and then, when his minion Pesch (Georg John, né Georg Jacobsohn) comes in, he faces the dummies as he says that he asked for Hawasch and Spoerri to be there at 6 o'clock and asks why they are not yet there. The intertitle is presented in quotes and ends with the expressive signs "--!?" As Michel Chion points out, Lang's intertitles in *Dr. Mabuse* are highly expressive, the punctuation registering "signs of orality" such as hesitation, frustration, and "breathlessness," almost like a score.[149] The address' theatricalization and the embodiment of the interpellation undermines it. As Mabuse turns again to face his underling, he hurls his body towards him but does not actually lunge after him. This movement is enough to make the man cower and duck out of the door as we cut to von Wenck in his boat, awakening and then cuts back to Spoerri entering the room with the Inspector's wallet and accessories which he has just stolen.

Throughout the scene, the dummies sit on the fourth wall facing Mabuse directly in his line of sight and vituperation. Lang continued to use this technique in later films such as *Fury* (1936), providing an intermediate position between screen and audience. The dummy heads' placement in the shot makes it so that they intercept his address, though as with the question-response editing he does not realize it. Though they cannot really be addressed due to their inanimate nature, nonetheless, the intercepted interpellation activates them. When he tries to pour himself more whiskey and sees the bottle is empty, he slams the empty bottle upon the dressing table and one of the dummy heads serendipitously shakes, animating the inanimate. In the definition and description of the effects of apostrophe, this animation is key.[150] The dummy suggests a response to an overheard address or the kind of animation accomplished in lyric apostrophe. In apostrophe, there is a cathexis in an object based on the shared animation of the speaker and the reader, placing themselves in the spirit of that particular object and its animated qualities.[151] The dummies, in their position as the unacknowledged audience, still stand in for that audience, are a figure for a specifically ignorant audience. His address to the actual audience becomes akin to an address to one who is "absent" in the sense of "absent-minded," a bit like the minions who can't satisfy Mabuse. But as the audience gets to witness the address, overhearing while the minion gets the actual interpellation, this position allows for some distance, and the in the shaking dummy head the dead allegory, and the fixed or stagnant qualities of the dummy head and its metaphors, and the way they carry over to the audience are also shaken.

Here, the address doubles the dummies on both sides of the ledge they sit on; the fictional world and the "real" world of the spectator. Though other metaphors for cinema would suggest that these dummies are sitting on a "window" ledge of a certain reality, a picture frame, which can be read allegorically, or that that they provide a "mirror" reflection of the spectator metaphorically, the way that they appear here suggests that they are rather sitting on a theatrical stage, one that reflects all of the previous suggestions but also blocks them through a more opaque doubling. This doubling blocks interpretation and rather invokes the spectator to participate in the scene, confronting the spectator by creating an encounter of the self as other. The dummies both have front row seats to and are sitting *on* the stage. The dummy heads repeat the tradition of the *Rückenfigur* in German Romanticist painting (see David Caspar Friedrich's *Woman at the Window*, 1822*,* and *Wanderer above the Sea Fog,* c. 1818) since we see them from behind and are asked to "step into" their heads but also blocks the spectator from identification since one cannot see the figure's face and thus emotion.

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[149] Michel Chion, *Words on Screen*, trans. Claudia Gorbman (2013; repr., New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 50.
[150] In other scenes, Hull sits across from Mabuse in a loge and on a table to both of their rights is a strange lamp. It keeps shaking, providing uncanny animation to an abstract object. This more subtle animation is echoed more bluntly on stage with huge heads of dragon-like animals, each part of which moves independently (cheeks, lips, eyes, etc.)
[151] Culler, "Apostrophe."

The indirect, in fact wayward address that is inadvertently intercepted in the animated dummy heads complicates all of the above metaphors for viewing. Mabuse's indirect address of the dummies also intercepts and implies the spectator. The address draws spectator attention to the liminal space between screen-world and movie theater and doubles the spectator in the same way. By foregrounding the frame and placing the addressee, decidedly one incapable of hearing (a dummy—the audience member could not speak to the world on screen and would not be heard) upon it, Lang theatricalizes Mabuse's interpellation and the audience member's own participation in the drama of subjectivization. Mabuse's address, representing "technologies of influence" (Crary), fails and the frame falls away (as with a mise-en-abîme) to reveal the lyric utterance of a morally vulnerable "self" that is called Mabuse. He cannot make recourse to his personae (the inanimate dummies themselves cannot "recognize" him). Making reference to a frame of reference as a theatrical frame, in other words, allows it to fall away as artificial and the result is a lyric utterance, both authentic and immanent. In the dummy scene, there is a frame but the frame is of the theater. It thus draws attention to its own frame and negates it just as the figure itself is doubled inside and outside the world of that frame.[152]

Period Styles: Poetic Realism and Identarian Imaginaries

Doubling and in particular the Doppelgänger figure relies on both identification and dis-identification, and has been a trope in literature from Romanticism through Expressionism. John David Pizer writes of the particularly Poetic Realist (c. 1848 to the end of the 19th century) iteration of this trope as an ambivalent relation to totality, revealed through the dialectic of ego and alter-ego.[153] In his book *Ego Alter-Ego*, Pizer argues that for German Poetic Realism, the ego and alter-ego are psychic totalities. During this period, the two were usually near physical copies of each other and GPR's "Others" were frequently "doubles" though these are not "interchangeable terms,"[154] the other being a foreign entity and the double being familiar. He writes that the Poetic Realist movement in German Post-Romantic literature was characterized by a search for an aesthetic totality, especially in characterization, not so unlike Romanticism in the end, though its totality was psychological rather than fantastical or supernatural, though this is not a hard line. Pizer argues that the sociopolitical elements are usually subtle or not at all there in comparison with the period just before it, the *Vormärz* phase (1830-47). Mabuse seems to incorporate that earlier, more politically overt time in its themes and urban setting but not in the story itself. This search for totality occurred through the "[G]hostly haunting of the self by its Doppelgänger, brought on by the self's own guilty imagination"[155] and "the perfecting of the empirical with a 'projective totality.'"[156] Unlike the Romantic totality of universality, totality could also manifest as "a totality of ethical absence and spiritual lack."[157] In one sort of Poetic Realist doublings, parallels in the personal history of the author and a character replace physical resemblance.[158] In line with this iteration, many critics have

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[152] More on how the lyric necessitates the falling away of the theatrical frame below. The signifiers are freed of their associative worlds and allowed to associate with other signifiers in a deconstructionist manner.
[153] See Otto Ludwig, whose essays gave Poetic Realism its name according to some. Discussed in John David Pizer, *Ego-Alter Ego: Double And/As Other in the Age of German Poetic Realism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 4.
[154] Ibid., 3.
[155] Ibid., 17.
[156] Ibid., 6.
[157] Ibid., 10.
[158] Ibid.

conjectured Mabuse stands in for Lang and for the director's desire to control the spectator's experience of the film.

He would also have to stand in, then, for Lang's inability to control his own creation and its reception by the spectator, a problem that he nonetheless seeks to mitigate through his own breed of projective totality. Paul Coates argues that both the reader of fiction and the author go through a process of "identifying" with aspects of figures in a fiction and that each character is a fragment.[159] However, once the doubled-self manifests discretely in a medium, the Double gains an independent life as the Other. The effect is further exaggerated by figures for resemblance such as physical doppelgängers as well as other types of frustrated identification include between a double in name where the referent does correspond. As we saw in "This Living Hand," both the subjunctive tense and the address to the reader that interrupts the third-person descriptive mode doubles the living hand with which the reader may identify into a cold, dead, and ghostly one that haunts the guilty reader. What defines guilt here is unclear but perhaps the very thought that the living is unattached from the dead is a guilty one, and the reader is asked to identify as a way of grieving.[160] This "cold" one counter-intuitively takes on a life of its own. What is utterly empirical, the material hand constructed through sensual detail becomes a fantastical and eventually ethereal one that forces the reader to identify just as they disidentify (as the once "living" hand becomes cold and dead).

The empirical world thus attains what might be an "overlay," a doubled reality courtesy of the haunting ghostly hand or predetermined gunshot in Kuzmin, anchored in the address and the presumption to know the reader's innermost desires or, in this case, guilt. The "overlay" is completed by the deixis that locates the "fantasy" hand in the empirical world. The doubling property of the address breaks what otherwise begins as a descriptive narration anchored by the deictic. By the end of "This Living Hand," after first establishing a parallel "living hand" that would be dead, the reader's own hand is finally invoked with the words "see—here it is" as there is no other hand to see but the reader's own—still presented to the addressee as a separate object. Two worlds, that of the "fact" of the haunting (really an identification with a psychological state brought on by a guilty conscience) and that of "fantasy" provided in the disidentification underscored by the subjunctive are echoed in the shift from narration to address.

Kuzmin's "There he sits" directly parallels Keats' "This living hand" in an objective third person narration or description that becomes overlaid with the second-person relation. In the dummy scene, the dummies are the empirical and the audience could stand in for the subjunctive or fantastical outside of interpellation. They are that which described in the narration, what can be called a "reality effect" a certain excess detail that convinces the viewer that this scene does indeed

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[159] Qtd. in Pizer, 2.

[160] Butler writes about Freud's evolving sense of identification as a continuing form of attachment to the lost object, and specifically its incorporation in the process of mourning its loss. However, melancholic identification occurs when that lost object is unacknowledged or repressed by the society at large, relevant for the discussion of the type of identification Kuzmin explores. "Insofar as identification is the psychic preserve of the object and such identifications come to form the ego, the lost object continues to haunt and inhabit the ego as one of its constitutive identifications. The lost object is, in that sense, made coextensive with the ego itself. Indeed, one might conclude that melancholic identification permits the loss of the object in the external world precisely because it provides a way to preserve the object as part of the ego and, hence, to avert the loss as a complete loss." Judith Butler, "Melancholy Gender/Refused Identification," in *The Judith Butler Reader*, ed. Sarah Salin (1997; repr., Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 246.

take place in Mabuse's dressing room.[161] But they are also that which is addressed through the dramatic and wayward "mis-interpellation" of address and gesture (the fist hitting the table) that they spontaneously intercept, becoming animated. By way of the gaze, which is an embodied deictic maker akin to pointing to where the address might go, a subjunctive address occurs. Mabuse displays what occurs when the negative affect is combined with the apostrophe in poetry.

In a gestural equivalent of the vocative function, Mabuse inadvertently apostrophizes the inanimate dummy head in a manner befitting him, that is violently, with his hand slapping down upon the table next to them; with this gesture, Mabuse wills the audience itself into animation. However, this embarrassing gesture—for the audience knows these heads are deaf and dumb—surprises the audience with its efficiency. The gesture animates the heads by causing the table upon which they sit to shake and thus making them move almost magically, especially because of the way their shaking befits the kind of fear that Mabuse seeks to instill. In this case, his message is not necessarily received as such by his lackey but even the objects in the room are formed by the force of it. And yet he also constitutes his self through the unfortunate apostrophic "thou" of a dummy. The audience may choose to step aside of that address and just watch the spectacle he makes of himself. Perhaps what is most thrilling about this scene is our inability to know if it was planned or an accidence but the cinematic medium was in either case there to record poetic power.

In this process, Mabuse emerges as a poet of the anti-lyric. The obvious ways in which he doubles the figure of the poet are at least two. Firstly, he has personae like the masks of a poet. Collections like that by Catullus contain a series of speakers, speaking from behind masks or personae. Secondly, Mabuse operates by way of poesis or world-making, conjuring worlds that might be understood better as circumstance rather than events. Especially by these definitions, Mabuse comes asymptotically into the range to being a lyric poet. Klein-Rogge (who plays Mabuse) wrote in a publicity brochure for *Nibelungen:* " Mabuse revolts with consciousness of the facts, less for material gain than to defeat the moral uniformization of his era. He wants to feel urges, be a creator, even if it's only of evil. In one word, he wants what in our time has passed from a single individual to all men."[162] Mabuse understands power to be the destruction of the uniformity of morality and seeks instead emotion and to be a creator, even if it is only of the bad. How is Mabuse any different, which begs the question: is the lyric necessarily liberatory? It is intuitively difficult to call Mabuse a lyric speaker or poet. But if we take seriously the fact that he is trying to command, trying to interpellate, and only becomes a poet inadvertently, in his failure to do so, then perhaps we can understand him in the framework of the anti-lyric.

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[161] Roland Barthes, "The Reality Effect," in *The Rustle of Language*, trans. Richard Howard (1968; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). It also resonates with the distancing techniques later taken up by Rainer Werner Fassbinder and other Brechtian filmmakers, followers of Brecht's "epic theater." I intend to address this at more length in Chapter Three**.** However, here is a good time to say that instead of distancing the viewer it doubles them in this poetic realist way that animates the relation between subjectivity and objectivity as two sides of the same coin.

[162] French Translation of Rogge's words: « Mabuse[…] se révolte en toute connaissance de cause, moins pour des gains matériels que pour battre en brèche l'uniformisation morale de son époque. Il veut sentir ses pulsions, être créateur, même si c'est uniquement dans le mal. En un mot, il veut ce qui à notre époque est passé d'un sel individu à tous les hommes: le pouvoir » Qtd. in Eisenschitz, *Fritz Lang au travail*, 30.

The Category of the Anti-Lyric

In the beginning of this chapter we revisited the notion of the film as document, a counterintuitive claim for a fiction film. Here, we look at the trope of personae and how they allow us the possibility of judging their "attitudes," not by judging their characters, but by full attention to their evaluative positions and motives. The camera and editing, with their ambiguous point-of-view shots and countershots do act formally the way avant-garde films do, allowing us the possibility of taking up different positions in relation to these personae. In these approaches, we distance ourselves from the narrative and allegorical interpretation of it and see how, in the first instance, the film becomes a collaborative act in the present of viewing, and in the second, how a film can foreground an attitude rather than a situation based on the psychological character.

So what attitude is mediated by Mabuse? Mabuse's "self" could be said to be one performing self-abnegation, self-destruction, and self-effacement necessary to the "authentic lyric utterance," because it gathers and records the conjunctures of an attitude rather than making the volition of the mind a cause of some effect. The author of the original series, Norbert Jacques, wrote in German, but his French lineage is unmistakable in his own name. This multi-nationality is itself a marker of the fragmented and polyglot lyric voice. Mabuse's name thinly veils the French "m'abuse." The meaning of the reflexive phrase is not quite a cognate with the English, "I abuse myself." The verb *abuser* does in fact coincide with the English for using with excess, profiting excessively from something and using badly (as with abusing authority.) However, it can also mean to delude, to trick someone with an illusion. The reflexive infinitive *s'abuser* means to hide from oneself, to be deluded or mistaken. It's negation, *Je ne m'abuse pas*, means to understand correctly and *je ne m'abuse plus* to be disabused, to correct one's previous illusion. Just as the dummy heads come to life, in this scene a moment after, Mabuse himself reveals himself to unexpectedly have moral boundaries, also coming to life by responding to the immanent situation and diverging from his name. When his underling brings him the spoils they have picked off of the Inspector von Wenck, Mabuse finds his wallet and declares that it must be returned. He is no corpse robber (*kein Leichenfledderer*).[163] He becomes more than a "flat" character or allegory for evil. A small uncertainty arises and also a small window for imaginative possibilities for a different moral code, in particular a doubt as to Mabuse's real motives within these inconsistencies. If it is not for money and if he has some respect for the dead, then what game is he playing?

Mabuse's personae play on the racialized imaginary and culture of fear surrounding ethnic others during this historical period (but of course already taking place in print representations during the 19th century and before) directly preceding Adolf Hitler's rise to power and the ethnic cleansing programs of the National Socialist Party. Gunning has also noted this association with Mabuse with contemporary stereotypes of Jews. He writes, "After the newspapers report the theft of the contract, Lang shows a bearded speculator (probably coded as Jewish) taking off his glove and conveying a secret signal to his underling."[164] And a footnote to this passage reads: "Is Mabuse also coded as

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[163] The term *Leichenfledderer* is interesting in itself; in English, it is translated as corpse-robber. An old-fashioned word for this is "ghoul." The word ghoul had just come into the Russian language from the 1001 Arabian Nights around the time of the film and Kuzmin uses it in the second part of his Hull series more explicitly. Edgar Hull's name in Russian when transliterated is also ghoul and "New Hull" is pronounced "New Ghoul." Thus the title of Kuzmin's poem pays homage both to Hull and to Mabuse, suggesting they are different sides of the same coin. I argue that the literary double-entendre and slippage is crucial to the image slippage as well. More on this further on.

[164] Gunning, *The Films of Fritz Lang*, 102.

Jewish, particularly in this scene where he acts as stock speculator, a profession that Weimar associated with Jews (as it did, as Anton Kaes pointed out to me, psychoanalysts!)? Certain reviewers saw it this way, as in the review from the *Münchener Gazette*, from 1925 quoted by Gunter Scholdt, which described Mabuse as a 'typical picture of the criminalistic Jew.' Scholdt (ed), p.149. However, this review also attacks the film as a Jewish product from author Norbert Jacques and publisher Ullstein and Thea von Harbou as 'a teachable student of the Jewish master.'[165] The question of who passes for Jewish either because of physical features or because of ideology is here as blurry as ever it was. Lang was himself half-Jewish; his mother converted from Judaism to Catholicism and raised him Catholic.[166] One can certainly see the doubling of the director as a way of exploring his own "passing" official status and the ethical necessity precisely of not passing ideologically. The film certainly also pushes the question of how one could even begin to conform to the heinous stereotypes circulating at the time without a pound of make-up and fake appendages.

Mabuse's disguised identities do aspire to convince the viewer of their authenticity, since we see him putting on those exaggerated disguises. They seek only to be authentic to themselves as attitudes and worldviews (elitist, orientalist, capitalist). In addition, by contrast, they show the world around them to be complacent to stereotypes and only even mildly suspicious when he appears as a well-dressed opera-goer. The fact that the character is foregrounded ahead of these attitudes puts him in the category of anti-lyric, always at a certain distance. Cadberry writes:

> This form we may call the anti-lyric, remembering that it differs from drama and from epic in that it is *neither acted on a stage nor sung directly to an audience*, but that it differs from lyric too in that we do not see the poet plain-in fact, we can only make sense of anti-lyrics by remembering always to be aware of the difference between the poet and the words of the poem.

This description translated into film terms would say that neither does the character act "on a stage" nor does he break the fourth wall directly. The indirect, inadvertent address in the dummy scene and the mise en scène allude to both the dramatic and the epic modes, however the actor does not speak in an epic mode, directly at an audience, directing his speech instead behind his back and his gaze at the dummies. Neither is the scene so theatrical as to be entirely enclosed within the world on stage, either. The theatrical wigs and disguises are left by the wayside in what is supposed to be a more direct encounter with the "real" Mabuse. It alludes to the stage but it occurs in the intimate framing of the dressing table.

Gunning writes that Mabuse is Lang's "enunciator figure," a doubling of the director and the director's wish to be in complete control of meaning. Gunning puts it this way: "Lang creates not only his ultimate figure of urban crime, but his most complex enunciator figure, the author of crimes who aspires to be a demiurge in control of his own creation…"[167] But the extent to which Lang

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[165] Gunning, 486n2. Von Harbou would later stay behind in Nazi Germany when Lang went to the states and worked for the Nazi Film Production unit UFA though her reasons for doing so are unresolved.

[166] In a famous story, though not recorded in Goebbel's journals, Lang also refused the Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbel's advances and eventually left for France and then America where he made films with strong anti-fascist allegories such as the second part of the Dr. Mabuse Trilogy, *The Testament of Dr. Mabuse* (1933). That film was banned in Nazi Germany, because it "constituted a threat to [the then Fascist] law and order and public safety-in accordance with a regulation to be found in the Law of Censor"Gösta Werner, "Fritz Lang and Goebbels: Myth and Facts," *Film Quarterly* 43, no. 3 (1990): 25, https://doi.org/10.2307/1212633.

[167] Gunning, *The Films of Fritz Lang*, 96.

theatricalizes Mabuse, revealing each guise as a disguise and performance, suggests that Lang obviates Mabuse's aspiration to be in control from the very first shot. By virtue of the directorial lens upon him, the spectator is rather placed either in his POV or in the position of judging him. Theatricalizing not the character himself but the allegory of the address, theatricalizing the interpellation of his address and its failure marks Mabuse not as a character in a fictional world but as an "imitation of character" whose self-"authentic" attitude is based on this desire to control. In order to "judge" the world he presents us we must first judge him and his attitude towards it. Gunning writes that, "What Mabuse controls is his own multi-faceted identity, which is to say, the way other people see him; he is a master of appearances, an illusionist, *an actor*."[168] As Gunning notes,

> Mabuse's fictional identities do not so much attack the system as exploit its structure for his own ends. … In modernity, individual identity becomes largely determined by its role within a profession, institution or social event, and Mabuse never appears in any of his roles out of place. Instead, as in the opening sequence, his power comes from the ease with which he situates himself within a pre-existent web of interlocking pieces.[169]

What Gunning points out is that the theatrical, what is in this case the societal, frame is important for the success of his disguises, i.e., for his communicative gestures. However, what we notice is that he does not seem out of place within the context but to us off screen he sticks out. For instance, when Mabuse grimaces in a way that shines through his disguise and reveals the "real" below it, he does so only when he thinks he is not being watched and does not acknowledge us, but in a sense he grimaces, we feel "meant" by it.

The Collective Hallucination and Fantasy

For Crary, at least at first, Freud serves as a straw man in order to dismiss the notion of the charismatic figure at the heart of Lang's film. Crary prefers to discuss the kinds of technological power he represents. He follows these powers from the first of the Mabuse trilogy into the second and aligns them with the consolidation of power by corporatized television and radio and the propagandistic use of sound/image by the Nazi regime. In a later book, however, in a footnote, Crary allows for Elsaesser's association of Mabuse [among others, Caligari, etc.] with the persistent romantic figure of the Double whose appearance is always greeted:

> with the shock of recognition followed by an equally violent disavowal of such dangerous self-knowledge. It keeps in suspension just what the relationship is between self-image and object-choice, once this becomes a question of political self-realization and manifest destiny. . . . [These characters] make visible the extent to which the ambiguous feelings of love and hate, binding the subject to his alter ego, are in fascism repressed, displaced and 'streamlined' into the cult of the charismatic leader, via what, after Freud, is 'secondary narcissism.[170]

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[168] Gunning, 100.
[169] Ibid., 102.
[170] From Thomas Elsaesser, "Myth as the Phantasmagoria of History: H. J. Syberberg, Cinema and Representation," *New German Critique*, no. 24/25 (1981): 108–54. Quoted in Jonathan Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture*, October Books (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 209n139.

Crary's own repression of that argument both in the earlier work and by relegating it to a footnote in this later work can be read as symptomatic for the way that perhaps today our own strong ambivalence is displaced into the charismatic technology itself and its ability to lull us into a position of passivity and of fantasy.

Eisner herself wrote that the film "seems to fall half way between reality and fantasy" in the quote with which I introduced this chapter. In *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex,* Butler narrates an account in Laplanche and Pontalis' argument about the emergence of fantasy not as an object but as a "*scene*" that occurs because an original object is lost and cannot be recuperated. She writes of the simultaneous implications of auto-eroticism, surely an end of apostrophe, where "both positions [of desire and its object] are inhabited" and quotes from Laplanche and Pontalis: "In fantasy the subject does not pursue the object or its sign: he appears caught up himself in the sequence of images. He forms no representation of the desired object, but is himself represented as participating in the scene although, in the earliest forms of fantasy, he cannot be assigned any fixed place in it (hence, the danger, in treatment of interpretations which claim to do so)."[171] This unfixed, pre-address, kind of fantasy is often described as suture, a way of identifying with the narrative on screen and having no fixed position in the scene except in the gaps.

Fragments of the most "diversified particularization"

The opening shot of the film is one of those rare subjective shots in cinema, as the camera is positioned seemingly where the owner of the hands would be [*Figure 6*].[172] The lyric is a subjective POV but one of "pure" subjectivity not one owned by a specific character. The subjectivity of the shot is not sustained (as subjective shots rarely are in fiction) but since we do not yet know to which character this view belongs, it is "pure subjectivity," in the sense of objective subjectivity.

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[171] Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex* (1995; repr., Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 267–68; Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality," *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 49, no. 1 (1968): 26–27.

[172] The most notoriously literal example of an attempt to create a camera that tells the story entirely from a first-person perspective as an agent in the world of the film is *Lady in the Lake* (Robert Montgomery, 1947). Otherwise, the POV effect often occurs in discrete sequences in the context of a larger narrative, In *Lady in the Lake*, the effect occurs only before we are permitted – by an over-determination of narrative and production limitations – to see the face of the escaped convict, who turns out, after facial surgery, to be Humphrey Bogart. The film anticipates virtual reality and video games where the game operates from the point of view of the viewer or player. Rather than "first person," this effect is sometimes called "second-person," since all the characters we see on-screen address the spectator in the second person.

Figure 6 Opening shot: Dr. Mabuse (Rudolf Klein-Rogge) uses images of himself resembling playing cards to remember his different personae. Here the hands point to photography as a form that preceded it and made claims on authenticity.

A host of questions follow: Is this POV "lyric"? What to do with the display of still images, photographs, as the first image of a film? How diegetic is the image? How is it training the spectator to see? What position is the spectator in? I will tackle these questions one at a time, if not exactly answering these questions then setting out the parameters of the complications, ambivalences, and ambiguities on display.

As the first shot in a first-person mode, it sets a tone to the rest of the film. The sequence presents itself to the spectator's eyes directly, also in an embodied way rather than promising disembodied omniscience. However, neither is the lyric purely just "subjective" and the camera can help us see this. The lyric foregrounds the film's claims to authenticity or truth-claims by virtue of a camera that becomes like a mask for the viewer—an as-of-yet unknown person. Furthermore, as the personae in front of the camera in *Dr. Mabuse* are so much "types,"[173] the camera in this instance clearly counteracts the image with its own ambiguity of identity but rather strong relationality, leaving the spectator grounded and emplaced within, on, or just outside the frame. As with the lyric apostrophe, the spectator has leeway to come forward as a spiritual self and observe from a subjective position rather than from one embedded in an ideological order, though the apostrophe bordering on interpellation makes the spectator constantly aware of that order.

The shot presents us with personae in photographs, another medium with a hallowed factual status of indexical relation with the world.[174] But what it asks us to notice is the intervals between them.

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[173] Types are usually established by their context, their costume, and through captions, as in August Sander, *People of the 20th Century*, ed. Gabriele Conrath-Scholl, Susanne Lange, and SK Stiftung Kultur Cologne (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2002). Here, however, there are no environmental clues to stand in for context.

[174] Barthes inquires precisely into the "ontological" difference between photographs and cinema is *Camera Lucida* and concludes that photographs can have a punctum and a studium. In a later book, he attributes a "third meaning" to the cinema, which resonates in many ways with the punctum of the photograph. Still, he insists that these categories or separate. The end of this chapter will revisit this similarity and difference with Eisenstein's help, See Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard, First edition (1980; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Roland Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (1977; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 52–68.

The viewer studies the similarities and differences, and the viewer quickly notices that these personae are all the same person in different dress, a series, "tautegorical"[175] in the sense that it emphasizes difference in similarity rather than similarity in difference (a quality of the lyric that this discussion will broach more in the second chapter) or set rather than metaphors or analogies. Coleridge's "Symbols and symbolical expressions; the nature of which is always tautegorical (i.e. expressing the same subject but with a difference) in contra-distinction from metaphors and similitudes, that are always allegorical (i.e. expressing a different subject but with a resemblance)." Through this concept, we expand our understanding of what constitutes a "subjective" camera beyond handheld or clear point-of-view shots associated with a character. The hand offers us a poetic totality.

This particular shot resides in the liminal space between title card and action, a third category that approaches the alternation between a narration directed at the viewer, what might be called epic, the dramatic action which might provoke a first-person identification we saw above. Without context, the image speaks directly. The suite of personae announces a serial structure playing on similarity and difference, iteration and variation, and comprises an otherwise invisible totality. The "factual" nature of the photograph further contributes to the totality in the Kantian sense, implied, intuited but never ascertainable. The spread revealed by the hand holding cards further illustrates what Pizer claims is the relation between ego and alter-ego in Poetic Realism. Pizer writes,

> If one adheres to the precise nuance inherent in the original Latin, the alter ego must be seen as governed by a relationship of radical alterity to the primary ego. Thus, when one juxtaposes the two figures in a dialectic synthesis, the entire spectrum, the broad range of human personality traits is revealed. Opposing, indeed antithetical qualities are thereby fused and united like the colors in a rainbow.

The range and display of Mabuse's personae, seen as a spectrum of "doubles" and "others" functions as Poetic Realism does, while Edgar Hull's character in itself (especially as it later came to be representative in the form of a Germanic epic hero Siegfried) offer's a more Romantic totality, one that must be killed off in the film. Together, as foils, Mabuse and Hull offer yet a dialectical third. It is not surprising that Kuzmin hallucinates, not exactly fantasizes, a spectrum that complements the empirical apparition of Edgar Hull. The photographs unfold like a hand cards. One could argue, that the "present" of watching occurs through the spectator's process of reconciling the dialectic of identification and disidentification,[in this case with the camera and with the fictional characters.

In this opening scene, the photographs appear in sequence, referencing the seriality of the medium itself with changing frames that lead to transformation rather than movement.[176] It "trains" the viewer how to see the rest of the film. This opening scene would then seem to be interpellating the viewer into a way of seeing, in seeing as Mabuse, according to his ideology. For Kuzmin who agrees to "see as" Mabuse in some ways, i.e., in series, but not by the same value assessments, Edgar Hull serves as an ideal addressee, as he joins a series of beloveds. A configuration of "family resemblances" is exactly how Werner Wolf would like us to see the lyric. The lyric is not *all* traits

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[175] Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection* (1825; repr., New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 206., qtd. in Ewan James Jones, *Coleridge and the Philosophy of Poetic Form* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 153–55.
[176] On reconsidering the essence of cinema as transformation rather than indexicality, see Tom Gunning, "The Transforming Image: The Roots of Animation in Metamorphosis and Motion," in *Pervasive Animation*, ed. Suzanne Buchan (New York ; London: Routledge, 2013).

found in particular instances of lyric poetry, i.e., lyric is not a "whole man," but rather a collection of many traits, a critical mass or quality.[177] Rather than needing a lyric to fulfill all of the traits that scholars have proposed over time to call it one, he suggests an approach that classifies the lyric based on a Wittgensteinian family resemblance and draws upon Eva Müller-Zettelmann's "pluri-componential model" (*Mehrkomponentenmodell*),[178] meaning the lyric itself is a "configuration" of some of its "alleged traits."

Though these recent studies could appear to be compromising in the face of innovation or lack of consensus, these properties of the lyric date back to Hegel, who writes that the lyric is a balancing act between a unity, if temporally ephemeral, of inner life, to be understood as a feeling or mood, and a fragmented external life.

> The central point of unity in a lyric must therefore be regarded as the inner life of the poet. But this inner life itself is partly the individual's pure unity with himself and partly it is fragmented and dispersed into the most diversified particularization and most variegated multiplicity of ideas, feelings, impressions, insights, etc.; and their linkage consists solely in the fact that one and the same self carries them, so to say, as their mere vessel. Therefore in order to be the centre which holds the whole lyric work of art together the poet must have achieved a *specific* mood or entered a specific situation, while at the same time he must identify *himself* with this particularization of himself as with himself, so that in it he feels and envisages *himself*. In this way alone does he then become a self-bounded subjective entirety and express only what issues from this determinate situation and stands in connection with it."[179]

The lyric subject in the process of invoking is a vessel or a unity with herself, "a mood of the heart concentrated on a concrete situation," the vessel acting as a hold for fragments of the most "diversified particularization." The vessel is a self-image; the apostrophized object creates a subject. "The object is treated as a subject, an I which implies a certain type of you in its turn. One who successfully invokes nature is one to whom nature might, in its turn, speak. He makes himself poet, visionary. Thus, invocation is a figure of vocation."[180] I would contrast this object that is treated as a subject with an object that becomes animated through fetishization. The "you" in Culler is the constitutional element in the "I" of the speaker who creates a self-image through the address. But he who addresses others projects the self and its desires onto them is a visionary of a homogenized society. Hegel insists only on the poet as a vessel, accommodating and gathering the multiplicity around him and which fills him in a particular situation, what Dominique Rabaté calls *circumstance*, that conjunction of the "moment and situation that is more or less veiled."[181] As the name Hull in the German context relates to the veil (*Verhüllung*), we can take this assertion quite literally.

The veiled situation of a false mystical unity underpinned by physiognomic resemblance manifests in and through Mabuse as the unity. Even in the poem, physiognomic resemblance limits the unity to a

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[177] For a systematic approach to nine common traits of the lyric and their equally systematic dismantling one-by-one, see Werner Wolf, "The Lyric—an Elusive Genre Problems of Definition and a Proposal for Reconceptualization," *AAA: Arbeiten Aus Anglistik Und Amerikanistik* 28, no. 1 (2003): 59–91.

[178] Eva Müller-Zettelmann, *Lyrik und Metalyrik: Theorie einer Gattung und ihrer Selbstbespiegelung anhand von Beispielen aus der englisch- und deutschsprachigen Dichtkunst* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2000).

[179] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (Clarendon Press, 1975), 1133.

[180] Culler, "Apostrophe," 63.

[181] Rabaté, *Figures*, 71.

certain type; one certainly notes the proto-"Aryan" or Slavic qualities of all three of Kuzmin's love interests, emphasized by the fact that Richter later played the national folk hero Siegfried. Malmstad and Bogomolov conclude that Richter had more of a "psychological" rather than simply a physiological affinity with Rakov and Kniazev and that they serve as a muse for asserting "the creativity and integrity of the individual spirit" and "the power of love."[182] The guiding principle of the allusions and of the poem are "displacements and affinities in a textual palimpsest."[183] The endless possibilities of material transformation opens the phenomenal world to ontological seriality, a form embraced by the poem and one which Kuzmin associates with anamnesis, or the concept classically delineated as Platonic recurrence and distinguished by Deleuze, after Kierkegaard, as generative repetition. Kuzmin's universal myth of *uznavania*, or 'recognition,' a belief in a singular essence that can be found in qualitatively diverse symbols, resonates with Plato's epistemological idea of anamnesis, the recollection of knowledge from past incarnations of self. Here *uznavania* manifests in the faces of Vsevolod, Rakov and Richter, forming paratextual coordinates within the poem that serve as a panoply reminiscent of the way Mabuse holds out a hand of cards. However, anamnesis is not purely textual, and not based on physiognomic resemblance alone. Sonic materiality is perhaps more at stake here: Hull's name also has the capacity for material transformation into different kinds of vessels in different languages, i.e. it surpasses its theatrical frame of national context.

Perhaps the spectator is in "Lang's" position. Many have remarked that we know not to whom these hands belong and there were unverifiable rumors they were Lang's. If the spectator is Lang, then she is "the poet-director" contemplating the full spectrum that lies between herself and this double. But since this cannot be verified, it is important to investigate another position, that of one who can feel invoked by each of these photographs, and this is where Kuzmin is our model.[184] Is Kuzmin's position simply one of fantasy, ungrounded and unlocalizable? Perhaps. Osip Mandelstam wrote about Kuzmin's 1910 creed of "clarism": "…the clarism of Kuzmin has its dangerous side. It seems that such good weather as occurs, especially in his last poems, in fact never occurs."[185] And yet, if one wishes, one can watch the film as not simply provoking a fantastical atmosphere of unrelation that never occurs, and instead take seriously its adaptation as a diagnosis of the film-cum-document of two or more acting upon it, i.e., it creates a position that is not necessarily that of the "ideal spectator," and suggests an act of relation to others over one with the film.

Scenes of Subjectivization

In promising to "partially clarify" the interrelation between Dr. Mabuse and Hull, Kuzmin offers to describe both a self and its process of subjectivization in relation to the filmic object. The process of visual "subjectivization" into a political or ideological order from Jacques Rancière's formulation of subjectivization within a relational aesthetics in *Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization*: "What is a process of subjectivization?" he asks. "It is the formation of a one that is not a self but is the relation

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[182] Malmstad and Bogomolov, *Mikhail Kuzmin*, 332.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Other adjacent instances include when Barthes experiences looking not into the eyes of Napoleon but obliquely looking "at eyes that looked at the Emperor" or when Jean-Paul Sartre, in *L'imaginaire* (1940) to which Barthes wrote *Camera Lucida* in hommage, explains that a work of art can cease being an object and take on the affective quality of the person or thing of which it is an image Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard, First edition (1980; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 3.
[185] Mandelshtam, "On Contemporary Poetry (1916)."

of a self to an other."[186] The speaker in relation to the film emerges from opacity by undergoing a process of subjectivization as well as it recounts itself in relation to the film; the opacity of the "self" outside of relation explains the only "partial" clarification. Rather than the "recognition" of Hull leading to the interpellation of the subject into an authoritarian and hierarchical order, lyric address such as invocation or apostrophe invokes the individual as a "self" in a process of negotiation with an immanent "other."

In James Martel's *The Misinterpellated Subject,* he emphasizes and explores how interpellation by the state can go awry and, in Althusser's words, miss its mark at least one out of ten times.[187] In describing the workings of interpellation and especially where it breaks down, Martel invokes Judith Butler on Benjamin's understanding of allegory and points to the implicit to the importance of the moment of turning around and its theatricality. For if a subject who turns must already have been ready to turn, this presumes their subjectification but the moment of turning is an allegorical, i.e., externalized and theatrical moment, where that logic can be disrupted.

> [F]or Benjamin, allegory serves to unmake the functions of persuasion. Rather than deliver a clear and true message, for Benjamin allegory exposes false messages, often quite inadvertently. Thus the imagined scene of a police officer saying, "hey, you there!" is not the pinnacle of subjectivization but instead the moment where the flaw in the operation of the ISA becomes potentially evident. Even if only imagined, Althusser's depiction of the scene of interpellation suggests that when rendered visible—when it is theatricalized—the process of producing authority is exposed as fundamentally empty and failed.[188]

The categories of interpellation and invocation overlap in the performance to some extent. The categories are messy; when interpellation goes "awry" it acts more like indirect address and invocation.

Theatricalization is helpful for considering the workings of indirect address of the audience—which is also apostrophe or *direct* address of an object, since it manages to animate the inanimate and the inanimate notion of self. One definition of theatricality is "the movement of the words, the dual nature of the enunciator (character/actor) and his utterances [... and] the artificiality of performance (representation)."[189] Paradoxically, unlike theatricality, "indirect" address, or address of something that clearly cannot be addressed whether due to absence or inanimacy, creates a non-duality grounded in the successful mimesis of a subject and their circumstance within a failed depiction or mimesis of the whole scene and context. It exposes the directly lived experience rather than one authenticated by the authority implied in the production of the scene. It also provides an alternative to the distanced contemplation that theatricalization entails since it brings along with it a whole stage in which one must also accept. We will see how this plays out in the lyric scene.

Returning to *Dr. Mabuse*, we can see the "invocation" of the spectator occurs via mise en scène through the spectator's evaluative faculty. Speculative evaluative acts, both financial and interpretive,

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[186] Jacques Rancière, "Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization," *October* 61 (1992): 60.
[187] James R. Martel, *The Misinterpellated Subject* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017).
[188] Ibid., 46.
[189] Patrice Pavis, *Dictionary of the Theatre: Terms, Concepts and Analysis*, translated by Christine Shantz (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 395–97, quoted in André Loiselle and Jeremy Maron, *Stages of Reality: Theatricality in Cinema* (University of Toronto Press, 2012), 3–5. For the presence of the world on stage versus the presence of the absent world, see also Timothy Corrigan, *Film and Literature: An Introduction and Reader* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999), 62–6, also quoted in Loiselle and Maron, 3–5.

are at the heart of the plot and the activity of the film's main characters, Dr. Mabuse and the detective, leading to a possible reading of the film as an allegory for evaluative models. The circumstance in the film comes about historically in the sense that the film registers interpersonal relations that had become characteristic only recently. Already in 1903, Georg Simmel diagnosed monetary interpersonal interactions and its effects on the "soul" (*Seele*) in his book *The Metropolis and Mental Life*: "The calculating exactness of practical life which has resulted from a money economy corresponds to the ideal of natural science, namely that of transforming the world into an arithmetical problem and of fixing every one of its parts in a mathematical formula…[It] filled the daily life od so many people with weighing, calculating, enumerating and the reduction of qualitative values to quantitative terms."[190] He warns that these mundane events that "transcend all subjective elements" come "immediately into contact with the depths of the soul."

We are likewise interpellated into an orientalist order of extreme difference and little nuance. Mabuse speculates on others (Hull) by reducing them to their base common denominator, economic value. but he achieves this manipulation by speculating on those "victim's" willing belief and inability to see other ethnicities beyond stereotypical traits. In this way, Mabuse catches his victims in the efficiency of railway timetables in the domain of the *Bild*. Simmel concludes that the resultant "blasé attitude" that one takes towards others in the city, caring not for them as humans but as their potential monetary value and equivalence, is an unavoidable consequence of the "shocks" of modern life. Benjamin writes in "The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire"(1938) that these same shocks numbed the senses and demanded novelty on a higher register to combat rampant homogeneity and monotony, as early as 1857, as evidenced in Charles Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal*. Baudelaire's speaker attributes "monstrous delicacy" to "ennui," moral lassitude and an impression of emptiness leading to melancholy.

This subtle beast, then, is the most subtle of the ones he has named elsewhere in the poem as the derelict "menagerie" of his contemporaries and, for its subtleness, worthy of note. Thus he focuses on the mutual insincerity between city dwellers in the first, heraldic poem, "Au lecteur"("To the Reader") in which he trumpets a lineage and fraternity with its own coat of arms culminating in the line, which is veritably emblazoned across the rest of the collection: "Hypocrite lecteur,—mon semblable,—mon frère!"[191] It would seem that this is a type of interpellation into an order of skeptics, and indeed, it is not far off and difficult to distinguish. One main difference is that the speaker is an individual and the hearer is addressed as one as well, on the basis of resemblance and of equality.

Furthermore, connecting dissimulating characters by calling them "brothers" offers one answer to questions of provenance, family lineage, and otherwise points to the difficulty of ascertaining or establishing authenticity. The problem of doing so appears at the heart of Mabuse's plot. "We have met before," Mabuse tells Hull, both dressed appropriately in high society attire and with expensive tickets to private opera boxes ("the loge" of Kuzmin's poem). Hull either believes Mabuse, is hypnotized, or is bound by social rules of politesse and etiquette, but these variations of cause overdetermine the same result. Baudelaire and Mabuse approach the other in much the same way, appealing to a uniform hypocrisy and speculation among socialites. Hull, the supposed sympathetic hero and victim, is as avid a gambler as Mabuse and has surely made his money by speculating, as well. The similarity of deception and of self-deception are the ingredients for a new age of human

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[190] Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in *Metropolis*, ed. Philip Kasinitz (1903; repr., London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1995), 30–45, http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-349-23708-1_4.
[191] Charles Baudelaire, *Fleurs du Mal* (1857; repr., Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1999).

city-dweller and of poetry, which had often been tasked with panegyric for noblemen, whether morally noble or not.

On the Failure of Mimesis and the Animation of the Spectator through Apostrophe over Interpellation

If the lyric succeeded in mimesis, it would no longer be lyric but rather allegory that never connected the world of phenomena with the phenomena of feeling, exterior with interior, and things with their sounds. The mimetic world would lose that internal sense of animation that occurs through the lyric interface. The lyric works by representing a "self" mimetically as best it can and admitting limitation in mimesis of an Other. Culler claims that the lyric *is* mimetic, in that it is "mimetic of the experience of the subject" and further emphasizes that the elaboration of the individual in the Romantic period made this experience recognizable and the genre definable.[192] Although Culler does not worry about the other, the lyric self emerges through the invocation of otherness and then only by virtue of fleeting resemblances that allow the self to make itself recognizable through the shared materiality (of the world, of language) before again receding into opacity and obscurity: objective correlatives, shifters, and deictic markers make it possible for the other to appear and the self, precisely through those opacities, and allow the invocation of the other.[193] By these means, the lyric runs counter to the gaze that seeks to own or fix at the risk of losing the living thing.

The cost of this desire to fix a being into a symbol is the moral in the Orpheus myth, when Orpheus loses Eurydice by turning around rather than calling out to her and listening for her response, since as a poet who was known for his voice, he very well could have done so. The Orpheus myth offers a warning against specifically visual fetishism. Adriana Cavarero, through a close-reading of H.D.'s "Eurydice," describes how the gaze has counterintuitively overshadowed the voice in the Orpheus myth.[194] It is precisely Orpheus' reliance on his gaze rather than his ability to address the other, Eurydice, to hear her respond in her own voice, that leads to Eurydice's banishment to hell, whereas she was not even aware that she resided there prior to his projection. Orpheus' address comes very near to interpellation is not exactly the mimesis of another but the address of another that nonetheless presumes to know who the other is and to address them into that profile. Mimicry and caricature are versions of mimesis that are also interpellative. Interpellation thus seeks to accomplish a coercive function. The speaker hides their own position, whereas apostrophe and invocation rather expose the speaker more than the listener. This exposure creates a generous shared, public space with the potential for conjuncture and coincidence.

There are many definitions and accounts of the effects of apostrophe. One such provided by Culler is as a fictional event: "The temporal movement from A to B, internalized by apostrophe, becomes a reversible alternation between A^1 and B^1: a play of presence and absence governed not by time but by poetic power"[195] by replacing a temporal presence and absence with an apostrophic presence and absence. Lauren Berlant, following Barbara Johnson's "Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,"

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[192] Jonathan Culler, "Lyric, History, and Genre," *New Literary History* 40, no. 4 (2009): 884.

[193] I take this notion in part from ongoing conversations with Francesco Giusti and from his presentation "Rethinking Mimesis as a Technē: Recognition & Shareability in the Lyric." Situating the Lyric Conference, June 8 2017, Metcalf Trustee Center, Boston, MA.

[194] See Adriana Cavarero, *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood (Tu Chi Mi Guardi, Tu Che Mi Racconti)*, trans. Paul A. Kottman (1997; repr., London : New York: Routledge, 2000).

[195] Jonathan Culler, "Apostrophe," *Diacritics* 7, no. 4 (1977): 67.

writes that the lyric is an address to "a fetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a fetus) who is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening."[196] As Berlant writes, "the condition of projected possibility, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ("you" are not here, "you" are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining), creates a fake present moment of intersubjectivity in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is made possible by the fantasy of you, laden with the *x* qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence."[197] For Culler the lyric doubles subjects and temporality, making them reversible. For Berlant, it is about the doubling of consciousness and the creation of a suspended temporality through a desire to do so and a conjuring of a fantasy (the *x* qualities) of the other.

The difference between Louis Althusser's description of interpellation and lyric apostrophe, as identified by Culler and Berlant, is at the crux of my argument, because effectively shows the difference between instrumental, fantastical projection and an awareness of subjectivity as conditioned out of a conjuncture of material circumstances. One example of Culler's notion of apostrophe is the address of inanimate objects or natural phenomena (as in "O wild West Wind" in the famous opening of "Ode to the West Wind" by Percy Bysshe Shelley) allow a poet to invoke the spiritual life, and thus the capaciousness, of his overhearers and in a process that makes an Other of the self. The strategies of the lyric that I identify, such as apostrophe in particular as an alternative to "hailing," are constantly aware of the possibilities inherent in the address and its potential for misdirection. In other Berlant's terms, they are self-aware fantasies, often self-referential and reflexive. Indeed, they intentionally "direct" address obliquely in order to bring someone who is absent to presence through a fiction that is aware of itself as such. Culler stresses the "optative character" of the apostrophe and the way it stresses its own "impossible imperatives."[198] This description can be applied to the Keats fragment, in which the imperative "see here it is" absolutely requires the poet to *want* to see; it clearly cannot command and is indeed asking something impossible in most senses except the imaginative one.

Lyric address through mise en scène thus operates as a mimetic suggestion of a model of relation, while in gesture, rather than "hailing" the "subject," it invokes them as an affective world-maker, poet, or fellow *actor* in the performative document. Lyric address, particularly apostrophe, thus serves as a complement and subversion to Althusser's ideological address, self-consciously augmenting the potential of the address to be "misdirected," for the command or the fantasy to fail, for what emerges is the localized, democratic and horizontal rather than vertical (i.e. hierarchical) process of recognition. The authenticity of the "self" in cinema's lyric emerges partially through relation, based on an indirect address or invocation of the spectator as a complex, multifaceted self rather than an ideological subject. This "off-screen" spectator is formed in intersubjective configurations with the world on-screen, creating equivalently complex and multi-temporal communities. Rather than being subject to a gaze, the spectator is invoked with a gesture.

The lyric in cinema signifies a process of address that acknowledges an ideological gaze, which interpellates the spectator as a subject, but simultaneously complicates that gaze through gesture that localizes the individual in an idiosyncratic, geographically and historically specific relation. This can

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[196] Lauren Berlant, *Cruel Optimism*, unknown edition (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2011), 25.
[197] Ibid.
[198] Culler, "Apostrophe," 65.

occur on-screen as a way of encouraging a lyric mode of spectatorship or can equally occur in a spectatorship that primes itself to see this way. The case studies of Lang and Kuzmin provide models for both.

Summary of the Argument

Bringing lyric into film helps us see the camera as "pure subjectivity" and to engage with film by asking us to understand that the communicative exchange with film is impossible. Rather than therefore slipping into the belief of a passive and ideologically doomed spectator who is simply the recipient of communication and information, however, the lyric models engagement with non-communicative entities that nonetheless fosters an imaginative sense that intersubjective world-building is possible. In addressing the screen, the poet Kuzmin molds the non-communicative into a world of his creation but he also partially clarifies how the film itself invokes absent entities. In drawing attention to the absent, the film creates a space for the spectator as a participant. These pivots allow the world in the film to potentially turn out very differently than its foregone conclusion, providing many chances within its episodic, serial narrative for imaginative intervention through the thickening of the medium. In presenting itself as a document, the film sets itself up to be actualized in the present tense of its projection, a kind of performance that elicits idiosyncratic projections in the present tense. Yet these projections are grounded in the movement of the film that is continuous with the present, allowing for animation itself. The scene of interpellation creates a dramatic context but the lyric pokes holes in it and speaks to those beyond its walls without need for a direct address, instead opting for direct address of objects that makes the speaker at once vulnerable, ridiculous, and a self-identical subject. This process of self-subjectivization to a world of configurations and the life of objects avoids the possibility of self-authentication by social, instrumental and communicable means.

2/Mise en Scène: Un-framing the Actor and Lyric Intimacy

If those who read *Mabuse* primarily as an allegory for enunciation with the character of Dr. Mabuse at the allegory's center, then what of Eisenstein and Shub's version in which Mabuse all but disappears? Is there something inherent in the mise en scène that survives his removal?

Though after New Criticism and its injunction, following John Stuart Mill, to read the poetic speaker as a dramatic persona separate from the poet, contemporary readership praxis often asks that the poet and speaker continue to be separated but holds that the speaker is "authentic" precisely because of its closeness to the poet through voice rather than context.

The Position of the Lyric Spectator

Might it be possible to understand the lyric's liminal subjectivity as capacious in its non-binary (active/passive) nature, generous, and non-instrumental? As a type of expression, it can lead spontaneously and temporarily to porous forms of community. In John Stuart Mill's conception of poetry, understood as lyric poetry, he writes apologetically of a dichotomy, "But if we may be excused the antithesis, we should say that eloquence is heard, poetry is overheard."[199] The passive construction emphasizes the object or act of poetry rather than the speaker or the listener, who are media for its reception but not its origination. In fact, if this is a dichotomy, then the eloquence of Mill's formulation needs poetry as its less immediate double. Poetry is the material manifestation of feeling as self-sufficient and reflexive, "embodying itself" mimetically:

> Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself, in moments of solitude, and embodying itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the feeling in the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself out to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavoring to influence their belief or move them to passion or to action.[200]

In this descriptive precursor to T. S. Eliot's "objective correlative," the difference between poetry and eloquence emerges as the difference between an objective shape that the speaker and reader can share, while eloquence wishes to impose a shape upon the reader in an act that can range from being instrumental at best and coercive at worst and forcefully persuasive in the middle range. In the former, the dichotomy and indeed unequal power relation between speaker and listener resolves in a community described by and shaped through the symbolic object.

Though after New Criticism and its injunction, following John Stuart Mill, to read the poetic speaker as a dramatic persona separate from the poet, contemporary readership praxis often asks that the poet and speaker continue to be separated at the same time as it holds that the speaker is "authentic" because of the subjective voice that asymptotically approaches that of the poet. In yet another formulation of the idea, Mill defines poetry in a manner that would seem to come straight out of the characteristics of the "institution of cinema"[201]: "[N]o trace of consciousness that any eyes are upon us must be visible in the work itself. The actor knows that there is an audience present; but if he act

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[199] John Stuart Mill, "Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties," *The Crayon* 7, no. 4 (1860): 95.
[200] Mill, 95.
[201] David Bordwell, "Classical Hollywood Cinema: Narrational Principles and Procedures," in *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader*, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 22.

as though he knew it, he acts ill."[202] Here Mill uses a performance analogy with an actor on a theatrical stage. One might think that what is being compared here is a kind of "character," which is how the New Critical tradition seeks to read poems. In this method, the lyric is read it is as a "dramatic monologue," a kind of riddle for the viewer whose answer arrives purely in guessing at who is speaking. Perhaps a false step in this guessing game would be what their theatrical set would look like, i.e., surmising context differently from historical circumstance. But what is interesting here is the comparison of a poet to an actor is configuration between speaker and audience that this analogy actually stages (i.e. *ce qu'il met en scène*). The actor cannot look to the audience for approval, meaning the social aspect of authenticity must be left out.

Poetry would seem completely separate from narrative cinema. While narrative is overtly a spectacle, lyric is the extreme case of non-acknowledgement that a spectacle or performance is happening at all. But Mill brings them closer – he says there is a performance but for whom is the performance if not the audience? Mill's account is particularly remarkable, for poetic expression is primarily an oral medium and he does not specify that the poet need not acknowledge that they are being overheard. It is particularly the eyes, in Mill's account, that would give the "actor" away. It is precisely the eyes of Orpheus looking back at Eurydice that lose her to the underworld forever, though he only had to use his voice for her to follow him successfully.[203] But is the injunction to police one's "trace of consciousness" lest one "acts ill" all there is to the lyric staging and lyric mise en scène? It is initially very difficult to see any difference between this staging and that of the classical narrative cinema.

Metz's definition of classical cinema in "Story/Discourse" echoes Mill for the predominant mode of "story" over "discourse" (Mill's eloquence) in the fiction cinema as it developed from tropes codified around the time *Dr. Mabuse* was made and by *Dr. Mabuse* itself. His reads:

> It is enough, and it is even essential — this is another, equally well defined, path of gratification - that the actor should behave as though he *were not seen* (and therefore as though he did not see his voyeur), that he should go about his ordinary business and pursue his existence as *foreseen* by the fiction of the film, that he should carry on with his antics in a *closed room*.[204]

Is there a difference between "behaving as though he were not seen" and "[N]o trace of consciousness that any eyes are upon us must be visible in the work itself" acting as if the actor does not know the audience is there. In Mill's summation ignoring the eyes in particular is important. Here, too, behaving as if not *seen*, but particularly in the present, is at the fore, rather giving way to the *foreseen* of the destiny in foretold in the plot. The closed room, whether of the theater or the cinema, alludes to the fourth wall, which the actor, whether lyric, theatrical, or cinematic must not break. Vachel Lindsay's early contemplation of cinema posited that the "closed room" has been important as a particular kind of "lyric," intimate cinema since the beginning. However, it is useful to understand the metaphor of the "closed room" as such and not as a literal closed room. This definition leaves certain gestures and mise en scène, rather than the actor's eyes, to communicate the knowledge that the scene is being seen and overheard.

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[202] Mill, "Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties," 95.
[203] Cavarero, *Relating Narratives*.
[204] Christian Metz, "Story/Discourse (A Note on Two Kinds of Voyeurism)," in *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema*, trans. Alfred Guzzetti (1975; repr., Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986), 96.

In one of 109 more and less transparent puzzles commonly referred to as his "Zürauer aphorisms" written between 1917-1919, Franz Kafka alerts us to one potential point of view of the supposedly "passive" audience with the stage as an allegory for a created universe.

Manche nehmen an, dass neben dem grossen Urbetrug noch in jedem Fall eigens für sie ein kleiner besonderer Betrug veranstaltet wird, dass also, wenn ein Liebesspiel auf der Bühne aufgeführt wird, die Schauspielerin ausser dem verlogenen Lächeln für ihren Geliebten auch noch ein besonders hinterhältiges Lächeln für den ganz bestimmten Zuschauer auf der letzten Gallerie hat. Das heisst zu weit gehn.

Some assume that alongside the great *Ur*-deception
there is also definitely one special little deception put on just for them, that is, if a romantic play is being performed, the actress, besides the phony smile for her lover, has yet another, especially sneaky smile for the very specific spectator in the Second Gallery. That's called going too far.

–Franz Kafka, Zurau Aphorism #99[205]

Kafka subtly upbraids the spectator who would see not just the phony (*verlogenen*, lit. "phony") character that the theatrical actor in a contextualized role plays but the sneaky (*hinterhältiges*, lit. holding back) smile for the spectator, presumably that of the existential actor. In Kafka's analogy, the spectator allows herself to be interpellated by the dramatic fiction. The actor is a messenger of the *grossen Urbetrug* ("great *Ur*-deception,"), i.e., one who answers its interpellation, since this actor assumes responsibility for that which otherwise operates completely indifferently to whether the specific individual knows it or not, as does a play. The great *Urbetrug* can be understood as just another theatrical set in which the one who believes in its framework and that its framework is reproduced on the level of the particular feels themselves the unfortunate beneficiary of a billion smaller deceptions. The ongoing role-playing, which the actor presumably undertakes to make sure that a very specific spectator believes in the overall role-play, for instance, the need of that actress to dissimulate to her lover in that particular scene, which the spectator knows is a fiction causes alienation.[206] Ultimately role-playing that is instrumental or deceptive in nature not only provokes alienation, but ultimately inequality and injustice, since undermines moral intuition.

But if one sees the universe as uncreated in that sense, as authentic in the sense that it is made in an interrelational encounter in the present, then there is no distance between the character and the actor, between the role one plays and the self. There are greater implications involved here, like the difficulty this fact would create for those who are "just carrying out orders," for instance. If it is a special deception just for them why not just as well think of a special truth just for them, "alongside" (*neben,* lit. nearby) the *grossen Urbetrug* ("great *Ur*-deception"). Kafka concludes that the allegorical Ur-deception cannot travel between the world of the stage and the theater; the two worlds operate "alongside one another" but the periphery, the lowest cost seats, the marginal and unimportant and, as a place of at best indifference and at worst even contempt, the Second Gallery is still going "too far."

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[205] My translation with Julian A. Friedrich from a new German facsimile edition Franz Kafka, *Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe Sämtlicher Handschriften, Drucke Und Typoskripte*, ed. Roland Reuss et al. (Basel: Stroemfeld/Roter Stern, 1995).
[206] See the first of the two looks that Pascal Bonitzer delineates in "Les Deux regards" Pascal Bonitzer, "Les Deux Regards," *Cahiers Du Cinéma*, no. 275 (April 1977): 40–46.

The danger of a certain misunderstanding of Kuzmin's lyric spectatorship and indeed of reading the film as setting up a situation of "overhearing" is precisely the kind of over-reading that Kafka calls "going too far."[207] But Kuzmin's observations about the film and of specific moments do not presume that the film is talking to him or that the actor can come off the screen. He precisely registers that the actor does not see him, is indifferent to him, and that he cannot make contact. It is rather that he sees himself seeing the film that creates the lyric circumstance of self-sufficiency and reflexivity that Mill otherwise furnished as definitions of the lyric. When Wellbery says, "the theatrical frame vanishes and the communicative gestures become *authentic utterances*," he refers to the way that lyric discourse moves from seeking a real response from an interlocutor and rather seeks a particular kind of judgment and approval for a "self" at stake.

Wellbery's distinction between performative utterance in the idyll and authentic utterance in Goethe's lyric helps us distinguish between communicative enunciation and the activity of the lyric. He writes of the idyll's "performed utterances":

> Their mode of address is inflected, in other words, by a certain theatricality; they seem always to rehearse, or perform, a latent script. And just as in a theatrical performance it is not the actor in his own person who is the subject of the utterances but rather the *role* he plays, so here the statements are not moored to the life of an individual. The subject of enunciation in the idyll is a *social role* shaped by the expectations of the implicit audience before which the speech performance occurs...
>
> In the lyric text, however, the theatrical frame vanishes and the communicative gestures become *authentic utterances*. By this term I mean acts of speech embedded in the speaker's existential situation and marked, therefore, by the urgency of the speaker's care (*Sorge*) in the broadest sense of the term. Thus, the subject of enunciation is no longer a social role; it is, rather, a *self*, which is itself at stake in the communicative action.[208]

Rather than being theatrical utterances, uttered on a stage and within a dramatic situation, the latter, lyric, is the result of an existential circumstance. The "communicative action" Wellbery leaves us with at the end could be a bit misleading. The communicative, enunciative, is a mode of instrumental speech, which Gunning attributes to Mabuse. However, here it becomes possible to distinguish communicative speech from communicative action and thus see the rainbow of gestures and live configurations that can also be part of the lyric without being communicative in the instrumental or informative sense. The lyric actor must not show a trace of consciousness of the spectator but the lyric actor in a role can do so if the spectator she conjures is likewise conjured in a "role" (as the apostrophe does) or circumstance (as a series of conjunctions).

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[207] It is also part of a "hermeneutics of suspicion" (Paul Ricoeur) and the mechanisms of homophobia that "paranoid reading" (Eve Sedgewick, Leo Bersani, et al.) reveals. A more anodyne kind of "going too far" has been explored in Woody Allen's film *The Purple Rose of Cairo* (1985), set in New Jersey in 1935, in which a neglected wife (Mia Farrow) era sees the same film repeatedly as a mode of escapism until one of the characters, the explorer and safari leader (Jeff Daniels), comes off of the screen and into her world and plays on exoticizing eros that distracts from feminist engagement.

[208] David E. Wellbery, *The Specular Moment: Goethe's Early Lyric and the Beginnings of Romanticism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 12.

The Space of the Lyric: The "Closed Room"?

While "eloquence" (Mill), "enunciation" (Metz) or any acknowledgement of its own address (Bordwell) are all descriptions of breaking the fourth wall, an act in which classical cinema does not often engage, I suggest, the lyric address, which can also be found in narrative, fiction, and allegorical cinema, participates in discourse by addressing a listener-spectator "sitting on the fourth wall" (like the dummies) without breaking it, i.e., as another actor. Whether identified with the camera or with another objective correlative, what I call the "lyric spectator's position" in the room, on the wall of the room, at the interface, is necessarily embodied in its limitations described both by "shape" (Mill), qualities, and sometimes action or movement (if of the camera). Metz's description of "exhibitionism" also in "Story/Discourse" comes closest to what the lyric does. Metz distinguishes between the theater and the cinema on account of the different kinds of distance they create. The theater "withdraws" but leaves a double of itself, what he calls a "double withdrawal," while the distance in the cinema is the "absence of the object seen." The intimate situation in the closed room, that of eroticism, for instance, is not the same in cinema, as the object is not necessarily complicit in the fantasy. Throughout "Story/Discourse," he weighs in which ways the cinema is and is not exhibitionist and comes up with gradations of exhibitionism and thus also of gradations of voyeurism, distinguished by how "reconciled to the fact of their own existence" they are. One type of "exhibitionism" like that to which "classical theatre" comes asymptotically close, endlessly alternates the binaries of passive/active viewing and, because of the rapid exchange of identifications, makes possible the viewing position of the object and an awareness of the world seen by way of its configuration of other objects. Though Metz does not suggest an alternative to these binaries, one can imagine that their rapid succession and alternation create an instability and uncertainty that does not settle, like the very movement of cinema.

> True exhibitionism contains an element of triumph, and is always bilateral, in the exchange of phantasies if not in its concrete actions: it belongs to discourse rather than story, and is based entirely on the play of reciprocal identifications, on the conscious acceptance of the to-and-fro movement between I and *you*. Through the *mise en scène* of ['true exhibitionism's'] contrary impulsions, the perverted couple (which has its equivalents in the history of cultural productions) takes on the pressure of the voyeuristic desire[…]in the *never-ending alternation of its two sides: active/passive, subject/object, seeing/being seen.* If there is an element of triumph in this kind of representation, it is because what it exhibits is not exactly the exhibited object but, via the object, *the exhibition itself.*[209] [emphases added].

It is interesting to note how Metz uses mise en scène here. The perverted couple is that which exchanges fantasies, if not concrete actions and roles, both similar to and juxtaposed with "a pure onlooker whose participation is inconceivable."[210] This definition is both similar and different from "feeling confessing itself to itself" in Mill's definition of lyric. On the one hand, this "confession" is revealing and thus exhibitionist. The reciprocal nature posits that the poem is both poet and listener and this is made possible by the passive voice construction where the poem "is heard." The lyric in film is this particular mode of exhibitionism.

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[209] Metz, "Story/Discourse" 93-4.

[210] He likens the kind of viewer established by the narrative cinema, not the exhibitionist cinema, to a child who sees the "amorous play of the parental couple" and concludes that the cinematic signifier is not only "'psychoanalytic'; [the cinematic signifier] is more precisely Oedipal in type"(64).

There is a difference in the institution of film, which "knows it is watched," "yet does not know" or does not want to know, as Metz says of "story," and lyric poetry, which knows but does not show it. He writes that because when shooting occurs the audience is not there and when the projection occurs the actor is not there, "the cinema manages to be both exhibitionist and secretive. The exchange of seeing and being-seen will be fractured in its centre, and its two disjointed halves allocated to different moments in time: another split."[211] The temporality of the lyric is also a split one as the "diegetic" addressee is absent, or made absent before brought to presence. As with "This Living Hand," two temporalities and with them two spaces, that of the living and that beyond the pale, meet in the united time-space of the poem. In addition, the labor of filmmaking is separated from the result.[212] The film partakes in the phantasmagoria connected to the fetish object known as the commodity. The value of an object is not decided by its laborers but at the time exchange.

The Phantasmagoric: Commodities, Actors, Scenes, and Séances

The theme of the occult séance in the film, a kind of film within the film, gives a clue as to what kind of document of an encounter with a higher spirit Lang imagines his film to be. In parallel, Benjamin's views on innervation allow us to see that gambling is the other side of the coin of poetic composition and activity.



Figure 7 A visual rhyme: Hands around a casino game and a séance positioned radially viewed from above. An intertitle referring both to the gambling and to the séance reads: "Now, ladies and gentlemen, you have an over-view [*über alles orientiert*]… The game can begin," ("Jetzt, meine Damen und Herren, sind Sie über alles orientiert… Das Spiel kann beginnen").

On the one hand (pun sustained), Adorno's definition of a "phantasmagorical commodity" presides, allowing us to see it, too, as a consumer item in which there is no longer anything that is supposed to remind us how it came into being. It becomes a magical object, insofar as the labor stored up in it

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[211] Metz, "Story/Discourse," 95.

[212] Pointed out at length by Benjamin in the final version of "The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility," *SW 4*.

comes to seem supernatural and sacred at the very moment when it can no longer be recognized as labor."[213] Marx calls the commodity "[a] very strange thing," for with it "the definite social relation between men themselves" takes on the "fantastic form of a relation between things."[214] Jacques Derrida points out that to describe the commodity, Marx "must have recourse to theatrical language and must describe the apparition of the commodity as a stage entrance (*auftritt*). And he must describe the table become commodity as a table that turns, to be sure, during a spiritualist séance, but also as a ghostly silhouette, the figuration of an actor or a dancer."[215] He reminds us that the commodity form and its socially attributed value in the moment of exchange have nothing to do with its "physical nature" or with the "thingly (material) *relations"* (*dingliche Beziehungen*) that arise from it. This description of animation and figuration puts into relief the difference between the apostrophe of a thing that animates it according to its material properties and the personification of a non-living thing. The potentially dead hand in Keats, for instance, cannot enter into relation as an animated phantasmagoria but it can address the reader. It cannot be personified and yet its material properties can be made to speak and shape relations.

On the other hand (for where there is media there is a second hand), Benjamin writes that a medium becomes a medium, (i.e., immediate, active in the present, a necessary state for a medium to be one otherwise it is just an object or machine, such as the radio when it is off) only through other media. A medium comes into being as such only by way of a "détour par le toucher,"[216] that is, by way of or through the *diversion* by touch. Indeed, in his book *Iconomie,* on the economy of filmic images, Peter Szendy points out that the adjectives Benjamin uses to describe media such as thin and thick introduce conditions of "variable density" that liken media to a more or less viscous fluid. Szendy adds, touch is not a simple deviation in addition to other ones (since media always must deviate through another medium to become): "Insomuch as it implies 'transduction' rather than translation, touch seems to be the paradigm of the becoming medium of all media, as propagation at a distance *through contact.*"[217] He further elaborates, echoing work on touch by Jean-Luc Nancy and Maurice Merleau-Ponty[218] that "Touch is not in itself a medium but if touch is 'médiumnique' [mediumistic], it is so, because it is the element or *milieu par excellence* of the difference from oneself, of the distance from being with the self (*l'écart d'avec soi*) where the technical prosthesis already weaves itself (*où se trame*)."[219] Benjamin picks up on the importance of the physicality of touch when in contact with a medium and at once becoming a medium and distant from the self on a larger scale in his work on innervation, which he describes as the feeling of access to a universal consciousness that occurs equally in gambling and in poetic composition.[220]

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213 Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2002), [X14].
214 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (United States: Madison Park, 2010), 165.
215 Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International* (Routledge, 2012), 189.
216 Peter Szendy, *Le supermarché du visible* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 2017), 77.
217 Ibid., 75.
218Jacques Derrida, *On Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy*, trans. Christine Irizarry (2000; repr., Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2005); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible (Le Visible et l'invisible)* (1964; repr., Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968); Jacques Derrida, *Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy* (Paris: Galilée, 1998).
219 Szendy, 75.
220 Benjamin's work informed Miriam Hansen's notion of "Vernacular Modernism," which has in turn greatly influenced my own thinking.

Figure 8 During the séance, in another room, Dr. Mabuse meets Countess Told. His hand takes the life from hers, visible in the way her hand suddenly goes limp.

Spectators under the hypnotist's power are primarily dissociated from their body, while distraction and heightened emotion reconnects them with it, even if it is in a hysteric way. Miriam Bratu Hansen writes that "In an unpublished fragment written around 1929-30, 'Notes on a Theory of Gambling' (…des Spiels),' Benjamin states that the decisive factor in gambling is 'the level of motor innervation"' The successful contact of the gambler's motor stimuli with "fate" requires, before all else, a 'correct physical predisposition."[221] Benjamin wrote that the real gambler or *Spieler*, rather than the hypnotist, will have a full body experience that does not rely on visual stimulae. It concerns a 'predisposition' rather than a predetermination, which Hansen describes as a "heightened receptivity" that allows "the spark within the body from one point to the next":

> In other words, rather than relying on the master sense of vision, say, by "reading" the table…gambling turns on a "bodily presence of mind," a faculty that Benjamin elsewhere attributes to 'the ancients.' … The ability to commune with cosmic forces, however, is mobilized in the register of play, of simulation: "gambling generates by way of experiment the lightning-quick process of stimulation at the moment of danger" it is, as it were, "a blasphemous test of our presence of mind."[222]

This description can account for the experience of being a lyrical spectator, 'predisposed' but not predetermined by ideology. It is the feeling of being bodily with the images before the ball drops, of being so attune that one can divine and compare at the same time, knowing all the while that what is on the screen is beyond the feeling in memory, is what is attractive about the feeling, irreproducible in the present but also the possibility of comparison with it—an attunement of intuition and reason.

Benjamin dreams of a gambler who seeks divinatory power in the ability to mimic and to play, which is not the same as to reproduce narratives. Mimesis in poetry must fail, and the lyric cinema, as the lyric poem, must be aware of the limits of its ability to represent the world. At the same time, they

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[221] Benjamin SW 2, 297, 298, quoted in Miriam Bratu Hansen, "Room-for-Play: Benjamin's Gamble with Cinema," *October* 109 (July 2004): 9–10.

[222] Miriam Bratu Hansen, "Room-for-Play: Benjamin's Gamble with Cinema," *October* 109 (July 2004): 9–10. She quotes from Benjamin, Arcades Project, 513 and Benjamin SW 2, 298. See also Daniel Morgan, "'Play with Danger': Vernacular Modernism and the Problem of Criticism," *New German Critique* 41, no. 2 (2014): 67–82. Morgan accounts for how "innervation" is the "good kind" of mimesis in Hansen's work and constitutes a type of translation..

must relish the muse and music of sensuous similarity within the Mabuse of "nonsensuous similarity," which is what Benjamin called language itself, "the most complete archive of nonsensuous similarity."[223]

Not all lyric necessarily embraces either this "nonsensuous similarity" or Metz's "play of reciprocal identifications," which sounds similar to Kuzmin's promises of the "reciprocal interrelation" and "partial clarification." And yet it is precisely the play, the exchange value lent to those identifications that is left out of the partiality and interrelation in Kuzmin's relationship with the material object. In other words, he is not gambling for money. The romantic imaginary around both the first and second listener often genders the one who hears as female and attributed to that position and thus to that gender the quality of passivity. However, the impersonal and sensory, embodied vision, however momentary, and which continually redefines signifiers seems to be the antidote to a series of fetishistic objectifications and even stereotypes that occur in the institutionalized "fish-tank" of Metz's vision of how the film enunciates and oblige desires the spectator did not even know they had. In *Inside the Gaze: The Fiction Film and Its Spectator*, Francesco Casetti somewhat agrees with Metz about the spectator's position but goes beyond by claiming that there is an *actual* deictic address to the "enunciatee's presence"[224] and that the particular enunciation of a film "defines the film's coordinates (and the *you who emerges* draws its identity from this initiating gesture)."[225]

> If the emphasis is on roles, as it is in the theatrical-communicative, then the moment when a text determines its *I* and *you* becomes not only an initiating gesture but the major activity of the text. This moment founds, or at the very least determines, each successive development, and carries the responsibility of actualizing what has been already decided. If, in contrast, we reverse our critical path, we must assign principal responsibility to the body.[226]

This "major activity of the text" is itself a constant negotiation between the imaginative and the corporeal *I* and *You* and the interplay of their imagination and actualization. As Casetti writes, resolving the conflictual "research agendas," as he calls them, of "symbolic geography" and "concrete forces" necessitates a third way. "The text finds its own realization in a continual coming-and-going, through which roles and bodies support and adapt to one another, pursuing each other in turn."[227] Casetti could also weigh in on the problem Kafka proposes above. The spectator was simply "reflecting the conditions of existence within the text"[228] if roles are involved. However, he also proposes a wink, what he calls a "simulated enunciation," as a kind of doubling rather than reflection, what Kafka's spectator might have intuited in the "deceptive smile."[229] None of these

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[223] Ibid., 10n20.
[224] Francesco Casetti, *Inside the Gaze: The Fiction Film and Its Spectator (Dentro Lo Sguardo: Il Film e Il Suo Spettatore)*, trans. Charles O'Brien and Nell Andrew (Milan: Bompiani, 1996; Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1998), 22. "The enunciatee's presence is obvious both when a film speaks openly of itself or when it concentrates on narrative… but when a concurrence of different forms exists in the same film (in other words in cases involving an alternation between the poles of commentary and narrative), it must be derived from a process of confrontation."
[225] Ibid., 24.
[226] Ibid., 40.
[227] Ibid., 41.
[228] Ibid., 40.
[229] He writes that this includes, "Houses of mirrors, *winks*, Russian dolls: often a film opens out upon a moment that will suddenly double it, either because the images and sounds provoke additional significations or because what is shown reveals the reality backstage" [emphasis added] Ibid., 84.)

conditions describe non-communicative enunciation, however. The coordinates may emerge, and the spectator inhabits them, but the spectator does not become the *direct* you of communication.

My own gamble in entering this debate between Metz and Casetti over the validity of speaking of deictic power of address in the cinema (Metz's skepticism and Casetti's conviction of it) is that there is a middle way where the film can *invoke* the spectator, the actual aspect of the spectator rather than the spectator inhabiting a role, through a figure (rather than the spectator's figure), sometimes precisely by addressing a figure and enlivening it through gesture.[230] This *invocation* lies between Metz's "evocation" and Casetti's communication. Metz writes, "In a more general way, there always will be an important difference between textual arrangements that *evoke* the author's or spectator's figure, and words like I or YOU, that *designate* explicitly the corresponding persons in a conversation."[231] But what about when the address does neither of these things, instead *invoking*, calling upon, as in the lyric address of the apostrophe?

Apostrophizing Spectatorship and the "Spectator-Fish" That Swim Alongside

According to Culler, apostrophe has three functions, which mutually support each other and allow the full experience of what it means to both be a subject and an object at the hands of the other. The first function is as intensifiers and "images of invested passion."[232] The second presupposes the "animicity " of objects and constitutes "encounters with the world as relations between subjects," and the third is to "dramatize or constitute an image of self."[233] This last "image of self" is of course also one of "invested passion" and so the three functions feed into each other.

> Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" is perhaps the clearest example of the way in which the apostrophic mode, making the wind a *thou*, poses the problem of the poetic subject as a problem of the wind's relation to him. If the wind is spirit it can make the speaker either an *it* or a *thou* to its *I*. So Bloom writes, "He can either surrender himself to the wind as an object for it to experience ("O lift me as a wave, a leaf, a cloud") as the leaf, cloud, and wave are objects for it, or else he can attempt to call upon the wind to take up a stand in relation to him, to enter into him and he into the wind." And again, "stand in relation Thou to I, and I to Thou, so that your impetuosity, your energy and life may also be mine, and that your message may be my message ... No mystical merging into a larger Identity but mutual confrontation of two realities is what is involved here" [Shelley's Mythmaking, pp. 84, 87]. Of course it is in his ability effectively to sustain this apostrophic discourse that the speaker produces the poetic event and is constituted as poetical spirit.[234]

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[230] One example might be the glass Coke bottle and the tin Coke can in *The Gods Must Be Crazy* (Jamie Uys 1980). For a montage featuring this figure that shows a large gamut of possible relations between the indigenous tribe and a specific representative of capitalist imperialism, see "The Gods Must Be Thirsty" (YouTube, January 16, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8bGHkTgkjUg.

[231] Christian Metz, "The Impersonal Enunciation, or the Site of Film (In the Margin of Recent Works on Enunciation in Cinema)," trans. Béatrice Durand-Sendrail and Kristen Brookes, *New Literary History* 22, no. 3 (1991): 756.

[232] Culler, "Apostrophe," 60.

[233] Culler, 63.

[234] Ibid.

Invoking a figure into which a spectator can also invest passion veers from breaking the fourth wall in a direct address. A specter of identification haunts; there is no "merging" but rather Shelley's "mutual confrontation of two realities."[235] The spectator chooses to be an object in relation to the invoked figure or object, or to take up a stand in relation, i.e. the spectator chooses a position of passionate investment as part of the configuration of the world. There is the specter of identification here, whether with characters, camera, or object, but it is not psychological and is rather grounded in the circumstance. In that case, the camera would be, like the poet, the "I" of the spectator. But as it does not occur onscreen, it can hardly be a figure for the spectator other than in the way it relates through gesture in relation to the scene. Likewise, an identification with characters, if they are too psychologized and do not remain opaque to themselves or transcend personality in gesture,[236] relating, precisely to the opacity of others, then an identification with them would come only from a passive engagement with narrative.

Apostrophe thus creates space within which two (reversible) subjects can meet; it creates a particular mise en scène. The "space of enunciation"[237] distinguishes the "position of the work" from the "position of the director." How do those 'positions' invoke spectators differently than the space of the apostrophe? The "space of enunciation" is a space of communication. The social situation which has the potential of becoming a communicative situation here instead manifests an interrelation, a situation between subject-subject, subject-object, and reality-reality (temporal or otherwise) in what could be termed an "apostrophic space." The embodiment of these poles in subjects-objects and their establishment through gesture and deixis creates the lyric circumstance onscreen. "Identifications" otherwise tend to keep a viewer from an embodied relation to the world onscreen.

This embodiment is a crucial distinction from Metz's description of the "spectator-fish" that the "institution of cinema" needs or imagines: Metz writes:

> Spectator-fish, taking in everything with their eyes, nothing with their bodies: the institution of the cinema requires a silent, motionless spectator, a vacant spectator, constantly in a sub-motor and hyper-perceptive state, a spectator at once alienated and happy, acrobatically hooked up to himself by the invisible thread of sight, a spectator who only catches up with himself at the last minute, by a paradoxical identification with his own self*, a self filtered out into pure vision.* We are not referring here to the spectator's identification with the characters of the film (which is secondary), but to his *preliminary identification with the (invisible) seeing*

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[235] could be more clear here

[236] This process is important to Brecht's epic theater. The difference between the epic and lyric theater may primarily be in the passionate intensity with which these gestures are animated. Francesco Giusti reads the interruption of action in the gesture and the "suspension of action" as the "lyric" within Brecht's "epic." This "suspension of action" can be provoked by passionate intensity. It is this quality of the melodrama, too, that stops the forward motion of the plot, but

[237] Stephen Jenkins notes that Bellour's and other's turn towards form and "the space of enunciation" comes from a desire, as in Peter Wollen's *politique des auteurs*[237], to distinguish the position of the work from the position of the director. He writes, "Bellour insists on the need for close examination of formal devices because it is questions of form which are repressed from the person Lang's discourse" Jenkins, *Fritz Lang*, 26. Casetti also writes, much later: "Indeed, I put my money on the conjunction of reception studies and textual analysis, comparing what the film does to the spectator and what the spectator does to the film. In so many reception studies the text simply disappears or becomes a completely indifferent object, whereas I insist that the text is crucial, if only because its presence is what turns a social situation into a communicative situation" (Casetti xvii)

> *agency of the film itself as discourse*, as the agency which puts forward the story and shows it to us.[238] [Emphases mine].

Metz here posits the "seeing agency" of the film. The lyric mode in film specifically points to the spectator's physical absence while holding a place for that absence. It admits something is lacking, whereas, "The narrative plenitude and *transparency* of this kind of film [the institutional film] is based on a refusal to admit that anything is lacking, or that anything has to be sought for; it shows us only the other side of the lack and the search, an image of satiety and fulfilment, which is always to some extent regressive: it is a formula for granting a wish which was never formulated in the first place."[239] Rather than transparency, by contrast, a lyric figure acts like a crystal, seemingly transparent but actually insisting on opacity. In this case, the opacity is the inability to move past the reflection of Hull, which is a blockage, quite literally a veil, but it is also the substance itself the physical block of the vessel. Hull's is not an image one can move through. It is not a Romantic ideal but a "lyrical abstraction," a view of whiteness that sees its opacity rather than purity, and sees its layers as a series of cloudy gradations, "the opaque flash of pure transparency."[240]

Perhaps the most apt metaphor for the encounter of the (lyrical) spectator in an "apostrophic space" with the "space of enunciation" is the spectator-fish who sees his own image in a kind of beveled fish-bowl.[241] Kuzmin offers us one later when he cannot move past his own reflection in the facets of a crystal. Far from reflecting his world as a film read in the mode of the "mirror" that would reflect all the world on the same plane of the mirror, or through Metz's transparent fish-tank, what it reflects is the opaque figure, the circumstantial and apostrophic figure of Hull's face, which by the laws of optics should very well be his. In other words, he sees the absence of his own face and that it has been replaced with hull's figure in what might otherwise be dismissed as the transparent social or communicative frame. Hull's face means something within that frame that Kuzmin has no control over, indeed, and this bothers him the context of the Russian Revolution and his inability to signify as anything but bourgeois. This problem emerges in his most famous poem, *Trout Breaks the Ice*, for which *Novyi Gul'* is a preparation.

The Theatrical and the Apostrophic

Rather than focus on subject- or value-formation, Expressionism in cinema sought to represent inner psychology in outer appearances; its exaggerated chiaroscuro sets reflect the mental states of its protagonists in distorted mirrors without claims to documentary or realism. The spectator partakes in the elevated emotions represented in fantastical sets symbolizing an interior landscape. Lang's film questions the possibility of a mimetic relation to psychology. In a famous scene in the film, Dr. Mabuse answers the question of what he thinks of expressionism with the retort, "*Expressionismus ist Spielerei… Aber warum auch nicht? – Alles ist heute Spielerei–!"* [Figure 9]. Presumably, Mabuse thinks equally little of expressionism's ability to depict "the real" as any other period style, including Romanticism and Classicism. They are all styles and forms of artifice. The fact that the proclamation comes from Dr. Mabuse, both the least trustworthy character and an expert in

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[238] Christian Metz, "Story/Discourse (A Note on Two Kinds of Voyeurism)," in *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema*, trans. Alfred Guzzetti (1975; repr., Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986), 96.
[239] Ibid., 91.
[240] Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (Cinéma 1: L'image Mouvement)*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (1983; repr., Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1986), 93.
[241] This is the image Metz provides us but does not see in his idea of the "spectator fish."

"*Spielerei*," or game-playing, makes it both unreliable and an authoritative assessment by the director's own alter-ego.

Figure 9 A famous meta-discussion in the film: "–Wie stellen Sie sich zum Expressionismus, Herr Doktor?" "–Expressionismus ist Spielerei… Aber warum auch nicht? – Alles ist heute Spielerei–!"[242] Throughout these images the statue in the background comes in and out of relation, first hidden behind a living actor, then framed between two men, and finally being served by the butler (clockwise). In the last image (bottom right), Countess Told's fringed garment acts as a curtain at the front of a stage; this "curtain" acts as a pair of quotes and the mute figure as our traveler struck with the sight of Mabuse's soon-to-be Ozymandias figure, here Mabuse.[243]

As the scene unfolds, the statue in the background, an artifact from another era and culture (ambiguously Mesopotamian or African), takes its place as the most privileged vantage point over the room, including over Mabuse, and continues to preside over subsequent scenes. It is certainly not a figure for an omniscient viewpoint but rather an embodied and particular, if "other" one that creates a certain cultural and aesthetic relativity within the scene. In the foreground, a party-goer's dress mimics a curtain, subtly framing the scene as a theatrical performance for the viewer. In

[242] "'—What's your position on Expressionism, Doctor?' '—Expressionism is a game… But then again why not? — Everything today is a game—!'"
[243] Kuzmin intuits the general reference to Ozymandias in his poem "Germaniia" even if the poem is not about this scene in particular.

contrast with the scene in the hotel room with the depiction of a lyre in the background, this scene makes its aesthetic stakes explicit through dialogue, however, the silence and supervision of the blind figure offers another commentary. Perhaps the film's status as a document depends less on its inherent reality and more on the form of spectator-witness it fashions.

At the very least, one wonders what this statue would think and say if it could and imbue it with subjectivity fitting its form, one evocative of the "traveler from an antique land" in Shelley's 1818 poem "Ozymandias," who witnesses the ruins of a the "King of Kings" of whom nothing but rubble remains. One does not identify psychologically with the statue on screen but rather affectively and perhaps even bodily see from his position. One does not simply feel like the child of Metz's Oedipal cinematic signifier, disembodied and helpless, but rather one feels rigid, turned to stone. However, this reversible figure merges our position with that of both the traveler and the statue which he sees, giving us a condition much like Ozymandias' himself since he was a stone statue. Like "our" own "styles," the viewer will start to crumble eventually coming into relation with this temporally and perhaps also spatially removed setting. That poem arises from the speaker's encounter with a traveler and the majority of the poem is reported speech, the traveler's report of the sculpture's ruins. The speaker vouches for the traveler's authenticity by imparting his own passionate interest upon him and substituting any social frame. In this scene in the film, on the one hand, there is direct speech and self-aware dialogue – dramatic action and irony, which create distance from Mabuse's speech but the statue counterintuitively offers a more intimate position.

Here the "speaker" is the camera, which describes the scene and from a modest, self-effacing intimacy, while the curtain acts as a pair of quotes and the mute figure as our traveler struck with the sight of an Ozymandias figure, here Mabuse: "a shattered visage… whose frown,/And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,/Tell that its sculptor well those passions read/Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things…"[244] Kuzmin's version of Mabuse all but explicitly takes up Shelley's "Ozymandias," the position of the statue in this scene, and the first view of Mabuse's looming face in "Germaniia"[245] Kracauer, building off of Rudolf Arnheim's observation, describes the looming face in the following way: "A small bright spot, Mabuse's face gleams out of the jet-black screen[246], then, with frightening speed, rushes to the foreground and fills the whole frame, his cruel, strong-willed eyes fastened upon the audience."[247] In his poem, Kuzmin describes a composite of the somnambulist Cesare from *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (*Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari* 1920) and Dr. Mabuse's looming face as a ruin in the middle of a desert wilderness: "These eyes in exaggerated make-up/drooping mouth/broken brows/nostril trembles…[…] Wake up, somnambulist!/ What spasm distorted/ the sweetest features?/Poison, collapse, torture, fear?.../Eyelids glisten in the middle of wilderness…/Where is the laurel crown?/ Why is there a shroud like a mantle?"[248] Signaling an apocalyptic vision, the end of the poem reads: «Blow, blow, brothers! It's nothing that the brow is furrowing…/Through smoke, fire, and curses/love will gush in./Not-yet-born one, be resurrected!/ We are waiting and will out wait him …/Motherland,

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[244] Published in his 1819 collection *Rosalind and Helen, A Modern Eclogue* under the title "Sonnet. Ozymandias."
[245] Mikhail Alekseevich Kuzmin, *Stikhi i proza* (Moskva: Sovremennik, 1989).
[246] Probably at the moment when he wears "Chinese glasses" at the gambling table.
[247] Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler*, 83.
[248] "Эти глаза в преувеличенном гриме,/опущенный рот,/сломаны брови,/ноздря дрожит... […]Проснись, сомнамбула!/Какая судорога исказила/черты сладчайшие?/Яд, падение, пытка, страх?.../Веки лоснятся в центре дико.../Где лавровый венец?/Почему как мантия саван?»

friendship and songs—/Nothing is higher!"[249] Interestingly, the poem's finale explicitly confronts and attempts to do away with a second layer of meaning with the line "Nothing is higher!" The second layers or allegories here are figured as the messiah being resurrected as a metonym for Germany in ruins. That which replaces the allegory is "Motherland, friendship and songs." One hears echoes, too, of Benjamin's description of allegory in the Baroque as a ruin. Though Mabuse is far from destroyed as of yet in the story, the blind gaze of another temporality and another aesthetic "style" foretells his destruction, indeed completed by the inability of his blind counterfeiters whom he has trapped to help him escape in the final scene. When the "theatrical frame vanishes" (Wellbery) and authentic utterances emerge, one finds oneself in the same small, closed, intimate room, and the statue looks back at us, spectator-fish, producing an opacity in the image.

Lyric Intimacy and Lyric Allegory

Vachel Lindsay aligned what he called "Intimate Motion Pictures" with the lyric in *The Art of the Moving Picture* in 1915. He contends that what one can understand as an extreme version of the "closed room" (Metz) is itself a marker of the lyric in its intimacy and specifically its placement of spectators as "privileged characters" who are also "members of the household." He writes:

> …[T]he Intimate Film ["the equivalent of the lyric"] has its photographic basis in the fact that any photoplay interior has a very small ground plan, and the cosiest of enclosing walls… If there is a table in this room, it is often so near it is half out of the picture or perhaps it is against the front line of the triangular ground-plan. Only the top of the table is seen, and nothing close up to us is pictured below that. We in the audience are privileged characters. Generally attending the show in bunches of two or three, we are members of the household on the screen.[250]

While Lindsay continues his account by resorting to the metaphor of the window, he asserts that the spectator presses his nose up against it. This assertion would very well describe the scene at hand, including the table that exits the frame to the left, were it not for the woman blocking the edge of the table. Thus the theatrical takes precedence in this scene but negates itself as its curtain is also a character who sits on the wall, as with the statue on the "back" of the stage, and as with the dummies in the scene preceding this one.

My wager here is that the lyric appears in Lindsay's description, in the context of a fiction usually understood as allegory, and even appears as itself an allegory. However, the lyric also interrupts the allegory, allegorizing precisely a limited access to the real and the failure or "ruin" of allegory itself. Allegory is an extended aesthetic metaphor that assists in concretizing the abstract systems that govern everyday life. Theorist Fredric Jameson finds that the wider capitalist system cannot be encompassed in any other form but allegory, as it "allows the most random, minute, or isolated" elements "to function as figurative machinery." Jameson states that "we map our fellows in class

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[249] Дуйте, дуйте, братья!/Ничего, что кривится бровь.../Сквозь дым, огонь и проклятье/ливнем хлынет любовь./Нерожденный еще, воскресни!/Мы ждем и дождемся его.../Родина, дружба и песни —/выше нет ничего!»

[250] Vachel Lindsay, *The Art of the Moving Picture* (Macmillan, 1915), 74–75. Lindsay also describes "intimate" pictures as "colder and quieter" and suggest that they "might be called blue," while he calls films of the epic category "Splendor Photoplays" and assigns them the color yellow "since that is the hue of pageants and sunshine," 79. In this light, epics might be those that present themselves as relatively clear, uncomplicated, unnuanced depictions.

terms day by day, and fantasize our current events in terms of larger mythic narratives."[251] If a rigid class system and system of classification in general is a feature of capitalism, Dr. Mabuse clearly engages that system and uses it to his advantage, as Gunning has noted, but also revealing its failures. In arguing that Mabuse is an anti-lyric character, promoting a more intimate interrelational model that the lyric potentially provides. Though the lyric operating within capitalism must appear as an allegory of relation, it does not claim to be a "larger" mythic narrative but insists on its localization through its immanent temporality and self-performativity. Indeed, *Mabuse,* a film typically understood as fiction and read as allegory of capitalism, but to which Lang and others rhetorically attributed authenticity by calling it a "document" and "image of its time," references the lyric to establish its aesthetic authenticity throughout for its effects. However, on one occasion, the film includes a painting, a depiction of a lyric scene, that raises the question of this lyric as itself an allegory within the film.

An ornately-framed idyllic pastoral painting hangs in the background of a scene in the beginning of the third act [Figure 10]. The painting depicts a lute player serenading two women who lean against a tree. It presides over minimal action occurring in the foreground of the scene and over a suspended time frame; the scene in total lasts a minute and a half and is comprised of this shot for its majority, with a few cutaways to inserts, intertitles, and medium shots of both of the main characters framing the long take on either end. The scene is thus edited in a style very close to standard narrative cinema today, though there is no shot-counter shot of the two characters' interaction. Instead, the camera isolates each character before showing their relation through a more theatrical blocking, the camera acting more as a stage light. The painting of the quiet and comedic scene definitively cues a *lyric mode*, here represented as *triangulated configuration* of the *mise en scène*, which the film uses throughout in order to gesture towards a dual temporality, one that combines the on-screen and off. An important shift occurs in this "beat," if not in the scene, then at least potentially in the spectator's awareness of their own act of watching.

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[251] Fredric Jameson, *The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System* (Indiana University Press, 1995), 3. For an extensive exploration of the relationship between allegory and ideology and the specifically the problems of representation see Jameson, *Allegory and Ideology*. Jameson points out that Auerbach's *figura* is a "mediatory concept rather than a structural one" and proposes to consider it within a view of the "philosophical problems of immanence and of representation in general."

Figure 10 A scene from Part I, Act III of Dr. Mabuse the Gambler (Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler dir. Fritz Lang, 1922): Hugo Balling (uncredited, right) and Edgar Hull (Paul Richter, left) meet below a painting of a performance of a lyric song.

The painting represents the scene of a lyric song addressed to two figures, who are the audience to this lyric declamation. Perhaps it is merely a prop, one thinks, placed there for the verisimilitude Roland Barthes evokes as "reality effects"[252] in novels, or a certain excess that convinces the viewer that this scene does indeed take place in the fancy Excelsior Hôtel. Yet, it is the room's very carefully arrangement and sparsity that calls attention to the painting. The painting represents the Romantic lyric's, idealized performance, but what might strike the viewer as uncanny, is that the figures in the foreground of the film scene are arranged in the configuration and make the same gestures as are found in the painting. Mimicking the stance and posture of the lute player, Hull (Paul Richter) leans over Hugo Balling (uncredited), whose light outfit blends into the pillow to the right of him in the same way the semi-reclining woman's dress billows out upon the meadow at her feet. Instead of the woman on the left in the painting, a crystal stands impassively on the table in the foreground, complete with darker-colored satin tablecloth draped in the very form and shade of the more upright woman's dress. The singer in the scene of lyric performance addresses one of the listeners directly, presumably his beloved, while the third "overhears."[253] This configuration invokes the lyric circumstance of expression and reception. It effectively halts the narrative and places the operations and assumptions of the narrative in suspension.

[252] Barthes, "The Reality Effect (Effet de Réel)."

[253] In other languages and traditions including the "original" Greek instance of the lyric (see Kathleen McCarthy's work), including in the Russian tradition, which has a clear distinction between singular and plural "you," and in the Arabic tradition, where there is a dual pronoun for "you" specifying two people, the poet can more explicitly address two at once, creating a small community comprised of the speaker and two listeners. This possibility is also contained in the ambiguously singular or plural English "you." In this case study, I explore the *slant*, indirect address to the one who overhears as a classic formulation of romantic poetry, and claim that the one who "overhears" becomes part of the community on-screen, retaining its idiosyncrasy through this oblique address. I explore the more explicit pluralities of this indirect address in subsequent chapters.

In a film so interested in mimesis and figuration, and the possibilities and pitfalls inherent in their exaggerations, this moment of the slightly amiss mimesis of a lyric song demands to be taken as serious and parodic, exalted and bathetic. [254] It constitutes an opportunity for critical study of the way an institutional mode of omniscience, suture, and absorption presents itself for the spectator's evaluation. Anticipating a judgmental position, the lyric intercepts it through indirect address and offers multiple, simultaneous, and virtual positions to the viewer. These diverse positions both authorize the viewer to respond to the film from a discrete subjective evaluative position but in making the spectator just off-screen or just out of sight, overhearing, the film also limits the authority of the spectator and draws spectatorial attention to the ways in which this spectator is contiguous with and implicated by the world on screen. The lyric mode introduces the evaluative position as an event that needs continuous updating in the singular of the encounter–in this case of the act of viewing or the filmic utterance. The subtitle to part one of the film, for instance, asks any audience today, is this an "Image [of the Lyric] of *Our* Times?"

Tautegorical Aside: Lute-Lyre-Liar

I have been referring to the initial painting as a lyric scene, though it contains a man playing a lute. In a kind of tautegory, the lute and a lyre are used interchangeably as symbols of poetry and within an associative constellation of metonyms that reflect differences in context and time. Technically, a lute is a lyre with an independent fingerboard. The lute and the lyre constitute tautegorical symbols for poetry. John Hollander writes, "The 'lute-harp-lyre' constellation, uniting the contemporary string instrument with those of David and Orpheus, for example, represents no capricious substitution of one term for the other. Rather, it depends upon a constant habit of figurative association of the instruments and what they stand for…" He affirms, "A metonymic use of the lute (for the lyre) to represent poetry as well as music is a familiar one."[255] The lyre-lute constellation here evokes Coleridge's category of the tautegory. The associative and tautegorical faculty becomes important in the film itself, and the multi-faceted, reflective crystal carafe in this scene can also be understood as a vessel for that faculty, but here for the cinema as another incarnation of the window, mirror, frame metaphors for cinema.

So what makes the lyric scene and what is at stake?

Returning to this overt reference to the lyric scene within the film, it is possible to say that this particular scene shows two of lyric's most fundamental qualities. One, that it makes reference to a *form* prior to it, which could be ritual or aesthetic rather than referencing a prior event or "story." And, two, that it dramatizes the process of *misrecognition* that occurs when subject and object poles are unstable. By Kathleen McCarthy's definition of the classical lyric, it prioritizes the form unlike satire or elegy, which make reference to the pro-poetic (or the pro-filmic). Satire and elegy rely on

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[254] The three ingredients Georges Didi-Huberman argues make up what he calls the "lyrical documentary" (Casado 2014). For more on "lyrisme documentaire," see *L'œil de l'histoire 1: Quand les images prennent position*, « Interposition des Champs : Remonter l'histoire » and Chapter 2.

[255] John Hollander, *The Untuning of the Sky : Ideas of Music in English Poetry, 1500-1700* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961). The accompaniment of a voice by an instrument can be extended to the accompaniment of one medium with and by another, for instance poetry with a photography. While a caption tends to "fix" the meaning of the photograph, poetry purports to do no such thing. Bertolt Brecht's verses in *War Primer* act as a stable referent for the changing images of war.

the representation of prior, non-poetic speech ("this illusion that the scene represented exists prior to the discourse that represents it is what narrative theory calls 'story')" the speech that a lyric poem on the other hand "represents is itself already a poem, thus diminishing the distance between the poet as 'maker' of an artifact and poet as speaker within the poem."[256] When the poet Kuzmin writes a poem "about" the film, he makes explicit references to characters in the film and to moments, scenes, and gestures both of the film and from his personal history, which would seem to make the poem elegiac. However, his address of the characters in the second person overshadows *references* to story, making the poem into lyric utterance by virtue of its use of the form prior to it in the film, as well as by use of the figures to preserve its form. Instead, his long poem's serial structure evokes the structure of the film itself and its self-generating logic. The second question of *mis*-recognition that allows another, unexpected quality to surface instead also lies at the heart of this scene and is thematized in the narrative-allegorical register as well as a mis-evaluation. For this register, it is important that *not* being acknowledged visually, as by an actor breaking the fourth wall, i.e., looking back into the camera, foregoes the possibility of misrecognition inherent to modes of interpellation. Yet there are transcendent, particularly apostrophic, gestures as well as figures that stand for a lyric spectator-actor, in other words a participant in the lyric scene.

"Ahem" : Gesture and Apostrophe

In this scene, Hull coughs, a sort of polite interpellative "ahem!" [*Figure 11*], to get the attention of the unresponsive inhabitant of Room 112, to whom he has paid a visit, because he thinks he has lost a great sum of money to him the previous night at cards. At first this appears to be a polite form of interpellation. However, the fact that it takes the form of a cough is significant on another register, since Balling himself is ailing, one knows not exactly of what. Like in "This Living Hand," the "reader" (here Hull) takes on the cough of the one who is sick. However, in the context of the one who "returns" the address, it turns out to be reminder of mutual vulnerability, stemming from a primary guilt, that renders them equally precarious.

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[256] Kathleen McCarthy, "First-Person Poetry," in *The Oxford Handbook of Roman Studies*, ed. Alessandro Barchiesi and Walter Scheidel (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 445. Lyric's effects are "situated in discourse, while elegy's and satire's depend more heavily on reference." Satire and elegy rely on the representation of prior, non-poetic speech ("this illusion that the scene represented exists prior to the discourse that represents it is what narrative theory calls 'story')" the speech that a lyric poem on the other hand "represents is itself already a poem, thus diminishing the distance between the poet as 'maker' of an artifact and poet as speaker within the poem."

Figure 11 The opening shot of Act III shows the excess of languages spoken at the international Excelsior Hôtel, however, shortly after, Hull addresses a sickly cough towards Hugo Balling when he fails to respond to his interpellation. The cough is part gesture, part oblique address.

Balling does not have a cough, per se, but the gesture joins him in the realm of frailty. This address is like an interpellation in another language, one not included in the list spoken at the Excelsior but in the Esperanto of the cinema in the dream of cinema as a universal language. What he is really saying here is "Excuse me, Herr Balling?" and so this is the most polite interpellation one can make while standing on the threshold, hesitant and trepidatious that he has the wrong door. This address is as close as one can get to interpellation before it becomes apostrophe.

Malin Wahlberg, building on Frank Kessler's historical work in his book *Mise en scène*, has put particular emphasis on the *mise* ("putting") in *mise en scène* ("put-on-stage" or "staging"), focusing on a schema of how poesis within documentary can create "authenticity" and a "tension between the concrete and abstraction."[257] She writes of putting a scene together so as to "enact conversation," by which she means to re-make a conversation so as to "frame and sound" the act of listening, and to "enact acting," to deliberately show the making of a scene and "forge a theatrical gesture in order to enhance the chance element of the encounter."[258] In one of Wahlberg's examples, the re-enactment of an everyday shop interaction, a Polish man taunts a Polish guest worker just trying to get a haircut in *Ridge* (*Säsong*, John Skoog, Sweden, 'Moving Sweden' Project, 2019). His imploring of the worker to walk more confidently into the store so that he can be more sexy foregrounds both sexist and xenophobic attitudes possible in a simple entrance into a shop (when not the cough of Hull's "ahem" for instance), while a woman looks on. The scene takes place in a grove, a kind of Romantic setting, because of the haircut. This particular example interests us not only for its juxtaposition with Hull's entry but because the *mise en scène* in that scene includes a flesh-and-blood "witness" who, in inaction, operates figuratively.

The scene rides on a distinction between re-enactment as satire and provocation and looking on as expressive representation. Lyric's effects are "situated in discourse, while elegy's and satire's depend

[257] Malin Wahlberg, "In Frame and Out of Synch: Collaborative Gestures of Enactment and Voice" (Visible Evidence XXVI, Los Angeles, 2019); Kessler, *Mise En Scène*.
[258] Wahlberg.

more heavily on reference."[259] Satire and elegy rely on the representation of prior, non-poetic speech ("this illusion that the scene represented exists prior to the discourse that represents it is what narrative theory calls 'story')" the speech that a lyric poem on the other hand "represents is itself already a poem, thus diminishing the distance between the poet as 'maker' of an artifact and poet as speaker within the poem."[260] In other words, the author and the player start to become one. They both create and act out a reality they see inherent or implied in the world around them instead of prescribing laws they cannot live by. The camera focuses intently on a "third," a woman who sits quietly but fixedly watching both the re-enactment and the actualization of the caricatured macho gestures being suggested by the Polish man in the present of viewing, both hers and ours, as if they were actually directed at her. This makes the spectator doubly uncomfortable, both for the guest worker, who in this context might be considered the "non-human," the object being taunted, getting a haircut and for her, whose discomfort enlivens the discomfort the guest worker cannot fully show. Wahlberg's emphasis on the *mise* dovetails nicely with mine, as she emphasizes precisely the "re-" of reenacting and of re-making of the gesture in the "putting-on-stage" and while I completely agree, I draw attention to the way that the gesture breaks down the divide between theatrical "re-" enacting in the eyes of that triangulated third, who sees both re-enactor and addressee. She is quiet but not because she is a silent or passive witness—this Skoog makes clear as he films her face in close-up; rather, she would refuse to be interpellated by such gestures, leaving the Polish man to make a fool of himself. As she is indirectly mocked, as a woman, her gaze speaks that which the addressee of the re-enactment also silently communicates and cannot say. Admittedly, there is an uncomfortable play on the attempt at objectifying the imaginary woman that the Polish man imagines and the way this woman is turned into an objective correlative in the scene. However, the parallel objectification of migrant and woman and their parallel refusal to respond also signals a kind of protest of the objective correlative to express feelings in response to being taunted.

The *put-on-stage*-ness of the lyric spectator in particular is to place the spectator in a position contiguous to the space on screen. That mise en scène is triangular, and encourages the spectator to receive the "action" as if they are witness to a gesture, indirectly or obliquely addressed to them. Giorgio Agamben's "Notes on Gesture" are useful for distinguishing here between action and gesture in the theater and in the cinema.

> Because it is centrally located in the gesture, not the image, cinema essentially ranks with ethics and politics (and not merely with aesthetics).
>
> What is gesture? An observation by Varro holds an extremely valuable clue. He inscribes gesture in the sphere of action, but distinguishes it clearly from acting [*agere*] and doing [*facere*]
>
> A person can make [*facere*] something and not enact [*agere*] it, as a poet makes a play but does not act it (*agere* in the sense of playing a part); on the hand the actor acts the play, but does not make it. So the play is made [*fit*] by the poet, but not acted [*agitur*] by him; it is acted by the actor, but not made by him.[261]

Agamben wagers that gesture is neither acting nor doing in only either the theatrical or the poetic sense. Though his example is a play that the poet writes, if the cinema of gestures is that which the

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[259] McCarthy, "First-Person Poetry," 445.
[260] Ibid.
[261] Giorgio Agamben, "Notes on Gesture," in *Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience* (1993; repr., London New York: Verso, 2007), 139–40.

actor as himself performs, then it is akin to the political and ethical of the communicative gesture that attains to the level of lyric utterance. As with Kafka's spectator, there would be confusion if the actor themselves addressed us from the stage, unless the actor were the poet and anyway still would not address one particular viewer. The cough is indeed an act of communication that the actor is scripted to perform, though it is such a liminal case that the spectator has a say in how to read it. The cough does not carry information. It is an "utterance," an interruption that can be interpreted rather than acted upon such.

The gesture of the poem and of apostrophe in particular is the act of summoning the reader who "overhears" the address to a non-human entity in the form of a figure; in film, one can imagine this sort of spectator being invoked as overhearing and overseeing from just off-screen based on gestures that occur on screen. The figure into which the spectator in invoked is often non-human, sometimes natural, and reifies a shared physical and emotional position of speaker and listener. Rather than inferring a viewer, and rather than suturing the viewer into the action, it gives the spectator a place to reside in the world of the action in an impersonal way (conversely, personality is attributed to objects). Apostrophic gestures position the listener-spectator as an affective entity relating to the world on screen free from identification.

These gestures perform two important functions:

1) They objectify the viewer without fetishizing her, because here the address imbues the object with subjective qualities.
2) Unlike the voyeur, this lyric spectator is not granted immunity and does not belong to a different world.

The world on screen is continuous with the world in the theater and the viewer "sits" on the fourth wall rather than being on the other side of it. In other words, like the gesture itself which ceases to be tied to a specific ego and which goes between interior and exterior in the individual, the lyric spectator enters the picture when invoked as a shared affectively charged element of the imagination. They constitute a point of cathexis for film's negotiation with what kind of authentic world might be recognized. To be attuned to the "authenticity" that comes of the gesture within a lyric configuration here is to pay attention to triangulated configurations – actors/non-actors, the camera, and objects – as figural nodes that can be understood as performative "speaker," "addressee" and "objective correlative" that are always in movement. How does one enter this room *alongside* but not *as* Hull?

Overhearing vs. Eavesdropping

> "…[U]nderstand that it is not at the place of the subject that the camera operates, but at the place of the Other" [262]

Pascal Bonitzer has written that cinema is "centrifugal," i.e., it relies on the "blind" world outside the frame in order to make meaning and the on-screen "specular space" is constantly making reference to it, vanishing into it, a bit as a painting has a vanishing point.[263] The question of what lies on the other side of its walls determines the way that the world on-screen escapes into the world off-screen.

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[262] Pascal Bonitzer, "Partial Vision: Film and the Labyrinth," trans. Fabrice Ziolkowski, *Wide Angle* 4 (1981): 58.
[263] Bonitzer, "Partial Vision."

On the other side of the wall from the lyric scene in the hotel room, the shot suggests a non-instrumental intersubjective relation. There is a joke in the cut to this shot from inside the hotel room, as it reveals the fine line between an eavesdropper and an "écouteur" (one who listens as one overhearing in the lyric sense) and the potential for one to become the other. Thus far in the scene, the viewer has remained a fly on the wall but all identifications have been blocked and all conclusions about plot and character have been thrown up by the lyric suspense. Now, the temporality of the plot re-enters and Carozza eavesdrops so that she can enter the hallway at the precise moment Hull does and create this "coincidence" that leads to her wooing him on behalf of Mabuse. However, if the overhearer eavesdrops as she does, there is a dispossession of the lyric position. The reader/spectator is touched by the dead hand of Keats' warning. In fact, the lyric position is tested and mocked by the interpellation by the camera into the role of the eavesdropper.

Figure 12 Cara Carozza, under Dr. Mabuse's powers, acts as the "voyeur." Here only able to eavesdrop, her mode is an anti-lyric one. She listens in instead of "overhearing" from the other side of a wall.

But the camera is at some distance and again provides both spatial and temporal suspension that allows us to choose to hear differently. Hull was on the threshold to the room coughing before he entered it. Here we are not "on the threshold," sitting on the fourth wall, to return to our useful phrase, but rather here we have a clear and open view on "*Das Zimmer nebenan*" (the neighboring or adjoining room) [*Figure 12*]. An empty chair faces us and, here operating by the cinematic effect of the mirror, we are suddenly not to be found in our own seat face. Instead, we are the *other* voyeur in the room. But as the spectator is also the only voyeur in the room, spying on the eavesdropper, and for this the spectator is doubly shamed or guilted or at least embarrassed for the rest of the love story, as well.

Following Lang's typical question-response editing, the "question" of who exactly overhears is here "answered" but not without a productive delay; and "why" is completely no longer in question as the viewer comes to see through the ethos of the anti-lyric speaker Mabuse (and his minions) again. The viewer is offered a freedom of choice when faced with the possibility of identification with a voyeuristic eavesdropper by being shown the voyeur on the other side of the lyric dream, and on the other side of the hotel wall, which is here framed in an exactly parallel plane to the cinema screen. The carrier agent for Dr. Mabuse's own fetishistic gaze, what Laura Mulvey has termed the "male gaze," is Cara Carozza, here with a "fetishistic ear." Acting for Dr. Mabuse,

she emerges from the room in time to drop a glove in front of Hull, a step in Mabuse's manipulative plan for her to woo him and fold him into an exploitation of desire. But Carozza is in turn the recipient of Hull's gaze in the film and thus the framer is framed, the fetishizer fetishized, and our embarrassment doubles again. Though the voyeur is revealed, this voyeur is destabilized later, gesturing apostrophically, invoking the one off-screen (in this case on the other side of the screen but which here is continuous rather than a separating wall). This invocation often occurs in the form of an apostrophe, which is a deictic pointing at something absent, creating the addressee in a relational way with the imagination. In this scene she "knows" what is on the other side of the wall in the sense that she knows what she must use Hull for. The lyric is obsessed with contingency, and with the feelings elicited by the encounter and the act of utterance, which prompts the poet to compose, the speaker to speak or recite, perform an iteration on this occasion of a form that has happened before but changes in response to the immanent conditions. The cyclicality of the contingent–the necessity of repetition with a difference–radically diverges from mechanical models of reproduction. Carozza carries out her plan without awareness of the contingent but we, emplaced in the "room next door" return to our seats and our place on the fourth wall with some relief with a sense of what types of address no longer work.

The Stereotype in Lyric Intimacy and the Photoplay

It is at least historically fitting that the earliest conceptions of a "intimacy" and of the lyric photoplay in film, coterminous with one of the earliest pieces of film criticism and published in 1915, should have been penned by a poet. But it is perhaps equally fitting, if not at least relevant to our inquiry. That his poetry was based upon the problematic representation and "mimesis" of minority populations and his reliance on stereotypes of African Americans, Chinese-Americans and Orientalizing images in his poetry have made it almost impossible today to discuss Lindsay's legacy. While his verse reads almost like sound or *zaum* poetry at times in its intensity of phonemic and rhythmic patterning, its faults are in the way these sounds are not abstract at all but announced as a mimesis of the speech, looks, gesture, and dance of ethnic stereotypes.[264] The pratfalls of Lindsay's verse, for us today glaring, resonate with Lang's thematic obsessions with exaggerated caricatures or "mimesis" in Mabuse.

Mabuse's disguises render equally offensive stereotypes and, while it is easy to note that our modern perspective makes these shocking, it raises the question of how these would have been seen at the time, i.e., whether they would have been obviously caricatures or whether a less sensitive viewer would have taken these as "realism." The powdered make-up has already been noted above and even appears in Kuzmin's brief blazon of Mabuse's looming face. The intertitles even call attention to it, asking us to look for the powder in the shot by very early on calling Spoerri "the cocaine-sniffer," itself another assignation of "type." This insistence on types comes from another aspect baroque allegory that Benjamin finds lacking: "For it is common practice in the literature of the baroque to pile up fragments ceaselessly, without any strict idea of a goal, and, in the unremitting

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[264] Richard Hyland has written about the double-edged sword of deeming a poem like "The Congo" simply racist and burying it. He writes, "What *The Congo* not only points out but demonstrates is that the irrationality that Western civilization for millennia projected onto Black people is an aspect of our own selves and culture, the part we have always hoped to repress, the part that it is the role of the university and organized religion to talk us out of," Charles Bernstein, "Richard Hyland on Vachel Lindsay's 'The Congo,'" *Jacket2*, October 5, 2013, https://jacket2.org/commentary/richard-hyland-vachel-lindsays-congo.

expectation of a miracle, to take the repetition of stereotypes for a process of intensification.[265] All the actors in the film take these stereotypes for completely believable personae; they corroborate those visions as reality. In the world of the film, these are believable human beings. Is this a problem of the film's imagination of these characters, or are we to read the film as commenting that this is in itself a mass blind spot caused by something akin to Mabuse's own hypnosis? The fact that the viewer is taught to see the actor behind the exaggerated masks from the first shot offers one response. One can certainly argue that the indiscriminate cast of caricatures ranging from Jew to Asian to Gentile makes him more of an early comedic figure, a parody of stereotyping, including of evilness, more than stereotypes themselves, though it is always a difficult fine line. In any event, it is a fantasy.[266]

Mabuse himself suffers from refused identification. He is the extreme manifestation of the rejection of such assimilation. Kuzmin has already shown us that Mabuse can be seen as having refused homosexual desire and in the case of the ethnic stereotypes, it is possible to read the continuation of a desire for assimilation gone awry. With the presentation of business cards, Mabuse wishes to be seen as an authentic subject and seeks reified authority for such an authenticity. Seen another way, wishing authenticity with a self, to be "recognized," he is rather defined as an Other by the dominant ideology. He seeks to be included and, when rejected, seeks to define himself by racial stereotypes.

> This activity of 'appropriating' and 'inhabiting,' what we might call the dissimulation of the subject in fantasy, effects a reconfiguration of the subject itself. The idea of a subject which opposes the object of its desire, which encounters that object in its alterity, is itself the effect of phantasmatic scene. The subject only becomes individuated through loss. This loss is never fully encountered precisely because fantasy emerges to take up the position of the lost object, to expand the imaginary circuit of the subject to inhabit and incorporate that loss."[267]

Having been individuated through his own society's phantasmatic desire to locate a scapegoat for its own profligacy, Mabuse takes up the position to fulfil the society's phantasmatic desire.

Clearly, Lang does not wish the audience to become part of that blind mass; the film's gestures are pedagogical in the same way that Balling instructs Hull that he is not who he thinks he is. From the beginning the film teaches the spectator to see difference in similarity rather than similarity in difference through its exhibitionism; the spectator sees the same subject in multiple different guises rather than the similarity between different characters. It is interesting in this context to consider how thinkers such as Agamben, and quite evidently Brecht and Benjamin preceding him, imagine gestures as "a trope pointing towards a coming politics that is non-identitarian"[268] and how lyric gestures participate in this project. But a non-identitarian politics, if the film signals its necessity, does not avoid the capitalist logic of value, and since capitalist logic is always already tied to race as well, a lyric utopia would have to envision the end of both of these logics at once. This the film does

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[265] Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama (Ursprung Des Deutschen Trauerspiels)*, 178.

[266] Indeed, Klein-Rogge plays Dr. Mabuse in a parody of films about evil *avant la lettre*; Mike Myer plays Dr. Evil in *Austin Powers: International Man of Mystery* (Jay Roach US, 1997), seemingly taking his eyebrow raising directly from this early character.

[267] Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 204.

[268] Nicholas Chare and Liz Watkins, eds., *Gesture and Film: Signalling New Critical Perspectives* (Routledge, 2017), 3.

with an homage to Dadaist logic, to which Benjamin in "The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility" also looks for an answer to the numbing shocks of modernity.

Intimate Configurations: From Romantic to Dada

This hotel-room scene has an emotional valence predominantly of intimacy, as Lindsay suggests, but its primary mode is mimetic through gesture and stance. The mise en scène mimics the painting in a lyric configuration placing the characters in relation not based on personality or belief but on the prescribed ritual of the lyric and its mise en scène, which is a logic of perceptual relation. The "song" in the mimetic version, what is supposed to be a love song serenading one of the women, takes on a different tenor than a Romantic love poem in the film scene. As noted, Kuzmin restores the connotation of desire to the unexpected location of Mabuse's gaze; however, there is a Dadaist (what could be called a Dadaist lyric) epideictic undertone to this scene, which entails throwing all previous values to the winds with the introduction of a system of nonsense.

Hull, an American Billionaire, visits Balling, because the night before, he lost 150,000 marks at a game of cards to a man who presented himself as Balling. Betting the same amount as was in the bank, a highly risky bet called *va banque*, he loses despite having the highest cards in hand. Dr. Mabuse, impersonating Balling through analogue identity theft [*Figure 13*], has hypnotized him and he does not recognize his own upper hand, literally; he throws his cards away and concedes the game. Now having rendered himself to the Excelsior Hôtel to honor his debt, Hull again has trouble recognizing that which is right in front of him but for different reasons. Balling confirms that his name is identical with the name on the calling card Hull has in hand but Hull does not recognize his physical features having never met him before.



Figure 13 On the left, Mabuse's stolen identity granted him by the reified authenticity of the business card, which acts also a kind of promissory note in reverse (an interpellative promissory note). On the right, Hull's epiphany when his valuation of his indebtedness to Hugo Balling is corrected by the "real" Hugo Balling: "Then I don't remain indebted to you for 150,000 Marks from the game?"

When Balling finally answer's Hull's address by slowly, painfully, painstakingly sitting up at the mention of his own name, he still does not answer fully but rather obliquely. He must look at the calling card Hull holds out to him to say whether he wrote "Excelsior Hôtel, 112." He does so not by recognizing himself in Hull's address but rather by conceding that he shares a name (which could simply be "you") with him who is addressed, however, the qualities of that person are not his. When

he denies that he wrote the business card, one can imagine he says, "he whom you thought you were addressing is not me." This gesture further breaks down the narrative thrust and opens the scene up to re-evaluation and the imagination. The viewer waits for what seems like an eternity for "the real" Balling to humorously fish his spectacles out of what looks like a foot bath and meanwhile may forget why we are waiting. The intertitles also come late, leaving the viewer with time enough to imagine the conversation. The action, if any can be said to occur, is the frustration of projections, removing grounds for the forward momentum of the plot and its resolution. They lean towards each other and study each other's faces, striking a pose at once resembling and removed from the Romantic lyric scene in the pictorial representation with a lute. They are both silent rather than one singing to the other, a wink to the technological constraints of the new medium in which the lyric must take on different contours; They are both men, rather than a man singing to a woman; And they are costumed differently and in a city. Meanwhile, the crystal carafe in the place of the one who overhears reflects. This particular mimetic doubling of the lyric scene in the painting has an absurdist or nonsensical element, and here the Dadaist sensibility starts to creep in to empty the scene of its Romantic and romantic meanings.

The emphasis here on the type of spectator Dr. Mabuse's "principle" produces is familiar from Frankfurt School writings on spectacle, particularly on the question of pacing controlling attentiveness and distraction. Benjamin and Kracauer's writings on film and movie palaces from the Weimar period characterize cinema as a medium inherently serving mass control by structuring the perceptual field through spectacle. Benjamin focuses on the rhythmic change of frames. In "The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility," for example, Benjamin recounts the transition from the "contemplation" of painting to the "distraction" of film as primarily that of a control over the timing and content of mental associations. He nonetheless sees a hope of combatting such powers of control in Dadaist art as a tactically military avant-garde providing a would-be antidote, a training ground for active participation and thought in modernity. He attributes some of the effect of the shock in film to its "tactile" quality:

> From an alluring visual composition or an enchanting fabric of sound, the Dadaists turned the artwork into a missile. It jolted the viewer, taking on a tactile [*taktisch*] quality. It thereby fostered the demand for film, since the distracting element in film is also primarily tactile, being based on successive changes of scene and focus which have a percussive effect on the spectator.[269]

The spectator's process of association in view of these images is indeed interrupted by their sudden change. "This change constitutes the shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, seeks to be buffered by intensified presence of mind."[270]

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[269] Benjamin, *SW 4*, 119.

[270] Walter Benjamin, *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, 4: 1938–1940*, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2006), 132. "Darauf beruht die Chockwirkung des Films, die wie jede Chockwirkung durch gesteigerte Geistesgegenwart aufgefangen sein will," Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften I. Abhandlungen.*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 434. This phrase is from the third version of the essay. Benjamin's footnote to the third edition elaborates on this point further: "Film is the art form corresponding to the increased threat to life that faces people today. Humanity's need to expose itself to shock effects represents an adaptation to the dangers threatening it. Film corresponds to profound changes in the apparatus of apperception—changes that are experienced on the scale of private existence by each passerby in big-city traffic, and on a historical scale by every present-day citizen" Benjamin, *SW 4*, 281.

Mabuse stands for the alliance between technology and forms of power that dehumanize and absorb subjects through spectacle and "sensationalism," highly emotional shocks and ultimately numbing distraction.

Trans-Temporal Tautegory of the Lute-Lyre-Harp-Dada!: A *mise en scène mise-en-abîme*[271]

In our prototypical scene, the absurdist elements in the foreground resonate with the contemporaneous art movement Dadaism. The circumstances of the plot empty out the referential value of the proper noun "Hugo Balling," the pseudonym of the evil Dr. Mabuse, even while it refers excessively through resemblance to the name Hugo Ball, the Dadaist Cabaret Voltaire ring leader.[272] Ball authored *Lautgedichte* ("sound poems"), crafted for their idiosyncratic rhythm, vowels and consonants that claimed no resemblance with existing language. Unlike Bruitist poetry, which, similar to Italian Futurist poetry (and similar to Lindsay in its mimetic quality) focuses on the onomatopoetic mimicking the sound of war, for instance, and Tristan Tzara's, who orchestrated sound events by asking different readers to read in different languages simultaneously, Ball was known for sound poems that were completely nonsensical–pure vectors, gestures of sound. The more Dadaist staging of the Romantic scene in the painting suggests there is a transtemporal, transhistorical aspect to the lyric configuration, as well as a vehemently historical one, and that in Lang's time, this rather absurdist, Dadaist scene is one way to see the Other without projections.[273] Instead, we have nonsensical sound poems, which is another version of the reification of authenticity. In speaking nonsense, they foreground that they are not seeking a second level of authority. In addition, in lieu of the lyre, the lute, or the harp as lyric figuration, instead we get a crystal carafe, the very emblem of Bourgeois sensibility. This crystal carafe will carry us forward like a lighthouse in our pursuit of the lyric in the chapters to come.

As stated but here for a secondary reason, the scene is also still a "love scene" in the sense of holding a potential for the unfolding of mutual recognition as a creative act of cooperative world-building (a very complex definition of love, I know). The first step in the scene pictured here is the explicit rendering and then debunking of projection, and then, the reassemblage of its meaning otherwise through a temporally-unfolding network of relations. The distance of the one who "overhears" allows for the recognition of the operative direct address of the listener through the speaker's projection of them, here Mabuse's set-up for Hull's expectation of Balling. As the direct address that would consign Balling into the capitalist order–and of an early debt economy–fails at a

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[271] What I am calling "mise-en-abîme" here is importantly a slightly inexact or "off" repeated representation and can be said only of the mise en scène arrangement of the figures in the frame. There is a shift in time between the first and the second. Even this move away from exact mimesis is a lyric gesture. The lyric is notoriously difficult to to categorize and just as soon as some criteria is established there is an example of poem that breaks that criteria but might still contain enough other criteria to be considered a lyric poem. Thus, in the mise-en-abîme of the painting, many elements are repeated but some of the canonical ones of dress, time, and style change. The inexactness invites a kind of "family resemblance" that is as close to a definition of the lyric as we can get, that definition being rather asymptotic.

[272] With thanks to Dr. Saskia Haag for corroborating what had remained a subliminal intuition on my part and for encouraging its pursuit.

[273] What if Mabuse is also a victim to the "disavowal of grief" (Butler) of the meaninglessness that WWI produced? When he steals the identity of a Hugo Balling, itself a reference to Hugo Ball, the Dadaist performance artist, is this a desire to frame Dadaism as a criminal act? Is Mabuse's constant speculating about how he can have power and control partly motivated perversely by society's disavowal of meaninglessness?

moment of Balling's extreme vulnerability, the indirect address is reflected and proliferated in the crystal, standing in for an absent, multi-faceted spectator, and becomes an address towards a possible, imagined community in-the-making.

As Hull does not owe the "real" Balling any money, Balling deflects Hull's proclamations of debt as he would of love; evaluations along these lines are suspended and no financial transaction takes place. Balling and Hull stare at one another without a sense of their relation and with no reason to assess the other's instrumental value (cf. Simmel and his diagnosis that the new metropolitan life entailed "weighing, calculating, enumerating and the reduction of qualitative values to quantitative terms"). Furthermore, as highlighted earlier in his answer to Hull's cough-'ahem', Balling is sick. He is rendered vulnerable by sickness and by Hull, who has just burst into his room with a preconception; he has no capacity for poesis.[274] It seems he, too, may have been irrevocably interpellated by Mabuse as his only symptom is the same headache Hull had the day before when Mabuse stared at him in a similar way. Indeed, his identity has been sapped. Nonetheless, he takes his time, reaching for his glasses and squinting, seeking resemblance, familiarity, recognition. Is this the temporality and intent of the lyric in itself?[275] People watch Balling cleaning his glasses so he can see what is written and authenticate or dismiss it, a gesture that goes on much longer than expected in a version of Bellour's "dyssymetrical expectancy." Benjamin describes Brecht's Epic Theater as moving forward "jerkily like the images of a film strip"[276]—if epic moves forward jerkily, lyric does it fluidly… with some friction. The scene models an *intersubjective configuration*[277] in suspension that the film picks up by way of these gestures.

I realize that I have written much about this short scene, have elaborated upon it for many pages, but it is precisely the temporal suspension and doubling of the scene that I wish to acknowledge. The lyric, and perhaps what we might term "lyric realism," suspends and doubles time, operating

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[274] Partly a bad pun but only partly: Here the "real" Balling might be said to be a "bad poet," for he literally "acts ill," (in Mill's conception this meant that he knows Hull is watching him and does not ignore it but rather stares back) but actually by Brecht's account he is a very good poet: "If we define the lyric as expression we have to be aware that such a description is one-sided. It may be that individuals who are expressing themselves, or classes, whole epoch may express themselves, and passions, we soon end up with 'humankind' expressing itself. When bankers express themselves to each other, or politicians, then we know they are doing deals; even when a sick man expresses his pain he also gives the doctor or the onlookers pointers, so there are actions too; but poets, it is said, are concerned only with pure expression, so their actions consist only of expression and their intention can only be to express themselves"5/29/20 4:52:00 PM

[275] Since poetry has been identified as the exact opposite of that other visual and spatial art, painting, in an early study of media specificity, *Laocoön: an Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry* (1776), it has been delineated precisely by its engagement with a more extended temporality. Lessing described that temporality in terms of narrative and anti-narrative, and the engagement and extension of a moment. This quality of poetry can be said to come as much from its temporality. In poetry there is a before and after in narrative/time such that when the character happens to scream–it is but for a moment and we do not attribute it to his character but rather to his circumstances at the time. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoon. An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry. With Remarks Illustrative of Various Points in the History of Ancient Art*, ed. Ellen Frothingham (Boston : Roberts Brothers, 1887).

[276] Benjamin, *SW 4*, 331.

[277] Not "subjective configuration," which Casetti uses to describe an identification between a character or narrator and the spectator. His example comes from the alliance between Thompson and the narrator's point of view in *Citizen Kane* (1941). Of the subjective configuration he writes: "a spectator in the subjective configuration, whose perception passes through a character's eyes (thus a spectator within the on-screen field), meets a space, also not homogenous, but this time because of a powerful degree of focalization; here is a space which exhibits itself with an explicit attention, which offers itself as effectively seen and appears, in a word, expropriated" (66). Indeed, we do not see the world through the character's eyes but rather feel the character's emotional position within it.

upon the signifier, emptying or at least re-evaluating it upon returning it to specificity, authenticity, and immediacy of it.

Lyric Gestures of Address and Valuation: Apostrophe & Epideixis

An exploration of the gestures in the film *Dr. Mabuse* show that the film problematizes claims of film's privileged, "indexical" relation to the "real" and is thoroughly obsessed with its epideictic one. Epideixis (or "beyond pointing") is a form of praise or blame with an emphasis on value, traditionally assigning praise or blame. It is non-mimetic in the sense that we do not adopt the point of view of a represented character's values. Instead these values arrive as "memorable apothegms offered to readers to repeat and remember."[278] These apothegms here might come in the form of an intertitle or, more likely, as a gesture.

Mabuse's activities include speculation, which is also the activity of the reader looking for a second, allegorical level of a text. Mabuse's version of speculation is of course also epideictic in the creation of value that is epideictic; it is both monetary manipulation and the manipulation of emotion, which produces valuations, such as panic on the stock market floor and Mabuse's seduction of Cara Carozza and her subsequent one of Hull not in and for itself but for some duplicitous aim (though that ultimate aim is also unclear and rather as tautological as love can be–an altruistic love for love's sake is strangely here made similar to power for power's sake in the lyric-anti-lyric relation). Hull, the short-lived protagonist, personifies an elegiac mode–love, loss, potential metamorphosis and resurrection. The pathos of these tropes run the gamut of the film's affective spectrum from muted slapstick humor and self-parody–a critique of its own diegetic world–to earnest claims to authentic representation.

As shown by the above readings, the film has often been understood allegorically and the elements metaphorically, however, more rarely have they been thought of as experiential and embodied shapes for the viewer to inhabit. An attention to the lyric apostrophe foregrounds the way mise en scène and particular figures capture intersubjectivity and interrelation. Deictic gestures, in creating figures for a shared world rather than a referential truth, borrow and establish their own authenticity from the lyric and furthermore foreground the cognitive operation of epideixis. Reading the scene through the lyric lens it provides, and other examples of the lyric mode, thus offers a subversive mechanism to the ways in which Mabuse's powers (standing in for technology itself) have been said to operate.

Speculative evaluative acts, both financial and interpretive, are at the heart of the plot and the activity of the characters in the film in question, Dr. Mabuse and the detective, leading to a possible reading of the film as an allegory for evaluative models.[279] However, it also points to the failure of those models that would err either on the side of overidentification (somewhat like the detective who starts to fit in too much with the underworld party-goers) or of objectification and fetishism (Mabuse). The lyric's "failure" is that it cannot account fully for reality (what allegory pretends it knows) without the viewpoint of the other. Figures for lyric poesis in the film foreground the role of the other in the making of the self and, ultimately, in the process of world-making. The goal is to identify the concrete strategies in mise en scène and figuration that produce lyric effects such that the spectator is called upon to "watch lyrically," and to describe these effects.

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[278] Jonathan Culler, *Theory of the Lyric* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 36.
[279] In Benjamin's sense of allegory.

The relation built by song in the painting momentarily supplants relations built on monetary value in the rest of the film by creating a bridge between inside and outside. Here the silent character Hull "serenades" Balling and the carafe. He "sings" that he owes money and the listener refuses to accept it, a variation on and perversion of the romantic spurning of a lover.

> The title [*gestes lyriques* or lyrical gestures] insinuated itself as a way of identifying a mobile tie between inside and outside. The gesture allows an expression of this mixture between an interior reaching out that is also a call from without, and a response to this call [280]

Theodor Adorno argues the same movement in a more confrontational sense with a socio-historical context, "lyric implies a protest against a social condition which every individual experiences as hostile, distant, cold, and oppressive." He recognizes that the lyric is, "a form of reaction to the reification of the world, to the domination of human beings by commodities that has developed since the beginning of the modern area, since the industrial revolution became the dominant force in life."[281] The classical lyric might defy such a definition, such as it is, based on a modern phenomenon, however, the enlivening of inanimate objects, the imbuing them with interiority and personality (as one does the melody and sound of a lyre) is the same movement in a countersense of imbuing humans with impersonality, and here goes one step beyond resisting reification; even if humans are to be objectified, resisting that objects become fetishized also cyclically relieves the human of such a fate. Likewise more abstract values such as the privileging of one aesthetic style as more authentic than another can no longer hold as these styles become reified as authority itself.

Choreographed and set into relation through lyric gestures of deixis—not in itself lyric but one of the lyric's main forms of actualization—the figures foreground the evaluative frames or epideixis underlying interactions—i.e., the ideological frames—and momentarily suspend them at countercurrents with the forward motion of the plot such that they can be re-evaluated through sensual and spiritual experience of their forms.

"I hold it toward you" : Deictic Gestures Invoking the Viewer

In the example of "This Living Hand," there are a number of shifters that take on meaning when embodied in a hand and in the text which also reaches as a hand. What would the equivalent in the cinema be? I suggest that gestures do the work of shifters and propose the following scenario as an example. Gestures of deixis invoke the just out-of-frame (the "blind" space according to Bonitzer)[282] that we know to be absent—thus they invoke an absence. For instance, gestures can perform and theatricalize the ideological projections occurring in the gaze rendering them visible and therefore contestable. For instance, the romantic address changes though the form of longing stays the same. In her jail cell, after being sacrificed heartlessly by Mabuse, given up as a pawn and here passed poison in order to escape his own detection, Carozza has given up all sociality to remain true to this romantic notion but against her will. Between four walls, her love does not look like an idyll or like the romantic scene of the painting. In the interpellative paradigm of Mabuse, she becomes a

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[280] Dominique Rabaté, "A World of Gestures," *Journal of Literary Theory* 11, no. 1 (2017): 90.
[281] Adorno, "Lyric Poetry and Society," 40.
[282] Bonitzer writes specifically about how the "blind space" is used in horror and suspense film. There is a bit of horror in the lyric vulnerability of exposure to the other, I would add, in addition to what I have already mentioned, with Bellour and Sitney, is "lyric suspense."

criminal, having sold her "self" to him as spectacle. Here she is clothed all in black, as in mourning. In closing her eyes and reaching with her touch and voice, she lets this other come forward in whatever form they may, to her salvation at the moment she has been abandoned by the fantasy. The lyric gesture is even more authentic when the other does not arrive, when the object to which it points appears only in its representation, always already mediated, as in the cinema, or in poetry, forever in suspense.

Figure 14 Cara Carozza invokes Mabuse through her optic imagination (her mind's eye) but verbally and, more importantly, gesturally she invokes "you.") Her hands are close together, signifying that she is reaching towards hands or, more uncannily, down towards the head of an audience member who sits slightly below her.

Carozza's imagination (the image behind her eyelids) is continuous with the world off-screen. Lamenting her own position in relation to the outside world she cannot reach, she goes inside, shutting her eyes, presumably letting her own projection emerge in thought but letting the gesture invite the viewer to respond. There is no other in the prison cell with her except for the spectator. The point of view is uncertain but not exactly omniscient, since we are aware we cannot see precisely what she sees behind her eyelids. The spectator has a moment of doubling, at once imagining that she sees Mabuse as Carozza reaches out to us–the lyric gesture addresses us as Mabuse, the anti-lyric persona, whom we can judge and in whom we momentarily see a bit of ourselves—while at the same time recognizing the veritable openness of the space between her hands.[283] Compounding this invocation of the audience is the impression of the shot being at an eye

[283] Hands are important for the gesture – so much scholarship has focused on the face but Barthes writes about a Robert Mapplethorpe photograph in which the subject covers his face that he is not hiding his face but showing his hands.

level or even slightly higher but the gesture and her closed-eye gaze are lower, as if she gestures "down" to us in the space of the auditorium.[284]

Invoking a muse or a natural phenomenon constitutes the apostrophic gesture that is the occasion for lyric speech. In this scene, she invokes Mabuse through her optic imagination (her mind's eye) but gesturally she invokes "you." Accordingly, the image is stripped bare and isolates the gesture, which approaches lyric utterance rather than representation.

> The lyric… negates both the sociality of Love, and its objective representability. Love becomes a privileged experience–a discovery of the self in the other–which lies outside all normal discourse and social competence. Furthermore, because Love is the relation one entertains to one's most intimate self, it is not the object of the lyric discourse, but rather its Origin: the emotional movement the authentic utterances of the text endeavor to articulate [285].

With her closed eyes as she conjures her beloved and her outreached hands, one feels she transcends the plot point. The gesture is a mark of authenticity that is similarly devoid of content, containing only the "Du…?" The question mark at the end of her utterance is no longer certain of the beloved who legitimized her criminal actions. The spectator conjures the image behind her closed eyes as if she is now in charge of superimposing Mabuse's image over the stock market floor. The spectator thus "voices"—here visually—she is encouraged to lend their imagination to poet-actor's mind's eye. The lyric spectator also figures her hands mean the spectator in the present, whom she invokes also alongside the head of Mabuse.

An added dimension of an orality of hesitation and raised tone at the ending created by the punctuation elevates the intertitle into the orality of lyric poetry and address. As Chion helped us see with Mabuse's intertitles, the *athorybos* is "any object or movement in the image that could—either in reality or in the imagination—produce sound but which is not accompanied by any sound. (For example, curls of smoke that in real life do not make a sound could be imagined as doing so."[286] The intertitles take on the *athorybal* quality of character's voice addressing us. As something that could make sound but which does not have one, athorybos is like the absent address of a lyric poem, that which has a body but no voice and we are left to voice it, to voice it instead of ears (as we are in political speech.)

Yet in this instance in the context of the plot, it places us potentially in two positions at once, the position of Dr. Mabuse, thus the position of the one who *cannot* hear, and the one who overhears. We are guilty but only in the subjunctive. Let me be clear. I am not claiming that we identify with Mabuse, since this is the operation of representational arts rather than the lyric and the film clearly wishes to make this difficult by representing Mabuse in such a way that it is difficult to empathize and rather makes his worldview an anti-lyric one. Rather the address from the figure of the jilted, faithful lover places us in his position. In the position of the camera, we are at once the "other" of

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"There is another (less Proustian) expansion of the *punctum*: when, paradoxically, while remaining a 'detail.' it fills the whole picture. Duane Michals has photographed Andy Warhol: a provocative portrait, since Warhol hides his face behind both hands. I have no desire to comment intellectually on this game of hide-and-seek (which belongs to the *Studium*); since for me, Warhol hides nothing; he offers his hands to read, quite openly; and the *puncture* is not the gesture but the slightly repellent substance of those spatulate nails, at once soft and hard-edged." Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, 45.

[284] This is also a moment like that of Frank Kessler, following Rivette and Amédée Ayfre of "the complex and paradoxical function of mise en scène abolishing itself to attain its most powerful effects," Kessler, *Mise En Scène*, 26.

[285] Wellbery, *The Specular Moment*, 16.

[286] Chion, *Words on Screen*, 60.

Mabuse and of Carozza. What would that other be? The one who disabuses herself. This invocation is "generative rather than directive" and thus not about closure, to use Lyn Hejinian's framework to delineate an "open" text from a "closed" one.[287]

The Mise en scène of Invocation Over interpellation

As in the scene of the painting, one would think that mise en scène is pure allegory, making reference to a "higher" meaning. However, it is rather reified and objective. Mise en scène is one way to get at the distinction between invocation and interpellation. The business cards above encapsulate this notion well—they are "concrete" if not yet concrete poetry, though they do and undo the idea of authenticity through the ironic stance of the plot. When shown, they are part intertitle, part image, isolated from context. Plot can thus be left aside and the theme of hallucination has the same effect. Dr. Mabuse in the persona of Sandor Weltmann (literally "man of the world") conjures orientalist imagery for a homogenous mass of spectators.

Figure 15 A theatrical space where mass hallucination induced by one of Mabuse's personae, Sandor Weltmann during an "experimental night": which promises "mass suggestion, awake hypnosis, trance, natural magnetism, secrets of the Indian fakirs…" and the homogenous spectators.

The theme of hallucination precisely undoes the idea that what we see onscreen is authentic. On the other hand, the homogeneity of the spectator's costumes makes the spectators an ethnographic study of Weimar convention and a variation on a set rhythm within the frame. Here the prevailing culture is one of fear of the other—the dominant movement that of recoiling. The woman on the right side of the frame is less passive and ducks more pronouncedly out of the frame. The juxtaposition of theatricality and performance on a stage with the performance of everyday life

[287] Lyn Hejinian, "The Rejection of Closure," in *The Language of Inquiry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 30–40.

through costume corresponding to class, etc. here comes into the foreground.[288] The performance on stage is there to reflect the performance off-stage and this reflection is further underscored as that which was on stage comes walks off of it. In this sense, the film is a document of the projections of the spectators, their collective hallucination of the other, and of their own collective consciousness through self-projection and hallucination. The mise en scène here does not function as an allegory but as two spaces that confront each other with their own allegorical meanings roughly akin to that of "savage" and "civilization," of desire and fear of desire. It functions rather as a way first of turning "objects" into eyes[289] but it completes this transformation in furthermore turning objects into hands. This may just be complex allegory but in its complexity it blocks lines of flight away from the immanent.

Shifters and Figures in the Cinema

In *Discourse, Figure*, François Lyotard writes of shifters, a type of word whose meaning changes dependent on the situation in which it occurs, is uttered, as by deixis, that invokes at the same time as they anchor in an outside as the feeling anchors in the invocation or the apostrophe, however, specifically he references that this occurs through the gaze. "With shifters, language is pierced with holes where the gaze insinuates itself, the eye sees outside and anchors itself there, but this 'outside' is itself returned to the primary intimacy of the body, its space (and time).'[290] What shifters exist in silent, gestural cinema? Of course, they appear in intertitles but for Lyotard, this language is interrupted and fragmented by the gaze and its anchors. In this film where gazes assess and seek to control and own, shifters "spoken" in gestural language, configuring a relation with an absent "enunciatee," in Casetti's words, might constitute a shifter without content, allowing the imagination of a self, a becoming, to *emerge* and take shape instead. In these instances, the outside is returned to the primacy and intimacy of the body or bodies on-screen and the spectator forms a part of this outside. The world on screen, as a recording, cannot change, as Metz is quick to point out[291] in response to Casetti's assertion that the communication of the screen is bi-directional, but its emphasis, its aspect, and its relation with the world off-screen can.

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[288] In "Story/Discourse," Metz writes that "The cinema was born much later than the theatre, in a period when social life was deeply marked by the notion of the individual (or its more elevated version, 'personality'), when there were no longer any slaves to enable 'free men' to form a relatively homogenous group, sharing in the experience of a few major affects and so sparing themselves the problem of 'communication,'" Christian Metz, "Story/Discourse (A Note on Two Kinds of Voyeurism)," in *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema*, trans. Alfred Guzzetti (1975; repr., Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1986), 95. This history rather makes one read the Weltmann scene as an indictment of the theater. The audiences still comport themselves as if they were at the theater Metz describes.

[289] Like Lacan's sardine can, "The picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I, I am in the picture."

[290] Qtd. in David Rodowick, *Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2001), 7.

[291] Metz relies on Gianfranco Bettetini, who he says, "correctly states that the film, despite its spoken words, is always on the side of the written, never on that of the oral. It is true at least on one point, but a capital point: enunciator and addressee–at the global level of the work, not inserted dialogues–do not exchange their marks along the way; and the addressee does not change by his reactions either the propositions or the proposal of the enunciator" Metz, "The Impersonal," 755. I do not think that this is entirely correct, just as after one has seen the entire film and the breakdown of Dr. Mabuse, one cannot watch the film with the same attitude towards him. As the end of the film renders him completely ineffectual, one's knowledge changes the way in which one views. Likewise, reading Kuzmin's poem changes the way one views the film–he speaks back to it, addressing it in the second person–and this does change the meaning. It is probably for this reason that Fritz Lang continued to make two more in the trilogy and as late as 1960. The particular Dr. Mabuse had become specific, idiosyncratic, local, and much less menacing, even familiar.

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In his work on digital media, D.N. Rodowick, following Lyotard, writes that the figural defines a semiotic regime where "the ontological distinction between linguistic and plastic representations breaks down. This opposition, which has been the philosophical foundation of aesthetics since the eighteenth century, is explicitly challenged by the new electronic, televisual, and digital media."[292] The figural is a "force that transgresses the intervals that constitute discourse and the perspectives that frame the position of the image" *Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media.*[293] The indexical promise of photography's physical trace, is replaced by a kind of linguistic deictic pointing or shifter; that which was plastic representation becomes figural in the digital age. Though this film precedes the digital age, its obsession with the delay between pointing and the thing pointed at, between the trace and its functional valuation, allow us to think of it as prescient and as a pre-cursor to the digital in its use of invocations to activate plastic representation as figure throughout. The figure can act as a lyric gesture does, relating the inside to the outside, as does the deictic, the act of pointing that relates the embodied position with an outside one. Shifters serve as deictic markers in language that make room for two embodied positions, inside and outside.

The Trace of a Trace: Lyric Pointing

What can shifters, in film embodied in gestural pointing (deixis), teach us about film? Why do so many film reviews refer to films as lyrical and how might a more nuanced understanding of the lyric help us approach problems of authenticity, indexicality, and non-narrativity in films, even those that are primarily and classically considered narrative such as *Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler* (1922)? Might a poem help elucidate the fiction film's internal conflicts and obsessions with authenticity, counterfeit and deception? Recent media studies since the proliferation of digital media have returned to the question of the index and its relation to documentary authenticity; meanwhile, recent theories of lyric poetry have focused on a reliance on deictic gestures as one of the lyric's fundamental tools for creating a sense of presence and present-ness, physically and temporally. Both words, index and deixis share an etymological relation to the fingers of the hand. While it would seem that the two terms are opposed (the latter relates to a physical trace while the former speaks of language and thus a symbolic referent) the two terms both signify by conjuring a presence. That presence, though initially physical, becomes virtual or imagined from the position of the speaker.

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[292] David Rodowick, *Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2001), 45.
[293] Rodowick, 2.

Kuzmin explored the intersection between icon and indexical properties in a poem about the Shroud of Turin the year before writing *Novyi Gul'* in April 1923 "Turning a Gold Mirror" ("*Zerkal'nym Zolotom Vrashchaias*'," «Зеркальным золотом вращаясь»). In that poem, the very blood that marks the shroud literally "sings": "The blood sang thickly and distinctly:/"You will again see prophetic stains." (*Krov' zapela gusto i vniatno:/Uvidish' opiat' veshchie piatna*, «Кровь запела густо и внятно:/Увидишь опять вещие пятна»). Mary Ann Doane writes in response to Georges Didi-Huberman's work on the equally potent iconology and indexicality of the Shroud of Turin captures the conundrum at the heart of a chain of media claiming privileged status via the index as a privileged referent. The shroud's claims to aura and authenticity are based on its direct contact with Christ's body, of which it is said to have retained its form. However, as Doane points out, "the shroud is visible only through a kind of hermeneutic straining."[294] A photograph cements the shroud's iconic status, because the photograph transformed "image into icon" via an objective and authentic technology, "unexpectedly," as Didi-Huberman puts it, revealing a figure in the shroud. Doane writes, "the indexical itself has attained a form of semiotic sovereignty in the face of its imminent demise."[295] The demise can be blamed on the rise of the digital and its seemingly immaterial basis both on physical phenomenon and in terms of its continued existence on digital platforms.

But though the index seems to be operating on its own to authenticate, the iconic resemblance or similarity to an imagined face of Christ, a kind of metaphor, decisively clears away any doubts. Doane tackles Didi-Huberman's analysis of "the very emergence of figuration from a stain"[296] in order to broach the concept of media specificity. She shows that in the case of Didi-Huberman's shroud, it is the opacity of the stain that is a marker of contact, whereas the iconicity has nothing to do with the trace. Fear and anxiety accompanies the digital's inability to assure that there is a world prior to it through indexicality as cinema was able but this index as trace is only half of the story. As Doane reminds us, of the two kinds of index, trace and pointing, the latter is frequently forgotten in the drive to ground the photochemical image as trace. "Only the first definition—the index as imprint or trace (preeminently the footprint)—seems to correspond to the cinematic image."[297]

Doane's article ends with a subtle but unavoidable prophecy—as self-aware as it is about the rhetoric of "touching reality" being akin to theology—based on the index that points rather than traces, and the opaqueness of representation to which it points as history. For this index still exists in the digital rather than materiality datable to a particular medium, especially as cinema deteriorates and reappears in digital remediation. The implication of history as a series of attitudes and relationships with technology rather than a chronology scents of Heidegger in his "Question Concerning Technology." For Heidegger, technology enframes and in this sense it is no longer a particular medium but a way of organizing certain attitudes and energies as "standing reserves." Doane ends her article elliptically: "The challenge of digital media, in its uses and theorization, is that of resisting not only a pervasive commodification of the virtual but also the digital's subsumption within the dream of dematerialization and the timelessness of information, returning history to representation and reviving the idea of a medium. Making it matter once more." This last sentence fragment. Who or what makes the idea of a medium matter once more? The process of returning history to representation, it seems. In other words, the one who points to representation itself as

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[294] Mary Ann Doane, "The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity," *Differences* 18, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 128.
[295] Ibid.,129.
[296] Ibid., 128.
[297] Ibid., 136.

history might paradoxically make the idea of a medium rather than the representation matter—matter in a double sense—both that it is material and has import. The fallacy would be to believe the digital timeless and dematerialized as unbound with reality while it still points (even if it does not trace) to its own logics of representation.

The Figure of the Crystal and the Pitfalls of Representation

To what does the allegory of the lyric in this scene point if an allegory—even one whose meaning is the possibilities and failures of enunciation— can point at all? Returning to the scene of the lyric, which is also the scene of the crime, and having explored Hulls' polite cough-utterance and the ways in which Ball(ing) "acts ill," all that remains is to inquire after the third figure in the scene, the second woman in the painting (left), who overhears while her friend is addressed. In the film's reimagination of the scene, she is not represented but rather figured as the crystal carafe that stands impassively on the table in the foreground, complete with darker-colored satin tablecloth, draped in the very form and shade of the upright woman's dress. The carafe captures all of the metaphors for cinema in one: The ornate quality of the carafe echoes the baroque *frame* of the painting, which holds some kind of representation for contemplation. Balling is also caught in the *reflection* of the carafe, made into a ghostly projection of himself as if confirming that he has been Mabuse'd. The carafe also hints at the cinema as window, lending an air of realism to the hotel room. Kuzmin's poem ends with a focalization on a crystal like the one in this scene and like the one that Sandor Weltmann uses to hypnotize the Inspector in the theatrical hypnosis scene towards the end of the film.

True to the physics of reflection at an angle, what appears in the facets is not a mirror reflection of the self or a window through which to see reality, nor is it a framed representation to contemplate, it is rather a reflection of the other.

I'm holding an unprecedented crystal,
As if a proliferation of mirrors
Connected the facets.
How wondrous in every pane is light:
Either the gold of oncoming years
Or the flash of reminiscences.

A hand magically directed
patterned figures
to the correct glass frame:
Oceans, woods and cities,
Streams, rainbow, star,
All the "mysteries of Nature."

A flying swarm of diverse faces :
Poet, hermit and hero,
And sounds and breath.
And every quick turn
Brings with it a new
Game and combination.

When love lives in you,
Nothing can break the glass:
Not a hammer, not a bullet.
I come closer to the window,
But no matter how I turn the crystal—
all I see is Hull's image.

Держу невиданный кристалл,
Как будто множество зеркал
Соединило грани.
Особый в каждой клетке свет:
То золото грядущих лет,
То блеск воспоминаний.

Рука волшебно навела
На правильный квадрат стекла
Узорные фигуры:
Моря, леса и города,
Потоки, радуга, звезда,
Все "таинства Натуры".

Различных лиц летучий рой:
Поэт, отшельник и герой,
И звуки, и дыханья.
И каждый быстрый поворот
Все новую с собой несет
Игру и сочетанье.

Когда любовь в тебе живет,
Стекла ничто не разобьет:
Ни молоток, ни пуля.
Я ближе подхожу к окну,
Но как кристалл ни поверну -
Все вижу образ Гуля.

In the last stanza, it seems that Kuzmin refuses to move past melancholy and surrenders his poem to the ultimate failing of the traditional muse to revivify the image and place the inaccessible past and dead (or the signifier of them) other into circulation with new associations. Kuzmin sees the potential for transformation but initially his poem ends on a sinister note much like that with which the film nears the end when Mabuse uses a crystal to hypnotize von Wenck. This crystal is flat and not full of water. The water inside the crystal carafe seems to be important as a fluid medium that embodies the spectator while here [*Figure 16*] it is a flat crystal with no center for spectatorial agency.

Figure 16 Dr. Mabuse as Sandor Weltmann holds a crystal up to von Wenck. Instrumentalizing it, he succeeds in hypnotizing von Wenck, who then nearly drives off of a cliff. Mabuse hides behind the crystal, which remains out of focus (right). Note the man looking Von Wenck but also past Von Wenck at us (left).He "overhears" the hypnosis and looks at the crystal and von Wenck from a different angle, remaining unhypnotized. He suggests a gaze that breaks the fourth wall but stops short of delivering it.

His speaker only sees Hull in every facet of the crystal. This lack of resolution is a lack of metamorphosis but we can also imagine him seeing his own image and realizing how bourgeois it is and how he can never escape this paradigm. He has incorporated the lost object, identified with it. But this is the operation of fictional representation and Kuzmin is first and foremost a poet and not a fictional spectator who undergoes banal identification.[298]

Initially, the crystal's facets offer a "game" of "combinations" of a "proliferation of mirrors." "I'm holding an unprecedented crystal,/As if a proliferation of mirrors/Connected the facets…//And every quick turn/Brings along with it new/Games and conjunctions.// When love lives in you,/Nothing can break the glass:/Not a hammer, not a bullet./I come closer to the window,/But no matter how I turn the crystal—/all I see is Hull's image." The speaker grips as hard onto the love that "lives on in you" as he does the crystal itself but he plays the game of montage. While Mabuse smashes a glass out of anger at von Wenck, Kuzmin does not attempt to smash the crystal and free the image from its endless flashing as he turns it left and right initially reminiscent of a carousel. If one imagines this more as a phenakistoscope upon whose various facets the image of his addressee in the poem appears, the image haunts him in motion.

On first reading, Hull is a fixed image that encompasses all that the speaker sees in the same way Mabuse does. However, rather than delineating individual character personality traits, the ethology of characters under the sign of the lyric highlights interpersonal relations and evaluations made on a reversible principle. In particular, these relational behaviors create a space for the other to come forward or emerge in their own manner rather than respond to prescribed or prejudiced invocations. Hull's name, because of its American provenance points the American viewer towards ships—indeed, perhaps he made his riches as a shipping magnate—and away from the German meaning of "shroud," though in its home context, the meaning would stand out like a sore thumb. Narratively, his name would function like a gun, foreshadowing his death mid-way through the film. But the name points more than it signifies. For one, the name reveals the importance of the position of the listener as important as that from which one points. When reading the last line, one must remember that Hull is not simply a signifier for the character onscreen but itself a succession of signifiers, invoking different spectators in different languages and mythological backgrounds. The Hull of the ghoul and the shroud.

The name is not onomatopoeia, which Doane writes is rather the iconic in language, "i.e. a conventionally agreed upon resemblance to a thing (in language, a sound) that stands in for the thing itself." Traditionally, the word is a signifier. However, what happens when the word is taken out of any particular linguistic context? It becomes a sound that is neither onomatopoetic nor a signifier. It becomes sound, pure index of a source of that sound. Doane elucidates the status of the index in that instance when she writes,

> Whereas, the icon stands in for the thing itself, the index, 'more insistently than any other type of sign, is *haunted by its object*. The index is 'actually modified by its object' It puts its addressee into a 'real connection' with its object, and at one point, Peirce defines the index as 'being really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object' (Peirce 251). Indices 'furnish positive assurance of the reality and the nearness of their Objects'(25). But they are limited to the assurance of an existence; they provide no insight into the nature of their objects; they have no

[298] If anything, it is self-identification, and this comes up again in *Trout Breaks the Ice*, which I hope to elucidate briefly in Chapter 2.

> cognitive value, but simply indicate that something is 'there.' Hence, the 'real' referenced by the index is not the 'real' of realism, which purports to give the spectator knowledge of the world. The index is reduced to its own singularity; it appears as a brute and opaque fact, wedded to contingency—pure indication, pure assurance of existence.[299]

With this reference to realism, Doane shows that the index, unlike realism, does not adhere to the codes of stylistic conventions that Bazin identifies in his work. The index does not fundamentally promise mimesis. Doane here relies on Peirce to focus our attention on how the index cannot be traced to the "real" of the world but rather acts as its referent, and by virtue of that, has its "own singularity; it appears as a brute and opaque fact, wedded to contingency."[300] To rephrase Doane here, the index is a gamble. What lyric gives us *of* the "real" through its insistent indexical words and pointing is this same opaque singularity. Though in this case, the sign is not necessarily haunted by its object but by its *subject*.

The English word Hull comes from the German word to cover or shroud. Likewise carrying the meaning of an envelope, in plural, clothes, garments or "the outer case of a carton in which a manufactured article is packed," the word refers to a superficial covering, husk or container of pith, not the matter of importance itself. When Norbert Jacques, the author of the original Mabuse novels, first describes Hull's hypnosis, he makes a similar appeal to the German meaning of his name to introduce an absence of ground for an idea of essence itself, whether good or evil. The novel describes the encounter with Mabuse as follows:

> *Nur nach außen spielte Hull gelassen. Innerlich befand er sich in einer heißen Erregung. Es gingen Schleier vor seinem Hirn hin und her. Seine Noten chassierten zu dem Gast hinüber, ohne daß er es eigentlich merkte. Seine Sinne waren wie von einem feinen und unsichtbaren Spinnweb belegt, das ihn immer mehr einengte.*
>
> It was only outwardly, however, that Hull appeared undisturbed. He felt a good deal of excitement within, and a veil seemed to be obscuring his mental vision. His banknotes

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[299] Doane, "The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity," 135–36. On cinematic touch and realism: an index, when repeated, can take on a life of its own and a certain realism see André Bazin, *What Is Cinema?*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Erica Carter, vol. 2 (1958; repr., Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2005), 32–33. He writes, "In *Il Bandito*, the prisoner, returning from Germany, finds his house in ruins. Where a solid building once stood there is now just a pile of stones surrounded by broken-down wals. The camera shows us the man's face. Then, following the movement of his eyes, it travels through a 3 60-degree tum which gives us the whole spectacle. This pang shot is doubly original. First, because at the outset, we stand off from the actor since we are looking at him by way of a camera trick, but during the traveling shot we become identified with him to the point of feeling surprised when, the 360-degree pan having been completed, we return to his face with its expression of utter horror. Second, because the speed of this subjective pan shot varies. It starts with a long slide, then it comes almost to a halt, slowly studies the burned and shattered walls with the same rhythm of the man's watching eye, as if directly impelled by concentration. I have had to dwell at some length on this minor example to avoid making a purely abstract affirmation concerning what I regard, in an almost psychological sense of the word, as cinematic 'tact.' A shot of this kind by virtue of its dynamism belongs with the movement of a hand drawing a sketch, leaving a space here, filling in there, here sketching round the subject, and there bringing it into relief" (Bazin).

[300] Doane, 135.

> fluttered across to the stranger without his appearing aware of the fact. His senses seemed to be imprisoned in a delicate, invisible web, pressing ever more and more closely upon him.[301]

Hull's exterior appearance is "undisturbed,"(*gelassen*) while a "veil" moves back and forth in front of his brain (*Es gingen Schleier vor seinem Hirn hin und her*). *Verhüllung*, a synonym of *Schleier* contains the root *hull*, so that we get a mise-en-abîme of a veil moving in front of a veil. Most importantly, he loses the ability of his "senses" (*Sinne*). If there is an essence here, it is vision fed by energy and sensory perception. Perhaps Hull deludes himself as a bourgeois participant in Mabuse's game.

In *Progul'ki Gul'ya*, or *Hull's Strolls*, completed on the heels of *Novyi Gul'* in late March 1924, Kuzmin uses the word *ghoule*[302] in roman characters, proving that he had the otherworldly phenomenon from the Arabic *ghūl* in mind, although it was not a common word in Russian at the time.[303] In the mixed genre work, a boy reading *1001 Nights* explains to his mother that ghoul is "not a person but a word, a French word" signifying (*znachit'*) "vampire, beast, a corpse-eater, sucking the blood of the living." The mother relates her desire to read more about ghouls but retreats to bed with a headache, as if a victim to one. The boy, whose nickname is the term of endearment, *golubchik* ("dove"), which is also the animal that makes the *gul'* when it is employed as a murmur or hum, comforts her that tea will cure the headache. The dramatic dialogue ends with the faux stage direction that the mother kisses the boy passionately and a narrator relates that the boy is surprised and then continues reading, waving away a fly. The surprise and the fly take on equivalent roles at the end of this scene—emotion is both shocking and something to be waved away. Absorption in the vampiric-exotic rules the day.

This valence of Hull's name evokes the melancholic attachment of emotionalism to a both natural and psychological phenomenon. It connotes the beloved who forms and disintegrates along with the desert sand, roused by the wind that modernity wishes to kill off. Grains of sand in the desert gather as grains of film on the screen, to conjure an image that is also a shared hallucination. Michael A. Sells has described the *ghūl* figure in the *nasīb,* an amatory prologue to the *qaṣidah,* or Arab ode, as a dynamic polarity representing the beloved. One can kill the ghoul with one's sword if struck once; if struck a second time, the ghoul/beloved will come back to life.[304]

The lyric makes reference to a *form* prior (though not necessarily temporally as we see with the above morphological series of culturally diverse but simultaneous forms) rather than to a prior event or story is at the lyric's center. The early cinema scholar Yuri Tsivian describes certain "tropes of film reception" in the silent era and argues that on the one hand, the shock of cinema was assimilated by already existing cultural and literary tropes. He writes, "Specifically, familiar faces on the screen would evoke the motif of doubles and duality with the traditional accessories of magic mirrors and haunted portraits."[305] On the other hand, early film reception worked by putting new life into old

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[301] Norbert Jacques, *Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler: Roman* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1920), 2. Jacques, Norbert. *Dr. Mabuse.* Translated by Lilian A Clare. Eugene, Oregon: Bruin Books, 2015, 3.

[302] In French, the word is typically written *goule*, suggesting that Kuzmin may only have previously heard the word.

[303] There is no record of the word in the Brockhaus-Efron Encyclopedia (1890-1907).

[304] Michael A. Sells, "Guises of the Ghūl: Dissembling Simile and Semantic Overflow in the Classical Arabic Nasīb," in *Reorientations: Arabic and Persian Poetry*, ed. Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych, Reorientations: Arabic and Persian Poetry (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1994). On the ghūl of pre-Islamic poetry who "the ghūl lures its victims into the desert through trickery in order to devour them" and its continued work on the imagination in later poetry of t*awaḥḥush*, estrangement, alienation or, lit. the process of metamorphizing into something beastly, see also Tarek El-Ariss, "Return of the Beast: From Pre-Islamic Ode to Contemporary Novel," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 47, no. 1–2 (July 11, 2016): 62–90.

[305] Yuri Tsivian, *Early Cinema in Russia and Its Cultural Reception* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 3–4.

literary clichés, forming a "buffer zone between film and culture."[306] He does not mention crystal. Kuzmin, in collaboration with Lang's film, represents the particular possibilities of silent cinema for lyric subjectivity through "new" images in poetry, figuring the "new" subject. The metaphor of the ghoul, both for the cinema and for the universal beloved, describes cinema's ability to enchant but also to create productive self-reflection. This metaphor is itself imported from an exotic context. It invokes cinema's inherent exoticism, or quality of being outside and striking (as it strikes the movie screen with luminosity), through its ability to defamiliarize the spectator from their own environment and return them to it through another, ghostly or indefinite world. However, the crystal here just as easily emerges from the last stanza of A. S. Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*. As a reference, it takes on postmodern qualities.

A complete disfigurement does not yet occur but rather the exaggeration of figure and its corruption, to a certain extent, through the keen attention to the caked make-up, what Kuzmin elsewhere in the poem cycle writes are "beauty marks and toupees,"[307] allows for its refusal. Hull thus reappears in every facet, emphatically and passionately reproducing the figure.[308] But the precise physical attributes of Hull are less important, since Hull is also a Ghoul that reappears at different historical moments to crystallize and then rejoin the sands (of time.) T.S. Eliot's notion of the "objective correlative"[309] focuses attention not on the object as a fact but on the way an object gains relevance and charge when it carries the position, point of view, and the completion of an intention in world. In his dissertation, Eliot distinguishes "real" from "unreal" objects by their *continuity* with experience, providing one explanation for the previous definition of "document" as something that can be acted upon, i.e., it has an actionable relation to the world.

> [W]e discover that it was just this continuity with experience, this fullness of relation, which gave us what we call our real objects, and just the discontinuity, the mere intention, which gave us our unreal objects. The "unreal" object, qua object, is just the bare intention, the object-moment; whereas the "real" object is real because it has so much to draw upon; because if removed it would, we

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[306] Ibid., 3.

[307] "Antiquity must be quite dead/for him who got it into his head/to love You and I am ready to refuse/beauty marks and toupees./Retrospective stage scenery/Lies as useless tatters." Here the "you" could easily be an invocation of cinema itself!

[308] Largier has written of "Figural realism" as a practice that conjures images to negate them and access divine truth. He argues that, in the sense that Auerbach has meant it, in its truly embodied, sensorial form, it takes on immanence and presence to create a reality effect but its opacity is a negation and alludes to a non-physical body. See Niklaus Largier, "Allegorie Und Figuration. Figuraler Realismus Bei Heinrich Seuse Und Erich Auerbach," *Paragrana* 21, no. 2 (2012): 36–46.

[309] "The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked…The artistic 'inevitability' lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in Hamlet. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they appear. And the supposed identity of Hamlet with his author is genuine to this point: that Hamlet's bafflement at the absence of objective equivalent to his feelings is a prolongation of the bafflement of his creator in the face of his artistic problem. Hamlet is up against the difficulty that his disgust is occasioned by his mother, but that his mother is not an adequate equivalent for it; his disgust envelops and exceeds her. It is thus a feeling which he cannot understand ; he cannot objectify it, and it therefore remains to poison life and obstruct action"
See T. S. Eliot's piece on Eliot, "Hamlet." Hamlet Eliot, T. S. 1975. Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot. Edited by Frank Kermode. New York: Harvest Books. Eliot.

> feel, leave so much more of a void in our experience… Both real object and unreal object are, qua objects, equally real; when, both, so to speak, are at the fovea. It is only when we cease to consider either simply as an object, that one appears to be real and the other unreal.[310]

Within the framework of Mill's formulation of poetry versus eloquence, the objective correlative and poetry emerge objects imbued with internal intention that make them a live part of relation, while eloquence seeks externally to impose a shape upon the reader that objectifies. The crystal as a "pure" symbol (rather than embodied object) would simply replace Metz's metaphor of the spectator as a "Spectator-fish," who is "self-filtered out into pure vision…to his preliminary identification with the (invisible) seeing agency of the film itself as discourse."[311] However, this assumption is embodied in the mise en scène in the actual objects presented there for correlation. It is an embodiment of the self-reflective poesis within the scene, one that has access to the facets of the self in all its opacity in the reflection. Eliot would agree that the symbol cannot be pure in poetry, He writes, "No symbol, I maintain, is ever a mere symbol, but is continuous with that which it symbolizes. Without words, no objects. The object, purely experienced and not denominated, is not yet an object, because it is only a bundle of particular perceptions; in order to be an object it must present identity in difference throughout a span of time."[312] It is to engage with the the crystal as an object that enters into relation with a particular space and time but also with the crystal as a methodology of seeing—a model of spectatorship—that this dissertation undertakes to do.

How does mise en scène and film more generally invoke the spectator into this embodied continuity with the figure? Instead of being like a painting, the mise en scène is like the crystal decanter. Saying nothing explicitly, the camera takes on the position of the overhearer and reflects, a cipher-avatar for the individual spectator. The crystal acts as an objective correlative of that individual spectator but more importantly of many possible subjects, momentarily binding a certain community of spectators, perhaps also alluding to an impossibility of communing publicly otherwise. The crystal that quietly observes serves as a figure for access to "the real" for Kuzmin, who finds his own fraught experience correlated in the figure of the crystal, and in the mutable, if iconic image of a singular *Gul'* (Гулъ) The icon cannot quite rejoin the general rumble or hum *gul* (гул)—an underlying near homophone in the text—when it is reflected in the crystal at the end of his poem. It has come out of unrecognizable sound and opened up to this multiplicity of meanings.

One often forgets in studies of spectatorship that a spectator both sees and hears. Lyric mise en scène configures the absent off-screen world as that "sitting on the fourth wall" partly through "sound" or its suggestion. The on-screen figures and gestures function as non-verbal appeals that nonetheless take into account the oral and aural quality of the image. As Eliot writes above, "without words, no objects." Recognizing the object on screen necessitates a mental concept of some kind, even if it is a mimetic utterance like a cough. Mental configurations between objects and text are constantly challenged in the silent cinema where there is a non-synchronization between the realms of sound and image but this inter-relational that would seek "counterpoint" or syncopation continues afterwards. They continue into the sound era and into digital video, functioning alongside, sometimes in tension, syncopated, with overt vocal means of address. No one interpellates the crystal carafe in the scene. It remains there as a kind of witness to the scene's unfolding and the

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[310] Thomas Stearns Eliot, *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley* (1964; repr., Columbia University Press, 1989), 131.
[311] Christian Metz, "Story/Discourse," 96.
[312] Thomas Stearns Eliot, *Knowledge and Experience*, 132.

changes in perception in time. However, Kuzmin ends the poem with its description rather than with its address, the poem returns to addressing another spectator, with the carafe and Hull's image as an objective correlative between them. Segmented into facets as the cinema is segmented into frames and yet, rather than remaining a symbolic realm, made through its correlatives to be continuous in a larger experience of the mise en scène of modernity.

Post-Script: Eisenstein and Shub's Version of the Lang and Von Harbou Screenplay

The original cut of Lang's film snuck through Soviet censorship due to low domestic film production in the years directly following the Russian Revolution and a need for content. However, Shub and Eisenstein prepared to re-edit the film under title *Golden Putrefaction* or *Gilded Rot* (*Pozolochennaia gnil'*, Позолоченная гниль) with a streamlined propagandistic message for wider Soviet distribution. That version was not released in St. Petersburg until August 1924, more than a year after Kuzmin saw Lang's original.[313] Comparing the Eisenstein-Shub adaptation of the screenplay and intertitles with Kuzmin's remediation provides a clear vision of the differences between programmatic narrative and the openness of lyric address. In order to think mise en scène independently from editing one last time before moving on to think considerably about the lyric in editing in chapter three we need Eisenstein and Shub to show us how the film was re-edited to fit an ideological framework, and how in order to do that both needed to minimize and maximize the film's excesses.[314] Their version, any actual copy of which has been lost, survives as a screenplay that propagates the Soviet message of Western decadence as addiction, i.e., insatiable desire and obsession continuous with the fetishism of capitalist objects. In service of this message, they emphasize and overwhelm by virtue of the theme rather than a narrative. As Catherine Walworth writes, "[Shub] and Eisenstein transformed the German original into a piece of anti-capitalist Soviet propaganda, completely re-creating (or deleting) characters and bending scenario structure as needed to show simple, depraved bourgeois types."[315] It is interesting to imagine if this simplification is possible considering the dynamics within the frame itself, not necessarily something that can be manipulated in editing, of some of these shots.

First, they needed to maximize the general world of the film's excesses. This means needing to minimize the excesses of Dr. Mabuse as the node of all the both narrative and stylistic excesses and yet the film survives his removal. Thus Dr. Mabuse all but disappears as a character except as the jealous kidnapper of Countess Told. To that end, they rename him "Cardsharp Braun"[316] and inject a good amount of sarcasm into what we can read as intertitles. For instance, intertitle 10 of the last draft reads "Braun, preparing for "business"… (Braun, gotovias' k "delu", Браун, готовясь к «делу»)[317] This sarcastic narrative voice intrudes again in intertitle 30: "Night – after the 'work' day,"

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313 James Goodwin, *Eisenstein, Cinema, and History* (Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 33.
314 The title, *Golden Putrefaction* or *Gilded Rot* (*Pozolochennaia gnil'*, Позолоченная гниль), was actually the same as the subtitle of another film, Vladislav Starevich's *Sashka-naezdnik* (1917) Alexandr Deryavin, "Introduction to Guilded Rot. Screenplay in 6 Acts. (Позолоченная Гниль. Кино-Пьеса в 6-Ти Частях)," *Kinovedcheskie Zapiski* 58 (2002), http://www.kinozapiski.ru. Deryavin suggests that there was an ongoing theme of drugs as a corrupting force in the West in Soviet film. In one film with a screenplay by Osip Brik called *Opium* (1929), opium-smokers are connected with religion rendering Karl Marx's famous dictum into the plot of the film.
315 Catherine Walworth, *Soviet Salvage: Imperial Debris, Revolutionary Reuse, and Russian Constructivism* (Penn State Press, 2017), 143.
316 They spell *shuler* with two 'l's (*shuller,* шуллер).
317 The rest of the footnote is difficult to discern, it might be "without disdaining make-up" (не брезгал гримом).

this time meant to categorize the activities of all of the blasé, bored, and stimulant-seeking bourgeois characters. Jettisoning Mabuse as an engine of "evil" among only confused or lost souls who are at heart good in some way or at least seeking and perhaps capable of love means maximizing the corrupt bourgeois as agents of their own iniquities. The film needs to code a bourgeois woman as a "representative émigré," referring to the White Russians who had fled after the Revolution, for instance. Intertitle 34 reads: "How they entertain themselves," seeking at that point to let the image speak for itself. This intertitle reads like a documentary-ethnography's descriptive voiceover, as does Intertitle 94: "The pastimes of people who have nothing to do in life," and simply, "A degenerate woman" ("*Дегенератка*"). We also hear that Edgar Hull (*Gull*) (spelled with two 'l's unlike in Kuzmin, who Russifies the word and also makes it more versatile) is a good-for-nothing loafer, playboy wastrel, living it up by losing his father's millions («Гулль — бездельник, прожигатель жизни, прокучивающий миллионы отца»).The bourgeois and émigrés are a tribe and the image will illustrate how they are in their native territory: casinos, poker halls, occult soirées and fancy hotels.

Minimizing excesses includes taking out scenes such as the prison scene with Cara Carozza apostrophizing the audience, the hotel room scene with the crystal carafe, and the instrumentalizing of the crystal in the last hypnosis scene, which in the first re-write survived despite slimming the film down to only 10 parts and jettisoning many other scenes in that version.[318] Walworth is right, in her book *Soviet Salvage*, that:

> The once excitingly complex course of criminal action that seemed to follow winding medieval street patterns has now been reduced to a wide, paved boulevard of simplified action… [T]he effect is lackluster in comparison with the Lang film, with character motivation now reduced to mere aristocratic boredom. There is no 'good' versus 'evil' in her version, but rather sheer villainy turned against itself [319].

I have been arguing, however, that the "good" vs. "evil" paradigm is itself an allegorical conceit that is undermined in Lang's version, since the allegory, as we have seen, is not always one of lust for power but also one of misunderstood desire. Even in other allegorical readings the dualistic paradigm is questioned and re-figured as the post-human desire of technology to unseat the creator. What Walworth points out is that character motivation imbued scenes with intention. What I would add without contradicting Walworth is how this motivation animates and gives value to the world rather than simply driving the plot.

The people in the film are judged as being unable to engage with lived time. In Intertitle 66, we get a description of the people we see as "People—for whom daily life is only a tedious delay in the anticipation of those hours when they can sit at the card table." This intertitle points precisely to moments of suspension when spectator agency is invoked and which are associated with the

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[318] The first re-write is itself fork-tongued. The intertitles number 1-178 with КОНЕЦ written at the end but then continue, splitting after Sheet 2, Side 2 (each sheet is double-sided), which numbered 87-117, the second version numbering from 118-198. There is also a discrepancy on Sheet 3, Side 1, which repeats number 117 from Sheet 2, Side 2. Sheet 4 begins 119 but there is an x placed next to it and 118, leading one to imagine this page 4 was meant to follow 117 on Sheet 2. Thus the drafts are labyrinthine, like Mabuse's alleyways, but the second version is much more firmly typed with none except #33 crossed out. Esther Il'inichna Shub and Sergei Eisenstein, "'Doktor Mabuzo': Pozolochennaia Gnil'. Kino-p'esa v 6-Ti Chastiax. Chast' Pervaia." (1924), f. 3035, op.1, no. 2, Russian State Archive of Literature and Arts (RGALI).

[319] Walworth, *Soviet Salvage*, 143.

boredom of the bourgeoisie, presumably because they have no agency within the given circumstance. It is hard to know, based on their screenplay, how much of this suspension and lived time would have survived since they do not assign shot lengths to the particular scenes they preserve but since the screenplay is much shorter and it seems like that was part of the goal of the re-edit as well, one can imagine not much. However, with the new intertitles, these scenes certainly take on another quality, that of pedagogy, which implicitly makes the spectator different, more aware, and more conscious of their own difference from *these* "people." Eisenstein and Shub's narrative voice codes the lived time previously permeated with the constant intention of the gaze upon it as boring.[320]

Post-Tricks: The Question of Montage

There is a shot of Mabuse in the Loge, when he is waiting for the show to be over so he can approach Richter, when he looks at the camera. Arguably, he looks bored before he gathers his fingers and the camera cuts to close up to show him with his eyebrow raised and screwed up. That unfocused gaze the moment before is much more what we associate with a spectator who is not passive but waiting for something that speaks to *them* to arrive. The editing sequence shows a transformation in modes of seeing.

[320] For the champion of boredom's evergreen essay see Siegfried Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays*, trans. Thomas Y. Levin (1964; repr., Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005).

Figure 17 The actor Rudolf Klein-Rogge looking bored or contemptuously at the spectacle (screen left) and calculatingly at his next victim, Hull.

Gunning reads this moment as almost breaking the fourth wall and showing his enunciative power (since afterwards Hull has a headache) but we can also read it as Eisenstein and Shub co-opt it here. We are asked to be bored, even during the spectacle that seeks our entire attention (with phallic larger-than-life moving masks and a tiny Carozza whose shirt is pulled up from the rafters at the end), and Mabuse is guide in that. For a moment, Mabuse asks us to identify, and even wants our minds to drift as we watch other members of the audience going absolutely wild. One throws even his neighbor's flowers at the stage as she looks on unapprovingly and as a black servant looks on flabbergasted. Their gazes offer us ways in which we can react. But Mabuse's gaze is "outside of the frame" and relies on montage.

Eisenstein is famous for montage that created dialectical concepts from the conflict between two frames or within the frame. This latter is a form of mise-en-scene. After having looked at some of the excesses within the shots, thinking about how Shub and Eisenstein edited the film to fit an ideological theme suggests that excess can override ideology. The question of how much of the film succeeds in this lyric mode we have been observing could be answered by examining how much they had to cut out to make a fully ideological film work to relay their message and nothing else, and if this was even possible in editing, given the self-sufficient formal qualities of many of the images. However, the question-response style of editing and the changing the utterance-like (*athorybal*) intertitles to denotative ones.[321] It is true that Shub and Eisenstein removed some of the most lyrically excessive scenes.

What Eisenstein learned from Lang

Eisenstein, like Lang, thought the character should be both "larger than life" and "of the time" in order to reach the level of symbol while remaining . In relation to the figure of Timosh in *Arsenal*, Eisenstein finds "the need for a hero adequate to his epoch who may require the creation of a *Sverkhchelovek*, a Nietzschean Superman, a 'figure transcending the boundaries of everyday limitation', one that from the personal 'totally metamorphoses into the general':

> Under such circumstances a hero is naturally drawn beyond the limits of the real (as in the shooting scene), because it is impossible to collect in a real, living person all the aspects of the epoch. A normal person won't incorporate all those features. This can work only in a character that has grown into a generalized image. And [Alexander] Dovzhenko acts completely properly when he translates him onto an unreal plane, one approaching the symbolic."[322]

It is interesting that Eisenstein sees this process of creating a "generalized image" as one of translation. Nesbet writes of this quote, "It is completely 'natural,' says Eisenstein, to have to

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[321] Another example is Intertitle 61, which describes the inspector as "a bored young man whose interest only awakens to the life of risky gambling": "Рихард фон Венк скучающий молодой человек, возбуждающйи в себе интерес, к жизни азартной игрой».

[322] SM Eizenshtein, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, 6 vols., eds. PM Atasheva, IV Vaisfel'd, NB Volkova, Iu A Krasovskii, SI Freilikh, RN Iurenev, SI Iutkevich (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1964) quoted in Nesbet 2007, 137.

sacrifice the real in the interests of the fantasy, the truly collective hero, the Superman…"[323] But this claim challenges Eisenstein's own rigorous separation of the terms *obraz* (image) and *simvol* (symbol), as Nesbet explains, the *obraz* in his thinking is the 'unity of form and content', which has *dinamika* (dynamic), while the *simvol*, 'immobility' (*nepodvizhnost*). The German equivalent of *obraz* is, of course, *Bild*, the word that Lang uses to describe Mabuse. It is interesting as Nesbet notes here, that, "Naturally [Eisenstein] finds that Dovzhenko (whom he treats much as Schiller treats Goethe, as a kind of 'naïve genius') fills his films with symbols where Eisenstein would instead have *obrazy*." Nesbet complicates the notion that Dovzhenko's images are only symbols. She calls them "binocular," writing, that yes the apples in *Earth* (1930), a film which many a film critic has called "lyrical," are symbols for fertility but they are also "the surface of apples," and so many as to create a circumstance for the viewer to be "drunk on the surface of apples."[324] How does such a binocular vision come about? Is it implicit in the image or is a process by which we learn to see, and which Nesbet helps us see with the help of the contradictions inherent in Eisenstein's attempt to separate himself from Dovzhenko.

Figure 18 "Binocular" seeing in the loge scene of *Dr. Mabuse*.

[323] Anne Nesbet, *Savage Junctures: Sergei Eisenstein and the Shape of Thinking*, KINO : The Russian Cinema Series (London: Tauris, 2007), 137.
[324] Ibid., 138.

The editing sequence goes from shot to a countershot from the POV of Dr. Mabuse. First he and the spectator through his eyes see a fuzzy image before focusing. Even when we focus, however, the excessive and defamiliarizing, ornate lampshade of ruffled fabric, which can't be symbolic being rather a fair amount of surface, draws our attention first. The film then removes one of the binocular sights to focus on Hull. Here again, we have a transformation in seeing. Whether consciously or subconsciously, from editing Fritz Lang's *Dr. Mabuse* into a morally and ideologically straightforward parable Eisenstein would have learned that a "logical progression" of action, narrative, or ideology, could be undermined internally by mise en scène and excess. This skill would go on to serve him for the rest of his career.

An Extension of Lyric Seeing : "The Third Meaning"

Barthes describes the filmic as the "third meaning" of a film beyond the denotative (informational) and connotative (symbolic or "obvious") meaning, and specifically relates it to hearing through the notion that, in the classical understanding of the senses, the "third sense" was hearing.[325] These binaries can be loosely mapped onto the *obraz/simvol* binary as well. The third meaning is concerned with the signifier emptied of its signified; it is that "obtuse" meaning, literally "blunted, rounded in form," and a "drifting." [326] Barthes asks of his own characterization of Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible* (1944), "Are not the traits which I indicated (the make-up, the whiteness, the wig, etc.) just like the blunting of a meaning too clear, too violent?" with the narrative and ideological meaning in mind. Earlier he concludes, "The characteristic of this third meaning is indeed — at least in SME — to blur the limit separating expression from disguise, but also to allow that oscillation succinct demonstration —an elliptic emphasis…"[327] Most importantly of all, it "carries a certain emotion,"[328] Barthes concludes.

Though these observations could as easily be made about Lang's film, Eisenstein's conscientious and explicitly theorized notion of "vertical montage" permits Barthes to imagine that these obtuse details are yet another track, a quasi-audible one alongside the denotative and connotative interactions that resonate between shots in non-linear ways. It is a wholly sufficient track in and of itself, though also anticipatory of the coming of sound.[329] The denotative and connotative "form a dialogism so tenuous that there is no guarantee of its intentionality," he writes, and in this way bypasses the ability or necessity of attributing these details of mise en scène to an auteur. The filmic and allows the "oscillation succinct expression."[330] So the third meaning is a medium, or *the* medium, within the

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[325] For qualities of the "filmic" image see Jean Epstein's essay on "Photogénie" Jean Epstein, "On Certain Characteristics of Photogénie," in *French Film Theory and Criticism: 1907-1929*, ed. Richard Abel, vol. 1: 1907 – 1929 (1924; repr., New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 314–21.
[326] Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, 59.
[327] Ibid., 57.
[328] Ibid., 59.
[329] Like myself, Barthes finds this "a happy coincidence, since what is here in question is indeed *listening*: firstly, because the remarks by Eisenstein to which reference will be made are taken from a consideration of the coming of sound in film; second, because listening (no reference to the *phoné* alone) bears within it that metaphor best suited to the 'textual': orchestration (SME's own word), counterpoint, stereophony)," Barthes, 53n1.
[330] Ibid., 57. Oscillation is a term that especially feminist film scholars in the 1980s adopted to open up the field of spectatorship just after the equal and opposite move Laura Mulvey made in defining exactly whose gaze and what kind it was in her 1975 essay "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema."

medium, between representation and expression. It foregrounds the relay between expression and resemblance and allows a process of valuation to become visible that is separate but alongside the narrative.

The "Third Meaning" does depend on the spectator. In terms of gesture, it is something one can *point at* though not explain. Writing of a peasant woman's fist and her bun in Eisenstein's *Potemkin* (1925), made within a year of editing *Dr. Mabuse*, Barthes identifies the fist as implicitly symbolic of the revolution (anachronistic to the time of the narrative but nonetheless part of the pathos the film intended to evoke in its contemporary viewership) while the bun, shaped similarly, seems to mock the fist in its nostalgic value for something that antedates the revolution.

> Look at another bun (that of the woman in image IX): it contradicts the tiny raised fist, *atrophies* it without the reduction having the slightest symbolic (intellectual) value; prolonged by small curls, pulling the face in towards an ovine model, it gives the woman something touching (in the way that a certain generous foolishness can be) or sensitive - these antiquated words, mystified words if ever there were, with little that is revolutionary or political about them, must nevertheless be assumed. I believe that the obtuse meaning carries a certain *emotion*. Caught up in the disguise, such emotion is never sticky, it is an emotion which simply *designates* what one loves, what one wants to defend: an emotion-value, an evaluation.[331] [emphasis added]

The bun only draws attention to itself in relation to the fist and ultimately imbues the fist with the same. Eisenstein's interest in excess makes it possible to believe he did plant these details, indeed, to be in excess of the "obvious" and often ideologically subservient information otherwise contained in the images. Ideology cannot exist without emotion. Here though Barthes says the bun carries emotion-value and that he performs the cognitive process of "evaluation," which are not personal, his designation of it as "never sticky" and that which Barthes can point to but not quite explain remain in the realm of feeling.[332]

The emotion-value of which Barthes writes is the work of epideixis in the lyric but how does the lyric have the same effect? Can poetry (or words) even create a "third meaning" In Barthes' examples of the "third meaning," he relies on resemblances, in particular mimicking resemblances that verge on mocking (or satire), but points to their excessive, aspectual similarity to establish a doubt as to whether the similarity is in fact mimicry or coincidental. This uncertainty leaves only the disparity between two different systems of value in conflict and unable to authenticate or corroborate one another. Thus we get, even within the frame, a hint of Eisenstein's philosophy of montage by conflict. Likewise, it is difficult to say which is more immanent but because the ideological one belongs to the plot, it becomes the artificial value, while the incidental-seeming one becomes the lyrical.

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[331] Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, 58–59.

[332] For a schema of the differences between feeling, emotion, and affect, see Charles Altieri, "Strange Affinities: A Partial Return to Wordsworthian Poetics After Modernism" (Romantic Circles, July 1, 2003), https://romantic-circles.org/praxis/poetics/altieri/altieri.html. Abbreviated: Affects = "states of the body experienced as inseparable from the presence of imaginary projection." Emotions="take place in terms of plots" and correlate to "cognitive inquiry." Feelings= "extensions of the sensation."

Anaphoric emptying of the signifier

Tellingly, Barthes invokes the haiku, often considered a lyric form, to describe its action as an "anaphoric gesture." Though he still discusses Eisenstein, the phenomenon he sees at work *within* the image is not the "collision" between images that sublimates into a concept—Eisenstein's analogy between the cinematic shot and Japanese ideograms in "The Cinematographic Principle and the Ideogram" (1929) to explain the meaning of images in montage[333]— but instead an "anaphoric gesture without significant content," as "a sort of gash rased of meaning (of desire for meaning)." Barthes explains the obtuseness of this phenomenon in the example of the woman with the fist and the bun thus:

> Eisenstein would probably have acknowledged this incongruity, this impertinence of the signifier…Then, the signifier (the third meaning) is not filled out, it keeps a permanent state of depletion…We could also say on the contrary — and it would be just as correct — that this same signifier is not empty (cannot empty itself), that it maintains a state of perpetual erethism… *the obtuse meaning can be seen as an accent*, the very form of an emergence, of a fold (a crease even) marking the heavy layer of informations and significations. If it could be described (a contradiction in terms), it would have exactly the nature of the Japanese haiku — *anaphoric gesture without significant content, a sort of gash rased of meaning* (of desire for meaning). Thus in image V:
>
> Mouth drawn, eyes shut squinting,
> Headscarf low over forehead,
> She weeps.
>
> This accent…subverts not the content but the whole practice of meaning. A new—rare practice affirmed against a majority practice (that of signification), obtuse meaning appears necessarily as a luxury, an expenditure with no exchange. This luxury does not *yet* belong to today's politics but nevertheless *already* to tomorrow's.[334] [emphasis added]

We can imagine Kuzmin turning the facets of the crystal and seeing only Hull's face as this sort of emptying anaphoric gesture. Hull again refers to the previous Hull (and Kniazev and Rakov), which is progressively emptied and returned to the present moment. Hull acts as this erethetic agent, stimulating excitation and innervation in Kuzmin. Resemblance is key for Barthes and for Kuzmin, though for Kuzmin this occurs between the on-screen image and an off-screen image, which happens to be off-off-screen in the space of St. Petersburg. Thus Hull becomes Rakov, becomes Kniazev becomes a "gash," the "you" of the poem. The basic principle of resemblance operates to empty the signifier of its signified. Though in Barthes' example of the fist and the bun from Eisenstein the resemblance mocks or "contradicts the tiny raised fist, *atrophies* it without the reduction having the slightest symbolic (intellectual) value," the effect of emptying does not necessarily result in bathos. Indeed, the lyric teeters on the edge between bathetic excess, tender

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[333] Sergei Eisenstein, *Film Form: Essays in Film Theory*, trans. Jay Leyda (New York; London: Harcourt, 1969), 28–45.
[334] Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, 62.

emotion, and "decreation" of the poesis.[335] It depends on the absence of the signified to render the material medium present and to render the reader to their own immediate feeling and excessively emotional valuation. These factors make "cause and effect" difficult to parse as in lyric logic and as in *Dr. Mabuse.*

In Lang, Mabuse's caked makeup or unruly disguise mustache and exaggerated expressionistic acting are at once part of the narrative, a confirmation that Mabuse is in disguise, i.e. in character, and something the other characters cannot see, appearing for the viewer alone. Even if Eisenstein and Shub minimized his appearance, that caked face serves to emphasize "our" proximity to and familiarity with Mabuse (echoed by the intimate shots from an uncertain position behind his dressing room mirror). The position of the camera and the accent or fold of the "obtuse" details do not create a sense of omniscience but of intimacy; they make the viewer more aware than the detective of disguise, bourgeois and otherwise. In the original, each new disguise, the caked make-up refers back to the previous disguise. Mabuse looks less like himself than his makeup looks like his makeup. But the viewer is just as intimate with Hull's fresh face. As the only character in the film who does not wear obvious make-up or a disguise (until he reappears as a ghost-ghoul at the end with heavy eyeliner), we seem to have direct access to him, somewhat indirectly, ironically, through his dissimilarity from the other characters.

Barthes describes the "emptiness" of the signifier that is the third meaning in a way that could describe Hull himself (his very name suggests this emptying function, as Kuzmin foregrounds as he reimagines Hull in different circumstances). Hull's youthful enthusiasm and passion welcoming Cara Carozza, plumping up her pillow, and feeding her sweets, all appears in excess, a mimicry of someone intoxicated with love and over-acted, especially, counterintuitively to in contrast to her affected behavior and heavy make-up.

Through the juxtaposition of these two characters, the story thematizes the difference between the filmic-lyric —a kind of romantic "naturalness" and "authenticity" (part and parcel of a certain brand and perception of American candor) in the form of spontaneity, immanence, and a lack of self-awareness, for which Hull comes to stand,—and the expressionist theatricality of excess and artifice.[336] However, as we have seen, within the mise en scène itself, there are similarities that cannot be contained in a simple or stable binary and which the image stages repeatedly through its careful doublings and arrangements. In Lang's case, these arrangements encourage the appearance of a "third" (meaning, or, in the framework the movie and its lyric mode, one who "overhears") through images on screen that appeal to and appear continuous with the "lyric spectator's" world through deixis, as in the case of Kuzmin's poem, encouraging him to find their own aspectual doppelgängers. These effects bring the image closer to feeling prior to emotion and affect. If there is a lyric equivalent to "third meaning" it is by virtue of incidental aspectual resemblance, which can be created through sound and hearing, preferably to vision. This is the effect of the beveled crystal

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[335] "Simone Weil in *La Pesanteur et La Grâce* has a chapter on what she calls *décréation*. She says that decreation is making pass from the created to the uncreated, but that destruction is making pass from the created to nothingness." Wallace Stevens, "The Relations Between Poetry and Painting," in *Poets on Painters*, ed. J. D. Mcclatchy (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989), 123.

[336] Kuzmin's poem addresses the way stage makeup and its exhibitionist qualities bring one into the present in the lines: "Antiquity must be quite dead/for him who got it into his head/to love You and I am ready to refuse/beauty marks and toupees./Retrospective stage scenery/Lies as useless tatters. (*Античность надо позабыть/Тому, кто вздумал Вас любить,/И отказаться я готов/От мушек и от париков,/Ретроспективный реквизит.*)

carafe, which reflects at various "angles of incidence," the angle a ray makes perpendicular to the surface at the "point of incidence."

The signifiers that act as these points, such as the crystal carafe, are not fixed enough to be easily metonymically displaced. As signifiers they are slippery aspects. To clarify this idea, it makes sense to go to the most obvious technique in cinema by which metonyms are displaced, and that is by virtue of editing or montage. Lang used the "Question and Response" model of cross-cut editing as well as "continuity" editing that allowed Lang to show less "cause and effect" but rather the transformation of attention, intention, and excitation in characters onscreen that send the viewer back on their own participation in such processes. Chapter Three considers the transformation of values through the crystal-faceted structure that a montage based in anaphoric gestures creates.

3/Lyric Montage and the Interval: Anaphoric Ethnographies and the Porous Circumstance

The Crystallization of Now

In early 1940, Walter Benjamin, who had seen Dziga Vertov's *A Sixth Part of the World* (1926)[337] upon its release while in Moscow, writes thesis number thirteen in "On the Concept of History" in which he concludes that the task of a Marxist method of writing history will consist in preserving the materiality of history through the principle of montage. In the first stage, he determines "to assemble large-scale constructions out of the smallest and most precisely cut components. Indeed, to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal of the total event (*den Kristall des Totalgeschehens zu entdecken*). And, therefore, to break with vulgar historical naturalism. To grasp the construction of history as such. In the structure of commentary."[338] On the metaphor of the crystal in Benjamin's work, Nassima Sahraoui has written that "the 'Now' is the crystallised historical event. It is crystallised time, and as such it represents the condition of the possibility of a politics of openness."[339] It is precisely the openness of the "now" that allows its address. Benjamin's structure for critical poesis, which he puts into practice in *The Arcades Project*, aims to "characterize and preserve the intervals of reflection (*die Intervalle der Reflexion*), the distances lying between the most essential parts of this work, which are turned most intensively to the outside (*den höchst intensiv nach außen gewandten*)."[340] Benjamin imagines the interval as a space carved, held open without dialectical sublimation, through the inward in-tense movement of outward facing.

This study argues that the salute is one type of lyric gesture that can hold open an interval and, when used in composition, create a work of crystallization that returns and renders the spectator in the participatory present. The gesture registers two poles intensively turning to the outside upon its performance. This chapter additionally shows this gesture in different moments in history, tracing it from Walt Whitman's speech act of salutation to Vertov's enactment of it in filming and graphically staging it in intertitles and montage, and finally to a third international re-appropriation in North Africa.

A Re-vision of the Crystal: A Multifaceted Unity of Multitudes

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337 The full title of the film is *A Sixth Part of the World. A Kino-Eye Race around the U.S.S.R.: Export and Import by the State Trading Organization of the U.S.S.R.* [Shestaia chast' mira. Probeg Kino-Glaza po SSSR: Eksport i import Gostorga SSSR/IIIестая часть мира (Пробег Кино-Глаза по СССР, Экспорт и импорт Госторга СССР)] but also has been referred to under other similar translations. See O. Sarkisova, "Across One Sixth of the World: Dziga Vertov, Travel Cinema, and Soviet Patriotism*," *October*, 2007, 20; Yuri Tsivian, *Lines of Resistance: Dziga Vertov and the Twenties* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 408. I will refer to it as *A Sixth Part* for short.

338 Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2002), 461, [N2, 6]; Walter Benjamin and Rolf Tiedemann, *Gesammelte Schriften V. Das Passagen- Werk. 2 Bde.* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), 575 [N2, 6].

339 Nassima Sahraoui, "A Crystal of Time: (Political) Reflections towards a History of the Now: Benjamin and Derrida," *Anthropology & Materialism*, no. 1 (2017): 14.

340 Ibid., 456 [N1, 3].

> A kind in glass and a cousin, a spectacle and nothing strange a single hurt color and an arrangement in a system to pointing. All this and not ordinary, not unordered in not resembling. The difference is spreading.
>
> —Gertrude Stein, "A Carafe, that is a Blind Glass"

In Gertrude Stein's short prose poem, which opens her book *Tender Buttons* (1914), the lyric within the prose emerges when the gander at categorization, first attempted through an anthropomorphic description "a blind glass" is overtaken by kinship ties, "a cousin," and become more abstract and challenging to trace but "not unordered in not resembling." Stein's poem preserves of the lyric, one might say, that it reveals based on aspectual resonance, not resemblance. The utterance, a fact, reflects unrelated meanings that then still fall into some order, though superficially disparate. Rather than being the object of pointing ("pointed at"), the carafe organizes pointing (not "pointing to a system" but "a system to pointing"), and in a sense, reality. In an age of empiricism, reality must be demonstratable and who or whatsoever can hold it in evidence controls it. In the chiasmic sentence, it reflects human enterprises conversely as a mirror would and, perhaps, the pursuit of similarity and homogeneity, too, is redirected in its blind gaze. Though Stein's method does not usually stand in for "standard lyric" procedure and principles, reading this opening poem as an *Ars Poetica* reveals that she espouses a similar concept of poesis, if not the poesis itself, to Mikhail Kuzmin's romantic-leaning early modernism. Stein's blind carafe reflects greater interest in lyricism than might appear on the surface.

The lyric as a mode for reading transnational and transmedial objects draws attention to complex identities and the status of personhood under different social, historical, and political conditions.[341] The lyric spectator, for her part, can be understood as a series of intervals between facets. She moves between them and, in turn, perceives their movement as transformation. This conception of the lyric subject works for a glass carafe as it does for film. As Dominique Rabaté suggests, "The lyric subject is thus not to be understood as a given that expresses itself in language, lyricism is not language changed into song, but a process, a quest for identity."[342] In the pictorial allegory of the scene in the last chapter, the decanter on the table serves as a spectator-overhearer, a point-of-view that no other point-of-view in the scene can have. In hand, it circulates possibilities available within reproductive logic and the crystallised total event; it reflects the same image numerous times but which is not the same from different angles. Multilingualism that is also a multiverse of symbolic connotations assembles a plurality of visions and diverse community that goes beyond the "face value" of Richter as either personal memory or nationalist ideal (soldier, epic hero, ethnic type). This chapter picks up on these qualities of the cinematic crystal that are homologous to the lyric.

Although the crystal decanter is a bourgeois symbol *par excellence*, it reappears in this chapter on Soviet Russia and Marxism; In locating the spectator between its facets in what Vertov called "the interval," (*interval'*, интервальь), it avoids the pitfalls of a position in the suture of the classical narrative cinema. Suture denotes a cut that stitches the spectator between two continuous shots they do not notice and aligning with the apparatus' omniscience or transcendence, all the while limiting that view.[343] Quite to the contrary, it offers a vessel without providing the secure identificatory closure of being the particular point-of-view of either a character within the story or the author of

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[341] I follow Gérard Genette in proposing the lyric as an "epistemological mode."
[342] Rabaté, *Figures*, 66.
[343] See Silverman, Kaja. *The Subject of Semiotics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

the story. This fragmented, face-less, faceted object offers a series of oblique reflections that act as opacities to one searching for their reflection and transparencies into the interior.[344]

Perhaps most importantly, the figure of the crystal for the lyric offers a form, keeping a space for a multiplicity of conjunctures without relying on the category of the human. Not all lyric carries all of these characteristics, but rather, this chapter shows how the film picks up these particular lyric traits. This objectivity cannot be a human one; or, understood another way, the vessel stands in for a human subject, not recognizable or perhaps not yet recognizable under the context and conditions presented. Its address becomes impossible. Even if it is at the center of the room, the category of the human does not have to be at the center of the relation—it breaks down into the facets of expressions, gestures, aspects, and guises. Though in efforts to make the inhuman speak, the inhuman approaches a notion of the human (since speaking *is* humanizing), this new-found subjectivity is not the same as a personification or giving something voice. Instead, it retains an objecthood that transforms the category of the human. Montage offers another way of discussing the interrelation of objectivities.

When we go to the filmmaker who takes the crystalline fracturing of images within the sequence and even within the frame to an extreme, we get Dziga Vertov. Vertov did the most splitting of the frame, both between images and within the image itself. Every image becomes subjective; the positions of the camera so various and numerous call attention to each position rather than to convention meant to stand in for the effacement of the camera. Likewise, he explicitly ties his experiments in extreme montage within a transnational and transmedia frame in borrowing the anaphoric poetic structure of Walt Whitman's rhetorical lyric.[345] Whitman's poetry dances with ideology but also transcends it, depending on emphasis and accent. Just as the crystal carafe in the previous chapter reminds us of an amalgamation of gazes in the frame, stressing the interaction between points of view is oddly part of the lyric.

The Vertov of montage is more well-known than the Vertov who sought the "lyrical" within the image. His brother and cameraman, Mikhail Kaufman, is credited with sustaining interest in human faces while Vertov professed machines the subject of his aesthetic. Whether within the image or in the interstice between images, the poetic documentary that they made together entailed a spectator that served as glue— but not in a classical cinema "suture" sense. The emptiness of the signifier "I" becomes a quality of transparency and porosity at the heart of the montage.[346] A glass carafe in Vertov's *Kino-Pravda N. 11* (U.S.S.R., 1922), shot by his brother Mikhail Kaufman[347], functions as an over-hearer much the same way it does in Fritz Lang.

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[344] Not a window, associated with realism, but more like the common expression "the eye is a window to the soul."
[345] Stephen Stepanchev, "Whitman in Russia," in *Walt Whitman and the World*, ed. Gay Wilson Allen and Ed Folsom (Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1995), 300–338; Ben Singer, "Connoisseurs of Chaos: Whitman, Vertov and the 'Poetic Survey,'" *Literature/Film Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (1987): 247–58.
[346] It is important to note from the beginning that the porosity of the "I" appears almost counterintuitively considering the history of the subject in Romantic poetry. Take for instance the phallic intimations of the line in Whitman, "What cities the light or warmth penetrates, I penetrate those cities myself," whose verb "penetrate" implies the city is porous, not the subject. Yet the subject is also compared to light, and this comes at the end of the poem after the subject has already taken in a lion's share of light in stanza after stanza proclaiming, "I see!"
[347] Dziga Vertov, *Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984), xxiv.



Figure 19 The beveled, bourgeois crystal carafe in *Dr. Mabuse* (left) and the smooth, bald "Leninist" carafe in Dziga Vertov's Kino-Pravda N. 11 (U.S.S.R., 1922) (center and right).[348]

The carafe in a segment of *Kino-Pravda* [*Figure 19*] shows us the surroundings, defamiliarizing what is probably a church, rendered upside down by its new container. Religious subversion aligns with communism's promise of immanent utopia and its policy of demonizing the institution of Russian Orthodoxy. Especially by contrast to the most dominant geometric shape, the carafe is grounded. An arrow points up on two sides of the large wooden box at the base of what might be a flagpole two symbols metonymically displaceable by god or country. Moscow's military district commander Muralov's head bobs from side to side in the reflection. Muralov looks a lot like Lenin in the short glimpses Vertov gives us. Filmed from a low angle, the decanter hovers over Muralov's left shoulder. It mimics the cylindrical shape of the spectator "sitting on the fourth wall" with his Cossack-style hat and even Lenin's round face (and implicitly his bald head). It would seem to gather the spectator and Lenin in one image, perhaps, or simply allude to the three-dimensionality which the cinematic image, like the carafe, gathers. A counter shot offers us a pan of a crowd of "Worker and Peasant Youth" from a position next to Muralov. After an intertitle presents the speech of Muralov telling them that training exercises are going on in the region, the image cuts to the training exercises in an extended pan that implies that the gaze of the carafe and the spectator reach farther than Muralov can see. Lateral pans in alternation right to left and left to right dominate the remainder of the sequence, whereas before the newsreel showed primarily movement centered in the frame, especially whirling and circular motions. The sequence adopts a sweeping and collecting aesthetic as if taking a cue from the minimalism of the new soviet carafe's form.

This particular decanter has nothing to do with singing or with the lyre, those traditional notions of the lyric having been shown in the last chapters to be tired allegories. Instead, it gathers, reflects, and gives what here reads as an expansive but still grounded point of view upon the political rhetoric Muralov and the intertitles silently expound that physically and figuratively places the people both in the foreground and in an overseeing position, sandwiching the politicians and sloganeering. It also transports the viewer to these locations and delivers the viewer to these sites. The logic of the omniscient, transcendental camera appears familiar to any student of film studies. However, the carafe functions a bit differently since it does not allow these shots to be completely disembodied. Instead, the eye with which we see them remains tied to this initial scene.

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[348] Thank you to Anne Nesbet for referring me to this carafe.

Crystalline Space-holders for Emergent Subjectivities: Participants in Re-citation[349]

In the case of the Soviet economic propaganda film *A Sixth Part of the World* (Dziga Vertov, U.S.S.R., 1926)—a filmed combination of facets of the U.S.S.R-in-the-making—Vertov's primary structuring rhetoric borrows from Walt Whitman's "Salut au Monde!," originally published as "Poem of Salutation" (1856) in the second edition of *Leaves of Grass*.[350] The camera takes the place of the poem's speaker, and the intertitles borrow refrains from the anaphoric parts of the text such as "I see you" and "I hear you" between images. The film takes the poem as a script for performance, "voicing it" onto the screen.

The lyric poem leaves itself open to being embodied by a reader and made actual through its resituated meaning, created by voicing and deixis. Whitman heralds the world in a tone that falters between ideologies. In his guise as a representative of American goodwill towards all the nations, his speaker speaks both a quasi-revolutionary internationalism—signaled by his use of French for the title—and of global industrial futures. Vertov picks up this thread at the end of his film by making a prophecy of a third-world internationalism. It also performs an ethnographic voice in miniature, naming peoples and tribes and describing them in one line.

How does one bring out unity in a list of observations? In multitudes? Describing the rest of the film, Vertov conceives of erasing the boundaries between audience and participants, also seeking to erase the boundaries between film and life. In "*A Sixth Part of the World* (Conversation with Dziga Vertov)" in the film journal *Kino* in 1926, Vertov describes the "audience" of the film as follows:

> [T]he film has, strictly speaking, no 'viewers' within the borders of the U.S.S.R., since all the working people of the U.S.S.R. (130-140 million of them) are not viewers but *participants* in this film. The very concept of this film and its whole construction are now resolving in practice the most difficult theoretical question of the eradication of the boundary between viewers and spectacle.[351]

His assertion that his film opens the border between life and art not only suits the preferred rhetoric of the U.S.S.R. at the time, which would ask each of its inhabitants to be productive and proactive contributors to the newly formed communist state. *A Sixth Part* incorporates its participants within the images and between them. The montage gives equal importance to the images and the intertitles in addressing spectators. The para-cinematic and the representational comingle throughout, for

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[349] I take the emphasis on the re-cite in re-citare from Dominique Rabaté, "Retour Sur La Notion de Gestes Lyriques," *Publications Numériques Du CÉRÉdI, "Actes de Colloques et Journées d'étude,"* no. 17 (2016)., cited in Francesco Giusti, "Recitation: Lyric Time(s) I," in *Re-: An Errant Glossary* (Berlin: ICI Berlin Press, 2019), 35–47, https://www.ici-berlin.org/oa/ci-15/giusti_recitation.html. Rabaté writes: "One of the major features of poetic enunciation resides in the fact that the poem is always more or less re-citation" (« une des caractérisations majeures de l'énonciation poétique reste le fait que le poème est toujours peu ou prou re-citation. ») He draws attention to the muscular activity and pleasure of the re-enunciation, aspects of film that scholars of the phenomenology and somatic nature of film have argued as well. This chapter pursues the notion not only of oral re-citation but of a bodily, gestural re-citation, that of "the lyric as the re-enactment of selected gestures under different circumstances" Francesco Giusti, "Reversion: Lyric Time(s) II," in *Re-: An Errant Glossary* (Berlin: ICI Berlin Press, 2019), 151–61, https://www.ici-berlin.org/oa/ci-15/giusti_reversion.html.

[350] Whitman renamed the poem "Salut au Monde!" four years later in the 1860 edition. His late addition of this international poem no doubt aimed at widening his reputation.

[351] Tsivian, *Lines of Resistance*, 182. The citation for the original article is "Shestaia chast mira (Beseda s Dzigoi Vertovym)," Kino, 17 August 1926, p.3

instance, in one scene bringing the grain of the photographic medium and wheat grains into near identity. Finally, in the cinematic modernism of Vertov's film lyric, the spectator is created through the "machine" of the lyric film itself, in which the repetition of a reduced gesture is not mechanical reproduction but rather "gives birth" to new participants of the lyric, or of the U.S.S.R., whichever comes first. With the lyric subject's manifestation comes the agency of creative re-production, whereas with blind allegiance to a party or national project comes reproduction and reliance on reified authority in the Adornian sense. Does Vertov's rhetoric equal the film experience? As this essay is not a sociological study, it cannot say. However, at least one finding was that Soviet propaganda films did affect viewers.[352] Vertov's *A Sixth Part* can give a sense of how a film might change viewer imaginaries of their place, perhaps enfolded into its images. However, it is also important to remember that Vertov's film does not work entirely as propaganda, for many at the Sovkino bureau strongly disapproved of the film precisely because its ideology was not as clear as they would have liked.

It is only more sustaining for an argument about holding a multi-faceted, multi-valent semantic content open within the lyric that Vertov received criticism from all sides for the ambiguity of the message the film ultimately conveyed. For instance, Vertov's film undermines the desire to show a "united" Soviet land, a geographic sixth part of the entire globe, precisely by showing the peoples who were not yet part of the project in order to fold them into the project. Another problem is how fascinating and how very much in the present are the rituals Vertov includes, such as a "Shaman shaman-ing," as one intertitle puts it. In contrast, another intertitle proclaims the traditions are receding. Vertov issued a rebuttal stating that "The announcement about the 'political semi-literacy' of *A Sixth Part* puts the Sovkino Board itself in an embarrassing position. In the first place, the picture was accepted by the Board of Sovkino. In the second, Comrade Shvedchikov [party functionary responsible for film industry 1926-1929] expressed his positive opinion after a showing in the presence of a number of people[…]"[353] If the bureau accepted the film both before and after it was shot, in other words, its message had to be politically clear and entirely in line with the party message.

Vertov argued for the linearity and thus readability of his montage sequences, writing: "*The newsreel advertisement (35-100 feet)* Example: The unloading of an ocean liner in Petrograd is included in a current newsreel, say *Kinopravda.* "Fordson" tractors are unloaded. A train rushes along. Moscow. The tractors are delivered to the Gostorg [the State Import-Export Trade Office], "Techno-import."[354] The passive construction of these sentences and short, concise moments such as "A train rushes along" emphasize the objects in the process as actors. These balanced equations of object, intertitle, transformative process would also make up much of *A Sixth Part* but not all. Likewise, the montage of progress by showing supply chains, trade routes, and factories played an important role. However, the process in *A Sixth Part* would not fit in one film since it was vast, slow, and arguably more about internal change, a way of changing a new nation's self-perception and harnessing optimism, than an external process. In this film, the intertitles towards the very end do most of the

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[352] The original article is S. P. Rosenthal. "Changes of Socio-Economic Attitudes Under Radical Motion Picture Propaganda." *Archives of Psychology*, N. 166. New York, 1934. One summary of the study distinguishes between education and propaganda by stating that propaganda presents a preformulated conclusion. It says Rosenthal showed "newsreels' to serve as propaganda. There is not confirmation that they are Vertov's. I. C Jarvie, *Towards a Sociology of the Cinema* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013).

[353] Tsivian, *Lines of Resistance*, 256.

[354] Vertov, *Kino-Eye*, 25.

heavy-lifting of narrativization and reporting on progress, while discrete images carry the energy of the overall film. However, they also do as much to interrupt their momentum.

Removing the intertitles altogether in later films yielded affectively intense images. For instance, they recorded immanent joy in participants both of the national project and the film project when they were two coterminous projects, rather than delivering a messianic message of one to come. A later propaganda film directed by Vertov's brother and cameraman Mikhail Kaufman, *Nebyvalii Pokhid* (*An Unprecedented Campaign*, 1931), notoriously celebrated the first five-year plan (1928-1932), showing the joys and ease of industrialized agriculture as a great success in the Ukraine. Kaufman's camera draws an arc in the sky to follow hay bales joyously flying through the air as if weightless rainbows. However, history would show that the energetic and smiling faces that Kaufman's film followed during the implementation of the plan led only a short time later to the 1932-1933 Kholodomor (Famine-Genocide). The representation of history in the making is inevitably a risky process, as are celebrations before the completion of a task. The cinematic tools of montage combined with Whitman's rhetorically informed techniques that resist closure have the effect of suspension on the images that hang between lyric gestures of invocation and anaphoric returns that seek to recuperate subjects for the soviet industrial project.

Meeting and Rebuffing the Salute: Some Transparencies and Opacities in Whitman

Vertov's reliance on the mechanical eye ("kino-eye") would seem to preclude the lyric. Yet, in his assembly, Vertov relies upon Whitman's legacy of willing equality through attention and recording human subjects who were barely recognizable as human in his time as Whitman did, to animate the inanimate by virtue of the single-image sequence's internal rhythm, like Whitman's internal lines, and the kaleidoscopic vision that they offer when placed nearby one another.

In the poem, the speaker is addressed as "Walt Whitman" by a higher power, which in Vertov is the camera mechanism. These two entities give them both omniscient powers. In Whitman, this endowment occurs through his recognition of and by an unknown being. He hears it call "Walt Whitman" and answers by addressing the peoples of the earth in turn. In the style of both a contemporary shout-out and Homerian epithets, he sometimes follows these mentions with an elaborate description of the recipient of his attention. As a journalist covering the American Civil War, Whitman had the first-hand experience with some of that about which he wrote and was in conversation with practices of journalistic objectivity. However, in this poem, since the reach of the poem is so vast, he could not have had first-hand knowledge of everything he enumerates. He was quite interested in the camera, sitting for it several times but precisely refusing the "pose," and it is reasonable to believe he used supports such as photographs and other accounts in composition. Nevertheless, "Whitman" the persona has unlimited powers to see and hear, whereas the original provocation comes from a being with only one certain attribute: a hand. In offering Whitman his hand, Whitman gains the power to share his observations and to see farther than he would have otherwise.

The first four stanzas establish the question and response structure with the being that has brought "Walt Whitman" forward. Stanza five is dedicated to hearing, in particular rituals, dances, hunting, choruses of "negroes" and "long-shore-men" but also animal sounds and ending with religious prayer. Stanza six inaugurates the shift to the visual with a question, "What do you see?" Stanzas 7-30 thus visit various parts of the world. At first, sight must establish itself only by noting dark and

light. The concrete is "upon a surface," perhaps implying its superficiality by contrast to chiaroscuro. Then natural and geological formations come to fore. Mariners "drifting helplessly," "some with contagious diseases," are contrasted in the next stanza with the purposefulness and predictability of steamship routes and an enumeration of ports by their proper names. Railroads follow but without as much detail, connecting "state to state" and continents, while electric telegraphs follow, like railroads, communicating different kinds of states, such as "news of the wars, deaths, losses, gains." These stanzas establish human-made cities and ports as equal to natural phenomena and as metonyms for crowds and masses rather than individual humans.

While the efficiency of the train and steamship routes modern achieves the status of mythology, rivers bring Whitman to traces of old empires, deities, and priests. At the same time, battlefields seem to flatten the new and the old, "ancient and modern expeditions" alike. Despite insisting that "I think some divine rapport has equalized me with them," putting "them" before "me, he nonetheless records the category of forgotten or outcast men and women, because "menial," "prisoner," "murderer," "defective human bodies," "pirates," or "helpless infants." This list of things Whitman sees ends in an address to "You, where you are!" as he addresses "You," followed by nationality, types, occupations, as well as those he cannot specify. He recaps the journey and recalls the equality of all he has stated. Then he apostrophizes the vapors as he himself was invoked, recalling him to the more spiritual or conceptual as he repeats "I think" in these last shorter stanzas. In the final stanza, he repeats his salute as a narration of gesture that is a "signal,/To remain after me in sight forever." This emphasis on sight throughout is especially interesting in light of the abandonment of hearing of the first stanzas.

Among continents recorded by the traces of old dramas, he invokes North America by a short two-line stanza about the Native American "red man." Out of all the stanzas, this one might be the most melancholy. He states: "I see the despondent red man in the west, lingering about the banks of Moingo, and about Lake Pepin,/He has heard the quail and beheld the honey-bee, and sadly prepared to depart." That which he sees the "red man" [sic] hear is unavailable to him as his faculty for sight does not give him access to the man's ears. The man is still there in the poem staying in Whitman's "sight forever," as he wills it at the end of the poem. This sight is as of a freeze-frame. His is another category of communion unavailable to Whitman who cannot speak to the man, who has at least as close of a relationship with what he hears as Whitman does. These moments of opacity make Whitman and "the red man" both similar and mutually exclusive as he narrates his departure as a foregone conclusion or as a journalistic fact. The conflictual emotions here seemingly resolve into moments of aspectual resonance, such as in the next stanza, "I see the sharp-eyed Samoiede and the Finn." These sharp eyes presumably again create a momentary kinship though it may last no longer than the blink of an eye and the duration of a rather short line.

Whitman makes his position at the pinnacle of civilization and industrial progress clear by letting his addressees know that they will "come forward in due time" to his side, except those who want no part in his narrative. At this moment of prediction, he is speaking to enslaved peoples, and thus the notion of progress here is about liberation in a future time to come. Vertov makes a similar move to the other nations of the world in a reproductive logic, promising that the machine of communism will "give birth" to more communist machines, which implies a state liberated from capitalism.[355] By insisting on the kino-eye's ability to see both immanently and objectively rather than through the distorted because the narrative, meaning instrumental, vision of theatrical dramas, Vertov bases his

[355] This intertitle is perhaps the most infamous of the film so I will not discuss it at length but it informs the logic of the lyric throughout this chapter.

confidence on the mechanical apparatus and its physical participation in the world. His notion of participation complicates the passive/active binary in this sense and makes its working definition one that Whitman would certainly condone —participation as an extension of sight.

Borrowed Rhetoric Made Lyric

In the previous chapter, we had an unreal but nonetheless complementarily lush "claricism" to combat Mabuse's stark vision; in both Whitman and Vertov, the equivalent resistant form might be the brevity of each description in a contained line as a single extension in tension with an encyclopedic list that goes on, a kind of domination by duration, that feels epic. The shorter line length falls under the category of what Gilles Deleuze (after Guattari) calls "passional delirium" that throw subject back onto subject rather than capitalist signs that "carry the peripheral subject toward the center" or the endlessly circulating "paranoid regime" of the despotic or imperial sign.[356] Deleuze writes:

> In the great imperial formations, whether archaic or even ancient, there is the great signifier, the signifier of the despot; and beneath it the infinite network of signs that refer themselves to one another. But you also need all sorts of categories of specialized people whose job it is to circulate these signs, to say what they mean, to interpret them, to thereby freeze the signifier: priests, bureaucrats, messengers, etc. It is the coupling of meaning and interpretation. And then there is still something else: there still must be subjects who receive the message, who listen to the interpretation and obey, carrying out the tedious assignments . . . And each time, one could say that having reached its limit, the signified generates more meaning, allowing the circle to grow.[357]

Thought it makes claims to a transcendent, global gaze, in appealing to the senses of sight and hearing, it limits its own capacities and creates the necessity for others through their capacities to hear that which the poet cannot. The peoples whom Whitman mentions are mentioned precisely for being minorities and in mentioning them together he makes them visible, putting them into a national and transnational circuit of gazes. The cons of being "visible to" and "recognizable by" the imperial gaze, to begin with a process of dehumanization, fetishization, and instrumentalization, are beyond reversible, already a *fait accompli* after the age of exploration, but creating configurations from the visible that reimagine the way the world is visible is a question that preoccupies the texts in this study, as well as how various iterations of the initial gesture proceed.

As with Keats' "This Living Hand," we have a gesture towards the other. Again (as with the gestures in Mabuse), this gesture at times comes into an infra-thin relation with the coercive gesture of interpellation, this time because a god-like figure initially offers Whitman his hand and in so doing imbues (hypnotizes?) Whitman with his prophetic powers. This figure could very well be aligned with that who assures an industrial manifest destiny (Whitman) or Gostorg, the state trade agency that sponsored the film (Vertov). If the gesture escapes, however narrowly if at all, perhaps it is

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356 Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York and Cambridge, Mass: Semiotext, 2007), 14-16.

357 Deleuze, 15, qtd. in Wen-chin Ouyang, *Politics of Nostalgia in the Arabic Novel: Nation-State, Modernity and Tradition* (Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 119–20.

attributable to the predominant mode of an open-ended address that comes precisely from the alliance between objective and subjective positionality. "Walt Whitman" has an uneasy alliance with the machine of western and industrial expansion (Whitman). Contextually, its relation is as the machine eye (Kino-eye) and its alliance with Gostorg (Vertov), both of which are uncanny appropriations of biblical and epic modes. The subject thus circulates among other subject positions to be interpreted in various ways rather than in one way that only serves to fix the signifier, i.e. the owner of that prophetic "I."

Hand-some and face-less

This salute in Whitman's poem can be understood as a lyric gesture not least because it re-cites and repeats the gesture of the salute from specific positions ("Who are they who salute, and that one after another salute you?" the handed-speaker asks) thereby proliferating what would otherwise be a centralized interpellation. The proliferation of a certain gaze, if interpellative, is not necessarily utopian or salutary, if one thinks upon Mabuse's decentralized power in the third film of the trilogy, of Michel Foucault's Panopticon, or simply other kinds of "salutes" such as Althusserian "hails" or Hitlerian "heils." There are, admittedly, many kinds of salutes. Both the latter two examples aim at a particular predetermined ideological subject and exclude those who overhear, hoping that they will fall in line. However, Whitman makes clear that the battlefields in this poem are overgrown with grass: "I see the battle-fields of the earth—grass grows upon them, and blossoms and corn." This salute is not military; it was taken up by the avant-garde.

Whitman's initial gesture of salute and its descendants along these lines could be called adaptations, responses, rewritings, or even "begettings" of some Ur-gesture of salute (it is given by a hand-some but face-less entity), but they are all transnational and transmedial readings (in verse, cinema, or prose) of the "other" in a way that would wish to bring them into relation through belonging(s), i.e. through a close and potentially indiscriminate relation between subject and object, in Vertov's case, with objects that network and form a chain of production but counterintuitively in the service of autonomy. The gesture in the poem and of the poem brings out an aspect that I have been arguing is key to the lyric side of cinema: the oblique address of the apparatus coupled with the gesture able to re-direct the interpellative into the invocatory and to offer re-imaginings of the spectator-reader willing to "come forward" in the apostrophe.

This apostrophe serves to welcome the inhabitants of a "dead empire" into a new modern state. In her recent chapter on *A Sixth Part*, Liliya Kaganovsky recognizes the apostrophe but quickly dismisses it:

> Like the apostrophe in poetry, Vertov's film "turned back" on itself, interrupting the flow of images and speaking directly from the screen. Unlike the literary apostrophe, however, Vertov is not "making the dead speak, while the living are struck dumb, frozen in their own death" (as Paul de Man would have it); rather, he is addressing himself / the film to the actual viewer, rooting his film directly in the present tense.[358]

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[358] Lilya Kaganovsky, "'The Threshold of the Visible World' : Dziga Vertov's A Sixth Part of the World (1926)," in *Arctic Cinemas and Documentary Ethos*, ed. Liliya Kaganovsky, Scott Mackenzie, and Westerstahl Stenport Anna (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2019), 52.

Although Kaganovsky is correct to echo Vertov's notion that the spectator is a participant in the present, she is too quick to dismiss the "dead" subject as that which the film actualizes. The apostrophic address is not opposed to the present tense, in fact it makes present, in the present, those who cannot be otherwise, and cinema spectators are very much included in this category. If here it is not the dead who are made to speak, it is a certain aspect of those subjects that had been dead under the Tsarist empire. Though I am not partial to de Man's definition, it is interesting to consider how the "living are struck dumb, frozen." Alexei Yurchak interestingly suggests the term "heteronymous" for a certain unpredictability that occurs when "the form of representation is replicated but its meaning is changed" by new context. Though Yurchak writes about how this process made possible the demise of the U.S.S.R. in late Socialism, it is not impossible to imagine that this idea could apply to the representation either to a ritualized lyric address. Moreover, he writes of the copying of ideological representations as unique, first because "[i]deological forms were not just copied but perfectly replicated, which made them 'frozen' and context-independent."[359] The film already shows some reproduced images of Lenin, and is obsessed with the notion of reproduction. It is self-aware that those reproduced subjects are dead unless made to speak.

The "we" as an entity retains a romantic ideation, that is, of the mass as natural force, whose force is only unleashed towards the full potential of a democratic productivity when each individual has agency to choose to participate. This agency is acknowledged in the gesture's invitation. The "we" emerges from networked vision and the reproductive capacities of the lyric machine. Though Whitman's poem anaphorically repeats "I hear" and "I see," each "I" is made differently by the direct object which it sees as it enters more and more natural phenomena and subjects into the register of that "we." Likewise, as seen above, with the "red man," the hearing is not the monopoly of the speaker and in fact cannot be performed by him alone. This chapter focuses on the particular transcendental imagination of the spectator-participant as a Hobbesian "we" that is made up of specific, discrete, and vivid individuals momentarily freed of historical structures of inequality, hierarchy, and marginalization through the apostrophe and the anaphora.

Both poem and film include objects anthropomorphically, specifically the machine, into the same sweep as the human and organic. For the film, under capitalism, the object and machine are mere fetish items and are thus dead (glassy-eyed dolls, the pelts of skinned animals in a vitrine or even frantically dancing girls). However, under communism and under Whitman's gaze, they are animated through a natural force. The camera's own ability to animate, for example by using stop-motion techniques by omitting the hands that move pears into boxes and stack those boxes, making it appear that the pears pack themselves,[360] undermines the message that labor should be visible. The messages are complex and sometimes undermine themselves when these natural forces become "phantasmagorical commodities" that become sacred and supernatural at the moment of hiding their labor.[361]

The present study does not seek to elide the incongruities of the textual objects contained within it nor to resolve them. It seeks merely to trace the journey of a kaleidoscopic crystallization of the lyric mode in montage as it moves into the global realm and seeks to say "we." In particular, the combination of a transparent utterance paired with the opaque indexical marker and deictic gesture

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[359] Alexei Yurchak, "Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 3 (2003): 48.

[360] Vertov's Dialectical Marxist misstep in his eagerness to show how easy work will be once the Soviet Union has the proper machines.

[361] Theodor Adorno, quoted in Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* [X14].

creates an open-ended lyric machine with a proven record and continued potential for creative response. Perhaps the proof of the power of the gesture is a reference to the poem in the Maghrebi political literary magazine *Souffles* in Algeria in 1966 on the occasion of a visit from the Black Panthers. Whether in homage to or subversion of Whitman, Abraham Serfaty's short text shows how Whitman plants various seeds in his poem that create the conditions for immanent and earthbound connection between peoples. These seeds grow to form lyric gestures across intervals. Though performed at oblique angles, they are central to the lyric aspect of the prose piece as it breaks the epic mode in both poem and film.

The Rawness of Rhetoric in the Lyric: Recursive Lyric Speech as Constituting the "I"

> "Verse is transformed speech that is — human speech overgrowing itself. The word in verse has a thousand unexpected semantic nuances" this is the openness of the lyric." —Tynianov "

Lacan writes that "repetitive utterances" serve as places where "subjectivity brings together mastery over its abandonment and the birth of the symbol."[362] The poem not only assumes but reinforces a pre-existing unequal power relation. Its anaphoric structure, with each line picking up the subject from the last, provides a model for a circular, winding motion throughout the film that could be understood as a traditional version of some of the abstracted sounds that reappeared in variation through an avant-garde *zaum* poem. While in Whitman, the subject starts every line and remains in a fixed and stable position of authority as the agent of sight or of address, in the film, it is never clear where a film phrase begins. The intertitles could refer both to the images before and after them and the agent doing the seeing might be the spectator seeing the film or the subject in the film seeing the spectator. In Whitman's poem, the repetition of the anaphoric structure replaces meter, which varies in each line, as the rhythmic glue.

This voice resides between the interpellative apparatus, the attempted and failed communicative address, and the lyric address. In a sense, *A Sixth Part* fails to foster a lyric or associative spectatorship due to the voice of the intertitles. Through the sheer size of the letters, they reify authority and the images turn toward it. However, it also must doubt its own power to address the image at all, since they reside in different systems and at times must describe the addressee to be sure to hit its mark. At first the intertitles try to interpellate by virtue of a description of the image, and then they attempt to make language into image. Thus, language doubts its power over the image; the speaker doubts its ability to address the other.

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[362] Lacan, Jacques. *Ecrits* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p. 318) Qtd. in Chion *The Voice in Cinema* 18.

Figure 20 "AND YOU, WASHING THE LAUNDRY WITH YOUR FEET" (left); "AND YOU" (right)

An earlier subtitle describes what comes in the image just after "and you [informal/singular], stomping your laundry with your feet," which later becomes a general address "and you [informal/singular]"that implicitly includes all of the preceding ones while also becoming graphically confrontational to the viewer. Lauren Berlant writes,

> Apostrophe […] appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place *x* to *y*, but it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realizes something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under the condition, and illusion, that the two is really (in) one.[363]

This turning back of the images in address of the camera make what might be an authoritative address into a lyric one. The various you's addressed come farther or closer to being one with the spectator; "you, eating rice" may be more familiar, though the manner of eating, with bare hands, may again distance the promised "oneness."

[363] Lauren Berlant, *Cruel Optimism*, unknown edition (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2011), 25.

Figure 21 Image following the intertitle "YOU [formal/plural], WHO ARE EATING RAW REINDEER MEAT"

A series of intertitles addresses people eating in different fashions (rice with their hands, etc.) The "you" of "You (formal or plural *vy*), eating raw deer meat" may seem totally distant, and yet a glance from the "you" at the camera brings the spectator into proximity. As the film is itself decanted for the audience, might the spectator be understood as consuming the film, itself raw material.[364] In the context of imperialism, the implication is that these peripheries, especially the natural resources, can be abstracted into empty, untouched, raw material but the image resists that metaphor by presenting the inhabitant and his own relationship with the raw as a satisfying one.

Intervals of History

Vertov's notion of the "interval" ("*interval'"*) in "We: Variant of a Manifesto" (1922) is well-known but I will reproduce one definition here:

> Intervals [*intervaly*] (the transitions from one movement to another) are the material, the elements of the art of movement, and by no means the movements themselves. It is they which draw the movement to a kinetic resolution"[365]

Intervals are like charged gaps with dead ends on both sides. They appear knowable and thus unrelatable. In his essay "Interlude" [*Promezhutok*] (1924), Russian literary and film critic Yuri Tynianov, defines verse as that which occurs in the interlude [*promezhutok]*. This word has multiple meanings, including: interval, span, gap, (inter)space and lapse. Tynianov underscores that verse is akin to the gaps between the idea-configurations in allowing for new conditions of dimensionality and space. He suggests how History and verse seem to be at odds but verse actually constitutes a movement whereas it resembles a standing in place:

> Language in poetry has thousands of unexpected shades of meaning; poetry gives language a new dimension. New poetry is new vision. And the growth of these new phenomena happens only in the interludes when inertia loses its grip. The action of inertia is, essentially, all we know —in skewed historical perspective, an interlude without inertia seems like a dead end. (Every innovator is ultimately working for inertia; every revolution is produced for the canon.) But there are no dead ends in history. There are only interludes.[366]

For Tynianov, not only does the word in verse multiply non-reproductively into "unexpected semantic nuances" but, he writes, verse is "a new vision," perceptible by some other optical tool than that afforded by History. The perspective of History only allows for "effects," where movement resolves into inertia. These gaps are where there is energy for transformation rather than in prose narrative, which is in the discourse of history. The "dimensions" are larger and "grow" only

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364 This observation follows a comment made by Anne Nesbet at the 1st Berkeley Silent Film Conference, 2011.
365 Dziga Vertov, *Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984), 8.
366 Yuri Tynianov, *Permanent Evolution: Selected Essays on Literature, Theory and Film*, trans. Ainsley Morse and Philip Redko (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2019), 175. Yuri Tynianov, *Poetika - Istoria Literatury - Kino* (Moskva: Nauka, 1977), 169.

in the gaps where there is movement. History can only see objects or fixed moments. The things that remain unknown or unaccounted for by history are therefore not dead ends for its notions of progress but rather "interludes" and it is in these gaps that verse creates "new vision," a metaphor that brings it into the company of other aesthetic objects such as the visual arts and cinema.

Tynianov may have been thinking about cinema itself, and even Vertov's film, when he wrote this comparison of the shared qualities of verse and film in "The Foundations of Film" (1927):

> Montage is not the linking together of shots, it is their differentiated succession [*smena*]--this is exactly why any shots that are interrelated in at least some way can displace one another. …Shots in cinema do not 'unfold' in a sequential order, a gradual sequence… They displace one another in the same way a single line of verse, one metrical unit, is succeeded by another: at a precise boundary. Cinema jumps from shot to shot, just as a poem jumps from line to line… The 'jumpy' nature of cinema, the role played in it by the unity of the shot, the semantic transformation of ordinary objects (the word in poetry, the object in cinema) these are what cinema and poetry have in common."[367]

One hears the debate between Lev Kuleshov, who believed in a narrative "linkage" between shots, and Eisenstein, who wanted montage to produce concepts from images and lines in dialectical "conflict," in the quotes opening lines. Within Vertov's and Tynianov's *intervaly* and *promezhutki*, "dead ends," which are paradoxically brought out at the moment of the loss of inertia, are not recognized in historical discourse but in verse are actually quite alive and moving the "semantic transformation of ordinary objects." in their invocation across these gaps. In Vertov's film, as in poetic verse, objects resolve into new configurations that can be read linearly, however, both objects and subjects "jump" into new images in full open-ended movement. We may recall Barthes' "obtuse meaning," which is precisely the opposite of the "unfolding" that Tynianov also dismisses here in his rejection of montage as "linking." Tynianov and Vertov's notions of the "interval" and "interlude" form an interesting background for Barthes'"anaphoric gesture without significant content, a sort of gash rased of meaning."[368] The gesture simultaneously enlivens and withholds the meaning of the content, enlivening a consciousness prior to instrumentalization.

Some Historical Generic Poetic Categories: Odic, Epic, Transcendental

The film has been read through the lenses of specific genres of poetry and other writing ranging from the ethnographic to the poetic and many genres within the poetic — it has been called a triolet, "odes-in-pictures" and odic, as well as a poetic travel survey, utopian vision, and *kino-probeg* or cine-race. It has also been read as ethnographic data-collecting, perhaps the cinematic equivalent of a reading of Whitman's poem as a list poem. This study will go through existing accounts briefly in order to show how reading along lines of genre accents the film's communicative aspects. While not so much concerned with what genre the film constitutes, it traces the way the film uses lyric techniques to make possible the formation of a particular subjectivity aware of itself as a collective

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[367] Tynianov, 256-58.

[368] Roland Barthes, *Image-Music-Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (1977; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 62.

consciousness within a new national collectivity.[369] Unlike Whitman, the film does not seem to renounce traditional poetic formal techniques like rhyme, meter, rather rendering them modern by bringing them into film form through the image and visual rhymes and rhythms; however, it does reject "amorous stanzas for women with stomach aches!"[370] as Kornei Chukovsky characterizes Whitman's abandonment of previous lyric tropes.[371]

Taking the notion of a generic "orientation" (*ustanovka*)[372] from none other than our friend Tynianov, from an article he wrote a year after the film, Michael Kunichika's work characterizes the film as "oriented" towards the "Odic," part of a tradition of Russian imperial odes, a genre that Kunichika argues was being revisited at the time of the Soviet Union's formation. The tension he identifies is between the ode as a genre in service of the Russian Empire and this new ode in service of the Communist state. It might seem paradoxical that these different state formations would appeal to the same form for their national imaginations. He argues that, "Part of the viability of the ode, of course, is due to the sheer fact of the spatial amplitude of the country and the preservation of its territorial integrity after the Revolution."[373] Kunichika openly states he does not engage with a "philological approach to film form"[374] but he does note that in film, the "basic communicative structure" of the "you" in the odic form "refers to the filmic audience rather than to the Tsar, even though the bearer of the poetic 'you' remains the same; in other words, the cine-eye as odic poet."[375] It is not clear, however, that the "bearer" of the "you" can be the same if the addressee has changed.

On the one hand, the "speaker" is the poet-filmmaker, however, this speaker is *made* to a large extent precisely in the address. Whitman's initial authenticity as poet came from an unknown technology with no ability to see but which could reach out a hand. Vertov's invitation comes from technology itself, from the airplanes that provide the first views, for instance, and the camera-eye that records them. Perhaps similarly to Whitman's god-like muse who seems to support manifest destiny, the Gostorg company never quite grants authenticity to Vertov's vision but rather its brand name grants legitimacy to the narrative of forward progress. However, the addressee changes from the ode's overlord Tsar, a fixed symbol[376] of stable power and of the nation, to diverse individuals and groups, masses, and anthropomorphized machines, all in movement. Certainly other metonyms and meta-images possibly take the place of national symbols but, as in verse, they are constantly displaced by others through the "jump" effected in montage.

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[369] In this sense, I am going against a camp of literary scholars who do not believe that one can generalize about the lyric and should instead categorize poems based on specific types of poems (ballad, ode, etc.) The opposite camp says that one cannot know what forms to study unless there is some overarching notion of what forms are worthy of studying at all and why.

[370] Kornei Chukovsky and Anonymous, "Anonymous Review of The Poet of Democracy: Walt Whitman (Poeziya Gryadushchei Demokratii: Uot Uitman), 2d. Ed., Trans. Kornei l. Chukovsky. Biulleteni Literaturi Zhizni (Bulletins of Literature and Life) 22 (July 1914): 1253-1258.," in *Walt Whitman and the World*, ed. Gay Wilson Allen and Ed Folsom, trans. Stephen Stepanchev (1914; repr., Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1995).

[371] He declares that Whitman shouted these lines and puts quotes around them but he is much more likely impersonating Whitman than quoting. If it is a quote it would have been translated into Russian and then back into English.

[372] "Orientation" in Tynianov's definition means the "relation to the extraliterary speech series which is closest to it."

[373] Michael Kunichika, "'The Ecstasy of Breadth': The Odic and the Whitmanesque Style in Dziga Vertov's One Sixth of the World (1926)," *Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema* 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 59.

[374] Ibid., 56.

[375] Ibid., 60.

[376] It is worth noting that multiple examples in Vertov's newsreels show such symbols of state power, even Communist ones, literally frozen in front of film cameras, not knowing how to move and act at such a close distance from their subjects.

Most importantly, as shown in the last chapter, the form of address is not really a "communicative structure" but rather a circumstance, as a repeatable performance of "subjectivity encountering itself."[377] The address repeats at the beginning of every line. The intertitles are at once the inertia that closes the interval and that which precisely keeps the interval open through deixis. In invoking subjects in a series of moving photographs, the intertitles never quite settle into the inertia of an end point of history and never achieve the certainty that they would have in addressing a symbol of the nation. Beyond purely communicating the richness of the Tsar's kingdom to flatter the Tsar and sing the glory of his property, for instance, the film imagines and stages the encounters between subjects. This is not to say that national pride does not factor in. For Hegel, consciousness can express itself in national feeling and values most associated with the folksong, closer to the ballad. The subject is neither related to individual experience nor personal affect. Consciousness recognizing itself constitutes subjectivity in the lyric. In simply deictically addressing and describing, their primary function is one of raising consciousness.

A lyric reading differs from Kunichika's in that the lyric mode fuses the legacy of a Romantic voice with a Modernist vision. It foregrounds the individual and collective consciousness over "peoples" who are subject and, in Hegelian fashion, finds that the "personality" or photogénie of the machines contributes to such consciousness. In characterizing peoples as mass, as a force of nature, it seeks to deterritorialize and de-naturalize tribal systems. Rather than associating them firmly with their localities and thus with different regions of one nation, the "local" becomes that created in the encounter rather than geographically anchored. Even the machines and natural phenomena are predominantly individual. The seer, the kino-eye, is not an arm of empire primarily, it is an individual whose individuality and personality is formed only in the encounter with the other. We have to take Vertov seriously in his championing of the kino-eye, of the possibilities of the machine to see and of the encounter between the machine and the human, and the human with the human, through the machine, with the machine holding the place and space of the interval. There is also the encounter of the machine, primarily understood through rhythm, through the orchestration of the human in editing. These intervals substitute for a major extent the spatial and temporal trappings of the Russian continent that is "one sixth of the world." This fraction of the world is itself an interval, smaller than other fractions, but there is an implication that if one takes six of them together, one has a whole world.

Admittedly, both Whitman's poem and Vertov's film can likewise be read as sharing qualities with the epic. It's scale and duration as well as an implicit narrative of nations or peoples coming together by virtue of Western or Soviet imperial progress. In "On the Present Situation of Russian Film," Walter Benjamin, who saw the film when it was first released in Moscow, faults the film for the uncertainty of the way it connects the people it shows and their modes of production.[378] But he also asserts that the film mocks the epic nature of the music *Tännhauser* and Lohengrin or riffs off of these operas by Richard Wagner as it accompanies "pictures of cranes hoisting equipment and transmission systems."[379] This bathetic pairing allows for a certain distance from the state coercion of peoples, perhaps, and the catalogue remains as raw material to be worked on by people in the future. We gather that this initial interpellator cannot be a typical earthly body, because it asks

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[377] Culler, *Theory*, 105.

[378] Originally published in *Die literarische Welt*, March 1927. *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 747-751. Trans. by Rodney Livingstone.

[379] Walter Benjamin, *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 2: Part 1: 1927–1930*, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2005), 13.

Whitman to act as its eyes and ears, presumably missing them, though it tells Whitman to take its hand—remember "This Living Hand"—wherewith it imparts the ability to overcome some earthly laws, like limitations on sight and gravity, and to appropriate other elemental ones, such as mist's property of "becoming vapor." This transcendental being is rather modeled on Emerson's concept of the "over-soul," published 14 years earlier in 1841, than a corrupt god—Emerson even imagined his "over-soul" to have something akin to arms (but no hands) as the "great nature in which we rest, as the earth lies in the soft arms of the atmosphere."[380]

Transmedial Mis-translations : Transcendentalist Voice vs. Transcendental Gaze

Walt Whitman's poem falls under the temporal and stylistic category of transcendentalism. There are, however, three complications with simply calling the film transcendental. As Jean-Louis Baudry argues in "The Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus," the camera is inherently ideological because it functions to delude the viewer into being the center of the represented world, unhampered by any physical limitations of the body, space and time. He calls this spectator a "transcendental subject."[381] Baudry's description of the ontological state of the cinematic spectator as that of a transcendental (ideological) subject or "imaginary unity" can be productively compared and contrasted with the transcendental lyric subject, "Walt Whitman," as he dons or operates Vertov's "kino-eye." Indeed, the camera eye seems limitless and promises direct access to many parts of the U.S.S.R. without the need to move the physical body. The spectator identifies not with some character but with the camera itself. However, this identification relies to some extent on continuity.

Baudry presents a unified (mirror-stage) image of the entire filmic medium as ideological, because it does not reveal its own apparatus; the very illusion of movement that does not reveal its own stillness and seriality is fundamentally ideological. Relying on Lacan and the mirror-stage of identification, Baudry writes that the transcendental subject's "place is taken by the camera which constitutes and rules the objects in this 'world.' Thus the spectator identifies less with what is represented, the spectacle itself, than with what stages the spectacle, makes it seen, obliging him to see what it sees, this is exactly the function taken over by the camera as a sort of relay."[382] Baudry emphasizes that film works through the negation of difference. He even argues first that one would *think* that the spectator would be aware of the film as "slices from 'reality'" but because of the technical apparatus one soon forgets. His point relies on the illusion of continuity between frames through continuity of action and special contiguity, and at the very least, continuous narrative and

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[380] Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Over-Soul," in *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Volume 2*, ed. Joseph Slater (1841; repr., Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1979), 160. For Emerson, communication and speech were not possible without the over-soul, which for him was god: "The Supreme Critic on the errors of the past and the present, and the only prophet of that which must be, is that great nature in which we rest, as the earth lies in the soft arms of the atmosphere; that Unity, that Over-soul, within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other; that common heart, of which all sincere conversation is the worship, to which all right action is submission…" However, as P. Adams Sitney points out, an "affirmation of the inescapable centrality of the poet's body," was the "thoroughly Whitmanian revision of Emerson," P. Adams Sitney, *Eyes Upside Down: Visionary Filmmakers and the Heritage of Emerson* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 16.

[381] Jean-Louis Baudry, "Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus," trans. Alan Williams, *Film Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (1974): 43. In Baudry's text, his last footnote is devoted to the film *Méditerranée* (Jean-Daniel Pollet and Volker Schlöndorff, 1963), which greatly inspired J.-L. Godard's *Contempt* the same year. For more see Antoine-Dunne & Quigley, *The Montage Principle*, 157-8

[382] Ibid., 45.

recognizable, consistent characters. Though he bases his remark primarily on the elision of difference between still images that makes for the illusion of movement, the observation can also be applied to homogenous worldviews of nationhood and subjecthood within nationhood, a continuity of perspective of what constitutes a subject of a particular nation. However, neither in the former nor the latter case can we say that Whitman or Vertov negate difference so readily.

Reading Whitman and Vertov together, one sees that they both take several different distances, positions, angles, and types of motion in their staged encounters with other subjects at the same time as they minimizes the distance between them. While Whitman's voice seems to maintain a consistent distance at the center by virtue of his subject's fixed position at the beginning of the phrase, the variations in distance, in clarity of vision, and in length of line, demonstrate a constant shifting of perspective and relation, from high to low angle, and from close up to long shot, communicating intimacy, curiosity, and inaccessibility. For Whitman, the over-soul's hand provides a mechanism by which to exceed earthbound limitations; for Vertov, the affordances of new technologies such as the camera and the airplane. However, though the camera appears at the "center" of the Soviet Union, that center is itself destabilized and produces many centers. The camera appears not only at the margins of the empire but at the margins of the action and, in an illusory way, at the margin of the very frame it composes.

The first complication of any attribution of a transcendent mode comes from the perspective of the camera. An intertitle announces that what follows is "in the land of capital." In the airplane shot in the first shot of the film, we understand we are in an airplane by virtue of flying parallel to, though above, another airplane in the image. The camera, too, is "in the land of capital." In order to film it, the camera would have to be in another airplane. Even if one suspends this disbelief and wishes to believe a "god-like" eye of communism watches the capitalist plane, the semantic composition of the shot and its effect is to show that communism is running at least parallel to and perhaps doing one better than capitalist technologies, in other words, communism as it is defined here would not be definable were it not for capitalism, and without communism being that which is beside or here literally to the left of capitalism. In other words, the physical body's ability to move may be unhindered, and may even travel into the land of capital, however, it is itself limited by capitalist ideology. Though perhaps it seeks to impart a feeling that communism is the only vehicle for the transcendental subject as Baudry describes it, the very fact that it points to its own relation to ideology somewhat undermines by bringing into consciousness subconscious ideological effects.

The film's second complication of the transcendental mode comes through vertical or parallel montage. The way the spatial relation of the camera to the subject of the images fluctuates and in no way tries to maintain continuity, even of the type of vision of which the "I" is capable. After this parallel tracking shot of the plane, the camera pans forward onto a horizon. Then an intertitle announces the "Golden chain of capital" ("Zolotaya tsepochka kapitala," «*Золотая цепочка капитала*»). Here, in what does count as Baudry's transcendental subject, the viewer transports indoors with a front-row seat and gold rings, then "Foxtrot" dancers, one of whom breaks the fourth wall. The viewer's gaze is the central concern of each shot. The camera associates with capitalism, though later, direct gazes into the camera by the new Soviet constituency would seem to parallel these. However, since the former are on stage and the latter "life caught unawares" (by the camera not *of* the camera) the emphasis on "life" here rather than the fetishized and staged death of capitalism comes forward. When they are not staged acts, the images illustrative of capitalism are relatively still, for example, we see a stuffed angry or hungry-looking dog baring its teeth—an affect similar to Dr. Mabuse's—and an uncanny, blank-eyed stare of dolls resonates with Mabuse's hypnotized subject. They have nothing of the markers of time, series, change, and cyclicality.

Together and in juxtaposition, these images tell a Manichean narrative of how communism will win out over capitalism. The pan of the camera adheres to conventional narrative and point of view techniques, however, this technique is only used once in "the land of capital."

Figure 22 Opening shot: "I: IN THE COUNTRY OF CAPITAL." The plane is filmed from the point of view of another plane. The shot is followed by an intertitle "*Vizhu*" and the same image of the plane.

The voice of the intertitles exists on yet another plane but does not clearly have a privileged position. Early in Vertov's *Sixth Part*, the film seems to be operating with a one-to-one or illustrative relationship between text and image implying a grammatic equivalence ("this is that.") In the first five minutes, the intertitles announce "Colonies" and "Capital" followed by their corresponding images of enslaved laborers and rows of standing soldiers. Vertov describes the intertitles as "in parentheses," a "specific series of 'word-themes'" and "factored out of the picture and isolated into a contrapuntally constructed word-radio-theme."[383] When they proclaim "I SEE" ("*VIZHU*"), they provoke a type of "inner speech"[384] of the viewer as they pronounce the words on screen and re-cite an absent subject and echo, thus make audible, the process of viewing that the spectator undergoes. Far from suturing the viewer into an apparatus that hides itself, these interjections call attention to the spectator's physical activity. The "objective" kino-eye of the images thus receives a subjective echo or theme that plays "contrapuntally," a favorite concept of Eisenstein as well, to give structure and momentum to the images. After this film, Vertov sought to remove words altogether, which he did in *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929), however, here he already signals his belief that they act in parentheses, as thematic commentary. Who is the speaker of these commentary in relation to "life caught unawares?" Vertov's project sought to create the Soviet subject as one continuous, living,

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[383] Vertov, *Kino-Eye*, 82-83.

[384] L. S. Vygotskiĭ, *Thought and Language*, trans. Alex Kozulin (1934; repr., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986). Though here I mean re-citing the word as they read, I also keep in mind Lev Vygotsky's work, especially influential in the early part of the 20th century. Unlike Piaget, he was concerned less with socialization than with individualization. As Alex Kozulin explains in his introduction to *Thought and Language* (1934), "in inner speech, culturally prescribed forms of language and reasoning find their individualized realization" (xxxvi). On parallel strains in the thinking of Vygotsky and Mikhail Bakhtin see Caryl Emerson, "The Outer Word and Inner Speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of Language," *Critical Inquiry* 10, no. 2 (1983): 245–64.

breathing, laboring and self-reproducing material phenomenon with his camera eye at its center. The Soviet body thus becomes the equivalent of an immanent, earthly, and technological "over-soul." The spectator identifies with the camera but that identification is constantly unsettled by other subjects who also see the camera. The spectator does not have a monopoly on sight and the word-themes that appear in the intertitles are constantly re-defined and enlarged.

The Triolet and Montage

Vertov's montage, with its various speeds and momenta, which might be compared to the varying lengths of Whitman's stanzas, draw attention to their repetition with change through syncopated rhythms that destabilize the extension and quality of the I's vision. Viktor Shklovsky wrote of the film as a case in which using poetry as an analogy to describe its form was appropriate, and at the same time argued that the difference between poetry and prose was minimal:

> All sorts of people say this and large numbers of films strive towards a resolution which, by distant analogy, we may call poetic. There is no doubt that Dziga Vertov's *A Sixth Part of the World* is constructed on the principle of poetic formal resolution: it has a pronounced parallelism and a recurrence of images at the end of the film where they convey a different meaning and thus vaguely recall the form of a triolet.[385]

The triolet, a short poem form of French origin close to the rondeau, is usually of a set length, eight lines of eight syllables each, and with only two rhymes used throughout to form a rhyme pattern of *abaaabab*. In addition, the first line repeats as the fourth and seventh and the second as the eighth. As Shklovsky admits, the resemblance is vague. However, he does distinguish the way images at the end of what one may separate into stanzas as film phrases take on different meanings. In the places where imagery recurs and thus takes on new meaning it is as if the film took a breath and, beginning again, referenced past phrases in order to build on them. Certain images recur throughout and may constitute slant rhymes. Though Shklovsky does not go into detail, one can follow his line of thought and conclude that "rhymes" occur more with the play of gazes and gestures, which might be seen as the ends of phrases.

Shklovsky also writes intentionally of the political import as if to point out its distance from ideology and free it to the work of poetry, "*A Sixth Part of the World*, in spite of its government sponsorship, is a poem of pathos."[386] He continues of Pudovkin's *Mother* and its last, undeniable inclusion of the government headquarters to say what can be applied to *A Sixth Part* as well:

> The ambiguity of the poetic image and its characteristically indistinct aura, together with the capacity for simultaneous generation of meaning by different methods, are achieved by a rapid change of frames that never manage to become real. The very device that resolves the film — the double-exposure angle-shot of

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[385] Viktor Shklovsky, "Poetry and Prose in the Cinema," in *The Poetics of Cinema*, ed. Boris M. Eikhenbaum, trans. Richard Taylor, Kindle, vol. 9, Russian Poetics in Translation (1927; repr., Leningrad: Moscow Kinopechat'/Kino Izdatel'stvo RSFSR, 2013), 33.
[386] Ibid.

> the Kremlin walls moving — exploits the formal rather than the semantic features: it is a poetic device.[387]

This description hones in on the literal doubling of the image as a poetic device. This device resembles the effects of apostrophe, which also does not physically make present but creates a figurative doubling. The doubling in *Mother* then makes the central government something addressable. Shklovsky's complaint about *Mother* (and by virtue of their similarity certain parts of *A Sixth Part*) when he ends this observation with "In cinema at present we are children" might be about the coarseness of the special effect device to externalize the internal phenomenon of doubled consciousness when he concludes this reflection. The coarseness of the figure could just as well be a spectacle of a technical feat that takes away from the less mediated "pathos" he finds in the rest of the poetic tools that constitute *Mother* and *A Sixth Part*. However, neither has it ever been new to use technical advancements or the predominance of popularity of a particular genre to change poetic form, which for its part is also evolving.[388]

Rhetoric in the Lyric: Anaphoric Editing, Structure, and Enunciation

The triolet has common qualities with the poetic anaphora, the rhetorical tool that Whitman uses in many of his poems, namely in the use of repetition as a means of referring back to a previous line, as a kind of rhyme and tautology. The logical tautology tied to immanent utterance, however, destabilizes the very logical category of tautology. Both the gesture of salutary address and the refrain "I see" ("*Vizhu"*) manifest in Whitman and in Vertov as the rhetorical structure of anaphora. As previously stated, this rhetoric is biblical and so does have a relationship with both history and the epic foundation of a people or nation. The biblical aspect is also the list poem aspect, which Ben Singer calls a "Social Inventory." However, the list does not remain uninterested or objective. As Singer notes of the Whitman poem, "Whitman expresses a feeling of strong identification with the people he has just delineated in the social inventory. It is an empathy so fundamental as to suggest a complete union between the poet and the mass, as if he incarnates the diverse individuals he describes.[389] In other words, the speaking "I" places himself among the "you" that he addresses. Thus he also narrates his own address by them (quoted previously.) Oksana Sarkisova interprets this dispassionate, non-mimetic, but nonetheless interested quality through the lens of the imperial project and specifically the interest and valuation that advertisement lends a product. Sarkisova's work places the film among the early Soviet propaganda films and specifically as a travel film or *kino-probeg*. She shows that "scenic patriotism" was initially not a core part of Soviet ideology, which foregrounded "class over nation as a unifying principle" and was indeed more internationally focalized.[390] The film is unique in its combination of travel cinema and advertisement for a "new

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[387] Ibid.

[388] See Mikhail Bakhtin, "Epic and Novel: Towards a Methodology for the Study of the Novel [Эпос и Роман (О Методологии Исследования Романа)," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson, University of Texas Press Slavic Series (1941; repr., Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2011), 3–40. "Epic and Novel" for the trends towards "novelization" in the late 19th century, for instance including the beginning of Pushkin's *Evgenii Onegin*, to which Kuzmin's *New Hull* made reference through the figure of the crystal.

[389] Singer, "Connoisseurs of Chaos: Whitman, Vertov and the 'Poetic Survey,'" 255.

[390] Sarkisova, "Across One Sixth of the World," 23.

political entity wrapped into an economic rhetoric," underlining how the Soviet subject is constructed based on a transformation of values.[391]

This transformation is established through the use of the vocabulary of ritual and rhythm – through repetition and epideixis, values are redefined and assimilated. Sarkisova has noted the reversibility operating on the whole power structure: "While the 'taxonomic impulse' of Vertov's work exemplifies features shared with the early travelogues, its editing and intertitles reverse the traditional power axis as minorities are shown as masters and owners, rather than passive recipients of the mastering gaze."[392] Vertov's assertion that his spectators act as participants certainly challenges Metz's conviction that: "[T]he addressee does not change by his reactions either the propositions or the proposal of the enunciator,"[393] for simply by looking back in the way they do, the imperial voice is humbled and destabilized, and by offering that gaze to the viewer, the enunciating "I" of shows a vulnerable aspect.

It is uncertain and shifting, because of the anaphoric repetition, if the speaker refers to that which is onscreen or off, the immanent temporality or a future one. Who is speaking—is it someone we see on screen, an omniscient voice, or a third option?[394] The uncertainty of these positions makes the film a constantly new performance and utterance by virtue of which the spectator negotiates possible positions and projections. Baudry's notion that the work of the transcendental subject "is exactly the function taken over by the camera as a sort of relay" returns as the camera is but one of a series of "seers" asked to take up the relay. It returns but not as a unified body resolved into a total or coherent product of the mirror-stage. Kunichika himself refers to a "chain of spectatorship" (differently recalling and inadvertently subverting the "golden chain of capital" from the second intertitle). In "From the History of the Kinoks," written in 1929, Vertov also describes his work on *A Sixth* as running along "the chain of Gostorg machinery. I turned that into *One Sixth of the World*, contrasted with the capitalist encirclement."[395] Kunichika writes:

> …Vertov seems to establish a cinematic space in which another viewer – this time the gaze of a colonized woman attached to the intertitle 'hatred' – participates in a chain of spectatorship that indicts the capitalist spectator from this gaze emerging from the colonies. Her perspective, in other words, is one in which the cine-eye might share, and she might also be understood to say 'I see'. But *what haunts the sequence, given all the many spectators at play in it, is the possibility that the subject of 'I see' shifts:* that is to say that 'I see', which would seem so firmly rooted in the cine-eye, could also have been uttered by an imperialist speaker surveying goods and entertaining spectacles.[396]

For Kunichika, the ambiguity of the shifting "rehearses Russia's proverbial capacity to speak from the position of both colonizer and colonized" and shows how the "odic" is an extension of imperialism that only differentiates between the "Tsarist past and socialist present."[397] In this "chain," the interval between the seemingly stable "voice" in that it is firmly not in the picture, and the changing ranges, latitudes and longitudes, human and non-human, are perhaps most interesting

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[391] Ibid., 38.
[392] Ibid., 51
[393] Metz, "The Impersonal Enunciation," 755.
[394] Deleuze's proposal of the "out-of-field" is an interesting one for a third way. This essay will consider it.
[395] Vertov, *Kino-Eye*, 95.
[396] Kunichika, "'The Ecstasy of Breadth,"' 69.
[397] Ibid.

of all. In a sense, the intertitles hold that interval clearly open, offering different options. It is the film's strength that it ultimately offers so many ambiguous positions to the spectator, and what allows it to differ from Whitman's poem. Does the "you" refer to the one we see on screen? Yes, definitely sometimes. Does it also sometimes refer to the spectator? Yes, this is especially true when we suddenly see the posh bourgeois spectator from behind watching the scene of sheep being washed that the spectator has already seen. Does this particular mise-en-abîme solidify the "ideal" spectator as a bourgeois one? Possibly. Then one wonders if the kino-eye is only the bourgeois city-dweller but the Kino-Eye does get the better of the bourgeois, watching the watcher, so to speak. It is difficult to say to whom or what the "you" "refers," since it is a shifter and deictically linked to a "speaker," which is also here constantly shifting position both with the shifting camera and slightly out of synch with it. It is even more difficult to say that the "you' remains the same"—that the speaker-eye is the same odic poet when the addressee has changed, for instance into an inanimate object, for it is precisely in the encounter with the addressee that the speaker is formed and that the enunciative act becomes a lyric act.[398]

Casetti defines what an anaphora and cataphora look like in the cinematic syntax of montage thus: "In a two-shot sequence, when what is seen precedes the seeing subject, the construction is anaphoral; when the seeing subject precedes what is seen, the construction is cataphoral."[399] Both Whitman and Vertov's use of repeated phrases to create anaphoric sequences make these two distinctions difficult to parse, however, and show how the lyric is different from communicative enunciation, whether in poetry or film. Each "I" constitutes a new deictic circumstance and a subject that changes in every moment of utterance and perhaps is even changed by it. In addition, when the intertitles say "You" and the addressee comes on-screen, like the question-response in Mabuse that addressee is also changed by the address, on the one hand interpellated into the Soviet Union but on the other invoked as an apostrophic force, on par with water generating power as it cascades out of a dam and animated grains destined for bread.

Interrogating whether deictic markers such as I and You are appropriate when used to describe cinematic enunciation (he firmly argues that they cannot be) Metz reminds that these pronouns occur most frequently in oral exchange and less so in "story."[400] He groups these personal pronouns with other indicatory markers, including anaphora, calling them indexes in order to deconstruct what

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[398] Metz's most straightforward gloss of "enunciation" might be "Enunciation is the semiologic act by which some parts of a text talk to us about this text as an act." In defining it thus, he gets away from the need for the metaphor of deixis, that which he calls a "quasi-inimitable mechanism" in the cinema. Instead, he gives an example of doubled signification—the oboe as being musical and announcing its oboe-ness. Another example: "In a film, if characters watch something from a window, they reproduce my own situation as a spectator and remind me both of the nature of what is going on—a film projection, a vision in a rectangle—and the part I am playing in it" Metz, "The Impersonal Enunciation, 754. In *A Sixth Part*, however, deixis is more than a metaphor.

[399] Casetti, *Inside the Gaze*, 135.

[400] Metz, "The Impersonal Enunciation," 748. "In fact, he occupies both the source, in that he can be identified with the camera, and the target, in that the film watches him… The spectator would then be both an I and a YOU. This proposition, formulated in those terms, does not make much sense: this is a first indication of the inconveniences encountered in the use of personal pronouns. Personal pronouns can only lead toward a deictic conception of enunciation in cinema, which in my opinion is not suitable to the realities of film. This is, however, the most common theory in the terrain of cinema. It usually remains implicit, even more less unconscious. It appears again, aware of itself for the first time, and vigorously articulated, in the work of Francesco Casetti." Metz also invokes Gianfranco Bettetini to firm up the idea that the film is "always on the side of the written," Ibid., 755. But again, these dismissals are on the level of cinema as communicative act.

scholars might possibly mean when they speak of the film as an enunciating "I."[401] As noted in Chapter One, Metz's revisitation of enunciation theory is energized by Casetti's claims that an "I" and "You" are possible as communicative functions of the cinema. When Metz writes disparagingly about the possibility of the film being an "I" because it can never be changed by an address, he writes that "this remains true, even when the canonical markers of enunciation unmistakably appear (for this happens), such as extra-diegetic commentaries saying 'You' to the public: this 'You' will never be able to respond."[402] Yet, the "participants" of Vertov's film respond to the camera. The viewer also "responds" by being able to recognize certain things they are asked to recognize, or not just as the subjects on screen may recognize themselves in the salute of the kino-eye, or not. When Metz says that the deictic markers I and You "provides us with information on enunciation through enunciation itself; this group also is dependent on certain changes in reality, as opposed to the book or film," he hits on the way that a film like Vertov's does depend on a response in reality.[403] Vertov's response to Whitman does, indeed, change Whitman's speaking "I" even if it does not contradict it by showing that though perhaps the "I" cannot become a "You" (if anything, it becomes an indirect or overhearing "You"), then it nonetheless is deictic as it changes depending on its addressee, here most obviously ideologically, from a capitalist to a communist "you." In a larger frame, it changes the enunciator by making the enunciator more specific, less isolated, even more democratic, the fulfillment of Whitman's wish in the initiating salute. When we view the film as a recording and formal delivery of a pro-filmic circumstance, the salutation and response of the kino-eye greeting, the film itself becomes a lyric utterance.

One could also read the "chain of spectatorship" and the chain of you's occupying the I as a series of transmedial translations, which, since they occur in film, resist the main narrative in their appearance. A chain opposed to capitalist encirclement, as Vertov envisioned the "chain of Gostorg machinery," might be closer to the kind of chain created in lyric translation in the sense of a machine giving birth to a new machine. David MacDougall argues for the thick description that photography, film and video inherently bring to ethnographic recordings:

> In a sense, *translation* is always to anthropology's advantage, for it channels data through the keyhole of language, producing a condensation of meaning and leaving most of the data behind. Photography, film (and now video) construct meanings, as it were, on the other side of the keyhole, for photographic images, however heavily coded in diverse ways, also contain analogues (rather than translations) of vision. If they were somehow to pass through the keyhole they would, as Barthes says, stubbornly drag their referents with them [404]

What is true of the these pictorial renderings might also be true of lyric translation, even from film back into prose (as in the last example I will get to of *Souffles*) for in these kinds of translation, the

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[401] He concludes that, at least classical film cannot enunciate as an "I" because it is monodirectional as he asks, "[I]s an I that cannot become a YOU still an I?" He calls these discourses "noninteractive" because "completed before it is presented and does not give either to enunciation, nor to the reader-spectator any possibility for modifying it" Metz, "The Impersonal Enunciation," 748.

[402] Ibid., 755.

[403] One thinks, too, of Jean Rouch's participants whose voiceover narration provides the "omniscient" view of their own actions in the film. The participants respond to the camera's enunciation, changing the third person of the camera into a "I" by addressing narrating in the first person but also, potentially, changing the "I" of the camera into a "You" by then changing the "I" when he says "I become Jaguar" and further narrating the behavior of this "Jaguar" in the third person. The camera then becomes the "you" (as in "you see") to whom he tells the story.

[404] David MacDougall, *Transcultural Cinema* (Princeton University Press, 1998), 68.

analogue is the keyhole itself, and the keyhole is included with the referents (i.e. the frame is included with the picture and makes itself vulnerable to response).

One interesting example of both the cinematic resistance to condensation of meaning but also of the lyric inclusion of the keyhole can be seen in Robert Gardner's *Forest of Bliss* (1986), a film that also uses non-linear montage (though each strand is linear and they are ultimately braided together) in order to tell a story of the place of Benares where bodies are burned on floating pyres. This film openly conceives of itself as a document of a translation (of an eastern practice through a western keyhole) while at the same time refusing to translate any of the language spoken in the film. By frustrating the audience's desire for subtitling, Gardner makes us aware of the opacity of the culture he is filming in offering a symbolic frame structure that alludes to Greek and Roman mythologies.[405] Otherwise using non-linear editing that emphasizes disorientation and disjunctive moments in several parallel processes, he offers a different kind of visual and structural translation. The witness of these particular rites take the viewer into a space that is partly material and earthly, and partly transcendental, or floating just above in a limbo between intellectual cognition, ontological recognition, and existential ignorance.[406] A memorable moment of landing is the only time we hear a voice from behind the camera expressing that they just stepped in excrement while descending a narrow staircase. This limited translation never claims that we will be able to grasp the symbolic system of the place itself, but rather through anaphora allows a viewer unfamiliar with the burial rituals at Benares, India, to observe from the point of view of a visitor as objects accrue meaning over several processes, productive, opaque, and cinematic.

Anaphoric Geolocation: Porosity, Transparence, and Lodging "There"

One particular sequence of intertitles unites an address of natural elements, objects, and peoples whom it repeatedly defines as "still" (*eshche*, еще) doing something. In this "stillness" one also uncannily hears the stillness associated with capitalism, though of course these two kinds of stillness are not causally related except that they fall under the wrong kinds of ideologies (and capitalism is thus grouped with religion). Boats stuck in the ice attain the same status as pagan shamans, Islamic rosaries, and purification rituals. A man walking in a long take towards the top of the screen in a perspectival shot represents the as of yet unrecoverable. Yet this sequence comes three-quarters of the way through the film. They are all seen as outdated, something of the old world, that which will soon disappear yet recurs in its last gasp.

> I SEE YOU…/BLACK SEA
> AND TO YOU FROZEN SEA ON THE BALTIC SHORES
> BOATS STUCK IN ICE
> AND YOU
> AND SOMEBODY, LEAVING INTO THE UNKNOWN, FROZEN
> DISTANCE

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[405] Robert Gardner and Akos Ostor, *Making Forest of Bliss: Intention, Circumstance, and Chance in Nonfiction Film* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Film Archive, 2002).

[406] "Whatever doubts as to its anthropological value (and here I think the author's disavowal of anthropological intent should be taken in the same spirit as Robert Frost's disavowal of symbolic intent) it would seem essential to 'read' the work before coming to such conclusions" MacDougall, *Transcultural Cinema*, 72.

SOMEWHERE THEY ARE STILL DIGGING IN THE EARTH WITH A STICK
SOMEWHERE THERE ARE STILL WOMEN COVERING THEIR FACES WITH A CHADORA
SOMEONE IS STILL COUNTING A ROSARY
SOMEONE IS GETTING AGITATED
SOMEWHERE A SHAMAN IS SHAMANING
THERE IS STILL A PLACE WHERE
THERE IS A RITE OF WOMEN'S PURIFICATION
THERE IS STILL A PLACE WHERE
IN SACRIFICE TO THE GOD OF MENKVE
THE OLD DEPARTS SLOWLY…

"Somewhere" is repeated anaphora grounded in the indexicality of image. Not just imaginary or hypothetical but *there*—followed by "someone," an agent of the place, then finally, the repetition of "there is" of the deictic transforms into a sort of moral. However, these deictic markers leave the opacity, the rhythmic and entrancing ritual of the thing to which they point intact. Though the intertitles categorize them as "the old" the co-exist with the rhythms of the machines. They become a type of machine, a fact which is inadvertently referred to in the intertitle: "Furs produced by the Tungus, Ostyaki and Samoyeds are traded for machines for the Soviet State." The minorities are viewed as small machines that give birth, through trade, to other machines that will replace their labor.

Rather than transparency, the index in film has been treated as opacity. Picking up from my discussion in Chapter One on indexicality and contingency:

> Although indexical because the photographic image has an existential bond with its object, they are also iconic in relying upon a similarity with that object… Hence, the "real" referenced by the index is not the "real" of realism, which purports to give the spectator knowledge of the world. The index is reduced to its own singularity; it appears as a brute and opaque fact, wedded to contingency—pure indication, pure assurance of existence" [407].

The contingency or circumstance here can be understood as the intertitles that address and even interpellate the people into an order in the moment of their becoming iconic. But the photographic index and the pure deictic in some of the titles grants these peoples "pure assurance of existence." At first this could be said to be "thanks to" the Soviet Union, which funded the film after all, but then again they can be said to exceed this contingency, existing in many different timeframes and on the image's own *dissimilarity* with themselves. The photographic image does not register as a

[407] Doane, "The Indexical and the Concept of Medium Specificity," 135–36.

similarity with its object in these cases but the intertitles point precisely to this indexical singularity of the image in the informal and singular (*ty*, ты).[408]

"There is still a place where" implicitly antagonizes the unity of the "here" of the film and of its viewing. "The old departs slowly…" Whitman's version of this was the repeated refrain, modestly or surreptitiously, sneakily, in parentheses: "(You will come forward in due time to my side.)"[409] As Vivian Sobchak reminds us, this process of viewing is an act of willpower and even of hospitality: "I prospect the film's viewing-view/viewed-view as energetically as it prospects the horizons of its world[…] I am not a mere bodily receptacle for the film's visual address, but rather a hospitable host, allowing this *other* visual address temporary residence in *my* visible address, in *my* body."[410] This idea of letting the image lodge in the body is reciprocal in the lyric, according to Rabaté,

> There is thus a physiological and emotional participation in the recipient, as when listening to music. But this movement of re-enunciation goes beyond this first participation or springs from there. It is the *plasticity of the lyrical* enunciation itself which is at stake here: the lyrical "I" has a certain *porosity*, a manner of *subjective transparence* that allows the reader's subjectivity *to lodge* there and during the time of recitation, to become the "I" of the poem being read. Let's try to say this with a little more precision, since the reader may also very well identify with the "you" (*tu*)[411] of the poem. The reader does not identify with the subject speaking the poem in the sense of a novelistic identification. Rather they *momentarily take up residence in the enunciating center* (and thus the center of verbalization, in addition to reception and destination) of the linguistic operation to which they must give their support. The reader momentarily lends his voice to this center. This *porosity* specific to the poetic text must be contemplated.[412] [emphasis added]

This "center" to which the reader-spectator lends their support is but one of many "centers" brought forward by the anaphoric intertitles and by the seeing recipients of the address. The film certainly makes a capacious porosity big enough for one sixth of the world, with this first step at least, one of its largest priorities, both inside and between frames.

Suture: Figuring the Speaker, Fracturing the Figure

In "suture," particularly in shot/reverse shot editing, the spectator is aware of their own position in the field "whose absence is experienced as unpleasurable" because it is limited. Kaja Silverman recounts how for Jean-Pierre Oudart, the missing field is the "Absent One," also "the Other" but specifically with "the attributes of the mythically potent symbolic father: potency, knowledge, transcendental vision, self-sufficiency, and discursive power" who finds his "fictional correlate in an

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[408] See also Bela Balázs on the close up on the face as it exists outside of space and time, especially outside of the mass, even if we have just seen it as part of a larger mass or, in this case, project in the intertitle Béla Balázs, *Béla Balázs: Early Film Theory : Visible Man and The Spirit of Film*, ed. Erica Carter, trans. Rodney Livingstone (1924–1930; repr., Berghahn Books, 2010), 61.

[409] The preceding lines invoke: "peon of Mexico! you slave of Carolina, Texas, Tennessee!/I do not prefer others so very much before you either;/I do not say one word against you, away back there, where you stand…"

[410] Vivian Sobchack, *The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 271.

[411] Also informal/singular, this time in French.

[412] Rabaté, "A World of Gestures," 92.

ideal paternal representation." In the last chapter, we saw how Dr. Mabuse is a perfect example of this phenomenon, and at first seems to be the representation of such a "speaking subject" (or "The Grand Enunciator" as Gunning calls him) before all the excesses of both theatricality and the lyric make this speaking subject and subject of speech both one, when his hands correspond to Lang's own hands for instance, and none, when his gaze is undermined by gestures to the audience as forces for imagination.

> The gaze within the fiction serves to conceal the controlling gaze outside of fiction; a benign other steps in and obscures the presence of the coercive and castrating Other. In other words, the subject of speech passes itself off as the speaking subject.[413]

Mabuse is not a "benign" eye and thus forces the hand of the "speaking subject." But insomuch as the lyric gestures and mise en scène provide for a kind of "reality outside the fiction," which the speaking subject is precluded from admitting in order for it to maintain itself as the veil or mask of the real subject of speech, it makes surpassing the limitations of this suture possible.

It would seem that the disembodied intertitles, which allow the "participant" to "lodge" are the main "location" of the spectator, which very nearly amounts to the kind of "suture" discussed in relation to Hollywood narrative cinema and the male gaze, i.e. in the more limited sense. But the interval between images unsettles this conclusion. In order to investigate the position of the spectator more closely, it would help to look at a moment when the spectator is figured onscreen and to discuss how this "figure" is itself deconstructed by a triangular montage that I argue does in montage what the mise-en-scène does in the image of Lenin and the round carafe with which this chapter began. First, the montage assembles the circumstance here described. Then the figure itself contributes to the question of the doubled subject. Narration—an omniscient view of the subject—doubles in the moment it makes itself available to the address. As with the intertitles that present "the old" departing at the same time as it shows it moving on screen "now," this doubling occurs through editing that offers both ideology and sensation without recourse to special effects such as superimposition.

Invocation of a Figure for a Participatory Spectator-Ship

The icebreaker featured in *A Sixth Part* has an interesting history and functions in parallel with the Whitman poem. The Icebreaker "Lenin" was originally commissioned for the Russian Empire under the name the St. Alexander Nevsky. It was built in England under the supervision of Russian writer and naval engineer Yevgeny Zamyatin, author of the dystopian novel *We* in which many of the characters are named after ship models. The "Lenin" launched in 1916 but by June 1917 the Russian Empire no longer existed and the British Royal Navy requisitioned the ship. It then served in the Royal Navy as the HMS Alexander during the Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War, which sought to crush the Bolsheviks and return firm power to the Tsar. However, the Red Army gained ground and the British retreated, leaving the Icebreaker to the White Russian Army in 1919. It fell to the Bolsheviks in 1921 and served as a prominent symbol of victory over Western capitalist forces in Bolshevik propaganda and the popular imagination.

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[413] Kaja Silverman, *The Subject of Semiotics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 204.

Yes, this figure of spectatorship clearly falls into one of Metz's risks of speaking of deixis in film. The fragmented, non-synthetic portrait views offers an anthropomorphization of the ship, buttressed by the description of the ship's hull as a "chest" (*grud',* грудь); two lifesavers appear as eyes on either side of the bow. The ship and spectator are both addressed in the informal/singular "you" (*ty,* ты).[414] But perhaps by so brazenly falling there it defuses Metz's fear of the pitfalls for enunciation, particularly if taken as lyric enunciation.[415] Lyric enunciation has always been troubled by the pathetic fallacy and anthropomorphism, particularly of nature. Though modernism simply transposed that impulse to machines, the transposition is not meaningless as it welcomes an "impersonal" enunciation (as Metz himself welcomes). As machines could actually reflect the creative capacities and imaginations of humans, made by their own hands in their own likeness, literal or symbolic. For what appears to be anthropomorphism is actually a metaphorical (apostrophic) meeting point for humans and machines rather than a simply one way anthropomorphism of the machine. Vertov clearly was not concerned with the anthropomorphism of machines (Kino-Eye) but rather the mechano-morphism of the human.

[414] In Jean Epstein's essay on "Photogénie," the cinema imparts faces to abstract objects Epstein, "On Certain Characteristics of Photogéni.e.".

[415] "Any conception of enunciation that is influenced too much by deixis contains, as soon as the analysis of spoken exchanges is left behind, three main risks: anthropomorphism, artificial use of linguistic concepts, and transformation of enunciation into communication (= 'real, extra-textual relationships)" (Metz 758)

f Still of "A SHIP STUCK IN THE ICE" (left) and the Icebreaker "Lenin" apostrophized as "AND YOU" (right) from Dziga Vertov's *A Sixth Part of the World* (1926).

The montage goes further than this stand-off or shot-counter shot like structure by giving us two different shots from the mast and one from the "ribs" or the side of the ship.[416] The one most similar to the transcendent gaze is the bird's eye view shot from the top of the Icebreaker Lenin's mast, since it is an extreme, almost god-like high angle shot and connotes mastery.[417]

[416] The specificity of this personification of the ship is quite different from the way the ship is used in David Burliuk, Alexander Kruchenykh, Vladmir Mayakovsky and Victor Khlebnikov's 1912 futurist manifesto "A Slap in the Face of Public Taste" (Пощечина общественному вкусу) when they order "Throw Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, etc., etc. overboard from the Steamship of Modernity." (Бросить Пушкина, Достоевского, Толстого и проч. и проч. с парохода Современности.) Modernity is embodied in a steamship for similar reasons as the icebreaker symbolizes forward progress and breaking new routes but the steamship is unfamiliar, on a set path, compared to the relatively organic icebreaker.

[417] The puns in this section are unintentional and unavoidable by the very nature of etymology and the ways that concepts are informed by objects-relations.

Figure 23 (Clockwise from top left) Two shots from the mast of the Icebreaker "Lenin," a shot from the "ribs," and the intertitle, "Breaking the ice with its chest."

Like in the example of the capitalist airplane shot from another airplane, however, the camera's proximity to a god-like point of view to which Whitman sometimes lays claim is undermined by being firmly tied to the mast, which references its non-allegorical, non-transcendent, and grounded quality. It still has an ideological accent but the gaze is located, physically attached to, and dependent on that which it films.

The example here is of a "you" that can become an "I," a process particular to the lyric circumstance rather than a communicative one. Metz writes that his reservations about the enunciative model are that it is different than communication because works are "mono-directional" and noninteractive discourse.[418] He asks, pressingly, "is an I that cannot become a YOU still an I?"[419] But what is an I that can become a You? It is precisely a participant. Here we jump aboard the "you" of the icebreaker and become the "I" of the icebreaker

The camera's gaze sees from its mast but also its ribs and, in a more sensorial, immersive shot, ice crunches around the camera. The ice is so tactile one can almost hear it crack; it also maintains its metaphorical meaning from the first introduction of boats stuck in the ice of old ideologies.

Apostrophe enacts in poetry what physics, in particular Schrödinger's uncertainty principle with regards to spatio-temporal transformations and the theory of relativity was suddenly able to do in time and which the interval in cinema attempted to harness. The theory "meant the dethronement of time as a rigid tyrant imposed on us from outside, a liberation from the unbreakable rule of 'before and after.'"[420] In Vertov there is what seems like a direct acknowledgement of the audience in the intertitles—when it is at its most direct address that slips in and out of Gostorg propaganda. However, it appears equally as with the icebreaker in an oblique address much more like an apostrophe. For instance, here the audience could take themslves for the "you" of the intertitle and then learn the address was meant for the Icebreaker "Lenin," thus finding out they were "overhearing" this address and finding themselves at liberty to "come forward" if they were open to giving voice and body in the form of the icebreaker. 'The less ordinary the addressee ("whether a muse, an urn, Duty, or a beloved [or an icebreaker] the more the poem seems to become a ritualistic invocation" in which the reader participates."[421]

However, even the logic of an addressable heroic icebreaker figure breaks down in the montage. Viewed from an immanent future—the icebreaker will surely reach the camera. However, the camera shoots from the position of the "boat stuck in the ice" (*Figure 23*). The camera sees the icebreaker from the point of view of the one being saved in the past that is the imminent future of the more immersive shots with the icebreaker. Like Kracauer's 'mass ornament,' this figure is not

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418 Christian Metz, "The Impersonal Enunciation, or the Site of Film (In the Margin of Recent Works on Enunciation in Cinema)," trans. Béatrice Durand-Sendrail and Kristen Brookes, *New Literary History* 22, no. 3 (1991): 752.

419 Metz, 749.

420 Annette Michelson, "The Wings of Hypothesis: On Montage and the Theory of the Interval," in *Montage and Modern Life: 1919-1942*, ed. Matthew Teitelbaum (Cambridge, Mass. : Boston: The MIT Press, 1992), 65. Quoted in Simon Cook, "'Our Eyes, Spinning Like Propellers': Wheel of Life, Curve of Velocities, and Dziga Vertov's 'Theory of the Interval,'" *October* 121 (July 2007): 79–91.

421 Culler, *Theory*, 187–88.

able to read itself. Afterall, the icebreaker is a blind machine, like the blind mass, though it is addressed in the familiar, singular.[422] This is exactly where the importance of the Kino-Eye's vision reappears began by imploring the audience of a doubled vision both subjective and third-person objective "I (the Kino-Eye) see" and "I (the spectator) see" This example is a perfect example of what could have been called the "semi-literate" soviet propagandistic constructions of the film, however, it is literate as a part of a lyric logic, in which time is cyclical and the past and future coincide and exist in the "now" of crystallization regardless of future and past. It must be felt plough and plod, trundle and smash through the ice. These are the lyric gestures that may be re-cited, re-peated, and re-produced.

The Resistance to Figurality and the "Depersonalization of Pronouns"

To better distinguish a 'poetic' mode from a 'lyric' mode, Rabaté writes that in the poetic, definite articles lose their referential value and participate in a "de-personalization." As when an article presents *as* a definite that which is indefinite, Vertov's film presents a machine as *the icebreaker "Lenin,"* in other words, definite and personified. The circumstances are "transcended" in their essentialization. This is where Rabaté differentiates between the poetic and the lyric.[423] He writes:

> "A certain resistance to this [poetic] mode of figurality seems to me exactly what defines what I would call more specifically a lyric enunciation. The difference goes through the status of the circumstance, since there is no lyric text except out of circumstance, in the maintenance of an aim towards that circumstance, which can never become context."[424]

Rabaté links circumstance with "conjuncture," which he writes is "more or less veiled."[425] He writes,

> "The lyric enunciation looks in the present of its inscription to play against death, in subtracting the instant from its transience, in re-dynamising it in a utterance ["un dire"] that wrests it from the lost past…. Circumstance plays thus in two

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[422] See Gertrud Koch, "Face and Mass: Towards an Aesthetic of the Cross-Cut in Film," trans. Devin Fore, *New German Critique*, no. 95 (2005): 144.

[423] On the subject of what is called "poetic" in the cinema : « À première vue, sont qualifiés de "poétiques", même dans les critiques les moins professionnelles, des films qui s'écartent d'une norme, que cette norme soit commerciale, narrative, esthétique ou morale. Dans le cinéma fictionnel, il s'agit avant tout d'une distance prise avec la narrativité traditionnelle dans le documentaire, avec une volonté didactique. Ou les deux à la fois dans le "documentarisme poétique" de 1930, comme le montre un beau texte dans lequel Béla Balázs fait l'éloge *de L'Homme à la caméra* de Dziga Vertov : "Ni succession cohérente d'événements ni fable, le voyage que nous propose Vertov est poési.e. Ce sont des impressions qui nous sont communiquées ». Quoted in « Qu'est-ce qui est 'poétique' ? Excursion dans les discours contemporains sur le cinéma » Nadia Cohen and Anne Reverseau, "Qu'est-Ce Qui Est 'Poétique' ? Excursion Dans Les Discours Contemporains Sur Le Cinéma," *Revue Critique de Fixxion Française Contemporaine*, 2012, http://www.revue-critique-de-fixxion-francaise-contemporaine.org/rcffc/article/view/fx07.19/744.

[424] Rabaté, *Figures*, 70. « Une certaine résistance à ce mode de figuralité me semble justement définir ce que j'appellerais plus spécifiquement une énonciation lyrique. L'écart passe ainsi par le statut de la circonstance, car il n'y a de texte lyrique que de la circonstance, dans le maintien d'une visée vers cette circonstance, qui ne saurait jamais se transformer en contexte » (70) In helping him define the poetic, Rabaté quotes from Dominique Combe, *Poésie et récit*, Paris, Corti, 1989, p. 162, and Laurent Jenny, *La Parole singulière*, Paris, Belin, 1990, 50.

[425] Ibid., 71.

> opposite directions : it is at one and the same time that which must be surpassed and that absolute singularity that language should not betray"[426]

The filmed rescue of the boat stuck in ice has a context but the film puts this event in recirculation as a repeatable gesture.[427]

We may see Vertov's method of making a "portrait" a bit as Aleksandr Rodchenko would describe his two years later in 1928 as a way of constructing a "conjuncture" isolating circumstance over context. In "Against the Synthetic Portrait, For the Snapshot," Rodchenko calls portraits to be made in a series and ties it to the "real" and "contemporary," implying a resistance, too, to syncretism:

> Crystallize man not by a single 'synthetic' portrait, but by a whole lot of snapshots taken at different times and in different conditions. Paint the truth. Value all that is real and contemporary. And we will be real people, not actors." [428]

In the desire for "real people" and not "actors," Rodchenko and Vertov echo the concerns of Mill, Metz, and even to some extent Kafka in wanting theater strictly separated from life. For Vertov the ice breaker acts as a real person of the future. In the close-up portraits from different sides, they are taken out of the context of history and act without letting on that there is an audience.

The double time is here embodied in the figure of two boats. One is stuck in the ice and the other is the Icebreaker "Lenin" coming to the rescue. We are both the "you back there" who will come forward in time and the "you" one who will bring forward but in the first case only through images. The point of view we see of the icebreaker is that of the boat stuck in the ice. Our position and vision is doubled.[429]

Vertov's "figurality" already makes use of the figurality that comes from naming the icebreaker Lenin, which makes an icebreaker "*the* icebreaker Lenin," in other words, quite definite. He plays with this poetic trope, making the indefinite definite, later invoking its logical iconic figuration. By including the boat towards the end of the film and following it with shots of Lenin's framed portrait decontextualized at first before he reveals it above masses in front of Lenin's mausoleum, Vertov makes an analogy between the Icebreaker Lenin and Lenin's head, between ice floes and the masses.[430] The eternal Lenin will never die just as the icebreaker that breaks through frozen, stagnant pre-communist history also becomes eternal. In the thick description of film, we even see the visual aspect of Lenin's head.

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[426] « Le circonstanciel joue donc en deux directions opposes: il est à la fois ce qu'il faut dépasser mais concurremment cette singularité absolue que la langue ne devrait pas trahir » (71)

[427] The same is true of a shot earlier on in the film that was also used in *Tungusi* (1927), which Elizaveta Svilova edited with the remaining footage from *A Sixth Part*. In that film, this same shot, used metaphorically and not specifically related to any context within the ways of the Tungusi in Vertov's film signified in Svilova's as part of a descriptive, ethnographic sequence related to hunting. The context of the hunt, as a trace of a tradition that was supposedly to be left behind, was thus made into the larger "circumstance" generalizable in its singularity in Vertov's film.[427]

[428] Aleksandr Rodchenko, "Against the Synthetic Portrait, for the Snapshot," in *Photography in the Modern Era: European Documents and Critical Writings, 1913-1940*, ed. Christopher Phillips, trans. John E. Bowlt (1928; repr., New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1989), 241.

[429] Béla Balázs, [L'esprit du cinéma], cited by Philippe Despoix dans "Métamorphoses du portrait urbain à la fin des années 1920: du 'cinéma transversal' de Balázs au 'roman-essai' musilien", dans Transmédiations. Traversées culturelles de la modernité tardive, Jean-François Vallée, Jean Klucinskas et Gilles Dupuis (dir.), Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2012, p. 223.

[430] Lenin died on January 21, 1924.

Figure 24 Two views of a portrait of Lenin hanging from the wall of the Kremlin. The first photo is relatively decontextualized. The year 1924 is visible on either side of his portrait in the second, wider shot providing it with historical context.

It is an extreme version of "This Living Hand" in the sense that Lenin lives after death, or as Alexei Yurchak has written about, the willing imagination of Lenin was so fantastic that it even succeeded in making him into a sacred mushroom.[431]

The rapid cutting and succession of images, for instance from the Icebreaker, through a series of suddenly literate minorities and Mongolian pioneers (a communist version of boyscouts), new projects for dams and irrigation canals, functions to create an ongoing metaphorical space where the literal is also metaphorical (the ice melts to irrigate fields, and even the radio arrives on its "waves"). As Gertrud Koch writes, "Facts become models of reality" and the film operates as a "bridge" but which "no longer connects any places, but instead stands above them as a metaphor."[432] Koch reminds us that "Not only was film supposed to bring the nations back from the battlefields and into the shared kingdom of pre-linguistic corporeality, but it was also supposed to reconcile the mass with itself."[433] Koch writes about Weimar cinema, and about Mabuse in particular when she writes that the film was not meant to "depict the mentality of the interwar period. Rather, they re-produce the subject that was being developed." In "re-produce" one can hear re-cite, re-gesticulate. Vertov takes the "re-produce" quite seriously as an important part of the chain of production in general.

Internal Echo of the Interval: A Folk Tale

Vertov was not the only one to see the Russian people as ice breakers. As Zamyatin, who named certain characters in his novel *We* (*My,* Мы 1920-21) after icebreaker models writes, the ice is the

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[431] Alexei Yurchak, "A Parasite from Outer Space: How Sergei Kurekhin Proved That Lenin Was a Mushroom," *Slavic Review* 70, no. 2 (2011): 307–33.
[432] Koch, "Face and Mass," 148.
[433] Ibid., 147.

breaking ice of bourgeois history.[434] In an essay entitled, "On My Wives, On Icebreakers, and On Russia," ("O *moikh zhenakh, o ledokolakh, o Rossii*") written in 1932 and first published in the Paris-based weekly magazine *Marianne* in French under the title "*Brise-glace*s," Zamyatin describes the Icebreaker, and through it, the new Soviet, as a hybrid, half human, half machine:

> Russian man had to be, will need to be, especially strong-ribbed and particularly thick-skinned, not to be crushed by the weight of that unprecedented cargo that history has thrown onto his shoulders. And especially strong ribs – 'frames,' especially thick steel skin, double sides, double bottom – are required of the icebreaker not to be crushed by the compression of it by the grip of ice fields…[435]

If the ice is stagnant history and the people are also likened to ice breakers here, then the people must be both the ice breaker and the ice floes (as we see in Vertov's film.) For Zamyatin, the figure seems at first to be but the latest figure in a line of folk heroes but even that folk hero is the kernel of a porous but strong position in relation to history that sounds rather lyric in its ability to echo and to be creative. Most importantly, it is not bourgeois; it lacks the baroque and theatrical markers of allegory, of the "well-dressed" :

> As Ivan the Fool in Russian fairy tales, the icebreaker is only pretending to be clumsy and if you pull it out of the water, if you look at it in the dock - you will see that the outlines of its strong body are rounder, more feminine than that of many other ships. In its cross-sectional diagram, an icebreaker is like an egg - and to crush it in the hand is equally impossible. It delivers such blows but itself leaves these alterations, which would sink to the bottom every other, more beautifully dressed, European ship, intact and only slightly crumpled.[436]

These androgynous wise or holy fools are a new kind of beloved, an ideal in many ways as unreachable as the poetic beloved. Finally, he likens the machine to an organic entity, the egg, or an organic crystallization of a future time. The icebreaker is not only pretending to have qualities, just as Ivan the Fool. In any case, even the egg is only pretending to be as fragile as an egg.

A "Reserve of the Imagination"

The icebreaker's lyricism appears as a foil to the battleship, the combative symbol for the newly formed nation and directly linked with state power. Battleship Aurora makes a patriotic appearance in mostly narrative films such as Kozintsev and Trauberg's *The Devil's Wheel* (1926) in the same year as Vertov's *Sixth Part*, and the famous Battleship Potemkin in Eisenstein's eponymous film just a year earlier. In contrast with the obvious unidirectional intention of the battleship, the icebreaker opens up imaginative channels and the possibility for the circulation of ideas. It also provided an uncanny steel figure next to the train, a primary figure associated with modernity and with a certain linear and narrative cinematic vision.

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[434] In this sense, the scene could also be taken allegorically as the equivalent of poetry transforming by shattering of the bourgeois crystal of *Mabuse* which Mabuse himself refused to shatter and yet remaining the medium poetry by preserving and reconstituting its fragments.

[435] Yevgeny Zamyatin, "O Moikh Zhenakh, o Ledokolakh, o Rossii," in *Mosty*, vol. 9 (Munich: tsope (цопэ) Izdatelstvo Tsentralnogo obedineniia polit. emigrantov iz SSSR) IX: 25., 1962), 21–25. See also A. N. Kholodilina, *Leningradskii Korablestroitel'nyi* (Sankt-Peterburg: Sudostroenie, 1992).

[436] Kholodilina.

No predictable tracks underlay its trajectories; its purpose was to forge paths into the inaccessible waters of the newly formed Soviet Union for purposes of trade; its symbolic significance was, first, a victory over the Tsarist regime, and second, its ability to make headway into unexplored regions of consciousness. In narrating the appearance of the "Ship of Fools" (*Narrenschiff*) in his *History of Madness* (1961) and the beginning of the expulsion of madness in secular society, Michel Foucault recuperates lyricism in its relationship to madness, dreams, desire, and in the relationship of the human to "unreason."[437] In his work on heterotopias as "real" spaces that carried the mythic charge of the "unreal" of utopias, "Of Other Spaces" (1967), he writes of boats as holding an extreme type of imaginative potential:

> the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea and that, from port to port, from tack to tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies in search of the most precious treasures they conceal in their gardens, you will understand why the boat has not only been for our civilization, from the sixteenth century until the present, the great instrument of economic development (I have not been speaking of that today), but has been simultaneously the greatest reserve of the imagination. The ship is the heterotopia par excellence.[438]

The icebreaker offers a figure for what I am calling the "lyric spectator " as a particular form of such a "reserve of the imagination," which collides with a seemingly non-imaginative or documentary entity, whether it be associated with the past, with a stagnant or slow-changing society, with a superstructure, or most literally with a geographic boundary. This spectatorship is envisioned as a literal spectator-ship, and as this pun does not work in the Russian I take full credit for it. Nonetheless, it is useful to envision the icebreaker by contrast with Metz's Spectator-fish. Indeed, Kuzmin later wrote "Trout Breaks the Ice," about such a fish that sought to make contact with a peasant on the other side of the pond's surface.

As a practical invention, the Icebreaker promised the facilitation of more trade routes, expanded frontiers, and the physical inclusion of more diverse, ambi-gendered populations into the centralized structure of the newly formed Soviet Union. In some ways it lessened the imagination by filling it with concrete knowledge and encounters. However, as a figure, it was both opaque and created a kind of transparent path out of once opaque ice. It is a complex figure. But how did the figure of the icebreaker work for Vertov? And how, if at all, was its technology transferrable to lyric art? Just as the amalgamation of gazes within the frame, the interaction between points of view, is oddly part of the lyric, so too is the amalgamation of gazes through montage.

By contrast, Sergei Eisenstein's patriotic *Battleship Potemkin* (1925) models the effects of the panoptic gaze of authority in its form. The limitations on camera movement document the means of production. The desired illusion of limitless space ironically meant that the space of the camera was circumscribed for to move towards it would have destroyed the illusion of freedom and infinite horizons:

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[437] Michel Foucault, *History of Madness*, ed. Jean Khalfa, trans. Jonathan Murphy (1961; repr., New York: Routledge, 2006), 516–17. Foucault writes: "Descartes, in his movement towards truth, made impossible the lyricism of unreason."
[438] Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces [Des Espaces Autres(1984)]," trans. Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics*, no. 16 (Spring 1986): 27.

> The ship must not be moved an inch. For that would destroy the illusion of the open sea.
> And the ancient crags would peep gleefully into the camera eye.
> These strict demands of space hampered our movements.
> The time demands were no less strict: the film had to be ready by the anniversary date and this proved a restraint on our imagination.
> Chains and anchors held tight the old hulk of a battleship that was rearing to go out to sea.
> The chains and anchors of space and time restricted our eager imagination.
> And perhaps this accounted for the austerity of the film.
> Mines, mines, mines….
> It is only natural that they should pop up from under my pen as I write this.
> Mines dominated all our work.
> …
>
> But more terrible than the mines was the guard, Comrade Glazastikov. Yes, Glazastikov [from Russian *glaz*—an eye. Hence, big-eyed.] This is no pun. And he (alas!) proved worthy of his name, which aptly described this ever alert Argus guarding the tiers of mines under our feet…"[439]

Thus Comrade Glazastikov's gaze (and its explicit alliance with authority and, in turn, the mines of censorship and self-censorship) supercedes the gaze of the mechanical camera eye, and the film must bend to his will, or the cast, crew, and vessel threaten to be blown asunder. Such pressure restricts the vessel and the film to the illusion of an open sea rather than a true one, even though there is one to be filmed. Vertov's film, on the other hand, records the human who goes further than the mechanical eye can see with its help. The icebreaker scenes carve out routes that were previously blocked. The inverse conditions of filming in the two cases parallel the condition of the soviet project; Eisenstein found restrictions in the political and military apparatus in an otherwise unfettered natural space and time, while Vertov celebrated an industrial eye created free movement through geographic barriers where previously they had protected the peoples from a centralized, omnipotent gaze.[440] With his lyric form of montage, Vertov circulates a vision of emancipated space and an attendant plurality.

Emancipation of Space and the "Out-of-Field"

The shots speak across time and space thematically. These themes are controlled to some degree in the voice of the intertitles in *A Sixth Part*, while in later films without intertitles they are left more open. They recall the way that Whitman's stanzas are grouped by theme but within those themes

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[439] Sergei Eisenstein, *Notes of a Film Director* (1946; repr., Fredonia Books, 2003), 21. Eisenstein even notes the unsatisfying false "model" (see Gertrud Koch's use of the Wittgensteinian Philosophy of language in "Face and Mass," quoted elsewhere in this chapter) he provides with the one shot of the ship from an angle like that of Vertov's "ribs" : "True, there is a side view of the battleship in the film, but this was shot . . . in the 'Moorish' swimming-pool of the Sandunov Public Baths in Moscow, with a miniature model of the war vessel proudly riding the tepid 'waves' of the pool."

[440] For a good description of the at times false difference between Vertov and Eisenstein's approach to dialectical montage, see Petrić, Vlada. *Constructivism in Film - A Cinematic Analysis: The Man with the Movie Camera*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

anomalies jump out, such as the manipulation of time by traces or the presence of deities among humans, allowing the reader to reconsider the "objectivity," for instance, of even the enumerations of proper nouns, which begin to sound themselves like deities. Circling back to types or continents likewise imagines the "passive" and objective world as a database as unfixed and dynamic as the speaker.

> ...Yet such aggregations of montage fragments [in Vertov] do not result in abstract combinations of disparate units. Quite on the contrary, they give rise to a complex network of themes and motifs…as Manovich explains, 'in the hands of Vertov, the database, this normally static and objective' form, becomes dynamic and subjective."[441]

A Sixth Part suggests the Icebreaker "Lenin," a static entity that travels unphased by the landscape around it, as the machine that would best embody the Soviet citizen. In many ways, it is best prepared for the overwhelming or shocking nature of everything there is to see. The camera strapped to its side at the moment of impact and rupture, or on the top of its mast, sees the opening of new frontiers from its point of view from the center of the action, it remains acutely aware of its internal echoes. For Deleuze, reading Vertov in a section entitled, ""Towards a gaseous perception," montage liberates the object from its lack of self-awareness, just as it imbues it with even more objectivity. Deleuze writes that the effect is "to carry perception into things, to put perception into matter, so that any point whatsoever in space itself perceives all the points on which it acts, or which act on it, however far these actions and reactions extend. This is the definition of objectivity, 'to see without boundaries or distances"' [442].

The way the fragments fill the frame also invokes that which is just out of frame, both suggesting the continuation of the pattern in the frame meanwhile preserving its diversity and standing as other to it, off to the side of it, watching.

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[441] Frank Kessler, *Mise En Scène*, Kino-Agora 6 (Montréal: caboose, 2014). Kessler quotes Lev Manovich, *The Language of New Media* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002), 243.
[442] Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 81.



Figure 25 Clockwise from top left) Icebreaker view from mast of moving ice floes, German workers protesting, Muslim prayer, a Soviet rally. The fragmentation and porosity at any scale.

Deleuze's concept of the "out-of-field" subdivides the visible into a set with the invisible (or out of frame) but does not limit it only to one set. Deleuze refers to that which connects between sets as the whole, which he imagines to be a thread to the "Open." This concept helpfully describes two different ways in which the picture plane determines the spectator's relationship to what lies beyond the frame:

> The out-of-field refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present. This presence is indeed a problem and itself refers to two new conceptions of framing. If we return to Bazin's alternative of mask or frame, we see that sometimes the frame works like a mobile mask according to which every set is extended into a larger homogeneous set with which it communicates, and sometimes it works as a pictorial frame which isolates a system and neutralizes its environment.[443]

Deleuze keeps both of these meanings open to his notion of the out-of-field, using the metaphor of a thread for the "Open:" "the finer it is — the further duration descends into the system like a spider — the more effectively the out-of-field fulfils its other function which is that of introducing

[443] Deleuze, 16.

the trans-spatial and the spiritual into the system which is never perfectly closed."[444] What happens to the spectator/addressee when they become part of the out-of-field that is continuous with the monadic porousness? They become a part of the floating mass, a quantity turning to quality in Marx's third law, "quantitative changes to qualitative changes; those qualitative changes are not gradual but rapid, sudden, and occur in bounds from one state to another."[445]



Figure 26 The controlled forces of the Dnieper River dam (left). Peasants shoveling grain "back" at the camera in an anaphoric gesture that acknowledges the position of the camera without the "actors" breaking the fourth wall. Addressing the spectator through the grain also reminds us that the film is doing so through the grain of the film.

The film instructs the spectator to identify not with any identitarian position but with its medium, just as it asks for identity with the ecology of the geographic fragment in the title. Indeed, as the agents on screen shovel grain directly at the camera, the spectator makes contact with the grains of wheat and of the silver halide crystals (silver salts) that in being exposed have transformed into metallic silver; the film iterates the grain. The film is united in form and content; The spectator views from inside the grain shower, rather than outside of it. An audience in the mise-en-abîme showing the backs of spectators in an auditorium watching Vertov's film. The grain enlivens our haptic system.[446]

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[444] Ibid., 17.

[445] Jacques Aumont, "Montage Eisenstein I: Eisensteinian Concepts (Montage Eisenstein)," trans. Lee Hildreth, *Discourse* 5 (1983): 90.

[446] For a discussion of the haptic quality in *A Sixth Part* see Emma Widdis, *Visions of a New Land: Soviet Film from the Revolution to the Second World War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 107–11. See also Emma Widdis, "Socialist Senses: Film and the Creation of Soviet Subjectivity," *Slavic Review* 71, no. 3 (2012): 590–618. For more on haptics, see Laura U. Marks, *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2000); Laura U. Marks, *Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Jennifer M. Barker, *The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).Their notions of touch have informed the particular form of "reaching" without necessarily touching that I have been describing here.

The Lyric I's Porosity: Visualizing the Self as Interval or Gap

What may seem like a series of shots that can be held up as examples of either analogies, metaphors (as in the first pair), as "before and after" comparisons or transformations, as juxtapositions rest uneasily under any such one fixed direct of reading. The similarity of the shots and the framing of them does allow for some nuanced observations that beg a reading. For instance, How does Vertov conceive of masses? It seems important that some are standing while the "old world" religious bow in prayer. It also seems important that the Russian crowd faces towards the camera while the German manifestation faces away. Scale is also important—though both the slaves under colonialism and the peasants shoveling grain or sheep wool both perform similar types of backbreaking labor in rows, the peasants are shown like gods, the camera at the level of their curiously disembodied feet. But even this last creates a peculiar effect, where the sheep wool becomes at least as empathic as the women's skirted lower halves. With scale again, the Russian mass is too small to see individual faces and the only close up that the camera shows, again because of scale, is of Lenin's head.

What we have seen in our examples, however, is how something within the frame ruptures the illusion of either a self-enclosed system of a world or a continuous one beyond the frame. The way the image extends in the world is always limited by its ideological enemy but that enemy is equivalent to the ideological workings within the frame and in this sense cancels itself out. In the scene of watching a mass watch a film, the spectator imagines the self as part of a mass of spectatorship, Gertrud Koch argues in her essay "Face and Mass: Towards an Aesthetics of the Cross-Cut in Film": "It was only because he was already situated in the mass that it even became necessary for the individual to uncouple himself from it in order to preserve his own positionality. Taylorism, Fordism, and mass sports circulate around this figure of equivalence and exception."[447] In this sense, individuation occurs at the moment when it has already occurred as a way of effecting equivalence.[448] The situation of the individual in the mass, however, does not account for discrete and particular circumstances within each kind of mass.

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[447] Koch, "Face and Mass," 141.

[448] To borrow from Kafka's parable "The Coming of the Messiah."

Figure 27 Before and after the tractor arrives in the "egg"

In this last example from the film, one atypically shaped frame at the center remains empty. A soft-edged triangular hole, like the hull of ship, or an egg-shape left in the center of the marginal arrangement showing grain collected, distributed, and plowed by hand welcomes a cameo, a silhouette of a man fused with the tractor, emerges from the egg-shaped interval. The egg gives birth to a tractor. The image initially invites the out-of-field (out of the grain fields), in two senses —in the off-off-screen space of the theater and the fields that lie beyond the theater into the picture— through a Lacanian lack at the film's unified mirror-stage center (since this is quite late in the film, one has emerged at this point) literally represented by a black hole at the intersection of three images of peasants working the fields. This hole is the conjuncture, the different configurations of the world that have become possible out of frame are invoked as the "missing piece" within the frame, deciding the relation between the different images.

"Your Factories," proclaims one intertitle that encourages the spectator to feel ownership over the line of production and ownership through knowledge. These two elements cement, in the manner of a frozen present and history, the relationship between subjects, at the moment that they wall up the interval; the logic of medium (the kino-eye) equates the subject, the object, the factory, and the machine. Left unresolved, however, is the still surprisingly and unsettled equation with the organic. NOT ONLY TRACTORS BUT ALSO MACHINES PRODUCING TRACTORS] ("*NE TOL'KO TRAKTORY/NO I MASHINY proizvodiashchie traktory*") an intertitle towards the end says. These are not the "ugly ducklings" of the "Machines giving birth to machines" yet unspecified and unknown. The crystallization of now occurs in the triangulation, either of mise-en-scène or here through the montage of fragments within the frame, a combination of montage editing and mise-en-scène arrangement techniques. But the apostrophic invocation of the lyrical spectator as a generative interpretive force at the very moment of porosity in the interval happens equally within the frame in duration before the appearance of the tractor and continues through it.

The Gesture as Prophetic Ethnography: The *Creation* of Ritual

> « Le geste me permettait aussi de tresser dans le même mouvement quelque chose de personnel et quelque chose d'impersonnel, dans une négociation. »[449]
>
> ["Gesture permitted me to braid together in the same movement something personal and something impersonal in a negotiation"]

What I have been suggesting be called a lyric montage triangulates three players, the present, the future, and the one who overhears as the "now" in the off-screen that actualizes the conjuncture. It "decontextualizes" the portrait and at the same time makes the crystalized "now" of watching singular.

For the lyric spectator, I argue, the verbal refrains of the film and its repetitive, cyclical and vertiginous referents make it such that, despite the narrative of progress, the film creates an ethnographic ritual by putting the lyric and the cinematic on equal footing. Vertov's lyric version of the icebreaker in *A Sixth Part* might be said to allow the people of the newly formed Soviet Union to come forward with their individual and idiosyncratic rhythms (a word I will use as a stand-in for the ethnographic idea of ritual, which Jonathan Culler suggests for poetic rhythms' relation to abstracted ritual drumming.) One might view the icebreaker, like the film or the poem, as a ritual object that matches the large drums of the ceremony just before the Icebreaker footage that sets the pace for what the filmmaker hopes will be a free and equal and individual society, exploring the unconscious and facilitating the exchange of memory and experience.

The intertitles become complicated by becoming hybrid—the textual image (intertitle) meets the cinematic image on a plane of equivalency (subject and predicate) that is at once defining, as with a caption, illustrative, and tautological. On the other hand, the relationship between intertitles and image changes; for example, the formal and/or plural "you"(*vy*) also softens and becomes the individual "you" (*ty*) signaling that the leveling will occur when tribes can come forward as individuals and as familiars. The sentences begin with the subject "You" while the moving images occupy the place of the predicate. In Russian, the verb "to be" is implied in the subject. In the end, the speaker of the film rises to the status of a seer and the intertitles herald this by repeating "I see" followed by natural phenomena, such as the Black Sea. The Soviet viewer transcends her own body in the bodies of others, and finally transcends those bodies to become a subject through ocular function, and through this attain to a kind of ownership of all the lands constituting the "sixth part." Perhaps the lyric form that this rhetorical, unpredictable, anaphoric verse-form heralded was one that necessarily encountered the subject as a historical one, in particular a material historical one. Whitman and Marx posed very similarly for the camera. Whether this was unconscious or the exact replication of a form is uncertain but it crystalizes the beginning of materialist reciprocal gesture — a way of seeing, of being seen, and a way of recognizing what "departure" of certain subjects cannot be heard outside of this frame.

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[449] Rabaté, "Retour."



Figure 28 Karl Marx (left) and Walt Whitman (right) in uncannily similar poses and haircuts seem cousins; Whitman's more rough-and-tumble American beard is itself a kind of lyric versioning.

"Intervals of Reflection": Barthes' Lament: Against 'Lyricism'

At least in Vertov, the film crystallizes a historical moment in the process of being transformed into another historical moment. In the capitalist "lyricism" universality reigns without history, without discrepancy of means. Writing about the infamous touring exhibition of photographs *The Family of Man* (1955), Roland Barthes rails against a false "lyricism," in quotes, in its neglect of history, promulgation of eternal truths and naive universalism. Organized by Edward Steichen in 1955 for the Museum of Modern Art in New York and toured by the government soft propaganda wing United States Information Agency (USAI) and Coca Cola , the infamous exhibition toured for many years in Europe and to places where America had burgeoning neo-imperial interests. As a post-cold war liberalist cultivation soft power's cultural and ideological influence.[450] Particularly, Barthes' problem with the exhibition lies with the captions:

> '[P]rimitive' sayings, verses of the Old Testament; all define an eternal wisdom, an order of affirmations which escape History: 'The Earth is a mother who never dies. Eat bread and salt and speak the truth,' etc.: this is the realm of gnomic truths, the junction of all the ages of humanity at the most neutral degree of their identity, here where the evidence of the truism has no more value than at the heart of a purely 'poetic' language. Everything here, the content and appeal of the pictures, the discourse justifying them, aims at suppressing the determining weight of History: we are kept at the surface of an identity, prevented by sentimentality itself from penetrating in that further zone of human conduct, where historical alienation introduces those 'differences' which we shall here call quite simply injustices.[451]

His justified complaint especially targets what could be called intertitles, koans and morals taken predominantly from the bible but also, without any specificity, to be African proverbs, for instance. Barthes writes, "Hence, I very much fear that the final justification of all this Adamism is merely to give the world's immobility the alibi of a certain 'wisdom' and of a certain 'lyrical' nature which will eternalize the actions of man only the better to render them harmless."[452] Unlike Vertov's 'journalistic" lyric intertitles that carry a

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[450] Allan Sekula, "The Traffic in Photographs," *Art Journal* 41, no. 1 (1981): 19–20, https://doi.org/10.2307/776511.
[451] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Lavers (Hill and Wang, 2012), 197. 197.
[452] Ibid., 199.

stamp of time, Steichen's exhibition appears to be timeless. An inventory of Vertov's "captions" include the modes of informing about the name of a people, addressing them and the "overhearing" audience, as we have seen above, and registering while announcing a moment of history through an account of material traces and herald a new era. In contrast, the photographs of the 1955 exhibition often took sayings from the bible as "context," as eternal truths.

Even somewhat political seeming captions such as "Who is on my side? Who?" comes from "Kings 9:32" in the Bible and, without additional historical context, cannot be interpreted as a cry for unions or any meaningful response to disparities in power, class, race, or education or other modes of disenfranchisement. As Sekula recounts, the American government had recently intervened and staged a coup in Guatemala, overthrowing a communist leader who wished to nationalize the land of the American company United Fruit, when Steichen brought the exhibition there. And in this context, Steichen waxes poetic, in a "lyrical vein" as Sekula describes it as he quotes at length from Steichen's autobiography: "Regardless of the place, the response was always the same… the people in the audience looked at the pictures and the people in the pictures looked back at them. They recognized each other."[453]

With this moment, this dissertation reaches the smallest interval between lyric invocation and ideological interpellation. It is a moment when images can be appropriated for ends, what Sekula later describes as the "universal equivalent," where photography becomes a currency like any other and a phantasmagoric commodity that dominates the periphery from the center. This moment of the out-of-context, Barthes and Sekula make clear in their critiques, has the potential to erase the awareness of violent and dehumanizing histories unfolding and which should not be forgotten. In the same breath, it has the potential to foster an encounter that salutes subjects in the making, who overhear an echo of the parts of themselves that cannot be seen.

[453] Sekula, 21.

Epilogue/Lyric as a Mediating Technology for Inaccessible Traditions

New Lyrical Extensions of Vision: Walt Whitman in Algeria Salutes Homeward

Following one thread to Whitman and Vertov's gesture to the "open" of 1966—exactly forty years after Vertov's film—one finds the Moroccan Jewish leftist militant and engineer[454] Abraham Serfaty, who was forty years old at the time, writing an ecstatic and hopeful essay recounting the visit of the Black Panthers, based in Oakland, California to Algiers. The pan-Soviet call becomes the pan-African ethos of the journal, which included a report from the first Pan-African Cultural Festival in Algiers and an interview with Senegalese filmmaker Ousmane Sembène in the same issue. The essay starts with the narration of a return, "It was the return from a long voyage. Some five centuries of oppression traversed before coming to salute the earth of Africa, from this hall in Algiers where they went for several evenings to tell us about their struggles, their songs, their recovered dignity."[455] The essay describes two returns with a difference, that is, the return is not a nostalgic one to a perceived origin. The returns occur both on the narrative level and on the formal, referential level.

In its form, one finds a return to Whitman's original address in that the essay borrows the signs from the Whitman's catalogue text but puts them in relation to their involvement with slave trading. While Whitman's syntax performs a democratic equality, giving balanced weight to the "objects" (often-times people) he holds in his attention, Serfaty uses metonymy to signal the accumulation of "objects," which are equally the frictionless passages for human trafficking, while other kinds of human mobility such as Whitman enjoys remain out of reach. Serfaty brings his attention to the spaces of capital, literally the capital cities of global trade:

> *Plus de cinq siècles depuis que les navigateurs Portugais partaient à la conquête de la Route des Epices et y établissaient, des îles du Cap Vert à Sao Thomé, les postes d'où ils organiseraient, de la Guinée à l'Angola, centré sur la delta du Niger, le principal marché du capitalisme émergeant, celui des esclaves. Très vite, les voiliers chargés de marchandise humaine prirent la nouvelle route de l'Ouest. Les millions de 'nègres' ainsi commercés développèrent le sucre et le coton, la richesse des planteurs des Antilles et de Virginie, et l'or obtenu pour prix de leur 'commerce' allait, via Lisbonne et Seville, grossir les coffres honorables de Londres et Amsterdam.*
>
> More than five centuries since the Portuguese navigators left for the conquest of the Spice Route and there established, from the isles of Cape Verde to São Tomé, the posts from which they organized, from Guinea to Angola, centered on the delta of the Niger, the principal emergent market of capitalism, that of slavery. Very quickly, the sailboats loaded with human merchandise took the new route west. The millions of "negroes" thus trafficked cultivated sugar and cotton, the wealth of the planters in the Antilles and Virginia, and the gold received for their "trade" went, via Lisbon and Seville, to fill the honorable coffers of London and Amsterdam.[456]

Serfaty's sentences here seem to tell a story but, in its incompleteness, the first one constitutes a fact from an omniscient position to trace the route of capital as if looking at a map. Nonetheless, the

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[454] Olivia C. Harrison and Teresa Villa-Ignacio, eds., *Souffles-Anfas: A Critical Anthology from the Moroccan Journal of Culture and Politics* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 3, 188.
[455] Abraham Serfaty, "Salut Aux Afro-Américains," *Souffles*, 1969.
[456] Serfaty.

narrator has a tired air about him. He does not begin in the present with "It has been more than five centuries," he begins "More than five centuries," as if the block of time constituted an insurmountable monolithic block, a glacier of history, whose weight was not in geological immobility but in the gold amassed from human exploitation and the facelessness accrued by the cities of capital. In these nuanced decisions, he shares a political "commitment to syntax" with Whitman and a political philosophy that manifests "a refusal to tolerate exclusions, a refusal, indeed, to register distinctions, an openness as impartial as it is impersonal" in a kindred cataloguing. There is a shared commitment to unraveling and following the thread of the origins of wealth and accumulation in the world capitals.

The paragraph ends by personifying the capitals, showing the dehumanization of those who profited off of the dehumanizing strategies and effects of slavery. Here, Serfaty critiques the omniscient, globalizing eye with what we might call a capitalist democratic syntax. This syntax gathers the dispersed and exiled by virtue of the shared absent listener that overheard Whitman's "shout outs" to all the great trading cities but was relegated to one fateful line in "Salut au Monde!": "slave-coffle, as the slaves march on—as the husky gangs pass on by twos and threes, fasten'd together with wrist-chains and ankle-chains;" In Serfaty's cataloguing, the cities become "fasten'd" together with the by virtue of their prosperity on the backs of slaves.

In a countermove, he subsequently returns mobility to these subjects, who are "moving, moving" rather than being transported. He writes:

> "black people
> are moving, moving to return
> this earth into the hands of
> human beings"[457]

Serfaty's text relays a humanism where hands are not commodities, not dead objects that in turn exploit the earth; the repetitive movement has a moment of return, and this movement is not only alive but made visible and capable of being recognized in this labor. The journey from 'black people" to "human beings" still expresses a hopeful lyrical view that the *Family of Man* espoused. However, this view is qualified in retrospect as a gesture towards a receding horizon of history (the Federal Bureau of Investigations was already encroaching on the Black Panthers in Algiers.)

The process of return in Serfaty's triolet is not not necessarily an Odyssean return home but instead here it is the return of a gaze. In his reduction of the map of the world, he invokes Whitman's swooping bird's and vapor's -eye-views, and in staying close to the hands and the earth, Vertov's slightly lower, embodied one (his mast's eye view). He returns Whitman's gaze steadily to him, and the "salutation" in French, from Algiers more than a hundred years after Whitman wrote: "I see Algiers, Tripoli, Derne, Mogadore, Timbuctoo, Mongrovia." It is unclear what signal exactly Whitman makes when he raises high his perpendicular hand "to remain after me in sight forever" but Serfaty suggests something else, that the Black Panthers will return the land to the "hands of human beings" before he ends his essay with an appreciation of the Black Panthers and a final call: "Let us salute them," (*Saluons-les!*). This last emphatic salute extends the power of salute to those who wish to join the "we" in the making, a "we" constituted precisely in the salute.

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[457] This small fragment is written in English in the original.

Third-Worldism, 'internationalism'

Like those "moving," Serfaty's short, genre-defying text—is it a manifesto, a review, a journalistic piece, a palimpsest — moves among forms for cataloguing, out of Whitman's and the exploitative, capitalist democratic one of Whitman's day to one of cataloguing archetypes. "Subjected to the worst of oppressions ever known and during such a long period, a human group, they emerge as accusers and renovators, as fighters and builders." The "human group" in this passage is historically black here, as black as the black people who are returning "the earth into the hands of human beings" but Serfaty makes them recognizable beyond their physiognomy by invoking other types of rhetoric (accusations) alongside poetic ones (renovation.) This elevation of men to archetypes or concepts recalls Lang's description of Mabuse, and particularly Kazemir Malevich's rendering for the Russian version of the poster for *Dr. Mabuse*. In the abstract circle hovering above the upside down crosses, it becomes possible to see a kind of black sun that "judges not as the judge judges but as the sun falling around a helpless thing."[458] The upside down cross may represent the judgement of god, or of an evil power while the black circle-sun is simply an opaque and indifferent fact, like the deixis and like Auden's poetry that "makes nothing happen: it survives." This ecological indifference, weather menacing or ideal (as in Kuzmin) continues to appear in works that engage the post-romantic lyric, especially in existential circumstances that necessitate creativity for survival.

In his film *Ceddo* (1977), Ousmane Sembène transports Malevich's conceptual representational mode to the moment after pan-Africanism and the Civil Rights era in the US have passed and Senegalese "black people" are fractured amongst themselves between Islam, Christianity, and a tribal agrarian matrilineal monarchy. Sembène's peasant subjects are clothed in block-printed bold colors that directly reference the Kazimir Malevich's series of peasants and sportsmen paintings that combine representation and abstraction.

Figure 29 (Clockwise from top left): Kazemir Malevich, "Peasant in the Fields" (1929) and a still of farmers from *Ceddo* (Dir. Ousmane Sembène, 1977, "Morning in the Village after Snowstorm (1913) and group of farmers in *Ceddo*.

[458] Whitman's epigraph for *Leaves of Grass*.

Sembène studied filmmaking at the Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography (VGIK) in Moscow and worked at Gorky Studios. He would have seen these paintings. What Sembène helps the viewer see, however, is not just that he borrows from Malevich but that Malevich already borrows from the African color palette to signify peasants, uniting the peasants of Russia with the slaves that the communist project promises to liberate as it grows internationally. While Serfaty celebrates the ones with the closest connection to the earth with a form similar to Shklovsky's "triolet" and to Vertov's propulsive, anaphoric intervals, Sembène incorporates a Langian excess through formalism like Lang and takes advantage of the self-authenticating opaque index of pure color as a placeholder for the face as Lang does with Dr. Mabuse and Hull.

These two strands of the lyric mode, both with different versions representation (excessively self-emptying and anaphorically ethnographic), offer gestures of invitation to the spectator that can be seen to operate in two works by contemporary video artists working in the digital. These two approaches necessitate seeing media as "documents" for actualization, performance, translation, and adaptation. While the lyric offers a space for self-authentic enunciation in early cinema, it resurfaces as the "real" in a post-truth digital age.

The Withdrawal of Tradition Past a Surpassing Disaster

In Jalal Toufic's *The Withdrawal of Tradition Past a Surpassing Disaster* (2009), Toufic suggests that certain crises are formative for a community in that this community loses its access to its own traditions. Both the tradition and the community are "reciprocally" defined by the disaster as those things that withdraw.[459] That which is absent negatively defines community and tradition. The argument resonates with Franz Fanon's injunction to 'the native poet' of colonial and post-colonial states in *The Wretched of the Earth*, to make the people the subject of their art and to reconnect them with themselves by including colonization in the poetry rather than attempting a nostalgic restoration.

The native poet moves from denouncing the oppressor in pre-liberation to becoming a mediator between the people and a suppressed history through the colonial past. Susan Hayward, in her article "Framing National Cinemas," adds to Fanon's characterization of the native poet a similar characterization for the native filmmaker. When Hayward adjusts Fanon's "native poet" to the "native poet-film-maker," she suggests that the poetics of mediation between the individual and tradition when the individual has been estranged by rupture occur equally in poetry or in film. But not all filmmakers can be considered "native," and not all films are akin to poetry or serve the purpose of mediation between the individual and tradition. What, then, are the poetics of such a mediation available both to film and poetry? She writes, "…the poet-filmmaker must negotiate that pre-history through the colonial past and call everything into question… and do so by addressing his/her own people, by making a fundamental concession of the self to others - to make the people the subject not the object of his/her art."[460] The poetics seem to be an art centered on the people neither as an object to be described and nor, according to their use value or status as commodities

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[459] Toufic, Jalal. *The Withdrawal of Tradition Past a Surpassing Disaster*, Forthcoming Books, 2009, PDF. Accessed from jalaltoufic.com on July 11, 2016.

[460] Susan Hayward, "Framing National Cinemas," in *Cinema and Nation*, ed. Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000), 100.

(slaves, workers, etc.) and neither as an exotic or fetish item as the same people have been made to be by the colonial gaze, but rather as the addressee and conversant of the work

What tradition, then, does a filmmaker "at home" in the digital and virtual imagine he connects the spectator to when the spectator is part of a globalized art market? If shared disaster forms a new community defined precisely by the loss of tradition prior to the disaster, to what extent is the easily globalized technology of the digital, networked communities available through the interface of the computer, part of the disaster itself and to what extent is it simply a medium intermittently relaying disastrous content? John Akomfrah and Ali Cherri's work directly and indirectly addresses these questions, asking the viewer to wonder who the "speaker" or person behind the camera is endlessly without offering any conclusive dramatic persona, thus showing where a New Critical approach to his lyric or a psychoanalytic spectatorship approach to film fall short. The speaker/filmmaker or, in Fanon and Hayward's terms, the filmmaker-poet, appears to be both immanent and absent, both author and subject who explicitly performs the risk of becoming an object or victim.

Fanon's Native Poet-Filmmaker

If we query what value and power Fanon finds in lyric, here defined as simply as possible as a song sung by one voice, we might say it is its particularity and the particularity of which it sings that, in being heard, acts as a document against overarching and dispersed fictions that would determine interpersonal relations. Under colonial conditions in particular, the individual is alienated and sacrificed to a larger entity that does not recognize the humanity of the individual. Therefore, only a native poet will recognize him and it is his duty to do so. In Fanon's example of "African Dawn," about a Senegalese man who is summoned to fight for the French against the Germans in WWII and returns home decorated, only to be killed by a local colonial French chief. In this example, his home village recognizes him by bestowing the privilege of dancing a particular dance, the Douga, usually restricted to the most important of the society. The women in the village compose new poems for his arrival to sing of that privilege. However, when he is killed before arriving, it is a tragedy that provokes the poet's send off, communicated through the personification of a vulture, whom the poet imagines apostrophizing the village through the dead body. The vulture "seemed to say" to the dead man, "Naman! You have not danced the dance that bears my name. Others will dance it."[461] Thus, a third, natural force, authorizes the village to dance a sacred dance in honor of the fallen hero. In a sense, they all embody that hero. The poet authorizes this transference, bridging the narrative of the poem with the material present through the rhetoric of prophecy, which is akin to a speech act of permission.

This example of the lyric, the exceptional and particular that becomes communally embodied, likewise befits the dynamic relationship the individual body has with the cinema. Hayward states that film is ontologically "a pluricultural site," "as much about human flux and difference as is the human body."[462] Hayward describes the enunciative, performative erotics of the nation state as patriarchal, needing a maternal body to care for it, which it finds in colonial populations. She defines its discursive representation as "in constant denial" of its concrete power structures, presenting itself as unified, gender-neutral, abstract, enlightened and unambiguous.[463] Whereas, Fanon calls for a national culture, built from a collective thought process "of a people to describe, justify, and extol

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461 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (1961; repr., Grove Press, 1963), 166.
462 Hayward, "Framing National Cinemas," 110.
463 Ibid., 98.

the actions whereby they have joined forces and remained strong."[464] These possibilities of shared imagination must nonetheless be grounded in historical fact. For example, he says that "negroes" no longer exist due to colonialism.[465] Therefore, for a politician to imagine establishing a nation with this culture in mind would be impossible, he says. Such is the legacy of colonialism and its violent encounters that "blacks" are now post-negro.

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent,' T.S. Eliot writes from a more agential perspective on tradition, though still with the task of engaging with tradition after the unprecedented technologically amplified caesura of World War I. He writes, "[Tradition] cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense…and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence." This remark, which he writes as a universal, must also be taken in its historical context. The word 'labour' here can refer both to the female act of giving birth and thus to the reproduction of the nation by lineage as well as the Marxist principle of production. Eliot casts himself as a medium for the past in two senses, then, both impersonal, as a body and as a machine. His is not a specifically British nationalist tradition, as he goes on to mention Homer, but his project operates under the belief that it is still possible to access the great works written in other democratic times, and later in his career, Anglican ones, as a frame of reference, albeit as fragments and shards in works such as *The Waste Land* (1921), which in itself troubles the reproductive commodification underpinning gender relations. The body is miraculously intact, though it can see itself as part of a mass of ghosts streaming over a bridge, as in a newsreel. He writes, part observer, far enough to see the entity called the crowd, part participant, close enough to hear: "A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,/I had not thought death had undone so many./Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled…" His eye and the camera eye have access to the inheritance of death, its own kind of tradition, its products labor rather than right. As slaves never had ownership over the results of their labor, even this relationship to tradition is impossible and unimaginable for Fanon.

Toufic writes from about the cinema from a "post-cinematic" position in which the body of the film produced by the Hollywood studio system, with its para-colonial, narcissistic tendencies is itself undone and, done again, so now "undead," in the sense of unresponsive but nonetheless haunting. His first book of essays, *Vampires: An Uneasy Essay on the Undead in Film* (1992), considers the undead in film and film itself as an undead medium. In a short section entitled, "Breathless," he describes the encounter with a vampire that could also apply to the individual experience watching a computer screen. No longer a reason to communally gather in a crowd as the cinema was, this media platform would seem to suck the breath out of the viewer without returning it to a larger body. He writes that the undead has no mirror image, for "[i]f they don't wipe the mirror, living people cannot see their image in it in winter since their breath, visible then, hides the surface of the mirror. But, with the vampire, one encounters an inexistent mirror image hidden by inexistent breath."[466] In a theater, the audience breathes, even in short and infrequent sighs, some kind of life into the image as a symbolic reflection of the communal. There was a time when the audience inhaled the image, too, through communal gasps. However, in front of an individual screen, any horror at the crimes and violence in the news is at once sucked out of and returned to the viewer through a series of recursive, anaphoric links that invoke the viewer as in "This Living Hand." Cherri does wipe the screen in a magician-like

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[464] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 168.
[465] Ibid., 169.
[466] Toufic, Jalal. *Vampires: An Uneasy Essay on the Undead in Film*. 1st edition. Barrytown, N.Y. : New York, N.Y: Station Hill Press, 2014, 39. http://www.jalaltoufic.com/

gesture at the end of the video before the video repeats, allowing the viewer for a moment to both catch and, with the momentary suspension of sight, catch sound of her breath. In another earlier video, "Slippage," the camera records impassively while Cherri attempts to hold his breath as long as possible. No one intervenes. This idea can be seen at play in the work of John Akomfrah's and Ali Cherri's work. I will discuss only one project by each, both coincidentally from 2010, Akomfrah's feature-length, single-channel digital video work *Nine Muses* and Cherri's 3-channel video installation "My Pain is Real."

The Political Ecology of John Akomfrah's *The Nine Muses* (2010)

> [W]e must focus on that zone of hidden fluctuation where the people can be found, for let there be no mistake, it is here that their souls are crystallized and their perception and respiration transfigured.[467]
>
> —Franz Fanon, "On National Culture"

In Akomfrah's film, "double time" comes to stand for an interwoven immanent now that crystallizes, including quicker-paced montage of industrial archives with the glacially slow long takes and pans of melting polar ice. The film introduces the structure of the nine muses, which appear in intertitles. Throughout the film, intertitles introduce the nine different muses, beginning with Mnemosyne, the muse of memory, and ending with Terpsichore, the muse of dance. The film thus makes a trajectory from psychological past to embodied performance, from tradition to iterative collective ritual. The muses serve in some way as the different peoples did for Whitman and Vertov, as different belief systems necessitating their own idiosyncratic rituals.



Figure 30 *Stills from John Akomfrah's* The Nine Muses *(2010).*

A figure, a *Rückfigur* (a German Romantic figure used in painting and seen from behind), stands in as what seems to be an empty signifier, looks on at both of these landscapes, accompanied by texts out of context as elliptical as the bible, evoking that ahistorical shared essence that Roland Barthes called "lyricism." This myth, which Barthes attributes to the photo exhibition *The Great Family of Man,* continues in the digital with its rhetorical promise to create a plane of equivalency and immediate

[467] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 162–63.

visibility and to offer a total, immanent archive in which all voices can be heard.[468] Though Akomfrah's first images invite the openness of the "floating signifier" akin to a lyric subject. This subject quickly becomes racial , economic, and aesthetic (the colors of their costumes are either red, blue, or yellow, suggesting the primary colors). This combination creates an indexical play of gazes that the spectator follows as invocations, visual rhetorical tricks analogous to verbal ones as are used in lyric apostrophe. The resulting effects, I argue, are the construction of 1) a collective interiority – by which I mean, a general atmosphere and tone of longing, here elegiac, and 2) an aspectual reflection – a play with rhyme and puns that stand in for points of contact and points of departure between the presence of the image and the absence of words, between the natural world of poetic cycles and structures and the artificial human one of narrative and history.

Instead, Akomfrah's poetics function through the reaching and never touching, still creating a bridge in the metaphor at the interval, the meeting of proof and speculation that the indexical analogue and the deixis in digital film, respectively, provide. Here analogue film is somewhat of a pun since it functions as an analogy; it has been digitized to conform with the footage shot in Alaska. So it loses its indexical quality but when paired with an emphasis on natural elements, both in wild and metropolitan environments (the footage shows the great 1928 flood in London), it retains its specificity and particularity, suggesting natural time is inextricable from historical time in the Anthropocene. It is important that the film is shot in Alaska, markers of which are few and difficult to see but appear in street signs and other spartan makers of civilization. Akomfrah sees America as Stuart Hall does when he writes of the "'New World' Presence" of a "terra incognita":

> [N]ot so much in terms of power, as of ground, place, territory. It is the juncture-point where the other cultural tributaries met, the 'empty' land (the European colonizers emptied it) where strangers from every other part of the globe met…. It is the space where the creolizations and assimilations and syncretisms were negotiated….It stands for the endless ways in which Caribbean people have been destined to 'migrate'; it is the signifier of migration itself - of traveling, voyaging, and return as fate, as destiny; of the Antillean as the prototype of the modern or postmodern New World nomad, continually moving between centre and periphery.[469]

When these images are seen from the vantage point of the particular spectator Akomfrah suggests, a Caribbean or otherwise diasporic figure, notions of essential identity break down into the particularities of experience, here aspectual similarities between migratory subjects based on specific migratory journeys.

In many ways, sleek 4K scenes of an unidentified polar landscape would seem to have the least to do with archival footage of British industry and daily life between the 1920s and 1970s and more to do with car commercials. The landscape and figures evoke metaphors of being "frozen in time," slick as the pre-historical time of the ice age rendered doubly ahistorical by the digital. However, of course,

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[468] See, for instance, *Life in a Day* (Kevin Macdonald and Loressa Clisby 2011), a "crowdsourced drama/documentary" produced by National Geographic that boils 4,500 hours of footage—80,000 submissions from 192 nations—of one day, the 24th of July, 2010[468] into 90-minutes. The film has many of the same problems of universalizing 'lyricism', and furthers other mythologies of its time, especially related to the ongoing war in Iraq. Though it foregoes intertitles and any "voice-of-god"-style narrative, it still chooses who has access to narrative agency and thus a certain amount of persuasive power within this lyricism.

[469] Stuart Hall, "Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation," *Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media*, no. 36 (1989): 78.

they are traversed at every moment by power lines, roads and sea traffic, signs of modern technologies that nonetheless only reached such regions relatively late. Meanwhile, the steam trains, factories, floods, and everyday street scenes on deteriorating film stock feature people who look back at the camera, making themselves more contemporary and "present" than the contemporary images that avoid such direct address and allowing the landscape to make a sensory impression through the classical trope of the *Rückenfigur* at the same time as its atmosphere seems another kind of pun, a skepticism about whether the digital can make an impression of that kind without the analogue or whether it leaves one cold and numb. Since that figure is devoid of signs we cannot identify but only relate through the signifier with the landscape and that figure is also completely bundled against it in the fetishized down sports jacket in a landscape that also often references the car commercial.

Yet that body is specific as much as the tropes, audio, and technology would like to point away from that specificity. Hall writes that "Cultural identity…is a matter of 'becoming' as well as of 'being.'…Far from being grounded in a mere 'recovery' of the past, which is waiting to be found and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past."[470]

Alexander Galloway, like Virginia Jackson, refers to poetry as a medium like any other and its evocation of an outside (often a muse or a divine intervention) as a kind of interface between outside and insid. In this case the invocation of the appeal to an outside of muses and of classical and canonical existential British texts seems a self-authenticating gesture allowing a divulgence of interiority. However, the very same texts that might seem to authenticate interiority reveal their own opacity. Galloway's "mantra," "the interface is a medium that does not mediate. It is unworkable,"[471] refers for him to the insuperability of the translation itself, between aesthetic and historical context, between the inside and outside of a work, as a boundary that presents itself as a threshold but continues to insist upon itself within a work as an "intraface," the facets of the crystal, for instance. For Galloway, the interface is an "'agitation' or generative friction between different formats."[472] I insist here that, while each format (the digital image, the poem) is a container for other media, the other media nonetheless cannot be simply contained in the format but rather the format acts upon them throughout.

Like the people in the archives whom Akomfrah unearths, many of whom are also South Asian migrants, the body in his film, the witness, is decidedly a migrant. Interspersed with the *Rückfigur* and the faceless figure is a figure that Akomfrah films in three-quarter profile or full profile, a dreadlocked man who recurs sitting comfortably, even rebelliously, what would be identified as "loitering" in a racist discourse and being a flâneur in Baudelaire's Paris. As he gazes vaguely across at the industrial port he also gazes outside of the image. His profile echoes the profiles of men and women in other shots who seem to be searching for something just out of frame, the family members, for instance, who have left them in search of work in the north and their counterpart images, usually men gazing out of the image in their factories. This figure is one of Whitman's projected others who would soon be "by [his] side," a flâneur-figure, a pioneer explorer of globalism

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[470] Ibid., 70.
[471] Alexander R. Galloway, *Gaming: Essays On Algorithmic Culture*, First edition edition (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2006), 52.
[472] Ibid., 31.

as it hits its last frontier in the melting arctic, a poet who has landed where formerly only vapors could go to sing a song of itself.

"By Proxy" Lyric Turn: Ali Cherri's "My Pain is Real" (2010)

> No 'we' should be taken for granted when the subject is looking at other people's pain.
>
> —Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others [473]

Cherri's "My Pain is Real"[474] combines a lived present and an experienced present, on two identical screens overlaying the image with a paratactic voiceover, and on a third, larger screen, with the image of his face looking out at the spectator from a slightly high angle (as one looks when using one's laptop camera to film oneself and looking down at the laptop on a table) as it undergoes a process of decomposition. This third screen is the most quiet, though it shows the most viscerally disturbing footage. The "cause" of the wounds that appear seems to be an ordinary cursor, a hand with its index finger extended, that any computer user would recognize. As the mouse moves, we understand it to be a mouse that he is moving, though this is never explicit. It is a visible hand attached to an invisible one, a proxy for an agent. This agent is radically singular. Neither part of the "I" onscreen nor offscreen, it separates both viewers (Cherri, the spectator on screen and the spectator off-screen) from the wounds and pain associated with them. As Sontag's quote lets on, there can be no interrelational "we" when it comes to looking at pain.

As it migrates around his face, first it bruises his skin, and then pieces of his skin disappear to reveal the blood, sinews, and yellow puss around his nose and pieces of his cheek. As his innards are exposed, his eyes grow wide, from surprise, uneasiness. Despite the title of the piece, he does not seem to be in pain commensurate with the wounds inflicted. Instead, he seems to be numbed or hypnotized, perhaps by the images appearing on the other two screens. In a variation of the same piece published online by the magazine *Ibraaz* in 2012, the images of his face register flickering as can occur when the transmission from a television satellite is unclear or interrupted, which creates an erratic rhythm that is at once entirely familiar, and further are intercut with images flashing at a seizure-inducing speed that parallels the flickering of pure light. Cherri's fascination with the flicker or void at the center of "bad images," images that reveal their own technologies whether they are pixelated or reveal transmission patterns can be traced throughout his career.[475] Cherri has harnessed a tension between the jarring, but nonetheless overly familiar rhythm of cathode ray tube or digital

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[473] Sontag, Susan. *Regarding the Pain of Others*. F First Paperback Edition Used edition. New York: Picador, 2004. Print.

[474] The title implicitly references Stanley Cavell's

[475] Describing his exhibition "Bad Bad Images" at the Galerie Iman Farès in 2002, Cherri wrote of the violent images he had curated and magnified to reveal their materiality: "Bad Bad Images questions above all the possibility or impossibility of representing violence. The flow of these raw images, holding back no secrets, revealing everything, negate any time that might be spent on reflection. These are visceral images. The screen has obliterated the distance between the event, the image and its perception, deconstructing these images to separate them from their contexts and reducing them to their elemental component: the pixel. And through this poetic transfer, they are then redrawn to create an artwork. By creating a void in these images, I am trying to free them from their perception as fragments of reality, trying to create a space through which the imagination might enter. Such imaginary queries have certainly been referenced before in the history of painting. But one will always find what one is looking to see. By presenting them as such, these images do not lose their political slant. They might even earn back their greatest strength: the power to move. This is the essential quality of bad images." https://www.alicherri.com, accessed September 20, 2019,

streaming currents combined with the unpredictable rhythmic editing of the content, and the long take of a single shot of his face. The latter stands in for the lover's caress and love poem, but also a lament (rithā').



Ali Cherri, "My Pain is Real," 2010. Video still, video installation.

These images accomplish a shorthand way of describing the two simultaneous realities and two temporalities, that virtual[476] violence occurring on a screen and that which we see manifesting on the active spectator's face, is through the use of two words, one a sonic metaphor, the other visual: "echoic" or "telescopic."

A mouse in the shape of a white hand with this index finger extended is a familiar digital icon from many computer programs, but a pun Cherri suggests here is its allusion to the debates about the indexical nature of photography from Henri Fox Talbot to Roland Barthes and his notion of the "punctum," a wounding recognition. It reminds us of Keats' "This Living Hand" by posing the question—is it his or is it "ours"? The addition of wounds in Adobe After Effects to the photo is equally an uncovering, a subtraction of a layer of pixels, like skin, that gets us closer to Cherri's "inside" state while remaining on the surface of the screen, plasmatic. Clicking virtually becomes a literally concrete haptic, tactile activity, and the content of that touch onscreen is "written" on his face in negative carvings rather than overlays, suggesting that wherever he is virtually also takes him away from his physical location.

In the digital process of making the film, the layers in After Effects rather became a mask or shield. Cherri says, "Aftereffects … works with layers. I cut out the layer of the wound I wanted to apply to my face and I layered it on top of my face and make it move slowly and then make the cursor appear like it is on top of the layer"[477] It would seem that his face is the palette or origin and that he layers more on top. However, the internal need to collect images of wounds precedes his face and the mask and therefore also can be said to form the foundation for the image. He further discloses the origins of the project, which are only more layers: "For the project I started looking into the archives of one of the local newspapers al-Safir for photographs of people who were injured during the 2006 war. The face pose I have is actually a photograph of a woman and her face injury. It's from a woman who was in this pose. It started with that image and I wanted to shoot myself in this pose.

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[476] *Optics* relating to the points at which rays would meet if produced backward Dictionary 2.3.0 (mac)
[477] Ali Cherri, Skype Interview about "My Pain is Real" (2010), Skype, April 30, 2017.

Then it was done on After Effects. I started with the wound on the nose and then put the rest of the wounds on the face and started to animate it in aftereffects.

An accompanying diptych meanwhile shows an open window with the curtain registering the wind viewed from a small distance while an audiotrack relates subjective memories along with news media on the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the siege of Beirut in 2006. The curtain takes on the objective correlative of the effects registered from the unknowable real and virtual distances from events, even from the center of the event. The invisible, transparent wind moving the curtain maybe a better metaphor than a window, mirror, or frame, as we move into this era of a virtual touch that does reach. Perhaps "I" feel this doubly as an American citizen who was in New York City but way uptown at the time of the attack.

The wind is carrying the debris of history, sonically. Like the wind carrying the debris of history and paradise and blowing Angelus Novus into the future in Walter Benjamin's "On the Concept of History" (1940), this face resembles Benjamin's description of Paul Klee's painting of "His eyes are wide, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how the angel of history must look. His face is turned toward the past. Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet."[478] In playing at the angel of history from Benjamin's lyrical portrait-allegory Cherri casts himself as the angel and the victims of the war raging nearby his door as the debris. Unlike the angel, however, he is already up against a wall (the future is unsurpassable) and the "past" is all around him. This allegory is a lyrical one, one of immanence rather than transcendence, and a crystallizing document of that moment.

Though the wave of the hand at the end of the three minutes is theatrical or artificial, in a sense, serving as a kind of "wink" to the viewer, it resists leaving the spectator alone with that private deception by continuously upholding artificiality in the repetitive quality of the loop, which renders the gesture as indifferent. The theatrical, magician's gesture (like the flapping of a wing) fails as a frame (it could only be of a fallen angel); it is as phantasmagorical as the disembodied hand, being neither an indication of the labor necessary to make the video nor an indexical gesture of any other kind. It thus serves more to un-frame than to frame like pulling back an invisible curtain and thus making it visible in the gesture, allowing the "evidence" of wounds to be both radically specific as they are graphed onto the subject we see, potentially universal, and imminently repeatable.

Furthermore, that theatrical gesture is not enough to derail the first-hand experience that the artist-poet-actor conveys in watching the disembodied hand and violent world events, both represented visually in the main screen and vocalized in the audio accompanying the scene of the open window. The open window and the curtain play together like the vocal cord upon which the breath plays when it sings or like the chord of the lyre as the player strum, signaling, perhaps, the open possibility of forms for the lyric—not still to come—but immanent, as all around us as the air we breathe. Cherri's body becomes a vessel, like the carafe-decanter, containing the bodies, fragments from History, giving it a raw, living, and immanent form.

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[478] Benjamin, *SW 4*, 392.

Appendix A : *Georgia in Twelve Acts*—Supplementary Media (.mp4)

> Quotation, then, or third-person acting, is a way of outflanking the situation, with its evident impossibilities, and ratifying the 'imaginary nature of the self by holding it at a distance on stage and allowing its ventriloquism to designate itself. Yet something must be quoted, some 'already existing' and recognizable (or at least nameable) gesture must make up the substance of the quote, just as the gesture of the actor quoting his lines should also be identifiable as a type of conduct (if only the historically recognizable and legitimated conduct of acting itself).[479]

The film portrait *Georgia in Twelve Acts* begins with the actress Georgia Moll gathering flowers in a field and humming the refrain from "Toum Balalaika," a Yiddish folksong that she sings. It is a riddle-like question and response dialogue between a boy and a girl. The girl sings "Foolish lad, why do you have to ask?/A stone can grow, grow without rain/Love can burn and never end/A heart can yearn, cry without tears." She does not sing the words, but the riddle question-response provides another reference for the way the film is edited and also hints at the filmmaker's presence. The primary references are Lang's editing in Dr. Mabuse and Vertov's anaphoric one. At the end of the opening scene, Georgia walks towards us. We cut to Georgia young, staring up at a movie screen in a scene from Jean-Luc Godard's *Contempt* (1963). It is a close-up, so she looks into the camera at a slightly oblique angle in an off-screen, off-direct address, considering, watching. The final scene is also a scene from *Contempt* of Georgia from behind walking and then running down a path between overgrown grass, a ragged "desire line," and at the end of it the buildings of Titanus Studio in Rome and Jack Palance, playing the American movie producer, pulling up in a red convertible. This film ends before he arrives. As she descends the path, she runs her fingers through the grass, here in slow motion, a moment of spontaneity caught by the camera.

The film takes its twelve-act structure from Dr. Mabuse and Mikhail Kuzmin's poem in identifying twelve interlocking themes:

1. Family
2. Photography
3. Voice, Dubbing, Censorship
4. Translation
5. Scenes in ruins, fragments, memory, war and the larger question of "civilization"
6. Feminisms circa 1963 and now
7. Industry and institutional cinema war stories
8. Marriage Rites
9. Spectatorship
10. Acting the self
11. Fantasy and projection of identity/nationality/culture/gender and international feminisms
12. The indifference of Nature, the indifference of fate

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[479] Fredric Jameson, *Brecht and Method*, Second Edition edition (London; New York: Verso, 2011), 54.

Appendix B: A Table for Brecht

"Epic Theatre"(1930) with a Column for the Lyric

In Brecht's chart delineating dramatic and epic theater, he describes the absorption of traditional dramatic theater in contrast to the critical distance of the epic theater. Brecht writes that the table format should not overemphasize total oppositions but rather shifts in accent. He describes a different accent, "In a communication of fact, for instance, we may choose whether to stress the element of emotional suggestion or that of plain rational argument."[480] It is possible to imagine the third column as another accent.

Dramatic Theatre	Epic Theatre	Lyric Theatre
plot	narrative	between expression and performance
implicates the spectator in a situation	turns the spectator into an observer	turns spectator into speaker *and* observer of self in motion towards the other (thus spectatorship rather than observation)
wears down the capacity for action	arouses the capacity for action	understands action to be a function of desire; a ritual (repeatable & "universal") action
provides spectator with sensations	provokes the spectator to make decisions	provokes individual to consider sensations of collective decisions and conditions
experience	picture of the world	decanter of encounter
spectator is involved in something	spectator is made to face something	called upon to respond to something
suggestion	argument	invocation and appeal
instinctive feelings are preserved	instinctive feelings [brought to] recognition	celebrated
the spectator is in the thick of things	the spectator stands outside and studies	the spectator is the projected onto something other; locus and the audience
the human being is taken for granted	the human being is the object of inquiry	the human being is must occupy a nexus between object and subject pole
	intersubjective space over objects	between humans is the object of projection
humans do not change	humans can and do change	capacity: there are multiple possibilities within humans at any time
eyes on the finish	eyes on the process	eyes (and ears) on the patterns, echoes, cycles, interface
one scene gives way to another	each scene for itself	scenes repeatable with a difference in series
growth	montage	duration and suspension
linear development	curves	circles, boomerangs, waves (ebbs and flows)
evolutionary determinism	jumps	dispersal and unification, pulsing
human being as a fixed point	human being as a process	human being as dialectical, dialogic process
thought determines being	social being determines thought	being (feeling) and thought (form) mutually determining
feeling	reason	feeling plus defamiliarized reason

"Entangled in the ideology" it is ideology and its limits revealed "even as [lyric] helps to compose it" (Culler *Theory of Lyric* 339) i.e., each address is potentially an interpellation and each interpellation an address; however, in apostrophe the interpellation fails by virtue of summoning a world that is opaque and thus cannot be controlled by the ideologue

The lyric column sketched here does not promise to be an absolute dialectical sublimation of two antithetical accents but rather to describe the "theater" (or more broadly, a phenomenological state of being in community) that is interested in expressing the process of negotiation and comparison

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between differences within the community. It chooses and is chosen in dialogue, as both the actor and the spectator. The lyric "column" (a kind of third force) constantly mediates or negotiates between the two others in the present, offering the possibility for constantly new sublimations and forms of "community as self-presence" in the continuous present of lyric temporality. The "theatre" can apply to any mise-en-scène (i.e. theater of war, public square, home theater, etc.)

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