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Educated into Violence: The Colonial Origins of Separatist Rebellion

DISSERTATION

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in Political Science

by

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DEDICATION

For *Angelyn Mendoza*, who has been my main source of comforting pasta, never-ending lipstick, and pep talks into the wee hours of the night just to get me through all of these pages;

For *Jai Dave*, who came into this madness late but didn't let the prospect of it scare him off and instead fit into all the parts of my life so seamlessly that it still doesn't feel real;

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Educated into Violence: The Colonial Origins of Separatist Rebellion

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
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Why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? Independence is a context in which states exhibit political instability and weakness, yet not all groups take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede. Rationalist explanations of rebellion which focus on factors of wealth or opportunity over-emphasize the ability of groups to take advantage of certain moments and under-emphasize how groups perceive wealth or opportunity. Emotive explanations emphasize the importance of subjective determination and relative conditions. Yet while these studies point to political exclusion or perceptions of backwardness, they do not account for how groups end up in a position or why they come to this conclusion. Without considering education, these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. What students learn influences the nature of grievances and opportunities for social mobility.

I address two necessary conditions for when separatist rebellion occurs: development of a national identity and perceptions of inclusion based on this identity. I argue that colonial education policies structure group perceptions of inclusion in the new state, becoming particularly salient in the lead-up to independence. Penetrative education policies encourage the development of a national identity by strengthening the attachment of minority groups to the

colonizer and bonds within the same community. As a result, rebellion tends to happen sooner because it is easier for groups to identify conditions of discrimination. In contrast, shallow education policies do not strengthen reliance on or association with the colonizer and instead promote political fragmentation within groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallowly educated groups are less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity. This ultimately delays rebellion. I utilize archival data from colonial officials and semi-elite interviews as evidence for process-tracing in two cases: the Moros in the Philippines and the Karen in Burma.

Introduction

"It is in the encouragement and promotion of education on these lines that the government can perhaps do most to strengthen the national unity of the Karens."
-Donald M. Smeaton[1]

"It has been truly asserted that while the effects of schools are lasting, they become apparent only with the lapse of time."
-Sixto Y. Orosa[2]

Variation in the Onset of Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia

Several regions in the world are comprised of states that were former colonies. One of the most salient features of much of the post-colonial world is a mismatch between borders and peoples. In most cases, post-colonial states did not get to choose their borders but instead ended up settling for where colonial powers left or what colonial powers agreed upon in peace treaties. As a result, several states in the post-colonial world are host to multiple ethnic groups, many of which are in the minority because they did not get to decide the boundaries of their state. In some cases, these groups wage separatist rebellions against a state they do not see as theirs.

On one hand, scholars have identified the role of political, social, or economic inequality in fostering rebellion.[3] On the other hand, scholars have also found that rebellion is more likely to occur between different ethnic groups "because ethnic groups are more apt to be aggrieved,

[1] Donald M. Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma* (1887).
[2] Sixto Y. Orosa, "The Sulu Archipelago and Its People," (Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Company, 1931).
[3] This is not an exhaustive list. See Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ted R. Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," *International Political Science Review* 14, no. 2 (1993); Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (2011): 478–495; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90; Håvard Hegre & Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 508–535; Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Dataset," *American Sociological Review* 74 (2009): 316-37.

better able to mobilize, and more likely to face difficult bargaining challenges."[4] While ethnic diversity alone is not a sufficient cause of violent conflict, it can make certain things easier. This matters because disputes related to self-determination are more likely to escalate and are also less likely to be resolved by compromise, accommodation, or settlement.[5] Thus, separatist rebellions can last a long time. This is problematic, since longer conflicts can solidify communal cleavages and diminish the likelihood of cooperation in the future.[6]

Figure 1: Rebellion in Southeast Asia

Rebellions waged by various ethnic groups against the state have broken out across Southeast Asia (SEA) as demonstrated in Figure 1. On average, SEA is home to some of the

[4] Ethnic wars for secession make up 39:40 cases that Walter and Denny assess. Elaine Denny and Barbara F. Walter, "Ethnicity and Civil War*," Journal of Peace Research* 51, no.2 (2014): 199-212.

[5] Barbara F. Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[6] Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory & Cases* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990).

lengthiest rebellions, especially when these conflicts are separatist in nature (see Table 1 and 2). Based on data I generated from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset & UN Regional divisions, SEA has a longer average length of conflict than other regions. Based on data from Collier, Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, a comparison of the average length of conflicts in their total 77 cases versus the 6 cases in Southeast Asia showed that conflicts in Southeast Asia last almost three times as long.[7] It is also a region marred by colonial conquest on part of European powers along with the Americans and the Japanese. SEA is an area of the world where a colonial context shapes the development of these states and the subsequent rebellions that happen within them. There are two states in particular where we see variation in both the colonial context and the onset of separatist rebellion: the Philippines and Burma.

Table 1: Duration of Ethnic Conflict by Region[8]

[7] See Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Måns Söderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 253–273.

[8] Using the data from the Ethnic Power Relations data set, each of the cases was categorized based on the UN divisions (See Appendix). Southeast Asia, region 11, has a longer average length of conflict.



Table 2: Duration of Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia[9]



[9] Using data from Collier, Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom from *On the Duration of Civil War,* a comparison of the average length of conflicts in their total 77 cases versus the 6 cases in Southeast Asia showed that conflicts in Southeast Asia last almost three times as long. The regions were categorized based on the same classifications in Table 1 of the Appendix.

Both the Philippines and Burma are home to some of the lengthiest and most violent separatist rebellions. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has fought against the Philippine government since the early 1970s for self-governance while the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) has been battling the Burmese government for their own state since 1949. These rebellions have become protracted and increasingly violent. There have been several ceasefires and peace treaties negotiated between the Philippine government and the MNLF along with other splinter groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). There are also more radicalized groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf, with which the government does not negotiate. Similarly, there have been a number of ceasefires between the Karen National Union (KNU), the political branch related to the KNLA, and the Burmese government. In 2019, the KNU commemorated its 70th year of fighting.

In the years leading up to and following independence across Southeast Asia, many ethnic groups were not silent about their displeasure at the prospect of joining a state that was not their own. Sometimes, groups sent delegations to the capitals of their respective colonial power to lobby for their own state. Other times, they expressed their concerns in writing or through formal declarations. Such was the case for Muslims in the Philippines, one of whose leaders put it as follows:

> We are independent for 500 years. Even Spain failed to conquer us. If the United States quits the Philippines and the Filipinos attempt to govern us, we will fight.
> - Statement presented to U.S. Colonel Carmi A. Thompson by the Sultan of Sulu, one of the Moro leaders, in 1921[10]

Here we see a clear statement of displeasure about being ruled by a different authority accompanied by the threat of violence. This was made by the Moros, the collective term coined by the Spanish to describe the Muslim population they found when they colonized the

[10] "America's Mohammedan Wards," *Congressional Record* Volume LXVIII—Part 3, *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the Second Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress*, p. 2424, 1927.

Philippines. The Moros could, and did, rebel. But not during Philippine independence. On the other hand, groups like the Karen in Burma made similar claims and went on to launch a bloody rebellion soon after Burmese independence. These rebellions were both separatist in nature, fueled by the desire of ethnic groups, to control their respective political fates. Yet they happened at very different points in the states' histories.

My research addresses why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? Separatists rebel when they 1) develop a national identity and 2) perceive disadvantages on the basis of this identity. In this dissertation, I demonstrate the mechanism by which education policies shape this development and perception, ultimately affecting the onset of separatist rebellion. The puzzle of early and late seceders is contingent upon when these two necessary conditions are met.

This introduction will proceed with a definition of the terminology used in this dissertation. The following section presents my theory regarding the onset of separatist rebellion, followed by a literature review in which I show the gaps in the literature that this theory addresses. I then describe the research design and case selection in the project. Finally, I outline the remaining chapters of the dissertation.

Terminology

The dependent variable in this project is the *onset of separatist rebellion*. I will work backwards to break down each of these components, including related terms. I begin with *rebellion*. Rebellion involves the use of violence against the state.[11] *Separatist rebellion*, then, is the use of violence against the state in pursuit of a separate state. Separatists are often, but not always, a nation. What, then, is a nation? A *nation* is an ethnic group that seeks to control its

[11] This is consistent with Russell's definition of rebellion as "a form of violent power struggle in which the overthrow of the regime is threatened by means that include violence." Weede and Muller note that works on rebellion do not always agree on "the threshold of participation and violence." Diana E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Erich Weede and Edward N. Muller, "Rebellion, Violence, and Revolution: A Rational Choice Perspective," *Peace Research* 35, no. 1 (1998): 43-59.

own political fate, either in the form of independence or autonomy. Nationalism is the belief that this identity component, ethnicity, matches with a political component, a state. National identity, then, is an individual's sense of membership to the nation.

It is fitting to then define *ethnicity*, since nations are based on it. The existing literature defines ethnicity as membership around the perception of a shared culture or ancestry.[12] These "socially relevant ethnic groupings" can be based on cultural, religious, or linguistic differences.[13] Several scholars challenge the assumption that rebellion is ethnic simply because ethnic groups are involved. Ethnic identity must be more than circumstantial.[14] I contend that separatist rebellion often falls along ethnic lines because the legitimacy of nation-states rests on the desire to be ruled by "their own people."[15] The desire to separate from the existing colony and become a distinct state is a substantive consequence of ethnic membership.

The last component of the dependent variable is *onset*. By onset, I refer to when separatist rebellion begins. But marking when something begins needs a reference point. I consider independence as the reference point. As a result, immediate onset occurs soon after a colony's independence whereas delayed onset is at least a decade after independence. *Early seceders* are groups who have an immediate onset of separatist rebellion while *late seceders* have

[12] The State Failure Project defines ethnic wars as "episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seeks major changes in their status." See Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Pamela Surko, Alan Unger, and Rochert Chen, "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning," 1998; Kanchan Chandra, "Introduction," in *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*, ed. Kanchan Chandra (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, (1922) as characterized in Andreas Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries," *American Journal of Sociology* 113 no. 4 (2008): 970–1022.
[13] James D. Fearon, "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 no. 2 (2003): 195-222.
[14] Bruce Gilley, "Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 6 (2004); Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Harvard University Press, 2004).
[15] Andreas Wimmer, *Waves Of War* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

a delayed onset. Lastly, my independent variable of *colonial education policies* refers to formal decisions made by officials about how schools serving the colonized population are structured.[16]

Argument

My research addresses the puzzle of early and late seceders by asking the question why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? Separatists rebel when they 1) develop a national identity and 2) perceive disadvantages on the basis of this identity. In this dissertation, I demonstrate the mechanism by which education policies shape this development and perception, ultimately affecting the onset of separatist rebellion. In order to understand when groups decide that they want their own state, it is necessary to understand the conditions that shape a group's understanding of what inclusion or exclusion will mean for them. Accounting for this variation, in turn, requires moving back in time to colonial rule.

I begin with colonial education policies. I rule out pre-colonial conditions on the basis that colonialism set societies on a decisively new course. I will show that the groups most resistant to being educated were also less likely to rebel right away. This suggests that group characteristics are less salient in determining education policy. In addition, "we find the same power adopting different systems in the same place at different times, and in different places at the same time."[17] This suggests that the charactestics of the colonial power are also not salient in

[16] In my focus on colonial education policies, I deviate from characterizations of colonialism as direct or indirect and instead focus on how much room for minority identities these policies leave. In this way, I measure colonial reach through institutions of education rather than on political infrastructure or economic institutions. By doing this, I am able to measure the extent of colonialism through a very specific institution, education, that has long-term impacts on the development of identity beyond a single generation. It also allows me to measure the effect of colonialism without rather than relying on identity of the colonial power as a heuristic. This addresses some problems with some studies of colonial power in that the1) same colonizer used different strategies in the same colony, depending on the group (i.e. British divide and rule) 2) same colonizer used different strategies across different colonies 3) multiple colonizers in the same colony over time. By focusing on a specific set of institutions, education, I am able to still look at formal decisions without measuring so broadly that I fail to capture significant variation.

[17] John Sydenham Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge University Press, 1948), 277.

determining education policy. As a result, I do not consider the determinants of colonial education policies as salient, especially for the outcome of rebellion onset.

Education, in particular, has the capacity influence both of the necessary conditions identified in my argument. First, education can impact the develop of national identity through a shared experience and curricula. Second, education also has an indirect influence on conditions that serve as triggers for rebellion. This includes, but is not limited to, career mobility and political representation. The prospects for both of these can increase, depending on one's education level. Thus, "while it is no sole cause or panacea, education can play an important role in exacerbating or mitigating social conflicts."[18]

There are two types of colonial education policies: shallow or penetrative. When they are penetrative, competing local identities are crowded out in favor of a more universal identity. When they are shallow, the system makes room for local identities and does not try to replace it or crowd it out.

Figure 2: The Process of Colonial Education Policy and Onset of Separatist Rebellion



Colonial education policies have an effect on two things that influence the development of a national identity: colonial attachment and group cohesion. Colonial attachment is the external relationship between the colonized minority and the colonial power. Group cohesion is

[18] Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy: Schooling and Ethno-Religious Conflict in the Southern Philippines* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 3.

an internal one, describing how tied fellow members feel with one another. Both of these things shape whether or not a national identity develops. Combined, colonial attachment and group cohesion shape a group's perception about how well they will fare in a newly independent state, or what I call their *perception of inclusion.* This involves concerns about social mobility, career prospects, or access to resources. It is the perception of these issues that ultimately structures whether or not a group will be an early or late seceder.

I identify two causal pathways and demonstrate them using the Philippine and Burmese case. Shallow education policies established by Americans in the Philippine colony resulted in a delayed rebellion on part of the Muslim population. These policies did not strengthen reliance on or association with the colonizer and instead promoted weaker cohesion within the Muslim community. As a result, the development of a national identity was not encouraged and Muslims were less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity during Philippine independence. This ultimately resulted in delayed separatist rebellion. Penetrative education policies in Burma resulted in an immediate rebellion on part of the Karen. These policies strengthened both the Karen's attachment to the colonial power and with one another. As a result, the development of their national identity was faciliated and the Karen were more likely to perceive targeting on the basis of their identity soon after Burmese independence. This ultimately resulted in a more immediate rebellion.

Literature Review

My research addresses this puzzle by asking the question why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? The study of separatist rebellion spans literature on ethnic conflict, rebellion, and nationalism. In order to structure my assessment and critique, I divide my literature review

into three sections: conditions for separatist rebellion; rival hypotheses to colonial education policies; and competing mechanisms for education and violence.

Variation in when we see rebellion, relative to independence, remains a puzzle both empirically and theoretically. Independence is a context of political transition, negotiation, and (often) state weakness. These are all factors that scholars of political violence have indicated as times when states are especially vulnerable to rebellion. Thus, if these arguments are true, then we should expect to see rebellion during independence.

Yet rebellion during independence does not always occur. In some cases, like with the Karen in Burma, groups are early seceders who wage separatist rebellion soon after independence. But, in other cases, rebellion occurs long after a state's independence. These, like the Moros, are late seceders, who "develop only after a prolonged period of frustration and conflict."[19] The existing literature on political violence and nationalism provides many points of entry to the question of why some separatists rebel sooner than others. But they also leave gaps that need to be addressed.

Conditions for Separatist Rebellion

On one hand, rationalist explanations of rebellion spend a lot of time identifying factors that make rebellion appealing, either because there are resources or windows of opportunities that make success feasible. If these arguments were true, then we would expect to see far more rebellion happening during independence because new states are more likely to experience political instability and weakness.[20] Yet not all groups take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede even when they have the resources to do it. Furthermore, wealthy and poor

[19] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* 236 and 243. Horowitz first uses the term "early seceder" in his discussion of backwards groups in backwards regions.
[20] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, And Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

groups alike make separatist demands. In focusing on opportunities or resources, rationalist theories of rebellion downplay how groups *perceive* these factors. Some groups choose to rebel when they do not have enough resources or when success looks unlikely. In addition, other groups do not rebel when they have resources or could succeed. These instances suggest that perception plays a bigger role than what is accounted for by rationalist explanations.

On the other hand, emotive explanations emphasize the importance of subjective determination and relative conditions in spurring rebellion because groups perceive these conditions as unequal. More recent studies of rebellion consider political exclusion or, very specifically, *perceptions* of backwardness on the eve of independence. These perceptions, or what some call "subjective evaluations" play a role in onset.[21] But these studies do not account for *how* groups end up being excluded or *why* they end up perceiving that they are worse off relative to others.

I address the problems with rationalist and emotive explanations by focusing on education as an explanation. This draws from the literature on the relationship between education and identity formation, along with education and modernization. In particular, education influences opportunities for social mobility, particularly when careers are dependent upon specific skills or languages. There may be other institutions that influence this, such as political ones that determine who is or is not eligible for employment. Colonial officials were particular about who they hired, especially when it came to their non-European civil administration. But in many cases, employees were not eligible for even low-level administrative positions unless they had the right language or skills. Often, this had to be learned in schools.

[21] Subhasish Ray, "Sooner or Later: The Timing of Ethnic Conflict Onsets after Independence," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 6 (2016): 800-814.

Without considering education, these explanations miss what shapes the *underlying* conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. Education addresses what these two categories of explanations for rebellion miss: the development and salience of national identity, in relation to things like resources, opportunity, or deprivation. Education serves as the means by which groups have better career opportunities or access to resources. Inequality can easily by fostered by cutting some groups off from education entirely. I focus on both the *content* and *process* of education, linking *what* students learn and *how* they learn it to how they form a common identity and perceive discrimination on the basis of it.

Rival Hypotheses

First, I turn to international factors that may influence the onset of rebellion. Support from other governments or the diaspora can provide groups with the resources or motivation necessary for rebellion.[22] If these arguments were true, then we should see substantial external support for early seceders. But the efforts of the diaspora are less relevant during the colonial period since a diaspora does not exist yet. The displacement of people from states often took place during post-colonial conflicts or after state borders was drawn to divide up existing colonies. Moreover, it was unlikely that a state would stand against a colonial power to support a rebellion in the colony, even if co-ethnics were involved. We should expect to see late seceders finally rebel when they have international support. I will demonstrate that international support alone is not an immediate cause for rebellion. All it does it help prepare a group to mobilize until a targeted threat occurs or extend the duration of a rebellion after it starts.[23]

[22] Erika Forsberg, "Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (2013); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004): 563-95.
[23] Ibrahim Elbadaw and Nicholas Sambanis, "External Interventions And The Duration Of Civil Wars," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2433 (2000).

Arguments about how early seceders are motivated by perceptions of backwardness do little to operationalize this concept. One solution has been to focus on the role of ethnic exclusion on the eve of independence. Exclusion becomes salient when it involves those in power favoring their own members at the expense of others.[24] However, exclusion alone is still an insufficient explanation for the onset of rebellion. It is a proximate cause that does not address why some groups feel excluded or why some worry more about exclusion from state offices and government contracts while others do not. In order to understand the origins of exclusion from careers in government, distributional benefit from the public purse, or even political representation, it is necessary to move backwards from the eve of independence to the period preceding it: colonialism. More broadly, exclusion on the eve of independence does little to explain late seceders other than to indicate that ethnic exclusion became salient at some point after independence. Yet these arguments do not describe the threshold or tipping point in which ethnic exclusion causes rebellion. I address the underlying conditions that shape how groups identify exclusion as salient.

A timelier rival hypothesis concerns the presence of other groups. There is evidence that the rebellion of one ethnic group in a state can cause a "domino effect" in which other groups rebel, too. The mechanism by which this occurs concerns either the signal that governments send about being willing to concede to challengers or that a situation of ongoing conflict is a period of state weakness.[25] There are two consequences concerning early and late seceders if these

24 Andreas Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 92.

25 Forsberg, "Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall?"; Stephen M. Saideman, "Policy Paper 18: Is Pandora's Box Half-empty or Half-full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration," 1995; Henry E. Hale, "The Parade Of Sovereignties: Testing Theories Of Secession In The Soviet Setting," *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 1 (2000): 31-56; Barbara F. Walter, "Explaining The Intractability Of Territorial Conflict." *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (2003): 137-153;Ted Robert Gurr and Will H. Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis Of The 1980s With Risk Assessments For The 1990s." *American Journal of Political Science* (1997): 1079-1103.

arguments are true. First, we should expect to see more late seceders only *after* governments have made concessions. Yet this leaves little consideration for early seceders, especially the ones who rebel first. Second, there should be more early seceders during armed struggles for independence. But this is not the case. Moreover, it does not explain the logic of late seceders who ignore a period of state weakness. My theory provides a way to understand the logic of both early and late seceders along with when late seceders finally rebel.

A series of rival hypotheses from the existing literature concerns pre-colonial political centralization. My aim is not to disregard pre-colonial legacy arguments entirely.[26] Rather, I rule out pre-colonial factors for my specific outcome of interest. Pre-colonial conditions are less salient for separatist rebellion because of object of their action, the entity from which they wish to secede, is a state that is a direct colonial creation. In addition, colonialism inhibits the independent development of natives by constraining their agency. I rule out pre-colonial conditions on the basis that colonialism, whether rule was direct or indirect, set societies on a decisively new course. This was the case no matter how rule was carried out.

The last rival hypothesis I rule out is a state's pathway to independence. Colonies can become independent through armed resistance or peaceful negotiation. Minority groups are at a disadvantage in either scenario, since they lack the numbers to wage a successful resistance or the votes to influence negotiations. Situations of armed resistance should be more conducive to secessionists because, unlike negotiations, minorities do not need the permission of others to participate. More importantly, minorities are more secure in their perception of status in a new state when independence is negotiated. This is because negotiations generally conclude with a constitution that outlines rights and government systems. Even between the two states in

[26] Pre-colonial conditions have yet to take center stage in comparative studies, but there are works that have begun to assess their role on contemporary outcomes. See Ewout Frankema, "The Colonial Roots of Land Inequality: Geography, Factor Endowments, or Institutions?" *The Economic History Review* 63, no. 2 (2010): 418-451.

Southeast Asia that achieved a negotiated independence, the Philippines and Burma, there is variation in early and late seceders. This suggests, at the very least, that negotiation alone is an insufficient explanation. Instead, I consider how factors of education influence how groups perceive the terms of negotiation and what it means for inclusion in the newly independent state.

Mechanisms of Education and Violence

The literature concerning education and political violence highlights several mechanisms. The tolerance literature argues that education can reduce violence by creating shared norms.[27] Education increases an individual's critical thinking and cognitive skills, enabling them to empathize better with individuals who have a different background. Education also socializes students into accepting norms about equality that are more likely to lead to peace.[28] These arguments imply that any curriculum should lead to less violence. If this mechanism is correct, then the most-educated individuals should be the least likely to rebel. However, this is not the case. One of the founding members of the MNLF in the Philippines was a former university professor.

Other mechanisms focus on how education promotes violence. The frustration-aggression mechanism suggests that educated individuals use violence as recourse for grievances because they better understand and expect more from their political context. Furthermore, being educated can help develop skills critical for participation.[29] Yet if this mechanism was correct, then the most-educated individuals should be less likely to rebel since they presumably understand how

[27] "Tolerance education" refers to pedagogical approaches that use education to address problems of social development. The belief in tolerance education and its potential for peace exists in both academic and policy circles. For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sees education as a way to address intolerance as it promotes shared rights between different people. See UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, 1995, http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/ declarations/tolerance.pdf

[28] Lange and Dawson, "Dividing And Ruling The World?"

[29] In particular, education can provide an understanding about how to properly assert oneself into the proper channels to enact change.

to navigate other solutions for their problems. In addition, they should be less susceptible to scapegoating that does not accurately reflect their plight.

The critical socialization literature emphasizes how schools can be segregated on the basis of an exclusive identity such as ethnicity, thus making violence between groups more likely. This may not always be carried out with malicious intent.[30] But this practice may also reinforce differences in identity or limit the social contact between groups, reducing the likelihood that relationships will form between them. Moreover, separated schools can thwart efforts to create a common identity through a shared language or history. It is also more likely to result in separate curriculums. This can be especially damning for broad nation-building projects.

The critical socialization literature does not go far enough in its assessment of the context and content of education. It implies that separation between groups can result in conflict. But separation can also be uneventful. The *content* of the process rather than the process alone may make a difference in the onset of rebellion. It is not merely a matter of literacy, but also of what is being read. This assessment is consistent with existing studies that focus on *how* educational systems grapple with differences.[31]

The argument I put forth in this dissertation most closely aligns with the critical socialization literature. I argue that the mechanism at work in this process is through education as a common experience. Education facilitates the development of a national identity. It is not simply that students are learning the same things. What matters is that students are sharing a formative experience in the classroom. In order to determine whether or not this mechanism is at work, I consider levels of enrollment and curricula. In order to verify this mechanism, I should find that students learning similar things in different settings to be less likely to develop a

[30] Students and schools may be separated along the basis of language or religion since the process of instruction may be easier, especially with familiar instructors.
[31] Tony Gallagher, *Education in Divided Societies (*Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

national identity that serves as the basis for rebellion. I should also find that rebellion does not occur until a common education *experience* takes place. When members of a group experience uneven levels of enrollment, I should find that educated members are more prone to rebellion, as well.

Research Design

Methodology

I utilize an interdisciplinary, multi-method approach of two cases. I primarily engage in comparative historical analysis for each, a method that involves making structured comparisons along similar characteristics across each case.[32] I bolster this method with process-tracing to determine the causal mechanisms that link factors in the colonial education to the onset of separatist rebellion in each case. The use of primary documents from archives, secondary historical accounts, and interview accounts all provide additional pieces of evidence that enable me to construct a more accurate account of the influence of colonialism on various separatist groups. I utilize records from the perspective of the colonizing power and colonized groups for a more holistic understanding.

My theory is focused on explaining the process of how colonial education policies and the onset of rebellion are linked. Because it is a multi-step process, process-tracing is a suitable method for gaining causal traction on each of the steps that link my independent variable to my dependent variable. Process-tracing is a form of within-case analysis that makes descriptive and causal inferences based on pieces of evidence that are seen as part of a temporal sequence of events.[33] In order to focus on the unfolding of events over time, since an outcome like separatist

[32] Dan Slater, *Ordering Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
[33] Mahoney addresses the potential for causality in this method. See James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical-Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis,* ed. By James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

rebellion does not just come into fruition overnight, it also becomes important to describe key steps in the process.

A more comprehensive understanding of process-tracing can be obtained through a combination of the works of different scholars. According to George and Bennett, the process-tracing method "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable."[34] Process-tracing "maps the process, exploring the extent in which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the mechanism."[35] Lastly, process-tracing involves making deductions about how "events [within a case] are linked over time."[36] Sequencing and long-term processes are important in showing how "casual analysis is fundamentally historical – the order of events or processes is likely to have a crucial impact on outcomes."[37]

The goal of my process-tracing is to demonstrate the cause-effect link between colonial rule and separatist rebellion through a series of steps.[38] It involves "the use of evidence from within case studies to make inferences about historical explanations."[39] This evidence is referred to as causal process observations (CPOs), which concern context, process, or mechanism.[40] It is important to clarify that CPOs need not be uniform across my cases. Rohlfing particularly defines CPOs as "non-comparable observations," indicating that forms of evidence can vary

[34] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies And Theory Development In The Social Sciences* (MIT Press, 2005) 206.
[35] Jeffrey T. Checkel, *It's The Process Stupid! Process Tracing In The Study Of European And International Politics*, no. 26. Arena, 2005.
[36] Jack A. Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions," in *Comparative Historical Analysis,* ed. By James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 48.
[37] Paul Pierson, *Politics In Time: History, Institutions, And Social Analysis* (Princeton University Press, 2004), 56.
[38] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Cornell University Press, 1997).
[39] Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.). *Diplomatic History: New Approaches* (New York: Free Press, 1979).
[40] Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices," in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool.*

from one case to another.[41] Thus, I utilize a combination of primary and secondary sources from archives in combination with semi-structured interviews.

Case Selection

Southeast Asia is a region that displays diversity, particularly along the outcomes of my variables. At the same time, the region also maintains a shared history that serves as a control in this study. I cannot control for all factors, but I am able to limit the number of influential ones through my focus on this region alone. Because of its diverse political history, focusing on Southeast Asia for theory development first is important since "why some entire regions of the world are so much different when it comes to such major events."[42] This focus mirrors the approach of scholars supporting Comparative Area Studies.[43] There are currently 11 states in Southeast Asia (Table 3).

[41] Ingo Rohfling, "Don't Call It Causal When It Is An Observation," *Politics, Science, Political Science*, 2012 https://ingorohlfing.wordpress.com/2012/10/24/dont-call-it-causal-when-it-is-an-observation/

[42] Benjamin Smith, "Comparing Separatism Across Regions: Rebellious Legacies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East," in *Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications* Ed. Ariel I. Ahram, Patrick Köllner, and Rudra Sil (Oxford University Press, 2019).

[43] For more recent work regarding Area Studies, see *Comparative Area Studies:* 2019.

Table 3: Southeast Asian States

Brunei Darussalam	Philippines
Cambodia	Singapore
Indonesia	Thailand
Laos	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Vietnam
Myanmar	

My focus on independence periods removes cases that were either not colonized or did not exist under the period of European colonialism.[44] There are many ways to determine this. One dataset is the Correlates of War (ICOW) Project Colonial History Data Set, which has a "decolonization" value for the *IndType* variable. This criterion removes Thailand because it was never formally never colonized despite a history of land lost to colonial powers in the form of treaties.[45] This also removes Timor-Leste as it separated from Indonesia in 2002. Singapore is also ruled out due to its formation being a result of its expulsion from Malaysia in 1965. From the 11 possible Southeast Asian states, this leaves 8.

There are two ways that colonies become independent: through violence or negotiation. Using the same ICOW dataset, this can be assessed using the *IndViol* variable.[46] Upon applying this criterion, colonies in Southeast Asia can be divided into two categories (Table 4). The nature of a colony's transition to independence involves a series of competing variables. Focusing on just one pathway to independence can better, but not perfectly, control for this. For example, an

[44] "The entity was a dependency ruled by a foreign power before achieving independence. (Note that this includes traditional colonies, protectorates, and parts of empires, as well as any other entities that were ruled by a foreign power or that were part of an entity that was not in the COW system)." Paul R. Hensel, "ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0." 2014 http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html

[45] Shane Strate, *The Lost Territories: Thailand's History of National Humiliation* (University of Hawaii Press, 2015).

[46] This is a dummy variable measuring if independence was violent or not. If yes, then "the independence occurred through organized violence." If no, then " the independence did not involve organized violence." "An independence process is considered violent if it comes to pass through armed revolt by the entity, or if it occurred through armed conflict between the former ruler and another state (as when the entity in question is conquered or freed by a foreign power, or when it changed hands as part of a treaty ending a war)."

armed struggle for independence involves the potential of multiple actors fighting with or against the colonial power. This is particularly important in the context of Southeast Asia as some peasant revolts and Communist efforts contributed to the outcome of independence.[47] But this was an unintended consequence on their part. The role of these groups who were neither nationalist nor separatist still influences the context. The order and number of challengers to government authority has also been found to make a difference in when groups decide to rebel.[48] From the 8 possible cases, I turn to the 3 that experienced a peaceful transition to independence.

Table 4: Southeast Asian State Pathways to Independence

Pathway to Independence	
Peaceful Transition to Independence	Brunei Darussalam Burma (Myanmar) The Philippines
Armed Struggle for Independence	Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaya North Vietnam

The two colonies I focus on are Burma and the Philippines. I rule out Brunei, as it does not experience separatist rebellion. This is determined via the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Dataset.[49] Turning to Burma and the Philippines holds

[47] For a thorough description of these outcomes, see George McT. Kahin, "The Postwar Revolutions in Southeast Asia," *The Antioch Review* 11, no. 2 (1951).
[48] Barbara F. Walter, "Building Reputation: Why Government Fight Some Separatists But Not Others," *American Journal of Political Science*, 50, no. 2 (2006).
[49] Based on UCDP data, Brunei is not a case that experiences territorial incompatibility, which is "Incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (internal conflict)." See Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset*," Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–637; Therese Pettersson, Stina Högbladh, and Magnus Öberg, "Organized Violence, 1989-2018 And Peace Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 4 (2019). Similarly, Brunei does not have any minorities who have waged a rebellion, based on the MAR Qualitative Dataset. In particular, it does not have any ethnonationalist rebellion, which is "These are regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political

several significant independent variables constant. First, both colonies experience a bifurcation in their administrative structure based on where minorities lived. The Philippines was split between civilian rule for the Christian areas and military rule for the Cordillera Autonomous Region and Muslim Province. Burma was divided between Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas. Second, both cases involved several colonial influences, in which the initial one heavily pushed for religious conversion. The Philippines was a Spanish colony for several centuries prior to American and Japanese colonialism. The Spanish succeeded in converting many locals to Christianity. In Burma, American Baptists were active prior to British colonial efforts. Baptists succeeded in converting many locals, as well. Third, both cases became independent in the absence of an armed struggle.

I then determine which ethnic groups to focus on in Burma and the Philippines. There is only one case in the Philippines, that of the Moros. This provides me with a case of delayed onset, since they do not rebel for more than two decades after Philippine independence. In Burma, there are two groups which engage in separatist rebellion: the Karen and the Shan. I focus on the Karen, since they serve as a case of immediate onset. In Chapter 5 where I outline the onset of rebellion, I will demonstrate how my theory also applies to the case of the Shan. Thus, I have a case for each of the two pathways outlined in my theory.

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autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government, who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945." See Minorities at Risk Project, "Minorities at Risk Dataset," College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2009 http://www.mar.umd.edu/

Table 5: Indicating Separatist Rebellion

	Date of Independence	Years Until Rebellion	Separatist Rebellion
Source	*ICOW Colonial History Dataset*	*UCDP Prio Dataset*	*MAR Qualitative Database*
MYANMAR	1948		
Arakan		0	:
Karen		1	X
Mon		1	:
Kachin		1	:
Karenni		9	:
Shan		10	X
Lahu		25	:
Nagaland		43	:
Wa		49	:
Kokang		61	:
Palaung		65	:
THE PHILIPPINES	1946		
Moros		24	X

While Burma and the Philippines have significant similarities, there is also variation in my variables of interest for both the Muslims and the Karen.[50] It took some time for the term Moro to be used within the community and its use is still contested in some circles. Broadly, the term refers to the at least 13 different tribes who all practice Islam, albeit with some variation. Various sultanates engaged in treaties with different powers. Muslims resisted efforts of Spanish conversion, being pushed further south into Mindanao and Sulu in the process. In addition, they resisted efforts of any colonial power to subjugate them and demonstrated a capacity to rebel several times throughout the colonial history of the Philippines. The Moros were never favored by the colonial power. In summary, they had a common basis for identity, experience with self-rule, geographic concentration, shared history of oppression, and demonstrated capacity to rebel.

[50] A comparison for how each case defies the theoretical expectations can be found in Appendix C.

These are factors that existing studies argue as salient.[51] The Moros should have been most likely to rebel during Philippine independence. Yet they do not. Instead, they are a case of delayed onset.

There is significant variation within the Karen regarding dialect, religion, and location. Within-group variance along these factors should have made it less likely for the Karen to rebel.[52] The two main dialects are Sgaw and Pwo Karen. While Baptist efforts succeeded the most with the Karen, not all of them are Christian. Some are Theravada Buddhists while others are animists, sometimes referred to in colonial documents as "heathen Karen." The population was often described as scattered, with a concentration of Karen near the border with Thailand and the Tenasserim area further south. There was also not a history of pre-colonial Karen political organization, let alone a state. While they were in the minority, the Karen experienced British favor in civilian administration and military/police hiring along with political representation. This was in contrast to pre-colonial tensions with the Bamar, who were in the majority. The Karen did have a Karen National Association (KNA), which advocated for the education, representation, and economic plight of the community as a whole. The KNA was a considerate effort of representation. However, the community was still an incredibly heterogeneous and scattered group. They had no experience of self-rule, and experienced relatively less tension during colonial rule. All of these factors indicate that the Karen should have been less likely to rebel during Burmese independence.[53] Yet they are a case of immediate onset.

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[51] A myriad of studies contribute to highlighting the salience of these factors. For a few examples, see Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, And Civil War,"; Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*; Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns Of Ethnic Separatism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 2 (1981): 165-195; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict."
[52] Denny and Walter, "Ethnicity and Civil War."
[53] Ibid.

Dissertation Outline

In Chapter 2, I outline my theory concerning the onset of separatist rebellion. I identity two types of colonial education policies: penetrative and shallow. Penetrative education encouraged the development of a national identity by heightening the attachment of minority groups to the colonizer and strengthening bonds within the same community. On the other hand, shallow education policies did not heighten colonial association and instead encouraged fragmentation. Grim perceptions of inclusion on the basis of this national identity make separatist rebellion more appealing. As a result, penetrative policies prime groups to be early seceders while shallow ones encourage late seceders. I situate this argument more concretely in several literatures in order to highlight the importance of colonial legacies and education for national identity formation and rebellion.

In Chapter 3, I recount the colonial history and administrative development of both the Philippines and Burma. It is not a comprehensive history, as this dissertation is not focused on the entire colonial history of either state. I begin with describing how both cases were colonized and then focus on the specific development of their educational bureaucracy. I also provide an account of how the ethnic minority in question, Muslims in the Philippines or the Karen in Burma, fared during the colonial period. I briefly extend this coverage of history to how each ethnic minority group participated in WWII. This is because their actions shaped the context in which each group found itself in the lead-up to the independence of their respective colony.

In Chapter 4, I demonstrate how colonial education policies influenced the formation of national identities in the Philippines and Burma. First, I provide a detailed description of what penetrative and shallow education policies look like. I do so by turning to primary and secondary sources to show that Muslims in the Philippines experienced shallow education policies while

the Karen in Burma experienced penetrative ones. As a result, the formation of a Karen national identity was facilitated while a Muslim one was not.

In Chapter 5, I finally explain how the onset of separatist rebellion is triggered by a second necessary condition: targeting on the basis of national identity. This occurs based on whether or not education policies resulted in a stronger or weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. Ultimately, shallow education policies resulted in a weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. This is why the rebellion of Muslims in the Philippines was delayed. It would not be until scholarships from the international community and the Philippine state facilitated in the formation of a national identity AND the declaration of martial law that rebellion takes place. This is because the latter fulfilled the second necessary condition of targeting on the basis of national identity. The Karen developed a national identity due to penetrative education policies that resulted in a stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion. Yet they would not rebel either until the second necessary condition was met. This occurred soon after Burmese independence when the KNDO headquarters was attacked.

Chapter 6 is the Conclusion. I first return to my theory and summarize the main arguments in each chapter. I move to the contributions of this dissertation for existing and future research on nationalism, rebellion, and colonialism. I then broaden to the comparative implications of this project for Southeast Asia and the post-colonial world. In so doing, I consider if insights from my cases can also explain patterns of separatist rebellion in other post-colonial states and beyond.

Chapter 2: Explaining the Logic of Separatist Rebellion

"The plot of history is written, retrospectively, by the 'winners.' As a consequence, the actions of the 'losers; appear in hindsight to be fragmented, illogical, and incoherent."
-Clive J. Christie[54]

Introduction

After World War II, regions such as Southeast Asia underwent a wave of independence through rebellion or negotiation. Despite the diversity within Southeast Asian colonies, state borders often coincided with the boundaries settled by colonial powers. These borders have remained relatively intact.[55] The region has not been immune to separatist claims, but these are often viewed as "exceptions to be explained" rather than a norm.[56] Among these exceptions are early seceders, who wage separatist rebellion soon after that a colony's independence, and late seceders, who "develop only after a prolonged period of frustration and conflict."[57] Why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? Understanding *when* separatists rebel can tell us a great deal about *why*.

I argue that contrasting education policies during the colonial period structure two conditions that influence the onset of separatist rebellion: a development of national identity and perceptions of inclusion based on this identity. Penetrative education policies consist of a universal and standardized curriculum, majority or many minority instructors, a lingua franca, and compulsory or wide enrollment. As a result, these policies facilitated creation of a national identity by heightening the attachment of minority groups to the colonizer and strengthening

[54] Clive J. Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism* (IB Tauris, 1998).
[55] There are two exceptions: East Timor, which gained its independent from Indonesia, and Thailand, which was not colonized.
[56] Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 48.
[57] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* 2nd edition (University of California Press, 2001), 230, 236, 243.

bonds within the same community. Minorities educated under penetrative policies also had a grimmer prospect of their inclusion since they were more likely to be targeted by majority groups (or its allies) and were less eligible for careers in the newly independent state. Thus, they rebelled sooner. In contrast, shallow education policies in the colonial period did not heighten reliance on or association with the colonizer and promoted political fragmentation within groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallow educated groups were less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity. This ultimately resulted in delayed rebellion. In order to understand the logic of early and late seceders, it is necessary to consider how colonial education made it easier to identify and mobilize behind a national identity.

The existing literature on separatist rebellion over-emphasizes the ability of groups to take advantage of independence as an opportunity. Rationalist explanations of rebellion focus on factors of wealth or opportunity.[58] New states are found to be more prone to violence than older ones because they are more likely to experience periods of political instability and weakness.[59] Independence is a specific context in which states exhibit these characteristics, yet not all groups take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede. Furthermore, the evidence is uneven since wealthy and poor groups have made separatist demands. In focusing on opportunities or resources, rationalist theories of separatist rebellion downplay how groups perceive these factors.

Emotive explanations emphasize the importance of subjective determination and relative conditions. For example, studies that measure political exclusion or perceptions of backwardness

[58] Wimmer condenses broad categories of the literature under the label "greed-and-opportunity-tradition." It encompasses arguments related not only to opportunity but also recruitment, resources, and wealth. He characterizes these explanations as having to do with material and organizational factors. See Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configuration Analysis of a New Global Data Set," *American Sociological Review* 74, (2009): 316-337. Ray characterizes this literature as the "Rationalist Approach." See Subhasish Ray, "Sooner or Later: The Timing of Ethnic Conflict Onsets after Independence," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 6 (2016): 800-814.

[59] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, And Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.

on the eve of independence do not account for *how* groups end up in that position or *why* they come to this conclusion, respectively. Without considering education, these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. What students learn influences the nature of the grievances that they assume are true. This content also influences opportunities for social mobility, particularly when careers are dependent upon specific skills or languages. Furthermore, schools can make mobilization easier by functioning as sites for recruitment and assembly.

Separatists are often a minority group, outnumbered by a majority that will almost always have a greater share of state control. Factors such as the social mobility and career opportunities can alter the equation and mitigate the disadvantages of small numbers. Sometimes, these factors only serve to delay rebellion until a later time. In other cases, some groups never rebel. Indeed, there are far more potential separatists than actual ones. There are even fewer successful separatists. My theory implies that if groups do not develop a national identity and feel targeted on the basis of this identity to the point of feeling that their prospects of inclusion are grim, they will be less likely to rebel.

In the years running up to and immediately following independence in Asia, separatist groups were not silent in their displeasure at the prospect of inclusion into a newly independent state not their own. Some groups sent delegations to the capitals of their respective colonial power, hoping that they could appeal to the colonizing government's authority. In some cases, minorities asked for an extension of the colonial period or special arrangements to protect them in the post-colonial state. Their concerns also considered the prospect of a separate

independence.[60] Others, such as the Moros in the Philippines, expressed their concerns through formal declarations:

> "We are independent for 500 years. Even Spain failed to conquer us. If the United States quits the Philippines and the Filipinos attempt to govern us, we will fight."
> -Moros, 1921

The Moros could, and did, rebel at different points in time. But they did not rebel during independence despite making the threat to do so. On the othre hand, the Karens in Burma also made similar claims but launched a bloody rebellion soon after independence. Why were the Moros late seceders when the Karen were early seceders? Variation in the onset of separatist rebellion necessitates a closer look at the conditions that shape a group's understanding of what inclusion will mean for them. And accounting for this variation, in turn, requires moving back in time to colonial rule.

I begin with my argument, which relates contrasting education policies during the colonial period to varied onset of separatist rebellion during the time of independence. I then highlight areas in the existing literature that overlook independence as an opportune context for rebellion and situate my argument within work that traces explanations back in time to the colonial period and the institutions of colonialism itself. I conclude with the contributions of my research.

Theorizing About the Onset of Separatist Rebellion

I outline the causal process linking colonial education and the onset of separatist rebellion in Figure 1. As previously discussed, independence is a context vulnerable to rebellion due to it being one of political transition and negotiation.

[60] Horowitz, 2001, 237.

Figure 3: The Process



The process by which rebellion emerges during independence, or not, begins with the factor that influences the development of a national identity: colonial education policies. *Colonial education policies* consist of formal decisions made by officials about how schools serving the colonized population are structured. This definition excludes decisions made by the colonized population for schools they maintained on their own. I deviate from existing characterizations of colonial policies as direct or indirect and instead focus on how much room for minority identities education policies left. I categorize two types of colonial education policies: shallow and penetrative.

Penetrative and shallow education policies are ideal types that I operationalize using four characteristics: curriculum, instructors, language, and enrollment. *Curriculum* refers to what is taught in classrooms.[61] *Instructors* refers to the dominant identity of instructors in schools. *Language* refers to the language used to instruct students along with what students were expected to master during their time in school. *Enrollment* refers to the percentage of students who attended schools.[62][63]

[61] The inclusion of history courses has often been seen as integral to certain areas. See Marc Sommers and Peter Buckland, *Parallel Worlds: Rebuilding the Education System in Kosovo* (Paris: UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004); Shoshana Steinberg and Dan Bar-On, "The Other Side Of The Story: Israeli And Palestinian Teachers Write A History Textbook Together," *Harvard Education Review* 79, no. 1 (2009): 104–112. The way in which things are taught and what is included also plays a role. See Kenneth D. Bush and Diana Saltarelli, *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Peacebuilding Education for Children* (Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2000).

[62] The distribution of access to education can be made deliberately unequal, as is the case with several states on the African continent. See Ukoha Ukiwo, "Education, Horizontal Inequalities And Ethnic Relations In Nigeria,"

A series of questions guide my operationalization of colonial education policies along these characteristics. First, did schools adhere to a standardized curriculum for all students? Second, were instructors predominantly from the colonial power or educated group? Third, did schools teach or expect fluency in a single language? Fourth, did enrollment span across geographic regions and/or economic classes? The more affirmative responses to the four aforementioned questions are, the more penetrative the colonial educational policies. As an ideal type, penetrative education policies consist of a universal and standardized curriculum, colonial or familiar instructors, a lingua franca, and compulsory or wide enrollment.

Penetrative education policies encourage the development of a national identity as distinct from the majority or in line with the colonial power. *Shallow education policies* do not. Shallow education policies can be a result of deliberate decisions to educate the population differently or be a de facto result when a population resists instruction. The outcome is the same in either case: a national identity is not imposed favor of a majority or colonial one.

In order to influence the development of a national identity, colonial education policies affect two things: colonial attachment and group cohesion. *Colonial attachment* refers to the relationship of the minority group and the colonial power. A heightened attachment results in a stronger association between the two. *Group cohesion* refers to the relationship of minority group members with each other. A stronger intra-communal cohesion bodes well for the development of a national identity. Colonial attachment is an external relationship while group

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International Journal of Educational Development 27, no. 3 (2007): 266–281; Bilal Fouad Barakat, "Education and intra-alliance conflict: Contrasting and comparing popular struggles in apartheid South Africa and Palestine," *Research in Comparative and International Education* 3, no. 1 (2008): 5–19; David Johnson, "Building Citizenship In Fragmented Societies: The Challenges Of Deracialising And Integrating Schools In Post-Apartheid South Africa," *International Journal of Educational Development* 27, no. 3 (2007): 306–317.

[63] Mitsuko Matsumoto, "Schooling's 'Contribution'to Contemporary Violent Conflict: Review Of Theoretical Ideas And Case Studies In The Field Of Education And Conflict," *Research In Comparative And International Education* 10, no. 2 (2015): 238-256.

cohesion is an internal one. The former affects how non-members treat the group while the latter affects how members relate to one another.

Both colonial attachment and group cohesion shape a minority group's perception about how well they will fare in a newly independent state, or what I call their *perception of inclusion.* Included in consideration of the perception of inclusion are matters concerning social mobility, career advancement, and political representation. Perceptions of inclusion are grimmer when groups anticipate discrimination or disadvantage in these areas as a result of their national identity. It is the perception of these issues that ultimately structures whether or not a minority group will be an early or late seceder.

I identify two different causal paths, one for penetrative policies and another for shallow policies. Penetrative education policies result in both a heightened attachment to the colonial power and intra-communal cohesion. This is because the initial, and often main, organizer for schools is the colonial power. In some cases, the first generation of educated minorities may choose to work in administration and instruction. But this is all completed in a system built by the colonial power. Penetrative policies also ensure that more members of a group are simultaneously educated in the same way. The shared experience of instruction and its content results in a stronger shared group identity.

A heightened association with the colonial power and intra-communal cohesion also increase the likelihood that a minority group will have grim prospects for inclusion and the means to rebel against it. This exists for several reasons. First, minorities who benefitted from the favor of the colonial power lose this protection when the colonizer leaves. Second, minority groups run the risk of being targeted by the majority, or coalition of minorities, that outnumbers them in the newly independent state. The situation for minorities is worse when the majority did

not benefit from a close colonial association or if a coalition of neglected minorities band together and resents the favored minority. Third, even well-educated minorities may be left out of a newly independent state that structures its policies for employment and representation around the identity of the majority. The situation for minorities is worse when a national language outside of what they learned during the colonial period is established. This does not mean they are automatically precluded from learning, although this is possible, but it does place them at an initial disadvantage. Fourth, well-educated minorities are also more likely to have an understanding of their disadvantages and have the knowledge to mobilize in response to it. This is a result of not only the knowledge gained in their instruction but also because their shared experience in schools makes it easier to communicate within their community and build upon existing relationships forged in school.

Penetrative education policies ultimately result in separatist rebellion closer to the time of independence. This is because minorities become educated under the wing of the colonial power, developing a strong group identity along with it. Both of these factors make it harder for such groups to not only assimilate into but also harness opportunities in a newly independent state in which they are outnumbered. The combination of heightened attachment with the colonial power and intra-communal cohesion help construct and reinforce a group's national identity by non-members and members, respectively. Not only is the commonality between members reinforced by their education, but they are also treated as a cohesive other as a result. This path is displayed in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

Figure 4: Process of Penetrative Education Policies



Figure 5: Process of Shallow Education Policies



It is important to note three caveats. First, simply being outnumbered in a newly independent state does not mean that a minority group can expect grim prospects for inclusion. Rather, penetrative policies make it more likely that state policies favoring the majority will be a detriment to groups with a strong education background in other areas. The likelihood of hostility against the minority also increases if the majority in the new state did not benefit from a heightened colonial association in the same way as the minority. Second, penetrative education does not guarantee that a group will have the resources to mobilize. As previously discussed, groups can rebel without sufficient resources or choose not to even when they have them. What I instead argue is that penetrative education policies make mobilization *easier* as it reduces the transaction costs and time needed to build trust and communicate concerns within a community. In the face of grim prospects of inclusion, this ease is beneficial.

Third, I do not claim that shallow education policies are a necessary condition for delayed separatist rebellion. Instead, I argue that shallow education policies do not create the

underlying causes that move separatist to rebel. This is because such policies weaken or do not affect attachment with the colonizer. In addition, such policies can encourage group fragmentation, as there is not an external, standardized effort to spur community bonds. As a result, shallow policies do not necessarily make it any easier for groups to communicate a perception of grievances that can boost morale, recruitment, and patronage for the cause.

Shallow education policies do not simply reflect an absence of penetrative policies. As an ideal type, shallow policies consist of a separate or specialized curriculum, emphasis on minority instructors, multiple languages of instruction, and voluntary or low enrollment. I identify them separately because these are still a deliberate set of policies actively pursued by the colonial power. It is not simply being uneducated or neglected by the colonizer but rather a different way of being educated. Such policies are still sanctioned by the authority of the colonial power and, as such, reflect the power imbalance between colonizer and colonized even though shallow policies are less influential in developing a national identity. More importantly, shallow policies do not *actively* create outcomes in the way that penetrative policies can. In some cases, shallow policies may uphold a status quo or be the result of an inability to alter the status quo.

While my theory does not anticipate early seceders among shallow educated groups, there are some conditions that make it possible. If shallow educated groups develop a national identity prior to colonialism *and* they are targeted as a group on the basis of this identity to the point in which their prospects of inclusion are grim, then they may be early seceders. My theory can also extend to when late seceders finally rebel. Late seceders may eventually rebel if they develop a national identity after independence *and* are targeted as a group on the basis of this identity to the point in which the prospects of remaining are grim. The prospects of remaining

are grim when groups anticipate greater barriers to social mobility, career opportunities, or political representation. This is similar to when the prospects of *inclusion* are grim.

Literature Review

Separatist rebellion is an armed attempt by "an ethnic group claiming a homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is part."[64] It is a form of ethnic conflict in which groups that share a myth of common descent pursue the specific goal of statehood.[65] Almost all separatist movements since 1946 have been ethnic conflicts.[66] Unlike broader definitions of separatist or self-determination groups, I do not include groups that only want autonomy in my definition of a separatist rebellion.[67] I am specifically interested in ethnic groups that not only want control over their own political future but are also willing to take up arms for it. It is at this point that ethnic identity is not just a coincidence but becomes salient enough to justify risking one's life.[68]

The study of separatist rebellion spans literature on ethnic conflict, rebellion, and nationalism. In order to structure my assessment and critique, I divide my literature review into

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[64] I adopt this definition from what Horowitz calls "armed separatism. I specific the use of the term rebellion to solidify that the direction of this action is against the state's authority. See Donald Horowitz, "Irrendentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections," in *Irredentism and International Politics*, edited by Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1991).

[65] For Weber, this was a subjective feeling based on a shared culture and ancestry. See Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*, (1922) 1985 as characterized in Andreas Wimmer, "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries," *American Journal of Sociology 113* no. 4 (2008): 970–1022. Chandra disagrees with this, arguing more for ethnicity on the basis of descent-based attributes. See Kanchan Chandra, "Introduction," in *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics,* ed. Kanchan Chandra (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). The axis of ethnicity will vary, falling along different "socially relevant ethnic groupings" depending on the context. See James D. Fearon, "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 no. 2 (2003): 195-222.

[66] A majority of wars for secession have an ethnic component. Denny and Walter find that out of 40 wars of secession, only one was non-ethnic. See Elaine K. Denny Walter and Barbara F. Walter, "Ethnicity and Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014): 199-212.

[67] I do include groups that demand autonomy if they had made separatist demands at an earlier point in time. It is not uncommon for groups to shift demands between autonomy and independence.

[68] Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Harvard University Press, 2004). Andreas Wimmer, "Who Owns The State? Understanding Ethnic Conflict In Post-Colonial Societies," *Nations and Nationalism* 3, no. 4 (1997): 631-666.

three sections: conditions for separatist rebellion; rival hypotheses to colonial education policies; and competing mechanisms for education and violence.

Conditions for Separatist Rebellion

Explanations of ethnic conflict overlook independence as an opportune time for rebellion. The few studies that address independence focus on proximate causes. Without considering education, these explanations overlook how proximate causes of early or late seceders are structured. Rationalist explanations that focus on resources and opportunity are particularly prone to this fault. Emotive explanations, which begin to account for relative disparities, do not go far enough in demonstrating their underlying causes. I address both problems in my theory by accounting for how education policies structure the more proximate causes of rebellion, regardless of whether or not groups have the means to succeed.

Rationalist explanations for the onset of rebellion emphasize the importance of resources and opportunity in explaining the onset of hostilities. In regards to resources, rebellion occurs when groups either have the material means to do so or can expect to reap material benefits from action at that moment. These arguments can be expanded beyond the material capacity of a group to the relative wealth or resources between groups or regions.[69] A history of autonomy or direct rule can also play a role.[70] In regards to opportunity, periods of state weakness, political instability, institutional negotiation, or questionable commitment are seen as opportune times to rebel,[71] as are times when recruitment or looting is easier.[72]

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[69] Wimmer, 1997; Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns Of Ethnic Separatism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 2 (1981): 165-195; Macartan Humphreys, "Natural Resources, Conflict, And Conflict Resolution: Uncovering The Mechanisms," *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 508-537; Michael L. Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources And Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 337-356; Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore. "A Diamond Curse? Civil War And A Lootable Resource," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 4 (2005): 538-562.

[70] Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009.

[71] Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,"; Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Barbara F. Walter, "Information, Uncertainty and the Decision to

Walter provides an argument that addresses timing of rebellion without focusing on resources is. Governments have an incentive to fight earlier challengers in order to establish a reputation that will deter later ones. But governments may make concessions to earlier challengers if they can demonstrate that rebelling first is costly.[73] Within her framework, early seceders are expected when there are multiple groups with similar demands. Groups may not know if the state intends to crack down heavily on an early seceder, but they may be motivated to act first in order to receive concessions before others. However, Walter's argument does not fully account for what determines *which* group(s) will be the early seceder(s). It is this question that my study addresses.

In short, rationalist explanations for civil wars and rebellion conclude that these occur when resources and opportunity indicate feasibility.[74] The empirical evidence for these theories are mixed. Rebellion occurs even when groups are not wealthy, structuring its membership and actions.[75] This implies that groups can rebel in order to send signals or make a point, even if they are not playing to "win." Moreover, some groups do not rebel even with resources or during opportune times. Resources and opportunity alone, or together, may provide explanations for which rebellions succeed or last longer, but they cannot adequately explain why some rebellions happen sooner than others.

Secede," *International Organization* 60, no.1 (2006b); Barbara F. Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent* (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (*Princeton University Press, 2002); Barbara F. Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science,*12 (2009b): 243-261; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?" *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 2 (2011): 275–297.

[72] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004): 563-95.

[73] Walter, 2009b; Barbara F. Walter, "Building Reputation: Why Government Fight Some Separatists But Not Others," *American Journal of Political Science*, 50, no. 2 (2006b).

[74] Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War," Center for the Study of African Economics (2006): Working Paper 10. Even Horowitz concedes that separatists will not pursue their goals if they do not think that they will successfully reach independence. See Horowitz, 1981, 168.

[75] Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

There are at least two shortcomings with rationalist explanations for the onset of rebellion. First, rationalist explanations anticipate independence to be an opportune time for rebellion. Colonies become independent either through victory in an armed struggle or peaceful transition to self-government. In either case, some form of negotiation takes place to determine the parameters of colonial retreat and subsequent political institutions. Such transitions are often a period of political instability, even if brief, as power changes hands and institutions are reformed or built. As a result, there is an expectation of some state weakness on part of the newly independent state that is either inheriting institutions or building new ones. Some newly independent states are able to weather this change better than others, but the nature of a transition implies that there will be a period in which the state is still relatively less stable during independence. Newly independent states can enter into agreements or signals in an attempt to handle potential rebellion. But the nature of new beginnings also suggests that these states are less capable of making credible commitments, as well.

Despite independence being an ideal time for rebellion, few studies thematize it as a context worth studying on its own. As mentioned earlier, most studies are concerned with ethnic conflict or separatist rebellion overall, regardless of the temporal context. The few studies that do focus on why some groups rebel when the state is new while others wait or never rebel emphasize perceptions of backwardness.[76] In particular, the focus is on "the positions of ethnic groups and regions relative to others."[77] But what determines this positionality? These explanations assume that relative positions are objective features and that groups are aware of them. I advance an argument that demonstrates how education affects the perceptions groups have of their positions, regardless of reality. Understanding how these perceptions are shaped,

[76] Horowitz, 1981, 170.
[77] Ray, 2016, 803.

and when they become salient, can help us better understand why some separatists rebel sooner than others.

Second, there is an assumption by scholars that "opportune times" are apparent to groups. Such may be the case in hindsight or when an observer is removed from the field or moment. But potential rebels can interpret windows of opportunity differently, even with perfect information, and they may miss them. On the other hand, rebels can also choose to purposely interpret a moment as opportune even when it is not. Both of these situations suggest that perception plays a key role in determining the onset of rebellion, something that rationalist explanations do not fully account for. Under rationalist explanations, groups should clearly see and seize opportunities. These explanations leave little room for miscalculation or deliberate actions that delay or inhibit success.

In summary, rationalist studies of separatist rebellion miss two things. The first is in not seeing independence as a context defined by conditions of state weakness, transition, and vulnerability. The second is that, even if our studies did focus on this point, rebels might miss or choose to ignore independence as an opportune time for rebellion anyways. This paper focuses on the intersection of these two factors: who utilizes independence as an opportunity versus who does not? In doing so, the emphasis of analysis moves away from assuming that independence means the same thing for minority groups. Instead, analysis can focus towards understanding how minority groups perceive the same moment differently, based on their colonial education.

Political and economic gains may be important, but existing research has found these to be secondary to the emotions that shape perception. The emotive approach focuses on the role of subjective determinations about relative conditions. The perception of deprivation or threat plays

a key role.[78] The focus here is on relative deprivation or discrimination.[79] Discrimination can be deliberate at the hands of the state or as part of modernity's nation-building or implied through inequality.[80] This inequality can be related to situations of extreme poverty or low economic growth.[81] But actual discrimination does not need to occur. Moreover, groups can differ in which factors are perceived as salient.[82] In some cases, a group's fear for its safety can result in rebellion, independent of timing and available resources.[83] Even rationalist explanations involve some level of perception in order to assess the salience of a factor. Rationalist accounts assume that perception matches reality. Emotive accounts argue that perception does not have to match reality in order to be important.

The emotive approach accounts for how discrimination does not need to occur and mere *perception* is strong enough to motivate rebellion. These perceptions can be shaped by structural conditions or self-perceptions by members of a group.[84] As a result, perception can reflect the actual level of advantage or disadvantage a group can expect in a newly independent state or perception can be misguided due to leaders who manipulate information, respectively. Minority groups are more prone to perceiving negative outcomes from inclusion in a new state since they

[78] Kaufman focuses on how symbolic predispositions (SYPs) influence threat perceptions that shape ultimately shape patterns of politics that have a subsequent effect on the quality of ethnic relations between groups. See Stuart J. Kaufman, *Nationalist Passions* (Cornell University Press, 2015); Zeki Sarigil and Ekrem Karakoc, "Who Supports Secession? The Determinants Of Secessionist Attitudes Among Turkey's Kurds," *Nations and Nationalism* 22, no. 2 (2016): 325-46.
[79] Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
[80] Wimmer makes this argument about the centrality of discrimination several times. See Wimmer, 1997; Wimmer, 2004.
[81] Ray, 2016.
[82] Gautam Nair and Nicholas Sambanis, "Violence Exposure and Ethnic Identification: Evidence from Kashmir," *International Organization* 73 (2019): 329-63.
[83] Timur Kuran, "Ethnic Dissimilation and its Global Transmission," in *Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict*, Ed. by David Lake (San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego, 1996); David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton University Press, 1998).
[84] More recent work has begun to consider the contours of this constructions. Siddiqi, for example, questions structuralist explanations of deprivation and discrimination in favor of subjective self-perceptions of ethnic elites. See Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, "Discrimination is What Ethnic Groups Make of It: Subjective Perceptions of Peripherality Among the Mohajirs of Pakistan," *Nations and Nationalism* 25 no. 2 (2019): 697-717.

are more likely to be beholden to the policies of the majority. Such concerns about the future are heightened after a major political transition, such as when a colony becomes an independent state. The main threat a group perceives can structure patterns of politics that have a subsequent effect on the quality of ethnic relations between groups.[85] Various institutions or actors such as the colonizer, the state, or groups themselves can create these patterns. I argue that specific colonial education policies structure the perception that minority groups have about the prospect of their inclusion in a newly independent state.

Grievances can structure the subjective dispositions that are the subject of the emotive approach, but the scope of which grievances lead to rebellion is vast. The consequences of ethnicity on the length and intensity of conflict has been disputed even though grievances often do fall along ethnic lines.[86] Such grievances can be a result of relative disparities,[87] ethnic exclusion,[88] or active discrimination by the state[89] and/or competing groups.[90] The literature linking grievances to rebellion is vast and lumping all of these factors into one literature runs the risk of blurring mechanisms together in unhelpful ways. In general, this literature maintains that the more intense the grievances, the more likely that a group is to rebel. Again, however, the evidence is highly uneven. Not all aggrieved groups rebel. Moreover, groups do not always rebel when their grievances first become apparent. Such is the case even for wealthy groups that could rebel and choose not to do so. This implies that the existence and perception of grievances can

[85] Kaufman, 2015.
[86] Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War* (Harvard University Press, 2008). The trend remains even after removing secessionist movements from the universe of civil wars as cases. See Walter & Denny, 2014; Donald L. Horowitz, "The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4 (1993).
[87] Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009.
[88] Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[89] Horowitz, 1985.
[90] Ted R. Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," *International Political Science Review* 14, no. 2 (1993); Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (2011): 478–495.

occur at different points. In other words, what makes grievances salient? I argue that colonial education policies prime some groups towards perceiving inclusion as less opportune, thus result in immediate rebellion.

Emotive explanations consider the importance of relative positioning for the onset of rebellion. Horowitz argues that backward groups (which are less suited for education, employment, and per capita income) are early seceders, regardless of if they are in an economically backward or advanced region. Advanced groups, who benefitted from education and non-agricultural employment, are late seceders because they have a higher threshold for political events and tend to be more spread out across the state. While economically backwards groups often lack the numbers to place candidates in important political positions, their concerns about disadvantage are centered on "proportionality in relation to population."[91] Ray builds on Horowitz and finds that, in addition to perceptions of backwardness, early seceders are those excluded from political power on the eve of independence and downgraded in political status immediately after independence, and regionally-based.[92] Both arguments make a case for perception, yet neither considers what shapes it.

I argue that colonial education influences the likelihood of perceptions of backwardness along with exclusion or changes in political power. In order to meet the education requirements to serve in government positions or political office in the time immediately before or after independence, individuals had to have gone to school in the colonial period. Arguments that focus on factors at the eve of independence are theoretically limited. They do not tell us why some groups experience independence as a threat versus an opportunity, why some feel independence to reduce or enhance their power, and why some experience independence as

[91] Horowitz, 1985, 259.
[92] Ray, 2016.

involving a downgrade (as opposed to an improvement) of their political status. In order to understand this, we need to move back in time, so that we can identify those groups most likely to experience independence as an opportunity for separatist rebellion. Specific colonial education policies helped some groups develop a national identity in time for independence while others did not.

Rival Hypotheses

First, I turn to international factors that may influence the onset of rebellion. Support from other governments or the diaspora can provide groups with the resources or motivation necessary for rebellion.[93] If these arguments were true, then we should see substantial external support for early seceders. But the efforts of the diaspora are less relevant during the colonial period since a diaspora does not exist yet. The displacement of people from states often took place during post-colonial conflicts or after state borders was drawn to divide up existing colonies. Moreover, it was unlikely that a state would stand against a colonial power to support a rebellion in the colony, even if co-ethnics were involved. We should expect to see late seceders finally rebel when they have international support. Yet I will demonstrate that international support alone is not an immediate cause for rebellion. All it does it help prepare a group to mobilize until a targeted threat occurs or extend the duration of a rebellion after it starts.[94]

Arguments about how early seceders are motivated by perceptions of backwardness do little to operationalize this concept. One solution has been to focus on the role of ethnic exclusion on the eve of independence. Exclusion becomes salient when it involves those in

[93] Erika Forsberg, "Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (2013); Collier and Hoeffler, 2004.
[94] Ibrahim Elbadaw and Nicholas Sambanis, "External Interventions And The Duration Of Civil Wars," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2433 (2000).

power favoring their own members at the expense of others.[95] My theory accounts for how the likelihood that a group can expect exclusion increases when there is reason for those in power to resent or target them. However, exclusion alone is still an insufficient explanation for the onset of rebellion. It is a proximate cause that does not address why some groups feel excluded or why some worry more about exclusion from state offices and government contracts while others do not. In order to understand the origins of exclusion from careers in government, distributional benefit from the public purse, or even political representation, it is necessary to move backwards from the eve of independence to the period preceding it: colonialism. More broadly, exclusion on the eve of independence does little to explain late seceders other than to indicate that ethnic exclusion became salient at some point after independence. Yet these arguments do not describe the threshold or tipping point in which ethnic exclusion causes rebellion. I address the underlying conditions that shape how groups identify exclusion as salient.

Moving back in time carries its own intellectual pitfalls. One runs the risk of pursuing infinite regress and forever tracing back the "causes of causes."[96] Pierson proposes that one way to address at which point in time scholars should stop their assessment is at critical junctures that, "mark a point at which their cases begin to diverge in significant ways."[97] Periods such as the beginning and end of colonialism, I argue, fit this definition of a point of divergence. There is still a danger, however, in truncating the causal argument too soon and omitting causally antecedent conditions. Wimmer finds that this is the case in the previously assessed relationship

95 Andreas Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 92.
96 Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, "Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics" *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 7 (2010): 886-917.
97 Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton University Press, 2004).

between ethnically diverse states and poor public goods provisions. Both are legacies of state formation in the pre-colonial and colonial period.[98]

In their work on critical antecedents, Slater and Simmons instruct scholars to be clear about which factors serve as descriptive context or background similarities in their cases. These should be distinguished from rival hypotheses or critical antecedents that pose a clear challenge to a study's causal argument.[99] There are a few factors that I characterize as background similarities rather than as rival hypotheses or critical antecedents: history of persecution, group size, population dispersion, experience with self-rule, colonial administration of regions, and transition to independence.[100]

A timelier rival hypothesis concerns the presence of other groups. There is evidence that the rebellion of one ethnic group in a state can cause a "domino effect" in which other groups rebel, too. The mechanism by which this occurs concerns either the signal that governments send about being willing to concede to challengers or that a situation of ongoing conflict is a period of state weakness.[101] There are two consequences concerning early and late seceders if these arguments are true. First, we should expect to see more late seceders only *after* governments have made concessions. Yet this leaves little consideration for early seceders, especially the ones who rebel first. Second, there should be more early seceders during armed struggles for

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[98] Andreas Wimmer, "Is Diversity Detrimental? Ethnic Fractionalization, Public Goods Provision, and the Historical Legacies of States," *Comparative Political Studies* (2015): 1-15.

[99] This terminology comes from Slater and Simmons. Similar attention to context is addressed in Hillel David Soifer, "The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures," *Comparative Political Studies* 45 no. 12 (2012); Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," *World Politics* 59, no. 3 (2007): 341-369.

[100] Each of these will be elaborated upon further in empirical chapters that compare my cases.

[101] Forsberg, "Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall?"; Stephen M. Saideman, "Policy Paper 18: Is Pandora's Box Half-empty or Half-full? The Limited Virulence of Secessionism and the Domestic Sources of Disintegration." (1995); Henry E. Hale, "The Parade Of Sovereignties: Testing Theories Of Secession In The Soviet Setting," *British Journal of Political Science* 30, no. 1 (2000): 31-56; Barbara F. Walter, "Explaining The Intractability Of Territorial Conflict." *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (2003): 137-153;Ted Robert Gurr and Will H. Moore, "Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis Of The 1980s With Risk Assessments For The 1990s." *American Journal of Political Science* (1997): 1079-1103.

independence. But this is not the case. Moreover, it does not explain the logic of late seceders who ignore a period of state weakness. My theory provides a way to understand the logic of both early and late seceders along with when late seceders finally rebel.

One rival hypothesis from the existing literature concerns pre-colonial political centralization. There are several variations of this argument. One is that colonizers did not want to expend additional time and effort in creating new authorities in areas where it would be difficult to change local institutions.[102] Thus, groups with a higher level of pre-colonial centralization experienced indirect rule. If this hypothesis were true, then groups experiencing indirect rule would be early seceders. This is because groups harder to rule directly perhaps had a greater capacity to govern themselves and/or resist colonial control. I challenge this in that areas that were harder to rule should coincide with shallow education policies in which local identities were maintained. This diminished association with the colonial power and reduced intra-communal cohesion, thus delaying rebellion.

A specific variation of the pre-colonial centralization hypothesis focuses on how it influences pre-independence recruitment. Ray argues that higher levels of pre-colonial centralization led to under-recruitment in the top ranks of colonial security forces. This ultimately led to a higher likelihood of post-independence rebellion since under-recruited groups were more likely to be excluded from representation in the newly independent state.[103] Yet even among groups with similarly low levels of pre-colonial political centralization, there is variation in the onset of separatist rebellion. This suggests that pre-colonial centralization is not a rival hypothesis in explaining the onset of separatist rebellion.

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[102] Matthew Lange, *Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power (*Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); John Gerring, Daniel Ziblatt, Johan Van Gorp, and Julian Arevalo,"An Institutional Theory Of Direct And Indirect Rule," *World Politics* (2011).

[103] Subhasish Ray, "History and Ethnic Conflict: Does Precolonial Centralization Matter?" *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (2019), 417–431 ; Gerring et al., 2011.

I further rule out this rival hypothesis, and pre-colonial conditions more broadly, on the basis that colonialism, whether rule was direct or indirect, set societies on a decisively new course. This was the case no matter how rule was carried out. Indirect rule maintained a "decentralized framework in which important decision-making powers are delegated to the weaker entity."[104] As a result, local leaders were preserved on some administrative level.[105] Direct rule was a more centralized framework in which colonial officials replaced local leaders. Despite the political differences between direct and indirect rule, Mamdani argues that the effect of colonialism overall was much deeper. Indirect rule may have maintained local leaders, but it also involved shifting the mentality of the masses rather than just a local elites who were kept in power.[106]

An "extreme" case underlining the importance of this point is Thailand (Siam). Siam was never formally colonized, yet its development was considerably influenced by interaction with the British and French colonies and officials at its border.[107] If "the pressures of colonialism forced the Thai royalty to redefine and re-categorize traditional 'boundaries'-geographical, ethnographic, and legal-along "modern" lines," one can only imagine how much stronger this effect was on formal colonies.[108]

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[104] Gerring et al., 2011, 377.
[105] Lakshmi Iyer, "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences," The Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 4 (2010): 693-713; Matthew Lange, "British Colonial State Legacies and Development Trajectories: A Statistical Analysis of Direct and Indirect Rule," in *States and Development: Historical Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance*, ed. Matthew Lange and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2005: 117-139).
[106] See Mahmood Mamdani, "Historicizing Power And Responses To Power: Indirect Rule And Its Reform," *Social Research* (1999): 859-886.
[107]Rachel V. Harrison and Peter A. Jackson, eds. *The Ambiguous Allure of the West: Traces of the Colonial in Thailand*, (Hong Kong University Press, 2010).
[108] David Streckfuss, "The Mixed Colonial Legacy in Siam: Origins of Thai Racialist Thought," *Autonomous Histories, Particular Truths: Essays in Honor of John RW Smail, Monograph* 11 (1993).

My aim is not to disregard pre-colonial legacy arguments entirely.[109] Rather, I rule out pre-colonial factors for my specific outcome of interest. Pre-colonial conditions are less salient for separatist rebellion because of object of their action, the entity from which they wish to secede, is a state that is a direct colonial creation. In addition, colonialism inhibits the independent development of natives by constraining their agency. In the best case scenario, groups may develop on a relatively similar path than they would have without colonial interruption. But in the worst case scenario, their development is severely affected by the colonial interruption. Thus, beginning my analysis at the colonial period, rather than the pre-colonial, provides a stronger likelihood of assessing a group

Previous work by Fearon and Laitin further highlight the salience of colonialism for conflict. They find that post-independence civil war is more likely in areas where locals fought colonizers prior to independence. They contend with two possibilities: there is either a causal mechanism in which conflict in one period influences conflict in another or there is a proxy effect in which persistent features between periods of conflict exist. In either option, however, this effect is found in post-colonial states.[110] This implies that something related to colonialism triggers the salience of conflict or its proxies. I argue that colonial education policies can exacerbate anxiety about inclusion in a new state, thus making post-colonial states more prone to rebellion.

I counter the divide between indirect and rule as a rival hypothesis on the basis that it is an inaccurate way to categorize colonial experiences. The same colonial power implemented

[109] Pre-colonial conditions have yet to take center stage in comparative studies, but there are works that have begun to assess their role on contemporary outcomes. See Ewout Frankema, "The Colonial Roots of Land Inequality: Geography, Factor Endowments, or Institutions?" *The Economic History Review* 63, no. 2 (2010): 418-451.
[110] Fearon and Laitin, 2003.

different forms of rule at different times.[111] Shifting from direct to indirect rule also happened incrementally rather than all at once.[112] Moreover, colonial powers often used different strategies across the same colony.[113] Indirect rule, specifically, was implemented differently between colonies.[114] As a result, more recent studies of direct or indirect rule are less likely to consider them as dichotomous outcomes and instead as concepts that differ in "matters of degree."[115] Furthermore, few colonial powers implemented direct or indirect rule in the way same, aside from the British. This makes it an insufficient rival hypothesis due to variation in measurement. Instead, I focus on a specific area of colonial era policy, education, and assess its impact at the group level.

There is work that uses the identity of the colonizer as a way to operationalize different education policies.[116] Colonial powers had overarching goals for their subjects and this was reflected in education plans. However, it is not enough to consider an overall British or American education policy when different groups experienced this system differently during the colonial era. The simultaneous, yet uneven experience of different groups in the same colony

[111] Betts provides an account of how French colonial theories were based on the practices of assimilation up until the end of the 19th century. This involved administrative and cultural absorption of colonial areas for the purposes of civilizing them. But this practice eventually became replaced by a theory of association by the beginning of the 20th century. This involved a focus on making colonies more as partners in order to maintain France's empire. See Raymond F. Betts, *Assimilation And Association In French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*. No. 604 (University of Nebraska Press, 1960).

[112] Jessica Trisko Darden, "Policing Young Minds: Education and Security Policy in British Southeast Asia," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* (2018): 1–16 .

[113] The British employed indirect rule in some regions in India, which came to called the native or princely states, and direct rule in others. See Iyer, 2010; Ajay Verghese, *The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Violence in India* (Stanford University Press, 2016). This was similar to French holding in Senegal. Herbst specifically looks at colonial rule in Africa, showing that colonizers struggled to govern large colonial holdings, especially since they could not penetrate beyond the capital or coastal areas. See Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Frankema, 2010.

114 Adnan Naseemullah and Paul Staniland, "Indirect Rule And Varieties Of Governance," *Governance* 29, no. 1 (2016): 13-30; Shivaji Mukherjee, "Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India: Historical Institutions and Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 10 (2018).

[115] Gerring et al., 2011.

[116] Dupraz, for example, argues that British colonial legacies in education were more advantageous than French ones for relevant regions in Cameroon. See Yannick Dupraz, *French And British Colonial Legacies In Education : Evidence From The Partition Of Cameroon, Journal of Economic History* (2019).

suggests that scholars need to take a closer look at specific institutions and the policies that are carried out between groups. A better way to measure the extent of colonial rule is through education policies that span different colonizers.

The last rival hypothesis I rule out is a state's pathway to independence. Colonies can become independent through armed resistance or peaceful negotiation. Minority groups are at a disadvantage in either scenario, since they lack the numbers to wage a successful resistance or the votes to influence negotiations. Situations of armed resistance should be more conducive to secessionists because, unlike negotiations, minorities do not need the permission of others to participate. More importantly, minorities are more secure in their perception of status in a new state when independence is negotiated. This is because negotiations generally conclude with a constitution that outlines rights and government systems. Even between the two states in Southeast Asia that achieved a negotiated independence, the Philippines and Burma, there is variation in early and late seceders. This suggests, at the very least, that negotiation alone is an insufficient explanation. Instead, I consider how factors of education influence how groups perceive the terms of negotiation and what it means for inclusion in the newly independent state.

Mechanisms of Education and Violence

Authorities can choose to handle threats with education policies rather than force. Governments may turn to mass schooling as a way to pursue nation-building, especially when they are facing threats to territory.[117] Education can serve as a long-term solution to integrating groups on the periphery who are in danger of becoming a threat to the cohesion of the state. Similarly, education can help construct immunity to external threats that may try to divide the state from within by appealing to existing divisions.

[117] Keith Darden and Harris Mylonas, "Threats to Territorial Integrity, National Mass Schooling, and Linguistic Commonality," *Comparative Political Studies* 49, no. 11 (2016): 1446-1479.

Education can assist in forming national identity, formally and informally.[118] Formal education requirements on curriculum and instruction can shape the history, language, or practices to which students are exposed. It becomes easier to establish the idea of a shared national identity when there is an education system that teaches a shared history in a systematic way.[119] Over time, this process can entrench a certain identity. The timing and content of this "scholastic revolution" educates a first cohort that can impart values to following generations.[120] Informally, characteristics of enrollment can socialize students by increasing the likelihood of interaction of different groups in the classroom. These interactions can serve to further emphasize a common national identity.

Nation-building efforts have benefited from policies that instill a sense of identity at an early age. The education system provides an accessible and standardized way to do so. The Soviet government proved as much:

> By establishing separate systems of native-language education for most of the minority ethnic groups that had their own ethnoterritorial administrative units, the Soviet government created an institution dedicated to instilling a common and separate identity among minority students. The school system fostered the development of a separate identity by physically separating students belonging to the titular ethnic group from their ethnic Russian counterparts. The identity was further reinforced in the classroom, where

[118] Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism and Modernization," in *Nationalism,* Eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, (Oxford University Press: 55-63).
[119] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
[120] Darden provides a theoretical framework for scholastic revolution. The spread of ideas across populations and geographic space become easier with the development of mass schooling, increased literacy, and standardized curricula. This also makes it easier to create and sustain a national identity because of the transmission and control of ideological narratives. Moreover, mass education has the capacity to sustain ideologies "since the first schooled generation will transmit those values in ways that previous or subsequent cohorts do not." Balcells attributes variation in the salience of Catalan national identity in France and Spain to the timing and content of mass literacy. Mass education at the hands of a strong French state prevented the successful mobilization of a competing Catalan national identity. See Keith Darden, *Resisting Occupation: Mass Literacy and the Creation of Durable National Loyalties*; Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, "The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse," *World Politics* 59 no. 1, (2006): 83-115; Laia Balcells, "Mass Schooling and Catalan Nationalism," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10 no. 4 (2013): 467-486.

> titular students were taught the culture and history of their ancestors, who were portrayed as having a direct genetic link to the members of the modern ethnic group.[121]

Educating the masses can be risky for colonial powers. On one hand, it can be dangerous for colonial powers to allow education of the colonized as it can foster anti-colonial movements against their rule. One need not look further than the numerous student-led movements against regimes in Southeast Asia, some of which benefitted from Western education overseas, to appreciate what the colonial powers themselves did at the time. On the other hand, education can be targeted in ways that benefit the colonial power by reducing administrative costs, increasing economic efficiency, and ultimately allowing for more extensive extraction of resources. It is, therefore, a double-edged sword. Administrators can make deliberate choices about who receives an education and in what. The ability to implement education policies and control their outcomes is precisely what makes education a fitting measurement for colonial reach.

The literature concerning education and political violence highlights several mechanisms that guide the criterion I use to measure colonial education policies. The tolerance literature argues that education can reduce violence by creating shared norms.[122] Education increases an individual's critical thinking and cognitive skills, enabling them to empathize better with individuals who have a different background. Differences end up being respected, or at the very least tacitly acknowledged, rather than becoming points of prejudice. Education also socializes students into accepting norms about equality that are more likely to lead to peace.[123] These

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[121] Dmitry Gorenburg, "Not With One Voice: An Explanation of Intragroup Variation in Nationalist Sentiment," *World Politics* 53 (2000): 115-42.

[122] "Tolerance education" refers to pedagogical approaches that use education to address problems of social development. The belief in tolerance education and its potential for peace exists in both academic and policy circles. For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) sees education as a way to address intolerance as it promotes shared rights between different people. See UNESCO Declaration of Principles on Tolerance, 1995, http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/ declarations/tolerance.pdf

[123] Matthew Lange and Andrew Dawson, "Dividing And Ruling The World? A Statistical Test Of The Effects Of Colonialism On Postcolonial Civil Violence," *Social Forces* 88, no. 2 (2009): 785-817.

arguments imply that any curriculum should lead to less violence. There is an emphasis on the *process* of being educated rather than the *content* of the education. What is taught, who teaches, when material is introduced, and pedagogical practices vary. This leads me to consider curriculum.

Other mechanisms focus on how education promotes violence. The frustration-aggression mechanism suggests that educated individuals use violence as recourse for grievances because they better understand better and expect more from their political context. Furthermore, being educated can help develop skills critical for participation.[124] The critical socialization literature emphasizes how schools can be segregated on the basis of an exclusive identity such as ethnicity, thus making violence between groups more likely. This may not always be carried out with malicious intent.[125] But this practice may also reinforce differences in identity or limit the social contact between groups, reducing the likelihood that relationships will form between them. Moreover, separated schools can thwart efforts to create a common identity through a shared language or history. It is also more likely to result in separate curriculums. This can be especially damning for broad nation-building projects. As a result of these mechanisms, I also consider enrollment, instructors, and language of instruction.

Similar to the tolerance literature, a key problem with both of these arguments is the focus on simply being educated. The first argument implies that being educated can help individuals identify whom to blame and how to mobilize against them. But education can also reveal underlying structural reasons for inequality or correct misinformation about deprivation. The critical socialization literature does not go far enough in its assessment of the context and

[124] In particular, education can provide an understanding about how to properly assert oneself into the proper channels to enact change.
[125] Students and schools may be separated along the basis of language or religion since the process of instruction may be easier, especially with familiar instructors.

content of education. It implies that separation between groups can result in conflict. But separation can also be uneventful. The *content* of the process rather than the process alone may make a difference in the onset of rebellion. It is not merely a matter of literacy, but also of what is being read. This assessment is consistent with existing studies that focus on *how* educational systems grapple with differences.[126] I provide a summary of each mechanism's shortcoming and which factors I include in my measure of colonial education policies as a result in Table 6.

Table 6: Addressing the Shortcomings in Mechanisms Linking Education and Violence

Mechanism	Problem	Factor
Tolerance	Emphasis on process of education rather than content	Curriculum Language
Frustration-Aggression	Emphasis on process of education rather than content	Curriculum Language[127]
Critical Socialization	Assumption that separation alone leads to conflict Focuses solely on student interaction	Enrollment[128] Instructors[129]

More recent studies identify that the relationship between education and conflict is not entirely linear. Lange and Dawson find that education can lead to ethnic violence, but only in low and middle-income countries that are ethnically diverse.[130] They conclude that education

[126] Tony Gallagher, *Education in Divided Societies (*Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[127] Establishing a common language is an important component of national identity. Anderson discusses this in depth in *Imagined Communities.* But these are not the same thing. However, common language is sometimes used as a measure for national identity because both are often included together in mass schooling. See Darden and Mylonas, 2016. For an example of a study that uses it as a proxy, see Balcells, 2013. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of Nationalism* (London: Verson Books, 1991).
[128] Many studies of education and its role on nation-building emphasize mass schooling. This is important but it is not the only thing that matters. I consider mass schooling as one component of penetrative education policies. But I also couple mass schooling with what students are learning. Darden and Grzymala-Busse adopt a similar approach in their focus on the timing and content of mass literacy and onset of communist rule. See Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2006.
[129] Instructors are hired and maintained under the authority of the colonial power. Their presence is a proxy for colonial reach. Gellner discusses the role that instructors play as part of a pyramid of schooling. See Gellner, 1983, 34.
[130] Lange and Dawson, 2010; In later work, Lange adds the condition of weak political institutions. See Matthew Lange, *Educations in Ethnic Violence: Identity, Educational Bubbles, and Resource Mobilization* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

either creates a class of highly trained individuals with the means to recognize and mobilize a lack of opportunity or that the content of curricula plays a mediating role on conflict.[131] This work emphasizes the tolerance and frustration-aggression mechanisms. Yet while this addresses *if* rebellion occurs, it does not fully account for *when.* Moreover, this account overlooks the specific context of post-colonial states.

Conclusion

In order to understand why some separatists rebel sooner than others, I argue that it is necessary to consider how contrasting education policies during the colonial period structure two conditions that influence the onset of separatist rebellion: a development of national identity and perceptions of inclusion based on this identity. The development of a national identity is facilitated by penetrative education policies that heighten attachment to the colonizer and strengthen intra-communal cohesion. Minorities educated under penetrative policies could expect a grimmer prospect of their inclusion since they were more likely to be targeted and were less eligible for opportunities on the basis of this national identity. As a result, they rebelled sooner. Conversely, shallow education policies in the colonial period did not colonial attachment and promoted political fragmentation. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallow educated groups were less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity, which ultimately delayed rebellion.

[131] Lange and Dawson, 2010

Chapter 3

Colonialism and Administration in the Philippines and Burma

"The possession of the Philippines came suddenly and unexpectedly to the American people. A succession of events which were not anticipated, but which could not properly be avoided, bound the islands to us."
–David P. Barrows[132]

"The British power in India was the instrument of fate. The need for political security along the frontier and the drive to find, in Burma and through Burma in China, new markets for the mass products of the indsutrial revolution, took effect during the nineteenth century in the piecemeal absorption of Burma in the Indian Empire."
–J.S. Furnivall[133]

Introduction

Southeast Asia is comprised of several post-colonial states. In most cases, post-colonial states did not get to choose their borders but instead ended up settling where colonial powers retreated or agreed upon in peace treaties. As a result, several states in the post-colonial world are made up of various ethnic groups, many of which are in the minority because they did not get to decide the boundaries of their state. Various Western powers, along with Japan, held colonies across Southeast Asia for several centuries.

The Spanish, Americans, and the Japanese colonized the Philippines. Colonialism in the Philippines began in the 16th century with the arrival of the Spanish. Spain maintained a hold over the Philippines for over 300 years with the exception of Mindanao and Sulu, the southern part of the Philippines occupied by Muslims. Despite a lack of total control, the entire territory of

[132] David P. Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines, 1903-1913* (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Company, 1914). Barrows was a Professor of Political Science in the University of California; Former City Superintendent of Schools, Manila 1900-01; Chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes of the Philippines 1901-03; Director of Education for the Philippines 1903-09.
[133] J.S. Furnivall, *An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma* (Rangoon: Peoples' Literature Committee and House, 1957). Furnivall was an Advisor on National Planning to the Government of Union of Burma.

the Philippine Islands was ceded to the Americans after Spain lost the Spanish-American War in 1898. Efforts to secure Philippine independence persisted beyond the Spanish-American War in what is referred to as the Philippine Insurrection or Philippine-American War. Nationalist organizations such as the Katipunan led by Emilio Aguinaldo declared Philippine independence on June 12, 1898 and hoped for American recognition. But the resulting Treaty of Paris signed on December 10, 1898 did not grant independence to the Philippines. Instead, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico changed colonial hands from Spain to the United States. Philippine insurgents disagreed with the decision and continued to resist. At least 76,000 American soldiers were deployed to the Philippines to put the resistance down. By 1903, the Americans had succeeded in bringing the Philippines under its control.[134] This included areas that had been impervious to Spanish efforts, such as the southern Philippines.

U.S. domestic politics played a strong role in determining the fate of the Philippine Islands. Republicans had several reasons for maintaining control over the Philippine Islands. They argued that Filipinos needed time to prepare for self-government and criticized how Democrats were not taking enough time to do so. At the same time, safeguarding American capital in the Philippines ensured that certain businesses would pressure Congress to prolong independence. The Philippines was also seen as a valuable point of geopolitical influence. It was already a predominantly Catholic state due to 300+ years of Spanish colonialism. But American religious leaders were keen on using it as a starting point to evangelize the rest of Asia. More importantly, the Philippines was considered a key area for maintaining naval bases that would make it possible to support the Open Door policy with China and thwart Japanese threats.

[134] Max L. Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam And Politics In Southeast Asia* (Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence College, 2007). A more detailed account of resistance by Christian Filipinos after the Spanish-American war can be found in Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines*, 1899–1903 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).

Burma was a British colony administered through the British Raj in present-day India. Through a series of three Anglo-Burmese Wars, the British annexed Burma in a piecemeal fashion and maintained rule from 1824-1948. The first Anglo-Burmese War was considered a "defensive war" in which insurgents from Burmese-controlled areas increasingly made their way into British-ruled territories. The second and third wars were influenced by British commercial and ideological interests having to do with trade and missionary work. In 1858, the East India Company transferred its holdings in Burma and India to the British Crown. This allowed for the creation of a Province of British Burma in 1862. Burma would become a Province of British India in 1886, a year after the Third Anglo-Burmese War completed the annexation of Upper Burma.

Similar to American politics, British political parties held different attitudes toward imperialism. The Conservative Party was more pro-imperialist than the Liberal Party. Even the British decision to complete the annexation of Burma with the Third Anlgo-Burmese War in 1885 was motivated by geopolitical interests regarding French expansion or industrial and financial capitalists who had interests in the British Empire.[135] Regardless of the party in power, however, a constant of British rule over Burma was characterized by their disruption of both the monarchy and the monastery. In addition, the British adopted divide-and-rule policies in which they provided preferential policies for some minorities but not others. Burma was placed under a combination of direct and indirect rule in which Indian officials were brought to the center while traditional leaders were maintained in the periphery whenever possible.[136]

[135] Webster provides a thorough comparison of the development of competing explanations for Britain's third venture in Burma. See Anthony Webster, "Business and Empire: A Reassessment of the British Conquest of Burma in 1885," *The Historical Journal* 43, no .4 (2000): 1003-1025.
[136] For a more detailed distinction of differences with British rule in India, see Ajay Verghese, *The Colonial Origins Of Ethnic Violence In India* (Stanford University Press, 2016).

Both the United States and Great Britain were democratic states with colonial holdings in the 20th century. In order to maintain this, political parties offered ideological justification. American President William McKinley proclaimed a policy of benevolent assimilation in which the goal of military presence in the Philippine Islands was to secure the rights and freedom of natives. American political parties also argued that it was necessary to prepare the Philippines for independence by assisting in the creation of a modern democracy. Eventually, a timeline for Philippine independence was established. Similarly, the British provided justification for their colonial empire by arguing that they were bringing civility to natives. Unlike the Americans in the Philippines, however, the British published a White Paper outlining its postwar plans for Burma as self-government within the British Commonwealth *without* a timeline for independence.[137]

In this chapter, I outline how the Philippines and Burma became colonies and how each was administered. There is a *general* history in which colonizers administer an entire colony. But there is also a *specific* history in which certain ethnic groups have vastly different colonial experiences than their counter parts in the majority. The purpose of this chapter is to shed more light on the colonial experience of a specific group in the Philippines and in Burma. On one hand, the Moros in the Philippines resisted far longer than Christian Filipinos. Christian Filipinos eventually gained an independent state while the Moros did not. On the other hand, the Karen in Burma experienced better education and career opportunities than the Burmese majority. Yet the Karen also did not acquire an independent state. Both the general and specific history within each colony will be addressed in this chapter. I conclude with a brief discussion of how

[137] More specifically, the British proposed getting rid of the ministerial system established in the 1935 constitution in favor of direct rule.

majorities in the Philippines and Burma secure independent states while the Moro and Karen minorities, respectively, did not.

Colonialism in the Philippines

The Spanish Period

There was not a Philippine national consciousness when Spain arrived in the 16th century. An individual patriarch or tribal chieftain commanded areas in which inhabitants spoke the same dialect and shared the same customs. But there was no concerted effort to bring everyone in the area under one ruler nor was there a basis for a shared identity at the time.[138] Pre-colonial Philippines was not politically or socially advanced, with the exception of areas in the south that were inhabited by Muslims. The Spanish engaged in a policy of *reduccion,* in which they forced smaller, scattered groups based on kin into larger ones that made administration and conversion easier.[139]

Spain instituted a standardized method of converting locals to Christianity. Priests used the local language for their evangelization. Grammar books (*artes* and *vocabularios*) translated prayers from Spanish to Tagalog in an effort to facilitate the conversion process.[140] Ultimately, conversion was rather smooth among the population in the north. Such was not the case with the Muslim population in the south, which resisted Spanish conversion at every turn. The Spanish were also not able to establish an education system that incorporated Muslims in a meaningful way.[141] As a result, a de facto separation between Christian Filipinos in the north and Muslims in

[138] Apolinario Mabini, *The Philippine Revolution*, 1969.
[139] Renato Constantino, "Identity and Consciousness: The Philippine Experience," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 6, no. 1 (1976): 5-28.
[140] Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, "Islamic Education in The Philippines" in Handbook of Islamic Education. Ed. R. Arjmand Daun (Springer International Publishing, 2017).
[141] Subject A, interview by Mary Anne Mendoza, 2018.

the south existed throughout Spanish rule. Spain was never able to bring the entire Philippine territory under their control due to Muslim resistance.

Unlike the Muslim areas in Mindanao and Sulu, Christian areas were under Spain's political control. The Minister of Colonies was responsible for the entire colony and the governor general was the representative of the Spanish king in the Philippines. A man with a military rank of lieutenant general or captain-general held the position. He had the authority to suspend decisions made by the Colonial Ministry, banish citizens, prohibit written items, prohibit political association, and prohibit religious exercise outside of Catholicism. In addition, the governor general was commander-in-chief of the Philippine army.[142]

Political leadership at the local level was also under Spanish control. Peninsular Spaniards, who were born in Spain and came to the colony, occupied positions as army offices, civil service officials, and judges. Few of these positions went to Filipinos. Some wealthy Filipinos held positions on the Administrative Council, an advisory body in which its members were not paid. But this political system lacked continuity since leadership changed based on elections in Spain. In addition, there was no representative for the Philippines in the Spanish parliament.[143]

Christian elites played a role in the colonial administrative structure of the Philippines. Emilio Aguinaldo, who led the Insurrection in the Philippine-American War, was the son of a *gobernadorcillo (*municipal governor). Later on, Aguinaldo would become a *gobernadorcillo capitan municipal (*municipal governor-captain). Manuel Quezon, an aide to Aguinaldo during the Philippine-American War, was the son of teachers. He was also of Spanish-Filipino descent. Moreover, his father was a retired Sergeant of the Spanish Civil Guard. Aside from developing a

[142] Mabini, 1969.
[143] Mabini, 1969.

group cohesion through schooling, many leaders of the Philippine Revolution developed strong colonial attachment as members of elite families who either married or worked closely with Spanish officials.

Some schools in Manila taught Latin and Spanish. This was a requirement for anyone studying philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence in the Dominican-run University of Santo Tomas. Most Philippine priests and lawyers knew Latin but not Spanish since "the educational system was wholly religious."[144] Many leaders of the Philippine Revolution wrote in Spanish, which reflects their status as members of the elite. Yet not every key figure in the Philippine revolution came from an elite family that could afford to send their sons to Spanish schools. Mabini, for example, paid for the Colegio de San Juan de Letran by working as a teacher. Few Filipinos could afford to go to school in Manila and many chose to be priests since it was a profession that was well-received by locals. Eventually, friars allowed for the inclusion of medical and pharmacy school because they did not want to encourage people to go to school overseas and risk them learning new ideas. By keeping students in their sights, friars could still control the texts and instructors in the Philippines.[145]

Many members of the Philippine Revolution embraced or benefitted from the education system set up by the Spanish. Quezon boasted of his education in the public school system that preceded the American colonial period.[146] The Colegio de San Juan de Letran in Intramuros, Manila was founded in 1620 by Dominicans. Initially, the school was meant to educate orphans to be Christians. Over time, the curriculum was modified to better complement Western

[144] Mabini,1969.
[145] Mabini, 1969.
[146] Manuel L. Quezon, *Discursos Del Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, Comissionado Residente De Filipinas, Pronunciados En La CąMara De Representantes De Los Estados Unidos, Con Motivo De La Discusión Del Bill Jones*, *1914*; Collection: The United States and its Territories, 1870 - 1925: The Age of Imperialism.

education in Europe and the United States.[147] Among its alumni are three Philippine presidents involved in the revolution: Emilio Aguinaldo, Manuel L. Quezon, and Sergio Osmeña. The college also boasts a long list of alumni who were members of the Revolution, some of which include: Ladislao Diwa, Apolinario Mabini, Gen. Mamerto Natividad, Jr., Faustino Villaruel, and many delegates to the Malolos Congress that first declared an independent Philippines with its own constitution in 1898.

The long list of alumni who went on to participate in efforts for Philippine independence demonstrates that simply being educated by the colonial power did not denote loyalty. Instead, a common education experience under the colonial power lowered the transaction cost of mobilization. Being educated in the same place made it easier for revolutionaries to find like-minded peers and mobilize. Moreover, a common curriculum also made it easier to coordinate in the same language.

American Control over the Philippine Islands

The Spanish-American War & Philippine Insurrection

Emilio Aguinaldo led the movement for Philippine independence and collaborated with the Americans against the Spanish during the Spanish-American War. Filipinos declared independence on June 12, 1898 and hoped for American recognition. But the resulting Treaty of Paris signed on December 10, 1898 did not grant independence to the Philippines. Instead, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico changed colonial hands from Spain to the United States. This was formalized on January 4, 1899, when President McKinley established that American sovereignty was to be recognized in the Philippine Islands.[148]

[147] "History of the Colegio," Colegio de San Juan de Letran- Intramuros, Manila, 2011.
[148] David P. Barrows, *A History of the Philippines* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1905), 297.

American officials expressed how "the possession of the Philippines came suddenly and unexpectedly to the American people" despite having just fought a war and negotiating a treaty with the Spanish.[149] Initially, the treaty concluding the Spanish-American War focused on Spanish holdings in Latin America. A later commission settled debates about including the Philippine Islands. While the Americans were accused of being motivated by imperialism, Barrows argues that inclusion of the Philippine Islands was done out of a responsibility to prevent "further bloodshed and turmoil."[150]

Philippine leaders disagreed with the American decision and mobilized to form an independent government and prepared for the Philippine-American War. A new government declared the Malolos Constitution on January 23, 1899 in Malolos, Bulacan. The body elected Emilio Aguinaldo as president. Battles against American forces in the Philippine capital of Manila began on February 4, 1899.[151] At least 76,000 American soldiers were deployed against what was called the Philippine Insurrection.[152] To some officials, the Americans were not suppressing a movement with a "genuine republic."[153] Instead, the Malolos Congress was seen as representing people mostly from one region in an American colony.

The Philippine Insurrection against the Americans was severely diminished in 1900. In 1900, a Civil Philippine Commission was appointed by the American president to determine legislation over the Philippine Islands with the purpose of "organizing and establishing civil government already commenced by the military authorities."[154] This body would go on to become a key administrative component in the colony. Legislature powers concerning taxation,

[149] Barrows, 1914, vii.
[150] Barrows, 1914, viii.
[151] Barrows, 1905.
[152] Gross, 2007.
[153] Barrows, 1914, x.
[154] Printed in *Public Laws Passed by the Philippine Commission,* I, xliiii ff.

appropriation of funds, and establishing a system of education, civil service, courts, and government held by the military governor were transferred to this body.[155] Its initial members included Judges William H. Taft, Luke E. Wright, and Henry C. Ide; Professors Bernard Moses and Dean C. Worcester. The Commission began work in September to convince Filipino leaders of the merits of American rule. Several of these Filipino leaders went on to hold administrative positions and eventually formed the Federal Party, which was tasked with convincing military leaders to surrender to the authority of the Americans and bring an end to the Insurrection.[156]

McKinley was re-elected President of the United States in November 1900 and opted for a stronger stance in the war against the Insurrection. General MacArthur issued a general order that resulted in the arrest of thousands in the Philippines. Among those arrested were thirty-nine leaders of the revolution called "Irreconcilables" who were sent to a military prison in Guam.[157] Remaining "zone commanders" were forced to surrender or captured. Eventually, however, they were paroled and released.

On July 4, 1901, it became possible for the establishment of a civil government in which Taft, the President of the Philippine Commission, became the first American Civil Governor of the Philippines. As an additional show of goodwill, three Filipinos were added to the Philippine Commission: Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda, and José Luzuriaga.[158] The events of 1901 set into motion the end of the Philippine Insurrection. But it is more accurate to note that "active revolution" ended in 1901 with the capture of General Aguinaldo since guerilla warfare continued with various generals until 1902.[159] The Philippine Organic Act (1902) passed by the

155 David P. Barrows, "The Governor-General of the Philippines Under Spain and the United States," *The American Historical Review* 21, no. 2 (1916): 288-311.
156 Eventually, this would change its name to the Progressive Party (*Partido Nacional Progresista);* Barrows, 1905, 308-09.
157 Barrows, 1916, 301
158 Barrows, 1905.
159 Barrows, 1914, 2, 39.

American Congress established the creation of a civil government in the Philippine Islands.[160] A key objective of the bill was to create a Philippine Assembly upon the end of insurrection and completion of a census. The goal was to eventually create a bicameral legislature with the Philippine Commission as the upper house and the Philippine Assembly as the lower house. The Act also extended the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution to Filipinos.[161] The Philippine-American War ended in 1902 after the passage of the Organic Act. By 1903, the Americans had succeeded in bringing the Philippines entirely under its control.[162] Rebels were eventually pardoned and allowed to return or remained in exile.

American Administration of the Philippine Colony

The objective of American administration over the Philippines was one of benevolent assimilation. President McKinley proclaimed this as a policy in which it was "the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples" by "substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule."[163] Unlike other colonial powers, the United States wanted to prepare its colony for eventual independence. As a result, different American presidents focused on their duty to civilize the Filipinos in an American image.[164] Some policy choices involved establishing a merit-based civil service, constitution with a bill of rights, and an elected legislature with political parties.

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[160] It is also referred to as The Philippine Bill of 1902 or the Cooper Act. See "The Philippine Bill of 1902," http://www.chanrobles.com/philippinebillof1902.htm#.Xcpc-kVKjBI

[161] Ronald E. Dolan, ed. *Philippines: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991).

[162] Gross, 2007; A more detailed account of resistance by Christian Filipinos after the Spanish-American war can be found in Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation.*

[163] "Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation by President William McKinley, December 21, 1898," Cited in Hazel M. McPherson, *Mixed Blessing: The Impact of American Colonial Experience on Politics and Society in the Philippines*, (University of the Philippines Press, 2013).

[164] Malini Johar Schueller, "Colonial Management, Collaborative Dissent: English Readers in the Philippines and Camilo Osias, 1905–1932," *Journal of Asian American Studies* 17, no. 2 (2014):161-198.

A standing committee called the Committee on the Philippines was established in the U.S. Senate from 1899-1921.[165] It was tasked with overseeing administration of the Philippine colony. After 1921, the Committee's tasks were transferred to the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions.[166] There were two Filipino deputies in the U.S. Congress who were appointed to represent Philippine interests in Congress. The Assembly chose one and the Commission appointed the other, but the U.S. government paid both salaries.

These two main bodies provided governance in the Philippine Colony. The Commission consisted of eight members appointed by the U.S. government who worked alongside an appointed governor-general. The Commission was often likened to an upper house. The second body was the Assembly, which consisted of eighty-one members for each district. Members of the Assembly were voted in and selected a Speaker from amongst them.[167] The Philippine Assembly was unprecedented among colonies. Spain did not establish legislative administration in its colonies and instead allowed the home government to legislate over everything.[168] The British had "legislative councils" in its colonies in which natives could be members, but the natives never had a separate elected body.[169]

The Assembly had the power to propose, reject, or adopt legislation in the form of bills or orders. When it came to bills, the Commission had veto power and could make amendments. Any bills approved by the Commission were then subject to the approval of the U.S. Congress,

[165] The Committee on the Philippines was established prior to the ratification of the treaty that concluded the Spanish-American War.
[166] Robert W. Coren, Mary Rephlo, David Kepley, and Charles South, *Guide to the Records of the United States Senate at the National Archives, 1789-1989: Bicentennial Edition* (Doct. No. 100-42) Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1989.
[167] Otto van den Muijzenberg, *Colonial Manila, 1909-1912: Three Dutch Travel Accounts* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2016), 32.
[168] Barrows, "The Governor-General of the Philippines Under Spain and the United States."
[169] Barrows, *A Decade Of American Government In The Philippines.*

which also maintained a veto power.[170] Once a bill reached Congress, the two Filipino deputies were allowed to comment on the proposal. There was an expectation that each deputy would represent the attitudes of the body that appointed him, either the Commission or the Assembly.[171]

There were 1,132 municipalities in the Philippine Islands in which "local self-government" was applied. There were also thirty-eight provinces that were administered by a Provincial Board consisting of a governor, treasurer, and supervisor.[172] Each governor was elected by town councilors. The governor would then appoint the treasurer and supervisor. The rules of civil service were determined by a Civil Service Board, which dictated equal opportunities for Americans and Filipinos to be employed and promoted within the public service area. When all qualifications were equal, the law determined that a Filipino be given preference.[173]

The office of Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines was created under the Spanish King Philip II. The Council of the Indies provided a list for the king to select a Governor who would live in the Philippines as his personal representative. In practice, however, the Catholic Church provided a check on the powers of the Governor.[174] After the Americans won the Spanish-American War, they appointed General Arthur McArthur as a "provost-marshal-general and civil-governor of Manila" to preside as a military governor.[175] The Philippine Commission that was established in 1900 took over many legislative powers that had previously been held by the military governor. After the Philippine Insurrection was addressed in 1901, it became clear to American officials that a civil government was in order. Therefore, the President

[170] Van den Muijzenberg, *Colonial Manila*, 32.
[171] Van den Muijzenberg, *Colonial Manila*, 33.
[172] Provinces had their roots in Spanish administrative divisions that the Americans chose to keep while simply adding more local autonomy.
[173] Barrows, *A History of the Philippines*, 311
[174] Barrows, "The Governor-General of the Philippines Under Spain and the United States."
[175] Barrows, "The Governor-General of the Philippines Under Spain and the United States."

of the Commission became appointed Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands with authority over all civil affairs that the previous military governor had held. The military governor was relieved of civil powers except in areas that were still not under full control.[176]

The Americans maintained the position of a Governor-General in the Philippines. He was appointed by the U.S. government and worked in tandem with four Americans and four Filipinos. All nine of these individuals made up the Commission. The insular, or central, government of the Philippine Islands was made up of four branches, which were directed by a Secretary who was also a member of the Commission. Each commissioner was in charge of a department. But each department was administered with an American and Filipino in charge.[177] The initial Commission corresponded to its founding members: Secretary Worcester directed the Department of Interior, Secretary Ide directed the Department of Finance and Justice, Secretary Wright directed the Department of Commerce and Police, and Secretary Moses directed the Department of Public Instruction.

Each department had several bureaus under its jurisdiction. Of particular importance for this study is the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, which was under the Department of Interior. This bureau managed, studied, and advised legislation for Muslim tribes. The Bureau of Education, which handled public schools, was under the Department of Public Instruction. In order to support the Philippine government and its administration, the U.S. Congress approved of a $3 million gift in gold to the Islands in February 1903.[178] The structure by which a bureau reported to a department headed by a Secretary within the Philippines is in contrast to the French structure of administration. The assimilationist influence of the French colonial policy meant that local officials of a department did not report to the governor-general in the colony's capital but

[176] Barrows, "The Governor-General of the Philippines Under Spain and the United States," 304.
[177] Van den Muijzenberg, *Colonial Manila*, 32.
[178] Barrows, *A History of the Philippines*, 312-13.

instead to the corresponding ministry in the colonizer's national government. Such was the case in Algiers from 1881-96 before centralization under a governor-general was pursued.[179]

Representatives in the Assembly were determined by a popular vote from *only* the Christian provinces, as its jurisdiction did not extend to pagans or Mohammedans. Instead, the Commission had jurisdiction over the non-Christian peoples through the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes created in 1901.[180] 6,987,686 Christians were counted out of a total 7,635,426 inhabitants.[181] The distribution of representatives was based on census data that counted the population at three levels: province, municipality, and barrio. The survey was completed by General J. P. Sanger, Henry Gannett, and Victor Olmsted in 1903 and published in 1905.[182]

In order to be eligible to run for the Assembly, an individual had to be at least twenty-five years old and fulfill all the requirements of a voter. Voters were men who were Philippine citizens prior to 1989 and swore their loyalty to the subsequent constitution. A voter had to be able to speak, read, and write in either English or Spanish; own property worth 500 pesos; or pay a direct tax of 30 pesos each year. Any individuals who had served in an official position under the Spanish were also considered voters.[183]

There was a clear distinction between states in the American Union versus its territories. Inhabitants of states in the Union could vote for political representatives or amendments. Territories could not influence elections and were not represented by members of Congress. Instead, territories were governed *by* Congress because the territories were "too sparsely inhabited or too underdeveloped politically to be admitted" as states.[184] At the time, Barrows

[179] Arthur Girault, *Principes de Colonisation et de Législation Coloniale* (1904), II, 388, 389.
[180] Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines*, 53.
[181] "The Census of the Philippines," (Washington, DC, 1905).
[182] Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines*, 39.
[183] Van den Muijzenberg, *Colonial Manila*, 32.
[184] Barrows, *A History of the Philippines*, 316.

considered maintaining the Philippine Islands as a territory a potential "permanent and final form" that could change depending on Filipino desires and political development.[185] He also added that, "international politics in this coming century will not be favorable to the independence of the small and imperfectly developed state."[186] Both statements indicate that American colonial officials had not yet decided if they would relinquish control over the Philippines when they took control of the colony.

American Policies in the Philippine Colony

The stance of the two major parties, the Democratic Party and Republican Party, on Philippine independence had a strong influence on overall colonial administration. After the Spanish-American War, the main point of contention between both parties concerned the Philippine Islands.[187] The Democratic Party was motivated by the goal of helping the Philippines become independent sooner. In order to achieve this, natives would be incorporated into colonial administration so that they could prepare for self-governance. On the other hand, the Republican Party was less inclined towards hastening Philippine independence. Instead, the party's efforts were focused on maintaining an American hold over the Philippines due to economic and geopolitical interests.

[185] Ibid, 318.
[186] Ibid, 318.
[187] Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines*, 63.

Table 7: American Presidents During the Philippine Colonial Period

Term	President	Party
March 4, 1897 – September 14, 1901	William McKinley	Republican
September 14, 1901– March 4, 1909	Theodore Roosevelt	Republican
March 4, 1909– March 4, 1913	William Howard Taft	Republican
March 4, 1913– March 4, 1921	Woodrow Wilson	Democrat
March 4, 1921– August 2, 1923	Warren G. Harding	Republican
August 2, 1923– March 4, 1929	Calvin Coolidge	Republican
March 4, 1929– March 4, 1933	Hebert Hoover	Republican
March 4, 1933– April 12, 1945	Franklin D. Roosevelt	Democrat
April 12, 1945– January 20, 1953	Harry S. Truman	Democrat

The Republican Party considered the Philippines a key site for economic and religious purposes. Colonel Carmi Thompson, a politician from Ohio, was sent to the Philippines in 1926 at the request of U.S. President Coolidge. Thomposon's report stated, "From the standpoint of American commercial interests in the Far East, it would be unwise to relinquish control of the Philippines at the present time...We need the Philippines as a commercial base."[188] A second motivation was religious. Governor General Wood considered the Philippines as "the center and spearhead of the great Christian effort" that would serve as a basis "for the extension of Christianity in the Orient."[189] As a result of these attitudes, the Republican Party was less inclined towards speeding up the timeline for Philippine independence as there were greater benefits from maintaining the colony.

[188] "Report of Conditions in the Philippine Islands," Cleveland, December 4, 1926. LCMD, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Box 3467-3488.
[189] Leonard Wood, Wood to Hermann Hagedorn, Manila, July 8, 1925. LCMD, Leonard Wood Papers, Box 179.

Other international powers also influenced geopolitical reasons for maintaining the Philippine colony. American presidents such as Coolidge and Hoover sought disarmament and reduction in the size of the Navy stationed overseas. However, disarmament and the ratio of ships were dependent upon the Americans maintaining their colonial hold over the Philippines.[190] For example, the Dutch and the British were worried that Philippine independence would trigger Indian, Burman, Malay, or Indonesian nationalist uprisings.[191] The British also sought American presence in Manila in order to maintain peace.[192]

The appointment of the Governor-General of the Philippines often reflected the control and aims of the elected party. For example, Republican President William H. Taft appointed William Cameron Forbes as Governor-General in 1909. Forbes supported slowing down political involvement and education development for Filipinos until their economic capacity increased.[193] Moreover, Republican presidents like Coolidge doubted the legitimacy of claims that support for Philippine independence were widespread. Coolidge wrote to Speaker of the House Manuel Roxas: "The extent to which the grievances which you suggest are shared by the Filipino people has been a subject of some disagreement."[194] This was in contrast to the findings of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, which stated that "not a single witness before your committee could name 10 Filipinos who do not favor independence" and listed different groups that had all expressed this desire.[195]

Woodrow Wilson's election in 1912 interrupted the line of Republican presidents who were elected since the Philippines became an American colony. As a Democrat, Woodrow

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[190] LCMD, Journal of W. Cameron Forbes: 2nd Series, III, 13; Ibid, 68.
[191] National Archives of Singapore, Dept. of State file 841.34546d/65, Singapore, November 1, 1928; file 846d.ooP.R./17, Singapore, July 18, 193o, Grunder and Livezey.
[192] Nicholas Roosevelt, "Philippine Independence and Peace in the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, VII (1930), 407-416.
[193] Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines*, 47.
[194] Calvin Coolidge. Coolidge to Manual Roxas, February 21, 1924. LCMD, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Box 400:1.
[195] 71st Congress, 2nd Session, *Senate Report on S.* 3822, 7.

Wilson reflected the party's emphasis on speeding up Philippine independence. The Democrats campaigned on a platform calling for Philippine independence "as soon as a stable government can be established."[196] Soon after being elected, Wilson acknowledged American holdings over the Philippine Islands but also expressed a desire "to deprive ourselves of that frontier."[197] Wilson's stance evolved while in office, still supporting independence but with a greater emphasis on a gradual pace. This was in response to some of his appointments pushing for a faster timeline.

After Wilson was elected with a Democratic Congress in 1912, members of the Philippine Commission resigned. In addition, Forbes left and Worcester retired.[198] Upon Harrison's arrival, there was no remaining Secretary of a department or American official with whom he could work. They had all left.[199]

The Democratic Party's platform influenced appointments that Wilson made to key positions in the Philippines. The Governor-General position, for example, was the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands.[200] Wilson appointed Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General of the Philippines. Harrison resigned from the U.S. House of Representatives to take the position. Upon his arrival to the Philippines in 1913, Governor-General Harrison confirmed Wilson's commitment to the Democratic position through a prepared statement: "Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for their independence, and we hope to move towards that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit."[201] Harrison heavily emphasized the importance

[196] Quoted in Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (Baltimore, 1937), 190-91.
[197] Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*, 205.
[198] Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines*, 63.
[199] Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines*, 64.
[200] C. A. De Witt, *The Power of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to Deport or Expel Aliens,* 1910.
[201] Bureau of Insular Affairs, File No. 141/85.

of speeding up the timeline for independence to the next four years. This alarmed nationalist leaders in the Philippines, such as Quezon, who expressed disdain for how Governor-General Harrison "thinks he can turn [the Islands] loose in about four years."[202]

Wilson's appointment of Harrison from 1913-1920 ensured that pro-Filipino policies would be passed. The process of Filipinization involved transferring authority away from the U.S. and to Filipinos. Harrison was particularly keen on increasing the number of natives who served in government positions as a way to prepare for self-government.[203] These efforts were aided by the fact that his American colleagues, appointed by a Republican President, did not stay in their positions upon his arrival. Initially, the Philippine Legislature consisted of an appointed upper house called the Philippine Commission and an elected lower house called the Philippine Assembly. Through the passage of the Jones Act, sometimes referred to as the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, the legislature was replaced with a Philippine Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines.[204] Harrison's overall commitment to the Philippine cause of independence enamored him with the masses. He was the only Governor-General of the Philippine who was given Philippine citizenship.[205] His Republican colleagues were less pleased with what they perceived to be attitudes outside of American interest.[206]

Not only did Wilson's choices advance Democrat platform positions in the Philippines, they also left a reality that Republicans would navigate after winning the next election. Wilson actualized the Democratic preference of preparing Filipinos for self-government in at least two

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[202] Roy Watson Curry, "Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 41, no. 3 (1954): 435-452.
[203] Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy."
[204] Executive power still remained in the hands of the Governor-General who was appointed by the U.S. president. The Jones Bill also deferred Philippine independence to a later date.
[205] Harrison was also an advisor for the first four presidents of the independent Philippine state.
[206] Ricardo Trota Jose, "Harrison, Francis Burton (1873–1957) – Champion of Filipinization" In Ooi Keat Gin (Ed.), *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, Volume 1*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

ways. First, Wilson's policies led to a Filipino majority and American minority in government. Second, he increased the number of Filipinos in civil service. Governor-General Harrison consulted leaders of the Nationalist Party frequently, thus creating a norm of the Party as an informal authority. Republicans did not express a lack of support for these changes, arguing that the changes were happening too fast.[207]

Republican control of government continued when Harding was elected after Wilson. As a result, the Republicans inherited Democratic policies in the Philippines that were not aligned with their aims for the islands. Harding assembled the Wood-Forbes fact-finding mission to assess the possibility of Philippine independence.[208] The Wood-Forbes mission found, among other things, rampant corruption. Senate President Quezon and House Speaker Osmeña, both members of the Nacionalista Party, appointed allies on boards who voted to increase loans for sugar, copra, and hemp. Loans were also mismanaged for other party members.[209] The mission concluded that Governor Harrison allowed these practices, which eventually jeopardized not only the Philippine National Bank, but also the Philippines as a whole.[210] The mission recommended that the powers of the Governor-General be strengthened, a clear undoing of what the Democrats had established under Harrison.[211] In addition, Harding appointed Wood as the next Governor-General. The Republican reversal of not only Democrat policies in the Philippines but also the appointment of Governor-General demonstrates that the direction of

[207] Frank McIntyre, "Notes on the Philippine Islands," pp. 74, 76, 77, Bureau of Insular Affairs, File No. 7519/33 ½.
[208] "General Leonard Wood Thanking Governor Ferrer Of Cavite Province, Philippines, For The Reception Of The Wood-Forbes Mission," 1921, Photograph. https://www.loc.gov/item/96500327/; Reports On Philippines; "Wood-Forbes Mission Gives President Its Findings on Island Affairs," *New York Times,* 15 Nov 1921
[209] Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge, 1974), 240-46.
[210] Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., *The American Half-Century (1898-1946)* (Quezon City, 1998), 262-63; Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), 273; HR, *GGPI 1922*, 15. As cited in Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
[211] Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, 354-55.

colonial control was less about the Philippines and more about American domestic politics.

A date for Philippine independence was set after the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Japanese Occupation during WWII delayed the timeline for Philippine independence. Roosevelt was keen on promising that independence would be pursued as soon as possible: "When the Japanese invaders have been driven out, the Philippines will take its place as a free and independent member of the family of nations."[212]

Despite the importance of presidents as party leaders, it is important to note that there was sometimes disconnect between the executive and legislative approaches towards Philippine independence. For example, Wilson was keen on granting independence to the Philippines, as had been promised. The Republican Congress under his leadership did not vote for this. Yet when Hoover vetoed a bill for Philippine independence, his Congress immediately overrode the veto. Part of this is a function of American party politics in which the Democrats and the Republicans had competing approaches towards administering the Philippine colony and its independence. More importantly, differences between the two branches demonstrate how administration of the colony was also a result of institutions in the U.S. It was less about specific characteristics of the Philippine colony and more about U.S. domestic or international interests.

American Colonialism in Mindanao

Early American Relations in Mindanao

Initially, Muslim leaders did not engage in resistance against the American arrival, hoping to remain separate from the rest of the Philippines.[213] After the Spanish-American War,

[212] Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Filipino People after the Landing of American Forces in Leyte, *Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines,* 41 no. 2, 149.
[213] Gross, 2007, 172; Peter G. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon* (New Day Publishers, 1979), 34. Finley notes that some of the Moros sided with the Americans to suppress the Philippine Insurrection but that this was done for revenge against the Filipinos rather than because they fully trusted the Americans. See Colonel John P. Finley, "The Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines. II," *The Journal of Race Development* 7, no. 1 (1916): 27-46, 33.

the Americans were preoccupied with quelling the nationalist insurgents led by Emilion Aguinaldo in the north. In an effort to not split resources, the Americans sent Brigadier General John C. Bates to Jolo to negotiate with the Sultan. His main objectives were to notify the Sultan that the Americans would inherit and assume the obligations of their 1878 treaty with Spain. He also brought $10,000 in Mexican money to demonstrate goodwill and assure the Sultan that his local authority would remain in power, especially over the pearl fishing trade.[214] Bates represented the Americans while the Sultan of Sulu, the Dato Rajah Muda, the Dato Attik, the Dato Kalkio, and the Dato Joakanain signed for the Muslim population.[215]

Several articles in the Kiram-Bates Treaty focused on maintaining the Sultan's political authority.[216] Article 1 established American sovereignty over all of Sulu, but Article 3 established the "rights and dignities" of the sultan and his datus and prohibited religious persecution.[217] The treaty also maintained that Americans would not encroach on lands near the Sultan's residence if there were no military reasons to do so. However, it allowed Americans to "occupy and control such points…as public interests seem to demand."[218] The culmination of these articles left room for American troops to survey the land and station troops while also keeping local leaders acquiescent. More importantly, the treaty ensured that the Sultan's political authority would remain intact even with the presence of a new authority. The Americans promised an external presence that was less contentious than the Spanish.

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[214] Richard F. Pettigrew, "Treaty With the Sultan of Sulu." Information Concerning the Philippine Islands," 1900.
[215] Pettigrew, "Treaty With the Sultan of Sulu."
[216] This is sometimes referred to as the Bates Agreement or American-Sulu Treaty.
[217]Pettigrew, 1900; "The Bates Treaty of 1899," Conditional Agreement Between Brig.-General John C. Bates, Representing the United States, and the Sultan of Jolo (Sulu), August 20, 1899; http://filipino.biz.ph/history/ba990820.html; MAJ Andrew J. Bacevich, Jr., "Disagreeable Work: Pacifying the Moros, 1903- 1906," *Military Review* (1982): 50-51; James R. Arnold, *The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913* (Bloomsbury, Press, 2011), 9.
[218] Pettigew, "Treaty With the Sultan of Sulu."

Certain protections were also established in this treaty. The freedom of religious worship was protected, partly due to the American treaty with Spain requiring it and also partly due to American values. In addition, the Sultan's territory, and anywhere else in the Sulu Archipelago, was assured protection from threats of foreign nations. The sultan and several datus were also paid monthly salaries. The yearly total of these salaries was an amount that was greater than the Spanish total. It also included payments for several datus, not just the ones present to sign the treaty with Bates (Table 8).[219] Thus, the treaty not only assured the continuation of self-rule, but also made it profitable to do so. Byler refers to this as a "policy of attraction" in which the U.S. tried to be persuasive about the benefits of their control while simultaneously using their might to repress naysayers.[220]

Table 8: Payments to Datus from the Kiram-Bates Treaty

To the Sultan	$250
To Dato Rajah Muda	75
To Dato Attik	60
To Dato Calbe	75
To Dato Joakanain	75
To Dato Puyo	60
To Dato Amir Haissin	60
To Habji Buter	50
To Habib Mura	40
To Serif Saguin	15

According to Arnold, the Americans were under the impression that Kiram was the most powerful Moro leader. In reality, he commanded a small group of Muslims rather than a standing army of thousands that the Americans expected. In particular, Bates had negotiated American-Tausug relations with this treaty. The Tausug were one of thirteen other Muslim tribes in the southern Philippines. Bates then obtained unwritten agreements with other Moro chiefs in

[219] Pettigrew, "Treaty With the Sultan of Sulu."
[220] Charles Byler, "Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-1913," *Military Review* (2005): 41-45. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/byler.pdf

Mindanao and Basilan.[221] In other areas, such as Cotabato, the Americans did not need to do as much since leaders like Datu Piang were willing to collaborate.[222]

Even after the Philippine Revolution and American takeover, Muslim leaders anticipated less infringement upon their autonomy. The Philippine Commission acknowledged the authority of the Sultan of Sulu by passing acts that paid him and his advisors.[223] Furthermore, Muslims had a belief that the Americans would maintain some level of separation:

> "Unconquered by the Spanish or by the Christian Filipinos, they surrendered to the United States Army because they thought they had an understanding that the American flag would govern and protect them from the Filipino flag forever."
> -Carmi A. Thompson (Special Representative to the President of the United States, 1927[224])

Finley remarks that the Muslim population did not fully comprehend the events following the Spanish-American War. Sovereignty was transferred from the Spanish to the Americans, but the Moros did not have sovereignty. The Americans replaced the Spanish and the war between the Spanish and the Filipinos subsided. Yet these details were lost on a majority of the Muslim population and only chiefs understood its meaning. This further suggests that a cohesive identity between the Muslims did not yet exist, as information would have been easier to transmit.

Administrative Structures in the Southern Philippines

The administrative control of American officials in Mindanao and Sulu grew after consolidating control. The period of noninterference came to an end in 1903 and was replaced by

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[221] Arnold, *The Moro War*, 8-9.
[222] Patricio Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2010), 200-210.
[223] Philippine Commission, Act No. 1259, "An Act Providing For The Payment Of Certain Sums Of Money To The Present Sultan Of Sulu And His Principal Advisers, And Making Permanent Appropriation Therefor," *Official Gazette* 12 Nov 1904 https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1904/11/12/act-no-1259/; Philippine Commission, Act No. 1320, "An Act Providing For The Payment Of Certain Sums Of Money To The Present Sultan Of Sulu And His Principal Advisers, And Making Permanent Appropriation Therefor," *Official Gazette* 12 April 1905 https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1905/04/12/act-no-1320/
[224] Carmi A. Thompson, "Are the Filipinos Ready for Independence," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 131 (May 1927), 3, cited in, "The Moro Province of the Philippines: National Imagination and the Periphery in Comparative Perspective" By Joshua Gedacht.

direct rule. Act 787 of the Philippine Commission established the Moro Province.[225] The Moro Province was divided into five districts in order to make administration easier: Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, and Sulu. The American army maintained governance at the provincial and district level. Civilian staff members were predominantly local Christian Filipinos and some Chinese, Europeans, and Americans.[226]

Two special provinces were created in which military rule was considered necessary. Both of the special provinces consisted of, "small disciplined cadres of junior officers, wielding enormous and autonomous authority over their subjects, and integrating the latter through intermediaries whose power was dependent on their Army superiors."[227] Army rule over the special provinces took up nearly 40% of the Philippine colony.[228]

One province was the Cordillera Autonomous Region that consisted of the northern mountain area of the island of Luzon. A large population of the Igorot resided here. Barrows notes that the population was receptive to the Americans and, as a result, trails and schools were built. It would later be named the Mountain Province and placed under direct control of the Secretary of the Interior in 1908 through Act No. 1876. The Mountain Province consisted of seven sub-provinces: Amburayan, Apayao, Benguet, Bontok, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Lepanto. The justification for not placing these areas under Filipino control was so that the Americans could protect them from exploitation.[229]

The second province was the southern area of the island of Mindanao. The inhabitants were the Muslim population that the Spanish called the Moros. This would be named the Moro

[225] Finley, "The Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines. II," 34.
[226] Arnold, *The Moro War*, 86-87.
[227] Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative*, 21.
[228] Ibid, 22.
[229] Barrows, *A Decade Of American Government In The Philippines*, 53.

Province and placed under direct Army control by Act No. 787 in 1903.[230] Five sub-provinces were included: Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Samboanga, and Sulu. In addition, a government over the Moro Province was established. It consisted of a governor, secretary, treasurer, engineer, attorney, and superintendent of schools. Muslims were less likely to be included in local administrative affairs out of the American perception that they were "backward." The Moro Province was administered separately from the rest of the Philippine colony until 1913. After that, the Moro Province shifted to civil government and was replaced by the Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1914.

The first Governor of the Moro Province was General Leonard Wood, who chose to curtail the traditional authority of Moro leaders. It was harder to build schools in this area due to continued raids and attacks on American posts. In particular, *juramentados,* which involved Moro swordsmen willing to die in attacks, plagued the peace of American officials. As a result of the Organic Act in 1903, American officials imposed provisions that threatened the status quo in the Moro Province. Some provisions targeted the power of the sultans and datus, such as the provision to abolish slavery, appoint a governor from Manila, and implement a new legal system.[231] A *cedula* tax was also collected from the Moros for the first time starting in 1903. This was initially a tax levied under Spanish rule. The *cedula* tax (a head tax) collected from the Muslim population went towards funding tribal ward districts.[232] Related to these provisions was the establishment of schools with a non-Muslim curriculum that did not teach shari'a.[233] There was Muslim resistance to these policies that persisted until American forces succeeded in restoring order in 1914.

[230] Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative*, 20.
[231] Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam And Politics In Southeast Asia*, 173.
[232] Ibid, 176; "Report of the Governor of the Moro Province 1903-04."
[233] Ibid, 173, 179.

The subsequent Muslim response to the United States was not a simple dichotomy of resistance or collaboration. Some leaders engaged in multiple strategies. For example, Datu Santiago of Cotabato initially supported Governor Leonard Wood. This changed after Santiago chose to lead a revolt against the head tax, something that had been passed more than twenty years earlier. Yet Wood accepted Santiago's surrender and reappointed him as a district leader.[234] Abinales argues that the Muslim response of resistance to and collaboration with the United States was a result of shifting context.[235] Initially, Muslims in the southern Mindanao interacted with Southeast Asia and the world beyond it rather freely. Sultans often signed treaties with European powers while resisting Spanish rule. American officials changed this context and made the Moro world much smaller by forcing them into an autonomous administrative unit.

Muslim elites also responded in different ways to Filipinization, the process by which the Moro Province was brought under authority of Christian Filipinos from the rest of the Philippine colony. Many leaders supported the idea of a separate Mindanao under continued American authority. When this did not look feasible, Muslim leaders opted for an autonomous Muslim area.[236] Eventually, support for Filipinization became the main response after proponents secured the support of datus in Lanao and the Sultan of Sulu.[237] Datu Piang would later thwart this. Piang declared loyalty for Filipinization by allowing for the expansion of public schools in Muslim areas under his control and sent two of his children to Manila to be educated.[238] Piang still continued to support the separatist cause and promised like-minded datus that he would provide

[234] Samuel K. Tan, *The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972* (Manila Filipinas Foundation, 1977), 41.
[235] Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative*, 37.
[236] Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative*, 62.
[237] Peter G. Gowing, *Mandate in* Moroland: The American government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920 (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1983), 254.
[238] One of his sons attended the Cebtral Luzon Agricultural School to study "trade and exchange" and English. *Philippine Free Press,* 6 Jan 1917.

funding for a Muslim delegation to lobby for the separation of Mindanao directly to Congress.[239] According to Abinales, Piang played both the Filipino and American side out of the need for survival.

The Moro Province was formally abolished in 1913 and replaced with the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Department was in charge of the "special provinces" of Cotabato, Zamboanga, Sulu, Lanao, and Davao.[240] Part of this was a result of U.S. domestic policy. The Democrats, proponents of Filipinization, regained control of the U.S. Congress in 1913.[241] Democrats supporting Filipinization advocated for "rapid inclusion of Christian Filipinos in the government."[242] It was also was guided by a belief that there were not significant differences between Christian Filipinos and non-Christian Filipinos. As a result, the solution was not separate administration but an integration of the non-Christian population under the Christian Filipino majority.

After 1914, the non-Christian areas of Mindanao and Sulu were relinquished from American military control. Instead, the area was placed under the authority of a civilian governor and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was created. The shift from military to civilian control in the Moro Province to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu formally took place on January 1, 1914. It involved not only administrative changes in setup and legislation but also political changes in staff.[243] One direct result of this was that public works projects could finally be pursued in the non-Christian areas. Under military control, for example, no permanent roads were built in Mindanao and Sulu aside from one connecting two camps and another to a penal

[239] Interwiew with Datu Piang, JRH, Box 28-33.
[240] *Philippine Free Press*, 25 July 1914.
[241] Patricia Horvatich, "The Martyr and the Mayor: On the Politics of Identity in the Southern Philippines," in *Cultural Citizenship in Island Southeast Asia: Nation and Belonging in the Hinterlands* Ed. Renato Rosaldo (University of California Press, 2003), 20.
[242] Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 257.
[243] Finley, "The Mohammedan Problem in the Philippines. II," 31.

colony.[244]

From 1913 to 1916, the non-Christian areas of the Philippines were under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Commission. The passage of the Jones Law in 1916 ensured that legislative control of these areas would be in the hands of a Filipino legislature, not the Americans.[245] Under the Commission and overall legislature, non-Christian areas were subject to the control of Christian Filipinos. A second outcome of the Jones Law was that 7:90 members of the lower house and 2:24 members of the Senate were representatives of the Non-Christian people. Thus, "three prominent Moros and two Pagans" were appointed.[246]

In 1920, the governorship of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was replaced with Philippine leadership. This department further integrated Mindanao into the Philippines. Mindanao and Sulu were moved to the jurisdiction of a newly established Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes that was under the Philippine Department of Interior and reported to the Philippine Legislature. Moreover, the districts of Cotabato became provinces. Cotabato remained a "special province" due to its Muslim majority while Davao became a "semi-regular province" due to its *lumad* (indigenous) majority.[247]

World War II and Philippine Independence

American colonialism is differentiated by its desire to prepare the Philippine colony for independence. After suppressing an independence movement of the Katipunan, the Americans set forth with their own vision of how to prepare the Philippines. The Jones Act (1916) established that the Philippines would be granted independence after it became a stable

[244] Maixmo M. Kalaw, "Recent Policy towards the Non-Christian People of the Philippines," The Journal of International Relations 10, no. 1 (1919): 1-12.
[245] Kalaw, "Recent Policy towards the Non-Christian People of the Philippines."
[246] Among the Moros was appointed Senator Hadji Butu Baki and two Representatives: Datu Piang and Datu Benito. See Kalaw, "Recent Policy towards the Non-Christian People of the Philippines," 10.
[247] Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative*, 75.

democracy. The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided a timeline for Philippine independence. It specified that, after a ten-year transition period, the Philippines would be independent in 1946. In accordance with the Act, an elected Commonwealth government replaced the insular government that had been setup in the Philippines as a U.S. territory.

The Japanese Occupation interrupted American influence over the Philippines in World War II.[248] Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8 1941, the Philippines was also attacked.[249] The Japanese occupied Manila on January 2, 1942 but the final surrender of US-Philippine troops was not secured until April 1942. Many Filipino elites served positions under the Japanese administration, yet the Japanese were opposed by guerillas across the Philippines.[250]

Filipinos served alongside American troops against the Japanese. Even many Muslims in the southern Philippines fought against the Japanese. There was a concerted effort against Japanese forces that landed on the shores of areas in Mindanao.[251] Japan formally surrendered in September 1945 after U.S. efforts in the Philippines and the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The American timeline for Philippine independence was eventually restored and the Philippines became independent on July 4, 1946.[252] However, the date of

[248] Harry Banda is credited with coining the phrase Japanese Interregnum to refer to this period, yet scholar such as Grant K. Goodman disagree with whether or not Japanese occupation of the Philippines was an interruption or "historical continuity." See Harry J. Benda, *The Japanese Interregnum in Southeast Asia* (Yale University Press, 1968) and Grant K. Goodman, "The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines: Commonwealth Sustained," *Philippine Studies* 36, no. 1 (1988): 98-104. For a broader assessment of Japanese Occupation in Southeast Asia, see Nicholas Tarling, *A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941-1945* (University of Hawaii Press, 2001).

[249] Immewahr provides a discussion of the adequate attention placed on Philippine casualties after the attack on Pearl Harbor despite the fact that Filipinos were considered U.S. nationals at the time. See Daniel Immewahr, *How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019).

[250] The Japanese granted the Philippines independence on October 14, 1943. This period is sometimes referred to as a puppet state in which Jose P. Laurel was merely a figurehead for Japanese authority.

[251] Spencer Davis, "Troubled Future Faces Moros in Freed Philippines: Sultan of Sulu Fears an Outbreak of Old Religious Issues," *Lewiston Daily Sun*, 22 May 1945.

[252] The celebration of Philippine independence would be later moved to July 12 to reflect Aguinaldo's initial declaration and to shed commonality with the independence date of the U.S.

Philippine independence also corresponds with what some Moro leaders refer to as a denial of *their* independence.[253]

British Control over Burma

The Anglo-Burmese Wars

The British East India Company first arrived in Burma in the 17th century. Both the British and French provided arms for warring kings in the region. However, Burma was considered less central to the Company's interests until various Burmese forces began encroaching into British-controlled territory. The British-ruled province of Bengal shared a border along the Naaf River with the Burmese-ruled province Arakan. Refugees fleeing the monarch's policies and pretenders vying for the throne fled to British India for protection and to mobilize. This escalated when Burmese troops seized staff of the East India Company along the border, bringing the British directly into the fighting. This is why the First Anglo-Burmese War is sometimes referred to a "defensive war," since they were brought in by insurgents trying to use British soil.[254]

There were a total of three Anglo-Burmese wars, with each war resulting in a British takeover of more Burmese territory. After the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-26) in which the British East India Company won, the British gained control of Assam, Arakan, and Tenasserim through the Treaty of Yandabo.[255] There were two grades: superior officials appointed by the Crown who served in the central administrative system and subordinate local officials.[256] Superior officials were able to exercise more authority in the British system of direct rule in

[253] Nur Misuari, interview by Jamela Alindogan, "Fighting for Peace in the Philippines," Vice News, 2011 https://video.vice.com/en_us/video/the-vice-news-interview-nur-misuari/5731e8a730c7459e3ab942dc
[254] Seekins, *Historical Setting.*
[255] Arthur P. Phayre, *History of Burma* (2 ed.). London: Susil Gupta, 1967.
[256] Furnivall delves into greater detail on the local organization of Tenasserim and the rest of Burma. See J.S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge University Press, 1948), 37.

places such as Tenasserim. This changed in 1834 after Tenasserim was placed under the authority of the Government of Bengal and expectations were more in line with how India was administered. Eventually, superior officers in Tenasserim were to be replaced by Europeans.[257] The European and local officials operated somewhat separately for several years, linked by the Head Native of each district. Eventually, the Head Natives were allowed to exercise judicial and magisterial powers by being promoted to the position of judge or magistrate, respectively.[258] Yet there was disconnect between who was writing and executing legislation. Burman judges and magistrates were promoted to apply the principles of Western laws without having learned English or, in some cases, without having copies of the laws they were being asked to apply.[259]

The following wars were less defensive and influenced by the commercial, ideological, and social interests of the British. There was a desire by British capitalists to open up the markets in Burma for both trade and exports. Missionaries were interested in continuing the work of Baptist Adoniram Judson, who started work in the area in 1813. Furthermore, there was an underlying motivation to bring civilization to the people in Burma that could only be provided by direct British rule.

The Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-53) resulted in the British annexation of Pegu and Martaban, which was then renamed Lower Burma. It was sparked when a Burmese governor in Rangoon arrested two British merchants for not paying customs duties. They paid a fine and were released, but the British governor general in India, the Marquis of Dalhousie, insisted on sending Commodore George Robert Lambert back to Rangoon to demand compensation and the removal of the governor. When the Burmese resisted additional concessions, the British attacked

[257] Arakan had already been placed under the authority of Bengal after shifting to civilian rule. See Furnivall, 1948, 35-36.
[258] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 38.
[259] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 39. He cites RAB, Annual Report on the Administration of Burma (1868-89), 61; 1881-82, 23.

several parts of Lower Burma. Upon successfully annexing Lower Burma as a province of British India, the British successfully added more ports to their control and stripped what was left of the Burmese kingdom of its richest areas.[260]

In 1858, British holdings in Burma and India were transferred from the East India Company to the Crown.[261] In 1862, the Province of British Burma was created through a combination of four provinces under the authority of a Chief Commissioner stationed in Rangoon. The Chief Commissioner was eventually given legal authority to extend Indian Acts to Burma of his own accord. Informally, however, this was considered unrealistic, as an extension would not be done without government approval.[262] The first Commissioner of Pegu, and later Chief Commissioner, was Major Arthur Phayre.[263] The resulting 1862 constitution in British Burma was marked by an overall expectation of uniformity in administration. New positions and departments, such as various Inspector-Generals, were created in order to maintain order. Complete annexation of Burma took place after the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885). The Third Anglo-Burmese War resulted in the annexation of Upper Burma. A year later, Burma was created as a Province of British India.

British Administration of Burma

Sovereignty over Burma rested in the British Crown through a hierarchical model. Below the Crown in Council was the Secretary of State for India and Burma, then the British Governor and the High Court, and then another hierarchy of civil service officers. The Burma Government

[260] Donald M. Seekins, *Burma: A Country Study* (1983).
[261] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 39
[262] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 39; *British Burma Gazetteer, Volume I* (Rangoon: 1879, 1880), 496.
[263] He would later have the title Sir Arthur.

acted and passed legislation through the authority of the Governor who represented the Crown. The British Parliament had the last say.[264]

After the three Anglo-Burmese Wars, the British made significant changes to the political and social structure in Burma in order to control the province. First, they abolished the monarchy and sent King Thibaw into exile. Second, they separated the Buddhist monkhood (*Sangha*) from the state. This was a particularly significant shift as monks had previously been dependent upon the monarchy for sponsorship. Third, they broke up the autonomous circle system into villages devoid of social ties. A British legal system also took over and replaced Burmese self-government.

King Thibaw had been advised by some of his ministers to flee in order to maintain fighting. But he and Queen Supayalat instead chose to surrender to the British. The king and queen were instead escorted by British troops and exiled to India. Thus, the monarchy came to an end. Remaining princes who continued resisting were defeated. Remaining insurrections also discouraged the British from choosing to put another prince on the throne in Upper Burma. Instead, they chose to ensure that Burma would be a province administered through British India.

In pre-colonial Burma, the monarch and the monastery had a close relationship. The king was not the head of the Buddhist monkhood (*Sangha*), but he was expected to provide material support. Upon removing the monarchy, the British also severed this pre-existing tie to the monastery. There was no room for the *Sangha* to bestow legitimacy to the state since the British built a secular system and allocated more authority to the courts rather than to religious figures. Furthermore, the British maintained a similar policy of religious neutrality in Burma since they had adopted this in India in light of its religious diversity.

[264] John F. Cady, "Conflicting Attitudes Towards Burma," *Far Eastern Survey* 15, no. 2 (1946): 27-31.

Furnivall went so far as to characterize the annexation of Burma as having "destroyed the Burmese social order."[265] Pre-colonial Burma was comprised of a hereditary village headman who reported to a circle chief and was responsible to a royally appointed official of the Burmese kings. The Burma Village Act of 1889 removed districts and chiefs in Lower Burma. Village headmen took over many of the jobs of the chiefs, such as in policing and collecting taxes. But the headmen were now agents of the state versus important to the village.[266] Pre-colonial village headmen derived their authority from local prestige. The Deputy Commissioners appointed colonial ones.[267]

British decisions uprooted not only the existing political structures, but also social structures. In order to account for the changes in social order, the British sought to impose a rule of law shaped by Western principles.[268] For example, a Governor-General replaced the Burmese monarch and a township officer was in charge of approximately 18,000 village units that the British created from the previous circle system. A direct result of the British break up of the circle system into villages was the limitation of village autonomy.[269] Villages could not coordinate action after the circles were broken up. In addition, villages did not have authority to determine how money was spent, even though they contributed to a district fund. Increasingly, one monastery served the needs of several villages, which was a shift from the pre-colonial norm of having one monastery per village.[270]

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[265] J.S. Furnivall, *Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma* (Peoples' Literature Committee & House: 1957), page xii
[266] Cady, "Conflicting Attitudes toward Burma."
[267] Ibid.
[268] In his Preface, Furnivall lamented how "the inadequacy of law to control the working of anti-social economic forces" was responsible for institutional failure, debt, increased crime, unrest among the Buddhist clergy, and corruption. In earlier works, he emphasized how "the prime care of any colonial power must be to maintain order." See Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 8.
[269] Seekins, *Burma*, 26.
[270] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 154.

After the Province of Burma was *created*, it was added to the British Raj and incorporated into a two-tiered system of administration.[271] First, there was Ministerial Burma, which was made up of mostly the Burman majority. Ministerial Burma was also sometimes referred to as Burma Proper and included Tenasserim, Arakan, Pegu, and the Irawaddy divisions. The second area was the Frontier (later Scheduled or Secluded) Areas where many different ethnic minorities resided. The Frontier Areas included the Shan Kingdoms, Chin Hills, and Kachin Tracts. The Karenni States were left outside of either area since it had been a de facto borderland between the Burmese kingdom and British-occupied Lower Burma after the Second Anglo-Burmese War.[272]

Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas were administered differently. A system of parliamentary home rule was implemented in Ministerial Burma since the monarchy had been removed. Greater importance and investment was placed on the rice, petroleum, and timber industries in Ministerial Burma.[273] Traditional rulers were maintained in the Frontier Areas. In addition, British divide-and-rule policies resulted in an ethnic imbalance when it came to civil service and the armed forces. The Karen, Kachin, and Chin were given preference for recruitment into regiments. However, there were fewer investments made to the development of these areas, as well. Similar to India, the British sought minimal interference in minority areas and tried to separate its administration from Ministerial Burma. A Burma Frontier Service was created in 1923 after the dyarchy system was introduced. The dyarchy system introduced an elected Legislative Council to Burma as a province of India.

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[271] Some scholars take the position that "Burma" did not exist until the British created it. For example, see Marja-Leena Heikkila-Horn, "Imagining 'Burma': A Historical Overview," *Asian Ethnicity* 10, no. 2 (2009): 145-154.
[272] In 1872, a treaty was signed which stated that "the State of Western Karenni shall remain separate and independent," See Maung Maung, *Burma's Constitution*; 169–170
[273] Furnivall provides a more detailed account of this. See Furnivall, *Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma*.

Burma was governed as a Province of British India until 1937. This meant that it was administered through the Raj, which was the administrative system of the British Indian government. The Raj was a well-organized system in which there was a hierarchy between governors, divisional commissioners, and sub-divisional officers.[274] An additional consequence of this decision was that there was an influx of migrants from India, including Indian soldiers who served under British authority (*sepoys*). Hindi was also the language used in many official capacities, such as with Burma's Post Office.[275]

Despite being administered through the Raj, British administration of Burma differed from that of India in some ways:

"In India, the British administration had to employ Indian agency for all posts, major and minor, which were not filled by Europeans. But in Burma the people were in no position to compete with the influx of Indians who flooded in to exploit the resources of the country and to take up posts for which no Burmans were available."[276]

There was an increasingly high rate of foreign and Indian people in Burma's population. Hiring Indian workers was cheaper and easier than training Burmese workers. In addition, the British subsidized the immigration and employment of Indian laborers.[277] Indian immigration mostly came from famine-prone areas like Bengal and Madras. This evened out with Burma's need for more laborers during seasons for rice planting and harvesting.[278]

[274] Jared Downing, "Myanmar 101: British Burma," *Frontier Myanmar* 11 April, 2017.
[275] Martin Smith, "Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democracy and Human Rights," (Anti-Slavery International, 1994), 23.
[276] Cited in Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 117.
[277] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice.*
[278] Seekins, *Burma*, 29.

Table 9: Racial Constitution in Burma, 1901-31[279]

Year	Percent of Total Population (a) Foreign (b) Indian	
	(a)	(b)
1901	6.97	5.84
1911	8.02	6.15
1921	8.98	6.69
1931	9.74	6.95

The Burmese colony was "a plural society consisting of several groups living side by side but separately."[280] Foreigners tempered the Burman majority. There were three major foreign groups (European, Indian, and Chinese) and each of these groups consisted of sub-groups whose identities overlapped with labor and industry. Europeans were familiar with the Western institutions that the British were bringing to Burma, especially in regards to capitalism in trade and commerce. The Burmans outnumbered foreigners, but lacked experience or education in these institutions that were necessary to be effective.[281] There was not much that these groups had in common other than an economic "desire for material advantage."[282]

Colonial Burma is sometimes described as having a "three-tiered structure" between these groups. Europeans made up the top tier by working in managerial, administrative, or professional positions. The Chinese made up the second tier, which involved retail shops along with lower positions in the engineering or medical field. Indians were also in this tier, working in transportation and communication industries. A majority of Rangoon's population and government works in Lower Burma in 1931 was Indian. The Burmese made up the last tier, often

[279] Table reproduced from Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 117 that based on Census, 1931, p. 224
[280] Furnivall, *Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma*, k.
[281] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 158.
[282] Ibid.

resistant to or prevented from working in the city. They were soon outnumbered, even in the capital.[283]

Unsurprisingly, municipal institutions worked best in Rangoon. There were many Europeans working alongside the most-educated Burmese, Indian, and Chinese people who were often amenable to Western ideals. But outside of Rangoon, municipal administration left much to be desired, especially when it came to overcrowding and high turnover of officials. Rural self-government also did not do well.[284] In direct contrast, however, was the success of self-government in villages.

The *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms* recommended "as far as possible complete popular control in local bodies and the largest possible independence for them of outside control."[285] One consequence of this was the Rural Self-Government Act of 1921, which created district councils in charge of vernacular education, public health, sanitation and vaccination, and cattle dispensaries. There were also circle boards and village committees, but these were not effective as the councils were not unified, members were not familiar with Western regulations, there was a lack of freedom to fully regulate, and committee members did not want to do certain tasks.[286]

Burmese political development increased through the introduction of diarchy and separation from India. The system of diarchy was introduced in 1923. This was the result of increased pressure from the Burmese for self-government after British proposals for the process caused a delay. The new constitution created a system of self-government that resembled the diarchy system in India for Burma Proper but not the Shan States or the Karenni and Tribal Hills.

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[283] Seekins, *Burma*.
[284] Furnivall provides a detailed account for this. See Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 151-53.
[285] Furnivall, *Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma*, 155.
[286] ISC, Report and Proceedings of the Indian Statutory Commission (1930), 424, 431, 441; Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 156.

The Burma Frontier Service was created with its own set of civil servants specifically for the Frontier Areas. In addition, the Governor was given an Executive Council and government powers were split between Reserved and Transferred.[287] Rural areas in Burma were given a large majority of the elected members in the Legislative Council. The main electoral unit was the household. Anyone over the age of eighteen was eligible to vote, male or female.[288] Shortly after, a rebellion against British rule took place in Lower Burma and "petty local uprisings" continued "every few years."[289]

Burma became separate from India in 1937. This was a result of several years of procedural votes and meetings. In 1928, the Burma Legislative Council voted to conduct an inquiry into the institutions of both India and Burma. After the council passed a motion in favor of separation, an Indian Round Table Conference and Burma Round Table Conference were both set up. In 1932, the British Government held elections in Burma in which the electorate expressed opposition to separation from India yet Burmese leaders did not want to serve on the Legislative Council. As a result, the Joint Committee of Parliament considered both the India White Paper and the Burma White Paper. After the Committee convened in 1933-34, they passed the Government of India Act and Government of Burma Act (1935) in which Burma was to be governed as a state that was independent from India.[290]

The constitution of 1937 furthered distinguished between Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas. Ministerial Burma became semi-self-governing while the minority regions of the Frontier Areas remained under British authority. The Frontier Areas were divided into Part I

[287] Reserved powers related to defense, law and order, finance and revenue, and nation-building.
[288] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 160-62; However, it was reported that the vote was not considered as important since everyone was automatically registered.
[289] Sir Charles Crostwaith, *The Pacification of Burma* (Kessinger Publishing, LLC: 1912), 13-14, 103-104; Donald M. Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma* (1887), 3; Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 162.
[290] John L. Christian, "Burma Divorces India," *Current History* 46, no. 1 (1937).

areas called Excluded Areas, which would be under direct control of the governor, and Part II areas, which would be under direct control of the legislator. The governor was allowed to veto a bill that had anything to do with either area. The chain of command that made up the resulting Burma Frontier Service included a governor, deputy-commissioners, assistant-superintendents, and local leaders.[291]

Prior to 1937, the military in Burma did not have any Burmese people in the army or military police.[292] There were two reasons for this. First, it was cheaper and easier to recruit Indians rather than Burmese people. Second, it was dangerous to provide arms and training to the majority of a population that was similar in "religion, race, and national sentiment with the king and their kinsfolk just across the border."[293] Thus, Karen recruits became a more viable option.[294] A garrison of British and Indian troops, with some supplements from the various hill tribes, oversaw the plains area. Reinforcements from India could be called in as needed.[295] Japan invaded Burma during WWII in the period after separation from India and before a Burmese army formed. As a result, necessary training of a Burmese military took place under British and Japanese guidance during WWII.

British Policies in Burma

After the three Anglo-Burmese Wars, it took the British another five years to bring the remaining countryside areas of Burma under their control. Armed bandits, former army members, and surviving princes engaged in resistance against the British. A majority of the casualties during this time were villagers in Upper Burma. To bring order to the area, the British

[291] H.N.C. Stevenson, *The Hill Peoples of Burma* (Calcutta: Longmans Green and Co., 1944).
[292] Instead, the military presence in Burma was mostly British and Indian: two battalions of a British Infantry, three battalions of an Indian infantry, the Burma Rifles, ten battalions of Military Police serving as armed reserve for India's Army. See ISC, Report and Proceedings of the Indian Statutory Committee (1930), 206 and cited in Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 179.
[293] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 178.
[294] Smeaton, Burma.
[295] Furnivall, *Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma*, t.

recruited the Karen to fight Burman rebels. By 1887, Burmans were not recruited into the colonial army because the British trusted the Karen, Chin, and Kachins more.

Such recruitment policies were examples of the divide-and-rule policies that the British became known for in their governance of Burma. This involved "formally [acknowledging] differences of religion, language, continental origin, culture, and political tradition among its non-Europeans subjects."[296] While they were not the only colonial power to do so, the British were commonly associated with the policy:

> "Typically, imperial powers depend on the inability of oppressed local populations to muster a unified resistance, and the most successful occupiers are skilled at exploiting the differences among the occupied. Certainly, that was the story of the British Empire's success, and its legacy of nurtured local hatreds [that] can be seen wherever the Union flag flew."[297]

Certain groups within the colony that exhibited superiority or cooperation were given preferential treatment while other groups were not.[298] But these group distinctions often fell along ethnic lines or, at the very least, ethnicized group identities for the first time.[299] Ethnic groups were then solidified by British census practices. Some scholars contend that a pre-colonial inter-ethnic harmony was disrupted by these policies, which resulted in an ethnicization of identities that did not previously exist.[300] In some cases, these patterns of ethnic identification persisted long after independence.[301]

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[296] David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics Of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980 (Yale University Press: 2000).
[297] James Carroll, *Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: 2000).
[298] Lange and Dawson, "Dividing and Ruling the World?"
[299] Shawn McHale, "Ethnicity, violence, and Khmer-Vietnamese relations: the significance of the lower Mekong delta, 1757–1954." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72, no. 2 (2013): 367-390.
[300]Smith, *Ethnic Groups in Burma*, 22; Matthew J. Walton, "Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of Panglong," Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (2008): 889-910; Cheesman also attributes the Burmese state's concept of "national races" or taingyintha to this. See Nick Cheesman, "Seeing 'Karen' in the Union of Myanmar," *Asian Ethnicity* 3, no. 2 (2002): 199-220; Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 16.
[301] Ali Merima, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Boqian Jiang, & Abdulaziz B. Shifa, *Colonial Legacy, State Building and the Salience of Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa,* CMI Working Paper WP 2015: 16 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2015).

1870 marked a shift in British administrative policy away from laissez-faire. After the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886, the increased interest of European capitalists influenced the reception of Burma as a Provincial Government with its own Legislative Council. Over time, laissez-faire policies were replaced with more actives ones that promoted economic and social welfare.[302]

While the administrative positions incorporated Burmans, specialist positions did not. Furnivall argues that for "most of these auxiliary services, special training was more important than a knowledge of Burma."[303] As a result, specialist positions such as doctors and engineers in Burma were mostly European or Indian individuals. Schools to train Burmans in these jobs were not in demand. One consequence of this affected inoculation practices. Shortly after Tenasserim was occupied, the British began an inoculation campaign against smallpox in Burma.[304] But the ones doing the vaccination were Indian while the ones translating the process to patients were Burmans. Very few medical officials were fluent enough in Burmese to properly explain the benefits of the procedure. As a result, many natives were skeptical and few were vaccinated.[305]

British Colonialism over the Karen

British-Karen Relations and Admistration

Roman Catholics arrived in Burma before the Protestants, but they overlooked the Karen. It was not until the First Anglo-Burmese War that missionaries spent more time with them. In particular, Baptists missionaries such as Adoniram Judson successfully converted the Karen to Christianity starting in the 1830s.[306] American Baptists strongly influenced the conversion of the

[302] Furnivall provides a more detailed timeline of these policy changes. See Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 64.
[303] Furnivall, *Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma*, o.
[304] RAB, Annual Report on the Administration of Burma (1880-81), 37.
[305] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 148.
[306] Others such as Englishmen such as William and Felix Carey had been in Burma before Judson, but Judson made the most progress. See Randolph L. Howard, *Baptists in Burma* (Philadelphia: The Judson Press, 1931).

Karen. This was facilitated by pre-colonial experiences in which the Burmese kings were not kind to the Karen, who eventually remained in the mountain areas to avoid the Burmans. Robbins notes that the Sgaw and Pwo Karen were able to occupy more of the Delta section because of British protection.[307]

Initially, the British were not consistent in their loyalist relationship with the Karen. The Karen had been instrumental in the first two Burma Wars. Their pre-colonial hostility with the Burmans and position in the territory made it easy for the British to collaborate with them and take over Lower Burma.[308] Yet in the Third-Anglo Burmese War 1885-86, the British were not keen on allowing missionaries to set up Karen self-defense organizations. British officials, such as Smeaton, were concerned about memorandums that would result in forced disarmament and restriction of gun sales in Karen districts.[309] This was particularly frustrating to Smeaton since "disloyal Burmese officials" would be able to use the memorandum to "disarm and harass the loyal Karens" out of jealousy.[310]

The Karen played a significant role in preserving British rule in Burma. They kept the Burmese and Shan from taking over Lower Burma.[311] Burmans from Upper Burma were also responsible for dacoities, or "robbery generally accompanied by murder." The Karen were hired to handle these incidents, often because they were cheaper and better fighters than sepoys.[312] Karen fighters willingly handled dacoits using guns when they had them and spears, shields, or bows when they did not.[313] As a result, Burmans often avoided Karen districts.[314] This was

[307] Joseph C. Robbins, *Following The Pioneers: A Story Of American Baptist Mission Work In India And Burma* (Philadelphia: The Judson Press, 1922.
[308] Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*,
[309] Ibid, 32, 33, 34, 40, 51-53, 59.
[310] Ibid, 25, 33.
[311] Ibid, 5.
[312] Ibid, 26-27, 47. 53
[313] Ibid, 19, 40.
[314] Ibid, 20

compounded by the fact that the initial arrival of the Chief Commissioner in Burma resulted in a desire to disarm all the Burmese but not the Karen.[315]

Yet divide-and-rule policies had an overall effect of working out in favor of the Karen minority over the Burman majority. The Karen were not all in one place, so the British made accommodations for those in Ministerial Burma. Separate representation was allotted for the Karen: 5 in the Legislative Assembly under the 1923 Dyarchy Constitution; 12 in the House of Representations under the 1935 Constitution.[316] The Karen also had a disproportionately large role in the army and police force. Between 1923-1937, 2 out of 4 battalions of the Burma Rifles, a regiment of the British Indian Army, were exclusively Karen.[317] After 1927, Burman recruitment into the army was stopped. Because of their role in the military and policy, the Karen were a major player in repressing Burman dissent in the 1920s. This further fueled animosity between the two groups in the lead-up to WWII.

The British adopted a system of indirect rule in the frontier/hill areas and maintained local chieftains. In the plains, they imposed direct rule and their own administration. This was done out of expediency, as it would have been costly to impose administration on the tribes in the hills. In order to maintain direct rule, the British needed Burmans who were familiar with Western law and administration. As a result, monastic schools had to make way for new schools that trained boys for administration positions.[318]

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[315] Crosthwaite, *The Pacification of Burma*, 64, 80, 131.
[316] Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (London: Zed Books, 1991); Josef Silverstein, *Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980).
[317] Ian Morrison, *Grandfather Longlegs: The Life and Gallant Death of Major Seagrim* (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), 30-31; Steve Rothwell, "The Burma Rifles," *Burma Campaign*, 2001 http://www.rothwell.force9.co.uk/burmaweb/burif.htm
[318] Furnivall, *Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma*, l.

World War II and Independence in Burma

British decisions during WWII consistently challenged the independence of Burma. Although the British signed the Atlantic Charter, which clearly stated recognition for "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live," Prime Minister Winston Churchill clarified that this would not apply to Burma. Furthermore, Churchill's government issued a white paper in May 1945. It clarified that Burma Proper would have "full self-government within the Commonwealth" after 1948 but that the Shan States and border areas with non-Burman minorities would remain under British authority. This included the Karen.

Plans for Burma's independence were acted upon even before the conclusion of the war. In 1940, Aung San and 29 other men secretly left Burma for military training with the Japanese. Known as the Thirty Comrades, they eventually formed the beginning of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) that would include an additional 200 Burmese men in Thailand and Japanese intelligence. The BIA assisted in efforts to take over Rangoon from the British so that the Japanese could cut off Allied access to supplying Chiang Kai-shek via the Burma Road. Japan invaded Burma in 1942 and established a puppet government similar to that in the Philippines. The Japanese mainly favored ethnic Burmans, a shift from British policies of favoring ethnic minorities such as the Karen.

Upon successfully bringing Burma under Japanese control in 1942, Burmese leaders were appointed to positions that were still ultimately under Japanese authority. Ba Maw was made Prime Minister and Aung San became head of the BIA's successor, the Burma Defense Army. A year later, Japan declared Burma's independence in 1943 and Aung San became head of the new Burma National Army (BNA). Despite the initial promise of ensuring Burma's independence, the attitude of military leaders in Burma shifted. There was resistance to Japanese rule due to

harsh policies against the Burmese people, especially from their military police called the Kempeitai. By 1944, Burmans had chosen to collaborate with the British against the Japanese.

The Karen, among other minorities, remained loyal to the British during WWII. Because of this, clashes between Burmans and ethnic minorities took place during the war and the BIA executed many of the Karen as British sympathizers.[319] But this also made it easier for Aung San to consider working with the British against the Japanese because some of his Karen officers in the KNA had connections with British officers. Aung San played a key role in serving as a coordinator between different groups involved in betraying the Japanese. Aung San worked with British Lord Mountbatten, the head of Southeast Asia Command, to attack Japanese units and place Rangoon under British control in 1945. The Karen also played a significant role working with the British on several operations against Japan.

Aung San's actions received mixed reactions. Mountbatten was willing to overlook previous Burmese actions since their betrayal of Japan assisted in recovering Burma. As a result, the BNA was considered part of the Allied forces and was renamed the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF). But the British government of Burma, which was in exile in London and India, did not want Aung San involved in a post-WWII Burma despite his efforts at cultivating minority inclusion during and after WWII.

When the British regained control over Burma after WWII, the situation was different. Initially, there were plans to restore colonial rule in Burma. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPLFL) sent a delegation to London in January 1947 and convinced the Atlee administration to allow for the election of an assembly that would draft Burma's constitution. In addition to this, the Panglong Agreement (1947) was signed after the Panglong Conference, in which representatives of some of the largest ethnic minorities in Burma had a meeting with

[319] Seekins, *Burma*, 44; Smith, *Burma*.

General Aung San who represented the Burmese Government.[320] The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the inclusion of ethnic minorities in an independent Burma, yet only the Shan, Kachin, and Chin sent delegates who eventually signed the Agreement. The Karen sent observers but did not sign while the Mon, Arakanese, Wa, and Naga were excluded for various reasons.[321]

Two conferences were held in Panglong in 1947 for the purpose of bringing ethnic minorities into an independent Burma. During the second conference, the Panglong Agreement settled the inclusion of the Kachin, Shan, and Chin. In particular, there would be a Shan State and a Kachin State. A Chin Special Division was also created. Upon seating a delegation in the Constituent Assembly after elections, a Karenni State was also established. The Shan and Karenni states were also given a right to secede from the union after 10 years. Absent from the conference were the Mon, Arakanese, Wa, and Naga.[322] The Karen attended the conference, but only as observers. The Karen National Union boycotted subsequent elections for the Constituent Assembly.

Aung San and several of his ministers were assassinated in July 1947 on the orders of U Saw, who had been left out of the Attlee-Aung San agreement. But the British did not want to delay the timeline for independence, so Governor Rance appointed Thakin Nu as Prime Minister. The Constituent Assembly approved the constitution for an independent Union of Burma in September 1947. Prime Ministers U Nu and Clement Atlee signed a treaty recognizing the independence of the Union of Burma the following month. The British also agree to cancel Burmese debt and provide a military mission. Despite opposition from the Conservative Party

[320] "Panglong Agreement," *UN Peacemaker* 1947.
[321] Walton provides a detailed description for why each group is excluded. See Walton, "Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma."
[322] Ibid.

under Churchill's leadership, the British Parliament passed the Burma Independence Act. The Act established that the transfer of power to an independent Burma would be on January 4, 1948.

Conclusion

Both the Spanish and the Americans had a significant impact on the development of the Philippine colony. Spanish efforts were successful at converting a majority of the population in the north to Christian, but never fully penetrated into the south where the Muslim population resided. After the Spanish-American War, the United States inherited the Philippine colony and did not yield to the attempts of the Philippine Insurgency for independence. The resulting Philippine-American War merely delayed the eventual American takeover of the Philippines. The American policy of benevolent assimilation proclaimed a respect for the rights and freedoms of the Philippine natives, yet there were also significant administrative policies that structured the lives of both Christians and Muslims in the Philippines.

The Christian and Muslim areas of the Philippines were initially governed separately. The Christian majority was placed under civilian administration with the purpose of preparing them for self-government while the Muslim minority was placed under military administration with the purpose of assimilation. Increasingly, American officials reduced the power of Muslim leaders over their territory. Several shifts in administrative structure, partly influenced by domestic party politics in the United States, eventually resulted in placing the Muslim areas of the Philippines under civilian control over the entire Philippine colony.

The British East India Company, and eventually the Crown itself, took over Burma in a piecemeal fashion. After three Anglo-Burmese Wars, the Province of Burma was established. The Province of Burma was administered through British India, which meant that policies and decisions were doubly foreign to the Burmese. In addition, Burma was eventually overrun by the

influx of European and Indian foreigners who were drawn to commercial and labor opportunities in the new colony. The ethnic Burman majority was soon outnumbered.

Tensions between Burmans and other ethnic minorities were exacerbated by British policies and administrative decisions. Divide-and-rule, in which the British favored some groups over others, resulted in an uneven distribution of representation. In particular, the Karen were overrepresented in the military police and army. They were also ensured representation in various legislative bodies. The British further solidified these distinctions when they divided Burma into Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas. The Frontier Areas were able to maintain local leaders, thus ensuring a relatively different experience of colonial rule than Ministerial Burma.

The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines and Burma in WWII disrupted the political development of both colonies. Christians and Muslims fought alongside American forces against the Japanese in the Philippines. In Burma, the Burmans first chose to work with the Japanese against British forces but later changed allegiance. The Karen maintained a loyalty to the British that made them targets of Burman forces. Eventually, both the Philippines and Burma were freed of Japanese control and Western forces returned. The Philippines continued on a timeline of independence that had been established prior to WWII and eventually became an independent state in 1946. The Muslim minority, however, was not granted a separate state. Plans for Burma's independence were not as regulated, but the colony eventually became independent in 1948. The Karen were also not given an independent state.

Chapter 4

Colonial Education and Minority Identity Formation

In the Philippines and Burma

""“Along with families and religious institutions, the school is an institution charged with the socialization of the young into the life of the larger community and society. It sits at the nexus between the private world of the family and the public world of the state and holds within its walls that which is most precious to us - our children.”
-T. Mende[323]

"It is in the encouragement and promotion of education on these lines that the government can perhaps do most to strengthen the national unity of the Karens."

–Donald M. Smeaton[324]

“…having no means of communicating with the Moros except through their own dialects, the knowledge of the Arabic system of writing and of the local dialects become necessary as qualifications for office and as part of the curriculum of the primary schools.

-Najeeb M. Saleeby[325]

Introduction

Colonialism is traditionally characterized along a metric of direct or indirect rule, which often involves a consideration of governance arrangements with varying levels of power distribution. The direct style of rule is characterized by “highly centralized decision-making” while indirect styles of rule involve “a more decentralized framework in which important

[323] T. Mende, “From Aid to Recolonisation” (London: Harrap, 1973), 99; cited in Keith Watson, *Education in the Third World* (Routledge, 2014), 183.
[324] Donald M. Smeaton served several positions in Burma, including Chief Secretary, Chief Commissioner, and a member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council of Burma. See Donald M. Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma* (1887), 222-23.
[325] Najeeb M. Saleeby served several positions in the Philippines, including Captain and Assistant Surgeon in the Department of Mindanao, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in charge of Moro Affairs, Superintendent of Schools, and a member of the Legislative Council of the Moro Province. See Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands* (Manila, 1913), 24.

decision-making powers are delegated to the weaker entity."[326] These descriptions of governance arrangements have been applied as labels for strategies that colonizers adopted in their respective colonies. Indirect rule involved the preservation of indigenous leaders at local levels of administration and internal affairs.[327] Direct rule involved replacing these leaders with colonialists, often through processes of violence and imposition. The dichotomy of direct versus indirect rule is an insufficient understanding of colonialism's legacy because it does not fully capture the different ways in which colonialism influenced life in the colonies. The implementation of direct or indirect rule has been moved from being considered as a dichotomous outcome to "matters of degree."[328]

The extent of colonialism can be measured in different ways and the research regarding the influence of colonial legacies on economic and political development is vast.[329] One way, in particular, is through the development of infrastructure. For example officials in the Philippines were very concerned about the quality of roads:

> There has been a very considerable amount of road work done by the Spanish Government, especially throughout the town of Zamboanga .and neighboring section, also in and about Jolo and Cotabato, and a small amount at Iligan, but most of this work has fallen into a bad condition and requires extensive repair. Until the revenues of the province are very much improved the amount of road construction must necessarily be very limited and confined to the vicinity of the principal towns.[330]

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[326] Gerring et al., "An Institutional Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule," *World Politics* 63, no. 3 (2011), 377.
[327] Lakshmi Iyer, "Direct Versus Indirect Colonial Rule In India: Long-term Consequences," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 92, no. 4 (2010): 693-713; Matthew Lange, "British Colonial State Legacies and Development Trajectories: A Statistical Analysis of Direct and Indirect Rule," in *States and Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
[328] Gerring et al, 2011.
[329] While not an exhaustive list, a more recent assessment of this literature is in Alexander De Juan and Jan Henryk Pierskalla, "The Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies: An Introduction," *Politics and Society* 45, no. 2: 159-172.
[330] Pershing, 1914, 15.

It is evident, however, that structures of education can also provide a way to measure the extent of colonialism based on differences in reach. For example, although schools were built in Mindanao, these were mostly for "the Christian inhabitants and semicivilized people within [American] reach." Places closer to the inside of the province comprised of mostly "uncivilized natives," were not reached by the school system in the first year.[331] The British conquered Burma through a series of wars, thus ensuring that areas were colonized at different times. Moreover, colonial officials often complained about how difficult it was to reach tribes in the hills. This is why American Baptist missionaries often turned to the Karen to evangelize in harder to reach places.

Other scholars have researched the role of education in shaping national identity. Darden provides a theoretical framework for what he calls a "scholastic revolution." The spread of ideas across populations or a geographic space become easier with the development of mass schooling, increased literacy, and standardized curricula.[332] This also makes it easier to create and sustain a national identity because of the transmission and control of ideological narratives.[333] Moreover, mass education has the capacity to sustain ideologies "since the first schooled generation will transmit values in ways that previous or subsequent cohorts do not."[334] Balcells attributes variation in the salience of Catalan national identity in France and Spain to the timing and content of mass literacy. Mass education at the hands of a strong French state prevented the successful mobilization of a competing Catalan national identity.[335]

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[331] Pershing, 1914, 14.
[332] Keith Darden, *Resisting Occupation*, Forthcoming.
[333] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of Nationalism* (London: Verson Books, 1991).
[334] Keith Darden, Anna Grzymala-Busse, "The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse," *World Politics* 59, no. 1 (2006), 90.
[335] Laia Balcells, "Mass Schooling and Catalan Nationalism," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 19, no. 4 (2013): 467-86.

There is also work that uses the identity of the colonizer as a way to operationalize education policies.[336] Colonial powers had overarching goals for their subjects that were reflected in education plans. However, it is not enough to consider an overall British or American education policy when different groups experienced this system differently during the colonial era. The simultaneous, *yet uneven* experience of different groups in the same colony suggests that scholars need to take a closer look at specific institutions and policies that are carried out *between* groups. A better way to measure the extent of colonial rule is through education policies that span different colonizers.

Educating the natives can be risky for colonial powers. On one hand, it can be dangerous for colonial powers to allow education of the colonized as it can foster movements against their rule. At the same time, education can be targeted in ways that benefit the colonial power. This is precisely what makes education a fitting measurement for colonial reach. Colonial powers may only be willing to engage in education when they can control its effects or target certain populations. This provides a sense of where colonial powers feel comfortable enough to build or fund schools along with whom they trust enough to educate students.

I argue that contrasting education policies during the colonial period influence the development, or lack of, a national identity. Penetrative education policies consist of a universal and standardized curriculum, majority or many minority instructors, a lingua franca, and compulsory or wide enrollment. As a result, these policies facilitate the creation of a national identity by strengthening the attachment of minority groups to the colonizer and strengthening bonds within the same community. In contrast, shallow education policies do not strengthen

[336] Dupraz, for example, argues that British colonial legacies in education were more advantageous than French ones for relevant regions in Cameroon. See Yannick Dupraz, *French And British Colonial Legacies In Education : Evidence From The Partition Of Cameroon, Journal of Economic History* (2019).

either a reliance on or positive association with the colonizer. Instead, these policies promote political fragmentation within groups.

In this chapter, I outline the salience of colonial education policies. First, I distinguish between two types of education policies, shallow and penetrative, and demonstrate how this fits in to the existing structure of schools established by various colonial powers. Through the case of the Karen in Burma and Muslims in the Philippines, I demonstrate how colonial education policies influence the development of a national identity through both colonial attachment and group cohesion. On one hand, penetrative education policies for the Karen in Burma resulted in a stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion. On the other hand, shallow education policies for Muslims in the Philippines contributed towards a weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. Education policies in both cases are assessed with archival data regarding the language of instruction, identity of instructors, content of curricula, and extent of enrollment.

A Tale of Two Colonial Education Policies

J. S. Furnivall was an Advisor on National Planning to the Government of Burma. He was also a proponent of an education system in the colonies, but often distinguished between schools in the Western and non-Western world. Western societies, which were often more likely to be homogenous, had specific goals about preparing students for the modern world. But Western officials tried too hard to bring the ideals of these schools into the non-Western world, often overlooking the fact that these areas were more diverse. In short, Furnivall believed that a Western model of education would not work in the non-Western world.[337]

According to Furnivall, there were four stages to colonial education policy that reflected the political ideals of Europe. First, missionaries arrived in colonies and made inroads for foreign

[337] John Sydenham Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia* (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943); John Sydenham Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge University Press, 1948), 372.

intervention. Second, missionaries built schools for the native population. Third, colonial powers continued to encourage native education, but ensured that they had supervision over the funds they provided for this purpose. Other than fiscally, the intervention of colonial governments was minimal. Fourth, colonial powers asserted themselves more directly into the process and "[assumed] responsibility for the promotion, direction, and control of education."[338]

The four stages of colonial education policy correspond to the development of four types of schools: European, Western, Vernacular, and Native. The first type were *European schools*, which were specifically for the children of Europeans who would be educated in the colony in the same way that they would be if they were in Europe. There were two types of missionary schools, which differed based on the language of instruction. *Western schools* had a Western-centric curriculum in which instruction took place in a European language. They were similar to European schools in almost every respect, except for making "adaptation to local culture."[339] Western schools were intended for the "westernized native."[340] The other type of missionary schools was the *vernacular schools*, which had a Western-centric curriculum but instruction took place in a vernacular language. These schools were intended for students who would "remain within the native sphere of life, but in some degree of contact with the western world."[341] The last of the schools were the *Native schools*, which were predominantly focused on religious instruction.

Each colonial power established, or acquiesced to, the development of each of these types of schools. Furnivall argues that "the force of circumstances" rather than "deliberate policy"

[338] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 373.
[339] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 374.
[340] Ibid.
[341] Ibid.

explains the progress of each school under different colonial powers in different regions.[342] This description suggests that colonial education policies were less effective at influencing the outcome of student progress than originally intended. He further identifies two trends: subsequent growth in demand for Western schools and a corresponding decline in demand for vernacular schools; decline in growth for native schools. Both of these trends demonstrate how an increased demand for Western schools came at the cost of schools, vernacular and native, that maintained local identities.

Colonial education policies are a significant factor for several reasons. First, Furnivall overlooks that developing the same types of schools does not mean that the same ratio of each type developed over time. A disproportionate amount of European schools would have a different effect on a colony than a disproportionately large number of native schools. Second, there is variation in the reach of these policies within a colony. Some education policies reinforced local identity while others did not. For example, he does not include Anglo-vernacular schools, in which English and a local dialect were included when possible, in his categories. Furthermore, there was often considerable difference between how majority and minority groups in a colony were educated. The majority may have attended mostly Western schools while minority groups attended vernacular ones or some other comparable combination. Fourth, the influence of school type may differ between majority and minority groups. A majority group may be less receptive to a heavily-Western curriculum that challenges their identity whereas a minority group may be more inclined to welcome it if it translates to expanded career opportunities.

I propose considering the reach of education policies over the development of national identity. This addresses the concerns that Furnivall overlooks. First, assessing the reach of

[342] Ibid.

colonial education policies through curriculum, enrollment, language, and instructors offers a more detailed approach than reliance on heuristics of the four categories of colonial schools. The reach of a native school, for example, will differ from one colony to the next or one group to another. Furthermore, not all schools operated the same way. Some vernacular schools had an easier time if the local dialect was already established within the community. In other cases, instructors in anglo-vernacular schools still needed a translator to teach students. Understanding what is taught, who is teaching, or how many students attended provides a more detailed description of the context in the colony. Second, assessing the reach of colonial education policies leaves room for variation between majority and minority populations.

Colonial education policies consist of formal decisions made by officials about how schools serving the colonized population are structured. This definition excludes decisions made by the colonized population for schools they maintained on their own. I deviate from existing characterizations of colonial policies as direct or indirect and instead focus on how much room for minority identities education policies left. I categorize two types of colonial education policies: shallow and penetrative. Shallow education policies can be a result of deliberate decisions to educate the population differently or be a de facto result when a population resists instruction. The outcome is the same in either case: a national identity is not imposed favor of a majority or colonial one.

Shallow education policies do not simply reflect an absence of penetrative policies. As an ideal type, shallow policies consist of a separate or specialized curriculum, emphasis on minority instructors, multiple languages of instruction, and voluntary or low enrollment. I identify them separately because these are still a *deliberate* set of policies actively pursued by the colonial power. It is not simply being uneducated or neglected by the colonizer but rather a different way

of being educated. Such policies are still sanctioned by the authority of the colonial power and, as such, reflect the power imbalance between colonizer and colonized even though shallow policies are less influential in developing a national identity. More importantly, shallow policies do not *actively* create outcomes in the way that penetrative policies can. In some cases, shallow policies may uphold a status quo or be the result of an inability to alter the status quo.

Colonial education policies affect two things that are salient for the formation of group identity: colonial attachment and group cohesion (Figure 1). *Colonial attachment* refers to the relationship of the minority group and the colonial power. A stronger attachment results in a stronger association between the two. *Group cohesion* refers to the relationship of minority group members with each other. A stronger group cohesion bodes well for the development of a national identity. Colonial attachment is an external relationship while group cohesion is an internal one. The former affects how non-members treat the group while the latter affects how members relate to one another.

Figure 6: Effects of Colonial Education Policy



Penetrative education policies result in a stronger colonial attachment. The more students who enroll in public schools and learn from instructors who are not their co-ethnics, the closer to a colonial power the group become. This is because the initial, and often main, organizer for schools is the colonial power. Instructors are often Western transplants, which do not learn native

languages for the purpose of instruction. In some cases, the first cohort of educated minorities may go on to choose to work in public education. But this is all still completed in a system built and controlled by the colonial power.

Group cohesion is also strengthened by penetrative policies. As more students enroll in public schools, they go through a shared experience. This is because penetrative policies ensure that more members of a group are simultaneously educated in the same way. The shared experience of instruction and its content results in a stronger shared group identity. When coupled with how colonial powers can choose to educate ethnic groups differently, the difference between groups is solidified.

Shallow education policies result in a weaker colonial attachment. When fewer students enroll in public schools to learn from instructors, they are associating less with the colonial power. Public schools, which are sites of colonial authority, do not become places by which a group benefits from the colonial administration. As a result, other sites of colonial authority, such as the civil service and police forces, make up a greater portion of interaction with the colonial power. These sites become more salient at shaping perceptions about the colonial power's relationship with a group.

In addition, shallow policies do not encourage group cohesion. Students cannot have a shared education experience in which they learn the same material in the same way simultaneously if there is not a critical mass enrolled. It is not that shallow education policies necessarily weaken group cohesion. Instead, these policies do not actively strengthen it the way that penetrative policies can. It is less relevant if a colonial power educates groups differently when a group is not educated at all.

Colonial Education in the Philippine Colony

Education under the Spanish focused on converting locals to Christianity. Rather than forcing natives to learn Spanish, friars learned Tagalog and translated phrases to make conversion easier. Grammar books (*artes*) and dictionaries (*vocabularios*) translated prayers from Spanish to Tagalog in an effort to facilitate the conversion process.[343] This effort also elevated Tagalog as a dialect over other options. Schools established in the Philippines introduced Filipinos, but not Muslims, to a more Western curriculum. Young men also had the opportunity to continue education in Spain before returning to the Philippines. Moreover, the result of this familiarity with European schooling and the Spanish language made Filipinos more open to European ideas.[344]

Such was not the case with the Moros who resisted Spanish conversion. These efforts did not make their way through the southern part of the Philippines where a majority of the Muslim population lived in Mindanao and Sulu. According to some reports, Muslims previously inhabited areas further north as far up as the Philippine capital of Manila. But Spanish efforts pushed the population further south until they could no longer challenge Muslim control. However, an overall colonial education system for the masses was not established under the Spanish because religious leaders and conservatives did not want to risk weakening the control of the state and church.[345]

American colonialism, however, would take a much stronger approach towards establishing an education system in the Philippine colony. Similar to other colonial officials,

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[343] Vicente L. Rafael, "Confession, Conversion, and Reciprocity in Early Tagalog Colonial Society," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, no. 2 (1987): 320-39.
[344] Bernard Moses, "Colonial Policy with Reference to the Philippines," *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association* 1 (1905): 88-116.
[345] Apolinario Mabini, *The Philippine Revolution* (1969); Oliver Charbonneau, "Civilizational Imperatives: Americans, Moros, and the Colonial World," 47; Interview Subject, A.

Barrows believed that educating the Filipino people would help them understand the merits of American institutions and eventually embrace the benevolence of American authority.[346] Efforts to prioritize Philippine education happened almost immediately: existing schools reopened two months after American forces took over Spanish garrisons. The transition was so quick that soldiers served as teachers until instructors could come to the colony.[347] Less than a year later, 600 American teachers sailed to the Philippines on the *USS Thomas* to work in the public schools set up in the Philippine colony.[348] The first General Superintendent of Public Instruction, Dr. Fred. W. Atkinson, and corresponding Secretary Bernard Moses of the Department of Public Instruction influenced the structure of public education across the Philippine Islands.

Some schools in Manila taught Latin and Spanish. This was a requirement for anyone studying philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence in the Dominican-run University of Santo Tomas. Most Philippine priests and lawyers knew Latin but not Spanish since "the educational system was wholly religious."[349] Very few Filipinos could afford to go to school in Manila and many chose to be priests since it was a profession that was well-received by locals. Eventually, friars allowed for the inclusion of medical and pharmacy school in the Philippines because they did not want to encourage people to go to school overseas. At least in the colony, friars could still control the texts and instructors.[350]

Native access to public education was staggered. Initially, most education opportunities in the colony were structured for Spanish children living in the colony. Natives could have some

[346] David P. Barrows, *A History of the Philippines* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1905), 314.
[347] David P. Barrows, 'The Memoirs of David Prescott Barrows', *Bulletin of the American Historical Collection* 23 (1995), 47–8.
[348] This is the origin of the term "Thomasites," which came to refer to not only the initial 600 Americans aboard the USS Thomas but also any additional American teachers who came to the Philippines in the first few years. See Jonathan Zimmerman, *Innocents Abroad: American Teachers in the American Century* (Harvard University Press, 2006).
[349] Mabini, *The Philippine Revolution*.
[350] Ibid.

access to primary education through parish schools or private tutors. Secular higher education became more accessible in the 1860s.[351] After this, educated Filipinos sought more educational opportunities to increase their job opportunities within the colonial administration. This began with royal decrees in 1863 and the establishment of the Superior Board of Public Instruction, which created a teacher-training institute (*the Escuela Normal*) in Manila and mandated public primary schools in each parish.[352] This meant that university enrollment would also increase. A second result of these decrees concerned secondary and university education. After 1865, Dominicans at the University of Santo Tomas were tasked with supervising the centralization of higher education. Colegio de San Juan de Letran and the Ateneo Municipal were made first-class secondary schools for boys, thus offering the same curriculum as in Spain.[353] More schools were elevated to this status through the century.

The Filipino educated class came to be known as the *ilustrados*. According to Cullinane, there were four characteristics used to describe Filipino elites: wealth, ethnic origin, office holdings, and education. The emphasis of the term *ilustrado* was on education, in the form of advanced degrees or professional titles, versus socioeconomic status or origin. But wealth and education were often closely associated, so the term came to be more associated with a general "Filipino upper class.[354] An "ilustrado consciousness" developed, which Culinane attributes to a "common educational experience" and the ease of expressing this consciousness in the same language.[355]

[351] Ibid.
[352] Ibid.
[353] Ibid.
[354] Cullinane finds fault with assuming wealth and education went together because "not all ilustrados were from wealthy families and not all educated Filipinos were illustrados." Michael Cullinane, *Ilustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908* (Ateneo University Press, 2003), 27.
[355] Ibid.

Despite the education of some elites who would eventually make up the *illustrado* class, an overall colonial education system in the Philippine was severely lacking under the Spanish:

> There was no great school system existing to be made over; there was no teaching force consisting of thousands of teachers who would go right on with traditional methods; there was no traditional curriculum to be uprooted; there was no well-defined public opinion in relation to schools that had to be defied.[356]

English was determined as the language of public instruction for several reasons. First, there were many different dialects in the Philippine Islands. As a result, there was not a common language among the natives nor could there be a common canon from which to determine literature. Second, few spoke Spanish aside from the educated elites. Moses estimates that less than 10% of inhabitants spoke Spanish even after over 300 years of colonization.[357] Of the natives who *did* speak Spanish, their fluency was poor.[358]

The Philippine colony changed hands from Spain to the United States after the United States won the Spanish-American War in 1898. The subsequent Treaty of Paris ceded the entire territory of the Philippines despite Spain's lack of control over the Muslim south. The Americans set up a separate Moro Province in which Muslim areas were placed under military control while the Christian North was placed under civilian control. This persisted until 1913 after they succeeded in bringing the entire colony under American authority. In the next few decades, Americans prepared their Philippine colony for independence under the policy of benevolent assimilation.

Shallow Education Policies for the Muslim Minority

The initial American presence in Muslim education was minimal. This was due to their takeover of Spanish schools, which barely breached the southern Philippines. The situation

[356] W. C. Grimes, "Organization and Administration of Education in the Philippine Islands," *The Phi Delta Kappan* 10, no. 6 (1928), 181.
[357] Moses, "Colonial Policy with Reference to the Philippines," 97.
[358] Pershing, "Annual Report," 1913, 13.

changed when the Moro Province was established in 1903, because it also included the establishment of a Department of Public Instruction that was responsible for Mindanao and Sulu.[359] The Department of Public Instruction had two superintendents from 1903-1914. The first was Najeeb M. Saleeby, an Arab-American physician. The second was Charles R. Cameron, an American graduate of Cornell University.[360]

Changes in policy for the Philippine colony also affected educational development in Mindanao and Sulu. Filipinization, the process of increasing Philippine leadership, resulted in the Department of Public Instruction in the Moro Province to merge into the insular government's Bureau of Education. [361] In 1915, the Bureau of Education was given 1,000,000 pesos to build and operate schools in the Non-Christian areas.[362] It was seen as act of extreme generosity "from the pockets of the Christian people."[363] After 1915, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu became integrated into the Bureau of Education of the insular government. One consequence of this was that education reports stopped differentiating between Muslim and Christian enrollment figures. I specify my data in this chapter depending on how detailed colonial reports were at the time.

The overall trend in the Moro Province/Mindanao and Sulu suggested by various colonial reports was that there was expansion in public education. More schools were built in areas that had not been previously reached and more students were enrolling in these schools. Furthermore, there was an increase in instructors to meet the increase in demand. Milligan makes a clear

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[359] Frank W. Carpenter, *Report of the Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (Philippine Islands)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1916), 325.
[360] N. M. Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion*, *Ethnological Survey Publications: Volume IV, Part I.* (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905).
[361] Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, "Democratization or Neocolonialism? The Education of Muslims Under U.S. Military Occupation, 1903-1920," *Journal of the History of Education Society* 33, no. 4 (2004): 451-67.
[362] "Act 2531," Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1915.
[363] Maximo M. Kalaw, "Recent Policy towards the Non-Christian People of the Philippines," *The Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 1 (1919), 4.

distinction, however, between growth for the Christian majority and Muslim minority.[364] The enrollment of Muslim students was disproportionately lower than their Christian counterparts.

Enrollment

Muslims enrollment in public schools during the period of American military rule was low. This was due to a combination of several factors: instruction in English, limited distribution of schools, and a mistrust of others. Initial numbers were low due to placement. Although American soldiers staffed existing schools so that they could reopen sooner, very few of them served Muslim children. This was because American soldiers took over Spanish garrisons immediately, but Spain never controlled areas deep in Mindanao and Sulu.[365] Over time, the Americans built more schools that reached deeper into Mindanao and Sulu.

Sources vary in regards to the specific numbers reported, but there are a few trends that persist across sources. First, overall enrollment in Moro Province increased incrementally from 1903 to the 1930s. Second, the percentage of enrolled students from the population of those eligible was low. Third, Christian Filipinos made up a larger portion of student enrollment relative to Muslims. Fourth, retention rates were low and students often only stayed in school until the second grade. More than half of the student population was enrolled in the first grade at any given time.[366] Aside from actual student retention, Milligan also challenges the likelihood that students would recall any of the skills they learned in the first or second grade.[367]

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[364] Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy: Schooling and Ethno-Religious Conflict in the Southern Philippines* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005); Milligan, "Democratization or Neocolonialism?" 2004.
[365] Milligan, "Democratization or Neocolonialism?" 2004.
[366] Charles. R. Cameron, "Seventh Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools of the Moro Province, School Year (1909–1910)," Charles R. Cameron Papers, C-88.1-025-80 (Xavier University Museum and Archives: Cagayan de Oro, Philippines); Charles R. Carpenter, "Report of the Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu," 352; Charles R. Cameron, "Twenty-first Annual Report of the Director of Education," 85.
[367] Milligan, "Democratization or Neocolonialism?" 2004.

Various reports indicate expansion in the education sector from 1903 to 1920. Numbers increased in terms of student enrollment, instructors hired, and schools built. The Moro Province was formally established in 1903 and had 2,114 students enrolled.[368] When military rule of the area ended in 1913, attendance had expanded to 4,535 students. Enrollment increased far more once the Filipino controlled legislature took over education policies for Mindanao and Sulu.[369] The numbers further support this claim: by 1920, more than 33,000 students were enrolled.[370] Specific numbers exist for Sulu. In the 1921-22 school year, there were 9,738 students enrolled (6,885 boys and 2,853 girls). These figures included Christian and Muslim students.[371]

But it is also important to keep the numbers in perspective for three reasons. First, total enrollment across the entire province was still low. In 1907, 90% of the population in the Moro Province was Muslim but they only made up 17% of student enrollment. In 1909, 8% of the total Christian population was in school but 1/10 of 1% of the Muslim population was enrolled.[372] In 1913, it had reached 10% of the total Christian population but only ½ of 1% of the Muslim population was enrolled.[373] Second, increased enrollment is mostly attributed to the Christian population. Enrollment of Muslim students in the Moro Province was low. Moreover, most of the enrollment was concentrated in the first two grade levels and there were problems with

[368] Leonard Wood, "Annual Report of the Governor of Moro Province," 14; Charles R. Carpenter, "Report of the Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, 1914," 351.
[369] Kalaw, "Recent Policy towards the Non-Christian People of the Philippines," 1919.
[370] The Government of the Philippine Islands Department of Public Instruction, "Twenty-First Annual Report," 82-83. Milligan notes that the increase in enrollment is also attributed to the addition of the Bukidon and Agusan provinces to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1914. Both of these provinces were mostly Christian. See Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 2005.
[371] Sixto Y. Orosa, "The Sulu Archipelago and Its People," (Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Company, 1931), 125.
[372] Charles R. Cameron, Sixth Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools of the Moro Province, School Year (1908–1909);" Cameron, "Seventh Annual Report."
[373] John J. Pershing, "The Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province: For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1913" (Washington, D.C., 1913), 51–2. My estimates here are based on a combination of Pershing's figures for public schools and Carpenter's figures for private schools in the same year. See Frank Carpenter, "Report of the Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu," 353.

retaining students. This was particularly the case for Muslim students, as well.[374] In Sulu, most students enrolled were below the fifth grade.[375] Third, enrollment numbers between Christians and Muslims were no longer differentiated after 1915 when the Department of Mindanao and Sulu became integrated into the Bureau of Education of the insular government.

Muslim elites were well positioned to resist enrollment. Some members of the community kept and traded slaves, a practice the Americans tried to end. In response to American efforts to educate Muslim children, many families sent the children of their slaves instead.[376] Datu Piang was one exception. While many of his contemporaries did not trust any part of the colonial education system and its place in a broader structure of Western education, he supported it. However, Piang sent his sons to schools in Manila rather than the ones that were available in Mindanao and Sulu.[377] This demonstrates several things. First, Muslim elites did not trust colonial schools and resisted enrollment as much as possible. Second, the few who did trust colonial schools still wanted their children to learn from those with the best resources, such as in the capital. This suggests an understanding of how to best maneuver around the education system to provide their children with viable skills and status once in the future. In other words, it was clear to Datu Piang that his sons would fare better in some schools than others. Not all colonial schools were the same. The luxury of this choice was not available to everyone.

Over time, the Director of Education reported that Muslim enrollment between boys and girls increased. They implemented compulsory attendance for boys.[378] But this was useful only for the students already attending. It did not assist as much with overall retention or expansion.

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[374] Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 2005, 65.
[375] Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 125.
[376] Ibid.
[377] Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers And Rebels: Everyday Politics And Armed Separatism In The Southern Philippines* (University of California Press, 1998), 94-95.
[378] Director of Education, "Twentieth Annual Report" as quoted in Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 125.

Moreover, many Muslim families were not keen on coeducation.[379] Muslim elites were reluctant to send their daughters to these schools. In response, the Americans built boarding schools specifically for this demographic. The goal of these boarding schools was to "bring [Muslim girls] up to womanhood under the elevating moral influence of the American Christian woman."[380] Yet Christianity was not a formal part of the curriculum.[381] The girl's dormitory in Jolo that opened in 1916 was one of the only places in which Muslim girls were enrolled in a public school.[382]

Officials in the Bureau of Education specifically tried to persuade *datus* to send their daughters to the dormitory as a way to convince other Muslim families to do the same.[383] *Datus* were assured that their daughters would still exist in a context that adhered to Islam and the government provided all funds for room, board, and uniforms.[384] Very few Muslim girls attended, but the ones that did were generally daughters of *datus* or other elites. By the end of 1919, there were 13,596 girls enrolled in public schools in Mindanao and Sulu. This was a 39% increase from the previous year.[385] But it is important to again recognize this as an aggregated total of Muslim and Christian girls.

A majority of schools in the Moro Province were located in Christian areas. Elementary and secondary schools built by the Spanish were maintained, whenever possible. It is unsurprising that a majority of these schools were located in Christian areas since the Spanish were unsuccessful at breaching into Mindanao and Sulu. The Americans built new schools and these *did* reach into the Moro Province. But many of the schools they built in Muslim areas were

[379] Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 125.
[380] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 97.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Orosa *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 130.
[383] Ibid,
[384] Ibid, 131.
[385] Director of Education, "Twentieth Annual Report" as quoted in Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 125.

initially near military sites.[386] The locations of these schools were a function of where American control was strongest. As a result, instructors in these institutions signed up for a rather isolating social life outside of work.

Non-American instructors from the Philippines were predominantly Christian Filipino and were wary of teaching in Muslim areas without American protection.[387] The combination of location and instructors limited the capacity of these schools to serve Muslim students. There were 2,114 students enrolled in 1904 yet only 240 were Muslim.[388] By 1922, there were 73 schools in Sulu: 68 primary, 4 intermediate, and 1 secondary.[389] There were no universities. Christians, who were the minority in the area, made up the majority of the student population in the Moro Province.

Education became a basis for protest across several different Moro communities. The areas of Lanao and Cotabatao were sites of additional resistance concerning the compulsory requirement for public education in 1923. This led to increased clashes between the Philippine Constabulary, who were allowed to keep their guns, and members of the Maranao and Maguindanao communities, respectively. Additionally, schools in Lanao were burned down in the latter half of the decade. This act of protest destroyed the foundation for public education in the area.[390]

Arguments about the positive role of education in promoting peace are not supported by evidence concerning enrollment. If socialization is the mechanism by which tolerance is established, then Muslim and Christian students should have interacted often and in large

[386] Ibid, 58.
[387] Ibid, 62
[388] Wood, "First Annual Report," 14.
[389] Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 125.
[390] Moshe Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar* (Lexington Books, 2002), 227.

numbers. It is unlikely that a critical mass of students interacting was achieved, given that overall enrollment was low but it was *particularly* low for the Muslim demographic. Some Muslim students were sent to Manila or the United States if they were "promising."[391] But this was not enough to reach the critical mess of interaction necessary either. Even when interactions did occur, Wood notes that Moro attitudes towards Christian Filipinos in political positions were similar to how U.S Southerners viewed carpet-baggers.[392]

With enrollment concentrated in the first two grade levels, and problems with retention, it is unlikely that interactions were long-lasting. The promotion of similar values would not have easily developed with such short retention. Thus, this also provides evidence against the mechanism that education promotes peace by allowing students to learn the same things together. Rather, it further implies fragmentation *between* not only the Muslim minority and Christian majority but also fragmentation *within* the Muslim minority.

The evidence presented in this section demonstrates how shallow colonial education policies through evidence of enrollment contributed to weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. With such low enrollment and short retention, it was not likely that Muslim students would development a significant relationship with colonial officials through the school system. Furthermore, the bulk of interaction with American colonial officials was thus through their capacity as a militant authority. The Moro Province was kept under military, not civilian, control for several years. There were many battles with the Muslim population at the time, such as the Battle of Bud Bagsak. The lack of positive interactions with American instructors coupled with the prevalence of negative interactions in the form of conflict ensured a much weaker colonial attachment.

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[391] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 76.
[392] Cited in Ralph Benjamin Thomas, "Muslim but Filipino: The Integration of Philippine Muslims, 1917-1946," Ph.D. diss, University of Pennsylvania, 1971.

In terms of group cohesion, there was not a critical mass of Muslim students enrolled who were learning the same things in the same way, simultaneously. This severely inhibited the possibility for a common identity to develop. American officials were focused on civilizing what they saw as a savage population. But the overall result of demographic distribution, limited American control, or accommodations for the children of elites was that fewer Muslim students were enrolled. Moreover, this enrollment was for shorter periods of time. Efforts to better integrate the Muslim population would increase in the decades after Philippine independence. But in the decades leading up to Philippine independence, education was not threatening or comprehensive enough to facilitate the creation of a national identity.

Curricula

I identify two objectives of the curricula for public schools in the Moro Province. First, Muslims were to be prepared for assimilation into a Philippine state. Supplemental vocational training would ensure that Muslims had employable skills. Second, the Muslim population would be civilized through schooling. Both objectives were complementary to one another and were expressed as such by American officials:

> The purpose which inspires all the industrial work in the schools of this province is that of providing education for the eye and the hand in conjunction with the mind. We cannot separate industrial training from academic training without causing one-sided development. It is believed that true education consists in an harmonious mingling of the two and this is the principle followed in the schools of the Moro Province.[393]

Milligan identifies an underlying "hidden curriculum" in which the Americans hoped to weaken the identity of Muslim Filipinos in order to make it easier for them to become subordinates of a Christian Filipino state.[394] I do not disagree with his assessment. Several American officials made these objectives clear in their private and public states. However, I am

[393] Cameron, "Seventh Annual Report of the Superintendent of Schools," 21–2.
[394] Milligan, "Democratization or Neocolonialism?"

focused on the consequences of colonial education policies rather than their intent. Even if such objectives were explicit or hidden, they are less significant when considered in the context of low Muslim student enrollment and retention. I instead grapple with the effects of low enrollment and a separate curricula rather than engaging in a consideration of underlying intent. Moreover, I contest that there was a cohesive Muslim identity at this time.

In practice, the Americans had a dual approach in their education objectives that had separate standards for the Christian majority and the Muslim minority. The Americans wanted to foster national unity through "education in a common language and by training under common liberal institutions" for the Christian majority.[395] Christians were to be prepared for self-government since they would eventually inherit the administrative apparatus. The Muslim minority was to be prepared for assimilation into this dynamic. The formal policy was aimed towards, "the ultimate incorporation of [Mindanao and Sulu] into a united Philippines."[396] In order to achieve the goal of Muslim incorporation, Americans felt the need to civilize what they considered to be a savage, backwards population.[397] This distinction between populations was not just evident in the civilian-military rule divide but also in areas which the Philippine Commission and Assembly had jurisdiction.[398]

Curriculum in the Moro Province was intended to have a stronger emphasis on vocational training.[399]As a result, Muslim students were expected to take four years longer to complete a

[395] David P. Barrows, *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines, 1903-1913* (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Company, 1914), 52.
[396] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 74.
[397] Ibid; Michael Hawkins, "Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, no. 3(2008): 411-29.
[398] Nobutaka Suzuki, "Upholding Filipino Nationhood: The Debate Over Mindanao In The Philippine Legislature, 1907–1913*," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 44, no. 2 (2013): 266-291.
[399] Bulletin No. 7-1904, *Courses of Instruction for the Public Schools of the Philippine Islands prescribed by the General Superintendent of Education* (Manila: 1904).

longer primary education series.[400] This consisted of stick laying, block building, paper folding, hat and mat weaving, beadwork, and needlework. By the third and fourth years, boys focused on rattan working and carpentering while girls focused on dressmaking and needlework.[401] There was also room for Muslim children to learn "the useful arts of their own people."[402] The introduction of industrial and vocational education did not necessarily challenge pre-existing local identities, but instead provided knowledge that could be seen as complementary to it. More importantly, the additional industrial and vocational education ensured that the Muslim students who did attend these schools would have access to employment even after the Americans left.

Specialized agricultural schools were built in the region to facilitate the goal of vocational training. In Sulu, the Agricultural School at Lapak was built and maintained by the Bureau of Education.[403] There was also the Indanan Farm School on the island of Jolo, founded by an American woman named Lorillard Spencer, and boasted an enrollment of 80 students. The standard curricula of all public schools were taught at Indanan along with manners and athletics. In addition, students also had farming lessons. Religion, however, was not taught at all.[404] Thus, the curricula in these agricultural schools further reinforced the instruction of employable skills without challenging the religious basis of local identity.

Not only did agricultural schools aid in the instruction of employable skills, but they also left room for religious schools that could maintain the viability of local identity. M*adaris,* Islamic schools, provided a strong counter to the threat that colonial schools could have had on local identity. Islamic education existed in the region as early as Islam's arrival to the Philippines in the 14th century. But these were not eradicated during the American period (several American

[400] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 2005, 61. 79.
[401] Ibid, 80.
[402] Ibid, 60.
[403] Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People,* 127.
[404] Ibid, 129.

records referred to these as *pandita* schools). *Pandita* comes from the Sanskrit word meaning "learned man" and was used to refer to individuals that had an extensive knowledge of Islam and other areas.[405] As a result, *panditas* were not only religious figures but also judges, scribes, medical experts, and courtiers of the sultan.[406] *Pandita* schools were small classes that took place either in the mosque or the *pandita's* home.[407] Students either met with them daily or lived with the *pandita*. Muslim elites sometimes funded these efforts.[408]

American efforts to prepare Muslims for participation in a state governed by Christian Filipinos were persistent. Colonialism challenged this structure, particularly as American efforts to modernize the community clashed with the traditionalism of these schools.[409] But colonial schools were not threatening to the group's identity since the presence and persistence of Islamic schools mitigated the threatening influence American colonial education policies may have had on Islamic identity.

The evidence presented in this section demonstrates how shallow colonial education policies through evidence of curricula contributed to a weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. The bulk of education for Muslim students focused on vocational training. While the classroom left room for them to learn reading and arithmetic, they were not asked to become experts on American or Philippine history. Their local history was not significantly challenged. Furthermore, members of the different groupings within the Muslim community maintained their differences. For the students enrolled in colonial schools, there was not a significant challenge to their local identity coming from the curricula. Even if there was a challenge to local identities, a

[405] Cesar A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Manila: University of the Philippines Press , 1999), 114, 441; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*.
[406] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*,.
[407] Boransing Manaros, Frederico V. Magdalena, and Luis Q. Lacar, *The Madrasah Institution in the Philippines: Historical and Cultural Perspectives* (Illigan City: Toyota Foundation, 1987), 10 .
[408] Boransing, Magdalena and Lacar, *The Madrasah Institution*, 10 ; Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*, 115
[409] Hawkins, "Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South."

critical mass of students was not enrolled. Maintaining *pandita* schools, in which instruction took place in a smaller setting that did not enroll many students in one place, also ensured that differences within the Muslim community were maintained. At least for now.

Language

Individual leaders heavily influenced American policy towards the language of instruction. Leonard Wood, the first Governor of the Moro Province, did not want to humor local languages because he found them to be, "crude, devoid of literature, and limited in range."[410] He found the continuation of other dialects "unwise" and wanted to support English as the main language in order to facilitate "official and most business affairs in the comparatively near future."[411] This perspective contrasted with the attitude of others such as Superintendents of Public Instruction Najeeb Saleeby and Charles R. Cameron who supported instruction in the language of the locals. Even Governor Tasker Bliss supported teaching students in the Moro Province in their own language.[412] Overall, a "considerable number" of textbooks were "printed in the Arabic character" so that Muslim students could "learn to read and write their own tongue."[413] But Saleeby went so far as to create readers for the Tausug and Maguindanao in Arabic script.[414] Saleeby's readers included a phonetic primer and translation of an existing primer that was formatted similarly to the English version.[415]

It is important to emphasize that these primers were not universally accessible for all members in the Muslim community. In this specific example, Saleeby's primers were readers for the Tausug and Maguindanao community. There were at least eleven other groupings within the

[410] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 62.
[411] Wood, "First Annual Report," 1914, 14-15.
[412] Tasker H. Bliss, "Annual Report," 1906, 82.
[413] Leonard Wood, "Third Annual Report of Major General Leonard Wood, U.S. Army, Governor of the Moro Province From July 1, 1905 to April 16, 1906," (Zamboanga, 1906), 15.
[414] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 62.
[415] Najeeb Saleeby, *Sulu Reader for the Public Schools of the Moro Province* (Zamboanga, PI: Mindanao Herald Press, 1905). As cited in Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 2005.

Muslim community in the Philippines to whom he did not tailor the readers. American colonial officials recognized that even *pandita* schools were reinforcing differences within the Muslim community by facilitating reading and writing in the local dialect that used a modified Arabic script.[416]

While the goal of these accommodations was to make it easy to learn American ideas and become literate with English as a common language, the actual outcome was one in which the Muslim community remained fragmented from one another.[417] Children in "pure Moro districts" received instruction in their dialects first since their daily life was not conducted in English.[418] Classroom accommodations for language provide evidence that does not support mechanisms for how shared interactions could assist in the formation of a national identity. While the promotion of similar values through learning may still take place once material is translated, the process of translation maintains a difference. In addition, without a common means of communication, it was harder for the entire Muslim community to develop a shared national identity. Their differences were reinforced by not only internal cultural or linguistic differences, but also by uneven recognition by the American colonial apparatus.

[416] Cited in Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 63; Charles R. Cameron, "The Schools of Moroland," *The Mindanao Herald: A Decennium Issue* (1909); Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 2005.
[417] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, , 83; Saleeby, *Sulu Reader*.
[418] "Annual Report," 13.

Figure 7a and 7b: Excerpts from the Maguindanao Primers



15

لُوْغْ لَاغْ لِيْغْ مُوْرْ مَارْ مِيْرْ

* * * *

مُوْنْ مَانْ مِيْنْ نُوْرْ نَارْ نِيْرْ
هُوْمْ هَامْ هِيمْ وُوْكْ وَاكْ وِيْكْ
يُوْبْ يَابْ يِيبْ ثُوْتْ ثَاتْ ثِيْتْ

* * * * *

نِنِ مَخَ كَلِمَ اَدُوَ اِبتَغِنْ

يَا بَا دَا اُوْ بُوْ تُوْ لُوْ مُوْ دِيْ غِيْ

* * * *

3

بِسْمِ اللهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيْمْ

.....

نَنِ سُوْرَةَ فَغَنَدَنْ لَاغُوْنُ وَنَا مَغَاجِ سَاسِكُوْلُ غُبِرُنْ يَانَنْ
دَالِمْ نَنْلُوْ اَفَصَلْ بِتِيَارَنَنْ · سُ فَصَلَ فَغَنِيْ سَنْ اِنغَتْ كَنْ
اِكَلِيمَ فَنْدَغْ يَا نِنْ اِنفِيغْ سُ لَاغُونْ اَلِفْ سَرْنَوْنْ سُ بِرَسِنْ
دِيتَسْ دِيوَ دَفَنْ فَتِيْ مَدْ كَسَرْ اِنتُرْ سُ مَغْ كَلِمَنِنْ فَيْدُ اِبتَغِنْ
اُغْغُوْ مَدَا كَلِ بَتَغِنْ غَتْ سَمَلْمُوْ اَلِفْ لَمَنْ سَمَرْغَنْ كَا غْغُوْ
كَسَبْتَنْ مَغْ وَنَا اِكفَتَحِوُنْ اُغْغُوْ سُ كَا نْتَلُنْ اُغْغُوْ سُ كَسُوْرَنْ
اِندَالُمْنْ فَنْ سُ نْتَوِينْ اُغْغُوْ سُ هَمْزَةْ وَصَلْ اُغْغُوْ سُ اَلْ تَعْرِيفْ
اُغْغُوْ سُ اِكفَكِيدْ كَنْ كَسُوْرَتْ سَهَمْزَةْ مَنَا سُ نَحْوْ سَبَاسَنْ
عَرَبْ · كَامَيْكَ كَسَبْتَنْ مَغْ وَنَا مَلْمُوْ نَلَنْ مَوْتَلْ سُ قُرْآنْ ·
سُ فَصَلَ اِكَدُوَ سَنْ اِنغَتْ كَنْ اِكَنَلُوْفُوْلْ اُغْغُوْ اِيسَ فَنْدَغْ
يَا نِنْ اِنفِيغْ نْ فِنتُوَا سُ بَاسَنْ مَرْكَنْ سَبَاسَنْ مَغَنْدَنَوْنْ يَاغَلَنْ
سُوْرَةَ مَرْكَنْ اَنْتْ نْ اَرْنَلْدْ فِرْمَرْ اَنْتُوْ فَغَنَدَنْ مَغْ وَتَا سَاسِكُوْلْ ·

The evidence presented in this section demonstrates how shallow colonial education policies through evidence of language contributed to a weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. The objective of American colonial officials was to make English the official language moving forward. This was done to prepare Muslims for inclusion in a Philippine-governed state. But exceptions were made to allow room for local dialects, thus distancing the Muslim community from both the Christian majority and American officials who spoke English. Furthermore, the adoption of translations or primers in the classroom ultimately resulted in maintaining fragmentation between the different groups within the Muslim community. For students enrolled in colonial schools, language accommodations maintained their local identities

and did not provide a catalyst for the creation of a national identity just yet. This was enhanced by how *panditas* also taught reading and writing in local dialects. As a result, language accommodations did not facilitate the creation of a national identity among the Muslim community.

Instructors

Muslim resistance to Spanish colonization limited Spanish influence to mostly the northern parts of the Philippines. The Moros quickly filled administrative positions after the Spanish left. The situation changed when the colony switched to American hands. Existing schools were re-opened and initially maintained by American soldiers with teaching experience in an effort to reopen schools sooner.[419] Only a few of these existing schools served Muslim communities since the Spanish had not conquered these areas.[420] New schools were established in the Moro Province by 1900, shortly after the U.S. arrival to replace the Spanish.[421] There was an effort to ensure that American teachers trained native teachers.[422]

In Davao, which is located in the Moro Province, the effect of American schoolteachers had several cultural impacts on the students. Many students learned to speak English. In an annual report, a governor of the Moro Province highlighted progress when fewer students left the village to participate in a religious ceremony involving human sacrifice and cannibalism in the hills. There was also an expectation that participation would eventually end.[423] However, it is important to bear in mind that the influence of these instructors was on a smaller number of

[419] W.C. Grimes, "Organization and Administration of Education in the Philippine Islands,"1928; Kalaw, "Recent Policy towards the Non-Christian People of the Philippines," 1919; David P. Barrows, Papers, Bancroft Library, "Memoirs."
[420] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 56.
[421] Cameron, "The Schools of Moroland," 52.
[422] Pershing, "Annual Report."
[423] Ibid, 9.

Muslim students due to low levels of enrollment and retention. Even if their influence was intensive, it was not extensive.

The Bureau of Education was administered under the Secretary of Public Instruction. A general superintendent headed this with the assistance of 10 division superintendents. The number of division superintendents was increased to 18 after an amendment passed on July 24, 1901. At least 1,000 American teachers were appointed to teaching positions across the Philippines. The number of teachers and their range across the Philippines expanded as the need for them increased. A bill passed on October 8, 1902 divided the Philippines into 36 divisions for the purposes of schooling. Many of these divisions coincided with existing provinces.[424]

A majority of instructors in these schools were Christian Filipinos. By 1904, there were 52 public schools open in Moro Province. This employed 74 total instructors: 15 Americans, 50 Christian Filipinos, and 9 Muslims.[425] By 1914, there were over 230. At least 200 of these were Christian Filipino while 15 were American and 16 Muslim.[426] Efforts were made to hire more female instructors in order to increase the enrollment of Muslim girls. At least "six of the highest ranking Mohammedan princess of the sultanate of Sulu" became instructors in the public school system. In Sulu, which was located south of the island of Mindanao, there were 193 teachers in 1922. Three were American "and all the rest Filipinos – Mohammedan and Christian."[427] Yet reports did not frther specify the breakdown. In the provinces of Sulu, Lanao, and Cotabato, there were 42 male and female Muslim instructors in public schools by 1922.[428] These three provinces coincided with the three largest groups that made up the Muslim population.

[424] Moses, "Colonial Policy with Reference to the Philippines," 114-115.
[425] Pershing, "Annual Report,"; Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 62.
[426] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 62.
[427] Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 125.
[428] Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People*, 127.

Muslim instructors received training that closely aligned with American objectives for the Moro Province. Sometimes, their training took place in the United States. However, the cooperation of Muslim instructors with American training should not be seen as an indication of overall Muslim acceptance of American education. While there were already a few Muslims who openly or reluctantly collaborated with American policies, only a few of them taught.[429] Specific numbers vary, but government sources at the time identified, "only a few Mohammedans" who were instructors even by 1915.[430] Even the administration of many schools was heavily comprised of Christian Filipinos.[431] Similar to enrollment, there was not a critical mass of Muslim instructors to merit a significant outcome on developing a national identity.

The Department of Mindanao and Sulu made efforts to incentivize and maintain instructors who came to teach predominantly Muslim students. They providing housing, higher salaries, and the "privilege of acquiring homesteads." There was a lot of fertile land that was not legally owned by anyone.[432] Yet this did not mean that no one lived on this land. On the contrary, some of these potential homesteads were on land that belonged to Muslim families for decades, if not longer. The practice of promising land to Christian Filipinos willing to move into Mindanao would later be solidified in legislation passed by a newly independent Philippine state. But during the colonial period, few instructors took the offer. American officials struggled to have enough teachers in these schools "who [were] familiar with English and Moro."[433] Thus,

[429] Tan and Abinales also both highlight the shifting relationship that Muslim leaders had with American officials. Inter-Muslim rivalries often resulted in collaborating with the Americans to the detriment of other Muslim tribes and not because of American affinity.
[430] The Government of the Philippine Islands, Department of Public Instruction, "Sixteenth Annual Report of the Director of Education," 57.
[431] Milligan, *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy*, 73.
[432] Camilo Osias, *Barrio Life and Barrio Education* (World Book Company: Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, 1921) 101.
[433] Wood, "Third Annual Report," 1906, 15.

the threat of more Christian Filipino instructors coming into Mindanao and Sulu was not enough to galvanize Muslims behind a common national identity either.

The evidence presented in this section demonstrates how shallow colonial education policies, through evidence of instructors, contributed to weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. Initially, the instructors were American soldiers and teachers. Over time, Christian Filipinos made up the majority of instructors in the Moro Province. This meant that there was limited interaction between Muslim students and American officials as teachers. Interactions with colonial officials would mostly be through administrative or military arenas. Violent interactions, such as the four-day Battle at Bagsak Mountain in 1913, left a stronger impression when it was one of the few interactions they had with colonial officials. This was increased by how Muslims could not hold high political office, partly due to legislation and partly because they did not have the educational background necessary for it.

Learning from predominantly Christian instructors could have socialized Muslim students. Only a few Muslim instructors elected to teach in these schools. The few that did were trained the same way as their Christian counterparts. Moreover, the collaborative process in the classroom could have promoted experiences of learning similar values. But these arguments are less compelling when enrollment is considered. Having many Christian instructors was not as threatening to local identity given that enrollment among Muslim students was low.

Shallow Education Policies and Muslim National Identity

The shallow education policies over Muslims in the Philippines did not assist in the development of a national identity. Low enrollment in schools built by American powers undermined any other efforts in education policies. Records indicate an increase in student enrollment, schools built, and instructors hired. However, very few Muslim students went to the

American schools that benefitted from this increase. The few who did barely stayed past the second grade. This meant that there would not be a critical mass of Muslim students engaging in a shared experience of learning the same thing in the same way with their peers. The absence of this would not foster a national identity since there was no basis for group cohesion in the classroom. In addition, instructors in these schools were initially Americans and then predominantly Christian Filipinos.

The curricula and language policies in colonial schools also did not assist in the development of a Muslim national identity. There was a stronger emphasis on vocational training for Muslim students, which included learning skills that had already been important to the community. More importantly, however, American schools did not replace Islamic education. *Pandita* schools, in which a few pupils learned from one individual, persisted through the American colonial period. This preserved local level identity and a fragmentation of the larger Muslim community since students were not all learning together. In addition, accommodations via primers and translations for different languages used within the Muslim community further reinforced differences rather than commonalities.

British Education of the Burmese Colony

Buddhist monks established an education system in pre-colonial Burma. Nearly each village had a monastery in which Buddhist leaders taught young men the basics of the alphabet and the tenets of Buddhist values. The emphasis of this education was mostly religious, concerned with how to live a moral life. There were no grades or examinations.[434] Most boys did not learn more than their letters and how to recite Pali verses, often only up to the level of a

[434] Office of the Superintendent, "Octennial Report on Education in Burma for the Years 1902-03 – 1906-07" (Government Printing, Burma: 1908), 1.

secondary education.[435] These monasteries are often described as classless: rich and poor students enrolled together. However, it is important to emphasize that this was only the case for males. Female enrollment was not salient in this system.

In effect, Burma had a universal education system through the monasteries. Literacy rates in Burma were higher than their European counterparts in the 1800s.[436] Only a few women were literate, as this was generally reserved for elite women. But the rates of female literacy were still reportedly higher than in Europe. Moreover, "the majority of Burmese women were illiterate, but they were educated."[437]

The curricula for schools in pre-colonial Burma included knowledge of geography, astrology, and medicine. Over time, however, colonial reports argued that education "remained stationary while the West overtook [Burma.]"[438] There were also opportunities for vocational education in which teenagers could be apprentices, even outside of the education system. In higher education, students could learn advanced crafts.[439]

Britain established three types of schools in Burma. The largest proportion of enrollment was in vernacular schools, which maintained Burmese as the language of instruction. About 90% of students were enrolled in a vernacular school, but these schools did not teach students the English skills necessary to work in government jobs for the colonial authority. Bridge Scholarships provided financial assistance to bright students in vernacular schools so that they could afford to go to Anglo-vernacular schools, but only a few students could take full advantage of the opportunity.[440]

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[435] Nick Cheesman, "School, State, and Sangha in Burma," *Comparative Education* 39, no. 1 (2003): 45-63.
[436] J.S. Furnivall, *An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma* (Rangoon: Burma Book Club, 1931), Preface, x.
[437] Office of the Superintendent, "Octennial Report," 1908, 2.
[438] Office of the Superintendent, "Octennial Report," 1908, 2.
[439] Office of the Superintendent, "Octennial Report," 1908, 2.
[440] "Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1932-33."

In addition, early retention rates were low for vernacular schools in rural areas because they did not include agriculture in the curricula. Around 88% of students enrolled in vernacular schools did not complete the minimum courses needed to qualify for literacy.[441]

The other two schools, anglo-vernacular and English, charged tuition. Anglo-vernacular schools taught in English, with Burmese as a supplemental language for the lower class. English schools taught in English with Burmese as a second language. (Thus, they should also have been considered anglo-vernacular schools, just with a different emphasis on which language came first). Admission of Burmese students in English schools was capped at around 10%.[442] Thus, Furnivall's categories of colonial schools were slightly upheld in Burma. But a significant factor was also the distribution of enrollment across these schools, something he does not fully address. A second significant factor aside from enrollment concerns governance of each type: "education in Burma was left almost entirely to private agency; western education to the missionaries, and Burmese education to the monks."[443] In this case, monks maintained native schools through the monasteries.

Furnivall often distinguished between education as a social asset for society in pre-colonial Burma under the monastery system and as an economic asset in colonial Burma under the British system.[444] Monastic schools promoted not only literacy and knowledge about Buddhism but also stressed he importance of living a moral life. As a social asset, higher enrollment was advantageous because it meant that more students would promote community life. The British changed the fundamental role that education played in people's lives. Students

[441] An estimated 75% of students enrolled in lower primary departments withdraw in Standard I while more than 87%% of students failed before completing the Fourth Standard from 1924-1930 See A. Campbell, "Report of the Vernacular and Vocational Education Reorganization Committee," (Rangoon: Government Printing Press, 1938), 153.
[442] J.S. Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia*.
[443] Ibid.
[444] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 204.

learned a different set of skills in Western schools, such as the ability to speak English and qualify for jobs in the colonial administration. Thus, speaking English became a coveted skill for social mobility. As an economic asset, higher enrollment was a disadvantage because it created more competition for the same jobs. This dichotomy implies that assessing the outcome of education policies was dependent upon what kind of asset it was seen as:

> Where schools teach children how to live, the more who go to school the better; but when they teach them merely how to make a living, the more who go to school, the less they earn" and "competition raised the standard of qualification for the various appointments[445]

British management of Burma through India affected job opportunities and social mobility. British officials maintained that it was cheaper and more efficient to hire Indians rather than Burmans. Part of this was because India had been a colony of the Crown much sooner, so the British were already accustomed to one colonial population. But a more significant reason was due to language. According to Furnivall, "up to 1930, one could not use the telephone in Burma without a knowledge of Hindustani."[446] Very few workers in the postal and telegraph departments were Burmese as a result. This suggests that even the few who did acquire knowledge of English in school were still at a relative disadvantage.

The Burman Majority and British India

There was a general understanding among British officials who studied Burma's education that pre-colonial Burma was well-educated. The Buddhist monastic system ensured higher rates of literacy, often without an eye on class. The initial architects of education for the Burmese colony, such as Sir Arthur Phayre and Sir Albert Fytche, recognized this. Their successors did not.

[445] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 376.
[446] Ibid, 121.

Burmans did not need to attend Western schools in order to access employment.[447] Monastery education was sufficient for subordinate clerical or administration positions. But there were not enough opportunities for them to go to school and be engineers or doctors. Furnivall consistently defended this discrepancy by saying that there was no demand for Burman doctors and engineers.[448] Low-level industry jobs were slightly open for Burman workers, but they could not access high-level industry and commerce jobs either.[449] English played a critical role in job opportunities, especially for the Burmese who wanted clerkship positions. However, they also did not want to convert to Christianity, so many of the Burmese refused to go to a missionary school even after these schools were funded by colonial grants.[450]

The Karen Minority and Baptist Missionaries

While the British presence in colonial Burma began in 1824 and concluded in 1948, the arrival of American Baptist missionaries in 1813 preceded it. Different types of schools were established during this time. The earliest system of schools to which the Karen were exposed was through Baptist missionaries. There was a difference in the education experiences of what were referred to as the heathen and Christian Karen. The heathen Karen did not have much access to education. The Christian Karen had access to a myriad of resources: village schools, Association of the Churches, Home Mission Societies, Missionary Conventions, high schools, etc.[451]

Even in schools established by missionaries, penetrative education policies were evident in the language and curricula. Missionaries made some effort to "reduce the Karen language to writing."[452] Individuals such as Dr. Wade learned both the Sgaw and Pwo dialects and then

[447]Ibid, 55.
[448] Ibid, 127.
[449] Ibid, 119.
[450] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 55.
[451] Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*, 214.
[452] Robbins, *Following The Pioneers*, 54.

adapted the Burmese alphabet to these sounds, thus making a phonetic system.[453] He used this knowledge to make dictionaries and the *Karen Thesaurus*.[454] Thus, even the way in which Karen was brought to writing reflected an identity other than theirs. Furthermore, the resulting material for textbooks was predominantly a reflection of foreign material. For example, the first textbook in a Karen dialect was the New Testament. The translation of the Bible was accompanied by a commentary and church history book. When a Karen dialect was used, it was in the form of original hymns, ultimately still reflecting foreign content.[455] Missionaries also translated Shakespeare's plays, *Pilgrim's Progress*, and *Arabian Nights*.[456]The Karen engaged in missionary work within the Chin, Kachin, Lahu, and Wa communities.[457] This demonstrates that through their education with missionaries, the Karen not only embraced a stronger colonial attachment but also worked on behalf of the colonial power.

Karen who were educated in missionary schools sometimes went on to evangelize other communities. It was common to find Karen graduates who continued missionary work for other communities such as the Chin, Kachin, Lahu, and Wa.[458] The S'gaw Karen Christians in Bassein went on to help open a Kachin mission.[459] Saya Po Tun was a Karen missionary who graduated from the Bassein Sgaw-Karen High School. He learned other languages and eventually translated the New Testament in order to make it accessible for the Lahu community with whom he worked. This was necessary as the Lahu preferred to not send their children to school in the

[453] It is worth noting, however, that some nationalist Karen writers have argued that there was a Karen literary tradition but that it was lost due to the intervention of the Burman and Mon kingdoms. See Re Moh, Phar, 'K'n˜au' k'lu`. dau. a'l`.a' õ le`(' õ The Karen Race and Its Literature'), Kwe Kalu (1999), 19 as cited in Nick Cheesman, "Seeing 'Karen' in the Union of Myanmar," *Asian Ethnicity* 3, no. 2 (2002): 199-220; Harry I. Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma: A Study in Anthropology and Ethnology* (1922), 300.
[454] Robbins, *Following The Pioneers*, 53-55; Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma*, 310.
[455] Robbins, *Following The Pioneers*, 54, 58; Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma*, 300, 310.
[456] Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma*, 300.
[457] Robbins, *Following The Pioneers* , 66.
[458] Ibid.
[459] Ibid, 76.

plains areas but instead built their own chapel and school solely for their community.[460] This demonstrates another difference with how the Karen approached education: they were willing to work both inside and outside of their communities. Very few of the other groups did the same.[461] Even in mission schools, instructors were revered. Government officials did not have the same level of authority over the Karen that a schoolmaster had.[462]

The "special classes" refers to races whose languages are recognized by the Burma Education Department as vernacular languages. Groups within the special classes included the Karens, Chins, Shans, Kachins, Talaings, Taungthus and Danus, who are native to Burma. It also included immigrants from India such as the Tamils, Telugus and Manipurians along with the Chinese.[463] Special classes were a linguistic distinction meant for students who did not speak Burmese, Urdu, or English at home. As a result, Urdu-speaking Indians were excluded from being part of the special classes.[464] One additional exception was that Urdu-speaking Muslims, referred to as Mohamedans, were classified with Burmese speakers of the same religion.[465]

There are three main divisions within the special classes. The "more civilized communities" were closely connected via racial affinity and manners to the Burman majority, such as the Talaings, Karens, and Shans. The "hill or wild tribes of Thibetan or Mongolian extraction" were the Kachins and Chins. Immigrants, from China and India, made up the last division. The three divisions in the special classes did not include all the different ethnic

[460] Ibid, 83.
[461] There was some mention of the Chin working alongside the Karen to also preach, but not their own. See Ibid, 77.
[462] Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of* Burma, 207.
[463] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," (Government Printing: Burma, 1907), 21.
[464] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19" (Government Printing: Burma, 1919), 21-22.
[465] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Years 1917-18 to 1921-22" (Government Printing: Burma, 1923), 71.

minorities in Burma. Instead, it included the minority native races that the Education Department could interact with but excluded "the wilder and more inaccessible tribes."[466]

Of particular importance to this study is how the British classified the Karen. At the time, the Karen were "mainly Christian," with others in the community practicing Buddhism or believing in animism.[467] The British classification of the Karen was based on language.[468] Yet more recent records about the distribution of the Karen show a different trend. The majority of Karen today are Buddhist while a minority are animist.[469] A different distinction notes that a majority of the S'ghaw-speaking Karen is Christian or animist while a majority of the Pwo-speaking Karen is Buddhist.[470]

Baptist missionaries had an easier time converting "the simple-minded Karen than amongst the more astute Burmese."[471] After the establishment of the Burmese colony, English became an economic asset, which increased job opportunities for its speakers. Karen schools were often in better condition and management than Burman schools, which was credited to the efforts of Baptist missionaries.[472] Baptist missionaries were also credited with teaching the Karen to pursue and "have a more national interest in education…than exists among any other race not excluding the Burmans."[473] Karen support for education was strong, which manifested in attitudes of funding schools in kind and promoting co-education for boys and girls.[474]

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[466] Office of the Superintendent, "Third Quinquennial Report," 29.
[467] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1917-18" (Government Printing: Burma, 1918), 14.
[468] Ibid.
[469] Minorities at Risk Project, "Minorities at Risk Dataset" (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2009) http://www.mar.umd.edu/
[470] "Minority Rights Group International," Karen, https://minorityrights.org/minorities/karen/
[471] Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 55.
[472] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08" (Government Printing: Burma, 1908), 25; Office of the Superintendent, "Fifth Quinquennial Report for the Year 1912-13 to 1916-17," (Government Printing: Burma), 3.
[473] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13" (Government Printing: Burma, 1913), 17.
[474] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 57.

Even though the Karen were praised for their attitudes towards education, their schools were not perfect. The Karen were considered "the most satisfactory of the special races" and "the most important race educationally."[475] But their progress was described as "uniform," unlike their Burman contemporaries.[476] Smeaton called for a series of reforms to be made for Karen education: officially recognizing Karen languages; grants in aid for Karen schools; removing the Burmese language requirement in schools; teaching Karen in schools; and encouraging missionaries to study Karen. When it came to school management, Smeaton suggested that officials "leave the schools in the hands of the people as much as possible."[477] All of these suggestions imply that these practices were either missing or executed poorly when it came to Karen education. It also demonstrates that the Karen did not have a strong influence in the administration and curricula of their schools. Clearly, the British did.

Enrollment

In terms of enrollment, the Karen were consistently the largest portion of the student demographic relative to all the other special classes, especially when taking into account indigenous schools. When the numbers in public and private schools are combined, there were more Karen students enrolled than any other group (many of which were Christian converts).[478] Furthermore, there was a significant gap, or what officials referred to as a *longo intervallo*, between Karen enrollment and the second highest group.[479] The only exception to this is in the Northern Circle, with only one school for the Karen, where they were not the most numerous

[475] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 25; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13," 1931,17.
[476] Office of the Superintendent, "Fifth Quinquennial Report 1912-13 to 1916-17," 28.
[477] Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma,* 222-23.
[478] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10" (Government Printing: Burma, 1910).
[479] This was often the Shan or Talagings. Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16" (Government Printing: Burma, 1916), 15.

tribe.[480] Based on a 1913-17 Education Report, there were 34,896 Karen children in schools, which reflected 3% of the total Karen population. For context, about 6% of the Burmese population and 0.5% of the Shan were in school.[481] It is not entirely clear if enrollment in Sunday schools is included in this number, but Robbins cites enrollment numbers from the Burma Baptist Convention Reports in 1921 and 1922 which report 4,881 and 14,264, respectively.[482] A second major shift was during the 1918-19 school year, in which more than 50% of Tamil and Telugu students were in anglo-vernacular schools. They were the highest in this subdivision, surpassing the Karen.[483]

There are several caveats that should be considered when assessing enrollment data in colonial Burma. First, the British often combined numbers for Burmans and Karens in their records. Other times, they only provided aggregate assessments. For example, one reported noted that, "In 1862, 1:5 students were Burmese while the remainder was mostly Christian Karen out of a population of 5,000 students." This sometimes makes it difficult to provide concrete numbers for Karen data but does provide a way to make assessments based on trends. At other times, however, the British were explicit in the difference between Karen numbers and other ethnic minorities.

Second, there is missing data for the total number of schools. One reason for this missing data is because not all mission schools are on the registered list of schools due to high instructor turnover. Another reason was that ineffective schools were removed from the public list. Both of

[480] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 21.
[481] Cited in Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma*, 309.
[482] There was a slight distinction within the Karen community in which the Karen on the Hills east of Toungoo were not as advanced the Karen on the plains or the delta. See Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08", 25; Robbins, *Following the Pioneers*, 32, 57.
[483] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 22.

these reasons specifically influenced schools "in backward districts and in the Karen Hills."[484] Third, available data for school and enrollment numbers varied for each report. As a specific example, reports from the 1918-19 school year indicated that, "These figures exclude pupils of special classes in unrecognized special schools and in recognized institutions not special. There are private schools for most of the special classes, but no private schools exist for special communities of Indian origin other than Tamils and Telugus."[485]

Table 10: Karen Anglo-Vernacular Schools

1907-08[486]	12	
1912-13[487]	12	2581
1913-14[488]	12	2848
1916-17[489]	13	2822
1917-18[490]	13	
1918-19[491]	13	2500
1919-20[492]	20	
1921-22[493]	13	3659

[484]This was often the Shan or Talagings. Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16," (Government Printing: Burma), 20; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 26.
[485] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 22.
[486] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 25.
[487] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13," 17.
[488] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16."
[489] Office of the Superintendent, "Fifth Quinquennial Report 1912-13 to 1916-17," 28.
[490] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1917-18," 14.
[491] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 22.
[492] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1919-20" (Government Printing: Burma, 1921), 27.
[493] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 71.

Table 11: Karen Vernacular Schools

1907-08[494]	852	
1912-13[495]	930	26242
1913-14[496]	968	30527
1914-15[497]		31872
1915-16[498]		32135
1916-17[499]	1165	32047
1917-18[500]	1153	30217
1918-19[501]	1106	30000
1921-22[502]	1044	31415

Table 12: Schools and Total Enrollment of the Special Classes

1907-08[503]		48264	
1908-09[504]		49375	
1912-13[505]	1276	42004	public schools for special classes
1913-14[506]	1320	47593	public schools for special

[494] This was a 10% increase during the school year. Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 25.
[495] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13," 17; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16."
[496] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16."
[497] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16," 13.
[498] Ibid.
[499] Office of the Superintendent, "Fifth Quinquennial Report 1912-13 to 1916-17," 28; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1917-18," 14.
[500] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1917-18," 14.
[501] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 22.
[502] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 71.
[503] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 34; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10" (Government Printing: Burma, 1910), 29-30.
[504] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10" (Government Printing: Burma, 1910).
[505] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16" (Government Printing: Burma, 1916).
[506] Ibid.

			classes
1914-15[507]		66646	special classes in public schools
1915-16[508]		70628	special classes in public schools
1915-16[509]		54367	special schools
1916-17[510]	1715	55749	public schools
1917-18[511]	1704	55137	public schools
1918-19[512]		90143	special classes in any school
1919-20[513]		90262	special classes in any school

Table 12 provides combined data on the total enrollment of students in the special classes, often in public schools. Specific enrollment numbers for just the Karen population are not readily available. In the 1901-02 school year, 20,013 Karen were enrolled in special schools while in there were 28,580 Karen enrolled in the 1902-03 school year.[514] Despite the absence of specific numbers, British officials made it clear in their reports that the Karen were always the largest portion of enrollment among the special classes. More specifically, the Karen as made up 2/3 of enrollment and attendance in public institutions for special classes in a given year.[515] Even when a special school for the sons of Shan Chiefs was established in Taunggyi, in the Southern Shan States, a majority of the boys enrolled were Shans or Karens.[516]

It is also possible to make inferences about Karen enrollment based on how other groups were doing at the time. The number of Karen anglo-vernacular schools was rather stable while

[507] Ibid.
[508] Ibid.
[509] Ibid.
[510] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1917-18," 14.
[511] Ibid.
[512] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1919-20," 1919, 26.
[513] Ibid,
[514] Office of the Superintendent, "Third Quinquennial Report," 1908, 30.
[515] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16," 15.
[516] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 22.

the total number of vernacular schools and corresponding enrollment steadily increased, as demonstrated in Table 10. The exceptional progress of the Karen can also be tracked over time. For example, there was a 25% increase in the enrollment of Karen students in 13 anglo-vernacular schools to 2,822 students and in 1,165 vernacular schools with 32,047 students. For context, there was also an increase in the number of Tamil and Telugu anglo-vernacular schools from 11 to 15 schools and 1,622 students to 2,381 in the same five-year period. The total number of schools and enrollment for their vernacular schools in the same period went 69 to 58 and 2,203 to 2,060, respectively.[517] In the 1918-19 academic year, there were 6,000 Shan students in 175 schools; 5,000 Tamil and Telugu students; 4,000 Talaing students; 135 Lisaw students and 59 Gurkhas. These numbers pale in comparison to the approximately 32,500 Karen students enrolled in their anglo-vernacular and vernacular schools.[518] These numbers demonstrate that the Karen were heavily involved in the colonial education system both in enrollment and number of schools, especially when in comparison to any other race in the special classes. Out of any of the other special races, and even the Burmans, the Karen had a stronger relationship with the colonial power through their enrollment in schools.

The Government Engineering School was founded in 1895. European, Eurasian, Indian natives, Burman, and Karen students were eligible for enrollment in this school, but the distribution was uneven. For example, for the 1906-07 school year there were no Europeans who sat for final examinations, but there were 9 Eurasians, 14 Burmans and Karens, and 40 natives of India.[519] There was no medical college or school in Burma at the beginning of the 1900s. In some cases, scholarship holders could attend the Calcutta Medical College. In Madras (modern-day Chennai), there were 12 "Burma scholars" training as hospital assistants: 7 Burmans, 4

[517] Office of the Superintendent, "Fifth Quinquennial Report 1912-13 to 1916-17," 28.
[518] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 1919, 22.
[519] Office of the Superintendent, "Third Quinquennial Report," 1908.

Mohamedans, and 1 Karen.[520] This number demonstrates how certain officials used the category of Burman in an aggregate sense. During the 1908-09 school year, 26 out of 32 students presenting at the American Baptist High School, Rangoon matriculated while 3 out of 11 at the same society's school for Sgau-Karens at Bassein matriculated.[521] Two inferences can be made from this data. First, Karen students were the only native minority who advanced this far in their education, far more than other Burmese natives in the special classes. Second, however, is that the Karen were not doing as well or on par with Eurasians or Burmans who also enrolled in engineering or medical school. Thus, the Karen can be regarded as doing well. But they did well only in comparison to others in the special races. They were still a minority.

Overall enrollment in *public* schools increased in the 1908-09 school year. Private schools experienced a decrease in enrollment despite an increase in the number of schools. A majority of the decline was from male enrollment, but it was offset by an increase in enrollment in primary public schools. Furthermore, there was an increase in public schools under private management and students enrolled in them than the previous academic year (1907-08). More Karen private institutions were established, yet fewer students enrolled in them.[522] In the following academic year (1909-10), there was another decrease in enrollment in Karen anglo-vernacular public schools under private management and an increase in Karen vernacular schools.[523] At least 29,291 Karen were enrolled in schools this year. In particular, "no less than 2,761 Karens are learning English in 12 schools conducted by Missionaries, some of them situated in places remote from centers where English is heard or understood."[524]

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[520] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 9.
[521] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10."
[522] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10."
[523] It should be noted, however, that similar trends occurred in the anglo-vernacular schools for the Shans, Tamils, and Telugus along with the vernacular schools of the Talaing, Taungthu, and Shan. See Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 21.
[524] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 21.

Periods of decrease in Karen numbers did occur and were noted by officials. One of the first declines was during the 1909-10 academic year.[525] But there was then an increase in attendance among schools for the special classes in the 1910-11 academic year due to Karen, Shan, and Shin vernacular public schools that were under private management.[526] When the number and enrollment in public schools decreased in the 1917-18 school year, it was attributed to losses in mostly Karen schools.[527] Yet these decreases continued in the 1918-19 school year, as well: the total number of recognized schools for special classes and the students enrolled; the total number of students belonging to special classes in all recognized schools.[528]

Personal motivation was not the reason for declines in enrollment. Colonial officials reported disease as the culprit. The Sgau-Karen American Baptist Mission School, Bassein had students affected by beri-beri during the 1909-10 academic year.[529] More broadly, Deputy Inspectors for Karen schools noted that the sub-circle divisions were large and that it was not easy to travel to all of them. Many of the Karen lived in remote villages in hilly parts of the district where they work on *taungyas*. In some cases, these villages were not permanent since they would be relocated if a harvest season was not good. Schools could also close in response to a bad harvest season.[530] For example, 19 schools in the township of Leiktho closed because there was not enough food.[531] The schools usually opened again, but this disruption influenced enrollment and retention numbers.

This section demonstrates how penetrative colonial education policies, using evidence about enrollment, contributed to stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion. More schools

[525] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 21.
[526] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13," 1913, 5.
[527] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1917-18," 1918, 14.
[528] 1 Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 1919, 23.
[529] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 8.
[530] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13," 1913.
[531]Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 37.

increased the likelihood of interaction with British officials, such as the Deputy Inspectors, who came once or twice a year. While it is true that some schools in the Karen Hills were in remote areas, there was still an expectation that the colonial officials played a regulatory and administrative role with the Karen. The majority of interactions with colonial officials, either experienced or anticipated, were not violent. These interactions were more likely to make a larger impression on the Karen community since so many of their children were enrolled in schools. This is in stark contrast to the Moros who did not have a strong education system upon which they could base interactions with colonial officials. In addition, the Karen were often hired by the British to address Burman dacoity, which was ""robbery generally accompanied by murder." These incidents apparently avoided villages of the Christian Karen since perpetrators knew that they would be held accountable.[532] Karen contingents assisted the British in navigating the forests and hunting fugitives of Burman troops.[533]

Furthermore, high enrollment of Karen students promoted strong group cohesion. British officials noted that the Karen displayed a "want of solidarity" in their schools.[534] There were fewer schools serving a wider range of communities, thus increasing the likelihood that Karen students who would be otherwise separated could have a shared education experience. Their Buddhist counterparts had grown accustomed to one monastery per village. But the Karen benefitted from one school serving multiple areas, since it increased interaction between the Karen. Furthermore, unlike the smaller *pandita* schools serving the Moros, this one school for many communities fostered the development of a national identity. Such a mentality would serve as a basis for making it easier to feel discrimination and mobilize on the basis of this identity once there was a catalyst for it.

[532] Reporters did not want to use the word "rebellion." See Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*, 6, 15.
[533] Ibid.
[534] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 3.

Curricula

There were three industrial schools under private management: the Convent, Prome Road; St. Mary's School, Rangoon; and the Bghai-Karen School, Toungoo.[535] The Bghai-Karen School, Toungoo offered courses in printing, book-binding, and carpentry, and sometimes weaving.[536] They stopped teaching blacksmithing, cane-work, and tinsmith work due to a decline in enrollment. In the 1907-08 school year, the number of students enrolled in the school dropped from 74 to 39. Many officials attributed this to how Karen students in the hills did not have much use for these skills.[537] Most boys who passed these subjects were enrolled in carpentry.[538] Yet it is also worth noting that enrollment across the three industrial schools at Prome Road and St. Mary's, Rangoon, and Toungoo saw an overall drop in enrollment in the 1909-10 academic year.[539] The Mary Chapman Training College for Teachers and School for the Deaf, Rangoon specifically trained Burmese and Karen girls orally on subjects of needlework, lace making, and weaving.[540]

Karen students were not barred from participating in industrial schools. For example, there were 13 Burman and Karen apprentices at the Burma Railway Workshops, Insein (a year later there were 14) and 55 pupils for printing, book-binding, and carpentry at the Bghai Karen School, Toungoo. In the Eastern Circle, weaving was offered at the Bghai Karen School,

[535] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13," 1913, 3.
[536] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 17; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 16; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1912-13," 1913, 3; 1913-14, 12; 1914-15; 10.
[537] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 17.
[538] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16," 1916.
[539] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 16.
[540] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 53.

Toungoo, and needlework was offered in 16 vernacular and 5 anglo-vernacular Schools.[541] Weaving was dropped the following year.[542]

There were also opportunities for technical and vocational education within the colonial education system under the British. However, opportunities to work in areas such as commerce or industry were not easy to obtain since foreign workers dominated these sectors. Thus, despite the formal opportunities available in school the reality was that very few Burmans chose to study technical or vocational education since they could not find work in commerce or industry.[543] There was no medical college or school in Burma at the beginning of the 1900s. In some cases, scholarship holders could attend the Calcutta Medical College. In Madras, there were 12 "Burma scholars" training as hospital assistants: 7 Burmans, 4 Mohamedans, and 1 Karen.[544] According to some records, the Karen did not fare well in all technical subjects. They found "prescribed tests difficult" in music and failed compulsory subjects when music was included.[545]

Karen education did not leave room for their group identity in the classroom. Initially, the curriculum of the vernacular schools was supposed to include a study of Karen dialects, which was encouraged. This became optional since there was supposedly not a Karen literature that could be utilized for the purpose.[546] Special textbook committees were later established during the Conference of Kachin Schools in 1915. This resulted in efforts to prepare textbooks for Kachin, Chin, Shan, Karen, and Talaging primary Standards. In addition, the number of native instructors who could teach with these textbooks increased.[547] These efforts influenced the

[541] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 15; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 16.
[542] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 16.
[543] Office of the Superintendent, "Octennial Report," 5.
[544] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 6.
[545]Ibid, 17.
[546] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 25; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 11.
[547] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 77.

curricula of vernacular Karen schools. Karen dialects replaced Burmese as the medium of instruction.[548] Despite this movement towards bringing more Karen identity into the curricula, several years of schooling devoid of this had already taken place. The high numbers of Karen enrollment in years prior to the start of these efforts suggests that the penetrative education policies of the British had already resulted in challenging local identity. Such efforts to bring it in afterwards only resulted in reinforcing differences.

This section demonstrates how penetrative colonial education policies, using evidence about curricula, resulted in stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion. The Karen were praised by British officials for their attitude and progress in schools. More importantly, Karen interest in education and the maintenance of their schools was attributed to missionaries whose work instilled these values in the population. This close colonial attachment existed even before a staggering number of schools were established. Without a colonial hand, the belief was that the Karen would not be as invested in their education.

It is plausible that schools did not *intend* to crowd out local identity. But this intention is less significant than the actual consequence. Industrial schools, for example, were open to Karen enrollment. Of students who did enroll, few found use for the things they learned in school when they returned back to the village. In addition, opportunities to work in commerce or industry were less accessible to the Karen since other groups dominated those areas. Both of these experiences solidified how the Karen were different, especially in terms of how to relate what they learned in either every day life. Moreover, the late inclusion of Karen dialects into textbooks in schools ensured that there would be a separation between their domestic and school life. It did not matter how many students were enrolled in schools if the distinction between what they learned in school and what was relevant at home was stark. This would serve as a basis for

[548] Ibid, 78.

not only reinforcing how the Karen were different, but also that they shared more with one another and thus had a separate national identity. Once that was established, it would be easier for the Karen to identify discrimination on the basis of this identity and facilitate mobilization along its lines.

Language

The main concern for education of the special classes was language. Burma did not try to impose a language, but Burmese ended up being "unavoidably imposed on schools for hill races" when they did not have their own language or teachers.[549] Accommodations were not made for the education of "wild and backward tribes" because it was too hard to account for every language and script in schools. They were forced to learn English and their own language was only utilized for basics if the script was close to Burmese. There was also pressure to teach them Burmese as soon as possible since some instructors had to rely on interpreters.[550] The Karen, Kachen, Chin, Talaing, and Shan did not have their own textbooks or teachers. In addition, they did not have opportunities for higher education in their language. As a result, Burmese instructors had to resort to the use of old Burmese textbooks using Burmese for children who did not speak this language at home. The British attributed this to why schools were less popular and literacy rates did not progress.[551]

There are two main Karen dialects, Sgaw and Pwo. Robbins noted that the third main division included the Red Karens and that there was also a number of minor tribes. A 1921 Census reported that 134,924 out of a total 178,225 Christian Karen were Baptist. More than 3/5 of the converts were Sgaw Karens and 2/5 from the Pwo and other tribes. The British assisted

[549]Ibid, 77.
[550]Ibid, 32.
[551]Ibid, 77.

both the Sgaw and Pwo Karen in occupying more land after the Burmese had historically driven the Karen community into the mountain areas.[552]

The policy of British colonial officials was to discourage minor languages and dialects in favor of Burmese.[553] As a result, Burmese or English was the medium of instruction, even in special schools.[554] In some cases, officials noted that "local administration [refused] to have anything to do with Karen schools, unless the Burmese language [was] the vehicle of instruction and the medium of examination."[555] Language policies in schools resulted in crowding out Karen identity, both in terms of the S'gaw Karen or Pwo Karen dialect.

Either Burmese or anglo-vernacular courses were taught, except for students enrolled in lower classes in the hill schools. But there was increased support to make Karen a medium of instruction, as evident in the Anglo-Vernacular Conference of 1921. Upon their recommendation, the local government moved to accept Karen as a second language up to and inclusive of the anglo-vernacular high school course. Readers in the S'gaw-Karen dialect were to be prepared for this purpose.[556] Eventually, the Government accepted the recommendation and Karen was recognized as a second language up to high school examination.[557]

Anglo-Vernacular education in Burma only did well with the Karen population. Each Karen mission station had its own anglo-vernacular school and almost every Christian village had its own day school.[558] The Karen were the largest demographic in anglo-vernacular special schools with the Tamils and Telugus soon behind.[559] For example, in the 1905-06 school year, 1 student passed the entrance examination while 5 passed the preparatory examination; 28 passed

[552] As cited in Robbins, *Following The Pioneers*, 49-50.
[553] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 34.
[554] Office of the Superintendent, "Third Quinquennial Report (1902-03 -- 1906-07)," 30.
[555] Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*, 220.
[556] Sixth Quinquennial Report 1917-18 to 1921-22, 71.
[557] Ibid, 78.
[558] Robbins, *Following the Pioneers*, 58.
[559] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16," 1916.

the Middle School examination and 111 girls passed the Upper Primary examination.[560] Chinese immigrants preferred to enroll in ordinary schools, while natives of India (Tamils and Telegus) enrolled in their own vernacular and anglo-vernacular Schools in Rangoon. There were also efforts "to bring the wilder tribes (Chins, Kachins and others), within the educational fold."[561] The Shans and the Chins also took part in English education, but they never advanced as much as the Karen.[562]

Karen students enrolled in Anglo-Vernacular learned two languages at school but still used their native tongue back home.[563] This reinforces the way in which Karen identity was not fostered in schools and instead crowded out. Furthermore, this reinforced how the Karen, as a group, were considered different. Although this did not make things easier, there was a collective experience in which students did one thing in school and another thing at home with their co-nationals. These experiences also reinforced their sense of difference, which was a key catalyst for the development of their national identity.

Instructors

Overall, Karen instructors were preferred due to their community's commitment to education. The Deputy Commissioner of Papun wanted to lower the qualifications needed for instructors because they wanted to prevent "non-Karen outsiders," from teaching. Even in cases where hiring and retention of instructions was difficult, especially in the remote villages of the Karen, officials felt confident in relying on the Karen due to their enthusiasm as instructors.[564]

While there are not always concrete numbers for total Karen instructors, it is clear that they were a strong presence in schools. For the 1907-08 academic year, the number of

[560] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 21.
[561] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 34.
[562] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 21.
[563] Office of the Superintendent, "Third Quinquennial Report (1902-03 -- 1906-07)," 8.
[564] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 72.

Vernacular Certificated teachers increased from 1,253 to 1,488 in the province. This number included Burman, Karen, and Tamil teachers.[565] The Sgaw Karen Mission in Bassein was considered one of the most successful. The mission had at least 170 village schools with 760 enrolled in its boarding school from lower to high school. The school had an endowment and there were at least 22 teachers. While these numbers differ from the schools mentioned in British reports, it is worth noting the commitment of the Karen to the mission schools.[566]

The Inspector of Schools, Meiktila Circle, noted that the instructors were all Burmans or Karens, even in the Shan schools for his circle.[567] The Karen were also instructors and educational missionaries for pioneer schools that served the Kachins and Chins in the hills of Upper Burma. In some cases, schools in remote areas in the hills had better staff and enrollment.[568] The Bghai-Karen School, Toungoo, was one of the few that offered weaving. However, the course was dropped one year because the instructor left and there was not a replacement.[569] This demonstrates not only the importance of each instructor's knowledge base, but also the problems of retention to which many colonial officials alluded. Ultimately, Karen instructors were not easy to replace.

There was low retention for Karen instructors and managers because they could not remain in this line of work given the low wages. Managers were paid via paddies and results grants, but this was often not a lot of money since there were only a few families in each village.[570] Karen certified teachers had special rules for the payment of their salary until 1903 when they were treated the same way as Burman instructors. Yet certain British officials, such as

[565] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08," 1908, 16.
[566] Robbins, *Following The Pioneers*, 60.
[567] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 1919, 23.
[568] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 71.
[569] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910, 16.
[570] Ibid.

the as The Inspector of Schools for the Central Circle, did not agree with this decision. They advocated for permanent salary grants that could provide at least Rs.6-Rs.8 a month.[571] Another key difference between the Karen and other groups in the special classes was that their communities made regular contributions in kind to fund schools and instructor salaries. They combined these funds with Government grants.[572] Most students did not pay a fee to attend school.[573] This behavior further demonstrates how committed the Karen were to the education of their community in the colonial system, a commitment that many colonial officials attributed to the efforts of missionaries.

Another key difference for Karen instructors was that many of them attended conferences in each of the Circles. The content of these conferences included lectures and papers. Lectures often covered the importance of physiography and hygiene. The Inspector of Schools was involved with religious and moral instruction, teacher responsibilities, and sanitation in schools. When it came to papers, these were specifically about education, such as religious and moral instruction, improving teaching in monastic schools, or the spelling of Pali words in Burmese. Aside from the regional conferences open to all instructors that were attended by the Karen, the Karen had their own conference in Toungoo and Tharrawaddy.[574] In the Western circle, the content involved the presentation of papers and general remarks on how to improve teaching in monastic schools, spelling of Pali words in Burmese, moral instruction, and science. The papers that were read and discussed were solely about education.[575] The Inspector of Schools was involved with religious and moral instruction, teacher responsibilities, and sanitation in schools. The lectures in the Eastern Circle concerned physiography and hygiene and there was a separate

[571] Ibid.
[572] Office of the Superintendent, "Third Quinquennial Report," 1908, 32.
[573] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910.
[574]Ibid; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16."
[575] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1909-10," 1910.

conference for Karen teachers in Toungoo.[576] These conferences, especially the one specifically for Karen instructors, demonstrate that colonial officials recognized the commitment of Karen instructors to their work. There were enough instructors willing to participate. Moreover, they contributed to efforts that ultimately brought more Karen materials to the curricula of different schools. Thus, even at the level of administration, the Karen demonstrated a commitment to maintaining and improving upon the existing structure of colonial education.

This section demonstrates how penetrative colonial education policies, using evidence about instructors, contributed to a stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion between the Karen. Karen instructors embraced their role in the colonial education system, showing a commitment to students in their own community and other special races. Their elevated status through schools further reinforced their favor with the colonial power.

Yet Karen instructors also strengthened their sense of group cohesion. One school serviced many communities, thus bringing students closer. Unlike Muslims in the Philippines, there was no separate school that only Karen students attended where they could learn about their separate identity. Moreover, Karen students came back home with a sense that their education did not match what they needed back in the village. Incidents like this reinforced their sense of being different. Several colonial accounts stated that the Karen lacked a literature. But this does not mean that the Karen lacked narratives. Several missionaries recorded a Karen origin story about waiting for the Book of God to return.[577] This challenges the belief that there was no Karen literature. Instead, it is more precise to argue that the Karen had their own sense of identity, but that it was challenged by what missionaries and colonial officials chose to highlight in writing.

[576] Ibid.
[577] See Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*; Robbins, *Following The Pioneers*.

Penetrative Education Policies and Karen National Identity

The penetrative education policies over the Karen in Burma assisted in the development of a national identity. Through high levels of engagement and enrollment, the Karen demonstrated a stronger attachment to the colonial power. This was in contrast to the Burman majority, who was at odds with the British in different ways, and the other groups in the special races who did not enroll at comparable rates. In addition, the Karen were willing to work on behalf of foreign powers in other communities as missionaries or instructors. They also worked alongside British officials to police the Burman community. In so doing, they further strengthened their colonial attachment. This would incur the wrath of other groups in Burma, making the Karen more likely to be targeted once the British left. Anglo-vernacular schools only succeeded with the Karen, also demonstrating a stronger attachment to the colonial power since they learned English more than the other groups. The content of what they were reading also reflected Western values, such as through the Bible or works of fiction.

Ultimately, the Karen did not have total control over their schools but this fostered their sense of group cohesion. This is evident in the lack of their dialect or history in the curricula, something the British tried to defend as a result of a lack of Karen literature. Instead, their dialects were adapted to Burmese sounds and then used to translate the Bible or Western fiction. However, the stories and skills that the Karen learned in schools did not match what they heard or needed back home. It did not matter that many Karen students were learning these things. The contrast between the content in schools and their identities back home only served to reinforce their difference as a group, further contributing to the development of a Karen national identity.

Conclusion

The type of colonial education policy has a significant effect on a group's external attachment to the colonial power and internal attachment to each other. The extent to which education policies leave room for or crowd out local level identity can be assessed through the curricula and language taught in schools, instructors hired to teach, and enrollment of the population. On one hand, the Karen were subjected to penetrative education policies, which fostered a stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion. They were taught a Western curriculum in English, enrolling at numbers that exceeded any other minority group in Burma. In addition, instruction was often conducted at the hands of Western instructors until members of their own community could do so. This means that the Karen were more closely attached to the English and that more members of their community were sharing in the experience of learning the same things together. On the other hand, Muslims in the Philippines experienced shallow education policies, which resulted in a weaker colonial attachment and fragmentation. Muslim students were able to avoid American schools and often chose to send their sons to *pandita* schools instead. There, they learned about their faith in smaller groups. When Muslim students did go to an American school, they were taught a separate curriculum with an American or Christian instructor who would use primers specified for their tribe's script. This means that Muslim students were less attached to American officials since their interactions were limited. More importantly, Muslim students were not sharing an education experience since they were learning from different panditas or separate scripts rather than something that all Muslim students had in common.

The Karen responded well to missionary efforts to educate them, thus ensuring that the Karen had a stronger colonial attachment than other groups in Burma, including the Burman

majority. Missionaries made some effort to "reduce the Karen language to writing," but a majority of this was comprised of Christian works.[578] The Karen also engaged in missionary work within the Chin, Kachin, Lahu, and Wa communities.[579] They served as instructors for other communities later on, such as in Shan schools, and attended conferences organized by the Inspector of Schools. This demonstrates that through their education with missionaries, the Karen not only embraced a stronger colonial attachment but also worked on behalf of the colonial power. Coupled with the new exclusivity with which missionaries succeeded in their work with the Karen population, the attachment of the Karen to a foreign power was all but guaranteed. Thus, the Karen would be less likely to perceive a threat from the British. They would, however, be more wary of a threat from the Burmans.

A stronger colonial attachment is also evident in the behavior of the Karen after the British established schools in Burma. For a while, the curricula in schools attended by the Karen did not reflect their own identity. English or Burmese was the medium of instruction, as a result of what the British cited as the absence of a Karen literature. Furthermore, the Karen were the only group among which anglo-vernacular schools flourished. But because they lacked a literature, English or Burmese was often utilized. Karen students did not use either of these languages back home, which further solidified their relationship to the colonial power. Karen schools had the benefit of Karen instructors in larger proportions, but these instructors were not teaching subjects that reflected Karen identity. There was also low retention among instructors for the Karen community, implying that instructors may have had a less significant role in the effect of education policies.

[578] Robbins, *Following The Pioneers*, 54, 58.
[579] Ibid, 66.

Penetrative education policies over the Karen also resulted in stronger group cohesion. When the curricula and language of instruction did not reflect what the Karen could use back home, it further reinforced their identity as a group. This made it les significant whether they had Karen instructors or not. More importantly, however, is the role of enrollment on group cohesion. Karen students were enrolled at a higher proportion than any of the other special races. This ensured that they were going through a shared education experience in which they were learning the same things at the same time.

Muslims in the Philippines experienced shallow education policies, which ensured that they would have a weaker colonial attachment. Few instructors in the schools serving Muslim students were Muslim. Many of them were either American or Christian Filipinos, so there was less interaction with colonial authority in schools. Even if there *were* more Muslim instructors, the education policies experienced by their community would still have been shallow due to accommodations for language and a dual curriculum. Several of the Superintendents for Public Schools supported the inclusion of instruction in local languages, going so far as to create readers in familiar scripts. The curricula in schools for the Muslim community included more vocational training and left room for religious schools that could maintain the viability of local identity. *Pandita* schools were not eliminated during the American period, thus leaving room for Muslim students to learn from their own community. Both the curricula and language, in combination with low Muslim enrollment in public schools anyway, provided a way for Muslims in the Philippines to experience a weaker colonial attachment to the Americans. It also did not help that most of their interactions with American officials were thus violent, such as in the Battle of Bud Bagsak, or contentious, such as when they were forced by Pershing to disarm.

With shallow education policies also came weaker group cohesion among Muslims in the Philippines. There were not enough Muslim instructors in schools to provide a cohesive experience for students. Even if there were, language accommodations reinforced the differences between tribes within the Muslim community. Not everyone used entirely the same script, as is evidenced with Saleeby's primers for students in the Tausug and Maguindanao community. Furthermore, the growth in the number of *pandita* schools during the American colonial period ensured that students not only learned more about their local identity but also did so in a fragmented way. With very few of the population actually enrolling or remaining in colonial schools, the structure in which *pandita* schools educated a few young boys at a time meant that there was less of a shared education experience for the Muslim community. As a result, the shallow education policies encouraged weaker group cohesion.

This chapter outlines the salience of colonial education policies. The language of instruction, identity of instructors, content of curricula, and extent of enrollment all contribute towards assessing how much room for local identity the colonial education structure leaves. Shallow education policies, as experienced by Muslims in the Philippines, leave more room for local level identity. It also results in a greater likelihood that colonial attachment and group cohesion will be weaker. The development of a national identity is not facilitated in the absence of these factors. Penetrative education policies, as experienced by the Karen in Burma, crowd out local level identity. This results in a greater likelihood that colonial attachment and group cohesion will be stronger. The latter set of policies, in which colonial attachment and group cohesion are stronger, help foster a group's sense of national identity and better prepare a group to react to instances of discrimination on the basis of this identity. It is this identification and ability to react to it that ultimately results in a more immediate onset of separatist rebellion.

Chapter 5

Assessing the Onset of Separatist Rebellion in the Philippines and Burma

"From this very moment, there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranao, or a Badjao. *He is only Moro."*[580]

"1. For us, surrender is out of the question; 2. Recognition of the Karen State must be completed; 3. We shall retain our arms; 4. We shall decide our own political destiny."[581]

Introduction

There are two necessary conditions for separatist rebellion: the development of a national identity and being targeted on the basis of this identity.[582] This chapter focuses on the latter as the trigger for when rebellion finally occurs. Variation in the onset of separatist rebellion necessitates a closer look at the conditions that shape a group's understanding of what inclusion in an independent state will mean for them. It is easier for individuals to be targeted or feel targeted based on being part of a certain group if they already identify with it. Positive and negative treatment on the basis of this group identity reinforces a group's sense as being an other. This makes it easier to mobilize a rebellion since members either feel tied to one another or that non-members will not welcome them.

I distinguish between when a national identity is formed and when separatist rebellion emerges. They do not need to be simultaneous. The formation of a national identity involves a sense of a shared ethnicity, be it through a myth of common descent or an ethnie, that is made

[580] Quoted in Peter G. Gowing, "Moros and Khaek: the Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and Thailand," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1957): 27-40.
[581] See Karen National Union, "About KNU," KNU HQ, 2018 https://www.knuhq.org/public/en/about/background.
[582] Yet these are not sufficient conditions, as groups can have different thresholds for what they constitute as being targeted. Some level of resources and organization contribute towards the decision to rebel, both of which can be facilitated by education colonies. Groups that experience penetrative policies are also more likely to rebel sooner since they share a collective experience, making it easier to organize with co-ethnics down the line, and also a greater share of resources since they have greater social mobility and access to employment. As we shall see, access to resources emphasized by rationalist theories of rebellion may not even be necessary.

salient. In addition, nations emphasize the salience of this shared ethnicity in the form of increased political autonomy or independence. In this study, I focus specifically on separatists. Separatist rebellion emerges when a group turns to the use of violence against the state to pursue their goal of securing their own sovereign state by fighting for independence

The Philippine case focuses on demonstrating the delay and eventual onset of Muslim separatist rebellion. First, I describe how there was not a Muslim national identity during the colonial period by demonstrating that there was weak group cohesion and colonial attachment. The shallow education policies detailed in the previous chapter did not facilitate the development of a national identity and thus delayed the onset of rebellion. Then, I assess when a national identity finally forms, which is after significant changes in education policy emanating from international and domestic sources. Finally, I describe when separatist rebellion finally takes place. This occurred after, and in response to, the onset of martial law. The declaration of martial law gave rise to second necessary condition: discrimination on the basis of national identity.

The Burmese case, by contrast, highlights and demonstrates the formation of a Karen nation and immediate onset of separatist rebellion. First, I show that despite the formation of a national association during the colonial period, there was not a separatist rebellion. This national identity was facilitated by penetrative education policies that strengthened group cohesion and colonial attachment. Then, I outline when separatist rebellion emerged and demonstrate how independence signaled discrimination on the basis of national identity, thus triggering an immediate onset of hostilities.

The structure of analysis for my two cases, Muslims in the Philippines and the Karen in Burma, differ since the onsets of their rebellion vary. The first half of the chapter focuses on the Philippine case. This section begins with assessing what it means for a Muslim national identity

to exist, linking these empirical debates within the broader literature on nationalism. I then demonstrate that there was not a Muslim national identity during the American colonial period and that this did not develop in response to an independent Philippine state. I conclude with a description of when separatist rebellion occurs and link it to the development of a national identity and targeting of Muslims on the basis of this identity. The second half of the chapter focuses on the Burmese case. I begin the section with debates about a Karen national identity. I then engage with competing evidence about whether or not a Karen national identity existed during the British colonial period. After showing that there was a clear national identity on the eve of Burmese independence, I conclude with how the context of independence alone was not enough for the Karen to feel targeted on the basis of this identity. It would still require discrimination on the basis of their identity to trigger separatist rebellion. However, they were better primed to respond to this trigger *because of* penetrative education policies.

Debates on Muslim Nationalism

Assessing whether or not a Muslim nation existed at a given time is a debate involving scholars, policy-makers, and community members who can be categorized into two perspectives. The first perspective is what Tan characterizes as the unitary approach, which assumes that a united Muslim identity based on a shared history and culture has existed since the pre-colonial period.[583] Spanish and American colonial officials also shared in this mentality when they assumed that the Islamic people in the southern Philippines (called Moors or Mohammedans) were all the same. This attitude later justified the assumption that all of the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu were uncivilized and unfit for self-governance. Even members of contemporary Muslim movements, such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), invoke this historical unity. For example, MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari claims that Muslims were an unconquered

[583] Samuel K. Tan, "Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle," *Selected Essays on the Filipino Muslim*, 1973.

people for over 500 years and disagreed with questions about a lack of unity between different rebel groups.[584]

Identifying the nation as existing further back in history is consistent with the work of scholars of nationalism, such as Anthony Smith. Smith emphasized that nations were based on older cultural groups that he called ethnie. Ethnie were "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity."[585] The focus of the unitary approach is on the commonality of the group behind their Muslim identity. Advocates of the unitary approach support the idea that a cohesive, Muslim nation has existed long before armed groups rebelled in the early 1970s.

A second perspective holds that the Muslim community has historically been pluralistic and only recently constructed to appear as unified. This approach begins with the premise that there has not been a united Muslim identity based on history or culture. Instead, "inter-Muslim" disunity persisted.[586] During his time as a colonial official, Taft referred to these as insurrections between linguistic groups.[587] The pluralistic approach is consistent with evidence of family rivalries and inter-Muslim conflict, particularly in collaboration with Americans. The constant break down of Muslim alliances during the colonial period also challenges the claim that, from early on, an "ethnic pride" united the Muslim community.[588]

Demonstrating that the nation has not always existed, even when a potential people have, is consistent with the argument of constructivists. Constructivists, such as Anderson, focus on the

[584] Nur Misuari, interview by Jamela Alindogan, "Fighting for Peace in the Philippines," *Vice News*, 2011 https://video.vice.com/en_us/video/the-vice-news-interview-nur-misuari/5731e8a730c7459e3ab942dc
[585] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Wiley-Blackwell: 1986), 32.
[586] Tan, "Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle."
[587] William Howard Taft. Statement of Governor Taft, February 1, 1902, in "Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines," 49.
[588] Tan, "Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle," 25.

role of modernizing processes in creating a sense of national identity.[589] Anderson argues that print capitalism made it possible to have a widespread vernacular and conception of the nation as persisting across time and space. The focus of the pluralistic approach is on the different Muslim tribes that would *eventually* become part of the national identity referred to as the Bangsamoro. Advocates of the pluralistic approach support the idea that a cohesive Muslim nation has not always existed, but had historic roots upon which armed groups in the early 1970s could build.

Pan-Muslim solidarity is more recent than contemporary leaders in Mindanao contend. Revolts against American decisions during the colonial period occurred. But these revolts were focused on local-level grievances related to taxation, abolition of slavery, or encroachment of datu authority. These revolts were not about the independence of the Muslim Province to be governed as a Muslim polity, nor were they formed across the entire Muslim population. Some American officials treated the entire "Mohammedan" population as a homogenous category, something inherited from the Spanish categorization of Indios versus Moros. But the Muslim population was not organizing a united effort against the Americans.[590]

This study adopts the pluralistic approach but maintains the unitary perspective as a guide for how to interpret certain pieces of evidence. I begin my inquiry into the colonial period with the understanding that the Muslim response was not homogenous. Thus, I take great care to emphasize which groups are relevant by changing my terminology from Muslim to Tausug, Maguindanao, Maranao, etc. when it is relevant. I do not assume that a nation existed at all times. I also maintain an understanding that colonial reports of a homogenous response do not imply a deliberate and united effort on part of Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu. As Tan suggests,

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[589] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of Nationalism* (London: Verson Books, 1991); Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism And Social Communication: An Inquiry Into The Foundations Of Nationality* (MIT Press, 1966); Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* 1965.

[590] Patricio Abinales, "The Moro Struggle as Myth and as Historical Reality," *The Rappler* 28 Feb 2015 https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/85353-moro-struggle-myth-historical-reality

things like "the continuity of Muslim resistance to colonialism" says more about the "general impact of colonialism" than it does about the Muslim societies. Yet it is important to remember that the unitary perspective shapes how certain scholars and policy-makers see the world. I would be remiss as a researcher to ignore this perspective. Moreover, it is important to understand who employs this reading of history because the implementation can provide insight into the timing of rebellion.

Muslim Nationalism in the Philippines

While there were clashes between the Muslim population and American colonial officials, these were not instances of rebellion, let alone separatist rebellion. Abinales is explicit about how these revolts were not "forward-looking, anticolonial, or nationalist."[591] I adopt a similar interpretation in this study. One key example of how these revolts were not forward-looking is through the shifting allegiances between Muslim leaders and American officials. The lack of a Muslim "ethnic pride" and shifting allegiances reflected an opportunistic relationship with the Americans.[592] For example, Datu Piang initially served as an advisor to Datu Uto. He would later turn on Uto to form an alliance with Datu Ali, making him his son-in-law in the process. Later on, Ali revolted against the Americans and Piang did not step in to help.[593] Piang was also known for ordering the use of force against Datu Amirul without consequence from the Americans.[594] These examples demonstrate that clashes during this time were not forward-thinking or anti-colonial. In most cases, these were instances of acting in the moment without regard for ousting the colonial power. Of greater importance, however, is how easily different

[591] Tan, "Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle,"115.
[592] Tan, "Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle," 25.
[593] Patricio N. Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim Narrative* (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2009), 47-49; Patricio N. Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 202.
[594] Abinales, *Making Mindanao*, 204.

Muslim leaders were willing to work against one another in order to gain short-term advantages rather than working with one another against the Americans.

American officials were well aware that Muslim alliances could shift from allies to enemies.[595] Some leaders engaged in multiple strategies. For example, Datu Santiago of Cotabato initially supported Governor Leonard Wood. This changed after Santiago chose to lead a revolt against the *cedula* or head tax, something that had been passed more than twenty years earlier. Yet Wood accepted Santiago's surrender and reappointed him as a district leader.[596] Abinales argues that the Muslim resistance to or collaboration with the United States was a result of shifting context.[597] Initially, Muslims in southern Mindanao interacted with Southeast Asia and the world beyond rather freely. Sultans signed treaties with European powers while resisting Spanish rule. American officials changed this context and made the world much smaller. As a result, alliances would inherently shift more often.

Aside from these revolts not being anti-colonial, they also were not nationalist. This is because the revolts were not in the name of self-governance on the basis of identity. Instead, revolts were in response to threats to local life or the authority of the datus: collection of the cedula tax; disarmament campaigns; compulsory education in schools that did not teach *shari'a*; payment for road construction; enforcement of monogamy; or actions of the Philippine Constabulary.[598] Furthermore, the basis for these revolts was not always about overthrowing colonial authority. In some cases, it was simply about ensuring that colonial officials did not disrupt norms such as owning arms, having multiple wives, or deciding schools for their

[595] Edward Bowditch, "Military Training of the Moros," (Edward Bowditch Papers, Rare Manuscript Collection, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University, n.d.) 31, 35-36.
[596] Samuel K. Tan, *The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1972* (Manila Filipinas Foundatin, 1977), 41.
[597] *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim Narrative*, 37.
[598] Abinales, "The Moro Struggle as Myth and as Historical Reality"; Gross cites Tan, 1977 and Che Man, *Muslim Separatism*, 51-56. Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago.*

children. The entire structure of colonialism was not the target of these revolts, nor was there a cohesive Muslim effort to overthrow it.

The cedula tax provides a crucial example of how revolts against the Americans were not nationalist. While the cedula tax is broadly defined as a head tax, the specifics of its worth vary between sources.[599] A common description, however, was that Muslims paid the cedula tax for the first time after the Americans took over.[600] Wood referred to this as "practically the first general tax which the [Muslims] have been called upon to pay." Opposition to the tax was on the principle of "a recognition of superior authority" and "a token of submission to the Government."[601] Resistance to the cedula tax was linked to how it challenged the authority of datus who, previously, taxed arbitrarily and took into account the "industry and accumulations of the person taxed."[602] Gowing notes that the Battle of Bud Dajo (1906) was in response to the cedula tax.[603] Some areas were more receptive than others. Muslims in the Cottabato district complied while most in the Lanao and Sulu districts opposed. Moreover, even when leaders such as the Sultan of Sulu stopped resisting the tax, their followers did not all follow suit.[604] This further demonstrates a lack of cohesion on the basis of Muslim identity at the time, something that is a necessary component for separatist rebellion.

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[599] Some sources broadly defined it as a head tax, sometimes collected through the required purchase of a registration certificate, on all inhabitants while others specified that it was for everyone over the age of 18 or only for males aged 18-25. In addition, there is variation in reports about if the tax was one or two pesos. See Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department," Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province: September 1, 1903 to August 31, 1904," (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904); Peter G. Gowing, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920," 377; Marya Svetlana T. Camacho, "Race and Culture in Spanish and American Colonial Policies," in *Mixed Blessing: The Impact of the American Colonial Experience on Politics and Society in the Philippines*, Ed. Hazel M. McFerson (Praeger, 2001); Orosa, *The Sulu Archipelago and Its People.*
[600] Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department," Annual Report," 1904, 12.
[601] Ibid, 18; Orosa, 37.
[602] Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, "Annual Report, 12.
[603] See Gowing, "Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920"; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*; "Intimacy and Annihilation: Approaching the Enforcement of U.S. Colonial Rule in the Southern Philippines through a Private Photograph Collection," *InVisibile Culture* 25 & 26 (2017).
[604] Peter Gowing, "Mandate In Moroland: The American Government Of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920," Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 1968; Gowing, 1983.

Further evidence of the weak cohesion of Muslims during the American colonial period can be found in contemporaneous accounts of the population. Najeeb M. Saleeby, who served several official administration positions in the Moro Province, described the population as "greatly disunited" since a different Islamic tribe inhabited each district.[605] Trinidad Pardo H. de Tavera was a former president of the Federalist Party and one of the first Filipino members of the Commission. Tavera identified the tribe as the largest category relevant for describing the Muslim community at the time:

> "The idea of a common country had not yet penetrated their primitive consciousness, their independence has not yet a national character but is simply of a tribal character [sic]."[606]

> "Their sense of aggroupment [sic] did not go beyond the association of a limited number of individuals; we see that there is a limited feeling in favor of aggregation; that in favor of the aggregation of tribes does not exist; on the contrary, the spirit of segregation predominates amongst them, for which reason their spirited desire for independence is of no value for their civilization."[607]

Another way to assess the weak cohesion of Muslims during the American period is through how easily their armed resistance was subdued. Several hundred members of the Muslim population gathered in a volcanic crater, Bud Dajo, to prepare an armed resistance against the American imposition of the cedula tax under Wood. The Battle of Bud Dajo in Sulu took place over 3 days in March 1906. Exact numbers differ, but out of ~800 American participants, there were ~21-33 casualties. Of the ~1000 participants, which included women and children, there

[605] Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands* (Manila, 1913), 15. He served as Captain and Assistant Surgeon in the Department of Mindanao, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in charge of Moro Affairs, Superintendent of Schools, and a member of the Legislative Council of the Moro Province.
[606] Trinidad Pardo H. de Tavera, "The New Filipino Mentality," Edward Bowditch Papers, Cornell University, Box 1, 17.
[607] De Tavera, "The New Filipino Mentality."

was ~600 casualties.[608] Other sources, including American newspapers, stated that there were no Muslim survivors.[609] The battle is considered one of the most intense efforts against American officials and one of Wood's most brutal campaigns against the Muslim population in the Philippines.

The slaughter of Muslims during the Battle of Bud Dajo may be attributed to technological differences in warfare until a second battle, Bud Bagsak, is considered. In 1912, Pershing was tasked with enforcing a disarmament campaign against the Muslim population. Muslims in Sulu and Lanao rebelled. In the resulting Battle of Bud Bagsak, there were at least 500 Muslim casualties after five days. The Americans also succeeded in gathering nearly 10,000 firearms.[610] An American victory, with numerous Muslim casualties, was the result even when Muslims had firearms. This demonstrates that American victory was not simply due to their technological advantage. Furthermore, not all Muslims rebelled.

Aside from being fueled by local grievances, only some Muslims participated in revolts against the Americans. For example, the Battle of Bud Dajo and the Battle of Bud Bagsak took place in Sulu. This means that a majority of Muslims involved were from the Tausug community. Muslim leaders, outside of the Tausug community, were willing to pay the cedula tax. Other Muslim communities, such as the Magindanaos, Maranaos, and Samals did not participate in resistance against the tax "simply because they knew nothing of them."[611] The limitation of information and coordination hindered the possibility of separatist rebellion on the

[608] Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, 164. It is important to note that American participants were troops while Muslim participants included women and children.
[609] "No Moro Survived: Battle on Mount Dajo was one of Extermination – Criticism of Gen. Wood – Seige of Crater, It is Declared would have Forced Surrender," *The Washington Post* 11 March 1906. Cited in Kaine V. Walther, "Extending American Colonial Governance Over Filipino Muslims, 1903–1920," in *Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821-1921* (University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 213.
[610] Walther, "Extending American Colonial Governance Over Filipino Muslims."
[611] Patricio N. Abinales, "Distorting Mindanao, Part 2," *The Rappler* 5 Dec. 2014.

basis of Muslim identity. There was not a national identity just yet. Without one, there could be no rebellion for self-rule either.

Not only was there a lack of a cohesive Muslim effort against the Americans, but there was also a significant level of fighting within the Muslim community. Tan specifically refers to "inter-Muslim conflicts" that "appeared to have been connected to family rivalries."[612] This evidence makes it harder to assume that there was a cohesive group advocating for the political control of an entire Muslim community given that there was infighting. Conflicts within the community persist today in what are called *rido* or clan feuds. There is a greater sense of a cohesive identity after the onset of separatist rebellion in the early 1970s, but it is not all encompassing.

Different members of the Muslim community expressed a desire for separation from Christian Filipinos. In 1921, the Sultan of Sulu presented U.S. Colonel Carmi A. Thompson with the following: "We are independent for 500 years. Even Spain failed to conquer us. If the United States quits the Philippines and the Filipinos attempt to govern us, we will fight."[613] In 1924, Ralph B. Thomas presented a letter on behalf of at least 200 Maranao leaders. It argued that Christian leaders should not decide Islamic tradition and law:[614] "Should the American people grant the Philippines an independence, the islands of Mindanao and Sulu should not be included in such independence…Our public land should not be given to people other than the Moros."[615] Afterwards, the United States placed a ten-year transition before the Philippines Commonwealth would be independent. 120 Maranao datus from Lanao wrote a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt. They specifically requested that Mindanao not be part of the Philippines governed by

[612] Tan, "Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle."
[613] "America's Mohammedan Wards," *Congressional Record* Volume LXVIII—Part 3, *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the Second Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress*, p. 2424, 1927.
[614] Horvatich, "The Martyr and the Mayor: On the Politics of Identity in the Southern Philippines."
[615] Ibid.

Christian Filipinos.[616] Despite these examples, a statement from an entity representing the entire Muslim community did not emerge. These statements came in a piecemeal fashion, from datus in a specific tribe versus the entire Muslim community.

Muslim separatist rebellion was delayed as a result of shallow colonial education policies. This occurred for two reasons. First, shallow education policies established by the Americans facilitated weaker group cohesion. Without a shared education experience in which Muslim students learned the same things, a clear national identity was less likely to take root. Instead, the shallow policies fostered fragmentation. Pandita schools exemplified these policies, in which only a few boys learned from a pandita and primers in schools that were tailored to one community's script. Second, shallow education policies also weakened the Muslim sense of colonial attachment. Low enrollment and retention limited the number and type of interactions that Muslim students had with American, or Christian Filipino instructors. Instead, Muslim-American interactions consisted of events such as the Battle of Bud Dajo and Bud Bagsak. The American colonial officials did not favor them. Weak group cohesion and colonial attachment did not facilitate the formation of a national identity *and* decreased the likelihood that Muslims would feel a sense of discrimination on the basis of this identity. Without the latter, separatist rebellion would remain latent.

It is important to emphasize, however, that Muslim elites responded in different ways to Filipinization, the process by which the Moro Province was brought under authority of Christian Filipinos. Some leaders supported the idea of a separate Mindanao under continued American authority. When this did not look feasible, Muslim leaders opted for an autonomous Muslim

[616] Horvatich, "The Martyr and the Mayor: On the Politics of Identity in the Southern Philippines," 20.

area. Eventually, support for Filipinization became the main response after proponents secured the support of datus in Lanao and the Sultan of Sulu.[617]

One of the earliest statements made in June 1921 demonstrates the preference for American authority held by some Muslims. Fifty-seven datus and residents in Sulu presented a petition to Manila and Washington demonstrating a desire for either a separate Moro state or that Sulu remain a "permanent American territory."[618] Abinales attributes this preference for American rule to an alignment of interests between the U.S Army and some Muslim leaders. "Army-bureaucrats" wanted to demonstrate the effectiveness of their rule in the Moro Province while some Muslim leaders collaborated to protect their political or economic interests.[619] Ultimately, both interest groups were not interested in increased Christian Filipino rule.[620]

However, the key word here in understanding support by some Muslim leaders for continued American rule is "some." Abinales was also clear that: "each ethnic group responded to American military occupation based on how it affected their own areas, not 'Moro Mindanao.'"[621] Leaders such as Datu Mandi voiced support for American authority over a Mindanao separated from the Philippines, but Muslim leaders in Lanao contested the split

[617] Datu Piang would later thwart this. Piang declared loyalty for Filipinization by allowing for the expansion of public schools in Muslim areas under his control and sent two of his children to Manila to be educated. Piang still continued to support the separatist cause and promised like-minded datus that he would provide funding for a Muslim delegation to lobby for the separation of Mindanao directly to Congress. According to Abinales, Piang played both the Filipino and American side out of the need for survival. Gowing, 1983, 254; *Philippine Free Press* 11 May 1915 and 19 Jan 1918; "Interview with Datu Piang," JRH, Box 28-33. One of his sons attended the Central Luzon Agricultural School to study "trade and exchange" and English. *Philippine Free Press* 6 Jan 1917.
[618] Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, 168.
[619] Patricio N. Abinales, "From *Orang Besar* to Colonial Big Man: Datu Piang of Cotabato and the American Colonial State,: in *Lives in the Margins: Biography of Filipinos Obscure, Ordinary, and Heroic,* Ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 193-228. The Sultan of Sulu, for example, demonstrated an interest in flying an American flag over his trading fleet.
[620] Abinales; Alunan Galang, *Muslim Secession or Integration?* (Quezon City, 1969), 16-17.
[621] Patricio N. Abinales, "American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview," East-West Center Working Papers, *Politics and Security Studies,* no. 7 (2004), 3.

between "pro-independence" and "pro-American" attitudes.[622] In short, Muslim leaders were not in agreement about their attitude toward the American government. The fifty-seven individuals who signed in support of this declaration may have been the only members of the Tausug community who supported it. This is also within the context of twelve other Muslim groups aside from the Tausug that did not sign – and possibly did not even know about the declaration. This further demonstrates weak group cohesion, especially on an issue as significant as political rule. There was no national identity at the time, since there was not a cohesive group, let alone agreement, about how the group should be ruled.

More importantly, however, is the implication that continued American rule has for colonial attachment. The preference for remaining an American territory was expressed by the Tausug community in Sulu. This is the same community that had been slaughtered in the Battle of Bud Dajo and the Battle of Bud Bagsak less than two decades prior. On one hand, their willingness to be ruled by the Americans can be interpreted as evidence of military success. Colonial officials, such as General Wood, were adamant about using force to subdue the Muslims. Prior to the battle, Wood had written to U.S. President Taft, claiming that, " all that is necessary to bring the Moro into line and to start him ahead is a strong policy and vigorous enforcement of the law."[623] It is possible that Muslim leaders in Sulu realized the difficulty of self-rule and instead opted for demonstrated American might.

On the other hand, the decision to remain under American rule can be evidence of leaders in Sulu being strategic. Between the American officials or Christian Filipinos, the former may have been seen as the lesser of two evils. Filipinization was happening across the rest of the

[622] William Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands, 2* (1945), 44-45; "Critical Decatem 47-48," *Manila Daily Bulletin*, 22 Aug 1926.
[623] Leonard Wood. Leonard Wood to William H. Taft, Leonard Wood Letters, Syracuse University Libraries: Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University.

Philippine colony relatively quickly. It would only be a matter of time before it reached Mindanao. In appealing to American officials, Muslim leaders could keep Christian Filipinos at bay for a while longer until a different pathway became evident. This interpretation is consistent with the work of previous scholars, such as Abinales and Charbonneau, who highlight how Muslim leaders chose to collaborate or challenge American rule depending on the context. More importantly, encroaching Filipinization was a threat to Muslim communities, but it was not a threat that resulted in separatist rebellion. Without the formation of a Muslim national identity, there was no united Muslim group that could respond to any threats.

Even if there was a segment of the Muslim population willing to entertain American rule, Muslim colonial attachment to the Americans was still weak. Unlike the Karen, Muslims in the Philippines did not enjoy a favored status with their colonizer. Christian Filipinos were favored, being directly prepared for self-rule. This group was able to form political parties soon after the Americans acquired the Philippines. When independence was being discussed, the timeline was dependent upon the readiness of the Christian Filipino leaders, not Muslim ones.

Moreover, members of the Muslim community were not asked to act with the colonial power against other groups. For example, there was not a Muslim police or military force used to repression Christians in the way that the British employed the Karen in the Burma Rifles or separate Karen forces against ethnic Burmans. The only time that there was some collaboration with the Americans was when some datus turned against their fellow datus. But as many scholars have noted, these betrayals were episodic and often based on personal relations. It was not a concerted effort to work with the colonial power. Thus, even if there were instances in which some Muslims worked with the Americans, it was never enough to make them hated by other

groups since collaboration was fleeting. The norm for American-Muslim relations in the Philippine colony was not favor or warmth. Instead, it was hostile at worst and limited at best.

It is also important to indicate the difference between the meaning of Muslim separatism in colonial and post-colonial Philippines. Muslim separatism during the American colonial period referred to separation from a political unit ruled by Christian Filipinos. Thus, it was not inconsistent to advocate for Muslim separatism and continued American rule. These advocates wanted to avoid Filipinization. Inclusion in an independent Philippine state was anathema to Muslim requests. When Muslim separatism is invoked in the post-colonial Philippines, it initially meant independence for a Muslim state that would be entirely separate from the Philippines. As the rebellion wore on past the 1970s, Muslim separatism expanded to include the possibility of an autonomous region within the Philippines. The debate between autonomy and independence is one of many factors that influenced the rise of splinter groups from the initial MNLF. This distinction in what separatism connotes in pre-colonial and post-colonial Philippines reflects the importance of using "context-specific indicators" that take into account how the same indicator "can have different meanings across contexts."[624]

When did Muslim rebellion finally take place? This is what I turn to next. Three events are identified as proximate causes for the eventual rebellion: the Corregidor Incident/Jabidah Massacre of 1968, Muslim-Christian violence in 1970-71, and the declaration of Martial Law in 1972.

The Corregidor Incident/Jabidah Massacre refers to a disputed event in which Muslim recruits were killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in March 1968. Under the authority

[624] James Mahoney, "Comparative-Historical Methodology," *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): 81-101, 96. Also see Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: Wiley, 1970); Robert Adcock and David Collier, "Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research*," American Political Science Review* 95, no. 3 (2001): 529-46.

of President Marcos, predominantly Tausug members were recruited for Project Merdeka. Recruits were part of a secret unit called Jabidah and were trained on Corregidor Island.[625] The event has not been well documented, which Majul attributes to the Marcos government's suppression of information.[626] In one account, trainees were massacred after they wanted to back out upon realizing that their real mission was to invade Sabah, a Muslim-majority region in Malaysia, and not to fight communists.[627] Demonstrations broke out across the Philippines, particularly in front of the President's office, after news of the deaths of Muslim trainees was released. There were also calls for President Marcos to resign, especially from prominent Muslim figures such as Congressman Rashid Lucman.

Two months after the Corregidor Incident/Jabidah Massacre, Datu Udtog Matalam formed the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM).[628] The MIM manifesto called for an independent state comprised of Sulu, Palawan, and most of Mindanao.[629] The bulk of the MIM's political actions took the forms of manifestos or declarations available to the public via the press. Even though the MIM only lasted for a few months, scholars of Muslim history have identified it as paving the way for the MNLF and eventual armed resistance against the state.[630]

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[625]Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, *Under The Crescent Moon: Rebellion In Mindanao* (Ateneo Center for Social Policy & Public Affairs, 2000).
[626] Cesar Adib Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement In The Philippines* (Mizan Press, 1985).
[627] Marites D. Vitug & Glenda M. Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, 2000), 4; Macapado Abaton Muslim, *The Moro Armed Struggle In The Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative* (1994); Salah Jubair, *Bangsamoro: A Nation under Endless Tyranny* (Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin SDN BHD, 1999), 132.
[628] It later became known as the Mindanao Independence Movement to include non-Muslims in areas such as Cotabato. See Gross, 2007.
[629] Leah G. Noble, "Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate," *Asian Survey* 21, no. 11 (1981): 1097-1114; Peter G. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon* (New Day Publishers, 1979). Documents issued by the MIM can be found in the appendixes of Alunan C. Glang, *Muslim Secession or Integration?* (1969) for the "Manifesto of the Muslim Independence Movement, "Mindanao Independence Movement, May 1, 1968, Pagalungan Darul Islam, Cotabato, Philippines.
[630] The MIM only lasted a few months. Matalam soon accepted a position from President Marcos to be an advisor for Muslim Affairs. Reports differ on whether or not he formally "surrendered." See Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*.

Violence broke out in two Philippine provinces in the late 1970s: Lanao del Norte and Cotabato. In both cases, there was a Christian majority that threatened the victory of Muslim politicians. Muslims were called "barracudas" in Lanao del Norte and "blackshirts" in Cotabato while Christians were called "Ilagas," from the Visayan word for "rats."[631] The Illaga launched at least 21 massacres from 1970-71, sometimes mutilating the bodies of victims.[632] One of the most publicized was the Manili Massacre involving 70 Muslim civilians who were killed in a mosque in Manili, Carmen, North Cotabato.[633] These events worsened Muslim-Christian relations and caught the attention of Muslim leaders outside of the Philippines, such as Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.[634] While violence between the communities was a severe form of inter-communal violence, this was not separatist rebellion. Separatist rebellion did not occur at this time because the extent of targeting was not widespread enough. Indeed, Muslim victims were targeted on the basis of their identity, but it was localized to mainly two provinces. Until targeting on the basis of identity took on a larger scope, separatist rebellion would be delayed.

Both the Jabidah Massacre and Christian-Muslim violence attracted international recognition for Muslims in the Philippines. Leaders such as Libyan Prime Minister Muammar Gaddafi characterized these events as genocide and brought the issue of Muslim-Christian violence to the United Nations. Governments in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco pledged aid to

[631] The Ilagas were Visayans, mostly Illonggos, who made up a majority of the Philippine Constabulary. Other sources refer to them as ILAGA, an acronym for the, informally named, Ilonggo Land Grabbing Association.
[632] Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*; "Mindanao: A Memory Of Massacres," *The PCIJ Blog*, 2015 https://pcij.org/blog/2015/02/13/mindanao-a-memory-of-massacres
[633] Casualties included women and children. Residents had gathered at the mosque for peacetalks with Christians when armed men in uniform opened fire. No one was held responsible for the attack, even though the Ilaga or collaboration with the Philippine Constabulary was suspected. Feliciano Lucas, "Commander Toothpick," who was the Ilaga leader was the prime suspect but was later released. See William Larousse, *A Local Church Living for Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Relations in Mindanao-Sulu, Philippines 1965-2000* (Gregorian Biblical BookShop: 2011), 136.
[634] Noble, "Muslim Separatism in the Philippines."

Muslims in the Philippines.[635] Despite all of these factors, the prospect of an armed separatist rebellion was still not a given. The Filipinas Foundation, a Manila-based group, conducted the Alpha Report shortly after the MIM manifesto.[636] The survey found that more 50% of those interviewed did not support secession and nearly 25% were not committed to the cause.[637] There was still not widespread support for a separatist movement, let alone rebellion. This would require a much stronger trigger, one that would demonstrate a clear targeting of Muslims on the basis of their identity on a grander scale.

President Marcos declared martial law over the entire Philippine state on September 21, 1972 via Proclamation 1081. He spent the bulk of the proclamation outlining the Communist threat. In later sections of Proclamation 1081, Marcos also cited the "equally serious disorder in Mindanao and Sulu resulting from the unsettled conflict between certain elements of the Christian and Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu." Yet there was only one mention of Mindanao out of nine points determining "rebellion and lawlessness."[638] Marcos determined three constitutional courses of action: 1) calling the armed forces 2) suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and 3) declaration of martial law. He justified the last option after having exhausted the first two.[639]

Martial law also included provisions that had several ramifications for the Muslim community. First, martial law banned political groups, so organizations such as the MIM were no longer allowed. This increased the need for the organization of groups to take place underground. Second, martial law included the restriction and collection of civilian firearms.

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[635] Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession.*
[636] The Filipinas Foundation changed its name to the Ayala Foundation in 1990.
[637] T. J. S. George, *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1980), 152.
[638] For the entire statement regarding Muslims, see the Appendix B. "Proclamation No. 1081" *Official Gazette* 1972 https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1972/09/21/proclamation-no-1081/
[639] "Proclamation No. 1081."

Three weeks after President Marcos declared martial law, he announced a commitment to send an entire division of troops to address Muslims in the Southern Philippines. Both of these things increased the urgency with which the Muslim community was being targeted.[640]

Many scholars have argued that martial law led to armed rebellion, either because of chronology or content. McKenna concurs that, "The imposition of martial law was, in fact, the proximate cause, not the consequence, of an armed Muslim insurgency against the Philippine state."[641] Buendia emphasizes how military offensives took place *after* the declaration of martial law in 1972. This solidified the goal of separatism.[642] Noble goes further and suggests that it was the specific *conditions* of martial law that triggered violence. In particular, she focuses on how the prospect of forced disarmament rendered non-political outlets of discontent a moot point.[643] I extend beyond simply considering that the prospects of martial law rendered non-political forms moot by demonstrating *how*: martial law targeted Muslims in the Philippines on the basis of their identity in an extensive way that was imposed across the state. Rebellion occurred soon after the declaration of martial law because a national identity had developed in response to preceding changes in education policies.

The timing of armed resistance also demonstrates the importance of discrimination on the basis of national identity. Muslim leaders were already making plans to fight against the state prior to martial law. Nur Misuari reportedly founded the MNLF secretly in 1969 yet chose to remain operating with the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), an organization of Muslim elites sending young men abroad for training. This further demonstrates that a national identity had developed by this time. But the MNLF would not formally go public for another

[640] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, 156.
[641] Ibid, 156.
[642] Rizal G. Buendia, "The Secessionist Movement and the Peace Process in the Philippines and Indonesia: The Case of Mindanao and Aceh," *Asia-Pacific Social Science Review* 5, no. 1(1989): 50-66.
[643] Noble, "Muslim Separatism in the Philippines."

three years, doing so *after* the proclamation of martial law. This demonstrates the importance of my second necessary condition regarding the targeting of a group on the basis of their national identity.

President Marcos declared October 25, 1972 as the deadline by which civilians needed to turn in their firearms. He had specifically singled out the Southern Philippines. A few days before the 25th, "more than four hundred armed Maranaos" attacked Marawi City, necessitating a response from the state. A week late, Muslim rebels and government forces also began fighting in the city of Cotabato. By the end of November, Muslim rebels and government forces were fighting across the Southern Philippines.[644]

Rationalist explanations for rebellion are unable to account for why Muslims rebelled after martial law 1972 but not after Philippine independence in 1946. Harsh military suppression and discrimination existed beforehand. These were not all met with separatist rebellion. In addition, resources alone are also an insufficient explanation. By the early 1970s, it was evident that the Muslim community had resources. They were capable of resisting inter-communal violence. In addition, the terms of martial law singled out several violent incidents with the Muslim community. These incidents would not have been possible if they did not have enough arms to resist. Nor did the mere possession of arms trigger rebellion. Instead, separatist rebellion occurred after Marcos declared martial law. This is because his declaration was discrimination against Muslims on the basis of their national identity, serving as the necessary catalyst to finally trigger the onset of separatist rebellion.

Armed resistance in response to martial law was the onset of separatist rebellion. Assessing the leadership demonstrates willingness for separatist rebellion. The name of the leading rebel group was the Moro *National* Liberation Front (emphasis mine). Yet names alone

[644] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, 148.

may not always denote meaning. We can also turn to the first issue of the MNLF newsletter *Maharlika* to see a reflection of national attitudes:

> From this very moment, there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranao, or a Badjao. *He is only Moro*. Indeed, even those of other faith who have long established residence in the Bangsa Moro homeland and whose good-will and sympathy are with the Bangsa Moro Revolution shall, *for purposes of national identification*, be considered Moros. In other words, *the term Moro is a national concept that must be understood as all embracing* for all Bangsa Moro people within the length and breadth of our national boundaries." (emphasis mine)[645]

The attitude in this newsletter reflects an acknowledgement of different groups within the Muslim community while establishing that a broader, national identity exists. This is a clear reflection of the identity component necessary for a national identity. Furthermore, the newsletter reflects a willingness to include non-Muslims in the territory as part of the nation. This is a reflection of the territorial component and desire for political control that distinguishes nations from other identity-based categories. At this point, a national identity did indeed exist. This was the result of changes in education policy that facilitated the development of a cohesive Muslim national identity.

We can also consider the attitude of the greater Muslim community. By the mid-1970s, at least 55% of Muslims were in support of the MNLF and rebellion against the government. This took the form of direct membership or provision of resources.[646] Efforts to train Muslim guerilla fighters in response to the Jabidah Massacre also reflect the existence of a broader, national identity. A majority of the recruits for the operation to invade Sabah were Sulu Muslims from the Tausug community.[647] According to some reports, the Malaysian government supported the training through the influence of Tun Mustapha. Tun Mustapha was the chief minister of Sabah

[645] Quoted in Gowing, "Moros and Khaek."
[646] Lela G. Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front," *Pacific Affairs* 49, no.3 (1976): 413.
[647] Noble, "Muslim Separatism in the Philippines."

in Malaysia. He also shared an ethnicity with Sulu Muslims in the Philippines, as he was an ethnic Tausug, and had relatives living in Sulu.[648] However, Muslims who trained in Malaysia were not just Tausug. There were also Maranao recruits from Lanao and a few Magindanaon recruits from Magindanao.[649] This demonstrates that, although the Jabidah Massacre involved one community, multiple Muslim groups felt a need to retaliate against the Philippine government. Such a mentality among the Muslim population was not as apparent during the American colonial period.

While the MNLF did not control all of the rebels involved in fighting the government, it was the main armed separatist organization. McKenna attributes this to the absence of its leadership from the country.[650] Even if it is true that the MNLF did not control all of the rebels, it does not negate the existence of separatist rebellion. Not every member needs to be in agreement with or controlled by a rebel organization. Instead, two things are essential. First, that there is a group with a belief in a shared national identity. This is evident through the newsletter, survey data, and recruitment. Second, that the group engages in armed conflict against the state for the purpose of fighting for independence.

The MNLF was the main organization for armed resistance, so I will focus the bulk of my assessment on them. A majority of their leaders were young, mostly college students or recent graduates. McKenna further argues that many of the college-educated youth who led the MNLF were former members of the MIM youth section. This meant that aside from being college-educated, some of them were clerics who graduated from Al-Azhar University or took classes at Notre Dame University in Cotabato City.[651] While some commanders were relatively

[648] Ibid.
[649] Ibid.
[650] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, 157.
[651] Ibid, 160.

young and had experience training, others commanders were former outlaws who were not necessarily from elite families.[652]

The visibility of the *datus* made them vulnerable to the state and powerful signals to the masses. McKenna notes that *datus* adopted three different strategies after the threat of martial law: 1) denunciation of rebels and loyalty to the state; 2) sympathy with the rebels but denunciation of violence; 3) active support of rebellion. It is important to note that it was mostly young, Manila-educated datus who fell in the second category.[653] This is puzzling given that the aforementioned leadership of groups such as the MNLF was also comprised of young, well-educated men.

One way to address this discrepancy is through assessing the incentives of young, well-educated *datus* from other young, well-educated men who were not elites. The former had the opportunity to accept money or positions from the state, thus making cooperation with President Marcos a more appealing option. The latter, however, were not necessarily afforded the same opportunity for compliance but stood to gain from leading a separatist rebellion against the state. Success would ensure that they would be in a better position for leadership or employment since an newly independent state would have more open positions than the existing Philippine state. This denotes a class distinction, in which status mattered. For example, some MNLF commanders, such as Datu Ali Sansaluna and Disumimba Rashid, were outlaws that came from non-prominent *datu* families.[654] This is further supported with evidence that even when *datus did* support the rebellion, they were the ones who defected sooner and in greater numbers.[655]

[652] Ibid, 160.
[653] Ibid, 162.
[654] Ibid, 160.
[655] Ibid, 163.

Ultimately, in both cases, well-educated Muslims were at the forefront of advocating for the Muslim community in different ways.

The mobilization of the *datus* changed depending on which position would best secure their inclusion. Many of the *datus* who chose to support the state during martial law were awarded with government money or positions. Eventually, even the *datus* who initially supported rebellion defected. This may be because these were mostly the well-educated elites who could afford to empathize with the rebellion but ultimately were still elites who had their status to fall back on. By 1980, there were hardly any ethnic elites in support of mobilizing for rebellion. This makes sense since the Marcos regime was in a position to reward and protect them while the rebels could not guarantee any of this.

By the time that Muslim separatist rebellion took place in the 1970s, education policies had changed. But in order to understand this, it is important to clarify the terms of attachment. After independence, colonial attachment increasingly became less relevant to groups involved. This is because the United States shifted from being a colonizer to an equal state. The Philippine state, however, took on the role of authority over both the Muslim and Christian populations. The closest conceptual equivalent to colonial attachment thus becomes state attachment.

Changes in education policies after Philippine independence increased the Muslim community's sense of cohesion. Immediately after independence, the Philippine government approached the "Moro Problem" as one that could be solved by better integrating this population into the state in order to alleviate the socioeconomic problems experienced by Muslims.[656] It was

[656] Muslim provides a lengthy description of this inequality. See Muslim, *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines*.

an approach that closely resembled the American approach of preparing Muslims for integration rather than independence.[657]

In response to socioeconomic inequality in Mindanao, the Philippine Congress created the Commission on National Integration (CNI) in 1957 with the goal of assisting the advancement of Non-Christian Filipinos. The CNI provided "scholarships locally or abroad for National Cultural Minorities." [658] A consequence of these scholarships was that Muslim students were funded to study in Manila.[659] While there was room for the children of *datus* to benefit from this initiative first, CNI scholarships enabled the children of non-elite Muslims to attend universities in Manila, as well. McKenna notes that "probably never more than 10-15" Muslim students graduated from university every year from the late colonial and post-colonial period. From 1958-67, there were 1,391 Muslim college graduates. 16% of those graduates were CNI scholars, which was higher than in years without CNI scholarship.[660]

CNI scholarships increased the interaction that Muslim students had with non-Muslim students. But it is important to note two things. First, increased interaction occurred in universities in Manila. The Philippine capital was in stark contrast to the socioeconomic conditions of the Southern Philippines. Muslim students educated in the capital experienced first-hand the inequality between the Christian majority in the north and their Muslim communities in the southern Philippines. Second, the basis for the provision of scholarships further solidified Muslim identity as minorities. CNI scholarships were specifically for cultural minorities. While

[657] Milligan traces this trajectory through the rhetoric and policies of early Philippine politicians.
[658] Congress of the Philippines, "Republic Act No. 1888," 22 June 1957; James F. Eder and Thomas M. McKenna, "Minorities in the Philippines: Ancestral Lands and Autonomy in Theory and Practice," in *Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities*, Ed. By Christopher R. Duncan (Cornell University Press, 2004).
[659] Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines.*
[660] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, 141.

this included members of the indigenous community, it was clear that Muslims in the Philippines were distinct from both the Christian and indigenous population.

A second education-related initiative came externally. From 1955-78, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser promoted scholarships as part of his pan-Islamic programs. Over 200 Muslims from the Philippines studied overseas. Many Muslim students went to Al-Azhar University.[661] Nasser's scholarships further expanded education to Muslims who did not come from elite families. Similar to the CNI scholarships, Nasser's scholarships reinforced Muslim identity in the Philippines since it was not an opportunity available to Christian Filipinos. As a result, there was a greater number of students interacting with instructors and peers in a common experience that helped solidify a national identity. Students were selected on the basis of being Muslim while non-Muslims were excluded. Furthermore, even though these students were in a different state, their instructors were Muslim instructors. Both of these factors reinforced the salience of their Muslim identity.

Al-Azhar graduates already taught in Muslim schools in the Philippines. But there were only a few and most were from Indonesia.[662] Nasser's scholarships changed this. Now, Muslims in the Philippines could educate their peers. After being educated in Cairo, graduates of Al-Azhar returned to the Philippines and often served as religious teachers for their communities. According to McKenna, "It was much later before the presence of indigenous Islamic teachers had a commensurate effect on popular Islamic consciousness in the Philippines."[663] This suggests that *panditas*, despite persisting through the colonial period, did not assist in the development of a national Muslim identity in the Philippines. One explanation lies in the difference between *pandita* schools and Islamic universities. *Pandita* schools operated on a small

[661] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, 143.
[662] George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, 143.
[663] McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, 144.

scale, focused on one individual teaching a few students. Universities, on the other hand, were much larger but centralized on being Muslim as a common facet of identity. They taught other subjects aside from religious studies, but there was a reinforcement of one's Muslim identity. In other words, graduates of Al-Azhar University had experience in bridging an identity gap with Muslims from other states. Finding the commonality between Muslims in the Philippines was more likely after that experience.

Majul provides a detailed description of the role that Nasser's scholarships played on the global Muslim community:

> Upon their return, many of them became a part of a new and younger *ulema* with a deeper understanding of Islam and exposure to religious reformist tendencies in the Muslim world. Others who did not return to dedicate themselves fully to religious activity served in the offices of traditional leaders. More than a few of the scholars had studied in military and professional schools in Egypt. Also, more than a thousand Muslims would make the annual hajj to Mecca with some of them extending their journey to Muslim countries, especially Egypt. They would return with a heightened religious fervour and loaded with Islamic literature for relatives and friends. Soon *madrasahs* (Islamic schools) increased in number, supported by Arab and Muslim non-Philippine teaching staff, with support coming from Muslim countries and international Muslim organisations. Muslim traditional leaders would go abroad to solicit help for religious activities and when successful would have their prestige increased in their respective communities. The number of mosques increased. Mosque attendance and *madrasah* enrolment flourished. There would be new ulema organisations, either independent of or attached to traditional leaders. Muslim professional associations also came into existence. Muslim CNI scholars with other co-religionists founded college associations, first along ethnic lines then under Islamic principles. With better transportation and communication facilities, Muslims were able to travel to urban areas where they would pray together, thrusting aside regional or linguistic differences[664]

Once the Philippine state tried to implement a more penetrative education policy in order to integrate the Muslim population, a subsequent effect of stronger group cohesion and attachment took place. These two factors contributed to the formation of a Muslim national identity. It also made it easier to perceive discrimination on the basis of this identity since members of the group felt tied to one another and separate from non-members. The second

[664] Cesar Adib Majul, "The Moro Struggle in the Philippines," *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1988): 897-922.

necessary condition for the onset of separatist rebellion is discrimination on the basis of this identity. This condition was met after President Marcos declared martial law, in which he specified a Muslim threat. Unlike the inter-communal violence in 1970s, this threat was against all Muslims in the entire state. In response, armed separatists engaged in rebellion.

Muslim Attitudes Regarding Philippine Independence

The relationship between Muslims and Christians in the Philippines can be traced back to the Spanish. Spanish efforts succeeded in converting a majority of the population. Priests used the local language for their evangelization. Grammar books (*artes* and *vocabularios*) translated prayers from Spanish to Tagalog in an effort to facilitate the conversion process.[665] Ultimately, conversion was rather smooth among the population in the north. Such was not the case with Muslims in the south, which resisted Spanish conversion at every turn. However, Spain did succeed in pushing the Muslim population further south. The Spanish also had a history of hiring Christians to engage in attacks against Muslims. As a result, a de facto separation between Christian Filipinos in the north and Muslims in the south existed throughout Spanish rule. Spain was never able to bring the entire Philippine territory under their control due to Muslim resistance.

American colonial officials continued many Spanish practices after bringing Muslim areas under their authority. Civilian rule was instituted everywhere except for two provinces in which military rule was considered necessary. One province was the Cordillera Autonomous Region in northern mountain area on the island of Luzon. This would later be named the Mountain Province and placed under direct control of the Secretary of the Interior in 1908. The second province was the southern area on the island of Mindanao. This would later be named the

[665] Jeffrey Ayala Milligan, "Islamic Education in The Philippines" in *Handbook of Islamic Education*, Ed. R. Arjmand Daun (Springer International Publishing, 2017).

Moro Province in 1903.[666] Both of the special provinces consisted of, "small disciplined cadres of junior officers, wielding enormous and autonomous authority over their subjects, and integrating the latter through intermediaries whose power was dependent on their Army superiors."[667] Army rule over the special provinces took up nearly 40% of the Philippine colony.[668]

American policies aimed at preparing Christians for independence but Muslims for integration should have been a clear cause of Muslim apprehension about Philippine independence. Leonard Wood, first Governor of the Moro Province, was adamant about curtailing the authority of Muslim leaders and levying taxes. Governor John Pershing issued the order of Muslim disarmament in 1911. This was met with the Battle of Bud Dajo and of Bud Bagsak. After American victories in both, the Moro Province shifted to civilian rule as the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. These factors posed a threat to the Muslim community, but there was not a cohesive Muslim national identity at the time that could mobilize a rebellion in response. While there were indeed revolts, these were not separatist rebellion since it was not an all-encompassing effort on behalf of all Muslims for the purpose of self-rule.

Muslim prospects of inclusion in an independent Philippine state were not as grim for several reasons. Unlike the Karen, Muslims in the Philippines did not have as much experience in administration to begin with: "The Moros will never fill clerical positions in this country."[669] They did not have the opportunity to occupy the highest levels, let alone significant positions, of leadership. Part of the reason was because they were not educated in the same way as their

[666] Abinales, *Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative*, 20.
[667] Ibid, 21.
[668] Ibid, 22.
[669] United States Congress, Senate Committee on the Philippines. "Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate." *Washington, DC: Government Printing Office* (1902).

Christian counterparts. Christian areas had access to a public education system and professional civil service. While executive positions in agencies were exclusively for Americans, Christian Filipinos could be in some positions of authority.[670] Muslims could not. This ultimately meant that Muslims in the Philippine had less to lose by remaining part of an independent Philippines.

In addition, Christian elites made promising statements about inclusion. Some leaders made it clear that including Muslim tribes as "brethren" would be necessary for their inclusion in the nation.[671] The attitude of elites towards Muslims developed, eventually becoming one about how Christian governance over them was good: "the incontrovertible fact is that the non-Christian Filipinos received the best treatment and attention when the Filipinos were given greater control of their own affairs."[672] Stevens argues that Christian Filipinos "mimicked the United States' colonial policies and metrics in governing the Muslims to show their capability for self-governance."[673] Thus, Christians had an incentive to be overly inclusive, at least in their rhetoric, to Muslims. Even if they did not intend to make good on these promises, it was still less threatening than explicitly targeting Muslims on the basis of their identity. While it is true that General Aung San made similar overtures to ease the worries of the Karen, Aung San was also murdered prior to the independence of Burma. Christian leaders who made assurances to the Muslim population were still alive, some still in government, when the Philippines became independent.

In order for separatist rebellion to begin, there needed to be targeting on the basis of national identity. But the American colonial period did not facilitate the development of a

[670] Onofre D. Corpuz, *Bureaucracy in the Philippines* (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1957).
[671] As reported by Sergio Osmeña, Edward Bowditch Papers, Cornell University, Box 3, 36.
[672] Manuel L. Quezon and Camilo Osias, *Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause* (Manila: Manila Book Co., 1924), 82-83.
[673] Joseph L. Stevens, "Colonial Mimicry And Mockery: Filipino-Muslim Relations During The Early American Colonial Period," Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2011.

Muslim national identity. In the absence of a national identity, it was less likely that Muslims would perceive discrimination on the basis of this identity. It would not be until much later, after international and domestic support for education, that a national identity would develop. After that, the threat of discrimination on the basis of this identity would be fulfilled by the declaration of martial law.

Karen Rebellion in Burma

The establishment of the Karen National Association (KNA) in 1881 indicated the presence of a cohesive, possibly national, identity.[674] The KNA (or Dawkalu) was supposedly formed in response to the Third Anglo-Burmese War. It had a clear focus on Karen identity and improvement of the Karen so as to "keep the nation together in the march of progress."[675] This involved the broad goal of establishing unity between the diverse and scattered Karen population.[676] Key areas for advocacy involved education, political representation, agriculture, and access to credit.[677] The basis for forming the KNA was clear: improvement of the Karen community. The focus was on Karen identity, despite internal differences in religion and dialect. All districts with Karen inhabitants were represented at the first meeting of the KNA. While only Christians were in leadership positions, non-Christian Karen also attended.[678]

There was also indication of a cohesive Karen identity through their use of print. Christie referred to this as a "revolution of cultural awareness" among the Karen elite.[679] The American

[674] Although unspecified, Cheesman seems to refer to the KNA as Dawkalu, "the first modern proto-nationalist organisiation" that promoted a pan-Karen identity. See Nick Cheesman, "School, State and Sangha in Burma," *Comparative Education* 29, no. 1 (2003). Similarly, Marshall notes that the Daw k'lu referred to "the whole race." See Harry I. Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma: A Study in Anthropology and Ethnology* (1902), 311.
[675] Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (London: Zed Books, 1991), 45; San C. Po, *Burma and the Karens* (London: Elliot Stock, 1928), 62.
[676] David M. Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma* (1887), 193.
[677] Clive J. Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism* (IB Tauris, 1998), 57.
[678] Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma*, 311.
[679] Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia*, 57.

Baptist Mission Press in Rangoon became the headquarters for Karen printing. A Karen type was first made and printed here on a "linotype machine." There were Karen presses in Bassein and Toungoo, as well.[680] There were reportedly 7-8 vernacular newspapers or periodicals in which the Karen managed all but 1-2. The *Dawkula (Karen National News)* ran biweekly.[681] The *Morning Star*, published by the American Baptist Mission Press in Burma, ran monthly and was specifically in Sgaw Karen. It was edited by Rev. Francis Mason, who considered in the "the oldest native newspaper in Further India."[682] Mason turned to the *Morning Star* as another way of educating Karen Baptists, but the periodical was not limited to only religious pieces. It also included announcements, updates from traveling Karen evangelists, science or history pieces, and translations of works such as *The Pilgrim's Progress*.[683]

Several primary and secondary sources converge on the idea that missionary activity in the 19th century was crucial in creating a Karen national identity:

> Karen nationality was in part developed through Christian missionary activity, for proselytization encouraged a feeling of common ethnic identity contrasting with that of Buddhist Burmans or Mons. Memories of harsh treatment under the Burmese kings led Karen leaders to form the National Karen Association in 1881, which promoted Karen unity and supported the establishment of British colonial rule.[684]

One of the most successful organizations to assist with fostering a Karen national identity was the American Baptist Mission who began work in the late 1820s. These organizations not only set up pastoral networks in Karen villages but also built schools, such as the Judson College in Rangoon.[685] The efforts of missionaries, and later the British colonial education system,

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[680] Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma*, 310
[681] Ibid.
[682] "Morning Star," Mercer University Research, Scholarship, and Archives https://libraries.mercer.edu/ursa/handle/10898/669
[683] Ibid.
[684] Frederica M. Bung, ed. *Burma, A Country Study* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1983).
[685] Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia*, 55.

facilitated the formation of a stronger group cohesion and colonial attachment. These two things would be the basis for a Karen national identity.

Yet not everyone agreed with whether or not a Karen nation existed in colonial Burma. Vinton called the Karen a "loose aggregation of clans" that had yet to be a nation.[686] But Smeaton disagreed, maintaining that separate tribes within the Karen were working together. In particular, Smeaton was heartened to see that the educated, mostly Christian Karen, "were willing to bind themselves closer than ever to their illiterate and heathen tribesmen, in order to raise the nation as a whole."[687] Even with this sense of solidarity, there was still not a separatist rebellion on the part of the Karen.

The Karen had the means to rebel, but they did not turn to separatist rebellion against the British. Cheesman refers to the third Anglo-Burmese War (1885-86) as a period in which "the embryo Karen nationalist movement militarised rapidly," yet he does not define what made the effort nationalist.[688] Their use of violence was not about mobilizing for self-rule on the basis of Karen identity. Instead, it was in collaboration with the British. The Karen had the means to rebel. This is evident in how the British employed Karen-staffed armies to handle anti-Brish rebellions led by ethnic Burmans in Lower Burma in 1886. But it was not in the name of a Karen national identity just yet.

During WWII, attacks by the BIA resulted in coordination among the Karen. For example, the BIA placed all of the Karen in Myaungmya under arrest upon their arrival. A nearby Karen ex-army officer immediately moved to gather forces to assist his co-ethnics under arrest.[689] In

[686] Dr. Vinton, who worked closely with the Karen population, made this statement. It is cited by Smith, *Burma*, 45 and Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*.
[687] Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*, 218-19.
[688] Cheesman, "School, State and Sangha in Burma," 207.
[689] Ian Morrison, *Grandfather Longlegs* (London, 1947), 183-92.

1946, the Karen sent four people to London to advocate for Karen "Home Rule."[690] This was not home rule for just the Christian-practicing Karen or the Sgaw-speaking Karen. Instead, it was for all Karen, even the heathens.

It was much clearer that a Karen nation existed by the time that Burma became independent. A month after Burma's independence, 400,000 members of the Karen community engaged in a "peaceful demonstration" calling for the recognition of a Karen state, Kawthoolei. Their calls further demonstrate that a Karen national identity existed.[691] There was also a clear demarcation of territory to which Kawthoolei referred. More importantly, the size of the protest demonstrates that the Karen had the capacity to mobilize. Given their history of fighting for the British, it is logical to assume that the Karen could have waged a separatist rebellion at this time. The absence of rebellion here should not be taken as a sign of lacking capacity. Instead, it should be seen as a sign of restraint. This restraint, I argue, is due to a lack of targeting on the basis of national identity.

The Karen national movement emerged more formally with the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1949, a year after Burmese independence. There was already a territory to which the KNU sought to have as an independent Karen State, which spanned several divisions in which most of the Karen population resided: Irrawaddy, Tenasserim, Hanthawaddy, Insein and the

[690] Hugh Tinker, *The Union of Burma: The Study of the First Years of Independence* (Oxford University Press, 1957), 20.

[691] There is a discrepancy between the four slogans. *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom* identifies "1. Give the Karen state at once; 2. Show Burman one Kyat and Karen one Kyat; 3. We do not want communal strife; 4. We do not want civil war." See Karen National Union (KNU), *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom,* (Thailand: Karen History and Culture Preservation Society, 1991), 10. The website of the KNU identities "1. For us, surrender is out of the question; 2. Recognition of the Karen State must be completed; 3. We shall retain our arms; 4. We shall decide our own political destiny." See Karen National Union, "About KNU," KNU HQ 2018 https://www.knuhq.org/public/en/about/background.

Nyaunglebin Sub-Division.[692] The goals of the KNU outlined in their manifesto also make it evident that there was a Karen national identity:

1. The establishment of a Karen state with the right to self-determination
2. The establishment of national states for all the nationalities, with the right to self-determination
3. The establishment of a genuine Federal Union with all the states having equal rights and the right to self-determination[693]

The important factor for this project, however, is the onset of separatist rebellion. Rebellion would be fulfilled by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which also formed in 1949. The KNLA served as the military arm of the KNU. Initially, the Karen did not greet an independent Burmese state with rebellion. Several events prompted Prime Minister U Nu to ask for Karen assistance in securing Rangoon: Communist revolts in 1947 and 1948; mutiny of the 1st and 3rd Burma Rifles.[694] At one point, the Karen Commander-in-Chief was given the rank of Lieutenant-General and had command over defense and police forces.[695] The Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) formed in response to this and was recognized by the government for protecting Rangoon, often "without any support from the regular army other than river transport."[696] There was also a Karen Union Military Police (UMP).

Despite Karen efforts to assist the Burmese state, their efforts were not rewarded. Tinker argues "it would be profitless to attempt to establish who offered the first, and most, provocation."[697] But it is evident that Burmese-Karen clashes increased at the end of 1948. The attitude towards the Karen changed by December 1948. Karen leaders were arrested and those serving in armed services were disarmed and jailed. Karen villages were attacked, looted, and

[692] KNU, *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom*.
[693] As cited in Ananda Rajah, "A 'Nation Of Intent' In Burma: Karen Ethno-Nationalism, Nationalism And Narrations Of Nation," *The Pacific Review* 15, no. 4 (2010), 521.
[694] KNU, *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom*.
[695] Tinker, *The Union of Burma*, 36-37.
[696] KNU, *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom*, 10.
[697] Tinker, *The Union of Burma*, 39.

destroyed. The KNDO was outlawed in January 1949 and Burmese troops attacked its headquarters, targeting top Karen leaders in the process. In response, "an order was issued to all the Karens throughout the Country to take up whatever arms they could find and fight."[698]

The Burmese government's attack on the KNDO headquarters was the catalyst that triggered the onset of separatist rebellion. The Burmese government coordinated with other Burman rebel groups against the Karen. The resulting scenario, in which "the Karens found themselves fighting against all the armed elements in the country," ensured that the Karen were targeted on the basis of their national identity.[699]

Karen separatist rebellion in 1949 challenges both rationalist and emotive explanations for rebellion. The KNU had not been prepared for a full rebellion at the time, since the Burmese government turned on them after initial cooperation.[700] Yet even without resources, which rationalists emphasize, the KNU rebelled. Furthermore, they engaged in rebellion against the state *after* their headquarters was attacked. It did not matter if independence was an opportune window to act, since initial Karen efforts were in cooperation with the government against Communist forces. Some of the Karen wanted to utilize this opportunity of state weakness. But mutineers led this movement, not Karen leaders who preferred avoiding rebellion. Different leaders quickly moved to curtail this response. KNU President Ba U Gyi, for example, pledged the loyalty of the KNU to the government in order to undermine movements to rebel against the state.[701] Even when it was evident that the new state would promote the majority, a clear indication of relative depravation emphasized by emotive explanations, the Karen still initially cooperated. It was only after the government demonstrated a clear targeting of the Karen on the

[698] KNU, *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom*.
[699] Ibid, 11.
[700] Ibid.
[701] Tinker, *The Union of Burma*, 37.

basis of their national identity, signaled through an attack on KNU headquarters, that separatist rebellion occurred.

Although this project focuses on the how separatist rebellion emerged soon after Burmese independence, it would be inappropriate to claim that this rebellion was unopposed. At least four Karen groups united under an armed response in preparation of Karen independence.[702] But this was not homogenous. Christians and Buddhists led attempts to address the needs of the Karen community prior to independence. There was diversity in whether or not unity with the rest of the Burmese colony would be feasible. These attitudes often coincided with a community's relationship with Rangoon as one of cooperation or conflict.[703] Independence was the main goal of the armed response, but there were also other groups that sought an autonomous Karen state.

Aside from the diverse attitudes towards rebellion, scholars of Karen nationalism also caution against seeing the KNU as the only representation of Karen nationalism. There is a less mainstream set of ideas that make up the "Union Karen" perspective. This nationalist perspective has been supported by elites separate from the KNU that are interested in working to accommodate the Burmese state. Smith has traced the existence of this perspective through Burmese independence and the parliamentary democracy period from to military rule in 1962. But since 1962, this perspective has been less prevalent and overshadowed by the KNU's more militant nationalist perspective.[704] The possibility of maintaining the Karen nation while remaining in the confines of a Burmese state exemplifies the presence of a peripheral

[702] Cheesman cites Josef Silverstein, *Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity* (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1980), 46; Robert H. Taylor, *The State in Burma* (C. Hurst, London, 1987), 286–7.
[703] Smith, *Burma*.
[704] Ashley South, "Karen Nationalist Communities: The "Problem" of Diversity," *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2007): 55-76. South also notes a geographic distinction between nationalist perspectives from Karen who live further in Burma and those who live along the Thai-Burma border. The distinction between nationalist perspectives is further supported by the existence of contrasting creation myths between the Karen in Burma and the Karen in Thailand. See Shway Yoe (the pen name for J. G. Scott) and A. R. MacMahon for Karen creation myths in Burma and David Marlowe for the equivalent with Karen in Thailand.

nationalism. Hechter defines peripheral nationalism as one in which, "a culturally distinctive territory resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government."[705]

Karen Apprehension Regarding Burmese Independence

A prominent characterization of the Burmese-Karen relationship is one of hostility. The Karen claim to have arrived in Burma first, settling the land in peace until the arrival of Burmans who won the feudal war and persecuted the Karen, Mons, and Arakanese. As a result, the Karen were driven to the mountains and jungles, which were areas that eventually became referred to as the hill areas. Those who did not flee were treated as slaves.[706] These tensions persisted during the colonial period, but in an inverse fashion. The Karen played a disproportionately larger role in the military/police force and civilian administration under the British. This was due, in part, to the British perception of ethnic Burmans as being unreliable.[707] They also had specific representation in legislative bodies.

Changes to the political administration of Burma had consequences for the Karen. Starting in the 1920s, Great Britain implemented increased self-rule for Burma. This involved a move from the dyarchy system, in which Burma was administered through India, to a ministerial model that was separate from India. Other minorities were administered as part of the excluded areas under the Burma Frontier Service.[708] This included the Shan, Karenni, and hill areas.[709] Consistent with divide-and-rule practices, the British allowed for accommodations for the Karen. One of these was separate constituencies, in which the Karen had representation in certain

[705] Michael Hechter, *Containing Nationalism* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
[706] KNU, *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom*.
[707] Andrew Selth, "Race and Resistance in Burma 1942-45," *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. 3 (1986): 483-95.
[708] H. N. C. Stevenson, *The Hill Peoples of Burma* (Calcutta: Longmans Green and Co., 1944).
[709] Tinker, *The Union of Burma*, 5.

chambers.[710] These were sometimes referred to as "communal" seats in which Indians, Karens, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans were given preference.[711]

The Karen had a strong colonial attachment, which contributed to their negative perception of inclusion in a Burmese state. Their plight against the Burmans improved under what some called "a breathing spell during the period of the British Regime." Under the Colonial Central Authority, the Karen were able to work and go to school.[712] They also referred to the British as a "Liberator and Guardian Angel."[713] The Karen were key members of the military and police force employed by the British. As a result, it was often members of the Karen community who were involved in repressing Burman unrest, such as with anti-British rebellions in the 1880s or Saya Rebellion in the 1930s.[714] Out of all other races, the Karen applied the most to serve in military service with the British in WWI.[715]

It would be incorrect to overlook apprehension and weakness in the British-Karen relationship, as well. For example, the British were not keen on having the missionaries allow for Karen self-defense organizations during the Third Anglo-Burmese War.[716] Individuals such as Field-Marshal Auchinleck and Admiral Mountbatten had praised the Karen for their service during WWII, granting many assurances, only to not follow through.[717]

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[710] Smith, *Burma*, 50.
[711] Tinker, *The Union of Burma*, 3, 5.
[712] KNU, *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom*, 8-9; See Burma, Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry, *Report Submitted to H.M.G. and to the Government of Burma* (Rangoon, 1947), Part II, 121; Morrison, *Grandfather Longlegs*, 69-73.
[713] "The Karen Memorial," from *IOR: M/4/3023;* Hugh Tinker, *Burma: The Struggle for Independence 1944-48* (London: HMSO, 1984).
[714] Smith Dun, *Memoirs of the Four-Foot Colonel* (Ithaca: Colonel University, Department of Asian Studies, Southeast Asia Program Data Paper 113, 1980), 104; Rajah, "A 'Nation Of Intent' In Burma"; Smeaton, *The Loyal Karens of Burma*.
[715] Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma*, 314.
[716] Smeaton, *Loyal Karens of Burma*.
[717] Burma, Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry, 176.

Tensions between the Karen and Burmese were further enhanced by their positions during WWII. Karen soldiers kept their loyalty to the British. The Burmese initially sided with Japan in order to form the Burma Independence Army (BIA) against the British. The Karen were targeted by BIA members for their previous loyalties to the British.[718] Karen soldiers returned home to their villages after the Japanese Occupation, which dissolved British forces in Burma. Skirmishes between the BIA and Karen forces took place in several areas, including Myaungmya and Papun.[719]

There were several examples of Karen loyalty to the British even during WWII. The British established the Burma Levies, an irregular force comprised of mostly ethnic minorities, to fight the Japanese.[720] A related Karen force under the authority of Major H. P. Seagrim helped establish a propaganda network of guerillas for the British.[721] In 1945, the Karen Levies were formed through Operation Character.[722] Furthermore, British Officers in Force 136 organized Karen guerillas. Their work kept the road to Toungoo open for the British.[723]

Karen inclusion in an independent Burma was threatening for several reasons. First, the removal of British authority would inherently remove safeguards for the Karen. It was clear that the Karen would not have the same level of political representation since they were in the minority. There was evidence of this with Karen concern about the lack of representation or consultation regarding Burman reconstruction or the Aung San-Atlee and Nu-Atlee Agreements.[724] In addition, it was difficult to anticipate military or police employment at the same levels once the Burmese state took over. Second, the Karen were educated for the purposes

[718] KNU, *The Karen People of Burma*.
[719] Morrison, *Grandfather Longlegs*.
[720] Charles Cruickshank, *SOE in the Far East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1983).
[721] Morrison, *Grandfather Longlegs*.
[722] Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia*.
[723] Report by the Supreme Allied Commander, 145; Tinker, The *Union of Burma*, 14-15.
[724] "The Karen Memorial,"; Tinker, *Burma, 23;* KNU, *The Karen People of Burma*.

of participating in civil administration tailored to the British. A Burmese state would have different needs. The likelihood of the threat of greater Karen unemployment was evident in how Burmans were already being to dominate "lower rungs of administration" in colonial Burma.[725]

But the threat of inclusion in an independent Burma was not enough to trigger rebellion. If this alone were enough, then the Karen would not have cooperated with the government to quell Communist uprisings and mutinies with the Burma Rifles. There was also clear language in the constitution, which made room for a Shan, Kachin and Karenni state in Burma. But there was not wording for a Karen state, simply the possibility of one via referendum in the future.[726] In addition, there were things that tempered the threat of inclusion. For example, the Karen were granted representation in 1947 Constituent Assembly Elections. Out of 255 seats, 24 were reserved for the Karen. Yet the KNU, and the Communists, did not participate in these elections and chose to boycott them instead.[727] Even with these factors, independence was not the proximate cause of separatist rebellion.

The onset of separatist rebellion requires targeting on the basis of national identity. This was fulfilled after the government attacked the KNDO headquarters. There was already an understanding that the Karen were going to be targeted on the basis of their national identity. This much is evident in their own descriptions, such as a KNU publication called *The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom,* which outlines their history of persecution at the hands of the Burmans since their arrival. It also clearly states the expectation that an independent state for the Karen was necessary due to their concern about Burman authority:

> "The bitter experiences of the Karens throughout our history in Burma, especially during the Second World War, taught us one lesson. They taught us that as a nation, unless we control a state of our own, we will never experience a life of peace and decency, free

[725] Po, *Burma and the Karens*.
[726] Tinker, *The Union of Burma*, 30.
[727]Ibid, 26.

from persecution and oppression. We will never be allowed to work hard to grow and prosper."[728]

Addressing the Shan Case

There are two cases of separatist rebellion in Burma: the Karen and the Shan. The Shans were regarded as similar to the Karen. Shans were a member of the special classes, which meant that the Burma Education Department recognized their language as a vernacular. They were also considered some of the "more civilized communities."

The Karen are a case of immediate rebellion due to penetrative education policies, as demonstrated in this chapter. The Shan, however, are a case of delayed rebellion. I provide a brief discussion of their education and rebellion in this section, specifying how it corresponds to my theoretical expectations of shallow education policies ultimately delaying the onset of separatist rebellion.

Overall, colonial education policies over the Shan can be considered shallow. Their enrollment numbers were not high. While Karen enrollment was 3% of their population, 0.5% of the Shan population was enrolled.[729] This may not seem like much, especially since Karen enrollment numbers are so high. But it is worth noting that the Shan were sometimes the second highest group enrolled. For example, there were 32,500 Karen students enrolled in the 1918-19 academic year. There were only 6,000 Shan students in 175 schools. The third largest enrolled group was, collectively, 5,000 Tamil and Telugu students.[730] Shan students enrolled in Shan schools. But even when a special school for the sons of Shan Chiefs was established in Taunggyi, in the Southern Shan States, a majority of the boys enrolled were Shans or Karens.[731] Thus, they rarely had their own exclusive schools. Both the low Shan enrollment and

[728] KNU, 1991, 8.
[729] Cited in Marshall, *The Karen People of Burma,* 1992, 309.
[730] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 1919, 22.
[731] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 22.

combination with Karen students suggests that education did not facilitate the development of a national identity since not enough Shan students were partaking in the same experience.

The curricula and instructors of Shan schools were not focused on Shan identity. Similar to the Karen, the Shan did not have access to vernacular textbooks. Burmese instructors had to resort to the use of old Burmese textbooks using Burmese for children who did not speak this language at home.[732] Burmese was the language of instruction for schools in the Shan States. The only exception was the village monasteries, in which Shan scriptures were taught to some students.[733] The Shans took part in English education, but they never advanced as much as the Karen.[734] In addition, they did not have opportunities for higher education in their language. They also did not have as many of their own instructors.[735] The Inspector of Schools, Meiktila Circle, noted that the instructors were all Burmans or Karens for the Shan schools for his circle.[736] Shan schools were more likely to have high instructor turnover or be in ineffective. As a result, they were often removed from the public list kept by colonial officials.[737]

It is evident that the Shan had a national identity by the time that they rebelled. This identity was fostered by a history of self-rule, which reinforced the difference of the Shan from other ethnic groups. The colonial period under the British is often considered peaceful. The British allowed Shan princes (*Saohpas*) to maintain authority over their "quasi-autonomous area" with their own administration and law enforcement.[738] In 1922, the Federated Shan States were created, which established a governing body over all of the Shan areas for the first time. The

[732]Ibid, 77.
[733] Bertil Lintner, "The Shans and the Shan State of Burma," The Shans and the Shan State of Burma, *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 5, no. 4 (1984): 403-450.
[734] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06," 1907, 21.
[735] Office of the Superintendent, "Sixth Quinquennial Report," 1923, 77.
[736] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 1919, 23.
[737] Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16," (Government Printing: Burma), 20; Office of the Superintendent, "Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19," 26.
[738] Alternatively, this was spelled as Sawbwas in the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry documents.

British also allowed for legislation that prevented non-Shan individuals from entering or settling in the Shan states. Similarly, Japan treated the Shan States as separate during WWII.[739]

Aside from being treated as distinct, the Shan also demonstrated a commitment to leadership. The first President of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples, created to protect interests of those living in the frontier areas, was a Shan *Soahpa*.[740] The Shan participated in both of the Panglong conferences organized by General Aung San, which was organized to determine the inclusion of ethnic minorities in an independent Burma. The resulting Panglong Agreement outlined the contours of the state. In particular, it allowed the Shan the right to secede from the Union of Burma after ten years had passed if they did not want to stay. The right to secede, and the existence of a Shan State, was ensured in the first Burmese constitution. This assurance meant that the Shan would be less likely to feel targeted on the basis of their identity. A stronger indication that the Shan would not face discrimination was ensured by the fact that the first President of the Union of Burma, Sao Shwe Thaike, was a member of the Shan community.

However, a Shan national movement still developed in the 1950s response to increased Burmese authority and the threat of the Kuomintang (KMT). KMT forces crossed into Shan territory in 1949. In 1952, the government of the Union of Burma placed a majority of the Shan States under military control in order to deal with the KMT threat. Burmese troops increasingly entered the area in the next three years, resulting in the first time that many Shan people interacted with the Burmese. This spurred Shan national activity, especially among intellectuals. Organizations such as the Shan Students Association and Literary Societies were established for the purpose of holding cultural seminars at major universities and publishing materials. Research

[739] Lintner, "The Shans and the Shan State of Burma."
[740] Ibid, 407.

was increasingly conducted in the Shan language and script, with modifications to make the vocabulary more modern.[741] It is important to note that while there was a national movement at the time, but it was not a rebellion. Without a threat on the basis of Shan identity, separatist rebellion was not necessary.

In 1956, some Shan *Saohpas* formed the Shan State United Party (SSUP) to advocate for their secession. Other members of the Shan community attended a conference in Mong Yai to advocate for secession, as well. These events took place two years before the constitution granted their right to secede. Their actions demonstrate that rebellion was not the first course of action. The Shan sought other ways to express their desire for self-rule. It was not until there was a targeted discrimination of the Shan community that rebellion occurs. The government used its army and Military Intelligence Service (MIS) to repress Shan nationalists. In response, young people organized armed guerilla units in the jungle. The first of these rebel groups was the Noom Seik Harn (The Young and Brave Warriors).[742]

University students played a key role in the beginning of the rebellion. Some of the first recruits to the Noom Seik Harn were university students. The Battle of Tang-Yan is seen as the beginning of Shan rebellion against the Union of Burma. Shan university students joined members of the Wa community for the attack. After this battle, various armed groups ambushed Burmese camps and outposts across the Shan States. It is important to note that not all of the rebel groups worked together. There was infighting, such as between the educated and uneducated groups.[743] The salience of education in the rebellion is evident in how university students were among the first to turn to rebellion and in how there was a divide between the educated and uneducated factions.

[741] Ibid.
[742] Ibid.
[743] Ibid.

I have tried to provide a brief within-case comparison of the Shan and the Karen. Unlike the Karen, the Shan experienced more shallow education policies that align their case closer to the Moros. They may have been taught Burmese and a Burmese-oriented curriculum and their instructors were mostly Burmese or Karen, but overall enrollment was low. This suggests that there was not a critical mass of Shan students learning the material to pass on to one another. In addition, the low enrollment ensured that the Shan students were not having a similar education experience. All of these factors indicate that colonial education policies over the Shan did not facilitate in the development of a national identity.

However, a Shan national identity was facilitated by the experience of self-rule. British officials granted a lot of autonomy to Shan *Saophas*, something that was not disrupted by the Japanese. Shan leaders also held key positions over not only their people, but also the minorities and state in Burma. The relative isolation of the Shan was disrupted by a KMT invasion. This necessitated an increase of Burmese troops over the Shan States. In response, a Shan national movement did take place. Thus, the case of the Shan also demonstrates other ways that facilitate a national identity when shallow education policies do not. It is important to note that at this point, a Shan national movement was facilitated by education. Universities were key areas of mobilization and the development of learning materials in Shan script were prioritized. Similar to the Moros, education played a key role in facilitating cohesion prior to rebellion. Shan rebellion finally occurred ten years after Burma's independence. Yet this was not simply the expiration of the ten-year waiting period ensured in the constitution. It is evident that desire for self-rule was evident two years prior due to the formation of a political party and conferences. Shan rebels were responding to the military and IMS specifically targeting their community.

Conclusion

The case of Muslims in the Philippines demonstrates how the delayed onset of separatist rebellion occurs in the absence of two necessary conditions: the development of a national identity and being targeted on the basis of this identity. While there were revolts during the American colonial period, these were not about the liberation of the Muslim Province. Instead, they were about local level grievances such as specific taxes. In addition, the ease with which American officials could subdue Muslim armed resistance at the time demonstrates a lack of coordination among the Muslim population. Neither of these factors indicates the existence of a Muslim national identity by the time that the Philippines became an independent state. Scholarships from the international community and the Philippine state would later serve to reinforce the salience of this Muslim identity as distinct from that of Christians in the Philippines. A national identity developed as a result of these education policies. Yet separatist rebellion would not take place until the second necessary condition, targeting on the basis of this identity, occurred. The trigger for separatist rebellion from the MNLF took the form of when President Marcos declared martial law in 1972. This was a clear targeting of Muslims on the basis of their identity at the state-level and it was met with separatist rebellion.

The case of the Karen in Burma demonstrates how immediate the onset of separatist rebellion is when both necessary conditions are met. A Karen national identity formed during the colonial period, facilitated by the evangelizing efforts of American Baptists and British education policies. This is evident in the willingness of the more educated, Christian Karen to advocate for the plight of not just themselves but also their non-Christian co-ethnics. A sense of Karen identity was based on this ethnic component, despite religious, linguistic, or territorial divides in the Karen community across Burma. Yet even with the formation of a national identity, separatist rebellion did not occur since there was not a targeting on the basis of Karen

identity just yet. Even at independence, the Karen initially cooperated with the government in Burma to quell mutinies and Communist threats. It was not until the government attacked the KNDO headquarters, a clear indication of targeting the Karen on the basis of their identity, that the KNU waged a separatist rebellion.

Conclusion

"In the rush of colonial powers to cement good relationships with the respective nationalist movements, the rights of minorities and loyalist communities, and the political structures that were designed to protest their interests, tended to be forgotten."

–Clive Christie

In this dissertation, I address why some separatists rebel sooner than others. My research addresses this puzzle of early and late seceders to figure out the conditions that induce or inhibit rebellion. In questioning *when* separatists rebel, I provide an argument that also tells us a great deal about *why* they rebel. And if we know why, this understanding shapes policies that can prevent the onset of rebellion overall or prevent ways from making it worse. I answer this question using evidence from Burma and the Philippines, two post-colonial states in Southeast Asia that are home to some of the lengthiest separatist rebellions. Specifically, I analyze evidence regarding Muslims in the Philippines and the Karen in Burma.

The main argument in this dissertation is that the onset of separatist rebellion has roots in education policies of the colonial period. It is not colonialism alone, but socialization through policies of education, that separatist rebellion occurs. In order to understand the logic of early and late seceders, it is necessary to consider how colonial education makes it easier to identify with and mobilize behind a national identity. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources along with semi-elite interviews, I demonstrate two causal pathways through process-tracing. I find that that shallow policies in the Philippines resulted in a weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. This is why the separatist rebellion of Muslims in the Philippines was delayed. I find the opposite in Burma, where penetrative policies facilitated the

development of a national identity through a stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion. This is why Karen separatist rebellion was more immediate.

This conclusion proceeds with three sections. The first section is a summary of the main points in each chapter. Second, I extend my comparison to another post-colonial state in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and consider the extent to which my theory can be applied to other states in the post-colonial world. Third, I conclude with the academic contributions, implications, and limitations of my project.

Dissertation Summary

The introduction establishes the research question and research design. Southeast Asia is home to some of the lengthiest rebellions, especially separatist ones. Europeans, the Americans, and the Japanese colonized the region for centuries. Existing theories of rebellion identify the importance of state weakness, resources, and deprivation as triggers for rebellion. Yet there is still variation in when separatists rebel despite the presence, or absence, of these factors. Some groups are early seceders who have an immediate onset of rebellion soon after a colony's independence. Other groups are late seceders who take longer to rebel, ultimately having a delayed onset of their rebellion. There are two states in particular that exhibit variation in colonial context and the timing of when they face separatist rebellion: the Philippines and Burma.

In Chapter 2, I outline my theory of separatist rebellion and how it links back to colonial education policies. There are two necessary conditions for separatist rebellion: the development of a national identity and discrimination on the basis of this identity. Both of these conditions are influenced by colonial education policies. Shallow education policies did not strengthen colonial association and instead encouraged fragmentation. On the other hand, penetrative education

policies facilitate the development of a national identity by making colonial attachment and group cohesion stronger. Grim perceptions of inclusion on the basis of this national identity make separatist rebellion more appealing. As a result, penetrative policies prime groups to be early seceders while shallow ones encourage late seceders. I situate this argument more concretely in several literatures to highlight the importance of colonial legacies and education for national identity formation and rebellion.

Chapter 3 focuses on the development of colonial administration in the Philippines and Burma. It begins with how each state was colonized. I then move to the development of colonial authority in both cases, with a specific focus on how the system affected Muslims in the Philippines and the Karen in Burma. I continue the timeline to include how each group participated in WWII since this involvement shaped the context faced by each in the lead-up to independence.

In Chapter 4, I demonstrate how colonial education policies influenced the formation of national identities in the Philippines and Burma. I provide a detailed description of penetrative and shallow education policies by turning to primary and secondary sources regarding the curricula, enrollment, language, and instructors in schools for my two cases. Muslims in the Philippines experienced shallow education policies while the Karen in Burma experienced penetrative ones. As a result, the formation of a Karen national identity was facilitated while a Muslim one was not.

In Chapter 5, I explain how the onset of separatist rebellion is ultimately triggered by a second necessary condition: targeting on the basis of national identity. But this second condition does not trigger rebellion unless the first condition, development of a national identity, is met first. Shallow education policies did not facilitate the development of a national identity. This is

why the separatist rebellion of Muslims in the Philippines was delayed. It would not be until scholarships from the international community and the Philippine state facilitated the formation of a national identity AND the declaration of martial law that separatist rebellion takes place. The Karen developed a national identity due to penetrative education policies. Yet they would not wage a separatist rebellion until the second necessary condition was met. This occurred soon after Burmese independence when the KNDO headquarters was attacked.

Extending the Logic of Early and Late Seceders

The Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and Ambonese Separatist Rebellion

The Indonesian Archipelago is part of maritime Southeast Asia and consists of more than 17,000 islands. One of the first external forces to arrive in the region was Islam in the 15th century. Islam spread throughout Indonesia, blending with local customs. By the 16th century, it was the dominant religion in Java and Sumatra by the time that Europeans brought Christianity. The Portuguese came to Indonesia in 1512, bringing Roman Catholicism with them. Several Dutch companies, in search of spices, followed suit and brought Protestantism. These voyages were successful and the Dutch government eventually ordered the creation of the United East India Company/ *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC), which was a combination of several competing Dutch trading companies. The company was dissolved in 1800 and the Dutch government took charge of the VOC's colonial holdings in what came to be known as the Dutch East Indies. Initially, the government took over VOC-controlled areas, which mostly comprised of parts of Java's coast and the city of Batavia. Local rulers, such as sultans, maintained control over the interior.

Figure 8: Map of Indonesia

The Maluku Islands (the Moluccas) had the lengthiest period of colonialism in all areas of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, from the 16th-20th century.[744] Similar to the Philippines, Islamic Sultanates and smaller kingdoms were already established in the Moluccas prior to the arrival of Christianity. The Portuguese were particularly interested in the clove market controlled by Ambonese Muslims.[745] There were several examples in which Muslim rulers fought back against colonizers and prevented the Portuguese from controlling the clove trade in Maluku. Eventually, the VOC imposed a policy of excluding Asian traders and taking control of clove-

[744] Paramita R. Abdurachman, *Bunga Angin Portugis di Nusantara: Jejak-Jejak Kebudayaan Portugis di Indonesia* (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2008); Barbara Dix Grimes, "The Pursuit of Prosperity and Blessing: Social Life and Symbolic Action on Buru Island, Eastern Indonesia," Ph.D. thesis (The Australian National University, 1993).
[745] Sumanto Al Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2015): 1-29.

rich areas.[746] As the price of cloves dropped and colonial administration grew, the Ambonese found themselves in need of work.[747] Thus, many of them enlisted as non-commissioned recruits for the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army /*Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger* (KNIL). When the Dutch left Indonesia after WWII, many of their Moluccan recruits came with them.

As a result of these external forces, Ambon was home to both a Muslim and Christian community. In 1930, 2/3 of the population was Christian while the remaining 1/3 was Muslim.[748] Several scholars note that there was intermarriage and co-existence between the two communities until Dutch efforts to align with Ambonese Christians divided the two.[749] Yet this contradicts interviews with Ambonese Muslim leaders who cite centuries of Christian-Muslim strife in Ambon.[750] Furthermore, a series of Christian-Muslim conflict resolution practices in Ambon suggest that peaceful co-existence was not the norm.[751]

Ambonese Christians were a special caste, *pangkat,* in which they served in low-ranking administrative positions and separate military units for the Dutch. When the Dutch shifted to direct rule in 1800, missionary activities increased and the status of the native clergy was elevated at the expense of traditional chieftains.[752] Most of the people hired in colonial

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[746] Grimes, "The Pursuit of Prosperity and Blessing"; Orang J. Keuning*, Ambon Portugis dan Belanda: Sejarah Ambon Sampai Akhir Abad ke-17*, Trans. Frans Rijoly (Ambon: 1988); Leonard Y. Andaya, *The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1993). M. Adnan Amal, *Portugis dan Spanyol di Maluku (*Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2010); Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596–1950* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993).
[747] Richard Chauvel, *Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to Revolt, 1880– 1950* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990).
[748] Ibid.
[749] Richard Chuavel, "Ambon: Not a Revolution but a Counter-Revolution," in Audrey R. Kahin, ed. *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 239; Shirley Dean, *Ambon: Island of Spices* (London: J. Murray, 1979); Dieter Bartels, "Your God Is No Longer Mine: Moslem-Christian Fratricide in the Central Moluccas (Indonesia) after a Half-Millennium of Tolerant Co-Existence and Ethnic Unity," In *A State of Emergency: Violence, Society, and the State in Indonesia,* ed. Sandra Pannell (Darwin: Northern Territory University Press, 2003).
[750] See Al Qurtubyfor Interview with Thamrin Ely, Ambon, March 28, 2010.
[751] Al Qurtuby notes inter-village alliances (*pela-gandong)*, Christian-Muslim unity (*salam-sarane),* and a local mechanism of conflict resolution (*baku bae*).
[752] Frank L. Cooley, *Ambonese Adat: A General Description* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

administration positions were Protestant Ambonese.[753] Ambonese Christians, as a whole, played a key role as non-commissioned officers in the KNIL and were heavily involved in the Marechaussèe Corps that assisted in the Dutch take over of Aceh.[754] Eventually, Christian villages served as key recruitment sites and their recruits were paid the same rate as Dutch individuals in the army.[755] By 1930, an estimated 10% of the Christian Ambonese population was spread across the Dutch East Indies in an administrative or military capacity.[756]

The Japanese occupied Dutch East India from 1942-45. During the Occupation, they purged the civil service of not only Dutch officials, but also Indonesian employees. Teenage boys were taken from their homes in order to train with a Japanese "auxiliary army."[757] The Netherlands was liberated from German control in May 1945 and was not prepared to return to Indonesia when Japan surrendered in August 1945. As a result, the Dutch turned to the British for help. But South East Asia Command, under British Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, only had experiencing operating in Sumatra. It was abruptly tasked with assuming responsibility over the remainder of Indonesia.[758] For context, modern-day Sumatra is the largest island under Indonesian control.

There was a six-week gap between Japan's declaration of surrender and when it went into effect due to the logistics of transferring rule. During this time, Japanese soldiers deliberately left behind or gave their armaments to Indonesians. Japan made thousands of weapons available to Indonesians, even after their departure.[759] The problem, from the perspective of the Dutch, was that these arms did not go to a properly trained military force. Instead, it went towards many

[753] Bartels, "Your God Is No Longer Mine."
[754] I.O. Nanulaitta, *Timbulnja Militerisme Ambon* (Djakarta, Bhratara), 1966.
[755] Ibid.
[756] Richard Chauvel, *The Rising Sun in the Spice Islands: A History of Ambon During the Japanese Occupation* (Clayton, Australia: Center for Asian Studies, Monash University, 1985b).
[757] H.J. van Mook, "Indonesia and the Problem of Southeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 4 (1949): 561-75.
[758] Ibid.
[759] Ibid.

different groups: nationalists; Communists; Muslims; private bodyguards; local bandits. Estimates suggest that only 20% of these 50,000-1000,000 Japanese armaments were collected in Java by the Allied powers.[760] Soon after Japan surrendered, the Republic of Indonesia declared its independence.[761] This further complicated the presence of so many arms in the region.

WWII and the Japanese Occupation affected the relationship between Ambonese Christians and Muslims. Japanese forces were skeptical of Ambonese Christians because of their close relationship with the Dutch. Instead, Japanese forces favored Ambonese Muslims. Ambonese Muslims willingly collaborated with the Japanese in order to further undermine the Dutch. The Japanese also supported jihadist movements in the region.[762] This included the Jam'iyyah Islamiyah of Seram (the Seram Islamic Organization), which coordinated more Muslim jihadist groups in the Molucca Islands. It is worth noting that this organization formed under the supervision of Kabayashi Tetsuo (Omar Faisal), who was a graduate of Al-Azhar University in Egypt.[763] This is the same university that would later educate hundreds of Moro students with scholarships provided by the Nasser government.

Ambonese Christian-Muslim tensions did not escalate into conflict at the same level as the Burmese and the Karen during the same period.[764] The greater issue was for Ambonese Christians who were still in Java due to their service in the KNIL. Some returned home to Ambon, others were taken as prisoners-of-war with the Dutch, and others remained stranded across Java. Ambonese soldiers who were stranded in Java were among the first to participate in

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[760] H. J. Van Mook, "Indonesia," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 25, no. 3 (1949b): 274-285.
[761] George McT. Kahin, "Sukarno's Proclamation of Indonesian Independence," *Indonesia* 69, (2000): 1-3.
[762] Al Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia."; Chauvel, *Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists*; Richard Chauvel, "Ambon's Other Half: Some Preliminary Observations on Ambonese Moslem Society and History," *Review of Indonesian and Malay Affairs* 14, no. 1 (1980): 40–80.
[763] Al Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia."
[764] Chauvel, "Ambon's Other Half."

communal violence against Indonesian nationalists who declared a unified Republic of Indonesia soon after Japanese forces surrendered.[765] The return of the Dutch to Indonesia was weak and they never regained total control of the entire area. In Ambon, however, there was hardly a gap between the departure of the Japanese and the return of the Dutch.[766] Ambonese Christians were more than happy to welcome the Dutch back after the Japanese had favored Ambonese Muslims.

The Dutch had been in Indonesia for three centuries. As a result, many Dutch families moved to and established homes in Indonesia. The Netherlands had also placed a considerable amount of effort in the development of the colony. Thus, while the government was willing to transfer self-government to Indonesia, a "certain pride in past achievements" contributed to an unwillingness to relinquish total authority.[767] But their position was complicated by the fact that the Dutch did not regain as much control of the colony after WWII. The overall proposal of the Dutch was for a *federal* Republic of Indonesia. Under these plans, Ambon would be part of the state of East Indonesia and the region of the South Moluccas.[768]

In 1947, the Dutch resorted to the use of force to ensure their status over a federal Republic of Indonesia. Resulting international pressure to these actions culminated in a ceasefire and a Round Table Conference in 1949. The agreements signed here transferred sovereignty of the Dutch East Indies to create the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). This was after four years of fighting between Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch. The hope was that the RUSI would negotiate a federal constitution and administrative structure with its included states.

[765] Ben van Kaam. *The South Moluccans; Background to the Train Hijackings* (London: C. Hurst, 1980).
[766] Ibid.
[767] H. J. van Mook, *The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia* (London: George, Allen, and Unwin, 1950), 219; van Mook, "Indonesia and the Problem of Southeast Asia."
[768] Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia.*

Christie argues, however, that the resulting states did not have an army or Dutch protection to ensure this outcome.[769]

One of the states included in this federation was East Indonesia. However, it collapsed in 1950 in response to threats from the government, which meant, "nothing now stood between Ambon and the unitary Republic of Indonesia."[770] The Republic of the South Moluccas declared its independence as *Republik Maluku Selatan* (RMS) for three reasons: inclusion of the South Molucca region in the state of East Indonesia was provisional; the Republic had violated the terms of the Round Table Agreements; the state of East Indonesia effectively did not exist in light of the violation.[771]

Separatist rebellion was not the only choice nor was it the first option for Ambonese Muslims. The Sarekat Ambon (Ambonese Association) formed in Java in 1920 by educated elites and was supported by the Muslim community. The Partai Indonesia Merdeka (PIM) that formed in 1946 was comprised of former Sarekat Ambon leaders. They dominated representation in the Council of the South Moluccas and advocated for a position that supported Indonesian nationalism, especially in the form of a federal state.[772]

Moreover, rebellion was not going to be easy. At least 4,000 Ambonese soldiers went to the Netherlands after the Royal Dutch Indies Colonial Army dissolved in 1950. The soldiers could have assimilated into Indonesia's army or accepted dismissal, yet they chose to remain as soldiers for the Dutch.[773] At least 12,500 soldiers and their family members left for the Netherlands rather than remain in an independent Indonesia. A majority of these soldiers were

[769] Ibid, 118.
[770] Ibid, 119
[771] Ibid.
[772] Ibid.
[773] Fridus Steijlen, "In and Out of Uniform: Moluccan Soldiers in the Dutch Colonial Army," in Colonial Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1945: "Aliens in Uniform" in Wartime Societies Ed. *Eric Storm, Ali Al Tuma* (Routledge: New York, 2015).

Protestants, but there were an estimated 300 Catholics and 150 Muslims in their ranks.[774] This meant that the number of possible Ambonese rebels with military experience was reduced.

Education in the Dutch East Indies

Overall, the colonial education policies in the Dutch East Indies can be described as shallow, especially when assessed through enrollment. Enrollment in primary education was low in comparison to other Southeast Asian colonies at the time.[775] There was a large gender gap in enrollment in which there were 4 boys enrolled for every 1 girl. But this should not be taken as evidence that education in the Dutch East Indies was lacking. There were other schools, but the Dutch marked these as "unrecognized schools," to indicate that colonial officials did not recognize them. A majority of the unrecognized schools consisted of Islamic schools.[776] Ultimately, the Dutch East Indies developed "a highly differentiated system of education." European schools remained as havens for the children of the colonial officials. Secular village schools, with a vernacular education, served as the counterpart for natives. Religious schools, which included Islamic and Christian missionary schools, were kept out of the public education system.[777] Thus, Muslim children did go to schools. They just did not go to the colonial schools. This dynamic is similar to that of Muslims in the Philippines during American colonial rule.

A point made in this dissertation is that different groups can experience colonialism differently, even when they are part of the same colony. The Dutch East Indies was no different. Dutch and Indo-European children enrolled in European schools. Thus, they were exposed to the same curricula that existed in primary schools back in the Netherlands. Moreover, there was a stark inequality in the distribution of education expanses. European schools received more

[774] Ibid.
[775] J.S. Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast A*sia.
[776] Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam*.
[777] Frankema, "The Colonial Roots of Land Inequality."

funding per student than schools for indigenous or Chinese students.[778] This can be seen in the literacy gap that existed between regions. Peripheral regions had a higher literacy rate than central areas.[779] Some scholars attribute this to the work of Christian missionary schools that were established in the outer areas.[780] This dynamic is similar to that of the Karen in Burma.

The VOC facilitated the arrival of clergy to teach and evangelize in Ambon. They established religious structures, including schools. The curricula in these schools did not highlight Ambonese culture. Instead, elementary schools covered basic subjects: Malay language, handwriting, arithmetic, singing, and flute-playing. When history was covered, it was either general or biblical history.[781] Unlike the Karen, however, Ambonese Christians did not carry out missionary work. Ministers mistrusted the sincerity of some converts.[782] It is also important to note here that Ambonese Christians would have been less likely than Ambonese Muslims to perceive this material as penetrative.

Teachers also led Sunday services, making the local school a key site and "schoolteachers…the backbone of Ambonese Christianity."[783] Ambonese Christians benefited from the increase in the number of Christian missionary schools and became one of the most highly educated groups in the colony. Thus, the children of Ambonese Christian elites had the opportunity to pursue higher education in Java and interacted with the children of other elites

[778] Ewout Frankema, "Why Was The Dutch Legacy So Poor? Educational Development In The Netherlands Indies, 1871-1942," *Masyarakat Indonesia* 39, no. 2 (2013): 307-326. He cites 1908: *Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Koloniën),* 1929: *Statistisch Jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indië.* Enrolment and population data for the Philippines: *Handbook of Philippine Statistics, 1903-1959.* Expenditure data on the Philippines 1908 and 1929: Bureau of the Census and Statistics, *Statistical Bulletin of the Philippines 1,* 1918, and *Yearbook of Philippine Statistics,* 1946.
[779] Furnivall *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia.*
[780] Frankema, "Why Was The Dutch Legacy So Poor.
[781] Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Brill: Leiden, 2008).
[782] Ido Hendricus Enklaar, "Joseph Kam, 'Apostel der Molukken'. 's-Gravenhage: Boekencentrum," Bijdragen tot de zendingswetenschap; no. 4.
[783] Al Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia."

across the East Indies.[784] These education opportunities facilitated the creation of a "Javanese-educated, Indonesian-oriented" Ambonese elite among the Christian population.

Ambonese Christians maintained a relationship with the Dutch that Ambonese Muslims did not have.[785] The number of schools for Ambonese Christians grew from 32 in 1633 to 54 in 1700 while the student population more than quadrupled.[786] Only six schools for Ambonese Muslims were built in the same period. In addition, only the children of elite Muslim families who collaborated with the Dutch were eligible for enrollment.[787] Without a formal education, Ambonese Muslims had limited career options. Several scholars describe their situation as "second-class citizens in colonial Ambonese society."[788]

There is a difference between education in the entire East Indies and for Ambonese Christians. Overall, Dutch education in the East Indies was shallow. Enrollment numbers were not high and they did not try to teach the natives Dutch. Ambonese Christians experienced a more penetrative form of education policies, in which there was high enrollment without a reflection of their identity in the curricula. Moreover, their people did not serve as instructors. Ambonese Muslims experienced a shallow colonial education policy, in which the Dutch did not recognize Islamic schools. The Dutch opened fewer schools for the Muslim population. As a result, education policies facilitated the development of an Ambonese Christian identity but not necessarily an Ambonese Muslim one. It is important to note here that this does not mean there was no sense of a Muslim identity in Ambon. There was. However, this identity was not

[784] Van Kaam, *The South Moluccans.*
[785] Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia;* Peter Janke, "The South Moluccan Story," *Terrorism and Democracy* (1992): 73-113.
[786] Fatimah Hussein, *Muslim-Christian Relations in the New Order Indonesia: The Exclusivist and Inclusivist Muslims' Perceptions* (Bandung: Mizan, 2005); Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam*.
[787] Chauvel, *Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists*; Bartels, "Your God Is No Longer Mine."
[788] Al Qurtuby, "Ambonese Muslim Jihadists, Islamic Identity, and the History of Christian-Muslim Rivalry in the Moluccas, Eastern Indonesia," 21; Jeroen Adam, "How Ordinary Folk Became Involved in the Ambonese Conflict: Understanding Private Opportunities During Communal Violence," *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 166, no. 1 (2010): 25-48.

mobilized towards an independent state solely for Muslims. This was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that an independent Indonesia would be a Muslim-majority state.

Colonial officials further reinforced the differences between Christians and Muslims in Ambon. Ambonese Christians had a collaborative relationship with the Dutch. They were recruited into the KNIL at higher rates and had access to employment in civilian administration as a function of better education opportunities. Ambonese Muslims did not. The Japanese maintained the distinction between the two, but inverted the power dynamic. Japanese officials favored Ambonese Muslims and assisted in the establishment of jihadist groups. The reinforcement of difference between these two groups also served to reinforce the national identities of both groups as separate from each other. It was not about a united Ambonese identity. One was either an Ambonese Christian, who enjoyed Dutch privileges, or an Ambonese Muslim, who did not.

Christian separatists waged separatist rebellion in Ambon. But they did not immediately advocate for rebellion. Groups like Serakat Ambon and PMI indicate that there was support for Indonesian nationalism, even among the Ambonese who were Christian and Muslim. It is important to note that an independent Indonesia would be a Muslim majority-state, one that would outnumber Christians. But it seems that the main factor was not an independent Indonesia. This was not a threat as long as it was a republic. Thus, there was no rebellion in the lead up and time following Indonesia's independence when its status as a republic was still ensured. It was not until the RUSI crumbled and the establishment of a *unitary* Republic of Indonesia that Christian separatists rebelled. This event marked the beginning of a targeted threat against the Ambonese. It was not simply that they would be included in an independent Indonesia, which was a Muslim-majority state. It was the fact that it was not going to be a republic anymore that

served as a threat. The salience of this threat is further highlighted by how Ambonese Christians still turned to separatist rebellion even after 4,000 of their fellows had left Indonesia for the Netherlands.

Post-Colonial Implications

The comparative implications of my project are also relevant outside of independence periods and beyond post-colonial states. The specific question addressed in this dissertation, why do some separatists rebel sooner than others, is addressed using independence as a reference point. It is worth situating this question during independence, since independence is a period of political instability or negotiation and, potentially, state weakness. These are factors that existing research has identified as conducive for rebellion. There is merit in understanding why some separatists can take advantage of this time while others do not. These factors can also exist at other times. More importantly, the broader implications of my project are about the role of historical legacies in shaping the development of national identity. Education policies, in particular, can influence the proximate causes of separatist rebellion such as economic inequality or political representation.

The main policy implications of my project relate to education. Colonial powers are not the only ones with education policies. States certainly do, as well. My findings indicate that ethnic groups are more likely to develop a separate national identity when many of them are enrolled in schools that have a separate curriculum, co-ethnic instructors, and a common language. A group with a common identity fostered through a common education experience is more likely to have a stronger tie with fellow members and a heightened sense of threats to this identity. These conditions make it easier to mobilize for rebellion. Governments that try to foster a national identity through schools must try to prevent severe inequalities in the learning

experiences of different ethnic groups. Failure to do so can set the foundation for separatist rebellion.

Based on this conclusion, governments have two options. First, they can ensure that majority and minority groups have equal levels of access to a similar education. This is easier said than done, as it means devoting more resources to encourage ethnic minorities to attend schools with other ethnic groups or provide additional funding so that schools deliver the same quality of education. Furthermore, governments should not leave communities to their own devices even if these are high-quality schools. Allowing each ethnic group to control their own group's education can strengthen a sense of national identity even more if there are no guidelines from the government about a universal curriculum. Second, governments should encourage *supplementary* cultural education from minority communities. For example, places of worship or the homes of elders can provide a place for students to learn about their community's cultural identity. Governments should not see these as competition, provided that state schools are equal in access and quality. Trying to eradicate community outlets only serves as a trigger for separatist rebellion since it is likely to be perceived as discriminatory.

Theoretical Consideration

Academic Contributions and Implications

My first contribution concerns the literature on political violence and critical junctures. The lion's share of research on separatist rebellion is atemporal and focuses on whether or not rebellion occurs overall. These studies are important and have contributed significantly to our understanding of nationalism and rebellion. I do not attempt to refute all of these studies outright. Instead, I move to focus more on situating separatist rebellion within a specific context. Many existing theories assume that separatists have the same perceptions at all points in time. But independence represents a window of opportunity with its own unique set of circumstances that

may not be expected again in the future. This is also why it is important to hold factors related to the pathway to independence, armed or negotiated, as constant.

Independence might serve as a critical juncture in that it is a *period of time* in which actors have more choices than at another point in time. Scholars who examine critical junctures may find that independence is a useful case for consideration. Critical junctures are "periods in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases onto divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory that diverges significantly from the old."[789] During a critical juncture, "agents face a broader than typical range of feasible options and the notion that their choices from among these options are likely to have a significant impact on subsequent outcomes."[790] Additional options, with a significant reach, may become possible during independence as colonial powers retreat and native interest groups vie for power either through institutions or violence. The same options, or the same scope of reach, may not be as available once the conditions present at independence are over.

My second contribution concerns the legacies of colonial rule as antecedent conditions. Explanations for rebellion range from rationalist ones emphasizing state weakness, resources, and mobilization or emotive ones concerning perceptions of deprivation. However, many of these studies fail to consider the deeper roots for post-colonial violence. I move beyond these proximate causes and consider what policies or institutions shaped them. This dissertation builds

[789] Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, "Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 7 (2010): 886-917.
[790] Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," *World Politics* 59 (2007): 341-69.

upon a growing literature that specifically considers how colonial factors affect violence in the post-colonial period.[791]

By expanding the historical period under scrutiny, I engage with the literature concerning antecedent conditions. There may be factors *before or during* independence that act in specific ways. Certain conditions during a critical juncture can result in a "loosening of constraints on agency or contingency." At the same time, other actors or forces can "act within the context of these [conditions] to produce divergence."[792] It is important to consider if the context of independence is just a background similarity or has causal effects, especially in comparative research. A paired comparison research design needs cases in which antecedents are common between cases in order to serve as control variables.[793] But when these antecedent conditions have causal effects, it is important to sift out which factors interact during the juncture in a causal sequence.

My third contribution concerns the literature regarding education and national identity. It is one thing to place time and resources in educating the majority that is expected to have political control in the future. It is another to devote efforts towards the minority that, at most, participates in a state largely shaped by the majority. This is not to suggest that minorities are unimportant but rather to emphasize that the reasons for their education may differ from the majority.[794] There is a vast literature that categorizes colonial rule based on the identity of the

[791] Verghese, *The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Violence in India*; Mukherjee, "Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India"; Ray, "Sooner or Later"; Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War".
[792] Hillel David Soifer, "The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures," *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 12 (2012): 1572-97.
[793] Slater and Simmons, "Informative Regress."
[794] The Americans were explicit about their hopes of modernizing the Philippines in a Western-oriented direction. They helped establish political parties and representation structures in the hopes that this would catch on. The British ruled Burma initially with a dyarchy system in which it had an elected council but was administered as a province of India. Later changes moved Burma towards a ministerial system that was separate from India and closer to the direction of self-governance. Not all colonial powers were explicit about their preference for seeing a

colonial power or the indirect-direct divide. But colonial powers varied their decision between their colonial holdings, within a single colony, and across time. Because "local context conditions change over time," colonial strategies had to adapt.[795] Studies that focus on the national identity of the colonizer as an independent variable fail to account for this.[796] There is greater analytical leverage in focusing on the structures, interactions, or specific policies that were implemented rather than relying on heuristics to measure the influence of colonialism.

Scope Conditions and Limitations

I build upon existing explanations for the onset of separatist rebellion and focus on how colonial education policies structure the underlying conditions for perceptions about the prospect of inclusion. Explanations that focus on conditions of the state, resources, or inequality/exclusion to explain rebellion do not account for the institutions that create or maintain these conditions. Such conditions may be proximate causes, but these explanations miss the structural conditions that influence the "deep-rooted determinants of conflict."[797] Institutions can structure the paths for state capacity or socioeconomic inequalities long before conflict erupts, thus providing temporal clarity on the direction of causality beyond proximate causes.

Two points of clarification are in order: colonial education policies are not the only means of driving separatist rebellion and independence is not the only time for rebellion. Rather,

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democratic form of government develop in their colonies since very few colonies were explicitly prepared for self-government.

[795] Alexander de Juan and Jan Henryk Pierskalla, "The Comparative Politics of Colonialism & Its Legacies: An Introduction," *Politics & Society* 45, no. 2 (2017): 159-72.

[796] Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom provide a through overview of the influence of colonial legacies on the survival of post-colonial democracies. They identify that specific national legacies and the length of colonial rule can have consequences for democratic survival. What is missing, however, is a closer assessment of which aspects of a nation's specific colonial practice results in the legacy. See Michael Bernhard, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom, "The Legacy Of Western Overseas Colonialism On Democratic Survival," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (2004): 225-250.

[797] Mukherjee, "Colonial Origins of Maoist Insurgency in India," 2; Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns Of Ethnic Separatism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 2 (1981): 165-195.

independence is a specific context that is vulnerable to rebellion and education policies can prime certain groups to act earlier under specific conditions. There are other ways that separatist rebellion can come about, particularly in a non-colonial context. But I argue that one of the under-theorized mechanisms linking colonialism and rebellion is through education policies. In addition, existing theories of rebellion should be tested under conditions under that hold certain factors constant.

Separatists are often a minority group, outnumbered by a majority that will almost always have a greater share of state control. Factors such as the social mobility and career opportunities can mitigate the disadvantages of small numbers. Sometimes, these factors only serve to delay rebellion until a later time, such as in the case of late seceders. In other cases, some groups never rebel. Indeed, there are far more potential separatists than actual ones. There are even fewer successful separatists. While my universe of cases is focused on the groups that do rebel, my theory still has implications for the many that never do. It implies that if groups do not develop a national identity and feel targeted on the basis of this identity, they will be less likely to rebel.

While my theory does not anticipate early seceders among shallow educated groups, there are some conditions that make it possible. If shallow educated groups develop a national identity prior to colonialism *and* they are targeted as a group on the basis of this identity close to independence, then they may become early seceders. My theory can also extend to when late seceders finally rebel. Late seceders may eventually rebel if they develop a national identity after independence *and* are targeted as a group on the basis of this identity.

I identify two scope conditions for my argument. First, this argument is focused on seceders. It distinguishes between early and late seceders, relative to independence. It does not apply to latent seceders that never wage separatist rebellion. Second, education policies must

differ between groups that will eventually be part of the newly independent state. When many groups are educated with similar policies, even if it is penetrative, the likelihood of early seceders is minimal. This is because many groups end up sharing a stronger colonial attachment, so it is harder for any group to feel singled out for being favored by the colonizer. More importantly, there is a higher likelihood of cohesion developing *between* groups when multiple groups are educated under the same penetrative policies.[798] Cohesion develops as members of a group are educated together. Penetrative policies that affect multiple groups result in many groups interacting with one another through the shared experience of education.

Future Work

Based on my findings, there are at least three trajectories that work concerning colonial education can go. First, studies could look to the past. Existing studies of colonial policy have addressed questions about why certain institutions take root or are established in some colonies but not others. This takes the form of political institutions, broadly conceived of as direct or indirect rule, or economic institutions, specifically considered through extractive or inclusive institutions.[799] Similarly, future research could address why do some colonizers establish shallow education policies while others do not? Related to this puzzle is whether or not some groups are more receptive to these policies than others.

Studies could also make lateral comparisons between different colonies at the same time or different groups in the same colony. I focus on a specific set of policies over education systems. Research concerning the effects of colonialism often turn to the identity of the colonial power or duration of rule as a heuristic. Yet this often proves inaccurate when multiple powers colonize one place or when the same colonizer employs different forms or rule in the same

[798] This is similar to the concept of bridging social capital.
[799] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins Of Power, Prosperity, And Poverty* (Crown Books, 2012).

colony or across different ones. By comparing education policies, I avoid over-generalizing and instead have a way to leverage more comparisons between groups in the same colony, across different colonies at the same time, or within the same colony over time.

Lastly, future research could extend the timeline further and consider the colonial legacies of education policies on the post-colonial state. This can most easily be assessed through institutions. The natural conclusion of such work would be to trace the educational development of different ethnic groups in the same state. On one hand, effective post-colonial governments may succeed in overcoming the differences between shallow and penetrative educated groups, thus staving off rebellion. On the other hand, these governments may be too late or prove ineffective at undoing the damage established by discriminatory education policies. This area of research could also be traced through the behavior of different groups. It is worth considering if penetrative education policies prove to be beneficial or harmful to their respective cohorts and under what conditions such outcomes occur.

There is also merit in considering future work regarding education policies more broadly. Education is not inherently good or bad. What matters is the ways in which education is carried out, to what ends, by whom, and to whom. In addition, the order in which identity formation occurs may matter. Some early seceders may already have a national identity prior to being educated. Shallow education may not facilitate the formation of a national identity, but this is not significant for a group that *already* has one. Penetrative policies may serve as a threat to groups with a national identity, thus serving as the proximate cause for rebellion. Conversely, penetrative policies can neutralize the potential for a minority group to develop a national identity if they are educated in the same way as the majority. This is ultimately the goal of assimilationist policies. This is one way that latent separatists remain latent. Lastly, states that

successfully deter separatist rebellion with education have not entirely safeguarded their future. Latent seceders can become late seceders if other factors influence the formation of their national identity and heighten their sense of threat. However, education policies have generational and structural effects. Access to certain education opportunities, for example, can have a long-term influence an individual's quality of life. Thus, certain education policies may lock in and maintain latent seceders.

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Appendix A

Table 1 and 2 Regional Categories

Regions are based on the UN Population Division Classification of Countries by Major Area and Region of the World. See http://www.unep.org/tunza/tunzachildren/downloads/country-Classification.pdf.

1	Caribbean	2	Central America
3	Eastern Africa	4	Eastern Asia
5	Eastern Europe	6	Middle Africa
7	Northern Africa	8	Northern Europe
9	South America	10	South Central Asia
11	Southeast Asia	12	Southern Africa
13	Southern Europe	14	Western Africa
15	Western Asia		

Appendix B

Portion of Martial Law Addressing Muslim Rebellion

Proclamation No. 1081 is lengthy. A majority of the document singles out the problem of Communist support groups in the Philippines, but a portion specifically singles out Muslims in the southern region:

> WHEREAS, in addition to the above-described social disorder, there is also the equally serious disorder in Mindanao and Sulu resulting from the unsettled conflict between certain elements of the Christian and Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu, between the Christian "Ilagas" and the Muslim "Barracudas", and between our government troops, and certain lawless organizations such as the Mindanao Independence Movement;
>
> WHEREAS, the Mindanao Independence Movement with the active material and financial assistance of foreign political and economic interests, is engaged in an open and unconcealed attempt to establish by violence and force a separate and independent political state out of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu which are historically, politically and by law parts of the territories and within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines;
>
> WHEREAS, because of the aforesaid disorder resulting from armed clashes, killings, massacres, arsons, rapes, pillages, destruction of whole villages and towns and the inevitable cessation of agricultural and industrial operations, all of which have been brought about by the violence inflicted by the Christians, the Muslims, the "Ilagas", the "Barracudas", and the Mindanao Independence Movement against each other and against our government troops, a great many parts of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu are virtually now in a state of actual war;
>
> WHEREAS, the violent disorder in Mindanao and Sulu has to date resulted in the killing of over 1,000 civilians and about 2,000 armed Muslims and Christians, not to mention the more than five hundred thousand of injured, displaced and homeless persons as well as the great number of casualties among our government troops, and the paralyzation of the economy of Mindanao and Sulu;

Appendix C

Green indicates that the case had the independent variable specified by the theory while red indicates that the case does not. Based on various theories of rebellion, the Moros were more likely to rebel and the Karen were less likely to rebel. Yet the opposite happens. The Moros are late seceders while the Karen are early seceders.

Literature	**Moros**	**Karen**
Groups with a history of prior mobilization are more likely to rebel (Gurr, 1993)	Spain did not conquer all of the Philippines due to Muslim resistance over a 300 year period. The Moros turned to armed resistance against the Americans several times. Even after defeats, Muslims were armed and trained to fight alongside Americans during WWII.	The Karen did not engage in armed resistance against the British. While they were employed in army units, their efforts went towards repressing the rebellion of other groups in Burma.
Groups with a history of self-rule are more likely to rebel (Gurr, 1993)	Several tribes in the Moro community were accustomed to being organized into sultanates in which sultans had treaties with existing states prior to the arrival of the Spanish.	The Karen claim to have arrived in modern-day Burma first, calling it Kaw-lah.
		They later lost the war against the Burmans and either fled to the mountains or were subjugated.
Groups with perceptions of relative deprivation of backwardness are more likely to rebel (Horowitz, 1981; Kaufman, 2015; Gurr, 1970)	The 13 tribes exhibited different levels of political centralization.	The Karen were the most advanced of the special classes, enrolling in higher education or technical schools alongside the majority.
Economic inequality increases the likelihood of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004)		
Windows of opportunity, such as state weakness or reformation, make rebellion more likely (Posen, 1988; Walter; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Bertrand, 2005)	Philippine independence was an organized transition with the American government.	Burma's independence was an organized transition with the British government.
Groups are more likely to rebel when there are additional challengers (Walter 2009)	The socialist Hukbong Laban sa Hapon movement emerged to fight the Japanese in WWII and extended their efforts against the Philippine government upon independence.	There were many ethnic groups at the time of Burma's independence. Some received constitutional protections while others did not. Several waged armed resistance soon after independence, but for non-separatist reasons.

Previous state response of negotiation or indiscriminate violence can make rebellion more likely (Walter, 2009; Lindemann and Wimmer, 2018)	The American government did not negotiate with Muslim rulers after revolts took place. Americans used brute force against all combatants, women, and children in the Battle of Bud Dajo and the Battle of Bud Bagsak.	There was no need for the British government to negotiate with the Karen since the Karen did not turn to armed resistance.
Ethnic exclusion makes rebellion more likely but may not be a necessary condition (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2010; Vanhanen, 2012; Lewis, 2017)	The Moros were not awarded separate political representation or specialized positions in the government or armed forces. They were also not specifically banned.	The Karen were included in the British civil service and armed forces. Separate political representation, sometimes disproportionate, was also present.
Geographic concentration and a shared language/customs make mobilization for rebellion easier (Denny and Walter, 2014)	All of the Moros practiced Islam, albeit with some differences. They were concentrated to the southern Philippines in Mindanao and Sulu.	The Karen were geographically scattered, had at least two major dialects, and did not identity with the same religious practice.