

Essays on Psychological Resources and Political Behavior: Knowledge, Efficacy, and Trust

By

Elizabeth Lauren Mitchell Elder

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Political Science

in the  
Graduate Division  
of the  
University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Gabriel Lenz, Chair  
Professor Laura Stoker  
Professor Cecilia Mo  
Professor David Broockman

Summer 2021



## Abstract

Essays on Psychological Resources and Political Behavior: Knowledge, Efficacy, and Trust

by

Elizabeth Lauren Mitchell Elder

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Gabriel Lenz, Chair

How do people get the resources they need to participate in politics? Generations of political scientists have studied how the processes that provide people with unequal money, time, education, and social capital produce inequalities in engagement with politics. This dissertation follows in that tradition. I examine the causes and consequences of three psychological resources that facilitate political engagement: knowledge about political issues, a sense of power over outcomes in one's life, and a sense of attachment to the place one lives.

Chapter One investigates an underappreciated kind of information about politics: knowledge of which social groups demand or benefit from policy proposals. My coauthor and I find evidence that this knowledge is widespread in the American public. We argue that people use information about the groups linked to policies to form issue attitudes that are stable over time and consistent across issues, qualities which prior work has argued are limited to only the most-informed citizens.

Chapter Two moves from knowledge about politics to the next stage of political engagement: participation in civic and political life. Drawing on literature from social psychology, I argue that people who generally feel more power over outcomes in their lives participate more in politics. Because people from higher-status socioeconomic backgrounds tend to feel more efficacious than those from less-advantaged households, the sense of power is one in a long list of resources that allow the well-off to participate in politics at higher rates than others.

Chapter Three contributes to an emerging literature on the political implications of the sense of attachment people feel to the places they live. I argue that people who feel the place they live is part of their sense of self should trust more in the people and institutions associated with the place. In a large survey, I find that Americans who identify with the place where they live have higher social and political trust and participate in civic life at higher rates.

In summary, the first chapter of this dissertation finds reason for optimism about inequalities in psychological resources, documenting a widespread form of political knowledge that allows more people than previously thought to form stable and consistent issue positions. The second chapter is less optimistic, introducing an additional source of advantage for well-off people in political participation. The implications of my final chapter are less clear; more work on place identity is needed to understand how it affects the distribution of social and political trust in the mass public. Taken together, these chapters underscore that to understand inequalities in political participation, researchers must look beyond traditional socioeconomic resources to psychological resources like knowledge, efficacy, and trust.

# Contents

Page No.

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>Contents</b>   | <b>i</b>  |
| <b>Acknowledgements</b>   | <b>ii</b> |
| <b>Chapter 1</b>  | <b>1</b>  |
| Social Groups and Ideological Belief Systems: Fresh Evidence on an Old Theory |           |
| <b>Chapter 2</b>  | <b>25</b> |
| Psychological Power in Political Life   |           |
| <b>Chapter 3</b>  | <b>43</b> |
| Geographic Identity as a Political Concept                                    |           |
| <b>Bibliography</b>   | <b>57</b> |
| <b>Appendices</b>   | <b>75</b> |

## Acknowledgements

I'm grateful for having finished this dissertation, and I'm grateful for the many people who made it possible.

Few people are lucky enough to find true mentorship in their advisors, but I have been lucky enough to find it twice. Matthew Hayes, as my undergraduate advisor, taught me my first lessons about research and academia, and I still use these lessons every day. I would not have made it to graduate school or through graduate school without his guidance. Gabe Lenz, as my committee chair, has been the best advisor anyone could hope for. I thank him for his dogged advocacy of me and my work, and for the endless time he spent advising me on the substance and strategy of my research. I am also grateful for his many excellent audiobook recommendations along the way.

Laura Stoker has shaped how I think about research more than anyone else. I thank her for her exemplary syllabi, her always-thorough feedback, her generosity with her time, and her belief in me despite having read many terrible drafts of my work.

Many other faculty members contributed to this dissertation and to my development as a scholar. Cecilia Mo provided precision and clarity with every meeting. David Broockman's feedback was always both fast and indispensable. I thank Eric Schickler, Paul Pierson, Joel Middleton, Jack Citrin, Ruth Berins Collier, Leonardo Arriola, and Susan Hyde for their guidance and support as well.

The Institute of Governmental Studies provided me with a desk and a community, as well as many kinds of valuable research support, throughout graduate school. I am grateful for the shelter, duct tape, tea, and much more, but most of all for the carrels.

I am endlessly grateful for my colleagues in the Berkeley political science department. I thank those ahead of me for their advice, reassurance, and encouragement to take the small things less seriously, especially Jake Grumbach, Rachel Bernhard, Joseph Warren, Andrew McCall, Neil O'Brian, and Alexander Sahn. I thank my cohort-mates for their commiseration and support, especially Casey Ste. Claire and Jacqueline Vokoun, without whom my first years in graduate school would have contained far less humor and kindness. I thank the brilliant people who arrived after me for listening patiently when I gave too much advice and inspiring me with their innovative work, especially Alan Yan, David Nield, Julia Christensen, and Anna Mikkelsen. I thank Alexander Stephenson for being there all along.

I thank my parents for teaching me to read and to be curious, though they may have gotten more than they bargained for on both counts; and for introducing me to the West Wing, which started my love of politics. I thank my sisters, my longest-running sources of joy and pride.

Finally, I thank my husband Ehren for every kind of support I could imagine and for listening to me the most and the best.

# Chapter 1

## **Social Groups as the Source of Political Belief Systems: Fresh Evidence on an Old Theory\***

*We present novel evidence that attitudes towards social groups structure political belief systems. First, we show that most Americans have a rich knowledge of the social groups that support and oppose group-related policies. This knowledge often exceeds people's awareness of where Democrats and Republicans stand on these same issues. Then, we show that this knowledge promotes what Philip Converse called ideological coherence: Americans who know which groups support and oppose a policy are more likely to hold stable policy positions over time and to organize their attitudes into consistently liberal or conservative bundles. In the 20th century, knowledge of social groups' issue positions rivaled knowledge of parties' positions in its ability to generate attitude stability and constraint. However, as party identification has strengthened in recent decades, knowledge of parties' positions has become the most important source of structure in most Americans' belief systems.*

---

\*The work in this chapter was coauthored with Neil A. O'Brian.

Sixty years ago, in what has become one of the most widely cited articles in the study of political behavior, Philip Converse argued that the American public was not ideological (1964). He demonstrated that many people’s attitudes towards political issues changed readily over time, and their attitudes towards different issues were not consistently liberal or conservative. In other words, Americans’ attitudes were not stable or ideologically constrained.<sup>1</sup>

Characterizing stability and constraint in issue attitudes has been a central goal for scholars of political behavior in the years that have followed Converse’s essay. While explanations vary, the field has coalesced around an account that centers on cues from political elites: people attentive to politics form issue attitudes based on signals from the party or ideological leaders they prefer (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; Hetherington, 2001; Lenz, 2012; Freeder et al., 2019). In this account, which has primarily focused on partisan cues, political elites’ signals are the main source of stability and constraint in Americans’ attitudes; for the sizable portion of the public that does not receive these cues, attitudes remain unstable and unorganized.

Scholars working in this tradition consider stable and constrained attitudes necessary for processes of democratic accountability. Like many resources, however, the partisan and ideological cues that foster stability and constraint are unevenly received by the mass public; people of higher education and social status are often more attentive to elite cues they can use to form consistent beliefs. People lower in “political sophistication,” who rely instead on group-based reasoning to understand politics, are worse-equipped for political engagement.

However, in a less-referenced portion of his 1964 essay, Converse suggested an alternative account: attitudes towards prominent social groups could provide stability and constraint in Americans’ issue attitudes. Noting the durability and interconnectedness of attitudes towards racial issues, he argued that attitudes towards core social groups could structure attitudes towards a network of related policies. For example, the interconnectedness of attitudes towards crime, school busing, and civil rights could boil down to a single question: “are you sympathetic to [African-Americans] as a group?” (Converse, 1964, 38). However, Converse writes, “we have no direct empirical evidence supporting this illustration” (Converse, 1964, 39). Despite being central to Converse’s influential theory of belief systems in the mass public, and related to a rich literature on social groups (Mason, 2018; Ahler and Sood, 2018; Achen and Bartels, 2017; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), this prospect has not yet been empirically explored.

We show that attitudes towards social groups, coupled with knowledge of what policies those social groups support and oppose, structure political belief systems. Knowledge about where social groups stand on political issues is widespread—in some cases, more widespread than knowledge about where the major parties stand. In the 1970s, for example, African Americans were generally more supportive of economic redistribution than white Americans, and 68 percent of people knew this fact. Only 51 percent, however, knew that Democrats were more supportive of economic redistribution than Republicans.

Because of this widespread knowledge, social groups can fill a role much like that of party or other political elites in theories of social learning (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992; Lenz, 2012): when people know where a preferred social group stands on an issue, they can form an issue attitude aligned with their group preference. Knowledge of social group positions shapes Americans’ attitudes much like—and sometimes more powerfully than—knowledge of party positions. We

---

<sup>1</sup>Kinder and Kalmoe (2017) provide an excellent overview of recent evidence on this topic; but see Ansolabehere et al. (2008) and Freeder et al. (2019) for other perspectives.

show that people with knowledge of which social groups align with specific policies drive much of the observational relationship between group affect and policy attitudes (e.g., Sears et al., 1979; Tesler, 2014).

Knowledge of group positions explains substantial variation in two features of public opinion scholars have studied for decades: response instability over time, and constraint between issue attitudes. People who know which social groups support or oppose a policy are more likely to maintain the same attitude towards the policy months and years later. We argue this stability arises from the fact that people’s attitudes towards social groups are quite stable (e.g., (Converse, 1964; Sears and Funk, 1999; Tesler, 2014)). When an issue is linked to a social group, a stable attitude towards the linked social group generates more consistent evaluations of the issue.

Similarly, when people associate a social group with multiple political issues, social group attitudes create what Converse calls constraint: people who know which policies a group supports and opposes hold consistently liberal or conservative positions across issues related to that group. Attitudes towards policies linked to the same group are correlated due to their common source; negative (positive) attitudes towards a group foster negative (positive) attitudes towards an array of policies associated with that group.

The importance of social group placement knowledge varies over time. Throughout the 1970s, social group knowledge was the dominant source of stability and constraint, but today party position knowledge has become the dominant source. What explains this variation? Building on a rich literature on social identity, social sorting, and affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2019; Mason, 2018), we find that party position knowledge is most powerful when people’s social identities and group affect align with their party membership. Social group knowledge best explains stability and constraint when people’s attitudes towards party-aligned groups are at odds with their partisanship (e.g., a racially conservative Democrat). As more people have come to belong to parties that match their group memberships or identities (an increase in what Mason (2016) calls social sorting), party knowledge has become more important in structuring belief systems.

The account presented here offers a new way—or rather, new evidence on an old way—of understanding how Americans organize their political beliefs. Research has long shown that many Americans explain their feelings about parties and candidates by referencing social groups (Converse, 1964; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Our evidence that social groups are central to belief systems echoes the accounts citizens have long offered for their own attitudes. By measuring the kinds of knowledge many voters say they use to make sense of politics, we can better understand which voters have the information they need to form stable and constrained political attitudes (Lupia, 2006).

## **1 Social Groups & Belief Systems**

Social groups structure political behavior in myriad ways. A robust scholarship documents that social groups—including, but certainly not limited to partisan groups—are core to how people evaluate parties (Ahler and Sood, 2018; Achen and Bartels, 2017), candidates (Teele et al., 2018; Crowder-Meyer et al., 2020), and issues (Tesler, 2014; Sears et al., 1979; Conover and Feldman, 1984). When these group memberships are internalized as a social identity, they can powerfully affect how people define their interests and view those inside and outside the group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). More broadly, the race, class, and gender groups people belong to equip them with



norms and values that shape how they engage with politics (see Anoll, 2018; White and Laird, 2020, for example).

Building on this work, we ask what a social group-focused account of political attitudes can contribute to the field's longstanding quest to characterize belief systems in public opinion. If deep-seated prejudices against and favor towards social groups are tied to how Americans think about so many political objects, how might we expect people to organize their political beliefs? We argue that social groups act as central elements for stabilizing and unifying attitudes towards an array of political issues related to social groups.

## 1.1 Americans' Knowledge of Social Group Attitudes

Our central claim is that when people associate social groups with a political issue, they form attitudes towards the issue that are more durable over time (attitude stability) and more consistent with their attitudes towards other policies associated with those groups (constraint). Knowledge of groups' positions links political issues to group attitudes, and this linkage which generates stability and constraint.

The starting point of this theory is knowledge: for social group attitudes to affect policy attitudes, people must know (or have beliefs<sup>2</sup>) about linkages between social groups and policies. Many policies in American politics are linked, both in political discourse and in public opinion, to a relatively small set of groups. It is not necessary or realistic that people know the position of every social group on every issue. Instead, we suggest that people associate any given policy with a particular group or set of groups, often groups who demand or oppose the policy.

These group-policy links are clearest in the case of policies that directly benefit a particular constituency: the legalization of gay marriage is associated with LGBT people, and food stamps are associated with the poor. Other policies are associated with the kinds of people who demand them. Feminists demand equal pay for women, business groups demand industry deregulation, and environmentalists demand environmental policy.

Groups become linked to policies when they are paired, explicitly or implicitly, in communications from media and political elites. Elites sometimes explicitly communicate the kinds of people they wish the public to associate with a policy; a famous example is Ronald Reagan's invocation of the "welfare queen" image to associate and stereotype welfare policies with the undeserving poor (Kohler-Hausmann, 2007). But often, explicit linkages are unnecessary. People can associate policies with groups by inferring from context the kinds of people who might benefit, or by observing the kinds of people who are linked to the policy in their lives or in media. In an example of the latter, Gilens (2009) demonstrates that media images of black, rather than white, poverty have forged an association between African Americans and welfare policy.

Like all forms of political knowledge, knowledge about the groups who demand or benefit from policies is unevenly distributed in the populace. We expect that for many important policies, however, this knowledge will extend beyond the most politically engaged citizens and into portions

---

<sup>2</sup>Throughout, we refer to "knowledge" of policy-group linkages rather than beliefs about those linkages. We focus on comparing people who have correctly learned which groups are consistently associated with policies (e.g., white people are more conservative on economic redistribution than black people) to people who have not learned those associations. The latter group is almost entirely people who do not perceive any group-policy link at all. Perceiving incorrect links (e.g. that white people are more supportive of aid to minorities than are black people) is, for the issues we examine here, rare; what low rates there are can likely be attributed to measurement error. See section SA.1.

of the public who pay little attention to party politics and political news. People can passively absorb information about the groups associated with a policy through exposure to political messages, interpersonal conversations, or media portrayals that make these linkages clear. Mere exposure, incidental or otherwise, to discussion of a policy should often be sufficient to link it to a relevant social group.

When people know the groups linked to a policy, their attitudes towards the groups can affect their attitude towards the policy.<sup>3</sup> There is ample evidence that people's attitudes towards social groups affect their attitudes towards political objects associated with those social groups, from diverse literatures on symbolic politics (Sears et al., 1979), heuristic use (Petersen et al., 2011), media effects (Gilens, 2009), issue framing (Nelson and Kinder, 1996), and the origins of ideological beliefs (Kerlinger, 1967; Conover and Feldman, 1981).

However, this prior work generally has not described the mass public's knowledge of what policies are associated with what groups. Returning to the case of welfare policy and African-Americans illustrates this point. Gilens (2009) finds that priming the recipients of welfare as black rather than white decreases support for welfare spending among whites. Gilens, among others, has also found that public opinion surveys show an observational relationship between racial resentment and support for welfare and other economic programs (Gilens, 2009; Kinder and Mendelberg, 2000, 56). Combining this evidence, it seems that people's welfare attitudes reflect underlying racial resentment because African-Americans and welfare have been linked in the public's mind.

Yet, to our knowledge, there has been no exploration of how many people associate welfare policies with African Americans absent researcher intervention. This leaves open the question of how common knowledge of groups and associated policies is "in the wild"—that is, how much of the public knows which groups are associated with important policies, absent any researcher intervention. Answering this question can help us understand why, and for whom, group attitudes structure public opinion.<sup>4</sup>

As the example of the "welfare queen" suggests, strategic elites can seek to damage the popularity of policies they dislike by pairing the policies with stigmatized groups; stereotypes of those stigmatized groups spill over onto evaluations of policies associated with them. Thus, group affect may influence policy attitudes through prejudice and negative associations. However, policy attitudes may also develop through knowledge that groups someone feels favorable to benefit or demand a certain policy (Tesler and Sears, 2010). For this reason, we refer to "group attitudes" or "affect" rather than prejudice throughout the paper because we expect people's feelings about groups to drive attitudes towards policies associated with them, regardless of whether those feelings are positive or negative<sup>5</sup>.

---

<sup>3</sup>We do not address where group identity or group affect comes from, but instead rely on other work that argues attitudes towards core social groups (e.g., racial groups) are acquired early in life and represent long-standing predispositions that are then capable of shaping political attitudes (Sears et al., 1979; Sears and Funk, 1999).

<sup>4</sup>To draw an analogy: studies on issue voting find that people vote for candidates that agree with them on issue X. However, this effect is concentrated among people who know the candidate's position on the given issue (e.g., Lenz 2012). Scholars argue that knowledge of the candidate's/party's position shapes voters' attitudes. We argue a similar learning process happens with groups.

<sup>5</sup>Negative attitudes are generally a stronger predictor of constraint (and stability), but positive attitudes work similarly; see Section SA.3.5 and SA.4.5.

## 1.2 Social Group Knowledge Increases Attitude Stability & Constraint

In his influential account of ideology in the mass public, Philip Converse argues that the issue attitudes of many Americans are “idiosyncratic,” rather than holding well-thought-out policy positions that are linked to an underlying ideological predisposition, people’s attitudes are unorganized and often changing. Idiosyncratic attitudes have two markers: they change over time, and they are not organized into liberal or conservative issue bundles (Converse, 1964, 44-48). For example, Converse reports in his 1964 essay that he asked a set of respondents whether the federal government should provide funding to needy school districts. He then asked those same respondents the same question two years later and found that many gave much different answers. Furthermore, answers about school funding were only weakly related to positions on other issues; knowing a respondent’s opinion about education spending, for example, conveyed little information about how the respondent felt towards privatizing infrastructure.

Converse took these idiosyncratic—that is, unstable and unconstrained—issue positions as evidence that “large portions of an electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial periods of time” (Converse, 1964, 50-51).

However, Converse also suggested that attitudes towards issues associated with social groups may be less idiosyncratic than other issue attitudes. Comparing the stability of attitudes towards several issues, “the items that stand out as most stable,” he said, “are those that have obvious bearing on a population grouping” (Converse, 1964, p. 46-67; see also Tesler (2014); Sears and Funk (1999)). And when discussing the associations between attitudes towards different issues, he noted that less informed people may have interrelated attitudes towards multiple policies that concern African Americans — more interrelated, even, than attitudes towards those same issues among the highly informed (p.38-41). We explore this possibility here.

Knowledge of the groups that support and oppose a policy promotes stable attitudes because it provides a consistent way to evaluate the policy. Attitudes towards social groups are relatively stable over time (Sears and Funk, 1999), so policy positions based on social group attitudes should be stable as well. Additionally, a key reason that issue attitudes fluctuate over time is that people judge issues based on different criteria at different times, depending on what information is salient (Zaller, 1992). Judging policies by the groups that demand or benefit from them is a common and cognitively easy shortcut (Petersen et al., 2011), perhaps because of the centrality of social groups to political thought (see, e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2017; Conover and Feldman, 1984). When people link issues with social groups, those groups provide a consistent way to form attitudes towards the issue. Because attitudes towards groups are reasonably stable, then, people with the knowledge to evaluate an issue using their group attitudes will have consistent issue attitudes over time. People knowledgeable about an issue’s group linkages therefore ought to have more stable attitudes towards the issue than people who do not have this information.

Knowledge of group-policy links promotes constraint in a similar way. When a group attitude serves as the basis for judging a single issue consistently over time, the result is attitude stability; when a group attitude serves as the basis for judging multiple issues across domains, the result is attitude constraint. We consider someone’s attitudes to be “constrained” if their attitude towards policy issue X correlates with their attitude towards policy issue Y through a common cause. We expect that when people perceive or know two policies to be linked to the same group, they are more likely to hold consistently liberal or conservative positions on those issues.

Constraint between issue attitudes arises naturally from a process in which attitudes towards policies are based on attitudes towards those who support or oppose the policy: attitudes towards policies linked to the same group will be correlated due to their common source. For example, the racialization of both welfare and crime and punishment (e.g. Mendelberg, 2001) would mean that support or opposition to each of these policies is linked to affect towards African-Americans.

Because we expect social group placement knowledge to be widespread in the mass public, we also expect stability and constraint based on social group attitudes to be more pervasive than Converse's analysis would suggest. If people across the spectrum of political sophistication know the issue positions of social groups, this knowledge can serve as a potential source of organization in the belief systems of many in the mass public.

### **1.3 Group Knowledge in a Partisan Context**

Recent work on the structure of belief systems centers largely (although not exclusively) on political parties. This scholarship argues that voters who learn their party's position on an issue adopt that position, creating both stability and constraint (Lenz, 2012; Freeder et al., 2019; Achen and Bartels, 2017). The role we attribute to social groups in this paper mirrors the effect other scholars attribute to party and ideological leaders: when people know how social groups they favor or disfavor stand on an issue, they adopt an attitude towards the issue that aligns with favored groups. We think of following parties and social groups not as competing explanations, but as natural complements, with social groups and partisanship varying in relative importance between individuals and over the political life cycle of an issue.

We expect knowledge about issue-group linkages to be most influential when the parties' positions on an issue are undifferentiated, unclear, or recently taken. For any number of reasons, partisan elites may not send clear signals about where they stand on an issue, and less-politically-attentive people may not receive the signals party leaders do send. However, policies rarely become salient without demanders and beneficiaries. The group memberships of these advocates may be ubiquitous in discussions of a policy, even when party positions are absent. In the time between an issue becoming salient and its partisan implications becoming clear, even the most partisan voters may rely on the issue's group ties in forming attitudes towards it.

For example, in the 1990s, gay marriage became a topic of national political debate, but the positions of the national parties were not immediately clear. However, other visible social groups — most notably, LGBT organizations and conservative Christian organizations — were tightly linked to the issue. We expect that in the 1990s, many Americans did not associate either party with gay marriage, but did know the positions of LGBT people and conservative Christians. Consequently, attitudes towards these social groups should initially play a more central role than party in stability and ideological coherence on this issue. However, after the parties differentiated on the issue and knowledge of those differences diffused among the public, party became increasingly important for shaping attitudes.<sup>6</sup>

Even when parties' positions are clearly broadcast and widely received, knowledge of those positions should matter more for some people than others. Recent work on the growing importance of partisanship suggests that party (and therefore, party positions) should matter most to people

---

<sup>6</sup>Of course, the ability of party leaders to send clear signals on the issue was likely shaped by the group-based positions many of their constituents had already taken.

who are “socially sorted:” that is, people with social group memberships and attitudes that match their party identification (Mason, 2018; Wronski et al., 2021). People who are not sorted are likely to be cross-pressured by their partisan and social group attachments, and therefore should be less likely to rely solely on party position knowledge, even in an era when that knowledge is at a record high (Freeder et al., 2019).

## 2 Analysis and Results

### 2.1 Data and Measures

To test our hypotheses about the role of group position knowledge in public opinion, we rely in part on data from the American National Election Studies (ANES). These data consist of surveys of nationally representative samples of the American public, carried out regularly in election years since the 1950s. In particular, we draw on two sets of studies. The first is the 1972, 1974 and 1976 ANES which includes both a cross-section and panel component. The second is the 1992-1997 panel study, which interviewed combinations of fresh and repeated respondents in 8 waves over these 6 years.<sup>7</sup> We use these studies because they are the only years the ANES includes questions about where people think social groups (e.g., racial groups) stand on political issues, which we use to measure knowledge of social group-policy links.

Because the ANES has not asked respondents to place social groups on policies since the 1997 survey, we supplement these data with a nationally representative cross-section recruited through NORC-Amerispeak in March-April 2021 (N=565) and a two-wave panel of respondents recruited through YouGov in March-April 2021 (N=451 in wave 1; N=347 in wave 2). NORC-Amerispeak maintains a probability-sampled nationally representative panel of respondents, and YouGov’s online panel is a highly-regarded data source for academic surveys (Stoker and McCall, 2017). In these 2021 studies we, as closely as possible, replicate the question wording used on the ANES.<sup>8</sup>

The American National Election Studies asks respondents their positions on a range of political issues each year. They also ask respondents where they believe the Democratic and Republican party stand on issues and, in a handful of years, where they believe social groups like “most black people” and “most white people” stand on various issues. For example, respondents are often asked whether they believe that the “government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living...or if the government should just let each person get ahead on his own.” Respondents are then able to place their own attitudes on a 1-7 scale. On that same 1-7 scale, respondents then rate where they believe “most whites” and “most blacks” would place themselves on that scale, where the Democratic party stands, where the Republican party stands, and so on.

We use these questions to measure respondents’ knowledge about the associations between social groups and political issues. We code a respondent as correctly placing racial groups if

---

<sup>7</sup>The 1970s panel component interviewed 1,320 respondents at least four times during this four-year period. The 1990s panel component had 551 total respondents that completed the final 1997 wave.

<sup>8</sup>Sample demographics and questionnaire wording for the self conducted studies can be found in Section SA.8. YouGov and NORC are weighted using post-stratification weights provided by the firms. Due to concerns of straight-lining, as our surveys include multiple variations on the same question, we drop respondents from our YouGov sample who fail basic attention checks and respondents who straight-lined in our NORC-Amerispeak sample.

they perceive that most whites hold more conservative preferences on the policy than most blacks. (Across each of the policies in our sample, whites do have more conservative preferences than blacks (Brady and Sniderman, 1985, 1064), though we detail two instructive exceptions in our results section.) Likewise, in the case of party (and ideological groups), we code the respondent as correctly placing the parties if the respondent perceives the Republican party (or conservatives) to be more conservative than the Democratic party (or liberals). Respondents who place the parties or racial groups in reverse positions, at the same point, or indicate that they “don’t know,” are labeled as not knowing.<sup>9</sup>

Racial and partisan groups are the only groups asked about in both the 1970s and 1990s, so much of our analysis focuses on knowledge of racial and partisan positions. However, in 1976 the ANES also asks respondents where they believe “most businessmen” and “most poor people” stand on three economic policies; where “most men” and “most women” stood on a question of gender equality; and in 1997, where respondents believe “most Christian Fundamentalists” and “most Gays and Lesbians” on a question of gender equality. As above, we label that someone “knows” the groups’ positions if they place the more conservative group (businessmen, Christian Fundamentalists, men) to the right of the more liberal group (poor people, LGBT people, women) on the group related policy question.

By comparing respondents’ placements of different groups on an issue, we can identify which respondents know that one group supports a policy more than a comparison group does. Though measuring knowledge of relative group support does not capture all the ways in which policies can be linked to particular groups, we expect the measure to capture most respondents who are aware that particular groups demand or benefit from each policy.

The analysis that follows focuses on the role of racial group position knowledge, except where explicitly noted in Section 2.2. Only racial groups are the subject of questions in both the 1970s and 1990s ANES panels, and over-time comparison is important to our analysis. To make sure our contemporary data is comparable with these earlier surveys, our 2021 studies also focus on racial group knowledge.<sup>10</sup> We view race as an especially useful case because racial groups are linked to a range of different policy areas (racial, economic, crime), which is valuable in studying constraint. However, section SA.6 replicates the results for the few analyses that are possible with other social groups (class, gender and culture war issues); the results are consistent with those presented below.

## **2.2 Americans’ Knowledge of Social Group Preferences**

We first document levels of knowledge in the American public about the positions various social groups have on political issues. Using the questions described above, we calculate the percentage of Americans who correctly place social groups—and, for comparison, parties and ideological groups—on a variety of political issues. Figure 1 presents levels of knowledge about the positions of racial groups and parties on all the issues for which placement questions were included on the ANES or our contemporary surveys. We find that many people have a rich knowledge of where


---

<sup>9</sup>Few people place the parties or racial groups on the “wrong sides” of one another. Rather, respondents who do not place the groups on the correct sides (e.g., whites more conservative than blacks) overwhelmingly place them at the same points or simply state that they “don’t know.” See Section SA. 1. We also reproduce results by degree of a respondent’s perceived difference between groups in Section SA.2.6.

<sup>10</sup>We also ran two pilot studies on LUCID and MTurk which included some non-racial questions. Results are similar in these samples and available from the authors upon request.

various social groups stand.

Figure 1: Party and Social Group Position Knowledge



Graph shows the proportion of respondents who correctly place White people to the right of Black people (gray bars), Republicans to the right of Democrats (black bars), conservatives to the right of liberals (blue bars), businessmen to the right of poor people (red bars), men are to the right of women (green bar), and evangelical Christians to the right of LGBT people/feminists (orange bars) for each policy position.

The results in the left-hand panel of Figure 1 are striking. First, in the 1970s, people generally had a weak sense of where the parties stood on policy issues. Even on economic policy, which the parties had clearly differed on since the inception of the modern two-party system, and which consumed much of the political agenda at the time, fewer than 50 percent of respondents perceived Republicans to be less supportive of redistribution than Democrats. On race-related policies, party knowledge falls even lower—despite the Democratic Party clearly emerging as the leftward party on civil rights in the 1960s.<sup>11</sup>

Knowledge of where racial groups stand on various policy issues in the 1970s is much higher.

<sup>11</sup>In the 1970s, otherwise low knowledge respondents held much higher knowledge of where social groups stood, compared to where parties stood. See section SA.1.4.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, people are often successful at identifying where racial groups stand on racial issues. But even on economic issues, respondents in the 1970s had a good sense of where racial groups stood—particularly when compared to their knowledge of party positions. Knowledge of class groups’ positions on economic issues is, as one might expect, even higher than knowledge of racial groups’ positions on these issues. Finally, the proportion placing women to the left of men on the issue of women’s equality far outstrips the proportion placing Democrats to the left of Republicans<sup>12</sup>.

By 1997 respondents had become more knowledgeable about the parties’ positions on racial and economic issues; knowledge of party positions on these issues met or surpassed knowledge of racial group positions, and levels remained similar in 2021. However, 1997 respondents’ knowledge of the parties’ views on gender-related issues lagged slightly behind their knowledge of relevant social groups’ positions, perhaps a sign that parties’ positions on these issues were not yet fully clear.

We take our results as evidence that voters learn which groups support and oppose group-related from their political context. However, Brady and Sniderman (1985) provide an important alternative explanation for this knowledge: a process of projection. The projection account argues that people attribute attitudes that are similar to their own to groups they like and attitudes dissimilar to their own to groups they dislike.<sup>13</sup> For example, a white person who dislikes black people attributes positions to black people that are very unlike the white person’s own positions. Another alternative explanation is that people are simply mapping the party positions onto group-aligned social groups.

To explore these alternative explanations, we included policy questions — general immigration levels and environmental protection — which lacked an obvious connection to racial groups (the environment) or in which black and white respondents actually held similar positions (immigration levels) on our 2021 surveys.<sup>14</sup> Figure 1 shows that the proportion of respondents viewing black people as more liberal than white people on these issues drops substantially. If voters were projecting their own attitudes onto groups they like and dislike, we would not expect this dramatic variation in levels of knowledge between issue areas. And if voters simply translated their knowledge of party positions on to groups regardless of group-policy links, we would expect levels of party and group knowledge to be similar on these non-racial issues. Instead, these patterns fit with our hypothesis that people develop meaningful links between groups and the policies they demand or benefit from.<sup>15</sup>

Taken together, these results suggest that knowledge about the social groups that support and oppose important political issues is common in the American public. At least half of respondents are able to place social groups correctly on any given social-group related issue—a proportion that is largely unchanged over the past 50 years. Americans’ ability to place parties on issues, however, has grown quickly over this time period. While group placement knowledge used to be far more common than party placement knowledge on many issues, both are now about equally common: even on explicitly race-related policies like government assistance to minority groups, knowledge

---

<sup>12</sup>in 1976, partisan divides on gender-related issues were relatively small, and the parties had not yet sent clear signals about their positions.

<sup>13</sup>That is, the opposite of our account.

<sup>14</sup>We phrased the question in general levels of immigration (no reference to documented/undocumented immigration). A follow up study might investigate using Latino-White position knowledge on this issue.

<sup>15</sup>For further discussion of this alternative explanation, see Section SA.2.7.



of parties' positions is as high or higher than knowledge of racial groups' positions.

## 2.3 Social Group Knowledge Generates Attitude Stability

We next turn to the topic of attitude stability. The results in the previous section suggest that many voters know which groups support and oppose important policy issues. For these people, we argue, group attitudes can serve as a consistent basis for evaluation of an issue, leading to stable preferences over time.<sup>16</sup> This section tests the prediction that people who know an issue's supporters and opponents have more stable attitudes towards the issue.

We test this proposition using data from the 1972-1974-1976 ANES panel, the 1992-1997 ANES panel<sup>17</sup>, and a two-wave panel of respondents recruited on YouGov in Spring 2021. To measure attitude stability for each respondent, we take the standard deviation of each person's responses to an issue question across each of the three survey waves (two waves for YouGov). For ease of interpretation, we multiply this number by 100. People who have stable attitudes will have scores closer to 0, while people who have less stable attitudes will have higher scores.<sup>18</sup> We re-scale all policy variables to range from 0-1.

We compare levels of issue attitude stability between respondents who do and do not place the racial groups correctly on each issue. The left-hand panel of Figure 2 shows that people who know where the social groups stand on issues have more stable attitudes, albeit to varying degrees, across each question in the 1970s and 1990s surveys.<sup>19</sup> By 2021, however, this relationship has weakened.

The first line of the right-hand panel of Figure 2 then presents precision-weighted averages, across all issues, of the difference in attitude stability between respondents who do and do not know the groups' positions on each issue. For example, the top black point in the right-hand panel represents the average difference in attitude instability between those that know and do not know the social groups' policy views across all the issues in the 1970s panel (this equals the average difference between each of the pairs of black points in the left-hand panel). By 2021, people who can accurately place social groups do not have appreciably more stable attitudes than those who cannot. However, in the earlier two periods, people who know the groups' positions have more stable attitudes than those who do not. This pattern is consistent with our argument that knowledge of social group positions produces stability in issue attitudes.

The remaining rows of Figure 2's right panel test three alternative explanations for higher stability among people who know where racial groups stand. All three relate to the notion that people who know where racial groups stand are more likely to know more about other aspects of politics as well. First, it could be that knowledge of party positions explains the association between group knowledge and stability. People who know where the parties stand on important issues tend to share their party's positions, and these positions tend to be stable (Freeder et al., 2019; Lenz,

---


<sup>16</sup>Converse, and decades of research that followed, find that voters when asked the same question at different points in time, tend to give different answers. However, research shows that predispositions towards social groups (e.g., religion, race) tend to be more stable than specific policy attitudes (Converse, 1964; Sears and Funk, 1999; Tesler, 2014).

<sup>17</sup>The group knowledge questions are included in the 1997 pilot study, which then can be linked to the 1992-1994-1996 panel.

<sup>18</sup>For alternative measurement strategies, see Section SA. 3.3. Results are consistent.

<sup>19</sup>Figure SA.3.4 breaks down respondents who place groups at same point (or don't know), and those that place blacks as more conservative. Few respondents fall into the latter category and the results are robust.

Figure 2: **Attitude Instability by Knowledge of Social Group Policy Views**



**Left Panel:** Lower values represent more stable attitudes over time. Point estimates represent the average standard deviation of a respondent's attitudes across survey waves. Closed circles include respondents who know the racial social group's position; open circles represent those who do not know the social group's position. **Right Panel:** Each coefficient represents the average difference in stability between respondents who know and do not know the social groups' policy views. For example, the top black point in the right hand panel represents the average difference (precision weighted) of each set of black circles in the left-hand-panel.

2012). Knowledge about the parties' positions, if correlated with knowledge of groups' positions, could explain the levels of stability among those with high social group knowledge. If the effect of group knowledge on issue attitudes were reducible to party knowledge, group knowledge would have no effect among people who do not know where the parties stand.<sup>20</sup>

To test this alternative explanation, we divide respondents into groups based on whether they know the parties' positions on each issue. For both groups, we then plot the relationship between group placement knowledge and attitude stability in the second and third lines of Figure 2. In each year, respondents who do and do not know the parties' positions look similar: within both groups, respondents who know which social groups support a policy have more stable attitudes than those who do not. Knowledge of party positions cannot fully explain the relationship between group knowledge and issue stability.

A related possibility is that people know that African-Americans are allied with the Democratic

<sup>20</sup>Party and groups are tightly interlinked (see section 4). We separate the effect of group and party to emphasize group knowledge is not reducible to party given the prominence of party cues in the literature.

party and whites tend toward the Republican party. This knowledge could link racial attitudes to issue attitudes through the intermediate step of party.<sup>21</sup> The 1997 ANES and our 2021 YouGov survey contain questions that allow us to measure whether respondents know which social groups are aligned with which party<sup>22</sup>. Lines 4 and 5 of Figure 2 compare results among respondents who do and do not know which parties the social groups in question support. In 2021, the effect of social group knowledge on stability is similar in both groups. In 1997, the relationship is stronger among people who do not know the group-party alignments—the opposite of what we would expect if group-party alignment knowledge explained the effect of social group position knowledge. These results suggest that knowledge of social groups’ party alignments is not responsible for the relationship between group-policy knowledge and stable attitudes.

A third alternative explanation is that the effect of social group knowledge is reducible to the effect of general knowledge: that is, people who know where the racial groups stand simply know more about politics and are therefore more likely to have stable attitudes (Ansolabehere et al. (2008)). To test this, we split the sample into three groups based on how the ANES interviewer judged each respondent’s overall political knowledge: above average, average, or below average.<sup>23</sup> Lines 6-8 divide respondents by their level of interviewer-rated political knowledge. Across all three levels, respondents who know the groups’ positions have more stable attitudes than those who do not. Again, other forms of political knowledge cannot explain the relationship between social group knowledge and attitude stability.

Next, we investigate the possibility of change over time in the relative importance of knowledge of group and party positions in attitude stability. As discussed above, partisanship has grown stronger over the period from our earliest data to our most recent; we therefore compare the relationship between attitude stability, party placement knowledge and group placement knowledge over time. To do this, we first create an index measure of stability by averaging the stability measure across all issues for each respondent and, as in the earlier results, multiply this value by 100. We regress this stability measure on the percent of policies on which respondents place groups correctly, the percent of policies on which they place the parties correctly, and then both. We expect that as voters are able to correctly place parties and groups on more policies, the standard deviations in their attitudes over time will decrease—that is, they will hold more stable attitudes.

Table 1 shows the relationship between attitude stability and moving from correctly placing no groups on policy issues to correctly placing 100 percent. In all bi-variate models, group and party position knowledge predict more stable attitudes.<sup>24</sup>

When the two types of knowledge are pitted against one another, in the 1970s and 1990s panels, we find that social group knowledge is a much stronger predictor of attitude stability than is party knowledge. This is striking: for decades after Converse wrote, social groups generated stable preferences more than partisan knowledge. By 2021, however, it appears that the effect of party knowledge dominates. As party has generally become more influential in Americans’ political behavior, its power to structure issue attitudes has grown.

---

<sup>21</sup>This view aligns with recent scholarship on affective polarization that argues knowledge of group-party alignment drives partisan attachment (Wronski et al., 2021), which may then feed back into more stable attitudes.

<sup>22</sup>Knowledge of social group-partisan alignment is lower than knowledge of where those same social groups stand on group-relevant policy issues.

<sup>23</sup>Knowledge in the 2021 YouGov survey is measured using a battery of factual political knowledge questions.

<sup>24</sup>Results are robust once controlling for demographic characteristics. See Section SA.3.1.

Table 1: Attitude Stability: Comparing Social Group Knowledge and Partisan Cues

|                       | 1972-74-76 ANES   |                   |                   | 1992-94-96 ANES   |                   |                   | YOUNG 2021        |                   |                   |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                       | (1)               | (2)               | (3)               | (4)               | (5)               | (6)               | (7)               | (8)               | (9)               |
| % Place Race Correct  | -3.23**<br>(0.62) |                   | -2.81**<br>(0.68) | -5.97**<br>(1.28) |                   | -4.74**<br>(1.46) | -2.61**<br>(1.24) |                   | -0.01<br>(1.26)   |
| % Place Party Correct |                   | -1.76**<br>(0.57) | -0.91<br>(0.61)   |                   | -4.63**<br>(1.28) | -2.32<br>(1.45)   |                   | -8.71**<br>(1.38) | -8.70**<br>(1.47) |
| Constant              | 17.28**<br>(0.45) | 16.09**<br>(0.35) | 17.47**<br>(0.47) | 15.99**<br>(0.93) | 15.42**<br>(1.00) | 16.78**<br>(1.08) | 10.62**<br>(1.01) | 16.17**<br>(1.25) | 16.17**<br>(1.35) |
| <i>N</i>              | 1780              | 1779              | 1773              | 323               | 323               | 322               | 347               | 347               | 347               |

Standard errors in parentheses

Avg. Standard Deviation 1970s x 100 = 15; Avg Standard Deviation 1990s x 100 = 12; Avg Standard Deviation 2021 x 100 = 9

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$

The outcome is the average standard deviation of a respondent's attitudes across each issue (measured at different points in time) multiplied by 100. A value of zero means that a respondent gave the same answer to policy X in each survey wave. Lower values equal more over-time stability. % Place Race Correct is scaled 0-1 and represents the percent of times a respondent correctly places white people to the right of black people across each policy.

## 2.4 Social Group Knowledge Generates Ideological Constraint

We next turn to ideological constraint. If, as we argue, people form policy attitudes based on their attitudes towards the groups that demand or benefit from the policy, constraint should arise naturally among attitudes towards issues that relate to the same group. That is, if a social group (e.g., African Americans, Evangelical Christians, feminists) is associated with multiple issues, attitudes towards those issues ought to be related due to their shared group basis. However, we expect this to happen only, or much more strongly, among people who are aware of the group-issue associations.


We expect that people who link a set of social groups to multiple group-related policies will show more ideological constraint between attitudes towards those policies. We test this prediction in the case of racial groups. Racial groups are an important source of structure across multiple issue domains in American public opinion, and as a consequence, we have the most data available for racial issues.<sup>25</sup> For these analyses, we use data from the 1970s and 1990s ANES panels, as well as our 2021 YouGov and NORC studies.

The left panel of Figure 3 shows constraint between each possible pair of issues (listed on the y-axis) for respondents who do and do not know where the social groups stand on both issues. We measure constraint by taking the standard deviation between each set of issue pairs. People with more constraint — that is people who consistently express liberal or conservative positions across issues — have lower standard deviations between issue pairs. Across each issue, people who know where social groups stand show more constraint between issue attitudes than those who do not.

As in our analysis of stability, the right-hand panel of Figure 3 pools the issues together into precision-weighted averages of the relationship between group position knowledge and constraint

<sup>25</sup>Results for other groups are available in Section SA.6. Similar results persist. We also conducted a small experiment in which we told people about a group-policy association and checked whether this increased constraint. A pilot suggested a modest increase in constraint, but in a replication using the NORC sample, our treatment failed to manipulate perceptions of group-policy associations.

Figure 3: Ideological Constraint by Knowledge of Social Group Policy Views



**Left Panel:** Each set of points are the standard deviation between the issue pairs listed down the left column. Lower standard deviations represent more constraint between issue pairs. Closed circles represent the standard deviation between the issue pairs for people who know the racial group positions on those issues. Open circles are those that do not know both racial group positions. As group knowledge increases, people show more constraint (lower standard deviations) between issue attitudes. **Right Panel:** Each coefficient represents the average (weighted) difference in constraint between respondents who know and do not know the social groups' policy views. For example, the top black point represents the average difference between the knowers and don't knowers in 1972 (each of which are shown in the left panel).

across all issue pairs and explores several alternative explanations for these trends. Negative coefficients mean group-knowledge increases constraint (lowers the standard deviation).

This first line of the right-hand panel of Figure 3 suggests that in all years, people who know where the groups stand on issues have more constrained attitudes. It could be that many people who know where groups stand on issues also know where parties stand, and this party position knowledge explains their constraint. Yet the effect of group knowledge persists among both respondents who know and do not know the party positions (see lines 2 and 3). Indeed, in three of the four data points, group knowledge is a more powerful predictor of constraint among people who lack knowledge of party positions.

Lines 4 and 5 explore a related explanation: people may know how social groups align with parties. Group knowledge may then simply be reducible to people linking parties and groups. However, the results suggest the effect of group knowledge is similar among those who do and do not know which groups stand with which party. Finally, it could be that group knowledge is reducible to more general political knowledge. Lines 6-8 break down results by general political knowledge. With the exception of the lowest-knowledge group in 2021, the effect of constraint is similar across all knowledge groups. Respondents across all levels of political knowledge have more constrained attitudes when they know where groups stand.

Building on this final result, we want to emphasize a core point. Other scholarship suggests that more politically knowledgeable people have more constrained attitudes (Barber and Pope, 2018; Ansolabehere et al., 2008). Our results align with this finding. However, below-average knowledge respondents who accurately place social groups have levels of constraint that approach those of above-average knowledge respondents; below-average knowledge respondents who cannot place the social groups have little appreciable constraint at all. At least in these cases, knowledge of racial group positions allows low-knowledge respondents to display a level of constraint similar to that of their high-knowledge peers. See Section SA.4.3.

Finally, as in the case of stability, we examine the effect of party placement knowledge and social group placement knowledge over time. We create an average individual measure of constraint by measuring the standard deviation across all of each respondent's positions on race-related issues in a given year (each question is on a 1-7 scale, recoded to range from 0 to 1). Voters who have high levels of ideological constraint (e.g., express consistently liberal positions across issues) have a standard deviation closer to 0, while respondents who have less constraint have a higher standard deviation between answers. We again multiply the standard deviations by 100 for ease of interpretation. For example, in 1997, we took the standard deviation of a respondent's answers across three policy questions: liberal-conservative placement, aid to minorities and government services and spending. The average standard deviation was .17 in 1997.

Using this measure, we then compare respondents' levels of constraint based on the percentage of times they correctly place the parties and social groups across policies. We expect that as people are able to correctly place groups on more issues, the standard deviation between a respondent's policy attitudes will decrease (that is, constraint between attitudes will grow).

Table 2 shows the effect of moving from correctly placing no groups on policy issues to correctly placing 100 percent.<sup>26</sup> In the 1970s, knowledge of party and group positions both predict constraint. However, when both are pitted against each other, the effect of racial group knowledge is twice as large. By 1997, party knowledge becomes more predictive of constraint in both relative and absolute terms. Indeed, when included in the same model, the effect of party is about 4 times that of knowing racial positions in 1997 (column 6). This pattern then persists in the 2021 sample, with the party knowledge similarly dominant over group knowledge when pitted against each other. As was the case in our analysis of stability, group knowledge was the strongest predictor of constraint in the 1970s, but the relative importance of party knowledge has grown over time.

---

<sup>26</sup>Results are robust when controlling for demographic characteristics. See Section SA.4.1.

Table 2: Individual Constraint: Comparing Social Group Knowledge and Partisan Cues

|                       | 1970s Pooled ANES |                   |                   | 1997 ANES         |                   |                   | 2021 YOUNGOV/NORC |                   |                   |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                       | (1)               | (2)               | (3)               | (4)               | (5)               | (6)               | (7)               | (8)               | (9)               |
| % Place Race Correct  | -8.60**<br>(0.68) |                   | -7.23**<br>(0.72) | -4.06**<br>(1.52) |                   | -1.70<br>(1.62)   | -3.15**<br>(1.35) |                   | -1.56<br>(1.40)   |
| % Place Party Correct |                   | -6.32**<br>(0.68) | -3.79**<br>(0.72) |                   | -7.52**<br>(1.52) | -6.84**<br>(1.65) |                   | -6.46**<br>(1.46) | -5.96**<br>(1.52) |
| Constant              | 31.29**<br>(0.48) | 28.63**<br>(0.38) | 32.09**<br>(0.50) | 19.94**<br>(1.11) | 22.77**<br>(1.21) | 23.37**<br>(1.35) | 21.33**<br>(0.91) | 24.88**<br>(1.30) | 25.39**<br>(1.37) |
| <i>N</i>              | 3969              | 4018              | 3968              | 503               | 503               | 502               | 967               | 967               | 967               |

Standard errors in parentheses

Avg Stndrd Deviation 1970s x 100 = 26; Avg Stndrd Deviation 1997 x 100 = 17; Avg Stndrd Deviation 2021 x 100 = 19

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$

The dependent variable is the standard deviation across each respondent's answers, multiplied by 100 (for the sake of interpreting the coefficients). A value of 0 means that a respondent gives the exact same response across each question asked. Higher values mean the respondent gives more varied answers across policy questions. The 1970s pooled data includes year fixed effects.

### 3 Mechanism: Social Group Knowledge & Belief Systems

#### 3.1 Social Group Knowledge Shapes Issue Attitudes

We have demonstrated that many Americans know the social groups that support important policies and that this generates attitude stability and constraint. A key intermediate step in our account is that knowledge about which social groups support a policy links social group attitudes to policy attitudes: for knowledge about these group-policy linkages to produce stability within and constraint among issue attitudes, voters must use this knowledge to form attitudes towards those issues.

This section tests whether knowing where social groups stand on an issue leads people to form issue attitudes related to their attitudes towards social groups. We expect, for example, that when someone perceives that black people support economic redistribution more than white people, their racial attitudes will affect their attitude towards economic redistribution. A similar association ought *not* exist among people who are not aware that black people are more supportive of economic redistribution.


Consistent with expectations, Figure 4 suggests that knowledge of group-policy linkages moderates the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes. To illustrate this relationship, the left panel presents the relationship between placement knowledge, group attitudes, and issue attitudes for an especially stark issue: the government guarantee of jobs.

The top-left panel shows that among people who do not know that blacks are more supportive of economic redistribution than whites, racial conservatives and racial liberals have effectively the same attitudes on government-guaranteed jobs. The flat red trend-line going from left to right represents this pattern. However, the bottom-left panel shows that racial conservatives and liberals who *do* perceive differences between racial groups are much more polarized on this question. The positive slope (red line) going from left-to right reflects this. That is, people who express warmer feelings towards whites than blacks are more conservative on a government guarantee of jobs, but

only if they perceive that policy to be supported by more blacks than whites.

We are interested in the difference in the slope between the bottom and top panel. When the difference is positive and significant, the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes is stronger among those who can accurately place the groups than among those who cannot. The right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the difference in slopes for all issues on each survey. In nearly every case, the coefficients in the right-hand panel of Figure 4 are positive and significant: group attitudes and policy attitudes are more strongly linked among people who know where the relevant groups stand on the policy.<sup>27</sup>

Figure 4: Issue Attitudes by Respondents Who Know & DK Social Group Policy Views



**Left Panel:** The x-axis is difference between ratings of black and white people on a feeling thermometer. Higher values represent warmer feelings towards whites. The y-axis measures attitudes towards government guaranteed jobs. Higher values equal more conservative attitudes. A positive slope means that people who have more positive feelings towards whites compared to blacks, corresponds with holding more conservative economic attitudes. (Data from 1972 ANES). **Right Panel:** The right panel presents difference in slope between those that know and do not know social group policy views. Positive coefficients mean the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes is stronger for issues on which a respondent can accurately place the social groups than for issues on which they cannot. For example, the second-to-bottom point (on “Gov’t Jobs”), represents the difference in red slope lines between the top and bottom left-hand panel.


This empirical pattern is consistent with our theory. However, as discussed in the sections on stability and constraint, other factors may explain our results. For ease of comparison (and as we do in the previous sections), we pool together all issues for each year and calculate the precision-weighted average difference in slopes across all issues between respondents who associate groups with a policy and those who do not. The first row of Figure 5 presents the results of Figure 4, collapsed into precision-weighted averages by year. The remaining rows of Figure 5 test alternative

<sup>27</sup>Although we include binary “know” and “don’t know,” one might think that larger perceived differences between groups will generate a larger effect. Results are consistent with this expectation. See Section SA.2.6.



explanations for this relationship beyond the effect of social group knowledge (as done in previous sections).

**Figure 5: Alternative Explanations for difference in Issue Attitudes, Group Affect and Social Group Policy Views**



This figure explores alternative explanations for Fig. 4; line 1 shows the average by year of all points in the right-hand panel of Fig. 4. Each point represents the difference in the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes between respondents who know and do not know group policy views, averaged across issues. Positive coefficients mean the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes is stronger for respondents who can accurately place the social groups than for those who cannot.

As in previous sections, other forms of knowledge cannot account for the role of social group knowledge. The relationship between knowledge of social group positions and impact of group attitudes on issue attitudes is similar in all comparisons: people who do and do not know where the parties stand on issues (lines 2-3), people who do and do not know which parties groups align with (lines 4-5), and people at all levels of political knowledge<sup>28</sup> (lines 6-8), with the exception of the lowest knowledge category in 2021<sup>29</sup>.

The results presented in this section accord with the common finding that attitudes towards policies reflect attitudes towards the groups associated with them. However, they suggest that this well-established pattern primarily—and for some issues, only—exists among people who know where the social groups stand on the issue in question.

<sup>28</sup>For the 2021 YouGov sample, as before, this was determined by factual questions about government/politics.

<sup>29</sup>Section SA. 2.2 repeats this model with individual fixed effects, and the results are robust to this specification.

## 4 What Explains Change over Time? Social Groups, Affective Polarization, and Partisan Sorting

The previous sections show that since the 1970s, the importance of party placement knowledge has grown and the influence of group knowledge has declined in structuring constraint and stability. Does this mean group attitudes matter less to belief systems now than they did in the 1970s? Perhaps not: a large literature points to the centrality of groups to party identification and the recent increase in party's influence on political attitudes (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2019; Achen and Bartels, 2017; Mason, 2018). This section explores the possibility that the overlap of group attitudes with partisanship drives the increasing importance of party knowledge.

One explanation for why party position knowledge has become more influential is the growth of affective polarization: over the past 40 years, people have come to like their own party more and (especially) the other party less (see Iyengar et al. (2019) for a review). This strengthened affect towards the parties could increase the importance of party cues as people become more biased towards their ingroup (their own party) and hostile towards the outgroup (the opposing party; see Tajfel and Turner (1979)).

While scholars present multiple explanations for affective polarization's growth, a prominent literature argues it is the result of increasing alignment between party and other social identities like race or religion (Wronski et al., 2021; Mason, 2018). As the parties have become socially sorted, such that racial, religious and ideological identities all align with party identification, this strengthens people's attachment to their party and fuels partisan identity as a social identity. Likewise, as social out-groups increasingly align with the opposing party, this similarly fuels antipathy towards the out-party (Wronski et al., 2021).

If party identity increases in importance as party identification aligns with group memberships and group affect, knowledge of party positions should be most important to belief systems among people who like groups in their party's coalition and dislike those in the other party's. People whose party membership is misaligned with their affect towards groups in the party's coalition (e.g., a white Southern Democrat in the 1970s), however, might be less attached to their party as they are pulled in different directions by the positions of the groups and parties they prefer. These non-sorted people therefore should be less likely to structure their belief systems around party positions.

This pattern would explain why knowledge of party positions has grown more influential on stability and constraint over time. Literature on party sorting suggests that over time, more people have developed party identifications that match their affect towards or identity with party-aligned social groups; that is, more people have party-sorted group attitudes. If people with party-sorted group attitudes are more likely to organize their beliefs using party cues than people with non-sorted attitudes are, party position knowledge could be growing more important because the sorted people are now a larger portion of the electorate.

We test this expectation using data on whether people's affect towards racial groups are sorted to align with their partisanship and then test the relative effect of racial group knowledge versus party knowledge. Because black people are considered a part of the Democratic Party's coalition, we code a Democrat who feels more warmly towards black people than a reference racial group (here, white people) as having group attitudes that are "sorted" with their party (as before, we measure affect using racial feeling thermometers). Analogously, a Republican who feels more

warmly towards white people than black people is also “sorted.” “Non-sorted” respondents are those with the opposite pattern. Respondents who feel equally warmly towards both groups are excluded, as are pure independents (as they cannot be classified as sorted or non-sorted).

We then test the relationship between group and party placement knowledge on stability and constraint, now separating respondents into the sorted and non-sorted groups described above. Table 3 presents regressions of attitude stability (columns 1-6) and attitude constraint (columns 7-12) on respondents’ knowledge of racial groups’ and parties’ positions. Constraint and stability are measured, as in previous sections, using the standard deviation of attitudes across issues (constraint) and over time (stability). Negative coefficients suggest that knowledge decreases a respondent’s standard deviation—that is, negative coefficients indicate increased stability and constraint.

Table 3: Average Effect of Knowledge by Alignment of Racial Affect & Partisanship

|                       | STABILITY         |                   |                   |                    |                    |                   | CONSTRAINT        |                    |                    |                    |                   |                    |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                       | 1970              |                   | 1997              |                    | 2021               |                   | 1970              |                    | 1997               |                    | 2021              |                    |
|                       | Sorted<br>(1)     | Not Sorted<br>(2) | Sorted<br>(3)     | Not Sorted<br>(4)  | Sorted<br>(5)      | Not Sorted<br>(6) | Sorted<br>(7)     | Not Sorted<br>(8)  | Sorted<br>(9)      | Not Sorted<br>(10) | Sorted<br>(11)    | Not Sorted<br>(12) |
| % Place Race Correct  | -2.15<br>(1.42)   | -4.57**<br>(1.23) | -2.22<br>(4.00)   | -11.29**<br>(4.31) | 0.87<br>(2.08)     | -6.82**<br>(3.35) | -4.15**<br>(1.40) | -12.55**<br>(1.48) | -1.70<br>(4.73)    | -4.03<br>(4.86)    | -5.42**<br>(2.42) | 0.04<br>(3.29)     |
| % Place Party Correct | -0.99<br>(1.21)   | -1.01<br>(1.16)   | -5.69<br>(4.00)   | -0.67<br>(3.65)    | -16.07**<br>(2.16) | -6.05*<br>(3.36)  | -8.13**<br>(1.33) | 0.79<br>(1.49)     | -10.40**<br>(4.25) | -2.10<br>(4.79)    | -5.70**<br>(2.60) | -5.40<br>(3.46)    |
| Constant              | 17.55**<br>(0.99) | 18.96**<br>(0.89) | 17.33**<br>(3.12) | 20.92**<br>(2.49)  | 22.54**<br>(2.00)  | 19.55**<br>(3.13) | 29.26**<br>(1.18) | 31.54**<br>(1.23)  | 26.73**<br>(3.58)  | 26.05**<br>(4.06)  | 27.17**<br>(2.46) | 25.77**<br>(3.29)  |
| Observations          | 440               | 398               | 63                | 47                 | 164                | 76                | 1,106             | 1,013              | 92                 | 68                 | 357               | 155                |

Note:

Standard errors in parentheses; \* $p < .01$ ; \*\* $p < .05$

Negative values represent more stability and constraint. Sorted respondents are those who feel more warmly to the party aligned racial group (e.g., Republican who feels more warmly towards whites than blacks). Not sorted respondents are those who feel more warmly to out-party racial group (e.g., Democrat who feels more warmly towards whites than blacks; this would describe many mid-century white Southern Democrats).

Dependent variable is standard deviation to battery of policy questions asked in the previous sections. “% Place Race” equals percent of times respondents correctly place whites to the right of blacks on each policy. “% Place Party” equals percent of times respondents correctly place Republicans to the right of Democrats on each policy.

The results are broadly consistent with our predictions: for both constraint and stability, the effect of party knowledge is larger among subjects whose racial affect aligns with their party membership. However, in most cases, the effect of party is negligible when affect towards the racial group and party are unaligned. For subjects whose racial affect and partisan affiliation are out of line, the effect of racial groups is often stronger. For subjects whose racial affect and partisan affiliation are aligned, the effect of party is stronger<sup>30</sup>.

To contextualize these results, consider a conservative white Southern Democrat in the 1970s who feels warmer towards white people than black people, though their party has taken clear stances favoring civil rights. Their attitudes are more likely to be shaped by knowledge of how policies bear on racial groups for whom they have deep-seated predispositions, rather than by a party that although they are a member of, advocates for policies of the racial out-group. Conversely, and consistent with literature on party attachment, a white conservative Republican may

<sup>30</sup>In the Supplemental Appendix, we perform a similar analysis using a different way of capturing strengthening partisan identity: our 2021 YouGov survey asked respondents how important party was to their identity. People who said party was less important to them, were more likely to use social groups to structure stability and constraint (and vice versa who among people who said party was important to their identity). See Section SA.5.1.

be especially sensitive to cues from a party that aligns with their group membership (e.g., Mason, 2018).

These findings suggest the increasing importance of party position knowledge to belief systems is due, at least in part, to the growing alignment between partisanship and group attitudes. Because party position knowledge seems to be more important to sorted respondents than non-sorted ones, party position knowledge has a larger role in public opinion as the proportion of people with party-sorted group attitudes increases.

The patterns shown here align with the broader view that the sorting of partisans along group-based lines is responsible for the growing importance of partisanship to Americans' political attitudes. In this view, the strength of partisanship is not a sign that group memberships, attitudes, and knowledge matter less, but that they matter differently: group attitudes structure public opinion by strengthening the effects of partisan attachment.<sup>31</sup>

## 5 Discussion & Conclusion

We show that knowledge about which social groups support or oppose policies is central for forming durable political attitudes and constraint in the mass public. First, many people are knowledgeable about the types of social groups that support or oppose policies. This knowledge has historically exceeded knowledge of where parties or ideological groups stand on those same issues. Next, we show that knowledge of group-policy linkages creates attitudes that are more stable and constrained. People who know that different policies affect the same group are more likely to organize their attitudes into liberal and conservative packages and hold more durable attitudes over time. However, these “ideological” positions are organized based on group attitudes rather than liberal and conservative ideological beliefs.

However, our results suggest that the role of party in generating attitude stability and constraint has increased over the course of our three time periods, while the relative importance of social groups has declined. What explains the over-time shift? Our analysis suggests that party cues are especially strong for respondents that are socially sorted — that is, people who feel warmly to racial groups aligned with their party — and weakest for those whose racial identity is out-of-line with party. As party and group membership have come increasingly sorted in recent decades (e.g., Mason, 2018), and attachment to party increases, party position knowledge has become more important. Groups still matter to belief systems, but they largely seem to work through parties.

These findings build on a rich literature on how group attitudes affect policy attitudes. Political science has long argued that people think about politics in terms of groups. This paper provides simple descriptive evidence on an idea implicit in this research: people know what social groups go with what policies, even if they lack more formal political knowledge. In addition, while a large literature shows that people develop attitudes based on predispositions towards groups (Conover and Feldman, 1984; Sears et al., 1979), we show that much of this relationship is concentrated among people who know or link groups with certain policies.

These findings speak to core questions of democratic accountability. Scholars have long been

---

<sup>31</sup>We run a similar analysis using a feeling thermometer towards Democrats/Republicans and Liberals/Conservatives. “Not sorted” respondents (e.g., Democrat identifier who feels more warmly to Republicans) rely on group cues more heavily. We also find that groups are particularly strong when a person disagrees with their party; party cues are more important when a respondent agrees with their party. See Section SA.5 for analysis.

concerned that Americans do not have the political knowledge they need to make informed choices. If political conflict is fundamentally about competition between group interests, however, knowledge about groups' interests is key to understanding politics. Our results suggest many people possess this knowledge: most Americans have a good idea of where salient social groups stand on issues. This suggests people possess the knowledge they need to understand politics, a rosier picture for democratic accountability than much of the literature on political knowledge would suggest.

Though our theory applies to any group seen to demand or benefit from a policy, data availability largely limits our evidence to analysis of race-related issues. These are particularly important cases given the centrality of racial groups to the modern American party system (Schickler, 2016).<sup>32</sup> Extending these analyses more fully to other social groups and issue areas is an important area for future work. Additionally, the questions here did not include an issue areas on which parties' positions were unclear. Future work on issues not yet subsumed by party may better elucidate the role of social group knowledge in nonpartisan issues in a hyperpartisan time.

In contrast with prior work, the results presented here suggest that even Americans who are unaware of parties' and ideological groups' positions can hold stable and constrained issue attitudes. Group knowledge is a powerful informational resource that allows its bearers to better engage in politics. The next chapter turns to another resource that encourages engagement with politics: the belief that one's actions can bring about desired outcomes. As in this chapter, understanding the distribution of this resource sheds light on longstanding inequalities in political engagement.

---

<sup>32</sup>Section SA.6 replicates our findings with limited data on class-based social groups and economic policies, and groups at the core of the culture wars (Christian Fundamentalists and LGBT people). Results are consistent for other groups, too.

## Chapter 2

### Psychological Power in Political Life

*Why do some people participate in politics more often than others? Conventional accounts emphasize skills and resources that enable participation. I draw on literature in social psychology to suggest a different, but complementary explanation: people who feel more powerful are more likely to participate in politics. Over the course of the lifespan, people with a greater sense of control over their life vote, contact their representatives, and donate to politicians at higher rates. These findings contribute to our understanding of unequal rates of political participation. The wealthy and educated may participate more in part because they feel more powerful; people with more limited resources who participate nonetheless may do so in part because they possess a compensating sense of power.*

## Introduction

Power is a natural topic of inquiry for political scientists: canonical definitions of political science, and of politics itself, place power at the center of what we study (Weber 1919; or see Goodin and Klingemann 1996 for a review). Accordingly, great and growing literatures explore how entities like states, institutions, and parties pursue and maintain power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Aldrich, 1995). Other work focuses on individuals—leaders, or would-be leaders—as they seek to amass influence in political systems (Neustadt, 1960; Sniderman, 1975).

Political elites are not the only people who know or care how much power they have. By virtue of our position in our workplaces, families, social groups, and societies, each of us has capacities and limitations that shape our level of influence over outcomes we care about. Literature on this “personal sense of power” (Anderson et al., 2012) suggests that in general, people have beliefs about their level of influence and that these beliefs have far-reaching implications for their thoughts and behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). I define these beliefs about one’s level of influence over outcomes across life domains as *psychological power*.

Psychologically powerful people believe they are able to affect what happens in their life. I argue that this belief has political consequences: relative to people who feel powerless, people who feel powerful participate more in civic life, feel more politically efficacious, and engage in more political activity. Decades of research on related constructs suggests that these participatory consequences could be the tip of the iceberg. When people feel powerful, they focus more on their own interests, pursue their goals more tenaciously, and experience more positive emotions, to name a few of power’s many effects with implications for political behavior.

This paper presents evidence that psychological power leads to political efficacy, civic participation, and political action. I first introduce the concept of psychological power and present definitions of an individual’s sense of power both as a stable trait and as a temporary psychological state. Then, using data from three surveys, I demonstrate that people who feel more powerful participate in politics and civic life at higher rates. Two long-term panel studies suggest that levels of psychological power in adolescence predict political efficacy and participation in adulthood, and that feelings of power in youth predict changes in participation later on. The size of the association between power and participation is substantial compared to that of important skill- and resource-related demographic variables and does not disappear when these variables are accounted for.

While the results presented here focus on how often and why people who feel powerful participate in politics, they also invite future research into the potentially wide-reaching role of psychological power in political behavior. Studying psychological power broadens the traditional focus on political efficacy, or beliefs about control over political outcomes, to beliefs about control over outcomes more generally. This broader focus has three advantages. First, since general power-related beliefs develop early in life, we can better understand the roots of orientations towards politics. Second, since psychological power can be affected by many life events, we can better understand the implications of nonpolitical life for political outcomes. Third, while work on political efficacy is centered on participatory outcomes, psychological power has implications for many outcomes across political thought and behavior.

# 1 What is psychological power?

Psychological power is the extent to which an individual believes they can control outcomes across domains of their life. That is, someone who feels powerless<sup>1</sup> thinks that their actions cannot change the things that are important to them; someone who feels powerful sees themselves as in control of what happens in their life. These beliefs about control are entirely subjective. A roulette player may believe their betting strategy will guarantee them winning money, when in fact the outcome is purely random; a discouraged student may believe their grades will not improve no matter how hard they try, when in fact more studying would lead to higher scores. As I discuss further below, in terms of psychological and behavioral consequences, the subjective sense of power matters beyond (and perhaps even more than) one’s objective level of control.

Psychologists have long studied a family of control-related beliefs that includes the concept I focus on here. Psychological power as I define it consists of beliefs about an “agent-ends” relationship—in particular, beliefs about the causal link between oneself (the agent) and outcomes in one’s life (the ends) (Skinner, 1996)<sup>2</sup>. This places psychological power in close kinship with two other constructs: locus of control and self-efficacy. Locus of control is a set of beliefs about a means-ends relationship: on what factors (the means) is some set of outcomes (the ends) contingent? For example, generalized locus of control concerns beliefs about whether outcomes in one’s life depend on chance, on powerful others, or on one’s own actions. Self-efficacy, on the other hand, concerns the relationship between agents and means: generalized self efficacy asks to what extent I (the agent) am capable of executing some tasks (the means) of interest.

An analogy to political efficacy may help to clarify the distinction between these concepts. Political efficacy is the extent to which a person believes they can affect political outcomes. It has to do with the relationship between an agent (oneself) and some ends (political outcomes). However, political efficacy is more commonly broken down into internal and external components. Internal political efficacy concerns agents and means—beliefs about whether a person (the agent) is capable of performing tasks related to citizenship (the means)—while external political efficacy concerns means and ends—beliefs about whether political outcomes (the ends) are contingent upon citizen action (the means). The broader concept of political efficacy is analogous to psychological power: both capture whether a person feels they can control some outcomes, in politics or in life overall.

Despite their conceptual differences, measures of locus of control and generalized self-efficacy sometimes overlap with one another and especially with psychological power. Survey items that ask respondents to agree or disagree with statements like “I am in control of what happens in my life” have been used as measures of all three concepts. I take statements like these, which map clearly onto an agent-ends relationship, to measure psychological power. Going forward, as I review evidence on the nature of psychological power, I include studies with measures that capture the extent to which one believes they have control over outcomes in their life—regardless of how authors label the construct they measure.

---

<sup>1</sup>Throughout, I will use phrases like “feels powerful” (or powerless) and the “sense of power” interchangeably with psychological power.

<sup>2</sup>Skinner (1996) is the source of the agent-means-ends framework used here, and it maps this framework onto many existing constructs related to power and control.



## 2 Sources of Variation

I have defined psychological power as an individual's beliefs about the extent to which they can affect outcomes across domains of their life. These beliefs vary greatly between individuals: some people are constitutionally convinced of their agency in any situation, while others always cast themselves as victims of circumstance. Yet an individual's sense of power also varies over time, as someone who feels firmly in the driver's seat in the morning might feel powerless after a day of unsuccessful efforts. These between- and within-person differences suggest that two components contribute to an individual's sense of power at any given time: a stable individual tendency towards feeling more or less in control across situations; and a time-varying assessment of one's level of control at a particular moment. I refer to these components respectively as "trait" and "state" psychological power.

State power is an expectancy. An expectancy is an assessment of the likelihood of something; the sense of power is an assessment of the likelihood that one can control outcomes in one's life. Someone in a high state of power expects, with high confidence, that they can control what happens in their life at that time. A person's expectancy of control is continually updated as their assessment of the relationship between the self and the relevant outcomes changes, whether due to new experiences, changing context, or a shifted mindset.

State power changes in response to a variety of environmental cues. For example, negative life events like job loss (Pearlin et al., 1981) and victimization (Frazier et al., 2004) decrease feelings of power. In the laboratory, some work manipulates psychological power by placing subjects in situations that give them high or low control over outcomes (Langner and Keltner, 2008). Other experimental work demonstrates that state power can change even without changes in objective control conditions: a common paradigm shifts power by prompting subjects to recall times in which they had high or low power in the past (Galinsky et al., 2003). This highlights that psychological power is principally subjective. An expectancy of control depends on one's mindset as much as it depends on objective conditions.

Trait power represents a tendency towards high state power; that is, people high in trait power tend to expect that they can influence outcomes in their lives. Evidence for a trait-like (i.e. stable over time and across situations) sense of power comes in three forms. First, an individual's tendency to see themselves as in control in general predicts their feelings of control across a variety of tasks and situations (Bandura, 1989). Second, panel studies that reinterview the same respondents multiple times over many years demonstrate that trait psychological power changes little over time, often approaching personality traits like the Big Five in terms of their stability (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2012, 2013). Finally, twin studies suggest that psychological power is genetically heritable (Dawes et al., 2014). Taken together, this evidence points to a trait component of the sense of power that is stable within individuals.

Trait power has two likely antecedents: one's history of successful and failed attempts to control outcomes, and one's tendency to attribute outcomes in general to the self. First, developmental psychologists suggest that children develop beliefs about their levels of control by observing what happens when they try to control something (Skinner et al., 1998; Flammer, 1995). People with a tendency to report feeling powerful, then, have learned through experience that their actions can cause outcomes. However, causal inference is difficult. People are equipped with cognitive machinery that produces judgments about whether an

outcome in the world is attributable to the self, and this judgment is imperfect (Edwards and Potter, 1993; Wegner, 2004). Some people are more likely than others to attribute things that happen in their lives to their own actions (Cheng and Furnham, 2001). These people may then feel more powerful not because they *are* more historically successful at exerting control, but because they are more likely to *interpret* their control attempts as successful.

### 3 Power and Politics

There are many routes through which psychological power may affect political behavior. As I demonstrate below, people who feel powerful are more politically efficacious than those who feel powerless. They also form stronger attitudes (Krosnick and Petty, 1995), experience different emotions (Langner and Keltner, 2008; Berdahl and Martorana, 2006), and devote more cognitive and behavioral energy to the pursuit of their own goals and interests (Guinote and Chen, 2017)<sup>3</sup>. Although these features of powerful people have many implications for politics, several point to a common prediction: people who feel more powerful will participate more in civic and political life.

Political efficacy, or beliefs about one’s ability to affect political outcomes (Campbell et al., 1954), can be thought of as psychological power in the domain of politics. Perceptions of control in a particular domain are a function of domain-specific considerations and general perceptions of control. Political efficacy, then, arises from a combination of beliefs about one’s relationship with political outcomes and beliefs about the self’s ability to affect outcomes in general (Easton and Dennis, 1967; Merelman and Gary, 1986). Given the robust relationship between political efficacy and participation (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1963; Finkel, 1985) , I therefore expect that feeling powerful will increase political participation by increasing political efficacy.

Beyond its relationship with political efficacy, psychological power has other effects that may encourage participation. People who feel powerful are more likely to take action in service of their goals and desires (Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote and Chen, 2017). They are also more likely to voice their opinions (Berdahl and Martorana, 2006). Therefore, if a civic or political act could help someone achieve a goal, further an interest, or express an opinion, making them feel more powerful should make them more likely to take action.

Existing literature in political science supports the notion of a relationship between participation and a general sense of power. Early work on the personality of political leaders and activists found that people who entered politics were often those who felt confident and in control of their lives (Sniderman, 1975). Other literature, focused on the characteristics of young people who end up becoming politically active, finds that general feelings of efficacy and control lead to action on behalf of political goals (Carmines, 1991; Condon and Holleque, 2013). Finally, twin studies suggest that the heritable component of the sense of control partially accounts for the heritable component of political participation (Dawes et al., 2014; Littvay et al., 2011).

---

<sup>3</sup>These examples are drawn from the literature on social power. I take them as indicative of the effects of general power for two reasons: first, they comport with findings on more general (i.e. not strictly social) feelings of control, and second, recent work suggests that the primary mechanism for the effects of social power is perceived control over one’s own outcomes (Fast et al., 2009), what I call psychological power.

Taken together, this work suggests that people with dispositionally high psychological power—that is, high trait power—participate in politics at higher rates. Feelings of control set early in life, be it at conception, in adolescence, or during young adulthood, are tied to participation later on. The results presented below corroborate this finding. However, prior work does not speak to whether a *state* of power increases participation. Powerful-feeling people are participatory people, but can making a person feel more powerful incline them towards political action?

Because socioeconomically well-off people tend to feel more powerful (Kraus et al., 2009), the answer to this question has implications for the normative slant of these findings. If increasing psychological power can increase political participation, there is potential for power to play an equalizing role. Interventions that make people feel more powerful can narrow participation gaps between the haves and the have-nots. On the other hand, if increasing control does not affect participation, psychological power represents an intractable advantage held by higher-status Americans in bringing about their political goals.

## 4 Empirical Strategy

In this section, I present evidence from surveys about the observational relationship between psychological power and political participation. After documenting a correlational relationship, I conduct several analyses to demonstrate the robustness and longevity with which power predicts participation. Results suggest that people who feel more powerful are more likely to participate in politics, cross-sectionally and over time, and this relationship cannot be explained by contemporary confounders. These results do not demonstrate that psychological power causes participation, so I close by documenting insights from this observational data for future causally-identified research.

### 4.1 Data and measures

To explore the relationship between psychological power and political participation, I take advantage of three existing surveys that measure both of these concepts. One, the General Social Survey, consists of a nationally-representative cross-sectional sample of American adults. The second, the National Educational Longitudinal Survey, is a panel study following a nationally representative sample of youth into young adulthood. The final survey, the Youth Development Study, is a panel survey that interviewed a group of Minnesota middle-school students 19 times over 23 years. Each is described in further detail below.

The General Social Survey (GSS) is conducted biennially by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. It surveys a nationally representative sample of American adults about a wide range of topics of interest to social scientists. The GSS often contains questions about political participation, and in 2000 and 2004, it contained questions that measure trait psychological power. In particular, the 2000 GSS asked respondents how much “choice and control” they felt they had over what happened to them. The 2004 survey asked respondents whether they agreed more with the statement “I have little influence over things that happens to me” or the statement “what happens to me is largely my own doing.” While the 2000 survey asked only about voting and discussing politics as forms of

participation, the 2004 survey asked respondents whether they had donated to campaigns, contacted politicians about issues, and several other political acts.

The National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS) interviewed a nationally representative sample of over 12,000 8th graders in 1988. It then reinterviewed the same students in 1992, 1994, and 2000. The 1994 and 2000 surveys asked respondents about their voter registration and turnout status, while the 1988 and 1992 surveys contain batteries measuring trait psychological power. The questions in the measure, drawn from Pearlin and Schooler's mastery scale (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978), capture respondents' perceptions of the size of their role in their life's outcomes; as such, it is an acceptable, though imperfect, mapping to perceptions of their ability to control outcomes across life domains<sup>4</sup>.

The Youth Development Survey (YDS) began in 1988 with a representative sample (n=1,139) of ninth graders in the Minneapolis-St. Paul public school system. The sample was reinterviewed periodically on 19 occasions, most recently in 2011, when respondents were in their late 30s. The YDS asked respondents about turnout in 4 presidential elections and 2 midterm elections, and it has included questions on broader forms of participation in several waves. In addition, a battery of questions related to psychological power was included on 13 of the survey's 19 waves. I average three questions, drawn from Pearlin and Schooler's perceived constraints subscale (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978), to construct a measure of trait psychological power.

## 4.2 Power is associated with many forms of participation

To test whether political participation is related to psychological power, I first look for a simple, cross-sectional, bivariate relationship: at any given time, are people who feel more powerful more likely to participate in politics? I answer this question by plotting the relationship between power and many forms of self-reported participation across the three surveys described above. The surveys ask respondents whether they have engaged, or would engage, in political acts ranging from voting and donating to campaigns to boycotting and protesting.

The results presented in Figure 1 describe the relationship between power and participation. Each point estimate in Figure 1 represents the coefficient on psychological power in a bivariate OLS regression of the participation outcome on the y-axis on the survey's measure of power. All variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1. In the GSS and YDS, power and participation were measured in the same survey; the YDS results are from wave 16, conducted in 2009, which contained the largest battery of participation outcomes. Since power and participation were not measured in the same wave in the NELS, those results compare power measured in 1992 to outcomes measured in 1994.

---

<sup>4</sup>An ideal measure of psychological power targets beliefs about the relationship between the self and desired outcomes. The Pearlin and Schooler Mastery Scale contains two subscales, one related to mastery and one to constraint. In my view, the constraint subscale is a valid measure of what I've defined here as the general sense of power; its questions ask respondents how much control they feel they have over the things that happen in their life. The mastery subscale also bears on feelings of control, but its questions are more self-regarding than the constraints scale: they focus on one's ability more than the contingency of outcomes. Therefore, the mastery subscale is an acceptable indicator of perceived control, while the constraints subscale is an ideal one.

Across all three surveys and nearly all the measured political acts, people who feel more powerful are more likely to participate. Conventional election-related activities like registering to vote, voting, and donating to campaigns are all more common among people who feel powerful, as are non-electoral activities like contacting representatives and joining political groups. The results are more mixed for oppositional forms of political activity; people who feel more powerful are more likely to participate in boycotts and petitions, but not clearly more likely to protest or demonstrate. In all, however, psychological powerful people participate in politics at higher rates.




Figure 1: Psychological power predicts participation in politics. Points represent coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on power in a bivariate OLS regression of participation on power; a positive coefficient means that higher power is associated with more participation. Data from the General Social Survey, National Educational Longitudinal Study, and the Youth Development Survey. All variables rescaled to range from 0 to 1.

In addition to political participation, the Youth Development survey asks about respondents' participation in a broad range of civic activities. This includes general questions about volunteering, as well as questions about specific roles in supporting religious, business, sports, and other kinds of organizations. I will focus here on three outcomes capturing civic participation: whether a respondent reported volunteering in the past year; the total number of roles in civic organizations (e.g. membership, fundraising, leadership) a respondent reports;

| Power Quartile | Prop. Volunteering | Avg. Civic Roles | Prop. Leadership Roles |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1              | .21                | 2.4              | .13                    |
| 2              | .28                | 2.5              | .13                    |
| 3              | .36                | 3.0              | .15                    |
| 4              | .38                | 2.8              | .17                    |

Table 1: Levels of civic participation in each quartile of psychological power. Columns show the proportion of respondents in each power quartile who report volunteering in the past year, the average number of roles in civic organizations, and the proportion with a leadership role in a civic organization.

and whether a respondent reports holding a leadership role in a civic organization.

Table 1 presents the percent of respondents who volunteered recently, respondents' average number of roles in civic organizations, and the percent holding a leadership role in civic organizations for respondents in each quartile of psychological power. Each variable is drawn from wave 16 of the YDS, when respondents were in their early 30s.

In each case, people who feel more powerful are more likely to participate in civic organizations. Among respondents in the top quartile of psychological power, 38% had volunteered in the past year, and they held an average of 2.8 roles in civic organizations, with 17% holding leadership roles. In the bottom quartile, only 21% had volunteered, with an average of 2.4 roles and 13% holding leadership positions. In this sample, at least, people who felt more powerful were more active in their communities beyond politics.

### 4.3 Power and Participation Over Time

The estimates displayed in Figure 1 and Table 1 largely represent the relationship between power and participation at a single point in time. The panel structure of the NELS and the YDS allow us to look at the relationship over time: does power at one time predict participation in politics later on?

Why might we expect earlier power to predict later participation? First, the sense of power early in life may contribute to beliefs about political efficacy later on, as generalized perceptions of control feed into more specific domains (Rotter, 1966; Condon and Holleque, 2013). Second, voting is habit-forming (Coppock and Green, 2016). Generalizing somewhat, if power leads to participation in young adulthood, later participation may follow as an indirect consequence of youthful feelings of power. Finally, while measuring power and participation at different times renders us unable to capture the direct effects of state power, the stability of trait power (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013) suggests that trait power measured early in life may be informative about one's state power later on.

Figure 2 shows the relationship between power and one form of participation, voting in elections, over a twenty-year span. These results pool together results from the YDS using all possible pairings of a wave measuring turnout and a wave measuring power in the same year or earlier. Each point represents the coefficient on power in a bivariate OLS regression of voting on power, and the line represents a simple average of all estimates at each between-wave distance. Blue dots represent pairs in which power was measured before most respondents were of voting age.

Figure 2 suggests that feelings of power earlier in life predict participation later on, even when power is measured more than a decade before voting. The relationship wanes to half its cross-sectional size at a length of 15-17 years between the measurement of power and turnout. Wave pairings in which power was measured before most respondents were old enough to vote have similar coefficients to other pairings of their year distance, suggesting that feelings of power shaped before entering the electorate shape voting behavior just as much as feeling of power later in life.




Figure 2: Bivariate relationship between power and participation over time. Across all possible wave pairings with a given number of intervening years, points represent the average of coefficients on power in regressions of voting on power. Blue dots represent power measurements taken before most respondents were of voting age. Data from the Youth Development Survey.

This approach also allows us to eliminate some confounders that might affect power later in life. For example, high socioeconomic status in adulthood might increase both feelings of power and political participation. If power and participation are both measured during adulthood, adult socioeconomic status could be responsible for any relationship detected. However, if power is measured at age 18 and participation at age 32, adult socioeconomic status cannot account for this relationship; only variables set before age 18 remain as potential confounders. Similarly, measuring power before a respondent enters the electorate (as in

the blue dots in Figure 2) allows us to rule out that voting increases feelings of psychological power, accounting for the correlation between the two.

A more stringent test of whether earlier power predicts later participation involves Granger causality—that is, does power predict changes in participation over time? For example, in the National Educational Longitudinal survey, we observe respondents' reported turnout in 2 presidential elections. In the 1992 election, when respondents were first aging into the electorate, 48% of respondents reported voting; by the 1996 election, 57% turned out. I expect the general sense of power to predict which respondents sorted into the electorate over this period.

This approach—controlling for prior turnout in assessing the relationship between power and turnout—allows us to separate out the effects of stable variables that could confound the relationship. For example, students with more educated parents feel more powerful and are more more likely to vote. Controlling for 1992 turnout in predicting 1996 turnout accounts for the effect parental education, and other background variables, had on voting in 1992; this should attenuate the extent to which parental education confounds the relationship between power and voting in 1996.

Figure 3 divides NELS respondents into those who did and did not report voting in the 1992 election. Each panel then shows the level of 1996 turnout for respondents with different levels of psychological power. In both panels—that is, among both respondents who did and did not vote in 1992—respondents who felt more powerful in 1992 were significantly more likely to turn out to vote in 1996. Supplementary analyses suggest that similar results hold in the YDS: power predicts turnout in presidential elections above and beyond prior turnout.

Taken together, these results suggest that people who feel powerful early in life are more likely to become active citizens later on. Adolescents who feel powerful vote more often when they enter the electorate and remain more likely to vote throughout young adulthood; if they do not vote in their early elections, they are more likely to enter the electorate at each opportunity. The results presented here do not demonstrate that psychological power causes political participation. Instead, they demonstrate that psychological power is useful in predicting participation, above and beyond other useful predictors.



### Power Predicts Changes in Turnout




Figure 3: The sense of power, measured in 1992, predicts voting in 1996 controlling for voting in 1992. The x-axis shows psychological power; the y-axis shows turnout in the 1996 election with a LOESS smoother. The left- and right-hand panels respectively show respondents who abstained and turned out in the 1992 election.

## 4.4 Power and Inequality in Participation

I have provided evidence that people who feel more powerful participate in politics more often. How should we interpret the magnitude of this association relative to other important participation-related variables, like education and socioeconomic status? And does the relationship between psychological power and participation persist when background variables like these are statistically controlled?

In this section, I use the National Educational Longitudinal study's nationally representative sample of more than 11,000 public school students to describe the relationship between trait psychological power, voter turnout, and two variables important to both: socioeconomic status (SES) and educational attainment. The size, diversity, and quality of the NELS makes it an ideal sample to examine how these features are related in the American electorate.

The NELS contains a measure of each respondent's socioeconomic background calculated from their parents' education, occupation, and income. The SES variable was recorded in the first year of the survey, when respondents were in 8th grade. The measure of psychological power used in this section comes from the same wave. The SES and power variables are recoded to range from 0 to 1. The NELS also contains a measure of respondents' education recorded in the final year of the survey, eight years after most respondents graduated from high school.

Table 2 presents three OLS regression models. The first shows the bivariate relationship between psychological power in 1988 and voting in the 1996 presidential election: moving from the minimum to the maximum on the power scale is associated with about a 1/3 increase in voting rates. The second column shows the relationship between voting and the two background variables, SES and education (the omitted category of education is less than a high school diploma/GED). Finally, the third column adds the power variable to the model including background characteristics.

These results suggest that the association between power and voting is substantively sizeable. In a bivariate regression, moving from the minimum to the maximum on the power scale is associated with an increase in voting rates comparable to moving from no high school diploma to having a bachelor's degree. In the model controlling for education and socioeconomic background, moving from the minimum to the maximum of the power scale is comparable to gaining a high school diploma or GED (relative to no high school graduation) in its relationship with turnout. Even when these important drivers of turnout are accounted for, power remains a significant and sizeable predictor of participation.

The results in Table 2 should not be interpreted as an estimate of the causal effect of power on participation. There are surely omitted variables in these models. Further, the education variable is measured after psychological power; if, say, power increased participation in part by increasing subjects' educational attainment, including education as a control would dampen the coefficient on power. These results are intended as a way to benchmark the size of the association between power and participation and as an indication that the association is not completely explained by demographic features associated with both power and turnout.

Table 2:

|                         | <i>Dependent variable:</i>  |                     |                     |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                         | Voted in 1996 Election      |                     |                     |
|                         | (1)                         | (2)                 | (3)                 |
| Power (1988)            | 0.372***<br>(0.028)         |                     | 0.167***<br>(0.028) |
| Background SES (1988)   |                             | 0.333***<br>(0.037) | 0.317***<br>(0.037) |
| HS Diploma or GED       |                             | 0.165***<br>(0.024) | 0.155***<br>(0.024) |
| Some College            |                             | 0.307***<br>(0.023) | 0.291***<br>(0.023) |
| AA or Certificate       |                             | 0.305***<br>(0.024) | 0.291***<br>(0.024) |
| Bachelor's Degree       |                             | 0.392***<br>(0.024) | 0.369***<br>(0.024) |
| Advanced Degree         |                             | 0.425***<br>(0.032) | 0.403***<br>(0.032) |
| Constant                | 0.333***<br>(0.019)         | 0.102***<br>(0.025) | 0.018<br>(0.028)    |
| Observations            | 11,003                      | 10,988              | 10,915              |
| R <sup>2</sup>          | 0.016                       | 0.072               | 0.076               |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> | 0.016                       | 0.072               | 0.075               |
| <i>Note:</i>            | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |                     |                     |

## 4.5 Potential Mechanism: Political Efficacy

The results presented so far suggest that psychological power predicts participation in politics. What explains this association? In this section, I provide suggestive evidence that the general sense of power encourages the development of political efficacy. Because feelings of control over outcomes in general can feed into feeling more control over political outcomes, a sense of power early in life may lead to the development of political efficacy later. Politically efficacious people are more likely to participate in politics. Efficacy, then, may link psychological power to participation later on.

The Youth Development Survey provides an extensive battery of questions related to political efficacy. It includes two traditional measures of the concept, which ask respondents whether people like them have no say in government and whether the average person can get anywhere by talking to government officials. In a different wave, respondents were presented with a list of reasons people give for participating or abstaining from politics and asked how important each was to their level of political activity; several of these reasons provide insight into respondents' feelings of efficacy. All these items were measured on 4-point scales.

I expect that people with a higher general sense of power in adolescence will develop a stronger sense of political efficacy in adulthood. People who feel generally in control of life outcomes when they enter the political sphere should come to feel more capable of affecting political outcomes. They ought not, however, be especially likely to endorse other motivations for participation (like a taste for politics, or adherence to a norm of civic participation) that don't have to do with feelings of efficacy.

To test whether feelings of power encourage the development of political efficacy, I regress political efficacy-related beliefs of respondents in their early thirties on those respondents' psychological power when first entering the electorate (age 17-18). I expect psychological power to predict political efficacy: respondents who feel more powerful should be more confident in their capacity and standing to effect political change. I do not expect them to be more likely to endorse other motives for participating in politics, like civic duty or a taste for political action.

Figure 4 presents the results. People with a higher sense of power as young adults were later less likely to express feelings of powerlessness related to politics: they were less likely to say their actions would be ineffectual, and less likely to feel politics was too complicated or not their responsibility. However, powerful-feeling people were no less likely to say they participated later because it was their duty or because it was exciting. This suggests that the participation of people who feel generally powerful is linked to beliefs about their political efficacy, but not to other beliefs about participation.




Figure 4: Bivariate relationship between power and beliefs related to political efficacy. Points represent the coefficient on power in a regression of power on each outcome; ranges represent 95% confidence intervals. Data from Youth Development Survey.

## 5 Discussion and implications for causal research

The evidence presented here suggests that people who feel more powerful are more likely to participate in politics and civic life, perhaps because they are more likely to believe these activities will effect change. Feelings of power in young adulthood predict participation and changes in participation later in life; this suggests that any variables that could explain this relationship by affecting both power and participation must be set before people enter the electorate. Still, though these results demonstrate that power predicts participation, they are insufficient to support the claim that power causes participation.

One way to assess whether power causes participation would be to observe natural variations in power within individuals over time in surveys like those used here. However, the measures of psychological power available in these surveys were designed to capture stable predispositions towards feeling in control of life outcomes (i.e. trait power, not state power), and this intent is reflected in their stability: across the panel surveys, feelings of power rarely change by more than a tenth of a standard deviation on average between two-year waves, and often change by much less. Therefore, while existing panel surveys are valuable for the study of trait power, only measures of state power would allow researchers to take advantage of natural shifts in feelings of control.

In studies of social power, researchers have developed experimental paradigms that allow them to reliably capture social power's causal effects. This is a promising avenue for the study of the general sense of power. However, initial attempts to develop power-enhancing treatments have failed to produce sufficiently large changes in subjects' levels of state power (see the Appendix for further information). It could be that the general sense of power is more difficult to manipulate than the sense of power in a particular domain, like social relationships. Future researchers seeking to experimentally shift state power should develop impactful treatments that engage subjects' attention beyond traditional text-based paradigms.

Because survey measures of power are so stable over time and difficult to manipulate, further research is needed on the properties and measurement of state power. I have conceptualized generalized state power here as a moment-to-moment assessment of one's feelings of control over life outcomes, which suggests state power should change fairly readily, but it could be that between-person tendencies towards higher and lower feelings of control overwhelm within-person situational variation in most cases. Panel studies measuring state power would elucidate the relationship between trait and state power over time.

Absent evidence that shifting power can cause participation—that is, that people participate more when they feel more powerful—we cannot rule out two possibilities: one, that the relationship between power and participation is accounted for by some omitted variable; or two, that trait power leads to participation, but state power does not.

The latter possibility is troubling. Some people, early in life, develop a stable tendency to view important outcomes as within their control, while others do not; people who feel powerful are more affluent and come from better-educated families than those who do not. These powerful people are more likely to engage in civic and political actions that further their goals. As a result, political outcomes might be less likely to reflect the desires of the (generally lower SES) people who feel they can't affect these processes. The sense of power, then, represents a psychological advantage, in addition to material and informational

advantages, for better-off people in the political process.

Future work should seek to clarify whether psychological power is truly an intractable advantage for the already privileged, as a trait-power-forward account would suggest, or whether interventions can increase people's feelings of control in a way that encourages them to act in their civic and political interests. In addition, prior work suggests that people who feel powerful may think about politics differently in many ways. Researchers should draw on the large bodies of work on power outside political science to look beyond participation to power's broader effects on political attitudes and behavior.

## Chapter 3

### **Geographic Identity: Social and Political Correlates of Place-Based Attachments**

*Since V.O. Key's foundational account of the politics of Southern states, scholars of political behavior have studied how place can shape citizens' attitudes and behavior. A spate of recent scholarship investigates whether, in an era of nationalized politics and media, place still matters. In this paper, I take up two questions that are crucial in understanding how a place might affect its residents: what does it mean for a person to identify with a place, and how can identification with a place be measured? I develop a concept of geographic identity and present a flexible measure that can be used to capture strength of identification with a variety of places. I present evidence that many Americans identify strongly with the country, state, and city they call home, and that the strength of this identification is related to social trust, political trust, and civic participation.*



Geographic identity, a part of a person's self-concept defined by their relationship with a physical place, is an important concept in political science, though it has rarely been called by that name. Attachments to various geographic places have been shown to shape political attitudes and behavior. For example, American national identity has drawn a great deal of scholarly attention (Citrin et al. 2001; Gleason 1981; Transue 2007). The South and its political culture have long been regarded as distinctive (Acharya et al. 2018; V.O. Key 1949). Rural places and their politics are an area of growing interest (Walsh 2012). This and other work has shown that particular place-based attachments have important implications for politics. Recently, however, interest in a broader approach to the study of geographic attachments has grown (Hopkins 2018; Jacobs and Munis 2018; Wong 2010). The object of this study is to provide a general framework for the conceptualization and measurement of geographic identity.

Drawing on literature on geographic identity in other social science disciplines, I first develop a concept of geographic identity. Though a social identity framework is a useful starting point in this pursuit, I argue that the element of space intrinsic to geographic entities requires that identification with a place not be subsumed by identification with the social group that shares it. Geographic identities are strong when people feel strongly attached to a place, feel a deep sense of belonging in a place, feel that their past experiences are rooted in a place, and see a place as providing continuity between their past, present, and future.

I then apply this theoretical framework to develop a series of survey questions designed to measure strength of geographic identification in a way that is applicable to a broad array of places. Using two surveys of online samples, I test this measure's ability to capture the strength of Americans' attachments to the nation, state, and locality they call "home." I find that a majority of Americans have strong attachments to the country, state, or city they consider home; national identity is the strongest of these, but states and localities are also targets of identification. I then demonstrate that a stronger sense of national or state identity is associated with higher levels of social trust, political trust, and civic engagement, while a stronger sense of local identity is not associated with any of these. This suggests that these social and political factors and state and national identity are formed through or affected by common processes, while local identity is somewhat different. This study should be considered a first step in exploring the measurement and explanatory potential of geographic identity in political science.

## **The Concept of Geographic Identity**

Geographic identity is a component of one's self-concept defined by a relationship with a physical place (Proshansky et al. 1983). Though the physical nature of the place (its spatial layout, natural and man-made landmarks, geographic scale) is fundamental, the content of the identity is primarily informed by socially constructed characteristics and subjective experiences of the place (Entrikin 1996). Places are usually accompanied by social groups composed of the people who live within them, like Americans, Southerners, or Bostonians. Identification with a place is associated with identification with its social group, but the relationship with the place itself cannot be entirely subsumed by the relationship with those who live in it (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell 1996). The physical environment provides a location

of, framework for, and symbols regarding social and individual experiences (Lalli 1992).

A geographic identity therefore comprises identification with two entities: one, the social group associated with the place, and two, the space itself and its physical characteristics. Identification with a geographically-defined social group signifies a part of the self-concept defined by membership in that group; that is, it is a social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and should function as such. Identification with a space, discussed in detail below, involves familiarity with and attachment to its features. These two loci of identification are mutually constructed. The physical space influences how the relevant social group is defined and conceptualized, and the boundaries, important features, and meaning of the physical space are constructed through social processes (Entrikin 1997; Lalli 1992). Since social and space-based identification are both interdependent and individually important, the two jointly constitute geographic identity.

While identification with a social group (social identity) is a familiar idea in political behavior research, identification with a space is not, so the latter needs further explication. Identification with a place occurs when the physical features of a place, like its terrain, built environment, or climate, become part of how an individual defines themselves. The physical attributes of a place that are considered salient and the meaning attached to them are the result of social processes (Di Masso et al. 2017). The psychological and sociological role of an attachment to a physical place is to provide the place's residents with "ontological security"—a sense of continuity and stability in both the day-to-day proceedings and longer narrative arc of one's life (Giddens 1984; Grosby 1995; Phillips 2002). A place becomes part of one's self-concept when it provides this security. Strength of space-based identification, then, depends on the extent to which a person sees the space as stable, familiar, and interwoven with their personal narrative.

An individual can hold many geographic identities. For example, one person may have distinct and simultaneous relationships with a home, neighborhood, city, state, region, and country, or several of any of these (Phillips 2002; Proshansky et al. 1983). In this way, place identity as a concept is more closely analogous to the umbrella concept of "social identity" than a specific social identity (i.e. racial or gender identity); it encompasses many dimensions of the self-concept as defined by their relation to different places. Strong identification with one place does not preclude strong identification with another, unless contextual factors or the content of identities brings them into conflict. These geographic identities coexist and interact with one another, as well as with other identities; for example, social constructions of a single city vary across racial and class groups, which may affect the content of place identities within those groups (Walker 2007).

## **Geographic Identity in Political Science**

Existing work in political science that discusses geographic identity often involves a single identity, like American national identity (e.g. Citrin et al. 2001) or rural identity (e.g. Cramer 2012). These works do not speak directly to a more general conceptualization of geographic identity. Two important exceptions are Wong (2010) and Hopkins (2018). In her book Boundaries of Obligation in American Politics, Wong explores the various manifestations of "community" in social and political life. Wong's primary focus is the extent to which geographic community attachments entail a sense of communal obligation; accord-

ingly, her conceptualization and measurement of the sense of geographic community is based on closeness to the people within the space, not the space itself (2010, p.70). She demonstrates that Americans generally have attachments to geographically-defined communities, including both immediate communities like neighborhoods and more distant ones like state and national communities, and that these attachments are related to political trust and engagement.

Hopkins (2018), in documenting and explaining the nationalization of American politics, devotes a chapter to the assessing the strength and content of subnational identities. He conceptualizes “place-based identity” as a social identity, and he measures its strength using instruments often used in social identity theory. Hopkins demonstrates that national identity is on average substantially stronger than various subnational identities, including regions, states, localities, and neighborhoods. He also argues that subnational identities are largely not political: priming local identity does not affect hypothetical vote choice in a congressional election, and an analysis of open-ended responses indicates that people associate pride in their country with political attributes far more than pride in their state.

The inclusion of space-based identification as part of the concept of geographic identity separates the current work from that of Hopkins (2018) and Wong (2010), who define geographic attachments entirely in terms of the social group (Hopkins) or community (Wong) associated with it. While the social identification component of geographic identity is certainly important, the literature in other fields reviewed above suggests a distinct and essential role for attachment to the physical and socially constructed aspects of the space itself. Social group attachments play a role in self-definition, self-esteem, and structuring a complex social world. Space-based attachments help provide a sense of constancy and security to everyday life and provide structure to the events of one’s past, present, and future. By integrating space-based attachments into a concept of geographic identity, we can better capture the full breadth of roles played by geographic places.

Work in political science and related disciplines on specific geographic identities naturally tends to focus on places that share boundaries with political institutions. Attachments to nations and states are the subject of most of this work (Citrin et al. 1990; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Schildkraut 2007; Smith 1993). Local identities, the attachment counterpart of local governments, are an uncommon topic (exceptions include Rahn et al. 2009 and Alkon 2018). Given their straightforward connections to the three major levels of government in the American context, I will focus in this study on national, state, and local identity. Other important work focuses on geographies without accompanying governments, like rural identity (Walsh 2012) or post-Civil War Southern regional identity (Achen and Bartels 2017; Reingold and Wike 1998); as these works make clear, geographies without governments need not be apolitical, and future work should study these attachments further.

## **Components of Geographic Identity**

Drawing on literature about national identity (Citrin et al. 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007), I define geographic identification as a two-step process: categorization of a place as part of one’s self-concept, and identification with the place and its social group. Measuring geographic identity therefore requires two steps: determining whether a place is a part of a person’s identity (a binary concept), and measuring the strength of identification with that

place (a continuous concept). Strength of identification can further be broken down into the two subcomponents of geographic attachments discussed above: social identification and space-based identification.

Categorization involves seeing a place as part of one's self-concept. This can be measured by eliciting the name of a place that a subject sees as important to them, or by asking whether they would agree that a particular place is "part of who I am." Social identification involves identification with a group of people defined by a geographic place, rather than the place itself, so measures of social identification might refer to attachments to "Americans" or "Californians" rather than "America" or "California". It can be measured using instruments from studies of other social identities, like sensitivity to threats to the group, strength of emotions evoked by group-level experiences, the extent to which one's self-esteem is tied to that of the group, and how well one feels they fit in a group relative to others (Greene 2002; Huddy 2003; Huddy et al. 2015).

Space-based identification involves a sense of attachment to the physical features of a place. The locus of attachment here is not the social group, but the place itself. Space-based identification is strong when a place is familiar and the past, present, and future events in one's life are tied to it; someone with a strong space-based identification with a place is familiar with it, comfortable in it, and has important memories, daily routines, and future plans that take place within its boundaries. This element of geographic identity is overlooked by other work in political science, and it is therefore the focus of the empirical work in this paper.

## **Social and political implications of geographic identity**

Existing literature on geographic identity suggests several politically relevant concepts that are related to strength of geographic identification. First, those with a strong sense of geographic identity should be more likely to participate in civic and political life. This includes activities like volunteering for, donating money to, or joining an organization for a community or political cause. This expectation is present in prior literature on this topic (Anton and Lawrence 2014), and it arises from both the social and space-based components of geographic attachments. Those who identify strongly with a social group are generally more willing to take action on behalf of that group (Huddy et al. 2015), so strong social identification with a geographically-defined group should lead to more action on behalf of the relevant place. Attachment to the physical aspects of a space should create a motivation to preserve and better it. The familiarity and security that go along with a strong attachment to place should also lead to more participation.

Second, those with a strong geographic identity are likely to have higher levels of social trust, or the belief that people can generally be relied upon to do what's right. Individuals who identify strongly with a place feel more attached to the place's social group, and members of groups tend to be more trusting towards one another than of non-group members (Brewer 2008). Therefore, people who strongly identify with a geographically-defined social group should be more likely to have a general sense of trust in the people around them. In addition, strong place-based attachments are in part based on a sense of security within that place; Giddens (1991) argues that a sense of security depends on a sense of trust, so strong attachments to place should go hand in hand with high levels of social trust.

Strength of a geographic identity should also be related to trust in the political institutions of the relevant place. Individuals with a strong geographic identity should place more trust in the institutions of the relevant place because of the institutions' association with the attributes of the place of identification: an institution associated with a place one identifies with should be regarded as trustworthy relative to an institution associated with a place to which one feels no attachment. While subnational identities are likely much less political in content than national identities, at least in the American context (Hopkins 2018), it remains possible that individuals' concepts of state and local politics are associated with their concepts of the states and localities themselves.

## Study 1

The purpose of study 1 is twofold. First, it tests the measurement properties of a new battery of questions designed to capture the space-based component of strength of geographic identity. Second, it provides an application of this measure by testing the relationship between politically relevant concepts—social trust, political trust, and civic participation—and three geographic identities, the countries, states, and cities a group of respondents considers “home.”

To test a measure of geographic identity and its correlates, I conducted a survey of US residents over 18 years of age recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. The survey attracted 644 responses. Of these, 75% identified as white, 8.5% as black, 7% as Asian or Asian American, 6% as Latino/a, and 2% as something else. 61% were women, and 38% were men. 11% report having a high school diploma or lower, 72% having some college, an associate's degree, or a bachelor's degree, and 15% having a master's, professional, or doctoral degree. These demographics are broadly reflective of Mechanical Turk as a whole (Ross et al. 2010), though the proportion of female respondents is higher than expected.

The survey began with a series of basic demographic questions—the respondent's gender, race, partisanship, ideology, education, and age. Next, respondents were randomly assigned to receive one of four sets of questions: one-quarter were asked about their national identity, one-quarter about their state identity, one-quarter about their local identity, and one-quarter were asked none of these. All respondents were asked to identify the country, state, and city they considered home, but additional questions were asked about one of these depending on the assigned condition. Respondents were asked how long they had lived in their home country, state, or city and whether they felt positively or negatively towards the place.

The primary measure of interest was a series of questions about the respondent's relationship with the country, state, or city respondents reported was their home. These questions are designed to measure the categorization and strength of identification components of geographic identity discussed above; see Table 1 for the full wording. The categorization question elicits the place the respondent considers home. Previous work suggests it is reasonable to assume that any place a respondent calls “home” is part of their self concept (Lalli 1992). Responses were given by selecting one's home either from a drop-down menu (country or state) or manual response (locality).

Table 1: Questions Measuring Geographic Identification

|  |
|--|
| <b>Categorization</b>  |
| <p>Next, you will be asked some questions about the (country/state/city or town) you consider home.</p> <p>This might be the (country/state/city or town) you were born in, the (country/state/city or town) you live in now, or the (country/state/city or town) you've lived in the longest. What (country/state/city or town) would you say you consider home?</p>  |
| <b>Strength of Identification</b>  |
| <p>When I am in (place), I feel strongly like I belong there.</p> <p>Being from (place) is an important part of who I am.</p> <p>I feel really at home in (place).</p> <p>If I were to drive through part of (place), I would find things that remind me of my past.</p> <p>I would like to live in (place) forever.</p> <p>Compared to other countries/states/cities or towns), (place) has many advantages.</p> <p>People in other (countries/states/cities or towns) are probably jealous of place.</p> |

To measure respondents' strength of space-based identification with the places they considered home, respondents were presented with a series of statements (wording in Table 1) and were asked to rate on a scale of 1-7 whether they agreed with each statement. The battery of questions was identical across the three treatment conditions; control respondents did not see or answer them. The name of the home country, state, or city given by the respondent was filled in to the question wording as indicated in Table 1. To create these statements, I drew on Lalli (1992) to identify four components of a measure of space-based attachments. General attachment, measured by the first, second, and third items in Table 1, reflects a feeling of linkage between the place and the self and a consequent feeling of belonging. Rootedness, measured by the fourth item, captures the extent to which a person's memories of their past are tied to a place. Commitment, measured by the fifth item, reflects a person's intention to stay in a place, which captures the extent to which their narrative of their future is tied to the place (McAndrew 1998). Finally, external evaluation, measured by the final two items, captures the value a person places on the place in question.


Following these measures of geographic identity, respondents were asked a series of questions designed to measure social and political trust and engagement. Social and political trust were measured both generally and with questions specific to geographic scale. General social trust was measured with an average of responses to three common questions on social trust; general political trust was measured with a single item on how much respondents think they can trust the government to do what is right. Respondents also rated how much they trust people in their home country, city, and state and how much they trust their home's national, state, and local governments. Finally, respondents reported whether they had engaged in a number of political and social activities over the past year, and whether they wanted to be more engaged in politics and in their community.

## Analysis of Results

A first task is to evaluate the performance of the measure of geographic identity. To determine whether the individual questions load onto the expected components, I carried out confirmatory factor analysis using the R package 'lavaan' (Rosseel 2012). The results are encouraging: the standardized root mean squared residual is .03, well below a suggested cutoff rate of .08, and the comparative fit index is .982, above the suggested cutoff rate of .95 (tze Hu and Bentler 1999). Given these results, the 7 question measure was collapsed into its 4 components by averaging the elements of each scale and combining them into a single overall measure of identification strength; the new 4-component scale is used for the remainder of analyses. Its Cronbach's alpha is an acceptable .74. Results are very similar when these analyses of fit are run on the individual national, state, and local responses. Correlations between the components and items can be found in in the appendix.

Figure 1 displays histograms of the overall strength measure for national, state, and local identities, each of which ranges from 1-7. The mean strength of identification for national identity is 5.52, the mean for state identity is 4.82, and the mean for local identity is 4.76. The distributions each appear to be left-skewed; most responses are also clustered above the midpoint of the scale. It appears that many respondents have at least some identification with their nation, state, and locality and that this measure has some ability to discriminate between high and low levels of attachment.

Figure 1: Distribution of Responses- Strength of Identity



Strength of identification is correlated with reporting positive feelings towards a place (.47 for country, .67 for state, .55 for locality), as is each subscale, except for rootedness. However, contrary to expectations, it is uncorrelated with length of residence and proportion of one’s life spent in a place, with the exception of national identity being modestly correlated with length of residence. Similarly, strength of identification is unrelated to whether one currently lives in the community they consider home, except for the familiarity dimension of local identity strength.

Table 2 presents bivariate regression coefficients of the social and political variables of interest <sup>1</sup> on strength of identification. Looking first at local identity in the third column, the associations between strength of local identity and the dependent variables of interest are clustered around 0; almost all are insignificant. The exception is a weak but significant relationship between strength of local identity and social trust of those in one’s home locality. In the middle column, strength of state identity has significant positive relationships with general and state social trust, general and state political trust, and engagement in civic life. It is not associated with engagement in politics. National identity has associations comparable to state identity with national social trust, general and national political trust, and engagement in civic life, but weaker or no relationships with the remaining variables.

As described earlier, the survey contained an embedded experiment. Respondents were randomly assigned to answer the battery with respect to only one identity, and some were assigned to answer none. Hence, the battery of geographic identity questions can be conceptualized as a treatment that increases the salience of the relevant identity. In line with the observational expectations about geographic identity and trust outlined above, I expected that priming a geographic identity would increase social and political trust both generally

<sup>1</sup>All dependent variables have been recoded to run from 0 to 1. Originally, all variables ran from 1-5 except for the engagement variables, which are counts that run from 0-9 (all) and 0-4 (civic and political).



Table 2: Bivariate Regression Coefficients

|                                | National | State   | Local   |
|--------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|
| General social trust           | 0.030    | 0.046*  | 0.022   |
| (Std. error)                   | (0.016)  | (0.012) | (0.014) |
| Place-specific social trust    | 0.067*   | 0.061*  | 0.037*  |
|                                | (0.016)  | (0.012) | (0.015) |
| General political trust        | 0.053*   | 0.059*  | 0.010   |
|                                | (0.019)  | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Place-specific political trust | 0.057*   | 0.084*  | 0.027   |
|                                | (0.020)  | (0.014) | (0.017) |
| Engagement (all)               | 0.038*   | 0.042*  | -0.008  |
|                                | (0.018)  | (0.014) | (0.016) |
| Civic engagement               | 0.065*   | 0.067*  | -0.007  |
|                                | (0.024)  | (0.020) | (0.022) |
| Political engagement           | 0.024    | 0.020   | -0.008  |
|                                | (0.019)  | (0.013) | (0.017) |

*Note:* \*p<0.05

and within the relevant geographic unit. This expectation was not borne out. Priming national, state, and local identity did not produce significant increases in social or political trust, with the exception of the local identity condition increasing general political trust. There was also no increase in social or political trust specific to the scale of the prime; relative to the control, the national identity condition did not increase national social or political trust, state did not increase state, and local did not increase local. It may be the case that priming geographic identity increases social and political trust among those who are strongly attached to the relevant place, while those who do not identify with, or are even alienated from, the places they consider home would experience a decrease in trust based on the prime. Lacking a pretreatment measure of attachment, this suspicion cannot be verified without further data.

## Study 2

Based on the results of Study 1, I selected a limited subset of questions from the original survey to test on a larger and more representative population. The new study included a non-probability online sample of US adults from Lucid Labs (n=8978). Of these, 79% identified as white, 11% as black, 5% as Asian or Pacific Islander, 2% Native American, and the remainder as something else. 11% of respondents identified as Hispanic. 42% were men, and 58% were women. This sample was more representative in terms of educational attainment, with 9% of respondents reporting having a master's, professional, or doctorate degree, 33% a Bachelor's or Associate's degree, 29% some college or vocational training without a degree, and 29% having a high school degree or less.

The survey in Study 2 contained a selection of questions designed to hone in on the

relationship between state identity and social and political trust. This second survey differs in 3 key ways from Study 1. First, there was no split in the sample with respect to geographic scale of the target place; all respondents answered questions about the state they considered home. This was done to facilitate comparisons of identity strength across states; a split sample would not have allowed for large enough samples within smaller states to allow between-state comparisons on identity strength and other related variables of interest. Second, a shortened version of the geographic identity strength battery was used including only general attitude towards one's home state and the 3 questions measuring general attachment. Third, only two outcome variables were used: generalized social trust and general political trust. The survey vendor maintains a panel of respondents, so many demographic variables were obtained through previous measures; another selection of demographic variables was collected at the end of the survey.

The expectations for study 2 are comparable to those for study 1, though truncated by the more limited questions and supplemented by the larger sample. First, I expect that the geographic identity strength measure will continue to perform well. Since only one of the subscales was used, factor analysis will not be conducted, but the internal consistency of the questions will be assessed. Second, I expect that descriptively, strength of state identity will be correlated with social and political trust, as was the case in study 1. Finally, I test an aggregate-level hypothesis about the kinds of states that elicit strong identification from their populations: I expect that average state identity strength will be correlated with state-level measures of like social capital (Putnam 2001).

## Analysis of Results

First, I assess the measure's performance. The Cronbach's alpha of the 3-item scale is .90, indicating that it is quite internally consistent. The average of the 3 items (which is used as the measure of identity strength hereafter) is correlated with positivity of feeling towards one's home state at .75. The distribution of responses to the condensed measure is somewhat more left-skewed than the original. In the full measure, the distribution of strength is left-skewed, but peaks between 5 and 6 before falling; in the condensed measure, there appears to be a ceiling effect. 1827 respondents, or 27% of those who both answered all 3 questions and provided a sensible answer to the question asking for their state's name<sup>2</sup>, answered 7 (on a 7-point scale) to all 3 questions.

The size and diversity of this sample allows for the analysis of strength of state identity across demographic subgroups. Respondents with a Bachelor's Degree or higher level of educational attainment had stronger state identities than those without one. Black and Latino respondents had slightly lower levels of state identity strength than White and Asian American respondents, but these differences were not significant. Homeowners had significantly higher levels of state identity strength than renters, and respondents who reported having been a victim of a crime had much lower levels than those who had not. There were no differences in identity strength across genders. Average state identity strength increases slightly, but not significantly, across income levels. Older responses had slightly but

---

<sup>2</sup>All future analyses are subset to respondents who both provided a sensible answer to the state's name question and answered all 3 state identity strength questions, n=6845.

significantly stronger state identity.

Second, I assess the descriptive relationship between strength of state identity and social and political trust. Bivariate regressions indicate that the relationship is moderately strong and highly significant; moving from the maximum to the minimum on the scale of state identity strength corresponds to an increase of about 15% of the scales of social and political trust. When a number of demographic and attitudinal controls are included in a regression model, the coefficient on strength of identity remains significant and only slightly decreases in size, suggesting that strength of state identity explains variation outside of what is explained by demographic explanations for social and political trust. Its effect remains significant with a number of specifications. While these relationships are statistically significant at conventional levels, they are slightly smaller than those obtained in study 1.


Finally, I explore how state-level variation in identity strength relates to state-level variation in Putnam's measure of social capital, available at [http://bowlingalone.com/?page\\_id=7](http://bowlingalone.com/?page_id=7) (Putnam 2001). This is a measure intended to capture the strength of social ties within a community; measured at the state level, it includes variables like the number of civic and social clubs per capita, the average number of civic and social groups to which people belong, voter turnout, and social trust. Though the social capital data are about 15 years old, they provide a useful check of the state identity strength measure's validity: state social capital measures the social ties between state residents, and a state's average identity strength captures the extent to which the state's residents share a common identity. The two are conceptually distinct, but clearly should be associated.

The average strength of identification with each state was computed using a weighted average of the identification strength of all survey respondents who listed that state as home. Respondent weights were calculated by raking on education and race/ethnicity to state-level 5-year 2012-2016 ACS estimates. These results were then merged with Putnam's state-level social capital measures. The relationship between identity strength and social capital is reasonably strong; the two are correlated at .39, and a one standard deviation increase in state social capital is associated with a one-third standard deviation increase in state identity strength. A plot of the results can be found in figure 2. The cluster of states with the highest social capital (North and South Dakota, Vermont, Minnesota, Montana, and Nebraska) have, for the most part, higher than average levels of state identity among their residents. Texas, which lies somewhat apart from most states, is an instructive outlier regarding how social capital and identity strength might differ: while its social capital is relatively low, it has one of the highest levels of average identity strength. Texan identity is notoriously strong and content-laden thanks to its distinctive culture and history, so it makes sense that its identity might be stronger than its capital would suggest.

## Discussion and Conclusions

Interest in the relationship between geography and political behavior has grown in recent years (Walsh 2012; Hopkins 2018; Rodden 2019). In this paper, I have sought to lay groundwork for future contributions to this literature through the conceptualization and measurement of attachments to geographic places. I have defined geographic identity, developed a measure of identity strength applicable to a variety of spatial scales, and tested some

Figure 2: State Identity Strength and Social Capital



preliminary hypotheses about beliefs and behaviors related to strength of identification.

Geographic identity is a part of one's self-concept defined in relation to a physical place. This involves two components: categorization of the place as part of one's self-concept, and identification with the place and its associated social group. While existing measures of geographic identities measure attachment to the geographically-defined groups, the instrument developed here measures the strength of identification with a geographic place. In combination, these measures can more fully capture these dimensions of geographic identity. The measure was tested on national, state, and local identity among U.S. residents. The battery used here performed equally well (as tested through factor analysis and measurement validity statistics) in capturing national, state, and local identity, suggesting that it can be used to measure geographic identities that vary widely in size.

In two different samples, strength of national and state identity were related to social and political trust. When aggregated to the state level, strength of state identity is strongly related to state-level measures of social capital. Local identity is largely unrelated to social and political trust. More research is required to understand the strength of these relationships with national and state identity and the lack of a relationship with local identity.

This study is an early step in a research agenda exploring the role of geographic identity in political behavior. I have focused here on the correlates of identifying strongly with one's home nation, state, or locality in general, but a fruitful path for further research would involve the effects of attachments not to where people call home, but where people live now. A city or state to which many current residents feel strongly attached may enjoy greater levels of participation or civic-mindedness. Another potential area of research involves attachment to particular places, with attention to the content of those identities. For example, the measure developed here could be used to capture strength of identification with the South as a region among Southerners. Southerners who identify particularly strongly with the South may hold attitudes or engage in behaviors that are more reflective of Southern norms or stereotypes. Finally, further work should interrogate the causes of strong geographic identities. If those who identify more strongly with their home states are more socially and politically trusting, it is useful to know what individual, social, or institutional features contribute to strong identification. These and other avenues of research may illuminate the causes of geographic identity and its consequences for political behavior.

## References

- Abele, A. E. and B. Wojciszke (2007). Agency and communion from the perspective of self versus others. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 93(5), 751.
- Abramowitz, A. (2012). *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization and American Democracy*. Yale University Press.
- Acharya, A., M. Blackwell, and M. Sen (2018). *Deep roots: How slavery still shapes southern politics*, Volume 6. Princeton University Press.
- Achen, C. and L. Bartels (2017a). *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press.
- Achen, C. H. (1975). Mass political attitudes and the survey response. *American Political Science Review* 69(4), 1218–1231.
- Achen, C. H. and L. M. Bartels (2017b). *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*, Chapter Partisan Hearts and Spleens: Social Identities and Political Change, pp. 232–267. Princeton University Press.
- Achen, C. H. and L. M. Bartels (2017c). *Democracy for realists: Why elections do not produce responsive government*, Volume 4. Princeton University Press.
- Ahler, D. J. and G. Sood (2018). The parties in our heads: Misperceptions about party composition and their consequences. *The Journal of Politics* 80(3), 964–981.
- Aldrich, J. H. (1995). *Why parties?: The origin and transformation of political parties in America*. University of Chicago Press.
- Alkon, M. (2018). Local sociotropism: How community variation in trade exposure affects voter demands.
- Alloy, L. B. and C. M. Clements (1992). Illusion of control: Invulnerability to negative affect and depressive symptoms after laboratory and natural stressors. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 101(2), 234.
- Alves, H. and A. Mata (2019). The redundancy in cumulative information and how it biases impressions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.
- Anazonwu, C., C. Onyemaechi, C. Uzuh, and I. Chinenyenwa (2019). Self-esteem, Altruism and Personal Sense Of Power As Correlates Of Female Students' Participation In Campus Politics. *ZIK JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH* 2(1).
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso.
- Anderson, C. and A. D. Galinsky (2006). Power, optimism, and risk-taking. *European journal of social psychology* 36(4), 511–536.

- Anderson, C., O. P. John, and D. Keltner (2012). The personal sense of power. *Journal of personality* 80(2), 313–344.
- Anderson, C., O. P. John, D. Keltner, and A. Kring (2001). Who Attains Social Status? Effects of Personality and Physical Attractiveness in Social Groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81, 116–132.
- Anoll, A. P. (2018). What makes a good neighbor? race, place, and norms of political participation. *The American Political Science Review* 112(3), 494–508.
- Ansolabehere, S., J. Rodden, and J. Snyder (2008a). The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting. *American Political Science Review* 102(2), 215–232.
- Ansolabehere, S., J. Rodden, and J. M. Snyder (2008b). The strength of issues: Using multiple measures to gauge preference stability, ideological constraint, and issue voting. *American Political Science Review* 102(2), 215–232.
- Anton, C. E. and C. Lawrence (2014). Home is where the heart is: The effect of place of residence on place attachment and community participation. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 40, 451–461.
- Arceneaux, K. (2012). Can partisan cues diminish democratic accountability? *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2), 271–285.
- Arcuri, L., L. Castelli, S. Galdi, C. Zogmaister, and A. Amadori (2008). Predicting the vote: Implicit attitudes as predictors of the future behavior of decided and undecided voters. *Political Psychology* 29(3), 369–387.
- Aronow, P., J. Kalla, L. Orr, and J. Ternovski (2020). Evidence of rising rates of inattentiveness on lucid 2020. *Working Paper*.
- Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory. *American psychologist* 44(9), 1175.
- Barber, M. and J. Pope (2018). Who is ideological? measuring ideological consistency in the american public. *The Forum* 16(1), 97–122.
- Barberá, P., A. Casas, J. Nagler, P. J. Egan, R. Bonneau, J. T. Jost, and J. A. Tucker (2019). Who leads? Who follows? Measuring issue attention and agenda setting by legislators and the mass public using social media data. *American Political Science Review* 113(4), 883–901.
- Bargh, J. A. and M. J. Ferguson (2000). Beyond behaviorism: on the automaticity of higher mental processes. *Psychological bulletin* 126(6), 925.
- Barnes-Holmes, D., Y. Barnes-Holmes, P. Power, E. Hayden, R. Milne, and I. Stewart (2006). Do you really know what you believe? Developing the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a direct measure of implicit beliefs. *The Irish Psychologist* 32(7), 169–177.

- Barnett, M. and R. Duvall (2005). Power in international politics. *International organization* 59(1), 39–75.
- Baumeister, R. F., E. Bratslavsky, M. Muraven, and D. M. Tice (1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? *Journal of personality and social psychology* 74(5), 1252.
- Baumeister, R. F., J. D. Campbell, J. I. Krueger, and K. D. Vohs (2003). Does high self-esteem cause better performance, interpersonal success, happiness, or healthier lifestyles? *Psychological science in the public interest* 4(1), 1–44.
- Beaumont, E. (2011). Promoting political agency, addressing political inequality: A multi-level model of internal political efficacy. *The Journal of Politics* 73(1), 216–231.
- Bekkers, R. (2012). Trust and volunteering: Selection or causation? evidence from a 4 year panel study. *Political Behavior* 34, 225–247.
- Benjamin, D. J. and J. M. Shapiro (2009). Thin-slice forecasts of gubernatorial elections. *The review of economics and statistics* 91(3), 523–536.
- Berdahl, J. L. and P. Martorana (2006). Effects of power on emotion and expression during a controversial group discussion. *European journal of social psychology* 36(4), 497–509.
- Berinsky, A. J., G. A. Huber, and G. s. Lenz (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.com’s mechanical turk. *Political Analysis* 20(3), 351–368.
- Bisgaard, M. (2019). How Getting the Facts Right Can Fuel Partisan-Motivated Reasoning. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(4), 824–839.
- Bizer, G. Y., Z. L. Tormala, D. D. Rucker, and R. E. Petty (2006). Memory-based versus on-line processing: Implications for attitude strength. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 42(5), 646–653.
- Blackwell, L. S., S. Rodriguez, and B. Guerra-Carrillo (2015). Intelligence as a malleable construct. In *Handbook of Intelligence*, pp. 263–282. Springer.
- Blumenstiel, J. E. and T. Plischke (2015). Changing motivations, time of the voting decision, and short-term volatility—The dynamics of voter heterogeneity. *Electoral Studies* 37, 28–40.
- Boas, T. C., F. D. Hidalgo, and M. A. Melo (2019). Norms versus action: Why voters fail to sanction malfeasance in Brazil. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(2), 385–400.
- Bobo, L. (1988). Attitudes toward the black political movement: Trends, meaning, and effects on racial policy preferences. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 287–302.
- Bohns, V. K., D. A. Newark, and E. J. Boothby (2018). When Do We Feel Responsible for Other People’s Behavior and Attitudes? *Advances in Group Processes* 35, 159–179.



- Boudreau, C., C. S. Elmendorf, and S. A. MacKenzie (2019). Racial or Spatial Voting? The Effects of Candidate Ethnicity and Ethnic Group Endorsements in Local Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(1), 5–20.
- Brady, H. E. and P. M. Sniderman (1985). Attitude attribution: A group basis for political reasoning. *American Political Science Review* 79(4), 1061–1078.
- Brady, H. E., S. Verba, and K. L. Schlozman (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American political science review* 89(2), 271–294.
- Brescoll, V. L. (2011). Who takes the floor and why: Gender, power, and volubility in organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 56(4), 622–641.
- Brewer, M. B. (2008). *Rationality and social responsibility: Essays in honor of Robyn Mason Dawes*, Chapter Depersonalized trust and ingroup cooperation, pp. 215–232. Psychology Press.
- Brewer, M. B., Y. Y. Hong, and Q. Li (2004). Dynamic entitativity. *The psychology of group perception* 19.
- Broockman, D. E. and D. M. Butler (2017). The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(1), 208–221.
- Brown, R. (2001). *Group Processes* (Second ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.
- Bulman-Pozen, J. (2014). Partisan federalism. *Harvard Law Review* 127.
- Burger, J. M. (1989). Negative reactions to increases in perceived personal control. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 56(2), 246.
- Burgoyne, A. P., D. Z. Hambrick, J. S. Moser, and S. A. Burt (2018). Analysis of a mindset intervention. *Journal of Research in Personality* 77, 21–30.
- Callahan, S. P. and A. Ledgerwood (2016). On the psychological function of flags and logos: Group identity symbols increase perceived entitativity. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 110(4), 528.
- Campbell, A., G. Gurin, and W. E. Miller (1954). The voter decides.
- Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities. *Behavioral science* 3(1), 14–25.
- Carlson, J. M. and M. S. Hyde (1980). Personality and Political Recruitment: Actualization or Compensation? *The Journal of Psychology* 106(1), 117–120.
- Carmines, E. (1978a). A competence theory versus need theory of political involvement. *JPMS: Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 6(1), 17.

- Carmines, E. G. (1978b). Psychological origins of adolescent political attitudes: Self-esteem, political salience, and political involvement. *American Politics Quarterly* 6(2), 167–186.
- Carmines, E. G. (1991). Psychological antecedents of adolescent political involvement: Personal competence and political behavior. *International Journal of Adolescence and Youth* 3(1-2), 79–98.
- Carney, D. R., J. A. Hall, and L. S. LeBeau (2005). Beliefs about the nonverbal expression of social power. *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 29(2), 105–123.
- Castano, E., S. Sacchi, and P. H. Gries (2003). The perception of the other in international relations: Evidence for the polarizing effect of entitativity. *Political Psychology* 24(3), 449–468.
- Castano, E., V. Yzerbyt, and D. Bourguignon (2003). We are one and I like it: The impact of ingroup entitativity on ingroup identification. *European journal of social psychology* 33(6), 735–754.
- Catellani, P. and M. Bertolotti (2014). The effects of counterfactual defences on social judgements. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 44(1), 82–92.
- Chaiken, S. and D. Maheswaran (1994). Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing: effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 66(3), 460.
- Chanley, V., J. L. Sullivan, M. H. Gonzales, and M. B. Kovera (1994). Lust and avarice in politics: Damage control by four politicians accused of wrongdoing (or, politics as usual). *American Politics Quarterly* 22(3), 297–333.
- Chaplin, W. F., O. P. John, and L. R. Goldberg (1988). Conceptions of states and traits: dimensional attributes with ideals as prototypes. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 54(4), 541.
- Chatman, J., N. Bell, and B. M. Staw (1986). The managed thought. *The thinking organization*, 191–214.
- Cheng, H. and A. Furnham (2001). Attributional style and personality as predictors of happiness and mental health. *Journal of Happiness Studies* 2(3), 307–327.
- Chetty, R. and N. Hendren (2018). The impacts of neighborhoods on intergenerational mobility II: County-level estimates. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133(3), 1163–1228.
- Chetty, R., N. Hendren, M. R. Jones, and S. R. Porter (2018). Race and economic opportunity in the United States: An intergenerational perspective. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Cho, M. and D. Keltner (2020). Power, approach, and inhibition: empirical advances of a theory. *Current Opinion in Psychology* 33, 196–200.

- Chong, D. and J. N. Druckman (2010). Dynamic public opinion: Communication effects over time. *American Political Science Review* 104(4), 663–680.
- Citrin, J., B. Reingold, and D. P. Green (1990, November). American identity and the politics of ethnic change. *The Journal of Politics* 52(4), 1124–1154.
- Citrin, J., C. Wong, and B. Duff (2001). *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction*, Chapter The Meaning of American National Identity: Patterns of Ethnic Conflict and Consensus, pp. 71–100. Oxford University Press.
- Claro, S., D. Paunesku, and C. S. Dweck (2016). Growth mindset tempers the effects of poverty on academic achievement. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113(31), 8664–8668.
- Clifford, S. and J. Jerit (2013). How words do the work of politics: Moral foundations theory and the debate over stem cell research. *The Journal of Politics* 75(3), 659–671.
- Clifford, S. and J. Jerit (2018). Disgust, anxiety, and political learning in the face of threat. *American Journal of Political Science* 62(2), 266–279.
- Cobb-Clark, D. A. and S. Schurer (2012). The stability of big-five personality traits. *Economics Letters* 115(1), 11–15.
- Cobb-Clark, D. A. and S. Schurer (2013). Two economists’ musings on the stability of locus of control. *The Economic Journal* 123(570), F358–F400.
- Cohen, S., W. J. Doyle, D. P. Skoner, P. Fireman, J. M. Gwaltney Jr, and J. T. Newsom (1995). State and trait negative affect as predictors of objective and subjective symptoms of respiratory viral infections. *Journal of personality and Social Psychology* 68(1), 159.
- Condon, M. and M. Holleque (2013). Entering politics: general self-efficacy and voting behavior among young people. *Political Psychology* 34(2), 167–181.
- Conover, P. J. and S. Feldman (1981). The origins and meaning of liberal/conservative self-identifications. *American Journal of Political Science*, 617–645.
- Conover, P. J. and S. Feldman (1984). Group identification, values, and the nature of political beliefs. *American Politics Quarterly* 12(2), 151–175.
- Converse, P. (2006 (1964)). The nature of belief systems in the mass publics. *Critical Review* 18(1-3), 1–74.
- Converse, P. E. (2006). The nature of belief systems in mass publics (1964). *Critical review* 18(1-3), 1–74.
- Cooper, C. (1974). *Designing for Human Behavior: Architecture and the Behavioral Sciences*, Chapter The house as symbol of the self, pp. 130–146. Dowden, Hutchison & Ross.

- Coppock, A. and D. P. Green (2016). Is voting habit forming? New evidence from experiments and regression discontinuities. *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4), 1044–1062.
- Corneille, O. and M. Hütter (2020). Implicit? What Do You Mean? A Comprehensive Review of the Delusive Implicitness Construct in Attitude Research. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 1088868320911325.
- Craig, S. C., P. S. Rippere, and M. S. Grayson (2014). Attack and response in political campaigns: An experimental study in two parts. *Political Communication* 31(4), 647–674.
- Crandall, C. S. and A. Eshleman (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. *Psychological bulletin* 129(3), 414.
- Crowder-Meyer, M., S. K. Gadarian, J. Trounstine, and K. Vue (2020). A different kind of disadvantage: Candidate race, cognitive complexity, and voter choice. *Political Behavior* 42(2), 509–530.
- Crump, S. A., D. L. Hamilton, S. J. Sherman, B. Lickel, and V. Thakkar (2010). Group entitativity and similarity: Their differing patterns in perceptions of groups. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 40(7), 1212–1230.
- Cushman, F. (2020). Rationalization is rational. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 43.
- Dahl, R. A. (1967, December). The city in the future of democracy. *American Political Science Review* 61(4), 953–970.
- Dalege, J., D. Borsboom, F. van Harreveld, H. van den Berg, M. Conner, and H. L. J. van der Maas (2016). Toward a formalized account of attitudes: The Causal Attitude Network (CAN) model. *Psychological review* 123(1), 2.
- Dassonneville, R. and I. McAllister (2018). Gender, Political Knowledge, and Descriptive Representation: The Impact of Long-Term Socialization. *American Journal of Political Science* 62(2), 249–265.
- Dawes, C., D. Cesarini, J. H. Fowler, M. Johannesson, P. K. E. Magnusson, and S. Oskarsson (2014). The relationship between genes, psychological traits, and political participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4), 888–903.
- De Mesquita, E. B. and S. A. Tyson (2020). The Commensurability Problem: Conceptual Difficulties in Estimating the Effect of Behavior on Behavior. *American Political Science Review*, 1–17.
- Deng, M., M. Zheng, and A. Guinote (2018). When does power trigger approach motivation? Threats and the role of perceived control in the power domain. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 12(5), e12390.

- der Toorn, J., M. Feinberg, J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, T. R. Tyler, R. Willer, and C. Wilmuth (2015). A sense of powerlessness fosters system justification: Implications for the legitimation of authority, hierarchy, and government. *Political Psychology* 36(1), 93–110.
- Di Masso, A., J. Dixon, and B. Hernández (2017). Place attachment, sense of belonging and the micro-politics of place satisfaction. In *Handbook of environmental psychology and quality of life research*, pp. 85–104. Springer.
- Dietze, P. and E. D. Knowles (2020). Social Class Predicts Emotion Perception and Perspective-Taking Performance in Adults. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 0146167220914116.
- Duckworth, A. and J. J. Gross (2014). Self-control and grit: Related but separable determinants of success. *Current directions in psychological science* 23(5), 319–325.
- Dweck, C. S., C.-y. Chiu, and Y.-y. Hong (1995). Implicit theories and their role in judgments and reactions: A word from two perspectives. *Psychological inquiry* 6(4), 267–285.
- Dynes, A. M., H. J. G. Hassell, and M. R. Miles (2019). The personality of the politically ambitious. *Political Behavior* 41(2), 309–336.
- Easton, D. and J. Dennis (1967). The child's acquisition of regime norms: Political efficacy. *American Political Science Review* 61(1), 25–38.
- Eaton, A. A., P. S. Visser, J. A. Krosnick, and S. Anand (2009). Social power and attitude strength over the life course. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 35(12), 1646–1660.
- Edwards, D. and J. Potter (1993). Language and causation: A discursive action model of description and attribution. *Psychological review* 100(1), 23.
- Egan, P. J., N. Persily, and K. Wallsten (2008). Gay rights. *Public opinion and constitutional controversy*, 234–266.
- Ely, R. J. (1995). The power in demography: Women's social constructions of gender identity at work. *Academy of Management journal* 38(3), 589–634.
- Entrikin, J. N. (1996). Place and region 2. *Progress in Human Geography* 20(2), 215–221.
- Entrikin, J. N. (1997). Place and region 3. *Progress in Human Geography* 21(2), 263–268.
- Erol, R. Y. and U. Orth (2011). Self-esteem development from age 14 to 30 years: A longitudinal study. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 101(3), 607.
- Esaiasson, P., M. Gilljam, and M. Persson (2017). Responsiveness beyond policy satisfaction: Does it matter to citizens? *Comparative Political Studies* 50(6), 739–765.
- Farnham, B. (1990). Political cognition and decision-making. *Political Psychology*, 83–111.

- Farrar, K. and M. Krmar (2006). Measuring state and trait aggression: A short, cautionary tale. *Media Psychology* 8(2), 127–138.
- Fast, N. J., D. H. Gruenfeld, N. Sivanathan, and A. D. Galinsky (2009). Illusory control: A generative force behind power’s far-reaching effects. *Psychological Science* 20(4), 502–508.
- Fazio, R. H., D. M. Sanbonmatsu, M. C. Powell, and F. R. Kardes (1986). On the automatic activation of attitudes. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 50(2), 229.
- Federico, C. M. and J. Sidanius (2002). Sophistication and the antecedents of whites’ racial policy attitudes: Racism, ideology, and affirmative action in america. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 66(2), 145–176.
- Feinberg, M. and R. Willer (2015). From gulf to bridge: when do moral arguments facilitate political influence? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 41(12), 1665–1681.
- Festinger, L. Biased argumentation and critical thinking.
- Finkel, S. E. (1985). Reciprocal effects of participation and political efficacy: A panel analysis. *American Journal of political science*, 891–913.
- Fischle, M. (2000). Mass Response to the Lewinsky Scandal: Motivated Reasoning or Bayesian Updating? *Political Psychology* 21(1), 135–159.
- Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. *American psychologist* 48(6), 621.
- Flammer, A. (1995). Developmental analysis of control beliefs. *Self-efficacy in changing societies*, 69–113.
- Flynn, D. J. and Y. Krupnikov (2019). Misinformation and the Justification of Socially Undesirable Preferences. *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 6(1), 5–16.
- Fowler, A. (2019). Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting?
- Frazier, P., J. Steward, and H. Mortensen (2004). Perceived control and adjustment to trauma: A comparison across events. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 23(3), 303–324.
- Freder, S., G. S. Lenz, and S. Turney (2019). The Importance of Knowing “What Goes with What”: Reinterpreting the Evidence on Policy Attitude Stability. *The Journal of Politics* 81(1), 0.
- Friedman, J. A. (2019). Priorities for Preventive Action: Explaining Americans’ Divergent Reactions to 100 Public Risks. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(1), 181–196.
- Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: Research progress over the past decade. *Personality and individual differences* 34(5), 795–817.

- Galdi, S., B. Gawronski, L. Arcuri, and M. Friese (2012). Selective exposure in decided and undecided individuals: Differential relations to automatic associations and conscious beliefs. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 38(5), 559–569.
- Galinsky, A. D., D. H. Gruenfeld, and J. C. Magee (2003). From power to action. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 85(3), 453.
- Galvin, B. M., A. E. Randel, B. J. Collins, and R. E. Johnson (2018). Changing the focus of locus (of control): A targeted review of the locus of control literature and agenda for future research. *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 39(7), 820–833.
- Gawronski, B. and G. V. Bodenhausen (2011). The associative–propositional evaluation model: Theory, evidence, and open questions. In *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Volume 44, pp. 59–127. Elsevier.
- Gentner, D. and C. Toupin (1986). Systematicity and surface similarity in the development of analogy. *Cognitive science* 10(3), 277–300.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford University Press.
- Gidron, N. and P. A. Hall. Populism as a Problem of Social Integration.
- Gilens, M. (2009). *Why Americans hate welfare: Race, media, and the politics of antipoverty policy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Gleason, P. (1981, October). American all: World war ii and the shaping of american identity. *The Review of Politics* 43(4), 483–518.
- Goldman, S. and D. J. Hopkins (2018). Past Place, Present Prejudice: The Impact of Adolescent Racial Context on White Racial Attitudes. *Present Prejudice: The Impact of Adolescent Racial Context on White Racial Attitudes (October 30, 2018)*.
- Goodin, R. E. and H.-D. Klingemann (1996). Political science: The discipline. *A new handbook of political science*, 3–49.
- Green, D. P., S. E. Ha, and J. G. Bullock (2010). Enough already about “black box” experiments: Studying mediation is more difficult than most scholars suppose. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 628(1), 200–208.
- Green, D. P., B. Palmquist, and E. Schickler (2004). *Partisan hearts and minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters*. Yale University Press.
- Greene, S. (2002, September). The social-psychological measurement of partisanship. *Political Behavior* 24(3), 171–197.
- Groenendyk, E. (2012). Justifying party identification: A case of identifying with the “lesser of two evils”. *Political Behavior* 34(3), 453–475.

- Groenendyk, E. (2018). Competing motives in a polarized electorate: political responsiveness, identity defensiveness, and the rise of partisan antipathy. *Political Psychology* 39, 159–171.
- Groenendyk, E. (2019). Of Two Minds, But One Heart: A Good “Gut” Feeling Moderates the Effect of Ambivalence on Attitude Formation and Turnout. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(2), 368–384.
- Grosby, S. (1995). Territoriality: the transcendental, primordial feature of modern societies. *Nations and Nationalism* 1(2), 143–62.
- Grose, C. R., N. Malhotra, and R. Parks Van Houweling (2015). Explaining explanations: How legislators explain their policy positions and how citizens react. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3), 724–743.
- Gruenfeld, D. H., M. E. Inesi, J. C. Magee, and A. D. Galinsky (2008). Power and the objectification of social targets. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 95(1), 111.
- Guerin, B. (2003). Language use as social strategy: A review and an analytic framework for the social sciences. *Review of General Psychology* 7(3), 251–298.
- Guinote, A. and S. Chen (2017). Power as active self: From acquisition to the expression and use of power. *Oxford handbook of personality and social psychology*.
- Hassell, H. J. G. and J. Q. Monson (2016). Representational Inconsistency: Presentation of Self and Explanations of Washington Activity in Campaign Mail and Franked Mail. In *Congress & the Presidency*, Volume 43, pp. 206–226. Taylor & Francis.
- Hastie, R. and B. Park (1986). The relationship between memory and judgment depends on whether the judgment task is memory-based or on-line. *Psychological review* 93(3), 258.
- Hatemi, P. K., C. Crabtree, and K. B. Smith (2019). Ideology Justifies Morality: Political Beliefs Predict Moral Foundations. *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Hertzog, C. and J. R. Nesselroade (1987). Beyond autoregressive models: Some implications of the trait-state distinction for the structural modeling of developmental change. *Child Development*, 93–109.
- Hetherington, M. (2001). Resurgent mass partisanship: The role of elite polarization. *American Political Science Review* 95(3), 619–631.
- Hintz, S., P. A. Frazier, and L. Meredith (2015). Evaluating an online stress management intervention for college students. *Journal of counseling psychology* 62(2), 137.
- Hirschi, A. (2009). Career adaptability development in adolescence: Multiple predictors and effect on sense of power and life satisfaction. *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 74(2), 145–155.
- Hitlin, S. and C. Long (2009). Agency as a sociological variable: A preliminary model of individuals, situations, and the life course. *Sociology Compass* 3(1), 137–160.



- Hochschild, A. (2016). *Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. The New Press.
- Holbein, J. B. and D. S. Hillygus (2020). *Making Young Voters: Converting Civic Attitudes Into Civic Action*. Cambridge University Press.
- Holbein, J. B., D. S. Hillygus, M. A. Lenard, C. Gibson-Davis, and D. V. Hill (2016). The Development of Students' Engagement in School, Community and Democracy. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–19.
- Hopkins, D. J. (2018). *The Increasingly United States*, Chapter Sweet Home America. University of Chicago Press.
- Horiuchi, Y., Z. Markovich, and T. Yamamoto (2018). Does Conjoint Analysis Mitigate Social Desirability Bias?
- Howe, L. C. and J. A. Krosnick (2017). Attitude strength. *Annual review of psychology* 68, 327–351.
- Huckfeldt, R. R. (1979). Political participation and the neighborhood social context. *American Journal of Political Science*, 579–592.
- Huddy, L. (2003). *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Chapter Group Identity and Political Cohesion, pp. 511–558. Oxford University Press.
- Huddy, L. and N. Khatib (2007, January). American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1), 63–77.
- Huddy, L., L. Mason, and L. Aaroe (2015, February). Expressive partisanship: Campaign involvement, political emotion, and partisan identity. *American Political Science Review* 109(1), 1–17.
- Hughes, S., D. Barnes-Holmes, and J. De Houwer (2011). The dominance of associative theorizing in implicit attitude research: Propositional and behavioral alternatives. *The Psychological Record* 61(3), 465–496.
- Hünermund, P. and B. Louw (2020). On the Nuisance of Control Variables in Regression Analysis. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.10314*.
- Hurwitz, J. and M. Peffley (2005). Playing the race card in the post-willie horton era: The impact of racialized code words on support for punitive crime policy. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69(1), 99–112.
- Iyengar, S., Y. Lelkes, M. Levendusky, N. Malhotra, and S. Westwood (2019). The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the united states. *Annual Review of Political Science* 22, 129–146.
- Jacobs, N. F. and B. K. Munis (2018). Place-based imagery and voter evaluations: Experimental evidence on the politics of place. *Political research quarterly*, 1065912918781035.

- Jaeger, B., A. M. Evans, M. Stel, and I. van Beest (2019). Explaining the persistent influence of facial cues in social decision-making. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 148(6), 1008.
- Jarvis, W. B. G. and R. E. Petty (1996). The need to evaluate. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 70(1), 172.
- Jasanoff, S. (2011). Cosmopolitan knowledge: Climate science and global civic epistemology. In *The Oxford handbook of climate change and society*.
- Jennings, M. K. (1996). Political knowledge over time and across generations. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 60(2), 228–252.
- Jensen, C. and M. B. Petersen (2017). The deservingness heuristic and the politics of health care. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(1), 68–83.
- Jian, G. and L. Jeffres (2008). Spanning the boundaries of work: Workplace participation, political efficacy, and political involvement. *Communication Studies* 59(1), 35–50.
- Johnson, R. E., C. C. Rosen, S.-H. J. Lin, and others (2016). Assessing the status of locus of control as an indicator of core self-evaluations. *Personality and individual differences* 90, 155–162.
- Jost, J. T. (2019). A quarter century of system justification theory: Questions, answers, criticisms, and societal applications. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 58(2), 263–314.
- Jost, J. T. and A. C. Kay (2005). Exposure to benevolent sexism and complementary gender stereotypes: consequences for specific and diffuse forms of system justification. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 88(3), 498.
- Jozkowski, K., M. Willis, B. Crawford, R. Turner, and W.-J. Lo (2019). Does empathy toward women who seek abortion predict attitudes toward access to abortion? In *APHA's 2019 Annual Meeting and Expo (Nov. 2-Nov. 6)*. American Public Health Association.
- Judge, T. A., A. Erez, J. E. Bono, and C. J. Thoresen (2002). Are measures of self-esteem, neuroticism, locus of control, and generalized self-efficacy indicators of a common core construct? *Journal of personality and social psychology* 83(3), 693.
- Judge, T. A., A. Erez, J. E. Bono, and C. J. Thoresen (2003). The core self-evaluations scale: Development of a measure. *Personnel psychology* 56(2), 303–331.
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2003). The ontology of “political violence”: action and identity in civil wars. *Perspectives on politics* 1(3), 475–494.
- Kam, C. D. (2007). Implicit attitudes, explicit choices: When subliminal priming predicts candidate preference. *Political Behavior* 29(3), 343–367.
- Kam, C. D. and E. J. Zechmeister (2013). Name recognition and candidate support. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4), 971–986.

- Keele, L. (2005, Spring). Macro measures and mechanics of social capital. *Political Analysis* 13(2), 139–156.
- Kellogg, R. T. (1982). When can we introspect accurately about mental processes? *Memory & Cognition* 10(2), 141–144.
- Keltner, D., D. H. Gruenfeld, and C. Anderson (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological review* 110(2), 265.
- Kerlinger, F. N. (1967). Social attitudes and their criterial referents: A structural theory. *Psychological Review* 74(2), 110.
- Kinder, D. and T. Mendelberg (2000). *Individualism Reconsidered: Principles and Prejudice in Contemporary American Opinion*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Kinder, D. R. and N. P. Kalmoe (2017). *Neither liberal nor conservative: Ideological innocence in the American public*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kohler-Hausmann, J. (2007). The crime of survival”: Fraud prosecutions, community surveillance, and the original” welfare queen. *Journal of Social History*, 329–354.
- Kraft, P. W., M. Lodge, and C. S. Taber (2015). Why people “don’t trust the evidence” motivated reasoning and scientific beliefs. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 658(1), 121–133.
- Kraus, M. W., P. K. Piff, and D. Keltner (2009). Social class, sense of control, and social explanation. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 97(6), 992.
- Kreps, T. A., K. Laurin, and A. C. Merritt (2017). Hypocritical flip-flop, or courageous evolution? When leaders change their moral minds. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 113(5), 730.
- Kropko, J. and R. Kubinec (2018). Why the two-way fixed effects model is difficult to interpret, and what to do about it. *Available at SSRN 3062619*.
- Krosnick, J. A. and R. E. Petty (1995). Attitude strength: An overview. 1, 1–24.
- Kurdi, B. and M. R. Banaji (2019). Attitude change via repeated evaluative pairings versus evaluative statements: Shared and unique features. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 116(5), 681.
- Kustov, A., D. Laaker, and C. Reller (2019). The Stability of Immigration Attitudes: Evidence and Implications. *Available at SSRN 3322121*.
- Lachman, M. E. and S. L. Weaver (1998). The sense of control as a moderator of social class differences in health and well-being. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 74(3), 763.
- Lalli, M. (1992). Urban-related identity: Theory, measurement, and empirical findings. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 12, 285–303.

- Lammers, J., J. I. Stoker, F. Rink, and A. D. Galinsky (2016). To have control over or to be free from others? The desire for power reflects a need for autonomy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 42(4), 498–512.
- Lammers, J., J. I. Stoker, and D. A. Stapel (2009). Differentiating social and personal power: Opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach tendencies. *Psychological Science* 20(12), 1543–1548.
- Lance, C. E., J. Christie, and G. M. Williamson (2019). Do state and trait measures measure states and traits? The case of community-dwelling caregivers of older adults. *Assessment*, 1073191119888582.
- Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 32(2), 311.
- Langner, C. A. and D. Keltner (2008). Social power and emotional experience: Actor and partner effects within dyadic interactions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 44(3), 848–856.
- Lapate, R. C., B. Rokers, T. Li, and R. J. Davidson (2014). Nonconscious emotional activation colors first impressions: A regulatory role for conscious awareness. *Psychological science* 25(2), 349–357.
- Laurison, D. (2015). The willingness to state an opinion: Inequality, don't know responses, and political participation. In *Sociological Forum*, Volume 30, pp. 925–948. Wiley Online Library.
- Lehmann, A. (1983). Heimat land oder heimat stadt? *Der Burger im Staat* 33, 232–235.
- Lenz, G. (2012). *Follow the Leader?: How Voters Respond to Politicians' Policies and Performance*. Chicago University Press.
- Lenz, G. S. (2013). *Follow the leader?: how voters respond to politicians' policies and performance*. University of Chicago Press.
- Levay, K. E., J. Freese, and J. N. Druckman (2016). The demographic and political composition of Mechanical Turk samples. *Sage Open* 6(1), 2158244016636433.
- Lewis, P. G. (2013). Policy thinking, fast and slow: a social intuitionist perspective on public policy processes. In *APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper*.
- Lewis-Beck, M. S., W. G. Jacoby, H. Norpoth, and H. F. Weisberg (2008). *The American voter revisited*. University of Michigan Press.
- Li, Q. and M. Brewer (2004). What does it mean to be an american? patriotism, nationalism, and american identity after 9/11. *Political Psychology* 25(5), 727–739.
- Lickel, B., D. L. Hamilton, G. Wierzchowska, A. Lewis, S. J. Sherman, and A. N. Uhles (2000). Varieties of groups and the perception of group entitativity. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 78(2), 223.

- Lipset, S. M. (2000). The indispensability of political parties. *Journal of democracy* 11(1), 48–55.
- Littvay, L., P. T. Weith, and C. T. Dawes (2011). Sense of Control and Voting: A Genetically-Driven Relationship. *Social Science Quarterly* 92(5), 1236–1252.
- Lodge, M. and C. S. Taber (2005). The automaticity of affect for political leaders, groups, and issues: An experimental test of the hot cognition hypothesis. *Political Psychology* 26(3), 455–482.
- Long, S. (1978). Personality and political alienation among white and black youth: A test of the social deprivation model. *The Journal of Politics* 40(2), 433–457.
- Lupia, A. (2006). How elitism undermines the study of voter competence. *Critical Review* 18(1-3), 217–232.
- Madison, J. (1788). Federalist 46. In *The Federalist Papers* (2009 ed.). The Constitution Society.
- Magee, J. C. and A. D. Galinsky (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. *Academy of Management Annals* 2(1), 351–398.
- Marshall, J. (2019). The Anti-Democrat Diploma: How High School Education Decreases Support for the Democratic Party. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(1), 67–83.
- Martorana, P. V., A. D. Galinsky, and H. Rao (2005). From system justification to system condemnation: Antecedents of attempts to change power hierarchies. In *Status and groups*, pp. 283–313. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Mason, L. (2016). A cross-cutting calm: How social sorting drives affective polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80(S1), 351–377.
- Mason, L. (2018). Ideologues without Issues: The Polarizing Consequences of Ideological Identities. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82(S1), 866–887.
- Mata, A. (2019). Social metacognition in moral judgment: Decisional conflict promotes perspective taking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.
- Mata, A., M. B. Ferreira, and S. J. Sherman (2013). The metacognitive advantage of deliberative thinkers: A dual-process perspective on overconfidence. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 105(3), 353.
- Mayer, A. K. (2011). Does education increase political participation? *The Journal of Politics* 73(3), 633–645.
- McAdams, D. P. (2013). The psychological self as actor, agent, and author. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 8(3), 272–295.
- McAndrew, F. T. (1998). The measurement of 'rootedness' and the prediction of attachment to home-towns in college students. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 18.

- McCrae, R. R. and P. T. Costa Jr (1997). Personality trait structure as a human universal. *American psychologist* 52(5), 509.
- McGraw, K. M. (1990). Avoiding blame: An experimental investigation of political excuses and justifications. *British Journal of Political Science* 20(1), 119–131.
- McGraw, K. M. (1991). Managing blame: An experimental test of the effects of political accounts. *American Political Science Review* 85(4), 1133–1157.
- McGraw, K. M. (1998). Manipulating public opinion with moral justification. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 560(1), 129–142.
- McGraw, K. M. and T. M. Dolan (2007). Personifying the state: Consequences for attitude formation. *Political Psychology* 28(3), 299–327.
- McGraw, K. M., R. Timpone, and G. Bruck (1993). Justifying controversial political decisions: Home style in the laboratory. *Political Behavior* 15(3), 289–308.
- Mendelberg, T. (2001). *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton University Press.
- Mendelberg, T., K. T. McCabe, and A. Thal (2017). College socialization and the economic views of affluent Americans. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3), 606–623.
- Merelman, R. M. and K. Gary (1986). The development of political activists: Toward a model of early learning. *Social Science Quarterly* 67(3), 473.
- Miller, D. T., D. A. Effron, and S. V. Zak (2011). From Moral Outrage to Social Protest: The Role of Psychological Standing. In *The psychology of justice and legitimacy*, pp. 117–138. Psychology Press.
- Mirowsky, J. (1995). Age and the sense of control. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 31–43.
- Mistry, R. S., L. Nenadal, K. M. Griffin, F. J. Zimmerman, H. A. Cochran, C.-A. Thomas, and C. Wilson (2016). Children’s reasoning about poverty, economic mobility, and helping behavior: Results of a curriculum intervention in the early school years. *Journal of Social Issues* 72(4), 760–788.
- Mo, C. H. (2015). The consequences of explicit and implicit gender attitudes and candidate quality in the calculations of voters. *Political behavior* 37(2), 357–395.
- Morisi, D., J. T. Jost, and V. Singh (2019). An asymmetrical “president-in-power” effect. *American Political Science Review* 113(2), 614–620.
- Mosleh, M., G. Pennycook, A. A. Arechar, and D. Rand (2019). Digital fingerprints of cognitive reflection.
- Nelson, T. E. and D. R. Kinder (1996). Issue frames and group-centrism in american public opinion. *The Journal of Politics* 58(4), 1055–1078.

- Neustadt, R. E. (1960). *Presidential power*. New American Library New York.
- Nie, N. H., J. Junn, and K. Stehlik-Barry (1996). *Education and democratic citizenship in America*. University of Chicago Press.
- Niemi, R. G., S. C. Craig, and F. Mattei (1991). Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study. *American Political Science Review* 85(4), 1407–1413.
- Noel, H. (2013). *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nowicki, S. and M. P. Duke (2017). Foundations of locus of control. *Perceived control: theory, research, and practice in the first 50*, 147–170.
- Offe, C. (2019). Political disaffection as an outcome of institutional practices? Some post-Tocquevillean speculations (2006). In *Liberale Demokratie und soziale Macht*, pp. 251–275. Springer.
- Ojeda, C. (2018). The Two Income-Participation Gaps. *American Journal of Political Science* 62(4), 813–829.
- Olcaysoy Okten, I., E. D. Schneid, and G. B. Moskowitz (2019). On the updating of spontaneous impressions. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 117(1), 1.
- Orr, L. V. and G. A. Huber (2019). The Policy Basis of Measured Partisan Animosity in the United States. *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Overbeck, J. R. and B. Park (2001). When power does not corrupt: superior individuation processes among powerful perceivers. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 81(4), 549.
- Parker, L. E. (1993). When to fix it and when to leave: relationships among perceived control, self-efficacy, dissent, and exit. *Journal of applied psychology* 78(6), 949.
- Paunesku, D., G. M. Walton, C. Romero, E. N. Smith, D. S. Yeager, and C. S. Dweck (2015). Mind-set interventions are a scalable treatment for academic underachievement. *Psychological science* 26(6), 784–793.
- Payne, B. K., J. A. Krosnick, J. Pasek, Y. Lelkes, O. Akhtar, and T. Tompson (2010). Implicit and explicit prejudice in the 2008 American presidential election. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 46(2), 367–374.
- Pearlin, L. I., E. G. Menaghan, M. A. Lieberman, and J. T. Mullan (1981). The stress process. *Journal of Health and Social behavior*, 337–356.
- Pearlin, L. I. and C. Schooler (1978). The structure of coping. *Journal of health and social behavior*, 2–21.
- Persson, M. (2015). Education and political participation. *British Journal of Political Science* 45(3), 689–703.

- Petersen, M. B. and K. Arceneaux (2020). An Intuitionist Theory of Argument Strength in Politics: How Intuitive Cognitive Biases Produce Universally Strong Arguments. *Political Psychology*.
- Petersen, M. B., R. Slothuus, R. Stubager, and L. Togeby (2011). Deservingness versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic. *European Journal of Political Research* 50(1), 24–52.
- Peterson, E. and G. Simonovits (2017). Costly Values: The Limited Benefits and Potential Costs of Targeted Policy Justifications. *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 4(2), 95–106.
- Petty, R. E. and J. T. Cacioppo (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In *Communication and persuasion*, pp. 1–24. Springer.
- Phillips, T. (2002). Imagined communities and self-identity: An exploratory quantitative analysis. *Sociology* 36(3), 597–617.
- Prager, J., J. I. Krueger, and K. Fiedler (2018). Towards a deeper understanding of impression formation—New insights gained from a cognitive-ecological perspective. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 115(3), 379.
- Prasad, M., A. J. Perrin, K. Bezila, S. G. Hoffman, K. Kindleberger, K. Manturuk, and A. S. Powers (2009). “There must be a reason”: Osama, Saddam, and inferred justification. *Sociological Inquiry* 79(2), 142–162.
- Proshansky, H. M., A. K. Fabian, and R. Kaminoff (1983). Place-identity: Physical world socialization of the self. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 3, 57–83.
- Putnam, R. D. (2001). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Touchstone Books by Simon & Schuster.
- Rahn, W. M., K. S. Yoon, M. Garet, S. Lipson, and K. Loffin (2009, August). Geographies of trust. *American Behavioral Scientist* 52(12), 1646–1663.
- Reeves, B. and C. I. Nass (1996). *The media equation: How people treat computers, television, and new media like real people and places*. Cambridge university press.
- Reichert, F. (2016). How internal political efficacy translates political knowledge into political participation: Evidence from Germany. *Europe’s journal of psychology* 12(2), 221.
- Reingold, B. and R. S. Wike (1998). Confederate symbols, southern identity, and racial attitudes: The case of the georgia state flag. *Social Science Quarterly* 79(3), 568–580.
- Rico, G., M. Guinjoan, and E. Anduiza (2019). Empowered and enraged: Political efficacy, anger, and support for populism in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*.
- Riker, W. H. (1964). *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Little, Brown.



- Rinderknecht, R. G. (2019). Effects of Participant Displeasure on the Social-Psychological Study of Power on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. *SAGE Open* 9(3), 2158244019876268.
- Robison, J. (2017). The role of elite accounts in mitigating the negative effects of repositioning. *Political Behavior* 39(3), 609–628.
- Rodden, J. A. (2019). *Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide*. Basic Books.
- Rosa, J. P. (2000). Local story: The massie case narrative and the cultural production of local identity in hawai’i. *Amerasia Journal* 26(2), 93–115.
- Ross, B. H. (1987). This is like that: The use of earlier problems and the separation of similarity effects. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 13(4), 629.
- Ross, J., L. Irani, and B. Tomlinson (2010). Who are the turkers? worker demographics in amazon mechanical turk. *CHI EA 2010*.
- Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: An r package for structural equation modeling. *Journal of Statistical Software* 48(2), 1–36.
- Roth, S. (1980). A revised model of learned helplessness in humans 1. *Journal of Personality* 48(1), 103–133.
- Rothbaum, F., J. R. Weisz, and S. S. Snyder (1982). Changing the world and changing the self: A two-process model of perceived control. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 42(1), 5.
- Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological monographs: General and applied* 80(1), 1.
- Rubin, E. L. and M. Feeley (1994). Federalism: Some notes on a national neurosis. *UCLA Law Review*.
- Rudolph, T. J., A. Gangl, and D. Stevens (2000). The effects of efficacy and emotions on campaign involvement. *The Journal of Politics* 62(4), 1189–1197.
- Runte, A. (2010). *National Parks: The American Experience*. Taylor Trade Publishing.
- Ryan, T. J. (2019). Actions versus consequences in political arguments: Insights from moral psychology. *The Journal of Politics* 81(2), 0.
- Sadri, G. and I. T. Robertson (1993). Self-efficacy and work-related behaviour: a review and meta-analysis. *Applied Psychology* 42(2), 139–152.
- Schaerer, M., L. P. Tost, L. Huang, F. Gino, and R. Larrick (2018). Advice giving: A subtle pathway to power. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 44(5), 746–761.

- Schickler, E. (2016). *Racial realignment: The transformation of American liberalism, 1932–1965*. Princeton University Press.
- Schildkraut, D. J. (2007, August). Defining american identity in the twenty-first century: How much "there" is there? *The Journal of Politics* 69(3), 597–615.
- Schnell, S. M. and J. F. Reese (2003, Fall/Winter). Microbreweries as tools of local identity. *Journal of Cultural Geography* 21(1), 45–69.
- Schnitzlein, D. D. and J. Stephani (2016). Locus of control and low-wage mobility. *Journal of Economic Psychology* 53, 164–177.
- Sears, D. and C. Funk (1999a). Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults' political predispositions. *The Journal of Politics* 61(1), 1–28.
- Sears, D. O. (1993). Symbolic politics: A socio-psychological theory.
- Sears, D. O. and C. L. Funk (1999b). Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults' political predispositions. *The Journal of Politics* 61(1), 1–28.
- Sears, D. O., C. P. Hensler, and L. K. Speer (1979). Whites' opposition to "busing": Self-interest or symbolic politics? *American Political Science Review* 73(2), 369–384.
- Seeman, M. (1959). On the meaning of alienation. *American sociological review*, 783–791.
- Seibert, S. E., G. Wang, and S. H. Courtright (2011). Antecedents and consequences of psychological and team empowerment in organizations: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of applied psychology* 96(5), 981.
- Semin, G. R. and J. T. Cacioppo (2008). Grounding social cognition: Synchronization, entrainment, and coordination. *Embodied grounding: Social, cognitive, affective, and neuroscientific approaches*, 119–147.
- Sheehy-Skeffington, J. (2014). *Society in Mind: The manifestation of structural power and status differences in cognitive and regulatory domains*. Harvard University.
- Sherman, G. D., S. Türkay, S. T. Moulton, M. C. Friedman, N. Darani, B. Daly, and S. Kayden (2019). The generalized sense of power is a psychological resource: Evidence from a disaster response field training exercise. *European Journal of Social Psychology*.
- Sigelman, L., C. K. Sigelman, and B. J. Walkosz (1992). The public and the paradox of leadership: An experimental analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 366–385.
- Simonet, D. V., K. E. Miller, S. Luu, K. L. Askew, A. Narayan, S. Cunningham, C. Pena, A. Attar, R. Fonseca, and H. M. Kobezak (2019). Who is empowered? Relative importance of dispositional and situational sources to psychological empowerment. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology* 28(4), 536–554.

- Simonovits, G., A. M. Guess, and J. Nagler (2019). Responsiveness without Representation: Evidence from Minimum Wage Laws in US States. *American Journal of Political Science* 63(2), 401–410.
- Skinner, E. A. (1996). A guide to constructs of control. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 71(3), 549.
- Skinner, E. A., M. J. Zimmer-Gembeck, J. P. Connell, J. S. Eccles, and J. G. Wellborn (1998). Individual differences and the development of perceived control. *Monographs of the society for Research in Child Development*, i–231.
- Smets, K. and C. Van Ham (2013). The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout. *Electoral studies* 32(2), 344–359.
- Smith, E. S. (1999). The effects of investments in the social capital of youth on political and civic behavior in young adulthood: A longitudinal analysis. *Political psychology* 20(3), 553–580.
- Smith, R. M. (1993, September). Beyond toqueville, myrdal, and hartz: the multiple traditions in america. *American Political Science Review* 87(3), 549–566.
- Smith, R. M. (2003). *Stories of peoplehood: The politics and morals of political membership*. Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, R. W., D. Faro, and K. A. Burson (2012). More for the many: The influence of entitativity on charitable giving. *Journal of Consumer Research* 39(5), 961–976.
- Sniderman, P. M. (1975). *Personality and democratic politics*. Univ of California Press.
- Sniderman, P. M., T. Piazza, P. E. Tetlock, and A. Kendrick (1991). The new racism. *American Journal of Political Science*, 423–447.
- Specht, J., B. Egloff, and S. C. Schmukle (2011). Stability and change of personality across the life course: the impact of age and major life events on mean-level and rank-order stability of the Big Five. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 101(4), 862.
- Spielberger, C. D. (2010). State-Trait anxiety inventory. *The Corsini encyclopedia of psychology*, 1.
- Spreitzer, G. M. (1995). Psychological empowerment in the workplace: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. *Academy of management Journal* 38(5), 1442–1465.
- Steyer, R., A.-M. Majcen, P. Schwenkmezger, and A. Buchner (1989). A latent state-trait anxiety model and its application to determine consistency and specificity coefficients. *Anxiety Research* 1(4), 281–299.
- Stoker, L. and M. K. Jennings (2008). Of time and the development of partisan polarization. *American Journal of Political Science* 52(3), 619–635.

- Stoker, L. and A. McCall (2017). The quest for representative survey samples. In *The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behavior and Public Opinion*, pp. 458–471. Routledge.
- Stolz, D. S., L. Müller-Pinzler, S. Krach, and F. M. Paulus (2020). Internal control beliefs shape positive affect and associated neural dynamics during outcome valuation. *Nature Communications* 11(1), 1–13.
- Taber, C. S. and M. Lodge (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3), 755–769.
- Tajfel, H. and J. C. Turner (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austing and S. Worchel (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, pp. 33–47. Monterey: Brooks/Cole.
- Tajfel, H. and J. C. Turner (1986). *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Chapter The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, pp. 7–24. Burnham Inc Publishi.
- Tajfel, H., J. C. Turner, W. G. Austin, and S. Worchel (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. *Organizational identity: A reader* 56(65), 9780203505984–16.
- Teele, D. L., J. Kalla, and F. Rosenbluth (2018). The ties that double bind: social roles and women’s underrepresentation in politics. *American Political Science Review* 112(3), 525–541.
- Tenn, S. (2005). An alternative measure of relative education to explain voter turnout. *The Journal of Politics* 67(1), 271–282.
- Tesler, M. (2014). Priming predispositions and changing policy positions: An account of when mass opinion is primed or changed. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4), 806–818.
- Tesler, M. and D. Sears (2010). *Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America*. Chicago University Press.
- Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Accountability: The neglected social context of judgment and choice. *Research in organizational behavior* 7(1), 297–332.
- Tetlock, P. E. (1989). Structure and function in political belief systems. *Attitude structure and function*, 129–151.
- Tetlock, P. E. and G. Mitchell (2010). Situated social identities constrain morally defensible choices: Commentary on Bennis, Medin, & Bartels (2010). *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 5(2), 206–208.
- Tetlock, P. E., L. Skitka, and R. Boettger (1989). Social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability: Conformity, complexity, and bolstering. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 57(4), 632.
- Thompson, S. C. (2002). The role of personal control in adaptive functioning. *Handbook of positive psychology*, 202–213.

- Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: the effect of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 80(1), 86.
- Torres, M. (2019). Estimating controlled direct effects through marginal structural models. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 1–18.
- Transue, J. E. (2007). Identity salience, identity acceptance, and racial policy attitudes: American national identity as a uniting force. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1), 78–91.
- Treinen, H. (1965). Symbolische ortsbezogenheit: eine soziologische untersuchung zum heimatproblem. *Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie and Sozialpsychologie* 17, 73–97, 254–297.
- Twigger-Ross, C. L. and D. L. Uzzell (1996). Place and identity processes. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 16, 205–220.
- tze Hu, L. and P. M. Bentler (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling* 6(1), 1–55.
- Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. *Unpublished manuscript*.
- Vaisey, S. (2009). Motivation and justification: A dual-process model of culture in action. *American journal of sociology* 114(6), 1675–1715.
- Valentino, N. A., T. Brader, and A. E. Jardina (2013). Immigration opposition among us whites: General ethnocentrism or media priming of attitudes about latinos? *Political Psychology* 34(2), 149–166.
- Valentino, N. A., K. Gregorowicz, and E. W. Groenendyk (2009). Efficacy, emotions and the habit of participation. *Political Behavior* 31(3), 307.
- van Rooij, I. and G. Baggio (2020). Theory before the test: How to build high-verisimilitude explanatory theories in psychological science.
- Vial, A. C. and J. L. Napier (2017). High power mindsets reduce gender identification and benevolent sexism among women (but not men). *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 68, 162–170.
- V.O. Key, J. (1949). *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. A.A. Knopf.
- Walker, R. C. (2007). An alternative construction of identity: A study of place-based identity and its implications. *American Communications Journal* 9(3).
- Walsh, K. C. (2012). Putting inequality in its place: Rural consciousness and the power of perspective. *American Political Science Review* 106(3), 517–532.
- Weber, C. and S. Klar (2019). Exploring the psychological foundations of ideological and social sorting. *Political Psychology* 40, 215–243.

- Weber, M. (2004). Politics as a Vocation. In T. B. Strong, D. Owen, and R. t. Livingstone (Eds.), *The Vocation Lectures* (2/14/2004 ed.), pp. 33. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Wegner, D. M. (2004). Précis of the illusion of conscious will. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 27(5), 649–659.
- Westen, D., P. S. Blagov, K. Harenski, C. Kilts, and S. Hamann (2006). Neural bases of motivated reasoning: An fMRI study of emotional constraints on partisan political judgment in the 2004 US presidential election. *Journal of cognitive neuroscience* 18(11), 1947–1958.
- Wheatley, T. and J. Haidt (2005). Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe. *Psychological science* 16(10), 780–784.
- Wheeler, S. C., K. G. DeMarree, and R. E. Petty (2007). Understanding the role of the self in prime-to-behavior effects: The active-self account. *Personality and social psychology review* 11(3), 234–261.
- White, I. K. and C. N. Laird (2020). *Steadfast Democrats: How social forces shape Black political behavior*, Volume 19. Princeton University Press.
- White, P. A. (1988). Knowing more about what we can tell: ‘Introspective access’ and causal report accuracy 10 years later. *British Journal of Psychology* 79(1), 13–45.
- Williams, D. Socially Adaptive Belief. *Mind and Language*.
- Wilmuth, C. A. (2016). *Gender Differences in Professional Advancement: The Role of Goals, Perceptions, and Behaviors*. Ph. D. thesis.
- Winter, G. and S. Church (1984). *Umweltprobleme und Arbeitslosigkeit*, Chapter Ortsidentität, Umweltbewusstsein und kommunalpolitisches Handeln, pp. 78–93. Beltz.
- Winter, N. J. (2008). *Dangerous frames: How ideas about race and gender shape public opinion*. University of Chicago Press.
- Wong, C. J. (2010). *Boundaries of Obligation in American Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wronski, J., J. V. Kane, and L. Mason (2021). Who’s at the party? group sentiments, knowledge, and partisan identity. *Journal of Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1086/715072>.
- Yazdi, A. M. T. and N. M. Mustamil (2014). Do narcissists and high Machs more empowered? Assessing the relationship between Machiavellianism and narcissism, and psychological empowerment. *International Journal of Business and Management* 9(7), 78.
- Yeager, D. S., R. Johnson, B. J. Spitzer, K. H. Trzesniewski, J. Powers, and C. S. Dweck (2014). The far-reaching effects of believing people can change: Implicit theories of personality shape stress, health, and achievement during adolescence. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 106(6), 867.

- Yeager, D. S., C. Romero, D. Paunesku, C. S. Hulleman, B. Schneider, C. Hinojosa, H. Y. Lee, J. O'Brien, K. Flint, A. Roberts, and others (2016). Using design thinking to improve psychological interventions: The case of the growth mindset during the transition to high school. *Journal of educational psychology* 108(3), 374.
- Yeager, D. S., G. M. Walton, S. T. Brady, E. N. Akcinar, D. Paunesku, L. Keane, D. Kamentz, G. Ritter, A. L. Duckworth, R. Urstein, and others (2016). Teaching a lay theory before college narrows achievement gaps at scale. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 113(24), E3341–E3348.
- Young, E. A. (2015). The volk of new jersey? state identity, distinctiveness, and political culture in the american federal system. *Unpublished manuscript*.
- Zaller, J. and S. Feldman (1992). A simple theory of the survey response: Answering questions versus revealing preferences. *American journal of political science*, 579–616.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology).
- Zhang, B., M. Mildenerger, P. D. Howe, J. Marlon, S. A. Rosenthal, and A. Leiserowitz (2018). Quota sampling using Facebook advertisements. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 1–7.
- Zimmerman, M. A. and J. Rappaport (1988). Citizen participation, perceived control, and psychological empowerment. *American Journal of community psychology* 16(5), 725–750.

## Chapter 1 Appendices

### Contents

|          |   |            |
|----------|---|------------|
| <b>1</b> | <b>Knowledge</b>  | <b>85</b>  |
| 1.1      | All Respondents . . . . .   | 85         |
| 1.2      | White Respondents . . . . .   | 87         |
| 1.3      | Black Respondents . . . . .   | 89         |
| 1.4      | Social Group Knowledge, by General Levels of Political Knowledge . . . . .                  | 91         |
| <b>2</b> | <b>Issue Attitudes</b>  | <b>92</b>  |
| 2.1      | Placebo Knowledge . . . . .   | 92         |
| 2.2      | Individual Fixed Effects . . . . .  | 93         |
| 2.3      | Multivariate Regression & Racial Sub-Groups . . . . .                                       | 94         |
| 2.4      | Feel Close to In-Group . . . . .  | 95         |
| 2.5      | Racial Identity . . . . .   | 96         |
| 2.6      | Effect by Perceived Differences of Group . . . . .  | 97         |
| 2.7      | Projection . . . . .  | 98         |
| <b>3</b> | <b>Temporal Stability: Additional Results</b>   | <b>100</b> |
| 3.1      | Multivariate Regression, Controls . . . . .   | 100        |
| 3.2      | Control for General Political Knowledge . . . . .   | 100        |
| 3.3      | Stability, measured by correlations . . . . .   | 102        |
| 3.4      | Stability, measured by Group Perceptions . . . . .  | 103        |
| 3.5      | Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks . . . . .                                     | 104        |
| 3.6      | Difference in Stability, White v. Black Respondents . . . . .                               | 105        |
| <b>4</b> | <b>Constraint: Additional Results</b>   | <b>106</b> |
| 4.1      | Multivariate Regression, Controls . . . . .   | 106        |
| 4.2      | Control for General Knowledge . . . . .   | 106        |
| 4.3      | Sub-Group Analysis: Constraint among generally high and low knowledge Respondents . . . . . | 108        |
| 4.4      | Constraint, measured by Group Perceptions . . . . .   | 109        |
| 4.5      | Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks . . . . .                                     | 110        |
| 4.6      | Difference in Constraint, White v. Black Respondents . . . . .                              | 111        |
| <b>5</b> | <b>Social Sorting &amp; Affective Polarization: Additional Results</b>                      | <b>112</b> |
| 5.1      | Partisan Identity (2021 YouGov) . . . . .   | 112        |
| 5.2      | Party ID & Party Affect . . . . .   | 112        |
| 5.3      | Party ID & Lib-Con Affect . . . . .   | 114        |
| 5.4      | Issue Sorting . . . . .   | 116        |
| <b>6</b> | <b>Constraint and Stability: Non-Race Social Groups</b>                                     | <b>117</b> |
| 6.1      | Social Sorting: Non-Race Social Groups . . . . .  | 119        |



|          |   |            |
|----------|---|------------|
| <b>7</b> | <b>Knowledge of Ideological Groups</b>            | <b>121</b> |
| <b>8</b> | <b>Survey Demographics &amp; Question Wording</b> | <b>122</b> |
| 8.1      | Survey Descriptive Statistics . . . . .           | 122        |
| 8.2      | Survey Questions . . . . .                        | 126        |
| 8.2.1    | NORC-Amerispeak . . . . .                         | 126        |
| 8.2.2    | YouGov Panel . . . . .                            | 128        |

# 1 Knowledge

## 1.1 All Respondents

Table 1: Know Group Positions, 1972/1976

|                             | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Gov't Guarantee Jobs  | 0.68    | 0.27    | 0.05      |
| Party: Gov't Guarantee Jobs | 0.51    | 0.38    | 0.10      |
| Race: Gov't Health Ins      | 0.58    | 0.40    | 0.02      |
| Party: Gov't Health Ins     | 0.42    | 0.52    | 0.06      |
| Race: Ideology              | 0.68    | 0.26    | 0.06      |
| Party: Ideology             | 0.68    | 0.22    | 0.10      |
| Race: Rts Accused           | 0.55    | 0.40    | 0.05      |
| Party: Rts Accused          | 0.31    | 0.59    | 0.10      |
| Race: Aid Black             | 0.74    | 0.23    | 0.03      |
| Party: Aid Black            | 0.42    | 0.48    | 0.10      |
| Race: Busing                | 0.58    | 0.37    | 0.05      |
| Party: Busing               | 0.33    | 0.53    | 0.14      |

The "correct" column includes the percentage of respondents that place the more conservative group to the right of the more liberal group. The same/DK column includes the percent of respondents who place the groups at the same position or say they do not know at least one of the group's positions. The "incorrect" column includes those people that place the more liberal group to the right. For example, the first row ("Race: Gov't Jobs") shows that 68% of respondents believe that most whites hold more conservative position on government guarantee of jobs than most blacks. The second row ("Party: Gov't Jobs") shows that 51% of respondents believe that Republicans are more conservative on government guarantee of jobs than Democrats.

Table 2: Know Group, 1997

|                     | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|---------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Aid Black     | 0.75    | 0.13    | 0.11      |
| Party: Aidblack     | 0.66    | 0.21    | 0.13      |
| Race: Gov Serve/Sp  | 0.56    | 0.37    | 0.07      |
| Party: Gov Serve/Sp | 0.73    | 0.16    | 0.11      |
| Race: Ideology      | 0.64    | 0.29    | 0.07      |
| Party: Ideology     | 0.80    | 0.09    | 0.11      |

Table 3: Know Group, 2021

|                             | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Gov't Guarantee Jobs  | 0.71    | 0.20    | 0.09      |
| Party: Gov't Guarantee Jobs | 0.80    | 0.09    | 0.10      |
| Race: Gov't Health Ins      | 0.71    | 0.24    | 0.05      |
| Party: Gov't Health Ins     | 0.86    | 0.10    | 0.04      |
| Race: Aid Black             | 0.72    | 0.25    | 0.03      |
| Party: Aidblack             | 0.80    | 0.15    | 0.04      |
| Race: Police                | 0.79    | 0.15    | 0.05      |
| Party: Police               | 0.83    | 0.08    | 0.09      |
| Race: Environment           | 0.24    | 0.62    | 0.14      |
| Party: Environment          | 0.76    | 0.17    | 0.07      |
| Race: Immigration           | 0.34    | 0.58    | 0.08      |
| Party: Immigration          | 0.82    | 0.16    | 0.03      |

## 1.2 White Respondents

Table 4: Know Group, White Respondents, 1972/1976

|                             | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Gov't Guarantee Jobs  | 0.69    | 0.26    | 0.05      |
| Party: Gov't Guarantee Jobs | 0.50    | 0.40    | 0.11      |
| Race: Gov't Health Ins      | 0.58    | 0.40    | 0.02      |
| Party: Gov't Health Ins     | 0.40    | 0.55    | 0.06      |
| Race: Ideology              | 0.68    | 0.26    | 0.06      |
| Party: Ideology             | 0.68    | 0.23    | 0.10      |
| Race: Rts Accused           | 0.56    | 0.40    | 0.05      |
| Party: Rts Accused          | 0.29    | 0.61    | 0.10      |
| Race: Aid Black             | 0.76    | 0.21    | 0.03      |
| Party: Aid Black            | 0.39    | 0.50    | 0.11      |
| Race: Busing                | 0.58    | 0.37    | 0.05      |
| Party: Busing               | 0.32    | 0.55    | 0.13      |

Table 5: Know Group, White Respondents, 1997

|                     | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|---------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Aid Black     | 0.77    | 0.13    | 0.10      |
| Party: Aidblack     | 0.67    | 0.21    | 0.12      |
| Race: Gov Serve/Sp  | 0.56    | 0.37    | 0.07      |
| Party: Gov Serve/Sp | 0.73    | 0.15    | 0.12      |
| Race: Ideology      | 0.65    | 0.29    | 0.06      |
| Party: Ideology     | 0.81    | 0.09    | 0.11      |

Table 6: Know Group, White Respondents, 2021

|                             | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Gov't Guarantee Jobs  | 0.72    | 0.21    | 0.07      |
| Party: Gov't Guarantee Jobs | 0.83    | 0.08    | 0.09      |
| Race: Gov't Health Ins      | 0.73    | 0.22    | 0.05      |
| Party: Gov't Health Ins     | 0.90    | 0.06    | 0.05      |
| Race: Aid Black             | 0.71    | 0.27    | 0.02      |
| Party: Aid Black            | 0.82    | 0.14    | 0.04      |
| Race: Police                | 0.79    | 0.17    | 0.04      |
| Party: Police               | 0.85    | 0.05    | 0.09      |
| Race: Environment           | 0.22    | 0.65    | 0.13      |
| Party: Environment          | 0.79    | 0.17    | 0.05      |
| Race: Immigration           | 0.29    | 0.63    | 0.07      |
| Party: Immigration          | 0.85    | 0.13    | 0.02      |

### 1.3 Black Respondents

Table 7: Know Group, Black Respondents, 1972/1976

|                             | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Gov't Guarantee Jobs  | 0.61    | 0.32    | 0.07      |
| Party: Gov't Guarantee Jobs | 0.66    | 0.25    | 0.09      |
| Race: Gov't Health Ins      | 0.54    | 0.42    | 0.04      |
| Party: Gov't Health Ins     | 0.59    | 0.34    | 0.07      |
| Race: Ideology              | 0.72    | 0.21    | 0.08      |
| Party: Ideology             | 0.75    | 0.20    | 0.06      |
| Race: Rts Accused           | 0.52    | 0.38    | 0.09      |
| Party: Rts Accused          | 0.50    | 0.40    | 0.10      |
| Race: Aid Black             | 0.65    | 0.35    | 0.01      |
| Party: Aid Black            | 0.64    | 0.31    | 0.05      |
| Race: Busing                | 0.58    | 0.35    | 0.07      |
| Party: Busing               | 0.46    | 0.37    | 0.16      |

Table 8: Know Group, Black Respondents, 1997

|                     | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|---------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Aid Black     | 0.58    | 0.21    | 0.21      |
| Party: Aidblack     | 0.61    | 0.18    | 0.21      |
| Race: Gov Serve/Sp  | 0.53    | 0.44    | 0.03      |
| Party: Gov Serve/Sp | 0.79    | 0.15    | 0.06      |
| Race: Ideology      | 0.57    | 0.29    | 0.14      |
| Party: Ideology     | 0.67    | 0.10    | 0.24      |

Table 9: Know Group, Black Respondents, 2021

|                             | Correct | Same/DK | Incorrect |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Race: Gov't Guarantee Jobs  | 0.71    | 0.21    | 0.08      |
| Party: Gov't Guarantee Jobs | 0.83    | 0.13    | 0.04      |
| Race: Gov't Health Ins      | 0.70    | 0.23    | 0.07      |
| Party: Gov't Health Ins     | 0.75    | 0.22    | 0.03      |
| Race: Aid Black             | 0.71    | 0.20    | 0.08      |
| Party: Aid Black            | 0.72    | 0.24    | 0.04      |
| Race: Police                | 0.79    | 0.11    | 0.11      |
| Party: Police               | 0.79    | 0.13    | 0.08      |
| Race: Environment           | 0.35    | 0.53    | 0.12      |
| Party: Environment          | 0.60    | 0.27    | 0.13      |
| Race: Immigration           | 0.57    | 0.38    | 0.05      |
| Party: Immigration          | 0.66    | 0.28    | 0.05      |

## 1.4 Social Group Knowledge, by General Levels of Political Knowledge

To understand how knowledge of where parties and groups stand on issues is distributed in the electorate, we next break down respondent knowledge of party and social group policy views by more general political knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Group knowledge is especially high among low knowledge respondents when compared to knowledge of party positions. This is especially pronounced in the 1970s, although it persists across years.

Table 10: **Knowledge of Party and Social Group Policy Views among those with Low Political Knowledge**

|           | (1)<br>Below Avg:<br>Pct Know Race | (2)<br>Below Avg:<br>Pct Know Party |
|-----------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Avg. 1972 | .5166667                           | .3                                  |
| Avg. 1976 | .43                                | .212                                |
| Avg. 1997 | .5266667                           | .5033333                            |
| Avg. 2021 | .72                                | .5925                               |

Each cell represents the average knowledge of party versus group positions across years. Only implicitly or explicit racial questions included.


<sup>1</sup>In each year, interviewers for the American National Election Study are asked to rank respondents on a scale from 1 to 5 to measure their general knowledge levels. For the 2021 YouGov sample, we measure general knowledge by responses to questions about basic political facts (e.g, how long is a Senator’s term).



## 2 Issue Attitudes

### 2.1 Placebo Knowledge


Figure 1: Placebo Knowledge



One alternative explanation for the relationship between group knowledge and group attitudes' effects on issue positions is that voters may know that know the racial groups positions on policy X are just generally more knowledgeable about politics and this drives the effect for attitudes on policies other than X. To test this alternative explanation, we replicate the analysis where we regress attitudes on policy X on knowing racial groups knowledge on policies other than X. The effect is much smaller for misaligned policies suggesting that knowledge about racial group positions on specific policies drives the effect.

## 2.2 Individual Fixed Effects

Figure 2: **Individual Fixed-Effects**



Main results from Figure 6 showing the effect of knowledge on the relationship between group attitudes and issue attitudes, but using individual fixed-effects. Here, variation emerges from within the respondent (e.g., someone who knows position on issue X, but does not know social group position on issue Y.)

## 2.3 Multivariate Regression & Racial Sub-Groups

Table 11: Issue Attitudes with Controls

|                       | 1972               |                    |                   | 1976               |                   |                   |                    |                    | 1997              |                   |                    | 2021               |                   |                    |                    |                   |                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Accuse      | (2)<br>Jobs        | (3)<br>Ideology   | (4)<br>Accuse      | (5)<br>Jobs       | (6)<br>Ins        | (7)<br>Busing      | (8)<br>Aidblack    | (9)<br>Ideology   | (10)<br>Aidblack  | (11)<br>Gov Ser/Sp | (12)<br>Jobs       | (13)<br>Ins       | (14)<br>Aidblack   | (15)<br>Police     | (16)<br>Env       | (17)<br>Imm        |
| Group FT              | 0.21***<br>(0.05)  | -0.04<br>(0.06)    | 0.09**<br>(0.03)  | 0.08<br>(0.05)     | -0.05<br>(0.06)   | -0.05<br>(0.06)   | 0.12**<br>(0.04)   | 0.11*<br>(0.05)    | 0.01<br>(0.08)    | 0.30**<br>(0.09)  | 0.05<br>(0.08)     | 0.06<br>(0.06)     | 0.01<br>(0.08)    | 0.17***<br>(0.05)  | 0.11<br>(0.08)     | 0.05<br>(0.05)    | 0.20**<br>(0.08)   |
| Know Group            | 0.02***<br>(0.00)  | 0.03***<br>(0.00)  | 0.00<br>(0.00)    | 0.02***<br>(0.00)  | 0.02***<br>(0.01) | 0.05***<br>(0.01) | -0.01*<br>(0.00)   | 0.02***<br>(0.00)  | 0.00<br>(0.01)    | 0.01<br>(0.01)    | 0.03***<br>(0.01)  | -0.01<br>(0.01)    | -0.00<br>(0.01)   | -0.01*<br>(0.00)   | -0.03***<br>(0.01) | 0.00<br>(0.01)    | -0.02**<br>(0.01)  |
| Group FT X Know Group | 0.07***<br>(0.01)  | 0.06***<br>(0.02)  | 0.04***<br>(0.01) | 0.06***<br>(0.02)  | 0.03<br>(0.02)    | 0.09***<br>(0.02) | 0.04***<br>(0.01)  | 0.06***<br>(0.01)  | 0.08<br>(0.04)    | 0.03<br>(0.03)    | 0.03<br>(0.03)     | 0.05***<br>(0.01)  | 0.04<br>(0.02)    | 0.01<br>(0.01)     | 0.04*<br>(0.02)    | 0.02<br>(0.03)    | -0.01<br>(0.02)    |
| Party ID              | 0.02***<br>(0.00)  | 0.02***<br>(0.01)  | 0.03***<br>(0.00) | 0.02***<br>(0.00)  | 0.03***<br>(0.00) | 0.04***<br>(0.01) | 0.01*<br>(0.00)    | 0.01*<br>(0.00)    | 0.07***<br>(0.00) | 0.04***<br>(0.01) | 0.04***<br>(0.01)  | 0.06***<br>(0.01)  | 0.09***<br>(0.01) | 0.07***<br>(0.00)  | 0.06***<br>(0.01)  | 0.07***<br>(0.00) | 0.06***<br>(0.01)  |
| White                 | -0.03<br>(0.06)    | -0.09<br>(0.07)    | 0.06<br>(0.04)    | -0.01<br>(0.06)    | 0.06<br>(0.06)    | 0.01<br>(0.06)    | 0.02<br>(0.04)     | 0.16**<br>(0.05)   | 0.09<br>(0.07)    | -0.12<br>(0.09)   | -0.02<br>(0.08)    | 0.05<br>(0.03)     | 0.12**<br>(0.04)  | 0.04<br>(0.02)     | 0.04<br>(0.03)     | 0.04<br>(0.03)    | 0.05<br>(0.03)     |
| Black                 | -0.05<br>(0.06)    | -0.41***<br>(0.07) | -0.00<br>(0.04)   | -0.05<br>(0.07)    | -0.18**<br>(0.07) | -0.14*<br>(0.05)  | -0.32***<br>(0.06) | -0.12*<br>(0.06)   | 0.17*<br>(0.08)   | -0.16<br>(0.10)   | -0.17<br>(0.09)    | 0.12*<br>(0.05)    | 0.20***<br>(0.06) | 0.05<br>(0.03)     | 0.05<br>(0.04)     | 0.07<br>(0.04)    | 0.17***<br>(0.05)  |
| BA+                   | -0.08***<br>(0.02) | -0.02<br>(0.03)    | -0.04**<br>(0.01) | -0.09***<br>(0.02) | -0.04<br>(0.02)   | -0.01<br>(0.03)   | -0.11***<br>(0.02) | -0.11***<br>(0.02) | -0.04<br>(0.02)   | -0.08**<br>(0.02) | 0.04<br>(0.02)     | -0.12***<br>(0.03) | -0.10**<br>(0.03) | -0.07***<br>(0.02) | -0.09***<br>(0.02) | -0.00<br>(0.02)   | -0.13***<br>(0.03) |
| South                 | 0.06***<br>(0.02)  | -0.01<br>(0.02)    | 0.05***<br>(0.01) | 0.01<br>(0.02)     | 0.00<br>(0.02)    | 0.07**<br>(0.01)  | 0.02<br>(0.01)     | 0.05*<br>(0.02)    | 0.03<br>(0.02)    | 0.02<br>(0.02)    | -0.00<br>(0.04)    | 0.01<br>(0.02)     | -0.00<br>(0.03)   | 0.02<br>(0.02)     | 0.08**<br>(0.02)   | 0.02<br>(0.02)    | 0.04<br>(0.03)     |
| Constant              | 0.40***<br>(0.06)  | 0.52***<br>(0.07)  | 0.33***<br>(0.04) | 0.46***<br>(0.06)  | 0.40***<br>(0.07) | 0.27***<br>(0.07) | 0.84***<br>(0.04)  | 0.33***<br>(0.05)  | 0.19*<br>(0.07)   | 0.60***<br>(0.09) | 0.32***<br>(0.09)  | 0.27***<br>(0.04)  | 0.41***<br>(0.05) | 0.06<br>(0.03)     | 0.17***<br>(0.04)  | 0.41***<br>(0.04) | -0.06<br>(0.03)    |
| N                     | 1803               | 906                | 1514              | 1525               | 1283              | 1447              | 1626               | 1511               | 411               | 442               | 445                | 443                | 443               | 940                | 443                | 503               | 474                |

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Fig. 6 results with controls.

Table 12: Issue Attitudes: White Respondents, only

|                       | 1972              |                   |                   | 1976              |                   |                   |                   |                   | 1997              |                   |                    | 2021              |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Accuse     | (2)<br>Jobs       | (3)<br>Ideology   | (4)<br>Accuse     | (5)<br>Jobs       | (6)<br>Ins        | (7)<br>Busing     | (8)<br>Aidblack   | (9)<br>Ideology   | (10)<br>Aidblack  | (11)<br>Gov Ser/Sp | (12)<br>Jobs      | (13)<br>Ins       | (14)<br>Aidblack  | (15)<br>Police    | (16)<br>Env       | (17)<br>Imm       |
| Group FT              | 0.36***<br>(0.06) | -0.05<br>(0.07)   | 0.15***<br>(0.04) | 0.15**<br>(0.06)  | 0.01<br>(0.07)    | -0.01<br>(0.04)   | 0.24***<br>(0.07) | 0.20***<br>(0.06) | -0.03<br>(0.12)   | 0.43***<br>(0.10) | 0.10<br>(0.09)     | 0.33***<br>(0.08) | 0.33**<br>(0.12)  | 0.54***<br>(0.07) | 0.22<br>(0.11)    | 0.45***<br>(0.08) | 0.43***<br>(0.10) |
| Know Group            | 0.04***<br>(0.01) | 0.04***<br>(0.01) | 0.01<br>(0.01)    | 0.02***<br>(0.01) | 0.03***<br>(0.01) | 0.07***<br>(0.01) | -0.00<br>(0.00)   | 0.02**<br>(0.00)  | 0.00<br>(0.01)    | 0.02*<br>(0.01)   | 0.05***<br>(0.01)  | 0.00<br>(0.01)    | 0.02<br>(0.01)    | -0.00<br>(0.01)   | -0.03**<br>(0.01) | -0.01<br>(0.01)   | -0.03**<br>(0.01) |
| Group FT X Know Group | 0.02<br>(0.02)    | 0.05*<br>(0.02)   | 0.04*<br>(0.01)   | 0.05*<br>(0.02)   | 0.01<br>(0.02)    | 0.05*<br>(0.03)   | 0.01<br>(0.01)    | 0.05***<br>(0.02) | 0.16**<br>(0.06)  | 0.01<br>(0.03)    | 0.01<br>(0.04)     | 0.12***<br>(0.02) | 0.07<br>(0.04)    | 0.02<br>(0.02)    | 0.10***<br>(0.03) | 0.02<br>(0.06)    | 0.05<br>(0.06)    |
| Constant              | 0.40***<br>(0.01) | 0.50***<br>(0.02) | 0.49***<br>(0.01) | 0.49***<br>(0.01) | 0.56***<br>(0.02) | 0.40***<br>(0.01) | 0.84***<br>(0.01) | 0.50***<br>(0.02) | 0.54***<br>(0.02) | 0.60***<br>(0.02) | 0.45***<br>(0.01)  | 0.54***<br>(0.03) | 0.46***<br>(0.03) | 0.46***<br>(0.02) | 0.67***<br>(0.02) | 0.28***<br>(0.01) | 0.58***<br>(0.02) |
| N                     | 1609              | 806               | 1374              | 1379              | 1168              | 1311              | 1465              | 1351              | 387               | 411               | 413                | 308               | 308               | 642               | 308               | 339               | 328               |

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Fig. 6 among white R's only.

Table 13: Issue Attitudes: Black Respondents, only

|                       | 1972              |                   |                    | 1976              |                   |                   |                   |                   | 1997              |                   |                    | 2021              |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Accuse     | (2)<br>Jobs       | (3)<br>Ideology    | (4)<br>Accuse     | (5)<br>Jobs       | (6)<br>Ins        | (7)<br>Busing     | (8)<br>Aidblack   | (9)<br>Ideology   | (10)<br>Aidblack  | (11)<br>Gov Ser/Sp | (12)<br>Jobs      | (13)<br>Ins       | (14)<br>Aidblack  | (15)<br>Police    | (16)<br>Env       | (17)<br>Imm       |
| Group FT              | 0.23<br>(0.15)    | 0.06<br>(0.10)    | 0.20<br>(0.22)     | 0.07<br>(0.22)    | -0.23<br>(0.24)   | 0.57*<br>(0.28)   | -0.60*<br>(0.25)  | -0.07<br>(0.22)   | -0.31<br>(0.48)   | -0.03<br>(0.48)   | -0.24<br>(0.35)    | 0.49*<br>(0.20)   | 0.06<br>(0.27)    | -0.10<br>(0.14)   | -0.01<br>(0.26)   | -0.26*<br>(0.10)  | -0.15<br>(0.25)   |
| Know Group            | -0.06**<br>(0.02) | -0.04*<br>(0.02)  | -0.06***<br>(0.02) | -0.05*<br>(0.02)  | 0.00<br>(0.02)    | -0.02<br>(0.02)   | -0.02<br>(0.02)   | -0.00<br>(0.02)   | -0.02<br>(0.04)   | -0.02<br>(0.03)   | 0.00<br>(0.04)     | -0.02<br>(0.03)   | -0.02<br>(0.03)   | -0.03*<br>(0.01)  | -0.04<br>(0.02)   | -0.00<br>(0.02)   | -0.05**<br>(0.02) |
| Group FT X Know Group | 0.01<br>(0.04)    | -0.02<br>(0.04)   | -0.05<br>(0.03)    | -0.11<br>(0.07)   | 0.05<br>(0.07)    | -0.06<br>(0.08)   | 0.14<br>(0.09)    | 0.07<br>(0.06)    | -0.03<br>(0.18)   | 0.02<br>(0.15)    | 0.32<br>(0.26)     | -0.01<br>(0.06)   | 0.05<br>(0.08)    | 0.04<br>(0.03)    | 0.06<br>(0.06)    | 0.09<br>(0.06)    | 0.07<br>(0.05)    |
| Constant              | 0.52***<br>(0.05) | 0.25***<br>(0.04) | 0.49***<br>(0.04)  | 0.45***<br>(0.05) | 0.27***<br>(0.05) | 0.40***<br>(0.06) | 0.45***<br>(0.06) | 0.26***<br>(0.04) | 0.50***<br>(0.09) | 0.54***<br>(0.09) | 0.28***<br>(0.06)  | 0.61***<br>(0.08) | 0.49***<br>(0.10) | 0.40***<br>(0.05) | 0.64***<br>(0.06) | 0.14***<br>(0.04) | 0.62***<br>(0.06) |
| N                     | 163               | 82                | 117                | 124               | 103               | 117               | 143               | 138               | 20                | 30                | 33                 | 50                | 50                | 105               | 50                | 54                | 47                |

Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Fig. 6 among black R's only.

## 2.4 Feel Close to In-Group

This section tests whether people who know where groups stand on issues have a stronger relationship between their issue attitudes and their feelings of closeness to their racial group.

Table 14: Issue Attitudes: Feel Close to Blacks (Black Rs Only)

|                          | 1972              |                 |                   | 1976             |                 |                   |                   |                   | 1997            |                  |                    |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|--------------------|
|                          | (1)<br>Accuse     | (2)<br>Jobs     | (3)<br>Ideology   | (4)<br>Accuse    | (5)<br>Jobs     | (6)<br>Ins        | (7)<br>Busing     | (8)<br>Aidblack   | (9)<br>Aidblack | (10)<br>Ideology | (11)<br>Gov Ser/Sp |
| Feel Close to Blacks     | 0.01<br>(0.10)    | 0.26*<br>(0.11) | -0.20*<br>(0.09)  | 0.13<br>(0.12)   | 0.14<br>(0.15)  | -0.18<br>(0.14)   | 0.16<br>(0.14)    | -0.14<br>(0.10)   | -0.00<br>(0.32) | 0.00<br>(.)      | -0.28<br>(0.16)    |
| Know Group               | -0.04<br>(0.13)   | 0.09<br>(0.13)  | -0.13<br>(0.10)   | -0.12<br>(0.17)  | 0.10<br>(0.20)  | -0.12<br>(0.17)   | -0.10<br>(0.17)   | -0.17<br>(0.11)   | -0.50<br>(0.32) | -0.42<br>(0.31)  | -0.33<br>(0.23)    |
| Close Black X Know Group | -0.18<br>(0.15)   | -0.24<br>(0.14) | 0.05<br>(0.11)    | 0.07<br>(0.18)   | -0.14<br>(0.21) | 0.08<br>(0.18)    | -0.10<br>(0.18)   | 0.15<br>(0.13)    | 0.64<br>(0.43)  | 0.25<br>(0.29)   | 0.64*<br>(0.27)    |
| Constant                 | 0.47***<br>(0.09) | 0.03<br>(0.10)  | 0.60***<br>(0.08) | 0.33**<br>(0.10) | 0.17<br>(0.14)  | 0.44***<br>(0.13) | 0.47***<br>(0.12) | 0.38***<br>(0.09) | 0.50*<br>(0.16) | 0.58*<br>(0.18)  | 0.33*<br>(0.12)    |
| <i>N</i>                 | 168               | 83              | 117               | 120              | 98              | 113               | 141               | 136               | 11              | 7                | 12                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Here, because policy questions are coded such that higher values are more conservative, feeling close to blacks times knowledge should produce a negative coefficient (in the more liberal direction). Small sample size in most years makes interpretation difficult.

Table 15: Issue Attitudes: Feel Close to Whites (White Rs Only)

|                          | 1972              |                   |                   | 1976              |                   |                   |                   |                   | 1997              |                   |                    |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                          | (1)<br>Accuse     | (2)<br>Jobs       | (3)<br>Ideology   | (4)<br>Accuse     | (5)<br>Jobs       | (6)<br>Ins        | (7)<br>Busing     | (8)<br>Aidblack   | (9)<br>Aidblack   | (10)<br>Ideology  | (11)<br>Gov Ser/Sp |
| Feel Close to Whites     | 0.02<br>(0.03)    | 0.03<br>(0.04)    | 0.03<br>(0.02)    | 0.00<br>(0.03)    | -0.04<br>(0.04)   | -0.03<br>(0.03)   | -0.01<br>(0.02)   | -0.04<br>(0.04)   | -0.14<br>(0.10)   | -0.02<br>(0.06)   | -0.08<br>(0.06)    |
| Know Group               | 0.11***<br>(0.02) | 0.20***<br>(0.03) | 0.02<br>(0.02)    | 0.09***<br>(0.03) | 0.09**<br>(0.03)  | 0.17***<br>(0.03) | -0.03<br>(0.02)   | 0.03<br>(0.03)    | -0.07<br>(0.06)   | -0.01<br>(0.05)   | 0.06<br>(0.05)     |
| Close White X Know Group | 0.05<br>(0.03)    | -0.03<br>(0.05)   | 0.03<br>(0.02)    | 0.01<br>(0.04)    | 0.00<br>(0.04)    | 0.08<br>(0.04)    | 0.03<br>(0.03)    | 0.05<br>(0.04)    | 0.23*<br>(0.11)   | 0.08<br>(0.08)    | 0.11<br>(0.07)     |
| Constant                 | 0.45***<br>(0.02) | 0.45***<br>(0.02) | 0.50***<br>(0.01) | 0.51***<br>(0.02) | 0.57***<br>(0.02) | 0.42***<br>(0.02) | 0.90***<br>(0.01) | 0.57***<br>(0.02) | 0.68***<br>(0.05) | 0.52***<br>(0.04) | 0.48***<br>(0.03)  |
| <i>N</i>                 | 1634              | 812               | 1393              | 1334              | 1125              | 1268              | 1414              | 1302              | 179               | 168               | 180                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 2.5 Racial Identity

This section tests whether people who know where groups stand on issues have a stronger relationship between their issue attitudes and the importance of their racial identity.

Table 16: Issue Attitudes: Racial Identity Important (Black Rs Only)

|                              | (1)               | (2)               | (3)               | (4)               |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                              | jobs              | ins               | aidblack          | police            |
| Racial Identity              | -0.40<br>(0.24)   | -0.47<br>(0.28)   | -0.14<br>(0.22)   | -0.09<br>(0.17)   |
| Know Group                   | -0.30<br>(0.24)   | -0.42<br>(0.28)   | -0.14<br>(0.20)   | -0.24<br>(0.18)   |
| Racial Identity X Know Group | 0.18<br>(0.30)    | 0.43<br>(0.35)    | -0.36<br>(0.28)   | -0.08<br>(0.23)   |
| Constant                     | 0.89***<br>(0.20) | 0.84***<br>(0.23) | 0.85***<br>(0.14) | 0.80***<br>(0.12) |
| <i>N</i>                     | 50                | 50                | 50                | 50                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Racial identity scaled from 0-1, where 0 represents someone whose race is “not at all important” to their identity and 1 is someone whose race is “Extremely important” to their identity. Here, because policy questions are coded such that higher values are more conservative, black respondents whose racial identity is important when interacted with knowledge of how racial groups bear on a policy, will have a negative coefficient.

Table 17: Issue Attitudes: Racial Identity Important (White Rs Only)

|                              | (1)                | (2)               | (3)               | (4)                |
|------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
|                              | jobs               | ins               | aidblack          | police             |
| Racial Identity              | -0.27*<br>(0.11)   | -0.13<br>(0.13)   | -0.01<br>(0.12)   | -0.06<br>(0.12)    |
| Know Group                   | -0.20***<br>(0.06) | -0.13<br>(0.07)   | -0.22**<br>(0.07) | -0.25***<br>(0.05) |
| Racial Identity X Know Group | 0.56***<br>(0.13)  | 0.39**<br>(0.15)  | 0.31*<br>(0.14)   | 0.36**<br>(0.13)   |
| Constant                     | 0.63***<br>(0.05)  | 0.55***<br>(0.06) | 0.60***<br>(0.06) | 0.73***<br>(0.05)  |
| <i>N</i>                     | 312                | 312               | 312               | 312                |

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Racial identity scaled from 0-1, where 0 represents someone whose race is “not at all important” to their identity and 1 is someone whose race is “Extremely important” to their identity. Positive coefficient on interaction term means that white people who feel closer to whites, when they know group positions, generally have more conservative attitudes.

## 2.6 Effect by Perceived Differences of Group

This section tests a continuous measure of group knowledge: does the effect of group attitudes on issue attitudes increase as people see the groups as further apart from one another on the issue?

Figure 3: Attitude, by Perceived Difference Between Groups




The perception of difference between groups runs along x-axis. Questions are averaged (precision weighted), by year. As people perceive groups to be further apart, group affect correlates more strongly with relative attitude. For example, among respondents that view whites as much more conservative than blacks on government provided health insurance, affect towards whites and blacks correlates more strongly with support/opposition for government provided health insurance.

## 2.7 Projection

We take our results as evidence that voters learn which groups support and oppose group-related from their political context. However, Brady and Sniderman (1985) provide an important alternative explanation for this knowledge: a process of projection. The projection account sees voters' own issue attitudes as the source of their perceptions of the attitudes of social groups.<sup>2</sup> Brady and Sniderman argue that people attribute attitudes that are similar to their own to groups they like and attitudes dissimilar to their own to groups they dislike. For example, a white person who dislikes black people attributes positions to black people that are very unlike the white person's own positions.

Figure 4: **Histograms of racial group placement differences among conservatives.**



The x-axis represents the difference between the placement of black and white people on each issue, with positive numbers indicating black people placed further to the left than white people. We subset the data to 1) people who feel more positively to whites than blacks and 2) people who indicate they are more conservative on each policy item.

Brady and Sniderman provide compelling evidence that projection plays some role in perception of social groups' attitudes. However, the projection account leaves important patterns unexplained. Most importantly, projection cannot account for observed differences in knowledge of a group's positions across different issues (as, for example, in Figure 1).

To illustrate this, consider a group of respondents who a) feel warmer towards white people than black people, b) are conservative on the issue of environment, and c) are conservative on the issue of aid to minorities. How might these people judge the positions of white and black people on these issues? A projection account would predict that on both environment and aid to minorities, they should overwhelmingly attribute more liberal attitudes to black people than white people. In our account, the predictions for the two issues are different: the issue of aid to minorities is linked to racial groups, while the issue of environment is not. Therefore, we expect many respondents to know black people are more liberal than whites on aid to minorities, but we expect fewer respondents to do the same on the issue of environment.

Figure 4 shows the positions attributed to black and white people on environment (on the left) and aid to minorities (on the right) among the subset of respondents to our 2021 NORC survey

<sup>2</sup>That is, the opposite of our account.

who feel warmer towards white people than black people and are conservative on both issues. On the issue of aid to minorities, the pattern both we and the projection account predict is borne out: 85% of respondents know that black people are more liberal than whites. However, on the issue of environment, only 38% place blacks to the left of whites and another 38% of respondents place the racial groups at the same position — a choice that makes little sense if respondents are projecting their attitudes onto the racial groups.

Instead, this pattern fits with our hypothesis that respondents associate government aid to minorities with racial groups to a greater extent than they do environmental policy. While we do not doubt that projection plays some role in perceptions of groups' positions, especially when a person does not know the group's position, the evidence presented in this section suggests that people make meaningful distinctions between issues on the basis of their social group ties.



### 3 Temporal Stability: Additional Results

#### 3.1 Multivariate Regression, Controls

Table 18: Stability with Demographic Controls

|                       | (1)<br>1970s       | (2)<br>1997        | (3)<br>2021        |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Group Correct | -3.09***<br>(0.62) | -4.85***<br>(1.35) | -2.70*<br>(1.24)   |
| South                 | -0.09<br>(0.51)    | -0.08<br>(1.03)    | 1.09<br>(0.83)     |
| BA+                   | -1.56**<br>(0.58)  | -1.44<br>(1.03)    | -2.01*<br>(0.83)   |
| Party ID              | -0.37***<br>(0.11) | -0.46*<br>(0.23)   | -0.15<br>(0.18)    |
| White                 | 0.34<br>(2.60)     | 1.37<br>(3.51)     | 0.02<br>(0.94)     |
| Black                 | 5.36*<br>(2.70)    | 3.83<br>(3.94)     | 0.99<br>(1.47)     |
| Constant              | 18.34***<br>(2.64) | 16.07***<br>(3.71) | 11.38***<br>(1.51) |
| <i>N</i>              | 1466               | 315                | 343                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

#### 3.2 Control for General Political Knowledge

Table 19: **Stability Controlling for General Knowledge**

|                             | (1)<br>1970s       | (2)<br>1997        | (3)<br>2021        |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Group Correct       | -3.59***<br>(0.76) | -4.67***<br>(1.26) | -2.48*<br>(1.23)   |
| General Political Knowledge | -1.52*<br>(0.63)   | -5.16***<br>(1.28) | -2.34*<br>(1.07)   |
| Constant                    | 18.54***<br>(0.54) | 18.49***<br>(1.10) | 12.13***<br>(1.22) |
| <i>N</i>                    | 1550               | 315                | 347                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Temporal Stability controlling for ANES interviewer rated knowledge, 1972-1976 and 1992-1996, only.

Table 20: **Individual FE**

|            | (1)               |
|------------|-------------------|
| Know Group | -0.575<br>(0.565) |
| <i>N</i>   | 9193              |


Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Average attitude stability, pooled with fixed-effects.

### 3.3 Stability, measured by correlations


Figure 5: Stability Correlations between first and last wave



### 3.4 Stability, measured by Group Perceptions

This section divides respondents into those who place the groups accurately, those who place the groups at the same point or say they don't know where the groups stand, and those who place the groups on the wrong side of one another.

Figure 6: Response Instability, by Group Perceptions



Lower values mean more stability (lower standard deviation between responses). We break down respondents who either 1) place whites as more liberal than blacks, 2) respondents who place whites and blacks at same point and 3) whites who place blacks as more CONSERVATIVE. Note the average sample size for those that place blacks as more conservative is very small (observations per sub-group in text next to coefficient) (see also Section 1).

### 3.5 Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks

This section tests whether positive or negative attitudes towards a racial group produce a stronger link between group placement knowledge and stability.

Table 21: Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks (Whites Only)

|                      | Positive Feelings to Blacks |                   |                   | Negative Feelings to Blacks |                    |                    |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                      | (1)<br>1970                 | (2)<br>1997       | (3)<br>2021       | (4)<br>1970                 | (5)<br>1997        | (6)<br>2021        |
| % Place Race Correct | -14.10**<br>(4.53)          | -5.18<br>(4.90)   | -2.50<br>(2.24)   | -3.80***<br>(0.80)          | -9.52***<br>(2.33) | -5.67*<br>(2.56)   |
| Constant             | 26.79***<br>(3.57)          | 13.31**<br>(3.67) | 9.82***<br>(1.83) | 17.47***<br>(0.60)          | 18.97***<br>(1.68) | 14.27***<br>(2.22) |
| <i>N</i>             | 41                          | 22                | 102               | 791                         | 85                 | 83                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Broken down by whether respondent has more positive feelings towards blacks than whites (columns 1-3) and people who have more positive feelings towards whites than blacks (columns 4-6).

### 3.6 Difference in Stability, White v. Black Respondents

Table 22: Stability between White and Black Respondents

|                        | (1)<br>1970s       | (2)<br>1997        | (3)<br>2021        |
|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Race Correct   | -3.10<br>(2.06)    | 6.80<br>(4.61)     | -9.87**<br>(3.43)  |
| White-Black            | -5.67***<br>(1.59) | 4.06<br>(3.26)     | -8.45**<br>(3.08)  |
| White-Black X Pct Race | -0.26<br>(2.16)    | -13.50**<br>(4.80) | 8.83*<br>(3.67)    |
| Constant               | 22.78***<br>(1.52) | 12.17***<br>(3.12) | 17.60***<br>(2.90) |
| <i>N</i>               | 1477               | 316                | 283                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

White-Black variable 0-1 variable coded 1 if respondent is white, and zero if the respondent is black.

## 4 Constraint: Additional Results

### 4.1 Multivariate Regression, Controls

Table 23: Results with Controls

|                      | (1)<br>1970s       | (2)<br>1997        | (3)<br>2020        |
|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Race Correct | -7.92***<br>(0.69) | -2.89<br>(1.52)    | -2.22<br>(1.36)    |
| White                | 2.43<br>(1.73)     | -7.16<br>(4.55)    | -1.19<br>(1.07)    |
| Black                | 1.85<br>(1.90)     | -3.40<br>(4.98)    | 1.57<br>(1.62)     |
| South                | 0.23<br>(0.59)     | -1.70<br>(1.17)    | 0.75<br>(0.93)     |
| BA+                  | -3.99***<br>(0.70) | -4.22***<br>(1.15) | -3.90***<br>(0.92) |
| Party ID             | -0.31*<br>(0.13)   | -0.90***<br>(0.26) | 0.55**<br>(0.20)   |
| Constant             | 30.20***<br>(1.81) | 31.55***<br>(4.72) | 20.45***<br>(1.55) |
| <i>N</i>             | 3922               | 492                | 956                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Pooled responses with controls.

### 4.2 Control for General Knowledge

Table 24: **Results Controlling for Interview Knowledge**

|                      | (1)<br>1970s       | (2)<br>1997        | (3)<br>2020        |
|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Race Correct | -7.90***<br>(0.70) | -3.50*<br>(1.57)   | -2.67<br>(1.91)    |
| Gen Political Knwldg | -2.54***<br>(0.67) | -3.13*<br>(1.54)   | -5.06**<br>(1.63)  |
| Constant             | 32.29***<br>(0.55) | 21.73***<br>(1.37) | 24.05***<br>(1.85) |
| <i>N</i>             | 3924               | 493                | 451                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Pooled responses controlling for general knowledge.

Table 25: **Constraint FE**

|           | (1)                |
|-----------|--------------------|
| Know Race | -5.89***<br>(0.49) |
| <i>N</i>  | 38524              |

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Attitude constraint with individual fixed and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by respondent.



### 4.3 Sub-Group Analysis: Constraint among generally high and low knowledge Respondents


Figure 7: Constraint by General Political Knowledge and Group Knowledge



Each point represents the average standard deviation of issue pairs across all possible issue pairs. Otherwise low knowledge respondents, who know where racial groups stand on issue positions, show as much constraint as otherwise high knowledge respondents. Lower values equal more constraint.

## 4.4 Constraint, measured by Group Perceptions

Figure 8: Constraint by Perceptions of Group Policy Views



Constraint by Perceptions of Group Policy Views

Lower values equal more constraint. Ideological constraint by perceptions of group policy views. Results by respondents who 1) place blacks as more liberal than whites on both questions; 2) those that place blacks and whites at the same position on either question; and 3) those that place blacks as MORE CONSERVATIVE than whites on both questions. Note the average sample size for those that place blacks as more conservative is very small (observations per sub-group in text next to coefficient)(see also Section 1). Pairs with insufficient observations are not plotted.

## 4.5 Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks

Table 26: Positive vs. Negative Feelings towards Blacks (Whites Only)

|                      | Positive Feelings to Blacks |                    |                    | Negative Feelings to Blacks |                    |                     |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
|                      | (1)<br>1970                 | (2)<br>1997        | (3)<br>2021        | (4)<br>1970                 | (5)<br>1997        | (6)<br>2021         |
| % Place Race Correct | 2.64<br>(3.11)              | -2.60<br>(6.15)    | -2.41<br>(2.93)    | -10.04***<br>(0.97)         | -7.68*<br>(3.45)   | -13.68***<br>(3.55) |
| Constant             | 23.28***<br>(2.31)          | 17.62***<br>(4.56) | 19.24***<br>(2.18) | 32.72***<br>(0.72)          | 25.52***<br>(2.68) | 29.66***<br>(2.64)  |
| <i>N</i>             | 175                         | 31                 | 193                | 1958                        | 122                | 175                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Broken down by whether respondent has more positive feelings towards blacks than whites (columns 1-3) and people who have more positive feelings towards whites than blacks (columns 4-6).

## 4.6 Difference in Constraint, White v. Black Respondents

Table 27: Constraint between White and Black Respondents

|                        | (1)<br>1970s       | (2)<br>1997        | (3)<br>2021        |
|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Race Correct   | -7.82***<br>(2.16) | 1.50<br>(5.27)     | 4.01<br>(3.83)     |
| White-Black            | 0.24<br>(1.61)     | -2.14<br>(3.78)    | 2.75<br>(3.02)     |
| White-Black X Pct Race | -0.87<br>(2.27)    | -5.84<br>(5.50)    | -7.89<br>(4.10)    |
| Constant               | 31.08***<br>(1.52) | 21.87***<br>(3.59) | 18.42***<br>(2.86) |
| <i>N</i>               | 3866               | 494                | 762                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

White-Black variable 0-1 variable coded 1 if respondent is white, and zero if the respondent is black.

## 5 Social Sorting & Affective Polarization: Additional Results

### 5.1 Partisan Identity (2021 YouGov)

Table 28: Constraint & Stability by Partisan Identity

|                       | Partisan Identity Import |                     | Partisan Identity Not Import |                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Constraint        | (2)<br>Stability    | (3)<br>Constraint            | (4)<br>Stability   |
| % Place Race Correct  | 4.04<br>(3.17)           | 1.14<br>(1.96)      | -2.20<br>(2.40)              | -0.67<br>(1.65)    |
| % Place Party Correct | -20.06***<br>(3.24)      | -16.64***<br>(2.41) | -7.39**<br>(2.48)            | -4.48*<br>(1.89)   |
| Constant              | 33.27***<br>(3.08)       | 22.91***<br>(2.27)  | 25.47***<br>(2.49)           | 12.66***<br>(1.70) |
| <i>N</i>              | 198                      | 153                 | 232                          | 177                |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Columns 1 and 2 are those respondents who say their partisan identity is important to them. Columns 3 and 4 are those respondents who do not indicate their partisan identity is not important to them.

### 5.2 Party ID & Party Affect

Table 29: Party ID & Party Affect: Constraint

|                       | 1970s              |                     | 1997               |                    | 2021                |                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Aligned     | (2)<br>Unaligned    | (3)<br>Aligned     | (4)<br>Unaligned   | (5)<br>Aligned      | (6)<br>Unaligned   |
| % Place Group Correct | -7.17***<br>(1.09) | -14.40***<br>(3.44) | -1.01<br>(1.88)    | -17.81*<br>(7.75)  | -2.14<br>(1.57)     | 0.32<br>(6.47)     |
| % Place Party Correct | -4.82***<br>(1.07) | -6.16<br>(3.27)     | -6.29**<br>(2.04)  | -16.47*<br>(7.03)  | -11.38***<br>(2.01) | -14.93*<br>(7.09)  |
| Constant              | 32.57***<br>(0.83) | 38.79***<br>(2.50)  | 22.70***<br>(1.63) | 41.51***<br>(6.26) | 30.23***<br>(1.88)  | 35.21***<br>(6.14) |
| <i>N</i>              | 1772               | 213                 | 375                | 27                 | 700                 | 64                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Aligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards Democrats than Republicans (using feeling thermometers). Unaligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards Republicans than Democrats.

Table 30: Party ID & Party Affect: Stability

|                       | 1970s              |                    | 1997               |                   | 2021                |                  |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Aligned     | (2)<br>Unaligned   | (3)<br>Aligned     | (4)<br>Unaligned  | (5)<br>Aligned      | (6)<br>Unaligned |
| % Place Group Correct | -3.79***<br>(1.07) | -5.17<br>(2.80)    | -3.76*<br>(1.69)   | -18.64<br>(13.83) | -0.80<br>(1.37)     | -12.35<br>(7.71) |
| % Place Party Correct | 0.57<br>(0.94)     | 0.09<br>(2.72)     | -4.33*<br>(1.83)   | 9.46<br>(8.13)    | -12.51***<br>(1.60) | -7.60<br>(11.22) |
| Constant              | 17.92***<br>(0.78) | 17.97***<br>(1.63) | 17.38***<br>(1.29) | 21.71*<br>(9.91)  | 20.59***<br>(1.57)  | 26.14*<br>(9.14) |
| <i>N</i>              | 718                | 101                | 238                | 17                | 274                 | 18               |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Aligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards Democrats than Republicans (using feeling thermometers). Unaligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards Republicans than Democrats.

### 5.3 Party ID & Lib-Con Affect

Table 31: Party ID & Lib-Con Affect: Constraint

|                       | 1970s              |                     | 1997               |                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Aligned     | (2)<br>Unaligned    | (3)<br>Aligned     | (4)<br>Unaligned   |
| % Place Party Correct | -7.03***<br>(1.18) | 0.23<br>(1.78)      | -5.40*<br>(2.48)   | -5.28<br>(5.75)    |
| % Place Group Correct | -5.04***<br>(1.24) | -10.73***<br>(1.74) | -5.05*<br>(1.98)   | -12.23<br>(6.10)   |
| Constant              | 31.29***<br>(1.03) | 32.75***<br>(1.33)  | 24.43***<br>(2.37) | 29.39***<br>(4.04) |
| <i>N</i>              | 1308               | 649                 | 278                | 56                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Aligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards liberals than conservatives (using feeling thermometers). Unaligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards conservatives than liberals.

Table 32: Party ID & Lib-Con Affect: Stability

|                       | 1970s              |                    | 1997               |                    |
|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>Aligned     | (2)<br>Unaligned   | (3)<br>Aligned     | (4)<br>Unaligned   |
| % Place Party Correct | -0.86<br>(0.99)    | -1.02<br>(1.49)    | 0.42<br>(2.23)     | 5.88<br>(6.46)     |
| % Place Group Correct | -2.56*<br>(1.13)   | -3.00<br>(1.64)    | -5.12**<br>(1.74)  | -7.99<br>(6.89)    |
| Constant              | 17.00***<br>(0.90) | 17.75***<br>(1.18) | 14.38***<br>(1.93) | 15.38***<br>(4.03) |
| <i>N</i>              | 570                | 307                | 175                | 37                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Aligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards liberals than conservatives (using feeling thermometers). Unaligned respondents are those who are (for example) Democrats who feel warmer towards conservatives than liberals.



## 5.4 Issue Sorting


Table 33: Average Constraint & Stability by Agree or Disagree with Party on Issue

|                       | CONSTRAINT       |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 | STABILITY       |                 |                 |                  |                  |                  |
|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                       | 1970             |                 | 1997            |                 | 2021            |                 | 1970            |                 | 1997            |                  | 2021             |                  |
|                       | Agree<br>(1)     | Disagree<br>(2) | Agree<br>(3)    | Disagree<br>(4) | Agree<br>(5)    | Disagree<br>(6) | Agree<br>(7)    | Disagree<br>(8) | Agree<br>(9)    | Disagree<br>(10) | Agree<br>(11)    | Disagree<br>(12) |
| % Place Group Correct | -4.09<br>(0.43)  | -6.52<br>(0.70) | -1.90<br>(0.86) | -2.34<br>(1.81) | -1.47<br>(0.56) | 2.60<br>(1.88)  | -0.35<br>(0.70) | -5.02<br>(1.00) | -2.99<br>(2.13) | -5.19<br>(1.80)  | 0.30<br>(0.94)   | -1.42<br>(3.62)  |
| % Place Party Correct | -12.16<br>(0.43) | 6.89<br>(0.69)  | -7.46<br>(0.98) | 5.95<br>(1.77)  | -9.43<br>(0.73) | 5.07<br>(1.82)  | -2.90<br>(0.77) | 0.26<br>(0.90)  | -7.60<br>(4.02) | -2.14<br>(2.41)  | -10.98<br>(1.55) | -0.08<br>(4.75)  |
| Avg. Observations     | 583              | 289             | 241             | 104             | 319             | 67              | 283             | 169             | 43              | 44               | 240              | 25               |

For each issue with available data, we analyze people who perceive themselves to be in-line with the national party and share the position of the party (e.g., a racially liberal Democrat), and compare them with respondents who perceive themselves to be misaligned with their national party (e.g., a racially conservative Democrat). We measure perceived alignment as someone who identifies as a Democrat, and perceives their own issue position to be more closely aligned with Democrats than Republicans, as measured by their party-placement. We label those that place their own attitudes closer to the out-party as disagreeing with the party. We limit the 1997 sample to only ideological self-placement and government services spending because these are the only years in which party placement was available in the first wave. Regression coefficients are weighted averages and standard errors are in parentheses.


## 6 Constraint and Stability: Non-Race Social Groups

Figure 9: Constraint by Knowledge of Class-based Social Groups



Note: Data on class-based social groups only available in 1976. **Left Panel:** Lower values equal more constraint. Social groups here are knowledge of where “businessmen” and “poor people” stand on each of the issues in question. **Right Panel:** Robustness checks (see main manuscript for details.)

Figure 10: Stability by Knowledge of Class-based/Culture-based Social Groups



Note: Data on non-race social groups only available in years shown on graph. Question on women equal roles uses gender based knowledge in 1976 (men/women stand on issue) and culture wars based knowledge in 1997 (Christian Fundamentalists/LGBT stand on issue). **Left Panel:** Lower values equal more stability. Social groups here are knowledge of where “businessmen” and “poor people” stand on each of the economic issues in question; where “men” and “women” stand on women equality in 1976; and where Christian Fundamentalists/LGBT people stand for the question on Women Equality in 1997. **Right Panel:** Robustness checks (see main manuscript for details.)

## 6.1 Social Sorting: Non-Race Social Groups

Table 34: Constraint: Party versus Class Knowledge (1976 ANES)

|                       | (1)      | (2)        |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|
|                       | Sorted   | Not Sorted |
| % Place Class Correct | -7.49*   | -11.23**   |
|                       | (3.63)   | (4.21)     |
| % Place Party Correct | -7.82**  | -6.71*     |
|                       | (2.49)   | (3.03)     |
| Constant              | 37.71*** | 39.42***   |
|                       | (2.86)   | (3.30)     |
| <i>N</i>              | 462      | 232        |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table replicates analysis of social sorting in Table 3 of the main manuscript but with class-based social groups and affect. Column 1 are respondents that are socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer affect (measured using group feeling thermometers) to the class based group that aligns with their party (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to poor people than businessmen). Column 2 are respondents that are not socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer to the out-party group (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to businessmen than to poor people).

Table 35: Stability: Party versus Class Knowledge (1970s ANES Panel)

|                       | (1)      | (2)        |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|
|                       | Sorted   | Not Sorted |
| % Place Class Correct | -2.11    | -5.70      |
|                       | (3.35)   | (4.04)     |
| % Place Party Correct | -2.45    | -5.52*     |
|                       | (2.20)   | (2.75)     |
| Constant              | 21.85*** | 26.62***   |
|                       | (2.67)   | (3.26)     |
| <i>N</i>              | 313      | 177        |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table replicates analysis of social sorting in Table 3 of the main manuscript but with class-based social groups and affect. Column 1 are respondents that are socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer affect (measured using group feeling thermometers) to the class based group that aligns with their party (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to poor people than businessmen). Column 2 are respondents that are not socially sorted; that is those respondents that feel warmer to the out-party group (e.g., Democrat that feels warmer to businessmen than to poor people).

Table 36: Stability: Party versus Culture War Groups Knowledge (1990s ANES Panel)

|                   | (1)<br>Sorted      | (2)<br>Not Sorted  |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Know Culture Grps | 2.20<br>(2.92)     | -3.72<br>(3.96)    |
| Know Party        | -1.59<br>(2.74)    | -0.10<br>(3.74)    |
| Constant          | 10.52***<br>(2.37) | 17.96***<br>(3.69) |
| <i>N</i>          | 120                | 75                 |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Replicates social sorting (see section 4 of main manuscript) with the question of gender equality in the 1997 sample. Uses affect towards fundamentalist Christians and LGBT people and knowledge of where those groups stand on question of gender equality.

## 7 Knowledge of Ideological Groups

Table 37: Constraint

|                         | (1)                | (2)                | (3)                |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Lib-Con Correct | -7.59***<br>(1.25) |                    | -6.84***<br>(1.34) |
| % Place Group Correct   |                    | -4.84***<br>(1.34) | -2.12<br>(1.42)    |
| Constant                | 26.82***<br>(0.80) | 26.21***<br>(0.98) | 27.75***<br>(1.03) |
| <i>N</i>                | 1568               | 1567               | 1564               |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table compares the effect of ideology and group knowledge on constraint. Data available only for 1976 for questions regarding whether 1) government should guarantee jobs or 2) rights of the accused and thus should be interpreted with caution when compared to the tables in the main manuscript.

Table 38: Stability

|                         | (1)                | (2)                | (3)                |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| % Place Lib-Con Correct | -5.47***<br>(0.77) |                    | -5.64***<br>(0.89) |
| % Place Group Correct   |                    | -4.30***<br>(1.01) | -1.41<br>(1.09)    |
| Constant                | 21.37***<br>(0.53) | 21.33***<br>(0.78) | 22.36***<br>(0.83) |
| <i>N</i>                | 1190               | 1102               | 1007               |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table compares the effect of ideology and group knowledge on stability. Data available only for 1976 for questions regarding whether 1) government should guarantee jobs or 2) rights of the accused and thus should be interpreted with caution when compared to the tables in the main manuscript.

## 8 Survey Demographics & Question Wording

### 8.1 Survey Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for surveys used. The 2020 ANES pre-election survey — which is not used in the study because it lacks the relevant questions — is included for comparison purposes.

Table 39: NORC-Amerispeak Mar/April 2021

|    | Statistic        | Obs    | Mean  | SD    | Min   | Max   |
|----|------------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1  | BA               | 565.00 | 0.36  | 0.48  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 2  | White            | 565.00 | 0.65  | 0.48  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 3  | Black            | 565.00 | 0.12  | 0.32  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 4  | Hispanic         | 565.00 | 0.15  | 0.35  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 5  | Asian Pac Island | 565.00 | 0.04  | 0.21  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 6  | Male             | 565.00 | 0.49  | 0.50  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 7  | Age              | 565.00 | 48.06 | 17.70 | 18.00 | 91.00 |
| 8  | Party            | 557.00 | 3.83  | 2.19  | 1.00  | 7.00  |
| 9  | Party FT         | 561.00 | -0.08 | 0.50  | -1.00 | 1.00  |
| 10 | Race FT          | 560.00 | -0.02 | 0.22  | -1.00 | 1.00  |
| 11 | Aid Blacks       | 509.00 | 0.41  | 0.31  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 12 | Immigration      | 486.00 | 0.55  | 0.32  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 13 | Environment      | 516.00 | 0.26  | 0.28  | 0.00  | 1.00  |

Table 40: YouGov Mar/April 2021

|    | Statistic        | Obs    | Mean  | SD    | Min   | Max   |
|----|------------------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1  | BA               | 451.00 | 0.32  | 0.47  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 2  | White            | 451.00 | 0.68  | 0.47  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 3  | Black            | 451.00 | 0.11  | 0.32  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 4  | Hispanic         | 451.00 | 0.14  | 0.34  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 5  | Asian Pac Island | 451.00 | 0.02  | 0.15  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 6  | Male             | 451.00 | 0.49  | 0.50  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 7  | Age              | 451.00 | 50.05 | 17.78 | 19.00 | 92.00 |
| 8  | Party            | 447.00 | 3.80  | 2.34  | 1.00  | 7.00  |
| 9  | Party FT         | 443.00 | -0.01 | 0.61  | -1.00 | 1.00  |
| 10 | Race FT          | 447.00 | -0.03 | 0.27  | -1.00 | 0.99  |
| 11 | Aid Blacks       | 451.00 | 0.46  | 0.37  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 12 | Defund Police    | 451.00 | 0.59  | 0.30  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 13 | Gov't Jobs       | 451.00 | 0.51  | 0.34  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 14 | Gov't Ins        | 451.00 | 0.46  | 0.39  | 0.00  | 1.00  |

Table 41: ANES 1997

| Statistic     | N   | Mean  | St. Dev. | Min   | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max   |
|---------------|-----|-------|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|
| BA            | 550 | 0.31  | 0.46     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| White         | 549 | 0.90  | 0.30     | 0.00  | 1.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Black         | 549 | 0.08  | 0.27     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Hispanic      | 551 | 0.09  | 0.28     | 0     | 0        | 0        | 1     |
| Party ID      | 539 | 3.78  | 2.14     | 1.00  | 2.00     | 6.00     | 7.00  |
| Age           | 550 | 49.35 | 16.91    | 18.00 | 36.00    | 62.75    | 91.00 |
| Male          | 334 | 0.44  | 0.50     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| South         | 551 | 0.34  | 0.47     | 0     | 0        | 1        | 1     |
| Party FT      | 549 | -0.06 | 0.41     | -1.00 | -0.30    | 0.20     | 1.00  |
| Race FT       | 532 | 0.05  | 0.16     | -0.50 | 0.00     | 0.10     | 0.70  |
| Gov Serv/Sp   | 478 | 0.48  | 0.25     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.67     | 1.00  |
| Aid Blacks    | 511 | 0.64  | 0.26     | 0.00  | 0.50     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Women Eq Role | 517 | 0.24  | 0.28     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.50     | 1.00  |
| Ideology      | 441 | 0.54  | 0.23     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.67     | 1.00  |

Table 42: ANES 1976

| Statistic  | N     | Mean  | St. Dev. | Min   | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max   |
|------------|-------|-------|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|
| BA         | 2,237 | 0.15  | 0.36     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| White      | 2,230 | 0.87  | 0.33     | 0.00  | 1.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Black      | 2,230 | 0.10  | 0.30     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Party ID   | 2,218 | 3.61  | 1.96     | 1.00  | 2.00     | 5.00     | 7.00  |
| Age        | 2,234 | 45.62 | 18.20    | 18.00 | 29.00    | 60.00    | 99.00 |
| Male       | 2,248 | 0.42  | 0.49     | 0     | 0        | 1        | 1     |
| South      | 2,248 | 0.26  | 0.44     | 0     | 0        | 1        | 1     |
| Party FT   | 1,839 | -0.05 | 0.25     | -0.97 | -0.15    | 0.00     | 0.97  |
| Race FT    | 1,843 | 0.13  | 0.23     | -0.97 | 0.00     | 0.27     | 0.97  |
| Gov't Jobs | 1,790 | 0.57  | 0.33     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Gov't Ins  | 1,769 | 0.50  | 0.39     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Rts Accuse | 1,845 | 0.55  | 0.35     | 0.00  | 0.17     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Aid Blacks | 1,851 | 0.55  | 0.33     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Busing     | 1,987 | 0.85  | 0.28     | 0.00  | 0.83     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Ideology   | 1,506 | 0.54  | 0.22     | 0.00  | 0.50     | 0.67     | 1.00  |



Table 43: ANES 1972

| Statistic  | N     | Mean  | St. Dev. | Min   | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max   |
|------------|-------|-------|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|
| BA         | 2,702 | 0.13  | 0.34     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| White      | 2,705 | 0.88  | 0.33     | 0     | 1        | 1        | 1     |
| Black      | 2,705 | 0.10  | 0.30     | 0     | 0        | 0        | 1     |
| Party ID   | 2,695 | 3.62  | 1.97     | 1.00  | 2.00     | 5.00     | 7.00  |
| Age        | 2,688 | 44.38 | 17.74    | 17.00 | 28.00    | 58.00    | 98.00 |
| Male       | 2,705 | 0.43  | 0.50     | 0     | 0        | 1        | 1     |
| South      | 2,705 | 0.26  | 0.44     | 0     | 0        | 1        | 1     |
| Party FT   | 2,111 | -0.03 | 0.27     | -0.97 | -0.15    | 0.10     | 0.97  |
| Race FT    | 2,118 | 0.13  | 0.25     | -0.97 | 0.00     | 0.27     | 0.97  |
| Gov't Jobs | 2,131 | 0.55  | 0.34     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Gov't Ins  | 1,112 | 0.48  | 0.41     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Rts Accuse | 1,940 | 0.53  | 0.35     | 0.00  | 0.17     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Aid Blacks | 2,001 | 0.54  | 0.33     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Busing     | 2,491 | 0.87  | 0.28     | 0.00  | 1.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Ideology   | 1,548 | 0.52  | 0.21     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.67     | 1.00  |

Table 44: ANES 2020 Pre-Election (Weighted)

|    | Statistic        | Obs     | Mean  | SD    | Min   | Max   |
|----|------------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1  | BA               | 8149.00 | 0.37  | 0.48  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 2  | White            | 8178.00 | 0.65  | 0.48  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 3  | Black            | 8178.00 | 0.12  | 0.32  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 4  | Hispanic         | 8178.00 | 0.14  | 0.34  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 5  | Asian Pac Island | 8178.00 | 0.04  | 0.20  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 6  | Male             | 8213.00 | 0.48  | 0.50  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 7  | Age              | 7926.00 | 48.49 | 17.76 | 18.00 | 80.00 |
| 8  | Party            | 8245.00 | 3.87  | 2.26  | 1.00  | 7.00  |
| 9  | Party FT         | 8116.00 | -0.02 | 0.59  | -1.00 | 1.00  |
| 10 | Aid Blacks       | 7403.00 | 0.46  | 0.34  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 11 | Gov't Jobs       | 7322.00 | 0.52  | 0.33  | 0.00  | 1.00  |
| 12 | Gov't Ins        | 7352.00 | 0.46  | 0.36  | 0.00  | 1.00  |

Table 45: ANES 2020 Pre-Election (Unweighted)

| Statistic          | N     | Mean  | St. Dev. | Min   | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max   |
|--------------------|-------|-------|----------|-------|----------|----------|-------|
| BA                 | 8,149 | 0.45  | 0.50     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| White              | 8,178 | 0.73  | 0.44     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Black              | 8,178 | 0.09  | 0.28     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Non-White Hispanic | 8,178 | 0.09  | 0.29     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Asian Pac Island   | 8,178 | 0.03  | 0.18     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Party ID           | 8,245 | 3.89  | 2.25     | 1.00  | 2.00     | 6.00     | 7.00  |
| Age                | 7,926 | 51.57 | 17.19    | 18.00 | 37.00    | 66.00    | 80.00 |
| Male               | 8,213 | 0.46  | 0.50     | 0.00  | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Party FT           | 8,116 | -0.02 | 0.59     | -1.00 | -0.55    | 0.55     | 1.00  |
| Gov't Jobs         | 7,322 | 0.53  | 0.32     | 0.00  | 0.33     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Gov't Ins          | 7,352 | 0.46  | 0.35     | 0.00  | 0.17     | 0.83     | 1.00  |
| Aid Blacks         | 7,403 | 0.46  | 0.34     | 0.00  | 0.17     | 0.67     | 1.00  |

## 8.2 Survey Questions

### 8.2.1 NORC-Amerispeak

1. First, we'd like to ask for your feelings towards several groups of people using a "feeling thermometer." We'll ask you to place your feelings towards each group on a scale from "very warm" to "very cold." If you don't have any warm or cold feelings towards a group, please select "neither warm nor cold."

How warm or cold do you feel towards [black/white/Democrats/Republicans] people?

2. Next, we'd like to ask you some questions about issues in the news these days. Some people feel the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased. Others feel the number should be decreased.

Where would you place [yourself/most white people/most black people/most Democrats/most Republicans] on this scale?

- (a) 1. Number of immigrants permitted should be increased a lot
  - (b) 2. Number of immigrants permitted should be somewhat increased
  - (c) 3. Number of immigrants permitted should be slightly increased
  - (d) 4. Number of immigrants permitted should be kept the same
  - (e) 5. Number of immigrants permitted should be slightly decreased
  - (f) 6. Number of immigrants permitted should be somewhat decreased
  - (g) 7. Number of immigrants permitted should be decreased a lot
  - (h) 8. Don't know/not sure
3. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves.

Where would you place [yourself/most white people/most black people/most Democrats/most Republicans] on this scale?

- (a) 1. Government should help minorities far more
- (b) 2. Government should help minorities somewhat more
- (c) 3. Government should help minorities slightly more
- (d) 4. Government help for minorities should stay the same
- (e) 5. Government should help minorities slightly less
- (f) 6. Government should help minorities somewhat less

- (g) 7. Government should help minorities far less
  - (h) 8. Don't know/not sure
4. Next, we'd like to ask you some questions about which political party is more favorable to several different social groups.

Which party do you think is more favorable to [black/white] people?

- (a) Republican Party
  - (b) Democratic Party
  - (c) Neither
  - (d) Don't know
5. Experimental Treatment A (1/3 respondents): We'd like to know whether or not you've heard much about an issue in the news these days.

Most people don't think of environmental policy as a racial issue. But new research shows that racial minorities are exposed to much more air pollution, like soot, smog, and car exhaust, than white people are.

In fact, there's a long history of pollution contributors like toxic waste dumps and petrochemical facilities being located near neighborhoods where racial minorities, especially African Americans, live. That may help explain why today, most African Americans support stronger environmental regulations.

How much have you heard about this topic in the news lately?

6. Experimental Treatment B (1/3 respondents): We'd like to know whether or not you've heard much about an issue in the news these days.

Many people don't think of environmental policy as a top priority. But new research shows that millions of Americans are at risk for cancer from air pollution, like soot, smog, and car exhaust.

In fact, there's a long history of pollution contributors like toxic waste dumps and petrochemical facilities being located near neighborhoods where many Americans live. That may help explain why today, most Americans say stronger environmental regulations would be worth the cost.

How much have you heard about this topic in the news lately?

7. Experimental Treatment C (1/3 respondents): Pure control (nothing shown).

8. Finally, we'd like to ask you some questions about a few more issues. Some people think that we need stronger regulation to protect the environment. Others think government regulations are already too strong and should be reduced.

Where would you place [yourself/most white people/most black people/most Democrats/most Republicans] on this scale?

- (a) 1. Environmental regulations should be strengthened a great deal
- (b) 2. Environmental regulations should be strengthened somewhat
- (c) 3. Environmental regulations should be strengthened slightly
- (d) 4. Environmental regulation should be kept the same
- (e) 5. Environmental regulations should be reduced slightly
- (f) 6. Environmental regulations should be reduced somewhat
- (g) 7. Environmental regulations should be reduced a great deal
- (h) 8. Don't know/not sure

### 8.2.2 YouGov Panel

1. Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own.

Where would you place [yourself/most white people/most black people/most Democrats/most Republicans] on this scale?

- (a) 1. Government should see to jobs and standard of living.
- (b) 2.
- (c) 3.
- (d) 4.
- (e) 5.
- (f) 6.
- (g) 7. Government should let each person get ahead on their own.
- (h) 8. Don't know/Unsure [Not prompted]

2. Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own.

**Please do not answer this question (and just go to the next question by clicking the arrow below).**

- (a) 1. Government should see to jobs and standard of living.
- (b) 2.
- (c) 3.
- (d) 4.
- (e) 5.

- (f) 6.
  - (g) 7. Government should let each person get ahead on their own.
  - (h) 8. Don't know/Unsure [Not prompted]
3. Many people are talking about the role of police departments in society. Some people think that funding for police should be eliminated entirely and that money should instead be invested in mental health, education and other social services. Others think that funding for police departments should be increased dramatically. Still others fall somewhere in between.

Where would you place [yourself/most white people/most black people/most Democrats/most Republicans] on this scale?

- (a) 1. Completely eliminate funding for police and invest that money in social services
  - (b) 2.
  - (c) 3.
  - (d) 4.
  - (e) 5.
  - (f) 6.
  - (g) 7. Dramatically increase funding for police departments.
  - (h) 8. Don't know/Unsure [Not prompted]
4. There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some feel there should be a government health insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals, and through private insurance or other company paid plans.

Where would you place [yourself/most white people/most black people/most Democrats/most Republicans] on this scale?

- (a) 1. Government insurance plan
- (b) 2.
- (c) 3.
- (d) 4.
- (e) 5.
- (f) 6.
- (g) 7. Private insurance plan
- (h) 8. Don't know/Unsure [Not prompted]

5. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves.

Where would you place [yourself/most white people/most black people/most Democrats/most Republicans] on this scale?

- (a) 1. Government should help minority groups
  - (b) 2.
  - (c) 3.
  - (d) 4.
  - (e) 5.
  - (f) 6.
  - (g) 7. Minority groups should help themselves
  - (h) 8. Don't know/Unsure [Not prompted]
6. We'd like to ask for your feelings towards several groups of people using a "feeling thermometer." We'll ask you to place your feelings towards each group on a scale from "Very warm" to "Very cold." If you don't have any warm or cold feelings towards a group, please select "Neither warm nor cold."
- How warm or cold do you feel towards most [black people/white people/Republicans/Democrats]?
7. Which party do you think is more favorable to [black/white] people?
- (a) Republican Party
  - (b) Democratic Party
  - (c) Neither
  - (d) Don't know
8. For how many years is a United States Senator elected – that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? [R types number]
9. Which political party currently has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives?
- (a) Democrats
  - (b) Republicans
  - (c) Each party holds the same number of seats
  - (d) Don't know
10. How important is being [pipe in respondent race] to your identity?

- (a) Extremely important
- (b) Very important
- (c) Moderately important
- (d) A little important
- (e) Not at all important

11. How important is being [pipe in respondent party identification] to your identity?

- (a) Extremely important
- (b) Very important
- (c) Moderately important
- (d) A little important
- (e) Not at all important



## Chapter 2 Appendix

### Pilot Experiments

A key next step in this research agenda is to test the proposition that increasing a person's sense of power makes them more willing to engage in political activity. To do this, I have tested two experimental designs: a story treatment, modeled on lab experiments that manipulate social power; and a training treatment, modeled on growth mindset experiments that manipulate perceptions of control. In both cases, the treatments did not reliably increase the sense of power, and they did not significantly increase subjects' willingness to participate in politics.

#### **Story treatment**

Lab experiments on social power often manipulate the sense of power by asking people to think of a time at which they felt powerful/powerless. However, literature suggests that online survey takers are very familiar with and strongly dislike this manipulation, and as a result, it no longer works consistently on this population (Rinderknecht 2019). My alternative treatment asked subjects to read a story in which they were described as having more or less control over a situation.

In this survey experiment, respondents first read the high or low power treatment story. Both stories described the reader as a witness to an automobile accident, but varied whether the reader was described as an active leader in a rescue attempt or a passive observer. They then answered a manipulation check battery, with questions measuring general power, social power, and political efficacy. Finally, respondents answered an outcome battery, with questions about their willingness to participate in various forms of political activity. All respondents were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk.

Using the state power measures, the high power treatment (relative to low power) may have had a significant positive effect on the general sense of power and social power, but the effect was quite small and did not appear reliably across samples. It did not increase political efficacy. In no case did the treatments significantly increase respondents' willingness to participate in politics. Effect sizes on all outcome measures and an index of the outcome measures were close to zero and of varying signs.

#### **Training treatment**

I also designed a treatment modeled on growth mindset trainings in the educational psychology literature. In these trainings, designed to increase subjects' sense of control over their educational outcomes, subjects read information about how effort can lead to higher test scores, grades, and intelligence. My training contained information encouraging subjects to feel more in control over life outcomes more generally.

In the experiment, subjects assigned to the treatment condition worked through a 5-8 minute online training with information about how much control people have over outcomes in their lives, how feeling powerful can lead to better life outcomes, and strategies for feeling more in control. Subjects then answered a block of manipulation check questions measuring state power and a block of outcome questions measuring willingness to participate in political activities. Subjects in the control condition answered the power and participation questions before working through the training.

Subjects were recruited via a Facebook ad targeted at people interested in self-help/self-

improvement. Most respondents seemed to take the training seriously based on their open-ended responses, and their feedback was overall positive.

The treatment did not successfully increase feelings of power; the difference in power between treatment and control groups was insignificant and imprecisely estimated, but was the opposite of the expected direction. The same is true for participation outcomes.

## Chapter 3 Appendix

### Supplemental Figures

Table A1: Correlations Between Items

|              | Who I am | Feel at home | Drive around | Belong there | Advantages | Jealous |
|--------------|----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------|---------|
| Who I am     | 1        | 0.628        | 0.363        | 0.605        | 0.448      | 0.408   |
| Feel at home | 0.628    | 1            | 0.324        | 0.801        | 0.495      | 0.344   |
| Drive around | 0.363    | 0.324        | 1            | 0.344        | 0.231      | 0.162   |
| Belong there | 0.605    | 0.801        | 0.344        | 1            | 0.525      | 0.385   |
| Advantages   | 0.448    | 0.495        | 0.231        | 0.525        | 1          | 0.595   |
| Jealous      | 0.408    | 0.344        | 0.162        | 0.385        | 0.595      | 1       |
| Live forever | 0.537    | 0.656        | 0.128        | 0.710        | 0.555      | 0.463   |

Table A2: Correlations Between Subcomponents

|                 | Ext. Evaluation | Rootedness | Commitment | Gen. Attachment |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------|------------|-----------------|
| Ext. Evaluation | 1               | 0.216      | 0.565      | 0.544           |
| Rootedness      | 0.216           | 1          | 0.128      | 0.386           |
| Commitment      | 0.565           | 0.128      | 1          | 0.715           |
| Gen. Attachment | 0.544           | 0.386      | 0.715      | 1               |

Figure A1: Strength of Identity by Subscale

