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Journal

Institute of Urban and Regional Development

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Publication Date

1980-06-01

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Working Paper 326
June 1980

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This paper was presented at the International Regional Science Association meetings, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 16-18, 1980. This research was made possible in part by a sabbatical supported by the University of California. The author would like to thank in particular Marc Weiss, Doreen Massey, Pierre Vilar, Linda Collins, and Madeline Landau, for helpful conversations on the ideas presented within. She is also grateful to the Institute of Urban and Regional Development for staff support.

ABSTRACT

The region is not a generalizable concept found among the basic abstract categories of a Marxist analysis, because it is a physical entity, not a form of social relations. Regions, in a Marxist theory of capitalist development, are territorial arenas for the evolution of capitalist social relations and are of interest in themselves only as empirical phenomena whose identifying features and significance vary from case to case. Regionalism, on the other hand, can more easily be handled theoretically. Its definition requires a territorial dimension, a political claim on the State, and the presence of one or more types of conflict arising from social relations in civil society. Both Marxists and nonMarxists have too readily made fetishes of regions in the past, resulting in the implication that social relations of place exist in which one place exploits another. This type of analysis fuses the role of the State with the social relations found within and across territories. In order to understand the regional patterning of capitalist development, including regional struggles, Marxists must incorporate a theory of the State and pursue concrete analyses of cases of regionalism.

I. Introduction

The concepts of region and regionalism have assumed an uneasy place in the Marxist theory of capitalist development. In this paper, I tackle the task of clarifying the uses and misuses of the regional category for Marxists. In the following section, I inquire into the social relations that underlie regional concerns, arguing that the notion of region cannot be given the same theoretical status that class, gender, and certain cultural categories hold in the Marxist lexicon, but that it may be possible to posit abstractly a workable definition of regionalism. The following section explores the multiple roots of regional social relations that may form the basis for regionalism: economic relations from the structure of the mode of production, household material relations from the mode of reproduction of labor, and cultural social relations. In the fourth section, I cover the special case of the State, arguing that the State has its own particular set of social relations which play a central role in regionalism. Building on these elements, in Section V I propose a Marxist definition of regionalism, using notions of territoriality, one or more of several possible sets of regional social relations, and political claims on some arm of the State. In Section VI, I reconsider the question of the meaning of region in Marxist analysis, trying to move from the definition of regionalism to that of region. Here I conclude that regions exist and are meaningful for Marxists only as empirical phenomena which must be subjected to concrete, historical, case-by-case analysis. Both Marxist and non-Marxist research is taken to task for making fetishes of regions and implicitly suggesting that regions are economic actors within a sort of social relations of place, where one place exploits another. Finally, I draw out the implications for ongoing Marxist research on regional development under capitalism.

II. Regions and Regionalism as Social Relations

Marxists engaged in research on regional development problems find themselves on borrowed terrain. The concept of region, and its study in what is known as regional science, is not a fundamental Marxist category. Since Marxist theory builds upon the model of mode of production and has a commitment to preserving a coherent social science framework which moves from this general model to more specific phenomena, Marxist theorists cannot work with a theoretical concept, such as region, without trying to map it back onto the basic categories of Marxist theory and development theory in particular.

Whether or not this theoretical exercise can be accomplished, entities called regions have been and are an important, sometimes primary, object of human struggle. Marxist development theory is obliged to confront this empirical reality. But for Marxists, the significance of a region lies in the struggles over and within it, not the entity *per se*. If regions were not the basis of or arena for conflict, the study of them would be uninteresting and perhaps nonexistent. The purpose of a workable Marxist definition of region, then, is to capture the causes of and grounds for such conflict. Such a definition must affirm the existence of the social relations of regions.

Unlike the definitions of State¹ and class, which refer unambiguously to social groups or hierarchies, the definition of region is problematic for Marxists from the outset.² Region connotes a territorial, not sociological, entity.³ The primacy of social relations in Marxist analysis requires either that territorial units correspond one-on-one with social relations, or that the use of region as a category of analysis be subordinated to categories of social relations. If the latter practice is required, then regions cannot be spoken of abstractly in a Marxist analysis, but must always be identified by the social relations that characterize them in a given instance. In other words, their concrete historical context must be given.

Both formally and informally, Marxists have sometimes slipped into the use of region as an abstract conceptual category. The most explicit argument for the existence of spatial relations of production is found in Soja (1978), where he implies that places have theoretically specifiable relations with one another. Less explicitly, Marxists, along with their social science and journalistic counterparts, frequently fall into language that characterizes regions as active agents in the development process. For instance, we might say that the Southern region is experiencing uneven development, or worse, that the South is attracting jobs away from the North. Here the notions of "region" and "job" become substitutes for the economic actors—capital and labor—which Marxist theory specifies as the active agents in the development process. I will try to show throughout this paper that the use of region as a theoretical category is fundamentally unMarxist, and that regions cannot be unambiguously equated abstractly with any set of social relations. If so, then Marxists must develop a more innovative vocabulary for talking about the phenomenon of regional conflict in a theoretical way.

Two definitional possibilities exist. One is to eschew the noun "region" and to use only the adjective "regional" to qualify other categories. This subordinates the spatial to the social.

¹Here and throughout I use the capitalized "State" to refer to the Marxist characterization of the entire political apparatus in a capitalist society, while the word "state" refers to American subfederal political entities.

²This is not true of regional science, which has produced an extensive if inconclusive literature on the definition of region. See Appendix I, Social Science Definitions of Region, of the author's forthcoming book *Regional Political Economy*.

³I will assume throughout this paper that the terms "region" and "regional" apply to any bounded and definite territory larger than a labor market area, i.e., an SMSA. Metropolitan units, small towns, and neighborhoods I leave to the description "city" and "urban." Note that this delineation includes everything from a province or state to a nation or set of nations like the EEC and territorial units without formal political existence as well (e.g., Appalachia). This usage comes from common practice (urban and regional planning) and captures only the physical dimension of the terms. It is not a substantive definition, which is the subject of the subsequent sections.

For instance, if we say "regional development," we mean development in its concrete territorial form, not the development of regions themselves. The reification of space does not occur. But perhaps more useful is the concept of regionalism, that is, the espousal of a territorial claim by some social group. Regionalism is a social phenomenon, about which it may be possible to make some theoretical statements and to endow with an abstract meaning. If regionalism turns out to be a complex social phenomenon, we may be able to specify the various forms that it may take, drawn from empirical observations. In the following sections, I will employ the term regionalism rather than region, because it focuses more directly on the territorial social conflicts that are the concern of Marxist analysis of regional development. While regionalism is clearly a subjective and experiential term, it may also refer to the objective social dynamics which cause territorial differences in social formations.

We can investigate the social relations that constitute regionalism by beginning with the Marxist notion of alienation. The notion of alienation compares the reality of human experience with an ideal in which the human community exists free of any institution or relation in which one group is denied full access to the fruits of their efforts or to the collective shaping of community culture. One form of alienation exists when a division of labor in material production develops in which one group (designated a class) compels another group or class, through control over the means of production, to labor to support both groups. This particular division of labor and exploitation of one class by another constitutes the basis of the Marxist analysis of the mode of production. Examples of modes are slavery in the classical era (slaves and slaveowners), feudalism in the Middle Ages (serfs and landlords), and capitalism in contemporary times (wage workers and capitalists). In detail, Marx investigated the division of labor in the capitalist production of commodities, working out analytically the organization of the capitalist workplace, in which capitalists, who own the means of production and control the work process, exploit workers, who were forced to sell their labor power at a wage lower than the value of what they produce. Capitalist organization involves the appropriation of the product of labor from the worker, as well as the worker's loss of control over working conditions and the community guarantee of material security in childhood and old age.

While Marx's analysis of the capitalist workplace was brilliant, systematic, and historically valid, it tackled only one sphere of human existence and only one of several generic institutions in which alienation takes place. Followers of Marx have frequently equated the Marxist method of dialectical materialism with the primacy of the capitalist workplace in contemporary society. In fact, such an interpretation (while it may not be untrue to Marx) is unnecessarily restrictive.⁴ Materialism, as the basic Marxist postulate about human behavior, refers to a preoccupation with the material reproduction of human life and society, which is not synonymous with production of use values alone. In understanding regionalism, I have found it necessary to apply Marxist analysis to those additional sets of institutions which together with production govern relationships within the human community: the household, the State, and the set of cultural institutions.⁵ Each of these has significant interrelationships with the capitalist workplace and its social relations, but has an organization of the expenditure and appropriation of human labor time that differs from capitalist production relations. These may be the subject of struggle, regional or otherwise, sometimes linked with labor or socialist struggles, sometimes antagonistic to them.

⁴For one version of the argument that a Marxist materialist analysis does not require that mode of production be the primary human social relation that characterizes a society, see Hartmann and Markusen (1980). Their position is that it is erroneous to assume abstractly that there must be *one* dominant set of social relations in any society in any era. For instance, in the analysis of capitalism, many Marxists ignore or belittle the continuation of patriarchy and the exploitation of women's labor power in the patriarchal household, coincident with exploitation of wage labor, on the grounds that such exploitation is subordinate to, or even caused by, capitalist exploitation. A similar argument regarding culture may be found in Collins (1978).

⁵Some Marxists contend that the existence of institutions *per se* signals exploitation and oppression, since otherwise there would be no need for them, as in the theory of the withering away of the State. While this position is attractive, especially when forcefully argued by scholars such as Stanley Diamond, I prefer not to employ this restrictive definition of institution, contending that nonexploitative social organizations with a division of labor may indeed exist.

Any one of these institutions, if it involves oppression or exploitation, can be a form of alienation from the human community.⁶ For expository purposes, we will separate the institutions into two groups: those that concern the expenditure of human labor power directly in production and reproduction, and those that encompass the political and cultural life of the community. Since each has its role in the analysis of regionalism, I will focus in the next section on each in turn, but warn that it is frequently the interrelationships among these institutions that underlie the struggles over regionalism.

⁶Both exploitation and oppression refer to forms of alienation. Exploitation generally refers to the appropriation of labor power or other economic resources. Oppression is a more general term, which can include the appropriation and domination of other forms of human activity and resources, where one group controls a set of institutions which determine the content of human experience at the expense of another group.

III. The Multiple Roots of Regional Social Relations

The Mode of Production

The organization of human society is fundamentally structured around one or more modes of production, which govern the social relations and techniques of production involved in the production of use values with human labor.⁷ It is not merely the mode of production itself, but a number of features of its economic and social structure that can serve as the basis for the evolution of regionalism. These latter include the territorial incidence of class structure, the territorial pattern of production sectors, the differential degrees of development of the productive forces across regions and of development of social relations of production across regions.

Specifying the mode or modes of production that characterize societies experiencing regionalism is clearly the appropriate starting point. For instance, an understanding of contemporary regionalism in the United States requires exploration of at least three modes of production: primitive communism (Native Americans), slavery (the South prior to the Civil War), and capitalism (the North, originally, and currently the entire economy). The first two did not exist in pure form, but were shaped by capitalism in its ascendancy, at least insofar as they have figured in regional struggles. Capitalism, moreover, needs to be understood through several stages of its development: petty commodity production (a survival of the passage from feudalism to capitalism), primitive accumulation and mercantile capitalism, and industrial capitalism, now characterized as monopoly capitalism. Each stage has produced a different array of productive forces and social classes. The clash of people with positions in different modes may become a regional struggle, depending on the territorial placement of each. For instance, the Native American defense against European colonialism and the Southern slaveholders' defense against Northern industrial capitalism both became regional struggles because of the spatial concentration of each protagonist group.

Even within a mode, such as capitalism, it is possible for classes to be unevenly distributed territorially, so that class conflicts take on a regional form. Working-class communities facing absentee mine owners, for instance, become class-based regional struggles (*e.g.*, South Africa, Appalachia). Similarly, differences in sectoral composition of production across territories may result in conflicts between needs of classes in different sectors. For instance, in the United States today, corporations in the energy sector in the West find their needs conflicting with the needs of the manufacturing sector in the East. Sometimes class and sectoral differences coincide. An example is the struggle between western family farmers and eastern capitalist interests (finance, railroads, steel, manufacturing in general) in the nineteenth-century United States.

Finally, spatial differentiation in the development of a mode of production may serve as the substance of a regional conflict. Differential development of the productive forces of capitalism, for instance the level of sophistication of technology, may result in regional antagonisms between capitalist classes or coalitions of classes. Or differential development of social relations, such as the territorial incidence of unionization or community organization for collective consumption, may provoke conflict between regional fractions of the working class or, again, among coalitions of classes. The current working-class espousal of regionally targeted programs for the Northeastern United States may be traced to the advanced degree of capitalist development in that area. The highly skilled labor force is militantly organized to demand its share of output and a high level of social services, which in turn has encouraged capital to move to areas where social relations and productive forces are less well developed.

⁷I assume that it is not necessary here to explain the mode of production nor the specific types that have been identified empirically by Marxist scholars. For useful discussions, see Hobsbaum, 1964; Foster-Carter, 1978; and Balibar, 1971.

It is important to note that these aspects of the mode of production may not be territorially differentiated at all. Or they may be differentiated but may not form the basis for a regional struggle. Thus in themselves they cannot define a *region*, nor define *regionalism*. A particular regional struggle may be attributable solely to one or another of these features, or to a combination, but still the features do not yield an abstract definition of regionalism. If regionalism has an abstract and generalizable meaning, then it must be located in an institution or human practice *other* than the mode of production *per se*.

The Mode of Reproduction of People

A second human institution, companion to but more ancient than the first, is the mode of reproduction of labor power⁸ (or more generally, people).⁹ Like the mode of production, the reproduction of people has its counterpart social relations and forces. For most of human history, one mode of reproduction has been dominant: patriarchy. It has adapted to differences in mode of production, but has been resilient in its internal structure (Rubin, 1975; Hartmann, 1979). Since it is less familiar than mode of production, a brief exposition is in order.

The major patriarchal institution is the household, a human social unit which generally consists of husband and wife, their children, and in some eras their grandparents and other relations, in which a division of labor exists whereby women labor to reproduce the labor power of both themselves and the other members of the household, either through direct production of food, clothing, and shelter, or via further processing of products or commodities produced in other workplaces (forests, fields, factories, etc.). The men generally own the household and control the most important decisions about household organization. The control of women's labor power and its products by men in households is reflected in rules and restrictions including marriage, divorce, adultery, naming, inheritance, and alimony (in our day). It is paralleled by prohibitions and restrictions on women's ability to participate in those productive activities engaged in by men (occupational segregation) and, under capitalism, on the returns to women's labor outside the household (low wage levels for women).¹⁰

Preservation of patriarchal institutions or efforts to destroy them are frequently a large element in regional struggles. The "home" in the widespread sentiment "fighting for God, home and country" euphemistically means the patriarchal household. The currently dominant faction in the nationalist struggle in Iran defends a severe patriarchy as one primary aim of the struggle against imperialism. On the other hand, battles for liberation of a region, as in many of the socialist revolutions, include a commitment to the abolition of the worst forms of patriarchal oppression as a concession to women active in the struggle. In other cases, regional struggles have evoked a consciousness of the issue of women's liberation as a counterpart to that of other groups (for example, the link between abolition and women's rights in the Civil War era). However, as in the case of the mode of production, the mode of reproduction of people does not in itself define the essence of regionalism.

⁸In contemporary society, the dominant ideologies, both bourgeois and Marxist, label this sphere of human activity consumption (see any economic textbook for the former; Castells [1977] or Stone and Hartman [1980] for the latter). This characterization profoundly misunderstands the organization of the household and the expenditure of labor time within it under both modern capitalism and previous modes of production. See Hartmann and Markusen (1980).

⁹Even the use of the term "labor power" accepts the categories of the prior analysis of mode of production. In order to see household labor as producing not just labor power but the whole human being, I prefer to use the rather odd phrase, "the reproduction of people."

¹⁰Numerous attempts have been made to subordinate the contemporary social relations of household production into the Marxist analysis of the capitalist mode of production (Harrison, 1973; Secombe, 1974; Rowbotham, 1973; Zaretsky, 1973; Quick, 1972; Smith, 1975). I side with the feminist critics (Hartmann, 1979; Rubin, 1975; Eisenstein, 1979) who argue that patriarchy constitutes a separate, though interrelated, system of social relations which involves different forums for struggle (especially the household) and champions different issues (child care, health care, reproductive rights, neighborhood issues, etc.).

Cultural Relations

Neither Marxists nor social scientists generally, not even anthropologists, have a well-worked-out model of cultural oppression. Sociologists like Parsons have produced models of culture, but such models are purely functionalist and do not encompass a notion of oppression. Marxists acknowledge cultural oppression and have documented it in many applied studies. More recently, following Raymond Williams's (1973) pioneering theoretical work criticizing the reification of the base/superstructure dichotomy in Marxism, work has begun in the Marxist camp on building theoretical models of culture. For present purposes, however, I use the concept "culture" to designate one or more of those human practices, informal or formal, which are not readily identifiable as economic or political in nature. Cultural institutions that may be important to the analysis of regionalism include language (above all), kinship groups, religious affinities, and ensembles of cultural practices such as rites of birth, death, and change-of-life, habits of social intercourse, or relationship to the environment.

Frequently, such cultural practices that might distinguish regional groups can be traced to prior modes of production or stages in the development of productive forces.¹¹ An analysis of regionalism, however, cannot merely cite this historical evolution, but must deal with such cultural institutions and practices on their own merits, because they demonstrate a degree of autonomy or resiliency to change that is significant in explaining contemporary social dynamics. Accepting Althusser's (1971) contention that the mode of production explains social relations only in the last instance, I would contend that regionalism in many cases must be investigated in the intermediate instance, where cultural forces can be very powerful in shaping regional struggles.

Much of the most useful work to date on examining the cultural roots of regional struggles appears in the form of applied studies (e.g., Buechler and Buechler, 1978). This tendency toward a requirement for cultural phenomena to be dealt with on a concrete, case-by-case basis may not reflect an analytical weakness but rather the fact that cultural practices vary much more across contexts than do economic or political relations. Sociological work on culture documents the importance of a variety of cultural institutions to the success, decimation, or survival of a group subject to rapidly changing historical forces (e.g., Gutman's [1976a] work on the black family and his [1976b] work on nineteenth-century American working-class culture, and E. P. Thompson's [1963] work on nineteenth-century British working-class culture). Most of these do not deal directly with regional implications. Similar work promises regional applications. For instance, work on Native Americans (Jorgenson, 1978) show how the collective attitude toward land and its use (not exploitation) results in a regional clash between two different cultures within the current capitalist mode of production. Collin's study (1978) of "Okies" in the twentieth century shows that their use of family and kinship structure was extremely important in their ability to withstand dustbowl conditions, proletarianization, and migration to California during the 1930s, as well as contemporary coping with changes in the agricultural region of California.

Cultural practices vary from those that are nonoppressive to those that are explicitly oppressive of other groups (for example, racism). The norm against which cultural oppression is measured is the notion of self-determination: the group right to their language, religion, and social institutions, and the right to change them as they desire, without forcible destruction or change imposed by another group. Cultural oppression may also take the form of denial of participation in existing social institutions to a particular group because of their membership or origins in a different culture. The precise meaning of restoring cultural self-determination is often somewhat ambiguous, even debated within the persecuted group itself (for example, the traditionalist Native Americans versus the younger generation; the Booker T. Washingtons versus the W. E. B. DuBoises; and the Martin Luther Kings versus the Malcolm Xs). In part, these

¹¹Some excellent attempts have been made to show how various cultural institutions are derived from the rise or fall of a mode of production, from patriarchy, or from a more detailed division of labor. See, for instance, Levi-Strauss on kinship (1969), V. Gordon Childe (1965) on culture generally, and Imamu Baraka (1963) on American jazz.

internal clashes reflect the existence of internal oppressive structures within the culture (*e.g.*, the oppression of women or class exploitation within the culture); in part, they represent the assessment of the historic possibilities for the group. And the bounding of a culture, *i.e.*, who is included within it, is as problematic as the bounding of a region, for some of the same reasons that I discuss below.

Cultural conflicts are frequently fought along regional lines. Many regional struggles are primarily cultural in content, at least at the level of consciousness. For instance, while the division between Catholic and Protestant Ireland had its roots in the English appropriation of the best Irish Catholic Land and its settlement by English troops who had served the Crown, over generations the struggle for an independent Ireland took on an increasingly cultural tenor, demanding freedom from the prohibition against speaking Gaelic, from restrictions on practicing the Catholic religion, and from an imposed educational system.

Nevertheless, the cultural element does not yield us the fundamental definition of region. Cultural struggles may take place within regions. In the contemporary United States, however, many cultural struggles take place in urban neighborhoods and in particular institutions that are not regional in nature and do not include all members of the region. Cultural struggles may also transcend territorial boundaries; a primary example was the centuries-long struggle of the Jews, in many locations of Asia, to preserve Jewish culture and envision the re-creation of their homeland. Regionalism is thus not in essence a cultural phenomenon.

IV. The State, Political Oppression, and Regionalism

The final institution that is central to our analysis of regionalism is the State, that is, the political apparatus that governs a society.¹² The State is organized differently from economic and cultural institutions, in that it uses police power or threat of it as the enforcer of social relations within it (as opposed to starvation or loss of community membership). To date, the State also differs distinctly from other institutions by being territorially based, a feature that makes it central to regional analysis.

State structure and dynamics differ greatly from country to country, from region to region, and from era to era. States may be oppressive, supporting the exploitation of one class by another, of one race by another, or of women by men. In the Diamond tradition, as we noted above, the very existence of the State implies such exploitation in civil society. But the State not only supports exploitation and oppression in other human institutions, but can also be analyzed as a set of social relations itself. Such political relations, while interrelated with the social relations of modes of production, of reproduction, and of culture, have a degree of autonomy that may outlast the transition from one mode to another.

To date, Marxist analysis has not met this challenge satisfactorily.¹³ It has focused, from Marx's time to the present, on political economy, precisely because the economic relations among people were understudied in Marx's own day. Marx reacted to the idealism he sensed in the Hegelian school, and set aside the question of design of an ideal State apparatus to plumb the nature of economic apparatus under capitalism (Arthur, 1970). Political struggles, for Marx and Engels and their nineteenth-century followers, were derivatives of economic struggles. Nevertheless, the State apparatus was a legitimate arena in which to pursue class ends, so that democracy was a rallying cry of working-class revolutionary socialism. Democracy, at least formally, was granted in capitalist societies before (and in many cases in place of) control over the means of production, fundamentally altering the arena in which class struggle took place. Subsequent to full extension of the franchise, economic conflict increasingly occurred in the State sector, through interventions such as protection and regulation of trade unions, social welfare legislation, and Keynesian attempts to manipulate the economy.

I have identified various forms of economic exploitation and cultural oppression. Is there a parallel phenomenon we can identify as political oppression? This requires a commitment to a particular theory of the State, an issue not yet resolved in Marxist theory. A concept of political oppression would have to be drawn from the social relations of political structure. Political oppression would connote the alienation of a group from the political life of the community, the mechanisms for which vary with the modes of production and reproduction within the culture. In what follows, I attempt to develop an argument about political oppression from the Marxist theory of the state under capitalism. In doing so, I will note the problem associated with this attempt and its outcome, and caution the reader that it is a tentative attempt.

If those who argue (Poulantzas, 1976) that the State is autonomous (or semi-autonomous) under advanced capitalism are correct, then we can legitimately offer a notion of political oppression where a group's objective position is in part a function of their treatment under State structure and policy, which differs in nature from cultural and economic relations. If we hold that the State is primarily a ruling-class institution with no social relations of its own, then political oppression is always a strict corollary to economic oppression and cannot be defined otherwise. I prefer the former characterization of the State under advanced capitalism, because it acknowledges the political gains made by the working class in the nineteenth and

¹²In order to deal with the State in a more rigorous fashion, this definition excludes many of the cultural institutions sometimes included under the rubric "State." The State is that identifiable set of institutions that organize and intervene in all other aspects of social life, codified in law and backed by the threat of police power. In this discussion, I am referring exclusively to the State as found under predominantly capitalist modes of production.

¹³The new generation of Marxist State theorists, however, is rapidly approaching such an analysis. See, for instance, O'Connor (1973), Bridges (1974), Poulantzas (1976), and Wolfe (1977).

twentieth centuries, in fighting for a democratic State which cannot avoid yielding to working-class demands in some, albeit reformist, areas. This is the essence of the notion of legitimation in Offe (1972) and in O'Connor's earlier work (1973). The concept of legitimation, however, is unduly mechanistic, tautologically defining as legitimating the nature of any State action which does not either directly benefit the accumulation of capital or supplant capitalism with socialism. This ignores working-class struggle and pressure to secure certain gains, and underestimates the structural changes in the economy that result from working-class demands for State intervention. A more positive and complex view of the operation of the State under bourgeois democracy, including an argument for the translation of working-class demands into political aims, democratizing the State apparatus, is presented in O'Connor (1978).

From this general view of the State I have constructed a concept of political oppression under capitalist democracy. Since under democratic structure each member of the society is supposed to have an equal part in the collective governance of the society, the norm against which to measure political oppression is the equal opportunity for and exercise of political power.¹⁴ Political oppression is the array or use of political power to deny a group the right to full participation in the political life of the community and to control over their collective future through the exercise of political mechanisms.

In capitalist societies with formal democracy, the exercise of political power is denied to some groups via State mechanisms that permit economic or cultural power to be translated into political power (mass elections, restricted party systems, representative legislatures, professionalized justice, sheltered bureaucracy, biased ideology production, a corporate-modeled civil service). Thus, in contemporary capitalist countries, capitalist interests dominate the State through their ability to buy legislators, determine the agenda items, pay their way out of court, and shape the course of research and ideology (Domhoff, 1979). In contemporary patriarchal societies, capitalist and socialist alike, the interests of men are maintained through their domination of the State apparatus directly (men hold the important political posts) and through mechanisms similar to the above. Likewise, whites in the United States and other countries have used the political apparatus to oppress blacks, not so long ago directly disenfranchising them via means such as the poll tax.

Political oppression, the denial of full rights to participate in controlling the collective life of the community, has been crucial to many groups because the State's intervention in their lives has been so pervasive. Democracy has been a central working-class demand; now that formal democracy exists, demands persist that it *operate* democratically. While political control is significant because it is instrumental to economic and cultural ends, the State cannot be dismissed as derivative or subordinate to them, since it has its own institutional structure and is itself an arena of struggle (O'Connor, 1978).

The problem with such a definition is that its use of the word "oppression" implies a moral espousal of the cause of the group claiming denial of political rights and political self-determination. If political questions were untainted by class, gender, and cultural antagonisms, then self-determination might be an absolute moral value, although its existence might not in that case be contested. But political rights and power are instrumental to economic and cultural ends. In most cases, the claim to political oppression is rooted in an economic or cultural privilege or disadvantage that a certain group seeks to redress. The activist group may not be a group oppressed in other contexts. For instance, a regional capitalist class may claim political oppression from another nation or region through colonial status or minority representation in government, but on achieving autonomy or reformist class ends, it may prove equally oppressive, both politically and economically, to its own regional working class. Or a set of regional interests, including a coalition of capital and labor, may fight for autonomy so that they can monopolize a resource-based commodity, thus increasing their exploitation of other peoples through unequal exchange. And political oppression does not necessarily mean economic

¹⁴The importance of the *exercise* of political power, instead of its mere formal endowment as a right, is articulated in Gaventa and Couto (1976).

oppression. Some groups may be less economically oppressed under colonial status than their counterparts in liberated nations.

Nor can political oppression be equated with minority status within the territory of a State. Minority groups may control the State apparatus, due to economic or cultural advantages (for example, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant men in the United States). And for some minority groups incorporation in a larger region or nation, even when colonial in nature, may be superior to self-determination. The preferred status depends on the treatment of that group within the political apparatus. Minorities, even when they do not control the State apparatus, may be better off struggling within a larger coalition in an existing region than on their own politically. This was the argument advanced by those who opposed the "black nation" concept in the 1930s (see Allen, 1976).

Like the notion of exploitation of labor power, political oppression must be treated as an abstract concept, because in its concrete form it is complicated by other forms of oppression and its instrumentality to them. But it can be used in the same way that the abstractions of labor time and value are used in Marxist economic theory. Since the accumulation process and the exchange system under capitalism require equalization of rates of profit, the prices of commodities that workers produce are not synonymous with their values. The exploitation of individual workers in particular workplaces cannot be measured by the differences between their wages and the price of the product, since surplus value may be siphoned off or transferred over in the profit-rate-equalization process. So, too, the notion of political oppression must remain operative on the general level, connoting a structuring and deployment of State sector institutions in a fashion that deprives some group of what they would otherwise control under a different array of political power. In practice, political oppression is almost always connected to economic or cultural oppression. Yet the need for a concept of purely political oppression remains, as it is possible to contemplate a society with no economic classes or cultural differentiation in which one political group (for example, the military) controlled another, perhaps in time becoming the basis for a new form of economic or cultural oppression. For instance, the debates on the Soviet Union suggest that a form of political oppression exists that is helping to generate a new class structure.

While most political oppression does not take a territorial form (for example, the exclusion of the franchise to certain classes or minority groups), it may do so. The control of Native Americans through the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the past is an example. Thus political oppression, which accompanies economic and cultural oppression, can itself be a target of struggle, as indeed it has been for Native Americans. But the territorial claim to political oppression poses a moral dilemma because of its nondeterminate conjunction with other forms of oppression. Autonomy for a region, or district elections replacing areawide elections, can be either progressive or regressive, depending on whose political power is enhanced by the changes and how they employ it. While the principle of self-governance can be held in general, it may be opposed by Marxists in specific cases because its net result may be to increase other forms of oppression at the same time it extends formal political rights. For instance, Lovering (1978) argues that Welsh nationalism would only benefit the Welsh capitalist class, and that Welsh workers are better off economically under British political rule. Thus a Marxist analysis must reserve normative judgment on questions of regional political oppression in the abstract. Rather, political oppression must be analyzed together with an estimation of its conjunction with economic and other forms of oppression.

But if political oppression cannot be damned in isolation, then neither can economic oppression, unless Marxists agree to claim universally that economic oppression is by definition worse than political. Some do. To eschew this formulation is to introduce a degree of indeterminacy in Marxist political prescription. This issue has caused extensive political debate within and among Marxist political groups. The specifically territorial dilemma can be traced back to Marx and Engels's political strategies and to the debates on the National Question in the Second International.¹⁵ Twentieth-century events have not permitted the issue to subside. The

¹⁵See Davis (1967) and Vilar (1979) for excellent accounts of the historical debate on nationalism within the Marxist camp.

destruction of capitalist relations of exploitation of labor by capital has not necessarily eliminated other forms of exploitation or oppression in socialist societies.¹⁶ Some would argue that the attempt to eliminate one form of oppression (for example, imperialism in Iran) may worsen the position of other oppressed groups (for example, women in the Iranian case). Acknowledging multiple sources of oppression does not necessarily pose problems for Marxist analysis; on the contrary, the attempt to claim that all oppression can be reduced to capitalist economic relations is probably Marxism's greatest weakness.

¹⁶For a thorough airing of the debate about current social relations in the Soviet Union, see the forthcoming *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Fall 1980.

V. A Marxist Definition of Regionalism

Regardless of the evaluation of political oppression in a particular case of regionalism, the political dimension plays a critical role in the definition of regionalism (Markusen, 1978). Even if a regional cause is solely economic in nature, its target is political, since it becomes regionalized precisely through a claim before some arm of the State to a change in territorial treatment. Thus, the State and its political relations provide the key to an abstract characterization of regionalism. Regionalism is the political claim of a territorially-identified group of people against one or several mechanisms of the State. This definition satisfies the requirements of Marxist methods. First of all, it presents regionalism by its social relations, between a group of people and some other group, not specified in the definition, who are objectively antagonistic to some end of the former group and whose struggle occurs within the State sector. Secondly, it uses a territorial qualifier that distinguishes regional groups from other social groups engaged in struggle, and links territory to the existence of State institutions, so that it clearly identifies one *arena* of struggle—a political arena—even if the *content* of the struggle is economic or cultural. Third, it allows the particular delineation of the regional group to arise from historical and subjective experience, without attempting to squeeze people into an abstract ahistorical pattern of regions across the globe or to assume current forms of the State (for example, nation) as the basis of world regions. In current form, it could be applied to any era, to any mode of production. It only requires one institution, the State. Implicitly, then, the definition argues that regionalism was not a meaningful concept nor a real experience before the emergence of the State as a political organization. Regionalism is linked fundamentally to the emergence of the State and to the particular territorial form that the State has assumed throughout recorded history. In the following sections, I elaborate on the precision and expansiveness of this definition of regionalism.

Territoriality

The territorial nature of a regional struggle arises in practice from some prior differentiation between people in that region and in other regions. The differentiation may result from various economic or cultural differences, or even from differences in purely political treatment. These differences are legitimized and extended by the State, so that some social group demands better treatment or political autonomy for its territory, in order to eliminate adverse sources of differentiation (for example, imperialist control over the terms of trade) or to preserve positive ones (rights to language and culture). Territorial differentiation in itself, however, is not grounds for regional definition or regional struggle. Unless the differentiation results from or is grounds for some form of oppression, regional variation in human cultures and economic structures need not provoke conflicting regional demands on the State. Furthermore, a regional cause may be oppressive, as when a regional struggle involves the attempt by one regional group to preserve its privilege or increase its exploitation of another group, by insulating itself from the redistributive nature of the State (the Martha's Vineyard secession drive) or by asserting monopoly control of a resources base. Thus not all territorial struggles are progressive, a problem I have alluded to above.

While the concept of regionalism requires territorial differentiation, the goal of a regional struggle may be the elimination of such differentiation or the end of oppression connected with it, so that that particular manifestation of regionalism may be liquidated in the process. And the object of territorial struggles may be a universal claim, such as socialism or the franchise, but the struggle for it may be territorially confined because the State operates within existing territorial units. Such struggles have the potential to be linked up with similar struggles by other groups.

Regional Social Relations

The social group whose circumstances and claims give the region its character may not be the entire population of that region. Frequently a regional struggle is led by a particular group who will gain most from a particular political victory, because new policies or decentralized control of the State apparatus will permit them to pursue their class, gender, cultural, or political ends with greater success. Other members of that territorial unit may favor the existing political arrangement, because it favors them or because they fear that they will be worse off under the domination of the group leading the regional revolt. Others may participate in the regional struggle, hoping to bend it to their ends in an accompanying and successive internal struggle.

The activism suggested by the definition of regionalism above must not permit it to be seen as a purely subjective phenomenon. The delineation of regions is not simply subjective, based on the choices of classes and other social groups within regions. Regionalism does not exist solely in the consciousness of its proponents, but in the objective political relationships existing across territories and the existence of political, economic, or cultural oppression that finds expression in those political relationships. The Quebecois people were culturally oppressed before they began to fight back. The English-speaking population was the source of oppression; the Canadian State was the formal means of promoting their cultural hegemony, which facilitated economic exploitation as well. The "regional" basis of the Quebecois struggle was defined by the nature of the Canadian State, which forced them to pursue separatism as a means of gaining cultural and political autonomy. In the course, the boundary of the region adapted was that previously drawn in the formation of the Canadian State between the province of Quebec and other provinces, even though many French-speaking Canadians live outside of this region and many English-speaking Canadians live inside of it. Whether or not any conscious struggle takes place around it, territorially-based differentiation, subject to political intervention or manipulation, forms the objective basis of regionalism.

The precise regional lines drawn around parties to a regional struggle will depend on alliances that can be formed with other groups who might have common cause or whose position is ambiguous but winnable.¹⁷ Because of this, the boundary of a region may arise from the particular nature of the struggle. In some cases, it is itself an object of the struggle, as when the antagonists to a regional issue wish to define the region differently in order to enhance their political or military power. An example is the central Spanish government's attempt in the mid-1970s to define the Basque region as one containing seven provinces, while the Basque separatist and nationalist movements accept only three, sometimes four; clearly the centrists hoped that so defining the region would blunt the power of the separatist movements and sway autonomy elections in their favor.

Finally, the multiple roots of regional struggles covered in the previous section result in a complex pattern of social relations that can be expressed in regionalism. When class, cultural, and political claims all manifest themselves in a regional struggle, the chances are that no simple characterization of the social relations can be constructed. In these cases, multiple and competing claims over the goals of regionalism, and perhaps multiple definitions of the region, may be put forward. In Catalonia, for instance, both class and cultural identities operate in the autonomy movements, but since some members of the Catalan working class are Andalusian (twenty percent) and thus do not speak Catalan, which is one of the political demands of the movement, they may oppose it as members of a different culture even though Catalan autonomy would undoubtedly further the goals of the working class in Catalonia as a whole. This complexity of the social relations of regionalism requires that Marxists pursue concrete, historical analyses of each case.

¹⁷ This imprecision is similar to the problem of drawing of class lines in revolutionary struggles, such as in China, or the problem of delineating the working class—does it include professionals, for example?

The Political Claims of Regionalism

If social relations are the subject of regionalism, the political claims on the State are the object of regionalism. Regional conflicts under contemporary capitalism and the nation/state political system can be characterized by the level or severity of their claims. One type consists of those regional movements which demand fundamental change in nation/state status: independent status from an existing nation state (*e.g.*, Puerto Rico), unification with or annexation to another independent nation state (Vietnam) or cessation from one with affiliation to another (Northern Ireland). A second type encompasses those regions whose protagonists seek a fundamental change in the territorial structuring of power and institutions within a given nation state, either through horizontal restructuring (the desire of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan to disaffiliate with Michigan and join Wisconsin), or, more importantly, through the vertical restructuring of power. This latter generally involves a decentralization of formal government machinery and decision-making power (autonomy movements in Quebec and Spain, the current Flemish/Walloon conflict in Belgium, proposed devolution in Scotland and Wales), but can involve a regional struggle to strengthen centralization which would accrue to that region's advantage (*e.g.*, the Northeast's demand for Federal takeover of welfare). A final type of regional conflict includes those in which regional groups struggle within the existing political structure for more favorable treatment via State revenue collection and dispersal arrangements, expenditure programs, or rules and regulations governing the economic, cultural, or political conditions across regions. The American Sunbelt/Frostbelt or East/West struggles at the federal level exemplify this type.

The three types range from revolutionary to reform to conservative with respect to political structure, but do not necessarily represent equivalent gains for regional protagonists in that order. The best strategy will depend upon which classes, sectors, etc., are represented in a particular regional movement and their relative strengths, and which classes, etc., control the existing and neighboring State apparatuses. The regional bourgeoisie in Scotland, Tom Nairn argues, has been better off supporting a narrowly cultural and nostalgically militaristic Scots nationalism without real ambitions to independence from England because it has profited from riding along on the coattails of British imperialism, Scots soldiers doing much of the fighting. On the other hand, the Catalanian bourgeoisie has favored strong autonomy for its region for forty years because the Franco regime denied national political power and economic privilege to the Republican-supporting Catalonians.

Working-class groups, too, may opt for different strategies toward the political content of regional demands. Lovering (1978) argues that Welsh workers would be better off eschewing the Welsh nationalist movement, which he characterizes as petit-bourgeois-based, and targeting the British State. In Catalonia and Andalucia, on the other hand, the left, working-class-based parties argue for strong worker support for regional autonomy because they feel that regional control of culture, social spending, and some forms of economic regulation are the only feasible routes toward working-class political power in Spain as a whole.

Internal disunity within a regional movement, especially a cross-class movement, will frequently express itself in disagreements about political target. Different classes will perceive that one or another type of political claim will best serve their ends. A Catalanian bourgeoisie will favor cultural autonomy and freedom from economic discrimination by the Franquist center, but oppose any greater independence or any real devolution of economic power onto a regional government which is newly formed and left-dominated.

Thus the distinction between a politically reformist and a revolutionary struggle does not carry with it any of the normative connotations which the same characterizations of economic struggles generally do in Marxist thought. Since I have concluded that existence of political oppression cannot be analyzed in absence of economic and cultural oppression, and since regional struggles are complicated by differing degrees of correspondence with class, gender, and cultural struggles a revolutionary regional struggle is not necessarily progressive. Its quality will depend upon its conjunction with other forms of existence or elimination of oppression and exploitation.

VI. From Regionalism to Region

Given this view of regionalism, is it possible to derive from it a workable Marxist definition of region? No. The multiple sources of regional conflict and the propensity for regional boundaries and goals to change require a concrete historical analysis of each instance. A region can be conceived of in a Marxist analysis as a territorial unit with some form of political status, actual or intended, but it cannot be said *a priori* to have any particular social relations nor any normative status in Marxist theory. Is this emphasis on the limited analytical content of "region" important? Yes, because regions are regularly reified in both regional-science and Marxist treatments. In this section, I clarify these misuses by arguing what a region is *not*, in a Marxist framework.

A Region is Not an Economic Class nor an Economy

Two common definitions of region that are implicit in much Marxist work are that a region is an economy (*e.g.*, Spain, the Northeast) or that a region is synonymous with an economic class (*e.g.*, some applications of the internal colony argument). The first view is easy to refute, especially given the recent theoretical work on the world economic system.¹⁸ Production and exchange in the United States are inextricably interlinked with that of the rest of the capitalist world. Furthermore, "economies" do not have relations; classes and political institutions within nations and regions have relations. When one region is said to be exploited by another, the author is really trying to say that a certain group within the first is exploited by some group who resides in another. Not all residents of one region benefit from the ability of a class within their region to exploit another group located in another region.¹⁹ When theorists use regional or national designations as economies, they are generally referring to the political identity of the State, which intervenes in and governs many of the economic relationships among classes and sectors in one region and those in another.

Nor are regions differentiable as classes. At least to date, no significant one-to-one relationship between a class and a spatial location on the regional level has occurred under capitalism.²⁰ But one way that capitalism might solve its class conflicts in the future would be the regional segregation of classes (*e.g.*, assembly operators and workers in some locations, professional-managerial workers in others, as in the current electronics industry [Saxenian, 1980]). It is arguable that the capitalist class has no home—that they personally reside in many different residences and that their profit is constantly being transformed into new production activity across locations all over the globe.

While residents of a region may share a common source of economic exploitation (foreign ownership of land or employment as wage labor in one industry), the essence of a region is not this economic condition but its translations, along with other claims, into a political demand. If all the workers in Appalachia fought for control of coal production through workplace struggles, they would be fighting a class, not a regional, war. It would only coincidentally be regional; that is, it would merely take place in that region. It could, if it included coal miners in other regions, be supra-regional as well. The phenomenon would become regional only if this territorial differentiation became the basis for political intervention, *e.g.*, from the United States government in the case of Appalachia, where coal capitalists in Appalachia might have used access to centralized political machinery to pursue their class ends. In this case, a regional

¹⁸Ironically, this same literature perpetuates the confusion by continuing to use the same language; see Wallerstein (1974), Kay (1975).

¹⁹Although the latter may permit the former to appropriate some gains through the struggle among groups in that region; see the debate between Emmanuel and Bettelheim (1970) over whether workers in capitalist countries "exploit" Third World workers.

²⁰In urban areas, one can make an argument about class segregation across space (see Markusen, 1976). The closest analogies at the regional level are mining communities such as Cripple Creek, Colorado, Lead, South Dakota, and Appalachia, but even these had some independent mine owners, entrepreneurs, and local merchant capitalists.

struggle of coal miners against capitalists *and* the State would ensue, where their political claims against the State might include greater political autonomy for Appalachia (where workers might have greater chance to control legislatures—not, however, the historical case) or a better deal for the region in terms of support for an alternative economic base.

The fallacy that a region is an economic unit or an economic class with a common fate is most prevalent when the internal colony thesis is applied to problem regions within advanced capitalist countries (Persky, 1972; Hechter, 1975). Such analysis suggests that a region may be exploited by a system of economic relationships in which other regions extract resources or product from the area, *i.e.*, the region is a colony. These treatments tend to abstract from the class, gender, and cultural relations emphasized above as fundamental elements in social relations among regions, implying that “home” ownership of resources would improve everyone’s lot. In fact, miners in Butte, Montana, copper mines were no better off than Michigan copper miners when Anaconda was owned and headquartered locally. On the contrary, due to Anaconda’s domination of state-level politics when locally based, workers gained political power when Anaconda left. Economic exploitation arises from economic relationships, not territorial ones. The territorial relationship arises from the nature and extent of State intervention favoring one class or another, or one class fraction (for example, a segment of capital) at the expense of others, or a cross-class coalition, at the expense of other regions. It is politically, not economically, defined. The internal colony thesis confuses class structure with State structures; it is classes that exploit classes, not places that exploit places.

A Region is Not a Cultural Group

A similar argument may be made about cultural relations as a definer of regions. While cultural bonds can be the content of a regional struggle, they become a regional struggle only when translated into territorial and political terms. Black nationalism in the United States, for instance, has been an economic and cultural struggle for autonomy, but except for the debate around a black nation in the Cotton Belt, the Marcus Garvey movement, and the settlement of Liberia, the struggle has not been regionally defined. A cultural struggle need not be currently located in a territory to be regional, but it must have a territorial aim. Thus the Zionist vision of a Jewish State became a regional struggle even before the creation of Israel, because it laid claim to a territory and demanded an accompanying change in State structure. Similarly, the Palestinian movement is also a regional struggle since it too claims a territory and is engaged in a political battle for it.

Cultural preservation does not require a territorial organization. Jewish culture thrives in many countries; Catholic and other cultures survive in the United States. Cultural autonomy can be fought for within a given State structure without being territorial (or therefore regional) as well. The right of the Amish to keep their children out of public schools, the right to bilingual education, and the civil rights of minorities have all been pursued in political arenas without being regionally based. If a culture is territorially concentrated, it may be the basis for a regional struggle when cultural identity is suppressed by a State apparatus or used as a basis for exploitation in economic institutions. The possibility for a territorial solution may result in cultural refugees migrating to a place where the neighborhood, the enclave, the region or even the nation can provide cultural protection through control of a separate political apparatus or spatially differential political treatment. American history is replete with such examples, from the original religious colonies to the Mormon settlement of Utah and minority migration patterns across regions. Culturally-based regions can also be imposed, as in the forced enclosure of Native Americans on reservations in the western United States (even if they were originally eastern groups) or in controls on migration of certain groups internally. Cultural struggles become regional when the members of the culture are territorially concentrated and differentiated (or wish to be), and when they pursue cultural ends through political channels, arguing for a territorial (rather than universal) solution.

The Region is Not Solely a Political Unit

I have argued that economic and cultural conflicts may not be regional in nature, and that regional struggles can be either economic or cultural. Thus regions cannot abstractly be defined as either economic or cultural phenomena. It is now necessary to argue that regions are not solely political units, and that not all political units constitute regions. The definition of regionalism implies only that regions are territorial units, with some political content to the definition. The political dimension is essential to the definition, while economic and cultural content are not. But while it is possible to argue that a regional struggle, in addition to having a political focus, may be predominantly political in content (against political oppression), it is also necessary to point out that the nature of political oppression must ultimately be bound up with some form of economic or cultural oppression, arising from differentiation across regions.

First of all, it is true that all political units forming the basis of the State are territorial, at least currently. Not all political organizations are territorial; some (like the Trilateral Commission and the Fourth International) transcend existing political delineations because they are internationalist in vision. But State machinery is arrayed on a territorial basis, with nations and their political subdivisions the major units. This is a historical product of the nature of State power (police power and violence were most easily extended and defended territorially, at least in the era of armies dependent on human labor power) and of the evolution of capitalism, where large-scale production, a world market, and the competitive and chaotic but insistent growth intrinsic to capitalist development promoted the emergence of the nation-state.

Since territoriality is merely a feature of this evolution, it is in no sense absolute or ahistorical. It may disappear in the future, when we might imagine the State organized on lines other than territorial. Or a multinational State may replace the current multiplicity of States. Even currently, the strength of the territorial characterization varies tremendously across nations where subnational political units have different degrees of autonomy and power, and therefore significance. In the federal nations of the United States and Canada, the states and provinces (themselves the product of strong prior regions in the nation-building process) have considerably more autonomy than in Europe, where class-based voting is more prevalent. But even in countries where no well-developed subnational political machinery exists, regional claims are still regional when they demand territorially-based treatment (for example, Welsh and Scottish nationalism).

On the other hand, not every territory or every political unit constitutes a region. The existence of one or more sources of differentiation around which regional struggle potentially or actually forms is a sufficient condition. The Navajo nation is a region because it has a territorial basis and holds political claims on both state and federal governments; it is the Navajo culture and its evolution from a prior mode of production that lend it its identity. Nor are regional boundaries given solely by existing political boundaries. The Northeast United States is a region because it is currently experiencing a form of economic decline differentiating it from the rest of the country, and because a cross-class coalition residing there now levies political claims for favorable territorial treatment on the federal government. Its boundaries, however, are not precisely defined. It is variously represented by the New England Congressional Caucus, a narrow definition; by the Coalition of Northeastern Governors (CONEG), a broader definition; and by the Northeast-Midwest Institute, a research arm and the broadest definition. Each of these is an attempt to broaden alliances but to define the region to correspond to a particular economic experience.

VII. Implications for Marxist Research on Regional Development

The discussion above suggests several conclusions for the Marxist analysis of regional development. First of all, the argument that for Marxists regions do not exist at all as an abstract category implies that regional development cannot be discussed or studied abstractly either. Regions do not develop: social relations within regions and across regions develop. Theorizing about the course of capitalist development within a region requires an empirical analysis which identifies the cultural, political, and economic structures that have evolved historically, both internally and with respect to other regions. In this respect, it is likely that Marxist scholars of regions will not be able to do as well as Marxist urbanologists have done in identifying and analyzing the process of urbanization under capitalism.²¹ There is simply no counterpart "regionalization" that appears intrinsic to even one stage of capitalist evolution.

Secondly, Marxists working on regional issues should attempt to make their analyses more rigorous, by eschewing the fetishism of space, *i.e.*, the treatment of regions as if they were synonymous with economic classes, "economies," or cultural groups. The Marxist literature on development, regionalism, and even urbanism is replete with such usages, undoubtedly borrowed from the tradition that runs from the classic school of political economy up through the contemporary non-Marxist social sciences.

Finally, the emphasis on the political nature of regionalism and regions requires that any analysis of regionalism will have to incorporate a theory of the State and a study of its concrete presence in a particular regional context. To date, most work (*e.g.*, *Radical Review of Political Economics*, 1978) has relied heavily upon economic analysis, although some sociologists and anthropologists have been critical of overly economic formulations and contributed cultural studies, mostly empirical. The greatest weakness in regional and international analyses of capitalist development is the absence of any explicit theory of the State and the failure to distinguish between economic and political relations. Theories of unequal exchange, for instance, would be much stronger if their authors would distinguish between power over markets that comes from pure monopoly power or the spatial concentration of production, and power over currency exchange rates and terms of trade that are guaranteed and deployed via a powerful State apparatus. In order to understand the latter case, we need to understand the access of the dominant sector of capital (*e.g.*, oil corporations) to particular States (*e.g.*, the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela), the relations among these States, and the degree to which exploitative oil prices are attributable to purely economic power or to mediation of that power through political power.

Since this paper has been almost wholly definitional in nature, I must conclude that its function in the literature is to demonstrate that the terrain upon which Marxist scholars of regions operate is not yet clear, and that pursuit of good, clear regional analysis is only beginning. I would like to welcome my colleagues to the endeavor.

²¹ See, for instance, Tabb and Sawers (1978), Castells (1977), Cox (1978), Pickvance (1976), Harloe (1977), and issues of the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (1977).

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