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Revolutionary Intellectuals: Progressive Political Thought and Intellectual-State Relations in
Turkey and the Middle East, 1930-1960

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Global Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

Revolutionary Intellectuals: Progressive Political Thought and Intellectual-State Relations in
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by

Sarp Kurgan

This research analyzes progressive revolutionary thought and politics in Turkey in relation to comparable movements in Egypt and Iran from 1930 to 1960. In this context, progressive intellectualism is a socially and nationally oriented paradigm that strives for a secular and egalitarian democracy, and this study examines how these subjects have been at the vanguard of revolutionism in these countries, albeit in complex and sometimes highly problematic ways. My research is located at the intersection of Global Studies, Intellectual History, and Political Theory. It further engages in studies of Modernization, Gender and Sexuality, Ethnicity and Race, Development, and Securitization. This study tracks changes and continuities in Turkey's revolutionary ideologies, strategies, and narratives in relation to its regional context to understand the influence of regional political-economic structures and institutions on various ideological formations. It analyzes domestic and regional interpretations of two global ideologies that had dominantly represented revolutionism (namely national-liberation and socialism) through a sexually, geographically, and generationally diverse group of intellectuals. The key research question asks: how did

interactions and confrontations between revolutionary intellectuals and state actors influence the trajectories of Turkish republican revolution and other nationalist revolutions in the Middle East? The research is built around a two-pillar mixed methods approach. The first is qualitative, analyzing ten Turkish progressive intellectuals. The second methodological feature is comparative and explores Iranian and Egyptian counterparts. The research is based on the varied nature of their intellectual production, which includes scholarly works, memoirs, autobiographies, letters, journal and newspaper articles, interviews, speeches, court defenses, and literary works such as novels, short stories, poems, and plays. This dissertation argues that state elites' securitization of progressivism since the 1930s was linked to the undoing of Turkish republican project in the 1950s. The research further shows how hegemonic processes in the twentieth-century Middle East had functioned in three interrelated areas: 1) hegemony as regime legitimacy; 2) hegemony as controlling the codes of dominant political culture; and 3) hegemony as determining the limits of legitimate politics, in other words, establishing the boundaries between "politics as usual" and "politics of securitization."

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I. Introduction

Revolutions and revolutionary politics played a defining role in the making of the contemporary world order. Aiming at a radical transformation in pursuit of a perfect order, revolutionaries across the globe sought fundamental changes in politics, economy, society, and culture. For many, revolutions represented the only path to progress. Whether they were successful or not, revolutionaries left deep impacts on their respective societies. This dissertation seeks to understand the evolution of progressive revolutionary thought and politics in Turkey between 1930 and 1960. The period covers the establishment of the single-party regime by Atatürk's CHP (Republican People's Party), the transition to the multi-party regime after World War II by İnönü's CHP, the DP (Democrat Party) government in the 1950s; and it finally ends with the military intervention against the DP in 1960. It further seeks to explain Turkey's hegemonic shifts and sociopolitical transformations from the perspective of progressive intellectuals. Twentieth century revolutionary politics, led by progressive intellectuals, had a fundamental impact in the making of political regimes and socioeconomic structures in Turkey and the broader Middle East. Revolutionism constituted the dominant way for progressive political thought for most of the twentieth century. The discourse of revolution had a major appeal for a variety of political actors, even for some conservative or reactionary ones.

In Turkey, the debates surrounding the revolutionary streams have traditionally been lively, intense, and not without contradictions. Even though progressive revolutionaries failed to assume power, both public opinion and academia attribute a significant role to their historical influence, especially in culture, civil society, state discourses, and welfare policies.

Paradoxically, there also is a consensus on the historical weakness of Turkey's revolutionary movements. The easy defeat that the revolutionaries suffered against the military in the 1980 coup and their inability to recover thereafter are the basis of this consensus. One could point to the brutality of the coup or Turkey's post-1980 neoliberal security regime as factors that prevented such a reconstruction. Still, the fact that revolutionary movements did not become meaningful political forces decades after the defeat has led some observers to the conclusion that Turkey's revolutionary movements were always weak.

In contrast to most studies of Turkey's progressive ideologies, this dissertation does not employ a rise and fall paradigm. Rather, it tracks changes and continuities in revolutionary ideologies, strategies, and narratives. This allows conceptualizing revolutionism not as a specific doctrine but as a tradition of political thought in constant transformation, influenced by hegemonic struggles and structural factors. Second, while most studies focus on a singular interpretation of revolutionism, this research takes revolutionary streams as a holistic but heterogenous camp. For most of the twentieth century, two schools of political thought, namely national liberation and socialism, have dominantly represented revolutionary politics. Despite political differences, these two schools shared materialistic, social-minded, and nationalist *Weltanschauungs*. This study focuses on the Turkish interpretations of these global ideologies. Lastly, while most studies of Turkish progressivism exclusively focus on the domestic context, I compare Turkish progressivism to its Egyptian and Iranian counterparts, which allow for theoretical considerations with regional implications. Overlaps among Turkish, Egyptian, and Iranian revolutionary progressivisms in terms of political thought and experiences indicate that the transformations in progressive political thought can best be understood in their regional contexts, as opposed to their national contexts.

At the center of this study, stand the revolutionary intellectuals, who were part of a small, urban-educated elite. In many ways, the 1930-1960 period was the heyday of intellectuals, whose expertise, scientific knowledge, and visions for the future elevated them to a position of influence. Nineteenth century sociopolitical transformations in the Middle East have led to the making of intellectuals as a novel historical bloc. Revolutionary intellectuals often did not come from socioeconomically impoverished segments. Rather, most revolutionaries came from privileged – but not necessarily wealthy – backgrounds with modern, secular, Western-style education. In a sense, revolutionary intellectuals were beneficiaries of an unfinished modernization process that they wished to spread further in an alternative way. Their attempts to spread these benefits constituted the core of revolutionaries' hegemonic struggles. They created alternative narratives of modernization and progress; and sought to spread them amongst various social blocs, most notably military-bureaucratic strata, intellectuals, youth, workers, and peasants. They assumed the role of vanguard educators to awaken the people to a new political consciousness. This study focuses on how these subjects had been at the vanguard of revolutionism in these three countries, albeit in complex and sometimes highly problematic ways.

Revolutionary intellectuals understood progress as a social and national paradigm that aimed for a secular and egalitarian democracy. Moreover, they understood progress as a dialectic but ultimately linear process, deterministically moving from traditional to modern, ignorant to educated, dependent to independent, impoverished to prosperous, and oligarchic to democratic. Revolutionary intellectuals' conceptualization of their society also fit in this dialectical narrative. They understood their society in dichotomous terms. This articulation was prevalent in all revolutionary traditions. But it was their ideology that determined the

major blocs in their configurations, in which primarily class and secondarily identity – gender, ethnic, and religious – emerged as key elements. For revolutionary intellectuals, post-nineteenth century modernization processes failed to create an independent, enlightened, democratic regime backed by prosperous and educated citizens. They took it upon themselves to create that regime by assuming control of the state apparatus, thus the modernization drive. Their struggles became entangled in that very modernization process they sought to alter. For almost all revolutionary activists, capturing the state apparatus by vanguard elites backed by conscious masses and using it for radically progressive changes constituted the very meaning of revolution. Revolution was the main answer to the problems caused by the incomplete and troubled modernization process. Modernization, as most revolutionaries understood, was a two-pillar struggle, fought against the Western encroachment (imperialism) externally and the remnants of the imperial-feudal order (autocracy and/or fascism) internally.

Naturally, intellectuals' hegemonic struggle, whether they were trying to steer the regime towards a particular direction or to topple it down completely, draw the ire of the established order. The regime reaction was often (but not always) securitization. Turkey's political establishments considered revolutionary intellectuals' hegemonic struggle not as part of politics as usual, but as a security threat to be dealt with immediate and extraordinary measures. The interactions between the state and the intellectuals played transformative roles for both actors. How the intellectuals understood the state and how the state actors understood the intellectuals, which determined the nature of their dialectic interactions, played a defining role in the making of progressive political thought, as well as Turkey's political order. Despite the emphasis on the state, this study is not state-centric. Rather,

progressive political thought was. For revolutionaries, the state represented the prime target, the major tool to implement their visions once they had control over it.

The key research question concerns the concept of hegemony, within the realms of state legitimacy, political-economic thought, and political struggle. Hegemony – rule by consent – is a generic term that this dissertation aims to expand. More specifically, this dissertation asks: how did interactions and confrontations between revolutionary intellectuals and state actors influence the trajectories of Turkish republican revolution specifically and other nationalist revolutions in the Middle East generally? To that end, this dissertation analyzes 1) the primary factors that justified revolution for progressive intellectuals; 2) the role and purpose of intellectuals as understood by themselves; 3) progressive articulations on social distinctions and political-economic structures; 4) external hegemonic struggles against hegemonic bloc and reactionary counter-hegemonic blocs, as well as internal hegemonic struggles within the progressive camp; 5) breaks and continuities of revolutionary thought, ideology, strategy, and narratives; and 6) comparisons of Turkish progressives with their Iranian and Egyptian counterparts. A key phenomenon upon which this work relies is that intellectual-state relations in Turkey and the broader Middle East during the twentieth century had fundamentally transformative impacts for both parties.

This research is built around a two-pillar mixed methodology. The first pillar, qualitative, analyzes ten Turkish revolutionary intellectuals. The second pillar, comparative, looks at Iranian and Egyptian revolutionary narratives to articulate Turkish progressivism in its regional context. The comparative analysis also brings insights into how political-economic structures and institutions might have influenced ideological formations. This research uses

the term “intellectual” as in Antonio Gramsci’s depiction of “traditional intellectual.”¹

Another common usage of the term had been with regards to access to formal education, in other words, a status distinction. Many intellectual analyses at the time attributed a distinct role to this “historic bloc” – a social bloc that could form the new basis of consent to a certain order. For this group, I use the term “urban-educated bloc.”² This bloc was generally recognized as the *aydın* segment in Turkey, the *effendi* segment in Egypt, and the *rowshanfekr* segment in Iran.

Turkish revolutionary intellectuals who constitute the qualitative pillar and the core of this research are Halide Edib Adıvar,³ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir,⁴ İsmail Hakkı Tonguç,⁵ Fakir

¹ For Gramsci, intellectuals fall between two categories, “traditional” and “organic.” Traditional intellectuals, or the intelligentsia, who rose organically to the bourgeoisie in its ascendancy, became detached from it in the historical process and appeared autonomous of that class, some even becoming dissidents. Organic intellectuals, on the other hand, are the primary agents within their classes, such as union organizers, but have a limited ability to reach across classes. Traditional intellectuals may not correspond to a distinct class, but their influence can reach various sectors of society. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 5-14.

² I recognize that ‘urban-educated’ might be a misnomer since most medresehs in Iran and Egypt were in urban areas, at the heart of public life. This was, of course, not a phenomenon in republican Turkey. The term more accurately describes the people who had received their educations in the novel, secular education facilities.

³ Halide Edib Adıvar (1884-1964), hereafter only Adıvar. Nationalist revolutionary, novelist, historian, and professor. Participated the Liberation War as Mustafa Kemal’s press secretary. Took part in political opposition against Mustafa Kemal in 1923-1925 and remained in voluntary exile until 1938. Reconciled with President İnönü. Became a member of the parliament from the Democrat Party in 1950-1954. Later broke with the party and left politics in 1954. For relevant secondary sources on Adıvar, see: Durakbaşa, *Halide Edib: Türk Modernleşmesi ve Feminizm*, 2000; Arat, “Nation Building and Feminism in Early Republican Turkey,” 2010.

⁴ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897-1976), hereafter only Aydemir. Kemalist revolutionary, historian, journalist, theoretician, bureaucrat. Socialist who later became Kemalist. Took part in the early years of the Bolshevik revolution, wrote the first book on Lenin in Turkish. Arrested in Turkey 1925 for underground communist activity. Left the prison a Kemalist. The ideologue of intellectual journal, *Kadro*, which produced radical interpretations of Kemalism. After being sacked from bureaucracy in 1950, he became a prolific historian and novelist. For secondary sources on Aydemir, see Ünver, “Şevket Süreyya Aydemir,” 2009.

⁵ İsmail Hakkı Tonguç (1893-1960), hereafter only Tonguç. Kemalist revolutionary, pedagogue, teacher, bureaucrat. Developed a signature education project, *Village Institutes* (Köy Enstitüleri). Identified by conservatives with Kemalist social engineering efforts and socialism. Sacked from bureaucracy and persecuted during the DP period. For secondary sources on Tonguç, see Engin Tonguç, *Devrim Açısından Köy Enstitüleri ve Tonguç*, 1970; Pakize Türkoğlu, *Tonguç ve Enstitüleri*, 1997; Yağcı, *Büyük Oğul Efsanesi: Tonguç'un Romani*, 2019; Karaömerlioğlu, “Köy Enstitüleri,” 2009.

Baykurt,⁶ Doğan Avcıoğlu,⁷ Nazım Hikmet,⁸ Sabiha Sertel,⁹ Hikmet Kıvılcımlı,¹⁰ Orhan Kemal,¹¹ and Behice Boran.¹² First five intellectuals fall under the national liberation category, while the latter five fall under the socialist category.¹³ Seven are men and three are women. They belong to different generations. The oldest was born in 1884 and the youngest was born in 1929. They are also diverse geographically. Some are Balkan refugees, some are from Istanbul, and the others are from different Anatolian provinces such as Bursa and

⁶ Fakir Baykurt, (1929-1999), hereafter only Baykurt. Kemalist-socialist revolutionary, teacher, novelist, syndicalist. Graduate of Tonguç's Village Institutes. Persecuted after the 1950s. Chair of Turkey's first teachers' syndicate. Forced to exile in Germany, where he died.

⁷ Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926-1983), hereafter only Avcıoğlu. Kemalist-socialist revolutionary, journalist, theoretician, historian. Chief ideologue of left Kemalism, especially during the 1960s. Chief author of the *Yön* journal. Sought to mobilize the younger ranks of the military for a socialist-Kemalist revolution. For secondary sources on Avcıoğlu, see Atılğan, *Yön - Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar*, 2002.

⁸ Nazım Hikmet Ran (1902-1963), hereafter only Nazım. Socialist revolutionary and Turkey's "world poet." Persecuted throughout his adult life for communism. Imprisoned between 1938 and 1950. Forced to exile to the Soviet Union where he died. For secondary sources on Nazım, see: Fiş, *Nazım'ın Çilesi*, 2005; Göksu and Timms, *Romantik Komünist: Nazım Hikmet'in Yaşamı ve Eseri*, 2011; Kemal, *Nazım Hikmet'le Üç Buçuk Yıl*, 1947; Toprak, "Mayakovski'nin İntiharı ve Nazım Hikmet," 2015; Blasing, *Nâzım Hikmet: The Life and Times of Turkey's World Poet*, 2013. Zekeriya Sertel, *Mavi Gözlü Dev*, 1969.

⁹ Sabiha Sertel (1895-1968), hereafter only Sertel. Socialist revolutionary, journalist, author. First woman to be trialed for her writings in Turkey. Survived an anticommunist, reactionary lynching attempt in 1945. Forced to exile in 1950 and died in the Soviet Union. For secondary sources on Sertel, see: Erdem, "Sunuş: 100. Yılında Büyük Mecmua Dergisi Üzerine," 2019; Sayers, "Sabiha Sertel Kimdi," 2015; Yıldız Sertel, *Annem Sabiha Sertel Kimdi? Neler Yazdı?* 1993; Toprak, "Sabiha (Zekeriya) Sertel ve Türk Feminizmi," 1988; Hülya Semiz Türkoğlu, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Döneminde İlk Kadın Gazeteci: Sabiha Sertel*, 2019.

¹⁰ Hikmet Kıvılcımlı (1902-1971), hereafter only Kıvılcımlı. Socialist revolutionary, theoretician, historian. One of the most influential socialist theoreticians, especially among the youth in the 1960s and 1970s. Persecuted by the government and sacked from the TKP (Turkey's Communist Party). Died in exile. For secondary sources on Kıvılcımlı, see Ağcabay, *Türkiye Komünist Partisi ve Dr. Hikmet*, 2009; Türkali, *Tek Kişilik Ölüm*, 1921; Ulus, *Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism*, 2011.

¹¹ Orhan Kemal (1914-1970), hereafter only O. Kemal (for him not to be confused with Kemalists that generally describe Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's followers). Socialist revolutionary and author. A leading representative of the socialist-realist genre in Turkey. Wrote over thirty books. For secondary sources on O. Kemal, see Otyam, *Arkadaşım Orhan Kemal ve Mektupları*, 1975; Bezirci, *Orhan Kemal*, 1984.

¹² Behice Boran (1910-1987), hereafter only Boran. Socialist revolutionary, scholar, politician, theoretician. Purged from her professorship in 1946 for leftist views. Arrested in 1950 for peace activism. Turkey's first woman party chair. Forced to exile after the 1980 coup where she died. For secondary sources on Boran, see: Atılğan, *Behice Boran: Öğretim Üyesi, Siyasetçi, Kuramcı*, 2007; Mumcu, *Bir Uzun Yürüyüş*, 1990.

¹³ There were considerable overlaps between these two groups of people. Moreover, as this research will show, these two groups gradually came to closer political positions. So much so that younger intellectuals under the national liberation school, namely Avcıoğlu and Baykurt, gradually identified with socialism, though not in its Marxist-Leninist interpretation but its Turkish interpretation of leftwing-Kemalism. Veteran socialists like Nazım and Sertel, meanwhile, came to defend certain Kemalist principles as a last line of defense against reaction.

Adana. They are, however, not diverse ethnically. They all identify as Turks. The absence of Kurdish progressive intellectuals, which is related to the denial of Kurdish identity in republican Turkey, poses one limitation for this dissertation.¹⁴ The research is based on a variety of sources including scholarly works, memoirs, autobiographies, letters, journal and newspaper articles, interviews, speeches, court defenses, and literary works such as novels, short stories, poems, and plays. The selected figures were influential figures that played prominent roles inside their ideological camps (and some within the state apparatus) and maintained their relevance to this day. The comparative pillar focuses on Egypt's and Iran's progressive intellectuals.¹⁵ This analysis is based on English and Turkish translations of their works and secondary literature on these intellectuals.

This study builds upon and seeks to contribute to the social and political theories of Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu, and Şerif Mardin. Gramsci's theories on hegemonic struggles, organic crises, intellectuals, and Caesarism offer tools to understand revolutionary politics in the twentieth century Middle East. Bourdieu's theories on state-making, on the other hand, and more precisely his conceptualization of the state as a "field of struggle" offers contributions to Gramsci's dichotomy between the state and civil society. Yet both theorists have limitations too. Political thought and experiences of Turkish and other Middle Eastern revolutionaries pose challenges to these theorists for their overreliance on static models on institutions, as in the case of Gramsci, and social blocs (elite and popular), as in

¹⁴ Arguably, the only notable Kurdish progressive of this era was Yaşar Kemal. Being known as a Kurd was so unfamiliar in non-Kurdish parts of Turkey that Orhan Kemal's private letters referred to Yaşar Kemal as "the Kurd" (see Otyam, *Arkadaşım Orhan Kemal ve Mektupları*, 1975). Only in the 1960s, the Kurdish identity began to surface publicly. Progressive Kurds such as Kemal Burkay, Musa Anter, Canip Yıldırım, and Şerafettin Elçi made their entrance to national politics, although not as Kurds, but as Easterners (*Doğulular*).

¹⁵ Some of these intellectuals are Sadeq Hedayat (1903-1951), Sadiqeh Dowlatabadi (1882-1961), Bozorg Alavi (1904-1997), Khalil Maleki (1901-1969), and Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) of Iran and Tawfiq al-Hakim (1898-1987), Huda Sha'arawi (1897-1947), Naguib Mahfouz (1911-2006), and Salama Musa (1887-1958) of Egypt.

the case of Bourdieu. Mardin's theory of the Center-Periphery clash, on the other hand, has been Turkey's most dominant modernization paradigm since the 1980s. It has also come under severe and valid criticisms. Yet a critical reading of Mardin's theory, which would be in line with progressive and other intellectual analyses, still offers valuable tools in understanding Turkey's sociopolitical confrontations and transformations. More specifically, this dissertation suggests that Mardin's theory has validity only when understood as an intra-elite distinction, as opposed to an elite-people distinction. Moreover, the alliance of the Center and the Periphery – not clash – constituted the main dynamic.

This dissertation consists of four main chapters. Chapter 2 engages in a historical review that comparatively discusses modernization histories of Turkey, Iran, and Egypt from the late nineteenth century to their nationalist revolutions in the early twentieth century. A comparative historical reading offers insights into the making of major social blocs and state apparatuses. As such, modernization histories are informative on structures and institutions. Moreover, how progressive intellectuals understood their respective modernization histories informed their ideologies and strategies. This chapter also critically reviews Gramsci's, Bourdieu's, and Mardin's sociopolitical theories.

The rest of the dissertation is organized into three research chapters. Each research chapter deals with the 1930-1960 period and engages in the question of hegemony through its convoluted meanings. Chapter 3 engages in the question of hegemony building capacity of nationalist regimes through themes such as regime legitimacy, sociocultural distinctions within the ruling bloc, and intellectual-people distinction. It asks what makes a regime legitimate in intellectual perspectives. It shows how Turkey's Kemalist establishment differed from its Iranian and Egyptian counterparts in building a hegemonic regime. The

chapter also investigates the weaknesses of Kemalist hegemony, especially in resolving the contradictions in its ruling bloc and, more importantly, resolving the intellectual-people distinction. It argues that hegemony in the early-to-mid-twentieth century Middle East has been a multifaceted and layered process of complex relations of alliances and conflicts. These processes involved various social blocs, each possessing different capitals (namely, political, economic, intellectual, patrimonial, social) in varying degrees. Nationalist regimes' ultimate hegemonic project was to create a "unity of fate" among the members of the nation, by eradicating class and status distinctions and by spreading a distinct political consciousness to the masses, most importantly to the peasantry.

Chapter 4 deals with ideological hegemony through the question of independence. The chapter argues that independence has been fundamental for Middle Eastern revolutionary thought, the *raison d'être* of politics. The chapter asks how Middle Eastern progressive intellectuals articulated this concept. It shows that progressive intellectuals developed an interconnected, three-legged understanding of independence. These were state sovereignty, national sovereignty, and economic sovereignty. The chapter further shows how progressives built their thought upon earlier nationalist articulations on independence and carried them to radical conclusions like anti-imperialist and anti-fascist egalitarian nationalisms. Moreover, the chapter investigates the growing ideological cohesion between the two dominant progressive schools which became acute in the late 1950s.

Chapter 5 deals with revolutionaries' counter-hegemonic struggle, in other words, revolutionary thinking and exercise. It is centered around three themes: intellectuals' vanguardism, revolutionary narratives and imaginations, and revolutionary struggle against or within the state apparatus and against reactionary/conservative political streams. It

investigates social blocs' and institutions' influence on revolutionary thought and politics. It asks: what are the main determinants behind the making and transformation of respective revolutionary strategies and ideologies in Turkey and the Middle East? It shows how Turkish revolutionism, which had been an ideological mix of Kemalist national liberation and Leninist socialism, has gone through a transformation in its ideology and strategy from the 1930s to the 1960s. Ideologically, the hegemonic position in the progressive camp gradually shifted from Kemalist national liberation to Leninist socialism. Strategically, the shift was from *war of position* to *war of maneuver*. In other words, the strategy shifted from engaging in a long hegemonic struggle towards targeting the state outright. These ideologic and strategic shifts were related to progressive intellectuals' political experiences and their shifting articulations on the nature of Turkey's political-economic regime. The chapter argues that progressive counter-hegemonic struggles influenced more than progressive political thought. State responses against progressivism – often in the form of securitization – fundamentally transformed the state apparatuses ideologically and institutionally.

Informed by twentieth century Turkish revolutionary intellectuals – and by their Iranian and Egyptian counterparts – this dissertation puts forth several findings on the notion of hegemony and hegemonic transformations in the Middle East. In the Turkish case, this study puts forth two findings, one being related to hegemonic processes over national politics and the other to hegemonic processes over the progressive camp. The first argument is that state elites' marginalization and securitization of progressivism since the 1930s was directly linked to the undoing of republicanism as a progressive political project beginning in the mid-1940s. The dominant coalition of republican elites became fractured in the mid-1940s and broke down in the late-1950s to witness heightened struggles between hegemonic and

counter-hegemonic factors. The inability to promote a new hegemonic vision by the state elites opened the path to new alliances between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. Thus, the securitization of progressivism opened the path to the incorporation of fascist and Islamist streams to the state apparatus. The incorporation of conservative and/or reactionary counter-hegemonic streams into the state has been the standard response of Turkish state elites during periods of heightened hegemonic struggles. The second argument is that as the political establishment securitized socialism and marginalized national liberation, progressive commitment to Kemalism grew. Turkish progressivism had been an ideological mix of Kemalism and Leninism. What caused this link was not a political or practical alliance, which never materialized, but overlaps in political philosophies, social bases, and narratives. No matter what distinguished the progressive camp internally, the fate of these ideological traditions remained interdependent. In other words, when one tradition failed, it discredited the other.

Finally, the comparative analysis of Turkish progressivism and its Iranian and Egyptian counterparts shows that hegemonic processes in the twentieth-century Middle East had functioned in three interrelated areas: 1) hegemony as regime legitimacy; 2) hegemony as controlling the codes of dominant political culture; and 3) hegemony as determining the limits of legitimate politics, in other words, successfully establishing the boundaries of 'politics as usual' and 'politics of securitization'. Ultimately, through a qualitative and comparative analysis on the evolution of progressive thought and politics in mid-twentieth century Turkey, this study contributes to intellectual history, political theory, and Middle Eastern studies. It secondarily engages in intersecting fields of modernization, securitization, social movements, gender and sexuality, ethnicity, and development.

II. Hegemony, Revolution, and Ideology in the Middle East: A Theoretical and Historical Review

The key theoretical concern of this research shapes around the question of hegemony, particularly on how hegemonic struggles influence sociopolitical transformations and how intellectuals influence these processes. A study on hegemonic struggles is also a study on social divisions because hegemonic struggles are confrontations among and within social blocs under various ideological banners. This chapter's first part critically reviews Antonio Gramsci's theories on hegemony and intellectuals, Pierre Bourdieu's theories on social distinctions and state apparatus, and Şerif Mardin's theories on Turkey's modernization history and sociopolitical divisions. The second part offers a historical review of Turkish, Iranian, and Egyptian modernizations from the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. The historical review focuses on state centralization, social bloc formation, revolutions, and ideologies. It also engages in studies of globalization, modernization, gender and sexuality, social movements, ethnicity and race, and development.

A. *Hegemony and Distinctions: A Theoretical Review*

Gramsci builds his theory of hegemony to understand how the bourgeoisie class manufactures consent for an oppressive and exploitative system. He borrows the term from Russian Marxists who used it interchangeably with domination. Gramsci's central argument is that the bourgeoisie class secures control primarily through ideological consent – not coercion – by building a hegemonic culture and by promoting its values as common sense.

Consent enables the bourgeoisie to claim an “ethical regime,” built upon “intellectual and moral leadership.”¹⁶ Hegemony is an extra layer of protection in addition to coercion.

Gramsci anticipates civil society resistance before the revolutionaries’ frontal assault on the state. The revolutionaries must win over the civil society, first by assuming leadership over their constituency, and later over the entire society. Gramsci explains “a social group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power...it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well.”¹⁷ Hegemonic struggle for revolutionaries is a dual process, one fought over the leadership within the progressive camp and the other fought against conservatives/reactionaries within the civil society.¹⁸ Winning this fight requires “the possibility and the necessity of creating a new culture,”¹⁹ in line with the masses’ “national-popular” consciousness.²⁰

A hegemonic struggle is thus a social engineering project, ideally based upon consent with limited coercion, aiming to implement a vision of transforming the society, reorganize it under new principles, and awaken the people to a new political consciousness. For Gramsci, “the foundation of a ruling class is equivalent to the creation of a *Weltanschauung*.”²¹ Hegemonic contestants seek to make an ideology common sense, appearing almost apolitical. For a dominant bloc, this goes both for the allied social blocs within the ruling coalition (which Gramsci names the subalterns) and the antagonist blocs excluded from the ruling

¹⁶ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 259; also see Riley, “Hegemony, Democracy, and Passive Revolution in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks,” 2011, 135.

¹⁷ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 57-58.

¹⁸ Gramsci, *Antonio Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings*, 1994, 320.

¹⁹ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 276.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 130-133; Hoare and Smith, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, 1971, xxv; Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, 2006, 7.

²¹ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 381; also see Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” 1975, 351-352.

coalition (which Gramsci names the subordinates). Gramsci stresses the distinction between consent and coercion as he writes “the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership,” targeted towards antagonistic subordinate groups and allied subaltern groups respectively.²² A hegemonic regime rests upon the support of groups that make the regime’s primary constituency and their allies. Their ideology also penetrates social blocs that are excluded from the ruling coalition. A hegemonic regime is not one that everyone accepts or against which no one rebels. Rather, it is a regime that firmly controls the state apparatus and effectively promotes its ideology even across subordinated social blocs through its consent-based control over the civil society.

Gramsci attributes a critical role to intellectuals in manufacturing and maintaining hegemony.²³ He divides intellectuals into two categories: traditional and organic. Traditional intellectuals – intelligentsia – rose organically to the bourgeoisie in its ascendancy but detached from this class, some even becoming dissidents.²⁴ Organic intellectuals, meanwhile, belong to a distinct social bloc but have limited ability to reach across classes. Intelligentsia may appear autonomous and may not correspond to a distinct class, but their influence can reach various social blocs. Gramsci diverts from social-democratic Second Internationalists (who understood the relationship between workers and intellectuals mechanistically where the intellectuals as refugees from the bourgeoisie leading the mass base of workers) and Leninist Third Internationalists (who promoted the vanguard party, which would fuse the workers and the intellectuals into a cohesive unit, would also bring consciousness to

²² Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 56; also see Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” 1976, 21.

²³ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 5-14.

²⁴ See Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, 2006, 89.

workers).²⁵ While these traditions understand consciousness as transmitted downwards to the working class, Gramsci argues that the working class must raise its organic intellectuals and assume the conscious responsibility, aided by assimilation of ideas and personnel from the opposite bloc. He understands political consciousness as a dialectical process. Hegemonizing the civil society requires an organic connection between the popular element that “feels but does not always know or understand” and the intellectual element that “knows but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel.”²⁶

Gramsci considers civil society as the ultimate field of struggle for a hegemony building process whereas the state represents the ultimate revolutionary aim. The state, as in most Marxist interpretations, is a unitary and static actor under the control of a dominant bloc (and partly its subalterns), exercising coercive functions against the subordinates.²⁷ The experiences of Turkish progressive intellectuals, however, pose challenges to these analyses, because many intellectuals waged their struggles primarily within the state apparatus (see Chapter 5 for how Turkey’s counter-hegemonic contestants, progressive or otherwise, sought integration to the state apparatus instead of challenging it directly). Pierre Bourdieu’s theories on the state are helpful, which criticize Marxist interpretations that articulate the state in economistic and functionalistic terms with a focus on what it does and for whom it does it.²⁸ Bourdieu understands “the development of the modern state as a progress towards a

²⁵ Hoare and Smith, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, 1971, 3-4

²⁶ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 418

²⁷ See Riley, “Hegemony, Democracy, and Passive Revolution in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks,” 2011, 19. Gramsci (in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 212) stresses the military’s political duty to defend the Constitution, in other words, the legal form of the State together with its related institutions.

²⁸ Bourdieu, *On the State: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1989 – 1992*, 2014, 5; also see Loyal, *Bourdieu’s Theory of State: A Critical Introduction*, 2017, 43.

For comparisons between Gramsci’s and Bourdieu’s views, particularly on the state apparatus, see Koch, “State-civil society relations in Gramsci, Poulantzas and Bourdieu,” 2022; Burawoy, “The Roots of Domination: Beyond Bourdieu and Gramsci,” 2012.

higher degree of universalization ... and ... monopolization.”²⁹ The state for Bourdieu is a fractured field with an autonomous logic and a “successful claim of monopoly on the legitimate use of physical and *symbolic* violence over a definite territory and the totality of the corresponding population.”³⁰ The state exercises power over different fields and species of capital, and especially over the rates of conversion between them.³¹

This makes the state “meta,” a power above powers and produces a bureaucracy with an interest of pursuing the “universal” public interest.³² The state acts as the “central bank of symbolic capital”³³ and “the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power.”³⁴ Symbolic capital, or the “form taken by any species of capital whenever it is perceived through categories of perception,” provides the state with authority and legitimacy.³⁵ The representative of the state becomes the repository of common sense.³⁶ Similar to Gramsci who emphasizes consent over coercion, Bourdieu emphasizes symbolic violence over physical violence. No power can be exercised as naked power alone; thereby, “domination, even when based on naked force, that of arms or money, always has a symbolic dimension.”³⁷ Symbolic violence leads the subordinate classes to misrecognize the dominant culture as legitimate, in other words, accepting the dominant social bloc’s hegemony.³⁸

²⁹ Bourdieu, *On the State: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1989 – 1992*, 2014, 222.

³⁰ Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” 1994, 3 (emphasis original).

³¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

Critique of Marxist interpretations of the state also comes from several Marxist intellectuals, most notable of whom being Nicos Poulantzas, who stressed the relative autonomy of the state from the capitalist class. See Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 1980.

³² See Loyal, *Bourdieu’s Theory of State: A Critical Introduction*, 2017, 95-97.

³³ Bourdieu, *On the State: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1989 – 1992*, 2014, 122-123.

³⁴ Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” 1994, 9.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁶ Bourdieu, *In Other Words*, 1990 p. 136

³⁷ Bourdieu, *Pascallian Meditations*, 2000, 172; also see Loyal, *Bourdieu’s Theory of State: A Critical Introduction* 2017, 51.

³⁸ Symbolic violence is the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning as legitimate upon groups or classes in a process “whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a form

Because “the universalization of requirements...does not come with a universalization of access to the means needed to fulfill them, it fosters both the monopolization of the universal by the few and the dispossession of all others.”³⁹ The process thus provides a certain group of individuals – the state nobility – with privileged access to symbolic capital and violence.

The monopoly over symbolic violence makes the state a field of competing forces. The access to state power becomes inseparable from the construction of the field of struggles for the monopoly over the advantages attached to this monopoly.⁴⁰ Agents belonging to different social groups with high levels of economic, political, or cultural capitals compete over the distribution of public goods and different forms of capital. These confrontations are inherently about defining the dominant state ideology. Arguing that economic capital alone cannot adequately explain the reproduction of social hierarchies, Bourdieu further analyzes how different social classes relate to symbolic capital through the concept of habitus.⁴¹ Habitus – embodied class produced by social conditioning⁴² - is made by symbolic struggles internally within social blocs and externally with outside blocs. For Bourdieu, the habitus of each class – bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, workers - plays a determining role in how they relate to the state’s symbolic capital. Internal symbolic struggles are most apparent and severe within the dominant class. Their struggle “defines the legitimate principles of domination between economic, educational, and social capital.”⁴³ The state as an internally

which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder.” See Bourdieu and Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, 1977, xiii; also see Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Sociologists*, 2006, 66.

³⁹ Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” 1994, 8.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁴¹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 1984, 66-69; also see Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Sociologists*, 2006, 95.

⁴² Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 1984, 437. For Bourdieu, habitus is a generative and unifying principle that makes the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle: Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* 1990, 54; Bourdieu 2012, 337

⁴³ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 1984, 254.

divided field of struggle is where those with high levels of economic or cultural capital struggle over the imposition of the dominant form of capital in societal relations.⁴⁴

Bourdieu thereby contributes to Gramscian thinking on hegemony by articulating the state as an autonomous field of struggle, as well as through the concept of symbolic power and the state's monopoly over it. His emphasis on symbolic power, however, underestimates the state's coercive nature. He also pays little attention to groups that reject and/or challenge the state's monopoly on symbolic violence. In other words, the state's monopoly on symbolic violence appears omnipresent and omnipotent. Hegemony, however, is a process of mutual relationships among culture, politics, and economy in a constantly circulating and shifting network of influence.⁴⁵ The state monopoly over symbolic violence is also never complete because power is not something that can be achieved once and for all. It constantly faces challenges from counter-hegemonic contestants, who alter both the degree of monopolization of symbolic violence and the forms of symbolic power the state preaches (see Chapter 5 for how subordinated counter-hegemonic contestants challenged the state attempts to monopolize symbolic violence from the margins, while simultaneously seeking integration within the state). State response against antagonistic challenges takes the shape of domination which often goes beyond symbolic forms of violence. Yet domination also takes different forms.

Securitization is an extreme form of domination and an inherent – yet often missed or overlooked – part of hegemonic confrontations. Securitization theory focuses on security as the move that takes politics beyond established norms by framing an issue as a special kind

⁴⁴ Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 1998, 264-265; also see Loyal, *Bourdieu's Theory of State: A Critical Introduction*, 2017, 86.

⁴⁵ Jones, *Antonio Gramsci* 2006, 4-5.

of or above politics.⁴⁶ Securitization is thus a more extreme version of politicization, presenting an issue as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds.⁴⁷ Securitization expands upon Gramsci's tripartite articulation of dominants, subalterns, and subordinates in describing a political system. Turkish state elites often took progressives' counter-hegemonic struggles as existential security threats. Mohammed Ayoob shows that security-oriented thinking is common among Third World state elites, which results from the twin pressures of late state-making and late entry into the international system.⁴⁸ Charles Tilly, meanwhile, shows that the state reaction towards antagonistic blocs shows variations and can take forms of prescribing, tolerating, or forbidding (see Chapter 5 for how counter-hegemonic struggles within the state apparatus influence the variations of state reaction towards antagonistic contestants, in other words, which group to securitize and which group to politicize).⁴⁹

Implementing securitization policies is linked to a political regime's hegemonic capacity. Securitization is a self-referential practice because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security matter, not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is presented as such.⁵⁰ Securitization is an inter-subjective and socially constructed process. The securitizing actor cannot determine securitization's success. The issue becomes securitized only if the audience accepts it as such (see Chapter 5 for securitization policies

⁴⁶ For securitization theory, see Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1998.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 23-24.

⁴⁸ This is not uncommon in Third World countries. Mohammed Ayoob argues that security has been the central concern of all calculations and behaviors of Third World political actors throughout the twentieth century due to the twin pressures of late state making and late entry into the international system. He stresses that late political development resulted in certain common characteristics such as lack of internal cohesion, lack of unconditional legitimacy of state nobility and institutions, and easy permeability by external actors (Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, 1995,14-16).

⁴⁹ Tilly, *Contentious Performances*, 2008, 149.

⁵⁰ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1998, 24.

and hegemony).⁵¹ Securitization requires convincing the audience of the boundaries of legitimate politics. In other words, defining boundaries is a form of hegemonic struggle. Nationalism has been the hegemonic ideology in the Middle East. Determining the kind of nationalism – egalitarian, constitutionalist, antifascist, anticommunist, religious, secular, etc. – and its securitized and tolerated antagonists had been central to Turkey’s hegemonic confrontations (see Chapter 4 for progressive articulations and agitations on nationalism through the concept of sovereignty).

Hegemonic confrontations extend beyond confrontations over (and within) the state apparatus and among social blocs. They also concern internal struggles within ideological camps and social blocs. Gramsci recognizes that revolutionaries must first build their hegemony over the progressive camp and later extend it into national politics. Yet he pays no major attention to internal ideological struggles. Bourdieu also pays attention to inner struggles over the habitus of each social group. But he often disregards how sociocultural differences might lead to significant ideological or practical distinctions that transcend classes. This is common in many social theories of European origin, which often envision singular classes and thereby disregard internal class conflicts in their focus on conflicts between classes.⁵² In contrast, most Middle Eastern theories envision divided classes, especially with regards to middle classes. These internal divisions open new fields of struggle within the state. Mardin’s analyses on Turkey’s modernization and sociopolitical divisions exemplify this. Evrand Abrahamian and Nikki Keddie in the Iranian context and Anouar

⁵¹ Ibid., 30-31.

⁵² Jan Nederveen Pieterse problematizes the unitary perspectives on the middle class, putting forth that middle class is both layered (age, ethnicity, lifestyle, religion, regional origin, etc.) and plural (middle classes). See Nederveen Pieterse, *Multipolar Globalization: Emerging Economies and Development*, 2017, 156-162.

Abdel-Malek and Albert Hourani in the Egyptian context also develop overlapping paradigms.

Applying the Center-Periphery model of Edward Shils⁵³ and the bureaucratic centralism model of Shmuel Eisenstadt⁵⁴ into Ottoman modernization, Mardin argues that Turkey's primary sociopolitical confrontation has been dualistic between the forces of the Center and the Periphery.⁵⁵ The officials of the Center, who opposed segmentation and sought unity and centralization, were set apart from the Periphery by being on the other side of the fence, as well as by the virtue of distinctive status characteristics and symbolic differences.⁵⁶ Relative to the heterogeneity of the Periphery, the ruling class was singularly compact. The Periphery developed its varied counterculture against the political, economic, and cultural encroachment of the Center.⁵⁷ The decline of the empire brought the interactions between the two camps into the center of politics. The Periphery started to rely on local notables' (*eşraf*) leadership, who lacked an autonomous status, to articulate local interests.⁵⁸ The penetration of market values into Anatolia transformed the local notables' earlier bases of influence. Notables with varying types of capitals (religious, mercantile, landed) took an increasing interest in economic pursuit, which led to uniformity in the upper echelons of the provincial Periphery.⁵⁹

This development altered the nature of the Center-Periphery clash, bringing the bureaucrats and local notables into closer contact, on the one hand, and adding a new dimension to the conflict over patronage relations in the periphery, on the other. Education

⁵³ Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*, 1975.

⁵⁴ Eisenstadt, *The Political System of Empires*, 1963.

⁵⁵ Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," 1973, 170.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 171.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 177.

was the most significant realm that reproduced their distinction. Sons of bureaucrats of any capacity entered modern, Western-style education institutes, while sons of rural notables often received traditional *medrese* education. The Center, under the leadership of a new and intellectually more uncompromising type of bureaucrat, gradually developed a critical view of the provinces as a backwater of civilization. The Periphery, in response, started clinging to Islam.⁶⁰ For Mardin, in the late nineteenth century, this new type of bureaucrat impatiently pursued a comprehensive modernization to establish a new regime. This bloc found itself in conflict both against the Periphery's local notables and the Center's more traditional components.⁶¹ The core of Mardin's argument is that the complex and constantly transforming relationships between the Center and the Periphery set the stage for the primary political confrontation during the republican era. Both camps defined (and re-defined) themselves, partly against their great other, because of their hegemonic struggle against each other, as well as their inner hegemonic conflicts.

In the Iranian context, Keddie argues that modernization processes led to the making of two distinct cultures, secular-modern and religious-traditional, which became acute in the mid-twentieth century and produced "two Irans." In addition to a cultural division between the elites and the masses, this division grew between two middle classes that gradually developed distinct ideologies.⁶² Abrahamian argues that Iran's middle classes were divided between salaried and propertied blocs. The propertied middle class made by *ulema*, *bazaar* merchants, and guild elders had a conservative, religious, theocratic, and mercantile *Weltanschauung*. The salaried middle class, in contrast, developed a modernistic, secular,

⁶⁰ Ibid., 179.

⁶¹ Ibid., 180.

⁶² Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 102.

and socialistic one.⁶³ In the Egyptian context, Hourani emphasizes the role of distinct education systems, modern and traditional, in the making of sociocultural and political distinctions. He argues that by the late nineteenth century, two different educated classes emerged, each with a distinct spirit: the traditional Islamic spirit and the spirit of the younger generations that turned its face towards Europe.⁶⁴ Abdel-Malek identifies Islamic fundamentalism and liberal modernism as the two main tendencies of the modern Arabic political thought. Islamism finds its primary base in lower-middle classes and traditional intellectuals, while further influencing artisans, certain segments of the working class, and small or aristocratic landowners. Modernism, on the other hand, finds its primary base in the new middle class and urban intellectuals, and influenced segments that were most directly affected by changes in the economic structures such as factory workers, professionals, bureaucrats, and the industrial and financial bourgeoisie.⁶⁵

The overlaps among these theoretical paradigms are not coincidental. They all rely upon a structuralist-objectivist articulation based on dialectical interactions between ideological camps representing different social blocs. Gramsci – the theoretician of superstructure⁶⁶ – owes his structuralism to Marxist dialectic materialism, although in an altered fashion compared to Marxism’s orthodox and Leninist interpretations. He conceptualizes the historical process as a struggle between two generic camps: progressives and reactionaries.⁶⁷ Gramsci theorizes hegemonic struggle both as a tool to grab power for progressives and a generic schema of how history moves forwards as a complement to Marxist historiography of

⁶³ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 259.

⁶⁴ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 1983, 138.

⁶⁵ Abdel-Malek, *Contemporary Arab Political Thought*, 1983, 4-6; Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, 1968, 202-203.

⁶⁶ Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, 2006, 33; Anderson, “The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,” 1976, 69-78; Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” 1975, 364.

⁶⁷ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 221

class struggles. Bourdieu takes the binary opposition as the universal classification principle, which finds its original source in gender. He writes “a vision of the world is a division of the world...To bring order is to bring division, to divide the universe into opposing entities.”⁶⁸ Bourdieu understands the primary struggle of domination over the state between two poles, those with economic capital and those with cultural capital, in other words, the intellectuals.⁶⁹ Mardin, Keddie, Abrahamian, Hourani, and Abdel-Malek show overlaps with this dialectical articulation. They develop respective paradigms of distinctions between two poles as the primary analytical tools to analyze the transformations of societal relations. Later scholars have validly criticized such structural and binary articulations for being deterministic, undermining people’s agency, being Eurocentric (and/or Enlightenment-centric), relying on static models, and having close connections to positivism without paying attention to the foundations of its truth claims.⁷⁰ Still, other factors validate utilizing these paradigms.

First, binary division narratives have been the dominant paradigms of different modernization schools (capitalist, socialist, and nationalist). These narratives have found prominence in Turkey’s, Iran’s, and Egypt’s academic and intellectual circles through the twentieth century and beyond. Revolutionary intellectuals who constitute the core of this research also understood the world in dialectical divisions. Yet they did not claim these meta divisions to be fully comprehensive. Ethnic, religious, and gender distinctions that went beyond binary meta divisions also occupied the revolutionary intellectuals’ mindsets (see Chapter 4 for progressive perspectives on these distinctions). They also recognized that meta

⁶⁸ Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 1990, 210-211; also see Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Sociologists*, 2006, 14-21.

⁶⁹ Loyal, *Bourdieu’s Theory of State: A Critical Introduction*, 2017, 88; Bourdieu, *The State Nobility*, 1998, 264-265; Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” 1994, 4-5.

⁷⁰ For reflections on these criticisms, see Eley, *A Crooked Line*, 2005, 115-183 and Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century*, 2005, 97-140.

divisions were not unchanging structures. E. P. Thompson brings agency to the center of his analysis and shows how classes are not static structures, but ongoing relationships made by experience.⁷¹ Likewise, Middle Eastern progressive intellectuals' understandings of binary divisions are unfixed. Rather than being attached to a particular static structural understanding, progressive political thought constantly transformed itself in its hegemonic struggle. For progressive revolutionaries, dialectics constituted the philosophy of change. They were not free from such transformations either.

Second, this study offers a history of Turkey's hegemonic confrontations from the viewpoint of progressive intellectuals. Binary divisions are useful for conceptualizations and assessing changes and continuities within ideological traditions. Meta blocs of ideological lines help explain the overlaps and interactions between distinct political traditions. This offers explanations on how progressive political thought shared significant elements with Kemalism (see Chapter 4 for the parallels between progressive and Kemalist perspectives, especially with regards to sovereignty). While meta divisions may not correspond to definitive institutional or structural configurations, they are, nevertheless, descriptive of ideological formations and transformations. Moreover, in the Turkish context, a distinctive pattern of binary sociopolitical division has constantly reproduced itself since the mid-1940s. Briefly, these confrontations were between the CHP vs. the DP in 1945-1960; Leftists vs. Rightists in 1960-1980; Secularism vs. Islamism in 1980-2000, and the AKP (Justice and Development Party) vs. the opposition in the twenty-first century. Consequently, binary thinking had been the universal tool of most Turkish intellectuals. Constant reproduction of

⁷¹ E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, 1963, 8-9.

meta binaries also makes paradigms of decline and defeat less useful compared to a paradigm emphasizing continuity and change.

Mardin, Keddie, Abrahamian, Abdel-Malek, and Hourani all point to a division between two *Weltanschauungs*. The nuance between Mardin and others is that Mardin envisions a definitive Center firmly held by a social bloc, while Iran and Egypt scholars envision a distinction between two middle classes, neither of which possessing real political capital. This relates to Kemalists' hegemonic capacity over the state apparatus and its key constituency as opposed to its Iranian and Egyptian counterparts (see Chapter 3 for hegemony building capacities of nationalist regimes in the Middle East). Mardin's theory has been Turkey's most dominant modernization paradigm since the 1980s. It has also come under criticism, mainly for 1) overreliance on American modernization paradigms 2) disregarding economic interests in its focus on culture; 3) taking Islam as the absolute Periphery even though Islamism had integrated itself into the state apparatus since the mid-1940s; 4) sidelining Kurdish and Alevi identities; and 5) creating a conservative ideal of "Kemalist Center" of alienated bureaucrats vs. "Islamic Periphery" of authentic masses.⁷² These criticisms are largely accurate. Yet this dissertation, informed by progressive intellectual narratives, suggests that the Center-Periphery Paradigm has historical validity in understanding the complexities of Turkish sociopolitical confrontations, if it is taken 1) as a distinction within elites instead of a greater distinction between the elites and the masses; 2) not as a continuous conflict but as a complex set of relations, in which alliance is the main dynamic; and 3) in a layered sense that allows for distinctions, in other words, hegemonic

⁷² For these criticisms, see Açıkel, "Toplum ve Muarızları: 'Merkez-Çevre' Paradigması Üzerine Eleştirel Notlar," 2006 and Gürakar, "Merkez-Çevre Paradigması Türkiye'nin Siyasetini Açıklamanın Anahtarı Olabilir Mi?" 2020.

conflicts within the two meta blocs (see Chapter 3 for progressive articulations on interactions between the forces of the Center and the Periphery in the making of Turkey's republican establishment).

Mardin's theory identifies the forces of Center and Periphery as the dominant blocs that shape Turkey's modernization history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For most Turkish progressives, these forces were the military-bureaucratic segment and rural notables respectively. Later scholars also produced overlapping historical narratives. Focusing primarily on state centralization, revolutions, and ideologies, the next part offers a comparative historical and literature review on Turkish, Iranian, and Egyptian histories. It also engages in studies of globalization, modernization, gender and sexuality, social movements, ethnicity and race, development, and securitization. This section aims to shed light upon historical conditions that have led to the making of progressive narratives and characteristics by the early twentieth century. It also serves to offer a historical background.

B. Centralization and Revolutions: A Historical Review

Turkey, Iran, and Egypt had considerable overlaps in their historical trajectories. They shared a regime type based on religion and state (*din-u devlet*) mentality where religious authority was key for rulers' legitimacy.⁷³ Bureaucratic, religious, and military elites made the state nobility. Religious officials (*ulema*) enjoyed varying degrees of financial autonomy via religious foundations (*vakıfs*) and assumed the leading role in educational and judicial affairs,

⁷³ See Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1991, 83; Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards*, 2005, 70; Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*, 1999, 11.

in addition to their political responsibilities.⁷⁴ Small shopkeepers (*esnaf/bazaaris*) occupied a central role in the urban economy and civil society while maintaining close ties with the *ulema*.⁷⁵ Small landowners constituted the bulk of the peasant population.⁷⁶ Well until the late eighteenth century, military-bureaucratic elite, *ulema*, *esnaf*, and a peasant majority, in addition to semi-nomadic tribes had constituted the main pillars of the sociopolitical structure. By the early nineteenth century, these states experienced major changes in their economic and military position vis-à-vis the European powers. Nineteenth century globalization processes, which for these three states primarily meant European economic and political encroachment, forced fundamental internal transformations.

On the one hand, these processes created fundamental differences in these examples, domestically and internationally. Turkey is an example of imperial failures in modernization like Tsarist Russia or Qing China. Iran, on the other hand, suffered from a weak dynasty incapable to pursue modernization reforms and therefore developed greater dependency to hegemonic imperialist powers. Egypt, meanwhile, was directly colonized and is part of the problematic of decolonization. These differences naturally alter later state making processes as well as expressions of nationalisms, revolutions, and hegemonic contestations. Yet despite such notable differences, intellectual attitudes and intellectual-state relations showed major resemblances throughout the twentieth century, especially with regards to the questions of sovereignty, security, and ideological formations. This signals the impact of regionalism in hegemonic contestations which can overcome differences in domestic structures and

⁷⁴ Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 22; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 27; Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 15; Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule*, 1992, 106.

⁷⁵ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 34-35; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 27; Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule*, 1992, 120.

⁷⁶ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 10; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 33-34; Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1985, 20.

international contexts. The following section highlights major differences and similarities in Turkey's, Egypt's, and Iran's modernization trajectories.

Ottoman statesmen began detecting changes in their position in the world economy by the early seventeenth century.⁷⁷ Crushing military defeats in the late seventeenth century made the Ottoman's weakness apparent. This led to a gradual centralization and Westernization ideas, as well as to the abandonment of classical Ottoman ethos based on religion and conquest.⁷⁸ Ottoman state nobility pursued ambitious centralization attempts since the eighteenth century. Yet the empire remained considerably decentralized by the late eighteenth century, especially in tax collection.⁷⁹ By the nineteenth century, reform attempts grew more comprehensive than military modernization. Economy, administration, and education became new focuses of reform efforts, though the military maintained its prominence.⁸⁰ By the 1839 *Tanzimat* Edict, the Ottomans have made significant attempts in centralization, while a central bureaucracy that defeated or incorporated its main rivals has emerged as a formidable social bloc, capable enough to sideline the court. The bureaucratic elite gradually developed a homogenous habitus and a political consensus of "saving the state from decline."⁸¹ The Great Powers' encroachment and nationalist uprisings in the Balkans

⁷⁷ Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 73; E. Thompson, *Justice Interrupted*, 2013, 1.

⁷⁸ Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 41-43.

⁷⁹ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 8; Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 59.

⁸⁰ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 42-45.

⁸¹ Various scholars have long problematized the so-called 'decline thesis' concerning the late Ottoman Empire. Zürcher (in *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 63-65) for example argues that what the Ottomans lacked comparatively to their European rivals were money and population. Still, "the decline" had undeniably occupied the mindset of Ottoman statesmen from the early nineteenth century to the actual collapse of the empire. Decline, however, was not the only thing that occupied their mindsets. Minawi (in *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz*, 2016) for example shows that the Ottomans tried to take part in the Scramble for Africa in their own right, however unsuccessful. Such expeditions would later become a focus of criticism by the republican intellectuals of their imperial past.

remained the most significant factor that pushed the modernization attempts. The dissolution of the empire remained a central threat in the bureaucratic mentality.

The empire also faced economic challenges and was gradually pushed into a semi-periphery status within the world economy in the nineteenth century.⁸² Economic exploitation from Western powers caused significant discontent among elites and the public alike. Reforms were costly and mismanagement of restricted resources led to frequent bankruptcies. The Ottoman elites became concerned with growing their resources by increasing tax revenues, overcoming their industrial backwardness, and increasing agricultural production.⁸³ Growing trade relations and cash-cropping agriculture around port cities resulted in rapid transformations in social structures.⁸⁴ The Ottoman economy was dominated by small-scale agricultural production except for areas near port cities. These areas remained open to foreign trade and capital. European and native non-Muslim merchants, who gradually became a comprador stratum, dominated trade.⁸⁵ Capitulations, concessions, foreign debts, and flow of manufactured Western goods hampered the efforts to restructure the Ottoman economy. Even though the state increased its capacity to collect taxes, economic growth remained considerably slow throughout the nineteenth century.⁸⁶

⁸² Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 2016, 11; Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 47.

I use the term semi-periphery here in the same sense as Immanuel Wallerstein (in *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, 2004).

⁸³ Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 73; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 45; Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 91; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 111.

⁸⁴ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 47-49; Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*, 1995, 178-180.

⁸⁵ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 34; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 89, Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 28.

Pamuk (in *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi, 1500-1914*, 2005, 166-167) stresses that while the non-Muslim bourgeoisie had an undeniable comprador nature, they were also dominant in Anatolian trade and agriculture, which had the effect of preventing the penetration of European merchants.

⁸⁶ Pamuk (in *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 148-155) calculates that the annual growth between 1820 and 1913 was 0.5 percent on average and 60 percent in total, which was similar in Greece and Egypt too.

Centralization efforts were at the expense of groups that had constituted Ottoman social structures. During the early nineteenth century, the military-bureaucratic segment managed to confiscate religious foundations, crush the janissaries, and incorporate the landlords who opposed centralization.⁸⁷ With the janissaries gone, the *ulema* and *esnaf* lost significant muscle against the state and were compelled to adopt a more conciliatory stance.⁸⁸ Centralization measures also often put heavy burdens on peasants.⁸⁹ Ottoman court *ulema*, meanwhile, often rallied behind modernization attempts.⁹⁰ Gradual secularization of Ottoman judicial, administrative, and education systems further curtailed the *ulema*'s influence. The *ulema* remained incapable of producing ideologies that would challenge the secularization process, partly due to their close adherence to the establishment.⁹¹ By the late nineteenth century, the court *ulema* became a nearly obsolete group. Meanwhile, the heterodox *ulema* of Sufi sects was restricted to the peripheries, absent of any significant financial or political power, but maintained ties to the civil society.⁹² The peripheries of the empire resisted centralization attempts, which strengthened their identities in defiance of the Center.⁹³ The

⁸⁷ Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, 1991, 118; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 33; Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 37.

⁸⁸ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 59; Quataert, "Ottoman Workers and the State," 1994, 21.

⁸⁹ Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 95; Bruinessen, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*, 1992, 280-283.

⁹⁰ This was partly due to their close adherence to the establishment, where they enjoyed an inferior position compared to military-bureaucratic elites, and partly due to their desire to respond to the spread of *Bektaşilik* among the janissaries, an unorthodox, anti-state interpretation of Islam (see Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 27 and 108). In addition to *Bektaşilik*, the Alevi population in Anatolia who exercised an unorthodox form of Islam constituted a major concern for the *ulema*. In general, the Ottoman establishment considered the Alevis a potential fifth column, to be used by the Shia Safavid Empire (see Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, 1991, 87; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 209; Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik*, 2005, 15).

⁹¹ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 10.

Ironically, the most significant blow to the *ulema* came from the only Ottoman sultan who embraced Islamism. Islamic intellectuals and the court *ulema* became targets of Abdülhamid II, who feared Islamic criticisms against his regime (see Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 73).

⁹² Mardin, *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*, 2011, 44.

⁹³ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 17.

empire remained less centralized compared to its European counterparts but was able to prevent the oppositional groups from unifying.⁹⁴

Ottoman centralization was an elite-led affair under the dominance of the military-bureaucratic segment. The *Tanzimat* statesmen, the Young Ottomans, and the Young Turks constituted the three generations of late-Ottoman bureaucratic elites.⁹⁵ Each group had developed distinct intellectual traditions that showed continuity, dialectically leading to the making of a materialist, secular-nationalist, positivist, and progress-oriented worldview.⁹⁶ The Ottoman military-bureaucratic segment kept the people (*reaya*) out, suppressed rivaling social groups, partially sidelined the court since the 1830s, and became the primary force behind reforms. The brief constitutional experiment of 1876, led by Young Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats, aimed to codify the rising influence of the bureaucracy as well as to withstand pressures from European powers that pushed for greater reforms in communal relations.⁹⁷ The autocratic reign of Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909) reversed the military-bureaucratic modernization trend and temporarily shifted the balance of power towards the court.⁹⁸ Muslim bureaucratic and non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisies remained the only social segments that could challenge the court's supremacy. These two blocs took two resources out of the sultan's control: social resources acquired through Western-style education and adaptation of Western goods, institutions, and ideas for the bureaucrats, and economic resources, attained through commerce for the merchants.⁹⁹

Ottoman statesmen put a heavy emphasis on Western-style education institutions throughout

⁹⁴ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 8; Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 59.

⁹⁵ Mardin, *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*, 2011, 26; Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 13-17.

⁹⁶ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 177 and 184-187.

⁹⁷ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 115-123.

⁹⁸ Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II," 2008, 49.

⁹⁹ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 44 and 81.

the nineteenth century, which eventually led to the making of an autonomous military-bureaucratic with a distinct habitus and nationalist *Weltanschauung*.¹⁰⁰ The focus point of bureaucratic opposition was the sultan's autocracy that promoted Islamism while repressing nationalism and his inability in preventing Western encroachment and the empire's dissolution.¹⁰¹ Gradually, the Young Turks became convinced that the military should assume the dominant role in politics, tasked with saving the empire and transforming the nation.¹⁰²

Iranian and Egyptian modernization processes showed parallels to the Ottomans as they too aimed for centralization and preventing European encroachment. Yet there were also sharp differences. In contrast to the Ottomans, Iran's eighteenth century was marked by decentralization with no significant social bloc pushing for centralization. Throughout the political chaos and depopulation following the collapse of the Safavid dynasty in 1736, the autonomy of landlords, tribes, and *ulema* increased significantly.¹⁰³ When the Qajar dynasty rose to power in 1789, it lacked military power, administrative stability, and ideological and/or religious legitimacy.¹⁰⁴ The dynasty remained powerless outside Tehran. Its central

¹⁰⁰ See Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 68-69; Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 367; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 99.

¹⁰¹ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 158; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 113.

Inability to effectively resist external challenges has been a common accusation of consecutive generations of reformers against their respective 'old orders' (see Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 205).

¹⁰² Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 215.

¹⁰³ See Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 18-20; Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 18-21; Keddie, *Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective*, 1983, 582-583; Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 204; Seyf, "Population and Agricultural Development in Iran, 1800–1906," 2009, 447.

¹⁰⁴ Katouzian (in "The Short-Term Society," 2004) argues that the lack of the ruler's legitimacy is a historical phenomenon in Iranian politics, causing the state nobility to become arbitrary in their rule.

focus remained tribal insurgencies.¹⁰⁵ The Qajars governed Iran primarily through manipulation of social divisions, especially tribal, ethnic, regional, and sectarian differences.¹⁰⁶ While there were sporadic reform efforts in military, education, economy, and administration led by some state elites, the Qajars ultimately remained unwilling and unable to carry comprehensive reforms.

By the early nineteenth century, European political and economic influence in Iran was negligible. Its main trade partners were its neighbors.¹⁰⁷ First major defeat against a European power, Russia, came in 1827. Although comparatively belated, the impacts of European encroachment were overwhelming, which also disrupted reform efforts. The Qajars experienced further failures in revenue increase.¹⁰⁸ Increasing trade relations with European merchants pushed Iran to a semi-periphery status.¹⁰⁹ Cash-cropping the agriculture caused land accumulation by the privileged, famines, and bread riots.¹¹⁰ The inability of the Qajars to protect the native bourgeoisie against its European counterparts created significant discontent.¹¹¹ Unable to raise revenues, the Qajars resorted to selling monopolies, which further increased public discontent.¹¹² The state's inability against Russia and Great Britain,

¹⁰⁵ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* 1982, 41; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 23; Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 36; Keddie, "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective," 1983, 581.

¹⁰⁶ Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 2008, 33.

¹⁰⁷ Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 27; Moaddel, "Shi'i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890-1892," 1994, 5.

¹⁰⁸ As the government was unable to tax the rural or urban notables and tribal leaders, it started selling government positions to the highest bidder. Taxing the *bazaar* was also difficult. Many *bazaaris* paid their taxes, not to the government but to the *ulema*. See Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 51.

¹⁰⁹ Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 19; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 34.

¹¹⁰ Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 26; Malek, "Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Iran," 1991, 70; Seyf, "Population and Agricultural Development in Iran, 1800-1906," 2009; Cronin, "Bread and Justice in Qajar Iran," 2018, 858; Seyf, "Iran and the Great Famine, 1870-72," 2010, 290.

¹¹¹ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 60-61; Malek, "Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Iran," 1991, 75.

¹¹² E. Thompson, *Justice Interrupted*, 2013, 76.

two powers that had dominated Iranian politics, was apparent. Groups within the *ulema*, *bazaar* merchants, and urban middle and upper classes, which until then had little contact with Europe, started developing their respective responses.¹¹³ As the Qajars retreated from reforms, the incentive passed to intellectuals, traditional and modern.

Eighteenth century decentralization and comparatively belated centralization reforms sharply diverged Ottoman and Iranian modernizations. Compared to the Ottomans, Iran, most notably, lacked the officer modernizers.¹¹⁴ The Iranian intelligentsia was also numerically smaller. In the absence of state-sponsored secular education, they remained a self-made social bloc from the upper echelons of the socioeconomic hierarchy.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, they began developing secular, nationalist, and constitutionalist perspectives that aspired for a modern, centralized state that would be able to compete against its European rivals.¹¹⁶ The Shi'i *ulema*, meanwhile, remained a more centralized, ideological, and hierarchical bloc. They enjoyed autonomous financial resources, an entrenched position in urban civil society,

¹¹³ Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*, 1996, 24; Boroujerdi, "The Ambivalent Modernity of Iranian Intellectuals," 2003, 12.

¹¹⁴ Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 2010, 9.

The first central army, the Cossack Brigade, was formed in 1879 and by 1906 it was fewer than 2000 men (Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 40). Moreover, it was primarily tasked with protecting the royals, remained under heavy Russian influence, and was known for its lack of discipline. Many nationalists detested the brigade due to its Russian connections (Cronin, "Iran's Forgotten Revolutionary: Abulqasim Lahuti and the Tabriz Insurrection of 1922," 2004, 129).

¹¹⁵ Matin-Asgari (in *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah*, 2002, 19) notes that the Qajars started sending students abroad by 1810 and emulated the Ottoman education system, although to a limited degree due to lack of resources. Mottahedeh (in *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 56) stresses that students returning from abroad with idealist agendas often found themselves in disillusionment. The spread of European-style education networks would cause alarm among many *ulema* whose monopoly in education was under attack. The education of girls, on the other hand, was condemned as heresy and created even more uproar. Many advocates of girls' education became the targets of violent *ulema* (see Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 111; Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards*, 2005, 200; Najmabadi, "Genus of Sex or The Sexing of Jins," 2013, 212; Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 2007, 53).

¹¹⁶ Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 36; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 50; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 35; Katouzian, "The Short-Term Society," 2004, 13; Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 2012, 30.

and access to the state nobility.¹¹⁷ *Bazaar* merchants, semi-nomadic tribes, and landowners also remained more powerful and autonomous compared to their Ottoman counterparts.¹¹⁸ Throughout the nineteenth century, the connection between the *ulema* and the *bazaar* grew stronger. They often belonged to the same families through intermarriage and a significant proportion of urban *ulema*'s income came from levies paid by the *bazaaris*.¹¹⁹ The connection between the traditionalist and modernist blocs, on the other hand, was practically nonexistent. These blocs gradually developed distinct features and equipped themselves with a sociopolitical perspective and habitus. Regardless, both groups desired a strong and just state that could prevent European encroachment. Alliances between secular and religious blocs against imperialism and autocracy would play defining roles in Iran's history.¹²⁰ The Tobacco Protests of 1891, which followed a concession to European merchants, became the first instance of the secular-religious alliance.¹²¹

Egypt's modernization processes showed generic resemblances to its Ottoman and Iranian counterparts but eventually diverged principally by property relations and the British occupation.¹²² Egypt became an Ottoman dominion in the sixteenth century, though it

¹¹⁷ Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 13; Kamali, *Revolutionary Iran: Civil Society and State in the Modernization Process*, 1998, 39-40; Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 204.

¹¹⁸ Kamali (in "Multiple Modernities and Islamism in Iran," 2007, 377) stresses that the modernizing elites in Iran had to struggle against a strong constellation of power in civil society, most notably against the *ulema* and the *bazaar*.

¹¹⁹ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 59; Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 30; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 15.

¹²⁰ For secular-religious alliance and its influence in Iranian politics, see: Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006; Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 2010, 9; Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 28; Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 131; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 259-260.

¹²¹ Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, p.62; Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 28.

¹²² One relevant side note is that the direct colonization of Egypt, which represents its most significant structural divergence compared to Turkey and Iran in its historical trajectory, might have reflected itself as the much greater influence of postcolonial school in Egypt's historiography relative to respective Turkish and Iranian historiographies (see for example Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 2002; Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt*, 1988; Esmeir, *Juridical Humanity*, 2012; El-Shakry, *Great Social Laboratory*, 2007).

remained an autonomous province.¹²³ The Ottoman authority deteriorated throughout the eighteenth century, which strengthened the Mamluk military oligarchy.¹²⁴ Napoleon's invasion de facto ended the Ottoman rule; it also discredited the Mamluks.¹²⁵ Under Muhammad Ali, who rose after the French retreat, Egypt experienced one of the most rapid centralization processes of the nineteenth century. Within decades, Egyptian centralizers defeated and incorporated the Mamluks, increased state revenues, suppressed the merchants and *ulema*, monopolized agriculture and trade, developed a centralized bureaucracy, built a conscription-based army, established native industries, built modern education institutes, settled the tribes, confiscated *vakıfs*, and challenged their Ottoman (de jure) overlords in an expansionist policy.¹²⁶ The making of a centralized bureaucracy led to fundamental changes in property relations. To keep the nascent bureaucratic bourgeoisie loyal to the court and distinct from the populace, Muhammad Ali relied exclusively on elites of Mamluk-Ottoman origin and rewarded loyalty with land and military titles.¹²⁷ Land confiscations were at the

¹²³ Egypt never was a proper Ottoman province like Anatolia or the Balkans. The Ottoman *Timar* system was never applied in Egypt. The Ottoman rulers were content with granting Egypt a considerable autonomy, provided that Egyptians 1) recognized the sultan's sovereignty and accepted its deputies, most notably the governor; 2) provided an annual remittance; and 3) sent military support upon request (See, Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule*, 1992, 16-20).

¹²⁴ Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, 1984, 1; Goldschmidt, *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation State*, 2004, 12; Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 23; Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*, 1999, 11.

¹²⁵ Dykstra, "The French Occupation of Egypt, 1798-1801," 2008, 134.

¹²⁶ Goldschmidt, *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation State*, 2004, 21-23; Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*, 2005, 27; Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 56-58; Ibrahim, "The Egyptian Empire," 2008, 206-208; Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 2002, 10; Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha," 2008, 150; Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, 1984, 72-73; Philipp, "From Rule of Law to Constitutionalism," 2016, 163.

¹²⁷ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 2002, 247.

The other major group that was influential in bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century was foreign and minority specialists (Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, 1984, 77).

expense of small landowning peasants.¹²⁸ By the mid-nineteenth century, this process had created a novel elite, distinct by their identity, education, and land possession.¹²⁹

A major pillar of Muhammad Ali's state-making was cash-cropping Egypt's agriculture.¹³⁰ Centralization was made possible by the rise of large land ownership.¹³¹ The landed aristocracy vastly benefited from the incorporation of Egypt into the European-dominated world economy, especially during the mid-century cotton boom with the American Civil War, which drastically increased the export of Egyptian cotton.¹³² Integration led to increasing European involvement. Following the breaking of the monopoly system, landlords and European merchants began wielding more influence.¹³³ Capitulations, concessions, massive debt to European states and creditors, dual court systems for foreigners that protected the Christian bourgeoisie, dominated Egypt's economy.¹³⁴ A dual elite was born: aristocrats of Ottoman-Mamluk origin and merchants of European and Arab Christian (mostly Syrian and Lebanese) origin.¹³⁵ The spread of Western-style education, meanwhile, caused a decline in mostly Sunni *ulema*'s influence, who were organized around orthodox institutes like al-Azhar or heterodox Sufi sects. *Ulema* lost its financial autonomy and monopoly over education and judiciary.¹³⁶ They, however, maintained their influence within

¹²⁸ Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1985, 20; Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, 1984, 161.

¹²⁹ Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1990, 15-17.

¹³⁰ Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 2002, 12-13; Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1985, 67-78.

¹³¹ Toledano, "Social and Economic Change in the Long Nineteenth Century," 2008, 271.

¹³² Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, 1993, 52.

¹³³ Hunter, "Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali," 2008, 180-185.

¹³⁴ Toledano, "Social and Economic Change in the Long Nineteenth Century," 2008, 274-276; Hunter, "Egypt under the successors of Muhammad 'Ali," 2008, 187-189.

¹³⁵ Cole (in *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, 1993, 44) stresses further that by the 1880s, there were an estimated 100,000 Europeans in Egypt, among them large numbers of Greek and Italian workers and shopkeepers. Tucker (in *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1985, 69) notes that the participation of merchants of Egyptian origin in international trade was minimal, though they were involved in local trade.

¹³⁶ Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 1995, 10; Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, 1994, 70; Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, 1993, 36-38; Toledano, "Social and Economic Change in the Long Nineteenth Century," 2008, 260; Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 1990, 14.

the civil society and remained intellectually relevant by generating novel, hybrid modernization perspectives.¹³⁷ Western-style education institutes remained open to non-elite, Arabic speaking Egyptians to fill the lower and middle echelons of growing bureaucracy; but the higher echelons of state power belonged almost exclusively to the Ottoman-Mamluk aristocracy.¹³⁸

The growing connection between the landed aristocracy and European merchants enabled the former group to openly challenge the court in the 1870s.¹³⁹ The increasing European encroachment and the aristocratic privileges of the state nobility started creating discontent among the educated natives who filled the bureaucracy's middle ranks. The financial crisis in the late 1870s led to a full-scale sociopolitical crisis, finally leading to Colonel Urabi's revolt and the consequent British occupation in 1882.¹⁴⁰ The occupation intensified trends that the revolt tried to reverse: European political-economic domination, accumulation of huge estates, cash-cropping agriculture, and the aristocracy's political monopoly.¹⁴¹ The British administration relied on compliance and/or support of the Khedive and the landlords, who

¹³⁷ Abdel-Malek, *Contemporary Arab Political Thought*, 1983, 39; Reid, "The 'Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest," 2008, 235; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 1983, 161-163.

¹³⁸ Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha," 2008, 155; Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1990, 69.

Education had a central place in Muhammad Ali's centralization efforts and constituted the principal cultural impact of his reign (see Starkey, "Modern Egyptian Culture in the Arab World," 2008, 395). Like the Ottoman context, the emergence of Western-style education institutes emerged in tandem with the rise of the modern military. Education institutes opened to train officers, doctors, veterinarians, nurses, administrators, and engineers (see Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 56; Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1985, 123).

¹³⁹ Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*, 1999, 31 and 176.

¹⁴⁰ Urabi was a native Egyptian whose path to higher offices under the monopoly of landed elites. Opposition to the military-bureaucratic monopoly of the state nobility of Turkish origin was central in the revolt (see Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, 2002, 267). The revolt witnessed the first expressions of Egyptian nationalism, which opposed European political-economic domination, the Khedive's autocracy, the state nobility being exclusive to a non-native identity, and over-taxation and exploitation of workers and peasants. See Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, 1993, 160.

¹⁴¹ Reid, "The 'Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest," 2008, 238; Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1985, 81.

grew unprecedentedly wealthy.¹⁴² The British administration showed every major sign of colonial governance: cash-cropping agriculture; maintenance of law and order above all else; free trade ideology; and abandonment of state education.¹⁴³

These developments in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt began crystalizing their nascent nationalist ideologies respectively. Divergences in historical trajectories had altered their social bloc formations. Iran's relatively belated centralization process, due to geographical distance to Europe and eighteenth-century political turmoil, prevented the rise of a modern bureaucracy and kept traditional social blocs like *ulema*, *bazaaris*, and tribes powerful. By the 1900s, Turkey's and Egypt's centralizers had broken the power of their traditional blocs, most notably the *ulema*. They also saw the rise of Muslim bureaucratic and non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisies. Yet the composition of their bureaucratic bourgeoisies was different. Ottoman bureaucracy was distinct from the populace by its education and access to state power. Egyptian bureaucracy was further distinguished from the populace by their ethno-linguistic background and land possession. Moreover, the British occupation cut the access of non-elites to education.¹⁴⁴ Whereas in Turkey, students from humble backgrounds began filling the ranks in the military and other schools in the late nineteenth century.¹⁴⁵ By 1900, there were over forty institutes of higher education, most of which training military

¹⁴² Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 251.

The land confiscations continued in a more 'legal' fashion under British rule. By 1907, landless peasants constituted 37 percent of the population (Esmeir, *Juridical Humanity*, 2012, 154).

¹⁴³ Already before its occupation, Great Britain had developed considerable interests in Egyptian affairs, such as the Suez Canal, Egypt's debt to European creditors, the cotton market, and containment of the French influence. See Hopkins, "The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt," 1986, 369-372; Rogan, *The Arabs: A History*, 2009, 129-131; Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 250.

¹⁴⁴ Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 1990, 18.

¹⁴⁵ Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 77; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 114-115; Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 72; Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 35-37; Mango, *Atatürk*, 2008, 149.

officers.¹⁴⁶ Royal colleges produced not merely young officers, bureaucrats, and urban professionals but a novel “historic bloc” – a social bloc capable of forming the new basis of consent to a certain order (see Chapter 3 for how this created an organic connection between the Kemalist regime and the urban-educated bloc).

Regardless of these distinctions, however, the main tenets of nationalist thought had emerged in all three examples in the 1900s. A commonality of nascent nationalism has been a dual opposition against court autocracy and Western political-economic encroachment (see Chapter 4 for how future progressives reproduced this line of thinking as opposition to fascism and imperialism since the 1930s).¹⁴⁷ Nascent nationalist opposition prepared the groundwork for the revolutions in the Middle East in the 1900s and 1910s.¹⁴⁸ The following part of this historical review deals with these revolutions and the emergence of secular ideologies like nationalism, socialism, and feminism.

The Young Turks’ Constitutional Revolution of 1908 began as a military insurgency and later found mass support. It aimed to save the empire from collapse by restoring the Young Ottoman ideals of constitutionalism, not to create something new.¹⁴⁹ Compared to their reformist predecessors, the Young Turks were more educated, secular, and progress-oriented.¹⁵⁰ Their shared education background made them a more homogenous group.¹⁵¹ But

¹⁴⁶ Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 32 and Mardin, *Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset*, 1991, 51.

¹⁴⁷ See Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards*, 2005, 115; E. Thompson, *Justice Interrupted*, 2013, 65; Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, 1993, 274; Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 158; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 113.

¹⁴⁸ For comparative analyses on these revolutions, see: Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia,” 1995; Zürcher, “The Young Turk revolution: comparisons and connections,” 2019.

¹⁴⁹ Hanioglu, “The Second Constitutional Period,” 2008, 64.

¹⁵⁰ See Mardin, *Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset*, 1991, 57-58; Mardin, *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*, 2011, 26.

¹⁵¹ Zürcher (in *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 100) stresses that in addition to being all male and Muslim, as well as possessing a literate background, education is the only thing that unites this group. In their class backgrounds, the Young Turks varied from low clerks or peasants to Ottoman highborn elites. They were also ethnically and geographically varied.

the Young Turks were ideologically and intellectually less articulate compared to the Young Ottomans. They developed no coherent ideology in opposition. They were influenced by various Western and native ideological trends that culminated in a romantic Ottoman nationalism.¹⁵² Science and progress constituted the main pillars in their *Weltanschauung*.¹⁵³ The Young Turk officers who spearheaded the revolution relied on the support of the emerging intelligentsia, who rose in tandem to the military-bureaucratic segment in the same institutions, shared their concerns, and produced ideas and programs for them.¹⁵⁴ Officers' "intellectual and moral leadership" over the Young Turks, in particular, and the urban-educated segment, in general, was a new historical phenomenon.¹⁵⁵ They acted as the militant vanguards of a demographically small group who possessed intellectual capital, the Muslim-Turkish urban-educated bloc.

The Young Turk revolution established many of the revolutionary frameworks that future progressives reproduced. These include state-oriented strategic thinking, vanguardism of conscious elites, sovereignty-oriented political thought, justifying political means through narratives of science and progress, self-sufficiency aiming national developmentalism, disdain towards Western political-economic interventionism, and ambivalent attitude with regards to the "people." Capturing the state apparatus by vanguard elites and transforming it

¹⁵² Mardin (in *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 197) stresses that the most identifiable among all Young Turk ideas is Ottomanism. They appealed to all Ottomans to prevent foreigners to meddle in their domestic affairs. In opposition, they have regularly appealed to unite all religious and ethnic segments.

¹⁵³ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 13.

¹⁵⁴ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 68-69.

¹⁵⁵ Turkish nationalists' hegemony over the Young Turk movement was a relatively new phenomenon, which Hanioglu (in *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 216) traces to the 1902 Congress of the ITC. Zürcher (in *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 101) stresses that the military's dominance within the ITC also dates to the early twentieth century. Furthermore, immediate threats such as nationalist separationists, European rivals, primarily Russia, and the mass of Muslim migrants following significant land losses further strengthened the position of the military, as well as its ideology. See Uzer, *An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism*, 2016, 17; Üngör, *Modern Türkiye'nin İnşası*, 2016, 95; Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey*, 2006, 7.

in the name of the people was the Young Turk's political strategy.¹⁵⁶ They were a well-organized (and armed) group with a close-knit identity and political philosophy. This also is the Leninist strategy to power, but the strategy in European revolutionisms predates Lenin.¹⁵⁷ There was a paradoxical duality in how the Young Turks perceived the people. They expressed love, respect, and commitment to an abstract notion of the "people" but were equally distrustful of the people who remained lethargic towards the Hamidian autocracy and disinterested in Young Turks' political agitations.¹⁵⁸ The Young Turks agitated in the name of a theoretical people who felt the necessity of progress but did not carry out the revolution for they were ignorant and incapable of understanding their true interests.¹⁵⁹ The Young Turks' self-entitled task was to educate the people and transform them into a conscious nation.¹⁶⁰

The Young Turks sought to create a modern bureaucracy by replacing the sultan's patrimonialism.¹⁶¹ The bureaucracy in the last years of the empire became more unanimous in their political, educational, and intellectual backgrounds. Post-revolutionary bureaucratic reordering has been critical in the establishment and entrenchment of nationalist hegemony, while this hegemony has led to the alienation of many nascent Islamists, as well as Kurds and Arabs.¹⁶² A major dividing line within the military-bureaucratic elites had been between the

¹⁵⁶ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 202; Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 225.

¹⁵⁷ See Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men*, 1980.

¹⁵⁸ See Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 150-152; Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 404; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, 1991, 282-283.

¹⁵⁹ Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 225 and Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 393.

¹⁶⁰ See Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, 1989, 223; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 113.

¹⁶¹ Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 23; Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 39. Göçek (in *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 77) notes that in addition to abolishing the ranks of elite officials who rose due to their connections, the Young Turks also established many scholarships for the poor to foster their own ranks.

¹⁶² A new Islamism emerged as a reaction to Young Turks' secularism, led by the conservative, popular *ulema*, who enjoyed a certain degree of status, but not so much autonomous financial or material power during the Hamidian era. Islamism found its social base after it had lost its royal patronage (see Mardin, *Bediüzzaman Said*

officers who rose by their familial heritage or loyalty to the sultan (*alaylı subaylar*) versus the officers who rose by their educational and professional merits (*mektepli subaylar*).

Following the devastating defeats in the First Balkan War of 1912, the Young Turk officers sacked the *alaylı* segments from the high bureaucracy and started filling the ranks with its own personnel.¹⁶³ The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 also strengthened secular and ethnic interpretations of nationalism among the state elites while facilitating the spread of nationalism among the urban masses.¹⁶⁴

The Young Turks quickly realized that neither revolution nor their commitment to an ambiguous constitutionalist agenda was enough to realize their political goals. In opposition, they paid insufficient attention to imperialism. Rather, they developed a love-hate attitude towards the European powers, taking them both as the zenith of progress and the threat to the empire.¹⁶⁵ Constitutionalism was not nearly enough preventing Great Power interference in internal affairs, especially concerning the Christian minorities.¹⁶⁶ Pressing political issues such as the Armenian Question¹⁶⁷ and the Macedonian Question¹⁶⁸ became more problematic, while the dissolution of the empire seemed nearer than ever after the Balkan Wars. The revolution also led to tremendous internal turmoil which gradually made the Young Turks more authoritarian and militaristic. *Alaylı* officers, heterodox Sufi *ulema*, and

Nursi Olayı, 1992, 26; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 186; Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 112).

¹⁶³ By 1914, the Young Turk leaders in their thirties and forties assumed decision making positions within the military and the government (see Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 41-43).

¹⁶⁴ See Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 81; Toprak, *Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi*, 1995, 107-108; Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 10. Mardin (in *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*, 2011, 126) stresses that the post-revolutionary era witnessed the most conscious attempts to build cultural identity by the ruling elite for the Turkish-speaking population.

¹⁶⁵ See Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 57.

¹⁶⁶ Hanioglu (in *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 31-32) stresses that the chief value of the constitution and the parliament for the ITC, except for being a 'modern' symbol, was its potential as a mechanism to prevent the Great Powers' interventions.

¹⁶⁷ See Göçek, *Denial of Violence*, 2014.

¹⁶⁸ See Adanır, *Makedonya Sorunu*, 2001.

thousands of civil servants and spies who owed their position to the Sultan constituted powerful counterrevolutionary groups.¹⁶⁹ The 1909 counterrevolution attempt was the foremost incident that shattered the revolutionaries' confidence and reinforced the Young Turks' suspicion against religious organizations and the masses.¹⁷⁰ Gradually, the Young Turks reproduced many of the autocratic measures of the Hamidian era. Their ideals of Ottomanism transformed into pan-Turkism (Turanism). By 1914, the Young Turks exercised complete control over bureaucracy, parliament, military, as well as every major organization in the civil society.¹⁷¹

The Young Turks were critical of European economic encroachment; but they did not develop an economic program in opposition.¹⁷² They initially pursued liberal economic policies aimed at revenue increase and attracting foreign capital for industrialization.¹⁷³ They did not confront the capitulations and the Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-ı Umumiye*) which drained the state budget.¹⁷⁴ Christian Ottoman merchants who relied on Great Powers' protection was another major concern, as well as the absence of a Muslim-Turkish

¹⁶⁹ Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 76-80; Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 2008, 103.

¹⁷⁰ Mardin, *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Olayı*, 1992, 139-140.

¹⁷¹ Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 93; Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 151.

¹⁷² Keyder (in *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 73-74) stresses that an economic program was not central in the Young Turk mentality. There was no social bloc that demanded 'national economics.' Their solutions to the problems they had identified were political and administrative, not economic. Toprak (in *Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı*, 2016, 14) notes that the 1908 Revolution was in the name of the bourgeoisie, even though there was no such bourgeoisie.

¹⁷³ See Toprak, *Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi*, 1995, 77.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottomans pursued several failed industrialization attempts. See Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1991, 215; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 170; Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 111.

¹⁷⁴ Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 364; Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 2016, 11-28; Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 23; Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 56-57.

Pamuk (in *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 120) calculates that in 1875, more than 60 percent of the budget went to debt payments, which had extremely high-interest rates.

For the Young Turks and *Düyun-ı Umumiye* see Toprak, *Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi*, 1995, 51.

counterpart.¹⁷⁵ The Young Turks came to see the Christian bourgeoisie as fifth columns, although the bureaucratic bourgeoisie paradoxically still saw them as models of modernity until the 1910s. The Muslim merchants could emulate the success of their Christian and Jewish counterparts.¹⁷⁶ Following the Balkan Wars, and increasingly with the Great War, the Young Turks pursued a policy of national economics (*milli iktisat*), promoting protectionism, cooperatives, self-sufficiency, agricultural development, and rapid industrialization, as well as full autonomy over customs, finances, and banking.¹⁷⁷ A key part of this policy was to create a Muslim-Turkish bourgeoisie, who was hoped to play the major role in securing economic sovereignty.¹⁷⁸ By the end of the war, these policies created not a sovereign and self-sufficient economy but a novel rich segment of government cronies who enriched themselves through black market profiteering and confiscation of non-Muslim properties and businesses.¹⁷⁹

Regardless of the revolution's outcomes and consequent crises, it sparked an era of "Ottoman enlightenment."¹⁸⁰ It opened the gates for mass politics and modern ideologies. In

¹⁷⁵ Hanoğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 28; Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1991, 215; Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi, 1500-1914*, 2005, 239.

Keyder (in *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 47) stresses that the Muslim Ottoman merchants and craftsmen became the first victims of the integration of the Ottoman Empire into global capitalism. Göçek (in *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire*, 1996, 114) notes that in 1912, while Ottoman Muslim participation became limited to 15 percent in internal trade, 12 percent in industry and crafts, and 14 percent in professions, the share of minorities expanded to comprise 66 percent in internal trade, 79 percent in industry and crafts, and 66 percent in the professions. Toprak (in *Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi*, 1995, 6) notes that only 20 percent of corporations before World War I belonged to Muslim subjects.

¹⁷⁶ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 86; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 112.

Another direction for the Young Turks in their search for a native bourgeoisie, as well as a model of modernity, was the Dönme community, who had run trade networks in Salonika until 1912 (see Baer, *The Dönme: Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks*, 2010, 68-76).

¹⁷⁷ Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 163; Toprak, *Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi*, 1995, 7.

¹⁷⁸ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 83; Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 131-135.

¹⁷⁹ Toprak, *Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi* 1995, 6-9; Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 2016, 11-28.

¹⁸⁰ Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 91.

Toprak (Ibid., 111) notes that 30 percent of the written work in the last two centuries of the empire is printed in the period between 1908 and 1918.

1908, three major nineteenth century ideological currents – Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism – were in circulation. Their commonality was to find a pragmatic and unifying ideology based on extant demographics.¹⁸¹ Of course, these perspectives were beyond ideological and included social demographic engineering too. Young Turk opposition to Hamidian Islamism, changing demographics due to land losses, and growing nationalism among the non-Turkish populations brought Turkism to the forefront.¹⁸² The ITC started transforming itself from a conspiratorial organization to a political party, allowing mass membership. Provincial notables and merchants started filling the memberships, enabling the Periphery leaders to assume a position in politics, though the military-bureaucratic segment dominated the leadership.¹⁸³ The government carried further secularization, centralization, and education reforms, downgrading the *ulema*'s official position.¹⁸⁴ The media started assuming a much bigger role in politics as the strict censorship, at least initially, disappeared.¹⁸⁵ Intellectuals and politicians discovered a new popular source of imagination: the Anatolian masses. New intellectual trends such as *Halka Doğru* (Towards the People) emerged to overcome the intellectual-people distinction, educate the rural masses, and create agricultural development.¹⁸⁶ Narratives of national sovereignty (*milli hakimiyet*) assumed a central role in political debates.¹⁸⁷ Lacking economic or social capital enjoyed by traditional elites, nationalist leaders consolidated their power through the ballot box. Their legitimacy across

¹⁸¹ See Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*, 1991, 92, Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 211.

¹⁸² Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 376-382; Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, 1995, 18.

¹⁸³ Hanioglu, *The Second Constitutional Period*, 2008, 77; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 55; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 75.

¹⁸⁴ Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2016, 459.

¹⁸⁵ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 200.

¹⁸⁶ Toprak (in *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 118) notes that the desire for sovereignty led the intellectuals to the people, where they sought their own selves.

¹⁸⁷ Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 91.

the Muslim-Turkish segments relied upon their novel status as the “representatives of the people,” in addition to revolutionary leaders’ charisma as “liberating heroes” (*hürriyet kahramanları*).¹⁸⁸

Socialism and syndicalism also surfaced after the revolution. Like other contemporary examples, intellectuals and industrial workers made the socialist base. There were dozens of strikes immediately after the revolution.¹⁸⁹ Workers hailed the revolution and adopted its nationalist discourse.¹⁹⁰ The government, however, violently repressed and banned the strikes.¹⁹¹ The Young Turk nationalism denied class struggles in a discourse of organic national unity.¹⁹² Few socialist intellectuals worked under nationalist hegemony through limited political openings. Socialist members of the parliament were compelled to compete against the Young Turk’s nationalism.¹⁹³ Socialism in this period attracted very little support. Socialists had to work against an increasingly repressive and militaristic government, in a preindustrial society with numerically insignificant industrial workers and no contact with the peasant majority.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, most socialist came from non-Muslim backgrounds such as Armenians and Jews. Despite their influential roles in spreading revolutionary ideals

¹⁸⁸ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 201.

¹⁸⁹ Toprak (in *Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı*, 2016, 14) stresses that while there were some noteworthy workers’ mobilizations prior to the revolution, particularly in labor-intensive industries such as ports, railroad construction, tobacco manufacturing, the Hamidian autocracy, economic hardships, and workers’ numerical weaknesses have harmed their visibility and influence.

¹⁹⁰ Adanır, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ulus Sorunu ve Sosyalizmin Oluşması ve Gelişmesi,” 1995, 68.

¹⁹¹ The Young Turks were initially supportive of the workers in their attempt to win over the urban masses. Ultimately, the government banned all strikes within a year of the revolution after they spread to crucial sectors such ports and railroads, over fears of socialism, alarming for the foreign capital, harming the government’s credibility, and hindering trade (see Toprak, *Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı*, 2016, 14).

¹⁹² Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 150.

¹⁹³ Ahmad, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son Döneminde Milliyetçilik ve Sosyalizm Üzerine Düşünceler,” 1995, 32.

¹⁹⁴ See Dumont, “Yahudi-Sosyalist Osmanlı Bir Örgüt: Selanik İşçi Federasyonu,” 1995, 111; Yalimov, “1876-1923 Döneminde Türkiye’de Bulgar Topluluğu ve Sosyalist Hareketin Gelişmesi,” 1995, 160. Despite the nationalist hegemony, however, many multiethnic and multireligious unions came to existence after 1908 (See Quataert, “Ottoman Workers and the State, 1826-1914,” 1994, 26).

among Turkish urban-educated and working-class segments,¹⁹⁵ they had little political relevance in an environment that rapidly grew more nationalistic. Still, socialists from Muslim and Turkish backgrounds were active in major cities until the mid-1920s and found representation in the Ankara parliament of 1920.¹⁹⁶

Feminism is another progressive tradition that surfaced with the revolution, with several women's journals and organizations emerging afterward.¹⁹⁷ The gender question entered intellectual agendas long before the revolution. Possibly due to the Ottoman Empire's greater integration to Europe and several cosmopolitan cities like Istanbul and Thessaloniki, the gender question entered Ottoman intellectual circles before Iran and Egypt. Elite attitudes gradually developed a consensus on the necessity to change women's status and seclusion.¹⁹⁸ They also envisioned new roles and duties for women within a nationalist framework. Family constituted a major nationalist concern about gender.¹⁹⁹ For male intellectuals, women's patriotic duty was to raise a modern, educated, healthy nation. This required the women to be educated and included in the society.²⁰⁰ The Young Turk elite adopted progressive discourses on women's rights, while coopting the women's movement and showing antagonism to autonomous or explicit feminist demands.²⁰¹ Nationalist hegemony was apparent in early feminist writings. Many Turkish-Muslim women expressed their demands in a nationalist

¹⁹⁵ On this, see Berberian, *Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds*, 2019.

¹⁹⁶ Durgun, "Left-Wing Politics in Turkey," 2015, 14; Tunçay, *Türkiye Sol Tarihine Notlar*, 2017, 127.

¹⁹⁷ Toprak, "The Family, Feminism, and the State during the Young Turk Period," 1991, 447; Toprak, *Türkiye'de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm*, 2016, 4; Arat, "Contestation and Collaboration: Women's Struggles for Empowerment in Turkey," 2008, 389.

¹⁹⁸ Uzer, *An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism*, 2016, 54; Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1991, 36.

¹⁹⁹ Kandiyoti, *Cariyeler Bacılar Yurttaşlar*, 1997, 191; Toprak, "The Family, Feminism, and the State during the Young Turk Period," 1991, 443.

²⁰⁰ Toprak, *Türkiye'de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm*, 2016, 36.

²⁰¹ Hanioglu, "The Second Constitutional Period," 2008, 106; Kandiyoti, *Cariyeler Bacılar Yurttaşlar*, 1997, 169.

narrative, increasingly so after the Balkan Wars.²⁰² The women's movement gained significant ground after 1908, including demands for legal and social rights.²⁰³ Feminism found a social base, though the movement remained predominantly an elite activity.²⁰⁴

Iran and Egypt experienced overlapping revolutionary situations in the early twentieth century that influenced their ideological and social bloc formations in the future decades. In Iran, the Constitutional Revolution between 1905 and 1911 emerged as a secular-religious alliance, despite eventually being strained by internal conflicts.²⁰⁵ Iranian revolution, unlike its Young Turk counterpart, was a popular uprising with grassroots articulations of democracy. Revolutionaries also demanded a nationalist state-building project including centralization, conscription-based army, and financial independence.²⁰⁶ Revolutionaries agitated for national unity against Western encroachment and the incapacity of corrupt Qajar autocracy against it.²⁰⁷ Yet the revolutionary alliance collapsed after the initial victory against the court. The conservative *ulema*, who were concerned over the revolution's secular direction switched to the counterrevolutionary camp.²⁰⁸ Still, the revolution contributed to the making of Iranian secular nationalism and its hegemony over the intelligentsia and urban-

²⁰² Metinsoy, "The Limits of Feminism in Muslim-Turkish Women Writers of the Armistice Period," 2013, 85.

²⁰³ Toprak, *Türkiye'de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm*, 2016, 370.

²⁰⁴ Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, 2008, 184.

²⁰⁵ Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 71.

²⁰⁶ See Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 3; Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 2010, 7; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 35; Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 2012, 37.

²⁰⁷ Najmabadi (in *Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards*, 2005, 115) notes that the constitutionalists promoted the idea that 'We are a single nation!' while arguing that the dividing lines in the nation were the results of autocracy and imperialism.

²⁰⁸ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 220.

It was not the *ulema* alone who switched sides. Many landlords, merchants, and intellectuals who had initially supported the revolution withdrew their support, some siding with the Qajar court, following the more radical direction of the revolution than initially envisioned. Arjomand (in *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 48) stresses that the ideology of Islamic traditionalism provided a platform for all those who were alienated by the constitutionalists' reform agenda. Afary (in *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 131) stresses that the main lines of fragmentation in the revolutionary alliance occurred over freedom of speech, assembly and publication; equality before the law for non-Muslims; land reform; and women's education.

educated bloc.²⁰⁹ Yet this ideological hegemony was based on a comparatively smaller social bloc that also lacked political and economic capital, as well as a strong patron.²¹⁰ Iran's urban-educated bloc lacked institutional and sociopolitical apparatuses that were necessary to exercise hegemony, particularly a modern army and police force.²¹¹ *Bazaaris* and landlords could politically outmaneuver them, while the *ulema* constituted a more compact and well-connected group. Moreover, the *ulema* gained considerable legal and institutional status with the revolution and became a more politicized group through the revolution.²¹²

Revolutionary struggles also brought new ideologies like socialism and feminism to the forefront.²¹³ Social democracy gained influence through the Azeri and Armenian populations, despite the absence of an industrial working-class inside Iran, due to their contacts with Azeri, Armenian, Georgian, and Russian populations in the Caucasus.²¹⁴ Leftist

²⁰⁹ Ansari (in *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 2012, 33) stresses that the Constitutional Revolution produced a "historic bloc" that became dominant in Iranian politics until the 1960s. Afary (in *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 1996, 116-129) stresses the post-revolutionary enlightenment, which saw the publications of over 200 periodicals, as well as many radical journals that criticized the *ulema*, and promoted socialist and secular agendas.

²¹⁰ Compared to the Ottoman context, Iranian modernization was led by the public and was more rapid. This might explain generally Turkey's evolutionary transformations versus Iran's revolutionary transformations throughout the twentieth century. Foran (in "A Century of Revolution," 1994, 225-226) stresses the influence of revolutions and revolutionary moments in Iranian twentieth-century history, calling it 'Iran's persistent insurgency.' Keddie (in "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective," 1983, 580) stresses that Iran stands at the forefront of rebellious and revolutionary countries in the twentieth century.

²¹¹ Arjomand (in *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 59) stresses that the revolutionaries did not inherit a centralized state in 1906, which offers explanations on the political disintegration.

²¹² Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 101; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*. 1988, 52.

²¹³ Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 3; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 100; Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 2007, 43; Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards*, 2005, 125.

²¹⁴ Matin-Asgari, *Both Eastern and Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian Modernity*, 2018, 30; Matin-Asgari, "From Social Democracy to Social Democracy: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of the Iranian Left," 2004, 39; Mirsepassi, *Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought*, 2017, 35; Afary, "Armenian Social Democrats, the Democrat Party of Iran, and Iran-i Naw: A Secret Camaraderie," 2004, 67; Afary, "Social Democracy and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11," 1994, 24.

The porous nature of Transcaucasia had a major impact on the emergence of the Iranian leftist tradition. The Azeri and Armenian populations who lived on both the Iranian and the Russian side of the border carried socialist ideals to Iran (see Dailami, "The First Congress of Peoples of the East and the Iranian Soviet Republic of Gilan," 2004; Atabaki, "Incommodious Hosts, Invidious Guests," 2004).

revolutionaries organized around grassroots councils (*anjumans*) and secret societies. During the counterrevolution of 1908-1909, revolutionaries in Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, were the principal defenders of constitutionalism.²¹⁵ Some rural *anjumans* in northern Iran also became centers of revolutionary activism and promoted the demand for reforms in landlord-peasant relations.²¹⁶ Socialist and social-democratic ideals were also prevalent in the national parliament in Tehran.²¹⁷ Feminism was another progressive tradition that emerged with the revolution. Like their Ottoman counterparts, Iranian male intellectuals and early feminist activists had begun considering the improvements in women's social status as a gateway to national progress by the late nineteenth century.²¹⁸ During the revolution, urban elite and some middle class women became influential political actors and organized around their *anjumans*.²¹⁹ Key feminist concerns of this period were education and greater access to the public sphere. Women adopted revolutionary nationalism and many feminists prioritized national goals over feminist ones. Two major areas of women's activism were forming a national bank and boycotting foreign manufactured products.²²⁰ Women's activism drew the *ulema*'s hostility who felt threatened by feminist discourses politically, financially, and ideologically.²²¹

²¹⁵ Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 13; Halliday, "The Iranian Left in International Perspective," 2004, 19; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 1002.

²¹⁶ Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 175.

²¹⁷ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 104.

²¹⁸ Afary, "On the Origins of Feminism in Early 20th-Century Iran," 1989, 75; Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 111; Rostam-Kolayi, "Expanding the Agendas for the 'New' Iranian Woman," 2003, 165; Paidar, "Feminism and Islam in Iran," 1995, 52.

²¹⁹ For women's revolutionary activism and their *anjumans*, see Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 122-131.

²²⁰ Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996, 179.

²²¹ Mahdavi, "Reza Shah Pahlavi and Women: A Re-Evaluation," 2003, 196; Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 111.

In Egypt, the British occupation intensified the making of Egyptian nationalism while crystallizing its cultural and ideological tenets. Nationalists strove to remove foreign influence, strengthen the national community, limit the court's power, and eventually achieve political power.²²² The occupation forcefully closed the path of an ascending social bloc to political power but paradoxically opened new avenues for agitation within the civil society.²²³ Education of the entire society – not only to new forms of knowledge but to a new political consciousness under the vanguard of nationalist elites – emerged as a major aim of all Egyptian nationalists.²²⁴ Printed press and political parties manifested different interpretations of nationalisms such as secular, Islamic, and pro-khedivate.²²⁵ Secular and territorial interpretations of nationalism became the dominant one, which were also prevalent in Egypt's 1919 revolution.²²⁶ Landlords and urban-educated bloc constituted the backbone of the revolution.²²⁷ The revolution was a broad alliance that witnessed the vibrant

²²² Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 165; Abdel-Malek, *Contemporary Arab Political Thought*, 1983, 88.

²²³ Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1990, 87.

Unlike their Turkish counterparts who had little influence over the civil society partly due to the Hamidian autocracy, Egyptian nationalists were cut from power but were influential in the civil society

²²⁴ See for example Phillip, "Participation and Critique," 2016, 251-252; Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt*, 1988, 123; El-Shakry, *Great Social Laboratory*, 2007, 5.

There is a major similarity between how the Turkish and Egyptian nationalists considered the 'people'. The *fellah* entered the nationalist discourses as the representation of 'true' Egyptian identity, while also being despised as ignorant, uncivil, filthy, and lazy (see Selim, *The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt 1880-1985*, 2004, 1).

²²⁵ Egypt witnessed the emergence of three political parties that were formed in 1906 and dominated political-intellectual life until 1914. Each of these parties represented different nationalist tendencies such as Islamist-nationalism, secular-nationalism, pro-khedivate nationalism. For a more detailed analysis of Egypt's political parties and nationalist tendencies in the early twentieth century, see Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 180-217; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 1986, 1-15; and Daly, "The British Occupation," 2008, 245.

²²⁶ Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 1983, 295; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 1986, 15 and 40; Beinín and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 102.

²²⁷ See Beinín and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 13; and Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, 1968, 58-59.

participation of novel progressive activists, whose activism also reflected the nationalist hegemony.²²⁸

Socialism entered Egyptian politics in the early twentieth century. Initially, it was foreign and non-Muslim workers and intellectuals who spearheaded socialism.²²⁹ The colonial domination and the struggle for national independence were significant elements in the making of Egyptian socialism.²³⁰ Labor activism among native workers remained closely linked to the nationalist movement.²³¹ The labor movement received considerable support from some nationalists which resulted in the incorporation of socialism into the national struggle in a subaltern position.²³² The occupation temporarily delayed the conflict between the two movements. Egyptian feminism also emerged in the same period. Early Egyptian nationalism, like its Turkish and Iranian counterparts, included calls for women's social advancement as part of the national empowerment agenda.²³³ Egypt's reformist intellectuals promoted the education of girls since the early nineteenth century.²³⁴ Nationalists had envisioned new roles for women that celebrated them as mothers of the nation and educators of the young generations, leading the young men to a nationalist consciousness.²³⁵ Egyptian feminism developed under the umbrella of nationalist hegemony.²³⁶ Women activists often

²²⁸ Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 450; Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*, 2005, 107-110.

²²⁹ Ismael and el-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt*, 1990.

²³⁰ Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 3.

²³¹ Beinin and Lockman (Ibid., 90) stress that the domination of European industries and the privileges of foreign workers influenced the practical and intellectual merging of workers' nationalist and labor activism.

²³² Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, 1985, 80; Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 77.

²³³ Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 1995, 12-13.

²³⁴ Booth, "Liberal Thought and the 'Problem' of Women," 2016, 189.

The support for girls' education was not unanimous. It drew sharp criticisms especially from the higher echelons of the *ulema* (see Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, 1994, 133). Yet it had the firm support of most secular-nationalist males who drew connections between the relative 'backwardness' of Egypt to women's social 'backwardness' (see Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 1995, 17).

²³⁵ Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*, 2005, 36.

²³⁶ Feminism remained an explicitly privileged activism, though not always wealthy (see Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, 1994, 177 and Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 1995, 3). Regardless of their background, however, feminist activists often considered themselves as vanguards whose struggle would touch

considered national and feminist struggles as dual expressions of the same fighting.²³⁷ When confronted with the question which fight to prioritize, many favored nationalism over feminism as they conceptualized their true struggle not against Egyptian men but the British.²³⁸

All three revolutions had ambitious – but also ambivalent – aims. Ambiguity in ideology and program was a common trait of contemporary European and Middle Eastern nationalisms.²³⁹ All three revolutions failed in their immediate aims. Iranian revolution fell partly due to internal conflicts and to a larger extent due to Russian interventions in 1907 and 1911. Political instability, tribal insurgencies, Islamist-traditionalist reactionism, weak political apparatus, political-economic dependence on foreigners left many intellectuals in despair and disillusionment. The Egyptian revolution could only secure nominal independence. The political field remained divided between the British administration, the khedivate, and the nationalist Wafd (Delegation) Party. In Turkey, the postrevolutionary order witnessed the conflicts and dual existences of Islamism and secularism, Ottomanism and Turkism, democracy and authoritarianism, liberalism and statism, nativism and Westernism, peopleism and vanguardist elitism. The idea of a secular republic was circulating but was yet a marginal among the Young Turks and nationalist intellectuals. The revolution in a few years unfolded into an unprecedented “organic crisis.”²⁴⁰ The period from 1912 to 1922 was the most catastrophic decade in modern Anatolian history. It witnessed

all women (see Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, 1994, 191). Because secularism was not the explicit interpretation of nationalism, Islamic articulations also provided new intellectual avenues for women whose activism developed within Islamic frameworks (see Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 1995, 4).

²³⁷ Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 1990, 103; Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, 1994, 56.

²³⁸ Baron, *Egypt as a Woman*, 2005, 9; Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, 1994, 121.

²³⁹ For European revolutions, see Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men*, 1980, 125-127.

²⁴⁰ For organic crises, see Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 210.

several wars, genocide, massacres, starvation, mass migrations, and the dissolution of the empire (see Chapter 3 for how nationalist orders' hegemony-building capacity was dependent upon their crisis resolution capability).

Regardless of their immediate outcomes, nationalist revolutions facilitated the empowerment of a historic bloc – the urban-educated segment. Intellectuals became a novel social bloc created by the virtue of their education. They performed crucial bureaucratic, professional, and technical tasks in their rapidly urbanizing societies. Few among them went beyond these practical tasks and assumed the role of social visionaries and agents of change (see Chapter 5 for how progressive intellectuals understood their own social missions). Middle Eastern progressive intellectuals and nationalist revolutions were also parts of the ongoing global trends. The emergence of national liberation and socialist schools as the dominant revolutionary tendencies paralleled the earlier emergence of European revolutionisms in the nineteenth century.²⁴¹ As the revolutionary waves in Western and Southern Europe declined in the late nineteenth century, they spread to the rest of the world. The first two decades of the twentieth century witnessed revolutions and revolutionary situations in Russia, China, Korea, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, as well as in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, among others (see Chapter 4 for intellectual parallels between Middle Eastern and global revolutionary paradigms in the early to mid-twentieth century). Appealing to an abstract “people” became common for all political contestants, as the masses became indispensable for legitimacy.²⁴²

²⁴¹ Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men*, 1980, 125-127.

²⁴² See Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East*, 2001 on the advent of mass politics in the Middle East.

Finally, these revolutions also facilitated the making of modern political ideologies that marked the twentieth century and beyond. The analysis in this research – in line with contemporaneous progressive analyses – is based on an understanding of six main ideological camps. These are socialists, national liberationists, the CHP, the DP, fascists (Turanists/pan-Turkists), and Islamists. These camps were constantly transforming blocs with occasional exchanges and overlaps in narratives, ideology, and personnel. They were categorizations of distinct ideological traditions with their internal struggles. Each camp was an ideological alliance in a constant transformation that did not always translate into cohesive practical alliances. This schema was not a fixed model of politics; it offered a generic representation of ideological camps that persisted and reproduced themselves in their hegemonic struggles throughout the twentieth century and beyond (see Chapter 5 for the progressive counter-hegemonic struggle against the state nobility that made the dominant bloc and the reactionary counter-hegemonic camp made by fascists and Islamists).

Socialism	National Liberation	CHP	DP	Fascism (Turanism/pan-Turkism)	Islamism
Progressive-Revolutionary Counter-Hegemonic Camp		The Center of Hegemonic Bloc (The Dominant Bloc)		Reactionary-Conservative Counter-Hegemonic Camp	

Turkey, Iran, and Egypt showed major overlaps in their historical trajectories and the evolution of their respective progressive intellectual traditions, which found their original expressions in nationalism. Key structural differences in their historical trajectories were the strength of the central state and bureaucracy vis-à-vis social blocs and European powers, the status of the urban-educated bloc within the state apparatus and the civil society, and dominant property relations. These differences after the 1920s resulted in major variations in domestic institutional settings and trajectories of progressivisms. The next three chapters analyze these overlaps and variations – as well as their evolutions – from the viewpoint of progressive intellectuals with a focus on Turkey.

III. From Revolution to Regime: A Comparative Study of Progressive Thought on Regime Legitimacy in Turkey and the Middle East

The early twentieth century in the Middle East witnessed a novel and contested ideological hegemony: nationalism. Devastating crises and revolutions led to the making of new, nationalist regimes in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt in the 1920s. They entrenched themselves in the 1930s. These regimes aspired to political-economic independence, rapid development and modernization, sociocultural transformations, and a new political consciousness for the masses. This chapter compares hegemony building capacities of these regimes, with its focus on Turkey's Kemalist establishment. Kemalists' self-declared hegemonic project was to create a "unity of fate" among the members of the nation, by eradicating class and status distinctions and by spreading a nationalist political consciousness to the masses, most importantly to the peasantry. This research builds upon the political and social theories of Antonio Gramsci (organic crises, historic bloc, and Caesarism), Pierre Bourdieu (intra-elite and inter-class distinctions), and Şerif Mardin (Center-Periphery relations). It asks: How did Turkish progressive intellectuals understand the concept of hegemony in relation to state legitimacy and assessed the Kemalist regime? The chapter comparatively analyzes Turkey's progressive political thought on regime making, intra-elite divisions, and intellectual-people distinction. It expands the concept of hegemony through an analysis of postrevolutionary nationalist regimes' hegemony building processes in the Middle East from the viewpoint of progressive intellectuals.

This chapter argues that hegemony building for these nationalist regimes was a multifaceted and layered process of complex relations of alliances and conflicts. These processes involved various social blocs, each possessing different capitals (political, economic, intellectual, patrimonial, social) in varying degrees. The study finds that hegemony building for these regimes required 1) crisis resolution and forging an “organic connection” to a social bloc; 2) contradiction resolution by liquidating economic and patrimonial privileges; and 3) consciousness spreading to the masses, especially to the masses. The chapter also shows that a critical reading of Mardin’s theory, in line with contemporaneous intellectual analyses, offers valuable analytical tools to understand Turkey’s sociopolitical confrontations and transformations. It secondarily argues that the Center-Periphery Paradigm has validity, but only when understood as an intra-elite distinction – not as an elite-people distinction. Alliance – not clash – constituted the main dynamic, while both sets of elites remained detached from the people.

According to Turkish progressive intellectuals, forging hegemony for a regime first required establishing state sovereignty by resolving the crisis of the old order. It then required building an “ethical regime,” a regime of “intellectual and moral leadership” with a claim to represent the nation. Another quest was to eradicate distinctions by liquidating mercantile and landowning elites. Finally, the incorporation of subordinated urban and rural toiling masses into the regime by spreading a distinct political consciousness (also material benefits) constituted the ultimate hegemonic aim. Turkish intellectuals attributed success to the Kemalist regime for crisis resolution and building an “ethical regime.” They were critical of the Kemalist establishment’s alignment with the mercantile and landowning elites, as well as for its inability to incorporate the masses. By the 1950s, most progressives argued that the

Kemalist revolutions were incomplete for they did not realize the structural transformations that would make the nation, not its elites, sovereign. More precisely, the Kemalists built their hegemony over the state apparatus and the urban-educated segment. Its hegemony in the Periphery, on the other hand, remained shaky and dependent upon the support of rural notables, who were not eradicated but coopted. Consequently, Kemalists failed to resolve the elite-people distinction as they remained unable and/or unwilling to incorporate the peasantry into the republican order.

This chapter is divided into three parts. Part I analyzes intellectual narratives on crisis resolution and the “organic connection” between the Kemalist establishment to the urban-educated bloc and its intellectuals. Part II analyzes the making of the republican elite as a coalition of the Center and Periphery forces. Part III investigates the “intellectual-people distinction,” Kemalism’s “historic failure” in progressive narratives. Moreover, each part compares Turkish progressive narratives with Iranian and Egyptian progressive narratives, allowing for theoretical conclusions on hegemony in the context of early-to-mid-twentieth century Middle Eastern nationalisms.

A. Crisis Resolution and Organic Connection

The early twentieth century in the Middle East was marked by catastrophic crises. Revolutions and “single men” entered intellectuals’ imaginations as the sole resolution to crises. In Gramscian thought, revolutions are preceded by “organic crises” where the ruling class can no longer rule by consent and social blocs detach from their traditional

representatives.²⁴³ This facilitates conditions for social blocs' coalescing into a united front, led by charismatic "men of destiny," a modern Caesar, who discursively appeals to the entire people.²⁴⁴ During moments of organic crises, regime legitimacy becomes compromised, which forces the regime to rely upon coercive measures more heavily. In these moments of heightened hegemonic struggle, which Gramsci famously describes as "the old is dying and the new cannot be born,"²⁴⁵ the potential of a new revolutionary popular alliance – the united front – emerges.²⁴⁶ Turkey, Iran, and Egypt showed parallels and divergences in their experiences of crises in the 1910s and the consequent rises of Caesars in the 1920s. The capacity of their respective Caesars to initiate a hegemonic project remained dependent on their ability to resolve their respective "organic crises."

The accomplishment of extant nationalist goals was central to Kemalist hegemony. Intellectuals in the 1910s had witnessed wars, genocides, massacres, starvation, and mass migration, as well as the humiliation of foreign occupation and the desertion of revolutionary leaders who had once captured their imaginations. Many became convinced that something more thorough than *İhtilal-i Meşrutî* (Constitutional Revolution) was required for survival.²⁴⁷ The keyword was *inkılap* (revolution).²⁴⁸ Aydemir, a radical Kemalist ideologue, understood revolutions as linked to legitimacy crises and considered them conditional upon the political apparatus' crisis resolution ability.²⁴⁹ He then distinguished two types of

²⁴³ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 210. Also see Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, 2006, 95-98 and Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony," 1975, 364-365.

²⁴⁴ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 210.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 271.

²⁴⁶ In Gramsci's articulation, this alliance would be led by the working class and contributed by subaltern groups. On Gramsci's views on the United Front, see *Ibid.*, 237-239; also see Anderson, *The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci*, 1976, 13 and Hoare and Smith, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, 1971, xlvii-liii.

²⁴⁷ Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 9.

²⁴⁸ Both *ihtilal* and *inkılap* translate to English as revolution. The same is true for *devrim*.

²⁴⁹ Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, 1973, 22.

revolutions, *ihtilal* vs. *inkılap*: *ihtilal* was a chaotic and abstract change in superstructure by capturing state power. If the cadre that captured state could engage in broader structural changes to resolve the preceding crises, then *ihtilal* turned into a more comprehensive and complete revolution, namely *inkılap*.²⁵⁰ Inherent in his belief was that only a committed and conscious cadre united behind a single leader could accomplish such transformations.²⁵¹ While not all intellectuals rallied behind Kemalist *inkılaps*, they developed a consensus that Kemalists – or rather Mustafa Kemal – resolved old Turkey’s crisis and accomplished the nationalist dreams.

Progressive intellectuals universally celebrated the War of Liberation and the Lausanne Treaty, both fundamental to Kemalist historiography.²⁵² Adıvar, who was in exile during Mustafa Kemal’s presidency, argued that the republican revolution had corrected the mistakes and completed the aims of its predecessor in 1908.²⁵³ Sertel, Turkey’s first woman journalist to be tried in court for her writings, regarded Mustafa Kemal as the most progressive of all political leaders since *Tanzimat* and praised his anti-imperialist, peopleist, statist, secular, gender-egalitarian principles.²⁵⁴ Kıvılcımlı, a socialist theoretician, depicted the republican history in the late 1930s as the history of a democratic revolution in the form

²⁵⁰ Aydemir originated this differentiation in the 1930s in his short articles. See, for example, Aydemir, “İnkılabın İdeolojisi: İnkılap Kürsülerinde İnkılap İlmileşmelidir,” 1934. He repeated this argument in later years in several other works such as *Menderes’in Dramı*, (1969) 2019; *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 1959 (1971), and *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, 1973.

²⁵¹ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968.

²⁵² Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt*, (1966) 1993, 274; Sertel, “İnönü Zaferleri,” 1941; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965; Nazım, *Kuvayı Milliye* (1941) 2008.

²⁵³ Adıvar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev* (1955) 2007, 336; Adıvar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 194.

This work is based on two of Adıvar’s previous books, published in English. They are Adıvar, *Turkey Faces West: A Turkish View of Recent Changes and their Origin*, 1930 and Adıvar, *The Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, 1935.

²⁵⁴ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 132.

national liberation.²⁵⁵ Nazım, who was imprisoned in a sham trial during the last months of Atatürk's presidency,²⁵⁶ praised him in his iconic *National Forces' Epic*, which he wrote in prison.²⁵⁷ Future generations of progressives reproduced this narrative. O. Kemal, whose family was exiled for his father's opposition to Mustafa Kemal, praised him for making the Turkish people a nation.²⁵⁸

By embracing the regime, Turkish progressives showed a significant divergence compared to their Iranian and Egyptian counterparts. This created major silences in Turkish intellectual narratives. The atrocities committed against the Kurds and Alevis in the 1920s and 1930s remained taboo subjects for most intellectuals. Nazım was a rare figure who brought up these issues.²⁵⁹ Nationalists, however progressive, often approved or did not problematize repressions against the non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie and middle class. Aydemir defended the Wealth Tax of 1942 that blatantly discriminated against Turkey's Christian, Jewish, and Dönme minorities as a "blood tax," for minorities could accumulate such wealth because Turks shed their blood for centuries.²⁶⁰ Kırılçılımlı argued that a fundamental factor behind the Kemalists' success was to eradicate the Christian bourgeoisie in favor of the Turkish bourgeoisie.²⁶¹ Sertel, who was a Dönme and socialist journalist, condemned minorities, together with commercial bourgeoisie and religious reactionaries, as natural allies of fascism, therefore an "internal enemy" of national unity.²⁶² In contrast to

²⁵⁵ Kırılçılımlı, *Demokrasi Türkiye Ekonomi Politikası*, 1937.

²⁵⁶ For Nazım's letter to his mother where he equated his case to that of Dreyfus, see Fiş, *Nazım'ın Çilesi*, 2005, 121.

²⁵⁷ Nazım Hikmet, *Kuvayı Milliye*, (1941) 2008.

²⁵⁸ See O. Kemal's letter in Otyam, *Arkadaşım Orhan Kemal ve Mektupları*, 1975, 317.

²⁵⁹ Nazım, "Hapisten Çıktıktan Sonra," (1950) 2008; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1455; Nazım, "Hasan Torlak" (1950s) 1987.

²⁶⁰ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 235-236.

²⁶¹ Kırılçılımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 2: Yakın Tarihten Birkaç Madde*, (1933) 1978, 120-127.

²⁶² Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*, (1944) 2010, 236-238.

silences, a vocal theme was Turkish exceptionalism, which put Turkey as the first successful example of national liberation revolutions.²⁶³ Iranian and Egyptian intellectuals also shared Turkish exceptionalism to some extent. Iranian socialist-feminist Fatimah Sayyah considered Turkey as the gold standard for the East.²⁶⁴ Egyptian leftist Ismail Mazhar praised the Turkish revolution as a breakthrough for the progress of Middle Eastern peoples.²⁶⁵ Egyptian nationalist-feminist Huda Sha'arawi wrote "If the Turks have called you Atatürk (Father of Turks), I say that is not enough; for us, you are Atasharq (Father of East)."²⁶⁶ These notions must have contributed to Aydemir's beliefs that tasked Turkish intellectuals to be of guidance to global anti-imperialist struggles.²⁶⁷

In Iran, Reza Shah's rise to power in 1921 also followed a decade of crisis, which had sidelined the democratic demands of the Constitutional Revolution in favor of centralization demands and led revolutionaries like Hassan Taqizadeh to champion enlightened despotism.²⁶⁸ Reza Shah shared and accomplished many nationalist goals such as centralized bureaucracy and conscription-based military, liquidation of tribes, curtailing the *ulama* and landlord influence in politics.²⁶⁹ His state feminism, which focused on education, patriotic motherhood, heterosexual public life, and unveiling, exemplifies how heavily his regime

²⁶³ Adıvar was convinced that Turkey was the only Muslim-populated country that institutionalized its revolutions and faced firmly towards the West while maintaining the good of its Eastern heritage. See Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 110-111. For Aydemir, the Turkish revolution was historically unique as it was the first example of a national liberation revolution against colonialism and internal class contradictions. See Aydemir, "Plan Mefhumi Hakkında," 1932. This narrative was reproduced by the next generation of progressive intellectuals (see Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (1968) 1992, 55).

²⁶⁴ Amin, "Globalizing Iranian Feminism," 2008, 22.

²⁶⁵ Ismail Mazhar compared the Kemalist and Leninist revolutions, claiming that the latter represented a historical breakthrough for all humanity, while the former constituted a breakthrough for the progress of Middle Eastern peoples. See Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 1986, 83.

²⁶⁶ Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 1995, 213.

²⁶⁷ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 129.

²⁶⁸ Matin-Asgari, *Both Eastern and Western*, 2018, 61; Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 2012, 66.

²⁶⁹ Ansari, *Modern Iran*, 2007, 37-40; Zirinsky, "The Rise of Reza Khan," 1994, 46.

drew from earlier intellectual demands.²⁷⁰ Many feminist activists rallied behind these reforms, even though policies like forced unveiling created uproar among many ordinary Iranians.²⁷¹ Sadiqeh Dowlatabadi, a nationalist-feminist and veteran of the Constitutional Revolution, exemplifies how Iran's intellectuals accepted Reza Shah as a modern Caesar who would break the stalemate between progressives and reactionaries. She conceded autonomous women organizations when they were coopted by the regime because the violent opposition of the ulema to gender reforms left no alternatives for these early feminists.²⁷² Even leftist parties conditionally supported Reza Shah's regime in the early 1920s.²⁷³ Trade unions also echoed the regime's paternalistic approach and hailed Reza Shah as the defender of Iranian workers.²⁷⁴ During the 1920s, he could rally intellectual support for his hegemonic project, recruiting notable revolutionaries such as Isa Sadiq and Ahmad Kasravi, as well as the Teymurtash, Forughi, Mirza triumvirate, who were the brains behind his modernization drive.²⁷⁵ Revolutionary intellectuals' participation in Reza Shah's regime cannot be explained as their giving in to autocracy. Rather, they saw an enlightened despot who shared their goals and exercised domination over reactionary segments that had blocked

²⁷⁰ Khosravi, "Iranian Women on the Road," 2013, 139.

²⁷¹ Chehabi, "The Banning of the Veil and Its Consequences," 2003, 212; Ettehadi, "The Origins and Development of the Women's Movement in Iran, 1906-1941," 2004, 97; Amin, "Globalizing Iranian Feminism, 1910-1950," 2008, 9; Katouzian, "Riza Shah's Political Legitimacy and Social Base, 1921-1941," 2003, 31.

²⁷² Finishing her education at Sorbonne, Dowlatabadi returned to Iran in 1927 and became the first woman to walk in Tehran unveiled. She participated in non-governmental *Jamiyat-e Nesvan-e Vatankhah* (Patriotic Women's Organization) and took an active role in organizing the second Conference of the Eastern Women in Tehran in 1932. Soon after the conference, the regime closed the *Jamiyat-e Nesvan-e Vatankhah* and replaced it with the state-sponsored *Kanun-e Banuvan*. Despite Reza Shah's closure of autonomous women's organizations and journals, Dowlatabadi continued her activism in state-sponsored organizations. She became the chair of *Kanun-e Banuvan* (see Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009; Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996; Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards*, 2005).

²⁷³ Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 85; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 120.

²⁷⁴ Cronin, "Popular Politics, the New State, and the Birth of the Iranian Working Class," 2010.

²⁷⁵ Cronin, "Modernity, Change, and Dictatorship in Iran," 2003, 2; Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 60.

progressive agendas. For nationalist-feminists like Dowlatabadi, who firsthand experienced Islamists' violence since 1906,²⁷⁶ patriarchal patronage might have seemed more plausible compared to the alternative.

The Wafd (Delegation) Party's and Saad Zaghlul's rise in Egypt followed the 1919 Revolution and Egypt's nominal independence in 1922. The struggle against occupation assumed the central position in Egyptian nationalism.²⁷⁷ The Wafd initially secured widespread intellectual support. Socialists like Salama Musa joined the party for he saw independence as the prerequisite to any socialist program.²⁷⁸ Unrealized nationalist aims, however, curtailed the Wafd's hegemonic project immediately. Sha'arawi, for example, demanded Zaghlul's resignation in 1924 over the Sudan question.²⁷⁹ Revolutionary novelist Tawfiq al-Hakim, who called for a national awakening in the 1920s, called for a "blessed revolution" in the 1940s.²⁸⁰ Mohammad Mandour, a leading leftist Wafdist, argued that in 1919 the movement was entirely political, which left the goal of realizing democracy, social justice, and complete independence, as well as the fight against poverty, illness, and ignorance to future generations.²⁸¹ For younger intellectuals, the Wafd was not the party of liberation; it was the part of the old order to be dismantled.²⁸² Enlightened dictatorship gained greater prominence among intellectuals especially after World War II.²⁸³ The

²⁷⁶ Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009; Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution: 1906-1911*, 1996.

²⁷⁷ Beinin, "Egypt: Society and Economy, 1923-1952," 2008, 315-318.

²⁷⁸ Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 137.

²⁷⁹ Notably, Sha'arawi did not demand Zaghlul's resignation over another central issue to her: women's enfranchisement. For Sha'arawi, if the Wafd struggled for Egypt's liberation, then it was unjust that the Wafd denied half the nation in its role in liberation. Yet ultimately, it would be the Sudan, not voting rights, question that led her to break ties with Zaghlul (see Sha'arawi, *Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist*, (1930s) 1986, 122 and 131).

²⁸⁰ Al-Hakim, *The Return of Consciousness*, (1974) 1985, 59.

²⁸¹ Mandour, "The National Workers and Students Committee," (1944) 1983, 115-116.

²⁸² Botman, "The Liberal Age, 1923-1952," 2008, 308.

²⁸³ Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 143.

discrediting of the Wafd, the court's corrupt autocracy, and the British occupation initiated Egypt's organic crisis in the late 1940s, which brought, "almost a full breakdown in politics and morality," as well as reaction, corruption, and leaders' betrayal.²⁸⁴ The formation of Israel and the defeat of Egypt in 1948 also exacerbated these problems. Ultimately the Free Officers, Egypt's first *effendi* corps, broke the political impasse in 1952.²⁸⁵ They represented a miniature, intra-military national front.²⁸⁶ The officers' revolution created massive enthusiasm among intellectuals.²⁸⁷ By 1956, Nasser became Egypt's undisputed Caesar and the champion of anti-imperialism, as all political streams sought to join his coalition.²⁸⁸

Initiating a hegemonic project first required resolving the crisis, which also corresponded to the monopolization of state power. Intellectuals assessed their respective regimes by their capacity to take power from the foreigners and the monarchies in the name of the nation. These regimes constituted a vanguard group (the composition of which changed in three countries based on their modernization histories) that took power and launched a nationalist hegemonic project in accordance with extant demands of the urban-educated bloc. Military triumphs also helped modern Caesars to launch their hegemonic projects. Yet this only created the necessary grounds for initiating a project. Nationalist regimes' relations to their key constituency, the urban-educated bloc (that had varying levels of access to political and

²⁸⁴ Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 220.

²⁸⁵ See Batatu, *The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions*, 1984, 8; Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 375; Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-90*, 1993, 35.

²⁸⁶ All major political groups, socialists, Islamists, fascists, and Wafdists had a diverging number of supporters within the officer corps and the Free Officers. See Beattie, *Egypt during the Nasser Years*, 1994, 52; Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970*, 1988, 116.

²⁸⁷ Seeing a true Egyptian – raised in a *fellah* family – with a nationalist and scientific mindset at the head of the government, Musa considered his life's work a success (*The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 224-225). Al-Hakim noted that it was not only the people but also mature intellectuals who were drawn to euphoria (*The Return of Consciousness*, (1974) 1985, 20).

²⁸⁸ Ismael and El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988*, 1990, 88; Beattie, *Egypt during the Nasser Years*, 1994, 129.

social capital), as well as its intellectuals, were also of paramount importance to realize their political agendas. Regardless of the socioeconomic composition of the state nobility, the urban-educated (or in native terms *aydın, effendi, rowshanfekr*) *Weltanschauungs* constituted the core of the nationalist hegemonic project.

Every ruling bloc belongs to a wider social bloc. Their hegemony-building capacity rests upon their ability to lead their key constituency intellectually and morally. The leadership over this bloc enabled the ruling bloc to claim leadership over the entire people. Mustafa Kemal, for example, originally envisioned the CHP (Republican People's Party) as a "school of politics," an institution to fuse different social blocs under the intellectual and moral codes of a distinct *Weltanschauung*.²⁸⁹ Late Ottoman modernization efforts, especially in education and military, were fundamental to the making of a new ruling bloc and its support base, which also diverged Turkey's modernization process from its Egyptian and Iranian counterparts. This facilitated the making of an organic connection among the urban-educated segments under the leadership of military-bureaucratic elites. Kemalists for their hegemonic project could rely upon a larger constituency that was intellectually and morally integrated with the new ruling bloc, in no small part due to their educational backgrounds.

For Adıvar, the Young Turks were Turkey's "first truly native rulers."²⁹⁰ In 1919, the military, as the "sole remaining intact institution," became the uncontested leader of the liberation movement with a solid intellectual support.²⁹¹ Turks as an "army-nation" became a popular intellectual imagination. Aydemir, a military school graduate, recalled his school years: "We frequently repeated these words with affection: Our lands! Our state! ...As I

²⁸⁹ For Mustafa Kemal's depiction, see Bila, *CHP, 1919-1999*, 1999, 37-38.

²⁹⁰ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 119-120.

²⁹¹ Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 135.

repeated these words...I knew that these feelings...made me proud... On the street, I looked down on anyone who was not military or from a military academy...The military was the foundation of the homeland. It was the military that ensured the state's survival. We were the children of this military."²⁹² Dissidents like Adıvar criticized Atatürk for his narcissistic tendencies yet praised him as "a symbol of Turkey's relentless struggle for freedom."²⁹³ She held revolutionary accomplishments at higher regard compared to the dictatorial measures that made them possible.²⁹⁴ In the 1950s, she argued Turkey's democratization must proceed without sacrificing one step from these accomplishments.²⁹⁵ What is more, the republican order reproduced this connection into the future generation of progressive intellectuals, who, however critically, incorporated Kemalist paradigms of progress. Intellectuals like Baykurt and Avcıoğlu sought to understand how Turkey's revolutionary progressivism could turn into conservative stagnation with the 1940s and reactionary regression with the 1950s.²⁹⁶

Socialists, meanwhile, critically applauded Kemalists' commitment to superstructure revolutionism and the secular and materialist worldviews attached to it. Conceptualizing Kemalism as a radical petty-bourgeois revolutionism allowed the socialists to use Kemalist discourses as a starting point for their political agitations. Sertel conditionally justified the single party regime because a hasty transition to multi-party elections could lead to a reactionary triumph and readily approved the regime's repression against Turanists and Islamists in the 1920s.²⁹⁷ Nazım, who understood historical progress as a dialectical ladder,

²⁹² Aydemir, *Sıyrı Arayan Adam*, 1959 (1971), 45.

²⁹³ Adıvar, *Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihani: İstiklal Savaşı Hatıraları*, (1928) 2007, 333.

²⁹⁴ Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 160.

²⁹⁵ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 198.

²⁹⁶ See Baykurt, "Yerinde Saymak," (1959) 1974, 72; Baykurt, "Bulanık Seller," (1959) 1974, 57; Avcıoğlu, "Maneviyat Peşinde," 1959; Avcıoğlu, "Meşrutiyetin Hudutlarında," 1959.

²⁹⁷ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 92 and 95.

held Ankara of 1920 equal to Paris of 1789 and Moscow of 1917.²⁹⁸ Depicting socialism as the natural next step in Turkey's liberation, Kıvılcımlı agitated for a "Second National Forces" alliance since the 1950s.²⁹⁹ He attributed the vanguard position in the second national struggle also to the military-bureaucratic segment as the striking force of Turkey's revolutionary forces.³⁰⁰ The next generation of socialist intellectuals like O. Kemal also reproduced Kemalist narratives, such as "privilegeless, classless, fused populace," to describe their political agendas.³⁰¹ Boran, a socialist scholar, readily defended Kemalist revolutions' commitment to science and progress³⁰² Ultimately, in Gramscian terms, socialists celebrated Mustafa Kemal as a progressive Caesar.³⁰³ Kemalists were also successful in generating compliance from the Islamist and fascist oppositions. A universal progressive criticism was that with İnönü's presidency, the political establishment began integrating fascist and Islamist counter-hegemonic opposition as a weapon against progressivism.³⁰⁴ This trend accelerated after World War II with Turkey's integration into the Western bloc and transition to the multi-party regime while securitizing progressive intellectuals and trade unions.³⁰⁵ Leaving aside its ideological alliances, the Kemalist establishment diverged from its Egyptian and Iranian counterparts by its capacity to generate

²⁹⁸ Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1264 and 1478; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Madrid," (1936) 1987.

²⁹⁹ Kıvılcımlı, *Eyüp Konuşması*, (1957) 2003, 22.

³⁰⁰ Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz* (1960) 2008; Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizm'in Gelişimi*, 1965, 21.

³⁰¹ O. Kemal, "Vukuat Var Tefrikasi ile İlgili Not," (1954) 2007, 149.

³⁰² Boran, "Kalp Fikir Gerçek Fikir" (1944) 2010.

³⁰³ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 219-220.

³⁰⁴ Tonguç, "Softalık," (1960) 1997; Nazım, "Tehlikeye karşı başarıyla savaşabilmek için onun ana sebeplerini araştırmak gerekir: Kara Kuvvet Yeşil Sancak No.4," (1959) 2002; Nazım, "Yobazlığın harekete getirilmesinin sebeplerinden biri: Yeşil Sancak Kara Kuvvet No.6," (1959) 2002; Boran, "İlahiyat Bir İlim Değildir," (1950) 2010; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 343-345.

³⁰⁵ Sertel, "Zincirli Hürriyet," 1945; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Teyfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 126.

intellectual support from all counter-hegemonic groups and to determine the limits of their opposition.

In Egypt, the politically divided field among the Wafd, the British, and the Khedivate further allowed a vibrant and politicized civil society.³⁰⁶ The 1930s and 1940s witnessed gradual radicalization of the urban-educated bloc and its associated intellectuals. This turned counter-hegemonic streams such as Islamism, fascism, and socialism into mass movements under intellectuals' leadership.³⁰⁷ Tensions between the Wafd leadership, gradually more dominated by landlords, and the urban-educated segment, whose numbers were rapidly growing.³⁰⁸ The *effendi Weltanschauung* began denationalizing landowners for their Ottoman-Turkish backgrounds by the 1920s, which gradually became more radical.³⁰⁹ In the 1940s, *effendi* narratives reflected a self-entitled liberation mission. Socialist intellectual Rashid al-Barrawi, for example, articulated the *effendiyya* as the vanguard of Egypt's deterministic march towards progress, leading other impoverished segments of workers and peasants.³¹⁰ The Free Officers' revolution was in the name of the nation, but its core constituency was the urban-educated bloc. Nasser reportedly thought of the revolution as of al-Hakim's revolution, reflecting what he thought, felt, and wrote. Al-Hakim agreed with this view.³¹¹ Yet he harshly criticized Nasser retrospectively for Nasser "made [them] feel...that in Egypt...there could only be found one single intelligence, one power, and one

³⁰⁶ Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 5; Botman, *Egypt from Independence to Revolution*, 1991, 4 and 8.

³⁰⁷ Beinun and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 153.

³⁰⁷ Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 396.

³⁰⁸ Compared to Turkey and Iran, Egypt's state expenditure on education was considerably higher at over ten percent of the budget from the mid-1930s to the 1950s (see Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 1923-1973*, 1985, 25).

³⁰⁹ A classic example is Tawfiq Al-Hakim's *Return of the Spirit* (1933), 2020. For denationalization of the landed elite in academic narratives, see Ryzova, *The Age of the Efendiyya*, 2014, 242.

³¹⁰ For a detailed analysis on al-Barrawi, see Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 66-87.

³¹¹ Al-Hakim, *The Return of Consciousness*, (1974) 1985, 18-19.

personality...Without him...the only thing ahead would be ruin. Thus, it was with fascism, Hitlerism, and Nasserism; all of them stand on a single base which is the elimination of minds and wills other than the mind and the will of the leader.”³¹² This perspective diverges sharply from how Turkish progressives articulated Mustafa Kemal’s single man authoritarianism and the personality cult built around him.

In Iran, Reza Shah’s regime depended upon an “uneasy symbiosis” with intellectuals.³¹³ For the intellectuals as a bloc, this meant no meaningful access to political power or economic welfare, no organic attachment to the regime, and the constant threat of arbitrary violence.³¹⁴ By the 1930s, despite accomplishing many nationalist goals of the 1920s, Reza Shah’s regime secured intellectuals’ dissidence. Younger intellectuals took him as a brutal autocrat put on the throne by the British and delegitimized his once-acclaimed accomplishments.³¹⁵ Despite unprecedented state monopolization, the regime remained vulnerable against rival nationalist ideologies. This was partly because Reza Shah’s ascendance to power was through the British whereas the Kemalist regime enjoyed the legitimacy of a military triumph against foreign occupation. Oppositional ideologies flourished in semi-open (for example in Taqi Arani’s *Donya* journal)³¹⁶ or closed (for example among younger officers or students)³¹⁷ circles. In short, Reza Shah’s Caesarism proved unable to create a new hegemony among its key constituency. When a foreign occupation ended his reign in 1941, the regime collapsed immediately. The 1940s saw the rise of the Tudeh, originally an antifascist party that supported unionism, as an exceptional

³¹² Al-Hakim, *The Return of Consciousness*, (1974) 1985, 44.

³¹³ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 61.

³¹⁴ Katouzian, “Riza Shah's Political Legitimacy and Social Base, 1921-1941,” 2003, 31-32.

³¹⁵ Hedayat, *The Pearl Cannon*, (1947) 1986; Alavi, *Prison Papers* (1941) 1991.

³¹⁶ For the *Donya* journal, see Matin-Asgari, *Both Eastern and Western*, 2018, 101-106.

³¹⁷ For younger officers, see Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 2010), 238. For students during the Reza Shah era, see Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah*, 2002.

political force for gathering the support of secular intellectuals – and workers in large facilities – almost in their entirety.³¹⁸ For a while in the 1940s, for intellectuals, who associated Pahlavi nationalism with fascistic autocracy and the ulama with religious obstructionism, the Tudeh offered a coherent vision of reform and political supremacy.³¹⁹

All three nationalist regimes formed in the early 1920s had the urban-educated segments as their key constituency for their hegemonic projects. The urban-educated bloc emerged as a “historic bloc” – the backbone of all political streams during the early-to-mid-twentieth century. Kemalism succeeded in curtailing the appeals and determining the limits of counter-hegemonic streams. A wide range of intellectuals from socialist, fascist, and Islamist backgrounds aimed to integrate themselves into the Kemalist establishment and utilized Kemalist narratives. In general, they sought not to challenge Kemalism but made it compatible with their visions. Turkish progressives grew more dissident against the CHP, while they celebrated Atatürk, arguably as a progressive Caesar. Even more, progressives selectively took his ideology as a valid but incomplete modernization paradigm. Still, a regime’s leadership capacity over its key constituency is one part of a successful hegemonic project. Another is resolving contradictions, in other words: distinctions. Turkish progressives identified two key domestic distinctions to be resolved, one among the elites, and the other between the intellectuals and the people.

B. Regime Making: Building and Maintaining a Coalition

³¹⁸ Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 2008, 107-113.

³¹⁹ Matin-Asgari, “From Social Democracy to Social Democracy,” 2004, 41.

Assuming power for a group of revolutionaries – in addition to leading their key constituency – also rests upon building alliances with allied subaltern groups that possess distinct capitals. Revolutionary situations often lead to the making of fronts, or rather, of two heterogeneous camps pitted against each other. A united front under a charismatic leader adds to revolutionaries’ capacity to succeed. Maintaining the coalition, even after the revolution, contributes to a regime’s hegemonic capacity, especially when this coalition is institutionalized.³²⁰ These alliances, however, alter the nature of the regime and its hegemonic project since alliances come with access to political power. Access to symbolic and material monopolies that come with state power breeds conflicts within the alliance, which often either shrink or collapse the revolutionary alliance. This part shows how the CHP institutionalized the alliance between the forces of the Center and the Periphery and thereby sustainably managed their conflicts for decades. Middle Eastern progressives understood the world and sociopolitical structures in binary divides. Their meta-divide was generally between old vs. new, with accompanying divisions between secular vs. religious, progressive vs. conservative/reactionary, and industrial vs. agrarian. They shared the nationalist goal of a unified, harmonious nation, which for progressive intellectuals required contradiction resolution.

Hegemony is a struggle-ridden process, in which different actors strive for superiority and intend to achieve unity. Mardin’s theory has been influential since the 1980s, intellectually and politically, and came under criticism, especially of secular intellectuals. This chapter, informed by contemporaneous progressive narratives, puts forth that the Center-Periphery

³²⁰ Institutionalization is in fact a key sign of success for revolutionary orders. See for example Sohrabi’s research that compares 3 revolutions in terms of their ability to institutionalize. Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia,” 1995.

Paradigm remains valid in understanding the complexities of Turkish sociopolitical confrontations, if it is taken 1) as a distinction within elites instead of a greater distinction between the elites and the masses; 2) not as a continuous conflict but as a complex set of relations, in which alliance is the main dynamic; and 3) in a layered sense that allows for distinctions, in other words, hegemonic conflicts within the two meta blocs. A significant element of Kemalist hegemony was its alliance with the Periphery. In progressive narratives, this also points to the limits of Kemalist hegemony. The CHP remained incapable and/or unwilling to challenge the patrimonial authority of its rural cadres, thus betraying the republican project. Unlike Mardin, progressive intellectuals since the 1930s articulated Turkey's main hegemonic process as an alliance that also included internal conflict. Intellectuals saw this alliance behind the revolution's eventual crumbling into conservatism in the 1940s and reactionism in the 1950s, becoming a regime of not the people but a small number of rural and urban elites.

The alliance, which produced the republican elites, dates to the Liberation War. For Adıvar, it was this alliance, which brought "typical Anatolian Turks" to power, made the victory possible.³²¹ Mardin misreads the parliamentary opposition during and after the Liberation War as the Periphery's challenge.³²² However, 1) both the Kemalists and their opposition were intermixed groups containing both Center and Periphery elements;³²³ 2) both groups were led by the military-bureaucratic segment;³²⁴ and 3) the greater political challenge to Kemalists' state-making project came not from the Periphery (like the Sheikh

³²¹ Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 127.

³²² Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," 1973, 181.

³²³ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal İkinci Cilt 1919-1923*, (1964), 2005.

³²⁴ Ibid.

For the overlaps between the Kemalists and the Second Group and the continuity between the Young Turks and the Kemalists, see Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*, 1984 and Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic*, 1991.

Said Revolt) but rival nationalists of Young Turk origin.³²⁵ A certain Center-Periphery paradigm entered intellectual narratives in the 1930s, which identified the republican elites in both the Center and Periphery blocs, where the former had the initial superiority.³²⁶ They possessed distinct *Weltanschauungs* and ideological leanings but were united in their political-economic interests.³²⁷ They also possessed capitals of different nature. Rural notables possessed traditional patrimonial capital and aspired to greater economic capital. The military-bureaucratic segment, on the other hand, possessed access to material power.³²⁸ It was the alliance of two sets of elites that monopolized political power in a liberation revolution against the foreign powers and the sultanate.³²⁹ By bringing these two segments together, the CHP institutionalized the alliance.³³⁰

The revolution had determined reaction and its associated feudal structures as its great other.³³¹ In practice, as Nazım depicted, this meant brutal repressions against *some* Kurdish, Alevi, and Islamist elites, while their more complying segments were often assimilated into the CHP.³³² The regime incorporated Sunni-Turkish rural notables compliant with republicanism.³³³ As Sertel observed, they immediately blocked revolutionary agendas such

³²⁵ Halide Edib Adivar argued that the Kurdish revolt had enabled the Kemalist regime to get rid of the legitimate nationalist opposition. See Adivar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 125 and 203-204.

³²⁶ Adivar, for example, identified two main political trends in Turkey: progressives and conservatives; the former made by educated segments, most of whom in military and bureaucracy, and established its superiority by the 1930s, and the latter made by small urban merchants and property owners, rural bureaucrats, rural notables and landowners, and complied with the order. She had considered the third trend, reactionism, to be defeated by the revolutions. See Adivar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 154-157.

³²⁷ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 3-17.

³²⁸ Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 2: Yakın Tarihten Birkaç Madde*, (1933) 1978, 58-59.

³²⁹ Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 2: Yakın Tarihten Birkaç Madde*, (1933) 1978, 63.

³³⁰ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991; and Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt, 1884 – 1938*, (1966) 1993.

³³¹ Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakârlık, İslamcılık*, 1998, 79.

³³² See Nazım, "Hasan Torlak," (1950s) 1987; Nazım, *Yaşamak Güzel Şey Be Kardeşim*, (1963) 1987.

³³³ Adivar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 154-157.

as land reform.³³⁴ Baykurt observed that the land reform agenda was completely abandoned in 1946 due to landlords' opposition. Thereafter, even speaking of the land problem drew the establishment's ire.³³⁵ Rural notables, whose subaltern position added political capital to their patrimonial authority, exerted a great influence in national politics and became a dominating force by the 1940s.³³⁶ In the 1940s, Boran found in her anthropological field studies in western Anatolian villages that the republic has resolved the old order by detaching the economic and social authority from the political and administrative. But this often remained in appearance alone, she argued, because the former village *agas* were replaced by a new "agricultural bourgeoisie" that resembled small town bourgeoisies and sought to cling to its socioeconomic status in a new, competition-ridden economic system.³³⁷

A critical moment was the rural notables' alliance with the ascending national bourgeoisie.³³⁸ Progressive intellectuals identified national bourgeoisie and land-owning rural notables as the two blocs upon which the military-bureaucratic segment relied after the revolution. Progressive narratives emphasized that all political order rests upon certain blocs, and the republican order broke with its populist revolutionary narratives to build alliances with rural notables (especially large land-owners) and the national bourgeoisie (which progressive narratives identified as the product of the 1930s' statist policies).³³⁹ These blocs

³³⁴ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 104-105; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 77.

³³⁵ Baykurt, "Deşilecek İki Yara," (1959) 1974, 107.

³³⁶ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 345-346.

³³⁷ Boran, "Köyde Sosyal Tabakalanma," (1942) 2010.

³³⁸ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 124-125.

For secondary sources on the Young Turk and republican national bourgeoisie, see Toprak, *Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi*, 1995; Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları*, 1995.

³³⁹ Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizm'in Gelişimi*, 1965; Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005.

gradually became capable enough sidelining the military-bureaucratic segment.³⁴⁰

Progressive intellectuals pinpointed the mid-1940s where the dominance within the political apparatus shifted from the military-bureaucratic segment – and its urban professional and intellectual allies – to landowners and bourgeoisie.³⁴¹ Nazım’s iconic poetic novel *Human Landscapes from My Homeland* depicts a disheartened intellectual-politician of the CHP, surrounded by old and conservative pashas, landlords, and businessmen, in the first-class compartment of Anatolian Express. He realizes: “we entered a new age; we got tired.” In the 1960s, intellectuals like Avcıoğlu, Boran, Kıvılcımlı, as well as others, systematically theorized the undoing of the republican revolution in the popular academic tradition of their age: (materialist) historical sociology.³⁴² These analyses depicted a toppled down military-bureaucratic segment, which found a subaltern position in the new hegemonic restructuring. They also depicted a political regime that between 1945 and 1960 (the transition to multiparty democracy and the DP government) remained under the hegemony of two blocs: the national bourgeoisie (which became a comprador stratum) and the landlords. The republican regime initiated the Anatolianization of political-economic power, but only for a limited number of urban and provincial elites.

For progressive intellectuals, the Periphery constituted the remnants of the old order. Rural notables held the peasantry in tutelage through feudal patrimonial relations. This made the rural elites incompatible with the republican revolution and required their subordination,

³⁴⁰ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 108-109; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1095-1096; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 406-408.

³⁴¹ Some notable moments were the de facto closure of Village Institutes, purges from academia, lynch attempts against Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel, and acquittals of fascist-racist intellectuals and bureaucrats, compromises from staunch secular policies, and the Truman Doctrine.

³⁴² Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (1966) 1973; Kıvılcımlı, *Osmanlı Tarihinin Maddesi*, (1974) 2020.

if not annihilation.³⁴³ Progressives saw the Center-Periphery alliance at the core of unrealized revolutionary aims expressed in Kemalism's peopleism principle.³⁴⁴ This understanding popularized the idea among the intellectuals that Kemalist revolutions were incomplete.³⁴⁵ The confrontation between the CHP and the DP is often understood as Center-Periphery clash *par excellence*, where the former represents the Center and the latter the Periphery.³⁴⁶ Yet many intellectuals, such as Aydemir, observed the DP as a continuation of the CHP, made by the same cadres and ideology.³⁴⁷ Moreover, even during the multiparty era, Center-Periphery division existed in both parties. Sertel's unpublished papers in the 1950s referred to the DP as the Bayar-Menderes Alliance, emphasizing its bourgeoisie-landlord nature.³⁴⁸ O. Kemal argued that the republican revolutionaries' concessions to rural elites eventually created a hybrid order of constitutionalism and feudalism in the 1950s.³⁴⁹ The distinction between the CHP and the DP governments for Boran was not the social blocs they represented, but the dominant segment within their hegemonic bloc, which in the CHP was the military-bureaucratic elite and in the DP the bourgeoisie and the landowners.³⁵⁰ For

³⁴³ Tonguç argued that the state must find its social base either in landlords who exploited the peasants or in peasants by redistributing the land and making them capable to soil it with modern technique (see Tonguç, "Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Davası," (1945) 1997, 346).

³⁴⁴ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 181-182; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt, 1884 – 1938*, (1966) 1993, 489; and Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 35.

³⁴⁵ See Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 254-255; Nazım Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1185.

³⁴⁶ Even Mardin's critiques point that the Center-Periphery clash could be a fitting paradigm to understand Turkey's 1930s and 1950s. See Açıkel, "Toplum ve Muarızları," 2006, 33.

³⁴⁷ Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 149-151 and Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988, 14.

³⁴⁸ Yıldız Sertel, *Annem Sabiha Sertel Kimdi? Neler Yazdı?* 1993, 245.

Islamist intellectuals, meanwhile, detested President Bayar, whom they associated with freemasonry and the alienated Kemalist establishment, and adored Prime Minister and landlord Menderes, whom they saw as a man of the people Bora, *Cereyanlar*, 2018, 438.

³⁴⁹ O. Kemal, "Gelenekler Üstüne," (1954) 2007, 151-152.

³⁵⁰ Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (1968) 1992, 53.

progressives, these two classes also constituted fascism's backbone and the key responsible in Turkey's dependent underdevelopment.³⁵¹

There was, however, a reproduction of the Center-Periphery clash underneath the alliance. In intellectual analyses, its source was again the rural notables, but of smaller means, who were left out by the CHP. Nazım's and O. Kemal's narratives depicted the resentment of smaller landlords to the government.³⁵² Avcıoğlu argued that this group of rural notables, influenced by rural and small-town *ulema*, equated their traditional, regressive social orders with religion and resisted revolutionary attempts to change rural structures. This resistance resurfaced with the transition to the multi-party regime and rallied behind the DP.³⁵³ Like the CHP, the DP enabled a new group of rural notables to accumulate political, economic, and intellectual capital, as such further integrated the Periphery into the Center. The DP initiated a second wave of Anatolianization of political-economic power, again covering only a small number of elites. This still left behind a wide range of resentful rural middle classes and notables whose socioeconomic status came under threat with the post-1946 capitalization.³⁵⁴ They would constitute a new basis for the Center-Periphery clash, again with the principal aim of integration into the Center, thus reproducing the paradigm beyond the 1960s. Progressive narratives often prioritized political-economic interests in their analyses and saw no clash where the Periphery resisted against the Center's encroachment.³⁵⁵ They saw the Periphery's gradual integration into the Center, in alliance

³⁵¹ Boran, "Sosyoloji Işığında: Bir Cemiyet Sistemi Olarak Faşizm," (1945) 2010; Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*, (1944) 2010.

³⁵² O. Kemal, *Üçkağıtçı*, (1969) 2005; O. Kemal, *Müfettişler Müfettişi*, (1966) 1979; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008.

³⁵³ Avcıoğlu, "Din veya Devrim Meselesi," 1957.

³⁵⁴ Indeed, these blocs would constitute a key popular bloc for fascist and Islamist parties in the 1970s. See Bora and Can, *Devlet Ocak Dergah: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket*, 1991; Zengin, *Akıncılar Hareketi: 1970'lerde İslamcı Gençliğin Oluşumu ve Eylem*, 2021.

³⁵⁵ Kuvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 2: Yakın Tarihten Birkaç Madde*, (1933) 1978.

with the urban bourgeoisie and conservative military-bureaucratic factions. Yet they also identified a cultural realm that witnessed clashes between two *Weltanschauungs*, which for Baykurt was between the teacher and the imam.³⁵⁶

In Iran, crises historically transcended the divisions between the two middle classes. The Secular-Religious alliance paradigm emerges as the dominant narrative in explaining Iranian revolutionary mobilizations in 1891-1892, 1905-1906, 1951-1953, and 1978-1979.³⁵⁷ In all cases, common opposition against autocracy and foreign encroachment brought secular and religious intellectuals together. In all cases, the alliance did not institutionalize but collapsed after initial successes. The question of oil nationalization constituted a domestic and international crisis by 1951. Mohammad Mosaddeq's National Front represented a broad coalition of the two middle classes. Mosaddeq's nationalism rapidly assumed hegemony across the urban civil society.³⁵⁸ Politicized sections of the ulema also joined, while some of their leaders assumed a subaltern role in the coalition. The distinction between the two middle classes gradually made political differences unbridgeable.³⁵⁹ Iran's ulema had been a distinctly autonomous bloc that the Front could neither convince nor coerce.³⁶⁰ Islamist leaders left the coalition. It was in this context that Khalil Maleki, a leading National Front intellectual, theorized his Third Force, offering an alternative path to socialism through

³⁵⁶ Baykurt, "Çağlayan Köyü," (1959) 1974, 146.

³⁵⁷ Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006; Keddie, "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective," 1983; Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988.

³⁵⁸ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 115.

³⁵⁹ These differences were with regards to secularism, women's rights, and land reform. See Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 175.

³⁶⁰ The distinction in Iran's structures compared to Turkey and Egypt is the ulema's autonomy, providing the bloc with financial power and a network of sociopolitical alliances, most notably with the bazaar. Among the three examples, Iranian Islamism would be led almost exclusively by the ulema, while in Turkey and Egypt Islamist leaders almost exclusively emerged from effendi segments. See Kamali, *Revolutionary Iran: Civil Society and State in the Modernization Process*, 1998; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988.

gradual reforms and progressive alliances.³⁶¹ In 1953, Mosaddeq's front became a secular liberation alliance backed by urban masses.³⁶² It created a counter-alliance, made by the conservative state nobility and *ulema*, united around the court, sponsored by the US.³⁶³ The Front, despite popular, intellectual, and parliamentary support it enjoyed, collapsed with a coup. Put in Gramscian terms, Iranian secular-nationalists and socialists fared extremely well in their counter-hegemonic struggle and their "War of Position" but were decisively defeated in "War of Maneuver", followed by a massive onslaught against socialists and secular-nationalists.³⁶⁴

Egypt's Wafd emerged a broad coalition, where landowners and bourgeoisie constituted its leadership, and *effendis* and their rural counterpart, small to medium size landowners, constituted its backbone.³⁶⁵ The *effendi*-landlord alliance that made the 1919 revolution, however, was no longer sustainable by the 1940s. Landlords' dominance within the Wafd leadership grew, in contrast to growing numbers and ambitions of the *effendi* segment.³⁶⁶ But the distinctions within the *effendi* bloc along modern-traditional and secular-religious lines also remained. Naguib Mahfouz's *Cairo Trilogy* is one example of how such distinctions cut across the urban-educated segment, by depicting the parting of two brothers

³⁶¹ Maleki introduced two principal concepts, the Third Force in General and the Third Force in Particular, which he applied to the colonized and semi-colonized countries. The 'General' referred to the efforts to break free from the dominance of Western and Eastern blocs, in the Iranian context formed by Mosaddeq's popular coalition, while the 'Particular' referred to the specific socialist path for each country, formed by the leftwing of the coalition, pursuing progressive agendas such as land reform and suffragette. See Katouzian, "The Strange Politics of Khalil Maleki," 2004, 169-172; Katouzian, *Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism*, 2018, 127-132; Katouzian, "Khalil Maleki: The Odd Intellectual Out," 2003.

³⁶² Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013, 168.

³⁶³ For the making of the alliance between the Pahlavi court and the *ulema*, see Ibid., 161.

³⁶⁴ Matin-Asgari, *Both Eastern and Western*, 2018, 167.

³⁶⁵ Beinun and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 13; Beattie, *Egypt during the Nasser Years*, 1994, 25; Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, 1968, 58-59.

³⁶⁶ Botman (in *Egypt from Independence to Revolution: 1919-1952*, 1991, 79) notes that in the fifty cabinets formed from 1914 to 1952, the landlords on average represented 58 percent of ministers. In Wafd's cabinet in 1942 they represented 64 percent of ministers.

into Islamist and socialist organizations respectively.³⁶⁷ Progressives' relentless calls for a united front never materialized, partly due to divisions between two middle classes.³⁶⁸ Liberation frameworks could not bring *effendi*-led Islamists under a united front.³⁶⁹ The Free Officers' revolution also did not solve these distinctions. Even though Nasser established a hegemonic united front by 1956, most post-revolutionary accounts also attribute failure to his hegemonic project. For example, Naguib Mahfouz's novels after the late 1950s exposed how the revolution failed to resolve the old distinctions while creating new traumas.³⁷⁰ His *Miramar* exemplifies how Nasser's regime dismantled the old elite but could not raise the status of popular classes or address the distinctions among them.

Forging and maintaining alliances is crucial for assuming power, as well as building hegemony. The Center-Periphery paradigm fits Turkey not as a clash but as complex sets of relations involving interest-based alliances (and clashes) and sociocultural distinctions (and assimilation of such distinctions). Relative strengths of subaltern blocs, on the other hand, directly affect the nature of a ruling bloc's hegemony. The Kemalist regime institutionalized the liberation coalition. This extended the CHP's hegemony into the provinces, not through ideology and intellectuals, but interest-based alliances. In almost all progressive analyses, the Center-Periphery alliance constituted the roots of the CHP's conservatism and its abandonment of peopleism.

³⁶⁷ Mahfouz, *The Cairo Trilogy: Palace Walk, Palace of Desire, Sugar Street*, (1957) 2001.

³⁶⁸ For united front paradigms in Egypt's pre-revolution period, see Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970*, 1991, 47 and 69-74; Ismael and El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988*, 1990, 59-61.

³⁶⁹ Secular intellectuals were especially concerned over the Ikhwan's rise, condemning them for hampering the liberation struggle. See Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 201; E. Thompson, *Justice Interrupted*, 2013, 152.

³⁷⁰ Two notable examples are Mahfouz, *The Thief and the Dogs*, (1961) 1989; Mahfouz, *Miramar*, (1967) 1993.

C. *Spreading Consciousness: The Limits of Kemalist Hegemony*

The peasant question has been fundamental to Middle Eastern politics in the twentieth century. Turkish, Iranian, and Egyptian nationalists had aspired to establish meaningful connections with the peasantry. So much so that nationalists who rarely saw a village began idolizing the village as the authentic space of national identity.³⁷¹ Despite differences in their narratives, all hegemonic contestants preached saving the peasantry through their version of correct modernization. “Consciousness spreading” became a key aim of modernizing streams. It constituted the underlying impetus of their emphasis on education.³⁷² The regimes and intellectuals approached hegemonic struggle as a social engineering project, aiming to reorganize societal relations under new principles and awaken the people to a new political consciousness. Yet all three regimes, as well as counter-hegemonic streams, mostly failed in spreading a distinct political consciousness.³⁷³ “Consciousness spreading” was the greatest limit of Kemalism’s hegemonic project. The revolution could not forge organic connections to the “people” and failed in its aim to transform people into citizens. Progressive intellectuals identified Kemalists’ alignment with urban and rural economic elites and the subsequent subordination of urban and rural masses at the heart of the problem.

³⁷¹ A common intellectual attitude until the 1940s was to seek the authentic, ancient roots of the nation in the villages, unspoiled by Western, as well as Eastern influences – Eastern influences often being defined as the other two of Turkish, Arab, and Farsi influences.

³⁷² See Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 333-334 and Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, 1946, x-xii. For academic sources, see Vejdani, *Making History in Iran*, 2015; El Shakry, *Great Social Laboratory*, 2007; Üstel, *Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde*, 2021.

³⁷³ Spreading consciousness must be differentiated from gathering electoral support. The DP in Turkey (and to a lesser extent the CHP), as well as the Wafd and the Nasserist regime in Egypt, partially managed to receive peasant support for their political bids. Yet neither group was remotely successful in politically nor mentally transforming the peasantry as they wished.

Turkish progressive intellectuals' understanding of consciousness spreading paralleled Gramsci's theories on "national-popular" consciousness.³⁷⁴ They idolized a unified consciousness involving both the modern and the national-popular by making it central to their hegemonic projects. Becoming a nation and overcoming intellectual-people distinction was the same struggle; both required a "unity of fate" among the nation's members.³⁷⁵ This was only possible by eradicating class and status distinctions, in other words, changing rural structures substantially. For progressive intellectuals, this could be achieved by establishing a national education network and improving living standards.³⁷⁶ This was a point that the Kemalist establishment discursively shared, but they practically remained conservative.³⁷⁷ By the 1940s, a new generation of intellectuals were raised in republican education networks and adopted Kemalism's peopleist narratives, only to realize the gap between the narrative and the reality.³⁷⁸ For progressive intellectuals, distinctions had cultural and material aspects that were intermixed with each other.³⁷⁹ In other words, a substantial change in political consciousness was possible only if it was accompanied by changes in material living conditions. The Anatolian peasantry that suffered through decades of devastating crises and

³⁷⁴ Gramsci (in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 334) depicted political consciousness as a dialectic dialogue, writing 'every leap forward towards a new breadth and complexity of the intellectual stratum is tied to an analogous movement on the part of the mass of the "simple."

³⁷⁵ See Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 182 and Tonguç, "Köy Enstitüleri," (1948) 1997, 418; Baykurt, "Hacettepe'de İki Çocuk," (1960) 1974.

³⁷⁶ See Baykurt, "Boyumuzun Ölçüsü," (1960) 1974; Avcıoğlu, "Köy Enstitüleri," 1957; Avcıoğlu; "Halk Eğitimi," 1957.

³⁷⁷ See Kuvülcümlü, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 7: Muttefik: Köylülük*, (1933) 1978, 143.

For Kemalist conservatism with regards to the village question, see Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta*, 2017.

³⁷⁸ See Baykurt, "Çağlayan Köyü," (1959) 1974, 152; Baykurt, "Akıp Giden Zamanlar," (1959) 1974 169; O. Kemal, "Dert Dinleme Günü," (1948) 2007. Also see, Birkan, *Dünya ile Devlet Arasında Türk Muharriri, 1930-1960*, 2018.

³⁷⁹ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015.

exploitation was incapacitated to change these structures themselves. Progressives depicted a peasantry that was held “captive by natural and social forces beyond their control.”³⁸⁰

Kemalists were aware of the wedge between the people and the elites.³⁸¹ The regime sought to create unity via solidarism and corporatism, crystallized in its *peopleism* principle. In the 1930s’ progressive narratives, the revolution’s fate remained conditional upon the regime’s ability to spread its ideology and establish national sovereignty. By the 1940s, progressives’ consensus was that the revolution established state but not national sovereignty.³⁸² The revolution created an “ethical regime” only for its subaltern partners – like intellectuals, bureaucrats, merchants, landowners – but not for the masses. Urban and rural toilers were kept out, and thus, as in the imperial-feudal order, remained in a subordinated status. Like the Ottoman Empire, the republic treated ordinary Anatolians as “cows to be milked”, taking soldiers and taxes, and giving nothing back.³⁸³ These distinctions continued during the DP period, even when intellectuals faced partisan repression. Despite political pressures and regression in living standards, the urban-educated segment could maintain a subaltern position within the regime, in contrast to the subordinated position of the toiling masses.³⁸⁴ Both parties failed to improve rural living standards sustainably and perpetually. The CHP limitedly improved them in the 1920s by ending banditry (creating law and order after a decade of crisis) and abolishing the Ottoman

³⁸⁰ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008.

³⁸¹ The classical example here is critical Kemalist Karaosmanoğlu’s *Yaban*. See Karaosmanoğlu, *Yaban*, (1932) 1986.

³⁸² See, for example, Sertel, “Zincirli Hürriyet,” 1945.

³⁸³ See Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt, 1884 – 1938*, (1966) 1993, 24; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 126; Baykurt, “Köylünün Ne Suçu Var?” (1960) 1974.

Ankara Governor Nevzat Tandoğan’s statement in 1944 is notable: ‘You Anatolian cows! What do you have anything to do with nationalism, with communism? If nationalism is necessary, we will do that. If communism is good, we will bring it too. You have only two duties, being farmers to raise crops and coming to arms when called’ (in Bora, *Cereyanlar*, 2018, 135).

³⁸⁴ See, for example, Baykurt, “Asıl Değişmesi Gereken,” (1960) 1974, 233-234.

Aşar tax.³⁸⁵ And the DP limitedly improved them in the 1950-1953 period, primarily through agricultural mechanization, globally rising food prices due to the Korean War, and foreign aids.³⁸⁶ The incapacity to improve living standards curtailed both parties' hegemonic projects.

For critical Kemalists, the CHP's "historic failure" in delivering its promises was blatantly obvious. Aydemir argued that was because the CHP failed to raise revolutionary cadres. It became not a party of revolutionaries but a bureaucratic faction, serving the narrow interests of the urban and rural elites.³⁸⁷ Rural development was an outstanding failure.³⁸⁸ In Aydemir's narrative, as the CHP failed to become the people's voice, the DP filled this gap. This made the masses' voices clear: "*I too exist; I too have a voice in this nation. Not only ağas, beys, and pashas, but I too am a human.*"³⁸⁹ Tonguç argued that the creation of a revolutionary new required the destruction of the entire Ottoman elites, modern and traditional alike.³⁹⁰ Despite educational differences, these elite blocs shared an interest in "sucking the peasant's blood".³⁹¹ For Tonguç, both segments possessed a scholastic mentality, were detached from the realities of life, and "consumed a lot but produced nothing."³⁹² Paralleling the republican ethos, he saw nationhood incompatible with status and class privileges.³⁹³ It was in this context Tonguç envisioned his signature project, the Village Institutes, as the revolution's next step. Briefly, the project envisioned making

³⁸⁵ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 210.

³⁸⁶ Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 226-233.

³⁸⁷ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005, 364; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt, 1884 – 1938*, (1966) 1993, 390; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, (1959) 1971, 458.

³⁸⁸ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 57; Tonguç, "Köy Eğitimi Meselesi I," (1938) 2000; Tonguç, "Köy Eğitimi Meselesi II," (1938) 2000.

³⁸⁹ See Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988, 92. (Emphasis original).

³⁹⁰ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 220-223.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 315-316.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 11-15; Tonguç, "Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Davası," (1945) 1997, 344-345.

peasants into intellectuals to resolve the intellectual-people distinction. These intellectuals would remain connected to their community, revive the village from within, and spread the revolution. They were to act as the peasantry's organic intellectual vanguards against the exploitation of bureaucrats, merchants, landlords, and sheiks.³⁹⁴ The project was ultimately abolished under conservative pressure. One landlord-politician blatantly declared that he "did not want the donkey [he] rode to be smarter than [he] was."³⁹⁵

Socialists, meanwhile, generally understood the republican revolution in structure-superstructure dichotomy. They argued that the revolution fell short of structural transformations, thus made its undoing. For Sertel, the forceful exclusion of workers and peasants from the political apparatus ensured the abandonment of peopleist ideals under the dominance of the ascending bourgeoisie and rural notables.³⁹⁶ Boran argued that workers' and peasants' living standards did not improve during the republican period, because the political apparatus remained closed to them. She observed in the 1940s that the peasantry confronted a new social phenomenon, rural-to-urban migration, which left them exposed to sociocultural traumas and alienation.³⁹⁷ In his last novel, Nazım put Atatürk's CHP as a reasonably secular and anti-imperialist, petty-bourgeois party, but ultimately doomed to corruption and failure for its allegiance to feudal and bourgeois elements.³⁹⁸ Three decades ago, he had been warning the Kemalist establishment that the CHP to keep its radical spirit had to be Jacobins, not Girondins, meaning that it should be the party of small peasants and petty-bourgeoisie, not large landowners and commercial bourgeoisie.³⁹⁹ For Kıvılcımlı,

³⁹⁴ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019.

³⁹⁵ In Birkan, *Dünya ile Devlet Arasında Türk Muharriri, 1930-1960*, 2018, p.96.

³⁹⁶ See Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 69-70 and 181-182; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 111 and 127.

³⁹⁷ Boran, "Sanayide Köylü-İşçi," (1942) 2010; Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (1968) 1992, 47.

³⁹⁸ Nazım, *Yaşamak Güzel Şey Be Kardeşim*, (1963) 1987, 94.

³⁹⁹ Nazım [Fıkracı], "Yine Başlayacaklar Mı?" (1930) 1987.

Kemalism represented a paradoxical duality: it was progressive and revolutionary against the reaction of imperialism and monarchical feudalism; but it was reactionary against the people, namely workers and peasants.⁴⁰⁰

Progressive intellectuals sought to offer answers on how the DP presented itself as the party of the masses, while effectively presenting the CHP as the party of elites. O. Kemal saw the detachment of the people from the state as the core of the revolution's failure. In his narrative, the experience of the poor with the state – and thus with the CHP – was the experience of a striking worker to the police, a peasant whose land had been confiscated to the gendarmerie, or a street vendor to the municipal authorities.⁴⁰¹ For an average person seeking welfare and dignity, the state was an institution that actively repelled such struggles. Baykurt's works also exemplify how the CHP added political and economic capital to landlords' patrimonial capital. The consequence for the average peasant was that the immediate subalterns of former landlords could reproduce the same patrimonial relations. The average peasant who sought welfare and dignity had to confront a miniature, an intra-village coalition of the Center and Periphery forces.⁴⁰² Avcıoğlu took a different approach and argued that the DP did not build a bond with the landless or small landowning peasantry but with the rural elites – landowning and religious, who had a domineering role in determining the peasantry's electoral choices.⁴⁰³ As a continuation of the CHP, the DP reproduced the same methods of mobilizing political support from the rural provinces and suffered a similar incapacity to expand its hegemony.

⁴⁰⁰ Kuvâlcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 2: Yakın Tarihten Birkaç Madde*, (1933) 1978, 63.

⁴⁰¹ For the peasant attitude against the gendarmerie, see O. Kemal, *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde*. (1954) 2008, 370-375. For Kemal's narrative on street vendors and municipal police, see O. Kemal, *Gurbet Kuşları*, (1954) 2007; O. Kemal, "Grev," (1954) 2007; O. Kemal, *Murtaza* (1952) 1987.

⁴⁰² Baykurt, *Yılanların Öcü*, (1958) 2006.

⁴⁰³ Avcıoğlu, "Gözler Köylerde," 1957.

This failure narrative of the CHP's "historic failure" finds its most acute expression with regards to the Kurdish question. Progressive intellectuals generally shared the regime's modernizing narrative and firmly believed that the feudal structures – the patrimonial authority of Kurdish leaders – had to be eradicated by force.⁴⁰⁴ The most radical of progressives on the Kurdish question, Kıvılcımlı, understood Turkey's Kurdish policy in colonial terms and argued that Turkey was an exploited and semi-colonized country in its foreign relations and an exploiting and colonizing country in its internal relations.⁴⁰⁵ Still, he took Kemalism – despite its assimilationist and terrorizing policies – as a preferable alternative against the traditional Kurdish leadership who readily collaborated with imperialist powers.⁴⁰⁶ Progressives problematized the gap between the narrative and reality in the CHP's Kurdish policy. As Nazım wrote, "the government hanged some of these *sheiks* and *bey*s; but did not touch most of them. Get civilized folks, it said. They bought buildings in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir; got used to civilization. Occasionally they return to Kurdistan, to get their feet kissed, to preach sermons, also to collect the income of their lands and herds; then they return to Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, civilization."⁴⁰⁷ Kıvılcımlı wrote that the republican motto "sovereignty belongs to the nation" – which to him in practice meant "sovereignty belongs to the bourgeoisie" – could only be implemented in the Kurdish

⁴⁰⁴ Adivar, for example, depicted the Kurdish regions as wild places, devastated by smuggling, raids, banditry, and conflicts, requiring to be modernized (see Adivar, *Zeyno'nun Oğlu*, (1928) 2010). For Tonguç, the eastern cities represented a region to be conquered with education and development, which also necessitated saving the people from the exploitation of landlords and sheiks (see Tonguç, "Atatürk Üniversitesi," (1959) 2000, 492-495). Sertel held Kurdish landlords that "Mustafa Kemal brought from the East" particularly responsible in blocking land reform (see Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 123). Aydemir, who believed the Kurdish question be primarily about social structures, argued that the correct solution was to liquidate the "crownless sovereigns" and "conquering the region in the name of the people, and with the people" (see Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 303-314).

⁴⁰⁵ Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 8: Yedek Güç: Milliyet (Doğu)*, (1933) 1978 20.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Nazım, "Hasan Torlak," (1950s) 1987, 286.

On the symbiotic relationship between the Turkish state nobility and Kurdish tribal and religious leadership, see van Bruinessen, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*, 1992.

regions as “sovereignty belongs to the gendarmerie.”⁴⁰⁸ The republican regime could not exercise consensual control over the Kurdish populated regions. This created a regime distinct from Turkish populated regions that relied upon the collaboration of pro-regime feudal leadership and militarism.⁴⁰⁹

For progressives, the CHP’s refusal to confront the Periphery was at the core of its hegemonic failure. For conservative and reactionary intellectuals, the single-party regime facilitated the making of a bond between the DP’s rural wing and the peasantry, as they both opposed the CHP for sociocultural reasons. This narrative of failure relates to the interpretation of the Center-Periphery paradigm as a distinction between the rulers and the masses as opposed to an intra-elite distinction. This reading has been dominant among rightwing circles.⁴¹⁰ While less dominant, it is also prevalent among leftwing circles.⁴¹¹ Mardin too validates this reading when he conceptualizes Center-Periphery distinction as a tax-collector vs. taxpayer distinction.⁴¹² Yet in Mardin’s concrete analyses, the actors of this conflict are always the elites that possess distinct capitals. Moreover, during the republican era, most rural elites managed to remain tax-exempt. And they collected taxes – often aided by the state – from the populace informally (mainly rent, labor, and debt-interest).⁴¹³ They

⁴⁰⁸ Kuvâlcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 8: Yedek Güç: Milliyet (Doğu)*, (1933) 1978. 83.

⁴⁰⁹ Kuvâlcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 8: Yedek Güç: Milliyet (Doğu)*, (1933) 1978, 128.

⁴¹⁰ Bora, *Cereyanlar*, 2018, 404-406.

Some major rightwing intellectuals who rely on this categorization are Peyami Safa (1899-1961), Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983), Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975), Cemil Meriç (1916-1987), Sabahattin Zaim (1926-2007), and more recently Yalçın Akdoğan and İbrahim Kalın, both of whom Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s close advisors.

⁴¹¹ The dominant paradigm in Turkish progressive circles has been to attribute progressivism to the military-bureaucratic bloc and conservatism to the urban bourgeoisie and rural notables. The revisionist paradigms date to İdris Küçükömer’s (1925-1987) *Düzenin Yabancılaşması* in which he put the military-bureaucratic segment as Turkey’s elitist and conservative bloc as opposed to the progressive masses (see Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması: “Batılılaşma”* (1969) 2014). Later, scholars such as Murat Belge and Levent Köker continued this narrative that problematized what they conceptualized as the progressive Center myth (see Belge, *Sosyalizm, Türkiye ve Gelecek*, 1989 and Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 1990).

⁴¹² See Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 1991, 57-58.

⁴¹³ A classic example is Orhan Kemal’s *Hanımın Çiftliği*, which exposed the landlord-state alliances pitted against the ordinary peasants. See O. Kemal, *Hanımın Çiftliği* (1961) 2003.

also benefited vastly from agricultural credit schemes funded by public banks.⁴¹⁴ Tax-collector vs. taxpayer conceptualization would put Center-Periphery firmly as an elite-people distinction. But it would disregard intra-elite distinctions between the military-bureaucratic segment and rural notables, thus making the theory obsolete. It also disregards the fact that rural notables increased their economic capital disproportionately compared to the military-bureaucratic segment, whose hold over political capital weakened gradually in favor of urban bourgeoisie and rural notables.

Mardin's theory also points to an urban bias, which was shared by critical Kemalists like Aydemir and Tonguç.⁴¹⁵ Yet progressive narratives ultimately recognized that the real issue was not space but class and complained of the establishment's "landlord bias."⁴¹⁶ Baykurt observed how the DP administrations also reproduced the CHP's urban bias, especially in delivering education and healthcare services.⁴¹⁷ Progressive narratives recognized that the rural elite maintained a closer cultural connection to the masses.⁴¹⁸ Intellectuals like O. Kemal and Avcıoğlu recognized that despite the repressive and exploitative relation that rural notables built with the rural masses, the detachment of the republican order from the masses enabled the rural notables to act as their intellectuals.⁴¹⁹ The greatest consequence of the CHP's inability to create a stratum of rural revolutionary intellectuals was that the rural masses had no option but to continue relying upon rural notables as their traditional

⁴¹⁴ See Baykurt, "Efkar Tepesi," (1959) 1974, 9-10.

⁴¹⁵ Aydemir complained that since the abolishment of the Ottoman *Aşar* tax, the republican administration took every economic decision with an urban agenda (Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 210). Tonguç argued that the contemporary civilization was corrupt as it created miracles and increased living standards, but only in the urban areas and at the expense of exploiting the villages (see, Tonguç, "Köy Enstitülerimizde Eğitim ve Öğretim Meseleleri," (1943) 2000, 163).

⁴¹⁶ I borrow this term from Nederveen Pieterse (in *Multipolar Globalization: Emerging Economies and Development*, 2017, 77).

⁴¹⁷ See Baykurt, "İki Okul," (1959) 1974 and Baykurt, "Cankurtaran," (1959) 1974.

⁴¹⁸ See, for example, Kemal, *Üçkağıtçı*, (1969) 2005.

⁴¹⁹ Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (1966) 1973; O. Kemal, *Murtaza* (1952) 1987.

representatives when they had to interact with the political apparatus.⁴²⁰ Nazım’s works exemplified how rural notables in the 1940s, in alliance with the political establishment, could devour the CHP’s idealist intellectual bureaucrats, who either became corrupt themselves or, abandoned by their party, faced marginalization and political repression.⁴²¹ However, rural notables also failed in forging an organic connections to the peasantry because of the contradictions between the interests of two groups. On the contrary, rural notables became more detached from the “people” – symbolically and materially – as they gradually integrated themselves into the Center. Kemalists were undoubtedly detached from the masses. But so were the rural elites, who had been distinct by the masses by their economic, patrimonial, and political capitals.

The incapacity of the Kemalist establishment to spread political consciousness stands at the core of rightwing (as well as some leftwing) intellectuals’ reading of the Center-Periphery paradigm as an elite-people distinction. Bourdieu’s theories on state making and state nobility offer guidance on how alliance and conflict can exist simultaneously within the higher echelons of social hierarchy, which Mardin’s paradigm largely misses in its exclusive focus on cultural conflicts. Yet Bourdieu’s articulations offer little explanation on how a set of elites (in Turkey the forces of the Periphery) could transcend inter-class sociocultural distinctions, despite conflicting interests.⁴²² For most progressives, the Kemalists failed to penetrate the fields of traditional cultural hegemony in rural Anatolia precisely because they

⁴²⁰ Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (1966) 1973; O. Kemal, “Telefon,” (1942) 2007.

⁴²¹ Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008.

In the 1950s, rural notables’ political capital grew further, which enabled this group to persecute republican intellectuals who sought to side with the peasantry. On this, see Baykurt, “Sepet Havası,” (1959) 1974; Baykurt, “Yolumuzun Yokuşu,” (1960) 1974.

⁴²² Studies from Turkey that rely upon Bourdieu’s analyses read it as class distinctions reflecting cultural distinctions. Yet they offer no explanation on how Turkey’s poorer segments can identify with conservative rich segments (see Aksu Bora, *Kadınların Sınıfı*, 2010).

remained unwilling and/or incapable of confronting rural socioeconomic structures. The DP, which gathered the support of resentful rural notables in the 1940s as well as a considerable portion of the CHP's large landlords, could capitalize on the CHP's hegemonic failure. The DP did not need to spread a distinct political consciousness. It was no revolutionary party but a continuation of the CHP; it did not need to offer a new political consciousness. It did not unsettle a ruling bloc but rather altered the relations within the dominant bloc, relying upon the political support of the rural and urban masses who were disgruntled against the CHP for a variety of reasons.

Hegemonizing the peasantry constituted an unaccomplished aim for hegemonic and counter-hegemonic groups in Iran and Egypt too. During the Reza Shah period, rural revival and peasants' living standards constituted the most neglected areas of development.⁴²³ Reza Shah's land registration and tax policies made large landowners a class of landlords, giving them greater tutelage over the peasantry.⁴²⁴ Yet they too remained disgruntled due to Reza Shah's land confiscations.⁴²⁵ Indeed, his regime in less than a decade had lost legitimacy across all major social blocs. Deprived of any support base, the regime relied exclusively on bureaucracy, military, and court patronage.⁴²⁶ Rival hegemonic projects failed as well. The Tudeh failed to connect with the peasantry, except for Azeri peasants.⁴²⁷ Even Mosaddeq's hegemony was largely an urban phenomenon.⁴²⁸ The ulama gained popular influence during the Reza Shah era but had no meaningful contact with the peasantry.⁴²⁹ Indeed, in popular

⁴²³ Keddie, Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 97.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁴²⁵ Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran*, 2010, 251.

⁴²⁶ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 136.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 377 and 382.

⁴²⁸ See Hegland, *Days of Revolution*, 2014, 52 and 58.

⁴²⁹ Zirinsky, "Riza Shah's Abrogation of Capitulations," *1927-1928*, 2003, 88; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 83-84.

rural imagination, the ulama remained associated with moneygrubbing, deception, and exploitation.⁴³⁰

Egypt's Wafd, like the CHP, sought organic unity among the nation through solidarist narratives and corporatist policies. The nation, as defined by the Wafd, was a combination of groups whose purpose was to achieve and maintain independence.⁴³¹ The Wafd sought to take workers – through affiliated unions – and peasants – through affiliated village-heads – under its tutelage.⁴³² The Wafd secured the peasantry's political support but failed to improve their living standards or pass a land reform law, as well as to spread a distinct political consciousness. Musa observed that the greatest failure of the 1919 revolution and the regime afterward was to reach out to the *fellah*.⁴³³ Counter-hegemonic streams fared similarly. By the 1940s, led by *effendis*, they enjoyed multiclass support bases.⁴³⁴ The *effendis* fared well in appealing to the urban strata of workers, artisans, shop-owners, and students.⁴³⁵ Despite major attempts and pro-peasant narratives, they were less successful in appealing to the peasantry.⁴³⁶

“Spreading consciousness” to the peasantry under a hegemonizing narrative has been the universal failure of all political traditions in the early twentieth century Middle East. It also was the weakest link of the Kemalist hegemonic project. Masses, especially in villages, remained distanced from intellectuals and detached from the state. Turkey's critical

⁴³⁰ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 352.

⁴³¹ Botman, *Egypt from Independence to Revolution: 1919-1952*, 1991, 32.

⁴³² Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 396.

⁴³³ Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 202-203.

⁴³⁴ Ryzova (in *The Age of the Efendiyya*, 2014, 255) stresses that these forces ought to be understood not in isolation from each other, but rather as social and protest movements in the context of the failures of a regime that failed to deliver its promises. They all catered to the same audience, young and articulate effendi males, while hoping to reach out to workers and peasants.

⁴³⁵ Botman, *The Liberal Age, 1923-1952*, 2008, 300 and Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991, 358.

⁴³⁶ See Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 396.

intellectuals pointed out that the real problem was neither space nor value systems, but the CHP's refusal to address class distinctions. They would argue that the alienation of the masses from the government has not been a consequence of Center-led modernization. That was because the government compromised its peopleist promises to faulty alliances.

D. Conclusion

Hegemony in the context of regime legitimacy was an issue that preoccupied Middle Eastern progressive intellectuals' minds throughout the twentieth century, although under different names. This chapter analyzed their narratives on hegemony in the context of regime legitimacy and offered a critical avenue for rethinking Mardin's Center-Periphery paradigm. Progressive narratives understood regime hegemony as a process of multilayered and multifaceted alliances and conflicts. They were made by multiple social divisions such as urban vs. rural, military-bureaucratic segment vs. rural notables, intellectuals vs. people, and rich vs. poor. The intellectuals who are at the center of this research were active agents of these counter-hegemonic struggles. Personal experiences with the state often informed their narratives. This research has certain limitations for it relies solely on progressive intellectual narratives. There are, of course, broader avenues into the question of hegemony building in general and the nature of Kemalist hegemony in particular. A natural limitation is that intellectuals belonged to a social bloc distinct from the broader populace and their reflections were also informed by their *Weltanschauung*.

In progressive narratives, a hegemonic regime had to monopolize state power by resolving the preceding crisis and relying upon a historic bloc as its key constituency. It had

to resolve national contradictions by eradicating class and status distinctions, or at least preventing such distinctions to overwhelm national interests. Finally, and most importantly, it had to spread a distinct political consciousness, which the masses would only embrace if the state could expand its ethical regime. Hegemony in Turkey and the Middle Eastern in the early-to-mid twentieth century was a complex process of multifaceted relations, involving several multilayered social blocs. These processes corresponded to a regime's relations to 1) its key constituency, whose intellectuals helped form a novel *Weltanschauung* and a new basis of consent; 2) allied groups which Gramsci identified as subalterns and possess distinct capitals, as well as capacity to compete over political capital and thereby alter the nature of the regime; and 3) antagonistic and/or repressed blocs and political groups, which Gramsci identified as the subordinates. Nationalists' ultimate hegemonic project, for Kemalists the "unity of fate" of a classless populace, was to make an ideology common sense, appearing almost apolitical in the eyes of allied groups within the governing bloc (subalterns), and even the antagonist groups within the opposite bloc (subordinates). Maintaining hegemony required both "domination" and "intellectual and moral leadership," targeted towards antagonistic and allied groups respectively.⁴³⁷ The nature of a regime for Turkish progressive intellectuals was dependent upon the social blocs upon which the regime relied. The universal progressive argument on a political regime's legitimacy and its nature could be simplified as such: a regime either relied upon the people or the elite; and a regime that relied upon the elite was bound to be regressive, despite its original nature or promises.

A critical reading of Mardin's Center-Periphery Paradigm, informed by progressive articulations on the social blocs that made the Kemalist establishment, offers insights on

⁴³⁷ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 56.

Kemalism's hegemonic project and the rural notables' gradual integration into the regime. This means reading the Center-Periphery Paradigm as an intra-elite distinction of alliances and confrontations, while positioning both blocs distinct from the broader populace. Unlike Mardin, progressive intellectuals saw the alliance as the main dynamic, which had emerged during the Liberation War and later institutionalized in the CHP. They identified this alliance behind the CHP's crumbling into conservatism in the 1930s and 1940s, becoming a party of not the people but a small number of rural and urban elites.

In the current context, with an urban-rural demographic ratio of 93-7 and unprecedented state centralization, the Center-Periphery paradigm may no longer be valid. But the paradigm continues to maintain intellectual and political relevance. As late as the 2010s, Turkish intellectuals who belonged to different ideological spectrums relied on Mardin's paradigm to understand the AKP's rise. In today's Turkey, former peasants are in power – or sons of rural migrants, many of whom not are notables of any scale, although many AKP leaders also came from elite backgrounds. Rural-to-urban migrants of recent decades still constitute the AKP's key constituency. This might have validated the reading of the Center-Periphery paradigm as an elite-people distinction, if only former “people” did not only become elites but also elitists. This was a predicament that had dominated the minds of Turkish intellectuals of all spectrums since the Young Turks came to power in 1908: how could such charismatic leaders, who came of the people, forge such elitist and even autocratic regimes? Their answer often was the same: “men of the people” – or Caesars in Gramscian terms – after rising to power chose to align their interests not with the people, but with the alienated elite; and in time, they became captive to those elites, sidelining their earlier revolutionary promises.

IV. Independence in Turkish and Middle Eastern Progressive Political Thought: State Sovereignty, National Sovereignty, and Development

Independence has dominated political narratives globally for most of the twentieth century. In Turkey and the broader Middle East, diverse political traditions – hegemonic or counter-hegemonic – developed their distinctive articulations on independence. Despite its centrality in political narratives for every major ideology, however, independence has been an underexamined concept. Extant studies of Turkey’s progressive political streams often pay insufficient attention to political thought in their focus on political confrontations or strategies.⁴³⁸ This chapter analyzes Turkish progressive revolutionary thought on independence in relation to comparable ideologies in Egypt and Iran from 1930 to 1960 by studying how progressive intellectuals articulated on this concept in complex and sometimes highly problematic ways. The chapter further investigates how social structures and political institutions influence ideological formations. It asks: how did progressive political intellectuals understand the concept of independence and how did these understandings transform over time? The key argument is that independence had been the foundational pillar of Turkish (and Middle Eastern) progressive political thought, the *raison d’être* of politics. The chapter also shows that progressive intellectuals conceptualized independence as a multidimensional concept, which they analyzed through the lenses of state sovereignty, national sovereignty, and development. Thereby, independence was also related to questions

⁴³⁸ Notable studies that focus on progressive political thought are Bora, *Cereyanlar*, 2017; Şener, *Türkiye Solunda Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset: Yön, Mdd ve Tıp*, 2015; Birkan, *Dünya ile Devlet Arasında Türk Muharriri 1930-1960*. 2018.

like political theory, modernization, nationalism, identity (ethnic, gender, and religious), class, and democracy.

This chapter deals with hegemony, particularly within the ideological realm. Claiming part in ideological hegemonic processes necessitated intellectual capital. This belonged primarily to state actors, who, as Bourdieu stresses, have privileged access to symbolic power, and secondarily to intellectuals, who, as Gramsci stresses, play a major role in hegemonic processes by promoting or challenging the dominant ideology. Nationalism has been the hegemonic ideology in the Middle East, which explains the centrality of independence in political narratives. The definition of an ideology is a process, shaped by intellectual hegemonic struggles. Precisely because of its hegemonic position, the definition of nationalism has been the primary hegemonic contestation, participated by all ideologies, including philosophically anti-nationalist ideologies like Islamism and socialism. As such, nationalism took many forms (anticommunist, antifascist, secular, religious, egalitarian, elitist, constitutional, fascist, racist, progressive, etc.). Kemalism had been the hegemonic interpretation of Turkish nationalism; but how to define Kemalism also remained central to Turkey's hegemonic confrontations, especially after Atatürk's death in 1938. All definitions of the nation excluded some social blocs within the population, and thereby, all nationalisms promoted either assimilative transformation or annihilation of the excluded blocs.

Defining nationalism also necessitated promoting a distinct intellectual narrative regarding independence. Progressives of national liberation and socialist traditions pointed towards a gradual deterioration of Turkey's independence in all relevant meanings since the mid-1940s, which also corresponded to the unmaking of the Kemalist revolutions. This resulted in an ideological merge of socialist and national liberation schools, increasingly in the late 1950s.

Veteran and young socialists came to see Kemalism as a last line of defense against counterrevolutionary reaction. Meanwhile, national liberation intellectuals, who defined their political positions as Kemalism, produced socialistic interpretations of it. Yet both schools also produced counternarratives that clashed with the Kemalist establishment's practices and exposed the gap between narrative and reality, especially regarding national sovereignty and development.

This chapter is divided into three parts. Part I analyzes how progressive revolutionaries understood state sovereignty, which they built upon earlier Kemalist articulations, and traces the evolution of these understandings towards anti-imperialism. Part II analyzes progressive revolutionary narratives on national sovereignty, which were informed by critical observations of Kemalist practices and the transition to multiparty politics, and traces how they evolved towards anti-fascist nationalism. It also shows how anti-fascism constituted the core of progressive articulations on democracy. Part III analyzes progressive understandings on development, which corresponded to economic sovereignty. Progressive developmentalism prioritized capability raising (especially of the peasantry) and promoted a mixed approach that combined top-down and bottom-up strategies. Each part also compares Turkish progressive narratives with their Iranian and Egyptian counterparts, which allows analyzing the influence of social structures and political institutions on ideological formations.

A. State Sovereignty

State sovereignty has constituted the starting point of independence narratives. This section analyzes how progressives built their independence narratives with regards to state

sovereignty. Independence narratives among Turkish intellectuals originated during the crisis-ridden period from the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 to the Kemalist Revolutions in the 1920s. The making and popularizing of Turkish nationalism occurred simultaneously with intellectual fears over the nation's survival.⁴³⁹ Progressive revolutionaries found their starting point on independence in Kemalist theses. Kemalists, meanwhile, had their ideological origins in the Young Turk movement. State sovereignty constituted the Kemalists' greatest concern.⁴⁴⁰ Progressive revolutionaries agreed with the prioritization of state sovereignty. This was true both for national liberation intellectuals, who could occasionally secure prominent positions within state bureaucracy during the single-party period, and socialist intellectuals, who faced persecution throughout the republican era. This section shows how progressive intellectuals built their ideas on state sovereignty upon Kemalist theses – in critical yet sometimes highly problematic ways – and carried them into a radical conclusion: anti-imperialism. Moreover, progressive intellectuals reproduced Kemalist narratives in their criticisms of Turkey's political establishment in the 1940s against İnönü's presidency and the 1950s against the DP government. Relying upon Kemalist narratives, they depicted a gradual deterioration of Turkey's state sovereignty.

Independence for Kemalists was a two-pillar struggle, defined internally against the institutions of caliphate and sultanate and externally against political-economic domination and encroachment of Western powers. For progressives, this conceptualization must also

⁴³⁹ The climax points of 'nationalist awakening' were the occupation of Izmir by Greek forces, with support from the allied forces, and the royal Caliphate Army (*Hilafet Ordusu*) which was sent to crush the nationalist liberation movement. See Adivar, *Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihani: İstiklal Savaşı Hatıraları*, (1928) 2007; Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal İkinci Cilt 1919-1923*, (1964) 2005; Sertel, "Son Dua," 1919.

"Nation" of course was an imagined entity at this point yet to be constructed out of Turkish-speaking Muslims of Anatolia. On this, see Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 1991.

⁴⁴⁰ See Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 211; Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 112.

target affiliated social blocs: feudal remnants of the imperial order and the non-Muslim comprador bourgeoisie attached to Western powers.⁴⁴¹ Kemalist revolutions envisioned gradual and assimilative transformations of social blocs affiliated with these structures towards nationalization. Progressive intellectuals agreed with the Kemalists that any meaningful societal change had to begin at the political level by establishing the supremacy of the national state against these forces. They identified the War of Liberation, the proclamation of the republic, and the Lausanne Treaty as milestones for establishing state sovereignty in the hands of nationalists. Informed by these experiences, progressive intellectuals conceptualized liberation as a necessarily armed affair, arguing that there could be no peaceful resolution with imperialism.⁴⁴² These struggles, progressives argued, resolved all major obstacles before state sovereignty: border discords, Western interference in domestic affairs (especially with regards to Christian minorities), capitulations and concessions (and the dual court system that granted privileges to foreign and native Christian merchants), and political-diplomatic equality with Western powers.⁴⁴³ Most progressive intellectuals also went beyond the Kemalist theses and called for the annihilation of bourgeoisie and landlords. These “parasite classes” that survived the Ottoman Empire were a constant threat to the state’s sovereignty.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴¹ See Aydemir, “İnkılap Heyecanı,” 1932, 5-6; Aydemir, “İnkılap Neslinin Şarkısı,” 1933, 9; Avcıoğlu, “Din veya Devrim Meselesi,” 1957; Nazım [Orhan Selim], “Kurtuluş,” (1930) 1987, 176; Nazım [Orhan Selim], “Kuva-yı İnzibatiye,” (1936) 1987, 201; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “Negüs’ün Protestosu,” (1937) 1992, 44; Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye’de Kapitalizm’in Gelişimi*, 1965, 10.

⁴⁴² Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 138 and Aydemir, “Hüseyin Cahit Bey Öncü!” 1934. Adıvar (in *Hindistan’a Dair*, (1937) 2014, 28) argued that while strong nations could occupy a country using solely economic means, a nation that desired independence was compelled to shed blood to earn it. Similarly, Nazım in his poem *İstiklal* (Independence), which was on Egypt’s liberation struggle, wrote “a nation cannot be deemed alive if it does not know to die for its homeland.” See Nazım, “İstiklal,” (1956) 2008.

⁴⁴³ Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 143; Adıvar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt, 1884 – 1938*, (1966) 1993, 247; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “Kapitülasyonların Mirasları,” (1937) 1992; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 115.

⁴⁴⁴ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019.

Progressive intellectuals thought of societal problems in terms of contradictions and how to resolve them. They generally identified two meta-contradictions that were hierarchically superior to other societal contradictions: one among nations externally and one among classes internally.⁴⁴⁵ Adıvar, the most conservative intellectual within the progressive camp, argued that “the struggle between classes and nations would continue until the equality in people’s dignity and rights are recognized.”⁴⁴⁶ Progressive analyses often paid greater emphasis on external contradictions. Aydemir saw national liberation as the antitheses of imperialism globally and capitalism domestically.⁴⁴⁷ He attributed a leading position to Turkey in rapidly globalizing liberation movements. To Aydemir, their fates were interconnected, which meant that Turkey’s independence was conditional upon other anti-imperialist triumphs.⁴⁴⁸ Seeing a divided world between industrialized colonizers and under-industrialized semi-colonies and colonies, Aydemir argued that national liberation struggles were to transform the so-called Eastern Question from the colonization of the East by the West to the East’s political-economic independence and modernization, won against the West.⁴⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the rise of fascism and the prospect of a second war in the 1930s shaped socialists’ independence thinking.⁴⁵⁰ Kırılcımlı, the harshest critique of Kemalism within the

⁴⁴⁵ Aydemir, “Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi: 2) Marksizm,” 1933; Boran, “Sosyoloji Işığında: Harpten Sonra Faşizm,” (1945) 2010; Boran, “Dünyanın Gidişi,” (1941) 2010.

⁴⁴⁶ Adıvar, *Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı*, (1928) 2007, 152.

For Adıvar’s conservatism, see Boran, “Halide Edib’in Yeni Romanları,” (1941) 2010.

⁴⁴⁷ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 111-113 and 190.

⁴⁴⁸ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 139-141

Contrary to Aydemir’s agitations, the political establishment had no interest in spreading anti-imperialism abroad. Toprak (in *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 230) argues that Atatürk was cautious against the third-worldist, anti-imperialist discourses of the Kadro movement. Anti-imperialism was useful during the War of Liberation but in the 1930s, Turkey was in no position to spread a global revolution. Moreover, the anti-imperialist foreign policy stance was risky in the changing global order.

⁴⁴⁹ Aydemir, *Cihan İktisadiyatında Türkiye*, 1931, 3.

⁴⁵⁰ Nazım, *Alman Faşizmi ve Irkçılığı*, (1936) 1987. For a notable example of Nazım’s anti-imperialist and anti-fascist works in the 1930s, see Nazım, *Taranta-Babu’ya Mektuplar* (1935) 2008 and Nazım, *Benerci Kendini Niçin Öldürdü* (1932) 2008.

progressive camp, understood it as an anti-imperialist movement that sustained a stably independent Turkey.⁴⁵¹ Sertel overlapped with Aydemir when she argued that national liberation struggles were to make any imperialist order unsustainable (Nazi or British).⁴⁵² Struggles among imperialist powers, however, challenged small nations, forcing them to a buffer state position.⁴⁵³ Small nations could maintain their independence only by pursuing a coordinated (if not confederated) anti-imperialist foreign policy.⁴⁵⁴ Progressives generally argued that state sovereignty was conditional upon anti-imperialist foreign policy.

Kemalists' anti-imperialist triumphs in the 1920s, militarily and diplomatically, enabled them to build a sovereign state apparatus, for which the republican establishment enjoyed exceptional credit from progressive intellectuals. Intellectuals wholeheartedly shared the regime's concern over state sovereignty and many progressives conceptualized diverse issues such as communitarian duty, ethnicity, gender, and religion in relation to it. Intellectuals recognized the total mobilization necessary for a liberation struggle (and maintaining independence afterwards), including effective leadership, national unity, consensual mobilization of the public, and above all, self-sacrifice for the cause.⁴⁵⁵ Ziya Gökalp, who is

For Nazım's newspaper articles on imperialism and fascism in culture and media, which he wrote under different pennames, see: See Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Açık Bacak ve Emperyalizm Propagandası," (1935) 1991; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Foks Jurnal," (1937) 1992; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Bir Daha Foks Jurnal," (1937) 1992; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Bu Kepazelik Tekrar Etmemeli," (1936) 1987; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Amerika Vaşileri," (1935) 1991; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Bir İnce Mesele," (1935) 1991; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Tepetaklak Hakikatler," (1936) 1987; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Ulus'un Bir Makalesi ve Anadolu Ajansı," (1936) 1987.

⁴⁵¹ Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 8: Yedek Güç: Milliyet (Doğu)*, 1933, 195; Kıvılcımlı, *Demokrasi Türkiye Ekonomi Politikası*, 1937.

⁴⁵² Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*, (1944) 2010, 190; Sertel, "Dünyanın İçinde Bulunduğu Buhran," 1943; Sertel, "Milli Kurtuluş Hareketleri," 1941.

⁴⁵³ Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*, (1944) 2010, 186

For Sertel's writings on the impossibility of peace and independence under an imperialist order, see Sertel, "Üçüncü Bir Harbin Çıkmasını Önlemek Mümkün Mü?" 1943; Sertel, "Küçük Milletlerin İstiklali Nasıl Kurtulabilir?" 1941; Sertel, "Harp Karşısında Küçük Milletler," 1941; Sertel, "Küçük Milletlerin İstiklali Nasıl Emniyet Altına Alınabilir," 1941.

⁴⁵⁴ Sertel in the 1940s promoted the idea of a Balkan confederation against Great Power competition in the region. See Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*, (1944) 2010, 232.

⁴⁵⁵ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 167.

acclaimed as the ideological father of Turkish nationalism, expressed this sentiment: “there is no individual, but community; there is no right, but duty.”⁴⁵⁶ Adıvar’s characters in many of her nationalist novels, who sacrificed their feelings for an individual for their duty to the nation, embodied this dictum.⁴⁵⁷ Aydemir’s works from the 1930s reflected a heavy emphasis on communitarian duty to the revolution without much concern for citizenship rights.⁴⁵⁸

Among national liberation intellectuals, Tonguç had most severe reservations about putting additional duties upon the peasantry that was already impoverished.⁴⁵⁹ Regardless, restricted state resources forced him to rely upon unpaid peasant labor for the construction of schools in the villages.⁴⁶⁰ Emphasis on communitarian duty (both for national liberation and socialist revolution) was common among socialists too. Nazım’s *National Forces Epic* depicted how liberation was made possible by the sacrifices of ordinary people.⁴⁶¹

The emphasis on state sovereignty led progressives to articulate identity blocs (gender, ethnic, or religious) either as subaltern partners to be coopted by the greater cause (nationalist or socialist) or obstacles to be subordinated. Intellectuals like Adıvar and Sertel argued that women’s contributions to liberation struggles justified their egalitarian demands.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁶ Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924)

⁴⁵⁷ See Adıvar, *Ateşten Gömlek* (1922) 2007 and Adıvar, *Vurun Kahpeye* (1926) 2007.

⁴⁵⁸ See Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968

⁴⁵⁹ Modern state worked for its peasants, Tonguç argued, not the other way around. See Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, 1946, 95-96.

⁴⁶⁰ See Tonguç, “Köylerde Okul Binaları İnşaatı,” (1939) 1997.

Younger intellectuals like Avcıoğlu and Baykurt were aware of the discontent it raised among the peasants, but they often argued that restricted state resources necessitated relying upon the organized labor of the peasantry. See Baykurt, “Sağlık Olsun,” (1960) 1974; Baykurt, “İki Okul,” (1959) 1974; Avcıoğlu, “Köy Enstitüleri,” 1957.

⁴⁶¹ Nazım, *Kuvayı Milliye*, (1941) 2008.

⁴⁶² See Adıvar, *Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihanı*, (1928) 2007 and Adıvar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 252-256; Sertel, “Türk Kadınlığının Terakkisi,” (1919) 2019; Sertel, “Kız Darülfünunu Meselesi,” (1919) 2019; Sertel, “Kadınlara Çalışma Hakkı,” (1919) 2019; Sertel, “Türk Feminizmi,” (1919) 2019; Sertel, “Kadınlık ve Seçimler,” (1919) 2019; Sertel, “İstiklal Mücadelesinde Türk Kadını,” 1941.

For secondary sources, see Arat, “Contestation and Collaboration,” 2008, 391 and Metinsoy, “The Limits of Feminism in Muslim-Turkish Women Writers of the Armistice Period (1918-1923),” 2013, 85.

Intellectuals generally saw a direct correlation between progress (in its generic meaning) and progress in women's societal status.⁴⁶³ Yet progressive agitations on women's emancipation had limits, which for national liberation intellectuals often was Kemalist state feminism that promoted an educated, virtuous, and hard-working republican woman tasked with raising patriotic males.⁴⁶⁴ For Adivar, serving her nation was every woman's duty.⁴⁶⁵ She did not problematize how the republican regime marginalized feminist activists who stepped outside the boundaries.⁴⁶⁶ Adivar created many of the republican gender discourses in her early works.⁴⁶⁷ A key feature of her works *Beat the Bitch*, *New Turan*, and *Shirt of Fire* was heroines, depicted in a genderless way, sacrificing their personal wishes for a greater cause.⁴⁶⁸ Socialists, meanwhile, exposed the shortcomings of republican gender policies, especially with regards to working women.⁴⁶⁹ They problematized the gap between women's legal rights and their capacity to exercise them and popularized taboo subjects like traditions, harassment, violence, rape, and child abuse.⁴⁷⁰ Yet socialists also overlapped with national

⁴⁶³ To Adivar, women's status was the measurement of the nation's overall progress. To Aydemir and Tonguç, any progress that excluded women was simply incomplete. See Adivar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 74; Aydemir, *Toprak Uyanırsa*, (1963) 2012, 414; and Tonguç, *Mektuplarla Köy Enstitüsü Yılları*, (1941) 1979, 36.

⁴⁶⁴ On state feminism, see Kandiyoti, *Cariyeler Bacılar Yurttaşlar*, 1997, 167; Zihinoğlu, *Kadınsız İnkılap*, 2016, 105; Sancar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti*, 2012, 17-22.

⁴⁶⁵ Adivar, *Hindistan'a Dair*, (1937) 2014, 60.

She also praised the republican regime for being the first Turkish government to recognize women's duty to serve Adivar, "İngiliz Kadın Hapishanesinde Gördüklerim," (1936) 2017, 177.

⁴⁶⁶ Significantly, marginalized feminists, the most notable one being Nezihe Muhiddin, also continued to praise the regime's progressive stance on gender within a nationalist framework, despite their personal experiences See Libal, "Staging Turkish Women's Emancipation," 2008, 43

⁴⁶⁷ See for example Adivar, "Kadınlığa Dair," (1919) 2017, 93; Adivar, "Fesler, Çarşafklar," (1919) 2017, 108; Adivar, "Türk Kadınları Hakkında," (1919) 2017.

⁴⁶⁸ Adivar, *Vurun Kahpeye* (1926) 2007; Adivar, *Ateşten Gömlek* (1922) 2007; Adivar, *Yeni Turan*, (1912) 2019.

⁴⁶⁹ Socialists problematized the dual exploitation women suffered at work and home.

See for example Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Yol Vergisi ve Kadınlar," (1936) 1986; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Kadınlık İçin," (1935) 1991; Sertel, "Kadınlar Siyasete Girerse," (1930); Sertel, "Mebus Bayanlar Niye Bağırıyor sunuz," (1936); Kıvılcımlı, "Kadın Sosyal Sınıfımız," (????) 2009.

⁴⁷⁰ Sertel, "Görüşler: İnkılap Zihniyeti," 1937; O. Kemal, "El Kapısı," (1954) 2007; O. Kemal, *Cemile*, (1952) 1980.

liberation perspectives on 1) producing normative gendered expectations, especially with regards to motherhood;⁴⁷¹ and 2) subjugating the gender contradiction to class and international contradictions.⁴⁷² Progressives of both schools wanted to incorporate women's struggle in a subaltern position.⁴⁷³

Ethnic minorities posed more complex ideological challenges to nationalism than gender. Progressives shared the republican regime's ideal of national unity but disagreed with its practices.⁴⁷⁴ This was unsurprising for national liberation intellectuals; but socialists too were nationalists first and internationalists second, indeed considering being national as the gateway to being international.⁴⁷⁵ Progressive intellectuals' articulations on ethnic minorities were based upon their relations to imperialism. They developed distinct understandings regarding non-Muslim minorities (and its comprador bourgeois leadership) and the Kurdish minority (and its feudal leadership). Progressive intellectuals of both schools distanced class from ethnicity and focused their attacks on elite echelons.⁴⁷⁶ Socialist intellectuals were

⁴⁷¹ This was despite socialists' insistence that there should be no distinction in moral expectations from men and women. Generally, socialists evaluated men and women through a class filter and expected their behavior and appearance to fit a normative proletarian outlook. The standards, however, were different for men and women. Although men who looked or behaved "bourgeois" would face criticisms in socialist circles, women's "bourgeois" attitudes would be considered a graver danger that could cause social corruption. See Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Çok Boyanıyorsun Kadınım," (1934) 1991; Nazım, [Orhan Selim], "Çok Açılıyorsun Kadınım," (1934) 1991; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Ana," (1934) 1991.

⁴⁷² See Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Feministlik," (1935) 1991; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Beynelmillel Kadınlar Günü," (1937) 1992; Sertel, "Yanlış Yolda Giden Bir Feminizm," 1935.

Sertel's argument here is notable as she wrote 'The making of women's social status is the result of society's historical evolution. What coerces and enslaves women are not the men but the society. Women can guard their rights not with women's organizations but by uniting with other coerced individuals. For the liberation of women, we need to build our defense and assault not at superstructure but structure.'

⁴⁷³ This was an overarching paradigm for socialism, affecting global, regional, and national levels. For the global origins of this thought through an analysis of Clara Zetkin's political thought, see Boxer, "Rethinking the Socialist Construction and International Career of the Concept Bourgeois Feminism," 2007.

⁴⁷⁴ Sertel, "Görüşler: Cumhuriyetimizin Karakteristikleri," 1940; Sertel, "Muhtekirler Milli Emniyeti Bozuyor," 1941; Nazım, "Yurtsever Aydınlarımıza Düşen Önemli Ödevlerden Biri," (1959) 2002; Kemal, "Vukuat Var Tefrikası ile İlgili Not," (1954) 2007, 149.

⁴⁷⁵ See for example Orhan Kemal's letter in Otyam, *Arkadaşım Orhan Kemal ve Mektupları*, 1975, 235; Kemal, "Kısa Kısa," (1970) 2007, 355; and Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1477-1478.

⁴⁷⁶ Adıvar and Aydemir acknowledged that most non-Muslims were not at all different from average Turks See Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, (1959) 1971, 390-391; Adıvar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, (1955) 2007, 254.

particularly concerned over the anti-Semitic surge in the 1930s' Europe, which spread rapidly among Turkey's fascist and Islamist intellectuals.⁴⁷⁷ Increasing visibility of reactionary intellectuals among the CHP's ranks led most socialists, including Nazım, Sertel, and Kemal since the 1940s to retrospectively reinterpret Atatürk's nationalism as anti-racist and anti-Islamist.⁴⁷⁸ Progressives directed their criticisms towards cosmopolitanism, which also included Istanbul's Muslim bourgeoisie.⁴⁷⁹ Most progressives agreed on the cosmopolitan (and therefore anti-national) character of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie as well as their attachment to imperialist capital through commercial relations.⁴⁸⁰ For Sertel, minority capitalists were agents to foreign capital.⁴⁸¹ Kıvılcımlı in 1960 pointed to the failure of republican nationalism because native Christians, who were representatives of foreign

⁴⁷⁷ For some examples socialists' anti-racist writings from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, see Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "İğneli Fıçı," (1937) 1992; Nazım, "Vur Abalıya," (1935) 1991; Nazım, *Alman Faşizmi ve Irkçılığı* (1936) 1987; Sertel, "Yahudi Düşmanlığı Kavgası," 1937; Sertel, "Satılık Ülke," 1941, O. Kemal, "Dünyada Harp Vardı," (1944) 2005; O. Kemal, "Nurettin Şadan Bey," (1944) 2007.

⁴⁷⁸ For socialists' defense of Atatürk's nationalism, see Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 181; Kemal, "Sanat ve Politika," (1965) 2007; Nazım, "Kore Harbi ve Yobazlar Hakkında: Yeşil Sancak – Kara Kuvvet No.2," (1959) 2002.

⁴⁷⁹ Adıvar often depicted the richest, cosmopolitan echelons of Istanbul as over-Westernized elites, alienated from their nation. In her memoir, she recalled her criticisms against educated Turkish women who remained detached from political matters (*Mor Salkımlı Ev* (1955) 2007, 207). In *Yeni Turan* ((1912) 2019, 127), she depicted Istanbul's cosmopolitan women as "nationless, jobless, aimless, embellished puppets." This was not Adıvar's only novel sharply critical of Istanbul's cosmopolitan segments. The same theme appears in *Handan* (1912) 2019, *Ateşten Gömlek* (1922) 2007, and her other memoir *Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihanı*, (1928) 2007. Aydemir's articles in *Kadro* sharply attacked Istanbul's liberal intellectuals, describing them as the remnants of Ottoman cosmopolitanism, followers of nineteenth-century European liberalism that had lost its hegemony against national liberationism. See Aydemir, "İnkılab Bitti Mi," 1932; Aydemir, "Yarı Münevverler Klübü," 1932; Aydemir, "Polemik: Bergsonizm Yahut Bir Korkunun Felsefi İfadesi," 1932; Aydemir, "Polemik: Milli Kurtuluş Hareketleri Hakkında Bizim Tezimiz," 1932; Aydemir, "Darülfünun: İnkılab Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığına Karşı," 1933; Aydemir, "Don Kişot'un Yeldeğirmenleri ile Muharebesine, Kürsü Politikacılığına ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığına Karşı," 1933; Aydemir, "İnkılabın İdeolojisi: İnkılab Kürsülerinde İnkılab İlmileşmelidir," 1934; Aydemir, "Polemik: Büyük Meclis ve İnkılab," 1934. Among the socialists, Nazım in his newspaper articles targeted those segments. See Nazım, "Ecebi Murebbiyeler," [Adsız Yazıcı] (1937) 1992. Another example among the socialist authors was Suat Derviş in her iconic *Çılgın Gibi* (1945) 2015.

⁴⁸⁰ Sertel, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi," (1944) 2010; Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizm'in Gelişimi*, 1965; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008.

⁴⁸¹ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 19; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 38.

companies (especially in wholesale, industries, and banks), still controlled Turkey's economy.⁴⁸²

Progressives also overlapped with the republican establishment in their assessments of Kurdish leadership as reactionary and feudal. They universally considered the Sheik Said revolt of 1925 as a reactionary insurgency aligned with the British.⁴⁸³ Most progressives also overlapped with the regime's modernizing and orientalist narrative, depicting the Kurdish minority as a reactionary bloc to be corrected with science and modernity.⁴⁸⁴ Adıvar's *Zeyno's Son* depicted the Kurds as wild people, devastated by smuggling, raids, banditry, and conflicts.⁴⁸⁵ Progressives generally objected administrative or military solutions to the Kurdish question and promoted 1) liquidating landlord, tribal, and sheikh leaderships, 2) distributing land to the peasantry, and 3) region-wide education network.⁴⁸⁶ In contrast, the republican establishment, especially after the advent of the multiparty regime, sought incorporating traditional leadership for their electoral potentials.⁴⁸⁷ The republican establishment heavily repressed the Kurdish identity. Many progressives including socialists like Sertel shared the republican nationalism that disregarded a separate Kurdish identity,

⁴⁸² Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz: Milli Birlik Komitesi'ne İki Açık Mektup*, (1960) 2008, 35.

⁴⁸³ See Avcıoğlu, *31 Mart'ta Yabancı Parmağı*, (1969) 1998. Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 8: Yedek Güç: Milliyet (Doğu)*, (1933) 1978.

For secondary sources on the Sheikh Said revolt, see Bruinessen, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*, 1992, 442; Kirişçi and Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu, Kökeni ve Gelişimi*, 1997, 118; Üngör, *Modern Türkiye'nin İnşası*, 2016, 216-217; Bozarıslan, "Kurds and the Turkish State," 2008, 341; Yeğen, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse," 1999.

⁴⁸⁴ Aydemir, "Polemik: Derebeyi ve Dersim," 1932, 43-45; Nazım, *Yaşamak Güzel Şey Be Kardeşim*, (1963) 1987, 20; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 94; Tonguç, "Atatürk Üniversitesi," (1959) 2000.

For regime discourse: Zeydanlıoğlu and İfe, "The White Turkish Man's Burden," 2008, 155-158.

⁴⁸⁵ Adıvar, *Zeyno'nun Oğlu*, (1928) 2010. In *Mor Salkımlı Ev* ((1955) 2007, 313), Adıvar depicted the Kurdish kids as honest, courageous, and just, while adding that it required a great will to handle them, as they were weak in leadership qualities, raged quickly, and were guided by their emotions. The Turkish kids, on the other hand, were easy to handle, disciplined and calm, showed high leadership qualities, and represented the peace element in the orphanage.

⁴⁸⁶ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericiilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 123; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 303-314.

⁴⁸⁷ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 317. Also see, van Bruinessen, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*, 1992, 376.

despite her awareness of racial discriminations in Europe and the US.⁴⁸⁸ In the 1930s and 1940s, socialists, even in their underground publications, showed a degree of blindness towards the Kurdish question's ethnic dimension.⁴⁸⁹ Nazım understood repressive minority policies, even in exile in the 1950s, not as a problem in itself but as a means to “sell the homeland to foreigners.”⁴⁹⁰ Kıvılcımlı elaborated on the Kurdish question in the 1930s. Parallel to socialists' attitude towards feminism, he considered the Kurdish nation a “reserve force,” a potential subaltern partner in the revolutionary camp under correct political vanguards, instead of their feudal leadership that served the imperialist powers.⁴⁹¹

Progressives articulated religion in its relation to imperialism too. Most progressives were complete secularizers politically and religion to them was a dividing line between old and new. Informed by late Ottoman and early republican experiences, progressives equated politicized religion with reaction, often at the service of imperialism.⁴⁹² Anti-clericalism entered Adıvar's, Nazım's, and Sertel's narratives in the 1910s.⁴⁹³ Younger intellectuals like Avcıoğlu saw imperialist interventions behind every Islamist insurrection in Turkey's modern history.⁴⁹⁴ There was, however, a generic distinction between national liberation and socialist schools in their perception of religion.⁴⁹⁵ National liberation intellectuals attributed

⁴⁸⁸ See Sertel, “New-York'ta Sokaklardan Esir Geçiyor,” 1937; Sertel, “Queen Mary'nin Bin Bir Yolcusu Arasında,” 1937; Sertel, “Queen Marry'de,” 1937.

⁴⁸⁹ For socialists' criticisms of the regime's Kurdish policy, see Tunçay, *Türkiye Sol Tarihine Notlar*, 2017, 259-260.

⁴⁹⁰ Nazım, “İran'ın Bağımsızlığı Üzerine Şah Rıza Pehlevi,” (1958) 2002, 57.

⁴⁹¹ Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 8: Yedek Güç: Milliyet (Doğu)*, (1933) 1978.

⁴⁹² Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 218; Tonguç, “Softalık,” (1960) 1997, 450; and Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 339.

⁴⁹³ See, Sertel, “Kadınlara Çalışma Hakkı,” (1919) 2019; Nazım, “Kara Kuvvet,” (1918) 2008; Adıvar, “Fesler, Çarşafklar,” (1919) 2017; Adıvar, “Türk Kadınları Hakkında,” (1919) 2017.

⁴⁹⁴ Avcıoğlu, *31 Mart'ta Yabancı Parmağı*, (1969) 1998, 9.

⁴⁹⁵ The exceptions to this rule are Tonguç and Kıvılcımlı. Kıvılcımlı preached ‘correct Islam’ as a historically progressive force while Tonguc claimed no knowledge over religion. See Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019; Tonguç, “Softalık,” (1960) 1997; Kıvılcımlı, *Eyüp Konuşması*, (1957) 2003; Kıvılcımlı, *Fetih ve Medeniyet*, (1953) 2020; Kıvılcımlı, *Allah – Peygamber – Kitap* (1965) 2018.

sociocultural utilitarian value to religion, claimed knowledge over it, and preached a narrative of correct Islam.⁴⁹⁶ Whereas socialist intellectuals often believed that religion had no place in a modern society beyond as a means of organized deception used by fascism and imperialism.⁴⁹⁷ Socialists accused the Kemalist establishment in the 1930s for turning a blind eye to reaction.⁴⁹⁸ As Islamism reintegrated itself to the state apparatus in the mid-1940s, Kemalist intellectuals like Aydemir and Tonguç complained that the CHP's secularizing reforms had not gone far enough.⁴⁹⁹ Younger intellectuals like Baykurt did not think of İnönü's CHP as a secular party.⁵⁰⁰ He argued in the 1950s that it was only a handful of republican teachers who defended secularism in Turkey's peripheries.⁵⁰¹ Progressive narratives since the 1950s emphasized the causation between the growing influence of religion in politics and how Turkey lost its sovereignty.

With the end of World War II, during which Turkey remained neutral, a novel theme appeared in progressive narratives: Turkey's state elites began sacrificing state sovereignty by surrendering political-economic control to an alliance of national bourgeoisie and feudal

⁴⁹⁶ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 73-75 and 200-201; Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 150; Adıvar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, (1955) 2007, 73 and Adıvar, *Hindistan'a Dair* (1937) 2014, 94; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, (1959) 1971, 111-112; Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 283.

Progressive nationalists resembled disciples of a new, secular religion, promising heaven on this earth through science, progress, and national morals. The resemblance between ideologies and religions was not lost on the progressive nationalists. See Adıvar, "Din ve İdeolojı," (1939) 2017; Aydemir, "Bir Ruh Fantezisi Yahut Yerli Peygamber," 1932.

⁴⁹⁷ See Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Bir Çin Hikayesi," (1930) 1987, 27; Nazım [Ben], "Arap Bakkal," (1931) 1987; Nazım [Adsız], "Müslüman Fashı Nefer," (1937) 1992; Nazım, "Eğitim Politikamızın İçyüzü," (1959) 2002; Boran, "Hangi Manada Milli İlim," (1943) 2010; Boran, "İlahiyat Bir İlim Değildir," (1950) 2010.

⁴⁹⁸ See Nazım, *Yaşamak Güzel Şey Be Kardeşim*, (1963) 1987, 133-135. For an implicit criticism of Nazım in the 1930s, see Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Radyo," (1930) 1987.

For socialist underground writings on Kemalism and reaction, see Tunçay, *Türkiye Sol Tarihine Notlar*, 2017, 197-198.

⁴⁹⁹ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 303; Tonguç, "Softalık," (1960) 1997, 449; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988, 175-176; Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 338-339. Also see: Avcıoğlu, "Maneviyat Peşinde," 1959.

⁵⁰⁰ Baykurt, "Deşilecek İki Yara," (1959) 1974, Baykurt, "Bulanık Seller," (1959) 1974.

⁵⁰¹ Baykurt, "Yapağıdaki Arkadaşlar," (1960) 1974; Baykurt, "Ne Kadar İleriledik," (1959) 1974.

landlords and by aligning Turkey's diplomacy with the Western camp. Progressives' prioritization of state sovereignty had been conditional. For Aydemir, "the primary mission of the state was to ensure social structures' development in accordance with social utility."⁵⁰² In Aydemir's social contract, the nation created the state as a fortress and then came to its service.⁵⁰³ Progressive members of the political establishment observed, however, that the sovereign state did not serve the nation's interests because the control over the state belonged to self-interested elite social blocs.⁵⁰⁴ The mid-1940s saw the adoption of capitalist developmentalism and the rise of a flawed democracy under the control of urban and rural notables.⁵⁰⁵ Socialists also identified the mid-1940s as the abandonment of republican revolutionism. Unlike their national liberation counterparts, they also problematized Turkey's integration into the Western camp.⁵⁰⁶ Nationalists like Aydemir considered this as a geopolitical necessity against the Soviet threat.⁵⁰⁷ Uncritical if not positive attitude towards Turkey's alliance with the Western camp was even common among younger national liberation intellectuals like Avcıoğlu in the 1950s.⁵⁰⁸ This began changing in the late 1950s, and more radically in the 1960s. Baykurt and Avcıoğlu, among others, reinterpreted

⁵⁰² Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 201.

⁵⁰³ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 193.

⁵⁰⁴ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019.

⁵⁰⁵ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt, 1884 – 1938*, (1966), 489; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 35.

⁵⁰⁶ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 340-355.

⁵⁰⁷ Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, 1973, 77-78.

Nevertheless, Aydemir was critical of Turkey's alliances because Turkish diplomats were compelled to signed alliance agreements under unequal terms. Aydemir did not categorically object to Turkey's NATO and CENTO memberships; he criticized however that no other NATO member country had their independence so restricted by bilateral agreements with the US (Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988, 331). His real criticism was that Turkey's bilateral agreements gave the US the power to determine what constituted a threat for Turkey and intervene at will, without even consulting their Turkish partners (Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988, 335). Notably, Aydemir (in *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 385-486) blames not Menderes but his foreign minister F. R. Zorlu for jeopardizing Turkey's independence. In the 1970s, he considered the progressives' demands to leave NATO unrealistic. (Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, 1973, 24).

⁵⁰⁸ Avcıoğlu, "Monroe'dan Truman'a, Truman'dan Eisenhower'e," 1957; Avcıoğlu, "Arap Milliyetçiliği," 1957; Avcıoğlu, "Orta Doğudaki Boşluk," 1957, Avcıoğlu, "NATO'nun Sekizinci Yılı," 1957.

Atatürk's nationalism as anti-imperialist and grew critical of Turkey's NATO membership in 1952 as a violation of Turkey's independence.⁵⁰⁹ National liberation position on independence gradually became aligned with the socialists' position.

Socialists utilized Kemalism's anti-imperialist and pro-peace independence narratives and sought holding the regime accountable to those narratives, especially in the 1930s and early 1940s.⁵¹⁰ Since the mid-1940s, they labeled political-economic elites as a fifth column who aligned Turkey's interests with their own and with imperialist powers.⁵¹¹ Sertel argued that Atatürk's death in 1938 emboldened the fascist cadres within the state who sought allying Turkey with Nazi Germany.⁵¹² She observed a greater postwar consensus among the state elites for allying Turkey with the US, which also repressed progressive and anti-imperialist voices.⁵¹³ She articulated the İnönü presidency as the reversal of Kemalist anti-imperialism and stressed the similarities between the Ottoman-era capitulations and Turkey's bilateral treaties with the US.⁵¹⁴ With the DP government, Sertel and other socialists argued, Turkey fully abandoned anti-imperialism and became a semi-colony at the behest of its state nobility by derailing the republican revolution and remaking the structural conditions that destructed the Ottomans.⁵¹⁵ These developments convinced socialists like Nazım and Kıvılcımlı of the

⁵⁰⁹ Baykurt, "Kerpiç Uzmanı," (1959) 1974; Avcıoğlu, "Batılı Dostların Gölgesinde Türkiye," 1959.

⁵¹⁰ Nazım, "Kuva-yı İnzibatiye," (1936) 1987; Nazım, "Birleşen Cepheler," (1937) 1992; Nazım, "İspanya'da Aksî İnkılap ve Sadri Ertem'in Bir Yazısı," (1936) 1987; Nazım, "Harpci ve Sulhçu Millet," (1936) 1987.

⁵¹¹ Nazım, "Tehlikeye karşı başarıyla savaşabilmek için onun ana sebeplerini araştırmak gerekir: Kara Kuvvet Yeşil Sancak No.4," (1959) 2002, 54; Nazım, "Cezmi Sarıkaya'nın İdris Dağlıca'ya Cevabı: Kara Kuvvet Yeşil Sancak No.5," (1959) 2002; Nazım, "Böyle Bir Kadere Rıza Göstermemeliyiz," (1959) 2002.

⁵¹² Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*, (1944) 2010, 188.

Sertel was convinced that had it not been for the USSR's victory against the Nazis in Stalingrad in 1942, Turkey would have entered the war on Germany's side (see Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 177).

Hanioglu (in "The Historical Roots of Kemalism," 2012, 36) notes that by the time of Atatürk's death, rightwing Kemalists controlled the state apparatus.

⁵¹³ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 322.

⁵¹⁴ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tefvik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 115.

⁵¹⁵ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tefvik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 20-28 and 117-119.

Also see, Nazım, "Yeşil Sancak – Kara Kuvvet No.1," (1959) 2002, 48-49.

necessity of a liberation alliance with the Kemalists, a second National Forces.⁵¹⁶ Nazım even agitated towards young officers to assume the vanguard position in overthrowing the DP; he made no such calls during Atatürk’s and İnönü’s presidencies.⁵¹⁷ To him and other socialists, the process that resulted in Turkey’s semi-colonization delegitimization of the government began with the 1940s’ CHP and finalized with the 1950s’ DP.⁵¹⁸

The comparative analysis in this section aims to explore the overlaps and divergences in politics and narratives of sovereignty. Turkish, Iranian, and Egyptian progressivisms shared many characteristics: They formulated liberation as a dual struggle against external imperialist and internal autocratic forces, both of which being backed by “parasite” social blocs. They understood the world through contradictions. International contradictions constituted the most important, followed by domestic class contradictions. Middle Eastern progressives thought of sovereignty politics in terms of unification and homogenization. In Egypt, Salama Musa argued that all socialists were absolute and radical nationalists.⁵¹⁹ In Iran, Khalil Maleki’s Third Force theory explored the prospects to resolve class and international contradictions simultaneously through broad liberation alliances while

⁵¹⁶ See Nazım, “Avni’nin Atları,” (1958) 2008; Nazım, “Tek Cephede ve Milli Kurtuluş Komitelerinde Niçin Bütün Yurtseverler İşbirliği Yapmalı,” (1958) 2002. Also see Nazım’s interview and radio speech in Budapest in 1954.

When his interviewers ask Nazım to read some of his poets, Nazım chooses to read Kuvayı Milliye’s brief part on Mustafa Kemal. Indeed, there is no pragmatic reason why he would praise Mustafa Kemal in an interview that is extremely unlikely to be circulated in Turkey. For Nazım’s interview, see Nazım, “Edebiyat Konuşmaları: Ali Karaman-György Hazai,” (1954) 1992.

⁵¹⁷ See for example Nazım, “İzmirli Teğmen,” (1959) 2008, where he called an imaginary young lieutenant to the mountains for resistance. Also see Nazım, “Eski Muharıplerin Şeref Günü,” (1959) 2002 and Nazım, “Eskişehir Milli Kurtuluş Komitesinin Subaylar Arasında Dağıttığı Beyanname Hakkında,” (1959) 2002, where Nazım called the War of Liberation veterans to organize young officers.

⁵¹⁸ Nazım did not call for a coup; his agitations towards the officers ended immediately after the 1960 coup. Immediately afterward, Nazım showed suspicion of officers’ intentions, and warned them to take lesson from Enver who despite coming of the people did not rest upon them after he took power and chose to ally himself with German imperialism (See Nazım, “Türk Subayının Faciası: Dalından Kopup Çürüyen Elma,” (1960) 2002). Within a year, he lost all hope in the officers (See Nazım, “Günün Konusu ve Yorumu,” (1961) 2002, 155).

⁵¹⁹ Like most socialists, Musa considered the question of national independence firmly linked up with anti-imperialist struggles all over the world (Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 138).

attributing greater importance to the national question.⁵²⁰ They highly valued communitarian duty. Like Adivar's nationalist novels, Dowlatbadi's *A Pitiful Tale* and al-Hakim's *The Return of the Spirit* explored the conflict of personal and patriotic love and the eventual triumph of the latter.⁵²¹ Iran's and Egypt's liberation and socialist movements consistently brought women's emancipation to the political realm but attributed secondary importance to the gender question and sought to incorporate feminism as a subaltern partner.⁵²² Ethnicity also constituted a dividing line for progressive movements. In Egypt, leftist leaders until the 1950s disproportionately came from non-Muslim, often Jewish, backgrounds, which brought additional repressions on leftist organizations, especially after 1948.⁵²³ In Iran, Azeri and Kurdish autonomy movements in the 1940s led to crises in the socialist movement, eventually splitting the Tudeh.⁵²⁴

In contrast to generic overlaps, there were also notable divergences in independence thinking. In Iran, Reza Shah monopolized state power in line with extant nationalist demands. Yet younger nationalists, as Hedayat expressed in his *Pearl Cannon*, took him as an obedient servant of the British. Hedayat criticized his bureaucratic, military, educational, and cultural reforms, which were acclaimed by earlier nationalists.⁵²⁵ In the early 1920s, Reza Khan had the backing of the progressive forces who believed that he would accelerate Iran's passage through a capitalist stage of development, a prerequisite for socialism. But in

⁵²⁰ See Katouzian, "The Strange Politics of Khalil Maleki," 2004 and Katouzian, *Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism*, 2018, 127-132

⁵²¹ For Dowlatbadi see Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men Without Beards*, 2005, 170; Al-Hakim, *Return of the Spirit* (1933), 2020.

⁵²² See Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009; Moghissi, *Populism and Feminism in Iran*, 1994; Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970*, 1988; Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*, 2011.

⁵²³ Ismael and El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988*, 1990; Beinlin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988.

⁵²⁴ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982

⁵²⁵ Hedayat, *The Pearl Cannon*, (1947) 1986.

1927, one year after his coronation, Iran's communist party labeled Reza Shah as the leader of feudalists, semi-colonialists, and comprador capitalists.⁵²⁶ When a joint invasion of the UK and the USSR (two chief antagonists for earlier nationalists) ended his reign in 1941, it created no nationalist backlash but relief and joy.⁵²⁷ The interregnum period until the 1953 coup witnessed competing narratives of independence, which by the late 1940s coalesced into two main camps around the oil nationalization question.⁵²⁸ Nationalization for most nationalists meant sovereign control over oil resources, which developed into a popular expression for dignity and independence.⁵²⁹ The Tudeh's inability to promote a viable independence narrative hampered its popularity.⁵³⁰ The party supported the USSR's oil concession demand through a narrative of positive equilibrium (granting equal concessions to the UK and the USSR) and described northern Iran as a "legitimate security perimeter for the Soviets."⁵³¹ The Tudeh's pro-Soviet leadership declined to support Mosaddeq's National Front, branding him a reactionary agent of American colonialism, until 1952.⁵³² After the CIA-led coup in 1953, Mohammad Reza Shah, who had fled the country amidst turmoil and returned only after his reign was secured by the coup, was compelled to promote an authentic

⁵²⁶ Ladjevardi, *Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran*, 1985, 18.

⁵²⁷ Katouzian, "Riza Shah's Political Legitimacy and Social Base," 2003; Katouzian, "State and Society under Reza Shah," 2004.

⁵²⁸ See Ansari's (in *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 2012) differentiation of competing nationalisms in Iran.

⁵²⁹ Siavoshi, "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1949-53," 1994, 106; Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013, 5

⁵³⁰ Several scholars who worked on the Tudeh argued that the party's biggest problem was its leadership's capitulation to the USSR, which made the party vulnerable against charges of treason and delegitimized the party even in the eyes of its leading intellectuals. See Ansari *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, 2012, 129; Matin-Asgari, "From Social Democracy to Social Democracy: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of the Iranian Left," 2004, 42; and Behrooz, *Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran*, 2000, 17-18.

⁵³¹ The general line of the Tudeh in this period was to tie in popular nationalist demands and slogans with their claims that Iran would be better off if it would sever its ties to the West and rely solely on Soviet trade and goodwill (see Keddie, *Modern Iran*, 2006, 126). For the designation of Northern Iran as the legitimate security perimeter of the USSR, see Zabih, *The Left in Contemporary Iran*, 1986, 4-5. For positive equilibrium, see Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013, 19 and Halliday, "The Iranian Left in International Perspective," 2004, 25.

⁵³² Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 322; and Siavoshi, "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1949-53," 1994, 107.

independence narrative. The monarchy, however, was delegitimized beyond repair. Iranian progressive assessments of state sovereignty in the 1950s were much more pessimistic compared to their Turkish counterparts, which offers explanations on the distinctions between their respective nativisms. Turkish progressives developed anti-American sentiments, while their Iranian counterparts additionally developed anti-Western and anti-secular tendencies.⁵³³

In Egypt, state sovereignty remained divided between the Wafd, the Khedivate, and the British. The Wafd shared the paternalism of its Turkish and Iranian counterparts, but absent of state power, it could not fully incorporate and/or repress progressive (or reactionary) politics. Albeit under repression of the court and the British administration, socialist, feminist, and oppositional Wafdists built autonomous organizations. Radical strategic paradigms like armed struggle entered Egyptian progressivism in the late 1940s.⁵³⁴ From the revolution in 1952, when Nasser initially had the support of the US and the UK, to his monopolization of state power in 1956, Nasser incorporated or subordinated the entire civil society.⁵³⁵ Egyptian nationalism was also under transformation. After the defeat in Palestine in 1948, anti-Zionism became an inseparable part of Egyptian anti-imperialism. 1952 Revolution's anti-imperialist Arab nationalism became hegemonic, replacing the 1919 Revolution's territorial and to a degree anti-Arab nationalism.⁵³⁶ Marxist intellectual Attiyah

⁵³³ See O. Kemal's differentiation between two Wests in O. Kemal, "Gene 'Bati' Üzerine," (1964) 2007. In Iran, prominent progressive intellectuals like Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati gradually came to defend an Islamic liberation ideology. See Al-e Ahmad, *Occidentosis* (1962) 1984 and Shariati, *Religion vs. Religion*, (1970) 1993. Also see Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*, 1996.

⁵³⁴ Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970*, 1988, 102.

⁵³⁵ See Beattie, *Egypt During the Nasser Years*, 1994 and Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991.

⁵³⁶ The nationalism of the 1920s was exclusively territorial. In addition, most Egyptian nationalists saw little relevance between Egypt and other Arab nations. Indeed, intellectuals such as Haykal, Musa, and al-Hakim had strong anti-Arab sentiments in the 1920s (see Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 1986, 106-107). Goldschmidt (in *Modern Egypt*, 2004, 228) stresses that prior to the 1950s, Egyptians rarely identified themselves as Arabs. By the 1940s, especially after the defeat in Palestine, pan-Arab nationalism gradually

al-Shafai defended a Nasserist national front in 1959 to unify all social categories against enemies abroad – imperialism and Zionism – and enemies within – feudalism and monopolies.⁵³⁷ Nasser’s anti-imperialism inspired many Turkish progressives like Nazım and Avcıoğlu after the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Israel, the UK, and France invaded Egypt.⁵³⁸ Aydemir, who had envisioned a global anti-imperialist role to Turkey in the 1930s, envied Egypt’s leading position in the non-aligned movement.⁵³⁹ He complained that Turkey betrayed its revolution by supporting imperialism and monarchism in the Middle East. Aydemir observed a break from non-interventionist and pro-peace Kemalist foreign policy towards adventurist yet dependent Ottoman diplomacy.⁵⁴⁰

In the Middle East in the late 1950s, the hegemonic nationalism within progressive revolutionary thought had emerged as anti-imperialism. Many progressives argued that in the Third World the class struggle became anti-imperialism because there were essentially no class struggles domestically. Yet Turkish, Egyptian, and Iranian progressives had different experiences of anti-imperialism, which offer explanations on differences in their perspectives. Iran and Egypt were occupied in the 1940s and engaged in nationalization-oriented anti-imperialist (and anti-monarchist) struggles in the early 1950s with vastly different outcomes. For a Middle Eastern anti-imperialist in the late 1950s, in terms of their relations to imperialism, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran respectively represented betrayal, hope, and failure.

gained ground against territorial nationalism. Seikaly (in *Men of Capital* 2016, 23) shows that pan-Arab nationalism was also weaker compared to territorial nationalism among the Palestinian bourgeoisie during the 1920s and 1930s.

⁵³⁷ Al-Shafai, “What Is the National United Front,” (1956) 1983. Arrested by the regime in 1959, al-Shafai died in prison in 1960 (see Abdel-Malek, *Contemporary Arab Political Thought*, 1983, 61).

⁵³⁸ Nazım, “İstiklal,” (1956) 2008; Avcıoğlu, “Pusulatsız Gemi,” 1958.

⁵³⁹ Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, 1973.

⁵⁴⁰ Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019.

B. *National Sovereignty*

National sovereignty (*milli egemenlik*) as a political motto entered Turkish politics with the Liberation War and remained dominant ever since. Kemalists' attention to imperialism ramped down after their triumph. The Young Turk revolution had designated autocracy (*istibdad*) as its chief enemy. The Kemalist revolution, meanwhile, designated reaction (*irtica*) as its chief enemy. Neither revolutionary order had clearly defined these terms; but Kemalist practices and discourses indicated that they took reaction as a mixture of Ottoman sultanate and caliphate, heterodox religious organizations that mobilized around *Sufi* sects, and pro-caliphate (mainly Kurdish) landowners. Kemalists in the 1920s claimed that the realization of national sovereignty was conditional upon defeating reaction. Progressive intellectuals wholeheartedly agreed. This section shows how Turkish progressives reproduced Kemalist understandings of national sovereignty, even in their criticisms of the Kemalist establishment for its disregard towards the structural bases of reaction. National sovereignty has been foundational in progressive understandings of democracy. More precisely, democracy for progressives arose from independence – not liberalism. Both progressive schools were critical of the conditions under which Turkey transitioned to multiparty democracy in the 1940s. By the late 1950s, most progressives argued that Turkey's experience with democracy had been a massive failure, which led to the unmaking of the revolution and resurgent reaction.

Adivar has been an exception among the progressives, whose ideas on national sovereignty gradually evolved towards a conservative-liberal direction. She understood national sovereignty as people's freedom from autocracy, and autocracy in the twentieth

century took the form of single-party regimes. In single-party regimes, Adıvar wrote, the nation faced an exploiting, colonizing foreign power over its will. These regimes put party interests before national interests by equating the party's survival with the nation's survival, condemned non-members as unpatriotic if not treasonous, and corrupted even the most idealist intellectuals.⁵⁴¹ Diverging from her earlier literary works, Adıvar in the 1950s referred to Gökalp's dictum as the foundational dictum of all dictatorships. For Adıvar, "where there was no individual, there could be no community but herd; where there was no right, there could be no duty but slavery."⁵⁴² She observed that every government since the Young Turk revolution had reproduced the Hamidian autocratic tools. While she justified the Kemalist dictatorship as a revolutionary transition period (a necessary evil), she argued that Turkey must adopt a constitutional regime that recognized people's sovereignty and rights.⁵⁴³ Concerned over racial and religious nationalisms, Adıvar promoted a civil nationalism, which to her was based upon territory, culture, tradition, and common interests.⁵⁴⁴

Compared to Adıvar, intellectuals like Aydemir and Tonguç, who rallied behind Kemalism, supported a more aggressive and radical revolutionism. They understood sovereignty as people's freedom from exploitation, externally and internally. This required struggling against impoverishment and ignorance and destroying the "parasite" social blocs.⁵⁴⁵ Aydemir and Tonguç were skeptical towards liberal democracy.⁵⁴⁶ For Aydemir, democratic revolutions in the West had made the people subject to capitalists and created

⁵⁴¹ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 155-156.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*, 156.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, 93-194 and 334.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 92-93 and Adıvar, *Hindistan'a Dair*, (1937) 2014, 157.

⁵⁴⁵ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 538-540; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 235-236.

⁵⁴⁶ Aydemir believed that democracies were incompatible with revolutionary orders and thereby the liberal 1924 constitution contradicted the objective aims of the revolution and social structures (see Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt, 1884 – 1938*, (1966) 1993, 325).

backward social orders.⁵⁴⁷ Tonguç argued that constitutional rights were meaningless in the face of sharp social distinctions.⁵⁴⁸ Educated, capable citizens who worked on their own behalf could become sovereign – not exploited, poor peasants.⁵⁴⁹ Most peasants were unaware of their constitutional rights; in any case, they were incapacitated to exercise them.⁵⁵⁰ National liberation intellectuals equated the revolution’s peopleist ideal of creating a homogenous nation without class or status distinctions with national sovereignty.⁵⁵¹ The *raison d’état* of modern state to Aydemir was guarding the nation’s interests by “ensuring the development of social structures in accordance with social utility.”⁵⁵² He conceptualized national liberation revolutions as a fourth way (as opposed to liberalism, socialism, and fascism), a new social contract for the colonized world.⁵⁵³ For Tonguç, modern states must connect to a social base, which could either be elite echelons or people.⁵⁵⁴ In sum, for progressive Kemalists, making the nation sovereign – the *raison d’état* of the republican revolution – meant empowering the citizenry and facilitating their direct participation in politics.⁵⁵⁵ They were also keenly aware of the lack of improvement in the peasantry’s sociopolitical condition during the republican era. The peasantry remained compelled to

⁵⁴⁷ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 170.

⁵⁴⁸ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 683.

⁵⁴⁹ Tonguç, “Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Davası,” (1945) 1997, 346.

⁵⁵⁰ Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938, 72-74; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 538-540.

⁵⁵¹ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 113-114; Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, 1946, 95; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 13-14.

⁵⁵² Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968. For Aydemir, what differentiates a modern state from its medieval counterpart is that the modern state is based upon national sovereignty and restricted by law (See Aydemir, *Halk için İktisat Bilgisi*, 1938, 133).

⁵⁵³ Aydemir, “Geri Teknik ve Say’ın Sefaleti,” 1932; Aydemir, “Beynelmilel Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi,” 1933; Aydemir, “Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi: 1) Faşizm,” 1933; Aydemir, “Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi: 2) Marksizm,” 1933; Aydemir, “Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi: 3) Türk Nasyonalizmi,” 1933; Aydemir, “İnkılap Neslinin Şarkısı,” 1933.

⁵⁵⁴ Tonguç, “Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Davası,” (1945) 1997, 346.

⁵⁵⁵ Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, 1946, 96.

serve elite echelons like landlords, capitalists, sheikhs, and bureaucrats, who continued to pull the political strings.⁵⁵⁶

Like national liberation intellectuals, socialists also problematized the exclusion of the urban poor and the rural masses from political processes and exposed the structural factors against the fulfillment of their sovereignty. Relatedly, they problematized the composition of the republican elite, among whom landlords and bourgeoisie gradually increased their representation. The main accusation was that the people who made the state sovereign did not share the benefits of independence.⁵⁵⁷ Kıvılcımlı wrote in the 1930s that Turkey's bourgeoisie had expended its progressivism with the Liberation War by establishing its sovereign regime. The proletariat was to realize the "unfinished business" with Turkey's social liberation.⁵⁵⁸ Boran in the 1940s also drew attention to the limitations of bourgeois progressivism concerning the denial of people's sovereignty.⁵⁵⁹ Sertel in the 1940s differentiated between state and popular sovereignty, writing that "the republic had not completed its democratic revolution...On the contrary...it secured the state's sovereignty against the people's. It took a quality that protected the interests of a privileged class and exploit the people for those interests."⁵⁶⁰ The commonality of these critiques was this: Turkey's liberation might have been led by its elites; its democratization, however, would not come from the top but popular sources. Socialist understanding of sovereignty relied upon the Leninist interpretation of revolutions in two stages, bourgeois-democratic and socialist. As such, true national liberation was to be realized by the socialist revolution.

⁵⁵⁶ Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938, 72-74 and Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 3 and 538-540

⁵⁵⁷ This theme dominates Nazım's two major works, namely *Kuvayı Milliye* (1941) 2008 and *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları* (1947) 2008.

⁵⁵⁸ Kıvılcımlı, *Devrim Zorlaması Demokratik Zortlama*, 1970, 57.

⁵⁵⁹ Boran, "Humanizmanın Sosyal Şartları," (1943) 2010.

⁵⁶⁰ Sertel, "Zincirli Hürriyet," 1945.

Moreover, socialists since the 1930s pointed to fascism, which in Turkey came under the banners of Turanism and/or Islamism, as the gravest danger to national sovereignty. Nazım formed his anti-fascism largely within republican narratives by portraying fascism as a class-based, reactionary, belligerent, and colonialist autocracy.⁵⁶¹ He depicted anti-fascist struggles – most notably the Spanish Civil War – in relation to Turkey’s liberation struggle to legitimize an anti-fascist nationalism, fused within Kemalism’s revolutionary narratives.⁵⁶² National liberation was progressive because it fought against reaction internally and imperialism externally; therefore the natural outcome of Turkey’s revolution was independence-oriented, anti-fascist, pro-peace policy.⁵⁶³ Kemalism offered a broad lexicon against autocracy, reaction, war, and class privileges, which the socialists readily used to equate liberation with anti-fascism.⁵⁶⁴ Socialists generally understood fascism as the class dictatorship of two social blocs: comprador bourgeoisie and feudal landlords.⁵⁶⁵ These blocs also constituted the DP’s leading social pillars.⁵⁶⁶ This had allowed the socialists to articulate the DP government as fascist, especially in the late 1950s when it grew more authoritarian and Islamist.⁵⁶⁷ Yet despite the centrality of anti-fascism in socialist thought, they attributed no agency to fascism as a political system or to fascists as political actors. For most socialists, fascism was the dictatorship of not fascists, but large capitalists. Boran argued that

⁵⁶¹ See Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “Münevverler Faşizmi Niçin Sevmiyorlar,” (1937) 1992; Nazım, *Alman Faşizmi ve Irkçılığı*, (1936) 1987, 324.

⁵⁶² See for example Nazım [Orhan Selim], “Eğer Milletim Beni Çağırırsa,” (1936) 1987; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “Birleşen Cepheler,” (1937) 1992. Nazım in several newspaper articles referred to progressive Kemalist journalists, such as Falih Rıfkı Atay and Sadri Ertem, and their concerns and critiques of fascism, possibly to legitimize his own position (see Nazım [Orhan Selim], “Harpci ve Sulhcu Millet,” (1936) 1987; Nazım [Orhan Selim], “İspanya’da Aksi İnkılap ve Sadri Ertem’in Bir Yazısı,” (1936) 1987).

⁵⁶³ Nazım [Orhan Selim], “Kimlerin Dostluğundan Şüphe Ederiz,” (1936) 1991; Nazım [Orhan Selim], “Milli Kurtuluş Hareketlerinin İki Vasfı,” (1936) 1987).

⁵⁶⁴ Sertel, “Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşları,” 1945.

⁵⁶⁵ Boran, “Sosyoloji Işığı Altında: Bir Cemiyet Sistemi Olarak Faşizm,” (1945) 2010.

⁵⁶⁶ Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz*, (1960) 2008, 29-30. Also see Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 2013.

⁵⁶⁷ Notably, however, Turanist fascists were not strongly represented in the DP. Turanist intellectuals were expelled from the party in the early 1950s. See Avcıoğlu, “Rejim Buhranı,” 1962, 196.

large capitalists controlled leaders like Mussolini and Hitler, who were “only the spokespersons and representatives of fascism.”⁵⁶⁸ Socialists generally paid little attention to fascist social bases.⁵⁶⁹ They argued that if fascism could win, it was only because people did not unite against it.⁵⁷⁰

Socialists understood liberal democratic values as incomplete but progressive steps towards national sovereignty. Yet they too were skeptical towards a hasty transition to a multiparty regime in the early republican period.⁵⁷¹ Their intellectual and political credit to the state elite has gradually diminished with Atatürk’s death. Socialists in the early 1940s realized how fascist cliques within the Kemalist establishment wielded a strong influence. Sertel wrote that these cliques implemented a political, legal, economic, social, and cultural system that was aligned with fascism and almost succeeded to have Turkey join the Axis forces.⁵⁷² The growing distrust against the republican elite led most socialists to promote democratic rights more stubbornly, especially of labor and political organizing to facilitate popular empowerment.⁵⁷³ Socialist-realist authors like O. Kemal problematized the elitism of republican peopleism, which in the 1940s became more blatant.⁵⁷⁴ Scholars and theoreticians like Boran and Kıvılcımlı problematized how the political establishment reduced national sovereignty to the ballot box; and they championed popular oversight mechanisms over

⁵⁶⁸ Boran, “Sosyoloji Işığında: Bir Cemiyet Sistemi Olarak Faşizm,” (1945) 2010; Boran, “Sosyoloji Işığında: Harpten Sonra Faşizm,” (1945) 2010.

⁵⁶⁹ See Bora and Can, *Devlet, Ocak, Dergah*, 2004.

⁵⁷⁰ Sertel, “Fransa Niçin Mağlup Oldu,” 1940; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “İtalya’da Faşizm Niçin Muvaffak Oldu,” (1936) 1987; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “Almanya’da Faşizm Niçin Muvaffak Oldu,” (1936) 1987.

⁵⁷¹ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 92 and 95.

⁵⁷² Sertel, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi*, (1944) 2010, 188; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 177; Sertel, “Zincirli Hürriyet,” 1945.

⁵⁷³ Boran, “Halk İradesi Nasıl Gerçekleştirilebilir,” (1946) 2010; Boran, “Demokrasinin Esas Şartları Nelerdir,” (1945), 2010.

⁵⁷⁴ O. Kemal, “Dert Dinleme Günü,” (1947) 2007; O. Kemal, *Gurbet Kuşları*, (1954) 2007.

political and judicial processes.⁵⁷⁵ Socialists spearheaded the counter-narratives against widespread intellectual and elite reservations against extending voting rights to the entire populace.⁵⁷⁶ Like the Kemalists in the 1920s, socialists in the 1940s and 1950s promoted a Rousseauian national will conception that put the nation as the ultimate source of collective wisdom.⁵⁷⁷ Finally, socialists emphasized economic freedoms. Boran in the mid-1940s defined American and British regimes as negative democracies and argued that the state must act to protect lower classes from the abuses of stronger social blocs and guarantee economic stability for its citizens.⁵⁷⁸ Socialists since the 1930s agitated for an anti-fascist nationalism, in a political environment which gradually produced an elite consensus over anticommunist nationalism.

Progressive intellectuals since the early republican years maintained a structuralist understanding of national sovereignty which gradually grew more critical against the political establishment. They championed land reform and nationwide education network as minimum requirements for a healthy transition to a democratic regime within a secular nationalist framework. Later generations of progressives, Kemalists and socialists alike, reproduced this structuralist understanding. A prominent theme within the progressive circles in the 1950s was Turkey's failed experience with democracy. Intellectuals like Baykurt, O.

⁵⁷⁵ Boran, "Halk İradesi Nasıl Gerçekleştirilebilir," (1946) 2010; Kıvılcımlı, *Eyüp Konuşması*, (1957) 2003, 20; Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz*, (1960) 2008, 35,

⁵⁷⁶ Boran, "Demokrasinin Esas Şartları Nelerdir," (1945) 2010; Boran, "Kalp Fikir Gerçek Fikir," (1944) 2010; Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz*, (1960) 2008, 35.

⁵⁷⁷ For Rousseauian social contract and Kemalism, see Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 112-113 and 282. For Kıvılcımlı's explicit call to the 1920s' peopleism, see Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz*, (1960) 2008, 34.

⁵⁷⁸ Incidentally, socialists in the mid-1940s echoed US President Roosevelt's narratives on democratic freedoms. For praises of Roosevelt among Turkish (and Egyptian) socialists, see: Boran, "Demokratik Gelişmelerin Bugünkü Durumu," (1945) 2010; Boran, "Demokrasinin Tarihi Doğuş Şartları," (1945) 2010; Sertel, "Roosevelt," 1945; Sertel, "Roosevelt'in Dört Hürriyeti," 1945; Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961, 99-102.

Kemal, and Avcıoğlu observed how the DP's rise created a public and intellectual rejuvenation as a progressive step towards national sovereignty in the late 1940s, only to be broken by the DP's extension of the CHP's authoritarian paternalism and elitism.⁵⁷⁹ Despite its shortcomings, Kemalist peopleism, especially education efforts, facilitated the making of a stratum of organic intellectuals from the wider populace, who were extremely disillusioned over the reversal of revolutionary principles.⁵⁸⁰ Baykurt, who came from a poor peasant background and graduated from the Village Institutes, reproduced Tonguç's arguments with regards to education and land reform as a precondition to democracy.⁵⁸¹ He emphasized the role of landlords and sheikhs against the realization of national sovereignty.⁵⁸² O. Kemal understood liberation as the recognition of human dignity.⁵⁸³ His works emphasized how economic exploitation and political repression in favor of economic elites barred people's right to a dignified life – not to mention political sovereignty.⁵⁸⁴ Intellectuals' expectations since the early 1920s regarding the republican establishment as a progressive force to liberate the nation from the yoke of religion (ideologically) and landlords (materially), were gone by the mid-1940s.

The 1950s saw the growing ideological cohesion of national liberation and socialist intellectuals on national sovereignty. Transition to multiparty democracy under an anticommunist nationalist hegemony and policy disempowered the people against the elite. Baykurt, Avcıoğlu, and O. Kemal stressed how the rural elites exercised control over entire

⁵⁷⁹ Avcıoğlu, "Koalisyon Meseleyi Halleder Mi," 1957; Avcıoğlu, "Muhalefet Ne Alemde," 1957; Avcıoğlu, "Handikaplı Koşu," 1957; Baykurt, "Boyumuzun Ölçüsü," (1960) 1974; Baykurt, "Yorgancı Salih Ocağı," (1959) 1974; Kemal, *Hanımın Çifliği* (1961) 2003; O. Kemal, *Murtaza* (1952) 1987.

⁵⁸⁰ On this, see Birkan, *Dünya ile Devlet Arasında Türk Muharriri, 1930-1960*, 2018.

⁵⁸¹ Baykurt, "Deşilecek İki Yara," (1959) 1974, 107-108,

⁵⁸² Baykurt, "Efkar Tepesi," (1959) 1974.

⁵⁸³ Kemal, "Aydınlık Gerçekçilik," (1961) 2007.

⁵⁸⁴ Kemal, "Sanat ve Politika," (1965) 2007; O. Kemal, "Grev," (1954) 2007; Kemal, "Telefon," (1954) 2007. Also see Kemal's letter in Otyam, *Arkadaşım Orhan Kemal ve Mektupları*, 1975, 160

voting blocs.⁵⁸⁵ Unions remained under strict supervision and exercised no pressure over the political and economic establishments.⁵⁸⁶ Avcioğlu correlated the absence of pressure from below led by autonomous civil society organizations with Turkey's reproduced authoritarianism despite changes in government.⁵⁸⁷ He argued that democracy in underdeveloped countries must have a social character from the beginning, unlike Western democracies.⁵⁸⁸ For Baykurt, Turkey's "greatest insecurity in democracy was ignorance."⁵⁸⁹ He problematized the conservative-liberal national sovereignty understanding that gave fathers the freedom to enforce their daughters' clothing or to prohibit their access to education.⁵⁹⁰ Yet most progressives combated elitist accusations against voters' ignorance for the DP era.⁵⁹¹ They promoted the unity of all democratic forces against the DP (with implicit and/or explicit calls for a united front).⁵⁹² National liberation intellectuals, who initially considered the DP as a legitimate (meaning sufficiently Kemalist) political actor, gradually came to regard it as a fascistic and reactionary force.⁵⁹³ In the early months of 1960, the vast majority of Turkish intelligentsia was concerned over the DP's potential to demolish its last remaining democratic credential by refusing to hand over power peacefully via elections.

⁵⁸⁵ Baykurt, "Efkar Tepesi," (1959) 1974; Avcioğlu, "Gözler Köylerde," 1957.

⁵⁸⁶ See Avcioğlu, "Muhalefet Ne Alemde," 1957. Also see, Çelik, *Vesayetden Siyasete Türkiye'de Sendikacılık*, 2010.

⁵⁸⁷ Avcioğlu, "Gülü Sevenler," 1957.

⁵⁸⁸ Avcioğlu, "Hindistan'da Demokrasi," 1957.

⁵⁸⁹ Baykurt, "Boyumuzun Ölçüsü," (1960) 1974.

⁵⁹⁰ Baykurt, "Gevşeyen İlköğretim," (1960) 1974; Baykurt, "Cılavuz'u Kuşatanlar," (1959) 1974; Baykurt, "Konyalı Kız," (1959) 1974.

⁵⁹¹ Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz*, (1960) 2008, 34; Baykurt, "Köylünün Suçu Var," (1960) 1974; O. Kemal, "Başlarken," (1960) 2007; O. Kemal, "Gurbet Kuşları," (1960) 2007; O. Kemal, "Kısa Kısa," (1970) 2007.

⁵⁹² Avcioğlu, "Tek Yol," 1957; Nazım, "Tek Cephede ve Milli Kurtuluş Komitelerinde Niçin Bütün Yurtseverler İşbirliği Yapmalı," (1958) 2002; Kıvılcımlı, *Eyüp Konuşması*, (1957) 2003.

⁵⁹³ The difference between Avcioğlu's writings until 1957 and in 1959 and 1960 is notable. Until the late 1950s, most progressive nationalists considered the DP a legitimate government despite its flaws. By the late 1950s, most intellectuals were convinced to its fascistic nature. See Avcioğlu, "İş Birliğine Götüren Yol," 1957; Avcioğlu, "İş Birliğine Dair," 1957; Avcioğlu, "Seçimlere Doğru," 1957; Avcioğlu, "Kim Kazanacak," 1957; Avcioğlu, "Jimenez'i Hatırla," 1958; Avcioğlu, "Örümcek Ağı," 1959; Avcioğlu, "Korku ve Tereddüt Arasında," 1959; Avcioğlu, "Meşruiyetin Hudutlarında," 1959; Avcioğlu, "Mezarlık Sessizliği," 1959.

Iran from 1941 to 1953 and Egypt from 1923 to 1952 had electoral orders without a monopoly over the political apparatus. By the mid-1950s, Iran and Egypt had established political monopolies, respectively around monarchist and republican nationalisms. Reza Shah's dictatorship in the 1930s made anti-autocracy central to Iranian progressivism.⁵⁹⁴ Reza Shah's fall and the Tudeh's rise initially gave optimism to many intellectuals, which quickly turned into disillusionment. Hedayat's *Haji Agha* satirically depicted the reproduction of autocracy after Reza Shah's fall. The novella problematized two conservative pillars: *hajis* (pilgrims, in other words, religion) and *aghas* (landlords).⁵⁹⁵ For Hedayat, Iran's autocracy was beyond individuals; the entire political establishment was corrupt where everyone was a miniature Reza Shah. In the 1940s, anti-autocracy transformed into anti-fascism.⁵⁹⁶ Socialist-realist author and prominent Tudeh intellectual Bozorg Alavi emphasized Tudeh's politics as anti-fascism in Iran and abroad.⁵⁹⁷ The Tudeh's women branch targeted Reza Shah's gender reforms for being modeled after fascism.⁵⁹⁸ The 1940s also saw the spreading of fascism to a wider social base, especially among the Islamists.⁵⁹⁹ The religious and political establishments utilized the nascent fascist organizations against

⁵⁹⁴ See for example Alavi, *Scrap Papers from Prison* (1941) 1991.

⁵⁹⁵ Concerning Reza, Haji says 'they brought in a coarse peasant and entrusted him with their very all; and a bunch of louts did a pretty dance around him, beating their breasts and buttering him up, until they landed us where we are today (Hedayat, *Haji Aqa*, (1945) 1998, 69) Ironically, Haji's portrayal of Reza and the people who surrounded him represented Haji himself and the political and ordinary people who surrounded him for his patronage.

⁵⁹⁶ Abrahamian (in *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 342) describes the dominant attitude of the Iranian intelligentsia as nationalism, which remained the hegemonic ideology; constitutionalism, which regained its popularity following Reza's autocracy for the generation that did not experience the 1910s' crises; and socialism, which meant not necessarily public ownership of enterprises, but rather, rapid modernization, secularization, and industrialization.

⁵⁹⁷ See Alavi's interview in Raffat, *The Prison Papers of Bozorg Alavi*, 1985, 76.

⁵⁹⁸ See Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 2007, 94. For leading socialist women activists of the time such as Fatimah Sayyah, Hajar Tarbiyat, Maryam Firouz, and Raziye Ebrahimzadeh, see Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 176-177.

⁵⁹⁹ The most notable example is the *Fedayeen-e Islam*, founded by Sayyed Mojtaba Navvab-i Safavi in the mid-1940 and created a pattern for the next generation of Islamic militants. Navvab became an explicit role model for Ayatollah Khomeini. For more information on the *Fedayeen-e Islam*, see Taghavi, "Fadaceyan-i Islam," 2004.

the Tudeh.⁶⁰⁰ Fascism also had a base among state officials, especially among high ranking officers.⁶⁰¹ With the oil nationalization crisis, Iranian progressive focus became anti-imperialism, which remained decisively so until the Islamic Revolution. Many progressive accounts attributed little political agency to the monarchical regime after 1953.⁶⁰² The shah did not pull the strings; the imperialists who controlled him did.⁶⁰³ Most progressives also identified landlords and comprador bourgeoisie as the shah's main support base.⁶⁰⁴ The coup left a deep impact on Iranian collective memory and put terms such as "hidden hands, foreign servants, and fifth columns" in political discourses.⁶⁰⁵ Anti-imperialist nationalism subordinated every other political discussion.

Egyptian progressivism from the 1920s to the 1960s blended anti-imperialism and anti-fascism, with anti-imperialism being more dominant.⁶⁰⁶ Authoritarian modernism also replaced liberal nationalism's hegemony in the 1940s.⁶⁰⁷ Progressive movements sought to remove the Wafd's political dominance so as to turn the state into an instrument for the common good.⁶⁰⁸ Anti-fascist press and organizations flourished in the 1930s.⁶⁰⁹ Socialist

⁶⁰⁰ Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013, 57.

⁶⁰¹ Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013.

⁶⁰² For the shah's legitimacy crisis, see Abrahamian, *Tortured Confessions*, 1999, 113.

⁶⁰³ See, for example, Jazani, *Capitalism and Revolution in Iran* (1970) 1980.

⁶⁰⁴ Behrooz, *Rebels with a Cause*, 2000, 3; Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 2008.

⁶⁰⁵ Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013, 219.

⁶⁰⁶ The nation, as defined by the Wafd, was a combination of groups whose purpose was to achieve and maintain independence (Botman, *Egypt from Independence to Revolution*, 1991, 32).

⁶⁰⁷ The Wafd's incapacity to address socioeconomic development and its concessions to the British administration, especially in 1936 and 1942 are notable reasons. On Egypt's student protests and the responses of the political establishment and the intellectuals, see El Shakry, "Youth as Peril and Promise," 2011 and Botman, *Egypt from Independence to Revolution*, 1991, 93-97. For effendi attitudes against the 1936 treaty, see Goldschmidt, *Modern Egypt*, 2004, 79; Di-Capua, "Changing the Arab Intellectual Guard," 2018, 44. For effendi attitudes against the Wafd's coming to power under British pressure rather than electoral victory see Botman, "The Liberal Age," 2008, 300.

⁶⁰⁸ Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 143.

⁶⁰⁹ The rise of fascism in Europe, the British administration's tolerance to antifascist writings, and actively pro-fascist, anti-communist segments of the Egyptian press contributed to the rise of education-oriented antifascist organizations and press: see Ismael and El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt*, 1990, 32-33; Gershoni, *The Demise of 'The Liberal Age*, 2016, 321-322.

groups that surfaced in the 1940s had their origins in these organizations.⁶¹⁰ Egyptian progressives promoted anti-fascist front strategies as the gateway to genuine democracy.⁶¹¹ Like their Turkish counterparts, Egyptian progressives were concerned over fascist and Islamic reaction, represented by al-Fatah and Ikhwan respectively.⁶¹² Both groups utilized political openings granted by the court and the British administration for their anti-communism.⁶¹³ Progressive intellectuals were especially concerned over the Ikhwan for hampering the liberation struggle; and Musa argued that the Ikhwan's reaction could dissolve Egypt's nationalism and jeopardize the Copt's stake in national progress.⁶¹⁴ The 1952 revolution initially created mixed reactions among progressive groups, partly due to extant connections between the revolutionary cadre and reactionary groups.⁶¹⁵ Nasser's anti-imperialism and promotion of the *effendi* demands enabled him to build a national union as a corporatist way to national sovereignty, aiming to create a road and organic connection between the regime and the key sectors of the society: workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, professionals, national capitalists, and bureaucrats.⁶¹⁶ Marxist intellectual Attiyah al-Shafai wrote that a united front under Nasser was to bring all the social categories and classes against external (imperialism and Zionism) and internal (feudalism and

⁶¹⁰ Botman *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 1988, 17; Ismael and El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt*, 1990, 36.

⁶¹¹ Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 113.

⁶¹² Botman, *Egypt from Independence to Revolution*, 1991, 91-92; Beattie, *Egypt During the Nasser Years*, 1994, 23.

⁶¹³ Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, 1968, 27; Beinlin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 368-369.

⁶¹⁴ Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957) 1961; 201.

For progressive intellectuals and the Ikhwan, see E.Thompson, *Justice Interrupted*, 2013, 152 and Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 1985.

⁶¹⁵ Most progressive organizations and fronts endorsed the revolution, while some had contacts within the officers and had advanced notice of the takeover. Pro-Soviet communists, on the other hand, followed the Moscow line, condemning it as a fascist coup. See Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism*, 1988, 130; Ismael and El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt*, 1990, 72-77.

⁶¹⁶ Beattie, *Egypt During the Nasser Years*, 1994, 128.

monopolies) forces of exploitation.⁶¹⁷ Another Marxist Fuad Mursi stressed that democracy was not a goal in itself but a means to social progress. Since the government was firmly in national hands struggling against colonialism, despotism, and feudalism, there was no longer a need for opposition parties.⁶¹⁸

National liberation and socialist intellectuals in the Middle East generally understood the state as an instrument to realize the conditions for authentic national sovereignty. They envisioned national liberation as a process that combined bottom-up (peasant empowerment through education, organizing rights, and land ownership) and top-down (eradication of reactionary social blocs) measures.⁶¹⁹ The progressive articulations on national sovereignty were overlapping in both schools of thought, which grew closer to each other in the 1950s. They equated national sovereignty with democracy in structuralist terms. There was an apparent dichotomy in progressive understanding of democracy: on the one hand, they were anti-elitists who argued that peasants understood (or sensed) their political interests better than politicians and intellectuals and championed the people's agency in political processes. On the other hand, many progressives (especially in the early republican years) were critical against liberal and/or multiparty democracy for it would make landlord and bourgeoisie segments sovereign and resurface reaction. Progressive answers to this dichotomy further reflected their structuralist worldviews: they considered the eradication of socioeconomic elite echelons through land reforms and nationalizations and the spread of national education

⁶¹⁷ Al-Shafai, "What Is the National United Front," (1956) 1983.

⁶¹⁸ In Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 217.

⁶¹⁹ Adivar, whose suggestions pointed towards a concert of elites, is the exception here, which can be attributed to her generational and class differences. Despite being a dissident to Ataturk's presidency, her thought ironically overlapped most with the Kemalist practices within the progressives.

network as the minimum requirements for a democratic regime, as well as for becoming a sovereign nation.

C. *Economic Sovereignty*

Development has been central in progressive political thought. Progressive intellectuals understood development primarily in its relation to economic sovereignty, as a prerequisite to “complete independence.” Like their differentiation of state and national sovereignty, progressive development paradigms envisioned 1) an economically sovereign state from external imperialist and capitalist sources and internal comprador and feudal attachments; 2) an economically sovereign and capable populace, free from exploitation of elite social blocs and subordination to nature. Progressive development strategies reflected this duality by combining top-down and bottom-up strategies. Kemalist discourses on development and economic sovereignty again offered a starting point for most progressives. Kemalist *statism* envisioned state-led industrialization and agricultural development; and *peopleism* promoted a solidarist and egalitarian nationalism by rejecting status and/or class privileges and by turning “people” into “citizens.” Progressive intellectuals were keenly aware of the gap between narratives and practices. Progressive criticisms against Kemalism focused most intensely on development. They stressed how Kemalism failed to identify and dismantle the structural barriers before development. The abandonment of the solidarist development model in the mid-1940s in favor of the state-led capitalist model and the economic crisis in the late 1950s shifted progressive articulations. In line with their structuralist understanding, progressives have identified the mid-1940s as the triumph of the bourgeoisie-landlord alliance in assuming complete control of the national economy. Then, progressives

universally argued, these blocs redefined Turkey's national interests as subordinating to Western imperialism and dominating the toiling masses – thus abandoning Kemalism's independence-oriented principles and recreating the structural dependencies that made the Ottoman Empire a semi-colony.

The Kemalist establishment lacked a distinct economic mentality.⁶²⁰ Aydemir related this problem to the absence of capable cadres who possessed technical and theoretical capital.⁶²¹ Tonguç saw the problem in the elitist and scholastic mentality of the late Ottoman elites who clung to their political capital in the republican regime.⁶²² Sertel argued that because the Kemalists lacked an economic program, Muslim-Turkish İstanbul and İzmir commercial bourgeoisies (who made extraordinary profits during the war years⁶²³) and Anatolian rural notables (who also added to their wealth by confiscating mostly Armenian properties and lands⁶²⁴) immediately took the national development program into their hands.⁶²⁵ Many progressives pinpointed the 1923 İzmir Economy Conference, which called the representatives of four groups (merchants, farmers, shop-owners, and workers) to determine the new regime's economic agenda. Unchallenged by unorganized shop-owners and numerically small workers, commercial bourgeoisie and rural notables steered the regime towards adopting a conservative-liberal definition of developmental and economic national

⁶²⁰ This was not uncommon in nationalist revolutionism until the mid-twentieth century. See Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men*, 1980, 125-127. For a socialist critique of this absence and its consequences, see Sertel, *İlericilik Gericiilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 110.

⁶²¹ Aydemir argued that colonies and semi-colonies did not produce thinkers, theoreticians, and scientists; they rather imported them. See Aydemir, "Yeni Devletin İktisadi Fonksiyonları," 1934.

⁶²² Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 84.

⁶²³ See Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1085-1096; Adıvar, "Üniversite Şehrinde," (1937) 2017.

⁶²⁴ There was considerable silence among Turkish progressives regarding the Armenian genocide. For rare and implicit examples, see: Nazım, "Hapisten Çıktıktan Sonra," (1950) 2007 and Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1455.

⁶²⁵ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 77.

interests.⁶²⁶ Some socialists like Sertel critically supported Atatürk's economic policies for their adherence to independence and for recognizing the reasons behind the Ottoman decay: semi-colonization under imperialist pressures, failure to industrialize, and incapacity to change rural structures to increase agricultural efficiency.⁶²⁷ Yet progressives commonly identified certain flaws in Kemalist developmentalism which in the 1940s remade Turkey's dependency conditions. In a nutshell, these flaws were 1) disregarding rural development by abandoning the peripheries to rural notables;⁶²⁸ 2) creating an oligarchic bourgeoisie by short term profit-oriented industrialization policies;⁶²⁹ and 3) paying insufficient attention to raising the capability of the populace that was impoverished after a decade of crises and wars.⁶³⁰

Most progressives also problematized Kemalism's firm denial of class politics (and the existence of classes in Turkey). Kemalism's faulty class understanding was common among many nationalists. Adıvar described the composition of the 1920 Ankara parliament as being made by ordinary Turks.⁶³¹ Ordinary Turks to Adıvar were not peasants and urban wage-earners; they were merchants, landlords, sheikhs, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and officers. Other nationalists like Aydemir recognized that Turkey by the 1930s had not yet developed sharp class distinctions that appeared in western industrialized societies, which maintained

⁶²⁶ Baykurt, *Öğretmenin Uyardırma Görevi*, (1969) 2000; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 104-105.

⁶²⁷ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 64; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 28. Sertel also argued that the Young Turks' national economy was incapable of confronting the capitulations, remained eager to attract foreign capital, repressed workers' strikes in foreign companies. The Young Turk regime turned its attention to confiscating the non-Muslim businesses, which ignited chauvinism (Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 53, 61-62, and 79).

⁶²⁸ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 57; Baykurt, "Yollar Kapalı," (1959) 1974.

⁶²⁹ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 155; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 106 and 132; Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizm'in Gelişimi*, 1965, 17-19.

⁶³⁰ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 1-13; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008.

⁶³¹ Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 127.

advanced technique but backward social orders that worked for the interests of the capitalists.⁶³² Progressive Kemalists Tonguç and Aydemir were keenly aware of existing class distinctions and saw the Kemalist vision of an egalitarian nation as an ideal, to be completed by radical and social nationalism.⁶³³ Socialist theoretician Kıvılcımlı, meanwhile, promoted a definition of the proletariat that was broader than industrial workers and included agricultural and indirect producers.⁶³⁴ He argued that the denial of classes was based upon faulty statistics of institutions that represent the commercial bourgeoisie and problematic analyses of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois intellectuals.⁶³⁵ Other socialists like Sertel and Nazım exposed Turkey's classed realities with literature and journalism.⁶³⁶ Kemalist positivism preached organizing societal relations (including development) within scientific principles. Socialists philosophically agreed but asked whose interests were to determine the scientific principles. Marxist materialism thus added the class dimension to nationalist positivism by preaching to organize the societal relations within scientific principles to the benefit of working masses, who according to socialists were the nation.

Peopleism had been the Turkish expression of nationalist egalitarianism and the response to class politics.⁶³⁷ The Kemalist establishment never explicitly defined the principle; and it fell drastically short of delivering even those vague definitions.⁶³⁸ Social policy has been a

⁶³² Aydemir, "Makinaların Muhacceretı," 1933; Aydemir, "Programlı Devletçilik," 1934.

⁶³³ Aydemir's 'social nationalism' terminology resulted in his former comrades like Nazım to brand him as a hidden fascist. See, Nazım, *Benerci Kendini Niçin Öldürdü*, (1932) 2007, 327.

⁶³⁴ Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfının Sosyal Varlığı*, (1935) 2008, 35.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, 10 and 59.

⁶³⁶ For some examples, see Sertel, "Leşe Konan Kuzgun," 1940; Sertel, "Susuz Değirmen Dönmez," 1940; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Ölümler Dünyasının Sınıfları," (1936) 1987; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Talebe ve Kahve," (1936) 1987.

⁶³⁷ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 133; Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 144-145.

⁶³⁸ Intellectuals like Sertel and Aydemir criticized Atatürk's CHP for not developing and pursuing a coherent economic ideology. See Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005 and Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015.

major failure during the early republican years. The Kemalist establishment promoted charity to tackle urban poverty with little success.⁶³⁹ Socialists until the 1960s utilized *peopleist* principles to problematize Turkey's urban underdevelopment and promoted a social justice agenda, which was notably missing in the CHP's and DP's agendas. Nazım's newspaper articles from the 1930s sought to hold the regime accountable to its *peopleist* promises.⁶⁴⁰ In satirical short pieces, he exposed flaws in urban development: obsession with lawmaking without the groundwork and actual initiative for change, capital-oriented statism, expensive and insufficient health, education, and municipal services, and the lingering influence of foreign companies and merchants.⁶⁴¹ O. Kemal, a younger socialist-realist author, saw exploitation at the center of Turkey's underdevelopment. His focus, however, was not the systemic level but how underdevelopment and poverty affected the poor and how the poor struggled against injustice.⁶⁴² O. Kemal's works paid closer attention to micro-level exploitation and depicted class-based exploitation beyond binary divisions.⁶⁴³ He saw Turkey's class relations not as a system where one class lived off the exploitation of another;

⁶³⁹ For social policy in Turkey, see Buğra, *Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Türkiye'de Sosyal Politika*, 2008.

Adivar was a rare example among progressives by promoting charity. See Adivar, "Üniversite Şehrinde," (1937) 2017; Adivar, "Zengin Hali," (1938) 2017; Adivar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 334.

⁶⁴⁰ See Nazım [Fıkracı], "Küllü Şey'in," (1930) 1991; Nazım [Fıkracı], "Keşkül-ü Fukara Tatlısı ve Halk Fırkası," (1930) 1991; Nazım [Fıkracı], "Yine Başlayacaklar Mı," (1930) 1991; Nazım, [Adsız Yazıcı], "Elçiye Zeval Olmaz," (1937) 1992.

⁶⁴¹ See Nazım [Adsız], "Eşekler ve Hamallar," (1937) 1992; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Asri Fetva," (1937) 1992; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Kalkınması, Düzelmeye, Çoğalması İçin," (1936) 1987; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Kapitülasyonların Mirasları," (1937) 1992; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Halk Sanatkarı Mı? Devlet Sanatkarı Mı?" (1937) 1991; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Yarım Tahsilliler," (1936) 1987; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Sıhhatimiz Yüzde Elli Tehlikede," (1937) 1992; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Devlet Hastanesi," (1937) 1992.

⁶⁴² See O. Kemal, "Başlarken," (1960) 2007; O. Kemal, "Gurbet Kuşları," (1960) 2007; O. Kemal, "Ekmek Partisi," (1960) 2007; O. Kemal, "Düşünceler," (1960) 2007.

⁶⁴³ In other words, he paid closer attention to the interactions of foremen and workers, gendarmeries and peasants, petty-workers and unemployed, etc. as opposed to bourgeoisie vs. proletariat or landlord vs. peasant. Imperialists, politicians, and factory owners were abstract and distant to workers and peasants, contrary to foreman and gendarmerie. See O. Kemal, *72. Koğuş*, (1952) 2012; O. Kemal, "İşsiz (Beye Kapıyı Göster)," (1954) 2007; O. Kemal, *Cemile*, (1952) 2008; O. Kemal, "Notlar: Gene Şive Taklidi," (1953) 2007; O. Kemal, "Şive ve Taklit," (1953) 2007.

but rather as a *Tower of Babel*, where each segment lived off the exploitation of the one below and was exploited by the one above, without any contact or concern for those who were in other segments.⁶⁴⁴ In sum, socialists until the 1960s approached the development question primarily in terms of popular experiences of classed-based exploitation, underdevelopment, and poverty.

The second pillar of Kemalist developmentalism was *statism*. Like *peopleism*, *statism* was also never explicitly defined. Its adoption followed the disruptions after the Great Depression. In the absence of domestic and foreign investment, *statism* tasked the state to lead the industrialization and agricultural modernization campaigns.⁶⁴⁵ Dissident nationalists like Adıvar problematized the politicized nature of *statism* that created regime cronies and remarked how both the Young Turk and the Kemalist revolutions witnessed the enrichment of a small group of cronies.⁶⁴⁶ Yet she defended nationalist economic policies for reviving Turkish businesses, without paying much attention to the confiscations of non-Muslim businesses.⁶⁴⁷ Socialists, meanwhile, exposed the classed nature of *statist* policies and depicted how the quest to create a national bourgeoisie resulted in the making of an industrial-commercial oligarchy. Most progressives saw the origins of Turkey's comprador bourgeoisie in statism of the 1930s.⁶⁴⁸ Kıvılcımlı showed how credit and land speculations worked to provide the nascent bourgeoisie with capital accumulation.⁶⁴⁹ Progressive intellectuals identified how state banks made a national bourgeoisie in three sectors:

⁶⁴⁴ See Kemal, "Balon," (1954) 2007.

⁶⁴⁵ For a radical interpretation of Kemalist statism, see Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968.

⁶⁴⁶ Adıvar, "Üniversite Şehrinde," (1937) 2017, 198.

⁶⁴⁷ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 136-141.

⁶⁴⁸ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 108-109; Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005.

⁶⁴⁹ Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Gelişimi*, 1965, 126.

commerce via *İş Bankası*, industry via *Sümerbank*, and agriculture via *Ziraat Bankası*.⁶⁵⁰

Kıvılcımlı argued that the Turkish bourgeoisie since its emergence in the 1900s developed under heavy state protection and in the republican period it developed a dual nature: its survival depended upon subordination to Western capitalism and domination over the people.⁶⁵¹

Progressives understood the consequences of flawed *statism* in relation to failed industrial and rural development and Turkey's incomplete independence. For Aydemir, the Liberation War and consequent political revolutions were the first steps towards independence; but the real revolution was to save Turkey from the yoke of imperialism through socioeconomic development.⁶⁵² Aydemir equated economic sovereignty with an integrated and industrial national (and classless) economy that could globally build trade relations under equal terms.⁶⁵³ Inherited semi-colonial structures necessitated a planned and statist industrialization strategy, which would also realize a nation independent of foreign and domestic oligarchic subjugation.⁶⁵⁴ With emphasis over technical advancement without class conflicts and collective fate of semi-colonized and colonized nations, Aydemir (and the *Kadro* movement he led) foreshadowed the Dependency School of the 1960s and other critiques of capitalist modernization theses. Progressive development paradigms often rested upon a state-led

⁶⁵⁰ For credit schemes and how they made new strata of elites, see Baykurt, "Efkar Tepesi," (1959) 1974; Kıvılcımlı, *Eyüp Konuşması*, (1957) 2003; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008; O. Kemal, *Üçkağıtçı*, (1969) 2005.

⁶⁵¹ Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizm'in Gelişimi*, 1965, 7-8.

⁶⁵² Aydemir, "İnkılabın İdeolojisi: Açık Bütçeden Mütevazın Bütçeye, Mütevazın Bütçeden Zengin Bütçeye," 1934; Aydemir, "İnkılabın İdeolojisi: Yürüyen Devlet," 1934; Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005, 174; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 394.

⁶⁵³ Aydemir, *Cihan İktisadiyatında Türkiye*, 1931, 136; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 221; Aydemir, *Halk için İktisat Bilgisi*, 1938, 155-157; Aydemir, "Sosyal Milliyetçiliğin Zaferi," 1934.

⁶⁵⁴ Aydemir, "Darülfünun: İnkılap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığı," 1933; Aydemir, "Plan Mefhumu Hakkında," 1932; Aydemir, "İnkılap Hukuku," 1934; Aydemir, "Makinaların Muhacereti," 1933; Aydemir, "Milli İktisat Planı ve Şeker Sanayimiz," 1933; Aydemir, "Yeni Devletin İktisadi Fonksiyonları," 1934; Aydemir, "İş Kanunu Yeni Cemiyetin Temel Kanunlarından Biridir," 1934; Aydemir, "Programlı Devletçilik," 1934.

mixed economy. Its central pillars were 1) large industries spread across Anatolia; 2) agricultural modernization through land reform, cooperatives, education, and mechanization; and 3) infrastructure program, most notably railroads. The state sector was to monopolize large industries and foreign trade, while the private sector (concentrated in agriculture, handicrafts, and small industries) was to complement the national development plan.⁶⁵⁵ Progressives intellectuals generally saw development as an interconnected phenomenon of different sectors; nevertheless, they prioritized advanced and heavy industries as the true marker of development.⁶⁵⁶ Socialists argued that Kemalists accurately understood the centrality of economic independence in political independence and the centrality of industrialization in economic independence. The question was who would lead the industrialization campaign and for whose interests.⁶⁵⁷

Rural development occupied a central place in progressive developmental thought. Tonguç's *Village Institutes* had been the most comprehensive republican rural development project.⁶⁵⁸ Tonguç believed that the industrial civilization had improved the urban living conditions at the expense of villages, whose inhabitants were abandoned the peasantry against nature they could not master and socioeconomic affairs they could not alter.⁶⁵⁹ Tonguç's prerequisite to being a modern society was closing the urban-rural gap.⁶⁶⁰ His developmentalism envisioned training peasant kids as teachers, healthcare personnel, and

⁶⁵⁵ Neither socialists nor liberation intellectuals promoted complete state ownership and attributed a role to the private sector. See, Boran, "Ekonomik ve Sosyal Kanunlara Karşı Gelinmez," (1944) 2010; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericiilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968.

⁶⁵⁶ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 221; Boran, "Sanayide Köylü-İşçi," (1942) 2010.

⁶⁵⁷ Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 2: Yakın Tarihten Birkaç Madde*, (1933) 1978, 97-98,

⁶⁵⁸ The project's aim was radically ambitious. Tonguç envisioned spreading primary education to entire Turkey in less than two decades without receiving any financial aid from the state, in a country where 80 percent of the population was scattered across 40.000 villages, many of which did not have any schools, infrastructure, or contact with towns or cities. It was later abandoned in the late 1950s under conservative pressure.

⁶⁵⁹ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 84.

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 79 and 683,

agricultural technicians to serve in village schools, which Tonguç placed at the center of rural revival.⁶⁶¹ For Tonguç, the revolution's survival was conditional upon its ability to spread in the villages, which could only be realized by development.⁶⁶² The impoverishment of rural Anatolia and restricted state resources enforced extraordinary measures, which included utilizing organized peasant labor especially in infrastructure construction.⁶⁶³ The eventual abandonment of the *Village Institutes* marked for many progressives the abandonment of republican progressivism. Intellectuals since the 1940s observed a growing landlord bias in the CHP's rural policies.⁶⁶⁴ Aydemir considered rural development the greatest failure of the republican revolution.⁶⁶⁵ Avcıoğlu showed how prioritizing large landowners instead of the small peasantry in agricultural mechanization led to unemployment and uncontrolled urban-to-rural flows instead of increase in agricultural efficiency.⁶⁶⁶ Production methods remained ancient, and productivity low.⁶⁶⁷ O. Kemal and Baykurt wrote how land and capital accumulations by landlords did not contribute to agricultural development for their wealth went abroad or to luxury consumption instead of investment.⁶⁶⁸ They further challenged

⁶⁶¹ Ibid., 497-498; Tonguç, "Köy Eğitimi," (1937) 1997; Tonguç, "Köy Eğitimi Meselesi I," (1938) 2000, 104; Tonguç, "Köy Eğitimi Meselesi II," (1938) 2000, 121-123; Tonguç, "Köy Enstitülerimizde Eğitim ve Öğretim Meseleleri," (1943) 2000, 163.

⁶⁶² Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 407-408.

⁶⁶³ Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938, 49.

Tonguç was not alone. Younger progressives also championed the necessity of utilizing people's organized and educated labor for development (see Baykurt, "Sağlık Olsun," (1959) 1974). These arguments were reproduced well into the 1970s. See Avcıoğlu, *Devrim Üzerine*, 1971.

⁶⁶⁴ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 210 and 314; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008; O. Kemal, *Hanımın Çifliği*, (1961) 2003.

⁶⁶⁵ Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 1959 (1971), 458; Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005, 364; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt*, (1966) 1993, 390.

⁶⁶⁶ Avcıoğlu, "Yarının Meseleleri," 1959; Avcıoğlu, "Sıtma Tedavisi," 1959.

⁶⁶⁷ Baykurt, "Yerinde Saymak," (1959) 1974; Avcıoğlu, "Yarının Meseleleri," 1959.

⁶⁶⁸ O. Kemal, *Hanımın Çifliği* (1961) 2003; Baykurt, *Yılanların Öcü*, 1958.

triumphant agricultural development narratives of the DP by exposing the stagnation in agricultural welfare standards despite increasing incomes.⁶⁶⁹

A fundamental progressive critique against capitalist modernization theses regarded human disempowerment. In response, progressive developmentalism promoted capability raising. The struggle against nature occupied a central place in progressive development theses. Aydemir read the civilization history as “the history of humans’ struggles and triumphs against nature.”⁶⁷⁰ Tonguç equated development with people’s “mastery over their fates,” including mastery over nature.⁶⁷¹ Unlike capitalist developmentalism that pitted nations and classes against each other, national liberation developmentalism was to be a collective struggle against nature.⁶⁷² Progressive articulations on capability raising was influenced by Anatolia’s impoverishment in the early twentieth century.⁶⁷³ Especially the peasantry’s empowerment was crucial for the making of the national economy. Turning the peasantry into commodity producers on their own fields and consumers of national industries was central to progressive development agendas.⁶⁷⁴ This required direct state interventions at multiple levels, such as actively struggling against feudal forces,⁶⁷⁵ distributing the available

⁶⁶⁹ Baykurt, “Bir Peynir Hikayesi,” (1959) 1974. Baykurt, “İçecek Su,” (1959) 1974; Baykurt, “İğdır Yolu,” (1959) 1974; O. Kemal, *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde*, (1954) 2008; O. Kemal, *Hanımın Çiftliği*, (1961) 2003.

⁶⁷⁰ Aydemir, *Halk İçin İktisat Bilgisi*, 1938, 18; Aydemir, *Toprak Uyanırsa*, (1963) 2012.

⁶⁷¹ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 465; Tonguç, “Anadolu Köylerinde Kalkınma Hareketleri: Okullar,” (1936) 1997, 41; Tonguç, “Aksu Köy Enstitüsü Kurulurken,” (1940) 1997, 164; Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938, 49.

⁶⁷² Aydemir equated freedom with liberation from the domination of nature through advanced technique and sought to replace class struggle with struggle against nature. See, Aydemir, “Polemik: Bergsonizm Yahut Bir Korkunun Felsefi İfadesi,” 1932; Aydemir, “Yeni Devletin İktisadi Fonksiyonları,” 1934.

While this understanding was more common among national liberation struggles, socialist intellectuals also took development as a struggle against nature, in addition to being a class struggle. See Nazım, “İnsan ve Tabiat,” (1936) 1987.

⁶⁷³ Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 188; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 63-70; Aydemir, *Toprak Uyanırsa*, (1963) 2012.

⁶⁷⁴ Aydemir, “İnkılabın İdeolojisi: Açık Bütçeden Mütevazın Bütçeye, Mütevazın Bütçeden Zengin Bütçeye,” 1934; Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938.

⁶⁷⁵ Aydemir, “Polemik: Derebeyi ve Dersim,” 1932; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 239.

land to peasants,⁶⁷⁶ organizing and equipping the peasants with modern tools and machinery,⁶⁷⁷ and integrating them into the national market with infrastructure projects.⁶⁷⁸ Tonguç argued that rural revival must rely upon the experiences and knowledges of the peasantry; a top-down and scholastic agenda unfamiliar to Anatolian rural realities would not work efficiently and would face resistance from peasants.⁶⁷⁹ Progressivism generally remained skeptical towards monolith rural development perspectives, especially regarding 80.000 Anatolian villages, scattered in distant, diverse, and isolated geographies. The state's function was to aid the peasantry against natural and social captivating forces with technological, intellectual, material, and political assistance.

Economic sovereignty and development constituted the biggest wedge between the political establishment and progressive political thought in early republican Turkey. Aydemir, a firm Kemalist, critically remarked that revolutionary discourses like “privilegeless, classless, fused populace” or “peasants as the masters of the nation” did not go beyond hopeful wishes. Statism remained as inefficient and corrupt state administration over industries and banks.⁶⁸⁰ Rural development was an outstanding failure; most villages were left practically untouched for decades.⁶⁸¹ Peasants remained captivated to natural and social forces, thus outside the scope of the republican revolution.⁶⁸² The republican class denial

⁶⁷⁶ Aydemir *Cihan İktisadiyatında Türkiye*, 1931, 13.

⁶⁷⁷ Aydemir, “İş Hasreti ve 500.000.000 Liralık Türk Bütçesi,” 1932; Aydemir, “Şeker İstiklali ve 160.000 Ton Türk Şekeri,” 1932.

⁶⁷⁸ Aydemir, “İç Pazar ve İktisatta Bütünlük,” 1932.

⁶⁷⁹ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 37-40.

⁶⁸⁰ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005, 239; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 1959 (1971), 487; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Birinci Cilt*, (1966) 1993, 409 and 420.

⁶⁸¹ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 57.

Aydemir further remarked that “so long as the land remained empty, ownerless, conflict-ridden; and the peasantry on it lived tired-out, weakly, semi-slaved, it could never have become [the nation's] master” (see Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 299).

⁶⁸² Tonguç, “Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Davası,” (1945) 1997.

allowed more blatant exploitation of workers and peasants.⁶⁸³ Industries developed in accordance with foreign-dependent oligarchic interests and therefore concentrated in commercial centers as opposed to being rationally spread across Anatolia. Ultimately, the crisis of post-1946 capitalism came because of systemic problems identified by many progressives. The abandonment of balanced budget and trade policies of 1923-1945 years in favor of liberalization created high growth from 1946 to 1953. The cash inflow surged imports and created trade deficits, which were initially covered by US credits. Growth rates lagged after 1954, a consequence of declining global growth rates after the postwar boom and declining agricultural profits after the Korean War's end. Declining growth exacerbated the currency deficit problem, which led to inflation, devaluation, crippling investments, and unemployment. The DP sought to de-liberalize the economy, but greater global integration and import-dependent industrial production ensured a more restricted maneuver field compared to the 1930s. Unable to secure foreign credit, the DP turned to populism and cronyism, which exacerbated the crisis.⁶⁸⁴

Capitalization in the 1940s and crises in the late 1950s helped building a progressive consensus over development and modernization.⁶⁸⁵ Kemalists like Avcıoğlu gradually grew more critical against Turkey's economic and political ties to Western countries, arguing that aids and foreign companies extract more wealth than they bring.⁶⁸⁶ He criticized the DP,

⁶⁸³ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 107 and 116; Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye İşçi Sınıfının Sosyal Varlığı*, (1935) 2008.

⁶⁸⁴ For primary sources on the DP's economic crisis, see Aydemir, Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988.

For secondary sources on the DP's economic crisis in the 1957-1960 years, see Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 2016, 85-95; Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 2014, 226-234 Buğra, *Devlet ve İşadamları*, 1995, 175-185.

⁶⁸⁵ For a recent study on post-1946 pro-American capitalist modernization process in Turkey, see Adalet, *Hotels and Highways*, 2018.

⁶⁸⁶ Avcıoğlu, "Fakirler Kulübü," 1959; Avcıoğlu, "Batılı Dostların Gölgesinde Türkiye," 1959; Avcıoğlu, "Müşterek Pazar Meselesi," 1959. In the 1960s, this became the common leftist argument. See Avcıoğlu,

stressing how unplanned and short-term profit-oriented developmentalism wasted restricted resources and declined investments.⁶⁸⁷ Equating economic development with independence, Avcioğlu argued that the path to development was to consume less and invest more.⁶⁸⁸ The real question was which social blocs would bear the burden of development.⁶⁸⁹ Baykurt and O. Kemal, who were organically connected to Turkey's most impoverished segments, produced definitions of development from below which corresponded to people's right to a dignified life.⁶⁹⁰ Their works exposed a critical flaw in republican developmentalism concerning upward social mobilization. *Peopleist* narratives promoted education and work ethic for that purpose. Contrary to intellectual misconceptions, these messages resonated with the people, but they did not work in practice.⁶⁹¹ Baykurt and O. Kemal (as well as other socialist-realist authors) depicted how the rich constantly belittled the poor's dream of education of their naivete; how the poor's hard work did not even meet basic necessities let alone a dignified life; and how the state appeared as an institution that actively repelled the struggle of the poor for dignity and justice.⁶⁹² Turkey in the 1940s could provide only illegal or informal means for upward social mobilization through scheming, corruption, black market profiteering, or connection to the powerful. The republican ethos became meaningless as it could not expand "citizens" as a social bloc by assimilating from "people."

Türkiye'nin Düzeni (1966) 1973; Baykurt, *Öğretmen Bugün Ne Yapmalı*, (1969) 2000, 208; Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (1968) 1992; Kıvılcımlı, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizm'in Gelişimi*, 1965.

⁶⁸⁷ Avcioğlu, "Görünen Köy," 1958; Avcioğlu, "İktisadi Strateji," 1957; Avcioğlu, "Güzelleştirme Yatırımları," 1958.

⁶⁸⁸ See Avcioğlu, "İktisadi İstiklal," 1957; Avcioğlu, "Yatırımlar Azdır," 1957; Avcioğlu, "Kalkınmanın Fiyatı," 1958. This had also become a universal progressive argument in the 1960s. See Baykurt, *Öğretmenin Uyandırma Görevi*, (1969) 2000, 191.

⁶⁸⁹ Avcioğlu, "Japon Mucizesinin Esrarı," 1958; Avcioğlu, "Hürriyetsiz Kalkınma," 1957.

⁶⁹⁰ Baykurt, "Asıl Değişmesi Gereken," (1960), 1974. O. Kemal, "Aydınlık Gerçekçilik," (1961) 2007.

⁶⁹¹ See for example Kemal, "Nermin," (1954) 2007; and Kemal, "Harika Çocuk," (1954) 2007; Baykurt, "Cılavuz'u Kuşatanlar," (1960) 1974.

⁶⁹² Baykurt, "Büyük Bahçe," (1960) 1974; O. Kemal, "Cılız," (1954) 2007; O. Kemal, "İş," (1954) 2007; O. Kemal, *Eskici Dükkanı* (1962) 2005; O. Kemal, *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde* (1954) 2008.

The most notable intellectual impact of Turkey's capitalist transition and crisis has been the growing ideological cohesion of national liberation and socialist schools concerning development, which became acute by the late 1950s. Avciođlu and Baykurt are two examples who broke with Kemalism's class denial to adopt class-based development paradigms.⁶⁹³ Beyond overlaps in class paradigms and strategies, there were three additional commonalities of progressive developmentalism. First, it had a major emphasis on globalization, which had reached the world's most distant corners.⁶⁹⁴ Progressives argued that globalization made national self-sufficiency and autarky a potentially catastrophic impossibility and promoted fair trade relations under equal terms.⁶⁹⁵ The pace of globalization also made development an urgent necessity.⁶⁹⁶ Second, most progressives shared Kemalism's overurbanization concern. Adıvar considered rural-to-urban migration as a Bolshevization threat;⁶⁹⁷ Tongu promoted agricultural education to connect the peasantry to their land and thereby to forestall social traumas;⁶⁹⁸ Boran drew attention to traumas experienced by newly urbanized workers who remained alienated to urban life;⁶⁹⁹ Aydemir considered urban *gecekondus* (shantytowns) as social cancer, caused by the unbalanced transition from the agricultural to industrial economy.⁷⁰⁰ Younger intellectuals like Baykurt and O. Kemal who were more conscious

⁶⁹³ See Avciođlu, "Vatandařın Refahı," 1959; Avciođlu, "Ne Ekmek Ne Hürriyet," 1959; Avciođlu, "Sıtma Tedavisi," 1959; Baykurt, "Sofralarımız," (1959) 1974; Baykurt, "Hacettepe'de İki Çocuk," (1960) 1974.

⁶⁹⁴ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 320; Aydemir, *Cihan İktisadiyatında Türkiye*, 1931, 3; Tongu, "Yüksek Köy Enstitüsünde İş Eğitimi," (1940s) 2010; Tongu, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 534-538.

⁶⁹⁵ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 192; Aydemir, *Cihan İktisadiyatında Türkiye*, 1931, 3; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 80; Boran, "Hangi Manada Milli İlim," (1943) 2010; Boran, "Zirai Reformda Memleketi İflas Etmiş Bir Rejime Götürmek İstiyorlar," (1945) 2010.

⁶⁹⁶ Aydemir, *Toprak Uyanırsa*, (1963) 2012, 201-202; Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 188-189; Tongu, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, 1946, 318.

⁶⁹⁷ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 310.

⁶⁹⁸ Tongu, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 465.

⁶⁹⁹ Boran, "Sanayide Köylü-İşçi," (1942) 2010.

⁷⁰⁰ Aydemir, *Toprak Uyanırsa*, (1963) 2012, 49 and 253; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988, 229.

towards Turkey's poorer segments considered the *gecekond* as the last refuge of rural-to-urban migrants and praised the communal effort required to raise them.⁷⁰¹ Finally, progressivism took socioeconomic development as the ultimate sign of progress, stressing the conditionality of revolution's survival and Turkey's independence upon its development. Hence, progressives' structuralist developmentalism was reinforced with an emphasis on links to Western capitalism and the position of bourgeoisie and landowners within the political-economic system.

Structuralism had been prevalent among Iranian and Egyptian progressives also. Middle Eastern progressivism generally identified landlords and industrial-commercial bourgeoisie as the fundamental support base of their respective monarchies, which ultimately remained dependent upon imperialist support.⁷⁰² Progressives in both countries promoted Third World socialisms that did not promote state ownership beyond critical and monopoly industries.⁷⁰³ Yet the overlaps in respective developmental paths of Egypt and Iran signal the limits of structuralist thought and the prominence of institutions. Egypt's Free Officers Revolution in 1952 sought to break Egypt's structural political dependency, as well as commercial, industrial, and landed monopolies and oligopolies, while the Iranian monarchy relied heavily upon the US support. Still, in both countries, development strategies in the 1950s and beyond relied upon technocratic planning with a focus on capital-intensive large industries and mega

⁷⁰¹ Baykurt, "Akkanfil," (1960) 1974; O. Kemal, *Gurbet Kuşları*, (1954) 2007.

For a classic study on Turkey's *gecekond* phenomenon, see Karpat, *The Gecekond*, 1976.

⁷⁰² Behrooz, *Rebels with a Cause*, 2000, 3; Bein and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 264.

⁷⁰³ For Iranian independent socialist Khalil Maleki's developmentalist thought, see Katouzian, *Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism*, 2018 and Katouzian, "The Strange Politics of Khalil Maleki," 2004. For Egypt's independent socialist Rashid al-Barrawi's developmentalist thought, see Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002.

infrastructure projects.⁷⁰⁴ Unions remained weak against the state apparatus and only flourished in brief moments of political freedom.⁷⁰⁵ Industrialization created new strata of cronies in both countries.⁷⁰⁶ Notably, in its emphasis over sovereignty, Middle Eastern progressivism until the late twentieth century paid no major attention to accountability. Unions and professional associations remained the only institutions to which progressive intellectuals showed notable attention. In other words, Middle Eastern progressivism in the mid-twentieth century exclusively focused on structures and policies and disregarded institutions as a fundamental aspect of development politics.

This section showed how Turkey's progressive intellectuals understood development in structuralist terms, primarily in its relation to the state's and nation's economic sovereignty. Progressive developmentalism has been a multifaceted strategy with industrial, agricultural, and infrastructure dimensions. It had combined bottom-up and top-down strategies, which had tasked the national state with protecting the nation's interests against foreign and internal sources. Progressive intellectuals observed a growing economic control of the bourgeoisie and landlords at the expense of Turkey's economic independence. Many progressives saw the DP experience as the confirmation of the impossibility of genuine and national development with a political apparatus controlled by Turkey's urban and rural elites in alliance with imperialist powers. Aydemir argued that the DP left a *beggar* economy, dependent upon foreign aid to survive.⁷⁰⁷ Avcıoğlu also drew attention to the DP's economic legacy and championed national development mobilization and economic sacrifice for over a

⁷⁰⁴ For Iran, see Harris, *A Social Revolution*, 2017; For Egypt, see Beattie, *Egypt during the Nasser Years*, 1994. For Egypt's developmentalism since the Sadat years, see Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, 2002; Kadri, *The Unmaking of Arab Socialism*, 2016; and Beattie, *Egypt during the Sadat Years*, 2000.

⁷⁰⁵ Ladjevardi, *Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran*, 1985; Posusney, *Labor and the State in Egypt*, 1997.

⁷⁰⁶ Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran*, 2008; Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991.

⁷⁰⁷ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988, 246 (italics original).

decade.⁷⁰⁸ Sertel argued that the DP recreated the structures of Ottoman dependency.⁷⁰⁹ Gradually, a progressive consensus emerged in the late 1950s, influenced by the DP's economic crisis, that envisioned a new republican revolutionism that strove for greater structural changes

D. Conclusion

This chapter dealt with hegemony in the context of ideology. Nationalism has been the hegemonic ideology in the Middle East since the early twentieth century; and the definition of nationalism has been the focal point of ideological hegemonic confrontations. Various ideological streams promoted their distinct nationalist visions to influence or replace the official definition. Political thought on independence has been central to nationalist visions. This chapter argued that independence had been the foundational pillar of progressive political thought, which understood this concept in three main dimensions: state, nation, and economy. Progressive revolutionaries found their starting point on independence in Kemalist theses and articulated it as a two-pillar struggle, fought against Western encroachment externally and the remnant structures of the old imperial-feudal order internally. The former articulation corresponded to state sovereignty and became the basis of Turkish anti-imperialism. The latter corresponded to national sovereignty and became the basis of their anti-fascism and democracy articulations. This dual notion of sovereignty was foundational to progressives' revolutionary social contract that was both top-down and bottom-up. Progressive developmentalism also combined top-down and bottom-up strategies, simultaneously emphasizing state leadership and popular empowerment.

⁷⁰⁸ Avcıoğlu, "Yarının Meseleleri," 1959; Avcıoğlu, "Sıtma Tedavisi," 1959.

⁷⁰⁹ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965.

Turkish progressive revolutionary intellectuals were an exception in the Middle East with such strong ideological overlaps with the official nationalist interpretation. However, overlaps between progressivism and the dominant secular nationalist liberation vision were also a phenomenon in Iranian and Egyptian revolutionary traditions, with Mosaddeq's and Nasser's movements respectively. This shows how secular nationalist paradigms created the original narratives of progress which future progressives within national liberation and socialist camps consensually applied to their narratives. This does not mean that revolutionaries copied these narratives. Rather, they engaged in critical debates with the hegemonic ideology to which they were sympathetic due to philosophical and practical commonalities. An additional factor contributing to commonalities is the shared backgrounds and political experiences among secular intellectuals of all political schools. Their shared habitus led to significant overlaps in intellectuals' political consciousness, which eased finding ideological common grounds in the late 1950s. Growing ideological cohesion among progressive intellectuals was also due to their ultimate failure in influencing the official nationalist ideology. Rightwing Kemalist interpretations which were sympathetic to fascism and Islamism were dominant within the state in the 1940s and more so in the 1950s. Pro-western anticommunist nationalism triumphed over anti-imperialist and anti-fascist nationalisms. In line with their structuralist paradigms, progressive intellectuals understood the transformation of official nationalism towards a more conservative direction in relation to the growing influence of the urban bourgeoisie and rural notables over the political apparatus.

In the current Turkish, Iranian, and Egyptian contexts, the political emphasis, if not obsession, on sovereignty has not disappeared over the years, decades after liberation

struggles and revolutions. What is notable, despite the eventual failure of progressivism in influencing the transformation of official nationalism in these three countries – which have taken firm Islamist and authoritarian turns in different ways in the 1980s – readily employ the sovereignty narratives that were once developed by progressive intellectuals. In other words, these regimes evolved to a point (politically, economically, ideologically, and socially) that would constitute an absolute nightmare scenario for mid-twentieth century progressive intellectuals. Ironically, however, progressive discourses spread among Turkey's political elites as a justification for their policies.

V. The Struggle for Political Power in Turkey and the Middle East: Vanguard Intellectuals, Revolutionary Thought, and Counter-Hegemonic Confrontations

Twentieth century progressive revolutionism, led by dissident intellectuals, played major roles in the making of the modern Middle East. Nationalist revolutions in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt had produced political orders that were contested among multiple social blocs and ideological camps. This period also marked the heyday of intellectuals, who were prominent actors in these political confrontations. This chapter investigates hegemonic struggles primarily in Turkey and secondarily in Iran and Egypt. It focuses on 1) intellectuals' role and position in counter-hegemonic confrontations; 2) progressive narratives and political thought on revolution; and 3) progressive intellectuals' counter-hegemonic struggle against and within the state apparatus, as well as against conservative and reactionary intellectuals. The chapter thus investigates hegemony as struggles to political power. It also returns to the political theories of Gramsci (organic crises and united front) and Bourdieu (state as a field of struggle). Moreover, the chapter critically engages with securitization theory as a framework for intellectual-state relations in the Middle East. The research question asks: what are the main determinants behind the making and transformation of respective revolutionary strategies and ideologies in Turkey and the Middle East? This research expands the notion of hegemony by analyzing the interactions between the state actors and progressive intellectuals, which had been transformative for both parties.

This chapter shows how Turkish progressive revolutionism, which had been a mix of Kemalism and Leninism, has gone through ideological and strategic transformations. Ideologically, these schools have moved closer. Frequent borrowing of terminology and

personnel from the other progressive bloc, overlapping analyses of Turkey's political-economic regime, and intersecting articulations on intellectuals, progress, and revolution made these schools an ideological camp. This camp, however, did not turn into a political alliance – a united front in Gramscian terms. These changes developed in tandem with the growing conservatism and anticommunist nationalism of Turkey's political establishment, which came together with the marginalization of progressive Kemalists and increasing securitization of socialists. The chapter further shows how Turkish intellectuals conceptualized revolution as the sole answer to Turkey's long, convoluted, and in many ways failed modernization process. They positioned themselves as the vanguards of progressive change and understood the state as an institutional tool to implement their visions.

The chapter argues that progressive counter-hegemonic struggles influenced more than progressive political thought. State responses against progressivism – often in the form of securitization – fundamentally transformed the state apparatuses ideologically and institutionally. Progressive intellectuals, in their ideological focus on structures, often sidelined (but not completely disregarded) the role of institutions – more specifically state capacity – in how hegemonic confrontations unfolded. Securitization practices against progressivism, which were standard in the region, came together with the utilization of fascism and Islamism. This granted a subaltern position to these ideologies within the state apparatus and thereby a new field in their hegemonic struggle. The extent and violence of securitization policies remained especially dependent upon institutional configurations. This chapter further shows how securitization and politicization practices reveal a fundamental aspect of hegemony from the perspective of the state actors: the capacity to determine the

legitimate boundaries of politics by successfully implementing the limits of politicization and securitization.

The chapter is divided into three parts. Part I analyzes revolutionary intellectuals' self-entitled mission as the vanguards of progress. Part II investigates how intellectuals understood revolution, how these understandings transformed over time, and the influence of social structures and institutions on these understandings. Part III explores intellectuals' counter-hegemonic struggles against and/or within the state and against conservative and reactionary intellectuals. Moreover, each part compares Turkish intellectual narratives with Iranian and Egyptian intellectual narratives. Comparisons offer theoretical and analytical conclusions on progressive revolutionary *Weltanschauung* in the twentieth century Middle East.

A. *Intellectuals: Vanguards of Progressive Change*

How intellectuals understood their roles and purposes in societal relations heavily informed their political imaginations. Turkish and Middle Eastern intellectuals were a novel social bloc, made by the spread of formal, state-sponsored, and secular education. As a social bloc, intellectuals were disillusioned by the troubled modernization process. The Young Turks were both inspired and frightened by their perception of modern European civilization.⁷¹⁰ Likewise, Turkish progressives developed convoluted perceptions of modernity as inspiring for its progressive and scientific nature, and frightening for its

⁷¹⁰ Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 57

Mustafa Kemal preached: "Civilization is such a powerful fire that it burns and destroys those indifferent to it. Uncivilized people and societies are forever doomed to live under the feet of the civilized."

divisive, exploitative, and destructive nature.⁷¹¹ Intellectuals believed that the nations which could not duly adapt to modern circumstances were doomed.⁷¹² Progressives conceptualized their roles as the harbingers of a new political consciousness – fit for the challenges brought by modern times – to be spread to the population. Adivar, for example, wrote that intellectuals must comprehend the evolution of life and the changes in human necessities, and accordingly guide their nations, which would otherwise be trampled to death in history’s Armageddon-like march.⁷¹³ Intellectuals observed a reality and necessity of collectively transitioning from religious to scientific mentality, and they positioned themselves as the truth-tellers of the new age.⁷¹⁴ They were to be people’s educators and navigate them through modernity’s challenges.

The Kemalist regime faced opposition from the Istanbul press and universities in its early years.⁷¹⁵ In response, the establishment tried to raise its organic intellectuals via education institutes like Ankara University, *Halkevleri* (People’s Houses), and Village Institutes.⁷¹⁶ National liberation intellectuals spearheaded these efforts. Regime-affiliated intellectuals like Aydemir and Tonguç wrote hostile analyses against “semi-intellectuals” who failed to comprehend the revolution.⁷¹⁷ Tonguç, who was critical of the late Ottoman education system and the intellectuals it produced, complained of “modern bigots,” who corrupted the

⁷¹¹ See Nazım [Orhan Selim], “Bir Çin Hikayesi,” (1930) 1987; O. Kemal, “Gene ‘Batı’ Üzerine,” (1964) 2007; Adivar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 147.

⁷¹² Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 37; Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965); Adivar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev* (1955) 2007, 207; Adivar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 20.

⁷¹³ Adivar, “Zaman Adamı, Zamane Adamı,” (1937) 2017.

⁷¹⁴ Adivar, “Din ve İdeoloji,” (1937) 2017; Nazım [Adsız], “İlim Anası,” (1937) 1992; Baykurt, *Öğretmenin Uyandırma Görevi*, (1969) 2000.

⁷¹⁵ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965), 276.

⁷¹⁶ See Mardin, *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 230; Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 253-254; and Zürcher, “Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic,” 2004, 107.

⁷¹⁷ See Aydemir, “Yarı Münevverler Klübü,” 1932 and Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 17.

revolution from within.⁷¹⁸ Moreover, Aydemir challenged the universalist claims of European theories (and Turkish intellectuals who remained committed to them) and argued that national liberation movements would demolish the Eurocentric intellectual hegemony.⁷¹⁹ Dissident nationalist Adıvar also pointed to the corruptness of late Ottoman intellectual realm, both modern/secular and religious/traditional.⁷²⁰ She pointed to education for “building the foundations of a new mentality to be awakened across the nation.”⁷²¹ Socialists also developed critical attitudes against European intellectual hegemony and Ottoman intellectuals. Nazım’s poems and other writings since the late 1920s foreshadowed an Orientalism critique, exposing the connection between European knowledge production and colonialism.⁷²² Sertel argued that only a few intellectuals could comprehend the true extent and radicalism of the Kemalist revolutions. Like Tonguç, Sertel also stressed that the lack of intellectual capital due to shortcomings of the Ottoman education system had decelerated the revolution.⁷²³ Most progressive intellectuals detested a certain type of intellectual who was embodied in the alienated, detached, cosmopolitan, over-Westernized Ottoman intellectual.

Despite their notable lack of sufficient personnel with intellectual and technical capital, the Kemalists did not meet all intellectuals with open arms. Like the political incorporation and exclusion of social blocs (mercantile bourgeoisie and rural notables vs. urban workers

⁷¹⁸ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 25.

⁷¹⁹ Aydemir, “Europacentrisme’in Tasfiyesi,” 1932; Aydemir, “Polemik: Biz Avrupa’nın Hayranı Değil, Mirasçısıyız,” 1934; Aydemir, “Polemik: Milli Kurtuluş Hareketleri Hakkında Bizim Tezimiz,” 1932.

⁷²⁰ Adıvar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, (1955) 2007, 208.

⁷²¹ Adıvar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, (1955) 2007, 276.

⁷²² A clear example of Nazım’s anti-orientalist agitation was his poem “Piyer Loti,” (1933) 2008, exposing the interconnection of knowledge production and exploitation. Nazım wrote ‘*Hashish! ... Submission! ... Kismet!... Cage, inn, caravan, water fountain! ... A sultan dancing on a silver tray! ... Maharajah, padishah, a thousand-and one-year old shah ... Here is the East as seen by the foreign poet! Here is the East of books, printed 1.000.000 every minute. ... Yet, not yesterday, not today, not tomorrow, such an East did not exist, will not exist! ... East, the land over which naked captives died hungrily! The country that belonged to everyone, except the Easterner! ...*’ Also see Nazım Hikmet [Orhan Selim], “Şark ve Oryantal” (1936) 1987. Similarly, Sertel’s *Çitra Roy ve Babası* (1936) is notable for her critique of orientalist knowledge production.

⁷²³ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 72.

and peasants respectively), the establishment also incorporated and excluded intellectuals based on ideological considerations. In Bourdieu's terms, the political establishment, once monopolized, developed a capable symbolic capital to determine the value of intellectual capitals of different ideologies.⁷²⁴ In Gramscian terms, the Kemalist establishment incorporated national liberation from the left and Turanism (which in the 1930s took the form of fascism) from the right as subaltern partners, which sometimes functioned as a source of internal opposition within the state apparatus. Socialists from the left and Islamists from the right, on the other hand, were to be subordinated as the antagonists of the new order. National liberation intellectuals' subaltern position made them inferior to state elites but also granted them the privilege of speaking in the revolution's name. They became part of Turkey's "traditional intellectuals," who rose organically to an ascending social bloc – the military-bureaucratic segment – as well as to the wider urban-educated segment that the governing bloc intellectually and morally (and eventually politically) led. Even dissident national liberation intellectuals like Adivar in the 1930s and Baykurt and Avcıoğlu in the 1950s claimed to teach and speak on behalf of not a distinct social bloc but the nation in its entirety.

Kemalism's ideal intellectual was a teacher.⁷²⁵ Kemalists and progressive intellectuals overlapped in seeing the intellectual bloc as the messenger agents and vanguards of revolutionary consciousness – notwithstanding their differences in correct consciousness.⁷²⁶

The Kemalists were the products of secular education and wished to spread it across the

⁷²⁴ See Bourdieu, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," 1994; and Bourdieu, *On the State: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1989 – 1992*, 2014.

⁷²⁵ Notably, many national liberation intellectuals such as Adivar, Tonguç, Aydemir, and Baykurt worked as teachers in their intellectual careers.

⁷²⁶ Zürcher (in *The Young Turk Legacy and the National Awakening*, 2010, 113) writes that the Young Turks often portrayed themselves as educators of a backward population.

population. They were aware of the wedge between the urban-educated bloc (including the military-bureaucratic segment) and the broader populace, especially the peasantry. National liberation intellectuals considered the people as the new grounds to raise a Kemalist political consciousness.⁷²⁷ For progressive Kemalists, the revolution's survival depended on its ability to "infuse its ideals into the Anatolian youth and intellectuals."⁷²⁸ This required overcoming the intellectual-people distinctions, of which nationalist intellectuals were aware since the early twentieth century.⁷²⁹ Nationalists antagonized societal ignorance, but they also argued that the life experiences of Turkey's peasantry gave it a distinct knowledge. For Tonguç, the revolution was to intersect this authentic knowledge with modern scientific knowledge.⁷³⁰ Aydemir argued that the peasantry, despite being uneducated, constituted the population's most savvy segment.⁷³¹ Adivar believed intellectual-people distinction to be represented in Turkey's traditional shadow play, *Karagöz ve Hacivat*, which revolves around the stories of Karagöz and Hacivat who respectively represent Istanbul's exploited, beaten, humble resident who somehow manages to get away from the worst of situations by humiliating his oppressors and know-it-all intellectual who knows without understanding.⁷³² Overcoming such distinctions constituted the ideological core of progressive nationalist revolutionary struggle. Tonguç noted that "ideals...could only survive as long as there were people who internalized and defended them."⁷³³

⁷²⁷ See Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968.

⁷²⁸ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 275.

⁷²⁹ Adivar, "Halka Doğru," (1919) 2017.

⁷³⁰ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019.

⁷³¹ Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 206; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 1959 (1971), 302-304.

⁷³² Adivar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev*, (1955) 2007, 116.

⁷³³ Tonguç, "Atatürk Üniversitesi," (1959) 2000, 497.

Meanwhile, for socialists, finding a social base in a tightly restricted civil society was essential to their intellectual relevance. Their main field was print media.⁷³⁴ The 80 percent illiteracy rate made the urban-educated segment socialism's immediate base. Gramsci described the intellectual-people distinction as "the popular element that feels but does not always know or understand" and "the intellectual element that knows but does not always understand and in particular does not always feel."⁷³⁵ Progressive depictions of the intellectual-people distinction overlapped with this understanding. Socialist intellectuals blamed "bourgeois intellectuals" – including progressive Kemalists – as a bloc incapable of understanding or feeling.⁷³⁶ Socialists believed that neither the republican establishment nor its intellectuals could successfully transcend extant status distinctions. A common attitude in response was to reject their privileged statuses and put themselves as proletarian intellectuals.⁷³⁷ Moreover, socialists drew attention to structural factors behind societal ignorance, arguing that the differences of knowledge between uneducated peasants and urban-educated was the consequence of their different life experiences. For Nazım, the Turkish peasant "learned without land, knew without books."⁷³⁸ O. Kemal, who was a rarity among Turkish intellectuals for being self-taught, depicted Turkey's uneducated segments as instinctively savvy yet incapable of withstanding exploitation and injustice.⁷³⁹ Associated with this understanding was a revised false consciousness narrative that exposed ignorance as

⁷³⁴ Disabled to work among the masses with explicit socialist agitations, socialists were confined to print media through journalism and socialist-realist literature. See Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 92.

⁷³⁵ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 418

⁷³⁶ Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1304-1334.

⁷³⁷ For Nazım's depiction of his transition from being a *paşazade* (pasha offspring) into a proletarian artist, see Nazım Hikmet, *Yaşamak Güzel Şey Be Kardeşim*, (1963) 1987, 30. For Kemal's rejection of his petty-bourgeois status, see Kemal, "Düşünceler," (1960) 2007.

⁷³⁸ Nazım, *Kuvayı Milliye*, (1941) 2008, 571.

⁷³⁹ O. Kemal's *Hanımın Çiftliği* (1961) 2003 and *Kaçak* (1970) 2005 are two notable major examples.

being systematically and politically forced upon the people.⁷⁴⁰ People needed not being educated to understand injustice, nor to resist it.⁷⁴¹ Socialists sought to transcend these distinctions in practical terms: struggle. They promoted collectivism and education as the correct means to struggle against systemic exploitations – which the masses could not fully comprehend.⁷⁴²

Progressive intellectuals understood their roles as mass educators towards a political consciousness that would realize a prosperous and free order, against a populace that might not be open to their message. Adivar’s novel characters like Aliye in *Beat the Bitch* strove to be a “mother and light” in the service of a village community that eventually stoned her to death. Baykurt’s articles in the 1950s argued that education – especially of girls – was such an important task that the state had to enforce it, against the wishes of the people.⁷⁴³ For Nazım, an intellectual’s duty was to understand the social reality objectively, point towards a solution, and selflessly fight for it alongside the people.⁷⁴⁴ Boran argued that progressivism in art was realism and wrote that historically, revolutionaries “understood the [societal] realities better and expressed them in their ideologies.”⁷⁴⁵ O. Kemal described his intellectual mission as realistically bringing the voices of the working people to the public arena and

⁷⁴⁰ See Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 810-813; Kemal, “Aydınlık Gerçekçilik,” (1961) 2007, 232-233; Kıvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz* (1960) 2008, 35.

⁷⁴¹ This was indeed a very strong emphasis in both Nazım and O. Kemal. Kemal’s *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde* (1954) 2008; *Hanımın Çiftliği* (1961) 2003; and *Cemile* (1952) 1980 are novels shaped around small people’s resistances to injustice. One major theme in Nazım’s *Kuvayi Milliye* was that the people learned to be anti-imperialist by their experiences and by resistance.

⁷⁴² See See, for example O. Kemal, *Üst Yanı Fasa Fiso*, (1961) 2007; Nazım Hikmet, “İşçiler Sendikalara Girmeli Mi?” (1959) 2002; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 47-61.

⁷⁴³ Baykurt, “İki Okul,” (1959) 1974; Baykurt, “Yangeldimcilik,” (1959) 1974; Baykurt, “Kör Bıçak,” (1959) 1974.

⁷⁴⁴ See for example Nazım’s description of Halil, the imprisoned intellectual who represents the author’s persona, in Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008. Also see Nazım Hikmet, “Barış Uğrundaki Mücadelede Şairin Rolü,” (1956) 1992, 123. Imprisonment in his narratives appeared frequently as “service to homeland.” See Nazım, “Sultan Hamit Devrinde,” (1947) 2008.

⁷⁴⁵ Boran, “İleri Sanat, Geri Sanat,” [1946] 2010.

answering the normative question “how it should be.”⁷⁴⁶ He argued that intellectuals’ duty was similar to the doctor in the sense that “they should diagnose the disease and give the necessary prescription for treatment.”⁷⁴⁷ Avcioğlu also adopted the doctor narrative, complaining that Turkish intellectuals “accurately diagnosed diseases but said nothing of the treatment.”⁷⁴⁸ Hence, many progressive intellectuals also embodied a version of the Kemalist motto, “for the people, despite the people.”

The differences in political positions of national liberation and socialist intellectuals created divergences in how intellectuals understood their revolutionary duties. Yet both schools shared a strong sense of vanguardism, which also corresponded with distrust against the masses for their proneness to emotional manipulation. Progressive emphasis on vanguard intellectual cadres also showed the elitist nature of revolutionary thought. Aydemir was an elaborate theoretician of revolutionary elitism. He attributed a significant role to intellectuals – cadre – in revolutionary politics as a minority vanguard who selflessly pursued revolutionary interests.⁷⁴⁹ He conceptualized the cadre as the organizers and administrators of the revolutionary political order who worked for progressive societal interests.⁷⁵⁰ It was a narrow and elite group made by the most conscious, disciplined, and advanced elements that gathered around the party and the leader as the “commanding officers of a national revolution.”⁷⁵¹ To Aydemir, only a supra-class idealist cadre could protect the revolutionary order from individual or class interests and reaction while educating and guiding the nation

⁷⁴⁶ Kemal, “Gerçekçilik,” (1962) 1983, 53.

⁷⁴⁷ Kemal, “Şive ve Taklit,” (1953) 2007, 142.

⁷⁴⁸ Avcioğlu, “Yenilik İhtiyacı,” 1957.

⁷⁴⁹ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 85-86.

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 135-136.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 259.

towards progress.⁷⁵² The cadre was to formulate the revolution's ideology and build its corresponding institutions. It would also spread the revolution through education to awaken a new consciousness among the masses.⁷⁵³ For Aydemir, masses could have no ideas or logic but only emotions, which remained open to demagogues' manipulation, especially if the population is uneducated and politically unconscious.⁷⁵⁴ Aydemir's vanguardism was influenced by Leninism⁷⁵⁵ and Plato's *Republic*.⁷⁵⁶ A committed agent of the revolution, Aydemir – like many revolutionary theoreticians globally – was searching for the ideal and incorruptible political order.

Tonguç, another progressive Kemalist, had more systematic and practical views on intellectual leadership. Tonguç was critical of urban intellectuals who “enjoyed seeing the peasant only in ceremonies.”⁷⁵⁷ He saw the village as the only uncorrupted source of the new generation of intellectuals, who, unlike Ottoman intellectuals, would be rural, educated to work, and organically attached to their people.⁷⁵⁸ Transcending the intellectual-people distinction and spreading the revolution to the peasantry necessitated raising intellectuals who would remain connected to their villages.⁷⁵⁹ In Gramscian terms, Tonguç sought to raise “organic intellectuals” of the village, for the village, and inside the village, to realize the

⁷⁵² Aydemir, “İnkılabın İdeolojisi: 1789 İhtilalinin Mezarı Başında,” 1934; Aydemir, “Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi: 3) Türk Nasyonalizmi,” 1933.

⁷⁵³ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 86-89 and 96.

⁷⁵⁴ See Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 9 and 471.

⁷⁵⁵ Being educated in Moscow in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Aydemir also wrote the first book on Lenin in Turkish in 1924, back when he was a socialist. See Aydemir [Şevket Süreyya] (with Sadrettin Celal, Luzovski, Pierre Pascal, and Zivoniev), *Lenin ve Leninizm*, (1924) 2005.

⁷⁵⁶ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991, 432.

⁷⁵⁷ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 9.

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

Tonguç acknowledged that many of Turkey's intellectuals had humble peasant origins, but they too were assimilated into an urban mentality, became alienated from the peasantry, and gradually joined the ranks of those who exploited the village (see Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938, 67 and Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 126).

⁷⁵⁹ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 575.

Kemalist discourse of “peasant is the master of the nation.”⁷⁶⁰ Tonguç’s institutes united education and labor.⁷⁶¹ Education must be connected to the realities of life, Tonguç argued, otherwise it would be irrelevant as the *medrese*.⁷⁶² The project trained peasant kids as teachers, healthcare personnel, and agricultural and technical experts. They would then work in villages as educators, as well as act as republican vanguards in the villages’ socioeconomic and cultural revival. A village teacher was to represent both intellectualism and educated labor to solve the village problems.⁷⁶³ They were not to be guests in the village but active and organic members of its community, both to learn from and teach to them.⁷⁶⁴ Intellectuals must not expect miracle solutions; they must be the agents of change to the problems they wished to be resolved.⁷⁶⁵

Cut from the state apparatus and the masses, socialist intellectuals tasked themselves with a different vanguard role: truth-tellers. While national liberation intellectuals like Aydemir aspired for political leadership over the masses, socialists aspired for intellectual leadership. Sertel depicted “being a light to [workers], equipping them with the knowledge to overcome fate, making them capable of defending their rights” as service to the homeland.⁷⁶⁶ Others like Nazım and O. Kemal exposed the wide gap between the triumphant peopleist narratives

⁷⁶⁰ See Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, 1946, ix and 202; Tonguç, “Pazarören Köy Enstitüsü Kurulurken,” (1941) 1997, 185; Tonguç, *Maarif Vekili Köy Enstitülerinde*, (1942) 1997, 196; Tonguç, “17 Nisan,” (1961) 1996, 447.

⁷⁶¹ For Tonguç, Turkey’s village question was bigger than a simple development project could resolve. Tonguç believed it required a complete ‘revival’ of the village, which would be possible through an education mobilization led by people who had internal knowledge of the village conditions and that relied upon scientific principles and native knowledge and aimed at transforming the peasants into agents that could triumph over nature and destiny (see Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 49-50).

⁷⁶² See Tonguç, “Birinci Maarif Şurası,” (1939) 2000, 148.

⁷⁶³ Tonguç, “Anadolu Köylerinde Kalkınma Hareketleri: Okullar,” (1936) 1997, 43; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 652; Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938, 67.

⁷⁶⁴ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 40 and 559.

⁷⁶⁵ Tonguç, *Mektuplarla Köy Enstitüsü Yılları*, (1941) 1979, 217.

⁷⁶⁶ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 61.

and the reality of Turkey's subordinated masses.⁷⁶⁷ Socialist formulated their responsibility as being the spokespersons of the people, whose exploitation and misery went neglected.⁷⁶⁸ This mission also included struggling against religious and racial propaganda.⁷⁶⁹ Socialists conceptualized their duty to stand with the oppressed on the right side of history. As such, until the late 1950s, socialists spread not a distinct political consciousness; rather, they countered official and reactionary discourses with their narratives of truth, science, and the people's interests. They did not point to a single means of revolutionism; they expected all intellectuals to contribute to the people's cause in the best way they could.⁷⁷⁰ Yet becoming intellectuals of the exploited – not merely for the exploited – also required diminishing the intellectual-people distinction. Sertel and Nazım, who had privileged backgrounds, blamed the intellectuals' status blindness, and blamed those who could not accept workers as their equals.⁷⁷¹ Yet other socialists like Kıvılcımlı, who came of poorer backgrounds, blamed the status blindness of privileged socialists, who reproduced the intellectual-people distinction.⁷⁷²

The difference between socialist and national liberation intellectuals was not the consequence of ideological distinctions. Instead, their overlapping *Weltanschauungs* led them to a similar self-entitled vanguard position. The distinctions in this role were the results of their respective position vis-à-vis the state apparatus. Moreover, with the growing

⁷⁶⁷ Exposing this gap emerged as a major socialist tactic in this period. See Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], "Halkevi ve Kulüp," (1937) 1997 and O. Kemal, "Dert Dinleme Günü," (1947) 2007.

⁷⁶⁸ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 80-81 and Kıvılcımlı, *İnkılapçı Münevver Nedir?* (1935) 2011.

⁷⁶⁹ See Nazım's intellectual assaults against rightwing intellectuals in the 1930s in Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Bay Mistik," (1936) 1987; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Yine Bay Mistik, (1936) 1987; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Bay Mistik'in Kurnazlığı Yahut Taktik," (1936) 1987; Nazım [Orhan Selim], "Bilanço," (1936) 1987. Sertel also considered her antifascism in the 1940s as her greatest struggle. See Sayers, "Sabiha Sertel Kimdi," 2015, 12.

⁷⁷⁰ O. Kemal, "Düşünceler," (1960) 2007; Nazım, "Barış Uğrındaki Mücadelede Şairin Rolü," (1956) 1992.

⁷⁷¹ See Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 47; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1304-1323.

⁷⁷² See Kıvılcımlı, *Yol Dizisi Kitap 9: Partide Konaklar ve Konuklar*, (1933) 1978. Also see Ağcabay, *Türkiye Komünist Partisi ve Dr. Hikmet*, 2009, 87; Türkali, *Tek Kişilik Ölüm*, 2021.

conservatism of the political establishment in the 1940s, national liberation intellectuals found themselves politically marginalized. Anticipating the opposition the teachers would face by those who exploited the village, Tonguç championed that republican teachers had to be well-read, organized, and disciplined, even if their state would abandon them.⁷⁷³ Younger progressives problematized the abandonment of intellectuals – especially the teachers.⁷⁷⁴ Intellectuals’ poverty and exploitation also became a major issue since the 1940s.⁷⁷⁵ O. Kemal is a notable example, who wrote eighteen novels and twelve short-story books from 1950 to 1965, while also working as a journalist, and spent his life in poverty nevertheless.⁷⁷⁶ Progressive intellectuals also observed a growing number of urban-educated left behind, which they understood as the abandonment of the republican education ethos.⁷⁷⁷ The rampant inflation during the DP years brought further pressures on the lower strata of urban-educated. Moreover, the urban-educated segment and their intellectuals observed a growing abandonment of Kemalism by the state elites since the DP’s rise to power. These developments had pushed the political consciousness of younger intellectuals towards more radical and socialistic interpretations of Kemalism, which added to the growing intellectual cohesion between the two schools that represented progressivism.

The comparative part of this section investigates how the intellectual bloc’s position within a political regime might have influenced their self-described societal roles. Reza

⁷⁷³ Tonguç, *Mektuplarla Köy Enstitüsü Yılları*, (1941) 1979, 61.

⁷⁷⁴ Baykurt, “Gevşeyen İlköğretim,” (1960) 1974, 237; Baykurt, “Yapağlıdaki Arkadaşlar,” (1959) 1974; Baykurt, “Sepet Havası,” (1959) 1974; Baykurt, “Naci’nin Güzel İşi,” (1959) 1974.

⁷⁷⁵ On leftist narratives on intellectuals’ poverty, see Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1065-1069. For how progressives such as Sertel, as well as others like Suat Derviş and Naci Sadullah, problematized intellectual poverty in the 1930s and 1940s, see Birkan, *Dünya ile Devlet Arasında Türk Muharriri, 1930-1960*, 2018, 371-372.

⁷⁷⁶ Kemal, “Dereden Tepeden,” (1965) 2007. Also see Bezirci, *Orhan Kemal*, 1984, 21-27 and Otyam, *Arkadaşım Orhan Kemal ve Mektupları*, 1975, 235 and 251.

⁷⁷⁷ Nazım, “Eğitim Politikamızın İçyüzü,” (1959) 2002; Kemal, “Balon,” (1954) 2007.

Shah's regime lacked an organic connection with the intellectual bloc and had no use of them as visionaries and educators.⁷⁷⁸ Heavy censorship repressed intellectual voices, especially on the left. A group of intellectuals, who published *Donya* (World) journal, applied materialist-dialectic analyses to Iran with attention to intellectuals – envisioned as cultural leaders.⁷⁷⁹ Alavi, a member of the *Donya* circle, depicted his intellectual role as enlightening the Iranian people.⁷⁸⁰ Hedayat named the socialist journalist in his novella *Hajji Aga Monadi al-Haq*, literally proclaimer of truth.⁷⁸¹ With Reza Shah's abdication and the rise of Tudeh, the intellectuals connected their vanguard role with a political vision. Egyptian intellectuals also assumed a cultural vanguard position, which also included defining the collective Egyptian nationality.⁷⁸² Egypt's liberal-colonial order had allowed a partial and discontinuous political vanguard role to intellectuals who led the counter-hegemonic movements and played prominent roles within the Wafd.⁷⁸³ The Free Officers' regime also championed the intellectual leadership. They shared a vision for national independence, social transformation, progress, and social justice, which helped the regime build a connection with the intellectuals in the 1950s that was reminiscent of the Kemalist-intellectual relations in the 1930s.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁷⁸ Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 60-65.

⁷⁷⁹ Ghods, "The Iranian Communist Movement under Reza Shah," 1990, 508.

Matin-Asgari (in *Both Eastern and Western*, 2018, 101-14) draws attention to the similarities between *Donya* and *Kadro* in their attempts to create a hegemonic materialist trend in their respective domestic contexts.

⁷⁸⁰ In his interview with Raffat (in *The Prison Papers of Bozorg Alavi*, 1985, 67) Alavi noted "For over twenty years, I am not a political person. Political in the sense of personal make-up, in the sense of being involved in party affairs, or siding with issues, and so on. I am not that kind of person at all. And I never was one. Really, from the time I left Iran, in my opinion, I am totally withdrawn. And, as I see it, it is a matter of having a common purpose. That is, if one's purpose is to enlighten the Iranian people, well then, one can do that regardless of being political. But the kind of political involvement that requires one to go out and organize a group, to talk to a people and bring them around to one's way of thinking. This is not for me. I would not know how to go about it. I never did."

⁷⁸¹ Hedayat, *Haji Aqa*, (1945) 1998.

⁷⁸² A classic example is Tawfiq Al-Hakim's *Return of the Spirit* (1933), 2020. Also see Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 220; Selim, *The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt 1880-1985*, 2004, 1.

⁷⁸³ For effendiya intellectuals' political roles see Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002, 22 and Ryzova, *The Age of the Efendiyya*, 2014.

⁷⁸⁴ Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002.

Generally, Egyptian, Iranian, and Turkish progressivisms in this period had intermixed national and social revolutionism, both of which granting prominent vanguard roles to intellectuals. Yet the terms and ability to exercise these roles remained dependent upon the political and ideological limits set by the state.

Being an intellectual in the Middle East in the early to mid-twentieth century was not a class but a status position, distinguished by education.⁷⁸⁵ Progressive intellectuals envisioned a vanguard societal role to themselves to use this education to spread a distinct political consciousness. Their means to enlighten their constituency – which almost exclusively was the urban-educated– remained dependent upon the boundaries set by their respective political regime. Revolutionary intellectualism meant being a vanguard fighter, either politically or culturally and morally. In Turkey, socialist intellectuals from the 1930s to the 1960s had continuously adopted a cultural leadership role as truth-tellers – as opposed to revolutionary leaders. National liberation intellectuals who were organically attached to the Kemalist establishment until the mid-1940s envisioned a political and intellectual leadership role. Consequently, national liberation intellectuals envisioned bringing political consciousness to the peasantry (political leadership), while socialist intellectuals were concerned over people's daily issues (cultural and moral leadership). With the DP government, which shifted the position of national liberation intellectuals politically, these two schools have moved closer intellectually. With the growing popularity of socialism among the urban-educated, socialist intellectuals in the 1960s moved on to a political vanguard role, which immediately led to the abandonment of people's daily concerns and greater emphasis on industrial development

⁷⁸⁵ Matin-Asgari, *Both Eastern and Western*, 2018 and Hammad, *Industrial Sexuality*, 2016, 18 and 29.

among socialist narratives.⁷⁸⁶ Intellectuals' vanguardism remained dependent upon their understanding revolutionism, which also witnessed transformations from the 1930s to the 1960s. The next part investigates progressive political thought on revolution and its evolution.

B. Revolution: The Gateway to Progress

This section analyzes progressive narratives on revolution and how progressive intellectuals understood the Kemalist revolution. Revolutionism had captivated the imagination of all Middle Eastern progressives in the early to mid-twentieth century. The reasons behind the spread of revolutionism are global, regional, and domestic. Modern revolutionism, which began waning in Western and Southern Europe in the late nineteenth century, was picked up by ambitious modernizers in the early twentieth century in distant geographies such as China, Mexico, and Russia, as well as in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt. Regionally in the Middle East, intellectuals closely watched the developments in neighboring countries. Common grievances against European encroachment and domestic autocracies enabled them to grasp the interconnectedness of regional modernization. At the domestic level, intellectuals understood these problems as the consequences of flawed modernization processes led by self-interested and/or politically unconscious leaders. Intellectuals saw the liberation from autocracy and imperialism as dependent upon the coming revolution, which they imagined as comprehensive and radical transformations in all aspects of societal

⁷⁸⁶ Prominent socialist intellectuals like Boran and Avcıoğlu came to define development as genuine and heavy industrialization in the 1960s, as a precondition to a welfare society. See Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (1968) 1992 and Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (1966) 1973. On this, also see Buğra, *Kapitalizm, Yoksulluk ve Türkiye'de Sosyal Politika*, 2008.

relations. Revolution was more than changes in governance and/or production relations. Revolution meant the only way to genuine progress and the answer to the failed modernization process which brought not an enlightened, democratic, and prosperous society but exploitation and repression.

The Kemalist establishment officially portrayed itself as a progressive, revolutionary, and modernist regime, guided solely by science.⁷⁸⁷ The republican *Weltanschauung* rested upon scientific rationalism centered around people's agency, secular nationalism defined mainly through language and common history, and solidarist developmentalism.⁷⁸⁸ Kemalist political philosophy was dualistic between the old and new.⁷⁸⁹ The Ottoman-Islamic past and its remnants and the rival nationalists of Young Turk origin represented the old in the official ideology.⁷⁹⁰ Disillusioned with half-hearted, reformist, and evolutionary modernization efforts of the Ottoman past, Kemalists believed that series of sociopolitical revolutions constituted the path to genuine progress.⁷⁹¹ However, other than the radical but vague idea of a secular, centralized, and self-sufficient republic, neither the Kemalists nor the intellectual cadres attached to them had exact blueprints concerning a revolutionary order.⁷⁹² This was a

⁷⁸⁷ Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali*, 1998, 71.

⁷⁸⁸ See Hanioglu, "The Historical Roots of Kemalism," 2012, 32; Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, 2006, 162; Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey*, 2006, 2-3; Toprak, *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 135-161.

Bringing the source of political authority down to earth had been a fundamental Kemalist principle. Its radical followers, like Refik Ahmet Sevengil, who was a radical secular member of the parliament, declared in 1929 that "We toppled down Allah together with the sultan. Our worship places are the factories" (in Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması, 1923-1931*, 1981, 220). Although the official Kemalist position was much more lenient concerning religion, certainly not going as far as their Bolshevik counterparts, such comments were not too marginal among the intellectuals.

⁷⁸⁹ Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, 2011, 61.

⁷⁹⁰ Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali*, 1998, 40-41; Perry, "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran," 2004, 257.

⁷⁹¹ Toprak (in *Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi*, 2020, 6) argues that World War I had dramatically changed the modernization paradigm of the Turkish intellectuals from evolutionary progress (*terakki*) to revolution (*inkilap*).

⁷⁹² Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005 and Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015.

commonality in most national revolutions globally.⁷⁹³ Adıvar, who was part of the Liberation War's leading cadre, wrote retrospectively that intellectuals who gathered in Ankara in 1920 developed a consensus, however vague, on the necessity of a modern and Western-style government.⁷⁹⁴ Although small in numbers within the liberation movement, republicanism, championed by nationalist intellectuals, prevailed with the military's institutional support.⁷⁹⁵ Turkish progressivism supported the republican revolution and its consequent steps for its institutionalization because they removed the major obstacles against Turkey's progress and prepared the groundwork for greater structural transformations.⁷⁹⁶ Institutional support of the military was crucial for the republican project both for its realization and safeguarding.

Extant studies of Turkish progressivism, which almost exclusively focuses on socialism, took Kemalism's influence over socialism as the latter's intellectual incapacity to break the former's hegemony.⁷⁹⁷ Others emphasized the friendly relations between Kemalist Turkey and the USSR to explain Turkish socialists' timid opposition.⁷⁹⁸ One factor they miss is the overlapping *Weltanschauung* between Kemalism and Leninism. Notably, Turkish conservative and reactionary political movements and intellectuals had not missed this connection.⁷⁹⁹ Turkey's progressive intellectualism emerged at the intersection of two revolutions: Kemalist and Leninist. Consequently, national liberation and socialist schools shared significant elements with both revolutionary traditions. The most notable commonality between progressive and Kemalist *Weltanschauungs* was the dualistic reading

⁷⁹³ Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men*, 1980.

⁷⁹⁴ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 177.

⁷⁹⁵ Adıvar, *Türkiye Garba Bakıyor*, (1930) 2015, 135.

⁷⁹⁶ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 406-408; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 83 and 283.

⁷⁹⁷ Aydınoglu, *Türkiye Solu: 1960-1980*, 2008; Yurtsever, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş: Türkiye Solu, 1960-1980*, 2021.

⁷⁹⁸ Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar: 1925-1936*, 2021.

⁷⁹⁹ Demirel, *Adalet Partisi: İdeoloji ve Politika*, 2021.

of history and society between the old and new. Progressive narratives understood change as a natural law, which came with the rejection of sacredness attributed to politics, religion, or tradition.⁸⁰⁰ They conceptualized history as a dialectical process between the forces of progress and reaction, in which progress was deterministically destined to triumph.⁸⁰¹ O. Kemal's historical narrative, for example, depicted "a war between light and dark, knowledge and deception, progress and reaction, rightful and mighty, robbed and robber."⁸⁰² Progressive demands for change went beyond the Kemalist revolutions, agitating for radical destruction of the old structures. The Kemalist establishment, however, prioritized entrenching the regime above all else, which necessitated the incorporation of imperial structures, most notably the bureaucracy.⁸⁰³ Progressives argued in response that the inability and/or unwillingness to destruct the old would keep counterrevolution alive, which would ultimately dismantle the revolution.⁸⁰⁴ To survive, revolutions had to move forwards, perpetually.

Revolutions, then, were the radical gateway to the new for the progressives. Revolutionism was the ideology of change, irrespective of strategy or political conviction. Progressive intellectuals conceptualized revolutions as broader than political or even economic changes but as the creators of new people and societies. Adivar, whose

⁸⁰⁰ Nazım, "Tolstoy ve İyilik," (1935) 1991; Boran, "Dünyanın Gidişi," (1941) 2010.

⁸⁰¹ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 8-9; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008; Kıvılcımlı, *Devrim Nedir?* (1969) 1974.

⁸⁰² O. Kemal, *Üst Yanı Fasa Fiso*, (1961) 2007.

⁸⁰³ This allowed the privileged segments of the Ottoman era to be incorporated into the republican order. Former sultanate or caliphate supporters, establishment ulema, or bureaucrats who remained loyal to Istanbul during the War of Liberation years could find prominent positions within the new establishment by paying lip service to the CHP (see Bila, *CHP, 1919-1999*, 1999, 61-62). This fits perfectly with how Mango, a biographer of Mustafa Kemal, described him as a revolutionary with the instincts of a conservative for order and stability (Mango, "Atatürk," 2008).

⁸⁰⁴ Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (1968) 1992; Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (1966) 1973; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991.

revolutionism dated to 1908, described the Young Turk revolution as the “nation’s awakening from its long and inauspicious sleep” under the Hamidian autocracy that had derailed Turkey’s natural path to progress.⁸⁰⁵ She argued that each society had to deal with two sets of contradicting necessities: 1) individual rights vs. communitarian duties and 2) stability vs. change.⁸⁰⁶ But they must ultimately adapt to the “nature’s eternal and vital law,” change and progress.⁸⁰⁷ Aydemir understood revolutions as linked to legitimacy crises, which closely paralleled Gramsci’s depictions of organic crises. Revolutions were conditional upon the political apparatus’ ability to resolve crises.⁸⁰⁸ When a government failed to perform its *raison d’être* – governing internal contradictions in favor of social utility – it paved the path towards a revolution.⁸⁰⁹ Revolutions were to resolve these crises by creating new politics, economics, social norms, culture, and morals.⁸¹⁰ Socialist journalist Sertel understood revolution as a law of nature; it represented the triumphant alliance of the oppressed against the oppressor that ensured the transition into a new society.⁸¹¹ For Nazım, revolution signified a leap in humanity’s natural path to progress, which he likened to a ladder with the last foreseeable step being the socialist revolution.⁸¹² Tonguç argued that each historical age required new types of human capabilities, which in practice meant the creation of a new people.⁸¹³ Baykurt, in 1959, argued for the necessity of “a new order, a new life, a new

⁸⁰⁵ Adıvar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 113.

⁸⁰⁶ Adıvar, “Din ve İdeoloji,” (1939) 2017.

⁸⁰⁷ Adıvar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 60.

⁸⁰⁸ Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantiği ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, 1973, 22; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 1959 (1971), 192.

⁸⁰⁹ Aydemir, *Menderes’in Dramı*, (1969) 2019, 281 and 429.

⁸¹⁰ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 164; Aydemir, “İnkılap Bitti Mi,” 1932, 5.

⁸¹¹ Sertel, *Çitra Roy ve Babası*, 1936.

⁸¹² Nazım Hikmet [S. Süleyman], “İnkılap ve Kültür Birbirinden Ayrı Şeyler Midir,” (1930) 1991; also see Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1264 and 1334

⁸¹³ Tonguç, *Köyde Eğitim*, 1938, 86.

worldview...a new culture...One must clean the heads...to remove all superstitions” in order to make citizens from people.⁸¹⁴

The most fundamental and universal progressive criticism against the republican revolution was that it had not gone far enough. Specifically, it did not address Turkey’s “parasite” socioeconomic structures, which paved the path towards the revolution’s unmaking. Socialists generally understood the republican revolution in Marxist structure-superstructure distinction, and Kemalism fulfilled most socialists’ superstructure expectations.⁸¹⁵ Further socialist expectations from the Kemalist revolution, eventually unmet, were the liquidation of feudalism and safeguarding workers’ rights and welfare.⁸¹⁶ Socialists like Sertel and Nazım celebrated the revolution’s secular and modernizing reforms, but argued that the disregard towards structural socioeconomic problems ensured that 1) political and cultural revolutions did not spread beyond the urban-educated segment, and 2) urban and rural elites who harbored reactionary ideologies could gradually nullify and eventually overturn these accomplishments. This allowed socialists to build a narrative of “incomplete revolution” around Kemalism.⁸¹⁷ This view gained prominence among national liberation intellectuals in the mid-1940s. Tonguç argued that the revolution could not survive if remained confined to cities and must spread among the peasantry.⁸¹⁸ The only way to

⁸¹⁴ Baykurt, “Çağlayan Köyü,” (1959) 1974.

⁸¹⁵ See Nazım Hikmet [Fıkracı], “Çocuğun İsmi,” (1930) 1987; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1264.

⁸¹⁶ The two main avenues of socialist activism were the TKP’s *Aydınlık* (Enlightenment) journal and *Amele Teali Cemiyeti* (Workers’ Advancement Society). They promoted not a socialist revolution, but workers’ rights and welfare Toprak, *Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı*, 2016, 355-38. Amele Teali Cemiyeti’s demands were 1) prohibition of child labor; 2) 46-hour workweek; 3) prohibition of night work; 4) three additional vacation days for women workers for their physiological needs; 5) minimum wage; 6) right to unionize freely; 7) a comprehensive union law; 8) compensation for work accidents; 9) insurance; 10) vacation rights (see Toprak, *Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı*, 2016, 381-388). Both movements were closed after the Sheikh Said revolt.

⁸¹⁷ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 69-70 and 254-255; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008, 1185.

⁸¹⁸ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 24.

achieve this was to revive the village and empower the peasantry against the exploitation of bureaucratic and rural social forces.⁸¹⁹ Kemalism as an incomplete revolution for not realizing the structural transformations to make the nation sovereign gradually became a universal progressive argument and also gained popularity within the urban-educated bloc.⁸²⁰ The adaptation of structure-superstructure dichotomy by progressive Kemalists led to materialist and structuralist historiographies of the revolution's unmaking, which vastly influenced the younger generations of intellectuals.⁸²¹

The differences in respective socialist and national liberation visions and narratives were largely pragmatic and strategic as opposed to ideological.⁸²² These two schools' position vis-à-vis the political establishment (subaltern vs. subordinate) also determined their revolutionary visions. National liberation intellectuals and their revolutionary thought was a postrevolutionary phenomenon; it was shaped primarily in the 1920s and crystallized with the 1930s. National liberation thought was preoccupied with pragmatic concerns. Its chief aim was not to make a revolution but to assist its process in spreading and entrenching. National liberation intellectuals believed that the decay of the Ottoman order made it incompatible with the modern world order.⁸²³ They conceptualized revolution as the creator

⁸¹⁹ Tonguç, "Köy Eğitim ve Öğretiminin Amaçları," (1944) 1997, 231; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, p.1-24.

⁸²⁰ Baykurt, *Öğretmenin Uyardırma Görevi*, (1969) 2000, 195-196; Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, (1968) 1992, 34.

⁸²¹ This dichotomy later found its expression in academic circles as a distinction between political and social revolutions. Many of these works would put Turkey either as a revolution from above with little to no public participation or as a political revolution. On this, see Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, 1979 and Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*, 1978.

⁸²² The most notable, if not the only, ideological distinction between these two schools was over the class question.

⁸²³ See for example Adıvar, "Tarihin Köşe Başında," (1919) 2017, 110-113; Adıvar, *Mor Salkımlı Ev* (1955) 2007, 336; Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 193; Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 110; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019, 13-14.

of a new political order that could transform its citizenry.⁸²⁴ To Aydemir, the revolution had to become an antithesis to colonialism by creating a society with advanced technique but no class contradictions.⁸²⁵ He sought to theorize the revolution scientifically, which he deemed necessary for its internalization by intellectuals and the urban-educated segment.⁸²⁶ Since the 1930s, Aydemir complained of Turkish intellectuals' incapacity to comprehend the revolution, let alone carry it forwards.⁸²⁷ Younger Kemalists like Avcıoğlu since the late 1950s also echoed this narrative and argued that a realist, critical, and materialist depiction of the Kemalist revolution was yet to be written.⁸²⁸ Tonguç, meanwhile, argued that the revolution was yet to find a social base. This was conditional upon transforming the village culture and worldview by changing its material conditions and raising a republican generation from the peasant youth.⁸²⁹

Socialist revolutionism, unlike Kemalism, had a rich source of ideological blueprints. This equipped the socialist intellectuals with analytical tools (predominantly structural) to comprehend the meaning and the direction of the republican revolution. Turkish socialists formulated a pragmatic revolutionary understanding and took it as the means to a political system that enabled comprehensive modernization and liberation. Most socialists in this period paid little attention to revolutionary doctrines and strategies. O. Kemal, for example, understood revolution as the gateway to a political system that rested upon science and promoted dignity and happiness.⁸³⁰ Influential socialists of the time were not union

⁸²⁴ Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 85.

⁸²⁵ Ibid., 113

⁸²⁶ Ibid.; Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, (1959) 1971.

⁸²⁷ Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, (1959) 1971; Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali*, 1973.

⁸²⁸ Avcıoğlu, "Yenilik İhtiyacı," 1957.

⁸²⁹ Tonguç, "Köy Eğitiminin Mahiyeti, Prensipleri ve Teşkilatının Esasları," (1938) 2000, 129; Tonguç, "Köy Enstitülerimizde Eğitim ve Öğretim Meseleleri," (1943) 2000; Tonguç, *İlköğretim Kavramı*, 1946, x; Tonguç, "Köy Eğitim ve Öğretiminin Amaçları," (1944) 1997, 213.

⁸³⁰ O. Kemal, "Düşünceler," (1960) 2007 and O. Kemal, "Aydınlık Gerçekçilik," (1961) 2007.

organizers or party leaders; they were journalists and authors. Intellectuals were convinced that the conditions for a socialist revolution were not ripe because socialism was politically subordinated, the Kemalists established hegemony over the urban-educated segment, urban intellectuals were detached from rural masses, and there was no industrial working class.⁸³¹ The socialist thought focused on a long counter-hegemonic struggle to prepare the people to a revolution by spreading an alternative political consciousness.⁸³² This also shows another commonality in progressive revolutionary articulations that put an overwhelming focus on consciousness spreading and counter-hegemonic struggle. Turkish socialists did not foresee or agitate for a revolution until the late 1950s. Their chief concern had been gaining popular and political legitimacy – in Gramscian terms transitioning from a subordinate to subaltern position – which also required partial accommodation with Kemalism.

Progressives' specific demands and agitations embodied a combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies. Their sociopolitical imaginations, influenced by the nationalist intellectual hegemony, pointed towards centralization, illiberalism, and homogenization. Aydemir described revolutions as coercive but progressive interventions in social order under the leadership of elite and conscious vanguards.⁸³³ Manufacturing consent was a postrevolutionary task; revolutions were *despite the people, but for the people*.⁸³⁴ This required not separation of powers, but a *revolutionary united front*, made by the

⁸³¹ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 88.

The unforeseeable revolutionary prospect was also a common theme in Nazım's poetry in his late years. He was convinced that he would not see Turkey's revolution, but that his son in Turkey certainly would (see, for example, Nazım, "Avni'nin Atları," (1958) 2008).

⁸³² Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 151-153.

⁸³³ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005; 92; also see Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 85 and 272.

⁸³⁴ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005, 200 (emphasis original).

The capacity to create consent was the ultimate revolutionary task and the determinant of its ultimate success. See Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 83.

revolutionary leadership and conscious intellectuals.⁸³⁵ Socialists disagreed with the elitism of the “despite the people, for the people” motto, but their political imaginations were shaped by Leninism and also pointed towards a strong single-party government.⁸³⁶ Liberal intellectual Adıvar acknowledged the necessity of dictatorial authority for revolutionary aims and noted the early republican intellectual consensus on “action instead of words.”⁸³⁷ The wretched condition of Anatolia in the mid-1920s, widespread social ignorance (a demographic reality most progressives had to acknowledge despite reservations on its elitist implications), and the urgency of socioeconomic development shaped the progressive political consciousness towards single-party regimes.⁸³⁸ National liberation and socialist intellectuals did not consider this as a violation of people’s sovereignty but a progressive step towards its realization. Tonguç’s political philosophy, for example, rested upon empowering the peasantry against captivating political and feudal forces.⁸³⁹ Progressives did not argue that the peasantry had no political consciousness; they argued that its political consciousness was shaped by its local living conditions.⁸⁴⁰ Changing these living conditions was to spread the revolution and its culture at the expense of feudalism.

Finally, progressive revolutionary consciousness was preoccupied with counterrevolution, which they believed to be represented by Turanist/fascist and Islamist intellectuals and harbored by the urban bourgeoisie and rural notables. Kemalist political discourses also condemned pan-Turanism and Islamism as counterrevolution. Yet Turanism found itself a

⁸³⁵ Ibid., 274-275 (emphasis original).

⁸³⁶ Kuvılcımlı, *Devrim Nedir?* (1969) 1974.

⁸³⁷ Adıvar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009, 204. Adıvar’s main concern was to ensure that the dictatorial revolutionary tendencies remained temporary. See Ibid., 194.

⁸³⁸ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 92.

⁸³⁹ Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019.

⁸⁴⁰ Kuvılcımlı, *İkinci Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz*, (1960) 2008; Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008; Tonguç, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, (1947) 2019.

subaltern position in the new political order, while Islamism was subordinated until the mid-1940s. National liberation and socialist views diverged on Kemalism's success to defeat its reaction until the 1950s when they reached an intellectual consensus on its failure. Since the 1930s, socialist intellectuals insisted on ideological and political counterrevolution and accused the Kemalist establishment of timidity.⁸⁴¹ Their structuralism led socialists to undermine fascism and Islamism – as well as their intellectuals – as genuine political ideologies but as surrogates of capitalism and feudalism. Nazım's journal articles in the 1930s exposed materialist self-interests beneath the surface of idealist narratives, promoted by rightwing intellectuals.⁸⁴² Boran's articles in the 1940s also reflected similar themes.⁸⁴³ These concerns also spread to national liberation intellectuals in the 1940s. They came under fascist intellectuals' assaults for harboring communism and Islamist intellectuals' assaults for their militant secularism. Younger progressives reproduced these narratives of the Kemalist revolution's shortcomings. The rise of the DP as an authoritarian power and the integration of fascism and Islamism in Turkey's rightwing political movements under an anticommunist umbrella caused a growing concern among the urban-educated segment.⁸⁴⁴ The concerns over the unmaking of Kemalist revolutions had spread to a popular base, which also included the lower and middle echelons of the military-bureaucratic segment.

The revolutionary imaginations of Iranian and Egyptian intellectuals also paralleled their Turkish counterparts. Regardless of structural differences (which were many), their intellectuals promoted overlapping revolutionary narratives as the radical gateway to the

⁸⁴¹ Nazım, *Yaşamak Güzel Şey Be Kardeşim*, (1963) 1987.

⁸⁴² Nazım, *Alman Faşizmi ve Irkçılığı*, (1936) 1987.

⁸⁴³ Boran, "Kalp Fikir Gerçek Fikir," (1944) 2010; Boran, "Sanatın Sosyal Şartları ve Roman," (1943) 2010.

⁸⁴⁴ For the integration of these ideologies into rightwing political and civil society organizations, see Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 2003 and Örnek, *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı*, 2015.

new. Egyptian intellectuals like al-Hakim, Musa, and Mahfouz understood revolution as a nation's (re)birth.⁸⁴⁵ Yet revolutionary aims and demands were remarkably pragmatic and unindoctrinated. The urban-educated segment in all three countries gradually embodied socialistic interpretations of republicanism, which meant not public ownership of enterprises but rapid modernization, secularization, and industrialization.⁸⁴⁶ Even Iran's Tudeh at the height of its power described itself as a mass party and championed a gradualist and reformist program.⁸⁴⁷ The parallels in Middle Eastern revolutionary imaginations, despite structural divergences, indicate the influence of 1) regionalism (for Middle Eastern revolutionism remained less militant and radical compared to its European and Asian counterparts and sought political legitimacy as opposed to confrontation) and 2) institutions (for institutional settings had a determining impact over revolutionary processes and consequently over revolutionary imaginations). The institutional divergence between respective Egyptian and Iranian liberation movements in the early 1950s is notable. Iranian liberation movement – Mosaddeq's National Front – had been a loose alliance backed primarily by the urban civil society and remained open to frictions. It enjoyed no institutional political support and was toppled down by a military coup with foreign support. Egyptian liberation movement – led by the Free Officers – had been like a miniature national front. Like the Young Turks in the 1900s, they were a close-knit and secretive organization. Their divisions did not surface until after the revolution, which in essence was a military coup that

⁸⁴⁵ Al-Hakim, *Return of the Spirit* (1933), 2020; Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa*, (1957); Mahfouz, *The Cairo Trilogy: Palace Walk, Palace of Desire, Sugar Street*, (1957) 2001.

Likewise, Aydemir also conceptualized Turkey's liberation revolution as its *rebirth* (emphasis original). See Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, (1932) 1968, 235

⁸⁴⁶ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 342; Meijer, *The Quest for Modernity*, 2002.

⁸⁴⁷ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 326; Rahnema, "The Left and the Struggle for Democracy in Iran," 2004, 252; Harris, *A Social Revolution*, 2017, 56; Matin-Asgari, *Both Eastern and Western*, 2018, 150-151.

turned into a revolution with intellectual and popular support. The counterrevolutionary role of the Iranian military as opposed to the revolutionary role of the Turkish and Egyptian militaries influenced revolutionary thought. Turkey's 1960 military intervention against the DP— universally celebrated as a revolution by progressive intellectuals — also added to these views.

Turkish and Middle Eastern revolutionism until the 1960s had constituted the ideology of progressive change. Moments of crises had a popularizing impact on progressivism in the eyes of the urban-educated bloc, who became more open to revolutionary messages. The 1940s and 1950s saw the popularization of progressivism among the urban-educated segment in the Middle East. Their message was revolutionary, but their actual demands and politics often pointed to gradualism and reformism. Progressive paradigms of change focused on structures as the only meaningful change. This had reduced the importance of institutions in the eyes of many intellectuals, who argued that institutional achievements could easily be nullified and overturned by structural forces. The unfolding of the Kemalist revolution in the 1950s vindicated this view. Yet beyond institutions and structures, the unfolding of a revolution is also determined by actual hegemonic struggles, participated by actors who possess distinct natures of capitals (military, political, intellectual, economic, patrimonial, etc.). The next section analyzes progressive intellectuals' counter-hegemonic struggle, which impacted not only progressive thought but also the transformation of political apparatuses in the Middle East.

C. Hegemonic Struggles

This part investigates the counter-hegemonic struggle led by progressive intellectuals. The word struggle should not signal confrontation exclusively; counter-hegemonic struggles also included cooperation and negotiation. This part takes the intellectuals' counter-hegemonic struggle as their bid to political power, by the virtue of their symbolic capital, and as the representatives of a "historic bloc" – the urban-educated segment. Middle Eastern intellectuals' counter-hegemonic struggles reveal that their field of struggle was neither the state nor the civil society but both. Specifically, this struggle was 1) *within* and *against* the state apparatus, and 2) against conservative/reactionary intellectuals within the civil society, fought primarily over the allegiance of the urban-educated bloc. State responses towards counter-hegemonic struggles showed variations, generally between subalterns and subordinates. Middle Eastern progressive struggles show how these variations were hierarchically layered. Access to political power was not the same for all subaltern actors; meanwhile, subordination politics could extend from mild repression to violent securitization. Finally, this part shows how counter-hegemonic struggles played a key role in transforming modern state apparatuses in the Middle East. Specifically, politics of alliance and antagonism (especially securitization) had a transformative influence over the state apparatus in terms of its institutional configurations and official ideology.

The interactions of ideological positions and social blocs within the republican order show how the state apparatus remained as a contested and fractured field. The formation of the republican regime immediately gave way to intra-elite contestations within the military-bureaucratic segment, which led to the defeat and/or incorporation of rival nationalists (including former Young Turk Turanists) by the CHP.⁸⁴⁸ Bourdieu explains that "the

⁸⁴⁸ Both Halide Edib Adıvar and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir emphasized in their respective analyses over the internal conflicts among the nationalists that they were often personal in nature and had not been related to

construction of the state monopoly over physical and symbolic violence is inseparable from the construction of the field of struggles for the monopoly over the advantages attached to this monopoly.”⁸⁴⁹ Respective capitals enable different social blocs and cliques like intellectuals, rural notables, bureaucrats, or urban merchants to compete over greater access to this monopoly. These capitals represent different and sometimes conflicting interests and *Weltanschauungs*. National liberation intellectuals initially occupied a subaltern position within the regime. Similarly, the nascent national bourgeoisie and rural notables also occupied a subaltern position vis-à-vis the military-bureaucratic segment. This reveals a problem in Gramscian state understanding, which puts the state as a unitary actor under the control and in the service of one social class. In Turkey, internal conflicts within the realm of the state resulted in the triumph of the alliance between the urban bourgeoisie and rural notables, at the expense of progressive Kemalists and other intellectuals.⁸⁵⁰ Tonguç and Aydemir identified the problem as the CHP’s inability to raise revolutionary intellectuals who could forestall the revolution’s elitist and bureaucratic turn.⁸⁵¹ Younger intellectuals like Baykurt and Avcıoğlu often problematized the abandonment of republican intellectuals, especially in the peripheries.⁸⁵² National liberation intellectuals’ struggle was primarily within the state apparatus; and its outcome was their detachment from the state and the gradual delegitimization of their politics.

ideological differences. See Adivar, *Türk’ün Ateşle İmtihani: İstiklal Savaşı Hatıraları*, (1928) 2007; Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal İkinci Cilt 1919-1923*, (1964), 2005.

⁸⁴⁹ Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” 1994, 16.

⁸⁵⁰ For Nazım’s analysis on the abandonment of Kemalist intellectuals, see Nazım, *Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*, (1947) 2008.

⁸⁵¹ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991; 235.

⁸⁵² Baykurt, “Aydın Kırımı Sürecek Mi?” (1960) 1974; Avcıoğlu, “Köy Enstitüleri,” 1957.

Unlike their national liberation counterparts, socialists found themselves in a subordinate position since the mid-1920s.⁸⁵³ Socialists occupied a peculiar position. They constituted the only progressive and organized opposition, appealed to the same social bloc as the Kemalists via alternative narratives of modernization and progress, while also conditionally supporting the revolutionary regime. Kemalists sought to incorporate the socialist intellectuals with partial success.⁸⁵⁴ Those who refused cooptation, like Sertel and Nazım, faced repression.⁸⁵⁵ Socialism's subordination meant lack of access to political legitimacy, which forced their counter-hegemonic struggle exclusively to the tightly restricted civil society. Gramsci writes that every hegemonic bloc leads a coalition of subaltern groups while it "dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to liquidate or to subjugate." Yet how a hegemonic bloc subjugates its subordinates shows transformations and variations. Socialism in Turkey transitioned from being subordinated into being securitized in the late 1930s. Socialism as an existential threat – primarily due to its class conflict paradigms – became a unifying force for Turkey's hegemonic bloc, which in the 1940s was caught up in an internal struggle. Moreover, the subordination practices against Islamist, Turanist (who refused cooptation), or even pro-sultanate intellectuals eased with Atatürk's death.⁸⁵⁶ Sertel noted that during

⁸⁵³ Sertel accurately traced this subordination to the Sheik Said revolt. The special tribunals formed afterward targeted not only Islamists and Turanists who challenged the new regime but also socialists who were then supporting the regime. See Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015.

⁸⁵⁴ Aydemir is one example. So are several of his fellow *Kadro* writers such as Vedat Nedim Tör and İsmail Hüsrev Tökin.

⁸⁵⁵ Sertel and Nazım are two prominent socialist intellectuals whom the republican regime unsuccessfully sought to convert. Socialism as an internal threat occupied the minds of many prominent republican elites such as Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak and Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya. Sertel wrote in her memories that Kaya offered her a spot in the parliament in return for her joining the CHP in 1937. Kaya and Nazım's former comrade Aydemir tried to persuade him also in 1937, and Nazım's refusal led to his arrest in 1938 along with several other socialists like Kıvılcımlı and author Kemal Tahir in phony military trials. Order for this arrest came from the very top, Marshall Çakmak, who thought of socialist intellectuals as a fifth column against the USSR in an active war. See Blasing, *Nazım Hikmet: The Life and Times of Turkey's World Poet*, 2013, 102 and Göksu and Timms, *Romantik Komünist: Nazım Hikmet'in Yaşamı ve Eseri*, 2011, 178-180.

⁸⁵⁶ A notable event is that in 1938, the government declared a general amnesty and pardoned the group known as *Yüz ellilikler* (Group of Hundred Fifty) who opposed Ankara between 1920 and 1925 to return from exile.

Atatürk's presidency, Islamists and Turanists were disabled to organize while progressives could promote their views – within restrictions – via journalism and literature. During İnönü's presidency, however, the regime became openly terroristic against progressives, under the influence of fascist cliques within the state elite who almost succeeded in aligning Turkey with Nazi Germany.⁸⁵⁷ Socialists, in response, claimed the anti-imperialist, militantly secularist, and peopleist legacy of Kemalism, precisely against the Kemalist elite.⁸⁵⁸ They presented themselves almost as counter-hegemonic deputies of an upgraded Kemalism.

Progressive intellectuals understood these processes within binary divisions. Liberal Adıvar, socialist Kırılıcılımlı, and Kemalist Avcıoğlu were united in conceptualizing Turkish politics as a confrontation between conservative (backed by urban merchants and rural notables) and progressive (backed by the military-bureaucratic segment and intellectuals) forces.⁸⁵⁹ For socialists, the strategic implication of binary oppositions was the united front strategy. This paradigm had entered Turkish progressivism in the 1930s, corresponding to the rise of fascism in Europe.⁸⁶⁰ The 1940s witnessed another strategic shift from counter-hegemonic *War of Position* to confrontational *War of Maneuver*, again utilizing the front

Furthermore, sidelined leaders of the War of Liberation who led the TCF were also allowed to return to politics with prominent roles within the CHP. Most notably, communists were exempt from the amnesty. One journalist in 1938 justified this decision on the grounds that sultanate supporters no longer constituted any threat, but the communists did. The article concluded that “The amnesty is for those who heeled before the Turkish Revolution, not for those who rebel against it.” See Birkan, *Dünya ile Devlet Arasında Türk Muharriri, 1930-1960*, 2018, 73-74.

⁸⁵⁷ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 182-3.

⁸⁵⁸ Nazım, *Kuvayı Milliye*, (1941) 2008, 543 and 573; Sertel, “Görüşler: Cumhuriyetimizin Karakteristikleri,” 1940; Sertel, “İnönü Zaferleri,” 1941; Sertel, “Harbe Girsek Bu Bir İstiklal Harbi Olacaktır,” 1941; Sertel, “İsmet İnönü'nün Söylevi” 1939; Sertel, “İngiliz, Fransız, Türk Anlaşması,” 1939.

⁸⁵⁹ Adıvar, *Türkiye'de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009; Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (1966) 1973; Kırılıcılımlı, *Osmanlı Tarihinin Maddesi*, (1974) 2020.

⁸⁶⁰ Nazım Hikmet [Adsız Yazıcı], “Fransız Faşizminin Mağlubiyeti,” (1937) 1992; Nazım, “Birleşen Cepheler,” (1937) 1992; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “İtalya'da Faşizm Niçin Muvaffak Oldu,” (1936) 1987; Nazım [Adsız Yazıcı], “Almanya'da Faşizm Niçin Muvaffak Oldu,” (1936) 1987; Sertel, “Amerika Yazıcıları Faşizme Karşı Nasıl Mücadele Ediyorlar,” 1937; Sertel, “Görüşler: İnkılap Zihniyeti,” 1937; Sertel, “İslahatçı Namık Kemal,” 1940; Sertel, “Müşterek Müdafaa Edeceğimiz Davalar,” 1941; Sertel, “Atatürk'ün Sönmeyen Meşalesi,” 1941; Sertel, “Faşizm İspanya'yı Niçin Kana Boyuyor,” 1937; Sertel, “Paris Ayakta,” 1937; Sertel, “Fransa Niçin Mağlup Oldu,” 1940.

paradigm. In 1945, Sertel reached an agreement on building a large democracy front with the DP leadership, who recently left the CHP.⁸⁶¹ This short-lived alliance shows that 1) bourgeois and landlord politicians needed progressives' intellectual capital; and 2) progressive imaginations on alliance fronts, in which intellectuals were to play political and cultural vanguard roles, also pointed to a conscious bid to political power by utilizing their symbolic capital as intellectuals. The abrupt abandonment of the alliance by the DP leaders, however, also shows that the capitals enjoyed by the bourgeois, rural notable, and military-bureaucratic segment easily trumped over intellectuals' symbolic capital. This experience reinforced Sertel's belief that progressive change could only come from organized and educated popular forces.⁸⁶² The unequal political confrontation in Turkey over fronts had been between anticommunism and antiimperialism/antifascism in the mid-1940s. The postwar state elite consensus was firmly anticommunism, which allied Turkey with the western camp.⁸⁶³ In the late 1950s, the DP's crisis and its loss of urban-educated and intellectual support resurfaced socialist front paradigms, which aimed to unite progressives and Kemalists.⁸⁶⁴

The conservative turn of the state elite in the late 1930s meant marginalization and dismissal for progressive Kemalists and securitization for socialists. Both subaltern and subordinate groups in Turkey's hegemonic structures held hierarchical positions. State reaction against antagonistic groups showed variations, generally between securitization and

⁸⁶¹ See For their respective narratives on the forming of this alliance, see Z. Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım: 1905-1950*, 1968, 260-265 and Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 214-217. Also see Y.Sertel, *Annem Sabiha Sertel Kimdi? Neler Yazdı?* 1993, 204-210.

⁸⁶² Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015.

⁸⁶³ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 322.

⁸⁶⁴ Nazım, "Tek Cephede ve Milli Kurtuluş Komitelerinde Niçin Bütün Yurtseverler İşbirliği Yapmalı," (1959) 2002; Nazım Hikmet, "İşçiler Sendikalara Girmeli Mi," (1959) 2002; Sertel, Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 355; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 243.

politicization. Securitization is a move that takes politics beyond established norms by framing an issue as above politics. It is an extreme version of politicization by presenting an issue as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political-legal procedures.⁸⁶⁵ For example, in 1938, socialists like Nazım and Kuvılcımlı were tried in special military tribunals and were severely punished in these phony trials; whereas Nazi-affiliated pan-Turanists in 1944 were tried in regular courts (even though there were several officers among them) and received light sentences (which were overturned in appeal). Securitization is an inter-subjective and socially constructed process. The securitizing actor cannot determine this move's success; the audience does by accepting or rejecting securitization.⁸⁶⁶ Securitization requires convincing the audience to the boundaries of legitimate politics and extralegal measures against internal security threats. Defining these boundaries is a form of hegemonic struggle that involves both the state and civil society. The İnönü administration expanded these boundaries by incorporating many dissidents of the revolution and drawing the lines against "black and red reaction," namely Islamism and socialism.⁸⁶⁷ However, the ideological encampment of anticommunist and antifascist fronts brought the utilization of ultranationalist and Islamist appeals for the making of a new national unity narrative at a social and political level, in contrast to original revolutionary unity narratives.

Securitization policies led to significant changes in Turkey, structurally, institutionally, and intellectually. Practically, securitization for socialist intellectuals meant extralegal physical and symbolic violence such as surveillance, censorship, incapacity to organize

⁸⁶⁵ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1998, 23-24.

⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

⁸⁶⁷ For "black and red reaction," see Aydemir, *İkinci Adam İkinci Cilt, 1938-1950*, (1967) 1991.

around parties and unions, economic impoverishment, imprisonment, torture, and targeted assassinations. Securitization extended and normalized exceptional measures such as special tribunals, secretive state institutions, and politically sponsored mob violence. In 1945, right after Sertel's alignment with the DP leadership together with several other progressives became public via their journal, a mob of Islamists and Turanists ransacked Sertels' printing house, nearly killing the couple, while the police watched.⁸⁶⁸ After the incident, the government prosecuted Sertels for provoking the public, espionage, and treason.⁸⁶⁹ Fearing to be associated with socialism, the DP immediately cut ties with Sertels. The trial was not in a special tribunal unlike the 1938 trials, but the accusations were security-related at the highest level.⁸⁷⁰ In 1948, progressive members of the Ankara University, including Boran, were purged.⁸⁷¹ In 1950, Boran was arrested for her peace activism over the Korean War. These measures also extended to progressive Kemalists, who were crypto socialists according to conservative statesmen and intellectuals.⁸⁷² The Village Institutes were shut down in the mid-1940s and Tonguç faced legal harassment and demotions. Hasan Ali Yücel, the education minister and a close ally of Tonguç, was replaced by Nazi-sympathizer Reşat Sirer in 1946. The education ministry saw rollbacks from Kemalist secularism with the rapid spread of religious schools. The transition of power from the CHP to the DP in 1950 further accelerated these processes.⁸⁷³

⁸⁶⁸ For the Tan Lynching, see Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 285-296.

⁸⁶⁹ See S. Sertel and Z. Sertel, *Davamız ve Müdafamız*, (1946) 2015.

⁸⁷⁰ Turanists who received funds from the Nazis lobbied the government to enter the war on Germany's side, for example, were not accused of treason in 1944.

⁸⁷¹ For the purges, see Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 335-336. Also see Adalet, *Hotels and Highways*, 2018, 77.

⁸⁷² For conservative assaults on Tonguç and Yücel see E. Tonguç, *Devrim Açısından Köy Enstitüleri ve Tonguç*, 1970 and Yücel, *Davam*, (1947) 2019.

⁸⁷³ Türkoğlu, *Tonguç ve Enstitüleri*, 1997.

Simultaneously, Kemalist secularism and solidarism were gradually but decisively abandoned for being too socialistic for the nascent anticommunist hegemony. Beyond its impacts on progressivism, securitization policies led to a reordering of the state with a seismic rightwing shift ideologically and institutionally. They also laid down the policy patterns of consequent Turkish governments against progressivism. Socialists and other progressives agitated against the threats of Turanist fascism and racism and Islamic reaction. The political elite considered socialism the bigger threat, which brought the incorporation of Islamism and Turanism – the revolution’s former foes. Many republican elites, as well as national liberation intellectuals like Adıvar and Aydemir, had believed that the reaction to revolution was defeated.⁸⁷⁴ However, both ideologies were integrated into mainstream rightwing political movements as subaltern partners in the 1940s, which also capacitated them to wage their counter-hegemonic struggles within the state apparatus in addition to the civil society.⁸⁷⁵ Conservative civil society organizations, such as anticommunism societies and religious lodges, established partnerships with the state elite in a subaltern position. The reliance on reactionary ideologies and the reliance on securitization policies were correlated. The DP after 1957, for example, made its de facto partnership with *Nurcu* Sufi Islamists open, which shocked many Kemalists.⁸⁷⁶ For socialists, this episode was reminiscent of the Young Turk revolution’s reversal from progressivism because of compromising to Islamism,

⁸⁷⁴ Aydemir, *Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal Üçüncü Cilt 1923-1938*, (1965) 2005 and Adıvar, *Türkiye’de Şark-Garp ve Amerikan Tesirleri*, (1954) 2009.

Socialists thought otherwise. Sertel recollected her discussion with Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya and how she questioned him about pro-Nazi groups and reactionaries. Kaya belittled them as a handful of people with whom the state could easily deal (see Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 174-177). Sertel argued that with Atatürk’s death, the state nobility immediately began re-incorporating Turanism (see Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015, 228 and Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Teyfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 139).

⁸⁷⁵ Mardin, *Türkiye, İslam ve Sekülerizm*, 2011, 71-72; Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 2003, 62.

⁸⁷⁶ Aydemir, *Menderes’in Dramı*, (1969) 2019.

Turanism, and imperialism.⁸⁷⁷ In a similar vein, Tonguç had warned İnönü against the mounting conservative pressure against the Village Institutes, noting that “once [İnönü] started sacrificing heads, the [reactionaries] would then demand [İnönü’s] head.”⁸⁷⁸ Most progressives in the 1950s would agree that compromises from the revolution brought its downfall.

Socialism and national liberation of the progressive camp and fascism and Islamism of the reactionary camp had vast political differences. Each of them often rejected their internal counterpart as illegitimate political actors. Most national liberation intellectuals were fierce anticommunists, and many socialist intellectuals often accused national liberation intellectuals of serving fascism and/or imperialism. However, progressives and reactionaries understood the opposite camp as a united front and vice versa. In Sertel’s analysis, revolutions and other progressive steps created contesting reactionary alliances, in the Turkish case between Islamism and Turanism both in the 1910s and the 1940s.⁸⁷⁹ Regardless of political differences, the fate of ideological movements within the same bloc remained interdependent to the fate of intellectually aligned groups. Socialism’s securitization came with the attachment of national liberation’s marginalization. When one tradition broke down under the government’s pressure, it discredited the other by diminishing its intellectual capital. Moreover, it also came together with the demise of the CHP’s progressivism and the consequent challenges against Kemalist secularism and positivism from within the state apparatus and the civil society.⁸⁸⁰ What caused this link was the close parallels between

⁸⁷⁷ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 88.

⁸⁷⁸ Türkoğlu, *Tonguç ve Enstitüleri*, 1997, 486.

⁸⁷⁹ Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 95.

⁸⁸⁰ Many high-ranking CHP officials grew critical of the 1930s’ militant secularism and considered Islam an effective tool both for establishing national unity and combating socialism. Intellectual challenges against Kemalist revolutions also became mainstream in the late 1940s. See Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Tevfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, (1969) 2015.

socialist and national liberation schools in their *Weltanschauungs*. They also agitated the same social bloc. They presented similar ideological threats according to the higher echelons of the military-bureaucratic segment, urban bourgeoisie, and rural notables. The influence of anticommunist securitization practices thus extended to overturn Kemalist modernization paradigms with conservative, pro-American, Islamic modernization paradigms in the 1950s.

The DP experience, especially its organic crisis in its last years, further transformed Turkey's intellectual movements. National liberation intellectuals were dismissed from the state, and securitization of socialism intensified.⁸⁸¹ In the late 1950s, Kemalist intellectuals in their entirety saw the revolution in jeopardy. Socialists, meanwhile, saw the prototype native fascism, led by an alliance of comprador bourgeoisie and landlords who aligned Turkey's interests with their narrow class interests and brought back political-economic capitulations.⁸⁸² The DP's incapacity to rule by consent gave way to coercive tactics, which gradually extended against all opposition, including conservative anticommunist intellectuals who had once supported the DP.⁸⁸³ The threats against the Kemalist revolutions and the DP's growing authoritarianism led to the emergence of novel Kemalist imaginations among younger intellectuals, influenced by progressive (including socialist) critiques. Most Kemalists were reluctant to adopt Marxism. Still, novel progressive understandings of peopleism and statism aimed to reinterpret Kemalism in the Cold War. Socialists from the 1930s until the 1950s were weak in terms of political capital. However, their intellectual capital extended to the CHP's ranks and influenced the political imaginations of a vast

⁸⁸¹ Tonguç and Aydemir, who were already marginalized, were demoted, and eventually dismissed by the DP government. Tonguç also faced prosecutions.

The TKP, which survived as an underground organization on and off since the 1920s was broken down by a wave of arrests in 1951. It could not organize domestically until the 1970s.

⁸⁸² Nazım Hikmet, "Menderes Hükümeti Kimlerin Hükümetidir," (1960) 2002; Sertel, *İlericilik Gericilik Kavgasında Teyfik Fikret*, (1945) 1965, 119.

⁸⁸³ See Nazım's satiric depiction in his "Gerileyen Türkiye Yahut Adnan Menderes'e Öğütler," (1955) 2008.

segment of young intellectuals. In the mid-1950s, the CHP rediscovered its antagonism against foreign capital.⁸⁸⁴ In the late 1950s, some CHP politicians were openly suggesting socialism as an alternative development path.⁸⁸⁵ Many socialist intellectuals of the 1960s received their early political education in the youth branches of the 1950s' CHP.⁸⁸⁶

By the 1950s, the republican education networks had raised a new generation of intellectuals and expanded the urban-educated segment. These groups had internalized Kemalism as their *Weltanschauung* and considered themselves stakeholders in the political realm. The DP's crisis disrupted their "common sense" by extending securitization practices towards the entire opposition as a threat to national unity.⁸⁸⁷ The DP emerged to resolve a preceding crisis and ultimately created its own crisis via unsustainable and elitist socioeconomic policies. Its approach to the crisis was populist authoritarianism that pursued polarizing tactics and incorporated anti-Kemalist groups as subaltern partners.⁸⁸⁸ Authoritarianism deepened simultaneously with the socioeconomic crisis. These transformations were in clear contrast to the DP's original political values, which fused liberal democratic values with a rightwing understanding of Kemalism.⁸⁸⁹ The early

⁸⁸⁴ See Bila, *CHP, 1919-1999*, 1999, 154 for the CHP's opposition to foreign capital in Turkey's strategic sectors such as oil.

⁸⁸⁵ Karpat, "The Turkish Left," 1966, 181.

⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 180.

⁸⁸⁷ I use the term common sense here in Gramscian terms, meaning that it signifies a thought that is common to a social group. He used the term 'good sense' to describe thought that is common to society as a whole (see Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 1971, 326 and Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, 2006, 53-55). The clearest example of the DP's attempts to securitize the opposition in its entirety was its *Tahkikat Komisyonları* (Inquiry Commissions), an upper court led by the DP politicians. These commissions had the right to prohibit any oppositional activity, including of the CHP if deemed a danger to national unity. There was no higher court of appeal to the decisions of these commissions. Another clear example was the lynching attempt against İnönü in his opposition campaign in 1959. The fact that a former president and a hero of the War of Liberation could receive such a grotesque treatment sent shock waves across the opposition.

⁸⁸⁸ Nazım, "Yeşil Sancak – Kara Kuvvet No.1," (1959) 2002; Nazım, "Tehlikeye karşı başarıyla savaşabilmek için onun ana sebeplerini araştırmak gerekir: Kara Kuvvet Yeşil Sancak No.4," (1959) 2002; Nazım, "Yobazlığın harekete getirilmesinin sebeplerinden biri: Yeşil Sancak Kara Kuvvet No.6," (1959) 2002.

⁸⁸⁹ Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam Üçüncü ve Son Cilt, 1950-1964*, (1968) 1988.

republican ethos of thriftiness, hard work, self-reliance, stability, and education was replaced by a “Wild West” mentality.⁸⁹⁰ Socialistic approaches became an appealing alternative avenue for the middle and lower ranks of the intelligentsia, urban professionals, and the military-bureaucratic segment, whose material conditions had been worsening since the mid-1950s.⁸⁹¹ Many progressive Kemalist intellectuals had initially seen the DP as an extension of the CHP, if not a better alternative to it. In its last years, they saw the DP as Kemalism’s reaction.⁸⁹² Socialists, meanwhile, pointed to the unfolding of the revolution, which in Gramscian terms, had passed through progressive Caesarism under Atatürk, conservative Caesarism under İnönü, and finally fascism under the Menderes-Bayar alliance.

The implementation of securitization against progressivism and the utilization of fascism and Islamism under an anticommunist umbrella has also been the patterned response of Iranian and Egyptian political establishments. These counter-hegemonic movements received direct and indirect support from the hegemonic bloc institutionally and intellectually. In Iran, the *ulema* in the 1940s was preoccupied with secularism, socialism, and women’s rights, all central points in the Tudeh program.⁸⁹³ Unorthodox Islamist-fascist organizations received the protection of the political and religious establishments for their militancy against secular intellectuals.⁸⁹⁴ The Tudeh’s challenge laid the groundwork for a reactionary alliance between the court and the *ulema*. In 1952-1953, this alliance, backed by the US, targeted another secular challenge, the National Front, which by then had lost its most notable

⁸⁹⁰ For the emerging ‘Wild West’ mentality under the DP, see Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 1989, 74.

⁸⁹¹ For socialism’s increasing appeal in the 1950s for urban salaried segments, see Karpat, “The Turkish Left,” 1966.

⁸⁹² Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, (1969) 2019.

⁸⁹³ Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran*, 2007, 95; Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 372.

⁸⁹⁴ When the militants of *Fedayeen-e Islam* assassinated the secular intellectual Ahmad Kasravi, his assassins were given amnesty because conservative politicians wanted to use the group against the Tudeh (Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013, 57).

religious backers.⁸⁹⁵ The imperial regime until the 1960s rested upon a court-*ulema* partnership, while the industrialists and landlords made its key support base.⁸⁹⁶ In Egypt, like Turkey, progressive political imaginations pointed towards united fronts under intellectuals' vanguard, though progressive movements remained fractious and worked under securitization.⁸⁹⁷ Fascist al-Fatah and Islamist Ikhwan, on the other hand, found political openings under an anticommunist umbrella and collaborated with the Court-British complex against progressive fronts.⁸⁹⁸ The Ikhwan, due to its connections to the propertied middle class, the establishment *ulema*, traditionalist intellectuals, and the authorities' relatively mild treatment, became Egypt's largest political organization in the 1950s.⁸⁹⁹ Al-Fatah and Ikhwan were heavily represented among the Free Officers in the early revolutionary years.⁹⁰⁰ This pattern of cordial relations between the political establishments and conservative/reactionary intellectual movements had immediate social consequences. Official anticommunisms sanctioned racial and religious violence against minorities under a narrative of national unity. All three countries experienced massive social traumas in the 1950s, the infamous highpoints being the mob violence and pogroms in 1952 in Egypt and 1955 in Turkey and Iran. Turkey's political establishment was quick to blame the communists, followed by another wave of anticommunist arrests.

⁸⁹⁵ For the making of the alliance between the Pahlavi court and the *ulema*, see Abrahamian, *The Coup*, 2013, 161; Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran*, 2009, 197; Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, 2006, 128-130.

⁸⁹⁶ Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 1982, 420; Arjomand, "Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective," 1986, 391; Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 1988, 81; Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet*, 2009, 235-236; Behrooz, *Rebels with a Cause*, 2000, 2.

⁸⁹⁷ See Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970*, 1988, 85 and Ismael and El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt*, 1990.

⁸⁹⁸ See Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, 1968, 27; Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 368-369.

⁸⁹⁹ E. Thompson, *Justice Interrupted*, 2013, 150; Beinin and Lockman, *Workers on the Nile*, 1988, 370-375; Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, 1968, 202-203.

⁹⁰⁰ Beattie, *Egypt During the Nasser Years*, 1994; Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 1991.

This part focused on the intellectual-state relations and state responses towards progressivism, which often took the form of securitization. Political establishments carried securitization policies within an anticommunist framework, which brought the integration of fascist and Islamist political movements into the state apparatus and gave them greater openings in the civil society.⁹⁰¹ In Turkey, this process came with rollbacks from the Kemalist revolution, led by the political elite, to the dismay of the urban-educated bloc and intellectuals. Progressive analyses were structuralist and pointed to the connection between fascist and Islamist ideologies and urban bourgeoisie and rural notable social blocs. These analyses were sometimes flawed and simplistic, but not completely inaccurate. Fascist and Islamist intellectuals found prominent patrons who possessed political, economic, and patrimonial capitals. They also provided the political-economic elites with intellectual capital to combat Kemalism's intellectual hegemony, as well as the appeal of progressivism. Progressive intellectuals, meanwhile, worked in a position of marginalization and securitization, detached from the working and rural masses, and agitated exclusively towards the urban-educated segment.

D. Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with hegemony in the context of counter-hegemonic struggles. Counter-hegemonic confrontations had major influences in the making of political orders and ideological traditions in the Middle East. These struggles were waged both over the state apparatus and the civil society, though the capacity to struggle over the state was determined

⁹⁰¹ Securitization practices have become institutionalized throughout the twentieth century, utilizing new tactics like new policing practices, thug violence, religious morals, and gender norms, against progressive and popular mobilizations. See Amar, *The Security Archipelago*, 2013.

by access to political capital. In Gramscian terms, a subaltern position came with access to varying degrees of political capital, while subordinated groups faced political repression and were to operate within the civil society. The hegemonic bloc, in Turkey represented by the CHP and the DP, sought to establish the boundaries for legitimate politics. These boundaries, however, were contested and changed over time, decisively in favor of rightwing ideologies. Turanists and Islamist movements integrated themselves into rightwing political movements as subaltern partners. Meanwhile, national liberation intellectuals were marginalized, and socialist intellectuals were securitized. The chapter argued that progressive counter-hegemonic struggles faced a growing antagonism from the political establishment, which was transformed ideologically and institutionally by its responses against progressivism towards a more conservative and repressive stance. Progressive intellectuals understood these transformations in dialectical terms and conceptualized Turkish political history as a confrontation between progressive and conservative forces. In socialist analyses, these forces coalesced into anticommunist and antifascist/antiimperialist fronts in the 1940s, with the decisive triumph of the former. The anticommunist umbrella became the gateway to the state for reactionary political streams. Politics of anticommunism eventually targeted Kemalist solidarism and secularism, which represented gateways to socialism to the conservative segments of the political establishment in the 1940s. This had forced the progressive intellectuals to safeguard Kemalist principles against the political establishment.

Politics of anticommunism and consequent repression on progressivism had major sociopolitical consequences. Anticommunist propaganda heavily relied on racial and religious narratives that fed social antagonism against minorities. Securitization measures in the name of national unity gradually extended their limits beyond socialism. With the DP's

crisis in the late 1950s, they surrounded the entire opposition. In its last year, the DP attempted to close the CHP to ban the entire political opposition and organized a lynch attempt against İnönü in his campaign trail. Coupled with the growing influence of Islamism in the civil society and the state, these processes sent shockwaves across the urban-educated segment, including the intellectuals and the military-bureaucratic segment, who had internalized Kemalism as its *Weltanschauung*. The DP's response to its crisis had delegitimized the government across the urban-educated bloc. Simultaneously, socialists agitated for a united front against the DP, which would bring together Kemalists and socialists for a common cause. While most Kemalists, progressive or otherwise, remained reluctant to adopt socialism – let alone Marxism-Leninism – socialistic interpretations of Kemalism, especially with regards to statism and peopleism, found greater appeals. When the DP government fell abruptly with a military intervention organized by mid-ranking officers in 1960, the urban-educated segment and almost all progressive intellectuals hailed this move as a revolution and the re-establishment of Kemalist principles and values.

The counter-hegemonic struggles and consequent transformations in the Middle East until 1960 have produced a set of patterns. First, the united front paradigm that surfaced in the 1930s became the prime strategy of revolutionism. Second, political antagonism established its dominance within the state apparatus, institutionally and ideologically. The utilization and incorporation of Turanism and Islamism came together with this antagonism and gradually caused seismic shifts in Turkey and the Middle East towards an Islamist-nationalist hegemony. Finally, the DP experience has also created a political pattern that would reproduce itself multiple times in Turkish political history: a conservative-liberal party, which emerged with the mission of resolving a preceding crisis, created its own crisis with

unsustainable and elitist political-economic governance and as a solution pursued polarizing authoritarian populist tactics, only to deepen the crisis into an organic crisis. These organic crises have seen increasing appeal from consecutive governments towards Islamist and ultranationalist politics and movements and resistance from the urban-educated segment that coalesced around republican intellectual and moral values.

VI. Conclusion

This dissertation investigated progressive revolutionary political thought, intellectual-state relations, and hegemonic confrontations in Turkey and the Middle East from the establishment of the CHP's single-party regime in 1930 and the removal of the DP from power by junior military officers in 1960. It explained Turkey's hegemonic shifts and sociopolitical transformations from the perspective of progressive revolutionary intellectuals, who generally fell into two schools of political thought: national liberation and socialism. The research on revolutionary intellectuals and their interactions with the political establishment traced changes and continuities in their ideologies, strategies, and political narratives. It conceptualized revolutionism not as a specific doctrine but as a tradition of distinct political thought that aimed to use the state apparatus as a tool under the guidance of conscious vanguard intellectuals to spread the benefits of modernization to a wider base towards the making of a new social, political, economic, cultural, and moral order. Comparisons of Turkish revolutionary intellectuals with their Iranian and Egyptian counterparts revealed several regional commonalities in the progressive *Weltanschauung*, such as the prominence of the urban-educated bloc (*aydın, effendi, and rowshanfekr* segments respectively in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran), science-oriented political paradigms, dialectic structuralism, and independence-oriented nationalism. Utilizing a qualitative and comparative analysis on the evolution of progressive thought and politics, this study aimed to contribute primarily to intellectual history, political theory, and Middle Eastern studies, and secondarily to the intersecting studies of modernization, securitization, social movements, gender and sexuality, ethnicity, and development.

The key research question revolved around the question of hegemony within the realms of state legitimacy, political-economic thought, and political struggle. The dissertation aimed to expand the generic definition of hegemony – rule by consent – by analyzing hegemonic confrontations and interactions between revolutionary intellectuals and the political establishment and how they influenced the making of Turkey’s political order and socioeconomic structures. This dissertation presents several arguments. First, the struggles of the state elite against progressivism, which often took the form of marginalization and/or securitization, had been directly linked to the undoing of republicanism as a progressive political project since the mid-1940s. Second, the practices of marginalization and securitization had ideologically coalesced progressivism around novel interpretations of Kemalism, which did not turn into a political alliance but interconnected their political fates, nevertheless. Finally, this dissertation argued that hegemonic processes in the twentieth-century Middle East had functioned in three interrelated areas: 1) hegemony as regime legitimacy; 2) hegemony as controlling the codes of dominant political culture; and 3) hegemony as determining the limits of legitimate politics by successfully establishing the boundaries between “politics as usual” and “politics of securitization.”

This dissertation was divided into four main chapters. Chapter 2 historically reviewed modernization histories in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt to investigate the making of major social blocs and state apparatuses. This review showed how the late Ottoman modernization efforts created a novel social bloc, the military-bureaucratic segment, which assumed the “intellectual and moral” (and consequently political) leadership of the urban-educated segment. This chapter also critically reviewed the social and political theories of Gramsci, Bourdieu, and Mardin. While building upon these theories, this work also showed how the

experiences of Turkish progressive intellectuals posed challenges to them. These experiences revealed that the state was not a unitary actor under the control of a certain social bloc (in contrast to most Marxist articulations on the state) but a contested field over which multiple actors with different capitals competed. Progressives and other actors waged their struggles both over the state and civil society. Moreover, state practices of subalternation and subordination also differed. Not all subaltern partners of the regime had equal access to political capital. Subordination practices, meanwhile, extended towards securitization which normalized exceptional measures, especially against socialism, under the pretext of an existential security threat. Bourdieu's understanding on the state as "a field of struggle" offers analytical tools to understand political transformations. However, his arguments on the reproduction of the state elite into a nobility, primarily via elite education institutes, offer little help in understanding the formation of the twentieth century Middle Eastern state elites for they are too static in conceptualizing both the gradual and radical changes across the state elites. Finally, this dissertation showed how Mardin's Center-Periphery paradigm, Turkey's most dominant modernization paradigm since the 1980s, had historical validity if it was understood 1) as a distinction within elites instead of a greater elite-people distinction; 2) not as a continuous conflict but as a complex set of relations in which alliance constituted the key dynamic; and 3) in a layered way that allowed for confrontations within the Center and Periphery blocs.

Chapter 3 dealt with the question of hegemony-building capacities of Middle Eastern nationalist regimes through themes such as regime legitimacy, sociocultural distinctions within the ruling bloc, and intellectual-people distinction. It showed how Turkey's Kemalist establishment differed from its Iranian and Egyptian counterparts in building a hegemonic

regime by realizing extant nationalist goals and by forging an organic leadership over the urban-educated bloc. An additional factor that added to Kemalists' political capital was the institutionalization of Tukey's liberation alliance within the CHP. The institutionalization, however, also came with reversals from revolutionary promises. Progressive intellectuals identified the problem as the conflicting interests of the regime's subaltern partners (nascent national bourgeoisie and rural notables) with the revolution's prime constituency, the people. Progressive intellectuals understood regime hegemony as a process of multilayered and multifaceted alliances and conflict, made by multiple distinctions such as urban vs. rural, military-bureaucratic segment vs. rural notables, intellectuals vs. people, and rich vs. poor. The ultimate hegemonic project for the nationalist regimes had been to create a "unity of fate" across the members of a classless nation. For progressive intellectuals, this project did not go beyond a hopeful wish.

Chapter 4 dealt with the question of hegemony in the context of independence and argued that independence had been the *raison d'etre* of politics for Middle Eastern progressives. Progressive intellectuals developed an interconnected, three-legged understanding of independence: state sovereignty, national sovereignty, and economic sovereignty. Progressive independence narratives, especially with regards to economic sovereignty, promoted a combination of bottom-up and top-down strategies. Independence was to be safeguarded from external (imperialistic) and internal (fascistic/autocratic) sources. The chapter showed how socialist and national liberation intellectuals built parallel understandings of independence due to their shared *Weltanschauung*, which pointed towards a gradual deterioration of Turkey's independence in all relevant meanings since the mid-1940s. This commonality facilitated an ideological merge of socialist and national liberation

schools in the 1950s. Their narratives of independence clashed with the political establishment's practices and exposed the gap between discourse and reality with regards to national sovereignty and socioeconomic development. Progressives argued throughout the 1950s that Turkey's political-economic elites recreated the conditions of Ottoman structural dependency, against which Turkey's liberation movement struggled in the 1920s.

Chapter 5 investigated revolutionary intellectuals' counter-hegemonic struggle within and against the state apparatus and within Turkey's highly restricted civil society. The chapter revolved around intellectuals' vanguardism, narratives and imaginations of revolution, and progressive revolutionary counter-hegemonic struggles. The chapter argued that these hegemonic struggles influenced progressive political thought towards a more confrontational strategy due to intellectuals' political experiences and their shifting analyses on the nature of Turkey's political-economic regime. It further argued that these struggles also transformed the state apparatus ideologically and institutionally due to its practices of marginalization and securitization against progressivism. Progressive intellectuals utilized structuralism to understand Turkey's hegemonic transformations and often sidelined the role of institutions, especially regarding state capacity. Marginalization and securitization practices against progressivism came with the incorporation of fascism and Islamism into the Turkish political order as subaltern partners, which opened them a new field in their hegemonic struggle. Moreover, the chapter showed that a regime's hegemonic capacity was related to its ability to determine the legitimate boundaries of politics by successfully implementing the limits of politicization and securitization. Finally, this chapter showed how the DP's organic crisis coalesced the urban-educated segment and many of its intellectuals around novel interpretations of Kemalist revolutionism.

Progressive narratives on the Kemalist revolution's unfolding and their comparisons with Egyptian and Iranian revolutionary narratives offer information on political transformations in the Middle East in the twentieth century. In Gramscian terms, the Kemalist regime represented a progressive form of Caesarism, which turned into a conservative form of Caesarism under İnönü with greater compromises to conservatism and reaction. The DP represented the transfer of power from the military-bureaucratic segment to the alliance of urban bourgeoisie and rural notables. They were the former subaltern partners of the revolution and in time they managed to sideline their former patron, the military-bureaucratic segment, to a subaltern position. Progressive intellectuals argued that these social blocs harbored reactionary ideologies and defined Turkey's national interests in accordance with their narrow class interests. Moreover, they harbored reactionary ideologies like Islamism and utilized them against progressivism. With the crisis in the late 1950s, securitization practices extended to the entire opposition, which turned the regime into fascism. These processes entrenched the commitment of the urban-educated segment to Kemalist principles. Read in this light, it is little surprise why the urban-educated segment and many progressive intellectuals hailed the military intervention in 1960 as a revolution. The officers' movement represented a wide range of political schools from national liberation to fascism but were united around a vague definition of Kemalism.

A key weakness of this dissertation is that it relied solely on progressive intellectuals as its primary sources to understand Turkey's hegemonic confrontations and sociopolitical transformations. Further research on state practices through official records (especially of the courts) and/or towards conservative/reactionary intellectual movements can provide further insights. Still, this research on progressive intellectuals reveals how this episode of

intellectual-state relations and Turkey's hegemonic transformations initiated two patterns that reproduced themselves throughout the twentieth century and beyond. First, the utilization of reactionary intellectual movements and social bases against progressivism continued beyond the 1950s. In the 1960s, all counter-hegemonic movements, including socialism, began attaching themselves to respective social bases, which transformed them from intellectual to multi-class social movements. Socialism's greater intellectual and popular appeal created a massive concern among Turkey's state elite, which reproduced their anticommunist convictions. In the 1960s and 1970s, fascist and Islamist movements institutionalized themselves into political parties and became integrated into the political realm as subaltern partners of Turkey's rightwing politics. This provides insights into how the contemporary Islamist-nationalist political hegemony in Turkey was manufactured, partly against the progressive challenges. Second, the DP's crisis and its response to it initiated another pattern, where a conservative-liberal party that emerged with the mission of resolving the preceding hegemonic crisis created its very own crisis. As a solution, it sought polarizing authoritarian-populist tactics and reached out to reactionary streams for political alliances. This exacerbated the crisis by delegitimizing the government in the eyes of the Kemalist masses and hampering its ability to rule by consent. This dynamic offers insights into understanding contemporary Turkish politics by showing a historical precedent to the AKP, which, like the DP, emerged as representing itself as a democratizing force and a resolution to Turkey's crises, only to create its own crisis of governance.

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