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Coffee Shops, Beat Cops, and the Ballot Box: A Study of Gentrification, Urban Policing,
and Political Behavior

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Ayobami Stephen Laniyonu

2018

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Coffee Shops, Beat Cops, and the Ballot Box: A Study of Gentrification, Urban Policing,
and Political Behavior

by

Ayobami Stephen Laniyonu

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2018

Professor Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Chair

This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of contemporary policing practices, focusing particular attention on the high volume, aggressive, and racially discriminatory policing strategies that police departments throughout the United States began to adopt in the 1970s and 1980s. In a series of empirical analyses, it makes three principle claims. First, this dissertation argues that the adoption of these punitive policing practices can be attributed in no small part to municipal strategies of gentrification and revitalization. In doing so, it advances research on the *post-industrial policing hypothesis*, which argues that as cities pursue growth strategies designed to appeal to members of the so-called “creative classes” or businesses in the post-industrial sector, they will increasingly adopt punitive policing practices to harass, displace, or control groups (including racial and ethnic minorities) that are deemed incompatible with these strategies. Mobilizing data on order maintenance policing (OMP) in New York City and the Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) police stops that OMP generated, this dissertation finds that gentrification in New York City is associated with significantly higher rates of SQF police stops, mostly in neighborhoods that lie adjacent to or near gentrifying tracts.

In a second analysis, this dissertation argues that these aggressive policing strategies have the potential to impact political behavior, and explores how OMP practices in New

York City affected voter turnout and candidate choice in that city. In a series of national and local elections, it finds that while concentrated policing can negatively affect political participation in the form of voter turnout, heavily policed communities can and do mobilize to counteract these harmful and discriminatory policing policies. Specifically, it finds that while SQF policing was associated with lower rates of turnout in the 2010 and 2006 national elections, it was also associated with higher rates of turnout in the 2008 national election and the 2013 mayoral election and Democratic primary. While the positive association between turnout and policing in the 2008 national election was likely do to the unique mobilizing affect that Barack Obama's campaign had on marginalized communities, this dissertation argues that the higher rates of turnout in the 2013 general and Democratic primary are attributable to the mobilization of communities in New York City to end SQF policing. In support of this claim, this chapter presents additional evidence that higher rates of SQF policing was associated with more support for the Democratic primary candidate (John Liu) who promised to end SQF policing and significantly less support for the candidate (William Thompson) who promised to keep it.

In its third and final analysis, this dissertation explores the extent to which aggressive and discriminatory policing affects political behavior in other national contexts, specifically the United Kingdom. Characterizing contemporary policing practices in Britain which: 1) were adopted specifically following their successful implementation in American cities such as New York City and 2) which exhibit similar levels of racial and ethnic disparity, this chapter argues that like gentrification, *post-industrial policing* and its political consequences are global in scope. Mobilizing data from police stops of citizens in Greater London, Manchester, and the West-Midlands this analysis similarly finds that as the intensity of police-citizen contact increases, political participation decreases. Unlike in New York City, however, this analysis does not uncover instances or contexts where higher levels of policing were associated with higher rates of turnout, which it tentatively attributes to differences in political opportunity structure in the two contexts.

The dissertation of Ayobami Stephen Laniyonu is approved.

Robin Davis Gibran Kelley

David O. Sears

Lorrie Frasure-Yokley

Matthew Alejandro Barreto, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2018

*To every member of my family
without whom this entire process would
have been impossible.*

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VITA

- 2019 – Assistant Professor, Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies, University of Toronto, Ontario
- 2018 – 2019 Research Scientist, Center of Policing Equity, John Jay College, New York, New York
- 2018 Ph.D. (Political Science, expected), University of California, Los Angeles, California
- 2018 M.A. (Statistics, expected), University of California, Los Angeles, California
- 2016 – 218 American Bar Foundation/National Science Foundation/Law and Society Association Doctoral Fellow, The American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois
- 2016 Teaching Assistant, Department of Statistics, University of California, Los Angeles, California
- 2014 – 2016 Teaching Assistant, Department of Statistics, University of California, Los Angeles, California
- 2007 – 2011 B.A. with Honors (Government and Politics, Sociology), University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

Laniyonu, Ayobami. 2018. “The Political Consequences of Policing: Evidence from New York City”. *Political Behavior*. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-018-9461-9

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"Neighborhood Income Segregation and Attitudes Towards Local Policy" (Paper Presented with Scott Minkoff and Jeffrey Lyons at the the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco CA, 2017)

"The Political Consequences of Stop and Frisk in New York City" (Paper Presented at the International Meeting on Law and Society, Mexico City 2017)

"Coffee Shops and Street Stops: Policing Practices in Gentrifying Neighborhoods" (Paper Presented at the Politics of Race, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consortium, University of California Santa Barbara, 2017)

"The Effect of Stop and Frisk Policing on Political Participation" (Invited Presentation at the American Bar Foundation, Chicago IL, 2016)

"A Comparative Study of Black Racial Group Consciousness in the United States and the United Kingdom" (Paper Presentation at the 74th Annual Conference of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago IL, 2016)

CHAPTER 1

Death by Gentrification? The Police Killings of Saheed Vassell and Alejandro Nieto

Saheed Vassell was shot and killed by New York City police officers in the Crown Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn on April 4th, 2018. Officers from the New York City Police Department (NYPD) are alleged to have shot Saheed within seconds of arriving at the scene (Mueller and Schweber 2018). As a matter of policy, the NYPD rarely releases 911 call information, but was quick to do so in this instance to bolster its claim that the killing was an unfortunate consequence of police nevertheless working to ensure the safety of residents of the neighborhood (Lennard 2018). Callers, the police stressed, suspected that the bent metal pipe Saheed was carrying was actually a gun and city officials up to the mayor have argued that officers responded appropriately to protect community members against the perceived threat.

Long-term residents of the neighborhood where Saheed was killed were quick to push back against these claims. Not only did they call into question whether responding officers had followed basic protocol by shooting to kill and denying Saheed the opportunity to surrender, but they also criticized the claim that Saheed was perceived as a threat to the community in the first place. At protests, demonstrations, and in reports to the media, long-term residents have emphasized that *they* knew Saheed was a harmless man who suffered from mental illness, and that the behavior that motivated the 911 calls and was used to justify his killing generated no fear among long-term residents of the neighborhood (Lennard 2018; Mueller and Schweber 2018). Rather, they and others have argued that Shaheed's death was a "death by gentrification" and lay partial fault for his death at the hands of the upper middle

class, well-educated, and predominately white gentrifiers who have settled into historically black Crown Heights in record numbers and who are alleged to have called the police in the first instance (Lennard 2018; Mueller and Schweber 2018). As a black man in this changing context, Saheed may have been especially vulnerable to the racialized forms of fear and threat these in-movers can harbor.

As tragic as it was, Saheed’s killing was not the first police killing that has been attributed to gentrification. Solnit (2016), for example, has described the police killing of Alejandro Nieto in a park in Bernal Heights, San Francisco. Unlike in the case of Saheed, there is no ambiguity in who called the police and their relationship to the city. Several white residents, newly employed in that city’s famed tech industry, had called 911 to report a ‘menacing’ and ‘suspected Latino gang-member’ (Solnit 2016). Alejandro, a life-long resident Bernal Heights was in fact a bouncer at a local club and had stopped in the park to eat. As in Crown Heights, however, officers responding to the concerns of fearful white residents ended up killing Alejandro, claiming that they mistook the Taser that he wore for his job for gun.

Outraged at the deaths, community members in both Crown Heights and Bernal Heights mobilized to protest. Taking their claims to the streets, hundreds gathered in Crown Heights to protest both the police protocols that saw Saheed killed and the structural violence that allowed gentrification to take root in that neighborhood in the first place (Gabbat 2018; Lennard 2018; Mueller and Schweber 2018). In San Francisco, high school students organized walk-outs and members of the city’s Latino community organized rallies and demonstrations against gentrification and police violence (Estrada 2017).

Although the events described in these two cases are unique, in this dissertation I argue that the underlying dynamics that produced them are not. Extant scholarship on gentrification — which usually sees white, well educated, and high socio-economic status (SES) individuals move into central city neighborhoods while displacing long-term black and Latino inhabitants — has made it clear that gentrification is occurring in cities throughout the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Extant scholarship has characterized, for example, the dramatic extent and rapid pace of gentrification in New York City, Washington DC, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia (Davis 2006;

Freeman 2005; Gibson 2004; Hyra 2017; Solnit 2002); Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal (Hackworth and Rekers 2005; Walks and Maaranen); and London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, York and New Castle (Atkinson 2000; Waights 2014). At the same time, qualitative scholarship on policing in several of these cities has described changes in police practices and strategies which it attributes to gentrification and urban revitalization¹ (Davis 2006; Gibson 2004; Millie 2008b; Vitale 2008). This scholarship has described how policing in these contexts has become significantly more aggressive and pro-active; increasingly prioritizes the policing of petty offenses and misdemeanors; and increasingly targets youth, the poor, people of color, and the homeless for simply existing in downtown and revitalizing areas — producing millions of new police-citizen encounters as a consequence. Yet while these qualitative studies provide compelling accounts of the relationship between adverse and discriminatory forms of policing and gentrification, they do not offer systematic evidence of this relationship that can account for competing explanatory factors. This dissertation therefore asks: to what extent is gentrification systematically associated with more punitive policing or adverse police contact across cities?

And how ought scholarship understand the protests and demonstrations that followed both of these shootings? If gentrification does produce worse policing outcomes, how do impacted communities — predominately black and Latino — respond? Clearly, police violence can spark community mobilization, protests, and demonstrations. Indeed, the protests and demonstrations that followed the killings in Crown Heights and Bernal Heights echo the protests and demonstrations that followed the spate of highly publicized police killings of unarmed African Americans (and the non-indictment of their killers) in 2013, 2014, and 2015, and motivated widespread participation in the Black Lives Matter Movement (Taylor 2016). As a protest movement, the Black Lives Matter Movement has been successful at mobilizing communities to protest acts of police violence, motivating African Americans to run for political office, and increasing African American turnout and electoral participation (Eligon 2015; Lauter and Pearce 2015; Schwarz 2014). Nevertheless, sustained protest movements

¹Distinct from gentrification, revitalization refers to municipal investment into services, infrastructure, attractions, and amenities to improve neighborhoods and the city generally (Grodach and LoukaitouSideris 2007)

against police violence or other harmful police behavior are rare, and we know relatively little about the political consequences of contemporary policing practices absent a movement like the Black Lives Matter Movement. Indeed, extant literature on the consequences of criminal justice contact (including contact with police) strongly suggests that sustained and repeated contact with police will reduce political participation (Lerman and Weaver 2010; Weaver and Lerman 2014b). This dissertation therefore also asks: what affect do contemporary policing practices generally have on the political behavior of the communities disproportionately affected by them?

By addressing these questions together, this dissertation attempts to address a significant gap in the literature on what could be called the political economy of urban policing, or the manner in which the strategies that local elites adopt in the pursuit of economic growth and competitiveness drive municipal policing practices, with consequences for the political behavior of local communities. Extant literature on the political economy of *incarceration* has already advanced a framework for understanding these relationships as they relate to prisons, and has documented how a series of fiscal crises in the 1970s, the restructuring of the world and national economies in the form of de-industrialization, and elite concern over the socio-political disruptiveness of “surplus labor populations” (e.g. low and working class men, particularly of color) contributed to *mass incarceration* in the United States (Gilmore 2007; Wacquant 2008). According to this literature, mass incarceration is the partial by-product of deteriorating local and national economic conditions and was propelled by some elites who viewed prison construction as a means through which they could return their cities, counties, and regions to stability or economic profitability (Gilmore 2007). The political consequences of this strategy have been dramatic and the subject of significant scholarship which has documented the corrosive impact that it has had on political participation and representation (Burch 2013; Lerman and Weaver 2010; Uggen et al. 2016).

Little of this framework has been applied to policing, however, despite ample evidence that gentrification and revitalization were elite driven projects designed to return cities to economic competitiveness and stability, and the clear potential for locally controlled policing to be mobilized in service of this project (Davis 2000; Gibson 2004; Vitale 2008). This disser-

tation addresses this limitation and argues that the dynamics observed in the Crown Heights and Bernal Heights — of communities experiencing adverse police contact as a consequence of gentrification and acting politically in response to it — may play out more generally and systematically in cities. More explicitly, I argue that 1) gentrification systematically affects the intensity of aggressive and racially discriminatory police practices in cities that experience it and 2) that these policing practices have the potential to systematically affect political behavior. What’s more, given the fact that gentrification and revitalization have been pursued in contexts beyond the US and evidence of the diffusion of criminal justice policies from the United States to other nations (Newburn 2002) this dissertation also argues 3) that these dynamics are not unique to the US criminal justice system, but are generalizable cross-nationally.

In doing so, this dissertation advances what has been called the *post-industrial policing* hypothesis. The post-industrial policing hypothesis argues that macro-economic and political changes in the 1970s and 1980s compelled many cities to pursue new strategies to maintain growth and economic competitiveness and that these strategies ‘necessitated’ (from the point of view of municipal elites) the adoption of aggressive, punitive, and fundamentally discriminatory policing practices (Sharp 2014; Gibson 2004). Specifically, the hypothesis argues that faced with the declining competitiveness of heavy manufacturing and industry, central state retrenchment, fiscal austerity, and neo-liberal economic restructuring many large cities in the United States and other Western democracies made substantial investments into municipal projects to attract: 1) businesses in the information, knowledge, and “creativity industries” (Florida 2004) and 2) the predominately white, high SES individuals (gentrifiers) who would work in or patronized those businesses (Gibson 2004). Gentrification — produced in part by sustained municipal investment — in this sense is not the outcome of ‘natural’ processes of housing or labor markets, but the outcome of targeted and deliberate elite strategy (Gibson 2004). In order to make the city ‘viable’ or ‘productive’ in this manner, however, the post-industrial policing hypothesis argues that municipal elites had to attend the fear crime, perceptions of disorder, and conceptions of proper use of public space held by these gentrifiers, and mobilized local police for this purpose.

Going further, however, I argue that this shift in policing practice can have significant political consequences for communities. More specifically, I argue that the frequent and adversarial police contact that members of some communities now experience as a consequence of gentrification can negatively affect rates of political participation in those communities. This argument follows both from the literature on the negative effect that frequent police-citizen contact can have on attitudes towards the legal system, perceptions of individual and community efficacy, educational attainment, socio-economic status, and mental health (Baumgartner et al. 2017; Epp et al. 2014; Fine et al. 2003; Gau and Brunson 2010; Geller et al. 2014; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Rios 2011; Stoudt et al. 2011; USDOJ 2015), and from extant literature which has uncovered the powerfully demobilizing effect that other forms of criminal justice contact (such as time spent in prison or jails) can have on individual and aggregate level rates of political participation (Burch 2013; Weaver and Lerman 2010).

At the same time, however, I argue, that the extant literature may underestimate the capacity of communities to contest or mobilize against criminal justice policies. Extant studies paint a relatively bleak picture of the capacity of communities to affect change in US criminal justice policy generally, and relatively few studies have explored the specific potential for community mobilization to affect policing practices specifically (but see Felker-Kantor (2016)). Extant literature on Latino American political mobilization against threatening immigration policies and the mobilization of seniors against harmful Social Security reform, however, has demonstrated that communities that are threatened or harmed by policies can mobilize to contest them (Barreto et al. 2009; Campbell 2003; Pantoja and Segura 2003). In this dissertation I argue that the same is true for policing, but critically suggest that such mobilization may be contingent on the presence of political opportunities and contexts which signal the openness or capacity of the political system to enact policy change. Post-industrial policing, I therefore argue, likely has a negative impact on community political engagement in most instances and contexts, but this negative impact is certainly not absolute.

Finally, I argue that we may expect these relationships to hold across national contexts. As noted, the changes in macro-economic conditions that produced urban revitalization and gentrification as favored growth strategies were not limited to the United States, but affected

other Western democracies as well. While extant literature has characterized US policing (and the entire criminal justice system) as highly idiosyncratic, I argue that we may expect post-industrial policing to follow from gentrification in other contexts and for this policing to affect political behavior in the communities where it is applied.

1.1 Plan of the Dissertation

With that said, the rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the over-arching theory and argument of the dissertation: that contemporary policing has been mobilized in the pursuit of gentrification and urban revitalization, that this policing can systematically affect political behavior, and that these relationships are not unique to the United States.

Chapter 3 presents a detailed empirical examination of an implication of the first claim: that adverse and punitive police-citizen interactions in US cities are partly attributable to gentrification. Rather than focusing on police shootings, however, this chapter explores the impact of gentrification and revitalization on police stops produced by New York City's aggressive, pro-active, and highly discriminatory Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) police tactic. More so than police shootings (which are relatively rare events), stops made under SQF reflect the routinized, everyday behavior of New York City police officers and where these stops occur offers a better indicator of areas police have prioritized.

Methodologically, this chapter utilizes a relatively new type of spatial model — the spatial Durbin model — to accurately assess the impact of gentrification on SQF policing in New York City. The spatial Durbin model is a type of spatial model that allows analysts to explore how variation in the characteristics of one neighborhood affect outcomes in that neighborhood and in neighborhoods situated nearby. Using this model, Chapter 3 presents the impact of gentrification on SQF policing and identifies a strong positive association between gentrification and SQF policing. Interestingly, the results suggest that the effect of gentrification on SQF is largely indirect, such that gentrification in one neighborhood leads to substantially higher levels of SQF in *adjacent* or *nearby* neighborhoods. This effect

persists despite the inclusion to a wide range of covariates, including rates of crime. They also persist despite the inclusion of 311 call rates, which are used to proxy for calls that gentrifying in-movers might place to municipal agencies like the NYPD. Together, these results suggest that policing might be supplied to gentrifying neighborhoods in excess of any demand that local residents might make.

Chapter 4 addresses how community members react to these forms of policing. Utilizing the same SQF data as in Chapter 3, it explores this question, but adds precinct level data on voter turnout and vote choice. Examining the impact that SQF played across several elections, Chapter 4 uncovers an important pattern of mobilization, demobilization, and candidate choice which suggests that while routinized, invasive, and discriminatory policing practices constituted by SQF likely reduce political participation in most contexts, this may not always be the case.

Specifically, the results from Chapter 4 suggest that while the spatial concentration of SQF in New York City was associated with reductions in voter turnout in national level elections in 2010 and 2006, the spatial intensity of SQF was positively associated with voter turnout in the 2013 mayoral elections — an election where SQF policing was a central campaign issue and where policed communities were given an opportunity to affect the course of SQF policing directly by selecting the next mayor. Furthermore, results from my analysis in this chapter demonstrate that the intensity of SQF policing was positively predictive for support for the Democratic party candidate (John Liu) who promised the most reform and change to SQF policing and negatively predictive of support for the Democratic primary candidate (William Thompson) who was the most supportive of SQF. In sum, these results suggest that while policing can constitute a demobilizing force, this may not always be the case and that given the political opportunity to directly affect harmful policing policies, some communities may mobilize to do so.

Chapter 5 of the dissertation considers these relationships beyond the context of the United States. It argues that adversarial police contact, irrespective of national context, can affect political behavior and explores the political consequences of policing in three large metropolitan counties in the United Kingdom: Greater London, Greater Manchester, and

the West Midlands. Mobilizing data on the policing of anti-social behaviors and Stop and Search powers — which mirror the aggressive and discriminatory post-industrial policing practices studied in New York City — this chapter presents evidence that concentrated neighborhood policing reduces voter turnout in the United Kingdom as well.

Chapter 6 concludes with a review of the findings, further discussion of their implications, and analysis of limitations and future directions.

CHAPTER 2

Towards a Theory Post-Industrial Policing and it's Political Consequences

American police departments have undergone several substantial transformations since their establishment in the early and mid-19th (Willis 2014). The most recent has been the adoption of aggressive, pro-active, and preventative policing strategies, which American police departments began to adopt at a large scale starting in the 1980s and 1990s (Willis 2014). These strategies — such as order maintenance policing, zero tolerance policing, and quality of life policing — can be defined by the frequent investigatory stops that officers working under them make (typically for minor infractions and of people of color), and collectively dominate the current landscape of policing in the United States (Thatcher 2014).

These new strategies have dramatically changed the nature of policing where they have been implemented, and have generated a voluminous literature to analyze them. Extant studies on the causes and consequences of these new forms of policing, however, have failed to account for the powerful ways in which local political economy (e.g. the strategies and tactics that municipal elites pursue to maintain economic stability, growth, or competitiveness) affect local policing, and have neglected the effect that these practices can have on the political behavior. Instead, extant literature largely focuses on: 1) explaining the extent to which levels of crime or perceptions of threat predict variation in police intensity, 2) characterizing how policing can lead to racially disparate levels of criminal justice contact, affect attitudes towards the legal system, and negatively impact life outcomes, and 3) characterizing the impact that other criminal justice institutions and practices can have on political

behavior.

This dissertation presents three empirical analyses which together advance a framework for addressing these limitations and understanding: 1) how local economic strategies might affect policing, 2) how impacted communities might respond to this policing, 3) and the geographic extent in which this relationship might hold. In this chapter, I present the underlying theories and review the extent literature that under-gird this framework. First, I argue that policing is powerfully affected by local political economy or changes in local political economy. More specifically, I argue that recent changes brought about by de-industrialization, state retrenchment, and the rise of the “post-industrial economy” have exerted a powerful effect on contemporary policing practices in ways that cannot be anticipated by the extant literature. As such, I advance the *post-industrial policing* hypothesis, which has argued that as cities (or neighborhoods within cities) come to rely on urban revitalization and gentrification in response to these macro-economic changes, they are more likely to rely on aggressive, pro-active, and discriminatory policing to make these areas more appealing or less threatening to the businesses and residents this strategy is designed to attract (Sharp 2013; Vitale 2008; Gibson 2004).

Second, I argue that the aggressive, investigative, and discriminatory policing practices wrought by neoliberal economic changes have the potential to adversely affect political participation and engagement. While many different mechanisms may connect policing to political behavior, I focus on the *interpretive effects mechanism* which characterizes how frequent and negative interactions with government institutions can negatively affect political trust and efficacy, and thereby participation (Lerman and Weaver 2014a; Metter and Soss 2004; Soss 1999). At the same time, I argue that policed communities have the capacity to mobilize to counter-act these policies contingent, however, on the presence of meaningful political opportunities and resources.

Third, I suggest that this relationship is not unique to the United States and argue that the impact of policing practices on political behavior generalizes beyond the United States. In making this claim, I highlight the fact that the factors that motivated some local governments in the United States to pursue gentrification and revitalization as growth strategies are not

unique to the United States but have affected a wide range of Western democracies (Atkinson and Bridge 2004; Atkinson and Bridge 2002). Coupled with the demonstrated ability of US criminal justice policies to diffuse or spread across contexts, (Newburn 2002), I argue that we ought to consider both post-industrial policing and the negative interpretive effects it can generate as applying broadly and beyond the United States.

The remainder of the chapter is broken up into three main sections, each treating the literatures I address and the arguments I seek to put forth. In the first section, I review literature on the factors that determine police intensity across cities and space, and present my argument that this literature fails to consider the manner in which policing can be mobilized by municipal elites in pursuit of economic gain or competitiveness. I then present the post-industrial policing hypothesis, which offers a framework for anticipating how policing can be leveraged by local elites, and theorize the implication that this hypothesis has for the spatial distribution of policing across neighborhoods.

In the second section, I turn my attention to consideration of the political consequences that police contact can have on communities. Here, I review extant work on the political consequences of mass incarceration and the voluminous literature on the effect that frequent and adverse police contact can have on attitudes towards the police, attitudes towards the legal system more generally, health, and educational achievement. I then consider the multiple avenues through which policing can affect political participation, under what conditions we might expect mobilization, and under what conditions we might expect demobilization.

The third and final section argues that these relationships should not be considered unique to the United States and discusses how policing practices in the United Kingdom might affect political behavior in that context. While extant literature linking criminal justice contact in the United Kingdom to political outcomes or behaviors is limited, I nevertheless describe how two policing practices — the deployment of stop and search police powers and the policing of anti-social behaviors — may affect political behavior in that context.

2.1 Background Extant Explanations for Police Allocation and Strength

A large extant literature has explored the factors that explain police prioritization or intensity across municipalities or across neighborhoods within municipalities. While many explanatory factors have been proposed and tested, explanations in this literature can roughly be divided into two theoretical frameworks. The first and perhaps most intuitive explanation lies in the rational-bureaucratic framework, which argues that variation in policing is determined by levels of crime or differences in demand for police. This framework is rooted in Weber's (1978) rational-bureaucratic ideal type of political authority, which posited as an ideal the notion that determinations concerning the application of punishment, social control, or coercive state power be rationally determined by need, democratic deliberation, and consensus. Similarly, public choice models suggest that differences in municipal allocation of policing are determined by differences in the preference structure of residents, thought to be a function of objective levels of crime, likelihood of crime victimization, or risk sensitivity (Sampson and Raudenbush 2004; Tiebout 1956).

Despite its intuitive appeal, the notion that crime or risk of victimization predicts police intensity across cities or neighborhoods in a city has only received mixed empirical verification. On the one hand, several cross sectional and longitudinal studies on municipal spending on police and police force size per capita have suggested that crime is a strong predictor of police intensity and prioritization (Jacobs and Helms 1997; Stuckey 2005; Zhao, Ren, Lovrich 20120). In a study of police intensity in New York City, Kane (2003) similarly found violent crime and grand larceny to be among the strongest predictors of police deployment across precincts. At the same time, however, a large set of studies have also failed to uncover strong or consistent evidence that crime affects how much cities prioritize policing or where they are deployed (Kent and Charmichael 2014; Kent and Jacobs 2005; Nalla, Lynch, and Leiber 1997; Ruddell and Thomas 2010; Sever and McSkimming 2004).

To a certain extent, these inconsistent findings may reflect a weakness of empirical operationalization. Police may not just simply go where crime occurs, but may pro-actively go

to places where crime is likely to occur in the future as a means of preventing it. Extant literature, for example, has demonstrated that youth between the ages of 18 and 24 are far more likely to commit crime than any other age cohort, and that crime is significantly higher in neighborhoods where ‘social disorder’ or disruption is higher (e.g. neighborhoods with a high share of single-mother households or high levels of employment) (Pratt and Cullen 2005). Following these factors that contribute to the “supply” of crime to certain cities or neighborhoods, police may rationally deploy to areas where the share of young people or indicators of social disorder are high. Extant literature has offered some evidence that social disorder and youth share of the population positively predict police intensity, but the findings have been somewhat weak and inconsistent (Stuckey 2005).

In contrast to the rational-bureaucratic perspective, conflict theory argues that all institutions and practices of the criminal justice system — including law making, street-level policing, and incarceration — are principally determined by inequality between social groups and the control that dominant groups exercise over the criminal justice system (Blalock 1967; Liska 1992). Within this framework, the racial and class threat hypotheses suggest that dominant groups (e.g. white Americans and the wealthy) explicitly mobilize the criminal justice system to keep racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and working class individuals subordinated, especially at moments or in contexts where their power or control is threatened. According to Blalock’s (1967) power threat hypothesis and many studies that have followed, the ‘threat’ constituted by racial and ethnic minorities typically comes in the form of population growth or share, such that we might expect spending on police to increase as the black or Latino share of the population increases. The same is true of the economic threat hypothesis: the framework predicts that as the share of the population that is poor, working class, or unemployed increases, so too will the intensity of social control or allocation towards institutions of social control (Chiricos and Delone 1992). Threat, particularly as it relates to racial and ethnic minorities, may not be limited to population share, however, and can include increasing economic competitiveness (Liska and Chamlin 1984) or protests, rebellions, and uprisings (Jackson and Carroll 1981). It may also clearly come at the intersection of race and class, such that whites attempt to mobilize police when they feel threatened by the

share of the population that is black *and* poor (Liska 1992).

Empirically, the vast majority of analyses testing the racial threat hypothesis have found evidence that the percentage of black Americans in a city is positively correlated with the intensity of policing or municipal spending on policing, net other factors (Jacobs and Helms 1997; Kent and Charmichael 2014; Kent and Jacobs 2005; Ruddell and Thomas 2010; Sever 2003 Stuckey 2005; Zhao, Ren, and Lovrich 2012). Other studies have found that the legacy of black political protests and uprisings in the 1960s and 1970s strongly predict policing as well (Jackson and Carroll 1982; Sharp 2006). But while the black American share of the population has consistently predicted policing intensity, the size of the Latino American population has been a less consistent predictor. For example, while Zhao, Ren, and Lovrich (2012) uncovered a negative relationship between the share of the Latino American population and indicators of policing intensity, Holmes et al. (2008) uncovered weak, positive effects.

In contrast to the racial threat hypothesis, evidence that policing is associated with indicators of economic threat is weak. Some studies, relying on the GIN coefficient as an indicator of economic threat, have found it to be positively associated with indicators of police deployment (Kent and Charmichael 2014). At the same time, a broader set of studies which have explored the effect that the unemployed or impoverished share of the population exerts on policing have uncovered non-significant, inconsistent, or substantively marginal effects (Holmes et al. 2008; Kane 2003; Kent and Charmichael 2014; Ruddell and Thomas 2015, Zhao, Ren, and Lovrich 2008).

While these two theoretical perspective explain a great portion of the variance in police intensity, they are nevertheless limited. Principally, I suggest that they fail to adequately account for the manner in which dominant groups actively mobilize local police in the pursuit of economic competitiveness or gain. While this argument is still premised in the inequality that exists between different social groups (e.g. the conflict perspective), it suggests that the *negation* of socio-political threat is not the sole motivator for dominant groups. Rather, criminal justice polices and institutions can be *purposefully and pro-actively* mobilized principally (if not exclusively) for the purpose of economic gain and competitiveness.

Extant studies which have characterized the manner in which *prisons* have been drafted for the purpose of economic competitiveness offer evidence of this practice or potential. Gilmore (2007), for example, has argued that the building of prisons in California served the multi-faceted function of controlling marginalized groups *and* returning land, labor, capital, and state capacity to productivity following a series of economic crises in the 1970s. As De Giorgi (2008) puts it, under Gilmore’s (2007) framework: “Mass incarceration performs the important task of productively re-investing economic redundancies generated by the larger transformation of the economy — revalorizing abandoned land, reinvesting idle capital, re-activating State functions, and recycling a growing labor force” (159). Other studies on post-Bellum Black Codes, vagrancy laws, convict lease, Jim Crow, and sharecropping have also demonstrated that elite control over the criminal justice (or extra-legal forms for terror) worked to facilitate economic growth just as much as the socio-political domination of black Americans (Davis 2000; Mancini 1978; Roback 1984).

I argue that this framework has important implications for understanding police behavior in cities, particularly those experiencing gentrification. In this context — where the black, Latino, and working class share of the population may actually be declining or constant — the threat perspective might predict that we would observe a reduction in policing or police intensity. Instead, gentrification typically produces a shift in priorities such that police are more aggressive, punitive, and even predatory compared to cities where gentrification is not occurring (Davis 2006; Gibson 2004; Sharp 2013; Vitale 2008). While gentrification certainly leads to greater inter-personal contact between different racial, ethnic, and class groups (which may draw heightened policing), the findings presented by Gilmore (2007) nevertheless suggest that part of this contradiction might be explained by elite decision making and influence over criminal justice policies or practices.

In the following section, I describe one such practice (order maintenance policing), its origins (that can be attributed in part to a desire to reduce crime and perceptions of threat felt by dominant groups), and its eventual mobilization as a policy tool to advance local economic competitiveness.

2.1.1 Order Maintenance, Quality of Life, and Postindustrial Policing — Mobilizing Police Policy for Economic Growth

Order maintenance policing (OMP) is a policing strategy that emerged in American cities following a series of social and political crises in the 1960s and 1970s. It emerged as one among a set of new policing strategies adopted by municipal police departments confronted by dual claims of police brutality and under policing in minority communities; a crisis of confidence within the broader public following student protests, anti-war protests, and urban riots; and surging rates of violent crime (Willis 2014). To address these issues, police departments shifted away from “traditional” modes of law enforcement which took a reactive approach to crime, encouraged police departments to be bureaucratically detached from the communities they policed, and prioritized serious crimes over petty offenses. In its place, many departments began to adopt order maintenance policing strategies which attempted to address community concerns and crime through the aggressive, proactive, and preventative policing of “disorder.”

In this regard, OMP has been regarded by some as a “rational” police innovation, designed specifically to reduce crime. Indeed, its most well-known justification has come from Wilson and Kellings’ (1982) influential Broken Windows theory of crime. According to the theory, serious crime originates in weakened community cohesion and is enabled by the tolerance of petty offenses (such as public intoxication, graffiti, loitering, and disturbing the peace) and the presence of physical disorder (such as an unfixed broken window), which signal to criminals a breakdown of social order. The authors argued that serious crime, community disorder, and urban decay could be alleviated through the aggressive and proactive policing of these petty offenses and the order maintenance approach emerged as one of the most dominant and widespread policing paradigms in the late 1980s and 1990s (Taylor 2001).

In truth, there is very little empirical support for the notion that Broken Windows or OMP reduce crime. In a natural experiment of five major US cities, Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) found no evidence in support of the claim that disorder causes crime, while analyses in Chicago (Sampson and Raudenbush 2001) and Baltimore (Taylor 2001) found that indi-

cators of marginalization and disadvantage are far stronger determinants of neighborhood level crime than disorder. Furthermore, Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) found that individual perceptions of “disorder” are far more powerfully influenced by the racial and class composition of a neighborhood than by objective levels of physical or social disorder, and the authors called into question the ability for residents to objectively identify levels of disorder in any neighborhood without reliance on racial and class-based stereotypes.

Independent of its ability to reduce crime, however, order maintenance policing has been justified as responding to other critiques of policing that emerged from this crisis period, particularly police detachment and alienation from the community, low public confidence in police, and its failure to take community preferences seriously. In this sense, OMP might be seen as consistent with the public choice/rational bureaucratic framework’s emphasis on democratic consensus or community preference in determining policing practices and priorities, especially given its frequent pairing with community policing, wherein police are encouraged to meeting frequently with community residents to set priorities and objectives (Willis 2014). Indeed, Vitale (2008) argued that order maintenance policing is best understood as a particular strategy that emerged from the more general paradigm of social control and urban governance — the quality of life paradigm — which claimed to foreground the needs and desires of the democratic, law abiding “majority” over the ‘deviant minority’.

Scholars have provided some evidence in support of this framework. In a work titled “The Black Silent Majority”, for example, Fortner (2015) characterized how increased crime and drug use (compounded by residential segregation and limited political influence) eroded the sympathy that the middle and working class majority of black residents of Harlem expressed for drug addicts, leading many people in that community to advocate for a more aggressive policing and support the Rockefeller drug sentencing laws. Vitale (2008) similarly has described how sympathy for the homeless and other marginalized groups eroded across New York City during the 1980s, producing dramatic conflicts in places like Tompkins Square Park and the city’s subway system, and motivating the NYPD to adopt some aggressive, zero tolerance policing tactics that prefigured later order maintenance policing strategies.

The history of OMP, however, clearly also manifests conflict and was indisputably in-

fluenced by perceptions of socio-political threat that dominant social groups — particularly whites — felt in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Indeed, much of the rhetoric of policing for the majority belies deep conflict between social groups. For example, Kelling and Coles (1997) have argued that middle class resentment towards the liberatory social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the disruption they posed to the established social order that fueled support for punitive policing in New York City. Alexander (2010) has also argued that white racial resentment and fear of the sociopolitical gains African Americans made during the Civil Rights and Black Power Eras motivated support for a broad spectrum of punitive social policies, from street-level policing practices to mass incarceration. Finally, both Garland (2001) and Simon (2007) have argued that economic insecurity and perceptions of economic precocity (e.g. class threat) produced a demand for more intensive crime control and state practices that would reduce risk.

What is key for this analysis, however, is that with its relative emphasis on social disorder rather than serious crime, OMP implies and allows for the enforcement of more subjective standards or “socially accepted behaviors,” affording significant discretion to officers and their commanders in this mode of policing compared to more traditional styles. Wilson and Kellings’ (1982) original article on Broken Windows emphasized the importance of policing “incivility” and “disorder,” but what constitutes incivility and disorder in reality is contested, subjective, and contingent. As Vitale (2008: 72) has argued: “‘Disorder’ can only be defined in relation to community responses... if a social behavior or physical condition provokes a response of fear and withdrawal it can be considered disorderly.” Public intoxication, for example, may not constitute an incivility on a campus quad, but may violate preferences for civil behavior in a middle-class neighborhood or commercial corridor, irrespective of its actual illegality. People in these areas may expect or demand that officers police this behavior in different ways. Order maintenance policing thus introduces a tremendous amount of discretion on the part of officers and their commanders based on demands from mobilized communities and interests, and it sets the stage for the mobilization of policing practices by dominant or well organized groups.

This is precisely what the postindustrial theory of policing argues: that the selective

enforcement of petty crime and public disorder has become a policy tool in large urban projects of revitalization, gentrification, and postindustrial growth. The theory of post-industrial policing argues that the implementation of OMP in fact is only marginally related with reducing crime or keeping blacks, Latinos, or the poor socially or politically subordinate. Rather, the theory suggests that the shift to order maintenance policing enables urban policy makers to enforce conceptions of public order, civility, and even urban aesthetics consistent with those held by populations and industries thought to promote urban growth (Millie 2008b). Given evidence that many of these potential residents, tourists, and consumers have deeply racialized and class based conceptualizations of disorder, civility, and fear of crime (Garland 2001; Hale 1995; Sampson and Raudenbush 2001; Welch 2007), urban managers pursuing postindustrial growth strategies may proactively regulate public space so that it is amenable to these individuals. As a result, the theory suggests that the policing practices that follow from these changes amount to the purging of targeted areas of the city of classes, individuals, and behaviors that in-movers may associate with crime and disorder.

The extant literature contains several compelling case study analyses of the development and application of order maintenance policing in the service of gentrification or revitalization. Vitale's (2008) study of New York City identified a coalition of mid-Manhattan business and property owners as the pioneers of the policing and security styles that would later become adopted by the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations and developed into the coherent set of policing tactics and strategies identified in OMP. Concerned that homelessness, crime, and disorder were discouraging commerce and depressing property values, business owners developed organizations, such as the Grand Central Partnership, that attempted to deal with the effect of crime and homelessness by, "utilizing aggressive policing, restrictive physical barriers, and token social services" (129). Gibson (2004) and Davis (2006) have described similar processes in Seattle and Los Angeles respectively, in which a combination of ordinances targeting the homeless and aggressive policing tactics were designed to protect billion-dollar downtown revitalization projects.

If elites hold the policy levers at the local level then we may not only expect this sort of variation across cities but within cities themselves. That is, we might expect that as

a particular neighborhood experiences gentrification, OMP increases in that neighborhood. This dissertation argues this may indeed be the case, and devotes Chapter 3 to exploring this relationship empirically.

2.2 Post-industrial Policing and Political Behavior

Gilmore’s (2007) analysis of prison building in California demonstrates how criminal justice institutions can be mobilized for economic gain *and* the socio-political subordination of marginalized groups. Focusing largely on mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement, a broad literature has characterized how intense this subordination element can be. For example, the literature notes that over two million Americans are currently incarcerated in the United States and well over six million Americans — including 1 in every 13 black Americans — could not vote in the 2016 Presidential elections due to state level statutes prohibiting felons, ex-felons, parolees, and probationers from casting a ballot (Uggen et al. 2016). Extant studies have argued that these rates of incarceration and disenfranchisement may have significantly affected the outcome of the 2008 Presidential election, partisan control of state and federal legislatures in the 1990s and 2000s, and weakened the political representation of liberal, urban, and predominately minority districts relative to white, rural, and conservative districts (Gottschalk 2008; Lotke and Wagner 2003; Manza and Uggen 2006; Uggen et al. 2016. But see Burch 2012). Extant studies have also argued that individuals who have spent significant time in prison are far less likely to turnout to vote than individuals who have had no criminal justice contact (Weaver and Lerman 2010), and that those living in neighborhoods where large numbers of individuals have been incarcerated are significantly less likely to participate in politics, independent of their own experiences with the criminal justice system (Burch 2013).

Yet while the political significance of mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement is now well established, the manner in which *policing* may uniquely and systematically affect political behavior is far less appreciated. Indeed, much of the extant literature characterizes policing as the entry point to other institutions (e.g. prisons) and processes (e.g. disenfran-

chisement) that do the “real work” of political marginalization or exclusion. This, I argue, is a significant oversight. Policing constitutes the single largest element of the criminal justice system and employs more personnel, commands a larger share of state and federal expenditures, and produces more contact with the criminal justice system than courts, prisons, or jails (Hughes 2006). Indeed, the absolute number of police-citizen interactions in a given year dwarfs the number of incarcerated individuals by a factor of ten: approximately forty-three million Americans experience some sort of police contact in a given year, including approximately 12% of all US drivers and millions of urban residents and pedestrians (Eith and Durose 2011; Lundman and Kaufman 2003; NYCLU 2017).

Existing sociological and criminological research has found that these instances of police contact can have significant consequences for attitudes and behaviors, with racial and ethnic minorities more likely to be negatively affected. For example, while individuals across all demographic groups rate contact with the police negatively, black and Latino Americans are more likely to report worse contact (Weitzer and Brunson 2009). Indeed, an expansive literature has characterized how black and Latino Americans (especially young men) are targeted to be stopped, detained, and searched by police officers — who may be more invested in maintaining “social order”, hierarchy, and inequality than in enforcing the law or reducing crime (Fassin 2013) — and the physical, verbal, emotional, and sexual abuse they can suffer in these interactions (Baumgartner et al. 2017; Epp et al. 2014; Fine et al. 2003; Gau and Brunson 2010; Geller et al. 2014; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Rios 2011; Stoudt et al. 2011; USDOJ 2015). Fine et al. (2003) and Stoudt et al. (2001), for example, characterized patterns of police harassment of black and Latino youth in New York City, and described how these stops can generate fear, alienation, distrust, resentment, and anger towards the police. Other studies of urban policing have suggested that frequent police stops can produce anxiety and symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder (Geller et al. 2014) and that policing can negatively affect test scores and opportunities for educational attainment (Rios 2011).

Extant studies have been very attentive to the consequences that police stops can have for attitudes and perceptions of the legal system. Peffley and Hurwitz (2010), for example,

argued that a large part of the gap between black and white attitudes towards the police and perceptions of structural bias in the criminal justice system can be explained by differences in individual and vicarious interactions with police officers (see also Carr et al. 2007). Research on *police legitimacy* — belief that police officers have the authority to dictate individual behavior and that citizens have an obligation to follow police orders — has similarly demonstrated that negative interactions with police officers can reduce an individual’s willingness to call, assist, or comply with law enforcement (Jackson et al. 2012; Kirk et al. 2012; Mazerolle et al. 2012; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). Stops produced by many contemporary policing practices — including SQF policing — may be uniquely corrosive to police legitimacy, however, as police legitimacy is strongly determined by the extent to which police treat members of the public fairly, with courtesy, and without bias (Geller et al. 2014; Tyler et al. 2014). As described earlier, however, stops generated by policies like SQF give officers broad discretion (which may appear like arbitrary and biased behavior), disproportionately target young racial and ethnic minorities, overwhelmingly fail in their legal state mission to recover drugs or weapons, and increase the opportunities for officers to engage in abuse (Fine et al. 2003; Geller et al. 2014; Stoudt et al. 2011; NYCLU 2017).

2.2.1 Police Contact and Political Demobilization

Based on this extant research, we may reasonably expect police contact or exposure to negatively affect political participation or engagement, arguably through four different mechanisms. First, policing practices may lead to the accumulation of legal financial obligations (LFOs), which in some states can lead to disenfranchisement. Meredith and Morse (2017), for example, have demonstrated that interactions with the criminal justice system can lead to the accumulation of debts stemming from court costs, fines, and victim restitution, which in some states must be paid back as a condition of voting or having one’s right to vote restored as a consequence of incarceration (see also Ruback and Clark (2011)). And while these authors specifically consider LFOs incurred following incarceration, predatory and revenue driven policing practices (like those practices in Ferguson, Missouri) can also lead to the systematic accumulation of LFOs and potentially to voting prohibitions (Carbado 2016;

USDOJ 2015).

Second, policing practices can undermine the accumulation of skills and socioeconomic resources that facilitate political participation (Brady et al. 1995). As noted above, punitive interactions with officers can worsen education outcomes and lead to more serious criminal justice contact, especially for black and Latino youth (Ownes 2017; Rios 2011). Policing can also negatively affect the economic resources that facilitate political action and voice, and can even affect an individual’s opportunity for employment, thereby affecting both economic resources and the development of politically useful skills (Brady et al. 1995). The US Department of Justice’s (2015) report on the predatory and revenue driven policing practices of the Ferguson Police Department, for example, characterized the negative effect that aggressive and racially discriminatory policing had on some resident’s ability to maintain employment, while other reports characterized the severe financial strain that tickets, fines, and LFOs put policed individuals and communities under (Carbado 2016).¹

Third, police stops may drive individuals to avoid state institutions, though a process called system avoidance (Brayne 2014). In an ethnography of a marginalized black neighborhood, for example, Goffman (2015) described how frequent direct and indirect interactions with police officers and other criminal justice institutions led some community residents to systematically avoided state and non-state institutions — including the police, courts, and even hospitals — which were perceived by residents as places where the surveillance and social control functions of the state would be exercised over them. In large test of this potential outcome, Brayne (2014) explored whether frequent and negative interactions with police and the criminal justice system led to a reticence among individuals to interact with institutions that keep or require formal records, and found evidence of it in a large, nationally representative survey. While neither author tested whether voting behavior was affected, we might predict that if aggressive proactive policing policies produce legal entanglements that result

¹Maciag (2014) has demonstrated that Ferguson, MO was not unique in this practice and many surrounding municipalities in St. Louis County engaged in similar policing practices. Other studies have more generally demonstrated that police departments engage in more revenue generating practices when their cities are under financial distress or their budgets contract (Baicker and Jacobson 2007; Park 2017) suggesting that this practice and potential mechanism may not be limited to Ferguson, MO.

in system avoidance, then those targeted by these forms of policing may be less inclined to register or turnout to vote, since both processes require or produce records that can be tied back to the individual.

Finally, policing policies and practices may affect political behavior through their “interpretive effects” or the manner in which their implementation, enforcement, or symbolism can affect perceptions and socialization in politically meaningful ways (Mettler and Soss 2004; Lerman and Weaver 2014a). In a case study of welfare recipients, for example, Soss (1999) demonstrated how citizens who had frequent interactions with welfare agents that were invasive, humiliating, and disempowering formed negative attitudes about the government and their own socio-political standing based on their interactions with those agents. As additional scholarship has argued, these negative attitudes and perceptions can lead to lower levels of external political efficacy, trust in government, and thereby participation and engagement (Lerman and Weaver 2014a; Metter and Soss 2004; Soss 1999). The ability of policies to frame impacted groups can also affect perceptions of deservingness and socio-political status. The framing of some needs-based welfare programs (such as Aid for Families with Dependent Children) may have sent signals to their recipients and to the larger society that program recipients were poor and undeserving members of the civic community, while the framing of other programs (such as aid to veterans) may have done the opposite (Mettler 2007; Mettler and Soss 2004).

A similar process of political socialization and signaling may be at work in policing, especially in the context of the frequent involuntary police stops produced by policies like SQF. Engagement with the police can constitute the most frequent interaction some people, particularly young adults, have with legal and government authority, so stopped individuals may form attitudes about the state based on interactions with the police (Tyler and Huo 2002). As noted, interactions with police are overwhelmingly poor or negative, and like the welfare agents considered by Soss (1999), police officers have a tremendous amount of discretion which they may abuse or manipulate in interactions that can produce anger, frustration, and distrust, resulting in lower levels of efficacy and trust. Police policies can also signal deservingness and social standing. Epp et al. (2014), for example, demonstrated that

black drivers are aware that they are targeted by discriminatory police practices and argued that these practices signal to black drivers that they occupy a marginalized or second-class social position. Indeed, the authors argued that it is this signaling effect that does some of the most harm to black drivers' perceptions of police fairness and legitimacy, independent of officer misconduct or abusive treatment.

And while extant studies on the interpretive effects mechanism principally describes a process that might connect individual contact with officers to political outcomes, the effects produced by interactions with police officers may extend past the individual stopped by the police and outwards towards the community where the interaction occurred, or to social networks of which the stopped individual is a member (Tyler et al. 2014; Walker 2014). Fagan et al. (2016:210), for example, noted that police stops, "suggest [a] public discounting of worth," and may be considered, "a form of public shaming," which may affect individuals who identify with those being stopped or when a police policy targets a particular racial, ethnic group, or community (Epp et al. 2014). Rosenbaum et al. (2005) similarly found that the vicarious experiences individuals have with police-officers (e.g. experiences that they may have through their friends or family) strongly affect changes in attitude about the police. The 'lessons learned' about government and socio-political standing, therefore, may extend past the individual and to the larger community that they are a part of.

2.2.2 Police Contact and Political Mobilization

At the same time, however, demobilization may not be policing's only political consequence. Indeed, police violence and misconduct has instigated well-known instances of collective political action, civil disobedience, political mobilization, rioting, and insurrection during the Civil Rights movement, the Black Power movement, Chicano student protests, the Black Lives Matter movement, and the protests following the killings of Saheed Vassell and Alejandro Nieto noted earlier (Escobar 1993; Bloom and Martin 2013; Goodman and Baker 2014; National Advisory Commission 1968; Predergast 2011; Smiley 2015; Williams 1993).

Research on *policy threat* offers a useful framework for understanding how criminal justice

policies might induce participation. Policy threat characterizes the ability of threatening, harmful, or discriminatory policies and policy environments to catalyze political participation among the individuals and communities that are affected by them (Campbell 2003; Cho et al. 2006; Barreto et al. 2009; Barreto et al. 2005; Walker 2016). For racial and ethnic minorities in particular, harmful policies or threatening policy environments may activate ethnic solidarity or racial group consciousness, which may further facilitate higher levels of political participation (Barreto et al. 2009; Chong and Rogers 2005; Dawson 1994). Barreto et al. (2009) and Pantoja and Segura (2003), for example, characterized how the threatening policy environment posed by punitive immigration policies spurred mobilization in Latino communities and resulted in higher levels of political engagement, participation, and perceptions of ethnic solidarity. Campbell (2003) similarly found higher levels letter writing to Congress among senior citizens following the passage of harmful and threatening Social Security reform measures. In both instances, communities that were or could have suffered from policy implementation mobilized politically to contest it.

Findings from a growing literature also suggest that criminal justice policies can exert a similarly mobilizing effect. As the extant literature makes clear, criminal justice policy can produce real and serious harm, and the policy threat literature would anticipate forms of political mobilization designed to contest it. Walker (2014) found precisely that and argued that when contact with the criminal justice system leads to a perception that it is systematically unjust and unfair, proximally affected individuals (e.g. family and friends) may be mobilized to change it. White (2016) similarly argued that the threat constituted by provisions for potentially discriminatory policing and immigration enforcement contained within the Secure Communities Act increased Latino American voter turnout in communities that implemented them. Simply put, rather than suffering the material, legal, or psychological effects of harmful policies, the policy threat literature demonstrates that affected groups occasionally mobilized to counter-act them.

Critically, the (counter)mobilizing potential of threatening or punitive policies may be contingent. Extant research suggests that such mobilization may first depend upon the presence of community-based organizations, local activists, or political elites who can fa-

cilitate participation by providing resources, fostering efficacy, coordinating action, or signaling to members of the community that institutional politics and policies are susceptible to change. Barreto et al. (2009), for example, attributed part of the success of the 2006 immigrant protests to the direct appeals made by elites and the organizational infrastructure they provided. Walker (2016) and White (2016) similarly point to the catalyzing role that community-based organizations and activists can play by providing material resources and information, coordinating action, and offering opportunities to participate.

Mobilization in the face of threatening policy may also depend on political opportunities and sites for political action: threat may only catalyze action when the perceived or objective possibility for affecting outcomes through participation exists. In a study of policy threat's mobilizing effect on seniors, for example, Campbell (2003) found that the threat to seniors constituted by Social Security reform increased participation in an activity that could actually influence the policy (letter writing to Congress) but had no discernable effect on other forms of political participation. In a classic study of how violent police behavior can instigate protest participation, Eisinger (1973) similarly found that relatively "open" political opportunity structures — embodied in part by the presence of black elected officials — can signal to local community members that political participation (in that case protests) may lead to substantive policy change. Finally, Kriesi (1995) found that the success of once marginalized and disempowered left-libertarian movements in Europe could be explained in part by shifts in the constitution of political elites, competition among them, and attempts by some to court new political constituencies (see also Meyer 2004). The threatening policy environment posed by policing may therefore increase participation, but this mobilizing potential may be contingent on the presence of political elites and favorable political contexts.

2.2.3 The Case of New York City's 2013 Democratic Primary and Mayoral Election

This dissertation presents an analysis of these dynamics in New York City's 2013 Democratic primary and general election for mayor, which may have presented communities harmed by

SQF policing with precisely the sort of electoral context or opportunity needed to instigate electoral mobilization. Media reporting and the mobilization of unions and community-based organizations helped make police behavior and the SQF tactic a key campaign issue in both the Democratic primary and the general election, while the Democratic primary itself pitted several Democratic candidates with distinct position on SQF against one another (Leland and Moynihan 2012).² Among major candidates, Bill de Blasio and John Liu were the two candidates most opposed to existing SQF policing practices. Bill de Blasio was clear in his call for reforming SQF policing, replacing then Commissioner Ray Kelly, appointing a general inspector to oversee the NYPD, and allowing city residents to sue the city of New York if they believed they were targets of racial profiling. John Liu’s position went further, and he was the only major candidate to advocate for completely abolishing SQF policing (Gould 2013).

The opposition of these candidates to SQF stood in stark opposition to the position adopted by William Thompson, a leading candidate the race and an African American politician who won the Democratic party’s mayoral nomination in 2009 but lost to Michael Bloomberg in the general election. Thompson notably did not repudiate SQF and supported the program in televised debates (Barbaro 2013). His support of the program earned him the endorsement of former mayors Michael Bloomberg and Rudy Giuliani, as well as endorsements from unions representing police officers in New York City. It also earned him strong criticism from critics of the program and African American political leaders (Barbaro 2013).

I suggest that the electoral context presented by the 2013 Democratic primary and general election — specifically the opportunity to substantially change SQF policing — mobilized communities negatively affected by SQF policing, and further that these communities were engaged in the candidate selection process during the Democratic primary. Several candidates may have mobilized communities negatively affected by SQF by directly appealing to them; the presence of vocal critics of SQF among major candidates may have signaled an opening of the political or policy environment to policy change; and it was likely clear to

²No leading Republican candidate opposed the policy (Kaplan 2013).

community residents that political participation in the primary and general election could actually affect policing policy (Freeland 2013; Leland and Moynihan 2012). So, while intense community level policing likely reduces political participation in many (if not most) electoral contexts, conditions were such in 2013 that mobilization in response to harm could have produced favorable outcomes. I present empirical analysis testing this argument in Chapter 4.

2.3 Revitalization, Policing, and Political Behavior in a Cross-national Perspective

The previous two sections described a process through which gentrification can affect policing in the United States, and thereby political behavior, but to what extent are these relationships unique to the United States? Dominant framing of police practice and the criminal justice system across borders stresses the idiosyncrasy of a wide range of US criminal justice practices — ranging from the extreme violence displayed by US police officers to the practice of mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement itself (Gottschalk 2008). As described above, United States currently incarcerates and disenfranchises (due to felony convictions) a far larger share of its population than any country in the world (Uggen et al. 2016; Walmsley 2003); its prison system is the most punitive of all Western democracies, and is routinely characterized as excessively violent, inhumane, and degrading (Gottschalk 2014; Reiter 2016); its criminal justice system exhibits a profound level of racial bias rooted in its deep and unique history of racial domination (Alexander 2012); and its street-level police force is the most militarized among Western nations, killing on average more people per day than were killed in a three-year span in the United Kingdom (Balko 2013; Witte 2015).

I argue, however, that policing’s impact on political behavior may be more general than these facts might suggest. While no other democracy has experienced the general institutionalization of mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement, recent decades have nevertheless seen the explicit transfer of other criminal justice practices from the United States to other democratic societies which could themselves affect the political participation of af-

affected individuals and communities. Newburn (2002), for example, identified a broad set of British criminal justice policies — including zero-tolerance policing, OMP, youth curfews, ‘Three Strikes’ criminal sentencing, the use of private prisons, electronic monitoring, and the appointment of ‘Drug Czars’ — as explicitly ported from the United States to the United Kingdom. Insofar as the political effect of the US criminal justice system stems directly from the content of the policies themselves (and the interpretive effects they might produce), then we may expect political consequences in countries that have implemented them.

To that end, I also argue that neighborhood-level policing intensity can affect voter turnout in the United Kingdom, focusing specifically on the impact of two urban policing practices that have shown significant similarities to practices in the United States. The first is the policing of so called anti-social behaviors (ASBs), which emerged as a central crime reduction strategy in the United Kingdom following the implementation of OMP in New York City in the early 1990s (Millie 2008a; Vitale 2008). Similar to OMP in the United States, the policing of ASBs targets low level ‘quality of life crimes’ (such as graffiti, disorderly conduct, noise offenses, and public intoxication), in the belief that eliminating these low-level offenses can prevent more serious crimes from taking place down the line.

In addition to ASB policing, I explore the political consequences of police-citizen interactions that stem from the police’s ‘stop and search’ powers, which enable British police to stop, question, and search individuals on the street. Unlike ASB policing, British police powers to stop and search individuals originated in an Act of Parliament in the mid-19th century. Nevertheless, the policing practice has displayed remarkable similarities to Stop and Frisk practices in New York City: as in New York and other parts of the United States, the legal pretext to stop and search citizens has been mobilized in the context of proactive policing strategies designed to deter criminal offending, especially weapons related offenses (Bradford 2014). And like patterns of officer initiated stop and frisks in the United States, stop and search does not seem to significantly affect crime rates or result in the discovery of contraband, but disproportionately targets racial and ethnic minorities while reducing confidence and trust in the police (Bradford 2014; Delsol 2015).

In this section, I provide further background of these policies, their similarities to policing

policies in the United States, and their ability to produce politically relevant interpretive effects.

2.3.1 Anti-social Behavior Policing and Stop and Search in the United Kingdom

The vigorous policing of ASBs emerged as a prominent urban policing strategy in the United Kingdom following the passage of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. The policy itself, however, was modeled off New York City's OMP strategy, and was implemented in the United Kingdom in part due to the work of criminal justice consultants from the United States who argued that the implementation of these police tactics could reduce crime and revitalize neighborhoods (Millie 2008a; Newburn 2002; Vitale 2008). While the "disorders" targeted by the ASB policing are generally termed incivilities in the United Kingdom, the list of offenses targeted by the two strategies overlap significantly (Harradine et al. 2004; Sharp 2013). Thus, while the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act defines ASBs as any behavior, 'that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as [the perpetrator]' (cited in Millie 2008a), the policy largely targets offenses such as begging, vagrancy, trespassing, disturbing the peace, and public drinking/intoxication (Metropolitan Police Service 2017).

In contrast, stop and search powers were granted to British police in the early 19th century by the 1824 Vagrancy Act, which gave British police the power to stop, search, and arrest any suspicious person who intend to commit an arrestable offense on public land, though the 1968 Firearms Act and the 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act also grant stopping and searching powers to the police under additional circumstances (Bridges 2015). Generally, however, the power to stop and search citizens was unregulated and used in a much broader range of circumstances than the legislation may have permitted (Bridges 2015). Regulation and monitoring was introduced with the passage of the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), however, which formalized the practice and defined the conditions under which a stop and search could occur.

As in the United States, British police and government have maintained that the power to

stop, detain, and search individuals is a critical police power and an effective crime deterrent (Metropolitan Police Service 2017). Empirical evidence, however, is generally unsupportive. Miller et al. (2000), for example, estimated that stop and searching strategies only reduce crime by .02%, and further found no evidence that it deterred crime. Ward et al. (2011) similarly found little evidence of a crime reduction effect in a quasi-experimental study focused on knife crimes in multiple areas in Britain.

2.4 British Policing and the Production of Negative Interpretive Effects

Though the extant literature has not identified compelling evidence that either policing policy significantly accomplishes its crime reduction goals, there is well documented evidence suggesting that these policies negatively impact individuals and communities disproportionately affected by them. Community resentment and anger towards stop and search practices, for example, has been identified as a central cause of the 1981 Brixton and the 2011 London riots (Delsol 2015), though both policies may have the potential to generate political resentment or alienation. I suggest that this is because stops that are produced by both practices: 1) can affect citizen perceptions of government more broadly, 2) are regularized to such an extent that targeted individuals and communities experience frequent direct and indirect exposure, and 3) are largely perceived to be illegitimate or unfair. Effectively, I argue that police practices in the United Kingdom can produce negative interpretive effects that can affect political behavior.

Firstly, irrespective of national context, badge carrying police officers with the legal power to stop, arrest, or use force against citizens likely satisfy the condition that police be identifiable with the state. And combined, the policies constitute perhaps the most frequent form of involuntary police-citizen contact in the United Kingdom. According to data released by the Home Office, British police conducted an average of 1 million stops and searches per year from 2006 to 2016, and potentially conducted an additional 2 million stops that did not result in a search, so called stops and accounts (Bridges 2015: 25). Similarly, from

2011 to 2016, British police recorded an average of 2.2 million police-citizen interactions due to ASB offenses, accounting for 36% of all offense-based interactions.³ The policing of ASBs and stop and search also constitute fundamentally adversarial contact between police and community. Extant research demonstrates that most police-initiated police-citizen interactions are negatively remembered or leave citizens with negative impressions (Skogan 2006). Citizen experiences with officers executing OMP strategies or who conduct physical searches of persons may in particular leave the experience feeling humiliated, violated, or disempowered (Brunson 2007; Stoudt et al. 2011).

In addition to the generally adversarial nature of police-initiated contact in general, both policies carry with them low levels of perceived legitimacy due to perceptions that they disproportionately and unfairly target certain populations and communities, such as racial and ethnic minorities and the poor. A reoccurring criticism of the policing of ASBs lies in the exceptionally broad set of behaviors that can be characterized as ‘likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ (Bannister et al. 2006; Harradine et al. 2004; Millie 2008a). As Whitehead et al. (2003: 4-5) noted, ‘virtually any activity can be anti-social depending on a range of background factors, such as the context in which it occurs, the location, people’s tolerance levels and expectations about the quality of life in the area.’ Given legal ambiguity of what behaviors should be targeted, scholars have suggested that officers and their commanders can unjustly substitute group stereotypes or the preferences of social dominant groups for anti-social behavior, at the expense of socially marginalized groups (Millie 2008a; Vitale 2008).

Consistent with this notion, existing evidence has suggested that the policing of ASBs disproportionately targets youth, individuals living in urban areas, and the socially marginalized (Millie 2008a), and although robust statistics on the racial and ethnic identification of individuals targeted by the policing of anti-social behavior is lacking, some evidence has also suggested that racial minorities or individuals living in predominately minority areas are more likely to be targeted as well (Crawford and Lister 2007). Millie (2008b: 385),

³From analysis of British crime data, publicly available at <https://data.police.uk/>

for example, has described how differences in aesthetic preferences can result in differential policing of ASBs based in class, while Crawford’s (2009: 13) analysis of ASB policing in two London neighborhoods found that procedural injustice is highly visible to youth that are targeted, noting that the, ‘over-riding impact if the [anti-social behavioral] orders was to exacerbate fragile police-youth relations and encourage feelings of stigmatization, social exclusion and unfair treatment among local young people.’

Similar patterns in disparate exposure, low levels of perceived legitimacy, and social exclusion have been observed in the deployment of stop and search powers. Empirical evidence has found that race is a stronger predictor of an individual’s likelihood of being stopped and searched by British police than actual offending rates (Medina Ariza 2014), and the practice has a long history of reducing public perceptions of police legitimacy, so much so that a government report noted that, ‘For decades the inappropriate use of these [stop and search] powers, both real and perceived, has tarnished the relationship between constables and the communities they serve, and in doing so has brought into question the very legitimacy of the police service’ (HMIC, 2013: 2). Importantly, this has resulted in a situation where the experience of being stopped and searched can powerfully reduce feelings of socio-political inclusion. Bradford (2014), for example, has demonstrated that individuals who experience these types of stops are less likely to report feeling a sense of belonging in London or the United Kingdom.

As with SQF policing in New York City, the politically alienating effects of police contact or exposure likely affects both individuals *and* aggregate communities, such that neighborhood-level rates of political engagement are likely to be affected by the form and intensity of policing in that neighborhood. Like police use of force and misconduct, the implementation of order-maintenance strategies exhibits significant variation across neighborhoods and concentration within specific neighborhoods (Crawford and Young 2009; Terrill and Reisg 2003; Kane 2002), suggesting that the political consequences of ASB and stop and search policing will vary across neighborhoods as well. What’s more, the extant literature has demonstrated that attitudes towards the police, perceptions of police legitimacy, and levels of collective efficacy are powerfully affected by police behavior in one’s neigh-

neighborhood and experiences that one's friends, family, and neighbors have with police (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Tyler et al. 2014). The political alienation induced by the interpretive effects mechanism, therefore, may follow from concentrated ASB or stop and search policing present and experienced at the neighborhood level, and may affect neighborhood-level rates of political participation, just as much as the individual level participation. This potential effect is analyzed formally in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3

Gentrification and Order Maintenance Policing

This chapter presents an empirical test of the postindustrial policing hypothesis, which argues that contemporary policing patterns can be understood, in part, as derivatives of larger municipal strategies designed to attract and cater to the preferences of highly educated, middle to upper class, and predominately white residents, tourists, and potential in-movers. Emerging from a series of case study analyses of New York City (Vitale 2008), Seattle (Gibson 2004), and Los Angeles (Davis 2006), and explicitly articulated as a hypothesis by Sharp (2013), the postindustrial policing hypothesis argues that some of urban policing’s most aggressive and controversial tactics stem from larger urban “revitalization” or growth strategies designed to transform areas of the city so that they are 1) amenable to the living, consuming, and social practices of tourists and potential in-movers with high levels of human capital 2) consistent with their conceptions of proper use of public space and 3) reflective of their particular racialized and class based perceptions of crime, safety, and disorder.

Within the actual built environment of the city, this process of revitalization is often associated with gentrification: the transformation of urban areas previously characterized by low levels of investment and suffering from high levels of socioeconomic marginalization to areas characterized by high levels of investment and occupancy by higher income, better educated, and (often) whiter residents (Zuk et al. 2015). The postindustrial policing hypothesis suggests that municipal police departments — working to construct, maintain, or prepare areas of the city for this transition — similarly transition to styles of policing that emphasize addressing fear of crime, perceptions of social disorder, and behaviors that ostensibly inhibit the enjoyment or consumption of public space for “regular residents” (Sharp 2013; Vitale 2008). In practice, these policing strategies have manifested in tactics that

focus on particular behaviors (panhandling, public intoxication, and public disorder) and populations (the homeless, young people, and people of color).

Past research on the relationship between policing and neighborhood change mostly take the form of case study analyses of large cities. Most notably, Vitale (2008) traces the origins of the “quality of life” policing paradigm, OMP, and the Stop, Question, and Frisk policy to urban revitalization strategies following a financial collapse in New York City in the mid-1970s. Sharp (2013) does, however, present a cross sectional analysis of 180 American cities and finds a strong and positive relationship between the share of the population who are members of the gentrifying creative class and indicators of OMP.

These works offer strong empirical evidence of the hypothesis but are nevertheless limited. First, these analyses do not test the most direct spatial implication of the postindustrial policing hypothesis and the finding most consistently reported from the qualitative literature: that areas *within* a city experiencing gentrification will experience higher levels of postindustrial policing. Second, it is not clear whether municipal leaders adopt postindustrial policing strategies to “prepare” areas of the city for transition or whether these practices are the result of citizen demand, potentially stemming from shifting demographics in gentrifying neighborhoods. The extant literature, in fact, gives evidence for both processes. Gibson’s (2004) analysis of policing strategies in Seattle suggests that city leaders were proactive in adopting aggressive policing tactics as part of a larger strategy designed to make Seattle a competitive global city. Vitale’s (2008) study of the emergence of quality of life policing in New York City, however, identifies the emergence of the entire quality of life paradigm and the strategies that followed in a failure of police responsiveness to community demands and as the result of local social and political mobilization.

Using newly available data sets on quality of life and OMP practices in New York City, this chapter presents an empirical analysis of the effect of gentrification and neighborhood change on policing practices. A series of spatial Durbin models demonstrate that, consistent with the postindustrial policing hypothesis, gentrification is positively and strongly associated with OMP in the form of police stops under New York’s SQF program. Interestingly, the results suggest that the positive impact of gentrification on policing is indirect rather than

direct: Gentrification in one a tract induces a significant increase in policing in adjacent tracts while potentially reducing policing intensity in the gentrifying tract itself. Results from analysis of 311 call data, used to proxy for citizen demand for police services, suggest that citizen demand for police service is only weakly associated with policing intensity in gentrifying tracts, offering suggestive evidence that other mechanisms, potentially elite level influence or decision making, connect gentrification to higher policing rates.

The results presented here principally address the spatial implications of the postindustrial policing hypothesis and provide fairly robust evidence that the aggressive policing practices associated with the quality of life policing paradigm and postindustrial policing, such as OMP and SQF, increase with gentrification. The results are also relevant to a much larger literature on the determinants of police allocations across and within cities. The analysis uncovers evidence for the racial threat hypothesis when the share of black and Latino Americans in a Census tract are used as proxies. It also uncovers strong evidence for the economic threat hypothesis across model specifications when the share of families falling below the poverty line is used as a proxy. Finally, it presents a substantial association between tract level crime and policing intensity.

3.1 Extant Literature

The extant literature contains several compelling case study analyses of the development and application of OMP in the service of gentrification or cultural revitalization (Davis 2006; Gibson 2004; Vitale 2008). Building off these qualitative studies, Sharp (2013) has presented the first empirical test of the hypothesis and argues that patterns of policing in cities that have adopted revitalization or gentrification as growth strategies should be different from cities that have not. As such Sharp explores the ratio of arrests that are typically pursued to under the quality of life paradigm and OMP (drunkenness, driving under the influence, liquor law violations, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, “suspicion,” curfew and loitering law violations, and runaways) to serious felony offenses, and takes it as an indicator of the relative emphasis a municipality places on postindustrial policing. Sharp finds that three

proxies for gentrification or neighborhood revitalization (the share of a municipality employed in postindustrial industries, employed in postindustrial occupations, and holding a college degree) are all positively correlated with greater municipal emphasis on quality of life or OMP.

Sharp’s work presents a strong empirical test of the postindustrial hypothesis, but is limited. Principally, the approach doesn’t allow a test of perhaps the most direct implication of the hypothesis: that the intensity of OMP will vary *within* a city according to the spatial distribution of gentrification or revitalization. I test precisely this implication and hypothesizes that:

H1: Neighborhoods experiencing gentrification will display higher levels of order maintenance or quality of life policing

Sharp’s articulation of the hypothesis suggests a strong degree of intentionality: The hypothesis argues that police officers and municipal leaders direct policing strategy to make their cities more attractive to residents who may stimulate growth. Yet the analysis does not consider the reverse: whether urban revitalization strategies and gentrification lead to increases in policing, potentially as a function of demand from in-movers or neighborhood residents. Insofar as gentrification attracts new residents to communities where conceptions of proper use of space may differ, it has the potential to lead to conflict and community disagreement, which may in turn lead to increased police presence and activity. In his work, Vitale (2008) emphasizes the origin of OMP policing strategies in community demand for police responsiveness and persistent mobilization to communicate these preferences to elected officials. Gibson’s (2004) work in contrast suggests that public officials in Seattle adopted aggressive OMP strategies prior to and as a means of bringing about revitalization. It is very possible that municipal leaders in Seattle adopted OMP following its implementation in New York City and in light of Fagan et al.’s (2010) argument that OMP strategies persist in areas of the city long after gentrification has been completed, on whole the extant literature seems to suggest that the spatial distribution of OMP is not principally motivated by demand, but perhaps is supplied by policy officials, administrators, or other municipal elites interested in

revitalization. Given this, I hypothesize that:

H2: The intensity of OMP policing will not follow demand for services or will be independent of demand for services

3.2 Independent Variables

There is no academic consensus on how to operationalize gentrification (see Zuk et al. 2015 for a thorough review of different approaches) and I employ multiple coding schemes to identify neighborhoods that have experienced or are currently experiencing gentrification. The primary operationalization used throughout this study is based on a series of works (Chapple 2009; Freeman 2005; Macaig 2015), which categorically distinguish between tracts ineligible to gentrify, those with the potential to gentrify but did not, and those tracts that did gentrify.

Following the coding schemes employed in this literature, and to capture the notion that gentrified or gentrifying tracts first experience marginalization and disinvestment, I identify tracts that are eligible to gentrify if in the year 2000 they have populations over 500 (to exclude parks and industrial districts), rank in the bottom 50% of all New York City tracts by median household income, and bottom the 50% by median rent price. Gentrified or gentrifying tracts are a subset of these eligible tracts that from 2000 to 2014 experienced an increase in inflation adjusted median rent prices, ranked in the top tercile in terms of growth in the size of the population holding a bachelor's degree, and also ranked in the top tercile in terms of median rent price increase.¹ I assume tracts identified as gentrified or gentrifying in such a manner were experiencing such changes throughout the period, but most specifically in the years spanning 2010 to 2014, which are analyzed here.

In addition to the categorical coding described above, I test the relationship between

¹Some measures of gentrification use changes in house valuation, rather than rent, in their coding. Changes in rent prices should be preferred in an analysis of New York City, however, since they more immediately reflect notions of displacement and neighborhood transition implied by gentrification: Increases in house valuation does not imply or demand shift in who occupies the house or their income quite as immediately as shifts in rent.

policing and gentrification using three additional measures derived directly from Sharp (2013).² The first measures the percentage change in the share of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. The second measures the percentage change in the population that is employed in the “postindustrial sector”, specifically those employed either in professional, scientific, and management industries or those in education, health, and social services industries as measured by the United States Census Bureau. The third is a similar measure drawn from the Census that measures the change in the share of the civilian population in management, professional and related *occupations*.³ Again, since gentrification implies long term demographic changes, I measure the change in the share of the population employed in these industries, occupations, or with higher education from 2000 to 2014. To account for skew, each measure is logged.

To test whether the spatial distribution and intensity of policing are a function of citizen demand, I develop a measure of demand for services from New York City’s 311 call database. New York City’s 311 program allows residents to place service requests directly to municipal agencies. Unlike 911 calls which generally concern emergencies, 311 calls directed towards the NYPD are overwhelmingly oriented towards community disagreements or conflicts over the proper use of public space like noise complaints, public drinking, or skateboarding on the sidewalk. They are thus likely to give an indication of the extent to which citizen demand for police intervention, emanating from social conflict and quality of life offenses, generates OMP or quality of life policing.⁴ A publicly available and geocoded database of 311 calls in

²Notably, I do not include a proxy for gentrification that incorporates racial change over time, as this is a central source of debate in the literature. As I demonstrate in the text, my coding of gentrification nevertheless seems to capture the implied shift in racial composition generally associated with gentrification without selecting for it

³Sharp (2013) does not present an explanation for their use of the occupation and industry-based measures from the Census or summarize where else these measures have been used. The use of occupational categories is similar to Atkinson’s (1999) study of gentrification in Greater London and is consistent with the underlying theoretical mechanism proposed. However, this proxy for gentrification or neighborhood change is almost completely absent from Zuk et. al’s (2015) review of the gentrification literature in the United States and it is not wide spread. I include both here for consistency across tests of the hypothesis.

⁴The 311 data is not an exhaustive measure of resident calls to the police related to order maintenance offenses; residents can still call 911 to report these them, and these calls are not included in the 311 data base. An empirical comparison of city wide 911 and 311 OMP related call rates, however, suggests that as much as 90% of OMP calls are first directed to 311, making the 311 call data a strong proxy for these calls

New York City is available online.⁵ I use data from 2010 to 2014 and select only those 311 calls directed towards the NYPD. I further subset this data and only utilize calls for which the complaint type falls within the confines of OMP policing. Specifically, I only count calls concerning: chronic biking, roller skating, or skateboarding; a derelict vehicle, disorderly youth, public drinking, graffiti, a homeless encampment, illegal fireworks, a noise complaint, panhandling, squeegee men, urinating in public, or illegal vending. I aggregate the total number of 311 calls related to OMP for each Census tract and standardized by the tract's population to generate a yearly per capita 311 call rate. To account for skew in the variable, I take the log of the measure.

To control for the potential effect of racial threat, I include measures for the percentage of the Census tract that is black or Latino American. For the purpose of this analysis and to capture the extent to which officers make policing decisions based on the visual characteristics of an individual, Afro-Latinos are coded as black (results are consistent which Afro-Latinos are coded as Latino American). To control for the potential effect of economic threat, I include a measure for the percentage of families that fall below the poverty line. To control for the effect of crime on the outcome variable, I rely on a geolocated database of all felony crimes reported to the NYPD.⁶ I aggregate the total number of felony crimes occurring in each Census tract and standardized these counts by the population. I then log these rates to account for skew. In addition to the crime rate I employ additional proxies for the “supply” side of crime and measure the share of the population between the ages of 18 and 24 and the percentage of single mother households with children in each tract.

All measures used to construct the primary coding for gentrification, its four additional proxies, and control variables were taken from the United States Census Bureau. Data from the year 2000 was pulled from the Decennial Census while data from 2010 through 2014 was taken from the ACS. These data were mapped to GIS shapefiles, which were pulled from the

⁵<https://nycopendata.socrata.com/Social-Services/311-Service-Requests-from-2010-to-Present/erm2-nwe9/data>

⁶All felonies except rapes, which are not geolocated in the data set are included in these counts. Crimes where no XY coordinates were recorded are also dropped.

New York City Department of City Planning web page.⁷ Census tracts from 2010 and 2000 were matched using the Longitudinal Tract Database (Logan, Xu, and Stults 2014).

3.3 Dependent Variable

Following other work analyzing OMP in New York City, I take the per capita intensity of street level police stops under New York City’s Stop, Question, and Frisk program as an indicator of postindustrial policing (Lerman and Weaver 2014). The legal pretext for police officer stops under the program emerged from *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) in which the US Supreme Court ruled that officers could stop citizens or residents if they had reasonable suspicion that a crime had or was being conducted, *and* believed the suspect was carrying weapon. It has since, however, become a tactic within the city’s larger OMP strategy, targeting many classes of individuals associated with disorder including the homeless, youth and people of color (Livingston 1997; Spitzer 1999; Vitale 2008). This was particularly the case under the mayoral administration of Rudy Giuliani in the 1990s and early 2000s, which instructed the NYPD to aggressively and nearly indiscriminately stop and frisk anyone (typically young men of color) who appeared to be committing a crime or behaving in disorderly conduct (Livingston 1997; Spitzer 1999). The practice continued to the mayoral administration of Michael Bloomberg in the late 2000s, whose NYPD stopped hundreds of thousands of innocent city residents every year, arguing that this aggressive and preventative approach reduced crime and disorder.

Geolocated data on stops under the Stop, Question, and Frisk program were obtained from the NYPD and are available from 2006 to 2014. I subset this data to the years 2010 through 2014 given that data on tract level crime is only available from 2010 to 2014. To account for differences in population size at the tract level, I divide by tract level population. To account for skew, this measure is logged.

⁷<http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/open-data.page>

3.4 Methodology

The analysis proceeds as follows. In the first section I present a set of descriptive tables and figures which map gentrification across Census tracts in New York City, display differences in stops per capita by tract type, present summaries of tract level characteristics by tract type, and display how these have changed from 2000 to 2014.

I then present results from a series of regressions run on the data. Following established procedures for estimating models on spatial data, I first run standard OLS models on the data. Initial OLS results suggest a strong positive association between gentrification and stopping rates. Given the spatial nature of the data, however, standard OLS models are likely to be misspecified due to spatial dependence arising from at least one of the following sources: 1) omitted variables that act on tracts closely situated in space (correlated effects), 2) serial dependence or interactions of the outcomes on one another in space (endogenous interaction effects), and/or 3) the possibility that covariate values in one tract affect outcomes in neighboring tract (exogenous interaction effects) (Elhorst 2010). I run a test of spatial dependence on the residuals of the OLS analysis (Moran's I), which confirms spatial dependence in the data. A series of Robust Lagrange Multiplier tests run on the OLS models suggest that both spatial lag and spatial error models should be preferred over OLS models.

Following LeSage and Pace (2009) and Elhorst (2010) I proceed from here to run a series of spatial Durbin models on the data.⁸ The spatial Durbin model models the outcome of interest as the process of endogenous interactions effects, direct effects, and exogenous interaction effects. More directly, the stopping rate in any tract is said to be determined by stopping rate in neighboring tracts, covariate values in that tract itself, and covariate values in neighboring Census tracts. More specifically, the Spatial Durbin model takes the form:

⁸The results of the robust Lagrange Multiplier test can be somewhat inconclusive as to which spatial model, error or lag, to select. LeSage and Pace (2009) advocate for the use of the spatial Durbin model, a more generalized form of both the spatial lag model and error models, when Robust Lagrange Multiplier tests give evidence of spatial lag and error. As Elhorst (2010) notes, the spatial Durbin model has the distinct advantage of producing unbiased coefficient estimates even if the true data generating process is a spatial error model or a spatial lag model and notes its ability to model two spatial two spatial processes as opposed to one. It also does not impose prior restrictions on the magnitude on the potential spatial spillover effects as does the spatial lag model.

$$Y = \rho WY + \alpha_{1N} + X\beta + WX\theta + \epsilon \quad (3.1)$$

Where Y is an $N \times 1$ vector of the logged stops per capita in a given year, ρ is a spatial autoregressive coefficient estimated by the model that measures the strength of the endogenous interaction effect, W is an $N \times N$ matrix of spatial weights that mark a tract's neighbors, X is an $N \times K$ vector of covariate values, and both β and θ are $K \times 1$ vectors of fixed but unknown parameters to be estimated by the model (Elhorst 2010). In this analysis, a tract is said to be a neighbor of another tract if it shares a boundary or a vertex with that tract.

3.5 Descriptive Results

Figure 3.1 maps gentrification in New York City Census tracts from 2000 to 2014. Visual inspection conforms with expectations, with recognizable sections of Brooklyn, northern Manhattan, and the Bronx experiencing gentrification over the time period. Descriptively, the number of tracts estimated to have experienced gentrification (233) is higher than those generated in Maciag's (2015) study, which estimates that 128 tracts experienced gentrification from 2000 to 2015. The findings presented here are consistent, however, with the descriptive results presented in Timberlake and John's-Wolfe (2016).

Figure 3.2 displays boxplots of (the log of) stops per capita across time and by tract type. For each year, boxplots on the left and in red depict the distribution of stops per capita in tracts that were not eligible to gentrify, green boxplots in the middle depict the distribution of stops per capita in tracts that had the potential but did not gentrify, and blue boxplots on the right depicts the distribution of tracts that did gentrify or are gentrifying.

Lower median stops of the red box plot are generally consistent with expectations: Far fewer stops occur in areas where there are higher rents and higher median incomes. Differences between the green and the blue boxplots display interesting patterns, and offer tentative support for the postindustrial policing hypothesis.⁹ The plots suggest that tracts

⁹Throughout the analysis, the principle comparison of interest is between tracts that could gentrify but

Figure 3.1: Gentrification in New York City





Figure 3.2: Stops in New York City Census Tracts



that experienced gentrification over the period have the highest rates of police stops, despite higher rates of growth in education and rent. This tentatively suggests that gentrification and the demographic changes associated with it do not necessarily induce reductions in policing but rather more policing, relative to communities that had similarly been marginalized in the year 2000. Tests for statistical significance (not shown) confirm what is displayed in the box plots. With the exception of 2014, stop rates significantly higher in gentrifying tracts than they are in tracts that were sufficiently marginalized in 2000 but did not experience gentrification over the period.

3.6 Racial, Economic, Social, and Housing Differences

Table 3.1 compares median differences in model covariates and selected socioeconomic variables across the three different types of tracts. As might be expected, non-eligible tracts have the lowest rates of single mother households and unemployment and the lowest per-

did not, and those that did gentrify or experience gentrification. This comparison gives an indication of the effect of gentrification on marginalized tracts which is the central theoretical concern.

centages of black and Latino Americans. They also have the highest rates of BA, MA, and PhD attainment, higher rent prices, and higher household incomes in both the baseline year and ending year. These results are partially a result of the coding scheme, which selected on the basis of median income, rent price, and education, but demonstrates that across other potential indicators of gentrification, particularly the racial composition of a Census tract, non-eligible tracts comport a priori with expectations.

Table 3.1: Select Summary Statistics By Tract Type

	<i>Ineligible</i>			<i>No Change</i>			<i>Gentrified</i>		
	2000	2014	Δ	2000	2014	Δ	2000	2014	Δ
Single Mother	4.7	4.3	-8.2	18.6	14.7	-21.1	19.1	12.2	-36.1
Poverty	8.3	8.1	-2.3	26.9	26.6	-1.1	30.9	24	-22.3
BA	15.8	20.6	30.7	7.9	11.7	47.3	6.2	17	174.3
PhD/MA	9.4	12.4	32.2	4.0	5.2	29.8	3.5	7.6	115.4
Post Industry	35.4	39.5	11.5	35.7	39.6	10.9	33.8	39.2	15.8
Post Occupation	34.7	38.2	10.2	22.1	22.8	3.1	21.6	31.7	47.0
Unemployment	3.6	5.1	41.4	7.1	7.6	7.2	8.0	7.6	-4.6
Black	4.1	4.5	9.6	31.5	29.2	-7.3	37.1	34.2	-7.0
White	52.5	46.1	-12.3	5.3	6.1	15.1	2.5	12.7	401.0
Latino	10.8	13.1	21.2	31.9	33.1	3.8	41.5	35.4	-14.8
Ages 18-24	8.7	8.8	0.7	10.5	10.7	2.3	11.5	11.6	1.1
Rent	1109	1375	24.0	885	1113	25.7	803	1184	47.5
Income	65969	67064	1.7	36207	34568	-4.5	32112	40526	26.2

Interesting differences emerge in comparisons between non-changing tracts and gentrifying tracts, some of which are a direct result of the coding scheme but some of which again validate the operationalization of gentrification used here. Ideally, nonchanging tracts and gentrifying tracts would be similar on a wide range of observable socioeconomic factors and different, allowing us to attribute differences in policing to gentrification and not underlying or antecedent socioeconomic conditions. This is partially the case. In the baseline year, for example, non-changing and gentrifying tracts have comparable rates of single mother households, education completion rates, unemployment, and individuals aged 18 to 24. By 2014, however, gentrified tracts have experienced dramatically larger increases in degree acquisi-

tion, income, and rent prices (consistent with the coding). Changing tracts also demonstrate larger reductions in unemployment, poverty, and the percentage of single mother households. Gentrified tracts also evince an astounding 400% increase in the white population (compared to 15% in non-changing tracts) which were not specifically selected on, but are at the same time consistent with theory and other empirical operationalizations of gentrification (Zuk et al. 2015). Gentrified tracts also experience a significant reduction in the Latino American share of the population.

Table 3.1 shows, however, that rival factors may explain differences in policing levels, justifying the regression approach adopted in the analysis. In both 2000 and 2014, tracts that experienced gentrification have higher levels of black and Latino Americans than non-changing tracts, suggesting that racial threat may potentially explain differences in police stops per capita. Gentrifying tracts also have higher poverty rates, lower rent prices, and lower family incomes in 2000, suggesting the potential that economic threat may explain some of the differences in policing for some years in the analysis.

I also note that, across all three tract types, the share of employment in in postindustrial industries does not differ substantially, suggesting that this proxy drawn from Sharp (2013) may not accurately capture gentrification processes at the tract level. At the same time, however, employment in postindustrial occupations does follow the expected pattern: Ineligible tracts have higher levels of employment in postindustrial occupations, non-changing tracts and gentrifying tracts have comparable levels of employment in the baseline year, and gentrifying tracts have substantially higher levels of growth in the share of the population employed in these occupations by 2014.

Not displayed in Table 3.1 are differences in crime and 311 calls by tract type. Following expectations, ineligible tracts had the lowest 311 call rates per capita and per capita crime rates in every year (2010 to 2014). Gentrifying tracts had significantly higher rates of 311 calls per capita and crime per capita than non-changing tracts, suggesting that the higher stop rates in gentrifying tracts may be a function of citizen demand and/or objective levels of crime.

3.7 Spatial Durbin Model Results

To determine whether gentrification, race, class, demand for police services, or crime levels explain differences in stopping intensity across neighborhoods, I run a series of spatial Durbin models that can control for variation in all these factors simultaneously. I run separate regressions for each year, which additionally controls for variation in the level of policing that are city wide and year specific and allows us to clearly view how model parameters change over the life of the program.¹⁰

As Elhorst (2010) notes, interpreting the regression coefficients from a spatial Durbin model is substantially different from interpreting the coefficients from OLS models. Since covariate values in a tract can affect stop rates in that tract and in adjacent tracts as well, covariates have direct and indirect effects on outcomes. At the same time, since the outcomes in each tract are in part a function of spatial autoregressive processes that pass through neighboring tracts, and each tract has a different set of neighbors, the estimated partial derivative of a unit change in a covariate will be different for each observation (see Elhorst (2010) for a useful illustration of the partial derivative structure of spatial Durbin models). Following Elhorst (2010) and Yang, Noah, and Shoff (2015) I report the average of the direct and indirect effects as well as the total estimated effect for a covariate in the main text. Regression results are reported in the Appendix section of this chapter.

Table 3.2 displays the relationship between the categorical operationalization of gentrification and stops per capita from 2010 to 2014. The results of the model suggest that overall, gentrification has a strong and positive effect on police stopping rates city wide, but that the indirect and direct effects may work in different directions. In 2010 and 2011 the model finds gentrification to be weakly and negatively associated with stopping rates directly, or within the tract in which it occurs. Thus, a hypothetical switch from a marginalized tract that did not experience gentrification to a marginalized tract that did experience gentrification was associated with about a 9%($100 * (e^{-.095} - 1)$) reduction in stops per capita in 2010 and 2011.

¹⁰Most significantly, legal challenges to New York's SQF program alleging racial bias produced a dramatic reduction in stops starting in 2013, while the election of the progressive and Democratic Bill de Blasio in 2014 may have further introduced substantial differences in police behavior in these years.

No statistically significant direct effect was uncovered for 2012, 2013, or 2014. In contrast to this direct effect, the indirect effects of gentrification on stopping rates are strong, positive, and more consistent over the years analyzed. Thus, to switch a marginalized tract that did not experience gentrification to a marginalized tract that did was associated with a 51% increase in stops per capita in nearby tracts in 2010, a 72% increase in stops per capita in 2011, a 90% increase in stops per capita in 2012, and a 70% increase in 2013. The overall or total effect emerges as positive and statistically significant in 2011, 2012, and 2013, but is large and positive in all years.

Table 3.2: Effect of Gentrification on Police Stops

	Direct	Indirect	Total
2010			
Ineligible	-0.078*	0.414**	0.336*
Gentrified	-0.095*	0.414**	0.32
Log(311 Calls)	0.202***	0.035	0.237**
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.699***	0.112	0.812***
Black	0.008***	0	0.007***
Latino	0.008***	-0.004	0.005
Ages 18-24	-0.001	-0.017	-0.018
Poverty	0.011***	0.013*	0.024***
Single Mother	0.009***	-0.007	0.003
2011			
Ineligible	-0.076*	0.332**	0.256
Gentrified	-0.098**	0.543***	0.445**
Log(311 Calls)	0.234***	-0.066	0.168
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.767***	0.06	0.827***
Black	0.007***	0	0.007***
Latino	0.007***	0	0.007**
Ages 18-24	-0.001	-0.021**	-0.022*
Poverty	0.009***	0.017**	0.026***
Single Mother	0.008***	-0.007	0.001
2012			
Ineligible	-0.063	0.314**	0.251*
Gentrified	-0.029	0.642***	0.613***
Log(311 Calls)	0.237***	-0.235***	0.002
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.728***	0.167**	0.894***
Black	0.007***	0	0.007***

Latino	0.007***	-0.004	0.003
Ages 18-24	-0.002	-0.015	-0.017*
Poverty	0.009***	0.02***	0.029***
Single Mother	0.01***	-0.014	-0.004
2013			
Ineligible	-0.122**	0.236	0.114
Gentrified	-0.043	0.531**	0.488*
Log(311 Calls)	0.15***	-0.22**	-0.071
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.77***	0.035	0.805***
Black	0.008***	0	0.008***
Latino	0.005***	-0.009**	-0.004
Ages 18-24	0.003	-0.034***	-0.032**
Poverty	0.009***	0.017**	0.026***
Single Mother	0.008**	-0.017	-0.01
2014			
Ineligible	0.008	0.589**	0.597**
Gentrified	-0.005	0.433	0.428
Log(311 Calls)	0.192***	0.064	0.256*
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.607***	-0.582***	0.025
Black	0.006***	0.002	0.009***
Latino	0.005**	-0.011**	-0.006
Ages 18-24	0.01**	0.006	0.016
Poverty	0.013***	0.013	0.026**
Single Mother	0.016***	-0.016	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The model also uncovers a positive, yet weak and inconsistent association between the rate of 311 calls related to OMP and tract level stopping rates. For example, a 10% increase in these calls is only (directly) associated with a 1.5% to 2.4% increase in stops per capita, depending on year. The indirect effects are not consistent across years and actually emerge as negative in 2012 and 2013, where a 10% increase in the OMP related call rate is associated with a 2.4% and 2.2% reduction in stop rates in neighboring tracts. It is hard to explain this result and why it occurs in these years, but these results may reflect how officers are allocated to neighborhoods based on responses to these call rates. Specifically, it may be the case that as one neighborhood experiences an increase in OMP related calls, officers from neighboring tracts are pulled to police that tract, resulting in fewer stops per capita in those

neighboring tracts.

Other coefficients are largely significant and behave as expected. Across all years, crime rates have a strong direct effect on stopping rates. The model reports that for every 10% increase in felonious crimes per capita there is an associated 7.0%, 7.7%, 7.3%, 7.7%, and 6.1% increase in stops per capita in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 respectively, lending strong evidence for the rational bureaucratic framework. Indirect effects for crime are positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero with the notable exception of 2012 when they are positive and 2014 when the indirect effect is strong but *negative*. This effect may be due to similar mechanisms as described above where officers are drawn from neighboring tracts to deal with crime, leading to a reduction in stops in neighboring counties.

Across years, the model estimates a positive direct effect for racial threat on stopping rates. For example, every 10% increase in the black American share of the population (i.e. from 20% to 30%) is associated with a 6% to 8% increase in stops per capita depending on year, while every 10% increase in the Latino American share of the population is associated with 5% to 7% increase in stops per capita. The model does not uncover statistically significant indirect effects for the share of the black American population but interestingly it uncovers fairly substantial and negative indirect effects for the Latino share of the population in 2013 and 2014. Economic threat also emerges as very strong predictor of per capita stopping rates: A 10% increase in the share of families in poverty in a tract is associated with between a 24% and 29% increase in stops per capita.

Finally, and contrary to expectations, the share of the population between 18 and 24 is negatively associated with stopping rates per capita. The effect is sizeable, a 10% increase in the share of the tract between the ages 18 to 24 is associated with a 16% decrease in stops per capita in 2012 and a 31% decrease in 2013. Note also the somewhat inconsistent negative direct effect and the strong and very consistent positive indirect effect of a hypothetical shift from marginalized, non-gentrifying tract to an ineligible tract. Here the model is suggesting that tracts that were not sufficiently marginalized to be eligible to gentrify have lower per capita stopping rates, but as with gentrification, a switch to a less marginalized status would induce higher stopping rates in surrounding neighborhoods.

Table 3.3 shows the relationship between the logged change in the degree holding population and stopping rates. The effect is positive, consistent with the hypothesis, but fairly weakly sized. The model suggests that a 10% increase in the change in the degree holding share of the population is associated with between a .9% to 1.7% increase in stops per capita. As with the categorical coding of gentrification, the principle association seems to be indirect: The model uncovers positive indirect effects for every year except 2010, although a positive direct effect is uncovered in 2014. Other covariates largely behave as they did in Table 3.2. The regressions uncover similar strong and positive effects for crime, 311 calls, racial threat, and poverty on stopping rates and some evidence for a negative effect of the share of the population between 18 and 24 on stopping rates.

Table 3.3: Effect of Education Gain on Police Stops

	Direct	Indirect	Total
2010			
Log(Education Gain)	0.017	0.073	0.09*
Log(311 Calls)	0.219***	-0.015	0.204**
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.718***	0.018	0.736***
Black	0.008***	-0.001	0.007***
Latino	0.009***	-0.004	0.005
Ages 18-24	-0.002	-0.009	-0.011
Poverty	0.01***	-0.002	0.009
Single Mother	0.011***	0.001	0.011
2011			
Log(Education Gain)	0.016	0.104**	0.12***
Log(311 Calls)	0.241***	-0.052	0.189*
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.776***	0.01	0.787***
Black	0.007***	-0.002	0.006***
Latino	0.008***	-0.002	0.006*
Ages 18-24	-0.001	-0.02**	-0.021*
Poverty	0.009***	0.006	0.014**
Single Mother	0.008**	0.002	0.009
2012			
Log(Education Gain)	0.017	0.078**	0.095**
Log(311 Calls)	0.212***	-0.161**	0.052
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.729***	0.163**	0.893***
Black	0.008***	-0.001	0.007***

Latino	0.008***	-0.005*	0.003
Ages 18-24	-0.003	-0.017*	-0.019*
Poverty	0.01***	0.015***	0.025***
Single Mother	0.008**	-0.017*	-0.009

2013

Log(Education Gain)	0.009	0.096**	0.105*
Log(311 Calls)	0.138***	-0.113	0.026
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.787***	-0.056	0.731***
Black	0.009***	-0.002	0.007***
Latino	0.006***	-0.012***	-0.006
Ages 18-24	0.002	-0.023*	-0.021
Poverty	0.011***	0.011*	0.022***
Single Mother	0.008**	-0.01	-0.002

2014

Log(Education Gain)	0.041**	0.128**	0.169**
Log(311 Calls)	0.197***	-0.153	0.044
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.63***	-0.509***	0.121
Black	0.006***	0.001	0.007**
Latino	0.004*	-0.008*	-0.004
Ages 18-24	0.011**	0.016	0.027
Poverty	0.011***	-0.007	0.004
Single Mother	0.017***	-0.01	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 display the relationship between change in the share of the population employed in postindustrial industries and occupations and stopping rates. The results from these models do not give quite as strong evidence for the postindustrial policing hypothesis. The results from Table 3.4 are somewhat suggestive that police are responsive to rates of growth in the share of the population employed in postindustrial occupations, but weakly so and not consistently across years analyzed. In contrast to the other operationalizations of gentrification, Table 3.5 does not offer evidence that changes in the share of the population employed in postindustrial industries has any effect on stopping rates per capita.

Table 3.4: Effect of Occupation Gain on Police Stops

	Direct	Indirect	Total
2010			

Log(Occupation Gain)	0.031**	0.065*	0.096**
Log(311 Calls)	0.24***	-0.028	0.212**
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.686***	0.053	0.739***
Black	0.009***	-0.001	0.008***
Latino	0.008***	-0.001	0.006**
Ages 18-24	-0.004	-0.013	-0.017
Poverty	0.011***	-0.001	0.01*
Single Mother	0.012***	-0.008	0.003

2011

Log(Occupation Gain)	0.02	0.056*	0.076*
Log(311 Calls)	0.226***	-0.056	0.17**
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.776***	0.039	0.815***
Black	0.008***	-0.002	0.006***
Latino	0.009***	-0.001	0.008***
Ages 18-24	0.003	-0.02**	-0.017*
Poverty	0.01***	0	0.011**
Single Mother	0.008**	0.001	0.01

2012

Log(Occupation Gain)	0.012	0.059*	0.07*
Log(311 Calls)	0.247***	-0.117*	0.13*
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.75***	0.028	0.778***
Black	0.009***	-0.002	0.006***
Latino	0.006***	-0.003	0.003
Ages 18-24	-0.004	-0.008	-0.012
Poverty	0.011***	0.007*	0.018***
Single Mother	0.012***	-0.008	0.004

2013

Log(Occupation Gain)	0.003	0.022	0.025
Log(311 Calls)	0.161***	-0.087	0.074
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.787***	-0.132*	0.654***
Black	0.009***	-0.001	0.007***
Latino	0.003*	-0.006*	-0.003
Ages 18-24	0.007	-0.027***	-0.02*
Poverty	0.014***	0.007	0.021***
Single Mother	0.01*	-0.008	0.001

2014

Log(Occupation Gain)	0.003	0.059	0.062
Log(311 Calls)	0.182***	-0.102	0.08
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.62***	-0.464***	0.156
Black	0.006***	0.002	0.008***
Latino	0.004*	-0.005	-0.001

Ages 18-24	0.015**	-0.002	0.013
Poverty	0.011***	0	0.011
Single Mother	0.012**	-0.017	-0.004
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

3.8 Discussion and Conclusion

In sum, the results extend empirical support for the postindustrial policing hypothesis. Overall the analysis finds the association between gentrification and SQF to be strong and positive, net tract level crime rates and other potential factors. The results further suggest that the most dramatic impacts are indirect: Gentrification in a tract does not necessarily induce heightened policing in the tract that experienced it, but significant policing in adjacent or neighboring tracts. These results are consistent with Davis' (2006) analysis of revitalization and policing in Los Angeles, in which the homeless in that city's downtown central business district were pushed to Skid Row, where their rates of contact with police officers subsequently skyrocketed (see also Stuart 2016). This pattern is also consistent with Florida (2014) and Millie (2008), notions of pleasurable enjoyment of urban space, and what one might call the "aesthetics" of policing for revitalized space. Gentrifying in-movers likely do not prefer to see heavy and frequent policing in their neighborhoods any more than they prefer to see signs of "disorder". The dislocation of policing from these changing neighborhoods to adjacent neighborhoods would be consistent with these preferences.

In addition to the main result, the analysis finds significant yet weaker effects for the continuous operationalizations of gentrification. Change in the share of the population with college degrees and employed in postindustrial occupations are associated with higher stopping rates but weakly so. These smaller effects may offer evidence of the placed based policing strategies suggested by the hypothesis. Officers may not mechanistically respond, tract by tract, to demographic shifts and change. Rather, they dramatically ramp up postindustrial policing practices in targeted and specific city districts that are well known to them to be in the midst of change.

The analysis also uncovers comparatively weaker effect for 311 calls on stopping rates. This finding suggests that the higher stopping rates observed in gentrifying tracts are not principally explained by higher rates of citizen demand for police intervention or OMP in these neighborhoods. This suggests that the mechanisms presented in Vitale (2008), in which individual and community level mobilization, political lobbying, and expressed demand significantly affected police behavior and initiatives, do not explain much of the contemporary spatial variation in OMP in New York City. It may be that elite level decision making is an important additional factor in explaining policing intensity in gentrifying neighborhoods, consistent with the mechanisms characterized in Gibson (2004). The results presented here, however, do not give affirmative evidence of this relationship and more empirical work is needed to test it. At the same time, the comparatively weak relationship between 311 calls and stopping intensity may be due to the existence of additional pathways through which citizens can express their preferences to the police and the greater rationalization of police deployment through COMPSTAT. Police may be more sensitive to community members in face-to-face police-community accountability meets than to relatively anonymous 311 calls. Police may also view 311 calls as a less informative, reliable, or useful means to achieve crime reduction than data coming from COMPSTAT, which attempts to optimize police deployment and behavior to achieve crime reductions.

Finally, the results also present evidence that both the threat and rational-bureaucratic perspectives explain the spatial distribution of police stops under Stop, Question, and Frisk in New York City. Tract level stopping rates closely follow tract level crime rates. At the same time the share of the black American and Latino American population, as well as percentage of families living in poverty are strongly associated with Stop and Frisk rates.

3.9 Appendix

Table 3.5: Spatial Durbin Model: Effect of Gentrification on Stopping Rates

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Ineligible	-0.106**	-0.098**	-0.084**	-0.138***	-0.033

	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.057)
Gentrified	-0.122*** (0.047)	-0.134*** (0.047)	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.078 (0.053)	-0.036 (0.064)
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.692*** (0.027)	0.763*** (0.026)	0.717*** (0.026)	0.767*** (0.030)	0.648*** (0.035)
Log(311/Capita)	0.200*** (0.025)	0.238*** (0.023)	0.252*** (0.024)	0.164*** (0.026)	0.187*** (0.034)
Black	0.008*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Latino	0.009*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)
Ages 18-24	-0.0002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)
Poverty	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)
Single Mother	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.004)
Lag: Ineligible	0.221*** (0.068)	0.192*** (0.067)	0.189*** (0.068)	0.179** (0.075)	0.240*** (0.091)
Lag: Gentrified	0.232*** (0.082)	0.296*** (0.081)	0.329*** (0.083)	0.254*** (0.093)	0.184* (0.111)
Lag: Log(Crimes/Capita)	-0.413*** (0.044)	-0.461*** (0.044)	-0.340*** (0.046)	-0.477*** (0.049)	-0.639*** (0.054)
Lag: Log(311/Capita)	-0.118*** (0.041)	-0.177*** (0.041)	-0.251*** (0.041)	-0.190*** (0.045)	-0.099* (0.056)
Lag: Black	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Lag: Latino	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.003)
Lag: Ages 18-24	-0.006	-0.009*	-0.006	-0.016***	-0.004

	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Lag: Poverty	−0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	−0.003 (0.004)
Lag: Single Mother	−0.009** (0.005)	−0.008* (0.005)	−0.013** (0.005)	−0.012** (0.006)	−0.017** (0.007)
Constant	0.231 (0.159)	0.219 (0.155)	0.001 (0.153)	−0.424** (0.173)	−2.000*** (0.222)
ρ	.66	.64	.58	.64	.65
Observations	2,084	2,085	2,083	2,078	1,975
Log Likelihood	−1,826.529	−1,785.048	−1,812.974	−2,033.999	−2,301.242
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,695.058	3,612.096	3,667.947	4,109.999	4,644.485

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.6: Spatial Durbin Model: Effect of Degree Gain on Stopping Rates

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Log(Degree Gain)	0.011 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	0.012 (0.014)	0.001 (0.015)	0.031* (0.019)
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.716*** (0.029)	0.775*** (0.028)	0.717*** (0.029)	0.792*** (0.032)	0.672*** (0.039)
Log(311/Capita)	0.220*** (0.027)	0.245*** (0.026)	0.224*** (0.027)	0.147*** (0.028)	0.210*** (0.037)
Black	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Latino	0.009*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Ages 18-24	−0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.010** (0.005)
Poverty	0.011*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)
Single Mother	0.011*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)

Lag: Log(Degree Gain)	0.024 (0.021)	0.042** (0.020)	0.034 (0.021)	0.041* (0.023)	0.035 (0.029)
Lag: Log(Crimes/Capita)	−0.425*** (0.045)	−0.441*** (0.045)	−0.288*** (0.048)	−0.497*** (0.051)	−0.625*** (0.056)
Lag: Log(311/Capita)	−0.139*** (0.042)	−0.164*** (0.041)	−0.199*** (0.043)	−0.137*** (0.046)	−0.193*** (0.057)
Lag: Black	−0.005*** (0.002)	−0.005*** (0.002)	−0.005*** (0.002)	−0.007*** (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)
Lag: Latino	−0.007*** (0.002)	−0.006*** (0.002)	−0.007*** (0.002)	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.006** (0.003)
Lag: Ages 18-24	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.009* (0.005)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.012** (0.006)	0.001 (0.008)
Lag: Poverty	−0.007*** (0.003)	−0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.003)	−0.010*** (0.004)
Lag: Single Mother	−0.006 (0.005)	−0.004 (0.005)	−0.014** (0.005)	−0.009 (0.006)	−0.015** (0.007)
Constant	0.245 (0.163)	0.413*** (0.160)	0.305* (0.159)	−0.380** (0.175)	−2.064*** (0.228)
ρ	.60	.58	.52	.60	.61
Observations	1,799	1,800	1,797	1,794	1,701
Log Likelihood	−1,607.054	−1,568.955	−1,597.864	−1,791.040	−2,026.801
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,252.108	3,175.911	3,233.728	3,620.079	4,091.603
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01					

Table 3.7: Spatial Durbin Model: Effect of Occupation Gain on Stopping Rates

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Log(Occupation Gain)	0.024* (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.0004 (0.016)	−0.004 (0.020)
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.681*** (0.034)	0.773*** (0.033)	0.748*** (0.033)	0.800*** (0.038)	0.669*** (0.046)

Log(311/Capita)	0.243*** (0.032)	0.231*** (0.030)	0.258*** (0.030)	0.170*** (0.033)	0.192*** (0.043)
Black	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Latino	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Ages 18-24	-0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.016** (0.006)
Poverty	0.011*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
Single Mother	0.012*** (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.010** (0.005)	0.014** (0.006)
Lag: Log(Occupation Gain)	0.024 (0.020)	0.027 (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)	0.012 (0.023)	0.036 (0.029)
Lag: Log(Crimes/Capita)	-0.306*** (0.046)	-0.327*** (0.046)	-0.298*** (0.046)	-0.471*** (0.051)	-0.588*** (0.058)
Lag: Log(311/Capita)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.138*** (0.045)	-0.183*** (0.043)	-0.133*** (0.049)	-0.151** (0.060)
Lag: Black	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Lag: Latino	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)
Lag: Ages 18-24	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.019*** (0.006)	-0.009 (0.009)
Lag: Poverty	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.0001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)
Lag: Single Mother	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.016* (0.008)
Constant	0.406** (0.165)	0.557*** (0.164)	0.225 (0.160)	-0.644*** (0.180)	-2.627*** (0.234)

ρ	.49	.55	.42	.50	.48
Observations	1,280	1,280	1,280	1,276	1,221
Log Likelihood	-1,194.598	-1,156.194	-1,165.522	-1,324.613	-1,506.708
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,427.197	2,350.387	2,369.045	2,687.227	3,051.416

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.8: Spatial Durbin Model: Effect of Industry on Stopping Rates

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Log(Industry Gain)	0.011 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.0003 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.019)
Log(Crimes/Capita)	0.708*** (0.032)	0.795*** (0.030)	0.756*** (0.030)	0.832*** (0.034)	0.684*** (0.043)
Log(311/Capita)	0.201*** (0.029)	0.228*** (0.027)	0.213*** (0.028)	0.142*** (0.030)	0.179*** (0.041)
Black	0.008*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Latino	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Ages 18-24	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.010* (0.006)
Poverty	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)
Single Mother	0.010*** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)
Lag: Log(Industry Gain)	-0.038 (0.026)	0.007 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.028)	0.002 (0.035)
Lag: Log(Crimes/Capita)	-0.398*** (0.046)	-0.420*** (0.046)	-0.316*** (0.046)	-0.546*** (0.050)	-0.707*** (0.057)
Lag: Log(311/Capita)	-0.122*** (0.044)	-0.144*** (0.043)	-0.154*** (0.042)	-0.121*** (0.046)	-0.073 (0.058)
Lag: Black	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.003

	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Lag: Latino	−0.006*** (0.002)	−0.004** (0.002)	−0.005** (0.002)	−0.008*** (0.002)	−0.007** (0.003)
Lag: Ages 18-24	0.004 (0.006)	−0.004 (0.006)	−0.0001 (0.006)	−0.006 (0.007)	0.008 (0.009)
Lag: Poverty	−0.003 (0.003)	−0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	−0.002 (0.003)	−0.009** (0.004)
Lag: Single Mother	−0.009* (0.005)	−0.005 (0.005)	−0.015*** (0.005)	−0.004 (0.006)	−0.005 (0.007)
Constant	−0.064 (0.162)	0.347** (0.157)	0.134 (0.158)	−0.845*** (0.173)	−2.757*** (0.230)
ρ	.54	.53	.46	.54	.53
Observations	1,488	1,489	1,488	1,483	1,414
Log Likelihood	−1,362.382	−1,294.790	−1,315.487	−1,482.493	−1,727.830
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,762.763	2,627.580	2,668.975	3,002.985	3,493.660

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

CHAPTER 4

Policing and Political Participation in New York City

Chapter 3 presented the effects of gentrification on punitive policing in New York City, but what effect (if any) do these adversarial street-level police interactions have on political behavior? Many extant studies have explored the impact of the criminal justice system on American politics and have demonstrated how institutions and practices of the US criminal justice system can significantly constrain an individual’s ability to participate, erode political efficacy and trust, and weaken the capacity of entire communities to engage in politics (Alexander 2012; Burch 2013; Manza and Uggen 2006; Lerman and Weaver 2014b; Uggen et al. 2016). Extant studies have emphasized that these negative political consequences are concentrated among black and Latino Americans, whose rates of incarceration and political disenfranchisement far outpace those of white Americans (Uggen et al. 2016).

Most extant studies, however, have focused on the political consequences of *mass incarceration* and *felon disenfranchisement*, to the relative exclusion of other criminal justice policies or forms of criminal justice contact. The omission of studies on police policy and police-citizen contact is perhaps the most striking, given policing’s status as the ‘frontline’ of the criminal justice system. The frequency of everyday police-citizen interactions, for example, far exceeds the frequency with which individuals are arraigned in court or the size of the incarcerated population (Eith and Durose 2011). Yet with the notable exception of Lerman and Weaver (2014b) and Weaver and Lerman (2010), few empirical studies have tested the impact that police contact or exposure may exert on political behavior.

The absence of studies focused on policing’s political consequences is surprising given evidence that police behavior — particularly violence and misconduct against black and Latino Americans — can *instigate* political action, as has been the case with political mobilization

against police brutality in the 1960s and 1970s and the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement (Escobar 1993; Felker-Kantor 2014; Goodman and Baker 2014; National Advisory Commission 1968). The contemporary literature largely omits these cases in its framing, however, and contemporary studies generally fail to provide a convincing explanation of how exposure to the criminal justice system can increase political participation and engagement. An important exception lies with recent studies which have characterized how the threat or harm constituted by the US criminal justice system and immigration enforcement policies can instigate mobilization (Walker 2014; White 2016). While criminal justice contact may demobilize individuals in many instances and contexts, findings from these studies suggest that criminal justice policies that are discriminatory, threatening, and do active harm can also instigate higher levels of political participation among those who are driven and able to combat them.

This chapter formally tests the political consequences of policing utilizing the same data set of 2.7 million geocoded police-initiated street stops conducted by the New York City Police Department under its SQF program, but incorporates additional precinct level data on voter turnout and voter choice. The results, drawn from binomial regression models and matching analysis, suggest that while policing can reduce political participation, it can also serve as a point of mobilization and engagement. Specifically, the results suggest that spatially concentrated policing reduced voter turnout in the 2006 and 2010 off year elections, most likely through the production of negative interpretive effects that can reduce an individual's sense of political trust, efficacy, and standing, and thereby their political participation (Epp et al. 2014; Weaver and Lerman 2010). At the same time, however, the results demonstrate that policing is not uniformly demobilizing, and uncover instances where concentrated policing was associated with *higher* rates of voter turnout and engagement. More specifically, the results suggest that the spatial concentration of SQF policing was associated with higher voter turnout in the 2008 Presidential election, the 2013 mayoral election, and the 2013 Democratic primary for mayor — a pattern I argue is attributable to the mobilizing effect of Barack Obama's presidential campaign and the political opportunity that the 2013 Democratic primary and general election presented voters to change policing

policy in New York City. Indeed, further analysis suggests that policed communities were responsive to Democratic primary candidate positions on SQF, and that more intense SQF policing was associated with more support for the candidate (John Liu) who advocated for ending SQF policing and less support for the most prominent candidate (William Thompson) who supported the program.

Taken together, these findings suggest that everyday policing can significantly affect the behavior of American citizens and communities and foreground the political significance that millions of everyday police-citizen interactions have for American politics. While a set of this study's findings are consistent with past studies that have characterized the negative impact of the US criminal justice system on political participation and engagement, additional findings offer evidence of mobilization and engagement to contest harmful and discriminatory policing policies. The results also importantly point to the potential for political mobilization directed towards formal electoral institutions, in addition to the protests and direct action identified in other work. Finally, the pattern of mobilization and demobilization identified in this analysis tentatively suggest that the likelihood of political mobilization against harmful criminal justice policies is contingent on political opportunities and context. This study's identification of mobilization and voter engagement in New York City's 2013 municipal elections suggests that political action against punitive and discriminatory criminal justice policies may be more likely at the local level, where most interactions with the criminal justice system are experienced, where political opportunities to affect policing policy may be more plentiful, and where the mobilization of negatively affected communities may be more likely to result in policy change.

4.1 Extant Literature

Empirically, the set of studies that test for mobilization or demobilization following any form of criminal justice contact is small. In one study, Weaver and Lerman (2010) mobilized data from two nationally representative surveys and explored whether a wide range of personal interactions with the criminal justice system (being questioned by the police, arrested, con-

victed of a crime, serving prison or jail time under a year, and serving time for longer than a year) were correlated with reduced levels trust in government, voter registration, voting, and civic participation. They found that being questioned by the police, arrested, convicted of a crime, and serving jail time of any length all reduced trust in government; that any jail time served was correlated with a reduced likelihood of being registered to vote and forms of civic participation; and that being arrested, convicted, and serving any jail time was correlated with a reduced likelihood of voting. In a different survey, however, Walker (2014) found a surprising positive association between criminal justice contact (direct or indirect) and political participation, particularly non-electoral forms of political participation.

Burch (2013) also considered the impact of criminal justice contact on political participation but focused on the effect that the intense spatial concentration of incarceration can have on community level political participation. Specifically, Burch (2013) tested whether the spatial concentration of incarcerated and politically disenfranchised individuals could affect community level political participation by weakening norms of political participation, undermining social capital and social networks, reducing the resources available for collective mobilization, and disincentivizing outside groups (like political parties and NGOs) from mobilizing community members. The analysis presented there did find convincing evidence for the latter three mechanisms.

Finally, Lerman and Weaver (2014b) investigated the effect that NYPD police stops have on local political engagement and tested this relationship at the neighborhood level, in an analysis that closely mirrors the one presented here. The authors investigated the effect that the intensity of SQF policing had on political participation, which they measured using community 311 call rates. Distinguishing between 311 calls that concern NYPD and those that did not, the authors tested whether frequent and negative contact with officers reduced citizens' likelihood of engaging municipal bureaucracy related to the police or NYPD. Overall, they found that as the community-level intensity of policing increased, the frequency of 311 calls related to crime, public safety, or the NYPD decreased.

While important contributions to the literature, for scholars interested in the specific effect of policing on political participation, these studies have important limitations. Weaver

and Lerman (2010) did not identify an effect of interactions with police officers on behavior in either survey, despite the broad set of dependent variables they tested. It may be that policing has no effect on political behavior, but as Lundman and Kaufman (2003) have suggested, self-reported police contact data may lack validity, and validity issues are well known to undermine data on self-reported political participation. Second, the authors explored the effect of police stops at the individual level. As Burch (2013) has demonstrated, however, the relationship between stopping and political engagement may have an important spatial component, and there may be political consequences that cannot be identified without accounting for police behavior in the community that an individual is a member of. And while Burch (2013) did explore aggregate level effects, that study focused on incarceration, and cannot provide substantial insight into the consequences of policing.

Finally, while Lerman and Weaver (2014b) do focus on the consequences of policing and did so at the aggregate level, the study contains important short comings as well. First, it is not clear what the underlying distribution or demand for 311 services is. Some sub-section of the population may constitute the core of 311 callers, whose sensitivity or exposure police stops may be confounded in their analysis. Second, it is not clear that 311 calls offer a strong proxy for political engagement. White and Trump (2016), for example, did not find a strong or consistent relationship between aggregate level 311 call rates and other aggregate level measures of political engagement such as Census response rates, voter turnout, or political donations. Minkoff (2016) has discussed the limitations of 311 data more generally and has argued that in order to be adequately mobilized as a proxy for civic engagement, researchers must simultaneously account for absolute demand for services.

The analysis presented below sidesteps these issues by utilizing administrative voter and policing data in New York City, which is not subject to the same reliability issues as self-reported data. It focuses specifically on policing to capture the consequences of this understudied dimension of the criminal justice system, and its use of voting data allows it to directly characterize the effect of policing on politics. By focusing on SQF policing in New York City, the analysis is also able to isolate some (but not all) of the potential mechanisms (discussed in Chapter 2) tying policing to political participation. New York, for example,

does not require payment of LFO's as a precondition for voting, so the systematic effect of policing on LFOs and thereby political participation is likely muted in this analysis. Similarly, SQF policing rarely results in more serious legal entanglements (such as a citation or summons to court) that might yield strategic avoidance of formal state record keeping agencies and practices that could result in arrest or surveillance. Finally, this analysis is able to control for the effect policing may exert of political participation through socioeconomic resources or status. The results presented below, likely therefore characterize the interpretive effects of policing on participation, although as I discuss in the conclusion, the specific mechanisms underlying the outcomes cannot be concretely identified in this study.

4.2 Hypotheses

On balance, the extant literature suggests that concentrated policing likely reduces political participation, although additional research suggests that mobilization to counter-act policing is possible. In the context of SQF policing in New York City, the 2013 Democratic primary and general election presented voters with an opportunity to support candidates who committed to reforming SQF policing and who actually had the power to do so. Conversely, the national level elections of 2006, 2008, and 2010 neither featured candidates who committed to changing SQF policy nor candidates who actually had the ability to do so. Phrased differently, while the spatial intensity of policing in a neighborhood may reduce the likelihood of turning out in national elections — where voters do not have the opportunity to affect policing policy and candidates generally do not run on police reform — the threatening and punitive environment constituted by policing policy may increase turnout at the local level where policing policy is set and in an election where police reform was a central campaign issue. I therefore hypothesize that:

H1a: Areas of New York City that experience higher levels of SQF policing will exhibit lower levels of voter turnout in the 2006, 2008, and 2010 national elections

H2a: Areas of New York City that experience higher levels of SQF policing will exhibit

higher levels of voter turnout in the 2013 mayoral election and Democratic primary for mayor

New York's 2013 municipal elections not only presented voters with an opportunity to vote for a candidate who might change SQF policy, but an election (the Democratic primary) where multiple competing candidates adopted distinct positions on SQF. Specifically, John Liu adopted the most radical position on SQF and advocated abolishing the program, De Blasio adopted a relatively progressive position and advocated significant reforms, and William Thompson adopted a moderate or conservative position, arguing that the program should remain relatively unchanged. If policy threat motivates affected communities to combat harmful and threatening policies, then we may not only expect higher levels of political participation among policed communities in an electoral context that might affect the policy, but higher levels of support for candidates who advocate for more reform. I therefore hypothesize that:

H2a: The spatial intensity of SQF policing will be positively associated with support for John Liu and Bill de Blasio

H2b: The spatial intensity of SQF policing will be negatively associated with support for William Thompson

The theory of interpretive effects further suggests that the quality of interactions may impact evaluations of self and government, and thereby likelihood to vote. Communities where officers frequently treat residents they stop in an aggressive or invasive manner may have worse experiences and may evince lower levels of participation than similarly situated areas. More explicitly I hypothesize that:

H3a: Areas where frisks and searches during a stop are more frequent will exhibit lower levels of voter turnout

H3b: Areas where the application of force during a stop is more frequent will exhibit lower levels of voter turnout

H3c: Areas where stops are based on the furtive movement of suspects will exhibit lower levels of voter turnout¹

Finally, extant theory on police-citizen interactions suggests that black and Latino Americans experience police stops worse than white Americans and as a result, the magnitude of the hypothesized relationships may be stronger as the black and Latino share of a community increases. Hypothesis 4 states this expectation explicitly:

H4a: The demobilizing or mobilizing effect of police stops will increase as the minority share of the population increases

H4b: The effect of police stops on candidate support (for John Liu and Bill de Blasio and against William Thompson) will increase as minority share of the population increases

4.3 Data and Methods

Data for the analysis came from several sources. Data on the number of police-initiated stops was again pulled from the NYPD’s SQF dataset.² Aggregate level voter turnout data for the 2006, 2008, and 2010 national elections came from the Harvard Election Data Archive (Ansolabehere et al. 2014). The Data Archive also contains GIS shape files, which present digital representations of the geographic boundaries of New York City’s voter tabulation districts (VTDs). VTDs are the smallest geographic unit that voter turnout and candidate choice data are available and serve as the primary unit of analysis for the study.

The generation of control values, drawn from Census data, was somewhat complicated since VTDs and Census tracts do not neatly overlap in many areas of New York City. To

¹The intuition for this last measure is that stops based on the ostensible furtive movements of the suspect are more likely to be discretionary, be perceived to be illegitimate, and therefore to produce negative interpretive effects. See, for example Goel et. al (2017)

²The set of interactions recorded in the database still may not constitute the universe of police-citizen interactions, as officers may not document all stops or may incorrectly record interactions (Ridgeway 2007). Nevertheless, the NYPD has significantly enhanced its auditing procedures to make the data more reliable, such that it is deemed reliable enough for use in legal procedures and other scientific analyses (Mummolo 2018; Gelman et al. 2007. See also, Goel et al. 2016).

address this issue, the analysis took advantage of data collected during New York City’s 2010 redistricting process, from which the calculation of the fraction of each Census tract that falls within each VTD is relatively straight forward. Where a VTD was completely constituted by a single election district, control variables from the corresponding Census tract were assigned to that VTD. Where a VTD was constituted by multiple Census tracts, however, control values were calculated via an averaging procedure that weighted covariates based on the share of the population of the VTD that came from each constitutive Census tract. This procedure was used on data from the 2010 ACS to generate control values for the models run on 2010 turnout data. To calculate control variables for the 2006 and 2008 elections, the analysis assigned tract level control values from the 2000 Decennial Census to the 2010 voter tabulation map using Longitudinal Tract Database tool (Logan et al. 2014). Tract level control values for 2006 and 2008 were then generated by linear interpolation.

Data from the 2013 municipal elections were gathered from a different source and control variables were tabulated via a different procedure. Data on candidate choice was pulled from a publicly available data set hosted by the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism’s Election Atlas Project (New York City Primary Results 2013; Center for Urban Research 2013). Candidate choice data for these years was also collected at the VTD level but unlike data from the national level elections, they fit the 2013 map of voter tabulation districts rather than the 2010 map. To generate estimates of VTD level control values, the analysis first overlaid the 2013 map of New York City Census blocks over the 2013 VTD map, and assigned every Census block in the city to a VTD. It then collected control data from the 2013 ACS at the level of the block group, which like voter tabulation districts, are completely and exhaustively constituted by individual Census blocks. It then calculated block level control values using population size as a weight and with block level controls tabulated, aggregated these control values to the level of the voter tabulation district.

The analysis models aggregate level voter turnout in the national level elections as well as candidate choice in the 2013 mayoral Democratic primary election in a series of binomial regression models, which specifically model the total number of “successes” (citizens who turnout in the first set of analyses and number of supporters of a candidate in the

second) out of a series of “trials” (an estimate of the voting eligible population³ and the number Democratic primary voters), as a function of an intensity parameter itself determined (through the logit link function) by covariates. In both cases (turnout and candidate support), the aggregate level data is the summation of discrete Bernoulli trials (e.g. an individual’s decision to turnout to vote or not, or to vote for a candidate or not) which can be represented in a binomial model.⁴ Following standard practices (Gelman and Hill 2006), the analysis fits so called “quasibinomial” models, which depart from standard binomial models by allowing for variance terms that do not equal the mean.

4.4 Variables

Voter turnout is the focal dependent variable for the 2006, 2008, and 2010 national elections, for the 2013 Democratic primary election, and for the 2013 general election for mayor, and was operationalized as the number of voters out of the voter eligible population. Three models were run for candidate choice in the 2013 Democratic primary: 1) the number of Democratic primary voters who supported William Thompson Jr., 2) the number of Democratic primary voters who supported Bill de Blasio, and 3) the number of Democratic primary voters who supported John Liu, each out of the number of Democratic primary voters.

The focal independent variables for the models run on voter turnout were the per capita stopping rate; frisking and searching rate; use of force rate; and rate of stops based on furtive movements. For parsimony, the analysis of candidate choice in the 2013 Democratic primary election only explores the effect of the total stopping rate on candidate choice. The measure of the use of force relied on coding provided by the NYPD’s in their Stop, Question, and

³Following McDonald and Popkin (2001), I estimate the voter-eligible population as the population of citizens over the age of 18 who are not incarcerated. New York State allows individuals on probation to vote and automatically restores the voting rights of all individuals who have completed parole, so no correction needs to be made for these populations. Unfortunately, the New York Board of Corrections does not release data that would allow for tract level estimation of the population currently completing parole, which may induce bias into the estimates.

⁴The modeling specification is in this manner consistent with the data generating process. I present results from spatial model specifications in the Appendix. Results from these modeling specifications are consistent with the results presented in the main text.

Frisk codebook, which characterizes the use of force as force applied via an officer's hands, a wall, the ground, the drawing of an officer's service weapon, the pointing of an officer's service weapon, the use pepper spray, the use of a police baton, or handcuffing. Instances of searches, frisks, and stops based on furtive movements are categorically marked in the data set. Each type of stop was geolocated to the VTD in which it occurred and the aggregate number of each type of stop was calculated. This total count was then divided by the population of the VTD to get the stopping rate. To account for skew, this rate was logged.

Finally, a series of control variables were included to control for aggregate level factors that have been included in prior studies (see Geys (2006) for a review). The regressions for voter turnout in 2010, 2008, and 2006 include the share of the election district that is black American, Latino American, has been living in the same residence for the past 12 months, and is a homeowner. These regressions also control for population size, median household income, the share of single-mother households, and the share of the electoral district that turned out to vote in the last election. To control for skew, the population size and the median household income were logged. Due to data limitations, the 2006 regressions do not include a measure of past voter turnout.

The regressions from the 2013 elections include a similar set of controls: the share of the population that is black and Latino, the share that has lived in the same house for the past 12 months, rates of home ownership, the log of the population size and median household income, the share of households headed by single mothers and voter turnout in 2009. To control for additional unmeasured factors that explain candidate support, the candidate support models also include controls for past levels of electoral support that that candidate received. Thus, controls were introduced for the share of the election district that supported William Thompson in his 2009 mayoral run against Michael Bloomberg, the share of the electoral district that supported de Blasio in his 2009 campaign for public advocate of New York City, and the share of the district that supported Liu in his 2009 campaign for comptroller. Finally, given high rates of Democratic partisanship in New York City and the independent effect that party affiliation or membership might exert on the local municipal elections, all analyses run on data from 2013 include rates of Democratic party membership.

4.5 Results

Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 report the results of binomial regression models run on the relationship between stopping intensity and turnout in the 2010, 2008, and 2006 national elections, while Table 4.4 reports the results between stopping intensity and voter turnout in 2013. Each table reports the odds ratios, which give the effect of a unit switch in each covariate on the odds of turning out. They also report first differences for each covariate, which give the effect of switching the value of a covariate from the minimum value it obtains in the data to the maximum value it obtains, while holding all over covariate values in the VTD at their actual values.

Generally, such a switch is associated with a reduction in the share of the population that turns out to vote in the national level elections and an increase in the 2013 municipal elections, consistent with the hypotheses (H1a and H1b). Table 4.1 shows the results for the models run on turnout in the 2010 election. The first differences presented here suggest that a minimum to maximal shift in the overall stopping rate, frisk and searching rate, use of force rate, and furtive stopping rate is associated with a decrease of 9%, 6%, 4%, and 7% in the share of the VTD that turns out to vote, respectively. Other coefficients largely behave as expected: increases in the black share of the district, the share of long-term residents, or the share of a district who are homeowners is associated with higher turnout, while an increase in the share of single mother households is associated with a reduction in turnout. Increases in the Latino and non-citizen share of the population is (surprisingly) associated with increases in turnout. Finally, and as might be expected, the turnout rate in 2008 is the single strongest predictor and the first difference of this coefficient is substantially larger than those generated from other coefficient estimates

Table 4.2 presents an important exception to this pattern and suggests that higher rates of SQF policing are associated with higher rates of turnout in 2008 presidential election. Movement across the range of possible values for per capita stops, frisks and searches, use of force, and furtive movements is associated with a 9%, 6%, 5%, and 7% increase in turnout, respectively. The relationship between policing and turnout shifts back to a negative rela-

Table 4.1: Effect of Police Stops on Voter Turnout: 2010

	Stops	Δ	Frisks & Searches	Δ	Force	Δ	Furtive Movements	Δ
Log(Stops)	0.96*** (0.95, 0.97)	-9.4	0.97*** (0.97, 0.98)	-5.7	0.98*** (0.97, 0.98)	-3.7	0.97*** (0.96, 0.97)	-6.9
Black	1.19*** (1.15, 1.22)	3.2	1.19*** (1.15, 1.23)	3.2	1.18*** (1.14, 1.22)	3.1	1.20*** (1.16, 1.24)	3.4
Latino	1.05* (1.00, 1.10)	0.9	1.06* (1.01, 1.11)	1.1	1.07** (1.02, 1.13)	1.3	1.06* (1.01, 1.11)	1
Non-citizen	1.53*** (1.47, 1.59)	7.8	1.52*** (1.45, 1.58)	7.6	1.51*** (1.45, 1.58)	7.5	1.53*** (1.46, 1.59)	7.7
Same House	3.02*** (2.89, 3.16)	10.8	3.06*** (2.92, 3.19)	10.9	3.04*** (2.90, 3.18)	10.7	3.07*** (2.94, 3.21)	10.9
Homeowner	1.13*** (1.08, 1.18)	2.3	1.14*** (1.09, 1.18)	2.4	1.14*** (1.09, 1.19)	2.4	1.14*** (1.09, 1.19)	2.5
Log(Population)	0.99 (0.98, 1.00)	-1.2	0.99 (0.98, 1.01)	-0.7	1 (0.98, 1.01)	-0.4	0.99 (0.98, 1.00)	-0.9
Log(Income)	0.99 (0.96, 1.01)	-0.7	0.99 (0.97, 1.02)	-0.5	1.01 (0.98, 1.03)	0.3	0.99 (0.96, 1.01)	-0.7
Single Mother	0.99*** (0.99, 0.99)	-10.1	0.99*** (0.99, 0.99)	-10.5	0.99*** (0.99, 0.99)	-10.5	0.99*** (0.99, 0.99)	-10.3
Turnout '08	1.54*** (1.53, 1.55)	56.1	1.53*** (1.53, 1.54)	55.7	1.54*** (1.53, 1.54)	55.7	1.54*** (1.53, 1.54)	55.8
Constant	0.15*** (0.10, 0.21)	—	0.14*** (0.10, 0.20)	—	0.11*** (0.08, 0.17)	—	0.14*** (0.10, 0.20)	—
Pseudo R ²	0.68		0.67		0.66		0.67	
N	5,457		5,421		5,096		5,389	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

tionship in the 2006 midterm elections however. Table 4.3 shows that the first differences for the overall stop rate, frisk and search rate, and furtive movement rate are associated with 7%, 4%, and 7% reductions in aggregate level turnout. No statistically significant result is identified in the relationship between the use of force per capita. In sum, higher rates of policing were associated with reduced turnout in two out of the three national elections, generally consistent with expectations.

Table 4.2: Effect of Police Stops on Voter Turnout: 2008

	Stops	Δ	Frisks & Searches	Δ	Force	Δ	Furtive Movements	Δ
Log(Stops)	1.04*** (1.04, 1.05)	9.4	1.03*** (1.02, 1.04)	6.1	1.03*** (1.02, 1.03)	4.7	1.04*** (1.03, 1.04)	7.4
Black	1.36*** (1.33, 1.39)	6.8	1.35*** (1.32, 1.38)	6.8	1.39*** (1.36, 1.42)	7.3	1.35*** (1.32, 1.38)	6.6
Latino	1.02 (0.98, 1.06)	0.3	1.01 (0.97, 1.05)	0.2	1.02 (0.98, 1.06)	0.4	1.02 (0.98, 1.06)	0.4
Non-citizen	0.56*** (0.50, 0.63)	-10.9	0.56*** (0.50, 0.63)	-10.9	0.58*** (0.51, 0.65)	-10.5	0.56*** (0.49, 0.63)	-11
Same House	1.07 (0.95, 1.19)	0.8	1.07 (0.94, 1.19)	0.8	1.08 (0.95, 1.21)	0.9	1.03 (0.91, 1.16)	0.4
Homeowner	0.77*** (0.73, 0.81)	-5.8	0.76*** (0.72, 0.81)	-5.9	0.75*** (0.71, 0.80)	-6.2	0.77*** (0.73, 0.81)	-5.7
Log(Population)	0.94*** (0.93, 0.95)	-5.3	0.94*** (0.93, 0.95)	-5.7	0.94*** (0.93, 0.95)	-5.7	0.94*** (0.93, 0.95)	-5.3
Log(Income)	1.17*** (1.14, 1.19)	11	1.17*** (1.14, 1.19)	11	1.15*** (1.13, 1.18)	10	1.16*** (1.14, 1.19)	10.7
Single Mother	2.28*** (2.14, 2.42)	9.9	2.38*** (2.24, 2.52)	10.4	2.30*** (2.15, 2.44)	10	2.32*** (2.18, 2.46)	10.1
Turnout '06	1.70*** (1.69, 1.71)	72.1	1.70*** (1.69, 1.71)	72.2	1.70*** (1.69, 1.71)	72.2	1.70*** (1.70, 1.71)	72.3
Constant	0.24*** (0.17, 0.34)	—	0.25*** (0.18, 0.35)	—	0.29*** (0.20, 0.41)	—	0.26*** (0.18, 0.36)	—
Pseudo R ²	0.82		0.81		0.81		0.81	
N	5,224		5,178		4,645		5,142	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4.4 presents the results from analysis of the 2013 Democratic primary and general election and suggests that as policing intensity increased, so too did voter turnout. First difference values estimate that a shift from the minimum to maximum values of SQF are

Table 4.3: Effect of Police Stops on Voter Turnout: 2006

	Stops	Δ	Frisks & Searches	Δ	Force	Δ	Furtive Movements	Δ
Log(Stops)	0.96***	-6.5	0.97***	-3.9	0.99	-0.9	0.96***	-6.6
	(0.95, 0.97)		(0.96, 0.99)		(0.98, 1.01)		(0.95, 0.97)	
Black	1.45***	6.4	1.47***	6.5	1.43***	5.9	1.48***	6.6
	(1.38, 1.52)		(1.40, 1.54)		(1.36, 1.50)		(1.41, 1.54)	
Latino	1.20***	2.9	1.21***	3.1	1.17**	2.5	1.20***	2.9
	(1.10, 1.29)		(1.12, 1.31)		(1.07, 1.28)		(1.10, 1.29)	
Non-citizen	0.10***	-27.6	0.09***	-27.9	0.08***	-29.5	0.10***	-27
	(-.06, .26)		(-.07, .25)		(-.10, .26)		(-.06, .26)	
Same House	3.44***	11.4	3.32***	11	3.59***	11.1	3.45***	11.3
	(3.18, 3.70)		(3.06, 3.58)		(3.30, 3.87)		(3.19, 3.71)	
Homeowner	0.28***	-18.5	0.29***	-18.2	0.28***	-17.9	0.29***	-17.8
	(0.20, 0.37)		(0.20, 0.38)		(0.18, 0.38)		(0.20, 0.38)	
Log(Population)	0.88***	-11.7	0.89***	-10.5	0.92***	-8	0.89***	-10.8
	(0.86, 0.91)		(0.87, 0.92)		(0.89, 0.94)		(0.87, 0.91)	
Log(Income)	2.29***	42.3	2.24***	41.1	2.17***	39.3	2.25***	41.2
	(2.24, 2.34)		(2.19, 2.29)		(2.11, 2.23)		(2.20, 2.30)	
Single Mother	0.75	-2	0.68*	-2.7	0.58**	-3.6	0.8	-1.5
	(0.41, 1.09)		(0.33, 1.02)		(0.22, 0.95)		(0.46, 1.14)	
Constant	0.00***	—	0.00***	—	0.00***	—	0.00***	—
	(0.00, 0.00)		(0.00, 0.00)		(0.00, 0.00)		(0.00, 0.00)	
Pseudo R ²	0.39		0.38		0.38		0.39	
N	5,432		5,224		4,149		5,160	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

associated with a 2% increase in voter turnout in the Democratic primary and a 6% increase in voter turnout in the general election for mayor, supporting the notion that policing can constitute a force for political mobilization, conditional on elites and context. As might be expected in an off-year election, black and Latino share of the population is negatively associated with turnout in 2013, as is the population size and share of single mother households. Predictably, areas with long term residents evince higher rates of turnout in both the Democratic primary and the general election, and the share of registered Democrats in the VTD and the VTD's past history of electoral participation were strongly associated with turnout rates. Income and home ownership are both, surprisingly, negatively associated with turnout.

I also hypothesized that more SQF policing would be associated with more support for candidates that endorsed reforming SQF (John Liu and Bill de Blasio) and less support for candidates who did not (William Thompson) (H2a, H2b). Results from the binomial regression models run on candidate support, presented in Table 4.5, are consistent with these hypotheses. Again, odds ratios and first differences giving the effect of a shift from the minimal to the maximal value of a coefficient are displayed. The results suggest that such a shift is associated with a 15% increase in support for John Liu and 12% reduction in support for Thompson. The estimate for SQF policing's effect on support for Bill de Blasio is positive but not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 also present a test of the hypothesis that the intensity of interactions that featured frisks and searches, the use of force, or stops based on the "furtive movements" of the suspect would be associated with stronger demobilization effects (H3a, H3b, H3c). The models uncover no evidence supporting these hypotheses.

The final set of hypotheses consider variation in these results across different types of communities. Given extant research that black and Latino communities experience more and worse SQF than white communities, H4a and H4b hypothesized that the magnitude of the effects hypothesized in H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b — of demobilization in the national level elections, mobilization in the local elections, and candidate support for anti-SQF candidates in the 2013 Democratic primary — would increase as the black and Latino share of the VTD

Table 4.4: Effect of Police Stops on Voter Turnout:
2013 Democratic Primary

	Democratic Primary	Δ	Mayoral General	Δ
Log(Stops)	1.04*	2.3	1.07***	5.6
	(1.01, 1.07)		(1.04, 1.10)	
Black	0.76***	-2.4	1.01	0.1
	(0.63, 0.89)		(0.89, 1.13)	
Latino	0.56***	-4.7	0.65***	-5.2
	(0.42, 0.70)		(0.52, 0.78)	
Same House	4.33***	6.8	4.56***	10.4
	(3.97, 4.69)		(4.22, 4.91)	
Homeowner	1.00***	-12	1.00***	-19.1
	(1.00, 1.00)		(1.00, 1.00)	
Log(Population)	0.77***	-12.4	0.78***	-16.8
	(0.73, 0.81)		(0.74, 0.82)	
Log(Income)	0.93*	-3.7	0.97	-1.9
	(0.88, 0.99)		(0.91, 1.02)	
Single Mother	1.00***	-12.3	1.00***	-19
	(1.00, 1.00)		(1.00, 1.00)	
Share Democrat	13.47***	17.2	10.24***	22.1
	(13.16, 13.79)		(9.92, 10.56)	
Turnout '09: Democratic Primary	1.28***	34	—	—
	(1.26, 1.30)			
Turnout '09: Mayoral General	—	—	1.56***	33
			(1.53, 1.60)	
Constant	0.15***	—	0.18***	—
	(0.06, 0.35)		(0.08, 0.41)	
Pseudo R ²	0.51		0.51	
N	3,885		3,803	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4.5: Effect of Police Stops on Candidate Choice: 2013 Democratic Primary

	Thompson	Δ	De Blasio	Δ	Liu	Δ
Log(Stops)	0.91*** (0.88, 0.93)	-11.6	1.01 (0.99, 1.03)	1.7	1.35*** (1.28, 1.43)	15.2
Black	2.37*** (2.18, 2.58)	17.2	1.84*** (1.74, 1.94)	14	0.18*** (0.15, 0.22)	-8.6
Latino	1.64*** (1.48, 1.80)	9.4	0.96 (0.89, 1.04)	-0.9	0.38*** (0.30, 0.47)	-5.8
Same House	1.15 (0.86, 1.54)	1.7	0.75* (0.60, 0.96)	-4.2	1.33 (0.73, 2.43)	1.2
Homeowner	1.00** (1.00, 1.00)	6.5	1 (1.00, 1.00)	-1	1 (1.00, 1.00)	-2.3
Log(Population)	0.94*** (0.90, 0.97)	-6.2	0.98 (0.95, 1.01)	-2.1	1.35*** (1.26, 1.45)	10.2
Log(Income)	0.96 (0.92, 1.01)	-4.3	0.97 (0.94, 1.01)	-4.1	1.09 (1.00, 1.19)	3.4
Single Mother	1.00** (1.00, 1.00)	-7.7	1 (1.00, 1.00)	3	1 (1.00, 1.00)	4.3
Turnout '09: Democratic Primary	0.92*** (0.90, 0.94)	-13.4	1.09*** (1.07, 1.10)	18.9	0.83*** (0.79, 0.87)	-8.7
Thompson '09	1.45*** (1.21, 1.73)	6.8	—	—	—	—
De Blasio '09	—	—	3.80*** (3.34, 4.31)	31.5	—	—
Liu '09	—	—	—	—	1.62* (1.09, 2.41)	2.3
Constant	0.41** (0.21, 0.78)	—	0.72 (0.43, 1.20)	—	0.004*** (0.001, 0.01)	—
Pseudo R^2	0.15		0.15		0.11	
N	3,855		3,855		3,855	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

increases.

To test this contention, I ran an additional series of multiplicative interaction models, which adapt the baseline models displayed in Tables 4.1 through 4.5 but include as additional predictors multiplicative interaction terms which condition the effect of stopping intensity on turnout by the share of the voting district that is black or Latino. While interpretation of the substantive significance of the multiplicative interaction term is best communicated visually through marginal effects plots, given the number of potential models to test, I opt to display summary tables of these effects in the main text, and present results from the full interaction models in the Appendix section.

Tables 4.6 and 4.7 summarize the results. The main results in these tables summarize whether the interaction effect (e.g. the marginal effect of black or Latino share of the VTD on the relationship between policing and turnout/candidate support) are positive or negative. In parentheses, the tables display whether the baseline relationship (e.g. the relationship between policing and turnout/candidate choice when black or Latino share of the population is zero) is positive or negative. Full interpretation of the interaction effect can be gained from considering the two together. For example, the first column of Table 4.6 suggests that the effect of black and Latino share of the population on the correlation between policing and turnout is negative. The “baseline relationship” is also negative, so the model estimates that the demobilizing relationship between policing and turnout gets stronger or “more negative” as black and Latino share of the population increases.

These results from 2010 are the only ones strongly consistent with expectation. Column 2 shows the results from 2008. The models estimate the marginal effect of black share of the population here to be positive, such that not only was policing positively associated with higher turnout in 2008, but this relationship gets stronger as black share of the population increases (no statistically significant effect was estimated for the Latino share of the population). Column 3 shows the results estimated for 2006, which also contradict expectation. While the baseline models estimate that the association between policing and turnout is negative in the 2006 mid-term election where black or Latino share is zero, it estimates that this negative association *weakens* as the share of black and Latino Americans residents in-

Table 4.6: Marginal Effect of Race & Ethnicity on Turnout (Summary)

	2010	2008	2006	2013 Democratic Primary	2013 Mayoral General
Black	– (–)	+ (+)	+ (–)	NS	NS
Latino	– (–)	NS (+)	+ (–)	+ (+)	NS

Note: The table gives the direction of the marginal effect of the black and Latino share of the population on the relationship between policing and turnout. The direction of the baseline relationship is given in parentheses. Thus, for example, while the association between policing and turnout is negative in 2006 and where no blacks or Latinos are present, the marginal effect of black share of the VTD is positive, so the size of the demobilizing effect diminishes as black share of the population increases

Table 4.7: Marginal Effect of Race & Ethnicity on Candidate Choice (Summary)

	William Thompson	Bill de Blasio	John Liu
Black	+ (–)	– (+)	– (+)
Latino	+ (–)	– (+)	– (+)

Note: The table gives the direction of the marginal effect of the black and Latino share of the population on the relationship between policing and turnout. The direction of the baseline relationship is given in parentheses. Thus, for example, while the association between policing and support for Thompson is negative where no blacks or Latinos are present, the marginal effect of black share of the VTD is positive, so the size of the demobilizing effect diminishes as black share of the population increases.

crease. The results from the 2013 local elections are largely insignificant, with the exception of the positive marginal effect of the Latino share of the population on mobilization in the Democratic primary.

Table 4.7 presents the marginal effect of black and Latino share of the population on support for candidates in the Democratic primary, which again contradict Hypothesis 4. In every instance, the marginal effect of black and Latino share of the population runs counter to expectation. The baseline models, for example, estimate a negative relationship between William Thompson and policing intensity where no blacks or Latinos are present, but suggest that this relationship weakens as minority share of the population increases. The opposite is true of the marginal effect of black and Latino share of the population on the relationship between policing and support for John Liu and Bill de Blasio. Baseline models estimate a positive relationship between support for these candidates and the spatial concentration of SQF policing where no blacks or Latinos are present, but that the magnitude of this association weakens as minority share of the tract increases. In sum, it does not appear as if an increase in the black or Latino share of the population was associated with a stronger relationship between SQF policing intensity and support for candidates who advocated for SQF reform, but the opposite.

4.6 Matching Analysis

As Lerman and Weaver (2014a) have noted, one weakness of cross-sectional models such as these lie in the potential endogeneity between neighborhood characteristics and levels of SQF policing, and the potential omission of variables that predict SQF policing levels. The authors, however, exploited the placement of communities into different police precincts, whose “policing styles and approach, training, force strength, leadership, and community relationships” may vary exogenous of community characteristics, to explore a potential causal effect (Weaver and Lerman 2014b: 213). Comparisons between socio-demographically similar districts, placed into starkly different police precincts may uncover a causal effect.

Following Lerman and Weaver (2014a), then, the following section offers supplementary


evidence of policing’s effect on political participation, relying on a matching strategy to leverage potentially exogenous variation in levels of SQF policing across election districts as a function of the police precinct within which they reside. Like Weaver and Lerman (2014), I identify police precincts that rank “high” in stops, searches and frisks, and stops based on furtive movements if they rank in the top 50% of all precincts on these metrics. I then match districts falling within “high” precincts to districts falling in “low” precincts based on all available covariates and explore differences in voter-turnout rates.

Figure 4.1 displays the results, which offer some confirmation of the associational results presented in Tables 4.1 through 4.4. Consistent with these original findings, point estimates of the treatment effects of SQF policing suggest that concentrated policing had a positive effect on voter turnout in the 2008 general election and a negative effect in the 2010 national election. In the first case, the results are statistically distinguishable from zero and are consistent across all three measures of treatment, and in the second case they are significant for two out of three measures of treatment (the exception being the measure of treatment generated from furtive stopping rates). The matching procedure also estimates higher levels of turnout in the 2013 Democratic primary for Mayor in two out of the three measures of treatment, but the results are not statistically significant. Estimates of the treatment effect of policing on turnout in the 2013 general election are not consistent and flip direction depending on the measure of treatment. Like results from the Democratic primary, however, these results are indistinguishable from zero. Finally, estimated treatment effects from 2006 run counter to expectation, as the matching procedure estimates a positive treatment effect, but again results are not statistically significant.

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, the results presented here suggest that while policing can negatively affect political participation, it may not always do so: in electoral contexts which present communities with an opportunity to address the threat or harm constituted by policing, policed communities may mobilize to counter-act that harm. Specifically, the results uncover a negative relation-

Figure 4.1: Estimated Causal Effect of Police Exposure on Voter Turnout



Note: # $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

ship between stopping intensity and aggregate level turnout in the 2010 and 2006 midterm elections in New York City, but also uncover a positive association between policing intensity and voter turnout in the 2013 Democratic primary and municipal elections — which fielded candidates who advocated for significant reforms to SQF policing and who may have directly appealed to affected communities — and in the 2008 presidential election.

Additional analysis of the 2013 Democratic primary election offers additional evidence that policing can increase participation and engagement. Here the results demonstrate a positive association between the intensity of policing and the share of the Democratic primary vote received by the Democratic candidate most critical of SQF (John Liu). The results also demonstrate a negative association between stopping intensity and support for William Thompson who largely supported SQF. These findings offer an important counterweight to the conclusions made by Lerman and Weaver (2014b), who have argued that policing drives people away from state services and from civic or political engagement. They also supplement findings made by Walker (2014), who argued that the most likely form of political

mobilization against the harms of the criminal justice system will be non-electoral. The findings presented here suggest that while both may be true, policing can also be a driver of institutionally oriented electoral participation.

The finding that policed communities may mobilize to participate in electoral institutions echoes findings in the historical literature which have characterized the political strategies that groups have adopted to combat police abuse (see, for example Felker-Kantor's (2014) analysis of black political mobilization against police brutality in Los Angeles and Baers (2015) analysis of mobilization against police torture in Chicago). The evidence presented here — that such contestation also happens in the domain of electoral politics and that policing was a relevant issue in New York's 2013 Democratic primary for mayor — is consistent with their work. It is also consistent with reporting on the mobilizing strategy of the Black Lives Matter movement and other organizations oriented towards reducing police violence. These reports suggest that community groups have been active in several primary campaigns with significant implications for the criminal justice system at the local level, such as Anita Alvarez's campaign for public prosecutor in Chicago in 2016 (Alcindor 2016; Lulay 2016). Interestingly, the findings here suggest that Democratic primary voters were responsive prior to campaigns centered on the issue of police reform prior to the mobilization of the Black Lives Matter movement in 2014.

The analysis encountered a surprising, positive relationship between policing intensity and turnout in the 2008 presidential election, despite the fact that that year did not feature a candidate who campaigned on police reform or could have directly affected SQF policing in New York City. I speculate that this positive association may be explained by the mobilizing effect that Barack Obama had on African American and potentially other marginalized communities (Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015; Merolla et al. 2013). Specifically, I speculate that Barack Obama's candidacy could have conceivably raised political efficacy, trust, and engagement in policed communities or signaled changing opportunity structure. Even though it was unlikely that his election would lead to direct or immediate changes in SQF policing, policed communities may have viewed his race and/or his progressive policy platform as indicators that he would be a strong representative of their interests. At the same time, and

consistent with the literature on political opportunity structure, it may also be the case that policed communities reasoned or believed that election of a progressive African American president could lead to shifts in political opportunities, yielding substantive policy change down the line, at the municipal level, and related to policing (Kriesi 1995).⁵

The presence of Barack Obama on the ticket in 2008 may also explain the positive marginal effect of black share of the VTD on the positive relationship between policing and turnout in 2008. If Obama's candidacy mobilized policed communities or was perceived as an opportunity to indirectly affect the odds of changes in SQF policing, then this effect is likely to increase as black share of the population increases. As literature on black empowerment theory demonstrates, these heavily policed black and Latino communities may have been especially mobilized by his campaign (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015; West 2017).

The positive marginal effect of black and Latino share of the VTD on the relationship between policing on turnout in 2006 was similarly unanticipated. It may be the case, however, that the positive marginal effect of Latino share of the population on the relationship between policing and turnout in 2006 was a by-product of the large-scale immigration demonstrations and protests that occurred that year, which (as noted) increased levels of participation and engagement of Latinos (Barreto et al. 2009). Thus, while policing was negatively associated with turnout where no Latino's were present, the higher rates of efficacy and engagement produced by those mobilizations in Latino communities upset policing's demobilizing effect. What explains the positive marginal effect of black share of the population on the relationship between policing and turnout in 2006, however, remains a somewhat of a puzzle and may constitute an interesting site for future research.

The results giving the marginal relationship between race and candidate selection in the 2013 Democratic primary may be the most interesting and unanticipated. The results suggest a weakening in the relationship between stopping intensity and support for candidates with critical policy positions towards SQF as black and Latino share increases (and conversely,

⁵Obama's candidacy, for example, may have shifted white racial attitudes towards blacks (Goldman 2012).

more support for William Thompson, a moderate on the issue). This result may nevertheless reflect recognition among African Americans that black elected officials can secure less punitive criminal justice policies and less discriminatory criminal justice outcomes relative to white elected officials (Sharp 2014). Thus, despite Thompson’s articulated position on SQF and the criticism received from some black elites, heavily policed black and Latino communities in this instance simply may not have been convinced that Thompson would have perpetuated policing policies that harmed them, perhaps because of his race (Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015). Conversely, the credibility of De Blasio and Liu’s message to reform SQF may have been weaker in predominately African American and Latino communities, eroding the observed relationship between policing intensity and support for these candidates.

4.8 Appendix

Table 4.8: Spatial Error Model: Stops on 2010 Turnout

	Stops	Frisks & Searches	Force	Furtive Movements
Log(Stops)	−0.006*** (0.001)	−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.005*** (0.001)
Black	−0.010 (0.006)	−0.009 (0.006)	−0.014* (0.006)	−0.008 (0.006)
Latino	−0.034*** (0.007)	−0.033*** (0.007)	−0.034*** (0.007)	−0.032*** (0.007)
Non-citizen	0.104*** (0.008)	0.105*** (0.008)	0.104*** (0.008)	0.104*** (0.008)
Same House	0.116*** (0.017)	0.118*** (0.017)	0.114*** (0.017)	0.119*** (0.017)
Homeowner	0.036*** (0.007)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.036*** (0.007)
Log(Population)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.0002 (0.001)
Log(Income)	−0.0002 (0.003)	−0.0001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	−0.0002 (0.003)
Single Mother	−0.001*** (0.0001)	−0.001*** (0.0001)	−0.001*** (0.0001)	−0.001*** (0.0001)
Turnout '08	0.628*** (0.007)	0.626*** (0.007)	0.628*** (0.007)	0.627*** (0.007)
Constant	−0.127** (0.045)	−0.127** (0.045)	−0.141** (0.045)	−0.133** (0.044)
λ	.578	.579	.578	.578
N	5,530	5,491	5,147	5,458
Log Likelihood	8,788	8,732	8,242	8,708
AIC	−17,550	−17,437	−16,457	−17,391

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 4.9: Spatial Error Model: Stops on 2008 Turnout

	Stops	Frisks & Searches	Force	Furtive Movements
Log(Stops)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Black	0.079*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.005)	0.083*** (0.005)	0.078*** (0.005)
Latino	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)
Non-citizen	-0.070*** (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.010)	-0.070*** (0.010)	-0.073*** (0.010)
Same House	0.047* (0.019)	0.041* (0.018)	0.030 (0.019)	0.042* (0.018)
Homeowner	-0.042*** (0.007)	-0.043*** (0.007)	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.043*** (0.007)
Log(Population)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
Log(Income)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.004)
Single Mother	0.112*** (0.021)	0.112*** (0.021)	0.109*** (0.022)	0.113*** (0.021)
Turnout '06	1.178*** (0.009)	1.189*** (0.010)	1.198*** (0.010)	1.188*** (0.010)
Constant	-0.120* (0.048)	-0.095 (0.048)	-0.057 (0.050)	-0.102* (0.048)
λ	.512	.520	.498	.515
N	5,528	5,470	4,853	5,420
Log Likelihood	8,686	8,642	7,716	8,575
AIC	-17,347	-17,258	-15,406	-17,124

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 4.10: Spatial Error Model: Stops on 2006 Turnout

	Stops	Frisks & Searches	Force	Furtive Movements
Log(Stops)	−0.009*** (0.001)	−0.007*** (0.001)	−0.006*** (0.001)	−0.008*** (0.001)
Black	0.015 (0.011)	0.014 (0.011)	0.016 (0.010)	0.023* (0.011)
Latino	−0.106*** (0.013)	−0.102*** (0.013)	−0.101*** (0.013)	−0.104*** (0.013)
Non-citizen	−0.184*** (0.019)	−0.181*** (0.019)	−0.174*** (0.019)	−0.171*** (0.018)
Same House	0.136*** (0.029)	0.128*** (0.028)	0.183*** (0.028)	0.116*** (0.028)
Homeowner	−0.033* (0.013)	−0.022 (0.013)	−0.040** (0.013)	−0.019 (0.013)
Log(Population)	−0.011*** (0.002)	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.013*** (0.002)
Log(Income)	0.041*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.007)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.034*** (0.007)
Single Mother	0.026 (0.039)	0.021 (0.038)	−0.026 (0.038)	0.009 (0.038)
Constant	−0.139 (0.082)	−0.106 (0.080)	−0.171* (0.080)	−0.055 (0.080)
λ	.684	.685	.663	.696
N	5,502	5,284	4,183	5,216
Log Likelihood	6,455	6,379	5,349	6,398
AIC	−12,886	−12,733	−10,674	−12,771

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 4.11: Marginal Effect of % Black on Turnout

	2010	2008	2006	2013 Democratic Primary	2013 Mayoral General
Log(Stops)	0.97*** (0.96, 0.98)	1.02*** (1.01, 1.03)	0.94*** (0.92, 0.95)	1.02 (0.98, 1.06)	1.05** (1.02, 1.09)
Log(Stops)*Black	0.94*** (0.92, 0.97)	1.10*** (1.08, 1.12)	1.10*** (1.06, 1.14)	1.09 (0.99, 1.18)	1.05 (0.96, 1.15)
Black	1.18*** (1.14, 1.22)	1.37*** (1.34, 1.40)	1.48*** (1.41, 1.55)	0.75*** (0.66, 0.85)	1 (0.89, 1.13)
Hispanic	1.01 (0.96, 1.06)	1.08*** (1.03, 1.12)	1.28*** (1.18, 1.38)	0.57*** (0.49, 0.66)	0.66*** (0.58, 0.75)
Non-citizen	1.55*** (1.49, 1.61)	0.56*** (0.49, 0.62)	0.10*** (-0.06, 0.26)	—	—
Same House	3.03*** (2.90, 3.16)	1.06 (0.93, 1.18)	3.43*** (3.17, 3.68)	4.30*** (3.00, 6.17)	4.55*** (3.23, 6.41)
Homeowner	1.13*** (1.08, 1.17)	0.78*** (0.73, 0.82)	0.29*** (0.20, 0.38)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)
Log(Population)	0.99* (0.97, 1.00)	0.95*** (0.94, 0.96)	0.89*** (0.86, 0.91)	0.77*** (0.74, 0.80)	0.78*** (0.75, 0.81)
Log(Income)	0.98 (0.96, 1.01)	1.18*** (1.16, 1.20)	2.31*** (2.25, 2.36)	0.93* (0.88, 0.99)	0.97 (0.91, 1.02)
Single Mother	0.99*** (0.99, 0.99)	2.04*** (1.90, 2.18)	0.63** (0.28, 0.98)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)
Past Turnout	1.54*** (1.53, 1.55)	1.73*** (1.72, 1.73)	—	1.28*** (1.25, 1.31)	1.56*** (1.51, 1.62)
Share Democrat	—	—	—	13.64*** (9.92, 18.74)	10.27*** (7.44, 14.17)
Constant	0.16*** (0.11, 0.23)	0.20*** (0.15, 0.28)	0.00*** (0.00, 0.00)	0.15*** (0.06, 0.34)	0.18*** (0.08, 0.41)
Pseudo R^2	0.68	0.81	0.39	0.51	0.51
N	5,457	5,458	5,432	3,885	3,803

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4.12: Marginal Effect of % Latino on Turnout

	2010	2008	2006	2013 Democratic Primary	2013 Mayoral General
Log(Stops)	0.97*** (0.96, 0.98)	1.04*** (1.03, 1.05)	0.91*** (0.89, 0.92)	0.99 (0.95, 1.03)	1.05* (1.01, 1.09)
Log(Stops)* Latino	0.96** (0.93, 0.99)	1.01 (0.99, 1.04)	1.30*** (1.24, 1.35)	1.23*** (1.10, 1.38)	1.07 (0.96, 1.20)
Latino	1.06* (1.01, 1.11)	1.01 (0.97, 1.05)	1.17** (1.07, 1.26)	0.54*** (0.47, 0.62)	0.65*** (0.57, 0.74)
Black	1.17*** (1.13, 1.21)	1.36*** (1.33, 1.39)	1.52*** (1.46, 1.59)	0.78*** (0.69, 0.89)	1.02 (0.90, 1.15)
Non-citizen	1.54*** (1.48, 1.61)	0.56*** (0.49, 0.63)	0.10*** (-0.06, 0.26)	—	—
Same House	3.03*** (2.90, 3.17)	1.06 (0.94, 1.18)	3.09*** (2.83, 3.34)	4.21*** (2.94, 6.04)	4.52*** (3.21, 6.37)
Homeowner	1.13*** (1.08, 1.18)	0.77*** (0.73, 0.81)	0.29*** (0.21, 0.38)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)
Log(Population)	0.99 (0.98, 1.00)	0.95*** (0.94, 0.96)	0.88*** (0.86, 0.90)	0.77*** (0.74, 0.80)	0.78*** (0.75, 0.81)
Log(Income)	0.99 (0.96, 1.01)	1.17*** (1.14, 1.19)	2.28*** (2.23, 2.33)	0.93* (0.88, 0.99)	0.97 (0.91, 1.02)
Single Mother	0.99*** (0.99, 0.99)	2.29*** (2.15, 2.43)	0.68* (0.34, 1.02)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)
Past Turnout	1.54*** (1.53, 1.55)	1.73*** (1.72, 1.74)	—	1.28*** (1.25, 1.31)	1.56*** (1.50, 1.62)
Share Democrat	—	—	—	13.31*** (9.69, 18.28)	10.06*** (7.28, 13.89)
Constant	0.15*** (0.11, 0.21)	0.23*** (0.17, 0.33)	0.00*** (0.00, 0.00)	0.15*** (0.06, 0.35)	0.18*** (0.08, 0.42)
Pseudo R^2	0.68	0.81	0.4	0.51	0.51
N	5,457	5,458	5,432	3,885	3,803

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4.13: Marginal Effect of % Black on Candidate Choice

	Thompson	De Blasio	Liu
Log(Stops)	0.86*** (0.82, 0.89)	1.04** (1.02, 1.07)	1.42*** (1.35, 1.48)
Log(Stops)*Black	1.21*** (1.14, 1.28)	0.89*** (0.84, 0.95)	0.79** (0.61, 0.97)
Black	2.33*** (2.25, 2.42)	1.86*** (1.80, 1.91)	0.19*** (−0.02, 0.41)
Latino	1.75*** (1.65, 1.85)	0.93 (0.85, 1.01)	0.37*** (0.15, 0.58)
Same House	1.12 (0.83, 1.41)	0.76* (0.53, 1.00)	1.34 (0.74, 1.94)
Owner Occupied	1.00** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)
Log(Population)	0.94*** (0.90, 0.97)	0.98 (0.95, 1.01)	1.35*** (1.28, 1.42)
Log(Income)	0.97 (0.92, 1.01)	0.97 (0.94, 1.01)	1.09 (1.00, 1.18)
Single Mother	1.00** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)
Democratic Turnout ‘09	0.92*** (0.90, 0.94)	1.09*** (1.07, 1.10)	0.83*** (0.79, 0.88)
Thompson ‘09	1.47*** (1.29, 1.64)	—	—
De Blasio ‘09	—	3.78*** (3.66, 3.91)	—
Liu ‘09	—	—	1.55* (1.15, 1.95)
Constant	0.40** (0.21, 0.76)	0.72 (0.43, 1.21)	0.004*** (0.001, 0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.16	0.15	0.12
N	3,855	3,855	3,855

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4.14: Marginal Effect of % Latino on Candidate Choice

	Thompson	De Blasio	Liu
Log(Stops)	0.84*** (0.81, 0.88)	1.08*** (1.05, 1.10)	1.49*** (1.42, 1.57)
Log(Stops)*Latino	1.37*** (1.28, 1.46)	0.76*** (0.68, 0.84)	0.64*** (0.44, 0.85)
Latino	1.52*** (1.42, 1.62)	1.03 (0.94, 1.11)	0.43*** (0.21, 0.65)
Black	2.47*** (2.39, 2.56)	1.78*** (1.72, 1.83)	0.17*** (-0.03, 0.38)
Same House	1.12 (0.84, 1.41)	0.77* (0.53, 1.00)	1.41 (0.81, 2.01)
Homeowner	1.00*** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)
Log(Population)	0.94*** (0.90, 0.97)	0.98 (0.95, 1.01)	1.35*** (1.28, 1.42)
Log(Income)	0.96 (0.92, 1.01)	0.97 (0.94, 1.01)	1.09 (1.00, 1.18)
Single Mother	1.00** (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)	1.00 (1.00, 1.00)
Democratic Turnout '09	0.92*** (0.90, 0.94)	1.09*** (1.07, 1.10)	0.83*** (0.79, 0.88)
Thompson '09	1.43*** (1.25, 1.61)	—	—
De Blasio '09	—	3.89*** (3.76, 4.02)	—
Liu '09	—	—	1.56* (1.16, 1.96)
Constant	0.41** (0.21, 0.77)	0.71 (0.42, 1.19)	0.003*** (0.001, 0.01)
Pseudo R^2	0.16	0.15	0.12
N	3,855	3,855	3,855

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

CHAPTER 5

Policing and Political in London

This chapter explores the extent to which the relationship identified in the previous chapter unique to the United States. Chapter 3 documented the political consequences of OMP and considered the extent to which the punitive and discriminatory policing practices adopted in New York City affected the political behavior of affected communities. It found that like other experiences with the US criminal justice system (such as arraignment in court or time spent in jail or prison), sustained and involuntary interactions with police officers negatively affects political participation. Specifically, it found that neighborhoods where police contact was the most intense were significantly less likely to turnout to vote in some elections. At the same time, it found evidence that given the opportunity, or the favorable electoral contexts, heightened policing can lead to *higher* rates of political participation and engagement, specifically that when faced with an opportunity to significantly change policing in New York City, policing communities may mobilize to do so.

But to what extent does criminal justice contact affect political participation beyond the United States? As described in Chapter 2, punitive policing practices have migrated from the United States to other contexts, such as the United Kingdom. Here, the policing of anti-social behaviors and the deployment of stop and search powers show significant similarities to policing practices and programs in the United States and in New York City. Using publicly available data sets on policing and political participation in three large metropolitan areas, this chapter formally tests for an association between criminal justice exposure and political participation in a series of cross sectional binomial and panel fixed effect regression models. Results from cross sectional regressions suggest that neighborhoods that experience higher per capita stops evince lower levels of political participation. An additional series

of fixed effect panel regression models offer further evidence of this relationship and suggest that changes in the intensity of ASB policing over time produce expected changes in political participation as well. A final series of interaction models test the extent to which the identified relationship between policing intensity and political participation changes as Black, South Asian, and Muslim share of the population varies, and finds — contrary to the expectation that the demobilizing effect of policing will be more acute in minority neighborhoods — that as minority share of the population increases the negative relationships between policing and political participation generally decreases.

5.1 Hypothesis

The extant literature on the political consequences of policing or criminal justice contact on political behavior in the United Kingdom is virtually non-existent, but given the nature of ASB policing and the deployment of stop and search powers described in Chapter 2, we may reasonably expect that neighborhoods where these forms of policing are the most intense may exhibit lower levels of political engagement.

H1A: Neighborhoods that are more heavily policed by ASB policing will have lower aggregate rates of voter turnout

H1b: Neighborhoods that are more heavily policed by stop and search policing will have lower aggregate rates of voter turnout

As noted, however, the extant literature suggests that not all individuals or communities are policed equally, and specifically suggests that racial, ethnic, and religious communities experience more punitive forms of police contact, which may result in even lower levels of political participation. I therefore also hypothesize:

H2: As the share of the population that is Black, Asian, or Muslim increases, the negative impact of police intensity on political participation will also increase.

5.2 Methodology

To test for a relationship between policing and political participation, I again run a series of binomial regression models. As before, binomial regressions model how a set of explanatory covariates affect the number of ‘successes’ that occur in a series of Bernoulli trials. In this analysis, the binomial regressions model how policing intensity affects the number of eligible voters in a ward who turn out to vote.¹ Again, I follow Gelman and Hill (2006), and fit ‘quasibinomial’ models, which depart from standard binomial models by allowing for variance terms that do not equal the mean. To test how the relationship between policing and political participation varies by the minority share of the electoral ward (Hypothesis 2), I run binomial regression models which interact the share of the population that is Black, Asian, or Muslim with measures of police intensity.

In addition to the binomial regression models, I present the results from fixed effects panel regression models. Whereas the binomial regression models present the cross-sectional association between policing intensity and voter turnout, panel regression models present the association between policing intensity and ward level turnout over time, and here test whether increases in policing intensity are associated with reductions in turnout over time. The fixed effects specification adds a ‘dummy’ indicator variable for each ward, which has the additional benefit of capturing omitted, time invariant factors that are unique to each ward and potentially affect voter turnout.

5.3 Data

I mobilize available data from three large metropolitan areas in the United Kingdom to test the hypothesis, specifically Metropolitan London, Greater Manchester, and the West Midlands.² Collectively, these three regions account for approximately 25% of the British

¹Election wards are the smallest available unit for which voter turnout data is supplied and provide as fine grained as possible data on the relationship between police intensity and voter participation.

²The data, therefore, speak most directly to policing’s political consequences in England, though broad similarities in ASB policing and stop and search powers exist in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

population and, as a result, a large share of stop and searches and ASB policing (Millie 2008a). Robust data on the frequency and intensity of ASB policing and stop and search intensity is not uniformly available for these regions, however, so in the following analysis I present the relationship between ASB policing and voter turnout in Metropolitan London, and the relationship between stop and search and voter turnout in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands.

Data on the intensity of ASB policing and stop and search was drawn from a publicly available data set provided by the British government.³ The data contains records of police-citizen interactions from December 2010 to December 2016, and generally records the date of each stop, the longitude and latitude at which it occurred, and the crime category of the offense.⁴ For the analysis of ASB policing in London, I record only those crimes that are labelled as ‘anti-social behaviors.’ A separate data set offers similar information, but over fewer years, for police-citizen interactions stemming from stop and search.

Ward level voter turnout data and data on the size of the electorate was obtained from the Greater London Authority and from the British Electoral Commission.^{5,6} To overlap with data on policing intensity, I collect and analyze data from elections held in 2012, 2014, and 2016 in London, and held in 2015 and 2016 in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. Demographic data for each ward, used as control data, was also obtained from the Greater London Authority and from the Office of National Statistics.^{7,8}

³<https://data.police.uk/>

⁴As Tompson et al. (2014) have noted, publicly available police data are “geomasked” or anonymized, so that the recorded coordinates do not always correspond to where police-citizen contact occurred. This unfortunately introduces error in this measure. The authors find, however, that error is relatively low (between 5% and 10%) when crimes or instances of police-citizen contact are aggregated to the MSOA level, and further find that error decreases as the size of the unit of geography increases. This study aggregates police stops to the election ward level, which in the cities and counties analyzed here, are generally larger than the average size of the MSOA, so the error induced by this process of geomasking is likely to be low.

⁵<https://data.london.gov.uk/elections/>

⁶<http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data>

⁷<https://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/ward-profiles-and-atlas>

⁸<http://www.neighborhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/>

5.4 Variables

The focal independent variable for each model presented in the analysis is a yearly logged, per capital measure of the ASB policing/stop and search rate. Every encounter that occurred in the election year was geo-located to the electoral ward in which it occurred, and the aggregate number of each stops was calculated. The total number of stops was then divided by the population of the ward to get the stopping rate, which was then logged to account for skew.

As in Chapter 4, an additional set of control variables were included to control for aggregate level factors that have been included in prior studies on voter turnout, and which may otherwise explain voter turnout (see Geys 2006). Extant literature on the role of race and ethnicity on voter turnout has found both individual level variation in electoral participation among individuals from different racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, and variation by the ethnic composition of a neighborhood (Heath et. al 2013). Each regression therefore includes a measure of the share of the ward that are Afro-Caribbean, Black Africans, Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi, or Muslim. Each of these variables displayed a high degree of skew and were logged in the analysis.

Rational choice theories of electoral participation also predict that population size is inversely related to turnout, as the odds of casting a pivotal vote decreases as population size increases, decreasing the incentive to turn out to vote (Downs 1957). Denser urban communities may have also have less social solidarity and weaker social ties, reducing likelihood to turnout (McClurg 2003). I therefore include the (logged) ward-level population in the analysis. Resource mobilization theories of political participation suggest that individuals and communities with more wealth and education participate at higher rates than poorer and less educated individuals (McClurg 2003), so in the regressions, I proxy for socio-economic status using the average house price in the ward, the share of the ward that have Level 1 educational qualifications or less, and levels of unemployment.⁹ Relatedly, levels of ward level ‘social dysfunction’ or family instability may affect proclivity to engage in pro-social civic

⁹Ward level house value is only available for London.

or political activities such as voting, so I control for the share of families in each ward that are single parents. Finally, research suggests that home ownership gives individuals strong incentives to engage in the political process and suggests that individuals who are private renter are less invested in the outcome of elections (Fischel 2001). I therefore also control for the share of the population that are homeowners and those who are social renters. Since the Home Office only conducts Censuses every ten years, I use linear interpolation to estimate these control values for 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016.


5.5 Results

I first present descriptive maps of ASB policing and stop and search practices in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. Figure 5.1 displays the spatial distribution and intensity of ASB policing in Greater London. There is a clear concentration of ASB policing in the City of London and the surrounding downtown area, potentially due to the much higher day time populations in these areas or police incentives maintain perceptions of order, given their status as tourist, shopping, and entertainment destinations. Policing intensity is also generally higher in London’s inner or central boroughs compared to the outer boroughs. Stop and search policing in the West Midlands and Greater Manchester is also concentrated in the downtown city centers of Birmingham and Manchester respectively (both located near the center of their respective counties), though pockets more intense policing can be observed in other locations.¹⁰

I present the results from the first series of binomial regression models, which test for an association between ASB policing rates and voter turnout in the 2012 and 2016 Mayoral elections and the 2014 local government election in London, in Table 5.1. Table 5.1 presents the odds ratios associated with a unit change in the covariates and first differences associated

¹⁰The spatial concentration of ASB and stop and search policing in inner city or downtown wards may complicate the analysis, as stops in these areas may be of non-residents, which might not affect the political participation of local residents and voters. As a test of robustness and to address this issue, I present additional analysis that excludes these downtown wards in the Appendix. Results from this analysis are consistent with the results presented here.

Figure 5.1: Per Capita Intensity of ASB Policing in London



with each covariate. The odds ratios give the effect that a unit change in a covariate has on the odds of turning out in each ward, while the first differences give the estimated change in voter turnout that would occur if levels of a covariate are shifted from their minimum to maximum values. For example, in 2012, the first difference associated with ASB policing estimates the city-wide difference in voter turnout that would have occurred if levels of ASB policing in each ward were shifted from the lowest rates observed in the city that year (1% in Bromley-Shortlands) to the highest rate (31% in Westminster-St. James's).

The results suggest a moderate association between the policing of ASBs and city-wide turnout. Results from the analysis suggest that a unit increase in the (logged) per capita ASB rate is associated with a 4% reduction in the odds of turning out in 2012 and 2016, and a 5% reduction in 2014. The first difference values suggest that a hypothetical switch in the level of ASB policing in each ward from the city-wide minimum to maximum would have induced approximately a 3% reduction in the overall turnout rate in 2012 and 2016, and a 4% reduction in 2014.

Figure 5.2: Per Capita Intensity of ASB Policing in the Greater Manchester and the West Midlands




Table 5.1: Effect of ASB Policing on Voter Turnout in London

	2012	Δ	2014	Δ	2016	Δ
Log(ASB stops Per Capita)	0.96***	-2.9	0.95***	-4.0	0.96***	-3.0
	(0.93, 0.98)		(0.92, 0.97)		(0.95, 0.99)	
Log(Population)	0.98	-0.4	0.94**	-1.8	1.02	0.8
	(0.93, 1.04)		(0.89, 0.99)		(0.98, 1.07)	
Log(House Price)	0.96	-2.4	0.95*	-2.0	0.97	-1.6
	(0.91, 1.01)		(0.91, 1.00)		(0.92, 1.01)	
Homeowners	3.51***	11.2	1.70***	5.1	2.49***	9.1
	(2.72, 4.53)		(1.34, 2.15)		(2.01, 3.09)	
Social Renters	1.64***	6.3	1.06	0.8	1.22**	2.5
	(1.40, 1.93)		(0.91, 1.24)		(1.05, 1.41)	
Single Parent Family Households	0.63**	-2.5	0.59***	-3.1	0.61***	-3.1
	(0.40, 0.99)		(0.39, 0.87)		(0.44, 0.86)	
Level 1 Education or Below	0.33***	-8.9	0.75**	-2.4	0.27***	-10.6
	(0.26, 0.43)		(0.58, 0.96)		(0.22, 0.35)	
Unemployed	0.99	-0.5	1.11***	4.1	1.06**	2.3
	(0.92, 1.06)		(1.05, 1.18)		(1.00, 1.11)	
Black Caribbean	0.95***	-4.3	0.96***	-4.6	1.02***	3.4
	(0.93, 0.98)		(0.94, 0.98)		(1.01, 1.03)	
Black African	1.05***	4.7	1.00	0.6	0.97***	-4.9
	(1.04, 1.07)		(0.99, 1.01)		(0.95, 0.98)	
Indian	0.98***	-2.0	0.99	-0.7	0.98***	-2.2
	(0.96, 0.99)		(0.98, 1.01)		(0.97, 0.99)	
Pakistani	0.96***	-4.3	0.99	-0.9	0.97***	-3.7
	(0.95, 0.97)		(0.98, 1.01)		(0.96, 0.99)	
Bangladeshi	0.99	-1.0	1.01**	1.6	1.00	0.1
	(0.98, 1.00)		(1.00, 1.02)		(0.99, 1.01)	
Muslim	1.09***	7.2	1.00	0.3	1.06***	5.3
	(1.06, 1.12)		(0.98, 1.03)		(1.03, 1.08)	
Constant	0.53	-	1.22	-	0.56	-
—	(0.22, 1.29)	—	(0.52, 2.86)	—	(0.25, 1.25)	—
Pseudo R ²	0.52		0.36		0.56	
N	570		555		525	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. ASB: anti-social behavior

Other covariates largely behave as expected. Higher shares of single parent households, individuals with Level 1 qualifications or no qualifications at all, and individuals of Pakistani or Indian ethnic ancestry is associated with lower turnout rates. Afro-Caribbean share of the ward is associated with lower levels of voter turnout in 2012 and 2014, though positively associated with turnout in 2016. Population size is also negatively associated with voter turnout, but only in 2014. In contrast, greater shares of homeowners and social renters is strongly associated with higher turnout rates. Inconsistent with expectations, higher house prices are associated with lower turnout (in 2014), higher Muslim share of the population was associated with increased voter turnout (in 2012 and 2016), and unemployment share is positively associated with turnout (in 2014 and 2016). Bangladeshi share of the population is also positively associated with turnout, but only in 2014. Finally, the Black African share of the ward does not emerge as a consistent predictor of voter turnout rates across years.

Table 5.2 presents results from the series of binomial regressions which test for the relationship between (logged) per capita stop and search rates and voter turnout in the 2014 local level elections and the 2015 Parliamentary elections, in the West Midlands and Greater Manchester. Since wards in these two areas fall within somewhat disparate political authorities, so I include an additional dummy variable for the metropolitan borough that the ward falls in. Overall, the results are consistent with the relationship identified in Table 5.1, with more intense policing rates negatively associated with voter turnout, though the overall magnitude of the effect is weaker. Results from the model suggest that a unit increased in the logged stopping rate reduces the odds of turning out by 1% in 2015 and 2% in 2016 and estimates that a switch from the minimum to maximum stopping rate would have been associated with a 1.2% reduction in turnout in 2015 and a 2.6% reduction in turnout 2016. Patterns in the control values largely follow those uncovered in Table 5.1. Population size, single parent share of the population, share with low educational qualifications, and share Indian are associated with lower voter turnout levels, while share homeowner and social renters were positively associated with turnout. Again, contrary to expectation, the unemployed share of the population appears to be positively associated with voter turnout, as does Muslim share of the population (in 2015).

Table 5.2: Effect of Stop and Search on Voter Turnout in
Greater Manchester and the West Midlands

	2015	Δ	2016	Δ
Log(ASB Stops Per Capita)	0.99** (0.98, 1.00)	-1.2	0.98** (0.96, 1.00)	-2.6
Log(Population)	0.89*** (0.84, 0.94)	-3.7	0.94 (0.81, 1.10)	-1.6
Homeowners	1.83*** (1.69, 1.98)	11.2	2.33*** (1.87, 2.90)	12.2
Social Renters	1.29*** (1.15, 1.45)	3.0	1.31 (0.95, 1.81)	2.6
Single Parent Family Households	0.51*** (0.36, 0.72)	-2.6	0.20*** (0.08, 0.52)	-5.0
Level 1 Education or Below	0.47*** (0.42, 0.53)	-9.0	0.45*** (0.31, 0.64)	-7.6
% unemployed	1.03*** (1.01, 1.05)	2.1	1.08*** (1.03, 1.14)	4.7
Black Caribbean	1.00 (1.00, 1.01)	0.8	1.00 (0.98, 1.03)	0.0
Black African	1.00 (0.99, 1.01)	0.4	1.01 (0.98, 1.04)	1.4
Indian	0.99** (0.98, 1.00)	-1.4	0.98** (0.95, 1.00)	-3.1
Pakistani	0.99 (0.98, 1.00)	-1.2	1.01 (0.98, 1.05)	1.8
Bangladeshi	1.00 (1.00, 1.01)	0.3	1.01 (1.00, 1.03)	2.2
Muslim	1.02*** (1.01, 1.04)	3.4	1.04* (1.00, 1.10)	4.9
Constant	1.98** (1.09, 3.59)	—	0.73 (0.14, 3.72)	—
Borough FE?	Yes		Yes	
Pseudo R ²	0.76		0.61	
N	351		342	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. ASB: anti-social behavior

In Table 5.3, I present the results from additional fixed effects panel models, which present the relationship between per capita stopping intensity and voter turnout over time. The panel fixed models presented here test for the association between turnout and policing within a single unit over time, and therefore have the additional advantage of averaging out omitted or unmeasured ward level characteristics which may have been correlated with voter turnout in the binomial models presented in Table 5.1, but would have been incorrectly modelled in the error term, inducing bias to the regression coefficients. To correct for heteroskedasticity, the models estimate standard errors estimated at the ward level.

Table 5.3 presents three models. Model 1, presents the results from a panel fixed effects regression that only includes ward-level fixed effects. Model 2 adds additional year specific fixed effects, which control for year specific, city-wide trends in voter turnout that may have affected all wards equally. Model 3 presents the results from spatial panel fixed effect models, which additionally account for the potential effect of spatial auto-correlation on the results, i.e. the effect of unmeasured/omitted variables that act on wards similarly situated in space. Unlike in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the outcome modelled in these regressions is the simple turnout ratio, and the coefficients presented give the linear relationships between variables and the turnout ratio. The results presented in Table 5.3 are consistent with those presented in Table 5.1. Across all three model specifications, an increase in per capita ASB stopping rate from one year to the next is associated with a decrease in ward-level turnout rate. Direct estimates across models suggest that a 10% increase in the logged per capita stopping rate was associated with a between a .1% and a .4% reduction in aggregate voter turnout. The significance of the control variables varies across models. Across all three models an increase in the share of single parents was strongly associated with reductions in voter turnout over time. The models also estimate that increases in the population and in the unemployment rate was positively associated with voter turnout over time, but only in the first two models.

Table 5.3: Fixed Effect Panel Regression Models: ASB in London

	Model 1	Model 2	Model3
Log(ASB Stops Per capita)	-0.04*** (-0.05, -0.03)	-0.02*** (-0.03, -0.01)	-0.01*** (-0.02, -0.005)
Log(Population)	0.24*** (0.14, 0.33)	0.08** (0.003, 0.17)	0.02 (-0.04, 0.09)
Log(House Price)	-0.001 (-0.02, 0.02)	-0.07*** (-0.09, -0.05)	-0.01 (-0.02, 0.01)
Homeowners	0.16 (-0.15, 0.48)	-0.11 (-0.41, 0.20)	-0.14 (-0.44, 0.16)
Social Renters	-0.11 (-0.42, 0.19)	-0.02 (-0.30, 0.26)	0.05 (-0.18, 0.29)
Single parent Family households	-1.51*** (-1.97, -1.06)	-1.46*** (-1.87, -1.06)	-0.78*** (-1.21, -0.34)
Level 1 Education or Below	-0.35*** (-0.59, -0.11)	-0.06 (-0.28, 0.15)	0.05 (-0.19, 0.29)
Unemployment	0.23*** (0.16, 0.31)	0.11*** (0.05, 0.18)	0.03 (-0.03, 0.09)
Black Caribbean	0.003 (-0.003, 0.01)	0.01*** (0.003, 0.01)	0.001 (-0.001, 0.002)
Black African	-0.01*** (-0.02, -0.004)	-0.003 (-0.01, 0.003)	-0.003*** (-0.004, -0.001)
Indian	-0.02** (-0.04, -0.004)	-0.003 (-0.02, 0.01)	-0.003 (-0.02, 0.01)
Pakistani	0.01 (-0.01, 0.02)	0.02*** (0.004, 0.03)	-0.002 (-0.01, 0.002)
Bangladeshi	0.09** (0.02, 0.16)	-0.02 (-0.07, 0.03)	0.0004 (-0.05, 0.05)
Muslim	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.01)	-0.003 (-0.02, 0.02)	0.03*** (0.01, 0.05)
2014 Dummy	-	0.05*** (0.04, 0.06)	0.05*** (0.04, 0.05)
2016 Dummy	-	0.08*** (0.07, 0.10)	0.07*** (0.06, 0.09)
λ	-	-	0.76 (0.723, 0.797)
N	1,650	1,650	1,650

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. ASB: anti-social behavior

5.6 Interaction Models

While the overall results provide clear and compelling evidence that there is a negative association between policing intensity and political participation, it remains unclear whether all neighborhoods are equally affected, and specifically whether Black, Asian, and Muslim communities evince more demobilization from policing than others (Hypothesis 2). Results from interaction models run are unresponsive of this notion. Indeed, with one exception, the results suggest that as Black, Asian, and Muslim share of the population increases, the demobilizing effect of community level policing *diminishes*.

Turning first to the results from Greater London, Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 display the estimated marginal effect of Black, Asian, and Muslim share of the population on the relationship between ASB policing and ward-level turnout rates in 2016.¹¹ Direct estimates are given by the solid black line with 95% confidence intervals of the effect given in gray bands surrounding the line. As the figure depict, as the Black, Asian, or Muslim share of the electoral ward increases, the estimated effect of ASB policing on voter turnout decreases, eventually reaching the point where the models estimate that there is *no* relationship between ASB policing and ward-level turnout.

A somewhat similar pattern in the marginal effects can be observed in the analysis run on stop and search policing, though the models provide some evidence that the demobilizing effect of stop and search is more acute in predominately Black electoral wards. This is depicted in Figure 5.6, which shows that as the Black share of the electoral ward increases, the reduction in the odds of turning out to vote increases as well. This relationship is only statistically significant in the 2015 Parliamentary elections, however, and not in 2016. The estimated marginal effect of Asian and Muslim share of the electoral ward is opposite: as the Asian and Muslim share of the population increases, the negative effect of stop and search policing on ward-level political participation decreases, but only for the 2016 election and

¹¹I present graphs of these marginal effects rather tables to facilitate interpretation, as the estimated coefficients from binomial models with interactions is not as straight-forward. Table version of these results are available in the Appendix. I also only present results for the 2016 election results for parsimony, but the findings presented in the main text are consistent across all elections. Results from these election years are also available in the Appendix

Figure 5.3: Marginal Effect of Black Share of the Election Ward on Estimated Coefficient (ASB)




Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of Asian Share of the Election Ward on Estimated Coefficient (ASB)





Figure 5.5: Marginal Effect of Muslim Share of the Election Ward on Estimated Coefficient (ASB)



not for the 2015 Parliamentary elections.

Figure 5.6: Marginal Effect of Black Share of the Election Ward on Estimated Coefficient (Stop and Search)




Figure 5.7: Marginal Effect of Asian Share of the Election Ward on Estimated Coefficient
(Stop and Search)





Figure 5.8: Marginal Effect of Muslim Share of the Election Ward on Estimated Coefficient
(Stop and Search)



5.7 Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, the results suggest that criminal justice contact in the United Kingdom does exert a negative influence on political participation. Both the policing of ASBs and the use of stop and search powers are associated with lower levels voter turnout in the three major metropolitan areas studied here. First differences generated from binomial regression models of ASB policing in London put the effect of policing intensity on ward level voter turnout on the same level as other important determinants of aggregate level voter turnout, such as home value prices, the share of households in the ward that are single parents, or the racial composition of the ward. Results from binomial regression models of stop and search policing in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands, as well fixed-effect panel regression models, show a more modest, yet nevertheless confirmatory relationship.

The most surprising and unanticipated finding was the positive marginal effect of Black, Asian, and Muslim share of the electoral ward on the relationship between ASB policing in London, and the positive marginal effect of Asian and Muslim share of the electoral ward on the relationship between stop and search policing and voter turnout in Greater Manchester and West Midlands. The demobilizing effect of policing on political participation weakened as the share of the electoral ward belonging to one of these groups increased. With the exception of the negative marginal effect of Black share of the population on the relationship between stop and search policing, these results depart from expectations. There are several potential explanations for this pattern. First, the finding that Black share of the population exerts a negative marginal effect on the relationship between stop and search policing but a positive marginal effect in regard to ASB in Greater London could reflect important differences in the qualitative experience and overall legitimacy of the two practices. Specifically, stop and search policing in Black communities in Greater Manchester and the West Midlands may be more punitive, intrusive, and alienating than it is in other communities in those regions, and more punitive and alienating than ASB policing in Black communities in London. This would be consistent with the historic mal-affect that stop and search policing has had in Black British communities, but suggests that stop and search policing and ASB policing are

experienced different in predominately Black communities.

The positive marginal effect observed in Greater London and in Greater Manchester/West Midlands among Muslims and Asians could be the result of mobilization on the part of some members of minority communities, who may be welcoming of the police and approve of the enhanced policing of their communities. Insofar as minority communities tend to suffer higher rates of crime and disorder, higher rates of ASB or stop and search policing (in Asian and Muslim communities) may increase police legitimacy, collective efficacy, or social solidarity and thereby political participation. Unfortunately, the aggregate-level data used in this analysis cannot test for this explicitly. Future work, utilizing individual-level data, may want to further explore how different members of different communities experience ASB and stop and search policing, and its secondary effects on political behavior. Such data would overcome another important limitation of this study: that it explores the relationship between where stops *occur* and voter turnout, not the relationship between where stopped individuals *live* and voter turnout.

5.8 Appendix

Table 5.4: London Binomial Regressions (White Interaction)

	2012	2014	2016
Log(ASB Stops Per Capita)	0.96*** (0.93, 0.99)	0.95*** (0.93, 0.98)	0.97*** (0.95, 0.99)
White	0.91* (0.81, 1.02)	1.02 (0.93, 1.11)	0.91*** (0.85, 0.97)
Log(Population)	0.96 (0.91, 1.02)	0.93** (0.88, 0.98)	1.00 (0.95, 1.05)
Log(House Price)	0.98 (0.93, 1.03)	0.97 (0.92, 1.02)	0.99 (0.94, 1.04)
log home owners	3.34*** (2.59, 4.29)	1.65*** (1.30, 2.09)	2.44*** (1.97, 3.01)
log social renters	1.58*** (1.34, 1.85)	1.03 (0.88, 1.21)	1.14* (0.98, 1.33)
single parent	0.59** (0.38, 0.92)	0.60** (0.40, 0.90)	0.61*** (0.43, 0.84)
level 1 education level or below	0.36*** (0.28, 0.47)	0.76** (0.59, 0.98)	0.30*** (0.24, 0.39)
Unemployment	0.96 (0.89, 1.03)	1.11*** (1.04, 1.19)	1.03 (0.97, 1.08)
Black Caribbean	0.96*** (0.94, 0.98)	0.96*** (0.94, 0.98)	1.02*** (1.01, 1.03)
Black African	1.05*** (1.04, 1.07)	1.01 (1.00, 1.01)	0.97*** (0.96, 0.99)
Indian	0.97*** (0.95, 0.99)	1.00 (0.98, 1.02)	0.97*** (0.96, 0.99)
Pakistani	0.96*** (0.94, 0.97)	0.99 (0.98, 1.00)	0.97*** (0.96, 0.98)
Bangladeshi	0.99* (0.98, 1.00)	1.01** (1.00, 1.03)	1.00 (0.99, 1.01)
Muslim	1.09*** (1.06, 1.12)	1.00 (0.97, 1.03)	1.04*** (1.02, 1.07)
ASB Stopts per capita *White	0.82*** (0.74, 0.90)	0.93* (0.86, 1.00)	0.91*** (0.86, 0.96)
Constant	0.55 (0.23, 1.33)	1.39 (0.59, 3.26)	0.54 (0.24, 1.19)
Pseudo R^2	0.5	0.36	0.55
N	568	553	523

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 5.5: London Binomial Regressions (Black Interaction)

	2012	2014	2016
Log(ASB Stops Per Capita)	0.97** (0.94, 1.00)	0.95*** (0.92, 0.97)	0.97*** (0.95, 0.99)
Black	1.03*** (1.01, 1.06)	0.97*** (0.95, 0.99)	1.00 (0.98, 1.02)
Log(Population)	0.95* (0.90, 1.01)	0.93*** (0.88, 0.98)	0.99 (0.95, 1.04)
Log(House Price)	0.97 (0.92, 1.02)	0.95** (0.90, 0.99)	0.97 (0.93, 1.02)
log home owners	3.64*** (2.80, 4.72)	1.77*** (1.40, 2.24)	2.66*** (2.15, 3.30)
log social renters	1.38*** (1.17, 1.63)	1.04 (0.89, 1.21)	1.06 (0.92, 1.22)
single parent	0.74 (0.47, 1.18)	0.68* (0.45, 1.01)	0.78 (0.55, 1.10)
level 1 education level or below	0.33*** (0.26, 0.43)	0.74** (0.58, 0.95)	0.29*** (0.23, 0.37)
Unemployment	0.89*** (0.83, 0.96)	1.05 (0.98, 1.12)	0.97 (0.92, 1.03)
White	0.89*** (0.85, 0.93)	0.93*** (0.90, 0.97)	0.90*** (0.87, 0.93)
Indian	0.95*** (0.93, 0.96)	0.98** (0.96, 1.00)	0.95*** (0.94, 0.97)
Pakistani	0.96*** (0.95, 0.98)	1.00 (0.98, 1.01)	0.98*** (0.97, 0.99)
Bangladeshi	0.98*** (0.97, 1.00)	1.01** (1.00, 1.02)	0.99 (0.98, 1.00)
Muslim	1.09*** (1.06, 1.13)	0.99 (0.97, 1.02)	1.05*** (1.02, 1.08)
ASB Stops per capita *Black	1.03** (1.00, 1.05)	1.00 (0.98, 1.02)	1.01 (0.99, 1.03)
Constant	0.49 (0.20, 1.19)	1.64 (0.71, 3.76)	0.58 (0.27, 1.25)
Pseudo R^2	0.5	0.36	0.55
N	568	568	566

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 5.6: London Binomial Regressions (Asian Interaction)

	2012	2014	2016
ASB stops per capita	0.96** (0.94, 0.99)	0.95*** (0.93, 0.98)	0.97*** (0.95, 0.99)
Asian	0.93*** (0.91, 0.96)	0.98* (0.95, 1.00)	0.93*** (0.91, 0.96)
Log(Population)	0.97 (0.91, 1.02)	0.92*** (0.87, 0.97)	0.99 (0.95, 1.04)
Log(House Price)	1.00 (0.95, 1.06)	0.98 (0.93, 1.03)	1.01 (0.97, 1.07)
log home owners	3.67*** (2.85, 4.74)	1.65*** (1.32, 2.08)	2.37*** (1.92, 2.92)
log social renters	1.83*** (1.55, 2.15)	1.06 (0.90, 1.24)	1.22** (1.05, 1.41)
single parent	0.78 (0.50, 1.23)	0.59*** (0.40, 0.87)	0.69** (0.50, 0.97)
level 1 education level or below	0.32*** (0.24, 0.41)	0.81* (0.63, 1.04)	0.29*** (0.23, 0.37)
unemployment	0.95 (0.88, 1.02)	1.09*** (1.02, 1.16)	1.02 (0.97, 1.08)
Black Caribbean	0.97** (0.95, 0.99)	0.97*** (0.95, 0.99)	1.02*** (1.01, 1.03)
Black African	1.05*** (1.03, 1.06)	1.00 (0.99, 1.01)	0.98** (0.96, 1.00)
White	0.93*** (0.89, 0.98)	0.96** (0.92, 1.00)	0.93*** (0.89, 0.96)
Muslim	1.05*** (1.02, 1.08)	1.01 (0.98, 1.03)	1.04*** (1.01, 1.06)
ASB Stops per capita *Asian	1.03** (1.00, 1.06)	1.02* (1.00, 1.05)	1.02* (1.00, 1.05)
Constant	0.45* (0.18, 1.11)	1.27 (0.54, 2.99)	0.47* (0.21, 1.05)
Pseudo R^2	0.5	0.36	0.55
N	568	553	524

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 5.7: London Binomial Regressions (Muslim Interaction)

	2012	2014	2016
ASB stops per capita	0.97** (0.94, 0.99)	0.95*** (0.93, 0.98)	0.97** (0.95, 0.99)
Muslim	1.00 (0.98, 1.02)	0.99 (0.97, 1.01)	0.99 (0.98, 1.01)
Log(Population)	0.97 (0.92, 1.03)	0.93*** (0.88, 0.98)	1.00 (0.96, 1.05)
Log(House Price)	1.04 (0.99, 1.10)	0.99 (0.94, 1.04)	1.05** (1.01, 1.11)
log home owners	3.22*** (2.49, 4.15)	1.57*** (1.25, 1.96)	2.11*** (1.71, 2.61)
log social renters	1.78*** (1.51, 2.10)	1.05 (0.89, 1.23)	1.21** (1.03, 1.41)
single parent	0.91 (0.58, 1.43)	0.62** (0.42, 0.91)	0.80 (0.57, 1.11)
level 1 education level or below	0.33*** (0.25, 0.43)	0.83 (0.64, 1.06)	0.31*** (0.24, 0.40)
unemployment	0.98 (0.91, 1.05)	1.10*** (1.03, 1.17)	1.04 (0.98, 1.09)
Black Caribbean	0.97** (0.95, 1.00)	0.97*** (0.95, 0.99)	1.02*** (1.02, 1.03)
Black African	1.06*** (1.04, 1.07)	1.00 (0.99, 1.01)	0.98* (0.97, 1.00)
White	0.99 (0.95, 1.03)	0.97 (0.94, 1.01)	0.97** (0.94, 1.00)
ASB Stopts per capita *Muslim	1.05*** (1.03, 1.08)	1.02* (1.00, 1.04)	1.04*** (1.02, 1.06)
Constant	0.26*** (0.11, 0.63)	1.06 (0.47, 2.38)	0.26*** (0.12, 0.55)
Pseudo R^2	0.5	0.36	0.55
N	568	553	524

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

6.1 Review of Findings

To review, this dissertation explored the causes of consequences of contemporary policing practices focusing particular attention on order maintenance policing in New York City and London. In the first set of analyses, this dissertation argued that that policing policy can be actively mobilized by local elites in the service of municipal growth and economic policies, and demonstrated the impact that gentrification at the local level can exert of order maintenance policing strategies, specifically the Stop, Question, and Frisk police tactic in New York City. Substantively, the analysis uncovered a large affect, such that gentrification was associated with a large increase in the per capita intensity of SQF policing. Results from spatial Durbin modeling procedures suggest that the effect is largely “indirect” such that gentrification in one neighborhood is associated with significantly more SQF stops in nearby neighborhoods, which suggest that officers may be engaged in “boundary” making/maintaining policing or even “preparing” adjacent neighborhoods for gentrification. These results are consistent to the inclusion of crime and 311 calls for police services.

Importantly, this dissertation also addressed the political impact that such policing can have on the political behavior in affected communities. Extending the literature on the political consequences that other forms of contact with the criminal justice system can have on political behavior and extant literature on the impact that police contact has on legal attitudes and life outcomes, this dissertation argued that we should be concerned with the political consequences that policing practices such as SQF can have. Testing for an effect

in New York City, Chapter 4 explored the impact that concentrated SQF policing had on voter turnout in a series of national and municipal elections. Findings here importantly demonstrated that while concentrated policing *can* exert a negative impact on voter turnout, policed communities can mobilize to counter-act these negative effects, particularly when presented with favorable electoral contexts and opportunities to do so. More specifically, it found that in a local Democratic primary election, where reform of SQF policing became a central campaign issue, the intensity of SQF policing was strongly associated with support for the candidate who advocated getting rid of SQF and substantially less support for the candidate who advocated for keeping the program.

Finally, this article presented empirical evidence that the political impact of concentrated police contact is not limited to the United States, but may generalize across contexts. More specifically, it explored the political consequences that certain British policing practices — namely the policing of anti-social behaviors and the deployment of stop and search powers — had on voter turnout in national and local elections. The findings largely mirrored the findings from New York City and the United States, and although the overall magnitude of the effect was significantly smaller, the results nevertheless suggest that concentrated neighborhood policing can exert a negative effect on political participation.

6.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Work

This dissertation suffered from some limitations, however, that will be addressed in later work. First, is the lack of identification of causal mechanisms. The cross-section results presented in Chapter 1 do not offer proof positive, or definitive causal evidence that elites are driving municipal policing policies and practices. Despite the findings that indicators of gentrification are positively and strongly associated with higher levels of order maintenance policing, net local demand, calls for service, or levels of crime, the models presented in Chapter 1 do not uncover direct evidence that specific municipal elites or leaders direct police officers to neighborhoods in the city.

The extent literature offers some pathways through which this effect could occur. Sharp

(2013), for example, suggests that local mayors in municipalities experiencing gentrification may specifically seek to hire police chiefs who advocate for aggressive OMP strategies. Here, the case of New York City again is illustrative, as Vitale (2008) describes precisely this phenomenon occurring: former mayor Rudy Giuliani (running on a political platform of law and order) specifically selected Bill Bratton to implement OMP in New York City and as did former mayor James Hahn in Los Angeles. As Vitale (2008) describes, however, Giuliani was also vigorously supported by a coalition of constituents including property developers and business owners. So while mayors may select leaders who then give marching orders to beat cops, the effect of gentrification on policing could work through elites with an interest in revitalization and gentrification who mobilize to increase the odds of selecting a mayor who will in turn select police leaders who enact OMP policies. Blasi (2007) and Gibson (2004) outline slightly different mechanism, where local city council members simultaneously place pressure on the mayor and heads of police agencies to enforce OMP in their political jurisdictions.

At the same time, we might consider officer behavior, independent of the marching orders they are given by commanders. Extant studies have found that officers consider context when making stops, and may be more likely to stop pedestrians and motorists when they are “out of place” or in contexts that officers do not believe they belong (e.g. young African men walking or driving in predominately white neighborhoods) (Novak and Chamlin 2008). The pattern may have little to do with elites and may largely be a symptom of officer biases and perceptions.

Identification of mechanism was also an issue in the analyses presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Despite the range of controls that were included in each of those regressions, the use of matching analysis, and the use of spatial-temporal models, questions about causal mechanism linger. Future work may address these causal questions through use of exogenous shocks to policing or spatial discontinuities introduced by police boundaries.

The second key concern is scope: how broadly do these results generalize. While gentrification has been pursued in cities throughout America, and Sharp (2013) does give evidence of the post-industrial policing hypothesis in medium sized cities, we might nevertheless be interested in the extent to which these city level findings generalize beyond New York City.

Future work may also be interested in the implications of these findings in contexts where gentrification/revitalization are simply not feasible or are not pursued. For example, to what extent do the findings presented here generalize to suburban space, and are there identifiable differences in the relationship between policing and political economy in majority white suburbs, majority-minority suburbs, and exurbs? Extant case studies have suggested the policing in regions with severe levels of municipal fragmentation, such as Saint Louis, Missouri and parts of California are more likely to rely on predatory and extractive forms of policing to keep what otherwise would be failing cities and suburbs financially afloat. To what extent do these patterns generalize?

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