

The Making of a Hemispheric Intellectual-Statesman: Leo S. Rowe in Argentina (1906–1919)

RICARDO D. SALVATORE

He [Leo Rowe] attended conferences; repeatedly visited the Latin American countries; planned the activities of the Union; had intimate relations with all the political leaders of the Hemisphere; served as a leading exponent of the most friendly inter-American relations; and for nearly a half of a century was an active participant of good neighborliness towards the peoples of the south of the Río Grande.

—Roscoe R. Hill

The mission of an intellectual-statesman of a commercially and technologically dominant nation is double: to gather sufficient information to generate valid generalizations about the peripheries he/she visits, and to establish the superiority of his/her own culture and society. He/she has to persuade and collect, inquire and advise. In his quest for knowledge—a quest informed by disciplinary concerns as well as by individual trajectories—the neocolonial intellectual-statesman engages the local intelligentsia in seeking information, collaboration, and stimulation.¹ This interaction reinforces, corrects, but rarely rejects, imperial ideas, i.e., generalizations about law, politics, societies, and cultures that help to envision and construct the center's supranational sovereignty. Imperial ideas disseminate faster in the periphery when assisted by local intellectuals. The hegemonic work of an empire is usually mediated by local intellectuals, particularly those in control of crucial institutions in the fields of education, law, government, and culture. Intellectual exchanges seem more determinant or crucial in an informal empire, one not perturbed by the imperatives of territorial control, racial domination, or direct administration.

Recently, there has been a growing interest in studying the origins of the US empire, particularly from a cultural perspective. The influence of United States discourses about progress, civilization, democratization, and hygiene has been particularly pervasive in Latin American societies, governments, and cultures, though the question of US hegemony in the region continues to be debated.² The recent attention in the field of American Studies to the flows of cultures and “Americanization” in the hemisphere promises to bring together approaches to the history of inter-American relations that have hitherto remained segmented and without much cross-fertilization.³ My work concerns the intersection between knowledge and informal empire, in particular as it refers to representations of South America by United States scholars in the early twentieth century. Except for isolated efforts, scholars have paid little attention to the crucial role of knowledge-producers in envisioning the great areas of domination and hegemony.⁴

This article focuses on a US intellectual turned imperial statesman: Leo Stanton Rowe, the director of the Pan-American Union during a twenty-six year period (1920–1946). During the McKinley administration, Rowe was appointed to codify the laws of Puerto Rico, work he completed in 1902. In 1906, he traveled to Brazil as the US delegate to the Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, accompanying Secretary of State Elihu Root. In 1908, he was the chairman of the US delegation to the Pan American Scientific Congress at Santiago, Chile. After this, he traveled frequently and extensively throughout Latin America, building connections with prominent statesmen and intellectuals in the region. In 1917, President Wilson appointed him to the Treasury Department to advise on financial policies toward Latin America. In 1919, he was promoted to Chief of the newly created Latin American Division of the Department of State. The following year he accepted the directorship of the Pan American Union, succeeding John Barrett. He remained in this position until his death in December 1946.

A year before his death, at the celebration of his twenty-five years of service at the PAU, Rowe was granted the distinction of “First Citizen of All the Americas.” Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, writing about Rowe’s career, presented him as the US citizen who did most to foster “the cause of inter-American friendship, understanding and solidarity.”⁵ Before his tenure, Latin American nations were annoyed by their exclusion from the Paris Peace Conference, showed great indignation for the US interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and felt threatened by the economic power of the Colossus of the North. Rowe, according to Welles, managed to dissipate those fears and animosities, by promoting the principle of equal sovereignty of all the American states, much before President Franklin Delano Roosevelt launched his Good Neighbor policy in 1933. In addition, Rowe turned the PAU into a “clearing house of information” for all the Americas, rendering a valuable service to both scholars and businessmen: “under his direction the Pan American Union became a great clearing house for authoritative information covering every aspect of the political, economic, social and cultural life of the twenty-

one American Republics. It also became what it should be, a meeting ground for all citizens of the nations of the Western Hemisphere” (366).

His knowledge on public policies, urban government, and constitutional law positioned Rowe as an intellectual who could be consulted by the US government on questions of foreign policy. His services as a “colonial officer” in Puerto Rico and Panama transformed him into an expert in Latin America. An important publication record gave him the attention of US progressive scholars as a regional expert. Rowe, together with Paul Reinsch, published the first works on Latin American politics known in the United States.⁶ In *The United States and Porto Rico* (1904), Rowe summarized his impressions and reflections about the US colonial government in Puerto Rico. This work was followed by *Problems of City Government* (1908), a book emphasizing the new problems facing municipalities as a result of increased populations and increased demand for public utilities. As a result of his investigations in Latin American finance, Rowe published in 1918 *The Early Effects of the European War upon the Finance, Commerce and Industry of Chile*. In 1920, he published a comprehensive study of Argentine constitutional government, *The Federal System of the Argentine Republic*. Both as a scholar in Philadelphia and later as a statesman in Washington, Rowe was very influential. In addition to presiding over the American Academy of Political and Social Science, he was a founding member of the American Society for International Law. Edward Silva and Sheila Slaughter included Rowe as one of the progressive social scientists who cooperated with the US government in its imperial adventures.⁷

During his tenure as director of the PAU, Leo Rowe promoted the idea of “intellectual cooperation” between the two Americas. The Americas, he thought, shared similar histories, institutions, and ideals. Achieving actual cooperation in the economic, institutional, and cultural spheres required the engagement of leading scholars and statesmen from both Anglo and Spanish America. If intellectuals cooperated with each other in the dissemination of a common worldview, Pan-Americanism would be able to attain—sooner and peacefully—its goals of commerce, peace, and solidarity. Between 1906 and 1919, Rowe traveled frequently to South America, trying to understand the mentality of the region’s “leading classes.” In his many encounters with local intellectuals, he preached the gospel of constructive Pan-Americanism and, while doing so, “discovered” the mechanics of “intellectual cooperation.”⁸

Between 1906 and 1919, before he became director of the Pan American Union, Rowe established close relations with members of the Argentine intelligentsia. Two extended terms at the University of La Plata (1906 and 1908), active participation in three Pan-American Congresses (Rio in 1906, Santiago in 1908–1909, and Buenos Aires in 1910), a series of public conferences, and various publications in Spanish gave him notoriety and a reputation in local intellectual circles. Important academic journals of Argentina put his ideas at the disposal of a wider readership. Rowe was sufficiently known at the time as to generate

commentary and inspire scholarly works. Immersed in Argentine intellectual circles, he absorbed a series of political problems discussed locally, turning them into useful information about Argentine government and politics.⁹

Rowe's propositions about the new scenario for hemispheric relations, about the tensions between political centralization and democratic local governments, and about the importance of practical-scientific education circulated in Argentina through a small network of local intellectuals. US hegemony in South America—imagined Rowe—had to work through networks of local intellectuals, chiefly because these intellectuals controlled or had privileged access to the means of representation. This is one of the main questions that this essay examines: how a scholar who collaborated at first with the US formal empire in the Caribbean became a promoter of Pan-Americanism, the chief rhetoric of the US informal empire. A second issue relates to the question of imperial hegemony. Hegemony does not necessarily mean replication or acceptance of the same. It is rather a selective adaptation of a set of principles, value norms, and ideas emanated from the imperial center. More than a compact and homogeneous set of fixed propositions, hegemony works through a number of variations, adaptations, and differences that stretch the truth-claims and norms presented by the hemispheric hegemon.

This paper examines the resonance of Rowe's published works and speech acts on the Argentine intelligentsia. It attempts to evaluate the degree of influence that Rowe was able to exert among local intellectual circles. Displaced to a local context, Rowe's publications and speeches generated a series of reactions. The Pennsylvania political scientist brought to Argentina some propositions about municipal government, the role of public opinion in modern democracies, the new problems posed by business monopolies and organized labor, the new role of the United States in the international arena, and the possibilities of Pan-American cooperation. Argentine intellectuals repositioned their nation in relation to this new rhetoric and these ideas. In the proximity of this high-ranking member of the US intelligentsia, local intellectuals were forced to revise their putative Europeism, reconsider the advantages of Pan-Americanism, and relocate Argentina's identity and role within the new parameters suggested by the US hegemon—international law, democratic governance, and research universities.

The ways his ideas were interpreted, dealt with, and contested are at the center of this essay. By contextualizing the process of enunciation and diffusion of Rowe's discourse, and by paying close attention to the networks of intellectuals who interacted with the US scholar, I follow the program of study and the methodology we suggested in *Close Encounter of Empire* (1998): to read the persuasive invitation of the empire within the context of micro-interactions involving "foreigners" and "locals," to pay attention to local voices in order to better understand the discourse of the dominant. Our earlier collective tried to underscore the mutually constitutive nature of identity in imperial encounters. Here an emphasis is added: the importance

of local networks of intellectuals in facilitating the reception and interpretation of a central, imperial, potentially hegemonic discourse.

Pan-Americanism, the discourse of US hegemony regulating the special relationship between the US and the South-American republics, acquired its full meaning and mechanics of implementation only in contact with local/national intellectuals. In Argentina, a group of prominent scholars and statesmen processed, adapted, and recirculated the ideas emerging from US intellectual and policy circles. Conversely, the imperial intellectual-statesman borrowed from the work of local intellectuals much of what was specific and particular to Argentine political and constitutional history. Rowe's representations of Argentine government built upon an existing body of local knowledge: the comparative history of constitutional law and government. As ideas circulated in both directions, it is not surprising to find a certain convergence of positions between foreign and local intellectual circles. Thus, it becomes easier to understand why hegemonic discourses such as Pan-Americanism generated so little local resistance.

The Visitor and the Locals

Though much could be said about Leo S. Rowe's career, I just want to emphasize a few points. First, Rowe had prior experience in colonial administration. As a result of this, he formed a position about the role of the United States in the international arena. Before coming to South America, he had worked on the revision of the legal codes of Puerto Rico (1900–1902) and had been a member of the Land Claims Commission of Panama (1913–1914). He derived from this experience an important lesson in imperial governance: US protectorates helped to perfect the institutions of “American government” by opening up new questions about sovereignty, procedures, citizenship, and rights. The US occupation of Puerto Rico was secured by a legal-constitutional structure at home, while abroad the occupation authorities provided the means for bringing these territories closer to “American” ideals of government. Only that Spanish political culture (manifested in family feuds, paternal leadership, and violent party confrontations) presented great obstacles to the learning of self-government. Early on in his career, Rowe was convinced that the United States had to teach “self-government” to the populations of Hispanic America.

Secondly, much before he was appointed director of the Pan American Union, Rowe was a scholar of ample prestige and good political connections. He was a professor of law and government at the University of Pennsylvania from 1896 to 1917. He served as president of the American Academy of Political and Social Science from 1902 to 1930. On several occasions he was consulted by US presidents (McKinley, Taft, Wilson) about foreign policy issues. His research interests, while diverse, were focused on certain topics: municipal government, constitutional law and government, Latin American progress, and university education.

Third, his travels to South America served to modify his views about the region, and he gradually assigned to the ABC republics (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) a co-civilizing role in collaboration with the United States. To this extent, he anticipated the assumptions of the Good Neighbor policy. His vision of inter-American relations and his theory of intellectual cooperation developed out of his encounter with the ABC countries. His trip to Rio de Janeiro in 1906, then to Argentina in 1907, and then to Chile in 1908–1909, were crucial for the development of his new imperial vision and knowledge. From then on, the State Department started to consider the collaboration with South American intellectual elites necessary, if not crucial, for the establishment of friendly and enduring inter-American relations.

Rowe went to the University of La Plata (UNLP) as a scholar representing the University of Pennsylvania in what was, perhaps, the first experiment in university exchanges between Argentina and the United States. The university granted him an honorary doctorate on October 30, 1906. He was invited and introduced to Argentine intellectual circles by Joaquín V. González, one of the leading scholars and literati of this generation, the founder of the University of La Plata, and its president between 1906 and 1915. Rowe took residence at the National College's *Internado*, perhaps one of the few institutions in the country that resembled an American college. Rodolfo Rivarola, then dean of the university's law school, put Rowe in contact with Argentine law students. In Rowe's second trip to Argentina, he found himself in the company of a distinguished Spanish professor, Adolfo Posada, who was delivering a seminar on political science.¹⁰ He gathered from Posada, who had been sent by the Spanish government to spread the idea of Pan-Hispanism, that to gain US hegemony in Argentina would demand a major cultural offensive in intellectual cooperation, for Argentine intellectuals were not eager to dismiss or drop the baggage of European culture.¹¹

During his stay in Buenos Aires and La Plata, Leo Rowe interacted with a select group of the Argentine intelligentsia. Among them were Joaquín V. González, the rector and founder of the University of La Plata; Estanislao Zeballos, an amateur archaeologist, novelist, and international law expert; Rodolfo Rivarola, an expert in penal and constitutional law and one of the founders of political science in the country; José N. Matienzo, a leading constitutionalist and political theorist; Victor Mercante, a pioneer pedagogist and writer, who introduced the "new school" in Argentina; Raymundo Wilmart, an expert in international relations and a socialist; and Rómulo S. Naón, the Argentine ambassador to Washington. If the idea was to build a group of informants that could summarize the present condition and history of Argentina, Rowe could not have made a better choice. These local intellectuals had accumulated, in their minds and works, a treasury of information about Argentina's constitutional law, government, education, international relations, and history.

These were all "public men," men with ample public exposure and notoriety due to their work in parliament, government administration, the university, the judiciary, and journalism. As journalists, correspondent writers, or commentators,

most of them had easy access to the press. They participated in government (or had access to it) due to their social connections. But, like US progressives, these intellectuals' ready access to power was sustained by their scholarly achievements. Some of them directed important academic journals.¹² Rivarola and Matienzo are considered the founders of political science in Argentina. Zeballos, a prolific essayist who wrote about immigration, Indian culture, and international relations, and founded the Argentine Scientific Society in 1872, was regarded as a leading intellectual figure of his generation. While Rowe did not get to meet criminologist José Ingenieros or economist Carlos Pellegrini, he had certainly met a group of local intellectuals that, due to their social and political connections, had a great influence on public opinion.

Most of them, with the exception of Matienzo and Raymundo Wilmart, were liberal-conservative (“liberales conservadores”), less progressive in social outlook than Rowe. Some had participated in conservative governments (under presidents Julio A. Roca, Manuel Quintana, and José Figueroa Alcorta) and were later displaced by the populist government of Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916–1922). Some of them had been positivists¹³ at some point of their careers (Mercante, Zeballos, Rivarola) but later shifted towards more “spiritualist” and “patriotic” positions. Except for the members of the younger generation (Enrique Gil and Amaranto Abeledo), none had studied in the United States. Without being “anti-American,” they were in general pro-European. Their academic connections in Europe had given them some degree of international exposure. Believers in progress, they were all shaken by the European war and assumed in response pacifist or neutralist positions.¹⁴ Unlike Rowe and other US progressives, local intellectuals supported liberal economic policies.¹⁵ Though they supported legislation on work conditions and female and child labor, they still did not see the need for regulating monopolies.

After his return to the United States, Rowe contributed an article to the *North American Review* in 1907 praising the achievements of the South American republics. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in particular, had made great progress in the prior forty or fifty years. The impressive growth of their cities and their modern urban infrastructure were proof of local aspirations to emulate and join the most advanced nations of the world. Unlike his experiences in Puerto Rico and Panama, Rowe found in the ABC nations a greater degree of democratic sociability, important universities in transition toward reform, and societies collaborating with their authorities in urban renewal. From his first trip to the region, Rowe concluded that “American ideals” could well take root in the southern republics. In his 1913–1914 trip—on which this article concentrates—Rowe discovered that these countries' *intelligentsias* could become the basis of a hemispheric “intellectual brotherhood.” Personal ties among university men could generate the good will required for Pan-American cooperation.

This essay focuses on certain moments of Rowe's interactions with local scholars and statesmen. I examine in particular the possible impact of his 1914 lectures at the University of La Plata on the state of US democracy. Also important

are the agreements and variations found in the treatment of university education and US foreign policy concerning Latin America. Lack of space prevents me from developing further Rowe's positions on Argentine federalism and municipal government, two points of scholarly interest about which there was some discussion among local intellectuals. Rowe gathered from the works of Rivarola and Matienzo, two leading constitutionalists, the idea that Argentina's federal system was a façade for a highly centralized ("Unitarian") government. To guarantee the success of the ruling party in local elections, the President could decree interventions in the provinces and he did so on many occasions.¹⁶

Unlike other US cultural and intellectual ambassadors to South America, Leo Rowe brought to Argentine elite audiences an interpretation of his own nation's history and present. In addition to collecting data and local opinion, he was ready to share with the local intelligentsia his concerns about the march of United States democracy (the growing encroachment of big business, the increasing centralization of government, and the declining role of municipalities), as well as his ideas about the true foundations of the US system of government (organized public opinion, an educated citizenry, and good universities). This novelty, in the context of a recent extension of the franchise in Argentina (the electoral law of 1912), generated interest and discussion among the local experts and statesmen.

Pan-Americanism—Variations on a Theme

Rowe's vision of Pan-Americanism during this period (ca. 1906–1919) was at the same time imperial and progressive. While endorsing the new view of a negotiated foreign policy common to all the Americas and the enhanced role of the ABC republics in hemispheric affairs, he supported the US "right" to intervene in the Caribbean and Central America. To Rowe, this was simply a matter of national self-preservation. Whereas the progressive neighbors of South America (the ABC nations, in particular) could be trusted to control and govern themselves, this was not true for the Caribbean and Central American nations. This Great Divide between the "land of progress" and the "land of revolutions" was to him—the same as to many of his generation—crucial for the maintenance of the Pax Americana.¹⁷ He recommended that the US should conduct a differentiated foreign policy, collaborating with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in arbitration committees organized to prevent intraregion confrontations. In its most immediate hinterland, on the other hand, he thought the US should exercise some degree of "government policing," as understood by Theodore Roosevelt. If the integrity of US territory was to be preserved and if European ambitions were to be kept at bay, the US should intervene whenever local "revolutions" generated a vacuum of power in the region.

Rowe was in favor of a multilateral enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁸ The United States, he thought, should consult the ABC countries about policy decisions concerning the peace and harmony of the hemisphere. During the first two

years of the Great War (1914–1915), he actively promoted South American cooperation in international forums for the defense of “neutral rights.” Although highly critical of Wilson’s non-recognition policy, Rowe was not ready to see the US’s dominant position in the hemisphere wither away. On the contrary, he advocated the need for selective interventions in the Caribbean and Central America. In this point, he was a progressive realist. The US had to promote the welfare of its own working class, even at the cost of maintaining protectorates. From the lands of recurrent revolutions came the bananas, the coffee, and the sugar that sustained the energy of the US working class. For the sake of its own welfare, the US should always protect its interests in these countries.

How were Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine received in Argentine intellectual circles? Not unfavorably. Not with open resistance. According to historian David Sheinin, Argentine policy-makers sustained a “flaccid” or “flexible” anti-Americanism.¹⁹ The strong dissidence they expressed at the 1890 congress in Washington changed gradually towards a position of possible economic complement between the United States and Argentina. The increase in bilateral trade, growing US investments in Argentina, and the Argentine elite’s growing sense of distinctiveness with the rest of Latin America, made them more receptive to US-led Pan-Americanism. By 1920 the Argentine intelligentsia had moved closer to the US position in international affairs. The more radical anti-Americanism, proposed by Manuel Ugarte, Alfredo Palacios, José Ingenieros, and Diego Molinari, was to an extent marginalized and displaced from the center of the political and intellectual scene.

The Argentine intellectuals who came into contact with Rowe expressed views about hemispheric cooperation that differed little from those of the Penn professor. Their interventions constituted variations on the same theme. Even those who embraced “Europeism” were ready to grant that the United States was the new hegemon in the hemisphere. Consequently, the US proposals for peace and commerce in the Americas could not be easily discarded. Others claimed greater participation of Argentina and other progressive Latin American nations in the making of hemispheric policies. The demand for greater recognition, however, did not lead to a full-blown criticism of United States expansionism as in 1890, for it was now clear to Argentine intellectuals that the US was not seriously planning to invade their country. Empowered by the de facto acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, Argentine statesmen and intellectuals demanded co-leadership of the Pan-American movement. And, in spite of their criticism of US interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, Argentine intellectuals shared the US view that these nations were not prepared for self-government.

Let us examine some of these local connections. Enrique Gil, a lawyer who had studied under Rowe at the University of Pennsylvania²⁰ and later became a leading organizer of the Instituto Cultural Argentino Norteamericano, thought that the US vision of hemispheric cooperation needed only a small correction. The United States

had to acknowledge the contributions of other nations and statesmen to the construction of Pan-Americanism. In particular, Gil wanted to include the doctrines of Drago and Calvo (two Argentine diplomats) as part of the new hemispheric consensus about peace and economic cooperation.²¹ Gil invoked the need for a multilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine: all American countries were responsible for the collective security of the hemisphere. While demanding equal recognition of policy principles elaborated from the South, Gil was an enthusiastic promoter of Pan-Americanism and thought, like Rowe, that the “loose union” in process was an example to be imitated by war-torn Europe.²²

To socialist Raymundo Wilmart it was clear that Argentina should join the United States and the Pan-American movement.²³ In his view, the European war had created, like in the post-Napoleonic era, a situation in which cooperation for mutual defense was needed. Monroe’s 1823 declaration had been a timely barrier erected against the ambitions of the Holy Alliance. Contemporary Pan-Americanism had to serve a similar purpose: “Our duty today and tomorrow is to unite among ourselves and with the United States for mutual defense” (244). As a pacifist, Wilmart shared Rowe’s rejection of the European notion of “armed peace.” He thought that American nations should bond together to defend international law. In order to produce a lasting peace—Wilmart wrote—the two Americas, the natural site of democratic government and of social equality, should now come together in rescue of a Europe destroyed by militarism and colonial ambitions.

International law expert Estanislao Zeballos was ready to dispose of the Monroe Doctrine altogether. He considered that this US policy statement had served well to prevent the European re-conquest of American territory in the nineteenth century, and that its modern version, the Roosevelt Corollary, was still useful to preserve stability in Central America and the Caribbean. But in South America the doctrine was no longer needed. These countries (Argentina in particular) had completed their civilizatory process, had become prosperous nations, and had acquired the respect of European nations. Hence, Argentina did not need the protection of the United States. Zeballos thought that Argentina should promote Pan-American cooperation, without renouncing its European roots and culture. On the occasion of Roosevelt’s visit to Argentina in November 1913, Zeballos told the audience gathered at the University of Buenos Aires that Argentina was a civilized “white country” that had embraced the best European civilization had to offer and improved the system of government adopted from the US in the nineteenth century. In the future, he envisioned Argentina and the US promoting, in separate ways, their gospel of peace, labor, prosperity, and culture.²⁴

Ex-president Theodore Roosevelt thought that the Monroe Doctrine was a bit outdated and that American tutelage should extend only to the closest hinterlands of the US: Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.²⁵ He must have been pleasantly surprised to hear this argument voiced by a leading Argentine intellectual. Roosevelt agreed with Zeballos: the Monroe doctrine did not apply to Argentina, a country that

needed no protection from the US.²⁶ He was also pleased to know that Zeballos shared his strategic division of Latin America and his view of Pan-Americanism as a civilizing process. He was probably not amused to learn that Argentina considered itself “wholly European” in culture. Yet, on the question of race, Zeballos went too far. He told the audience that Argentina had been so successful in “whitening itself” (from an original nation composed of Blacks, Indians, and mulattoes) that it was now “whiter” than the United States.

Zeballos’s variation on the Pan-American theme was neither novel nor conflictive. Rowe and other Latin Americanist scholars in the United States (Clarence Haring, Arthur Whitaker, Hiram Bingham, among others) had already accepted the notion that the ABC countries constituted an especially progressive enclave that required no tutelage from the US government. This was simply a reaffirmation of current US foreign policy, only enunciated from a Southern position. Rather than a moment of resistance, Zeballos’s claim that “Argentina was European” could be easily integrated into the emerging North American view of South America—if only the word “European” was read in terms of race and civilization. A European implant in South America (Argentina) could only facilitate the US mission of peace and commerce in the subcontinent. The “Europeans” of South America could be partners in progress and civilization.

As could be expected, Emilio Frers, the head of the Museo Social Argentino who organized Roosevelt’s visit, agreed fully with the ex-president’s view of hemispheric relations. For him, Roosevelt was the clearest exponent of the doctrine of “progressive evolutionism” that the US promoted: nations had to acquire a basic training in civilization and self-rule before they could control their social disorder and political instability. Only then, they became part of the club of progressive nations with responsibilities over their less favored neighbors. Argentina, thanks to the blessings of European mass immigration, had already achieved this stage. Argentina owed to Europe much of its human capital, its economic infrastructure, and its civilizatory influence. But the country needed to go beyond the stage of a European replica in order to realize its democratic potential. Now that Europe no longer provided a mirror of civilization, Frers proposed a new synthesis: Argentines had to be “*men of Europe with the spirit of America*.”²⁷

With regard to Pan-Americanism, Frers had only two observations to make. First, the common assertion that US economic power was feared in South America was a misperception that needed correction. There were possibilities of economic cooperation between the United States and South America. An agrarian-export economy now deprived of European manufacturers and loans could complement well an industrializing economy. Secondly, Frers felt that hemispheric cooperation should not be limited to commercial and capital flows but should primarily develop out of intellectual links. In this, he was in complete agreement with Rowe. Frers offered the good services of the Museo Social Argentino in order to disseminate “American propaganda” among Hispanic American nations.²⁸

Surprisingly, there were few voices of rejection to Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine. Perhaps the best-known opposition was that enunciated by Manuel Ugarte. Writing from France, Ugarte argued that Pan-Americanism was a rhetoric and policy engineered by the US to complete its imperial domination of South America. He believed, in fact, that the US was ready to economically colonize the weaker countries of South America (the Andean nations) and, in the end, impose its own culture and language. To Ugarte, US imperialism differed little from European imperialism. He urged South Americans to resist US economic penetration as a means to defend their cultural identity, which he considered a unique adaptation of Spanish traditions and values. To him, the “neo-Latins” were culturally identical to one another but radically different from the Anglo Americans. Pan-American unity (including the US) would not occur, simply because the “two Americas” did not have anything in common. As for Latin America, he was prepared to admit that there were differences of material wealth and military power within the region. The Southern nations could afford to stand up to the US menace, while the Andean nations were too poor to do so. Central America and the Caribbean—claimed Ugarte—were already part of the US hinterland.²⁹

This apparently radical version of anti-Americanism was too idealistic and European to constitute a serious challenge to US-sponsored Pan-Americanism. Ugarte’s proposal for a Latin American union could be said to be an adaptation of the old Bolivarian theme, but with a European, “neo-Latin” touch. In the short run, South America should take refuge in Europe, nurture its cultural links, to preserve its identity. In the future they should gradually build their own Latin American federation without the help or interference of the United States. Even though many within the elite would share Ugarte’s preference for European culture, few would buy the idea of a European cocoon for Latin American culture: first, because many of them were actually fighting *against* the radical heterogeneity brought about by European immigration; and, secondly, because Argentine intellectuals in the context of the Great War were reluctant to equate “European” with “civilization.” More importantly, in spite of a growing acceptance of Hispanismo, few thought that “Latin America” designated a common cultural ground. Much before Rowe’s visit, the Argentine intelligentsia was in agreement that countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala, or Paraguay were *outside* the contours of the Argentine imagined community. They were part of a “Latin America” to which the Argentine elite did not want to belong.

Ever since Rubén Darío wrote his *Odas a Roosevelt* and delegate R. Saénz Peña spoke of the inconvenience of Argentina joining a commercial union with the United States, there had been declarations in Latin America and in Argentina against the “Yankee menace.” Darío, José Enrique Rodó, and José Martí shared a common dualist view of a practical, materialistic “Anglo America” facing a spiritual and idealistic “Hispanic America.” Few in the Argentine intelligentsia of the Centenary (1910) would share this view. At the beginning of the inter-American conferences, Argentina tried to pursue a different path, privileging its relationship with Great

Britain.³⁰ Books such as Vicente Quesada's *Los Estados Unidos y la América del Sur* (1893) were openly anti-American. But, as argued by Oscar Terán, this anti-imperialism was sustained by "spiritualist" ideas and positions that flourished in the 1890s and early 1900s but later declined.³¹ The talk of the "Yankee Calibán," a rustic figure animated by the love of profits and concerned with practical, mechanical matters, rapidly disappeared from the public discourse in the early twentieth century. When travelers equated Argentines with the Yankee new rich in his boldness and directness, the locals took it as a compliment. Frers's 1913 speech left no doubt that the practical American spirit was something Argentines admired.

"American Problems"—The Novelty of US Democracy

In August 1914, in the midst of declarations of war in Europe, Leo Rowe delivered a series of conferences at the University of La Plata about the state of "American democracy" and about US foreign policy.³² Although Rowe's explanations of foreign policy were quite interesting, the two lectures devoted to the state of democracy in the United States were outstanding for their novelty. They presented not only a new perspective on democratic government but also a different narrative of US institutional history, one informed by social struggles and the transformation of the public sphere. Furthermore, these talks addressed the very contemporary problems of state regulation and governance under conditions of a mass democracy. Argentine intellectuals were not accustomed to hearing this type of discussion—at least not about the United States.

Rowe started his first lecture affirming that democracy was not just a form of government but a whole system of social organization. The US governmental system, while at first based upon political ideas, with time responded more and more to the new demands presented by civil society. Originally, the US government was designed by men suspicious of the populace. James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton were concerned with establishing checks against abusive government and guarantees protecting property and liberty. After the Civil War, however, public opinion shifted the center of political ideas in the direction of governmental regulation. Since the 1890s, the people demanded the government regulation of monopolies. Central to this revision of ideas was the need to affect the distribution of income with active policies (progressive income and inheritance taxes, labor protection laws) in order to perfect democracy. The transition from proprietary to corporate capitalism had put people's liberties in jeopardy and, hence, greater government intervention was needed to level the field.

Those who attended Rowe's first two conferences must have been astonished or, at least, surprised. Here was a professor of a prestigious US university saying that the US political system was not what its constitution said, that it was centralized and strongly interventionist. Here was an authority in law and political science redefining the meaning of democracy. A true democratic government, said

Rowe, was one that facilitated social and economic equality, not one that just protected individual rights to life and property. Here was a North American scholar, unsuspected of socialist leanings, telling his Argentine audience that modern democracies necessitated economic regulation, labor protection laws, and better city government. Otherwise, the citizens would fall prey to “industrial tyranny.”

The argument was persuasive not only because of the way it was conveyed—calmly and without hesitation—but also because of the novelty of the situation. Rowe was saying that, in the 1890s, US public opinion (mostly articulated by the Progressive movement) changed the conception and the nature of American government. This was really a contemporary assessment of the state of democracy in one of the most advanced industrial countries of the world. Early-twentieth-century US democracy differed much from the republic imagined by the Founding Fathers. To Rowe, “organized public opinion,” a relatively new force, had pushed both US capitalism and government in the direction of greater regulation and social equality. This was a view of the United States (*Norteamérica*) that the audience did not expect—a different perspective on things, *una verdadera novedad Americana*.

The timing was also important. Just at the beginning of the European war, Latin American “men of letters” were looking for other signposts, for other emblems of civilization and progress. A few years back, in 1910, Argentina had celebrated its Centennial. The elite had then exhibited pride for the accomplishments of progress and expressed concern for the urban and social problems associated with modernization. A powerful anarchist movement had taken control of important labor unions and threatened to disturb the banquet of progress of the agrarian economy. Two years before, Congress had passed an electoral reform (instituting the secret ballot and universal male suffrage) that forebode the end of oligarchic political control. 1914 was a year of recession, when the Argentine economy suffered a drastic reduction in exports to Europe and suddenly European immigration stopped. It was a year in which labor conflicts started to rise, as inflation deteriorated the incomes of Argentine workers. At this moment, the words of this previously unknown *profesor norteamericano* might have sounded with tremendous actuality and importance.

Rowe’s eloquence must have added interest to the speech. He spoke a language they all knew: of history, of evolution, of ideas that evolved, readjusting themselves to the economic and social environment. Rowe spoke of the “*nuevos rumbos*” of US democracy with the certainty of an evolutionary law. Among his audience were positivists, socialists, and social Darwinists concerned with the social and political dimensions of economic and technological progress. They could certainly empathize with Rowe’s preoccupations and predictions. The subject matter of the talk contained a supplementary attraction. Unlike other ambassadors of empire, Rowe spoke neither of the general problems of humanity and world affairs, nor about the problems of the Argentine nation in relation to the challenges of progress and civilization. He spoke of the United States, of its problems of government, of its social and economic evolution, of the adaptation of its ideas.

Though delivered in the assertive tone of an academic lecture, the speech must have sounded like a confession, intimate and revealing. The audience had probably never listened to a North American speak publicly about the *United States' problems* before. They were accustomed to think that Argentine or Latin American “problems” were the exclusive concerns of foreign experts.³³

In the second lecture, Rowe redefined the meaning of *democracy*. He told the audience that the expansion of the role of government was a direct result of the new demands stemming from modern life: economic regulation, conservation of natural resources, the protection of female and child labor, the control of big business, and so forth. That government itself was changing in the direction of centralized decisions and stronger executives, both at the federal and municipal levels. All these changes had dramatically transformed the meaning of democracy in “America.” US democracy was no longer just a system of government based on the free election of representatives. Its dynamic was now determined by the empowerment of organized public opinion, the ultimate controller of government actions and of economic interests.³⁴

The audience must have been surprised about this shift in perspective. Rowe was telling them—two years after the electoral reform—that free elections were no longer the basis of democracies, that the checks and balances that guaranteed freedom and equality of opportunity lie elsewhere: in the press and in the organizations of civic society.³⁵ To Rowe, neither the virtue of functionaries nor good administration emerged automatically from constitutions. Norms of government conduct had to be imposed by public opinion. In his lecture, Rowe treated the concentration of political power as a necessary evil of mature democracies. The accumulation of power into the hands of the executive made governments more efficient, more able to challenge economic combines and established bureaucracies. The concentration of power did not contradict the democratic principle. As long as public opinion watched over public administration, the people’s will would guide government (34).

What was the government of public opinion? Not the expression of the illiterate masses, but the civic articulation of demands projected by the educated reading public. The nation could no longer be defined outside of “print-capitalism.” An “ignorant democracy,” Rowe said, is a “falsified democracy.” Here the Argentine audience must have nodded, associating Rowe’s words to Domingo Sarmiento’s program: elementary education makes for a good citizenry. But this was not what Rowe had in mind. He was talking of something truly different: common education was no longer sufficient. Civic society had to be organized into multiple associations expressing particular needs and grievances. Modern democracies engendered good government only when their civil societies were organized and active, when they produced collective actions that sent messages to governments. He was referring to a different type of education: the experimental training in social-democratic interaction.

This “Tocquevillian turn” must have taken the audience by surprise. The nineteenth-century liberal—who believed in individual political rights, ample political participation, and government as representative of popular sovereignty—was a rare species in 1914. The Argentine intelligentsia still referred to Sarmiento’s educational vision with respect but had abandoned all pretense of a democracy built from the bottom up. Though their conceptions of democracy were still tied to the question of the elections, many believed that the preservation of republican government was the responsibility of a minority: the educated elite.³⁶ On this question, the apparent complicity between the foreign speaker and the local audience becomes suspect. Was Rowe aware of the ideals common to his audience? Did he know that among them were liberal-conservatives who would admit only a limited role for government? Did he know that socialists were equally individualistic and libertarian? Did he admit the possibility that his audience was not prepared to entertain his notion of a democratic society?

Rowe tried to present the problems of US government as a common concern. He insisted these were the problems of “*our American democracies*”—of the US, of Argentina, of Brazil, of Chile. The pronoun “our” was an invitation to consider the political evolution of the United States as a valid prediction of what could happen to the South American republics in the future. Yet the audience could have read this in terms of a cultural divide (Europe vs. America) that was to them problematic. His words had already raised alarm among conservatives, particularly when he spoke of collectivism and economic regulation with sympathy. But then Rowe went beyond, telling the audience that in a true democracy the working classes had to be free from “economic dependency.” To perfect democracy, government needed to improve the social and economic conditions of the poor. Otherwise, they would continue to sell their votes to the rich. American political thought, he stated, was reconsidering the central value previously attributed to property rights and moving towards a greater appreciation of social equality and better living conditions. Now, the state had to intervene to ensure workers their due share in the distribution of wealth.

Rowe spoke next of the European war. Socialists might have listened to his words with attention and sympathy. He said that the European states, caged in their own militarism and imperialist ambitions, were unable to let the working class develop their own organizations and demands. He projected that, with time, the working classes of Europe would have developed their own mechanisms to prevent war. He predicted that the war would not benefit the European working class. On the contrary, at the end of the war, they would find greater taxes, lower wages, and reduced opportunities of employment. The European war had buried two great hopes. One was the child of British liberalism: the hope that industrial capitalism would eradicate wars. The other was the son of international finance: the hope that the interdependence of financial markets would make wars impossible. Both predictions failed in August 1914. Now was the opportunity of the working class to launch a thorough opposition to the war.

This “progressive turn” in the speech shows the type of intellectual Rowe was. He belonged to a generation concerned with the questions of human suffering, economic and social inequality, and with the responsibility of statesmen and scholars in improving the conditions of life for the majority.³⁷ Rowe combined in his persona the progressive demands of a society undergoing fundamental changes and the conservative foundations of an elite man formed in economics, law, and government. “His” American Academy of Political Science had promoted discussion on the political rights of women, on the education of Black Americans, on child-protection laws, on industrial regulation, and on the promotion of a meritocratic civil service. This liberal-progressive consensus, typical of the US Progressive movement, was rather alien to the Argentine intelligentsia.³⁸ That is why Rowe’s important speech about “American democracy” provoked much less debate than expected.

Small Ripples—“American Democracy” in Local Context

Rowe’s 1914 conferences on the state of democracy in the United States did not make great waves in the Argentine intelligentsia. Rowe’s words generated only minor ripples on particular themes. The substance of a democratic society was not a subject that the Argentine intelligentsia was prepared to discuss. While local intellectuals were ready to engage him, however mildly, on the question of Pan-Americanism and US foreign policy, few saw the true implications of Rowe’s speech on US democracy. This limited reception cannot be explained by the lack of expertise of the local audience, for Rowe interacted with the most important experts in foreign relations, government, constitutional law, and politics in Argentina. One could also argue that the problems of government in an industrial society could not be easily applied to an agrarian society, or that the choices facing a mature democracy were different than those presented to a young republic. Although there is some truth in these arguments, the fundamental differences between Rowe and his local interlocutors were ideological. And this constituted a serious problem for the future of intellectual cooperation.

Some Argentine intellectuals were probably aware of Rowe’s arguments about United States government. In 1909, the *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* had published Rowe’s article on public opinion and democracy.³⁹ There, Rowe argued against the prevailing view that the US government was an automatic mechanism regulated by the Constitution. Instead, he thought, democratic government required the powerful force of social cooperation and collective action. Legislation was not sufficient to the progress of democracy; a strong and organized public opinion was essential for transmitting and actualizing popular needs to government. In a world of concentrated economic and political forces, only civic organizations could promote participatory and cooperative ideals. This Tocquevillian argument must have fallen on deaf ears, for *porteño* and La Plata intellectuals were not prepared to hear it.⁴⁰ To the contributors to the leading journal of political science at the time (*Revista Argentina*

de Ciencia Política), government was still defined in nineteenth-century terms: as a representative of a collection of individual wills.⁴¹

Who in Argentina was at the time thinking about “democracy” in an expanded sense? Certainly not Rodolfo Rivarola, the chairman of the Faculty of Law of the UNLP at the time of Rowe’s first arrival in Argentina. One of the founders of political science in the country, Rivarola held an elitist conception of politics and government. He openly criticized the electoral reform (the Saénz Peña law, 1912) for making suffrage compulsory and universal. He thought that the basic requirements for universalizing male suffrage (instruction, discernment, commitment, and freedom) were not given in Argentina. In his view, the elite should guide society on the road of “democracy”—not a patrician elite, not a moneyed elite, but one endowed with culture and sufficient moral capital.⁴²

A believer in a restricted franchise, Rivarola expected public offices to be entrusted to the most qualified. He considered democracy to entail an illusion of equivalence among individuals that had no support in reality.⁴³ Rather than targeting his criticism at class exploitation, social inequalities, or “industrial tyranny,” Rivarola directed his attacks against government corruption and party clientelism. In his view, these were the real obstacles to the working of an effective “democracy,” a term he equated with representative government. He believed that if a real meritocracy was established in Argentina, the constitutional principle of “providing for the general welfare” could be achieved without problems. The moral imperative of the governing class would take care of the problem of inequality.⁴⁴

Neither was Estanislao Zeballos, the statesman who introduced ex-president Roosevelt’s address at the University of Buenos Aires in 1913, thinking along the lines of an expanded democracy. Zeballos also opposed the recent reforms granting universal male suffrage. To him, thanks to this law, the “men of thought” would no longer govern Argentina. Instead they would be replaced by the “men of barricades.”⁴⁵ This profoundly antidemocratic statement was applauded by many of his colleagues. Zeballos considered the very concept of representative government problematic, for it was based on a false homogeneity: “the people.” Society was made up of individuals, each entrusted with the responsibility of subsistence. Each resident of Argentina (most immigrants were not citizens) should strive for individual progress and for the common welfare without depending upon or engaging in electoral politics.⁴⁶

Socialist Raymundo Wilmart was among the few who thought of democracy in class terms. Countries like Argentina had already undergone the “civilizing process” as defined by Sarmiento and Alberdi, that is, immigration, modern transportation, and widespread education. But civilization and progress did not necessarily produce “democracies.” In order to become modern democracies, new countries needed to shake off the class segmentation that divided their societies into “haves” and “have-nots.” Though optimistic about the country’s political development, Wilmart did not associate “democracy” with the present state of

Argentina's government. His own definition of democracy, like that of many of his contemporaries, stopped short of a new system of economic and social rights. His hopes that Argentina could become an "institutional country" (his definition of a "modern democracy") rested upon the promises made by President Sáenz Peña for free and transparent elections. The problem of the day was how to expand the electoral franchise, not how make a society more democratic or conditions of living more egalitarian.⁴⁷

Perhaps a scholar who came closest to Rowe's ideas was José N. Matienzo, a leading constitutionalist who later sided with the new middle-class party, the Unión Cívica Radical.⁴⁸ Unlike Rivarola and Zeballos, Matienzo was optimistic about the electoral reform of 1912. In his work he emphasized the importance of political reality as a significant component of constitutional history and considered "public opinion" to be the leading force orienting governments. An "intelligent, dignified and active" public opinion was necessary for the functioning of republican government.⁴⁹ Democracy was for him a possibility for the future, a commitment that demanded the permanent education of the people. For, like Alberdi, he considered the people not at the level of the republic. Before a democratic society could be established, Argentina had to perfect its own republican government, raising popular understanding of it ("tenemos que hacernos dignos de la república"⁵⁰).

In 1914, Matienzo dealt with the question of democracy. In his lecture, he specified the basic requirements for republican governments and democracies. A democratic, republican government required an intelligent and active public opinion. While conceding that civic virtues were needed, he attributed more importance to the existence of modern political parties, the true channels of public opinion. Argentina lacked these initial conditions. The country did not have free elections—fraud was the norm—and its political parties were mere factions defending private interests. He agreed that, in a democracy, citizens (aided by political parties) needed to tackle questions related to social and economic welfare (the regulation of monopolies, questions of public health, labor legislation, etc.). But, before these choices could be considered, the country needed two prerequisites: free elections and modern political parties. Like his contemporaries, Matienzo did not consider the role of the press as constitutive of a democratic society.

The United States and Britain were the two mirrors in which Matienzo contrasted the state of Argentine "democracy": the British case because of its recent extension of voting rights, and the American case because of its experience in regulating the activities of political parties. But the "democracy" Matienzo referred to was not the one Rowe had in mind. Matienzo applied the concept of "public opinion" to a completely different subject matter. To him, every current of feeling and sentiment emerging from the people constituted "public opinion." And every association of people around political goals constituted a "political party."⁵¹ Since its independence, different waves of "public opinion" had affected the nature of the Argentine government: federalist at first, organizationist or constitutionalist later, in

favor of material progress afterwards, for national assimilation later, etc. Each generation produced its own hegemonic (public) opinion, shifting the ship of government in a quite different direction than the preceding generation.⁵² To him, the notion that democracy was an evolving ideal, gradually perfecting itself, was unthinkable. He believed that public opinion had prevailed along the history of Argentina, producing distinct government arrangements, most of them *undemocratic*.

Hence, he could hardly associate the notion of popular opinion to that of democratic government. The question to him was not how to perfect democracy, but rather how to bring the government into some connection with popular opinion. Whereas Rowe emphasized problems of representation and organization related to public opinion, Matienzo was concerned with what we would call today “accountability”: whether a parliamentary system could make ministers more accountable to the people or whether the renewal of the chamber of deputies should be more frequent. The notion of a social and economic democracy was alien to him. His generation was concerned with perfecting the institutions of republican government, rather than producing a social-economic democracy.

Small ripples or miscommunication? The imperial intellectual’s message did not sink deep into the debates of the local intelligentsia. Why was this so? Due to extreme differences in their societies? Due to distinct conceptual tools? Before going any further, it should be granted that the Argentina that nurtured the emergence of the middle-class party, the UCR, was not prepared to discuss the constellation of topics that Rowe put on the table. Elite Argentines were concerned with the extension of the franchise, with the improvement of republican institutions, and with the patriotic education of immigrants; they were not fully engaged yet with questions of big business, labor unions, or economic regulation. The social and economic formation of Argentina (the agrarian-export economy) presented problems of excessive rents, growing prices, crowded tenements, casual employment, and immigrant assimilation, among others. So the problems of a maturing industrialized economy did not seem of immediate or pressing concern. Argentina, as it would be clear in the agrarian revolt of 1912, was closer to the situation of the United States in the 1890s than to that of 1914.

Rowe could count on Rivarola’s sympathy when he addressed the question of meritocracy in government, but not in relation to the question of a government of public opinion. Rivarola and Rowe had much to discuss about Argentine federalism and centralism, but not about contemporary social movements in the United States. Like most of his fellow lawyers and jurists, Rivarola was acquainted with traditional US constitutional theory but not with new pragmatist thinking about democracy. Distinct dualities organized their thoughts about government and law. Rivarola, following Alberdi, thought in terms of the contrast between a “real” and a “legal” nation, which translated into tensions between constitutional norms and political practices. Rowe, on the other hand, saw a dialectic development between two

opposing forces: the illustrated body polity (organized public opinion) and political ideas emerging from “American” experience and needs.

In spite of their efforts to update their readings and speak the same language, local intellectuals were often caught in the obsessions created by their country’s history. Rivarola, Matienzo, Zeballos, and others of this generation were obsessed with the persistence of personalist politics in the midst of material progress. They loathed the multiple signs of the *política criolla*, an apparently modern and democratic parliamentary politics, yet carried out through patronage, nepotism, corruption, and deceit. Much before Rowe’s arrival, the works of Agustín Alvarez and Carlos O. Bunge had clearly established a consensus about the danger of the resurgence of *caudillismo*⁵³ under the disguise of the parliamentary politician. The Juan Manuel de Rosas dictatorship (1835–1852) still weighed heavily in the political imagination of this generation, inflecting their writings with undemocratic traces. Moreover, the influence of positivism, with its emphasis on ethnic and social determinism, reinforced their suspicions of an extended democracy.⁵⁴

In addition, local intellectuals were still conceiving the problem of government in the terms designed by Alberdi and Sarmiento.⁵⁵ The problem of government was to one a dialectic between the “real” and the “legal” nation; to the other it was the question of how to educate an illiterate population in the complexities of republican government. The cultural nationalists who gained notoriety at the time of the Argentine Centennial (Manuel Gálvez, Ricardo Rojas, Leopoldo Lugones) added a third interpretation to the problem of governance: how to educate immigrants’ children in the cult of the fatherland. This topic (the love for the fatherland) was clearly one not suited for a conversation with foreigners.

Educating the Ruling Class

Education was another area of agreement between the imperial intellectual and the local intelligentsia. Animated by similar conceptions about progress, civilization, and race, both visitor and locals invested in higher education their hopes for the improvement of the political and social system. To Leo Rowe, the question of education was central to modern democracies, for it was the quality of its universities that conditioned the nature of a country’s government institutions. In his journeys throughout Europe, Rowe had learned of the importance of research universities and the boost they could give to industry and government. Universities and colleges helped to strengthen public opinion, the true foundation of modern democracies. In this point—the importance of higher education for the training of the governing class—Rowe’s ideas were in consonance with those of the Argentine intelligentsia.

Agustín Alvarez, the vice-rector of the UNLP, believed that intellectual improvement was the basis of all progress. Following Sarmiento, he regarded elementary education as crucial for the development of self-government. An informed voter required basic reading and writing skills. Alvarez, an acute critic of

Argentina's political culture, saw in Anglo America a strategy of elite education worthy of imitating. In this he was influenced by Sarmiento's *Conflictos y armonías de las razas en América* (1883), a book in which race explains the persistent difference in the political development of the two Americas. English traditions and culture made political liberty thrive in the US, whereas the Spanish heritage of intolerance and despotism still pervaded Latin American political culture. To Alvarez, the United States was an example of a country that had made tremendous progress because its educated men were in control of government.⁵⁶

Ernesto Nelson, the director of the "Internado," the residential college where Rowe resided in 1906, considered the college as the proper place where boys could acquire the virtues needed for self-government. The college prepared young men for public life, inculcating in them ideals of cooperation and altruism. Thus, the college contributed the groundwork for the future democracy. Families instead promoted notions of authority proper to monarchical governments. Nelson was proud that the University of La Plata's "Internado" resembled a US college. He considered Europe a region immersed in poverty and backwardness. In 1911, he guided a group of La Plata students on a tour of the eastern coast of the US. The group visited the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University. His students were so impressed by US universities that they wanted to reproduce at La Plata what they saw in Philadelphia and New York.⁵⁷

Joaquín V. González, the rector of the university, shared with Rowe many ideals.⁵⁸ He defended the idea of a "practical university," a university devoted not only to speculative or theoretical work but also to the solutions of practical problems of production and sociopolitical life. To González, a modern university should be founded upon the pillars of scientific research and public service.⁵⁹ He admired both the English tutorial system and the American residential college. The Colegio Nacional's Internado was the result his own initiative: he wanted to integrate an intermediary residential college into the university in order to prepare a select group of students for higher education. González's belief in practical education was, to an extent, a product of his epoch: the influence of positivist ideas about science, education, and governance. Many in his generation shared his views on the importance of practice for the development of mental processes.⁶⁰ The Internado was the embodiment of these beliefs. Here professors and students shared long hours of the day: in class, at the labs, in conversations, in sports. Santa Catalina, where the Internado was located, was an eight-hundred-hectare *estancia* previously owned by the Jesuits, now devoted to the formation of agronomists and veterinarians. Argentina, a successful agrarian-export economy, needed this type of experimental, scientific educational institution.

Though González argued that "his university" followed the tradition of the two older universities (Buenos Aires and Córdoba) and of the colonial colleges (Charcas and San Carlos), the University of La Plata was in many regards a radical departure from the past. During his term, González saw the creation of the natural

history museum, the faculty of physical sciences, and the schools of agriculture and education. The useful sciences were at the core of “his university.” He considered the university as a “didactic empire” representing all the disciplines and all of society’s heterogeneity.⁶¹ His views coincided with those of Rowe’s. A practical education was appropriate for building a democratic society. President Roosevelt’s children, González used to say, attended an agricultural college, while the new British universities (Leeds, Birmingham, and Sheffield) trained their students in the technical processes of leather, metals, and coal.⁶²

It was only natural, then, that Rowe felt at home at the University of La Plata. Here was a modern university, with applied research in areas of production crucial for the country’s economy (agronomy and veterinary), which also excelled in the social and human sciences. While enjoying the tranquility of the Colegio and its farm, Rowe could engage in conversations with law students and professors. Among them was the director of the Department of Juridical Sciences, Rodolfo Rivarola.

In 1915, Rivarola published *Universidad social: Teoría de la universidad moderna*, a book that examined the role of modern universities in the functioning of democratic societies. Rivarola stated that universities should offer “useful education,” education that could be transformed into economic value and productive work. Due to the diversity of modern societies, modern universities had to specialize in as many professions and sciences as possible, for it was their role to add new members to the ruling class. By endowing university graduates with expert knowledge, the university could help to level up society (“igualar por arriba”). Rivarola’s elitism was explicit. In spite of the prevailing democratic aspirations, modern societies continued to be governed by a special class (“clase dirigente”). In this context, modern universities had to improve and expand the potential and capabilities of this social class by forming professionals and scientists.⁶³

At the center of the modern university stood professional and scientific schools in charge of preparing students for public office. In addition, democracies required the continuous elaboration of new ideas and policies about the welfare of society (70–73). In this aspect, Rivarola came close to Rowe’s progressive views: universities should form good citizens, guardians of the social and political rights conquered by social forces, and, at the same time, create an environment conducive to social cooperation. This is what Rivarola meant by “educación social”: modern universities had to build a collective (national) conscience.

A few years before, González had published *Política espiritual* (1910), a book that summarized his thoughts about university education. Here González underscores the political value of education: “The university is the Fatherland in synthesis.”⁶⁴ While Rivarola emphasized the economic value of a university education, González presented universities as the furnace of patriotism. True patriotism required the pursuit of truth and justice. It was this sense of collectivity that González envisioned as the true foundation of a modern democracy. Only universities could inculcate in the leading classes a collective spirit of solidarity and

cooperation (53, 63). Work in common and fluent communication between students and professors were the necessary ingredients for the creation of such a spirit (244–52). González insisted on this point: in traditional universities, learning was based upon authority and routine; modern universities required instead the daily and active interaction between students and professors. The economic success of England, Germany, and the United States—he thought—was due in part to the fact that their “leading men” were educated in a milieu of reciprocal interaction and comradeship.

The Good Disciple

Realizing the idea of intellectual cooperation required the movement of scholars across borders. Two of the youngest scholars who Rowe met at La Plata, Amaranto Abeledo and Enrique Gil, did just that. They pursued graduate studies in the United States, facilitated in part by Rowe and his connections, and when they returned, they promoted “American culture” in Argentina. Ernesto Nelson, another of Rowe’s scholarly acquaintances, in collaboration with Gil, founded in 1928 the Instituto Cultural Argentino Norteamericano (ICANA), an institute dedicated to the promotion of cultural exchanges between Argentina and the United States. This was the institutional correlate of the policy strategy of intellectual cooperation. Through ICANA, the United States would disseminate the “good feelings” and “mutual understanding” that constituted the basis of US Pan-Americanism.

Enrique Gil completed his MA in 1911 at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, where Rowe was a full professor. In 1915, he returned to Washington to attend the Pan-American Scientific Congress. Afterwards, he became interested in inter-American interactions. In 1933, he completed a substantial book on the subject (*Evolución del panamericanismo*), in which he praised Wilson’s vision of international peace. Gil was a true believer of “Americanism.” He thought, against the prevailing misconception in Argentine intellectual circles, that there was tremendous intellectual capital accumulated in US universities and colleges, and that the moral force and creativity of “Americans” were giving birth to a new civilization. “La hora de América ha llegado,” he said at a 1923 conference in Buenos Aires.⁶⁵ His fervent pro-Americanism was perhaps exceptional, yet his case illuminates the dwindling influence of Europe (Great Britain in particular) after the Great War among the Argentine upper classes.

In a country in which nationalist feelings were on the rise (since the creation of the Patriotic League in 1919) and where anti-US feelings had been awakened by recent incidents,⁶⁶ Enrique Gil maintained a solid pro-US position. In 1939, he published *Por qué envié a mi hijo a una escuela de los Estados Unidos*, a book that was itself a declaration of pro-American principles.⁶⁷ This was a curious and brave intervention, in which Gil argued that the US was the best environment for the moral formation of a youngster, such as his son, Harry, who attended school in the United States between the ages of twelve and fourteen. Worried by the moral decay in

Argentine society, Gil and his wife had left Harry in a Boston high school after he finished sixth grade. The US high school combined strict rules with tolerance and good manners. Sports helped to temper the boys' character. Students learned there the meaning of freedom but also of responsibility. In his view, students should then return to Argentina, graduate from college, and then return to the United States to pursue graduate studies.⁶⁸

Favoring US education, the book contained a strong criticism of Europeism. At the time, other Argentine upper-class parents were sending their children to British or French high schools in Buenos Aires and its surroundings. None of them would separate from their children at this early age of twelve. Gil criticized these parents for their false and outmoded Europeism. In his view, Argentine parents bought too easily the idea that Argentina was like Europe, enjoyed living with borrowed traditions, and were given to imitate submissively a culture (Europe's) falsely portrayed as superior. The United States, considered Gil, was the "new civilization," a country vigorous and healthy that represented better the aspirations of Argentines, the other nation in the hemisphere that shared the US's belief in economic progress and social equality. Europe was an old civilization, already in decay, too attached to the notion of class, a culture that viewed South Americans with disdain (as "ex-colonials").

It was during this decade that Gil shifted from an orthodox to a liberal position. If in 1932 he supported the punctual payment of Argentina's foreign debt,⁶⁹ by 1938 he had become an admirer and supporter of President F. D. Roosevelt's new economic and social policies.⁷⁰ It was only at this time that Gil was able to read the problems of the US in the framework set by Rowe in his 1914 conferences: the need for economic regulation, the importance of the domestic market, the crucial support of organized labor, the conspiracy of "big business" against efforts to redistribute income. The New Deal brought actuality to those ideas. Finally, after sixteen years, the message of Rowe's conference was being picked up by a local intellectual. At last, Rowe's predicaments had found a good disciple. Patiently, Gil studied the policies implemented by the New Dealers and began to fulfill his part of the bargain in the game of intellectual cooperation: to familiarize Argentines about the new conditions of policy in the empire.⁷¹

Sending one's son to be educated in the United States is perhaps the best indication of the success of cultural hegemony, a gesture through which the local intellectual admits the superiority of the imperial intellectual and its educational institutions. We find here a trace of the reproduction of the *subalternity of knowledge* that the benevolent informal empire had attempted to establish through the policy of intellectual cooperation. Enrique Gil had studied in the United States and learned to appreciate the quality of its universities. His son's travel to a US high school served to affirm the superiority of US secondary education. The United States, rather than a brutish and greedy empire—Gil believed in the 1930s—was a leader in educating people for liberty, a source of friendship and culture, the new bastion of Western civilization. To disseminate this news, to assert this truth, Rowe and other scholars

and cultural ambassadors (Edwin Bard, Robert Bacon, among others) had ventured into South America in the years before the Great War. The battle for hegemony of which these academic travelers were part had apparently rendered some fruits. The independence of character of little Harry, the foundation of ICANA in Buenos Aires, the efforts of the students and authorities of the University of La Plata to imitate US educational methods were some of the evidence that US Pan-Americanism was a persuasive force gradually capturing the “opinion” of the local upper classes.⁷²

Conclusions

In the early years of US–Latin American intellectual contact, future director general of the Pan American Union Leo S. Rowe met, socialized, and exchanged ideas with key members of the Argentine intelligentsia. This article has examined local scholars’ perspectives on Pan-Americanism, the role of university education, and the question of “American democracy” at a time of an important transition among Argentine intellectuals from a focus on Europe to a greater interest in the United States. Rowe was one of the first to attribute crucial importance to scholarly exchanges between the United States and South America (which he called “intellectual cooperation”). For him, these exchanges were to become the basis of hemispheric solidarity, once initiatives of economic cooperation and hemispheric defense proved difficult to implement. During his stay at Buenos Aires and La Plata, Leo Rowe gathered materials for his study on political federalism in the Argentine Republic. From published local works, he took the idea that the initial federalism of the Argentine constitution of 1853 (ratified in 1860) had degenerated into a highly centralized dominium of the national government over the provinces and municipalities. While in the United States growing political centralization was necessary for fighting economic monopolies, in Argentina this centralization seemed to consolidate oligarchic government, hence drifting the country away from the model of “American democracy.”

Rowe took seriously his role as builder of a community of scholars who could support with their ideas and policies the emerging system of Pan-American cooperation. The US informal empire in South America—an empire that required neither territorial acquisitions nor gunboat diplomacy—necessitated the acquiescence and consent of local intellectuals. To attain this consent, US scholars were supposed to share “American ideals” of government and education with their southern colleagues, so that the latter could in time “perfect their democracies.” To this extent, scholars were to complement the work of businessmen and advertisers engaged in the promotion of the “American way-of-life” through products, films, radio, and direct publicity. How disposed were Argentine intellectuals to enter into these uneven and didactic conversations of empire? As this essay has shown, the elite that we may consider culturally dominant (the “liberal-conservatives”) tried to establish their difference from the United States, emphasizing the importance of the

European cultural legacy, underscoring the economic success of the Argentine economy in world markets, claiming recognition for Argentine diplomatic efforts in the hemisphere, and dismissing the existence of problems of “democracy” in Argentine government.

This article joins the effort of other scholars who have pioneered the study of the cultural bases of US hegemony and imperial practices in Latin America.⁷³ My premise is that in knowledge and academic exchanges we can find clues for understanding the cultural workings of informal empire. The construction of the Pan-American system, in the early years before the OAS, presupposed the contribution of scholars in the humanities and the social sciences, not only to “translate” Latin America to US audiences, but also to better understand the social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics of a region that had remained, until 1914–1918, economically, financially, and culturally dependent upon Europe. To this extent, the forging of an informal empire in South America was an enterprise of knowledge.

The Pan-American system envisioned by Elihu Root, John Barrett, Woodrow Wilson, and Sumner Welles required the voluntary cooperation of the intelligentsias of the ABC countries. It was imperative to integrate their views into the US vision of Pan-American peace, commerce, and governability. While the US hegemon needed to convey to South American elites lessons in government and education that were no different from the principles imparted to the Creole elites of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the ABC countries presented a particular difficulty. Here the intelligentsias considered themselves “men of European culture with American spirit.” Meeting “their” vision of regional integration and the possibility of convergence between the two Americas was one of the greatest challenges facing scholars like Leo Rowe.

Imperial hegemony works through flows of knowledge, in institutional sites that generate knowledge, assisted by collaboration between imperial and local knowledge-producers.⁷⁴ Leo S. Rowe’s engagement with Argentine intellectuals constitutes a case in point. Rowe came to an Argentine university to communicate and absorb knowledge, that is, credible discourses about government, constitutional law, urban development, and university education in the Americas. His performative display of accumulated knowledge in front of local audiences produced uneven results, particularly when he tried to inform local intellectuals about the state of “American democracy.” On two other crucial issues, Pan-Americanism and the education of elites, Rowe and the local intelligentsia were in agreement. It was in this communicative interaction that imperial hegemony was carved. It was “there” where notions of Americanness were exchanged and Argentine intellectuals understood better US institutions and the American way-of-life. The interactions between the imperial intellectual-statesman and his local connections show that, to some extent, the hegemonic project of intellectual cooperation was successful.

This is, to be sure, one way of looking at things. One could easily dismiss the theory and practice of Pan-Americanism as a temporary illusion. In a time of peril (the “European War”), a group of North American intellectual-statesmen established

contacts with a group of South American intellectuals and built up grandiose plans for hemispheric cooperation. These groups shared temporarily a transparent and all-encompassing ideology. They divided Western civilization into two halves, one in decay due to its inability to control conflict (“Europe”), the other the true carrier of the values of progress under peace (“America”). Building dreams, organizing conferences, and disseminating the promise of hemispheric cooperation through speech acts, they managed to sustain the illusion of Pan-Americanism for a while. A couple of diplomatic visits (Secretary Root in 1906 and ex-president Roosevelt in 1913), the collaboration between northern and southern institutions (the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the Museo Social Argentino, or the Universities of Pennsylvania and La Plata), and a profusion of conferences and articles in the press made this ideal sustainable as long as the external conflict and growing commercial interactions kept the parties interested in cooperation. But as soon as commerce dwindled and the European peace was signed, the cooperation between the US and the ABC countries faded away, moving to the backstage of international politics.

If this was so, US hegemony would be spasmodic, subject to the ebbs and flows of commercial activity, international conflicts, and interactions among intellectuals and statesmen. Such a view would be erroneous for, in my view, the US constructed, in cooperation with native intellectuals, a constellation of practices, a network of institutions, and a vision for hemispheric progress and peace that would defy the passage of time. These visions, practices, and institutions were sustained by a superficial but persuasive theory of international relations: the idea that the cooperation among scholars of the US and South America would create the “good feelings” needed for US capitalism and the American way-of-life to spread throughout Latin America. In turn, the project of hemispheric peace and commerce depended upon an ever-growing quest for knowledge, an insatiable demand for new discoveries that promised to mobilize intellectual energies and financial resources for decades. It was the demand for knowledge that conveyed permanency to the US hegemonic project. For once Wilson, Barrett, and Rowe were gone, the institutions that promoted intellectual cooperation would continue to generate a multiplicity of micro-encounters between North and South. Students from South America would continue to flow into US universities, and vice versa, as US students would gather evidence in South America for their master’s or doctoral theses.

This project of intellectual cooperation, as envisioned by this generation of scholars and diplomats around the time of World War I, would remain the cornerstone of US foreign policy, at least until the cold war era. In fact, the mutations experimented by the Monroe Doctrine during these years of the productive rediscovery of South America (the multilateral interpretation of it, the acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, the exchanges of experts, the several arbitration committees) would later become the foundations of the Organization of American States. The policies developed during this period would function as the basic infrastructure of the United States’ informal empire in Latin America. In this regard, the years of “good

feelings” brought about by the Good Neighbor policy can be conceived as the continuity and deepening of practices and ideas initiated as the result of the early-twentieth-century US “rediscovery” of progress and stability in South America.

The institutions founded during this period created practices that established a continuous flow of students and scholars, kept the interest in South America high among US scholars, and gradually and persistently disseminated among South American intellectual circles the ideas that the United States was the new beacon of Western civilization and its universities the custodians of the treasures of knowledge. In time (between 1900 and 1940), South American scholars and students gradually changed the destination of their academic pilgrimage from Europe to the United States. The Mecca of knowledge moved to North America, exerting a continuous attraction to generations of middle-class South Americans. The workings of empire were apparent in Nelson’s advice to Argentine parents to send their children to US schools: *there was the source of freedom, the school of self-government, and the elements to build the psychological infrastructure of modernity.*

The workings of empire appeared in classes of government, constitutional law, and political economy. There, in university classrooms, South American professors posed the comparison between the constitutions and political forms of North and South America at the center of the stage. Already in the post-WWI period, US scholars addressed the now fashionable question of how institutional structures (Anglo American versus Spanish American colonialism) shaped the path of economic progress. Leo Rowe contributed one perspective to the discourse of Pan-American cooperation and knowledge transfer. His office as director of the Pan American Union, the books accumulated at the Columbus Memorial Library, and his frequent visits to Latin America gave him the instruments to understand better one crucial aspect of Latin American society: its political and institutional development vis-à-vis the United States. From his practices of comparing the two sides of the Great Divide (Central America and the Circum-Caribbean versus South America) came a new understanding of the region as a whole that was presented as a foreign-policy program: “intellectual cooperation.” His visit, combined with that of many other scholars during this era of rediscovery, made the “problems” of the region legible to US academics and statesmen.

Through his speeches, receptions, and translations, Rowe was able to engage Latin American scholars, functionaries, and political leaders in a discussion about the character and condition of “the Americas.” In South America, as at Penn, Yale, Harvard, Berkeley, etc., the divergence and convergence of the two Americas became a recurrent theme because the empire had made South America into a field of study. To an extent, the US informal empire had managed to incorporate the subcontinent into its own sphere of scientific and humanistic concerns. Leo Rowe was, to this extent, one of the most important contributors to this flow of communications and concerns. To the degree that he did so, he became an

intellectual of hemispheric scope, someone who could reduce the complexity of governance, education, and the law in the Americas into simpler stylized models.

Notes

I thank Juan Pablo Scarfi for his excellent selections of material and bibliographic research. Funds for this project were provided by the Argentine “Agencia para la Promoción de la Ciencia y la Tecnología” (PICT 2002-05, no. 12205). Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers who helped me to clarify my writing.

¹ The word “neocolonial,” or even “imperial,” here refers to two characteristics of North American scholars in South America: (a) the circumstance of having worked in formal protectorates of the United States and, hence, having acquired knowledge about colonial governance; and (b) the ample visibility that empire provides them—the possibility, for example, of comparing various Hispanic American societies and governments. A subaltern or peripheral scholar (most of whom we call here “local intellectuals”) lacks this global or comprehensive vision. At most, local scholars are able to use evidence gathered in their contact with Europe as a counterpoint to the “truths” presented by North American scholars.

² See in particular Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds. *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.–Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Fred Rosen, ed. *Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); and Greg Grandin, *Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

³ See, among others, Marietta Messmer, “Toward an Inter-American Literary Historiography?” in *Hybrid Americas: Contacts, Contrasts, and Confluences in New World Literatures and Cultures*, ed. Josef Raab and Martin Butler (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008), 279–93; Claire Fox, “Commentary: The Transnational Turn and the Hemispheric Return,” *American Literary History* 18, no. 3 (2006): 638–47; Jon Smith and Deborah Cohn, eds., *Look Away! The U.S. South in New World Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Claudia Sadowski-Smith and Claire F. Fox, “Theorizing the Hemisphere: Inter-Americas Work at the Intersection of American, Canadian, and Latin American Studies,” *Comparative American Studies* 2, no. 1 (2004): 5–38; and Sandhya Shukla and Heidi Tinsman, eds., *Imagining Our Americas: Toward a Transnational Frame* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

⁴ Exceptions in this regard are Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 1898–1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); and Ileana Rodríguez, *Transatlantic Topographies: Islands, Highlands, Jungles* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

⁵ Sumner Welles, “In Memoriam: Dr. Leo S. Rowe,” *The Americas* 3, no. 3 (1947): 363.

⁶ John D. Martz, "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a Region," *Latin American Research Review* 6, no. 1 (1971): 74.

⁷ Edward T. Silva and Sheila Slaughter, "Prometheus Bound: The Limits of Social Science Professionalization in the Progressive Period," *Theory and Society* 9, no. 6 (1980): 794.

⁸ Two early essays by Rowe built on this idea of intellectual cooperation: Leo S. Rowe, "Our Interest in a United America," *North American Review* 189, no. 4 (1909): 587–93; and more explicitly in "The Need for a Constructive American Foreign Policy," *Political Quarterly* 4 (1914): 17–37.

⁹ The question of the contrast between a formal federalism and a real centralization in government—the concern of Rodolfo Rivarola and José Nicolás Matienzo, among others—became an important theme for Rowe.

¹⁰ Later on, Posada wrote the introduction to the Spanish translation of Rowe's book on municipal government.

¹¹ Argentina's changing position in international affairs and the world economy is discussed in Ricardo D. Salvatore, "The Unsettling Location of a Settler Nation: Argentina, from Settler Economy to Failed Developing Nation," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 107, no. 4 (2008): 755–89.

¹² For example, Rivarola directed the *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, Zeballos directed the *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, and Mercante was the editor of *Archivos de Pedagogía y Ciencias Afines*.

¹³ Like US progressives, they were believers in the power of science and aware that social experts were needed to carry out social reforms.

¹⁴ In fact, the year Rowe delivered his talks in Buenos Aires, the Museo Social Argentino was promoting the cause of "neutral rights."

¹⁵ When in the 1930s the world shifted in the direction of economic regulation and protectionism, they felt nostalgic about the good old days of the gold standard and free trade.

¹⁶ See Leo S. Rowe, *The Federal System of the Argentine Republic* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution, 1921).

¹⁷ See Rowe, "Need for a Constructive American Foreign Policy."

¹⁸ See Leo S. Rowe, "Alcance de las obligaciones de los Estados Unidos respecto de Méjico," *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas* 9, no. 50 (1914): 125–35. Later, in the 1920s, he insisted upon the need to separate the basic or original Monroe Doctrine from other principles that were later added to them. These other principles (for instance the so-called Roosevelt Corollary) were also sustainable, but not on the basis of protecting the American continent from European influence. They constituted solid foreign-policy principles that were based, rather, on the need for national self-defense. See Leo S. Rowe, "Inter-American Problems" (paper presented at the Latin American Seminar at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, October 1927).

¹⁹ David Sheinin, "Flaccid Anti-Americanism: Argentine Relations with the United States at the Turn of the Century" (paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Congress, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17–19, 1997).

²⁰ He completed his master's degree at the Wharton School under Rowe.

²¹ The Drago Doctrine established that the nonpayment of foreign debts did not give creditor nations any right to intervene in a weaker nation. The Calvo Doctrine promoted nonintervention in the affairs of other nations. The doctrine asserted that nations were not responsible for the assets lost by foreigners as results of internal conflicts or civil wars. Not being responsible, they were not liable to foreign interventions.

²² See Enrique Gil, "El Panamericanismo ante la Tradición de la Política Internacional Argentina," *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas* 12, no. 69 (1916): 247–60. Quoting President Wilson, he said that Pan-Americanism was "the concrete expression of the spirit of law, independence, liberty, and mutual help."

²³ See Raymundo Wilmart, "Sociología Internacional: El Panamericanismo; Su posible acción," *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas* 8, no. 45 (1914): 237–48.

²⁴ See Estanislao Zeballos, "Theodore Roosevelt y la Política Internacional Americana," *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* 46 (1913): 545–76.

²⁵ Roosevelt came to Buenos Aires to promote a similar argument: that Argentina was so advanced as a nation, by its civilization, wealth, and political stability, that it could help the United States to "discipline" the unstable neighbors of South America while the US took care of the "undisciplined" nations of the Caribbean and Central America.

²⁶ Theodore Roosevelt's lectures at the Colón Theatre in Buenos Aires on the 7th and 10th of November 1913 were reproduced as "Las Conferencias de Roosevelt," *Boletín del Museo Social Argentino* 2, no. 23 (1913): 382–407, 500–4, and 511–16.

²⁷ Emilio Frers, introduction to *Ideales de la democracia: Conferencia dada en el teatro Colón el teatro Colón el Viernes 7 de Noviembre de 1913*, by Theodore Roosevelt (Buenos Aires: Coni, 1913), emphasis mine. Frers' introduction to Roosevelt is also included in Roosevelt, "Conferencias de Roosevelt"; and "La Visita de Roosevelt," *Boletín del Museo Social Argentino* 2, no. 24 (1913): 473–516.

²⁸ See Emilio Frers, "El Museo Social Argentino y la Dotación Carnegie," *Boletín del Museo Social Argentino* 4 (1915): 205–9.

²⁹ See Manuel Ugarte, "Los Estados Unidos y la América del Sur," *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* 35 (1910): 496–513.

³⁰ See Thomas F. McGann, *Argentina, the United States, and the Inter-American System, 1880–1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).

³¹ Oscar Terán, "El Espiritualismo y la Creación del Anti-imperialismo Latinoamericano," in *Culturas imperiales: Experiencia y representación en América, Asia y África*, ed. Ricardo D. Salvatore (Rosario, Argentina: Beatriz Viterbo Editora, 2005), 301–14.

³² The conferences were published a year later as Leo S. Rowe, *Problemas Americanos: Conferencias por L. S. Rowe con un prólogo del Dr. Joaquín V. González* (La Plata: Talleres Gráficos Christmann y Crespo, 1915).

³³ In fact, aside from legal tracts or constitutional books, there was little on the shelves of Argentine libraries and bookstores that provided any contemporary information about the United States.

³⁴ See Rowe, *Problemas Americanos*, 30–32.

³⁵ To be sure, Rowe did not discuss the presence of “political machines” and “yellow journalism” as obstacles to democracy.

³⁶ Natalio Botana, following Juan Bautista Alberdi, calls this system of elitist government “*la República Posible*.” See Natalio Botana, *La tradición republicana: Alberdi, Sarmiento y las ideas políticas de su tiempo* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984).

³⁷ Progressives tried to push a new agenda of social reform and economic regulation by presenting themselves as experts in economics, sociology, and government. See Silva and Slaughter, “Prometheus Bound,” 781–819.

³⁸ Eduardo Zimmermann’s *Los liberales reformistas* sustains the opposite view. A group of the Argentine intelligentsia was actively and consciously promoting reforms for elevating the welfare of the masses before the arrival of Peronism. See Eduardo A. Zimmermann, *Los liberales reformistas: La cuestión social en la Argentina, 1890–1916* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1995). See also Eduardo A. Zimmermann, “Racial Ideas and Social Reform: Argentina, 1890–1916,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 72, no. 1 (1992): 23–46.

³⁹ Leo S. Rowe, “La Opinión Pública como Factor de las Democracias Americanas,” *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* 32 (1909): 312–22.

⁴⁰ In the postwar period, socialists confronted foreign monopolies of public utilities at the municipal level, while the new Radical Party challenged US and British capitalists in the areas of petroleum extraction. In the 1920s, Argentine cattle interests challenged the US-British monopoly of meat refrigeration for export.

⁴¹ See Darío Roldán, ed., *Crear la democracia: La “Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas” y el debate en torno de la República Verdadera* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006).

⁴² See Rodolfo Rivarola, *Partidos políticos: Unitario y federal; Ensayo de política* (Buenos Aires: Lajouane, 1904).

⁴³ In 1934, his wife published a summary of his “philosophy.” Among these collections of statements, one could read the following: “Sólo la ilusión de la democracia ha podido crear esta equivalencia de los individuos en la acción política y en el deber cívico, soberbia mentira convencional, en presencia de sucesos que constituyeron la vida política del país, como fue mentira soberbia la fórmula de la aristocracia de sangre, si a ella se atribuyó de inmediato la virtud supuesta de la estirpe, y no sólo la partícula atribuible a la herencia.” Rodolfo Rivarola,

Filosofía dispersa y amable de Rodolfo Rivarola para educadores y educandos, ed. Olga Tamarsi de Rivarola (Buenos Aires: Roldán, 1934), 80.

⁴⁴ Rodolfo Rivarola, “La Élite o Selección Necesaria,” *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas* 8, no. 47 (1914): 534–35.

⁴⁵ See Zeballos, “Theodore Roosevelt.”

⁴⁶ Rodolfo Rivarola, “El Dr. Estanislao S. Zeballos,” *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas* 27, no. 149 (1923–1924): 31–32.

⁴⁷ See Wilmart, “Sociología Internacional.”

⁴⁸ Matienzo was a “radical anti-personalista”—and the minister of interior of President Marcelo T. de Alvear during 1922–1923; consequently, he was opposed to President Yrigoyen. In his view, Yrigoyen’s second presidency had violated important constitutional provisions. So he welcomed the revolution of 1930 as a reflection of the shift in public opinion. See José Nicolás Matienzo, *La revolución de 1930 y los problemas de la democracia Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Librería Anaconda, 1930).

⁴⁹ José Nicolás Matienzo, *El gobierno representativo federal en la República Argentina* (Madrid: Editorial América, 1917), 13.

⁵⁰ José Nicolás Matienzo, *Los deberes de la democracia* (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos de Selin Suárez, 1914), 19–20.

⁵¹ See José Nicolás Matienzo, “El Gobierno de la Opinión Pública,” *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas* 10, no. 59 (1915): 433–50.

⁵² See José Nicolás Matienzo, *La ley de las generaciones en la política argentina* (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso, 1930).

⁵³ *Caudillismo* is a form of political leadership based on local clientelism, personal influence, and the use of private armies.

⁵⁴ The whiteness that made Zeballos proud was in actuality the attribute of part of the Argentine population: most of the Creole population from the interior provinces was dark-skinned.

⁵⁵ On the main tenets of both authors’ conceptions of government, see Botana, *La tradición republicana*.

⁵⁶ See Agustín Alvarez, *La creación del mundo moral, tres conferencias dadas en la Sociedad Científica Argentina, 1912* (Buenos Aires: La Cultura Argentina, 1915). Evoking Sarmiento was a common resource for writers dealing with the similarities in the educational projects of Argentina and the United States. Sarmiento’s “Conflictos y armonías de las razas” was often quoted in order to explain the paradox that similar educational investment had engendered quite different political traditions. See Alfredo Colmo, “Sarmiento y los Estados Unidos,” *Boletín del Museo Social Argentino* 4 (1915): 555–68.

⁵⁷ See Ernesto Nelson, “Un experimento transcendental en la educación argentina: El Internado del Colegio Nacional de la Universidad de la Plata,” *Boletín del Museo Social Argentino* 2 (1912): 209–69.

⁵⁸ While the minister of instruction, he had drafted the most progressive project of labor code in 1904, a code not enacted during this period. To draft this code, he commissioned socialist physician Biale Massé to travel across Argentina to survey working conditions.

⁵⁹ See Joaquín V. Gonzales, “El Colegio y la Universidad,” *Archivos de Pedagogía y Ciencias Afines* 2 (1907): 393–416.

⁶⁰ One could argue that this was a form of “pragmatism” and, as such, a truly American development. But this would require forgetting the influence of English, Austrian, German, and Swiss educational innovations.

⁶¹ See Gonzales, “El Colegio y la Universidad.”

⁶² González was also a promoter of female education. He created a women’s college (*profesorado*) within the university.

⁶³ See Rodolfo Rivarola, *Universidad social: Teoría de la universidad moderna* (Buenos Aires: Librería La Facultad, 1915), 34–44.

⁶⁴ Joaquín V. Gonzalez, *Política espiritual* (Buenos Aires: Lajouane, 1910), 40.

⁶⁵ See Enrique Gil, “Impresión de un argentino sobre Estados Unidos,” in *Evolución del Panamericanismo* (Buenos Aires: Librería de Jesús Menendez, 1933), 333–37.

⁶⁶ Especially, a certain degree of anti-American feeling emerged with the discussion about the Beef Trust in Congress in 1913–1922 and later, during the conflict between Standard Oil and the province of Salta in 1928.

⁶⁷ Enrique Gil, *Por qué envié a mi hijo a una escuela de los Estados Unidos* (Buenos Aires: ICANA, 1939).

⁶⁸ Following his teacher Ernesto Nelson, Gil recommended Argentines not to send undergraduate boys to the US, for at this age there was a danger of “extranjerización.” He recommended, instead, that students complete their graduate education in the United States, once they knew what they wanted to study and had a sense of the country’s problems.

⁶⁹ See Enrique Gil, *¿Debe suspenderse el servicio de la deuda externa?* (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos “Fermi,” 1932).

⁷⁰ See Enrique Gil, *Breve juicio sobre el momento social, político y económico de los Estados Unidos* (Buenos Aires: Revista Veritas, 1938).

⁷¹ Enrique Gil was in this regard exceptional. Few in Latin America understood at this time the importance and significance of New Deal policies.

⁷² Elsewhere, I have underscored the importance of US advertising and goods (automobiles, tires, typewriters, perfumery, and health products) in the transformation of Argentine consumer culture. See Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Yankee Advertising in Buenos Aires: Reflections on Americanization," *Interventions* 7, no. 2 (2005): 216–35. On the commercial conquest of South America by US companies, see Ricardo Salvatore, "Early American Visions of a Hemispheric Market in South America," in *Transnational America: The Fading of Borders in the Western Hemisphere*, ed. Berndt Ostendorf (Heidelberg: C. Winter Verlag, 2002), 45–64.

⁷³ See Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Helen Delpar, *The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United States and Mexico, 1920–1935* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992); Berger, *Under Northern Eyes*; Thomas F. O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900–1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Louis A. Pérez, *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). Among the more recent contributions to this growing area of scholarship, we need to mention Gretchen Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Ricardo D. Salvatore, *Imágenes de un imperio: Estados Unidos y las formas de representación de América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2006); Messmer, "Toward an Inter-American Literary Historiography?"; Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); and Claire Fox, "The Hemispheric Routes of 'El nuevo arte nuestro': The Pan American Union, Cultural Policy, and the Cold War," in *Hemispheric American Studies*, ed. Caroline Field Levander and Robert S. Levine (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008). Moved by a different agenda, a group of scholars have been producing innovative work in the field of hemispheric literary studies. See Smith and Cohn, *Look Away!*; Claire Fox, "Comparative Literary Studies of the Americas," *American Literature* 76, no. 4 (2004): 871–86; Shukla and Tinsman, *Imagining Our Americas*; and Levander and Levine, *Hemispheric American Studies*.

⁷⁴ The idea of an imperial hegemony in knowledge is further developed in Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Local versus Imperial Knowledge: Reflections upon Hiram Bingham and the Yale Peruvian Expedition," *Nepantla* 4, no. 1 (2003): 67–80; and Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Library Accumulation and the Emergence of Latin American Studies," *Comparative American Studies* 3, no. 4 (2005): 415–36.