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Traditional Authority in the State: Chiefs, Elections and Taxation in Ghana

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Nicole Bonoff

Committee in charge:

Professor Clark Gibson, Chair
Professor Karen Ferree, Co-Chair
Professor Stephan Haggard
Professor Edmund Malesky
Professor Craig McIntosh

2016

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The Dissertation of Nicole Bonoff is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

Co-Chair

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2016

Dedication

For my mother, Susan Bonoff. Thank you for inspiring my love of learning and tolerating my incessant questions.

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Chapter 1 through 8 in part are currently being prepared for submission for publication of the material. Bonoff, Nicole. The disseration author was the primary investigator and author of this material.

Vita

2007	Bachelor of Arts with Honors, Stanford University
2007	Bachelor of Science, Stanford University
2009	Master of Arts, University of California, San Diego
2013-Present	Democracy Fellow, US Agency for International Development
2016	Doctor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Traditional Authority in the State:

Chiefs, Elections and Taxation in Ghana

by

Nicole Bonoff

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2016

Professor Clark Gibson, Chair

Professor Karen Ferree, Co-Chair

This dissertation addresses the role that tribal chiefs play in electoral politics in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily local politics in Ghana. To examine these issues, the dissertation uses a combination of cross-national public opinion survey data along with original survey data from approximately 3000 households in southern Ghana. The argument put forth in the dissertation is that strong chiefs serve as vote mobilizers for local candidates in exchange for being allowed to extract informal taxation.

This collusion is hypothesized to lead to increased individual turnout in elections, decreased electoral competitiveness, and decreased quality of public service delivery. Methodologically, the dissertation estimates a measure of chiefly power using households' contributions of informal taxation, typically in the form on in-kind communal labor. In order to address the causal inference problem of studying informal political institutions, the dissertation uses a natural experiment of early 20th century railroads that are argued to have weakened the cultural power of chiefs. The findings support the idea that strong chiefs drive voter turnout in local elections, leading to less competition. However, the public service delivery and welfare consequences of strong traditional authority institutions are more muted.

1

Why are there Chiefs in Democracies?

1.1 Introduction

What are the politics of traditional authority in the modern state? How can hereditary chiefs and formal governments coexist? Scholars of Africa usually depict traditional authority as antagonistic to the power of elected officials. More recent work pushes beyond this framework and includes the possibility of the state co-opting traditional authority. But numerous examples exist in which traditional authorities appear to retain influence beyond acting as agents for the state - even international donor organizations complain about the "meddling" of traditional authorities in their programming (Kleist 2011). If traditional authorities retain any power, it is likely due to the benefits that formal political leaders derive from their continued existence.

I hypothesize that a collaborative relationship exists between elected local politicians and local chiefs. I argue that to increase their chances for electoral success, politicians will seek to recruit chiefs to mobilize citizens to vote on their behalf. In exchange for this service, chiefs gain greater fiscal autonomy with less government interference. This trade of services between chiefs and politicians both enriches chiefs financially and increases their legitimacy as powerful figures in the community. In addition, with more power comes an increased ability to deliver the vote. The tran-

sition to democracy has increased the value of strong chiefs as politicians search for credible clientelistic agents. This form of collusion produces complementarities between formal and informal governance as they can become reinforcing with respect to power.

The existence of powerful chiefs shapes important political and economic institutions at a cost to citizens. The collusion between officials and chiefs weakens the electoral connections between politicians and citizens, ultimately decreasing democratic competition, accountability, and good governance. As money flows from the government to informal authority, the quality of public services suffers. However, not all chiefs enjoy the same ability to deliver the vote. The variation in outcomes will be influenced by cultural norms (such as the role of traditional elders in adjudicating personal matters), and structural variables that affect the chief's ability to wield social sanctions. Such factors will therefore influence politicians' desire to enter into a partnership with particular chiefs. Culturally strong chiefs are likely to make the best voter mobilizers.

To understand this political environment, I use informal taxation as a proxy measure of chiefly authority and power. I define informal taxation as money or in-kind communal labor, including tribute, voluntarily contributed to local unelected officials, with the expectation that some percentage of that revenue will go toward providing local public goods. Tax collection is considered by many scholars to be the most important indicator of state power, both defining and measuring state authority. In this political environment, though, politicians are voluntarily willing to devolve that power to chiefs – despite their status as potential rivals – to enhance their electoral successes.

In this dissertation, I test these theories using original survey data from Ghana collected in 2012. To overcome the problem of the endogeneity of chiefly authority

and politics, I utilize a set of unique historic circumstances in early transportation networks to produce a natural experiment that treats for the levels of traditional power. I use this exogenous treatment variable to instrument for current levels of chiefly authority as measured by fiscal autonomy, and then use these estimations to examine electoral and public service delivery outcomes.

1.2 Previous Approaches to the Study of Traditional Authority

The importance of traditional authority in developing countries should not be underestimated. Though it takes the form of chiefs in Africa, traditional authority exists throughout the world as elders, religious leaders, or even rebel leaders. Traditional authorities hold great sway over the behavior of citizens, influencing social customs, economic behavior, and in this project, political decision-making (van de Walle 2007). In countries with weak institutional capacity, traditional authority can fill the role of development-coordinators and fiscal actors. Though traditional authority in a modern government acts similar to many of the civil society groups that coordinate citizens, it derives its power and authority from less than democratic sources such as heredity or custom (Mamdani 1996). These characteristics produced much of the documented ideological animosity between traditional authority and representative government, yet also make the institution more attractive for collaboration in an electoral environment. With the ability to regulate the power of traditional authority, politicians have the means to enhance their own prospects while improving the welfare of chiefs. This is not the politics of cooptation and coercion on the part of politicians, but rather represents mutually beneficial exchange. These issues are exacerbated by democratic

transition as government officials are forced to compete for the affections of citizens.

Weber (1922/1958) defines traditional authority as that which gains legitimacy through the sanctity of tradition. This is distinct from rational-legal authority, which is manifested mostly in the bureaucratic state, and maintains power through support of the normative rules (i.e. laws) and those who issue them. The existence of traditional authority in many of these developing countries is intriguing in itself. Weber imagined that societies generally transitioned from traditional to rational-legal authority in a linear fashion, without the two ever necessarily coexisting. In the case of Africa, chieftaincies are islands of non-elected government within democratic states. They have large support from the citizens, the same citizens who also support democracy (Logan 2013, 2009). Sklar (1999*a*; 1999*b*) refers to this unique arrangement as "mixed government" or "mixed polity," arguing that African countries displayed dual authority between traditional and legal rulers who codetermined governance. It is unclear why governments would allow these traditional authority figures to hold power if it took away from their own authority. In this section, I will address previous approaches to the study of traditional authority, in Africa and beyond. Included within this umbrella, I also describe other forms of non-governmental authority found in developed and developing countries.

Some of the foundational political science literature that touches upon issues of traditional authority on a theoretical level does not mention it by name. Coming out of the new institutionalist framework, this scholarship seeks to explain how institutions of enforcement arise and are sustained through social norms and sanctions (Milgrom and North 1990; Ostrom 1990). This approach differs dramatically from the anthropological and descriptive work that has defined studies of traditional and informal authority for most of the 20th century (Rattray 1923; Hill 1963; Goody and Goody 1966, 1967; Goody 1969).

The importance of social norms in regulating informal institutions has also been studied explicitly in Africa. However, the focus has been on the characteristics of a community that inhibit trust necessary for exchange or collective action. Of these characteristics, ethnic diversity has received the most attention. This literature finds that ethnic heterogeneity within a community leads to lower levels of investment in public services. The first explanation for this finding lies in different preferences for investment between non-co-ethnics (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999, Alesina and LaFerrara 2002). The community, plagued by disagreement, then under-produces services. However, more recent studies have moved beyond this first theory, looking toward the issues of norms and social sanctions. Co-ethnics, by the nature of being in the same social network, have both the ability to monitor behavior and punish misbehavior effectively. In highly diverse settings, individuals have the personal incentive to shirk their obligations toward the community as there is no punishment for free-riding. Habyarimana et al. (2007) use experimental games between non-co-ethnics to attribute these findings to both a technological mechanism about the ability to coordinate, as described above, as well as a strategic selection mechanism. The subtle difference between the two is that the technological explanation would imply that non-co-ethnics cannot punish each other, while the strategy selection explanation claims that only co-ethnics choose to punish.

The studies described above focus on voluntary non-governmental contributions to informal public services and the norms that bind people. Alternatively, Tsai (2007) examines how informal norms of accountability influence government decision-making. She finds that in rural Chinese villages, when local leaders are connected to the villagers by temples and family lineages, these leaders are more likely to produce public goods than leaders who are outside the social network. These "solidarity groups," as she labels them, provide the criteria that members of the community

are judged against to determine moral standing, while at the same time providing a public forum for politicians to publicize their good behavior. Through this study, Tsai expands upon the role that traditional institutions, such as religious organizations, play in public expenditures, norms, and social sanctioning. Furthermore, and in contrast to the finding that ethnic diversity harms public service provision, other scholars find that it can increase norms of cooperation in environments such as formal legislatures where there are institutional incentives for reciprocity and logrolling (Gibson and Hoffman 2013). This, in turn, increases expenditure levels.

While the previous body of literature addresses ethnicity in the contexts of informal associations or government decision-making, it does not discuss the role of traditional authority directly. The previous research on traditional authority in Africa has tended to focus on the effect of colonialism and decolonization on chieftaincy, rather than on modern, democratic politics (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson (2014); Berry (2001); Boone (2003); Firmin-Sellers (1996); Grischow (2006); Nugent (1996)). This literature also tends to dismiss strategic incentives on the part of the traditional authority. Rather, scholars depict these groups as passive, bending to the whims of government officials. This characterization helps explain the systematic attempts by early pro-independence governments to eliminate chieftaincy, which was seen as harming the legitimacy of this new legal authority especially after past cooperation with colonial officials (Nugent 1996; Mamdani 1996). In a cross-national study of West Africa, Boone (2003) describes how colonial and post-colonial governments interfaced with different types of chieftaincies. Boone argues that state-periphery relations were dependent on the level of hierarchy already present in rural populations ruled by chiefs, the value of economic assets in the area, and the economic dependence of the traditional elites on the state. Power sharing only arose with deconcentrated institutional structures and devolved authority to local elites. This

arrangement looked similar to the indirect rule utilized by the British throughout the colonial world, with government officials relying on chiefs to run much of the day-to-day operations of the state. In his study of Ghana, Lund (2008) argues that the government intentionally co-opted the native property rights structures to empower itself at the expense of certain traditional leaders. Independent governments in Ghana no longer tried to match administrative boundaries with chiefdoms, and instead created local governments with jurisdictions by population. Though also a study of Ghanaian property rights, Firmin-Sellers (1996) attributes all the strategic power to chiefs, stripping state actors of agency. She hypothesizes that with the introduction of colonial government, different Ghanaian chieftaincies altered property rights institutions themselves to curry favor with the government.

Though some scholars have attempted to address modern political environments, these works take an astrategic view of politics that makes it difficult to generalize these theories to other political contexts. In many ways a follow-up to Boone (2003), MacLean (2010) attempts to connect the literature on the effect of governmental policy on traditional institutions with the literature on social norms written by Miguel and Gugerty (2005). MacLean conducts an in-depth comparative assessment of four Akan villages, two in Brong Ahafo, Ghana and two in Abengourou, Cote d'Ivoire. With this study, she attempts to understand how informal reciprocity has been affected by national-level government policies. She defines informal reciprocity as an exchange of money and in-kind support to extended family members, community or ethnic group. MacLean finds that in Ghana, there is less informal reciprocity, but it has a broad base that extends to the village-community level. In Cote d'Ivoire, people give more of their income to one another, but only within close families. The author theorizes that these differences are the result of government policies, existing since the colonial era, that emphasized different levels of governance and citizen-

ship. In Ghana, indirect rule transformed into decentralization, which emphasized the village-level notion of citizenship and norms of reciprocity. This decentralized environment results in citizens taking their grievances to local elites, both elected and unelected, creating a system of localized authority and patronage. In contrast, Cote d'Ivoire has had a history of statist and highly centralized governance which emphasized the role of the family unit.

1.3 The Resurgence of Traditional Authority

Overall these studies, which tend to focus on the colonial or independence periods, do not create a complete picture of the politics of traditional authority. The theories often do not ascribe specific incentives or strategies to the chieftaincies or states. Additionally, these studies about early governance do not necessarily apply to modern state-traditional authority relations. Instead of taking place in the context of competitive electoral politics, these theories arise from periods of undemocratic government and rule by decree.

These gaps in the scholarly literature leave us less well equipped to understand the renaissance in traditional political systems that has occurred after democratization swept over the African continent in the 1990s. Englebert (2002) carefully catalogs this pattern, noting the constitutional recognition of chieftaincy in Ghana and Uganda with similar demands coming from Nigerian chiefs, the use of local associations in policing and justice in Tanzania, and the rise of traditionally-ruled militias and rebel groups in Cameroon, Rwanda and Congo. Yet, Englebert remains puzzled as to why these traditional leaders are reasserting their legitimacy when there are few signs of the formal state relinquishing its control on resources or of the traditional

leaders being viable substitutes for state decentralization in the pursuit of development. Taking a different view, Williams (2010; pg. 19) writes of modern South Africa that, "even though both the democratic state institutions and the chieftaincy want to exercise exclusive social control in the rural area, the reality is that neither is able to do so completely [...] To remain relevant at the local level, both the state institutions and the chieftaincy are forced to share sovereignty." This points to a more mutualistic relationship between the state and informal authority as electoral institutions develop, rather than the waning of democratic consolidation or traditional authority structures. Elections and the need for politicians to attract voters has increased the value of chiefs, since traditional leaders can coordinate behavior.

There have been more recent research attempts to explicitly and quantitatively address the role of traditional authority in modern electoral politics. Building off of Chandra (2004), Lundgren (2009) and Lundgren et al. (2010) examine what role chiefs in Sierra Leone play in patronage networks. These papers find that members of elite traditional families receive a greater number of favors and private goods from the government than the average citizen. They hypothesize that this patronage allows politicians to facilitate vote mobilization vis-a-vis influence from the chiefs. However, these works conflate different levels of chieftaincy, from paramount chiefs to village heads, who would presumably mobilize voters at different levels of government. Additionally, the question of voter mobilization and electoral outcomes is not empirically tested; rather, the authors assumed this outcome would occur as a natural consequence of patronage. Lastly, only tangible goods, like agricultural support and private toilets, are included in the measure of private favors. This excludes the possibility of more systematic ways government officials enrich chiefs. In South Africa, de Kadt and Larreguy (2014) demonstrate that the Bantustan ethnic group rewards the dominant African National Congress (ANC) party at such a rate to give

the party unilateral control over constitutional changes. The authors argue this voting pattern is due to vote-buying and turnout pressure from chiefs who support the ANC, an alliance that evolved in the post-apartheid era despite traditional leaders' previous association with anti-democratic rule (van Kessel and Oomen 1997). In a similar study, Baldwin (2013) examines the role of chiefs in the electoral process in Zambia. Unlike Lundgren et al. (2010), who take the position that chiefs dupe citizens into voting for their favored candidates, Baldwin asks whether following the chief's counsel can enrich the average citizen. She finds that when the chief and a Member of Parliament (MP) have a long-standing relationship, measured by years of overlapping tenure, the government provides a greater number of public goods in those communities. By maintaining a long-standing relationship between chief and MP, citizens can improve their quality of life. In the case of Zambia, patronage politics become economically rational for average people. These works show that there remains a deep role for traditional authority in modern electoral politics.

Other scholarly approaches to traditional and informal authority step back from the question of electoral process and re-examine the historically important financial incentives that drive arrangements like devolution of power, or the fiscal outcomes of such power relationships. Levi (1989), in a string of historical vignettes ranging from the Roman Empire to the British Empire, argues that governments empower already-present local elites for the sake of efficiency. Specifically regarding this issue of taxation, these elites knew where revenue existed to be extracted. The greater local information of indigenous elites resulted in higher tax returns for the government officials. Levi furthers this efficiency argument with her discussion of tax farming. By allowing tax collectors to keep a share of the revenue collected, this incentivized these individuals to collect the most money possible. Systems like tax farming and indirect rule represent forms of delegation that unburden the ruling government while at the

same time increasing revenue streams. Similarly, the self-help system described by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) can also be seen as an efficiency-improving mechanism. Mbithi and Rasmusson (1977) describe this system as a form of local decentralization that allows people to more effectively allocate public resources towards needed expenditures. From 1967 to 1973, 11.4% of national public works in Kenya used community self-help funds, and that system still exists today. Looking specifically at the role of chiefs in public service creation in Sierra Leone, Acemoglu et al. (2014) find a more disturbing result. Using fine-grained data that measures competitiveness within chieftaincy for control over traditional rule, they find that those areas with less competition for the throne have worse development outcomes across the board, implying that these chiefs do not have to compete for the affections of their people. Interestingly, they also find that the non-competitive chieftaincies have higher levels of social capital, participation, and support for chieftaincy as an institution, which they argue is a result of these informal and traditional institutions being engineered in these societies to explicitly support despotic rule by elites. Rather than being civically-minded, citizens in these communities are compelled by strong social norms to sustain traditional governance structures.

Taking a more systematic approach on fiscal governance, Olken and Singhal (2011) examine this decentralization and community self-help, or what they label informal taxation, cross-nationally. Informal taxation is defined by them as "a system of local public goods finance coordinated by public officials but enforced socially rather than through the formal legal system." The authors describe a system of revenue collection familiar to those who study developing countries: local leaders come together and assign households a certain amount of money or in-kind communal labor to complete a project for their community, like building a road or an irrigation channel. In their cross-country study using surveys, they find that between 20% and

50% of respondents have contributed informal taxes at some point over the past year. Though these taxes represent a small share of total taxes paid by households (0.48% to 26.80%), Olken and Singhal claim that in some cases informal taxes triple the estimates of locally collected revenue. The authors argue that officials delegate taxation to local elites for efficiency gains in both the extraction of revenue and the production of capital improvement projects. Local village leaders know where revenue exists and they can help effectively coordinate the opinions of the community regarding expenditures. Lastly, these local elites can monitor in-kind communal labor to ensure there are no free-riders in the production and use of public goods. Olken and Singhal argue that these state-traditional authority relations can be better understood through the lens of efficiency, not patronage.

Though not the focus of her work, MacLean (2010) alludes to the importance of communal labor in certain African countries. In Ghana, she finds high participation in communal labor development projects that were organized by local elites like chiefs. She writes that communal labor forms a large part of informal reciprocity in Ghana due to the village-level notion of citizenship. Public opinion in her case-villages was that the labor was "enforceable" and "evenly distributed among residents" (MacLean 2010; pg. 211). Villagers also spoke of communal labor as their obligation to the state. In contrast, there was little evidence of communal labor in Cote d'Ivoire, and villagers thought that communal labor was evidence of the failure of the state to implement its own development projects. MacLean envisions communal labor as an outgrowth of other social norms, not part of political or economic decision-making. While social shaming remains a component of community self-help and informal taxation, this system falls within the realm of semi-voluntary contribution that Levi (1989) also describes. These funds in these studies do not accrue because elites are forcibly extracting tribute, nor do people contribute due to ideological fervor. Rather, this

community self-help represents a clear exchange of revenue for needed services, like education or roads.

Although the above literature explores various aspects of the formation of informal authority, and of the relationship of formal authority to the state, none of the studies offer a complete picture of these topics. In the case of contemporary electoral politics, traditional authority would appear to be a threat to sovereign legitimacy, something to be rooted out. This characterization conforms to the work of Milgrom and North (1990), who describes how an institution arises out of legal anarchy such as informal norms, replacing it like Weber (1922/1958) predicted. Observationally, though, the modern political environment includes in many cases a stable and legitimate government existing side by side with traditional institutions. The potential for conflict is particularly apparent in the context of taxation. Though delegation and devolution has some efficiency benefits, ultimately the power to tax is the power to govern (Levi 1989; Olson 1993; North 1981). This thread runs through all the previous literature, that informal institutions - whether they are civil war rebel groups, criminal gangs or local fishery associations - have the ability to fill institutional voids and potentially overtake the state. There is an innate tension when democratic states co-exist with entities that might gain the power to usurp the state. However, that dynamic has been under-explored in the democratic electoral political environment.

Informal taxation should also be explained in terms of the strategic political logic behind its existence. Simple efficiency is an insufficient explanation. Given the historic importance of public finance in the relationship between the state and traditional elites, the negotiations regarding taxation authority provide a window into how these spheres of authority interact. Beyond a few studies on community self-help (Njoh 2003; Roseman 1996; Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977), little work has examined the politics of informal taxation. This is intriguing because these studies

describe the widespread existence of parallel and competing fiscal institutions, which are suspected to be channels of clientelism and patronage (Baldwin 2013; Williams 2010; Lundgren 2009). Additionally, few conclusions have been drawn about the effect of these public finance arrangements on actual public service outcomes, though they have been hinted at (Baldwin 2013; Olken and Singhal 2011). This dissertation will address these gaps in the informal authority, clientelism, taxation, and development literatures. By examining elites' choices to abdicate authority in order to ensure electoral success, I come to a better understanding of how their arrangements with traditional authorities remain viable in the modern state. I also explore the outcomes of this delegation on individual political behavior and public services.

1.4 Structure of Dissertation

In this dissertation, I first provide broad cross-national findings on the support for chieftaincy systems in modern Africa, and discuss the role of chieftaincy in Ghana since colonialism. I then present my theory of chiefs engaged in voter mobilization, and how this represents a clientelistic exchange between elites. Next, I explain the design of the dissertation's main empirical sections. I describe a natural experiment that treats for chiefly authority, and explain how I instrument and measure this critical concept. This chapter also describes the main data source of the dissertation, which is an approximately 3000 person household survey collected in southern Ghana. The next two empirical chapters are based on that survey, and cover, respectively, the electoral and development outcomes of strong chiefs. Brief descriptions of these chapters are as follows.

1.4.1 Chapter 2: Chieftaincy in 21st Century Africa

I use Round 4 Afrobarometer data from 2008 to demonstrate widespread public support for chieftaincy systems, which contradicts the argument that traditional authority is always exploitative and forced onto citizens (Mamdani 1996). I show that citizens' support for expanding informal authority seems to be most pronounced when citizens have distrust in the capacity of formal state institutions to provide good governance. This finding holds even when people support the ideal of formal democracy. This tension indicates that chieftaincy's growing support has the potential to threaten the legitimacy of state institutions in the minds of citizens.

1.4.2 Chapter 3: Chieftaincy and Decentralized Governance in Ghana

In this chapter, I outline the history of chieftaincy-state relations in Ghana and justify my selection of that case for in-depth study. I discuss how cultural practices - such as in-kind communal labor, customary land ownership, and dispute arbitration - bind citizens to chiefs. Presenting historical evidence of how government officials have either had close or contentious relations with chiefs in Ghana, I show how shifts in policy are related to the benefits that stronger chieftaincies bring to the state apparatus. I also explain how the current decentralized governance of Ghana, particularly governance of tax collection, places individual local politicians in positions to collude with traditional leaders.

1.4.3 Chapter 4: Clientelism through Chieftaincy: Politician-Chief-Citizen Relations

This chapter outlines the dissertation's main argument about the relationship between local politicians and chiefs. I discuss the motivations and characteristics of both sets of actors that make collusion beneficial. The chapter discusses the testable hypotheses of the relationship, which include predictions of increased turnout in local elections, decreased competitiveness of local elections, decreased turnout in general elections, and, declining public service quality. These hypotheses are grounded in my model of government-chief collusion, as well as theories about electoral accountability in democracies and the relationship of accountability to fiscal policy.

This chapter also addresses the literature on locally and informally versus centrally produced services. While much of the literature praises locally produced goods and decentralization for overcoming low information environments, it does not consider economies of scale or the different inputs (e.g. capital, labor or monitoring) necessary to produce different services. With these factors in mind, this chapter argues that there is a differential impact on delegation and fiscal autonomy for chiefs depending on which good is examined. Capital-intensive services should suffer the most and monitoring-intensive services might prosper with devolution of authority. Similarly, goods controlled by local governments should be more affected than those controlled by national government as this form of clientelism exists at the local level. However, devolution should lead to an overall decline in spending and quality of public services. Those services provided solely by the central government (e.g. electricity) should serve as good comparison cases as they should be unaffected by local-level clientelism in either direction.

I also discuss the concept of informal taxation and why it is important to the study of traditional authority. I argue that the level of informal taxation is the result

of negotiation between the formal and informal sector, and is a good proxy for the strength of chiefs. Informal taxation becomes not just the payoff for colluding with a politician, but also a measure of the persuasive capabilities of that chief, which determines whether or not he has the qualities to be a good mobilizer.

1.4.4 Chapter 5: A Natural Experiment in Chiefly Power and Informal Taxation

In this chapter, I present the research design that guides the majority of the dissertation. Specifically, I explain the as-if random natural experiment that I used to select an appropriate sampling strategy for my household survey. At the turn of the 20th century, a series of railroads were planned in southern Ghana to export resources from the country. However, only half were built due to declining resources at the proposed terminal points. The chapter argues that these railroads treated communities for modernity, weakening the coercive abilities of traditional leaders. I go through the secondary and empirical evidence to support this conclusion, and show how this early transportation access weakened chiefs, which would make them less desirable agents for politicians today. I also discuss potential threats to the exclusion restriction and provide evidence to mitigate those concerns.

I use this natural experiment to proxy and instrument for the level of current chiefly authority in the sampled communities, as measured by the amount of informal taxation paid by each household in the survey. To calculate informal tax contributions, household contributions of internally-derived taxes assessed by chiefs and tributes are added to monetized in-kind communal labor contributions. By monetizing communal labor, I attempt to measure the annual amount of hypothetical

wages lost by each adult family member. I show robust results that being provided a railroad over 100 years ago is associated with lower levels of informal taxation, which I argue demonstrates that stronger chiefs have a clear advantage in extracting this revenue. I also address how the railroads changed social norms about the proper role of traditional leaders. These first stage results are then used through the next two empirical chapters to look at the outcomes of this delegation.

1.4.5 Chapter 6: Chiefs and the Electoral Connection

This empirical chapter covers the effects of voter mobilization by chiefs on voter turnout and competitiveness of elections. Using chiefs as vote mobilizers results in an increase in turnout in local elections as well as greater electoral support for winning candidates. This chapter also presents evidence that those politicians that do not have access to strong chiefs for mobilization are forced to use more common means of directly buying votes from citizens. In those places where chiefs are weaker, there are both greater incidents of vote buying directly to voters as well as greater size of the vote buy. In this chapter, I also address the broader political behavior and elections literature in Africa to assess how well this sample in Ghana conforms to expectations about individual-level political participation.

1.4.6 Chapter 7: Public Service Outcomes of Informal and Parallel Fiscal Systems

I present results that show that strong chiefs harm the ability of local governments to provide some public services. However, I discuss that these broad results

about services are dependent on the inputs necessary to create that public service as well as if the production of that good is in control of politicians engaging in this clientelistic exchange. Using data from the household survey, this chapter argues that those goods that are most capital-intensive, such as formal healthcare, suffer the most under strong chiefs. This result makes intuitive sense because no matter how benevolent a singular chief might be in his public services spending, capital-intensive projects rely on economies of scale that a local chief would not be able to access. There are simply some services the formal sector is better at producing. In contrast, those public services that are monitoring intensive, such as bednet usage, can be improved by further devolving power to chiefs who both have the ability to monitor the provision as well as enforce social sanctions.

The chapter also attempts to comment on the public service and development literature which tends to ignore the different production inputs and legal budgeting authority of services, and picks specific ones to measure without justifying the selection. This chapter shows that public services are a basket of goods, and in the context of development, it is unwise to study particular goods in isolation from the others. This is because, despite these services coming from the same geographic area, effects of the political or fiscal system may vary due to different institutional or production constraints.

1.4.7 Chapter 8: Conclusion

I provide some concluding remarks about the role of chiefs and other informal authority figures in developing democracies. I discuss policy recommendations within Ghana to improve electoral accountability at the local level and better incorporate chiefs in the political and developmental process. I also address the limitations of this model of politics and suggest future extensions of this research agenda.

1.5 Acknowledgements

Chapter 1, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

2

Chieftaincy in 21st Century Africa

2.1 Introduction

While this dissertation is primarily concerned about the role of chiefs in Ghana, it is important to frame its trends within the broader context of modern African politics. After the independence movements in the 1960s, much of sub-Saharan Africa developed political systems framed around concepts like pan-Africanism - with varying degrees of socialist undertones - that sought to discredit or eliminate traditional hierarchical structures (Mamdani (1996); Williams (2010); Nugent (1996)). As the continent underwent democratization in the 1990s, a process that continues today, the previous political rhetoric which attempted to reduce the influence of traditional authority, gave way to more open societies where traditional leaders could reassert their place in society and politics (Englebert 2002). Some modern African constitutions recognize the legal authority of chiefs over traditional and land disputes, such as Ghana, Uganda, and South Africa. As people grew tired of autocratic rule, many citizens saw chieftaincies as an honest, but authentically African institution, and sought to maintain the importance of chieftaincies during the flurry of democratic constitution writing during the 1990s. But the tensions that existed during the colonial period have remained, with traditional leaders and politicians being wary of each other as they have attempted to establish and maintain political control. Recent high-profile

examples include the 1994 Guinea Fowl War in Ghana (a civil conflict between tribal groups that resulted in 15,000 dead over 400 villages that was only contained after government military intervention (*OECD-Observer*2013)), the 2013 debate over land tenancy reforms in Uganda which pitted the government against the Buganda Kingdom, and a number of chieftaincy succession disputes in South Africa over the past decade that have been litigated by the formal civil courts.

Other countries have restricted chiefs to more ceremonial roles. In Tanzania, founding president Julius Nyerere disbanded the chiefdoms in 1963, leaving them non-existent and anemic to this day. While chiefs have constitutional recognition in Botswana, their role on a national level is advisory and very narrow. Furthermore, the government retains the right to remove and suspend recognition for chiefs. Chieftaincy remains a contentious topic in Zimbabwe, where is sometimes viewed by the public as supportive of Robert Mugabe's dictatorship, though clearly it is difficult to know where traditional authorities' loyalties lie in that harshly autocratic environment. In 2012, Kenya passed a new Chiefs Act, stripping chiefs of any role in dispute resolution and reasserting the prohibition on chiefs engaging in partisan activities. As Zambia has made attempts to draft a new constitution since 2014 (to be voted on in 2016), there have been alternating reports that chiefs will be stripped of their role in customary land rule and that the president will capitulate to the chiefs demands to reassert their place in Zambian politics. While there is a general trend in greater legal recognition of chiefs identified by Englebert (2002), there are clearly exceptions.

To understand the current role of chieftaincy in consolidating democracies, in this chapter I turn to cross-national survey data to demonstrate the wide-spread public support for traditional leaders within different African countries, providing evidence that these hereditary leaders have appeal over diverse constituencies. It is this appeal, particularly within rural communities, that formal politicians exploit for

their own gain through collaboration with chiefs. The data comes from Round 4 of the Afrobarometer conducted in 2008, which contained a large number of opinion questions about the role of traditional authority leaders. The popular appeal of chiefs does not appear related to the actual level of democracy within a country or strong ethnic identities, but seems to spring from distrust in the ineffectual formal political institutions that have developed over the past two decades. When formal political institutions are well-functioning, citizens prefer to keep chiefs out of partisan politics and the production of public services. This finding differs from previous studies using similar data which suggest that attitudes toward all leaders, elected and unelected, are tightly correlated (Logan 2009, 2013). However, citizens do demand a place for chiefs on local government councils even when local councils are thought to be trustworthy. This support might be due to the image of chiefs as the makers of development, excellent advisers, or authentic and uncorrupted representatives of community interests. This chapter explores the determinants for supporting expansion of the role of traditional authority leaders, helping us understand the puzzle of why and how chieftaincy remains popular in democracies, even when legal restrictions remain on chiefs' ability to directly interfere in the political process. These results also provide insights on the discussion introduced in the previous chapter, if traditional and legal authority are substitutes or complements. My main results later in the dissertation indicate that these forms of governance can co-exist and be mutually reinforcing, but citizen demand for greater informal authority is driven by failures in formal government and vice versa. I give some concluding thoughts that electoral pressures on politicians might be driving the sustainability of chieftaincy.

2.2 Popular Support for Traditional Leaders

As discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, much of the previous literature on traditional authority has focused on colonial relationships defined by competition, antagonism and conflict with the formal state (Boone 2003; Firmin-Sellers 1996). Yet concurrent with this scholarly work was the widespread granting of constitutional protections for chieftaincy in Africa during democratization that swept the continent in the 1990s and 2000s. The unanswered question remains if the modern chieftaincy is viewed by the people as a corrupted, anti-democratic outgrowth of the formal state (Mamdani 1996), like during colonial times, or if there is popular support for this revival of traditional authority.

Using Rounds 1 (1999-2001) and 2 (2002-2003) of Afrobarometer, Logan (2009) begins to address these questions. She writes, "Africans who live under these dual systems of authority do not draw as sharp a distinction between hereditary chiefs and elected local government officials as most analysts would expect. In fact, far from being in competition for the public's regard, traditional leaders and elected leaders are seen by the public as two sides of the same coin" (pg. 103). Across six countries in Southern Africa, she finds that 63% of respondents believe their traditional leaders are interested in hearing from citizens like them, 55% believe chiefs are trustworthy, and 50% think they are free of corruption. The beliefs about elected leaders (president, MPs, local officials) are tightly clustered and correlated with evaluations of traditional leaders around mid-point scores. Similarly, in Round 2 with 15 sub-Saharan African countries, she finds that 53% of respondents trust their traditional leaders, 58% trust their president or prime minister, 45% trust the national legislature and 38% trust the local governments. Regarding variation between respondents, Logan finds those that are younger and more urban are more likely to be distrusting of chiefs, providing some evidence of modernization and Weberian approach to traditional leaders. Overall,

Logan argues that this tight correlation between assessments of all types of authority leaders is evidence of a single "leadership affect" and that there is no indication that citizens see valuing traditional leadership incompatible with a demand for democracy.

Logan follows up this inspection of the Afrobarometer data with a second study looking at Afrobarometer Round 4 (2013). In this study of 19 countries, 50% of respondents claim that chiefs have "some" or "a lot" of influence in governing their local communities, and 58% of respondents think that the authority of chiefs in governance should be further expanded. Furthermore, Logan claims that her findings "offer a clear challenge to the increasingly common assumption that allegiance to traditional rulers is based in significant part on the perceived performance failures of central and especially local governance officials" (pg. 370), yet at the same time the evidence presented in the paper is not as definitive as stated as there is a strong statistically significant negative relationship between the local government responsiveness and support for the expansion of chiefly power. In this chapter, I intend to explore how the perceived lack of competency among formal elected officials drives demand for chiefly authority. I discuss how increasing mistrust in the formal governance space, especially after multiple years of democratic governance, has increased the demand for strong chieftaincy not just by the citizens but by politicians too, who utilize the credibility of chiefs to appeal to voters.

2.3 Data and Methodology

In this chapter, I try to replicate and extend the work of Logan (2009; 2013). I conduct analyses on the Round 4 (2008) Afrobarometer data that were previously conducted on data from Rounds 1 and 2 by Logan. I also attempt to disaggregate some of the indices that Logan uses to better understand the underlying mechanisms

that drive public support for chiefly authority. Afrobarometer collects nationally representative samples, with over-samples of rural communities, plus quotas for gender and ethnicity in certain countries. Appropriate survey probability weights are provided with the merged data, to weight for 1200 respondents from each country. Afrobarometer data is not without its problems, of which the greatest concern is that even with the separate sampling frame for rural communities, citizens from those locations are underrepresented.[1]

While Round 4 was collected in 20 countries, Cape Verde is dropped from the analyses as there is no historical or current existence of traditional leaders. I differ slightly from Logan in my data coding as well. While she leaves individuals who answer "not applicable" to questions about the existence or demand for chiefly authority within her analyses, it is not clear what kind of preference or opinion is being stated. Since that response is not easily interpreted in countries where there are chiefs (meaning the other 19 within Round 4), these responses are coded as missing. This is similar to the decision to drop respondents from Cape Verde.

The primary dependent variables of interest are: 1) the demand for greater chiefly authority; 2) the belief that traditional leaders should sit on local government councils; 3) the belief that chiefs should adopt partisan identities; and 4) beliefs about the authority of traditional leaders over the production of public services.[2] These are all normative measures about individual-level beliefs about the proper place of chiefs, not measures of the actual strength of chiefs within a country.

My key independent variables are: 1) the perceived current level of chiefly authority; 2) levels of trust for different types of public officials;[3] 3) belief in how

[1]Further specifics about the sampling frames developed by Afrobarometer can be found at http://www.afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles.

[2]Count index from 0-8 of the belief of primary domain of traditional leaders over the following public goods: keeping the community clean; managing schools; managing health clinics; collecting income taxes; solving local disputes; allocating land; protecting rivers and forests; and maintaining law and order.

[3]In addition to questions about trust in institutions, Afrobarometer Round 4 asks about their

much different types of officials listen to regular citizens when making decisions; 4) beliefs about the secrecy of the ballot; 5) forms of non-voting political efficacy;[4] 6) the perceived current level of chiefly influence in the community; and 7) current performance of local government.[5]

The first explanatory measure proxies crudely for the current level of chiefly power. The second two explanatory variables measure support for and belief in the function of formal governance. My hypothesis is that those who have less trust in formal leaders or formal political institutions will be more likely to support expanding chiefly authority. Similarly, those respondents who think that formal officials listen to them will have less demand for informal governance. Those respondents who believe in the secrecy of the ballot will be less supportive of expanding traditional forms of governance as they think the democratic process is functioning. The hypothesized direction of political efficacy is ambiguous. It could be that those who have greater levels of political efficacy will be less likely to support strengthening chieftaincies as they should be able to better represent themselves in a more egalitarian democracy. Alternatively, higher levels of efficacy might be related to stronger chiefs as gover-

perceived levels of corruption. However, these questions have measurement validity concerns, not just in Afrobarometer surveys but other corruption perception surveys too, as they tend to over estimate the level of corruption. Among respondents, 22% to 35% answered that "most of them" or "all of them" were corrupt in reference to traditional leaders, members of parliament, or district councilors. Furthermore, while these are speculative questions, the survey questions about trust are directly about the respondents' own opinions. Given the high correlation between these two concepts (trust and corruption), only one type of indicator was used.

[4]There are two measures for this variable. The first one is a dummy variable if ordinary people can do "some" or "a great deal" to improve a problem with local government, with is a less restrictive conception of efficacy. The second version is a count index from 0-5 of non-voting political actions related to a problem in local government taken at least once in the last year, which are: discuss a problem with people; join others to address a problem; discuss a problem with community leaders; write a newspaper letter or call a radio show; complain to local government officials; and complain to other government officials. There is no correlation between the two variables, with a correlation coefficient of 0.06.

[5]Count index from 0-5 of stating "fairly well" or "very well" on the local government's handling of: making work known; providing budget information; allowing citizen participation; consulting traditional, civic and community leaders; handling complaints; and using government revenues for public services, not private gain.

nance is physically closer to these citizens and less abstract. If the idea that power begets more power and that informal authority operates through a positive feedback mechanism, higher levels of current informal authority should produce a desire for more in the future. Finally, high quality performance of formal government should reduce the demand for expansion of informal institutions.

I have adopted other covariates of African political behavior from Logan (2009; 2013) and Bratton et al. (2005) as controls. They include: 1) age; 2) sex; 3) level of education; 4) interest in public affairs; 5) an indicator for political knowledge; 6) partisan attachment; 7) an indicator for abject poverty; 8) an indicator for ruralness; 9) indicator if respondent identifies with an ethnic identity over national identity; and 10) belief if respondent's country is a strong democracy.[6] However, these covariates are not shown or describes unless statistically and robustly significant. Country fixed effects and clustered standard errors by country are also used, and specific analyses are subdivided by urban or rural and status as a democracy in 2008 as defined by a Polity IV score of 6 to 10. The construction of these variables is summarized in Table 2.1.

2.4 Results

To address the question of how formal and informal authority interact, I look at both the current level of chiefly authority and the demand for greater informal authority. While there has been a revival in traditional leadership over the past few decades across sub-Saharan Africa, there is also considerable variation across the continent. As seen in Figure 2.1, Zimbabwe, which has extremely weak formal

[6]Strong democracy is used instead of any form of democracy as very few respondents do not think their country is a democracy, only 1,858 out of 26,449. A sharper difference of opinion exists between believing there are major or minor problems, but the country is still a democracy (7,095 versus 7,770).

Table 2.1: Variable Descriptions from Afrobarometer Round 4

Variable	Type	Construction
Demand for greater chiefly authority	Dependent	"Increase somewhat" or "increase a lot"=1
Traditional leaders should be on Local Councils	Dependent	Should have seats on councils ("elected," "appointed," or "other")=1
Chiefs should adopt partisan IDs	Dependent	"Agree" or "strongly agree" that chiefs have the right to support a political party=1
Beliefs about chieftaincy authority over public goods	Dependent	Count from 0-8 of different public good primarily provided by traditional leaders
Perceived current level of chiefly authority	Independent	"Some" or "a great deal" of influence=1
Trust of public officials and institutions	Independent	Measured separately for Parliament, District Assembly, and traditional leaders; "Somewhat" and "a lot"=1
How much public officials listen to ordinary people	Independent	Measured separately for MPs, local councilors, and traditional leaders; "Often" and "always"=1
Belief about secrecy of ballot	Independent	"Not at all likely" or "not very likely" that powerful people can find out how you voted=1
Non-voting political efficacy	Independent	Two measures; "Some" or "a great sea" can be done by an ordinary person to improve problems in local government=1; Count from 0-5 of non-voting political actions
Current local government performance	Independent	Count from 0-5 of "fairly well" or "very well" on different performance indicators
Age	Control	Age in years
Sex	Control	Female=1
Education	Control	Completed secondary school=1
Interest in public affairs	Control	"Somewhat" or "Very interested" in public affairs=1
Political knowledge	Control	Correctly naming MP=1
Partisan attachment	Control	Feel close to a political party=1
Abject Poverty	Control	Gone without food once or more in the last year=1
Rural	Control	Rural sampling frame=1
Strong ethnic ID	Control	"Only" or "more" identify with ethnic ID over national ID=1
Belief that country is a democracy	Control	"Democracy with minor problems" or "full democracy"=1

state capacity, has the greatest amount of perceived influence by chiefs in political affairs. Yet other countries with high state capacity such as Botswana and Ghana also have a high percentage of respondents who believe chiefs are quite powerful. Countries with surprisingly low levels of perceived chiefly authority include Uganda, which has the strong, consolidated Buganda Kingdom within its boarders as well as South Africa, which provides constitutional recognition for chiefs. There is also no apparent relationship between the current level of chiefly authority and the desire for greater exercises of chiefly power, with a correlation coefficient of 0.17 between the perception of chiefly strength and demand for greater chiefly authority.




Figure 2.1: Perceived Authority and Demand for Increase Authority of Chiefs

Table 2.2 displays two different logit models for predicting support for greater chiefly authority. While Figure 2.1 supports Logan's conclusion about the widespread demand for chiefs, I was unable to confirm her (2009) intuition that support for

traditional leaders is related to greater support for formal government when looking at the issue of extending chiefly authority, as seen in Model 1. The demand to extend chiefly authority appears primarily driven by the trust people have in traditional institutions and their beliefs that chiefs listen to the problems of citizens. This belief can also be interpreted as how much chiefs fulfill their traditional role as advisers in conflict resolution. Furthermore, as seen in Model 2, previous experience with strong chiefs is most predictive of a demand for increasing chiefly authority. Perceiving that one has a strong chief already has a marginal effect of a 10.98% increase in the likelihood of wanting an even more powerful chief, significant at the $p<0.01$ level. Measures of trust or perception about the abilities of formal government officials are not statistically significant. Positive associations with parliament are more likely to result in a decrease in support for expanding the role of chiefs, significant at the $p<0.05$ level and with a marginal effect of 2.50%. This indicates there might be substitution effects between formal and informal authority in certain circumstances when the strength or weakness of one type of authority is apparent to respondents. In reference to the control variables, education is negatively associated with support for broadening the scope of traditional leaders while extreme poverty is positively associated with wanting to expand the role of chiefs.

The results of what predicts public opinion about expanding the political integration of chiefs on specific issues is more ambiguous, but point towards citizens demanding a separate and distinct sphere of influence for chiefs from politicians. The topics of whether chiefs should sit on local legislative bodies and whether they should be barred from adopting partisan identities are quite contentious in many countries. In Zambia for example, chiefs are allow to sit on local councils that make expenditure decisions. In other countries like Ghana, chiefs have their own legislative assemblies that make non-binding decisions about public affairs, and traditional leaders are

Table 2.2: Demand for Greater Influence of Chiefs

VARIABLES	(1) Logit Demand for Strong Chiefs	(2) Logit Demand for Strong Chiefs
Perceived Strong Chief		0.60***
		(0.14)
Trust in Parliament	-0.02	-0.11**
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Trust in Local Councils	0.03	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Trust in Traditional Leaders	-0.45***	0.39***
	(0.09)	(0.10)
MPs Listen	0.03	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Local Councilors Listen	-0.07	-0.15
	(0.06)	(0.09)
Traditional Leaders Listen	0.39***	0.37***
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Secret Vote	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.06)
Political Efficacy Index	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Stated Political Efficacy	0.23***	0.19***
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Government Performance Index	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.03	-0.24
	(0.08)	(0.19)
Observations	16454	9444
R-squared	0.05	0.07
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	No	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

legally barred from directly influencing official political affairs. These constitutional prohibitions also extend to partisan identification among chiefs as well in places such as Ghana and Kenya. Overall, the trend across the continent is that those countries that legally recognize the existence of chiefs also place clear restrictions on their actions, behavior, and voice. The political integration of chiefs represents a more specific form of expanding the authority of traditional leaders beyond their historic roles.

As seen in Table 2.3, the perceived strength of traditional leaders, as well as the perception that traditional leaders listen to citizens, both drive the belief that chiefs should sit on the local government councils that determine taxation and expenditure. There is no effect of formal government trust or consultativeness. Quality of local government services and self-reported efficacy are positively and significantly associated with the belief that chiefs should have a role in local government. This may be related to the idea that traditional leaders are more responsive actors or that chiefs bring about positive developmental outcomes. However, higher levels of trust in local government is negatively and significantly associated with the idea that chiefs should adopt partisan identities and become further enmeshed in formal institutions like political parties. Trust in local councils has a marginal effect of decreasing support for partisan chiefs by 2.79%, significant at the $p<0.05$ level. It appears that even among supporters of traditional leaders broadly conceived, there is disagreement about whether chiefs should become explicitly political.

Table 2.3: Demand for Political Integration of Chiefs

	(1) Logit	(2) Logit
VARIABLES	Chiefs on Councils	Chiefs with Partisan Identity
Perceived Strong Chief	0.40***	0.12
	(0.11)	(0.09)
Trust in Parliament	-0.01	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.06)
Trust in Local Councils	0.05*	-0.12**
	(0.07)	(0.06)
Trust in Traditional Leaders	0.14	-0.04
	(0.12)	(0.11)
MPs Listen	-0.04	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.11)
Local Councilors Listen	0.08	0.07
	(0.12)	(0.07)
Traditional Leaders Listen	0.27***	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Secret Vote	-0.05	-0.15
	(0.08)	(0.09
Political Efficacy Index	0.04	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Stated Political Efficacy	0.25***	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.11)
Government Performance Index	0.06***	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.01	-0.22
	(0.22)	(0.16)
Observations	9425	9556
R-squared	0.06	0.06
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the last set of analyses, I examine the explicit role of chiefs in public service delivery in Table 2.4. Public finances are a gray-zone where traditional leaders operate, being given vague responsibilities by the state to protect the land and environment as the customary caretakers. Chiefs are also involved in informal dispute

Table 2.4: Chiefs Providing Public Goods

VARIABLES	(1) OLS Chief Public Goods Index	(2) Logit Disputes	(3) Logit Land Allocation
Perceived Strong Chief	0.08**	0.26***	0.11
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Trust in Parliament	-0.06*	-0.13	-0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Trust in Local Councils	-0.03	-0.01	-0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Trust in Traditional Leaders	0.08**	0.31***	0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.06)
MPs Listen	-0.03	-0.22***	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Local Councilors Listen	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Traditional Leaders Listen	0.14***	0.41***	0.25***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Secret Vote	0.01	0.13	0.11
	((0.4)	0.10)	(0.10)
Political Efficacy Index	0.01	0.04	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Stated Political Efficacy	0.01	-0.10	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Government Performance Index	0.01	-0.05	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	0.02	-2.73***	-2.18***
	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.29)
Observations	9679	9081	9005
R-squared	0.24	0.16	0.14
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

resolution, that sometimes becomes more formalized, such as in Ghana where there is a complete separate justice system for customary law disputes. As chiefs rule over specific geographic areas, a role in law and order is also common, with chiefs informally punishing criminal and non-criminal behavior. The actual legal role of chiefs in public service generation is further complicated by the in-kind communal labor that traditional leaders organize from citizens, that is condoned by some formal government officials as a means of community self-help. In the Afrobarometer survey,

respondents were asked which individuals had primary responsibility in the provision of eight different public services: keeping the community clean; managing schools; managing health clinics; collecting income taxes; solving local disputes; allocating land; protecting rivers and forests; and maintaining law and order. The questions asked were phrased as: "Who do you think actually as primary responsibility for managing each of the following tasks. Is it the national government, the local government, traditional leaders, or members of your community?" Responses of traditional leaders were added into an index that ranged from 0 to 8. As chiefs are not legally responsible for the full production of any public services, this can be interpreted as an indicator of misinformation about the role of chiefs, with stronger chiefs appearing to control domains they do not really govern. However, it can also be thought of as an aspirational measure of what chiefs could and should do in their communities within their own authority. Analyzed within the OLS framework, traditional authority influence, trust, and belief that chiefs listen to citizens are positively and significantly associated with claiming more public goods are in the domain of chiefs. However, higher levels of trust in parliament and beliefs that local councils listen to citizens are negatively associated with thinking chiefs are in charge of public services. Neither the efficacy of respondents nor the actual performance of formal government affect beliefs about the primary providers of public goods.

I also examined a few specific public services from the index that Logan (2013) highlights - land and dispute resolution - and found that beliefs that MPs listen to constituents makes individuals less likely to say that chiefs are primarily responsible for dispute resolution. Similarly, trust in parliament, trust in local government and believing that local politicians listen is all negatively and significantly associated with believing that chiefs primarily control land allocation as seen in Model 3 in Table 2.4. Dispute resolution and land allocation, which are the traditional purview of chiefs and

customary law, are less likely to be reported as being provided by chiefs when there are more positive feelings about formal government and its capacity to consult with ordinary citizens. This provides the clearest evidence that there might be a trade-off in the minds of average citizens between formal and informal authority.

2.5 Discussion

These results portray nuanced yet strong public support for traditional authority. Logan (2009; 2013) and Baldwin (2013) are not wrong when they describe popular support for traditional leaders as being widespread. For example, many political pundits claim that Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who has been president since 1986, has seen his political base weaken as he has attempted land reforms that would benefit many poor farmers, but would also put him in opposition with the Buganda Kingdom (Englebert 2002). It is clear throughout sub-Saharan Africa that support for traditional leaders exists, especially when those individuals are seen as trust-worthy and consultative of ordinary citizens. This means that in many ways, African chiefs are in control of shaping their own public image.

However, it is not clear that public support for all governance systems or political leaders move together with an underlying factor that Logan (2009) labels the "leadership affect." Rather, when institutions like parliament and local councils are trusted and appear to care about the concerns of citizens, support for the expansion and further integration of chiefs into the formal political space weakens. This is particularly acute for the production of public services and adoption partisan identities, though specific opinions about the past performance and capacity of local government have little effect on opinions about the proper role of chiefs. Citizens' desire to limit the ability of chiefs to produce public services or have partisan connections,

while simultaneously demanding chiefs have a seat on local councils, seems to indicates that the public support of chieftaincy is connected to keeping the institution in an advisory position. This is the historic function of chiefs, not running the machinery of formal government. People appear to want to keep chiefs traditional and politicians accountable. However, the actual performance of formal institutions has a less clear effect on demand for informal authority compared to perceptions of the trustworthiness of government.

There are a few interpretations as to why these results differ from previous studies using older Afrobarometer data. The first explanation is that when the indices used to describe African public opinion are broken down into the constituent parts, the linked fate of democratically elected politicians and chiefs disappears. The other interpretation is that something has changed after two decades of democracy. Perhaps the credibility of formal political institutions has waned as democracy has not fulfilled the hopes of inclusive economic development. For example, 33.62% of respondents in Afrobarometer Round 4 think that most or all MPs are corrupt with another 52.28% believing that at least some are corrupt. The results are similar for local councils: 34.23% of respondents believe that most or all local councilors are corrupt and 50.90% believe that some are corrupt. Alternatively only 21.51% believe that most or all traditional authority leaders are corrupt and 44.98% think some are corrupt. However, 33.52% believe no traditional authority leaders are corrupt, which is a relatively strong statement of support for chieftaincy systems. In this environment where the perception of corruption is high and the majority of citizens believe that few elites care about their opinions, chiefs stand out in measures of public sentiment. Perhaps the resilience of and demand for greater traditional authority is in response to the deficiencies of formal governance and venal political parties. While the popular opinion of chiefs is positive, there is no evidence within Afrobarometer

that strong chiefs provide for citizens, producing needed public goods that are free from corruption. This demonstrates the importance of work like Baldwin's (2013) who explores if support for strong chiefs is a welfare-maximizing position from the perspective of individuals, as opposed to being duped.

What is missing from this analysis, however, is the response of democratically elected officials who have watched their support diminish while the demand for traditional leadership grows. As previously discussed, scholars have long explained the interaction between chiefs and formal government through the lens of co-optation, where traditional institutions are captured by strong, exploitative governments (Boone 2003; Firmin-Sellers 1996; Mamdani 1996). On the other hand, there is a suggestion that informal institutions thrive in places with weak state capacity, filling a governance void to at least provide people with something that operates like a government (Ostrom 1990; MacLean 2010; Levi 1989; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977). Writing specifically about chieftaincy in South Africa, Ntsebeza (2004; 2005) argues that chieftaincy has thrived in the post-apartheid era because the formal government has been unable to secure land allocation rights, leaving chiefs in control of a highly influential policy. I would suggest that perhaps there is a middle-ground view on this dynamic interplay, where formal elected leaders relinquish some of their authority in order to increase their power in other domains, which I address in the following chapters Instead of attacking chieftaincy out of concerns for legitimacy, political elites collude and coordinate with chiefs to further empower themselves to stay in political office.

2.6 Acknowledgements

Chapter 2, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

3

Chieftaincy and Decentralized Governance in Ghana

3.1 Case Selection of Ghana

With a well-documented history of state-traditional authority relations, Ghana provides an interesting window on the role of chiefs in electoral politics. Over time, the state has vacillated back and forth between embracing traditional authority systems as they are and attempting to constrain or crush them. Unlike other countries in Africa, in Ghana the chieftaincy system has persisted in a reasonably similar form to pre-colonial structures. This was facilitated through the use of indirect rule by the British that kept tribal kingdoms somewhat intact in order to maintain continued law and order. However, the state has also intervened in chieftaincy and tribal issues, such as codifying the list of recognized chiefs and delineating the scope of chieftaincy rule. In Ghana, the core cultural institutions that determine hereditary rule and local customs are still the source of public affection for and authority of chiefs, currently giving them broad leeway in society.

In this chapter, I support my theoretical argument about the role of chiefs in democracies with detailed historical information on Ghanaian politics and politician-chief relations. This evidence underpins four main points relevant to my argument.

First, I provide details of chiefs' high levels of cultural and institutional power. This is important for my argument because this power is what enables chiefs to be effective mobilizers, and thus be recruited by politicians. Second, I offer evidence showing that politicians do have the ability to take away informal taxation rights and legal recognition of chiefs – and have done so in the past. This provides evidence of the shifting status of chiefs overtime, with politicians adjusting that status to suit their political needs. These facts also support my argument that informal taxation rights are an important inducement to obtain chiefs' help with electoral mobilization. Third, I explain the details of how Ghana's decentralized fiscal system works. I illustrate how local politicians are able to control local taxes and thus offer chiefs informal taxes as incentives for helping with voter mobilization. Fourth, I provide details of parliamentary elections in Ghana. This is relevant because in future chapters I assess these elections as a counterfactual to local elections. National-level politicians in Ghana lack both the means to collude with chiefs as well as the motivation to use the form of credibility-enhancing clientelism that chiefs provide.

From a methodological standpoint, Ghana is also a superb place to study the strategic interaction between state and traditional authority because the country has 1) a decentralized fiscal system that empowers non-partisan local leaders in fiscal policy and 2) widespread use of local chiefs among the different ethnic groups that rule individual communities. This creates various formal-informal institutional combinations as these two forms of local leadership are forced to compete for public support on small political stages that are somewhat isolated from one another, generating numerous observations compared to countries with extremely centralized governance. These two features of Ghana also provide multiple opportunities for collusion between chiefs and marginal local politicians who lack the party apparatus to generate mobilized support, a topic at the heart of this dissertation. Finally, Ghana like many

other African countries, limits the ability of chiefs to serve for public office or be involved in politics in any way These formal rules remove the possibility that chiefs can simultaneously run for office and be chiefs, a situation that might exist in other countries. However, historically, it was the intrusion of chiefs in political life that precipitated these rules.[1]

More fundamentally, Ghana is a critical case study on the topic of chieftaincy in the modern-era. How and why does electoral consolidation seem to improve the standing of anti-democratic elites? While thought by many to be the most stable democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana maintains some of the greatest affinity for traditional authority leaders, representing a direct counterpoint to Weber's (1922/1958) theory of state modernization. Public support for chieftaincy only seems to grow with democratization, creating a puzzle that has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature. The government has tried multiple times to control and eliminate chiefs with success on many occasions. Yet tensions have reduced and these former rivals are both seemingly comfortable with the growing exercise of traditional power and democratic expression.

3.2 Ghana Tribal Customs, Old and New

Within Ghana, there are eight main ethnic groups that roughly correspond to the ten regional boundaries within the country. The groups are Akan, Mole-Dagbani, Ewe, Ga-Dangme, Gurma, Guan, Grusi, and Mande, in order of declining percentage of the total population (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). As of the 2010 Census, preliminary statistics indicate that Akan people make up 47.5% of the total

[1]Legally, there is no formal rules for chiefs stepping down and then running for office. Within Ghana, that is such a rare event that I have not run into any insistence of this choice since the 1992 Constitution. It is not clear how these individuals would be viewed given the legal prohibitions on chiefs in politics.

population and are over 50% of the population in the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern and Western Regions of the countries. These regions in southern and central Ghana make up the Akan homeland, with the Ashanti sub-group's historic capital in Kumasi at the center of present-day Ghana. The official state capital of Accra is consider the homeland of the Ga-Dangme people while the Ewe people are mostly based in the Volta Region. The second largest ethnic group, the Mole-Dagbani, are primarily located in the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions which geographically make up to top third of modern-day Ghana. As of 2010, 71.2% of Ghanaians identified as some form of Christian, 17.6% as practicing Islam, 5.2% as traditionalists, 5.3% as having no religion, and 0.8% as Other. However, many Christians in Ghana blend traditionalist practices into their belief system like ancestor worship through the chieftaincy system (Tweneboah 2012).

Given the historic dominance of the Akan people, who conquered many of the other tribes through military force (Rattray 1923), there is a high degree of similarity between the administrative structure of chieftaincies across ethnic groups. This evolution in structure started before colonization and continues to present-day through governmental intervention (Berry 2001; Boone 2003; Firmin-Sellers 1996; Grischow 2006), which is discussed in more detail below. However, due to the limited historic records that exist before the arrival of the British colonizers, much of the descriptions of cultural practices during that period are speculative as best. Evidence from the pre-colonial era suggests that while there was a strict hierarchy among chiefs, a notion of limited rule also existed with chiefs ruling with the consent from their people (Ward 1967).

By the colonial era in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the basic structure of chiefdoms across the major ethnic groups was set. Chieftaincies are hierarchical, running from a hereditary local chief or headman up to the *paramount* chief, or king,

who represents a large geographical region. As of today, it is difficult to find a published record with the exact number of chiefs.[2] These were just the approximately 2712 individuals were simply forgotten by accident in an unobserved 2003 publication. An official report from the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board claimed there were over 32,000 chiefs in Ghana as of 1991 (Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada 1993).Historically, due to the poorer conditions in the northern regions, those non-Akan kingdoms were flatter socially in the sense that chiefs were not much better off than commoners economically (Staniland 1975). In contrast, Akan paramount chieftaincies are associated with large landholdings and gold. Among the Ashanti, the largest Akan sub-group, the paramount chief in the city of Kumasi is considered the leader of all Ashanti peoples. The Fantis, the second largest Akan sub-group, have multiple smaller paramount chiefs, which is more similar to other non-Akan ethnic groups. Typically, there is a local chief or sub-chief in villages over 200 people.[3] In very urban places with large numbers of migrants like Accra or the mining cities in the Western Region, though chieftaincies exist, many people are not close or familiar with the specific individual(s) even if the city has been broken down into smaller sub-chieftaincies. Each local chief (or sub-chief) along with the paramount chiefs is attached to a physical *stool*, or throne, or is said to be *enskinned* in an animal skin. These are the physical manifestation of the chieftaincy as an institution. When a chief is deposed, he is said to be *destooled* or *deskinned*. The

[2]The National Registry of Chiefs is supposed to be maintain by the government of Ghana, but it has no online or regularly published presence. As an alternative indicator of the expansive number of traditional leaders in Ghana, in 2005 the Registry published an addendum to the 2003 publication to correct for errata for the years 1995 to 2001. That hard copy booklet was 226 pages long and has records for approximately 12 chiefs per page (National House of Chiefs 2005).

[3]What defines a major settlement is not clear officially or unofficially, but typically census Enumeration Areas in rural communities correspond to about 200 to 400 people minimum, which appears anecdotally to be the practical cutoff point for a designated sub-chief for a village. This should not be taken as strict fact, though, as this insight only applies to Akan villages in southern Ghana that I directly worked in during my 2012 field work. See Rattray 1923 for a detailed explanation for Ashanti tribal structure at the beginning of the 20th century, for more confirmatory evidence of these field observations historically.

use of these terms across ethnic groups is indicative of Akan hegemony in describing traditional authority structures. The largest cultural difference between the Akan's and other ethnic groups in Ghana is Akan's emphasis on the matrilineal succession of chiefs, where a chief's nephew by his sister is considered to be the next in line for the stool (Goody 1969; Goody and Goody 1967, 1966). Furthermore, the queen mother position, which is a royal advisor to a chief, is thought to be much more powerful among the Akan (Steegstra 2009), helping with the selection of new chiefs.

The connection between stools and landownership in Ghana leads to the depiction of chiefs as custodians of the land. The primary function of chiefs beyond cultural and religious ceremonies (Odotei 2002) is the maintenance and allocation of land for commercial activity. Previously, land was not so much sold as it was rented in sharecropping relationships (Berry 2001; Firmin-Sellers 1996). These sharecropping arrangements still exist today, combining elements of rent with tribute giving, though private land sales have increased through the 20th century (Jedwab and Moradi 2015; Berry 2001). However, some scholars estimate that over 80% of land in Ghana is owned by traditional authorities in customary arrangements (Bob-Milliar 2009). With the ambiguous property rights situation in Ghana, chiefs engage in land dispute resolution frequently. Unsurprisingly, those citizens who are more socially connected to a chieftaincy through clan relationships are more likely to benefit from this informal justice and less likely to be subject to expropriation (Goldenstein and Udry 2008).

In addition to land disputes, chiefs in Ghana have a broader role in informal dispute resolution. Although there is a somewhat-functional civil justice system in Ghana compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, chiefs tend to be the closest and most affordable source of justice in many rural communities. There is no prohibition on chiefs engaging as arbitrators in informal dispute resolution, a right

included both in the current constitution of Ghana and other legislation. Chiefs are legally permitted to rule on cases related to chieftaincy and customary law which tends to include land disputes (Kludze 1998). However, this law is difficult to enforce with many paramount chiefs in Ghana openly and publicly discussing their role in criminal and non-criminal extra-legal proceedings in recent years (Dzivenu 2008). Writing about the Akan, Chereji and Wratto-King (2013; pg. 14) argue, "When dealing with dispute, the Akans are concerned with restoring social harmony between the parties in conflict, and this is done by both parties exposing the truth about what went wrong and who kick-started the dispute. Basically, the process is regarded as a truth and reconciliation moment and not a legal court proceeding. However, to get to the root causes of the dispute, the elders or chiefs in charge ensure that the process is transparent." Thus, Ghanaian traditional courts play the dual role of promoting social cohesion and resolving disputes. In urban areas the breakdown of traditional courts is thought to be associated with increased vigilante violence and homicides (Adinkrah 2005). However, in my interviews with Akan and Ga chiefs and citizens, both groups also claimed that chiefs use corporal punishment (like public caning) or monetary fines as a punishment for crimes and offenses in their communities. Shunning and banishment from traditional lands are also common punishments from the traditional courts, particularly for offenses against the stool or stool lands or are considered disrespectful to tribal ancestors (Tweneboah 2012). At this time, the formal official courts turn a blind eye towards these issues of ambiguous authority, leaving the power of chiefs relatively unchecked in their local affairs.

The connection chieftaincies have with land also ties them closely to the issue of development. This manifests itself most clearly in the ringing of the *gong-gong* to call the community together for in-kind communal labor (Odotei and Awedoba 2006; Berry 2001; Boafo-Arthur 2003; Bob-Milliar 2009; Ubink 2007). In-kind communal

labor is a form of community self-help where citizens come together pooling their time and resources in the production of a public service. Traditionally only the chieftaincy has the right to call for communal labor (Knierzinger 2011); however, there have been attempts by Ghanaian governments to curb the use of communal labor by chiefs or redirect the control of it towards formal local governments in the past. This labor can focus on many community issues typically related to infrastructure building, such as roads and water boreholes for community taps. However, some chiefs use this labor to help build on personal plots of land or tend to personal fields. Variation exists within Ghana in the frequency and amount of communal labor contributions, which are at the discretion of the local chiefs. The voluntariness of these contributions is debatable, but many Ghanaians participate and praise the practices as good for development, based on my own field work experience. At the same time, ignoring communal labor requests falls under the domain of customary law, and shirking individuals are typically fined monetarily (Tweneboah 2012; Kludze 1998). Beyond coordinating labor, rights to tribute and direct informal taxation still exist, though vary across communities in size and frequency as well as the expectations of the public purpose of the funds (Ubink 2007).[4] Some chiefs now go so far as to attract international agencies to fund their communities, by-passing inefficient or corrupt government institutions (Kleist 2011; Knierzinger 2011). Community members have clear expectations of chiefs on the issue of development, as part of the long-standing accountability that defines chief-subject relations (Kleist 2011; Ward 1967; Ubink 2007).

[4]During my own field work, there was an expectation of a small gift given to each chief to make our presence known as a research team. The traditional gift is a small bottle of Schnapps or other liquor, or the monetary equivalent of approximately $10 to $15 US.

3.3 Legal History of Chieftaincy-State Relations

These rights and cultural duties must be viewed through the lens of traditional authorities' relationship with the state, which has alternately intervened and fawned over chiefs to serve its own political interests. Ghanaian chiefs have had a complex and primary place in politics since the colonial era. Ruling governments have used chiefs to enhance their own power by harnessing the reins of the traditional system. At the same time, as Pinkney (1970; pg. 96) writes, "chieftaincy in Ghana has always shown considerable resilience by trimming its sails to different political winds without either capitulating to higher authorities or trying to meet them head-on."

Early British colonials left chiefs reasonably autonomous in the political sphere, employing indirect rule. Chiefs forfeited their militaries, and could not rule on murder cases, but retained broad administrative and judicial powers during this period. Chiefs had the fiscal responsibility to improve their communities by providing funds or in-kind communal labor (Berry 2001; Ward 1967; Staniland 1975). Though the British did not heavily invest in public services, they encouraged chiefs to modernize the country as the chiefs themselves had additional wealth due to their lack of militaries (Grischow 2006). From the perspective of citizens, the state of affairs was not significantly different from the pre-colonial era when chiefs raised revenue for war; only the use of these funds had really changed. To facilitate the creation of property rights and tax collection, the British utilized chiefdom boundaries for administrative ones (Berry 2001). When the British toyed with collecting domestic revenue within Ghana, such as poll taxes, they relied heavily on the chiefs to serve as tax collectors (Rattray 1923; Ward 1967; Grischow 2006). Tax farming like this was not an uncommon practice and was utilized throughout colonial Africa. These direct formal taxes in Ghana did not raise much revenue or displace the informal fiscal institutions still operated by chiefs. However, the British understood that the only way these taxes

would be palatable to the locals was if they were seen being collected and supported by the chiefs. By the 1930s, the colonial government fully abandon the idea of formal direct taxation due to difficulties with compliance (Staniland 1975). More over, the colonial British sought to keep the Ghanaian chieftaincy from westernizing explicitly so it could retain its legitimacy and coercive authority over subjects (Firmin-Sellers 1996). However, in his assessment of northern Ghana, Staniland (1975) argues that indirect rule increased the value of paramount chieftaincies, creating future internal conflict by entrenching old authorities instead of allowing for traditional succession rules to apply.

As British rule neared its end, the relationship between chiefs and the state began to shift to a more hostile one. Boafo-Arthur (2003) argues much of this was a reactionary and punitive response, astutely writing, "Efforts to whittle the powers of chiefs, especially in the immediate post-independence period could be seen as a way of revenge for the solid defense of the colonial system by chiefs. It was also a way of ensuring that no pockets of political power centers capable of rivaling the authority of the post-colonial state existed. The power of the post-colonial state must be absolute so the autonomy of chiefs should be subverted and thereby reduce their influence on the politics of the period" (pg. 130). The post-colonial Ghanaian governments could not stand for potential threats to its new power.

Ideologically, Kwame Nkrumah's independence movement with its emphasis on workers' rights, youth and nationalism had little place for socially regressive chieftaincies. Nkrumah sought to drag Ghana into modernity, leaving behind old ways and those who were seen as colonial power-brokers, though scholars disagree on whether or not the chiefs were in favor of the independence movement, a large majority were hostile to independence and expanding the electoral franchise (Boafo-Arthur 2003; Knierzinger 2011). Hostile relations began in 1948 when Nkrumah led riots against

colonial elections that empowered chiefs and continued through his rise to the Prime Ministership in 1951 and his term as the first president of an independent Ghana in 1960. In his most famous statement on the subject of chiefs, Nkrumah declared, "Those of our chiefs who are with us [...] we do honour [...] those [...] who join forces with the imperialists [...] there shall come a time when they will run and leave their sandals behind them; in other words chiefs in league with imperialists who obstruct our path [...] will one day run away and leave their stools" (*Accra Evening News*, 5 January 1950; Gocking 2005; pg. 94). Lund (2008) states that property rights institutions were re-wired to destabilize chiefs, stripping them of their primary administrative and arbitration role, with the state regulating the sale of stool lands by 1952 (Knierzinger 2011). However, since chiefs were still allowed rights to informal revenue collection at the time, they were able to hide their wealth, straining the newly formed Ministry of Local Government. In response, Nkrumah reasserted an infrequently used colonial era law giving the government the last word in officially recognizing chieftaincies, which was codified in 1959 as the Chief Recognition Bill. This law is still in place today. Nkrumah also attempted to reduce the role of chiefs in developmental activities, establishing stronger local councils which directed community self-help activities like communal labor. Regional Houses of Chiefs were created, but they were heavily regulated by the government with the threat of destoolment. The national government constitutionally barred chiefs from getting involved with politics including sitting on local councils. This constitutional restriction extended from running for political offices while remaining enstooled to expressing political opinions. Eventually, powerful yet economically dependent chiefs of Ghana were incorporated into the party mobilization apparatus, creating allies from rivals (Boone 2003; Knierzinger 2011). Chiefs became loosely affiliated with multiple political parties, including Nkrumah's Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) (Boafo-Arthur 2003).

When the Nkrumah government fell in 1966, one of the first acts of the new conservative military government was to destool over 100 chiefs that had been propped up by the previous government (Knierzinger 2011). Traditional authority supporters were back in government. At the same time the government continued to be involved in mediating and interfering with tribal succession disputes (Lund 2008; Grischow 2006; Boone 2003; Nugent 1996). This included military intervention in the Northern Region during a deadly fight among the Mole-Dagbani over a tribal stool in 1969, known as the Yendi Skin Conflict (Staniland 1975), a dispute that still active with the assassination of the king in 2002 and breakouts of violence as recent as 2005. By 1971, a new Chieftaincy Act was passed providing for a National House of Chiefs, a deliberative body that still exists today. More importantly, the quota of one-third advisory membership on the local government councils was restored. This revitalization of traditional leaders happened most clearly at the local level during the 1970s and 1980s as the poorly-financed national government did not have the capacity to engaged in developmental activities, leaving chiefs back in their historic position of calling for communal labor and directing daily life (Knierzinger 2011; Nugent 1996). Though the Marxist dictatorship of Jerry Rawlings and the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) tried to stoke the flames of class resentment beginning in 1979, it too soon realized that the chiefs might better serve the state by leading on development issues during times of extreme economic crisis. Soon after, the Rawlings government amended the 1971 Chieftaincy Act in 1985 to free all decisions about stooling and destooling from party politics (Boafo-Arthur 2003), but at the same time included a subsection requiring the *gazetting* or recording of chiefs by the government in order to be officially recognized. Furthermore, in 1988, the government reverse course again passing the Local Government Law, which removed the one-third quota for chiefs on local councils (which later evolved into the main local government unit of today) and

created much animosity between the government and chiefs (Ayee 2000).

By 1992, however, public and political favor swung toward chiefdoms, partly precipitating a new constitution. The new constitution gave the ten Regional Houses of Chiefs an advisory legislative role, an attempt to replace the powers lost in 1988 (Boafo-Arthur 2001; Ray 2003), and gave the National House of Chiefs the duty of maintaining and updating customary law (Boafo-Arthur 2003). The new constitution also codified the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands in the Ministry of Natural Resources which pays royalties for natural resource exploitation to the chief as well as maintenance fees. However, these payments are frequently disputed and thought to be tainted with a high degree of corruption even today (Knierzinger 2011). In 1993, the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs was created in Ghana to oversee the National House of Chiefs, the ten Regional Houses, and the 196 designated traditional areas. In 1996, Rawlings suggested removing the politics prohibition against chiefs, but was met with fierce feedback from the public that wanted to keep traditional authority separate from the dirty business of electoral politics (Lentz 1998). In the same year, Ghana held its first multiparty elections that were deemed free and fair. Most recently, the 2008 Chieftaincy Act, reasserts chiefs' place in arbitration and dispute resolution in addition to clarifying succession disputes to avoid violent conflicts of the past. Despite this greater integration of chiefs into the legislative apparatus, the constitutional prohibition on chiefs getting involved in politics remains today. There is still no quota requiring their input in local government, though they can serve as advisers to the District Assemblies, the main local government political institutions.

Table 3.1: The Changing Political Status of Chiefs

Time Period	Summary of Relations
British Colonial Period (1821-1946)	-Indirect rule -Chiefs used for formal tax collection -Chieftaincy kept from modernizing to maintain power
Limited Home Rule and Early Independence (1946-1966)	-Hostility from Nkrumah -Chiefs seen as colonial collaborators -State regulation of chieftaincy affairs -Chiefs removed from advisory position on local councils
Authoritarian Period (1966-1992)	-Traditionalist restore some autonomy to chiefs -Government intervention in cases of violence -Creation of National House of Chiefs -Advisory position on local councils restored -And then advisory position removed again -State supportive of chiefs' involvement in development
Democratizing and Democratic Period (1992-Present)	-Creation of Regional Houses of Chiefs -Chiefs formally barred from politics in new constitution -Chiefs' domain over customary law reasserted

3.4 Official Administrative and Political Organization of Ghana

3.4.1 Local Government

The modern administrative and fiscal system in Ghana also heightens the importance of local elites and interests as it has transformed in the past few decades against this backdrop of increasing chiefly power. Ghana can be considered somewhat decentralized with regards to expenditures, as many public expenditures are budgeted at the local level, known as the District Assembly (DA). Within the ten regions of Ghana, there are 216 local governments, and that number increases every year. Scholars have characterized these trends in administrative unit proliferation across African states as the result of power grabs by local elites who want to gain from political office or fiscal authority as well as attempts by central governments to consolidate control by fragmenting regional opposition (Grossman and Lewis 2014). These arguments stand in sharp contrast to the efficiency and accountability gains that drive decentralization policy. In Ghana, these local governments are labeled based on population: Metropolitan, Municipal, or District Assembly. DAs, or rural local governments, represent two-thirds of districts. DAs primarily produce local infrastructure while the national government still has primary responsibility over spending on education, healthcare, and electricity.

Revenue is less decentralized, with DAs receiving much of their budgets in the form of transfers from the central government. The sources that fund these transfers include entertainment duties, casino revenue, betting and gambling taxes, corporate and individual income taxes, transport taxes, and advertisement taxes (Ayee 2000). The majority of revenue that remains within the central government comes from customs duties, indirect sales and VAT taxes. DAs do have their own sources of revenue, known as Internally Generated Funds (IGF), but their share is smaller relative to

central government transfers. The 1992 constitution gives these local governments domain over basic (poll) rates, property rates, fees, licenses, and royalties coming from tribal lands and lands rented to timber and mining companies. It is difficult to get representative figures about the relative shares of IGF to total revenue. In 2012, 26 out of the 29 DAs that I collected data within filed budget reports with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning detailing their past performance back to 2009 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2012). For 2010, the last year there were actual budget figures instead of prospective ones, IGF varied between 2% and 46% of total budgets, averaging 16%. The amount of cedis collected ranged from 76,644 to 2,185,168, averaging 522,651. These results indicate there is substantial variation in the capacity of DAs to collect own-source revenue, with many reports citing tax evasion as a major problem.

In 2012, changes were made to the budgeting process such that each DA submits a composite budget to the central government outlining expenditures and revenue that has been approved by the DA. Previously, each sub-committee within the DA negotiated its expenditures with complementary sector ministries in Accra. Before 2012, approximately 7.5% of total national budget was controlled by the DAs (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2010). It is still too early to tell how these changes in budgeting will affect further decentralization of expenditure duties as the budget figures for the first two years of this new budgeting process have just been filed. Before 2012, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development did not even receive copies of local budgets though the underfunded Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development did. The 2012 changes are an attempt to improve top-down oversight of the DAs.

Decentralized governance also incorporates small community interests electorally. Electoral Areas (EAs) are the primary voting units. Each EA elects a single

Assemblyman to the DA. Elections are supposed to take place every four years, though not concurrently with national elections. These local elections are winner-takes-all in single member districts and are strictly non-partisan elections; however, there are frequent unsubstantiated rumors during each local election round that the candidates have connections to political parties.[5] There is little information about the quality of candidates for DA elections, but there are some indications that it can be a platform for upward political mobility. Overall, the elections are poorly funded with low voter turnout (CODEO 2013, 2015). In addition to the Assemblymen, Members of Parliament (MPs) whose constituencies fall within the DAs sit as non-voting members along with a non-voting appointed District Chief Executive. The Chief Executive must also be approved with a two-thirds vote of the Assemblymen. Up to 30% more of the total members may be appointed, but the law governing DAs is unclear if these members are voting or advisory. There are no official records of the total number of members on DAs, but given the 6,156 EAs in the country over 216 local governments, there are an average of 28 voting members per DA.

The DAs main job is the management of local budgeting and strategic planning (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2010). This includes making decisions about expenditures and IGF priorities. Recently, there has been increasing pressure on making the DAs more self-sufficient with greater IGF shares of total budgets. Assemblymen are typically expected to interact directly with citizens in their EA. Typically, each EA is also assigned a local tax collector who works directly with the Assemblymen to identify citizens and businesses for revenue collection purposes (Kazentet 2011). From my discussions with various DA officials as well as local chiefs, there also appears to be a high degree of coordination between Assemblymen and chiefs on fiscal issues like tax collection and development spending. While budgets and planning are done in

[5]More information about District Assembly elections can be found in Chapter 5.

a committee setting in the DAs, the Assemblymen have a large amount of influence in shaping the official discussion of their communities as well as identifying spending needs and revenue sources.

Lastly, there is a level of non-partisan governance lower than DAs known as the Unit Committees (UC). Before fall 2010, there were over 15,000 UCs, though their role was undefined and advisory. However, recent legislation has made a single UC fit within a single EA, reducing the number to about 5,000 in hopes of increasing their governance capabilities, though they still have no budgeting authority or defined legislative role.

3.4.2 National Elections and Party System

The same EAs used to elect Assemblymen are then aggregated to elect MPs. There is typically one MP per DA, especially in the rural areas, for a total of 275 MPs. Beyond typical legislative functions, MPs serve as non-voting members on DAs and have their Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) to spend in their communities. Although these are supposed to be for infrastructure or community festivals, the funds end up being re-election resources that MPs use in campaigns (Tsubura 2013; Lindberg 2003). Unlike DA elections, MP elections are highly partisan. Held at the same time as presidential elections, MP elections have been dominated by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which was the outgrowth of Rawling's PNDC as democratic transition began in 1992. Both parties receive a large amount of support from all ethnic groups, though the NPP is associated with the Ashantis and the NDC is associated with the Ewes (Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Ichino and Nathan 2013*a*; Ferree and Long 2013). Of more importance to this dissertation, the NPP's association with the Ashanti ethnic group is a result of its opposition status to the Rawlings government, making it the more right-of-center and

neotraditionalist party. However, these ties to chieftaincy and ideology have faded over the years as both parties have moved to the center and have very similar policy platforms. Among the current MPs, 145 are NDC and 122 are NPP out of 275 total, leaving only five as independents or third party members. This strong two-party system appears unique within sub-Saharan Africa, making Ghana stand out in terms of democratic competition. Presidential elections are equally as contentious, with both the 2008 and 2012 elections being sent to a second round run-off. Though not the main focus of this dissertation, there is ample evidence that general elections in Ghana suffer from a high degree of clientelism and vote-buying, with ample ink spilled to document its various forms and effects on political behavior (Weghorst and Lindberg 2011, 2013; Ichino and Nathan 2012, 2013*b*; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Lindberg 2010, 2003)

3.5 Current Chieftaincy-State Relations

In many ways, the current chieftaincy-state relations have never been better with respect to the overall status and autonomy of the traditional leaders. Through legislative reforms over the years, chiefs have secured themselves multiple forums for dispute resolution and deliberation. They have regained control over customary law regarding succession and land ownership. And many chiefs have found an influential niche in local development as they have worked to attract international money and reassert control over communal labor activities.

However, there are still many unresolved issues, some which date back to the colonial era. Of biggest concern is land ownership. Ghana still has incredibly vague property rights, leading to issues of expropriation as well as under-investment in agriculture and human capital (Goldenstein and Udry 2008; LaFerrara and Milazzo 2012;

Ampadu 2013; Ubink 2007). Recently, chiefs have taken advantage of their autonomy in land ownership to engage in multiple fraudulent sales of the same parcels of land or to pocket the money from sales instead of reinvesting in the community (Ampadu 2013). Although the Ghanaian government has always tried to use the boundaries of traditional areas to guide administrative boundaries, the 2010 Census process and subsequent redistricting has made it clear that might not always be possible with new settlement patterns and increasing urbanization. Multiple boundary conflicts and disputes were recorded as chieftaincies wanted to avoid being split between multiple EAs, DAs or MP constituencies (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 2012). Yet there is repeated survey evidence from Ghana that people find their chiefs trustworthy and important leaders on development issues and dispute resolution (Logan 2013, 2009; Knierzinger 2011; Ubink 2007).

The greatest source of conflict, however, appears to be the ambiguity that remains in the 1992 Constitution and the 2008 Chieftaincy Act. Few scholars of Ghana truly believe that the constitutional requirement barring chiefs from politics is effective, as it is publicly ignored by chiefs and politicians alike (Kludze 1998). It is not even clear if the prohibition would stand up to constitutional scrutiny on the basis of freedom of expression. Boafo-Arthur (2001) argues that these unclear regulations force local politicians to curry favor from chiefs (or alternatively suppress their power) to gain electoral advantage, creating a pattern of repression and acceptance of traditional leaders. Writing of modern fiscal decentralization in Ghana, MacLean (2010; pg. 118) argues it "validated the continued authority of preexisting village chieftaincy," allowing systems of localized clientelism to flourish and follow the trend of neopatrimonialism throughout Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; van de Walle 2007). What is clear is that chiefs are well placed to influence political outcomes in their community given their close contact with local government officials. With

high levels of public and political support for the existence of traditional authority, effective enforcement of the boundary between the formal and informal spheres of influence remains difficult.

3.6 Acknowledgements

Chapter 3, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

4

Clientelism through Chieftaincy: Politician-Chief-Citizen Relations

4.1 The Job of the Politician. The Role of the Chief.

Since colonialism, chiefs' power has been subject to the consent of formal government. At both a national and local level, politicians have great discretion regarding how much autonomy to give chiefs, especially in the arenas of land allocation and revenue collection (Boone 2003). The fact that government officials allow chiefs to retain some power, despite being able to take away this power, requires explanation. Why would the government officials allow chiefs - potential political rivals - to maintain their powerful status? During the colonial era, the answer was the chiefs provided control over citizens as the British used indirect rule in Ghana. That explanation it not satisfying in the current political climate of free and fair elections where candidates want to actively cultivate voters. The present chapter explains the reason: that due to their strong cultural power, chiefs serve as more effective vote mobilizers than anyone else who would be available to help the politicians get elected. Politicians thus allow chiefs to continue to have an administrative presence in their communities - including extracting informal taxes - because to remove their ability to do so would mean a reduction in the chiefs' status, and a loss for the politicians of the most effective mobilizers available to them.

In the introductory and Ghana-focused chapters of this dissertation, I highlighted the ways that chiefs colluded with government officials in the colonial era. In this time, chiefs primarily acted as a source of legitimate authority and control over the population. However, in the post-colonial but pre-democratic years, chiefs in many African countries represented a threat to newly-independent governments, given that these governments had scarce financial resources and were discredited as colonial collaborators (Ntsebeza 2005; Mamdani 1996). The establishment of competitive elections has introduced a new role for chiefs: that of clientelistic agents of the government. Rather than just serving as village big men that keep local order and peace, chiefs can provide a path towards formal governmental control for politicians.

Due to the weakness of parties and other forms of organization, local politicians rely on chiefs to mobilize votes. To do this, politicians allow chiefs to collect informal revenue. And in doing so, chiefs squeeze out formal government taxation. Thus the more dependent on chiefs politicians are, the smaller the tax base becomes, and the worse public services become. The consequences of this collusion are increased electoral turnout combined with decreased electoral competitiveness.

Described in more detail below and in the next chapter, my definition of informal taxation comes from Olken and Singhal (2011), encompassing money or in-kind communal labor that is collected by non-state actors. Availability of informal taxation comes at the expense of the state enforcing formal tax compliance. It is due to the shirking of these official responsibilities that local politicians can facilitate this illicit exchange of resources to chiefs for their services.

4.1.1 Alternatives to Chiefs Maintaing Cultural Authority to Facilitate Vote Mobilization

Before I discuss why chiefs are generally the most effective mobilizers of voters, it is worth considering the other strategic options available to politicians for getting voters to the polls. The two major alternatives to using chiefs as mobilizers are cultivation of voters through good governmental performance alone (i.e. without any vote coercion) and mobilization by direct payments to individual citizens via professionalized vote brokers (Stokes et al. 2013). Considering the strengths and weaknesses of these other options helps clarify why chiefs can be the best strategic choice.

First is the option of mobilization by good governance. When elected politicians do not utilize clientelistic electoral agents, they encourage political mobilization and electoral support through proactive means. In an idealized democracy, politicians would focus on good governance. They would both provide needed public services for their constituents and collect taxes to fund those goods. These are politically costly activities that require both staffing and time. The public services would need to be of a high quality to appeal to voters while tax revenues should be spent efficiently and in a cost-effective manner so as not to place undue burden on citizens. More succinctly, politicians would relate to their constituents through an electoral connection. They would cultivate votes by being responsive, and derive their welfare benefit from remaining in elected office.

In new and consolidating democracies, however, these voter mobilization efforts are more difficult for politicians because they cannot credibly persuade voters to go to the polls. The electoral process might be unfamiliar for citizens and political parties might be weak and non-ideologically defined. Citizens do not know if the politicians they support or the political regime operating today will be there

tomorrow. This tension between being a good politician and seeking more nefarious means of getting elected is highlighted by Keefer and Vlacicu (2008) who describe a model of politician decision-making. They argue that in new democracies where campaign promises are incredible, politicians seek other means of organizing voters. It is unsurprising that many consolidating democracies are characterized by various forms of patronage, clientelism and vote buying. In contrast to the good governance model, here a connection is formed between voters and politicians on the basis of various private and club goods as well as direct monetary handouts. The literature of these clientelistic practices is wide and vast, some of it focusing on personal-patron relationships (Mainwaring 1999) while other scholars focus on the ability of politicians to funnel particularistic benefits from the government to citizens (Robinson and Verdier 2013; Hicken and Simmons 2008; van de Walle 2007). In the Keefer and Vlacicu model, campaign promises are channelled through patrons - powerful and wealthy elites - who distribute benefits to citizens on behalf of politicians, yet have support networks independent of the political process that provide them with the credibility that politicians lack. What is thought to underlay this whole diversity of interactions is the idea of contingent exchange, that patrons provide these benefits in exchange for electoral support (Piattoni 2001; Rongier 2004). With respect to the specific form of clientelism known as vote buying, the assumption of contingency has recently been questioned as monitoring reciprocity is difficult with secret ballots (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008). Instead, Nichter argues that politicians are buying turnout from marginal supporters who would not come to the polls except for monetary inducement. With or without monitoring, vote buying represents a strategic dance between patrons, brokers and clients to ensure the function of the electoral system for the benefit of politicians. Of course, there might be some situations where chiefs act in an identical manner to professionalized vote brokers, passing out hand-

outs to voters in exchange for turnout or vote choice. However, having chiefs use cultural power to mobilize voters is cheaper and more effective, from the perspective of politicians, than using monetary rewards. These advantages are considered further below.

Within the context of Africa, much attention has been given to this distinction between good governance and patronage politics. Sometimes labeled neopatrimonialism, scholars of African politics have noted repeatedly and in different contexts the use of patronage and personalism in ruling, claiming that it is the "core feature of politics in Africa" (Bratton and van de Walle 1994). Van de Walle (2012) defines neopatrimonialism as having three components: 1) a "big man" on top of the political system, usually a president; 2) institutionalized clientelism among elites to maintain power and the status quo; and 3) the use of state resources in the allocation of clientelistic benefits to elites. As new parties emerged from independence and later democratization in Africa, politicians were forced to seek alliances with elites to reach citizens, forming "overt power-sharing arrangements" (van de Walle 2007). Furthermore, van de Walle (2007) argues that African clientelism can be best thought of as prebendalism, or the acquisition of public office for personal gain, rather than in the machine politics terms that describe other polities with stronger party institutions like in Latin America. Instead of elites always attempting to gain control of the entire state apparatus, Englebert (2009) argues that the state sovereignty is divided up locally with individuals enriching themselves with legalistic fiefdoms. Van de Walle (2007; 2012) is not clear who are the elites or how patronage or prebends are distributed to them. Nor is his clear on how that relationship might change with greater democratic consolidation. I would argue these pockets of personalistic sovereignty are often controlled by traditional authorities, the historic patron-elites of Africa. Despite the well-defined literature on big man politics, there has been less discussion if

and how these exchanges and alliances might operate in more competitive electoral environments.

4.1.2 The Benefits of Collaboration

In this section, I propose an alternative form of clientelism via traditional authority, where votes are not purchased directly from voters but rather through powerful informal actors - chiefs - who have the ability to sanction people into compliance. This form of clientelism is likely to be a dominant strategy wherever it offers mutual benefits to politicians and chiefs, with politicians gaining the most effective vote mobilizers they could have, in return for giving chiefs autonomy and the ability to collect informal taxes. This is distinct from the traditional vote buying model, where politicians rely on a network of professional vote brokers, who are motivated by a desire to become more powerful within their political party (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*a*; Kitschelt 2000). Chiefs, on the other hand, are motivated by a wish to preserve their own individual livelihoods, which are threatened by the rise of formal institutions and politicians. I argue that politicians delegate voter mobilization efforts to chiefs who capture the rents of the exchange in the form of informal tax revenue, a concept described in greater detail below. This payoff is similar to the prebends described by van de Walle (2007; 2009). Below, I explain in more detail why collaboration is beneficial to both parties - why chiefs are the best choice as mobilizers for politicians, and why mobilizing voters for politicians is an attractive opportunity for chiefs.

It is worth considering what advantages a chief has over a professional vote broker. A chief has a well-spring of cultural authority to convince citizens to vote for a particular candidate (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008). This encouragement does not need

to take a threatening or violent form, as chiefs are very persuasive figures. Chiefs possess the qualities politicians lack in new democracies. Chiefs tend to be the major land owners in communities as well as operating dispute resolution forums. In Ghana, regional Houses of Chiefs and tribal councils are empowered by the government to adjudicate customary law disputes, primarily about the allocation of land and succession of different tribal stools (i.e. chiefly dominions). Local chiefs have the ability to coordinate social sanctions and punish minor crimes or offenses with capital punishment that make their opinions and rule weighty. Chiefs are, in sum, the gatekeepers of economic and social opportunity in rural communities. As Acemoglu et al. (2014) describe, it is in the places where chiefs are most despotic that they receive the most local public support because these chieftaincies have best engineered civil society to consolidate their power. This dynamic creates a sense of a tautology, that traditional authority is powerful because it is powerful. Despite their dominance over their own people, traditional authority leaders know that they exist at the whim of formal institutions which have greater financial and military backing. The continued longevity of chiefs is interwoven with the status quo political environment creating a mutualistic relationship between formal and informal governance. As van Kessel and Oomen (1997; pg. 562) write, "One constant theme [of chieftaincies] over time is that of shifting alliances: chiefs align themselves, whether wholeheartedly or for tactical reasons, with the powers that seem to offer the best chances of safeguarding their position."

Considering the performance of different clientelistic agents, chiefs appear best positioned as vote brokers in this environment. As custodians of the land and communities, they have superior information about citizen needs and political preferences compared to professional vote brokers. Furthermore, professional vote brokers might be costly to contract with given numerous outside career options. Despite the char-

acterization in the Latin American politics literature as party loyalists (Stokes et al. 2013), professional brokers can be bought off by the opposing political side or shirk like any other employee. Within Ghana, there is strong evidence that multiparty democratic campaigning combined with expectations of gift-giving has rapidly increased the costs of mounting viable campaigns. In a series of interviews and surveys of Members of Parliament in Ghana, Lindberg (2003) finds that the average amount of "chop-money," or small gifts given to constituents doubled in amount from 1992 to 2000. While voters have come to expect an increasing amount of handouts, vote brokers are also more difficult to monitor from the perspective of politicians as numerous agents might operate in the same space obscuring effort and output. Since professional vote brokers lack the cultural persuasive and sanctioning powers of traditional leaders, each potential voter needs to be paid individually to capture their votes and the contingency of the exchange is more uncertain. The professionalization of clientelistic agents makes it more difficult to pay these individuals through prebends, or the wealth of the state, compared to salaries paid by politicians or parties. Also, resource-poor non-partisan local candidates lack the ability to pay these salaries. Using chiefs as brokers can be thought of as a cost-saving measure as only a small handful of individuals require a monetary payoff, and they then mobilize citizens through social pressure instead of other small payoffs. Furthermore, that social pressure is more effective at enforcing the contingency of the clientelistic relationship. Chiefs act as a centralizing and dominating force in the electoral chaos, and are the more efficient and cost-effective choice compared to professional vote brokers.

While the benefits of using chiefs as vote brokers is a matter of costs and efficiency from the perspective of politicians, the benefits of collusion with formal authority to chiefs are more obvious: revenue-raising power. Derived from Olken and Singhal (2011), I define this informal taxation collected by non-state actors as

money or in-kind communal labor voluntarily contributed to local unelected officials with the expectation that some reasonable percentage of that revenue will go toward providing local public goods.[1] This concept does not include corruption, extortion, or robbery. Rather, informal taxation is extracted from a community through the same persuasive and quasi-voluntary means (Levi 1989) that I argue chiefs utilize to mobilize voters.[2]

In Ghana, citizens are expected to give gifts and tribute to their chiefs as well as contribute hours of labor directed and organized by the chiefs. Chiefs will ring the *gong-gong* to call the entire community to participate in physical labor at their discretions. Many projects are community-oriented, like maintenance of roads or public toilets, but communal labor can also include construction projects on chiefs' plots or working the agricultural lands of chiefs. Citizens that fail to contribute labor are typical subject of fines and fees collected by the chief. While this system is pervasive in Ghana, variation does exist in the frequency and amount contributed.

The ability of chiefs to collect informal tax revenue has been curtailed and regulated since the colonial period as a means of weakening potential political rivals. This includes taking away deliberative roles on local councils as well as attempting to formalize communal labor activities under the purview of local governments' discretion, described more detail in Chapter 3. However, in exchange for helping politicians electorally, chiefs are given greater access to collecting this revenue within their communities to keep for themselves. Practically speaking, the transfer of wealth is facilitated by a reduction in formal tax enforcement for those taxes and fees that are directly collected from private citizens, or a drawing up of the roots of the formal

[1] Olken and Singhal's definition focuses only on in-kind communal labor and does not state a clear expectation for any provision of public services.

[2] While the semantics of how voluntary these revenues are is debatable, that is probably a discussion best left to anthropologists. In almost a year of field work, I never heard a single person report thinking of these payments as predatory. Instead they spoke of their voluntary nature, even when there were perceived punishments for non-payment, or invoked tradition or norms.

state apparatus (Boone 2003; Levi 1989). This leaves more wealth in resource-poor communities for informal taxation, given a weak assumption that resources are fixed.[3] This concept of separate spheres of influence and control is a persistent feature in the literature about state-periphery fiscal relations and informal governance over time. In the more formal language of principal-agent games that are often used to describe many clientelistic broker arrangements, this revenue can be thought of as the wage chiefs' receive as working on behalf of politicians. However, by maintaining separate forms of authority, chiefs and politicians complement each other in way that enhances and strengthens their hold on power.

4.1.3 Variables influencing Chiefs' Effectiveness and Desire to Collaborate with Politicians

In the section above, I describe the basic characteristics that encourage collaboration between chiefs and politicians. In this section, I outline additional variables that help to explain variation in the likelihood of chiefs participating in mobilization, as well as variation in their effectiveness at doing so.

The specific relationship described above represents a variant on the many forms of clientelism and neopatrimonialism within Africa. To make the machinery of this collaboration work, chiefs need to be powerful enough cultural figures both to persuade voters to the polls as well as collect the informal taxation that is their reward for working with formal politicians. Variation in the strength of chiefs at the subnational level could be due to factors such as economic development and economic independence of a community, ruralness and the amount of customarily held land, or

[3]The idea that resource-wealth is fixed at the local level should be considered a weak assumption given the historic levels of competition and fighting over which entity gets access to tax collection in Ghana and elsewhere. The tension and animosity between formal and informal elites is not an abstract disagreement about identity politics, but rather over who controls state resources (Boone 2003; MacLean 2010). Income and income-generating activities being redirected to the informal sector represents a loss in potential income for the state.

differences in customs between ethnic groups. Presumably, rural communities with fewer outside employment options for chiefs would also increase the attractiveness of this arrangement as they would be more reliant on informal taxation for income. Demand from chiefs might also be driven by legal prohibitions on chiefs standing for elected office, like in Ghana. In countries where chiefs are not barred from entry into electoral politics, there might be little incentive to collaborate.

Beyond structural variables that should increase a chief's persuasive abilities other scholars have suggested that chiefs can improve on their abilities to collaborate with politicians over time. Given the fact that elections are not singular events, but repeat regularly, a chief with more experience should be more capable as a vote mobilizer. This human capital formation version of the basic principal-agent model has been explored formally in vastly different contexts from electoral clientelism. Beginning with Rogerson (1985) who showed that the memory of previous periods of play in principal-agent games could make wages rise or fall with effort, more recent models have attempted to explicitly capture this inter-temporal learning dynamic. In a two-period model, Mukoyam and Sahin (2005) demonstrate that, first periods themselves are not responsive to compensation in the traditional sense, nor do they bear much risk from shirking. Rather, the benefits of good behavior in period one feed into the ability of the agent to perform in period two, and provide the necessary incentives. In many ways, this model is analogous to how people actually learn on the job and improve performance over time, with previous periods setting outcomes on a trajectory that is only distinguishable in the long run. This theoretical research supports empirical evidence about compensation schemes in the real world, specifically the finding that younger employees and new CEOs receive less elastic bonuses than more veteran employees (Gibbons and Murphy 1992). This setup nicely extends to the relationship between politicians and chiefs not just because it allows persistence

of action, but also captures the wariness that new collaborative partners feel toward one another, with the politicians and chiefs having more uneasy relationships earlier in their tenure, a finding of Baldwin (2013) in her study about how politicians and chiefs collaborate in Zambia.

4.1.4 Characteristics of Politicians that Drive their Demand for Collaboration with Chiefs

There are two reasons local-level politicians - as opposed to politicians from other levels of government - are most likely to use chiefs as mobilizers. First, their lack of credibility makes them need chiefs, and second, their control of direct taxation gives them something to offer chiefs. Local-level politicians often lack institutionalized support and have credibility problems (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008). Also, although the specifics differ in every country, decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa has rapidly increased the number of new and under-funded local governments, which some scholars theorize are kept weak to prevent viable political rivals (Grossman and Lewis 2014). Within Ghana, the handicapping of local governments has led to those elections being strictly non-partisan, denying candidates party labels and institutionalized support for elections, which makes extra-legal means of voter mobilization more necessary for success.

At the same time, local governments are given access to the forms of direct taxation that most national-level governments avoid due to the difficulty collecting them as well as their limited ability to generate large amounts of income (Kasara and Suryanarayan 2014; Gibson and Hoffman 2007; Ross 2001). These direct taxes are thought to drive government accountability and demand for good governance through citizen demand, the normative basis for fiscal decentralization (Bardhan 2002), creating both a burden and an opportunity for local politicians. Within the District

Assemblies of Ghana sampled for this dissertation, these formal Internally Generated Funds (IGF) varied between 2% and 46% of total budgets for local governments, averaging 16% in 2010, representing a range of compactly and enforcement. The amount of cedis collected varied from 76,644 to 2,185,168, averaging 522,651 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2012). Politicians with the ability to control very-localized fiscal planning are best positioned to make deals with local political elites. While it is true that parliamentarians and local district councilors are both forced to make decisions within collective legislative bodies, local governments have far fewer voting members (an average of 28 per council in Ghana) to coordinate on decisions. Specifically in Ghana, local Assemblymen are also responsible for helping local tax collectors with enforcement as well as voting on new taxes. By enforcement, I mean specifically assisting collectors identify tax-evaders as well as promoting the payment of local taxes via political elites like chiefs in local communities. This promotion of taxes is anecdotally reported by both chiefs and local politicians in Ghana. The institutional arrangement creates a situation where local officials are both directly in charge of raising and collecting taxes in a manner that does not exist at the national level were revenue is more likely to come from indirect or corporate taxation (Ross 2001). Tax evasion and enforcement are controlled by a smaller number of officials compared to voting to raise new revenues in a legislative institution. However, if a strong connection between individual politicians and tax collectors did not exist as it does in Ghana, it would be difficult to coordinate this type of monetary exchange.

This is not to say that politicians at different levels of government cannot and do not collaborate with chiefs in other countries, but the institutional constraints on local politicians in Ghana make them the most likely collaborators as they are the political actors actually empowered to affect local, direct taxation and wealth. Furthermore, parliamentary candidates in Ghana have access to well-institutionalized

party support including professional vote brokers (Ichino and Nathan 2012, 2013*b*) that non-partisan local candidates lack. The unique two-party system in Ghana makes national-level candidates far more credible from the perspective of voters as well (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008). Nor do I mean to say that local politicians are incapable of being good, accountable officials who cultivate voters through quality public service delivery or resort to more traditional means of clientelism through direct vote buying of individuals. Rather, in situations where chiefs are socially influential and politicians have the means of delegating away state revenue, collusion between these groups might arise due to the complementary and incentive compatible strategies. This is an extremely mutualistic relationship, wherein the domain of chiefs is circumscribed by government officials, but the chiefs are enriched by thriving within that traditional and cultural realm.

4.2 Assumptions of this Model of Clientelism via Chiefs: The Importance of Cultural Power

Before outlining my hypotheses , in this section I clarify specific theoretical assumptions that I am making, but in most cases not testing directly. First, I outline the assumption that justifies using informal taxation as a measure of cultural power. Measuring the effects of cultural power is important, as one of my central theoretical ideas is that cultural power makes chiefs the most effective mobilizers for local politicians. This idea has roots in the works of others such as Boone (2003) and Levi (1989) who explain how the role of hierarchies in traditional authorities lead to different types of relationships with colonial powers, with strong native authorities having the potential to be good collaborators in indirect rule. I argue throughout this dissertation that power can be proxied and identified by the increasing existence of

informal tax revenue and the cultural power of chiefs can be operationalized with a variety of observable and opinion-based measures. The amount of taxation collected represents the coercive powers of an entity to extract revenue as well as the capacity of the entity to provide services back to the public through some quasi-voluntary compliance agreement between citizens and a ruler (Levi 1989). This assumption, which is more definitional by construction, is explored and justified in greater detail in Chapter 5.

A1: Where chiefs have more power, more informal tax revenue will be collected from households within that community.

The second assumption of this model is that authority and revenue resources are finite. Informal taxation represents a share of the total wealth that exists within an area. As informal taxation increases, formal taxation must decrease if there is a fixed amount of wealth that can be collected by state and non-state actors.

A2: As informal taxation increases, less formal tax revenue will be collected from households within that community.

The idea that resources are finite and scarce in poor, rural economies should not be considered a strong assumption. The competition over these limited revenue streams has driven much of the history of conflict between state officials and traditional leaders. Citizens only have disposable income to give to informal authority because the state does not enforce formal tax compliance. The money that is paid to chiefs by citizens in the form of gifts and tribute could be used for more income-generating activities or even the purchase of market licenses, representing lost potential revenue for the state. Similarly, in the absence of in-kind communal labor, those same

hours of work that families contribute at the discretion of chiefs could garner more personal income that could also be spent within communities on taxable activities. As these quasi-voluntary contributions are directed by informal actors with much of the benefits directly accruing to chiefs' personal wealth, some amount of downstream economic benefits are missed out by the formal revenue collection apparatus. These are similar losses to the state due to other black market, unregulated aspects of the economy.

It is worth noting that Assumption A2 is not stated as "where chiefs have less power and authority, there will be more formal taxation." That argument is outside the scope of this dissertation. That alternative theory speaks to the relative taxation capacity of the formal state in the absence of strong traditional leaders, which might be weak or diminished for other reasons not captured by this dissertation. In addition to probing Assumptions A1 and A2 in the next chapter, I also address the intractability of the endogeneity question that lies at the heart of this project, if the power of chiefs produces political outcomes or is the result of them.

There are two more assumptions in this model politics that are alluded above, but untestable. They are related to the unseen decision-criteria and action of politicians deciding to collude with chiefs. The first of these assumptions is that strong chiefs make better mobilizers. This a point I argue through this dissertation, that culturally influential chiefs can channel the same powers of persuasion that raise communal labor to encourage voters to go to the polls. Furthermore, these strong and powerful chiefs are better mobilizers than professional brokers, both from the perspective of effectiveness and cost, factors that strictly influence the decision-making of politicians to which type of actor to delegate vote mobilization efforts.

A3: Powerful chiefs are more effective and cheaper mobilizers than either weak chiefs

or professional vote brokers.

A4: Politicians will always use the vote mobilizer that is the most effective and cheapest when given that option.

More succinctly, I assume that when politicians have the option of use strong and powerful chiefs as vote brokers, they will do so.[4]

One could argue there is a causal timing issue with Assumption A1, the operationalization of chiefly power as the amount of informal taxes. This indicator measures that chiefs are sufficiently powerful enough to serve as vote brokers because they can extract revenue out of their communities without any legal mandate. But the measure is also the wage for helping politicians in their electoral campaigns. Ideally, panel data would exist such that the change in informal taxation over time could be measured to proxy for changes in power. Alternatively, criticisms about timing might be related to the idea that the level of informal taxation is not so much causing changes in other political outcomes, but rather the power of traditional leaders causes changes in governance structures simultaneously. While that is likely true, informal fiscal power remains a good proxy measure for chiefly strength as it is a quantifiable measure that varies between individuals and is not directly related to modern legal authority which no longer regulates these types of civic contributions. The theoretical connection to wages in principal-agent models that define the study of clientelism along with the historic importance over ownership of fiscal resources in African states are additional factors in support of using this indicator as a forensic measure of chiefly strength.

[4]It should be pointed out, that at least from the perspective of chiefs, it is not obvious that strong chiefs would want to collaborate with politicians. Historically, was more marginal or weaker chieftaincies in Ghana that tried to align more with the state as they face challenges from other chieftaincies (Boone 2003; Firmin-Sellers 1996). While that was true in the past, the existential threat that the state and democracy generate for chiefs is universal. It is only strong chiefs that have the skills and capacity to attract collaboration with politicians.

4.3 The Electoral Consequences of Collaboration with Power Chiefs

As described above, the effects of cultural power on encouraging chiefs' collusion with politicians is not something I can test directly. However, if chiefs truly are used as mobilizers due to their cultural power, this would lead to other non-obvious empirical consequences that are measurable - and thus falsifiable. In this section, I outline these falsifiable hypotheses that I use to obtain empirical support for my theory in Ghana.

H1: Where chiefs are more powerful, there will be an increase in turnout in local elections.

Chiefs' cultural power should be positively associated with local election turnout, similar to a turnout buying model of clientelism. This should occur because stronger chiefs are more likely to be recruited for mobilization efforts. Greater recruitment of chiefs, in turn, should be associated with greater turnout, as chiefs are more effective mobilizers than any other mobilizers available to local politicians. Thus, because strong chiefs are more likely to be recruited, and chief recruitment leads to greater turnout, chief strength should be positively associated with greater turnout.

Globally, local elections are low turnout events, with little information made available about candidates who sometimes lack party labels. This low turnout has been a persistent problem in Ghana, even in the recent 2015 elections (CODEO 2013, 2015), making these elections an opportunity for entrepreneurial candidates looking to improve their chances through greater turnout. If vote brokering were completely optimized such that agents did not expend unnecessary effort in turning out voters, it would be impossible to detect additional turnout. However, there are many reasons to think that type of optimization does not take place. Perhaps there is an element of

uncertainty about the ability of a broker to translate his effort into outcomes which drives up a surplus of voters or there is an impulse for candidates and brokers to win by larger electoral margins to solidified their standing. The empirical findings on competitive authoritarian elections are that these elections have higher turnout than democratic elections as people fear supporting the opposition(Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). Winning by large electoral margins might also be a strategy to dishearten opposition movements. This same type of fear and social pressure is likely if chiefs are facilitating mobilization efforts. Acemoglu et al. (2014) argue that high political participation within the context of strong chiefs is not a sign of civic engagement, but rather the strong incentives of citizens to follow the command of their rulers who dominate the social and economic landscape. These factors make individual turnout in local elections more likely when chiefs are deeply involved in electoral politics.

Hypothesis H1 addresses the likelihood of individuals or groups of citizens turning out in local elections. However, the point of using any clientelism and pressuring of vote choice is to better ensure specific candidates succeed in obtaining office, which has an anti-democratic effect of reducing the competitiveness of elections.

H2: Where chiefs are more powerful, there will be a decrease in competitiveness in local elections.

This decline in electoral competitiveness described in Hypothesis H2 could be operationalized in a few different ways, such as looking at win margins if accurate aggregate electoral data could be collected for whole geographic areas where chiefs are theorized to be active mobilizers. At the individual level, however, declining competitiveness can be thought of as the likelihood of voting for the winning candidate. A greater tendency to vote for eventual winners should be associated with more active mobilization efforts if clientelism operates as I describe in local elections.

The above hypotheses take the strength of chiefs as a static value. However, multiple scholars theorized about how variation in ethnic group composition (Miguel and Gugerty 2005), physical setting or even the personal characteristics of traditional leaders effect their abilities to persuade citizens. Baldwin (2013) claims that as the tenures of chiefs increase over time in number of years, they form closer relationships with politicians to obtain spending in their communities. From a purely rational-choice efficiency model, time and experience should make a chief better at self-assessing their own skills at voter mobilization, leading individual turnout and vote choice to decline over a chief's tenure. However, based on evidence that there are advantages to winning overwhelmingly in non-democratic elections combined with Baldwin's results about cooperation improving over time in Zambia, the experience of chiefs and improved cooperation with the politicians they collude with should also increase turnout and further reduced competitiveness, as represented in Hypotheses H3a and H3b.

H3a: Where chiefs have more experience, there will be higher turnout in local elections.
H3b: Where chiefs have more experience, there will be lower competition in local elections.

In addition to operationalizing the ability to collaborate as the length of tenure of a chief, I have also collected measures of people's perception that their chief and Assemblyman collaborate well. These measures of collaboration are considered as separate independent variables from the power of chiefs within the same empirical tests. Hypotheses H3a and H3b are not direct replications of Baldwin's core explanatory variable, but close approximations.

At the beginning of this chapter I argued clientelism via chiefs represents an

alternative electoral strategy to traditional forms of vote buying and mobilizing. This type of clientelism strictly dominates those more common forms for cost-effectiveness reasons from the perspective of marginal politicians. Hypotheses H4a and H4b capture the idea that when strong chiefs are not available or suitable for these mobilization activities, other forms of vote mobilization are more likely to occur and they are more expensive.

H4a: Where chiefs are less powerful, people are more likely to be directly targeted for vote buying.
H4b: Where chiefs are less powerful, people will be offered larger amounts of money for targeted vote buying.

These hypotheses assumes that politicians will not turn to good governance as a means of obtaining office when they lack strong chiefs, but this should be considered a weak assumption especially within Ghana given the extensive documentation of vote pressure activities in recent elections (Lindberg 2003; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013; Ichino and Nathan 2012).

4.4 The Developmental Consequences of Strong Chiefs and Devolved Fiscal Control

The hypotheses above relate to measurable electoral consequences of strong chiefs being recruited as mobilizers, in return for informal taxation rights. However, if it is accurate that chiefs are being recruited as mobilizers for these reasons, this should also have testable effects on development outcomes. In this section, I outline specific

hypotheses about development outcomes that should be supported if my theory is correct.

Two features make the form of vote brokering I describe unique. First, as previously stated, I have presented a form of vote buying that centralizes the payment scheme such that the rent accrues to the broker, not the voter, which is cheaper and more efficient from the perspective of politicians. Second, these rents do not come out of the pockets of politicians. Instead, a politician is selling the right of taxation to chiefs, and this is not a right he personally owns, but rather one that is owned by the formal government. These are prebends (van de Walle 2007), not candidate resources.

Perhaps, however, one does not accept the argument above that stronger chieftaincies will result in more clientelism that is facilitated by giving away state resources such as the rights to taxation. Or maybe the evidence that clientelism results in worse public goods outcomes due to weakened accountability mechanisms seems incredible (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008; Keefer and Khemani 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stokes et al. 2013; Wantchekon 2003). If one does accept Assumptions A1 and A2 of this model - that more powerful chiefs collect more informal taxation and informal taxation comes from a fixed amount of local community resources - there are downstream implications for fiscal governance and development that are independent of illegal campaign strategies. Chiefs produce their own wealth from their communities, but definitionally, there is some expectation that informal taxation will be put towards informally producing public services. An all-encompassing theory of state-chieftaincy relations is not necessary to understand the consequence of strong chieftaincy on public services.

There are numerous theories that argue that the informal and localized production of public goods should improve the quality of service delivery. With better

oversight and monitoring than those produced by formal government (Miguel and Gugerty 2005), these services should be produced with less "leakage" and loss (Ostrom 1990; Tsai 2007). At a more abstract level, the longer term time horizons of informal authority compared to elected officials should encourage adequate service delivery in order to receive a continuing stream of benefits from a community (Olson 1993).

Empirically, the developmental outcomes of strong chiefs in other countries has been more mixed. Baldwin's (2013) finding about strong chieftaincy-politician relationships in Zambia might be the result of the public service delivery system in Zambia that favors the autonomy of MPs to use independently-managed Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) (Tsubura 2013). While some scholars have found strong evidence of the beneficial effects of community-self help and social insurance that is facilitated through ethnic ties (MacLean 2010; Miguel and Gugerty 2005), Acemoglu et al. (2014) argue strong chiefs result in worse development outcomes in Sierra Leone.

The implications of strong chiefs for government-produced public goods depend on the formal institutions that engage in expenditures. If all fiscal policy were decided by central government authorities, any localized losses in tax revenue would likely be washed away as funds were reallocated throughout the country. However, fiscal decentralization policies in sub-Saharan Africa has moved away from just creating local governments as administrative pass-throughs that allocate central government block transfer funds. There are increasing expectations of own-source revenue to pay for local expenditures. These own-source revenues come in the form of direct taxation and licensing fees. In Ghana and many other countries, this revenue is kept by the local governments to build infrastructure such as roads, public toilets, market stalls and water boreholes. Alternatively, central governments will budget for public goods

related to national-level policies like health centers, schools, and electricity grids. Beyond the implications of Assumption A2, which asserts there is just less money for local governments to spend when high informal taxation exists, lower local taxation relative to central government transfers is thought to reduce accountable governance. Local governments with lower own-source revenue are less accountable to their citizens because they do not rely on direct taxation to fund government operations, a finding supported empirically cross-nationally and sub-nationally (Gibson and Hoffman 2007; Ross 2001). This broken fiscal contract between the state and citizens results in fewer public goods being produced (Bates and Lien 1985; Tilly 1992; Timmons 2005; Levi 1988), something citizens come to expect as they are not engaged in paying higher amounts of formal taxation. Whether or not lower direct, own-source taxation breaks the social contract between the state and citizens, the effect of less revenue available for expenditures should be reduced spending on public goods that are maintained by those lost sources of income.

I would argue the devolution of taxation and public service delivery to the informal sector does not necessarily result in aggregate gains in developmental outcomes. Strong chieftaincies, either through their own strength or via collaborative relationships between local politicians, reduced public funds for the production of goods by the state. The only way that strong chiefs can make up for these public losses is through massive efficiency gains or increases in the scale or quality of services. Declines in welfare would be directly related to the inactivity of the formal government rather than the authoritarian nature of informal institutions, as the state has fewer resources to budget for development projects and programming. If my argument that strong chieftaincies are associated with greater levels of clientelism and collusion is true, there is greater reason to believe these local governments would under-provide public goods. Weakened accountability mechanisms due to clientelism reduce the

need for local politicians to demonstrate good performance to secure reelection.

H5: Where chiefs are more powerful, public service quality and access will decline, in ways perceptible to the public.
H6: Where chiefs are more powerful, public service investment by the formal government will decline due to reduce formal tax revenue.

These hypotheses point to a conundrum hinted at in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. I argued that failures in formal institutions drive the demand for increased informal authority. However, there is no evidence that failures of informal authority drive demand for formal governance. Why citizens do not punish their failing chiefs or have declining trust in bad chieftaincy institutions is a puzzle that is not addressed well by the literature. It is one thing to be supportive of informal authority when it delivers on public services like Baldwin describes, but it is a different situation when chiefs are failing in their obligations. Perhaps Acemoglu et al. (2014) are correct, that the machinery of chieftaincy institutions so stacks the deck against accountability of elites that any forms of support cannot be seen as truly authentic. At least within Ghanaian history, most of the attempts to restrict the authority of chiefs has been driven by rival political elites, not average citizens. The overall durable and supportive environment for chiefs, even bad ones, from the perspective of citizens in Ghana is something that I cannot fully explain.

Hypotheses H5 and H6 address the investment in public goods by government officials. With less tax revenue, there just is not the capacity to produce as much quantity at the same level of quality. Public perceptions of the developmental level in a community should also be lower as the lack of investment is observable due to worse living standards. Testing Hypothesis H6 is outside the purview of this dissertation, however. This is due to the lack of government expenditure data that maps

directly onto chieftaincy boundaries. However, I argue this is an explicit outcome of this clientelistic system since politicians do not need broad public support for electoral success. (Lake and Baum 2001; Stasavage 2005; Abernethy 1969). In future research projects that have detailed geo-referenced data of expenditures, it would be important to explicitly test this hypothesis. As an alternative test, Assumption A2 addresses how amounts of informal taxation affect collection of formal taxation, that the amount of resources within a community are fixed. Assuming some linear transformation of formal taxation into government-provided public goods (with losses due to leakage, administrative burdens, and corruption), some confirmatory evidence supporting Assumption A2 should provide preliminary support for Hypothesis H6.

However, as indicated above, much of the literature on fiscal decentralization centers on the efficiency gains from increased information about local needs as well as greater monitoring of and by citizens. In order to better explain the impact on public services, it is necessary to consider the constituent components that make up the production of the products (specifically capital, labor and monitoring), how access to those inputs differ in the informal and formal sector, and which level of government is legally responsible for the production of the service in question. While overall service delivery and quality should decline under strong chiefs due to the lack of local formally-collected public resources, those products that are capital intensive will suffer worse. Although the definition of informal taxation builds in an expectation that some amount of the revenue will be used to produce local public goods, even if a chief wanted to reinvest all the revenue into services, he could not produce quality products of some types, specifically those that have large monetary inputs. For example, the production of healthcare requires large amounts of wealth, infrastructure, and economies of scale to staff facilities. An individual chief, no matter how benevolent, is not well suited to provide that service. By taking away revenue from the formal government, the

formal government is less able to provide that good as well. In contrast, there are some services, such as the provision of community safety, that might benefit from the oversight of very local authority figures that have the ability to dole out social sanctions and enforce norms.

As I do not have the means to classify certain public services as strictly capital or labor, this is more of a conceptual framework that expands on a larger discussion occurring in development studies, that the distributional effects in many different research projects come to contradictory conclusions because they observe outcomes on a single public service in isolation without considering the underlying policy-making process that goes into the production of different services (Kramon and Posner 2013). Only with a more holistic view on inputs can development outcomes be fully assessed. Empowering of chiefs differentially affects capital, labor and monitoring available for the production of public services, and these types of goods should be evaluated separately. Analyzing many types of public services also allows me to leverage the official and legal decentralized budgeting in Ghana. Some services are regulated by national budgets and political considerations, and are less likely to be affected by localized revenue shortfalls and chieftaincy politics, providing a counterfactual when budgeting is out of the control of colluding politicians.

4.5 A new perspective on the role of traditional authority

In this chapter, I provide a novel explanation for a surprising fact - that formal politicians allow chiefs to retain power, despite the fact that incentives "should" be pushing these politicians to reduce the power of their potential political rivals. Instead

of doing this, politicians allow chiefs to persist and grow in power - and acquire resources that the politicians themselves might otherwise accrue - because taking away chiefs' power would mean giving up the politicians' best method of vote mobilization. By seeking collaboration instead of conflict, chiefs and politicians can enhance each others' power. While the findings of Chapter 2 show there might be a trade-off in legitimacy between traditional and formal authority in the minds of citizens, this form of clientelism exploits that perception to further entrench both forms of governance in a mutualistic arrangement.

My argument about the relationship between chiefs and politicians makes a few important contributions to the study of elections in consolidating democracies. It explores an often overlooked aspect of electoral politics, the role of informal actors. My theory centers on chiefs' cultural power making them the best vote-mobilizing resource available to politicians. By being overtly traditional and influential in their communities, compared to quietly blending in and supporting the state, the chiefs become more attractive collaborators. This clientelistic relationship between politicians and chiefs helps provide an understanding of why sometimes there is collaboration as opposed to conflict between these groups. This model of politics helps answer the question of why informal institutions such as traditional authority remain. It is not because they can more effectively or efficiently provide public services, but rather that they have adjusted rapidly to the new electoral environment, inserting themselves directly between politicians and voters, to make themselves more valuable to candidates. This delegation relationship between politicians and chiefs rests upon a clarified reading of Weber (1922/1958) who did not imagine patrimonialism as theft, but rather supported through a more reciprocal relationship between traditional leaders and citizens. Pitcher et al. (2009; pg. 132) write, "The survival of clientelism [...] and its existence alongside a bureaucratic logic thus give the contemporary [African]

state its neopatrimonial character." The already existing patron-client relationship between chiefs and citizens has been transformed to incorporate vote mobilization as democratic consolidation occurs.

Finally, and most broadly important to comparative politics, this delegation relationship describes a form of vote buying not explicitly explored in the clientelism literature, where the rents of the payoff are not accrued to the voters, but instead to the vote broker who is a powerful actor and not just a means to an end. This result mirrors van de Walle's (2007; pg. 65) description of clientelism in Africa as being mostly ethnic voting, where the "rewards are more likely to go to ethnic brokers and regional elites, and the rewards to voters are likely to be largely symbolic and vicarious." However, the microfoundations of these arrangements have yet to be explored in a systematic way. By more carefully considering the motivations of chiefs as vote brokers as well as what specific capabilities they have relative to politicians, the extensions to the model are numerous and beneficial outside of the context of Africa.

Recently the topic of vote brokers as individuals as been reconsidered by Stokes et al. (2013). They present a single stage model of brokers engaging in moral hazard. The emphasis of their model is on brokers stealing a portion of the money intended for vote buying and other clientelistic behaviors. The model finds that brokers are more likely to steal when elections are volatile, voters are ideological as opposed to responsive to transfers, and the broker himself cares less about electoral outcomes. While many of these outcomes correspond to some of the hypotheses I have suggested, the Stokes et al. model fails to consider both the repeated nature of the politician-broker relationship as well as the characteristics that make collusion a good strategy from the perspective of the politicians. The limited notion of where brokers' rents come from - out of funds earmarked for voters - also takes a narrow view about the

multitude of other arrangements that clientelism can take in consolidating democracies where prebendalism still exists. In contrast, Keefer and Vlacicu (2008) present these costly payments to vote brokers as the price of politicians doing business with them. They describe this portion of the transfers passing through the elite patron-brokers as a "tax" and claim that these patrons will underwrite some of the costs of campaign promises, which results in decreased public goods provision by the state. However, the authors are vague about what form that tax would take or how large it is because it is not explicitly modeled. It is also unclear why patrons would credibly underwrite the costs of campaign promises and not just take all the transfers due to moral hazard. Their model operates from the perspective of voters, who seek out patron-mediated transfers because they are superior in credibility and worth more than transfers directly from politicians. That argument seems weak when patrons' objectives are to maximize their own wealth over time, not necessarily improve the welfare of a captive audience. Finally, undiscussed is why patrons, who are powerful figures in their model, would be interested in collaborating with politicians in the first place. Instead, Keefer and Vlacicu's model is concerned about rent-seeking behavior of the politicians and the voters, but not patrons who just instrumentally serve to alter others' welfare calculations instead of considering their own. When the vote broker is the more powerful and important political figure from the perspective of citizens - as is the case in places with strong traditional authority structures and weak democratic institutions - the conceptualization of rent-seeking, persuasion, monitoring, and sanctions tends to be upended in unexpected ways.

4.6 Acknowledgements

Chapter 4, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

5

A Natural Experiment in Chiefly Power and Informal Taxation

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I lay out a research design and methodological approach to investigating the role of chiefly authority in Ghanaian politics. The difficulty of studying this topic is two-fold. First, informal authority tends to be unseen and undocumented, influencing outcomes through implicit threats that do not come to fruition. Second, an endogeneity problem exists, where it is unclear if the strength of modern chiefs influences politics, or if chief strength is the outcome of that political environment.

I address the first problem by focusing on an observable indicator of chiefly power, the ability of chiefs to collect and coordinate informal revenue collection in their communities. Chiefs' power within their communities is the reason politicians use them as vote mobilizers. Measuring power with informal revenue collection also dovetails theoretically with the clientelism story. This is because rights to these fiscal resources also can serve as payment to chiefs for cooperating with politicians.

After discussing the validity of informal taxation as an indicator of informal authority, I turn to my research design strategy for overcoming the endogeneity concerns about the relationship of chiefly power and the state. To test the empirical

implications of this relationship between current formal and informal authority, I employ a natural experiment in Ghana that exogenously treated certain communities to have weaker chiefs historically. These effects in the level of chiefly power persist today, making them less likely to collaborate with politicians. I discuss the historical circumstances of this natural experiment, a series of railroads built during the colonial era in present-day Ghana. I argue these railroads had the unintended consequence of weakening traditional authority leaders by altering rural society in lasting ways that affected the ability of chiefs to coordinate collective action necessary for vote mobilization.

Finally, in this chapter, I address the empirical and data collection strategy for much of the dissertation that uses this natural experiment and informal taxation to instrument for chiefly authority. I show that this empirical strategy is robust to multiple specifications and in comparison to alternative operationalizations of chiefly authority. I also show that exposure to the natural experiment predicts different levels of public attachment to traditional authority leaders, indicating more anecdotally that these railroads did have an effect of diminishing the role of chiefs in community life.

5.2 Informal taxation as a proxy for coercive power

In the previous chapter, informal taxation rights are described as the payment chiefs receive for cooperating for politicians. Yet, at the same time, only those chiefs that are strong enough to mobilize voters to the polls are suitable collaborators. The amount of informal taxation collected is itself an operationalization of the persuasive strength of chiefs. Definitionally, informal taxation includes tribute and communal labor, both of which require a chief's ability to extract favors through cultural au-

thority.[1]

Other scholars have theorized about the connection between taxation and authority far beyond local politics in Africa. There is a deep-rooted argument in political science that taxation represents the primary interaction between a state (or state-like actors) and citizenry, with Schumpter (1918/2012) writing, "The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history. An enormous influence on the fate of nations emanates from the economic bleeding which the needs of the state necessitates, and form the use to which the results are put." As Hobbes (1651) and others (Tilly 1992; Levi 1988) have described, people give revenue in exchange for some amount of protection and domestic security provided by a trustworthy state. The ability of the state to extract these revenues is evidence of its strength, and continues to make the state stronger over time. Levi (1989) expands on this transactional conception of taxation by arguing that the coercive power to tax is a continuous variable of the amount of force necessary to collect these revenues, running from fully threatening and violent to ideologically-driven volunteerism of resources. She explains that most taxation exists within the realm of quasi-voluntary compliance where, like Hobbes writes, citizens exchange taxation resources for the delivery of some set of public services. Rarely does actual violent force need to be used, as a state powerful enough to mobilize taxation resources is powerful enough to deliver on public service promises as well as harshly punish non-compliance. Furthermore, compliance is increased through representative systems that "'legitimize' tax power by creating conditional cooperation [...] and by providing a forum for precommitments,"' (Levi 1989; pg. 180). Alternatively, Timmons (2005) reimagines these relationships as an

[1]Within the principal-agent frameworks that dominate the study of broker-politician relationships, this wealth also represents as the payment for services. While some might argue that this creates a simultaneity problem for causal inference, the deep intellectual history that ties taxation rights with authority and coercion mitigate some of these concerns. Furthermore, I am not saying that informal taxation causes electoral outcomes, but it is a forensic proxy value for the endemic strength of chiefs.

explicitly fiscal contract where tax compliance is directly related to the promise and ability of the state to deliver services. This reciprocity exists within many African states, where co-ethnics of the president are taxed at a higher rate as co-ethnicity enables easier and greater enforcement of laws (Kasara 2007). In turn, areas where the president's co-ethnics live are the main beneficiaries of clientelistic policy-making and public service delivery. These theories present a view that tax compliance and the capacity of the state to extract revenue - either through force or through the delivery of goods and services - are tightly correlated. While they provide hypotheses about how these different fiscal relationships arise in equilibrium, they do not necessarily explain how authority itself arises or is maintained.

Scholars of Western Europe have struggled to understand the formation of the modern state and its relationship to fiscal policy. Most associated with this area of study, Tilly (1992) writes that the demands of generating and sustaining military power led to state consolidation. While this argument is sometimes reduced to "more war, more state," what Tilly describes is the careful balancing act that early European states engaged in, both raising revenue and arms for war while maintaining the support of capitalist elites through increased private property protection. Through the dual provision of security and private property, paid for by revenues from the people, states were sent on a trajectory of increased centralization. This arrangement was constantly renegotiated, helping delineate the powers and expectations of the formal state. Similarly, as wealth increased in these states, citizens made greater demands for more diverse public services, generating a larger positive feedback between the capacity to tax and the capacity to provide legal enforcement of contracts (Besley and Persson 2009). Investment in a tax collection apparatus becomes an endogenous process, generating greater coercive abilities as well as capacity for expenditures. Further summarizing, Besley and Persson (2013; pg. 56) write, "When the government

has a larger stake in the economy through a developed tax system, it has stronger motives to play a productive role in the economy, as a complement to extraction... [which] reflects the underlying incentives of policymakers to improve the tax system and ensure taxes are paid." These processes, which were and have remained underdeveloped in Africa (Herbst 2000), have resulted in weakened state authority and formal tax revenues.

While informal authorities once maintained monopolies of violence over their lands as well as primary responsibility for the provision of public services, these roles have diminished as formal states have consolidated even when consolidation is anemic. What propagates traditional leaders' ability to coerce informal taxation, even as formal fiscal systems are established, is the continued monopoly on economic opportunities chiefs and village big men have in developing countries. This monopoly is not enforced through overt acts of violence or standing militias, but through the role social sanctions and monitoring play in facilitating rural social cohesion, as well as the role of weak private property rights. Numerous studies have examined the role that social sanctions, particularly those that operate in tight-knit ethnically homogeneous communities, play in levels of altruism, voluntary contributions, and obedience to social hierarchy (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Mbithi and Rasmusson 1977). Those who have studied the *harambee* voluntary tax contributions in Kenya find that not only do more homogeneous societies donate more funds (Miguel and Gugerty 2005), but that members of the dominant ethnic group receive more of the benefits of the newly created public services (Thomas 1987). These authors argue that this system of informal taxation is not only facilitated by the quasi-voluntary compliance that Levi (1989) describes, but also through close, personal relationships between community members that allow enforcement without violent coercion. The heightened visibility of contributions in small settings reduces the costs of monitor-

ing and enforcement, creating a sense of social pressure and shame. This effect of small settings has even been replicated experimentally in a developed country (Martin and Randal 2008). In the literature on tax evasion more broadly, observational and experimental work has found that altruism or reciprocity does not primarily drive compliance. Rather, compliance is driven by the threat of punishment, especially those fines that are in excess of the amount of the missing revenue (Slemrod 2007). In the context of rural Ghana, social sanctions might consist of depriving access to community-controlled public services - such as social safety nets, land or market access - as well as harsher punishments like shunning or banishment, all which are reportedly used by chiefs in the country. These are truly costly punitive actions that chiefs can administer, but legal norms restrain the formal state from utilizing as well as the state lacking stable public service delivery to withdraw as punishment.

Other scholars have described a similar role of traditional authority and ethnic kinship on fiscal politics in Ghana throughout history. Firmin-Sellers (1996), who compares communalistic and formal property-rights land systems in pre-independence Ghana, finds that where custodial land ownership was held by the traditional chiefs, tax collection increased over time and corresponded to an increase in public goods spending. This shows that while chiefs were responsive to the needs of subjects, the greater economic authority of chiefs as well as more insular societies facilitated this arrangement. These conclusions are further supported by MacLean's (2010) work that argues more insular groups of the Akan ethnic group in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire are more likely to have greater rates of informal tax contributions as well as lower levels of internal dispute. While the rise of rural ethnic hierarchies cannot fully be explained, within the context of developing countries, these arguments provide intriguing clues as to how they have been maintained despite modernization. Through a combination of weak private property, social sanction and the reciprocal provision of services,

traditional authority leaders in Ghana have been able to retain their informal states within the formal state.


5.3 A natural experiment to instrument for level of chiefly authority

This project explores how the cultural legitimacy of chiefs affects electoral and public service outcomes. Legitimacy and power serve as the selection criteria that politicians use to tap chiefs as their brokers. Without the necessary cultural respect, chiefs cannot serve as good collaborators when asked to stretch that authority beyond traditional duties to coordinate voter mobilization. However, this study has some endogeneity problems . It is unclear if the power of chiefs affects politician behavior and the ability to collect revenue, if politicians are empowering chiefs who lacked power previously, or if there is any relationship between the cultural legitimacy of chiefs and their ability to tax informally. In order to gain traction on this identification problem, I employ a natural experiment that treats for initial chiefly authority to better understand the dynamics at play today. Through this natural experiment and subsequent survey research, I can better understand the microfoundations of this delegation relationship.

To improve causal inference, exogenous measures of cultural legitimacy are necessary to examine current levels of delegation. A natural experiment exists in southern Ghana that treated chieftaincies' levels of historic cultural legitimacy and still has current effects on traditional power. During the late-19th and early-20th centuries, British colonial administrators proposed eight railroads that ran from the coastal ports of Ghana to the interior (roughly to Kumasi) to facilitate the expor-

tation of gold and other minerals and palm oil. At the time, railroads were the preferred methods of shipping due to the lack of rivers suitable for navigation in Ghana (Maxwell 1923). After careful negotiation and planning, while many rail lines were debated, only two were built by 1918. Another two lines were built in 1923 and 1927, and four lines were abandoned altogether, primarily due to lack of financing after World War I (Kimble 1963). Primary source evidence, such as communications between the colonial transportation authority and London, indicate that the major motivation for these railroads was mining and oil, and the final decision about which to build was based on the profitability of the mines and fields at the terminal points of the lines (Luntinen 1996; Newbury 1971; Gould 1960). The Secretary of Native Affairs in the Gold Coast writes that the colonial Survey Department made its choices "with a view to selecting the best railway routers from the constructional and traffic point of view" (Maxwell 1923; pg. 224). Nowhere in these documents do the strength of local chieftaincies (or any mention of local public opinion) seem to factor into the decision-making process. Thus, this natural experiment appears as-if random with reference to traditional authority in the southern regions of Ghana. By 1927, colonial spending priorities shifted dramatically toward road construction over railroads, ending the period of railroad expansion (Kimble 1963).

Jedwab and Moradi (2015) show these railroads had the unintended consequence of rapidly introducing the cash crop cocoa into the interior of Ghana. Cocoa had the subsequent effects of changing land-holding patterns to greater private property (Lund 2008) - bringing more migrants from all over West Africa - and increased urbanization along the rail lines, in the form of larger cities, due to increasing returns on commercial agriculture. This rapid social change has persisted until today, with cities along the rail lines that were built being larger compared to areas along placebo railway lines that were planned, but not implemented. This difference persists despite



(based on Jedwab and Moradi 2015)

Figure 5.1: Study Sites and Early 20th Century Railroads in Southern Ghana

the fact that these railroads are no longer in use today, and have not been used for the past 50 years. Furthermore, Jebwab and Moradi find that railroads built in the 1920s display similar characteristics to the placebo lines, their argument being that the cocoa frontier had already moved beyond the region by that point.

While Jedwab and Moradi's (2015) study focuses on the persisting urbanization and development agricultural booms bring, this natural experiment has large implications for the study of traditional authority. The effects of early transportation that the authors find in Ghana (e.g. land use change, urbanization) are the same factors that other scholars have identified as destabilizing to traditional authority and their ability to coordinate collective action. These generalized trends about the role of early transportation networks and rural society have been observed in numerous other settings. In another paper by the same authors, Jedwab et al. (2013) show that similar colonial railroads in Kenya served as focal points for development and infrastructure investments, creating path dependent development even after the

railroads were no longer operational. Though not discussed within their paper on Ghana, this pattern of urbanization is reflected in Ghana, with railroads generating a few, larger cities that contribute to greater urbanization at a regional level, while leaving other rural communities in place. The argument within the literature can be narrowed down to three competing mechanisms of how early transportation networks weaken traditional leaders: privatization of property, increase in income levels, and migration.

5.3.1 Private Property

Rising cocoa production encouraged the development of private property, with chiefs selling chieftaincy-owned stool lands to private farmers. The relationship between cocoa and private property emerged even before the railroads in the late 19th century (Hill 1963). Berry (2001) writes in her study of Ghana that cocoa introduction led to declines in tribute and the rise of rental agreements between chiefs and citizens. Increasing formal enforcement of property rights was also seen as a political tool for support for the colonial government by those who were less connected to the traditional leadership (Firmin-Sellers 1996), who used weak property rights to disadvantage political rivals and engage in predatory rental agreements (Onona 2010). In Cameroon also, Njoh (2002) argues that colonial introduction of private property rights and land reforms were tools explicitly used to weaken native authorities by limiting customary land tenure rules, similar to Lund's (2008) depiction of Ghana. Njoh (2002) writes, "In the traditional African context, access to land and other property was open to all members of any given community. Control over land was vested first in extended families, and then, in whole villages and ultimately in the chief or king." By introducing privatization, these bonds between different custodians of the land were broken. Removing land use and land disputes from the domain of traditional

leaders, reduced their primary function and role in society.

Outside of Africa, early transportation networks facilitated the same transition towards legal due process regarding land tenure. As described by Van Hoy (2008), 19th century Mexico underwent a similar process of formal legalization given the needs of railroad development. Due to the logistics of land acquisitions and labor needs, the formal state needed to assert itself over local elites, or *caudillos*. Van Hoy's study of three railroads before, during and after the rule of Porfirio Diaz, who centralized the Mexican state, provides key insights into how these early infrastructure projects reorganize rural power dynamics over land. New legal tools were developed to facilitate this massive construction in Mexico, including the legal doctrine of right of way and the use of subventions for land.

5.3.2 Income and Welfare

While there appears to be some consensus that early transportation diminished the primary role of traditional leaders and local elites on land issues, there is less agreement about the role that these rapid transportation developments had on individual welfare. Theoretically, with greater access to economic opportunity and wealth, people became less vulnerable to the coercion employed by traditional leaders. Though Jedwab and Moradi focus on increased agricultural production, Chaves et al. (2012) provide estimates of how these same railroads raised returns on capital and GDP per capita for Ghanaians. Similarly, Donaldson (2010) finds that colonial railroads in India were associated with increases in real income levels, a direct result from increased trade, and Goldfrank (1976) argues that railroads in Mexico led to the commercialization of agriculture through the expansion of markets. Furthermore, the social savings that came in the form of lower freight costs led to path dependent growth as people were able to redirect their labor towards other productive activities

in Mexico (Coatsworth 1979). In the case of Ghana, raising incomes combined with increasing dense urban settlements limited the ability of traditional leaders to monitor and punish subjects, leading to absence or obscurity of chiefs in urban centers. However, as Njoh (2002) states, these income gains mostly accrued to colonial settlers, not native peoples. Due to lack of historic data, it is nearly impossible to state whether or not early transportation gains directly resulted in increased incomes of local people, especially those not living in urban settings.

5.3.3 Migration

Within Ghana, early cocoa farmers also tended to be migrants from other parts of colonial Ghana and the rest of West Africa, trying to gain excess to newly privatized lands (Hill 1963). This early transportation facilitated urbanization by allowing rural dwellers to leave the countryside for other economic opportunities. These railroads also provided an exit option to rural life. Perhaps chiefs that were too harsh or autocratic would have been more susceptible to losing people to migration-out, encouraging traditional leaders to adopt more modern outlooks on chief-subject relations, but that is just conjecture. However Berry (2001) argues that early industrialization in 20th century Ghana encouraged citizen to "vote with their feet" and leave harsh rural conditions for a chance for better livelihoods. Given the historic threat of exit options, historic chiefs closer to urban centers would have likely responded to citizens by being less exploitative or expropriative.

Once again, these migratory patterns in 20th century Ghana mirror the experiences of 19th century Mexico where the construction of railroads displaced many rural peasants, yet at the same time led to the use of wage labor which attracted many migrants to the area (Van Hoy 2008). These same Mexican railroads were used in a separate study of 20th century remittances as an instrumental variable for mi-

gration, a very similar research design to this dissertation. In that paper, Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) find that railroads, which facilitated the migration of Mexicans in the late 19th century to the United States, allowed more aggregate remittances to be sent back to Mexico, resulting in persistent evidence of more business activity within those source-locations through the late-20th century. And in a different paper also taking an instrumental variable approach, the same railroads were used to demonstrate a persistence in inequality due to 19th century migration out of Mexico (Mckenzie and Rapoport 2007). These findings exists even though the Mexican railroads were originally built with a complete disregard for population centers and emphasized efficiency of transportation costs (Rees 1975), like in the Ghanaian case. Finally, even within the United States and Canada, early railroad development led to the proliferation of bonanza farming and boom-towns in an East-West orientation that is identifiable today (Conzen 1974; Studness 1964). A one-hundred year time lapse between the construction of infrastructure and evidence of altered socio-political communities is the same time frame for this dissertation. These other studies indicate the radical effects of early transportation globally through migration and the viability of a research design that uses such an event as an instrumental variable.

5.3.4 A Causal Theory of Railroads in Ghana

In total, these new forms of transportation and agriculture profoundly changed the Ghanaian countryside. Though there are examples of chiefs adapting to the new economic realities (Firmin-Sellers 1996), the overall effect of this rapid modernization was the weakening of long-standing traditional governance structures. This story represents what Boone (2003) calls the "rewiring" of power of traditional authority by colonial and early post-colonial governments, and what Joseph (1980) refers to as "disrupting" the country side. These represent fundamental changes in the underlying

societies, sending different communities along different trajectories of chiefly power in a path dependent manner. Greater levels of governmental interference in chief-society relations, intentionally or unintentionally, permanently reduced the ability of traditional authority to impose social sanctions and command respect. These changes are persistent even as private property, cocoa production, and access to transportation to urban centers is more evenly distributed across Ghana today. The railroads resulted in permanent changes in chief-citizen relations even when the proximate drivers of these changes were no longer actively operating in the communities. The urban development described by Jedwab and Moradi is only one aspect of the transformative effects of this treatment on modernization.

By engaging in heavy-handed administration and development initiatives in the past, formal government unknowingly limited their ability to find good collaborators in the modern environment of electoral politics, as discussed in the previous chapter (where I argued that strong chiefs are alternative political agents for weak politicians). This argument also turns the logic of Berger (2009) on its head. In his study, those regions of Nigeria with greater colonial administrative presence now have greater government capacity to produce public goods and coordinate people. According to the argument developed in this dissertation, however, previous governmental interference in traditional and rural society has reduced the number of potential clientelistic partners for politicians today due to that rapid modernization. This theory of change can be seen in Figure 5.2. The strength of modern chieftaincy systems produces a cluster of outcomes related to electoral and fiscal outcomes explored in later chapters. This chapter focuses on the relationship between an exogenous historic shock to strength of chiefs and current levels informal taxation to justify the Assumption A1 introduced in the previous chapter: *Where chiefs have more power, more informal tax revenue will be collected from households within that community.*

This is the first half of the instrumental variable approach to estimate the strength of chief, which is carried through the rest of the dissertation.




Figure 5.2: Theory of Change of the Effect on Railroads on Chieftaincy

5.4 Research Design and Data

Limiting myself only to those railroads that were planned but not built and those built before 1918,[2] I set out to randomly sample 3000 households in southern Ghana to be surveyed from July to December 2012 before the presidential and parliamentary elections in December.[3] By southern Ghana, I mean the governmental regions of Ashanti, Central, Eastern and Western, excluding Greater Accra. This roughly translates to the area south of Kumasi in the Ashanti Region and north of the Greater Accra Region of the capital. The treatment variable of railroads represents a historic and permanent weakening of traditional authority and current chiefly strength is proxied by the amount of informal taxes collected from individuals with sampled communities. Myself and a team of five local enumerators[4] went to 60 differ-

[2]I excluded railroads built after 1918 as Jedwab and Moradi (2015) find mixed results in those areas. They attributed this result to those areas missing the early waves of cocoa cultivation, indicating that the primary mechanism for the weakening of traditional leaders - changes in property rights and immigration patterns - would not be present.

[3]A version of the survey was piloted in two out of sample villages in the same region in April 2012 among 50 respondents.

[4]In total, there were eight enumerators used during the survey period, though some had to be replaced due to conflicting obligations. One was the research coordinator for the life of the project. One was a colleague of the research coordinator. Six were recruited at the University of

ent villages: 30 randomly selected villages that were within 20 kilometers of a planned but not built railroad (placebo), and 30 randomly selected villages within 20 kilometers of railroad that was built before 1918 (treatment). The intended sample was to be balanced between village clusters, with 50 surveys collected in each selected village. The research design also addresses the potential omitted variables of population (or urbanness) and ethnic differences driving outcomes.

5.4.1 Sampling Strategy - Communities

In order to complete the sampling frame, I used a variety of quantitative and qualitative techniques to ensure the physical existence of specific villages as well as a geographic and demographic distribution. This was a challenging process due to the lack of accurate government mapping and census data. Though this field work was completed in 2012 and the most recent Ghanaian Government Census was undertaken in 2010, none of the 2010 Census data at the enumeration level (which is roughly equivalent to communities and villages outside of major cities) was available during this time. Furthermore, access to the enumeration-level 2010 Census is still made unavailable by the Ghanaian Statistical Service, making it nearly impossible to validate the sampling frame with new population estimates.

Given the crude and out dated population figures, I attempted to generate a representative sample of communities based on population along the two types of railroads, treatment and placebo. I restricted myself to villages designated as rural

Ghana, Legon School of Social Sciences. They were recent graduates from the past year. All were university graduates in a social science discipline. There were six men and two women. The research coordinator and I held a one-week training session at the University of Ghana, Legon, running through the survey multiple times on each other. Though the survey was given in Twi-Akan, the team practiced translation in four other local languages in case of the need to translate specific words or parts for explanatory purposes. Overall, the sessions focused on uniformity of enumeration delivery as well as practicing difficult to understand questions and approaches to respondents with low levels of education and numeracy.

by the Ghanaian government, or those with populations of under 5000, as some large cities do not have chiefs that are actually residing in the city (Kleist 2011). I also made this decision in order to better control for the effect that population has on the ability of chiefs to exert influence. By roughly controlling for population, which is one of the technological obstacles for the creation of social norms, I created a hard test of my theory, with any differences between villages unlikely to be attributed to size alone. Rather, these are all villages that have chiefs that are easily identified as ruling over a specific small geographic area and are unlikely to be places of recent immigration. More importantly, this research design and sampling strategy also roughly controls for the ethnicity of chiefs. This region of Ghana is the historic homeland of the Akan people, primarily the Fantes and the Ashantis, who have extremely similar tribal customs related to the organizational structure of chieftaincies. Although migration in and out is theorized to be one of the means that these historic railroads affected the strength of chiefs, all of chieftaincies in the sample are Akan stools. Thus, all the communities in this sample should have roughly similar ethno-cultural practices related to chiefs, which is important given the inability to include geographic fixed effects in statistical models with a spatially generated treatment variable. To find the specific villages, I went through the following steps:

1) Placed a 12 kilometer by 12 kilometer grid over a current map of Ghana that included district boundaries.[5]

2) Dropped those grid squares whose furthest border was more than 20 kilometers away from either a treatment or placebo railroad. Also dropped any squares that were within 20 kilometers of a post-1918 railroad that would otherwise be label as a control square as their treatment status

[5]These grid lines are the same as those used by Jedwab and Moradi (2015).

would be ambiguous (Jedwab and Moradi 2015).

3) For grid squares with points that were 20 kilometers away from both a treatment and placebo railroad, they were marked as a treatment square.

4) Randomly select 60 grid squares from the remaining population along treatment and placebo railroads, 30 along each type, generating a sample of treatment and placebo squares.

To identify specific villages within the grid squares, I used a variety of sources. First, I consulted the enumeration-level census from 2000 which is comprised of an alphabetized list of enumeration areas within each local government district. This list does not include geographic coordinates or any spatial information to further locate the area in the district. I used the census as my first check of settlement existence as the census is the only available source of population data tied to specific named communities in Ghana. Next, I placed my same grid squares as described above over copies of historic maps that are part of the Heritage Materials Collection at the University of Ghana, Legon. Specifically, I used a set of maps from 1920 by an unknown mapmaker stationed at the colonial administrative office in Accra at the time. These folios represent some of the most accurate maps of Ghana available as they provide names of settlements, rivers and other important boundaries that today match with some of the modern local government boundaries. Most importantly for this project, these maps include the two treatment railroads built in 1918 and described by Jedwab and Moradi (2015). These maps are a series of twelve folios approximately four feet by three feet, covering the entire Gold Coast colonial state as of 1920, which allows for such fine-grain detail. The following steps were taken:

5) Settlements listed within the 2000 Census were matched by hand with settlements noted in the historic maps. Differences in the spelling of names were rectified with the help of native Twi-Akan speakers (e.g. Coomassie versus Kumasi). 70% of enumeration areas from the census list were name-matched in the historic maps. Those enumeration areas that were not found on the map were dropped.[6]

6) Of the settlements where a name-match occurred, the current physical existence and name of the settlement was confirmed through two more sources - up to date satellite data supplied through Google Earth as well as verbal confirmation of local residents within the study region. 95% of the name-matched areas were confirmed with modern physical assessment or testimony by locals. Those communities that could not be matched to a modern village were dropped.

7) Of the remaining villages within in grid square, all were geo-located in a electronic map and confirmed to be no more than 20 kilometers from a treatment or placebo railroad, as a Euclidean distance measure. Those that were more than 20 kilometers away were dropped.

8) Of the remaining villages in a square, one was randomly selected, with an eye towards a balanced selection of communities based on population between treatment and control groups. The number of villages that remained in any square before the final selection ranged from one to three. The population selection stratum were 0-1000, 1001-2000, and 2001-5000.

[6]This decision is also theoretically-driven as this is a project that addresses the long-lasting effects of historical events on rural communities. It is important to have communities that actually existed in pre-colonial times or as close as possible, before any modern transportation was introduced to Ghana. In other countries, such as Kenya, where chieftaincies were explicitly created by the colonial governments to serve a local mayoral function, different criteria for determining community inclusion into the research sample should be considered.

The goals was to select communities at rates of 40%, 30%, and 30% respectively of the total sample, as those are the average frequency of enumeration area sizes across all the local government districts in the study, as calculated with the 2000 Ghana Census.

5.4.2 Sampling Strategy - Households and Individuals

Within each village, 50 surveys were to be conducted in households that were randomly sampled with a walking pattern. An enumeration team of five trained enumerators would arrive in a pre-selected village. The research coordinator would announce their presence to the local village chief or his spokesman, letting him know the team was affiliated with the University of California, San Diego and conducting independent research. This was not an attempt to seek blanket consent, but rather put the villages, which were sometimes very remote and unfamiliar with outsiders, at ease. The specific nature of the survey was not discussed with the chiefs. In all 60 cases, chiefs or other local officials did not object to the research, or request that the survey team leave the community. The survey team would then map the community and locate the geographic center , and each would walk in a separate direction to distinct blocks or quadrants of the community. They were each supposed to survey five households per day over two days, or 10 total. They would select every third household to survey. If no one was home, the next house was selected. If an enumerator reached the edge of his quadrant, he would turn right and continue.

The sampling strategy within households sought to preserve representative samples of men, women, and people of different ages. Within households, initial introductions were made and the enumerators asked to speak to a head of the household. male or female. The enumerator would introduce themselves again if necessary and ask if they would participate in a household survey on livelihoods and develop-

ment in Ghana. If they agreed, this individual would be surveyed for the first half of the household survey. If they did not agree, the enumerator left and replaced that household with the one next store. The heads of the households were targeted for the first half of the survey as this part of the survey focused on issues such as household finances and payments of formal taxes. As was determined in piloting, non-heads of households did not know this information due to the traditional structure of Ghanaian homes.[7]

After a head of the household was interviewed, a Kish grid was used to collect the first names of currently residing members of the household that were over 18 years of age; the enumerators alternated if they would ask for male or female names by house. The head of household who supplied the names would then pull a randomly numbered card which would correspond to a specific male or female on the Kish grid. If that person was home, the enumerator would attempt to survey them.[8] This second half of the survey focused on individual-level political beliefs and behaviors as well as experiences with corruption and clientelism. If that person was not home, the enumerator scheduled an appointment. Consent was sought again, and if the person refused, a completely new household would replace that household. If the selected person did not show up to their scheduled appointment, another adult of the same sex would be randomly selected from within the household. If there were no person of the randomly selected sex within the household that could be interviewed and the enumerator was on track to collect less than 40% of their surveys in that village from one sex, the enumerator would replace the household entirely; otherwise, the

[7]Starting with household heads also was necessary because during the pilot survey, individuals refused to speak to enumerators without first talking to their head of household. As these people would need to be consulted at a minimum to have any participation, a decision was made that first introductions would be explicitly to them. This allowed for the survey to better capture their unique knowledge as well.

[8]Sometimes the household head would randomly draw him or herself, and he or she would be asked to complete the remainder of the survey.

enumerator would rerun the Kish process with the other sex.

This burdensome process was necessary to make sure there was a good amount of balance between male and female respondents. The only way to avoid an oversample of women in rural communities is to pre-select the sex to be interviewed and replacing households if demographic quotas were not being met. Though with better preexisting census data, ex post sampling weights could have been used to correct for some of these issues, that was not an option in this data-poor context. Additionally, by separating the survey into two halves, I was able to ensure both better accuracy and fewer non-responses on the household level questions while preserving demographic diversity by age for the political behavior questions.

5.4.3 Response Rates and Error Correction

Though I set out to collect survey data from 3000 households, I fell short of that number for a few reasons. In total, I surveyed 2636 households, about 87.9% of my target total. This response rate is in line with Afrobarometer Round 4 Ghana in 2008 of 90.2% and Afrobarometer Round 5 Ghana in 2012 of 72.9%. Most of the non-responses and shortfalls were due to a combination of tight scheduling and challenging conditions in many sites. This included washed out roads, difficulties securing reliable transportation, and in one case, a village that had been completely resettled two years early 10 kilometers away.[9] There was also a case of a village completely changing its name many years ago, but the name change being unrecorded in the census.[10] In

[9]This was the village of Nkwanta in Tarkwa Nsuayem in the Western Region. I confirmed with multiple locals that the entire town was relocated due to mining prospects in their old village. When the survey team first arrived nearby, we were told by people in Tarkwa, the largest nearby city, that the town had moved. When the team arrived to what was the new location, the people in the community confirmed that the whole village was relocated. Due to this confusion in the field, 58 surveys were completed in Nkwanta instead of the planned 50. Distance to railroad is based on the current location.

[10]Tabure/Tabere in Atwima in the Ashanti Region is known to locals as Bebu. Only the oldest members of the community, ages 60 and higher, remembered the town being called Tabure/Tabere.

half of the communities, 45 or fewer surveys were conducted. There is no systematic pattern to explain these non-responses, either by geographic region or time of year, implying that experience of the enumeration team was not a factor either. Of the 20 communities where 40 or fewer surveys were collected, 10 are communities with fewer than 1000 residents. However, these shortfalls were also due to a lack of enough households to survey, with the communities being organized around larger multi-generational households, in addition to typical non-responses. Additionally, these communities are evenly distributed between the treatment and control groups. Of the communities where 35 or fewer surveys were conducted (70% or less of the target), there is also no discernible pattern: three are treatment, two are control; two are of the small population category, two are of the largest population category, and one in the middle category; two are in the Ashanti Region and one each in the Central, Eastern and Western Regions; and they occurred in three different calendar months. Lastly, none of the community level samples dip low enough to be concerned about the inability to draw strong statistical inferences at the village level. [11] Given this distribution of response rates, there is no reason to think there is systematic bias in these patterns.

For the same reasons that made the sampling strategy difficult, ex post survey weights cannot be constructed for this project. Good survey weights are nearly impossible to construct without a valid census independent of the survey in question. That does not exist in rural Ghana, even by the government's own admission (Ghana Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 2012).[12] Furthermore, this survey

[11] Additionally, four communities have 51 surveys and one has 58. These were errors and miscommunication by the enumeration team in the field. They are split between treatment and control groups, and are in the two larger population stratum. Once again, there is nothing systematic about the dates or regions where these surveys were collected.

[12] As a robustness check, I generated probability sampling weights and ran all future specifications with and without them. There is no difference in the significance of any of the findings, though the coefficients are slightly altered. Given how out of date the 2000 Ghanaian Census is, I feel that it is a better decision to control for within and between village differences explicitly in the econometric

Table 5.1: Summary of Research Sample

Total Number of Villages	60
Ashanti Region Villages	18
Central Region Villages	14
Eastern Region Villages	17
Western Region Villages	11
Overall Response Rate	87.9
Average Number of Surveys Per Village	43.9
Total Number of Surveys	2636
Average Population	1588.6

is not attempting to be a regionally representative sample; rather, it is an attempt to understand how exposure to a specific set of historical circumstances affects political outcomes in those communities. To correct for any sampling errors, most of which are likely correlated to the villages and would effect the standard errors more than the point estimates, I use clustered standard errors (Deaton 1997). This also helps correct for the geographic reality that while there is good balance of treatment and control communities for three of four regions, all communities will be idiosyncratic in their norms and customs related to contributions of informal taxation with individuals more homogeneous within villages than between villages. I also include other individual and community level covariates that might be related to outcomes and the likelihood of responding overall. Locality level fixed effects cannot be included due to the special and geographic treatment status perfectly identifying villages. These econometric specifications are further described below.

5.5 Addressing Threats to the Exclusion Restriction

It is worth pausing to understand how this research and argument relate to Jedwab and Moradi's (2015) findings and it their findings represent a threat to the exclusion restriction of the natural experiment. Another way of saying this is to

models than rely on survey weights.

Table 5.2: Balance Table of Sampling and Selection Criteria

	Treatment	Control
Ashanti Region Villages	10	8
Central Region Villages	3	11
Eastern Region Villages	6	11
Western Region Villages	11	0
Response Rate	87.5	88.2
Average Number of Surveys Per Village	43.7	44.1
Total Number of Surveys	1313	1323
Average Population	1585.5	1591.6
Minimum Population	447	350
Maximum Population	4268	4194
Average Distance to Treatment or Control (km)	7.9	6.1

ask if their story provides an alternative causal pathway that predicts either the endogenous variable of interests (chiefly power) or subsequent dependent variables of interests (electoral behavior and public service delivery).

Jedwab and Moradi's key question is what drives urbanization, which they argue is the result of increasing returns on agricultural investment. Urbanization is measured by the percentage of the population in a vast area living in a city. Although they examine the proliferation of cities, the authors have little to say about the rural communities that remain. Furthermore, no explanation is provided for where these new urban dwellers come from: nearby rural communities, distant rural communities, or increasing family size. Finally, the paper still acknowledges that while agriculture is driving urbanization, the overall land-use pattern historically and today is rural landholders still engaging in agriculture, with urban centers focused on other economic actives.

In the publish version of the paper, Jedwab and Moradi are modest and restrained in what they consider the downstream consequence of the urbanization. Implicit in the study of cities is the concept of development, which is vague and multidimensional. In a previous working paper version of this paper from June 2012, the

authors code Ghanaian District Assemblies, the primary unit of local government, as either treatment or control. This is a move away from arbitrary grid squares. They display results showing that the percentage of citizens that have different types of public services such as schooling, health care access and electricity is greater in treatment districts compared to control districts. However, if it is easier to provide public services in urban centers and the railroads created cities, these results are simply driven mechanically due to the greater share of population in urban centers. This says nothing about the quality of services in rural communities. The measurement is also problematic since District Assemblies can be large areas geographically, with hundreds of kilometers between communities and to these defunked railroads. Furthermore, given the geographic size of District Assemblies, all are coded as treatment if any part of a railroad is in the district, leaving a very small number of control districts. Given the difficult interpretation of these public service results, it is not surprising these analyses were dropped from the published version of the paper.

This project is not an attempt to refute Jedwab and Moradi's (2015) findings, but rather, I am arguing that the causal mechanism of returns to agriculture is part of a larger, more conceptual intervention of modernization that also includes declining power of traditional authority. Although not discussed in their paper, it is reasonable to assume that traditional leadership is generally weaker in large urban settings due to the inability to enforce social sanctions among unfamiliar and diverse groups of people, and in places with greater private economic opportunities . However, it would be incorrect to assume the converse, that traditional authority is strong uniformly in non-urban communities. I would argue it is not. Modernization that did not result in urbanization still had a profound effect on traditional rural social relations. My research seeks to understand what happen to remaining rural communities, which complements Jedwab and Moradi's scholarship on cities.

However, below I consider potential threats to the exclusion restriction.

5.5.1 Income Effects

As stated above, I am not trying to refute Jedwab and Moradi, but rather answer the question of what happened to rural communities that received this shock of modernity. As such, the research design is explicitly constructed to reduce the threats to validity implied by extreme urbanization. Described in more detail below, communities greater than 5000 residents were not included in the study. Population size was explicitly controlled for statistically as that is their only measurement of economic development in published versions of their work. Implicit in that measure is an assumption of increased wealth or income for residents in those communities, and if lack of economic opportunity continues to drive chiefly power, those with more income should be less likely to pay informal taxation.

As a check on differential levels of wealth in treatment and control groups, I ran multiple balance tests to look for differences in individual-level wealth. There is very little evidence that on average, residents in treatment communities have more wealth. Those in treatment communities consume a statistically greater amount as measured in amount spent in the previous day, a proxy measure of income.[13] They are also marginally more likely to score higher on a 5-point living standards index[14] that measures having an improved floor, improved cooking fuel, being on the electricity grid, having an improved toilet, and an improved source of water.[15] Looking at the percentile breakdown, these average increases appear to be driven to greater wealth in the top 90% of the distribution, with respondents appearing extremely similar be-

[13] 9.80 for control; 12.78 for treatment; significant at the $p<0.01$ level

[14] Equally weighted index of having permanent flooring, using gas/paraffin/electrify for cooking, on the electricity grid, using an improved toilet (though public was counted as yes), and using an improved covered water source. The is derived from the Multidimensional Living Standards Index.

[15] 2.42 for control; 2.55 for treatment; significant at the $p<0.01$ level

low that level.[16] Household access to a cellphone is significantly greater in treatment communities.[17] However families are of the same size as are the size of of their homes as counted by rooms, 2.5 rooms for both groups. Although participation in commercial agriculture is greater in control communities[18], for those participating, they have the same rates of land ownership and sharecropping arrangements.[19] Despite any potential greater wealth, those in treatment communities are more likely to report being food insecure in the last week, a measure of abject poverty, though not at a statistically significant level.[20]

As for the relationship between individual-level wealth and political behavior, there is very little evidence that income in related to turnout in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the cross-national research on turnout has focus on institutional variable like the number of previous elections or electoral rules to predict turnout (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Bratton 1998; Kuenzi and Lambright 2007; Lindberg 2006). The evidence of how individual characteristics affect turnout demonstrates that being given a direct vote buy increases the likelihood of turnout, and those targeted are poorer in Kenya (Kramon 2013). More recent cross-national evidence finds that individual assets or education do not predict turnout when ruralness and age are control for statistically (Isaksson 2014). The evidence of the relationship between wealth and voting behavior in Africa is weak enough to not be concerned about this potential alternative causal pathway.

[16]For consumption, 20 cedis spent was the 90th percentile for both groups. The maximum consumption in control was 100 while the maximum in treatment was 420 cedis. Similarly, 90% of control residents scored 3 or lower on the index while 90% of treatment residents scored 4 or lower on the index.

[17]80.88% of control respondents have at least one cellphone and 87.20% of treatment respondents have at least one cellphone, a significant difference at the $p<0.01$ level

[18]59.67% of households in control and 48.68% in treatment

[19]71.99% of control farmers were land owners and 73.52% of treatment farmers were land owners. 18.62% and 18.79% were sharecroppers, respectively.

[20]60.14% of control and 65.96% of treatment households reported being concerned about having enough food for their families in the last week.

Regarding the relationship between individual wealth and public service access, this should only be a concern for measures that are less related to the community provision of a good, like family experience with illness. Services like pumped water into one's plot or private toilets are so rare in rural Ghana that they should not be a concern. Rather, as Chapter 7 attempts to address, we should be concerned about whether there is a relationship between residents using improved versus unimproved communal sources of water/sanitation and chiefly power.

5.5.2 Diffusion of Public Goods from Urban Centers to Rural Communities

An alternate causal mechanism might not be related to changes in individual income in treatment communities, but the benefits of urban centers diffusing into rural communities in such a way that they affect levels of informal taxation and/or public services access. This alternative explanation focuses on informal taxation and collectively produced public services being reduced by a mechanism other than the coercive abilities of chiefs.

5.5.2.1 A One Time Shock

Perhaps historic urbanization and cocoa along the railroads increased the levels of development in rural areas at the same time as creating cities, a sort of "rising tide lifts all boats" effect. These differences would make rural communities along the treatment and placebo railroads not comparable historically, with those along treatment railroads just having a higher level of baseline development. There would thus be less need for communal labor in those areas, as they received a one time shock of increased infrastructure development that continues to reduces the need to

collectively produce public services.

This is an unsatisfying explanation because towns and villages in placebo areas are not more isolated from urban centers today due to the use of roads and the disuse of the railroads. Capital infrastructure depreciates at a very high rate in this physical environment, needing continual maintenance. Finally, major investments in services such as health care and public education were enacted in the mid to late 20th century, directed primarily by the national government and without regard to the historic railroads. Furthermore, cities did develop in placebo areas eventually, though at a slower rate. Cocoa production eventually spread everywhere in Ghana, making the current economic makeup in rural places similar today. I would argue that in the treatment areas, however, the shock was larger and longer ago. These changes to traditional authority had a deeper and more profound effect on modern outcomes due to the length of time and their scale in treatment areas.

5.5.2.2 Continued Diffusion

Another alternative explanation is that cities continue to supply public services that create positive spillovers in rural communities or actively spend in surrounding rural communities. This would be another extension of Jedwab and Moradi's findings, primarily their unpublished work. As those rural communities in treatment areas are located by more or larger urban centers, they would have greater access to services, driving down the demand for communally produced public services and informal taxation in their own communities, as well as increasing access to public services.

The likelihood of this explanation seems to depend on the type of public service in question. More path-dependent infrastructure systems like electricity might be better described by this mechanism; yet at the same time, electricity grids are maintained nationally, mitigating the effects of municipal spending. Hospital-level

health centers might have this form of spillover as the point infrastructure might be located in the urban center, serving a large population in its catchment. There is some evidence of this with respondents in treatment communities have a health center staffed by doctors 20 minutes closer, significant at the $p<0.01$ level.

Other local services that are point infrastructure and are controlled by local governments should have fewer forms of these spillovers. Urban centers are separated into to their own Municipal Local Governments, distinct from District Assemblies, and it is unrealistic to believe one local government would spend resources on another. Furthermore, point infrastructure (e.g. boreholes and toilets) displays no such economies of scale. This potential mechanism is a good reason to assess multiple forms of public services, which I do in Chapter 7. However, given the different constraints on public service delivery, there should not be depressed informal taxation in a systematic way.

Additionally, for this mechanism to be operating, rural communities in treatment areas would have to currently be better connected to urban centers. As roads have superseded railroads today, placebo areas are equally connected to urban centers.

Some further evidence in support of this argument might be a different distribution of the types of projects communities build with their communal labor, but they are all a similar mix of public services and work on the chiefs' plots. There appear to be no systematic differences. Statistically, this causal mechanism could be somewhat controlled for with community level fixed effects in cases without a spatially determined treatment variable, but in the future scholars could supplement this dataset by collecting information on villages' distance to the nearest urban center.

5.5.2.3 Social Capital Diffusion

Social capital, might also diffuse from cities to rural areas. For example, better skills in the production of public services would make communal labor more efficient. Thus, the reductions in total donations of communal labor might be due to increased efficiency, rather than decreased chiefly authority. This diffusion of social capital would occur if there were more current migrations out and then back into rural communities along in the treatment areas.

However, there is very little evidence for this type of current migratory pattern in southern Ghana. Wealthier people in rural communities send their children into cities or out of the country for remittance purposes, but with no expectation of those children returning home to apply their new skills. These differences are already accounted for statistically with estimates of income and education for respondents. The only way to test such an effect would be collect data on the efficiency of communal labor along with the number of hours in communities. As an alternative proxy measure for exchange better urban and rural communities, I examined levels of remittances received by families. There is no statistically significant difference in remittances by treatment status, with treatment areas receiving less per year.[21]

5.6 Methodology and Results

5.6.1 Informal Taxation

The first step for this main analysis was constructing a measure of informal taxation burden per household. Extending Olken and Signhal's (2011) definition, I

[21]Control households receive 255.57 cedis per year while treatment households receive 248.24. If missing data is counted as 0 cedis, those figures are reduced to 160.88 and 144.25, respectively. This is likely are more accurate measure of the size of remittances.

test three forms of informal taxation: 1) tribute; 2) internally-generated revenue by chiefs; and 3) communal labor. Tribute was measured with a set of filtering questions asked of household heads that asked them to estimate the value of their yearly gifts to chiefs.[22] Similarly, internally-generated revenue was estimated by asking household heads to estimate the size and frequency of these contributions. Contributions were then normalized to a yearly amount between households.[23] While tribute and internally-generated revenue, which are pseudo-tax contributions collected by a chief, were self reported in monetary units, communal labor was not. I take Olken and Singhal's (2011) approach to monetizing communal labor contributions by calculating lost wages earned by the household. This was done by multiplying the total number of household hours per year contributed to communal labor. To avoid confusion, the subject of communal labor was introduced with the following definition for respondents: "Communal labor is when citizens work together and provide their own time and labor to complete a project without any payment in return." The statement helps both define the purpose of communal labor as related to public service provision as well as separate the concept from wage labor. The final calculation for a household is based on a series of survey questions asked to a random respondent in the household about the existence of communal labor, the frequency it occurs in their communities, how long sessions are in hours, and what percentage of adults in the household participate. Finally, to estimate wages lost, I assumed an hourly wage of 1 Ghanaian cedi per hour.[24] This is equivalent to about US $0.70-0.90 and is an

[22]Tribute was explicitly differentiated from sharecropping arrangements and contributions, which are quite common in Ghana due to customary land ownership. Sharecropping was asked about separately.

[23]Internally-generated revenue is a well-known term in Ghana. However, to reduce the possibility of confusion, the original filtering question was: "Does your household ever pay internally generated funds to your local chief or sub-chief to support public services?" This helped differentiate the concept from tribute by tying the contributions back to an expectation of public service delivery. Additionally, a separate question was asked about internally-generated contributions to other non-governmental organizations such as churches or farmers associations.

[24]Originally, I intended to develop a more nuanced measure of income lost that took into account differential wage-earning potential. I collected consumption data for households with the plan to

underestimation compared to the current Gross National Income (GNI) of $1550 per capita of Ghana according to the World Bank, assuming a 16 hour work day for most farmers and rural residents. The number of sessions per month varies from 0 to 16 with the plurality occurring 4 times per month, or once per week. The length of each communal labor session lasted 1 to 15 hours in a day. These three streams of income were added together to get the total household informal taxation burden per year, a statistic that is comparable across households and villages.[25]

Before moving forward, it is worth providing a more qualitative understanding of informal taxation and its constituent parts. Reported rates of tribute where quite low in the sample, with only 235, or 9.2%, of respondents claiming to provide tribute to chiefs. The existence of internally-generated revenues collected by chiefs were reported by 776, or 30.4%, of respondents.[26]While tribute and internally-generated revenues were rare to moderately common, the existence of communal labor was reported by nearly every household. Of the households surveyed, 2473 provided "yes" or "no" responses to the existence of communal labor.[27] Of those 2006, or 82.3% of

use that estimate wage-earning, making the assumption that all income is consumed. However, the consumption data has turned out to have too much missing data, even for imputation. Furthermore, assuming a uniform transformation of hours worked to wages lost across households requires the fewest assumption about between household differences. This choice should be considered a weak assumption, which only inhibits the ability to discuss how differences in wealth affect informal taxation, though attempts to correct for that are taken into account econometrically with other measures of poverty. Finally, as the most common forms of communal labor required a 1 hour contribution for all adult members of the household, and the modal household fine for non-compliance was 5 cedis (described in more detail below), this would imply that labor is typically valued around 1 cedi per hour assuming 5 adults in the household.

[25]Household levels of informal taxation and its three constituent parts were used instead of community level averages or aggregate measures for theoretical and methodological reasons. As much of the later parts of the dissertation address individual level public opinion and political behavior, community level measures would not allow investigation into those outcomes. Additionally, by focusing on household level contributions, between household variation can be examined such as how poverty or inequality affects contribution rates. Lastly, from a methodological standpoint, community level analysis would affectively reduce the sample size to 60 observations, which would under-power the other analyses.

[26]412, or 16.2%, of respondents also reported paying internally-generated revenue to other non-governmental entities.

[27]51 respondents said they "did not know" if communal labor took place in their community.

respondents, claimed that communal labor as described by the provided definition existed within their communities. This confirms the ubiquity of the practice as described by Olken and Singhal (2011) in these regions of Ghana. The most commonly reported activities included tasks such as 1) maintaining, cleaning or weeding of roads or 2) building public spaces or infrastructure (e.g. boreholes, schools, markets, clinics, community centers or communal toilet facilities). While these activities tend to be public goods oriented, 291, or 14.5%, of respondents reported that affirmatively that sometimes communal labor takes place directly on their chief's or sub-chief's land, including building new palaces. Of those who responded that communal labor existed within their communities, 98.4% described the work as required, not voluntary, and 96.0% claiming that there was a punishment for non-compliance. Of those who responded, 39.4% said their chief or sub-chief independently determined the punishment and another 31.6% said the punishment was determined in consultation between the chief and other organizers of the communal labor. The most common type of punishment was a monetary fine, reported by 94.6% of respondents who said there was a punishment. These fines range from 1 to 500 cedis for a household, with an average of 10 cedis and a mode of 5 cedis. These figures, which highlight the lack of choice households have in making informal taxation contributions also confirm Levi's (1989) understanding of quasi-voluntary compliance. When primed to think about these contributions in terms of the generation of public services, nearly all describe these contribution as required and typically enforced by traditional leadership and many included activities to sustain traditional leadership as a public good.

Despite the nearly universal frequency of contributing informal taxation within the sample, the two samples begin to diverge on the amount contributed yearly. Table 5.3 displays a difference in means t-test of informal taxation by treatment status. The 95% confidence intervals between the two means barely overlap at all. I can

Table 5.3: Difference in Means in Total Informal Taxation

Group	N	Mean	SE	95% CI
Control	1059	164.18	7.77	(148.93, 179.43)
Treatment	1069	133.58	8.11	(117.68, 149.49)

reject the null at the $p<0.01$ level that households in all communities contribute the same amount of money annually; I am also able to reject the null in the one-sided hypothesis test indicating that household in control communities where there was no historic railroad contribute at a higher rate with 99% confidence. This represents the first clear indicator that communities that were introduced to modern transportation in antiquity display persistent changes to this day.

As previously discussed, total informal taxation is the proxy for current chiefly authority. There is no clear and observable measure of chiefly authority, especially in the fiscal realm, beyond the ability of a chief to rally community resources for some greater good. Yet, this relationship between authority and the exercise of authority is highly endogenous. The first step in this whole dissertation is unraveling the causal relationship between authority and current societal and political outcomes, using the exogenous quasi-experimental intervention of the building of a historic railroad as a treatment that weakens traditional authority leaders. I attempt to model the data generation process of informal taxation in a parsimonious manner, to reduce over-identification. The instrument for informal taxation is the treatment status of the village. I evaluated other alternative explanatory variables, mostly related to the income and developmental effects: 1) the number of adults in the household, 2) abject poverty as measure by a dummy variable of whether the household has been in fear of going hungry in the past week, 3) the amount the household spent in total the day prior to the survey being conducted, and 4) the log of the population of the village.

The number of adults in the household directly affects the contribution of infor-

mal taxation by the construction of that variable, described above. Abject poverty as measured by food insecurity and consumption are included to control for how poverty and inequality affect contributions. These variables also addresses the "you get what you pay for" logic of Timmons (2005), which implies that poor families should be less likely to contribute resources. Alternatively these variables also measure how poverty affects the likelihood of predation by traditional elites, with poor individuals being more likely targets of extraction, the opposite direction from Timmons' prediction. Finally, the size of the community is included as a control as this measures the costs of enforcement needed to collect informal tax contributions. If a household is part of a larger community, it can more easily escape detection for free-riding on the contributions of others. Additionally, in larger communities there should be declining marginal returns on the contributions of each individual household, reducing a community's need for more universal participation. As previously discussed above, I use clustered standard errors to account for systematic differences between villages, which continues in later chapters. The results of this estimation are produced in Table 5.5. It is worth keeping in mind that only the treatment status is used as an instrument in the first state of the two stage instrumental variable regressions that ground much of the rest of the dissertation.

In Table 5.4, I first consider the parsimonious models of the constituent and combined parts of informal taxation - tribute, internally-generated revenue, and communal labor. These results confirm both the rarity and unimportance of tribute and internally-generated revenue in the communities in this study. Furthermore, with an eye towards the second stage estimations in later chapters of this dissertation, the natural experiment of a historic railroad only passes the weak instrumental variable test of an F-statistic higher than 10 when regressed on just the value of informal labor contributions, not the combined total of informal taxation. When regressed

on informal labor only, the variable has an F-statistic of 23.56. Additionally, I conducted a few more robustness checks comparing the F-statistic of treatment status as the instrumental variable with other more direct measures of chiefly authority from my household survey. When the outcome variable is either communal labor or total informal taxation, no other likely instrument produces an F-statistic more than 1. Other potential instruments considered were: 1) whether the chief resolves adultery disputes, 2) if he resolves religious disputes, 3) if he resolves other non-criminal disputes, 4) if he resolves criminal disputes, or 5) if he resolves land disputes. The fact that land dispute resolution was not predictive of communal labor contribution is somewhat surprising. Land dispute resolution is one of the few areas where chiefs in Ghana are given explicit domain by the state. Perhaps this variable cannot differentiate between when the chief has a lot of leeway in deciding these cases versus the situation where there are a lot of land disputes in these communities. For whatever the reason, this survey data does not confirm the importance of land control by traditional leaders on their ability to extract resources from their communities, a hypothesis of multiple other scholars of chieftaincy in Africa (Boone 2003; Firmin-Sellers 1996). For the rest of the dissertation, I only consider the role of in-kind communal labor, rather than a variable that also includes tribute and internally generated revenue. This measure matches Olken and Singhal's (2011) original conception of informal fiscal contributions which form the basis of unobserved financial burden on households. However, the role of tribute and internally generated revenue should not be discounted in future studies in other locations. They represent clear means by which traditional elites extract revenue from communities and might be more directly related to levels of authority in other settings.

In Table 5.5, I introduce the competing explanatory variables as well as clustered standard errors at the locality level. As seen in Model 1, the effect of the

Table 5.4: Truncated Models of the Effects of Treatment Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLE	Tribute	IG Revenue	Communal Labor	All Informal Taxation
Treatment	0.91	8.45	-40.38***	-30.60***
	(0.73)	(6.22)	(8.31)	(11.23)
Constant	1.37***	8.32*	156.04***	164.18***
	(0.51)	(4.40)	(5.90)	(7.96)
Observations	2408	2490	2308	2128
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
F-Stat	1.56	1.84	23.56	7.42
Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

exogenous introduction of a railroad to a community has a persistent effect even when controlling for other predictors of communal labor contributions. As hypothesized, the number of people in a household increases the amount of labor contributed for mechanical reasons of how communal labor is calculated. However, neither a dummy measure of poverty nor a measure of wealth are statistically significant in any specification, even when one is dropped in favor of the other. However, population is highly significant in the predicted direction, with those living in large communities contributing less labor. The specific reason for this result, either less enforcement or less need for contributions by households, cannot be determined. As seen in the models, the point estimates on all treatment variable remains the same even when competing explanatory variables are included indicating these are robust findings.

In Model 3, I reintroduce tribute and internally-generated revenue as additional explanatory variables, however, neither are significant nor do they improve the overall fit of the model, further justifying their exclusion from future models.[28]

[28]Model 1 Table 5.5 is also highly robust to redefining the outcome variable on interest as the amount of monetized communal labor per capita for adults in the household. The point estimate is -13.24 with p<0.01.The full results for this analysis are not displayed.

Table 5.5: Alternative Models to the Effects of the Treatment Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLE	Communal Labor	Communal Labor	Communal Labor
Treatment	-35.66**		-37.66**
	(13.27)		(13.50)
Number of Adults	67.01***	67.48***	65.49***
	(7.35)	(7.60)	(7.88)
Abject Poverty	1.50	1.45	1.49
	(1.05)	(1.11)	(1.03)
Consumption	0.08	-0.07	0.04
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.36)
log(Population)	-28.26***	-29.69***	-28.31***
	(10.78)	(11.51)	(11.08)
Tribute			0.02
			(0.13)
IG Revenue			-0.02
			(0.02)
Constant	183.64**	176.47**	188.71***
	(76.93)	(82.09)	(79.44)
Observations	2115	2115	1951
R-squared	0.22	0.21	0.21
F-Stat	18.24	21.32	12.15
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.6.2 Formal Taxation

The above analysis only addresses Assumption A1: *Where chiefs have more power, more informal tax revenue will be collected from households within that community.* Assumption A2 consists of the assertion that there are zero-sum fiscal resources in these communities: *As informal taxation increases, less formal tax revenue will be collected from households within that community.* This substitutability is implied in much of the work on informal fiscal systems and fiscal delegation (Levi 1989; Boone 2003; Tsai 2007) with the informal system thriving in a power vacuum where the formal system fails to take hold. I find that households in treatment communities that received a railroad (and thus, I argue, have weaker chieftaincy systems) do pay more in formal local taxes. These taxes include basic rates (i.e. poll taxes), market fees, and licenses, the sources of revenue explicitly controlled by local officials. However, there is no statistically significant difference in means between the treatment and control groups. The higher tax burden in treatment communities remains when national income taxes are accounted for, but once again, the differences in means are not statistically significant.

Table 5.6: Difference in Means in Formal Tax Revenue

Group	Mean - Local	Mean - Local and National	N
Control	83.57	136.97	1323
Treatment	118.10	157.72	1313

It should be noted, however, that many respondents refused to answer questions related directly to amounts of formal taxes paid, with 10.6% of respondents being unwilling to answer their contributions on national income taxes and 4.8% unwilling to discuss licensing fees, the most commonly used local revenue mechanism. This suggests a relatively high level of tax evasion, making it difficult to interpret these results.[29] Overall, the evidence that strong chiefs weaken the capacity of for-

[29]The differences the rate in "refuse to answer" responses (RTAs) for national income taxes and

mal government to extract revenue is in the direction expected, but not statistically significant.

5.6.3 Relative Informal Taxation

In an explicit test of Olken and Singhal's (2011) assertion that ignoring informal taxation severely underestimates the financial burden on households in developing countries, I also conducted a difference in means test on the total amount of tax burden per household (the sum of communal labor contributions and total reported formal taxation) as well as a comparison of the percentage of informal taxation as measured by monetized communal labor of total tax burden. Control villages with strong chiefs pay more in total tax burden yearly on average (268.39 cedis versus 266.48 cedis), but this difference is not significant. As for the relative amount of informal tax burden, the percentages were 71.8% and 69.8% for control and treatment households respectively, which is almost significant at the $p<0.10$ level. These results should not be considered to support or disprove Olken and Singhal's claim, which is cross-national in scope.

When the relative amount of informal tax burden (a percentage ranging from 0 to 100) is estimated with the treatment variable, with and without other explanatory variables previously discussed, and clustered standard errors in the OLS framework, the treatment variable is not significant.[30] Relative tax burden appears to be more related to household level characteristics that increase the likelihood of engaging in the formal economy and being subject to more formal taxation.

license were both statistically significant, with treatment households being more likely to RTA on these questions. For national income taxes, the rates were 8.6% and 12.5% for control and treatment communities respectively, a statistically significant difference at the $p<0.01$ level. Similarly, for licenses, the rates of RTA were 3.9% and 5.7%, respectively, and statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level. While households where chiefs should be weaker refused to answer these questions more often (implying possible tax evasion), this data is too ambiguous to draw any strong conclusions.

[30] Full results not shown.

5.6.4 Norms and Preferences about Traditional Authority

It is worth stepping back from the question of how to quantify chiefly authority to assess a claim presented at the beginning of this chapter: modernity weakened preferences for traditional leadership, thus reducing the ability of chiefs to dictate community behavior. This process, which is implied in the work of Jedwab and Moradi, Woodruff and Zenteno, Joseph, and Coatsworth, is a far more difficult measurement problem than the endogeneity of chiefly authority and politics. Throughout this chapter, I have argued that informal taxation is a good proxy measurement for the strength of traditional leadership. However, direct measures of citizen preferences and opinions about chieftaincy do exist. Compared to behavioral and revealed preference measures (like contributions to communal labor), these opinion indicators are subject to social desirability bias as well as subjectivity across different respondents. As such, these opinion-based measures provide weaker evidence.

Within the household survey I ran, there are five questions that address individuals' opinions about traditional leaders and their preferences for other forms of bureaucratic or legalistic authority. Like questions regarding the use of communal labor, there is near universal agreement that chiefs are important for creating good development outcomes[31] and that chiefs are important for the future of Ghana.[32] Additionally, just over half of both types of respondents said they would contact their chief or his representatives if there was a problem in the community, with the majority of other respondents saying they would contact their elected local Assemblyman. The response frequencies and rates divided by treatment status are provided in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 for the two remaining opinion questions about chiefs.

[31]Question: "Thinking about communities similar to yours, how important is one's local chief or sub-chief for creating good development outcomes?" 99.5% of control households and 98.7 of treatment households said "important" or "very important."

[32]Question: "How important do you think chieftaincy and traditional authority are for the future of Ghana?" 88.5% of control households and 92.6% of treatment households said "important" or "very important."

Table 5.7: Most Important Role of Chief
What is the most important role your local chief or sub-chief plays in your community?

	Control N	Control (%)	Treatment N	Treatment (%)
Upholding tradition	678	56.41	655	55.13
Maintaining law and order	323	26.87	328	27.61
Bring development to community	188	15.64	185	15.57
Protecting natural environment	9	0.75	19	1.60
Working with elected politicians	4	0.33	1	0.08
Total Respondents	1202	100	1188	100

Table 5.8: Role of Chief in Politics
How do you think chieftaincy's involvement or role in politics in Ghana should change?

	Control N	Control (%)	Treatment N	Treatment (%)
Smaller role	115	9.10	244	19.50
Stay as it is	1069	84.57	909	72.66
Greater role	80	6.33	98	7.83
Total Respondents	1264	100	1251	100

This evidence indicates that while people have very similar notions about the role of chiefs in development and dispute resolutions, respondents differed by treatment status on their beliefs about the role of chiefs in politics. In treatment communities, where I have argued chiefs are weaker due to the arrival of modernity and new social norms, there is a marked increase in the number of people who want to see chiefs further removed from the political process, further confirming the results of Chapter 2 that the demand for traditional authority and formal governance might be inversely related in the minds of citizens. Using a probit model with the treatment variable and other explanatory variables along with locality cluster standard errors, the predicted likelihood of a respondent claiming that the role of chiefs in politics should be diminished increases by 12.84% in treatment communities, significant at

the $p<0.01$ level, while the income of respondents is not significant.[33] These findings challenges the results of Logan (2009; 2013) who claims there is no incompatibility between the public demand for traditional authority and democracy as well as nuance to some of the results in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that the demand to extend chiefly authority in politics is the outcome of the trust people have in traditional institutions, their beliefs that chiefs listen to the demands of citizens, and previous experience with strong chiefs. I draw similar conclusions using this survey in Ghana: people with weak chiefs desire even weaker ones. Though the universality of support for traditional leaders speaks to the enduring cultural importance of chiefs in Ghana, these results indicate that early transportation networks shaped how citizens think about politics and the proper role of traditional elites in the direction that confirms the theorized causal chain.

5.7 Discussion and Conclusion

The robustness of the results from this natural experiment leads to several conclusions. The results show that being in a treated village that had a railroad built over 100 years ago still today lowers the ability of chiefs to rally communal labor contributions, equal in value to approximately 40 cedis per year per household, roughly $36 US depending on exchange rate. This represents a substantial portion of income for these very poor rural citizens who are living well below the national per capita income of $1550 US each year. Around 25% of households live below the poverty line according the World Bank which is approximately 700 cedis per year (about $630 US). Communal labor contributions are correlated with the size

[33] Full results not shown.

of families, with large families giving more, though that is by construction of the variable. Wealthy households as measured by consumption are not targeted for these contributions; neither are vulnerable poor families living in abject poverty. These findings do not confirm either the logic of "you get what you pay" or the depiction of traditional authority leaders as purely exploitative. The vast majority of respondents reported having in-kind communal labor within their communities. Additionally, most communal labor activities seem to be publicly-minded and concentrated on capital improvements and infrastructure projects, though some respondents report working directly on the chiefs' lands.

The results from this survey also confirm the findings of other scholarly literature on social compliance and norms building (Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Ostrom 1990), with the size of communities inversely affecting the ability of chiefs to collect labor revenue. As stated above, it is unclear if the robustness of this result is due to increasing costs of monitoring and employing social sanctions in larger villages or the decreasing marginal utility of any household's contribution, making enforcement relatively costly. Either way, increasing anonymity within a community lowers the amount a household contributes to in-kind labor.

This data suggest there is a subtle arrangement underpinning quasi-voluntary compliance (Levi 1989). There appears to be a clear sense that in-kind communal labor should occur on projects that benefit the community as a whole, with 99.3% of respondents (2446 individuals) agreeing with the statement "communal labor is an effective tool for development." The overwhelming cultural appreciation for communal labor in Ghana cannot be explained within this dissertation. However, punishments exist and can be quite high for families, with 5 or 10 cedis representing an amount far greater than a family of two adults contributing two hours at a value of 1 cedi per person hour. These represent substantial punitive measures, and respondents almost

universally claim to support these fines as effective deterrents to shirking.

The existence of and opinions about communal labor do not appear related to the strength of traditional leadership. However, the amount of labor extracted out of households does, as does the relative share of informal taxes relative to all revenue collected. Despite over a century passing since these railroads were built, and more than 50 years passing since they were functional, the introduction of modern transportation had profound effects on the ability of chiefs in these regions of Ghana to command labor output of subjects. In this study, I can only speculate as to the exact reason early introduction of transportation had such an effect. As transportation and commercial agriculture facilitated the migration of people in and out of communities as well as increasing the pressure for private property rights, chiefs might have been forced to recast their identities as autocratic local big men in order to address these socio-economic changes. Additionally, many of the changes, like more private property rights, subsequently spread throughout the country. While these changes to the nature of traditional authority do not translate into stated opinions about chieftaincy or communal labor, the weakening of traditional leadership is apparent in the reduced amount and frequency of communal labor that chiefs can extract from their citizens. Evidence of changed norms about chieftaincy is further depicted in differing opinions about the proper rule of chiefs in political life, a contentious topic in Ghana since colonial times. Those citizens who live with weaker chiefs want the role of traditional leaders further diminished. These results indicate that there a norms-based changed occurred due to the introduction of railroad, which destabilized chieftaincies.

These results demonstrate both the viability of monetized communal labor as a measure for chiefly authority as well as speak to the persistence of transportation shocks in rural development and long-run path dependent development of political institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002; Posner 2004). These results

are used in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation to study political behavior and developmental outcomes in Ghana. However, the subjects of communal labor and informal taxation could be addressed more broadly within the comparative politics literature, and could improve understanding of issues such as altruism, social capital and the role of norms creation. These concepts are relatively easy to understand, but are difficult to measure, due to the lack of behavioral indicators. Rather than relying on stated preferences or opinions of traditional leaders, I have measured households' willingness to forgo income to work for free on behalf of a non-governmental entity, a measure of how much that entity is supported and sustained within a community. Through the use of this creative measurement strategy, I have identified two types of communities. These communities represent two different outcomes for modern chieftaincy in Africa, where they are respected and valued in both, yet how that respect translates into actual obedience and organizing power differs greatly.

5.8 Acknowledgements

Chapter 5, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

6

Chiefs and the Electoral Connection

6.1 Introduction

Since 1992, Ghana has held six rounds of multi-party general elections, and those elections have been deemed free and fair by international observers since 1996. Despite being in the third decade of democratic elections, scholars are still attempting to understand what motivates vote choice and political behavior in Ghana and the greater sub-Saharan African region. From the individual perspective, the debate has focused on if ethnic considerations dominate vote choice compared to the retrospective economic assessments which are assumed to drive political accountability. While it seems clear now that ethnic voting is not purely expressive and driven by long-standing grievances (Horowitz 1985), what is less clear is whether ethnic considerations in vote choice are instrumental, economically rational, or related to the institutionally-created incentive structures in transitioning democracies. Furthermore, while African politics has often been seen through the lens of "big men" politics of corruption and patronage (van de Walle (2007)), less work has been done to understand how these clientelistic pressures affect individual-level decision-making. While models exist about who gets targeted by clientelism in other regions of the world (with evidence indicating that poor, compliant or weak partisans are the most likely

targets), less has been done to test these socio-economic theories in Africa. Lastly, most of the previous research has focused on voter behavior and clientelism at the national parliamentary level. Local politics has been ignored despite the fact that the effects of clientelism should be more salient in local politics where concerns about compliance monitoring are lower, politics is even more personalistic, and candidate credibility is lower.

In this chapter, I examine the electoral and political behavioral consequences of clientelism via strong informal authority in Ghana. Using original survey data described in the last chapter, I demonstrate that chiefs are able to facilitate clientelism and voter mobilization for local political candidates, increasing the individual likelihood of turnout as well as the probability of voting for the same winning candidate as their neighbors. This reduces reducing the competitiveness of those elections. Both the proxy measure of the strength of chiefs (using an instrumental variable approach) as well as direct measures of chiefly influence increase turnout in local elections.

I do not find evidence that greater perceived cooperation between chiefs and political actors increases the turnout in these local elections, nor do I find that the length of tenure of a chief - which should improve a broker's abilities - changes likelihood of turnout. However, I do find effects of perceived cooperation between chiefs and local Assemblymen on vote choice, specifically voting for eventual winners of elections. Finally, I demonstrate that in villages where chiefs are weaker in their rule over people, professional vote brokers are more likely to enter those communities and directly offer cash in exchange for turnout. This indicates there might be a form of substitution happening between clientelistic strategies conditional on the presence of strong chiefs.

These results demonstrate that the role of informal authority on democratic institutions is not neutral. Rather, traditional leaders are parlaying their social in-

fluence into affecting electoral outcomes. This effect persists even though chiefs are constitutionally barred from being involved in politics in Ghana. It appears that these prohibitions on direct interference have only served to push the role of chiefs in electoral politics underground and turn them into illicit vote mobilizers. The differential effects of strong chiefs in different electoral arenas indicates that their involvement alters the way voters view democracy, even when chiefs are not directly involved in clientelism.

6.2 Who votes in African elections and why?

Since Africa began holding competitive elections in the 1990s, scholars have focused on what motivates voters. A fundamental question of democratization, voter behavior has been studied in real-time in this unique environment in a way that has been unavailable in older democracies. This research has been dominated by a large and lingering question of what motivates these new voters: ethnic solidarity or retrospective economic assessments. In his seminal work, Horowitz (1985) describes ethnicity as the primary collective identification structure in politics, based in the "myth of collective ancestry" (pg. 52). Though he concedes that ethnicity is not static, Horowitz argues that ethnicity is familial, quickly allows people to identify in- and out-group members, and remains rigid throughout an individual's life. Though writing about more than elections and political parties, Horowitz suggests that the salience of ethnic boundaries makes the rise of ethnic-based voting a logical conclusion, where old tensions and disagreements fuel political competition. It was through this primordialist view of ethnicity that early scholars analyzed post-independence African politics (Geertz 1963). This depiction of ethnically-driven vote choice stands

in contrast to the normative description of democratic politics where politicians are rewarded or punished based on their past actions (Fiorina 1981; Ferejohn 1986; Downs 1957; Key 1966; Tufte 1978). Variously referred to as economic voting, retrospective voting, or accountable voting, an extremely large body of work (mostly focused on politics within the United States) addresses whether or not this process is motivating the choices of citizens. Thus, implicit in the assumption that Africans were "ethnic voters," was the claim that they could not overcome ancient grievances to hold politicians accountable for poor behavior.

As democratization progressed, researchers began pushing back on this depiction of African politics as completely ethnically-driven. While ethnicity is a prominent aspect of much of daily life throughout sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic identity is now thought to be more malleable and fluid.[1] What might appear to be individuals narrowly motivated by co-ethnicity is often voters being rationally-motivated by maximizing their estimated payoffs in material benefits (Chandra 2004). People use ethnic identity instrumentally to receive more state-benefits, sincerely believing that co-ethnics will provide more resources to them. The strong bias towards supporting incumbents (which is economically-motivated reasoning) can sometimes appear to be monolithic support for co-ethnics (Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen 2013). Furthermore, evidence indicates ethnicity is more likely to serve as an informational heuristic in low information environments about shared preferences over policy (Ferree 2006). The usefulness of instrumental ethnicity for public benefits is conditional on the political circumstances that drive competition between groups of citizens and distribute scarce resources, which might not highlight that ethnic social cleavage (Posner 2004; Bates 1983). In other words, it might be that elections produce ethnic tensions rather than ethnic grievances driving electoral behavior (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2013). More

[1]See Chandra (2006) for a review of different theories of ethnic identity.

recent evidence better addresses the political geography of ethnicity by demonstrating that voting against ones ethnic group can even be economically rational when a voter is a relative minority in a constituency and voting against one's ethnic group increases the likelihood of receiving non-excludable public goods like roads (Ichino and Nathan 2013*a*). Rational actors operating within poor informational environments represents a generalize sense of how vote choice is best understood in Africa today.

Another important discussion about voter behavior focuses on how increased democratization interacts with individual-level socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. education, income) that have been predictive in other settings (Campbell et al. 1960). Within Africa, some have found that higher education and income (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Bratton 2008) are associated with higher propensity to turnout, and ruralness is surprisingly more likely to lead to turnout too (Bratton 2008). However, more recent studies have found that the very poor vote more than the very rich (Kuenzi and Lambright 2011; Kasara and Suryanarayan 2014). The most recent cross-national evidence indicates that age, education, and ruralness supersede any effects of individual income (Isaksson 2014). Thus, the relationship between wealth and turnout is unresolved. Older individuals are also more likely to vote (Resnick and Casale 2011) while women are less likely (Inglehart and Norris 2000), though that gender gap is declining overtime (Amoateng, Heaton and Kalule-Sabiti 2014). It has also been found that those people with greater access to media and more interest in politics are more likely to cast a vote (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). Civic and religious participation is also related to higher turnout and participation in Africa and other developing country contexts (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007; Tsai 2007). And beyond traditional socio-economic or institutional variables, it has been found that citizens - while declining in turnout in second elections (Bratton 1998) - appear to learn through habituation over multiple rounds of uninterrupted

elections, becoming more comfortable and familiar with the process (Lindberg 2006; Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). Lindberg (2006) also argues that as more free and fair elections occur, people also increase in their support for democracy over other forms of government, endogenizing the process of democratization through citizen demand and elite supply as everyone coordinates on democratic governance. As people begin to trust institutions more, they participate more frequently (Kuenzi and Lambright 2011). From the individual-level perspective, it appears that demographics of African voters conform to trends in other regions of the world with respect to age, education and political efficacy, but not with respect to income.

6.3 The effects of clientelism on political behavior

Yet this behavioral model of the African voter fails to take into account another institutional driver of voting behavior, namely clientelism. Clientelism, sometimes called patronage, refers to a wide range of political arrangements where politicians offer direct material payments to targeted voters or small groups in exchange for political support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*). As Hicken (2011) writes, clientelism has the following key elements: dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy, and iteration.[2] This combination of elements alters individual-level political participation

[2]The notion of dyadic has changed over time, from one of face-to-face interactions between patrons and clients (Scott 1972; Mainwaring 1999) to one of networks and brokers who work on behalf of the patrons as middlemen (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013; Nichter 2008; Finan and Schechter 2012). Contingency refers to the idea that the exchange of benefits is reciprocal, with goods to the clients and political support going to the patrons. What distinguishes clientelism from other forms of targeted goods like constituency services is that access to the benefits "always comes with strings attached" (Hicken 2011; pg. 291). These benefits differ considerably from place to place, ranging from cash, building materials, access to public services (jobs, contracts, education), preferential access to government contracts, and preferential treatment under regulatory rules (Kitschelt 2011). However, unlike systems where goods might be targeted at specific subsets of the electorate, access to those goods can be restricted to individuals who did not support the patron. The hierarchical nature of clientelism appears obvious at first, with the

when the contingency and reciprocal nature of the relationship operates through repeated elections. As voter participation becomes explicitly conflated with electoral brokers, some of the socio-economic variables that drive turnout might be related to the likelihood of being targeted for clientelism. There is a much wider literature on which citizens get targeted, with some scholars claiming swing voters (Stokes 2005) and others claiming marginal partisans (Nichter 2008), while others find that those who are socially compliant or easiest to monitor are tapped for these exchanges (Finan and Schechter 2012; Cruz 2014). Although these are open debates within the literature, the most robust finding is those individuals who are poor and in need of basic amenities are most likely to be open to some clientelistic exchange out of desperation (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*a*; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Keefer and Khemani 2009; Magaloni 2006). Economic independence and particularly employment mobility, weaken clientelistic networks that rely on close monitoring for enforcement and captive audiences (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*; Hicken 2011).

Whatever the targeting mechanism, the goal of clientelism is to get enough supporters to the polls to win an election. If voters are being asked to change their vote choice, there might not be either an aggregate or individual level effect on the likelihood of turnout. If all candidates are engaging in clientelism, on average participating individuals should be more likely to vote for the winning candidate by

patrons being in a position of power and clients being beholden to their demands even their weaker socio-economic status. However, as Stokes (2005) writes, this relationship is worth dwelling upon because it represents the "perverse accountability" of the classic principal-agent relationship between citizens and politicians where votes are contingent on quality performance. The final component of clientelism, iteration, is perhaps the most debatable. The repeated interaction between patrons (or brokers) and clients allows both sides to develop credibility and trust which are necessary since the exchange of benefits tends not to occur at the same time (Hicken 2011). While this might seem to exclude interaction such as vote buying, it is worth considering that especially in places that hold repeated elections, each election is an opportunity for both groups to fine tune their beliefs and expectations about one another, allowing for what Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007*a*) call "vote choice elasticity," or how pliable any specific voter is in their political behavior to the exchange of benefits. Similarly, it allows clients to gauge the reliability and largess of different potential patrons (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008).

definition, though the size of the win margin is still ambiguous. However, as the theoretical concerns about monitoring of behavior have become more pronounced, it seems like "turnout buying" (Nichter 2008) is a much more reasonable approximation of clientelistic interactions where marginal voters overall are encouraged to go to the polls. This type of clientelism should increase the likelihood of turnout for citizens in addition to generating more voters for the winner if all candidates use the same techniques. It might be the case, however, that only more marginal candidates engage in clientelism, making the evidence of this mobilization that citizens vote in a more similar manner to their neighbors than should be expected otherwise.

There is mixed empirical evidence from Africa to support these theoretical implications of clientelism. Within Africa, clientelism has been conceived of in terms of "big man politics," taking place at the elite level of decision-making (van de Walle 2007, 2009). Scholars have been unclear regarding what they consider to be the elite level, but depictions tend to focus more on negotiating deals for political support and less on the mechanics of how elite bargaining operates in an electoral environment. What interactions politicians have with constituencies is largely symbolic or related to pools of money allocated to members of parliament known as Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in many countries which operate as reelection funds (van de Walle 2009; Tsubura 2013). Others have argued, like I have in this dissertation, that much of clientelistic activity is funneled through already-existing hierarchies of elites. As Wang and Kurzman (2007; pg. 74) write about vote buying, "the campaign need only mobilize relationships of trust at the top of the hierarchy, leaving the lower-level brokers to be mobilized by patronage leaders." Beck (2008) characterizes brokers claiming that there are high levels of social and economic autonomy among brokers, make them more influential within the political process. Writing about the higher prevalence of vote buying in rural Mexico, Lehoucq (2007; pg. 42) argues that

mass mobilization is more effective in "tightly knit communities - typically in rural or 'traditional' areas'...[where brokers can]..."detect and punish defectors." Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) document these mass mobilizations cross-nationally in Africa, with entire villages voting for the same candidates. Alternatively in urban areas, there is too much outside economic opportunity, in addition to these monitoring problems, to make many clientelistic exchanges feasible from the perspective of brokers. Perhaps this elite and personalistic form of clientelism in Africa is related to weakly institutionalized parties (Bleck and van de Walle 2011) or the neopatrimonial pasts of the countries (Bratton and van de Walle 1994); for whatever reason, the more party-based form of clientelism from Latin America and elsewhere does not seem to be considered as much by scholars of African politics. As others have theorized, it is the low credibility of parties and politicians to deliver on promises of broad public service delivery that pushes the supply of clientelistic exchange (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008).

Despite this aggregate evidence of clientelism operating through elites in Africa, the effects on average citizens are more nuanced. In Zambia and Kenya, Young (2009) finds that direct interaction between citizens and Members of Parliament (MPs) - which he argues proxies for clientelism - does not increase turnout, but appearances in the constituencies do increase individual mobilization and support for incumbents. Young tries to make the argument that this is evidence of public-minded economic voting, but there is not necessarily an incompatibility between clientelism - particularly turnout buying - and economic self-interest. In his direct study of vote buying in Kenya using a matching design, Kramon (2013) presents evidence that receiving cash for one's vote increase the likelihood of turning out, particularly among the poor and uneducated as well as those individuals who doubt the secrecy of the ballot. There is more experimental evidence that indicates the ability of clientelistic appeals to mo-

bilize voters. In Benin, Wantchekon (2003) convinced real presidential candidates in the 2001 election in Benin to randomize their campaign strategies to promote either clientelistic goods or programmatic policies in different villages, and he finds that clientelistic appeals tend to be more supported by the public, especially if they come from incumbents or regional parties. With a randomized public information campaign against vote buying in São Tomé and Príncipe, Vicente (2014) demonstrates a reduction in voter turnout, indicating that these clientelistic practices increase individuals' likelihoods of participation. While there appears to be clear evidence that clientelism can bring voters to the polls, much less evidence from Africa addresses how clientelism affects vote choice specifically or speaks to the swing versus marginal supporter debate about targeting.

This chapter attempts to address some of these unanswered questions. I examine clientelism facilitated by chiefs and show that differences individual turnout are due to the unique abilities of tribal chiefs to mobilize voters for local elections in Ghana. I demonstrate that clientelism with chiefs not only brings voters to the polls, but individuals are more likely to pool their support for candidates in local election, voting more consistently across individuals. In an environment where there is as single effective broker to work with, like a chieftaincy with a geographic rule, politicians without access to those informal authority networks will be forced to used less efficient and effective strategies (i.e. ones with greater monitoring costs) and suffer electorally. Combined with the evidence of increased turnout, these two results point to a clientelistic system more focus on turnout buying rather than convincing individuals to change their vote choice. These results derive from the following hypotheses described in Chapter 4:

H1: Where chiefs are more powerful, there will be an increase in turnout in local elections.

H2: Where chiefs are more powerful, there will be a decrease in competitiveness in local elections.

The dissertation's focus on local elections compared to MP elections is driven by the Ghana-specific electoral environment. MP elections in Ghana are highly partisan and not always competitive. These elections are well-financed by the parties who support mobilization efforts with broader campaigning on behalf on presidential elections that happen at the same time. The well-established and professionalized brokers that work on behalf of the parties accessible to most MP candidates, making coordination with specific chiefs a less attractive or necessary option for MP candidates. Furthermore, since MPs are not in direct control of resources that can be target to chiefs such as direct taxation, any payments to chiefs for their services would have to come out of the pockets on candidates or parties, not state coffers. Another way of thinking about these difference is that the partisan environment is so saturated in MP elections, there is not much room for chiefs to have a tangible positive effect on turnout.

Other scholars who have written about relationships between chiefs and politicians have posited that strong and long-standing collaboration between the two groups drives public support for politicians and improves collaboration through the production of local public services (Baldwin 2013). It makes sense that strong public support for collaborative relationships would also translate into turnout and electoral support for those politicians, and I find some limited evidence in favor of these arguments. The experience and professionalization of brokers should improve the persuasiveness and credibility of clientelistic appeals over time. More experience as a broker should be helpful at increasing turnout. In an attempt to replicate previous work (Baldwin 2013), I hypothesize that the length of tenure of chiefs increases turnout. Similarly, good cooperation - and thus coordination - between politicians and chiefs should in-

crease mobilization capabilities. This hypothesis is represented as Hypotheses H3a and H3b in Chapter 4:

H3a: Where chiefs have more experience, there will be higher turnout in local elections.
H3b: Where chiefs have more experience, there will be lower competition in local elections.

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that clientelism via chiefs operates through the social prominence of strong traditional leaders to persuade voters, which is more desirable from the welfare perspective of local politicians. The argument is supported by the ample evidence that clientelism in Africa is facilitated by already existing networks of elite authority (van de Walle 2007; Beck 2008; Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). In the absence of strong chiefs to collaborate with, however, I show that politicians are more likely to rely on typical cash handouts to mobilize voters. This is a mobilization strategy where the contingency of the relationship is weaker, making electoral success of those politicians more questionable. Clientelism through chiefs should thus be thought of as the preferred method of clientelism, not the only option, as seen in Hypotheses H4a and H4b from Chapter 4:

H4a: Where chiefs are less powerful, people are more likely to be directly targeted for vote buying.
H4b: Where chiefs are less powerful, people will be offered larger amounts of money for targeted vote buying.

These arguments help provide an understanding of how clientelism affects voter behavior when clientelistic institutions are not considered to be a dichotomous variable, but rather considered to vary in their strength and relative prevalence.

6.4 Elections in Ghana

Before presenting the research design and methodological approach for this chapter, it is worth briefly discussing the specifics of elections in Ghana and the country-specific evidence of clientelism and ethnic voting. As stated in the Chapter 3, Ghana is divided into Electoral Areas (EAs) which aggregate up to District Assemblies (DAs) and MP constituencies.[3] In rural areas of the country, there is a one-to-one correspondence between MP constituencies and DAs. Each EA elects one Assemblyman to sit on the DA. These local elections are non-partisan and EAs are single-member districts with winner-take-all elections.[4] There are currently 6,156 EAs within Ghana.

6.4.1 Local Elections

The non-partisan nature of the local elections comes into question each cycle as candidates display party colors and banners. There are rumors of party officials being seen campaigning on behalf of local candidates, but no widespread evidence of these electoral violations. Average citizens understand these elections are supposed to be non-partisan legally, but refer to many candidates as having a "secret" or "hidden" party. In addition to these directly elected representatives who make up approximately two-thirds of council membership, the MPs with constituencies in the district sit on the DA along with a District Chief Executive and other members appointed by the President, who represent not more than 30% of the council membership. The District Chief Executive also must be approved by two-thirds of elected

[3]More information about the administrative roles of Assemblymen can be found in Chapter 3.

[4]Unit Committee elections take place concurrently and the top five vote receivers are elected. These elections are also non-partisan. Unit Committees lack legislative and fiscal responsibilities. Their roles are ill-defined, and they serve as very local-level advisers to the DAs.

DA members. These appointed positions are supposed to be made in consultation with interest groups including traditional leaders, and traditional leaders are not allowed to be appointed to the DAs.[5] DA elections are supposed to be held every four years, established by law in their current form through the Local Government Act of 1993, the National Development Planning Act of 1994 and the Local Government Instrument of 1994. As the survey data for this dissertation was collected in 2012, the last local elections at that point in time were 2010.[6] Assemblymen receive little to no government support for campaigning or even outreach to constituents when they are in office (Yeboah-Assiaman, Asamoah and Osei-Kojo 2014).

6.4.2 National Elections

In alternating even numbered years, presidential and parliamentary elections are held.[7] The first multiparty elections under the current constitution of Ghana were held in 1992, but elections were not deemed free and fair until the following round and alternation of power in the presidency did not occur until 2000. Turnout in general elections has been stabilizing over the past few elections cycles: 79.43% in

[5]As for 2008, there were 170 DAs; however in June 2012, that number was increased to 216. For the purposes of this dissertation which examines political outcomes up to 2012, the pre-2012 configurations are used to analyze local elections. DAs are classified based on population size as Metropolitan (over 250,000), Municipal (over 95,000) or District or Rural (at least 75,000). The study sites in this dissertation are only within District or Rural Assemblies.

[6]While the next round of DA elections was supposed to be held in October 2014, it was repeatedly delayed due to lack of funding for the Electoral Commission of Ghana from Parliament as well as a constitutional struggle between the Supreme Court and the Electoral Commission over nomination and candidacy requirements related to the legislation that codifies the local governments. The elections were finally held on September 1, 2015. According to a preliminary report from domestic elections observers in Ghana, turnout was quite low though the atmosphere was peaceful. The report indicates that 93% of observed polling stations had polling stations set up to vote in secret, but that amount varied regionally, with Central Region having the lowest percentage, 77%, meeting legal standards. 11% of polling stations observed had unauthorized individuals present with Greater Accra Region having the highest percentage of polling stations in this category, 20% (CODEO 2015).

[7]Other African countries are split among concurrently held local and national elections. For example, Kenya and Nigeria have non-concurrent elections similar to Ghana while Malawi, Zambia and South Africa vote on national and local positions at the same time.

2012, 69.52% in 2008, 85.60% in 2004, and 61.74% in 2000, or an average turnout 71.36% over four rounds (IFES 2015). General elections are held in early December. Second round presidential elections are held in late December or early January if no candidate receives 50% of the vote. Voter registration occurs during spring of a general election year. As for the 2012 elections, there were 14,158,890 registered voters among an overall population of about 25 million (IFES 2015). In 2012, Ghana began using biometric voter identification protections to reduce voter fraud, though the system had known technical difficulties during the 2012 election with 19% of observed polling stations having failures at some point (CODEO 2013).

General elections are partisan and primaries do occur for MP candidates, but not uniformly between parties or constituencies. These primaries are typically not open to the public and are elite driven, occurring in spring or summer of an election year. It has been suggested that these primaries occur not to strengthen parties' electoral chances, but to facilitate the extraction of rents from potential candidates by local party leaders (Ichino and Nathan 2012, 2013*b*). Furthermore, Ichino and Nathan (2013*b*) argue that the strength and independence of local party members ends up producing a "reverse coattails effect" in general elections, where primaries increase local interest in rent-seeking and mobilization efforts which results in gains for presidential candidates of the same party.

Not only are the general elections partisan, but two parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC), have won every presidential election since 1992. The last two presidential elections (2012 and 2008) were both sent to second stage runoffs as support was evenly split between the NPP and NDC candidates. Among the current MPs, 145 are NDC and 122 are NPP out of 275 total, leaving only five as independents or third parties. Many analyst would describe Ghana as uniquely partisan among African countries, with a stable party system and

competitive support in the country. While support between the two parties is evenly divided nationally, few MP elections are considered competitive. Only 25 out of 106 MP seats in the Ashanti, Central, Eastern and Western regions were won by 10 or fewer percentage points in the 2008 elections.

6.4.3 Evidence of Clientelism in Ghana

The clientelistic nature of Ghanaian politics has been debated among scholars, leading to inconclusive findings. All the evidence that does exist examines national level partisan elections and does not address local government. Using pre- and post-election surveys around the 2008 election in Ghana, Weghorst and Lindberg (2011) find clientelistic appeals were not enough to drive vote choice. They do find evidence of swing voting late in the electoral cycle, due primarily to negative evaluations of the incumbent government. The clientelistic appeals that seem to be most effective were symbolic measures like attending local funerals and weddings rather than material benefits, which is a strategy that does not advantage incumbents like others have found (Wantchekon 2003). They argue that this demonstrates that the voters who put NDC back into power valued public goods and retrospective assessments of performance more than clientelistic appeals. In a follow-up study, the authors claim that rather than swing voters being motivated by clientelism (Stokes 2005), they find that swing voters are the ones most likely to use economic and retrospective assessments of performance when making their vote choice at the MP level (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). At the same time, Lindberg (2010) concedes that clientelism is endemic to the Ghanaian political system, facilitated informally with expectations for money by citizens as well as formally with constituency development-type funds that MPs have complete discretion over. Additionally, most of the evidence on Ghanaian clientelism examines MP elections, not local elections. This is problematic from a theoretical

perspective since local elections should be much more susceptible to direct appeals to voters due to being low-information, non-partisan environments. These local candidates lack the credibility to make compelling public goods promises like partisan MPs.

6.4.4 Evidence of Ethnic Voting in Ghana

Regarding the role of ethnicity - or ethnic self-identification - in Ghana, the scholarly and anecdotal evidence is more conclusive. While NPP and NDC have ethnic regional strongholds (Ashantis in the Ashanti Region and Ewes in the Volta Region, respectively), there is ample evidence that ethnic solidarity does not drive vote choice. Both parties enjoy support from all major ethnic groups, not just Ashantis and Ewes (Hoffman et al. 2009). Both major parties also run people of the local ethnic group in elections to appeal to the most voters (Lindberg and Morrison 2008). There is also evidence that intra-ethnic conflict between Akan subgroups like the Ashantis and the Fantis (whose home region is the Central Region), make smaller ethnic groups unpredictable swing voters or subject to greater electoral fraud and clientelism (Ferree and Long 2013).[8] While the depiction of Ghanaian voters as purely ethnic voters is not correct, the questions of how ethnic hierarchy affects individual political behavior have not been previously explored.

[8]While there is no evidence of systematic fraud in Ghanaian elections (CODEO 2013, 2015), there are many accusations of fraud or corruption. In particular, after the 2012 elections, there was so much controversy given the tight presidential election that the losing NPP candidate took his case to the Supreme Court. Evidence seems to indicate, however, that there is a pattern where strong partisans make accusations of (and very much believe in) electoral misconduct after their preferred party loses an election, dating back to at least 2004 (Parku 2014). This might just be a specific feature of the Ghanaian electorate, or part of a more general trend among African voters when there are strong partisan preferences.

6.5 Data and methodology

Data for this chapter comes from the same household survey described in the last chapter. I use the natural experiment of exposure to historic railroads to exogenously weaken traditional authority structures with the argument that those places with weaker chiefs are less capable of mobilizing voters to the polls on behalf of candidates. The econometric models presented below use an instrumental variable approach with the first stage measuring how the treatment status regarding the historic railroads predicts current household contributions to informal communal labor, a proxy measure for the strength of traditional authority leaders. In all models, clustered standard errors at the locality level are used to correct for correlated errors with the primary sampling units. Only the second stages of the models are presented as the first stage is captured in Chapter 5.

For the second stage models, a few groups of independent variables are examined. The first group attempts to address the individual level characteristics that have been studied in the political behavior literature, described in this chapter and Chapter 2. These include: a respondent's age, number of years of education, sex as measured by a dummy variable for female, and ethnicity as measured as a dummy variable for Akan, which is the dominate ethnic group in the region. Other predictors of political participation include an indicator if the respondent self-identifies as a community leader, a dummy variable representing whether the respondent has contacted a political or traditional leader about a problem in the last three months, a dummy variable representing whether the respondent has a negative assessment of the standard of development in the community,[9] and whether the respondent is a member of the chief's clan. The variables of community leadership and contacting political

[9]Question: "How would you evaluate the overall level of development in your community?" 5-point scale from very poor to very good, with very poor and poor being combined into a single indicator or a negative assessment.

leaders are both measures of non-voting political efficacy and interest in public affairs, which should increase the likelihood of voting. The assessment of the developmental state can be thought of as a retrospective evaluation of government performance. Clan connections are a measure of social hierarchy and elite status. Other variables related to income, poverty, and household size are also examined as wealth has been found to have unclear effects on voting behavior in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally the log of village population is included as increasing population makes voting less rational as individuals are less likely to be decisive voters (Downs 1957).

The next set of independent variables I examined address ways that chiefs illegally get involved in electoral politics, or at least are perceived to be involved in politics by the public. The first two measures are indicators of whether chiefs encourage citizens to vote in either local or MP elections, a variable reported by household survey respondents.[10] The other measure is a belief that chiefs have a secret or hidden party. While local elections are non-partisan, if a substantial number of citizens believe that a chief has a partisan affiliation, this should indicate his involvement in politics. Interestingly, neither of these activities - encouraging voting or having a hidden party - are conceived of as being associated with strong or weak chiefs per se. Some citizens see the promotion of voting a benign support for democracy, something that should be promoted. Clear party labels for chiefs in Ghana is also not necessarily seen as a sign of strength, but rather as a greater desire for political associations beyond traditional authority structures.

The last group of independent variables addresses the question of how time in tenure as a chief as well as cooperation affect individual level political participation in a village. These two variables explicitly speak to an unanswered question in the

[10]Respondents were also given a choice to answer that chiefs discourage them from voting. For MP elections, only 4 of 2561 respondents claimed this happened. For local elections, only 2 of 2558 respondents claimed they had heard this. These responses were coded as missing and dropped from the analyses.

literature about how certainty and professionalism affect clientelistic brokers (Baldwin 2013; Keefer and Vlacicu 2008; Stokes et al. 2013), and how these concepts translate into the persuasive power to mobilize voters. The perception of cooperation was measured at the individual-level with the following question: "How well does your local chief or sub-chief cooperate with your District Assemblyman?" This was measured on a 5-point scale with "good" and "very good" measures combined into a single indicator for strong cooperation between traditional leaders and local government officials. The tenure in years variable was collected directly from chiefs within the study villages; however, quick informational interviews with traditional leaders were only possible in 48 out of 60 villages due to scheduling conflicts. The squared terms of years of a chief's tenure is also included to measure if there are declining returns on a chief's knowledge of his community. Given the missing data problem, these measures are only used in a single analysis related to turnout in local elections and not used to predict vote choice.

Regarding dependent variables of interest, most were collected from the household survey. Turnout was self-reported for the local elections in 2010 and the general election in 2008. These questions are clearly subject to recall bias, however, there is no reason to think there would be a systematic bias in one direction or that the bias would be different in treatment versus control villages.[11] Respondents were asked about their intention to vote in the upcoming 2012 general elections that were one to four months away from the time respondents were surveyed.

Respondents were questioned about their specific vote choice in previous elections. For the 2010 local elections, responses were coded against secondary source

[11] Of greater concern, possibly, with these retrospective reports of turnout is the issue of timing and causality. All of the dependent variables that are supposed to predict turnout, with the exception of the treatment status regarding railroads, are collected through a household survey asking about living standards today. However, there is little reason to believe that living standards change dramatically over any period of time. However, to be cautious, only the most recent elections 2008 and 2010 were examined in most cases.

materials from district government websites that list Assemblymen as well as calling DAs to get lists of elected assemblymen.[12] I also used information directly from DAs and from public records of general elections to track the incumbent re-election rates going to 2006 for local elections and back to 2000 for MP elections, requiring winning candidate information for the election prior. However, since these Assemblymen and MPs represent more constituents than just those in the study villages, this information is used for contextual purposes.

The last set of dependent variables collected are on the frequency and size of vote buy approaches, going back to 2004. Frequency was also compressed into a dummy variable if the respondent had been approached once since 2004. Vote buy size is the reported amount that an individual was offered. These questions about vote buying were asked directly without any obscuring survey techniques such as a list experiment. A list experiment was piloted before the main roll out of the survey and was found no more successful at eliciting responses on this sensitive topic compared to direct questioning. In total, 2543 individuals were filtered into the survey panel on vote buying, with only 95 refusing to answer the question, making for a response rate of 96.40% among those who completed the survey.[13] Even so, this measure of the prevalence of direct vote buying is likely to be an underestimate of the practice. The underestimate is due to the social desirability effect which discourages respondents from revealing socially unpleasant information to survey enumerators. Additionally, only 378 respondents provided an actual amount they were offered, indicating large selection bias against reporting.

It is worth discussing a timing issue that surrounds this data, namely that values of informal tax contributions from 2012 are being used to predict electoral

[12]Information was not available for sitting District Assemblymen in Betinasi/Betenase/Batenase in Obuasi District or Nyamebekyere No. 2 in Birim North District.

[13]Filter question: "Have you ever been offered any gifts before an election such as party T-shirts, party T-shirts with money inside, or transportation costs to and from a rally?"

outcomes in 2008 and 2010. Ideally, there would be measures of informal taxation contribution before and after elections, but that data does not exist in any form. However, as this research design uses a 100-year old natural experiment to predict informal taxation, it is unlikely that two or four years of additional time passing would greatly affect these levels of contribution. The argument laid out in the previous chapter is that modern transportations permanently sent different parts of Ghana down different pathways in terms of how citizens interact with traditional leaders. There is no reason to believe that informal taxation levels would differ in the immediate years prior, especially in a systematic way that affects treatment and control communities differently. However, this artifact of the data should bias against finding results in these elections.

6.6 Results

The main argument of this dissertation is that strong chiefs have unique capabilities as vote mobilizers, but that the electoral environment affects the value of these services. In local elections where there is low information about candidates and parties are less institutionalize or do not exist in the case of Ghana, there is greater need to rely on already existing patronage networks, such as traditional authorities, to facilitate getting voters to the polls. However, the same conditions that make chiefs valuable in local elections due not exist in general MP elections where parties have alternative networks. Furthermore, while chiefs can translate their social standing into votes at the local level, that power then inhibits the ability of the formal state to consolidate power in these rural communities, impeded by strong chiefs extracting resources that could be used for public service delivery by the state. The strength

Table 6.1: Self-Reported Turnout in Local and General Elections

	Control (%)	Treatment (%)	Total Respondents	One-sided t-test p-value
2010 Local	66.25	60.36	2231	0.002
2008 MP	77.13	80.87	2307	0.014
2012 MP (Prospective)	90.96	92.10	2514	0.153

of informal authority alienates citizens from formal governance and the democratic electoral process, demobilizing them making them less likely to show up to the polls. Only in elections where chiefs are mobilizing voters (i.e. local elections) will voters be likely to turnout.

National statistics for voter turnout in local elections are hard to come by as the National Electoral Commission did not keep or catalogue local outcomes as of 2012, forcing researchers to go district by district to collect electoral data. One study of a district in the Brong Ahafo Region found that turnout varied between 13% and 68% in various EAs, with an overall turnout of 34.7% out of 134,296 registered voters in the Techiman Municipal elections of 2010 (Yeboah-Assiaman, Asamoah and Osei-Kojo 2014). A different study of the more urban Ashaiman District in the Greater Accra Region found only 10.3% turnout in 2010 out of 148,791 registered voters, which is still an increase over the 5.7% turnout in 1994 after local government was introduced to Ghana (Stephen 2012). This low turnout contrast with the 79.4% turnout in the 2012 national elections (IFES 2015). Table 6.1 displays self-reported turnout by treatment status of the village. Turnout for 2008 is right around the national average for both groups, though local elections turnout is much higher than what has been estimated by other scholars. The differences in the rate of reported turnout are statistically significant for 2008 and 2010 with those respondents with stronger chiefs reporting higher local turnout and lower national turnout than those in treatment villages with weaker chiefs, as hypothesized.

Table 6.2 presents the second stage results from two competing models of the likelihood of electoral turnout in the IV probit framework. Model 2 examines the

covariates that are both likely to drive turnout as well as might have some lingering endogenous effect on informal taxation. Model 3 adds individual level characters discussed in this chapter and Chapter 2 that are thought by many to change the propensity of voting, while addressing the strength of chiefs through a natural experiment where communal labor contributions proxy for traditional leaders' social standing. Model 4 directly tests the effects of chiefs inserting themselves in electoral politics by encouraging voting and by being perceived to have partisan attachments or loyalties. And Model 5 tests these three models together on self-reported turnout data from 2010. Without other covariates, the proxied and estimated strength of chiefs is significant in predicting increased turnout as seen in Models 1 and 4. However, Model 3 demonstrates the importance of other individual level characteristics, with age and community leadership increasing the likelihood of turnout. It also appears that size of community increases the likelihood of voting, which goes against prior expectation. For Model 3, the Wald test statistic for exogeneity of the instruments can be rejected. However, for Model 5, with all the covariates, the Wald Test cannot be rejected, likely due to over-identification and collinearity in the model. Model 6 is a more parsimonious model that drops covariates that were not statistically significant in other specification. It passes the Wald test to the same degree as Model 3, and is the base model for future analyses in the dissertation. The marginal effect of communal labor is 0.13. At the mean value of communal labor (135.76 cedis), the translates to a 17.04% increase in the likelihood of turnout. The other marginal effects for different significant covariates are: -0.08 for each addition adult member of the household, 0.05 for abject poverty, 0.01 for age, 0.12 for self-identifying as a community leader, and 0.15 for believing the chief is politicized. It is clear that communal labor contributions are among the most substantively significant determinants of local turnout. As a further robustness check, Model 6 was re-run in the 2SLS

framework. The results are robust with a Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic of 9.58, nearly at the Stock-Yogo critical value for indicating a strong instrument (Stock and Yogo 2005).[14]

In comparison, Model 7 uses the same specifications as Model 6 to estimate individual turnout in the last MP elections of 2008, but results are dramatically different. It appears that a completely different underlying model predicts general election turnout. Only self-identifying as community leader is a similar predictor of turnout, with a marginal effect of 0.13, or 13.11%.

These results indicate that two different processes are contributing to voter participation in local and general elections within the same communities. The direct and indirect application of pressure by chiefs to vote contributes to turnout in local elections. The strength of a chieftaincy system has no effect on the likelihood of turnout in general elections, indicating that some aspect of having strong traditional leaders might make voters less inclined to vote in MP elections.[15]

This difference between local and MP elections might be a Ghana-specific characteristic, in comparison to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Much the motivation for turnout and vote choice in general elections is driven by the highly partisan nature of these elections as well as the desire to win the presidency. Few MP elections are competitive which does drive down turnout. Though more competitive, local elections suffer from low turnout and public disinterest, leaving from for chief-driven mobilization efforts. Another way of interpreting these different regression results - in conjuntion with the differences in turnout rate by treatment status - is that

[14]Results not shown.

[15]As a check for endogeneity between the proxied measure of chieftaincy strength and the perception that chiefs encourage voting, I regressed the two-stage proxy measure of chieftaincy strength (communal labor contributions) along with the individual attributes that determine voting on the likelihood that chiefs promote voting. At the mean contribution of monetize communal labor, there is a marginal effect of 24.07% increase in the likelihood of chiefs encouraging voting, significant at the $p<0.01$ level. Results not shown.

Table 6.2: Turnout in Local and General Elections

VARIABLES	(1) IV Probit 2010	(2) IV Probit 2010	(3) IV Probit 2010	(4) IV Probit 2010	(5) IV Probit 2010	(6) IV Probit 2010	(7) IV Probit 2008
Communal Labor	0.004***	0.004***	0.005***	0.00	0.005**	0.004***	-0.00
	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)
Number of Adults		-0.25***	-0.31***		-0.28**	-0.26***	0.06
		(0.09)	(0.10)		(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Abject Poverty		0.23**	0.21**		0.17	0.17**	0.05
		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Consumption		-0.00	-0.01		-0.01		
		(0.00)	(0.01)		(0.01)		
log(Population)		0.10	0.24**		0.24**	0.15**	-0.04
		(0.07)	(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Age			0.02***		0.02***	0.02***	0.06***
			(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.005)	(0.01)
Years of Education			-0.01		-0.01	-0.02	-0.03**
			(0.02)		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Female			0.09		-0.01		
			(0.09)		(0.08)		
Community Leader			0.32***		0.33***	0.37***	0.57***
			(0.12)		(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Non-Voting Efficacy			0.08		0.10		
			(0.25)		(0.26)		
Negative Assessment of Development			0.10		0.07		
			(0.12)		(0.13)		
Chief's Clan			-0.02		0.02		
			(0.16)		(0.16)		
Akan			-0.04		-0.03		
			(0.12)		(0.12)		
Chief Encourages Voting				0.14	-0.02		
				(0.27)	(0.30)		
Chief Has a Hidden Party				0.36***	0.47***	0.46***	0.09
				(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Constant	-0.25	-0.43	-2.21***	-0.24	-2.17***	-1.41***	-0.53
	(0.20)	(0.52)	(0.77)	(0.21)	(0.82)	(0.49)	(0.71)
Observations	1956	1795	946	1787	901	1599	1679
Wald chi-squared	14.65	49.97	166.70	79.92	149.94	195.96	198.94
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered		

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

experience with strong traditional authority depresses turnout overall, including in uncompetitive MP elections, due to voter alienation with formal governance; however, through their work on behalf of local candidates, strong chiefs mitigate these effects by actively mobilizing voters.

Moving away from turnout generally, the next hypothesis I test is that strong chiefs reduce electoral competition in local elections. The use of clientelistic networks, which are illegal or quasi-legal in certain circumstances, enhances the electoral success of those politicians. One might argue that typically, these gains in electoral competitiveness should accrue to incumbent candidates who have greater access to money and resources (Wantchekon 2003; Lindberg 2010). Alternatively, it might be more marginal candidates that collude with chiefs. Either way, I hypothesize that ultimately this type of clientelistic relationship reduces democratic competition, with more voters casting votes for the eventual winning candidate - possibly the candidate who is willing to give the most in informal taxation rights to the chief.

This is a difficult effect to demonstrate due to the lack of electoral data at the EA level or polling station level. The best option is using self-reported data from survey respondents. However, as discussed above, this is subject to recall bias. More so, people are likely to over-report voting for the winner after the election to appear more conformist and evade possible social repercussion or because the winner's name is easier to recall. These upward effects should not, however, be more pronounced in the randomly selected treatment or control villages for any reason other than their treatment status.

As seen in Table 6.3, if a positive incumbency effect exists, it is more pronounced in local and MP constituencies that contain weaker chiefs, not stronger ones. It should be noted that this data comes from entire EAs (around 5000-7500 people) and MP constituencies (upwards of 200,000 people) that are represented in

Table 6.3: Incumbent Electoral Success Rate since 2000 - EA or Constituency Level

	Control (%)	Treatment (%)	All 60 (%)
Local Incumbent Success Rate	33.33	51.67	45.00
MP Incumbent Success Rate	78.89	83.33	81.11

Table 6.4: Difference in Means in Voting for Winner in 2010 Local Elections

Group	N	Mean	SE	95% CI
Control	575	0.71	0.02	(0.67, 0.75)
Treatment	556	0.64	0.02	(0.60, 0.68)

this data set, and may contain communities that would be in the opposite treatment status from the specific study sites. This data indicates that Assemblymen, including incumbents, lack the same re-election resources compared to MPs, making them more likely to use alternative forms of vote mobilization. It also demonstrates that incumbent success is relatively rare in local elections due to this instability.

Table 6.4 displays a difference of means in naming the eventual winner of the 2010 DA elections by a respondent between treatment and control villages. Out of 1413 people who reported voting in the DA elections of 2010, 1131 could provide the name of the candidate they supported, a cognitively challenging task as the elections are non-partisan. With nearly equal numbers of people answering the question, as well as equally sized standard errors, individuals in control villages where chiefs are stronger are more likely to report voting for the winner of the election, a significant difference at the $p<0.01$ level. The fact that the same number of people could recall a candidate's name indicates that no systematic differences in electoral information exist between treatment and control communities nor are the effects related to possible differences in population or levels of development between village types. Despite the hurdles that local candidates including incumbents face, it appears as if people within villages ruled strong chiefs are voting together for winners, a finding supported anecdotally in the literature (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007).

In order to examine the consequences of the strength of chiefs on the likelihood of voting for winning candidates in local elections, conditional on voting at all, I use the same model of voter turnout in Table 6.2 Model 6 with winning vote choice as the outcome of interest. As seen in Table 6.5, people living in areas with strong chiefs, as proxied by communal labor contributions, are more likely to vote for the eventual winner in a local election. This model is not very robust, failing to pass the Wald test of exogeneity. The marginal predicted effect of communal labor at the mean contribution is a 18.08% increase in the likelihood of casting a vote for a winner, significant at the $p<0.10$ level.

To further investigate this question, I subset the data to examine only those who claimed chiefs directly encourage voting in local elections as this should be the best predictor of explicit vote mobilization on behalf of candidates.[16] These results are not presented, however. The effect of communal labor contributions becomes insignificant in this new specification. These results speak to the need for greater investigation into who swing and malleable voters are in Ghana - if they exist, and if they are being swung towards winners or losers. Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) describe swing voters as swayed by retrospective assessments of poor performance, yet neither of the models in Table 6.5 there is no indication that negative assessments of the developmental state drive turnout. Perhaps strong chieftaincies help coordinate groups of voters to specific candidates, like Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) describe for turnout, rather than only having voters coordinate to winners. Or possibly only the most marginal candidates turn to chiefs for support in local elections. Without systematic electoral data from multiple communities within the same electoral unit, but with differentially strong chieftaincies, it is difficult to answer these questions.

[16]The sample size of respondents who 1) voted in 2010, 2) could provide the name of the candidate and 3) said that their chief did not encourage voting was too small for the alternative model to converge.

Table 6.5: Likelihood of Voting for Winning Candidates

	(1)
	IV Probit
VARIABLES	2010
Communal Labor	0.004*
	(0.002)
Number of Adults	-0.24
	(0.13)
Abject Poverty	0.00
	(0.01)
log(Population)	0.10
	(0.15)
Age	-0.00
	(0.00)
Years of Education	-0.00
	(0.03)
Community Leader	0.16
	(0.11)
Chief Has a Hidden Party	0.18
	(0.24)
Constant	-0.08
	(1.21)
Observations	874
Wald chi-squared	18.02
Standard Errors	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Overall though, strong chieftaincies seem to produce some collective changes in how citizens vote, while at the same time resulting in some villages pooling on failed candidates at times.

In many ways, the above analyses ignore the iterative and relationship-based nature of clientelism. The trustworthiness of a broker makes him attractive to politicians, but also to the citizens that he is attempting to mobilize on behalf of candidates. What makes clientelism via chieftaincy unique is that while traditional leaders might be best positioned to convince voters, they are also limited in supply and by definition have monopolies over their dominions. The strength of the relationship between chiefs and party leaders should increase levels of clientelism. As discussed by Baldwin (2013), good working relationships between chiefs and local elected leaders can be beneficial for citizens in the production of public goods. More so, people can use their chiefs' support of specific politicians as an informational shortcut when making their own voting decisions.

Table 6.6 displays the effects of good cooperation between chiefs and Assemblymen and experience of chiefs on turnout and vote choice in 2010 as second stage results from a series of instrumental variable probit models. This is still modeled on the base model for voting behavior developed above. The squared-length of tenure is also included to test if there are decreasing returns to coordination. Overall, the effects of cooperation and tenure on both turnout and vote choice are negligible. It appears that the perception of strong cooperation between chiefs and Assemblymen encourages voting for winners, with a marginal effect of 7.76% increase in the likelihood of voting for the winner, significant at the $p<0.05$ level. The length of time a chief has been in power does not appear to have any effect on turnout or vote choice. Perhaps this is due to the high rates of turnover in local elected office, inhibiting the ability of chiefs and politicians to form stronger relationships. In all Models, com-

Table 6.6: Effect of Cooperation and Tenure of Chiefs on Voting Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) IV Probit 2010 Turnout	(2) IV Probit 2010 Turnout	(3) IV Probit 2010 Vote for Winner	(4) IV Probit 2010 Vote for Winner
Communal Labor	0.003***	0.003*	0.004***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of Adults		-0.21*		-0.27***
		(0.13)		(0.10)
Abject Poverty		-0.05		-0.31**
		(0.12)		(0.13)
log(Population)		0.09		0.10
		(0.10)		(0.15)
Age		0.02***		0.00
		(0.01)		(0.00)
Years of Education		-0.03		0.00
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Community Leader		0.37***		0.17
		(0.14)		(0.15)
Chief Party		0.51***		0.35*
		(0.15)		(0.19)
Good Cooperation	0.05	0.15	0.14	0.23*
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Chief's Years in Power	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Chief's Years in Power Squared	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	- 0.21	-0.93	-0.46	-0.39
	(0.30)	(0.64)	(0.34)	(1.19)
Observations	1229	1012	689	578
Wald chi-squared	7.22	107.54	44.73	39.95
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

munal labor appears to once again be driving results along with the perception that one's chiefs has been politicized. However, Models 2 and 4 are only weakly robust to 2SLS specifications with a Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic of 11.27 and 7.53, around the 15% Stock-Yogo critical values, and the coefficients on communal labor lose their statistical significance.[17]

The final set of hypotheses addressed in this chapter look at what happens when politicians cannot rely on strong chiefs to mobilize voters. Given the evidence of pervasive clientelism in Ghana, it is unlikely that in the absence of neopatrimonial networks of traditional elites, there would be no clientelism at all. Working directly with chiefs to mobilize voters is advantageous from the perspective of local politicians in terms of cost and effectiveness, but without access to strong chiefs that wield a lot of authority in their communities, politicians should gladly turn to more professional brokers (Stokes et al. 2013). Professional brokers are more likely to use techniques like vote buying to directly influence the voting behavior of citizens as opposed to the social sanctions of informal authority. Thus, in places with stronger chiefs, there should be fewer incidences of vote buying along with smaller amounts offered as the practice should be less common.

Table 6.7: Difference in Means in Any Vote Buy Approach since 2004

Group	N	Mean	SE	95% CI
Control	1279	0.17	0.01	(0.15, 0.19)
Treatment	1264	0.22	0.01	(0.19, 0.24)

Survey respondents were asked the following question: "Have you ever been offered any gifts before an election such as party T-shirts, party T-shirts with money inside, or transportation costs to and from a rally?" If respondents answered yes, they were asked to indicate which electoral cycles this happened in, going back to 2004. Compressed into a dummy variable if the respondent had been approached in

[17]Results not shown.

any election since 2004, those in treatment villages were more likely to say yes, with 21.76% claiming so in treatment villages and 16.58% in control villages, displayed in Table 6.7. The difference is significant at the $p<0.01$ level.

Similarly, the frequency of multiple incidents of vote buying was higher where chiefs are weaker, as seen in Table 6.8. In addition to more people being approached and people being approached more frequently to sell their vote in treatment communities, the amount citizens were offered was also higher on average. Of the few people who would actually provide a cash amount in cedis, those in treatment villages reported receiving twice the amount as those in control villages, a statistically significant difference at the $p<0.01$ level. As seen in Table 6.9, it appears that the entire payout distribution is shifted upwards in treatment villages, though the modal amount offered was 5 cedis in both groups.

Table 6.8: Frequency of Vote Buy Approaches by Treatment Status

	Control	Treatment
0 Approaches	1079	992
1 Approach	124	127
2 Approaches	35	41
3 Approaches	16	40
4 Approaches	17	25
5 Approaches	8	39

Table 6.9: Vote Buy Amount Distribution by Treatment Status

Group	N	Mean	Median	Mode
Control	154	15.60	9.00	5.00
Treatment	224	28.23	15.00	5.00

Table 6.10 further investigates the likelihood of any incidence of vote buying and the size of the amount offered. Models 1 and 2 confirm the findings of Cruz (2014), that vote buying is targeted toward central community leaders both for the ease of monitoring and for the ability of those individuals to convince others to mobilize. Higher education is associated with lower likelihood of being approached, while larger

Table 6.10: Effect of Chiefs on Vote Buying

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV Probit	2SLS	2SLS
VARIABLES	Any Vote Buy Approach	Vote Buy Count	Vote Buy Amount
Communal Labor	-0.003*	-0.003**	-0.90
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(1.04)
Number of Adults	0.20*	0.22**	35.69
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(37.94)
Abject Poverty	0.01	0.01	-3.60
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(24.26)
log(Population)	-0.03	-0.07	-25.66
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(30.98)
Age	0.00	-0.00	-0.20
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.55)
Years of Education	-0.02	-0.03**	-7.83
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(7.80)
Community Leader	0.62***	0.75***	44.91
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(39.76)
Chief Has a Hidden Party	0.20	-0.10	-28.80
	(0.18)	(0.10)	(41.87)
Constant	-0.71	0.82*	281.85
	(0.72)	(0.46)	(302.45)
Observations	1880	1880	274
F-Stat		10.45	0.26
Wald chi-squared	162.53		
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

families are likely targets, an effect probably related to finical need. However, a direct measure of chieftaincy involvement in politics - having a hidden party - is not associated with vote buying. In Models 1 and 2, the strength of chiefs as measured by the instrumental variable lowers the frequency of offers to citizens, although Model 1 is not robust to 2SLS specifications. Within the instrumental variable framework, there is no effect of chiefly strength on the size of vote buys offered, which provides stronger evidence that all these voting behavior results are not driven by differences in economic development between treatment and control communities.

The marginal social status of vote buy recipients does not appear to be confirmed, however (Kramon 2013). In undisplayed models including assessment of de-

velopment, those who have negative assessments of the developmental state receive no more offers or larger amounts, confirming the findings of Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) and Hoffman et al. (2009). Those who are the most negative in their retrospective assessments need no more monetary incentive to vote against their beliefs. The contrasting null effect of a hidden party in these models compared to turnout might be related to the undefined meaning for citizens. Having a hidden party might mean that a chief has a clear partisan affiliation, or the term might be a catch-all concept that a chief inserts himself into electoral politics. Combined with the results on frequency of being approached in different types of villages, it appears that chiefs serve as somewhat of a deterrent to vote buying. Stepping back, this also seems to confirm that clientelism through chiefs might be a substitute for clientelism through professional brokers.

6.7 Discussion

The findings in this chapter help address a few unanswered questions in the literature. The first is about the definition and prevalence of clientelism. Clientelism can take many forms that range from neopatrimonialism to professional vote brokers. Far too often, when trying to understand if there are practices of contingent exchange in an electoral democracy, scholars are unyieldingly inflexible in their preferred definition of clientelism, and blind to practices on the periphery that do not conform to their expectations. However, if different forms of clientelism exist as complements or substitutes for one another, scholars might be underestimating how often these practices affect voters. In the case of this dissertation, I have argued that clientelism via chiefs is a preferred option in the case of very low information environments with a lack of party institutionalization, like non-partisan local elections. Yet, for chiefs

to be a viable strategy for politicians, there need to actually be chiefs that are capable of getting the voters to the polls. In the absence of these preexisting patronage networks, politicians are forced to use more common tactics of increasing electoral support, in particular vote buying. From the perspective of politicians, they might prefer to use informal authority networks to pressure voters as the mechanisms for enforcement might be less costly or more effective.

More than acknowledging the possibility that there is more than one form of clientelism with regards to brokers, evidence from this chapter indicates that there might be more than one form with respect to targeting. Vote buying appears more targeted towards local community leaders while others citizens might just need encouragement from powerful local leaders to go to the polls. Especially if there is some consistency among the preferences of people in the same community, pressure for turnout without even mentioning a specific candidate might be sufficient for improved electoral success.

At the same time, there is also evidence that while strong chiefs can result in citizens supporting winning candidates, chiefs might be encouraging voting on behalf of more marginal candidates who are less successful. This indicates that the set of available clientelistic strategies might differ between politicians with chiefs being the more attractive option for weaker politicians. The finding that strong chiefs increase vote pooling on winners might just be evidence of extremely strong social norms in a particular community to vote together. In the absence of detailed official electoral data, the issue of which types of candidates work with chiefs will remain difficult to address.

The second topic this chapter addresses is what motivates voters in Ghana. There is little evidence that either ethnicity or retrospective assessments of the economy affect turnout or vote choice, while more overt politicization of chiefs motivates

voters. If this direct measure of political influence or the proxied measure of chiefly strength are accepted as indicators of clientelism by informal authority figures, these findings would seem to contradict the evidence that African voters primarily care about good governance and public service delivery. It is possible that clientelism and good governance are not seen as separate issues, especially if chiefs help facilitate the production of goods in a community as Baldwin (2013) describes. I find evidence to suggest that beliefs about cooperation between chiefs and politicians affect voting for winning candidates, but that effect is overwhelmed by proxy measures for the strength of chiefs. Furthermore, when a dummy variable for having been previously approached for vote buying is added to the 2010 turnout model, being approached is associated with a predicted marginal increase in turnout of 10.70% (significant at the $p<0.01$ level) which seems to indicate that overt forms of clientelistic behavior do motivate voters.[18]

This chapter provides little confirming evidence that individual-level models can be used to explain political behavior in African countries. Greater age is associated with higher turnout, but advanced education does not affect turnout, though it reduces the likelihood of being targeted for vote buying. Poverty appears to be a motivator for turnout as well. However, self-described community leadership status is the most robust predictor of both turnout and targeting for clientelism.

The chapter begins to address an issue related to the iterative nature of clientelism that has not been previously discussed: how does clientelism at one level of elections affect electoral outcomes in another? I have argued that mobilization by chiefs is an effective strategy in marginal elections where candidates need to tap into already existent networks of persuasion. While it is thought that clientelism undermines accountability mechanisms in democratic elections, creating "perverse account-

[18]Results not shown.

ability" (Stokes 2005), what happens in other unconnected elections has not been explored. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the effects of a specific form of clientelism might extend past the elections where they take place. This is an important concern in federal and decentralized systems where multiple levels of elections take place concurrently or in off-years. One of the failings of decentralization policies has been the inability to account for how citizens can keep track of political actors and correctly attribute policy failures to the right actors. In the situation I describe in Ghana, chiefs are empowered (at the expense of financing local government public service delivery) in order to deliver votes. This results in poor development outcomes for citizens, which I discuss in the following chapter of this dissertation. From the perspective of citizens, however, what they see is a disengaged formal state and a seemingly robust informal state that attempts to help people overcome collective action problems through communal labor. Public services are poorly produced and the democratic vote does not seem to make any difference in holding politicians accountable. While chiefs might mobilize voters on behalf of local candidates, national elections will not draw voters who feel that their voice does not matter, which might generate the pattern of less general election turnout in treatment communities with weaker chiefs. In countries that hold different types of elections in different years like Ghana, clientelism might result in a decline in turnout in the potentially cleaner and more fair MP election, due to a spillover effect in the perception of the inability of the electoral connection to bring good governance, findings echoed in Chapter 2. In countries where elections are held concurrently, perhaps there is a "reverse coattails" situation like Ichino and Nathan (2013*b*) describe in how rent extraction among Ghanaian MP candidates drives up turnout, that in turn helps presidential candidates. What these results mean is that clientelism and corruption more broadly are corrosive to the state simply because they create a lack of confidence in state ac-

countability institutions. While clientelism might be defined by iterative contingent exchange, these practices occur across space and have unintended, but predictably negative, consequences for accountability and trust in different electoral arenas.

The issue of the negative feedback loop in citizen trust in institutions might explain the contradictory findings of increasing versus decreasing support in democratic governance overtime in Africa (Lindberg 2006; Bratton 1998). More directly related to this dissertation, however, the alienation from formal political systems might shed light on the resurgence of support for traditional authority leaders in Africa. Although there is disagreement between myself and others (Logan 2009, 2013) if the cross-national public opinion data indicates if support for traditional and elected leaders are substitutes or complements, depressed turnout in elections is the clearest indication of disengagement in the formal political process. Combined with the robust support for traditional leaders, communal labor, and the expansion of the public service delivery purview of chiefs (which is discussed more in the next chapter), these electoral findings indicate that despite the depiction of chieftaincy systems as exploitive and backwards (Mamdani 1996), citizens might prefer those institutions where they can understand the rules of the game and can more easily attribute outcomes to actors. Van de Walle (2012) argues that theoretically, clientelism and in particular clientelism that involves traditional authority is inherently undemocratic, and should wane with democratic consolidation. However, that understanding of chieftaincy and elites seems too static in failing to acknowledge the flexibility of these institutions to adapt to new political circumstances, something that seems proven by historical relations (Berry 2001; Boone 2003; Firmin-Sellers 1996). Rather than clientelism fading with democracy, this type of elite collusion explicitly inhibits democratization. My depiction of chieftaincy systems as collaborating with formal leaders from a position of weakness, but slowly undermining the credibility

of elected government adds a new layer to our understanding of how traditional authority systems are sustained in the face of modernity. By exploiting the need of democratic leaders to gather public support, chiefs can occupy a niche that ensures the continued need for their services.

6.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrate the effects of strong chiefs on elections. Chiefs directly encouraging turnout has a large positive effect on individuals showing up to the polls, even local elections that are reportedly of little interest to the general public in Ghana. Chiefs also appear to help mobilize mass blocks of voters, sometimes winners and sometimes not. I find some support that perceived cooperation between chiefs and local politicians encourages voting for winners, but not that it effects turnout. Nor is there any effect of the length of a chief's tenure on voting behavior, possibly because the co-tenure that is necessary to produced collaboration between chiefs and politicians is difficult in the volatile electoral environment of local government where there is low incumbency. Lastly, I show that practices like vote buying are more common in places where chiefs are weaker, indicating that different forms of clientelism might be best suited for specific conditions.

The finding that the impacts of informal authority on voting behavior and on vote buy targeting are conditional on the strength of chiefs provides clues as to why there have been inconsistent results about the appeals of clientelism broadly, or clientelism more narrowly defined as vote buying. The role of chief strength also helps explain public dissatisfaction with electoral democracy in Africa. The durability of chieftaincy seems to be related to chiefs' ability to exploit the credibility and trust gap that exists between informal authority and elected politicians. Instead of

the credibility of democracy being heightened with each election like Lindberg (2006) argues, trust in formal institutions remains stagnant. While it has been shown experimentally and through surveys that African voters demand and can be motivated by promises of good governance and strong economic performance, the current situation involves candidates picking between different variants of clientelism, and not picking the strategy of being accountable leaders. Perhaps that is not a realistic choice in political environments where local government is decentralized. It is in the space where democratic ideals have fallen short that chieftaincy systems can thrive in democracies. By providing services such as voter mobilization, chiefs keep the formal state from fully consolidating and further reliant on informal networks to attract electoral support.

6.9 Acknowledgements

Chapter 6, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

7

Public Service Outcomes of Informal and Parallel Fiscal Systems

7.1 Introduction

Much of the recent attention being paid to the issue of clientelism has focused on refining measurement strategies and better understanding the decision-making of party brokers and voters. This focus is understandable given the opaque and unseen aspects of clientelism and vote-buying. However, this work tends to ignore the consequences of clientelism for citizens, despite these negative consequences - the theorized negative affects on governance and accountability - being one of the main motivations for studying clientelism in the first place (Stokes 2005). This chapter attempts to step back from the strategic dynamics of clientelistic exchange and instead address the development and service delivery outcomes for those citizens who participate in such exchanges or live in communities where they are prevalent. The chapter addresses the assertion made by many chiefs in Africa that they are the best providers of development in their communities when faced with unresponsive government officials. As van Kessel and Oomen (1997; pg. 562) observe, "chiefs project themselves as guardians of African custom, but simultaneously as pioneers of rural development," a difficult and contradictory branding for informal authority in the modern era.

Using original survey data from southern Ghana, I examine outcomes related

to household access to education, healthcare, water and sanitation, electricity, and crime and safety. This chapter has three general findings. First, those who live in communities where chiefs are stronger tend to have worse or no better public service delivery and living standards outcomes, especially those outcomes which are related to infrastructure. However, some services that can actually be provided by informal traditional authority leaders (i.e. chiefs) are higher in quality under this institutional arrangement. These findings cast doubts on the capability of chiefs to be the primary catalysts for rural development today, but also the claims that clientelism harms welfare. Third, the ability of citizens to attribute policy outcomes in this environment appears to be broken, with people unable to effectively identify those responsible for developmental outcomes due to the overlapping areas of fiscal authority generated by strong chiefs.

As other forms of clientelism are likely pervasive, these results speak to the effects of clientelism by chieftaincy versus other forms. I argue that these findings can be attributed both to the strength of traditional authorities and the specific illegal voter mobilization efforts they undertake. Previous research has suggested that clientelism and patron-politics are an attempt to reduce informational asymmetries when politicians are not credible (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008; Baldwin 2013); however, these findings provide evidence that clientelism and strong informal authority further diminish information, circumventing potential gains in accountability or effective governance. The results have application even in the absence of clientelism because although strong chieftaincies are associated with clientelism in Ghana, the analyses in this chapter examine the effect of strong informal authority directly on developmental outcomes. As long as one accepts the assumption there are scarce local resources for local public service delivery, competition over those funds could empower less capable service providers.

7.2 Too much focus on instant of exchange

Clientelism, sometimes called patronage, refers to a wide range of political arrangements where politicians offer direct material payments to targeted voters or small groups in exchange for political support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*). It is theorized these direct benefits undermine overall democratic accountability, which is built on broad-based support, as well as public services with accountability mechanisms so the needs of citizens can be considered ((Stokes, 2005)). While some focus has been placed on the single interaction between citizens and politicians during elections, there is a general acknowledgement that clientelism is defined by repeated interactions between these groups of individuals (Kitschelt 2011).

This strategic setup, which runs throughout most of the clientelism literature, has helped scholars to better understand when clientelism exists, who is targeted for vote-buying, and who does the targeting. While previous work tended to focus on the institutional aspects of parties and electoral competition which affect these practices (Geddes 1999; Keefer and Vlacicu 2008; Levitsky 2007; Lindberg and Morrison 2008), it has become generally accepted that clientelism and direct-targeting of voters confers some cost-saving benefits from the perspective of parties. In particular, the use of brokers represents a "sub-contracting" of enforcement and monitoring activities, allowing for more efficient exchange of benefits between actors (Kitschelt 2011). Recent work has attempted to probe this topic of efficiency to understand which voters are most attractive to target. Most evidence indicates that politicians and parties target marginal or swing voters who tend to be poorer as their support is cheaper to buy (Stokes 2005; Magaloni 2006; Keefer and Khemani 2005). Yet that does not diminish the need to shore-up support among core supporters. Alternatively, Nichter (2008) argues that clientelistic parties do not buy the votes of swing supporters, but

buy the turnout of supporters who are marginally indifferent towards voting all together since monitoring of vote choice is difficult. At a very fine grained level, Finan and Schechter (2012) claim that clientelistic parties tend to leverage the contingency of the relationships with citizens by targeting those who express greater feelings of reciprocity, making them feel more obligated to follow through with the wishes of their patron. Finally, Cruz (2014) states the clientelistic parties overcome monitoring issues to collect on the gains of vote-buying by targeting those people who have the most social ties in the community, who by definition are easiest to monitor. The evidence indicates that clientelism can be highly adaptive to the political environment, and might represent a menu of options as opposed to a single strategy, but all versions share a common attribute of public goods being transformed into targeted and club goods in exchange for political support.

While this research agenda on targeting makes sense given the naturally strategic setup of this political exchange, it has come at the expense of further clarifying what the developmental consequences of clientelism are. The work that does exist tends to be highly abstract and disassociated from the experiences of voters, instead measuring consequences at the national level. For example, a few studies have found that clientelism politicizes the bureaucracy due to the use of bureaucratic positions as favors for political supporters (Golden 2003; Cruz and Keefer 2010). Regarding central government transparency, Desposato (2007) argues that in countries that are more clientelistic, the free flow of information from political bodies is reduced and legislatures are less likely to have roll call information made public. The conclusions about the national economic effects are more ambiguous, though. Clientelism is linked with greater rent seeking, which tends to distort economic incentives, but does not necessarily lower growth rates. Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) and Calvo and Murillo (2004) find a correlation between clientelism and the size of public expenditures, which

makes sense if public jobs are distributed as benefits to supporters. Expectations of the bundle of goods provided by clientelism and programmatic systems differ widely, with narrow and targeted services being over-supplied by clientelism at the expense of broad-based spending. There also appears to be a relationship between clientelism and corruption, or at least the belief that corruption exists in a country (Singer 2009), which has implications for investment and industrial development. Finally, the work that does address the experiences of average citizens remains speculative and theoretical, focusing on reduced individual efficacy and political engagement (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*). For all the acknowledgement that clientelism is not just a single incidence of vote-buying, but instead is a reframing of political accountability for the benefit of politicians, little evidence exist to support this idea.

The work on clientelism that focuses on the moment of strategic exchange stands in contrast to the broader development literature. Due to the influence of development economics in political science, there have been numerous studies and data collection exercises focusing on accurately measuring living standards and access to primary public services at the individual level (e.g. Demographic and Health Survey of the United States Agency for International Development, The World Bank, Millennium Challenge Corporation), yet they tend to be purely descriptive and avoid addressing the strategic and challenging political environments that produce these outcomes. There are a few attempts to marry these two fields, most addressing the issue of ethnic clientelism, where expenditures or other clientelistic benefits are explicitly mapped on the ethnic groups who are the recipients of such patronage (Chandra 2004; Kasara 2007). Alternatively, others have taken an experimental approach to measure the impacts of anti-clientelism and anti-vote-buying interventions, and then draw conclusions about behavior and the allocation of goods in the absence of such campaigns (Wantchekon 2003; Vicente 2014; Gallego and Wantchekon 2012). This

chapter builds off the results of the previous chapters in this dissertation, which highlight the nature of clientelism in environments with informal traditional leaders, to demonstrate how these practices affect development outcomes for citizens. Rather than looking at the strategic nature of clientelism, I address the real-world consequences of these practices that undermine accountable governance.

7.3 The role of informal authority on service delivery

In the previous chapters of this dissertation, I have argued that chiefs are connected to clientelism through their superior role as vote mobilizers. To increase their chances for re-election success, politicians seek out chiefs to mobilize citizens to vote on their behalf. Chiefs achieve this objective through a combination of soft power positions, such as controlling large portions of community lands, as well as more formal power positions, such as serving as arbitrators for dispute resolution, both in criminal and non-criminal cases. Ultimately, in communities where chiefs are powerful and respected enough to mobilize voters, they are not forced to use coercion. In exchange for this service, chiefs gain greater fiscal autonomy with less government interference. This trade of services between chiefs and politicians both enriches chiefs financially and increases their legitimacy as powerful figures in the community. With more power comes an increased ability to deliver the vote. In this relationship, unlike other forms of vote buying, the rents of the exchange accrue to the vote brokers rather than the voters who are denied the small short-term benefits of patronage. It is unclear what the net welfare gains are for citizens living under such conditions.

In practice, fiscal autonomy given to chiefs comes in the form of informal taxation, which is made available through weak enforcement of formal revenue streams by colluding governmental officials. Assuming a fixed amount of resources in any

given community, the right of a strong chief to collect informal taxes and tribute unfettered comes at the expense of potential formal tax revenue, which lowers the amount available for government expenditures, subsequently harming the welfare of citizens. A meta-study of 65 empirical national studies in developed and developing countries identified the lack of actual resources being the largest impediment to quality service provision (Boyne 2003). In most developing countries, the primary source of tax revenue comes in the form of centrally administered corporate income taxes, value added taxes on goods and services, agricultural taxes, and natural resource exploitation rents (Kasara 2007; Bates 1981). Revenue collected directly from individuals tends to be a minority share in developing countries, as individual income taxes do not exist due to widespread poverty. Those individually-sourced taxes that do exist tend to be fee or license based, though do include poll or head taxes in some countries.

Within most fiscally decentralized systems, the central governments collect the majority of the revenue and then redistribute that wealth back to local governments for the provision of public services (Gibson and Hoffman 2013, 2007). Yet, cross-national studies have found that citizens "get what they pay for," so to speak, with those paying more in taxes receiving a greater percentage back in the form of public services than those citizens with lower tax burdens (Timmons 2005). Additionally, the lower the amount of revenue that is collected from within a local community relative to central government transfers and foreign aid, the less politicians spend on public services, even holding total revenue constant (Gibson and Hoffman 2007). Gibson and Hoffman, in their study of Tanzania and Zambia, argue that as politicians become less reliant on citizens for funding governmental operations, they are less likely to appeal to them through the delivery of broad public goods. Low provision of goods by politicians and low expectations by voters reinforce each other,

reducing accountability by weakening the fiscal-electoral connection in democracies, undermining the key argument of accountability for fiscal decentralization (Ahmad et al. 2005). Alternatively, others have argued that high central government transfers shift citizens' attention away from local government and towards central authorities for breakdowns in service delivery (Rodden 2002), further reducing transparent accountability for policy outcomes. Within District Assemblies (DAs) in Ghana, the amount of own-source revenue has been found to range from 2% to 48% of local budgets, though most DAs ambitiously predict more local revenue and fall short yearly (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2010).

The focus of Gibson and Hoffman's (2007) study - along with similar accounts that examine depressed local own-source revenue in resource rich locations Ross 2001; Karl 1997) - does not explicitly address the role of electoral clientelism in these fiscal environments. Nor has any other work looked at the direct role of informal taxation on public service delivery. Other scholars have found that strong democratic competition increases the amount of public expenditures as politicians struggle for broad public support (Lake and Baum 2001; Stasavage 2005; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005), the same support that is less necessary under clientelism, which reduces the need to cultivate as many voters. As discussed in previous chapters, the delegation of authority from politicians to chiefs harms further accountability through voter disengagement. Combined with declining revenue levels as well as reduced reliance on individual taxation relative to central government transfers, the forms of patronage addressed in this dissertation should have a clear and negative effect on the quality of public service delivery within communities. By diminishing the capacity of the state to engage in taxation collection for short-term electoral gains, politicians who engage in the devolution of power to chiefs are harming the long-term ability of the state to both collect revenue and produce public goods (Tilly 1992). And due to a smaller

formal tax burden, citizens have less motivation to hold politicians accountable for poor public service delivery. This likely relationship between state formation, fiscal capacity, and public service delivery leads to one of the key motivating questions of this dissertation - what are the developmental effects of devolution away from formal actors?

Even in the absence of illicit forms of electoral mobilization, strong informal authority figures might affect overall public service delivery. Non-state actors might provide higher quality goods due to better enforcement of private rights or improved monitoring (Ostrom 1990; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Alternatively, if that there are limited resources in a community, the informal and formal sectors will be competing over the same sources of revenue, harming the resource-base for the government to provide public goods.

In a study similar to this dissertation, Baldwin (2013) finds that certain public services - mostly education and health - improve when traditional chiefs are more powerful. In her detailed study of Zambia, Baldwin argues that these gains in quality are due to increased coordination between chiefs and public officials with long co-tenure. Chiefs help bridge informational barriers between politicians and citizens by providing administrators information on community needs and directing people to vote for preferred politicians. Rather than duping citizens into voting for substandard politicians, chiefs help guide citizens to choices that result in welfare gains. These results echo Levi's (1989) and Keefer and Khemani's (2005) claims that devolution and outsourcing of fiscal responsibilities improve the production of public goods and revenue generation by reducing informational barriers and costs associated with monitoring and transactions. These arguments have spurred the rapid decentralization of formal fiscal responsibility and proliferation of local governments throughout the developing world over the past thirty years. In a separate study of China, Tsai (2007)

argues that when politicians are embedded in the same local solidarity groups as average citizens, bound by a common morality, people can also extract public services even in the complete absence of elections, indicating that informal authority does not hinder formal service delivery and might be the only accountability mechanism available in certain contexts. Lastly, there also appears to be a path dependent effect of strong chieftaincies on economic development, with centralized, hierarchical ethnic homelands having greater current wealth as measured by satellite light data (Michalopoulous and Papioannou 2013). These studies stand in contrast to more generalized assertions about the dire consequences of both patronage and weak formal revenue collection capacity on the provision of public goods. Given the clientelistic undertones of the role of chiefs in Ghana, I hypothesis that service delivery will suffer when chiefs are stronger, despite any efficiency gains from informal production of services.

7.4 Which development outcomes to measure?

These divergent findings on the developmental effects of informal authority speak to a larger quandary in the study of politics and developmental outcomes. Kramon and Posner (2013) correctly point out that developmental outcomes do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, when trying to assess the state of public service delivery in a country, each specific service examined might tell a different (and contradictory) political story from other services, as different specific goods are products of different political incentives and actors. This is due to a number of reasons including limited resources for certain expenditures as well as the clientelistic distribution of certain goods. Thus, the variation in outcomes and conclusions could be a statistical artifact, making it difficult to draw broader conclusions about the overall state of development

from a few goods and services.

On a conceptual level, different types of public services require different abstract inputs (for example, capital and labor), have different economies of scale, and are controlled by different levels of government that may or may not be affected by the strength of chiefs.[1] Kramon and Posner (2013) do not categorize inputs on these dimensions, but in the context of traditional authority, they represent key attributes due to the comparative advantages chiefs and the state have over these inputs. Much of the previous chapters' discussion about the persuasive abilities of chiefs to mobilize voters rests upon the assumption that leaders, who have large latitude within their communities, can convince citizens to take a specific action even without the threat of force, and can monitor that behavior. Chiefs use these same abilities to rally work forces to produce specific public services as well as contribute financially. Definitionally, by proxying for chiefly authority with the amount of informal taxation contributed by individual citizens, this amount should directly translate into the type and quality of public services produced through these resources. While traditional leaders might be quite capable of providing large quantities of cheap labor and monitoring to produce some services, few local level chiefs in any country would be able to provide the necessary capital for services that require huge amounts of spending to tap into economies of scale. Rather, infrastructure and complex public services like healthcare, education and electrification are provided by governmental entities

[1] Of course, there are many dimensions into which different types of public services could be sorted. These might include infrastructure versus services or perhaps the frequency with which the good is produced (e.g. in perpetuity for education as opposed to infrequently for water boreholes). However, assessing goods on inputs and legal budgeting authority improves on the theoretical understanding of the benefits of decentralization and devolution of fiscal governance. As Levi (1989) describes, the historic choice of governments to delegate fiscal decision-making was on the basis of efficiency gains through comparative advantage, typically due to the geographic burdens in large empires. Throughout this dissertation, the implicit comparative advantage of chiefs over other political actors has been the ability to mobilize actual people to achieve some goal. This makes the labor-capital and legal budgeting authority dimensions the most important for examining potential efficiency gains from delegation to chiefs.

in most countries. By considering the comparative advantage of traditional leaders and the formal state in the production of various public services, different hypotheses arise about the effects of empowering and enriching chiefs fiscally.

This chapter is an attempt to understand if and when the fiscally empowered informal actors might improve the efficiency and quality of public services relative to other likely forms of clientelism activities, as many scholars suggest occurs (Olken and Singhal 2011; Baldwin 2013; Levi 1989; Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*), . The primary result of the clientelistic system described in this dissertation is a shift of financial resources from the public sector to the informal sector, empowering chiefs to deliver services, but I argue that efficiency gains are dependent on the type of good. Those services that are labor and monitoring intensive should be more capably produced by strong traditional leaders while capital intensive services are better provided by well-financed government operations. As this dissertation is about local-level politics in Ghana - where Assemblymen have the ability to increase the welfare of colluding chiefs with lax tax enforcement - certain high-priority national political issues that are not fully regulated at the local level (such as school fees, vaccination, electrification, etc.) serve as a good comparison group as they should not be affected by local-level clientelistic relationships.

The choice of which specific development outcomes to examine as dependent variables is an imprecise exercise, the other half of Kramon and Posner's (2013) argument. The concept of development is multifaceted, taking encompassing ideas ranging from pure demography to health, wealth, political rights, and so on. In many ways, the scattershot approach to studying development is itself a frustrated and incomplete response to the long-standing acknowledgement that wealth, or more crudely gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, is an insufficient measure of economic well-being (Sen 2001, 1992; Hicks and Streeten 1979). While GDP per capita is relatively easy

to measure cross-nationally, it does not allow for analysis of unequal capital accumulation within countries that might not allow the benefits of economic growth to reach all parts of society. The increased use of social indicators - such as access to healthcare and schooling - attempts to illuminate these aspects of development by focusing on the end goals of economic growth, not the means. However, despite nearly five decades of work started by the United Nations Human Development Programme and continuing with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and others, as a scholarly discipline and a practitioner community, there is still no unifying index of human development.

What Kramon and Posner (2013) identify is not just a statistical artifact that contributes to inconclusive results among similar studies, but also evidence of an unsettled scholarly debate. In this context of debate over how best to measure development, I focus on measures of human development that have been used elsewhere in similar studies, but also on indicators that are based on behavior or experience rather than purely being based on perception. These behavioral and experience measures tend to be more objective and insensitive to survey response bias. I also analyze dependent variables that exhibit some variation at the household level instead of community level in order to statistically control for household wealth directly affecting these outcomes through channels other than the clientelism that is the focus of this dissertation.

Specifically, I examine access to education, healthcare, water and sanitation, electricity and crime and safety for survey respondents. The reasons for these choices are as follows. Education is a core public service provided throughout the world. Access to primary education is one of the key Millennium Development Goals, and the distribution of education services can be a highly politicized policy, with free education frequently made as a campaign promise in African elections and education

staffing being a component of political patronage.

Within Ghana, approximately 30.8% of the total government budget (all levels) was spent on education in 2011 (World Bank 2015). 84% of children receive primary schooling as of 2011 (UNICEF 2015). Healthcare comprises three of the eight Millennium Development Goals, with basic services treated as a human right within the international community. Similarly, water and sanitation directly link to health outcomes such as lack of access to improved water sources, and toilet facilities spread communicable diseases. Within Ghana, 81% of rural residents have access to clean drinking water, yet only 3% have household connections. Most rely on public taps or purchased water. Additionally, only 9% of rural residents in Ghana have access to modern sanitation facilities, 45% of which are public and thus not considered improved (WHO 2015). More than 34% of people rely on open defecation (Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation of UNICEF and WHO 2015). Crime and safety is included because it represents the original public service (i.e. "monopoly on violence"), but more recently had been the explicit purview of chieftaincy in Africa broadly, both before and after independence (Ward 1967; Grischow 2006; Firmin-Sellers 1996). Additionally, perceptions of crime and safety relate to other important indicators of economic development as the criminal environment affects one's willingness to invest in the future. Electricity is included as it represents a massive government expenditure in infrastructure, with much generation coming from dams. Electricity is also necessary for industrial and commercial development, so it is indirectly related to individual-level incomes. Electrification is also one public good solely controlled by the central government in Ghana. One public service that is excluded from this list, though not because of its prominence in development, is roads. Roads are incredibly important to rural livelihoods and access to economic opportunities. However, it is difficult to measure their quality in an objective way,

especially as an indicator that varies at the household level. Although distance in time to other public services is affected by the provision and quality of roads, because this distance is affected by other developmental factors as well, it cannot be used to draw conclusions about roads specifically.

How each of these public goods is measured is described in more detail below. I do not claim to resolve the problems about which outcome indicators should or should not be measured in order to produce more comparable results across studies. Rather, I examine a suite of development outcomes that vary along the dimension of capital versus labor intensive to understand the dynamics of this specific political environment in Ghana.

Stepping back from specific public goods outcomes, I also examine the mechanism by which decentralization and devolution are theorized to improve efficiency in the production of services - increased information between providers and citizens to better understand needs which improve accountability and greater political efficacy of citizens. Rather than reducing informational asymmetries (Baldwin 2013; Keefer and Vlacicu 2008; Keefer and Khemani 2005) or lowering transaction costs (Levi 1989; Olken and Singhal 2011), I have argued that clientelism and empowered informal leaders add layers of confusing overlapping authority for average citizens who no longer can accurately attribute responsibility for development outcomes. While the overt manipulation of citizens' political behavior has an obvious direct effect on accountability, even those citizens who desire to hold leaders responsible are less able to in these political environments where chiefs are empowered by local officials.[2] To address this more conceptual question about whether or not empowering local and in-

[2]I do not lay these out as specific hypotheses and implications of my theory in Chapter 4; however, I analyze citizens' fundamental understanding of the political environment because improvements to these measures are directly implicated as the mechanism of accountability through decentralization by other scholars. For their theories of improved service delivery to hold, at least through the mechanisms they describe, there should be identifiable changes in the efficacy of citizens where chiefs are powerful, which precipitates improvements in public goods.

formal actors leads to a more informed and efficacious citizenry, I look at measures of individual-level evaluations of development quality in a community, politicians' and chiefs' performance, political knowledge questions, preferred service providers, and beliefs about collaboration between the formal and informal political spheres. Analysis of these dependent variables serve as tests of the assumptions made by several scholars within the existing decentralization literature.

7.5 Data and methodology

The data for this chapter comes from the same household survey conducted in Ghana in 2012 that is used throughout this dissertation. The identification strategy uses the instrumental variable approach introduced in Chapter 5, using treatment status along historic railroads to measure the strength of chieftaincy today, proxied by communal labor contributions. Similar regressors are used in the second stage model, which was introduced in Chapter 6: ; number of adults in household; abject poverty; log of population where the survey was conducted; the age of the random respondent in the household; and his/her number of years of education as a measure of socio-economic status[3]. As for other control variables in the second stage of the following analyses, they include: the family's status as an entrenched member of traditional authority as measured by being part of the chief's clan, a dummy variable; the family's status as commercial farmers, a dummy variable[4]; and a regional dummy representing whether the household resides in the Ashanti Region, as opposed to the

[3]Educational achievement also proxies for concepts like social mobility and economic independence from the traditional economic structures within the countryside.

[4]The potential role of commercial farming status on household developmental outcomes is large, but ambiguous. Commercial farms are more likely to have steady household incomes increasing human development and economic opportunities. At the same time, by being tied to physical land, farmers have fewer options to leave communities with poor conditions or corrupt politicians or chiefs. Moreover, given the gray-area of private property rights in Ghana, farmers are sometimes beholden to chiefs who hold land customarily.

other three regions represented in this study.[5] Clan status is included within the models as previous evidence has indicated that traditional authority leaders directly extract public goods when there is political clientelism (Lundgren, Cunow and Diwari 2010). Similarly, much of the narrative about Ghanaian politics is about the Ashanti Region, home to the largest ethnic group, receiving a disproportionate amount of state benefits especially when the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is in power. The NPP is considered such a dominant party in the region, that many partisan elections are not competitive. Furthermore, the Ashanti Region is known to have some of the strongest and most autonomous chieftaincies within the country. Therefore, the dummy variable measuring Ashanti residence is included to control for the partisan effects of these factors. It is also worth noting that since these are all two-stage models, the direction and significance level are more informative than the size of the regression coefficients themselves. The difference in the covariates between this chapter and the last is that this chapter focuses more on institutions and relationships that should be related to individual access to public services rather than individual level political behavior. Only the second stages of the models are presented as the first stage is captured in Chapter 5.

Regarding the classification of specific goods by inputs on legal budgeting authority, no supplemental data was collected to make these distinctions. Rather, these components of public services serve as a useful qualitative frame for discussing and generalizing the results beyond specific goods in a certain place and time. Of course, it would be excellent to collect complete government data about the allocations of local governments to capital and salaries as well as national spending on local public services; unfortunately, within Ghana data is not detailed enough to geolocate all projects within local communities. Without this data, it is difficult to assess the

[5]Additional regional dummies were avoided due to the potential collinearities as well as over identification of the models given a geographic treatment variable.

competing assertion that forms of spending within a sector (e.g. vaccines versus hospital beds) are considered substitutes for one another, or that governments spend on labor-intensive services in the absence of larger budgets needed for more capital-intensive services. While these are legitimate concerns theoretically, local governments are also constrained by their legal mandate from the central government to keep health clinics well-stocked, infrastructure from degrading into disuse, and improving water and sanitation, thus limiting their ability to deviate to other forms of expenditure. I used reported spending patterns from DAs when broadly classifying a service as within DA authority of not (Ghana Ministry of Economic and Financial Planning 2012). Additionally, the decisions of local governments on expenditures are collective decisions by committee, making it difficult to attribute allocations to any specific politician's electioneering or collusion with traditional leaders. Other scholars have made advances in trying to calculate verifiable expenditures by type in developing countries through experimental means (Olken 2007).

7.6 Service delivery outcomes

Before discussing specific service delivery outcomes, it is worth noting that within the survey sample, the distribution of greatest development concern is nearly identical between treatment and control communities, with the vast majority of people claiming that "Water and Sanitation" or "Roads" are the biggest concern in their community within both groups. Concerns about the issues match survey evidence gathered cross-nationally over time with Afrobarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005), speaking to the universal importance of healthcare, access to clean water, and quality roads for commercial activities.

There are also few differences in how citizens rate the quality of their basic




Figure 7.1: Distributions of Assessments of Public Goods by Treatment Status

Table 7.1: Public Service of Greatest Concern
What type of public service is the biggest concern in your community?

	Control Frequency	Control (%)	Treatment Frequency	Treatment (%)
Education	171	13.44	155	12.18
Health	285	18.47	245	19.25
Water and Sanitation	392	30.82	400	31.42
Roads	382	30.03	340	26.71
Electricity	65	5.11	97	7.62
Safety	15	1.18	26	2.04
Environment	12	0.94	10	0.79
Total Respondents	1272	100	1273	100

public services between the samples when looking at mean rating as seen in Table 7.2, though their distributions do differ in some cases as seen in Figure 7.1.[6] Although these perception-based measures are less reliable than behavioral or experiential-based measures, they are a useful place to begin understanding any differences between the two types of communities. Within control communities, where traditional authority is stronger, there appear to be more people dissatisfied with education and roads than in treatment communities, with respondents more frequently using lower values of the 5-point assessment scale. Conversely, in the control communities, individuals appear more satisfied with public safety and environmental conditions, the traditional domains of chieftaincies.

7.6.1 Education

Much of the existing literature on public service delivery and political competitiveness has focused on education spending, with foundational research in African political development pointing to educational expenditures as one of the first priorities

[6]The only statistically significant differences in means for assessments of specific public goods between samples are education and roads, with $p<0.01$ in both cases. Choices on 5-point scale were noted as: very poor, poor, adequate, good, and very good.

Table 7.2: Mean Assessments of Public Goods on 5-Point Scale
How would you evaluate the quality of [INSERT PUBLIC GOOD] in your community?

	Treatment	Control
Education	3.04	3.14
Healthcare	2.74	2.78
Water and Sanitation	2.50	2.45
Roads	2.41	2.15
Electricity	3.17	3.13
Safety	3.55	3.59
Natural Environment	3.70	3.73

of newly independent governments (Abernethy 1969). Education spending sometimes is thought to come at the expense of other public goods as these expenditures broadly appeal to many constituents due to universal access and highly visible infrastructure; however, education also provides opportunities for targeted patronage in the form of public sector employment and contracts for building schools. Alternatively, in Baldwin's (2013) study of Zambia, she finds the greatest positive effects of strong informal authority in education spending as well as healthcare, places where electoral competitiveness should be lowered due to coordination between chiefs and politicians. Within Ghana, education is primarily financed and controlled by the national government which hires teachers and makes decisions about building new schools. Local governments are sometimes tasked with the responsibility of maintaining facilities. Respondents to the survey frequently spoke about communal labor being used on school grounds. While there is some variability in the cost of schools fees across the country, in particular at the secondary school level, fees are more tightly regulated at the primary and junior high levels by the national government of Ghana. The centralized control of educational expenditures as well as the electoral competitiveness at the national level (Abernethy 1969; Stasavage 2005) should limit the affects of fiscal delegation to chiefs, positively or negatively.

In this dissertation, two different specifications are used to measure access to

education in the community.[7] The first measure is the amount of average time in minutes children in the household travel to schools, for those families with school-aged children that attend. This measure includes primary, junior high and secondary schools that children attend through age 18. The average across schools is used because education often is single-sex, so the presence of a male school does not indicate the presence of a female school. This indicator measures physical infrastructure. Given the use of informal labor in the maintenance of schools structures, the strength of chiefs might be weakly positively associated with more schools. However, time to school is also associated with the quality of roads within a community, which should decline when chiefs are stronger, pushing outcomes in the other direction. The other measure of educational access is average school fees in cedis across children in a household, with the hypothesis being that in places with less educational resources, families would be forced to pay more for education, as they would be restricted to fewer options.[8]

As stated above, though, the national level control of education spending should dampen any of these local political effects. Table 7.3 displays the second stage estimations where yearly communal labor contributions are instrumented with the exogenous treatment status of a historic railroad. The lack of statistically significant effects of strong traditional leaders on educational outcomes is not surprising given the funding arrangements in Ghana. The lack of strong findings also fails to confirm Baldwin's strong claim about education and chiefs in Zambia. Those who are extremely poor are less likely to have close schools for their children. Interestingly, more well-educated people are also more likely to have their children travel further

[7] Other indicators would also be helpful in making a full assessment about the quality of education, such as the provision of school materials, the number of teachers, rates of teacher absenteeism, and student achievement. These measures are not available for this project.

[8] Of course, higher fees might lead to declining enrollments, which would appear as reduced educational spending in resource strapped communities.

for schools, perhaps seeking higher quality schools. The lack of any significant results on school fees supports the idea that the national government policies that set these rates have been fairly applied to different socio-economic classes. Lastly, for education, there appears to be no evidence that the Ashanti Region is better off than others; people in that region appear to pay no more for schooling, nor do they have closer access.[9]

Table 7.3: Access to Education Services

	(1) 2SLS	(2) 2SLS
VARIABLES	Average Travel Time to School	Average School Fees
Communal Labor	0.01	2.00
	(0.03)	(2.43)
Number of Adults	0.12	-148.28
	(2.07)	(157.59)
Abject Poverty	0.11***	-1.69
	(0.04)	(1.15)
log(Population)	1.30	105.43
	(0.04)	(89.68)
Age	0.04	-1.30
	(0.04)	(1.69)
Years of Education	0.43**	1.82
	(0.19)	(7.32)
Chief's Clan	0.83	-145.94
	(1.64)	(90.42)
Commercial Agriculture	0.08	-114.34
	(1.41)	(157.03)
Ashanti	-1.87	198.36
	(1.16)	(122.58)
Constant	-0.47	-234.74
	(9.42)	(559.15)
Observations	1233	1216
R-squared	0.41	-0.00
F-Stat	4.71	1.60
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[9]In terms of robustness checks, the two models are potentially weakly identified, each with Wald statistics around 5.85 and 5.66 , respectively. However, the weakness of the instrument should be expected because the hypothesis was that education provision should not be greatly effected by strong chiefs.

7.6.2 Healthcare

Like education, healthcare is probably the most commonly studied public good in development. Health standards are explicitly addressed in the Millennium Development Goals and access to quality healthcare is likely as close as a public good gets to being a human right (Sen 2001). Others scholars have used the provision of health services as a lens to understand policy-making (Walt and Gilson 1994; Gilson and Mills 1995; Gilson 2003; Boone and Batsell 2001) and basic economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). The importance of health outcomes cannot be overstated, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which suffers from both modern-day epidemics like HIV-AIDS as well as endemic diseases like malaria that kill hundreds of thousands of individuals globally each year.

I use multiple different measures to assess quality and access to healthcare within the study villages. The first set of indicators focus on households' experience of any illness or preventable illness (defined in this study as malaria or diarrhea) over the last month as well as travel time in minutes to a clinic or hospital staffed with doctors. As with educational facilities, clinic and hospital construction are primarily a central government decision, but the maintenance of clinics (and roads) is within the domain of local governments, making any hypothesized direction of the relationship between chiefly strength and travel time ambiguous. However, experiences with actual illness should be related to the true amount of resources being spent within a community. Individual-level experiences with preventable illness are directly related to lack of public health services within a community. Though local governments have less control over the designated construction of health facilities, they are responsible for helping to finance some medical supplies and drugs like anti-malarials that target the vast majority of illnesses reported by the DAs (Ghana Ministry of Economic and Financial Planning 2012). As I argue above, fiscally empowered chiefs should

reduce the amount of formal tax resources available to local governments, lowering investment in healthcare. These costly, capital-intensive investments are exactly the types of public goods that formal government should have a comparative advantage in producing compared to traditional leaders.

Table 7.4: Experience with Illness and Access to Medical Care

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	IV Probit	IV Probit	2SLS	2SLS
VARIABLES	Any Illness	Preventable Illness	Time to Hospital	Vaccine Index
Communal Labor	-0.00	-0.003**	0.52**	-0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.002)	(0.25)	(0.005)
Number of Adults	0.14	0.27***	-34.89**	0.77***
	(0.13)	(0.06)	(14.04)	(0.28)
Abject Poverty	0.44***	0.29***	-0.47*	0.03**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.01)
log(Population)	-0.01	-0.07	2.44	-0.24
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(8.43)	(0.17)
Age	0.00	-0.00	0.11	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.16)	(0.005)
Years of Education	-0.01	-0.01	1.55	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.95)	(0.02)
Chief's Clan	0.18**	0.22***	-10.31	0.13
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(8.57)	(0.02)
Commercial Agriculture	0.03	0.09	-9.07	0.80***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(10.91)	(0.24)
Ashanti	-0.30***	-0.18**	4.23	0.40**
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(7.87)	(0.16)
Constant	-0.43	-0.10	36.83	4.34***
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(59.08)	(1.15)
Observations	2014	1620	1940	2025
R-squared			-1.15	0.36
F-Stat			1.42	7.16
Wald chi-squared	101.33	108.80		
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table 7.4, the second stage instrumental variable (IV) probit results are displayed for incidents of illness and preventable illness along with the second stage 2SLS for minutes to the nearest medical center and an index of six common vaccines, described in more detail below. Increasing monetized participation in communal la-

bor, which is associated with strong chiefs, decreases the likelihood that a household would have experienced a preventable illness in the last month. Though the estimated predicted marginal effects per additional cedi of contribution is small (a decrease of 0.11%), this beneficial relationship between good health outcomes and strong chiefs is robust at the $p<0.01$ level. Additionally at the mean level of monetized communal labor for all households, 135.76 cedis, the decreased likelihood of experiencing preventable illness in the previous month, compared to a household that contributed zero communal labor, is 14.59%. This is a substantial decrease in risk.[10] Given the instrumental variable setup of this dissertation, it is worth considering the predicted effect size for being in a treatment or control community for this natural experiment. Treatment status was associated with giving 178.76 cedis less in communal labor contributions. Thus, in control communities where I have argued chiefs are stronger, there is a 19.22% smaller chance of preventable illness. However, as seen in Model 3 in Table 7.4, there is a negative relationship between distance in time to hospitals and the amount of communal labor a household contributes. This provides some evidence that public infrastructure might suffer under strong chiefs as governments have fewer resources to maintain health clinics.

In addition to simple health outcomes and access to well-staffed health facilities, I also examine uptake rates of preventative health measures that are highly promoted by domestic and international public health officials: vaccination and bednets. These health products serve to display two different mechanics that affect the usage of healthcare. Without access to medical centers, vaccinations rates should decrease. However, the usage of cheap bednets is more a social norm phenomenon, with people changing behavior together, an issue where community leadership might

[10] Alternatively, one could look at the predicted effect size for the difference in mean value of communal labor between control and treatment groups, (156.04 - 115.66)(0.05) = 4.34% decrease in the likelihood of preventable illness.

be important. As there is no vaccine available for malaria, a parasite transmitted by mosquitos, sleeping under a pesticide treated bednet is one of the most tangible actions an individual can take to prevent infection. The use of bednets is particularly important for young children who are less able to fight off malaria infections, with 25% of under age-5 mortality in Ghana being attributed to malaria (Abuaku, Koram and Binka 2005). Given the relatively cheap costs of providing bednets (sometimes less than $0.50 for large-scale distribution campaigns according to the WHO (Grabowsky et al. 2005)) combined with their effectiveness in preventing malaria, nets are frequently distributed for free at hospitals after childbirth.

Despite their effectiveness, bednet campaigns have large issues of non-compliance, with people not consistently using the nets after receiving them, failing to acquire new nets every 6-12 months, or failing to have their old nets redipped in permethrin insecticide, despite redipping being very low-cost or free. Public health officials have struggled with these issues, using frequent informational campaigns to reach households. However, broad findings from numerous randomized control trial and promotion designs have found that there is an income and information gap on consistent usage of bednets (Grabowsky et al. 2005). In a recent assessment of bednet usage in Ghana, scholars found that food insecurity and caregiver beliefs about malaria transmission were most related to usage, with 33% of non-compliers not believing there is a relationship between bednets and malaria prevention (De La Cruz et al. 2006), compared to 10% of compliers. Despite the relatively low-cost and approximately 3 year lifespan of a bednet, people are extremely price-sensitive to purchasing new bednets as old ones become worn and damaged; new nets within Ghana can costs at market (unsubsidized) for $6.00-14.00, which is quite expensive for poor households (Agyepong and Manderson 1999; *Modern Ghana* 2005). Additionally, De La Cruz et al. find that adult men are most vulnerable for non-usage, likely because bed-

net distribution is closely connected to childhood healthcare visits. Further lowering compliance, Binka and Adongo (1997) find that many Ghanians only use bednets seasonally during rainy months, with as low as 20% usage in the dry seasons, and mothers frequently wash nets when young children soil them, with the washing greatly reducing their effectiveness as the insecticide levels are diminished by washing away insecticide.

While provision of these goods is not directly controlled by the DAs, it is worth considering the independent effects that strong chieftaincies might have on healthcare uptake. The effect of strong chieftaincy systems on bednets should be beneficial. Ultimately, usage and upkeep of bednets are social issues about building norms for compliance (Binka and Adongo 1997). Many of the NGO and government-led awareness campaigns about bednets target community leaders and elders such as chiefs as they have the capacity to persuade and regulate community behavior. Thus, in communities where traditional authority leaders are stronger, there should be greater compliance of bednet usage, assuming that there have been public health campaigns addressing the subject.[11]

The same principle of persuasion should also apply to the uptake of different vaccines, though there are access concerns if health clinics are less widely available. Similar to being asked about bednet behavior, survey respondents were asked if any members of the household had been vaccinated against the following diseases: polio; elephantiasis; measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR); meningitis; tetanus; and yellow fever. These represent a set of commonly given vaccines, but only some of them are given in childhood (polio and MMR). The others are more rarely administered, but still necessary as preventative medicine, given the endemic nature of these dis-

[11]I do not have data to statistically control for the actual existence of a bednet campaign that involved participation of chiefs in my study sites. However, the involvement of traditional leaders in informational and compliance public health campaigns has been common practice in Ghana (Binka et al. 1996) and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa for the past two decades.

Table 7.5: Reporting of Vaccination in Household
Have any members of this household been vaccinated against the following diseases?

	Control	Treatment	Total
Polio	921	1046	1967
Tetanus	606	841	1447
Yellow Fever	671	744	1415
MMR	585	715	1300
Elephantiasis	386	324	710
Meningitis	158	185	344

eases. A dummy variable was constructed for each vaccine, only asking respondents if any member of the household was vaccinated for that disease anytime in the past. However, in contrast to bednets, the costs of providing vaccines are much greater, disadvantaging resource poor governments without well-stocked health clinics.

When all six vaccines are combined into an index, households in treatment communities (where chiefs are weaker) report receiving 2.94/6 and those in control communities (where chiefs are stronger) report 2.52/6, a statistically significant difference at the $p<.01$ level. This is the opposite direction from what would be expected if chiefs were using their persuasive abilities to promote public health, but in the expected direction if vaccination is affected by infrastructure. The reduced vaccination rate in control communities is perhaps due to the financial costs of maintaining drug supplies or the lack of clinics. Similar effects are seen in Model 4 in Table 7.4. Interestingly, large families and poverty are associate greater use of vaccines, perhaps due to targeted outreach efforts. This idea is further supported by the finding of greater vaccination rates in Ashanti, which is the common geographic target of health interventions led by international aid donors.

These negative findings on vaccination contrast to what appears to be the beneficial effect of chiefs on bednet usage. As a simple difference in means, in control communities there is greater reported use of bednets (86.18% versus 78.32%) and redipping of bednets (47.27% versus 43.65%). Given the extremely low-cost nature of

bednets and redipping, this measure is a fair assessment of chiefs' ability to promote public health through social norms. Furthermore, as seen in Model 1 in Table 7.6, there is a clear positive effect of stronger chiefs as proxied by communal labor on the reported usage of bednets. The marginal effect is 0.14% increase in the likelihood of usage with each cedi, significant at the $p<0.01$ level. At the mean level of communal labor contribution, that translates into a predicted marginal effect of an 18.85% increase in the likelihood of using a bednet. However, there was no effect of strong chiefs on the important factor of redipping nets, though poverty appears to be a clear impediment. As a final check on health outcomes, I separate out the malaria component of the preventable illness indicator to see if bednet usage is having a beneficial effect on malaria rates. Model 3 in Table 7.6shows that strong chiefs reduce household rates of malaria in the last month by a marginal effect of 0.14% per cedi contributed, a nearly identical effect size as bednet usage.

Overall, results are heavily mixed about the effect of chiefly power on health outcomes. Infrastructure does appear to be affected, but public health issues purely related to social norms are positively affected. There is robust evidence that people in communities where chiefs are stronger and there is more communal labor are also less likely to be affected by preventable illness despite the lack of health clinic infrastructure. These health outcome gains are likely the result of stronger social norms for bednet usage which is facilitated by stronger chiefs, a nearly costless health intervention. Despite these positive results, there is not clear evidence that chiefs are leveraging their strength for more government healthcare public goods spending in their communities as in the case of Zambia (Baldwin 2013). These negative findings about infrastructure do not disprove Baldwin's argument, but put into the question the exact mechanism of how chiefs might improve health outcomes of average people.

Table 7.6: Bednet Usage and Malaria Rates

VARIABLES	(1) IV Probit Bednet	(2) IV Probit Redipped	(3) IV Probit Malaria
Communal Labor	0.005***	0.00	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.001)
Number of Adults	-0.29***	-0.25	0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.21)	(0.04)
Abject Poverty	0.06	-0.28**	0.14**
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.06)
log(Population)	-0.04	0.05	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.07)
Age	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Years of Education	0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Chief's Clan	0.00	0.17	0.19**
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)
Commercial Agriculture	0.21	0.28	0.14*
	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.08)
Ashanti	0.30***	0.78***	-0.14*
	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.08)
Constant	0.64	-0.16	-0.01
	(0.81)	(0.91)	(0.54)
Observations	2007	1404	1885
Wald chi-squared	159.58	171.50	125.73
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7.6.3 Water and Sanitation

Closely related to health outcomes is usage patterns for improved water and sanitation sources. Without access to clean water and toileting facilities, communicable diseases become extremely prevalent.[12] Unlike healthcare, water and sanitation are directly within the purview of DAs, with own-source revenue going toward the construction of public toilets and boreholes frequently. As discussed above, in Ghana, 81% of rural residents have access to clean drinking waters yet only 3% have household connections. Most rely on public taps or purchased water. Additionally, only 9% of rural residents in Ghana have access to improved sanitation facilities. More than 34% rely on open defecation (Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation of UNICEF and WHO 2015).

I examined two sets of measures: household water source and household toilet facilities, categorized as improved and/or communal. I use the WHO (2015) definitions of improved sources. For improved water, the options are: piped water into dwelling; piped water to yard/plot; public tap or standpipe; tubewell or borehole; protected dug well; protected spring; or rainwater. Purchased bottled or tanked water is considered unimproved, though clean. I further subdivided improved sources into communal-improved sources that are shared. For improved sanitation, the WHO options are: flush toilet; piped sewer system; septic tank; flush/pour flush to pit latrine; ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP/KVIP); pit latrine with slab; and composting toilet. Public toilets are considered unimproved, but given how common they are, I analyze them separately as well.

Within the survey sample, only 110 out of 2607 people report using an improved drinking water source that is associated with permanent physical infrastruc-

[12]Though not asked to provide a diagnosis of their illnesses, likely much of the diarrheal disease is related to contaminated water sources or cross-contamination from toileting facilities to cultivated food.

ture on private property, such as piped water or a covered well on their property. Another 200 rely on purchased bottled water or tanker water, which while clean, does not meet the WHO (2015) definition of improved which has standards related to availability. All other respondents used improved water sources that are communal or unimproved sources. Use of any improved clean water source was similar in control and treatment villages (1033 versus 958, respectively), with an overall rate of 75.60% which is slightly lower the WHO statistics for all rural residents of Ghana, though the rate of clean water access is 83.40% when purchased water is included. The most common water source, improved or otherwise, was communal boreholes with a usage rate of 47.06%. Divided between control and treatment communities, the rates of borehole usage were 51.06% and 42.25% respectively, a statistically significant difference in means at the $p<0.01$ level, indicating the higher prevalence of these communal sources in communities with stronger chiefs. Regarding toilet facilities, only 87 households met the WHO standard of improved toilet facilities, which excludes public toilets (WHO 2015). In contrast, 417 households report using no facility and defecating in public; 1095 use communal toilets, or 42.31% of the total sample, once again matching the WHO statistics for rural Ghana. The remainder of households reported using other unimproved facilities like pits and buckets. Given that there are so few households using any improved toilet facilities, I limit my analysis to communal toilet facilities -which can at least provide some protections from the spread of disease - in order to understand any variation in sanitation public services.

Table 7.7 displays a difference of means test by treatment status for use of communal toilets. Those in treatment communities where chiefs are weaker are far more likely to use a communal toilet. This represents a 14.30% point increase in the use of a somewhat-improve facility in treatment communities. These effects persist once sanitation is modeled within the IV probit framework. As seen in Model 3 in

Table 7.8, in places with stronger chiefs and more communal labor, people report less frequently using communal toilets, significant at the $p<0.01$ level. As a predicted probability, each additional cedi contributed is associated with a decrease of 0.16% likelihood of using a communal toilet. At the mean value of communal labor, 135.76 cedis, results in a 22.16% decrease in the likelihood of using a communal toilet. With the lack of any improved facilities in these communities, those places with stronger chiefs as proxied by communal labor are likely using open spaces and highly infectious pits for toileting. The Wald test statistic for this model is 6.95, indicating that the errors for the two stages are uncorrelated and the two-stage specification is the correct model. The result is robust to an 2SLS specification as well. This result is somewhat surprising given the reported frequency that communal labor is used for building public toilets. However, as public toilets are effectively the only option in these rural communities, and local governments do contribute capital towards the building of sanitation infrastructure, it appears that any coordinating power a strong chief may have to extract labor is not sufficient to overcome the losses in revenue for the local governments from ceding income to traditional leaders.

Table 7.7: Difference in Means in Use of Communal Toilets

Group	N	Mean	SE	95% CI
Control	1283	0.35	0.01	(0.32, 0.38)
Treatment	1290	0.50	0.01	(0.47, 0.52)

However, communal labor has no statistically significant effect on using an improved or communal-improved source of water, as seen in Models 1 and 2 of Table 7.8. It is likely that there is just not enough variation between households, with families overwhelmingly using communal boreholes to access water. This implies that strong traditional authority is neither a help or hindrance to improved water sources, despite much communal labor effort directed towards producing boreholes. Perhaps

the issue of access to clean water is universally important enough, and well understood by the public, that all communities have the capacity to collectively produce these services. Or maybe informal and formal contributions to this service are clearer substitutes which means there is no difference in quality between types.

Table 7.8: Access to Quality Water and Sanitation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV Probit	IV Probit	IV Probit
VARIABLES	Improved Water	Communal Improved Water	Communal Toilet
Communal Labor	0.00	0.00	-0.005***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)
Number of Adults	-0.18	-0.23	0.27***
	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.05)
Abject Poverty	-0.02	-0.01***	0.18**
	(0.02)	(0.004)	(0.09)
log(Population)	-0.13	-0.17	-0.13*
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.07)
Age	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Years of Education	0.00	-0.00	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Chief's Clan	0.08	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Commercial Agriculture	-0.15	-0.16	0.13
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Ashanti	0.26	0.33*	-0.08
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.07)
Constant	1.40	1.69	0.94*
	(1.68)	(1.67)	(0.53)
Observations	2021	2021	1976
Wald chi-squared	40.07	92.15	222.38
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7.6.4 Electrification

Access to electricity is a purely national infrastructure issue in Ghana and serves as a good comparison to other public services that are more mixed in terms of which level of government controls expenditures. Electrification is a path-dependent

process that follows the creation of costly infrastructure and should not be affected by this local level clientelism. Electricity is measured as a simple dummy indicator of whether the household had service in their home. In the whole sample, 71.87% of respondents reported having electricity in their homes, split evenly between treatment and control communities. While capital-intensive public services overall should suffer under this type of clientelism by traditional leaders, national policies should mitigate some of the diminished accountability for a nationally provided public service. In results not shown, there is no effect of strong chiefs on the provision of electricity, although larger population size increased the likelihood of access. . These finding together help mitigate some of the concerns related to path-dependent development and violations of the exclusion restriction discussed in Chapter 5. Electricity should be the public good most likely to experience the diffusion effects of public goods from urban centers to rural communities in treatment areas. While larger populations are associated with more access, as shown by the simple difference in means between treatment and control communities, there is no difference in electrification.

7.6.5 Crime, Safety, and Dispute Resolution

Crime and public safety are hypothesized to be the arenas most suited for strong, influential chieftaincies. Maintaining domestic peace and security is one of the historic duties of chiefs in Ghana and throughout sub-Saharan Africa in colonial systems with indirect rule through delegation (Ward 1967; Boone 2003). By allowing chiefs to maintain order, colonial leaders were both able to lower the costs of governance while at the same time increasing the legitimacy of decision-making throughout the land. Within modern Ghana, the role of traditional leaders in dispute resolution is constitutionally recognized, with regional House of Chiefs that take appeals cases from local traditional councils as well as petitions directly from the paramouncy-level

chieftaincies that lead the major ethnic groups. Yet, few cases make it that far; within the Ashanti Region, for example, only an average of 38 cases per year made it to the House of Chiefs over a 5 year period from 2007 to 2011.[13] Most cases and disputes stay at the local traditional council level, which is staffed by local chiefs and subchiefs, queen-mothers, and village elders. Unfortunately, there is no systematic record keeping despite these bodies being a primary place for dispute resolution. While the Ghanaian constitution recognizes traditional councils, their domain is limited to customary law disputes. All formal legal authority is invested in the state police and courts.

The prevalence of informal dispute resolution is not unique to Ghana, where formal courts can be expensive, time-consuming and physically inaccessible (Blattman, Hartman and Blair 2014; Adinkrah 2005). The distrust in the formal system of justice is further compounded by petty corruption among the police. This complicated landscape leads to what is known as forum shopping, were individuals seek justice in multiple arenas at the same time, leading to conflicting decisions (Mwangi 2010). In this situation, many within the international development community see the strengthening of informal justice systems as the best means of improving rule of law in the absence of effective state-control. Given the historic domain over local security as well as the fact that chieftaincies maintain authority through implicit control, this is the realm in which strong traditional leaders should have the best ability to produce quality public goods. Just like they have the ability to mobilize citizens to the polls to vote for specific candidates, strong chiefs should have the ability to restrict behavior through monitoring and sanctions.

To measure the effect of chieftaincy on crime and safety, I examined a few variables. The first is distance in time to a police station, which is an infrastructure issue.

[13]Information directly collected from Ashanti House of Chiefs in 2012.

The next set of variables address household experiences with crime victimization as well as satisfaction with the judicial process if they were victims. Finally, respondents were asked questions on whether chiefs take roles in criminal and non-criminal dispute resolution, and were then asked to assess the quality of that involvement.

Table 7.9: Access to Police and Experience with Crime

	(1)	(2)
	2SLS	IV Probit
VARIABLES	Time to Police Station	Victim of Crime
Communal Labor	0.02	-0.00
	(0.14)	(0.00)
Number of Adults	-1.55	0.19
	(9.08)	(0.21)
Abject Poverty	0.26	0.00
	(0.21)	(0.01)
log(Population)	-8.54*	0.25
	(4.65)	(0.17)
Age	-0.06	-0.00
	(0.08)	(0.00)
Years of Education	-0.55	0.03
	(0.52)	(0.02)
Chief's Clan	-0.35	0.10
	(3.93)	(0.10)
Commercial Agriculture	0.04	0.29*
	(5.59)	(0.16)
Ashanti	-19.10***	-0.49***
	(4.49)	(0.14)
Constant	109.43***	-3.76**
	(32.56)	(1.62)
Observations	1949	2023
R-squared	0.54	
Wald chi-squared		79.26
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Time to police station was unrelated to communal labor as instrumented by the treatment variable, as seen in Table 7.9. This is a similar finding to the results

for school facilities. Interestingly, the Ashanti regional variable is associated with a highly statistically and substantively significant decrease in travel time: 19 minutes on average. This provides a small amount of evidence to indicate that the region might have a different relationship to the state public services apparatus compared to other regions. However, the Wald statistic for the model is only 6.19, indicating the model might be weakly identified.

Overall, reported crime victimization was relatively rare in the respondent households with only 164 households reporting being victims in the past year, though this is likely an underestimate of true crime levels.[14] Crimes were equally reported in treatment (n=83) and control (n=81) households. When incidence of crime victimization is predicted by communal labor as instrumented by treatment status, contributions have no effect on victimization, as seen in Table 7.9. There is no statistically significant difference in means among self-reported victims in treatment and control villages in their rates of contacting either traditional leaders or the police. However, those in treatment villages more frequently contact both types of authority after a crime: 18.29% versus 22.62% for traditional leaders and 25.61% versus 31.00% for police. Despite being no more likely to be victims and less likely to report their cases to any authorities, those self-reported victims in control villages, where traditional authority structures are stronger, are more likely to be satisfied with the resolution of their case, significant at the $p<0.10$ level as seen in Table 7.10. However, that effect is not robust in the IV probit framework, likely due to small sample size.[15]

Table 7.11 displays the rates of reported involvement by chiefs in various non-criminal as well as criminal disputes, which are also quite similar for treatment and control villages, except for land disputes. This can likely be attributed to the greater

[14]Respondents were asked specifically about: stealing, robbery, violent assault, sexual assault, duping in business as well as other crimes. Stealing and violent assault were the most common types, representing 118 and 30 of the reported incidents.

[15]Results not presented.

Table 7.10: Satisfaction with Resolution of Criminal Dispute Among Victims
Was your household satisfied with the resolution in your case?

Group	N	Mean	SE	95% CI
Control	47	0.72	0.07	(0.59, 0.86)
Treatment	37	0.57	0.08	(0.40, 0.74)

Table 7.11: Rate of Chief Involvement in Dispute Resolution
Is your local chief or sub-chief involved in resolving any of the following within your community?

	Control (%)	Treatment (%)
Crimes	63.99	61.08
Adultery	28.28	34.43
Land Disputes	43.82	60.31
Violation of Religious Tenants	43.06	44.58
Other non-Criminal Disputes	27.98	24.27
Total Respondents	1319	1310

amount of agriculture and private property in these areas (Jedwab and Moradi 2015). Within the IV probit framework, there is no relationship between chiefs' involvement in non-criminal or criminal disputes and communal labor, and no relationship between the use of criminal punishment or the belief in the effectiveness of those punishments and communal labor.[16] Finally, there is no statistically significant difference in means in how people evaluate their chief's overall handling of non-criminal dispute resolution on a 5-point scale between treatment or control, and there are null findings within the IV order probit framework as well.[17]

The conclusions we can draw from this information about crime and justice are limited due to null results. In confirmation of the fact that the informal sector has little ability to influence public infrastructure decisions made by central government bureaucrats, there is no effect of chiefly power on access to police stations, similar to schools centers. In a test of what should be traditional leaders' greatest comparative

[16]Results not presented.

[17]Question: "How well do you think your local chief or sub-chief handles his responsibility regarding non-criminal dispute resolution?" Mean answer was 3.30 in control households and 3.32 in treatment households, with higher scores representing better handling of dispute resolution.

advantage, they are no better at policing their citizens. There is no difference in the uptake of formal versus informal justice systems for victims or overall satisfaction in chiefs' dispute resolution between control and treatment communities. Yet at the same time, victims in communities where chiefs are stronger are more likely to report being satisfied with the outcome of their criminal dispute. In the domain where strong chiefs should be the greatest asset to developmental outcomes, chiefs have little impact beyond perception, provide no more justice services, and are are associated with no greater security.

7.6.6 Roads

As discussed above, a good measure of roads that varies at the household level does not exist. The quality of roads can be proxied with the length of time it takes to reach other public services, though. Roads building and allocation are directly within the purview of local governments. Local governments are responsible for both transforming central government grants into roads as well as using their own-source revenue to produce them. Though there is a labor component to the production of roads, in a tropical climate like Ghana, where roads degrade at a rapid rate, large amounts of capital (e.g. building materials and machinery) are needed to maintain quality transportation networks along stretches of road that extend beyond the boundaries of any single chieftaincy. Given the inputs of road building in Ghana, I hypothesize that the quality of roads should decline when local chiefs are empowered through fiscal delegation and district governments give up necessary financing for maintenance. Evidence in support of this hypothesis would come in the form of increased time to other public services. However, none of the three proxy measures for roads (length of time to schools, health center, or police station) assessed above were significantly affected by the strength of chiefs. These results might mean that infrastructure itself

is a more important determinant of access or that chiefs are equally good a maintain roads as DAs. Without a more direct measure of the quality of roads, it is difficult to conclusively tell the difference between these two explanations. However, looking at Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1, those respondents in control communities with stronger chiefs have statistically significant lower assessments of the quality of roads at the $p<0.01$ level.

7.6.7 Discussion on public good outcomes

The evidence on public services does not disconfirm Baldwin's (2013) optimistic findings, though it provides greater support for Kramon and Posner's (2013) argument that the choice of developmental outcome variable greatly affects the interpretation of one's data. This section of the dissertation is an explicit exercise in taking a holistic approach and displaying the limitations of our measurement strategies when it comes to actual livelihood outcomes. While I could not replicate Baldwin's findings about strong chiefs in another context, neither did I find evidence of the more pernicious depictions of rural elites in decentralized systems. Bardhan (2002) describes how decentralization and devolution in developing countries, rather than being beneficial for service delivery, instead results in elites capturing the local government structures to target public goods spending towards themselves. Within my study cites in Ghana, it does not appear than many public services are explicitly being directed towards local elites in the royal clans. Although many of the findings about service quality between control and treatment groups are null, chiefs do not appear to benefit citizens in terms of developmental outcomes which has been suggested by other scholars. Furthermore, if high informal taxation is an indicator of increased clientelistic activities, these results do not provide damning evidence of the harmful effects of reduced accountability systems on individual livelihoods. Overall, these are surprising null

results given the amount of scholarly literature that assumes distributional effects of both clientelism and local or informal public service delivery.

7.7 Affects on accountability and political efficacy

Given the overall null effects of fiscally empowered chiefs on actual public service delivery, the next step is to see if there is evidence for chiefs positively improving the political environment and accountability mechanisms. The political science literature on delegation and devolution of public expenditure responsibility argues that public service delivery can be improved by heightened accountability mechanisms. Voters have more information about who provides goods and what they are legally entitled to receive while politicians and bureaucrats have more information about the needs of citizens. Through a reduction in the transaction costs of gathering information, citizens can better attribute service delivery outcomes (effectively monitoring politicians) and utilize bottom-up punishment mechanisms like vote choice to keep politicians behaving well, though these arguments can extend to the informal political space where there is not an electoral connection. In this section, I step back from service delivery outcomes and assess whether the underlying mechanisms that scholars claim drive positive public services decisions appear to be operating in informal and localized service delivery. If the causal story presented in the work of Baldwin (2013), Tsai (2007), Levi (1989), and others is correct, citizens should have better political information and efficacy when governance is physically closer to them.

7.7.1 Accountability and Attribution

In confirmation of Baldwin's (2013) primary assertion, nearly all respondents believe that cooperation between their chief and the formal government is important for development outcomes, with 99% of people agreeing with that statement.[18] Similarly, over 99% of respondents believe their chief, Assemblyman, Member of Parliament (MP), and the President are important or very important to development outcomes in their specific community. Yet, among respondents, 13.40% believe that their chief and Assemblyman have a poor or very poor working relationship, and 24.09% believe their chief and MP have a strained relationship.

Respondents living in places where chiefs are stronger, as instrumented with the natural experiment, are more likely to rate the quality of development in their community as poor or very poor on a 5-point scale, as seen in Table 7.12.[19] This result is significant at the $p<0.01$ level, passes the Wald test of exogeneity, and is robust to 2SLS specification. The predicted marginal effect is 0.17%. At the mean contribution of communal labor, this results in at 23.58% increase in the likelihood of evaluating development poorly compared to a household that contributed nothing.[20] Given the suggestive evidence above about infrastructure and sanitation, it seems that chiefs might harm overall living standards.

Furthermore, people in control communities are more negative about their formal and informal political leaders overall, more frequently evaluating them all as poor or very poor at a statistically significant level, as seen in Table 7.13. This con-

[18] Question: "How important is cooperation between your local chief or sub-chief and government officials for development outcomes in your community?" There was a 4-point scale consisting of: not important at all, not important, important or very important. Agreement was coded as stating important or very important.

[19] The question has fewer respondents because the question was only added after half of the surveys were already completed.

[20] Alternative interpretations of this statistic exist. People might see strong chiefly authority as a sign of the lack of modernity or they might see the frequent use of communal labor as an indicator that their community lacks sufficient public resources rather than communal labor and traditional authority producing worse development outcomes, rather than development actually being worse.

Table 7.12: Poor or Very Poor Assessment of Development and Political Actors

VARIABLES	(1) IV Probit Development	(2) IV Probit Chief	(3) IV Probit District Assemblyman	(4) IV Probit District Assembly	(5) IV Probit MP	(6) IV Probit Parliament
Communal Labor	0.005***	0.004**	0.004***	-0.004**	0.00	-0.00
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of Adults	-0.25***	-0.20*	-0.26***	0.21**	-0.18	0.22
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.15)
Abject Poverty	0.02	-0.00	-0.005**	0.01	-0.00	0.00
	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
log(Population)	0.09	0.17*	0.11	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.09)
Age	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01**	0.00	0.001**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.003)	(0.00)	(0.002)
Years of Education	0.04**	0.01	0.02*	-0.04***	0.02*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Chief's Clan	-0.02	-0.11	-0.03	0.08	-0.11	-0.01
	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Commercial Agriculture	0.00	-0.33***	0.04	0.32***	0.07	0.14
	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Ashanti	-0.18	-0.71**	0.08	0.15	-0.24	-0.18*
	(0.13)	(0.31)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.11)
Constant	-0.73	-1.58***	-1.25***	0.38	-0.00	-0.09
	(0.68)	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(1.02)	(0.77)
Observations	1216	1964	1982	1967	1929	1865
Wald chi-squared	110.48	156.10	136.65	65.20	35.61	26.53
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7.13: Rate of Poor or Very Poor Assessment of Political Actors

	Control (%)	Treatment (%)	Total Respondents
Chief	20.19	16.39	2491
District Assemblyman	32.46	26.60	2509
District Assembly	30.29	34.27	2491
Member of Parliament	41.44	33.97	2431
Parliament	22.03	24.68	2334

firms some of Kitschelt and Wilkinson's (2007*b*) claims about clientelism alienating citizens.[21] There is a similarly sized effect of instrumented communal labor on the evaluation of respondent's chief and Assemblyman, although the model of poor assessment of chief is weakly specified, not passing the Wald test. This provides some good evidence in support of Logan's (2009; 2013) findings about support for all forms of leadership moving together. The predicted marginal effect of communal labor on poor assessments of the Assemblyman is 0.14% per cedi or an 18.42% increase in the likelihood of rating him as a poor performer. Thus, it appears that blame for poor development is shared by the chief and the Distinct Assemblyman, though there is much clear attribution to the Assemblyman even when the chief is collecting a larger amount of informal revenue. However, the DA as a whole was viewed more positively when there is more communal labor, perhaps due to connection between labor and the maintenance of physical infrastructure; citizens might be incorrectly attributing these activities to their local government. There is no effect of communal labor on assessments of one's MP or Parliament as a whole, as seen in Table 7.12.[22] Interestingly, there is limited evidence of correlational relationships between these assessments, with only assessments of individual politicians and the bodies they serve being positively correlated to a moderate level, as seen in Table 7.14. This is despite

[21]Chief, Assemblyman, and MP have significant differences in means at the $p<0.01$ level. District Assembly has significant differences in means at $p<0.05$ level. Parliament has significant differences in means at the $p<0.10$ level.

[22]These assessments are all measured on a 5-point scale, compressed to a binary indicator, with performance assessments of poor or very poor coded as 1, and all other assessments coded as zero.

Table 7.14: Correlation Matrix of Poor or Very Poor Assessment of Political Actors

	Chief	DAman	DA	MP	Parliament
Chief	1.00				
District Assemblyman	0.15	1.00			
District Assembly	0.14	0.49	1.00		
Member of Parliament	0.21	0.40	0.25	1.00	
Parliament	0.22	0.24	0.27	0.49	1.00

the overall greater negativity about political actors in control communities.

However, when respondents' assessments of different political figures take into account their observations about the developmental state (arguably a measure of how well the political system is performing), the role of chiefly authority and collusion between chiefs and local politicians becomes apparent. Table 7.15 repeats Models 2-4, but only for the subset of individuals who claimed that development was poor in their communities. This helps clarify if the perception of poor development outcomes is driving results compared to the strength of chiefs. . For this subset of individuals, communal labor has no effect on the perceived quality of chiefs. However, increases in communal labor contribution significantly increase poor assessments of Assemblymen and decrease poor assessments of District Assemblies as institutional bodies. The marginal effect of communal labor on Assemblymen is 0.15% per cedi, or a predicted effect of 20.46% increase in the likelihood of rating the Assemblyman poorly at the mean level of communal labor contribution. For the subset of respondents who do not rate development as poor, the effects of communal labor also disappear from the District Assembly; however, the marginal effect on assessments of Assemblymen is still robust at 0.22% increase in the likelihood of a poor rating, or a marginal predicted effect of 30.06% increase in poor rating at the mean level of contribution.[23] As chiefs and local politicians mingle in their responsibilities and duties, the ability of citizens to correctly attribute outcomes to political actors becomes muddied. In this political

[23]Results not shown.

system of overlapping authority, citizens acknowledge the worse state of development affairs in their communities under this specific clientelistic regime, but give chiefs a pass for organizing the very same communal labor that is taking resources away from the state - which could build more capital-intensive development projects - while harshly sanctioning Assemblymen.

Table 7.15: Poor or Very Poor Assessment of Actors for Poor Development Subset

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV Probit	IV Probit	IV Probit
VARIABLES	Chief	District Assemblyman	District Assembly
Communal Labor	0.00	0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.00)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Number of Adults	-0.20	-0.32***	0.47***
	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.08)
Abject Poverty	-0.00	-0.01***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.002)	(0.00)
log(Population)	0.20	0.07	-0.24
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Years of Education	-0.04	0.00	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Chief's Clan	-0.23	-0.27*	-0.10
	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Commercial Agriculture	-0.39***	0.06	0.25**
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Ashanti	-0.63***	0.06	0.05
	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Constant	-1.20	-0.55	-0.99
	(0.90)	(0.89)	(0.77)
Observations	639	627	625
Wald chi-squared	108.69	52.63	179.24
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

7.7.2 Political Information and Preferences

Beyond improving the ability to attribute political outcomes to political actors, devolution is also said (at least by proponents of devolution) to increase general political knowledge by making government physically closer to average citizens. In the realm of public service delivery, the crucial knowledge is which actor has legal responsibility for producing that public service. Without that knowledge, citizens are unable to effectively target their complaints and needs to the responsible parties. Within the survey, respondents were asked which type of governing body was legally responsible for providing specific public services. The choices for each service were: Chieftaincy, District Assembly, and Parliament/National Government plus Other. The following seven goods that were asked about: roads, education, healthcare, water and sanitation, electricity, safety, and environmental protection. For most of the public services, the correct answer is both the DA and the national government coproduce the public good, the exceptions being water and sanitation are only provided by local governments and electricity is managed by the central government. Traditional leaders, on the other hand, have no legal obligations to support the creation of any public goods in Ghana, though they are seen as important advisers especially on issues of safety and environment and have a extralegal role in dispute resolution. As such, the answer of chieftaincies being legally responsible for providing any public service is the only incorrect option. I created an index of misinformation about the legal roles of chiefs, ranging from 0 to 7.[24]

The distribution of the index by treatment status is displayed in Table 7.16. Within the instrumental variable 2SLS framework in Table 7.17, there is no effect of e communal labor contributions on the respondent incorrectly thinking the chieftain-

[24]I did not want to create the inverse knowledge index as it seems wrong to conflate people who answered DA or National Government. While neither are wrong in most cases, they are more or less correct in certain instances. Only responding Chieftaincy is a truly incorrect, uninformed answer.

Table 7.16: Distributions of Indices of Perceived Chiefly Authority and Capability

	Chiefs Legally Responsible		Chiefs Most Capable	
	Control (%)	Treatment (%)	Control (%)	Treatment (%)
0	82.26	77.42	76.72	68.28
1	6.25	6.34	6.03	11.19
2	4.83	10.07	8.17	12.72
3	0.87	1.54	2.82	1.53
4	0.79	0.89	0.53	0.61
5	0.48	0.57	0.69	0.54
6	0.55	0.32	0.23	0.38
7	3.96	2.84	4.81	4.75

cies have legal domain over public services or are best able to provide those services. Thus, there is no evidence that devolution to informal actors improves knowledge of public finances. However, a belief in the capacity of traditional leaders as an independent variable along with the instrumented amount of communal labor increases the belief in the legal authority of chiefs, significant at the $p<0.01$ level. Similarly, beliefs about capacity are driven by perceptions of legal authority, as seen in Model 4. Most interestingly, both knowledge of legal authority as well as beliefs about capacity are highly predicted by the Ashanti regional variable. In the area of Ghana most associated with strong, hierarchical chieftaincies, people appear better able to understand both the roles and the limits on chiefs' abilities in development.

7.7.3 Efficacy

The last main theorized benefit of devolution and informal authority is that when governance is closer to citizens, people will have greater abilities to take political action to make their voices heard. Setting aside voter participation, I look at five different outcomes to measure civic engagement. The first three are indicators if the respondent had contacted their chief or sub-chief, Assemblyman, or MP in the past three months about any concern, complaint, or issue regarding their community. The

Table 7.17: Perceived Chiefly Legal Authority and Capacity Over Public Services

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
VARIABLES	Chiefs Legally Responsible	Chiefs Legally Responsible	Chiefs Most Capable	Chiefs Most Capable
Communal Labor	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of Adults	0.24	0.14	0.27	0.15
	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.22)
Abject Poverty	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
log(Population)	-0.06	0.02	-0.23	-0.19*
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.10)
Age	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Years of Education	-0.02	-0.02*	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Chief's Clan	0.17	0.13	0.10	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Commercial Agriculture	0.08	0.13	-0.18***	-0.19
	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.15)
Ashanti	-0.67***	-0.43***	-0.66***	-0.33***
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Chiefs Legally Responsible			0.47***	
			(0.05)	
Chiefs Most Capable		0.36***		
		(0.05)		
Constant	0.93	0.08	2.40**	1.89***
	(0.91)	(0.64)	(1.04)	(0.74)
Observations	1992	1983	2008	1983
R-squared	0.09	0.30	0.04	0.26
F-Stat	7.33	14.80	5.82	28.23
Standard Errors	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

next indicator is self-describing as a community leader. There is no effect of communal labor on contact with one's MP, Assemblyman or chief in the IV probit framework..[25] There is no statistically significant difference in means or effect of strong chiefs in the IV probit framework on calling one's self a community leader, though being involved in commercial agriculture is positively significant at the $p<0.05$ level. Within the control group, 17.30% call themselves community leaders and within the treatment group the rate is 17.83%, not a statistically significant difference. The last indicator directly asks respondents about their level of political efficacy.[26] In the control communities, 65.69% of respondents said they had no say at all in politics as did 62.67% of people in treatment communities where chiefs are weaker; although, this is not a significantly significant difference in responses. Only 7.28% of the total sample said they have some say or more. Taken together, there is no evidence that fiscal delegation to chiefs - empowering local informal governance - improves feelings about political efficacy or willingness to take non-voting political action.

7.7.4 Discussion on accountability and efficacy outcomes

While the evidence about how chiefly authority affects public service delivery outcomes is mixed depending on type of public services or living standard outcome, the effects of increased informal authority on the mechanisms of local political accountability are clearer: strong chiefs harm the ability of citizens to influence or monitor the political system. In areas where chiefs are stronger, people have somewhat worse overall developmental outcomes, cannot attribute public service outcomes to specific political actors or attribute them to the wrong actor, are no more knowl-

[25] Results not presented.

[26] Question: "How much say do you have in getting the government to address issues that interest you?" Answers were a 5-point scale consisting of: no say at all, little say, some say, a lot of say, and unlimited say. The question has few respondents because the question was only added after half of the surveys were already completed.

edgeable about the legal role of chiefs in service delivery, and display no higher levels of political efficacy compared to people in communities with less delegation to chiefs. These individuals tend to be more negative about all political actors, indicating they have become alienated from the formal governance system as it cedes power to the informal sector. This mirrors some of the findings of Logan (2013; 2009), such as the finding that support from traditional leaders might move with support for other government officials, in contrast to my findings in Chapter 2 about the demand for stronger chiefs being related to weak formal governance. If decentralization and delegation to informal political actors does actually lead to better public service delivery, it is not operating through the mechanisms that empower citizens to hold officials accountable, which is further harmed by the use of clientelistic electoral practices (Stokes 2005). Rather, in an opaque system of authority, people become disengaged from the political process and their voices are not heard by elite decision-makers.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter attempts to answer a few questions in the development literature. What are the developmental consequences of clientelism? Does variation across different public services speak to the broader political economy literature about cooperation and delegation to informal actors? These results provide a greater understanding about the diversity of development outcomes in clientelistic environments. Overall, the picture is mixed according to this study in Ghana. While national-priority policies do not suffer under this type of political environment, more local-level public services do, especially those related to infrastructure. People have less access to medical care and sanitation, and are more likely to describe poor developmental conditions in their communities. This breakdown in accountability is likely due to the inability of citizens

to clearly attribute public service outcomes to any one political actor as overlapping authority obscures responsibility. These results might be particular to the type of clientelism addressed in this dissertation where public finances are effectively transferred to traditional elites who serve as vote brokers. However, clientelism always includes the reallocation of resources, either private or public, towards electioneering. It is not surprising that there are some perverse effects on individual-level development outcomes, or at least not positive ones. In contrast to these poor outcomes, there do appear to be some beneficial effects of chiefs on improving social norms such as usage of bednets, which reduces the incidence of malaria. However, these social benefits are not extended to public safety where strong chieftaincies should improve the quality of the service. It is also worth considering how generalizable these results are to other countries, primarily in Africa. Though Ghana ranks low in GDP per capita, number 134 out of 185 in 2014 according to the World Bank (2015), it has one of the lowest lived-poverty indices in sub-Saharan Africa (Mattes 2008), a difference likely attributed to greater natural resource wealth than other countries in the region. Ghana is also considered one of the most stable and competitive democracies within the region. With relatively high living standards, for small changes in the strength of chiefs over 100 years ago to have such consequences is remarkable. In poorer countries and those with less well-maintained national public service apparatuses, the effects would likely be more pronounced.

While Baldwin (2013) argues that cooperation and collaboration between chiefs and politicians can be a means to informational shortcuts for voters and improved services, there needs to be more discussion about how powerful traditional leaders effect development outcomes directly. Similarly, though many have argued that fiscal decentralization to the very local or informal level can be more efficient from the perspective of the state (Olken and Singhal 2011; Levi 1989), there are very

few goods - at least those related to basic and primary needs - that appear to be improved in quality when provided by non-state actors. This chapter instead provides some support to the theoretical claim that clientelism and decentralization diminish the accountability of governments to citizens though the evidence is not quite as damning as Bardhan (2002) depicts it with rural elites running personal fiefdoms as the results on service access were mostly null findings. Yet this research demonstrates that enlarging the role of intermediaries to engage in politicized distribution of public services can reduce the quality of some services while simultaneously making it more difficult for voters to accurately assess the performance of their elected and non-elected leaders.

The implications of these findings go beyond clientelism. Decentralization and delegation to local leaders, both formal and informal, has been a consistent policy recommendation to developing countries for the past three decades (Grossman and Lewis 2014). Foreign assistance organizations promote good governance and accountability through decentralization, based on the arguments that being closer to the decisions of government allows greater monitoring by citizens. The potential obstacles to effective governance still exist in the absence of political clientelism, however. While localized governance might increase the information citizens have about specific expenditures and policies, removing uncertainty over outcomes, the increase in the number of political actors diminishes the ability to attribute those outcomes to any specific individuals. This can be seen in this survey data from Ghana: while people in strong chieftaincies are able to identify problems in their community and relate those problems to negative feelings about political actors, they are no more able to actually identify who does what. Those citizens who live where chieftaincy is most culturally valued are more misinformed about the relationship between traditional authority and the state, which does not indicate much political

efficacy building among citizens.

For every outcome a citizen must process in order to engage in retrospective assessment of government, he now must consider another actor to possibly attribute the effect to. Even assuming good, high quality information about outcomes and political actors, uncertainty will only proliferate as more individuals become involved in developmental processes and the governance space. This uncertainty is further heightened by the reality that in many decentralized systems in developing countries, solitary actors are not responsible for the collection of specific resources to produce specific goods. Rather, devolution of expenditure authority reduces capacity for the collection of local-sourced revenues, making it impossible for citizens to ask the question: did I get what I paid for? These issues extend even further when one considers the joint production of specific goods. For example in Ghana, the national government might decide where to build a hospital and staff the hospital with doctors, but the locality in which that hospital resides might be responsible for maintaining the physical structure, stocking the clinic with drugs, ensuring there is clean water available for the medical teams, and handling salary payments to the staff. If an individual gets sick because the hospital is far away (maybe outside of her home district), the doctors are absent, and there are no drugs available, who is to blame? This is a cognitively taxing exercise not just because there are a lot of elements to keep track of, but because there is no correct answer. Lastly, it is worth noting these issues of overlapping authority are not limited to developing countries. In many federal systems, the ability to attribute outcomes to actors is extremely difficult, something politicians leverage when attempting to shirk responsibility, distribute blame, or unduly claim credit.

As decentralization remains a favored policy and collaboration with traditional leaders is becoming more popular among foreign assistance agencies, correctives

should be made to the policy instrument. It is not enough to believe that physical and geographic proximity is sufficient to provide the necessary information for voters to hold politicians and elites accountable. Nor is it sufficient to entrust the responsibility for producing informational shortcuts to those individuals who gain through obfuscation. There remains a place for people being educated explicitly about their rights and the responsibilities of those in charge of the state. One of the most robust findings in the political science literature on public expenditures is that in places where there are competitive elections, there are greater resources spent on public goods (Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Stasavage 2005). Though this spending tends to disproportionately advantage the wealthy (Timmons 2005; Ross 2006), at least the expenditures are made. Frequently, however, among development practitioners and scholars, the concepts of democracy and decentralization are used interchangeably, under the misguided notion that if there are more things to vote on there is more democracy. The evidence from this chapter should make us take pause, as devolution drawn out to its extreme conclusion of empowering informal authority undermines the potential for a strong electoral accountability relationship between citizens and formal leaders.

7.9 Acknowledgements

Chapter 7, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

8

Conclusion

8.1 The Status of Chiefs in Democratic Societies

I opened this dissertation by asking a series of simple questions: why are there chiefs and other informal authority leaders in democracies? How can their presence (and possible renaissance) in places like Ghana be explained, given a history of contentious fighting and state intervention? Some have suggested this may be due to the role that chiefs played in colonial states as imperial puppets and mouthpieces of the government (Firmin-Sellers 1996; Mamdani 1996; Boone 2003). Or perhaps chiefs serve as village big men, helping the state maintain control and being supportive of the new regime, an elite bargain for being complicit (van de Walle 2007; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2014). Alternatively, other scholars have suggested that chiefs and informal authority more broadly conceived are useful agents of the state. Informal authority figures can play roles in optimizing public finance and filling governance voids when the state lacks the institutional capacity to rule in the hinterlands (Levi 1989; Ostrom 1990; Olken and Singhal 2011) or helping the state better target its own resources (Baldwin 2013). Finally, the state may just be responding to public opinion trends that are supportive of chieftaincy and finds it a trustworthy, credible institution (Logan 2009, 2013). There are many answers to how states and chiefs have

related to each other over time, yet few explicitly grapple with the political realities of democratic consolidation and expansion of competitive electoral institutions (Baldwin 2013).

The explanation advanced in my dissertation is different from all these previous explanations because I more fully considered the strategic incentives that drive collaboration between chiefs and politicians in electoral democracies. My analysis shows that by filling the niche of credible and trustworthy community leaders, chiefs have secured their place as valuable vote brokers for politicians in new democracies. Not only are they capable vote brokers, but they are better at mobilizing citizens compared to professionalized brokers who are more likely to shirk and are more expensive to hire (Stokes et al. 2013). Chiefs can use their immense cultural and economic powers to persuade voters to the polls with little disagreement from citizens. And the more authority they have on issues of daily village life from the perspective of citizens, the better able they are to achieve this goal. Politicians are aware of trust for and public support of chiefs, especially on issues of the autonomy of customary law and local development. So the democratic politicians grant chiefs the right to be more traditional, to be more powerful, to be more important, to be less incorporated into legal democratic institutions, so that chiefs are better positioned to move groups of people in support of candidates. The more traditional traditional authority figures are, the more valuable they are to politicians seeking credible partners. The less modern chiefs are, the better able they are to survive the modern world.

Chiefs have been allow to increase their assertive claims to tradition and authority because they are willing to collude with politicians in the electoral arena. This relationship manifests itself in particular ways in Ghana. Chiefs are rewarded for their service through greater rights to informal taxation and the role of organizing development in the countryside. I demonstrate informal taxation rates are higher

where chiefs are more powerful, as determined by as-if random assignment in natural experiment. Control over fiscal resources has driven competition and animosity in the past in Ghana and elsewhere, implying there must be some reason that politicians are willing to forgo those resources in certain situations. By ceding those resources to traditional leaders, politicians not only have a way of rewarding collaboration, but also increase chiefs' influence and power in their communities, making them better mobilizers for future elections.

Within Ghana, much of this illegal collusion is facilitated by rights and access to locally produced revenue. The rights to local, direct taxation belong to the decentralized District Assemblies (DAs). Not only do Assemblymen vote on raising new taxes and fees, but they are charged with the responsibility to directly interface with their communities, its traditional leaders, and official tax collectors to encourage paying of taxes. Through poor enforcement of these local taxes, Assemblymen are capable of leaving more wealth in a community to be scooped up by traditional leaders. The variation in enforcement is apparent as Internally Generated Funds (IGFs) can account from anywhere between 2% and 46% of DA budgets. This exchange of resources can occur even though tax policy is decided collectively in the DAs because tax collection is highly individualized.

While Assemblymen in Ghana have the ability to selectively enforce local tax policy, what they lack are personal or party resources to effectively mount campaigns. Unlike highly partisan and well-financed parliamentary elections (Lindberg 2003, 2010; Ichino and Nathan 2012, 2013*b*), local elections are non-partisan, underfunded and low interest events (CODEO 2013, 2015). Without access to the more typical and institutional tools that improve the credibility of politicians (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008), local Assemblymen turn to the best forms of clientelism available to them: influential chiefs.

Strong chiefs who are likely partners in collusion and mobilization produce the obvious signs of clientelism in these local elections. In Ghana, that means higher turnout and reduced electoral competition. In typically low-interest local election, I show that citizens turn out to vote with greater likelihood due to pressure from strong chiefs. I also demonstrate that people tend to vote together as a block, a sign of decreasing electoral competition; furthermore, people typically vote for winners. When strong chiefs are not available to serve as vote mobilizers, I provide evidence that politicians turn to more expensive and less effective means of mobilization, specifically direct vote buying. In parliamentary elections, a good counterfactual to local elections that take place in the same locations as strong traditional authority, the results are the opposite. There is declining individual turnout, likely due to voter alienation brought on by the strength of chieftaincy systems relative to formal government. This evidence indicates the specific pressures faced by local candidates and not parliamentary candidates might drive this collaboration with chiefs.

There are also secondary theorized consequences of this arrangement in Ghana. The informal taxation that is used as the reward for working with chiefs reduces the amount of formal taxation available for public service delivery by local governments. This lack of funds results in citizens rating the quality of development in their communities more poorly as well as experiencing greater likelihood of illness and reduced access to clean water and sanitation, as shown by the empirical evidence from my household survey. However, within the same survey, citizens are more satisfied by the quality of dispute resolution in their communities, which is likely facilitated by informal traditional courts run by chiefs. I do not find evidence that strong chiefs are completely harmful to development outcomes, but instead have ambiguous results, with many null results. It might be that informal provision of services is a clear substitute for the formal production, or perhaps central government control

over the production of goods and revenue generation is more centralized than the decentralized apparatus of the Ghanaian state appears. Whatever the cause, there is no evidence that areas with strong chiefs are the beneficiaries of increased public expenditures (Baldwin 2013), nor is there evidenced from the multiple threats to livelihoods from clientelistic practices (Stokes et al. 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007*b*; Bardhan 2002). Giving the increasing national emphasis on own-source revenue for DAs, possible harm to service delivery should become more apparent over time if these practices continue.

Yet clientelism is far from a neutral economic exchange. I provide evidence that citizens who live where chiefs are stronger are less well informed about politics and less able to attribute development outcomes to political actors. These attitudinal changes do indicate there is a "perverse accountability" in this form of clientelism facilitated by chiefs (Stokes 2005). With these results, I cannot conclusively say that the welfare of citizens is worse off under strong traditional leadership compared to direct forms of vote buying. However, given that mobilization via chiefs does not feature a direct transfer of wealth to citizens like more commonly described vote buying, there are reasons to believe that average citizens are worse off economically with strong chiefs. These findings suggest that strong chiefs harm the underlying mechanisms of accountable democratic governance, though they are not overtly affecting general development patterns.

Beyond describing the politics of chieftaincy in Ghana, I also examine the concept of informal authority more broadly. In the literature, informal authority is described as this concept that is separate and distinct from the happenings of formal governance, due to the influence of the political economy literature that tends to see legitimacy and sovereignty as an either/or issue. This is a mistaken belief, that informal authority only exists in pockets when the state lacks the capacity to rule (Herbst

2000; Boone 2003; Levi 1989; Ostrom 1990; Tsai 2007; Olken and Singhal 2011). Rather, I demonstrate that formal and informal authority can be self-reinforcing. In the mutually beneficial relationship between chiefs and local officials in Ghana, local politicians diminish their control over fiscal resources and chiefs work cooperatively with politicians, both giving up some benefits in order to better ensure their own longevity and increase their authority together. That lens for understanding the relationship between informal and formal authority has a great deal of portability.

Given the under-explored importance of informal authority in many countries (in particular its relationship to elections and fiscal governance), perhaps the most important contribution of this dissertation is attempting to quantitatively measure the strength of informal authority through voluntary contributions of time and labor, which I and others call informal taxation (Olken and Singhal 2011). This behavioral measure of public support for non-elected leaders might have applications in various institutional settings like criminal gangs in India or Brazil to the influence of churches in the United States. Though informal taxation might not be an appropriate operationalization of informal authority in every context, it does push the discussion and conceptualization of the topic in a direction for greater inquiry.

8.2 Limitations of this research

The data and research design of this project are not without its limitations. In order to have strong causal identification on the concept of chiefly authority, the data from this project are both limited to a specific natural experiment in south Ghana and to rural villages of less than 5000 residents. This means that very different conclusions might be drawn in other regions of Ghana or in urban areas, though I think I have been clear about those issues thought the dissertation. Additionally, there are

some important limitation in the 2SLS model that drives much of this dissertation reducing sample size due to non-response, though I have demonstrated that there does not seems to be non-response bias between the two types of villages. There is also the issue of social desirability bias increasing refusal to answer questions on topics such as vote buying. Lastly, there are also systematic data access issues that both do not allow for the cross-validation of certain measurement decisions because either government data does not exist or there is no means to operationalize a specific concept. For example, household level measures of the quality of roads are difficult to construct beyond perception measures or the travel times to other infrastructure. In an ideal world, actual collusion between chiefs and politicians could be observed instead of relying on proxy variables and deductive thinking. Despite these data limitations, I believe that I have provided evidence for an overall affect of strong chiefs on politics. Smaller effects sizes should be assessed within the context of a 100-year old natural experiment, a framework where the significance and direction of effects is more important than coefficient size. Although this natural experiment is subject to threats to the exclusion restriction, with other causal mechanisms explaining outcomes, I believe I have provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that income effects or diffusion of development from urban centers is not driving most of these results.

There are also limitations to how far this model of politics can be extended beyond Ghana. Most obviously, the chieftaincy politics of Ghana do not fully generalize to other places even within Africa. Despite a historically tense and antagonistic relationship, chieftaincy in Ghana has remain relatively intact. Other countries, particularly those with more centralized colonial experience, do not have similar traditional institutions that could coerce citizens or threaten the sovereignty of the state. There are also other structural or institutional changes that might occur over time to weaken chiefs. Urbanization and migration might reduce the influence of chiefs

to purely ceremonial roles, like in large cities in Ghana, due to increasing wealth and individual anonymity. The regulations and limitations that formal states place on informal authority might also cause traditional authority to whither, making its leaders unlikely collaborators in electoral politics. Or formal state consolidation and capacity might continue to expand in rural locations, eliminating the public demand for chiefs. The clientelism described in this dissertation is facilitated by the specific fiscal organization of Ghana; however, other African countries have different systems of fiscal decentralization that limit the authority and ability of local politicians to strike individual bargains and divert state resources into prebends like informal taxation rights. Places might lack elected office at the local level completely or local government candidates might be more able to tap into national political parties for election support. Additionally, Ghana's uniquely partisan nature might drive much of the differences in political outcomes in local and general elections due to the different strategic and budget constraints politicians have for mobilization efforts. Alternatively, there might be other countries where parties at all levels of government are so weakly institutionalized, that parliamentary or presidential candidates might be the actors negotiating these bargains.

These theoretical limitations of the model really speak to the need for institutional awareness to understand how chiefs or other traditional authority leaders might operate within a different country context. The premise of this project was not to describe a theory of chieftaincy for all countries, but explore the acknowledged fact the traditional authority still matters in many places in sub-Saharan Africa and it matters a lot. In the rapidly changing context of economic growth, urbanization and most importantly democratization, the state and its citizens are attempting to come to some new consensus about the role of chieftaincy. How that consensus plays out is especially important within the context of elections and decentralized fiscal

governance. Given the complicated relationship chieftaincy has had with many colonial and post-colonial governments, increasingly competitive elections are testing that relationship again. The pertinent question is not if chiefs effect elections, but how they do so.

8.3 Policy Recommendations

This dissertation touches on two issues that receive direct foreign and domestic policy attention, namely the quality of elections and public services. I have described a situation where chiefs harm the quality of elections and possibly also reduce development outcomes and the underlying mechanisms for accountability. To give an example of where this matters in the policy world, the United States Agency for International Development's portfolio in Ghana explicitly mentions the need to increase local own-source revenue, improve top-down oversight of DAs' budgets through audits, and directly engage with civil society organizations for bottom-up oversight of DAs (USAID 2015*a*). These civil society organizations include traditional authority as well. USAID/Ghana also works on elections monitoring and support, including the 2015 local elections. Similar, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) focuses on "improving the accountability of government and decision makers to citizens" (DFID 2015). Ghana is not an outlier in the international community's approach to democracy and governance assistance in Africa, with most USAID Missions in Africa explicitly focusing on improving the quality of public service delivery at the local level. Other Missions even have explicit focus on traditional leaders, like in Zimbabwe where chiefs were recently trained to be more inclusive and understanding of human rights during informal dispute resolution (USAID 2015*b*). The policy world is specifically creating programs to address these governance issues.

If much of what drives the use of clientelism by politicians is the lack of credibility as many have hypothesized (Keefer and Vlacicu 2008; Wantchekon 2003), programs that help mitigate the drivers of the supply and demand for clientelism would be beneficial. This would include voter education campaigns not on the electoral process but on the candidates running, to provide politicians an opportunity to freely reach citizens in a transparent manner. In the case of decentralized governance, part of what might be driving low voter turnout is the lack of information that citizens have on the responsibilities of their local representatives, making them easy targets for illegal mobilization efforts as they care little about the outcomes of these elections. These informational deficiencies are evident in the inability of citizens to correctly attribute the public service outcomes of government officials in my survey. However, more than any programmatic intervention, changing the legal status of local elections to partisan in countries where they are currently non-partisan (like Ghana), would probably have the greatest positive effect on accountability. The difference in electoral results for local and parliamentary elections indicate there are different processes and electoral strategies being used by these types of politicians. Candidates would benefit from credible party labels and access to institutionalized party resources for elections. Voters would also have access to more informational shortcuts about the quality and position of candidates based off of party identifications, reducing the citizen demand for intermediaries like chiefs and other brokers, a role that others have described (Baldwin 2013). Most importantly, allowing elections to be partisan would reduced the forms of collusion between local politicians and parties which are the source of many rumors, casting doubt on the validity of these elections.

The above interventions affect the supply and the demand for clientelistic activities from the perspective of voters and politicians. An alternative approach would be to increase the monitoring capacity of both the central government and the citizens

as formal tax evasion is clearly a problem in some places of rural Ghana. In Ghana, the 2012 changes to the DA budgeting process go a long way in addressing this by clearly requiring reporting of expenditures and revenue to the central government. However, there is still much room for improvement including standardization of budget reports. Changes like better public reporting would reduce the ability of individual Assemblymen to pay out prebends and state resources for corruption and collusion. These modifications to decentralization policies are already occurring throughout Africa. Informational campaigns could also attempt to address the issue of tax evasion directly, trying to make the link between compliance and benefits (Cheeseman 2013). Furthermore, politicians should not be tasked with tax enforcement as that creates a clear conflict of interest. In the situation of traditional authority leaders who are actively involved in raising informal taxation but not directing that wealth to public needs, a campaign such as this could emphasize the need for greater community oversight over fiscal politics and make the point that local government has the capacity for greater transparency than traditional leadership. Alternatively, Ghana and other places are beginning to encourage greater citizen oversight of local government spending to encourage accountability. This type of activity might be a good role for traditional authority to play in helping shape local development in a more transparent manner as they are seen as trustworthy and credible individuals who listen to the concerns of citizens. Chiefs could be a source of good information about community needs and priorities.

This recommendation highlights perhaps one of the most important policies towards improving governance outcomes for people living in areas with strong chieftaincy: clearer laws outlining the legal standing of chiefs that are respectful of formal institutions but also acknowledge the realities of political life. I do not think any scholars of African politics would argue that the current laws barring involvement of

chiefs in politics have been effective or improved tensions between formal and informal institutions. Within the context of Ghana and countries that place prohibitions on chiefs in politics, what the laws mean should be clarified. In Ghana, the constitutional rule has been interpreted unevenly. Does the constitution bar chiefs from just running for office, speaking about politics, or even offering opinions on local developmental concerns? I am not trying to imply it is an easy issue to define this law in a statutory way. For example, there are frequent controversies in the United States about churches speaking out on political issues and putting their tax-exempt status in jeopardy. However, it is the inconsistent application of the law in Ghana that causes confusion and controversy. What complicates this issue more than the comparison of churches is that the Ghanaian government acknowledges and enshrines a place for chieftaincy in dispute resolution, land use and customary law. There likely exists some middle ground between having a chief concurrently serve in elected office and as a chief, and denying the real administrative and development responsibilities that are delegated to chiefs by the state. A clearly spelled out function and quota in either advisory or voting positions on DAs would go a long way to clarifying their place in the modern developmental state. This should be considered preferable to sending the political influence of chiefs underground where it cannot be monitored.

Just like DAs need monitoring to ensure they are properly delivering public services and collecting revenue, chiefs also need monitoring in order to avoid abuses of power which allow them to coerce people's voting behavior. This process could start by acknowledging and regulating the forms of illegal dispute resolution for non-customary cases as well as rebuking the use of capital punishment by chiefs for petty offenses (Tweneboah 2012). Furthermore, the ambiguity of the property rights system provides a large amount of leverage for corrupt and greedy chiefs to sell from what is thought to be collectively owned land (Ampadu 2013). Many of these issues are

currently being addressed in Ghana (and other African countries like Uganda), though trying to bring the practices of traditional authority into a legal framework that respects equity and human rights issues is going to be a process of fits and starts.

An overall policy approach to address the illegal role of chieftaincy in politics would be a combination of: 1) clearly defining the roles of politicians and chiefs plus voter information on these issues, 2) enforcing laws on the books about exploitative behavior by chiefs, 3) greater monitoring and oversight of fiscal decision-making by local politicians, and 4) greater institutionalized support for local candidates running for office. Addressing these problems, at least within Ghana, would go along way to reducing the supply and demand for clientelism via chiefs as well as reducing the more exploitative forms of coercion retained by chiefs over people. Many of these policy recommendation are in-line with democracy and governance work already being done by international organizations and the domestic government in Ghana. However, more clearly addressing the practical realities of chieftaincy and clientelism in Ghana should help improve their effectiveness.

8.4 Future research on chieftaincy

Future research on chiefs in politics should focus on quantitative measurement strategies that are reliable across time and space. The study of informal authority is limited primarily by data. Informal authority can be secretive, unseen and highly norms-based. These limitations lead to research that only addresses narrowly defined circumstances like (such as this dissertation or the work of other scholars (Baldwin 2013; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2014; de Kadt and Larreguy 2014)), or makes broad generalizations based on stated preferences data (Logan 2009, 2013). In this dissertation, I take a step in the right direction by focusing on informal taxation. By

marrying the theoretical literature on revenue collection and coercive authority with inquiry on the power of traditional authority, we can come to a better understanding of how citizens and the state interact with chiefs. Informal taxation and its constituent parts are easily generalizable concepts that can be measured in household surveys, which would allow for cross-national validation of the indicator.

There are other unexplored measurement strategies that were not used in this dissertation. There is room for creativity in thinking about how to operationalize informal authority in different context, a topic that has previous ignored by other scholars of development. I would hope that these measures would also make attempts and appeals towards use outside of specific studies. I have made attempts to begin collecting court cases in Ghana - in both the formal and traditional courts - to get a better grasp of the issue of forum shopping and preferences for traditional justice (Blattman, Hartman and Blair 2014; Mwangi 2010). I am also collecting data on rents and royalties collected by chieftaincies for customarily owned land (also known as stool land revenues) to cross-validate informal taxation as a measurement of authority and power. I also intend to use this information to explore the issue of how chiefs interact with the central government of Ghana, as these payments are managed by national government bureaucrats. The recent oil and mineral discoveries in Ghana over the past decade provide an opportunity to understand how shocks to traditional authority figures' wealth, via the value of their land, affect their relationships with the government, as well as affecting how chiefs balance the objectives of increased income and environmental protection. Lastly, I have some data on sharecropping patterns among farmers in Ghana that I hypothesize would increase preferences for powerful chieftaincies, conditional on low agricultural yields, to demonstrate that strong chieftaincy acts as a form of community-based agricultural insurance.

Beyond measuring how the power of chieftaincy affects its relationship to gov-

ernment, I believe the next avenue for research on traditional authority is how the personal characteristics of chiefs and traditional leaders affect development outcomes. There is already some work on this that tries to quantify more community-level characters like Acemoglu et al. (2014) who find negative development outcomes are related to less competition in a chieftaincy. Like Stokes et al. (2013) who study the role of vote brokers more, chiefs as individuals are tied up close with the institution of traditional authority. The personal characteristic of chiefs might affect their persuasive abilities as well as their developmental priorities. One approach might be to take some of the more qualitative and anthropological approaches use by others (Goody 1969; Goody and Goody 1967, 1966) to generate these indicators within Ghana and elsewhere. I intend to study how professional and educational backgrounds of chiefs affects informal investment in development, particularly on education. There is evidence that highly educated chiefs tend to be absent from village-life, leading to neglect of development (Kleist 2011). I am currently working with the Ghana National House of Chiefs to run such a survey that will combine interviews with geo-located service delivery points like schools, toilets and health centers as well as geo-located foreign assistance data to understand if and how chiefs are proactively attracting international investment.

The relationship between chiefs and citizens has also not been sufficiently explained. The work of Logan (2013; 2009) and Baldwin (2013) demonstrate observationally and experimentally that people value and follow the opinion of their chiefs, but not why. The question about trade-offs between formal and informal authority in the minds of citizens is not a settled issue. The next step in this public opinion research is understanding how people form opinions on issues that place citizens' interests against chieftaincy's interests, such as land tenure reform. With the proliferation of rapid or snap polling in Africa with cellular phones, specific policy-controversies

could be probed. This will help us understand how support of chieftaincies affects support for government policies or specific candidates for office, anchored by these policy-based flashes of disagreement.

8.5 Final thoughts

It should be no surprise that chiefs exist in one form or another given their history and adaptability to the changing winds of formal state intervention. As Staniland (1975; pg. 174) writes of Northern Ghana, "Pseudo-traditionalism is not [...] a new phenomenon. Tradition has always been made to serve 'political' ends, and politics has always been intrinsic to 'traditional' government." As democratization and broad public support for democratic governance swept Africa (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Lindberg 2006), chiefs and politicians were forced to negotiate a new normal if traditional leadership were to survive. Rather than democratization being the closing act of chieftaincy as many predicted (Weber 1922/1958), traditional leaders have found a way not only to adjust to electoral democracy, but to place themselves directly in between politicians and voters as a necessary component to electoral success. Through a combination of flexibility on the part of chiefs to adopt new roles and the changing demands of politicians in Africa, there can be increasingly strong traditional authority and increasingly consolidated democracy simultaneously.

I have shown that chiefs can exist in democracies because they still provide a valuable service to politicians. As the quality of governance and the likelihood of electoral success remain disentangled, state actors willingly give up some of their access to power and legitimacy to gain the benefits of elected office. By giving away the assets of the state, these politicians increase their personal welfare. Chiefs agree to collaborate in electoral clientelism for the short-term gains of greater wealth and

possibly the long-term gains of increasing popular legitimacy relative to the state. It is unclear if this relationship is sustainable, especially if the state becomes threatened by the influence of chiefs again or if citizens start demanding accountability from elected officials. The future does not, however, point towards a diminishing role for chiefs in politics.

Although this dissertation is about the role that chiefs play in clientelism, I do not intend for this to be a damning indictment of traditional authority in Ghana or elsewhere. I have argued that chiefs have found a way to remain integral to the Ghanaian state by serving as a channel between politician and citizens. At this time, this manifests in clientelism and harms democratic accountability. However, there is ample evidence that traditional and informal authority can be a positive force for development and good governance, serving as a civil society check on the state and producing quality public services. Perhaps there will come a time when chiefs feel secure enough in their position and right to exist that they will not engage in activities that undermine the democratic process. Making rights and responsibilities of chieftaincies well defined and not grounded in vague prohibitions on behavior would limit the need for these relationships. Until then, there will be opportunities and incentives for illegal collusion with politicians that undermine the quality of governance and democratic expression, but preserve a place for chieftaincy.

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Chapter 8, in part, is currently being prepared for submission for publication of material. The dissertation author was the principal investigator and author of this material.

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