

UC Santa Barbara

UC Santa Barbara Previously Published Works

Title

Based on a true story

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9521q2bx>

Journal

Neohelicon, 43(2)

ISSN

0324-4652

Author

Park, Sowon S

Publication Date

2016-12-01

DOI

10.1007/s11059-016-0357-6

Peer reviewed

Based on a true story

Sowon S. Park

Neohelicon

Acta comparationis litterarum
universarum


ISSN 0324-4652

Volume 43

Number 2

Neohelicon (2016) 43:473-483

DOI 10.1007/s11059-016-0357-6



Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self-archived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".

Based on a true story

Sowon S. Park¹

Published online: 31 August 2016
© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary 2016

Abstract The convergence in the 1980s between postmodern epistemology, cognitive psychology and narratology forcefully reoriented the idea of storytelling. From a fictional device for representing reality, storytelling was recast as a cognitive tool underlying all mental processes. On this view, our sense of reality was seen as an *effect* produced by individual narrativising. This idea has many implications. The aim of this essay is not to try to survey the literature on this complex topic but to characterise two issues that the narrative view of reality obscures. One is the role of a shared reality and the other is political inertia. This argument seeks to create space for thinking about the idea of a common reality which has been traduced in theoretical discussion in favour of fractured reality. It concludes with a discussion of what can be gained by seeing narrative as a vehicle for approaching reality and not reality itself.

Keywords ‘Based on a true story’ · Cognitive narratology · Authenticity · The Real · Anti-narrative

‘Based on a true story’

‘Based on a true story’ is a tagline we have come to see a lot at the cinema these days. In the last year alone, we saw it accompanying titles such as *The Imitation Game*, *Foxcatcher*, *Selma*, *Wild*, *Big Eyes*, *Unbroken*, *American Sniper*, *Woman in Gold*, *The Theory of Everything*, and *Mr Turner*. These were just a tiny fraction of the films that were released in this category.

To what can we attribute the increasing predominance of the ‘based on a true story’ category? Thomas Hodgkinson, reporting from the Screenwriters Conference

✉ Sowon S. Park
sowonpark@english.ucsb.edu

¹ UCSB, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

at the 2014 Austin Film Festival, provides some context: “echo(ing) through the conference (is) the notion that a movie now has to be based on pre-existing material for it to have much chance of getting made. (...) They need pre-existing material. They need IP (Intellectual Property). They need attachment.” (Hodgkinson 2014) Attachment to actual events is said to be a forceful hook, increasing immeasurably one’s chances of selling a script. Between 1995 and 2015, according to market data, more ‘true story’ films were made than those based on fiction.¹

The upward curve of the ‘true story’ genre in the film trade parallels the trend in television and publishing, where reality programs and life-writing are also ascending. What propels the ascent is consumer demand. A narrative appears to trigger a stronger response when attached to a ‘true story’ than to a story that is officially invented. Leaving aside the obvious question for now of just what exactly is a true story, the viewing/reading predilection suggests that in everyday life, we apparently accept an ontological distinction between what is real and what is made up.

The rise of the narrative view of reality

By contrast, in intellectual discussion, especially in the humanities, this distinction is dismissed as hopelessly naïve. Some of the most prominent literary theorists in the late twentieth century have brought to our attention the multiple ways in which real life is inextricably bound up with fiction. Arguing this point, for example, is the critic and novelist John Berger, who put it so well in 1984:

For an animal its natural environment and habitat are a given; for man—despite the faith of the empiricists—reality is not a given: it has to be continually sought out, held—I am tempted to say *salvaged*. One is taught to oppose the real to the imaginary, as though the first were always at hand and the second distant, far away. This opposition is false. Events are always to hand. But the coherence of these events—which is what one means by reality—is an imaginative construction. Reality always lies beyond—and this is as true for materialists as for idealists. (Berger 1984, 72)

On the view that Berger here, and numerous postmodernists and narratologists elsewhere, have proposed, reality is *produced* by our imaginative powers, which connect fragments of our experience into a coherent whole. Central to the *gestalt* is the epistemic structure of narrative, which, as many have argued, creates meaning by its selection and arrangement of events into relations of time, scale and causality.

So from the idea of narrative as a *literary* genre that has ‘a relation of events connected through chronology and causation’ to create a distinct kind of fictional reality that we associate with ‘The King died and then the Queen died of grief’, as Forster famously defined it (Forster 1927, 87), we move to the proposal that *all* of what we regard as real is an effect of narrativising.

A succinct example of this way of thinking is the phrase ‘a glass half full; a glass half empty’: two meanings can be produced from the same fact according to the

¹ See *The numbers*: <http://www.the-numbers.com/market/sources>.

structure of values brought to bear upon it. Based on such examples, one is mobilised to argue that the narrative frame determines the kind of knowledge it will produce.

From the 1980s onward, narrative came to be seen as systemic to an enormous variety of meaning-production, from epistemically objective disciplines like mathematics to those with a subjective ontology like literature. The narrative of quantum physics, the narrative of music, the narrative of sports management—it would seem that there was little that could be considered outside of narrative structure.

Taking this approach to its furthest extent, all human reality came to be understood as an effect of narrative for, to its most extreme exponents, the fine line between reality and fictionality had been rendered obsolete. As the argument went, reality is not legitimated by its correspondence to factual events 'out there', but by its own narrative structure, producing its own truths. It is in this sense that postmodernists proclaimed that there is no such thing as an objective reality.

This view is distinct from the traditional idea of reality having many sides. It goes beyond acknowledging that there are many subjective experiences of the same event or that an individual perspective cannot overcome every subjective bias. It frames objective reality as indeterminate, unstable and 'meaningless', until it is narrated into meaning. For what objective reality could there be outside of narrative if reality is an effect of it?

The parallel rise of cognitive narratology

The high days of postmodernism are behind us, but in an unexpected turn of events, these postmodern legacies are continuing elsewhere. Complicating Lyotard's opposition between narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge, it is now an offshoot of cognitive neuroscience that is providing an unexpected salience to the narrative view of reality.

Cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner, in his groundbreaking article, 'The Narrative Construction of Reality', points to a 'paradigm shift' in or about 1981, when narrative studies merged with cognitive psychology and formed cognitive narratology, becoming 'alive to the possibility of narrative as a form not only of representing but of constituting reality.' (Bruner 1991, 5) And in the last decade, this relatively new area has gained wide currency in cognitive linguistics, evolutionary psychology, cognitive anthropology and neuro-cognitive literary criticism. Narratology, as a field, has expanded dramatically in the last two decades.

Naturally, given the range of subjects, the term narrative casts a wide net around a variety of cognitive processes. But if there is a central line that brings together the pioneering work produced by the cognitive narratologist David Herman (2013), artificial intelligence theorist Roger Schank (Schanks and Morson 1995), and cognitive linguist Mark Turner (1998), it is that they all propose narrative as a fundamental cognitive mode. So in *The Literary Mind* (1997) Mark Turner writes:

the modern mind derives from our remarkable capacity to deploy a cohort of basic mental operations—*story*, *projection*, *blending* and *parable*. (...) Evolutionarily and developmentally, the mental cohort I call *story*, *projection*, *blending* and *parable* precedes the human singularities we know as language, art, music, mathematical and scientific discovery, religion, advanced social cognition, refined tool use, advanced music and dance, fashions of dress, and sign systems. This mental cohort makes our higher-order human behaviours possible, evolutionarily and developmentally. (Turner 1998, 13)

Narrativising, according to Turner, is a basic mental operation that *precedes* high-order cognitive processes, a pre-condition of all cultural expressions. It is something we don't even know we are doing until it is done. So though they begin from different starting points, this narrative model of mind in cognitive narratology converges with certain postmodern models of narrative reality, in so far as they see narrative as all-encompassing. It is a default mode of cognition from which one cannot opt out.

The culture of selfies

Alongside this paradigm, individual life-writing—autobiography, biography, memoir and autofiction—has flourished in the last 30 years. 'Write your life!' publishers encourage us. 'Be the heroine of your own story!' exhorts the personal growth trade. Underpinning the vast industry of life-writing is the credo that the self is constituted in the act of narration through which we emerge as more realised beings.

Such a view is underpinned by faith in individual choice and agency, propping up the myth that we are free to choose our reality by focusing on the facts we most value. This premise steers you to believe that the same level of creativity is required to invent yourself as when you write fiction. As David Lodge wrote after publishing thirteen highly successful novels, "If the self is a fiction, it may perhaps be the supreme fiction." (Lodge 2004, 16) Who could possibly resist such a compelling proposal? The self may be fitful and fragmentary but we can rely on narrative to marshal the pieces into a whole.

The life-writing genre and the two theoretical views—cognitive and postmodern—that I have outlined take as their central premise that reality is never a thing but a process, needing only a click of the narrative kaleidoscope for it to tumble into a whole new arrangement. They are concerned with how the fictional transforms or even constructs the factual rather than calling attention to making distinctions between the narrative process and the objects that it narrates. Broadly speaking all three perspectives, via different routes, arrive at the conclusion that fiction and reality are ultimately indivisible, that reality is subjective and relative, and that there are as many realities as there are voices to express it. This convergence between postmodern epistemology, cognitive narratology and life-writing has led to a doctrine with which we are all familiar: reality is a supreme fiction.

If reality is a fiction, of what relevance is the 'real'?

What this doctrine signally fails to offer is an insight into how we as a society or even as a species manage to share and sustain a reality, across the gaps produced by widely different narratives of ideology, religion, nationality, language and culture. The fictional view of reality accepts that out of the raw material of experience, we might narrate a personal reality, an emotional reality, an economic reality, a racial reality or a gendered reality. We could speak in terms of your reality or my reality. But the possibility that we might share an actual reality, an 'our' reality, is dismissed either as romantic pipe dream or a totalitarian fantasy.

But, despite the doctrine, the version of reality that appears to serve our most pressing need is the one attached to actual events. The 'real' has only increased its cultural purchase this century. Not only is the resurgence of the reality genre a notable trend in popular culture, the rise of documentary films and documentary realism in high-literary writing attest to the reorientation. Joshua Oppenheimer's superb documentaries, *The Act of Killing* (2012) and *The Look of Silence* (2015), Alecky Blythe's groundbreaking musical *London Road* (2011), and this year's Nobel laureate Svetlana Alexievich, all salvage 'true stories' from what has been historically consigned to the desert of the real.

The predominance of the true story or the reality genre has been explained by postmodern rhetoric as an attestation of the hybridity of the way we live now. It was argued that the blurring of reality and fictionality is that which most accurately reflects the hyperreal condition of our digital age. For example, David Shields, in his manifesto *Reality Hunger* (2011) has maintained that the distinction between fiction and reality is an outmoded legacy of nineteenth century realism, which he further attempts to demolish by using unattributed quotations mixed in with his own prose. Since the distinction between fiction and non-fiction is largely imaginary, according to Shields, the most truthful form for this century is that which celebrates the obliteration of the divide.

While his account precisely diagnoses the prevalence of hybridity and situates very clear-sightedly the rise of the true story genre in its relevant context, his reveling in the conflation of the real and the fictional is wanting. For his interpretation fails to recognize the powerful hold that the real, however naively defined, continues to exert. If we really did accept that everything on TV, in film and literature is fiction, whether it is presented as such or not, the reality tag would be made redundant instead of carrying such a premium. The real may be a form of illusion but the desire for it is not.

The insatiable appetite for lived truths that are distinct from fiction deserves to be credited as a more fundamental kind of hunger, requiring more theoretical attention than the dismissal it routinely receives. It is indisputable that many of the current manifestations of the genre—the improbable wish-fulfillments and the emotionally manipulative travesties—do not inspire much confidence in the real. Nevertheless the entertainment industry's exploitation of the desire for the real presses upon us the question why it is that we value the true story genre at all, if it is the case that we believe everything we see is fiction.

What is already clear is that the true story tag establishes a different set of expectations, triggering a line of processing that leads us to gauge the meaning and value of what we see differently. The force of this expectation was acknowledged in what is generally considered to be the first English novel, Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), the subtitle of which openly illustrates Defoe's appropriation of its energy.² The thread continues in literary history ranging from the works of metafiction writers like B.S. Johnson whose *Christie Malry's Own Double-Entry* (1973) plays with readerly expectations to writers of the 'new sincerity' like David Foster Wallace. But when expectations set up by generic categories are dishonoured, readers are usually incensed. An autobiography that is made up will be exposed as 'fake', with legal consequences. Random House, for example, offered refunds to outraged readers when it was revealed that James Frey had fabricated large chunks of *A Million Little Pieces* (2003) because it was sold as a memoir not a novel.

Consistent with reactions to the true story label are markers such as 'authentic', 'genuine' and 'original' all of which have been shown to confer a different level of engagement when assigned to objects of perception. So for example, a study conducted by a team of neuroscientists and art historians in Oxford reveals that when Rembrandt portraits were assigned as either 'authentic' or 'copy', the fMRI images of the subjects' brain showed a different response in the frontopolar cortex (FPC) and right precuneus, regardless of whether the pictures were actually genuine (Huang et al. 2011).

The real, authentic and original are categories that have been rightly problematised. That unmediated access to the 'real' is forever elusive is a theoretical truth universally acknowledged, not only in cognitive and postmodern circles, but by Berger, Barthes, Lacan, Freud and Marx. But regardless of whether a certain perception is real or not, what passes as authentic remains central to our sense-making.

Non-narrative modes of cognition

One could push back against the view that all our sense of reality is narrated into existence from a different angle by asking: is narrative the only, or always the most valuable, mode of cognition? Immediately one can think of cultural practices that refute this view—meditation and mindfulness, modes of cognition that are as old as narrative itself.

Whether within a Buddhist, Taoist, Quaker, Transcendental form, or in various mystical forms, most meditative practices reject narrative as a cognitive mode. They begin with a flat disavowal of all cause and effect thinking, focusing instead on the immediate here and now by actively resisting the temporal frame of the past and the future. They propose a form of cognition that pays attention to the ephemerality of all phenomena. They bring our awareness to the potentially illusory and often

² The subtitle is: The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Of York, Mariner: Who lived Eight and 20 years, all alone in an un-inhabited Island on the Coast of America, near the Mouth of the Great River of Oroonoke; Having been cast on Shore by Shipwreck, wherein all the Men perished but himself. With An Account how he was at last as strangely deliver'd by Pyrates.

harmful nature of erroneous narrative constructions. They reject dramatic reversals, sweeping resolutions, climactic epiphanies. Causality, temporality and spatial linearity are considered equally illusory and have to be relinquished if we are to have any contact with the notion of reality as understood within these various meditative traditions. They renounce narrating an event into meaning and advocate instead that we recognize and accept every event as the reason for itself. To defy the narrative impulse is to acquire a form of being not in time.

Anti-narrative is, of course, not only found in pre-modern Zen monasteries and esoteric Noh dramas. Scepticism towards storyworlds is deeply rooted at the heart of European fiction. Fictional worlds with digressions that do not cohere, amplifications that do not situate events into a relation of causality, deviations that defy spatial linearity are everywhere to be found, from *Tristram Shandy* (1759) to the theatre of the absurd (1950s).

The anti-narrative impulse (or the meta-narrative, as some have seen it) reached a highpoint in modernism, which carves up 'a beginning, a middle and an end', the enduring formula provided by Aristotle. The meaning in modernist texts is not so much narrated as symbolically intuited. Like music, modernist texts conjure up moods and emotions, offer you a chance however transiently to grasp life beyond narrative appearance. The perils of confusing narrative perception with reality are embodied in Beckett's Krapp, who upon hearing himself narrating his life-story as a younger man sweeps the table in a fit of fury at the folly.

This scene is representative of Virginia Woolf's life-long attitude to reality and fiction, as she resisted the idea that reality is story shaped. This worldview found its ultimate expression in *The Waves* (1931), a novel that is a representation of reality but is not a narrative. As she wrote in her diary during the period she was writing it, "I am not trying to tell a story." (Woolf 1981 [1929] vol. 3, 229) Rather what she saw as reality was stated in these terms:

I ... got then to a consciousness of what I call 'reality': a thing I see before me; something abstract; but residing in the downs or sky; beside which nothing matters; in which I shall rest & continue to exist. Reality I call it. And I fancy sometimes that this is the most necessary thing to me: that which I seek. But who knows—once one takes a pen & writes? How difficult not to go on making 'reality' this & that, whereas it is one thing. (Woolf 1981 [1928], vol. 3, 196)

Woolf's view recognizes a reality that exists before and beyond a narrated reality—they are realities that have no relation of causation or even a sense of chronology. It is not an epistemic scepticism within which truth and reality are turned into makeshift products of narration but a suspicion towards the narrative sense-making process itself.

Literary narrative as critique

Those steeped in postmodern and cognitive epistemology insist that reality is an effect of narrative, subjective, relative and provisional. This position does not invest in making ontological distinctions between fictional reality and actual reality but focuses on playing with, challenging and reversing assumptions of easy distinctions between reality and fiction. This attitude has proved rich in art, literature and criticism. In the digital age of virtual reality, this position has currency.

But if the distinction between what is objective and what is constructed, reality and fiction, truth and fictiveness cannot be maintained on any level, what ensues for those whose realities have been systematically suppressed? To put it another way, one can narrate the death of the King and the death of the Queen into a coherent 'The King died, then the Queen died of grief'. But what about 'The King died and then the Queen died of guilt' or 'The King died and then the Queen died in protest' or 'The King and the Queen did not die *at all*'? There is no end to how many versions there can be if there is no fact of the matter to adjudicate between them.

The political implication of accepting narrative as an elementary cognitive mode in these instances is erasure of the social relations that gave the narratives their critical meaning. It is important to appreciate the effect that this stance has on the real lives of those who have been subjected to historic injustice, widespread falsifications and systematic misrepresentations. Persisting in the belief that everything is provisional and biased robs the vital function of literary narrative to provide critique of ruling ideological propaganda, to address and resist manufactured reality, powered and perpetuated by the structurally dominant.

It also conceals levels of human existence on which narrative has no purchase. After all could there be any serious doubt that, *sub specie aeternitatis*, there is plenty in life that cannot be narrated into coherence? Ultimately no meaningful story can be produced for those who have been historically dispossessed.³ There is no redemptive coherence that can be salvaged for the tens of millions of civilians who died, for example in the invasions of Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, East Timor, the Chagos Islands, Iraq, Palestine and Syria, in the last sixty odd years. The occupiers tell a story of the invasions as an extension of freedom and democracy, as part of a narrative of someone's rights and someone's wrongs, but for the disinherited, reality is, to borrow Toni Morrison's epigraph to *Beloved*, a story that cannot be told. The point here is not so much that the perspectives of the invaded have not been narrativised with equal legitimacy as the invaders'. It is that basic facts about the invasions remain obscure in the construction of narrative that passes as official reality.

The crucial step for theorists of literature then is to resist decontextualisation of narrative production into an ahistorical cognitive mode and instead to situate it back in its social context to unmask the lineaments of manufactured reality. If history is our guide, we know that a misrepresentation of the facts, with enough widespread falsifying, leads people to unspeakable atrocities. Throughout history, the social

³ Pain and trauma suffered by the dispossessed have been more often expressed through song, dance, the visual arts and performance as embodied protest. See Hutchinson (2013).

function of literature was to puncture and correct narrative distortions enforced upon people by political authority. The narrative view of reality abandons such a role. So victors of landgrab invasions, Holocaust deniers, Juche philosophers of North Korea and digital narcissists are all legitimised to create highly realised narrative constructs, each narrative locating itself at the centre of its own world, all of them yearning for some relation of causality and temporality to connect its truth to a grander scheme. But who or what will validate the one over the other?

A foundation upon which multiple narratives can flourish

A final example of a 'true story' concludes this essay based on an event that occurred in Staten Island, New York on 17 July in 2014. Forty-three year old Eric Garner, father of six children and grandfather of two, was sitting in front of Tomkinsville beauty supply store around 5 pm, when he was accosted by two plain-clothes policemen who questioned him about selling untaxed cigarettes. In a few minutes backup arrived. Five uniformed NYPD officers joined the scene and at this point, they gathered around to arrest him. Twenty-nine year old Officer Daniel Pantaleo put Garner in a chokehold and the others helped take Garner down on the pavement. During the struggle, Eric Garner died. The arrest was filmed on a camera phone and there is little disagreement as to the facts of the matter. But the storytelling of the events remains polarised and unresolved.

The case went to trial in December 2014. The official investigation into the case placed the facts of Garner's death into storylines about the history of constant crime in the neighbourhood, Garner's medical history of asthma and obesity, and the narrow criterion of legal infringement. Within these narrative frames, the Grand Jury reached the judgment that cleared Officer Daniel Pantaleo and the NYPD of any wrongdoing.

After the verdict, there was a protest in NY and cyber-protests across the world that asserted the NYPD's culpability. These interpretive communities took different storylines. They were the history of police brutality against the black community, the continuing struggle for civil liberty, and ongoing activism for racial justice as part of the social contract. It is also noted that during the arrest, Garner protests his innocence and expresses his frustration about the continuing harassment from the police. 'Every time you see me you mess with me. I am tired of it. Please leave me alone.' he says. He is heard saying when he is put in a chokehold 'I can't breathe I can't breathe'. Officer Pantaleo is innocent in one version, guilty in the other. But what is the truth of the matter?

Of course the truth does not depend on facts alone because the facts of Garner's death are not disputed. What is meant by the truth of the event is something that corresponds to a consensus of what is just and right about murder, policing, the social contract, crime and justice. The truth involves more than the facts.

Equally, when it comes to conflicting narratives such as Eric Garner's, one cannot fall back into the vacuity of agreeing to disagree. The narrative view of reality would argue that facts themselves are 'meaningless' before they are narrativised into meaning. But in cases like this the fact—that Garner was killed in a

chokehold—is unambiguously meaningful, in and of itself, before and beyond any interpretative frame brings meaning to it.

If the versions contradict each other, the reason is not so much because there is an inherent bias in perception or that memory is necessarily selective or that narrative generates its own meaning or that the narrative frame determines the kind of knowledge, though they are all relevant to a point. It is because, as was demonstrated by Faulkner in *As I Lay Dying* or Kurosawa in *Rashomon*, the narratives are self-serving and each has something to hide. The multiple narratives testify to the unreliability of narrative construction rather than a view that asserts there is no objective reality outside of the narration.

In the early days of the postmodernism in the 1980s, there was a high note of optimism among the Left that a narrative view of reality would liberate the suppressed realities of the disinherited, creating a pluralist, rather than a relative, reality. But pluralism assumes equivalence or at least an aspiration towards it. A pluralist reality can only flourish on the foundation of justice for all, not at the expense of it. The truth has to be salvaged. But what will mobilise such a huge undertaking? When faced with narrative differences involving fundamental social conflicts, a shared reality based on an objective epistemology is the only foundation on which to build. A reality salvaged by means of disinterested observation and hyper-vigilance against narrative bias.

Because on issues related to social justice, only facts have the authority to adjudicate between narrative realities. The Garner case continues to be deeply problematic but we might remember that the current discussion would not have begun at all had it not been for the recording on a camera phone. The recording does not provide an unfiltered access to the real but it is an invaluable starting point for resisting narrative abuses. Of course, securing an account of the causal relations between fact and meaning is easy to say and hard to achieve. An objective answer to a socio-political conflict is difficult precisely because it is hard to reach a consensus on the narrative frame that will produce a shared meaning. But the process of trying to establish objectivity has great significance in its own right independent of securing it.

If the notion of narrative as a vehicle for approaching a shared reality has any validity, the shared narrative must be underwritten by a shared truth. It must have some basis on a true story in which we can all have faith. Because unless we approach narrative as a necessary and valuable tool for creating a meaning human reality, the version of reality that dominates will be the one produced by the dominant. Reality may be produced by narrative but is not narrative itself.

References

- Berger, J. (1984). *And our faces, my heart, brief as photos*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Bruner, J. (1991). The narrative construction of reality. *Critical Inquiry*, 18(1), 1–21.
- Forster, E. M. (1927). *Aspects of the novel*. London: Penguin Classics (2005).
- Herman, D. (2013). *Storytelling and the science of mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hodgkinson, T. (2014). How hollywood is killing the art of screenwriting. *The Spectator*.

<http://new.spectator.co.uk/2014/11/how-hollywood-is-killing-the-art-of-screenwriting>.

- Huang, M., Bridge, H., Kemp, M., & Parker, A. J. (2011). Human cortical activity evoked by the assignment of authenticity when viewing works of art. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00134.
- Hutchinson, Y. (2013). *South African performance and archives of memory*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Lodge, D. (2004). *Consciousness and the novel*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schanks, R., & Morson, G. S. (1995). *Tell me a story: Narrative and intelligence*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Shields, D. (2011). *Reality hunger*. London: Penguin.
- Turner, M. (1998). *The literary mind*. Oxford: OUP.
- Woolf, V. (1981). *The diary of Virginia Woolf III 1925–1930* (Ed., Bell, A.O.). London: The Hogarth Press.