

**Conservative Popular Appeals: The Electoral Strategies of Latin
America's Right Parties**

by

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Abstract

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How do elite conservative parties win mass support? Over time, political scientists have been puzzled by this question. In my dissertation, I analyze this question by investigating the strategies conservative parties use to attract these voters. In particular, my research shows that parties can choose from four possible strategies to build mass support: *economic moderation*, *orthogonal appeals*, *grassroots activities*, and *neoliberalism*.

I use machine learning to analyze four right-wing parties in Argentina and Chile and demonstrate that parties have varied in the strategies they chose to attract new voters. To this end, I classify the text of 4800 press releases using topic models with Latent Dirichlet Allocation. This method classifies the topics parties choose to focus on. For instance, it can show if a party has focused on moral values (e.g., abortion, gay marriage) or on economic issues (role of the market, exports promotion). By understanding the topics parties focus on in their press releases, I can analyze which strategies they use to attract poor voters.

The results of the classification show that for example, in Chile, one conservative party, Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), chose to create grassroots activities in poor areas in order to attract the urban poor, while the other conservative party, Renovación Nacional (RN), chose to use orthogonal appeals on the value of democracy and human rights, as well as presenting a moderate economic platform. In Argentina, UCeDe opted to focus on neoliberal appeals to attract both rich and poor voters, while Propuesta Republicana (PRO) decided to moderate its economic appeals.

To explain this variation I argue that the ties of conservative parties to conservative institutions constrain the strategies of conservative parties to expand their electoral coalitions. In particular, I analyze how the ties to the three most relevant

conservative institutions of Latin America's recent history, the Catholic Church, the Military, and business groups, affect the possible strategies of conservative party leaders. This analysis is based on qualitative evidence collected during 18 months of fieldwork in Argentina and Chile. I use an original database of the careers of party officials, as well as in-depth interviews with top conservative party leaders, to trace the ties of conservative institutions to the parties.

I show that these institutions can influence party strategies through two different paths. First, conservative institutions may have *external influence* to the party and threaten to cut valuable resources in case the party chooses not to defend their policy interests. Second, conservative institutions might choose to affect party strategies through the path of *internal influence*. In this path, representatives of the conservative institution occupy key party positions and block policies that may affect the interests of the institution.

My dissertation demonstrates that each party's strategic choices depend on the ties that party leaders have to these three conservative institutions. In the case of RN, the decision of party leaders to use orthogonal appeals as well as limited economic moderation is a consequence of the fact that RN leaders have moderate ties to export-oriented business groups, moderate ties to the Catholic Church, and weak ties to the military. In the case of UDI, its party leaders were able to build strong grassroots activities due to their strong ties to the military and business groups. These ties made it difficult for the party to use strategies of economic moderation or orthogonal appeals. Additionally, the strong ties of UDI to the Catholic Church made it difficult for the party to introduce progressive moral topics to attract new voters.

In Argentina, UCeDe leaders in the 1980s chose a neoliberal strategy due to the strong ties of UCeDe to liberal economic groups. In addition, party leaders had medium ties to the military which made it difficult to use a strategy of orthogonal appeals on Human Rights issues, and the party did not use moral progressive topics in order to avoid an adverse reaction from the Catholic Church. Last, PRO leaders chose a strategy of economic moderation to attract new voters. Different to other parties, PRO was able to implement such a strategy because it had moderate ties to ISI business groups. In addition, the party's moderate ties to the Catholic Church was translated in mixed positions on moral values. PRO's weak ties to the military makes it possible for them to utilize pro-democratic appeals. However, as the party was formed more than 30 years after the transition to democracy, its appeals are less about the role of the military, and more about the defense of republican institutions.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

María Morales has been a local leader at one of the poorest neighborhoods in Santiago de Chile since the 1980s. A former socialist, who even worked in the socialist party campaigns, María says today: “I never again voted for the left and now my daughters and I support the right. We are all now militants of UDI [the most right wing party in Chile] and worked in each of its electoral campaigns. What can I tell you? I changed politically. When I met the leaders of UDI I realized how wrong I was, they showed me that they truly cared for us” (The Clinic, 29 Julio 2013).

Very recently, in November 2015, Mauricio Macri, a businessman with a recently formed right-wing party won the presidency of Argentina. For the first time in Argentina’s history, a conservative party was democratically elected to the presidency. Surprisingly, Macri and his party also won in the province of Buenos Aires, a historical stronghold of the labor-based party and where large numbers of poor voters live.

How do elite conservative parties win the support of the masses? Across regions, social scientists have been puzzled by the fact that disadvantaged citizens often support parties that represent the policy interests of wealthy groups. In the US, poor states in the South have in the last decades supported the Republican Party (Gelman 2009). In recent years, the extreme right in Western Europe has won the support of poor voters in France, Switzerland, and Austria, among others. In India, the upper caste Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has made unexpected inroads with low caste voters (Thachil, 2011).

As María’s story and the 2015 Argentine Presidential elections illustrate, Latin America is not an exception to this trend. However, the literature on Latin American politics has not focused on how conservative parties build ties with low-income citizens. While most recent literature has focused on the emergence of left wing governments (Levitsky and Roberts, 2013; Hunter, 2010; Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, 2010; Baker and Greene, 2011; Flores-Macías, 2010), or on the relationship of orga-

nized popular sectors to labor-based parties (Levitsky, 2003; Burgess and Levitsky, 2003; Hunter, 2010; Roberts, 2006), the relationship between the right and the poor has not been analyzed.¹ Existing literature -and the prevailing wisdom in Latin American countries- suggests that in Latin America poor voters tend to identify only with left-wing parties.

An analysis of the political identification of low-income voters depicts a different picture. As Figure 1.1 shows, the self-identification of low educated citizens² with the right has been relatively high in the last 20 years. Between 30 to 50% of low educated citizens have identified with the right in Latin America. This high level of identification of poor citizens with the right becomes even more striking when compared to the identification of the poor with the left. As Figure 1.1 shows, self-identification with the left varies between 20 and 40%. The similar levels of identification of the poor with both sides of the ideological spectrum in Latin American countries would suggest that not only left-wing, but also conservative parties, are trying to attract low-income citizens.

¹A notable exception is Luna (2010).

²Low educated people correspond to citizens with (at most) complete basic education. The lack of reliable survey responses on income levels makes education levels a more accurate indicator of Latin American social classes (See Handlin (2013) for an in-depth discussion).



Figure 1.1: Ideological Self-Identification of Low Educated Citizens

How do right-wing parties obtain the support of the poor? The main goal of my research is to understand the strategies conservative parties use to attract them.

In order to quantitatively measure the strategies utilized by parties, I classified the text of 4800 right-wing party press releases using topic models with Latent Dirichlet Allocation. My method classifies the topics the press releases choose to focus on. For example, it can show if a party is focused on moral values (e.g., abortion, gay marriage) or on economic issues (role of the market, exports promotion). These topics demonstrate the political strategy used by the party to expand its outreach to voters.

My research shows that parties choose from four possible strategies to build mass

support: a) some parties choose to change their rhetoric on their economic programs to appear more moderate, b) some prefer to prime new cross-cutting cleavages (e.g. appeals based on moral values or human rights), c) others choose to build grassroots organizations in poor areas to create ties with the poor, and d) some decide to focus only on a neoliberal economic program to attract new voters. Interestingly, the variation in strategies is not only found across Latin American countries, but also across parties within a certain country, and even within a particular party over time.

Why do then conservative parties vary in the strategies they utilize to expand their electoral coalitions? Based on a database collected over year and half of field-work and interviews with leading right-wing political figures in Argentina and Chile, I argue that the ties of conservative parties to conservative institutions constrain the strategies of conservative parties to expand their electoral coalitions. In particular, I analyze how the ties to the three most relevant conservative institutions of Latin America in recent history, the Catholic Church, the Military, and business groups, affect the possible strategies of conservative party leaders.

Conservative institutions have two possible paths to constrain conservative parties. First, a conservative institution may have *external influence* to provide resources to the party.³ The threat of the institution to cut such resources may induce conservative parties to avoid certain strategies that affect the interests of conservative institutions. For instance, the Catholic Church may use its mobilization capacity to constrain conservative parties not to use an agenda of progressive moral values, even when those values might be highly approved by large sectors of the population. I call this path as *external influence*.

Second, a conservative institution may constrain conservative parties by having *internal influence* within the party.⁴ In this scenario, the conservative institution has representatives in the party leadership in order to defend its interests. For example, members of Catholic organizations may have a predominant presence within the party's leadership and these members will oppose a move of the party to defend a progressive moral agenda that would threaten the interests of the Catholic Church. I call this path as *internal influence*.

To explain the variation in the strategies parties use to build mass electoral support, my research focuses on four conservative parties across two countries: Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN) in Chile, and Unión de Centro Democrático (UCeDe) and Propuesta Republicana (PRO) in Ar-

³External influence refers to the fact that the conservative institution has external power to the party itself. The institution has a set of resources that makes it powerful per se, not due to its ties to a conservative party.

⁴Internal influence refers to the fact that the conservative institution is powerful within the party.

gentina. Argentina and Chile have been selected for several reasons. First, both countries share similar levels of socioeconomic development and a similar composition of social classes. Second, in both parties, conservative parties faced the challenge of building broad electoral coalitions after the transition to democracy. The authoritarian path to power was not longer available for conservative forces. Third, parties in both countries are anchored in a left-right economic cleavage. Last, conservative parties across Argentina and Chile differ in their internal organization, electoral strength, and social alliances.

1.1 The Logic of Conservative Parties

A large number of political scientists have differed on how to define conservative or right-wing parties. While the term goes back to the French Revolution and the place where the two main factions sat, whether to the left or the right of the President, it has been widely used to refer to a wide array of ideas, concepts, beliefs, and policies.

Academics have used two different definitions to identify right-wing or conservative parties: (Luna and Kaltwasser, 2014, 5-13). First, researchers have focused on an *ideological definition* of conservative parties by identifying a set of ideas or beliefs common to all these parties. This ideological definition has varied over time and region depending on what conservative parties have focused on. For instance, across regions and over time conservative parties have been characterized by economic conservatism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and/or moral conservatism. Even more, in a given time period, a conservative party may be defined by its defense of a minimal state, while another conservative party in another country or region may be defined by its defense of a strong state, for example in support of the military, and law and order. These variation of context and beliefs across regions and over time make an ideological definition less useful for comparative analysis.

Second, researchers have focused on a *sociological definition* of conservative parties. For Latin American conservative parties, Edward Gibson 1996 defines conservative parties as those parties whose core constituencies are the upper social and economic strata of society. In Gibson's words:

What sets conservative parties apart from other parties is the composition of the social coalitions that support them. Stated as a minimal definition, *conservative parties are parties that draw their core constituencies from the upper strata of society...* A party's core constituencies are those sectors of society that are most important to its political agenda and resources. Their importance lies not necessarily in the number of votes they

represent, but in their *influence* on the party's agenda and capacities for political action. (Gibson, 1996, 7)

Following Gibson 1996, in my research I use a sociological definition of conservative parties. Different to the ideological definition, the sociological definition is more suitable for comparative analysis, as it is not dependent on the particular cleavages or ideologies in a given region or country.

1.1.1 Why Do Latin American Conservative Parties Need to Expand?

In his seminal work on conservative parties Gibson states: the study of conservative parties is the study of the construction of polyclassist coalitions (Gibson, 1996, 8). Conservative parties have as their core constituency a minority of the population. In Latin America, “the potential core constituencies of a conservative party would include the owners and managers of major business firms, large landowners, and finance capitalists. They would also, however, include (...) descendants of aristocratic or socially prominent families, rentier groups, and high-income members of the liberal professions” (Gibson, 1996, 12). These groups represented in Latin America, in the year 2000, a minimum of 5% in countries such as Brazil, El Savador, or Mexico, to a maximum around 13% in countries such as Venezuela or Panama (Portes and Hoffman, 2003, 52). Therefore, to succeed in the polls and access executive positions, conservative parties need to expand to other social groups beyond upper sectors of society.

In the past, under restricted democracies Latin American conservative parties did not have the crucial necessity of expanding to other social sectors. In particular, during the last decades of the 19th century and early 20th century, conservative parties were particularly strong: “new elites whose economic power was based in the dynamic export sector came to share political power with landed elites based in more traditional, non-export sectors of the economy” (Collier and Collier, 1991, 101). This period, often referred to as oligarchic, was characterized by restricted democracies based on widespread electoral fraud and restricted suffrage.

However, with the extension of suffrage and the incorporation of labor into the political arena, the political landscape of Latin America changed dramatically (Collier and Collier, 1991). With regards to conservative forces, the incorporation period triggered strong political reactions, and in most cases conservative forces supported either an authoritarian path to reach power, or attempted to build conservative parties to defend their interests. In those countries where the partisan option was preferred (e.g. Chile, Colombia, Venezuela), mobilization over religious issues allowed

these parties to build broad electoral coalitions (Middlebrook, 2000, 11). These parties were a coalition of traditional, oligarchic elite, and a rural base of support absorbed in a clientelistic relationship with the landed elite (Collier and Collier, 1991, 362).

In the 1980s and 1990s, when democracy became the only game in town in Latin America, conservative forces had to abandon the authoritarian option and build (or strengthen) conservative parties to represent their political and economic interests. However, the task of building a broad electoral coalition in the new democratic setting was especially challenging. “In the past, Church-state conflicts frequently offered conservative parties a favorable basis on which to mobilize multiclass support, but for the most part, questions concerning the institutional position of the Catholic Church have long been resolved. Moreover, the influence of liberation theology on contemporary Latin American Catholics, particularly among Church personnel in close contact with the rural and urban poor, makes it more difficult for conservative parties to use religious appeals to bind together a broad-based political coalition, because religious and socioeconomic conservatives no longer overlaps as closely as they once did. These developments, coupled with the transformation of landlord-peasant relations in many Latin American countries as a result of agrarian reform, extensive migration from the countryside to urban areas and foreign countries, and the organizational work of leftist parties, all make it more difficult for conservative parties to mobilize rural electoral support in traditional ways” (Middlebrook, 2000, 27). Building electorally viable conservative parties in contemporary Latin America is, then, a daunting task.

1.2 Which Strategies Do Parties Utilize to Expand Their Electoral Coalitions?

Given that conservative parties have, by definition, only a minority of the population as core constituencies, conservative leaders need to plan a strategy to attract new voters. For Anthony Downs the response to this problem would be that conservative parties need to move towards the ideological position of the median voter in order to win elections (Downs, 1957). If citizens vote according to their economic interest, the median voter in Latin America would not vote for conservative parties. As a consequence, if conservative parties want to attract a majority of the votes they would need to moderate their economic appeals and move towards a more center economic program. My research agrees with Downs, as this is one of the possible strategies that a conservative party may follow. However, unlike Downs’ analysis,

my research shows that this is not the only possible strategy.

The world that Downs presents is an unconstrained world, where actors can choose freely how to change their appeals in order to attract a majority of voters. Even if we would assume that the world is a unidimensional place and that there exist two parties only, as Downs does, party leaders might not have the unconstrained power to move the party's positioning to whatever position might be the most effective for their goals. The literature on political parties has showed extensively how several internal factors constrain party leaders. In particular, Panebianco's (1988) analysis on the internal organization of political parties has showed the importance of party organization to explain how parties may not always follow a Downsian logic.

Similarly, Levitsky's (2003) seminal work on labor-based parties in Latin America has continued this tradition by showing how the characteristics of party organizations, in particular party's rootedness in society as well as the autonomy of party leaders, affect the capacity of a party to adapt to a new socioeconomic environment. Building on the analysis of party organization literature in the advanced industrialized world (Panebianco, 1988; Kitschelt, 1994; Koelble, 1991), Levitsky analyzes how the autonomy of party leaders and the rootedness of a party in society may actually help parties in Latin America to change their policy program, as well as change its organizational characteristics in order to continue having good electoral performance.

My research follows this literature by analyzing how party leaders are constrained in following a strategy that would allow them to build an electoral majority. Therefore, while moving towards the center in the economic arena might be one possible strategy to follow, this strategy is not always available for party leaders. In addition, as we do not live in a unidimensional world, party leaders may choose to bring up new issues to attract new voters. As a consequence, I claim that parties may choose from four possible strategies to attract new voters.

First, following the Downsian logic, political parties may choose to *moderate* their economic appeals in order to attract a broader group of supporters (Downs, 1957; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). In Latin American countries, the main cleavage that divides the ideological position of political parties is an economic-distributive dimension, where parties have distinguishable positions regarding the states role in the economy and the provision of social security (Kitschelt et al. 2010).⁵ In countries

⁵While analysts have contested the salience of a class cleavage in electoral politics in other regions of the world (mainly Western Europe) Clark and Lipset (1991); Inglehart (1981), Collier and Chambers-Ju 2012 suggest that "the contemporary period is a profoundly materialist moment in Latin America. With respect to Latin Americas two macro transitions to democracy and markets, mobilization for democracy has all but ended, and the regime-based cleavage has receded. In contrast, issues of poverty and marketization () are an ongoing, long-term and unfolding material

where the main cleavage is on economic issues, a moderation will entail a change in the party's economic program. In particular, parties that choose to moderate opt for a move to the center in the economic continuum. While this strategy might be attractive for those groups closed to the ideological center, choosing to moderate may entail the risk of losing the support of core voters.

Second, conservative parties may opt to focus on *priming orthogonal appeals* to obtain broad support. This strategy consists of including a new (non-economic) topic in the agenda that would cross-cut social groups. In particular, conservative parties may focus on topics such as democracy, religion, or crime to attract new voters. Interestingly, conservative parties might be even willing to include progressive moral agendas (e.g., gay rights) to obtain greater electoral support. Using orthogonal appeals might have the additional advantage of attracting not only sectors of the lower classes but also some middle-income voters. In addition, this strategy might have the advantage of avoiding alienation from the party's core constituencies if core groups only care about economic policies. However, priming orthogonal cleavages might not be as effective to build broad electoral coalitions when economic interests are highly salient.

Third, parties may choose to maintain their economic program and use right-wing economic appeals to appeal to both core and non-core voters. This strategy, named *neoliberal strategy*, consists on using the party's liberal economic program to convince low-income groups of the benefits of market reforms and neoliberal economic policies. This strategy is characterized by the absence of any of the three previous strategies. It is worth mentioning that the *neoliberal strategy* does not necessarily mean that the party will remain small. In countries where most people see the market and competition as the main mean of progress (e.g. as 'the American dream'), it is likely that a neoliberal strategy will attract broad sectors of society.

Last, conservative parties may choose to continue with their ideological positions while building non-programmatic ties with new voters (Kitschelt, 2000; Luna, 2010). In this strategy, political parties may opt to develop *grassroots activities* in low-income neighborhoods in order to attract the urban poor. In this case party leaders may choose to increase their presence in the poorest areas, while maintaining a programmatic link with their elite core constituencies (Luna, 2010). This strategy may avoid the risk of alienating the party's core voters as the party maintains its ideological position but may entail high organizational investments to be able to have a broad presence in poor neighborhoods.

It is worth mentioning that parties may choose one of these strategies or opt to

issue." The recent rise of the left as a consequence of dissatisfaction with market reforms Baker and Greene (2011); Stokes (2009) confirms the influence of materialist interests in electoral politics.

combine several of them. In addition, parties may vary, over time, in the type of strategy they choose to attract new voters. In order to understand which strategies conservative parties utilize I focus on the ties of party leaders to three key conservative institutions in Latin America: the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups. In particular, I claim that the ties of party leaders to these institutions affects the party's capacity to implement strategies.

1.3 Explaining Party Strategies: the Military, the Catholic Church, and Business Groups

Why do conservative parties in Latin America use different strategies to expand their electoral coalitions? To answer this, I focus on the ties of conservative parties to external conservative institutions. In particular, I focus on the alliances of party leaders with the three most important conservative institutions in the recent history of Latin America: business groups, the military, and the Catholic Church. The ties of conservative leaders to these three actors explain why conservative parties have different strategies to expand to new voters. In this section I explain first how conservative institutions may affect party's strategies on their programmatic appeals, and I then focus on how these institutions may affect their non-programmatic appeals.

Party leaders do not act in a vacuum. Similar to politicians in government, party leaders build alliances with different groups in society: business groups, unions, social movements, and religious institutions. For conservative actors in Latin America three groups have been particularly important throughout the 20th century: the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups.⁶ However, not all conservative parties, and not everyone within conservative parties, have similar alliances with these three actors. Understanding how party leaders are linked to these three groups is central to understand why parties choose to expand differently.

The military, the Catholic Church, and business groups have policy interests that may clash with the strategies of office seeking parties. The interests of business groups may clash with a will of the party to move towards a more moderate economic program. Similarly, the military and the Church may oppose the party's decision to introduce orthogonal appeals that contradict the interests of the institution. Human Rights violations during the previous military regime are of particular importance to

⁶In South America, the military has been the main ally of conservative elites to take labor-based parties or leftists presidents out of power. The Catholic Church has historically pressured conservative politicians to expand its power on topics such as education, moral values, and the separation of Church and state. Last, business groups have had a fluid relationship with conservative elites, supporting conservative candidates over left-wing adversaries.

the military. For the Catholic Church, a central concern are the demands of a more liberal and less religious society that seeks a more progressive agenda on moral values. A priori, none of these three institutions are centrally concerned with the possibility of a party using a strategy of grassroots activities, but as the next subsection will show the ties to these institutions may help conservative parties to build one.

1.3.1 Shaping Policy Positions

The military, the Catholic Church, and business groups may affect party policy positions through two different ways. In the first path, which I call *external path*, an external powerful institution (i.e. the military, the Catholic Church, or business groups), is strong enough to constrain party policy by either threatening to cut fiscal resources that the institution gives to the party, or threat to cut the capacity of the party to mobilize citizens. These threats put pressure on the party to oppose a moderation of the party's program. Depending on the institution, the moderation would be in terms of economic policy (business groups), moral values (Catholic Church), or pro-democratic values (the military). The external path is the upper part of Figure 1.2.

In the second path (seen in the lower part of Figure 1.2), members of the external institution (i.e. the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups) are also leaders in the conservative party. In this path, which I call *internal path*, those party leaders that are also members of the institution oppose policy moderation, because they either do not agree with the policy, or because moderation would put the person in risk. The risk could be either that the person loses their membership in the external institution or losing basic rights, such as freedom. The risk is particularly evident when party leaders who belonged to a military regime risk promoting pro-democratic reforms, such as trials on Human Rights violations, which could place the party leader at risk of going to prison.

Depending on the specific case and institution, the ties to the external institution may influence party policy through one or both paths. In the next subsections I analyze the argument for each of these institutions, and show the expectations in terms of party policy for each of the three conservative institutions.




Figure 1.2: Causal Argument

1.3.1.1 Business

An alliance between conservative leaders and business groups is central to understanding conservative party strategies. Based on the sociological definition of conservative parties, business groups are part of the conservative party core constituencies. My dissertation shows how these core constituencies may influence conservative parties and distinguish two possible paths of influence. In addition, I will show how the *type* of business groups that the party has ties to may affect partisan strategies differently.

Business groups may influence the party through both the *external path* or through the *internal path* (see Figure 3.1). In the first path business groups give conservative parties fiscal resources, normally as campaign contributions. The continuous and generous provision of fiscal resources makes the party dependent on these business groups. As a consequence, business groups may threaten party leaders to cut these resources in case the party decides to implement economic policies that threaten business interests.

In the second path, the conservative party may have business representatives within the party. In these positions, business leaders may internally block policies that may affect business interests. These can be done through two different mechanisms: business leaders may be ideologically against policies that affect business interests, and business leaders may face personal loss in case those policies are implemented.

However, knowing the strength of ties to business groups is not the only useful information needed to understand how party leaders will choose their position in economic topics. To understand this we need to analyze the *type* of business group that a conservative party has ties to. In particular, I distinguish between two different business groups that have different economic interests: Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and export-oriented business groups. While the former may be more open to moderation in certain areas (for instance, greater state intervention), the latter tend to defend open-market neoliberal policies. Therefore, to understand what party leaders will do in economic terms, we need to analyze both the strength of the ties to business groups, as well as their type.




Figure 1.3: Causal Argument for Business Groups

1.3.1.2 Catholic Church

The Catholic Church has been an ally of conservative actors in several moments of the 20th century in Latin America. In the new democratic period, the Church can influence the policy of conservative parties both through the *external influence* and the *internal influence* paths.

In the *external influence path*, the Catholic Church is a strong powerful external institution with the capacity to influence the party's position. An alliance with the Church can provide key resources to the party that can create dependence of the party on the Church.

In particular, the Catholic Church has three resources that are attractive to conservative parties. First, the Catholic Church in Latin America has a widespread presence throughout each country. In particular, the Church has a strong presence in poor neighborhoods, where conservative parties tend to have low levels of presence, if any at all. An alliance between a conservative party and the Church may help the party increase their presence in poor neighborhoods. Second, given the high popularity of religion among Latin American voters and, especially, low-income voters, the public support of the Catholic Church, or some of its members, to a conservative party can positively affect the party's image. Last, the Catholic Church has a strong network of educational institutions which can be a central place for conservative parties to recruit young members. These three benefits may help conservative parties to build mobilizational capacity, especially among young catholic groups and low-income voters.

But this alliance with the Church may incur costs on the conservative party. In particular, the party may become dependent on these resources. As a consequence, if the party needs the Church to continue its mobilization of young or low-income voters, party leaders will be extremely careful of not jeopardizing the alliance with the Catholic Church. This can be translated into an opposition of party leaders to any policy that may affect the interests of the Catholic Church. As chapter 4 shows, after the transition to democracy the Church in Latin America has focused mostly on defending its moral agenda. Therefore, we should expect party leaders with strong ties to the Catholic Church to oppose orthogonal appeals on a progressive moral agenda, opposing for instance divorce laws, gay marriage, abortion, or sexual education in public schools.

In the case of the *internal path*, the party is not constrained by a powerful external Catholic Church, but by the fact that many of the party leaders are also members of Catholic organizations. In its most extreme case, priests or religious authorities are also in control of the party. In its more common case, party leaders belong to catholic or ultra-catholic organizations such as Opus Dei or Legionarios de Cristo. In this

path, these party leaders will oppose a moderation of the party's position on moral values for one or two reasons. First, these party leaders do not personally agree with a reform of the moral values. For instance, party leaders belonging to Opus Dei will most likely oppose abortion rights, not just because the Catholic Church is pressuring the leader (as in the external path), but primarily because of the members' personal beliefs. Second, party leaders who belong to Catholic organizations might also be in risk if they choose to support a moderation of the party's policy on moral values. In particular, the risk could be that the Catholic organizations decides to expel the party leader from its organization. In its most extreme case, a priest that is also a party leader might jeopardize his religious position if he decides to support abortion rights. Figure 1.4 summarizes the argument.

Chapter 4 of this dissertation discusses in greater depth how the Catholic Church constrains conservative party's strategies to attract new voters in Argentina and Chile. Parties may vary in the strength of their ties with the Catholic Church. In addition, the Church may be stronger or weaker in different countries. These two variations will help explain when a conservative party is constrained by the Church and when it is through an *external* or *internal* paths.




Figure 1.4: Causal Argument for the Catholic Church

1.3.1.3 Military

The military in Latin America has also been a central ally for conservative forces throughout the 20th century. In particular, conservative actors and the military have allied in multiple occasions to reach power through military coups. In the new regional democratic landscape, the military is a less relevant political actor, but the ties of party leaders to the previous military regime still largely influence the party's strategies in expanding its electoral coalition.

Once democracy became the only game in town, the military had to adapt to the new landscape, as it could no longer use military coups to defend its interests. As a consequence, the military attempts to influence its main historical allies, the conservative parties, in order to defend its interests. In particular, in the new Latin American democracies, the military is particularly concerned with several issues related to the transition to a new democratic regime, including trials on Human Rights violations during the previous military regime and cuts to military budgets.

The power of the military after the transition to democracy may vary across parties. I argue that depending on the type of transition to democracy (negotiated vs by collapse), the military will have more or less external power to influence conservative parties. In particular, I claim that after a negotiated transition the military is still powerful and legitimate enough to give conservative parties mobilizational and fiscal resources. As a consequence, conservative party leaders may not be willing to risk those resources and will therefore choose to defend the military interests. In this case, the military has *external influence* to affect party strategies (see Figure 1.5). This path is not possible in cases where the transition to democracy was by collapse, as the military has not a strong external power to constrain its allies.

No matter the type of transition, the military can also influence parties through its internal path (see Figure 1.5). In this path, members of the previous military regime are also party leaders of the conservative party. These party leaders may oppose moderation in terms of pro-democratic reforms (e.g. trials on Human Rights violations during the military regime, or cuts to military spending) either because these party leaders do not personally agree with them or because passing those bills will jeopardize them personally. The risk is particularly high in the decision of these party leaders to oppose trials on Human Rights violations during the previous military regimes, as these trials may put these leaders in prison.

In Chapter 5, I explain in greater detail the ties between conservative parties and the military regime. I demonstrate how the ties of conservative parties in Argentina and Chile constrained parties to moderate on a pro-democratic agenda. Parties will vary in the strength of the ties to the military and therefore will vary in their positions on pro-democratic values. In addition, I explain which mechanisms are relevant for

each of the parties I analyze.

To summarize, the alliances of party elites are central to explaining why parties vary in the strategies used to build mass support. The ties that party elites have with the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups are particularly relevant. The ties between party leaders and these three institutions constrain the possibility of conservative parties to moderate or use orthogonal appeals to attract new voters. However, none of these institutions might necessarily oppose the decision of parties to follow a strategy of grassroots activities, as the policy interests of the military, the Catholic Church, or business groups would not be at risk with this strategy. Nevertheless, this strategy is a costly organizational strategy for parties. In the next section I explain how the ties to these institutions may also explain why some parties are able to build grassroots appeals to new voters, while others fail.




Figure 1.5: Causal Argument for the Military during New Democratic Regime

1.3.2 Building Non-Programmatic Appeals

Conservative parties may choose to use a strategy of *grassroots activities* in order to attract new voters. In this strategy, parties maintain their policy positions and in order to attract new voters, choose to create an infrastructure of *grassroots activities* on the ground. This strategy requires parties to build programmatic ties to core voters and non-programmatic ones with non-core voters Luna (2010). To implement this strategy, parties organize a variety of local activities that range from sports events, to cultural activities, to labor training. Through a continuous presence of the party in the neighborhood and a continuous provision of benefits to local citizens, the party builds long-term relationships with its voters (Zarazaga, 2014, 2015).

Unlike strategies that focus on programmatic appeals, such as moderation or priming orthogonal appeals, this strategy allows party leaders to maintain their preferred ideological position. This can be particularly attractive not only to core constituencies, but also to allied conservative institutions, such as the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups. However, building a strategy of grassroots activities requires a substantial organizational investment by the party. Accessing poor neighborhoods and building a continuous presence in these locales is a daunting task for these parties, as conservative parties have historically lacked presence in these neighborhoods.

Nevertheless, the ties of conservative parties to conservative institutions may assist them in creating an embedded partisan organization to implement a strategy of grassroots activities. In particular, the conservative institutions may provide party leaders with central resources for this strategy. To be able to follow this strategy parties need two key resources: access to resources and an embedded organization on the ground. The military and the Catholic Church may have a key role in helping conservative leaders to build an embedded organization on the ground, while business groups may have a central role in providing fiscal resources.

The role of the military in providing resources for a strategy of grassroots activities is central during the previous military regime. In particular, an alliance with the military provides the party with three key resources to build its embedded organization. First, the military can exercise *physical repression* on political activities targeted against the regime or its allies. This could be translated in a weakening of the ties between voters and left-wing or center parties. In Latin America this was especially true as the military weakened the ties between poor citizens and the left.

Second, the military regime controls all the *political appointments* to federal and local offices. Therefore, military leaders have the capacity to appoint political allies to key offices. This provides political allies several benefits, such as visibility and access to state resources. In Latin America, the military has appointed allies to

different key positions, including top executive positions (such as Finance Minister or Foreign Minister), but also on the local or state level. In particular, in some countries the military regime appointed a large number of political allies to mayoral positions in key municipalities. These appointments provide allies with better access to broad parts of the country, particularly in remote poor regions.

Third, the military regime controls the federal budget and can benefit political allies with large fiscal transfers. In particular, political allies will strengthen ties to poor voters if they can control the allocation of *social policy*, such as food stamps, direct transfers, or unemployment benefits. Specially, in difficult economic times these resources are very important for any political figure attempting to build stronger ties to poor populations.

These three resources can help the party to use a strategy of grassroots activities in order to reach to new voters. During the authoritarian period, this embedded organization might not be useful to attract voters, as there are no electoral activities. However, it could help the party in the future democratic regime, as the party's ties to poor citizens may continue after the transition to democracy.

An alliance to the Catholic Church may also help the party establish an embedded organization on the ground, especially when the Catholic Church has a strong mobilizational capacity. The Church has a widespread presence in Latin American countries, with a high presence in poor areas. In fact, in many poor areas the Church possesses a greater presence and legitimacy than the state itself. This presence is particularly attractive for conservative parties, as they have historically found it difficult to increase establish activities in poor neighborhoods.

Last, business groups may be able to provide the second key resource that conservative parties need for deploying grassroots activities: fiscal resources. In order to build a continuous presence on the ground, conservative parties need to invest large amounts of resources to cover the costs of local activities, individual benefits, and partisan offices. Generous campaign contributions by allied business groups may provide the party with ample resources to invest in a strategy of grassroots activities.

In conclusion, following a strategy of grassroots activities can be particularly attractive for conservative parties, as it will not demand a shift in the party's program or alienate the support of its core voters. However, to implement such a strategy, parties need to invest heavily in acquiring fiscal resources and deploy an embedded organization on the ground. This is another reason alliances with conservative institutions can be particularly attractive for conservative parties. While the military and the Church help the party to build an embedded organization on the ground, access to fiscal resources from business groups enable the party to finance grassroots activities.

1.4 Conservative Strategies in Argentina and Chile

To explain why conservative parties have followed different strategies to expand their electoral coalitions, I analyze the conservative parties in Argentina and Chile since the transition to democracy in the 1980s. Argentina and Chile both share a number of sociological and economic factors that make a better case for a more controlled comparison. First, both countries have historically had similar levels of socioeconomic development. Along with Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico, Argentina and Chile are mid-level income countries. Second, both countries have had unstable or exclusionary party systems in the pre-authoritarian period (Kaufman and Stallings (1991)). Third, both countries have had a strong military regime that weakened left-wing parties and their ties to poor voters. Fourth, in both countries, after the transition to democracy, conservative parties have faced the need of expanding their electoral coalition as their core constituencies were a minority in society. Fifth, this case selection allows me to maximize the number of parties to compare (four) while minimizing the number of countries. Both countries have had, since the transition to democracy, two relevant conservative parties in the national arena.

As a consequence, I focus on the four conservative parties of Argentina and Chile since the transition to democracy in 1983 and 1989 respectively. In particular, I analyze the cases of Union de Centro Democrático (UCeDe), Propuesta Republicana (PRO), Renovación Nacional (RN), and Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI). In the following sections I analyze the strategies chosen by each of these parties and I explain how the ties to the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups have affected their choice of strategy.

1.4.1 RN: Orthogonal Appeals and (Limited) Economic Moderation

At the late 1980s, Chile was getting ready for the 1988 plebiscite that would decide under what type of political regime Chileans wanted to live. In 1987, confronted by the increasing strength of leftist and centrist parties, several right-wing forces decided to form a single party that would allow them to maximize their electoral chances. Renovación Nacional (RN) was formed by the union of three main parties: Movimiento de Unión Nacional (led by Andrés Allamand), Frente Nacional del Trabajo (led by Sergio Onofre Jarpa), and Unión Democrática Independiente (led by Jaime Guzmán).

However, soon after its formation, rivalries between the three groups emerged.

Disagreements about the first internal elections ended up with a strong confrontation between those belonging to UDI and the other two groups. This confrontation would rapidly end with the expulsion of Jaime Guzmán, and the decision by Guzmán and his followers to run UDI as an autonomous party in 1988. However, this decision did not end with the internal divisions within RN, specially between Jarpa and Allamand.

From the beginning, RN brought together a seemingly unholy alliance of young right-wing modernizers, such as Allamand, and old-guard, nationalistic and conservative *caudillos*, many of them former members of Partido Nacional⁷ (Pollack, 1999, 111-5). Jarpa represented this second group of hardliners and politically traditional sectors. They were more tightly linked to the military regime (Jarpa himself had been Interior Minister during the military government), and represented the anti-left old guard that strongly opposed Allende's government in the 1970s. Allamand, on the other hand, represented a group of young professionals with little or no formal political experience, strongly identified with the economic (but not the political) legacy of the military regime. This group sought to build a new conservative party that would defend the neoliberal program implemented by Pinochet, but with a strong commitment to the democratic regime. This tendency, known as *Patrilla Juvenil*⁸ would defeat Jarpa's group in the party's Third General Council in Valparaiso in August 1990. The conflicts between the two groups, however, would not end then.⁹

Allamand presided over the party during the 1990s and was able to provide RN with a modernized image. In particular, RN was concerned -and it still is¹⁰- with the necessity of capturing new voters: "most notably small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, employees, teachers, and the self-employed" (Pollack, 1999, 135). Allamand acknowledged the need to compete for the same vote as the Christian Democrats and argued that the party would never be in a position to win an electoral majority unless it was able to capture that center ground, especially given that repeated polls indicated that most voters defined themselves as such (Pollack, 1999, 136).

The decision of Allamand to capture new voters was translated as a combination of two strategies: orthogonal appeals and (some) economic moderation. Renovación

⁷Partido Nacional was a party formed in 1966 as a result of the union of the two traditional parties *Partido Conservador*, *Partido Liberal*, and *Partido de Acción Nacional*. It was the first time in Chilean history where conservative actors created a unified conservative party.

⁸Other important members of this group were Sebastian Pinera, Alberto Espina, and Evelyn Matthei (who abandoned RN in 1999 to join UDI).

⁹Jarpa himself would resign to RN in July 1997, due to the continuous antagonism with the younger members of the party (Pollack, 1999, 112).

¹⁰In the 2013 primary election Allamand attempted to attract the moderate sectors of the political center of Chilean politics (CNNChile, 29 June 2013).

Nacional leveraged its pro democratic and pro Human Rights positions as an orthogonal appeal. In particular, RN focused on three main topics: civil-military relations, violation of human rights, and constitutional reform.

It's important to note that RN, at the beginning of the new democratic period, defended the role of the military coup, and its leaders publicly recognized their admiration to Pinochet and the authoritarian years. RN also strongly condemned parties that opted to criticize the military regime. However, unlike UDI, RN opted to support a more limited role of the military in the new democratic regime. In contrast to UDI, RN did not justify the violations of human rights, nor did the party state that there is a hierarchy of rights and that it is justifiable to violate certain rights (Pollack, 1999, 145). On the contrary, RN recognized the importance of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a framework to limit the excesses of state power and abuse (Pollack, 1999, 147).

Additionally, Renovación Nacional presented a more progressive moral agenda than other conservative parties in the region. The contrast is particularly evident when compared to the conservative positions of the other conservative party in Chile. RN leaders have been supportive in the last years of a more progressive discourse on topics such as gay rights and sexual education. However, as chapter 4 will show, the party has continued to strongly oppose any law that would permit abortion rights.

Last, the party has shown moderation in some areas of its economic program. In particular, the party has focused parts of its public rhetoric on a defense of the public sector. In particular, the party has defended the rights of public employees in areas such as education or health. This economic moderation is seen as an attempt of the party to move towards the center in economic issues in order to attract greater sectors of the population. This, again, differs strongly with the consistently right-wing economic position of the other Chilean right wing party.

In summary, at the beginning of the democratic period RN has chosen a strategy of orthogonal appeals to attract new voters. This strategy focused on a more pro-democratic position, especially on Human Rights issues, as well as on a more progressive moral agenda. As my theory suggests, the ties of the party to conservative institutions explain why RN opted for this strategy.

Figure 1.6 shows the strength of the ties of the leaders of Renovación Nacional with the three conservative institutions, as well as the expected outcomes. Since its formation, Renovación Nacional has had weak ties to the Military. Within RN only one faction of the party had direct participation in the previous military regime, and this faction lost power vis-à-vis the more liberal faction of Andrés Allamand. Second, the party has been split in terms of its ties to the Catholic Church. While one section of the party has had weak ties to Catholic organizations, others are strongly tied to it. As a consequence, my theory would predict that when the party is governed by those

who have no ties to the Church the party then will have a more progressive moral agenda. Alternatively, we could see that, in order to maintain a harmony between the two groups, RN will have a contradictory position regarding moral values, with some progressive demands and a defense to some conservative values. Last, the party has had moderate ties with business groups. In particular, the party has a strong presence of business representatives within the party, especially related to export-oriented business groups, but has lower levels of support from business groups in the form of campaign contributions.




Figure 1.6: RN Ties to Conservative Institutions and Expected Outcome

1.4.2 UDI: Grassroots Activities With the Urban Poor

Union Demócrata Independiente (UDI) was created in 1983 by the closest collaborators of Pinochet's military regime. The party's founder, Jaime Guzmán, was one of the minds behind Pinochet's doctrine. He was the leader of *gramialismo*, a conservative political movement that recruited a large number of young students at Universidad Católica de Chile. Guzmán was a fierce anti-Marxist, nationalist, and economic liberal. He was the architect of the 1980 Constitution and the person in charge of building a party that would defend the legacies of the military dictatorship in a future democratic regime.

The newly formed UDI was created with the goal of becoming a new type of conservative party, different from the traditional Chilean right-wing parties, such as Partido Conservador, Partido Liberal, and Partido Nacional. In particular, UDI's leaders were convinced of the necessity of forming a party with three main pillars: a party that would strongly defend freedom, particularly in economic terms, a party

inspired by catholicism, but that would not be a catholic party per se, and a popular party, that would cross-cut the different social classes to represent upper and lower sectors of society.

The first two pillars were translated into a rigid economic and social party program. UDI has been the most systematic defender of Chile's neoliberal economic system. Luna's (2010, 339) analysis of available roll-call voting shows that UDI has been the most important defender of market-oriented reforms - even more than RN. This defense has also been systematically present in party documents, speeches, and electoral campaigns since the transition to democracy. The catholic component of UDI has also always been present. UDI leaders strengthen the importance of defending family values, pro-life positions, and human dignity. In addition, UDI has close links to the conservative Catholic movement *Opus Dei*. More than 2000 UDI members and more than 15,000 sympathizers belong to *Opus Dei* (Pollack, 1999, 117). In addition, two of the most important UDI leaders - Joaquín Lavín and Jovino Novoa - are also members of *Opus Dei*, and the vast majority of party leaders were recruited from Universidad Católica de Chile. The catholicism of party leaders has been translated into a rigid morally conservative program that has been maintained since the party's formation in the mid 1980s.

The third pillar, the goal of building a "popular" party, has been the central path through which UDI has expanded its electoral base. UDI followed a strategy of *grassroots activities* that allowed them to attract the urban poor with non programmatic appeals. As Luna (2010) explains, the party segmented its linkages to voters by creating programmatic linkages with the upper sectors of society, and clientelistic linkages with low-income voters.

UDI's *grassroots activities* strategy can be explained by the ties of the party to the Catholic Church, the military, and business groups. From all the parties in my study, UDI is the party with the strongest linkages to the three conservative institutions. While the party has no institutional linkage to the Church, most of the party leaders were recruited from catholic organizations and many of them have strong personal ties to ultra catholic organizations such as Opus Dei. In addition, many of the leaders of UDI were active participants during the previous military regime, and were strongly devoted to Pinochet and his regime. Last, as Luna (2010) shows, the party has had the strongest ties to business groups among the two Chilean right-wing parties. Figure 1.7 shows the ties of UDI to the three conservative institutions as well as the expected outcome.

The ties of UDI leaders to the previous military regime also help explain how the party has been able to deploy a strategy of grassroots activities. To implement grassroots activities, UDI has built a strong partisan presence of in the *poblaciones* since the 1980s. To this end, the military regime appointed several *gremialistas* as




Figure 1.7: UDI Ties to Conservative Institutions and Expected Outcome

designated mayors in several Chilean cities, including Santiago, Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, and Concepción. The military regime decided to substantially increase local government budgets and administrative power, justifying this process with the need to disarticulate the brokerage networks that had dominated the local level before the coup (Klein, 2004, 306). As Klein (2004, 306) explains, between 1979 and 1983 alone, the municipal budgets quadrupled. In particular, the military regime transferred large amounts of social funds to Mayors. The distribution of housing, family subsidies, and unemployment benefits among the urban poor allowed *gremialistas* to build little by little their own network of clientelism. Even if some of this social programs were seen by *pobladores* as “miserable,” the acute economic situation of the early 1980s implied that these benefits were the main income of large parts of the population. In 1983, around 15% of the economically active population was receiving an unemployment scheme by the government. These social benefits, together with the violent persecution of organizations that had traditionally been present in Chilean slums, Socialists, Communists, and Christian Democrats, allowed *gremialistas* to build strong clientelistic linkages with the urban poor.

With the transition to democracy and the constitutional reform that democra-

tized the election of local mayors, UDI slightly re-adapted its strategy. While UDI leaders continued to build clientelistic linkages with the urban poor, they modified the way the party funded its clientelistic network. If in the past *gremialistas* used public resources to discretely target voters, after the transition to democracy they resorted to private funds to continue their clientelistic tradition (Luna, 2010).

Additionally, the strength of the ties between UDI leaders to the Catholic Church has made it difficult for the party to implement a strategy of orthogonal appeals on a morally progressive agenda. Similarly, the strength of ties between UDI leaders and business groups makes economic moderation unlikely. UDI has a strong presence of business leaders within the party, but, more importantly, UDI receives a large amount of resources in campaign contributions, which has helped the party to maintain its strategy of grassroots organizations.

1.4.3 UCeDe: Neoliberal Strategy

With the collapse of the military regime in 1983, conservative actors in Argentina lacked a political party that would uniquely represent their interest. In fact, several small provincial parties would compete to be the party that would successfully claim the upper-sectors of society as its core constituency (Gibson, 1996, 103). The result of this competition was the triumph of UCeDe, and its founder Alvaro Alsogaray. UCeDe became in the 1980s the most important conservative party, and the third most important party after Peronists and Radicals.¹¹

On June 21, 1982, only a week after the Falklands defeat, Alvaro Alsogaray announced the formation of a new conservative party with a program centered on liberal ideas. The military defeat implied the end of the military regime, and liberals aligned with Alsogaray quickly realized the need of building a political party to compete in the upcoming elections. UCeDe was formed with the support of former liberal leaders, intellectuals, businessmen, technocrats, and young activists.

Since its formation, Alvaro Alsogaray strongly criticized the military regime, not in terms of human rights violations, but in terms of the incapacity of the economic technocrats to implement a liberal economic system during the authoritarian regime. Alsogaray, a person trained in military institutions but with no previous political position in the *Proceso*, supported the role of the military in neutralizing the “subversive uprisings” and in ending the political chaos that existed until 1976 (Gibson, 1996, 107). His main critiques of the military regime were on economic terms. Alsogaray blamed the technocrats in the military regime for leading Argentina to high levels of

¹¹It should be noted that even if UCeDe was the third most important party in Argentina in the 1980s, Peronists and Radicals still retained the majority of the votes, representing a clear case of a bipartisan system.

debt, high inflation, and a severe recession. In particular, Alsogaray accused these technocrats for not ending with the “pernicious system” of statism, interventionism, and developmentalism (Alsogaray, 1983).

Alsogaray spent most of his political and technocratic life defending the role of free markets and fighting for the elimination of any state intervention in the economic realm. As Gibson (1996, 109) explains, “he was obsessively single-minded in that goal.” For this reason, Alsogaray focused on making UCeDe as the main defender of liberalism in Argentina. The party’s *Declaración de Principios* started with a strong critique of the “statist, interventionist, and dirigist regime that prevailed - with slight modifications- since 1943-45” (UCeDe, 1983, 1). UCeDe was founded to “fight against this economic system” and to “restore republican and liberal values.” The party program especially emphasized the need of protecting individual rights, freedoms, and private property. The party promoted the privatization of public companies, the elimination of regulations and bureaucratic rules that would intercede against private initiatives, and a drastic reduction of state interventions. This pure liberal economic program was the central component of UCeDe and the main tool to attract supporters.

The emphasis on liberalism was vital for the party to consolidate the support of its core constituencies. The laissez-faire criticism of the new Radical government’s economic policies allowed the party to increase its vote share and its representation in the House of Representatives. However, this strategy had its limits. As some of UCeDe leaders noticed, several sectors of society were not attracted by this economic program. Manuel Mora y Araujo, former candidate of UCeDe to the House of Representatives and prominent intellectual, explained this difficulty:

“The upper classes are liberal because they tend to be more cultured -I would say, more educated. Political and ideological proposals with great philosophical consistency (and this is the case for both liberalism and Marxism) appeal to sectors with high levels of education. For them to spread to lower social sectors *political mediators* are needed, something liberalism, to this date, has not possessed... These sectors, as they do not read too many books... will accept these ideas to the degree that they feel they address their problems, their concerns. This will take place not through autonomous reasoning, but through a process of social communication” (cited in Gibson 1996, 154).

To attract new voters UCeDe leaders attempted to do this by taking the liberal messages to neighborhoods of non-core voters. The main person within UCeDe appealing to non-core constituencies was a young councilwoman from the City of

Buenos Aires: Adelina Dalesio de Viola. She was seen as the “populist” and “unrefined” adversary of UCeDe’s elitist old-guard (Gibson, 1996, 154). Adelina de Viola constantly insisted on the need of broadening the party’s base of support. “As part of this, she encouraged the adoption of popular styles of mobilization, fostered the entry and growth of youth and university movements in the party, sponsored seminars for ‘liberal women,’ and played a key role in the translation of the party’s cerebral message into language and themes aimed at reaching the middle and lower classes” (Gibson, 1996, 154). During her campaign to get a seat in the House of Representatives, Adelina de Viola established a strong presence throughout the city’s poorer neighborhoods. This included opening UCeDe offices and spreading the values of economic liberalism to the urban poor. She constantly used populist appeals and referred to “our” neighborhood when visiting the poorer neighborhoods throughout Buenos Aires. She wanted to show that she was “one of them” and avoid the elitist image of other members of UCeDe, especially Alsogaray.

In summary, UCeDe had used a neoliberal strategy to attract new voters until the party’s dissolution in the 1990s.¹² Neither Alsogaray, nor other leaders as Adelina de Viola opted for a strategy of moderation to expand the party’s base of support. Neither did the party use a strategy of grassroots organizations to appeal to the poor, or chose an orthogonal appeal to cross-cut social classes. On the contrary, to appeal to other sectors of the electorate, part of the party opted for keeping the liberal economic program but slightly adapting its language, by introducing more populist appeals.

The focus of UCeDe on a neoliberal strategy can be explained by the ties of the party to the Catholic Church, the military, and the business groups. Figure 1.8 shows the ties of UCeDe to the three conservative institutions. UCeDe leaders had strong ties to business groups. UCeDe was composed by mostly businessmen and businesswomen, all coming from a strong liberal tradition. Alsogaray was one of the most well-connected conservative leaders. He had strong relationships to the economic elite and his appointments in previous governments had always been seen as a signal to restore confidence in the business community. In addition, several businessmen and women joined the party and became deeply involved in its activities. With regards to the Catholic Church, UCeDe has a liberal position that contradicted many of the demands of the Church. However, as chapter 4 shows, the mobilizational capacity of the Church in Argentina convinced UCeDe leaders not to oppose the interests of the Church. Finally, UCeDe had strong ties to the military. Even if Alsogaray had

¹²In the 1990s the UCeDe was close to President Menem, as several of UCeDe members had top positions in Menem’s government. Also, UCeDe backed Menem for the re-election in 1995. After that the party practically disappeared.

been one of the few liberal leaders not involved in the military regime, his personal beliefs on the role of the military, his personal history, and the involvement of other members of the party explain why UCeDe did not adopt a strategy of orthogonal appeals that would emphasize democratic values.




Figure 1.8: UCeDe Ties to Conservative Institutions and Expected Outcome

1.4.4 PRO: economic moderation

Propuesta Republicana (PRO) is the first conservative party in Argentina to elect a president in a democratic election. PRO is a newly formed party. In 2003, Mauricio Macri, a businessman and former president of one of the most important soccer teams in Argentina -*Boca Juniors*-, started his political career in the City of Buenos Aires. To this end, he decided to form his own party to compete in the 2003 elections for Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires. First called *Compromiso para el Cambio*, the party had the support of different political traditions (i.e. several small conservative parties, former Radicales, and Peronists). In his first election, Macri won the first round with 37% of the votes, against a center-left coalition led by the incumbent Aníbal Ibarra. Ibarra got elected in the second round, but *Compromiso para el Cambio* was able to obtain five seats in the House of Representatives. However, given the internal diversity of the party's candidates, only two of them remained in the party, and the other three decided to move to the Peronist caucus.

In 2005, Macri's *Compromiso para el Cambio* formed an alliance with the right-wing leader of *Recrear para el Crecimiento*: Ricardo López Murphy. Under the name of *PRO* the new alliance won the first place in the City of Buenos Aires with 33.9% of the votes, and around 8% in the Province of Buenos Aires. Macri himself was

elected to the House, while he was focusing on the upcoming 2007 election, where he would become Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires.

Since the beginning, and as one of the main conservative leaders of PRO noticed, the party decided to use a strategy of economic moderation to attract new voters:

“PRO is defined as a party of power. Reality is only transformed by obtaining top political positions. To this end, we knew we needed to get 50% + 1 of the votes in the City of Buenos Aires. But how were we going to do that? Well, not with ideology, and especially not with an ideology that would increase the right-wing image of a rich businessman as Macri. For that reason, from the beginning we opted for policies that would not convey a right-wing image. We want the state to promote private initiatives, but not in a way that creates opposition by public to the private sector. We think the private sector works better, but we do not privatize. We adapted a very centrist program. And when we moved to the center PRO started representing the middle-classes (...) From the beginning we focused on moderation. Macri was seen as the right, so his first team was full of left-wing people. We even hired a left-wing person to write his speeches” (National Senator and co-founder of PRO, personal interview 2013).

The decision of PRO leaders to moderate its economic program can also be explained by the ties of its leaders to the three main conservative institutions. Figure 1.9 shows the ties of PRO leaders to business groups, the military, and the Catholic Church. From all the parties in my study PRO is the one with the weakest ties to the military. The vast majority of PRO leaders do not have ties to the previous military regime. This lack of ties allows the party to use orthogonal appeals based on the value of democracy. However, as PRO emerged 20 years after the transition to democracy, the democratic-authoritarian cleavage has been less salient. Regarding the Catholic Church, PRO has within the party some members that are very connected to Catholic organizations, while others that define themselves as atheist or with an affiliation to a non-Catholic religion. These dual ties created tensions within the party about the possibility of supporting morally progressive issues. Last, PRO has strong ties to business groups. Macri himself devoted his career to business activities, as well as most of the other PRO leaders. However, in order to understand how the ties of business groups constrain party’s economic position we need to analyze the *type* of business group they are tied to. In the case of PRO, business leaders with ties to the party come from ISI business groups, which are more prone to a less open economy. This differs strongly with the ties of Chilean parties to export-oriented business groups.




Figure 1.9: PRO Ties to Conservative Institutions and Expected Outcome

1.5 Methods

To explain how conservative parties obtain mass support I use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. I apply machine learning techniques to a large corpus of documents in order to understand the strategies used by each political party. Then I use the data collected during 18 months of fieldwork in Latin America to understand how the ties of conservative parties affect party strategies.

To measure party's strategies from press releases I use machine learning techniques to classify a corpus of more than 4800 party press releases. In particular, I use topic models with Latent Dirichlet Allocation to discover the main topics that conservative parties have used to attract low-income voters. Party press releases were collected by scraping party's websites.

Automated text analysis provides some solutions to the shortcomings of manual coding. First, automated text analysis permits a fast analysis of a large volume of documents. Unlike manual coding, computational techniques require very little time to analyze thousands of documents. With the expansion of the available information through social media and party websites, automated techniques become an essential technique in order to provide a complete picture of party activities. Second, unsupervised automated text models (as Topic Models) do not require the researcher to create a codebook with pre-determined categories of topics. Third, the reliability problem of manual coding is solved as computers will always code the same document in the same way. Fourth, automated text analysis can easily be reproduced allowing greater transparency and future expansions of my work.

I combine the automated-text analysis with qualitative evidence on party strate-

gies collected through in-depth interviews to party leaders, as well as party documents such as party programs, leaders speeches, party's meetings conclusions. In many cases topic models allow me to confirm my qualitative findings, while in others it allows me to discover new topics.

I complement the quantitative findings of my research with in-depth qualitative analysis. First, during my fieldwork I compiled an original database of the social backgrounds of party leaders and candidates since the 1980s. This database traces the social connections of individuals to the Church, the previous military regime, and business groups. This database, as well as in-depth interviews with party leaders, experts, opposition leaders, and party members, allows me to conduct process tracing on how conservative institutions affect party's strategies to attract new voters.

1.6 Conclusion

This dissertation analyzes why conservative parties in Argentina and Chile vary in the strategies they use to expand to new voters. In particular, parties have chosen from four possible strategies: economic moderation, priming orthogonal appeals, building grassroots organizations, and implementing a neoliberal strategy.

To explain this variation, I analyze the strategies by four conservative parties in Argentina and Chile since the transition to democracy in the 1980s. For Argentina I analyze the cases of UCeDe and PRO, and for Chile I analyze the cases of Renovación Nacional and Unión Democrática Independiente. These four parties have varied in the strategies they used, some focusing on one strategy, and some combining more than one strategy.

In order to explain the variation across parties, I claim that the ties of conservative parties to conservative institutions affect the strategies that party leaders will use to appeal to new voters. In particular, I analyze the ties of conservative parties to the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups. Additionally, I distinguish between two possible mechanisms through which conservative institutions may influence party strategies. First, conservative institutions may have *external influence* by providing central resources to the party. This provision may create dependency of the party to the conservative institution. As a consequence, conservative institutions may threaten party leaders to cut those resources in order to avoid policies that will harm the interests of the conservative institution. Second, conservative institutions may have representatives as party leaders. In this mechanism, conservative institutions exercise *internal influence*. These leaders may be ideologically against policies that may affect the interests of conservative institutions, and these leaders may suffer

personal loss when those policies are implemented. As a consequence, these party leaders will block such policies from within the party.

In the next chapter I analyze the dependent variable of this dissertation: the strategies that conservative parties have used to attract new voters. To measure these strategies I combine qualitative and quantitative evidence. In particular, I use machine learning to analyze the content of party press releases. I combine the results from this analysis with historical evidence as well as qualitative evidence gathered in in-depth interviews with party leaders in both Argentina and Chile. Then I analyze how conservative institutions affect party's strategies. Chapter 3 focuses on the ties of conservative parties to business groups. Chapter 4 analyzes the ties between the Catholic Church and conservative parties, and Chapter 5 focuses on the ties to the military. Each of these chapters contains both a theoretical and empirical analysis of how the ties shape party strategies. In the Conclusion Chapter I summarize the findings of this dissertation and analyze how the argument can be expanded to other parties.

Chapter 2

Electoral Strategies

Since the transition to democracy conservative parties in Latin America have used a variety of electoral strategies to attract new voters. This chapter explains the possible strategies that conservative parties. In addition, I measure partisan strategies using a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis. First, I use machine learning algorithms to understand what conservative party's press releases are focusin on. In particular, I classify the text of 4800 right-wing party press releases using topic models with Latent Dirichlet Allocation. Additionally, I combine the evidence collected in 18 months of fieldwork to understand the strategies parties have used for those years where press releases are not available. Last, this chapter presents the strategies used for the four conservative parties in Argentina and Chile since the transition to democracy.

2.1 What Strategies can Conservative Parties Use?

Conservative parties in Latin America have followed different strategies to expand their electoral coalitions. First, political parties may choose to *moderate* their economic appeals in order to attract a broader group of supporters (Downs, 1957; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). In Latin American countries, the main cleavage that divides the ideological position of political parties in Latin America is an economic-distributive dimension, where parties have distinguishable positions regarding the states role in the economy and the provision of social security (Kitschelt et al. 2010).¹ In countries where the main cleavage is on economic issues, a moderation will entail

¹While analysts have contested the salience of a class cleavage in electoral politics in other regions of the world (mainly Western Europe) Clark and Lipset (1991); Inglehart (1981) Collier and

a change in the party's economic discourse. In particular, parties that choose to moderate opt for a move to the center in the economic continuum. While this strategy might be attractive for those groups closed to the ideological center, choosing to moderate may entail the risk of losing the support of core voters.

Second, conservative parties may opt to focus on *priming orthogonal appeals* to obtain broad support. This strategy consists of including a new (non economic) topic in the agenda that would cross-cut social groups. In particular, conservative parties may focus on topics such as democracy, religion, or crime to attract new voters. Interestingly, conservative parties might be even willing to include progressive moral agendas (e.g., gay rights) to obtain greater electoral support. Using orthogonal appeals might have the additional advantage of attracting not only sectors of the lower classes but also some middle-income voters. In addition, this strategy might have the advantage of avoiding alienation from the party's core constituencies. However, priming orthogonal cleavages might not be as effective to build broad electoral coalitions when economic interests are highly salient.

Third, political parties may opt to have *grassroots activities* in low-income neighborhoods in order to attract the urban poor. In this case party leaders may choose to increase their presence in the poorest areas, while maintaining a programmatic link with their elite core constituencies (Luna, 2010). This strategy may avoid the risk of alienating the party's core voters as the party maintains its ideological position but may entail high organizational investments to be able to have a broad presence in poor neighborhoods.

Last, parties may choose to maintain their economic program and use right-wing economic appeals to appeal to both core and non-core voters. This strategy, named *neoliberal strategy*, consists on using the party's liberal economic program to convince low-income groups of the benefits of market reforms and neoliberal economic policies. This strategy is characterized by the absence of any of the three previous strategies. It is worth mentioning that the *neoliberal strategy* does not necessarily mean that the party will remain small. In countries where most people see the market and competition as the main mean of progress (e.g. as 'the american dream'), it is likely that a neoliberal strategy will attract broad sectors of society.

Chambers-Ju 2012 suggest that "the contemporary period is a profoundly materialist moment in Latin America. With respect to Latin America's two macro transitions to democracy and markets, mobilization for democracy has all but ended, and the regime-based cleavage has receded. In contrast, issues of poverty and marketization () are an ongoing, long-term and unfolding material issue." The recent rise of the left as a consequence of dissatisfaction with market reforms Baker and Greene (2011); Stokes (2009) confirms the influence of materialist interests in electoral politics.

2.2 Measurement

To understand the strategies political parties use to attract new voters I analyze party documents content. In particular, to measure party strategies I look at party positioning in economic topics (to see whether the party is moderating or continuing with a right-wing economic program), whether the party focuses on orthogonal appeals, and whether the party organizes activities on the ground. If a party is focusing its economic appeals on centrist economic policies (e.g. more role of the state in the economy than the market) I code that party as using a strategy of *moderation*. If a party is introducing non-economic topics that cross-cut the economic cleavage (e.g. religion, moral values, nationalism, democracy) I code the party as using a strategy of *orthogonal appeals*, and when a party has broad activities at the local level I code that party as using a strategy of *grassroots activities*. In order to code a party as using a *neoliberal strategy* a party has to have a right-wing economic program and does not organize grassroots activities nor does it introduce orthogonal appeals.

Different from approaches that focus on party leaders' views, I focus on party documents to infer party's positioning and party activities. Focusing on party leaders speeches, interviews, or social media has some weaknesses. First, it is difficult to know which leaders (and when) speak in the name of the party. Are all leaders representative of the party views? Should we focus only on the party president? Is the party president always speaking on the name of the party? Second, the data on party leaders might vary widely across parties. Some party leaders may be interviewed widely while others very rarely. In addition, most politicians' speeches² are hardly saved and they are not compiled for Latin American political figures.

Therefore, I focus only on official party publications produced by the national party organization. Similar to the Party Manifesto Project, I aim to measure parties' policy preferences from party documents. However, in Latin America, different than Europe, party programs are not regularly updated and they have less information about the party's actual preferences. For most parties in my study party programs were drafted when the party was formed and, at most, updated once.

As a consequence, I choose to analyze party press releases. Party press releases are official reports of the party's opinions or activities. On average, conservative parties in Argentina and Chile produce two press releases a day. This granularity allows researchers to have a very accurate picture of each party's activities and opinions.

²In Argentina and Chile speeches are only kept for the country's President or speeches given during legislative debates.

2.2.1 Methods

To measure party's strategies from press releases I use machine learning techniques to classify a corpus of more than 4800 documents. In particular, I use topic models with Latent Dirichlet Allocation to discover the main topics that conservative parties have used to attract low-income voters.

The use of text mining and machine learning methods enables researchers to overcome several pitfalls of traditional qualitative analysis on political parties documents. Qualitative methods usually consist on manually reading documents and coding their content according to a pre-determined codebook. This approach has produced numerous contributions to our understanding of political phenomena (e.g. Policy Agendas and Congressional Bills projects in American Politics, and the Comparative Manifesto Project in comparative politics), and it has the main advantage that human coders are particularly good at interpreting complex text and mapping words into a set of categories. However, this approach presents some shortcomings. First, manual coding requires abundant human resources to analyze a large number of documents. This approach can be expensive, particularly if we need to manually read through thousands of documents. Second, manual coding may have a reliability problem, as different persons may use different criteria when coding the same document. While this approach can be solved by having multiple persons coding the same document, this solution imposes even more costs on human resources. Third, and most importantly, manual coding requires the researcher to pre-determined the topics of interest. The researcher creates a codebook that will be used by human coders with a number of predefined topics. Building this codebook requires expert subject knowledge and substantial human time. This approach imposes the constraint that researchers have to know the topics of the corpus beforehand, which might introduce the researcher's bias. As a consequence, manual coding might miss relevant topics that were not previously thought by the researcher.

Automated text analysis provides some solutions to the shortcomings of manual coding. First, automated text analysis permits a fast analysis of high volume of documents. Different to manual coding, computational techniques require very little time to analyze thousands of documents. With the expansion of the available information through social media and parties' websites, automated techniques become an essential technique in order to provide a complete picture of party activities. Second, unsupervised automated text models (as Topic Models) do not require the researcher to create a codebook with pre-determined categories of topics. Third, the reliability problem of manual coding is solved as computers will always code the same document in the same way. Fourth, automated text analysis can easily be reproduced allowing greater transparency and future expansions of my work.

I combine the automated-text analysis with qualitative evidence collected during 18 months of fieldwork in Argentina and Chile. In many cases topic models allow me to confirm my qualitative findings, while in others it allows me to discover new topics.

2.2.1.1 What are Topic Models?

Topic models is a machine learning algorithm that uncovers topics in a collection of documents. The goal of topic models is to automatically discover the topics from a collection of documents. The documents themselves are known, but the topic structure (what topics each document has and what words belong to which topic) is a hidden structure.

A topic is a probability mass function over words. For a topic k ($k = 1, \dots, K$), this probability distribution is represented with an $M \times 1$ vector θ_k where θ_{mk} describes the probability the k -th model uses the m -th word. To estimate a topic the model uses co-occurrence of words over topics (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, 17-18).

The simplest and most widely used topic model is latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). The intuition behind it is that documents have multiple topics and each topic is characterized by a distribution of words. For instance, a document may have two topics: tax reform and economic performance. The tax reform topic has words related to taxation with high probability and the economic performance topic has words related to economics with high probability.

As Grimmer and Stewart explain 2013, for each document, i represents the proportion of the document dedicate to topic k as π_{ik} and collects the proportions across topics to be $\pi_i = (\pi_{i1}, \pi_{i2}, \dots, \pi_{iK})$. The model assumes that each document's proportions are drawn from a common Dirichlet prior,

$$\pi_i \sim \text{Dirichlet}(\alpha)$$

where α represents the Dirichlet distribution's shape parameters.

Within each document, the words are drawn according to the distribution of topics. LDA has a two stage process. To obtain the j -th word in the i -th document, the first step is to draw its topic τ_{ij} ,

$$\tau_{ij} \sim \text{Multinomial}(1, \pi_i)$$

Conditional on topic assignemnt, the actual word is drawn: if the j -th word in the i -th document is assigned to the k -th topic, then the model draws from the corresponding topic,

$$W_{ij} \sim \text{Multinomial}(1, \theta_k)$$

2.2.1.2 Why Topic Models?

Topic models are a way to code political documents over time that provide a reliable and replicable mapping of words into topics. Topic models, as other unsupervised learning methods, learn the underlying features of text without explicitly imposing categories of interest. As Quinn et al. (2010) explain, previously if a researcher was interested in tracking topic attention over time within a set of documents, that researcher needed to bring a great deal of information into the analysis. For instance, the researcher had to first define the substance of the topics, as well as the number of topics. Then the researcher would define a set of rules or keyword to allow human coders to place documents into the researcher-created taxonomy of topics. This approacher imposed the researcher's bias by pre-defining the topics of a set of documents.

Differently, topic models, as other unsupervised learning methods, learns the underlying characteristics of text without explicitly imposing categories of interest. The researcher does not need to know the topics beforehand, rather topics are estimated from text. This method helps discover topics that may be theoretically relevant but understudied (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, 15).

In addition, topic models, as other machine learning methods, allow the researcher to quickly analyze thousands of documents. The mainstream approach in Political Science consists of hand-coding documents, which can be incredibly time-consuming and tedious. Topic models solve this problem by requiring very little time to analyze hundreds or thousands of documents. However, while hand-coding documents do not need much validation, topic models do.

2.2.1.3 Data and pre-Analysis Process

In this chapter I focus on the analysis of 4809 press releases from three conservative party in Argentina and Chile: Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), Renovación Nacional (RN), and Propuesta Republicana (PRO). Part of the press releases were collected during 18 months of fieldwork in Argentina and Chile, while others were scraped from the party's websites. Press releases range from 2012 to 2015.

Using thousands of press releases from conservative parties, I measure the main topics used by conservative parties to target voters. To perform this analysis, I pre-processed the documents following common practices in automated text analysis. First, I remove punctuation and capitalization of words. Second, I discard the order of words using a *bag of words* approach. Last, I remove all stopwords, consisting

of common uninformative words (such as 'the', 'a', 'for', in spanish: 'el', 'la', 'un', 'para', etc.). In addition to common words, I remove party leaders names as the goal of this research is to focus on party content and activities and not necessarily discriminate across party leaders ideas or actions.

For each party, I run a particular topic model in order to understand what topics *each* party is using. As a consequence I have three input matrices of word counts, which serve as the input to each topic model. I use the gensim package in python to estimate each topic model.³

2.3 Results

As topic models require the researcher to pre-define the number of topics that a corpus of documents will have, I have used Quinn et al. (2010) method of model selection. As the authors explain, the first state of the process different models are estimated varying the number of topics. In this research I vary the number of topic models K from 5 to 150, in intervals of 5 topics. At the second state, human judgment is used to choose the best model, assessing the quality of the topics and clusters. This is done by assessing whether the cluster of documents of each topic are internally consistent and distinct from other clusters. To select the optimal K value I followed Quinn et. al (2010, 266): K “should be large enough to generate interpretable categories that have not been overaggregated and small enough to be usable at all”. For instance, a model that has a topic on ‘spending’ might be too general, lumping together spending on education, health, social programs. This model might be over aggregating topics. On the other hand, if a model output includes topics on social spending in a specific hospital or school then the topic might be too specific. To find an optimal middle ground I analyze how specific topics are and how internally consistent are. To do so, I analyze the top 10 words of the top 10 to 15 documents of each topic to check for internal consistency. These documents are the most representative for each of the topics.

2.3.1 Renovación Nacional

The corpus for Renovación Nacional includes 797 press releases. The optimal K number of topics for RN is between 15 and 18 topics (see Figure 2.4). Models with less than 15 topics over aggregate topics, while models with K greater than 20 topics get too specific. For my analysis I choose the model with $K = 16$. It’s worth

³I also run models using MALLET, which provides similar results.

mentioning that the main content of topics do not vary much when moving between 15 to 20.

Table 2.1 shows the top 10 words for each of the 16 topics. In order to understand the content of each topics I sampled 10 to 15 documents for each topic and analyzed its content. This process not only allowed me to come with a label for each of the topics, but also to better understand the exact intention of each topic. For instance, we can have a topic whose top words have terms as ‘taxation’, ‘income’, ‘taxes’, ‘increase’ but we would not know, without reading through several documents, whether the topic is for or against increasing taxes.

Table 2.1: Top 10 words per topic. RN 16 topics

Regional Eco Dev	Public Sector	Abortion	Youth Participation	Mix	Mix 2	Agriculture	Mix 3
región	salud	aborto	directiva	millones	ministros	regional	vecinos
atacama	nuevo	marihuana	coalición	interesados	caso	zona	comunidad
araucanía	hospital	vida	trabajo	modelo	comisión	recursos	regional
comunas	obra	diputado	militantes	propiedad	general	agricultura	problemas
trabajo	sector	sociedad	nueva	marga	presidenta	autoridades	concejal
empleo	construcción	claramente	elecciones	esm	economía	desarrollo	valparaíso
agua	investigación	carácter	dirigentes	inversión	jefe	emergencia	necesidades
personas	ministra	abortos	oposición	contaminación	mayor	aysén	evelyn
zona	contraloría	finés	mesa	alcalde	santana	sector	cerda
mil	antecedentes	pc	encuentro	ciudad	parlamentarios	administración	comuna

Opposition	Mining	Education	Decentralization	Human Rights	Public Health Issues	Business	Righ-wing alliance
presidenta	diputada	educación	región	carabineros	consumo	salud	pri
ley	comisión	sistema	regional	derechos	dado	parlamentario	udi
senador	codeco	partidos	regiones	humanos	becker	empresa	derecha
ministro	atacama	programas	regionales	iniciativa	artículo	diputado	político
bachelet	antofagasta	colegios	dirigentes	ley	salud	camara	crisis
personas	minería	políticos	descentralización	aquellos	organización	servicio	mujeres
comisión	ayudar	financiamiento	general	serio	indicaciones	comisión	agenda
nueva	regiones	calidad	secretario	tramitación	mensaje	dicha	gente
diputado	crecimiento	educacional	desarrollo	senador	ahora	millones	sociedad
acuerdo	presupuesto	laboral	metropolitana	sociedad	chilenos	ministra	alianza

As Figure 2.1 shows, the topics for Renovación Nacional vary in the amount of coverage each has had. The top five topics that RN has focused on are: 1) Opposition, which refers mainly to critiques to President Bachelet and to topics related to the “ley antiterrorista”, 2) Youth Participation, which refers to the need of RN to incorporate more young members to the party, 3) Decentralization, which refers mostly to projects to increase regional powers and about municipal elections, 4) Right-wing Alliance, which refers mainly to the relationship of RN with the other right-wing party UDI, and 5) Public Sector, which refers to a defense of the public health system and a critique to layoffs of public workers.

From the remaining topics, of particular importance are the topics on Human Rights, Abortion, and Business. The human rights topic includes a variety of press releases related to human rights, such as criticism to the situation in Venezuela, a

defense of the Chilean ‘antiterrorist law’, and a defense of sexual diversity. The topic on abortion mostly criticizes a bill to legalize abortion sponsored by President Bachelet. Last, the topic on business interestingly includes demands to different business groups about labor conditions, tariffs increases, or costs to the middle class. See figure 2.2 for wordclouds of the top 30 terms of some of these topics.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of topics across RN documents






Figure 2.2: Wordclouds of most relevant topics




(a) Topic: Public Sector




(b) Topic: Abortion




(c) Topic: Education



(d) Topic: Human Rights



(e) Topic: Business



(f) Topic: Opposition


2.3.1.1 From Topics to Strategies: RN

As the previous subsection shows, topic models are an excellent tool to discover the main topics in a corpus of documents. In particular, topic models are good at analyzing a large corpus of documents and at discovering topics that the researcher might not expect. However, not all topics are necessarily related to a strategy to attract new non-core voters. For instance, press releases could focus on internal partisan issues, or on topics not related to appeals to attract new voters. I classify these topics as irrelevant. The rest of the topics, I classify whether they are related to orthogonal appeals, to economic appeals, or to activities on the ground (see Figure 2.3).

To move from topics to strategies I combine the knowledge I obtained from the automated text analysis of topic models with qualitative research during 18 months of fieldwork in Argentina and Chile. In particular, I read the content of the relevant topics and look at the position of the party on those topics (e.g. pro or against abortion, right-wing economic program or moderation). I use topic models not only to verify the findings I obtained during fieldwork but also to discover new strategies. The qualitative analysis allows also to expand the time-frame of my analysis to previous years where press releases were not published online. My analysis for RN spans from the transition to democracy in Chile (1989) to 2015.

As Figure 2.3 shows, RN has used two main strategies to attract new voters: *orthogonal appeals* and *economic moderation*. RN does not report any grassroots activities.

Figure 2.3: Topics by Strategy - Renovación Nacional



2.3.1.2 Orthogonal Appeals

As the topic models show, Renovación Nacional has focused on a variety of topics that cross-cut the economic cleavage. In particular, the automated text analysis shows that in the last years RN has had an active agenda on topics of human rights, gay rights, and abortion. While the data for RN press releases covers only the last few years, using orthogonal appeals is not a new phenomenon for the party. On the contrary, since the party's formation RN has used orthogonal appeals to attract new voters.

A strong focus on *Human Rights* has been one of the pillars of the party since its formation. Shortly after its formation, RN opted to focus on agenda that would agree with the main economic pillars of the previous military regime (i.e. a liberal market economy), but would reject the political legacy of the military dictatorship.

In particular RN focused on a strategy of orthogonal appeals that focused on three main topics: civil-military relations and violation of human rights.

It should be stressed that RN at the beginning of the new democratic period defended the role of the military coup, and its leaders publicly recognized their admiration to Pinochet and the authoritarian years. RN also strongly condemned parties that opted to criticize the military regime, especially the Christian Democrats that had first supported the coup and moved to strong opposition a few years after. However, different from UDI, RN opted to support a more limited role of the military in the new democratic regime. In one of the party's document in 1989, RN claimed that a stronger role of the military "would contradict one of our best civic traditions and make essential principles of the democratic regime vulnerable." (Renovación Nacional, 1989). RN leaders opted not to participate on the 11 September commemorations, and has neither organized nor participated in any official act of support for the previous regime. As Pollack (1999) explains, this unambiguous position towards the military regime has been a vehicle for rallying the civilian supporters of the military regime.

A remarkable difference between UDI and RN was also visible regarding the issue of Human Rights violations. Different than UDI, RN has not justified the violations of human rights, nor has the party stated that there is a hierarchy of rights and that it is justifiable to violate certain rights (Pollack, 1999, 145). On the contrary, RN recognized the importance of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a framework to limit the excesses of state power and abuse (Pollack, 1999, 147). Even if Allamand had first stated that during the dictatorship human rights violations were inevitable, he modified his position and has expressed sympathy with the families of the disappeared (Pollack, 1999, 147). However, in order not to alienate its core constituencies, RN has also employed a hardline rhetoric blaming the Marxist left for the atmosphere of political polarization and violence (Pollack, 1999, 148). "This tension between public justification and private condemnation has plagued the party throughout. The party modernizers are concerned not to alienate the more conservative elements of the party nor its *pinochetista* support base. However, too intransigent an approach will invariably deter RN's potentially vital moderate electorate. This 'double discourse' is highlighted by the party's parliamentary group, which best reflects the unbridgeable gap between apologists of the military regime (mainly in the Senate) and its detractors (a majority in the Chamber of Deputies)" (Pollack, 1999, 148).

In summary, at the beginning of the democratic period RN has chosen a strategy of orthogonal appeals to attract portions of the middle classes. After the initial years of the democratic regime RN continued with an agenda on *human rights* in order to appeal to broad sectors of society.

Today the party continues to have an agenda with a focus on Human Rights abuses. For instance, the topic models shows several documents (e.g. PR-RN 684, 626, 687) that confirm that RN today still holds a critic position against the previous military regime. PR-RN 120 shows that in the last party congress RN has even changed its Declaration of Principles in order to avoid any mention to the military regime and to condemn “any totalitarian regimes, any use of political violence, any violation to the Universal Human Rights Declaration”. In addition, the party expressed that “it has the conviction that freedom, human rights, and democracy are some of the core pillars of the party and that the military coup and Pinochet are not longer principles of the center-right in Chile” (PR-RN 624). The president of RN Cristián Monckeberg added: “nobody today can justify the cruel attacks and violations suffered by many of our co-citizens” (PR-RN 626).

In a similar line, the party criticizes human rights violations in other Latin American countries, especially those with left-wing governments. The topic models analysis shows a large number of documents where RN criticizes the situation in Venezuela, in particular the situation of “political prisoners, who are tortured and repressed”. PR-RN 272 even compares the situation of Venezuela to the previous military regime in Chile: “Many of us were born during a military regime that violated human rights, attacking and torturing young Chileans. We do not want our peers in Venezuela to go through the same”. Similar critiques are also portrayed for Cuba.

The party has also introduced an agenda that focuses on post-modern topics, such as *gay rights*, *abortion*, or *legalization of marijuana*. On the one side, the party has opted to present itself as a modern right-wing party that encourages individual freedoms. In particular, the party has a good record in accepting gay rights and it has even created an internal commission on *sexual diversity* (see PR-RN 82) to discuss the party’s definition of family. The leader of this commission, Luis Pereira, explained how the commission will attempt to have an internal discussion on topics of gay marriage, and adoption for gay couples. In addition, Carlos Cruz Coke, a member of the party Political Commission, explained that “the party has promoted a broad conception of family, not necessarily only between a man and a woman” (PR-RN 36). A central figure of the party, Alberto Espinoza, celebrated the decision of the Senate to approve the homosexual civil union by saying that “today the Senate is making justice with homosexual couples by accepting their rights and duties (...) and by making a more inclusive society where nobody can be discriminated for having a different sexual orientation” (PR-RN 797).

On the other side, the party has reacted negatively to bills presented by the left on topics of abortion, and legalization of marijuana consumption. On abortion the party supported pro-life organizations (PR-RN 10, 21), the party’s youth organized activities which slogan was ‘we are the voice of those who have no voice’ (PR-RN

189), and several female legislators declared that “we need to have a culture pro life not pro death” (PR-RN 247). Similarly, most party leaders have declared their opposition to a bill introduced by Bachelet’s government to legalize the consumption of cannabis. RN representative, Nicolás Monckeberg explained how the government’s bill is negative as “such a law will make the job easier for drug dealers and promote even more consumption at younger ages” (PR-RN 610). Another representative, Jorge Rathgeb, declared that “marijuana is not a harmless drug, it is especially harmful for minors” (PR-RN 610).

2.3.1.3 Limited Economic Moderation

Since its formation, RN has defended the necessity of having a social market economy, based in the concept of private property and personal drive. The party also emphasized that “the social needs that are not solved by the market should be attended by the state” (Renovación Nacional, 1987, 1). This showed the party’s strong commitment to a free market economy with a limited role for the state, only when markets fail. In this sense, RN’s economic position resembles strongly the other Chilean right-wing party (Pollack, 1999, 139).


However, an analysis of the results provided by the topic model shows a slightly different scenario. In the last few years certain RN leaders declarations show a more moderate picture than the original economic program. At least two topics show the party’s support for the public sector and criticism to certain private companies. For instance, top leaders of the party defended hospital workers that were protesting cuts by the government (PR-RN 4), criticized “massive layoffs from different government offices” (PR-RN 129), and presented formal complains about “the layoffs of government officials in the health sector” (PR-RN 233). In addition, party leaders have inquired businesses to check the security for its workers (PR-RN 97), to avoid increases in oil prices (PR-RN 47), or to avoid tariffs hikes in electrical services (PR-RN 280). In addition, the party has declared several concerns about the situation of the middle class. For instance, the party showed its concerns about the “difficult situation of middle class groups as taxi drivers and transportation workers” and accused the government of “getting richer on the expense of making the middle class poor” (PR-RN 73). The party has expressed, in numerous press releases (27), its commitment to the middle class and small business groups, particularly those in the agricultural sector.

However, RN press releases show a more right-wing economic positions on the topics of agriculture and mining. The topic named ‘agriculture’ focuses on press releases on the critical situation of the agricultural and forestry sectors due to the wild fires in the south of Chile (e.g. PR-RN 399, 305, 8, 175). In addition, RN


leaders showed their support to small and medium agricultural firms (309, 362, 314, 492), claiming for greater subsidies to the agricultural sector. RN has focused on a defense to mining activities. In particular, RN has criticized the government on price controls attempts on mining-related activities (PR-RN 319), asked for greater investments for the mining sector (PR-RN 18), or for lower levels of taxations for the mining sector (73.)

This analysis shows a mixed position of RN regarding economic moderation. While on the one side RN claims for greater protection for public sector employees or for a greater public role, it still shows a strong defense of economic interests of the agricultural or mining sectors, with a more right-wing economic position.


Figure 2.4: Plots of distribution of topics across RN documents




(a) Model 1a: 5 topics




(b) Model 1b: 20 topics




(c) Model 1c: 35 topics




(d) Model 1d: 50 topics




(e) Model 1e: 75 topics



(f) Model 1e: 100 topics



(g) Model 1f: 130 topics



(h) Model 1h: 150 topics

2.3.2 Unión Democrática Independiente

The corpus for UDI includes 3021 press releases and the automated analysis suggests that UDI has focused their rhetoric on 14 main topics. In order to choose the optimal number of topics I run different models varying the number of predetermined topics from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 150 topics (see Figure 2.8). Following Quinn et al. (2010) I have analyzed the topics of the different models in order to find a model that does not over aggregate topics nor does it over specify them. For the case of UDI, K between 12 and 17 seem to be an optimal number of press releases. For models with less than 12 topics, the topics are too general. For topics over 17 the models show good results but the topics just duplicate similar categories. Interestingly, in models with a large K (e.g. $K = 50$) no topic brings any new information than the model with 14 topics. It is worth mentioning that the content of topics do not vary much between 12 and 17.

Table 2.2 shows the topics and the 10 most frequent words for each topic. To determine the label of the topic I sampled ten to fifteen documents assigned to each topic and infer the commonality across documents.

Table 2.2: Top 10 words per topic. UDI 14 topics

Housing	Investment	Party Politics	Governability	Women*	Cultural/International	Local Activities
familias	aurora	deben	oposición	mujeres	señas	comuna
vilches	repavimentación	bien	presidente	educación	estratégico	alcalde
millones	obras	presidente	educación	coyhaique	festival	vecinos
mil	empresas	contentos	acuerdos	proyecto	hijo	municipalidad
carlos	dom	oposición	concertación	primera	compitiendo	municipio
alcalde	bellavista	políticos	diputado	barreras	concentrar	forma
vivienda	obra	crecer	proyecto	femenino	soccer	regional
entrega	camiones	timonel	sistema	diputada	atendamos	trabajo
viviendas	vecinos	melero	reforma	podemos	siento	proyecto
ayuda	tránsito	coalición	ley	calidad	últimamente	desarrollo
Mix	Opposition	Eco Opposition	Foreign Affairs*	Local Cultural	Mix	Theatre
favorecen	diputado	senador	tratado	campeonato	potencial	madurez
duelo	diputados	parlamentario	bolivia	jornada	productor	caballero
australia	comisión	presidente	estratégicas	goles	energéticas	emisión
esposos	ministro	diputados	minerales	familia	organiza	entendernos
opositor	cámara	bono	reservada	comuna	región	robles
amparo	independiente	concertación	cartagena	diez	importación	inactividad
proactivos	demócrata	mil	internacional	sábado	energía	similar
talentos	felipe	personas	cumplir	primera	viaja	abierta
pelota	unión	diputado	mismo	apoyo	involucre	palestina
equipos	bancada	tema	allende	jugadora	agricultores	plurianual

As Figure 2.5 shows, most of UDI's press releases focused on one topic: local development. The fact that the most common topic is about local development

shows the vast presence of UDI at the local level and its development of grassroots activities. The topic focuses on the activities of the party at the *comuna* level, showing a large number of cultural, education, health, and sports activities. In addition, the party reports on several activities to improve the neighborhood, as pavement, street lighting, or sewers. Second, the party has focused on criticizing the government of the socialist Michele Bachelet, on politics related to crime, abortion, and police, as well as on the government's economic program, and on its capacity to govern Chile. Third, the party has an active cultural agenda, and a topic focusing mostly on internal party dynamics (such as the relation to the other right-wing party Renovación Nacional, or criticism to the Christian Democracy). Last, the party also focuses broadly on housing policies and subsidies. This last topic reports mostly on the allocation of houses or government subsidies for house renovations. See figure 2.6 for wordclouds of the top 30 terms of some of these topics.

Figure 2.5: Distribution of topics across UDI documents







Figure 2.6: Wordclouds of most relevant topics




(a) Topic: Local Activities



(b) Topic: Housing/Subsidies



(c) Topic: Local Cultural



(d) Topic: Investment



(e) Topic: Party Politics




(f) Topic: Cultural/International

2.3.2.1 From Topics to Strategies: UDI

As the model shows, UDI press releases have focused mainly on topics related to local development. Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of topics across strategies. The topic models show that UDI has broadly used a strategy of grassroots activities and that it continues to have a right-wing economic appeal.

This finding coincides with qualitative findings, suggesting that UDI has implemented a strategy of *grassroots activities*. In order to estimate UDI's strategies I combine the insights from the topic models with qualitative research conducted during 18 months of fieldwork. The qualitative analysis allows me to expand the time frame of the analysis to the 1989-2015 period for UDI.

Figure 2.7: Topics by Strategy - UDI



2.3.2.2 Grassroots Activities

The most frequent activity reported in UDI press releases is related to *local activities*. In particular, the analysis shows that the party organizes a variety of local strategies. First, the party organizes activities related to local development (e.g. investment in street lighting (PR-UDI 5, 634), sewers (PR-UDI 5), street pavement (PR-UDI 647, 1621, 5), garbage collection (PR-UDI 1239) and education infrastructure (PR-UDI 778)). Second, UDI leaders organize cultural and sports activities on the ground, such as youth celebrations (PR-UDI 1), parties celebrating local athletes (PR-UDI 723), mobile libraries (PR-UDI 434), neighborhood basketball tournaments (PR-UDI 53), cultural activities (PR-UDI 845, 46), outdoor gyms in parks (PR-UDI 2750), and plays (PR-UDI 401). Third, the party organizes labor-related activities, as short employment training programs (PR-UDI 622), and activities for micro-entrepreneurs (PR-UDI 3000). Last, the party also reports the hand out of goods, such as school equipment, shoes, jackets, and backpacks (PR-UDI 190). As these activities shows, the press releases analysis show an extensive activity of the party at the local level. Different than all the other parties in this study, UDI press releases focus mainly on reporting activities on the ground.

This picture of a party with a strong presence on the ground coincides with existing qualitative analysis (Luna, 2010; Klein, 2004).

Union Demócrata Independiente (UDI) was created in 1983 by the closest collaborators of Pinochet's military regime. The party's founder, Jaime Guzmán, has been one of the minds behind Pinochet's doctrine. He was the leader of *gramialismo*, a conservative political movement that recruited a large amount of young students at Universidad Católica de Chile. Guzmán thought was fiercely anti-marxist, nationalist, and economic liberal. He was the architect of the 1980 Constitution and the person in charge of building a party that would defend the legacies of the military dictatorship in a future democratic regime.

The newly formed UDI was created with the goal of becoming a new type of conservative party, different to the traditional Chilean right-wing parties as the Partido Conservador, Partido Liberal, or Partido Nacional. In particular, UDI's leaders were convinced of the necessity of forming a party with three main pillars: a) a party that would strongly defend freedom, particularly on economic terms; b) a party inspired by catholicism, but that would not be a catholic party per se; and c) a popular party, that would cross-cut the different social classes so to represent upper and lower sectors of society.

The first two pillars were translated into a rigid economic and social party program. UDI has been the most systematic defender of Chile's neoliberal economic system. Luna's (2010, 339) analysis of available roll-call votings shows that UDI


has been the most important defender of market-oriented reforms - even more than RN. This defense has also been systematically present in party documents, party speeches, and electoral campaigns since the transition to democracy. The catholic component of UDI has also always been present. UDI leaders strengthen the importance of having a party that would defend family values, pro-life positions, and human dignity.

The third pillar, the goal of building a “popular” party, has been the central path through which UDI has expanded its electoral base. UDI followed a strategy of grassroots activities to attract the urban poor. For this strategy, UDI has built a strong partisan presence of the party in *poblaciones* since the 1980s. In particular, the party opened offices in about 200 shantytowns, mainly in the Greater Santiago area. Those offices were mostly built with the support of existing local organizations, as sports clubs or neighborhood associations (Pinto, 2006, 123-6). UDI leaders at the *Departamento Poblacional*, i.e. the party office in charge of developing the party’s presence in poor areas, opted to focus on two main activities: training and social support. For training, UDI focused on a diffusion of the party’s Declaration of Principles, and a general explanation of UDI’s goals. The goal was to explain the weaknesses of left-wing ideas vis-à-vis UDI’s ideology (see Pinto’s 2006 for a complete analysis of UDI leaders’ explanations on the expansion of the Departamento Poblacional).


Second, UDI focused on expanding the access of poor citizens to social programs. This was achieved by the greater access of UDI leaders to Mayor positions. In particular, the military regime appointed several *gremialistas* as designated Mayors in several Chilean cities, including Santiago, Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, and Concepción. The military regime decided to substantially increase local governments budgets and competence, justifying this process with the need to disarticulate the brokerage networks that had dominated at the local level until the coup (Klein, 2004, 306). As Klein (2004, 306) explains, between 1979 and 1983 alone, the municipal budgets quadrupled. In particular, the military regime transferred large mounts of social funds to Mayors. The distribution of housing, family subsidies, and unemployment benefits among the urban poor allowed *gremialistas* to build little by little their own network of clientelism. Even if some of this social programs were seen by *pobladores* as “miserable,” the acute economic situation of the early 1980s implied that these benefits were the main income of large parts of the population. In 1983, around 15% of the economically active population was receiving an unemployment scheme by the government. These social benefits, together with the violent persecution of organizations that had traditionally been present in Chilean slums, Socialists, Communists, and Christian Democrats, allowed *gremialistas* to build strong ties with the urban poor.

With the transition to democracy and the constitutional reform that democratized the election of local Mayors, UDI slightly re-adapted its strategy. While UDI leaders continued to develop grassroots activities for the urban poor, they modified the way the party funded its network. If in the past *gremialistas* used public resources to discretionally target voters, after the transition to democracy they resorted to private funds to continue their tradition (Luna, 2010).


Figure 2.8: Plots of distribution of topics across UDI documents




(a) Model 1a: 5 topics




(b) Model 1b: 20 topics




(c) Model 1c: 35 topics




(d) Model 1d: 50 topics




(e) Model 1e: 75 topics



(f) Model 1e: 100 topics



(g) Model 1f: 130 topics



2.3.3 PRO

The corpus for PRO includes 990 press releases. Its analysis shows 19 main topics. In order to choose the optimal number of topics I run different models varying the number of predetermined topics from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 150 topics (see Figure 2.12). Following Quinn et al. (2010) I have analyzed the topics of the different models in order to find a model that does not over aggregate topics nor does it over specify them. For the case of PRO, K between 17 and 20 seem to be an optimal number of press releases. For models with less than 16 topics, the topics aggregate different issues. For topics over 20 topics there are duplicates of similar categories. It is worth mentioning that the content of topics do not vary much between 17 and 20.

Table 2.3: Top 10 words per topic. 19 topics


'Sur'	Mix	Particip. in Media	Crime	Foreign affairs*	Mix	Agriculture	Women	Governing	Repub. Institutions
tener	unión	problemas	policía	sector	mucha	campo	años	rosario	partidos
recorrida	diputado	gran	tener	ucr	cambio	productores	hijos	planes	poder
seguridad	bloque	mismos	problema	codo	fórmula	gobernadora	mujeres	sociales	paz
líder	derechos	declaraciones	darle	frente	ratificó	lomas	posibilidad	ramos	sociedad
junto	millones	falta	justicia	producción	villa	escuchar	cambiemos	gracias	justicia
desarrollo	américa	propuestas	seguridad	elegir	tres	pobreza	caso	índice	democracia
mismo	justicia	bonaerense	situación	gobernado	chicos	inversiones	compromiso	hospital	ley
gran	judicial	dirigentes	metropolitana	juntos	junto	toda	casa	social	dar
gestión	partido	podemos	historia	capaz	trabajo	vecina	noche	acerca	dialogaron
social	alejandro	fuerza	inseguridad	elecciones	vicente	gobiernos	madre	valiosos	independiente

Mix	Youth*	Economy	Closeness	Opp.: Institutional	Cand.'s careers	Candidates/Campaign	Alternative to Kirchnerism	Multimedia (urls)
ustedes	mano	inflación	gobnar	trabajar	nació	presidente	líder	falso
participacion	local	puntualizó	cerca	país	consejo	candidato	partido	permite
creer	presentación	economías	ahora	proyecto	fundación	diputado	mejor	sintonía
profesionales	recursos	confianza	ex	frente	casado	candidatos	partidario	presentamos
discurso	jóvenes	trabajo	centro	declaraciones	legislatura	nacionales	cambio	rueda
mínimo	luján	cambio	cambio	lugar	desempeña	provincial	vivir	protagonista
sientan	ocho	futuro	hablar	senador	proyectos	equipo	enorme	estación
río	tramo	regionales	dialogar	cuenta	redes	energía	junto	funcionan
punta	desaffo	nación	mesas	problemas	casada	acompañado	acompañado	avanzando
promesas	habla	diputados	hicimos	visitó	encuentros	candidato	candidato	apostamos

Figure 2.9 shows how often PRO focused on each of the 19 topics. The most popular topic in PRO press releases has been the topic on candidates and campaign. In these press releases the party has focused on how to expand its presence across Argentine provinces, on reporting campaign activities, on announcing candidates, and showing their support to candidates. The second most popular topic was about party leaders' participation in media. The corresponding press releases mainly announced the party's future appearance in TV and radio shows. Third, the party focused widely on showing itself as an alternative to 'kirchnerism' and how PRO leader Mauricio Macri would work for the unity of Argentines. These press releases are mainly criticizing the government for polarizing society and for a change towards a future united Argentina. Fourth, the party has a set of press releases criticizing

the government about institutional issues. For instance, PRO criticizes the attempt of extending the presidential re-election, or the incorrect use of public funds, or the situation of the judicial system. Fifth, PRO focuses on the activities that the party is developing in the south of the city of Buenos Aires. ‘El Sur’ is Buenos Aires poorest area and this topic press releases show the activities that the party has developed there. From the remaining topics, a few are worth mentioning. Topic sixth focuses on the party’s economic policies and its main economic promises during campaign times. The party focuses on having clear rules in order to attract investment, improving employment policies in order to reduce unemployment, helping regional economies grow, and helping the agriculture sector. The party press releases also focus on the need of reducing crime and on the fact that they represent a new way to do politics, which consists mainly on being in close relationship to the people, hearing their needs, and focusing mainly on solving people’s problems.

Figure 2.9: Distribution of topics across PRO documents



2.3.3.2 Economic Moderation

Propuesta Republicana (PRO) is a newly formed party. In 2003, Mauricio Macri, a businessman and former president of one of the most important soccer teams in Argentina -*Boca Juniors*-, started his political career in the City of Buenos Aires. For that, he decided to form his own party to compete in the 2003 elections for Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires. First called *Compromiso para el Cambio*, the party had the support of different political traditions (i.e. several small conservative parties, former radicales, and peronists). In his first election, Macri won the first-round with 37% of the votes, against a center-left coalition leadered by the incumbent Aníbal Ibarra. Ibarra got elected in the second round, but *Compromiso para el Cambio* was able to obtain five seats in the House of Representatives. However, given the internal diversity of the party's candidates, only two of them remained in the party, as the other three decided to move to the peronist caucus.

In 2005, Macri's *Compromiso para el Cambio* formed an alliance with the right-wing leader of *Recrear para el Crecimiento*: Ricardo López Murphy. Under the name of *PRO* the new alliance obtained 33.9% of the votes in Buenos Aires, obtaining the first place, and around 8% in the province of Buenos Aires. Macri himself was elected to the House, while he was focusing on the upcoming 2007 election, where he would become Mayor of the City of Buenos Aires.

Since the beginning, and as one of the main conservative leaders of PRO noticed, the party decided to use a strategy of moderation to attract new voters:

“PRO is defined as a party of power. Reality is only transformed by obtaining top political positions. For that, we knew we needed to get 50% + 1 of the votes in the City of Buenos Aires. But how were we going to do that? Well, not with ideology, and especially not with an ideology that would increase the right-wing image of a rich businessman as Macri. For that reason, from the beginning we opted for policies that would not convey a right-wing image. We want the state to promote private initiatives, but not in a way that opposes the public to the private. We think the private works better, but we do not privatize. We adapted a very centrist program. And when we moved to the center PRO started representing the middle-classes. That is how we wanted to define the party, as a middle-class party. (...) From the beginning we focused on moderation. Macri was seen as the right, so its first team was full of left-wing people. We even hired a left-wing person to write his speeches” (National Senator and co-founder of PRO, personal interview 2013).

The moderation, though present since the beginning of the party, was even more

visible when compared between the 2003 and 2007 election. In 2003, Macri's party had four main proposals in economic terms: a) to guarantee the independence of the Central Bank; b) to create credits and a system of guarantees for small and middle-size job-creator businesses; c) to defend free competition, guarding the interests of consumers; and d) to demand the state a justification and a plan of sustainability when new public enterprises were created (CPC, 2003, 3). On social policy, for instance, *Compromiso para el Cambio* had also a conservative approach, stressing the need of NGO participation (instead of the state), and promoting a greater enforcement of the reglamentation of social policies that stipulate that beneficiaries have to work in exchange of receiving the social benefit (CPC, 2003, 1). In 2007, several of these proposals were no longer part of the campaign. Macri adopted a more centrist and vague position, focusing on the need to "solve people's problems" and on specific problems of the City of Buenos Aires, avoiding ideological discussions. The campaign focused on a positive message and an emphasis on "solving citizen's problems", no matter in which part of the city they lived, whether the rich in the north or the poor in the south.

In the press releases the differences between the economic positions of *Compromiso para el Cambio* and PRO today become even more clear. In all of its economic proposals, PRO avoids any wording that would tie them with a right-wing pro-market party. The party claims that PRO should support the agricultural sector (PR-PRO 450) and the regional economies in order to increase exports and produce growth (PR-PRO 124). The party also sustains that Argentina should have clear rules in order to attract investment which will generate employment (PR-PRO 99, 481). While these policies might imply a more open economy, the party never mentions it in these terms and makes sure always to frame it in a way that it will create more employment and more equality.

When the party is forced to answer a question whether they do want to privatize or nationalize certain company, PRO leaders tend to answer that these are obsolete debates and that 'left' and 'right' ideologies no longer exist (PR-PRO 731). For instance PR-PRO 415 states that 'the issue whether to privatize or nationalize should be analyzed case per case looking at the data and considering planning goals, and mainly overcoming the obsolete ideological debates that no longer exist anywhere in the world. Instead we generate confrontations and use deceptive rhetoric'. Even more, Macri, the party's main leader, has changed his mind about his position on certain nationalizations, for instance with the national flagship airline Aerolíneas Argentinas or with the national oil company YPF.

PRO press releases also frame the need of developing the agricultural sector as the main way to reduce poverty and unemployment: 'the real solution for the problems of unemployment and poverty will come the day we free the productive strength of the

agricultural sector and we end the arbitrary regulations that the current government has imposed' (PR-PRO 79). This framing contradicts the fact that the agricultural sector in Argentina is not labor-intensive and has historically had low wages to its employees.

To summarize, PRO has used a of moderate economic appeals, avoiding language that would tie the party to a neoliberal ideology. The party leaders are against the division between left and right, consider it obsolete, and are very careful in framing its economic promises with a constant tie to how these policies will generate employment and reduce inequalities. As one of the top leaders of the PRO explained, this has been an electoral strategy to attract new voters.

2.3.3.3 Orthogonal Appeals

The analysis of topic models for PRO press releases suggests that the party has focused on priming orthogonal appeals that emphasize the role of republican institutions (pro-democracy appeals). These topics focus mostly on criticizing the left-wing government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner respect to democracy and its republican institutions. In particular, the party has defended press freedom (PR-PRO 456), the defense of the independence of the judicial system, the importance of reaching agreements instead of confrontation, and has criticized violations to the Constitution.

These defense of the republican institutions, while it is a pro-democratic orthogonal appeal, it differs from the pro-democracy orthogonal appeals of other parties, such as Renovación Nacional. While RN focused most of its language on Human Rights abuses and the role of the military in the new democratic regime, PRO leaders do not discuss the role of the military.


2.3.3.4 Grassroots Activities

The party's activities in the south of the City of Buenos Aires (*el Sur de la Ciudad*) suggest an incipient development of a grassroots activities. One of the top 5 topics of the party focuses on the activities of the south. Press releases show how the party has built green spaces in the south (PR-PRO 229), how it has extended exclusive bike lines to the poor areas of the south (PR-PRO 238), how it has opened a health center for drug addictions inside a slum (PR-PRO 502), how it organizes sport activities in south *barrios* (PR-PRO 407), or how party leaders visit a slum to participate in a community activity meant to paint the exterior of neighbor's houses (PR-PRO 548). The press releases also mention public policies implemented for *el Sur*, as the extension of the *Metrobus* (a bus rapid transit system), the inauguration of a technological center (PR-PRO 211), or the move of government offices from the


center of the city to a new 'civic district' in the south (PR-PRO 241). In addition, Macri has expressed that 'one of the main goals of my government is to allow the neighborhoods in the south to have the same development opportunities than the ones in the north' (PR-PRO 214).

While this presence suggest a clear goal of the government to increase its presence in poor areas, its efforts however are more limited than the ones seen at UDI.


Figure 2.12: Plots of distribution of topics across PRO documents




(a) Model 1a: 5 topics




(b) Model 1b: 20 topics




(c) Model 1c: 35 topics




(d) Model 1d: 50 topics




(e) Model 1e: 75 topics



(f) Model 1e: 100 topics



(g) Model 1f: 130 topics



(h) Model 1h: 150 topics

2.3.4 UCeDe⁴

With the collapse of the military regime in 1983, conservative actors in Argentina lacked a unique political party that would represent their interest. In fact, several small provincial parties would compete to be the party that would successfully claim upper-sectors of society as its core constituency (Gibson, 1996, 103). The result of this competition was the triumph of UCeDe, and its founder Alvaro Alsogaray. UCeDe became in the 1980s the most important conservative party, and the third most important party after Peronists and Radicals.⁵

On June 21, 1982, only a week after the Falklands defeat, Alvaro Alsogaray announced the formation of a new conservative party with a program centered on liberal ideas. The military defeat implied the end of the military regime and liberals aligned to Alsogaray quickly realized about the need of building a political party to compete in the upcoming elections. UCeDe was formed with the support of former liberal leaders, intellectuals, businessmen, technocrats, and young activists.

Since its formation, Alvaro Alsogaray proclaimed harsh critiques to the military regime, not in terms of human rights violations, but in terms of the incapacity of the economic technocrats to implement a liberal economic system during the authoritarian regime. He, a person trained in military institutions but with no previous political position in the *Proceso*, agreed on the role of the military in neutralizing the “subversive uprisings” and in ending the political chaos existing until 1976 (Gibson, 1996, 107). The main critiques were on economic terms. Alsogaray blamed the technocrats in the military regime for leading Argentina to high levels of debt, high inflation, and a severe recession. In particular, Alsogaray accused these technocrats for not ending with the “pernicious system” of statism, interventionism, and developmentalism (Alsogaray, 1983).

Alsogaray has spent most of his political and technocratic life defending the role of market-freedom and fighting for the elimination of any state intervention in the economic realm. As Gibson (1996, 109) explains, “he was obsessively single-minded in that goal.” For this reason, Alsogaray focused on making UCeDe as the main defender of liberalism in Argentina. The party’s *Declaración de Principios* started with a profound critiques to the “statist, interventionist, and dirigist regime that prevailed -with slight modifications- since 1943-45” (UCeDe, 1983, 1). UCeDe was

⁴As the party vanished in the mid 1990s, press releases for this party are not available. As a consequence, I analyze the party strategies using original party documents, leader speeches, and secondary literature

⁵It should be noted that even if UCeDe was the third most important party in Argentina in the 1980s, Peronists and Radicals still retained the majority of the votes, representing a clear case of bipartisan system.

founded to “fight against this economic system” and to “restore republican and liberal values.” The party program made special emphasis on the need of protecting individual rights, freedom, and private property. The party promoted the privatization of public companies, the elimination of regulations and bureaucratic rules that would intercede against private initiatives, and a drastic reduction of state interventions. This purely liberal economic program was the central component of UCeDe and the main tool to attract supporters.

The emphasis on liberalism was vital for the party to consolidate the support of its core constituencies. The laissez-faire critiques of the new Radical government’s economic policies allowed the party to increase its vote share and its representation in the House of Representatives. However, this strategy had its limits. As some of UCeDe leaders noticed, several sectors of society were not attracted by this economic program. Manuel Mora y Araujo, former candidate of UCeDe to the House of Representatives and prominent intellectual, explained this difficulty:

“The upper classes are liberal because they tend to be more cultured -I would say, more educated. Political and ideological proposals with great philosophical consistency (and this is the case for both liberalism and Marxism) appeal to sectors with high levels of education. For them to spread to lower social sectors *political mediators* are needed, something liberalism, to this date, has not possessed... These sectors, as they do not read too many books... will accept these ideas to the degree that they feel they address their problems, their concerns. This will take place not through autonomous reasoning, but through a process of social communication” (cited in Gibson 1996, 154).

Even if UCeDe did not have a strong strategy to attract either the middle classes or the popular sectors, some of its leaders attempted to do this by taking the liberal messages to neighborhoods of non-core voters. The main person within UCeDe appealing to non-core constituencies was a young councilwoman from the City of Buenos Aires: Adelina Dalesio de Viola. She was seen as the “populist” and “unrefined” adversary of UCeDe’s elitist old-guard (Gibson, 1996, 154). Adelina de Viola constantly insisted on the need of broadening the party’s base of support. “As part of this, she encouraged the adoption of popular styles of mobilization, fostered the entry and growth of youth and university movements in the party, sponsored seminars for ‘liberal women,’ and played a key role in the translation of the party’s cerebral message into language and themes aimed at reaching the middle and lower classes” (Gibson, 1996, 154). During her campaign to get a seat in the House of Representatives, Adelina de Viola had an intensive presence throughout the city’s poorer

neighborhoods. This included opening UCeDe offices and spreading the values of economic liberalism to the urban poor. She constantly used populist appeals and referred to “our” neighborhood when visiting the poorer neighborhoods throughout Buenos Aires. She wanted to show that she was “one of them” and avoid the elitist image of other members of UCeDe, especially Alsogaray.

In summary, UCeDe had a economically liberal program that was maintained throughout the years the party lasted.⁶ Neither Alsogaray, nor other leaders as Adelina de Viola opted for a strategy of moderation to expand the party’s base of support. Neither did the party organize grassroots activities to appeal to the urban poor, or chose an orthogonal appeal to cross-cut social classes. On the contrary, to appeal to other sectors of the electorate, part of the party opted for keeping the liberal economic program but slightly adapting its language, by introducing more populist appeals.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I showed the four possible strategies that conservative parties may use to attract new voters. Parties may choose to *moderate* their economic appeals, to use a *neoliberal* strategies, to prime *orthogonal appeals*, or to focus on a *neoliberal* strategy. Parties may choose to focus on one strategy only, or to combine several of them. For instance, parties may combine a strategy of economic moderation with a orthogonal appeals. The only strategy that cannot be combine is the neoliberal strategy, as this one implies the absence of the other three strategies.

In this chapter I have also showed the advantages of using machine learning, and specifically topic models, to measure party strategies. Topic models allow researchers to analyze the large amounts of documents that are now available, such as social media participation, party press releases, or other text documents. In addition, topic models has the advantage over manual approaches in the fact that topic models do not require researchers to specify which topics a party may focus on.

In the empirical chapter of this chapter I have showed that parties have varied in the strategies they have used since the transition to democracy in the 1980s. RN leaders have focused mostly on priming orthogonal appeals (e.g. Human Rights and gay rights), and on a limited economic moderation. UDI leaders have focused mostly on grassroots organizations activity, showing a vast amount of local activities, more than any other party in this study. PRO leaders have focused mostly on economic

⁶In the 1990s the UCeDe was closed to President Menem, as several of UCeDe members had top positions in Menem’s government. Also, UCeDe backed Menem for the re-election in 1995. After that the party practically disappeared.

moderation, with some mentions to orthogonal appeals as well as an incipient strategy of grassroots activities. Last, the case of UCeDe shows a party that has focused on a neoliberal strategy to attract new voters.

The next three chapters will explain why conservative parties have varied in the strategies they chose to attract new voters. I claim that party ties to business groups (chapter 3), the Catholic Church (chapter 4), and the military (chapter 5) affect party leaders on which strategy they may choose to attract new voters.

Chapter 3

Conservative Parties and Business Groups

Conservative parties have historically enjoyed strong ties with business groups. This chapter analyzes how the ties of business groups affect party strategies to attract new voters. In particular, this chapter analyzes how the ties of party leaders to business groups provide valuable resources to the party, such as campaign contributions, but might limit the possibility of party leaders to moderate its economic appeals.

In a socioeconomic context of high poverty it might be attractive for party leaders to moderate the party's economic appeals in order to attract new voters. As Luna and Kaltwasser (2014) explain, in Latin America the median voter would not vote for the right. As a consequence, choosing a right-wing economic program might negatively affect the chances of conservative parties to reach government positions. As the analysis of conservative parties in Argentina and Chile shows, some party leaders have been able to moderate their economic appeals, while others have maintained a neoliberal economic program. To explain this variation I analyze the *strength of the ties* of party leaders to business groups.

However, the strength of the ties of party leaders to business groups is not enough to explain what conservative party leaders will do with their economic appeals. In this chapter I argue that the *type of business groups* also helps explain why some conservative parties moderate while others not. In particular, I distinguish between two types of economic groups: ISI business groups and export-oriented business groups.

This chapter shows that parties with strong ties to export-oriented business groups have the hardest time to moderate its economic appeals. On the contrary, those parties with only weak ties to ISI business groups can easily moderate its economic appeals. Parties with either weak ties to export oriented business groups or

strong ties to ISI business groups are intermediate cases. In the analysis of Argentinean and Chilean conservative parties UDI and UCeDe represent cases of strong ties to export-oriented business groups, RN has medium ties to export-oriented business groups, and PRO has medium ties to ISI business groups. As a consequence, we would expect UDI and UCeDe to have greater difficulties in moderating their economic appeals vis-à-vis the cases of PRO and RN.

In this chapter I first explain the theoretical argument of how business groups may affect the decision of party leaders to moderate its economic appeals. I analyze both the strength of ties as well as the type of business groups. Second, I analyze the recent history of business groups in Argentina and Chile to better understand the strength of ISI and export-oriented business groups in both countries. Last, I analyze the ties of each conservative party to both ISI and export-oriented groups and show how these ties affect the party's decision to moderate its economic appeals.

3.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Alliance Between Business and Conservative Parties

The ties of conservative party leaders to business groups is central to understand what strategies party leaders may use to attract new voters. Conservative leaders have historically had tight linkages with business groups. In general, many leaders of conservative parties are either businessmen or women themselves, or former CEOs of business groups. In addition, conservative party leaders rely on the ties to business groups in order to receive large amounts of campaign contributions from these private actors.

These two factors show that business groups may influence conservative parties through the *external* and *internal* path (see Figure 3.1). First, in countries where business groups are strong they may influence conservative parties through the provision of fiscal resources. This continuous provision of resources may create a dependence of conservative parties to business groups. As a consequence, business groups may use this power and threat to cut those resources in case the party fails to defend business interests.

Second, in many cases businessmen and women decide to join conservative parties in order to have a direct participation in politics. As party member business representatives can internally oppose an economic policy that affects business interests. These business representatives might be ideologically against of such economic policy and/or may suffer a personal loss in case of approving such policy. As a consequence, when these party members control the party they might be able to block

any economic policy that opposes business interests.

Nevertheless, the strength of the ties to business groups are not the only relevant variable to understand whether a party can moderate or not its economic appeals. There is a second relevant variable to help explain why some parties moderate and some not: *type* of business groups. I argue that not all parties have similar economic demands so in order to understand what demands a business group may have we need to understand what type of business groups it is. In particular, I distinguish between two different types of business groups: ISI business groups and export-oriented business groups. These two groups may have different demands which might be translated into different economic policies of conservative parties.

ISI business groups are those firms that were historically benefited by the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) period and focused mostly on non-tradable goods. These groups captured substantial gains from policies that combined fiscal expansionism and an overvalued currency (Kaufman and Stallings, 1991, 21). In particular, during the ISI periods these firms enjoyed high levels of protection from foreign competition which allowed them to grow by selling industrial production to the domestic market. Following Etchemendy (2014), I define ISI business groups as “those large domestic holdings which originated and maintain a substantial part of their assets in manufacturing and/or oil/fuels business.”

The activities of these economic groups tend to be threaten by liberalization policies. In particular, many of these companies may not be able to compete with manufacturing products from other countries. Additionally, these business groups tend to have strong ties to the state and are highly dependent on these ties. In many cases these companies enjoy generous contracts with the state that have helped them improve their economic performance. They tend to oppose drastic liberalization programs, and they support a stronger role of the state in economic issues.

Export-oriented business groups do not share the same demands than ISI business groups. Export-oriented business groups focus mostly on the exports of primary products (e.g. agriculture, fishing, mining), manufacturing in internationally competitive industries, or on liquid-asset sectors (e.g. finance, real-estate). These groups are not necessarily constrained to the demands of the domestic market or depend on state protections to have better economic results. On the contrary, given that most of their economic activity is in the international market, they will demand an open economy, with low tariffs, undervalued currency rates, and a limited role of the state. They normally push for the market, not the state, to have the central role of organizing economic activity and criticize overvalued currencies or subsidies to industries that focus on the domestic market.




Figure 3.1: Causal Argument for Business Groups




Figure 3.2: Causal Argument for ISI Business Groups




Figure 3.3: Causal Argument for Export-Oriented Business Groups

3.2 Business Characteristics

To understand the relationship between business groups and conservative parties I first analyze the characteristics of business groups in both Chile and Argentina. This analysis will allow me to understand the strength of export-oriented and ISI business groups in each country. In the following section, I analyze the ties of each business groups to conservative parties. These two variables, type of business and strength of ties, help predict what conservative parties will do in terms of their economic rhetoric in order to attract new voters.

3.2.1 Chile

Similar to most Latin American countries, Chilean leaders of the early twentieth century implemented Import-substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies. These policies promoted to replace foreign imports with a domestic production of goods and services. For this governments choose to protect domestic industrial production by increasing subsidies, setting high trade tariffs, with the final goal of developing a strong manufacturing sector.

As in other Latin American countries, Chile's ISI economic model was supported by a multi-class coalition of domestic-oriented manufacturing, medium and small businessmen, the urban middle class, and organized workers. This economic model lasted until the 1970s when Allende's socialist policies dismantled the ISI model and its multi-class component (Schamis, 1999). As a consequence, small, medium, and large business groups chose to support the new military regime (Silva, 1996, 40). Pinochet first implemented a gradual economic reform plan that in its early stages was supported by a broad coalition of capitalist and landowners.¹ Most business groups accepted the need of moving to lower levels of protection, but were in favor of a gradual path to a more open economy. As Strassner (2006, 77) explains, "backing for continued high protection was scant and largely confined to the subsector associations of manufacturer for domestic markets that could not compete with imports -metals, electronics, and textiles."

A few years after, a shift in power within the gradualist coalition pushed for a shift in Pinochet's economic program towards a radical process of economic reform. Starting in mid-1975 Chile moved away from its gradual approach to implement a radical neoliberal economic program. The new model centered on drastic privatization of state-owned companies, deflation, rapid deregulation of markets, and drastic reduction of tariffs. These policies had long been defended by the export oriented

¹See Silva (1996, chapter 4) for an in-depth explanation of the gradualist coalition, its internal conflicts, and its relation to the military regime.

conglomerates but, as Silva (1996, chapter 5) explains, this group was subordinated to other business groups during the gradualist years. As a consequence of external shocks, privatization, and superior financial capability, the international conglomerates obtained the economic power to wrestle control of the economy away from those that supported gradualism (Silva, 1996). These export oriented conglomerates² allied with a group of neoliberal economists, the ‘Chicago boys’, who had key technocratic positions within the military regime, to push for a more radical economic liberalization (Silva, 1996, 98-100).³

By 1976 the Pinochet regime had eliminated all nontariff barriers, implemented severe fiscal and monetary shocks, price deregulation, and exchange-rate devaluations (Schamis, 1999, 246). The economic team led by the Chicago boys reduced industrial protection from an average of 151.5% in 1974 to 13.6% in 1979 (Edwards and Cox Edwards, 1991, 114). Trade liberalization, as well as financial liberalization, hit especially industrial sectors that had flourish during the ISI times. As Gatica Barros (1989) shows, industrialization in Chile plummet: industrial output decreased by 10% between 1970 and 1982, and bankruptcies increased from an average of 8.4% per year in the pre-coup era, to 24.7% between 1974-82. The radical economic program implemented by the Chicago boys harmed particularly the ISI business groups that had focus on industrial production for the domestic market.

While the ISI business groups were severely harmed by the implementation of market reforms, they had always been weaker vis-à-vis the state when compared to similar business groups in other Latin American countries. In fact, Etchemendy[chapter 8]etchemendy2011 explains that the weakness of these ISI business groups vis-à-vis the state helps explain the lack of compensatory policies to ISI business groups during the implementation of market reforms. As a consequence, ISI business groups reach democracy in an extremely weak position.

However, not all business groups were negatively affected by the Pinochet’s regime. In fact, Pinochet’s liberal economic model benefited mainly a small group of diversified economic conglomerates whose main firms were in export activities (mining, fishing, agriculture), manufacturing in internationally competitive industries (food, processing paper), and liquid-asset sectors (finance, insurance, real-estate) (Schamis, 1999, 245-6). The tights between these business groups and the military regime started when these big businesses mobilized against the Allende government

²The three main conglomerates in this coalition were the Banco Hipotecario de Chile (BHC), Cruzat-Larraín, and the Edwards group. See Silva (1996, chapter 5) for an in-depth explanation on the role of these groups in the radical coalition.

³See Silva (1996) for an explanation of the close personal and professional ties between the internationalist conglomerates and the Chicago boys.

and continued with the decision of the military to incorporate executives and directors from these businesses to the government coalition.

In summary, the radical liberalization program implemented by Pinochet and the Chicago boys affected business interests unequally. While the reforms strengthen the position of export-oriented business groups and sectors with liquid assets (especially financial business groups), it severely weakened the power of an already weak ISI business group. As Imbert P. and Morales (2008, 73) show, the main business groups at the end of the military regime were no longer those groups that had focused on textiles, electronics, and mechanical industries, but those that had a strong focus on fruits and wine exports, on services, or forestry activities.

3.2.2 Argentina

Argentina, as Chile, also focused in an import substitution industrialization model in the post-war era. This model was characterized by a greater role of the state, high levels of protection to industries, state subsidies, and high tariffs. In this time period, 1930-1976, agricultural activity lost its predominant position and decreased from 30% of GDP to 12%. On the contrary, industrial activity went from 15-18% of GDP before 1930 to close to 30% in the 1970s (Kosacoff, 1993, 2). Industrial firms emerged first as small and medium firms that focused on the production of consumption goods that were no longer available through imports. After 1955 the ISI economic model moved towards its second phase, with greater focus on consumer durables and intermediate goods, especially in the petrochemicals, and auto industries.

The ISI economic model in Argentina gave rise to a group of local, industry-based conglomerates: ‘the Industrial Bourgeoisie’. As Etchemendy (2014, chapter 3) explains, several factors help explain the greater strength of the Argentine industrial groups vis-à-vis the state. In Argentina, the protagonists of the industrial deepening to the second phase of the ISI model was not the state but foreign companies. “Postwar state participation in industrial production was rather limited from the outset, and would focus mainly on the oil business through the state monopoly YPF, and on the steel and petrochemical sectors through the military-run companies” (Etchemendy, 2014). However, the greater role of foreign companies in the value-added industries is reversed after mid 1960s. The nationalist authoritarian government of Onganía (1966-1970) displaced foreign companies and promoted protections for those companies producing intermediate goods (Etchemendy, 2014). Last, in spite of the more liberal character of the military regime that reached power in 1976, the *Junta* implemented a program of Industrial Promotion (Régimen de Promoción Industrial) which increased state support to ISI business groups and prioritized the role of domestic capital over foreign investment (Etchemendy, 2014).

The conjunction of all these policies gave the domestic ISI business groups a strong but independent position vis-à-vis the state. By the 1980s, these ISI business groups were hegemonic in many industries (Etchemendy, 2014)⁴

Even if from 1976 to 1989 there were several attempts to liberalize the economy, it is only by 1991, with the government of Carlos Menem, that liberalization takes place. However, as Etchemendy (2014) shows, powerful ISI business groups have been compensated, which differs to the Chilean case. As a consequence, by the 2000s ISI business groups in Argentina were significantly stronger than for the Chilean case.

3.3 Cases

In this section I analyze the strength of the ties of conservative parties, as well as the type of business group they are tied to. In addition, I analyze the mechanisms of influence of business groups: whether the influence is *external*, through campaign contributions, or *internal*, through the presence of business leaders within the party's leadership.

3.3.1 UDI

Unión Democrática Independiente has had strong stable ties to business group since its formation during Pinochet's regime. As the previous section has showed, business groups had a relevant role during the military regime, and many of them had occupied key government positions. In addition, several of the technocrats in the economic team of Pinochet moved to the private sector once the authoritarian government ended (Huneus, 2001, 316-7).⁵ These business men and women had strong connection with the *gremialistas* who would give birth to UDI a few years later. In fact, as Huneus (2000) shows, these two groups were not two separate groups, but one intertwined group that shared a common past at the Catholic University and, more importantly, a long-term power strategy.

⁴Etchemendy (2014) shows the hegemonic position of groups like Techint and Acindar (steel), Astra, Bidas, and Pérez Companc (oil), Garovaglio and Richards (petrochemicals), Fortabat (cement), Madanes (aluminum), and SOCMA and CIADEA (autos).

⁵Huneus (2001, 317) also explains that the leaders of business organizations also had a central role during the military regime. Felipe Lamarca and Andrés Concha, president and general secretary of the SOFOFA (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril), and Walter Riesco, president of the CPC (Conferederación de la Producción y el Comercio), were members of the Legislative Commissions that supported the government of Pinochet.

Even if after the transition to the new democratic regime business groups attempted to build ties and agreements with all political parties,⁶ UDI has always had a strong and intertwined relationship to business groups. As Luna (2014, 164) explains, UDI was able to convince the most powerful Chilean business groups that they were the party that would consistently defend the neoliberal economic model implemented by Pinochet. In words of a UDI leader: Our leaders convinced business elites that the party would be able to protect the market-oriented model introduced under Pinochet, aided by the special majority requirements that Jaime (Guzmán) included in the 1980 Constitution (Anonymous UDI national officer, obtained from Luna (2014, 165)).

Luna (2014) shows that UDI leaders have kept this promise and have been the most consistent defenders of business group interests in the new democratic regime. Through an analysis of roll-call votes, Luna (2014, chapter 5) shows that the UDI has been the most systematic defender of the market-oriented reforms introduced under the dictatorship and the most responsive to business elite interests.

But how had these ties between UDI leaders and business groups affected the party's capacity to moderate its economic appeals? The analysis of party press releases shows that UDI leaders have consistently defended the interests of business groups. In particular, the database of party press releases shows a strong defense to *export-oriented business groups*. While the analysis of topic models does not show a consistent topic focusing only on economic topics, an analysis of the press releases shows how UDI has had a pro-business agenda.⁷ UDI press releases have focused on defending the interests of mining groups (PR-UDI 11, 87, 830, 3018), businesses in forestry (PR-UDI 52), agricultural sectors (PR-UDI 141, 295, 1116, 2558), pharmaceuticals (PR-UDI 225, 309, 453), and the role of the free market (PR-UDI 164, 225).

So how have business groups been able to influence UDI's economic position. Have UDI leaders influenced the party externally, internally, or both? To answer this question I rely on an original database on party leaders careers, on the database collected by Poderopedia.org on the ties of politicians to business groups, and on data on campaign contributions. The analysis of all these sources suggests that UDI has built ties with export-oriented business groups and that these groups have influenced party's strategies through a combination of internal and external mechanisms, but that the external mechanism prevails.

⁶See Silva (1995) for a detailed account of the relationship of business groups to the *Concertación* parties after the transition to democracy.

⁷Simple searches through the database with words such as "market" show how the party has a pro-business position on a variety of topics.

To determine the linkages between the *type* of business groups to UDI I analyze the data collected by Poderopedia.org. Poderopedia collects data on the ties and connections among politicians, business groups, and organizations in Chile. For the case of UDI, Poderopedia has collected data on 89 leaders. This data comes from a variety of sources, such as politicians tax reports, media coverage, party's websites, and data from the library of Congress. In Figure 3.4 shows most of the ties of UDI leaders are to those business groups that have benefited from the neoliberal market reforms. In particular, UDI has very strong ties to Finance sectors, which include banks, investment firms, and insurance companies. It is worth mentioning that this data is counting the number of ties, and not the strength of the ties. For instance, we are counting as equal if a leader has options in a company or whether a leader is the CEO of the company. However, as we have the data on the position that these party leaders had in the companies, we can filter the data for those cases where the party leader is or was a CEO, President, Vicepresident, Founder, Partner, or Manager. Figure 3.5 shows that UDI leaders have very strong connections to finance (58.06%), agricultural sector (29.03%), and real estate (25.03%).

While this data is useful to help us determine the *type* of business groups that UDI has built ties to, we need to analyze how business groups are influencing party's policies. As the theory section of this dissertation has showed, business leaders may influence party's strategies through an external or an internal path. In the external path, business groups influence party leaders through the provision of financial resources, normally as campaign contributions. The flow of resources generates a dependence of the party to these resources. In consequence, party leaders prefer not to threaten the interests of business groups to avoid an abrupt cut in campaign contributions. In the internal path, business leaders are also party leaders and internally oppose to policies that may threaten the interests of business groups.

The data from Figures 3.4 and 3.5 shows that UDI leaders are also members of business groups. In particular, Figure 3.5 shows that they not only have positions in business groups, but they have top positions. This suggests that business leaders influence party's policy *internally*. In particular, Figure 3.6 shows that 42.7% of the party leaders analyzed by Poderopedia have ties to business groups. However, when compared to the other right-wing party in Chile, Renovación Nacional, UDI does not show exceptionally high levels of business participation within the party. Figure 3.6 shows that UDI has a lower percentage of leaders with ties to business groups vis-à-vis RN.

However, when analyzed the external mechanisms through which business groups may influence party's strategies, UDI shows a much greater connection to business than RN. UDI has been the party receiving the largest amounts of campaign con-




Figure 3.4: Ties of UDI leaders to business groups, by sector

tributions by private donors.⁸ Chile has available data for campaign finances since 2004. This data is self-reported data and distinguishes between the type of contribution. To calculate the private contributions I add the values for anonymous and reserved, as the Chilean law (Number 19.884) explains. In addition, the Chilean law sets limits to the amount of contributions for each category: anonymous contributions cannot exceed 800 usd, while reserved funds range from 800 to 22,500 usd. I agree with Luna (2014) in that “A party financed by business interests and wealthy donors should therefore receive more reserved donations, as these types of donors are more likely to make larger donations.” I first analyze campaign contributions from private donors (anonymous and reserved), and then I focus only on reserved contributions which might indicate contributions from business groups or wealthy

⁸All data on campaign contributions focuses on campaign contributions to deputies, senators, and regional council representatives. I have excluded contributions to Presidential campaigns as parties compete in two coalitions (a center left and a center right) for the Presidency.




Figure 3.5: UDI leaders with top positions in business groups, by sector

donors.

Campaign spending evidence suggests that UDI has been the party benefiting the most from private contributions. Figure 3.7 shows private campaign contributions to the five most important political parties in Chile: UDI, RN, Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Partido Por la Democracia (PPD), and the Socialist Party (PS). This figure shows the exceptional levels of private contributions to UDI vis-à-vis all other parties. In particular, when compared to RN, the other Chilean conservative party, UDI has received on average of 2.3 times more campaign contributions than RN, with a maximum of more than 3.2 times more for the 2009 parliamentary election.⁹ In 2009, UDI receives more than 500,000 usd more than the other conservative party in Chile. The differences with the center party (PDC), and the left-wing parties (PPD and PS) are even more striking.

Regarding reserved contributions, UDI has also an advantage over all other parties. Figure 3.12 shows that both in 2005 and 2009 UDI was the party that received the largest amount of reserved contributions.¹⁰ When comparing to RN, UDI received more than 3 times more reserved funds in 2005, and 1.2 more in 2009. This suggests that UDI receives more funds from business groups and/or wealthy donors.

⁹When the contributions for presidential campaigns are included, the differences are even larger, with a maximum of 5 times more for the last presidential election. However, this numbers are distorted as the pact between UDI and RN presented a presidential candidate from UDI (Evelyn Matthei)

¹⁰Data on reserved contributions is not available for 2013.




Figure 3.6: Percentage of leaders with ties to business groups

In addition, it is worth mentioning the large amounts of funds that UDI has as own contributions. This could indicate that many of the wealthy or business leaders within the party are contributing also to the party (see especially Figures 3.8, and 3.9).

This analysis shows that UDI has built highly strong ties to business sectors. In particular, the analysis of ties of party leaders to firms shows that UDI leaders have strong ties to *export-oriented* business groups. In addition, this analysis shows that business groups have influenced UDI both internally and externally. The internal

influence is similar to the other Chilean conservative party. However, the external influence of business groups to party leader is stronger for UDI than RN, as UDI has received a much larger amount of private campaign contributions than RN. In the following section I analyze the ties of business groups to RN and see how these ties have affected the party's economic program.




Figure 3.7: Private Contributions to Chilean Political Parties 2005-2013

Amounts are in USD as of 2005, 2009, and 2013




Figure 3.8: Campaign Contributions to Chilean Parties by Type of Contribution 2005

Amounts are in USD as of 2005




Figure 3.9: Campaign Contributions to Chilean Parties by Type of Contribution 2009

Amounts are in USD as of 2009




Figure 3.10: Campaign Contributions to Chilean Parties by Type of Contribution 2013

Amounts are in USD as of 2013




Figure 3.11: Private Campaign Contributions to Chilean Parties (2005-2013)

Amounts are in USD as of 2005, 2009, and 2013. Moving Average.




Figure 3.12: Campaign Contributions from Business Groups or Wealthy Donors (2005-2013)
 Amounts are in USD as of 2005 and 2013 respectively. Values correspond to reserved contributions.

3.3.2 RN

Renovación Nacional has medium ties to business groups. Similar to UDI, RN leaders have strong ties to *export-oriented* business groups. An analysis of the ties of party leaders to business groups shows similar levels of ties between RN leaders and business groups vis-à-vis UDI. However, different from UDI, RN leaders receive considerably less campaign contributions from business groups than UDI.

As Pollack (1999, 132) explains, Renovación Nacional has historically not have as strong ties to business groups as UDI leaders. Several decisions by RN leaders show this. First, RN's lack of support to the entrepreneurial-backed presidential candidate (Hernan Büchi) in 1989. Second, RN decided to support the *Concertación's* labour and tax reforms during the first years of the new center-left governments of Aylwin and Frei. This contrasts with the more hard-line pro-business positions of UDI leaders. Third, RN leaders do not have the same level of ties that UDI leaders have to the economic leaders of the Pinochet regime that implemented most of the pro-business policies of the Chilean economic model.

This more tense relationship between business groups and RN leaders is translated in more moderate economic positions, as showed by the analysis of press releases in Chapter 2. In particular, RN leaders have had a more moderate position than UDI leaders, showing a greater support to the public sector. The analysis of topic models in Chapter 2 has at least two topics that show the party's support for the public sector and criticism to certain private companies. For instance, top leaders of the party defended hospital workers that were protesting cuts by the government (PR-RN 4), criticized "massive layoffs from different government offices" (PR-RN 129), and presented formal complains about "the layoffs of government officials in the health sector" (PR-RN 233). In addition, party leaders have inquired businesses to check the security for its workers (PR-RN 97), to avoid increases in oil prices (PR-RN 47), or to avoid tariffs hikes in electrical services (PR-RN 280).

However, RN press releases show a strong support to three business groups' interests: agricultural, forestry, and mining firms. The topic named 'agiculture' in Table 2.1 show a cluster of press releases showing the concern of RN leaders regarding the wild fires in the south of Chile (e.g. PR-RN 399, 305, 8, 175), as well as their support to small and medium agricultural firms (309, 362, 314, 492). In particular, RN leaders claim for greater subsidies to the agricultural sector. The third business-related topic that RN has focused on is related to mining activities. In particular, RN has criticized the government on price controls attempts on mining-related activities (PR-RN 319), asked for greater investments for the mining sector (PR-RN 18), or for lower levels of taxations for the mining sector (73.)

To explain this mix position of RN press releases on their economic policies I

analyze both the *types* of business groups that RN has ties to, as well as both the internal and external mechanisms through which business groups may influence party leaders.

The analysis of the data of the ties of RN leaders to business groups suggest that RN has strong ties to export-oriented groups. The data from Poderopedia includes an analysis of 72 party leaders. As Figure 3.13 shows, RN leaders have numerous ties to firms in finance, law, media, real estate, and manufacturing. Similar to UDI, firms in finance represent the sector with more ties to RN, but the percentage of ties is significant smaller (57.89% for UDI, and 37.84% for RN). This figure also suggests that RN has more diversified ties than UDI. Another difference between RN and UDI is that RN leaders have more ties to firms in manufacturing as well as in media. An analysis of the positions that party leaders have in private companies shows that the stronger ties of RN leaders are to finance (38.46%), law (38.46%), real estate (34.62%), media (23.08%), agriculture (15.38%), and manufacturing (11.54%) (see Figure 3.14). While this analysis shows greater ties to manufacturing sectors than UDI, these ties are significantly lower than the case of PRO, as the next section will show.

The strong ties of party leaders to activities such as agriculture, mining, and forestry (vis-à-vis other parties) may explain why the party did not moderate in topics that concerned these industries. Similarly, we should not expect a moderation of economic policy on topics related to finance. However, the topic model of my analysis does not pick up a focus of the party (neither in favor nor against) on finance-related issues. Last, the greater moderation of the party on topics such as gasoline prices or public health workers may be related to a lower level of ties of party leaders to the health sector or to oil companies (vis-à-vis UDI).

While this data is useful to help us determine the *type* of business groups that RN has built ties to, we need to analyze how business groups are influencing party's policies, whether through the internal and/or the external mechanisms. Figure 3.6 shows that for RN the internal mechanism is particularly strong. The data from poderopedia shows that 51.39% of party leaders have ties to business groups. However, RN has a lower level of party leaders in top positions vis-à-vis UDI (see Figure 3.15). In any case, the data suggests strong presence of business representatives within Renovación Nacional.

Nevertheless, RN has a strong difference to UDI regarding the external mechanism. RN has received significant lower levels of private campaign contributions. Figures 3.7 and 3.11 shows that while RN is the second most funded party through private contributions, it is still significantly behind UDI. Not surprisingly, private actors donate the most to right wing parties, then to center parties, and last to left-wing parties. Nevertheless, UDI receives an average of 2.3 times more private

contributions than RN. In addition, when we restrict the analysis to reserved contributions, i.e. those that probably come from either wealthy individuals or business groups, UDI receives an average of 2.1 times more than RN. The greater levels of contributions of business groups to UDI have also been studied by the literature on Chilean parties Barozet and Aubry (2005); Luna (2014); Pollack (1999). The support of RN leaders to reforms to laws regulating campaign contributions, and the stark opposition of UDI leaders, would also suggest that UDI receives significantly more contributions from wealthy individuals and business groups.

In summary, RN leaders show medium ties to business groups when compared to other conservative parties. RN leaders have a strong presence of business groups within the party, particularly of business groups on export-oriented activities. However, RN receives less financial support from business groups. This mixed relation to business groups allows the party to moderate on certain economic topics, but not on others.




Figure 3.13: Ties of RN leaders to business groups, by sector




Figure 3.14: RN leaders with top positions in business groups, by sector



Figure 3.15: Number of Party Leaders with Top Positions to Business Groups

3.3.3 PRO

Leaders of PRO have medium to weak ties to business groups when compared to other conservative parties in the region. In particular, business groups do not have strong external or internal influence to the party. In addition, most of the ties of party leaders to business groups are to ISI business groups, which differs from the Chilean cases and from the case of UCeDe.

Chapter 2 in this dissertation shows that PRO is the party that has been able to moderate the most its economic rhetoric. In all of its economic proposals, PRO avoids any language that would tie them with a right-wing pro-market party. The party claims that PRO should support the agricultural sector (PR-PRO 450) and the regional economies in order to increase exports and produce growth (PR-PRO 124). The party also sustains that Argentina should have clear rules in order to attract investment which will generate employment (PR-PRO 99, 481). While these policies might imply a more open economy, the party never mentions it in these terms and makes sure always to frame it in a way that it will create more employment and more equality.

When the party is forced to answer a question whether they do want to privatize or nationalize certain company, PRO leaders tend to answer that these are obsolete debates and that ‘left’ and ‘right’ ideologies no longer exist (PR-PRO 731). For instance PR-PRO 415 states that ‘the issue whether to privatize or nationalize should be analyzed case per case looking at the data and considering planning goals, and mainly overcoming the obsolete ideological debates that no longer exist anywhere in the world. Instead we generate confrontations and use deceptive rhetoric’. Even more, Macri, the party’s main leader, has changed his mind about his position on certain nationalizations, for instance with the national flagship airline Aerolíneas Argentinas or with the national oil company YPF.

PRO press releases also frame the need of developing the agricultural sector as the main way to reduce poverty and unemployment: ‘the real solution for the problems of unemployment and poverty will come the day we free the productive strength of the agricultural sector and we end the arbitrary regulations that the current government has imposed’ (PR-PRO 79). This framing contradicts the fact that the agricultural sector in Argentina is not labor-intensive and has historically had low wages to its employees.

Why has PRO been able to avoid pro-market positions while all the other conservative parties in this study have not? This moderate economic position is central to PRO’s success and has helped the party expand its electoral coalition. To explain PRO’s economic moderation I analyze the ties of party leaders to business groups.

Mauricio Macri, PRO’s main leader and first conservative president democrati-

cally elected in Argentina, is himself a businessman. Macri's father, Franco Macri, is one of the most important businessmen in Argentina. Franco Macri was the leader of SOCMA and Grupo Macri, one of the most powerful economic groups in Argentina. Their activity has focused mostly on construction (Sideco), and automobiles (Sevel), but it has been able to diversify to other activities such as garbage removal (Manilba), mail services (Correo Argentino), and food industries. The Macri Group is considered a "quintessential strong ISI business actor" (Etchemendy, 2014, 151). In addition, as Etchemendy (2014) explains, the power of ISI business groups such as the Macri Group helped them to get considerable concessions and benefits during the market reforms of the 1990s.

The Macri Group has always had strong ties to the state and these ties had been central to improve the group's performance. News articles have described the Macri Group as belonging to the *patria contratista*: a group of business men and women than have made their fortune through contracts (contratos) with the government.

Mauricio Macri has had top positions in the different companies of the Macri Group. However, he is not the only person in the party that has come from such a background. In fact, as [?60]Vommaro2015PRO explain, the "business faction" within the party comes mostly from SOCMA. Néstor Grindetti, Juan Pablo Piccardo, and Andrés Ibarra, among others, all come from senior positions in SOCMA. Morresi and Vommaro (N.d.) describe the business faction as a homogenous group, with solid business experience, and with strong ties to Macri. As the authors say, "the links between Macri and this group can hardly be exaggerated, since most of its members were former SOCMA senior employees that had already previously accompanied him when he was president of [the soccer club] Boca Juniors."

This analysis suggests that the party has some *internal influence* of ISI business groups. However, as Morresi and Vommaro (N.d.) explain, this group is one of five groups, and not even the majoritarian one. However, they do control central top positions, with Macri the indisputable party leader.

Many of these leaders do no longer have positions at the Macri Group, except Mauricio Macri. This would suggest that they would not go in personal loss in case they implement policies that would affect ISI business groups. An analysis of the tax reports (declaraciones juradas) of those members of PRO that work in government shows that the leaders have ties to agricultural companies, as well as real estate companies, mainly.¹¹ This data, however, is limited, as many of these tax reports lack information about the companies party leaders have ties to. It is hard, though, to analyze whether party leaders are at personal loss when they choose more moderate economic programs.

¹¹The analysis of the tax reports used the data collected by La Nación DATA.

However, we do have some evidence to show that the business leaders within the party have an ideological commitment to ISI business groups interests, particularly regarding state intervention. Morresi and Vommaro (N.d., 13) surveyed PRO party leaders and asked them about their position on different ideological stances. Their data shows that 80% of the members of the business faction agrees with greater “state intervention to reduce inequalities.” In addition, only 66.7% of the business groups believes that the “market is considered the best mechanism of distribution.” While similar data for Chile is not available, personal interviews with Chilean conservative leaders suggest that Chilean leaders would prefer greater role for the market vis-à-vis the state.

This analysis has showed that PRO leaders have some *internal influence* of ISI business groups. In order to analyze the *external influence* of business groups I analyze, similar to the Chilean parties, private contributions to political parties in Argentina.¹² This analysis suggests that the external influence of business groups to PRO is weak, but has increased in the last few years.

Figures 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19 show that PRO leaders has consistently received less private campaign contributions than peronist parties, especially the Kirchners’ Frente Para la Victoria (FPV). Given the high variability of party labels in Argentina I have opted to include the top recipients of private campaign contributions in each graph. In each graph several peronist parties are included, such as Frente para la Victoria, Frente Justicialista Union y Libertad, PJ, Union Popular, Union para el Desarrollo, or Frente Renovador. Similarly, I include several middle-class parties such as UCR, Frente Amplio Progresista, UNEN, Frente Progresista Civico y Social. For PRO, in some elections PRO is allied to Union PRO.

While the Frente para la Victoria has been able to receive considerably larger levels of campaign contributions, an analysis of the composition of those contributions suggests that PRO has, in the last few elections, received greater contributions from wealthy donors or business groups. Except for 2007 (Figure 3.20 and 3.21), the median of PRO’s contributions is considerably higher than Frente para la Victoria (see Figures 3.22, 3.23). In 2009, both parties have a similar median of campaign contributions (4506 usd for PRO, and 4538 usd for FPV), but FPV still receives more higher contributions. Starting in 2011, FPV loses most of its top donors, who choose either opposition peronist candidates (such as Eduardo Duhalde) or PRO. The median for PRO in 2011 doubles the median of FPV (2410 vs. 1386 respectively). However, top donors are still choosing peronist candidates over PRO: the upper

¹²The analysis has been done with the data collected by La Ruta Electoral, an open source website which has collected all private campaign contributions since 2007. Their data comes mostly from official sources, particularly the Cámara Nacional Electoral. I thank Andy Tow for giving me access to this data, as well as for his electoral data at andytow.com/atlas

quintile for Duhalde starts at over 10,000 dollars, while for pro it starts at 4687 usd. It is worth mentioning than PRO did not have a presidential candidate in 2011, which may explain why top donors opted to support peronist candidates more. For 2013 (Figure 3.23), the data shows a different pattern. PRO has been the party with the highest median (3273 usd), and the highest number for the upper quartile (6000 usd). However, the highest single contributions still goes for FPV. While the data for the 2015 presidential election is not yet available, the trend probably continues as it is the first time that PRO has a presidential candidate (Mauricio Macri), who actually won.

The analysis of private campaign contributions suggests that while FPV has been the most funded party, there has been a gradual shift of top contributors (probably wealthy individuals and/or business groups) from peronism to PRO. However, the support from top donors to PRO is still smaller than other right-wing parties, especially those in Chile. While in Chile there is a clear positive correlation between right-wing ideology and private contributions, in Argentina top donors have given resources to both peronist and PRO candidates. Actually, with exception of 2013, business groups or wealthy individuals have supported mostly peronist candidates. This coincides with what PRO leaders told me in in-depth interviews. In most interviews, PRO leaders complained for the lack of support from business groups, as they claimed these groups tend to support peronist candidates more.

In summary, this analysis has showed that PRO has medium to weak ties to ISI business groups. These business groups have some internal influence within PRO, but they are not a majority as in the Chilean cases. Additionally, business groups have a weak external influence over party leaders, as they have contributed more to peronist than to PRO candidates. This also differs strongly from the evidence from Chile.




Figure 3.16: Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2007

Amounts are in USD as of 2007




Figure 3.17: Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2009
Amounts are in USD as of 2009




Figure 3.18: Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2011
Amounts are in USD as of 2011




Figure 3.19: Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2013
Amounts are in USD as of 2013




Figure 3.20: Distribution of Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2007

Amounts are in USD as of 2007




Figure 3.21: Distribution of Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2009
Amounts are in USD as of 2009




Figure 3.22: Distribution of Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2011

Amounts are in USD as of 2011




Figure 3.23: Distribution of Private Contributions to Argentinean Political Parties 2013

Amounts are in USD as of 2013

3.3.4 UCeDe

UCeDe had strong ties to business groups. Similarly to the Chilean parties, the ties that UCeDe built were mostly to liberal, export-oriented business groups. In particular, the party counted with a large presence of business men and women within the party, which would indicate that business groups had *internal influence* to UCeDe. However, UCeDe was not largely benefited by financial resources from business groups. Actually, most business groups in Argentina opted to support other parties. Many of these business groups focused on ISI activities and felt threatened by the liberal ideology defended by UCeDe leaders.

As the second chapter in this dissertation shows, UCeDe implemented a neoliberal strategy to attract new voters. The party's main leader, Álvaro Alsogaray, spent most of his political and technocratic life defending the role of market-freedom and fighting for the elimination of any state intervention in the economic realm. As Gibson (1996, 109) explains, "he was obsessively single-minded in that goal." For this reason, Alsogaray focused on making UCeDe as the main defender of liberalism in Argentina. The party's *Declaración de Principios* started with a profound critique to the "statist, interventionist, and dirigist regime that prevailed -with slight modifications- since 1943-45" (UCeDe, 1983, 1). UCeDe was founded to "fight against this economic system" and to "restore republican and liberal values." The party program made special emphasis on the need of protecting individual rights, freedom, and private property. The party promoted the privatization of public companies, the elimination of regulations and bureaucratic rules that would intercede against private initiatives, and a drastic reduction of state interventions. This purely liberal economic program was the central component of UCeDe and the main tool to attract supporters. Contrary to what we see in PRO, UCeDe leaders were not willing to moderate their economic appeals in order to try to attract a larger sector of the electorate. In fact, UCeDe leaders were so committed to neoliberal ideas that they thought that spreading a neoliberal message would help them get the support of poor and middle-class voters.

To explain the party's decision to use a neoliberal strategy I analyze the ties of the party to business groups in Argentina. The analysis focuses on understanding not only the strength of ties between business and UCeDe, but also the *type of business* that the party had ties to, as well as the mechanisms (external or internal) that helped business groups to influence party strategies. Unfortunately, different than for the other countries, we lack data on campaign contributions or about the personal trajectories of UCeDe leaders (as many of this data has never been collected). I rely, though, on existing literature as well as media coverage of the time.

UCeDe, as the Chilean RN and UDI, counted with a large presence of business

men and women within the party. In particular, these were business men and women that agreed with the market-oriented ideology of the party. However, the party lacked the support of the Argentine business class as a whole. In fact, as Gibson (1996, 159) shows, several business groups felt threatened by market-oriented policies promoted by Alsogaray and its followers. In the 1980s, several business groups were the most powerful business groups in Argentina. These industrial groups were highly dependent upon the state, and needed state subsidies and protection in order to survive. The hard economic times of the 1980s made this dependence even stronger. For these business leaders it was hard to accept UCeDe's ideology, which promised to end state subsidies to private actors as well as reduce the role of the state in the economy. As Vicens and Gerchunoff show (cited in Gibson (1996, 159)), in the 1980s the government had subsidies to private industries for over 3 billion usd. The threat of UCeDe of cutting those subsidies made impossible an alliance between ISI business groups and the party.

As a consequence, UCeDe had a strong presence of export-oriented business leaders, which would indicate *internal influence* of business, but lacked *external influence* as the business sector in Argentina in the 1980s was reluctant to support market-oriented reforms. In fact, as Gibson (1996, 160) shows, the people in charge of obtaining campaign contributions from business groups declared that in multiple meetings with the business community they “assured business leaders that the free-market posture of the UCeDe was a long-term “ideal”, to be accomplished step by step, without disrupting the viability of business activities.” These attempts, however, failed and the party did not receive high levels of financial support.

Liberal, export-oriented business groups, however, controlled the party from within. For instance, among the business leaders within the party was Alberto Gustavo Albamonte, co-founder of UCeDe with Alsogaray and elected to the House of Representatives on 1987 and 1991. His career activities as a businessman focused mainly on foreign trade and media. Similarly, another figure among the business leaders of UCeDe was Pereyra de Olazabal, a devoted liberal, who also focused on foreign trade activities.¹³ His commitment to liberalism was so strong that during the military regime, as Secretary of Industry of the Province of Buenos Aires, he signed a decree to eliminate manufacturing (Viguera, 2000, 116).

The ideological commitment from Alsogaray and the other party leaders to *liberalismo* made it impossible for the party to adopt a more pragmatic strategy of economic moderation. Not only would have moderation helped the party to attract greater electoral support, but it could have also helped the party to obtain greater

¹³Pereyra de Olazabal would later on had a top position for the Menem government and he himself would be in charge of privatizations of energy, iron and steel companies.

financial resources from Argentina's business groups.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I analyze how business groups can influence conservative parties strategies to attract new voters. In particular, business groups can shape the economic program of conservative parties.

This chapter has showed that business groups may have two different ways of influencing conservative parties. First, through generous campaign contributions business groups may exercise an *external influence* to the party. In this scenario, conservative party leaders become dependent of business groups as they need those resources to maintain the party organization or to improve their electoral performance. This dependence gives power to business groups, as these groups may threaten party leaders to cut those funds if the party chooses to implement a program that affects business interests. Second, business groups may exercise *internal influence* to the party. In this case, business leaders are also party leaders. As a consequence, these business leaders may have an ideological commitment to defend business interests, and/or they may face a personal loss if the party chooses policies that may affect business groups. Therefore, these party leaders may oppose from within the party any policy against businesses' interests.

In addition, this chapter has showed that ties to business groups is not the only variable that explains the economic positioning of conservative parties. To understand how business groups might want to shape the party's economic policy we also need to analyze the *type of business groups* that a party has ties to. In particular, I have distinguished between two types of business groups: ISI business groups and export-oriented business groups.

The case of UDI shows how moderation was impossible given the strong ties of party leaders to export-oriented business groups. In particular, UDI leaders have received a large amount of resources in campaign contributions that has made the party dependent on these business groups. Moreover, a large amount of party leaders have also been business men and women in export-oriented activities, particularly mining, agriculture, health, and finance. As a consequence, the party has consistently defended a neoliberal economic policy, focusing on the importance of the market as the main actor to regulate economic activities.

The case of RN shows a strong difference with the UDI case. RN leaders show medium level of ties to export-oriented business groups. In particular, RN leaders also have a strong internal presence of export-oriented business groups in finance, law, media, and agriculture. These ties have made RN have a strong defense of the

interests of these sectors, particularly agriculture. However, the party has weaker external influence when compared to the other Chilean conservative party: UDI. RN leaders have received significantly lower levels of campaign contributions, especially from business groups and/or wealthy individuals. As a consequence the party has had some limited economic moderation, particularly on topics related to public sector employees and health workers.

The case of PRO, in Argentina, shows a different picture than the one from UDI or RN. PRO has been the party that has moderated the most its economic appeals. I explained this moderation by looking at ties to business groups. In particular, I show that PRO leaders have weak external influence from business groups, as they have received limited campaign contributions when compared to other parties in Argentina. Additionally, the economic moderation of PRO was possible given that the party has ties to ISI business groups, not export-oriented business groups. The evidence in this chapter shows that the business leaders within the party are more prone to have a stronger role of the state in the economy, as well as certain protections to private actors.

Last, the case of UCeDe is a case where the party has strong internal influence of export-oriented business groups. These groups have chosen to follow a neoliberal strategy. However, different from cases as UDI, the leaders from UCeDe lacked any external influence from business groups. This is due to the fact that business leaders in Argentina in the 1980s, mostly focused on ISI activities, were threaten with UCeDe's liberalization program.

In summary, this chapter has showed that business leaders can have two different paths to influence party's policies. In addition, conservative party leaders may have ties to different types of business groups, which will affect their economic positions differently. Analyzing both variables, the strength of ties as well as the type of business that a party has ties to, are central to understanding why a conservative party may choose to moderate its economic appeals while others opt for a more neoliberal economic program.

Chapter 4

Conservative Parties and the Catholic Church

This chapter explores how the ties of party leaders to the Catholic Church influences the outreach strategies of conservative parties. Similar to the other conservative institutions, the Catholic Church can influence party strategies through the external or the internal path. In the external path, the Catholic church provides party leaders with valuable mobilizational resources, as access to poor neighborhoods, public support, or recruitment of young catholic militants. The church can use these mobilizational resources to pressure parties to adopt strategies that will benefit their interests. In the internal path, party leaders also belong to catholic or ultra-catholic organizations, such as Opus Dei, and decide to defend the church's interests from within.

In this chapter I first focus on the theoretical argument, explaining how the Catholic Church influences party strategies. Then, I analyze the political role that the Catholic Church has historically had in Argentina and Chile in the 20th century and how it has been tied to political parties in Argentina and Chile. Last, I analyze the cases of UDI, RN, UCeDe, and PRO in order to understand their ties to the church and how this has shaped their position on moral values.

4.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Alliance between the Catholic Church and Conservative Parties

The Catholic Church has been an ally of conservative actors in several moments of the 20th century in Latin America. While the Church can provide parties with attractive resources that would help the party to expand its electoral support, the church can also constrain the party to adapt policies that will harm their interests. In particular, in the new democratic regime the Catholic Church may constrain party leaders to adopt a strategy of orthogonal appeals based on progressive moral values. Progressive moral values are particularly attractive for conservative parties, given the increase of social demands for greater moral freedoms (such as divorce, gay rights, abortion), as well as for the fact that priming these appeals will allow the party to continue with a right-wing economic agenda. However, strong ties to the Catholic Church may make this option unavailable.

The literature on the Catholic church in Latin America describes three main interests of the Catholic church in the last decades. First, an institutionalist tradition views the Roman Catholic church as a organization with a powerful bureaucracy that aims to defend the church's *corporate interests* (see Vallier (1970)). This interests consist, mainly, of maintaining the status of Catholicism as the dominant religion in Latin America, keeping the flock, gaining public support for the web of schools and charitable organizations that educate and socialize Catholics, and staying financially solvent (Hagopian, 2006, 9).

Second, a central goal of the Catholic church is to maintain *morality in the public sphere*, particularly influencing public policy on family values and issues of life and death (Hagopian, 2006, 9). Since 1992, when the Latin American Catholic Bishops Conference embraced John Paul's II new evangelization project, the Catholic church has had an active role in defending the importance of "traditional" family values, attacking divorce, gay marriage, abortion, or the use of contraceptives.

Last, the Catholic church in Latin America in the last few decades has focused on advancing its *social doctrine*. This included demands to reduce poverty, to increase the minimum wage, to give land for the tiller, and to have universal access to health and education (Hagopian, 2006, 9).

Since the 1980s, the Catholic church has been particularly active in promoting its interests as three main changes have threaten its power. First, an increase in religion pluralism, i.e. the increasing popularity of other religions (especially Evangelicals), has threatened the monopolist position of the Catholic church. This was translated into stronger pressure from the church to state officials to defend its corporate inter-

ests. As Hagopian (2008, 151) explains, religion pluralism brought special challenges to the Catholic church under the new democratic regime. “State-granted privileges are harder to justify in any case when a religious monopoly erodes but especially so in the open debate of a democratic society. Particularly endangered are state subsidies for the salaries of priests, maintenance of church buildings, and Catholic education; tax exemption on church assets, direct public support for Catholic charities and social services, and the right to provide religious instruction in the public schools.”

Second, the transition to democracy implied a new scenario where politicians are now more prone to responding to increasing demands on passing reforms on moral or family values (Hagopian, 2008, 151). In particular, the church wants to resist reforms related to family conceptions and reproductive rights, such as abortion rights, divorce, same-sex marriage, embryonic stem cell research, the morning-after pill, sexual reproduction education, and public campaigns distributing condoms. To resist these reforms the church has increased its demands to state officials.

While in some countries, such as Brazil, the church after the transition to democracy continued with an agenda that defends the economic interest of poor sectors, this is not the case for either the Chilean or the Argentinean church (see Hagopian (2008) for an explanation on this topic). Both in Argentina and in Chile, the Catholic church in the new democratic agenda focused mostly on defending their corporate interests as well as its moral agenda.

4.1.1 Constraining Conservative Parties: the Catholic Church External and Internal Influence

In the new democratic period, the Church can influence the policy of conservative parties both through the *external* and the *internal* paths.

In the *external path*, the Catholic Church is a strong powerful external institution with the capacity to influence the party’s position. An alliance with the Church can provide key mobilizational resources to the party that can create dependence of the party on the Church. The *mobilizational capacity* of the church refers to the capacity of the church to mobilize its rank and file for political action. Following Hagopian (2008) church mobilization depends on the density of voluntary associations and the degree to which membership in secular civic and religious associations overlaps.¹

¹While in the last decades the church has lost its dominance over social networks (Hagopian, 2008, 150), it still may have a capacity to mobilize some of its parishioners. Hagopian (2008) explains the decrease in the mobilizational capacity of the church since the transition to democracy: ‘Much of civil society in which the church invested heavily in fostering Catholic Action, ecclesiastic base

But why is the mobilizational capacity of the Church relevant for conservative parties that want to expand their electoral bases? First, the widespread presence of the Catholic church in Latin America can help conservative parties *increase their presence in poor neighborhoods*. In Latin America -as in several other developing countries- the Catholic church has widespread presence in poor neighborhoods. With low levels of state presence in these neighborhoods, the local church -and normally the local priest- plays a central role in helping the local community. In these areas, priests commonly take a leadership position to help improve the social and economic conditions of the neighborhood by demanding services from the state or providing food, medications, or other basic necessities at the local church. For most politicians, entering a poor area without a local leader is almost impossible. This is particularly true for conservative parties, who normally lack any connection with the local population or its leaders. If a conservative politician wants to access a poor neighborhood to campaign, it will certainly need the support of the local priest.

Second, given the high popularity of religion among low-income voters, the *public support* of the Catholic church (or some of its members) to a conservative party can affect positively the party's image. In Latin America, Catholics represent a 69% percent of the general population (2014 Pew Research survey, see 4.1 for a detail for each Latin American country). In addition, an analysis of public opinion surveys reveals that low-income voters are also more religious than middle and upper sectors, with higher levels of mass attendance. The high levels of religion in Latin America make the Catholic church an attractive partner to almost any political party. A public endorsement of the church, or at least of some of its members -either at the local or national level- can have a positive effect on the image and receptivity of the candidate.

Last, the Catholic church -through its multiple educational institutions- can help parties *recruit young students* as party militants. In Latin America -as in many other regions in the world- the church has been able to develop a broad network of Catholic schools and universities. An alliance of conservative parties with the church can give parties access to these educational centers. In particular, parties might be able to recruit from both high-schools and universities a large number of young citizens willing to participate in political or social activities. Among Catholics, the doctrine of social solidarity, makes young Catholics particularly interested in helping low-income communities. As a consequence, conservative parties can not only recruit a vast number of militants, but also militants willing to participate in activities at poor neighborhoods.

communities, and other forms of lay participation is now mobilized in organizations that lie beyond the reach of ecclesiastical authority.'

Table 4.1: Catholics in Latin America

Country	Raised Catholic	Currently Catholic
Nicaragua	75	50
Uruguay	64	42
Brazil	81	61
El Salvador	69	50
Dominican Republic	75	57
Puerto Rico	73	56
Argentina	86	71
Costa Rica	77	62
Honduras	61	46
Peru	90	76
Chile	77	64
Colombia	92	79
Venezuela	86	73
Ecuador	91	79
Guatemala	62	50
Bolivia	88	77
Mexico	90	81
Paraguay	94	89
Panama	74	70

Percentage of respondents to the 2014 “PEW Research Religious Survey in Latin America” that identify themselves as Catholics.

To sum up, in the path of *external influence* an alliance with the Catholic church can provide conservative parties with three key mobilizational resources to attract poor voters: the church has an organized infrastructure in poor neighborhoods; they have influence among voters in these neighborhoods, and they generate activist who can militate on behalf of the party. However, as the next section shows, an alliance with the Catholic church does not come free of costs.

In the case of the *internal path*, the party is not constrained by a powerful external Catholic Church, but by the fact that many of the party leaders are also members of Catholic organizations. In its most extreme case, priests or religious authorities are also in control of the party. In its more common case, party leaders belong to catholic or ultra-catholic organizations such as Opus Dei or Legionarios de Cristo. In this path, these party leaders will oppose a moderation of the party’s position on moral values for one or two reasons. First, these party leaders do not personally agree with

a reform of the moral values. For instance, party leaders belonging to Opus Dei will most likely oppose abortion rights, not just because the Catholic Church is pressuring the leader (as in the external path), but primarily because of the members' personal beliefs. Second, party leaders who belong to Catholic organizations might also be in risk if they choose to support a moderation of the party's policy on moral values. In particular, the risk could be that the Catholic organizations decides to expel the party leader from its organization. In its most extreme case, a priest that is also a party leader might jeopardize his religious position if he decides to support abortion rights. Figure 4.1 summarizes the argument.

To summarize, the Catholic Church in Argentina and Chile may use its external and internal influence to shape conservative party strategies. In particular, the Church will use these two paths to avoid the introduction of a progressive moral agenda.




Figure 4.1: Causal Argument for the Catholic Church

4.2 Historical Relationship

Since the formation of modern states in Latin America the Catholic church has been a central actor. Inheriting its power from the colonial times, the church was a wealthy organization with tight ideological links to broad sectors of society. Therefore, the church's institutional presence was an obstacle for the political consolidation of the new republican states. As Gill (2008, 29) explains, "The difficulties usually associated with consolidating a new regime required that the newly independent republics avoid alienating the institutional influence of Catholicism. Nevertheless, such an attitude did not prevent these governments from seeking to control the church."

Under the threats of the new regime, the church opted to build an alliance with Conservative forces to protect their interests. In the second half of the nineteenth century, when Liberal parties reached power, the process of church-state separation began. Given the strong ties between the religious hierarchy and conservative rural interests, Liberal groups chose to attack one of the Conservative's main allies: the Catholic church. This coincided with the modernizing values and ideology that Liberal parties adopted. In addition, as Gill (2008, 30) explains, the attack of Liberals against the church also helped Liberals to strengthen the new states. First, the extensive landed estates owned by the church became an attractive target for Liberal groups as an easy way to raise revenue. The expropriation and sell of these lands would not only allow the state for immediate revenue, but also the agricultural exploitation of those lands by private actors would generate greater revenue through export taxes. Second, Liberals decision to secularize cemeteries and marriages helped strengthen the new state apparatus, by providing the government with a basic administrative capacity to tax the population.

Initially, the church hierarchy sought to respond to these threats by forging an alliance with Conservative parties. But once bishops realized that the reforms were there to stay and even Conservative would not reverse them, they started an accommodating strategy. This meant that the church sought to disassociate themselves from a single set of elites and learned to accommodate any regime held political power, be it liberal, conservative, democratic, or authoritarian (Gill, 2008, 32-3). This was translated in a greater effort by the church to lobby for two specific benefits: education policies and public funding to church organizations (Gill, 2008, 33). In general, during the first half of the twentieth century the church maintained a cordial relationship to the state.

Argentina and Chile diverged in the development of the relationship between the church and political actors from the mid twentieth century. I explain each country separately.

4.2.1 Chile

The Catholic church in Chile faced the threat of an increasing expansion of socialist and communist ideas among its parishioners. This expansion threaten the church with a sharp increase in atheism among popular sectors. Chilean bishops opted first to rely on alliances with political elites, mostly through a neutral political position but a tacit alliance with the Conservative party (Gill, 2008, 126). The alliance with Conservatives was a less costly way for the church to fight against the communist threat, as it did not force the church to funnel more resources to a greater pastoral activity. While this alliance paid its dividends, the church did not rule out pastoral actions. As Gill (2008, 129) explains, the church nurtured grassroots organizations in poor areas and began urging social action to alleviate the plight of the poor. “Chilean episcopacy became the first in Latin America to shift substantial attention to the lower classes.”

A split in the Conservative party made the church strategy less attractive. The bishops opposed the new faction, Falange Nacional, as it would destroy the political power of its main ally. When in 1956 another group split from the Conservatives and join the Falange to form the Christian Democratic Party, it became evident for the church that they could no longer rely on an alliance with the Conservative party (Gill, 2008, 130). In addition, the more pro-poor program of the Christian Democrats made the alliance between this party and the church more natural.

This coincided with emergence of Catholic progressivism in Latin America which started with the Second Vatican Council and the Second General Conference of CELAM in Medellín Colombia. With the leadership of Raúl Silva Henríquez the church declared its position in favor of social justice and the poor. This was a break with the past, as the Catholic church had historically had a pro-elite orientation. In this conference the church decided to advocate for the development of *comunidades eclesiales de base* (CEBs), in English ecclesial base communities. These CEBs were local organization, with 15 to 30 people, who would meet regularly to discuss the Bible. However, the CEBs also had a social aspect and organized community activities to improve the local neighborhoods, to press the government for better public services, to teach participants working skills, or to provide clothing to the poorest (Gill, 2008, 37). This new orientation of the church was accompanied with a new intellectual orientation called the Liberation Theology, which attempted to improve the conditions of the poorest social classes against the oppression of the elites.

By the 1960s, official church documents showed a clear position connecting the need for evangelization with social justice (see (Gill, 2008, 138)). The church even advocated land reform, which attacked one of its former allies the landed elite. In addition, the church intensified its activity in poor areas, creating educational assis-

tance programs, the creation of cooperatives, land reform programs, and a greater presence of the church in labor unions. CEBs officially started in Chile in 1968 (Gill, 2008, 140).

During the socialist government of Salvador Allende, the church and the state maintained a relation of mutual respect. Criticizing a pro-poor President would heart the credibility of the church, but socialism and its inherent atheism made an alliance between church and government impossible. While tensions existed, particularly over education issues, bishops maintained a cordial relation to Allende's government.

Nevertheless, most bishops initially welcomed Pinochet's military coup of 1973. However, soon after one year in government a tense relationship emerged between the regime and the church. As (Gill, 2008, 142) explains, "the episcopacy wanted to continue its social policy, which ran into conflict with the government's demobilization of lower classes." For the Catholic church, given the increasing presence of competitors as Evangelicals or Communist, backing the military regime could threaten the allegiance of the poor to the church (see Gill (2008) for an excellent analysis on this topic). Therefore, the Catholic church opted to oppose the military regime and had a strong role in denouncing the regime's Human Right's violations, as well as providing help to persecuted people. The opposition of the church to Pinochet's regime lasted to its last minute, as bishops advocated for the 'No' option in the 1988 plebiscite.

4.2.2 Argentina

The drafting of the Argentine constitution in 1853 not only marked the beginning of Argentina as a modern state but also the triumph of liberalism and the waning of the church's influence (Gill, 2008, 152). Even if the new constitution declared that the Argentine government would sustain the Roman Catholic religion, the church confronted several setbacks against its power. In particular, the presidency of Julio Roca (1880-1886) introduced several anticlerical reforms, such as the secularization of education, the civil control of the registry, and a law introducing civil marriage.

As a reaction to the advancement of liberalism, the church created in 1928 the *Acción Católica Argentina* (ACA) as a major organizational effort to engage parishioners in their faith (Gill, 2008, 154-5). As Gill (2008) explains, ACA was from its inception conservative and political, asking their members not to vote for those politicians who advocated policies that would harm the church, as the separation of church and state, secular education, or legalized divorce. By 1945 ACA had more than 66 thousands members (Frías 1996), mostly from an urban middle class background. This contrasts with Chile, where *Acción Católica* targeted the blue-collar

working class (Gill, 2008, 155).²

As the church was not able to achieve political victories with the strategy implemented by ACA, the Catholic church opted to achieve greater political influence by supporting a military intervention in 1930. “Rather than relying upon their own resources to fight governments that opposed their interests, bishops could now rely on generals to intercede on their behalf. The relationship was mutually beneficial: The Church provided military dictators with the ideological justification needed to intervene in politics in exchange for a restoration of Church privilege. From this date on, the Church became an implicit, and often explicit, coconspirator in military rule, irrespective of what such support meant for the majority of Catholic parishioners” (Gill, 2008, 156). The alliance with the military allowed several catholic priests to occupy key state offices, as well as lay catholics to occupy ministers or lead universities (Esquivel, 2000, 13-4). Both the military and the church saw this alliance as the way to protect national and catholic interests in order to ‘save’ the Argentine nation.³ It is in this period that the church grows the most in terms of its institutional organization, by expanding the number of parishes, chapels, and dioceses.

With its success in penetrating the elite, as well as the army, universities, middle-class sectors, the church sought to expand among the working class. By this time, the 1940s, the church was at its peak in terms of power and enjoyed large amount of economic resources to expand its actions. However, these attempts would clash with the attempts of the president, Juan Domingo Perón, to build strong ties to the working class. Both peronism and catholicism were competing as totalizing ideologies, attempting to become the hegemonic ideology (Esquivel, 2000, 17). While the peronist government and the church maintained a cordial relationship during the first peronist government, the church became a strong opponent towards the end, choosing to support the military coup in 1955. Once again, the military and the church saw themselves as the guarantee of the Argentine nation. The support of the church to the military regime was translated in a greater expansion of the institutional presence of the church across the Argentine territory.

The position of the church vis-à-vis the peronist movement brought tensions within the church. In particular, younger more reformist sectors of the church opposed the antiperonist positions of the hierarchy. A large number of priests intensified its work towards vulnerable populations, especially in slums and poor neighborhoods.

²To explain this difference across countries Gill (2008) focuses on the threats that the church faced in each country. In Chile, the church was facing religion competition from Protestants and communists who were attracting the support of poor citizens. In Argentina the church faced a threat from above, mainly from the liberal party Unión Cívica Radical.

³See Zanatta (1996) for an explanation about how the church framed any attack to its interests as an attack to the Argentine nation.

By the end of the 1960s, both sectors within the church claimed for a greater penetration of catholicism in society, but they differed strongly on the characteristics and methods of such penetration (Caimari, 1995). The radicalization of politics after Peron's death and the violence between left and right wing sectors of peronism, strengthened the position of the conservative sectors of the church and it was translated, once again, in the support of the Catholic church to the military coup in 1976.

Even if not everybody within the church supported the new military regime,⁴ most church officials dismissed allegations of the government human rights abuses and in some cases were even accused of having direct participation during repression acts (see CONADEP report for greater details). Once government repression became widespread and difficult to deny, Catholic church leaders framed their critiques in a way not to fully blame the military regime (Gill, 2008, 164-5). In exchange for this support, the church obtained several benefits, which strengthen its position vis-à-vis other cults, as well as in terms of its corporate interests (Gill, 2008, 164-6).

4.3 Cases

To understand the relationship between the church and conservative groups I first analyze the mobilizational capacity of the church in each country and then analyze whether party leaders also belong to catholic organizations. These two variables help me understand, for each party, how the Church will constrain party strategies and to detect whether the Church has internal or external influence.

4.3.1 Chile

During the transition to the democratic regime, the Chilean Catholic church was in a strong position. The church had a wide presence across the Chilean territory and counted with wide popular support for its role during the military dictatorship. The Catholic church was seen as one of the most pro-democratic actors, with a central role in defending thousands of victims from Human Rights violations. The role of the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, as well as the presence in the ground through the numerous CEBs, gave the Catholic church both a moral authority and deep ties with the Chilean poor.

⁴The ones that did not suffered the consequences, as the repression against Catholic clergy in 1976 where three priests and two seminarians were assassinated by government offices (Mignone, 1988).

To measure the mobilizational capacity of the church I follow Hagopian (2009). As he explains, “[w]e would ideally want to know not merely how many associations actually exist and how many members they have but also something about how committed their members really are to those organizations, how strong the ties are between secular and religious associations and their members, and how tightly controlled the organizations are by religious authorities” (Hagopian, 2009, 279). For this, the author combines data on the participation of citizens in Latin American countries in civic, trade, and political associations. This data shows the general level of civic participation in a country. But to determine the church’s capacity to mobilize, socialize, and influence Catholics, the author looks at the degree to which membership in religious organizations overlaps with membership in civic associations. As (Hagopian, 2009, 279) explains, the intuition of this measurement is that if lay and religious Catholic activists are present in human rights groups, political parties, youth groups, or community organizations, they will infuse Catholic principles into the organizations they join and spread church influence beyond the orbit of regular churchgoers. The author classifies each of the Latin American countries in his study with a measure of high, medium, and low levels of church mobilizational capacity.

Chile is categorized by Hagopian (2009) as a country where the church has a *medium* capacity to mobilize society. Using the scores of the World Value Survey for 2000, Hagopian shows that in Chile 21% of respondents participate in Church organizations, and that the total overlapping number of respondents who participate both in civil or political organizations as well as religious organizations adds to 16.2%. This number is more than double than the Argentine case (7.5), similar to Peru (17.3), but lower than Mexico (25.5), or Brazil (33.7).

In the new democratic setting, the Catholic church opted to use this mobilizational capacity to defend both its corporate interests as well as its moral agenda. In particular, during the 1990s and the 2000s the Chilean church was alarmed at the possibility of morally progressive policies on topics such as divorce, sex education in schools, and reproductive rights. In the first official document since the transition to democracy, *Certainty, Coherence, and Confidence: Message to Chilean Catholics in an Hour of Transition* (1989), the Church showed its position on a number of values that have been absent from the political and social debates during the Pinochet dictatorship. Primary among those concerns was the fear of the church that an increase in freedom would be translated in a loss of social norms. The document criticizes ‘modern societies’, the deterioration of personal morality, changes in gender roles, marital divorce, and sexual conduct.⁵

An example of the political strength of the Catholic church is seen in its oppo-

⁵See Haas (2004) for an in-depth analysis of this document.

sition to an attempt by the two first democratic Presidents, Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei, to pass comprehensive programs of sex education. The Church saw this initiative as an attempt by the government to impart false values and promote promiscuity, and as a totalitarian move by the government to impose certain values. Several bishops and priest publicly declared its criticism against these programs and ferociously criticized the government for putting at stake the moral grounds of Chilean society. For instance, Cardinal Oviedo warned Chileans to remember that the “real campaign to dissolve the Chilean family is accompanied by aggressive promotion of free love among the young” (quoted in (Haas, 2004, 52)).

The fight around a divorce law might be the best case showing the strength of the Catholic church in Chile, as it was able to successfully avoid any law on divorce until 2004, long after most other Latin American countries (e.g. Argentina passed a divorce law in 1987). In fact, after 1996, when Ireland legalized divorce, Chile became the only nation that lacked some type of legal divorce (Haas, 2004, 55). The Church implemented an intense lobbying campaign, through right-wing politicians, to block all the attempts to pass a divorce law in 1990, 1991, 1994, and 1997 (Haas, 2004, 55). For this, they maintained a continual lobbying presence in Congress and through declarations in the press (Haas, 2004, 55). In particular, they pressured Catholic legislators as “a Catholic must not...favor any divorce law, defend it or support it” (Bishop Medina cited in (Haas, 2004, 58)). The Church fervently urged and pressured Catholic legislators to vote against abortion bills. Given the legitimacy of the church after the transition to democracy, as well as its mobilizational capacity, opposing the Catholic church was a risky strategy.

To fight against this possibility, the Catholic church opted to change its former alliance with the parties that have opposed the military regime (left and center left parties), to a strong alliance with the conservative parties (Haas, 2004; Strassner, 2006). The Church strongly opposed the initiatives to introduce progressive moral reforms and attempted to influence, both left-wing and right-wing politicians to stop it. As (Haas, 2004, 49) explains, “Due to the powerful political influence of the Church, political tendencies from Left to Right felt obligated to concur with the Church’s statements to the extent that they were able. None of the main parties could risk alienating the Church by not appearing responsive to its concerns”. In particular, the Right wholeheartedly embraced the Church’s position against reform seen as morally corrupt (Haas, 2004, 50). In the next subsections I analyze the ties of UDI and RN to the Catholic church and how these ties constrained them to defend the Church interests.

4.3.2 Internal Influence of the Church: the Cases of UDI and RN

As the previous section shows, since the transition to democracy the church in Chile built a strong alliance with the Right. However, neither UDI nor RN had an institutional backing with the Right. In addition, the church also maintained strong linkages with parties from the Concertación, especially the Christian-Democrats. Nevertheless, when the church opted to prioritize its moral agenda over its social doctrine, the Catholic church found a more natural ally in the Chilean conservative parties.

In particular, the church has greater internal influence to UDI than to Renovación Nacional. An analysis of the each party's leadership shows the difference across parties. UDI's leadership was drawn almost exclusively from former student activists from the Catholic University. As (Pollack, 1999, 116) explains, "while only five out of 46 RN congressmen during the Aylwin administration (1990-4) were student leaders at university, 12 of the 16 UDI parliamentarians had participated in university politics." In addition, UDI, not Renovación Nacional, is considered by the literature on Chilean parties, as a religious oriented party (as well as the Christian Democrats) (Luna, Monestier and Rosenblatt, 2013).

When analyzing the main pillars of both RN and UDI, only UDI leaders mention as one of their party's pillars a catholic component. All the party leaders I interviewed, when asked about the main ideas or pillars behind their party, answered that UDI was a party with 'catholic inspiration'. This refers to a strong defense of catholic values, but not necessarily a party that is institutionally attached to the Catholic church.

In addition, several important members of UDI also had tight linkages to the ultra conservative catholic movement Opus Dei. Two of UDI's most important leaders, Joaquín Lavín, the most successful presidential candidate for UDI, and Jovino Novoa, are members of this organization.

The strong ties between UDI leaders and the Catholic church has been translated in a strong defense by the party of the church interests and moral agenda. UDI leaders have fervently opposed all the attempts by the *Concertación* governments to introduce sexual education in public education, to pass a divorce law, or to recognize rights for LGBT citizens. For instance, representatives of the *Instituto Libertad*, a Think Tank with close ties to UDI, argued that the effects of a divorce law would fall on "the children of divorced couples and are related to poverty, drug addictions, crime, emotional instability, and a tendency of these young people to have difficulties in forming stable families". Several UDI leaders similarly argued that the divorce law would destroy Chilean families, diminish the value of marriage, and specially affect

the children of divorce marriages, who would be more prone to drug addictions or crime (The Clinic, 23 Junio 2014). Similarly, on topics of gay marriage UDI leaders have showed its opposition as “homosexual couples cannot procreate” (Felipe Ward declarations), or that marriage should only be between a man and a woman.

While Renovación Nacional has also strong Christian component, many of its members are not practicing Catholics (Pollack, 1999, 117). As Luna et. al. (2013, 928) explain, RN has both liberal and conservative factions within the party. This division coincides with the division explained in the previous chapter between those groups that supported the military regime and those that opposed them. Within RN, two main groups coexist. On the one side, there is the group called *liberales* which not only proposes a more critical view of the military regime, but also a more liberal vision on moral topics, such as divorce or other secular reforms. On the other side, the ‘duros’ group is closely tied to the military regime and has a more conservative position regarding personal freedoms.

This division within Renovación Nacional translates into an ambiguous strategy regarding the moral position of the party. As chapter 2 shows, the party has defended a morally progressive agenda regarding gay rights, but a morally conservative agenda regarding abortion. For instance, for gay rights, not only has the party allowed its legislators to personally decide their own votes, but it has also incorporated within the party a commission to discuss gay rights. However, the topic on LGBT right has created tensions within the party, particularly between the current President of RN, Carlos Larraín, who has a more conservative moral position on the topic, and the former president of RN Youth Movement, Óscar Rementería, who was the first member of RN in announced his homosexuality (see for instance The Clinic (20 Julio 2012)). The tensions within RN are seen, for instance, in the fact that within the party homophobic politicians coincide with a transsexual candidate or with a new group that aims to broaden the family conception that the party defends. Similarly, the contradiction within the party is seen in the fact that, as the party press releases shows, the party has an agenda to defend LGBT rights but strongly opposes abortion rights.

In conclusion, the strongest ties of UDI to the church vis-à-vis RN shows why UDI members were not willing to incorporate morally progressive values to the agenda. In addition, the ambiguous relationship of RN to the church, as the party is split between conservatives and liberals, shows why the party has introduced some morally progressive topics, while defending some conservative ones. Moreover, the strong mobilizational capacity of the Chilean church help explain its strength in shaping the Right’s agenda on moral issues.

Table 4.2: Catholic Church Organization Resources in Argentina and Chile

	Argentina	Chile
Number of Bishops	122	46
Bishops per capita	0.29	0.26
Number of Priests	5963	2395
Priests per capita	14.39	13.59
Number of Dioceses	73	27
Dioceses per capita	0.17	0.15
Number of parishes	2810	952
Parishes per capita	6.77	5.4

Per capita values are calculated for 100,000 habitants
 Data from Anuario Estadístico de la Iglesia 2013 (Edición 2015).

4.3.3 Argentina

During the transition to the new democratic regime in 1983, the church counted with a strong presence in the Argentine territory as well as economic resources for its activities. However, different than the Chilean church, the Argentine church did not have such high levels of legitimacy. While in Chile the Catholic church had been a central pro-democratic actor, in Argentina the tight links between military and church were translated in lower levels of support by the general population.

In addition, different than the Chilean church, the *mobilizational capacity* of the Argentine church has been weaker. Even if the Chilean and Argentinean churches show similar organizational capacity (see) Hagopian (2009, chapter 7) classifies Argentina as the country with the lowest levels of church mobilizational capacity. (Hagopian, 2009, 280) 16% of respondents in Argentina participate in Church organizations, and the overlapping number of respondents who participate in civil or political organizations as well as religious organizations is only 7.5%. This is less than half than the Chilean case (16.2) and the lowest when compared to other Latin American countries such as Chile, Mexico, Brasil, Peru, and Venezuela.

In the new democratic setting, the Argentine Catholic church, similar to its Chilean counterpart, focused on defending both its corporate interests as well as its moral agenda. In particular, the church opposed education reforms, the divorce law, reproductive health reforms, any attempts to introduce abortion rights, and gay rights. For all of these reforms the church focused on the fact that they represented a threat to traditional family values, to social order, and to the nation as a whole.

To fulfill its interests the Catholic church in Argentina did not ally with a right wing party, but attempted to influence every democratic government since 1983.

However, not all of them were receptive to an alliance with the Catholic church. For instance, the first democratic president, Raúl Alfonsín, had a very adversarial relationship with the Church. Alfonsín was the leader of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), a liberal party in its positions regarding state-church relations. The main conflicts centered in the divorce law passed in 1986 and educational reform. For instance, for the divorce law the church attempted to pressure legislators not to pass the law (Esquivel, 2009, 116). However, the church failed to mobilize Catholics in the streets, as divorce was already a reality for many of them. Only the most radical Catholic groups or students from Catholic institutions backed the attempts of the church to protest against legal divorce Fabris (2013). The discomfort of the Catholic church was such that several bishops claimed they would excommunicate those legislators that voted in favor of the law.

The church had a closer relation to the government of Carlos Menem. From the beginning Menem gave a preponderant place for the church and the Catholic faith in his speeches. In addition, the church had a strong influence in the selection of Education Ministers, and in sexual health matters (Esquivel, 2009, 121-3). Nevertheless, the multiple corruption accusations against President Menem and the deterioration in the economic situation provoked a change in the position of the church vis-à-vis Menem. In particular, the church was worried to be tied to a government that caused a wide increase in the levels of poverty, unemployment, and social unrest. The church continued having a similar position in the following governments of De la Rúa and Duhalde. Given the acute social, economic, and political crisis the church tried to articulate greater dialog among the main Argentine economic actors.

Last, during the Kirchners governments the relationship to the Catholic church was tense and full of distrust. The Kirchners passed several laws that were vehemently opposed by the government, such as reproductive rights, contraceptive distributions, women's rights, and sexual education (Esquivel, 2009, 128). The peak of the confrontation between the Kirchners and the church was when the government passed a law to allow marriage and adoption for gay couples. The church once again focused on the fact that this law would destroy family values and harm kids of future gay couples. To show its opposition, and to pressure legislators, the church mobilized a large number of Catholics, many of them students from Catholic schools. The main slogans of this protest were “kids deserve a mom and a dad” and “Argentina united for our children.” Bergoglio, the archbishop of Buenos Aires and head of the Argentine Catholic church, even declared that the law was a “war against the church” (Felitti, 2011). The tense relation between the church and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner changed once Bergoglio was elected Pope, when the government became closer to Pope Francis.

Both the Chilean and Argentinean churches faced similar threats, such as abortion

laws, education reforms, reproductive rights, and gay marriage. However, the Chilean church showed higher levels of mobilization and pressure over government officials. Nevertheless, the election of Jorge Bergoglio as Pope Francis in 2013, increased the popularity and strength of the Church among its parishioners. In the next section I analyze the ties of PRO and UCeDe to the Argentine Catholic church to understand how the Church influenced these parties in their strategies to attract new voters.

4.3.4 Internal Influence of the Church: the Cases of UCeDe and PRO

The Argentine catholic church does not have strong levels of internal influence, neither to UCeDe nor to PRO. Historically, Argentina has never had any strong confessional party. Nevertheless, both parties maintained an ambiguous relationship to the Catholic church.

The support of both the Catholic church and UCeDe leaders to the previous military regime could have set the basis for an alliance between the church and UCeDe. However, UCeDe relationship to the Catholic church was, at best, distant. In particular, the strong commitment of UCeDe to *liberalismo* created strong suspicious among catholic leaders. In fact, despite of its overall support of the church to the previous military regime, in the last few years of the regime the church criticized the economic program of the *Proceso*, condemning its individualism and the effects of economic reforms on the poor (Gibson et al., 1990, 210). This contrasted strongly with the position of UCeDe, which condemned the economic program of the military regime for not going far enough in terms of *liberalismo*.

In addition, liberalism defended the expansion of individual freedoms in all aspects of human life. This position contrasted strongly with the conservative and paternalistic position of the church, especially on moral matters. UCeDe leaders, such as Armando Ribas, declared its opposition to religion, criticizing the Inquisition and religious wars ‘that devastated society’ (Gibson et al., 1990, 211). The discrepancies between the church and UCeDe can be best seen in the fact that UCeDe voted in favor of the 1987 divorce law.

Nevertheless, UCeDe leaders were conscious of the risks of confronting the Catholic church. In fact, in official party documents UCeDe leaders attempted to highlight the coincidences between the interests of the church and the party (Gibson et al., 1990, 211). This concern came from the fact that a lot of the party’s core voters were practicing catholics and the fact that, as Gibson (1990, 211) explains, the lack of support from the church hindered the party’s possibility to penetrate middle and lower sectors of society. This fear was strong enough not to escalate the conflict

between the church and UCeDe leaders. The church could use its mobilizational capacity not only to influence UCeDe core voters, but also to block any attempts of the party to attract new voters. While the Argentina Catholic church is seen as weak when compared to other churches in the region, its organizational strength was still incredibly higher than UCeDe tenuous organization. As a consequence, except for its position on the legalization of divorce, UCeDe party leaders chose not to focus on an expansion of moral liberties as a strategy to attract new voters.

PRO never attempted to be a party that would represent Catholic interests. Different than, for instance, UDI, party leaders do not bring up any reference to catholic values when asked to describe the party's program. Macri himself has not had strong ties to Catholic church leaders, and he had a distant relationship to Jorge Bergoglio while he was archbishop of Buenos Aires. However, the bad relationship between the Kirchners and the archbishop improved the relationship between the Church and PRO's main leader.

Several central party leaders had close ties to the Catholic church, some of them to orthodox institutions as *Opus Dei*. Gabriela Michetti, one of the party's top figures as well as the candidate to Vice President in 2015, had not only strong ties to the Catholic church, but especially to Jorge Bergoglio. In addition, the Catholic church maintained strong ties with leaders such as De Estrada, who was considered as the speaker of the most conservative groups near the archbishop, or Victoria Morales Gorleri, who many named her as "Bergoglio's Deputy" (Vommaro, Morresi and Bellotti, 2015, 391-4).

In addition, the analysis of Vommaro et. al. (2015, 395) show that 76.9% of PRO leaders declared themselves as catholics, and a 40% considered themselves as a practicing catholics. In addition, as the authors mention, most PRO leaders offices are full with catholic symbols.

Nevertheless, several key PRO figures are uncomfortable with the levels of religiosity of some of its co-partisans. In particular, these leaders are afraid that the position of highly religious figures within PRO would give the party an image of a more conservative party. In fact, within the party there are several figures that consider themselves as atheists. In addition, the party has been very open in incorporating figures from other religions, such as Rabbi Bergman, or building ties to evangelist churches.

The tension between the two groups of the party had its peak when Macri had to pronounce his position regarding gay marriage. A judge in the City of Buenos Aires, governed then by Mauricio Macri, sanctioned in 2009 the right of a gay couple to get married. That day Macri publicly announced that he would not appeal the court's decision and that he supported gay marriage as a move towards greater levels of liberty. This contrasted with previous public declarations of Macri, who had

previously described homosexuality as a disease (Vommaro, Morresi and Bellotti, 2015, 384). Macri's announcement in favor of gay marriage created not only one of the most tense moments between internal sectors of the party, but also a strong pressure by the church to change Macri's position. Bergoglio made several public announcements criticizing Macri's decision, and even some catholic groups posted signs throughout the city criticizing PRO and its decision to support gay marriage (Vommaro, Morresi and Bellotti, 2015, 386). A few months later, when Cristina Fernández de Kirchner sent to Congress a bill to pass gay marriage, Macri gave freedom to its legislators to vote as their conscience would tell them. The different positions within PRO are seen in the fact that four of the legislators voted in favor, while 7 voted against.

Another moment of tension between PRO and the Catholic church occurred in 2012 when the Supreme Court of Argentina asked each subnational government to regulate the right of pregnant women to have an abortion in case of rape. Macri chose to ask the Legislature of the City of Buenos Aires to pronounce its position on this topic. An intense debate followed not only among legislators but especially within the party. In addition, the pressure of the Catholic church was such that Macri vetoed the bill (Vommaro, Morresi and Bellotti, 2015, 397-8).

To summarize, PRO lacks homogeneity among its leaders in its ties with the Catholic church. While some leaders are highly religious and belong to ultra-orthodox catholic groups, others are considered atheist or not religious. Its main leader, Mauricio Macri, has never had strong ties to the Catholic church. These ambiguous relation between the church and the party is translated into an ambiguous position regarding moral values. As the decision of the party to support policies that went against the moral agenda of the Church created strong tensions within the party, it is likely that the party will try to avoid positioning the party on moral values. In particular, the party will likely avoid a confrontation with the Catholic church after the election of Bergoglio as Pope Francis and his skyrocketing popularity among Argentine citizens.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has showed that conservative ties to the Catholic Church has constrained the possibility of these parties to use progressive moral appeals to attract new voters. In particular, I have showed that the Catholic Church might influence parties externally, through its mobilizational capacity, or internally, through the presence of catholic party leaders with strong ties to catholic organizations.

In particular, I have showed that the Chilean Catholic Church has a stronger mobilizational capacity vis-à-vis the Argentinean. This has helped the Chilean church

to have a stronger external influence to the Chilean conservative parties. However, the case of UDI also shows strong levels of internal influence, as many of its leaders are also affiliated with catholic and ultra-catholic organizations. For the case of Argentina, neither PRO nor UCeDe are strongly tied to the Church. UCeDe avoided confrontations with the Church, given that the Church had a much stronger mobilizational capacity than the party. Last, PRO has had mixed ties to the church, with a group within the party with strong ties, and another group with no ties at all.

As a consequence of the ties of these parties to the Church, only RN and to some extent PRO have used progressive moral values to attract new voters.

Chapter 5

Conservative Parties and the Military

Conservative parties have varied in the strategies they use to appeal to new voters. In this chapter, I explore how the ties of party leaders to the military¹ influence the choices of party leaders. In particular, as the analysis below will show, military allies can influence party leaders both externally and internally. During the new democratic regimes, the military attempts mainly to influence conservative parties internally, through several party leaders that had belong to the military regime. However, conservative parties may have also received benefits during the previous military regime. In these cases, the military influenced conservative parties through the external path.

This chapter will show that conservative leaders with strong ties to the military cannot focus on a strategy of *orthogonal appeals* of the rule of law. The direct participation in the previous military regime, as well as the pressure of the armed forces to defend their interests, make a strategy based on the importance of the rule of law hardly credible and unlikely.

In this chapter I first analyze the theoretical argument for how the military can affect conservative party's strategies. Then, I analyze the historical political role of the military in Argentina and Chile. This analysis will show that in the past conservative elites have used the support of the armed forces to access government positions. Last, I analyze the cases of UDI, RN, UCeDe, and PRO to show how the armed forces influenced the strategies that party leaders chose to attract new voters.

¹Military refers to the officers, active and retired, of the three armed services. The one year conscriptors who have comprised the bulk of the enlisted men in the army and a substantial part of those of the navy and air force have never been initiators of political action (Potash, 1961, 571).

5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Alliance Between the Military and Conservative Parties

The military in Latin America has also been a central ally for conservative forces throughout the 20th century. In particular, conservative actors and the military have allied in multiple occasions to reach power through military coups. In this section, I analyze how the military benefited conservative allies. The argument between the ties of the military and conservative parties needs to be distinguished in two time periods: during the military regime and after the transition to democracy. As the analysis below will show, the military has used *external influence* during the military regime, and a combination of *internal* and external influence after the transition to democracy.

5.1.1 The military and Conservative Allies during the Military Regime

During the military regime the ties of a conservative party to the military influence the party through the *external path*. It is worth mentioning that many conservative parties may not exist as parties during the military regime. However the military may give key resources to allied conservative leaders that will later constrain the party. In particular, the military could provide conservative parties with three valuable resources.

First, the military can exercise *physical repression* of any type of political activity against the regime or its allies. In Latin America this has included police repression of public demonstrations, prohibition of public criticism of the regime and its allies, banning all political meetings, destruction of opposition party offices, and censorship of books, music and other artistic expressions. Moreover, the military in Latin America has systematically used violence against opposition leaders, including kidnapping, physical and psychological torture, and causing the disappearance of many prominent opposition figures. As the cases of Argentina and Chile will show, the military has used a particularly hard-handed approach with political opponents involved in mobilizing poor citizens.

Second, the military regime controlled all the *political appointments* to federal and local offices. Therefore, military leaders had the capacity to appoint political allies to key offices. This provided political allies several benefits, such as visibility and access to state resources. In Latin America, the military has appointed allies to different key positions, including top executive positions (such as Finance Minister or Foreign Minister), but also on the local or state level. In particular, in some countries

the military regime appointed a large number of political allies as Mayors in key municipalities. These appointments provided allies with better access to broad parts of the country, particularly remote poor regions. Especially when the appointments were followed by fiscal resources to benefit the living conditions of poor populations.

Third, the military regime controlled the federal budget and could benefit political allies with large fiscal transfers. In particular, political allies could strengthen ties to poor voters if they controlled the allocation of *social policy*, such as food stamps, direct transfers, or unemployment benefits. Specially, in difficult economic times these resources were very attractive for any political figure attempting to build stronger ties to poor populations.

In conclusion, as Figure 5.1 shows, military regimes may help their political allies by giving them fiscal and mobilizational resources. These two resources are particularly useful to build grassroots ties with the urban poor. While these ties during the military regime might not be used for electoral activities, they will most likely remain after the military regime.

5.1.2 The Military and Conservative Parties in the New Democratic Regime

Once democracy becomes the only game in town, the military had to adapt to the new landscape, as it could no longer use military coups to defend its interests. As a consequence, the military may try to influence conservative parties either through the external or the internal path. The military after the transition to democracy is particularly concerned with trials on Human Rights violations during the previous military regime and cuts to military budgets.

These topics, though, can be particularly attracted for party leaders in the new democratic regime. With the start of the new democratic regime, parties focusing on democratic values or the importance of the rule of law tend to be supported by large sectors of the population. Given the repression of military regimes vis-à-vis the poor, parties used this strategy to attract not only the middle classes but also poor voters. However, parties with ties to the military will have difficulties in using such a strategy.

The *external* power of the military may vary from country to country. In order to understand the power of the military it is important to analyze the characteristics of the transition to democracy and the prerogatives that military elites maintained after the transition to democracy.

The literature on democratic transitions in Latin America (Guillermo et al., 1986; O'Donnell, 1988) distinguishes between two types of transitions to democracy: ne-

gotiated transitions and transitions by collapse. Each type of transition represents different negotiating power by the military as well as different levels of support of the military regime by the population. As a result, in each scenario the military has different levels of power to influence parties in the new democratic regime.

In cases of transition by collapse, the military regime has normally been marked by acute economic recessions, de-industrialization, loss of jobs, and high levels of repression. In these regimes, the conflicts that arise tend to erupt causing the government to collapse (O'Donnell, 1988, 282). As a consequence, the military rulers are in a very weak position to impose any demands in the future democratic regime. In addition, there is typically massive opposition to the military regime in the general population, which weakens the military even further.

Negotiated transitions paint a different picture. In this scenario, the military regime has enjoyed relative economic success and, though it employs repression, does so less systematically and extensively than in the cases outlined above (O'Donnell, 1988, 283). In this scenario, the military regime can negotiate with the new democratic elites several prerogatives that will protect their interests. The general population also shows greater levels of support to the previous regime, empowering the military even further.

In the cases of transition by collapse, the military has fewer available resources for its political allies during the first few years of the democratic regime. In these cases the military might not be able to externally influence conservative parties. In cases of negotiated transition, the military has stronger powers and a positive image of the population. In these cases the military regime is an influential actor and can constrain parties through its external power. In particular, the military may have both mobilizational and fiscal resources and threaten to cut these resources if conservative parties do not defend their interests. As a consequence, these conservative parties may not be able to focus on an agenda on Human Rights issues, or pro-democratic stances.

Regardless the type of transition to democracy, the military may also influence conservative parties through the *internal path*. In this scenario, a significant number of party leaders had a participation in the previous military regimes. These party leaders may oppose moderation in terms of pro-democratic reforms (e.g. trials on Human Rights violations during the military regime, or cuts to military spending) either because these party leaders do not personally agree with them or because passing those bills will jeopardize them personally. The risk is particularly high in the decision of these party leaders to oppose trials on Human Rights violations during the previous military regimes, as these trials may put these leaders in prison. If a party has many leaders with participation in the previous military regime we would expect low levels of internal support for an electoral strategy that would focus on

the role of democracy, the rule of law, or Human Rights to attract new voters.

5.2 Historical Relationship

The military has been one of the central conservative institutions in Argentina and Chile throughout the 20th century. This section focuses on explaining the political role of the military in both countries. In particular, the analysis focuses on the role of the military from the end of oligarchic regimes at the beginning of the 20th century to the transition to a democratic regime in the 1980s. This section gives a historical perspective to the ties between the military and conservative parties.

5.2.1 Argentina

The military in Argentina has had a prominent political role through out the 20th century. In 1930, a small group of high-ranking army officers made a coup against the radical government of Hipólito Yrigoyen. These group of officers had the civilian support of anti-Yrigoyen political groups, as well as a tacit support by the rest of the military. Soon in power problems arouse for the military, as they lacked a common program and diverged strongly on the objectives of the new government. One group, led by General Uriburu, had a strong nationalistic program and aim to implement reforms that would end with demagoguery, corruption, and a loss of moral values. This included having corporate representation, a restricted electorate, and the rule of an elite (Potash, 1961, 571-572). A second group, whose leader, Justo, was supported by a majority of the military, was not prepared to have an indefinite dictatorship in order to implement the goals that the first group had. On the contrary, Justo aimed to be elected himself to the presidency. However, neither Uriburu nor Justo were able to succeed over the other. Throughout the 1930s and first half of the 1940s, Argentina went through a series of military coups, high levels of fraudulent elections, and strong political persecution to the main opposition party (the middle-class Radical Party).

In 1945, Colonel Perón was elected President with the support of large sectors of organized labor. Perón was able to amass such support during his years as Labor Secretary in the previous military regime. Perón's government had both the support of large sectors of the population -mainly organized labor unions- and the armed forces. The growth of Perón's popularity, his unlimited political ambitious, and the corruption of some of the Perón's closest collaborators created strong tensions between Perón and the military (Potash, 1961, 574). This lead to the 1951 coup attempt. Since then, Perón never fully regained an unconditional support by the armed forces.

In 1955, and for the third time in 25 years, the military overturned a democratically elected government. “In so doing it acted neither as the instrument of discredited minority political groups as in 1930, nor as the essential self-centered nationalistic and totalitarian-oriented of 1943. Rather it acted in harmony with broad and but heterogeneous sectors of civilian opinion that for various reasons come to oppose Perón” (Potash, 1961, 575). This civil-military coalition resented Perón’s support by labor unions, the increasing influence of labor leaders, the benefits for the urban poor, as well as the high levels of corruption, and the use of intimidation and of espionage. This coalition believed that Perón was leading Argentina into social and economic ruin.

In the new authoritarian regime, the armed forces became highly politicized. As Potash (1961) explains, officers were appointed as provincial governors, as directors of several government agencies, and as interventionist in several organizations, including labor unions. Nevertheless, since then and up to 1983, the military would constantly be divided between those who wanted to stay in power, and those who continually thought that military coups should restore democracy once certain level of order was achieved.

In the decades between the military coup against Perón in 1955 and his return to power in 1973 the military was constantly divided on what to do about Peronism. The division was between *legalistas* -i.e. those more involved with the professionalization of the military and less interested in the participation of the military in politics- and *gorilas*, fervent anti-peronist who would advocate for an abolition of any type of peronist participation in subsequent elections. For this second sector of the military, the mobilization capacity of Peronism was a constant threat, especially after the Cuban Revolution and its threat of expansion to other countries in Latin America. The fears of Communism, even when Peronism never had any revolutionary or communist goals, created a constant threat for conservative sectors both within and outside the military (Collier and Collier, 1991, 739-740).

Between 1955 and 1973 the armed forces produced three military coups, all related to the perceived threat of peronism. In addition, peronist candidates were banned in all elections and Perón itself had to exile. The armed forces were themselves concerned with the *peronist* issue, but they also functioned as the channel through which other groups in society expressed their anti-peronism.

In 1973, a brief democratic period opened, and Peron, after his return from exile, governed until his death in 1974. The general polarizing climate of the times were intensified with Peron’s death, when his wife and vice-president Isabel Perón was appointed President. The peronist movement itself was highly divided between a right-wing, old-guard, faction, and the left-wing youth (mainly organized in ‘Montoneros’). Government repression to Montoneros and other left-wing organizations,

as well as the increasing levels of violence alerted the military once again. As a consequence, in 1976 the military decided to intervene in order to overthrow Isabel's government.

From 1976 to 1983 the *Junta Militar* governed Argentina. The Junta goal was to restore order to the country and to eliminate the 'left-wing threat'. As a consequence, between 10,000 to 30,000 people were disappeared, thousands were tortured, and forced to exile. The military regime persecuted workers, students, left-wing militants, Jews, homosexuals, and artists. The Junta also introduced market reforms that deteriorated the economic and social situation even further. In an attempt to recover legitimacy, the Junta decided in 1982 to invade the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), starting a war against the United Kingdom. After the rapid war defeat, the military resigned and elections were called for October 1983. The Human Rights violations, as well as the deterioration of the economic situation and the death of hundreds of young soldiers in Malvinas created a widespread social disrespect for the military as a whole. Several reforms during the democratic period, such as the trials against the military or the reduction of the military budget, debilitated the military even further, making it almost impossible to continue to have a prominent role in politics after 1983.

5.2.2 Chile

The military in Chile also had a prominent political role throughout the 20th century, particularly since the end of the oligarchic regime. This regime, common in Latin America at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, was characterized by the political and economic domination of owners of large agricultural holdings. For decades, this regime enjoyed high levels of stability, based not only on the economic power of the elite, but also on electoral fraud and a large clientelistic network in the countryside. Nonetheless, the regime was challenged by dissident elites from politically marginal regions of the country (mainly from the north and south of Chile) combined with new urban middle sectors. However, as Collier and Collier (1991) explain, the military played a central role in backing these dissident groups and pushing for a regime change. The military goal was to establish a new order that would be centralized, modernizing, and nationalistic, with a central role for the armed forces as agents of "regeneration" (Collier and Collier, 1991, 108-9). Without the military support, dissidents would have not been able to overcome the regime, as the oligarchic elite had a tight control over the peasantry, making it very hard for dissidents to organize popular mobilization to tuple the regime.

The 1929 crisis hit Chile and created a climate of political instability. In less than two years, from 1931 to 1932, Chile had 9 presidents, both civilians and military. In

October of 1932 Chile elected the conservative candidate Arturo Alessandri, with the support of left-wing and radical parties. However, the repression of his government to workers rapidly took away the support of the left. Following the conservative government, a more reformist government was elected in 1938, with the support of center and leftist parties. This 'Frente Popular' governed Chile from 1939 to 1941 and was the first attempt to incorporate the interests of working class sectors, which alarmed the right. As a consequence, the military attempted multiple times to weaken the government. The government opted for a more centrist position and the left was unable to satisfy the demands of the working class. As a consequence, the left (the Socialist Party) was discredited and became to re-think its orientation, moving towards a more Marxist and class-oriented party. In 1941, the President Aguirre Cerda died. Ríos (1942-46) and González Videla (1946-52) governed as representatives of a broad coalition of parties. The period was characterized by shifting alliances, patronage, corruption, and political immobilism.

In this context of party disintegration and fragmentation General Ibañez was elected to power in 1952 with an anti-party platform. He obtained the support of a broad coalition of parties, ranging from fascist to Marxist groups (Cavarozzi, 1975, 220). This heterogeneity debilitated the government and the President was unable to secure any stable basis for governing (Collier and Collier, 1991, 529). He moved from populist to accommodationist support, and was characterized by abrupt changes in its cabinet coalition members. In the 1958 election, the center parties were in complete disunity which helped the right to obtain a victory for its candidate Jorge Alessandri. However, this right-wing government was not better than the previous centrist attempts to find a political basis from which to pursue a consistent program, given the continuous process of polarization (Collier and Collier, 1991, 532).

In the 1964 election the strength of the left-wing parties convinced the conservative parties to support the new centrist party, the Christian Democrats. Eduardo Frei was elected president and he suffered the same incapacity of other centrist governments in finding a viable centrist policy for Chile. The inconsistencies in policy implementation resulted in greater polarization and a loss of support for the party. The increasing social unrest and the unstoppable polarization of Chilean parties ended with the election of Salvador Allende in 1970, the leader of the Socialist Party and supported by a Marxist coalition.

Allende, the first Marxist president elected in democratic elections in Latin America, governed with a left-wing economic agenda, aimed to implement several socialist economic reforms. These measures threaten not only the economic elites of Chile, but also the United States government, fearing an expansion of communist governments throughout South America. The economic reforms implemented by Allende harm the economy even further. As a consequence, a climate of social and political

unrest was predominant. As a consequence, the military, with the support of opposition parties and the collaboration of the US government, planned a military coup to overthrow the socialist government.

From 1973 to 1989 Pinochet governed Chile in what is considered the darkest times of Chilean history. Human rights organizations report that between 1200 and 3200 people were killed, up to 80,000 were put in concentration camps, and as many as 30,000 were tortured. Pinochet rapidly implemented neoliberal economic reforms, which at first created greater social unrest, high unemployment levels, and a sharp increase in inequality. However, towards the end of Pinochet's 17-year rule the economic reforms started improving the economic and social situation of Chile. Throughout the military regime, the government persecuted opponents, debilitated union organizations, and passed institutional reforms to strengthen the political power of the right vis-à-vis left-wing and centrist parties.

5.3 How does the Military Affect party Strategies? The Cases of UDI, RN, UCeDe, and PRO

This section analyses the ties between the military regimes in Chile and Argentina with the four conservative parties: UDI, RN, UCeDe, and PRO. In particular, I use an original database on the social background of candidates and party leaders to trace the ties of each party to the military regime. In addition I analyze how the military affected the strategies that each party has chosen.

5.3.1 UDI

Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) was created in 1983 by the closest collaborators of Pinochet's military regime. The party's founder, Jaime Guzmán, was one of the minds behind Pinochet's political doctrine. He was the leader of *gremialismo*, a conservative political movement that recruited a large amount of young students at Universidad Católica de Chile. As this section will show, the strong connections to the military gave Jaime Guzmán and the *gremialistas* a large amount of resources to build clientelistic networks with the urban poor. However, this strong linkages to the military were later translated in constrains during the new democratic regime.

Pinochet's military regime in the 1980s started planning how the regime would eventually transition to a democratic setting that would elect Pinochet as a democratic President. For that, Pinochet started working to its closes allies in order to

build a political party that would not only help him win an election, but that will differ strongly with previous Chilean right-wing parties. For that, one of the main goals of Guzmán -who was the person in charge of building such a party- was to create a party that would not only defend the regime's economic and moral values, but that would be able to have a "popular" nature. This popular nature meant building strong connections to the poor in order to break with the historical tendency of the poor to support Socialist candidates.

This task involved three main pillars: physical repression of left wing activists in poor areas, the political appointment of *gremialistas* as Mayors in poor municipalities, and the transfer of fiscal resources (mainly social programs) for those Mayors. These three pillars will give *gremialistas* the possibility to use a strategy of grassroots activities, as they would have presence in areas that they have not had in the past, absence of competition from the left, and access to discretionary resources to benefit poor citizens.

5.3.1.1 Repression of the Left

From the first day Pinochet targeted his actions against left-wing parties and his social organizations. In particular, the government focused its military activity in factories, slums (*campamentos*), labor federations, universities, and peasants associations. The brutality of the regime's action caused, in the first six months in government, the arrest of 80,000 persons, and the decision to remove from their job positions 160,000 workers due to their political views (Remmer, 1980, 282). In addition, around 200,000 persons went into exile, most of them members of left-wing parties and their families. As Remmer (1980, 285) explains, "the draconian repressive measures associated with the Chilean coup eliminated key opponents to military rule and created an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, and insecurity highly conducive to political demobilization."

Since 1973 and for many years political parties in Chile functioned only at the elite level, as they were cut-off from their social bases. However, repressions was neither too massive nor indiscriminate to totally eliminate autonomous organizational activity in poor neighborhoods (Oxhorn, 1991, 72). In particular, when in 1983 a wave of massive protest arose in Chile *pobladores* were already highly organized to participate. This group of *pobladores* lived in Chilean poor areas and had the capacity to formulate and represent the demands of the people in their slums. Actually, it was in the poor areas of Chile, particularly in Santiago, where the mobilization was stronger (Angell, 1993, 122).

However, these organizations were not immune to political repression. This was particularly true in the mass mobilizations of 1983-1984 against the military regime,

where slum leaders had a visible participation. The massive participation of slum neighbors rapidly increased the repression and levels of intimidation to that population. A high number of pobladores were killed and injured during these protests, regardless of whether they mobilized or not against the military regime. In addition, the military frequently made *allanamientos* to the shantytowns, in which entire populations were sealed off and all men were temporarily detained while their documents were checked and their houses searched.²

To summarize, opposition leaders in slums -either members of a political party or not- were severely repressed in Chile during the mass mobilizations of 1983 and 1984. This event strongly benefited *gremialistas* who were already attempting to build linkages to the urban poor. Ironically, two of the main UDI leaders, Longueira and Guzmán, expressed their anti-violence positions in an attempt to separate themselves from Communist leaders, accused by UDI leaders of generating the high levels of repression and intimidation to anyone living in a slum.

5.3.1.2 Appointed Mayors

As we just saw, one of the first goals of General Pinochet after the coup was to demobilize all political activity at the local level (Remmer, 1980). During the presidency of socialist Salvador Allende, several left-wing organizations at the ground had showed unprecedented high levels of mobilization (Landsberger and McDaniel, 1976; Remmer, 1980). To stop this, Pinochet rapidly suspended all mayor and aldermen from their positions. Soon after that, in July 1974, Pinochet passed decree-laws that implied a drastic reform of the territorial organization. In 1976, the Constitutional Law of Municipalities formalized the new hierarchical and centralized territorial structure that defined Mayors as “the prolonged arm of the central government in their *comunas*” (Klein, 2004, 305). From then on, Mayors nomination and stability in power would depend only from the will of the *Junta de Gobierno*.

At the same time, Pinochet decided to strongly benefit Mayors by decentralizing a large number of policy areas and resources. Mayors, as Klein (2004, 305) explains, were in charge of supervising all local institutions, offices, services, employees, and workers; formulating their policies, programs, and budgets; and coordinating the functioning of public services. Additionally, the military regime empowered Mayors by decentralizing large amount of fiscal resources, which translated into a drastic increase of local budgets. Mayors, for the first time in Chilean history, became prominent political figures with large amounts of political and economic power.

²For more details see Oxhorn (1991).

In the decision to appoint political allies as Mayors, Pinochet strongly benefited one group of society: *gremialistas*. An analysis of the persons appointed as Mayors during the military regime shows a strong bias towards this group. In particular, *gremialistas* were appointed to poor neighborhoods.

Why did Pinochet trust this group of young, unexperienced, people? As Klein (2004, 310) stresses, *gremialistas* were ideal candidates for Pinochet. First, they were members of an organization that was strongly devoted to fighting against the Popular Unity and had an impeccable anti-Marxist record. They were strong believers that the military regime would save Chile from the chaos and destruction that socialist had brought. Second, and different from right-wing leaders of former Partido Nacional, *gremialistas* were new in politics and “their image and reputation had not been tainted by their involvement in party politics, so reviled by the new military rulers” (Klein, 2004, 311). Last, *gremialistas* had a broader political project that appealed to Pinochet that promised a break with Chile’s traditional political system and that would end with the influence of Marxist groups.

In 1984, short after the formation of UDI as a political party, UDI opened up its first offices in Chilean shantytowns: at La Pincoya, in the commune of Conchalí, and at José María Caro in the municipality of Pedro Aguirre Cerda. One year later, Pablo Longueira, one of the persons in charge of developing UDI’s organization in poor areas, claimed that the party had already established 76 “Shantytowns Committees” that were working with at least 200 militants (Klein, 2004, 315). By 1986, the newspaper *La Tercera* claimed that the party had about 200 offices in shantytowns. Pinto’s analysis, which is based on interviews to UDI leaders, confirms this number and provides a list of at least 110 *comités* that were established by UDI in poor areas (Pinto, 2006, 171-4). This presence allowed the party to organize mobilizations of around 2000 slum dwellers in support of the military regime and against the popular protests that occurred in Chile in the mid 1980s. In addition, party leaders made sure to inform slum citizens about the different social programs, family subsidies, and unemployment programs that were implemented by the military regime.

By late 1980s, at least 27% of Mayors were self-declared as UDI. As Klein 2004 explains, this number might be higher as 103 Mayors were identified as ‘independent’, a label many UDI leaders used to use. The presence of the party at the ground level was particularly beneficial for UDI in the first parliamentary elections. From the 14 elected representatives to Congress in 1989, ten of them had previously Mayors. As Figure 5.1 shows, these appointed mayors were able not only to get elected for the first democratic election, but continued to have a strong electoral support throughout the democratic period.

Table 5.1: UDI Parliamentary elected in 1989 that previously were appointed Mayors

Name	Mayor	Years	Parliamentary (district)	Period
Francisco Bartolucci	Valparaíso	1978-87	Diputado (Valparaíso)	1990-2002
Carlos Bombal	Santiago	1981-1987	-Diputado (Santiago Centro)	1990-94
			-Diputado (Las Condes)	1994-98
Sergio Correa de la Cerda	Rauco	1974-77	Diputado (Curicó)	1990-2010
	Molina	1978-80		
	Curicó	1981-1989		
Pedro Guzmán	Chillán	1974-80	Diputado (Chillán)	1990-94
Juan Masferrer	Las Cabras	1982-89	Diputado (Las Cabras)	1990-2010
Patricio Melero	Pudahuel	1985-89	Diputado (Pudahuel)	1990-2010
Jaime Orpis	San Joaquín	1987-89	-Diputado (San Joaquín)	1990-2002
			-Senador (R. Tarapacá)	2002-2010
Víctor Pérez	Los Ángeles	1981-87	-Diputado (Los Ángeles)	1990-2006
			-Senador (R. del Bío Bío Cordillera)	2006-2014
Carlos Recondo	Los Muermos	1986-89	Diputado (Los Muermos)	1990-2010
Jorge Ulloa	Lebu	1988-89	Diputado (Lebu)	1990-2010

5.3.1.3 Social Policy

As the previous section shows, appointed Mayors were strongly benefited with a dramatic increase in their budgets. But what type of resources did these Mayors have? And, more importantly, did they have access to discretionary resources that could help them build a clientelistic machine?

In 1982 Chile faced one of its worst economic crisis since the 1930s with a GDP fell of 14.1 percent. As other countries in the region Chile faced several external shocks: high interest rates, deteriorating terms of trade, and the closing of international financial markets. This was translated to decreasing levels of capital flow and the decrease of credit, especially after the Mexican debt crisis. As a consequence, the government implemented several adjustment policies that drastically deteriorated living standards of the Chilean population.

As a consequence a massive wave of protests arose in 1983 in confrontation of the military regime. In order to avoid massive social confrontation, the military regime responded with a combination of physical repression and the implementation of targeted social benefits for the urban poor. Regarding the latter, the regime expanded existing unemployment programs, housing programs, and family subsidies. Each of these programs was targeted to those in greater need and none attempted to be a universalistic benefit for low-income sectors.

Unemployment was, by far, one of the main social problems of the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 1977 unemployment levels were 17.6 per cent, but by 1983 it reached

a historical peak of 30 per cent. To tackle this, the military regime implemented two main unemployment insurance programs: Programa de Empleo Mínimo (PEM) and Programa Ocupacional Para Jefes de Hogar (POJH).³ While in march of 1975 19,041 people signed up for PEM benefits, the number increased to 210,000 in 1976 due to the effects of the economic crisis (Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Álvarez Vallejos and Donoso Fritz, 2012, 59).

Despite these programs provided only minimal benefits -about a third of the minimal wage-, they represented the only source of income for many poor families. By the early 1980s, at least 210,000 people had enrolled in PEM, and more than half a million in POJH. Given that by that time Chile only had an economically active population of 3.5 million, the percentage of people with an unemployment insurance program was around 15 per cent ((Klein, 2004, 307)).

Several *pobladores* criticized these two unemployment programs. PEM and POJH benefits were seen as “miserable” and the activities requested in exchange were for many humiliating. The income obtained by PEM, for instance, would allow a family to obtain less than half a kilo of bread per day. However, in exchange of this meager benefits, Chileans were asked to work a full 8-hour workday. The activities in which citizens had to work were, in many cases, humiliating, for instance asking a construction worker to spend 8 hours a day straightening nails (Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Álvarez Vallejos and Donoso Fritz, 2012, 61-2). In addition, several news articles report that these two programs were allocated with discretionary criteria Navasal (23 de mayo de 1988).

The individualized and discretionary nature of these two programs, coupled with the repression to opposition figures on the ground, provided ideal conditions for a realignment of forces at the local level (Klein, 2004, 308-9). “With the growing amount of money at their disposal, and the control over areas of responsibility and programs that affected the daily lives of people, mayors interested in enlisting the support of the population living in their communities did have the means to do so. At the same time, and thereby putting this adherence on a firmer and more lasting basis, they could establish new networks of clientelism and patronage” (Klein, 2004, 309). In fact, during those years UDI members avoided talking about politics and mainly focus on “solving social problems.” Their activities consisted on mainly advising people about the governments new social programs and helping neighbors to enroll in order to become beneficiaries (see Pinto (2006)).⁴ In addition, Klein 2004, 318

³As (Lustig, 1995, 283) explains, PEM was first implemented in 1975 and initially directed towards unemployed workers in general, with a priority to heads of households. After the creation of POJH in 1982 -which specifically targetted heads of households only- PEM assisted women and youths. The monthly income per beneficiary was higher in POJH than in PEM.

⁴This practice resembles the strategy used by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, as

argues that UDI leaders also enlisted militants by paying water and electricity bills, offering plots of land, and even houses.

The military regime and the UDI *gremialistas* also focused on organizing neighborhood activities related to sports and culture. The goal was to penetrate in people's everyday life and tighten the connections between poor citizens and *gremialistas*. As Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Álvarez Vallejos and Donoso Fritz (2012, 99) explain, the regime had the intention of transforming people's behaviors in 'acceptable' social and political behaviors. The state organized several activities, particularly in neighborhoods with high poverty rates (see Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Álvarez Vallejos and Donoso Fritz (2012) for an in-depth discussion of these activities).

In conclusion, UDI leaders' strong ties to Pinochet's military regime allowed the party to have access to three valuable resources: key political appointments (particularly as Mayors in poor areas), physical repression to opposition leaders in these areas, and a vast amount of discretionary social programs. These resources allowed the party to implement a strategy of *grassroots activities* once democracy became the only game in town. Chapter 2 shows how the vast majority of party press releases focused on the activities of UDI leaders at the ground level. The party has organized activities on different areas. First, the party has organized a variety of activities to promote local development (e.g. investment in street lighting (PR-UDI 5, 634), sewers (PR-UDI 5), street pavement (PR-UDI 647, 1621, 5), garbage collection (PR-UDI 1239) and education infrastructure (PR-UDI 778)). Second, UDI leaders has organized cultural and sports activities on the ground, such as youth celebrations (PR-UDI 1), parties celebrating local athletes (PR-UDI 723), mobile libraries (PR-UDI 434), neighborhood basketball tournaments (PR-UDI 53), cultural activities (PR-UDI 845, 46), outdoor gyms in parks (PR-UDI 2750), and plays (PR-UDI 401). Third, the party has organized labor-related activities, as short employment training programs (PR-UDI 622), and activities for micro-entrepreneurs (PR-UDI 3000). Last, the party also reported the hand out of goods, such as school equipment, shoes, jackets, and backpacks (PR-UDI 190). As these activities show, the party has an extensive level of grassroots activities. The ties to the military regime explain how the party has been able to build those ties. As Luna (2014) shows, the party was able to maintain this strategy after the military regime through the generous fiscal resources provided by allied business groups.

explained by Thachil (2011); THACHIL (2013).

5.3.1.4 Costs of the Alliance with the Military

As the previous analysis shows, Pinochet's military regime provided UDI leaders with the key resources that would help UDI have a strategy of grassroots organizations. However, such an alliance did not come without any costs. In particular, the party was influenced by the military to avoid any emphasis on the value of democracy or the rule of law. A strategy that stressed the importance of free and fair elections, or the respect to civil rights was especially valuable in the first few years of the new democratic regime. However, as the case of Chile shows, the high levels of popularity of Pinochet and its regime made this constrain less costly. Additionally, the high levels of internal influence of the military to UDI made it less likely that these party leaders would defend policies that would put them at risk. The large number of party leaders that had had strong positions on the military regime made a pro-democracy orthogonal appeal impossible.

In the first democratic elections in 1989, UDI was able to elect 14 candidates to Congress. This was a consequence of the use of a strategy of grassroots organization, as Figure 5.1 shows, at least 10 of the 14 elected candidates had previously been appointed as Mayors by the military regime. However, the party failed to implement a strategy of orthogonal appeals that would emphasize the rule of law. Different to RN, UDI's attempts to implement a strategy of orthogonal appeals failed, especially in the first few democratic elections, but it continued over the subsequent elections.

5.3.2 RN

Renovación Nacional (RN) has had a different relationship to the military when compared to its ally UDI. While UDI was the main ally of the military, RN had an ambiguous relationship to the previous military regime and the armed forces. In particular, the party was strongly divided about this issue, with a group of strong defenders of the military role, and a group that wanted to avoid any linkages to the armed forces. This division within RN was translated into an ambiguous stance vis-à-vis the military, that varied depending on which of the two groups controlled the party.

To understand the ties between RN and the military I analyze the relationship between the military and RN leaders during and after the military regime, focusing on the internal and external levels of influence and I show how these influences were translated into an ambiguous position regarding the rule of law.

5.3.2.1 Ambiguous Relationship: the Military and RN in the Democratic Regime

Different to UDI, not all leaders of Renovación Nacional were part of the core political allies of Pinochet. With its formation at the end of the 1980s, RN brought together a seemingly unholy alliance of young right-wing modernizers, such as Andrés Allamand, and old-guard, nationalistic and conservative *caudillos*, many of them former members of Partido Nacional⁵ (Pollack, 1999, 111-5). Sergio Onofre Jarpa was the main leader of this second group of hardliners and politically traditional sectors. These two sectors differed strongly on the relationship and position to the previous military regime.

Jarpa's group, '*los duros*', was more tightly linked to the military than the young leaders around Allamand. Many of the members of Jarpa's group had participated in the military regime, many of them with position in the Executive Branch. Jarpa himself had been Interior Minister during the military government. This group was tightly linked to the military and represented an anti-left old guard that strongly opposed Allende's government in the 1970s. However, different to the *gremialistas* Pinochet did not see RN as the main party representing its interests and did not benefit these group with positions as appointed Mayors or the distribution of social policy. RN leaders, though, were benefited by the repression to left-wing opposition groups.

After the formation of RN, "los duros" believed that the military should continue having influence on the new democratic regime. This group were strong defenders of the September 11 coup, the legacy of Pinochet, and the fight against communism and the government of Salvador Allende (Lira Rojas, 2004, 33). The goal of this group was to use the number of representatives in Congress to veto any attempts of the new government to threaten the achievements of the previous military regime.

Allamand's group, also named *Patrulla Juvenil*⁶ had a different position regarding the previous military regime. *Patrulla Juvenil* was a group of young professionals with little or no formal political experience. Most of them had not directly participated in the military regime and the linkages with the military were pretty weak. This group strongly identified with the economic, but not political, legacy of the military regime. *Patrulla Juvenil* sought to build a new conservative party that would defend the neoliberal program implemented by Pinochet, but with a strong com-

⁵Partido Nacional was a party formed in 1966 as a result of the union of the two traditional parties *Partido Conservador*, *Partido Liberal*, and *Partido de Acción Nacional*. It was the first time in Chilean history where conservative actors created a singular conservative party.

⁶Other important members of this group were Sebastian Pinera, Alberto Espina, and Evelyn Matthei (who abandoned RN in 1999 to join UDI).

mitment to the democratic regime. This group took control of the party in August 1990 and led it to a more modern image that included a stronger position in favor of democracy and the rule of law. Remembering those first years of the party, Allamand explains: “there were serious political differences [between the two groups]: more or less dialog with the new government, more or less defense of legacy of the military regime, more or less sensibility regarding human rights violations, more or less condescension to the personal problems of Pinochet, more or less interest in moving the party towards the center” (Lira Rojas, 2004, 36).

Allamand also denounced in a newspaper interview that the right-wing parties in Chile were constantly pressured in the decision-making process by three pressure groups: the military, business sectors, and *El Mercurio* (i.e. one of Chile most relevant newspapers) (Lira Rojas, 2004). This declaration was supported by other RN leaders of the *patrulla juvenil*, and severely criticized by the conservative group of RN (Jarpa, Romero, Siebert). Allamand even recognized that the military were constantly restricting his decisions in order to avoid a more ‘liberal and modern’ right-wing party, as Allamand wanted (Lira Rojas, 2004, 47-8).

Once the liberal group of Allamand took control of the party, the internal influence of the military was weaker. As a consequence, Renovación Nacional was able to criticize the previous regime regarding Human Rights violations (see Chapter 2). To attract more votes, Allamand focused on appealing to those sectors of society that would agree with the military regime’s economic program, but would reject the political legacy of the military dictatorship. However, the conservative group was particularly strong in the Senate and fought fiercely to stop a liberal turn of RN.

In 1994, when Allamand was elected for its third presidency, the two factions within the party opted to create a new *estatuto* that would define new rules regarding internal conflicts. In particular, the leaders of the two factions at the *Comisión Política* (Alberto Cardemil for the conservative group and Alberto Espina representing the liberal group) made a pact to avoid public expressions of internal dissidences. Those minority groups opposing majority decisions agreed not to publicly express their disagreements. This agreement, for instance, allowed the party during its National Convention at Valparaíso to add a new set of principles, which included ‘support to a representative democratic system and to people’s rights’ (Lira Rojas, 2004, 53).

However, the party continued to be divided in topics related to the previous military regime. In particular, the tensions escalated when President Frei introduced a petition to reform the 1980 Constitution and, in particular, to eliminate the appointed Senators. In 1980, the military regime passed a new Constitution that established that key military and political figures had the right to have a seat at the Senate, even when they had not been elected. Given the power of Pinochet at

the time of the election, he was able to maintain this prerogative, and he was even one of the few Senators that the Constitution appointed as lifetime Senators. The reform to eliminate the appointed Senators showed the division of RN once again. Jarpa, Cardemil, and Prat, among others, expressed the opposition of the conservative faction, while Allamand and the liberals fervently supported this measure. This topic brought fierce tensions within the party, which called to a meeting of the General Council to debate them. The liberals won the majority of the votes during the General Council. However, external pressures from the military and from UDI (a close ally of the military) did not take long to appear. In particular, these groups started pressuring the conservative faction, with a large presence in the Senate (7 out of 11 RN Senators), to vote against the decision made by RN General Council. The Senators opted to obey the pressures from UDI and the military and opted to vote against the reforms and what the party agreed in General Council (Lira Rojas, 2004, 67-70). Soon after that, another member of the liberal group, Alberto Espina, replaced Allamand as RN president.

Also, in 1997 Jarpa decides to leave RN and form its own party. The leader of the conservative faction chose to form a new party, ChileFuturo, that included members that had an active participation in the military regime, nationalists, former military members, and ex-collaborators of Pinochet. The goal was to confront the reformist attempts of RN, in particular to any type of Constitutional reforms that will limit the prerogatives obtained by Pinochet. In addition, the increasing electoral victories of UDI vis-à-vis RN motivated many RN members to join UDI, as María Angélica Cristi or Alberto Cardemil⁷.

The election of Sebastián Piñera as president of RN in 2003, with the combination that the military lost power after 14 years of the democratic transition, marked a turn in RN's style. Piñera himself had always had a highly critical vision of the military regime and had publicly announced his vote against the regime in the 1988 plebiscite that defined the end of the military regime. Piñera had also supported several reforms of the *Concertación* and had himself a strong liberal position in both political and moral values. However, Piñera failed in maintaining a party united and disciplining its members (Barozet and Aubry, 2005). More importantly, the military continue to have some external influence over RN leaders. This can be seen, for instance, in the Presidential candidacy of Piñera in 2005, when he signed a pact with a sector of the military to limit the Human Rights trials if Piñera was elected President of Chile (La Nación, 06/01/2006).

While after 2005 the party continued having internal divisions and conflicts among

⁷Cardemil presided the party from 1999 to 2001 and had previously had direct participation in the military regime as Subsecretary of Interior.

leaders, the divisions were no longer between the two original factions (conservative vs liberals), as the two main figures. The predominance of liberal factions, and the gradual debilitation of the military regime (due to reforms passed by the *Concertación* and the consolidation of the democratic regime) was translated in a less ambiguous position of RN in support of human rights.

5.3.3 UCeDe

UCeDe had had a solid relationship to the previous military regime, but less strong than its Chilean counterparts. UCeDe's main leader, Álvaro Alsogaray, started his career in military institutions, as he graduated from the *Colegio Militar* where he studied engineering at the Army's School. During the military regime from 1976 to 1983 Alsogaray would publicly support the role of the military in neutralizing the 'subversive uprisings' and the political chaos of the 1970s (Gibson, 1996, 107). In addition, and more importantly, Alsogaray and other liberal leaders would particularly support the military's compromise to introduce economic reforms that would move Argentina to a free-market economic model.

A few leaders of UCeDe had positions during the previous military regime. Alsogaray himself had not. His name was mentioned several times as a potential Economic Minister, but he was never appointed. However, two other central figures of UCeDe in the early 1980s, Carlos A. Sanchez Sañudo (candidate to the Senate) and Armando Ribas (candidate to the House of Representatives) had ties to the previous military regime. Sanchez Sañudo was himself a retired member of the military (retired Admiral), while Ribas had been a mid-level technocrat during the Proceso. Nevertheless, none of these two figures had central positions during the military regime, contrasting with the cases of UDI and even RN.

These more tenuous ties of UCeDe with the military regime, and the fact that the Argentine military started the new democratic regime in a highly weak position, explain why UCeDe was not able to benefit much from the ties to the military regime. On one side, UCeDe was able to benefit of the repression of many opponents of the regime. In particular, the military regime severely repressed and attacked peronist leaders, left-wing militants, and workers. However, different than the Chilean case, the military regime was less successful in debilitating the electoral ties between peronists and its electoral base. While in Chile the military was effective in weakening worker unions and in debilitating the presence of Socialists and Communists in poor areas, the Argentine military regime failed in breaking the ties between low-income sectors and peronist leaders. On the other side, the military regime in Argentina, different to Pinochet's regime, did not attempt to help its allies to develop grassroots organizations in poor areas. As a consequence, none of the members of UCeDe were

appointed as Mayors in poor areas, nor did they have access to discretionary social policy to benefit low-income voters.

Nevertheless, UCeDe internal ties to the military regime impose some constraints in the new democratic regime. The fact that Alsogaray had not had a position during the military regime allowed him to express some critiques to the previous dictatorship. However, these critiques were circumscribed only to the economic role of the military regime, and not to its political role. Alsogaray blamed the previous military regime for not implementing a truly liberal economic program. These critiques, though, were targeted mostly to the civilians during the military regime and not to the military as an institution. As some of the founding documents of UCeDe explain, the economic problems of the previous military regime were

“unambiguously attributable to a small group of technocrats and politicians that indebted the country to incredible levels, gave impulse to the highest inflation in the world, and ushered in the current wave of recession and unemployment. This group had the most extraordinary opportunity on March 24, 1976, to heal the economy and put an end to the statism, interventionism, and ‘developmentalism’ that over more than thirty years had corroded the very foundations of the Republic. But it made no fundamental efforts to eliminate that pernicious system.”⁸

On the political role of the military, Alsogaray had more nuanced criticisms. He agreed on the central role of the military in eliminating the ‘subversive threat’ and ending the ‘political and economic chaos’ that the prior Peronist government and unleashed on the Argentine society (Gibson, 1996, 107). The support of UCeDe to the human rights violations of the previous military regime contrasted highly with the position of other conservative leaders and the other main political parties. To Alsogaray the military’s actions were legitimate “acts of war” and could not be judged by legal norms established for times of peace. He even claimed that all ‘disappeared’ persons should be considered under the category of ‘killed in combat’ (Gibson, 1996, 124-5).

In conclusion, the ties of UCeDe to the military constrained the party in the new democratic regime to follow a strategy of orthogonal appeals based on a defense of democratic values. However, UCeDe was not able to benefit much from the alliance to the military. The weakness of the military regime and its incapacity to help its allies to build ties to low-income voters affected the capacity of UCeDe to attract new voters.

⁸Cited in Gibson (1996, 107)

5.3.4 PRO

The analysis of PRO with the previous military regime is slightly different than the other three parties. PRO was formed in 2003, once the military was no longer a relevant political actor. The external influence of the military was by the time very weak. This was not the case of UDI, RN, or UCeDe which emerged during the transition to the democratic regime, facing strong threatening military, especially in Chile. PRO emerged not only 20 years after the end of the military regime, but also after the implementation of multiple reforms that debilitated the military institution. While Mauricio Macri is accused of having some tenuous economic ties to the military regime, especially suspected that the companies of the Macri family was particularly benefited during the *Proceso*, the party did not either have strong internal presence of members of the previous military regime. As a consequence, PRO was not pressured by the military, either externally or internally, to avoid a focus on the values of democracy. Nevertheless PRO does focus on the defense of many democratic institutions, such as the independence of the judicial system or their opposition to unlimited re-elections for the President. It is unlikely, though, that these claims come only because of the party weak ties to the military, as many of these critiques do not affect the policy interests of the military.

5.4 Conclusion

This section analyzes the ties of each of the four conservative parties to one of the central conservative institutions throughout the 20th century: the military. In particular, this section shows how the military in Chile was particularly savvy in benefiting its main political ally: UDI. Pinochet helped the young UDI leaders with key appointment as Mayors in poor areas, with discretionary social policy, and with a harsh and effective repression to the left that weakened the linkages between the poor and left-wing groups. These three resources helped UDI to increase their presence in neighborhoods where the right has historically had no presence. However, as UDI was the party with the strongest ties to the military regime it had the hardest time in using orthogonal appeals based on a defense of democratic values. For the case of UDI, the military had both strong external and internal influence to the party leaders.

Renovación Nacional's had a more ambiguous ties to the military than UDI. Internally, the party was actually split among two factions, one closely tied with the Pinochet regime, and the other one a group of young liberal groups that were critical of the political role of the military regime. The internal division of the party

was translated in a more ambiguous defense of the military regime than UDI. In several occasions the party had severe fights regarding its position on Human Rights violations or the 1980 Constitution. However, the powerful military in Chile was able to externally influence the party in numerous occasions. After more than a decade of the transition to democracy, and the implementation of reforms that debilitated the external power of the military in Chile, Renovación Nacional moved towards greater criticism of the military regime. This is seen in the recent decision by the party to eliminate any mention to the military regime in its partisan *estatuto*.

In Argentina, the military had a weaker external power than the Chilean military. For the case of UCeDe, the party had moderate ties to the military, with some leaders participating mainly in technocratic, but also military, positions. However, the military did not benefit UCeDe members with resources, as the case of Pinochet and the *gremialistas*. After the transition to the military, the external power of the military decreased. UCeDe was able to present some critiques to the previous regime, but the moderate internal ties to the military stopped the party from centering on a pro-democratic agenda.

Last, PRO is the only party in this research that emerged once the democratic regime was consolidated. As a consequence, the external power of the military was the weakest for the case of PRO. The party was not externally influenced by military pressures, nor had their leaders (a majority young leaders) any appointments with the previous military regime. Therefore, PRO had greater levels of freedom to use a strategy of orthogonal appeals. However, a speech based on the ‘need of a democratic regime vis-à-vis an authoritarian regime’ was less salient and probably useless as a strategy to attract new voters.

To summarize, the military regime was able to influence its allies during and after the military regime. However, those allies were constrained later on to use a strategy of orthogonal appeals. As this analysis show, conservative parties in Argentina and Chile had different ties to the previous military regime, which were translated in different benefits and constrains by one of the central conservative institution as the military.




Figure 5.1: Causal Argument for the Military during New Democratic Regime




Figure 5.2: Causal Argument for the Military during New Democratic Regime

Chapter 6

Conclusion

In the last years, conservative parties around the world have had multiple electoral victories. In several European countries the center-right and the extreme right have improved their performance vis-à-vis previous years. In Latin America, the election of Mauricio Macri, as well as the recent electoral loss of *chavismo*, might indicate the end of the left-wing period and the emergence of a right-wing trend. For many countries, the electoral victories of right-wing parties in Latin America constitutes a new phenomenon since the transition to democracy in the 1980s. While in the past many of the conservative actors would rely on non-democratic practices to reach power, today they are gaining the support of larger sectors of the population. Understanding their dynamics is imperative to better understand Latin American politics today. My dissertation aims to contribute to this knowledge as it represents the first comparative study of conservative party's electoral strategies in the region.

6.1 Overview of Findings

After the transition to democracy in Latin America conservative parties have faced the need of building political parties that would attract the support of broad sectors of the population. This constitutes a new challenge to conservative parties, as in the past, under restricted democracies, Latin American conservative parties could rely on military coups or fraud to access government positions. Building broad electoral coalitions can be particularly difficult for conservative parties, as they have as their core constituencies only a minority of the population: the upper sectors of society (Gibson, 1996). As a consequence, conservative party leaders need to attract new voters. In Latin America, where a majority of the population is poor, this means that conservative parties need to obtain the support of poor voters.

In order to attract poor voters conservative parties may follow different strategies. Unfortunately, the literature on Latin American political parties has understudied the role of conservative and the strategies it has used to attract poor voters. While most of the recent literature has focused on labor-based parties, or on the ties of the left to popular organizations, we lack comparative studies of how right-wing parties may attract the support of the poor.¹ This dissertation aims to fill this gap.

In particular, I claim that conservative parties may choose from four different strategies. First, following the Downsian logic, political parties may choose to *moderate* their economic appeals in order to attract a broader group of supporters (Downs, 1957; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). In Latin American countries, the main cleavage that divides the ideological position of political parties is an economic-distributive dimension, where parties have distinguishable positions regarding the states role in the economy and the provision of social security (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Second, conservative parties may opt to focus on *priming orthogonal appeals* to obtain broad support. This strategy consists of including a new (non-economic) topic in the agenda that would cross-cut social groups. In particular, conservative parties may focus on topics such as democracy, religion, or crime to attract new voters. Interestingly, conservative parties might be even willing to include progressive moral agendas (e.g., gay rights) to obtain greater electoral support. Third, parties may choose to maintain their economic program and use right-wing economic appeals to appeal to both core and non-core voters. This strategy, named *neoliberal strategy*, consists on using the party's liberal economic program to convince low-income groups of the benefits of market reforms and neoliberal economic policies. Last, conservative parties may choose to continue with their ideological positions while building non-programmatic ties with new voters (Kitschelt, 2000; Luna, 2010). In this strategy, political parties may opt to develop *grassroots activities* in low-income neighborhoods in order to attract the urban poor Luna (2010, 2014).

It is worth mentioning that parties may choose one of these strategies or opt to combine several of them. For instance, parties may combine moderation with orthogonal appeals, or orthogonal appeals with grassroots organizations. However, the neoliberal strategy, by definition, implies the absence of the other three strategies, as parties only use their right-wing neoliberal approach to attract poor voters. In addition, parties may vary, over time, in the type of strategy they choose to attract new voters.

To explain this variation I focus on the ties of conservative parties to the three most relevant conservative institutions in the recent history of Latin America: business groups, the military, and the Catholic Church. Similarly to the literature on

¹A notable exception is Luna (2014).

labor-based parties (Levitsky, 2003; Collier and Collier, 1991; Roberts, 2006), I claim that right-wing party ties to conservative institutions affect the party's strategic options. In particular, I analyze how each of these institutions may affect party strategies through two different paths of influence: *external* and *internal*.

In the first path, which I call *external influence*, an external powerful institution (i.e. the military, the Catholic Church, or business groups), is strong enough to constrain party policy by either threatening to cut fiscal resources that the institution gives to the party, or to cut the capacity of the party to mobilize citizens. These threats put pressure on the party to defend the conservative institution's interests. In the second path, members of the external institution (i.e. the military, the Catholic Church, and business groups) are also leaders in the conservative party. In this path, which I call *internal influence*, those party leaders that are also members of the institution oppose policy that may affect the interests of the conservative institution. The risk could be either that the person loses their membership in the external institution or losing basic rights, such as freedom.

My dissertation uses a combination of machine learning and qualitative methods to understand how business groups, the Catholic Church, and the military affect conservative party's strategies to attract new voters. In particular, I use topic models with Latent Dirichlet Allocation to analyze over 4800 party press releases. This analysis allows me to have comparable measures across parties on the strategy that each party has used to attract new voters. I combine this finding with qualitative evidence I collected during 18 months of fieldwork, mainly evidence on party leaders careers as well as in-dept interviews. This evidence allows me to do process tracing of how conservative institutions affect conservative party's strategies.

To understand how conservative institutions affect party strategies I focus on the four main conservative parties in Argentina and Chile since the transition to democracy in the 1980s. In particular, I analyze the cases of Renovación Nacional (RN), Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), Unión de Centro Democrático (UCeDe), and Propuesta Republicana (PRO).

Renovación Nacional has used a strategy of orthogonal appeals on Human Rights, democracy, and a more progressive moral agenda, as well as a strategy of (limited) economic moderation (chapter 2). In particular, the party has attempted to attract new voters by defending the role of the new democratic regime, Human Rights, as well as a morally progressive agenda on issues such as gay rights. I explain these choices by analyzing the ties of RN leaders to the three conservative institutions. First, RN has moderate ties to business groups (chapter 3), with a strong internal influence of business leaders, but a much weaker external influence. I show that RN has ties to business oriented groups and I show how the party's moderate ties to these groups vis-à-vis the case of UDI, explain the capacity of RN leaders to

moderate their economic agenda on certain limited issues. Second, I show that the moderate ties of RN to the Catholic Church (chapter 4) explain why the party was able to accept some moral rights, such as gay rights, while oppose others, such as abortion rights. Last, the weak ties of RN to the military (chapter 5) show how the party could implement a strategy of orthogonal appeals on democracy and Human Rights to attract new voters.

The case of Unión Democrática Independiente shows a different picture. UDI leaders have focused mostly on a strategy of grassroots activities to attract the support of the urban poor (chapter 2). This strategy was possible given the strong ties of UDI to the military during the Pinochet regime (chapter 5) and the strong ties to business groups (chapter 3). In addition, the strong ties of UDI leaders to export-oriented business groups (chapter 3), as well as to the Catholic Church (chapter 4), and to the military (chapter 5) explain why the party could not implement a strategy of economic moderation, orthogonal appeals on democratic values, or on morally progressive issues, respectively.

In Argentina, UCeDe leaders in the 1980s chose a neoliberal strategy (chapter 2). This decision is explained by the strong ties of UCeDe leaders to liberal, export-oriented business groups (chapter 3). In addition, party leaders had medium ties to the military which made it difficult to use a strategy of orthogonal appeals on Human Rights issues (chapter 5). Last, the party had medium ties to the Catholic Church and the threat of the Church to use its mobilizational capacity against UCeDe limited the chances of UCeDe to have a more liberal moral agenda (chapter 4).

PRO leaders chose a strategy of economic moderation (chapter 2) to attract broader sectors of society. Different to other parties, PRO was able to implement such a strategy because it had moderate ties to ISI business groups (chapter 3). In addition, the party had moderate ties to the Catholic Church, with a group within the party with strong ties, and another group with weak ties. This dual character made possible for PRO to defend some morally progressive agenda, but limited as it could risk the party's internal cohesion. Last, PRO leaders had very weak ties to the military, making it possible for them to have pro-democratic appeals. However, as the party was formed more than 30 years after the transition to democracy, its appeals are less about the role of the military, and more about the defense of republican institutions.

To summarize, this dissertation shows how conservative institutions, especially business groups, the Catholic Church, and the military, constrain conservative party's strategies to attract new voters.

6.2 Further Research on Conservative Parties

While my dissertation makes significant headway in explaining why conservative parties use different strategies to attract new voters, several key tasks would further address our understanding of conservative parties. First, further research is necessary to shed light on the effectiveness of these strategies to attract poor voters. While this dissertation explains which strategy conservative parties may use, future research could help us understand which strategy might give better electoral results to parties. My research suggests that economic moderation and grassroots activities might be the strongest strategies to make electoral inroads into poor voters. However, further research would be needed to connect the causal argument between strategies and electoral performance.

Second, as conservative parties have been understudied in Latin America, we lack a thorough understanding of conservative party dynamics in Latin American countries. While the literature has done an excellent job at explaining how conservative actors allied to the military to access government positions during the 20th century, we lack theories and empirical analysis on the internal dynamics of right-wing parties, their strategies vis-à-vis left-wing parties, or their adaptability to the left-turn in many Latin American countries.

Third, future research could analyze the validity of my argument in countries with different conservative institutions, where, for instance, the military does not constitute a strong ally of conservative actors, or where other religions are more predominant than Catholicism. Do other religions constrain conservative parties in similar ways? Would other institutions matter more outside the Latin American context? Expanding the argument to other regions could help us better understand how external institutions affect partisan strategies to expand their electoral coalitions. Similarly, other parties, such as center or left-wing parties, could also be incorporated into the analysis to improve our understanding of the dynamics between external powerful institutions and political parties.

Fourth, another important direction for future research would be to expand the analysis of conservative party's strategies beyond its electoral appeals. While electoral appeals are central to understand why conservative parties may win election, it is also necessary to analyze how conservative institutions may affect governing decisions of right-wing governments. How can business groups, the Catholic Church, and the military affect the policy decisions of allied governments? Similar to the analysis of labor unions and left-wing parties, we could benefit from better understanding how conservative institutions affect the policy choices of right-wing governments. In particular, scholars studying Latin America could expand our knowledge of how the recently elected right-wing parties have governed in countries such as Colombia

(Uribe), Chile (Piñera), Argentina (Macri), Paraguay (Cartes), among others.

Last, future works on party strategies could also benefit from incorporating machine learning to their analysis. Automated text analysis, and in particular topic models, can help researchers to have comparable indicators of party strategies across parties and across countries. Text analysis is particularly good for analyzing large corpus of data, now available through the participation of political parties in social media or the publication of party data in their websites. Topic models can be particularly helpful for researchers to discover strategies of parties without introducing researchers preconceptions. Future research on political party tactics and dynamics can incorporate topic models into their analysis to analyze thousands of documents that had not been previously analyzed.

6.3 Final Thoughts

This dissertation aims to contribute to the general study of conservative parties in Latin America and to the broader theoretical question of how conservative parties attract the support of low-income voters.

It is a common misconception to say that poor people are irrational and “vote against their own economic interest” when they vote to a right wing party. This misapprehension with regard to poor people is especially common in developing countries, such as in Latin America, which often exhibit very high rates of inequality, and where business interests are often far removed from the concerns of the working class.

My dissertation tries to dispel this notion, showing how right-wing parties succeed in attracting the votes of poor voters, by appealing to their economic as well as social interests. I quantitatively demonstrate the topics parties focus on when communicating with their audience, and show that successful right-wing parties target poor voters with strategies that appeal to their specific concerns.

Without appealing specifically to low-income voters, it would be almost impossible for conservative forces in emerging economies to build broad electoral coalitions. Regardless of one’s personal political inclinations, I believe these strategies are extremely important, since strong conservative parties that are actively engaged in the democratic process are essential for the long term stability of democracy in Latin America and the rest of the developing world. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether conservative parties that use strategies to appeal to poor voters, will also use their government positions to help the poor once they are in office.

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