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Publication Date

1996

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REFORMING MEXICO'S AGRARIAN REFORM

Laura Randall
Editor

M.E. Sharpe
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London, England

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Reforming Mexico's agrarian reform / Laura Randall, editor.

p. cm.—(Columbia University seminar series)

Papers presented at a conference held at Columbia University, Apr. 6–7, 1995, which was sponsored by the University Seminars of Columbia University and the Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1–56324–643–0 (alk. paper).—ISBN 1–56324–644–9 (pbk. : alk. paper)

I. Land reform—Mexico—Congresses.

I. Randall, Laura.

II. Columbia University. University Seminars.

III. Columbia University, Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies.

IV. Series.

HD1333.M6R445 1996

333.3'172—dc20

95–25771

CIP

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—

Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,

ANSI Z 39.48–1984.

BM (c) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

BM (p) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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right to the premium was equivalent, for many, to making an electoral commitment; while, of course, this promise need not have been kept, the risk was that overseers of the vote—which, in the countryside, is secret only under exceptional circumstances—would make “traitors” pay.

Finally, PROCAMPO's fifteen-year duration, which is among its positive aspects, also favored electoral manipulation, since the rumor was spread among peasants that direct support to grain producers was not an acquired right but a campaign promise, and that the program would only remain if the PRI were to win. The political insensitivity of the opposition parties did the rest, since they condemned both the populist manipulation of the program and its redistributive nature during their campaigns. For many peasants, therefore, what was at stake in their vote or failure to vote for Zedillo was not merely 1995's check but also the next fifteen years' worth of payments.

Note

1. The intransigence of FONAES is due to its rigid financial norms, but also to the fact that the corn-growing program was part of a plan to transform community supply councils throughout the country into multiactivity marketing companies. This project, promoted by FONAES, came up against political resistance from DICCONSA, which did not want to lose client control over the councils. Under these circumstances, the corn production-supply program became the scene of a struggle over the political spoils of a broad national consumer organization. DICCONSA won the battle, and from that moment on, there was a decrease in FONAES's interest in the councils and their projects. If such corporate savagery occurs in the young and socially sensitive areas of public administration, how do matters stand in the domain of the great saurians?

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JONATHAN FOX

National Electoral Choices in Rural Mexico

How do we know what Mexican rural citizens think about politics? Several different research perspectives provide important insights, but no single approach combines the diversity of the many ongoing trends with reliable nationwide indicators of rural political views. The degree to which the Chiapas rebellion surprised most political analysts should lead to great caution when drawing firm conclusions based on a linear extrapolation of the tip of the rural political iceberg that is visible at any point in time.¹ Rather than focus on the many reactions to the government's rural policy reforms, however, this essay will concentrate on one key dimension of rural citizens' capacity to express their political views: access to a guaranteed secret ballot. The right to a secret ballot is a necessary condition for political democracy. The secret ballot is not a sufficient condition for democratic voting, but without it all the other conditions could be ineffective. This paper will analyze data on the secret ballot, pressure of voters, and the presence of opposition political parties in rural areas. Until the electoral process is free and fair in rural areas, it will be difficult to know what campesino political views are.

Introduction

The government's agrarian and agricultural policy reforms provoked a wide range of reactions among the people most directly affected—the one in four Mexicans who live in the countryside. In some regions, among some groups, the reforms generated active or passive acceptance; the response was open protest among others, with an unmeasurable degree of “everyday forms of resistance” in

I am very grateful to Dr. Juan Molinar, Professor at the Colegio de México, for generously making IFE data available. Dr. Sergio Aguayo, of Alianza Cívica, provided very useful feedback. Thanks also to Rogelio Razo at MIT for able research assistance and data analysis.

between. Among those willing and able to protest, some opted for more militant action than others. Still others chose the long-standing exit option, leaving for the city or the United States.² No single generalization could possibly fit the inherently diverse individual and group reactions, but distinct general patterns do emerge.³ The problem is that it is extremely difficult to discern the *relative weights* of the main trends.

Studies of rural politics tend to fall into three disparate categories. First is the rich literature on rural social and civic movements, which provides great insight into how and why discontent turns into protest. Second is the growing body of public opinion poll data, which provide a snapshot of responses to questions about electoral preferences. The third main source of information about rural political views consists of the national election results themselves (if they are sufficiently disaggregated into rural and nonrural areas). None of these sources of information provides a comprehensive overview of effective access to national electoral options in rural areas, however. Each kind of information has its limits. First, studies of mobilization tell us very little about the political beliefs of the vast majority who do not participate actively. Second, national polling in Mexico rarely reaches into rural areas, and when it does, the specifically rural sample is far from robust. Moreover, in areas where political freedoms are lacking, exit polls may well reflect how people voted, but not necessarily how they would have preferred to have voted under democratic conditions.⁴ Third, national election data from rural areas reflect the results of a process that has yet to cross a minimum threshold of freedom and fairness (Alianza Cívica/Observación '94, 1994b).⁵ Therefore, none of the three main sources of information about rural political beliefs is sufficient to permit a reliable assessment of the relative national weights of diverse ongoing rural trends.

Rural movements for local level democratization have centuries of history in Mexico, but rural participation in national electoral politics has received much less research attention. If national electoral competition in Mexico is still new, then national electoral competition in rural areas is even newer. We do not know, however, what fraction of rural citizens had effective access to national choices in the 1994 presidential election.

This study begins with a brief discussion of exclusionary political practices and the potential for the government's recent agrarian policy reforms to be used as clientelistic control mechanisms. The analysis then focuses on access to the secret ballot in rural areas. Even if government officials tried to take advantage of the new reforms to encourage progovernment voting, ballot secrecy could potentially protect individuals and permit them to exercise their citizenship rights in spite of official pressures.

The analysis of ballot secrecy will draw on two different data sources. The Civic Alliance's election observation data will be discussed first, followed by an analysis of the degree to which opposition political parties were able to take advantage of their legal right to participate in the community-level administra-

tion of the voting process. Since the Civic Alliance found widespread violations of ballot secrecy in rural areas in the sample they observed, it is reasonable to assume that ballot secrecy was at least as serious a problem throughout the rest of the countryside. In this context, the participation of opposition parties in the administration of the polling place is probably a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for ballot secrecy to be respected. In other words, one can assume that voters at polling places where opposition parties were *not* present lacked a guaranteed secret ballot and therefore lacked access to meaningful national electoral choices.⁶ The discussion will first analyze the Civic Alliance's state-level data, followed by an assessment of the presence of opposition parties at polling places in significant indigenous populations based on municipal-level data for the three states with the largest indigenous populations: Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Chiapas.

Exclusionary Political Practices

Most discussions of electoral irregularities focus exclusively on fraud. This approach deals with many of the obstacles to free and fair elections. Fraud is a subset of a broader category of exclusionary electoral practices that violate basic democratic principles. Exclusionary political practices are defined here as systematic patterns of manipulating electoral access, including fraud, voter registration bias, the lack of secret ballot guarantees, voter intimidation, and vote-buying (Fox 1994b). These are issues of electoral *freedom*s, as distinct from issues of electoral *fairness*, many of which remain unresolved in long-standing democratic systems (e.g., fair access to mass media, limits to campaign financing). Exclusionary political practices are often situated in "local" politics because that is where most citizens either gain access to or are excluded from the state more generally. But authoritarian local politicians usually need national allies to survive, especially if challenged from below.

Most analysts assume that fraud and other exclusionary electoral practices raise fundamental problems for the democratic process only if they are obviously nationally centralized. Otherwise such practices tend to be treated as ad hoc and anecdotal.⁷ Conventional election observers tend to view such procedural problems as mere "imperfections" compared to classic ballot tampering, assuming that they are not deliberate and can be easily corrected through proper and timely technical intervention. Whether or not they are systematic (i.e., centralized), such exclusionary practices can certainly be *widespread*. Mexico's nonpartisan Civic Alliance observation movement found that in the 1994 presidential election, the secret ballot was not guaranteed in 38 percent of their national sample of polling places (as will be discussed below). In the combined national and state elections in Chiapas, the secret ballot was violated in 68 percent of the polling places observed (and perhaps more often in polling places not observed).⁸

New Levers of State Intervention in the Countryside

Where do Mexico's recent agrarian and agricultural reforms fit into the rural electoral equation? Rather than make generalizations about campesino political reactions to these important rural policy reforms, this study will address the question of their *access* to one particular channel for expressing their political views: the national election. One major link between this issue of electoral access, capacity to express political preferences and the government's policy reforms, is through the changing nature of state regulation of the rural economy. The nature of state intervention has changed significantly, but the state has not withdrawn from regulating key features of the peasant economy. The new regulatory institutions differ from those they replaced but still leave powerful discretionary levers in the hands of government officials, levers with the potential to be used for electoral manipulation.⁹

If the state had completely withdrawn from rural life, it would have given up a wide array of instruments that have managed to channel rural dissent for decades. The government's ambitious new programs for ejido land titling (PROCEDE) and crop payments for trade adjustment (PROCAMPO) were created as part of a broad policy shift to withdraw the heavy hand of the state from regulating peasant life. Whether they will in practice depends on the degree to which each program makes the transition from public declarations of intentions to the actual delivery of checks to real producers and the confirmation of individual land titles that match users' claims to each parcel. These tasks require the national state to develop remarkably intimate relationships with millions of individuals for the first time. These reforms require federal bureaucrats to reach more deeply into the countryside than ever before, to learn about, measure, and mediate the complex diversity of real-life producer-land use relationships.

For example, the PROCAMPO crop payment program requires the state to determine who was growing basic crops, with how many hectares, and whether they had legal use rights to the land, complete with each producer's correct name. Under the previous support price system, the official procurement agency (CONASUPO) did not need to know exactly who produced what. The new approach fits well with the new official ideology of "social liberalism," in which the state combines promarket economic policies with continued social concern. In contrast to the indirect patterns of regulation in the past, however, the new crop payment program requires the state to develop a formal relationship with every producer of basic grains in the country. This is a major challenge to state capacity, especially since the task of developing an official census of producers was given to the Ministry of Agriculture, an agency whose field apparatus is not known for its efficiency and transparency.

The reform of land tenure policy raises analogous questions about state capacity to develop accountable relationships with millions of campesinos in a very short time. The new agrarian regulatory apparatus was created with the explicit

recognition that abuses of authority were possible, and as a result agrarian officials had the obligation to "receive, investigate, and channel complaints and denunciations regarding possible violations of agrarian law and procedures committed by public servants to the appropriate authorities."¹⁰ As Baitenmann found in her Veracruz field research, however, since these agrarian officials "are also part of the same team that coordinates [the new land titling program], . . . they were not going to denounce themselves" (1994). She points out that the experience of the government's official human rights commission provides a notable contrast with the new agrarian apparatus, in that the new proaccountability human rights institutions are formally independent of the government agencies they are supposed to monitor.

To be successful on their own terms, Mexico's promarket rural reforms require the state apparatus to operate with qualitatively higher levels of accountability than in the past. Yet progress toward accountable governance in Mexico has been highly uneven, across both policy arenas and geographical space. Because civic movements for local democratization and accountable governance have advanced little in most rural areas, the official project of streamlining and targeting the state's role in agriculture and antipoverty efforts may well be undermined by authoritarian elements deeply embedded within the state itself.

Several of the government's rural reform programs provoked extensive criticism for being used for electoral manipulation. Many of these criticisms did not distinguish between electorally motivated "pork barrel" inducements that are characteristic of most electoral systems, and specifically *authoritarian* conditioning of access to these programs. The distribution of PROCAMPO crop payment checks right before the 1994 presidential election was one of most controversial government actions. More than 2.8 million PROCAMPO checks were delivered just a few weeks or days before the 1994 presidential election (in open violation of the government's own promise to suspend the program for the two weeks prior to the election).¹¹ The timing certainly suggests electoral motivations, but whether this counts as specifically authoritarian vote buying (vs. "normal" pork barrel vote inducements) depends on the government's capacity to effectively *condition* access on electoral support. In other words, if the government's "carrots" are linked to the threat of the "stick," then this manipulation falls outside the "normal" category of "democratic" inducements. As will be discussed below, for the Civic Alliance, this process fell primarily under the category of *coacción*, or pressure on voters.¹² Since most government benefits were distributed before election day, whether they were solidarity projects, land titles, or crop payment checks, the bargaining process between state and citizens was not systematically documented by independent observers. In practice, this bargaining process involved a diverse combination of efforts to gain electoral support both with and without the potential for monitoring and punishing noncompliance.¹³ Not all efforts to "buy" votes involve threats to enforce compliance. The "lag" effect in between the effort to "buy" votes and the election day act of "selling" them

may be one reason why such a large fraction of secret-ballot violations took the form of voters who showed their ballot to others before depositing it (see below). In an authoritarian vote-buying scenario, if the buyer pays the seller before the actual vote is cast, then the voter is under implicit pressure to show that he or she kept his or her part of the bargain.

Overall, however, it is impossible to measure the degree to which access to the state's new rural development programs, whether through land titles or through trade compensation payments, was conditioned on electoral support in 1994. It is possible, however, to address the degree to which ballot secrecy was violated, which would suggest the pool of voters who were vulnerable to efforts to condition access to the reform programs.

National Voting in Rural Areas

Mexico's national elections have long been seen as irrelevant to rural citizens, whose electoral priorities focus on municipal races.¹⁴ The classic anthropological view suggests that rural Mexicans trade their votes for local benefits rather than use their votes to express national party preferences. Guillermo Bonfil, one of Mexico's most prominent advocates of indigenous self-determination, suggested that they vote *en corto* (as part of a deal), and even did so in the contested 1988 race. That is, their vote is "based on short-term considerations that have nothing to do with political programs that propose alternatives models for the society in the future. [It] is seen more as a resource for here and now, exercised toward the promise of finishing a road, building a school or a drinking water system, moving forward a land titling process, and other small benefits that help to resolve ancestral problems that shape their daily lives. . . . The parties will have to dig very deep to get to the bottom and touch the levers capable of politically mobilizing the deep Mexico" (Bonfil 1990, iii).

This view of rural voting was convincing as long as national politics remained uncompetitive and as long as rural citizens lacked access to the information and rights necessary to choose among national options. This context is now changing. An alternative interpretation might suggest, for example, that indigenous voters do not so much lack national political preferences as they lack reasons for sacrificing short-term benefits in favor of what often appear to be unviable longer-term political alternatives. The "political opportunity structure" generally influences local political decisions about how and whether to take the risks inherent in supporting alternatives to the status quo (Tarrow 1994). In Mexico, at least until recently, no opposition political party has made organizing around specifically indigenous concerns a major national priority.¹⁵

It is certainly difficult for urban-based outsiders to know what the motivations of rural and indigenous voters are, but there is very strong circumstantial evidence that the official electoral machinery often has not left the voting decision up to them. The overwhelmingly pro-PRI 1988 returns in the region of the

Zapatista rebellion suggest that one can question the degree to which official rural votes reflect actual voter decisions, especially in indigenous regions. A major nonpartisan geographical study of the official 1988 returns gives a sense of the magnitude of this issue (López et al. 1988, 31–33). First, this study clearly shows that rural votes gave Salinas his official majority. In "very urban" areas he reportedly won only 34 percent, but in "very rural" areas he received 77 percent of the votes counted. While the rural and semirural districts accounted for 43 percent of the electorate, they produced 57 percent of Salinas' official vote. Within the countryside, the number of voters on the rolls in 35 federal congressional districts turned out to have 105 to 125 percent of the number of adults estimated from the census. In Chiapas, for example, the Ocosingo district had 105 percent, while the Comitán district had 124 percent. These remote districts also reported extraordinarily high turnout levels, ranging over 90 percent when compared to the population figures rather than the official rolls. Chiapas had 3 percent of the population but accounted for 6 percent of Salinas' national vote in 1988. The national electoral importance of these captive vote reserves may help to explain why President Salinas chose to reinforce rather than to weaken authoritarian political elites in Chiapas during the years preceding the rebellion.¹⁶

The Civic Alliance and the Secret Ballot

The Civic Alliance brought together a wide range of nongovernmental organizations to monitor the 1994 electoral process. While some of the participating groups had experience in several state elections, none had tried to monitor the national electoral process before. Some of the member groups were more "civic," some were more involved in grassroots development efforts, while others were more "political." Ideologically, Civic Alliance participants ranged from center-right to center-left, but they shared a strong skepticism toward all Mexican political parties.¹⁷

Founded only five months before the August elections, the Civic Alliance fielded more than 12,000 Mexican election observers and hundreds of international election "visitors," as they were officially called. The Civic Alliance observed a statistically representative stratified sample of more than 1,800 polling places for their national quick count (out of more than 94,000). Local affiliates extended this coverage in some states. They did not find any single obvious "smoking gun" in terms of election law violations; instead they found a diverse array of mechanisms that tarnished and distorted the process in different ways, so diverse that they found it impossible to quantify the overall effect on the electoral outcome. As a result, the Civic Alliance did not challenge the PRI presidential victory but did claim that the sum total of irregularities, whatever that was, certainly affected the PRI's margin of victory, many congressional races, and the Chiapas governor's race, which took place the same day. The alliance's main emphasis was to produce a "quick count" in case the ruling party tried to change

Table 16.1

**Electoral Violations in the 1994 Mexican Presidential Elections:
National, Urban, and Rural**

Type of violation	Polling places where violations observed (%)		
	Nationwide ^a	Urban ^b	Rural ^c
Lack of ballot secrecy	38.55	25.44	51.09
Pressure on voters	25.47	14.36	35.62
Voters not listed on rolls	7.16	4.49	9.47
Voters lacked registration card	7.69	8.87	7.56
Voters not from locality	2.93	1.81	3.86
Voters arriving in group	—	3.28	11.55
Ink not applied to all voters	7.50	4.31	10.52

Source: Alianza Cívica/Observación '94 (1994).

^aThe national sample was designed to be statistically representative of the country as a whole, including 1,810 polling places, stratified into localities of four different sizes ranging from more to less urban.

^bThis is the "most urban" category, defined as municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants.

^cThis is the "most rural" category, defined as municipalities of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants.

the results after the voting, and to document election law violations on the voting day itself.¹⁸

The alliance election observation effort documented the percentage of polling places affected by electoral law violations. Table 16.1 shows the main categories of election-day irregularities, first at the national level and then divided into the "most urban" and "most rural" of their four territorial categories. Almost all kinds of irregularities were more widespread in rural than in urban areas.¹⁹ The most widespread type of violation, by far, was ballot secrecy, and the rate of violation was much more significant in rural than in urban areas. The Civic Alliance data on ballot secrecy were controversial in part because the observers did not systematically document the nature or the number of individual violations at each polling place. The resulting incomplete data make it difficult to estimate the fraction of the electorate whose ballot secrecy was directly violated, but if voters at a given polling place had reason to believe that even some voters' secrecy was violated, then it is likely that their vote was cast with the expectation that it was certainly possible—if not likely—that their secrecy would be violated as well (even if "objectively" it was not violated in their case). In other words,

Table 16.2

**Violations of Ballot Secrecy in the 1994 Mexican Presidential Elections:
National, Urban, and Rural**

Type of violation	Polling places where violations observed (%) ^a		
	Nationwide	Urban	Rural
Lack of ballot secrecy	38.55	25.44	51.09
Observers specified cause	37.39	23.61	49.90
Method of violation			
No screens	0.89	0.63	0.97
Someone watched voting	16.53	6.74	25.42
Voters showed ballot	18.58	10.96	25.54
Other	18.59	12.93	23.52

Source: Alianza Cívica/Observación '94 (1994).

^aThe sum of the different causes is larger than the total because in many cases the observer specified more than one form of violation.

one could argue that the *perception* that ballot secrecy violations were likely would be sufficient to influence voting decision, especially in a region where other political rights could be violated by local bosses with impunity. As a result, even if not all voters lacked ballot secrecy at a given polling place, the violation of the *guarantee* of secrecy is sufficient to raise serious questions about the entire process at that polling place.

Observers specified the cause of secrecy violations in 37 percent of the cases found, and Table 16.2 presents the data available.²⁰ Again, the differences between urban and rural violations are dramatic. While the presence of screens at polling places was clearly almost universal, the degree to which outsiders were nonetheless able to watch the voting process suggested, in the view of Civic Alliance analysts, "some degree of complicity (or poor preparation) on the part of the coordinating committee (*mesa directiva*) of the polling place." Voters also showed their marked ballots to others to a remarkable degree. The Civic Alliance observers found a wide range of patterns that suggested some kind of "arrangement that seemed to oblige the voter to show someone how they had voted. While showing a ballot may not be an irregularity, it is a practice that implies the existence of one or more electoral violations and that demeans [the process] because of the manipulation of the needs and poverty of the low-income population. It also suggests the force and the level of [vote] buying and the pressure brought to bear on the voters."

The possible use of government rural programs to influence voting decisions is most likely to have been categorized by election observers as *coacción*. Table 16.3 presents the data on the scope and forms of voter pressure. Notably, the police and army played negligible roles in this process, even in rural areas. Local political elites, however, played direct roles, as representatives of either the

Table 16.3

**Sources of Pressure on Voters in the 1994 Mexican Presidential Elections:
National, Urban, and Rural**

Type of violation	Polling places where violations observed (%)		
	Nationwide	Urban	Rural
Pressure on voters (coacción)	25.47	14.36	35.62
Source of pressure			
Party representatives	12.16	6.29	16.81
Local officials or <i>caciques</i>	5.84	1.35	11.70
Polling place officials	4.76	1.72	9.35
Vote promoters	3.85	1.84	6.59
Other election officials	1.76	0.69	3.69
Police or army	0.51	0.54	0.55

Source: Alianza Cívica/Observación '94 (1994).

ruling party or the local government. As in the case of the overall data on irregularities, these data do not distinguish among polling places that experienced multiple kinds of voter pressure, as opposed to a more dispersed pattern.²¹ As in the case of ballot secrecy, the findings do not quantify how many voters were individually pressured at each polling place where pressures were exerted. Similarly, however, direct pressure did not have to be brought to bear on every individual to distort the electoral process. For example, if while waiting in line, voter X saw a local political boss who was perceived to have influence over access to crop payments or land titles pressure voter Y, then voter X may well have chosen to show his or her ballot to this same authority, to remove any suspicion of disloyalty. The overall findings that direct pressure was exercised on voters in more than one-third of rural polling places certainly suggest a serious and widespread problem.

In spite of the limits to the Alliance data, one cannot assume that their results therefore overstate the scope of irregularities. One could argue that procedural violations were less likely to occur in those polling places where independent observers were present. Indeed, the actual presence of independent election observers must have actually *biased* their sample toward an underestimate of the scope of irregularities. One could reasonably hypothesize that the actual levels of violation of ballot secrecy were much higher in many rural areas that were not independently observed. Recall that the Alliance's sample was a tiny fraction of the nation's polling places.

The final Civic Alliance report concluded that Mexico experienced two different elections at the same time. Table 16.4 shows the two extremes. "There were two clearly distinct elections: one in the urban zone, *modern*, where the elections were relatively clean, and another in the rural areas, especially in the

Table 16.4

Two Patterns of Electoral Violations

Violation	Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Jalisco, México, Nuevo León (%)	Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Puebla, Tabasco, Veracruz (%)
Ballot secrecy	22.34	59.89
Pressure on voters	12.53	46.03
Ballot-stuffing ("tacos")	2.64	5.02
Voters arriving in group ("carousel")	1.88	14.12
Serious disorder at polling place	3.30	12.39

Source: Alianza Cívica/Observación '94 (1994).

South, where there was a very high incidence of serious violations against the citizens. This could explain the difference in the judgment of those international visitors who were present at the *modern* election versus those who were in the rural areas. The rural polling places of the southern states, which also have the highest indices of poverty, marginality, peasant struggle, and political conflict, had serious violations during the election. There is sufficient evidence to question strongly the electoral process in that zone of the country. . . ." (Alianza Cívica/Observación '94, 1994b).

Opposition Political Parties at the Polling Place

One of the most revealing implications of the Civic Alliance data is that their presence, as independent observers, had such little apparent deterrent effect in rural areas. One could infer that those who carry out electoral violations in rural areas assumed that they can carry out their tasks with impunity. In the vast majority of rural polling places, where independent observers were *not* present, the principal obstacle to election law violators was the presence of opposition parties. Indeed, Mexican electoral law allows opposition parties to participate in the administration of the voting process by joining the committee that administers the polling place precisely to deter irregularities. Actual opposition party participation in these committees is a very revealing indicator of the degree to which parties are actually present at local levels throughout Mexico. The Federal Election Institute (IFE) collected a data set that documents political party participation in the administration of the polling places during the 1994 presidential election. While not complete, this data set provides a remarkable X ray of the horizontal penetration of parties into Mexican society. These IFE data show that the two major opposition parties lack presence in significant portions of the country.

The listing of a party on a ballot does not by itself offer a meaningful political choice. The local presence of political parties themselves is crucial for the actual vote to constitute a democratic option for two main reasons: one is an issue of fairness, the other an issue of freedom. The fairness issue has to do with access to electoral information. Because the independent print media are absent from most rural areas and the broadcast media are systematically biased in favor of the government, opposition parties and their local allies are the most important potential sources for the information necessary for voters to make an informed choice. In localities where the opposition does not participate at the polling place, it is reasonable to assume that they lack sufficient presence to provide political information, especially in regions where Spanish is not the first language.²² Second, because of such widespread violations of ballot secrecy in rural areas, in spite of the presence of independent observers, it is reasonable to assume that ballot secrecy was violated even more often where opposition parties were not present. In other words, the participation of opposition parties in the administration of the polling place is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ballot secrecy to be respected. Indeed, it was precisely this assumption that led the IFE to collect the data presented here.

The IFE data show that large groups of the Mexican electorate live in areas where opposition parties were absent. The opposition party with the most extensive presence was the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), which participated at 70.8 percent of the nation's polling places. The center-right National Action Party (PAN) participated at 67.1 percent of the polling places. Table 16.5 shows the state-level distribution of opposition party participation in the administration of polling places in the 1994 election. Notably, not even the ruling party played this role in 100 percent of the polling places (although members may have played other roles in the process). The gap, however, between ruling party presence and opposition party presence is quite significant. In many states, only one of the opposition parties had an extensive presence. In only a handful of states did the smaller opposition parties have any significant polling place coverage, most notably the National Cardenista Reconstruction Front Party (PFCRN, formerly the Socialist Workers' Party, PST), which participated at 22.6 percent of the polling places, and the new Labor Party (PT), present at 11.3 percent (mainly concentrated in five states). Both parties are widely considered to be linked to factions within the government. The PAN and the PRD had the most extensive opposition presence in all but four states.²³

The main patterns of party presence emerge when one focuses on two kinds of states: those where no opposition party covers more than 80 percent of the state's polling places, and those where at least one opposition party covers more than 90 percent of the state. These two groups of states might correspond roughly to the "two elections" observed by the Civic Alliance, one relatively clean and the other plagued by widespread violations. Table 16.6 shows the twelve states where 20 percent of the polling places were uncovered by either of

Table 16.5

Percentage of Polling Places with Political Party Representatives

State	Polls	PRI (%)	PRD (%)	PAN (%)	Other Parties (%)	
Ags	800	98.4	64.0	81.0	PDM 11.6	PARM 4.44
BCN	2,099	98.1	6.2	98.5	PPS 59.1	PT 18.8
BCS	458	99.8	40.8	97.8	PFCRN 16.6	PARM 15.0
Cam	672	98.4	67.3	38.8	PARM 45.4	PFCRN 16.7
Coa	2,313	96.3	58.0	90.3	PFCRN 47.1	PT 8.1
Col	548	98.2	79.0	85.9	PFCRN 59.7	PDM 33.8
Chs	3,151	89.0	72.1	32.1	PFCRN 16.9	PT 15.1
Chh	3,359	98.6	43.8	98.0	PT 36.0	PFCRN 34.9
DF	10,228	96.0	91.9	71.2	PFCRN 44.2	PPS 7.1
Dgo	1,804	95.7	56.8	86.2	PT 65.6	PFCRN 12.1
Gto	4,300	98.3	63.7	95.8	PDM 32.3	PFCRN 16.1
Gro	3,305	93.6	91.0	33.2	PFCRN 28.3	PPS 13.3
Hgo	2,268	97.2	77.8	32.4	PFCRN 22.0	PT 13.6
Jal	5,763	97.5	54.0	94.7	PFCRN 26.0	PDM 13.5
Méx	11,080	98.3	79.7	58.6	PFCRN 29.9	PDM 6.9
Mic	4,023	97.1	96.8	56.3	PDM 12.4	PFCRN 7.6
Mor	1,508	97.0	90.7	39.8	PFCRN 21.3	PT 4.4
Nay	1,086	98.6	93.2	44.0	PT 59.5	PFCRN 30.9
NL	3,622	94.7	42.6	89.9	PT 45.8	PFCRN 14.4
Oax	3,183	91.1	66.1	25.1	PPS 10.6	PFCRN 8.5
Pue	4,327	96.8	67.9	70.8	PFCRN 8.4	PPS 6.1
Qro	1,232	94.5	52.3	85.4	PDM 15.2	PPS 9.9
Qoo	626	95.2	68.0	50.2	PFCRN 24.4	PPS 21.1
SLP	2,410	97.7	57.1	78.5	PFCRN 11.2	PDM 7.6
Sin	3,863	97.6	69.2	87.8	PFCRN 7.9	PPS 6.5
Son	2,276	95.6	56.9	79.3	PT 11.4	PFCRN 6.0
Tab	1,711	98.1	97.1	30.0	PFCRN 22.8	PT 6.6
Tam	2,842	98.3	67.5	68.5	PARM 32.9	PT 21.0
Tla	915	98.1	77.2	52.6	PT 51.4	PDM 19.8
Ver	7,227	96.5	86.6	43.5	PFCRN 25.0	PPS 20.7
Yuc	1,504	97.7	27.7	97.7	PT 3.6	PFCRN 1.7
Zac	1,959	92.6	71.7	61.9	PT 24.7	PPS 9.5
National	96,464	96.5	70.8	67.1	PFCRN 22.6	PT 11.3

the two major opposition parties. In eight of these states, the opposition party with the broadest presence is the PRD, with the PAN more present in the other four. Interestingly, this list is not limited to the rather predictable southern, most rural states, but also includes the northern states of San Luis Potosí, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas. All these "uncovered" states, however, have significant rural populations, either in relative or absolute terms (e.g., Puebla). The Civic Alliance data on ballot secrecy in these states show that the degree of violations in these "uncovered" states was above the national average in six of the eight states for which data were published.²⁴

Table 16.6

States with Less Than 80 Percent Opposition Party Coverage

State	Highest opposition coverage (%)	PRD	PAN	Next highest opposition coverage (%)	Ballot secrecy violation (%)
Campeche	67.3	X	—	45.4	—
Chiapas	72.1	X	—	32.1	67.8
Hidalgo	77.8	X	—	32.4	60.2
Mexico	79.7	X	—	58.6	33.7
Oaxaca	66.1	X	—	25.1	53.1
Puebla	70.8	—	X	67.9	47.5
Quintana R.	68.0	X	—	50.2	44.3
San Luis P.	78.5	—	X	57.1	42.6
Sonora	79.3	—	X	56.9	—
Tamaulipas	68.5	—	X	67.5	—
Tlaxcala	77.2	X	—	52.6	—
Zacatecas	71.7	X	—	61.9	33.3

Source: Data on ballot secrecy violations from Alianza Cívica/Observación '94 (1994).

Table 16.7 shows the twelve states where an opposition party was able to cover at least 90 percent of the polling places. The PRD and the PAN each had the most extensive presence in six states. The PAN clearly led in its *degree* of coverage, however, with more than 95 percent in four of its six top states (Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, and Guanajuato), whereas the PRD broke 95 percent coverage in only two (Michoacán and Tabasco). When one compares these indicators of party presence with the state-level Civic Alliance data on ballot secrecy violations, the pattern is not straightforward. There is no direct correlation between extensive opposition presence and incidents of secrecy violations. The data are not sufficiently disaggregated to draw strong conclusions, but Table 16.7 shows that "covered" states where the PAN leads have far below average rates of secrecy violations, while the "covered" states where the PRD leads have above-average rates of secrecy violations. The most likely hypothesis is that two different factors were operating simultaneously. First, the ruling party opposition to the PRD is more intense than its opposition to the PAN, especially at the local level, so its efforts to discourage opposition voting would be more aggressive in areas of PRD strength. Second, in many regions the PAN is more experienced, more unified, and better organized as a party; therefore its activists may be more skilled at blocking electoral process violations. These two factors are mutually reinforcing.

Table 16.7

States with More Than 90 Percent Opposition Party Polling Place Coverage

State	Coverage (%)	PAN	PRD	Secrecy violations (%)
Baja Cal. Nte.	98.5	X	—	17.4
Baja Cal. Sur	97.8	X	—	—
Chihuahua	98.0	X	—	13.1
Distrito Federal	91.9	—	X	25.2
Guanajuato	95.8	X	—	—
Guerrero	91.0	—	X	43.8
Jalisco	94.7	X	—	24.7
Michoacán	96.8	—	X	55.5
Morelos	90.7	—	X	36.2
Nayarit	93.2	—	X	—
Nuevo León	90.0	X	—	37.7
Tabasco	97.1	—	X	46.8

Source: Data on ballot secrecy violations from Alianza Cívica/Observación '94 (1994).

Opposition Political Party Presence in Indigenous Regions

The statewide data above present only indirect indicators of urban/rural differences in opposition party presence. To find more precise indicators, one would need to disaggregate electoral districts or municipalities into categories of urban vs. rural, much like Civic Alliance did for its sample. Even this approach would be limited, however, as Civic Alliance recognized that its approach included rural peripheries of cities in its "urban" category, as well as town centers in its "rural" category. This analysis will focus on one especially powerful indicator of "rurality"—indigenous population at the municipal level. Mexico's indigenous peoples are widely recognized to represent the poorest and most rural group in Mexican society. Indigenous people are also among those most lacking in access to freedom of assembly and expression, as well as pluralistic sources of electoral information. These obstacles in turn block local efforts at direct political participation and representation. Both the Civic Alliance survey and the IFE's state-level map of political party presence would lead one to expect that opposition parties are least present in indigenous areas. If this were true, it would reinforce the Civic Alliance's conclusion that Mexico's most rural citizens were those most lacking access to a free and fair electoral process. Recall that indigenous peoples account for 10.7 percent of the national population, according to the National Indigenous Institute's conservative estimate (Embriz 1993, 23).

The analysis below will examine the relationship between opposition party participation in polling places and the percentage of indigenous population at the municipal level in three states. As Table 16.8 shows, these three states account

Table 16.8

State Distribution of the National Indigenous Population

State	Share of total indigenous population (%)
Oaxaca	18.29
Veracruz	13.47
Chiapas	12.98
Puebla	9.42
Yucatán	8.22
Hidalgo	5.73
México	5.56
Guerrero	5.17
San Luis Potosí	3.17
Michoacán	2.92

Source: Embriz 1993.

for the largest fraction of Mexico's indigenous population nationwide: Oaxaca (18.29), Veracruz (13.47), and Chiapas (12.98). Together, these three top states include almost 45 percent of Mexico's total indigenous population. The municipal-level percentages of indigenous populations were calculated from the National Indigenous Institute's demographic data on ethnicity (Embriz 1993). Unfortunately, the Federal Electoral Institute's municipal-level data on party presence at polling places turned out to have some gaps for some of the most indigenous regions, especially in Chiapas and Oaxaca. As a result, the data presented below are likely to *understate* the correlation between indigenous population and the absence of opposition political parties.

The first step in this analysis was to calculate the percentage of indigenous population for each municipality, developing a list with those from 5 to 100 percent. The second step was to calculate the percentage of each municipality's polling places where one or more of the three main political parties participated in the mesa directiva, and therefore the actual administration of the voting process. Table 16.9 shows that average percentage of participation in each state's indigenous municipalities for which the IFE had data.²⁵ The municipalities that lacked polling place data tended to have higher indigenous populations than the average for each state, so the results here probably overestimate the presence of parties in indigenous municipalities.

The differences between the presence of Mexico's three principal political parties in indigenous regions are quite sharp. The charts that follow show the relationship between the percentage of polling places covered in each state's indigenous municipalities, and the indigenous percentage of the population of each municipality. Percentages are averaged over each percentage category. In the three states with Mexico's largest indigenous populations, there is a clear negative correlation between indigenous populations and presence of opposition

Table 16.9

Polling Places Covered by Political Parties in Municipalities with More Than 5 Percent Indigenous Population (%)

State	PRI	PAN	PRD
Oaxaca	59.5	7.0	28.1
Veracruz	46.0	7.8	30.4
Chiapas	51.4	8.9	26.4

Sources: IFE and Embriz (1993).

political parties. The PRD is much more present than the PAN, although their presence is not trivial either.

Figure 16.1 shows the three parties' coverage of polling places in Oaxaca. This is the one state where the negative correlation is not continuous. In other words, PRD local presence increases as the indigenous percentage grows, from the 5–25 percent category through the 25–50 percent and 50–75 percent categories, after which it drops off sharply. The vast majority of Oaxaca's many rural municipalities are in the 75–100 percent range, and they are well known to function according to their own political rules, without the presence of any political party, including the PRI. At least 400 of Oaxaca's 570 municipalities are organized along non-Western, nonparty, ethnically distinctive principles of governance (Díaz Montes 1992). The state and federal governments are relatively tolerant of this unusual degree of local political autonomy, which suits the communities very well. But the implications for their citizens' participation in national elections are not clear. There is a widely shared understanding in which higher levels of government intervene little in local affairs in rural Oaxaca as long as the votes from those localities in national elections are ceded to higher authorities. In this context, the high relative levels of PRD presence in the middle categories are notable, especially in the 50–75 percent category, implying that a significant subset of Oaxaca municipalities are in transition toward a more competitive party system.

The patterns in Veracruz (Figure 16.2) and Chiapas (Figure 16.3) are more consistent with the hypothesized national patterns of party presence, with their penetration dropping off as the population becomes more indigenous. Even in these two states, there is a tendency that echoes the Oaxaca trend, where the PRD presence increases in the 25–50 percent category. The implication is that the PRD is gaining organizational presence (which is distinct from votes) in numerous indigenous municipalities in all three states. Moreover, the relative levels of coverage in Veracruz are especially high, reaching close to the PRI in all but the most indigenous municipalities.

Figure 16.4 shows the results of aggregating the indigenous municipalities of

Figure 16.1 Oaxaca: Political Party Presence in Indigenous Municipalities

Sources: IFE (1994) and Embriz (1993). [Complete data for 201 municipalities.]

these three states. Since these states together account for 45 percent of the total national indigenous population, this chart provides a powerful indicator of the national trend. The PRI maintains high levels of coverage even in many of the most indigenous localities. The PRD is making significant inroads into more rural, multi-ethnic areas, where its coverage breaks 80 percent of the polling places, but the PRD is still absent from more than 40 percent of the polling places in the most indigenous municipalities. The PAN penetrates somewhat farther into rural areas than its reputation as the "asphalt party" would lead one to expect, but its coverage still is quite low, never reaching more than one-third of the polling places in indigenous municipalities.

Conclusions

Elections and development policies are two different arenas of interaction between the state and its citizens. Rather than generalize about the complex linkages between these two arenas, this chapter has focused on one dimension of this

Figure 16.2 Veracruz: Political Party Presence in Indigenous Municipalities

Sources: IFE (1994) and Embriz (1993). [Complete data for 93 municipalities.]

interaction: the issue of the secret ballot, which permits citizens to express themselves politically without risking individually targeted reprisals from government officials. The government's new rural reforms are related to this issue of individual political expression because the policies have focused on developing direct relationships between the federal government and individuals, through both PROCEDER's land titling and PROCAMPO's crop payments. Only a synthesis of independent opinion surveys with micro-level ethnographic studies of state-peasant bargaining relations can adequately assess the degree to which these programs were carried out with the political neutrality promised by the government.

This chapter probed the other side of the coin: the most important mechanism through which ruling party officials had the potential to monitor compliance with clientelistic bargains. In light of the widespread violation of ballot secrecy found by the Civic Alliance, the empirical analysis was based on the assumption that the participation of an opposition political party in the administration of the polling place is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ballot secrecy to be

Figure 16.3 Chiapas: Political Party Presence in Indigenous Municipios

Sources: IFE (1994) and Embriz (1993). [Complete data for 50 municipalities.]

respected. Indeed, the Civic Alliance effort was crucial for documenting the pattern of irregularities, but their limited deterrent effect was limited to their small sample of polling places covered. Opposition parties, because of their institutionalized role in the process and their much greater coverage of rural areas, were the main potential deterrents to violations of ballot secrecy.

Ballot secrecy is directly linked to the capacity of citizens to reject the pressures of vote buyers and vote according to their political preferences. If voting were guaranteed to be secret, then even the poorest of the rural poor could potentially express themselves politically in favor of political alternatives that encourage more accountable governance, in spite of economic survival pressures to accept the government's favors. The secret ballot is therefore one of those democratic "formalities" that is actually most important to the system's *least* powerful citizens. They are the ones most vulnerable to reprisals if they vote for the opposition.²⁶

Most importantly, this chapter found that the main opposition political parties were not represented in many areas of significant rural states, and they were

Figure 16.4 Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Chiapas: Political Party Presence in Indigenous Municipios

Sources: IFE (1994) and Embriz (1993). [Complete data for 303 municipalities.]

weakest in indigenous regions within the rural states. In twelve states, both main opposition parties were not present at more than 20 percent of the polling places. Much more detailed research is necessary to determine whether one party might have covered the regions where the other party was absent, but since the other party usually had more than 20 percent less coverage, this is very unlikely. In another twelve states, an opposition party covered more than 90 percent of the polling places, though only six reached more than 95 percent. In other words, about one-third of Mexico's states can be considered to have been "uncovered," while another third were close to "covered" in terms of opposition presence. This pattern is broadly consistent with the main findings of the Civic Alliance: that the 1994 presidential elections involved two distinct election-day processes, one "modern" and relatively clean, the other filled with irregularities, including widespread violation of ballot secrecy and direct pressures by local bosses on voters.

The municipal-level polling place data confirm the patterns suggested by the state-level data. Looking at the patterns of party presence *within* the three states

with the largest indigenous populations, there is an inverse relationship between political party presence at the polling place and the percentage of indigenous population at the municipal level. In other words, the more indigenous the locality, the less likely that an opposition party was present at the polling place. Therefore, the more rural and indigenous members of the electorate are the least likely to have guaranteed access to a secret ballot.

Notes

1. For example, President Salinas's reform of Article 27 of the Constitution provoked little immediate rural protest, yet this policy change reportedly tipped the balance in the internal Zapatista debate over whether to take up armed struggle.

2. Indeed, top policymakers apparently expected rural outmigration to be the main campesino reaction to the policy reforms. At a May 1992 Harvard forum, Dr. Luis Téllez (then undersecretary of agriculture) predicted that the economically active population in agriculture would probably fall from 26 percent to 16 percent in the coming decade.

3. For analyses of specific movements and current trends, see *La Jornada del Campo* and *Cuadernos Agrarios*. For overviews of the political dynamics of the Salinas-era agrarian and agricultural reforms, see Fox (1994c, 1995).

4. The best public political poll of ejidatarios, sponsored by the Instituto de Proposiciones Estratégicas in 1990, found that 20 percent sympathized with the PRD, while the rest said they supported the PRI. But more notable is that PRI support was quite thin; only 10 percent said their affiliation was based on their "convictions." The rest reported that they supported the PRI because it was "convenient," because of various kinds of imposition, or because they knew of no alternatives (Morett Sánchez 1991, 110–11). For an overview of election polls in 1994 see de la Peña (1994). See also Domínguez and McCann (1995). They critique most Mexican polling as inadequate, but their description of their own polling source (Gallup) suggests a very thin rural penetration. It should be noted that while many diverse polls in 1994 were consistent with the election results, it is possible that they may have been influenced by the same distortions that limited freedoms inside rural polling places.

5. In Alianza's assessment, the multiple, pre-election biases meant that the process did not meet the minimum standards for "free and fair" even before the election day (thanks for this reminder from Sergio Aguayo, personal communication, October 1995). For overviews of rural fraud in 1994, see Moguel and Botey (1994) and Massieu Trigo (1994). Electoral fraud has long been seen as more widespread in rural than in urban areas. According to Molinar's comprehensive overview of party politics: "Electoral fraud is a generalized practice in the Mexican electoral system, but it is not universal or homogeneous. It is more common and intense in rural and remote areas. . . . This is not only because the PRI gets better results using cacique-style clientelistic mechanisms of electoral mobilization rather than modern campaign techniques; it also has due to with the opposition, which, with a few exceptions, only goes as far [into the countryside] as the paved road [network goes]." (1991, 9).

6. Note Molinar's point that the persistence of electoral fraud is due not only to authoritarian practices but to the limited outreach of opposition parties as well (see above).

7. International election observers often acknowledge that fraud has occurred but then assert that it was insufficient to affect the outcome. There are several problems with this approach. First, if elections are flawed by fraud but there are no comprehensive independent parallel counts, then one cannot know its magnitude. Exit polls are helpful but

second-best, since they are based on samples rather than the full universe of voters. Second, widespread expectations of fraud or manipulation are sufficient to affect voter decisions about whether to participate at all. Third, the conventional definition of fraud includes tampering with the ballots or the count but often overlooks other important exclusionary practices such as manipulation of the registration process, partisan purging of the rolls, voter intimidation, violation of the secret ballot, and vote buying.

8. Even at the national level, relatively few exclusionary actions are actually needed to effect a close electoral outcome. A "little bit" of exclusionary political practices can go a long way, especially in systems that lack second-round runoffs. The broader point here is not simply that most analysts treat only nationally organized fraud seriously. Rather, the proposition is that first, exclusionary political practices are a more useful concept than narrowly defined fraud, and second, the cumulative result of decentralized exclusionary practices may be large enough to influence national politics. Exclusionary electoral practices may well have been "marginal" compared to unbounded fraud in the past, but margins are supposed to matter in democracies.

9. This section draws on Fox (1995).

10. Chapter IX, Article 41 of the Internal Rules of the Agrarian Attorney General's office (cited in Baitenmann 1994).

11. According to the program's official schedule, the majority of participants in the program (2.8 million peasants) were to receive checks between June 15 and August 15, a period ending one week before the election. See Sosa (1994).

12. For the Civic Alliance criticisms of widespread vote buying, see Rudino (1994).

13. The concept of "semiclientelism" refers to a growing category of power relations: government efforts to induce support that lack either the will or the capacity to use authoritarian means to enforce compliance (Fox 1994a).

14. This section draws on Fox (1994c).

15. Analysts differ as to whether the PRD has made serious efforts to reach out to indigenous voters. For Cárdenas' most developed campaign statement on indigenous policy, see his "México está en deuda con sus pueblos indígenas," *La Jornada* (June 5, 1994).

16. In 1992 President Salinas faced a major political choice in Chiapas. Governor Patrocinio González had jailed the top officials of the federal indigenous affairs agency on trumped-up charges of fraud. Their real "crime" was to have carried out the policy they were charged with. According to the INI's Regional Solidarity Funds program, the government is supposed to support economic self-help projects organized by any legitimate community-based organization, whether or not they are affiliated with the ruling party. In many parts of rural Mexico, INI officials respected the policy's pluralist discourse, most notably in Oaxaca. INI officials in Chiapas were also willing to support development projects without requiring political subordination. According to Chiapas indigenous leaders who protested in their defense, the INI officials were jailed because they were doing their job. President Salinas chose to side with the governor rather than with his own federal agency. INI's reformist approach to community development was blunted in Chiapas, while González was promoted to the cabinet. This example, along with the electoral data, show that the "subnational authoritarian regime" typified by the Chiapas political system was not simply a remote backwater, forgotten by Salinistas pursuing reforms at the national and international levels. Nor was it an entrenched redoubt of autonomous resistance to Salinas' reform efforts. Alliances with hard-line governors such as González, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu in Guerrero, and other rural states were a crucial part of the Salinas project. For details, see Fox (1994a).

17. For confirmation of the Civic Alliance's nonpartisan nature, see Taylor's study (based on field research in Mexico City, Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl, and Pátzcuaro, 1995).

18. The alliance also did systematic studies of progovernment media bias in the months leading up to the election. They were not able to address the flagrant violations of

weak campaign spending laws, nor did they have the capacity to check the validity of the controversial official voter rolls.

19. Unfortunately, the presentation of the data does not permit one to know the degree to which the various kinds of reported irregularities tended to be concentrated in the same polling places. If the violations were concentrated in the same districts, that would support the hypothesis that many rural voters live in de facto "authoritarian enclaves." If the different kinds of violations were widely dispersed, it would be more difficult to support the hypothesis that such a "hard core" of authoritarian regions persists.

20. The alliance's observer field manual did not emphasize the importance of counting the numbers of voters who lacked ballot secrecy, suggesting that alliance leaders may well have underestimated the importance of this problem before the actual election.

21. The actual means of pressuring the voters included speaking to them in line or in the booth (8.42 percent), carrying out party proselytizing inside the booth (7.49 percent), giving out money or goods (2.57 percent), taking a list of voters (2.14 percent), and direct threats (1.12 percent) (Alianza Cívica/Observación '94, 1994b).

22. Mexico has an important network of rural radio stations, managed by the National Indigenous Institute, that broadcast in indigenous languages. Many of these stations work closely with communities and try hard to serve their interests, but they are not allowed to transmit political information.

23. The states where the second most extensive opposition presence was from one of the smaller parties were Baja California Norte (PPS, 59.1 percent), Campeche (PARM, 45.4 percent), Durango (PT, 65.6 percent), and Nayarit (PT, 59.5 percent).

24. In theory, it is possible that the regions not covered by the opposition party with the highest rate of coverage were actually covered by other opposition parties. An extremely detailed polling-place-level study would be required to test this with precision. The state-level data presented in Table 16.6 show, however, that in eight of these twelve states the gap between the first and second opposition parties' coverage was more than 20 percent. Only in Puebla and Tamaulipas was the party with the second-ranking coverage close. In other words, in most states where the main opposition party has major gaps, the second-ranking opposition party has vastly greater gaps in coverage. The second-ranking opposition party is most likely to cover areas not reached by the first party in the case of the PRD in rural areas of Sonora, and perhaps Puebla and Tamaulipas (Fox 1994c).

25. IFE's data on party presence at polling places, when compared to INI's list of indigenous municipalities (which is also incomplete), had the following gaps: Oaxaca (IFE missing 201 of 409 from INI's list), Veracruz (missing 5 of 110), and Chiapas (missing 20 of 77).

26. It must be noted, however, that potential threats of reprisals for electoral dissent would not disappear even if individual secret ballots were respected. If entire communities, or majorities within communities, were to vote for the opposition, then the official polling place returns would reveal this dissent to the authorities. Whether such broad communitywide electoral opposition would actually provoke negative sanctions would depend on local political conditions and the degree to which authoritarian elites had the will and the capacity to retaliate. In more politically open regions, however, the response would involve more "carrots" than "sticks," and electoral opposition would be indirectly "rewarded" by targeted, disproportionate government spending. For a discussion of this process based on state-level analysis of National Solidarity Program resource allocation, see Molinar and Weldon (1994).

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Panel III. Land Reform, Agrarian Organizations, and the Structure of Mexican Politics: Discussion

In response to several questions, the panelists replied, and members of the conference commented, that Frank Tannenbaum talked about the integration of the national political system, agrarian reform and rights, and organization of the campesinos. The role of campesinos in the ruling party led to identification with the nation-state.

The new neoliberal political order reduces the citizen to an individual consumer. State power has been redeployed; now the state deals directly with ejidatarios. This is not coparticipation in the policy debate. There is a farce of "popular consultation." The process solves the problems of the state, not those of the people.

A collusion of public agencies and private interests in the 1970s and 1980s avoided agrarian reform. No policy could accommodate both ranchers and Indians. The former hired "white guards." Further, foreign investment in livestock operations is encouraged under NAFTA.

The new provisions allowing mercantile corporations of 25 people to own up to 10,000 hectares of good pasture land and 20,000 hectares for forestry institutionalize illegal property holdings. In 1921, in Chiapas, the limit was 8,000 hectares. Consequently there were peasant land invasions, demanding land that had been claimed for many years. And in 1994, despite the change in the law, new claims for land were presented. Some 50,000 hectares were invaded. (The state can always expropriate land for reasons of public utility—for example, for oil and hydroelectricity.) The land reform was meant to be empowerment, but in Chiapas there is counterinsurgency.

The PROCAMPO program has let the state obtain more information about who produces what. Although there is less regulation, there is an increase in clientelism. And in Mexico, the worst scenario is the combination of economic neoliberalism with insufficient social and political neoliberalism in which the