

UC Davis

UC Davis Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Rebel Group Branding and External Intervention in Civil Conflicts

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/97p3w15b>

Author

Skoll, Amy Elizabeth

Publication Date

2021

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

Rebel Group Branding and External Intervention in Civil Conflicts

By

AMY SKOLL
DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

in the

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

of the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

DAVIS

Approved:

Heather McKibben, Chair

Jeannette Money

Lauren Young

Committee in Charge

2021

Abstract:

Why do some civil conflicts receive external intervention and others do not? What explains the variation in intervention type across different civil conflicts and why are some interventions more involved than others? Are some interventions more effective than others? Does intervention effectiveness vary across different types of interventions and different types of conflicts? In addressing some of these important, policy relevant questions, this dissertation project puts forth a new explanation for why there is such variation in external intervention and its effectiveness across civil conflicts: *rebel group branding*. In this project rebel group branding is defined as the overarching identifier of a rebel group, often rooted in grievances, that frames internal and external perceptions about why a rebel group is fighting. A rebel group's brand creates a conflict narrative that is often an oversimplification of a rebel groups motivations and becomes a heuristic utilized by both internal and external actors to determine quickly what a conflict is about. This dissertation is therefore made up of three separate article projects that examine how rebel group branding affects external intervention in civil conflicts.

In chapter one, this first article project argues that perceptions of a rebel group's brand can influence whether an external intervener decides to support a rebel group in question. Drawing upon concepts from business such as brand awareness, brand loyalty, and anti-brand behavior, this article demonstrates that different brands generate different types of intervention support. Using a multi-variate probit model to disaggregate various forms of external support and take into account the fact that different intervention types are not independent from one another, this article finds that religious rebel brands attract more committed forms of external support, whereas other rebel groups with ethnic and leftist brands attract less committed, more symbolic

forms of external support. Conversely, rebel groups that do not engage in any branding behavior are the least likely to attract external support.

In chapter two, this second article project then explores how the subsequent effects of external intervention on conflict outcomes can vary depending on the rebel group's brand, showcasing the interaction effect between rebel group branding and external intervention. Using a conditional mixed process (CMP) model, this paper not only demonstrates that external military interventions are non-random, but that they have a more deleterious effect in some civil conflicts over others. In particular, rebel groups with a religious brand (as opposed to an ethnic or ideological brand or rebel groups with no brand) are not only more likely to elicit external intervention, but intervention in these conflicts is also more likely to have a negative effect on the ability of the government and rebels to come to a negotiated settlement. The article project then uses a case study of Yemen to further explore the theoretical mechanisms of interest.

Finally, in chapter three, this third article project examines how rebel group branding can affect public opinion in an external state and how individual preferences for external intervention can also be manipulated by branding a rebel group in particular way. Using an original survey experiment conducted on UC Davis students, this paper finds that variation in rebel group brand awareness and brand loyalty can affect the type of interventions supported as well as the overall level of intervention support among survey respondents. In doing so, this article demonstrates that public support for external intervention is not uniform across all rebel groups and can be manipulated depending on the identity cleavage that gets emphasized.

CHAPTER 1:
Rebel Group Branding and External Intervention

Amy Skoll
UC Davis

Abstract:

Although external intervention in civil conflicts has become ubiquitous, our understanding of why some civil conflicts attract certain types of support over others (e.g. military support, foreign aid, sanctions, and mediation) is incomplete. In this article, I propose rebel group branding as an important factor driving external intervention. Drawing upon concepts from business such as brand awareness, brand loyalty, and anti-brand behavior, this article demonstrates that different brands generate different types and levels of intervention. Using a multi-variate probit model to disaggregate various forms of external support and take into account the fact that different intervention types are not independent from one another, this paper finds that religious rebel brands attract more committed forms of external support, whereas other ethnic and leftist brands attract less committed, more symbolic forms of external support. Conversely, rebel groups that do not engage in any branding behavior are the least likely to attract external support.

Introduction:

On February 1st 2021, Myanmar was launched into turmoil yet again after a military coup de 'tat deposed the short-lived democratically elected Burmese government. Unfortunately, this incident represents just one more chapter in a long and violent Burmese history. Myanmar has experienced over 70 years of violence within its borders, ever since Burma gained independence from British colonial rule in 1948 and the Bamar ethnic majority was put into power over 135 ethnic minorities.¹ With the exception of a few instable years of democratic rule, Myanmar has experienced one of the longest running civil wars as various ethnic minority groups in Myanmar have fought for greater autonomy or independence. This brutal civil war, along with the genocide of the Rohingya people (a Muslim minority group in the Rakine state), have led to one of the largest refugee crises in the world, with over a million Burmese refugees residing in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia.²

Despite the grave atrocities committed by the Burmese military (the Tatmadaw) and the far-reaching impact of the civil war in Myanmar on both the region and the world, it is surprising how little the international community has done in regards to the conflict. Although targeted sanctions have been imposed at various points throughout the conflict on top military leaders and on key industries in the country (i.e. the gemstone trade) which are widely known to be financiers to the Tatmadaw military, external intervention within the conflict has been noticeably absent. Although it is widely accepted that China has provided weapons to the Tatmadaw military, the various rebel groups within Myanmar have received very little military support. Additionally, even though in recent years Myanmar has received much higher levels of foreign

¹ "Overview of Burma." *BurmaLink* <http://www.burmalink.org/background/burma/overview/>

² "Key Issues for Refugees from Myanmar (Burma)." March 1, 2018. *Refugee Council of Australia* <https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/myanmar-burma/>

aid, during a vast majority of its ongoing civil conflict, Myanmar was near the bottom of developing countries when it came to foreign aid funding.³ Furthermore, diplomatic and mediation assistance have been noticeably absent in the conflict.

In contrast, there are many examples of civil conflicts that have experienced much higher levels of international involvement. Take, for example, Sudan, which also experienced one of the longest running civil wars along with a brutal genocide. Unlike Myanmar however, military support was given by numerous external states on both sides of the conflict and it also had extensive diplomatic and mediation assistance.⁴ It also received large amounts of foreign aid during the course of the conflict and sanctions were used at various points throughout the conflict to exert pressure on the Sudanese government.⁵ Not only were more external actors involved in the Sudanese civil war including neighboring states, regional actors, and Western powers, but the types of external intervention were also much more extensive throughout the conflict.

These contrasting examples raise some important questions. To begin, why do some civil conflicts receive foreign intervention and others do not? Subsequently, what explains variation in intervention type across different civil conflicts and why are some interventions more involved than others? Why do some civil conflicts attract more international attention, and why do others go on relatively unnoticed? Why do some rebel groups receive extensive levels of support by external actors, and why do others receive only more symbolic forms of support?

³ “Supporting the Transition: Understanding Aid to Myanmar Since 2011.” March 8, 2018. *ReliefWeb* <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/supporting-transition-understanding-aid-myanmar-2011>

⁴ “Love Thy Neighbor: Regional Intervention in Sudan’s Civil War.” April 1, 2004. *International Crisis Group* <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/love-thy-neighbor-regional-intervention-sudans-civil-war>

⁵ “U.S. Relations With Sudan.” January 12, 2021. *U.S. Department of State* <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/>

The problem with pre-existing literature on external intervention is that most quantitative research specifically looks at one type of external intervention (usually military interventions) when explaining why a conflict state might attract external intervention or not. However, in doing so, previous studies present a very simplistic picture of external intervention, one that ignores the fact that there is a myriad of foreign policy options external states can choose from when deciding whether they want to intervene in a conflict. These foreign policy options are sometimes strategic compliments, but can also be strategic substitutes. Therefore, when presented with a civil conflict, external actors can choose to intervene militarily (either on behalf of the government, or rebels), or they can choose to pursue less costly forms of intervention that do not require as many domestic resources, such as diplomatic or mediation assistance, sanctions, or even foreign aid. Additionally, they can choose not to intervene at all, or they can choose to pursue multiple forms of intervention simultaneously.

What is unclear from preexisting research on external intervention, is why some civil conflicts attract multiple types of intervention, whereas other states might attract one form of intervention, or perhaps none at all? Therefore, in addressing these important, policy relevant questions, this paper makes two main contributions: one theoretical, and one empirical. First, this paper proposes a novel explanation to account for the variation in external intervention across civil conflicts: *rebel group branding*. This paper defines a rebel group's brand as the overarching identifier of a rebel group, often rooted in grievances, that frames internal and external perceptions about why a rebel group is fighting. A rebel group's brand thus creates a conflict narrative that is often an oversimplification of a rebel group's motivations and becomes a heuristic utilized by both internal and external actors to determine quickly what a conflict is about. This paper then adopts concepts from business such as brand awareness, brand loyalty,

and anti-brand behavior as an analogy to demonstrate that not all rebel group brands are created equal. Some rebel brands attract more committed forms of external support, whereas other rebel brands attract less committed, more symbolic forms of external support. At the same time, rebel groups that do not engage in any branding behavior are the least likely to attract external forms of support. Specifically, this project tests whether certain types of external intervention are more or less likely to occur within a civil conflict depending on the rebel group's brand. In doing so, this paper then makes its empirical contribution by utilizing a novel modelling strategy that tests for multiple types of intervention at the same time. Like McKibben and Skoll (2021) this paper utilizes a multi-variate probit model that disaggregates among various forms of external support and controls for the fact that different intervention types are not independent from one another and can occur simultaneously within a civil conflict. The multi-variate probit model is designed to test multiple dependent variables in the same equation assuming that multiple interventions can be present in any given conflict and that these binary outcomes are correlated. Therefore, the multi-variate probit model is different than a multinomial probit, which models discrete choice data. Overall, this modelling strategy presents a more nuanced and realistic picture of external intervention in civil conflicts.

External Intervention in Civil Conflicts

Why do external states intervene in intrastate conflicts? Given the strong norm of state sovereignty in international relations, the overall level of external intervention by states in the affairs of other states is surprisingly high. Particularly when it comes to civil war, external intervention has become a regular occurrence and has significant consequences for the overall outcomes of the conflict. For example, external intervention has been demonstrated by scholars to increase conflict severity (Lacina 2006, Heger and Salehyan 2007, Moore 2012), to increase

conflict duration (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Regan 2002, Moore 2012), and to make civil conflicts more difficult to resolve (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Cunningham 2010).

Despite the potentially dire implications external intervention can have in intrastate conflicts, external intervention nevertheless remains an empirical regularity. States have a variety of motivations for intervening in a civil conflict and previous literature has identified a number of key reasons why external actors might get involved in a civil conflict that fall under four overarching themes: *economics, regime type, culture and geopolitics*.

Economics:

The first proposed mechanism for why states intervene is that states have financial incentives to do so. Findley and Marineau (2015) propose that states often have self-interested goals when intervening in intrastate conflicts. Particularly when rebel groups have access to natural resources, external interveners are likely to intervene on behalf of the rebels in hopes that they will either be able to gain a stake in the lucrative industry, or to protect their already existing interest in the industry (Koga 2011, Findley and Marineua 2015). Thus, under this proposed mechanism, states intervene when their prospects for profits are high or when their economic livelihoods are threatened by the instability caused by the conflict.

Ideology:

The second proposed mechanism for why states intervene has to do with ideology, particularly in the context of the Cold War. Regan (1998) finds that during the Cold War there was a 25% increase in the probability of intervention, as intrastate conflicts became proxy sites for the larger ideological battle between communism and democracy. This finding is in alignment with the work of several other scholars such as Regan (2002), Koga (2011), and

Kathman (2011). Furthermore, research has found that regime type matters when discussing external intervention in intrastate conflicts. For example, Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre (2007) find that semi-democracies are the most likely to be recipients of foreign intervention. They argue that in light of the Democratic Peace Theory, democratic states have had a vested interest in intervening in semi-democratic states in the hopes of inching them closer to democracy (Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre 2007).

Culture:

The third proposed mechanism for why states intervene has to do with cultural ties. For example, Nome (2011) argues that states intervene when they have transnational co-ethnic ties with either the government or the rebels in a conflict. Specifically, Nome (2011) finds that a state is more likely to intervene on behalf of the rebels if the predominant ethnic group in the intervening state is the same as the ethnic identity of the rebels in a civil conflict. Conversely, a state is more likely to intervene on behalf of the government if the intervening state either has the same dominant ethnic identity as the government or if the marginal groups in both countries have the same ethnic ties. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) also find strong evidence that suggests rebel groups are more likely to receive external support when they share transnational ethnic or religious ties. This type of support is especially likely to occur during ethnic or religiously motivated civil conflicts or when fractionalization is high Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011).

Geopolitics:

The fourth proposed mechanism for why states intervene is that they have strong geopolitical ties to the conflict state. Kathman (2011) finds that neighboring states are more

likely to intervene in a civil war, especially when the civil war becomes more intense, due to the fact that the neighboring state is fearful of conflict diffusion across borders and regional instability. States thus intervene to contain a conflict in order to maintain regional stability or to prevent the contagion of rebellious ideologies from spreading into their borders. Additionally, military interventions are much more likely from neighboring states, particularly in Africa, where ethnic groups were artificially separated in the Scramble for Africa, resulting in ethnic conflicts that are not easily contained by state borders (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016).

Overall, these previous explanations provide a good starting point from which to analyze external intervention in civil conflicts; however, as previously discussed, these previous works suffer from several limitations. First of all, most of these works look at external intervention as a simple binary variable that usually captures only the presence of military intervention within a civil conflict, typically in the forms of troops and weapons. However, external intervention has a multitude of forms and different types of intervention may be more or less likely to occur in certain types of conflicts (McKibben and Skoll 2021). Military assistance can either be given on behalf of the government, or rebels, or both. Additionally, external intervention may also refer to diplomatic support, such as mediation assistance, or it may refer to economic interventions such as sanctions or foreign aid. It is not only common for civil conflicts to receive some form of external intervention, but in many cases, it is also common to have multiple forms of external intervention simultaneously occurring throughout the conflict. It is, therefore, misleading to treat external intervention decisions as independent from one another; in reality, if external actors desire to get involved in a civil conflict, they have several foreign policy tools to choose from (McKibben and Skoll 2021).

In this article I argue that the choice of foreign policy option is often predicated on the level of interest and awareness an external actor has in a civil conflict, *ceteris paribus*. Not all external intervention decisions require the same level of investment in a civil conflict. For example, sending troops and weapons reflects a more extensive commitment than simply choosing to impose economic sanctions on the government in question. Moreover, some forms of intervention may be more symbolic in nature, whereas others require greater investment by the external intervener. To illustrate this further, this paper proposes a ranking of the different forms of external intervention discussed above from strongest support to weakest support from the perspective of the rebel group (roughly speaking):

1. *Military support (particularly in the form of troops and weapons) for the rebels*: When military support is given on behalf of the rebels, this represents the willingness of external actors to utilize a costly strategy to demonstrate their support. Military support often uses extensive financial and human resources and is often much more visible to the public. Therefore, this represents the strongest form of support, from the perspective of the rebels.

2. *Sanctions against the government*: Sanctions do not provide the rebels with direct and tangible forms of support, but sanctions (in theory) are designed to hurt the government and, at least symbolically, sanctions demonstrate international disapproval with the government, and thus, *de facto* support for the rebels to some degree.

3. *Mediation support*: Although many mediators indeed have a bias towards one side or the other in a civil conflict, the provision of mediation support implies that intervening states believe that the rebel group is deserving of at least some concessions. Therefore, instead of waiting for a clear military victory to occur (which empirically is most likely to result in a government victory), mediation support validates the concerns of the rebels.

4. *Increase in foreign aid to the government*: Typically, if a government receives a substantial increase in their foreign aid over the course of the conflict, the government is better off and is more likely to defeat the rebels. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) find approximately 40% of foreign aid goes to government military expenditures, since aid is fungible. As a result, foreign aid given to the government can have dire consequences for the rebels and can tilt the balance of power even further towards the government.

5. *Military support (particularly in the form of troops and weapons) for the government*: When military support is given to the government, this represents clear and tangible resources at the government's disposal to utilize against the rebels. This ultimately represents a strong anti-rebel position from the perspective of the rebels.

This ranking demonstrates that external actors not only make decisions about which side they want to support (if any) in a civil conflict; they also must choose the level of support they want to provide, knowing that their chosen level of support can serve as an important signal to both internal and external actors about their level of investment in a civil conflict. This signal can influence other external actors' decisions about whether and how they want to get involved in a conflict. Furthermore, this signal can also influence the government and rebel's perceptions about the other actor's strength, depending on the level of support each side has received. Therefore, from a research perspective, it is important to address both theoretically and empirically, the reality that external intervention decisions are not made independently of one another. At a more basic level, it is also important to account for the fact that there are multiple forms of external intervention to choose from and different types of external intervention may be more or less likely in certain types of civil conflicts, particularly if some conflicts attract higher levels of interest than others. This is why this paper pursues a new modelling strategy that simultaneously analyzes several forms of external intervention at the same time to present a more nuanced picture for why certain forms of intervention are more likely in some civil conflicts over others.⁶

Rebel Group Branding

Not all rebel groups receive the same level of international attention, nor do they prompt the same types of intervention support. Although it is true that external actors may have varying levels of strategic interest in a civil conflict, perceptions of a rebel group can also be an

⁶ Although the multi-variate probit model is an improvement from previous modelling strategies, it is still limited in the number of dependent variables it can manage. Typically, the multi-variate probit models will not converge if there are too many dependent variables in one model, which is why I have just included 5 in this paper.

important factor in determining overall levels of external involvement in a civil conflict. Conflict narratives can be a compelling magnet for external intervention, drawing in higher levels of involvement when there is a clear story of who the rebels are and what they are fighting for. In this section, I first define the concept of rebel group branding and explain how brands can vary in their level of brand awareness, brand loyalty, and anti-brand behavior. Then, I consider the strategic incentives and potential consequences of adopting a particular rebel group brand. Finally, this paper explores three common types of rebel group brands (religious, ethnic, and left/communist) to explain why certain rebel group brands might attract more committed forms of support, whereas others may attract more symbolic forms of support.

Not all brands are created equal: Explaining variation in brand awareness, brand loyalty, and anti-brand behavior

Civil conflicts are multi-dimensional; there are often political, economic, historical, geopolitical, religious, ethnic, tribal, and ideological dimensions to a conflict. Yet, civil conflicts, as well as the rebel groups within a civil conflict, are often classified in simplistic terms. In particular, a rebel group may be perceived as being religious, ethnic, or ideological in nature because of the strategic marketing decisions made by rebel elites. Therefore, even though a rebel group may have multiple motives underlying their call to arms, their underlying interests may be reduced to a single brand-- *the overarching identifier of a rebel group, often rooted in grievances, that frames internal and external perceptions about why a rebel group is fighting*. A rebel group's brand thus creates a conflict narrative that is often an oversimplification of a rebel group's motivations and becomes a heuristic utilized by both internal and external actors to quickly determine what a conflict is about. Rebel group branding is important because perceptions about what the rebels are fighting for can shape the decisions of external actors on

whether and how they should intervene in a civil conflict. In other words, a rebel group's "brand" can determine whether an external actor decides to "invest" in a conflict.

However, not all brands are created equal. First of all, rebel group brands may vary in their level of brand awareness. In the business world, brand awareness is the degree to which consumers recognize a product by its name; products that have high levels of brand awareness are likely to generate more sales because when given a choice between two products, most consumers are more likely to pick the one with a more familiar name (Kopp 2020). To draw upon this analogy, when it comes to a rebel group's brand, rebel groups that have greater brand awareness are more likely to attract the support of external actors. Therefore, external intervention should be more likely to occur when there is a common perception of what the rebels are fighting for, vis-à-vis a rebel's brand. Brand recognition makes it easier for external actors to know whether intervention is worth the investment and when rebel groups don't have a clear brand, external intervention in the conflict should be less likely.

Secondly, rebel group brands vary in their level of brand loyalty. In business, brand loyalty is defined as the "the positive association consumers attach to a particular product or brand" that results in high levels of devotion to a product or service (Kopp 2019). Brand loyalty is often fostered when customers can personally relate and identify with a brand (He et al. 2021). Companies like Amazon, Disney, Nike, and Trader Joes, generate high levels of brand loyalty⁷, largely because their consumers begin to associate these brands as a part of their identity and are loyal to them out of self-expression (He et al. 2021). Similarly, when it comes to civil conflicts, rebel groups should be more likely to have stronger brand loyalty when there is more potential

⁷ "Brand Keys Loyalty Leaders 2020 Report." September 14, 2020. *The Wise Marketer*
<https://thewisemarketer.com/brand-loyalty/brand-keys-loyalty-leaders-2020-report/>

for identity ties. In other words, in aggregate, if there are numerous individuals across the globe who share the same identity or ideological beliefs as the rebel group in question, there should be a larger appetite for intervention as individuals express preferences for intervention on behalf of their religious, ethnic, ideological community. Therefore, external intervention should be more likely to occur on behalf of a rebel group with a clear identity that many outside actors can relate to or identify with, thus fostering greater rebel group brand loyalty. Conversely, rebel groups that do not have a high potential for identity ties, should be less likely to receive external support, because it is difficult for the rebel group in question to develop a loyal following, when there are few external actors that share their identity or ideological aspirations.

Third, not all brands prompt the same levels of anti-brand behavior. Having a clear and strong brand makes it easy to distinguish between those who identify with a brand and those who do not. Therefore, strong brands can also prompt anti-brand behavior, where consumers assemble around a shared hatred of a brand and engage in activities such as boycotting a brand or actively seeking to harm a brand (Dessart, Morgan-Thomas, Veloutsou 2016). Think of common brands such as Apple, Fox News, or The New York Yankees; people either love them or hate them, with very little in between. Weaker brands however, don't attract the same passionate divergent preferences. Analogously, rebel groups with a strong brand are not only more likely to experience higher levels of support from external actors, but they are also more likely to prompt higher levels of external mobilization in opposition (e.g. support for the government to squash the efforts of the rebels).

The strategic incentives and potential consequences of adopting a particular rebel group brand:

However, unlike businesses that adopt branding strategies usually for the sole purpose of maximizing their profit, rebel groups often have multiple (sometimes competing) goals that they are trying to balance when making branding decisions. On the one hand, rebel elites may have a strong interest in attracting external support to increase their resources and bolster their legitimacy. Therefore, they might choose to market themselves in a particular way to attract the attention of external actors. On the other hand, rebel elites often need to adopt marketing strategies that are conducive to attracting internal recruits and creating unity among their existing rebel coalition. Although these goals can sometimes overlap, other times these goals are in direct competition with each other.

As a result, internal branding decisions may have unintended external consequences and external branding decisions may have unintended internal consequences. A rebel group that adopts a particular branding strategy for internal purposes, might end up attracting the support of external actors even when that was not their primary aim. In contrast, a rebel group that adopts a particular branding strategy specifically to attract external support, might suffer internally as the rebel group's brand takes on a life of its own and ventures away from many of the original grievances and goals of their rebel coalition. Therefore, in some cases, rebel leaders may in fact have a strategic incentive not to adopt a particular brand so that they do not attract unwanted support or so that they do not end up isolating or ostracizing potential stakeholders in their coalition. As my empirical research demonstrates, there are indeed many rebel groups who share a particular religion, ethnicity, or ideology, but choose not to market themselves using that common identifier. In fact, as demonstrated in Table 1.1 below, around 20% of my cases

represent rebel groups that did not adopt any particular brand whatsoever. They may have shared a common objective such as ousting a political leader from office, but they did not engage in religious, ethnic, or ideological messaging. Furthermore, it is important to note here that the presence of religious, ethnic, or ideological differences is not enough to say a rebel group has adopted a particular brand. For example, even though a majority of Kurds belong to the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam, the PKK never uses religion as a part of its identity, but rather identifies itself in ethno-nationalist and ideological terms (San Akca 2016). To illustrate this further, Tables 1.2 and 1.3 below demonstrate what percentage of conflicts with religious or ethnic differences between the rebel group and government have a rebel group that has adopted a religious or ethnic brand. For example, there are 93 cases in which the rebel group and government have religious differences, but only 47% of these cases have a rebel group that has adopted a religious brand.

Table 1.1:
Percentage of Cases that have a particular rebel group brand

	No Brand	Religious Brand	Ethnic Brand	Leftist/Communist Brand
Percentage of Cases	20.73%	14.86%	47.89%	21.10%

Table 1.2:

Religious Branding vs. Religious Differences Comparison			
	No Religious differences	Religious Differences	Total
No religious brand	277	93	370
Religious brand	33	44	77
Total	310	137	447

Table 1.3

Ethnic Branding vs. Ethnic Differences Comparison			
	No ethnic differences	Ethnic differences	Total
No ethnic brand	55	90	145
Ethnic brand	11	136	147
Total	66	226	292

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that not all rebel group brands are available for rebel groups to choose from. For example, if a rebel group does not share a common religious identity, it would be difficult to credibly adopt a religious brand. Therefore, it is important to clarify that although the concept of branding serves as a useful analogy, there are indeed limitations to the comparison, because unlike businesses, rebel groups have less agency over their branding decisions. That being said, the purpose of this paper is to use branding to as a useful tool demonstrate how perceptions of a rebel group might influence intervention decisions.

The question then becomes, *does rebel group branding influence external intervention decisions within a civil conflict?* Regardless of the strategic incentives a rebel group has to adopt a particular brand (either for internal or external considerations), once a brand has been adopted, external actors can then utilize this information as one component of their decision to intervene. *Ceteris paribus*, rebel groups with a strong, more easily identifiable brand should be more likely to prompt external intervention, regardless of whether the rebel group in question was trying to elicit the support of external actors.

Therefore, if we think about rebel group branding as a useful heuristic for foreign decision makers who are making foreign policy decisions regarding intervention in civil conflicts (and are often facing domestic pressure from their constituents who might have an interest in

intervention), we can begin to see why certain rebel group brands might be more effective at eliciting intervention than others.⁸ To begin, rebel groups with strong brand awareness should make international interveners more responsive to the civil conflict because there is a common perception of what the rebels are fighting for and an easily identifiable narrative that can serve as a useful heuristic for intervention decisions. Brand recognition makes it easier for external actors to know whether intervention is worth the investment and when rebel groups don't have a clear brand, external intervention in the conflict should be less likely. Secondly, rebel group brand loyalty should trigger stronger and more committed forms of external support because there is more potential for identity ties. In other words, when there are more "consumers" who identify with a brand, greater buy-in for a product will occur. Conversely, brands with low potential for identity ties should not receive external support, because of lack of external buy-in with the brand. Finally, rebel groups that prompt strong anti-brand behavior should witness stronger forms of external opposition to their goals. As a result, external intervention is not only more likely to occur in support of the rebels, but also external intervention should be more likely to occur in support of the government.

Different types of rebel group brands:

Table 1.4: Variation in External Intervention Across Different Rebel Group Brands

	Troops and Weapons for Rebels	Sanctions	Mediation Assistance	Foreign Aid Increase	Troops and Weapons for Gov't
No Brand	43%	17.7%	52.9%	36.5%	34.5%
Religious Brand	56.8%	27.2%	50%	40%	64.2%
Ethnic Brand	45.6%	37.2%	46.9%	40%	43.5%
Leftist/Communist Brand	34.8%	25.2%	34.3%	38.7%	46.4%

⁸ In Part 3 of my dissertation, I explore the link between public opinion and support for external intervention to more thoroughly understand the mechanism by which rebel group branding can affect external intervention.

As Table 4 above demonstrates, patterns of external intervention indeed vary depending on the rebel group's brand. In this paper, I assess variation in external intervention across three types of rebel group brands: religious, ethnic, and leftist/communist using data from San Akca's Dangerous Companions dataset (2016). Additionally, I compare the effects of these different rebel group brands to rebel groups that have no ideational brand. Rebel groups that have no ideational brand, such as the Cocoyes in Congo, might be united under the same objective, such as overthrowing a leader, but they do not create propaganda for a specific identity or ideology and are not known by an overarching identifier (San Akca 2016). Rebel groups with no ideational brand should be the least likely groups to experience any form of external intervention either in support or opposition as they should have no brand awareness, no brand loyalty, and are unlikely to prompt anti-brand behavior.

Conversely, rebel groups with a religious brand, such as Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen, should attract the strongest forms of external intervention both in support and in opposition. First of all, religion is an identity that spans that globe, meaning that the potential for brand awareness and brand loyalty are high. Not only are there millions, sometimes billions, of adherents to most of the world religions, representing a high potential for external interveners to share identity ties with the rebels, but also religion invokes strong feelings of moral obligation that should prompt stronger forms of external intervention. Letting your religious brethren suffer without providing assistance could elicit the wrath of God. An attack against your religious brethren can represent a personal attack against your belief system. The defeat of your religious brethren can potentially delegitimize your belief system across the globe. As a result, sitting back and doing nothing to support the religious rebel group in question can not only be an unpopular option by religious adherents abroad, but can also represent an opportunity for an external actor

to step up and take on a greater leadership role in the eyes of its global religious community. As a result, the high potential for external identity ties to the rebel group in question, along with the strong sense of moral obligation that comes with religion, should not only make external intervention on behalf of the rebels more likely, but should also make stronger forms of external intervention (e.g.: troops and weapons) more likely as well.

Furthermore, rebel groups with a religious brand are likely to prompt strong anti-brand behavior. Typically, it is not common for individuals to adhere to two different religious traditions; therefore, religion makes it easy to demonize the enemy and clearly distinguish between “us” versus “them”. Whereas individuals can be ethnically mixed, religious beliefs not easily mixed and are often diametrically opposed to one another. As a result, rebel groups with a religious brand are not only likely to prompt stronger forms of support on their behalf, but are also likely to prompt stronger forms of support on behalf of their adversary (the government). When external actors can clearly identify the brand of the rebels, it becomes easier to assess whether they are in support or against that particular brand. Religion, therefore, makes it easy to identify whether an external actor shares the identity of the rebels or does not share the identity of the rebels, making decisions of external support more straightforward.

In contrast, rebel groups with an ethnic brand, such as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (primarily made up of the Tutsis), are not likely to have as strong of a brand as rebel groups with a religious brand. Many ethnicities are highly localized in comparison to religious identities, and do not share the same global reach as religion, thus resulting in less brand awareness. External actors may have never ever heard of a particular ethnicity until the civil conflict began. Furthermore, even if a particular ethnicity has an active diaspora community, most diasporas are dispersed and do not exert a strong majority influence over an external government. Therefore,

although certain ethnic groups might attract attention for humanitarian concerns, or perhaps from their ethnic diaspora, ethnicity should be less likely to overlap with the geopolitical motivations of external states and should have less opportunity to attract supporters that share the same ethnic identity with the rebels, resulting in less brand loyalty. Finally, because ethnicity does not have the same potential for strong identity ties, it is less likely to prompt anti-brand behavior because ethnicity is not as useful as a heuristic for external actors to determine which side in the conflict they should take. This is not to say that rebel groups with an ethnic brand will never receive any form of external support. Instead, they are more likely to experience less committed forms of support such as economic and diplomatic assistance instead of military support, particularly in the form of troops and weapons. Having an ethnic brand still communicates a stronger signal to external actors than no ideational brand at all, and can still provide a compelling narrative that external actors can grab onto to justify involvement in the conflict, either for humanitarian and/or geostrategic purposes.

Finally, rebel groups with a leftist (or communist) brand present a unique opportunity to test my theory even further. First of all, it is important to distinguish that although both leftist and communist brands are ideological in nature and rooted in grievances of inequality, the communist brand is a specific type of leftist brand that was particularly salient during the Cold War. Therefore, the communist brand historically has had high levels of brand awareness and brand loyalty, particularly during the Cold War. Furthermore, the communist brand during the Cold War also elicited very loyal opponents to communism that ended up resulting in high levels of anti-brand behavior to contain the spread of communism around the globe. However, after the Cold War, leftist brands, no longer under the auspices of communism, should not share the same patterns of brand awareness or brand loyalty. Additionally, leftist brands should not prompt the

same anti-brand behavior that they did during the Cold War. As a result, we should see variation in external intervention support during and after the Cold War when it comes to rebel groups with a leftist/communist brand.

Therefore, if a rebel group's brand matters, we should see systematic variation in the different forms of external intervention across the various types of rebel group brands. From the logic discussed above, several hypotheses emerge:

- **Hypothesis 1:** All forms of external intervention should be less likely to occur in civil conflicts when the rebel group has no ideational brand.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Rebel groups with a religious brand should be more likely to receive stronger forms of support (e.g.: military support in the form of troops and weapons).
- **Hypothesis 3:** Rebel groups with a religious brand should be more likely to prompt anti-brand behavior, resulting in the government being more likely to receive stronger forms of support.
- **Hypothesis 4:** Civil conflicts in which the rebel group has an ethnic brand should be more likely to attract less committed forms of external support (e.g. sanctions and mediation support).
- **Hypothesis 5:** Patterns of external intervention given on behalf or in opposition of a leftist rebel group should change after the Cold War when the leftist/communist brand is no longer as salient.

Research Design:

To test these hypotheses, I utilize a multivariate probit model. A multivariate probit estimates several correlated binary outcomes jointly, which takes into account that different

types of external intervention decisions are not independent from one another. This model essentially estimates five equations simultaneously, one for each dependent variable of interest: military support on behalf of the rebels, sanctions against the government, mediation support, a substantial increase in foreign aid to the government, and military support on behalf of the government, taking into account that these five dependent variables are correlated, and that multiple forms of intervention could be occurring simultaneously within a conflict. My unit of analysis is a conflict dyad episode, of which I have 176 observations, covering the years 1975-2009.

For military support on behalf of the government, I use UCDP's external support dataset and code this variable as a 1 if the government in question received troops and/or weapons throughout the conflict. For military support on behalf of the rebels, I also use UCDP's external support dataset, but supplement this data with San-Akca's Dangerous Companions dataset that also has measures for whether a rebel group in question received troops and/or weapons. In doing so, I am able to increase my number of cases and have a more complete dataset, as San Akca's dataset has fewer missing data and covers a longer timeframe. When it comes to mediation, I utilize DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna's (2011) Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset which codes for the presence of mediation support. For sanctions, I utilize the "Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES)" dataset. I only code my sanctions variable as a 1 however, if the reasoning behind the sanctions is plausibly related to the civil conflict. Based on the categories provided by the TIES dataset, I therefore code the presence of sanctions when the sanctions are designed to destabilize regime, contain military behavior, deny strategic materials, or improve human rights. Finally, for a substantial increase in foreign aid, I utilize the "Net Aid Transfers (NAT)" dataset. I start by taking the average in foreign aid for the five years prior to

conflict onset and then compare this to the average amount of foreign aid given during the conflict. A substantial increase here is coded as an increase that is at least 20% more than the average aid given in the five years prior to conflict onset.⁹

For my main independent variable of interest, I examine the effect of a rebel group's brand. Here I utilize San Akca's Dangerous Companions dataset that includes a variable for a rebel group's ideational characteristics. This variable codes rebel groups as having religious, ethno-nationalist, leftist, or no ideational characteristics using extensive case analysis and data sources from LexisNexis (San Akca 2016). A rebel group with no ideational characteristics "does not associate itself with any identity and/or ideology" and "does not make propaganda for a specific ethnic or religious group and/or political ideology" (San Akca 2016). Conversely, rebel groups that have religious, ethno-nationalist, or leftist characteristics are groups that do identify with a specific identity and/or ideology and do make propaganda catered towards that identity and/or ideology. It is important to again distinguish here that simply having a shared religious, ethnic, or ideological identity is not enough to classify a rebel group as having a particular brand. Rebel groups need to engage in a more intentional process to be considered as having an ideational brand, and many rebel groups (approximately 20%) do not engage in any branding behavior whatsoever. San Akca's (2016) measure of ideational characteristics is therefore, preferable to previously utilized measures for ethnic or religious conflicts that simply identify whether the rebel group and government had differing religious or ethnic identities, as opposed to also taking into account whether the rebel group's identity is actually salient within the conflict.

⁹ As a robustness check, I also ran separate models that use a measure of aid that is at least a 25% increase during the course of the conflict. These models are included in the Appendix.

Additionally, I include a number of control variables in my models that are in line with the previous explanations put forth for external intervention. To account for economic motivations for intervention, I control for the presence of oil and the level of trade (log imports) in the conflict state. To account for ideological motives, I include a Cold War dummy variable as well as semi-democracy dummy variable to control for regime type. To account for geopolitical motives, I include a Middle East dummy variable and a measure of contiguity.¹⁰ I also include a standard set of controls including a state's GDP per capita and military expenditures as well as conflict duration to capture the preexisting resources of the conflict state and the opportunity (in terms of time) for external states to intervene.¹¹ When applicable, these variables are lagged for the year prior to conflict onset to minimize endogeneity concerns.

Results:

To begin, I start by running my multi-variate probit model to examine patterns of external intervention for rebel groups that adopt no ideational brand. Again, these groups may be united under the same goal, such as overthrowing a leader, but they do not adopt specific branding strategies that capitalize on their identity or ideology. As is seen in Table 5 below, rebel groups with no ideational brand are significantly less likely to witness almost all forms of external intervention (either in support or in opposition), in line with Hypothesis 1. What this data tells us is that rebel groups who do not adopt a particular brand, are less likely to attract the attention of external actors. As a result, these conflicts witness low levels of external involvement across

¹⁰ For cultural motives, I have a lengthier discussion and include a number of robustness checks in the subsequent section.

¹¹ Data come from the World Bank indicators for GDP per capita, the Correlates of War (COW) data on trade for imports (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009; Barbieri and Keshk 2016), the COW National Material Capabilities data for military expenditures (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972), the COW Contiguity Dataset for the number of contiguous states (Stinnett et al. 2002), Polity IV data to code for semi-democracy using a Polity score of -6 to 6 (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014), PRIO's petroleum dataset of on-shore petroleum locations, and UCDP's Conflict Termination Dataset for region and to calculate conflict duration (Kreutz 2010).

the board. Given the fact that rebel groups that have no brand are by definition unlikely to have brand awareness, brand loyalty, or be likely to prompt anti-brand behavior, it is not surprising that these conflicts are significantly less likely to prompt external involvement.

However, it is important to note that we do see different patterns in external intervention behavior depending on various characteristics of the conflict state, demonstrating the merit in disaggregating amongst various forms of external intervention in our models. For example, sanctions are more likely to be levied on conflict states that have higher military capabilities, but are less likely to be levied on conflict states that import a lot of foreign goods. Mediation support is more likely to be given to conflict states that have oil, but is less likely to be given to conflict states that have higher military capabilities or that are located in the Middle East. Substantial increases in foreign aid were more likely to be given during the Cold War and are more likely to be given to semi-democratic states and conflict states that have a higher number of contiguous neighbors. A substantial increase in foreign aid however, was less likely to be given to conflict states with oil. Finally, when it comes to military support, governments were more likely to receive troops and weapons during the Cold War, and rebel groups were less likely to receive troops and weapons when the conflict state imported a lot of foreign goods. Again, these results confirm the value in disaggregating amongst various forms of external intervention, as they demonstrate that there is not only a selection effect that occurs when it comes to external intervention, but that the selection effect varies depending on the type of intervention.

Table 1.5: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions for Rebel Groups with No Ideational Brand

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government	Troops and Weapons for Government
No Ideational Brand	-.690** (.290)	-1.142** (.479)	-.509 (.320)	-.650** (.252)	-.585* (.329)
Cold War	.137 (.252)	-.202 (.276)	.019 (.325)	.724** (.285)	.593* (.351)
Oil	-.073 (.291)	.613 (.455)	.695* (.375)	-.575** (.230)	.107 (.324)
Military Exp. (ln)	.206 (.159)	.734*** (.192)	-.445** (.191)	.088 (.194)	-.151 (.171)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.065 (.180)	.085 (.234)	.307 (.214)	.065 (.206)	.210 (.213)
Contiguity	.071 (.069)	-.075 (.086)	-.043 (.099)	.131** (.059)	-.111 (.088)
Imports (ln)	-.482*** (.165)	-.659*** (.236)	-.073 (.204)	-.106 (.210)	-.278 (.237)
Middle East	.719 (.522)	-.656 (.693)	-1.397* (.808)	-.531 (.411)	-.204 (.668)
Semi-Democracy	.042 (.243)	.357 (.359)	.392 (.304)	.537* (.291)	-.221 (.290)
Duration	.023* (.012)	-.015 (.013)	.070*** (.015)	-.002 (.013)	.057*** (.014)
Constant	.878 (1.349)	-5.421*** (1.849)	3.608** (1.745)	-1.621 (1.456)	2.335 (1.420)
N	176				
Log pseudolikelihood	-449.546				
Chi ² likelihood ratio	22.896				
prob > chi ²	0.011				

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

As my first model demonstrates, rebel groups with no ideational brand are significantly less likely to prompt almost all forms of external intervention support. In contrast however, I then run a model that compares the patterns of external intervention across rebel groups with a religious, ethnic, or leftist brand and find very different results. First, when we look at rebel groups who have adopted a religious brand in Table 1.6 below, we see that they are significantly more likely to receive more committed forms of external support, particularly in the form of troops and weapons, and are significantly more likely to prompt more committed forms of external support in opposition (troops and weapons given on behalf of the government),

providing support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. Rebel groups with a religious brand are also more likely to prompt mediation support and a substantial increase in foreign aid, demonstrating higher levels of external involvement almost across the board. What these results tell us is that rebel groups with a religious brand are more likely to elicit stronger forms of support on both sides of the conflict, likely due to their high levels of brand awareness, brand loyalty and susceptibility to anti-brand behavior.

Table 1.6: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions for Rebel Groups with Religious, Ethnic, or Leftist Brands

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government	Troops and Weapons for Government
Religious Brand	.812** (.369)	.149 (.482)	1.272*** (.402)	.518* (.288)	1.400*** (.418)
Ethnic Brand	.499 (.305)	1.099*** (.275)	.515** (.223)	-.016 (.265)	.299 (.303)
Leftist Brand	-.246 (.414)	.749** (.360)	-.621 (.430)	.391 (.360)	.310 (.312)
Cold War	.282 (.256)	-.310 (.286)	.275 (.344)	.708** (.294)	.698* (.375)
Oil	-.043 (.273)	.528 (.506)	.811** (.375)	-.466* (.270)	.343 (.309)
Military Exp. (ln)	.178 (.172)	.736*** (.196)	-.517*** (.159)	.081 (.196)	-.103 (.186)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.055 (.208)	.115 (.251)	.419** (.196)	-.025 (.216)	.249 (.200)
Contiguity	.104 (.071)	-.089 (.086)	.017 (.083)	.116** (.056)	-.099 (.076)
Imports (ln)	-.458** (.193)	-.675*** (.252)	-.085 (.171)	-.054 (.228)	-.387* (.217)
Middle East	.805 (.566)	-.297 (.730)	-1.844*** (.692)	-.512 (.408)	-.667 (.585)
Semi-Democracy	.032 (.247)	.282 (.358)	.526* (.296)	.575* (.296)	-.092 (.264)
Duration	.036*** (.011)	-.026** (.013)	.100*** (.020)	-.003 (.014)	.064*** (.015)
Constant	.169 (1.462)	-6.221*** (2.050)	2.761** (1.378)	-1.675 (1.442)	1.408 (1.406)
N	176				
Log pseudolikelihood	-432.043				
Chi ² likelihood ratio	16.722				
prob > chi ²	0.081				

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Rebel groups with an ethnic brand however, prompt very different patterns of external intervention support. As rebel groups with ethnic brands are less likely to have as high of brand awareness and brand loyalty and are less likely to prompt anti-brand behavior, we should see less committed forms of support being more likely to occur, which is what we do see in Table 1.6. In line with Hypothesis 4, rebel groups with an ethnic brand are significantly more likely to prompt sanctions and mediation support, but are not more or less likely to prompt more committed forms of external support (either in support or opposition). Thus, external intervention in these conflicts is still more likely to occur when compared with rebel groups that have no ideational brand; however, the types of external intervention that are more likely to occur are different than when rebel groups have a religious brand.

Finally, when it comes to rebel groups with a leftist brand, we see in Table 1.6 that only sanctions are significantly more likely to occur, demonstrating some symbolic external interest in these conflicts, but not much. However, as discussed above, there is good reason to suspect that rebel groups with a leftist brand might prompt different patterns of external intervention depending on whether they were fighting during or after the Cold War. Therefore, I have run a separate model that compares external intervention patterns during and after the Cold War for rebel groups with a leftist brand.¹²

As specified in Hypothesis 5, we should see different patterns of external intervention because the saliency of the leftist/communist brand was significantly diminished after the Cold War. In Table 1.7 below we see that rebel groups with a leftist brand during the Cold War were significantly less likely to receive troops and weapons and were significantly more likely to

¹² Unfortunately, the multi-variate probit model does not enable me to run an interaction term in my equations so I have to create two separate dummy variables, one for leftist brands during the Cold War and one for leftist brands after the Cold War.

prompt increases in foreign aid given on behalf of the government. We also see that mediation support was significantly less likely to be given to rebel groups with a leftist brand. These results support the notion that the leftist/communist brand had higher levels of brand awareness during the Cold War, but ultimately were more likely to prompt anti-brand behavior.

However, after the Cold War, rebel groups with a leftist brand did not prompt the same passionate response. For the most part, as seen in Table 7 below, rebel groups with a leftist brand after the Cold War were not significantly more or less likely to receive external intervention (either in support or opposition). Only mediation support is significant and negative in this model. Therefore, providing support to Hypothesis 5, we see that the leftist brand prompted different patterns of support during and after the Cold War, likely due to the fact that the leftist brand did not have the same level of brand awareness that it did during the Cold War.

Table 1.7: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions for Rebel Groups with a Leftist Brand During and After the Cold War

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government	Troops and Weapons for Government
Leftist Brand during Cold War	-.820* (.418)	.693 (.468)	-1.152** (.518)	.606* (.357)	-.526 (.391)
Leftist Brand after Cold War	-.595 (.489)	-.069 (.432)	-1.167** (.456)	-.325 (.465)	-.095 (.527)
Cold War	.380 (.305)	-.421* (.254)	.303 (.381)	.534* (.313)	.787* (.417)
Oil	-.100 (.301)	.672 (.483)	.628* (.359)	-.543** (.243)	.085 (.325)
Military Exp. (ln)	.103 (.168)	.658*** (.180)	-.600*** (.176)	.050 (.189)	-.227 (.171)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.150 (.178)	-.114 (.253)	.262 (.199)	-.068 (.206)	.150 (.196)
Contiguity	.098 (.071)	-.097 (.085)	.012 (.095)	.124** (.056)	-.091 (.078)
Imports (ln)	-.274 (.175)	-.453* (.243)	.162 (.182)	.035 (.204)	-.129 (.218)
Middle East	1.013** (.508)	-.229 (.719)	-1.129 (.738)	-.191 (.403)	-.040 (.637)
Semi-Democracy	.023 (.252)	.319 (.340)	.363 (.302)	.503* (.295)	-.222 (.284)
Duration	.039***	-.010	.097***	-.000	.064***

	(.011)	(.015)	(.018)	(.015)	(.015)
Constant	.761 (1.384)	-5.005*** (1.881)	3.632** (1.512)	-1.515 (1.351)	2.258* (1.371)
N	176				
Log pseudolikelihood	-449.534				
Chi ² likelihood ratio	27.556				
prob > chi ²	0.002				

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Overall, these results provide strong evidence that suggests rebel group branding matters for external intervention. First of all, my rebel group branding variables are not only significant, but also often have the largest substantive effect on external intervention in my models, demonstrating that rebel group branding not only matters, but is one of the most influential variables when it comes to external intervention decisions. Secondly, my results demonstrate that not all brands are created equal, nor do they elicit the same type of external response. In particular, rebel groups with a religious brand are the most likely to prompt external intervention, both for and against them. Rebel groups with an ethnic brand however, are not as likely to prompt the same type of passionate response, with more symbolic, and less committed forms of external support being more likely to occur. When it comes to rebel groups with a leftist brand, we see different patterns of external support both during and after the Cold War; whereas, rebel groups with a leftist brand during the Cold War were significantly less likely to receive external support and were significantly more likely to prompt external support given on behalf of the government, after the Cold War, rebel groups with a leftist brand were not more or less likely to prompt most forms of external support. Finally, rebel groups with no ideational brand (and thus no potential for brand awareness, brand loyalty, or the susceptibility to anti-brand behavior) were the least likely to receive almost all forms of external intervention.

Robustness Checks

Although these results provide very strong evidence in support of my theory and hypotheses, it is still uncertain from a causal inference perspective whether rebel group branding is really driving these results. As previously discussed, rebel groups may adopt branding strategies for either internal or external purposes; therefore, they may not be adopting a particular branding strategy for the sole purpose of attracting external intervention. That being said however, even if rebel groups are solely adopting a branding strategy for internal recruitment purposes or for inspiring their rebel fighters, their decision to brand themselves in a particular way can still send a signal to external actors that they can capitalize on to justify their involvement. However, what this paper has not yet addressed, is whether it is the rebel groups themselves who are adopting a particular brand, or whether external actors are the ones strategically branding the rebel group in question to justify their involvement in the conflict? In other words, does branding by the rebel group in question precede external intervention, or does external intervention prompt rebel group branding?

Although not a perfect solution for this question, as a robustness check I also run a few additional models to provide better clarity to its theoretical predictions. Here it is important to again clarify that a civil conflict being fought between two groups that have religious or ethnic differences is not the same as a civil conflict that has a rebel group that has specifically adopted a religious or ethnic brand. For example, in my data, there are 139 cases of civil conflicts that are being fought between two groups with different religious identities. However, there are only 81 cases in which the rebel group in question has adopted a religious brand, meaning that these groups have intentionally utilized religious rhetoric to identify their group and their goals. In

addition, there are 33 cases in which the rebel group in question has adopted a religious brand, but there are no significant religious differences between the two warring parties.

Therefore, if external actors wanted to justify their involvement in a civil conflict by capitalizing on religious or ethnic differences, we should see similar patterns of external intervention across all “religious” conflicts, regardless of whether the rebel group in question has adopted a “religious brand.” Even the mere presence of religious differences between the rebel group and government in question could be enough for external interveners to point to as a reasonable explanation for their involvement. However, when running a multi-variate probit model using a measure of religious differences (Svensson and Nilsson 2018), rather than a religious brand, I find that all forms of external intervention were not more or less likely to occur (see Appendix Table 1.3). In addition, when specifically looking at civil conflicts that have religious differences between the rebel group and government in question that have specifically *not* adopted a religious brand, I find that troops and weapons given on behalf of the rebels and significant increases in foreign aid are significantly less likely to occur (see Appendix Table 1.4). Similarly, I run the same models but instead looks at ethnic differences instead of religious differences. Again, all forms of external intervention are not more or less likely to occur when the rebel group and government in question simply have ethnic differences (with the exception of mediation support which is still significantly more likely to occur) (See Appendix Table 1.5). Furthermore, when looking at civil conflicts that have ethnic differences between the rebel group and government in question that have specifically *not* adopted an ethnic brand, I find that sanctions are actually significantly less likely to occur, whereas they were significantly more likely to occur when rebel groups adopted an ethnic brand (See Appendix Table 1.6). Therefore, it would appear from these results that the presence of religious or ethnic differences is not

enough to prompt external intervention. Instead, when rebel groups specifically brand themselves in a particular way, we see external intervention being more likely to occur.

That being said, it could still be the case that rebel groups are only adopting a particular brand after an intervention has taken place, or that they are inheriting a particular brand because of the identity of their external intervener. For example, religious conflicts might only become religiously branded once an external actor is already involved, depending on who the intervener is and what their strategic motivations are. Given the nature of the data that exists and the fact that this paper is not running a time-series analysis, it is indeed difficult to parse out specifically when a rebel group has engaged in branding behavior in relation to when various forms of external intervention (often by multiple interveners) has taken place. Even if I were to run a time-series analysis though, it would be difficult to determine when a particular brand forms and how to measure the onset of branding without conducting intensive case study analysis for all of my observations. Branding is also not an instantaneous occurrence; therefore, pinpointing an exact branding date would be prohibitive. This limitation is indeed problematic for fully ruling out reverse causality; however, for several reasons, these concerns can be somewhat ameliorated by using a multi-variate probit model that takes into account multiple types of external intervention simultaneously.

For starters, it is apparent from the analyses above that various forms of intervention are significantly more *or less* likely to occur depending on the brand of the rebel groups. Although it might make sense that a rebel group brand is adopted after an intervention is taken place, it is not evidently clear why a particular brand would be adopted after an intervention does not take place. For example, mediation support is less likely to be given to rebel groups with a leftist brand; however, theoretically it does not seem plausible that the lack of mediation support is

what prompted the rebel groups to adopt a leftist brand. Secondly, the theory in this paper stipulates that some brands are more successful at attracting external support than other brands. Therefore, it is unclear why a particular rebel group would adopt a particular brand post hoc because they only received more symbolic forms of support rather than more committed forms of support. For example, why would a rebel group adopt an ethnic brand because they only received sanctions and mediation support, rather than troops and weapons? In other words, why would some forms of intervention prompt one type of brand over another? This is not to say that there aren't some instances in which rebel groups are adopting a particular brand in response to an intervention that takes place; however, in a vast majority of our cases, rebel group branding is occurring when only some forms of intervention are present, while other forms are not. Furthermore, by taking into account various forms of external intervention (both in support and in opposition of the rebels), it is much more difficult to argue that a rebel group's brand is being dictated by a particular intervention or intervention type, especially when multiple forms of (sometimes) competing interventions are taking place. Finally, although one could imagine that a rebel group that receives more committed forms of support, particularly in the form of troops and weapons, might be more susceptible to taking on the brand imposed upon them by their intervener, it is unclear why this would only be the case for religious rebel groups and not ethnic or leftist groups, who are less likely to receive this type of intervention. Although none of this solves all causal inference issues, this logic should alleviate some of the concerns regarding the causal arrow going in the opposite direction.

Conclusion:

Overall, the theory and analyses put forth in this paper have several main implications for future research. First, I have demonstrated that different types of conflicts are likely to attract

different forms of external intervention. Therefore, in order to reflect the reality that external interveners are choosing from a number of different foreign policy tools when deciding whether or not to intervene in a conflict, future research needs to do a better job of distinguishing between different forms of intervention, both theoretically and empirically. Secondly, I have demonstrated that one of the strongest predictors of external intervention support is a rebel group's brand, a distinction that has not been made by previous research. In doing so, I provide compelling evidence that suggests not all brands are created equal and that perceptions of what a rebel group is fighting for can potentially influence external intervention decisions in significant ways. Finally, most previous research uses measures such as ethnic or religious differences to capture whether a conflict is "religious" or "ethnic" in nature; however, the results in this paper demonstrate that branding a conflict in a particular way is not the same thing as having religious or ethnic differences within a conflict. These results are important because they help both researchers and policymakers better understand why different forms of external intervention are more or less likely to occur in different types of conflicts. Then, by understanding how the selection effect for external intervention varies across conflicts, future research can hopefully better assess the effectiveness of these different types of intervention on civil conflict outcomes.

References:

- Barbieri, Katherine and Omar M. G. Omar Keshk. 2016. "Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 4.0." Online: <http://correlatesofwar.org>.
- Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M. G. Keshk, and Brian Pollins. 2009. "TRADING DATA: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(5): 471-491.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2007. "Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?" *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 69(1): 1-27.
- Cunningham, David E. 2010. "Blocking resolution: how external states can prolong civil wars." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): pp. 115-128.
- Dessart L., Morgan-Thomas A., Veloutsou C. (2016) What Drives Anti-brand Community Behaviours: An Examination of Online Hate of Technology Brands. In: Obal M., Krey N., Bushardt C. (eds) Let's Get Engaged! Crossing the Threshold of Marketing's Engagement Era. *Developments in Marketing Science: Proceedings of the Academy of Marketing Science*. Springer, Cham
- DeRouen Jr., Karl, Jacob Bercovitch, and Paulina Pospieszna. 2012. "Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset". *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.
- Elbadawi, Ibrahim A., and Nicholas Sambanis. (2000, March 18-19). "External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars." World Bank's Development Economic Research Group conference. Princeton University, NJ.
- Fang, Marina and Amber Ferguson. "Bill Clinton Is Sorry For A Lot Of Things." *Huffington Post* July 17, 2015. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bill-clinton-is-sorry_n_55a83397e4b0896514d0e220
- Findley, Michael G., and Josiah F. Marineau. 2014. "Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32(5): 465-486.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Lene Sijehold Christiansen, and Havard Hegre. 2007. "Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention and Democracy." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4242.
- He, Hongwei, Yan Li and Llyod Harris. 2012. "Social identity perspective on brand loyalty." *Journal of Business Research* 65: 648-657.
- Heger, Lindsay and Idean Salehyan. 2007. "Ruthless Rulers: Coalition Size and the Severity of Civil Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 51: pp. 385-403.
- Högbladh, Stina, Therése Petterson & Lotta Themnér, 2011. "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009. Presenting new data" *Paper presented at the 52nd Annual International Studies Association Convention*, Montreal, Canada, 16-19 March, 2011
- Jagers, Keith and Monty Marshall. 2000. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007."
- Kathman, Jacob. 2011. "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6): pp. 847-876.
- Koga, Jun. 2011. "Where do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties Domestic Political Institutions and Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts." *International Studies Quarterly* 55: pp. 1143-1166.
- Kopp, Carol M. "Brand Loyalty." *Investopedia*, September 11, 2019. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brand-loyalty.asp>

- Kopp, Carol M. "Brand Awareness." *Investopedia*, July 26, 2020.
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brandawareness.asp>
- Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243-250.
- Lacina, Bethany. 2006. "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(2): pp. 276-289.
- Lujala, Päivi; Jan Ketil Rød & Nadia Thieme, 2007. 'Fighting over Oil: Introducing A New Dataset', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(3), 239-256.
- McKibben, Heather and Amy Skoll. *Forthcoming*. "Please Help Us (or Don't): External Interventions and Negotiated Settlements in Civil Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*
- Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. 2016. "The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa." *American Economic Review*, 106 (7): 1802-48.
- Moore, Matthew. 2012. "Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration." *International Interactions* 38(3): 325-347
- Perkins, Brian M. 2017. "Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40(4): 300317.
- Regan, Patrick. 1998. "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts." *The Journal of Politics* 60(3): pp. 754-779.
- Regan, Patrick. 2002. "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): pp. 55-73.
- Reinhart, RJ. "U.S. Views Mixed on War in Afghanistan." Gallup, September 11, 2019.
<https://news.gallup.com/poll/266546/views-mixed-war-afghanistan.aspx>
- Roodman, David. 2005. "An Index of Donor Performance, Working Paper 67." Center for Global Development.
- Salisbury, Peter. 2015. "Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian 'Cold War.'" *Middle East and North Africa Programme Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs*
- San-Akca, Belgin. "States in Disguise: Causes of External State Support for Rebel Groups." New York: Oxford University Press. 2016.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In Bruce Russett (ed.) *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage, p. 19-48.
- Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2): 58-66.
- Svensson, Isak and Desiree Nilsson. 2018. "Disputes over the Divine: Introducing the Religion and Armed Conflict (RELAC) Data, 1975 to 2015." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62(5): 1127-1148.

CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX:

Appendix Table 1.1: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions using an Alternative Measure of Foreign Aid (An Increase of 25% or More)

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government (25% or More)	Troops and Weapons for Government
Religious Brand	.823** (.374)	.164 (.486)	1.260*** (.398)	1.126*** (.368)	1.449*** (.422)
Ethnic Brand	.504* (.302)	1.092 (.283)	.526** (.230)	.749*** (.276)	.303 (.301)
Leftist Brand	-.239 (.409)	.717** (.356)	-.598 (.417)	1.126 (.404)	.386 (.317)
Cold War	.284 (.257)	-.278 (.295)	.313 (.365)	.602** (.278)	.691* (.378)
Oil	-.042 (.272)	.520 (.530)	.825** (.327)	-.528* (.301)	.356 (.308)
Military Exp. (ln)	.180 (.175)	.722*** (.196)	-.512*** (.160)	.133 (.163)	-.107 (.189)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.056 (.208)	.098 (.253)	.423** (.193)	.186 (.168)	.251 (.201)
Contiguity	.105 (.071)	-.082 (.087)	.016 (.084)	.163** (.066)	-.096 (.074)
Imports (ln)	-.461** (.194)	-.649** (.253)	-.093 (.172)	-.176 (.197)	-.386* (.215)
Middle East	.795 (.571)	-.317 (.720)	-1.876*** (.699)	-.578 (.547)	-.694 (.600)
Semi-Democracy	.035 (.247)	.283 (.369)	.525* (.310)	.363 (.303)	-.091 (.266)
Duration	.036*** (.011)	-.024* (.013)	.097*** (.020)	-.014 (.014)	.063*** (.015)
Constant	.161 (1.469)	-6.197*** (2.044)	2.741** (1.385)	-3.416** (1.453)	1.419 (1.439)
N	176				
Log pseudolikelihood	-422.008				
Chi ² likelihood ratio	18.8937				
prob > chi ²	0.0416				

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 1.2: Leftist Brands During and After the Cold War: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions using an Alternative Measure of Foreign Aid (An Increase of 25% or More)

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government (25% More)	Troops and Weapons for Government
Leftist Brand during Cold War	-.808* (.416)	.670 (.470)	-1.124** (.508)	.510 (.394)	-.499 (.394)
Leftist Brand after Cold War	-.578 (.478)	-.080 (.444)	-1.135** (.459)	.452 (.378)	-.007 (.527)

Cold War	.388 (.305)	-.389 (.265)	.343 (.401)	.643** (.267)	.794* (.422)
Oil	-.098 (.303)	.640 (.495)	.624* (.353)	-.573* (.347)	.090 (.331)
Military Exp. (ln)	.103 (.170)	.658*** (.181)	-.596*** (.174)	.064 (.147)	-.233 (.172)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.154 (.180)	-.124 (.253)	.264 (.197)	.019 (.169)	.144 (.203)
Contiguity	.098 (.072)	-.093 (.087)	.012 (.096)	.139** (.057)	-.091 (.077)
Imports (ln)	-.272 (.177)	-.446* (.244)	.154 (.183)	.048 (.169)	-.121 (.218)
Middle East	.994* (.511)	-.225 (.712)	-1.155 (.747)	-.195 (.561)	-.039 (.650)
Semi-Democracy	.031 (.251)	.289 (.353)	.358 (.310)	.332 (.306)	-.222 (.288)
Duration	.039*** (.011)	-.009 (.015)	.096*** (.019)	-.007 (.013)	.063*** (.015)
Constant	.758 (1.389)	-5.006*** (1.880)	3.627** (1.500)	-2.473** (1.251)	2.307 (1.407)
N	176				
Log pseudolikelihood	-445.133				
Chi ² likelihood ratio	30.8483				
prob > chi ²	0.0006				

Appendix Table 1.3: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions for Rebel Groups Religious Differences

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government	Troops and Weapons for Government
Religious Differences	-.135 (.268)	.248 (.317)	.588 (.386)	-.320 (.277)	.660 (.403)
Cold War	.276 (.245)	-.158 (.308)	.122 (.323)	.786*** (.288)	.519 (.369)
Oil	-.120 (.293)	.600 (.483)	.578* (.342)	-.545** (.237)	.080 (.337)
Military Exp. (ln)	.115 (.166)	.627*** (.192)	-.464*** (.178)	.072 (.175)	-.120 (.169)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.270 (.170)	-.037 (.264)	.265 (.199)	-.021 (.204)	.252 (.196)
Contiguity	.074 (.070)	-.059 (.080)	.002 (.083)	.098* (.054)	-.054 (.074)
Imports (ln)	-.253 (.168)	-.465* (.264)	-.031 (.190)	.011 (.192)	-.202 (.202)
Middle East	1.144** (.505)	-.422 (.694)	-1.492** (.710)	-.309 (.351)	-.550 (.604)
Semi-Democracy	.111 (.231)	.327 (.348)	.406 (.288)	.484* (.269)	-.221 (.289)
Duration	.025** (.011)	-.002 (.014)	.078*** (.014)	.002 (.012)	.060*** (.014)
Constant	1.282 (1.336)	-5.265*** (1.863)	3.268** (1.549)	-1.809 (1.348)	1.645 (1.307)

N	176
Log pseudolikelihood	-450.219
Chi ² likelihood ratio	39.174
prob > chi ²	0.000

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 1.4: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions for Rebel Groups with Religious Differences, but No Religious Brand

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government	Troops and Weapons for Government
Religious Differences w/ no Religious Brand	-.688* (.385)	.372 (.253)	-.206 (.282)	-.726** (.355)	-.373 (.229)
Cold War	.284 (.254)	-.078 (.282)	.177 (.326)	.775** (.304)	.601 (.378)
Oil	-.012 (.301)	.498 (.508)	.670* (.377)	-.469* (.246)	.184 (.343)
Military Exp. (ln)	.168 (.172)	.599*** (.190)	-.464** (.199)	.064 (.185)	-.178 (.157)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.272 (.175)	-.059 (.260)	.247 (.220)	-.025 (.210)	.197 (.211)
Contiguity	.054 (.071)	-.058 (.079)	-.048 (.101)	.107* (.057)	-.107 (.086)
Imports (ln)	-.310* (.171)	-.408 (.251)	.017 (.209)	.001 (.201)	-.184 (.194)
Middle East	1.139** (.510)	-.376 (.679)	-1.244 (.830)	-.304 (.392)	-.236 (.651)
Semi-Democracy	.106 (.232)	.303 (.340)	.377 (.310)	.432 (.286)	-.293 (.298)
Duration	.028*** (.011)	-.002 (.013)	.072*** (.014)	.006 (.012)	.064*** (.015)
Constant	1.110 (1.356)	-5.165*** (1.852)	3.375* (1.785)	-1.673 (1.401)	1.885 (1.408)
N	173				
Log pseudolikelihood	-447.214				
Chi ² likelihood ratio	24.289				
prob > chi ²	0.007				

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 1.5: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions for Rebel Groups with Ethnic Differences

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government	Troops and Weapons for Government
Ethnic Differences	.104 (.364)	-.281 (.429)	1.568*** (.534)	-.295 (.343)	.553 (.460)
Cold War	.559** (.263)	.173 (.276)	.848* (.438)	.773** (.359)	.785** (.355)

Oil	-.322 (.383)	.912* (.472)	.380 (.488)	-.576* (.342)	-.248 (.435)
Military Exp. (ln)	-.051 (.179)	.620*** (.174)	-.797*** (.221)	.229 (.242)	-.331 (.212)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.229 (.196)	-.053 (.243)	.335 (.383)	.057 (.232)	.248 (.191)
Contiguity	.123 (.078)	-.110 (.072)	.001 (.132)	.098 (.075)	-.029 (.103)
Imports (ln)	-.042 (.221)	-.420* (.215)	.333 (.265)	-.269 (.277)	.121 (.271)
Middle East	1.008* (.580)	-.483 (.736)	-1.106 (.884)	-.812 (.579)	-.354 (.678)
Semi-Democracy	.095 (.268)	.529 (.411)	.537* (.325)	.543 (.352)	.012 (.331)
Duration	.031** (.014)	-.013 (.015)	.101*** (.020)	.015 (.016)	.050*** (.016)
Constant	1.225 (1.398)	-5.024** (2.007)	2.939 (2.849)	-2.185 (1.715)	.581 (1.703)
N	139				
Log pseudolikelihood	-349.661				
Chi ² likelihood ratio	20.567				
prob > chi ²	0.024				

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 1.6: Multi-variate Probit Model Analyzing Occurrence of Interventions for Rebel Groups with Ethnic Differences, but No Ethnic Brand

Dependent Variable	Troops and Weapons for Rebel Group	Sanctions Against Government	Mediation Support	Foreign Aid Increase to Government	Troops and Weapons for Government
Ethnic Differences w/ no Ethnic Brand	-.561 (.347)	-1.041*** (.284)	.492 (.310)	.153 (.301)	.461 (.354)
Cold War	.441 (.273)	.139 (.355)	.810** (.392)	.893** (.346)	.878 (.318)
Oil	-.390 (.381)	.663 (.528)	.752* (.399)	-.589* (.337)	-.131 (.402)
Military Exp. (ln)	-.045 (.183)	.621*** (.227)	-.822*** (.222)	.160 (.224)	-.351* (.210)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.194 (.183)	.086 (.262)	.144 (.229)	.048 (.226)	.189 (.198)
Contiguity	.103 (.078)	-.081 (.099)	.016 (.120)	.122* (.071)	-.005 (.089)
Imports (ln)	-.078 (.215)	-.526* (.275)	.461* (.247)	-.205 (.269)	.151 (.274)
Middle East	.924* (.539)	-.528 (.810)	-1.297 (.826)	-.566 (.553)	-.474 (.694)
Semi-Democracy	.098 (.278)	.368 (.410)	.371 (.344)	.464 (.333)	.007 (.314)
Duration	.028* (.014)	-.015 (.015)	.083*** (.018)	.016 (.016)	.053*** (.013)
Constant	1.669 (1.320)	-4.925** (2.065)	4.531** (1.799)	-2.161 (1.591)	1.038 (1.537)

N	137
Log pseudolikelihood	-341.761
Chi ² likelihood ratio	26.399
prob > chi ²	0.003

Standard errors clustered by country; * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

CHAPTER 2:
**The Conditional Effects of External Intervention on
Conflict Outcomes by Conflict Type**

**Amy Skoll
UC Davis**

Abstract:

Does external intervention have uniform effects on conflict outcomes across all different types of civil conflict? Although there is a growing literature that discusses the effects of external intervention on civil conflict outcomes, previous literature typically treats all civil wars as one aggregate category, assuming that external intervention has uniform effects across all civil conflicts. This paper instead demonstrates that external intervention, in the form of troops and weapons, has a conditional effect on the likelihood of a negotiated settlement being reached depending on a rebel group's brand. Using a conditional mixed process (CMP) model, this paper not only demonstrates that external intervention is indeed non-random, but that it has a more deleterious effect in some civil conflicts over others. In particular, rebel groups with a religious brand (as opposed to an ethnic or ideological brand or rebel groups with no brand) are not only more likely to elicit external intervention, but intervention in these conflicts is also more likely to have a negative effect on the ability of the government and rebels to come to a negotiated settlement.

Introduction:

In September 2014, the capital of Yemen, Sana'a, was taken over by Houthi rebels, forcing Yemen's President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee the country and launching one of the most devastating and tumultuous civil conflicts in the world today. More than five years later, the Houthis still have control over the capital of Sana'a along with governorates of Amran, Dhamar, Rima, Ibb and al-Mahweet and if anything, the conflict has only become more complicated over time with no end in sight. Although the Houthis have many political, economic, and tribal concerns, they are perhaps most well-known as being a Shia Muslim minority with the external support from their Shia Muslim brothers from Iran. As a result, the Yemeni Civil War is frequently cited as a sectarian religious civil conflict that has become a larger proxy battle between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran.

In the civil wars literature, a growing body of research has emerged that specifically focuses on the causes of religious civil conflicts and their resolution. This emerging research agenda comes at a time when religious civil conflicts, like Yemen, have become the most common form of civil conflict in the world. As evidenced by Svensson and Nilsson (2017), from 1975 to 2015, religious issue conflicts have been steadily on the rise and now religious conflicts comprise of the highest proportion of armed conflicts in the world today. This is in stark contrast to non-religious conflicts that have declined substantially after 1960 (Svensson and Nilsson 2017). These trends have prompted a number of scholars to revisit the role of religion and politics. Whereas secularization theorists predicted religion would become obsolete over time as societies became more modern, religion has seemingly made a "comeback," becoming increasingly more prominent in domestic and global politics.

Although it is evident that religion is an important factor to consider when analyzing domestic and global politics and that this new research agenda has brought forth many useful insights, it is still not clear how to analyze religion and its effects on civil conflicts. For example, what does it mean for a civil war to be classified as “religious”? How do we operationalize religion? Does religion really matter for our understanding of civil wars, or is religion really just a disguise for other geopolitical and economic motivations? What is it about religion that makes religious civil wars more intractable? In fact, many scholars and policymakers alike have argued that in focusing on the religious dimensions of the Yemen Civil War, the local political, economic, and tribal factors of the Yemeni conflict have been overlooked. As a result, this myopic approach ends up misclassifying the Yemen Civil War as religiously motivated, when in fact a number of other factors are instead driving the conflict. However, if the Yemeni conflict was purely driven by local determinants and religion was not a factor, would the conflict in Yemen have ever reached such regional and international attention?

These are all questions that we are not currently able to answer given the limited, albeit growing, scholarship on religion and conflict. From a conflict resolution standpoint, it matters how a conflict is classified because this classification often shapes discussion around what strategies should be taken to bring the conflict to an end. If religion indeed has an effect on civil conflict outcomes, then how should religion be viewed by scholars and policymakers with respect to the other factors that have also been well-established by the literature to matter for conflict resolution? This paper seeks to move our understanding of religion and conflict further by examining the role of religion in civil conflicts *vis-a-vis* external intervention.

As is evident by the Yemen case, perhaps one of the most significant ways that religion has the ability to transform civil conflicts is by increasing the stakes of the conflict, turning a

local dispute into one with regional and international implications. External intervention in civil conflicts is common across all civil conflicts; however external intervention in civil conflicts with religious dimensions sends a very different signal that has a distinct impact on conflict resolution. Although there has been a substantial amount of quantitative research done on the effects of external intervention on conflict outcomes, little is understood about how the effects of external intervention might vary based on conflict type. From a policy standpoint however, it is important to understand whether foreign policy tools have uniform effects across all civil conflicts, or if the effects of foreign policy tools are different depending on conflict type.

This paper proceeds as follows: First, I examine the shortcomings of existing research on external intervention and civil conflict outcomes and discuss the challenges in classifying civil conflicts as being religious, ethnic, or ideological in nature. Second, I introduce my concept of rebel group branding and discuss how perceptions of civil conflicts matter and can have detrimental effects on civil conflict resolution. Third I discuss my quantitative research design and explain the merits in using a conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator, and then present my results. Fourth, I provide an illustrative case study using the civil conflict in Yemen to provide further evidence of my theory. Finally, I discuss the overall implications of my research.

Review of Literature:

To begin, the literature on external intervention in intrastate conflicts does not paint an optimistic picture about the relationship between external intervention and civil war outcomes. In the literature, foreign intervention in intrastate conflicts has been demonstrated to increase conflict severity (Lacina 2006, Heger and Salehyan 2007) and increase conflict duration (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Regan 2002). By their logic, foreign intervention enables warring parties to be able to live another day and continue fighting when they otherwise might not be

able to, leading to longer, more deadly conflicts. In addition, foreign intervention can increase optimism about a side's relative military capability which can lead to errors of judgement that prevent warring parties from coming to the bargaining table (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000).

However, other authors in the literature point to the fact that external intervention may have different effects depending on who the recipient of the external intervention is. According to Moore (2012) foreign intervention *vis-à-vis* major conventional weapons transfers increases conflict severity (when received by rebels) and duration (when received by government). These findings point to the fact that foreign intervention can increase the capacity of warring parties to inflict pain on one another, especially when it provides access to military equipment that was not originally an option. Therefore, foreign intervention can transform low-skill, low-resource skirmishes to all-out military warfare. Furthermore, when it comes to negotiating a settlement Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) find that intervention can lower the probability of a negotiated settlement when it is given on behalf of the government, but that foreign intervention given on behalf of the rebels can increase the probability of a negotiated settlement. Since it is usually the case that governments have more power and military capability to begin with, external intervention given on behalf of the rebels can increase parity, prompting the government to come to the bargaining table (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008). On the other hand, external intervention given on behalf of the government only further increases the power differential between the government and the rebels making it easier for the government to secure a quick military victory (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008).

Conversely, Gent (2008) argues that external intervention on behalf of the government is only likely to occur in the most difficult cases, when the capabilities of the rebels are high. Therefore, the effects of government intervention are more difficult to ascertain as opposed the

effects of rebel intervention which more clearly increases the likelihood of a rebel victory (Gent 2008). Similarly, Sullivan and Karreth (2015) also argue that the effects of intervention are conditional on the relative capabilities of the government and rebels. They also find that intervention given on behalf of the rebels increases the likelihood of a rebel victory, but do not find evidence that rebel-based intervention increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement (Sullivan and Karreth 2015). When it comes to intervention given on behalf of the government, external intervention only has a significant effect on the likelihood of government victory when rebel capacity is high (Sullivan and Karreth 2015).

Although these above works do a good job exploring the various potential effects of external intervention on civil wars, their results are not consistent and raise serious questions about the complexities of external intervention. Furthermore, none of these articles distinguish between different types of civil wars. They all treat civil wars as one broad category without differentiating between the various reasons why civil wars begin in the first place. For example, as Kaufmann (2007) argues there may be fundamental differences in the effectiveness of foreign intervention in civil wars depending on the type of conflict that is taking place. According to Kaufmann (2007), foreign intervention has the potential to be more effective in ethnically motivated civil wars over civil wars with ideological motives (especially in the case of humanitarian intervention). In ethnic civil wars, warring parties can easily be distinguished from one another and ethnicity is not an identity that can be easily changed (Kaufmann 2007). Pointing to the Vietnam War as a quintessential example, ideological conflicts in contrast can be challenging for all parties involved to determine who the enemy is and to effectively organize and coordinate the efforts of each side in the conflict, making it more difficult for external interveners to come in and provide quick and decisive action in a civil conflict (Kaufmann 2007).

This argument draws attention to the possibility that foreign intervention could have different effects depending on the type of conflict at hand and could be an effective strategy when the internal divisions are easy to distinguish and coordinate. Although theoretically compelling, Kaufmann (2007) does not test his argument through quantitative analysis and in addition, he does not address how religiously motivated civil wars might compare to both ethnic and ideological civil wars.

This raises an important methodological question with serious policy implications: should intrastate conflicts be treated as one large category, or is there merit to distinguishing between different types of intrastate conflicts? If all civil conflicts are treated as one aggregate category, then the effects of external intervention are assumed to be uniform across all civil conflicts. These results can therefore be misleading, especially if foreign policy tools have various effects depending on the type of civil conflict. Consequently, there is both merit and need for studies that disaggregate between different types of civil conflicts to capture a more accurate picture of how foreign policy tools affect civil conflict outcomes.

The Challenges in Defining Conflict Type

To begin, it is important to discuss the challenges when it comes to defining conflict type. Civil conflicts are multi-dimensional; there are often political, economic, historical, geopolitical, religious, ethnic, tribal, and ideological dimensions to a conflict. Therefore, defining a civil conflict as a certain “type” of conflict is a difficult task. For example, although civil wars are frequently classified as “religious”, it is still not clear what makes a civil war “religious” in nature. Furthermore, operationalizing religion in quantitative studies has proven to be a difficult task. Traditionally, when examining religious civil wars, past literature has simply looked at

whether the two warring parties in a civil conflict were from different religious traditions, in line with Huntington's (1993) Clash of Civilizations theory. Religious fractionalization indices thus became the predominate operationalization for religious conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, this way of defining a conflict as religious has proven to be insufficient. First, the government and rebels could have different religious beliefs, but the conflict demands might not be religious in nature and/or religion might not even be a salient dimension to the conflict in the first place. Secondly, warring parties might be from the same religious tradition, but could still be fighting over religious issues, which would not be captured by these measures. Finally, as many scholars have argued before me, traditional fractionalization measures do not usually capture the theoretical mechanisms of interest (ie: why does the presence of religious diversity prompt and/or aggravate civil conflicts in the first place?)

Therefore, another approach that has been taken by the literature has been to classify civil conflicts as religious if there is a political and/or economic power disparity between two warring party groups that are from different religious traditions (Cederman et. al 2010). Although this approach does a better job capturing some of the mechanisms at play (political and economic grievances), this research does not highlight how religion uniquely affects civil conflicts. In other words, are these findings more illustrative of inequality and grievances more broadly or is there something specific about religious inequality and grievances that make them more conducive to conflict?

As a result, one empirical approach that has been taken in the literature to address this question has been to examine the demands explicitly stated by the rebel groups. Svensson (2007) and Basedau et. al (2016) specifically operationalize whether the stated goals of the conflict are religious in nature rather than just assessing whether two conflicting parties happen to be from

different religious groups, providing greater insight into how religion might causally impact civil war, rather than just establishing a potentially spurious connection between diversity and conflict. Therefore, for example, Svensson (2007) finds that there is a difference between religious *identity* conflicts versus what he identifies as religious *issue* conflicts; religious identity conflicts are conflicts fought between a rebel group and government that are from different religious traditions, whereas religious issue conflicts are conflicts fought over specific religious issues and demands. According to Svensson (2007), it is not necessarily the presence of religious differences that make civil wars more intractable, but when religious beliefs are specifically utilized to articulate demands in the war. Therefore, religious identity conflicts represent conflicts in which the two warring parties have different religious traditions, whereas religious issue conflicts are those in which the specific conflict demands are religious in nature. Religious issue conflicts can therefore be between two warring parties that are from the same religious background, but disagree on religious issues.

Although the approach taken by Svensson (2007) and Basedau et. al (2016) is probably the most theoretically meaningful way to classify a civil conflict as religious that currently exists, there are still some important gaps to fill. First of all, religion may indeed be salient in a civil conflict, but there could also be other salient issues that the conflict is also being fought over at the same time (economic, tribal, political, ethnic, ideological, etc.) This becomes problematic, because the presence of religious issues and demands in a civil conflict does not necessarily imply that religion is the *most* salient issue in the conflict. The presence of religious demands indeed infers that religion is important to the conflict; however, when there are other dimensions to the conflict as well, it becomes difficult to classify a civil war as being “purely religious”.

Secondly, in a similar vein, religious demands could be made within a civil conflict, not because religion is the most salient issue in the conflict, but because framing the conflict and conflict demands as religious might be a strategic marketing tool to attract both internal and external support. Therefore, the religious dimensions to a conflict might become more easily identifiable largely due to the fact that elite actors have strategically chosen to emphasize religion over other conflict issues to a) rally international support, b) justify larger geostrategic interests in the region, c) elicit sympathy for the cause from religious adherents and d) renew commitment to the cause by emphasizing the larger implications of the conflict. As a result, civil conflicts might be perceived as being religious in nature, but that perception is an oversimplification.

What if however, that oversimplification substantively matters? In other words, what if perceptions about what a conflict is about, matters more, or in a different way, than what the conflict is *actually* about? Previous research on religious civil conflicts has sought to answer the question of why religion matters for understanding civil war onset and outcomes. However, difficulties in defining and operationalizing religion have made this research susceptible to critique. Religion is such an abstract concept; therefore, how can it truly be measured in a large *n*, statistical analysis? As a result, existing measures of religion do a better job capturing perceptions about what a conflict is about, more so than what a conflict is actually about. However, the fact that outside actors can look at a civil conflict and classify a civil conflict as religious, albeit perhaps naively, says something interesting about civil conflict perceptions. This project therefore theorizes about how and why civil conflict perceptions matter, particularly when it comes to external intervention.

Rebel Group Branding:

It goes without saying that civil conflicts are multi-dimensional; there are often political, economic, historical, geopolitical, religious, ethnic, tribal, and ideological dimensions to a conflict. Therefore, as discussed above, defining a civil conflict as a certain “type” of conflict is a difficult, and perhaps unrealistic, task. Yet, civil conflicts, as well as the rebel groups within a civil conflict, are often classified in simplistic terms. In particular, a rebel group may be perceived as being religious, ethnic, or ideological in nature either because of strategic marketing decisions made by rebel elites, or because of external perceptions and discourse about a conflict actor. Therefore, even though a rebel group may be fighting for various reasons within a conflict, their goals and aspirations may be reduced to one brand. In this paper, I define a rebel group’s brand as the overarching identifier of a rebel group, often rooted in grievances, that frames internal and external perceptions about why a rebel group is fighting. A rebel group’s brand thus creates a conflict narrative that is often an oversimplification of a rebel groups motivations and becomes a heuristic utilized by both internal and external actors to determine quickly what a conflict is about.

The perception of a rebel group and the oversimplification of a rebel group’s goals matter for a number of reasons. First of all, perceptions about what the rebels are fighting for can shape the decisions of external actors on whether and how they should intervene in a civil conflict. In other words, a rebel group’s “brand” can determine whether an external actor decides to “invest” in a conflict. Given the fact that external intervention decisions are often strategically motivated, if a certain type of intervention is more common in a certain type of conflict, it may be that this intervention is trying to elicit a certain type of conflict outcome. In other words, if external

intervention is viewed as an investment in a conflict, the expected return on an investment may vary depending on a rebel group's brand.

Secondly, although rebel branding can be beneficial for the rebel group in attracting both internal and external support, how a rebel group is branded also introduces some risks. Civil conflicts are multi-dimensional; therefore, any perceived rebel brand is an oversimplification of what the goals of the rebel group are. This oversimplification can be problematic because it can overshadow other conflict goals (ie: political, economic, etc.), creating a situation in which the rebels feel that their local grievances have been hijacked by the rebel leaders and outside actors for larger strategic geopolitical gain. Perceptions about what the conflict is about can therefore alter the conflict bargaining agenda, as a rebel group's ideational brand takes on a life of its own.

However, not all brands are created equal. First of all, rebel group brands may vary in their level of brand awareness. In the business world, brand awareness is the degree by which consumers can recognize a product by its name; products that have high levels of brand awareness are likely to generate more sales because when given a choice between two products, most consumers are more likely to pick the one with a more familiar name (Kopp 2020). To draw upon this analogy, when it comes to a rebel group's brand, rebel groups that have greater brand awareness are more likely to attract the support of external actors. Therefore, external intervention should be more likely to occur when there is a common perception of what the rebels are fighting for, vis-à-vis a rebel's brand. Rebel group brand recognition makes it easier for external actors to know whether intervention is worth the investment and when rebel groups don't have a clear brand, external intervention in the conflict should be less likely.

Secondly, rebel group brands vary in their level of brand loyalty. In business, brand loyalty is defined as the "the positive association consumers attach to a particular product or

brand” that results in high levels of devotion to a product or service (Kopp 2019). Brand loyalty is often fostered when a brand has a strong identity that consumers can relate to (He et. al 2021). Companies like Amazon, Disney, Nike, and Trader Joes, generate high levels of brand loyalty¹³, largely because their consumers begin to associate these brands as a part of their identity and are loyal to them out of self-expression (He et a. 2021). Similarly, when it comes to civil conflicts, rebel groups should be more likely to have stronger brand loyalty when there is more potential for identity ties. In other words, in aggregate, if there are numerous individuals across the globe who share the same identity or ideological beliefs as the rebel group in question, there should be a larger appetite for intervention as individuals express preferences for intervention on behalf of their religious, ethnic, ideological community. Therefore, external intervention should be more likely to occur on behalf of a rebel group with a clear identity that many outside actors can relate to or identify with, thus fostering greater rebel group brand loyalty. Conversely, rebel groups that do not have a high potential for identity ties, should be less likely to receive external support, because it is difficult for the rebel group in question to develop a loyal following, when there are few external actors that share their identity or ideological aspirations.

Third, not all brands prompt the same levels of anti-brand behavior. Having a clear and strong brand makes it easy to distinguish between those who identify with a brand and those who do not. Therefore, strong brands can also prompt anti-brand behavior, where consumers assemble around a shared hatred of a brand and engage in activities such as boycotting a brand or actively seeking to harm a brand (Dessart, Morgan-Thomas, Veloutsou 2016). Think of common brands such as Apple, Fox News, or The New York Yankees; people either love them or hate

¹³ “Brand Keys Loyalty Leaders 2020 Report.” September 14, 2020. *The Wise Marketer*
<https://thewisemarketer.com/brand-loyalty/brand-keys-loyalty-leaders-2020-report/>

them, with very little in between. Weaker brands however, don't attract the same passionate divergent preferences. Analogously, rebel groups with a strong brand are not only more likely to experience higher levels of support from external actors, but they are also more likely to prompt higher levels of external mobilization in opposition (e.g. support for the government to squash the efforts of the rebels).

Theory:

Given the fact that not all brands are created equal, the question then becomes, *does external intervention have various effects on civil conflict outcomes, depending on a rebel group's brand?* In order to assess this question, one must first take into account that intervention decisions are indeed nonrandom. In a different part of my dissertation project, I demonstrate that rebel groups with a religious brand are significantly more likely to receive external intervention support in the form of troops and weapons, compared with rebel groups with an ethnic, leftist, or no ideational brand. Given the fact that external intervention decisions are often strategically motivated, if a certain type of intervention is more common in a certain type of conflict, it may be that this intervention is trying to elicit a certain type of conflict outcome. In other words, if external intervention is viewed as an investment in a conflict, the expected return on an investment may vary depending on a rebel group's brand. Therefore, the effects of external intervention across different conflict types may not be uniform when taking into account the non-random selection of external intervention. This is important from a policy standpoint, because previous studies assume that external intervention has uniform effects across all civil conflicts.

Furthermore, beyond the issue of selection, there may also be an interaction effect between the various forms of external intervention and a rebel group's brand. As I demonstrate in Part 1 of my dissertation, the stronger a rebel group's brand, the more committed forms of

external intervention are more likely to occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume external intervention that is prompted by a certain type of rebel group brand might have a different effect on civil conflict outcomes, because of the motivation behind why the external intervention occurred in the first place. In particular, I argue that external intervention is the most detrimental when it comes to rebel groups with a religious brand, specifically when it comes to the warring parties' ability to come to a negotiated settlement. The logic here is as follows:

First, as argued above, the oversimplification of a rebel group's goals can be problematic because it can overshadow other conflict goals (ie: political, economic, etc.), creating a situation in which the rebels feel that their local grievances have been hijacked by the rebel leaders and outside actors for larger strategic geopolitical gain. Here, rebel group branding ends up hindering the conflict resolution process, vis-à-vis external intervention, because it creates a mismatch between external perceptions about what the conflict is about versus what the conflict is actually about; as a result, rebel group branding can attract foreign interveners who are not as in tune with the local grievances shared by many of the rebel fighters. In turn, similar to the logic put forth by Sambanis et al. (2020), external intervention can heighten polarization centered on a specific cleavage, exacerbating conflict, because the warring parties are emboldened by the support given to them by their foreign patrons. This creates an endogenous relationship between external intervention and polarization, as certain cleavages can attract external intervention, and that external intervention can subsequently ossify and emphasize that particular cleavage within a conflict (Sambanis et al. 2020).

The increased salience of a particular cleavage due to external intervention not only increases polarization, but as I argue, can also increase fractionalization within a rebel group. As identity issues increasingly become the focus of conversation, local grievances such as poverty,

food insecurity, poor governance, corruption, etc. can become overshadowed. In turn, rebel fighters who were initially drawn to the cause because of these local grievances can become frustrated that their goals are not being prioritized. At the bargaining table, these groups may have a very different range of deals that they are willing to accept, compared to those that are emboldened by their foreign patrons to prioritize identity or ideological issues. As a result, this fractionalization can increase commitment problems by introducing more veto players and making it less likely that the rebels and their supporters can commit to an agreement without dissatisfied groups defecting (Cunningham 2010). Additionally, this fractionalization increases information problems as it creates more divergent and shifting preferences, making the bargaining range more difficult to discern. In light of these heightened commitment and information problems, a negotiated settlement becomes less likely (Walter 2009).

However, as previously demonstrated, not all brands are created equal; therefore, not all brands are as susceptible to polarization and fractionalization in the face of external intervention. As a result of religion's strong brand awareness, brand loyalty, and conduciveness to anti-brand behavior, rebel groups with a religious brand that receive external intervention should be particularly prone to polarization and fractionalization, because the strength of the rebel group's brand is more likely to overshadow other conflict issues. External intervention can end up pitting religious extremists and moderates against one another, enhancing fractionalization between those whose goals are more ambitious, versus those who are more localized in comparison. Furthermore, by enhancing the salience of religion in a multi-dimensional civil conflict, elite actors can end up prioritizing religious goals over local political and economic grievances. As a result, deals that would have been palatable to many of the rebels might in fact be overlooked by rebel elites because they don't go far enough.

Ultimately, when it comes down to the practical question of how to create a successful negotiated agreement, there becomes a mismatch between what the conflict is actually about, and what external actors believe the conflict is about. Consequently, religious branding and external intervention *alone* are not as detrimental to conflict outcomes than when external intervention occurs in religiously branded civil conflicts. The interaction between the two is a particularly deleterious combination. In comparison, rebel groups with either no ideational brand, an ethnic brand, or a leftist brand not only attract less committed forms of support, but are therefore less susceptible to their brand becoming beholden to external stakeholders.¹⁴ As a result, polarization and fractionalization are still possible when these rebel groups receive external support, but should be less likely to occur. Additionally, rebel groups with no ideational brand should not only be the least likely to receive external support, but when they do receive external support, they should be the least susceptible to polarization and fractionalization as a result of this intervention. In fact, previous studies such as Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) find that external intervention given on behalf of the rebels should increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement occurring because it increases parity between the government and rebels, making the government take the rebels more seriously, resulting in greater concessions. However, previous studies look at all civil conflicts in aggregate and do not address whether external intervention could have disparate effects depending on the conflict type. This study

¹⁴ Initially, one might expect that leftist brands under the auspices of communism during the Cold War might also follow a similar logic and be equally susceptible to their brand becoming beholden to international stakeholders. However, based on the logic presented here today, although leftist brands during the Cold War might have had high levels of brand awareness, they often had much lower potential for brand loyalty, as there were typically very few loyal supporters to communist rebels during the Cold War (namely the USSR and China). In terms of raw data, only 31.7% of leftist groups during the Cold War received military support, compared with 56.7% of rebel groups with a religious brand. Due to the high potential of anti-brand behavior however, 59.5% of leftist brands during the Cold War prompted military interventions on behalf of the government. As a result, civil conflicts fought by leftist brands during the Cold War were not very likely to end in a negotiated settlement, not because of the interaction between rebel group branding and external intervention, like my theory stipulates, but because they prompted such high levels of intervention on behalf of the government that usually resulted in a government victory.

instead examines whether there is a conditional effect of external intervention and tests the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: External military intervention given on behalf of rebel groups with a religious brand will decrease the likelihood of a conflict ending in a negotiated settlement.

Hypothesis 2: External military intervention given on behalf of rebel groups with a religious brand will decrease the likelihood of a conflict ending in a negotiated settlement more so than external military intervention given on behalf of the rebels either no ideational brand or an ethnic or communist brand.

Research Design:

To account for the non-random selection of external intervention and its subsequent effects on civil conflict outcomes, I employ a conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator which enables me to jointly estimate both external intervention and civil conflict outcomes (specifically whether a conflict ended in a negotiated settlement) by assuming the error terms of these two equations are correlated. The CMP model developed by Roodman (2011) is becoming a more common method of addressing the selection issue of external intervention (i.e. Murdie and Peksen 2014, Di Salvatore 2016, Di Salvatore 2020), because unlike traditional selection models (i.e. Heckman), CMP allows each equation to “vary by observation” instead of just observing a subsample in the second equation based on those cases that were deemed a “success” in the first equation (Roodman 2011). The CMP model also does not require a continuous dependent

variable in one or both of the two-stages, making it much more flexible of a modelling tool when looking at binary dependent variables.

My unit of analysis is a conflict dyad episode, of which I have 316 observations from 1975-2009. For the purpose of this project, I narrow my definition of external intervention to just military interventions, specifically in the form of troops and weapons, given on behalf of the rebels. I specifically look at just military interventions here for two reasons. First, military interventions, specifically in the form of troops and weapons, represents a much higher level of external investment than other forms of intervention; therefore, this more extensive level of involvement is more likely to represent a scenario in which a rebel group's brand becomes beholden to external stakeholders. Secondly, military intervention in the form of troops and weapons is a much more visible form of intervention, making it more likely that rebel fighters are aware of external involvement in the conflict. In my analysis I utilize UCDP's External Support data and San-Acka's Dangerous Companions data to code for whether the rebel group in question received support throughout the conflict in the form of troops and weapons as my first dependent variable in equation one. I then utilize UCDP's Conflict Termination dataset to code whether a conflict ended in a negotiated settlement as the dependent variable in the second equation of my CMP model. Here I include both UCDP's peace agreement and ceasefires categories to create my Negotiated Settlement variable.

I then create an interaction term in my negotiated settlement equation between external intervention and the rebel group's brand to assess whether there is a conditional effect of external intervention depending on conflict type. This is my main independent variable of interest. I therefore run four separate models accounting for various rebel group brands: religious, ethnic, communist, and no ideational brand, using San Acka's Dangerous Companions measure for

ideational characteristics. This variable codes rebel groups as having religious, ethno-nationalist, leftist, or no ideational characteristics. A rebel group with no ideational characteristics “does not associate itself with any identity and/or ideology” and “does not make propaganda for a specific ethnic or religious group and/or political ideology” (San-Acka 2016). Conversely, rebel groups that have religious, ethno-nationalist, or leftist characteristics are groups that do identify with a specific identity and/or ideology and do make propaganda catered towards that identity and/or ideology. The interaction term thus provides me with three separate dummy variables for analysis. For example, in my religious brand model, I am able to compare the effects of external intervention when given on behalf of religious rebels vs. non-religious rebels and I am able to compare the effect of religious branding when there is no external intervention and when there is external intervention given on behalf of the rebels. I am able to run the same comparisons for my ethnic, communist, and no ideational brand models.

The CMP estimator utilizes two equations, one that first estimates whether a rebel group receives troops and weapons, and second, the subsequent effect of the provision of troops and weapons on civil conflict outcomes (whether a conflict ended in a negotiated settlement). Therefore, I also add a number of control variables that are likely to affect the two dependent variables of interest in the CMP models. For the first equation I start by controlling for the brand of the rebels using San-Acka’s Ideational Characteristics measure to control for the fact that external intervention may be more likely to occur depending on the rebel group’s brand. I also include a variable for government intervention in the form of troops and weapons using UCDP’s external intervention data. I then include a dummy variable for whether the conflict state had oil prior to conflict onset using PRIO’s PETRO dataset, as oil is often a significant predictor of military interventions (Koga 2011 and Findley and Marienau 2015). Using the World Bank

indicators, I then include a lagged measure for GDP per capita for the year prior to conflict onset, as highly developed states are less likely to experience intervention due to higher state capacity (Krasner and Risse 2014). Using the Correlates of War data, I include a lagged and logged measure of military expenditures for the year prior to conflict onset, because interventions are less likely to occur when government military capabilities are high, due to the fact that interventions are often dependent on their likelihood of success or how much of an impact they will make (Gent 2008, Koga 2011). Also using the Correlates of War data, I include measure of contiguity for the conflict state as Regan (1998) and Kathman (2011) find that contiguity is a significant predictor of external military interventions. Then I include a dummy variable to control for the finding that external military interventions were more likely to occur during the Cold War (Regan 2002, Koga 2011, and Kathman 2011). I also include two dummy variables (one for the Middle East and one for Africa) to control for regional variation in external intervention. The Middle East control variable is particularly important for demonstrating that my theory doesn't just apply to sectarian Islamic conflicts, but rather applies to all religious civil conflicts. Finally, I include a measure for whether the conflict state was a semi-democracy for the year prior to conflict onset, coding a semi-democracy as a country with a Polity IV score of -6 to 6 for the year prior to conflict onset, as Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre (2007) find that semi-democracies are significantly more likely to be recipients of external intervention.

For the second equation, I then control for the presence of mediation support using DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna's (2011) Civil War Mediation dataset as they find that the presence of mediation assistance is one of the biggest predictors of a civil conflict ending in a negotiated settlement. I then include a dummy variable for the presence of government military support in the form of troops and weapons using UCDP's External Intervention data, as multiple

interventions on both sides of the conflict can make civil wars more difficult to resolve. I also include a dummy variable for what Barbara Walter (2017) calls the “second wave” of civil wars, during the time period of 1991-2003 where civil wars were much more likely to be resolved with a negotiated agreement, as this became a popular foreign policy tool by external actors during this time frame. Next, I create an autocracy control variable that is coded as a 1 if the conflict state had a Polity score of less than -6. Henderson and Singer (2000) find that autocracies are much more likely to resort to brutal repression to crack down against the rebels, making it much less likely that the autocratic government will be willing to grant concessions. Finally, using the UCDP’s Conflict Termination dataset, I include a dummy variable for whether the conflict was being fought over territory, as territorial disputes are often viewed as much more intractable as governments are often unwilling to give up territory, particularly when that territory is rich in natural resources (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, Fearon 2004).

Results:

Table 2.1 below demonstrates the two-stages of results from my CMP models. Here I compare across my religious, ethnic, leftist, and no brand models. To begin, in the first stage of my religious model, it is evident that rebel groups with a religious brand are significantly more likely to receive external intervention support in the form of troops and weapons, as demonstrated by the *Rebel Brand* coefficient in the religious model. Subsequently, taking into account that the provision of troops and weapons given on behalf of the rebels is not random, the second equation demonstrates that external military intervention (troops and weapons) given on behalf of rebels with a religious brand has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of a conflict ending in a negotiated settlement, in line with Hypothesis 1 (as demonstrated by the third dummy variable coefficient created by my interaction term in the religious model). Interestingly,

the effect of religious branding when there is no external intervention (as demonstrated by the first and second dummy variable coefficients created by my interaction term in the religious model) is insignificant, demonstrating that it is not just the religious branding that is making a negotiated settlement less likely, but specifically the combination of religious branding and external intervention. Furthermore, the effect of external intervention is not significant when given to rebel groups with non-religious brands, in line with Hypothesis 2. To further demonstrate that external intervention has a uniquely deleterious effect on the risk of a conflict ending in a negotiated settlement, my ethnic, leftist, and no brand models all demonstrate that external intervention does not have a significant negative effect on the risk of conflicts ending in a negotiated settlement, except in religiously branded civil conflicts that have received external intervention.

Additionally, it is worth noting that the coefficient for troops and weapons given on behalf of rebels with an ethnic brand is positive, albeit not statistically significant. In the Appendix, I have provided the results of my models when the two dependent variables of interest are separated out into independent equations, thus not taking into account that these two dependent variables are correlated through the CMP framework. It is interesting to point out however, that in these separate models, the provision of troops and weapons on behalf of rebels with an ethnic brand actually has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a civil conflict ending in a negotiated settlement, in line with the results put forth by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008). However, the significance of this variable disappears once you take into account the selection effect of external intervention. This result demonstrates the merit of employing a two-stage model to account for potential selection issues, and further

demonstrates that external intervention decisions and their subsequent effects are not uniform across conflict types.

Table 2.1: Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) Model for Negotiated Settlement

	<i>Religious</i>	<i>Ethnic</i>	<i>Leftist</i>	<i>No Brand</i>
DV- Rebel Intervention				
Rebel Brand	.446** (.217)	.182 (.171)	-.216 (.219)	-.272 (.222)
Government Intervention	.202 (.175)	.281 (.172)	.264 (.172)	.268 (.172)
Oil	-.007 (.203)	-.125 (.206)	-.109 (.201)	-.108 (.203)
Cold War	.286 (.181)	.248 (.181)	.271 (.184)	.243 (.181)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.173 (.112)	-.159 (.112)	-.151 (.113)	-.153 (.112)
Military Expenditures (ln)	-.006 (.060)	-.065 (.061)	-.059 (.060)	-.065 (.061)
Contiguity	.064 (.045)	.070 (.046)	.067 (.046)	.067 (.046)
Middle East	.955*** (.360)	1.07*** (.357)	1.05*** (.357)	1.04*** (.358)
Africa	.079 (.224)	.067 (.226)	-.002 (.234)	.151 (.241)
Semi-Democracy	.264 (.179)	.199 (.182)	.224 (.180)	.213 (.180)
Constant	.983 (.907)	.917 (.908)	.945 (.905)	1.000 (.912)
DV- Negotiated Settlement				
Rebel Intervention*Rebel Brand				
0 1	-.557 (.416)	.553* (.282)	-.207 (.326)	-.089 (.299)
1 0	-.521 (.363)	-.558 (.404)	-.462 (.366)	-.350 (.378)
1 1	-.932** (.431)	.241 (.430)	-.750 (.500)	-.708 (.468)
Government Intervention	.345 (.213)	.393* (.221)	.283 (.211)	.283 (.214)
Mediation	1.02*** (.210)	.961*** (.213)	.982*** (.215)	1.04*** (.210)
Second Wave	.302 (.190)	.251 (.194)	.235 (.196)	.247 (.194)
Autocracy	-.76*** (.231)	-.80*** (.233)	-.74*** (.231)	-.70*** (.228)
Territory	-.253 (.186)	-.67*** (.228)	-.336* (.186)	-.375* (.203)
Constant	-.85*** (.288)	1.00*** (.308)	-.767** (.309)	-.85*** (.308)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	316	316	316	316
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-290.439	-289.969	-293.908	-293.531
<i>Chi²</i>	85.90***	86.83***	78.96***	79.71***

Significance: *=.1; **=.05; ***=.01. (Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.)

The Case of Yemen:

To illustrate my theory further, consider the case of the most recent Yemeni Civil War. Not unlike most civil conflicts, the conflict in Yemen is highly complex with many competing

factors dynamically shaping the conflict environment. Yemen has not only experienced several civil wars, but has a history of religious, ethnic, and ideological tensions that are often difficult to disentangle from one another. Furthermore, there are several geopolitical and economic factors to consider in the conflict in addition to both regional and international interest in the outcome of the conflict. Therefore, when it comes to assessing the most salient issues in the civil conflict, it becomes clear that Yemen is in fact a difficult case to unpack.

To begin, it is important to understand the tribal and patrimonial networks that shape the political exchange between the “center and periphery” in Yemen (Jones 2011). Yemen has a long history of “tribal sovereignty” in which no Shaykh has the ability to exercise authority outside his own tribe (Jones 2011). However, this tribal sovereignty becomes a source of contention when the Yemeni state imposes political and economic constraints on the tribal Shaykhs (Jones 2011). The Shaykhs however have become increasingly reliant on the central government for economic handouts, and as a result, a rampant system of patronage has emerged (Jones 2011). Furthermore, the Yemeni government faces many challenges when it comes to its monopoly on the legitimate use of force due to the decentralized tribal system in Yemen (Perkins 2017). Weapons are dispersed among the tribes and thus tribes pose a significant threat to the authority and legitimacy of the Yemeni government (Perkins 2017). As a result, the Yemeni government increasingly faces pressure to maintain its power position by “co-opting, dividing, rewarding, or punishing tribal elites” (Perkins 2017, 304). This decentralized tribal system and patronage network often puts tribes in competition with one another and introduces resentment against the government which often advantages one tribe over another. This tribal resentment has been frequently cited as one of the motivating factors for the Houthi rebellion.

Secondly, the Yemen Civil War should also be viewed in light of the 2011 Yemen Arab Spring Revolt. Due to a stagnant economy that was overly-reliant on oil and foreign aid, a lack of job and education opportunities for the Yemeni youth aged 15-29 who make up over 1/3 of the population, and a sudden drop in GDP by 12.7%, Yemenis organized against the government to fight for social change (Perkins 2017). The Houthis, who shared similar economic grievances with the rest of the Yemeni population, shifted their rhetoric away from religion during this time and more towards revolution in support of the Yemeni youth (Salisbury 2015). During this time, their economic grievances were far more salient than their grievances centered on their identity, unifying the Houthis briefly with the rest of the disaffected Yemenis (Salisbury 2015). It wasn't until the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) that followed the Yemen Arab Spring Revolt, that the Houthis began to distance themselves from the rest of the Yemeni population due to Houthi specific grievances that they felt were not being adequately addressed during the NDC (Perkins 2017). In the process of their dissension, the head of the Houthi delegation was assassinated, further angering the Houthis (Kronenfeld and Guzansky 2014). Overall though, the NDC was widely unpopular in Yemen as it ended up favoring Yemeni elites and was a stark departure from the traditional decentralized government that Yemenis were accustomed to (Al-Hamdani 2019). As a result, this political turmoil created a power vacuum that the Houthis were able to exploit, culminating in the Houthi takeover of Sana'a in September of 2014 (Al-Hamdani 2019).

What is evident about the Yemen case, is that there are clearly many underlying motivations for the civil conflict, with religion just being one of them. As a result, is it fair to classify the Houthis as religious, given the multitude of other pressing issues at stake? This is where my concept of rebel group branding comes into play.

Although it is clear that the Houthis have many political and economic grievances against the state and one could easily make a case for why religion only has a marginal impact on the conflict, what is interesting to note is that political and economic grievances are often framed by the Houthis using religious rhetoric. In doing so, Jones (2011) argues that piety often becomes conflated with tribal grievance and when tribal grievances are framed as a holy war, the stakes are substantially raised. As a result, the conflict is no longer just about economic disparities or tribal resentment but has been reframed by rebel elites in religious terms. As a result, “the al-Huthi regard themselves as bastions against the encroachment of Sunni Salafi and Wahhabi influence that enjoys Saudi patronage” (Jones 2001, 908). It is common in Yemen for Houthi families to keep boxes outside their doors with “In the Path of God” printed on them (Worth 2018). These donation boxes serve as a salient reminder of the eternal ramifications of this conflict and that God is on their side. And with God on their side, how could they be expected to fail? This attitude creates a long-view of the conflict, one that stipulates that no matter the costs, and no matter how long it takes, victory is inevitable as long as one doesn’t give up. In the words of a Houthi fighter, “I will keep fighting them until the day of judgment” (Worth 2018).

Interestingly the Houthi’s main slogan: “God is great! Death to America! Death to Israel! Curse upon the Jews! Victory to Islam!” originated in Iran and is frequently utilized by the Iranian backed Hezbollah (Snyder 2017). Even though the Houthis represent a different strand of Shi’a Islam than that of Iran, the decision to utilize this slogan by the Houthis was indeed a strategic one. By adopting this slogan, the Houthis explicitly tied their goals to a larger religious community, aligning the Houthi movement with Iran long before Iranian involvement was even present. The strategic use of this slogan has not only fostered a relationship between the Houthis

and Iran, but also has given Iran justification for backing the Houthis, by enabling them to clearly connect their larger goals to Houthi ideology.

As a reaction to this religious framing, it then became easy for the Yemeni state and its Saudi ally to point the finger at Iran for inciting such religious extremism within Yemen. As a result, suspicions about Iranian involvement were present far before any evidence of Iranian intervention was established (Juneau 2016). Additionally, by describing the Houthis as Iranian puppets, the Yemeni government was able to delegitimize the Houthi movement, not taking the demands of the Houthis seriously and to further justify the economic and political marginalization of the Houthis (Clausen 2015). Thus, this sectarian religious narrative has been a useful tool for even the Yemeni government to justify their own actions against the Houthis. This leads to a viscous cycle in which the Houthis feel that they are being marginalized further for their religious beliefs and thus are more motivated to take action against the state with the help of their regional ally, Iran.

Ironically, Iranian involvement at the beginning of the civil war was quite minimal. In 2014, there really was no need for Iranian weapons because the Houthis had an alliance with Saleh, the former president of Yemen before the Yemeni Revolution in 2012, who controlled much of the Yemeni arsenal (Snyder 2017). However, as the conflict continued on, Iranian support was no longer in question, and the Houthis started to have access to better weapons that were clearly provided by the Iranian government (Snyder 2017). In fact, as Houthi power has increased, so also have its objectives. In turn, Iran has taken more of an interest in the Houthis over time (Juneau 2016). According to Juneau (2016), Iran has a track-record of keeping tabs on potential investment opportunities vis-à-vis non-state actors in other states, ready to intervene more extensively when it finds one that might pay off:

“Iran’s ties to non-state actors in a country also allow it to position itself as an indispensable player with a say in major decisions. To this end, it often hedges its bets by developing ties to many actors, providing them with shifting combinations of political, military and financial support. It tries to identify future winners, supporting a range of small groups with the expectation that at least some of them will eventually emerge as important players” (Juneau 2016, pp. 649).

Therefore, when Iran began to realize that the Houthis were serious contenders who were also actively branding themselves as religious partners to Iran, Iranian involvement and influence in the conflict began to grow, because they saw the Houthis as a rebel group worth investing in.

In addition, Saudi involvement on the side of the Yemeni state in response to the Houthis (evidence of anti-brand behavior) has now given the Houthis another enemy to fight. For the Houthis, this had increased the scope of their fight, taking it from one of local grievances, to one in which the stakes are much higher. The goals of the Houthis are no longer defined by local grievances against the state, but now include “bring[ing] down the House of Saud” (Worth 2018). Therefore, the involvement of external actors in this conflict has not only increased the scope of the conflict, but has increased the moral imperative to fight among many of the Houthis. As a result, polarization between the two sides is at an all time high, making conflict resolution, much more difficult.

In addition to increased polarization as a result of external intervention, external intervention in this case has also increased rebel fractionalization. In assessing the Yemen case, it is clear that the rebels in Yemen have never been made up of a uniform set of goals, tactics, or ideologies. To begin, there are intense tribal divisions between the Hashed, Bakeel and Khawlan tribes, dissensions between the military and political branches of the Houthi movement, and many politically and religiously agnostic supporters who have temporarily aligned themselves with the Houthi movement for pragmatic reasons (Al-Hamdani 2019). In this regard, the

Houthis are not unlike many other rebel groups in their divergent preferences and objectives. In addition to these various divisions, the Houthis also have religious factions including the Houthi jihadis who make up majority of Houthi fighters and are motivated by radical religious interpretation and are adamantly opposed to the influence of Salafi jihadis in Yemen and the Zaydi dogmatists who believe they are practicing a purer form of Islam and want to revive the Yemeni Mutawakkilite kingdom (Al-Hamdani 2019).

However, the faction that has developed the most authority and influence over the course of the conflict is the Sa'dah Core, whose ideologies are closer to Twelver Shi'ism, which is practiced in Iran but less familiar in Yemen (Al-Hamdani 2019). This faction has the closest ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon's Hezbollah (Al-Hamdani 2019). It is the Sa'dah's connection to Iran that has led to the perception that the civil war in Yemen is simply a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia even though most evidence seems to suggest that it was the Sa'dah Core that courted Iran, not the other way around (Al-Hamdani 2019).

Over the course of the conflict though, the Sa'dah core has become more emboldened as a result of Iranian influence. Consequently, the civil war in Yemen has been transformed from a small-scale domestic conflict to a large-scale conflict with significant geopolitical ramifications (Al-Hamdani 2019). The stakes of the conflict have been significantly increased and choosing to lay down their arms, would result in significantly less power and influence in the state and region for the Houthis, making it much more difficult to get the Houthis to agree to come to the bargaining table. As a result, despite the many factions that exist among the rebel fighters in Yemen, the most prominent division is driven by the Sa'dah core. In fact, according to Leaf and Delozier (2019), many moderate Houthis are even in favor of dropping the Houthi sarkha (or slogan) — “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam,”

because many moderates see the Houthi slogan as too extreme, overshadowing many of their local grievances, and attracting too much regional and international attention. However, the more militant extremist Houthis see the sarkha as an effective rallying cry and have seen the material benefits of branding their rebel objectives in a way that is attractive to Iran (Delozier 2019). Therefore, there seems to be a clear dissention between those Houthis who want to be known for their religious ties to Iran, and other Houthis who find that reputation to be harmful.

As another example, in 2019, the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities even though the UN concluded that the Houthis did not carry out this attack (Robinson 2021). This seemingly unnecessary (and misleading) claim by the Houthis is considered by many experts to be evidence of the Houthis becoming more entangled with Iran, desiring for their objectives to be seen in alignment with Iranian goals in the region (Robinson 2021). This was a significant setback however, in the overall progress (albeit small) towards peace that had been made in Yemen and once again has redirected attention away from the local grievances that fueled the conflict in the first place (Robinson 2021).

As a result of these competing factions and divergent preferences, the goals of the Houthis have continuously been unclear. According to Leaf and Delozier (2019), “The Houthis’ ultimate strategic goals remain murky. One northern Yemeni with a deep understanding of the group told us, “Sometimes I don’t know if the Houthis themselves know.” Some Houthis are pro-Ansar Allah (the Houthi family’s political entity), but many others could be more aptly defined as simply anti-Saudi (Leaf and Delozier 2019). Some want political representations, others religious freedom and an end to the spread and influence of Saudi-funded Salafism in Yemen; some are fearful of Saudi Arabia taking over their territory, others just want economic independence (Leaf and Delozier 2019). Additionally, many Houthis instead just want

guarantees of foreign non-interference, including interference that comes from their ally Iran (Leaf and Delozier 2019).

These different, and sometimes competing goals, make it very difficult to come to a negotiated settlement, because it is difficult to find a deal that is palatable to all Houthi factions. Both mediation attempts, including the 2016 Yemen Peace Talks in Kuwait and the 2018 Yemen Peace Talks in Sweden have led to very minimal progress, largely due to the inability of the Houthi rebels to agree on a path forward that was agreeable for everyone. Despite all the various goals and objectives of the rebels in Yemen, the Houthi faction with the most power and influence, the Sa'dah core, is the one that has the most ambitious vision for the future. As a result, during these peace talks, the Sa'dah core has been more difficult to please than the Houthi's who prioritize more local grievances (Asharq Al-Awsat 2018). However, it is virtually impossible for an agreement to be made without the buy in of the Sa'dah core, which has the ability to unilaterally continue the conflict, given their extensive power and influence and Iranian patronage.

As a result, religious branding by the Houthi rebels vis-à-vis the Sa'dah core has not only prompted external intervention on both sides of the conflict, but has created a particularly deleterious interaction effect between religious branding and external intervention. This interaction effect has increased polarization between the Saudi-backed government in Yemen and the Houthi rebels who have received increasing levels of support from Iran, and has increased fractionalization among the Houthi rebels as local grievances have been hijacked by rebel leaders and external interveners, transforming the conflict into one with increasing regional and international stakes. Consequently, the civil war in Yemen has become much more difficult to resolve, particularly by negotiated settlement, because deals that might have originally been

palatable at the start of the conflict, are no longer sufficient because they do not go far enough, given the increased stakes of the conflict. Although it is impossible to know the counterfactual scenario in this case, it seems unlikely that the civil war in Yemen would have escalated to the same degree, had the Houthi rebels instead emphasized their specific local and tribal grievances rather than their religious ideology.

Conclusion:

In an era where religious civil conflicts make up the highest proportion of conflicts in the world today, it is important to ask ourselves, what do we mean when we classify a civil conflict as “religious?” This paper argues that oversimplification matters, and how rebel groups are branded and perceived by internal and external actors is important to understand for conflict resolution. First, this paper finds that there is a selection effect when it comes to external intervention and that religiously branded rebel groups are more likely to receive military intervention support in the form of troops and weapons. Secondly, this paper finds that there is an interaction effect between rebel group branding and external intervention that is particularly deleterious in religiously branded conflicts. In particular, the combination of rebel group branding and external intervention, as evidenced by the case of Yemen, has the potential to foster fractionalization within a rebel group as there becomes an increasing divergence between the original local political and economic grievances, and the more ambitious objectives that tie certain rebel group factions to their external interveners. This paper argues that rebel groups with a religious brand are especially prone to this phenomenon because religion has strong brand awareness and brand loyalty, and can prompt strong anti-brand behavior. As a result, this paper finds that external intervention given on behalf of rebel groups with a religious brand decreases

the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, especially when compared with external intervention efforts given on behalf of rebel groups with an ethnic or leftist brand, or no brand at all. Finally, the results of this paper also demonstrate that there is merit to disaggregating among different civil conflict types when examining the effects of external intervention, because it is unrealistic and misleading to assume external intervention has uniform effects across all civil conflicts.

References:

- Al-Hamdani, Sama'a. 2019. "Understanding the Houthi Faction in Yemen." Lawfare Retrieved from: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-houthi-faction-yemen>
- Asharq Al-Awsat. (19 December 2018). "Stockholm Agreement Ignites Differences Among Houthi Leaders." Retrieved from: <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1511136/stockholm-agreement-ignites-differences-among-houthi-leaders>
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan and Andrew J. Enterline. 2000. "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 44(4): 615-642.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce. 2008. "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process." *Journal of Peace Research* 45(3): pp. 345-363.
- Barbieri, Katherine and Omar M. G. Omar Keshk. 2016. "Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 4.0." Online: <http://correlatesofwar.org>.
- Basedau, Matthias, Birte Pfeiffer, and Johannes Vullers. 2014. "Bad Religion? Religion, Collective Action, and the Onset of Armed Conflict in Developing Countries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(2): 226-255.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.
- Clausen, Maria-Louise. 2015. "Understanding the Crisis in Yemen: Evaluating Competing Narratives." *The International Spectator* 50(3): 16-29.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: 563-595.
- Cunningham, David E. 2010. "Blocking resolution: how external states can prolong civil wars." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): pp. 115-128.
- Dessart L., Morgan-Thomas A., Veloutsou C. (2016) What Drives Anti-brand Community Behaviours: An Examination of Online Hate of Technology Brands. In: Obal M., Krey N., Bushardt C. (eds) Let's Get Engaged! Crossing the Threshold of Marketing's Engagement Era. Developments in Marketing Science: Proceedings of the Academy of Marketing Science. Springer, Cham
- DeRouen Jr., Karl, Jacob Bercovitch, and Paulina Pospieszna. 2012. "Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) dataset". *Journal of Peace Research* 48(5): 663-672.
- Di Salvatore, Jessica. 2016. "Inherently vulnerable? Ethnic geography and the intensity of violence in the Bosnian civil war." *Political Geography* 51: 1-14.
- Di Salvatore, Jessica. 2020. "Obstacle to Peace? Ethnic Geography and Effectiveness of Peacekeeping." *British Journal of Political Science* 50: 1089-1109.
- Elbadawi, Ibrahim A., and Nicholas Sambanis. (2000, March 18-19). "External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars." World Bank's Development Economic Research Group conference. Princeton University, NJ.
- Fearon, James D. and David Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97: 75-90.
- Fearon, James D. 2004. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275-301.

- Findley, Michael G., and Josiah F. Marineau. 2014. "Lootable resources and third-party intervention into civil wars." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32(5): 465-486.
- Gent, Stephen E. 2008. "Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts." *International Studies Quarterly* 52: pp. 713-735.
- Harbom, Lotta, Stina Höglbladh and Peter Wallensteen. 2006. "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements." *Journal of Peace Research* 43(5)
- He, Hongwei, Yan Li and Llyod Harris. 2012. "Social identity perspective on brand loyalty." *Journal of Business Research* 65: 648-657.
- Heger, Lindsay and Idean Salehyan. 2007. "Ruthless Rulers: Coalition Size and the Severity of Civil Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 51: pp. 385-403.
- Höglbladh, Stina, Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér, 2011. "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009. Presenting new data" *Paper presented at the 52nd Annual International Studies Association Convention*, Montreal, Canada, 16-19 March, 2011.
- Jagers, Keith and Monty Marshall. 2000. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007."
- Jones, Clive. 2011. "The Tribes that Bind: Yemen and the Paradox of Political Violence." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34(12): 902-916.
- Juneau, Thomas. 2016. "Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment." *International Affairs* 93(3): 647-663.
- Kathman, Jacob. 2011. "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6): pp. 847-876.
- Kaufmann, Chaim. 2007. "Intervention in ethnic and ideological civil wars: Why one can be done and the other can't." *Security Studies* 1: pp. 62-101.
- Koga, Jun. 2011. "Where do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties Domestic Political Institutions and Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts." *International Studies Quarterly* 55: pp. 1143-1166.
- Kopp, Carol M. "Brand Loyalty." *Investopedia*, September 11, 2019. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brand-loyalty.asp>
- Kopp, Carol M. "Brand Awareness." *Investopedia*, July 26, 2020. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brandawareness.asp>
- Krasner, Stephen D. and Thomas Risse. 2014. "External Actors, State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction." 27(4): 545-567.
- Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243-250.
- Kronenfeld, Sami and Yoel Guzansky. 2014. "Yemen: A Mirror to the Future of the Arab Spring." *Military and Strategic Affairs* 6(3): 79-99.
- Lacina, Bethany. 2006. "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(2): pp. 276-289.
- Leaf, Barbara A. and Elana Delozier. 2019. "It's Time for a Serious Saudi-Houthi Back Channel." *War on the Rocks* Retrieved from: <https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/its-time-for-a-serious-saudi-houthi-back-channel/>

- Lujala, Päivi; Jan Ketil Rød & Nadia Thieme, 2007. 'Fighting over Oil: Introducing A New Dataset', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24(3), 239-256.
- Moore, Matthew. 2012. "Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration." *International Interactions* 38(3): 325-347
- Murdie, Amanda and Dursun Peksen. 2014. "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian Interventions." *The Journal of Politics* 76(1): 215-228.
- Perkins, Brian M. 2017. "Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40(4): 300317.
- Regan, Patrick. 1998. "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts." *The Journal of Politics* 60(3): pp. 754-779.
- Regan, Patrick. 2002. "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): pp. 55-73.
- Robinson, Kali. 2021. "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering." *The Council on Foreign Relations*. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis>
- Roodman, David. 2011. "Fitting Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-Process Models with CMP." *Stata Journal* 11 (2): 159–206.
- Salisbury, Peter. 2015. "Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian 'Cold War.'" Middle East and North Africa Programme Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs
- Sambanis, Nicholas, Stergios Skaperdas, and William Wohlforth. 2020. "External Intervention, Identity, and Civil War." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(14): 2155-2182.
- San-Akca, Belgin. "States in Disguise: Causes of External State Support for Rebel Groups." New York: Oxford University Press. 2016.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." In Bruce Russett (ed.) *Peace, War, and Numbers*. Beverly Hills: Sage, p. 19-48.
- Snyder, Stephen. 2017. "If Yemen's Houthis weren't Iranian proxies before, they could be soon." *Public Radio International (PRI)*. Retrieved from: <https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-25/if-yemens-houthis-werent-iranian-proxies-they-could-be-soon>
- Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. 2002. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2): 58-66.
- Sullivan, Patricia L. and Johannes Karreth. 2015. "The conditional impact of military intervention on internal armed conflict outcomes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32(3): pp. 269-288.
- Svensson, Isak and Desiree Nilsson. 2017. "Disputes over the Divine: Introducing the Religion and Armed Conflict (RELAC) Data, 1975 to 2015." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62(5): 1127-1148.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2009. "Bargaining Failures and Civil War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 243-261.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2017. "The New New Civil Wars." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 469-486.

Worth, Robert F. 2018. "How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate—And the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in th World." New York Times Magazine Retrieved from:
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/31/magazine/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html>

CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX:

Appendix Table 2.1: Individual Models for Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) Estimator

	<i>Religious</i>		<i>Ethnic</i>		<i>Leftist</i>		<i>No Brand</i>	
DV- Rebel Intervention								
Rebel Brand	.438**	(.218)	.197	(.171)	-.199	(.219)	-.302	(.222)
Government Intervention	.208	(.175)	.288*	(.173)	.270	(.172)	.270	(.172)
Oil	-.003	(.208)	-.122	(.209)	-.087	(.205)	-.087	(.206)
Cold War	.261	(.182)	.232	(.182)	.250	(.184)	.228	(.181)
GDP per capita (ln)	-.157	(.113)	-.143	(.112)	-.137	(.113)	-.139	(.112)
Military Expenditures (ln)	-.076	(.060)	-.075	(.060)	-.070	(.060)	-.076	(.060)
Contiguity	.065	(.046)	.071	(.047)	.069	(.046)	.069	(.047)
Middle East	.900**	(.363)	1.01***	(.357)	.986***	(.358)	.980***	(.358)
Africa	.068	(.228)	.057	(.228)	-.019	(.234)	.159	(.243)
Semi-Democracy	.235	(.182)	.172	(.183)	.200	(.181)	.195	(.181)
Constant	1.038	(.916)	.962	(.912)	1.004	(.911)	1.058	(.915)
<i>Number of Observations</i>	265		265		265		265	
<i>Log Likelihood</i>	-169.649		-171.027		-171.280		-170.764	
<i>Chi²</i>	26.07***		23.31***		22.81***		23.84***	

Significance: *=.1; **=.05; ***=.01. (Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.)

Appendix Table 2.2: Individual Models for Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) Estimator

	<i>Religious</i>		<i>Ethnic</i>		<i>Leftist</i>		<i>No Brand</i>		
DV- Negotiated Settlement									
Rebel Intervention*Rebel Brand									
0	1	-.605	(.427)	.532*	(.287)	-.193	(.333)	-.064	(.303)
1	0	.005	(.209)	-.177	(.275)	-.012	(.214)	.037	(.214)
1	1	-.468	(.362)	.625**	(.294)	-.260	(.386)	-.314	(.353)
Government Intervention		.278	(.217)	.334	(.220)	.217	(.212)	.230	(.213)
Mediation		1.05***	(.214)	.976***	(.215)	1.01***	(.212)	1.05***	(.212)
“New” Civil War		.289	(.196)	.246	(.197)	.229	(.201)	.238	(.197)
Autocracy		-.77***	(.240)	-.81***	(.238)	-.74***	(.238)	-.71***	(.233)
Territory		-.202	(.191)	-.64***	(.232)	-.296	(.189)	-.336	(.205)
Constant		-1.08***	(.247)	1.16***	(.273)	-.98***	(.268)	-1.02***	(.265)
<i>Number of Observations</i>		244		244		244		344	
<i>Log Likelihood</i>		-122.171		-119.690		-123.660		-123.491	
<i>Chi²</i>		58.35***		63.31***		55.37***		55.71***	

Significance: *=.1; **=.05; ***=.01. (Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.)

**CHAPTER 3:
Rebel Group Branding and Public Support
for External Intervention:
A Survey Experiment**

**Amy Skoll
UC Davis**

Abstract:

What explains variation in public support for civil war interventions? Why do some conflicts receive low levels of public support for intervention whereas intervention in other civil conflicts is widely popular? This paper proposes rebel group branding as a new mechanism that is a significant driver of public support for external intervention, demonstrating that public support for external intervention is not uniform across all rebel groups and can be manipulated depending on how the rebel group is identified. Using an original survey experiment conducted on UC Davis students, this paper finds that variation in rebel group brand awareness and brand loyalty can affect the type of interventions supported as well as the overall level of intervention support among survey respondents.

Introduction:

What explains variation in public support for civil war interventions? Why do some conflicts receive low levels of public support for intervention whereas intervention in other civil conflicts is widely popular? For example, according to GALLUP, American public support for U.S. military interventions has ranged from 47% in Libya (2011), to 51% in Kosovo (1991), to 66% in Sudan (1998), and to 83% in Iraq (1993) (Newport 2017). Furthermore, some civil conflicts receive very little international attention, are largely ignored by the American public, and result in little to no involvement by the U.S. government. Other civil conflicts might prompt more symbolic forms of intervention, such as sanctions or diplomatic assistance, but do not prompt external interveners to commit a significant number of resources to the conflict. Moreover, external intervention can vary not only in its popularity, but also in its form. Foreign leaders have a wide range of foreign policy options to choose from; thus, when it comes to civil conflicts, they not only need to decide whether they should intervene, but also what type of intervention they should pursue.

The public's appetite for intervention is one factor that leaders may consider when making these foreign policy decisions, and as a result, public opinion can play a significant role in determining civil conflict outcomes. For example, it is commonly understood that one of the reasons the United States did not intervene in Rwanda sooner, was because American support for intervention was extremely low. Even when President Bill Clinton finally decided to send a small force to Rwanda to deal with the humanitarian consequences of the genocide that had just occurred, only 34% of Americans were in support of intervention (Dieck 2015). In retrospect however, the United States' failure to respond quickly to the conflict in Rwanda partially contributed to one of the worst genocides in history. Even former President Clinton admitted that

not getting involved in Rwanda sooner contributed to the overall death toll, perhaps by as much as a third, and was one of his biggest regrets as President (Fang and Ferguson 2015). On the other hand, there have also been instances, such as Afghanistan, where public support for intervention was high at the start of the conflict, prompting extensive intervention efforts that were later regretted. In 2001, 90% of Americans were in support of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan; however, by 2019, 43% of Americans felt that intervention was a mistake (Reinhart 2019). Given the potentially dire consequences public opinion can have on external intervention decisions within civil conflicts, it is, therefore, important to have a better understanding of what drives public support for intervention in the first place.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy:

Although there has been some previous research that examines the effects of public opinion on foreign policy decisions, most of it has been focused on whether the United States should go to war or take action in an inter-state conflict or dispute, not whether the U.S. should get involved in a civil war (e.g.: Liberman 2006, Drezner 2008, Liberman 2012, Johns and Davies 2012). This literature has demonstrated however, that in contrast to the “Almond-Lippman consensus” (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955) that emerged in the 1950’s with the very pessimistic belief that the mass public was ill-informed about foreign policy and lacked any rational decision-making structure from which to form an opinion on foreign policy, individuals do care, and have rational opinions about foreign policy (Aldrich et al. 2006, Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). What is unclear however, is what drives public opinion on foreign policy decisions, particularly when it comes to external intervention in civil conflicts? Whereas some scholars have found important differences in support for external intervention across time and conflict based on gender, race, socioeconomic status, age, and ideology (e.g.: Burris 2008), it is

not evidently clear why we see this variation. Additionally, many studies that have examined public support for external intervention primarily look at conflicts that have a high number of American casualties like the Vietnam or Iraq War (Boettcher and Cobb 2006, Gartner 2008, Sullivan 2008), which are not representative of most opportunities for external intervention in a civil conflict. Finally, almost all of these studies primarily focus on public support for military action, ignoring the fact that there are many foreign policies from which politicians can choose from. Therefore, these previous studies do not reflect the reality that support for external intervention may vary depending on the choice of foreign policy tool (e.g. military action, sanctions, diplomatic support, foreign aid, etc.).

Furthermore, much of the previous literature on public opinion and foreign policy relies on descriptive data derived from public opinion polls. Although we can assess variation in public support for external intervention and make guesses about why we see this variation, it is difficult to draw any causal connections between a given conflict and public support for intervention in that conflict. Additionally, there are so many contextual variables to control for across civil conflicts, that it is difficult to parse out which variables matter when, and why. Many civil conflicts overlap in their timing and external states do not have an unlimited number of resources to commit. Weary from an ongoing intervention, the public may be less enthusiastic to commit government resources to a new civil conflict that has emerged, whereas they might have otherwise supported intervention had the civil conflict occurred earlier, or even later. A botched intervention might temporarily dampen support for future interventions, but a successful intervention might temporarily increase enthusiasm for intervention support. As a result, studying existing public opinion data to determine why some civil conflicts receive greater support for intervention than others, although interesting, is problematic.

Therefore, in this paper I seek to make two contributions, one theoretical and one empirical. To begin, I propose a new mechanism that I argue is a significant driver of public support for external intervention: *rebel group branding*. In doing so, I demonstrate that public support for external intervention is not uniform across all rebel groups and can be manipulated depending on how the rebel group is identified. Secondly, I conduct an original survey experiment to identify a causal connection between rebel group branding and public support for external intervention. By using a controlled experiment, I am better able to parse out the underlying drivers of public support for intervention in ways that is difficult to do using existing public opinion data. In doing so, I am able to demonstrate how perceptions matter when it comes to public support for external intervention.

Moving forward, this paper proceeds as follows: I first define my concept of rebel group branding and outline my theoretical predictions for how rebel group branding might affect public support for external intervention. I then describe my research design and original survey experiment and discuss my analyses and results. Finally, I discuss overall implications and avenues for future research.

Rebel Group Branding

I start with the premise that information is costly, and that people use informational shortcuts to form their opinions on politics (Popkin 1976). Even though previous research has found that people do care, and have rational opinions on foreign policy (Aldrich et al. 2006, Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), the average citizen is unlikely to be an expert on the intricacies of civil conflicts. Therefore, when asked whether or not the United States should intervene in a conflict, individuals are likely to use heuristics to guide their decision.

One heuristic that individuals may utilize when deciding whether the U.S. should intervene in a conflict is the identity of the rebel group in question. In American politics, research has demonstrated that individuals are more likely to support a political candidate if they share similar sociodemographic characteristics with the candidate (e.g. gender, race, etc.) (Cutler 2002). Other research has demonstrated that even when individuals do not share the same sociodemographic characteristics as a candidate, they may also use stereotypes about a particular candidate characteristic (e.g. religion) as a heuristic to determine whether or not they support that candidate (McDermott 2007). Although rebel groups are not political candidates running for office in the United States, it is reasonable to assume that individuals utilize rebel group characteristics in similar ways, as a heuristic for determining whether the rebel group warrants their support.

Using this assumption as my starting point, in this paper I then draw upon the branding literature in business to create an analogy for why individuals may be more or less likely to support a particular rebel group, depending on their perceived identity. In business, a brand is an overarching identifier that distinguishes one company from another. Brands can serve as signals to consumers regarding what a product is or what a company is about and can be a useful heuristic for consumers when making purchasing decisions. That being said, not all brands are created equal. In business, brands can vary in their levels of brand awareness and brand loyalty. Brand awareness is the degree to which consumers recognize a product by its name; products that have high levels of brand awareness are likely to generate more sales because when given a choice between two products, most consumers are more likely to pick the one with a more familiar name (Kopp 2020). Subsequently, brand loyalty is defined in the business world as the “the positive association consumers attach to a particular product or brand” that results in high

levels of devotion to a product or service (Kopp 2019). Brand loyalty is often fostered when a brand has a strong identity that consumers can relate to (He et al. 2021). As a result, brands that can connect with individuals on a personal level, often have higher levels of brand loyalty. In business, both brand awareness and brand loyalty alone can increase support for a particular product or business. However, it is important to recognize that brand awareness does not imply brand loyalty, and brand loyalty does not necessarily imply high levels of brand awareness (Chi et al. 2009). That being said, the combination of the two can have compounding effects (Chi et al. 2009).

Using the concept of branding as an analogy, I then examine how rebel group identities might vary in their level of “brand awareness” and “brand loyalty”, and how that variation might lead to different levels of public support for intervention. Although I recognize that rebel groups are not the same thing as businesses, the concept of a brand is theoretically useful for assessing why some rebel groups receive more support than others. Here I define a *rebel group’s brand* as the overarching identifier of a rebel group, often rooted in grievances, that frames internal and external perceptions about why a rebel group is fighting. A rebel group’s brand creates a conflict narrative that is often an oversimplification of a rebel groups motivations and becomes a heuristic utilized by both internal and external actors to determine quickly what a conflict is about. In other words, a rebel group’s brand helps external actors (or consumers) quickly identify the rebel group (or product) and determine whether they want to intervene (or purchase/invest) in the conflict.

In a practical sense, for the average citizen, a rebel group’s brand is often the way a conflict is discussed by elites and the media, framing the conflict as being religious, ethnic, racial, or ideological in nature. For example, there is a difference between simply saying that a

conflict is being fought between a rebel group and the government, versus saying that a conflict is being fought between a black rebel group and a white government, or a Christian rebel group and an Islamic government, or an ethnic minority rebel group and an ethnic majority government, or a communist rebel group and a democratic government. Even though civil conflicts are extremely complex and are often being fought for numerous reasons, they are often discussed in simplistic terms, reducing the conflict to one particular cleavage for the sake of brevity. However, I argue that the cleavage that gets emphasized can have an impact on public perceptions of a civil conflict and whether or not they believe their government should get involved. In other words, a rebel group's brand can serve as a mental shortcut for individuals to determine what the conflict is about, whether the conflict deserves their attention, and which side they should support in the conflict.

Drawing upon this branding analogy further, when it comes to a rebel group's brand, rebel groups that have greater brand awareness should be more likely to attract the support of external actors. Therefore, public support for intervention should be more likely to occur when there is a common perception of what the rebels are fighting for, vis-à-vis a rebel's brand. In other words, rebel group brands that have greater brand recognition in society should experience higher levels of support for external intervention. Since this experiment is conducted in the United States, I expect that certain rebel brands will have more brand awareness than others due to unique historical and cultural factors in the U.S. For example, the long history of racial tension in the U.S., the predominant role the U.S. played during the Cold War, and the hegemony of Christianity in America should predispose American respondents to see some cleavages as more salient than others. As a result, public support for intervention should be higher when these cleavages are emphasized because they present a familiar narrative that can serve as a useful

heuristic for figuring out what the conflict is about, whether the conflict deserves their attention, and which side they should support in the conflict.

Subsequently, when it comes to civil conflicts, rebel groups are likely to have stronger brand loyalty when there is more potential for identity ties. If a rebel group is identified using a brand that an individual can personally relate to, intervention support should be higher. For example, if a hypothetical rebel group is identified as being Christian, support for the rebel group should be higher among survey respondents who also identify as a Christian, versus individuals who identify as being Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, and so on. Conversely, if an individual cannot personally relate to a rebel brand, support for intervention should be relatively lower. Therefore, in the aggregate, support for intervention should be higher when rebel groups are identified using brands that represent more prevalent identities in society. In contrast, rebel group brands that emphasize a less prevalent identity in a given society, should result in less support for external intervention. This leads me to two simple hypotheses that I test in this paper:

Hypothesis 1: Support for external intervention should be higher when rebel groups have higher levels of brand awareness.

Hypothesis 2: Support for external intervention should be higher when rebel groups have higher levels of brand loyalty.

In this paper, I therefore test whether public support for external intervention can be manipulated by branding the rebel group in a particular way using an original survey experiment. How the rebel group gets branded in the real world (either by elites, or the media, or the rebel group itself) is indeed an interesting question; however, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I am simply assessing whether individuals are susceptible to rebel group branding and whether their support for external intervention varies depending on how a rebel group is

branded, by me, the researcher. If I find a connection between rebel group branding and individual support for external intervention, I can then make a convincing case for why perceptions of civil conflicts matter and can have significant foreign policy implications.

Research Design:

In 2020 I ran two rounds of a survey experiment on UC Davis undergraduate students to test the connection between rebel group branding and public support for external intervention. The first round of my experiment, in March 2020, consisted of 252 students and was conducted in the UC Davis Political Science Department's lab. In December 2020, I ran the second round of my experiment, consisting of 363 students. Due to the COVID-19 crisis, the second round of my experiment was unable to be run in the lab, but was available online for students to complete. For both rounds of the experiment, students were recruited through UC Davis political science courses and were offered extra credit points for their participation. Participation was voluntary and anonymous; although student ID numbers were collected to eliminate any duplicate responses.

My survey experiment starts by presenting respondents with a hypothetical conflict scenario. In this hypothetical conflict scenario, I chose a fictitious African country in which a historically repressive government has engaged in the indiscriminate killing of civilians in response to an armed rebellion. This scenario presents a clear injustice against the rebel group in question, but the country itself that is experiencing conflict does not exhibit any clear geostrategic interest for the United States. Therefore, this hypothetical scenario captures a conception of external intervention that is more humanitarian in nature. The identity of the government and rebels is then modified to reflect either a religious, ethnic, racial, or ideological division within the country. Survey respondents are then asked what the U.S. should do about the

conflict. They are allowed to select more than one option here to gauge not only whether individuals think that the U.S. should intervene, but also what level of involvement the U.S. should engage in. This survey question is therefore designed to capture the reality that external intervention has a myriad of forms and external intervention decisions are not independent of one another. Given a wide range of foreign policy options, individuals should be more likely to understand that external intervention is not a black and white decision, but rather has a multitude of forms that represent various levels of investment in the conflict.

After completing the experimental question, survey respondents were then asked to answer a few foreign policy questions, designed to gauge an individual's underlying knowledge of and attitude towards foreign policy. Individuals who prefer that the United States should avoid involvement in world affairs in general, should be less likely to support external intervention regardless of a rebel group's brand. Conversely, individuals who are generally more supportive of U.S. participation in world affairs should express higher levels of support for external intervention regardless of a rebel group's brand. Subsequently, survey respondents were asked a standard set of demographic questions to capture other covariates of external intervention support, such as race, gender, ideology, religion, and so on. However, these questions are also designed to identify whether support for rebel groups with a particular brand is higher among individuals who share the stated identity of the rebel group in question. For example, is support for Christian rebels higher among Christian individuals? These demographic characteristics enable me to test my brand loyalty hypotheses by using an interaction term to determine whether sharing the stated identity of the rebels, increases a participant's support for intervention.

The Experiment

To start, the control treatment for my hypothetical conflict scenario reads as follows:

Consider this HYPOTHETICAL scenario.

At the start of this year, a civil war broke out in the African country of Zambia. The government of Zambia has historically repressed the Zambian population through political and economic discrimination. In response to their unfair treatment and the corruption of the government, the Zambians started an armed rebellion against the government. Although the Zambian rebels have secured control over the port city of Lusaka, the government is not willing to make concessions. Instead, the government has launched a military campaign that has resulted in the indiscriminate killing of 20,000 civilians. As a result, the fighting has intensified and there seems to be no end in sight.

Of all the options below, what do you think the United States should do about the conflict in Zambia. Check ALL that apply.

- The United States should send 10,000 U.S. troops to help the government restore order in Zambia.*
- The United States should send 10,000 U.S. troops to help the rebels overcome the government in Zambia.*
- The United States should send tanks and missiles to help the government restore order in Zambia.*
- The United States should send tanks and missiles to help the rebels overcome the government in Zambia.*
- The United States should impose economic sanctions on the Zambian government to pressure the government to halt all military action against the rebels.*
- The United States should increase its foreign aid to Zambia by 25% to help stabilize the government and economy of Zambia.*
- The United States should send humanitarian assistance in the form of food and blankets to the civilian population of Zambia.*
- The United States should increase its financial assistance to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Zambia.*
- The United States should send diplomatic support to help mediate the conflict between the government and rebels in Zambia.*
- The United States should do nothing about the conflict in Zambia.*

For each of the treatment conditions, the same hypothetical conflict scenario is presented; however, the rebel groups are given a specific brand to emphasize a particular cleavage between the rebel group and government. There are 5 specific treatment conditions for this hypothetical conflict scenario that are as follows:

1. Ethnic Treatment: the rebels are identified as being a hypothetical ethnic group—the Nsengos-- fighting the government which is controlled by a different hypothetical ethnic group—the Tswalis
2. Racial Treatment: the rebels are identified as being black fighting a white government
3. Religious Treatment #1: the rebels are identified as being Christian fighting a Muslim government
4. Religious Treatment #2: the rebels are identified as being Shiites fighting a Sunni government
5. Ideological Treatment: the rebels are identified as being communist fighting the current regime

Each of these 5 treatment conditions represent plausible cleavages that historically have been present in civil conflicts over time. However, in line with my theoretical expectations, I do not expect each rebel group brand to elicit the same level of support for intervention, as I expect each brand to vary in its level of brand awareness and brand loyalty. First of all, I expect the racial treatment and religious treatment #1 to have the highest levels of brand awareness in the United States. According to recent polling from *The Economist*, religion (specifically Evangelical Christianity) and race (especially among blacks and whites) have become the two biggest predictors of political beliefs in the United States (“How to Forecast an American’s Vote”). Furthermore, race and religion have also become the most polarizing social cleavages in the United States (Abramowitz 2014). Therefore, in terms of brand awareness, race and religion (in particular Christianity) should be especially salient in the United States. However, I expect the racial treatment and religious treatment #1 to vary in terms of their brand loyalty. Here I am operationalizing the potential for brand loyalty based off the potential for identity ties. Therefore, in the aggregate, support for intervention should be higher when rebel groups are identified using

brands that represent more prevalent identities in society. As demonstrated in Figure 1 below, only 13.4% of the U.S. population identifies as black, and only 4.75% of my UC Davis sample identify as black. Consequently, in aggregate, the potential that my survey respondents would share the identity of the black rebels in the racial treatment is low, thus, decreasing the potential for brand loyalty. In contrast, 67.4% of the U.S. population (and 40.66% of my UC Davis sample) identifies as being Christian, indicating a much higher potential for participants to share the identity of the rebel group in religious treatment #1. As a result, support for intervention should be high in both the racial treatment and religious treatment #1, compared with the control group, given their higher potential for brand awareness; however, the religious treatment #1 should elicit more support than the racial treatment due to a higher potential for brand loyalty as well.

When it comes to the ethnic treatment condition, I would initially expect the ethnic rebel group brand to elicit the lowest levels of support overall since the ethnic groups in question are invented ethnicities that participants would not have heard of (thus, low brand awareness), nor would participants share the same ethnic ties (thus, low potential for brand loyalty). That being said, even though the ethnic groups in the ethnic treatment condition are fictitious, it is entirely possible that branding the rebel group in ethnic terms may elicit higher levels of support from individuals who identify as part of an ethnic minority themselves. Therefore, the ethnic narrative derived from the ethnic treatment might especially resonate with non-white survey participants. Although the United States is still a majority white, it is important to recognize that 64.18% of my UC Davis sample is not white and thus, the potential for my survey respondents to identify with the ethnic narrative, as an ethnic minority themselves, is much higher. This may increase

support for external intervention due to high levels of brand loyalty among participants who identify as an ethnic minority.

As for the second religious treatment condition, where the rebels are identified as being Shiites fighting a Sunni government, I expect there to be low levels of support for intervention. First of all, only 0.9% of the U.S. population (and 7.27% of my UC Davis population) identifies with the Islamic faith, thus lowering the potential for brand loyalty based off of identity ties. Secondly, given the very small number of Muslim Americans, it is unlikely that a majority of Americans will understand the sectarian cleavages between Sunnis and Shiites, thus lowering the potential for brand awareness as well. As a result, support for intervention should be relatively lower in this treatment condition when compared to the other treatment conditions.

Finally, when it comes to the ideological treatment where the rebel group is identified with the communist brand, I theoretically should expect relatively lower levels of support for intervention. At the height of the Cold War, 61% of Americans believed that communism was the worst form of government in the world, and 75% of Americans believed communism to be a threat to the world (Smith 1983). As a result, communism should have high levels of brand awareness, especially among U.S. adults who were alive during the Cold War, but extremely low levels of brand loyalty. Very few Americans should be able to personally relate to the communist brand and if anything, many Americans may even have a very antagonistic view towards the communist brand, thus reducing the likelihood of support for the rebels. That being said, given the fact that my UC Davis sample is primarily made up of young adults who were not alive during the Cold War (almost 99% of my sample is a young Millennial or from Gen Z), I expect that the communist brand may not elicit the same patterns of support. Brand awareness should be

lower in my UC Davis sample, and my survey participants may not have as antagonistic of a perspective towards rebel groups with a communist brand.

Overall, however, it is important to remember that each of these treatment conditions are being compared to the control treatment where no rebel group brand is given. Since the control treatment is not given a rebel group brand, it is impossible for the rebel group to have brand awareness or brand loyalty. As a result, all treatment groups, when compared to the control group, are likely to have higher levels of brand awareness and brand loyalty and are, thus, more likely to elicit higher levels of intervention support. Therefore, I expect that branding in general (regardless of the brand) should elicit more support for intervention compared to the control group because participants are able to identify a narrative that they can use as a mental shortcut to make a decision. When presented with an overarching identity for the rebel group in question, participants are receiving additional information that can help them decide the type and level of U.S. intervention.

It is also important to reiterate that participants are given a wide selection of external intervention options to choose from and are able to select multiple types of intervention in their response. Not all brands are created equal, and neither are all forms of external intervention. Support for sending troops and weapons to the rebels is a very different response than support for humanitarian assistance. Some intervention types require more extensive involvement and resources, whereas others are more symbolic in nature. Some intervention types are clearly targeted towards one side in the conflict, whereas other forms of intervention are more neutral. Therefore, even though I predict rebel group branding will increase public support for intervention overall, some brands are likely to attract some forms of support over others. In particular, rebel group brands with lower levels of brand awareness and/or brand loyalty might

elicit more symbolic and/or neutral forms of support, such as sanctions or humanitarian assistance, whereas rebel groups with higher levels of brand awareness and/or brand loyalty should elicit support for interventions that are more extensive and costly, such as providing troops and weapons to the rebels or foreign aid. In addition, rebel group brands with higher levels of brand awareness and/or brand loyalty should prompt participants to select multiple intervention types that they support. For example, participants may say that they support sanctions, humanitarian assistance, UN peacekeeping, and diplomatic assistance, or they may say that they just support sanctions, but no other forms of support, with the former reflecting a greater level of interest and involvement, and the latter representing a more minimal level of interest and involvement. Therefore, in my analyses I test for variation in intervention type across rebel group brands as well as the direction of the intervention (rebel support, government support, or neutral support) and the total number of interventions supported.

Limitations

It is important to acknowledge that there are indeed limitations to running a survey experiment on college students, as they are not fully representative of the U.S. population at large. In general, UC Davis students are younger, more ethnically diverse, less religious, more liberal and more educated than the general U.S. population. However, previous studies in International Relations have found that individuals who have higher levels of education are less susceptible to framing techniques than individuals with lower levels of education (i.e. Hiscox 2006). Therefore, in running my experiment with college students, who are on average more educated than the general U.S. population, my survey results, if anything, should be biased against my theoretical expectations. Therefore, if I find any effect of rebel branding in my survey

experiment at UC Davis, I should expect to find an even stronger effect if I were to run my experiment on a nationally representative sample.

That being said, I do expect certain rebel group brands to be more salient than others given my sample population. For example, I expect the ethnic brand to elicit more intervention support among UC Davis students because they are more ethnically diverse than the U.S. population. Whereas, non-Hispanic whites make up around 60% of the U.S. population, non-Hispanic whites make up only around 36% of my sample. Secondly, I expect the Christian brand to be less effective on my UC Davis population given the fact that only around 40% of my sample identifies as a Christian and 40% of my sample identifies with no religion, whereas around 65% of American adults identify as a Christian and only 26% of American adults are religiously unaffiliated. Third, I expect that the communist brand will not prompt as passionate of a response against the rebel group in question among UC Davis students, as most of them were not alive during the Cold War and did not experience the heightened fear communism elicited during that era. My theory anticipates that different rebel group brands will be more effective on some individuals than others due to variation in brand awareness and brand loyalty; therefore, it should be expected that my results would differ depending on the demographic makeup of my sample population. Nevertheless, it is still reasonable to examine whether rebel group branding indeed has an effect on public support for external intervention using the UC Davis sample.

Table 3.1: Demographic breakdown of UC Davis Sample compared with the US Population

	UC Davis Sample	US Population
Political Party		
Democrat	64.74%	30% ¹⁵
Republican	7.25%	24% ¹⁶
Independent	22.73%	45% ¹⁷
Race		
Non-Hispanic White	35.82%	60.1% ¹⁸
Hispanic	34.38%	18.5% ¹⁹
Asian	28.81%	5.9% ²⁰
Black	4.75%	13.4% ²¹
Religion		
Christian	40.66%	67.4%
Evangelical/Protestant	9.92%	46.6% ²²
Catholic	24.79%	20.8% ²³
No Religion	40.66%	22.8% ²⁴
Islam/Muslim	7.27%	0.9% ²⁵

Another limitation that is important to discuss is that my hypothetical conflict scenario presents external intervention as being much more humanitarian in nature, rather than for economic or geostrategic reasons. Additionally, the government in my hypothetical conflict scenario is intentionally presented as being repressive and brutal, tilting the bias towards the rebel group in question. Therefore, it is unclear, at least from the data and analyses presented in this paper, whether rebel group branding has the same effect on external intervention support in all civil conflicts, or just those that have a clear humanitarian narrative attached to them. For example, if the hypothetical conflict scenario was instead about a civil war occurring in a state

¹⁵ "Party Affiliation." Gallup <https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx>

¹⁶ "Party Affiliation." Gallup <https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx>

¹⁷ "Party Affiliation." Gallup <https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx>

¹⁸ "Quick Facts." 2019 Census Data <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219>

¹⁹ "Quick Facts." 2019 Census Data <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219>

²⁰ "Quick Facts." 2019 Census Data <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219>

²¹ "Quick Facts." 2019 Census Data <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219>

²² "Religious Landscape Study." PEW Research Center <https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/>

²³ "Religious Landscape Study." PEW Research Center <https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/>


²⁴ "Religious Landscape Study." PEW Research Center <https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/>

²⁵ "Religious Landscape Study." PEW Research Center <https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/>

that was an ally and top trading partner of the U.S. and the rebels were the aggressors, would rebel group branding affect public support for intervention in the same way? Furthermore, my analysis here focuses more on rebel group branding, but does government branding have a similar effect? For instance, if the rebels were presented as the aggressors trying to destabilize a “Christian” government or a “Communist” government, would public support for intervention vary? These are very interesting questions that unfortunately, I am unable to answer in this paper; however, in future research I plan to test for the effect of branding in alternative conflict scenarios.

Data and Analysis:

Using the participant responses from my survey experiment, I run several models to capture the effect of my treatment conditions on support for external intervention. The first set of models I run use each form of external intervention as the dependent variable. In Figure 1 below, I demonstrate how popular various forms of external intervention were across all treatment groups. I combine troops and weapons for the rebels into one category and troops and weapons for the government into one category since these were these least popular responses. In contrast, humanitarian support, diplomatic assistance, and UN peacekeeping were the most popular forms of external intervention, with more than 50% of respondents choosing these options. My various intervention types are listed in this Figure from most supportive of the government to most supportive of the rebels, with more neutral forms of intervention in the middle.



My first set of analyses, therefore, runs seven separate models, one for each type of external intervention as my dependent variables. Each dependent variable is coded as a 1 if a participant selected this form of external intervention as one that they would support, given the hypothetical conflict scenario. My independent variable across all of these models is the treatment condition compared with the control group. In other words, I test whether participants are more or less in support of various types of external intervention, depending on how the rebel group is branded, compared to the level of support for intervention participants in the control group demonstrate when the rebel group is not branded at all. Therefore, the coefficient for each of these 5 treatment variables should be interpreted as the effect of that rebel group brand compared with the control group that received the exact same hypothetical conflict scenario, but with no rebel group brand.

I also include a number of control variables in these models. For starters, I include gender as a control variable because previous studies have demonstrated that men tend to be more

favorable towards the use of military force, whereas women are much more responsive to humanitarian interventions (Eichenberg 2016). Additionally, I include a dummy variable for non-Hispanic whites because previous research has demonstrated that whites tend to be more favorable towards military interventions (Burris 2008). Burris (2008) also finds that the more affluent and more educated are also more likely to support military interventions so I seek to control for these factors as well in my analysis. Since my sample population is all college students who have yet to complete their degrees, I use a measure of their parent's educational attainment to proxy for income and educational background. This variable is a continuous measure ranging from 1-7 with 1 representing students whose parents have less than a high school diploma and 7 representing students who have at least one parent who has a graduate degree. I also include a measure for ideology, that is on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 representing highly liberal respondents and 7 representing highly conservative respondents. Nincic and Ramos (2010) find that foreign policy attitudes are largely shaped by ideological preferences, with conservatives preferring foreign policy actions that are more self-regarding (e.g. protecting American jobs and U.S. national security) and liberals preferring foreign policy actions that are more others-regarding (e.g. helping poor countries and protecting human rights abroad). However, I also include a measure for partisanship because other studies have demonstrated that foreign policy attitudes are often shaped more so by partisan cues (Baum and Groeling 2008). I then include a dummy variable for Evangelical/Protestant Christians as previous studies have found that evangelical Christians tend to express more militant, interventionist preferences when it comes to foreign policy (Barker, Hurwitz, Nelson 2008). Finally, I include two variables to capture a participant's general foreign policy outlook. As demonstrated by Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999), isolationist/internationalist dispositions are among the most significant

influencers of U.S. foreign policy preferences. Therefore, my *US Interests* variable is a 5-point continuous variable indicating the level of support for the following statement: *The United States military should only be utilized to protect American lives and U.S. interests. It should not become entangled in the affairs of other countries.* A 5 on this scale represents participants who strongly agree with this statement, and thus, have a much more isolationist approach to foreign policy. In contrast, my *World Order* variable is a 5-point continuous variable indicating how much participants agree with the following statement: *The United States is responsible for protecting world order.* A 5 on this scale represents participants who strongly agree with this statement, and thus, have a much more internationalist approach to foreign policy.

The results of these models are presented in Table 3.2 below. The first main takeaway from these results is that rebel group branding indeed has an effect on external intervention support, and that this effect varies by intervention type. To begin, compared to the treatment condition of no rebel group branding, almost all rebel group brands significantly increased support for diplomatic assistance, and decreased support for providing troops and weapons to the government. What these results demonstrate is that in general, providing individuals with a conflict narrative by branding the rebel group in question, made participants more likely to support the rebels and less likely to support the government outright. Interestingly however, all rebel group brands seemed to significantly increase support for foreign aid which is technically a form of support for the government. At first this seems unusual, because the government is clearly presented as repressive in my conflict scenario; thus, it is puzzling why so many students were in support of providing aid to the government. That being said, the way the foreign aid response was written emphasized the use of the aid to stabilize the situation (not to use against

the rebels), so it is likely that many students saw the foreign aid option as a more neutral form of support, rather than outright support for the government.

The second main takeaway from these results is that we see that not all brands are created equal. Some rebel groups brands were more likely to increase support for some forms of external support, whereas other rebel group brands did not seem to influence support for external intervention at all. For example, the ethnic rebel group brand had the most significant effect on support for humanitarian and diplomatic assistance when compared to the control group. Given its low potential for brand awareness and brand loyalty, it is not surprising that the ethnic treatment elicited support for more neutral, symbolic, and less costly forms of intervention. Interestingly, when it comes to troops and weapons for the rebels (arguably the costliest form of intervention), none of the rebel group brands had a significant effect. However, as demonstrated above, only around 10% of participants selected troops and weapons for the rebels across all treatment conditions; therefore, the lack of significant results is likely due to the small number of observations. That being said, although not significant, the black rebel treatment and Christian rebel treatments are the only treatments with a positive coefficient. Given their high level of brand awareness and potential for brand loyalty, it is not surprising that these two treatments were the only two to elicit a positive coefficient for the most intensive form of intervention. Finally, these results demonstrate that support for sanctions and UN peacekeeping were not significantly affected by rebel group branding.

Table 3.2: Results by Intervention Type

Intervention Type	Support for Gov't		Neutral Support			Support for Rebels	
	Troops & Weapons for Gov't	Foreign Aid	Peace-Keeping	Diplomatic Assistance	Humanitarian Assistance	Sanctions	Troops & Weapons for Rebels
Treatments							
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	-.256 (.309)	.410* (.242)	.188 (.199)	.828*** (.209)	.374* (.209)	.039 (.195)	-.031 (.278)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.926** (.443)	.210 (.247)	.292 (.200)	.309 (.198)	.139 (.205)	-.100 (.193)	.266 (.253)
Christian Rebel Treatment	-.583* (.341)	.441* (.242)	.207 (.200)	.333* (.198)	.020 (.201)	-.015 (.193)	.095 (.267)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	-.750** (.375)	.494** (.236)	.222 (.197)	.584*** (.199)	.170 (.201)	-.010 (.191)	-.317 (.294)
Communist Rebel Treatment	-.535 (.340)	.409* (.245)	.254 (.202)	.516** (.204)	.304 (.208)	.181 (.196)	-.332 (.313)
Controls							
Male	.077 (.217)	-.381*** (.140)	-.211* (.119)	.174 (.123)	-.163 (.123)	-.107 (.115)	-.125 (.167)
Non-Hispanic White	-.235 (.241)	.026 (.145)	.393*** (.130)	.270** (.132)	.175 (.134)	-.075 (.124)	-.161 (.180)
Parent's Education	.052 (.066)	.017 (.039)	.036 (.034)	.021 (.035)	-.013 (.036)	.066* (.034)	-.012 (.047)
Ideology	.196** (.098)	-.113* (.060)	-.193*** (.051)	-.128** (.052)	-.193*** (.052)	-.024 (.049)	.077 (.070)
Democrat	.294 (.277)	-.046 (.155)	.048 (.135)	.102 (.139)	.032 (.142)	.218* (.132)	-.031 (.193)
Evangelical	.596** (.277)	-.217 (.237)	-.413** (.190)	-.468** (.192)	-.131 (.197)	.200 (.189)	.442* (.227)
US Interests	.040 (.098)	-.005 (.058)	-.074 (.052)	-.106** (.053)	-.112** (.053)	-.051 (.050)	-.221*** (.074)
World Order	.111 (.101)	-.022 (.060)	.043 (.052)	.135** (.054)	.078 (.054)	.106** (.051)	.024 (.076)
Constant	-2.812*** (.715)	-.760* (.393)	.496 (.340)	.034 (.347)	1.093*** (.360)	-.448 (.332)	-.793 (.484)
N	530	530	530	530	530	530	530
Log pseudolikelihood	-80.531	-241.354	-329.903	-309.041	-300.725	-355.818	-152.975
Chi ² likelihood ratio	22.01	21.79	54.39	55.70	42.64	22.98	29.76
prob > chi ²	0.0552	0.0587	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0419	0.0051

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

In addition to running separate models for each intervention type, I also ran three different models that combined different forms of external intervention into three broad categories: *Government support*, *Neutral support*, and *Rebel Support*. As indicated in Table 3.2 above, government support includes troops and weapons for the government as well as foreign

aid; neutral support includes peacekeeping, diplomatic assistance and humanitarian aid; and rebel support includes sanctions placed on the government and troops and weapons for the rebels. Below, in Table 3.3, I demonstrate the results of my models when I simplify my dependent variables into these three broad categories of support. What is interesting about these results is that rebel group branding only seems to have a significant effect on prompting more neutral forms of intervention support. This is probably due to the fact that the hypothetical conflict scenario was presented as a case of humanitarian interventions, without any clear geostrategic interests in support of one side or the other. As demonstrated by the results in Table 3.3, only the ethnic rebel treatment and the Shiite rebel treatment had a significant impact on the likelihood of support for these more neutral forms of intervention. Although my theory predicted that both the ethnic treatment and the Shiite treatment would prompt more neutral, symbolic forms of support and thus, these results are in alignment with my predictions, it is somewhat surprising that the other rebel group brands did not have more of a significant effect.

Table 3.3: Support for Government, Neutral, and Rebel Interventions

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)
Treatments			
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.094 (.217)	.552* (.288)	-.016 (.198)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.143 (.224)	.085 (.249)	-.077 (.194)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.082 (.217)	.001 (.247)	.025 (.195)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.142 (.211)	.512* (.277)	-.163 (.192)
Communist Rebel Treatment	.044 (.220)	.393 (.269)	.063 (.198)
Control Variables			
Male	-.323** (.131)	-.282* (.163)	-.127 (.116)
Non-Hispanic White	-.099 (.138)	.496*** (.184)	-.132 (.126)
Parent's Education	.024 (.037)	-.061 (.048)	.079** (.034)
Ideology	-.045 (.056)	-.236*** (.067)	-.007 (.049)

Democrat	.044 (.148)	.178 (.182)	.174 (.133)
Evangelical	.057 (.208)	-.366 (.236)	.398** (.196)
US Interests	.026 (.055)	-.055 (.071)	-.079 (.050)
World Order	.013 (.057)	.198*** (.072)	.129** (.051)
Constant	-.798** (.374)	1.451*** (.465)	-.337 (.334)
N	530	528	528
Log pseudolikelihood	-271.177	-161.326	-348.057
Chi ² likelihood ratio	12.09	59.37	30.72
prob > chi ²	0.5203	0.0000	0.0037

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

It is important to recognize however, that in my survey experiment, participants were able to select multiple forms of external intervention in their response, meaning that some participants expressed higher levels of support for intervention overall by selecting multiple intervention types, whereas other participants expressed lower levels of support for intervention by selecting fewer intervention types. Here I am assuming that expressing support for multiple forms of intervention demonstrates a higher level of interest and involvement in the conflict than only expressing support for one or two types of intervention. Therefore, I also created a separate set of dependent variables that are more continuous in nature to capture variation in intervention support based on the number of interventions supported. I specifically parse out my more neutral forms of intervention and support for the rebels here in this part of my analysis. In Table 3.4 below I include 2 new dependent variables. The first is a continuous count of the number of neutral interventions supported by my participants. Therefore, a participant would score a 3 on this variable if they selected peacekeeping, diplomatic assistance, and humanitarian support, but would only score a 1 on this variable if they only selected one out of these three forms of neutral support. My second dependent variable in Table 3.4 is a continuous count of the number of both

neutral forms of support and support for the rebels; therefore, this variable is scored from 0-5 instead of 0-3 because this variable now includes sanctions and troops and weapons for the rebels as options to be counted.

Table 3.4: Continuous measures of Neutral and Rebel Support

	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments		
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.521*** (.151)	.533*** (.183)
Black Rebel Treatment	.265* (.150)	.278 (.181)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.194 (.149)	.205 (.181)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.344** (.148)	.294 (.180)
Communist Rebel Treatment	.365** (.151)	.389** (.183)
Control Variables		
Male	-.070 (.090)	-.128 (.108)
Non-Hispanic White	.272*** (.096)	.217* (.117)
Parent's Education	.020 (.026)	.046 (.032)
Ideology	-.184*** (.038)	-.184*** (.046)
Democrat	.060 (.102)	.139 (.124)
Evangelical	-.365** (.144)	-.189 (.175)
US Interests	-.089** (.039)	-.142*** (.047)
World Order	.097** (.039)	.141*** (.048)
Constant	2.020*** (.256)	2.530*** (.310)
N	528	528
R-squared	0.1486	0.1392
Adjusted R-squared	0.1271	0.1175

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

What these continuous models demonstrate is that almost all rebel groups brands had a positive and significant effect on the number of neutral interventions supported, with the exception of the Christian brand (which is still positive, but not significant). When including sanctions and troops and weapons on behalf of the rebels in the count, only the ethnic and communist brands stayed significant, although all coefficients were still positive for each rebel group brand in this model.

Although these results demonstrate overall that rebel group branding is indeed effective at influencing public support for external intervention, the brands that were the most effective at prompting intervention support were somewhat surprising, given my initial theoretical expectations. To begin, the racial treatment, and religious treatment where the rebels were identified as being Christian fighting a Muslim government did not always have a significant effect on overall intervention support. Given the hegemony of Christianity in American politics and the long history of racial tension in the U.S. it is indeed surprising that these brands were not more effective at prompting intervention support. Secondly, it is surprising that the communist brand was so effective at prompting intervention support, even on behalf of the rebels, given the antagonistic relationship the United States has had with communism over the years. Third, the ethnic brand was consistently the most effective at prompting overall intervention support, even though the hypothetical conflict scenario used two made-up ethnic brands that students would have never heard of before, limiting the potential for brand awareness and brand loyalty.

Although these results seem somewhat contradictory with my theoretical expectations, a closer analysis shines some light on these discrepancies. First, it is important to reiterate that my sample of UC Davis students is significantly different than the U.S. population at large. Therefore, the fact that the Christian brand was not more effective is not as surprising when you

consider how few Christians were in my sample of UC Davis students when compared to the national population. Furthermore, the higher percentage of students from an ethnic minority in my sample, might explain why the ethnic brand was so popular in my experiment, even though I used hypothetical ethnic groups that participants would not have heard of before. Third, although it is indeed surprising that rebel groups with the communist brand elicited so much support, the fact that almost all of my participants were not alive during the Cold War might explain these counterintuitive results. Furthermore, recent polling data has suggested that younger people are increasingly more critical of capitalism, more approving of communism, and more likely to vote socialist (Langlois 2019).

Additionally, however, I also ran a second set of analyses that interacted certain demographic characteristics with my treatment conditions to see whether certain rebel group brands were more effective on certain populations. Whereas my first set of tests were designed to test my brand awareness hypothesis, the following tests were designed to test my brand loyalty hypothesis. It is important to note moving forward that many of the interactions that I ran in this part of my analysis did not lead to very meaningful results, given my relatively small sample size and the rarity of certain demographic characteristics in my dataset. For example, there were only 28 students who identified as black in my sample (4.75%), meaning that only 4-5 black students were assigned to each treatment condition. This makes it very difficult to draw conclusive results about my brand loyalty hypothesis.

That being said, there were several key insights derived from these interactions models that are worth discussing. First of all, I ran several models that interacted a participant's religious identity with the treatment conditions. In doing so, I found that being an Evangelical/Protestant Christian predicted success perfectly for rebel support in the Christian rebel treatment condition,

meaning that every single student who identified as an Evangelical Christian and received the Christian rebel treatment either selected sanctions and/or troops and weapons for the rebels in their response. This is strong evidence for my brand loyalty hypothesis that predicts individuals will be more supportive of rebel groups that they share identity ties with. Additionally, the Evangelical/Protestant Christians in my sample were significantly less likely to support a high number of neutral forms of support in my continuous models, demonstrating that if an Evangelical/Protestant participant supported intervention in the civil conflict, there was a clear bias towards the rebel group in the types of interventions they supported, again evidence for my brand loyalty hypothesis. In a similar vein, identifying with the Islamic faith predicted success perfectly for neutral support in the Shiite rebel treatment, and predicted failure perfectly in the Christian rebel treatment. In other words, none of the Muslim participants in my survey expressed support for interventions that were biased towards the Christian rebels, and all of the Muslim participants in my survey expressed intervention support when given the Shiite rebel treatment. Once again, this is strong evidence for my brand loyalty hypothesis. These results can be seen in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below.

Table 3.5: Interaction between Evangelical/Protestant Christian and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.145 (.230)	.558* (.308)	-.022 (.208)	.537*** (.158)	.534*** (.193)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.026 (.234)	.179 (.270)	-.056 (.204)	.358** (.156)	.370* (.190)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.108 (.232)	.042 (.264)	-.095 (.205)	.280* (.157)	.224 (.191)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.251 (.223)	.428 (.288)	-.135 (.201)	.335** (.155)	.297 (.189)

Communist Rebel Treatment	.072 (.236)	.366 (.291)	-.036 (.209)	.378** (.160)	.353* (.194)
Interactions					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment*Evangelical	-.473 (.705)	-.011 (.885)	.016 (.690)	-.152 (.517)	-.022 (.629)
Black Rebel Treatment*Evangelical	Predicts failure perfectly	-.657 (.741)	-.218 (.675)	-1.021** (.515)	-1.022 (.627)
Christian Rebel Treatment*Evangelical	-.294 (.669)	-.326 (.756)	Predicts success perfectly	-.845* (.492)	-.229 (.599)
Shiite Rebel Treatment*Evangelical	-1.175 (.747)	Predicts success perfectly	-.300 (.655)	.083 (.501)	-.046 (.609)
Communist Rebel Treatment*Evangelical	-.308 (.663)	.137 (.760)	.954 (.694)	-.173 (.485)	.238 (.590)
Controls					
Evangelical	.581 (.490)	-.289 (.548)	.112 (.485)	-.018 (.366)	-.035 (.445)
Non-Hispanic White	-.082 (.139)	.507*** (.188)	-.112 (.127)	.275*** (.096)	.230* (.117)
Male	-.328** (.132)	-.268 (.165)	-.134 (.118)	-.065 (.089)	-.126 (.109)
Parent's Education	.021 (.038)	-.059 (.048)	.081** (.034)	.019 (.026)	.045 (.032)
Ideology	-.042 (.057)	-.236*** (.068)	-.003 (.050)	-.185*** (.038)	-.181*** (.046)
Democrat	.039 (.150)	.186 (.185)	.189 (.134)	.051 (.102)	.139 (.124)
US Interests	.025 (.056)	-.067 (.072)	-.073 (.051)	-.097** (.039)	-.146*** (.047)
World Order	.015 (.058)	.201*** (.072)	.137*** (.052)	.097** (.039)	.144*** (.048)
Constant	-.853** (.378)	1.452*** (.466)	-.384 (.337)	2.019*** (.256)	2.512*** (.311)
N	522	519	518	528	528
Log pseudolikelihood	-268.238	-159.311	-341.963	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	14.02	61.13	30.76	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.6657	0.0000	0.0213	---	---
R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1630	0.1479
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1334	0.1178

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table 3.6: Interaction between Islamic Faith and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.007 (.225)	.675** (.303)	.026 (.203)	.528*** (.157)	.569*** (.188)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.195 (.233)	.113 (.255)	-.127 (.201)	.253 (.157)	.249 (.188)
Christian Rebel Treatment	-.039 (.228)	.156 (.258)	.125 (.202)	.213 (.156)	.277 (.187)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.118 (.220)	.502* (.283)	-.077 (.199)	.315** (.156)	.301 (.187)
Communist Rebel Treatment	-.019 (.228)	.433 (.277)	.148 (.203)	.356** (.157)	.426** (.188)
Interactions					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment* Muslim	1.539 (.978)	-.558 (1.034)	-.931 (.931)	-.130 (.685)	-.673 (.823)
Black Rebel Treatment* Muslim	.518 (.863)	.563 (.997)	.645 (.790)	.194 (.603)	.331 (.725)
Christian Rebel Treatment* Muslim	1.417 (.882)	-.746 (.939)	Predicts failure perfectly	-.298 (.623)	-1.056 (.748)
Shiite Rebel Treatment* Muslim	.245 (.820)	Predicts success perfectly	-.953 (.773)	.262 (.577)	-.156 (.693)
Communist Rebel Treatment* Muslim	1.083 (.934)	Dropped because of collinearity?	Predicts failure perfectly	-.121 (.689)	-.871 (.827)
Controls					
Muslim	-.090 (.672)	-.366 (.730)	.048 (.585)	.076 (.458)	.256 (.551)
Non-Hispanic White	-.072 (.140)	.443** (.185)	-.165 (.128)	.260*** (.097)	.195* (.117)
Male	-.313** (.133)	-.273* (.165)	-.148 (.118)	-.055 (.091)	-.116 (.109)
Parent's Education	.029 (.038)	-.066 (.049)	.080** (.034)	.020 (.026)	.045 (.032)
Ideology	-.047 (.056)	-.262*** (.068)	.014 (.049)	-.200 (.038)	-.192*** (.045)
Democrat	.050 (.151)	.171 (.185)	.194 (.135)	.059 (.104)	.142 (.124)
US Interests	.012 (.056)	-.035 (.072)	-.083 (.051)	-.079** (.039)	-.135*** (.047)
World Order	.031 (.058)	.198*** (.073)	.119** (.052)	.099** (.040)	.137*** (.048)
Constant	-.826** (.379)	1.419*** (.472)	-.312 (.340)	1.980*** (.259)	2.510*** (.312)
N	530	514	518	528	528
Log pseudolikelihood	-264.574	-158.364	-339.151	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	25.30	61.74	32.36	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.1170	0.0000	0.0090	---	---

R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1409	0.1470
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1105	0.1168

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

I then interacted a participant’s racial identity with the treatment conditions; however, these results were less conclusive (the results of these models can be found in my Appendix). The ethnic and racial treatments did not seem to prompt different types of intervention support across various racial identities. Even among non-Hispanic whites, support for intervention was about the same as expressed by other racial groups. Puzzled by this finding, I decided to interact my treatment conditions with a participant’s partisanship. Given the fact that my survey experiment was administered in 2020 during a campaign year and the Black Lives Matter movement, I theorized that maybe the ethnic and racial treatments were more effective among Democratic participants. As can be seen in Table 3.7 below, my intuition was correct. The ethnic and racial treatments significantly increased support for both neutral interventions and interventions biased towards the rebels among Democrat participants and support for the rebels was actually significantly less likely among non-Democrats in the ethnic treatment condition. These results provide interesting support for my brand awareness hypothesis. Essentially what these results demonstrate is that certain narratives are more or less effective depending on a participant’s political party. Therefore, political parties may play an important role in priming individuals to see some cleavages as more salient and more important than others, increasing brand awareness for certain identity cleavages. Although initially not a part of my original theory, I believe that this interaction effect between rebel group branding and political party is worth exploring in more detail in future research.

Table 3.7: Interaction between Democrat and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.396 (.386)	-.247 (.456)	-.592* (.345)	.283 (.258)	.026 (.313)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.007 (.420)	-.628 (.438)	-.209 (.348)	-.163 (.264)	-.249 (.320)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.045 (.395)	-.934 (.413)	.060 (.333)	-.230 (.250)	-.197 (.303)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.544 (.404)	.573 (.602)	-.217 (.357)	.323 (.273)	.270 (.331)
Communist Rebel Treatment	-.038 (.423)	-.343 (.451)	-.022 (.348)	.097 (.262)	.117 (.317)
Interactions					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment*Democrat	-.454 (.467)	1.302** (.635)	.911** (.424)	.336 (.317)	.756* (.384)
Black Rebel Treatment*Democrat	-.183 (.497)	1.060* (.542)	.189 (.420)	.630* (.320)	.776** (.388)
Christian Rebel Treatment*Democrat	.092 (.472)	1.728*** (.565)	-.084 (.408)	.654** (.309)	.601 (.375)
Shiite Rebel Treatment*Democrat	-.558 (.476)	-.076 (.683)	.079 (.423)	.035 (.325)	.041 (.394)
Communist Rebel Treatment*Democrat	.121 (.496)	1.112* (.579)	.112 (.422)	.380 (.320)	.379 (.387)
Controls					
Democrat	.219 (.358)	-.710* (.404)	-.033 (.305)	-.286 (.231)	-.297 (.280)
Male	-.314** (.132)	-.323* (.169)	-.125 (.118)	-.079 (.090)	-.136 (.109)
Evangelical	.066 (.209)	-.325 (.245)	.422** (.199)	-.350** (.144)	-.169 (.175)
Non-Hispanic White	-.101 (.140)	.452** (.189)	-.148 (.127)	.267 (.096)	.206* (.117)
Parent's Income	.026 (.038)	-.054 (.050)	.080** (.034)	.024 (.026)	.050 (.032)
Ideology	-.047 (.057)	-.228*** (.069)	-.015 (.050)	-.180*** (.038)	-.184*** (.046)
US Interests	.028 (.056)	-.049 (.073)	-.079 (.051)	-.084** (.039)	-.135*** (.047)
World Order	.008 (.058)	.214*** (.074)	.138*** (.052)	.102** (.039)	.150*** (.048)
Constant	-.927** (.451)	1.986*** (.545)	-.201 (.386)	2.210*** (.293)	2.770*** (.355)
N	530	528	528	528	528
Log pseudolikelihood	-269.145	-153.603	-344.250	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	16.16	74.81	38.33	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.5827	0.0000	0.0035	---	---

R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1617	0.1525
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1321	0.1225

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Finally, one more significant finding from these interaction models based on race that is worth discussing is that non-Hispanic whites were significantly less likely to support communist rebels, whereas non-white (particularly those who identified as Hispanic) participants were significantly more likely to support the communist rebels. Thus, the white students in my sample were much more likely to fall in line with my predictions regarding the communist rebel treatment than non-white students. One contributing factor to this interesting finding could be the fact that approximately 42% of my sample grew up speaking a different language, other than English, in their home. This means that a significant number of students from my sample population have parents who are most likely not originally from the United States. Therefore, it makes sense that the communist brand did not elicit as strong of a sentiment among my non-white participants when compared to the white participants in my sample. This interaction effect, thus sheds light on the counterintuitive results found in the first part of my analysis that demonstrated higher levels of support for rebels with a communist brand.

Implications and Future Research

Overall, what my survey experiment has demonstrated, is that rebel group branding indeed has an effect on public support for external intervention. Furthermore, the type and level of intervention supported, also varies with a rebel group's brand. I also have demonstrated that there is an interaction effect between various participant identities and rebel group branding, ultimately providing support for my brand awareness and brand loyalty hypotheses. These results

have several key implications for future research. To begin, it is evident that perceptions matter and that public support for intervention can be manipulated by framing the conflict in a particular way. Therefore, the strategic decisions of rebel groups, elites, and/or the media can potentially have a significant impact on the public's appetite for intervention, depending on how the conflict gets framed. In a world where individuals have very little knowledge and understanding of civil conflicts, any piece of information that is given to them can have a significant impact of their support for intervention. Although heuristics can be useful for making quick decisions, they do not always give individuals an accurate picture of the situation at hand. As a result, when rebel group brands serve as a mental shortcut for determining what the conflict is about and what side they should support (if any) in a civil conflict, individuals can potentially be misled in their support for external intervention. Secondly, my results demonstrate that there is merit to disaggregating among different types of intervention when examining public support for intervention. Indeed, not all interventions are created equal, and my results demonstrate that individuals are more or less responsive to different types of intervention depending on a rebel group's brand. Therefore, there is room for future research to further analyze why various types of intervention receive more or less support in different conflicts. Finally, although my results are limited due to the fact that they were derived from a small sample of UC Davis students, they do offer a causal explanation for intervention support that cannot be derived simply from existing public opinion data. As a result, this paper provides an example for how survey experiment data can shed some light on public opinion and foreign policy.

References:

- Abramowitz, Alan I. (Jan. 20, 2014). "How race and religion have polarized American voters." *The Washington Post* Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/20/how-race-and-religion-have-polarized-american-voters/>
- Aldrich, John H., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp. 2006. "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 477-502.
- Almond, Gabriel A. 1950. *The American People and Foreign Policy*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Boettcher III., William A. and Michael D. Cobb. 2006. "Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty Framing and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6): 831-854.
- Burris, Val. 2008. "From Vietnam to Iraq: Continuity and Change in Between-Group Differences in Support for Military Action." *Social Problems* 55(4): 443-479.
- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2007. "Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?" *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 69(1): 1-27.
- Dessart L., Morgan-Thomas A., Veloutsou C. (2016) What Drives Anti-brand Community Behaviours: An Examination of Online Hate of Technology Brands. In: Obal M., Krey N., Bushardt C. (eds) *Let's Get Engaged! Crossing the Threshold of Marketing's Engagement Era*. *Developments in Marketing Science: Proceedings of the Academy of Marketing Science*. Springer, Cham
- Dieck H. (2015) *The Intervention in Rwanda*. In: *The Influence of Public Opinion on Post-Cold War US Military Interventions*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137519238_5
- Drezner, Daniel W. 2008. "The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion." *Perspectives on Politics* 6(1): 51-70.
- Fang, Marina and Amber Ferguson. "Bill Clinton Is Sorry For A Lot Of Things." *Huffington Post* July 17, 2015. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bill-clinton-is-sorry_n_55a83397e4b0896514d0e220
- Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 2008. "The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support for War: An Experimental Approach." *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 95-106.
- He, Hongwei, Yan Li and Llyod Harris. 2012. "Social identity perspective on brand loyalty." *Journal of Business Research* 65: 648-657.
- Herrmann, Richard K., Philip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser. 1999. "Mass Public Decisions to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 553-573.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2006. "Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes Toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing." *International Organization* 60: 755-780.
- "How to forecast an American's vote." November 3, 2018. *The Economist*. Retrieved from: <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/11/03/how-to-forecast-an-americans-vote>
- Johns, Robert and Graeme A. M. Davies. 2012. "Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilizations? Target States and Support for War in Britain and the United States." *The Journal of Politics* 74(4): 1038-1052.
- Kertzer, Joshua D. and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2017. "A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3): 543-558.
- Kopp, Carol M. "Brand Loyalty." *Investopedia*, September 11, 2019. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brand-loyalty.asp>

Kopp, Carol M. "Brand Awareness." *Investopedia*, July 26, 2020.
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/brandawareness.asp>

Langlois, Shawn. November 2, 2019. "More than a third of millennials polled approve of communism." *MarketWatch*. Retrieved from: <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/for-millennials-socialism-and-communism-are-hot-capitalism-is-not-2019-10-28>

Liberman, Peter. 2006. "An Eye for an Eye: Public Support for War Against Evildoers." *International Organization* 60: 687-722.

Liberman, Peter. 2008. "Retributive Support for International Punishment and Torture." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(2): 285-306.

Lippmann, Walter. 1955. *Essays in the Public Philosophy*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Newport, Frank. April 10, 2017. "U.S. Support for Syria Strikes Rates Low in Historical Context." *GALLUP*. Retrieved from: <https://news.gallup.com/poll/208334/support-syria-strikes-rates-low-historical-context.aspx>

Reinhart, RJ. "U.S. Views Mixed on War in Afghanistan." Gallup, September 11, 2019.
<https://news.gallup.com/poll/266546/views-mixed-war-afghanistan.aspx>

Smith, Tom W. 1983. "The Polls: American Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union and Communism." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 47(2): 277-292.

Chapter 3 Appendix:

Appendix Table 3.1: Interaction between Non-Hispanic White and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	-.118 (.262)	.379 (.320)	.135 (.243)	.512*** (.185)	.567** (.225)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.396 (.278)	.104 (.304)	.110 (.243)	.432** (.188)	.476** (.228)
Christian Rebel Treatment	-.146 (.275)	-.028 (.299)	.102 (.250)	.242 (.192)	.233 (.233)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	-.004 (.256)	.381 (.323)	-.005 (.237)	.308* (.185)	.304 (.224)
Communist Rebel Treatment	-.068 (.264)	.577* (.333)	.377 (.246)	.356* (.187)	.475** (.227)
Interactions					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment* Non-Hispanic White	.732 (.481)	Predicts success completely	-.481 (.421)	.022 (.319)	-.106 (.387)
Black Rebel Treatment* Non-Hispanic White	.812 (.495)	-.046 (.541)	-.567 (.412)	-.437 (.312)	-.532 (.379)
Christian Rebel Treatment* Non-Hispanic White	.728 (.472)	.083 (.518)	-.320 (.404)	-.129 (.304)	-.118 (.369)
Shiite Rebel Treatment* Non-Hispanic White	.547 (.475)	.482 (.652)	-.498 (.407)	.086 (.310)	-.050 (.376)
Communist Rebel Treatment* Non-Hispanic White	.455 (.489)	-.505 (.572)	-.911** (.418)	.016 (.314)	-.250 (.381)
Controls					
Non-Hispanic White	-.665* (.372)	.437 (.392)	.338 (.305)	.349 (.228)	.396 (.276)
Male	-.334** (.132)	-.283* (.165)	-.124 (.117)	-.066 (.090)	-.123 (.109)
Parent's Education	.025 (.038)	-.066 (.048)	.076** (.034)	.018 (.026)	.043 (.032)
Ideology	-.047 (.056)	-.238*** (.067)	-.022 (.049)	-.183*** (.038)	-.181*** (.046)
Democrat	.040 (.150)	.160 (.185)	.181 (.134)	.048 (.103)	.128 (.125)
Evangelical	.048 (.211)	-.382 (.242)	.382* (.197)	-.360** (.145)	-.191 (.176)
US Interests	.021 (.056)	-.061 (.072)	-.077 (.050)	-.092** (.039)	-.144*** (.047)
World Order	.011 (.057)	.202*** (.073)	.128** (.051)	.098 (.040)	.141*** (.048)
Constant	-.617 (.388)	1.518*** (.489)	-.496 (.351)	2.011*** (.268)	2.488*** (.325)
N	530	499	530	528	528

Log pseudolikelihood	-269.274	-158.633	-345.425	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	15.90	57.29	35.98	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.5997	0.0000	0.0071	---	---
R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1550	0.1437
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1251	0.1134

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 3.2: Interaction between Hispanic and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.377 (.274)	.513 (.349)	-.230 (.247)	.489** (.190)	.430* (.230)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.108 (.291)	.148 (.309)	-.220 (.241)	.181 (.186)	.176 (.225)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.280 (.274)	.112 (.300)	-.034 (.242)	.241 (.184)	.263 (.223)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.242 (.266)	.426 (.318)	-.276 (.233)	.336* (.180)	.263 (.218)
Communist Rebel Treatment	.235 (.276)	.185 (.310)	-.067 (.242)	.357* (.186)	.363 (.225)
Interactions					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment* Hispanic	-.630 (.444)	.275 (.582)	.460 (.402)	.115 (.309)	.267 (.374)
Black Rebel Treatment* Hispanic	-.019 (.458)	.129 (.506)	.332 (.402)	.375 (.313)	.401 (.379)
Christian Rebel Treatment* Hispanic	-.374 (.442)	.059 (.481)	.046 (.398)	.019 (.308)	-.053 (.372)
Shiite Rebel Treatment* Hispanic	-.058 (.442)	.608 (.652)	.115 (.406)	-.036 (.318)	-.041 (.385)
Communist Rebel Treatment* Hispanic	-.380 (.453)	1.348* (.718)	.209 (.405)	.026 (.314)	.061 (.380)
Controls					
Hispanic	.378 (.317)	-.272 (.341)	-.215 (.282)	-.239 (.218)	-.252 (.264)
Male	-.366*** (.131)	-.279* (.161)	-.120 (.116)	-.077 (.090)	-.135 (.109)
Parent's Education	.033 (.038)	.007 (.048)	.059* (.034)	.037 (.026)	.055* (.032)

Ideology	-.049 (.056)	-.220*** (.066)	-.011 (.049)	.177*** (.038)	-.178*** (.046)
Democrat	.028 (.148)	.165 (.182)	.172 (.132)	.037 (.026)	.120 (.124)
Evangelical	.059 (.210)	-.383 (.238)	.402** (.197)	-.353** (.146)	-.175 (.177)
US Interests	.022 (.055)	-.086 (.070)	-.072 (.050)	-.100** (.039)	-.151*** (.047)
World Order	.008 (.057)	.177** (.071)	.143*** (.051)	.093** (.040)	.144*** (.048)
Constant	-.988** (.418)	1.464*** (.510)	-.246 (.369)	2.158*** (.285)	2.665 (.345)
N	542	540	540	540	540
Log pseudolikelihood	-276.142	-167.286	-355.346	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	18.28	58.51	33.27	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.4376	0.0000	0.0155	---	---
R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1401	0.1385
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1104	0.1087

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 3.3: Interaction between Asian and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.023 (.248)	.454 (.334)	-.004 (.232)	.449** (.177)	.488** (.214)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.025 (.255)	.075 (.301)	-.230 (.231)	.290 (.178)	.256 (.216)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.011 (.246)	-.013 (.290)	-.055 (.227)	.177 (.174)	.173 (.210)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.125 (.248)	.923** (.403)	-.294 (.230)	.472*** (.178)	.371* (.216)
Communist Rebel Treatment	.037 (.253)	.798** (.371)	-.108 (.233)	.421** (.178)	.363* (.216)
Interactions					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment*Asian	.287 (.521)	.357 (.652)	-.068 (.452)	.305 (.349)	.196 (.422)
Black Rebel Treatment* Asian	-.415 (.566)	.195 (.555)	.511 (.436)	.001 (.337)	.157 (.408)
Christian Rebel Treatment* Asian	.242 (.532)	.315 (.545)	.211 (.451)	.239 (.348)	.259 (.422)
Shiite Rebel Treatment* Asian	.112 (.506)	-.762 (.604)	.434 (.432)	-.321 (.335)	-.153 (.406)

Communist Rebel Treatment* Asian	142 (.515)	-.852 (.581)	.600 (.443)	-.131 (.338)	.152 (.410)
Controls					
Asian	-.350 (.392)	-.216 (.386)	-.290 (.320)	-.144 (.248)	-.240 (.300)
Male	-.348*** (.133)	-.251 (.166)	-.125 (.117)	-.067 (.090)	-.122 (.109)
Parent's Education	-.043 (.056)	.009 (.046)	.062** (.032)	.054** (.024)	.073** (.030)
Ideology	-.043 (.056)	-.224*** (.067)	-.004 (.050)	-.178*** (.038)	-.177*** (.046)
Democrat	.076 (.150)	.244 (.185)	.174 (.134)	.078 (.104)	.153 (.125)
Evangelical	.093 (.205)	-.359 (.239)	.428*** (.197)	-.355** (.144)	-.171 (.175)
US Interests	.039 (.056)	-.068 (.072)	-.069 (.050)	-.097** (.039)	-.147*** (.047)
World Order	.022 (.058)	.207*** (.074)	.134** (.052)	.094** (.040)	.138*** (.049)
Constant	-.835** (.377)	1.294*** (.466)	-.288 (.337)	2.009*** (.259)	2.543*** (.314)
N	531	529	529	529	529
Log pseudolikelihood	-269.691	-159.679	-346.825	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	18.11	62.91	34.38	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.4484	0.0000	0.0113	---	---
R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1470	0.1386
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1470	0.1082

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 3.4: Interaction between Black and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.149 (.223)	.560* (.287)	-.043 (.203)	.542*** (.157)	.544*** (.190)
Black Rebel Treatment	-.095 (.230)	.178 (.257)	-.054 (.200)	.283* (.155)	.304 (.187)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.122 (.222)	.160 (.252)	.012 (.200)	.272* (.154)	.277 (.186)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.113 (.219)	.552** (.277)	-.161 (.197)	.350** (.154)	.301 (.186)
Communist Rebel Treatment	.078 (.230)	.474* (.280)	.047 (.206)	.383** (.159)	.401** (.192)
Interactions					

Ethnic Rebel Treatment*Black	Predicts failure perfectly	Predicts success perfectly	Predicts success perfectly	-.267 (.706)	.012 (.853)
Black Rebel Treatment* Black	Predicts failure perfectly	-1.076 (1.009)	-.563 (.922)	.006 (.705)	-.269 (.851)
Christian Rebel Treatment* Black	Predicts failure perfectly	-1.790* (1.074)	-.005 (.961)	-.914 (.706)	-.957 (.853)
Shiite Rebel Treatment* Black	.943 (.966)	Predicts success perfectly	-.029 (.922)	.506 (.714)	.444 (.863)
Communist Rebel Treatment* Black	-.201 (.759)	-.658 (.930)	.154 (.747)	-.072 (.556)	-.028 (.672)
Controls					
Black	.306 (.546)	.347 (.633)	.251 (.514)	.104 (.393)	.156 (.475)
Male	-.350*** (.131)	-.284* (.163)	-.125 (.117)	-.068 (.091)	-.127 (.109)
Parent's Education	.024 (.035)	-.005 (.045)	.062** (.031)	.053** (.025)	.072** (.030)
Ideology	-.044 (.056)	-.218*** (.066)	-.009 (.049)	-.177*** (.038)	-.178*** (.046)
Democrat	.053 (.150)	.138 (.183)	.164 (.133)	.056 (.104)	.130 (.125)
Evangelical	.099 (.206)	-.308 (.235)	.397** (.194)	-.337** (.145)	-.163 (.175)
US Interests	.035 (.056)	-.082 (.072)	-.071 (.050)	-.100** (.039)	-.150*** (.047)
World Order	.003 (.058)	.168** (.072)	.138*** (.052)	.084** (.040)	.131*** (.049)
Constant	-.857 (.381)	1.468*** (.466)	-.368 (.338)	2.014*** (.262)	2.524*** (.316)
N	522	523	526	529	529
Log pseudolikelihood	-268.640	-162.928	-346.754	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	15.73	54.91	30.92	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.4001	0.0000	0.0204	---	---
R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1406	0.1374
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---	---	0.1103	0.1069

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Appendix Table 3.5: Interaction between Non-White and Treatments

	Support for Gov't (Military and Foreign Aid)	Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Rebel Support (Sanctions and Military Support)	Continuous Measure of Neutral Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping)	Continuous Measure of Rebel Support (Humanitarian Aid, Diplomatic Support, Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Military Support)
--	---	---	---	---	--

Treatments					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment	.614 (.406)	.379 (.320)	-.346 (.345)	.535** (.260)	.460 (.316)
Black Rebel Treatment	.417 (.408)	.058 (.445)	-.457 (.332)	-.005 (.249)	-.056 (.303)
Christian Rebel Treatment	.582 (.386)	.055 (.430)	-.218 (.321)	.113 (.238)	.116 (.289)
Shiite Rebel Treatment	.543 (.400)	.864 (.565)	-.503 (.331)	.394 (.249)	.255 (.302)
Communist Rebel Treatment	.387 (.416)	.072 (.466)	-.534 (.340)	.372 (.254)	.225 (.308)
Interactions					
Ethnic Rebel Treatment*Non-white	-.732 (.481)	Omitted because of collinearity	.481 (.421)	-.022 (.319)	.106 (.387)
Black Rebel Treatment* Non-white	-.812 (.495)	.046 (.541)	.567 (.412)	.437 (.312)	.532 (.379)
Christian Rebel Treatment* Non-white	-.728 (.472)	-.083 (.518)	.320 (.404)	.129 (.304)	.118 (.369)
Shiite Rebel Treatment* Non-white	-.547 (.475)	-.482 (.652)	.498 (.407)	-.086 (.310)	.050 (.376)
Communist Rebel Treatment* Non-white	-.455 (.489)	.505 (.572)	.911** (.417)	-.016 (.314)	.250 (.381)
Controls					
Non-white	.665* (.372)	-.437 (.392)	-.338 (.305)	-.349 (.228)	-.396 (.276)
Male	-.334** (.132)	-.283* (.165)	-.124 (.117)	-.066 (.090)	-.123 (.109)
Parent's Education	.025 (.038)	-.066 (.048)	.076** (.034)	.018 (.026)	.043 (.032)
Ideology	-.047 (.056)	-.238*** (.067)	-.002 (.049)	-.183*** (.038)	-.181*** (.046)
Democrat	.040 (.150)	.160 (.185)	.181 (.134)	.048 (.103)	.128 (.125)
Evangelical	.048 (.211)	-.382 (.242)	.382* (.197)	-.360** (.145)	-.191 (.176)
US Interests	.021 (.056)	-.061 (.072)	-.077 (.050)	-.092** (.039)	-.144*** (.047)
World Order	.011 (.057)	.202*** (.073)	.128** (.051)	.098** (.040)	.141*** (.048)
Constant	-1.281*** (.469)	1.955 (.553)	-.158 (.399)	2.360*** (.303)	2.885*** (.368)
N	530	499	528	528	528
Log pseudolikelihood	-269.274	-158.633	-345.425	---	---
Chi ² likelihood ratio	15.90	57.29	35.98	---	---
prob > chi ²	0.5997	0.000	0.0071	---	---
R-Squared	---	---		0.1550	0.1437
Adjusted R-Squared	---	---		0.1251	0.1134

Significance levels: * p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01