

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Ethnic Armies and Public Trust: How the Ethnic Composition of African Militaries Affects
Public Faith in the Institution

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Master of Arts in African Studies

by

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2018

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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Master of Arts in African Studies

University of California, Los Angeles, 2018

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In a political context where interstate wars are nearly obsolete, most African militaries have turned their attention inward to address more pressing internal security issues. The internal focus of African militaries gives a heightened importance to the relationship between the military and the civilian population, but little research has been done to understand the factors that influence this relationship. Given the importance of ethnicity in guiding political and social interactions, this research project brings together dominant themes from the study of ethnicity and civil-military relations in order to understand the connection between the ethnic composition of African militaries and the variations in trust in the military among a country's ethnic groups. I hypothesized that in countries that perpetuate the practice of ethnic favoritism within the military, co-ethnics of the favored group will show higher levels of trust in the military than non-

co-ethnics of the favored group. Conversely, in countries where there is no overt ethnic favoritism within the military, different ethnic groups will exhibit more uniform levels of trust in the military. Using *Afrobarometer* public opinion surveys and an expanded data set from Harkness identifying countries with ethnically-favored militaries, I conducted a cross-national comparative quantitative study to determine if ethnic favoritism in the military could explain the variation in trust patterns. Although the results are statistically insignificant by conventional standards, the p-value produced given the limited sample size is highly suggestive that ethnic favoritism in African militaries has some measure of influence over the level of trust in the institution among different ethnic groups. It is clear there are other important factors beyond ethnic identity that guide public sentiments towards the military and additional research is necessary to fully flesh out the factors that explain variations in trust in the military, especially among different ethnic groups within the same country.

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The thesis of Kaitlyn Louise Sanborn is approved.

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2018

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my thesis committee, Prof. Dan Posner, Prof. Darin Christensen, and Prof. Ed Keller. Without your patience, careful guidance, and wealth of experience, I would not have been able to write this thesis, much less one on which I am proud to put my name. Your mentorship throughout the process has encouraged me to be confident in my academic work, to take intellectual risks, and to ask hard questions that challenge me to think more deeply about the world. I have no doubt these qualities will serve me well beyond graduate school.

I would also like to thank the International Institute staff, especially Magda Yamamoto, Sandy Valdivieso, and Erica Anjum. Though our relationship began as a professional one, it grew into a friendship that has been an invaluable source of support and encouragement to me throughout this program.

Thank you also to Olga Ivanova, whose endless patience as my Swahili teacher has given me a better grasp of Swahili in just two years, than my six years studying Spanish. Your insights from your own research experience were a great help in navigating my own research pursuits here at UCLA.

A special thanks also goes to my roommate, Jianchao Lai. You have been in the trenches with me these past two years and your friendship has helped me reach the finish line. I will miss you as I head off to Texas, but I have no doubt that you will continue to do great things here in Los Angeles!

I would also like to thank my family. You have always believed in me even when I doubted myself, and my time here at graduate school has been no exception. Thank you for your encouragement, your prayers, and your enthusiasm in helping me achieve my goals.

Lastly, I would like to thank my fiancé, Matt. This year has been a busy one for us as you completed pilot training, I wrote my thesis, and we planned a wedding! Thank you for your relentless love and support that has helped me see this project to fruition. Amidst the chaos, you have always made our relationship a priority, ensuring that our individual achievements were never at the expense of our collective growth. Despite hectic schedules, the challenges of living on opposite sides of the country, and the demands of our individual pursuits, we have continued to grow together as a couple and I am excited to embark on the next chapter of our lives side-by-side.

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the factors that guide public sentiments toward the military is a pressing issue in many African countries. Although a military's primary duty is to guard against external threats to the state's existence, many states, especially those in Africa, have used their militaries to address internal security issues as well. The internal duties of the armed forces vary based on the needs of the country. In some countries, the military is used to bolster policing activity, such as the employment of South African Defence Force personnel to apprehend criminals and undocumented people living in the country,¹ or the deployment of paramilitary units to protect polling places and quell riots during the August 2017 presidential elections in Kenya.² In other countries, militaries are dealing with much more robust internal problems, like the insurgencies simmering in the Sahel region³ and the Lake Chad Basin.⁴ As militaries look inward, their relationship with the civilian populace becomes an important factor in their effectiveness as a security force and their representation of the state.

Many factors affect the relationship between the military and the populace. A Western-centric perspective may be prone to expect that the professionalism, discipline, and effectiveness of the military are the most critical factors in guiding public sentiment towards the military, but

¹ Guy Martin, "6,000 SANDF troops deployed on internal and external missions," *defenceWeb*, last updated June 24, 2015, accessed February 1, 2018, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39649:6-000-sandf-troops-deployed-on-internal-and-external-missions&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242.

² "'Kill Those Criminals': Security Forces Violations in Kenya's August 2017 Elections," *Human Rights Watch*, last updated October 15, 2017, accessed February 3, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/15/kill-those-criminals/security-forces-violations-kenyas-august-2017-elections>.

³ Conway Waddington, "The Battle for the Sahel: Confronting Islamist Terror Groups Throughout the Region," *In On Africa*, last updated January 20, 2016, accessed February 2, 2018, <https://www.inonafrica.com/2016/01/20/the-battle-for-the-sahel-confronting-islamist-terror-groups-throughout-the-region/>.

⁴ "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," *International Crisis Group*, Africa Report N°245 (February 27, 2017).

in an African context, there are other important qualities to consider. In deeply fractured African societies, where ethnic identities often compete with national ones, ethnic affiliations play a prominent role in the political and social lives of many citizens. Although these ethnic identities coexist alongside national ones and their importance and salience may vary depending on the situation,⁵ ethnic connections create certain expectations of appropriate in-group behavior, especially the treatment of other co-ethnics. Consequently, ethnicity is often a foundation for the formation of political parties, guides voting patterns,⁶ and creates the backbone of patron-client networks that link political supporters to their leaders.⁷

Militaries are not exempt from this phenomenon. In weak African states, the head executive must secure his regime against a number of potential threats and challenges. The military can be both a threat to power, in the form of a coup d'état, and an asset in repressing other threats. As a result, many leaders rely on the bonds of ethnicity to bind the military's loyalty to himself. Through targeted recruitment of co-ethnics into the military and the officer corps, placing co-ethnics in prominent leadership roles, or establishing ethnically-based paramilitary groups to counter-balance the military, the leader can flood the security sector with his co-ethnics that are less likely to revolt against him and willing to repress other internal challenges.⁸ When a military becomes dominated by members of a particular ethnic group due to the practice of ethnic favoritism, a situation which some scholars have described as an "ethnic

⁵ Benn Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner, "Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 2 (April 2010): 494-510.

⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 318-319.

⁷ Philip Roessler, *Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 13.

⁸ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 28-47.

army”,⁹ the military becomes a symbol of that ethnic group, rather than the state at large. Those that share an ethnic connection with the dominant group may have greater trust and confidence in the institution, on account of their shared ethnicity, than members of ethnic groups that have been excluded from or discriminated against in the military.

Research Question

The primary research question is whether co-ethnics of the favored ethnic groups in African militaries exhibit higher levels of trust in the military than non-co-ethnics. I hypothesized that in public opinion surveys co-ethnics of the favored ethnic group in the military are likely to exhibit higher levels of trust in the military than non-co-ethnics of the favored group. Conversely, in countries where the military is more nationally representative due to the lack of intentional policies of ethnic favoritism, public opinion surveys are likely to show more uniform levels of trust across ethnic groups within the country. In order to tease out this relationship, I used several rounds of *Afrobarometer* survey data collected in 26 African countries from 2005 to 2017. These surveys collect information on a plethora of societal factors and issues, including ethnic demography and trust in the military. The measure of ethnic favoritism comes from an expanded data set provided by Harkness who compiled her data set using primary and secondary sources to determine whether a leader perpetuated a practice of favoring his co-ethnics within the military, which she describes as an “ethnic army”.¹⁰ Her data set was limited to leaders who reached a presidential term limit during their time in office so using her coding methods, I expanded the data set to include all cases for which *Afrobarometer* data is available. Using these two resources, I executed a cross-national comparative quantitative

⁹ Kristin A. Harkness, “Military loyalty and the failure of democratization in Africa: how ethnic armies shape the capacity of the president to defy term limits,” *Democratization* 24, no. 5 (2016): 801-818.

¹⁰ Harkness, “Military loyalty and the failure of democratization in Africa.”

study to determine the difference in sentiments between co-ethnics of the favored ethnic group in the military and non-co-ethnics.

Although this study produced a statistically insignificant finding, the resulting p-value given the limited sample size is highly suggestive that ethnic favoritism in African militaries has some measure of influence over the level of trust in the institution among different ethnic groups. Several countries also broke from the proposed hypotheses, leading me to believe that there are other important factors beyond ethnicity that guide public sentiments towards the military. The varying patterns of trust in the military across different countries cannot be adequately explained by this hypothesis and therefore further research is necessary to fully flesh out the factors that explain variations in trust in the military, especially among different ethnic groups within the same country.

Definitions

For the purpose of this study, following Cynthia Enloe, I define ethnic groups as socio-cultural groups that see themselves as being bound by a set of shared characteristics that are collectively valued.¹¹ Given the imperatives of neopatrimonialism common throughout Africa today, national leaders, once in power, tend to favor their own ethnic kin, including in the recruitment and leadership appointments in the national military. Ethnic favoritism within the military can take a number of forms. These include targeted recruitment of certain ethnic groups into the armed forces at large, stacking the officer corps with a certain ethnic group, promoting and appointing members of a particular ethnic group to the most powerful and influential positions in the military, and creating parallel security forces dominated by an ethnic group and

¹¹ Cynthia H. Enloe, "The Military Uses of Ethnicity," *Millennium* 4, no. 3 (December 1975): 221.

accountable only to the head executive.¹² A country with any one of these practices present was coded as having an ethnically-favored military.

Limitations

The scope of this thesis is limited by several constraints. *Afrobarometer* collected its first round of data in 1999, but did not collect data on respondents' ethnic identities until Round 3 (2005), meaning there is just over 10 years of survey data available from which to draw conclusions. Furthermore, although the *Afrobarometer* conducts its survey in 36 African countries, not every country is included in every round of data, and not all countries include information about ethnic identity.¹³ This resulted in some gaps in the data and required that several countries be excluded from the analysis, leading to a sample size of only 26 countries. Since these limitations only provide a partial picture of the entire post-independence era, this research project is unable to provide a general theory that could be applied beyond the context studied. These limitations, however, do not significantly undermine the relevance or legitimacy of the observations presented here. As a result, this project can still provide qualified insights into the connection between ethnicity and public trust in African militaries and provide grounds for future exploration of the subject.

Significance

A country's military is one of the most fundamental state institutions, created to secure its borders and defend against threats, foreign and domestic. While historically the most significant threats came from outside a country's borders, militaries are becoming increasingly concerned

¹² Samuel Decalo, *Civil-Military Relations in Africa* (Gainesville: Florida Academic Press Inc., 1998), 114-122.

¹³ The countries for which there is not a specific question about the respondent's ethnic identity are generally countries where ethnicity is not a prominent factor, such as Egypt or Cape Verde. Countries that did not have information about respondents' ethnic identities were excluded from this analysis. Excluded countries include Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, Mauritius (because it does not have an armed forces), Morocco, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Swaziland, and Tunisia.

with the threats to stability and security inside the country. In countries where this is the case, citizens are afforded a much more intimate exposure to their state's military, for better or worse. Militaries that inspire the confidence of the populace have an easier time doing their job and have a better working relationship with the populace to actually address whatever the security concern is. Animosity and distrust between the military and the population fosters an environment of fear that affects the military's ease of operation and effectiveness when addressing internal security concerns.¹⁴

LITERATURE REVIEW

Ethnicity and Society

There is an extensive body of literature about what constitutes an ethnic group, a full survey of which is beyond the scope of this research project. Primordialists, structuralists, and instrumentalists debate the merits of each school of thought, but the reality is probably somewhere in the middle, as Wolff explains:

“[E]thnic identity should perhaps rather be seen as something that has roots in a group's culture, and historical experiences and traditions, but that is also dependent upon contemporary opportunities that can be a useful instrument for mobilizing people for social, political, or economic purposes that may or may not be related directly to their ethnic origins.”¹⁵

For the sake of this study, ethnic groups are “defined by ascriptive differences, whether the indicium of group identity is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of

¹⁴ This understanding is rooted in the heavy emphasis on the concept of “winning hearts and minds” that emerged during the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and has since remained a prominent concept in understanding counterinsurgency operations. By winning hearts and minds, the military force garners legitimacy among the population to carry out its counterinsurgency activities and secures the loyalty of the population, thus denying insurgents a safe-haven within those communities. Armed forces that fail to achieve this legitimacy and trust have a strained relationship with the civilian population that can make it difficult, if not impossible to effectively combat the threat. See Robert Egnell, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’? A Critical Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan,” *Civil Wars* 12, no. 3 (2010): 282-303.

¹⁵ Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 36-37.

common origin, or some combination thereof.”¹⁶ Furthermore, these characteristics are “collectively held and collectively invested with value”¹⁷ by the members of the group, so that they are able to identify other members of the group, as well as non-members.

The existence of these sub-national identities does not automatically put these groups at odds with each other, but it does create an opportunity for conflict. Horowitz describes how the pursuit of political power by an ethnic group is both a means to an end and an end in and of itself. Power is an end because it confirms the ethnic group’s status within society and protects it from the threat of domination from another ethnic group, which inherently jeopardizes the group’s status. This social recognition fulfills a group’s collective self-esteem needs.¹⁸ Conversely, as a means, political power allows the ethnic group to access state resources.

Many African political systems are characterized by neopatrimonialism, where “the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office.”¹⁹ In such systems, political support is exchanged for pay-offs from the patron in power. A candidate’s ethnic identity is an important cue to voters; voters tend to favor co-ethnic candidates because they operate off the assumption that a co-ethnic leader, when in power, will target their community with material rewards for their political support. If, however, there is additional information about the co-ethnic candidate available to voters, specifically that casts doubt on his ability to deliver those benefits once in power, even co-ethnicity is not enough to garner the political support of his co-ethnics.²⁰ As a

¹⁶ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 17-18.

¹⁷ Cynthia H. Enloe, “The Military Uses of Ethnicity,” *Millennium* 4, no. 3 (December 1975): 221.

¹⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 187.

¹⁹ Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (July 1994): 458.

²⁰ Elizabeth Carlson, “Ethnic Voting and Accountability in Africa,” *World Politics* 67, no. 2 (April 2015): 353-385.

result, co-ethnicity provides a shortcut for voters to evaluate candidates in information-poor contexts²¹ but that support rests on the expectation that the candidate will favor his co-ethnics once in power. Recognizing this, however, most African leaders are cognizant of the expectations of their supporters and make efforts to visibly show that they are able to follow through on their end of the bargain.²²

Ethnicity and Trust

Although ethnic cleavages in society cut horizontally across all sectors and classes, the neopatrimonial system introduces a vertical relationship between ethnic groups based on which group controls state power, most notably concentrated in the position of the head executive. Co-ethnics of the ethnic group in power can more easily identify with the state because the state is perceived to represent their group, whereas groups that are excluded from state power are unable to identify with the state because they are politically unrepresented.²³ Ethnic domination by another ethnic group can become a major source of tension within society, since it drives fears that “an unranked system [of ethnic groups] may be transformed into a ranked one.”²⁴ The group that controls the state has the power to deal with a plethora of fundamental issues like “citizenship, electoral systems, designation of official languages and religions, [and] the rights of groups to a “special position” in the polity.”²⁵ The choices they make concerning those topics have the power to either foster inclusivity of other groups, or to exclude them and threaten their

²¹ Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, “Information and Ethnic Politics in Africa,” *British Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 2 (April 2013): 345-373.

²² Robin Harding and David Stasavage, “What Democracy Does (and Doesn’t Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections,” *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1 (January 2014): 229-245.

²³ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 185.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 188.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 187.

status as equal members of the state. As a result of the influence of neopatrimonialism on African politics, these decisions are often guided by ethnic affiliations, leading to the alienation of excluded ethnic groups and fostering animosity between excluded groups and the state.

This hierarchal structure of “ethnic nepotism” can also exacerbate horizontal ethnic relations, leading to increased levels of distrust between different ethnic groups within the population.²⁶ Even when this distrust does not rise to the level of overt ethnic tension or conflict, it can still significantly inhibit the social cohesion of a population. Researchers have found that overall levels of trust within a society are lower in heterogenous societies compared to more homogenous ones.²⁷ It seems that the ethnic heterogeneity can actually be a barrier to the formation of trust between groups.²⁸ This is because instead of generalized trust across the entire society, ethnically diverse societies often exhibit higher levels of particularized trust, in which trust is extended to an individual’s friends, families, and members of their own group.²⁹ Consequently, individuals in ethnically diverse societies are less likely to participate in broader social activities,³⁰ which can lead to deficiencies in social capital that are vital for societal growth and development.³¹ Even when these groups do interact with each other, exchanges between

²⁶ Daniel Zerfu, Precious Zikhali, and Innocent Kabenga, “Does Ethnicity Matter for Trust? Evidence from Africa,” *Journal of African Economies* 18, no. 1 (June 2008): 153-175.

²⁷ Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no. 4 (November 1997): 1251-1288.

²⁸ Paul Collier, “The Political Economy of Ethnicity,” Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 20–21, 1998, 4-5.

²⁹ Donna Bahry, Mikhail Kosolapov, Polina Kozyreva, and Rick K. Wilson, “Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia,” *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November 2005): 521-532.

³⁰ Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115, no. 3 (August 2000): 847-904.

³¹ Robert D. Putnam, “What Makes Democracy Work?,” *National Civic Review* 82, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 101-107.

groups can actually contribute to increased levels of inter-group distrust, which further exacerbates divisions within society.³²

These intra-group bonds of trust create norms of behaviors that ameliorate social interactions among group members. Trust between individuals lowers transaction cost in contexts where there are no strict means of enforcement, thus increasing the ease of exchange and promoting economic growth.³³ This social cohesion also helps to overcome collective action problems, such as the contribution to the provision of public goods, since a failure to do so can be remediated through social sanctions against the group member.³⁴ Consequently, members of the same ethnic group are more likely to cooperate with each other, where they would be less likely to cooperate with a non-co-ethnic.³⁵ All of these interactions are made possible through the bond of co-ethnicity that facilitates social cohesion and trust between group members.

Ethnicity and the Military

Both the vertical and horizontal facets of ethnic trust have implications for the public sentiment towards the military. In situations where the military does not have direct contact with the population, the relationship between the military and the population is similar to the vertical relationship between the populace and the state. Co-ethnics of the dominant group are likely to be more trusting of the armed forces, on account of the fact that the group's dominance affirms

³² Peter Thisted Dinesen and Kim Mannemar Sønderskov, "Ethnic Diversity and Social Trust: Evidence from the Micro-Context," *American Sociological Review* 80, no. 3 (2015): 550-573.

³³ Paul J. Zak and Stephen Knack, "Trust and Economic Growth," *The Economic Journal* 111 (April 2001): 295-321.

³⁴ Edward Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty, "Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya," *Journal of Public Economics* 89 (December 2005): 2325-2368.

³⁵ James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?," *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 4 (November 2007): 709-725.

their ethnic group's status within society and signals that the armed forces is attuned to and loyal to that ethnic group. When the military is deployed among the population, the horizontal aspects of ethnic relations are more important, since military personnel interact with the population at an interpersonal level. Whether viewing the military from afar or up-close and personal, an individual's ethnic identity and the ethnic composition of the military affect the individual's perception of the armed forces. As Enloe explains:

“It is not just a matter of a military's composition being ethnically skewed, but of the resultant image of the military in the minds of the civilian population. For if the military is the institution most closely identified with, and symbolic of, the nation-state, then the perception of a military “belonging” to one or two ethnic communities rather than to the populace as a whole cannot help but undermine the legitimacy of the nation-state itself.”³⁶

Where little else is known about the military, the military's ethnic composition could be a cue to the population about where its loyalties lie. In the cases of militaries with policies that favor certain ethnic groups, it is clear that the military's ultimate loyalty belongs to the head executive and its ethnic kin, rather than to the state itself or the people therein. This cue is a powerful factor in guiding public sentiments towards the security sector.

Civilian Control of the Military

The origin of these policies of ethnic favoritism within the military stems from the need for the civilian government to control the armed forces. Militaries, by their very nature, are political institutions and, therefore, all militaries play some political roles, whether covert in the form of subtle political influence and pressure or overt in the form of decisive military intervention such as a coup d'état.³⁷ How much of a political role the military is able to play

³⁶ Enloe, 223.

³⁷ Claude E. Welch, Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases for Developing Countries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 35.

depends on the level of control the civilian government has over the uniformed forces. The subordination of the military to civilian rule is a necessary precondition for political stability. This is especially true in countries where civilian governments are weak or ineffective, creating a vulnerability which could be exploited to justify military involvement. As Almond and his colleagues explain:

“The military’s virtual monopoly of coercive resources gives it great potential power, even if it chooses to exercise it behind the scenes. Thus, when agreement fails on aggregation either through democratic or authoritarian party systems, the military may emerge by default as the only force able to maintain orderly government.”³⁸

Without a strong institutionalized culture of civilian supremacy, the state’s military may view its role as the ultimate veto on political matters, with the prerogative to intervene should the civilian government fail to meet certain expectations. An insubordinate military has the power to hold the civilian government hostage, making it clear that the military is the ultimate seat of power within the government.

Recognizing the potential threat an insubordinate military poses to a leader’s regime, civilian governments can employ several different tactics to maintain control of the state’s security apparatus. The ideal method would be for the military to undergo a process of professionalization, whereby the military internalizes “the value of civilian supremacy as part of its ethical makeup.”³⁹ Recognizing their independence from the political realm and their unwavering obedience to the civilian government, a professionalized military has no reason to insert itself into political matters, thus eliminating the risk of military interference.⁴⁰ This

³⁸ Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Kaare Strom, and Russell J. Dalton, *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, 8th ed. (Pearson/Longman: New York, 2004), 94.

³⁹ Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. King, *Military Role and Rule* (Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1974), 6.

⁴⁰ Samuel Decalo, *Civil-Military Relations in Africa* (Gainesville: Florida Academic Press Inc., 1998), 190.

deference for civilian authority is rarely seen in Sub-Saharan Africa, where from 1956 to 2001 there were 80 successful coups d'état and 108 additional failed coup attempts by members of the security sector.⁴¹

Instead of trying to professionalize their militaries, many African heads of state have used other strategies of control to neutralize “potential interventionist impulses of their deeply divided and restless armies.”⁴² These methods of “coup-proofing” rely on securing the loyalty of certain segments of the population and putting them in positions that could effectively counteract or deter any challenge from the rest of the military. Decalo describes this method as the “trade-off” modality of civil-military stability, whereby loyalty is ensured through the distribution of the spoils of the state to key factions or members within the armed forces.⁴³ Because the head of state is the source of those material benefits, the loyal factions within the military are beholden to him, and it is in their best interest to help him maintain his position of power in order to maintain the benefits and status they receive.

In this way, the military becomes an integral part of the vast patronage networks that characterize many African societies. This actively undermines any professionalization within the armed forces, since their loyalty to the head executive is reinforced above any other loyalty to the office of the presidency, a code of conduct, or the constitution. It also prevents the armed forces from developing into a cohesive unit, since it exacerbates cleavages between the favored and neglected factions within the armed forces.

Ethnic Favoritism in the Military

⁴¹ Patrick J. McGowan, “African Military coups d'état, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends, and Distribution,” *The Journal for Modern African Studies* 41, no. 3 (Sep. 2003): 340.

⁴² Decalo, *Civil-Military Relations in Africa*, 196.

⁴³ Decalo, *Civil-Military Relations in Africa*, 132.

Favoritism and patronage within the armed forces follows a similar pattern to that exhibited in the broader society, namely that it falls along ethnic lines.⁴⁴ This was a tactic first employed during the colonial era by colonial administrations that were unable to manage their colonial territories using only Western personnel. As a result, they used a divide-and-rule method of domination of the indigenous populations, choosing certain local people groups through which to govern, often creating ethnic division where there was none before. This policy of favoritism touched every aspect of society: political structures, business enterprises, religious organizations, and the security apparatus. Colonial security structures were often dominated by particular ethnic groups that colonial rulers determined were “warrior tribes” and therefore were best suited for military service. For example, the British colonial administration in Uganda recruited heavily among the northern Acholi people, on account of their perceived “warlike” qualities.⁴⁵ Similarly, about 60% of the soldiers in the Ghanaian Army came from the northern region of the country,⁴⁶ despite the fact that this territory only comprises one-third of the country.⁴⁷ Their policies of ethnic favoritism were also deeply rooted in racist ideologies that dictated a hierarchy of races in which African people groups that looked more European were perceived to be more dependable

⁴⁴ Bruce Berman, Eyoh Dickson, and Will Kymlicka, “Introduction,” in *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*, eds. Bruce Berman, Eyoh Dickson, and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: J. Currey, 2004).

⁴⁵ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 30.

⁴⁶ J. Bayo Adekunle, “Ethnicity and army recruitment in colonial plural societies,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 2 (April 1979): 151-165.

⁴⁷ Howe, *Ambiguous Order*, 30.

and capable of serving the colonial administration.⁴⁸ As a result of targeted recruitment policies, at independence, only one third of the armies in Sub-Saharan Africa were ethnically balanced.⁴⁹

After independence, African leaders inherited the deeply dysfunctional political institutions and imbalanced security structures left behind by colonial administrations and instead of working to remediate the discriminatory policies, many post-colonial states became “the reincarnation of its colonial predecessor.”⁵⁰ They have employed similar policies of ethnic favoritism to secure their regimes against internal challenges. In a neopatrimonial state, especially where private sector economic opportunities are scarce, a government position is a form of patronage, so the preferential recruitment of co-ethnics into the armed forces, especially the officer corps, serves to both reward loyal constituents with visible patronage benefits and to protect the leader from any challenges to his authority.⁵¹ In the higher echelons of the officer corps, co-ethnics or even relatives of the head executive may be given the most prestigious and influential positions within the military hierarchy, such as the Chief of Defense or the leader of a branch of the military, to allow the head of state to keep tabs on the “pulse” of the armed forces.⁵² Even when there are not overt policies of favoritism within the military as a whole, some heads of state benefit from paramilitary groups outside the established military chain of command. These groups are often better equipped than their traditional military counterparts and

⁴⁸ J. ‘Bayo Adekunle, “Ethnicity and army recruitment in colonial plural societies,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, no. 2 (April 1979): 151-165.

⁴⁹ Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977), 39.

⁵⁰ George Klay Kieh Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese, “Introduction: The Military Albatross and Politics in Africa,” in *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, ed. George Klay Kieh, Jr. and Pita Ogaba Agbese (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 4.

⁵¹ Decalo, *Civil-Military Relations in Africa*, 114.

⁵² Decalo, *Civil-Military Relations in Africa*, 117.

report directly to the chief executive, providing an effective counterbalance against any potential threats that may arise from within the military.⁵³ For example, the General Service Units (GSU) in Kenya is a paramilitary group tasked with protecting the president. In 1982, when the Kenyan Air Force attempted a coup d'état against President Daniel arap Moi, the GSU, which Moi had begun to stack with his Kalenjin kinsmen, stepped in to quell the rebellion.⁵⁴ By favoring co-ethnics in this way, leaders both build their political base and indulge their authoritarian and exploitative impulses without jeopardizing their hold on power.

These militaries subordinated through ethnic loyalties are a critical tool for leaders seeking to maintain or expand their presidential powers. Emboldened by the loyal support of the security sector, a leader is free to employ more authoritarian methods of governance including silencing opposition leaders, restricting personal freedoms, intimidating voters, and ignoring the checks and balances of the other branches of government.⁵⁵ Leaders that benefit from a military that favors the president's co-ethnics are also more likely to challenge presidential term limits in order to seek an unconstitutional third term than their peers without ethnically stacked militaries.⁵⁶ In this way, ethnically skewed militaries secure power for leaders who otherwise lack democratic legitimacy.

This instrumentation of ethnicity as a means of controlling the military lies at the intersection of these two fields of study, ethnicity and civil-military relations. Given the extensive research on the affect of ethnicity as a prominent social and political cue that guides

⁵³ Decalo, *Civil-Military Relations in Africa*, 116.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁵⁵ Kristen A. Harkness, "Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for More," *Parameters* 45, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 18.

⁵⁶ Kristen A. Harkness, "Military loyalty and the failure of democratization in Africa: how ethnic armies shape the capacity of presidents to defy term limits," *Democratization* 24, no. 5(2016): 801-818.

interpersonal interactions, social cohesion, and interpersonal trust, I propose that the introduction of ethnic manipulation in the security sector is likely to have an affect on public sentiments towards the institution. The hypotheses examined in this study are an attempt to explore the relationship between the ethnic composition of the military and the levels of trust in the military among different ethnic groups.

HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODS

Hypotheses

Based on a careful reading of the relevant research and given the available data, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: In countries where the head executive has implemented intentional policies of ethnic favoritism within the military, co-ethnics of the favored ethnic group will exhibit higher levels of trust in the army than non-co-ethnics of the favored ethnic group.

Hypothesis 2: In countries where the head executive has not implemented intentional policies of ethnic favoritism in the military, ethnic groups will exhibit uniform levels of trust in the army.

The existence of intentional policies of ethnic favoritism in the military serve as a background condition for separating countries between Hypotheses 1 and 2. In Hypothesis 1, co-ethnicity or non-co-ethnicity with the favored ethnic group is the independent variable, while the level of trust in the military is the dependent variable.

Data

The data used here comes from two sources. The independent variable comes from the Harkness' "ethnic armies" data set. This data set includes coding for all African presidents who reached their term limits from 1995 to 2016. Countries were coded as having an ethnically-favored military if the administration perpetuated the intentional practice of ethnic favoritism within the military, such as targeted recruitment, stacking the officer corps or upper-level leadership, or establishing a parallel military group dominated by the members of the head executive's ethnic group. Her coding methods are based on the head executive's intent to favor his co-ethnics and empirical observations of ethnic imbalance in these levels of the security sector. Since her data set only includes presidents who reached a term limit during their time in office, I followed Harkness' coding practices in order to expand the data set to include all cases for which *Afrobarometer* survey data is available.

The *Afrobarometer* survey data provides the information for the independent and dependent variables. The survey records both the respondents' ethnic identity and reported level of trust in the army.⁵⁷ The survey data is collected in seven "rounds" from 1999 to 2017. Rounds 1 (1999-2001), Round 2 (2002-2003), and Round 4 (2008-2009) were omitted due to the fact that they did not include the questions necessary for this evaluation. Rounds 1 and 2 are excluded because they do not indicate the respondents' ethnic identities⁵⁸ and Round 4 is excluded because it did not include a question about the level of trust in the army. The level of trust in the army is recorded as qualitative increments of "not at all", "just a little", "somewhat", and "a lot". These

⁵⁷ *Afrobarometer* specifically asks about trust in the country's *army*, rather than the military as a whole. Although some countries do have other branches of military service, such as a navy and an air force, these are often substantially smaller than the army and do not carry as much sway as the army. Therefore, I presume that the measure of trust in the army is an adequate indicator of trust in the entire armed forces of the country.

⁵⁸ Rounds 1 and 2 ask about which categorical identity cleavage is most important to the respondent (e.g. ethnicity, religion, class, occupation, etc.) but does not include their specific identities.

measures were converted into quantitative increments of 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in order to execute the quantitative comparison.

Because each round of data spans two to three years, I first had to pair the data from each round with the relevant leader’s regime. Conveniently, the survey is administered in each country over a matter of months, making it easy to identify the leader in power during the several months the survey was conducted in a particular country. In cases where the leader’s regime spanned more than one round of data, the results for co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic levels of trust were averaged to create one input for evaluating Hypothesis 1, in order to better capture the sentiments across the leader’s regime and prevent skewing the data. This choice does have some drawbacks. Policies of ethnic favoritism within the military are not necessarily consistent over the entirety of a leader’s time in office and they may change as circumstances in the country change. Unfortunately, given that *Afrobarometer* survey data is only available every few years and many regimes only capture one round of the survey, it is not possible to pinpoint more specific year-by-year changes in the policies of ethnic favoritism and public sentiments towards the military.

The table below shows the cases included in this study:

Table 1. Cases Included

| Country | President | Term | Ethnically-favored Military? | Favored Ethnic Group |
|---------------|------------|--------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Benin | Kerekou | 1996-2006 | 0 | |
| Benin | Boni Yayi | 2006-2016 | 0 | |
| Benin | Talon | 2016-present | 0 | |
| Botswana | Mogae | 1998-2008 | 0 | |
| Botswana | Khama | 2008-present | 0 | |
| Burkina Faso | Compaore | 1987-2014 | 0 | |
| Burundi | Nkurunziza | 2005-present | 0 | |
| Cameroon | Biya | 1982-present | 1 | Beti/Bulu |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Ouattara | 2010-present | 1 | Dioula, Baoule |

| | | | | |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------|---|--------------------|
| Gabon | Bongo Ondimba | 2009-present | 1 | Teke (Mbede) |
| Ghana | Kufuor | 2001-2009 | 0 | |
| Ghana | Atta Mills | 2009-2012 | 0 | |
| Ghana | Mahama | 2012-2017 | 0 | |
| Guinea | Conde | 2010-present | 1 | Malinke |
| Kenya | Kibaki | 2002-2013 | 1 | Kikuyu, Embu, Meru |
| Kenya | Kenyatta | 2013-present | 1 | Kikuyu |
| Liberia | Sirleaf | 2006-present | 0 | |
| Madagascar | Ravalomanana | 2002-2009 | 1 | Merina |
| Madagascar | Rajoelina | 2009-2014 | 1 | Merina |
| Malawi | Bingu wa Mutharika | 2004-2012 | 1 | Lomwe |
| Malawi | Banda | 2012-2014 | 1 | Lomwe |
| Malawi | Peter Mutharika | 2014-present | 1 | Lomwe |
| Mali | Toure | 2002-2012 | 0 | |
| Mali | Traore | 2012-2013 | 0 | |
| Mali | Keita | 2013-present | 0 | |
| Mozambique | Guebuza | 2005-2015 | 0 | |
| Namibia | Nujoma | 1990-2005 | 0 | |
| Namibia | Pohamba | 2005-2015 | 0 | |
| Niger | Issoufou | 2011-present | 0 | |
| Nigeria | Obasanjo | 1999-2007 | 0 | |
| Nigeria | Jonathan | 2010-2015 | 0 | |
| Senegal | Wade | 2000-2012 | 0 | |
| Senegal | Sall | 2012-present | 0 | |
| Sierra Leone | Koroma | 2007-present | 0 | |
| South Africa | Mbeki | 1999-2008 | 0 | |
| South Africa | Zuma | 2009-present | 0 | |
| Tanzania | Mkapa | 1995-2005 | 0 | |
| Tanzania | Kikwete | 2005-2015 | 0 | |
| Togo | Gnassingbe | 2005-present | 1 | Kebye |
| Uganda | Museveni | 1986-present | 1 | Banyankole |
| Zambia | Mwanawasa | 2002-2008 | 0 | |
| Zambia | Sata | 2011-2014 | 0 | |
| Zambia | Lungu | 2015-present | 0 | |

Regimes that had evidence of ethnic favoritism in the military during the president's time in office were coded as "1" and regimes without evidence of this practice were coded as "0". The favored ethnic group in the military, for regimes where they exist, is identified in the last column.

Methods

First, I used the *Afrobarometer* online analysis tool to disaggregate national levels of trust in the army by each individual ethnic group. The trust levels of respondents that were ethnically matched to the favored ethnic group in the military were identified and separated from the average level of trust of the remaining ethnic groups in the country. This process was completed for each country's regime identified as having policies of ethnic favoritism in the military. Hypothesis 1 was evaluated using a t-test assuming unequal variances between the levels of trust of co-ethnic respondents and non-co-ethnic respondents of the favored ethnic group in the military.

Hypothesis 2 was evaluated by disaggregating responses based on the respondent's ethnic identity and comparing levels of trust in the army between ethnic groups within each country. Since Hypothesis 2 focuses on countries without intentional policies of ethnic favoritism in the military, there is no variable for co-ethnicity, so the comparison is limited to the variations in levels of trust in the military among all ethnic groups surveyed within each individual country. In order to hone in on the most meaningful comparisons, it was necessary to exclude several ethnic groups due to the fact they included only a handful of respondents. Ethnic groups with limited respondents are problematic because there is really no way to tell if the level of trust exhibited by those respondents is truly representative of that entire ethnic group. This results in a high standard error that makes it impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions about the actual level of trust in the military by that ethnic group. In order to prevent this, respondents from ethnic groups with fewer than 20 respondents were dropped from the sample.

Assumptions

The execution of these hypotheses rests on a key assumption that is worth exploring. Ethnicity is a very complex and difficult issue, and sometimes asking questions about ethnicity can trigger social desirability bias that may discourage the respondent from revealing his or her true thoughts or feelings on the subject. Adida, Ferree, Posner, and Robinson found that responses systematically differed when the interviewer and the respondent were non-co-ethnics compared to the responses elicited between a co-ethnic interviewer and respondent pairing. This was especially true regarding questions directly addressing ethnicity or social status. Individuals interviewed by a non-co-ethnic were more likely to respond in a way that was politically correct or socially desirable than individuals interviewed by a co-ethnic. Furthermore, these findings were stronger in countries where ethnicity is more politically salient.⁵⁹ The assumption, therefore, is that co-ethnicity with the favored ethnic group in the military is powerful enough to guide the respondents' trust in the army, but the survey question, "How much do you trust the army?" is not ethnically explicit enough that it would trigger the social desirability bias of the respondent based on the ethnic connection to the interviewer.

RESULTS

The countries with evidence of intentional practices of ethnic favoritism within their militaries during the available rounds of *Afrobarometer* data (2005-2017) are listed in the table below.

Table 2. Co-ethnic and Non-co-ethnic Levels of Trust in the Military

| Country | President | Round | Favored Ethnic | Co-ethnic Trust | Non-co-ethnic Trust |
|---------------|-----------|--------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Cameroon | Biya | R5/6 | Beti | 2.086 | 1.881 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Ouattara | R5/6/7 | Gur/Akan | 1.423 | 1.480 |

⁵⁹ Claire L. Adida, Karen E. Ferree, Daniel N. Posner, and Amanda L. Robinson, "Who's asking? Interviewer coethnicity effects in African survey data," *Afrobarometer* Work Paper No. 158 (June 2015).

| | | | | | |
|------------|--------------------|----------|------------------|-------|-------|
| Gabon | Ondimba | R6 | Teke | 1.781 | 1.366 |
| Guinea | Conde | R5/6 | Malinke | 2.445 | 1.549 |
| Kenya | Kibaki | R3/5 | Kikuyu/Ambu/Meru | 2.210 | 2.033 |
| Kenya | Kenyatta | R6/7 | Kikuyu | 2.218 | 1.852 |
| Madagascar | Ravalomanana | R3 | Merina | 1.656 | 1.438 |
| Madagascar | Rajoelina | R5 | Merina | 1.594 | 1.521 |
| Malawi | Bingu wa Mutharika | R3 | Lomwe | 2.545 | 2.452 |
| Malawi | Banda | R5/6 | Lomwe | 2.434 | 2.452 |
| Malawi | Peter Mutharika | R7 | Lomwe | 2.144 | 2.277 |
| Togo | Gnassingbe | R5/6 | Kebye | 1.943 | 1.237 |
| Uganda | Museveni | R3/5/6/7 | Banyankole | 2.342 | 2.100 |

The first and second columns identify the country and head executive that perpetuated ethnic favoritism in the military. The third column identifies the rounds of *Afrobarometer* data that overlapped with the president's time in office and were used to calculate levels of trust. The favored ethnic group is identified in the fourth column. The last two columns list the level of trust in the military exhibited by co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics of the favored group in the military. The measure ranges from 0-3, 3 being the most trust in the military.

Since Hypothesis 1 postulates that co-ethnics of the favored ethnic group in the military will exhibit higher levels of trust in the military than non-co-ethnics of the favored group, I used a one-tailed t-test assuming unequal variances. The resulting p-value of 0.0605 is not statistically significant by conventional standards, however, the fact that the p-value is less than 0.1 with only 13 cases is fairly persuasive. Although the difference between the average level of trust in the military by co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics is small, all the countries except for Cote d'Ivoire and Malawi follow the pattern hypothesized, with co-ethnics of the favored group exhibiting higher levels of trust in the military than non-co-ethnics of the favored group.




Figure 1. Co-ethnic vs. Non-co-ethnic Trust in the Military

Because the quantitative measure of trust was derived from qualitative categories included in the *Afrobarometer* survey, I recognized the possibility that the numerical trust levels may not accurately reflect the categorical data. In order to circumvent this issue, I ran the t-test again, this time comparing the proportions of co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics of the favored ethnic group in the military that exhibited trust in the military. Respondents that answered that they trust the military “Somewhat” or “A lot” were considered to be trusting of the military, while respondents that answered “A little” or “Not at all” were considered to be untrusting.

Table 3. Proportion of Co-ethnic and Non-co-ethnic Trust in the Military

| Country | President | Round | Proportion Co-ethnic Trust | Proportion Non-co-ethnic trust |
|---------------|--------------------|----------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Cameroon | Biya | R5/R6 | 0.712 | 0.649 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Ouattara | R5/6/7 | 0.452 | 0.466 |
| Gabon | Ondimba | R6 | 0.609 | 0.425 |
| Guinea | Conde | R5/6 | 0.713 | 0.492 |
| Kenya | Kibaki | R3/5 | 0.777 | 0.706 |
| Kenya | Kenyatta | R6/7 | 0.775 | 0.673 |
| Madagascar | Ravalomanana | R3 | 0.649 | 0.533 |
| Madagascar | Rajoelina | R5 | 0.613 | 0.564 |
| Malawi | Bingu wa Mutharika | R3 | 0.850 | 0.874 |
| Malawi | Banda | R5/6 | 0.836 | 0.836 |
| Malawi | Peter Mutharika | R7 | 0.728 | 0.772 |
| Togo | Gnassingbe | R5/6 | 0.599 | 0.397 |
| Uganda | Museveni | R3/5/6/7 | 0.846 | 0.741 |

The third column identifies the rounds of *Afrobarometer* data that overlap with the regime that perpetuated ethnic favoritism in the military. The last two columns identify the proportion of co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic respondents of the favored group in the military that trust the military.

The second t-test was also statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0.0797, however, just as before, this p-value given the limited sample size is highly suggestive that there may be a relationship between these two variables.

Looking at each individual case, it is clear that certain countries follow the hypothesis more closely than others. As mentioned, Cote d'Ivoire and Malawi are the only countries that break from the hypothesis completely, with co-ethnics showing equal and sometimes lower levels of trust than non-co-ethnics of the favored group in the military. Conversely, countries like Gabon, Guinea, and Togo have a considerable disparity between the sentiments of co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics of the favored group in the military when measured by both the numerical level of trust in the military and the proportion of each group that trusts the military.




Figure 2. Proportion of co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics of the favored group that trust the military by country regime

Although the p-values from both t-tests were insignificant by conventional standards, the results cannot be completely attributed to chance, considering the small sample size. The findings are still suggestive a relationship between these two variables, even if it is a weak relationship. Hypothesis 1 cannot be confidently confirmed, but it would also be inappropriate to completely reject it. At this point, further research is needed to better understand the magnitude of the relationship between these two variables.

Comparing levels of trust in the military among ethnic groups in countries that do not have policies of ethnic favoritism within the military, in accordance with Hypothesis 2, produces similarly inconsistent results. Several countries follow the hypothesis quite well, like Niger and Senegal, which can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 below.




Figure 3. Niger Trust in the Military




Figure 4. Senegal Trust in the Military

All ethnic groups have nearly equivalent levels of trust in the military, which is directly in line with the hypothesis presented. Not all countries fit the hypothesis as well as these two cases, but many others do follow roughly similar patterns. Interestingly enough, many of the countries with more uniform levels of trust across ethnic groups also appear to have generally higher levels of overall trust in the military. Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mali, and Zambia all have roughly equivalent levels of trust in the military across ethnic groups and average levels of trust in the military equal to or greater than 2. Not all countries, however, follow this pattern.

Although Liberia exhibits relatively uniform levels of trust across ethnic groups, it has a relatively low average level of trust in the military.




Figure 5. Liberia Trust in the Military

Several other countries break from the hypothesis altogether, exhibiting significant differences in the levels of trust in the military among their ethnic groups. Nigeria and Sierra Leone are stark examples of these contrary cases.




Figure 6. Nigeria Trust in the Military




Figure 7. Sierra Leone Trust in the Military

A full list of graphs of the levels of trust in the military for each country in the study can be found in Appendix A. A visual comparison between the trust patterns of these countries remains puzzling. Although some countries follow Hypothesis 2, many others do not, preventing me from confidently confirming Hypothesis 2. Some countries without ethnically-favored militaries show as much variation in the levels of trust among ethnic groups as countries with ethnically-favored

militaries. This inconsistency leads me to believe that there are other important factors that foster the disparity between levels of trust in the military among ethnic groups.

One possibility I considered is the fact that the average citizen may not know much about the military or have any interaction with members of the armed forces. Consequently, the general populace may not be aware of specific practices of ethnic favoritism in the military. Given the salience of ethnicity in many African societies, however, the president’s ethnic identity may play a role in influencing public opinion. If the population knows nothing about the actual composition of the military, they may assume, based on the importance of patronage structures in African political systems, that the head executive is likely to favor his co-ethnics in all areas of government bureaucracy, including the security sector. As a result, co-ethnics of the president may assume that the president has favored his co-ethnics in military appointments even when there is no objective evidence of an ethnic imbalance in the military. This assumption may encourage a willingness to trust the military when it is controlled by a president from the same ethnic group. I tested this possibility used a t-test assuming unequal variances to compare the level of trust of the president’s co-ethnics against non-co-ethnics in the population.

Table 4. President’s Ethnic Identity

| Country | President | Term | President's Ethnicity |
|---------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| Benin | Kerekou | 1996-2006 | Ditamari |
| Benin | Boni Yayi | 2006-2016 | Bariba/Nago (Yoruba) |
| Benin | Talon | 2016-present | Fon |
| Botswana | Mogae | 1998-2008 | Mongwato |
| Botswana | Khama | 2008-present | Mongwato |
| Burkina Faso | Compaore | 1987-2014 | Mossi |
| Burundi | Nkurunziza | 2005-present | Hutu |
| Cameroon | Biya | 1982-present | Beti |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Ouattara | 2010-present | Dioula |
| Gabon | Bongo Ondimba | 2009-present | Teke (Mbede) |
| Ghana | Kufuor | 2001-2009 | Asante (Akan) |

| | | | |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------|
| Ghana | Atta Mills | 2009-2012 | Fanti (Akan) |
| Ghana | Mahama | 2012-2017 | Gonja |
| Guinea | Conde | 2010-present | Malinke |
| Kenya | Kibaki | 2002-2013 | Kikuyu |
| Kenya | Kenyatta | 2013-present | Kikuyu |
| Liberia | Sirleaf | 2006-present | Gola/Kru |
| Madagascar | Ravalomanana | 2002-2009 | Merina |
| Madagascar | Rajoelina | 2009-2014 | Merina |
| Malawi | Bingu wa Mutharika | 2004-2012 | Lomwe |
| Malawi | Banda | 2012-2014 | Chewa |
| Malawi | Peter Mutharika | 2014-present | Lomwe |
| Mali | Toure | 2002-2012 | Sonrhai |
| Mali | Traore | 2012-2013 | Bambara |
| Mali | Keita | 2013-present | Malinke |
| Mozambique | Guebuza | 2005-2015 | Ronga |
| Namibia | Pohamba | 2005-2015 | Ovambo |
| Niger | Issoufou | 2011-present | Hausa |
| Nigeria | Obasanjo | 1999-2007 | Yoruba |
| Nigeria | Jonathan | 2010-2015 | Ijaw |
| Senegal | Wade | 2000-2012 | Wolof |
| Senegal | Sall | 2012-present | Fula (Pulaar) |
| Sierra Leone | Koroma | 2007-present | Temne/Limba |
| South Africa | Mbeki | 1999-2008 | Xhosa |
| South Africa | Zuma | 2009-present | Zulu |
| Tanzania | Kikwete | 2005-2015 | Mkwere |
| Togo | Gnassingbe | 2005-present | Kebye |
| Uganda | Museveni | 1986-present | Banyankole |
| Zambia | Mwanawasa | 2002-2008 | Lenje |
| Zambia | Sata | 2011-2014 | Bemba |
| Zambia | Lungu | 2015-present | Nsenga |
| Zimbabwe | Mugabe | 1987-2017 | Shona |

The resulting p-value of 0.0765 is not statistically significant, but once again, given a sample size of 42, the results are still worth considering. Although co-ethnicity with the president may not be a strong factor in influencing an individual's trust in the military, it does seem to have some relationship with the levels of trust in the military. The magnitude of this relationship appears to vary by country. In some cases, co-ethnics of the president exhibit considerably higher levels of trust than non-co-ethnics, while in other countries co-ethnics are on par with the average level of

trust across all ethnic groups. Similar to Hypothesis 1, further research is needed to understand why some countries follow the proposed patterns and others do not, and what other factors may be influencing the relationship.

Discussion

Although none of the hypotheses tested were statistically significant, they do seem to have some merit and would benefit from a more thorough examination. The criteria given by Harkness to identify the intentional practice of ethnic favoritism in the military resulted in a fairly small sample size (14 out of 44 regimes) for testing my primary hypothesis, which limited the effectiveness of the statistical tool used to evaluate the hypothesis. It appears that the variation in levels of trust among ethnic groups are influenced by the ethnic composition of the military and the ethnic identity of the respondent, but a more thorough evaluation is necessary to confidently assess the mechanics of the relationship between the two variables.

There are several possibilities that could be explored to further examine this relationship between ethnicity and trust in the military. One possibility is that even in countries where there are not intentional policies of ethnic favoritism in the military, there is the *perception* that certain ethnic groups are more closely associated with the military and may be over-represented—even if no actual ethnic imbalance exists. These groups may not necessarily be the president's own ethnic group but might be ethnic groups that, due to some cultural attribute, public stereotype, or historical factors, are more closely linked to the military. This sort of nuanced data would require greater time and intimate access to subject matter experts, but it would be possible to perform a similar analysis to the one presented here comparing the levels of trust between co-ethnics and non-co-ethnics of these ethnic groups that are perceived to be more closely linked with the military.

Another possibility is that these sentiments may be more strongly guided by personal experience with members of the military, rather than just assumptions or stereotypes.

Afrobarometer includes a question about whether soldiers have been seen in the respondent's local area in the recent past. This variable could be leveraged to determine whether there is significant difference between the levels of trust in the military of people who have interacted with the military and those who have not, and more specifically, whether a similar difference exists between members of the same ethnic group. The intra-ethnic comparison could also be helpful in gaining insight into the military's domestic track record. If individuals of an ethnic group with no exposure to the military exhibit higher levels of trust than individuals of the same ethnic group that have been exposed to the military, it may be an indication that the military's actions towards members of that ethnic group or within the regions where they live have undermined the military's credibility with that ethnic group. Conversely, if that comparison is reversed, it may indicate that the military has done well in fostering a positive and professional public image among that segments of the population that, based on assumptions, are less likely to trust the military.

Probably the most effective way to incorporate some of these additional factors is by using a statistical tool that can deal with multiple variables. A t-test is a relatively simple statistical tool that can only examine the differences between two sets of data, but trust is a very complex concept and cannot be fully understood by only considering one facet. In order to include additional variables in the analysis, a multi-variable regression analysis may be a better tool to analyze the relationship between the ethnic composition of the military and an individual's level of trust in the military. This would allow a researcher to consider characteristics like a country's ethnic diversity, the military's history of involvement in politics,

and individual's personal exposure to the military, or other factors that would likely be relevant in understanding the relationship between ethnicity and trust in the military.










CONCLUSION









The factors that guide public trust in the security sector remain unclear. This research project was an attempt to explore one possible explanation for the cross-national variations in levels of trust in the military among different ethnic groups. Given the importance of ethnicity as a prominent social and political cue, this thesis explored whether policies of ethnic favoritism in the armed forces could explain the uneven levels of trust among different ethnic groups seen in many countries in Africa. These policies of ethnic favoritism were identified by evidence that a certain ethnic group had been recruited disproportionately into the military at large, was over-represented in the officer corps, had received a disproportionate number of high-value military positions and appointments, or had been used to form an independent paramilitary group accountable only to the head executive.








Given the limited timeframe of *Afrobarometer* data on measures of public trust in the military and the criteria for determining ethnic favoritism, the final sample size was substantially limited, making it difficult to extrapolate meaningful findings. The statistically analysis indicates that ethnic favoritism in the military may have some explanatory power in the variations of trust in the military among ethnic groups, but more thorough research is necessary to confidently confirm this finding and to determine how much influence ethnicity has on trust in the military. The data gathered and presented are intriguing and are worth further analysis to continue to tease out the relationship between an individual's ethnic identity and his sentiments towards the military. Understanding this relationship can help identify shortcomings in the military's objective performance and its pursuit of legitimacy and confidence with the entire population. A




military that lacks public confidence and support will find it exceedingly difficult to do its job well, especially when those tasks require cooperation with the population such as in quelling public unrest and combatting insurgencies.

APPENDIX A









*All graphs are based on Round 6 data (2014-2015) except for Burundi, Madagascar, and Mozambique, which are based on Round 5 data (2011-2013).

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