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ASEAN, *Quo Vadis?* Domestic Coalitions and Regional Co-operation

ETEL SOLINGEN

This article advances a coalitional approach to understanding ASEAN co-operation as a product of the domestic political forces that conceived and nurtured it. Pivotal leaders throughout the region forged supportive internationalist coalitions at home that favoured domestic and regional political and economic stability and global access. This strategy demanded accommodation and co-optation of backlash states in the region, in an effort to protect the implementation of internationalist agendas across the domestic, regional, and global spheres. Accordingly, ASEAN's military expenditures were characterized by moderation, defensiveness, and transparency to avoid choking the domestic macroeconomic requirements of an internationalist strategy. The post-1997 regional crisis provides a test of both ASEAN's co-operation and a coalitional interpretation as its driving force.

Introduction

In 1967 Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines signed the ASEAN Declaration, but the convening of the first summit meeting of heads of state was held only in 1976 (Bali), when they adopted the Concord Declaration and the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia. In time, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar joined, with Cambodia likely to follow soon. The evolution of ASEAN has led to different interpretations of its essence, viability, and future. On the one hand, some scholars have pondered about its strength and durability, and about the extent to which ASEAN represents

anything beyond “business-as-usual” inter-state politics, of the kind that Neo-Realist approaches have described best.¹ Thus viewed, ASEAN’s behaviour — including some co-operation — can be most easily explained in terms of inter-state competition, power balancing, and arms races. On the other hand, ASEAN can be understood as a co-operative regional framework traceable to a converging pattern of domestic politics.² This view accommodates robust regional co-operation that eschews military competition and follows the logic of the domestic political forces that created and nurtured it.

The article subjects some key theoretical propositions embedded in the second approach to an empirical overview of ASEAN in recent decades. The section that follows outlines a set of expectations about ASEAN’s behaviour, derived from a domestic coalitional perspective. Accordingly, ASEAN can be understood as a regional cluster of “internationalist” coalitions that co-operate with one another to advance their grand strategy, encompassing domestic, regional, and international objectives. The subsequent section examines the historical record from a coalitional viewpoint. Anchoring the analysis of ASEAN on the nature of domestic coalitions does not imply that more classical security dimensions and the role of external powers are irrelevant. Far from it, the global political, strategic, and economic contexts are an integral part of a coalition’s grand strategy of political survival at home, even if the confines of this article force only a cursory treatment of this broader context. The conclusion explores the advantages and shortcomings of this perspective, and suggests that the post-1997 regional crisis offers yet another important test of the coalitional interpretation advanced here.

Domestic Coalitions and Internationalist Grand Strategies

The emergence and international behaviour of ASEAN can be interpreted by analysing the domestic political coalitions responsible for ASEAN’s genesis and growth. Which domestic coalitions within the ASEAN states saw it to their advantage to establish a co-operative framework rather than a competitive regional structure? As will be argued, the ASEAN states came to be progressively under the control of “internationalist” coalitions and it is the grand strategy of these coalitions that explains why a co-operative regional order evolved over time. A brief overview of coalitional variants and of the relationships among coalitions, grand strategy, and regional outcomes is in order.³

The central features of internationalization are openness to international markets, capital, investments, and technology. Internationalization affects individuals and groups in different sectors via

changes in employment status, labour incomes, and returns on assets, via changes in prices of goods and services consumed, and via the provision of public services. The distributional consequences of internationalization create two ideal-typical political coalitions in each country, one supporting it (internationalist coalitions), the other opposing it (backlash coalitions). Internationalization does not merely pose threats to material interests but also to cultures, identities, and values, and to the interests of political entrepreneurs endangered by both types of threats. Thus, coalitions are not merely about alternative positions *vis-à-vis* economic liberalization but about alternative integrated interpretations of the political-economic and strategic context as it affects domestic coalitional balances. Many internationalist coalitions retain state intervention and industrial policy although they do allow the expansion of private capital — local and international — far more significantly than backlash coalitions. So-called “crony capitalism” defies the internationalist/backlash divide and is therefore compatible with internationalist grand strategies, even if it does not necessarily represent its “best practice.”

Internationalist coalitions generally include export-intensive sectors and firms, large banking and industrial complexes (particularly those already involved in foreign trade, investment, lending, and licensing), highly-skilled labour and the labour force employed in competitive industries or firms, the latter’s suppliers, “symbolic analysts” oriented towards an open global economic and knowledge (technology) based system, consumers of imported products, state agencies in charge of economic reform (independent central banks, finance ministries, managers of export-processing zones), farm workers and small landowners with an eye on higher producer prices for agricultural exports, and — in democracies — politicians and parties representing the beneficiaries of reform.

Backlash coalitions include import-competing firms and banks closely tied to the state, state-owned enterprises and banks, small businesses, urban unskilled, formal sector blue-collar, white-collar and state employees, under-employed intelligentsia associated with all these groups, the military-industrial complex, threatened state bureaucracies (in planning, industrial policy, capital controls, and import licensing), and quite often civic-nationalist, ethnic, and confessional movements. These coalitions are “log rolled” by political entrepreneurs fearful that internationalization will erode their statist-nationalist or ethno-religious basis of political patronage.

Grand strategies build on synergistic effects across the domestic, regional, and global spheres. Domestically, the grand strategy of internationalist coalitions includes the pursuit of economic policies

compatible with global access and the decimation of its political opposition. Externally, the strategy is designed to maintain secure access to foreign markets, capital, investments, and technology. Regionally, a co-operative (non-violent) neighbourhood serves the grand strategy in all its aspects, allowing a stable investment environment and appropriate macroeconomic conditions, while avoiding expensive arms races. In contrast, the grand strategy of backlash coalitions seeks to preserve allocations to military and other protected (mostly statist) industrial complexes, and to weaken internationalist adversaries at home. Externally, they resist pressures for internationalization while challenging an array of international regimes depicted as anathema to nationalist objectives. Regionally, a context of insecurity and competition helps sustain their grand strategy. On the other hand, regional co-operation threatens backlash coalitions because it compels reduced allocations to the military and weapons-producing enterprises, and a devalued role for civic-nationalist and ethno-religious myth-making as a political currency.

Coalitions are constrained internally and externally in their ability to implement their grand strategy. Internally, they are constrained by their relative strength *vis-à-vis* their domestic challengers. Externally, they are constrained by regional coalitional balances of power, which are defined by the identity, strength, and interactive dynamics with coalitions in neighbouring states. Taking note of the regional context can thus illuminate a coalition's behaviour and its interaction with others in the region. The scope and nature of regional conflict and co-operation is influenced by the homogeneity/heterogeneity of the regional order in coalitional terms. Thus, higher and more extensive levels of co-operation can be expected where internationalist coalitions prevail throughout a given region compared to areas where backlash, or mixed, competing internationalist and backlash neighbours face one another, as in the Middle East and South Asia. Clusters of internationalist coalitions are characterized by extensive and intensive co-operation, that is, co-operation across various issue-areas and with a deepening level of commitment. In the realm of security, relations between internationalist coalitions are characterized by a number of features.

First, domestic considerations of political survival drive economic rationalization — and military downsizing — as much as external factors. Therefore, there is a virtual built-in guarantee that fellow internationalist coalitions will be, *ceteris paribus*, reluctant to defect through militarized strategies. Internationalist dyads and clusters must tame territorial or ethno-religious disputes for their grand strategies eschew militarized conflict. The potential for armed conflict and extensive military build-ups threatens the economic and political

fundamentals — fiscal conservatism, macroeconomic, political, and regional stability, access to capital, technology, and markets — that an internationalist strategy requires. Secondly, the mutually reinforcing domestic and interactive (regional) inducements to allay conflict reduce transaction costs in relations between internationalist coalitions. Agreement on issues under dispute is easier to reach, and there is less need to monitor or punish compliance or improve information. This transparency is highest where internationalist grand strategies are more fully in place and their political agents more strongly entrenched — conditions that are, of course, interrelated. Thus, internationalist coalitions beget the conditions for self-sustained, rather than externally-imposed, regional co-operation. In addition, these features make concert-like multilateralism more efficient and dense institutionalization less necessary (but certainly not impossible).

In the realm of economic co-operation, strong internationalist coalitions transfer their domestic programmes to the regional arena. Regional co-operative regimes emerge that serve the purposes of strengthening the internationalist model at home while disabling its opposition, and lubricating external ties to the global political economy. The need to harmonize product standards and legal and administrative infrastructures deepens the institutional links and interdependence among internationalist coalitions. They thus embrace trade-creating schemes that emphasize positive regional and global externalities compatible with “open regionalism”. Regional economic integration is not always required for co-operative relations to be maintained, although an absolute increase in regional trade and investment often results from interacting internationalist partners. For instance, where competitive — rather than complementary — economies are involved (as in ASEAN), the drive for integration is initially weaker. However, even in the absence of dramatic economic benefits from bilateral economic interactions, internationalist coalitions find it in their interest to maintain overall co-operative relations. The underlying logic of co-operation is global access, with regional arrangements serving only as stepping-stones subordinated to that logic. Naturally, where the credibility of the internationalist agenda throughout the region is questionable (as has been the case in Latin America’s Southern Cone, or the Middle East) formal regional arrangements in the direction of freer trade can, of course, signal a more believable commitment to extra-regional investors.

It is now time to reaffirm two obvious qualifications. First, the domestic impact of internationalization is far more complex and unpredictable than stipulated by any existing theory. Secondly, the distance between ideal and empirical coalitional types can be wide, as expected in social science abstractions, while hybrid forms abound.

With this in mind, ASEAN's record must be considered as an approximation, not quite an ideal-typical, internationalist cluster, with some members falling under the hybrid category, particularly in the earlier stages of ASEAN evolution, and most prominently in the case of Malaysia.

Evolution of an Internationalist Cluster in the Core ASEAN States

The framework developed thus far helps to explain the evolution of ASEAN as a regional cluster of internationalist coalitions that cooperated with one another to advance their domestic, regional, and international objectives. By the late 1970s, several ASEAN states came to be dominated by political entrepreneurs who were able to develop and coalesce internationalist constituencies (favouring foreign direct investment, natural resource and manufacturing exports) together with more traditional import-substituting interests (particularly in Indonesia, and notably automobiles in most ASEAN states). The political power of internationalist constituencies grew significantly by the 1980s, in tandem with the growth of private entrepreneurship, progressive internationalization, and the ability to maintain economic growth.⁴ In time, and in most cases, a burgeoning middle class — with vested interests in political stability — came to support the internationalist strategy, even as it began questioning the legitimacy of its political agents.⁵ Radical nationalist and ethno-religious groups were, for the most part, marginalized by these coalitions, preventing exclusivist political forms from undermining domestic, global, and regional purposes.

In Indonesia, following the ruthless repression of forces backing Soekarno, the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia), and Islamic contenders, Soeharto set out in the late 1960s to organize a new coalition that would rule Indonesia for the subsequent 25 years. His pivotal partners in the New Order (*Orde Baru*) were a small group of industrial entrepreneurs (mostly ethnic Chinese) and the armed forces (ABRI, which was purged and refashioned). In time, the coalition came to include a tame Islamist movement — the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association — with ties to *pribumi* (native Indonesian) economic groups. Soeharto's coalition turned Soekarno's grand strategy (an early backlash exemplar) on its head. Replacing Soekarno's inward-looking Nasser-style statism and a rhetoric condemning the global economy, Soeharto launched an export-led strategy of integration into the global economy, seeking Japanese, United States and other Western trade and investment partners, applying International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization plans, and reducing state enterprises.⁶ Furthermore, instead of

konfrontasi (confrontation), Soeharto proclaimed that “the creation of regional stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia will get first priority,” pointing to the links between his regional co-operative thrust and his attempt to reverse Soekarno’s economic model at home.⁷ Although Soeharto’s strategy benefited primarily his own nepotistic and patrimonial coalitional basis, economic growth in time co-opted growing segments of Indonesian society. Average trade openness (TO) — imports plus exports as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) — under Soekarno had been about 21 per cent, declining to 18 per cent between 1960 and 1965.⁸ Immediately after Soeharto’s coup, TO jumped from as low as 10 per cent in 1964 to about 33 per cent (of a US\$6 billion GDP) in 1966, but it was only in the late 1970s that TO climbed to more than 50 per cent of GDP (US\$78 billion in 1980). Net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows grew tenfold between 1970 and 1989.

Under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) implemented a high-growth strategy pivoted on economic stability and low inflation. Following the forced separation from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, the centrality of an export-led model to political survival became evident. Lee’s coalition thus shifted gears towards a strategy linking domestic prosperity and stability, global reach, and regional peace and stability through ASEAN.⁹ The PAP abandoned its socialist roots and co-opted trade union leadership, promising stability in exchange for discipline and low wages. State agencies (statutory boards) and enterprises emerged to spearhead the new strategy in the absence of strong private local entrepreneurship. Singapore’s openness to FDI doubled the share of FDI in gross domestic investment, from 33 per cent in 1966 to 68 per cent in 1980. Restrained money supply and stable and appreciating foreign exchange rates pre-empted inflation. In a relatively short time, the policy bore its expected fruit. Already high exports-to-GDP ratios of 115 per cent and higher in the late 1960s increased to more than 200 in the 1990s. Singapore’s TO doubled between 1971 and 1980, to nearly 425 per cent. FDI inflows, which had averaged US\$1.7 billion in the 1970s and 1980s, nearly doubled from US\$5.5 billion in 1990 to US\$9.4 billion in 1996.

Malaysia’s Mahathir bin Mohamad relied on a more hybrid coalitional form (Barisan Nasional) that included import-substituting, heavy-industry, public enterprise, and export-oriented manufactures representing primarily Malays-first (Muslim *bumiputera*) constituencies aggregated in UMNO (the United Malays National Organization). The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) were subordinated partners in the ruling coalition, as were smaller Malay parties. Although the New Economic Policy was a

discriminatory system favouring *bumiputera* supremacy at the expense of Chinese and Indian minorities, for the most part it shunned extreme forms of ethno-nationalism.¹⁰ By the early 1970s, an export orientation (initially based on primary commodities) had already been overlaid onto moderate import-substituting and heavy industry promotion policies, in an effort to attract transnational capital to counter domestic ethnic Chinese capital. By the mid-1980s, the coalitional balance had shifted away from this hybrid form in favour of deepened internationalization with a moderate decline in ethnic ownership quotas. Declines in government expenditures—particularly development and military budgets—hurt the *bumiputera* the most.¹¹ At the same time, a new Malay middle class (*Melayu baru*) became an active component of coalitional politics. During Mahathir's more inward-looking phase (1980–87), Malaysia's TO remained at slightly over 105 per cent on average, and exports/GDP at below 55 per cent on average. Government final consumption as a percentage of GDP grew from 15 per cent to 19 per cent by 1982, returning to 15 per cent by the end of the period. During the more open phase (1987 onwards, particularly following the 1990 National Development Policy) exports-to-GDP ratios grew to over 77 per cent on average. FDI inflows averaged US\$1.6 billion yearly from the 1980s onwards, rising dramatically in the early 1990s. Mahathir turned government deficits of 15 per cent of GDP in the late 1970s to a surplus in the early 1990s. "The concept of free enterprise...is the philosophical basis of ASEAN", declared Malaysia's Foreign Minister, although ethnic Chinese segments question that commitment.¹²

Thailand's ruling coalition of military and technocratic allies came to include industrial entrepreneurs under Sarit in the 1960s, and eventually the middle class. The 1970s reflected a succession of weak and unwieldy coalitions. As in the other ASEAN states, export-intensive entrepreneurs had gained the upper hand by the late 1980s. Under Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, a joint Public-Private Sector Consultative Committee (KRO) deepened internationalization through FDI and export promotion. The coalition's concern with political stability, appeal to foreign investors, and continued economic growth tamed the military's political role, particularly after 1992. Thailand's TO rose sharply in the late 1970s, from slightly over 40 per cent to over 55 per cent, but even more sharply in the late 1980s, reaching nearly 80 per cent by 1990.

In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos ran what might be closest to a state racket operation backed by military patronage, which bore only a few of the trappings of an internationalist strategy (mostly subservience to the United States, particularly since the 1970s). Marcos' failure to implement the growth part of the strategy doomed his survival. In the


aftermath of the “people’s power” revolution, new leaders attempted to marginalize the military and usher in economic reforms. Trade openness remained below 50 per cent on average until 1986, when it rose sharply under favourable international conditions, from 45 per cent to nearly 70 per cent by 1992.

On the whole, export-led strategies in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand succeeded with much less emphasis on industrial policy than in South Korea and Taiwan.¹³ Private entrepreneurship flourished to an extent virtually unparalleled in other industrializing regions. Mean government final consumption for ASEAN as a group oscillated between 11 per cent of GDP in the early 1970s to 12.5 per cent in the early 1980s, declining to 10 per cent in the early 1990s but rising since. In contrast, mean government final consumption as a percentage of GDP for the Middle East states was twice that of ASEAN in the early 1970s, three times larger throughout the late 1970s and late 1980s, returning to twice as large only after reform efforts in the early 1990s.¹⁴ Mean government deficits for ASEAN were around 3 per cent of GDP during the 1970s and early 1980s (long before Maastricht became history), turning to a surplus by the late 1980s. For the ASEAN states as a group, TO rose from about 80 per cent in 1971 to 140 per cent by 1980. Following a decline in the early 1980s, TO returned to 140 per cent by the end of the 1980s. FDI for the group as a whole rose slowly in the 1970s but sharply in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

A no less important consideration in the maintenance of stable growing economies is the role of military expenditures. Patterns of military expenditures throughout ASEAN — low growth relative to GDP growth, defensive nature, and transparency in military acquisitions — reflected the objectives of internationalist coalitions. Military expenditures were not allowed to trample the domestic macroeconomic requirements of their grand strategy: price stability and hospitable conditions for international investments. Military expenditures remained on a par with — or lower than — the international average for industrializing states. Indeed, even as they faced a threatening regional environment, ASEAN expenditures were one-fourth to one-fifth that of Middle Eastern states. ASEAN’s mean military expenditures as a group never reached 5 per cent of GDP at their height in the late 1970s to early 1980s and declined quite dramatically thereafter to 2.8 per cent of GDP in 1990 (see Figures 1 and 2).¹⁵


Soekarno’s military expenditures in the early 1960s averaged 5.4 per cent of GDP whereas his successor Soeharto averaged 3 per cent in the 1970s to 1980s and 1.2 per cent in the late 1980s to early 1990s, in tandem with a deepening of Indonesia’s internationalist drive. The New Order government specifically proscribed competitive military

FIGURE 1
ASEAN: Mean Military Expenditures



Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks (1979, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1996).

FIGURE 2
ASEAN: Military Expenditures



Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks (1979, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1996).

allocations that could undermine the political-economic model, although it allowed military involvement in economic activities that provided it with off-budget funds, a pattern born under Soekarno. Even under a military-backed domestic coalition, Thailand's military expenditures as a percentage of GDP were halved, from 5 per cent in 1985 to 2.6 per cent in 1994. Between 1985 and 1994 Malaysia's military expenditures declined from 5.6 per cent to 3.7 per cent of GDP, Singapore's and Brunei's from 6.7 per cent to 4.8 per cent, and Vietnam's (a latecomer to ASEAN) from 19.4 per cent to 5.7 per cent. These figures confirm a rather restrained pattern of military investments not only in comparison with other regions but also relative to GDP growth, where military expenditures lagged by 50 per cent behind GDP growth.

In sum, this section suggests that the domestic political and economic pillars of an internationalist grand strategy had taken root among the ASEAN states. Despite references to military acquisitions as the prelude to armed conflict, there were neither arms races nor offensive build-ups that threatened neighbouring countries. As Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal have argued: "States in the region are responding to uncertainty about future threats....There are as yet no highly focused competitive arms accumulations...and it is still rare for military expenditure to rise as a percentage of gross national product."¹⁶ The ASEAN states embraced transparency in military acquisitions and endorsed the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms requiring countries to report on major conventional arms transfers. This record is compatible with the grand-strategic objectives of internationalist coalitions emphasizing economic access over military prowess. Military investments amounted to an insurance policy, particularly against backlash adversaries in the region (Vietnam in the 1970s, for instance), but were not allowed to smother the grand strategy as a whole.

ASEAN's Record in Regional Co-operation

Where internationalist coalitions take hold throughout a region, their domestic political-economic strategies are reflected in the regional institutional arena as well. New co-operative regional regimes emerge that serve the purpose both of strengthening the internationalist model at home, and of lubricating external ties to the global political economy.¹⁷ In Mahathir's own words: "ASEAN...has an important role to play in national, regional and international affairs."¹⁸ Soeharto defined ASEAN's essence in 1976: "The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience."¹⁹ The

repression of domestic armed insurgencies (in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, in East Timor) was tolerated both to strengthen the ruling coalitions and to preclude the diffusion of instability and the potential erosion of ASEAN's collective appeal to foreign investors.

In the economic realm, global access and *concerted* unilateral liberalization, not defensive intra-regional trade, was the objective. By the early 1990s, intra-ASEAN trade accounted for no more than 18 per cent of ASEAN's total trade, and intra-ASEAN investment (mostly from Singapore) for less than 10 per cent of the total. Multinational investors have been most active in the push for regional integration. Only in 1993 was the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) agreed upon, designed to free trade in manufactured and processed goods by 2003.²⁰ Defined as "open regionalism," the approach seeks to enhance regional economic exchange without violating the legal requirements embedded in the World Trade Organization (most-favoured-nation rule) or discriminating against extra-regional partners. Even at the height of ASEAN's collective internationalist phase in the early 1990s, Malaysia advocated an East Asia Economic Caucus that would exclude "non-East Asian" states, a proposal that ASEAN rejected in consonance with "open regionalism" and global access — principles that ASEAN extended to APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation) through the Kuching Consensus (1990). The mixed nature of Mahathir's coalitional backing explains Malaysia's hybrid strategy, straddling internationalism and civic/ethnic nationalism, over time and across issue areas. Mahathir personally concentrated the formulation of Malaysia's grand strategy, now berating and now cajoling Western investments and markets, now threatening to leave the British Commonwealth and now hosting their 1989 meeting and imposing a "buy British first" policy, and all the while wielding Southern (or Eastern) solidarity against Western conspiracies.²¹

In time, ASEAN co-operation deepened into security issues, establishing a positive record of diffusing internal disputes and managing an effective diplomacy on regional matters.²² Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were initially excluded as backlash aberrations but their progressive transformation into would-be internationalists opened the way to inclusion. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and its aggressive backlash strategy raised the concerns of several ASEAN partners, particularly Thailand. With the Vietnamese leadership taking a proto-internationalist strategy in the 1990s, the door was opened for its accession to ASEAN — an important component of Vietnam's effort to rebuild its economy. After years of deriding the ASEAN states as "puppets of Western imperialists," and while moving towards economic liberalization and military downsizing, Vietnam acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1992.²³ Myanmar was accepted as

an observer member in July 1996. ASEAN played an important role in the global effort to stabilize Cambodia. It also rejected external (U.S. and European) intrusion regarding human rights and democratic deficits in Myanmar, stressing ASEAN's abstention from intervening in the domestic affairs of member states. On the whole, ASEAN behaved as an internationalist regional cluster would, begetting the conditions for self-sustained, rather than externally-imposed, regional co-operation even as its members retained hybrid aspects in their grand strategy.

These efforts amounted to a consistent policy of minimizing instability throughout the region, a precondition for the joint implementation of a domestic political strategy based on global reach and foreign investment. In the words of Lee Kuan Yew: "The most enduring lesson of history is that ambitious growing countries can expand either by grabbing territory, people and resources, or by trading with other countries. The alternative to free trade is not just poverty, it is war."²⁴ Kishore Mahbubani, Permanent Secretary (Policy) of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described how ASEAN coalitions watched closely their ranking in the World Economic Forum's competitiveness tables, and how they understood that "those engaged in civil war and conflict" could not compete well. Quite explicitly, Mahbubani advanced that "the most foolish thing that any East Asian society could do is to...engage in traditional military rivalries."²⁵

As argued in the preceding section, existing tensions within ASEAN never amounted to militarized competition or an arms race, even though outstanding disputes remained. These included: 1) Malaysia and the Philippines over the state of Sabah; 2) Malaysia and Singapore over the island of Pedra Branca; 3) Malaysia and Thailand over border-crossing rights; 4) Malaysia and Indonesia over the islands of Sipadan, Sebatik, and Litigan; 5) Malaysia and Brunei over the Limbag territory in Sarawak; and 6) Indonesia and Vietnam over the boundary close to the Natuna Islands.²⁶ Disputes over maritime boundaries and other issues have been handled in ways that do not upset the common regional strategy. The Philippines, for instance, recalled its ambassador to Singapore in 1995, in the wake of the execution of a Philippine maid accused of murder, but tension subsided thereafter.

In the early 1990s, the dispute over the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands between China and the ASEAN states (Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) gained prominence. Vietnam and China also have contending claims to the Paracel Islands. In 1987, China's navy constructed observation stations in the Spratly Islands and Chinese military forces clashed with Vietnamese forces in the area. In 1992, the Chinese People's National Congress declared that the Spratly Islands were a vital part of China and subsequently occupied

Da Ba Dau. In June of that year, China landed troops and planted markers in Dac Lac Reef, fixed oil-drilling platforms in disputed areas of the Tonkin Gulf, signed an agreement with a U.S. company to search for oil and gas in the Spratlys, and impounded Vietnamese ships departing from Hong Kong.²⁷ In 1995, China's naval forces seized Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, and Chinese maps now include most of the South China Sea as a part of China's sovereign territories. These actions appear to reflect the priorities of China's own backlash nationalist elements, including the People's Liberation Army, which favours naval modernization and a blue-water capability. At the same time, the ambiguous, hot-and-cold tactics displayed by China over the Spratlys reveal the continued domestic competition between its internationalist and backlash camps.²⁸ How did the ASEAN states react to these events?

On the one hand, there have been expressions of concern. Malaysia's military intelligence chief, Raja Rashid, announced publicly "that China's intention was to obtain all of the Spratly island[s]."²⁹ In 1992, Malaysia's former armed forces chief, General Hashim Mohammed Ali, expressed distress with China's increased military spending and imputed territorial ambitions in the South China Sea. Indonesia's 1995 Defence White Paper noted China's "12 per cent annual economic growth" and its rapid technological changes that might turn China into a dominant regional power. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdugani warned of "China's 'expansionist tendency, mainly southward' and noted that Beijing 'has questioned our sovereignty over the natural gas-rich Natuna islands ... included in China's territorial maps'."³⁰ Vietnam expressed fear of China and — before joining ASEAN — tried to convince ASEAN members that a common interest existed in containing China.³¹ Following China's seizure of Mischief Reef, Philippine President Fidel Ramos said that China could pose a grave threat to all of East Asia, and urged all ASEAN members to remain vigilant about developments in the South China Sea. Even Singapore, generally more tamed about China's intentions than other ASEAN countries, has expressed concern about China's military expenditures. Prime Minister Gok Chok Tong was quoted as proclaiming that "[I]n Asia, China's rising power and arms buildup has stirred anxiety. It is important to bring into the open this underlying sense of discomfort, even insecurity, about the political and military ambition of China."³²

On the other hand, notwithstanding these clear anxieties, all parties to the Spratly dispute have shown a commitment to avoid militarized responses; and warnings of impending conflict have not materialized as of early 1999. A coalitional perspective points to the shared interest of internationalist coalitions — from China to ASEAN — to avoid regional instability of the kind that international investors often punish.

Accordingly, ASEAN approved a Declaration on the South China Sea at its 1992 annual ministerial meeting, urging all parties with claims to the disputed islands to renounce the use of force and to settle the disputes amicably.³³ Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia expanded their trade with China. The ASEAN states also encouraged China's active participation in APEC and in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) hoping that these would tame China's behaviour. Even Vietnam eventually pushed for *rapprochement* with China, its main imputed threat.³⁴

ASEAN has not relied on formal dispute-resolution mechanisms, is not a collective security arrangement, and does not yet amount to a security community either.³⁵ ASEAN has, however, developed a co-operative regional regime on the basis of three principles: respect for state sovereignty, non-intervention, and rejection of the threat or use of force in resolving disputes. These principles were written into the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation and were deemed successful in preventing the outbreak of conflict. As early as 1982, Singapore's Foreign Minister had remarked that "intra-ASEAN disputes have 'become irrelevant or muted considerably'."³⁶ The Concord Declaration also reaffirmed a commitment to a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ASEAN has also developed several informal mechanisms known as the "ASEAN Way", emphasizing consultation (*musjawarah*), consensual decision-making (*mufakat*), accommodation among members, and informal diplomacy. The consensual rule allows the state which benefits the least from an agreement to influence the terms of the agreement, a principle that contradicts the notion of hegemony by most powerful states.³⁷ ASEAN has fostered reciprocity and developed confidence-building mechanisms, including bilateral military exercises in dealing with common internal and external enemies. Annual meetings of foreign ministers, summits of the head of states, and a plethora of inter-sessional working committees have helped deepen trust. Since 1992, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) have expanded to include discussions on conflict resolution and the promotion of transparency and confidence-building measures on security matters (notably the arms register). This record makes the ASEAN experience compatible with concert-like multilateralism and thin institutionalization, although internationalist clusters are congruent with denser institutionalization as well.

These achievements account for ASEAN's attempt to expand a seemingly successful model into a broader regional institution, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), created in 1994 to spearhead a dialogue on security matters in the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF has twenty-one members, including the ASEAN countries, South Korea, China, Cambodia, India, Japan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Australia, New

Zealand, Canada, the European Union, and the United States. ASEAN considers itself a model for the ARF, which is not designed to formally address specific conflicts. The ARF has promoted dialogue on the Spratly Islands dispute and Korean denuclearization, and has advanced confidence-building measures, including publication of “White Papers” on defence policy and the promotion of high-level contacts and exchanges between military establishments.³⁸ In 1995, the ARF approved a “Concept Paper” identifying an evolutionary approach towards a conflict-resolution mechanism and reaffirming ASEAN’s role as the driving force in the ARF. Michael Leifer suggests that even though a robust balance of power is a primordial consideration in East Asia, a cohesive ARF might still serve a useful role, provided ASEAN accepts a less central role than it has thus far sought.³⁹

Finally, although the engine of co-operation is intra-regional, ASEAN leaders have regarded the United States as an important pillar of their internationalist strategy, in both economics and security, and have sought to strengthen their bilateral ties with it in order to alleviate concerns with its military exit from the Philippines. In 1990, Singapore permitted the U.S. Navy to increase its use of naval facilities in Singapore, and in 1992 it allowed a U.S. military logistic facility to move from the Philippines to Singapore. Singapore’s air force chief, Brigadier General Bey Soon Khiang argued that “the reduction of American military presence in the Asia-Pacific is likely to be destabilizing.”⁴⁰ Similar agreements were reached between the United States and Indonesia, and between the United States and Malaysia. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusummaatmadja went as far as to suggest that ASEAN might need a formal military alliance in order to cope “with the security vacuum after the U.S. leaves the region.”⁴¹ These bilateral arrangements do not compete with, but rather complement, ASEAN’s brand of multilateralism.

Conclusion: The Post-1997 Crisis as a New Test

This article has advanced a domestic coalitional approach to understanding ASEAN’s behaviour. Accordingly, key political entrepreneurs throughout the region progressively forged supportive internationalist coalitions at home that favoured domestic and regional political and economic stability and global access.⁴² Economic growth was the foundation of their grand strategy, embedded in the concept of “national resilience” (*ketahanan nasional*), which, writ large, would endow ASEAN itself with resilience.⁴³ Since its early years, this strategy demanded an accommodation with backlash states in the region, in an effort to co-opt them and to protect the implementation of ASEAN’s

internationalist agenda across the domestic, regional, and global spheres. In accordance with certain coalitional expectations, ASEAN's pattern of military expenditures was characterized by its moderation (low growth of military expenditures relative to GDP growth) and by its defensive and transparent nature. Military expenditures were not allowed to choke the domestic macroeconomic requirements of an internationalist grand strategy.

Regionally, the ASEAN leaders — backed by their progressively stronger domestic coalitions — developed a pattern of dialogue and accommodation, renouncing the use of force through their Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. At a Bali meeting in 1979, they established far deeper commitments than a mere tactical alliance against Vietnam — commitments that endured well beyond the threat that triggered them. By the 1980s — in tandem with deepened internationalization — ASEAN leaders had become more domestically secure partners committed to collective protection of their common grand strategy. The 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea and the Post-Ministerial Conference signalled an even stronger pledge to increasing regional transparency and confidence-building. A critical landmark in regional co-operation — the ASEAN Regional Forum — came into being in 1994. Annual informal summits of ASEAN heads of state began in 1995. By 1997, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) entered into force, aimed at restricting nuclear weapons states from outside the region, none of which had signed the Treaty's protocol by January 1998.

The economic and political crisis since 1997 offers an opportunity to submit this coalitional perspective to a test. As argued, the approach predicts more stable, deeper, and durable co-operative patterns among strong internationalist coalitions in power throughout a region than where backlash coalitions prevail, as in much of the Middle East. Clearly, an internationalist strategy is not without risks but quite vulnerable to domestic and international sources of instability, which explains a tendency to retain hybrid elements.⁴⁴ Where internationalist coalitions are feebler at home and threatened by backlash coalitions in the region, the quality of co-operation is more likely to erode in response to these domestic and regional threats. Insofar as backlash forces might gain significant ground domestically, in response to the economic crisis, we might observe changes in regional co-operative patterns, departing from the behaviour typical of preceding years.⁴⁵ Such a scenario would be compatible with a coalitional account, as would the scenario of rebounding internationalist coalitions that stay the co-operative course. Although a coalitional perspective suggests tendencies, not deterministic expectations, two other scenarios would point to

anomalies for coalitional analysis. One addresses a situation where backlash coalitions take over throughout the region and their behaviour produces little change in extant patterns of co-operation. The other anomaly would be if strong rebounding internationalist coalitions upset their earlier co-operative pattern by, for instance, waging a war. Heavy military investments in the midst of an attempt to restore the health of internationalist agendas would be more conceivable where domestic backlash constituencies grow stronger. Such investments seem unlikely under the current circumstances.

As of late 1998 the economic crisis appears to have deepened internationalist strategies in some cases (notably Singapore and Thailand), eroded them in others (prominently Malaysia), while reshuffling the coalitional landscape altogether in Indonesia. Economic contraction and growing unemployment have bred both ethnic hatred (as in the assaults on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia) and civic-nationalist revivals, including the expulsion of foreign nationals from neighbouring ASEAN countries. On the whole, exclusivist forms of civic and ethnic nationalism have remained checked but some tensions have been evident. For instance, relations between Malaysia and Singapore deteriorated significantly as Mahathir imposed capital controls in September 1998, targeting at least in part the 10 billion ringgit held largely by Malaysians in Singapore. Mahathir also restricted Singapore's use of air space in the aftermath of the publication of Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs. There were mutual recriminations about past grievances and quarrels over Malaysian conditions for supplying Singapore with water, and presumed lawlessness in Johor. In addition, the collapse of a relatively coherent domestic coalition under Soeharto in Indonesia transformed it from a regional giant underpinning ASEAN co-operation as *primus inter pares* to the sickest man on the block, raising anxieties in Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore — with a far stronger coalitional basis — responded by reasserting its fundamental strategy: "A small, vulnerable country resident in a tough neighbourhood has had to put in place a strategy that secures its future over the long term. Integration with the rest of the world is the essence of that strategy. It is a degree of integration which no other South-east Asian state comes close to matching."⁴⁶

Some have found unilateral responses to the economic crisis to reflect ASEAN's weak multilateral institutional infrastructure. Public statements by different leaders were initially contradictory and in some cases — notably Mahathir's — no more than strident attempts to mobilize nationalism and international conspiracies to explain the crisis away.⁴⁷ And yet even meetings held at the height of the crisis in late 1997 (in Manila) yielded a common commitment to avoid protectionist responses

and to promote further liberalization and foreign investment while pressing for global solutions to the negative externalities of international financial flows. The “peer surveillance” scheme designed to ensure a convergence of domestic agendas was consistent with ASEAN’s informal style but unprecedented in its intrusiveness. Furthermore, in an institutional departure, finance and central bank officials established the first organization within ASEAN with its own secretariat. A year later, the Hanoi Plan of Action reaffirmed the need to restore investor confidence, regenerate economic growth, and promote sound macroeconomic and financial policies and stronger financial systems and capital markets. The 1998 Summit urged the study of a common regional currency (following a proposal by Philippine President Joseph Estrada) and advanced new measures to attract foreign direct investment, promote financial liberalization, and accelerate AFTA’s implementation (from 2003 to 2002).

All in all, ASEAN leaders responded to the worst economic and political debacle in thirty years by conforming to the premise that internationalist strategies compel helping — not undermining — the most ravaged partners, and that any attempt to take advantage of feebler neighbours would undermine the collective. Contributions by relatively stronger members — notably Singapore — to rescue packages for Thailand and Indonesia are a case in point. China’s own behaviour towards ASEAN reaffirms this view, insofar as it avoided devaluing the yuan that might have deepened the regional crisis even if it would otherwise enhance China’s own export prospects. As Vice-Premier Li Lanqing proclaimed at the Davos World Economic Forum in February 1998: [Restraining from a devaluation] “is not only in our own interest but also a contribution to the recovery of stability and confidence on the Asian currency markets.”⁴⁸ With its own house in trouble, Japan offered largely extensive diplomatic support but no rollover of Japanese banks’ loans or clear endorsement of an EAEC-style turn in the regional economy.

Neither did the economic crisis shatter ASEAN’s ability to cooperate in other important matters, such as membership expansion and security. Even as they accepted Myanmar in their midst, ASEAN leaders pressured the Yangon regime on human rights issues. The internationalist logic behind this convergence comes to relief in Jose Almonte’s statement that “the liberating influence of both ASEAN and the market system on Myanmar’s economy and society should help to ‘socialise’ the Yangon regime into the global community.”⁴⁹ Insofar as concerns with the domestic affairs of would-be members were not perceived as the endorsement of domestic oppositions, the two cases may be consistent with ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention.⁵⁰ More

of a departure was Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's proposal for a policy of "constructive intervention", designed to strengthen civil society in other countries. Responses to Anwar's dismissal as Deputy Prime Minister and the criminal proceedings against him were far more at variance with non-intervention, suggesting that new modalities may replace older ones while preserving co-operation. Thailand's proposed "flexible engagement" has not yet gained support. The ARF has not only survived the crisis thus far but has come out slightly strengthened, witnessing further declines in ASEAN military expenditures and further co-operation with China. Finally, as expected in internationalist clusters, and despite sharp exchanges regarding Anwar, de-escalation of disputes has proven dominant. This is merely an interim assessment of post-crisis ASEAN responses. Domestic coalitional shifts may yet yield alternative rejoinders to the question: ASEAN, *Quo vadis?*

NOTES

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- 1. See, for instance, Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN Security Dilemmas," *Survival* 34, no. 4 (1992/3): 90–107. A Neo-Realist perspective is also included in Etel Solingen and Thien Nguyen, "Explaining ASEAN: Neorealist Predicament or International Cluster?" (Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, 17–22 March 1998).
- 2. Amitav Acharya, "A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era," *Adelphi Paper* 279 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993): 1–91.
- 3. This section abstracts from a fuller version of the coalitional argument in Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1998).
- 4. For a comprehensive analysis of the domestic politics that led the key ASEAN states to favour economic openness, see Alasdair Bowie and Danny Unger, *The Politics of Open Economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand* (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- 5. Muthiah Alagappa, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
- 6. A moderate return to inward-looking policies in the 1970s was followed by a new wave of liberalization and privatization in the 1980s. See Andrew MacIntyre, "Power, Prosperity, and Patrimonialism: Business and Government in Indonesia,"

- in his edited volume *Business and Government in Industrialising Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 244–67.
7. Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 117; Khong Yuen Foong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex", in *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, edited by D. Lake and P. Morgan (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 318–42; Soekarno's acronym Nasakom reflected one of his two supportive coalitions (nationalist, religious, and communist forces), the other being the armed forces. See also Jusuf Wanandi, "The Correlation Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Indonesia," in *Asia and the Major Powers: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, edited by R.A. Scalapino, S. Sato, J. Wanandi, and S. Han (University of California Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), pp. 181–99.
 8. Data on trade openness for all ASEAN states are from Heston and Summers, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950–1988", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, no. 9 (May 1991): 327–68; and 1995 update in National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, Mass., January 1995) <www.nber.org/pwt56.html, supplemented for 1992–96 by World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, 1998), p. 310; and World Bank, *World Development Reports* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991–97). All data on exports are from World Bank, *World Tables* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, 1989–90, 1995), supplemented for 1992–1996 by *World Development Report* (1991–97) and *World Development Indicators* (1998), pp. 188–89. All data on FDI are from *World Tables* (1980, 1995), supplemented for 1992–96 by *World Development Report* (1991–97) and *World Development Indicators* (1998), p. 334.
 9. Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore: Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in *Asia and the Major Powers: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, edited by Scalapino et al., p. 289.
 10. Edmund T. Gomez and Jomo K.S., *Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits* (Cambridge University Press, 1997); and K.S. Nathan, "Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation," in *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 513–48.
 11. D. Geoffrey and S.D. Stafford, "Malaysia's New Economic Policy and the Global Economy: The Evolution of Ethnic Accommodation," *Pacific Review* 10, no. 4 (1997): 556–80.
 12. Quoted in Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of ASEAN and the GCC", in *The Insecurity Dilemma – National Security of Third World States*, edited by Brian L. Job (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 152.
 13. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 314.
 14. On further regional comparisons, see Bowie and Unger, op. cit., p. 10. Malaysia's government deficits and final consumption are higher than the rest, and Singapore's figures are the lowest.
 15. Data on military expenditures (MILEX) in this section is from *SIPRI Yearbooks* (various years, 1975–95) and IISS, *The Military Balance* (1995/96), pp. 266–67. For cross-regional comparisons, see Solingen, op.cit., pp. 28–29, 137, 166, 229–30. On transparency, see *Arms, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia*, edited by Bates Gill and J.N. Mak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
 16. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," *Survival* 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 3–22. See also Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military

- Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (1993/4): 78–112; Alagappa, op.cit., pp. 631–33; Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, "The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific," *Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (1994): 131; and Chin Kin Wah, ed., *Defence Spending in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987).
17. Acharya, "Regionalism". On the synergies between a stable domestic political order, economic growth, and regional co-operation in ASEAN, see Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," *Adelphi Paper* 302 (1996): 14–15; Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore: A Regional Security Core?" in *Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium*, edited by Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon W. Simon (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 62–63; and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security," in Alagappa, op.cit., pp. 477–512.
 18. Quoted in Nathan, op. cit., p. 533.
 19. Quoted in Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*. p. 162.
 20. Chia Siow Yue, "The Deepening and Widening of ASEAN," *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* 1, no. 1 (1996): 59–78. Ross Garnaut, *Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalization* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996); Linda Y.C. Lim, "ASEAN: New Modes of Economic Cooperation," in *Southeast Asia in the New World Order*, edited by David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 19–35.
 21. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: Looking Outward and Moving Inward?" in *Asia and the Major Powers: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*, edited by Scalapino et al., pp. 256–79.
 22. Susan L. Shirk, "Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?" in *Regional Orders: Building Security on a New World*, edited by Lake and Morgan, pp. 245–70; Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 1 (April 1998): 38–66.
 23. Vietnam's defence expenditures, in constant 1993 dollars, have since remained virtually the same, from US\$789 million in 1990 to US\$865 million in 1995 (*SIPRI Yearbook 1996*).
 24. "Survey: Asia. A Billion Consumers," *The Economist* 329, no. 7835 (30 October 1993).
 25. Kishore Mahbubani, "An Asia-Pacific Consensus," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997): 157; and "The Pacific Impulse," *Survival* 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 108.
 26. For a comprehensive list, see Ball, op.cit., pp. 88–89; and Sheldon W. Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982).
 27. Richard Betts, "Vietnam's Strategic Predicament," *Survival* 37, no. 3 (1995): 72; Alan E. Goodman, "Vietnam and ASEAN: Who Would Have Thought It Possible?," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 6 (1996): 596.
 28. Scott Snyder, "The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy," (United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, August 1996); Sheldon W. Simon, "Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts and the ASEAN Regional Forum" (International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, 12–17 March 1998); and Derek McDougall, *The International Politics of the New Asia Pacific* (Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 216.
 29. Buszynski, op. cit., p. 97.
 30. Alan S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China", *Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (1997): 306–7.
 31. Acharya, "A New Regional Order", pp. 43–44.

32. Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 8 (1996): 759.
33. Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," p. 18; Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 185.
34. Betts, op. cit., p. 67.
35. Miles Kahler, "Institution-Building in the Pacific," in *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region*, edited by Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 1–16.
36. Quoted in Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defense Community'?", *Pacific Affairs* 64 (1991): 173.
37. Khong, op. cit., pp. 330–33.
38. Malcolm Chalmers, *Confidence-Building in South-East Asia* (Westview Press, 1996).
39. Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum." For an even more skeptical view of the ARF and China's intentions, see Robyn Lim, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 2 (August 1998): 115–36.
40. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 173.
41. Quoted from Acharya, "The Association," p. 171.
42. Paul Dibb, David D. Hale, and Peter Prince, "The Strategic Implications of Asia's Economic Crisis," *Survival* 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 15; and Anwar, op. cit., pp. 477–512.
43. Emmerson, op. cit., p. 38.
44. Solingen, op. cit., pp. 47, 57, 58, 61.
45. On the potential for backlash responses in the aftermath of IMF-imposed programmes, see Richard Higgott, "The International Relations of the Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment" (Paper presented at a conference on "From Miracle to Meltdown: The End of Asian Capitalism?", organized by Murdoch University, Asia Research Center, 20–22 August 1998). On the weakness of populist challenges in East and Southeast Asian countries prior to the crisis, see Haggard and Kaufman, op. cit., p. 455.
46. Derek da Cunha, "Asian Crisis Sharpens Siege Mentality", *Sunday Times* (Singapore), 18 October 1998, p. 43.
47. On responses to the economic crisis, see John Funston, "ASEAN: Out of Its Depth?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 20, no. 1 (April 1998): 29–31; and Higgott, op. cit., pp. 1–34.
48. Quoted in Dibb et al., op. cit., p. 19.
49. Jose T. Almonte, "Ensuring Security the 'ASEAN Way' ", *Survival* 39, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 82.
50. Funston, op. cit., pp. 22–37.

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