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The Limits of a Grand Strategy Paradigm in International Relations:

Lessons from Israeli History, 1977-1983

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in

Political Science

by

Ari Barbalat

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Limits of a Grand Strategy Paradigm in International Relations:

Lessons from Israeli History, 1977-1983

by

Ari Barbalat

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2019

Professor Steven Spiegel, Chair

Grand strategy is the idea that there is an intellectually coherent "concept" available and desirable which integrates disparate foreign policy behaviours and activities into a unified whole which is readily implementable. This dissertation will probe -- using examples from the diplomatic history of Israel under Prime Minister Menachem Begin -- why 'grand strategy' fails to explain episodes in the history of Israeli foreign policy; Israeli history during this period highlights how one of the world's most agile foreign policies manifest in Israel's was able to thrive without one. The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest that the history of Israeli foreign policy challenges many assumptions of the presently popular "grand strategy" studies. By "grand strategy" I refer to the idea that states can, should and do possess an intellectually coherent integration of disparate foreign policy goals as a unity. The history of Israeli foreign policy offers many conceptual lessons that challenge the assumptions of this thinking. There is much to be said for the idea that countries "should" have a "grand strategy." Especially in a world like ours where the average layman (and statesman) does not ponder or comprehend the nuance of world affairs and the subtlety of international history, the *intellectualism* of grand strategy studies is a virtuous ideal. But the very "intellectualism" inherent in the idea of grand strategy is neither attainable nor possible nor helpful in many circumstances. This study suggests that the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy may be appreciated as the conceptual "obverse" of grand strategy studies.

The dissertation of Ari Barbalat is approved.

Michael Lofchie

Barbara Geddes

Barry O'Neill

Steven Spiegel, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2019

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DEDICATION PAGE

I dedicate this dissertation to:

*My Mother and Father, Glenda and Jeff

*My Grandparents Lorraine and Aaron (Bubby and Papa)

*Rabbi Dr. Charles Grysman of Congregation Zichron Yisroel in Thornhill, Ontario, who offered

me wise counselling during this period of time

*My Brother and Sister-in-Law Doron and Erin

*My Brother and Sister-in-Law Eitan and Sarah and their baby Caleb

*My Aunt, Monica, and my Cousins Hartley and Rebecca

*My Uncle Shmuel and my Cousins Itamar, Naama and Smadar

*The Yezidi Community of Richmond Hill, Ontario, especially Zozeya, Basima and Hayder,

assisted under the auspices of Project Abraham, a volunteer-led resettlement initiative in Toronto

*The Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture, especially Ezat, Vilma, Mulugeta and Domine.

*Ms. Gillian Collyer, who helped edit my work in the years 2017-18

*The staff of the John P. Robarts Library at the University of Toronto, especially Oday Khaghani

(User Services Supervisor) and Askari Husain (Supervisor, Access and Information Services)

**

Epigraph:

"For I desired mercy and not sacrifice." -- Hosea 6:6

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Biographical Sketch

Ari Barbalat holds a Master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Chicago and an

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of the self-published book *Israel and Eurasia: Contrarian Readings of Biblical Geopolitics* (Morrisville,

NC: Lulu Self-Publishing Platform, 2019). This dissertation was written in his home town of Thornhill,

Ontario, Canada. He volunteers with Project Abraham and the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture.

He speaks Hebrew and conversational Arabic. His academic interests encompass Israeli history, human

rights, and the contribution of Judaism to international relations theory.

Introduction

There is a popular concept in the study of international relations known as "grand strategy." It refers to the idea that instead of allowing an array of international relationships to unfold on their own and allowing the different apparatuses of external relations to carry out their own work their own way, these relations should be fused and streamlined into one integrated "programme." For example, instead of allowing Country X's relations with France to simply be X's relations with France, and instead of allowing Country X's relations with Argentina to simply be X's relations with Argentina, and instead of Country X's relations with East Timor to simply be X's relations with East Timor, Country X's relations with France, with Argentina and East Timor in particular and its relations with Southeast Asia, South America and Europe in general, should be conducted according to an overall "great plan." Many authors have written about American foreign policy by suggesting that the United States adopt specific "programmes" of grand strategy emphasizing specific priorities, goals and policies that should be *amalgamated* in particular ways, even though the specific authors and perspectives differ from one another and are often harsh critiques of American governmental decisions. This dissertation will examine Israeli history during the years 1977-1983. It will suggest that the ideal of a "one-size-fits-all" paradigm for improving foreign policy conduct is not necessarily appropriate for everybody. There are notable limits that the history of Israeli foreign policy in general and the tenure of Prime Minister Menachem Begin in particular suggest when contemplated in dialogue with grand strategy studies.

My personal working definition of a grand strategy is as follows: *the unification of all theatres and components of a given country's foreign relations into one coherent programme*.

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There are many virtues to contemplating grand strategy. Even in the Israeli scholarly context, there have been authors recommending that Israel adopt a "grand strategy" or abide by the conceptual principles imbibing grand strategy as studied in Western academies.[1] First and foremost, grand strategy theory looks down on the lack of *intellectualism* in foreign policy practice and discourse, lamenting the inability of leaders to think in holistic and nuanced ways about what they are doing. Even in Israeli writing on grand strategy, this theme is manifest. Israeli proponents of grand strategy lament the attitude of "*bitzuism*" or "do-ism" that in their eyes bely anti-intellectual attitudes in the Israeli decision-making brass. Grand strategy theory regrets that domestic influences distract from reasoned deliberation about choices and decisions, leading to unwise and avoidable errors. Grand strategy is also, in many ways, "convenient." In our age of "amalgamation," whether in the form of the "European Union" or in the form of "mergers and acquisitions," it is often very easy and convenient to "fuse" many parts into one whole. "Grand strategy" is interested in "streamlining" many parts of a country's international interactions and apparatuses of foreign policy bureaucracy into one whole. Especially in our world of advanced computer technology, this is arguably more appealing than ever.

This dissertation is motivated by my noticing many "blindspots" in grand strategy thinking. I am not offering a "critique" of grand strategy; a more thorough study of why the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy challenge most of the assumptions of grand strategy theory is beyond the scope of this dissertation. I hope, though, that suggested insights from the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy can breathe "new life" in their perspectives while generating appreciation for the precious insights of

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[1] One example is the scholarship of Professor Yehezkel Dror. Yehezkel Dror, *Israeli Statecraft: National Security Challenges and Responses*. Routledge, 2011; Yehezkel Dror, *A Grand Strategy for Israel*. Jerusalem: Academon, 1989; Yehezkel Dror and Sharon Pardo, "Approaches and Principles for an Israeli Grand Strategy towards the European Union." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11 (2006), pp. 17-44; Yehezkel Dror, "A Breakout Political-Security Grand-Strategy for Israel." *Israel Affairs* 12:4 (2006), pp. 843-79; Yehezkel Dror, *Grand-Strategic Thinking for Israel*. Ariel Center for Policy Research, 1999. Another contemporary writer is Dr. Charles Freilich. *Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy*, Cornell Press, 2012; Charles Freilich, *Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

theorists, historians and specialists in and of Israeli foreign policy, encouraging readers and students to appreciate them in new ways.[2] I am making reference to general assumptions of grand strategy theory throughout.

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[2]If done does a Google search on "Grand Strategy," one quickly finds the definition provided by "Wikipedia", which quotes the military theorist Basil Liddell Hart:

> [T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.
>
> Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. ...
>
> Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity. ("Grand strategy." Wikipedia entry accessed May 28, 2019. Source: B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* [Second Revised edition]. London: Faber & Faber, 1967, p.322)

Although his definition concurs with my understanding and the general understanding of the term, I am consciously *not using* this term for the following specific reasons. One, using this definition presumes that classical military thought and contemporary grand strategy theory are one and the same thing. One can debate whether such thinkers as Clausewitz, Jomini or Hart concur with contemporary grand strategy studies' ideas and assumptions and how similar or different they were and are from contemporary grand strategy writing.

Moreover, most of the popular books recommending specific American "grand strategy" programmes engage minimally at best with the ideas of such military thinkers and theorists. I humbly see the study of *strategy* and the study of *grand strategy* (especially in popular "grand strategy" books) as being two different bodies of scholarship, despite their overlap. Two, there is a body of scholarship on the history of the Israeli military that debates the influence of such thinkers on Israeli decision-makers, tracing the divergences and similarities between Israeli thinking and these thinkers' perspectives. Such a line of research would direct this dissertation down a different path of inquiry than the unfolding chapters follow.

Additionally, without negating the intellectual value of classical military thought, I do not possess enough familiarity with military affairs to make inferences about how reasonable such thinkers' ideas are beyond their contemplative value to a non-specialist. Four, what I see as the most important blindspot of grand strategy theory is the over-emphasis on analogy and analogical reasoning.

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Different Understandings of Grand Strategy

When one speaks of "grand strategy," there are three forms that "grand strategy" takes. One form is major "foreign policy doctrines" such as the "Kissinger Doctrine" of detente. These are major thematic principles that organize great powers' foreign policies. This line of reasoning is inapplicable to Israel's context because Israel does not have the reach or resources of major powers. Moreover, it is sometimes unhelpful to apply analogies from major powers to Israel's context because "doctrines" in the history of American foreign policy were not attuned to asymmetrical warfare, the problem Israel faces most directly; because the Middle East, unlike the Cold War, is not and never was "bipolar"; because Israel does not possess the geographic "blessings" of two oceans that the United States has; because Israel does not have allies in the formal sense the United States has; because Israel is not in the circumstance to dispatch troops to fight on other countries' behalf as in the Korean, Vietnam and Kosovo wars.

A second form is *classical geopolitical and military theory*. The ideas of such military planners as Sun-Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz, guerrilla warfare theorists like Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, and such geopolitical theorists as Alfred Mahan and Karl Haushofer, in the history of strategic thought, are often read as "inspirations" to grand strategy thought and theory. While the influence of some such thinkers on key figures in Israeli history and on key writers vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is discernable, I see these as inapplicable to the Israeli context. Firstly, while the influence of military theorists like Clausewitz on the IDF and guerrilla warfare theorists like Mao Zedong on the PLO are difficult to deny, there is a difference, in my perspective, between the *sources of the ideas behind visionaries* in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the *history of the organizational behaviour discernable in looking more closely at how decisions were and are made*.

Third, there are many contemporary "grand strategy" books suggesting new visions for American foreign policy. They aspire to draw analogies from past episodes in American foreign policy history and

ground them in specific theories of international relations, especially neorealism. Examples include Stephen Walt, *Taming American Power*; Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions;* Robert Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*; Barry Posen, *Restraint*; Robert Lieber, *Power and Willpower*. There are also expressions of grand strategy writing from neoconservative, liberal internationalist and critical perspectives. One can agree or disagree with specific proposals from these books. However, their failure to fit the Israeli context is based on many differences in how Israeli foreign relations plays out. At a minimum, their ideas are valid solely to the American context and would be difficult to transplant into any other foreign policy system, be it the European Union or Israel or Canada. Yet in Israel's case, they are particularly difficult to apply because they pay little attention to the dynamics of negotiations, coalition bargaining, party politics, inter-personal disputes, transnational history and the psychology of communication. These are central to Israeli conduct under any prime minister. I highlight their relevance to Israel under Begin. Although the chapters at hand do not address specific books and thinkers, the thematized assumptions about what "grand strategy" says and claims are based on general ideas regularly repeated in many grand strategy books, especially in the popular trend of American grand strategy writing as has become widespread in recent decades.

All these concepts of "grand strategy" are intellectually and educationally valuable. The purpose of this study is not to "critique" any scholar or book or even the overall trend. Rather, the ideal of an *integrated foreign policy programme and apparatus* can learn much from the very serendipitous "counter-point" of the history of Israeli foreign policy.

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As suggested just above, one can agree or disagree with specific proposals from these books. However, their failure to fit the Israeli context is based on many differences in how Israeli foreign relations plays out. At a minimum, their ideas are valid solely to the American context and would be difficult to transplant into any other foreign policy system, be it the European Union or Israel or Canada.

In these countries' cases, the theme of "decline" is less than relevant as it is in American thinking; in other countries' cases, the problems of *sovereignty, diplomacy, dependency, and international cooperation* are central in ways that American thinking does not appreciate. Furthermore, these countries do not play the same role in international and global "agenda-setting" the way the US does.

I personally agree philosophically with virtually every philosophical reason why the school of thought advocating for serious grand strategy studies in the university encourages deeper study of military thought and diplomatic history in the classroom of international relations; but as much as I concur with the importance of studying international relations with deference to "great books," overreliance on analogy can, at the opposite extreme, overlook the reality that contemporary situations, especially for a "new" state like Israel, are *radically new.* Without negating the importance of historical precedence, there is much to be said for *adaptive* reasoning to comprehend the specific new situation "as is" and "as it unfolds" no less than relying on historical analogies; from the vantage point of Jewish history, much of Israeli history is virtually unprecedented; from the vantage point of comparative history, especially with Europe, there are many ways in which Israeli history is *absolutely unique.* Even from the perspective of Middle Eastern history, the reality of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, secular nationalism in the twentieth century and the "revolution in military affairs" are arguably tantamount to the contemporary period representing radical breaks with the past. Analogies are absolutely important; but one also might recognize the extreme ramifications of rapid change.

Moreover, as important as re-appreciating the great classics of military thought that constitute the grand strategy theory "canon," there is the possibility, no less perilous, of negating the importance of *specific area studies knowledge.* While the *intellectual* deficits of foreign policy decision-making speak for themselves, grand strategy theory could go further to address the *intersubjective* deficits of entire cadres of practitioners knowing precious little about the history, culture and society of their counterparts and adversaries. Just as classical European "models" inform the worldview of thinkers attempting to cultivate American "statecraft," so much of the world applies American "models" and "statecraft" for their own institutional innovation.

Without negating the value of such emulation, there is no less to be said for the importance of *self-reliance* and the *trust in* and *cultivation of* local knowledge based on one's own memory and reality. In my perspective, contemporary grand strategy theory over-relies on American international relations theory while under-appreciating the insights of many sub-specialities of international relations. It also admires a "central planning" perspective on foreign policy activities that would end up imposing itself on diverse ways of doing things by people with different experiences and expertise. The case for streamlining components of a foreign policy apparatus is valid and important. But this is a matter of *bureaucracy, administration* and *organization* for their own sake. It is probably addressed in military theorists' writing, and interdiscipinarity in studies of negotiation, terrorism, intelligence, deterrence and peacekeeping already borrow from one another thereby cultivating mutual learning on an academic level in these sub-fields. I prefer to highlight the differences between the history of Israeli foreign policy and the *contemporary writing* on grand strategy in American circles. I think the value for mutual learning between the two is greatest this way.

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What can grand strategy studies learn from the history of Israeli foreign policy? The dissertation that follows suggests that it can learn much. For one thing, grand strategy studies, especially in the United States but increasingly popular in many other countries and academic-intellectual environments thinking about national foreign policies, remains, *even among its proponents*, rather undefined. Zbigniew Brzezinski's famous proposal for an American grand strategy, *The Grand Chessboard*, does not attempt to define grand strategy and actually avoids the term.[3] Christopher Layne's *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy since 1940* quotes three definitions of grand strategy from other scholars

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[3] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books, 1997.

without formulating a concept of the book's own.[4] In his book, the term "grand strategy" is presumed to be self-evident and is virtually interchangeable with the term "foreign policy."[5]

The very difficulty which exists in defining what grand strategy actually is suggests that learning from the history of Israeli foreign policy in grand strategy studies can open grand strategy theory to the limits of its paradigms while leading to greater appreciation for other ways of doing things. The very difficulty that exists in clearly defining grand strategy is already one hint that countries like Israel might be quite well off without one.

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That said, Barry Posen defines grand strategy as follows:

A grand strategy is a nation-state's theory about how to produce security for itself. Grand strategy focuses on military threats, because these are the most dangerous, and military remedies because these are the most costly. Security has traditionally encompassed the

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[4]Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006, p. 13.

[5]No less than John Lewis Gaddis, who pioneered Yale University's grand strategy studies program, states that 'grand strategy' is diffuse and effusive. In Gaddis' words:

My own definition – not shared by my colleagues, for we are argumentative in the classroom – is that grand strategy is the calculated relationship of means to large ends. It's about how one uses whatever one has to get to wherever it is one wants to go. Our knowledge of it derives chiefly from the realm of war and statecraft, because the fighting of wars and the management of states have demanded the calculation of relationships between means and ends for a longer stretch of time than any other documented area of collective human activity.

John Lewis Gaddis, "What Is Grand Strategy?" Indian Strategic Knowledge Online, p. 7.

http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/grandstrategypaper.pdf

preservation of sovereignty, safety, territorial integrity and power position--the last being the necessary means to the first three. States have traditionally been quite willing to risk the safety of their people to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power position.[6]

This attempt to specify what grand strategy "is" certainly is more acute than the authors alluded to above. But this definition, in its clarity, is precisely where appreciating the history of Israeli foreign policy can contribute. For the definition offered by Posen speaks solely of the military character of foreign policy; Israeli history offers so much more.

Most importantly, the *subject matter* constituted by the history of Israeli foreign policy is qualitatively different. For scholars of grand strategy, there is little serious consideration of conflict resolution. But in the study of Israeli foreign policy, this is central. While the centrality of military calculation and security considerations in Israeli history cannot be overstated, the history of Israeli foreign policy is, no less, the history of attempts to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict, even if these attempts were only provisional and were not enough to end it entirely. Herbert Kelman defines conflict resolution as an interactive problem-solving framework that goes beyond simply a "settlement." Conflict resolution generates public support for the agreement and encourages the development of new images of the other. Conflict resolution establishes a new relationship between the parties, best described as a partnership, in which the parties are responsive to each other's needs and constraints and are committed to reciprocity. Conflict resolution creates a degree of working trust between the parties and grounds itself in a pragmatic trust in the other's interest in achieving and maintaining peace. Conflict resolution addresses the parties' basic needs and fears and therefore has a greater capacity to sustain itself over time.

Whereas grand strategy is imposed and sponsored by dominant powers, conflict resolution is arrived at interactively and catalyzes a higher level of commitment among the parties. The tenureship of Prime Minister Menachem Begin offers fruitful insight into the character of conflict resolution in the

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[6]Barry Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Introduction.

Israel-Egypt peace process culminating in the Camp David Accords with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Grand strategy and conflict resolution are not mutually exclusive. To be sure, they can complement one another. Indeed, as Kelman states, conflict resolution involves the development of new attitudes *alongside* or *on top of* the old attitudes. Old attitudes remain intact even as new attitudes, associated with the new relationship, take shape.[7]

Posen states as follows in regard to American debates: "Great American generals from William Tecumseh Sherman to Dwight Eisenhower remind us that war is hell and that war is waste. The United States needs military power and needs to be prepared to use it. But this is no casual matter. Military power must be subjected to the discipline of political analysis. That is the purpose of grand strategy."[8]

But why is military conduct necessarily the central element in the story? Attention paid to the history of Israeli foreign policy suggests the importance of intelligence, negotiations and diplomacy in ways that have achieved just as much and arguably more than military activity.

Posen states that "although grand strategy depends on the sinews of national power, these sinews reflect a wide range of factors about which the specialists in threat assessment, alliance management, and combat--strategists, diplomats and soldiers--know little. They should confine their advice to what is germane to military power; otherwise their amateurism may prove counterproductive."[9]

In the history of Israeli foreign policy, however, one cannot speak of the Entebbe Rescue, the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, the surprise attack of the Yom Kippur War, the intrigue of the Lavon Affair, the struggle for Soviet Jewry, or the ups and downs of US-Israeli relations without listening to the voices of the diplomats, soldiers and strategists found in the history of negotiations and the history of intelligence that have played out in the highs and lows of Israeli history. The reality that the history of

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[7]Herbert Kelman, "Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective." In Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed. *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 118-19

[8]Posen, *Restraint*, Op. Cit.

[9]Posen, *Restraint*, Op. Cit.

Israeli foreign policy has indeed been made by amateurs is the heart of the story; grand strategy theory can learn much from the history and psychology of *improvisation* in Israeli conduct.

Moreover, attention to Israeli history teaches that grand strategy is often a luxury inasmuch as it assumes that governments are sophisticated and canny enough to think through long-term goals and trajectories and integrate these into a coherent and implementable programme -- this is beyond the capacity for many. The history of Israeli foreign policy suggests that the organizational constraints within Israel's system are "too much".

Additionally, grand strategy assumes that "one" set of priorities are innately "superior" to alternative sets of priorities held by dissident groups and excluded voices. In Israel's case, there are too many simultaneous "out-groups" that would need to be excluded in order for a clearly conceived grand strategy to be defined.

Furthermore, while contemplating a grand strategy might be a worthwhile path for contemporary Israel in the year 2019 to consider, Israeli diplomatic history requires one to come to terms with a "very different Israel" that did not have the advantages that Israel's regional situation presents today. On a different level, grand strategy studies overlook the reality that different countries and cultures, especially Israel and especially the Middle East, simply function differently than "normal" great powers as conceived based on the study of the rise and fall of empires.

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According to Posen: "Grand strategy is ultimately about fighting, a costly and bloody business. The worst threats are military. A large well-handled military in the hands of another state can produce rapid damage to one's interests, if those interests are undefended."[10]

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[10]Posen, *Restraint*, Op. Cit.

Yet inasmuch as the history of Israeli foreign policy transcends the Arab-Israeli conflict, the history of *regionalism* in Israeli foreign policy whether in covert relationships or failed negotiations, the suggestion of Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink must be borne in mind and could teach much to those thinking about grand strategy in other cultural and national environments: In their words, "stable and lasting peace is characterized by mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, as well as fully normalized, cooperative political, economic and cultural relations based on equality and justice, nonviolence, mutual trust, positive attitudes, and sensitivity and consideration for the other party's needs and interests." As they stress, these encompass both "*structural and psychological interests*."[11]

From Israel's complicated experience in attempted peacemaking, grand strategy can learn much about *social communication* and *social learning*. As Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov stresses, it is easier to first maintain and consolidate initial interaction and cooperation and establish joint institutions and organizations. This may catalyze the psychological change needed to support the evolution of peace. Only when the sides realize that peace relations are, indeed, beneficial because they provide not only security needs but almost economic benefits do they internalize the value of peace to their security and wealth and thereby become ripe for reconciliation.[12]

Grand strategy can learn much from the reality that the history of Israeli foreign policy is not only characterized by war but also, no less, by *dispute*. Raymond Cohen paraphrases the key features of dispute processing: that a dispute is deemed to be the stage in a relationship at which a quarrel becomes public; the disputes can only be understood as integral features of ongoing relationships, not as self-standing, isolated events; that disputes emerge over extended periods of time and thus require a *longitudinal*, historical approach in order to understand them; that disputes are cultural constructs, not

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[11]Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennick, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process." In Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *Reconciliation to Conflict Resolution*, pp. 11-38

[12]Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "Dialectics Between Stable Peace and Reconciliation." In Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, Op. Cit., pp. 76-77

concrete entities. The relationships within which grievances emerge, the concerned audiences, the things people quarrel over, the way disputes are handled, the course of the dispute, et cetera, acquire their meaning within cultural contexts and in relation to the values and beliefs of members of society; disputes are unlikely to be settled, thus they should be re-conceived as being *processed* and going through *processing*, inasmuch as disputes drag on, sometimes going underground for an extended period only to reemerge much later. Contention is not pathological but an inevitable dimension of social life. Third parties -- be they moderators, interested parties and audiences -- are rarely neutral observers but as agents that crucially affect the definition of a dispute and the behavior of the disputants. They do so by encouraging, discouraging, supporting, opposing, validating and disconfirming the disputants' claims.[13]

Grand strategy studies can learn from the disputes not only between Israel and its neighbours but among factions within cabinets and from the ideological confrontations between feuding schools of thought not only within Israel's polity but within its bureaucracy.

The history of Israeli foreign policy teaches important lessons that grand strategy studies can learn.

A) Very often, grand strategy studies emphasizes the importance of "unification" or "integration" of various different inputs and departments of a country's foreign policy conduct. It emphasizes "streamlining." The history of Israeli foreign policy suggests a different perspective on how foreign policy might be organized: the importance of *compartmentalization*. That is to say, letting small groups of teams and individuals "do their own thing" according to their own know-how; seeing foreign policy as a constellation of small teams with their own experience of how to operate and doing things in their respective "corner" with healthy mutual competition among them, despite its shortcomings, can suggest an alternative to a "streamlining" approach. Instead of

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[13]Raymond Cohen, "Apology and Reconciliation in International Relations." In Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, Op. Cit., pp. 179-80

conceiving debates over "prioritization" of goals in foreign policy as an irreconcilable conflict between Options A, B and C versus Options X, Y and Z, small teams of diplomats, spies, analysts, generals and soldiers and use their respective skills in their own way to tackle the threats they are best suited to dealing with. The danger of miscoordination might be weighed against the advantage of *initiative*.

B) Opposing visions of "grand strategy" and foreign policy are never going away. Very often, grand strategy writing sees proponents of one school of thought completely delegitimize proponents of another school of thought. In the history of Israeli foreign policy, opposing schools of thought *must coexist, cooperate and collaborate*: be they Ben-Gurion and Sharett, Rabin and Peres, Begin and Dayan, or any other pair. Hawk and Dove, Labour and Likud, Activist and Cautionary, are all combinations that show up repeatedly in the history of Israeli decision-making.

C) Tactics -- as manifest in the various specializations of foreign policy conduct such as intelligence gathering and analysis, public diplomacy (*hasbara*), lobbying, negotiation, battlefield maneuvers, technology, deterrence, counterterrorism -- are no less important than strategy. More often than not, questions of *do-ability* take precedence over those of "desirability."

D) Regardless of the grand strategy debated or deployed, *conflicts must, sooner or later, be resolved*. Thinking exclusively about preparation for war overlooks the inevitability, maturity and integrity of peacemaking.

E) The history of Israeli foreign policy testifies to the importance of *solitary individuals* who rise and fall according to their capacity to work as a team. This is a very different mindset than thinking according to "policies" and "interests" and "systems" that grand strategy scholars are most attuned to. Providing people with *individualized attention* is not only a key to studying Israeli foreign policy, it is a key to the character of diplomacy across borders.

Louis Kriesberg stresses the importance of *regard*: expressions that recognize the humanity and identity of other people.[14] Reconciliatory actions promoting regard for others have impacts on the identity of those undertaking the actions as well as of their recipients. Taking such actions reduces the likelihood of holding identities that incorporate sentiments and beliefs that people sharing one's collective identity are superior to other peoples and that others are inferior and less wholly human. Certainly, such reconciliatory actions the grievance of those who previously had suffered the indignities of low regard.

I hope this dissertation generates "*regard*" for peripheries of international history and international relations theory pertinent to Israeli foreign policy that a specialist in Israeli foreign policy would be aware of but that a generalist or a specialist in a different country's foreign policy, such as the United States', might not be aware of. Grand strategy could benefit most from individualized attention to particular details not commonly included in its body of scholarship.

<p style="text-align:center">**</p>

Each chapter below will suggest one key theme in the history of Israeli foreign policy manifest during the Begin years that grand strategy studies does not take sufficient account of.

First, grand strategy does not take sufficient account of the importance of *tactics*. In the unfolding of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations during the Camp David Peace Process overseen by American President Jimmy Carter, the talks between Egypt and Israel had *a logic of their own*. In the theory and practice of *international negotiations*, nations communicate with one another in a manner that is *situational*. The interlocutors possess relations between themselves in intra- and inter-group dynamics that play out *spontaneously*. In the case of the Egypt-Israel negotiations, this chapter highlights how Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem can been apprehended as a brilliant "tactic" in Egypt's negotiations process with Israel. The history of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations may be

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[14]Louis Kriesberg, "Comparing Reconciliation Actions within and between Countries." In Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, Op. Cit., p. 104

appreciated as Israel's *spontaneous response* to Sadat's "surprise". Thereafter, the two teams in negotiation with one another interacted with emphasis on *communication* and *reciprocity*. The psychology of the negotiations challenges the idea that a firm and fixed grand strategy is absolutely necessary. Instead, the *interactive character of negotiations* has a logic of its own.

Second, grand strategy assumes that there is an objective *consensus* as to what a country's foreign policy goals are and ought to be. In Chapter Two, I examine relations between Begin and Carter with emphasis on the problems taking place for Begin in his relationship with his cabinet members. Begin's Defense and Foreign Ministers, Ezer Weizmann and Moshe Dayan, respectively, had genuinely opposing visions to Begin as to what Israel's goals were and ought to have been; yet Begin also faced opposition from Gush Emunim, representing Israel's burgeoning Religious Zionist settler movement and from the Israeli Labour Party, these groups themselves possessing radically opposing visions to one another and also to Begin. Begin also relied on the centrist DMC party in his coalition which itself had a different view of Israel's primary goals. In Israel's context, formulating a grand strategy is problematic because doing so would inevitably marginalizes dissenting voices who, however distasteful their views might be, are "not going anywhere." Whether the dissent comes from Religious Zionists, Palestinian Arabs or Israeli Communists, let alone from opposition parties to the sitting government, coming to terms with a unity of needs and priorities is an arguably insurmountable challenge. Moreover, the reality of American veto power over Israel's conduct, particularly in the Carter years but manifest in other administrations as well, suggests that grand strategy, even if it existed in Israel's case, might not be implementable due to Israeli dependence on the United States, which itself sought to subordinate Israel to *its own* foreign policy priorities and which tends to offer *its own dissent* to Israel's sitting government's consensuses.

Three, grand strategy thought presumes that "goals", however defined, are necessary and imperative to a country's foreign policy conduct. What can be learned from the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin is that *caution* is a major *alternative* to the ideal of "grand strategy." Rabin, in power, faced the same kinds of internal opposition as Begin did; this is characteristic of any Israeli prime minister. Given the internal opposition faced by any Israeli prime minister, including the problem of

dependency on the United States in Rabin's relationships with Henry Kissinger, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the result is, at worst, "paralysis" in decision-making, or, seen optimistically, *conservatism*. Grand strategy theory often sees domestic politics as an impediment to "ideal" foreign policy behaviour because of the role that internal dissent plays in stifling wise conduct. In the case of Rabin's tenure and in the Labour Party's opposition both to him and to Begin, domestic opposition may be said to possess a helpful role: this opposition cultivates *centrism* in ideology, mitigating ideological perfectionism, and *conservatism* in foreign policy, mitigating risk-taking. When grand strategy proposals are made without attention to domestic politics and internal opposition, there is a danger that it promotes both such hazards: reckless risk-taking and ideological puritanism.

Four, grand strategy pays insufficient attention to the social character of *sectarianism*. The election of Prime Minister Begin owed to social and ethnic cleavages in Israeli domestic politics that, while manifesting in a democratic polity, can be compared to phenomena manifesting in Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East. The worldview of sectarianism fuses the psychology of resistance on the part of oppressed religious and ethnic minorities into rebellion against the established social order. In contemporary Middle Eastern history, this has contributed to major social revolutions at the domestic level and the constraining of leaders' choices due to deference to the grievances of oppressed groups in politics. Sectarianism is the primary cause of the rapidity of radical change in contemporary Middle Eastern politics.

Five, grand strategy presumes that regional security dynamics are *solely adversarial.* In the Middle Eastern regional situation during the 1977-83 years, Israeli relations with Middle Eastern governments were also, no less, *social* in character. There is a *social tapestry* in Israeli-Middle Eastern relations that plays out according to *transnational history* rather than any specific calculus. Although Israel's "Alliance of the Periphery" is not treated here, and although Israel's "Alliance of the Periphery" may be said to *indeed* constitute the existence of "Israeli Grand Strategy," lessons derivable from this chapter are pertinent to challenging counter-arguments to my claims in this dissertation. I can challenge critiques of my argument by suggesting that Israeli relations with Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia and the

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Maronites were A) contingent upon short-term situational fluctuations in local, regional and domestic circumstance, B) grounded in the social character of quiet diplomacy, and C) grounded mostly in *intelligence collaboration* and *commercial arms sales*, each of which had *transnational social histories of their own* without possessing a military character.

Six, grand strategy theory assumes that countries *initiate their own foreign policy behaviour*. While this claims is accurate in relation to great powers like the United States and the Soviet Union, in the case of Israel during the 1970s, much of Israel's conduct was a response to crises initiated by Israel's adversaries or taking place by virtue of circumstances outside of Israel's control, placing Israel in *reactive* mode: either *retaliating* or *responding* to situations unfolding on their own. Chapter Six outlines how many of the situations dealt with during the Begin tenure were situations originating on other countries' local context or responses to provocations from adversaries like the PLO. Even if there were an "Israeli Grand Strategy," it would inevitably be crafted *in response to pre-existing threats and realities* that Israel *cannot control*. At best, it must "manage" them. The realities of proliferation, terrorism, dictatorship, persecution and great-power competition in the Middle East are difficult and complicated problems existing regardless of Israel's response. Any response is inevitably *an adaptation* to what Israel contends with. This is not to say that Israel is not proactive and does not take the initiative. What I am saying is that this initiative-taking and this pro-activity are always *dialogical* with an adversary that exists regardless of the policy choice Israel undertakes in order to cope with it.

The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest that the history of Israeli foreign policy challenges many assumptions of the presently popular "grand strategy" studies. By "grand strategy" I refer to the idea that states can, should and do possess an intellectually coherent integration of disparate foreign policy goals as a unity. I work within the basic definition of grand strategy offered by Dr. Barry Posen, above.

<center>**</center>

There is much to be said for the idea that countries "should" have a "grand strategy." Especially in a world like ours where the average layman (and statesman) does not ponder or comprehend the nuance of world affairs and the subtlety of international history, the *intellectualism* of grand strategy studies is a virtuous ideal. But the very "intellectualism" inherent in the idea of grand strategy is neither attainable nor possible nor helpful in many circumstances. Grand strategy is the idea that there is an intellectually coherent "concept" available and desirable which integrates disparate foreign policy behaviours and activities into a unified whole which is readily implementable. This dissertation will probe -- using examples from the diplomatic history of Israel under Prime Minister Menachem Begin -- why 'grand strategy' fails to explain episodes in the history of Israeli foreign policy; Israeli history during this period highlights how one of the world's most agile foreign policies manifest in Israel's was able to thrive without one.

The history of Israeli foreign policy offers many conceptual lessons that challenge the assumptions of this thinking. It should be emphasized that I am not offering a "critique" of grand strategy thought. Rather, I am offering suggestions as to the *limits* of such thought to all countries, regions and circumstances without taking context and culture to heart. I hope that grand strategy theory and the history of Israeli foreign policy will ultimately be able to learn from one another. Different countries, like different people, simply "function differently."

The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest that grand strategy, in theory and in practice, is "not for everybody." Great powers can learn from Israeli history how debates over priorities and prioritization of goals and policies can distract from letting professionals do their job in their own way with their own best practices. Intelligence analysts, military planners, negotiators, embassy officials, diplomats and advisors -- who carry out "everyday practices" in foreign policy behaviour -- should be advised and reformed how to do their jobs better; grand strategy theory assumes that these individuals, in their small teams and institutional organizations, do not exist. The story of the history of Israeli foreign policy is how these "small people," so often overlooked in the study of international relations, carry the foreign policy of the country on their shoulders. To great powers, Israeli history teaches how *the individual in his*

microcosm, wheresoever he is in the bureaucracy and apparatus of foreign relations, are the quiet leaders in foreign policy regardless of the decisions made above. Stated differently, perhaps "grand strategy" is "no big deal."

At the same time, Israeli history teaches that grand strategy is a luxury. Countries who can and should adopt grand strategy programmes are those countries that are secure, stable and safe enough to trust that their existence will be preserved untouched in the decades and generations ahead. In this category I would include great powers and middle powers. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of middle powers acting with great agility in world affairs has grown. The reason for this is that during the Cold War, many minor states were beleaguered in existential crises with their neighbours. They were existentially threatened by war and insurgency and could not project influence afar. With the end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization, the number of active middle powers in the world has grown. In my perspective, countries that can "trust in tomorrow" should contemplate grand strategy programmes. However, many countries today continue cannot take their medium-term existence for granted. Specifically, developing countries in Africa fall into this category. The countries that share Israel's existential anxieties are those that face the danger of genocide, defeat in war, internal civil war and the loss of sovereignty to dominant global powers. They would be best advised to invest in *skills:* tactical skills, analytical skills, communication skills, war-fighting skills, counter-insurgency skills, improvisation skills and diplomatic skills. From Israeli history one can learn that *skills* are more valuable than strategies.

In the dissertation that follows, the chapters deal with topics that were selected because, in most (though not all) instances, they deal with the reality of *relationship skills*. Especially in Israeli-American and Israeli-Egyptian relations, but also in the dynamics of Israeli cabinets and in the bilateral relations between Israel and each of its Middle Eastern counterparts, there are "soft skills" in play that grand strategy theory overlooks.

What play out in Israeli-American and Israeli-Egyptian relations are matters of *tact* and *triangulation*; *control* and *resentment; acquiescence* and *discord*. Israeli cabinet relationships are stories of restraint and its absence, empathy and its absence, restraint and its absence, sensitivity and

its absence, patience and its absence, effort and its absence, consideration and its absence and tolerance and its absence. Every Israeli bilateral relationship in the Middle East -- be it a relationship of *deterrence* with adversaries like Iraq and Syria or a relationship of *collaboration* like Israeli-Moroccan relations -- rises and falls not only based on strategic considerations but based on the ebb and flow of *respect*. Grand strategy theory does not contemplate the dynamics of *compromise* as manifest in the *social* character of international relations.

<p align="center">**</p>

The many limitations of grand strategy theory in its present popular form to fully comprehend the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy transcend the modest limits of this dissertation. In the paragraphs of this introduction, delimiting the scope of the chapters of this dissertation to come, I have emphasized the most relevant blindspots in grand strategy studies that may be filled by contemplating the stories constituting contemporary Israel.

I have left out other blindspots, though, which are no less relevant for a broader compare-and-contrast. These topics are best left for another time and place, but they merit mention, even in brief: grand strategy, whether inheriting the long tradition of classical military thought or avoiding it, is often a handmaiden to atrocity inasmuch as geopolitics offers an excuse for the worst behaviours of the twentieth century; grand strategy, thinking almost exclusively in the realm of "planning," does not pay appropriate attention to *grievances*, which are the disproportionate substance of Israeli and Middle Eastern history; grand strategy adds little to the conversation on low-intensity conflict, the primary reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1970s that has not been stated by specialists thereon, let alone the growing catastrophe of genocide in the Middle East in the twentieth century, which, as well, has a significant body of scholarship of its own that has remained tangential from contemporary grand strategy writing.

The most significant blindspots, in my eyes, to grand strategy, are *epistemological*. In general, the conduct of Israeli foreign policy is undertaken *in secret*; the Mossad and Shin Bet do most of the "work";

thus, all of us who study the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy know precious little. Even in regard to negotiations, the "real story" of what took place during key Israeli-Arab negotiations is not necessarily "exactly" what the reports and memoirs written about them state at face value. What we do "know" is very modest.

From a different perspective, decision-makers themselves often "know" far less than they should about what their own country is doing, what their adversary is up to, and what is happening "on the ground." How much less do those who *write* about a country's foreign policy, especially when the source of many students' and scholars' information is either the Internet or the press, which often conceal more than they reveal. How much *less*, then, do those who "propose" suggestions about policy for countries they do not intimately know in life experience, particularly when, if these policies were ever implemented, they would bear major consequences for other peoples and polities who are understood even less. Furthermore, many writers on grand strategy assume that "they" and "their country" are the only ones devising strategies, without contemplating how the very state they are writing grand strategy "for" is being acted upon by the grand strategy plans and programmes of others. In all, grand strategy is a fruitful academic exercise and intellectual pursuit. But all of us should be exceedingly careful about making "suggestions" about policies and realities that we -- including and especially "scholars" -- have only modest grasps of. Given the cruelty embedded in grand strategy when it is acted upon in the world, all those who engage in studying it should be far more modest than they often are in the "recommendations" that are made based on assumptions that are conjectural at best.

Chapter 1. Negotiations and Reciprocity: The Social Logic of Israeli-Egyptian Negotiations

Abstract

Can the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord be situated in Israeli domestic politics? This chapter will suggest that the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations followed a *social* rather than a strategic logic, but this social logic played out in the dynamics of the inter-group relations between the Egyptian and Israeli negotiating teams. It should be borne in mind that negotiations, like espionage, *take place in secret*. Thus, assuming that they can be located in the popular pressure of Israel's polity on the sitting government overlook the reality that the only people who knew what was going on were the people in the room. Thus, there is a "bureaucratic" context in which the inter-group social relations between the parties should be contemplated, rather than any sort of electoral context. One should appreciate the multiple simultaneous theatres of Israeli domestic politics.

Introduction

This chapter will consider the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord. Although geopolitical writing on this period sees the treaty between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin as being paramount in importance, the chapter under development re-considers "why" and "how". With emphasis on the importance of the treaty for regional strategy, conventional wisdom in both diplomatic history and grand strategy writing is that the treaty matters for its wider consequences *vis-a-vis others*: either in beginning Israel's strategic shift away from its Alliance of the Periphery to more intimate relations with core "moderate" Arab states; in its linkage to the invasion of Lebanon by removing the counter-threat to Israel's south, thus making Israel's offensive to the north seem easier; in its consequence of the growth of a broader peace

process that in the 1990s will encompass Jordan and the Palestinians; or in relation to the rise of jihadism, with the assassination of Sadat and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, seen as emanating from a similar source.

Without negating the value of these insights, they exemplify *systemic* thinking par excellence. Integrative systems theory is implicitly or explicitly at the heart of grand strategy writing, as well as much diplomatic history, inasmuch as both tend to see developments as "pieces of a larger puzzle" transcending the actors themselves. Contemporary grand strategy writing about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process sees it through a similar "systems" lens: for its linkage to 9/11 and global terrorism, for its interconnection with resistance to American-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, or for its underpinning the ideology of American regional hegemony in the wider Middle East.

While this thinking is not "wrong", it overlooks the local and short-term dynamics of how negotiations unfold. In the case of Egypt and Israel, the treaty originated even before Jimmy Carter's presidency in the trust-building efforts of Henry Kissinger in the post-Yom-Kippur-War Sinai Accords negotiations. The key is to think *socially* about Middle Eastern international relations, not strategically, or at least to avoid the temptation to place strategic issues at the foreground and aesthetic, symbolic and relational aspects of regional interactions second; the reverse should be the case. Hamza Karcic observes that both "Camp David and Dayton [the Balkans peace talks under Richard Holbrooke in the late 1990s] show that suboptimal outcomes may come to define the legacy of successful mediation. Narrowing the number of actors involved may simplify the process and pave the way to success, but having few actors limits the potential scope of the success."[15]

Jimmy Carter continued this process, but he did not initiate it; the process was already unfolding according to a social logic of its own. Furthermore, without negating the American role, the Egypt-Israel accord developed according to the psychological after-effects of concession and bargaining, owing to the differing interpretations that Israel and Egypt derived from Anwar Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem. In

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[15]Hamza Karcic, "Camp David and Dayton: Comparing Jimmy Carter and Richard Holbrooke as Mediators." *International Negotiation* 22:1 (2017), pp. 1-32

Egypt's eyes, this visit and the legitimacy it conferred on Israel, *already was* the maximum concession to Israel, not requiring anything more; while in Israel's eyes, this visit was simply a symbol and Israel expected more tangible Egyptian reciprocation for Israel's relinquishing the Sinai. Moreover, negotiations, as practices, contain assumptions, conventions and implicit understandings of their own that require attention to "micro" phenomena playing out that are lost when looking through a wider regional lens.

By emphasizing these components of the Israel-Egypt Accord, the negotiations theorists below suggest, from a policy perspective, that it is more important *how* an initiative plays out than "what" the specific initiative is. The Egypt-Israel talks, ground-breaking as they were, constituted a *process,* not an event. Hence, while the impact on future Israeli-Arab negotiations cannot be denied, it is wrong to simply "expect" new analogous rapprochement and peace processes simply to emerge by American dictate; the US should *accompany* local negotiations and *facilitate* local bargaining, but short-term circumstances and cues will always vary. It would be wiser to cultivate more intimate bi- and tri-lateral relations between the parties, creating fruitful conditions for mutual ties to develop and allowing the parties to take the initiative, than to interfere by pressure and coercion, distracting the parties from the delicacy of diplomatic interactions.

While there is indeed a helpful role for the US to incentivize compromise and conflict resolution between the parties, this should take place on an ad-hoc basis with the parties in the lead; "grand strategy" is not the right approach. Peace processes involve many pitfalls and setbacks and a *long-term* trajectory outside the electoral cycles of American presidents; Egyptian-Israeli peace involved at least two presidencies and three secretaries of state. Yet they are also the product of *short-term* interpersonal bonding, friendship, camaraderie and mutual understanding between the parties. The values of compromise, reciprocity, concession, secrecy, privacy, dialogue and mutuality are not part of the conceptual repertoire of military-oriented writers about grand strategy.

On a different note, while the security dimension of any Israeli-Arab or -Palestinian peace agreement is undeniable, genuine peace between Israel and its counterparts requires a language as far away from military calculus as possible. Hence, grand strategy is unhelpful to conceptualize and

comprehend Israeli-Egyptian or Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations because it seeks to impose a military strategy on what is really a diplomatic issue, and does not allow the time required to develop the interpersonal relations that are part of the natural process of bargaining.

Finally, Israeli-American and Israeli-Arab relations should be studied outside of a strictly bilateral context with emphasis on the transnational relations of contemporary Middle Eastern history. Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Egyptian relations should not be seen as isolated phenomena from broader trends in Middle Eastern history. Political scientists should engage in active dialogue with diplomatic historians, military historians and intelligence historians who possess specialized and detailed knowledge of the nuances of contemporary history in the region in ways that Political Scientists often ignore. Policy writing on the Middle East should not take transformative events in history "for granted" by assuming that they can be easily replicated if only the right "formula" be found.[16] Historians, though, should remind those attuned to and engaged in politics that each of these events in the litany above *almost never happened*. Despite the best of intentions of well-meaning scholars, activists and politicians, it may never happen again. History should be appreciated for the stories of rare events it bequeaths and teaches.

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[16]Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky write as follows about the Egyptian-Israeli peace process:

> Out of the devastation and destruction of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations fashioned a US-led peace process. Based on a step-by-step strategy rather than on grand designs and based on a step-by-step strategy rather than on grand designs and comprehensive formulas. When these negotiations over interim arrangements broke down, Washington often stepped in and provided political assurances, economic assistance, or security guarantees, in effect offering the parties what they could not obtain directly from each other. This negotiating formula yielded two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements and a Syrian-Israeli disengagement accord. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's surprise visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and his address to the Israeli parliament demonstrated that leadership remained a critical precondition to peacemaking. But even bold leadership could not bridge all the divides. Israeli-Egyptian peace would require intensive US mediation, including the direct intervention of President Jimmy Carter at the Camp David Summit in 1978 and in the months that followed. With Egypt firmly in the American camp, and a "special" relationship with Israel, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty helped to shift the political tide in the region away from Moscow and toward Washington.

Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East.* Washington: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2008, p. 2.

Whereas Egypt felt that Israel did not really reciprocate at all, Israel did not see Sadat's visit as a concession but rather as an affirmation of what for Israel was self-evident: Israel's right to exist in the Middle East. On a different level, Israelis and Egyptians misunderstood and thus failed to recognize each other's identity. Israel continued in "wishful thinking" that Egypt was a separate entity from the rest of the Arab world; Egypt failed to recognize that Israel was a sovereign Jewish nation-state via Zionism and thus refused to confer legitimacy on Israel as a nation, transcending Judaism as a religion. Israel preferred to deal with a "de-Arabized" Egypt just as Egypt preferred to deal with a "de-Zionized" Israel.

In the Camp David talks, the opening positions of both sides (Egypt wanting all of Sinai returned and Israel wanting to keep some of it) ended with a very different negotiated result (Egypt getting full sovereignty, but with limits placed on where it would deploy weaponry). Neither sides' interests—Israel needing security, Egypt needing sovereignty—required new solutions, but merely reconfiguring previously introduced solutions such as were integrated into the Sinai talks between the parties under Henry Kissinger. Limits on the use of weapons, demilitarized zones, and UN control of other areas, for instance, were modified; moving the lines separating the parties, substituting an international force for the UN, and negotiating a timetable for implementing this plan. The goal of the Camp David talks was not to solve the problems; Kissinger already had. It was to take an obvious solution and modify it to fit the situation.[17]

Indeed, Carter's strategy was very similar to Kissinger's, growing out of the agreements Kissinger mediated between Egypt and Israel. Because of the partial steps previously taken and because previous arrangements were in place, the opportunity costs of disagreement were much higher for both sides by the time Carter's process began. That said, the previous partial agreements were insufficient to themselves produce final agreement. Without Sadat's unprecedented initiative, it is unlikely that Israel would have

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[17]David Matz, "How Much Do We Know about Real Negotiations?: Problems in Constructing Case Studies." *International Negotiation* 9:3 (2004), pp. 359-74

agreed to expand the bilateral agenda in play in the talks. Yet, even still, the two sides were so distant from one another that reaching the agreement would not have been possible without American mediation. At the same time, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem would have been unthinkable without the progress made in his relations with Israel in the previous years of bargaining and transitional arrangements. The Camp David talks turned out to be the final stage of the bargaining process between Egypt and Israel initiated by Kissinger; Carter's larger aspirations to include a solution to the Palestinian problem were not realized, but this failure does not negate the intimate continuity between his approach and Kissinger's to Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.[18]

Psychological Aspects of the Talks

From a psychological perspective, the closer Egypt and Israel came to the goal of peace, the stronger the *avoidance tendencies* of the two sides grew. Because the endpoint of the talks was unknown, frightening and noxious to the parties, their level of anxiety created overwhelming desires to pull back and vacillate. Ignoring the element of doubts and objections in the psychology of peace negotiation ignores the crucial human dimension at play during such talks.

The conceptual lesson derivable, therefore, is that the treaty was not at all "inevitable." Rather, it was contingent on the attitudes, practices and behaviours of the three core participants: Israel, Egypt and the United States. Simply prescribing "new" peace processes as goals, policies and strategies of American relations with the Middle East, as American grand strategy writing is wont to do, forgets the "pragmatics" of how these are actually implemented. It is more appropriate to think eclectically about the multi-layered bilateralisms occurring between Israel and its Arab neighbours, here, Egypt. Instead of suggesting bold new policy initiatives, it would be wiser to deepen the North American cultural understanding of the Middle East via more attuned and sensitive diplomatic engagement. In some ways, Jimmy Carter himself

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[18] Janice Gross Stein, "Structures, Strategies and Tactics of Mediation: Kissinger and Carter in the Middle East." *Negotiation Journal* 1:4 (1985), pp. 331-47

embodied this as a mediator between Israel and Egypt. At the same time, credit lies less with Jimmy Carter himself than with *how* he undertook the mediation of the negotiations.

Negotiations and Intersubjectivity

Since Begin's time, generally speaking, and since the Oslo Accords in particular, non-traditional diplomacy to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict has only proliferated. Whatever its imperfections, greater attention must be paid to how non-traditional and non-official diplomacy, such as "track two" diplomacy, can be expanded into new frontiers. Although there is a notable difference between official diplomacy ("track one" diplomacy) and non-official ("track-two" diplomacy) inasmuch as the latter is undertaken by *private* individuals in capacities that are not officially sanctioned, it must be borne in mind that the negotiators representing their respective governments, even in public and officially-sanctioned negotiations processes, are still, at the end of the day, *ordinary people*.

Thus, it matters who the negotiators, as individuals, are and *how they feel*. Not every negotiator is emotionally and psychologically "well." Noa Nelson, Rivka Albeck-Solomon and Rachel Ben-Ari explain that upon entering mediation, "disputants are likely to be stressed. They are already involved in conflict, an they are going to confront the other party in an unfamiliar procedure, guided by an unfamiliar mediator. It is an ambiguous, stressful situation, and it is likely to catalyze many of the individual differences attributed to attachment style…" Anxious disputants are characterized by their communication of negative emotion, expressed vehemently. Moreover, "because secure disputants feel more comfortable and optimistic during conflict resolution, they tend to expose themselves more and avow more responsibility and blame for the conflict than insecure disputants. Secure disputants probably also display more care for the other party and better interpersonal skills, such as empathy and leniency." *Secure* people communicate in ways that enhance the mediation and assist in resolving the conflict. Secure people display a problem-solving attitude in mediation. Secure people show more flexibility and creativity in their thinking than insecure disputants. Secure people express trust in the mediators. Secure

people also express more emotion conflict compared with avoidant disputants. Contrastingly, insecure disputants communicate in ways that hinder the mediation and sabotage agreement. Insecure people express rigid, dichotomous (black-and-white) thinking. Insecure people are more negative and aggressive in their speech. Insecure people are less self-exposing and less communicative, speaking laconically. "Because they feel more threatened during conflict resolution, they may be more defensive, renounce responsibility, and blame the other party."[19]

In addition, there is always a cross-cultural divide between negotiating teams which transcends the policy positions and preferences of the governments strictly understood. There are different psychologies in play that place the "public" aspect of the negotiations at the inevitable mercy of the "private." Ilai Alon and Jeanne Brett offer the following pieces of advice for negotiators with members from Arab and Islamic cultures. One: Spend extra time preparing for cultural differences. "You will want to know if the party at the table has the authority to make a commitment or is acting as an agent. You will want to know the other negotiator's experience in the West. If possible, talk to someone who has negotiated with this person or the person's organization in the past." Two: Commit the time to building and to maintaining relationships. "Plan to engage in casual conversation to begin the relationship-building process, but be sure to check with your cultural expert about which topics are appropriate for conversation." Three: Plan your actions according to clock time, but allow for wide margins to accommodate for event time. "If they miss a deadline, they miss a deadline. Refrain from automatically interpreting time behavior as a deliberate offense. Be as punctual as possible, but allow your negotiation partner some margin. Never make concessions because of time pressure. Avoid committing to a tight time schedule in the first place. Talk to your cultural expert about what auspicious events may be occurring at the same time as negotiations: these may serve as a basis for building relationships, but they may also serve as milestones for progress in negotiations." Four: Prepare argumentation in advance, making use of precedents, models and history. "Arrive prepared with a few precedent setting tales of your own." Five:

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[19]Noa Nelson, Rivka Albeck-Solomon and Rachel Ben-Ari, "Are Your Disputants Insecure and Does it Matter? Attachment and Disputants' Speech During Mediation." *Negotiation Journal* 27:1 (2011), pp. 45-68

Try to avoid language that might suggest that the parties have full control over future events. "Use deterministic language not probabilistic language. Avoid trying to negotiate contingencies based on the likelihood of the occurrence of future events, as such eventualities are viewed as in God's hands."[20]

The Importance of Competitive Politics

The simplest way of understanding what is contemplated in competitive politics theory may be illustrated by the biblical story of the "Sin of the Spies" in the Book of Numbers. According to the story, Moses sends a team of twelve spies to enter the Land of Canaan, observe its social and physical geography, and then report back with their observations. The narrative records that ten of the twelve cause a panic among the Israelites by relating that conquest of the land is impossible because the land is populated by giants too ferocious to be defeated; two spies hold that the Israelites should indeed enter and that victory against the giants is likely. The fear inspired in the Israelite camp by consequences of the ten spies' pessimistic assessment of conditions in Canaan overwhelms the morale of the Israelites, who ignore the confident assessment of the two dissenters, Joshua and Caleb, who are optimistic about the Israelites' prospects.

The discrepancy between the ten spies' majority opinion and the minority opinion of Joshua and Caleb is the very essence of competitive politics theory. Competitive politics theory would elucidate how and why the internecine in-fighting of the Israelites over how to interpret the external objective reality of the conditions of the land of Canaan and how these disagreements impact and mobilize the public opinion of the domestic audience in their competition for their attention. Although the Bible clearly sides with Joshua and Caleb against the majority opinion of the ten, when analyzing why specific foreign policy choices are made, political scientists, sociologists and international relations theorists interested in competitive politics focus on how divergent interpretations of the external world are manipulated in order

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[20]Ilai Alon and Jeanne Brett, "Perceptions of Time and Their Impact on Negotiations in the Arabic-Speaking Islamic World." *Negotiation Journal* 23:1 (2007), pp. 55-73

to attract electoral voters, public support, executive resources, social popularity, media attention or cabinet approval, depending on the setting and context.

David Houghton's study of President Jimmy Carter's response to the Iran Hostage Crisis, about how National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance clashed with each other regarding how to respond to the embassy seizure, reflects the kinds of insights that students of competitive politics are interested in. Brzezinski advocated for undertaking an *offensive* response by means of an activist military operation to storm the embassy, based on the analogy of the Israeli raid on the Entebbe airport in 1976 to rescue the hostages kidnapped by the Palestinian terrorist organization PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).Vance, on the other hand, advocated for a *quiet* response by means of negotiation to safely free the hostages, based on the analogy of President Lyndon Johnson's negotiation with the North Korean government to free the kidnapped sailors seized in the Pueblo crisis in 1968.[21][22] These kinds of considerations, as manifested in the political history of the Begin

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[21]In Houghton's words:

> The persuasiveness of an analogy does not depend simply on its cognitive appeal, however, but on the extent to which it is compatible with the belief systems, political priorities and/or bureaucratic interests of the analogizer's colleagues. A major conclusion which can be drawn from this case study is that the process of analogizing and of applying the lessons drawn from history is distorted by political factors and requirements. Even if an analogy appears to fit the case in hand, it may prove unpalatable and ultimately unacceptable to certain audiences if it implies courses of action which conflict with electoral or organizational interests. No one within the Carter administration seems to have seriously questioned the idea that the *Pueblo* strategy would eventually attain the release of the hostages during the Tehran crisis, but several key advisers questioned its applicability for reasons which had nothing to do with its cognitive appeal or relevance to the case. Cyrus Vance was unable to fully convince his colleagues of the worth of the *Pueblo* analogy because that comparison suggested that policy success could come only at the cost of political failure and humiliation. …
>
> Differing backgrounds and beliefs, and to some extent the goals and objectives associated with particular governmental roles as well, ensure that policy-makers will tend to exhibit different value hierarchies, and the reception of a given analogy will be determined in part by what it implies about the fate of the policy-maker's most treasured goals and values. Analogizing may be vital to the persuasion of the self, but what happens to an analogy which implies policy directions which conflict with political priorities, of which runs into opposition from a rival analogy proposed by a superior? Even if an analogy appears to fit the case in hand, it may prove unpalatable and ultimately unacceptable to certain audiences if it implies courses of action which conflict with electoral politics, as Cyrus Vance found to his cost. It is noticeable also that Vance could afford to follow principles – he was not subject to election and had intended to leave office after the 1980 presidential contest no matter what the outcome – whereas Carter and his staff were compelled to weigh principle against political interest.

[22]David Patrick Houghton, *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 203-4, 208.

years, 1977-83, will be discussed below.[23] Likewise, to understand how the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord unfolded, we should look at the competitive politics occurring among elite group members within the Israeli and Egyptian negotiating teams as a distinct form of domestic politics, rather than at Israeli electoral realities.

Inter-Group Dynamics

From the scholarly record on the Egypt-Israel peace accord, arguably Begin's most important accomplishment, it may be detected that the central problems faced in the negotiations were those of *inter-group dynamics*. The reason this is significant is for how it demonstrates that, instead of new grand strategies, what is needed is more sensitive and empathic diplomacy. The lessons derivable from these insights into effective negotiation during the Egypt-Israel talks over Camp David highlight that simply imposing and proposing policies for the Middle East, whether through the White House or through think tanks or through grand strategy writing, is not enough. Instead, the pragmatics, diplomatics and aesthetics of the negotiations and interactions are central. In light of negotiation theory's insights on Israel-Egypt relations, grand strategy as such is irrelevant to the bilateralism and trilateralism characterizing the relations between Jerusalem and Cairo directly, and the Jerusalem-Cairo-Washington triangle. It would be

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[23]In his study of American decision-making vis-a-vis the Middle East, Steven Spiegel emphasizes how the root causes of decisions lie in the intra-group relations of the president's closest advisors, who vye with one another to present their perspectives, in order to influence his decisions.

> Every president enters office with a global and regional philosophy. As events develop during the presidency, the chief executive is affected not only by his previous attitudes but by his White House advisers, his informal contacts within and outside government, and the chief foreign policy officials of the administration. Because no president can deal only with the Middle East, those officials shape his views when he is involved with other matters. … [T]he relationship among these advisers, their policy positions and their relative power within the administration, that determine policy more than the formal decision-making system used by the president for international affairs…Perhaps the most important influence of all groups and agencies is the political perspective that they have given policy makers. Battling for the hearts and minds of the American elite has been the true subject of the Arab-Israeli war for Washington.

Steven Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 394.

wiser to suggest means of enhancing these bilateral and triangular relations through enrichment of cross-cultural understanding so that Egypt-Israel relations deepen than to revise American Middle East policy strategically. It is more important *how* Egypt and Israel interact—and the same may be said for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab relations more broadly. The American logic of interaction with the Middle East as hegemon and outsider is not the same logic as that followed in intra-regional Middle Eastern transnational relations. Peace will only come when these transnational relations supplant in importance the overarching American role. To achieve this, it is more important for the United States to invest in new forms of *human understanding* of Middle Eastern societies and psychologies, including Israel's, than to invest billions of dollars in new military alliances.

According to Scott Lasensky, Daniel Shapiro, Robert Malley et al, the Camp David Talks vis-à-vis the evacuation of Israeli towns in Sinai presented the same problems that later negotiators would face vis-à-vis Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Sadat was adamant that all traces of Israel's presence in Sinai be evacuated, including even the small number of Israelis who engaged in diving and fishing as tourists, because they symbolized "continuing colonialism." Egypt likewise refused Israel's continued access to the large airfields it had built in Sinai after they were converted to civilian use; the US reimbursed Israel for their evacuation, as they possessed great economic value. American economic assistance in reimbursing Israelis and Egyptians for the cost of peace would come to involve enormous sums of American investment. Intriguingly, most Israeli inhabitants of the Sinai put up no resistance to being evacuated, in contrast to the communities that in 2005 would be evacuated from Gaza. Unlike the Gaza settlers, most Sinai settlers were apolitical and even pacifist. The only difference was the Sinai town of Yamit. The evacuation of Israelis from Yamit in the West Bank in 1983 was so controversial because protestors were violently removed from their settlements in graphic images that saw them dragged down from rooftops and doused with foam. Unlike the Gaza evacuation, the town of Yamit was destroyed rather than handed over to the Palestinians.[24]

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[24]Scott Lasensky, Gabriella Blu, Daniel Shapiro, Howard Raiffa, Samuel Lewis and Robert Malley, "International Dimensions: What is the Role of Third Parties?" *Negotiation Journal* 21:2 (2005), pp. 245-57

Carter's Role

According to David Hoffman, in the Egypt-Israel negotiations, shuttle diplomacy mediated by the United States was indispensable because of the toxic interpersonal relationship between Begin and Sadat. At these meetings, Begin and Sadat never even spoke to one another; tensions were so high that Carter personally went back and forth between the two leaders, drafting and revising proposals, because the early meetings between them resulted only in explosive argument. These private meetings afforded Carter many opportunities he would not have had in direct talks. Not only did meeting privately with the leaders allow him to build his relationships with them and, in turn, to try to get them to respect the perspective and motivations of the other side, Carter also tried to convince Begin that Sadat had made a courageous step in initiating the peace process, and encouraged Begin to respect the enormous personal sacrifice Sadat was making politically. Carter also tried to convince Sadat to see that Begin, who Sadat found to be difficult to approach or understand, was a man of conviction and honour. If Sadat and Begin had met one-on-one, they would have antagonized each other so horribly that little would have been achieved; Carter personally fulfilled this vital role.

In fact, while Carter's inter-personal relations with Begin were frosty, the relationships he cultivated with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Attorney General Aharon Barak, both of whom accompanied Begin to the talks, were amicable and straightforward. The value of these separate private meetings with the parties was in bridging the otherwise insurmountable gap between the very different negotiating styles of the two sides. This process enabled Carter to make revisions to Sadat's proposals, re-frame them to the Israelis, then re-translate these back to the Egyptians.

Even after a tense face-to-face meeting between Dayan and Sadat toward the end of talks almost resulted in the sudden departure of Sadat—showing how harmful direct interactions between the two parties could be—Carter was able to rescue the talks through further shuttle diplomacy privately. In the

end, the negotiations climaxed in the Camp David Accords, bringing peace to Egypt and Israel and earning Begin and Sadat the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978.[25]

A different perspective on the Camp David Talks is to see them as a form of what bargaining theorists James Gillespie and Max Bazerman call "parasitic integration". That is to say, in their interpretation Israel and Egypt were essentially cooperating with one another to "milk" the United States by extracting resources for their own private gains, taking advantage of the peace talks not to compromise with one another but to collaborate in acquiring resources in the form of payoffs for concessions. In their interpretation, parasitic integration occurs when two or more negotiators reach an agreement that is "Pareto-superior" for themselves but which imposes costs on other stakeholders: parties A and B cutting a separate deal among themselves at the expense of C. An example of this is American and European negotiating teams negotiating a separate deal among themselves in world trade talks at the expense of Third World parties. As they explain, parasitic integration results in a Pareto improvement for a subset of the negotiating parties; although this on the surface seems like integrative bargaining, such agreements are predicated on at least two parties extracting resources from others. In their words: "In order to eliminate a negative bargaining zone and establish an overlap in their reservation points, Egypt and Israel parasitically extracted resources from the United States."[26]

Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem

According to Herbert Kelman, the real story of Camp David is the relaxing of tensions that Sadat's visit to Jerusalem inspired, creating an opening for a genuine resolution of the Arab-Israeli

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[25]David Hoffman, "Mediation and the Art of Shuttle Diplomacy." *Negotiation Journal* 27:3 (2011), pp. 263-99.

[26]They comment as follows in greater specificity: "one could view the negotiations involving four major parties: Egypt, Israel, the U.S. executive branch, and the U.S. public. The Sinai accords may have been Pareto-superior for the first three parties, but inferior for the last party. At a minimum, resources were extracted from the United States. Whether this produced a net benefit for the United States is an open question that will not be resolved here, but it is critical for determining whether the agreement was Pareto-superior for all the negotiating parties." James Gillespie and Max Bazerman, "Parasitic Integration: Win-Win Agreements Containing Losers." *Negotiation Journal* 13:3 (2007), pp. 271-82

conflict by shattering the old assumptions. For many Israelis, the realization dawned that only by resolving the Palestinian problem could there be a genuine improvement in Israeli-Arab and especially Israeli-Egyptian relations. Thus, what transpired was an imperfect foundation for future peace efforts that might hopefully lead to a comprehensive peace. The simple reality that the leader of the largest Arab state came to Jerusalem and acknowledged Israel's legitimacy—and the broadcasting of that fact in a gripping drama, on a worldwide stage—created an unprecedented and irreversible fact. Sadat's visit was in itself the fundamental reward to Israel that could never be withdrawn. Sadat's was a strategy of unilateral reward; he offered himself as a sacrifice and "hostage". Believing that his visit to Jerusalem would break through the psychological barrier, create an atmosphere of trust conducive to a peace agreement and offer Israel reassurances against its fears and suspicions, Sadat's visit was conditional from the start. It was offered "on credit," creating the obligation of reciprocal concessions on Israel's part vis-à-vis the Palestinians and Sinai territory claimed by Egypt.

When the reality of a prospective settlement indeed registered, avoidance tactics on both sides set in: Some Israelis refused on ideological grounds to the return of any territory or the dismantling of any settlement. Most Israelis were worried that return of the Sinai would harm Israel's security and that Israeli concessions would be incessantly required with no precise endpoint. Subsequent to 1977, Egypt would slow down and reverse the normalization process with Israel to protest Israeli actions with which they disagreed as a form of sanctions. From Israel's perspective, these very sanctions not only violated the spirit of the Camp David Accords; they underscored Egypt's insincerity, creating fears that Egypt would renege on its part of the bargain. The combination of Egyptian re-integration into the Arab world and support for the PLO, combined with deepening Israeli mistrust of Egyptian behaviour, froze the Camp David Accords into no more than a "cold peace." Both Israel and Egypt have questioned the sincerity, trustworthiness and long-term commitment to peace of the other side, side-effects of the unrealistically

high expectations generated by Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and his anticipation of concessions from Israel in kind.[27]

According to Janice Stein, the central conceptual lesson of the Camp David talks has to do with the negotiating dynamic characteristic of a *triad*. On one level, both Egypt and Israel adamantly wanted the Soviet Union excluded from the talks: mutual concessions were worthwhile in order to keep the US in as mediator but lock the Soviet Union out. In September 1977, both Egypt and Israel strongly objected to Jimmy Carter's proposal to include the Soviet Union in the Geneva Conference. Prior to the conference, on October 1, 1977, the US and USSR issued a joint communique outlining areas of mutual agreement, signalling that the Soviets would engage as primary mediators in the conference. Alarmed, Sadat sent his foreign minister to Washington to urge Carter that "nothing be done to prevent Israel and Egypt from negotiating directly, with the US serving as an intermediary before or after the Geneva Conference is convened." Sadat requested that the negotiations be carried out as a US-Egypt-Israel triad, advancing the steps hitherto taken when Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan met Sadat's deputy prime minister Hassan al-Tuhami in Morocco. Sadat went to Jerusalem in order to initiate a trilateral bargaining structure and undermine a multilateral structure, thereby excluding the PLO, Arab world and Soviet Union from the process.[28]

According to Joshua Weiss, the subsequent Camp David negotiations were the fulfillment of the Sadat visit to Jerusalem inasmuch as Sadat's visit cemented his credibility in Israel's eyes, easing the process of Israeli concessions. Indeed, only by virtue of the visit and the confidence it built in Israel's perception were their reciprocal actions possible, climaxing in the Camp David talks. Sadat also sent signals that he was willing to break with long-held Egyptian policies and approaches. He had instituted a multiparty system that suggested a willingness to approach situations differently. Second, he had spoken

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[27]Herbert Kelman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier: An Analysis of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process." *Negotiation Journal* 1:3 (1985), pp. 213-34

[28]Janice Gross Stein, "Structures, Strategies and Tactics of Mediation: Kissinger and Carter in the Middle East." *Negotiation Journal* 1:4 (1985), pp. 331-47

frequently about the common bonds Israel and Egypt shared, emphasizing the commonalities between Islam and Judaism. Sadat even exhibited his knowledge of Judaism in order to show his legitimacy.[29]

Sovereignty Questions

According to Roee Kibrik, the Israeli-Arab peace process, as it unfolded first between Egypt and Israel, then between Jordan and Israel and the PLO and Israel, involved pragmatic compromises away from the Westphalian ideal of state-centered sovereignty toward negotiated hybrid sovereignty agreements. In the Egypt-Israel negotiations, in particular, deviations from the ideal-type of sovereignty manifested in Egypt's agreement to limit its military presence in the Sinai Peninsula as part of its concessions to Israel. One would expect that if Egypt maintained full sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula, it would follow that dispatching its military to the peninsula would be permissible and the need for it self-evident. In order to maintain the construction of sovereignty, the two sides agreed to portray the absence of Egyptian military forces from Sinai as an Egyptian expression of free will; this restraint would symbolize sovereignty itself over this territory. Israel, in turn, withdrew its army and civilians from the Sinai Peninsula in order to both achieve an internationally-recognized border arrangement, and to create an image of Egyptian sovereignty acceptable to Egypt and its internal and external audiences. Israel retained sovereignty over its internationally-recognized territory, while the Sinai Peninsula, including its population, oil fields, and developed infrastructure, was restored to Egypt. Although the Israel-Egypt peace agreement conforms to the ideal type of Westphalian *state* sovereignty, despite this conformity compromises and adjustments between the two parties needed to be made to *create and construct* it.

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[29]Joshua Weiss, "From Aristotle to Sadat: A Short Strategic Persuasion Framework for Negotiators." *Negotiation Journal* 31:3 (2015), pp. 211-22. Weiss adds further: "A negotiator has several options for enhancing his ethos. First, he can actually gain more knowledge and improve his skills in relevant areas—technical areas, for example—and convey that new knowledge to the other party. But ethos may be as much about *how* one expresses his expertise as much as what he actually knows. So the negotiator who seeks to enhance his ethos should project confidence: by attending to tone, posture, and body language."

Furthermore, even this ideal type of sovereignty involved compromise, particularly in respect to Egypt's non-deployment of military personnel to the peninsula.[30]

In Hamza Karcic's analysis of Camp David, emphasis is placed on Carter's strategy of playing delegation members against each other, particularly on the Israeli side: seeking out and engaging forthcoming members of delegations in order to soften the delegations' negotiating positions. On the Egyptian side, Carter tried to isolate more intransigent advisors in order to encourage Sadat, who was more forthcoming, to make more concessions. On the Israeli side, Foreign Minister Dayan and Attorney General Barak were more forthcoming than their prime minister. Carter and his team worked to encourage Sadat, Dayan and Barak, against their counterparts in their delegations, in order to advance his aim of fostering an agreement. In particular, Carter's team worked around Begin to engage with Moshe Dayan, whose reputation in Israel was tarnished by the disaster of the 1973 Yom Kippur War; with Ezer Weizmann, the only member of the Israeli delegation who had cultivated a personal relationship with Sadat; and with Aharon Barak, all of whom moderated Begin's positions. On the Egyptian side, Carter tried to engage personally with Sadat by bypassing Egyptian advisors Osama el-Baz and his Foreign Minister Kamel, while supporting Sadat, in the face of intransigence by oppositional Arab neighbours who ostracized him for his initiative with Israel.[31]

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[30]Roee Kibrik, "Sovereignty As it Should Be: Theoretical Gaps and Negotiations for Peace in Israel/Palestine." *International Negotiation* 21:3 (2016), pp. 440-72. In Kibrik's words:

> In the Israeli-Egyptian agreement, the practical realization of sovereignty on the eve of negotiations differed widely from its theoretical perception. Notwithstanding this hurdle, the parties managed to agree upon the theoretical meaning of sovereignty and on the steps necessary to narrow the gap and bring an end to the conflict. In the Israeli-Jordanian case, the practical realization of sovereignty did not deviate significantly from its theoretical conceptualization. Despite the increased complexity of its practical realization, as compared to the Israeli-Egyptian arena, the sides succeeded in narrowing the theoretical gap by means of "special arrangements," thus putting an end to the conflict. In the Israeli-Palestinian case the gap appeared abysmal, to the extent that the question of sovereignty was not even raised in the interim agreements. In order to narrow the gap and reach any kind of agreement, the parties needed to disassemble the concept of sovereignty and construct an alternative set of relations between authority, power, and political institutions. Accordingly, an attempt was made – while adhering to the main theoretical principles of the national-Westphalian model – to change the structure of authority in practice temporarily, with a view to realizing it in the future.

[31]Hamza Karcic, "Camp David and Dayton: Comparing Jimmy Carter and Richard Holbrooke as Mediators." *International Negotiation* 22:1 (2017), pp. 1-32

Janice Stein attributes the lessons of the negotiations to the conceptual dynamics of a triad. First, the mediator has substantial leverage which derives from its crucial position as coalition-maker, especially inasmuch as the other two parties compete with each other to secure the mediator's support. Furthermore, while direct adversarial bargaining is conceivably possible, the mediator's presence encourages the two parties to negotiate directly with the mediator, often more than with one another. These processes multiply in generating for the mediator valuable control of bargaining strategy and tactics: he gains leverage over agenda-setting, defining the issues, and managing the scope and pace of the negotiating process. Finally, a mediator with resources can also affect the payoff structure central to an agreement by creating a circular payment cycle: one party rewards the mediator, who in turn compensates the other party, who then makes payment to the initial payee. If such a process occurs within a triad, it may make agreement easier when direct concessions between adversaries are difficult.[32]

Negotiation Skills

As Louis Kriesberg notes, negotiation skills are most important in fostering agreements when the facts on the ground neither compel an agreement nor make it impossible. In such in-between circumstances, negotiation skills can make the difference in the following ways. One, negotiations conducted with skill can speed up the process of reaching an agreement, and in many circumstances this can be crucial. If negotiations are not completed quickly, the opportunity may pass for many years, and may never return. Two, negotiations skillfully conducted can create benefits to the parties involved even if no "successful" outcome is reached in the form of an actualized deal.[33]

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[32]Janice Stein, "Structures, Strategies and Tactics of Mediation: Kissinger and Carter in the Middle East." *Negotiation Journal* 1:4 (1985), pp. 331-47

[33]Louis Kriesberg, "Strategies of Negotiating Agreements: Arab-Israeli and American-Soviet Cases." *Negotiation Journal* 4:1 (1988), pp. 19-29

Herbert Kelman comes to the following conclusions in his analysis of the negotiations at Camp David. Social psychology, he notes, offers the following advice about how rewards can be most effective. One, rewards can serve as reinforcements, strengthening the behaviour that preceded and earned them. Hence, if the reward is timed sensitively, then it can increase the probability of further conciliatory or accommodative acts. Two, rewards create incentives for conciliatory behaviour on the part of the adversary by enhancing both the appeal of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the perception that a likely settlement is indeed achievable. Thus, rewards contribute to a "cycle of reconciliation" by creating incentives to reward the rewarder through reciprocal rewards, leading to a desirable outcome. Three, rewards can provide new information about the adversary's interests, intentions and credibility. This new image can be conducive to accommodation by communicating that the party offering the reward has the will and capacity to seek a settlement and by cultivating a greater degree of trust in that party's sincerity. Four, rewards may contribute to a reduction in hostility by engendering an atmosphere of goodwill, optimism and positive expectations. This change in atmosphere, combined with changed expectations, helps cultivate the development of mutual trust and the exploration of common interests and possibilities for compromise. Five, they create the obligation to reciprocate on the part of the adversary. The potency of this obligation depends on the degree to which the adversaries share a common communal identity and thus share a norm of reciprocity. Absent this condition, third parties can play a helpful role in incentivizing adversaries' fulfillment of reciprocal positive gestures.

At the same time, unilateral rewards can also backfire. For instance, many elements in the adversary's camp may not be interested in the positive gesture offered because they prefer to continue the conflict or are unprepared to sacrifice in reciprocal concessions implied by the other's offer. Moreover, the conciliatory gestures may not be powerful enough to overcome strong attitudes of animosity deeply ingrained in antagonistic societies. Hence, they may be interpreted cynically, as tactical maneuvers to deceive and disarm the recipient, or as disingenuous posturing for "good PR". Additionally, unilateral rewards may be construed by the adversary as a sign of weakness, not conciliation, or may be pocketed to

take advantage of the other's exposed position rather than appreciated as a gesture of compromise.[34] In Barry Steiner's analysis of American mediation efforts in comparative perspective, the following personal qualities are essential to an effective mediator. One, he must be stubborn and inflexible in resisting rising intractability; two, he must establish leverage on his own, without assistance from the antagonists; three, he must manage negotiations on key issues while a soft stalemate exists between the antagonists. He must also overcome the antagonists' resistance to his mediation efforts.[35]

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed these questions by considering the emergence of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Much academic writing on this period tends to focus on these events as being *catalysts in and of themselves*, studying the events in isolation or as paradigm shifts bearing monumental consequences. In the writing under development, I have concurred with the importance of these moments but I have challenged the assumptions about how they occurred and the ensuing significance that still unfolds therefrom.

The chapter has highlighted the fact that the *social* aspects of the negotiations are no less important than their strategic characteristics. Thus, seeing them only in strategic or geopolitical terms without attention to the human side discernable upon closer analysis misunderstands how the treaty emerged.

This chapter has contemplated the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord. Although geopolitical writing on this period sees the treaty between Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin as being paramount in importance, the chapter under development has re-considered "why" and "how" by drawing on the insights of negotiations theorists. With emphasis on the importance of the treaty for regional strategy, conventional wisdom in both diplomatic history and grand strategy writing is that the treaty matters for its

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[34]Kelman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier," Op. Cit.

[35]Barry Steiner, "Diplomatic Mediation as an Independent Variable." *International Negotiation* 14 (2009), pp. 7-40.

wider consequences *vis-a-vis others*: either in beginning Israel's strategic shift away from its Alliance of the Periphery to more intimate relations with core "moderate" Arab states; in its linkage to the invasion of Lebanon by removing the counter-threat to Israel's south, thus making Israel's offensive to the north seem easier; in its consequence of the growth of a broader peace process that in the 1990s will encompass Jordan and the Palestinians; or in relation to the rise of jihadism, with the assassination of Sadat and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, seen as emanating from a similar source.

Without negating the value of these insights, they exemplify *systemic* thinking par excellence. Integrative systems theory is implicitly or explicitly at the heart of grand strategy writing, as well as much diplomatic history, inasmuch as both tend to see developments as "pieces of a larger puzzle" transcending the actors themselves. Contemporary grand strategy writing about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process sees it through a similar "systems" lens: for its linkage to 9/11 and global terrorism, for its interconnection with resistance to American-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, or for its underpinning the ideology of American regional hegemony in the wider Middle East.

While this thinking is not "wrong", it overlooks the local and short-term dynamics of how negotiations unfold. In the case of Egypt and Israel, the treaty originated even before Jimmy Carter's presidency in the trust-building efforts of Henry Kissinger in the post-Yom-Kippur-War Sinai Accords negotiations. Jimmy Carter continued this process, but he did not initiate it; the process was already unfolding according to a social logic of its own. Furthermore, without negating the American role, the Egypt-Israel accord developed according to the psychological after-effects of concession and bargaining, owing to the differing interpretations that Israel and Egypt derived from Anwar Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem. In Egypt's eyes, this visit and the legitimacy it conferred on Israel, *already was* the maximum concession to Israel, not requiring anything more; while in Israel's eyes, this visit was simply a symbol and Israel expected more tangible Egyptian reciprocation for Israel's relinquishing the Sinai. Moreover, negotiations, as practices, contain assumptions, conventions and implicit understandings of their own that require attention to "micro" phenomena playing out that are lost when looking through a wider regional lens.

By emphasizing these components of the Israel-Egypt Accord, I suggest, from a policy perspective, that it is more important *how* an initiative plays out than "what" the specific initiative is. The Egypt-Israel talks, ground-breaking as they were, constituted a *process,* not an event. Hence, while the impact on future Israeli-Arab negotiations cannot be denied, it is wrong to simply "expect" new analogous rapprochement and peace processes simply to emerge by American dictate; the US should *accompany* local negotiations and *facilitate* local bargaining, but short-term circumstances and cues will always vary. It would be wiser to cultivate more intimate bi- and tri-lateral relations between the parties, creating fruitful conditions for mutual ties to develop and allowing the parties to take the initiative, than to interfere by pressure and coercion, distracting the parties from the delicateness of diplomatic interactions.

While there is indeed a helpful role for the US to incentivize compromise and conflict resolution between the parties, this should take place on an ad-hoc basis with the parties in the lead; "grand strategy" is not the right approach. Peace processes involve many pitfalls and setbacks and a *long-term* trajectory outside the electoral cycles of American presidents; Egyptian-Israeli peace involved at least two presidencies and three secretaries of state. Yet they are also the product of *short-term* interpersonal bonding, friendship, camaraderie and mutual understanding between the parties. The values of compromise, reciprocity, concession, secrecy, privacy, dialogue and mutuality are not part of the conceptual repertoire of military-oriented writers about grand strategy.

Additionally, while the importance of these events for the national and regional histories of the Middle East cannot be denied, they did not "just happen". Long-term patterns were in play which both preceded what occurred and are still unfolding thereafter. Thus, the negotiations should be seen as *evolutions* not shocks or anomalies. In consequence, the phenomena under examination are the result of *practices* among the actors which possess a logic of their own; these practices—negotiation, as treated here in its intra- and inter-group dynamics—continue to present variances and variations of themselves at different points in time and in different local contexts. Though the Egypt-Israel treaty

indeed constitutes a major consequential shift, much is overlooked by seeing them in isolation and by presenting them only in their geopolitical aspects.

The Israeli-Egyptian negotiations were an intersubjective learning process that gradually socialized the two sides, both by interests and by mutual understanding, into a relationship of empathy, not only one of peace.

Chapter 2. "Communication and Compromise: Relations Between Begin and Carter, 1977-1980."

Abstract:

This chapter will share insights from *Wikileaks* on Begin. They will underline how "trapped" Begin felt by his perception of triangulation by both Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and American President Jimmy Carter. Secondly, they reveal how Begin's domestic agenda, particularly as manifest in the 1977 campaign to become Prime Minister, was largely *centrist* in character. The value of these sources is the evidence they provide to how Begin was a *moderate* in power, notwithstanding portraits of him to the contrary in much historiography of his period in power. Thirdly, they reveal how Begin exercised both compromise and calculation to maintain his coalition's relationships with the Liberal wing of the Likud and the American government.

Is proposing a "grand strategy" for Israel worthwhile? The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight why "grand strategy" was irrelevant to Begin's foreign policy during his first term by highlighting the challenges faced by Begin as an individual during his first term.

This chapter will highlight the domestic political context of Israeli decision-making under Menachem Begin during his first term, with emphasis on the period of Israel's negotiations with Egypt. It will shed new light on what transpired by contemplating evidence released in the revelations found in the "Wikileaks" portfolio of secret American foreign policy documents, among which there are many that describe the relationship between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and US President Jimmy Carter and which analyze, from an American vantage point, the fluctuations of Israeli internal politics at the time. The evidence provided will suggest that while a "grand strategy" for Israel might be "conceptually" desirable, the raw realities within which Israeli foreign policy unfolds are essentially *human* realities, and thus would remain constant regardless of any hypothetical integrated security strategy in Israel's context.

The chapter will suggest that a hypothetical "Israeli grand strategy" could deleteriously interfere with letting Israeli government officials simply "do their job." Israeli foreign policy is anomalous to popular debates about grand strategy, yet Israel's anomaly highlights weaknesses in the popular paradigm of conceiving of international relations in "grand strategy" terms. The reports summarized in this chapter highlight the centrality of *contingency*, rather than strategy, in both Israeli politics *and* US-Israeli relations.

The purpose of this chapter is to reveal insights that have not been contemplated before in studies of the history of Israeli foreign policy by learning from the evidence divulged in the "Wikileaks" revelations disseminated by journalist Julian Assange. Evidence derived from these sources about American perceptions of Begin's foreign policy underscore how Begin *felt* during this period in his tenure.

The Wikileaks revelations on Begin's relationship with the US represent a contribution to debates over "grand strategy" in the history of Israeli and Middle Eastern foreign relations during this period and in general. The sensitivity to the nuances of Israeli politics manifest in the reports and assessments presented here are lacking in both diplomatic history writing and grand strategy proposals regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and US-Israeli relations. Integrating Israeli parliamentary and political history with historiography on the Cold War, Middle Eastern diplomacy and US-Israeli relations would cultivate a healthy exchange of interdisciplinary perspective between historians and political scientists.

Even under a "perfectly" executed Israeli foreign policy, there would still be great limits: the overbearing American overseeing of autonomous Israeli choices which brings about inevitable "approval-seeking" tendencies that are unescapable; the intensive competition between rival ideological perspectives manifest in the political parties and persuasions in Israel's coalitions which, cannot be silenced because silencing them would silence legitimate dissent among interpretations of long-term Jewish history underpinning different understandings of Zionism and of short-term Israeli history underpinning different "lessons learned" in Israeli collective memory; and the inevitability of human emotions and interpersonal relationships in decisions that are never made by one person alone and affect the lives of millions.

The heroism of the history of Begin's foreign policy lay not necessarily in the paradox between philosophy and action, ideology and pragmatism, and conviction and compromise. It lies in the conflict

between policy and *authenticity*. Grand strategy offers the temptation and allure that there is a "perfect" foreign policy available to statesmen if only bureaucratic infighting stopped, if only local domestic politics disappeared, and if only external vetoes were overcome. The history of Israeli foreign relations testifies to why this alluring temptation might wisely be resisted. Instead, it is wiser to appreciate that Israeli foreign policy, even when its choices are repugnant and indefensible, are nonetheless made by flawed men at work.

A. *Should Israel Have a Grand Strategy?*

Would a "grand strategy for Israel" be helpful?

One recent work to treat the history of Begin's foreign policy in considerable conceptual depth is that of Charles Freilich in *Zion's Dilemmas*.[36] The thrust of his book is that Israeli foreign policy decision-making is grossly flawed, marred by inherent and endemic coordination problems. The five "pathologies" he identifies are the *unplanned process*, the *highly politicized* character of deliberation, the *semiorganized anarchy* of weak executive leadership, the *un-institutionalized process* of agencies and bureaucracies at war with each other, and the *primacy of the defense establishment*. Chapters on Begin's foreign policy constitute three of his seven case studies, thereby constituting the "heart" of the book. Freilich recommends that Israel implement a coherent integrated security strategy; although he does not use the term "grand strategy," for all intents and purposes this is what he implies.

The irony of his work's findings are that despite the shortcomings of the history of Israel's foreign policy decision-making, many of the "flaws" he identifies are either secret strengths or unavoidable, inevitable realities that would exist even if a coherent security strategy were in place. As Freilich's insights reveal on the improvised nature of the Camp David peace process with Egypt, the *interpersonal* character of the interactions between the main actors in Israel's cabinet--that is, between

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[36]Charles Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012.

Begin, Dayan and Weizmann, to say nothing of the domineering role of President Jimmy Carter and the Americans--requires one to avoid thinking in terms of "ideal theory" according to which the *human process* of "getting by" and being "good enough" are measured against the perfectionism of a hypothetical grand strategy. Instead, the virtue ethics of "chaos control" play out.

In Freilich's own words: "Modifying one's positions in response to the other side is the essence of negotiations, and feelers, ploys, even improvisation, are part of the 'game.' As such, Israel's positions could reasonably have been expected to evolve over time--and they did."[37] Thinking in terms of 'grand strategy' would subject the history of Israeli foreign policy to the psychological and conceptual trap of presuming that there is such a thing as a "perfect" foreign policy. Sometimes cabinet members' and decision-makers' hopes and expectations get met, and sometimes they do not. "Some positions were deeply felt, others more flexible, and the participants themselves may not have always known which were truly inviolate and which would ultimately prove negotiable."[38]

Ironically, both the documents from Wikileaks and the narratives related in Freilich's work suggest that Israeli foreign policy, made in a context of *"Balagan"* (a Hebrew slang word for "turmoil"), has considerable strengths because this "creative chaos" brings out the best, rather than the worst, in the *intangible human element* in external relations where *human talents* come to the fore.

B. *Truth-Telling and Productive Problem-Solving*

The first shortcoming to applying a grand-strategy paradigm to Israel and assuming that there should be one is the central role of *authenticity* in the clashes of perspective and personality that characterize Israeli foreign policy. The ideal of "grand strategy" would seek to proceduralize these disagreements. Nevertheless, the Begin period highlights why such disagreements are essential to the co-

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[37]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 86.

[38]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 86.

leadership of Israeli foreign policy among leaders of different parties who improvise to "make it work" acceptably across philosophical divides.

A particular communique by Ambassador Samuel Lewis emphazised this by reflecting on the complicated question of a Jewish settlement in Shilo. He recounted a meeting which took place on January 26, whereupon Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan "asked me if I would mind speaking directly to Begin about it and of course I agreed." He and Dayan then approached Begin and [Ezer] Weizmann. Lewis reproached Begin by rebuking him as follows: "I told Begin flatly that I thought the government's failure to remove it was bound to have a very serious effect on the President's and our attitudes toward the current negotiating situation."[39] Yet what is most telling is Lewis' depiction of Begin's response to Lewis' verbal assault.

B1: Begin, Weizmann and Dayan

What happened next, relates Lewis, was "an extraordinary argument between Dayan and Begin, with Weizman essentially supporting Dayan's view but trying to be loyal and sympathetic to Begin at the same time. Dayan said to the Prime Minister: 'I argued strongly against allowing that archaeological site to be approved, for we all must have known it would only be a subterfuge.'" Begin replied by quoting back to Dayan some different statements back to him which Dayan had made in the Cabinet meeting on the matter. In Lewis' narration: "All three were admitting before me their seeming helplessness in the face of their political problem. They were turning to me to try to explain the political dilemma better to President Carter and to you. But I gave them no hope that I or anyone else could explain it very convincingly." Then Ezer Weizmann took Lewis aside and said to him, as Lewis relates: "I am going to do my best to do something about that damned Shilo situation. I have an idea, but I don't know if it will work. I'll do my best." Then he quickly left.

[39]"Gush Emunim Settlement at Shilo: Meeting with Begin." 1978 January 26, 00:00 (Thursday). 1978TELAV01240_d.

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV01240_d.html

Lewis' appraisal of this episode was as follows. "In the eight months I have been here, this was one of the most extraordinary meetings I have attended. It was as if I was being unexpectedly admitted to the bedroom while husband and wife were in the middle of a painful marital argument. I do not doubt the depth and anguish this issue is causing Begin and his colleagues. They certainly understand our feelings and I did not spare them in any sense from the probability that the reaction in Washington would be extremely adverse to what has happened."

Most acutely, he commented that this affair "is symbolic of the domestic difficulties Begin has gotten into over his effort to become a national leader rather than purely a sectarian one. As indicated in some previous messages, for him to ignore the views of his closest ideological compatriots in the broader national interest is sheer hell for him." As Lewis opined: "And I do not believe one can underestimate the physical effect it has or will have upon him as he tries to balance his obligations to his current position and to his deepest convictions."[40]

This episode highlights two core lessons. Firstly, the American Ambassador's interference in internal Israeli decision-making, scolding Israel's own Prime Minister in a circumstance complicated enough among legitimate contradictory opinions.

Secondly, the dissent of Dayan and Gush Emunim, from their own legitimate perspectives, to Begin's. Implementing a "grand strategy" for Israel ignores the reality of an American veto over Israel's choices. It also leads one to question whose voice to "silence" in the decision-making process. Begin, Dayan and Gush Emunim, each from their own distinct philosophy of Zionism and Israeli history, understood the lessons of 1967 different. While communication between these three should be modified so that the articulation of legitimately different perspectives is made smoother among the parties, defining Israel's "interests" in singular terms overlooks the reality that between Dayan, Begin and Gush Emunim, the meaning of what Israel "ought" to do was legitimately different, yet if you saw reality through the legitimate lenses that each of these three brings to understanding what Israeli foreign policy is and ought

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[40]"Gush Emunim Settlement at Shilo: Meeting with Begin." Op. Cit.

to be, the other perspective would make much sense. The temptation of a 'grand strategy for Israel' would lead to the *centralization* of the concept of "the Israeli interest." The reality unfolding in this episode is that Begin dealt with the *compartmentalization* of the concept of "Israeli interest" among competing understandings. A "grand strategy for Israel" would need to accept the reality that, however the State defines such an "interest," groups in civil society understand such "interests" very differently; this is the case between Begin and Gush Emunim.

C. Solidarity Between Rivals

One document summarized the views of Yitzhak Rabin on the reasons for Labour's defeat in the 1977 election and his view of the result. In Rabin's words: "I read and heard today something to the effect that the United States will, as it were, try to delay arms supply to Israel in the wake of the election results. I think that every Israeli, no matter what his party affiliation is, has to do his best to stand up to any attempt to link the guaranteeing of Israel's security and military power with the character and composition of the government in Israel."[41] Reliability and respect were, in Rabin's eyes, lacking in American communication with the Israeli public. American criticism is a central reality in the history of Israeli foreign policy. Despite the differences between Begin and Rabin, Rabin, despite losing the election, felt that Israel's contribution to US-Israeli relations should be appreciated.

Rabin also spoke out against attempts in the international press to malign his electoral opponent, Begin. "Without any relation to MK Menachem Begin's positions, I believe that the attempt of the international press and not only the press, to accuse him of certain things, to try to slander him, must be rejected by every Israeli regardless of his partisan affiliations." Rabin also opined that, at heart, Begin wanted and sought peace. In Rabin's words, "I believe that MK Begin, like any other leader of any other party, desires peace very much and wishes to prevent war. The question is not the desire or wish but the

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[41]"Begin and Rabin Speak Out on US-Israeli Relations." 1977TELAV03609_c. 1977 May 21, 00:00 (Saturday).

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977TELAV03609_c.html

policy and method toward achieving this desire."[42] Forbearance to criticism on Israel's part highlights that *communication*, not just "strategems," constitute the core of American-Israeli relations. Israeli leaders *feel judged* by the tone and harshness of American responses to American actions. Possessing an integrated national security strategy would change little of the core dilemma of *how Israeli and American interlocutors talk to one another*. The tension between *listening* and *speaking up*, on both sides, is a question not of strategy but of *tact*. It is unrelated to interests and strategy.

C1: Allon's Perspective

Furthermore, Rabin expressed trust that a Likud government would uphold all previous agreements signed by the Israeli government and endorsed by the Knesset. "I am referring to the disengagement agreement with Syria and the interim agreement with Egypt… The present government will act for the guaranteeing the continuation of the mandate [of UN peacekeepers on the Golan Heights] on a mutual basis. The world will surely want to know whether the future government, when and if it is set up, is indeed favorable to this agreement, will indeed honor this agreement."

Indeed, this communique stressed, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon had instructed all Israeli missions abroad to undertake efforts to counter unfavorable comments and articles about Begin. "Allon is reported to have noted that Begin won in a democratic election and rejected attempts to compare Begin with leaders of terrorist groups."[43] Allon alluded to the problem of *shame*: especially in the American arena, Israel lost and loses control over its *reputation*.

The core conflict between Israel and the United States, then, was psychological: the grey area between the United States' temptation to *control* and Israel's temptation to *self-sabotage*.

D. Carryover from Rabin's Term

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[42]"Begin and Rabin Speak Out on US-Israeli Relations." Op. Cit.

[43]""Begin and Rabin Speak Out on US-Israeli Relations." Op. Cit.

The same document highlighted a separate interview given by Menachem Begin simultaneously that Friday evening. Begin's replies to questions asked him by the interviewer were revealing. Asked whether the thought Israel must make a choice between confrontation with the United States and territorial compromise, Begin replied: "No, I do not think we are going toward a confrontation with the United States. Of course, I do not determine Washington's policy. Yet, I am convinced that we, Israel and the United States, have a mutual interest and that we can explain it in the United States. I am certainly doing so now." The conflict between *reliability* and *respect* characterized the grey area between *pressure* and *confrontation*.

Begin's view of relations with the Arab world was realistic in conception. Begin stated: "I am not claiming that the Arabs will accept our plan. They do not agree to any Israeli plan." Begin added: "The difference is that those who say that they will give up Judaea and Samaria, while they do not and really cannot reach an agreement with the Arabs, only invite pressure—from America as well. That is to say, we are told: You are not prepared to withdraw enough. Withdraw a little more."

Begin opined that "I think that we will act to explain this mutual interest between Israel and the United States. There does not have to be a confrontation, there does not have to be American pressure." Begin perceived that US-Israeli relations would be smoother if Israel held to a firm and specific position toward the territories conquered in 1967: "Now I hope that we will start to explain it properly for the first time in ten years, we will start to explain that this is not so, that retention by Israel of Judaea and Samaria is the thing that guarantees the chance for peace. If we give up Judaea and Samaria, there will not be any chance for peace."[44]

D1: Begin's View of Allon's Plan

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[44]"Begin and Rabin Speak Out on US-Israeli Relations." Op. Cit.

When the interviewer retorted that Begin's perspective was unacceptable both to American senators and to the Administration, Begin too responded with realism. He rooted his perspective as an outgrowth and natural outcome of Rabin's. In Begin's words: "They [the Americans] received lessons from Mr. Allon, Mr. Peres, Mr. Rabin and Mrs. Golda Meir to the effect that we are prepared to give up Judaea and Samaria. Thus, they have come to believe that this is in fact a just policy since the Israelis themselves preach it."

Begin spoke of Judea and Samaria as a continuity of lessons learned from the previous Rabin and Meir administrations. "The American representatives have never said that they favor Allon's Plan. On the contrary, I know that in Washington King Husayn's words were said again—Totally unacceptable. What is the difference then? I think that the Israeli policy and information campaign were totally wrong. We should now turn over a new leaf."

Begin was keen to emphasize how his ideas toward the future of the West Bank were a direct outgrowth of the experiences of the Rabin government in its negotiation process. Begin stated: "Allon's plan was presented to King Husayn three times. He said: Totally unacceptable. I think that it is exactly those using this deceptive term who have blocked the path toward an agreement with the Arabs." Begin understood himself as a continuation of the Rabin government, not a break with it. "When one says territorial compromise, as Mr. Peres and Mr. Allon say, for example, what is actually said? We say that we are giving part of Judaea and Samaria and keeping part to ourselves. I want everyone to remember that the Arabs answered with an absolute No to this."[45] Begin's sensitivity to American *follow-through*, and concern about *reciprocity over concessions* was, in Begin's mind, a question not of strategy but of *respect*. The question of *insensitivity* would characterize how Begin viewed American character judgments of him that, in his eyes, would come to be seen as *disproportionate* to Israel's own actions.

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[45]"Begin and Rabin Speak Out on US-Israeli Relations." Op. Cit.

E.   Rigidity and Creativity

From a different vantage point, formulating outcomes in advance of the situation's unfolding according to its own logic would introduce *rigidity* into Israeli decision-making and foreign policy. Freilich highlights the counterintuitive role of *creativity* in the Camp David process. Freilich notes that Begin's deciding to make the Camp David Accords dependent on Knesset approval "was a master stroke. By placing the onus on the Knesset, in effect saying 'peace is in your hands,' he circumvented what would have otherwise been an extraordinarily divisive and possibly insurmountable challenge. As it was, he barely carried his own party, and the Accords would not have been passed without opposition support (Labor)."[46]

Commenting on Dayan's joining of Begin's coalition amid severe public backlash against him over the trauma of the Yom Kippur War, Freilich remarks: "It thus must have seemed to Dayan like a heaven-sent opportunity when Begin, to the consternation of all, asked him to join his government as foreign minister. Though Dayan would prove the most skeptical for the three lead negotiators, becoming convinced of Egypt's sincerity only after nearly a year of talks, the diplomatic creativity he demonstrated was crucial to the talks' ultimate success."[47]

And yet, on the subject of peace, Begin said that he wanted peace of a different character than espoused by the Syrian and Egyptian regimes. Notes the report: "Begin wants exchange of ambassadors, trade, etc. He believes Hussein ready for peace with Israel. Begin said he is convinced that if the Arabs attack, Israel would have no difficulty in handling the threat." Begin also said that he concurred with his Chief of Staff that "Israel would be able to protect itself for the next five to ten years." On the territories conquered in 1967, Begin stated that Jews must be able to settle anywhere in their historic land. He saw

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[46]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 92

[47]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 96

deep religious significance in ceremonies in West Bank towns and settlements such as that he participated in at Kaddum where he gave a speech overseeing the dedication of a Torah scroll. In the report's words: "He insisted that his policies regarding the West Bank are essentially those of every political party in Israel except the Communists. Even the Alignment was committed to go to a referendum if this issue were treated in the peace negotiations."

E1: Begin's View of the 1977 Election Result

Begin avoided commenting on US-Israeli relations, although he did note that the visit of Prime Minister Rabin to Washington "had not been a success." Begin said he would send a Likud delegation, including Shmuel Katz and Moshe Arens, to Washington on May 26 to correct false impressions of his own background and views and those of his party. More attention was paid to the process of building a coalition. Begin contemplated offering Yigael Yadin the post of Deputy Prime Minister if the DMC joined the government, "although Begin views it as [a] meaningless position." Moreover, "since Ministry of Defense is going to Weizmann, Arik Sharon will be offered [the]job of heading internal security." Begin commented that Sharon is "one of the most brilliant military strategists in [the] world today," but that Sharon "made some unfortunate political blunders--particularly when Sharon left [the] Knesset and joined Rabin as his military advisor."

On the subject of the 1977 election, Begin said that he was surprised by the extent of domestic support for the Likud. "He expected to do well, but he never dreamed Labour would lose so heavily. He attributed this to a number of factors, primarily the desire for change after so many years of Labour party domination." According the report's transcript of Begin's words, the Alignment "used some rather vicious propaganda during the campaign to frighten the electorate—equating Likud with the Nazis, for example. Begin thought this was a tactical error by the Labour party because Israeli react angrily to this kind of approach."

Begin attributed Likud's victory to domestic problems. He perceived that Israelis were "anxious for change, tired of [the] same government in power for 30 years, and concern about increasing inflation and Labour unrest. However, he also stressed [the] delayed impact of [the] 1973 war and popular disillusionment with the Labour establishment's handling of defense and foreign policy matters."[48]

Indeed, Freilich points out, at the nadir of the negotiation process, in late July 1978, "60% approved of its conduct of the negotiations. Opposition to the final agreement was thus partly tempered by a shared recognition of its vital importance. The right, too, sought peace and did not wish to bear public blame for preventing it." To be sure, Begin's progress in the peace negotiations was strengthened by three factors. One, that most of the Knesset opposition at the time was notably more moderate than Begin's own party and supported the peace efforts, "if anything pressing for greater flexibility. Right-wing opposition in the Knesset was limited." Two, Begin was privileged to possess "nearly unchallenged control of his party and coalition throughout most of the process.... His overall control of the party and coalition, however, was such that the problem was manageable most of the time." Three, "Israel was united, from left to right, by the desire for peace with Egypt, and disagreement, extensive as it was, was over the extent of the concessions to be made, not the principle." As a result of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Begin's cabinet "enjoyed broad public support throughout the process."[49]

E2: Personal Involvement

Finally, Freilich's depiction of the Camp David process underscores the importance of *meeting people where they are at*. The risk of an integrated "grand strategy" or security strategy is that it could impose an overarching concept on situations that are largely fluid. Israeli decision-makers in Begin's cabinet *evolved to adapt to the situation*. As Freilich writes: "The improvisational nature of the process was partly immanent in the nature of the negotiating process, but also reflected the lack of systematic

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[48]"Begin's Views on the Election, The New Government and US Relations." 1977TELAV03614_c. 1977 May 23, 00:00.

[49]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 92.

planning and was thus only moderately substantiated." Begin and Dayan, nevertheless, possessed "an overall strategy that they pursued assiduously, that is, a separate peace agreement with Egypt, and they process was thus more incremental than sequential."[50] Indeed, Freilich stresses further: "A clear disconnect existed between the extensive information and assessments generated by the system and the absence of virtually any policy planning by Begin, Dayan and to a lesser extent Weizman. All three relied primarily on what they learned from their personal involvement in the talks, rather than on input from the national security agencies."[51]

Begin responded to fit the situation as it unfolded. Notes Freilich: "Similarly, the last thing they [Begin and Dayan] would have wanted was an 'honest broker' giving the cabinet the full range of options. Obfuscation, the antithesis of formulation, was the primary means they had to protect their flanks politically and gain the flexibility they required--and such an approach paid off."[52]

From one perspective, the interpersonal conflicts in play between Begin and Dayan brought *rigidity* into Israeli foreign policy. Yet when this rigidity is overcome, creativity is borne. Grand strategy does not contemplate where creativity comes from.

F: Begin Felt Cornered

The history of Israeli foreign policy should be appreciated for being a story of the characterology of *acquiescence* as actors surrender to one another and to circumstances beyond their control. Grand strategy assumes that foreign policy is made "by computer" rather than by human beings. As Freilich adds: "Even if Begin and Dayan did have a relatively clear endgame in mind--that is, a 'separate peace'--

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[50]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 90.

[51]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas,* pp. 96-97

[52]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas,* p. 86

the exigencies of the negotiating process would require numerous changes in Israel's positions and concessions."[53]

The irony of the history of Israeli foreign policy is that too much emphasis is placed on strategy and too little on *communications*. The story of the Camp David process was the ability of Israeli decision-makers to *meet change with change*. As Freilich remarks: "At a minimum, the nature of the process was very much a function of Begin the man and leader and would have been very different in [Begin's] absence. Dayan and Weizman, too, made important personal contributions. The highly idiosyncratic nature of decision making was thus manifested to a high degree."[54] Grand strategy emphasizes systemic thinking. Implementing a grand strategy in Israel's context would reduce the equally important role of *personal qualities*. As Freilich notices: "Lacking Begin's ideological bona fides and political mastery, arguably no one else could have made the concessions needed to reach agreement."[55]

F1: Begin's "Lonely Position"

One file noted offered a profile of Begin's psychology. It noted that Begin was in "essentially a lonely position." [56] It noted that this loneliness was "sharpened by his sensitivity to growing criticism" from his base of supporters. Begin's worldview differed from the *realpolitik* of American tactics toward the peace process inasmuch as Begin perceived things through a *normative* lens rather than a pragmatic one. "He perceives problems through a legal prism, which often leaves him incapable of appreciating the true shape of the larger picture. We believe these character traits will become increasingly evident as Begin perceives himself to be under growing pressure from Sadat, the US, and his own countrymen, and will add to his intractability as a negotiator."

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[53]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 86.

[54]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 97

[55]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas,* p. 97

[56]"Begin on Settlements Freeze Controversy." 1978TELAV13420_d. September 27, 1978. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV13420_d.html

The more trapped Begin felt, the more he would respond to the tactical assault from multiple simultaneous angles by responding with moral principles as he understood them. Begin's being cornered was noted by this analysis as follows. "As Prime Minister, Begin finds himself in a lonely position. But his is not just the usual loneliness of a national leader." He had few confidantes in high position "and he appears to have no one in the cabinet with whom he can relax. His colleagues in the cabinet are not his old friends. Many of those who have been his closest political associates do not agree with his present policies and have, in fact, openly criticized him." Indeed, the report notes, it was "especially surprising, in a system as collegial as Israel's, to find the Prime Minister so alone."[57]

F2: Begin's Personal Identity

Another symptom of Begin's being triangulated and feeling cornered was that in the intervening years while in power little occurred "to change this perception of being surrounded by a hostile world. As a result, he tends to see threats where others might see opportunities." A different perspective of the report was its comments on Begin's "Jewishness." He is "less a devout Jew who observes the full complex of Orthodox ritual than he is a traditionalist, i.e., a Jew who subscribes to religious values and the centrality of religious tradition to Jewish life." More than with his predecessors in the premiership such as Ben-Gurion, "his Jewishness and his sense of Israeli nationality are not separate aspects of his personality but overlap entirely."

The more Begin was, and felt, cornered and trapped, the more his understanding of himself "not merely as a political leader, but as a just and wise man, a patriarch and a man of authority presiding over his people" with a "quasi-religious role to play." He was strengthened in this view of himself by the "international acceptance and recognition which he received following his election and the say a divided

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[57]"Begin on Settlements Freeze Controversy." Op. Cit.

country suddenly rallied behind him." Begin saw himself as "an instrument chosen to save the Land of Israel from those who would barter it away."[58]

Grand strategy could lead to the "computerization" of Israel's foreign policy. The lessons of the history of Begin's foreign policy teach that the secret to Israeli foreign relations has long been its *humanization*. Greater *humanization* might be a more helpful recommendation. It might be wiser to contemplate ways that foreign countries' relations with Israel and Israel's relations with Middle Eastern countries and great powers might mature into becoming more *emotionally sensitive*. This might be a different conceptual route to brainstorm ways to make Israeli foreign policy and American-Israeli more mature. Indeed, it is the American tendency to think in terms of grand strategy that *hurt*, rather than helped, the key role of *understanding* that diplomats and ambassadors cultivate.

G. Begin and Jerusalem

While one might interrogate the biases of both American Ambassador Samuel Lewis and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin as manifest in these reports, questioning the silence reflected over wider concurrent concerns the inattention to the *social reasons* for why peripheries in Israeli politics such as perceived reality the way they did, the Wikileaks presented in this chapter possess a significant strength as a scholarly resource in understanding the history of US-Israeli relations: the role of the *Ambassador*.

Nevertheless, "erasing" the agonizing tensions in the internal cabinet frictions and hostilities with the domineering and interfering American ambassador influencing Israeli affairs would ironically erase the inescapable and intangible *human element* that makes participating in this process tragic and comics simultaneously. Yet, if Israeli "national interests" were "obvious," if choices were made, ostensibly, "by

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[58]"Begin on Settlements Freeze Controversy." Op. Cit.

computer," and if dissenting voices both against Zionism and within Zionism were marginalized, then more would be lost than be gained by having an integrated national security strategy.

When Israel was contemplating moving the Prime Minister's and Foreign Minister's offices to East Jerusalem, documents reveal American plans for an aggressive response. One communique suggested the following threat against Israel: "It must be made clear to Begin, that any complications of the Jerusalem problem through unilateral Israeli action would precipitate a serious crisis in US-Israeli relations." The US contemplating plotting with Europe to undermine Israel internationally should it proceed with the relocation of such offices. "In concert with other friendly governments, especially the EC nine, we should seek to persuade Begin that any such step would further isolate Israel in the world community; the US, as well as European governments, would be compelled to condemn Israel publicly and to support the inevitable anti-Israel resolutions on this issue which would be introduced at the UN and other international fora." [59]

G1: Undermining Israel at Home

The document also contemplating undermining Israel's friendships in the Congress and its relationship with American Jewry. "A parallel effort should be launched with friends of Israel in the Congress, as well as with prominent members of the American Jewish community." The communique recommended coercion in response: "In the event that Begin does move into East Jerusalem offices, the US would be confronted with a black-white range of options: to consent or to refuse to do business—at any level, at any time—with the Government of Israel in East Jerusalem." American government participation in such a forceful boycott "would have a profound effect on both US-Israeli relations and on the West Bank-Gaza negotiations."

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[59] "East Jerusalem Offices: US Response to Possible Fait Accompli." 1978TELAV17697_d. 1978 November 20, 00:00 (Monday).

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV17697_d.html

The report surmised that the question of relocating government offices to East Jerusalem will now lie dormant "unless and until the Israelis again feel themselves directly provoked by the US on the Jerusalem issue." It also noted that Begin's proposal was not the result of pressure even from the extreme right, and that Begin was careful not to commit himself to action. Rather, it "becomes a point of contention only when the most emotive of Israeli positions – the integrity of Jerusalem – appears threatened. In the past, public confidence in the government of Israel's ability to defend this position has been total, and symbolic bolstering of it at the expense of US-Israeli relations unnecessary."[60]

G2: Hostile Response

The advantages of a coercive American response to the relocation of Israeli governmental offices to East Jerusalem lay in the importance of American relations with the Arab regimes of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. "Failure to respond with anything more potent than rhetoric would further reinforce the widespread Israeli conviction that whenever the US and Israel get eyeball-to-eyeball, the Americans will always blink first." On the other hand, the disadvantages lay in the symbolic character of such a crisis in American-Israeli relations. "We would be confronting Begin on an issue of extraordinary unifying power—one which he could not afford to lose—by engaging in a bitter public dispute over when and where to conduct office business."

A coercive boycott of such offices would only affirm the move's symbolic significance. Furthermore, it would render any high-level visit a "battle of wills." Much of Congress and most of the American Jewish community would oppose what would be perceived as a "policy of retribution." Indeed, "the problems associated with US acquiescence in an Israeli fait accompli would pertain with even greater force to a humiliating failure to sustain a Jerusalem boycott. The doleful reality may be that, if it comes to a defiant Israeli move in East Jerusalem, we will be damned if we do and damned if we don't."[61]

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[60]"East Jerusalem Offices: US Response to Possible Fait Accompli." Op. Cit.

[61]"East Jerusalem Offices: US Response to Possible Fait Accompli." Op. Cit.

Indeed, American coercive action would be logistically complicated to sustain. The practical problems in sustaining such a hostile posture were forecasted as being the following: it would be impractical to do all our diplomatic business in Israel by mail; the Prime Minister would be able, if he wanted, to see the US ambassador, since he would continue to retain an office in the Knesset in West Jerusalem; any request by the US ambassador for an appointment would become a test of the boycott; the complications of the situation would greatly limit embassy flexibility and cut off a central channel for communication and mutual understanding; episodes of crisis, such as in Lebanon, would become even more complicated with hindered communication with Jerusalem; and an awkward situation would arise where some American officials call the Prime Minister in his East Jerusalem office, while others are prohibited from doing so.

The history of Israeli foreign relations cannot be conceived solely in terms of "strategic" language. The status of Jerusalem is a story of relationships and memory. *American* thinking was strategic in opposing Israel opening governmental offices in East Jerusalem. Israeli *memory* proved stronger and the American "strategy" of coercion did not unfold despite being contemplated.

H. Begin's Mood

One communique by Samuel Lewis, the American Ambassador to Israel, noted the state of fear which encapsulated Begin. The mood of his meeting dated February 11 with Begin, was "somber." Lewis stressed: "Without belaboring the point, you should know that we are now dealing with a Prime Minister here who is feeling beleaguered, hemmed in, highly suspicious of Sadat, misunderstood, deeply hurt and feeling undermined by your [President Carter's] public statements and by the accolades heaped on Sadat 'at Israel's expense' in Washington, and totally frustrated by Sadat's apparent success in making him into the villain of the negotiations."

Begin, Lewis reported, "sees Israel's cause being unfairly undercut and attacked in the US in order to please Sadat." Begin frequently read from the Israeli minutes of Begin's meetings with Carter

from the previous December. Begin protested bitterly about the phrase Carter used in his press conference Friday regarding the status of the Sinai: "And that therefore they [Jewish settlements] should not exist."

Begin insisted that the phrase "on all fronts" had "never before this past week been used in public by an American official, had never before this past week been used in public by an American official, that it amounted to a unilateral amendment of [Resolution] 242 without prior consultation, and that the President has known clearly since August that Begin's government "will never accept any foreign rule or sovereignty on the West Bank." Lewis recommended a personal meeting between Carter and Begin to ameliorate their interpersonal relationship.[62]

H1. Control and Acquiescence

One memo stressed that Begin's emotional state testified to "a deeply troubled Prime Minister, who believes he has gone very far and very fast at the expense of the approbation of his oldest friends and to some extent his oldest convictions. He feels that neither Sadat nor Carter understand nor credit him at this moment." It suggested a personal meeting with Vance to reassure Begin on a personal emotional level and steady the situation. Begin's personal state of nervousness over being cornered was described in these words: "Begin's mood is compounded really of two elements: resentment and increasing anger at Sadat for his personal attacks on Begin in the last two or three days, mixed with a sense of bafflement that Sadat still does not understand the significance of Begin's offer to restore all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty in the face of rising and vehement opposition from both the opposition here and key members of his own party. Begin always assumed that this was a negotiating process which was just beginning, and that Sadat would see his sweeping offer on Sinai as to some degree commensurate with Sadat's epochal decision to come to Jerusalem."[63]

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[62]"Begin's Lament." 1978 February 11. 1978TELAV01982_d https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV01982_d.html

[63]"Begin's Mood: An Incipient Crisis of Confidence." 1978 January 15, 00:00 (Sunday). 1978STATE011061_d

Paradoxically, points out Freilich, 'proper' policy planning "might have made it harder, possibly impossible, to reach agreement." If the ultimate "price" of the agreement had been clear in advance, Begin and Dayan "might not have been psychologically capable of making the necessary concessions" if the ultimate "price" of the agreement had been anticipated by them from the outset. [64] In Freilich's words: "Had a policy agreement been drafted in advance of the Camp David summit, for example, envisaging that Israel would ultimately have to cede the Sinai settlements and air bases, accept the Palestinian clauses (recognition of "legitimate rights,' 'resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects,' and resolution of the 'final status' of the West Bank), and agree to an exchange of letters on Jerusalem, it is likely that the political uproar, within the cabinet and public at large, would have precluded agreement."[65]

Grand strategy would risk over-centralization in Israeli foreign policy apparatuses, reducing the equally important place for gut-instincts and intuition. Healthy communication between decision-makers implied sensitivity to *silences* and to *quiet assumptions* about what *others involved and affected* by crucial decisions were and are thinking and *feeling*. The core conflict between the United States and Israel was less between different understandings of what Israel "should" do, but between *intensity* and *distance*.

I.   Begin's Cognitive Lens

One file noted offered a profile of Begin's psychology. It noted that Begin was in "essentially a lonely position." It noted that this loneliness was "sharpened by his sensitivity to growing criticism" from his base of supporters. Begin's worldview differed from the *realpolitik* of American tactics toward the peace process inasmuch as Begin perceived things through a *normative* lens rather than a pragmatic one. "He perceives problems through a legal prism, which often leaves him incapable of appreciating the true shape of the larger picture. We believe these character traits will become increasingly evident as begin

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[64]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas,* p. 86.

[65]Freilich, *Zion's Dilemmas*, p. 86

perceives himself to be under growing pressure from Sadat, the us, and his own countrymen, and will add to his intractability as a negotiator."

A different perspective of the report was its comments on Begin's "Jewishness." He is "less a devout Jew who observes the full complex of Orthodox ritual than he is a traditionalist, i.e., a Jew who subscribes to religious values and the centrality of religious tradition to Jewish life." More than with his predecessors in the premiership such as Ben-Gurion, "his Jewishness and his sense of Israeli nationality are not separate aspects of his personality but overlap entirely." The more Begin was, and felt, cornered and trapped, the more his understanding of himself "not merely as a political leader, but as a just and wise man, a patriarch and a man of authority presiding over his people" with a "quasi-religious role to play." He was strengthened in this view of himself by the "international acceptance and recognition which he received following his election and the say a divided country suddenly rallied behind him." Begin saw himself as "an instrument chosen to save the Land of Israel from those who would barter it away."

II. Begin's Character

Another symptom of Begin's being triangulated and feeling cornered was that in the intervening years while in power little occurred "to change this perception of being surrounded by a hostile world. As a result, he tends to see threats where others might see opportunities." The report found Begin to be a leader who is "trying desperately to hold on to his old constituency and does not yet seem aware that he probably cannot make peace with the Arabs and keep his old friends too." It noted that "attacks from within his party are more painful to him psychologically than politically." The analysis noted that Begin had difficulty abandoning his "old friends" in Herut colleagues and Likud supporters like Moshe Shamir and Geula Cohen even when shedding them might make good sense politically.

In light of the analysis' awareness of Begin's sensitivity to criticism, it predicted that "Begin can be expected to react vigorously when he believes his integrity has been called into question by another government," such as when he argued with Sadat over what was said in Sadat's visit to Jerusalem

regarding demilitarization of the Sinai and Begin's disagreement with the White House over what was or was not promised regarding Israeli settlement activities. The report thus suggested that in any negotiation situation, "questioning his record or recollection of what he said on an early occasion will not be productive" because his own memory is "legendary." [66]

By virtue of his sensitivity, Begin was found to be exerting himself to be as popular as possible. This was evident in his making himself available to a surprising number and range of visitors, both from Israel and from abroad, as well as in his extensive efforts to "never miss an opportunity to meet with a group in order to explain his views and plead his cause." Begin continued to believe in the virtue of oratory, as manifest in his belief that he could "convince any audience of the correctness of his views given enough time."[67]

I2: Legal Argumentation

Begin's normative perspective originated from his worldview in which "right and wrong are clearly distinguishable. Legal precedent and interpretations are used to support Israeli legitimacy and develop the justice of Israeli positions." Begin's "legalistic approach" to foreign policy reflected in his reliance on legal advisors, such as the inclusion of Attorney-General Aharon Barak in his delegation to Washington during the Camp David process. The report anticipated his continued use of legal argumentation in response to Egyptian and American proposals and to focus on precise wording rather than on broad political formulations.

The report also noted the "political indecisiveness" of Begin's administration. It opined that on certain aspects of his legislative performance, such as the bill against proselytizing and the law regarding exemption from military service for Orthodox girls, "he has given in to intemperate elements in his coalition." On the matter of settlement building, it noted that his coalition showed "an inability to face

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[66]"Begin on Settlements Freeze Controversy." 1978TELAV13420_d. 1978. September 27, 00:00. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV13420_d.html.

[67]"Begin on Settlements Freeze Controversy." Op. Cit.

difficult decisions." In summary, the report concluded its analysis of Begin's coalition as follows: "In the weeks ahead, pressure may be considered necessary in order to induce movement from Begin, but that same pressure will likely have the effect of only making him more difficult in negotiations."[68]

Begin's ability to navigate the "storms" of crisis with his own cabinet and the United States owed to his *personal qualities.* Personal qualities are *incalculable* in external relations. They are ignored in grand strategy thinking.

J: Anxiety from Every Source

Begin's relationship with Yigael Yadin and Simcha Ehrlich of the DMC and Liberal Party, respectively, alongside Dayan and Weizmann, in his first cabinet, highlights how Begin sought to surround himself with "mature adults" who would encourage compromises with his adversaries at home and abroad. By virtue of this, it is unclear what a "grand strategy" would replace or change for the better. As Guy Ziv stresses in his book *Why Hawks Become Doves*,[69] which discusses Begin in little detail but which probes change in leaders' foreign policy attitudes, leaders who are subtle enough to listen to opposing views *at home, in private*, *in cabinet*, are more likely to become compromisers with external adversaries. Though Begin is not a central study in this book, Begin demonstrated such a quality in the people he surrounded himself with. Possessing a "grand strategy" could counterintuitively tempt leaders against such listening as Begin demonstrating because they would adhere to the "plans" that a "grand strategy" would call for instead of the *relating* that circumstances at home and abroad might call for by contingencies outside of anyone's control.

One analysis commented on the circumstances of the Liberal Party. As Israel's classical "center right" party, the analysis observed that "had it not been for the distorting effect of Israel's abnormal

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[68]"Begin on Settlements Freeze Controversy." Op. Cit.

[69]Guy Ziv, *Why Hawks Become Doves: Shimon Peres and Foreign Policy Change in Israel*. Albany: SUNY Press, 2014.

security situation, it would probably have become the main opposition party to Labour. Given the predominance of foreign policy/security questions, however, Herut appropriated that role."

After the 1977 election, the Liberals in Israeli politics floundered. Analyzing the Liberals within the Likud party, one document suggested that if the Liberals are to remain a potent political force they must "re-emerge as a party with a clear ideological and programmatic identity. A sizeable segment of the Israeli middle class expressed, in its support for the DMC after the 1977 elections, a continuing interest in a revitalized Center alternative to both Labour and Herut. The Liberals, however – even with the DMC eliminated as a serious competitor – do not seem capable of filling this void. Distracted by debilitating internal wrangling, unable to attract new talent and lacking in dynamic leadership, the party's long-term prospects…are dim indeed." Indeed, in Knesset politics, the Liberals both as a party and as a faction represented moderation in foreign policy. They therefore found themselves floundering in the awkward position of supporting Labour governments on the paramount security issues. As a result, their claim to "opposition leadership" never played out. This left to Herut, whose differences with Labour were first and foremost in the foreign policy domain, the role of "official opposition," overshadowing the Liberals.[70]

J1: Begin and the Liberal Party

Nevertheless, the possibility of Begin losing the loyalty of the Liberals was too great a risk for Begin to take inasmuch as their support was imperative for ratifying the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. That said, noted this assessment, Simcha Ehrlich's [head of the Liberal party] "continued incumbency in the finance ministry and Liberal party leadership is far less assured." The assessment noted that although "Begin may need Ehrlich and the Liberals during the period of autonomy negotiations in the same way he has over the past months," nevertheless, "he will be less able over time…to retain as his government's

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[70]"The Liberal Party in Decline." 1979TELAV02097_e. 1979 January 31, 00:00 (Wednesday). https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979TELAV02097_e.html

chief economic decision-maker a man whom the public and much of Herut had overwhelmingly rejected."[71]

When the Liberals joined with Herut to form the *Gahal* party in 1965, and in 1973, to form the Likud, the Liberals had the ostensible status of equals. But, the assessment stressed, as a result of "Herut's activism, strong leadership, and mass appeal, the Liberal party rapidly assumed the role of a junior partner with responsibility for economic affairs. Herut was given a free hand in foreign policy and security matters, thus assuring its continued predominance, particularly in the perception of the electorate."[72]

One analysis speculated about possible replacements for Begin in the hypothetical event of Begin's death. One possibility might be a national unity government. This option "would be attractive to some in the Likud who shy away from going to elections right away and relish the prospect of associating Labour with their failures." It surmised that the Labour government would be hesitant to accept such a prospect because "Labour would want to give the Likud enough rope to hang itself in order to maximize Labour's own majority in the coming elections." In the event of early elections without Begin, the most likely Likud party successor to Begin was suggested to be Ezer Weizmann. "We still believe Weizmann is the best bet in any scenario, not because he is Begin's favourite but due to the lack of real competition."[73]

The problem with Weizmann, though, was that he would be unappealing to the constituencies within Likud to his right. The wild card was the choice that the NRP would make. It could easily join forces with Labour. But the electoral strength of Weizmann owed to his ability to appeal to moderates and liberals within the Likud. "As already noted, this process generally favors Weizmann, who is likely to have the support of both key Herut professionals and the central committee masses and would be the strong preference of the liberals... At any stage of the above process, disagreements would wreck an

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[71]"The Liberal Party in Decline." Op. Cit.

[72]"The Liberal Party in Decline." Op. Cit.

[73]"(C) Begin's Illness and Update of the Succession Picture." 1979TELAV19229_e. 1979 July 27, 00:00. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979TELAV16229_e.html

orderly naming of a new Likud leader. It is not inconceivable, for example, that the Liberals would refuse to follow a Herut figure other than Weizmann" such as Ariel Sharon or Yitzhak Shamir.[74]

A hypothetical contest between Labour and Likud without Begin would be decided by Likud's moderates and liberals. "Peres' success in forming a coalition would depend on the defection from the Likud to the alignment of the liberals who, as noted above, could bolt if Herut's candidate for prime minister were flatly unacceptable." Begin's personal favourite was presumed to be Yaakov Meridor, but his not being an MK rendered him ineligible.[75]

J2: Begin and the DMC

Begin's relationship with the Liberals highlights that, despite his "reputation" from his past, Begin, vis-à-vis both the Labour opposition and the United States, *was willing to be the first one to change*. Begin took the initiative in cultivating relationships with those who would help him be bridge builders.

One analysis of the 1977 election campaign even observed that Labour faced two opponents: the Likud and the DMC. Noting the popularity of the DMC, the assessment noted that the DMC was drawing from traditional Labour voters, "and thus also constitutes a challenge to be reckoned with." Ironically, it noted, neither party was capitalizing on Labour's weaknesses. As the assessment opined: "[Likud] enters the campaign with several handicaps—and Begin is one of them. Many traditional Labour voters looking for an alternative cannot accept Begin as Israel's next Prime Minister." [76]

On the other hand, "many Israelis, especially among disadvantaged Sephardic voters, support the Likud only because of Begin." Because the Likud bore the label of being "the war party," it was perceived as being "inflexibly hard-line." Because of the Israeli population was still disturbed by the

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[74]"(C) Begin's Illness and Update of the Succession Picture." Op. Cit.

[75]"(C) Begin's Illness and Update of the Succession Picture." Op. Cit.

[76]"Secretary's Visit: The Political Scene in Israel." https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977TELAV00874_c.html

trauma of the Yom Kippur War, the Likud would try to appeal to war-weary Israelis by focusing on domestic ills encompassing "inflation, economic stagnation, corruption, the virtual balance between immigration and emigration," as the main issues of the campaign. "This is where the Alignment is most vulnerable."

The differences between Peres and Begin were less nuanced than popular perceptions made note of, inasmuch as Peres represented the *hawkish* wing of the Labour party and was supported by many of his backers for pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. Perceiving that Peres' image was hawkish, the analysis noted that Labour's left flank in the *Achdut HaAvodah* faction and the Labour party's junior party, *Mapam*, opposed him for this reason. Rabin, Peres' rival for the Labour party's leadership, had the support of these both.

Rabin, the analysis noted, was backed by Golda Meir, who still wielded influence in the party. "Any talk of change, and Israel's air is full of it these days, benefits Peres within the framework of the Labour party, even if it is also an attack on Labour's role in the wider context of Israeli politics. For example, a number of known doves within the party are supporting Peres because they regard him as a more effective campaigner who will be better able to minimize the loss of Knesset seats generally conceded to be in store for Labour."[77]

The DMC party played a role in the 1977 campaign that transcended that of previous elections. Despite perceptions of the 1977 election as a shift from a "unipolar" to a "bipolar" party map in Israel, the influence of the DMC rendered the 1977 campaign Israel's first genuinely "multipolar" election.

In the analysis' words: "Depending on whether the DMC joined such a coalition, this might be a replay of the government of national unity that ruled Israel from 1967 to 1970. Although in many ways it would be a strong government…, in terms of foreign policy, at least, the Likud could be expected to exercise a hawkish veto over any Labour tendency to compromise."

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[77]"Secretary's Visit: The Political Scene in Israel." Op. Cit.

J3: Coalition Dynamics

The essential problem came down to coalition dynamics. "A more cohesive (if remote) coalition could result if the liberals split from the Likud following the election… and join with, say, the alignment and the DMC in a coalition. If it brings in the NRP, such a government could enjoy a very comfortable majority indeed." Yigael Yadin, head of the DMC, was keen enough to know that his chances of winning the election was unlikely. "Even Ben-Gurion with Dayan in tow failed in his 1965 attempt, despite their prestige."[78]

What made the DMC so potent a challenger to the two major parties was that, like the Likud, the DMC was concentrating on domestic problems. One of Yadin's platform positions, indeed, was to hold a new Knesset election under far different rules than the upcoming election, should DMC come in first. Moreover, Yadin attracted many impressive personalities to his campaign roster, particularly among industrial managers and high-ranking military reserve officers, "what may be loosely labeled as Israel's technocrats."

One of the central problems faced by Yadin was the endemic problem of Israeli politics since 1948: "To start from scratch with a brand new organization and successfully challenge the two major parties is unprecedented in Israel." But Yadin, despite these obstacles, was nevertheless likely to win 15 to 20 seats, enough to make him "indispensable to any coalition."

While Yadin himself was a moderate on territorial issues, his party comprised several hard-liners. That said, opined the authors of the assessment, we hold that "there is a tacit understanding among its leaders to submerge the foreign policy differences in favor of reforming Israel's institutions." Regrettably for the DMC and its prospects, however, "a typical disaffected Labour voter may in the privacy of the voting booth decide that a vote for the DMC would help the Likud and therefore will stick with Labour. It should be borne in mind that Israelis have traditionally been fairly conventional in their voting habits."[79]

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[78]"Secretary's Visit: The Political Scene in Israel." Op. Cit.

[79]"Secretary's Visit: The Political Scene in Israel." Op. Cit.

In Israeli politics there are too many simultaneous understandings of "national interest" to be streamlined in any integrated process because any such process would exclude important dissenting parties. The parties that do well in Israeli politics are those capable of *bold acts of change*. Israeli internal politics and US-Israeli relations have similar characteristics: the conflict between a "light touch" and a "strong opinion," between common sense and "uncommon sense," and between *familiarity* and *generosity*. That said, rarely in US-Israeli diplomatic correspondence do American interlocutors put negativity aside to express appreciation to their Israeli counterpart. The *language* of US-Israeli relations is a reality that no "grand strategy for Israel" would change. The irony of the Wikileaks above is that the American Ambassador operated convinced of the incorrigibility of "one and only" understanding of truth, whereas Israeli Prime Ministers cope with the reality of *multiple simultaneous understandings of truth* in a multiparty political system and a multi-perspectival cabinet. Despite the broader vision of the American Ambassador, the Israeli Prime Minister acts with greater *maturity*. That is to say, that the American Ambassador has the luxury of offering an informed "outsider's" perspective. But Israeli leaders need to consider other values than "honesty" alone: timing, consequence, compromise, fragility and delicacy.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to share new evidence on the history of Begin's foreign policy derived from the "Wikileaks" revelations available on the website of controversial journalist Julian Assange. The insights derived compliment those of Charles Freilich's recent work on Israeli foreign policy decision-making, wherein the history Begin's foreign policy plays a significant role in his argument.

Charles Freilich's study and the Wikileaks sources presented in this chapter highlight why Israeli foreign policy *theoretically* "should" improve in its bureaucratic coordination; but even the "perfectly" executed "project management" of Israeli foreign policy would never replace the incalculable human element.

Even while factions to Begin's political "right" alienated him during his compromises with the Egyptians during the Camp David process, causing him to feel abandoned by traditional supporters, Begin in power demonstrated remarkable flexibility and compromise in order to moderate his personal inclinations and to adapt his ideological "legacy" and "past" to the demands of his relationships with those in the political "center" of Israeli politics. That said, pressure on him by the United States contributed to Begin's acute sense of feeling manipulated, exploited and taken advantage of. Begin understood himself to have been triangulated by Presidents Sadat and Carter. Moreover, despite Begin's persuasions to the "right" of Israel's political spectrum, problems in Carter's relationship with Israel predated Begin's tenure, manifesting even during the tenure of Yitzhak Rabin.

While the continuities between Begin's and Rabin's foreign policy during the 1970s is outside the scope of this chapter, the episodes described above in this chapter are indicative of the importance of interpersonal relations between Israeli Prime Ministers and their American counterparts: the American President, the American Ambassador and the American Secretary of State. These have little to do with "grand strategy" and much to do with relations of intimacy between interlocutors.

Thinking fixatedly on grand strategy obscures one to just how excruciatingly difficult *compromise and communication* actually are. Israeli leaders know this in a way that foreign policy writers abroad do not understand because one can only appreciate it if one has lived through it. There is insufficient empathy for the impossibility of the situations Israeli Prime Ministers find themselves in.

Chapter 3: "Caution and Dissension: The Labour Party under Rabin and Begin."

Abstract:

This chapter highlights the ethos of *conservatism and caution* that characterized the tenureship of Yitzhak Rabin (1974-77). It highlights the contrast between his mindset and the American interlocutors he dealt with. This caution is attributed to the *centrism* of Rabin's foreign policy priorities, cultivating a middle ground between doves and hawks in the Labour Party; doing so, he mirrored the centrism evident in Prime Minister Begin's foreign policy during Begin's first term. Rabin faced dissension in the Labour Party manifest in his being challenged by Labour Party adversaries "to the right" of him such as Shimon Peres and the *Rafi* faction in the party.

Do Israeli decision-makers possess free will? In what follows below I will supplement evidence from the Rabin Memoirs with additional evidence from "Wikileaks" sources. They highlight that, rather than "grand strategy" motivating Rabin's foreign policy, his foreign policy was dictated by circumstances beyond his control: in-fighting in the Labour Party, the impulse toward centrism in Israeli politics, and the twin dependencies of Israeli foreign relations on the United States and regional powers' activism.

The purpose of this chapter is to contemplate varieties of "centrism" in the Israeli Labour Party during the mid- and late-1970s, specifically during the tenureship of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 1974-

77. The conceptual value of such contemplation is to highlight the foreshadowing by Rabin's term of later trends that would become evident during the tenure of Menachem Begin. The emphasis in this chapter is on expressions of "hawkishness" in the Israeli Labour Party during Rabin's term. These insights will suggest that not only were there noteworthy continuities between the Israeli-Egyptian negotiation process under Rabin and under Begin, but also in Israeli hesitance vis-à-vis American pressure to facilitate the creation of a Palestinian state. There is significant overlap between positions held by the "hawkish" elements in Israel's Labour Party during Rabin's tenure and those espoused by the Likud Party during Begin's first term. There is also significant overlap between attitudes toward the territories controlled by Israel after 1967 between the Labour and Likud parties during Rabin's tenure. Moreover, there is significant overlap between attitudes toward a Palestinian State between the Likud Party and the Rabin-era Labour Party. Ultimately, the Labour Party "fell" not only due to the ascendance of the Likud Party in 1977, but due to the consequences of internal infighting as leaders who actively espoused peace toward Israel's neighbours were incapable of making peace with fellow peace-oriented party-members.

The broader conceptual lesson of this chapter is that grand strategy is a luxury possessed by countries that are lucky enough to be able to pick and choose where they focus. Israel in the mid-1970s was not such a country. At the same time, the realities of dependence, in-fighting and caution evident during the Rabin years demonstrate that instead of postulating imaginative and imaginary programmes for "grand strategy" to be implemented by great powers in comparable circumstances, it might be wiser and more mature to simply follow the motto and maxim of: "First, do no harm." Rabin's first term was characterized by a "stay out of trouble" mentality; such an attitude might be healthier and safer than any proposed formulation of a given country's hypothetical "grand strategy."

A. *Evidence from the Rabin Memoirs*

Many of the details alluded to below in the "Wikileaks" sources highlight information about topics dealt with in the memoirs of Yitzhak Rabin.

Rabin, for example, emphasized the continuities between his administration and Begin's. Most notably, Rabin expresses the view that the Begin-Sagat negotiations and treaty were an extension and outgrowth of the disengagement agreements he himself negotiated with Egypt with the United States as a mediator. Rabin points out: "The 1975 agreement with Egypt was never meant to be an end in itself. As its title implies, it was designed to advance the 'momentum' toward peace and in that sense it has achieved its objective -- no minor accomplishment in Middle Eastern politics." Sadat's remarkable visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the treaty signed in subsequent years "could never have come about were it not for the course my government adopted in signing the 1975 interim agreement." Ironically, he notes that Begin and Dayan both opposed the 1975 agreement, yet, in power, they both took advantage of "the fruits of our labours."[80]

A1. *Labour Party "Hawks"*

To be sure, Rabin's memoirs depict Begin as the natural beneficiary of in-fighting in the Labour party. Begin is depicted as acting just as one would expect from an opposing party's leader; Rabin's primary adversary, as his memoirs reveal, was Shimon Peres, his own defense minister, more than Begin. In Rabin's words: "On the evening of May 17, 1977, when I heard the first election result and forecasts of the final outcome, it was clear to me that the Labour Party had been called upon to pay the price for the intrigues, conflicts, and internal dissension that had divided its ranks."[81]

Most of all, despite being situated "to the left" of his defense minister and Labour party rival Shimon Peres, Rabin was still very much a "Labour hawk." While he is remembered for his accomplishment of the Oslo Accords during his second term in office (1992-95), Rabin during his first term presented what was really a "shade of grey" in relation to the positions and policies of the Likud. This manifested in Rabin's opposition to a Palestinian state, preferring instead the "Jordanian option"

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[80]Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs.* Maxine Kaufman Nunn, trans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 275.

[81]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, p. 317

which would have ceded territory in the West Bank to Jordan which would rule the West Bank in a condominium. While Rabin was, therefore, interested in territorial compromise vis-a-vis Jordan, this was not necessarily the same as territorial compromise vis-a-vis the PLO. This also fell short of American proposals. Hence, Rabin and Begin represent continuities of one another. Both experienced hostile confrontations from the United States and both were blamed by the United States for being "intransigent" vis-a-vis their Arab counterparts.

A2. *Rabin and Carter in Conflict*

The Rabin memoirs, therefore, quote Rabin's rebuff to Carter. In Rabin's words, the difference between Labour and Likud was as follows. Labour was prepared to implement territorial compromise with Jordan in an arrangement that would place Jordan in charge of the Arab civil administration in the West Bank and Israel in charge of security affairs. Jordan and Israel would exercise shared control. Likud, in contrast, advocated no withdrawal from the West Bank whatsoever. "But both parties reject any suggestion of a Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan, and both refuse to negotiate with the PLO." Jimmy Carter responded to Rabin's explanation by suggesting that there could be "a kind of federation between Jordan and the Palestinian state, along the lines of the states in the USA…" Carter even conceded that the West Bank would be demilitarized and enjoy a quasi-autonomous status. Rabin replied: "We are vigorously opposed to an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan… For the moment, I won't dwell on the question of how the Palestinians will find their self-expression in a 'Jordanian-Palestinian state.' But no third state should come into being."[82]

Subjecting the West Bank Palestinians to Jordanian rule might have been a benefit to Israeli security interests, but suggesting such only short years after the 1970 "Black September" massacre of Palestinians by Jordan with Israel's assistance would have subjected Palestinians in the West Bank to the

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[82]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, p. 294

cruelties of a Jordanian occupation rather than an Israeli occupation. Espousing the "Jordanian option" was an expression of "Labour hawkishness" even though it entailed territorial concessions.

A3. *The Question of a Palestinian State*

Expressed differently, Rabin explained the options for conflict resolution as follows. In his words, one option, "advocated by the Palestinian extremists, (basically) is to create a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." A second option was "to grant the Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza the right to run their lives under an autonomous self-governing authority." The Palestinian Arabs would be able to choose Israeli citizenship and thereby acquire full rights as Israelis or to maintain the Jordanian citizenship they held at the time. The third option, which Rabin espoused and the Labour party adhered to, was that within the original borders of mandatory Palestine encompassing contemporary Israel, Gaza, the West Bank and Jordan, there would be two states: Israel and, "to the east of it, a Jordanian-Palestinian state that would include considerable portions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (mainly the densely populated areas)." This Jordanian-Palestinian state would enable the expression of the unique identity of the Palestinians in whatever form they choose to exercise their right to self-determination.[83]

Stated elsewhere, Rabin stressed that while Labour and Likud differ in how they would go about solving the Palestinian question, "we both oppose in the strongest terms the creation of a Palestinian 'mini-state' in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, first and foremost because it cannot solve anything." Rabin noted that it would not be able to absorb the 1.5 million Palestinians abroad living elsewhere in the Middle East and that it would surely be role by "the most extreme faction in the Palestinian political spectrum -- the PLO." The PLO would view a Palestinian state as the first phase in their goal of expelling the Israeli Jews and replacing the State of Israel with a state of Palestine.[84]

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[83]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, pp. 332-3.

[84]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, p. 334.

A4. *Rabin versus Carter*

In this context, Rabin's relations with President Carter were turbulent notwithstanding Rabin's representing the comparatively "dovish" wing of the Labour party in power. Rabin's memoirs relate Carter's words pleading for Israel to negotiate with the PLO: "We are utterly opposed to terrorism, but there are precedents for negotiations between states and organizations of this nature. I see no evidence of Palestinian leaders other than the PLO leadership. I see no evidence of Palestinian leaders other than the PLO leadership." Rabin responded that Israel would not negotiate with the PLO and that any change in American policy toward the PLO would "encourage elements equally undesirable to both our countries…" Carter thereafter stated that if the PLO changed its position and the Geneva Conference was not convened due to Israeli opposition to talking to the PLO, "he foresaw a sharp reaction on the part of the American people." Rabin then ended the exchange by stating that the administration should not adopt any firm positions because they would thereby incite Arab positions "that they could achieve their ends by means of American pressure on Israel."[85]

Rabin realized that American hostility toward him was severe and grave. He felt that under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Israel had enjoyed first priority in American arms deliveries, surpassing even the United States' NATO allies, but Carter placed Israel far down on the priority list. Ultimately, the consequence of American pressure on him was the Likud victory. He held the American administration culpable. "I cannot say what the United States gained by the president's statements and moves, but I do know what the Likud got out of them." In the run-up to Israel's elections in 1977, American statements cultivated a psychology of fear and disappointment, playing into the Likud party's hands and catalyzing its popularity. Rabin put it this way: "If these were the United States' intentions, if Israel was unable to

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[85]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, pp. 296-97

rely upon the United States as a friend and ally, then she would have to entrust her fate to a 'tough' and 'uncompromising' leadership to protect her vital interests."

A5. *Foreshadowing Begin*

In many ways, the period in Israeli history constituted by the Yitzhak Rabin tenureship as Prime Minister foreshadowed and prefigured the Begin era. This section to unfold below will elucidate why. Three reasons will be provided. One, there was significant overlap between the centrism of Israel's Labour Party vis-a-vis resolving the status of the territories conquered in the 1967 war and the centrism of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's first term.

That is to say, the "moderate" side of the Labour Party and the "moderate" side of the Likud Party saw matters pertaining to the status of the West Bank through similar lenses. Thus, the first Begin term should be seen as a continuity to the Labour Party's policies not a break from it. Secondly, the tenureship of Yitzhak Rabin saw significant turbulence in the American relationship with Israel in spite of Rabin's sincere and active pursuit of an Arab-Israeli negotiation process. There was no correlation between pursuing negotiations with Israel's adversaries and an "improvement" in American relations because, in the eyes of American interlocutors, Israeli concessions never went far enough. The frustrations ensuing between President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Begin were mirrored by those occurring between President Gerald Ford and Prime Minister Rabin. Third, the Labour Party succumbed not only to electoral defeat in 1977, but also to internal in-fighting.

B. Friction between the Labour Party and the United States

It is noteworthy to point out that there was friction between the Israeli Labour Party and US foreign policy no less than the Likud. In what follows, tensions between Israel and the US as reflected in Labour Party discourses and perceptions will be presented. There were noteworthy tensions between Israel and the US under Prime Minister Rabin (1974-77); there were many in Labour who supported Begin's peace process and were willing to support him; and there were many who, notwithstanding their affiliation with the Labour party, criticized American interventions in Israeli politics on nationalist grounds motivated by concerns about Israeli "caving" and "dependence" on the United States.

The section at hand will contemplate these nuances of Labour Party frustration with American policy toward Israel based on "Wikileaks" revelations pertaining to the affairs of the Labour Party before and after the 1977 Likud Party electoral victory.

B1. Rabin versus Kissinger

One of the most poignant problems in US-Israeli relations under Rabin was the "arms supply affair." In 1975, amid the negotiations with Egypt on the Sinai Accords, Israel submitted a request to the United States that included items that, in Rabin's words, "were more than superfluous; they bordered on the ridiculous…" The requests submitted were "frivolous and unworthy of consideration…I referred to our lists as 'inflated,' but I did no try to evade my share of the responsibility for them."[86] The list was, in Rabin's self-critical words, "exaggerated and pretentious."

One other episode in the Rabin Memoirs corroborates this picture of tensions between Rabin and the United States. Rabin presents the following episode of Kissinger's rage at him after he presented Israel's proposal for a partial settlement with Egypt. Rabin proposed as follows. 1. That the Suez Canal be open to the shipping of all nations, including Israel. 2. That the cease-fire with Egypt be unlimited and Egypt promise not to renew fighting. 3. That IDF forces would be stationed at a distance from the canal to

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[86]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* pp. 277-78.

be agreed upon between Egypt and Israel. 4. That Egyptian civilians prepare the canal for navigation, open it and operate it but no Egyptian forces be allowed into that area. 5. That Egypt would thin out its forces on the Western side of the canal to an extent agreed upon by the two countries. 6. Fifteen days after the agreement comes into effect, the prisoners of war held by both sides would be released. 7. The Israeli withdrawal would take place after the canal is cleared and opened to international shipping. 8. This partial settlement with Egypt would in no way prejudice the ongoing Jarring initiative for Israeli-Arab peace.

Rabin describes Kissinger's response as follows. Can I leave you a copy of the document?" I asked, in an attempt to reduce the tension. "You can leave me as many copies as you like," he replied gruffly, "but I won't have anything else to do with it!" The thrust of Kissinger's fury is depicted as follows: "If that's your proposal, I don't want to have anything to do with it....I won't touch it! It indicates a fundamental misconception of both the basic problem and your standing in the United States. It will lead to stagnation and confrontation. So do whatever you want, but leave me alone!" Rabin opined: "In hundreds of meetings, conversations and contacts, I had rarely seen Kissinger so furious." Rabin describes Kissinger's reaction thusly: "Kissinger roared at me."[87]

B2. Rabin on Israel-Arab Negotiations

One commentary available in "Wikileaks" by American ambassador Samuel Lewis observed that, according to Prime Minister Rabin, Israel must come to grips with two questions pertaining to the matter of settlements: one, whether or not to continue with the policy of settlements during the course of the negotiations, and two, where to settled. Rabin perceived that it would be a mistake for Israel if it were to waive its right to settle during the negotiations on the grounds that the Labour Party has never called for a settlement freeze.

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[87]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* pp, 198-99

Such a freeze, in Rabin's understanding, should be considered only as a bargaining chip in the autonomy negotiations inasmuch as the right to settle should not be relinquished simply for the sake of creating the "proper negotiating ambiance." Lewis observed that Rabin argued that American involvement should be kept at the Lowest level possible. Rabin felt that "Israel must now stand up to anyone who is against the principle that these talks are between herself and Egypt only."[88]

B3. Dayan's Status

Meanwhile, one Maariv article available in Wikileaks as an American embassy translation observed the change in Moshe Dayan as a person since the Yom Kippur War. It observed that only two years after the war did Dayan fully realize the significance of what happened to him politically; Dayan's trips abroad for speaking engagements were an index of his severe decline from centrality in Israeli political life. Dayan's decline was exemplified by the fact that only two of his colleagues in the hawkish Rafi faction in the Labour Party joined with him in voting against the interim disengagement agreement with Egypt in the Knesset in spite of his extensive efforts to marshal support for his position both in the public and in the party.[89]

A different Wikileaks document noted that Moshe Dayan, the Labour stalwart who would serve as Begin's foreign minister, called for "virtually unrestricted" Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Debating Israeli negotiations with Jordan in the Knesset, Dayan stressed that in the Israeli-Jordanian talks, Israel must hold fast to two principles: One, the right of Jews to settle permanently anywhere in Judea or Samaria provided they do not dispossess Arabs, and two, the right to maintain military installations in the West Bank to assure Israel's security. Dayan also asserted that "Arab states have adequate area to resettle refugees." Regarding the Palestinian refugee crisis, "Dayan said that Jordan represents the inhabitants of

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[88]"Rabin on Settlements." June 14, 1979, 1979TELAV12736_e. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979TELAV12736_e.html

[89]"Ben-Israel Keeps Executive Bureau Seat but Resigns All." December 29 1977. 1977TELAV11239_c. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977TELAV11239_c.html

the West Bank and maybe Gaza but not the refugees. He charged that Arab states are ready to renew fighting--both militarily and politically." Replying to Dayan's words, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon said that Dayan's statement did not rule out Jordanian rule over "considerable" parts of the Land of Israel. Prime Minister Rabin stated on July 23 that in any Israeli-Jordanian agreement Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley would remain and continue under Israeli control.

B4. Rabin, Peres and Dayan

The aforementioned report opined that the comments uttered by various opponents to Rabin's negotiations with Jordan during the Knesset debate during which Dayan spoke underscored the problems that the Rabin government was likely to face as it began to progress in its pursuit of Israeli-Jordanian peace negotiations. It stated that Dayan's "insistence on virtually unrestricted Jewish settlement rights in the West Bank, with sole caveat that Arabs not be dispossessed, certainly goes beyond [the] more moderate position of Rabin and Allon to maintain settlements based on security considerations." While Dayan's views on the territories may have very limited support in the Labour Party, "any disaffection would seriously threaten viability of the current government, with its one vote majority in the Knesset." Should a rift in the Labour Party emerge over early negotiations with Jordan, the report speculated that Rabin might be compelled to call elections earlier than expected."[90]

A different approach to peace was that presented to Shimon Peres by virtue of the Labour Party's affiliation with the Socialist International body. Peres was approached by the body to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with the PLO. Peres replied that the question of the Palestinians and the negotiations with Egypt should be kept separate and that negotiations with Egypt should take precedence.

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[90]"Knesset Debates GOI Policy on Jordanian-Palestinian Issue." July 25, 1974, 1974TELAV04197_b. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974TELAV04197_b.html

Peres grounded this rebuttal in his reading of the political climate in Israel, the Egyptian affirmation not to inject the PLO into the negotiations, and the PLO's character. Peres asked for German President Willy Brandt, Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica and other Socialist International personalities to meet with Sadat and convince him to resume direct negotiations with Israel.[91]

B5. Hawks in the Labour Party

One episode related in the Rabin Memoirs conveyed American exasperation at the back-and-forth taking place in Israel's cabinet. Rabin's hands were tied by the in-fighting taking place within his government. Rabin narrates: "The Americans were heartily sick of this game of hide-and-seek, and I found that I too needed great stores of self-discipline to refrain from hurling some harsh words at my government and perhaps even requesting that I be recalled from my post." Rabin notes the irony that, as Prime Minister, he was simultaneously negotiating with the Americans and the Egyptians and his own government.

Rabin presents the concern over Israel's adamant stance on Egyptian nonbelligerency as a stance imposed on him by his cabinet against his better judgment because he doubted this proposal would be received positively by the Americans or Egyptians. "On that point, however, the cabinet remained adamant, and I was instructed to notify the Americans that ending the state of belligerency was a sine qua non of a partial agreement. If asked how far Israel was prepared to withdraw, I was to say that I did not know."[92]

B6. The Role of Rafi

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[91]"Shimon Peres Comments on his Talks with Senghor." June 6, 1978. 1978TELAV07190_d https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV07190_d.html

[92]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* p. 196

The context for the tensions among stalwarts in the Labour Party over the character of an Israeli-Arab negotiation process can be seen in the following source. An analysis in Wikileaks featured the perspective of Mordechai Ben-Porat, a member of the Rafi faction of the Labour Party and also deputy speaker of the Knesset. He stated that seven of eight Rafi faction members in the Knesset, including Defense Minsiter Peres, committed themselves to opposing any interim agreement with Egypt that did not include an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency.

If an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency was not attainable, Peres would then share with his Rafi colleagues the concession that Israel would be foolish to reliquish its Sinai Peninsula passes in the absence of non-belligerency but was torn by the reality facing him as Defense Minister that he must attain what is available, not what is desirable. Ben-Porat stated that Rafi members saw with distinct importance the matter of the IDF's electronic surveillance installations being manned by Israelis not a third party. Furthermore, should Peres support an agreement that most of Rafi opposes, his influence in Rafi would be adversely affected. Ben-Porat wondered whether Peres might speak against an agreement Rabin might make with Egypt but vote for it in the Knesset.[93]

C. Rabin and the Labour Party's "Doves"

According to a different analysis, Rabin and Peres' feud owed to Rabin himself being, by orientation, more intimately aligned with the "dovish" wing of the Labour Party in contrast to Peres, who was situated "to the right" of him. When Peres was Labour Party chairman, the he too dealt with the challenge posed both by Mapam's possibly dissolving its alliance with Labour and the possibility of doves within Labour such as Rabin and Rabin's allies seceding to form "neo-Mapai" movement against him.

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[93]"Positions of Peres and Rafi Faction on Interim Agreement." July 12 1975. 1975TELAV04449_b https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975TELAV04449_b.html

The Labour party was understood to be gaining in strength, and in this capacity was divided on how to respond to an Israel-Egypt treaty negotiated by the Likud. As things stood, the "hawks have already made up their minds and seven or eight would vote against the treaty or abstain." Most of the moderates in Labour "would vote for the current treaty, and even for any amended package that the Begin cabinet would overwhelmingly endorse." Moreover, the disintegration of the DMC gave Labour the opportunity to entice "traditional Labourites who had flocked to Yigael Yadin's banner; and Labour's leadership seemed to be positioning itself to capitalize on the stalemated peace process and the growing public unrest with the state of the economy."

According to this analysis, a group of Labour party members including MK's Yitzhak Rabin, Yehoshua Rabinowitz, Abba Eban, Ora Namir, Yossi Sarid and Yeruham Meshel -- Labour's "Doves" -- gathered to oppose the position of the "hawkish" Rafi wing. It declared support for a peace treaty with Egypt and asserted that the party's misgivings about Begin's autonomy plan for the Palestinians must be subordinated to the higher goal of reaching peace. What bothered this group of Labour "doves" was the participation of many party "hawks" in an anti-autonomy rally on December 16, sponsored by the La'am faction under the leadership of Yigal Hurwitz. Labour MK Shlomo Hillel, one of the party's most prominent hawks, spoke at the rally.

C1. Rabin and Peres

Indeed, notes the report, chairman Shimon Peres intervened with strenuous effort to prevail on the doves to cancel the meeting. Coupled with Peres' concern that the meetings would hurt party unity by entrenching the doves as a competing faction, Peres was worried by the "decidedly Mapai coloration of the moderate group and the prominence of Rabin among its organizers. Peres, who came from the former Rafi wing of Labour, fears resurrection of the old Mapai faction under the leadership of his arch-rival,

Rabin." The report adds that the doves' decision not to invite Peres to the meeting "no doubt intensified his suspicions."

According to MK Yossi Sarid, the doves' intention to meet was "essentially tactical." Its purpose was to send a message to Peres that he not create the impression "that the hawks speak for the party." By cancelling the meeting they sense they have gained leverage on Peres. Sarid stated that a bill was presently being circulated by Herut MK Yigal Cohen-Orgad stipulating stiff conditions for a future autonomy regime on the West Bank; Cohen-Orgad claimed that the bill would be co-sponsored by a few Labour MKs. The doves obtained Peres' assurance that "he would see to it that no member of the Labour party co-sponsors the bill."[94]

D. Labour Peace Initiatives

One file stated the substance of the debate among Labour Party officials regarding the possibility of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in the foreseeable future. "We hear of late more statements from leaders such as Peres, Dayan and Rabin that the Arabs are not ready for 'real' peace; they tend to downgrade any indications to the contrary in the Arab world, …" This led to an attitude among Israelis to the effect that Arab opposition stimulating Israeli opposition to the effect that Israelis were provoked into a "peace-is-not-possible" mood. Abba Eban was part of a minority within Labour which perceived at least a remote possibility of now achieving a comprehensive peace agreement despite the significant risks for Israel. This minority within Labour was motivated by the conviction that Israel must be seen by the outside world as genuinely willing to try for a comprehensive settlement, fearing that without such a demonstration, Israel's support would erode.

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[94]"Knesset Debates GOI Policy on Jordanian-Palestinian Issue." July 25, 1974, 1974TELAV04197_b. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974TELAV04197_b.html

within Labour was motivated by the conviction that Israel must be seen by the outside world as genuinely willing to try for a comprehensive settlement, fearing that without such a demonstration, Israel's support would erode. The report noted that Rabin aimed for an understanding with the US that Israel, during the three-to-five year duration to be sought for a new agreement with Egypt, will not pressured to negotiate further withdrawals with any of its neighbours.[95]

D1. Diverse Ideas

Yigal Yadin, the head of the DMC party, had spoken in private about the autonomy plan ever since Begin proposed it in 1977. The DMC was the "only element within the coalition which has ever favored any solution other than permanent Israeli control over the Occupied Territories." The Liberal Party, despite its moderate orientation, did not concern itself with foreign policy.

What struck Lewis as remarkable was the diversity of thought regarding solutions to the status of the West Bank and Gaza in the Labour Party. Although the party was unofficially supportive of the Allon Plan endorsing a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, other perspectives were also espoused. Abba Eban spoke about an independent state joining Israel and Jordan to "form a Benelux-like community", while Yitzhak Rabin espoused a joint Israeli-Jordanian trusteeship over the West Bank. Meanwhile, MK Yossi Sarid represented the party's staunch left holding to the "ultimate necessity of withdrawal to the 67 borders," making room for a Palestinian state. On the other hand, MK's Shlomo Hillel and Amos Hadar refused to countenance any Israeli withdrawal from the territories whatsoever.[96]

D2 . The Labour Party's Foreign Policy Perspective

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[95]"Briefing for Rabin Visit." May 30, 1975. 1975STATE126392_b. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975STATE126392_b.html

[96]"Labor Starts to Shape its Peace Policy." Op. Cit.

One reality of the Labour Party under-appreciated in histories of the failures of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking is that within the Labour Party, both in power in the years 1974-77 and in the opposition, there existed multiple simultaneous and contradictory approaches to conflict resolution within the Labour Party. Even in the event of a "successful" Israeli-Arab or Israeli-Palestinian peace process, those very supporters of a negotiated solution understood the meaning of a "solution" very differently.

One document analyzing the Labour party during the Begin tenure stated that "while Labour is endowed with a rich diversity of views regarding West Bank/Gaza question, no one in the party is advocating the Begin government's policy". Begin was advocating Palestinian autonomy as a final status while Labour supported it only as a transitional arrangement toward an ultimate final status agreement.

Labour's position, however, also fell short of endorsing a Palestinian independent state. Instead, the Labour Party advocated territorial compromise along the lines of the Allon Plan, with Jordan as the preferred negotiation partner.

According to Samuel Lewis, while "a Labour government might be more flexible and tactically deft than the current one," it is doubtful that the party "would be able to overcome its internal contradictions sufficiently to reach a settlement." Lewis stated that the "range of Labor views on what to do about the West Bank is all over the map. Moreover, while agreeing that a Labor Government would, at least initially, demonstrate more flexibility and perhaps deftness in negotiation tactics, I remain highly skeptical that Peres (or Allon) would be able to overcome Labor's internal contradictions sufficiently to reach any agreement with Jordan or Syria, much less the PLO."

Lewis opined that the Settlements question in and of itself "will torment a Labour cabinet nearly as much as it does Begin. And Labour lacks and authoritative leader figure who can, if he chooses, impose his will on Labour's feudal barons."[97]

D3. If Labour Replaced Begin

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[97]"Labor Starts to Shape its Peace Policy." November 16, 1979. 1979TELAV24472_e. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979TELAV24472_e.html

The Israeli negotiating position should Labour ascend to power would develop in a direction and a tempo "dependent not only on a fixed Labour perspective but also in response to the changing domestic and foreign political context." Labour's policy would "develop in a direction and a tempo dependent not only on a fixed Labour perspective but also in response to the changing domestic and foreign political context." The difference between and Likud and Labour, then, was not necessarily in the specific position taken by Labour but in Labour's seriousness about negotiating actively to end the conflict.

Yigal Allon held to the position of the Allon Plan and Peres held to the idea of some combination of Jordanian confederation merged with territorial conviction "with decreasing conviction, while in private he is apparently resigned to an eventual outcome of a diffferent sort". A different faction, the Harif/Levinson group, was open to "any position which offers a realistic basis for negotiation" as long as Israeli settlements in the Golan were untouched.

While Labour's accession to power would catalyze the negotiations process, there would also be the side-effect of sifting out "those positions with greatest potential acceptability to the Labor coalition, the Israeli political structure (Knesset and public), and the other parties and potential parties to the negotiations." One or a mix of elements from more than one of these approaches could, after some time, become the official Labour and Government of Israel position.[98]

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[98]"Labor Starts to Shape its Peace Policy." Op. Cit.

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E.   The Problem of Factionalism

According to Rabin's Memoirs, the greatest problem facing an Israeli Prime Minister lies internally rather than externally. This problem is dissension. Rabin lamented: "There can be no greater threat to the public's confidence in its government than having cabinet squabbles splashed across the pages of the daily papers."[100] Rabin stresses that every Israeli cabinet contains members who possess differences of opinion. But "in order for a government to maintain its authority and credibility, once a decision is reached by majority vote the entire cabinet is obligated to stand behind it." This reality may be contextualized as follows.

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[99]"Labor Starts to Shape its Peace Policy." Op. Cit.

[100]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, p. 307.

One different Wikileaks report summarized how the Labour Alignment in power was overcome with "factionalism and ideological problems." The differences were so severe that "differences over future negotiations with the Arabs and the territorial issue have stymied efforts to draft a single political platform for the 1977 National Election." It explained that a faction headed by Abba Eban developed a program more "dovish" than the "Fourteen Articles" platform on which the Labour Party ran in the 1973 election. In consequence, the Party might need to postpone the convention to reconcile these stances.

E1. Eban, Dayan and Mapam

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Nevertheless, Moshe Dayan's faction in the party "could lead a walkout of hardliners if the platform accommodates too much to Mapam's views." Simultaneously, the antagonism between Rabin and Peres for party leadership continued. The sum total of these problems "raised the possibility that Labour's uninterrupted rule since the founding of the state might be approaching an end."

E2. Postponing the Convention

The repeated postponement of the convention, combined with "embarrassingly low" Party registration, combined with the intensity of intra-party disputes over the status of the occupied territories, were emblematic of the party's situation. Abba Eban's thirty-member drafting committee was disbanded because the disputes occurring regarding the party platform could not be resolved. At issue were the following disputes. Mapam at its convention the past June warned Labour to change its platform to a more flexible stand on negotiations, territories and the Palestinian question.

Other Labour figures, including Foreign Minister Yigal Allon and MK's Abba Eban, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon and Aharon Yariv, were "convinced that a new platform must be both more specific on territories and more forthcoming in offers to negotiate." Their platform stated that Israel would make far-reaching concessions in return for total peace and that "Israel stands ready to negotiate with Jordan and Palestinian representatives who are ready to recognize the State of Israel and negotiate with us. The PLO is excluded because of its activities and ideology."[101]

E3. The Rafi Faction

Another clause stated that Israel desires an all-encompassing peace settlement, but as a second-best, it would not be opposed to an agreement merely terminating the state of war. But on the "hawkish" wing of the party, other Labour leaders, particularly from the Rafi faction, showed no willingness for a more "flexible" version of the platform. The 1977 draft "enraged hardliners on the committee like Asher Ben-Nathan, who at the time was Defense Minister Peres' diplomatic advisor and was previously ambassador to Germany and France, Uri Agami, secretary of the Labour Party's Haifa branch, and others who claimed that the platform drafted by Eban's committee "does not represent a party consensus but rather is an attempt to appease Mapam."

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[101]"The Labor Alignment: A Status Report." August 12, 1976. 1976TELAV05538_b. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976TELAV05538_b.html

They were specifically angered that the platform did not mention the principle of non-withdrawal to the 1967 lines, the non-acceptance of a third state between Israel and Jordan, and the right of Israelis to settle in all parts of the Land of Israel." This faction intended to submit its own document stressing that "peace will not be achieved by territorial withdrawals."

E4. The Question of a Palestinian State

A different member of the drafting committee, former Ambassador to the UN Josef Tekoah, was preparing a compromise version which he believed expressed a consensus of the Labour Party. His document contains the following wording: "Permanent, recognized and defensible borders, based on a territorial compromise on all fronts." Additionally, it states: "In the peace agreement with Jordan, the historic and religious bond of the Jewish people to Judea and Samaria will be safeguarded by guaranteeing free movement by the citizens of Israel, the preservation of the Holy Places for Jews, and free access to those places by the continuation of Jewish settlement."

Tekoah's draft also stated that "the national rights of the Palestinians will find expression in the existing Jordanian-Palestinian state. Israel rejects the establishment of another Palestinian state." Abba Eban, in response, was reportedly amending his draft in an attempt to broaden its appeal to the Rafi faction and bring them on board to his platform.[102]

F. Intra-Party Squabbles

In the Rabin Memoirs, Abba Eban's reluctance to serve in his cabinet merited the following comment: "I truly believed hat Eban was well matched to the task I had in mind for him, and at the behest

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[102]"The Labor Alignment: A Status Report." Op. Cit.

of veteran Mapai colleagues I had visited him at his home in Jerusalem and asked him to join my cabinet. But his refusal was vigorous, and that was his choice to make."[103]

The very real likelihood of the Labour convention being cancelled altogether was proof of the weakness and turmoil in the party. In this context, Dayan was "staking out a hawkish position for himself in the Labour Party." He called for a decision that the "West Bank and Gaza Strip will remain part of Israel." His position was summarized as follows: "Not settlement leading to annexation, but annexation to open the way for settlement." Observers perceived that Dayan sought to heighten the polarization within the Labour Party and then ascend to leadership of the hawkish wing, "implicitly threatening a walkout from the party should it adopt a dovish platform." Peres, in this situation, would be hit with the dilemma of either following Dayan out "and playing second fiddle" or staying in the Labour Party "with a smaller constituency for his own hardline views." Peres, in turn, seemed confident that he could beat Rabin in an intra-party struggle. If he did, "Peres said he would make Dayan Minister of Arab Affairs and Eban Foreign Minister again."[104]

F1. The Labour Party and Mapam

The Labour Party also struggled with the dilemma of how to relate to Mapam. One report by Mapam's secretariat suggested merging with Labour in a "Mapam-Labour Front." This would give Mapam greater say in Labour decision-making. Mapam lamented that its clout in the Alignment had faded significantly for some time, but that it would be in no less peril if it decided to "go it alone." The proposal at hand would be a compromise between the two contingencies; the party's ranks were evenly divided.

In the Labour Party there was division on the matter of continuing the alignment with Mapam. While the party's leadership and rank and file favoured retaining the association, As Lewis stated,

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[103]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, p. 242

[104]"The Labor Alignment: A Status Report." Op. Cit.

Labour's hawkish factions such as the Moshav movement, saw Mapam "as an albatross no less than a dove." The Moshav movement "can be expected to exert pressure on Alignment head Shimon Peres not to accommodate Mapam should the latter decide to negotiate a new and more restrictive relationship.[105]

G. The Idea of an American Defense Pact

One document stated that Prime Minister Begin spoke before 320 major American and Canadian donors Begin said that he would recommend Israel to support a bilateral US-Israeli defense treaty if it were proposed. However, he would reject American troops in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Neither US troops, UN troops nor US units as part of a UN force would be permitted. Israel would decline the prospect of "foreign soldiers to defend our people. We shall defend ourselves."

Begin also announced that he met the day prior with Labour Party leader Shimon Peres and that the two came to the following consensus. Jerusalem would remain the united capital of Israel; no return to the 1967 borders; and non-acceptance of minor modifications in these borders; the IDF would remain in Judea and Samaria.[106]

G1. Peres on a Regional Security System

In a May 5 article in Maariv, Labour leader Shimon Peres argued that a regional pact with the United States as one of many participating parties was preferable to a bilateral US-Israeli defense treaty. In his perspective, a bilateral pact would strengthen Israel's deterrence power at the cost of Israeli independence. A treaty between such unequal powers as the US and Israel would make the latter an

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[105]"Mapam Secretariat Recommends Dissolving Alignment." December 20, 1978. 1978TELAV20041_d. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV20041_d.html

[106]"Begin on Defense Pact with US." September 1, 1978. 1978TELAV11557_d. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV11557_d.html

American satellite. The US would want to know in advance IDF military dispositions and strategic conceptions, the substance of every operation beforehand and the right to give "advice."

Additionally, a bilateral pact was intended to facilitate the signing of a peace agreement and had a territorial price-tag. It would be contingent on Israel's agreement to withdraw to the 1967 borders with minor changes. From a different standpoint, a bilateral pact would weaken public and congressional support of Israel because of popular American reservations about additional US commitments. If US troops became involved in the Middle East, the blame would consciously or unconsciously fall upon Israel.[107]

Peres calculated further that a bilateral pact was of questionable effectiveness. In the event of a surprise attack it was doubtful that the US executive/congressional system could act fast enough. Such a pact also had no relevance to terrorism. Neither would it play an effective role in a war of attrition. Furthermore, a bilateral US-Israeli defense treaty would open the door for the Soviet Union to offer parallel pacts to Arab states. Lastly, a bilateral pact would interfere with Israeli efforts to cultivate good relations with its neighbours without a permanent buffer of foreign armies.

As an alternative, Peres preferred a regional pact with the US participating as a full member. Such a pact with could be established after a peace agreement was concluded with the Arab states. It offered the advantage that the question of borders would be settled according to the specific security needs of the states involved, regardless of "irrelevant external guarantees." According to Peres, a regional pact would bring forth the following advantages. One, it would deter military intervention from outside the Middle East. Two, it would prevent aggression by one Middle Eastern power within the pact against another. Three, it would open up new possibilities for regional cooperation. However, at the stage of the peace process presently occurring, the main task was to conclude negotiations with Egypt. Only then would it be possible to consider the creation of a regional treaty system in the Middle East.

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[107]"Peres Prefers Regional Pact to Bilateral Alliances with US." May 10, 1978. 1978TELAV06123_d https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1978TELAV06123_d.html

G2. Eban and Arens

Notwithstanding the dissent of Peres above on the question of a bilateral US-Israeli treaty, in private both Moshe Dayan and Chairman of the Knesset Security and Foreign Affairs Committee Moshe Arens looked favourably on such an arrangement. Likewise, Abba Eban in the Labour Party also saw such a prospect positively. Notably, Eban, Labour's staunch "dove", viewed matters in a similar lens to his counterparts affiliated with Begin's cabinet and party.

Samuel Lewis opined: "Peres, however, clearly trying to make a bilateral pact appear as unattractive as possible; his purpose is to decouple such a treaty from consideration of the Israeli security requirements which must be met in any peace settlement." In Peres' perspective, consideration of a bilateral treaty during the negotiations process would hinder Israel's ability to obtain more significant guarantees such as defensible borders.[108]

H.   American Reliability

Responding to critical statements made toward Israel by American Democratic Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, even the "dovish" Abba Eban opined: "My only reaction to [Byrd's] statement...is to go and put up a settlement in a place where I would not otherwise think it should be put up." The same document cited a report in the Israeli newspaper Maariv claiming that those who hold that Israel can sign a peace treaty with Egypt and then look to the United States for security guarantees "had better take a long look at President Carter's statement" about Taiwan and China.

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[108]"Peres Prefers Regional Pact to Bilateral Alliance with US." May 10, 1978. 1978TELAV06123_d

It added: "At this hour, when Washington is tearing up a defense pact because it no longer suits its national interest, there is room for second thoughts...about the US commitment to Israel's existence and security." The cited article was said to quote unnamed Israeli officials Expressing surprise about US policy toward Taiwan in a manner that "raises gloomy thoughts" with respect to the validity of American commitments.[109]

H1. Carter versus Rabin

The Rabin Memoirs note that, under Carter, Israel witnessed "an alarming reversal in American policy". Rabin even notes that the United States was contemplating tacit recognition of the PLO in response to a tacit PLO acceptance of Resolution 242 as implying recognition of Israel's right to exist, without the PLO having to spell it out in as many words. The PLO would be understood by the United States to retain the right to raise the right to raise the Palestinian issue in any way it might choose.[110]

A different confrontation with the US is reported elsewhere in the memoirs. On a visit to the White House under President Carter, the Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill demanded of him: "Why don't you negotiate with the PLO? Why can't we ask you to do what we did? We talked with the Vietcong, not just with the North Vietnamese." Rabin notes that O'Neill "challenged me with a sharp question that almost sounded like an accusation…" Rabin describes his response as follows: "Did the Vietcong refuse to recognize the existence of the United States a call for its annihilation? ... Was their basic program a 'Vietcong Covenant' whereby the United States was to be replaced by a Vietnamese state?"

O'Neill interrogated Rabin: "If that's what we did, as representatives of a great power, why can't you do the same? Why could the French negotiate with the Algerian FLN and conclude an agreement with them…while you are unable to negotiate with the PLO?" Rabin went on: "Did the FLN plan to

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[109]"Intsum 713 - December 18, 1978 London for Glaspite Paris for Nicholas Murphy Other Addresses For Chiefs of Mission." December 19, 1978.

1978STATE318557_d

[110]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* p. 319.

annihilate France? Did the underground organizations in Israel and elsewhere challenge the existence of Great Britain? What basis is there for negotiations with the PLO, whose avowed raison d'etre is to destroy Israel and replace her with a Palestinian state?"[111]

I. Rabin and Peres

Rabin's Memoirs present Rabin's lament that very little of the decisions taken by Israel's cabinet are the Prime Minister's choice because the Prime Minister does not choose his cabinet. The Israeli Prime Minister can only "make do." This is especially so when the cabinet is composed of the Prime Minister's open and sworn adversaries. The irony of Israeli attempts at "peace-making" is that it was always easier to make peace with one's Arab adversary than with one's domestic rivals. Rabin wrote: "The other coalition partners decide who is to represent them in the cabinet, and they are not even bound to consult the prime minister, let alone seek his consent." Indeed, notes Rabin, "a Labour prime minister does not even have a decisive say about the ministers who come from his own party."

There is thus a gulf between grand strategy and "no choice." As Rabin wrote, "I should make it clear that an Israeli prime minister is not free to nominate the ministers of his choice. The question of whether or not he will be capable of working with them – like his opinion of their suitability for certain posts – carries no weight in our form democracy."[112]

Even on the subject of conceding territory for peace, there were significantly different positions among Labour Party leaders about how to go about peace with Israel's neighours. Peres foresaw present Jewish settlements probably remaining in the West Bank, but each canton would have the right to control further immigration "on a quota basis with reciprocal Arab settlement rights in Israel and, in either case, with the canton controlling not only numbers but any further right to acquire land, generally, he seems more disposed simply to find a saleable solution than to preserve Jewish settlement rights.

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[111]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* p. 294-95

[112]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* p. 241

Peres envisaged a close economic union between Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan with free movement of people; in this broader vision, Peres foresaw that the right to settle across cantonal boundaries would not be a problem. The immediate practical effect would be to give the Arabs of Gaza and the West Bank control of further Jewish settlement.[113]

I1. Party Unity

The paradox for Rabin was how to withstand Peres' growing appeal to the general public and to the party's rank and file, coupled with a seemingly easier capability of handling the divides between factions of the party. Rabin, though, was struck with the problem of how to maintain party unity while keeping Mapam on board. Rabin was supportive of public declarations expressing support for far-reaching territorial compromises but worried about putting this language in an official party document. Rabin faced a walkout by hardliners in Labour and the dissatisfaction of Mapam simultaneously. "Verbal pronouncements may not satisfy Mapam, or for that matter, the Dayan-Peres-Ben-Nathan wing of the party."[114]

Rabin's difficulty lay in aesthetics. Rabin possessed the respect of much of the Labour Party, but "often expressed a distaste for grass-roots party work" and "has not brought into positions of leadership any of country's several fresh, attractive figures who are pro-Labour…"[115]

Rabin had only limited success coping with Israel's economic problems of high inflation and huge balance of payments deficits. The one factor benefiting the Labour Party was that too big a share of the Israeli electorate could not accept Likud as an alternative to the Labour Party and felt there was nowhere for them to go if they deserted Labour.[116]

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[113]"The Labor Alignment: A Status Report." Op. Cit. l

[114]"The Labor Alignment: A Status Report." Op. Cit.

[115]"The Labor Alignment: A Status Report." Op. Cit.

[116]"The Labor Alignment: A Status Report." Op. Cit.

I2. The Labour Party in Opposition

Looking back on the 1977 election, Rabin recalled as follows. His decision to move the elections scheduled for autumn 1977 to May 1977 was perceived "variously as a 'brilliant trick' to deprive the newly-formed Democratic Movement for Change of the time it needed to establish itself; a move designed to Peres from picking up support within the Labour Party; and an exploitation of the fact that the Likud was unprepared for an early election campaign."[117] But how did the Labour Party relate to the world after its electoral defeat?

One manifestation of Labour's differences with US policy came to the fore in the prospect of Labour party veteran Abba Eban, Israel's former foreign minister under Prime Minister Golda Meir, and one of the challengers to lead the Labour party in contest against Shimon Peres and Yigal Allon at the close of Rabin's term, going to the US to help the Likud Party cope with American coercive pressure.

One document in Wikileaks suggests that Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met with Abba Eban and, with the seeming approval of Prime Minister Begin, visit the US as part of Israel's informational campaign to the American government and public. Eban seemed open to this suggestion and was consulting Labour Party chairman Shimon Peres and fellow colleagues.[118]

A different document noted that the Labour Party remains disspirited and in disarray after its defeat, with "continuing leadership ambiguities in the long-standing Rabin-Peres-Allon triangle still unresolved." Peres predicted that it would take months to rehabilitate the party. Peres said that Labour would give Begin time to pursue his foreign policy with little overt opposition. Peres suspected that Begin would find the challenge of reconciling his philosophical views with the facts of "international political life today" insurmountable, but that Begin should be given the chance to try. Peres also predicted that serious strains would develop in Begin's coalition but that this too would take time to develop: "Begin and the Likud will have relatively few problems which cannot be readily overcome."

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[117]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* p. 291.

[118]"Eban Proposed as Government Information Emissary to US." July 1, 1977, 1977TELAV04814_c. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977TELAV04814_c.html

The report stated that Peres hoped that Yigael Yadin and the DMC would remain in the opposition, but was reconciled to the likelihood that this probably will not occur. Peres surmised that Yadin would have little success trying to modify Begin's foreign policy and that Dayan's pragmatism and creativity would be employed to work for Begin, not against him. Peres noticed how Begin had moved considerably to moderate his ideological commitments so as to consolidate his position as a national leader, but conceded that his commitment to Israel's claim to the West Bank was unshakeable. Nevertheless, for "total peace" there was a "tiny" chance that Begin could change and concede West Bank territory.[119]

I3. The Labour Party and Israeli Settlements

A Labour Party response to the Begin government's Autonomy Plan was initiated by former Justice Minister Haim Zadok. His committee's paper rebuked the autonomy plan which would, in its view, "lead to the creation of a PLO-dominated Palestinian state."

The Labour Party's autonomy plan as drafted by the Zadok Committee, insisted on full Israeli control of certain "security zones", excluding such area from the autonomy plan from the outset. These would include settlements established by Labour governments during 1967-77 in the Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion and the Southern Gaza Strip. Settlement in these areas would be allowed to continue. The Zadok committee called for the implementation of autonomy in the remainder of the Gaza Strip and West Bank for a transitional period at the end of which Israel would withdraw and, as part of an Israeli-Jordanian

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[119]"Opposition Views of Begin and His Government." July 14, 1977. 1977TELAV05162_c. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1977TELAV05162_c.html

agreement, Israel would withdraw and these areas would become part of a single Jordanian-Palestinian state.

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At the heart of the Zadok Committee Report was the implementation of the Allon Plan, to be achieved by means of a transitional autonomy arrangement. That being so, many details echoed the Ben-Ellisar plan: maintaining IDF deployment in the West Bank to prevent terrorist activity and opposing the introduction of any foreign troops into the area.[120]

K. Beyond the "Reassessment"

The Rabin Memoirs quote the memorandum he received from President Ford warning Israel of the United States' "reassessment": "I wish to express my profound disappointment over Israel's attitude in the course of the negotiations. … I have given instructions for a reassessment of United States policy in the region, including our relations with Israel, with the aim of ensuring that overall American interests...are protected. You will be notified of our decision."

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[120]"Labour Party Struggles with Autonomy." February 20, 1979. 1979TELAV03516_e https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979TELAV03516_e.html

Rabin's response to the "reassessment" was as follows. Rabin comments that if Ford expected "that his letter would have a softening effect on the will of the Israeli cabinet, its threatening tone achieved exactly the opposite." He emphasized the lack of trust between himself and Kissinger, suspecting that Kissinger would blame Israel for the failure of his shuttle mission. Kissinger could not conceal his severe disappointment and suggested that there were misunderstandings between them, primarily about Israel's willingness to undertake a more significant withdrawal in the Sinai. Rabin, though, affirms that "I never intended to leave Kissinger with the impression that Israel would be willing to undertake a far-reaching withdrawal in return for anything less than termination of belligerency."[121]

K1. Israel's Options

One document quoted Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's words at a Labour Party rally for immigrants from Lithuania. Rabin stated that it is "seemingly possible to reach a settlement with the Arabs if we accept their conditions--withdrawal from all the areas conquered during the Six-Day War and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip." But an "agreement to such a solution constitutes the beginning of the state of the Jews." In Rabin's words, a "responsible government cannot conceive of the possibility of agreeing to such a solution or to a similar one." On the other hand, renouncing efforts to attain peace meant that a political stalemate would ensue, leading "with certainty to war." Rabin then stated a third way existed: "No withdrawal to the lines of June 1967, no establishment of a Palestinian state, but a confrontation from a position of strength in the quest for peace, either through negotiations with each one of the Arab states for a sharp transition from a situation of war to a situation of peace or through a transition in stages."[122]

L. Rabin Disdained as Weak

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[121]Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs,* pp. 256-57

[122]"Rabin Speech on Negotiations." September 3, 1974. 1974TELAV05036_b. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974TELAV05036_b.html

From the American standpoint, the weakness of the Rabin government that was revealed in the cabinet's response to his visit reinforced Rabin's cautious preference for buying time and moving slowly. The report implied that the opposition to Rabin was catalyzed by Rabin's appointing Ariel Sharon as his general advisor in June 1975.

The most noteworthy evidence of tensions between the Israeli Labour Party and the US may be seen in the threats against Israel made by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger asked Ford to "hit Rabin hard and very frankly on this subject when you see him." Kissinger disdained Israel on the following grounds. "…[T]o proceed in a measured way toward the common goal of a negotiated settlement with the necessary coordination between us, will require a restraint and mutual confidence that, in all frankness, are not reflected in this current Israeli campaign against us."

Kissinger opposed Rabin harshly. Kissinger gave Rabin a very difficult time. Rabin's Memoirs convey that Rabin said to Kissinger: ""We say a decisive yes to a partial agreement." Kissinger replied: Forgive me for asking, but within what context do we conclude the partial settlement? What is to guarantee Egypt the right -- which it regards as basic and inalienable -- to demand your withdrawal from the whole of Sinai if you insist that it waive its military option while you reject any link between the partial settlement and the overall settlement?"[123]

L1. Egyptian Nonbelligerency

Kissinger was dismissing the importance of Rabin's insistence of Egypt's guarantee of nonbelligerency. Kissinger understood the "trade-off" of Egypt's concession of nonbelligerency to Rabin's concession of "minor" territories in the Sinai back to Egypt. But Rabin's emphasis on nonbelligerency was necessary to build trust between Israel and Egypt in order to underpin securely any

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[123]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs*, p. 206

future Israeli concessions. Moreover, the trauma of the 1973 surprise attack on Israel by Egypt was ignored by Kissinger. Without Rabin's emphasis on nonbelligerency, Israel would have been in peril of a new Egyptian surprise attack should negotiations reach an impasse. Without a request of Egyptian nonbelligerency, no Israeli concession would be trusted as enforcing rather than negating peace.

Kissinger excoriated Rabin: "You talk of a withdrawal of seven to twelve kilometers, and in return to you expect Egypt to agree to nonbelligerency and rely on your goodwill in the hope that someday, many years from now, you might give up a few more kilometers of the Sinai! Is that a serious expectation?" This actually was a serious expectation inasmuch as an Egyptian-Israeli peace process was supposed to be the beginning of a long-term process. Kissinger thought in terms of grand strategy, subordinating Israeli-Egyptian relations to American-Soviet relations. He said to Rabin: "At the highest level, the United States cannot reject Soviet proposals without stating which terms are acceptable." He stressed to Rabin that relations between the superpowers "differ somewhat from relationships in the Middle East." But this was precisely the problem. Motivated by "grand strategy," Kissinger thought in terms of "all-at-once." Rabin did not think in terms of grand strategy. He thought of worst case scenarios and how to avoid them. As Rabin wrote elsewhere in his memoirs: "The 1975 agreement with Egypt was never meant to be an end in itself. As its title implies, it was designed to advance the 'momentum' toward peace and in that sense it has achieved its objective -- no minor accomplishment in Middle Eastern politics. I can only hope that the next achievement along the road will prove to be as durable and successful."[124]

L2. Gradualism

Israeli realities are more attuned to a step-by-step mentality. This owes to the character of fraternity between Israeli leaders who, despite the gulfs and differences between parties, nevertheless see

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[124]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* p. 275

one another as, at the end of the day, "on the same team." Israeli leaders "switch sides" fluidly and easily between cabinets and coalitions with one party and with another, affiliating flexibly. American presidents are time-sensitive due to the limits placed on how much can be achieved with a "ticking clock" winding down on a given president's administration. It is more rare for American politics to see continuities of personnel between administrations, particularly when these administrations are of opposing parties. The fluidity of Israeli politics, characterized by "jumping around" rather than thought-out strategy as such.

Rabin's perspective on peace with Egypt transcended Kissinger's because it foresaw an Egyptian-Israeli relationship which was deeper, broader and more intimate than the solely "tactical" understanding espoused by Rabin's American interlocutors. The strategic approach to peace espoused by Kissinger interfered with the relational approach to peace espoused by Rabin. In Rabin's words: "As for Israel, I am convinced that during the first phase we must devote all our attention to building the fabric of human relations, and there are many pitfalls awaiting us. It would be lethal for us to teach the Egyptians what to do."

Yet even in this broader vision, it is noteworthy how Rabin approached the matter not as a "strategy" or "policy" but as a step-by-step and one-step-at-a-time process. Grand strategy fails to cultivate or appreciate patience. In Rabin's words, "our main objective in the coming years should be to achieve the more subtle but invaluable goal of starting to build confidence, eliminating suspicion, hatred and a misunderstanding of each other's problems. After all, what is the core of peace if not the relations between peoples?" Precisely in this perspective lay the core of the dispute between the United States and Israel.

L3. Broader Vision

Rabin stated in his memoirs: Inasmuch as there was "little chance of Europe's developing as a democratic part of the world after World War II had it not been for the Marshall Plan, without providing

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concrete economic support to Egypt -- and to Israel -- those who preach peace will not be able to prove that their vision is truly valid."

Grand strategy, motivating Kissinger, interfered with people-to-people relations, motivating Rabin. Rabin stated explicitly: "The worst mistake" Israel could make "would be to patronize our neighbours because of advantages in our educational system and technology." In the years ahead, it was imperative, as Rabin saw it, "to focus on getting to know each other by meeting with groups of people of various occupations – farmers, industrialists, doctors, educators, laborers – and learning to appreciate each other's problems."

Subordinating Israeli relations with Egypt to an American-oriented mentality of grand strategy entrapped Israel in a relationship of superficiality with Egypt. Rabin expressed hope that the countries which "coaxed and cajoled the sides at each opportunity -- the United States, Canada and the European nations -- will pay more than just lip service to peace."[125]

Grand strategy clashed with the importance of depth in Israeli-Egyptian relations, as Rabin ultimately envisioned such relations. What mattered even in Israel's relations with the West, no less than with Egypt, was what occurred after, not leading up to, peace. The history of Rabin's period testifies to the value of a conservative mindset seeking to avoid risk and thwart worst-case scenarios was a helpful and responsible approach to Israeli diplomacy in the mid-1970s. Thinking this way can present an alternative to 'grand strategy' deliberations.

Conclusion

In the chapter above I have contemplated parallels and continuities between the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1974-77) and that of Menachem Begin after 1977. It has highlighted "shades of

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[125]Rabin, *Rabin Memoirs,* p. 330-31.

grey" between the Labour Party and the Likud, emphasizing the reality of "Labour hawkishness" and "Labour centrism." It has devoted emphasis to the reality of infighting in the Rabin administration (1974-77) which parallel and foreshadow dissension taking place in the Begin administration. It has also highlighted how American-Israeli clashes were just as severe during the Rabin administration, between the United States and Israel's Labour Party, as during Begin's administration seeing the Likud Party come to power.

An additional theme in this chapter has been the reality of in-fighting and factionalism in the Labour Party. The consequences of this in-fighting are still felt to this day, inasmuch as the Labour Party would not return to power for fully a generation, not until Rabin's re-election in 1992, and inasmuch as problems in uniting Israeli left-wing parties are still occurring in the present election. The consequences of this in-fighting in the 1970s were: firstly, a failure to coordinate among fellow left-wing partisans leading to failures of implementation and to a psychology of self-sabotage; secondly, a failure to collaborate with Israeli-Arab parties, such as Mapam (and the scarcely-mentioned Arab parties), leading to difficulties in obtaining "back-up" for policy proposals of common concern; and thirdly, a disdaining of the Labour Party's image in the eyes of the public. The evidence in the chapter at hand has been culled from revelations about this phase in Israeli history available in the "Wikileaks" revelations. In this sense, the chapter at hand represents a continuity from the previous chapter.

Rabin's foreign policy was just as "passive" and "reactive" as Begin's first term; there were "shades of grey" in Rabin's and Begin's approaches to peace negotiations whereby Begin picked up where Rabin left off. In both these administrations, Israeli-Middle Eastern and Israeli-American relations were too delicate to espouse anything other than a "wait and see" approach to external relations; indeed, the realities of dissension in the Israeli Prime Minister's cabinet suggest that the history of Israeli foreign policy during the mid-1970s is better characterized by a "no-news-is-good-news" mentality than by the existence of any kind of grand strategy. Yet to the extent that this is and was so, the history of Israeli foreign policy can teach valuable lessons to popular American theorizations of 'grand strategy'. Especially under the Rabin years (1974-1977), there is much to recommend for a foreign policy posture

recommending nothing more than "stay out of trouble." Rabin was arguably the only Israeli Prime Minister who, by temperament, was not an "aggressive extrovert." Instead of "grand strategy," Rabin pursued *quiet*.

Chapter 4. "Information and Bureaucracy: Intelligence, Epistemology and the Sabra-and-Shatila Massacre."

Introduction.

What can grand strategy theory learn from the history and theory of *intelligence* in Israeli foreign policy?

Inasmuch as the theory and history of Israeli foreign policy, especially after the 1973 war, emphasizes *asymmetrical warfare* against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the vicissitudes of counter-terrorism, what is central to both is *intelligence*. It is unclear what grand strategy theory adds to the study of intelligence inasmuch as the two bodies of scholarship are asking questions that are, in many ways, "apples and oranges." The study of grand strategy is focused on questions of *prioritization*; the

study of intelligence is focused on questions of *information processing*. The study of grand strategy is focused on questions of *planning*; the study of intelligence is focused on questions of *knowing*. The study of grand strategy is focused on questions of *goal-setting*; the study of intelligence is focused on questions of *how, whether and if we know what we think we know*. The questions posed by intelligence analysis theory are closer to those posed by the Kahan Commission Report in engaging with the Sabra-and-Shatila massacre which took place during the Lebanon invasion which was undertaken in 1982.

This chapter will contextualize the Sabra-and-Shatila Massacre of 1983 as an intelligence failure alongside other intelligence failures in Israeli history. It will rely on a reading of the Kahan Commission Report which investigated the massacre. This reading of the report will be prefaced by a discussion of theoretical and epistemological aspects of intelligence analysis. The central problem of the Sabra-and-Shatila massacre was not one of "grand strategy." Rather, it was one of information processing. Reading the Kahan Report in light of the history and theory of intelligence in Israeli history and in general scholarship on international relations will suggest that the central problem addressed by the Report is one of *knowing*, rather than planning.

Between Grand Strategy and Consistent Underestimation

It is reasonable to suggest that the significance of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon is that Israel *should* have a grand strategy. This line of reasoning might draw lessons from the role of "groupthink" in Israel's cabinet which contained a monochromatic alignment of views among personnel, in contrast with the first Begin government which was a cacophony of dovish- and hawkish-leaning voices. It might also draw lessons from the way in which powerful ministers in the cabinet "strong-armed" the cabinet and the country into a conflict that a more prudent and reasoned contemplation of consequences and alternatives might have prevented; from this point of view, one can interpret the lesson of the war as suggesting that a "grand strategy" could have prevented the tragedy. What I hope to suggest below is a different way of deriving significance from the war for the question of grand strategy. Inasmuch as "Operation Peace for

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Galilee" involved a set of assumptions and goals integrated into a coherent "strategy" known as the "Big Plan," it might be understood to be one of the rare occasions when Israel attempted to act according to a "grand strategy." But what actually transpired was that *everything fell apart* due to *cognitive overwhelm*. If this was the case in a "small-scale" attempt to initiate a grand strategy, how much more so could this be the case on a larger scale, whether a regional scale, a trans-regional scale or a global scale.

Arguably the most important work on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to emerge from the time of the conflict is that of Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*.[126] One review published in 1988 states of it: "Thus far, *Israel's Lebanon War*, by Schiff and Ya'ari, remains the best overall presentation of that unfortunate episode. Coming from two outstanding Israeli reporters whose dedication to Israel is beyond doubt, the book is a devastatingly effective indictment of the Israeli operation in Lebanon."[127]

The book emphasizes that the central problem faced by Begin's cabinet was *consistent underestimation*. If this was the case with the programme known as the "big plan," Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's "grand design," how much more so is this likely to be the case if a larger "grand strategy" encompassing not just one theatre but many theatres of Israeli foreign relations were to be implemented. I review its core insights below for two reasons. Firstly, for the purpose of offering the reader a brief summary of the events of the war in order to contextualize what follows. Secondly, the book underscores a significant point I am trying to make in the chapters at hand. From vantage point, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon can be construed to be a consequence of Israel's "Alliance of the Periphery" approach to the conduct of its foreign policy since 1948; this covert alignment linked Israel with Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia and the Maronite Christians of Lebanon. While quiet collaboration persisted in these relations, it is possible to suggest that the "Periphery Doctrine" *was* an Israeli grand strategy during the Cold War.

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[126]Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*. London: Touchstone, 1985

[127]Raphael Danziger, "Four Writers Look at Israel." *Judaism* 37:1 (1988), pp. 111-20

Schiff and Yaari's depiction of the war, however, highlight the gross miscoordinations between Israel and the Maronites, highlighting the limits of thinking of the "Alliance of the Periphery" as being more than a series of covert intelligence cooperation arrangements. Furthermore, the interplay between the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the history of the "Alliance of the Periphery" suggests themes that can be seen in other episodes in this relationship; for example, Iran's pulling back from coordinating assistance, with Israel, to the Iraqi Kurds in 1975 in order to pave the way for its own signing of the "Algiers Accord" with Iraq, alienating Israel in the process; Turkey's, Ethiopia's and Iran's regular voting against Israel in the United Nations; and the absence of any member of this grouping assisting Israel during its fatal hour in the 1973 Yom Kippur War; these relationships suggest that *these countries received more from Israel than they reciprocated*; hence, as Israel would learn in the invasion of Lebanon, the "Alliance of the Periphery" as rooted less in grand strategy than in a certain "psychology of naivete" on Israel's part.

The book by Schiff and Yaari emphasizes that the central problem faced by Begin's cabinet was *consistent underestimation*. If this was the case with the programme known as the "big plan," Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's "grand design," how much more so is this likely to be the case if a larger "grand strategy" encompassing not just one theatre but many theatres of Israeli foreign relations were to be implemented. It can be inferred from the history of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that Israel's Defense Minister tried to act according to something that could be seen as a "grand strategy"; yet it was impossible to carry out because it involved, literally and figuratively, undertaking initiatives in and on other people's territory, namely, those actors in Lebanon's brutal civil war that were not the PLO but that made Israel's aims unimplementable when it was in a position of authority. If the problem of *consistent underestimation* played out on Israel's northern border, *in one country*, one which Israel arguably had penetrated covertly better than any other in the Middle East, in this conflict, how much more so could the problem of *consistent underestimation* play out if it tried to coordinate activities and initiatives in countries as far away as Yemen, Iraq and Iran, today, let alone coordination with countries outside the Middle East region which are actively interacting with it today.

The first manifestation of *consistent underestimation* manifest in the Israeli Lebanon war was the pervasive problem of *impossible choices*, especially as groups came under Israeli dominion who had ambitions of their own that Israel was at a loss as to how to handle. For example, Schiff and Yaari describe how, in the months after the Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement, "the tangled skein of alliances and rivalries in Lebanon often seemed to verge on the ludicrous, particularly when some of Syria's allies in the anti-Gemayel coalition sought to line up new backers to protect them from Assad's bear hug." They add that the Lebanese Druze were willing to forgive Israel for its betrayal and offer it security against a revitalized PLO in exchange for Israel supporting the creation of a Druze canton in the Shouf and a modicum of independence from Syria. Arafat, who was cornered by the rebellion against him in Fatah, oddly discovered new allies in the Phalange, "who were only too happy to supply weapons and Israeli ammunition to his last stronghold in Tripoli, now that he dared to defy Damascus." In their observation, Israel and the United States, "like latter-day 'innocents abroad,' were left to manage as best they could."

Schiff and Yaari stress that *Israel was played*. Torn between choosing between an alliance with Israel which would bring forth his demise and the distance toward Israel maintained by his brother, Bashir [Gemayel] "lured the Israelis into Lebanon, left them in the lurch on the battlefield, and then made short shrift of his promise to reward them for their pains by concluding a peace treaty."[128] Resultingly, Israel fell prey to a string of "unanticipated setbacks: the tarnishing of its image in world public opinion; unprecedented friction between many Jewish communities in the West and the Israel they perceived during the months of fighting; and yet another oppressive burden on the anemic Israeli economy." By the time Israel began to extricate itself from the quagmire, the rest of Lebanon was plunged into a new round of civil war, pitting Amin Gemayel's regime against the Druze and Shiite forces, entities that Israel never entered Lebanon intending to confront. In Schiff and Yaari's words in the book's closing paragraphs: "Of Ariel Sharon's grand design nothing remains."

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[128]Schiff and Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 307-8.

The second manifestation of *consistent underestimation* expressed itself in the aspiration to *have it both ways* in choices that were absolutely irreconcilable. The IDF was unable to handle Druze-Maronite relations. The fear of the Druze to be overwhelmed by Maronite hegemony which would lead to their probable defeat triggered the Druze to send out feelers to Israel for mutual talks with the IDF. Jumblatt simultaneously sent emissaries to Yasser Arafat and the Syrians, while also holding a series of secret talks with a senior IDF figure. On Jumblatt's initiative they delved into questions of a possible political accommodation. His argument was that Israel should be interested in bolstering his forces because the Druze were determined to keep the PLO from stealing back into the Shouf mountain region.

Jumblatt even sent envoys to Israel a number of times, and through the mediation of local Druze they put forward some far-reaching proposals about covert Israeli aid for Druze autonomy in Lebanon in return for cooperation in keeping the PLO out of the Shouf, thus enabling friendly territorial contiguity for Israel between Beirut and South Lebanon. However, the Israeli cabinet opposed this. It hesitated to make contradictory commitments to both the Druze and the Maronites, and decided to maintain a position of ostensible neutrality. As a result, Israel stimulated the opposition and alienation of both. It wrought upon itself the resentment of the Phalangists, who were frightened about Israel cutting a deal behind their backs, as well as the hostility of the Druze, who construed Jerusalem's hesitance as a sign of continued support for their adversaries. By trying to "have it both ways," maintaining mutual relationships with everybody, "Israel seemed to be going out of its way to maintain the traditional balance of enmities."[129]

In the aftermath of the Druze-Maronite hostilities, the Phalangist command held a population census which showed that only 30 percent of the inhabitants were Christian, "but kept the results from the Israelis… Not in their worst nightmares did the Israelis imagine such a statistic. Had they bothered to investigate the actual demographic composition of Lebanon themselves before embarking on their military venture, they probably would have been more circumspect about backing the cause of Maronite hegemony."[130] The anticipation of a strong central government that would engineer a reconciliation

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[129]Schiff and Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 244-5

[130]Schiff and Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 304-5

between the communities under the leadership of the Maronites "was a mirage that drew the Israeli army deep into Lebanon and then vanished in a wink once it was too late to turn back."

The third manifestation of *consistent underestimation* that occurred in the Lebanon War according to Schiff and Yaari occurred by way of *unanticipated setbacks.* The intervention in Lebanon was grounded, in their presentation of it, on questionable logic. "All too quickly it emerged that [Sharon] had badly misjudged the conditions of the arena in which he had chosen to fight." The programme for Israeli involvement was founded on the following proposed goals: eliminating the PLO as an independent political factor; neutralizing the Syrian threat to Israel; installing an allied regime to Israel under Maronite rule; improving relations with the United States by virtue of the anti-Soviet character of the campaign. It was imagined that invading Lebanon successfully would cement Israeli leadership in the region while cementing its hold on the territories conquered in 1967. Schiff and Yaari refer to Sharon as "a naive romantic" because his initiative "was doomed from the start in its failure to appreciate the vehemence of the internal strife in Lebanon. That Bashir Gemayel would be able to impose a strong Christian regime on the country within weeks if only the IDF paved his way to the presidency was an outlandish assumption."[131] Moreover, the assumptions on which the plans were based were based on failures to anticipate the resolve and perseverance of the PLO and to predict the determined response by Syria to Israel's invasion.

Schiff and Yaari stress that the morale of the IDF was also misjudged. "The cumulative effect of the drive toward the Beirut-Damascus highway, the assault on the Syrian army, the 'creeping ceasefire,' and the plan to storm West Beirut, capped by the affront of being stationed around Sabra and Shatilla when the Phalangists went in to do their execrable deeds, left deep cracks in the army's belief in its leaders and the justice of its cause."[132]

The lesson of this episode in the history of Israeli foreign policy both for the study of grand strategy and for the theory of international relations is as follows. Usually, we presume that the central

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[131]Schiff and Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 304-5

[132]Schiff and Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 304-5

problem of world politics is that of *war*. What we learn from the episode described above is that, in the Lebanon War, the problem was that of *control*. *Control itself* was the pathology that brought about and ruined the Lebanon intervention for Israel. The impossibility and unimplementability of *planning* made *control* the tragic psychology of the war. Studying international relations from the perspective of *control* would yield new perspectives from history. Grand strategy holds that planning is the "solution." The history of the Lebanon war suggests that planning was the *problem*. There is a healthy middle ground: *caution*. This is where the divergent perspectives of grand strategy theory and Israeli history can coalesce. In Schiff and Yaari's words: "Perhaps a misguided war is a stage that every nation goes through on its way to political maturity. If so, Israel has come out of its adolescence considerably sadder but wiser about the limits of what force can achieve and the illusions that power can breed."[133] While scholars often examine the tragic consequences of war and terrorism in the Middle East and in Israeli history, the Lebanon War suggests that the tragic consequences of *manipulation* are no less important.

Between Grand Strategy and Intelligence

An emphasis on grand strategy and geopolitical reasoning infuses both Israeli and American writing on the history of Israeli foreign policy.

Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv write thusly about the conflict in Lebanon: "The Americans sank deeper into the Lebanese quagmire, becoming the targets of Shiite Muslim terrorism—for which they blamed Iran and Syria. The US Embassy and the US Marines' base in Beirut were both destroyed by a terrifying Shiite weapon, suicide bombers. When [George] Shultz tried to hammer out a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon, Syria sabotaged his efforts. Months of intensive negotiations went down the

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[133]Schiff and Yaari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, pp. 307-8.

drain. Shultz became disgusted with Syria, hastening his shift from even-handedness to firm friendship with Israel."[134]

From a different vantage point, Cold War historian Raymond Garthoff narrates the war in Lebanon as simply one theatre in a litany of pro-American versus pro-Soviet confrontations where the Soviet Union, in Garthoff's perspective, acted with restraint. Listing the confrontation between Cuba and South Africa in Angola, between Somalia and Ethiopia in Ogaden and the Pakistani role in arming Afghan insurgents against the Soviet Union, Garthoff notes the Israeli confrontation with Syria in Lebanon as follows: "Nor did the Soviets use their forces in Syria to prevent the Israeli defeats of Syrian forces in Lebanon. … The question is not one of who was right or wrong in any given instance, or whether particular actions by either side were justified, or whether they were wise (a separate question). There *is* a record of use of force by both powers that helps illuminate the circumstances under which, and the ways in which, each uses or chooses not to use military force."[135]

Andrew Bacevich interprets the history of American-Middle Eastern relations since the late 1970s as the spillover effect of Carter's misguided assertion of hegemony over the region to an extent unprecedented in previous American diplomatic history; the United States should, in his perspective, withdraw and disengage not only militarily and politically from the Middle East but also psychologically from the mentality that American preferences should guide and shape Middle Eastern life.[136]

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[134]Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Friends in Deed: Inside the US-Israel Alliance*. New York: Hyperion, 1994, p. 223.

[135]Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1985, pp. 678-79

[136]Andrew Bacevich, *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History*. New York: Random House, 2016, p. 22. "On July 3, 1979, the very day that the president departed for the ten-day retreat at Camp David that culminated with his 'malaise' speech, he signed off on a memo committing the United States to assist Afghan insurgents who were warring against the Soviet-supported regime in Kabul. The amount involved was small—initially, only five hundred thousand dollars. Material provided would be primarily 'non-lethal'—medical supplies and communications equipment, for example—with a few creates of obsolete British rifles thrown in for good measure. But the scope of the initial investment belied the magnitude of the mayhem the United States was seeking to promote."

Without negating these pieces of history writing, perspectives on regional history such as those presented here, which are grounded in grand strategy, are not sufficiently attuned to questions of epistemology.

Intelligence Agencies in the Lebanon War.

Walid Phares characterized the Lebanese Civil War, during the years 1975-90, as marked by "the interaction among dozens of services, hundreds of units and thousands of intelligence activities struggling in all possible directions" in a "giant puzzle." Connections, friendships and collaborations shifted frequently, as exemplified by the role of Turkish intelligence, a NATO member, which collaborated with Western intelligence against pro-Soviet Armenian factions and with Syria against pro-Western Armenian factions. Small intelligence services often misled and manipulated their allies, as the Lebanese Forces often did to their Israeli ally; in other cases, covert action and secret terrorist action would be indistinguishably intertwined. Sometimes small local services acted independently as "uncontrollable miniservices" who operated from the Syrian-occupied zone, "thus adding more complications to the confrontation in Lebanon." As a result, the Lebanese Civil War was understood differently in the eyes of Western and Middle Eastern conceptions.

As Phares put it: "While the Western conception, and the American practice in particular, is still restrained by the political systems and scale of values back home, the radical Middle Eastern perception and conception of covert action surpassed all Western expectations. On the one hand, a covert action initiated by Western allies found its maximum limit in training local military groups to locate and arrest radical activities in order to bring them to a court of justice. On the other hand, radical organizations, and even governments, were sponsoring civilian massacres or hostage taking with no limits nor moral

principles. 'Covert action' as a maximal possibility in the American and Western mind, is now facing 'terrorist action,' a regular behavior in the radical and fundamentalist currents of the Arab world."[137]

Phares helpfully breaks down the Lebanese Civil War into the following major "sub-conflicts." Christians vs. Palestinians and Muslims, 1975-82; Syrians vs. Palestinians, 1976-84; Syrians vs. Christians, 1978-1990; Israelis vs. Palestinians and Syrians, 1978-1982; Muslims vs. Muslims, 1985-87; Christians vs. Christians 1989-90. He also breaks down the competing goals of the various actors and interests in the Lebanese Civil War as follows. Syria: *Hegemony in Lebanon, military balance with Israel.* Israel: *Confront the PLO, contain Syria, peace agreement with Lebanon*. Iran: *Support the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon;* PLO: *Support the establishment a pro-PLO government in Beirut;* USSR: *Counter US influence in Lebanon*; USSR: *Counter US influence in Lebanon;* US: Free hostages, maintain US influence, establish equilibrium between Syria and Israel, contain terrorism and Soviet influence, uphold the independence of Lebanon; Muslims: *Create an independent, Muslim-ruled, pro-Arab state*; Christians; maintain and independent, pro-Western state.

Phares adds that the "move of one foreign intelligence structure into Lebanon pushed an opponent to counter. In a few years, Lebanon became the 'megalopolis' of the world's intelligence services. The emrgence of terrorist activities directed against the West from Lebanese territories created an additional incentive for involvement. This 'Mytho-Terrorism,' which was highly publicized by a vast literature worldwide, found a favorable terrain in Beirut's intelligence labyrinth."

Thus, there were also "second-class" intelligence services: the Iraqis, the Egyptians, the Saudis, trying to prevent Lebanon being used for anti-Saudi subversion,, the British, in support of US interests; the West Germans, to deter the plans of German terrorist organizations; the Eastern European services, until 1989, to assist the KGB; and the Turks, to defeat the Armenian nationalist movement. France's intelligence services were also present and active in collaboration with the Lebanese Intelligence Service

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[137]Walid Phares, "The Intelligence Services in Lebanon During the War of 1975-90." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 7:3 (1994), pp. 363-81

(LIS). Its purposes were to help the LIS and the Christian militias' operatives, to prevent anti-French terrorism originating from Lebanese territory, and to suppress the leftist militia *Factions Armees Revolutionaires* (FARL). Syria's intelligence services pursued the following objectives: supporting the Syrian occupation of Lebanon; the traditional collection of intelligence on Israel and the Western apparatus; and the management of its local and global terrorist strategy.

The KGB in Lebanon worked with Syrian and Palestinian services and the mini-services of Lebanese leftist groups. It gathered intelligence on Western and Israeli military installations, both in and around Lebanon. As Phares explains, "Moscow's interest in Lebanon was the extension of its broader Third World strategy of 'disrupting non-communist societies' and bringing a pro-Soviet government to power."

Part A: Theoretical Aspects of Intelligence Failure and Intelligence Analysis.

Grand strategy negates A) the unique rule of individual leaders and the "small-scale" relationships, public and private, between them; B) the role of *epistemology* in the intelligence process; and C) the impact of its initiatives and programmes on civilians, soldiers and ordinary people. In interpreting history, an exclusive focus on grand strategy overlooks what can be learned from the human story. Exclusive emphasis on geopolitics and great power politics overlooks the many ways that information processing and the (mis)communication and (mis)interpretation of truth play in actively learning lessons about the past relevant to assumptions about the future and present.

A broader bureaucratic and interpersonal perspective can illuminate the conventional wisdom about the war in new ways. When we broaden our perspective from the interactions between states to the interactions of individuals, we can derive a deeper perspective that is not appreciated by either realist, institutionalist or constructivist thought: an emphasis not on strategy but on human conduct. Though strategic thought and geopolitical reasoning are indeed central causal factors in understanding contemporary Israeli history, a fuller understanding of this history must also understand the limits of such

thinking. I attempt to highlight this in what follows by contemplating modestly some theoretical aspects of intelligence analysis.

According to Ohad Leslau, for example, the most important "tragic hero" of the Lebanon War was the head of AMAN, General Yehoshua Saguy. The intelligence assessment he provided discouraging against the Lebanon War suffered from the weakened *prestige* of AMAN which increased the cabinet's ability and willingness to disregard AMAN's opinion. Begin's second coalition consisted of so many people who thought alike such that the decision-making process "became closed to contrary information, and suffered from syndromes associated with Groupthink." In this atmosphere, Saguy's assessments were mostly demurred. In these circumstances, Saguy gave in to the majority. Saguy, in consequence, kept to himself the intelligence assessment warning that the Christian Phalangists decided to enter west Beirut. This information not shared, his "acquiescence had dreadful consequences for him personally and for Israel."

In April 1981, Israel attacked Syrian helicopters in order to assist the Christians during a battle in the town of Zahle. After the incident, Saguy claimed that Israel should not trust the Christians. He stated that the Christians perceived their future aligned with the Arab world and not in alliance with Israel. He repeated this argument in January 1982, when, during a secret visit to Beirut, he stressed that the Phalangists could not be relied upon. In April 1982, moreover, Saguy warned Begin that Israel should not trust the Phalange's promises because Bashir Gemayel perceived Syria, not Israel, as his optimal ally. Saguy, furthermore, remained silent in cabinet meetings regarding his assessments regarding the damage to US-Israel relations likely due to come from the war, the likely involvement of Syrian troops in Lebanon, and the likely failure of the Christians to fulfill their obligations.

As Leslau stresses: "What is the ideal type of the intelligence officer? A key factor is how he behaves when he knows that his opinion disagrees with the decisionmaker's preferences. If he persists in putting forward his unwelcome assessment, as Saguy eventually did, he might thereby relinquish any

chance of influencing the decisionmaking process in the future. But an intelligence officer who yields to pressure and fails to insist upon presenting his true professional assessment is in breach of his duty."[138]

A1. Creative Imagination and Critical Thinking

The Israeli scholar of intelligence Isaac Ben-Israel, in his exposition on the process of information processing in interpreting intelligence, challenges the presumption that intelligence analysis unfolds according to objective epistemological standards and processes. "One thing is clear: the estimator must have a *creative imagination.* Otherwise, he will fail right at the beginning - in the starting phase of creating possible hypotheses. He must also have a *critical mind.* In fact, he must spend most of his time criticizing his (and his colleagues') theories. Such criticism should be based on actively gathered information." In other words, "*'To estimate' is, generally, 'to falsify competing hypotheses'.* And the way to do this is to direct the gathering agencies toward potentially refuting observational information." Ben-Israel comments: "We all know about being wise after the event. The natural response of someone whose mistake is pointed out is: 'well, it seems simple now; but then, under pressure of events, with thousands of reports passing through our hands, things did not look simple at all'. … By searching for refutation instead of verification we can fish the truly relevant reports out of the huge sea of information, *before* the error of estimate becomes evident."

The differences between intelligence analysis and "objective science" are, in Ben-Israel's eyes, the following. Firstly, science unfolds in an *open society,* in which "relevant information is freely available and hypothesis can be freely refuted is a necessary precondition for the success of the scientific method." Intelligence analysis, by contrast, unfold in a "pure instance of a closed society."

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[138]Ohad Leslau, "The Effect of Intelligence on the Decisionmaking Process." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 23:3 (2010), pp. 426-48

Unlike science, which unfolds by an active researcher examining a passive partner, in intelligence analysis, there are "at least *two active* partners." Resultingly, in intelligence estimate, "even macro-problems suffer from the effect of the 'measurement' (that is, gathering information) on its measured subject (the behaviour of the enemy). Intelligence research must, therefore, explicitly take into account, as in quantum mechanics, the fact that its actions (gathering information, alerting forces, etc.) can cause changes in enemy behaviour." As Ben-Israel adds: "An over-stubborn estimator, more interested in defending his estimate than testing it by searching for refutations, will always be able to do this. He will simply reject falsifying reports on the grounds that they are unreliable and may be wrong. Only extreme honesty and a readiness to falsify his own estimates can 'save' the estimator from such a mistake."[139]

A2. Limited Information

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[139]Isaac Ben-Israel, "Philosophy and Methodology of Intelligence: The Logic of Estimate Process." *Intelligence and National Security* 4:4 (1989), pp. 660-718. Ben-Israel adds that intelligence should be exposed to the general public, or at least to selected representatives of the public to

create a 'micro-climate' of an open society *within the community*. Secondly, intelligence is *usable* in nature; it is for the use of decision-makers. Thus, intelligence is "more akin to technology and engineering than to theoretical science. It should be clear, however, that it is still a very primitive technology. We scarcely have a *tested* theory suited to safe engineering application… Like technology development in unknown scientific fields, intelligence estimate should be carried out piecemeal, controlled by suitable detectors of deviations from prediction, and avoiding the trap of estimates that are too large-scale and too long-term." Like physics, intelligence forces one to make use of *approximations*. However, because the adversary is *human*, it is necessary to remember that "the rationality referred to must be 'his' rationality, not 'ours'. In other words, we must assume our enemy wants to achieve *his* aims, in the best way *he* conceives." By extension, focus should be placed on understanding "the actions and behaviour of relevant individuals. This can be done by trying to understand their aims, relationships, abilities, methods of operation, etc. Attempting to understand 'essence' is futile.

Amos Kovacs, another Israeli scholar of intelligence, emphasizes that it is more accurate to speak pluralistically of intelligence analys*es*, of different kinds of intelligence interpretation that occur simultaneously. From the vantage point of scholarly research, it is often hard to differentiate between them when analyzing historical situations. In the organizational context of government intelligence, Kovacs notes how imperfect information reaches the table of decision-makers: "One is left with insufficient evidence: with collections of official documents and memos that show only a small part of the picture and reveal almost nothing about the mental processes; with memoirs which are notoriously self-serving and inaccurate; and with trying to extract the truth from the fading and subjective memories of the protagonists." Moreover, there are wholly different kinds of intelligence collection modes: "The sentry high up in his tower surveying all his surroundings; the spy satellite taking pictures of vast swathes of land or monitoring huge volumes of telecommunications traffic; the military attaches and heads of station sending in endless bits of information and gossip. Then, there is contingency collection, collecting basic intelligence and compiling databases, country studies, bombing encyclopedias."

Furthermore, sometimes intelligence is interpreted in different ways by decision-makers: sometimes it is used simply as background information. "Decision-makers consume intelligence in background mode because they intuit that it may serve them in the future or because the acquisition and the possession of information, even when this information is not directly relevant to specific needs, is also a symbol, prerequisite and instrument of power." Adds Kovacs: "This is especially true when the information is highly classified and access to it is limited. …Even when doing post-facto analysis it is almost impossible to determine which pieces of intelligence consumed in this mode influenced which seemingly unrelated future decisions and in what way."[140]

Kovacs lists five criteria for measuring usefulness in intelligence analysis. One, causing a commander or decision-maker to change a previously-chosen course of action; two, enabling a different, hopefully 'better', execution of a chosen policy or course of action; three, playing a pivotal role in the

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[140]Amos Kovacs, "Using Intelligence." *Intelligence and National Security* 12:4 (1997), pp. 145-64

decision-making process, such that had this intelligence not been available, a different decision would have been reached; four, forcing the adversary to change or modify the execution of his policy or course of action; five, enhancing the effects of our own chosen policy or diminishing adverse effects of the enemy's actions. Kovacs laments the "state of affairs in which the intelligence professional and the end-user belong to different professional cultures, perform in different spheres and have different goals." Since intelligence is "not an end unto itself, the intended use of the intelligence should be a guiding principle in all stages of intelligence work. When this is not so, we end up with intelligence agencies producing intelligence for other agencies or for the sake of intelligence. They go through collecting, evaluating, analyzing, writing reports and shipping them out—scarcely knowing nor caring about who reads them and to what purpose."

A3. The Importance of Deliberation and Discussion

One journal article to treat the Sabra and Shatila Massacre as an intelligence failure is that of Shlomo Gazit, who was Director of Military Intelligence during the Yom Kippur War. In recounting what happened in the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Gazit points out the following problems in communication among Israel's decision-makers. "One can understand the urgency for such a decision, which did not allow convening a regular cabinet meeting first. It was imperative that the forces move in before daylight and before Christian fanatics had time to initiate indiscriminate atrocities against Muslims and Palestinians. Indeed, between 10 p.m., when Bashir's death was recognized, to 3 a.m. when the IDF were already entering west Beirut, it was practically impossible to spend the 3 —4 hours necessary for convening a meeting and reaching a decision." However, the decision was taken between many telephone conversations between the Chief of Staff, the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister, without the Foreign Minister, Director of Military Intelligence and head of the Mossad. "It should have been quite easy to have the above six in one place, for the duration of the crisis." Had there been a special Command

Post set up with all the decision-makers present, those would have enabled "complete coordination between the main concerned parties of the cabinet."

Gazit posits the following lesson from Operation Peace for Galilee. "A decision taken at the scene of the fighting is very often biased because of the immediate and emotional impact of the sounds and sights of the battle-scene, not allowing a careful and comprehensive consideration of all the factors before the decision." Had the decision to let the Phalange enter the Sabra and Shatila camp been analyzed formally, it is "fairly obvious that both the DMI [Director of Military Intelligence] and the Mossad would have raised their strong reservations, warning against the unavoidable atrocities which would be committed by the Christian militias. The Israeli decision would probably have been a different one." Thus, "Israel's real problem during that crisis was just that for a variety of reasons, affecting the existing relations between the top decision-makers and the heads of their intelligence services, circumstances in 1982 made it impossible for the Israeli cabinet to have a balanced discussion and consideration before its decisions. We all know today the unfortunate consequences."

Ideally, notes Gazit, the personal representation of the Foreign Minister should have been present. To be sure, the Foreign Minister (Yitzhak Shamir) was neither updated nor consulted, and Israel's decision to enter West Beirut was not discussed with Washington; the Director of Military Intelligence did not participate in the discussions and his opinion was neither asked nor heard in regard to the strategic and political ramifications of an Israeli entry; and the head of the Mossad was not consulted despite its being in charge of Israel's liaison with the military and political leadership in Lebanon. As Gazit observes, "one should have asked Mossad to report on Christian reactions following the assassination, as well as to their possible intentions and plans for revenge." There is no record of the many telephone conversations which took place that night. Such records would serve the purpose of being a reference to whoever needs to know the decision, and one may ask for thee written record without bothering the decisionmakers, and

of defining in clear and precise terms the decision reached and what was discussed. "We all know how many conversations end up with each party having a different version of the discussion."[141]

A4. Different Lenses on the Israeli-Arab Conflict

The significance of understanding intelligence in a pluralistic lens is discernable in the very different ways that American and Israeli decision-makers "read" a given situation in the Middle East. As Gideon Doron points out, an American worldview, wherein grand strategy theory originates, perceives the conflict in the Middle East between Jews and Arabs as an international problem which should be solved by reliable international means, such as by redrawing the international borders between Israel and its adversaries. Israel, in turn, thinking through a lens of "localism," perceives two separate conflicts which are often elsewhere perceived as mutually exclusive: Israel's rivalry with Arab states, seen in an international lens, being one, and Israel's conflict with the Palestinians as another, seen in an *intracommunal* lens. Gaza and the West Bank are seen "by the Israelis to be part of their own lands, while the Americans consider them as occupied. Political debate in Israel over the future of the territories, especially when politicians of the two major political parties are involved, is frequently over tactics and timing and not over the ever-present ambition to continue holding all or most of these territories. Therefore, Israel's position of negotiating with the Arabs while refusing to surrender the West Bank territories, though strange and contradictory to the Americans, is regarded as perfectly logical to most Israeli decisionmakers."

Similarly, there are different simultaneous understandings of "normal." From one perspective, evaluators, data collectors and field officers engage in "normal" intelligence work; through this lens, "certain intelligence activities may be considered by outsiders as perfectly 'abnormal,' 'irrational,' and, of course, morally and legally unacceptable; yet in light of its objective — to maximize national security —

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[141]Shlomo Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker." *Intelligence and National Security* 3:3 (1988), pp. 261-87

they should be considered as rational. It is therefore rational, pending an implicit or explicit outcome of a costs and benefits calculation, to lie, bribe, kidnap, kill, and perform other types of activities which may be unacceptable by general and universal public standards. In the area of intelligence, such means are often permitted, so long as they are perceived as enhancing the 'public interest,' are directed against 'others' (those outside of the definition of the national community), and can be publicly overseen through some prearranged mechanism." Many intelligence failures, therefore, "are generated by asymmetric shifts in the national interests and priorities of one nation vis-à-vis those of others in the international and regional system." These changes "are conducive to the creation of a political imbalance and result in a mutual misperception and misinterpretation of new realities."[142]

B. Broader Theoretical Aspects of Intelligence Analysis

In the next section of the chapter, the reader is invited to contemplate the Sabra-and-Shatila massacre as an intelligence failure in light of other intelligence failures in Israeli history. The significance of these perspectives is to broaden one's understanding of intelligence failures in general and thus to contextualize the Kahan Report in their light.

B1. Understanding Intelligence Failure: The Yom Kippur War

According to Yigal Sheffy, the calamity of the 1973 Yom Kippur War for Israel was caused by Egypt overcoming its objective weakness after the 1967 Six-Day War by adopting deception as a means

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[142]Gideon Doron, "The Vagaries of Intelligence Sharing: The Political Imbalance." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 6:2 (1993), pp. 135-46

to counter its victorious neighbour. Sheffy defines deception as follows. In his words, deception is a consciously initiated process through which "the initiator transmits false information or impressions to the victim, causing him (or her) to adopt or adhere to an erroneous opinion or belief and to consequently construct an unrealistic picture of the prevailing situation."

The central problem of the 1973 intelligence failure vis-a-vis Egypt on Israel's was epistemological. Does Israel evaluate its adversaries according to their "capabilities, readiness and preparedness," or according to their "intentions and decisions"? Israel evaluated its sitation vis-a-vis its neighbours after 1967 according to the paradigm known as "the concept." Israel's understanding of "The Concept" stipulated as follows. A) Egypt and Syria are preparing for an open war to regain the territories they lost during the Six-Day War. B) Egypt is interested in recapturing western Sinai whereas Egypt wished to re-occupy the Golan Heights; C) Syria is not prepared to go to war without Egypt, while the latter, on its part, will refrain from initiating hostilities because of Israel's air superiority which can attack deep into Egypt's territory. D) the US-Soviet "detente" relationship discourages war in the foreseeable future; E) Egypt is led by a weak and indecisive leader unwilling to undertake war with Israel because any Egyptian initiation would be premature and would probably lose.

Sheffy states that the presumption that the Arab states would not open war in the near future was derived from an "intoxication of power syndrome," according to which "even if the Arabs overstated their power and launched a war, they would be trounced on the battlefield and therefore fail to achieve their goals." Egypt's deception fit into Israel's "concept" like a "glove." As Sheffy states: "The misleading message was, therefore, absorbed in Israel lock, stock and barrel during what turned to be a critical period for both protagonists." As Sheffy explains: "the more a deception story fits the victim's perceptions and beliefs, the more readily is the story accepted, absorbed and acted upon courtesy of cognitive biases, heuristic judgment and fixed mindset."

These biases trigger the following tendencies: on the intelligence level, they steer toward the interpretation of signs of undesirable changes on the enemy's side as unreliable, while on the operational level, they cause the defender to hesitate and delay responding due to a fear that such moves *per se* will

prompt deterioration of the status quo. On the other hand, the deceiver is at risk of detection in such a situation rather than in situations of war and active hostilities wherein differentiation between regular and irregular events is very unclear. In Sheffy's words: "A marine metaphor demonstrates the distinction between the two states. In calm seas, the smallest ripple catches the eye; in rough seas, however, even truly threatening waves may be noticed only in the wake of comparison--their height, density and direction--with all the other high waves in the vicinity. Stated differently, the mere observation of a threat's presence may be ineffective as an indicator of that threat."

Deception, thus, thrives upon the victims' sense and state of "lull." This mindset on the victim's part "interferes with his ability to psychologically adjust to the diametrically different situation instigated by the new situation of war. Therefore, because such a dramatic transition deviates from the orderly functioning of the human mind, as well as from collective-organizational thought patterns, the capacity to recognize change and respond appropriately -- and in good *time* -- declines."[143]

B2. Intelligence and Probability

Joab Rosenberg suggests the following analogy. Imagine a new client comes looking for life insurance. The insurance agent looks at his computer for the database of individuals sharing this client's age (say age 45), and considers how many of them died before the age of 60. Assume that the insurance company has a database of a million clients. Thus, according to the relative frequency interpretation of the probability that this client would die before age 60 is equal to the statistic of those in the database who died between the ages of 45 and 60. But then the agent discovers that the customer is Israeli. The database of a million past customers is irrelevant in this case because, as an Israeli, his chances of dying are higher

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[143]Yigal Sheffy, "Overcoming Strategic Weakness: The Egyptian Deception and the Yom Kippur War." Intelligence and National Security. 21:5 (2006), pp. 809-28

due to the security dangers in the Middle East facing Israel than in relation to the company's European clients. So the insurance agent, therefore, should not only consider the sample of past *Israeli* customers. What if, Rosenberg adds, this specific client is a fan of extreme sports such as skiing, riding a motorcycle, and skydiving? This would render the sample even smaller: only Israelis who are involved in extreme sports should be included. Adds Rosenberg: "Taking this argument further (considering the new customer's specific medical and genetic background, and so on) one must conclude that the sample of relevant events are only the events where he himself dies before the age of 60, which is of course a reduction ad absurdum of the relative frequencies of interpretation."

Trying to predict the probability of an Israeli-Syrian war in the upcoming year, a major strategic question for Israeli decision-makers, is actually an *absurdity* if considered in light of relative frequency. If nothign had changed between Israel and Syria between 1973 and the present, the 1973 war could be used as an input in frequency calculation relative to a future war. Likewise, to predict that "the chances of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons in the next five years is 60" could be interpreted according to the relative frequencies of other states acquiring nuclear weapons in the past. The situations "anticipated" in Middle Eastern current events literally *unpredictable* because both the reality of Middle Eastern history in the contemporary era is literally *unprecedented* inasmuch as the circumstances presenting themselves as "given" are difficult to compare to analogous phenomena in the recent past. Rosenberg opines: "...does the 1948 war have any relevance for predicting future possible wars (the 1948 war happened after World War II, when the Soviet Union was a superpower, there was a different leadership in the Arab world and so on)? It seems stupid and useless on the face of it. The problem of the relevant sample seems to bring us to a dead end with the relative frequencies interpretation."[144]

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[144]Joab Rosenberg, "The Interpretation of Probability in Intelligence Estimation and Strategic Assessment." *Intelligence and National Security* 23:2 (2008), pp. 139-52

B3. Intelligence and Accountability

Yaron Katz highlights the limits on Israeli intelligence operations caused by the impact of global and local media. He relates the episode of a rescue operation of bus hostages in April 1984. The initial reports said that only two of the terrorists on the bus were killed; afterwards, reports stated that all *four* were killed. A few days later, the Israeli press published a photo in which one of the terrorists, was being led away alive from the bus. The press continued to pressure the army regarding this discrepancy until, several months later, an investigative committee was formed. The national newspaper *Hadashot* was ordered closed by Military Censorship because its version of the story without the approval of Military Censorship. One year later, in February 1985, almost a year after the Bus Line 300 event took place, it was revealed that the main suspect in the deaths of the two terrorists was the Brigadier General. One year after that, though, it became apparent that the Brigadier General was framed as a result of false testimony given by the heads of Shabak to the investigation committees. Despite this, the government approached the President, who pardoned the heads of Shabak before checking out the complaint in court. Only then, after Military Censorship had allowed the reportage, did the press, critically covering the decision that led to the pardoning, deal intensely with the event. His analysis highlight the conflict between secrecy and accountability in Israeli intelligence. This conflict is exacerbated by the active role of the media.[145]

Meanwhile, Gideon Doron and Boaz Shapira outline the following model of the process of accountability in intelligence. They list its component steps as follows:

First stage: Initial phase

A.   Policymaker designs/orders a policy

B.   Professionals secretly implement the policy

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[145]Yaron Katz, "Global Media Influence on the Operational Codes of Israel's Intelligence Services." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19:2 (2006), pp. 316-334

C.   (1). Operation is successful: evaluation is performed by an ad hoc committee; politicials are informed ex-post-facto; case is closed.

(2). Operation is a failure; ad hoc evaluation committee is formed; politicians are not informed; case is closed secretly on the basis of false data.

Second stage: The investigation is in the inner circles

A.   Somehow the falsification becomes known among those in "circles of knowers"

B.   The prime minister is brought into the picture.

C.   Demands for clarification and acquittal.

D.   Prime Minister's refusal to deal leads to confrontation over basic values (secrecy/survival vs. publicity/legality)

E.   Case remains unknown to public.

Third stage: The publication.

A.   Case is revealed to public in codes.

B.   Case become publicly salient through partial information

C.   A public investigative committee is formed.

D.   The people responsible for failure or its revelation are removed/fired from their positions.

Last stage: Termination. Some time later (usually years) the complete story of the failure is fully publicized.

One example of this process in action provided by Doron and Shapira is the "Lavon Affair" of 1954. The epistemological problem in play in the Lavon Affair was central. What was wrong was the policymaker's *calculus*. In Doron and Shapira's words, "acts of sabotage are neither necessary nor sufficient to alter relationships among nations. Such relationships are established and terminated in accordance with alterations of national interests at any given point in time. Second, the employment of local Jews jeopardized the welfare of the Egyptian Jewish community. Professionally, the amateur ring was proven

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to be completely incapable of carrying out its assigned missions. Furthermore, their Israeli officer was found to have been irresponsible, performing at a substandard level."

The "Lavon Affair" was a covert Israeli attempt to undermine the relationship between the Egyptian "Free Officers" who took power in 1952 and the United States. The operation was a complete failure; the Egyptian Jews who were recruited to sabotage British and American interests in Egypt were caught. Doron and Shapira's model fits the Lavon Affair as follows.

Stage one. All the professionals involved in the affair were removed from their positions. The case was closed. A committee, consisting of the president of the Supreme Court, Itzhak Olshan and the ex-chief of staff, Gen. Yaacov Dori, was formed by Prime Minister Moshe Sharrett. Defense Minister Lavon was not removed from his position, but his isolation within the leadership of Mapai triggered him to quit his post and build a different power base in the Histadrut.

Stage Two. The Israeli officer who guided the operations was put on trial in August 1960. The committee determined that the testimonies given six years earlier were false. Lavon asked Ben-Gurion for public acquittance. Ben-Gurion refused.

Stage Three. The case was heard by the Knesset's Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security. Information from this committee was leaked to the public. Some members of the public supported Ben-Gurion, others Lavon. The Knesset's Committee studied the affair and said it reached no conclusions. Consequently, a ministerial committee was formed to decide what to do. It concluded that Lavon did not order the operation and therefore should not be held accountable. In protest, Ben-Gurion resigned from his post, catalyzing the Mapai party to terminate Lavon's career in both the Histadrut and the Knesset.

Stage Four: Ben-Gurion took new steps in 1964 to investigate the affair anew. When Prime Minister Eshkol refused to reopen the case, Ben-Gurion asked the party's leadership center to do so. Under Eshkol's pressure, it refused to do so. The next year, 1965, Ben-Gurion decided to form a new party. In Doron's and Shapira's words: "Everybody in Israeli politics presumably then tired of the case.

All the information was out in the open, but members of the sabotage ring were still in the Egyptian jail. Their story was, and is, yet to be told."[146]

B4. Intelligence and Exposure

Angela Gendron outlines the following paradigms of the intelligence community's worldview. First, intelligence services in liberal democracies tend to be risk averse. The exposure of covert activities can deprive an agency of public and ministerial support, ruining its reputation, impairing its ability to recruit new agents and impacting the viability of other agency operations. The risk of discovery "reinforces the natural bias against unnecessarily intrusive methods, but the risk of failing to avert a threat tends in the opposite direction. Prudence and worst case scenarios can lead to overreaction." Second, intelligence analysis is concerned with questions of "opportunity cost." Since resources are limited, they must be allocated where they are likely to be effective and where the potential benefit is greatest. This applies to surveillance capacity, intelligence professionals with the right language skills, or staff with appropriate agent handling experience. These may not always be available at all times. Third, sometimes open sources of information are not available. Although they are preferred due to considerations of ethics and efficiency, quite often the adversary operates secretly. Because the adversaries uses "subterfuge and deception, or is out of reach in a closed and hostile environment," secrecy is necessary to contend with such an opponent.

Fourth, moreover, intelligence collection capability requires a fusion of approaches. "Intelligence is an art form not a science: the analyst's ability to identify collection opportunities, the agent handler's sensitivity to the needs and vulnerabilities of sources, and the surveillance team's intuition regarding target movement patterns can all be critical in anticipating, creating, and exploiting opportunities." Technical equipment, skilled intelligence professionals, well-placed sources and fortuitous circumstances

[146]Gideon Doron and Boaz Shapira, "Accountability for Secret Operations in Israel." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 4:3 (1990), pp. 371-82

can allow access to a target at any particular time according to resources and opportunities available. Fifth, technology offers the temptation of easier and more ethical information gathering inasmuch as it allows greater discrimination between targets and innocent bystanders; but they conversely distract from the importance of human resources, especially when faced with a sophisticated and security-aware adversary that is knowledgeable enough to evade one's technological advantages either because he can outsmart them or because he is equally as technologically savvy.

Sixth, the more imminent and grave the threat, the more even a "low probability of success" can be accepted as "justifiable in some extreme circumstances." Thinking about efficiency is central to deliberations of the probability of success. But many covert decisions are made irrespective of cost, proportionality and collateral damage to innocent bystanders when the situation is dangerous enough to warrant the sidelining of these considerations. Seventh, there are important practical and moral reasons to ensure that covert collection activities focus on the target and precautions are taken to prevent harming innocent bystanders and causing unneeded collateral damage. This is prudent both to the security of current and future collection efforts and to avoid accusations of human rights violations that can harm the agency's reputation and domestic support.[147]

B5. Intelligence and Error

According to John Gentry, one of the most severe problems in intelligence failures lies in *management*, not with analysis as such. One problem is the evaluation criteria used to rate analysts'

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[147]Angela Gendron, "Just War, Just Intelligence: An Ethical Framework for Foreign Espionage." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18 (2005), pp. 398-434.

performance. They are judged and promoted according to their work as individuals. The incentive structures thus encourage analysts to work alone. Many senior managers do not understand the nuances of analytical depth, insight, breadth and sophistication among their subordinates. Publishing lots of relatively easy-to-produce current intelligence pieces is more bureaucratically attractive than publishing fewer, longer, better papers. Managers presume that the consumers they serve do not like surprises. They want support for their immediate problems, and therefore, analysts "with 'hot accounts cannot do much research. Because the career management process rewards quantities of production, there is little perceived need for expertise and correspondingly for research." There is a problem of the "paradox of expertise": the tendency of experts to stick with their assessments longer than warranted by changing situations. Moreover, managers often make poor decisions about other managers. Many managers of analysts were once successful analysts. But because management and analysis require different talents, "some good analysts have become weak and even bad managers. When this happens agencies lose twice: they lost a good analyst and damage a production unit by imposing a bad manager."

Too many managers are "technophiles." In Gentry's words: "They like gadgets. Many like information technology even better." The problem, though, is that access to information is often incongruous with developing insight, wisdom and understanding, and too often, there is a failure to know the difference. Lack of trust cultivates excessive caution. Because managers are in the "firing line" for sharp criticism from multiple angles, and are often politicians' scapegoat, managers are afraid of accusations of being wrong. This catalyzes them into delaying publication of controversial findings until evidence is more certain, reducing the risks of criticism while making intelligence concomitantly less useful to decision-makers. They often add caveats to assessments and use qualifying language designed to protect themselves against criticism. Consequently, the "chronic criticisms of intelligence -- some legitimate, some not -- distract managers, force them to be reactive, and push them to defend past actions rather than look ahead. They reinforce incentives to focus on the short-term because consumers have made clear that they do not like surprises and can be snippy when annoyed."

Objectivity in intelligence production is interrupted by politicization. Gentry defines this as "the purposeful introduction of motivated biases into intelligence products by intelligence professionals." The main type of politicization manifests in "slanting messages in pursuit of personal or organizational goals." This often pays out by skirting issues avoiding use of terms or concepts that agency managers believe that senior policymakers would rather not see. Managers of intelligence are motivated by bureaucratic interests. They are keen to defend and advance the interests of their agencies. In Gentry's words: "'Competitive analysis,' ostensibly designed to foster better collective judgments, instead often masks conflict among Balkanized, combative bureaucracies."[148]

Part C. Epistemology and the Kahan Report

In what follows, the chapter will now turn to a discussion of the contents of the Kahan Report in light of the conceptual aspects of intelligence analysis and intelligence failure as above. It will be helpful to consider the lessons stated above as to the *epistemological character of intelligence*, a significant domain that grand strategy theory does not take enough account of, yet which is very poignant to comprehending Israeli foreign relations.

The epistemological character of the Kahan Commission Report manifests in its regular use of counterfactual reasoning.[149] What are the strengths and limitations of counterfactual reasoning in

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[148]John Gentry, "Managers of Analysts: The Other Half of Intelligence Analysis." 31:2 (2016), pp. 154-77

[149]For a sample of writing in diplomatic history and international relations theory on counterfactuals, see: Richard Evans, *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History.* Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2014; Frank Harvey, "'What If' History Matters?: Comparative Counterfactual Analysis and Policy Relevance." *Security Studies* 24:3 (2015), pp. 413-24; Philip Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow and Geoffrey Parker, eds. *Unmaking the West: 'What If?' Scenarios that Rewrite World History*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006; Eric Grynaviski, "Contrasts, Counterfactuals and Causes." *European Journal of International Relations*. 19:4 (2011), pp. 823-846; Richard Ned Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010; Philip Tetlock and Aaron

international relations as manifest in this episode of the history of Israeli foreign policy? The following characteristics of counterfactual reasoning predominate. First, "bottom of the ninth" syndrome. In this perspective, counterfactual reasoning is problematic when it focuses on an "end-point" in an event--such as the ninth inning of a baseball game--as opposed to the long-term trajectory--as in the pattern of gameplay during the previous eight innings. From this perspective, using the Sabra and Shatila massacre, which took place "late" in the war, could be seen as overshadowing the events of the "rest" of the war, such as the broader events of the first year of 1982-83. In the course of the war, many other events "could" occupy the status in memory that Sabra and Shatila bears.

Furthermore, the character of counterfactual reasoning is such that it often obscures the suffering of the Other, whether this be the toll on civilians and soldiers during the war or the effects of the conflict on the opposing side. Emphasis is on the calamity befalling "me" and "us" rather than upon "you" and "them." The Kahan Commission Report focuses solely on Israel's quagmire rather than on Palestinian massacre victims' suffering. n the discourse of American opponents of the Iraq and Vietnam wars, language focuses more on the American defeats than on the atrocities inflicted on the civilians of Iraq and Vietnam.

To be sure, the thrust of the Kahan Commission Report was grounded in counterfactual reasoning through and through. The irony of the report is that according to everything that Ariel Sharon, Rafael Eitan and Menachem Begin *understood themselves to know*, they acted *prudently* in their handling of Israel's relations with the Phalange; but according to everything they *should have known*, they acted imprudently. The conclusion of the report is that Israeli leaders *should* have exercised discipline over the Phalange, that Israel *should* have passed along information to the other decision-makers about what was likely to happen. Indeed, the commission occupied a privileged position in being able to interview decision-makers after the fact, collecting counterfactual perspectives in order to form an "objective"

Belkin, *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996; Niall Ferguson, *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals.* New York: Basic Books, 2000.

picture based on all available "facts" in a manner which contradicted the conjectures and improvised intuitions of decision-makers in the government at the time. It would have been virtually impossible, even if all the facts of the commission were known to the decision-makers, still, there would have been little likelihood that, in the "heat of the moment," the decision-makers would have been able to organize, process, arrange and contemplate analytically in the manner expressed by the Kahan Commission. Thus, the irony of the report is that it can only be appreciated counterfactually.

To be sure, the contents of the report are filled with counterfactual reasoning and retellings of the events of the war. The report begins by citing the hypothetical goals of the war. It then goes on to explain, counterfactually, why new information as the Commission learned of would have prevented the lapses of the processing of information which led to the failure to prevent the Maronite massacre. The report of the Kahan Commission possessed the "God's Eye View" that the actors in the moment did not, could not possess, the "foresight" of the actors could not equal the hindsight crafted by the report.

C1. Questions of Knowledge in the Report

Counterfactual reasoning plays out in the Kahan Commission Report in multiple ways. Firstly, the report situates itself in the perception that Israel's war had failed to reach its principal "hypothetical" objectives. Abba Eban, in the forward to the report, comments thusly on Israel's assumptions: A) that the PLO would be physically destroyed in Lebanon and would cease to be an influential actor in world politics; B) that free of the intimidation of PLO terror the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza would come forward and negotiate agreements on the basis of the Camp David agreement as understood by Prime Minister Begin, meaning on the basis of autonomy as a prelude to permanent incorporation into Israel; C) a Lebanese president would be elected with a commitment to conclude a peace treaty with Israel by the end of 1982; D) there would be free movement of people and goods from Egypt through Israel to Lebanon, creating a "triangle of peace" as a basis of a new regional order; E) the United States would rejoice in Israel's defeat of the pro-Soviet PLO and Syria, and a better US-Israeli relationship

would develop; F) security arrangements would be agreed in South Lebanon enabling close Israeli participation in the policing of the area to insure absolutely to insure absolutely that no grenade or mortar bomb could ever come within range of an Israeli life or home; G) there would be a sharp reduction of Soviet influence and involvement in the Middle East. In Eban's words: "Nine months later not one of these objectives has been achieved."[150]

Yet the conceptual problem raised by the Kahan Commission Report is that of the possibility of "perfect" foresight and hindsight. According to everything that Israel's decision-makers and cabinet members *understood themselves to know*, they acted prudently; yet according to everything they *should have known*, they acted imprudently. That is to say, according to *what was known* by those testifying, the Maronite massacre of the Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila camps seemed improbable; yet according to *what was knowable,* that is, the evidence accumulated by the Commission, the Maronite massacre of the Palestinians was indeed most likely. Ironically, though, despite the evidence accumulated by the Commission, there is a perception gap between the perspective of the Commission and that of the cabinet members, inasmuch as the decisionmakers in the Cabinet were operating with imperfect foresight, let alone, perfect hindsight, in the way the Commission perceived the reality of the situation. The Commission was able to accumulate all available facts, undertake interviews with the participants, and, most simply, constitute itself *after* the massacre took place which the cabinet ministers claim they had no foreknowledge of.

In all these ways, the *objectivism* of the Commission and its Report contrasts with the *intuitionism* of the decision-makers. The report claims: "The way in which decisions are to be taken and the appropriate bodies to that end have been laid down in the procedures. These formats ought to be exploited in order to enhance the prospect that when decisions are taken, all the information at hand, the various positions, the pros and cons, and the possible ramifications of the decision will be taken into account.

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[150]Abba Eban, as quoted in: *The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report.* New York: Karz-Cohl, 1983, p. IX.

Experience and intuition are very valuable, but it is preferable that they not constitute the sole basis on which decisions are taken."[151]

The report comments further in appreciating its capacity to use counterfactual reasoning to justify its role in condemning the appropriate decision-makers: "The absence of any hard and fast law regarding various matters does not exempt a man whose actions are subject to the scrutiny of a commission of inquiry from accountability, from a public standpoint, for his deeds or failures that indicate inefficiency on his part, lack of proper attention to his work, or actions executed hastily negligently, unwisely, or shortsightedly when--considering the qualifications of the man who holds a certain office and the personal qualities demanded of him in fulfilling his duties--he should have acted perspicaciously." It adds: "No commission of inquiry would fulfill its role properly if it did not exercise such scrutiny, in the framework of its competence, vis-a-vis any man whose actions and failures were under scrutiny, regardless of his position and public standing."[152]

C2. The Human Element in Processing Information

In the Report's early pages, the Commission acknowledges the element of human error in the character of the testimonies provided. "...We shall not pretend to find a solution to all the contradictions in testimony. In many instances, these contradictions relate to the content of conversations that took place between various people without the presence of witnesses, or when the witnesses' attention was not focused on the content of the conversation, and there are no exact notes on these conversations." In these circumstances, "it is only natural that there exist several versions with regard to what was said, and the differences between them do not necessarily derive from a desire to conceal the truth but rather are sometimes the natural result of a failure of the human memory. We do not see the need to rule about those

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[151]Ibid, p. 100

[152]Ibid, pp. 65-66

contradictions which surround unimportant details that do not influence the decision about points in controversy."[153]

The contribution of studying the Kahan Commission Report to academics interested in bureaucracy and foreign policy is the lessons it conveys about the inevitability of *human imperfection* in the history of intelligence failure and problems in the processing of information among decision-makers. According to the Kahan Commission Report, the Chief of Staff testified that "it had never The Chief of Staff stated in his testimony before us that it had never occurred to him that the Phalangists would perpetrate acts of revenge and bloodshed in the camps." The report notes that the Chief of Staff "justified this lack of foresight by citing the experience of the past, whereby massacres were perpetrated by the Christians only before the 'Peace for Galilee' War and only in response to the perpetration of a massacre by the Muslims against the Christian population, and by citing the disciplined conduct of the Phalangists while carrying out certain operations after the IDF's entry into Lebanon."

The Chief of Staff assumed that the Phalangists would behave moderately toward the Palestinians so that the "president-elect could be accepted by all the communities in Lebanon." He also notes that, within the bureaucracy, information warning against the massacre was not made known to him. In the report's words, "none of the experts in the IDF or in the Mossad had expressed any reservations about the planned operation in the camps."[154]

C3. The Question of Inevitability

The irony of the Kahan Commission Report is not necessarily that the decision-makers in Israel's Cabinet acted imprudently or immorally in their behaviour leading up to the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Rather, the irony lies in the reality that, no matter what the decision-makers did, they *inevitably* would

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[153]Ibid, p. 5

[154]Ibid, p. 76

have acted wrongly inasmuch as, being human beings acting "in the moment," they could not have had the foresight that the Commission, in hindsight, assumed of them. For example, the Report comments that, according to the testimonies of the heads of the government and the IDF who were "for the most part firm in their view that what happened in the camps was an unexpected occurrence, in the nature of a disaster which no one had imagine and which could not have been--or, at all events, need not have been--foreseen. It was stressed in the remarks made in testimony and in the arguments advanced before us, that this matter should not be discussed in terms of hindsight, but that we must be careful to judge without taking into account what actually happened."

The response of the Commission to this complaint was: "We concur that special caution is required so as not to fall into the hindsight trap, *but that caution does not exempt us from the obligation to examine whether persons acting and thinking rationally were duty bound, when the decision was taken to have the Phalangists enter the camps, to foresee, according to the information that each of them possessed and according to public knowledge, that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps held out the danger of a massacre and that no little probability existed that it would in fact occur*."[155]

C4. The Use and Value of Analogy

The significance of these perspectives in the Kahan Commission Report lies in the lessons they convey about the nature of Israeli foreign policy. While it is common for the history and politics of Israeli foreign policy to be narrated and debated exclusively in the language of geopolitics, *within* geopolitics,

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[155]Ibid, p. 60

amid the geopolitical decision-making of the Israeli war in Lebanon, the story uncovered and related by the Kahan Commission Report is one not of geopolitics but of *epistemology*.[156]

David Houghton's study of President Jimmy Carter's response to the Iran Hostage Crisis, about how National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance clashed with each other regarding how to respond to the embassy seizure, reflects the kinds of insights that students of competitive politics are interested in. Brzezinski advocated for undertaking an *offensive* response by means of an activist military operation to storm the embassy, based on the analogy of the Israeli raid on the Entebbe airport in 1976 to rescue the hostages kidnapped by the Palestinian terrorist organization PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). Vance, on the other hand, advocated for a *quiet* response by means of negotiation to safely free the hostages, based on the analogy of President Lyndon Johnson's negotiation with the North Korean government to free the kidnapped sailors seized in the Pueblo crisis in 1968.

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[156]*Beirut Massacre*, pp. 66-67. The relationship between the Prime Minister and his Chief of Staff and Defense Minister unfolded as follows. According to the Prime Minister's testimony, "only in the Cabinet session of 16.9.82 did he hear about the agreement with the Phalangists that they would operate in the camps, and that until then, in all the conversations he had held with the Defense Minister and with the Chief of Staff, nothing had been said about the role of the Phalangists or their participation in the operations in West Beirut." In the communications between the Prime Minister and Defense Minister, more than one testimony stated that neither of them was aware of the entry of the Phalangists into the camp. "According to the testimony and the notes of those conversations, the matter of those conversations, the matter of the Phalangists was not mentioned in them at all. In a further conversation between the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister, on Wednesday at 18:00 hours, nothing was said about the participation of the Phalangists in the entry into Beirut. Similarly, on Thursday,16.9.82, when the Defense Minister spoke by phone with the Prime Minister during the discussion in the Defense Minister's office, the Defense Minister said nothing about the Phalangists. According to the content of the conversation…, his report to the Prime Minister was in an optimistic vein: that the fighting had ended, the IDF held all the key points, and it was all over. The only mention of the campus in that conversation was that they were encircled." The "perfect hindsight" of the report is as follows, contrasting with the imperfect foresight of those in office: "We may certainly wonder that the participation of the Phalangists in the entry to West Beirut and their being given the task of "mopping up" the camps seemed so unimportant that the Defense Minister did not inform the Prime Minister of it and did not get his assent for the Prime Minister. What is clear is that the Prime Minister was not a party to the decision to have the Phalangists move into the camps, and that he received no report about that decision until the Cabinet session on the evening of 16.9.82."

In the American bureaucracy under Carter, what unfolded during the intra-governmental conflict over the Iranian Hostage Crisis what emerged was the following lesson about analogies: "Differing backgrounds and beliefs, and to some extent the goals and objectives associated with particular governmental roles as well, ensure that policy-makers will tend to exhibit different value hierarchies, and the reception of a given analogy will be determined in part by what it implies about the fate of the policy-maker's most treasured goals and values." In Houghton's words, the "persuasiveness of an analogy does not depend simply on its cognitive appeal, however, but on the extent to which it is compatible with the belief systems, political priorities and/or bureaucratic interests of the analogizer's colleagues. A major conclusion which can be drawn.is that the process of analogizing and of applying the lessons drawn from history is distorted by political factors and requirements."[157]

C5. Past Performance and Future Behaviour

In the Kahan Commission Report, neither in-fighting nor analogies were the problem. Rather, the Report identified the epistemological problem of the Chief of Staff's overreliance on the assumption that the Maronites' past performance would dictate their future behaviour. "We have already said a number of times that the traumatic event of the murder of Bashir Jemayel and a group of Phalangists was sufficient reason to whip up the Phalangists." Thus, it "is difficult to understand how it was possible to justify ignoring the effect of this event on arousing a feeling of vengeance and hatred toward all those who were inimical to the Phalangists, and first and foremost the Palestinians. The consideration that the military organization of the Phalangists and their orderly and disciplined appearance attested to a change in their mode of fighting was specious, and we have already pointed this out."[158]

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[157]David Patrick Houghton, *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 203-4, 208.

[158]*Beirut Massacre,* p. 76.

Notes the report: "The isolated actions in which the Phalangists had participated during the war took place under conditions that were completely different from those which arose after the murder of Bashir Jemayel; and as one could see from the nature of [those] operations, in the past there had been no case in which an area populated by Palestinian refugees had been turned over to the exclusive control of the Palestinian refugees and had been turned over to the exclusive control of the Phalangists." Countering the Chief of Staff's testimony, the report comments: "Past experience in no way justified the conclusion that the entry of the Phalangists into the camps posed no danger. The Chief of Staff was well aware that the Phalangists were full of feelings of hatred toward the Palestinians and that their feelings had not changed since the 'Peace for Galilee' War...On a number of occasions, the Chief of Staff had harsh and clear-cut things to say about the manner of fighting between the factions and communities in Lebanon, and about the concept of vengeance rooted in them; and in this matter we need only refer to the detailed facts presented in this report."[159]

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[159]Ibid, p. 76. The Kahan Report, thus, in employing counterfactual reasoning, challenges the human intuitionism of Israeli decisionmakers' information processing during the Lebanon War with the "perfect hindsight" available via thoroughly objective research as manifest in the Commission's investigation. That being so, it overlooks the labyrinthine character of Israel's bureaucracy which, as Ira Sharkansky stresses, effects both the social psychology of everyday life in Israel as well as the ways that governmental decision-makers perceive situations: "Responsibility is blurred in the case of joint ventures and subsidiaries. Some structures are made obscure deliberately so they can do business with firms that will not admit an Israeli connection. Units that enjoy the benefits of public support escape government controls as they deal with clients and employees. There is a perverse mixture of big government, imperfectly coordinated, that leaves individual activities uncontrolled either by free market competition or effective bureaucracy." Sharkansky describes the governmental labyrinth as follows: "A map of Israel's public corporations illustrates the problem; their structure is difficult to comprehend. Some corporations are wholly owned by the government and by other public bodies, like the Histadrut, the Jewish Agency, and the municipalities. There are also joint ventures among corporations owned by these bodies and with private incorporations owned by these bodies and with private investors. Public corporations spin off subsidiaries; their subsidiaries have their own subsidiaries. Estimates of the number of government corporations range from the hundreds to the thousands, depending on the definitions employed." By consequence, "[t]hese and similar experiences leave clients and members of an organization guessing as to which rules are serious and which will not be enforced. At times there is an escalating spiral: noncompliance induces bureaucrats to devise more rules and control procedures, which induce clients and officers to calculate probabilities, the partial enforcement of existing rules and the addition of new rules in a fancied effort to limit noncompliance."

The lessons learned and taught by the Kahan Commission Report pertaining to negligence in the communication of intelligence between decision-makers and those wielding covert information do not take account of the nature of Israel's bureaucratic labyrinth. "Reports that were received and which required a preliminary evaluation to determine their significance and possible implications were not dealt with properly and in the meantime were rendered worthless due to a protracted process of examining their authenticity."[160]

Stated further: "The reports that were received via the various channels were also not always handled according to standard procedures, the result being that the reports sometimes became worthless. Sometimes, reports received were not recorded in the designated log books; reports that were relayed were sometimes transmitted with important omissions, which prevented their being handled properly. Reports that were dealt with (such as the handling of the report about the 300 killed within the framework of Military Intelligence/Research) were at times handled superficially, with a fruitless internal runaround and without exhausting the various possibilities for verification and examination."[161]

The report contributes to how *information processing,* not grand strategy, explains how the massacre unfolded. Thinking about intelligence analysis and intelligence failure reveals how Israel's internal bureaucracy "really" functions.[162]

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[160]Ibid, p. 102-3.

[161]Ibid, p. 102-3.

[162]According to Sharkansky: "Along with this variety of administrative cultures is a confusing melange of bureaucratic forms. Organizations have grown willy-nilly, with all the jumbled appearance of Middle Eastern cities, whose lack of physical order frustrates efficient transportation. Like the traveler who must find directions through the streets of ancient Jerusalem, Acre, or Jaffa, the client or employee of Israel's bureaucracy is bound to encounter a convoluted route with unexpected turns and dead ends." Furthermore, the Kahan Report opines thusly on the communication patterns: "Thus, for example, the reports in the possession of Divisional Operations about 300 killed (or the 120 killed) were not transmitted at all to Command Operations. The latter did not report (not even on the actual entry of the Phalangists into the camps) to Operations Branch/Operations. Thus, for example, the report about the 300 killed was received already on Thursday evening in Command Intelligence." Conspicuously, notes the report, "that report was not conveyed (neither in its telephone form nor in the form of the subsequent cable) to the knowledge of the Command Intelligence Officer. The report was not transmitted to Command Operations and *ipso facto* was not brought to the knowledge of the G.O.C., either that evening or the following day. Similarly, no orderly report was made regarding the decision of the G.O.C. Northern Command about halting the operations of the Phalangists. These flaws in the reporting require examination and analysis, since in the

Conclusion

What aspects of the Lebanese Civil War and Israel's involvement therein are overlooked by an exclusive emphasis on systemic factors in telling its story? The purpose of this chapter has been to reflect on how much more there is to Israeli foreign policy than a grand strategy paradigm might suggest. I have intended to highlight this by elucidating the insights of the Kahan Commission Report which investigated the Sabra and Shatila massacre of 1983. I draw attention to the following aspects of the report: A) the use of counterfactual reasoning in reconstructing the events leading to the massacre; B) the character of the tragedy as an intelligence failure; and C) the bureaucratic problem of information processing during the conflict in particular and in the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy in general. These testify to the importance of *epistemology* in the social reality of the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy. This is a blind-spot in much grand strategy theory.

The significance of the discussion of the shortcomings of a grand strategy-specific narrative of the history of Israel's foreign relations during, before and after the Begin years lies in the over-simplification of the social and transnational character of Israel's interactions with a multiplicity of adversaries. Especially in relation to the Lebanese Civil War and Israel's involvement therein, even the social character of terrorism and the tactical character of espionage and intelligence are overlooked by overemphasizing the role of geopolitics in Middle Eastern history in the late twentieth century.

The Kahan Commission Report, therefore, in both its strengths and its shortcomings, testifies that, despite the hegemony of geopolitics in the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy, one cannot ignore the importance of *epistemology*: the processing of information and the interpretation of truth. Yet, in contemplating epistemology, it is imperative to also acknowledge the role of *amnesia, oblivion* and *neglect.*

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absence of an orderly and proper report the decision-makers at the various levels lack the information required for their decisions." Again, though, this is narrated in the report without simultaneously contextualizing how frustrating bureaucratic procedures in Israel's bureaucracy so often are.

This chapter has probed the Kahan Commission Report which investigated the Sabra and Shatila Massacre of 1983. This Report is one of the rare episodes in contemporary history when a state investigated *itself* for the conduct of its military and covert activity abroad. The chapter pointed out the focus of the report on *epistemology* rather than grand strategy. That is to say, the focus of the report is on how truth and information were (mis)understood and (mis)communicated by the key decision-makers. The chapter contemplated where and why a focus on *epistemology* rather than grand strategy can improve scholarship on the history and political science of Israeli foreign policy. While most chapters of this thesis focus on Begin's first term, the discussion of the Kahan Report is a key paradigmatic episode in the dilemmas of decision-making evident in Begin's second term.

Chapter 5. "Transnationalism and Cross-Cultural Relations: Intra- and Inter-Group Relations in Israeli-Middle Eastern Interactions, 1977-83."

Abstract

In describing the regional and domestic environment within which Israel was situated during the Menachem Begin years, the chapter at hand attempts to achieve the following aims. One, it will highlight the work of scholars in strategic studies who have described Israeli encirclement by pro-Soviet adversaries in the years after 1973. Two, it will cite the memoir of Yair Hirschfeld who described his involvement in Austrian-sponsored private diplomacy with Palestinian and Jordanian factions to lay the groundwork for an alternative to the Israeli-Egyptian talks under American sponsorship. Three, it will discuss the social relations between Druze and Jews in Israel as affected by Israel's Lebanon invasion. The insights of this chapter will be situated in the writings of contemporary diplomatic historians' interpretations of the late 1970s in their scholarship on American-Middle Eastern relations. I will suggest

that more attention should be paid to the social relations organically occurring among Middle Eastern actors in contemporary Middle Eastern history. The purpose of doing so is to demonstrate that Israeli foreign policy, even in its internal bureaucratic factionalism, cannot be disentangled from the social interconnectedness of Middle Eastern history during these years. The transnational history of Israeli-Arab interactions during these years highlights that Begin's Israel is just as much a link in the social tapestry of Middle Eastern history any of its Arab counterparts was and is. The role of inter- and intra-group relations in this period is a lesson in the social logic of Israeli-Arab interactions which coexists side by side with the strategic aspects thereof.

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In this chapter, I suggest that intra- and inter-group relations offer no less compelling interpretations and insights to Israeli foreign relations during the Begin years than do interpretations grounded in grand strategy focusing solely on local and global great powers. The following examples of factionalism explaining more than grand strategy will be treated: one, the diffusion of the Israeli conflict with the PLO after the Yom Kippur War into broader international and cross-regional theatres; two, the private diplomacy conducted by Yair Hirschfeld with representatives of Palestinian factions supportive of a counter-process to the Israel-Egypt talks between Sadat and Begin; three, the relations between Druze and Jews within Israel which were socially affected by Begin's annexation of the Golan Heights and involvement in the Lebanon war. The lesson of these insights is that the *cross-cultural* logic of transnational relations explains Israeli diplomatic history during this period more than assumptions based on grand strategy.

The more Israel integrated with the Arab world as a result of the Egypt-Israel peace process, the more its "Alliance of the Periphery" with Ethiopia, Turkey, Iran and the Maronites became, concomitantly, complemented by the warmer Israeli-Arab relations manifesting in Israeli-Egyptian

relations; this "transnational alignment" constitutes a background to the Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1982-83 which, too, is more a lesson in transnational history than in grand strategy. Israeli-Middle Eastern relations thus follows a *social* logic too. Begin's moderation catalyzed Israeli-Middle Eastern *regionalism* and *regionalization*. Without recognizing this, historiography of the Middle East in the late 1970s, especially surrounding the "cataclysmic" year "1979", is incomplete.

Therefore, while it is appropriate to note the importance of domestic political opinion on "major" topics such as the security situation vis-à-vis the Palestinians, one must also take note of how little of the conduct of Israeli leaders truly meets public scrutiny. One domain of such conduct is Israeli negotiations with Arab and Palestinian leaders. Such negotiations usually manifest through quiet diplomacy and back-channels, or in secret communications in private meetings and communiques. Another domain of such conduct is specific battlefield decision-making, whether by the Mossad, the IDF or the Shin-Bet. The Begin years in Israel testify to the social logic of Israeli interactions with the Middle East in a manner obscured by an exclusive focus on grand strategy.

After 1973: The Responsiveness of Israel's Bureaucracy to Arab Strategy

Regarding the Begin years, both historians and political scientists have drawn attention to the rapidly changing strategic balance in the Middle East in Begin's time. Examples of contemporary political writing that do so are Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky's *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace* and Aaron David Miller's *The Much Too Promised Land*.[163]

The broadening of the Israeli-Arab conflict beyond Israel's immediate borders also manifests a *cross-cultural* logic and intersubjective character. There is, as it were, an "adversarial dialogue" between the counterparts. I intend to highlight the "social tapestry" uniting Israeli bureaucracy with occurrences in

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[163]Aaron David Miller, *The Much Too Promised Land*, Op. Cit; Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East*. Washington: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2008.

the broader Middle East. Literature cited below suggests that reform of the Israeli bureaucracy and the regional Arab military postures toward Israel are interlinked.

The most acute analyses of factionalism are found in the writings of specialists in strategy who describe the internationalization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the years following the Yom Kippur War. It diffused into several theatres as follows. Dany Shoham has noted the rise of the Iraqi threat to Israel as manifest in Saddam Hussein's sponsoring of the poisoning with toxic chemicals of Israeli produce exports to Europe. In 1978, the Iraqi regime sponsored—through Palestinian terrorists—the poisoning with mercury of Israeli oranges exported to Europe, arguing that the goal was to sabotage Israel's economy rather than killing European consumers. Poisoned oranges were later found in Great Britain and West Germany, as well as in the Netherlands, where some children were killed.[164]

Intelligence historians have described the intimacy of Israeli-West German intelligence cooperation during the Lebanon War, signifying the internationalization of the Arab-Israeli conflict into Europe in ways that stimulated closer Israeli-European intelligence cooperation.[165] Stephane Lefebvre has noted how 1977 was the year that Israel joined the Kilowatt Group, the European intelligence sharing body composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, the United States (the CIA and FBI), South Africa and the European Union member states.[166]

Military Bureaucracy

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[164]Dany Shoham, "The Anthrax Evidence Points to Iraq." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16:1 (2003), pp. 39-68

[165]Tamir Libel, "Hostage of Foreign Interests: German Intelligence Involvement in Arab-Israeli Hostage Deals, 1980-2010." *Journal of Intelligence History* 12:2 (2013), pp. 177-89; Shlomo Shpiro, "Know Your Enemy: West German-Israeli Intelligence Evaluation of Soviet Weapon Systems." *Journal of Intelligence History* 4:1 (2004), pp. 57-83.

[166]Stephane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16:4 (2003), pp. 527-42

Stuart Cohen has described how Israel's foreign policy in the Begin years specifically but in the years of Likud political leadership in the 1980s can be explained by drawing attention to the prioritization by the IDF of its limited resources toward military operations on the "outer" frontier of the Middle East rather than the more proximate "inner" frontier of Israel's immediate neighbours. Cohen attributes Israel's challenges in the "intra-frontier" domain to the difficulties in involved in maintaining control over the territories occupied in 1967.[167]

As early as 1975, IDF troops were dispatched to dismantle a Jewish West Bank settlement established at Sebastia. In April 1982, in compliance with the Camp David Accords, IDF troops were ordered to evict the community established in Yamit, a Jewish town established over the international Israeli-Egyptian border in the Sinai Peninsula. As Israel negotiated with a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation over the future government of the West Bank and Gaza Strip late in 1991, the scale of this particular commitment increased. In Cohen's words: "Be that as it may, the IDF has meanwhile also had to cope with the entirely separate form of 'intra-frontier' commitment posed by the threat of aerial bombardment. This became starkly apparent during Operation 'Desert Storm' early in 1991. Even before the outbreak of the fighting, Israel's entire population was issued with gas masks and instructed in the use of other defences against chemical warfare. During its course, her coastal cities were assaulted by over 30 Iraqi Scud missiles."[168] Logistical problems which occurred in the IDF's performance in the Lebanon War and the First Intifada suggested that many troops are "neither specifically trained, nor psychologically prepared, for the delicate – and often distasteful - tasks which such 'intra-border' commitments entail."[169]

Cohen observes that the hierarchy of priorities in IDF deliberations has long been dictated by situational circumstances. When Israel's central strategic concern was the enemy forces massed on her borders, military planning focused on those theatres, while operations further away were only supplementary means of accomplishing 'peripheral' goals, complementing more immediate geographic

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[167]Stuart Cohen, "Changing Emphases in Israel's Military Commitments, 1981-91: Causes and Consequences." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 15:3 (1992), pp. 330-50

[168]"Cohen, "Changing Emphases in Israel's Military Commitments," Op. Cit.

[169]"Cohen, "Changing Emphases in Israel's Military Commitments," Op. Cit.

threats. After the Yom Kippur War, heightened Arab military capabilities provoked a change in the IDF's perspectives.

Cohen cites Yitzhak Rabin's remark that the dangers posed by Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia exceeded those of Syria and Egypt and were no less bellicose. In the 1967 and 1973 wars, non-neighbouring Arab states could only indirectly participate in fighting against Israel by dispatching token expeditionary forces to the front. After 1973, and particularly in the 1980s, they came to possess unilateral strike capabilities. In the period of Begin's tenure, it was perceived within the IDF as if Palestinian insurgency within Israeli-occupied territory seemed to have petered out. There were no local rebellions requiring the IDF to supplement intra-border forces when the IDF was heavily engaged elsewhere on perimeter operation in either 1973 or 1982.

In 1981, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon replaced the existing military government in the West Bank and Gaza with a more civilian-oriented framework designated by the Civil Administration. As Cohen put it: "Not even well-trained reservists are adequately competent to fulfil either the 'remote' or the 'intra-frontier' obligations already becoming prominent. Both require an order of skills - and stamina - which only professionals can normally acquire. As much has long been recognised in the Air Force (the IDF's primary instrument for 'remote' operations), where all trainee pilots have to sign on for extensive periods of professional service. It is equally becoming apparent in other branches."[170]

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[170]Cohen adds further:

> The aura of optimism which prompted such moves was soon shown to be seriously misplaced. Contrary to the expectations current in many circles in the early 1980s, Israel's 'intra-frontier' commitments did not subsequently decline. On the contrary, one of the most striking transformations in Israel's strategic situation is the massive extent to which they have recently increased. For political as well as military reasons, they are now recognized to constitute a primary requirement. Most obviously is this so where the need to counter 'low intensity' Palestinian operations behind Israeli-occupied lines is concerned. That requirement became particularly prominent between September 1982 and summer 1983, when the IDF sought to pacify those portions of the Lebanon occupied in the earlier stages of its onslaught against the PLO (launched in June 1982 and then termed 'Operation Peace for the Galilee').

Cohen, "Changing Emphases in Israel's Military Commitments," Op. Cit.

In Cohen's assessment, this was a consequence of the rapid modernization of the armies of Israel's Arab adversaries coupled with their heightened confidence in their military skill to confront Israel after the 1973 war. This perspective would suggest that Israel's foreign policy was more dovish than Begin's ideology might otherwise suggest because the strategic gap between Israel and its adversaries had significantly narrowed. Cohen points out that: "Dragged into a typical guerrilla campaign by a combination of PLO remnants, Shiite fundamentalists and Syrian-sponsored irregulars, the Israeli government found this particular commitment to be so onerous that it eventually decided to cut its losses by unilaterally withdrawing IDF forces from most of the region."[171]

In summary, the social relations of bureaucratic factionalism and the *cross-cultural* relations of Israeli confrontations with Arab adversaries are interlinked.

Transnationalism in Begin's Foreign Policy

Attention to the transnationalism in Begin's foreign relations in the aftermath of Yom Kippur War can fill gaps in scholarship by highlighting the common *cross-cultural* milieu of Israeli-Arab interactions in the broader Middle East. On one level, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem* treats the Red Sea and East African context at great length, alluding to Libya's invasion of Chad, the suppression in 1976 of an abortive Marxist coup in Sudan, the war in Ogaden, the rise of the Marxist Derg regime in Ethiopia, and the situation in Zaire.[172] Sadat's memoir, *In Search of Identity,* sees Sadat's negotiation with Israel as his psychological "climax" in reliving the "liberation" he experienced

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[171]Cohen, "Changing Emphases in Israel's Military Commitments," Op. Cit.

[172]Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem: A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*. New York: Random House, 1997.

when imprisoned by the British during World War II.[173] Sadat's and Begin's memoirs, *The Revolt on the Nile* and *The Revolt,* respectively,[174] are so parallel to one another in romanticizing their involvement in anti-British guerrilla subversion in the 1940s. Begin's other memoir, *White Nights,* recalls not only his fervent anti-communism, which is relevant to seeing his affinity with Sadat who, in the 1970s, was his anti-communist "twin", it also routinely evokes memories of Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and other eastern European small nations "swallowed up" by the USSR, admiring their irredentism.[175]

This suggests that Begin may have formed an "image" of Sadat as struggling against communist satellization in the context of the Northeast African geopolitical situation of the 1970s. Both Begin and Sadat were, in their own polities, religious conservatives, deeply anti-Marxist, capitalistic and neo-liberal (Sadat's *Infitah* opening of the Egyptian economy is similar to Begin's opening to Israel's economy against the previous Labour-socialist system in Israel), and both were shifting their focus from conventional warfare to asymmetrical warfare. Indeed, the Israeli war in Lebanon against the PLO can be compared with the mass repression of political Islam in Egypt. Sadat faced massive internal dissent from jihadists opposed to peace with Israel, leading to his assassination; as did Begin who faced internal dissent from settlers in his evacuation of Sinai, foreshadowing the killing of Yitzhak Rabin. Sadat had an outsider image in Egypt as Sudanese born, and engaged in discourses of "Africanism" in many of his speeches. Begin had an Eastern European outsider image as a non-Sabra, and engaged in discourses evoking memories of Eastern Europe in World War II. The parallels between the two have not been dealt with in other research on the topic.

These similarities provide greater insight into the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations than contemporary writing thereon appreciates. Douglas Little, in *American Orientalism*,[176] minimizes the Egypt-Israel peace accord entirely in order to stress how American stereotypes of "corrupt and evil" Arabs, deeply embedded

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[173]Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography*. New York: Harper Collins, 1978.

[174]Anwar Sadat, *The Revolt on the Nile*. London: John Day Company, 1957. Menachem Begin, *The Revolt*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1978.

[175]Menachem Begin, *White Nights: The Story of a Prisoner in Russia*. New York: Harper & Row, 1979.

[176]Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

in American media, popular culture, film and literature, were exacerbated by the Israeli-Arab conflict as it was broadcast to Americans, reinforcing these images.

The Israeli-Arab conflict, depicted as a confrontation with Arab and Islamic resistance to the West, and especially to the US dominance and imperialism which the Israeli relationship with Washington symbolized in Arab eyes, created a vicious cycle of mutually reinforcing malicious images that American leaders embraced in adopting an even more confrontational posture toward the Arab and Islamic world by the dawn of the 1980s. Little's treatment of the 1977-83 years stresses not only the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which the US made no effort to stop, as well as to Israeli settlement expansion in the Begin years during and after the Camp David Accord, but, especially, the widespread American ignorance of how the Middle East really functions, as evinced by how blindsided the US was by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The US was likewise blinded by its own cartoon images in failing to understand the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Instead of understanding the Middle East on its own terms, American involvement was predicated on popular stereotypes deeply entrenched in the American imagination that continually cast Arabs and Muslim Middle Easterners into ever-recurring roles as villains.

But the transnationalism in Begin's foreign policy suggests that cultural dynamics between the Middle Eastern societies was more influential than emphasis on grand strategy's role alone reveals. Consider the role Morocco played in facilitating the secret backchannel negotiations leading up to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The Moroccan channel facilitated by King Hasan enabled Moshe Dayan and Hassan Tuhami of Egypt to pre-negotiate the terms of the forthcoming Sadat-Begin negotiations and Sadat's visit to Israel. Morocco's ties to Israel were based on more than common dependence on, and alliance with, the US. For one thing, there were analogical parallels between Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Morocco's of Western Sahara, as well as the twin threats of the PLO and Polisario front.

Moreover, Morocco deferred more to France than the US, particularly under the more pro-Israeli Francois Miterrand. Likewise, threatened by Algeria, Iran and Libya, Morocco desperately needed to break its isolation by getting closer to "conservative" Arab regimes like Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia,

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whose stances to Israel were more neutral. These influences are independent of the US. One of the biggest Israeli-Moroccan linkages was the Israeli-Moroccan community, which has not only functioned as a commercial and diplomatic bridge, but also, created incentives for both Israeli leaders and Moroccan rulers to demonstrate fealty to one another for its and their sakes.

Egypt and Lebanon

Ussama Makdisi, in *Faith Misplaced*,[177] treats the Egypt-Israel peace accord by primarily focusing on Palestinian exclusion therefrom which stimulated the increase of Palestinian terrorism as "resistance" in the form of such attacks as the 1978 hijacking of a coastal highway bus within Israel in March, taking dozens of Israeli civilians hostage. Thirty-eight hostages were killed and one Israeli soldier died when the bus exploded. Israel responded by undertaking Operation Litani in Southern Lebanon against PLO targets. In Makdisi's interpretation of the period, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty is significant primarily for giving Israel a free hand to intervene against the Palestinians in Lebanon. Moreover, the exclusion of the Palestinians from the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty thereafter underscored the importance of the Palestinian cause in Arab eyes, more acutely than before. On a different level, from Makdisi's perspective, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty underscored the oppressive Middle Eastern order orchestrated by American Middle East policy in deference to Israel's needs at the expense of the regions'. This was symbolized, in Makdisi's history, by the Shah of Iran's taking refuge in Sadat's Egypt fleeing from the Revolution. The thrust of Makdisi's work is that the Arab world was naïve about American intentions in the region. Arabs carried with them an image of America that was formed by their experience encountering idealistic and sympathetic Christian missionaries in the region; this image was shattered, he writes, by American support for Zionism, perpetually against the needs of the Arabs of the region.

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[177]Ussama Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of US-Arab Relations 1820-2003.* New York: PublicAffairs, 2011.

The value to historiography of the transnationalism which even pervaded the foreign policy of the first Israeli Likud Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, presents a more nuanced story of Middle Eastern history at the time. Attention paid to it would underscore that all Middle Eastern actors, especially in the Lebanon imbroglio, are equally guilty; thus, a heroes vs. villains narrative of history would be negated by a villains vs. villains narrative. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's tenure as Prime Minister is best remembered by his supporters for his negotiation of peace with President Anwar Sadat of Egypt.

Among his critics, he is best remembered for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and, most infamously, by the Sabra and Shatila Massacre which involved Maronite Christian militiamen who had been armed by Israel, slaughtering hundreds of Palestinians in revenge for the assassination of their leader, Maronite President of Lebanon Bashir Gemayel. Despite the infamy of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, two other massacres in Lebanon are too often ignored. First, the Tel Zaatar massacre of 1976, when Syrian troops massacred more than three thousand Palestinians in the Lebanese village for which the massacre is named. Second, the Shouf Mountain massacre of 1984; in this episode, the "opposite" of what transpired in Sabra and Shatila occurred; in Sabra and Shatila, Maronites, armed by Israel, massacred Palestinians; in the Shouf massacre, Maronite Christians, expecting assistance from the Israel Defense Force, were abandoned into the hands of Druze militiamen associated with the Lebanese National Movement.

The significance of these events for our purposes is as follows. One, they highlight the shift of Israel's attention from the South to the North. Two, they underscore the impossibility of blaming and legitimizing any single party as fighting in a "just" war in the Middle East in general and Lebanon in this specific instance. In 1976, Syrian troops arming Maronites massacred even more Palestinians than Israel did in 1982; without minimizing the plight of Palestinian victims, memory of the Tel Zaatar massacre has fallen into oblivion despite the far greater number of Palestinian deaths to what took place in 1982. Syria behaved quite analogously to Israel in undertaking operations against the PLO causing suffering to Palestinian civilians, doing so through proxies via Christian militias. In 1984, Israel *withdrew* from

protecting the Maronites, bearing guilt for their massacre for not arming them against the Druze, who in the Lebanese imbroglio, were allies of the PLO.

Salim Yaqub, in *Imperfect Strangers*,[178] draws attention to the transnational history of American relations with the region during the 1977-83 period, focusing centrally on the rise of Arab-American lobbying in the United States at this time. Yaqub focuses on the role that Arab-American lobbying played in "tilting" American Middle East policy toward Arab interests, particularly but not exclusively during the Carter years, climaxing in Carter's negotiations with the PLO during the Camp David process, against the opposition of Israeli Prime Minister Begin. The value to historiography of the transnationalism of Begin's foreign relations is the insight it provides into the innate dynamics of Middle Eastern history unfolding on their own that were not initiated by US policy.

Intriguingly, Yaqub's emphasis, unlike Maqdisi's, is not on the exclusion of the Palestinians from peace negotiations but rather the opening of new channels between Washington and the PLO, evidenced by, in his account, the PLO's attempt to mediate between Washington and Tehran during the Iran Hostage Crisis. In the United States, though, such trends as growing American commercial oil interests in the region; the expansion of Arab American immigrants' lobbying vis-à-vis Washington, such as the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee; and the proliferation of Black-Arab solidarity were the central transnational trends. According to Yaqub, specific events of relevance during this period include the Andrew Young Affair, the African-American UN Ambassador appointed to his post by Carter, who was fired for his illicit contacts and talks with the PLO; the Bert Lance Affair, the scandal which played out in the Jimmy Carter administration implicating Lance, Carter's Office of Management and Budget director, with illicit contacts with Arab financiers connected with BCCI (the Bank of Credit and Commerce International); and the Richard Shadyac affair, whereby Shadyac, working as a foreign agent on behalf of the Libyan government, gave Jimmy Carter's brother Billy a $220,000 loan, creating an embarrassing

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[178]Salim Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs and US-Middle East Relations in the 1970s.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016.

scandal during Carter's reelection campaign. These all testify to the preponderance of *transnational* factors that transcended grand strategy.

In Michael Oren's *Power, Faith and Fantasy*,[179] the central theme of his depiction of the years 1977-83 highlights the rise of Islamic extremism. In Oren's work, the Iran Hostage Crisis and the assassination of Anwar Sadat are two sides of the same coin; the arming of the Afghan *mujahedin* is similarly treated. The thrust of *Power, Faith and Fantasy* is also the theme of naivete via conjured images. In Oren's work, American naivete about the region also derived from religious stereotypes of the "land of the Bible", which were so pervasive that the US could not accept the "real" Middle East's sadism and realpolitik. Proper diplomacy was impossible for the United States, degenerating repeatedly into either outright appeasement or spiralling into warfare.

In Begin's years, this is seen in the Iran-Iraq War's outbreak with the rise of Islamic Revolution centered in Iran, and the blatant appeasement of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in order to combat it. The image of the "Barbary Wars" in American memory would be relived in crisis after crisis in the Middle East, as the counter-memory to naïve religious thinking. In Oren's account as well, the transnational travel of perceptions through the intertwined *cross-cultural* histories of contemporary American and Middle Eastern history transcends the strategic logic of interests in explaining contemporary Middle Eastern diplomatic history.

The Social Relations of Private Diplomacy

An exclusive focus on grand strategy, both in the narration of Middle Eastern history and in the prescription of policy proposals, likewise overlooks the importance of the human element manifest in the intra- and inter-group negotiations playing out in the Begin period: between the Israeli and Egyptian negotiating teams (and between them and the American leadership), on the one hand, and between

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[179]Michael Oren, *Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1777 to the Present*. New York: Norton & Co., 2008.

competing individuals and factions within the respective teams such that participants in these enterprises also require peacemaking skills *among one another*. The lesson is that it is wrong to think about strategy without thinking about *teamwork.* In international relations, self-nullification for the benefit of the team is no less important than self-interest for the benefit of the country. How the individuals cooperated with one another is just as central to the story as how the states involved did.

One testament to the *social relations* of Israeli foreign policy during the Begin years manifests in the memoir of Yair Hirschfeld, one of the pioneers of track-two diplomacy. As Yair Hirschfeld (who in 1993 would be among the lead negotiators of the Oslo accord with the PLO), reveals, he himself personally participated the first track-two diplomacy initiative of contemporary Israeli diplomatic history during the years of Begin's tenure. He participated in such with Palestinian leadership concomitantly to the "official" Begin-Sadat negotiations. In one theatre of these track-two talks, left-wing Israeli politicians close to Shimon Peres and the Labour Party attempted to reach agreements with their Palestinian counterparts through non-official channels in order to reach understandings about future peace negotiations that were anticipated to occur should the Labour party defeat Begin's Likud in subsequent elections. In another theatre, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky initiated contacts with Hirschfeld and PLO representatives. Hirschfeld, as an academic and a non-politician, was able to make contact with unofficial representatives of the PLO through Austria's mediation in a manner that would foreshadow Norway's role in the Oslo negotiations. Although the process broke down, the "failure" of track two diplomacy in this episode is arguably no less important than the "success" of the official Camp David talks.

This is so because the accumulated "lessons learned" from the continued failures of such talks between Begin's time through the 1980s until Yitzhak Rabin's tenure ultimately climaxed in the Oslo negotiations of 1993. In a third theatre of track two diplomacy as discussed by Hirschfeld, the two diplomacies – the *non-official* Israeli-Palestinian track two diplomacy and the *official* Israeli-Egyptian summit diplomacy -- competed with one another. As Hirschfeld explains, the track-two process involved rivals to Begin and Sadat on both the Arab and Israeli sides. These included PLO representatives more open to dialogue with Israel than the official leadership was; Jordan, whose prestige was over-shadowed

by Sadat's initiative; and Shimon Peres and the Israeli Labour Party who themselves were fierce rivals of Begin's Likud. To understand the inter- and intra-group dynamics in play in the track-two negotiations requires an analytical lens of competitive politics as the two diplomatic processes required their opposite's failure in order to legitimize themselves.

Private Peace Entrepreneurs

The initiative described by Hirschfeld testifies to the role of private citizens overcoming and transcending the factionalism otherwise embedded in governmental bureaucracies. Indeed, as Lior Lehrs describes, private peace entrepreneurs (ppes) are individual, private citizens with no official authority who initiate diplomatic correspondence with official representatives from the opposing side during a conflict in order to promote a conflict resolution process. The advantage they offer manifests in the resources of knowledge, expertise and ideas they wield. Unofficial meetings and correspondence they undertake with the other side of the conflict provides them with important knowledge resources, and when there are no communication channels with the other side, these resources are also exclusive. Through their boundary-traversing activities, private peace entrepreneurs develop this resource which further facilitates these activities. They are exposed to information about the figureheads, opinions, disagreements, internal processes and trends on the other sides. Over time they acquire abilities and tools that enable them to develop a strong familiarity with various topics and perspectives that reveal much about the rival side and the relationship between the hostile parties. This information can often be even more reliable and significant than the information than the information accumulated by official governmental institutions have. The left-wing activist Uri Avnery, who, as a private peace entrepreneur himself, met with leading PLO figures since the mid-1970s. In 1981 he said, "Foreign Minister Shamir has important information from his resources . . . I permit myself to say that my friends and I have information resources of our own, maybe not much worse."

A different example is Gershon Baskin, an Israeli private peace entrepreneur who managed to create a direct communication channel with Hamas's military wing in Gaza. Consequently, David Meidan, who oversaw Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's efforts to bring home captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, chose to use Baskin and his channel to negotiate with Hamas. Meidan was willing to relay messages back and forth through Baskin to Deputy Foreign Minister Ghazi Hamad and Ahmed Jabari, the head of Hamas's military wing, with whom Baskin was personally in contact with. If private peace entrepreneurs have access to decision makers on their own side, this access can be an important power resource in the eyes of their partners on the rival side of the conflict. In 1987, the Israeli private peace entrepreneur Moshe Amirav initiated an unofficial communication channel with Palestinian representatives, their acquiescence and support of the PLO leadership for the initiative, based was based on their perception that Amirav enjoyed close relations with key leaders in the Likud party and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Moreover, ideas that are developed within the private peace entrepreneurs' sphere of activities are based on a dialogue with representatives from the rival side and on feedback that the entrepreneurs receive from them. This interactivity provides an important advantage over the development of ideas within a single-nation brainstorming group or think tank. The different power resources between the sides can relate to one another and mutual interactions can exist between such power differentials. For instance, notes Lehrs, "resources of action can lead to resources of knowledge. Also, spiritual authority can provide, under some conditions, access to decision makers and important actors, while the power of continuity can assist in creating expertise or building a wide network and contacts."

Some entrepreneurs carry intellectual authority. They can be intellectuals, writers or academics who possess "cultural capital" and "symbolic capital as well as their independence. Lehrs cites Professor Judah Leon Magnes, the first president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, as an example. Lehrs points out that although "he lacked official status and his private efforts to promote a Jewish-Arab agreement were very controversial and unpopular in Jewish public opinion, he was considered an important player in the political and diplomatic spheres in Eretz Israel/Palestine during the British

mandate, largely because of his intellectual status." Other entrepreneurs possess the power of continuity.

In diplomatic and political systems characterized by high rates of turnover, with ministers, ambassadors and advisers changing frequently, private entrepreneurs offer the advantage of steadiness and stability in terms of personal relations and experience. This is a major power resource since most entrepreneurs possess the characteristics of stubbornness and persistence. Lehrs notes: "The Sisyphean ability of ppes to keep trying again and again, even after many failures, objections, and criticism, and to keep focusing their efforts on one clear goal over long periods of time is a major power resource."

Networks

Many entrepreneurs wield international networks and access to diplomatic circles and key figures in the relevant states. This is especially the case when the private entrepreneurs are former officials. Israeli entrepreneurs Yossi Beilin and Nimrod Novik attempted thus during the first tenure of Prime Minister Netanyahu (1996-99). Although neither men had official status, they were still involved in efforts alongside Palestinian officials to save the peace process with the PLO from the crisis it was facing, using channels of access they acquired over the years in the context of their official status. Beilin worked with the European Community and Novik worked with Egypt. Among the Americans, Dennis Ross was more accessible for Beilin, while Daniel Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller and Robert Malley were more accessible for Novik. Another private peace entrepreneur, Alon Liel, a former Israeli diplomat, attempted a private peace initiative with Syria (2004-2006) and used his networks with the Turkish government and later the Swiss government to promote the initiative and urge the Israeli government to bring an official to the negotiation channel. Lehrs suggests that it is often difficult to determine whether the indifference on the part of policymakers is closer to "passive opposition" or to "silent consent." In 1970, Nahum Goldmann, who was the president of the World Jewish Congress, reported to Prime Minister Golda Meir that he had received an invitation to meet, as a private citizen, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser in

Cairo. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Foreign Minister Abba Eban did not authorize Goldmann to conduct this mission.[180]

Three, attention paid to inter- and intra-group relations highlights how foreign policy decisions emerge out of rivalries between interests, agencies, ideologies and personalities within the governmental bureaucracies. This is so because hostile factions seek to "prove" that their experience and perspective within the foreign policy system are distinct and unique. This plays out in strife between advisors to the head of state, between worldviews and philosophies reflecting variant ways of learning about the external world, and disagreements over the logistical possibilities of what is "achievable" abroad. The problems faced by the track-two diplomacy initiatives were largely those of factionalism. Hirschfeld notes how "the kiss of death came from the PLO." The PLO feared "losing control over most of the Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories, and thus asserted political pressure and threats to prevent meaningful Palestinian support for the effort. Later on, this led to the assassinations of Fahd Qawassme and Zafer al-Masri by PLO splinter groups that wanted to assert their power and control over events."[181]

In September 1980, a Palestinian delegation of pro-Jordanian and pro-PLO activists went to Vienna. In Qawassme's absence, the delegation's leading personalities were Khalid Iseily, who would later succeed Qawassme as mayor of Hebron; Kamal Hassouneh, a leading West Bank industrialist from Hebron; and Rajah Salti, a Greek Orthodox industrialist from Ramallah. To avoid provoking Israel, the members of the delegation were all known businessmen who had refrained from taking political positions, of whom some had even enjoyed Israeli subsidies. Bruno Kreisky's initial overtures of promised economic aid resulted in unrealistic Palestinian expectations that frightened Kreisky and his aides into feeling that Austria was making commitments that it could not uphold. "While no practical results were achieved, the visit was an important beginning of an unfolding process in search of Palestinian self-government." In August 1983, Hirschfeld, under Yossi Beilin's leadership, chaired an effort to prepare policy ideas for Shimon Peres and to test potential support from within the Israeli Labour Party and the

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[180]Lior Lehrs, "Private Peace Entrepreneurs in Conflict Resolution Processes." *International Negotiation* 21:3 (2016), pp. 381-408

[181]Hirschfeld, *Track Two Diplomacy,* pp. 32-33

relevant government authorities. He undertook to listen to a wide range of Palestinian positions to identify common interests and possible policy approaches, then tested those ideas by speaking with Israeli experts and government officials while evaluating ongoing tendencies on the ground that could become barriers to implementing such policies tangibly.

Discussions were held with leading Palestinian administrators, journalists, business people and intellectuals including Mustafa Nabi Natche of Hebron and Karim Khalaf of Ramallah, the journalists Raymonda Tawwil, the mother of Suha Arafat, wife of Yasser Arafat, and Ibrahim Kar'im, business people such as Kamal Hassouneh from Hebron and Ibrahim Abdul Hadi from Nablus, as well as intellectuals such as Sari Nusseibeh. The planning effort combined discussions with Palestinian counterparts, with American interlocutors and with Israeli experts and officials. Hirschfeld recalls: "I assume that after these first meetings, our Palestinian interlocutors checked us out, and only when they understood that our small group was politically relevant were they prepared to discuss emerging policy options more openly and freely. As a result, the second round was devoted to the question of the necessary conditions for bringing about peace negotiations."[182]

Beilin and Hirschfeld

In early 1982, Beilin and Hirschfeld started to work on a five-component strategic concept. At the time there were preparations in Israel for the full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and intensification of Israeli-Egyptian economic relations that were intended to benefit the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Beilin and Hirschfeld developed the following five-point proposal to Shimon Peres. One: Establish an international committee in charge of financing and overseeing the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for economic aid to the West Bank and Gaza, as well as for Israeli activities in Africa, especially in Egypt. Two: Establish a professional committee from the West Bank and Gaza to lead and oversee development

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[182]Ibid, pp. 33-34

in agriculture, regional planning, education, health, social services and other spheres. Three: Establish a parallel legal committee. Four: Permit the established international committee to negotiate an economic development plan for the West Bank and Gaza with the Palestinian and Israeli committees. Five: Permit the established international committee to negotiate Israeli involvement in Asia and Africa, including Egypt, with the Israeli team. In February 1982, after Hirschfeld submitted this proposal to Shimon Peres, Elias Freij, the Palestinian mayor of Bethlehem, published his proposal for a Palestinian Peace Initiative in the *Washington Post*. Freij suggested that the Palestinians "recognize the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign and independent state within defined and internationally recognized border on a reciprocal, mutual and simultaneous basis," and that "an Israeli proposal "to give us our right to self-determination, and to reach it in stages, might be considered."

In reaction to this proposal, Hirschfeld remembers his response as follows: The idea of recognizing the Palestinians' right to self-determination in stages "clicked with me. In teaching my students about the content of self-determination, I had fancifully compared the right to self-determination, I had fancifully compared the right to self-determination to a large cupboard with many drawers and compartments. I had argued that in the modern world, some of the drawers in the 'cupboard of self-determination' could be given up voluntarily—as in the case of the European Union, which enacted provisions that clearly impeded some of the sovereign rights of its member states." Other compartments of self-determination and national sovereignty might be limited by agreements—as was the case in the deployment of Egyptian armed forces in Sinai, which by agreement were confined to specific areas of Sinai and were prohibited from being stationed closer to the Israeli border, "even though Egypt had unquestioned sovereignty over the entire Sinai Peninsula. In line with this way of thinking, I argued, it should be possible to offer the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank the right of self-determination with regard to economic development." "I wanted to be able to respond to Mayor Freij's proposal with two trump cards in my hand: backing from Peres (and the ILP), and an international support structure. I

received cautious approval from Peres and Beilin to prepare the suggested initiative in cooperation with Kreisky, Dingels, Budtz and Carlsson."[183]

On November 21, 1982, notes Hirschfeld, he was invited to Peres's home in the Ramat Aviv neighbourhood of Tel Aviv for the first time, to attend a meeting with Shawwa. The meeting would focus on the substance of a prospective Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement. Shawwa was accompanied by his son, Mansur, and all sorts of nuts, fruit and desserts were laid out for all to eat, although "Peres and Shawwa were both fully immersed in their conversation and did not partake of any of the temptations on the table, and I was too shy to touch anything." In the sitting, Peres commented that he sought a peace agreement with Jordan but saw negotiations on Palestinian self-government "as a possible and constructive step toward an Israeli-Jordanian peace solution, rather than as his first choice." Peres felt that "negotiations over the powers of a self-government body were not the essential matter at hand; more important was the creation of a new reality and momentum toward a final peace agreement."

The social relations of the participants in this interaction during Begin's time operated outside the logic and confines of grand strategy.

Shimon Peres

Peres envisioned a joint Israeli-Palestinian administration based on a 50:50 approach wherein the Palestinians would have the right to vote. Peres said to Shawwa: "You could adopt procrastinating tactics; make all kinds of inquiries. The decision would have to be taken together. True, you would be dependent on the Israeli side, but the Israeli side would also be dependent on you." In April 1983, negotiations between King Hussein of Jordan and Arafat collapsed. Shawwa suggested that the Jordanian-Palestinian

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[183]Ibid, pp. 22-24

talks be revived by including the Soviet Union and to offer further incentives to the PLO. Recalls Hirschfeld: "Unfortunately, the dialogue between Peres and the pro-Jordanian Palestinian mayors could not prevent the failure of the Hussein-Arafat dialogue. Nor could it offer any public support for King Hussein to proceed without the PLO and Arafat's endorsement. Nevertheless, these discussions set off an important exchange of ideas that would have an impact upon the policy planning of the future Peres government. Beilin and I made an effort to follow up on Shawwa's suggestions. When, a year after the failure of the Hussein-Arafat negotiations, Kurtzer from the American Embassy paid a visit to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, we were informed that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia would support King Hussein's role in the negotiations only if King Hussein reached an agreement with Chairman Arafat beforehand."[184]

Shawwa also suggested that if Arafat tried to block negotiations, there should be a return to step one and negotiations between Israel and Jordan in order to return the Gaza Strip to Egypt and the West Bank to Jordan. Comments Hirschfeld: "Nobody else made the same proposal. Although Israeli policymakers might have liked the idea, it was completely detached from the political and diplomatic reality determining US and Arab policies."[185] The inter- and intra-group relations among the participants is the core lesson of the interactions, rather than the strategic relations between state actors.

Austria

The "how" of negotiations also transcends the policy substance of the negotiations in how Hirschfeld accounts for the beginning of his involvement in the track two process. According to Hirschfeld's account, he first started to participate in the track-two process in 1979. That February, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran sparking the Iranian Revolution, he was invited by Austrian TV to participate in a discussion on the crisis in Iran. After this appearance, he was approached by Bruno Kreisky, Austria's chancellor, to meet with him. Kreisky had previously organized track-two

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[184]Ibid, pp. 27-28

[185]Ibid, pp. 34-35

negotiations between representatives of the PLO and Arieh Eliav, the former secretary-general of the Israeli Labour Party, and Uri Avnery, who at the time had just founded in 1975 the Israeli Council on Israeli-Palestinian Peace.

After the meeting, PLO representative Izzam Sartawi wrote a letter to Kreisky which was written on the letterhead of the Hotel Imperial in Vienna, rather than on PLO letterhead, in order to prevent the document from appearing to be an official PLO policy statement. In the letter, Sartawi warned that any American and Israeli attempt to circumvent the PLO by negotiating with Egypt instead would lead to a Middle Eastern conflagration; that Israel withdraw from territories occupied in 1967; and in return offered a commitment to "nonbelligerency" rather than peace. Sartawi wrote that "peace" would only be possible if Israel "accepted and implemented" that Arab refugees return to their original homes if they wished to do so or else be compensated. In Hirschfeld's words: "The hardly hidden threatening tone of Sartawi's letter, the excessive demands, and the unwillingness to offer peace but instead only a rather dubious concept of nonbelligerency cause these track-two negotiations end in failure. Nonetheless, Kreisky remained committed to playing an important role in promoting peace in the Middle East."

When Kreisky asked to see him, Hirschfeld hoped to receive professionally valuable input with regard to the political thinking of the new Israeli leadership under the Likud. Kreisky's dialogues with Hirschfeld were helped by Kreisky's being Jewish. As Hirschfeld recounts, "Our first meeting in February 1979 was a success. Kreisky a great cultural affinity with my parents; they spoke the same language and cracked the same jokes, their intonations of speech were almost identical, and most important, they shared the ideology of the Austrian Social Democratic movement. When Kreisky called me at my parents' house, my mother would answer and say to him, 'Your phone call brings sunshine and light to my heart.' This was not flattery; she really meant it. This shared Austro-Jewish background provided a sociocultural atmosphere that eased and supported our dialogue."[186]

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[186]Hirschfeld, *Track Two Diplomacy,* Op. Cit., pp. 9-10

In summary, Israeli-Arab relations during the Begin years cannot solely be accounted for by attention to the strategic aspects of Begin's foreign policy. Hirschfeld's account testifies to the role of private diplomacy between Israel and its Arab counterparts simultaneously. The factionalism of competing factions among Israeli and Palestinian parties highlights the social character of events during this period.

The Social Logic of Israeli-Druze Relations

Abraham Ben-Zvi's history of the US-Israeli relationship comments on the Lebanon War as follows: "Thus, although the Reagan inner circle desired a rapid agreement in Lebanon incorporating an early Israeli withdrawal, Israel's fears that an early agreement would intensify pressures to implement the Reagan Peace Plan tilted the balance in its favor. Israel was determined, in view of the costs it had endured in the course of the war, to frustrate any agreement that failed to take into account at least some of its basic objectives—among them security arrangements in southern Lebanon, as well as some measure of normalization with its northern neighbor." Thus, Israel "remained unwavering in its opposition to any 'withdrawal first' formula. Similarly, it remained reluctant, during the period preceding Jordan's decision not to join the negotiating process, to significantly modify its position regarding the basic components of an agreement with Lebanon."[187]

But Ben-Zvi only highlights a strategic reality. Jewish-Druze relations in Israel are grounded mostly in the *cross-cultural* spillover of Israel's involvement in Lebanon and in the identity politics of the Druze community. The inability of American foreign policy to interact with the cultures of the Middle East on their own terms is the cause of the oblivion and misunderstanding of the place of Druze social

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[187]Abraham Ben-Zvi, *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 151-52

relations in the Middle Eastern political tapestry. Jewish-Druze relations in Israel follow a logic and dynamic of their own.

Let us consider the social relations of the Israeli Druze vis-à-vis the Israeli government and toward their Muslim and Christian neighbours. The significance of this discussion of Jewish-Druze relations in Israeli politics is to highlight the shifting currents of Israeli domestic politics during and after Begin's time.

Inasmuch as Druze inter-communal relations are inextricable from their *intra*-communal relations, their voting patterns in Israeli elections pertain only minimally to concerns about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli security. Instead, concerns that the Druze express in elections pertain to their relations with Israeli Christians and Muslims, to majority-minority relations between the Druze and the Jewish community, narrowly-defined, and to the larger complexities of Jewish relations with the broader Arab minority, which affect the Druze in their Arab identity even if their religious identity leads to different dilemmas vis-à-vis Israeli Muslims and Christians.

While it is possible to detect a demographic shift toward religious traditionalism, territorial attachment to the West Bank and retaliation toward Palestinian terrorism as shifts in Israel's polity's social psychology since the late 1970s, these trends were under way before 1977 and continued even under Labour governments and with Labour electoral victories despite Labour governments' advocacy of peace, a two-state solution and accommodation of the Palestinians. This underscores the importance of adopting a *cross-cultural* perspective to Israeli external relations in their domestic aspect, especially as they stem from the outcomes of elections.

For 1977 was not only the year of Menachem Begin's election; it was the year of Kamal Jumblatt's assassination in Lebanon, presumably at the hands of Syria. As fault lines emerged between Israeli forces and their Maronite allies, on one side, and the alignment of the Marxist militias of the PLO and Druze LNM on the other, areas of mixed Christian-Muslim population gradually became homogenized sectarian enclaves. For example, Christians fled the mountains of East Beirut and other areas of their community's concentration, such as Baabda, Kisirwan and Jubayl, after the massacre of 177

of their Maronite co-religionists by vengeful Druze following Kamal Jumblatt's assassination in 1977. In order to escape retaliation by the Maronites for this massacre, Druze were forced to leave their jobs and homes in Christian areas, while Christians fled from Druze areas analogously during the Chouf Massacre of 1983.

Despite this exodus, Christians were still victims of car bombs, random shellings and other atrocities. As news of the confiscation by Druze of abandoned Christian properties spread, displaced families worried about whether they would be able to return to their homes after the conflict ended. Temporary dwellings in displacement soon became permanent places of residence. Yet one of the consequences of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the opening it gave to the Christian Maronite Lebanese forces to penetrate the mountainous areas of their Druze adversaries, such as the presidential palace in Baabda and keep the Beirut International Airport from falling back into Druze hands after Israel's withdrawal. In response, the Druze in retaliation defeated the Lebanese Forces in September 1983, causing the flight of thousands of Christians, who could not return until Lebanon initiated a resettlement program in 1992.

Lebanon Border Crossings

The impact of the Begin years on the Druze and Israeli-Druze relations manifested also in the opening of the Israel-Lebanon border after 1982, which enabled religious Israeli Druze to study Druze faith and wisdom in Khalwat al-Bayada, Lebanon, the Druze spiritual and religious center.[188] The opening of the Israeli-Lebanese border as a result of the 1982 war enabled numerous Israeli Druze to study there and build communal bonds with the Lebanese Druze, resulting in complications of identity and loyalty after 2000 when, after Israel's pullout from South Lebanon, the border was again closed. As a consequence of the border opening, hundreds of Lebanese Druze found jobs in Israel, especially in Druze

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[188]Asher Kaufman, "Belonging and Continuity: Israeli Druze and Lebanon, 1982-2000." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 48 (2016), pp. 635-54

villages. In the village of Yarka, Israel, for instance, the war caused a major economic boom, making it the commercial hub of the western Galilee. This took place when some members of the village used their access to Lebanon to amass significant wealth through licit and illicit trade.

This wealth penetrated Yarka, catalyzing its economic upsurge. Israeli state officials even facilitated these exchanges. Nissim Dana, a staff officer of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in charge of the Druze in the Golan Heights, opened a special office in Nahariya to handle cases of Druze seeking to visit Lebanon for religious purposes, in 1982. The Ministry of the Interior also issued permits for Druze who wished to cross the border for religious, business or family purposes, and even had its own administrative wing—the Civil Relief Headquarters in the Lebanon Division—that facilitated the entrance of Druze (and other civilians) into Lebanon. At the same time, hundreds of Lebanese Druze were granted permits to work in Israel, provided that their families were affiliated with the pro-Israel South Lebanon Army.

At the same time, Israeli and Druze interests also collided. Israel's policies during the Lebanon war to support its Maronite Christian allies contributed to Israeli Druze solidifying ties with their Lebanese brethren to support Israel's adversaries. Scores of Israeli Druze soldiers defected to help their Lebanese Druze brethren in their military struggle against the Phalanges. In addition, in Israel the Druze Monitoring Committee was founded in order to pressure the Israeli government to alter its policies in Lebanon and protect the Lebanese Druze.

Golan Protests

As Ahron Bregman records, Menachem Begin's annexation of the Golan Heights contributed to Druze social resistance against the Israeli state and military. When the Knesset in 1980 amended the Law of Nationality, enabling the granting of Israeli citizenship to the Golani Druze, Bregman notes that part of the purpose of this law was to make Israel's annexation of the Golan easier by enticing the Druze into

identifying as Israelis rather than Syrians. Israel offered the Druze such incentives as low taxation, higher water quotas and faster responses on building permits, which the majority of Druze rejected.

In March 1981, the leaders of the Druze community held a meeting at the Druze worship site in Majdal Shams, the khaluwe, attended by 6000 people, declaring that the Golan is "an integral part of the Arab Syrian territory" and that "the Syrian Arab nationality is an inherent inseparable character that will pass on from fathers to children." The elders rejected Israel's attempt to "mingle us into the Israeli entity" to "deprive us of our Syrian Arab nationality" and threatened that any Druze who embraced Israeli nationality "shall be apostate and renegade from our religion and social integrity. All and every kind of trading, sharing is sorrows and joys and inter-marriage with him shall be banned until he acknowledges his sin, repents, asks forgiveness from his society and restores his real nationality so that he is reinstated within us." Anyone who does so "humiliates our dignity, violates our national honour, recants our Religion, breaches our traditions and is considered a traitor to our country."[189]

When Israel annexed the Golan Heights in December 1981, the Druze of the Golan responded by denouncing Israel, attacking military vehicles and not allowing teachers and students to attend school. In February 1982, thousands of Jews gathered in Majdal Shams and declared an open-ended strike in solidarity with Syria. Under Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel dispatched hundreds of troops and imposed a full blockade on the Golan, cutting off transportation in and out of the area, preventing food from entering, and cutting off the supply of water and electricity.

Many Druze responded by rejecting Israeli ID cards and excommunicating any Golanis who accepted them by cutting off any association with them, even for funerals and weddings. The Druze strike lasted more than five months and was remembered among the Druze for cultivating self-reliance and social progress: women were empowered, resources cut off by Israel were replaced through communal sharing, female graduation from secondary school increased, leading to higher matriculation rates in

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[189]Ahron Bregman, *Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories.* New York: Allen Lane, 2014, pp. 124-25

Israeli universities and abroad, and the influence and status of the religious and traditional leadership of the Druze which stood firm behind the protest was increased.[190]

After Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and the weakening of the Druze LNM (Lebanese National Movement) and PSP (Progressive Socialist Party) movements during the course of the war, Druze influence in Lebanon weakened and floundered. The victory of Syrian-backed forces in Lebanon brought about constitutional changes and shifts in facts on the ground that Christian leaders perceived as inimical to their interests. The Taif Accord signed in 1989 required amendments to the constitution to grant Muslims greater political influence while effectively granting Syria a free hand in Lebanese affairs. In 1992, a large portion of Lebanese Christians boycotted the parliamentary elections to protest against Syria's growing influence, but the elections proceeded without them, and the new political balance of power diminished Christian representation.

Since most Christian leaders were in exile in France, the Maronite patriarch assumed the role of principal spokesman for the exiled opposition, yet he was resentful of Jumblatt's appointment of Minister for Displaced Persons, since Jumblatt himself, in their eyes, was the very man whose forces caused the Christians' displacement in the first place. In Christian eyes, Jumblatt's appointment embodied the government's cynical attitude toward national reconciliation. For what ignited the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s was the threat to Christians of Druze hegemony in lands claimed and disputed by both, while the Druze sought to challenge the conservative dominance of Maronite Christians and their Muslim allies in Lebanese affairs. The Christians, though, feared the disruption of the country's delicate ethnic balance by the entry into Lebanon of massive numbers of Palestinian refugees who soon enough allied with the Maronites' rivals, the Druze, in the alliance between the LNM and the PLO in the civil war years.[191]

Judith Harik points out that, as emigrants abroad returned to Lebanon, Druze and Christian returnees continued to have significant fears of the opposing community. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, in 1992, was appointed Minister of Displaced Persons, overseeing the situation of returnees, but in this

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[190]Bregman, *Cursed Victory,* pp. 125-28

[191]Judith Harik, "The Return of the Displaced and Christian-Muslim Integration in Postwar Lebanon." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 10:2 (1999), pp. 159-75

position, amid Syria's hegemony over Lebanon, his power was held in check by his need to follow the Syrian line. That said, his post allowed him to expand his clientele network. In Harik's observation, "Such an opportunity—surely one of the spoils of the civil war—suggests that he is likely to pay close attention to security issues which could interrupt or set back the process he and his assistants are orchestrating."[192]

The transnationalism of Israeli-Arab relations during Begin's tenure is of no less significance to the diplomatic history of the 1977-83 years than the grand strategy of local external powers. Above, I have attempted to show how factionalism among Lebanese Druze and Israeli Druze are interrelated. The transnational character of Israeli interactions "between" the Arab Middle East and the West call for this shift in interpretive perspective.

Conclusion

Without negating the value of understanding the complexity of Israeli history in the 1977-83 years in isolation from wider regional developments and to see the US-Israeli relationship as complicated enough as to warrant its own separate treatment, the purpose of the chapter above has been to suggest ways that an integrated historical narrative of diplomatic history during this period can see Israeli and Arab interactions as interlinked. Strategy and dialogue should not be considered mutually exclusive. Grand strategy thinking either presumes that the relationship between Great Powers and their local small state allies can be treated separately from the larger integrated regional social reality, or that local rivalries are so intractably insurmountable that local actors cannot cooperate with one another on their own.

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[192]Harik, "Return of the Displaced," pp. 170-71.

The purpose of this chapter has been to relate anecdotes, episodes and obscure events of the Menachem Begin period (1977-83) which highlight the interpenetration of Israeli internal politics with external regional reality in one cross-cultural "social tapestry." It has discussed the intimacy of private diplomacy between Israeli and Palestinian interlocutors, the response of Israel's bureaucracy to the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, and the relations between Israel and the Druze of the Golan, the Galilee and Lebanon. These "peripheral" events that are not central to popular perceptions of Begin's foreign policy. Nevertheless, they highlight the social character of Israeli-Arab cross-cultural relations in a transnational reality intrinsic component to the history of the Begin years. Social relations in their cross-cultural character explain Israeli-Arab relations no less accurately as a strategic lens does.

Israeli politics follows a *cross-cultural* social logic that is only somewhat oriented to grand strategy*; transnational history* explains more than grand strategy does by highlighting the symbiosis of Israeli and Arab factionalisms in motivating conflicts to spill over as a result of the inter-connected *social* tapestry of Middle Eastern history. I have attempted to show this in the analysis above of Israeli foreign relations during the Begin years by highlighting the following: the internationalization of the Israeli confrontation with the PLO, the Israeli-Palestinian private diplomacy sponsored by Austria, and the consequences on Jewish-Druze relations of the Israeli-Lebanese war.

Chapter 6. "Smallness and Spontaneity: Unforeseen Events and Hypothetical Thinking in Israeli Foreign

Policy, 1977-83."

Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is to point out that it is more accurate to contemplate Israeli foreign policy as unfolding in reaction to unforeseen events than according to the logic of any particular grand strategy. That is to say, with emphasis on the tenure of Menachem Begin, 1977-1983, it will be suggested that hypothetical thinking, rather than grand strategy, is the more accurate lens to contemplate Israeli foreign policy. Israeli foreign policy should be understood to be a story of improvisation rather than grand strategy. I will explain this with reference to several obscure episodes during Begin's premiership. These include the threat by Turkey to block the *Aliyah* to Israel of Iranian Jews in retaliation for Israel's holding of a conference commemorating the Armenian Genocide in 1982, Israel's concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program, the interaction between the Lebanese Civil War and the threat to Israel posed by Iraq, the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the problems of Palestinian terrorism of Soviet espionage in Israel during and prior to the Begin years, and the consequences of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. In each of these episodes, it will be stressed that Israeli foreign policy was largely reactive to external events. Instead of unfolding a specific grand strategy, Israel improvised its response to regional circumstances beyond its control. This chapter makes the case for a more comprehensive understanding of Israeli foreign relations under Begin.

Introduction

Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 is widely remembered in popular memory as the most significant event in Menachem Begin's foreign policy due to its legacy in subsequent debates over pre-emptive strikes and preventive warfare. Supporters and opponents alike have cited the precedent of Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor to make arguments both for and against future attempts at pre-emptive and preventive warfare, such as in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War and the possibility of an Israeli or American strike on Iran's nuclear program. I intend to suggest that the "hegemony" of the

memory of the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor as the "central" legacy of Menachem Begin's foreign policy overlooks the lessons that can be learned from other lesser-known and collectively-forgotten episodes during Begin's tenure. These episodes were of the character of unforeseen events.

The significance of suggesting that Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor is not necessarily the "most pivotal" event of Begin's tenure contributes to the argument that this larger study is attempting to make: that grand strategy is an inaccurate concept and paradigm to understand the history of Israeli foreign policy in particular and the history of Middle Eastern international relations more broadly.

The episodes under discussion below encompass the threat by Turkey to block the *Aliyah* to Israel of Iranian Jews in retaliation for Israel's holding of a conference commemorating the Armenian Genocide in 1982, Israel's concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program, the interaction between the Lebanese Civil War and the threat to Israel posed by Iraq, the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, the problems of Palestinian terrorism of Soviet espionage in Israel during and prior to the Begin years, and the rescue of the Jews of Ethiopia.

Context

Is grand strategy relevant to contemporary Middle Eastern diplomatic history? Previous chapters of this study have suggested that Israel's foreign relations with Middle Eastern countries during the period of Menachem Begin's tenure (1977-83) followed a *social* rather than a *strategic* logic.

Inasmuch as 'grand strategy' thinking toward the Middle East, both in the form of foreign policy writing and historiography, overlooks and misunderstands the social character of Middle Eastern history and politics, how can scholarship on Israeli-Middle Eastern relations be improved to take account of the deeper social dimensions in play? The chapter at hand will probe the social logic of *short-term thinking* as manifest in the characteristic *improvisation and spontaneity* constituting the history of Israeli decision-making in general and the period of Menachem Begin's tenure in particular.

The social character of *happenstance* in Israeli decision-making has been probed in recent scholarship. Specifically, Charles Freilich, who served in Israel's National Security Council, has observed: "Hard to accept as it may be, on most issues there simply *is no official policy* (Freilich's italics), and senior officials, often the entire system, operate in ignorance thereof, relying on guesstimates of what they believe it to be." Freilich stresses: "Typically reflecting the simple absence of a systematically formulated policy, only partially articulated positions, or the conflicted policies often enunciated by the premier and other ministers, this also results from a conscious decision on the part of premiers to keep it that way."

The episodes to be recounted below suggest a different reason for the spontaneous and improvised character of Israel's foreign policy during the Begin years: the approaches taken by Israel to local regional crises were marred not only by problems in Israel's bureaucracy but by the social character of Israeli dependency on third parties. Local Middle Eastern and international politics during the late Cold War period played out according to trends in the domestic politics and foreign policies of others that no Israeli 'grand strategy,' even if it existed, could control.

'Grand strategy' thinking presumes an "omnipotence" on the part of countries it is prescribed and ascribed to. This "omnipotence" is an illusion, particularly in a small state such as Israel and in a region such as the Middle East characterized by a constellation of feuding small states. 'Grand strategy' in the history of Israeli foreign policy is non-existent due to the severe limitations of dependency in the unavoidable diplomatic history of small states.

Grand strategy is not about security; it is about *control*. To assume that Israeli foreign policy follows or followed a grand strategy erroneously assumes that Israel's reach exceeds its grasp. As the episodes under discussion in the chapter to follow suggest, Israel's ability and aspiration to control Middle Eastern regional circumstances during the Begin years was limited and, at most, passive. It is important and appropriate to evaluate Israeli history by interrogating how prudent or imprudent specific choices in the history of Israeli foreign relations were.

But assuming that the "paradigm" of grand strategy applies to Israeli history, particularly but not exclusively during the Begin years, overlooks how often, regularly and easily Israel was held captive by

events outside of its capacity to stop. Hypothetical thinking and unforeseen events occurring in rapid short-term contexts explain the history of the period most accurately. *Smallness*, not grand strategy, is an accurate lens to understanding Israeli-Middle Eastern relations under Begin. As Charles Freilich put it: "From the pre-state days to the present, Israel's national security policy has been predicated on the assumption that the nation faces a realistic threat of politicide (destruction of a state) and even genocide."

The episodes related below underscore how Israeli interactions with actors in the region were grounded in *unplanned*, *unstructured*, *unforeseen* circumstances. To the extent that Israel collaborated with other countries to cope with these *unexpected* events, it is wiser to consider the collusion in place as possessing the character of a "partnership" -- *informal* in nature -- and subject to short-term fluctuations according to the ensuing turbulence that this cooperation was intended to cope with. In this light, this chapter contributes to the general conceptual theme of this dissertation: that the history and theory of Israeli foreign policy constitute the conceptual "obverse" to the popular scholarly trend of grand strategy theory as manifest in many intellectual circles of the contemporary study of international relations.

A.   Sadat's Death as an Intelligence Failure

The assassination of Sadat suggests that 'grand strategy' was less important to Israeli-Egyptian relations than social trends and bureaucratic problems within Egypt. The micro and macro origins of the Sadat assassination had little to do with Sadat's peace treaty with Israel. In micro, the failure of professionalism among Egypt's security personnel created holes that could easily be exploited by Sadat's assassin. In macro, the feud between political Islamists and the secular state in Egypt had social origins that ran deeper than Sadat's foreign policy orientation toward Israel.

A1: Logistical Problems: Security at the Parade

Far from being characterized by grand strategy, the assassination of Anwar Sadat was an intelligence failure. It played out according to internal Egyptian sociopolitical realities that were little affected by specific Israeli initiatives.

Ephraim Kahana and Sagit Stivi-Kerbis have studied the intelligence failure behind the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981. They point out that the Egyptian security system was full of fatal holes. Eight security agencies bore responsibility for securing the president's life: the secret police, the presidential police, the special presidential guard, the republican guard, military intelligence, the military policy, general intelligence and the soldiers of central security who specialized in containing disturbances.

A major difficulty arose in that these agencies were in turn subject to four discrete agencies, three of which—the republican guard, special presidential guard and the presidential police—fell under the president's authority. In reality, this meant that they were under the direct supervision of Vice President Mubarak, who was in charge of coordinating their activity. While the security forces correctly gauged the intensity of Islamic terrorism, the belief that nothing would happen at the October 6 parade somehow prevailed.

Despite the fact that Islambouli had previously been suspected of ties to the Islamic societies and officials had been warned by the military intelligence, no one prevented his participation in the parade, even after it became known that his brother was among those arrested on 3 September. Moreover, no one assigned to the security detail bothered to check the identities or credentials of the three "replacement soldiers" Islambouli had brought along. The fact that no such measures were taken, and that members of a radical Islamic group were allowed entry, constituted a security failure of the first order.

According to Avraham Rotem, who formed the Israeli VIP protection unit during the time of Rabin's assassination, the intelligence failures of the Rabin and Sadat assassinations were characterized by their failure to adapt non-routine measures to deal with non-routine thinking. According to Rotem, a routine security plan gives the attacker the advantage while non-routine thinking gives the security unit

the advantage. Rotem notes that in the case of Sadat's assassination, there was no Egyptian backup plan to adapt to non-routine thinking on the part of the assassin. There was no review of malfunction scenarios, planning of an escape route, or emergency strategy in case the escape vehicle could not be accessed or is disabled. Sadat was not ushered into his car, counter to what security wisdom would expect.

A2: The Day of the Affair: Personal Security

Ironically, Vice President Hosni Mubarak was rushed to an escape vehicle. Furthermore, no security personnel served as a human shield to defend the president while other personnel responded to the source of the fire. Furthermore, members of Sadat's special personal security detail did not act in accordance with the security practices they were familiar with: they were not present at the proper locale, they did not sit behind the president during the parade to prevent his rising from his seat when the attack began or to prevent his falling to the ground; and no one fired at the source of the attack.

Sadat's bodyguards were armed only with pistols in the face of the assassins' submachine guns and grenades. As per the conclusions of the subsequent investigation, had the security personnel been armed with automatic rifles, they could have likely foiled the assassination. Though the assassins' chances of success were near zero upon leaping from the truck, those chances rose as they progressed closer to the reviewing stand unhindered. The impression of investigating experts is that the security personnel panicked, perhaps due to their lack of appropriate weapons.

B. The 1982 Armenian Genocide Conference

A different episode highlighting the limits of a 'grand strategy' in Begin's foreign policy is the 1982 episode of Israel's being held hostage by Turkey over the private academic holding of an academic

conference on the Armenian Genocide. Turkey responded by threatening the security of Iranian and Syrian Jewish refugees. The conference ended up cancelled by Israel due to Turkish coercive pressure.

Turkey's threat to Jewish lives trumped Israel's need to promote Armenian Genocide memory. Because Turkey was concerned over international opinion regarding its treatment of minorities, Turkey attempted to "showcase" the Jewish community of Turkey to exemplify its tolerance to the West. Resultingly, the Jewish community of Turkey received greater autonomy and independence than Turkey's Kurds and Armenians. Using representatives of Turkey's Jewish community to communicate Turkey's disapproval of Israel's holding this conference enabled Turkey to exert leverage over Israeli internal affairs. Israeli foreign policy under Begin in this episode was dependent and reactive Turkey's coercion. Hence, it is more accurate to think in terms of unforeseen events than according to a paradigm of 'grand strategy.'

B1: Turkey's Threat

As Eldad Ben Aharon's study of the episode explains, Turkey threatened to block the transit of Iranian and Syrian Jews to Israel to coerce Israel to cancel the planned 1982 conference on the Armenian Genocide which was to be held at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Turkey exploited the situation of the Iranian and Syrian Jews in order to pressure Israel to stop Armenian participation in the conference.

At the 1982 'International Conference on Holocaust and Genocide,' among numerous discussions of the Holocaust and current trends in genocide research, there would also be six lectures and panels on the Armenian Genocide. Yad Vashem, Israel's Holocaust Museum, officially sponsored the event and many international scholars confirmed their attendance. The organizers received fellowships and grants from Jewish funds of Holocaust survivors. Organizers Israel Charny, Elie Wiesel and Shamai Davidson received implicit and explicit messages from Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs encouraging them to cancel the conference. Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted each of the participants on the list of

attendees and asked them not to attend the conference, many of whom were Jews. Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responding to Turkey's threats, also contacted Tel Aviv University to pressure the organizers to cancel the conference.

B2: Pressure on Israeli Academics

Israel Charny, interviewed by Ben-Aharon, recalled as follows: "One afternoon, on my way back home from work at the faculty, a man was waiting for me in front of my building. He introduced himself as Jack Veissid, president of the Jewish community of Istanbul, and he said that he had come to meet me." Charny added: "He explained in a very explicit tone that the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very concerned about my conference, and that Jewish lives were in jeopardy. Veissid then said that Iranian and Syrian Jews were fleeing through Turkey's borders, and the Turks would close the borders if the conference took place."

Israel's consul in Istanbul at the time, Avner Arazi, corroborated Charny's report of external interference in the hosting of the conference. "The main reason for our reckless attempts to cancel the conference was the hint that we received about Jewish refugees from Iran and Syria crossing into Turkey. […] Veissid found that all the arguments he prepared against the conference were insignificant compared to the issue of the refugees […] Veissid used this argument out of a sense of urgency and responsibility to our Jewish brothers and used it to convince Charny and his other partners to cancel the conference."

B3: Conflicting Priorities in Israeli Decision-Making

Arazi lamented that "we invested significant effort in order to reduce damages to Turkey from the Armenian participants. As a military regime, Turkey doesn't fully understand the limits of a democratic

state in interfering with freedom of expression." Turkey's threat to send Jewish refugees back to Syria and Iran was severe.

As Arazi stated: "Turkey has always been very helpful about helping refugees fleeing through its borders. It would be unprecedented for them to send Jewish refugees back to Iran and Syria." Israeli acquiescence to Turkey's threat highlighted how effective Turkey's threat tactics were, and could be used again, as they were in 1990 to bring forth the cancellation of a documentary on Israeli television on the Armenian Genocide.

Yossi Beilin, interviewed by Ben Aharon, stated: "We create a list of priorities, not just on small and marginal issues. These are difficult issues and difficult decisions, and only those in high levels of government have to deal with these dramatic dilemmas. The most difficult dilemmas arise when dealing with issues of aliyah and the protection of Jewish life. One could say that this is a very cynical process, but it is not cynical. It is policy. This is how we shape foreign policy."

B4: Summary

Turkey's machinations against the conference in adherence to its campaign against the memory of the Armenian Genocide, was conducted against Israeli academics with Israel unable to respond in defense of Israeli freedom of speech and academic expression. Israel acted in reaction to Turkey's threats, not in the name of any specific 'grand strategy'.

C. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon

A 'grand strategy' paradigm is likewise irrelevant to Israel inasmuch as many of Israel's foreign policy choices are constrained not necessarily by the bilateral adversarial relations between Israel and its neighbours but by the intra-Arab rivalries playing out *between* Israel's neighbours with Israel the target of competitive expressions of threat and hostility. This is evident in the "triangular" relations between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon which exacerbated the danger to Israel beyond the scope of either one of them's singular menace.

C1: Lebanon and Iraq

Many documents available on the *Wikileaks* website, made famous by whistleblower Julian Assange, highlight the interactions between Iraq and Lebanon during the 1970s. These documents highlight a different perspective on Iraq's nuclear program's threat to Israel. Unrelated to the "direct" threat that an Iraqi nuclear program may have posed, links between Iraq and the Lebanese Civil War rendered the possibility of a dangerous Iraqi presence on Israel's northern border. Coupled with the danger posed by Iraq's nuclear program, the Lebanese angle highlights the Iraqi threat to Israel being closer to Israel than is widely realized. However, because Iraqi-Syrian relations were often fraught with enmity, the hypothetical scenarios according to which Iraq may have involved itself in Lebanon varied. Even if Iraq involved itself in Lebanon, its threat to Syria was greater than its perceived threat to Israel.

The significance of these documents from Wikileaks transcends their new evidence about the interactions between Iraq and Lebanon. They express the limits of 'grand strategy' thinking inasmuch as 'grand strategy' tends to think in terms of *dyads* rather than 'triangles.' That is to say, grand strategy tends to frame foreign policy in terms of adversarial dichotomies: Israel *versus* the PLO, Syria *versus* Iraq, Iran *versus* Iran, the PLO *versus* the Phalange.

The primary link between Israel's invasion of Lebanon and Iraq under Saddam Hussein is the attempted assassination of Israel's Ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, by Abu Nidal, the Palestinian

terrorist who rivalled the PLO under Yasser Arafat, and was tied to Iraqi intelligence services. Many have speculated that Iraq and Abu Nidal arranged for the plotted assassination of Argov as a way to provoke Israel's invasion of Lebanon and thereby weaken Israel, as revenge for the 1981 attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor, and the PLO, simultaneously.

C2: Iraq and Libya in Lebanon

But according to one Wikileaks document from April 1976, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin reviewed the history of the Lebanese War and said that Syria unexpectedly decided early this year that it would support the balance which had existed between the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon and prevent the establishment of a leftist Palestinian regime there. Were a PLO entity to emerge in Lebanon, then Syria would be simultaneously threatened by three enemies at once: the Iraqi regime, Israel, and a Lebanese Palestinian entity. Rabin said he cannot see a solution in Lebanon without "a settlement of the question of Palestinian interference in the government of the host country," but "Iraq and Libya will not accept any solution which restricts the Palestinian role in Lebanon… The main interest of Iraq and Libya remains the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon so that the Palestinians, with Iraqi and Libyan volunteers, can take over."

Other Wikileaks paint a more nuanced picture of Iraqi-Syrian relations. A document dated September 1978 quoted deputy Israeli defense minister Mordechai Tzipori who stated that Israel would not fight Syria in defense of a Christian declaration of independence. Nevertheless, he believed that Israel "could defeat a combined Syrian-Iraqi force relatively easily, but he recognized that the political consequences for Israel would be unacceptable."

Tzipori cited Syria's non-intervention in the 1956 Sinai Campaign as a prime example of the Arabs' ability to ignore each other's troubles, and asserted that Syria would probably not have become involved in 1967 either if Israel had not taken the initiative. Tzipori "also dismissed the notion of a

possible Soviet intervention against Israel in a conflict with Syria and Iraq by pointing out that, for all their bluster, the Soviets have never intervened with their own forces on behalf of an ally, even in Korea and Vietnam."

C3: Cuba in Lebanon

Although Tzipori was clearly intent on averting a military clash with Syria, he based his position on political rather than military considerations. Tzipori recognized that Israel would find very little international support for a major military campaign against Syria at this time, whatever the apparent provocation. Tzipori said "Israel was perfectly content to keep the Syrians tied down in Lebanon, but the equation would change if the Syrians invited the Iraqis to fill in gaps in Syria itself created by commitment of Syrian forces to Lebanon. Were it not for the prohibitive political constraints, Tzipori maintained that Israel could easily knock out the Syrian army as well as the forces that Iraq would almost certainly send in to back up the Syrians. He asserted that Sadat would have had a much freer hand and Israeli-Egyptian negotiations would be a lot further along right now if the Israelis had destroyed the Syrian army a year or so ago."

Iraqi-Syrian relations were not the only problem for Syria. Syria was concerned about Cuba's role in the Middle East. A document dated November 30, 1976 cited reports of unknown reliability that Iraq was hosting at least 150 Cuban military instructors. Guerillas whom the Cubans were training were reportedly slated to operate in Lebanon. As of 1976, there were approximately 650 Cuban advisors in South Yemen, with 50 more scheduled to arrive. Somalis and a small group of Iranian dissidents were receiving military training from Cuban advisors in South Yemen.

A document dated February 1979 stated that Syria was concerned about the possible Cuban provision of military training and support which could be sued against Syrian forces.Syria also worried about Cuba's hosting of Lebanese associates of the Iraqi branch of the Baath party. A document dated

May 8, 1978, stated unsubstantiated Phalangist claims about the presence of 400 Cuban soldiers and military experts in Lebanon to assist George Habash's "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine."

A different document dated March 1978, speculated that "Iraqis may seek ways to support rejectionist Palestinians to whom they maintain links, but the Iraqi public shows little enthusiasm for adventurism." But the "overall picture is one of frantic activity to cover [the] emptiness of Iraqi support for [the] Palestinians." Iraqis may take some satisfaction from Soviet and Czech abstention in UNSC voting, but their isolation in [the] Arab world continues to mock pretensions to pan-Arab leadership." Arab ambassadors were "uniformly skeptical of Baghdad's proclaimed readiness to send reinforcements to Lebanon."

C4: Iraqi-Syrian Relations

One document dated December 1979 noted the predicament caused when some 40 Iranian volunteers arrived in Damascus. Syria allowed this in order to ingratiate itself with Iran at the expense of Iraq at a time when Iraq was openly hostile to Iran. Syria thus curried favour with Iran.

A document dated July 7, 1978 stated that in June 1976, the Syrians were under heavy international pressure to halt their offensive against the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia cut off aid to Damascus, while Libyan and Iraqi soldiers were fighting with the Palestinians against the Syrians, and the Soviet Union threatened to stop its assistance.

A February 1978 document stated that Iraqi-Syrian relations were so strained that the Iraqi government of goods through Lebanese ports when the fighting in Lebanon worsened in 1975 and through Syrian ports in 1977. In April 1976 the Iraqi government cut off crude oil deliveries through the Syrian pipeline to Mediterranean terminals. The problems in Syrian-Iraqi relations created an opportunity for Lebanon to exploit this chance to improve Iraqi-Lebanese relations. The Iraqi government fully supported the Lebanese government of Elias Sarkis and maintained influence in Lebanese affairs through

the return of Lebanese Baathist leader Abdul Majid al-Rafi'i to Tripoli and continued to maintain relations with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and with Palestinian groups.

A memorandum dated October 13, 1976 stated that the Lebanese army captured 150 Yemenis and 55 Iraqis during battles to pacify mount Lebanon. It highlighted Syrian media reports that Iraqis and Israelis had met in Israel in order to prolong the Lebanese and to "insure the provision of Israeli facilities for Iraqi troops entering Lebanon by sea." It also reported that Arab Liberation Front forces linked to the Baghdad regime and "deviationist Palestinian leadership" attacked a patrol of the Syrian Palestinian militia *Saiqa* in the Nabi Abu Rakab region on October 9. The Saiqa patrol took no casualties while many ALF troops were killed.

Israeli "policy" toward any of its particular Arab adversaries was only one dimension of that adversary's stance and activity against Israel. In light of Arab diplomatic history, specific Arab states' responses to Israel owed much to intra- and inter-Arab rivalries spurred on and incited by third parties.

C5: Syria in Crisis

Syria, which in the years concurrent to Begin's foreign policy entrenched its alliance with Iran which persists until this day, spent 1977-81 enmeshed in crisis after crisis. It lost its traditional ally Egypt with the signature of the Camp David Accords. Relations with Iraq plummeted to a nadir. Hafez al-Asad's foreign minister narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of an Iraqi-enlisted sniper in Abu Dhabi in October 1977. In July 1979, a temporary Syro-Iraqi rapprochement in opposition to Egypt broke down when Saddam Hussein, recently ascendant to the Iraqi presidency, accused some fifty of his closest Baath Party colleagues of plotting against him in collusion with Syria. Moreover, by striking against Iran and provoking the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi forces tied themselves down in the East and divested themselves of responsibility for assisting Syria against Israel.

At home, anti-Alawi violence crippled Hafez al-Assad's regime. On June 16, 1979, thirty-two young Alawi officer cadets were slaughtered after gunmen entered the Aleppo Artillery School. This was the climax of a wave of killings directed at high ranking Baathist and Alwai military officials, academics and civil servants, including Asad's own doctor. Between 1979 and 1981, over three-hundred Alawis and Baathists were killed in the city of Aleppo, including popular clerics who opposed these acts, a wave of murders sparked by the arrest of the prayer leader of Aleppo's Great Mosque, Sheikh Zayn al-Din Khayrallah. Ten-thousand troops were called in on March 9, 1980, for a search-and-destroy mission against Muslim Brotherhood perpetrators who were behind demonstrations which attacked Baathist barracks and party offices in the town of Jisr al-Shughur, and yielded two-hundred dead. On June 26, 1980, Asad himself just barely survived an assassination attempt at his Guest Palace when grenades two grenades were thrown at the gate of the Guest Palace. In 1973, Musa al-Sadr's fatwa proclaimed the Alawi Islam of Asad's family and ruling clique an official branch of Shi'ism. Aligning with Iran in 1979-81 was a further move to provide Asad with religious legitimacy. Yet given the Muslim Brotherhood uprising against him, whatever religious legitimacy he attained proved useless; he could only resort to force to protect his regime.

In understandable paranoia, Asad blamed a wide array of foreign elements for sponsoring these insurgents. Israel and the CIA came up, as did Jordan's King Hussein; in late July 1980, Syrian commandos stormed a Muslim Brotherhood training camp across the Jordanian border. Asad also hunted down hostile journalists in Lebanon. Salah al-Din Bitar, co-founder of the Baath party alongside Michel Aflaq, was found dead at the hands of suspected Syrian spies in Paris on July 21 1980. Iraq's Saddam Hussein was at the top of the list.

C6: Saddam Hussein

It was out of arch-enmity toward Iraq, indeed, that Syria sought to align with the new Iran. Asad unleashed his intelligence services against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in cooperation with Iran, to subvert the regime. Should Iran recover from Iraq's first strikes, the Middle Eastern strategic balance could shift in Syria's favour in opposition not only to Iraq but to its supporters elsewhere in the Arab world. While Syria did accept Iranian volunteers on their way to Lebanon, their effect both on the country's Shia population and on Israeli strategic policy was negligible in these immediate years. The Shia were too divided at this point to act as a significant independent entity. Moreover, however many Shia did arrive in Lebanon, they were of no assistance to the Syrian presence. At Zahle in spring 1981, Maronite militiamen had the Syrian army unit there trapped, whereupon Israel intervened and shot down the Syrian helicopters overtop which had flown in its unit's defense. Syria was compelled to install there surface-to-air missiles as a final deterrent effort, thus provoking an American sponsored ceasefire. Whatever stalemate was installed was counteracted by Israel in subsequent months. In November 1981, American President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig signed with Begin a "memorandum of understanding" stipulating US-Israeli strategic cooperation. One month later, in December 1981, Begin successfully passed through the Knesset a resolution formally annexing the strategic Golan Heights. Thus, despite the Syro-Iranian alliance cemented in the 1979-81 years, it failed to secure Syria against internal sabotage and renewed Israeli strength.

Israeli military operations against Lebanon and Iraq are often perceived to be Begin's "foreign policy legacy." Contemplating them this way overlooks the transnational character of Lebanese-Syrian-Iraqi relations and how the rivalry between Syria and Iraq inflamed the Lebanese theatre into a greater danger to Israel than an emphasis on the PLO's role in exclusivity suggests. Palestinian factions in Lebanon were mobilized not only by their goal of 'resistance' to Israel but by their competition with one another as pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi allies to "outdo" each other in anti-Israeli activity. Israel's invasion of Lebanon and attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor should be seen as evidence of the *reactive* character of Begin's foreign policy to trends in intra-Arab relations. These trends were more significant than any

distinct 'pro-active' orientation. Intra-Arab rivalries in their short-term, spontaneous character were a more provocative reality in the history of Begin's foreign policy than any particular 'grand strategy' was.

C7: External Involvement in Lebanon

Walid Phares characterized the Lebanese Civil War, during the years 1975-90, as marked by "the interaction among dozens of services, hundreds of units and thousands of intelligence activities struggling in all possible directions" in a "giant puzzle." Connections, friendships and cooperation arrangements shifted frequently, as exemplified by the role of Turkish intelligence, a NATO member, which collaborated with Western intelligence against pro-Soviet Armenian factions and with Syria against pro-Western Armenian factions. Small intelligence services often misled and manipulated their allies, as the Lebanese Forces often did to their Israeli ally; in other cases, covert action and secret terrorist action would be indistinguishably intertwined. Sometimes small local services acted independently as "uncontrollable miniservices" who operated from the Syrian-occupied zone, "thus adding more complications to the confrontation in Lebanon." As a result, the Lebanese Civil War was understood differently in the eyes of Western and Middle Eastern conceptions.

Phares helpfully breaks down the Lebanese Civil War into the following major "sub-conflicts." Christians vs. Palestinians and Muslims, 1975-82; Syrians vs. Palestinians, 1976-84; Syrians vs. Christians, 1978-1990; Israelis vs. Palestinians and Syrians, 1978-1982; Muslims vs. Muslims, 1985-87; Christians vs. Christians 1989-90. He also breaks down the competing goals of the various actors and interests in the Lebanese Civil War as follows. Syria: *Hegemony in Lebanon, military balance with Israel.* Israel: *Confront the PLO, contain Syria, peace agreement with Lebanon*. Iran: *Support the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon;* PLO: *Support the establishment a pro-PLO government in Beirut;* USSR: *Counter US influence in Lebanon*; USSR: *Counter US influence in Lebanon;* US: Free hostages, maintain US influence, establish equilibrium between Syria and Israel, contain terrorism and Soviet influence,

uphold the independence of Lebanon; Muslims: *Create an independent, Muslim-ruled, pro-Arab state*; Christians; maintain and independent, pro-Western state.

Phares adds that the "move of one foreign intelligence structure into Lebanon pushed an opponent to counter. In a few years, Lebanon became the 'megalopolis' of the world's intelligence services. The emrgence of terrorist activities directed against the West from Lebanese territories created an additional incentive for involvement." Thus, there were also "second-class" intelligence services: the Iraqis, the Egyptians, the Saudis, trying to prevent Lebanon being used for anti-Saudi subversion,, the British, in support of US interests; the West Germans, to deter the plans of German terrorist organizations; the Eastern European services, until 1989, to assist the KGB; and the Turks, to defeat the Armenian nationalist movement.

France's intelligence services were also present and active in collaboration with the Lebanese Intelligence Service (LIS). Its purposes were to help the LIS and the Christian militias' operatives, to prevent anti-French terrorism originating from Lebanese territory, and to suppress the leftist militia *Factions Armees Revolutionairs* (FARL).

Syria's intelligence services pursued the following objectives: supporting the Syrian occupation of Lebanon; the traditional collection of intelligence on Israel and the Western apparatus; and the management of its local and global terrorist strategy. The KGB in Lebanon worked with Syrian and Palestinian services and the mini-services of Lebanese leftist groups. It gathered intelligence on Western and Israeli military installations, both in and around Lebanon. As Phares explains, "Moscow's interest in Lebanon was the extension of its broader Third World strategy of 'disrupting non-communist societies' and bringing a pro-Soviet government to power."

C8: Summary

The significance of contemplating the role of other intelligence organizations' behaviour in Lebanon is to highlight that Israel was not the only actor intervening in Lebanese affairs. Israeli assertiveness vis-a-vis the PLO-Phalange conflict is only one angle to the Lebanese imbroglio. Israel was largely passive toward other countries' activities in Lebanon, notwithstanding the tragedy and centrality of Israel's invasion during the early 1980s.

D. Pakistan's Nuclear Program

To the extent that Israeli diplomatic history manifests a grand strategy, this may be found in the 'Alliance of the Periphery.' Yet the events under examination highlight how this inter-generational approach to foreign policy spanning the years between Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion to Begin underwent strain and stress during the Begin years. Although Israel can be situated in a regional security architecture, the 'Alliance of the Periphery' was also subject to change in response to unforeseen events and was hardly a static constant in Israeli history.

Although Pakistan lies outside of the geographic span of the 'Alliance of the Periphery,' Israel's limited capacity to address the danger posed to it by Pakistan's nuclear program testifies to the geopolitical limits of this relationship. Whether by virtue of the constraints upon Israel manifest by its changing relations with Turkey and Iran or by its reliance on distant outside powers to address the danger posed by Pakistan or by the limited character of its relationship with India at the time, Israel was unable to address the Pakistani nuclear program effectively. Hence, rather than follow a 'grand strategy,' Israeli foreign policy was held captive by hypothetical thinking and unforeseen events that it could not stop.

D1: Begin and Thatcher

One memorandum from Begin to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher noted Begin expressing to Thatcher his "concern about Pakistan's nuclear intentions and the alleged cooperation between Pakistan and certain Arab States in the nuclear field… The Israelis are well informed about the Pakistani programme and about Libyan contacts with Pakistan." The document presents Begin stating further: "Our evidence appears not dissimilar to theirs. Unlike them we have concluded that it does not for the moment substantiate suggestions about an Arab bomb. The allegations in paragraph 8 of the Israeli memorandum about the supply of inverters from Britain to Pakistan gives a distorted impression though some of the information is basically correct."

The British memorandum, however, blames Israel for being also responsible for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East in light of its own secret nuclear development. The memorandum states that the "Israeli decision to raise this matter with us presents an opportunity to underline to the Israelis (who, like the Pakistanis, are not signatories of the NPT) that they also have a part to play in ensuring that nuclear weapons are not introduced into the Middle East. Successive Israeli Governments since 1966 have said that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East." The document states further: "We have no doubt that the Israelis have the technical ability to design and develop nuclear explosives and they should have enough plutonium for a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. We believe the Israelis could quickly assemble about a dozen low yield weapons without testing for delivery, probably by aircraft."

D2: Schultz, Reagan and Begin

President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of State George Schultz evaluated the consequences of Pakistani nuclear activites as follows, referring to Israel: "Pakistan's nuclear weapons activities, if carried to completion, will lead to a nuclear arms race on the Subcontinent. This would result in greater regional insecurity, including the possibility of pre-emption by India or Israel or even eventually a nuclear

exchange." Schultz lamented: "Pakistan, however, views a Pak nuclear device as a deterrent to Indian nuclear blackmail, believing that in a future crisis India will use its nuclear monopoly to coerce Pakistan into making serious concessions. Moreover, eventual transfer of nuclear technology or weapons by Pakistan to unstable Arab countries cannot be excluded."

An American evaluation of India's view of Pakistan's nuclear program stated: "Our best estimate...is that India will follow a wait-and-see strategy. As the shock of the Israeli strike fades, Indian military strategists probably will become more confident of their ability to cope with the Pakistani F-16s before the first deliveries--the timing of which is still under discussion." It added: "Political strategists probably will focus attention on the potentially extreme political costs involved in attacking Pakistan, including the possibility of a Muslim oil embargo against India."

D3: Summary

The problem of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East during the Begin years transcended Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Begin was also worried about Pakistan's nuclear program. Yet it was beyond the capacity of Israeli foreign policy to address it. Instead of thinking in terms of 'grand strategy,' the history of Israeli foreign policy should be evaluated in light of hypothetical thinking and unforeseen events.

E. Palestinian Terrorism

'Grand strategy' thinking locks actors into fixed alliances and does not take into account how fast circumstances change on the ground. Moreover, 'grand strategy' does not take into account the psychological effects of terrorism against Israel.

Thus, a fifth shortcoming to the 'grand strategy' paradigm when evaluating the history of Israeli foreign policy lies in the transnational character of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli counter-terrorism. Terrorism is conducted by individual agents acting on their own, spontaneously, and motivated by ideological concerns that owe more to "micro-strategy" than grand strategy. Whether terrorism is understood to choose its operations in order to cultivate international propaganda for a specific cause, to provoke destructive and poorly thought-out reprisals, to retaliate for violence in the West Bank and Gaza or to mobilize domestic opinion in Israel or Europe or the West, all these aims as debated by terrorism scholars are "beside the point" as regards grand strategy. Inasmuch as terrorism follows a 'strategy,' the logic it follows is psychological and sociological.

Hence, the history of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli counter-terrorism defies the 'grand strategy' paradigm so popular today in foreign policy writing vis-à-vis the Middle East. Moreover, the transnational character of Palestinian terrorism, attacking Israeli targets in Europe and Africa, not only inside Israel, integrates the diplomatic history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more with the *intelligence history* of Israeli-African and Israeli-European relations and the *diplomatic history* of Palestinian relations with neutralist and Third-Worldist movements during the Cold War than to the geopolitical history of grand strategy specifically defined.

E1: The Rome Hijacking

On July 22, 1968, three armed Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Israeli passenger airliner flying from Rome to Tel Aviv. He quotes George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: "When we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle." Thereafter, Palestinian terrorists hijacks a TWA plane Rome, ordering it to land in Damascus, where the passengers were released but a bomb was detonated in the cockpit.

Leila Khaled, the lead hijacker, was released and later participated in another hijacking. A week later, two thirteen-year-old Arab boys recruited by the al-Fatah faction of the PLO, threw hand grenades at the El Al office in Brussels, and were granted refuge in the Iraqi embassy and thereafter escaped. Three months later, a Greek child was killed and thirteen others were injured in a grenade attack against the El Al office in Tel Aviv.

E2: PFLP Attacks

During 1968 and 1969, Palestinian terrorism also undertook bombings against Israeli shopping markets and malls. In 1970 the TWA plane flying from Beirut to Paris was hijacked and the hijacker was released. Six weeks later, an airplane bus taking passengers to an El Al plane at the Munich airport was attacked. One Israeli was killed and eight people were wounded. Three Arabs were arrested but quickly freed after another hijacking.

On September 6, 1970, the PFLP tried to hijack an El Al flight from Amsterdam to New York. Israeli security agents killed one of the hijackers and wounded Leila Khaled, who had been freed by Syria after her first hijacking a year earlier. Following her capture she was held in a British prison which she described as treating her "as if I were an official state guest," and was released after less than a month. On May 30, 1972, the Japanese Red Army, in coordination with the PFLP, murdered twenty-seven passengers and wounded eighty inside of Lod Airport.

E3: Munich and Vienna Terrorist Attacks

1972 saw the Munich Olympics terrorism attack against Israel's athletes, after which, less than two months later, German chancellor Willy Brandt made a secret deal with the Palestinian terrorists. These terrorists arranged for other Palestinian terrorists to hijack a Lufthansa airplane, holding its crew

hostage, threatening to kill them unless the Munich terrorists were flown to freedom in an Arab country. Brandt gave into these demands. The terrorists' bodies were flown to Libya, where they were given martyrs' burials.

In 1973-74, Palestinian terrorists attacked a train carrying Soviet Jews to Vienna, a jumbo jet from New Delhi, a Pan Am airlines office in Rome, and a DC-10 from Dubai. They took Israeli children hostage at schools in Maalot and Qiryat Shemona in Israel, killing dozens of children in the process.

In the years following the United Nations' granting the PLO observer status, Dershowitz points out that further terrorist attacks by Palestinian organizations occurred in the Orly Airport attack, the Entebbe hijacking, the attacking of a passenger terminal in Istanbul, hijacking a Lufthansa plane, killing twenty-six civilians, attacked an El Al plane in Paris, and shot passengers in Brussels. In October 1980, four Jews and injured twelve. In August 1981, a machine-gun attack on a Vienna synagogue, killing two and wounding seventeen.

E3: Summary

The Israeli involvement in Lebanon was catalyzed by the transnational character of Palestinian terrorism. Rather than be seen as a testament to "grand strategy" in the history of Israeli foreign policy, this background to Israel's invasion of Lebanon highlights how the invasion itself was a reactive measure undertaken in the context of counterterrorism.

F. Soviet Espionage

'Grand strategy' theory, historiography and foreign policy writing primarily focus on the direct threats that militaries pose to their regional and extra-regional adversaries. They do not address the history of espionage. Hence, addressing the history of Israeli foreign policy during the Begin years through a 'grand strategy' lens forgets the importance of intelligence in Middle Eastern history. Furthermore, over-

emphasizing the importance of grand strategy in Israeli foreign policy over-emphasizes the importance of *American*-Israeli relations, overlooking the equally pressing dangers posed by Soviet behaviour. Too often, conventional narratives of the history of Israeli foreign policy highlight the principal significance of Israeli-Arab and Israeli-American relations yet ignore how precarious and real the danger of Soviet penetration and proxy attack still felt during this phase of Israeli history.

Shlomo Shpiro's research challenges the conception that Israeli foreign policy was distinctively assertive by virtue of the license offered it by the United States. The shortcoming of such a perspective is its view that the constraining role of the Soviet Union to both Israel and the United States is overlooked. Such a perspective overlooks the active transnational role of Soviet espionage in the history of the period during, before and after Begin's years.

F1: Soviet Spy Affairs

Shpiro, for example, describes the infiltration of Soviet spies into Israel in the 1970s. Upon immigrating to Israel Soviet spy "Agent R" was subjected to routine questioning by Shin Bet counterintelligence officers; he was suspected of hiding something and, in a second interrogation, confessed his recruitment by the KGB and his assignments in Israel. Sensing the man's skills, the Shin Bet offered "Agent R" to work for Israel as a double agent.

Accepting, "Agent R" reported false information to his KGB handlers, while providing information to the Shin Bet on KGB tradecraft and intelligence requirements in Israel. He assisted in the arrest of one of the KGB's primary spies in Israel, Marcus Klingberg, who worked for decades in top security research positions. In winter 1981, the KGB dispatched him to contact Klingberg, with whom Soviet contact was severed for some time, who at the time was deputy director of the top secret Israeli Institute for Biological Research at Ness Ziona despite having worked for the KGB since the 1950s.

Klingberg suspected Agent R's approach and refused to allow Agent R into his home. In panic over the encounter, writes Shlomo Shpiro, "which was contrary to all tradecraft rules practiced by his KGB handlers for decades, Klingberg sought to contact the KGB through other means to verify that the nightly approach was not a Shabak provocation. Unknown to him, he was already under Shabak observation. Klingberg was under suspicion for some time but the Shabak was unable to collect any incriminating evidence against him which would ensure a conviction in court. The encounter with 'Agent R' provided conclusive evidence on Klingberg's treachery."

F2: "Agent R"

By operating Agent R, the Shabak was able to obtain extensive knowledge on KGB operations in Israel and identify weaknesses in Soviet intelligence communications. This information was utilized in identifying other people working for the KGB and foiling others' operations. In a different spy incident, Alexander Radelis, who immigrated to Israel as a 'sleeper' agent and ordered to keep a low profile for two years. In 1981, Radelis passed information to the KGB about the Israeli armed forces, specifically on IDF reserve units, tank types, engineering equipment, tensions in Israel's northern borders and on the economic situation in Israel. For communication, Radelis made use of an encrypted transmitter hidden at his Tel Aviv home.

Meanwhile, Radelis developed his keen talent in Ping Pong and was appointed trainer to Israel's national team, which often travelled abroad for competitions. He was arrested in 1996. In April 1983, Shimon Levinson, who was working in Thailand at the UN's Counter-Narcotics operations, was met by a man who introduced himself as a consul. He was flown to Moscow in May 1983. Levinson was interviewed by three former members of Israel's intelligence community.

F3: The KGB in Israel

Shpiro points out that on the second day of the debriefing, KGB officers became convinced that Levinson was a real traitor and not a provocation, and that he was ready to spy for them in Israel. Levinson was given instructions on how to use encrypted communications and secret inks, and was trained in encoding and decoding text. He was given a mailing address in Vienna for contacting his handler and given a set of operational instructions; for example, he was ordered to listen to Moscow Radio every morning at 7am and was told that if he heard the number '174' mentioned, in any context, that was a code for him to write a new report.

In 1985, Levinson, as a KGB agent, was appointed Chief Security Officer at the Prime Minister's Office, an extremely sensitive position which brought him into regular contacts with the military and the intelligence community. In this role, Levinson was regularly working with Israel's intelligence service and, being responsible for the physical security of the Prime Minister's Office building, had access to rooms where secret material was stored. He maintained contact with the KGB using secret ink, dead letter drops, radio communications and meetings abroad, which were conducted at a local Russian embassy or in public places. He was instructed to provide the Soviets with early warning on Israel's military intentions. He was instructed to draw an arrow on a certain traffic sign in Jerusalem if Israel was about to launch a military operation.

F4: Severity of the Affair

An arrow pointing upwards would indicate an attack against Syria, while a horizontal view would indicate an attack against Jordan. Levinson provided the KGB information on the structure of the Israeli intelligence community, its various units, including the Mossad, Shin Bet, the Military Intelligence Division, and Nativ, Israel's covert liaison to Jews in the Soviet Bloc. He gave the KGB names and

details of intelligence units and sub-units, names of their chiefs and their modus operandi. He also provided information on the structure of the Prime Minister's Office, its activities and key personalities, details on the Israeli Foreign Ministry, information regarding the Israeli political system, including personnel, parties, opinions and atmosphere, and information on American intelligence officers in contact with Israeli intelligence, including names, functions and fields of specialization.

The severity of this spy affair is captured by Shpiro's own words: "Incredibly, several former senior officers, including former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, came forward at his trial as character witnesses to testify in his defence. Levinson was tried behind closed doors, convicted and sentenced to 12 years in prison. He was released in February 1999, after serving eight years of his sentence."

F5: The Soviet Threat in Begin's Perspective and Worldview

Perceptions of Israeli foreign policy under Begin as having been distinctively "assertive" under-emphasize Soviet foreign policy's adversarial role in the region to Israel. Especially given Begin's personal experience as a torture victim in the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the worldview that grew out of this trauma, the Soviet threat to Israel loomed very large in Begin's personal psychology. Begin's fear of the Soviet Union was a central component of his worldview. This is evident in his debates with Shimon Peres in 1977 and 1981.

In 1977's first debate with Peres, Begin stated: "Furthermore, I believe that we have the opportunity, especially in the United States, to explain that the danger is not only to us, but also to the Free World, since such a Palestinian State would become a key Soviet base in the Middle East; hence we and the United States effectively have joint interests'" (Debate 1, Response 1). Begin also stressed: "We have common interests with the United States of America; we are essentially the ones who prevent a communist takeover in the Middle East, but I want to tell you that very few Americans are aware of it. I told a group of influential people in the United States that for six years, as we stood on the eastern bank of

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the Suez Canal, we saved thousands of American soldiers in Vietnam from injury and slaughter because we forced Soviet ships bearing weapons to the Vietcong in Tonkin to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, so that each shipment was delayed by 16 days'" (Debate 1).

In Begin's perspective, "[t]here is a certain leftist snobbery, perhaps under the influence of Mapam, which blocks this explanation…preventing the establishment of a Palestinian State. Practically speaking, any withdrawal from Judea and Samaria would mean the establishment of a Palestinian State. Establishing a Palestinian State the State of Israel in mortal danger. Furthermore, the danger posed by its serving as a Soviet base creates joint interests with the Free World."

F6: Summary

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Begin's perspective in relation to Israeli domestic politics and Israeli-Palestinian relations, it is nevertheless the case that the history of Israeli foreign policy under Begin emphasizes how real Israeli worries about the Soviet Union were during the Cold War. Emphasizing 'grand strategy' in Israeli foreign policy gives the importance of US-Israeli relations excessive interpretive "primacy" over the Soviet-Israeli adversarial relationship. Soviet espionage against Israel only adds to the importance to the significance of the Soviet threat to Israel and to the ability of intelligence and espionage operations to transcend the narrow limits 'grand strategy' imposes on foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East.

G: The Rescue of Ethiopian Jews

Yet another limitation of contemplating Israeli foreign policy as following any particular 'grand strategy' during the Begin years is the interdependence of Israeli cooperation with other states in order to

undertake its foreign policy initiatives. One example of this is American and Sudanese cooperation with Israel in the covert rescue of the Ethiopian Jews. Whatever Israel's initiative in carrying out this rescue, Israel could not have completed it without the tacit cooperation of assisting countries whose actions were outside Israel's control and who acted with their own incentives and reasons. The autobiography of Mossad operative Gad Shimron, who participated in the rescue of Ethiopians to Israel through Sudan, offers distinct perspectives on the role of Sudanese-Israeli relations on the rescue mission. He emphasizes the quiet cooperation of Sudanese leader Jaafar Nimeiri with both the United States and Israel in facilitating Ethiopian Jews' migration. The operation started under Begin but continued after Begin left office.

G1: Khartoum Airport

As an example of Sudanese cooperation with the operation, Shimron provides evidence of Sudanese secret servicemen assisting the Mossad in the airlift of the Ethiopian Jews onto a plane to Israel on the Brussels-based airline TEA (Trans-European Airlines)'s Boeing 707 aircraft. Shimron cites a 1984 *Los Angeles Times* article asserting that four Sudanese military buses were used to transport the Jews to a compound in the town of Gedaref. By the time it was 6pm, it was pitch dark outside and the Sudanese were very "nervous" about the prospect of a botched operation. Security men from Sudan's State Security Organization speeded the convoy through traffic police roadblocks and assembled the refugees on the far and deserted side of Khartoum Airport. This occurred on November 21, 1984, the first night of "Operation Moses."

A different relevant episode cited by Shimron is the leak in late 1984 of news of the nature of Sudanese-Israeli collaboration which catalyzed a chain of events which that ended with the overthrow of Sudanese President Nimeiri. As Shimron relates, the New York-based newspaper *Jewish Press* ran its own story on the repatriation of Ethiopian Jews through Sudan; then, on December 12, reports appeared

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in the *New York Times* and *Boston Globe.* Only an intervention by the Israeli government prevented the newspapers from expanding the reports. Meanwhile, planeloads of refugees continued to land in Israel on a regular basis. As Shimron relates, the Israeli magazine *Nekudah,* published by Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Stip, ran an article, based on interviews with Israeli officials, stating that "most Ethiopian Jews have already reached Israel." Then Reuters News Agency used the term "Operation Moses" to name the operation. This caused news of the exodus to appear in newspapers all over the world. President Nimeiri and his Vice President General Omar el-Tayeb had no choice but to immediately bar flights from Khartoum. This left thousands of Jews stranded in Sudan.

G2: El-Tayeb in Washington

Several weeks later, in February 1985, General el-Tayeb was invited to Washington. The *Los Angeles Times* wrote threat CIA director William Colby explained to el-Tayeb that the US administration was ready to help solve the Jewish refugee problem covertly, thus easing pressure on Nimeiri. Several days later, seven Hercules transports from an American transport squadron based at Ramstein Air Base in Germany landed in Gedaref's small military airfield. Under the protection of Mossad operatives, they arranged the removal of Jews from Tawawa camp to the airfield, where Ethiopian immigration activists ensured that the planes were boarded only by Jews and members of their families. Unlike the Israeli planes whose airlifts flew to Israel via Europe, the American flights took off from Sudan directly to Ramon Air Base in the Israeli Negev. George Bush, who at the time was director of the CIA, appreciated Israelès putting the lives of secret agents and military personnel on the line in order to rescue the Ethiopian refugees in the face of international indifference. This *personal* interest on the part of Bush, acting out of *conscience*, stimulated the American assistance to Israel.

During forty-seven days, on twenty-eight covert flights, the aircraft carried more than six thousand Ethiopian Jews on twenty-eight covert flights. Under the agreement of Sudanese Vice President

General Tayeb, the flights landed in Athens and Heraklion, Greece, Rome and Brussels. From there they proceeded to Israel.

G3: Summary

What is noteworthy to the student of international relations theory is the simultaneity of Sudan's cooperation *and* conflict with Israel occurring at different political and social levels. Sudan was "officially" hostile to Israel but secretly collaborating with it. Israel could not have completed the rescue mission on its own. 'Grand strategy' thinking tends to under-appreciate how reliant initiatives and activities are on the support and cooperation of third-party countries and subject to the vicissitudes of their political ebbs and flows.

H. Israel and Iran

While Begin is recalled in popular memory for the Israeli attack on Osiraq, Iraq's nuclear reactor, in 1981, memory of Israeli-Iranian relations has been obscured in contemporary debate. Ironically, in spite of tensions between Israel and Iran, the legacy of Israeli-Iranian restraint and even collusion has not entered into debates over Israeli and American responses to Iran's nuclear program.

Three accounts of Israeli-Iranian relations highlight the reactive nature of Israeli-Iranian relations. According to Trita Parsi, Israeli-Iranian relations were characterized by Israel's goal of *appeasement* toward the revolutionary Iranian regime. According to Ronen Bergman, Israeli-Iranian relations were characterized by *economics*. According to Abol-Hasn Bani-Sadr, Iran's former president and foreign minister, Israeli-Iranian relations were characterized by *ideology*.

Although, as Yossi Alpher stresses, Israel's "Alliance of the Periphery" does indeed possess the character of a "grand strategy," closer attention to the diplomatic history of Israeli-Iranian relations during specific periods of the Cold War and Middle Eastern regional history highlights how the "micro" considerations of intelligence, inter-personal interactions, diasporic links and diplomatic considerations explain more about how specific episodes in Iran-Israel relations than a blanket definition of "grand strategy" allows. Attention paid to the *diplomatic history* of Israeli-Iranian relations is more revealing than attention paid to the "grand strategy" of the relationship.

H1: Israeli-Iranian Relations as Appeasement

According to Trita Parsi's study of Iranian-Israeli relations, Israeli interactions with Iran were largely an appeasement process. For Israel, the fall of the Shah's regime was such a blow that every attempt to make up for its losses by currying favour with Iran's new government was a significant priority. On Iran's side, Iran's struggle against Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war rendered Iran a willing recipient of Israel's "gifts"; but Israel gave to Iran more than Iran was willing to reciprocate in return.

According to Parsi, one fallout of Israeli attempts to appease the new revolutionary regime was the reaction of the American administration under Jimmy Carter. In early 1980, amid the Iranian hostage crisis, Ahmed Hashani, the youngest son of Grand Ayatollah Abol-Qassem Kashani, who had played a key role in the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951, visited Israel to discuss weapons sales and military cooperation against Iraq's nuclear program at Osiraq.

His trip brought about the sale by Israel of tires for Phantom fighter planes as well as weapons for the Iranian army. This enraged President Carter because it contradicted Washington's policy of isolating Iran to secure the release of American hostages. Carter reprimanded Israel by putting a hold on future sales of spare parts. Khomeini reciprocated by permitting large numbers of Iranian Jews to leave Iran to

immigrate to Israel for the United States. In total, Iran purchased more than $500 million worth of arms from Israel between 1980-88, most of which was paid for through the delivery of Iranian oil to Israel.

While Iran accepted Israel's military aid, Iran refused to acknowledge Israel's help and to extend cooperation to other areas left Israel without durable strategic ties despite how much it sold Iran. In Parsi's words, "Israel mistook pragmatism in Iranian business dealings with nuances in Iranian views regarding Israel." Parsi points out further that while Iran sought to keep its dealings with Israel as secretly as possible because it remained committed to its goal of leading the Islamic world as a primary objective.

Iran perceived public disclosures of its dealings with Israel as attempts by either the United States, Israel or Iraq to defame it and to undermine its foreign policy. Simultaneously, though, Israel reaped benefits by publicizing it, particularly since the Reagan administration turned a blind eye to Israel's dealings with Iran. In Parsi's words: "The more publicity Israeli-Iranian cooperation received, the more isolated Iran became from the Arab world, and this in turn increased Iran's dependence on Israel."

H2. The Iranian Revolution as an Intelligence Failure

An intriguing interpretation of Israeli-Iranian relations is Uri Bar-Joseph's account of Israeli intelligence on the upheaval. According to Bar-Joseph's analysis, Israeli intelligence had a better grasp of what occurred in Iran because Israel's key estimators had greater grasps of Farsi and Iranian history and culture than their American counterparts. This enabled them to comprehend, far earlier and more acutely, the gravity of the situation in Iran.

They also possessed the ability to communicate with their Iranian counterparts in Farsi, which created an intimate atmosphere in which the Iranian officials with whom they were communicating exceeded the official line and expressed their own concerns and personal views. Israeli estimators could read the local papers and listen to local media, including Khomeini's cassettes, without translation, as well as draw on insights and leads from the Iranian Jewish community. They were even able to participate

in the demonstrations disguised as local protestors. Israeli estimators, therefore, were able to *sense*, rather than systematically analyze, the atmosphere sooner than the Americans.

In Israel's case, its implementation and decision-making processes were simpler and more efficient than what Bar-Joseph calls "the cumbersome American policymaking machine." Israel's ambassador in Tehran regularly met with the Mossad station chief and military attache as well as other Israeli state and private representatives in Iran. In these meetings, information and estimates were exchanged freely, and direct communication was possible with both the Mossad chief and the foreign minister.

Israeli diplomats in Tehran Uri Lubrani and Reuven Merhav both served previously in Ethiopia and had a keen sense of the weaknesses of the Shah's regime in light of the fall of Haile Selassie. They drew upon their intuition and experience to sense the parallels between the Shah's situation and Haile Selassie's. In Israel's case, with the intelligence failure of the 1973 Yom Kippur War still fresh in their minds, Bar-Joseph infers that they may have been more sensitive than their American colleagues to potential sources of threat and to the limits of conventional intelligence to provide a warning before they occur. In his words, "the combination of their personal skills and national experience provided them with tools, most important of which was intuition, to sense the growing unrest and accurately estimate its long term potential at a relatively early stage of the revolution."

On the basis of intelligence warnings in late 1978 Israeli firms closed their businesses in Iran in an ordinary manner, brought their employees and dependants back home, and created a surplus in their balance of payments with their Iranian partners. In preparation for the cut-off of Iranian oil the Israeli government signed contracts for an oil supply to be provided from Mexico. Israel also doubled its line of credit with the National Iranian Oil Company, and when its relations with the NIOC broke down, Israel had eight million tons of oil for which it had not paid.

On 13 March 1978, Lubrani and Merhav made a secret visit to the island of Kish in the Persian Gulf. They sought to convince the Shah to allocate 300 million dollars to support the poor Shia population of southern Lebanon as a means to forestall the growing influence of the radical Iranian

opposition there. The Shah declined. On their flight back Lubrani and Merhav concluded that, in Bar-Joseph's words, "the combination of a disconnected leadership that enjoyed an extremely lavish life and a growing popular frustration and civil unrest made a radical regime change highly likely."

H3. Israeli-Iranian Relations as Ideology

Former Iranian President and Foreign Minister Abol-Hasn Bani-Sadr's memoir presents an Iranian perspective on the Israeli-Iranian relationship in the early years of Iran's revolution, overlapping with his brief tenure. In this memoir he spoke of Israel as an archetype more than as a reality.

As an archetype, Israel was the "model" for everything Iran was on the road to becoming. Israel, in his perspective, symbolized Westernization and Western alignment. Because Khomeini's leadership of the Iranian Revolution created the conditions for Iran's retrenchment in the Iran-Iraq War, Iran's isolation from the Third World put it in a position where it needed to rely on the United States and Israel for military assistance. The Iranian Revolution, in theory, was supposed to put an end to these vestiges of the Shah's dictatorship. Instead, the under Khomeini, these tendencies were perpetuated.

References to Israel in Bani-Sadr's memoir are manifold. One pattern in the memoir is to lament the quiet Israeli-Iranian alignment of the Iran-Iraq War which, in his view, Iran should never have entangled itself in under Khomeini. Instead of "de-aligning," Iran *re-aligned*. "This fear of Iran manifested itself in the formation of the Organization for Gulf State Cooperation, which made two important decisions: the creation of a joint air force and the construction of a pipeline to offset the consequences of a possible closing of the pipeline to offset the consequences of a possible closing of the Gulf. Two axes were formed: Tehran-Tel Aviv and Riyadh-Cairo-Baghdad. Only the Tehran-Tel Aviv axis was hostile, but each turned to the United States for aid to continue fighting the other."

As Bani-Sadr saw it, the Israeli-Iranian relationship symbolized Iran's preference toward *re-alignment* rather than *non-alignment.* Thus, it hurt Iran by rendering it subservient to Israel and the US:

"While we wanted to put an end to war and insecurity, the regime exported war and terrorism, thereby furthering the objectives of the Israelis and Americans."

Not only was this so in regard to functional dependency, Bani-Sadr also lamented that this was the case vis-a-vis *ideational* dependency. Bani-Sadr implied that there were many parallels between Israel's orientation toward transforming the Middle East by force and Iran's under Khomeini: "The theories of the Israeli Right were winning converts. According to them, the Middle East is a region without states that has always been nothing but a mosaic of communities grouped into empires."

As he saw it: "A return to its original state was therefore necessary, and who better than Israel to play the role of federator? Only war could make this dream a reality. In addition, by promoting a war in the Gulf, the proponents of this theory alleviated the pressure on the Israeli borders and made the Iran-Iraq war the number one problem in the Middle East. The center of gravity of all the region's conflicts was thus shifted from Israel to the Persian Gulf."

In Bani-Sadr's view, Khomeini's very adoption of a grand strategy for Iran undermined the neutralism that should have *de-aligned* Iran from great power politics in the Middle East and the world. Iran *should* have made peace with Iraq, befriended small states worldwide, and adopted diplomatic solidarity with the oppressed in the Third World, opting out of both the Iran-Iraq War and the Cold War. In his view, the Iranian Revolution should have carried on the inspiration of social reform internally into an approach to international affairs that avoided the dangers and cruelties that geopolitics engenders. Bani-Sadr's memoir presents Israeli-Iranian relations in the early years of the revolution as a symbol of everything he felt was "wrong" with the Iranian revolution.

Bani-Sadr's memoir testifies to *happenstance* defining Israeli-Iranian relations during the overlap of the Begin tenure and the early years of the Iranian revolution. He suggests that Iranian relations with Israel owed to Iran's isolation and thus Iran's initiative to break out of this isolation. He also emphasizes that Iran's hope to *emulate* Israel, despite the ideological divide between them, motivated the quiet interactions between them.

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These phenomena, not grand strategy, capture more acutely what transpired during the Begin years. The light this sheds on Begin's foreign policy lies in the evidence it provides as to Begin's accommodative relationship with Iran. Rather than remembering Begin's attack on Iraq as a "precedent" for a possible Israeli attack on Iran, contemporary discourse might be advanced by remembering the quiet collaboration between Begin and Iran.

While Bani-Sadr was indeed "idealistic," it was Khomeini who, in Bani-Sadr's perception, was naive. For it was this naivete on Khomeini's part which spurred Khomeini on into an entrapping alliance with Israel and the United States. Notably, he stresses how this Israeli-Iranian relationship was initiated by *Iran*, for Iran's strategic needs, rather than by Israel.

The significance of Bani-Sadr's memoir is that, in contrast to the accounts above, Israeli-Iranian relations after Iran's revolution were initiated by *Iran* rather than Israel. As Bani-Sadr relates, Iran saw Israel as a model of military success to be emulated. Iran, ironically, found itself not only aligned with Israel, but through this alignment with Israel, a collaborator with the global right-wing bloc. The Iranian right-wing, in his view, were aligned with Israeli right-wing under Prime Ministers Begin and Shamir, and also with the American right-wing under President Ronald Reagan. In his view, the idealism of the Iranian Revolution was lost.

In one noteworthy passage, Bani-Sadr opines: "During this same period, the Khomeini regime sent troops to Lebanon, ostensibly to fight with Israel but in reality to organize international terrorism with Lebanese integrationists." Meanwhile, on October 21, 1984, Moshe Arens, Israel's ambassador in Washington, "admitted that his country was selling American arms to Iran. This admission, together with Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the Israeli theories about the disappearance of four states in the region (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq), created a feeling of unease in Iran, where this information was widely disseminated. Even within the regime, a current of protest surfaced, which both the Right and the Left naturally tried to turn to account."

Resultingly, in Bani-Sadr's assessment, the "Right triumphed, taking its bearings from the rejection of Israeli right-wing theories by the Americans and the momentary weakness of Soviet policy in the

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region, which resulted from the Soviet Union's entanglement in Afghanistan and its frustration in Lebanon and in the nationalist movements it supported." As a consequence, Iran's right-wing "maneuvered so cleverly that it was able to present rapprochement with the United States as the only possible solution."

The legacy of this alignment was, in Bani-Sadr's view, that a neutralist Iran in international affairs was rendered impossible. "I was already convinced that neither the Soviets nor the Americans would permit an Iranian victory, and that since their rapprochement on November 21, 1985, in Geneva, they had decided to act jointly. On April 3, 1986, the *Herald Tribune* published a report prepared by twelve American, Indian and Soviet experts recommending the neutralization of Iran. As if by chance, a short time later, in July 1986, [Yitzhak] Shamir declared that the West ought to normalize its relations with Iran."

In another noteworthy passage, Bani-Sadr described the opinion of many Iranian military officers during the Iran-Iraq War as follows: "During this period, the relations with the Americans disturbed the army. Certain officers reasoned as follows: "Of course, we depended on the United States during the Shah's reign, but we were in control then and if the Iraqis had attacked us, we would have had the means to tear them to pieces. Now, there are two strategies, one giving us independence but making us weak."

As Bani-Sadr summarizes, in light of Iran's drastic shortage of weapons and logistical resources mid-way through the Iran-Iraq War, the question became: "Should we enter into secret relations with the Americans and Israelis? The officers asking the question urged me to contact the Americans because, they said, 'If you don't, the mullah's will, and they'll get the weapons they need to destroy us.'"

As Bani-Sadr saw it, the result of the Iranian Revolution, thus, was that well before the Iran-Contra Affair revealed American-Israeli-Iranian collusion, Iran was already "Israelized." In his words: "In terms of organization, weapons, and culture, our army was identical to the Israeli and American armies. Our air bases and our communications networks were wholly adapted to the exigencies of a war in which the Zagros Mountains would serve as a line of defense against the Soviet Union. The duty was to hold out

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until its allies could react and enter the war. Thus, the organization of our military institution was based not on Iran's needs, but on those of a foreign power."

Commenting on this reality, Bani-Sadr opined: "That is precisely where the Israeli army differs from the Arab armies. The Israeli army exists within the culture of the Jewish people, whereas the Arab armies do not exist within the culture of the Arab peoples. This is one of the great weaknesses of the Iraqi army, for example." In other words: "At first, the soldiers did not know how to use their equipment in the field because their American instructors had told them that a given weapon could only be used in a given situation. The soldiers' training was perfectly adapted to the type of warfare employed by the American and Israeli armies, but no provision had been made for any other type of conflict."

Yet Begin himself, in interacting with Iran, ended up strengthening not only the Khomeini regime but the Khomeini *ideology* within Iranian politics. Bani-Sadr's memoir highlights that Israeli-Iranian relations were about Khomeini's *ideology*, not Israeli *strategy*, underpinned Israeli-Iranian relations.

H4. Context

The "hegemony" of the 1981 attack in popular memory can be seen in its popular and common usage to debate policy toward Iran. Louis Rene Beres and Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto commented as follows, seeing 1981 as a classic example of the success of pre-emptive activity: "At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the time has come for a strengthened commitment to self-defence rights in world affairs, legal rights designed to prevent aggression in an increasingly anarchic world and to assure national survival. Israel acted in support of these essential rights in June 1981."

They extrapolate the lesson of this event to the contemporary debate over pre-emption as follows: "Today, following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May, we must ask ourselves - as Prime Minister Netanyahu asked purposefully 114 in an interview with Wolf Blitzer on 17 May 1998 - the

following question: would it be wise for Israel and the United States to wait until Iran is ready to test nuclear weapons?"

From the opposing perspective, Austin Long and Whitney Raas deliberated as follows: "When Israel struck Osirak, Iraq was involved in a bloody war with Iran that limited its ability to retaliate. With Iraq in chaos, a capable proxy in Lebanon's Hezbollah, and high oil prices, Iran today has a much greater ability to strike back against both Israel and the United States."

They too connect Osiraq to contemporary debates over pre-emption as follows: "Although the IAF may be able to destroy known Iranian nuclear facilities (by extension the U.S. Air Force almost certainly can) and significantly delay Iran's nuclear program, Iran's potential responses to such a strike may cause policymakers to reject this option. Despite its potential utility, military counterproliferation must be complemented by political and economic efforts if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be checked."

In light of Bani-Sadr's memoir and its contribution to understanding the diplomatic history of Israeli-Iranian relationship in the early 1980s, the assumptions underpinning a direct link between Begin's foreign policy and a possible military attack on Iran, such as the aforecited quotations represent, should be revised.

H5. Summary

Trita Parsi, in his history of Israeli-Iranian relations, noted: "The minority view in Israel, dubbed the Beginist view, is advocated by [those who] argue that the preemptive doctrine of Menachem Begin—who destroyed Iraq's nuclear facility by bombing Osirak in 1981—must guide Israel's approach to Iran. The states in the Middle East are irrational and suicidal, according to this school of thought, and, as a result, no stable deterrent is option is available. Israel cannot afford to take any risks with such enemies.

The only viable defense is to ensure that these countries do not gain access to nuclear technology to begin with by pre-emptively destroying their nuclear facilities."

Counterintuitively, the Iranian Revolution isolated Iran so severely that the opportunity arose for an Israeli-Iranian flirtation. Begin, oddly, is popularly remembered more for his attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osiraq, which has coloured debates over how to respond to Iran's nuclear program, more than for his accommodationist relationship with Iran. If Begin's restraint in reaction to Iran's Revolution figured as gravely in popular memory as does the legacy of the Osiraq attack, the debate over how Israel might respond to Iran's nuclear ambitions might have taken on a different and more polite nature.

Conclusion

The episodes discussed above are examples of Israel under Begin being affected and overtaken by unforeseen events that were beyond Israel's capacity to prevent or pre-empt. Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor has been central to debates over the strategy and tactics of pre-emptive attack; it is not typically contemplated to conceptualize the limits of grand strategy theory, thought and historiography.

This chapter has highlighted that Menachem Begin's foreign policy was characterized by hypothetical thinking and unforeseen events, rather than a specific "grand strategy." Instead of citing the precedent of the Osiraq attack in order to propose new grand strategy programmes for the Middle East, it might be wiser to consider the broader history of the Begin period to interrogate the relevance of grand strategy to the history and future of Israeli-Middle Eastern relations.

The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the limits of a 'grand strategy' paradigm in understanding Israeli diplomatic history, 1977-83. Grand strategy is not about security; it is about *control*. Israeli decisions can be debated with reference to their efficacy and their prudence. But to assume that Israel acted according to a "grand strategy" is to overlook the machinations of Israel's adversaries that were so aggressive as to undermine any attempt at a bold foreign policy programme.

It is irrelevant what "grand strategy" if any an Israeli leader adopted during specific phases in Israeli history. Israel was usually reactive to, and frequently overwhelmed by, events beyond its control. It responded with spontaneity and improvisation rather than "grand strategy."

The episodes cited above could play such an intellectual role. Begin's foreign policy, both among his critics and his supporters, should be evaluated on a diverse and sundry array of episodes he dealt with.

Chapter 7. "Rapidity and Sectarianism: The Short-Term Character of Middle Eastern Regional Dynamics, 1977-81."

Abstract: Grand strategy programmes are almost entirely grounded in neorealist theory and thought. An additional problem with such an approach to the Middle East is, it is overlooks the importance of personality, ideology and party politics in how the Middle East "really" functions. In the Middle East, foreign policy cannot be disentangled from domestic politics. The approach of Menachem Begin, Israel's Prime Minister from 1977-1981, to Iran in the throws of its revolution, highlights this truth. Regardless of the overarching grand strategy adopted by American foreign policy, *sectarianism* – both religious and secular, ideological and sociological – is the Middle East's tragic fact of life. This needs to be borne in mind when applying abstract North American "theoretical models" to a part of the world where they only tangentially apply. This is not to negate the value of such theorizing; rather, it is important to appreciate the reality of *regional differences* and to appreciate why some parts of the world are "simply different."

INTRODUCTION

In what follows below, I will highlight three ways by which grand strategy theory misunderstands Israeli realities. First, I will highlight the complexities of Israeli party politics, which have a logic of their own according to Israeli domestic realities and according to Middle Eastern realpolitik puzzles. These will remain constant regardless of American strategic reality. Secondly, grand strategy theory imposes North American thinking on a very different reality in the Middle Eastern environment. Grand strategy theory being a largely North American phenomenon, it overlooks the rapid short-term fluctuations that render Middle Eastern politics simply different. The short-term rapidity of events in Middle Eastern history suggests that in much of Israeli history clear-cut "planning" is not necessarily as helpful as short-term responses to contingencies as they arise.

The chapter will contemplate similarities between the fall of the Shah in Iran and the fall of the Mapai government in Israel; the purpose is not to liken Begin with Khomeini, since they are radically different inasmuch as Begin always operated within democratic frameworks and actively cooperated with members of the "old guard" such as his Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Begin and Khomeini both led their countries during war, but there is a significant difference between the two-year Israeli involvement in Lebanon which was undertaken in a proxy-war to assist the Maronite Christians and the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Israel's Lebanon war was just as brutal, but it was shorter and more constrained. Moreover, Begin, unlike Khomeini, signed a peace treaty with Israel's adversary, Egypt. Nevertheless, there are similarities in the nature of religious politics that are characteristic of Middle Eastern affairs. Grand strategy theory hesitates to take religious politics seriously. Israeli politics and Middle Eastern reality highlight why appreciating the history of religious politics renders the significance of grand strategy peripheral to the distinct considerations that make the Middle East what it is.

A: *Ideology, Personality and Party Politics: Begin and Iran, 1977-1981*

Grand strategy programmes are almost entirely grounded in neorealist theory and thought. An additional problem with such an approach to the Middle East is, it is overlooks the importance of personality, ideology and party politics in how the Middle East "really" functions. In the Middle East, foreign policy cannot be disentangled from domestic politics. The approach of Menachem Begin, Israel's Prime Minister from 1977-1981, to Iran in the throws of its revolution, highlights this truth. Regardless of the overarching grand strategy adopted by American foreign policy, sectarianism – both religious and secular, ideological and sociological – is the Middle East's tragic fact of life. This needs to be borne in mind when applying abstract North American "theoretical models" to a part of the world where they only tangentially apply.

In 1977 the bottom fell out of Mapai, the socialist-oriented party which dominated Israeli politics since the state's founding in 1948. On the center, there emerged Dash, the Democratic Movement for Change, the father of Shinui, consisting of liberals and capitalists. On the right, the Orthodox split away

in opposition as much to the personal non-religious tendencies of prominent personalities on top of Mapai's hierarchy as to their ambiguous indifference to settlement in the ten-year old Occupied Territories. The disenchanted Sepharadim and Oriental Jewish communities long ostracized by the decadent Ashkenazi order shot back themselves in support of the Likud party headed by the far-right opposition leader Menachem Begin and proved the cultural base which elected him Prime Minister. While all in the confines of existing institutions, Israel was experiencing the outbursts of social revolution.

This section will assess the impact of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini's concurrent seizure of power during the revolution in Iran on Begin's foreign policy outlook in the latter's first term as Israeli Prime Minister. A lengthy section will open this chapter which compares trends in Khomeini's and Begin's rise to power and the fall of the Mapai order and the Shah's monarchy. It will open with a comparative analysis of revolutionary events in Iran as compared with the upheavals occurring domestically in Israel at the same time. Israel shared some of Iran's "rentier state" characteristics. Moreover, both Israel's and Iran's cases, change in government was brought about by a combination of minority unrest, bourgeois centrist discontent and rightist religious mobilizations. Most of all, in both the Khomeini and the Begin cases, the full impact of their particular revolutions on each other's was slow, tangential and indirect in the 1977-81 years.

An analysis of the gradual overlap of each other's regional strategies will follow, with particular emphasis on the following theatres of Middle East politics: Egypt under Anwar Sadat, with reference to the diplomacy of the Camp David Peace Process; Lebanon, wracked by sectarian frictions which ultimately lead to Israel's invasion; Syria under Hafez al-Asad in light of events in bordering Lebanon in the west and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War to its east; and Iraq in the face of the rise to power of Saddam Hussein, his attack on Iran and alliance diplomacy with Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Arab powers, and the Israeli bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. Only once Israel is mired deep into its quagmire in Lebanon and Iran has rolled back the first Iraqi onslaughts after the Battle of Khorramshar, in the 1982-4 years, do Israel and Iran fully appreciate each other as true adversaries, although discussion of these years is beyond the scope of this chapter.

The Fall of Mapai

To track the origins of Mapai's collapse one must begin with the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as it is known in Israel. In foreign affairs it brought forth the humiliation of the Mossad and other apparatuses of Israeli intelligence, which failed abjectly in anticipating the outbreak of war. Preoccupied with retaliating against Palestinian militant organizations,[193] they all but overlooked Syro-Egyptian rearmament and missed crucial signs of imminent attack. Some months after the war, the independent Agranat Commission interviewed some fifty-eight officials in some 1,400 meetings in its investigation of intelligence failures before the war and concluded the following:

> In the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, Aman had plenty of warning intelligence, provided by the Collection Department of Aman itself and by other collecting agencies of the state. Aman and the director of Aman did not correctly evaluate the warning provided by these pieces of intelligence, because of their doctrinaire adherence to the "*kontzeptziya*" and because of their readiness to

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[193]Shin Bet, the Israeli security apparatus in the Occupied Territories uncovered a ring of ninety Palestinians suspected of subversion on September 30, 1971, near Hebron. Between July and December 1971, 742 suspected terrorists were killed or captured in Gaza. A violent firefight between *fedayeen* and the IDF in February 1971 yielded five senior guerrilla leaders dead, and March 1972 became the first month since 1967 devoid of guerrilla raids onto Israeli soil. In a dramatic raid known as "Operation Springtime of Youth" in Beirut on April 13, 1973, a team of IDF commandos and Mossad agents killed Muhammad Najir and Kamal Adwan at the top of the Black September hierarchy and Kamal Nasser, the PLO's head spokesman. These operations were, though, of mixed success: Baruch Mizrahi, a Mossad agent disguised as a Moroccan businessman, was captured in North Yemen in May 1972 taking pictures of the port of Hodeida from which a PFLP team fired at an Eilat-bound oil tanker in 1971, and in July 1973, a Moroccan waiter in Norway was killed mistakenly by Mossad agents in Lillehammer, Norway who confused him with the Algerian Black September intermediary Kemal Benamane, leading to an embarrassing exposure of its activities by Norwegian police. The grandest calamity was the failure of Israeli intelligence to penetrate Munich and prevent the murder of nine Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games. Perhaps most telling of the preoccupations of Israeli decision makers was the presence in Vienna of Prime Minister Golda Meir on October 1, 1973—five days the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War—protesting Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's closure of the Schonau transit camp for Soviet Jewish refugees after the hold up of a train from Czechoslovakia by the Palestinian militants from Syrian-based al-Saiqa on September 28. For a review of these operations, see Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, 257-75, 293.

explain away…the enemy [moves] along the front lines…as a defensive deployment in Syria and a multi-arm exercise in Egypt, to exercises that had taken place in the past. [194]

Indeed, IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar told Cabinet in May 1975 that military intelligence received more than four hundred significant pieces of information between September 26 and October 5 carrying the threat of war which were misread.[195]

A new government was formed in the face of resignations from Meir's government and a public loss of confidence. Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister and Shimon Peres Foreign Minister. In September 1975, after a long process of procrastination and delay, the Second Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Egypt, Sinai II, was signed, placing early-warning stations across a twenty-mile wide demilitarized zone in the Sinai Peninsula, returning to Egypt the Abu Rudeis oil fields, and allowing ships to Israel to pass through the Suez Canal. After signing the treaty, Israel embarked upon a program of rearmament, receiving three billion dollars in American aid, of which close to two-thirds could be used to buy American weaponry. To pay for rearmament, a burdensome new value-added tax rose to 19%.[196]

Herein lay the seeds of sociopolitical disenchantment. Dash, the centrist Democratic Movement for Change, splintered off from Mapai, with the support of disaffected Labor hawks frustrated with the inflexibility of Israeli decision-makers in the post-war environment. It was a party of the Ashkenazi elite dominated intellectually by liberals from the emergent Tel Aviv University alongside retired IDF generals, former police, diplomats and intelligence officers.[197] As a bourgeois party, it resented the increase in taxation for the purposes of rebuilding an army in decline, and called for decentralization of the economy and government institutions to devolve from the leftist socialist political economy it viewed as needless.

Meanwhile, there developed in Mapai increased suspicion of Israeli Arab minorities. A leaked government memorandum published in the newspaper *al-HaMishmar* authored by Israel Koenig, senior

[194]Agranat Commission Report, as quoted in Black and Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars,* 318.

[195]Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 55-6n.

[196]Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive Branch: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 252-3.

[197]Amos Perlmutter, *The Life and Times of Menachem Begin* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 313.

Arab Affairs official in the Interior Ministry, argued for a coordinated campaign of defamation against Rakach faction leaders, harassment of all "negative personalities" at all levels and institutions, and programs to encourage the emigration of Arab professionals, among other proposals.[198] The leak inflamed Jewish and Arab constituents alike and led Rabin's government to rebuke it. But Arab discontent was already snowballing. As land requisitions for security reasons increased in scope and scale, so grew the ranks of Arab membership in the protest-oriented Rakach party. A Jewish-run branch of the Israeli Communist party, it attracted such prominent Arab members as author and former Minister of Knesset Emile Habibi, who wrote in 1974 *The Strange Case of Said the Pessoptimist*, a satire of the humiliation felt by his minority group. In 1974 Rakach sponsored the National Council for the Protection of Arab Lands to protest the government's land requisitions. On March 30, 1976, is called for a general strike in which some ten percent of the Arab labour force participated and crowds of fifty-thousand plus turned out in the northern towns of Nazareth and Shfar'am. The military was called in, and six demonstrators were killed.[199] Although but a fraction of the Israeli polity, Rakach in the 1977 elections won fifty percent of the Arab vote, up from thirty-seven percent in 1973 and thirty percent in 1969. It won sixty percent of the vote in Nazareth and ninety percent in Shfar'am. Rakach reduced the Mapai coalition from three Arab seats in the Knesset to just one.[200]

Among the Jews there developed an unofficial underclass subjected to the ridicule and indifference of the Ashkenazi elite: the Sepharadim, or Oriental Jews, descendant from medieval Spain, and modern North Africa and the Middle East.[201] Mired too often geographically in city slums or projects and socio-economically in the 'petty bourgeois,' and subjected therefore to the paternalism of government-initiated affirmative action programs, there developed in their midst resentment toward the values represented by the Ashkenazi upper class. In the depressed times of the mid-70s, it was increasingly considered corrupt.

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[198]Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel*, Vol. 2, *From the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 37.

[199]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 36.

[200]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 32-3.

[201]For a historical analysis of the status of Sepharadim in Israel, see Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "The Zionist Return to the West and the Mizrahi Jewish Perspective," in Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2005), 162-81.

A significant Black Panthers movement grew in the Moroccan community which demonstrated for better housing and employment opportunities.[202] The scandals at the top of Mapai did not help matters. While the working class and below struggled, the head of the state-run Israel Corporation was sent to jail for accepting bribes and embezzling money, while the Housing Minister, against whom the Black Panthers were demonstrating, accused of corruption, committed suicide.[203] PM Rabin was found to have maintained for his wife Leah a secret bank account in Washington in which thousands of dollars were illegally stashed.[204] The Sepharadim thus proved the backbone of Begin's and Likud's support: rightist parties garnered forty-six percent of their vote in 1977, up from thirty-nine in 1973 and twenty-six in 1969.[205]

Orthodox religious constituencies were also fed up. This was largely a reaction to the ambiguity and perceived indecision of Mapai vis-à-vis the territories occupied in 1967. Groups had previously challenged the government over the right to settle in the newly-conquered lands but only in 1974 did there emerge the united front of Gush Emunim which resorted to collective political action on the settlers' behalf. It developed close links with the National Religious Party traditionally aligned with Mapai. In tandem, they shook Rabin's fragile coalition by forcing the Prime Minister to choose between the agitating doves on the left demanding complete territorial withdrawal, and the growing hawkishness of others demanding rights to settle. In June 1974, the military ordered Gush Emunim settlers out of their establishment of the new Elon Moreh community located on the outskirts of Nablus. The settlers ignored and created a standoff. Rabin took a non-committal stance. His government offered, and the settlers agreed to, a 'middle-road': if the settlers agreed to move, they would be transferred to an army base near the Arab town of Qadum until further decisions were made. Though announcing that the settlers would be evacuated within weeks, it so happened that years passed and nobody moved.[206] By mid-1977 this

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[202]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 24.

[203]Ned Temko, *To Win or To Die: A Personal Portrait of Menachem Begin* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987), 193-4.

[204]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 20.

[205]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 23.

[206]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 17.

incident came to symbolize Mapai's indifference to the settler movement and, by extension, to the Orthodox communities in general. The last straw for the Orthodox within Rabin's shaky coalition was an incident in December 1976, when he held a welcoming ceremony for newly-purchased American Phantom jet fighter planes after sundown during Shabbat. Offended, the National Religious Party split and allied with Begin's party.

Thus under Rabin, Mapai collapsed four years after the 1973 War. It was the establishment of the pre-State years which emerged between the Balfour Declaration, through World War II, to the foundation in 1948. It led Israel to respect on the world stage in the decades thereafter, victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, and survival after the onslaught of 1973. Yet as the party of rural Israel, the motifs of the pioneer and the settler on the land grew stale in the bitter years that followed. It could not maintain the all-things-to-all people posture it held in its heyday because its constituent parts had outgrown it. As the far left demonstrated against the treatment of Arab peoples, so the far right reacted against its reluctance to expand onto their land. It could no longer remain secular and religious, dovish and hawkish, rich and poor, elite and down-to-earth, as it was before. Israel saw in Begin and the Likud Party each of the latter. Once a violent revolutionary marginalized by the Israeli populace, he emerged in the public eye in 1977 subtly enough as a social one.

All these factors led to the electoral outcome of May 1977. While Likud and the National Religious Party saw modest gains, Mapai collapsed. Having fifty-one seats in the Knesset in 1973, the number plummeted to thirty-two.

The Fall of the Shah Compared

Theda Skocpol has theorized that the Iranian revolution which deposed the Shah was the logical outcome of Iran's status as a "rentier state"[207] in which payments from the Shah's massive petroleum fortunes was the substantial driving force in the economy. Payments were made to the poor for

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[207]Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11:3 (1982), 265-83.

subsistence and sustenance; hence, they were kept reliant on the state bureaucracy for their livelihood. The bazaar economy developed outside of the rentier economy of the state, and was the only sector of society which remained independent of the Shah's influence. It was the gathering-place of wealthy merchants who could function self-sufficiently without the Shah's cheques.

Attached to the bazaar economy was the religious establishment. Wealthy businessmen and merchants were a primary source of donations to mosques and religious trusts. Mullahs were often employed in negotiating solutions to commercial disputes. Also attached to the bazaar economy, to complete the circle, was a large segment of the bureaucracy employed in government: university-educated kids of merchants who worked in government. The clerical establishment organized protests and inflamed oppositional rhetoric on behalf of its merchant allies, while government bureaucrats paid by the Shah were neutralized by their bazaari parents. Secular oppositionists in Iran had the money, but real power lay in the clergy. Military leaders were too weak, while other social-democrat oppositionists were long repressed by the Shah's establishment. Over the years of revolution, the clergy under Khomeini was the best-organized to take over.

There are parallels in the case of Israel with the 1977 collapse of Mapai. While not exactly a "rentier state" per se like the Shah's Iran there had developed in Israel a considerable reliance on the centralized government and its affiliated branches. The role of the continuous revenues from oil in Iran may be likened to the continuous flow of American aid and Diaspora donations in Israel. These were distributed by the government and its various branches. Much of it went to kibbutz subsidies. In other cases, to the assistance of the poor: in the 1950s and 60s, indeed, Sephardic Jews had identified overwhelmingly with Mapai, awarding them fifty-five percent of their vote in 1969, long the beneficiaries of state-sponsored Affirmative Action and welfare programs.[208] The Israeli equivalent of the 'bazaar' interests can be seen in the centrist opposition to Mapai in the Tel Aviv *Dash* party which resented government tampering in the economy and called for de-centralization. Like the Iranian bazaaris, there

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[208]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 23-4

had emerged in Israel a large faction of educated, elite professionals demanding reform to the economy of dependency. In Israel it was the exodus of the centrist Dash faction which made the electoral difference, winning fifteen seats in all; two thirds of its voters had selected Mapai four years prior. Thus, as in Iran, it was the political centrists and socio-economic upper-middle class which broke with the status quo, thereby bringing about the victory of the well-organized and shrewdly maneuvering far right.

Both the Shah and Rabin embarked upon massive rearmament programs mid-decade. Letting prices skyrocket in the 1973-4 OPEC crisis, Iran—while auctioning off its oil at $17.34 per barrel in December 1973—allowed shipments to states blacklisted by Arab producers, thus raking in spectacular profits. Unlike Saudi Arabia across the Gulf—its principal competitor in oil export—Iran had a dense population which could absorb the windfall profits comparatively smoothly, with less social disruption.[209] Its armed forces were dramatically larger, allowing them to soak up increased investment in weaponry. Iran's revenue jumped from $4.1 billion in 1973 to $17.4 billion by the cessation of the shock. Israel, likewise, after signing the Sinai II agreement with Egypt, embarked upon a program of rearmament, receiving three billion dollars in American aid, of which close to two-thirds could be used to buy American weaponry.[210]

Among the educated, however, there developed suspicions of: for what point? No direction in foreign policy could be spotted. On the one hand Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai, yet there was reluctance on Rabin's part to expand into the newly-occupied territories. He was not seen as storing weaponry for the purposes of peaceful deterrence either, since he had not abjured settlement in the territories in principle, and let the Gush Emunim movement stay put in Elon Moreh. In Iran, the Shah sparked rebellion among the Kurds against the Baathists in Iraq in 1974, then turned around and signed the Algiers Accord with these very same enemies. It challenged the Americans in the 1973-4 OPEC shock

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[209]Even before the embargo, Saudi Arabia, because of its sparse population, had to import hundreds of thousands of foreign workers; economic expansion with the new profits would cause this number to rise exponentially, bearing the prospect of increased social strains among segments of the kingdom's population and radicalizing extreme leftist and rightist contingents. Furthermore, accumulating soaring profits despite the impoverished condition of large parts of the population would give rise to charges of the royal family hoarding the wealth for themselves. Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 169.

[210]Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive*, 252-3.

then turned around and bought its weapons and accepted its approval to play the role of policeman of the Gulf.

Begin and Khomeini, in their differing contexts, spoke for those who wished for *meaning* in their country's conduct in the world. Begin had as much a streak for anti-American rhetoric as Khomeini is known for. In the midst of Rabin's Sinai negotiations, Begin blasted Secretary of State Kissinger: "You are not the first Jew to achieve high office in the country of your residence. Remember the past. There have been such Jews, who out of a complex that they might be accused of acting for the benefit of their people *because* they were Jews, did the contrary."[211]

While Begin was not a cleric as was Khomeini, he was religious-traditional personally and publicly. He was frequently seen in public wearing a kippah and (at least during the 1977 election campaign) made numerous trips to the Wailing Wall. He conceived Israel in Jewish religious terms, rather than secular European-Ashkenazi. Hence in office he ended El Al flights on Shabbat, increased public funding for religious schools,[212] and curbed Christian missionary activity. Socially, he curtailed abortions and allowed girls from 'traditional' religious families to avoid military service,[213] as well as yeshiva students and teachers.[214] His speeches were replete with motifs of Jewish suffering, Jewish pride and Jewish might.[215] Begin suffered a heart attack in March 1977. It served his campaign by leading to an outburst of public sympathy, while simultaneously keeping him away from the speech stump and helping the public forget his fiery speeches of decades past replete with imagery of martyrdom and overtones of war and warfare which had the effect of frightening the Israeli populace, and his characteristic sarcasm which tended to offend it. Ezer Weizman, the former general who ran his campaign and would become, in 1977, his Defense Minister, made extensive use of new television media in Israel to depict Begin as

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[211]Temko, *To Win or to Die*, 188.

[212]Eric Silver, *Begin: A Biography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), 221.

[213] Silver, *Begin*, 166.

[214] Silver, *Begin*, 221.

[215] Silver, *Begin*, 167.

relaxed and professional,[216] and focus upon a single issue—Eretz Israel and the fate of the occupied territories—with which he hoped to exploit the main issue on which Begin and the public agreed. New polling revealed that the proportion of Israelis who opposed returning any of the territories had risen from thirty percent in 1969 to forty-one in 1977, while those who supported giving back some fell from fifty-nine percent to forty-three percent in the same period. Only four percent of voters described themselves as 'on the left' versus twenty percent were 'on the right.'[217]

In a November 1977 column in the newspaper *Ma'ariv* Begin spelled out his platform. The column is evidence of Begin's aim to be as broad-based as possible in his appeal. He affirmed the right of Jews to settle in all of Eretz Israel, vowed never to agree to its division, and promised to begin the legal processes of establishing Israeli sovereignty over all the occupied territories. These clauses were espoused to mobilize the highly organized Gush Emunim bloc in his support, as well as to appeal to those better-educated Israelis who wished for Israel to be bolder and more consistent in a foreign policy crowned with a meaningful focus. To appeal to more dovish Israelis, he vowed to continue the search for peace with neighbouring Arab states. Lastly, he affirmed a commitment to civil rights for all, regardless of origin, race, nationality, religion, sex or ethnic group. This was designed to resonate with the non-Jewish opposition to Labor among Arabs and Druze despite the slim chances of winning them over. This was aimed more directly, though, at Sephardic Jews disenchanted with Labor policies.[218]

One may compare this with aspects of Khomeini. As Begin with Judaism, so Khomeini used Islam a motif with which to unite heterogeneous Iran under a banner under which all could relate. Begin's Jewish orientation was defined in opposition to the European-Ashkenazi order, while Khomeini's Muslim orientation was defined in opposition to the Ayran-Persian dynamic emphasized under the Shah. As such, Khomeini, despite his association with the Iranian far right, followed a pro-minority course in the immediate years after 1979. Fearing irredentist outbursts, Khomeini granted more autonomy to Arab

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[216] Perlmutter, *Life and Times of Menachem Begin*, 316.

[217] Perlmutter, *Life and Times of Menachem Begin*, 317.

[218] Perlmutter, *Life and Times of Menachem Begin*, 310.

communities, allowing for locally-elected councils.[219] This was the case with the Kurds as well, whose cultural and linguistic rights were for the first time officially recognized.[220] Similar changes were brought about by Khomeini for Iran's tribal peoples. Not only did the Turkish-speaking Qashqai tribe of Fars gain autonomy after the Shah's fall, they were given back access to lands taken from them under the Shah's land reform programs.[221] Similarly, the Bakhtiaris located chiefly in Isfahan experienced greater self-rule.[222] Nevertheless, the Bahai community was singled out for harassment by the Khomeini government.

Restraint: Israeli and Iranian Foreign Policy Outlooks

In terms of foreign affairs, the bold, aggressive rhetoric Begin spewed during his years as opposition leader and during his first term in office in addresses to the press and public, was moderated by the creativity and restraint of moderate Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan had earned a reputation within and without Israel as a war hero dating back as early as World War II, through the victory of 1967 and beyond. In 1973, as Israel turned back the Syrian onslaught in the North, Begin, as opposition leader, met with him and recommended the IDF march forward northward into Syria, occupy Damascus, and 'rescue' its Jewish community. Dayan rejected this proposal on the basis that doing so would be impossible given the small size of Israel's army.[223] Since then, he supported Palestinian autonomy within the Occupied Territories and saw dangers in the annexationist trends on Israel's right. He maintained close personal relations with Jordan's King Hussein. It was this trusted, popular minister who, as Foreign Minister in the 1977-9 years, conducted the nitty-gritty of the negotiations with Egypt to set up Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. He made numerous secret trips to Morocco to discuss the prospect with King Hassan and with Egypt's Deputy Premier Hassan Tohami, who traveled there to meet him. Cognizant of

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[219]Nikki R. Keddie, "The Minorities Question in Iran," in Saheen Ayubi and Shirin Tahir-Kheli (eds.), *The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 97.

[220]Keddie, "The Minorities Question in Iran," *The Iran-Iraq War*, 99

[221]Keddie, "The Minorities Question in Iran," *The Iran-Iraq War*, 100.

[222]Keddie, "The Minorities Question in Iran," *The Iran-Iraq War*, 101.

[223]Martin Van Creveld, *Moshe Dayan* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), 185.

Egypt's sensibilities over negotiating with Israel alone, it was Dayan who suggested American mediation, the first Israeli leader to do so. US military personnel would man the early-warning stations in demilitarized Sinai; US engineers would build Israel new air bases in the Negev to replace those in Sinai; US guarantees would provide Israel with oil.[224] Moreover, by requesting American mediation, he laid the groundwork for Egypt's provision with desperately coveted foreign aid. Thus, it was this proposal which added incentives neither Israel nor Egypt could provide to one another in order to entice both sides into a peace treaty whose proposals neither would likely have otherwise accepted.[225]

As relates to the Palestinians, Dayan was the moderate foil to Begin's settlement initiatives. A small number of settlements would be needed, Dayan conceded, to compliment military bases in the new territories, for security reasons. But these should *surround* the local populations, not displace them. Israel would provide the Palestinians with autonomy and permit them to live their own lives uninhibited. He would replace the military government established after 1967 with a popularly-elected eleven-member governing council.[226] In contrast with Begin, he opposed both annexation and permanent occupation.[227] In the negotiations with Egypt, it was Dayan (and to a degree Weizman) who pushed Begin into acquiescing to Sadat's demand for Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza.[228]

Only after Dayan's resignation in late 1979 does one see movement toward a bolder external policy in line with the hard-line of Begin's ruling coalition.[229] Having signed the Camp David Accords and won the Nobel Peace Prize, Begin no longer felt the need to enact a dovish foreign policy. Now he could expend Dayan and focus on winning the satisfaction of parties to his right.[230] Thus in 1980 he permitted Gush Emunim settlers to live in Hebron. In July 1980, the far-right Techiya faction sponsored a

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[224]Van Creveld, *Moshe Dayan*, 192-3.

[225]Van Creveld, *Moshe Dayan*, 193.

[226]Van Creveld, *Moshe Dayan*, 185.

[227]Perlmutter, *Life and Times of Menachem Begin*, 331.

[228] Perlmutter, *Life and Times of Menachem Begin*, 348-9.

[229] Dayan's personal relations soured after he expressed to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance openness to Sadat's demands for Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank without checking first with Begin. Begin, ambivalent about the idea, was dismayed at him for going behind his back. Silver, *Begin*, 189.

[230]Demko, *To Win or to Die*, 246.

bill in the Knesset stipulating the establishment of 'united' Jerusalem as Israel's capital, which easily passed through the Knesset. It was the most intrepid step toward the political annexation Israel had ever taken, and provoked strong backlash among Middle Eastern states: Egypt suspended talks on the implementation of the Camp David Accords, Saudi Arabia called for "jihad," turning its back on its earlier peace initiative, and Turkey closed its consulate-general in Jerusalem.[231]

When the Shah fell, there was only a *gradual* evolution from monarchy into religious republic. The Prime Ministers who took power in his immediate absence—Shahpour Bakhtiar, Mehdi Bazargan, and Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr—were not themselves "Islamists" but, to varying degrees, Mossadeghists. Even still, they were open to negotiations and relations with the US, and only rhetorically—*not* strategically—opposed to Israel. Indeed, according to congressional reports which emerged during the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986-7, Iran bought Israeli weaponry as early as 1980, when it acquired ammunition and spare parts for Chieftain tanks and American F-4 Phantom jets. In 1981, Iran bought over $130 million dollars' worth Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, 155 mm. mortars, ammunition and other weaponry through Israeli dealers. Forty truckloads a day of Israeli arms were entering Iran through Turkey. Moreover, it accepted fifty million dollars' worth of weapons seized from the PLO in Lebanon.[232] At the height of the revolutionary disorder in late winter 1979 after the Shah fell, thirty-three Israelis in Iran were granted protection from vigilante violence by Ayatollah Khomeini's confidant, Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi.[233] Moreover, according to Bani-Sadr's interview in *Le Monde*, Israeli intelligence expert warned Tehran of Iraq's impending invasion.[234] When, in January 1980, Bani-Sadr stated that Arab nationalism is hardly better than Zionism,[235] one can construe this as meaning that Zionism was hardly worse than Arab nationalism. Although the Israeli embassy in Tehran was given to the PLO and Yasser Arafat made statements in favour of Iran's revolutionaries, there loomed great

[231]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 117

[232]Sohrab Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 141

[233]Sobhani, *The Pragmatic Entente*, 143.

[234]Patrick Seale*, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 362.

[235]Daniel Pipes, "A Border Adrift: Origins of the Conflict," *The Iran-Iraq War*, 6.

distrust among Iran's new rulers toward the organization, sensing its pro-Iraqi tilt. Khomeini was dismayed at Arafat's expression of support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and close relations with Arab states which quickly aligned against the new Islamic Republic. Arafat was prohibited from opening offices outside of Tehran out of fear it might spy for Iran's Arab enemies. Khomeini even called Arafat a "dwarf."[236]

Indeed, as early as September 1979, Foreign Minister Yazdi had met American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the United Nations, and two months later National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski met Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan in Algeria.[237] If there was a neighbouring power which was afraid, it was the USSR, which warned the US against interfering in Iran's internal affairs in January 1980, and along with the communist Tudeh party, plotted for Bazargan's overthrow.[238] In February 1980, Khomeini accused Russia of fomenting secessionism among the Kurdish and Baluchi communities. He followed Jimmy Carter's lead in boycotting the Moscow Olympics in 1980, the Soviet Union being, in his mind, the 'other Great Satan.'"[239]

The Iranian Revolution and Israeli Foreign Policy

The impact of the Iranian revolution in these years was limited. In no theater of Israeli foreign policy did events in Iran have an adversarial impact on Israel. In some cases, particularly with regard to Israeli policy toward Iraq, Israeli decision-making was to Iran's benefit. Potential negative effects of the fall of the Shah were compensated for by advances in Israeli relations beyond the Middle East, particularly in South Asia.

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[236]Barry Rubin and Judish Colp Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 85.

[237]Shireen T. Hunter, *Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 55.

[238]Hunter, *Iran and the World*, 83-4

[239]Hunter, *Iran and the World*, 84

Lebanon

Israeli interests in Lebanon were never focused on the Shia but were from the beginning orienting toward, primarily, crushing the Palestinian presence there which had grown since Black September in 1970, and, secondarily, assisting the Maronites achieve ascendancy and thereupon ally closely with Israel against Syria. Israel was covertly involved in Lebanon since its 1958 eruption in hostilities and remained involved continuously thereafter, functioning as the primary arms and intelligence supplier of its Christian (though more specifically, Maronite) factions. Toward the end of Rabin's term in office, an arms link was established with the South Lebanon Army led by the Greek Catholic Major Sa'ad Haddad to function as a proxy against the PLO's entrenchment there. His mediocre performance in a March 1977 operation against the PLO prompted Israel to send in occasional armored night patrols to back him up.[240] When Menachem Begin took power late that year, Israeli policy became profoundly more provocative, motivated not by Rabin's goal of preserving the status quo to protect Maronite influence, but by the aim of smashing it so as to destroy the PLO and bring about a Maronite takeover. In 1978 he sent eight thousand troops to the southern outskirts of Tyre to crush PLO positions, bringing forth sharp criticism from both President Jimmy Carter and the UN Security Council, the latter of which was prompted to quickly send in the UNIFIL peacekeeping force. In office he trained Phalangist militiamen in Israeli camps in intelligence, security and combat, and presided over a sizable increase in Israeli and Maronite border crossings, thus moving Israel closer by strides toward direct intervention,[241] and took the unprecedented step of announcing the Israeli commitment to the Maronites publicly in front of all of Israel: "…in response to a request that our air force…intervene intervene, if Syrian aircraft attack us [the Phalangists], the government of Israel will seriously and sympathetically consider such intervention by the Israeli air force, and most probably the request will be granted."[242]

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[240]Kirsten E. Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (New York: Macmillan, 1998), 101.

[241]Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy*, 105-6.

[242]Begin to the Knesset, Aug. 22, 1978. Sasson Sofer, *Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 204.

Publicly, Begin justified these moves in the discourse of the Holocaust and genocide. On June 20 1980 he told an interviewer on Israeli radio that his goal was to prevent "the annihilation of time Christian minority. That is a first-rate moral achievement."[243] He made frequent comparisons to the Maronite predicament in Lebanon to the Jews in Germany or to the Czechs at Munich, viewing the Syrians and Palestinians as the equivalent of the Nazis. Whatever role, indeed, Iran played in these calculations, was miniscule.

In Lebanon, Iran did not take an active role until well into the Israeli invasion in the 1982-4 years, during which time very close links were established with Shia militants and revivalists in the form of the Hezbollah movement. Yet prior to these years, the Shia community had yet to assert itself as an independent element in Lebanese entanglements. In the 1975-6 civil war, more Shia fell than any other ethno-religious community, yet not as a collective entity. Most politically Lebanese joined either the Sunni-leftist PLO or the rightist Maronite militias, particularly the Phalangists.[244] Musa al-Sadr's Amal militia supported neither Israel nor the PLO in the civil war, giving tacit encouragement to Syria's intervention.[245] In 1978 his movement's growth was stinted by al-Sadr's mysterious disappearance while visiting Lebanon. Although after Israel's "Operation Litani" in the same year, its ranks aligned themselves against the PLO, Amal at this time fell well short of representing the whole of the country's Shia population, having to compete with the Najaf-based and religiously-oriented Da'wa party.[246] At the height of the revolution, in fact, the Phalangists saw little difference in the new Iranian regime than of the Shah, still conceiving Iran as a Persian entity with utility in a minority-periphery alliance of times past. In

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[243]Begin in radio interview. Quoted in Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy*, 107.

[244]Augustus Richard Norton, "A Countersensational Perspective on the Shi'a of Lebanon," in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar eds., *Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 51.

[245]Norton, "Shia of Lebanon," 53. Sadr's niece became Ayatollah Khomeini's daughter in law by marrying Khomeini's son Ahmad. Nevertheless, those Iranians in Lebanon with closest links to the revolution were those trained by Fatah militias. Robert G. Rabil, *Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel & Lebanon* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 57.

[246]Norton, "Shia of Lebanon," 57. After the rise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the fall of the Shah in Iran, it developed close links with the Iranian revolutionary movement.

December 1980, the Maronite Lebanese forces published a document envisaging a new 'pluralistic' regional order dominated by themselves, Turkey and Iran.[247]

Syria

Syria spent 1977-81 enmeshed in crisis after crisis. It lost its traditional ally Egypt with the signature of the Camp David Accords. Relations with Iraq plummeted to a nadir. Hafez al-Asad's foreign minister narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of an Iraqi-enlisted sniper in Abu Dhabi in October 1977.[248] In July 1979, a temporary Syro-Iraqi rapprochement in opposition to Egypt broke down when Saddam Hussein, recently ascendant to the Iraqi presidency, accused some fifty of his closest Baath Party colleagues of plotting against him in collusion with Syria.[249] Moreover, by striking against Iran and provoking the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi forces tied themselves down in the East and divested themselves of responsibility for assisting Syria against Israel. Israel itself elected the unpredictable Menachem Begin as Prime Minister who had his hawkish eyes set on Syria throughout and beyond his negotiations with Anwar Sadat.

At home, anti-Alawi violence crippled his regime. On June 16, 1979, thirty-two young Alawi officer cadets were slaughtered after gunmen entered the Aleppo Artillery School. This was the climax of a wave of killings directed at high ranking Baathist and Alwai military officials, academics and civil servants, including Asad's own doctor.[250] Between 1979 and 1981, over three-hundred Alawis and Baathists were killed in the city of Aleppo, including popular clerics who opposed these acts, a wave of murders sparked by the arrest of the prayer leader of Aleppo's Great Mosque, Sheikh Zayn al-Din Khayrallah.[251] Ten-thousand troops were called in on March 9, 1980, for a search-and-destroy mission against Muslim Brotherhood perpetrators who were behind demonstrations which attacked Baathist

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[247]Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy*, 108.

[248]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 310.

[249]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 354.

[250]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 316-7.

[251]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 325.

barracks and party offices in the town of Jisr al-Shughur, and yielded two-hundred dead.[252] On June 26, 1980, Asad himself just barely survived an assassination attempt at his Guest Palace when grenades two grenades were thrown at the gate of the Guest Palace.[253] In 1973, Musa al-Sadr's fatwa proclaimed the Alawi Islam of Asad's family and ruling clique an official branch of Shi'ism. Aligning with Iran in 1979-81 was a further move to provide Asad with religious legitimacy. Yet given the Muslim Brotherhood uprising against him, whatever religious legitimacy he attained proved useless; he could only resort to force to protect his regime.

In understandable paranoia, Asad blamed a wide array of foreign elements for sponsoring these insurgents. Israel and the CIA came up, as did Jordan's King Hussein; in late July 1980, Syrian commandos stormed a Muslim Brotherhood training camp across the Jordanian border. Asad also hunted down hostile journalists in Lebanon.[254] Salah al-Din Bitar, co-founder of the Baath party alongside Michel Aflaq, was found dead at the hands of suspected Syrian spies in Paris on July 21 1980.[255] Iraq's Saddam Hussein was at the top of the list.[256]

It was out of arch-enmity toward Iraq, indeed, that Syria sought to align with the new Iran. Asad unleashed his intelligence services against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in cooperation with Iran, to subvert the regime.[257] Should Iran recover from Iraq's first strikes, the Middle Eastern strategic balance could shift in Syria's favour in opposition not only to Iraq but to its supporters elsewhere in the Arab world. While Syria did accept Iranian volunteers on their way to Lebanon,[258] their effect both on the country's Shia population and on Israeli strategic policy was negligible in these immediate years. The Shia were too divided at this point to act as a significant independent entity. Moreover, however many Shia did arrive in Lebanon, they were of no assistance to the Syrian presence. At Zahle in spring 1981, Maronite militiamen

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[252]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 327.

[253]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 329.

[254]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 329.

[255]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 329.

[256]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 336.

[257]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 358.

[258]Seale, *Asad of Syria*, 358.

had the Syrian army unit there trapped, whereupon Israel intervened and shot down the Syrian helicopters overtop which had flown in its unit's defense. Syria was compelled to install there surface-to-air missiles as a final deterrent effort, thus provoking an American sponsored ceasefire. Whatever stalemate was installed was counteracted by Israel in subsequent months. In November 1981, American President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig signed with Begin a "memorandum of understanding" stipulating US-Israeli strategic cooperation. One month later, in December 1981, Begin successfully passed through the Knesset a resolution formally annexing the strategic Golan Heights. Thus, despite the Syro-Iranian alliance cemented in the 1979-81 years, it failed to secure Syria against internal sabotage and renewed Israeli strength.

Egypt

Israeli-Egyptian relations were influenced little by developments in Iran. The years of high-level negotiations culminated in the Camp David Accords signed in March 1979. The treaty stipulated that Israel would return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt (this was completed in 1982) and work toward Palestinian autonomy. Developments in Iran had miniscule impact upon Israeli-Egyptian talks. If anything, trouble in Iran and the unraveling of Henry Kissinger's détente worldwide gave President Carter even greater impetus to reach a deal so as to show the American public that at least part of his foreign policy was a success.

On October 6, 1981, President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in the midst of uproarious anti-government demonstrations in Egypt. These, though, were different than the revolutionary movement in Iran and would not necessarily have produced a more Khomeini-friendly government should the Egyptian establishment have collapsed. Indeed, Iran's case, unlike Egypt's, was that of an Islamic movement aiming from the start to seize state power; in Egypt, the Islamic movement did not have such an aim.[259]

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[259]Asef Bayet, "Revolution Without Movement, Movement Without Revolution: Comparing Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt," *Theory and Society* 40:1 (1998), 136-69.

Egypt's religious activists were themselves very divided in their attitudes toward developments in Iran.[260] Thus, the interplay of events in Iran and Israeli-Egyptian peace was negligible.

Iraq

Iraq provoked the Iran-Iraq War with a series of anti-Iranian assaults in 1980. It feared the spread of Islamic revolution among its Shia population in the south along the strategic Persian Gulf coast which had been implicated in a series of assassination attempts against top Baathist regime leaders including, most prominently, Saddam Hussein's deputy Tariq Aziz. Iraq feared encirclement and subversion by enemies both within and without: relations with Syria were close to a crisis, while Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan had never been friendly. The Kurds were suppressed bloodily 1974-5 after their uprising, and were still hostile. The Algiers Agreement of 1975 which pledged Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement out of the exchange of the Shatt al-Arab waterway to the Shah for Tehran's pledge to halt support for the Kurds, was in limbo after since the 1979 revolution; Shia revolution was feared to spread into Iraq by way of the southern Shia.

More optimistically, though, Iraq hoped to capitalize on the revolutionary disorder in Iran by striking early and fast and potently, so as to either knock Khomeini out of power and replace him with a friendly surrogate leader; or to smash Iran into heterogeneous little pieces. By opening up an eastern front against Iran, Hussein hoped to align Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the military government in Turkey, and the Gulf sheikhdoms behind him, thereby ending these old rivalries and crowning himself leader of the Arab world in the absence of a strong and visionary Egypt. Baghdad also sensed that the new science and technology could prove to its advantage: a considerable proportion of its oil revenues from the 1973-4 and 1978-9 shocks had gone toward the purchase of new weaponry from European powers, particularly France, whose technicians had helped it developed nuclear capability since 1974.

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[260]Walid M. Abdelnasser, "Islamic Organizations in Egypt and the Iranian Revolution of 1979: The Experience of the First Few Years," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 19:2 (1997), 25-39.

In the 1980-1 years, it seemed that an Iraqi victory would not be unlikely. Was the Iranian military in shambles or had Iraq actually improved its military performance? Indeed, the Iraqi army conducted itself disastrously against Israel on the Syrian front which demonstrated deficient intelligence on the size or disposition of the Israelis, a lack of initiative on the part of junior officers who squandered attack opportunities and demonstrated inflexibility when unit commanders were killed. On October 12, for instance, the Twelfth Armored Brigade walked directly into a deployment of Israeli tanks under General Dan Laner deployed on an inverted V-shaped cluster of hills facing south near the town of Sasa, when Israel opened fire and destroyed fifty of brigade's the hundred tanks as the Iraqis fired in all directions in a panic. Within three days, the Twelfth Armored Brigade had lost 80% of its tank strength. On October 16, Israel routed Iraq again, exacting heavy casualties and destroying seventy tanks, in a battle conducted so poorly by Iraq that the Jordanian Fortieth Armored Brigade under its command demanded to be re-subordinated out of fear of operating with the Iraqis any more. In the course of combat, indeed, Iraq caused more casualties to its own troops and to the Jordanians and Syrians than to the Israelis.[261] The Kurdish uprising of 1974-5 was met with overwhelming Iraqi firepower and was on the verge of complete suppression by the winter of 1975 after bombings not only of defensive positions but of civilian villages. At war with Iran, Iraq emulated its crass and brutal tactics of civilian bombardment with Soviet and European military technology, distancing itself from man-to-man combat on the ground.

By the turn of the decade, Israel became greatly worried by the prospect and potential use of the Osiraq nuclear reactor undertaken as Franco-Iraqi endeavour outside of Baghdad. At maximum, it could be used in a worst case scenario to build a nuclear weapon which could reach Israel should Iran be defeated. At minimum, it stood as a psychological deterrent against Iran, Syria and other enemies of Saddam Hussein against whom he could use it as a bluff. It also symbolized the reliance on high technology which fed the Iraqi military's confidence in its wars with the Kurds and now the Iranians. On June 7, 1981, Israel bombed and destroyed it. One Frenchman was killed.

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[261]Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 167-76.

Revolutionary Iran factored into Israel's decision-making here only inasmuch as it happened to be the opponent Iraq was fighting and which was on the verge of defeat. The strike had the effect of improving Iranian defenses while distracting Iraqi war planners. Within a year, the Iran-Iraq War would have turned around, with Iran gaining momentum.

The Significance of Religious Politics in Israel

Grand strategy writing about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tends to emphasize "grand scenarios" and either hypothesize how to achieve them or forecast how to avoid them. Whether these be a "two-state" solution of "Israel and Palestine living side by side," a "one-state dystopia," an "Israeli re-orientation toward Europe," the "integration of Israel into the Arab world," the "prospect of cataclysmic future wars with Israel's enemies," Israel's "demographic collapse" or Israel as "regional leader", whatever their merits and demerits, these are not necessarily the topics that Israeli voters drive to the polls to care about. Israeli society also wrestles with many "micro" issues that gain scarcely the attention they deserve.

While it is possible to detect a demographic shift toward religious traditionalism, territorial attachment to the West Bank and retaliation toward Palestinian terrorism as shifts in Israel's polity's social psychology since the late 1970s, these trends were under way before 1977 and continued even under Labour governments and with Labour electoral victories despite Labour governments' advocacy of peace, a two-state solution and accommodation of the Palestinians. This underscores the importance of adopting a *social* perspective to Israeli external relations in their domestic aspect, especially as they stem from the outcomes of elections. It is very common for American grand strategy writing to cast blame and stigmatize outcasts among different segments of the Israeli and Palestinian polities. Long-term resolution of the conflict will require cleavages *between* Israelis and *between* Palestinians to be resolved and *all* parties be made responsible stakeholders in conflict resolution. Israel's multicultural polity needs distinct attention.

Israeli society is too complex to be categorized along a simple "hawk-dove" continuum. While it is easy to see how North American observers simply basing their assumptions on headlines may think this way, the 1977 election may be seen more accurately as heightening demographic trends in Israel that otherwise were occurring beneath the surface and which continued to well after Begin's rise and fall. This does not mean that 1977 is not a watershed; but so was 1992, the year when Yitzhak Rabin was elected. Social trends leading to electoral victories for specific parties were key to both "earthquakes". The specific cleavages most central to Israeli elections are the secular vs. religious social divide and ethnic frictions between different Jewish communities who feel under-represented and threatened.

One conceptual issue ignored by grand strategy theory is the assumption of a unified front among Israeli leaders or the Israeli polity. The very "goals" put forward by grand strategy theory presume assumptions about the world and the region that are shared in circles of foreign policy thinking that unite around epistemological understandings of plausibility and reality that are not shared by those who see reality and plausibility radically differently. Religious politics shares in the fabric of Israeli history even if only by opposing it. Often this is conceptually achieved by "minimizing" the role of simultaneously-occurring debates and phenomena in the political system at the time, so as, for example, to focus on the role of the domestic opposition party (i.e., the Labour opposition to Begin's Likud) as opposed to other forms of opposition to the political status quo in Israel simultaneously being challenged by Haredi, Palestinian and Arab-Israeli dissent and protest. A second conceptual issue is the relegation of questions of *collective memory*, disputed and contested as it is, to the background. Whether this be the "lessons learned" from specific Israeli wars, the divergent interpretations of the distant past and modern history of the Jews, or conflicting interpretations of analogies in Israeli debate, these are just as much a component of the domestic politics of Israeli politics as the role of social movements are. These debates frequently play out in feuds between bureaucratic interests in Israel's intra-governmental system. This contributes to the combative character of debates over issues seemingly peripheral to Israel's "core" agenda at a given time, but which cannot be ignored either.

According to Ira Sharkansky, secular Jews in Israel see the problem of secular-religious relations in terms of the domino-theory: if the Haredi Agudat Israel party can change the status quo on this issue, a series of other religious-secular accommodations will ensue. One such is the state's policy of recognizing secular marriages and divorces that are performed outside of Israel. Agudat Israel has a problem with this issue, inasmuch as it is a question which provokes hostility toward them in Israeli society; sharp conflict with secular Jews is something that Haredi leaders prefer to avoid because it is a lose-lose situation. If the Agudat Israel gains a point at the expense of severely alienating secular interests, it may lose that point and many others when political alignments change. Also, expanding the role of Jewish law in public matters raises the problematic and complicated question of who would interpret and enforce individual cases? Such responsibilities are likely to fall to the Chief Rabbinate and Ministry of Religions, both of which are staffed by supporters of the National Religious Party, Mafdal, which has been Agudat Israel's rival for decades. In the eyes of some Agudat Israel leaders, it is better to sacrifice an issue than to augment the status of the NRP in religious issues.[262]

The relations between the Religious Zionist and Haredi movements within Orthodox Jewish politics in Israel are complicated, and were notably so during the Begin years. The Haredi newspaper *HaModia* protested the "anti-religious" policies undertaken by ministries under the National Religious Party during the Begin years. It made critical comments about the Ministry of Education and Culture, which was under NRP leadership, for not having stood with Agudat Israel against the violation of ancient Jewish graves by Israeli archaeologists; and about the Ministry of the Interior for police brutality against Haredi protesters who took to the streets. During the evacuation of settlements in Sinai, *Hamodia*, the voice of Israel's Haredi Orthodox community supported the government against the settlers and the NRP-aligned protesters against the withdrawal, whose religious worldview is largely grounded in religious nationalism and religious modernism. Rather than there being a common "united front" among Israeli Orthodox political parties, disagreement between adherents of religious nationalism and religious anti-

[262]Ira Sharkansky, *What Makes Israel Tick: How Domestic Policy-Makers Cope with Constraints*. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1985, p. 72

nationalism is usually the norm. *Hamodia*, when interrogated by self-professed religious members of Gush Emunim, did not appear at demonstrations to be in favour of such causes as the sanctity of gravesites and the prohibition of abortions and autopsies. *Hamodia* supported the peace treaty with Egypt on the principle of the sanctity of contracts, the priority to be given to peace over territory, and the sacrilege of the spilling of blood for political purposes.[263]

Although 1977 is widely seen as a "new dawn" in Israeli politics inasmuch as Menachem Begin and the Likud party came to power then, the active and visible empowerment of Mizrahi and religious Jews in political influence is more heterogeneous than monolithic. There have been just as many challenges to post-1977 "post-Zionism" as to pre-1977 "classic" or "labour" Zionism. In the 2003 elections, Shas declined in popular support for two core reasons: one, a defection of Shas voters to Likud in light of the deteriorating security situation during the Intifada; two, the charismatic leader of Shas, Aryeh Deri, who oriented the party toward social protest and socioeconomic justice, was replaced by a new chairman, Eli Yishai, who focused the party on controversial religious-secular issues; furthermore, there was significant public dissatisfaction with Shas' performance in the government since the 1999 elections, manifested in the sharp increase in Ariel Sharon's approval ratings after firing Shas from the government. Notably, though, Shas maintained itself in Ehud Barak's coalition amidst the Camp David negotiations, an example of its religious pragmatism in contradistinction to other Orthodox movements' religious Zionism.[264]

Noting the significant Israeli-Arab support for Shas in Israel's elections, as beneficiaries of its social conservatism and social activism on behalf of poor families with many children, Israeli political analysts Shmuel Sandler and Daniel Elazar have commented: "Could *Shas* replace the NRP in reconciling the tension between state and religion and provide a new direction for the religious camp in foreign policy?

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[263]Sharkansky, *What Makes Israel Tick,* p. 56

[264]Etta Bick, "A Party in Decline: Shas in Israel's 2003 Elections." *Israel Affairs* 10:4 (2004), pp. 98-129

The decisive role of the Arab voters in the transformation of power may prepare them for a new role in Israeli politics, one that they have never enjoyed during the previous era of Labour rule."[265]

In an intriguing analysis, Turkish political scientist Sultan Tepe compared the philosophy of the religious parties of Turkey and Israel, finding noteworthy similarities between the Sephardi Haredi party, Shas, and Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party in Turkey, and between the National Religious Party, Mafdal, and Turkey's National Action Party (NAP). He points out that all four religious parties adopt unconventional positions that defy well-entrenched religious-secular distinctions on many issues, while remaining silent on many other issues that are critical to liberal democracy. Moreover, all four originated as protest movements against the staunch secularism of both Israel's Labour Zionism and Turkey's Kemalist nationalism, which attempted to secularize national identities historically rooted in religion. In Israel, the status-quo agreement between Ben-Gurion and the Agudat Israel Rabbinic establishment effectively restricted religion to autonomous segregated spheres of society. In Turkey, the state tried to control religious practices by creating the directory of religious affairs. In both societies, religion became appropriated by secular governments en route to becoming multiparty democracies, while remaining peripheral to mainstream politics.

In Israeli politics, Mafdal was popularly known as a moderate religious party, while Shas is perceived as an ethnic Mizrahi (Jews of Middle Eastern, Asian and North African descent) Haredi party. Mafdal has often positioned itself as a bridge between secular and religious publics by entering government coalitions as its "religious pillar". Shas emerged in the 1984, by contrast, as a protest against mainstream Israeli politics. Mafdal perceives secular and religious communities as possessing different yet complimentary roles in the realization of divine redemption, as embodiments of Rav Kook's vision of secularist Zionism as "merely a veil" concealing the divine. Hence, it believes in secular-religious cooperation on all levels and has served in governmental coalitions since 1948. There was a shift after the 1967 military victory toward the religious obligation of settling the liberated lands; the settler movement,

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[265]Daniel Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, "The 1992 Knesset Elections Revisited: Implications for the Future." *Israel Affairs* 1:2 (1994), pp. 209-26

to Mafdal's "right" on Israel's spectrum, came to see sacrificing such lands as impeding the fulfilment of redemption. By contrast, Shas perceived Zionism very differently, focusing on the failure to create an egalitarian Jewish community and inequality in the Sephardi experience. Zionism and Israel were perceived as having imposed foreign ideas on Sephardi Jews. Shas believes that Sephardi Jews must return to their original religious roots and integrate into Israel on their own terms, thus, both recognizing and challenging Zionism by acting with pragmatism. Unlike with Mafdal, Israel is not seen as possessing redemptive religious value. On the other hand, Shas sees Israel as a community of "tribes" in which secular Jews, like Mizrahi Jews and Jews of other identities must coexist by maintaining harmony and welfare for all.

In Turkey, the Nationalist Action Party parallels trends seen in Mafdal and the Justice and Development Party parallels trends seen in Shas. Like Mafdal, the NAP blends ethnic nationalism and religion, attempting an interdependent synthesis of the two value systems. In the NAP's worldview, the Turkish government's preservation of a strong state creates the stability necessary to maintain Turkey's Islamic foundations, emerging out of Ataturk's desire to avoid Islam's disintegration. A thriving political and economic order is the prerequisite to the flourishing of Islam. In contrast, the Justice and Development Party, like Shas, perceives the secular state as a rival and a suppressive threat to religious moral development in Turkey. Like Shas' conception of Israel as a coalescence of different Jewish "tribes," so JDP sees Turkey as a collective of different Islamic communities: Arabs, Bosnians, Circassians, Kurds and Albanians. JDP and Shas both see their countries' secular nationalisms as empty ideologies. JDP envisions a "conservative democracy" and calls for the state's disengagement from the cultural sphere. Whereas Shas expressed noteworthy tolerance toward Israel's Arabs but a conflicted posture toward former Soviet immigrants, JDP expresses tolerance toward Kurds but not toward heterogeneous minorities like the Alevis.[266]

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[266]Sultan Tepe, "Religious Parties and Democracy: A Comparative Assessment of Israel and Turkey." *Democratization* 12:3 (2005), pp. 283-97.

Grand strategy theory engages minimally with the infinite factionalism of the domestic politics of Israeli foreign policy which are evident in Israeli religious politics as a social reality. The reality of these dilemmas in Israeli social history are significant for three reasons.

One, Israel is different from other polities because of the primacy of *civil-military relations* due to the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict. In other polities, where "hot" conflicts transpire far from the public's attention, civil-military relations are not necessarily a central component of democratic politics. In some societies, civil-military relations are characterized by a military dictatorship, but in Israel's case there is active public protest from both the left and right on the role of the military in society. In some societies, there is significant public apathy regarding foreign affairs, such as in many contemporary Western polities, but in Israel, there is a significantly "better-read" populace with respect to world affairs that is both interested and engaged, despite differences in perspective and ideology, in what transpires in Israeli foreign policy. Furthermore, in the Israeli case, the "intimacy" of public response to military operations, owing to the effects of terrorism, counter-terrorism, conscription and ongoing active warfare, is far deeper and higher than many comparable polities.

Two, in the Israeli case, issues of *religion and state* are more complicated than in many comparable cases similar to Israel. In Israel's case, not only are central issues like the status of the "two-state-solution" inseparable from questions pertaining to religion and society, but even peripheral foreign policy questions are difficult to separate from the transnational character of the Jewish diaspora and its sociology.

Three, in the Israeli case, Zionism remains a *diverse and polychromatic national movement* wherein divergent aspirations as to the character of a Jewish state are far from resolved. The conflict between Labour and Revisionist Zionism, dating to the times of Chaim Weizmann and Vladimir Jabotinsky and to the rivalry between David Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin, have never been resolved and still play out in debates over how Israeli domestic and military politics should unfold. Likewise, the conflict between far-left and centrist Zionism has scarcely been resolved itself. Although academic and journalistic attention tends to focus more on the phenomenon of the rise of Israel's far-right and its

relationship to the Israeli state and mainstream society, the intellectual, social and political movements of Marxist Zionism, post-Zionism, anti-Zionism, bi-nationalist Zionism, religious Zionism and Palestinian protests against Zionism are still alive and well today and present their own contentions with Israel's conduct of its external relations in their own right.

Sharkansky presents the following analogy to understand the bureaucratic side of Israeli politics: "*Along with this variety of administrative cultures is a confusing melange of bureaucratic forms. Organizations have grown willy-nilly, with all the jumbled appearance of Middle Eastern cities whose lack of physical order frustrates efficient transportation. Like the traveler who must find directions through the streets of ancient Jerusalem, Acre, or Jaffa, the client or employee of Israel's bureaucracy is bound to encounter a convoluted route with unexpected turns and dead ends.*"[267] Sharkansky explains that this metaphor characterizes social reality as follows: There is a surplus of rules and regulations, only some of which are enforced. Rules are promulgated by proponents of certain policies or bureaucratic traditions who are naïve about related issues that tend to frustrate implementation. Responsibility is blurred in the case of joint ventures and subsidiaries. There is a convoluted mixture of big government, imperfectly coordinated, that leaves individual activities uncontrolled either by free market competition or effective bureaucracy. There is a notable disparity between official pronouncements and actual behavior. At times there is an escalating spiral: noncompliance induces bureaucrats to devise more rules and control procedures, which induce clients and officers to calculate probabilities the partial enforcement of existing rules and the addition of new rules in a fancied effort to limit noncompliance.

This being so in Israel's bureaucracy, how much more so in its cabinets, Knesset and social history. This reality should be integrated into grand strategy theory by learning from Israeli history, rather than attempting to break from it or impose a different ideal system upon it.

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[267]Sharkansky, *What Makes Israel Tick,* pp. 146-47

Conclusion

In 1981, Bani-Sadr in Iran fell from power. In the same year, Begin was re-elected in Israel, albeit only marginally. Labor surged from thirty-two seats in 1977 to forty-seven in 1981. Likud won a mere forty-eight, just barely eking out a win. Israel's domestic problems had only gotten worse. The election was more divisive than the previous and led to periodic outbreaks of violence. Once, at a Shimon campaign rally in Petah Tikva, radicalized Likud supporters hurled flaming barrels at the crowd. Labor headquarters were vandalized.[268] Eighteen people were hurt and twenty-six of the perpetrators were arrested.[269] Racial and cultural issues reappeared, only worse. At a Shimon Peres campaign rally at Gan Sacher in Jerusalem, angry Moroccan demonstrators threw tomatoes at him. In other instances, Mapai leaders' cars and offices were vandalized. In response, Mapai leaders cast the Oriental supporters of Begin in terms of closed-door slurs. Peres called them "Khomeinistis" and told them to go back to their home countries, while former chief of staff Mordechai Gur, a Labor stalwart, lashed back at hecklers at one rally, hollering, "we will beat you as we beat the Arabs."[270] Labor won sixty percent of the Ashkenazi vote. Of new Likud votes this time around as compared with 1977, sixty-percent were from Oriental communities. Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Shamir were Begin's new Defense and Foreign Ministers, respectively.

After 1981 Israeli-Iranian relations deteriorate considerably. Israel invades Lebanon in 1982 and mired itself ever deeper into the quagmire which would develop. In the same year, Iran gains the momentum in its war with Iraq and attempts to push the battle westward onto Iraq's soil. The threat of Iran's revolution spreading across the Middle East only here begins to show. As the tide turns in the war, the tactically incompetent Iraqis resort to the most desperate of tactics to hold on. The concurrence of the

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[268]Temko, *To Win or to Die*, 258.

[269]Silver, *Begin*, 216.

[270]Sachar, *History of Israel* Vol. 2, 130.

Iran-Iraq War and the Lebanon War are to be seen with the formation and strengthening of Iranian-funded Lebanese Hezbollah in the years which follow.

To close, in this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that in the 1977-81 years the ascendancy of Menachem Begin to power in Israel and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran bear much in common, as do the fall of the Mapai establishment and the Shah's monarchy. Israeli-Iranian relations during these years were conducted with caution, calculation and moderation. Nowhere in these years do Israeli and Iranian foreign strategies clash.

The lesson for grand strategy theory is that patience with the sectarian, ideological, partisan and socio-religious realities of the Middle East cannot be avoided. The Middle East functions according to *short-term machinations with long-term spillover.* Grand strategy theory would hold that precisely because of the rapidly-changing nature of Middle Eastern politics where sectarianism tends to undermine local order, countries need to have long-term, flexible, streamlined, coherent and collaborative plans for where they are "going" so as to navigate the contingencies of radical shifts in regional circumstance; the history of Israeli foreign policy suggests the reverse by hinting at how such plans are futile in the face of turbulence. Since *religious politics* are integral to Middle Eastern affairs, grand strategy theory must learn how to listen to, understand and interact with sectarian grievances.

Chapter N

Conclusion

What can grand strategy theory learn from the history of Israeli foreign policy? The purpose of this dissertation has been to interrogate the helpfulness of "grand strategy" to understanding and conceptualizing the history and politics of Israeli foreign policy. It suggests that the history of Israeli foreign policy reveals why arguably the most "agile" country in the world in the conduct of foreign policy, Israel, is anomalous to the popular paradigm of the study of "grand strategy" increasingly common in international relations departments in Western universities.

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In Chapter One, I highlight why the dynamics of peace negotiations -- the Israeli-Egyptian negotiation process under Camp David -- have a logic of their own. This logic is grounded in

the *relational* interactions of the interlocutors. It is rooted in a back-and-forth ebb-and-flow that fluctuates according to the intra- and inter-group relations of the specific teams. In the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, these dynamics were catalyzed by the psychological impact of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 inasmuch as they stimulated an unplanned cycle of reciprocity that the two sides debated together in the talks as they spontaneously unfolded.

In Chapter Two, I highlight why the dynamics of Israeli decision-making under Menachem Begin during his first term were so fraught with conflict between the members of his cabinet, between his cabinet and the United States, and between his cabinet and out-groups that formulating specific goals to be implemented was virtually insurmountable as a challenge. Even if there were a specific strategy, this was liable to veto both by the United States and by Begin's opponents inside and outside his government. Conceiving foreign policy priorities is challenging enough a small group of decision-makers, let alone a large and diverse governmental bureaucracy. Grand strategy ignores the inter-dependence of Israel and the United States and Israel's government and its opposition. These are both inextricable pillars of Israeli diplomatic history and the history of Israeli foreign policy.

In Chapter Three, I interrogate whether having "goals" worthwhile at all. In the administration of Yitzhak Rabin (1974-1977), simply fending off "surprises" was "plenty." Conducting diplomacy with Egypt, Jordan and the United States involved an emphasis on *calm*, *caution* and *continuity* that demanding *acquiescing* to realities imposed on Rabin's government as "given" rather than actively postulating and asserting initiatives of its own. Grand strategy studies often encourage an ethos of "restraint"; but even such an ethos is a *choice* when great powers can decide their own course of action. A fragile government like Rabin's in fragile circumstances was not necessarily able to "choose" anything. A closer picture of the history of Israeli foreign policy suggests that leaders simply try to "get by". Since there was significant overlap between positions held by the Rabin and Begin governments, the differences between the two, notwithstanding differences in party, were differences in personal qualities. Rabin was arguably the only Israeli prime minister who could be described as a "quiet" person. An approach to external relations grounded in *quiet* had much to recommend for it.

In Chapter Four, I contemplate the Kahan Commission Report which investigated the Sabra and Shatila Massacre which occurred during the second Begin government in 1983. Although this is outside the scope of the dissertation, the second Begin government was rather different than the first and involved a different cast of characters entirely. That said, even among ideological "brethren," the coordination problems at war during the Lebanon invasion were enormous. The Kahan Report brought these coordination problems to light. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's "Big Plan" for Lebanon may or may not have had the character of a "grand strategy" in the distinct context of the time. But whatever one thinks of it or of the war in general, the Kahan Report revealed significant shortcomings intelligence analysis and significant difficulties in communication between Israeli intelligence and government decision-makers. The field of grand strategy studies has devoted insufficient attention to epistemology -- how information is interpreted -- and to the dilemmas of the intelligence process. While most of the dissertation focuses on Begin's first term, this chapter addresses arguably the most important event of the Begin's second term.

In Chapter 5, I present evidence highlighting the transnational and cross-cultural character of Israeli-Middle Eastern relations during the Begin years. A grand strategy perspective overlooks the role that private contacts have made in Israeli-Arab diplomatic relations. It also overlooks the way in which the diplomatic history of the Middle East is in some ways like a "mobile": anything affecting one party or country in its "corner" inevitably affects everybody else. As a result, the history of Middle Eastern international relations leads one to wonder whether "planning" in the thorough sense of the word is really possible given the immense interconnected relationship even between sworn adversaries.

In Chapter 6, I present a catalogue of "under-studied" episodes often overlooked in studying the Begin period. These encompass the rescue of Ethiopian Jews, the diplomatic affair over the holding of a commemorative conference on the Armenian Genocide in Jerusalem and the assassination of Anwar Sadat. In the turbulent Middle East, "surprise" is so common that the flexibility that comes with *spontaneity* is arguably more helpful than the rigidity that would come by imposing a "grand strategy" on a very delicate regional situation.

Due to constraints of space and time, I did not examine specific episodes that otherwise might have been ideal compliments to the chapters presented. Intended research that has not been fleshed out would have encompassed the following pieces of the history of Begin's period: the impact of the Yom Kippur War on Israel's consciousness; the emigration of Soviet Jewry; the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981; Begin's decisions in his second term such as the annexation of the Golan Heights; and Begin's "first incarnation" as leader of the Irgun in the 1940s as are chronicled in his memoir *The Revolt*.

If these topics were analyzed, they would have filled the following voids in the dissertation.

A) Discussion of the Yom Kippur War might have suggested that Israeli thinking owes more to *collective memory* than grand strategy. Especially in light of the Agranat Commission report, *internal institutional review* in the form of an "autopsy" informs thinking more than integrated strategy does. I printed off hundreds of pages from articles from the archive of Israel's geopolitical journal *Maarachot* treating "lessons of" the Yom Kippur War. The scope of such study and research would have exceeded the boundaries of time and space of this dissertation.

B) Discussion of the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor would have suggested that concerns over logistics and "do-ability" were and are more important than calculations of interests. I feel as if this is treated well enough in existent scholarly writing. I recommend the book *Two Minutes over Baghdad* by Uri Bar-Joseph, Amos Perlmutter and Michael Handel. Another book treating the logistical aspects of the Israeli response to Iraq's nuclear reactor project is: Shlomo Nakdimon, *First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel Foiled Iraq's Attempt to Get the Bomb*. New York: HarperCollins, 1987.

C) Discussion of the emigration of Soviet Jewry would have suggested that activism has a logic of its own that grand strategy does not appreciate. Especially in light of grand strategy scholars' tendency to critique lobbying as a distracting influence on properly-conducted foreign policy, the Soviet Jewry movement highlights the humanitarian importance of lobbying to saving lives in the event of genocide. Without lobbying, movements to protect vulnerable populations from genocide would be gravely

weakened. I feel that treating this topic would have exceeded the word limit and space limit allotted for this study. This is the most important omission that I regret not studying in detail. One chapter would have been too little to treat properly.

D) A discussion of Begin's second term would have extended analyses of Begin's relations with Carter to see how even with a different American president (President Ronald Reagan) arguably "closer" ideologically to Begin, the same difficulties in coordination with the United States were still taking place and were arguably inevitable. I thought the findings to such research would have been rather similar to the treatments of the Carter administration in this study.

E) A discussion of Begin's years in the Irgun would have suggested that guerrilla warfare has a logic of its own and that the conflict between the Irgun and the British played out according to small- and local-scale deterrence tactics. This direction of research would have led in quite different directions than a focus on Begin's foreign policy in office alone offered. The subject matter would have included relations between the Irgun and Haganah, the British Mandate in Palestine, the end and legacy of World War II, the highly controversial topic of the 1948 war, and the character of guerilla warfare. This is a very different "world" than the study of the foreign policy of *the state of* Israel after 1948 affords. Hence the omission.

Additional relevant topics which could have been addressed but were not due to constraints of time and space include: the *Lavi* aircraft project, the US-Israeli controversy over military equipment sales to Saudi Arabia, the annexation of the Golan Heights and the triangle of Israeli-American-Argentinian relations under the anti-Semitic junta, and the so-called "Vela Incident," the suspected Israeli-South African nuclear experiment in 1979. This research awaits another day.

Absent constraints of time and space, I would also, ideally, have engaged in comparisons of other Israeli Prime Ministers prior to Begin and have studied the affairs discussed above in comparative perspective with episodes in other countries' diplomatic histories. These directions for future research await subsequent scholarship.

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I hope this study contributes to greater dialogue between historians of Israeli foreign policy and theorists of international relations. The significance of such dialogue might suggest the significant *limits* to international relations theory's conceptual paradigms to understanding the peculiarities of Israel's way of operating and of relating to the world. At the same time, the many "pockets" of international relations theory such as negotiations theory, intelligence analysis theory and decision-making theory should be appreciated anew for their precious value in allowing us to "get inside the heads" of why Israeli leaders think, perceive and feel the way they do.

Grand strategy theory could learn much from the history of Israeli foreign policy. Specifically, it can learn how severe external and organizational constraints make formulating and implementing elaborate designs a luxury rather than a necessity. I believe that insights derived from this study can apply to many other small states' diplomatic histories and foreign policies in the Middle East, be they the Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization, or the regimes in place in Israel's Arab neighbours. The noteworthy difference in Israel's case is the reality of Israel's "hyper-democracy". In Israel's case, "internal wars" within the bureaucracy are more fluid than those in dictatorships while cabinet conflicts more easily overflow into the public sphere and domestic politics than is the case in authoritarian regimes.

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At the level of pedagogy, I hope this study contributes to new ways of teaching Israeli foreign policy. Firstly, studies of Israeli foreign policy often *challenge* assumptions considered self-evident in other areas of studying international relations. Israeli foreign policy can be taught not only by "applying" international relations theory's insights to Israel's example, but also in a manner of "compare and contrast" between Israeli history and the assumptions of international relations theory. Secondly, history

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and political science studies of Israeli foreign policy offer tremendous *psychological* insight into *how it feels* to be in the position of high- and low-level Israeli actors. This element of empathy can enhance appreciation for Israeli foreign policy across the disciplines. Thirdly, Israeli foreign policy can be studied in such a way as to *unite* disparate theories and schools of thought in both international relations and the wider social sciences; too often, competing approaches to theory and epistemology are understood to be irreconcilable; appreciating how the same event in a given episode of Israeli foreign policy can be fruitfully understood from multiple simultaneous perspectives and that these simultaneous perspectives compliment and enhance one another.

<center>**</center>

The most important conceptual lesson of this study is this: *grand strategy is not about security; it is about addictive thinking.* The reality of control is this: if you think you can outwit someone else, someone wittier will outwit you; if you think you can outsmart someone else, someone smarter will outsmart you; if you think you can out-manipulate someone, someone more manipulative will manipulate you. If you try to control a situation, it is both immoral and impossible. If you try, you will only check-mate yourself, entrap yourself and shoot yourself in the foot. "Grand strategy" in all its frightening aspects thrives in circumstances where no accountability, no honesty, no constraint and no oversight manifest; the study of "grand strategy" certainly has its value and there is much to recommend for its implementation in certain circumstances. The problem lies not in "strategy" but in the adjective "grand."

In life, as in foreign policy, there are too many factors, angles, considerations and dimensions to be properly grasped by anybody, even by the best. Cultivating a grand strategy would not necessarily increase a country's security; it would increase an establishment's *nitpickiness*. In my personal and subjective perspective, grand strategy is to international relations what control is to interpersonal relations.

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Quote:

"We will no longer say 'Our God' to the work of our hands." -- Hosea 14:3