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Conservation, Development, and State Environment-making in Chile

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Geography

by

Clare Marie Beer

2022

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Conservation, Development, and State Environment-making in Chile

by

Clare Marie Beer

Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

University of California, Los Angeles, 2022

Professor Eric Stewart Sheppard, Chair

The role of philanthropy in biodiversity conservation is rapidly changing. As philanthropic foundations and wealthy donors commit massive sums to help ‘save the planet,’ they are fueling a growing discourse that coupling large-scale conservation with large-scale giving is indispensable to solving the biodiversity crisis. But is it? What would this mean, and how would this function in practice? This dissertation addresses such questions through a case study of one large-scale conservation initiative in Chilean Patagonia, established through a novel public-private partnership between the Chilean state and the U.S.-based philanthropic foundations Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts. Drawing on thirteen months of fieldwork and a qualitative ‘distended case approach’ methodology, it traces the origins and trajectories of this initiative and interrogates the broader implications of mobilizing philanthropic capital and donor decision-making in state environmental governance. Tompkins Conservation

and The Pew Charitable Trusts attracted state buy-in for the partnership by speculating on the value and investability of national parks as economic assets. Reflecting a logic of conservation-as-development, this disrupted an entrenched state logic of conservation-versus-development that had derailed previous attempts to protect the region. Yet, this research finds that the execution of conservation-as-development in Chile – largely facilitated by these philanthropic foundations – is mimicking and reproducing key dynamics of extractive-led development, raising critical doubts about the appeal and feasibility of conservation-as-development as a green transition alternative.

The dissertation of Clare Marie Beer is approved.

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2022

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

CMS	Council of Ministers for Sustainability (<i>Consejo de Ministros para la Sustentabilidad</i>)
CONAF	National Forestry Corporation (<i>Corporación Nacional Forestal</i>)
MINREL	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<i>Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores</i>)
MMA	Environment Ministry (<i>Ministerio del Medio Ambiente</i>)
PPP	Public-private Partnership
SERNATUR	National Tourism Service (<i>Servicio Nacional de Turismo</i>)
SNASPE	National System of Protected Wilderness Areas (<i>Sistema Nacional de Áreas Silvestres</i>)

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The dissertating process has disavowed me of the notion that writing is individualized labor. No one writes alone. This dissertation is the product of the generous editing, engagement, and critique I received from others.

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CHAPTER 1: (Introduction) A Conservation PPP at the End of the World

The bitter winds of Patagonia are infamous. They blow strongest in the summer months between November and March, “stripping men to the raw” (Chatwin, 1988/1977, p. 42). Wind lends a particular ferocity to Chile’s General Carrera Lake – the third largest on the continent – which straddles the Chile-Argentina border in the remote southern region of Aysén. From space, the lake resembles the shape of a whale in breach, cutting across the Andes mountain range. It is known for being deep, cold, and tempestuous. The morning of December 8, 2015 began calmly enough as a group of six experienced kayakers set out for the fourth day of a five-day, 50-mile expedition along the lake’s northern edge (personal communication, 16 April 2019). The group included a who’s who of American outdoor “legends”: Yvon Chouinard, a climbing legend and founder of the Patagonia Inc. clothing brand; Rick Ridgeway, another climbing legend and former executive at Patagonia Inc.; Jib Ellison, a legendary whitewater rafter; and Douglas Tompkins, a legendary outdoorsman and co-founder of the North Face and Esprit clothing brands.

By mid-morning, the wind on General Carrera Lake had quickened, whipping waves into five-foot swells and creating dangerous paddling conditions (Williams, 2016). The double-kayak carrying Ridgeway and Tompkins capsized, plunging both men into the frigid water. A hasty rescue attempt by the other four men succeeded in towing Ridgeway to shore, but not Tompkins. A helicopter from a nearby luxury resort was dispatched; without a hoist to raise Tompkins from the water, it lowered a life ring and dragged Tompkins and another group member nearly half a mile toward shore. Tompkins was severely hypothermic and unconscious. He was rushed to a local hospital but later pronounced dead. No one wore a drysuit that day, a decision which proved tragically fatal and tragically ironic given that both Tompkins and Chouinard made their

fortunes selling drysuits and other outdoor technical gear. Tompkins' obituary in *The New York Times* quotes one of his daughters: "He flew airplanes, he climbed to the top of mountains all over the world. To have lost his life in a lake and have nature just sort of gobble him up is just shocking" (Abrams & Southall, 2015).

Tompkins' sudden death triggered, *inter alia*, the acceleration of a historic land donation to the Chilean state that he had planned for decades. After abandoning a successful business career in California, Tompkins moved to Chile in the early 1990s while the country was still reeling from the end of a 17-year military dictatorship. He had recently divorced Susie Buell Tompkins, with whom he co-founded The North Face and Esprit, and used money from the sale of his stake in the companies to buy land for conservation and sustainable agriculture projects. The dissolution of the marriage was accompanied by a philosophical about-face regarding capitalism and consumerism and their ruinous effects on the environment. Tompkins vowed to dedicate his future personal and professional pursuits, and the bulk of his wealth, to environmental protection. He settled in the isolated coastal fjords of northern Patagonia. A rainy and rugged area long neglected by the state and extractive industry, it was facing increasing rates of ecological destruction, including the clear-cutting of ancient alerce (*Fitzroya cupressoides*) forests that contain some of the oldest and largest trees on Earth.

In choosing Chile to live out a philosophy that he and others called 'deep ecology,' Tompkins attempted something that was at once completely novel and completely quotidian in this small, natural resource-rich but fiscally resource-poor country at the end of the world: large-scale land acquisition by foreigners.¹ A recent biography of Tompkins describes his first Chilean

¹ Scholars have theorized recent large-scale land acquisitions by foreigners, whether for extraction or conservation, through the concepts of 'land grabbing' (Sassen, 2013; Zoomers, 2010) and 'green grabbing' (Fairhead et al., 2012; Núñez et al., 2020).

acquisition:

[He landed] in the pasture of a small farm in a valley just off the ocean. To clear the runway, Tompkins buzzed the pasture to scare away cows and sheep grazing on the landing strip. On his final approach, a group of Chilean cowboys appeared on horseback and chased off the stragglers. As he landed the plane, the five *huasos* galloped alongside the airplane, decked out in ponchos and stiff-brimmed woven hats. Doug decided to buy the massive farm on the spot. “It was kind of a capricious purchase,” he later admitted. “I bought it on a whim, thinking at worst it’s sea-level native forest that is worthy of some private conservation.” It was a bargain basement buy. For the price of a two-bedroom condo in San Francisco, he now owned an entire ecosystem. (Franklin, 2021, p. 119)

Over the next 25 years, Tompkins would go on to own many ecosystems. He and his second wife Kristine McDivitt Tompkins, former CEO of Chouinard’s Patagonia Inc., purchased and conserved 2.2 million acres of private land in southern Chile, later replicating this in neighboring Argentina. They now are considered the largest private land conservationists in history (Saverin, 2014).

The Tompkins’ large-scale land acquisition for conservation – executed through a number of philanthropic foundations registered in the United States and Chile, including the Conservation Land Trust, the Foundation for Deep Ecology, Tompkins Conservation, Fundación Yendegaia, and Conservación Patagónica – was highly controversial. Especially in the late 1990s, their activities invited scrutiny or outright opposition from Congress, the President, the military, the Catholic Church, the media, corporate executives, and local Patagonian politicians and residents. No activity garnered more scrutiny than their Parque Pumalín project, a 768,000-acre expanse of dense temperate rainforest created from multiple land holdings that at one point stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Argentine border. In effect, the Tompkins had purchased the entire width of the country at the 42nd parallel, leading many to argue that they had cut Chile in two (M. Nelson & Geisse, 2001). There was no contiguous road infrastructure connecting the rural communities north and south of Parque Pumalín at the time, and the Tompkins opposed government plans to build a road through the middle of their property. This raised serious questions about national sovereignty, territoriality, and development, earning Mr. Tompkins in

particular the status of *persona non grata* with much of the public (Interview 79, 13 December 2019). Yet, he was undeterred, continuing his critique of Chilean-style extractivism and expanding his private conservation estate while promising to one day gift the entire estate back to the public domain.

In the prologue to another recent biography of Tompkins, sociologist Florencio Ceballos argues that he represented the ultimate threat to the Chilean elite in the post-dictatorship period: “Tompkins provoked like no one else the particular elite pact that became our transitional arrangement, full of irrational, capricious and profoundly manipulative fears” (Azócar, 2017, p. 47). The transitional arrangement that Ceballos references was the return to democracy following General Augusto Pinochet’s oppressive reign. National political and business elites had carefully orchestrated this arrangement to include the restoration of fundamental elements like civil society and human rights, while excluding any substantive altering of the also oppressive neoliberal development model that many still credit with turning Pinochet’s Chile into an ‘economic miracle.’ These elites feared the economic miracle would end if the model was altered, and so a logic of ‘change without reform’ won the day (Interview 34, 2 July 2019).

Tompkins posed a double threat: he dared to critique the business elite as a prominent ex-member of the business elite; and he dared to use Chile’s legal system, which touts incentives for foreign investment and some of the strongest private property rights in the world – designed to favor transnational industry – to challenge prevailing notions of what counts as acceptable forms of foreign investment and domestic land-use. As one informant put it, echoing a sentiment expressed by many others, no one would have batted an eye if Tompkins had purchased all that land simply to deforest it (Interview 39b, 7 October 2019). At a moment in which Chile’s environmental movement was only just re-emerging from almost two decades underground, and

domestic philanthropy was virtually non-existent, elites and non-elites alike could not fathom why Tompkins would choose to spend his fortune on conservation, or gift his land to the state instead of his heirs (Interview 79, 13 December 2019). This fueled sinister rumors ranging “from the conspiratorial to the phantasmagorical” (Saverin, 2014). For instance, he was accused of plotting to seize and sell the region’s abundant freshwater resources; of breeding “lions” (pumas) to decimate Patagonia’s livestock population, an historical driver of land degradation; of building a site to store nuclear waste; and of acquiring land to establish a second Jewish state. (Tompkins was not Jewish.) Many of these rumors took root or flourished in Chile’s elite-controlled print media (Interview 58, 17 October 2019).

In late 2015, the Tompkins were in discussions with the Chilean government to donate their private conservation estate to the National System of Protected Wilderness Areas (SNASPE) in order to expand or create national parks. The Tompkins long admired the role that American philanthropic dynasties like the Rockefellers and the Mellons played in U.S. conservation, helping to grow and strengthen the National Park Service with land and cash donations. They sought to play a similar role in Chile, having already donated land to help create Corcovado National Park in 2005 and Yendegaia National Park in 2013. Now they endeavored to donate the remainder of the estate, which included their largest projects Parque Pumalín and Parque Patagonia. For decades, the Tompkins had cultivated these in the style of U.S. national parks, investing hundreds of millions in rehabilitating preservation zones and demarcating these from zones of public access, developing integrated trail and camping infrastructure, and even building visitor centers and a museum.

Within weeks of Tompkins’ death, McDivitt Tompkins met with President Michelle Bachelet at La Moneda Presidential Palace in Santiago to formalize the donation. It would take

years to execute, but the final form adopted the public-private partnership model, adjoining the Tompkins' private lands with the state's public lands to expand Chile's national parks by 10 million acres. Tompkins once remarked in an interview with *The New York Times*, "If you're not willing to take the political heat, then you shouldn't get into the game of land conservation, especially on a large scale" (Rohter, 2005). There is no question that Tompkins took considerable political heat over the years; the question is why, and what it means more broadly. While the donation fulfilled a decades-long promise to the Chilean people, it has catalyzed a series of new questions: what is a public-private partnership for conservation, and what are its implications for the Chilean state, Chilean society, and the globalizing practice of environmental philanthropy?

1.1 Research Context

This dissertation takes public-private partnerships for conservation – hereafter referenced as conservation PPPs – as the central object of analysis, asking what they are, how they operate, and why they are gaining favor with global political, business, and philanthropic elites.

Conservation PPPs combine the financial and technical resources of private and third sector actors with those of public sector institutions to govern the protection of public goods like biodiversity and natural resources (Chisika & Yeom, 2021). In the context of an accelerating extinction crisis, they are viewed as a key, even indispensable, policy tool. According to Becker (2016), "a varied portfolio of income sources including public funding, philanthropy, visitor entrance charges, and concession fees is important for an effective management of public protected areas." Conservation PPPs help bolster and diversify a portfolio. They have existed for decades in national parks across the global North and South, traditionally employing private

capital to provision visitor and recreational services. Increasingly, however, they employ private or philanthropic capital to address the substantive objectives of conservation itself, including land acquisition and management standards, specifically targeting national parks in the global South. This shift reflects the fact that the majority of biodiversity stocks, and thus the bulk of potential conservation gains, is concentrated in countries of the global South (Balmford et al., 2003; Waldron et al., 2013). It also reflects the fear that these countries lack the capacity to adequately protect their biodiversity stocks or make conservation gains (IPBES, 2019; Saporiti, 2006).

Many conservation PPPs in the global South are based on a master logic that anthropologist Paige West (2006) calls ‘conservation-as-development.’ Under this logic, conservation doubles as the means of protecting highly biodiverse areas *and* delivering social and economic development to the rural poor living in these areas. Such projects aim to prevent further degradation of biodiversity and natural resources while securing the long-term consent and support of local peoples (Kremen et al., 1994). In practice, conservation and development are integrated through market-based activities like ecotourism and payments for ecosystem services, which proponents describe as economic and environmental ‘win-wins’ that derive value from nature without involving material extraction. Alpert (1996) calls integrated conservation and development a ‘marriage of convenience,’ writing that it “has been inspired largely by the failure of either to succeed on its own” (p 845).

Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) emerged in the 1980s as part of a broader push to decenter the conservation movement’s historical approach of ‘fortress-style’ protectionism through ‘people-oriented’ approaches (Wells et al., 1992). In recent decades, scholars and practitioners have fiercely debated the merits and limitations of such people-

oriented approaches, with some advocating for more socially-just alternatives and others advocating for a return to the exclusionary ethos of fortress-style protectionism (Brechin et al., 2002; Hutton et al., 2005; Lele et al., 2010; Oates, 1999; Terborgh, 1999). Nonetheless, a logic of conservation-as-development continues to pervade the discourses and practices of mainstream environmental governance in the global South.

Extant scholarship on conservation-as-development remains narrowly focused on the role of NGOs in designing and implementing projects. West's (2006) book *Conservation is Our Government Now* helped launch the concept as a pithy critique of ICDPs and their underlying neoliberal ideology. Tracing the history and effects of one ICDP in Papua New Guinea, the book finds that NGO workers in charge of managing the project sought to reorient the environmental and social relationships of the local Maimafu people around the production and sale of commodities. These workers expected this to incentivize conservation and encourage development. The Maimafu, meanwhile, expected that participating in the project would yield benefits like medicine and technology that ultimately never materialized. Her findings led West (2006) to question whether "using neoliberal market-based development strategies either conserves or develops rural or out-of-the-way places" (p. 36). Geographers and other social scientists have similarly critiqued NGOs' complicity in conservation-as-development, arguing that it amounts to a market-optimized modernization scheme rife with the vested interests, uneven power relations, and lackluster local results that characterize other modernization schemes (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010; Brockington & Scholfield, 2010a; Büscher, 2010a; Howell, 2014; Novellino & Dressler, 2009).

This disproportionate focus on NGOs reflects, in part, the era in which much of this scholarship was undertaken. From the mid-1990s through the mid-2010s, neoliberal policy

trends sweeping the global South catalyzed a general retrenchment of state agencies from conservation and development programming (Dempsey, 2016; MacDonald, 2010). These same neoliberal policy trends empowered NGOs to serve as direct agents of conservation and development, supplying the services and expertise once supplied by state agencies. The devolved, multi-stakeholder governance model that defined this era is perhaps best described, again, by West (2006):

I have heard critiques of the government of PNG [Papua New Guinea] as a failure and, since 2001, local articulations of the sentiment that “conservation is our government now.” Neoliberal policies and projects do away with the role of governments in favor of allowing the market to regulate and develop. Now, conservation and its organizations are seen by the residents of Maimafu as filling the role of government in some important ways. (p. 120)

Yet, past conditions do not characterize the present. The specter of climate change and the rise of what many regard as a second Gilded Age of globalizing capitalism signal a clear need to study how conservation and development programming is being shaped by the return of the state as the dominant site and subject of environmental action, and by philanthropy’s burgeoning influence (Giridharadas, 2019; Mann & Wainwright, 2018).

1.2 Research Objective

In this dissertation, I focus on the roles of the state and philanthropy in conservation-as-development, arguing that both are integral to understanding how and why this logic retains its appeal despite a “lack of concrete instances in which conservation and development have been successfully merged” (Oldekop et al., 2010). I analyze conservation-as-development as both a political-economic and territorial project of the modern capitalist state, mobilizing Christian Parenti’s (2015) concept of ‘state environment-making’ to explore how the push-pull tensions of capital accumulation and political legitimation that define the capitalist state also define how it “makes” environments: configurations of nature and space that collectively comprise what Jason

Moore (2015) calls the ‘web of life.’ In so doing, I show how imperatives of conservation and development, which map onto those of accumulation and legitimation, reflect the core ‘nature’ of the capitalist state. I also show how contemporary processes of state environment-making are conditioned by the leverage and participation of non-state actors, such as philanthropists, through policy tools like conservation PPPs.

Conservation philanthropy is nearly as old as the conservation movement itself. Both emerged in the United States toward the end of the 19th century, concomitant with the birth of the Progressive Era and major environmental and social reforms (Ealy & Ealy, 2006; Fox, 1985; Hays, 1969). Philanthropists played a role in many of these reforms, including donating resources to establish some of the country’s most iconic protected areas and pressing Congress to establish the National Park Service in 1916 (Daugherty, 2017; González, 2001; Mackintosh, 2018). Geographers problematize contemporary philanthropy as a globalizing phenomenon increasingly shaped by the political-economic conditions of neoliberalism (Brockington et al., 2008; Ramutsindela et al., 2011). In recent decades, these conditions have transformed the activities and impacts of conservation philanthropy, promoting the claim that philanthropy is undergoing its own neoliberalization while also furthering processes of neoliberalization within conservation (Holmes, 2012). Scholars studying philanthropy’s role in this context argue that many foundations and individual philanthropists are promoting market-based solutions for biodiversity protection while facilitating closer ties between the business world and conservation NGOs (Dempsey & Bigger, 2019; Jones, 2012; Mallin et al., 2019; Ramutsindela, 2009; Spierenburg & Wels, 2010).

The growing power and authority of foundations and philanthropists beg important questions about the status of philanthropy-state relations. Fiscal austerity, decentralized

governance, green financing, and the international institutionalization of biodiversity protection – all trends associated with the rise of neoliberalism – have afforded new political opportunities for philanthropic donors to take over responsibilities traditionally relegated to the state. These donors, much like NGOs, have advocated for or capitalized on neoliberal trends in global policymaking in order to increase their involvement in public conservation programming (Corson, 2011; Diallo, 2015; Duffy, 2006; Fortwangler, 2007). At the same time, scholars acknowledge that greater philanthropic involvement in public conservation programming is often the end result of these neoliberal trends and their ‘anti-state state effects’ (Mitchell & Sparke, 2016). Donors step in to fill a void, funding projects and making policy decisions when state action is weak or absent. This dynamic is especially pronounced in the global South where legacies of debt crisis and structural adjustment constrain public budgets for conservation, often justifying the need for philanthropic intervention.

Chile presents a unique empirical reality for grounding and interrogating theorizations of state environment-making and philanthropy-state relations. It has suddenly emerged as a world conservation leader on paper, protecting an impressive 21% of terrestrial territory and 43% of marine territory (CONAF, n.d.; MINREL, 2021). This reflects several land- and sea-based mega initiatives executed through conservation PPPs under President Bachelet, named a U.N. Environment Champion of the Earth in 2017 partly because of these initiatives. Accepting the award, Bachelet remarked, “Chile has shown the world that you don’t need to be a rich country to preserve the environment” (UNEP, n.d.). These initiatives have also helped Chile exceed the country-level Aichi Biodiversity Target calling for 17% terrestrial protection and 10% marine protection. Yet, Chile’s impressive metrics belie the fact that many of its protected areas are little more than ‘paper parks’ (Moorman et al., 2013; Petit et al., 2018). Its conservation system lacks


the basic funding and personnel, and the tools of management and enforcement, to ensure that everything protected on paper is actually protected in practice.

To understand the changing nature of philanthropy-state relations in Chile, and its effects on environment-making, this dissertation studies a recent mega initiative in Chilean Patagonia: two linked projects, the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks, that emerged from a first-of-its-kind conservation PPP between the state and the U.S.-based philanthropic foundations Tompkins Conservation – run by Kristine McDivitt Tompkins and the late Douglas Tompkins – and The Pew Charitable Trusts. In the following chapters, I trace the origins and trajectory of this mega initiative, arguing that Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts attracted state buy-in for the partnership by speculating on the value and investability of national parks as economic assets. Reflecting a logic of conservation-as-development, this disrupted a state logic of conservation-versus-development that had derailed previous attempts to protect the region, while helping reimagine Chile’s position in a rapidly greening global economic system.

1.3 The Network of National Parks & Route of Parks Projects

On March 15, 2017, in an outdoor ceremony in the picturesque valley of Parque Pumalín, the first female CEO of a major U.S. outdoor clothing brand and the first female president of Chile stood at a podium. They were surrounded by a truly motley crew of roughly 150 onlookers, including foundation staff, government ministers and other high-level officials, regional park rangers, a delegation from the Patagonia Inc. headquarters in California, personal friends of the Tompkins, the director of the 2018 documentary *Free Solo*, and members of the local fire department (Patagonia Inc., 2017). Together, McDivitt Tompkins and President Bachelet pledged to expand or create a total of eight national parks in Chilean Patagonia through a joint donation of ten million acres to SNASPE: one million acres of the Tompkins’ private property,

2.2 million acres of adjacent state property, and 6.6 million acres of reclassified forest and national reserves (CONAF, 2017; MMA, 2017a). This unique land deal would become the most famous terrestrial conservation PPP to date. Known officially as the Network of National Parks of Chilean Patagonia (*Red de Parques Nacionales en la Patagonia Chilena*), it qualifies as both the largest addition to SNASPE in over 50 years and the largest private land donation ever received by a national government (CONAF, 2019; Daley, 2017). A map of the Network of National Parks is depicted in Figure 1.



Parklands donated by Tompkins Conservation are highlighted in red, parklands donated by the state are highlighted in yellow, and pre-existing but reclassified parklands are highlighted in dark green

Figure 1: Map of the Network of National Parks (©Tompkins Conservation)

PROPUESTAS	SOCIEDADES APORTANTES Y SUPERFICIE APROXIMADA DE PREDIOS PRIVADOS A DONAR (HA)								TOTAL APROXIMADO
	BUCKLE Y TIC TOC, LLC	EMPRESAS VERDES LLC CHILE	CONSERVATION LAND TRUST	FUND. PUMALIN	EL AMARILLO LLC	FUND. YENDEGAI	VALLE CHAC LLC	RÍO BAKER LLC	
AMPLIACIÓN PARQUE NACIONAL HORNOPIRÉN			108						108
CREACIÓN PARQUE NACIONAL PUMALÍN			2.766	287.477	3.095				293.338
CREACIÓN PARQUE NACIONAL MELIMOYU			940	2.874					3.814
AMPLIACIÓN PARQUE NACIONAL CORCOVADO	197 (50% de los derechos)	197 (50% de los derechos)							197 ¹
CREACIÓN PARQUE NACIONAL PATAGONIA							80.353	3.370	83.723
RECLASIFICACIÓN Y AMPLIACIÓN DE LA RESERVA FORESTAL ALACALUFES A PARQUE NACIONAL						26.445			26.445

Land for the Network of National Parks was donated by three philanthropic foundations and five LLCs controlled by Douglas and Kristine McDivitt Tompkins

Figure 2: Table of the Tompkins’ Donated Properties (MMA, 2017a)

The terms and conditions of this PPP are laid out in a spare, seven-page document known as the Agreement Protocol (*Protocolo de Acuerdo*). In addition to providing a policy justification for the partnership and enumerating which state lands and which private lands would be donated (Figure 2), the Agreement Protocol stipulates that all donated lands must remain protected as national parks in perpetuity (Interview 53, 9 October 2019). Failing this, the partnership risks immediate nullification (Interview 79, 13 December 2019). Sanctioned in the Agreement Protocol is a second project beyond the Network of National Parks: the Route of Parks (*Ruta de los Parques*), a companion policy and branding framework promoting ecotourism in Chilean Patagonia. The Route of Parks includes but exceeds the Network of National Parks, referring to the entire conservation territory spanning Chile’s southernmost regions of Los Lagos, Aysén, and Magallanes (Figure 3). It encompasses a total of 18 national parks and 28.4 million acres – three times the size of Switzerland. Both projects represent ambitious attempts at landscape-level biodiversity protection while also signaling a broader regime shift in regional land-use: from

Importantly, Tompkins Conservation designed and masterminded both the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects, identifying which state lands should be donated along with their own and how the projects would be marketed to local and foreign audiences.

When I inquired about why the projects bore distinct names, a senior staffer at Tompkins Conservation replied:

President Bachelet said, ‘I want to give the project its own name’... because what concerns presidents? Having their own legacy. She added the name Network of National Parks to our proposal. So, the Network is part of the Route, the Network is what we just donated, but our concept for everything is the Route. (Interview 58, 17 October 2019)

Such a distinction is perhaps unsurprising, given that the PPP model itself seeks to merge the visions and goals of multiple stakeholders regardless of their inherent compatibility.

Yet, this particular distinction reveals fundamental differences in how the partnership’s purpose, aims, and even geographical scope are interpreted. In the research data I collected, foundation staffers and others affiliated with Tompkins Conservation refer to the partnership as the Route of Parks, defining its purpose as a regional alternative to industrial extraction. This is expressed through an idea they call “tourism as a consequence of conservation” (*turismo como consecuencia de la conservación*) where tourism is secondary to a primary aim of biodiversity protection. Meanwhile, ministers, government officials, and other state actors refer to the partnership as the Network of National Parks, defining its purpose as rural sustainable development. They highlight ecotourism as the primary aim. Chile’s National Tourism Service (SERNATUR) thus describes the project in commercial terms as “an internationally recognized product that will allow us to position tourism in new marketing channels” (SERNATUR, 2019). Foundation staffers from The Pew Charitable Trusts, which also works with the state and Tompkins Conservation to protect Chilean Patagonia, use the term Network of National Parks because they see the Route of Parks as too closely associated with the institutional branding and

identity of Tompkins Conservation (Interview 49, 10 September 2019). Throughout the dissertation, I utilize both names to refer to the broader partnership, but not synonymously. I utilize the Route of Parks more frequently in the chapters that focus predominantly on the role of philanthropy (Chapters 2 & 4), as this better reflects the empirics under discussion. For the same reason I utilize the Network of National Parks more frequently in the chapter that focuses predominantly on the role of the state (Chapter 3).

1.4 Methodological Approach

This dissertation is based on a study that employed qualitative methods and grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to collect and analyze data. Grounded theory is a means of generating theory and grounding theorizing through empirical abstraction and abduction (Bryant, 2017; Charmaz, 2006). The study also adopted what Peck and Theodore (2012) call the ‘distended case approach’ in order to understand how ‘fast policies’ (Peck & Theodore, 2015) move and mutate within global policy networks. The distended case approach “represents an attempt to take the translocal relativization and mutability of policy seriously, indeed as a problematic, while at the same time being attentive to the risks of leaching out ‘local’ socioinstitutional context” (Peck & Theodore, 2012, p. 24). This enabled me to investigate how the globalizing policy model of conservation PPPs and an underlying logic of conservation-as-development circulate as relational constructions between sites of invention and sites of uptake, and how the act of circulation itself transforms both the policy model and the connections between these sites. Conservation PPPs have traveled to Chile from various sites of invention, including supranational institutions like the Global Environment Facility and U.N. Development Program, U.S. universities, think tanks, and investment firms, and increasingly U.S.-based philanthropic foundations. Their connections to and movements through various sites of uptake across the

Chilean state apparatus have produced novel instances of resource spectacle (Chapter 2), environment-making (Chapter 3), and philanthropic conservation finance (Chapter 4).

In executing a methodology of up-close, qualitative research on the policy processes associated with conservation PPPs and conservation-as-development in Chile, I was less interested in studying the state or philanthropy *per se* than in studying them together and in partnership. How do the functions, logics, and practices of the Chilean state articulate and disarticulate with those of a particular segment of the ‘transnational philanthropic elite’ (Holmes, 2011) that I call *philanthro-environmentalists* (Chapter 4)? Answering this question necessitated ‘studying up’ (Nader, 1972) among state and philanthropic actors. I did so through a combination of interviewing, participant observation, and document analysis, rather than through extended periods of ethnographic immersion in state and philanthropic institutions. While this presented certain research limitations (discussed in the next section), it nevertheless afforded certain “opportunities to excavate the social and political context of decision making, to delve into the ‘reasons for reasons,’ and to hand back circulating narratives and proto-explanations for verification, qualification, or rejection” (Peck and Theodore, 2012, p. 26). The challenge, of course, was resisting the face value of much of what was said or observed, learning how and when to read between the lines. Triangulation against other data sources, fact-checking, and contextualization were especially key for analyzing the interviews and participant observation events that often felt like rehearsed public relations presentations (cf. Guthman, 2008).

As a “unique case” (Small, 2009) characterized by deviant or rare circumstances, the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects are well suited to inform and expand existing understandings of conservation PPPs and conservation-as-development. I undertook thirteen months of fieldwork in Chile, scheduled between August 2017 and December 2019.

Field sites, selected for their relevance to the research themes, included government offices in Santiago and Patagonia, philanthropic offices in Santiago and Patagonia, and civil society organizations in Santiago and Patagonia. It was impossible to study the Route of Parks in its entirety, given that the project spans one-third of Chile's national territory. Within Patagonia, I targeted the towns of Puerto Varas and Chaitén in the Los Lagos region and Coyhaique and Chile Chico in the Aysén region because these were major hubs of administrative and tourist activities associated with the case.

The research design connected three levels of social inquiry: local, non-state actors; regional and national state actors; and transnational philanthropic actors affiliated with the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects. Conducting research at all three levels was necessary for understanding how and why this conservation PPP materialized, and its implications for the Chilean state, Chilean society, and the globalizing practice of environmental philanthropy. Utilizing interpretive and abductive reasoning (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012), I tacked back and forth between empirical evidence and theoretical reconstruction at each stage of data collection and analysis in order to generate and ground theorization. This iterative-recursive approach maximized interpretive validity, while also triangulating across the three levels of social inquiry. Below, I offer a brief description of each of my methods and then conclude with an explanation of how I analyzed the collected data.

In-depth interviews were conducted with 79 informants spanning all three levels of social inquiry. These included current and former government officials, politicians, philanthropists, foundation staff, NGO staff, tourism actors, and environmental activists. Informants were intentionally selected using purposive sampling, though snowball sampling was also employed in the study's earliest phase. The interview format was semi-structured, which allowed for on-the-

fly probes and follow-up inquiries, with interview questions progressively modified to incorporate ongoing research findings (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Soss, 2006). As Li (2021) points out, interviewing elites often requires the adoption of specific strategies that cater to the informant's specific positionality, such as playing the role of an informed, policy-focused scholar among political elites; a neutral, disinterested stakeholder among economic elites; or a trustworthy and engaged interlocutor among professional elites. I interviewed both current and former government officials. This enabled me to trace the roll-out of the two projects across two different presidential administrations. I also found that former government officials were more willing to grant interviews and more forthcoming about their opinions and assessments of their work as state actors. Interviews ranged from 1-3 hours and were conducted by me in *castellano* (the variety of Spanish spoken in Chile) at the informant's chosen location. I took detailed, handwritten field notes in every interview and was permitted to audio-record a total of 66 interviews. Institutional Review Board approval for the research design, including interview scripts, was granted by UCLA's Office of the Human Research Protection Program (OHRPP) on October 30, 2018 (serial number IRB#18-001711).

Participant observation was conducted at 17 public events, including academic seminars on biodiversity conservation, government ceremonies and sessions relating to the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects, congressional committee hearings, roundtable discussions on conservation philanthropy, and public protests against state environmental policies. I took detailed, handwritten field notes at every event and was permitted to audio-record a total of 11 events. Paraphrasing Mountz (2007), participant observation enabled me to both see the state and see like a state. I practiced theory-driven participant observation in the sense that the event "or subject matter [was] meaningful only in the categories of a theory, from the very

beginning” (Lichterman, 2002, p. 122). My observations were guided by categories such as conservation PPPs, conservation-as-development, environmental governance, and state-nature relations. I also leveraged participant observation to practice what Fujii (2018) calls ‘strategic hanging out,’ sketching a web of relations between different actors and building out a list of potential informants.

Document analysis was conducted on a project archive that eventually contained more than 250 catalogued print and digital documents. The archive included newspaper articles, press releases, official state decrees, legal agreements and documents, memoranda of understanding, government contracts and budgets, promotional materials on the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects, publications by conservation philanthropists, annual shareholder reports from mining corporations, cadastral maps, environmental impact statements, and field-site photographs. These were sourced from physical archives (e.g. Chile’s National Library, Chile’s Library of Congress), digital archives (e.g. Memoria Chilena), websites, and informants. A particularly fecund source of documents was Chile’s Transparency Law (No. 20.285), which requires the state to turn over requested public documents to registered users of the Transparency Portal (*Portal Transparencia*) online platform.

Collected data were analyzed per the grounded theory method. I began by transcribing into Microsoft Word 198 pages of handwritten field notes and over 100 hours of audio-recorded interviews and participant observation. Some interviews were transcribed with the assistance of Spanish-language artificial intelligence software. Physical and digital documents were catalogued as individual entries in a Zotero project archive. I approached data collection and analysis dialogically. Field notes, interview transcripts, and documents were manually coded for themes on a continuous basis, and these themes drove successive theoretical sampling

throughout the research period. Initial rounds of analysis employed open coding to identify and label observed themes; axial coding was employed in successive rounds to organize codes into categories and relate them to one another (Bryant, 2017). Initial codes included a combination of descriptive codes informed by what was empirically observed and analytic codes informed by my theoretical framework. Axial coding yielded categories like conservation economy, spectacle, environment-making, ecotourism, Project Finance for Permanence, and philanthropy-state relations, in addition to those referenced above. One last round of selective coding helped establish core categories, eventually leading to the development of concepts such as *extractivism without extraction* (Chapter 2), *environmental strategic selectivity* (Chapter 3), and *dollars for policy philanthropy* (Chapter 4). A final note: all Spanish-language data and materials (written or audio-recorded) have been translated by me and appear here in English. I provide the original Spanish phrasing in italicized parentheses where appropriate.

1.5 Research Limitations

While the previous section established what I did in this study, it is equally important to establish its limitations, shaped both by the scope of the methodological design and the particular circumstances I encountered during fieldwork. I organize these limitations into three themes: following projects that are still ‘on the make’; issues of access in ‘studying up’; and conducting research under a militarized state of emergency. I discuss each in turn.

The timing of my doctoral fieldwork, conducted as the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks were rolling out on the ground, forced me to rethink how and from what perspectives I could realistically study this case of conservation-as-development. Though the Agreement Protocol was signed in March 2017, the projects were actively ‘on the make’ in January 2019. Many details were still being worked out by bureaucrats in Santiago and by local

officials in Patagonia. For example, the final national park created from the donation was not officially designated until January 30, 2019 (Diario Oficial, 2019), and Tompkins Conservation did not hand over management responsibilities for Pumalín Douglas Tompkins National Park and Patagonia National Park – formerly their Parque Pumalín and Parque Patagonia properties – to the state until April 26, 2019.

The first three months of my fieldwork (January through March) overlapped with the first summer tourist season for the projects, and my interviews with officials and residents in Los Lagos and Aysén reflected a generalized lack of understanding about what they were and what they might mean for local economic development. I quickly decided that this could not be a community-based study of the localized effects of conservation-as-development, as such effects take time to materialize. Given the seasonal nature of ecotourism markets, especially at these latitudes, and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, I do not anticipate that such a study would be feasible until at least 2025. Thus I decided to focus on a ‘studying up’ of the state and philanthropic power centers shaping conservation-as-development in Chile. Studies of state policies and processes are still fundamentally studies about people and communities because the state is a ‘peopled’ and relational category (Sneddon et al., 2022). Asking questions of these power loci is a relevant, if different, means of understanding localized effects.

Access is a perennial issue when ‘studying up,’ whether among cultural, financial, or political elites (Mountz, 2007; Ortner, 2010; Souleles, 2018). In Chile, gaining access to political elites was complicated by my lack of pre-existing contacts within the Piñera government and my positionality as a foreign-born “outsider” (Herod, 1999). My access to officials in Chile’s Environment Ministry developed slowly, ultimately scuttling my plan to conduct an institutional ethnography. Chile is a small country with clear class divisions, and social networking within


elite circles follows a rule of six-degrees-of-separation: gaining access often depends on demonstrating who you already have access to. I learned to employ several techniques. First, I relied on participant observation at public events to identify otherwise unidentifiable mid-level government bureaucrats whose roles proved indispensable to my study. Second, taking the advice of existing informants, I began cold-calling potential informants through WhatsApp when email proved fruitless. This did not always work, but was especially effective for accessing political elites in rural Patagonia where other opportunities were scarce. Lastly, I utilized Chile's Lobbying Law (No. 20.730), designed to increase government transparency and accountability, to request interviews with key officials in key state ministries. While this provided a certain degree of guaranteed access, I found it more difficult to build rapport with these informants because our interactions were legally obliged. Some of these interviews felt like PR presentations, leaving me to wonder if this would have been the case had I gained access through other means.

My access to philanthropic elites in Chile operated somewhat differently, perhaps because both foundations involved in this partnership are U.S.-based. This enabled me to leverage my positionality in more creative ways. Accessing staff at Tompkins Conservation was relatively easy, which surprised me. Accessing staff at The Pew Charitable Trusts was not easy, which did not surprise me. Pew's satellite office in Santiago is small, employing only a handful of Chilean staffers, and the main gatekeeper was dubious of my requests for interviews and information. I suspect this was driven by the internal power dynamics between the satellite office and Foundation headquarters, as well as pressure (real or perceived) from senior management to control the narrative of its overseas activities.

Just as my research progress was gathering critical momentum, Chile experienced the

largest political uprising since Pinochet's dictatorship. On Friday, October 18, 2019, Santiago was paralyzed by a series of coordinated attacks on its public transportation infrastructure, including the firebombing of multiple train stations and the temporary collapse of mobility across the greater metropolitan area. The "social explosion" (*el estallido social*), as it came to be known, had begun a few days earlier in response to a nominal hike in bus and subway fares. Chilean secondary students, who have a long tradition of protest activism, organized fare evasions and confrontations with the police. Meanwhile, government ministers made a series of public gaffes, including the Economy Minister suggesting that those concerned about rising fares should simply wake earlier to take advantage of non-peak pricing (T13, 2019). Simmering anger erupted into mass social unrest on October 18, with police and protesters clashing throughout the city. President Piñera declared martial law around midnight, sending the Chilean Army into the streets. The country remained under a militarized state of emergency for nine days, with the state imposing nightly curfews and limits on basic rights and displaying spectacular levels of violence against civilians.

Defying this violence, protesters remained in the streets for weeks. The slogans they chanted – including "it's not about the 30 cents, it's about the 30 years" and "Chile woke up" – made clear that the uprising was not a reaction to the fare hike alone but to the decades of rapacious economic and social policies that have steadily gutted the public good in spite of the country's return to democracy (Figure 4). Chile's current President Gabriel Boric, a junior legislator in 2019 who helped resolve the political crisis by brokering an agreement to rewrite the national Constitution, captured a prevailing sentiment of those early days: "if Chile was the cradle of neoliberalism, it will also be its grave" (León, 2021).



“From the ‘Chicago Boys’ to the ‘Oh Shit’ Boys, #ChileWithoutFear” (left)
“We don’t abandon the street until it’s worth living again, a new Constitution is a moral duty” (right)

Figure 4: Images from Street Protests in Santiago (October 2019)

I woke up on October 18 in the southern city of Puerto Montt, having completed important interviews with key informants in the previous days. Over breakfast at my hotel, before flying back to Santiago, I watched footage of the protests without computing that I was headed into the eye of the storm. I returned to a city in chaos. The typically 45-minute trip between the airport and my apartment lasted over five hours, and I found myself trapped and teargassed in a crowded bus as the police battled protesters in stalled traffic. The following days were tense and unsettling. I was required to check in with UCLA Risk Management twice a day and packed my bags for a potential evacuation. The end of martial law removed the threat of a coup attempt by President Piñera or the military, but it did not restore peace. Ongoing protests and instability in the streets marked my remaining ten weeks of fieldwork. I could not conduct some planned interviews as informants often cancelled at the last minute, fearing for their safety or my own. A number of promising leads that I had chased for months also could not be pursued. (Nor could I conduct follow-up research because of the COVID-19 pandemic.) In the end, these final tumultuous months impacted the quantity and variety of data I collected, shaping and

sometimes limiting the kinds of claims I make in the following chapters. For example, my discussion of Project Finance for Permanence (Chapter 4) does not examine the role of high-level state negotiators because I was unable to interview the officials advising President Piñera. I was also forced to abandon a line of inquiry on state environment-making and the COP25 global climate talks, which Chile was to host before they were moved to Madrid during the uprising.

1.6 Dissertation Overview

This dissertation is comprised of three substantive chapters that broadly explore the themes of conservation, development, and state environment-making in Chile. Taking the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects as a case study, the chapters demonstrate with empirical evidence and theoretical analysis how conservation-as-development is rendered through processes of state environment-making, and the ways in which these processes are increasingly shaped by the political advocacy and financial backing of transnational philanthropic elites. The chapters are ordered to reflect the temporality of Tompkins Conservation's historic land donation and the subsequent conservation PPP, beginning with an examination of why the Chilean state agreed to partner with Tompkins Conservation when it did (Chapter 2), then addressing how the partnership was implemented (Chapter 3), and finally interrogating the steps being taken to secure its future permanence (Chapter 4). Each chapter was written and prepared as a stand-alone journal publication. Chapter 2 was submitted to *Geoforum* in July 2022 and is currently under review. Chapter 3 will be submitted for review to the *Annals of the American Association of Geographers* in late 2022. Chapter 4 was published in *Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space* in June 2022.

Chapter 2, “*A Cold, Hard Asset*”: *Conservation as Resource Spectacle in Chilean Patagonia*, traces the role of two complementary forces behind the Route of Parks project, big

philanthropy and big conservation, showing how both shaped the state's eventual decision to take historic action for environmental protection by accepting the land donation from Tompkins Conservation. I argue that resource spectacle is key to understanding the 'how' and 'why now' of this mega project. Whereas traditional resource spectacles are conjured to court buy-in for extractive projects from private actors, in this case a conservation resource spectacle was conjured to court buy-in for large-scale conservation from the state. Big philanthropy emphasizes the spectacular investability of national parks by selling them as "a cold, hard asset" to policymakers, akin to Chile's other natural resources. It does so by rendering the value of protected nature legible and consumable through the same resource-making techniques that define extractivism. Yet, when applied to environmental protection, these resource-making techniques not only establish perverse incentives for action but also help fuel the convergence of conservation and extraction.

Chapter 3, *State Environment-making and the Dialectic of Development and Conservation*, builds on theorizations of the capitalist state's role in producing nature and space to consider its role in producing environments. Capitalist state theory conceptualizes the state as a necessary actor in the capitalist mode of production, performing functions that are key to capital accumulation. It also recognizes that a democratic state must continually legitimize its own power and authority by performing other functions that may undercut capital accumulation. This accumulation-legitimation imperative generates structural tensions that often drive incongruous, incomplete, or contradictory state actions. While capitalist state theory has explored the role of this imperative in general terms, it has failed to address how it impacts state environmental behavior specifically. The chapter seeks to redress this failure by interrogating how state environmental behavior is constituted by, and constitutive of, logics of accumulation-

legitimation. Drawing on Christian Parenti's idea of state environment-making and Bob Jessop's strategic relational approach, it explores the ways in which capitalist states simultaneously make environments of accumulation (oriented toward development) and environments of legitimation (oriented toward conservation). Internal disputes over the creation of the Network of National Parks, however, reflect at the micro-scale the macro-scale contradictions of state environment-making and what I call the *dialectic of development and conservation* in Chile: when development interests and conservation interests share the same space-time, development interests invariably win out.

Chapter 4, *Bankrolling Biodiversity: The Politics of Philanthropic Conservation Finance*, explores the rising prominence of philanthropic capital in conservation governance by focusing on a specific class of actors: *philanthro-environmentalists*. Unlike big, international NGOs and philanthrocapitalists, philanthro-environmentalists do not employ market-based, for-profit approaches to finance conservation. Rather, they employ a 'dollars for policy' approach that leverages their philanthropic power to advance public conservation outcomes. I examine how a transnational network of philanthro-environmentalists is using a novel mechanism known as Project Finance for Permanence to exact substantial political and fiscal commitments from the state in exchange for substantive philanthropic support for a mega conservation initiative in Chilean Patagonia. I find that Project Finance for Permanence targets policymaking as the primary site of philanthropic intervention, affording philanthro-environmentalists greater control over state conservation governance. Yet, I also argue that this raises serious questions about the limits and implications of leveraging philanthropic capital to solve public environmental problems.

The dissertation concludes by summarizing the main empirical findings and theoretical

contributions of this research. Finally, it outlines several directions for future research, building on what was not or could not be accomplished through this study.

CHAPTER 2: “A Cold, Hard Asset”: Conservation as Resource Spectacle in Chilean Patagonia

2.1 Introduction

You have to look at national parks today as *a cold, hard asset* of the country. It’s like copper in the ground, or fish in the sea. National parks drive more tourism than any other mechanism in the world, over a long period of time. So, as a country like Chile is looking for the diversification of its economic development and so on, the ministers who are driving economies in a country, they need to look at the national parks system – and a well-managed national parks system – as an investment, as an asset. You have to change the notion. It’s not just because they’re fabulous, it’s because they really do function, they change an economic model, not only at a regional, local level, but at a national level because you are talking about global markets when it comes to national parks. It’s the best brand, other than Marlboro and Coca-Cola. (Kristine McDivitt Tompkins, 5 September 2019, emphasis added)

Chile’s public conservation estate has expanded by unprecedented margins in recent years. Over 21% of terrestrial territory and 43% of marine territory now enjoy protected status, following the creation of mega projects like the Route of Parks of Chilean Patagonia (CONAF, n.d.; MINREL, 2021). The Route of Parks emerges from a novel public-private partnership between the U.S.-based philanthropic foundation Tompkins Conservation, co-founded by Kristine McDivitt Tompkins, and the Chilean state to protect nearly 30 million acres of land across 18 national parks at the bottom of the South American continent. It pitches ecotourism as a regional development alternative with national parks serving as engines of local economic growth. The partnership, over two decades in the making, was proposed by Tompkins Conservation but rejected by previous presidential administrations before finally being accepted. This article traces the role of two complementary forces behind the project, big philanthropy and big conservation, showing how both shaped the state’s eventual decision to take historic action for environmental protection. The Route of Parks represents big philanthropy’s growing involvement in biodiversity conservation and its increasing regard of large-scale interventions like big conservation as the best way to counter the accreting effects of climate change on global ecosystems.

Key to understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why now’ of this project is the concept of resource

spectacle: the dramatic performance of nature’s resource-ness, particularly as marketized and consumable commodities. Traditional resource spectacles are conjured to court investment for extractive projects from private actors, such as those predominating in the mineral landscapes of northern Chile or the forested landscapes of south-central Chile. In the extreme southern zone of Chilean Patagonia, however, Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts are conjuring a resource spectacle to court investment for a large-scale national parks project from the state. Describing the region and its high rates of species diversity and endemism as a suite of “world-class natural resources [that] do not enjoy the world-class protections they deserve” (The Pew Charitable Trusts, n.d.), big philanthropy lobbies for big conservation in Chilean Patagonia because of its rare combination of open, undeveloped landscapes – the majority of which are state-owned – and cheap land prices.

In this article, I argue that big philanthropy engages spectacle in Chile in order to attract the stakeholder buy-in that big conservation requires. Through spectacle, the Route of Parks is framed as a resource worthy of political legitimation and fiscal investment from the Chilean state, which has tended to treat conservation as a direct threat to economic growth and development. As indicated in the epigraph, big philanthropy emphasizes the spectacular investability of national parks by marketing them as “a cold, hard asset” to national policymakers, akin to Chile’s other natural resources. It does this, I argue, by rendering the value of protected nature legible and consumable through the same techniques of resource-making that define extractivism. Ultimately, these resource-making techniques not only establish perverse incentives for environmental protection, they also fuel the convergence of conservation and extraction. In developing this argument, I address three interrelated questions: when is spectacle invoked in resource-making, how was spectacle invoked to “make” big conservation a resource

in Chilean Patagonia, and what are the broader effects of this?

This article draws on data collected between 2017 and 2020 from interviews, participant observation, and physical and digital archives. A total of 79 semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors representing the state, philanthropy, civil society, and the public and private tourism sectors in Santiago and in Chilean Patagonia's Lagos and Aysén regions. Additionally, participant observation was conducted at 17 in-person or online events, including academic conferences, government seminars, congressional committee hearings, conservation philanthropy workshops, and community meetings. Over 250 print and digital documents on the Route of Parks (e.g. policy briefs, press releases, meeting minutes, legal files, memoranda of understanding, newspaper clippings, and maps) were also obtained from the National Archives of Chile, the Library of Congress Ley Chile platform, or by request through the Transparency Law (No. 20.285).

I begin by outlining a theoretical and conceptual framework for studying the Route of Parks, using the literatures on resource spectacle and conservation and development. This is followed by a brief explanation of big philanthropy and big conservation and their specific manifestations in Chile. Next, I introduce the case, detailing the origin story and project aims of the Route of Parks. I then show how big philanthropy conjures big conservation as a resource spectacle in Chilean Patagonia through three resource-making techniques meant to sell the success of the project to state policymakers: resource legibility, resource potentiality, and resource futurity. This is followed by a discussion of the broader implications and effects of conservation resource spectacles, as well as a brief conclusion.

2.2 Spectacle in Resource-making

The literature on resource spectacle draws from the central claim of critical resource geography

“that ‘natural resources are not naturally resources’ but the products of cultural, economic, and political work” (Bridge, 2011, p. 821). Natural resources must be ‘coaxed and coerced’ (Tsing, 2005) into being through social practices of ‘resource-making’ (Himley, 2021; Irrarázaval, 2021; Richardson & Weszkalnys, 2014; Valdivia et al., 2021). Bridge (2009) defines resources as dynamic and relational – what counts as a resource changes over time and space as technology and society change – and as power-laden political constructs that favor some socio-ecological imaginaries over others. This correlates to the Marxian understanding of historical materialism where resources are “defined only in relationship to the mode of production which seeks to make use of them and which simultaneously “produces” them” (Harvey, 1974, p. 265). Thinking relationally about resources and resource-making reveals the hybridity of resources as partly cultural and partly physical. Critical resource geographers examine hybridity through questions of ontology and agency to show how, exactly, ‘matter matters’ (Bakker & Bridge, 2006; Kaup, 2008). Huber (2019) and others have shown how ‘matter matters’ through its entanglements with political society, shaping everything from development to territoriality to nationalism (Coronil, 1997; Koch & Perreault, 2019; Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995).

Spectacle is one resource-making practice deployed to attract investor buy-in (Braun, 2020; Watts, 2004). Though spectacle is broadly defined by the literature, French Situationist Guy Debord’s definition is foundational. He defines spectacle as “not a collection of images” but “a social relation between people that is mediated by images” (Debord, 1994/1967, p. 2).

Critiquing the mystification and alienation of life under advanced capitalism, he argues that the images and objects of consumer culture increasingly commodify social relations. Following this, scholars emphasize the visibility and fetishism of resource spectacle. Spectacular images and speculative discourse render the value of nature-as-commodities visible to the market, but at the

cost of concealing the underlying social relations of production (Kneas, 2017; Zalik, 2010). Scholars also emphasize the temporality of resource spectacle. Describing the ‘economy of appearances,’ Tsing (2000) writes that the dramatic performance of resource abundance preconditions its actual economic performance because “profit must be imagined before it can be extracted” (p. 118). She recounts the Bre-X scandal, in which a Canadian junior mining company reaped billions on the Toronto Stock Exchange in the 1990s from fraudulent claims of a gold rush in Indonesia. There was no gold rush, and yet the mere *appearance* of one drove an investment frenzy. The scandal illustrates how resource spectacle is timed to attract financial capital in the present by anticipating a future that may never exist (Fent & Kojola, 2020; Huber, 2018; Kneas, 2016).

Igoe (2010, 2013, 2017) bridges Debord’s and Tsing’s work to consider how spectacle functions through contemporary conservation. Images not only mediate relations between people, he argues, they mediate relations between people and the environment: what he calls ‘the nature of spectacle.’ Spectacle transforms nature and conservation into consumable commodities “using images and performance to conjure desired future realities, giving them the appearance of having already been achieved. If successful, such strategies inspire investors and supporters to bring forth the funds by which the conjured realities are actually brought into existence” (Igoe, 2017, p. x). Empirically, Igoe grounds his argument in the history of Tanzania’s ecotourism industry, developed with help from an Austrian conservationist and filmmaker who insisted that nature could be turned into money by turning it into images. Since the 1950s, spectacular images of Tanzania’s nature landscapes like the Serengeti and Maasai Steppe have driven tourism revenue, which in turn has driven the transformation of more nature landscapes to match these spectacular images and produce more images, thus driving more tourism revenue. Igoe (2017)

writes that the nature of spectacle not only engenders an endless feedback loop between representation and reality, it does so in order to sell certain stories about capitalism and conservation “in which economy and ecology appear to harmonize” (p. 9).

Harmonization of economy and ecology is the primary objective of conservation and development: a model that integrates biodiversity protection and poverty alleviation through market-based activities promoted as economic and environmental ‘win-wins’ (Adams et al., 2004; Tallis et al., 2008). Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) and other ‘people-oriented’ approaches emerged in the 1980s in reaction to mainstream conservation’s longstanding approach of ‘fortress-style’ protectionism (Wilshusen et al., 2002). ICDPs remain popular today despite widespread criticism that they routinely fail to deliver on conservation or development (Brown, 2002). Some of this criticism has been leveled by those pushing to revert to fortress-style protectionism (Oates, 1999; Terborgh, 1999) and some has been leveled by social scientists arguing that ICDPs emphasize economic incentives and compensation at the expense of social justice concerns like Indigenous rights to land and political self-determination (Brechin et al., 2003; Mollett & Kepe, 2018). In a study of an ICDP in Papua New Guinea, West (2006) questions the logic of what she calls ‘conservation-as-development’ and whether “the development needs, wants, and desires, on the part of rural peoples, can be met by the protection of “biodiversity” on their lands” (p. xii-xiii). She critiques the neoliberal ideology that frequently co-opts such projects, reducing nature and social relations to mere commodities.

One mechanism driving ICDPs is ecotourism, which weds environmental protection and economic development by design. Conceptualized as an alternative to conventional mass tourism, ecotourism deepens the link between tourism and conservation, believing “not simply that they can work together, but that they must” (Stronza et al., 2019, p. 230). It is often

portrayed as a sustainability panacea generating funds for protected areas and employment opportunities for surrounding communities consistent with local conservation mandates (Honey, 2008). However, a number of scholars argue that ecotourism is less about promoting conservation and development than promoting capitalist expansion. Viewed from this perspective, ecotourism facilitates the neoliberalization of conservation by subjugating nature and people to new forms of market management (Büscher & Dressler, 2012; Duffy, 2008; Fletcher, 2012). Fletcher and Neves (2012) write that “widespread advocacy of ecotourism as a “panacea” for diverse social and environmental ills can be interpreted as an implicit endorsement of its potential as a manifold capitalist fix” (p. 60). Ecotourism provides spatio-temporal and environmental ‘fixes’ for the core contradictions of capital accumulation, thus helping to sustain and expand the capitalist system (Fletcher, 2011, 2019).

A growing body of research on ecotourism and payments for ecosystem services, another mechanism driving ICDPs, finds that their social and environmental impacts are numerous and often negative (Buckley et al., 2016; Holmes & Cavanagh, 2016). Social impacts include racialized dispossession and eviction (Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012; Loperena, 2016), disrupted livelihoods and resource access (Neumann, 1998; Ojeda, 2012), and state-backed violence via green militarization (Asiyanbi, 2016; Ybarra, 2018). Furthermore, the distribution of benefits from these mechanisms is highly uneven with gains mainly flowing to foreign firms or local elites (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; To et al., 2012). Scholars studying the political economy of conservation and development note that these negative impacts, and other gaps between the representations and realities of ICDPs, necessitate the production of success narratives (Lund et al., 2017; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017). According to Büscher (2013, 2014), selling the success of ICDPs is critical for mobilizing political and financial support from

policymakers. This is achieved primarily through marketing: “a strategy to change people’s perceptions about issues or things in line with predetermined objectives and so create buy-in and legitimacy for a particular product, idea, or political agenda” (Büscher, 2014, p. 81). In an industry that is largely ‘future positive’ (Mosse, 2004), selling the success of a conservation and development intervention helps secure legitimacy and funding up front and irrespective of any concrete outcomes that may or may not result.

This article bridges these theoretical and conceptual insights on resource spectacle and conservation and development to understand a new ICDP in Chile: the Route of Parks. The Route of Parks combines philanthropy and public administration to further conservation and development in Chilean Patagonia. Philanthropic actors conjure the Route of Parks as a resource spectacle in order to make it politically palatable and financially alluring to policymakers. This, I argue, demonstrates that spectacle is a key strategy for selling the success of ICDPs. In what follows, I trace how these actors apply speculative techniques of resource-making – the same used to attract investor buy-in for extractive production – to attract state buy-in for large-scale environmental protection. That resource spectacle is being invoked here as well highlights the synergies between contemporary conservation and extraction, including how they “make use of similar logics, strategies, and technologies” (Enns et al., 2019, p. 969). It also indicates that the analytical purchase of resource spectacle applies to a broader range of contexts and activities than scholars presently acknowledge. The next section introduces the complementary forces driving this resource spectacle in Chilean Patagonia: big philanthropy and big conservation.

2.3 Big Philanthropy & Big Conservation in Chilean Patagonia

Big philanthropy describes the ethos and approach of the most prominent international philanthropic foundations working on biodiversity conservation in Chile today: Tompkins

Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts. Tompkins Conservation was founded by American philanthropists Kristine McDivitt Tompkins and the late Douglas Tompkins, whose wealth derives from the outdoor apparel industry.² Since the early 1990s, they have protected a staggering two million acres of private land, spending over \$345 million on conservation and species rewilding projects in Chile and Argentina (Tompkins Conservation, 2019a). The Pew Charitable Trusts is a U.S.-based philanthropic conglomerate founded in the 1940s by Sun Oil Company executive Joseph N. Pew. It focuses a \$6 billion endowment on a variety of public-interest issues, including ocean and terrestrial conservation in the United States, Canada, and Australia. In 2018, it launched a 20-year partnership with the Chilean state, pledging to work with local NGOs, universities, and government agencies to improve conservation outcomes in Chilean Patagonia.

These foundations exemplify big philanthropy not only because they wield enormous asset portfolios, but also because they wield enormous organizational capacities that rival the state's. Big philanthropy fulfills a range of conservation activities on behalf of the state, such as: supplying land and infrastructure to SNASPE, Chile's public conservation system; training park rangers and other employees of the National Forestry Corporation (CONAF), which administers SNASPE; running wildlife recovery programs; funding academic research; formulating new legislation and public policies; developing new models for parks administration and concessioning; and building coalitions across government and civil society (CONAF & Fundación Yendegaia, 2018b; CONAF & The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018). Big philanthropy justifies the necessity of its conservation activities by highlighting important gaps and weaknesses in the state's approach. For instance, The Pew Charitable Trusts notes that only 113

² Tompkins was co-founder of Esprit and The North Face brands, while McDivitt Tompkins is former CEO of Patagonia, Inc.

parks staff are employed in Chilean Patagonia; in the Aysén and Magallanes regions, where the bulk of national parklands are concentrated, every park ranger “looks after an average of 63,800 hectares (246 square miles) – an area the size of Singapore” (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2019b). A chronic lack of fiscal and human resources severely limits state capacity to manage biodiversity and monitor threats, including forest fires, illegal logging, invasive species, and ocean contamination from the salmon industry.

Big conservation describes the kind of intervention that big philanthropy increasingly advocates. Big conservation is informed by an emerging paradigm known as large landscape conservation that seeks to connect working lands, protected lands, and urban areas through integrated ecosystem management. Large landscape conservation pursues landscape-level initiatives that bring together multiple sectors and stakeholders to “address land and water problems at an appropriate scale, regardless of political or jurisdictional boundaries” (McKinney et al., 2010, p. 20). It is championed by an extensive network of universities, think tanks, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations headquartered in the United States, including the University of Montana, Harvard University, the Lincoln Institute for Land Policy, and the Center for Large Landscape Conservation. The broader idea behind big conservation is that biodiversity loss is a big problem necessitating big solutions (Adams, 2020). Through initiatives like Nature Needs Half and Half Earth, this idea has permeated the scientific community and is now gaining favor with major donors. Big philanthropy’s embrace of big conservation and its emphasis on collaborations at the landscape scale challenges the methodological nationalism of traditionally state-bounded territorial approaches, while also helping globalize this U.S.-centric paradigm by exporting American conservation ideals overseas via donor-funded initiatives (cf. Nelson & Parrish, 2018).

In Chile, big conservation circulates through workshops, seminars, and binational peer learning exchanges hosted by a transnational network involving The Pew Charitable Trusts, Tompkins Conservation, Harvard University’s regional office in Santiago, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the International Land Conservation Network, and the Chile-California Conservation Exchange. This network considers Chilean Patagonia a model setting for big conservation for two reasons. First, large-scale conservation interventions are still feasible here. Population and urban density are low, and open landscapes remain more or less intact due to the region’s political-economic history as a rangelands economy (Núñez et al., 2016). Second, large-scale conservation gains are cheaper to achieve relative to other places in Chile and abroad because local land markets are less competitive and less expensive. As a former senior staffer at Tompkins Conservation said of Douglas Tompkins, “he sought and obviously found in Chile an ideal setting and an economic opportunity because at that time thirty years ago the land was cheaper. He could spend less money in Chile than in the United States” (Interview 57, 16 October 2019). In other words, Chilean Patagonia offers a bargain deal for big conservation that big philanthropy exploits to maximize impact.³

For these same reasons, scientists recognize Chilean Patagonia as having high remaining conservation value and as being among the last-best places to concentrate efforts for ‘conservation triage’ (Hayward & Castley, 2018; Packer & Polasky, 2018). In a global environment increasingly constrained by biodiversity loss and insufficient funding to address it, conservation triage favors the optimization of current funding to prioritize certain geographical areas over others. That Chilean Patagonia is scientifically understood as a high-value, last-best

³ Chile’s highly neoliberal regime of natural resource governance offers a further bargain for big conservation. Liberalized land markets, strong private property rights, and a general openness to foreign land ownership – originally designed to benefit big industry – have enabled big philanthropy to easily acquire land for conservation (Holmes, 2015a).

place for big conservation helps explain why it has become a target of big philanthropy. At the same time, it illustrates the degree to which big conservation has ‘gone global,’ in search of new settings befitting the ideal of large-scale interventions for large-scale gains. The transnational nature of both big philanthropy and big conservation is key to how these forces leverage spectacle and exert influence in Chile specifically, where until recently domestic philanthropists had been inhibited by onerous tax penalties of up to 40% on donations to conservation-related causes. Transnational donations have been subject to different standards, as have partnerships between transnational foundations and the state, which were crucial for carrying out a project as large and complex as the Route of Parks.

2.4 The Route of Parks

On March 15, 2017, McDivitt Tompkins and President Michelle Bachelet launched a novel public-private conservation partnership to create or expand eight national parks in Chilean Patagonia. Known as the Network of National Parks, the partnership added 10 million acres to SNASPE, including a joint donation of over a million acres of private lands owned by Tompkins Conservation and 2.4 million acres of adjacent public lands. It also included the reclassification of 6.6 million acres of existing forest and national reserves (CONAF, 2017; MMA, 2017a). It is the largest terrestrial conservation initiative in Chile in over half a century, and the largest private land donation ever received by a national government (Daley, 2017). Moreover, the partnership established the Route of Parks, a companion policy and branding framework promoting conservation and development through ecotourism in Chilean Patagonia’s national parks and surrounding rural communities. Geographically, the Route of Parks exemplifies the large-scale ideal of big conservation, spanning one-third of the country and protecting a territory roughly three times the size of Switzerland.

Both the Network of National Parks and the Route of Parks, though public-private projects officially, were proposed and largely planned by big philanthropy. Tompkins Conservation even identified which public lands should be donated by the state.⁴ This reflects a strategy the Foundation has employed in Chilean Patagonia since the early 1990s: buying and conserving private lands, often next to public lands, then gradually donating these lands to SNASPE. Tompkins Conservation's previous donations helped create Corcovado National Park in 2005 and Yendegaia National Park in 2013. With the Network of National Parks, the Foundation aimed to donate its remaining conservation lands to SNASPE in exchange for a sizable matching donation from the state. Importantly, it had tried and failed to do this twice before, during President Bachelet's and President Sebastián Piñera's first terms in office (2006-2010 and 2010-2014, respectively). After the Piñera administration concluded that such a project would inhibit economic growth by removing too much land from production, the Foundation resolved to add a development component to its proposal. The Route of Parks was quickly born, pitching a vision of rural development based on national parks.

The Route of Parks is an ecotourism circuit that utilizes Chilean Patagonia's limited but scenic highway and ferry infrastructure, built by military labor under Pinochet's dictatorship, to link the region's 18 national parks. Tompkins Conservation's promotion of conservation-based tourism as a development alternative should be understood in relation to its years-long support of the watershed social movement Patagonia Without Dams, which defeated a massive hydroelectric power project, and the growing extractive pressures posed by salmon aquaculture and coal and heavy metals mining (Bustos et al., 2017; Schaeffer, 2017). The Pew Charitable Trusts is also affiliated with the Route of Parks, collaborating with Tompkins Conservation and

⁴ Tompkins Conservation employs someone who specializes in territorial planning for conservation and has intimate knowledge of the geography of state property.

the Chilean state in recent years on a long-term philanthropic conservation finance mechanism known as Project Finance for Permanence (Beer, 2022).

At the heart of the Route of Parks and its concomitant resource spectacle is a digital media campaign that markets Chilean Patagonia's national parks to domestic and foreign audiences. This includes a bilingual website offering tourist information on the parks and surrounding communities, trip planning tools, suggested itineraries, and links to local service operators. The campaign espouses four objectives typical of ICDPs, but modified to emphasize big conservation: environmental protection, local economic development, integrated ecosystem management, and climate resilience (Figure 5). As one informant at Tompkins Conservation suggested, the goal is to change Chile's international image so that it "will be known not only for its wine, or for its astronomy, or for its salmon, but also for its conservation vocation" (Interview 13, 14 March 2019).




Figure 5: Project Benefits of the Route of Parks (Ruta de los Parques, n.d.)

In terms of the quantity and location of land, the same partnership proposal that was rejected by President Piñera in the early 2010s was accepted by President Bachelet several years later. Only one ingredient was added: the Route of Parks campaign. According to a former senior staffer at Tompkins Conservation,

Doug [Tompkins] realized that he had to clothe this thing in a story and he built the Route of Parks as a means to make possible, or attractive, or more attractive, the conservation project behind it... Tourism was never an interest for him, but he realized, strategically, intelligently, that tourism was a way to sell conservation.” (Interview 57, 16 October 2019)

The final donation attempt was formalized in mid-2015, just months before Tompkins died of hypothermia following a kayaking accident in Chilean Patagonia. President Bachelet, then in her second term, determined this time “the country could not say no” (Interview 53, 9 October

2019). To understand how big philanthropy succeeded in selling this ICDP to state policymakers, I now turn to enumerating the performance of big conservation as a resource spectacle.

2.5 Conservation as Resource Spectacle

Big philanthropy engages resource spectacle as a central strategy for pursuing its goals in Chile – goals that are premised on the national parks model of conservation and thus require state buy-in. Traditional resource spectacles perform the drama of ‘spectacular accumulation’ (Tsing, 2005) in order to attract private investment from financial actors for mining and other extractive projects. Big philanthropy, on the other hand, performs this drama for opposite ends: in order to attract public investment from state actors for the large-scale conservation projects it increasingly favors. Following Büscher’s (2014) call to explicate how, exactly, ICDPs like the Route of Parks are sold to policymakers, I argue that resource spectacle is one way these projects are rendered attractive and sellable, especially in state contexts where extractivism predominates.

In Chilean Patagonia, big philanthropy conjures a resource spectacle to reimagine the region’s territorial vocation away from a sub-national rangelands economy based on livestock grazing and toward an international conservation economy based on ecotourism (Blair et al., 2019; Louder & Bosak, 2019).⁵ The goal, as one informant stated, is to make ecotourism “the next sheep of Patagonia” (participant observation, 26 July 2019). Patagonia is an historical ‘resource periphery’ (McElroy, 2018) of the modern Chilean state and has long been regarded as an economic backwater. Yet, given the twin demands of development and environmental change, big conservation is emerging as a new regional resource frontier. Big philanthropy sells the success of this resource frontier by marketing the Route of Parks as “a cold, hard asset.” This

⁵ In lieu of formal legal tools for land-use planning, which are lacking in Chile, ‘territorial vocation’ functions as a geographically-informed approach to economic development and resource management.

entails resource-making, or the social processes through which nature is made knowable, exploitable, and investable (Kama, 2020; T. Li, 2014). Spectacle is a crucial resource-making practice here, deployed to perform the resource-ness of national parks through the Route of Parks campaign. Spectacle enables and potentiates speculation, that is, economic activity that aims “to anticipate the future; to stimulate its emergence; and to control it” (Bear, 2020, p. 8). The conjuring of conservation as a resource spectacle in Chilean Patagonia involves three resource-making techniques: performing resource legibility, speculating on resource potentiality, and spectacularizing resource futurity. Below, I describe and discuss each technique.

Resource Legibility: The Spectacle of Superlative Ecology

Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts render the Route of Parks legible as a value-bearing resource through a visual and discursive spectacle I call ‘superlative ecology.’⁶

Visual and discursive spectacles have always animated conservation projects, and big philanthropy’s campaign in Chilean Patagonia is no exception. Through a spectacle involving professional photography, glossy websites, print publications, tourism ads, and social media campaigns, the region is rendered unique, exotic, pristine, and therefore deserving of the highest levels of environmental protection. During fieldwork, I recorded countless instances of philanthropic actors describing the region in superlative terms, as “the last wild place on Earth,” “the least contaminated place on Earth,” and “the only place on the planet that remains untouched” (Interview 15, 18 March 2019; Interview 49, 10 September 2019; participant observation, 26 July 2019).

The spectacle of superlative ecology renders big conservation as a dual resource:

⁶ Massé (2019) also analyzes the relation between conservation, spectacle, and philanthropy, focusing on the “rhino poaching hotspot of the Mozambique-South Africa borderlands” (p. 1). Whereas in his case a ‘spectacle of (anti-)poaching’ is deployed by international NGOs to elicit support from donors, in my case the spectacle of superlative ecology is deployed by donors to elicit support from the state.

simultaneously possessing value for its own sake (the intrinsic value of protected nature) and value to be realized through markets (the exchange value of protected nature). This enables Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts to conjure the Route of Parks as a territorial project that is symbolically *and* economically investable (cf. Lunstrum & Massé, 2021). It is not a singular effort by big philanthropy, to be sure. Parallel efforts to fix conservation and ecotourism as Chilean Patagonia’s new territorial vocation are taking place across the public and private sectors (Mendoza et al., 2017; Núñez et al., 2020). Yet, the Route of Parks campaign provides powerful branding and a unified political vision for the region – that it should remain free of the mines, forest plantations, salmon farms, and related forms of extractive-led development that prevail elsewhere in the country. Describing the objective of the Route of Parks campaign, a Tompkins Conservation staffer explained:

[We are] positioning the territory as a conservation destination... and we want this to be a national concept. We are doing different things – from participating in tourism fairs, for example, to working with tour operators – so they begin to include the concept of the Route of the Parks in their tourist packages. We want everyone to speak the same language, and when we breathe this territory, we want everyone to say the Route of Parks of Patagonia! (Interview 13, 14 March 2019)

‘Positioning the territory’ toward big conservation demonstrates the degree to which landscape change is both material and discursive, with “transformations in perceptions and representations of landscape bring[ing] about new forms of land use” (Aliste et al., 2018, p. 1).

As with other resource-making techniques, the spectacle of superlative ecology performs the resource legibility of big conservation through a politics of scale (Nygren, 2021). Big philanthropy markets the Route of Parks as a sub-national environment of supranational significance whose protection will benefit all of humanity, not just Chileans. It is depicted as a “green lung” (Interview 46, 6 September 2019) for the country and the planet, containing geo-strategic resources like glacial and freshwater reserves, old-growth forests, and peat bogs that are integral to global water security and climate change mitigation. Citing a recent study conducted

in partnership with the National Geographic Society, Tompkins Conservation claims the Route of Parks is one of South America's richest carbon sinks, storing "almost three times more carbon per hectare than the forests of the Amazon" (personal communication, 30 September 2020). Moreover, since the Route of Parks accounts for roughly 30% of Chile's sequestered carbon total, Tompkins Conservation argues that the project is a key facet of Chile's nationally determined contributions to the Paris Agreement. By conjuring Chilean Patagonia as too valuable *not* to conserve on humanity's behalf, the spectacle of superlative ecology jumps scales to link local political action to global environmental impact.

Resource Potentiality: Speculating on Conservation-as-Development

Big philanthropy sells the success of the Route of Parks by speculating on its resource potential as a rural development alternative. Adopting the logic of 'conservation-as-development' (West, 2006), it argues that the project will be an engine of local economic growth for more than 60 communities through ecotourism and related commercial activities. Tompkins Conservation expresses this logic through the slogan 'tourism as a consequence of conservation' (*turismo como consecuencia de la conservación*), which a Foundation staffer described as follows:

Tourism is a tool for conservation... the ultimate goal of the Route of Parks, obviously, is the conservation of this territory, that this territory be valued in some way, and valued by the surrounding communities – that they see a contribution to their lives. If the communities do not feel that the park next to them generates a contribution, they are not going to take care of it, they are not going to defend it." (Interview 13, 14 March 2019).

The slogan emphasizes the economic promise of the Route of Parks even as it is governed by strict standards of environmental protection. As the same Foundation staffer intimated, this is a deliberate attempt by Tompkins Conservation to attract buy-in from local residents and the state: "to be viable in a developing country where the economy is important, the only way to negotiate with the government is this – seeing the economic issues behind conservation" (Interview 13, 14 March 2019).

This includes enlisting the expertise of global management consultancies to quantify the resource potential of the Route of Parks. For example, in 2016, McKinsey and Company completed pro-bono analysis for Tompkins Conservation that assessed “the economic opportunity of 10 of the 17 parks, which have infrastructure and/or accessibility to support visitor growth” (McKinsey & Company, 2016, p. 5).⁷ According to McKinsey, economic opportunity lies in the potential income streams of concessionary contracts for accommodation services (e.g. hotels and campsites), telecommunications and banking services (e.g. wifi and ATM fees), transportation services (e.g. buses, car rentals, chartered helicopters), tour operations (e.g. hiking, biking, photography), retail operations (e.g. groceries and souvenirs), and sustainable agriculture. The analysis – marked ‘proprietary and confidential,’ as is standard of McKinsey’s client outputs – projects that the Route of Parks could generate up to US\$270 million and 43,000 jobs for local communities over a ten-year period. These projections are notable, given that Patagonia is among the least populated and least economically productive areas of the country.⁸ Such projections depend on the inherently speculative technology of scenario modeling, ranging from a conservative ‘base case’ that reflects existing conditions without modifications to a highly conjectural ‘optimal case’ contingent on unlikely modifications like “policy changes from government and increases in investments into infrastructure in and around the parks” (McKinsey & Company, 2016, p. 2).

Both big philanthropy and the state speculate on how many tourists will visit the Route of Parks each year and, more importantly, how much money they will spend. Chile’s protected

⁷ This analysis was led by a senior director at McKinsey & Company who serves on the Advisory Council of Tompkins Conservation, and no doubt facilitated the pro bono arrangement (McKinsey & Company, 2018).

⁸ In the Aysén and Magallanes regions of Chilean Patagonia, where 14 of the 18 national parks are located, the total workforce population is just 153,000 people (INE, 2022b, 2022a).

areas receive 3.5 million visitors annually and this is projected to increase 60% by 2025 (Subsecretaría de Turismo, 2017, 2020). Nationally, ecotourism is already a billion-dollar business that constitutes as much as 10% of local GDP in some regions (participant observation, 5 September 2019). In Chilean Patagonia, the National Tourism Service tracks tourists' spending behavior in the parks and surrounding communities, breaking this down by nationality. On average, Brazilian, American, and Chilean tourists spend more than European tourists, who spend more than Argentine tourists, and so on (SERNATUR, 2017). These statistics are now used to make projections about which foreign markets SERNATUR should target for Route of Parks advertising, following a key finding from McKinsey that "more needs to be done to encourage higher-spending tourists who stay longer" (McKinsey & Company, 2016, p. 7).

Resource Futurity: Spectacularizing 'ROI Conservation'

Lastly, Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts spectacularize the resource future of the Route of Parks by promoting a return-on-investment model of parks management – 'ROI conservation.' ROI conservation frames public spending on national parks as an investment rather than an expense. This paves the way for national parks to be understood as rent-bearing economic assets, or capitalized "property that yields an income stream (and not a commodity for sale)" (Birch, 2017, p. 468). An informant described how national parks generate income across multiple sectors: "it is not just the hotel that earns the tourist dollar. He will visit the businesses in town, he needs to buy food, he may buy handicrafts or hire a tourism service, and he might damage his car and need to fix it. There are a million opportunities" (Interview 12, 12 March 2019). Under ROI conservation, the future value of Chile's national parks is "conjured like a spirit to draw an audience of potential investors" (Tsing, 2005, p. 57) who, in this case, are state policymakers.

Big philanthropy's framing of national parks as economic assets is a stark departure from historical understandings of national parks in Chile, which have included the view from more conservative circles that "creating a national park is like placing a curse on the land" (Interview 57, 16 October 2019). Big philanthropy, by contrast, argues that the Route of Parks promises meaningful future returns on state investments through ecotourism. It bases this argument on a 2015 study from the United States finding that for every taxpayer dollar invested in national parks, US\$10 are returned to local economies (National Park Service, 2015). Comparing Chile to the United States in this way is problematic, they are not analogous cases, and recently Tompkins Conservation has tempered the comparison to suggest that US\$6-10 would be returned for every taxpayer dollar spent. This remains purely speculative, however, because such a study does not yet exist in Chile. Nevertheless, the logic of ROI conservation is clear: spectacularizing ecotourism and its multiplier effects on public spending renders big conservation investable as an alternative resource future for Chilean Patagonia, just as it has for decades in the western United States.

Additionally, this model spectacularizes big conservation as the only truly sustainable resource future for Chilean Patagonia. Projections like those included in McKinsey's analysis strengthen big philanthropy's claim that ecotourism could become part of a national plan to transition away from copper mining, Chile's current commodity workhorse. Citing the same U.S. National Park Service data, the late Douglas Tompkins argued that conservation provides a return on investment of 10-to-1, far higher than copper mining and therefore more sustainably profitable (Interview 57, 16 October 2019). Another informant went further, suggesting that protected areas should become the CODELCO of the 21st Century (CODELCO is Chile's largest state-owned enterprise and the world's leading copper producer):

We need to go from a CODELCO based on mining, which has an enormous carbon footprint, to a

CODELCO based on ecological tourism, which would decarbonize the economy and reduce our carbon footprint significantly... CODELCO takes money from the ground, tourism brings money from the outside. What's more, the money can recirculate many times within the population. (Interview 12, 12 March 2019)

This reasoning is gaining traction with policymakers who face increasing pressure from Chilean scientists and civil society organizations to view national biodiversity as capital assets that, unlike copper, are renewable (Jaksic et al., 2019).

To summarize, resource spectacle is the strategy by which big philanthropy sells the success of Chile's Route of Parks to the state. Igoe (2017) notes that "modernist approaches to conservation and development are not possible without fantasy and storytelling" (p. 110), and both invigorate these three resource-making techniques. Taken together, they make promises about the future predicated on the dramatic performance of success and value to influence the state's political and financial decision-making in the present. A particular temporality of conservation as resource spectacle is invoked, mimicking that of other resource spectacles, where the present is summoned through anticipatory discourses about the future (Braun, 2020). While inherently speculative, these resource-making techniques have had very real effects. Tompkins Conservation shared McKinsey's analysis with policymakers and it was later cited as a compelling factor in the Bachelet administration's decision to green-light the Route of Parks (MMA, 2017b). Statistical projections and scenario modeling played a particularly alluring role by representing success and value numerically. According to one mid-level CONAF official, this is how conservation decision-making happens in Chile: "You have to go in with numbers, numbers, numbers, numbers, numbers. This is what Central [CONAF headquarters] hears. Central is interested in the dollars per hectare, in the return of ten dollars for every dollar invested, in GDP and increases to GDP, and in how many jobs are created" (Interview 21, 28 March 2019).

2.6 Extractivism Without Extraction

Although crucial here, spectacle is not a necessary condition of all resource-making projects. Indeed, there is a long history of private firms green-lighting projects without first conjuring a dramatic performance. If spectacle is just one of many resource-making practices, when is it invoked and why was it necessary in this case? Spectacle is invoked in particular material and historical contexts to attract stakeholder buy-in. More pointedly, it has become a regular feature of extractivism under financial capitalism (Tsing, 2005). Today, private firms increasingly rely on financial capital from investors to realize their resource-making projects – the junior mining firms that Tsing (2005) discusses are a classic example (see also Kneas, 2016) – and project boosters utilize spectacle to grab investors’ attention. Spectacle is especially important for mining and other subterranean activities that require large, up front capital investments “before the promise of a putative mineral deposit can be reliably known” (Gilbert, 2020, p. 17). Yet, my research finds that the same is true of some non-extractive activities like ICDPs that also rely on large, up front capital investments before concrete outcomes can be reliably known. What ICDPs and extraction projects have in common, then, is that both require stakeholder buy-in and both sell success as a means to secure financing.

Spectacle was a necessary condition in this case because big philanthropy could not execute its big conservation goals alone. It needed to attract stakeholder buy-in. National parks, the gold standard of environmental protection in Chile, are publicly conferred and publicly controlled by definition. The state has historically underinvested in them, and big philanthropy seeks to change this by conjuring a resource spectacle. The Route of Parks campaign reconciles competing motives. Whereas state policymakers communicate a clear desire to make money off the project, Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts are strikingly indifferent

about this (Beer, 2022). The Route of Parks campaign weds these competing motives by framing big conservation as a promissory engine of local economic growth, while also generating state-backed legitimacy and long-term public funding for it.

Importantly, I understand the resource spectacle that defines this ICDP as not just strategic but an expression of political pragmatism by Tompkins Conservation to fulfill its primary objective: guaranteeing that its private projects will be permanently protected as national parks by partnering with the state (Interview 22, 28 March 2019). As national parks, these projects are now subject to stringent international laws and standards per the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, which Chile ratified in 1967. Moreover, the partnership was established through a ‘restricted donation’ (*donación modal*) under Chilean law stipulating that if the state ever alters the national park designation of either the private or public donated lands, Tompkins Conservation could sue for breach of contract (Interview 79, 13 December 2019). These dynamics secure and strengthen Tompkins Conservation’s philanthropic legacy, underscoring why it pursued a public-private partnership in the first place.

That political pragmatism figures so centrally in this case underscores the durability and path dependency of extractivism as a governing paradigm in Chile. My analysis shows that here even conservation – the antithesis of extractive production – must be rendered legible and consumable through the resource-making techniques of extractive production. Barring this, state buy-in for a project like the Route of Parks is highly improbable, as evidenced by the failure of Tompkins Conservation’s previous donation attempts. Yet, to say that big philanthropy deploys the techniques of extractivism to market the Route of Parks to Chilean policymakers is not to say that the project is materially extractive *per se*. Equating the Route of Parks to the copper mines

of northern Chile, or to the forest plantations and salmon farms of south-central Chile is grossly inaccurate. Rather, this illustrates a kind of extractivism without extraction: how conservation becomes politically common sense in a material and historical context like Chile's where the state apparatus does not, and indeed cannot, value protected nature for its own sake because it is not designed to do so. In order for big philanthropy to sell the Route of Parks as an intrinsically valuable project, it must also sell the Route of Parks as an economically valuable project.

What are the broader effects of extractivism without extraction? Treating national parks as economic assets for the sake of furthering conservation and development in Chilean Patagonia will inevitably subject local landscapes and communities to deeper levels of market mediation and market rule that risk undermining the very conservation and development successes that project boosters sell. This is evidenced in one informant's critique that the Route of Parks campaign prioritizes "promotion over planning":

Unfortunately, the staff of Tompkins Conservation, through the delivery of a couple of parks, feel they are owners of this Route. They have announced to the world that everyone should come visit without having any idea of how many people fit, or how to prepare for all the people who will come. This is the antithesis of conservation, marketing a project that nobody knows how to handle... What infrastructure do the parks have to accommodate this? What rescue protocols? None of this is clear and today it is being announced to the world, in *The Guardian* and in *The New York Times*. (Interview 44, 5 September 2019)

Multiple informants also expressed concern that the Route of Parks will introduce problems of over-tourism (*sobreturismo*) and what locals call 'extractive tourism' throughout the region (Interview 16, 19 March 2019; Interview 18, 21 March, 2019; Interview 25, 4 April 2019; Interview 30, 11 April 2019). Extractive tourism is a folk category in Chile describing the tendency of ecotourism to replicate extractivism's signature maldistribution of economic benefits and environmental burdens in rural communities, catalyzing new patterns of pollution, landscape transformation, and community change. This evokes what scholars have called the 'ecotourism-extraction nexus' where "(industrial) extraction and (postindustrial) ecotourism can be

understood as two sides of the same neoliberal coin” (Fletcher, 2013, p. 70). Both overtourism and extractive tourism have plagued Chilean Patagonia’s iconic Torres del Paine National Park in recent years and could quickly metastasize elsewhere if CONAF repeats similar patterns of parks management and concessioning. The concern that highly capitalized outsiders stand to gain the most from this project was affirmed by news that the concession to operate the lodge in Patagonia National Park – donated by Tompkins Conservation – was awarded to the luxury hotel chain Explora, which already operates a five-star hotel in Torres del Paine (CONAF, 2021).

Ultimately, conservation as resource spectacle and its underlying dynamic of extractivism without extraction highlight what an emerging body of research recognizes as the growing convergence of conservation and extraction (Büscher et al., 2022; Enns et al., 2019; Le Billon, 2021; Norris, 2017). My case study contributes to this research by showing how big philanthropy and the nation-state both actively foster their convergence through the engagement of spectacle. Reterritorializing Chilean Patagonia from a sub-national rangelands economy to an international conservation economy, however, will not fundamentally alter the uneven power relations (core-periphery) that have historically defined it. Conservation as resource spectacle will doubtlessly contribute to the ‘eco-colonization of the periphery’ in Chile, where according to Aliste et al. (2018) “application of the value of nature in a globalized context represents simply a new geographical colonization of spaces on the nation’s periphery” (p. 14).

2.7 Conclusion

This article has explored the ‘how’ and ‘why now’ of Chile’s Route of Parks. I have argued that big philanthropy engages resource spectacle to attract buy-in for big conservation among relevant stakeholders, and that resource spectacle was necessary for selling the success of this project to state policymakers. Through the same resource-making techniques that define

extractivism, national parks in Chile are rendered economically valuable and investable to an otherwise intransigent state apparatus. Together, these techniques promote a logic of conservation-as-development, disrupting the entrenched state logic of conservation-versus-development that derailed previous attempts to green-light the project. Conservation resource spectacles, like traditional resource spectacles, are geographically constituted and geographically differentiated; in terms of where they can be convincingly deployed, space and place matter. Chilean Patagonia is a model setting for conservation resource spectacles, given its preponderance of existing protected areas and public lands to create new protected areas.

It is not altogether surprising to see conservation conjured as such in a material and historical context like Chile's, where the governing paradigm of extractivism is deeply embedded. It is also not altogether surprising to see conservation conjured as such by powerful philanthropic elites, who seek to stake an economic claim on big conservation in order to advance this specific global environmental agenda. Yet, the application of resource spectacle to contexts and activities beyond extractive production is worrisome – not least because it establishes perverse incentives for environmental protection. While the Route of Parks may not be materially extractive *per se*, it mimics and reproduces the same rentier logics that characterize state-nature relations under extractivism (Coronil, 1997; Mendoza, 2018). National parks are marketed as “a cold, hard asset” yielding income streams from the capture of ground rent, all while promising to ‘green’ Chile’s rentier state. But so long as conservation strategies reflect the path dependencies of resource extractivism, conservation will be subject to similar problems and pitfalls. It is therefore hard to imagine how a philanthropic strategy endorsing extractivism without extraction will deliver the transformational change that this mega project pretends.

CHAPTER 3: State Environment-making and the Dialectic of Development and Conservation

3.1 Introduction

It is in regard to the state that I would expect Poulantzas to have made his most significant contribution to political ecology. Specifically, he would have analyzed... the changing techno-economic-*ecological* functions of the state as well as their continuing subordination to its generic function of maintaining social cohesion in a class-divided society... Poulantzas would have analyzed how disputes over environmental policy and issues of political ecological governance more generally are shot through with disputes within and among fractions of capital, intensifying cracks in the power bloc. (Jessop, 2017, p. 196, emphasis in the original)

Within geography, there is a long tradition of theorizing the capitalist state's role in producing nature or space, yet its role in producing environments – different configurations of nature *and* space comprising the broader 'web of life' (Moore, 2015) – remains under-theorized. Capitalist states are fundamentally environmental actors whose practices of state-building and statecraft profoundly shape the nature and orientation of different kinds of environments: a dynamic that Christian Parenti (2015) calls 'state environment-making.' Capitalist state theory conceptualizes the state as a necessary actor in the capitalist mode of production, performing functions that are key to capital accumulation. It also recognizes that a democratic state must continually legitimize its own power and authority by performing other functions that may undercut capital accumulation. This double imperative of accumulation-legitimation generates tensions that often lead to state actions that are incongruous, incomplete, or even paradoxical. While capitalist state theory has explored the role of this double imperative in general terms, it has failed to address how it comes to bear on state environmental behavior. This chapter seeks to redress this failure by interrogating how state environmental behavior is constituted by, and constitutive of, logics of accumulation-legitimation. Drawing on neo-Marxist state theory, specifically the work of Nicos Poulantzas and Bob Jessop, I argue that environment-making is shaped by the strategic selectivity of the modern capitalist state.

I ground this argument in a case study of a new large-scale conservation project in Chile, the Network of National Parks, showing how state practices of ‘environmental strategic selectivity’ simultaneously make environments of accumulation (oriented toward extractive development) and environments of legitimation (oriented toward wilderness conservation). These environments are spatially co-produced and co-constitutive, and thus dialectically interrelated. The state’s double imperative of accumulation-legitimation produces contradictions and whether and how these contradictions are resolved depends on the particular balance of forces comprising the state apparatus at any given historical conjuncture. In Chile, a key means through which the state makes environments is the Council of Ministers for Sustainability: an inter-ministerial governing body embedded within the Environment Ministry, but largely controlled by the ministries that manage major industries like mining, energy, and fishing. As a primary venue for state environment-making, this is where the state determines how to balance conservation goals with development goals. Yet, as I argue, the form and structure of the committee is highly indicative of the ways in which the modern Chilean state makes environments. By providing a deeper theoretical exploration of state environment-making, this chapter contributes new insights to capitalist state theory and to geographical understandings of the capitalist state as fundamentally an environmental actor.

3.2 The Nature of the Capitalist State: Accumulation, Legitimation, Environment-making

In recent years, Extinction Rebellion, Fridays for Future, the Sunrise Movement, and other groups have emerged to demand immediate and sweeping policy reforms from nation-states to address the accelerating climate crisis. Their demand recognizes that historically the state and its institutions have played an important role in facilitating the primary drivers of the climate crisis and environmental degradation more broadly: resource extractivism, settler-colonialism,

imperialism, militarism, and the territorialization and securitization of political borders. Yet, these drivers are not just facilitated by the state, they are in many ways inherent to and inextricable from its core form and functions. This exposes a contradiction within modern environmental politics. While the state is increasingly regarded as the main target of social mobilization and the principle actor to which others in civil society turn to resolve ecological crises, it remains deeply culpable for and invested in the ongoing production of ecological crises.

Capitalist state theory conceptualizes this contradiction in terms of the accumulation-legitimation imperative. On the one hand, the state is structurally oriented around the capitalist mode of production and must perform key functions for capital accumulation, such as enforcing legal and property regimes, provisioning public infrastructure and services, regulating markets, and mitigating cyclical economic crises (Boyer, 1990; Harvey, 2006; Polanyi, 2001/1944). On the other hand, capitalist state theory recognizes that in the context of liberal democracy, the state must continually legitimate its own governing power and authority by performing other functions that may directly undermine capital accumulation, such as taxing business to fund social welfare spending and responding to the demands of popular protest with material concessions (Habermas, 1975; Offe, 1984). Crucially, Fraser (2015) adds that even as they undermine accumulation, the state's legitimation functions can also benefit capital and not just in times of crisis: "inclusive electoral arrangements can serve as a stabilizing force in ordinary times, securing mass loyalty to the system, alerting elites to the need for reform, and powering efforts to discipline capital for its own good" (p. 161). However, the double imperative of accumulation-legitimation generates tensions which often result in state actions that are incongruous, incomplete, or contradictory (O'Connor, 1973). While capitalist state theory has explored the role of the double imperative in shaping state behavior in general, the literature has

not sufficiently explored its role in shaping state environmental behavior specifically. There is still a need within the Marxist tradition to establish how the capitalist state's environmental behavior is constituted by, and constitutive of, the logics of accumulation-legitimation.

Several scholars have contributed novel insights into what might be called 'the nature of the capitalist state' through a discussion of the double imperative. Ioris (2014) draws on Offe's (1984) description of the state's productive versus allocative duties to explain why it engages in the contradictory tasks of both promoting nature exploitation and protecting nature from exploitation. He argues that capitalist statecraft supports accumulation by imposing anti-commons institutions like private property whose excesses engender pollution, species loss, and other forms of environmental degradation. Yet, the state's efforts to restrain these excesses are necessarily incomplete because they amount to "devising pro-commons strategies within overarching anti-commons priorities" (Ioris, 2014, pp. 25–26). Relatedly, Collard et al. (2020) investigate "the tension between the state's roles promoting economic growth and protecting against this growth's negative effects" (p. 1) by analyzing Canada's environmental assessment process, required of all major projects that potentially threaten endangered caribou populations. Finding that all but one of the 65 environmental assessments they analyzed were approved despite predicted negative impacts for caribou, they conclude that "often the state's promoter role trumps its protector role" (Collard et al., 2020, pp. 5–6). Spivey (2020) applies capitalist state theory to Japan's energy governance regime, suggesting that its recent evolution away from nuclear power reflects the state's response to the accumulation and legitimation crises precipitated by the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Following the disaster, the government moved to incentivize private investments in solar photovoltaic systems which have subsequently skyrocketed and are now rapidly transforming Japan's rural landscapes.

The push-pull tensions of accumulation-legitimation, their articulation with the crisis dynamics of capital, and their tendency toward incomplete and contradictory results are all consequential of how the capitalist state “makes” environments. The notion of state environment-making comes from Parenti (2015), who incorporates the state into Moore’s (2015) framework of capitalism as world-ecological regime to argue that “the modern capitalist state does not *have* a relationship with nature, it *is* a relationship with nature” (p. 830, emphasis in the original). He develops this argument by considering how the state as the territorial place of nature controls the delivery of nature’s use values to the production process through the enforcement of property regimes, the provision of infrastructure, and the production of scientific knowledge. We might add to Parenti’s argument by interpreting these as actions the state undertakes to fulfill its dual duties of capital accumulation and political legitimation, and by extending his framing of state formation as environment-making to also highlight the inverse: environment-making as state formation. Nature and its use values (resources) provide the material conditions of possibility through which the state organizes and amasses power (Bridge, 2014; Coronil, 1997; Koch & Perreault, 2019; Simpson, 2019).

3.3 Environmental Strategic Selectivity

If “the modern capitalist state does not *have* a relationship with nature, it *is* a relationship with nature” (Parenti, 2015, p. 830, emphasis in the original), then what theoretical premise operationalizes the processes of state environment-making? I argue that Bob Jessop’s strategic relational approach (SRA) is key to understanding how and why the modern capitalist state makes environments. An influential example of neo-Marxist state theory, the SRA emerged in the mid-20th century to challenge certain Marxist orthodoxies regarding the form and functions of the state while still preserving a general Marxist framing. The SRA characterizes the state as a

“dialectic of structure and strategy” (Jessop, 1990, p. 367) whose behavior is not purely reducible to economism or politicism but functionally integrates both. Drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci and Nicos Poulantzas, Jessop defines the state as a complex relationship reflecting the changing balance of power between competing social forces (class fractions) at any given historical conjuncture. Under class-based capitalism, society is always divided and the state is “a form-determined condensation of social forces in struggle” (Jessop, 1982, p. 225), with state power deriving from the dynamics of this struggle. In this context, Jessop argues, the state exercises ‘strategic selectivity’: inscribed within its institutional form is a bias making it “more open to some types of political strategy than others” (Jessop, 1990, p. 260). Instead of serving as a neutral or level playing field for struggle, the state awards differential favor to some social forces and their political strategies and interests. Which strategies and interests ultimately prevail is contingent upon an ‘unstable equilibrium of compromise’ brokered by the dominant power bloc and its supporting class fractions (Jessop, 1990).

The significance of the SRA, as Whitehead et al. (2007) note, is that it “recognizes the influence of class forces on the state (the state as relational) while simultaneously allowing for the relative autonomy of [the] state apparatus in developing courses of actions that best suit the different and competing needs of different class interests (the state as a site of strategy development)” (p. 44). In other words, the state is not a mere instrument of the dominant class fraction. Its behavior is neither pre-determined nor fully predeterminable. Jessop (1990) underscores the relational character of the state’s selectivity:

Its differential impact on the capacity of different class(-relevant) forces to pursue their interests in different strategies over a given time horizon is not inscribed in the state system as such. Instead it depends on the relation between state structures and the strategies which various forces adopt towards it. The bias inscribed on the terrain of the state as a site of strategic action can only be understood as a bias relative to specific strategies pursued by specific forces to advance specific interests over a given time horizon in terms of a specific set of other forces each advancing their own interests through specific strategies. (p. 10)

In competing for the state's favor, all social forces exercise a degree of agency through the development of actions and policies ('strategies') that reflect their political interests. Some of these actions and policies directly oppose the will of the dominant class fraction and, if selected, would radically alter state behavior.

Social domination and agency are explained by the SRA through the ideas of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Following Gramsci, Jessop (1982) describes hegemony as "the successful mobilization and reproduction of the 'active consent' of dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of intellectual, moral, and political leadership" (p. 148). He distinguishes between the capitalist state's accumulation strategies and its hegemonic projects, arguing that while the former "are directly connected to economic expansion on a national and international scale, hegemonic projects can be concerned principally with various non-economic objectives (even if economically conditioned and economically relevant)" (Jessop, 1990, p. 208). The existence of hegemonic projects invites the possibility of counter-hegemonic projects, which pursue political-economic transformation through collective social mobilization. Counter-hegemonic projects reflect the new or changing interests of diverse social forces and offer alternative forms of intellectual, moral, and political leadership for remaking the state (Jessop, 2002).

Like most capitalist state theory, the SRA was developed without clear empirical grounding and without considering questions of nature. Scholars are now beginning to 'environmentalize' the SRA by studying the competing political, economic, and cultural roles of nature in capitalist society and how the state attempts to mediate these through its regulatory and governance capacities. Quastel (2016) employs the SRA to analyze possibilities for eco-social transition, exploring how counter-hegemonic projects and collective social mobilization might transform

both the state and the economy. Critiquing the anthropocentrism of the SRA, Hwang (2021) argues that non-humans should be understood as social forces too, possessing agentive and affective power to influence state strategies and behavior. Empirically, he considers how blue-green algae and aquatic invertebrates have shaped and subverted the state's management of a multipurpose dams project in South Korea. Sneddon et al. (2022) illustrate the main proposition of the SRA – that the state is fundamentally a social relation – by taking a ‘peopled view of the state.’ Also focusing on dams, they find that individuals working inside and outside the state apparatus exert considerable control over the institutional processes governing dam removal and river restoration in the United States, doing so in strategic and sometimes contradictory ways. Finally, Jessop himself has started to address the ecological crisis by calling for diverse social forces to unify their struggles to reset the balance of forces locally, nationally, and internationally through green new deal, no-growth, and other radical strategies (Jessop, 2012; Jessop & Morgan, 2022).

This paper environmentalizes the SRA by developing the concept of ‘environmental strategic selectivity.’ Environmental strategic selectivity explains how and why the modern capitalist state balances its accumulation-legitimation imperative through environment-making. This concept resembles what Sneddon et al. (2022) call the state's ‘environmental selectivity,’ yet I argue that the word ‘strategic’ is a necessary qualifier given the central role of strategy to state selectivity vis-à-vis the environment and to Jessop's overall framework. Whereas Sneddon et al. (2022) emphasize that state actors have agency to “exercise power over environmental change through various means” (p. 2), I emphasize that the form-determined terrain of strategic selectivity comprising the state conditions its environment-making processes. Strategic selectivity was originally developed by Poulantzas. Jessop (2017) notes that Poulantzas, like his

Marxist contemporaries, largely “ignored the implications of capital’s distinctive metabolic interaction with nature” (p. 193), but speculates that he would have much to say about nature-capital-state relations today: Poulantzas would focus on the political-ecological struggles being waged to reset the balance of political forces, while also accounting for the structurally-inscribed selectivities of the state apparatus that make these struggles difficult to achieve.

Building on Jessop’s speculation, I argue that several of Poulantzas’s insights about the nature of the capitalist state are instructive for conceptualizing environmental strategic selectivity. First, Poulantzas argues that the state is not a fully united or homogenous entity that equally distributes power throughout its apparatus. Rather, it is a strategic field “of intersecting power networks, which both articulate and exhibit mutual contradictions and displacements” (Poulantzas, 1980, p. 136). Second, in a class-divided society, the state must serve as both a factor of cohesion and a site of struggle for the social forces it represents. In Poulantzas’s (1980) words, the state is “through and through constituted-divided by class *contradictions*” (p. 132, emphasis in the original). Third, state policy is the direct result of these class contradictions: “an institution destined to reproduce class divisions is not, and can never be, a monolithic bloc without cracks, whose policy is established, as it were, in spite of its own contradictions” (Poulantzas, 1980, p. 132). These insights help explain how the capitalist state makes environments: through uneven and contradictory practices of environmental strategic selectivity that reflect an ever-changing power balance between competing social forces, but which tend to favor some political strategies and interests over others. The state’s environmental strategic selectivity is neither singular nor unified. It is produced at different levels of the state apparatus, by different configurations of social forces in struggle who are responding to both human and non-human influences, and it often results in state actions and policies that mutually conflict.

3.4 The Dialectic of Development & Conservation in Chile

In Chile, state practices of environmental strategic selectivity simultaneously make environments of accumulation oriented toward extractive-led development, and environments of legitimation oriented toward wilderness conservation. These environments are spatially co-produced and co-constitutive, existing in dialectical relationship. The dialectic of development and conservation is related to the state's double imperative to both save and exploit nature within its territorial borders, and is thusly intrinsic to all capitalist space economies. Yet, this dialectic is especially tight in Chile given its positionality within the world system as a high-income but still predominantly resource-based economy.⁹ Chile is precariously situated on the cusp of Global North and South – it is a recent member of the OECD and no longer eligible to receive official development assistance, yet consistently ranks low in OECD human development indicators – and under enormous pressure to pursue the ‘right’ development path. Increasingly, this means doubling down on a chosen economic specialization of export-oriented resource extraction while at the same time doubling down on environmental sustainability through large-scale wilderness conservation projects like the Network of National Parks. Importantly, there is a geography to this environment-making strategy: environments of accumulation predominate in Chile's resource-rich north, central-north, and central-south regions, while environments of legitimation predominate in the south. Institutions are a key means through which the state makes environments of accumulation and legitimation. To illustrate this, I briefly review the recent history of Chilean economic and environmental institutionality. Detailing this provides a

⁹ Here, I use ‘positionality’ as Sheppard (2006) does, “to describe how different economic agents are positioned with respect to one another in space-time” (p. 46).

conjunctural context for understanding the Chilean state's environmental strategic selectivity in the contemporary post-dictatorship period.

Environments of Accumulation: Extractive-led Development

Chile remains firmly rooted in the same economic development paradigm first installed by Spanish colonial authorities in the 16th century, later adopted by the post-colonial state in the 19th century, and then deepened by General Augusto Pinochet's neoliberal military dictatorship in the mid-20th century. This paradigm reflects what is best described as extractive capitalism *par excellence*, and it is key to understanding how the modern state makes environments of accumulation. Like other Spanish colonies in Latin America, Chile's early industries relied on mineral and resource exploitation, which radically reoriented human-environment relations while initiating *longue durée* processes of anthropogenic environmental change (Miller, 2007). The post-colonial economy has continued to rely on raw materials extraction, privileging the development of primary production sectors like copper mining, agriculture, plantation forestry, and commercial fishing. These sectors are geographically materialized and differentiated as 'commodity regions,' what Chilean scholar Antonio Daher (2003) defines as the territorialization of capitalist production systems based on the mono-cultivation of natural resources for export to global markets. In Chile, mining commodity regions concentrate in the north, agricultural and forestry commodity regions concentrate in the central-north and central-south, and commercial fishing commodity regions concentrate in the far south. The extractive-led development paradigm underlying these commodity regions is the leading driver of domestic environmental degradation, transforming local metabolisms and exerting significant pressure on species and ecosystems (Clapp, 1998; Manzur, 2000).

Among the various legal and administrative instruments the state wields to make environments of accumulation, none is as consequential as the national Constitution. Written and ratified by General Pinochet's military junta in 1980, the Constitution codifies Chile's status as a mineral state, endowing mining-based economic activity with ironclad property and legal rights. Geographer Carl Bauer (1998) observes that the Constitution's political features have been scrutinized at the expense of its economic features. He argues that it is fundamentally an 'economic Constitution' that applies for the very first time the Chicago School's model for neoliberalizing markets to law and institutions: "The Constitution expands private economic rights and liberties, tightly restricts state economic activity and regulatory authority, and strengthens the courts' powers to enforce these principles" (Bauer, 1998, p. 12). It was also in Chile where the Chicago School's neoliberal model was applied for the very first time as "shock treatment" (Klein, 2007) to a nation-state's economy. Following General Pinochet's 1973 coup d'état, a group of Chilean economists known as 'los Chee-ca-go Boys,' given their training at the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman and others, were tasked with designing the new government's economic policies. They quickly implemented a series of radical free-market reforms that had been secretly drafted in a lengthy document called the brick (*el ladrillo*) before the coup d'état, and that later earned credit for turning Chile into an 'economic miracle' (Peck, 2010).

The Chicago School's neoliberal model and General Pinochet's economic Constitution survived Chile's transition back to democracy in 1990. The reasons for this are manifold, but the complicity of the *Concertación* – the center-left political coalition that governed from 1990 to 2010 – was key. The *Concertación* calculated that keeping both in place, at least in the short-term, was favorable to alternatives which risked jeopardizing the economy's strong growth rates

(Rodrigo, 2018). Yet, this also kept in place the high socio-ecological costs that characterize Chile's environments of accumulation, especially its 'sacrifice zones.' Sacrifice zones are defined as "places where residents suffer the devastating environmental health consequences of living downwind and downstream from major pollution hotspots – large industrial complexes of extraction, refining, energy generation, and petrochemical production" (D. N. Scott & Smith, 2016, p. 371). Under Chile's extractive-led development paradigm, the ongoing sacrifice of human and non-human welfare in municipalities like Coronel, Huasco, Tocopilla, Quintero, and Puchuncaví has long been justified as the inevitable price of progress (Castán Broto & Sanzana Calvet, 2020; Valenzuela-Fuentes et al., 2021). These sacrifice zones correlate to Chile's commodity regions. The symbolic identification of different regions with their respective commodity affects the state's ability to stabilize (or not) different production systems. For instance, Bustos-Gallardo and Prieto (2019) observe that whereas the polluting effects of copper mining in the north are largely accepted without contest, the polluting effects of salmon aquaculture in the far south have been vigorously contested.

Environments of Legitimation: Wilderness Conservation

Chile's environmental governance framework was drafted in the fragile years of democratic transition, and designed to accommodate rather than counterbalance the neoliberal economic framework implemented by 'los Chee-ca-go Boys' (Camus & Hajek, 1998; Carruthers, 2001). The resulting regime of environmental laws, rules, and agreements is institutionally diffuse and lacks sufficient regulatory mechanisms like monitoring and enforcement (Interview 32, 1 July 2019). Yet, to the extent that this regime governs the environment without posing real threat to Chile's natural resource markets and while still buying a certain degree of political credibility at home and abroad, it has proven remarkably successful. This dynamic is key to understanding

how the modern state makes environments of legitimation, especially those oriented toward biodiversity conservation. Known officially as “protected wilderness areas” (*áreas silvestres protegidas*), Chile’s public conservation areas cover more than 20% of national territory and reflect a Muirist imaginary of preservation landscapes. This imaginary is more *de facto* than *de jure*. Due to a chronic lack of fiscal and human resources to expand scientific management, and due to the extremely remote locations of many protected areas, the state often practices a conservation logic of ‘designate it and forget it’ (Interview 40, 20 August 2019).

Despite these structural deficits, the state’s conservation functions illustrate its duties to political legitimation. Wilderness conservation projects help the state demonstrate responsiveness to the emergent environmental concerns of public interest, as well as stay in good standing with international treaties and agreements like the Paris Climate Accords and Convention on Biological Diversity. Wilderness conservation projects also help the state regulate against resource exhaustion and over-exploitation. As James O’Connor (1991, 1998) demonstrates through his theorization of the second contradiction of capitalism, capital’s crisis tendency to degrade its own conditions of production prompts a need for the state to guarantee the long-term viability of capitalism by protecting and reinvesting in the conditions of production. In Chile, the role of conservation in state legitimation manifests in presidential legacies and, increasingly, in electoral politics. For more than a century, every President including Pinochet has created at least one national park during their tenure. Multiple informants suggested that President Michelle Bachelet’s support for the Network of National Parks was partly meant to boost her presidential legacy, which was bruised by a series of political scandals early in her second term (Interview 58, 17 October 2019; Interview 73, 2 December 2019;

Interview 74, 3 December 2019).¹⁰ Electorally, environmental and conservation issues consistently rank as top concerns among voters in national polling, and this is now reflected in politicians' rhetoric and in the government's daily agenda (DESUC, 2018). As one former government official remarked, "today it is much more popular to talk about conservation than it was ten years ago. This change in attitude has put pressure on the government" (Interview 52, 23 September 2019).

The state wields several legal and administrative instruments to make environments of legitimation, including the 1994 General Environmental Framework Law (No. 19.300) and 2010 Environmental Reform Law (No. 20.417). Both laws were passed in response to external mandates by Chile's trade and commercial partners, especially those associated with its bids to join powerful economic organizations: NAFTA in 1994 and the OECD in 2010. Such mandates, by the early 1990s, were a sign of the times. As Tecklin et al. (2011) write, "In addition to direct requirements related to NAFTA, the business sector had already begun to acknowledge the need for some minimal environmental framework in order to maintain access to foreign markets and the unobstructed flow of foreign direct investment" (p. 886). Yet, the expediency of NAFTA negotiations and political infighting within the government – some claimed that robust environmental institutions would imperil the economy and possibly incite another coup d'état from Pinochet, who still led the military – ultimately limited the scope and ambition of the 1994 law (Interview 39, 20 August 2019). Instead of creating an independent Environment Ministry with command-and-control powers, the 1994 law codified the same environmental commission established by ad hoc decree after Pinochet left power. The commission, CONAMA, adopted the

¹⁰ The Network of National Parks did boost President Bachelet's legacy. Soon after the project launched, she was recognized as a 2017 U.N. Champion of the Earth for her conservation work. She currently serves as the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.

‘coordinator model,’ diffusing management and enforcement authority across the state’s administrative apparatus (Ruthenberg, 2001). The 1994 law also placed CONAMA under the General Secretary of the Presidency, the ministry in charge of executing the President’s policy agenda, which meant that during this period environmental governance was thoroughly politicized even though state actors took pains to represent it as thoroughly depoliticized (Barandiarán, 2016).

By the mid-2000s, a blistering environmental performance review by the OECD and U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the loss of public confidence in CONAMA following several high-profile environmental conflicts spurred new calls for legislative reform (Latta & Cid Aguayo, 2012; OECD & ECLAC, 2005). While Tecklin et al. (2011) contend that this reform was primarily compelled by the requirements of OECD membership, Sepúlveda and Villarroel (2012) argue that it was equally compelled by a political legitimization crisis triggered by a major ecological disaster on the Río Cruces in the southern city of Valdivia. Described by some as “Chile’s own ‘silent spring’” (Barandiarán, 2018, p. 93), the disaster was caused when toxic effluent from a pulp mill owned by the timber giant CELCO-ARAUCO was dumped into a protected wetlands ecosystem. Thousands of black-necked swans were killed or displaced, with dead swans littering the wetlands and dying swans littering roads and backyards after falling from the sky. CELCO-ARAUCO was permitted to operate near these protected wetlands despite their status as a site of international importance under the Ramsar Convention, a fact that for many Chileans exposed the basic frailty of the state’s nascent environmental institutionalization and the truncated nature of its democratic transition to date.

The ensuing political legitimization crisis was partially resolved by President Bachelet’s 2008 pledge to overhaul the 1994 law. The final bill, approved by Congress in 2010, created an

independent Environment Ministry with Cabinet-level ranking, as well as two sub-agencies: one to administer the state's environmental impact evaluation system, and another to enforce compliance with and sanction violations of environmental regulations (Bergamini & Pérez, 2015). A third sub-agency to manage the state's biodiversity and conservation programs was proposed but then abandoned after significant pushback from a public employees union concerned about job security. It was later introduced as a separate bill in Congress, and has been under legislative debate for more than a decade. As the preceding sections have argued, capital accumulation and political legitimation are the driving forces behind state environment-making, which produces different kinds of environments oriented toward development or conservation. To further explore how state environment-making is shaped by practices of environmental strategic selectivity in Chile, the next section discusses the role of the Council of Ministers for Sustainability (*Consejo de Ministros para la Sustentabilidad*) in the Network of National Parks project.

3.5 The Council of Ministers for Sustainability & the Network of National Parks Project

The Council of Ministers for Sustainability (CMS) was added to the 2010 reform law as a political compromise to satisfy conservative legislators who opposed the creation of a newly independent Environment Ministry with unchecked power (Barandiarán, 2016; Interview 76, 9 December 2019). It was quickly justified on the grounds that the country needed a 'transversal' space for deliberating 'transversal' environmental public policy (BCN, 2010). As such, the CMS is an inter-ministerial governing body embedded within the Environment Ministry and chaired by the Environment Minister, but decisions are rendered by the participation of ten other ministers in charge of managing major productive sectors with environment-related functions, such as Agriculture, Economy, Energy, and Mining. The roles of the CMS include setting

standards for the sustainable use of natural resources, proposing sustainable development criteria for ministry-level planning and policymaking, and evaluating bills and administrative actions subject to environmental regulation (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, 2010). By law, it must ratify decisions by absolute majority, meaning that decisions must broadly appeal to the productive sector ministers with voting power.

Critics argue that instead of promoting inter-ministerial policy coordination, the CMS provides the productive sector ministers a right to exercise veto over decisions they perceive as threatening to industrial development. This was foreseen by some lawmakers during the bill's legislative debate, with a member of the Chamber of Deputies warning:

With all due respect I tell the [Environment] Minister that she is going to face many problems, because she will be surrounded by monsters on this Council: the Minister of the Treasury, the Minister of Housing and Urbanism, with the demands on agricultural lands; the Minister of Mining, with water usage. I want to say that the level of empowerment we are granting her with this initiative will mean constant fights. (BCN, 2010, p. 333)

The CMS has severely constrained the Environment Ministry's independence and overall effectiveness. Unlike other ministries which are free to set their own rules and regulations simply by working with the Executive, it must also seek the approval of its most adversarial counterparts. An informant described the ramifications of this as follows: "the Environment Minister today in Chile is a second-class minister. He must knock on ten doors of ten ministers who must say yes before he is able to do something. So his hands are tied, he is immobilized, and he cannot act promptly" (Interview 39b, 7 October 2019).

The 2010 reform law grants power to the CMS to recommend the creation of state protected areas to the President. It therefore possesses disproportionate authority relative to other state agencies with direct conservation duties. No less than six state agencies claim jurisdiction over the different categories of state protected areas (e.g. national park, national monument, marine protected area), and the CMS vets these agencies' proposals before making final

recommendations to the President, who typically adopts them without exception (Interview 35, 18 July 2019). This process worked differently for the Network of National Parks, however, not least because it emerged through a novel public-private partnership with the U.S.-based philanthropic foundation Tompkins Conservation. For decades, Tompkins Conservation bought and conserved private lands in Chilean Patagonia while promising to donate these as national parks to Chile's public conservation system, SNASPE. After failing to secure President Sebastián Piñera's support for a donation in 2011, the Foundation attempted again in 2015 during President Bachelet's second term in office. The donation package, largely unchanged from the first attempt, proposed to add a staggering 10 million acres to SNASPE through a joint donation of public and private lands. Whereas the center-right Piñera government considered but did not see the political opportunity of such a massive conservation project, the center-left Bachelet government did. Tompkins Conservation deliberately pitched its donation proposal to Bachelet's Interior Minister, Rodrigo Peñailillo, who was a supporter of the Foundation's work and personally close to the President. Bachelet later credited her approval of the project to Peñailillo's initial endorsement and to a chance meeting with Douglas Tompkins just two months before he died in a kayaking accident. According to a former senior Foundation staffer, "that is when she started to take it seriously. I also think the fact that Kris [Tompkins] was a woman, the widow, the two women created a kind of epic tale" (Interview 57, 16 October 2019).

In late 2015, President Bachelet convened a government working group whose mandate was not to evaluate the viability of the project but "to make the project viable" (Interview 53, 9 October 2019). This involved developing proposals to create or expand a total of eight national parks by transferring more than a million acres of Tompkins Conservation's private lands and 2.4 million acres of adjacent public lands to SNASPE, and reclassifying 6.6 million acres of

existing forest and national reserves (CONAF, 2017; MMA, 2017a). While the CMS retained the legal authority to vet the park proposals, its recommendation to the President in this case was a foregone conclusion: Bachelet had already decided to prioritize the Network of National Parks as an emblematic project of her presidency.

Formalization of the public-private land transfer to SNASPE and preparation of the park proposals lasted roughly 15 months and included the following: exhaustive cadastral analysis by the Ministry of National Assets (which manages state-owned land) to survey and delimit official park boundaries; the drafting of ‘supporting technical reports’ (*informes técnicos justificatorios*) by CONAF (which administrates SNASPE) to justify the conservation merits of each park; and a big-picture assessment by the Environment Ministry regarding project impacts on national biodiversity outcomes (Interview 46, 16 September 2019; Interview 53, 9 October 2019).

Although the final determination of project scope and the territorialization of each park was left up to the government working group, Tompkins Conservation wielded significant influence over the process. In its donation proposal, the Foundation identified which public lands should be incorporated, alongside its own, and this was used to guide the state’s cadastral analysis. In addition, a foundation staffer participated in flyovers to verify and map coordinates with the Ministry of National Assets, which in the end incorporated more public lands than the Foundation had originally calculated (Interview 57, 16 October 2019).

Cracks in the Power Bloc

The approval process for Chile’s Network of National Parks, a prototypical environment of legitimation and the most ambitious wilderness conservation project in over half a century, was contentious. Yet, as one former official in the Ministry of National Assets explained, such projects are always contentious because they involve the collision of interests:

There are economic interests, power interests, and territorial interests, which one cannot identify with a single political bloc either. They act very transversally. In any coalition government, even in a single political party, all kinds of pressures are unleashed... Carrying out this project was titanic. Anywhere in the world where you try to do something like this, you're going to find detractors, difficulties, obstacles, in all sectors. I would be lying to you if I told you we only had problems with people who were in opposition to the government. It was not like that. A lot of convincing had to be done. (Interview 77, 10 December 2019)

This collision of interests can be understood in terms of the state's environmental strategic selectivity. Again, Jessop (1990) defines the state and state power as both sites and objects of strategic selectivity that differentially impact the balance of political class forces and the strategies they pursue. The guardians of state power are the lawmakers, ministers, bureaucrats, and other political class forces who "activate specific powers and state capacities inscribed in particular institutions and agencies" (Jessop, 2008, p. 37) to serve their own interests.

Different political class forces in Chile activated the specific powers and state capacities of the CMS to shape the Network of National Parks in ways that served their differing interests. They were enabled by the particular institutional form of the CMS, which subjects the Environment Ministry's bureaucratic agenda, and projects like the Network of National Parks, to review and revision by a bloc of political class forces whose own bureaucratic agendas directly compete with it: the productive sector ministries. As a result, the CMS represents one level of the Chilean state apparatus where the push-pull tensions of environment-making for accumulation versus environment-making for legitimation are plainly observed. Following Poulantzas, it also represents how environment-making "is reproduced in and through the interplay between the state's institutional form and the changing balance of political forces" (Jessop, 2017, p. 188).

The Network of National Parks was formally presented to the CMS by the Environment Ministry in an April 2017 meeting. In order to win the votes of the productive sector ministers, the non-productive sector ministers took pains to frame the project as pro-environment *and* pro-development. They argued that it would promote sustainable economic growth via ecotourism, citing the main findings of a 2016 analysis by the global consultancy McKinsey & Company,

which was conducted for Tompkins Conservation. They also argued that economic growth would not come at the expense of productive industry because the vast majority of project territory had zero opportunity cost. According to the meeting minutes, the Minister of National Assets declared, “95% of the state property annexed to the Network of National Parks project is valuable in terms of biodiversity but does not allow the development of economic activities due to its mountainous geography” (CMS, 2018a, p. 4). To minimize the likelihood that a park-by-park review would invite heightened scrutiny from individual ministers, all eight proposals were put to a single vote (Interview 53, 9 October 2019). Ahead of the vote, officials from the Environment Ministry conducted bilateral meetings with the productive sector ministries to reconcile conflicts and secure final buy-in. This provided an opportunity for ministers to voice dissent behind the scenes rather than go on record (Interview 43, 4 September 2019).

Nevertheless, in the April 2017 CMS meeting, several productive sector ministers raised concerns about the effects of the project on public service provision, including future construction of road, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure, all of which are underdeveloped in rural Patagonia (CMS, 2017b). While these concerns were easily addressed through CMS consensus, others were not. Opposition from the productive sector ministers centered on the 5% of project territory that *did* allow for productive activities and whose protection, therefore, would imply a substantial opportunity cost for the state and private industry. This territory was concentrated in the marine waters off the new Kawésqar National Park and in the mineral-rich subsoil of the new Patagonia National Park. Describing this opposition, one former official in the Environment Ministry said, “[it] was terrible and very costly, personally and institutionally. That last year was very complicated in terms of pushing the agenda forward” (Interview 52, 23 September 2019).

In the following sections, I show how disputes over the creation of Kawésqar National Park and Patagonia National Park illustrate fundamental cracks in the CMS power bloc, and how these cracks produced particular practices and outcomes of environmental strategic selectivity. In both cases, the balance of political class forces within the CMS pursued the interests of accumulation when and where those interests existed, but under differing circumstances.

3.6 Kawésqar National Park

Kawésqar National Park measures more than 7 million acres and is one of the largest national parks on earth. A geographical mosaic of land and sea straddling both sides of the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, it protects a sprawling archipelago of Magellanic rainforest across 15,000 islands. Kawésqar National Park was created by incorporating a land donation from Tompkins Conservation with an existing protected area, the Alacalufes Forest Reserve, and additional adjacent state lands. While the Alacalufes Forest Reserve had included the surrounding marine waters within its boundaries, the proposed boundaries for the new Kawésqar National Park excluded these, leaving innumerable waterways open to concessioning by the export-oriented salmon aquaculture industry (CMS, 2017a). The CMS made this decision at the behest of several productive sector ministers, despite strong objections from the Kawésqar indigenous people for whom the park is now named.

Pursuant to U.N. ILO Convention 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, the creation of Kawésqar National Park required an indigenous consultation with eleven local Kawésqar communities recognized under Chile's Indigenous Law (No. 19.253). The months-long process resulted in a general consensus that expanding and reclassifying Alacalufes Forest Reserve as a national park would protect Kawésqar ancestral territory from further incursion by extractive industry. Yet, participants refused to support the park proposal unless marine waters

were also protected. For the Kawésqar, the ‘maritorio’ – a concept mixing the Spanish words for land and sea – is understood as a continuous whole existing in direct relationship to their people. It is an integral part of their worldview and how they interpret reality. Participants noted, “This unilateral and exclusionary imposition, led by the Ministers of Economy and Finance, shows the absolute ignorance of Santiago’s government bureaucracy about the vital importance the sea, estuaries, rivers, and inland canals have had in the life, culture, and customs of the nomadic, canoeist peoples of the southern Patagonian archipelago” (BB.NN., 2017, pp. 86–87). They therefore declared the CMS’s decision imprudent and harmful.

The Kawésqar people submitted a list of demands, the first of which called for the classification of the park’s interior and exterior waters as a Coastal Marine Protected Area of Multiple Uses, permitting only small-scale fishing and hunting for cultural subsistence. In addition they demanded to participate as co-administrators of the national park alongside CONAF, and that it be renamed Kawésqar. (Alcalufes is a derogatory name assigned to the Kawésqar people by early European explorers and settlers, and later adopted by the Chilean state.) Lastly, they demanded the creation of a park management plan establishing prohibited activities, including intensive tourism, industrial aquaculture, mining, and mineral and hydrocarbon prospecting. Arguing that the park proposal failed to meet any comprehensive standard for terrestrial and marine conservation while also violating a number of multilateral treaties and domestic laws, participants warned: “if the exclusion of fluvial, estuarine, lacustrine, inland marine and oceanic waters from the perimeter of the future national park is imposed, it will expose to international and national public opinion that the historical policy of cultural genocide, environmental racism, assimilation, sedentarization, and territorial confinement of the Kawésqar people continues in Chile in the 21st century” (BB.NN., 2017, p. 87).

These demands were shared with President Bachelet, who was willing to accept them. However, key productive sector ministers flatly rejected the creation of a Coastal Marine Protected Area of Multiple Uses, including the Economy Minister who manages the fishing and aquaculture industries, and the Finance Minister who manages government revenues, and the Mining Minister (Interview 77, 10 December 2019). Their obstinacy was on clear display during the January 2018 CMS meeting when the results of the indigenous consultation were discussed. According to meeting minutes, the Economy Minister lamented that he was not directly involved in delimiting the boundaries of Kawésqar National Park, while the Minister of National Assets replied that Chilean administrative law grants this power exclusively to her ministry (CMS, 2018a). The Economy and Mining Ministers then questioned the technical competencies of the Ministry of National Assets, insisting on the need “to verify if what has actually been delimited by the Ministry of National Assets is terrestrial and no marine areas are incorporated” (CMS, 2018a, p. 5). The underlying motivation for this bureaucratic turf fight was made plain when the Economy Minister stated, “it is complex to commit marine areas of high economic value, suitable for aquaculture activities, which have had to move further south due to global warming (CMS, 2018a, p. 4).

Global warming is not the singular cause of salmon aquaculture’s southward migration. It has moved because the industry has degraded production conditions in the marine waters of northern Patagonia and now seeks to exploit the more pristine production conditions of southern Patagonia’s marine waters (Irrázaval & Bustos-Gallardo, 2019). The state has incentivized the spatial expansion of the salmon frontier partly by opening Patagonia’s protected areas to aquaculture concessioning. To date, it has issued 400 such concessions, including 19 in Alberto de Agostini National Park (Carrere & Romo, 2021). This is a clear violation of Chile’s General

Fishing Law (No. 18.892), which permits aquaculture in national and forest reserves but not in national parks. The Comptroller General has ruled that aquaculture within a protected area must adapt to the specifications of its conservation management plan, yet many protected areas where salmon aquaculture is concentrated lack active conservation management plans (Interview 37, 16 August 2019).¹¹ Environmental activists contend that this is intentional (participant observation, 26 July 2019). The state cannot sanction salmon firms for failing to comply with conservation criteria if said criteria is not expressly codified in a management plan.

Reflecting the majority will of the CMS, President Bachelet's executive decree excluded the surrounding marine waters from Kawésqar National Park. The Comptroller General, however, ruled that because these were already protected by the Alacalufes Forest Reserve they must remain under protection. Reversing this would violate the international legal principle of non-regression, which prohibits the reduction or revocation of existing environmental protections. The executive decree was sent back for correction, where it was decided that the surrounding marine waters would be designated as a national reserve, thus allowing industrial aquaculture to continue (Interview 77, 10 December 2019). This highly unusual spatial arrangement, wherein a national reserve is embedded within a national park, means that different laws, conservation standards, and state agencies govern the management of the area's terrestrial resources versus its marine resources, despite their coupled needs and fragilities.

The publication of both protected areas in Chile's Federal Register was accompanied by the disingenuous claim that creating the national reserve reconciled "the fundamental demands of the Kawésqar people... that is, the protection of its waters, [with] the compatibility of carrying out productive activities in said maritime space" (Diario Oficial, 2019, p. 3). While the Kawésqar

¹¹ Chile's Comptroller General of the Republic (*Contraloría General de la República*) functions much like the U.S. General Accounting Office, with audit and oversight responsibility vis-à-vis the state's administrative apparatus.

people are mounting a coordinated resistance to salmon aquaculture in their ancestral territory, it remains complicated by the state's inability and unwillingness to enforce existing environmental laws or regulate the expansion of the industry. Currently, there are 67 active aquaculture concessions in Kawésqar National Reserve, with another 80 concessions in process (Carrere & Romo, 2021). A conservation management plan for Kawésqar National Reserve, which was mandated by July 2020, is now more than two years late (Diario Oficial, 2019).

3.7 Patagonia National Park

Patagonia National Park is located in Chile's remote Aysén region along the Argentine border, spanning a rich ecological transition zone between temperate nothofagus forest and arid grassland steppe. It is also located within the Deseado Massif, known for its high concentrations of gold and silver ores. The creation of Patagonia National Park was legally and technically complex. As with Kawésqar National Park, it incorporated one of Tompkins Conservation's flagship private parks with two existing protected areas – the Tamango and Lake Jeinimeni National Reserves – and additional adjacent state lands. The CMS approved a park proposal with an estimated surface area of 747,086 acres (CMS, 2017c). After more than a year of cadastral analysis, the final surface area grew to 764,655 acres (BB.NN., 2018a). President Bachelet designated the park via executive decree in January 2018, submitting the official boundaries to the Comptroller General weeks before leaving office. By the end of 2018, the park boundaries had been annulled and redrawn through a new executive decree by President Sebastián Piñera that reversed the inclusion of a polygon of state land where the Australian firm Equus Mining held concessions for mineral exploration and was actively drilling. The redrawn boundaries now exclude this polygon, enabling the firm's polymetallic project known as Los Domos to continue

less than 200 meters from the new national park, and still within a state-recognized Priority Site for Biodiversity Conservation (Segura, 2019).

President Bachelet's territorialization and President Piñera's subsequent reterritorialization of Patagonia National Park generated heated conflict between environmentalists, ranchers, farmers, and politicians both locally and nationally. The epicenter of the conflict was the small town of Chile Chico. Chile Chico had a robust mining economy based on gold and silver extraction at the Cerro Bayo mine until mid-2017 when a subterranean flooding accident killed two workers and halted production indefinitely (Cambero, 2017). According to union representatives, Cerro Bayo employed 30% of the town's workforce and layoffs initially affected some 600 miners before spilling over into other sectors dependent on miners' comparatively high wages, like food retail and automotive services (Interview 72, 28 November 2019). The Bachelet administration announced its plan to enroll the nearby Domos project site and other mineral-rich state lands into Patagonia National Park – thus restricting future mining-related job opportunities – just as unemployment ballooned past 50%.

Chile Chico quickly fractured into two opposing camps, pro-mining and pro-park, reflecting the town's historically strong ties to the mining industry and its budding ecotourism industry. Yet, multiple informants suggested that this was a false dichotomy fueled by the vocally pro-mining Mayor and rampant disinformation in the local news media (Interview 25, 4 April 2019; Interview 27, 9 April 2019; Interview 31, 15 April 2019). The real issue, they suggested, was timing. If the Cerro Bayo mine had not been in crisis, the creation of Patagonia National Park would not have incited such backlash. While Equus Mining had failed to persuade the Bachelet administration to spare the Domos project (Interview 77, 10 December 2019; Segura, 2018), the change in government in March 2018 presented the firm with a second

chance. This time, its pressure campaign was assisted by local politicians and union representatives who cited ranchers' lost access to public lands for summer grazing, farmers' pending petitions for gratis land titles, and cartographic errors as reasons to redraw the park boundaries, though these were widely interpreted as political cover for the mining lobby (Interview 28, 9 April 2019; Interview 30, 11 April 2019).

The pressure campaign scored an immediate success with the Piñera administration when the President retracted his predecessor's executive decree from the Comptroller General shortly after taking office. Officials later claimed this was necessary because several private properties were mistakenly included in the park boundaries, but the mistake was not discovered until after the executive decree had been retracted (Interview 69; 25 November 2019). In addition, the Economy Ministry's new Office of Sustainable Projects, created by the Piñera administration to fast-track highly-capitalized industrial projects through the state's environmental review process, selected Los Domos as the sole priority project for Aysén, given its promise of jobs and an investment of up to US\$1.4 billion (Segura, 2018b).¹² Multiple ministers also met with Chile Chico's Mayor, council members, and union representatives, as well as Equus Mining executives, on multiple occasions to discuss local unemployment and the fate of the Domos project (RLN, 2018a, 2018b). At the same time, the Minister of National Assets testified in a congressional hearing that Equus Mining had engaged in illegal mining activity within the Lake Jeinimeni National Reserve (Interview 29; 10 April 2019; Reyes & Valdivia, 2019). He vowed to take judicial action, but ultimately did nothing (Segura, 2018b). Lastly, a controversial plebiscite

¹² The Office of Sustainable Projects prioritizes large-scale investment ventures valued over US\$100 million, mostly in the infrastructure, energy, mining, and real estate sectors. To date, 34% of the investment value managed by this office has derived from mining non-renewable resources (MINECON, 2022). When asked how the office defines a 'sustainable project,' an official said it does not in fact evaluate the sustainability of a project; sustainability is meant more as a vision than a selection criterion (Interview 78, 11 December 2019).

in Chile Chico resulted in 90% of participants voting against the park (Interview 71, 28 November 2019). The plebiscite did not qualify as constitutionally valid, but was nevertheless used to legitimate the surreptitious efforts of government officials and the mining lobby already underway.

Despite objections from opposition politicians who accused it of pushing a hidden agenda to favor Equus Mining (El Divisadero, 2018), President Piñera's CMS approved the exclusion of the Domos project site from Patagonia National Park in October 2018. Its justification made no mention of Los Domos, but focused instead on "the need to correct the limits of the proposed surface area because privately owned land was mistakenly incorporated into the park" (CMS, 2018b, p. 4). Addressing critics, the Minister of National Assets argued that this decision was not anti-environmental since it *increased* the size of the park to 752,505 acres (Reyes & Ramírez, 2019). In fact, it *decreased* the size of the park by more than 12,000 acres (BB.NN., 2018b). Whereas the CMS framed the boundary change as a purely technical act to correct cadastral errors, several current and former government officials emphasized that it was fundamentally a political act driven by economic interests (Interview 52, 23 September 2019; Interview 69, 25 November 2019; Interview 74, 3 December 2019; Interview 77, 10 December 2019). The decision means that conservation and extraction will co-occur in the same space-time, with drilling visible from the park's Cueva de Las Manos attraction, a well-transited site for cultural and archaeological patrimony. Patagonia National Park and the Domos project also share the same watershed, which ultimately feeds General Carrera Lake, one of the largest freshwater bodies in South America (Interview 30, 11 April 2019).

3.8 Conclusion

Internal disputes over the creation of the Network of National Parks reflect at the micro-scale the contradictions of macro-scale state environment-making in Chile, and what I have called the ‘dialectic of development and conservation’: When development interests and conservation interests share the same space-time, development interests invariably win out. The bureaucratic turf fight over salmon aquaculture in Kawésqar National Park and the selection of the Domos project by the new Office of Sustainable Projects indicates that these are part of the 5% of project territory with significant economic opportunity costs. Thus, in both cases, political class forces mobilized to pursue these accumulation interests, risking the overall political legitimation of the conservation project. In a presidentialist system like Chile’s, which concentrates considerable conservation powers within the Executive, the President’s personal will can drive the state’s political will – but not completely. President Bachelet executed her will, yet still encountered obstructionism from her productive sector ministers that ultimately reshaped the Network of National Parks in key ways.

Thinking through Chile, this chapter has argued for the importance of the state’s form-determined terrain of strategic selectivity in understanding environment-making under capitalism. The modern capitalist state makes environments, *inter alia*, through environmental strategic selectivity: uneven and contradictory practices that reflect an ever-changing power balance between competing social forces, but which tend to favor some political strategies and interests over others. As such, the chapter has contributed to capitalist state theory by environmentalizing Bob Jessop’s strategic relational approach, and situating it empirically.

CHAPTER 4: Bankrolling Biodiversity: The Politics of Philanthropic Conservation Finance in Chile

4.1 Introduction

The role of philanthropic capital in global conservation is rapidly changing. A growing number of philanthropists seek to bankroll the biodiversity crisis, increasing the size of their ambitions and gifts to help close the ‘biodiversity financing gap’: the difference between the total cost of meeting global goals for biodiversity conservation and the actual amount spent by national governments and other sources (BIOFIN, 2018). For example, in September 2021 nine philanthropic foundations launched the ‘Protecting Our Planet Challenge,’ pledging an unprecedented US\$5 billion to support the 30x30 Campaign for Nature and its goal to protect 30% of the planet by 2030. This was announced ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, where world leaders will set an updated framework for managing global biodiversity in the coming decades. The Protecting Our Planet Challenge includes US\$1 billion from the Bezos Earth Fund, US\$500 million from both the Rainforest Trust and Wyss Foundation, and commitments from Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and the Rob and Melani Walton Foundation (Philanthropy News Digest, 2021). It follows the Wyss Foundation’s 2018 pledge of US\$1 billion to support the same campaign (Wyss Foundation, 2018). Philanthropic capital is considered especially key in the global South, where the greatest conservation gains are concentrated but where national governments often cite a lack of fiscal and administrative capacity to pursue such gains (Balmford et al., 2003; Waldron et al., 2013).

Recent studies estimate the annual biodiversity financing gap at US\$300-400 billion (Meyers et al., 2020) or US\$598-824 billion (Deutz et al., 2020), while suggesting that philanthropic capital is neither unlimited nor easily scaled up and thus does not hold the same

potential as private capital for closing the gap. At the same time, they concede that philanthropic capital is “highly catalytic for mobilizing private sector financial flows” (Deutz et al., 2020, p. 18). Indeed, the Protecting Our Planet Challenge was launched partly to spur additional private investments like those promised by a new consortium of financial institutions known as the Finance for Biodiversity Pledge. This reflects the reasoning behind blended finance and capital stacking: philanthropists should front capital for conservation finance at earlier, riskier stages so private investors can reap the benefits of market-rate returns at later stages.¹³ As so-called ‘early’ and patient’ capital (Mantell & Scoonover, 2018), philanthropy is now contemplated as a stabilizing force for financial capital, yet it has a much longer history as a supplemental funding source for domestic public budgets that represent over half of all financing for biodiversity conservation (UNDP, 2018). While philanthropic support for public conservation is not new, the pace and scale at which it is marshaled and some of the methods by which it is instituted are new, prompting important questions about the impacts on contemporary philanthropy-state relations.

This paper investigates the rising prominence of big, international philanthropic foundations (BIPFs) in conservation governance, focusing on a class of actors I call ‘philanthro-environmentalists.’ Philanthro-environmentalists differ from two other actor classes already receiving significant scholarly attention – big, international conservation NGOs (BINGOs) and philanthrocapitalists – in that they do not engage market-based, for-profit approaches to finance conservation. Rather, they engage a ‘dollars for policy’ approach that leverages the power of their philanthropy to improve public guarantees for conservation – a practice that might be called

¹³ Geographers have critiqued blended finance and capital stacking for encouraging the use of public and philanthropic dollars to essentially subsidize private accumulation without also demonstrating that for-profit finance is the more efficient and effective conservation solution (cf. Bigger et al., 2021; Christiansen, 2021; Dempsey & Suarez, 2016).

‘philanthropic conservation finance.’ Taking Chile as a case, I trace how a transnational network of philanthro-environmentalists led by Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts is using a novel philanthropic conservation finance mechanism known as Project Finance for Permanence to exact substantial political and fiscal commitments from the state in exchange for substantive funding for a new initiative called the Route of Parks of Chilean Patagonia. I argue that Project Finance for Permanence targets policymaking as the primary site of philanthropic intervention, thereby affording philanthro-environmentalists greater control over state conservation governance. Yet, this case also raises serious questions about the limits and implications of leveraging philanthropic capital to solve public environmental problems. The paper is informed by thirteen months of field-based research in Chile, conducted between August 2017 and December 2019, including participant observation at 17 governmental or philanthropic events and 79 semi-structured interviews with current and former government officials, philanthropists, foundation staff, NGO staff, private conservation advocates, and environmental activists. Participant observation and interview data are supplemented with document analysis of relevant government files and agreements, policy reports, news stories, foundation webpages and press releases, and donor-targeted literature and pamphlets.

The paper begins with a review of the literatures on conservation governance and conservation finance, and places philanthropy in relation to the state and other private actors. Next, it introduces the Route of Parks of Chilean Patagonia and conceptualizes two phenomena that I argue are more salient than prevailing concepts for understanding this unique case: ‘philanthro-environmentalism’ and ‘not-for-profit conservation finance.’ Then, I show how the concepts operate in the context of Chile’s new *Route of Parks Fund*, a Project Finance for Permanence deal led by Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts. The *Route of*

Parks Fund is characterized by a ‘dollars for policy’ approach, as well as the influence of donor anxiety and anchor funders; the penultimate section considers how these are altering the power dynamics and political stakes of contemporary philanthropy-state relations. The paper concludes with a brief reflection on how philanthropic conservation finance broadens existing understandings of conservation finance and its role in addressing the accelerating biodiversity crisis.

4.2 Placing Philanthropy in Conservation Governance & Conservation Finance

Geographers conceptualize modern conservation governance as a networked set of power relations involving the state, the market, and civil society (Corson et al., 2019; Holmes, 2011). A robust literature concludes that decades of neoliberal policy trends have enabled market and civil society actors to exercise greater control over conservation governance at multiple scales (Dempsey, 2016; Duffy, 2006; Youdelis, 2018). This literature has paid significant attention to the role of BINGOs (Brockington & Scholfield, 2010a, 2010b; Corson, 2010; Holmes, 2018; MacDonald, 2010; West, 2006), but far less attention to the role of BIPFs (Diallo, 2015; Holmes, 2012; Ramutsindela et al., 2011). Yet, BINGOs rely on BIPFs as a major source of financial and program support: Conservation International has received US\$395 million from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (Hance, 2016) and The Nature Conservancy has received over US\$150 million from the David and Lucile Packard Foundation (Lehren & Siegel, 2018). Many BIPFs now operate globally, have ambitious policy agendas, and wield serious political-economic power. To speak of the outsized impacts of BINGOs on modern conservation governance, then, necessarily implicates BIPFs. BIPFs and BINGOs work together through transnational alliances linking donors’ money and ideological motivations to the projects and advocacy of conservation groups. These transnational alliances increasingly include partnerships between BINGOs and

extractive corporations like Shell and De Beers (Enns et al., 2019), reflecting thickening ties among civil society's NGO, corporate, and philanthropic sectors (Ramutsindela, 2009).

Philanthropy has been subjected to numerous scholarly critiques, including that it is an instrument of the ruling elites that reinforces capitalist hegemony and their own cultural dominance (Arrove, 1982; Roelofs, 2003). Historically, philanthropy has been key to forming bourgeois subjects, who in turn have helped legitimize capitalism through more philanthropy (Prudham, 2009; Spierenburg & Wels, 2010). The benevolent portrayal of philanthropic elites serves to elide and normalize the negative effects of capitalism that produce their wealth and the need for their charity in the first place, such as labor exploitation, income inequality, and environmental degradation (INCITE!, 2017; Kohl-Arenas, 2016). Philanthropy is also critiqued for pursuing projects that reproduce American geopolitical hegemony. Especially since the Cold War, powerful U.S.-based foundations have promoted and advanced American imperial and foreign policy interests through their activities abroad (Schramm, 2006; Vogel, 2006). A third critique is that despite purporting to stimulate societal change, foundations often preempt it through funding practices that favor politically safe issues and groups over more progressive ones (Guthman, 2008). Writing on 'philanthropic colonization,' Barker (2008) shows how the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations co-opted U.S. environmentalism "by channeling the movement's work away from more radical ventures during its formative years" (p. 40).

Such critiques are now being extended to address philanthropy's growing involvement in state environmental governance (Betsill et al., 2021). As public-private conservation partnerships proliferate and BIPFs work to shape new policy frontiers like marine conservation and species rewilding (Mallin et al., 2019; Zamboni et al., 2017), scholars are asking whether philanthropic influence risks "dictating the terms of cash-strapped public conservation efforts" (Delfin, Jr. &

Tang, 2006, p. 424). They suggest philanthropy is transmuting the power of wealth into political and institutional power, while raising questions of transparency, accountability, and agenda setting (Fortwangler, 2007; Gruby et al., 2021). Several studies focus on the ways in which philanthropy has historically engendered land dispossession and forced removal of Indigenous peoples in the name of conservation (Milgroom & Spiereburg, 2008; Spence, 1999), and continues to sponsor projects that local communities describe as undemocratic and disenfranchising (Jones, 2012; Louder & Bosak, 2019).¹⁴ Other studies invoke Harrison's (2004) concept of 'governance states' to illustrate the influence of external networks of governance actors, including BIPFs and BINGOs, on national environmental agendas in the global South and how this influence undermines state sovereignty and territoriality (Duffy, 2006; Holmes, 2010). Corson (2011) finds that in Madagascar these governance actors took control of boundary mapping and other conservation territorialization processes, affording them a "'state' authority to decide the rights and acceptable uses associated with Madagascar's new protected areas" (p. 709). Writing on a public-private conservation partnership in Mozambique's Gorongosa National Park, Diallo (2015) argues that the U.S.-based Carr Foundation simultaneously challenged and bolstered the state's sovereign authority over its people and territory by performing key public functions like jailing and punishing suspected poachers.

Separately, a burgeoning literature within geography traces how biodiversity conservation is rendered investable through two modalities rapidly gaining favor with BIPFs and BINGOs: philanthrocapitalism and the financialization of conservation. Philanthrocapitalism merges capitalist means with philanthropic ends and can be defined as "the use of business and market-based tools, techniques, and methods to address intractable social problems" (Jenkins, 2011, p.

¹⁴ Both Jones (2012) and Louder and Bosak (2019) study Tompkins Conservation's Parque Patagonia project, which is now part of Chile's Route of Parks.

765). Holmes (2012) summarizes the ethos of philanthrocapitalism as such: the same skills and attitudes that make successful capitalists will make ideal philanthropists, and capitalist solutions benefit philanthropy because they are inherently efficient and innovative. While the novelty of philanthrocapitalism is debatable (Katz, 2005; McGoey, 2014), scholars agree that it exerts considerable influence over the current generation of donors and foundation officers. This is evident in the rise of impact investing, a branch of social finance that envisions “a new, “moral” financial system where investor dollars fund socio-environmental repair while simultaneously generating financial returns” (Cohen & Rosenman, 2020, p. 1259). Impact investing is the primary way philanthrocapitalists engage in and facilitate the financialization of conservation, using ‘mission-related’ or ‘program-related’ investments that align donors’ “social (charitable) and financial (portfolio maximizing) missions” (Rosenman, 2018, p. 147). Recent research reveals a philanthrocapitalist turn in conservation, documenting both the promotion of a discourse that markets are the best way to improve conservation outcomes and an increase in the number of donor-based projects tied to returns-seeking activities (Holmes, 2015b; Koot & Fletcher, 2020; Mallin et al., 2019; Tedesco, 2015). Holmes (2012) argues, however, that the discursive impact of philanthrocapitalism remains greater than its financial impact because of how it reimagines the relationship between the state, the market, and civil society. As BIPFs globalize, they bring this increasingly dominant discourse to bear on higher scales of governance and decision-making.

The financialization of conservation refers to the conversion of biodiversity and natural resource protection into capitalized, tradable assets through market-based instruments like biodiversity offsets and payments for ecosystem services. Dempsey and Bigger (2019) call this ‘for-profit conservation finance’ (FPCF), underscoring that private, returns-seeking capital is just

one variety of conservation finance that exists alongside public and philanthropic varieties.¹⁵

FPCF proponents liken it to a paradigm shift for conservation funding that swaps a demand for capital driven by conservation need for a supply of capital driven by investor appetite (Huwlyer et al., 2014). Critical scholars, however, differ on whether and how FPCF is generating investment returns. Whereas some frame conservation as a spectacular frontier for finance capital (Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Sullivan, 2013), others contend that the economic boom of FPCF is still largely promissory (Barbesgaard, 2018; Dempsey & Suarez, 2016). Still others argue that FPCF's actually existing returns derive from activities that are neither directly related to conservation nor necessarily financial (Dempsey, 2017; Silver & Campbell, 2018). For instance, Kay (2018) observes that shareholder profits generated by private equity firms in the U.S. come from projects that target working landscapes instead of protected landscapes, and rely on three revenue streams that are not by definition finance: real estate sales, public monies, and commodity production.

Asking why FPCF retains its appeal despite a lackluster track record, a new body of scholarship finds it is not purely reducible to market success or failure (Asiyanbi, 2018; Cavanagh et al., 2020). Rather, FPCF possesses more-than-financial powers of discourse, ideology, subject formation, and even morality that also serve to reinforce conservation's financialization. Asiyanbi (2018) and Cohen and Rosenman (2020) argue that pro-market discourse and ideology lend crucial legitimacy to nature financialization projects like REDD+ in ways that are not typical or required of financialization projects in other sectors. Similarly, Dempsey and Bigger (2019) find that 'marrying' conservation with accumulation entails a

¹⁵ Conservation finance simply connotes the raising of funds in general – whether public, private, or philanthropic. Yet, it has steadily come to connote the specific application of financialization practices in conservation, involving returns-seeking investors, banks, or other financial intermediaries that facilitate the delivery of revenue. Dempsey and Bigger's (2019) use of the 'for-profit' modifier helpfully clarifies this.

massive capacity building effort to reorient “subjects, territories, and social relationships” (p. 528) toward capitalist ideals by eliminating economically and environmentally wasteful conduct. Lastly, scholars have begun to study how morality and moral performance shape value creation in the financialization of nature (Ouma, 2020; Ouma et al., 2018). Studying farmland investments, Kish and Fairbairn (Kish & Fairbairn, 2018) analyze the everyday moral narratives of two different investor groups – mainstream agricultural investors and impact investors – to demonstrate how they “play a pivotal role in expanding the financial penetration of nature” (p. 569).

Taken together, these more-than-financial powers “can have enormous cultural and political disciplining effects on the conservation movement and on environmental governance” (Dempsey & Suarez, 2016, p. 666), especially as they infiltrate the logics and practices of those who continue to supply the vast majority of global conservation funding: state and philanthropic actors. In what follows, I argue that this is precisely what is happening with Chile’s Route of Parks: a FPCF approach was not adopted, but philanthropic actors are nevertheless internalizing and promoting its metrics-based, entrepreneurial spirit for their own political ends. While the extant literature overwhelmingly emphasizes “the shifts in philanthropy-driven conservation from donation toward profit-oriented finance models” (Mallin et al., 2019, p. 2), my findings suggest that conservation philanthropy’s traditional donation model is innovating as well. The Route of Parks highlights related phenomena I call ‘philanthro-environmentalism’ and ‘not-for-profit conservation finance,’ which also merit investigation. The next section introduces the case study and conceptualizes both phenomena.

4.3 Philanthro-environmentalism & Not-for-profit Conservation Finance in Chile

American fashion executive turned conservation philanthropist Douglas Tompkins moved to

Chile in 1991 after souring on a career he likened to “making stuff that nobody needed” (Langman, 2012). Having sold his founding stake in The North Face and Esprit brands, Tompkins settled in the remote coastal fjords of northern Chilean Patagonia and began amassing land for private conservation projects through his California-based foundation Conservation Land Trust (later renamed Tompkins Conservation).¹⁶ By the mid-2000s he and his wife Kristine McDivitt Tompkins, a former executive at the Patagonia Inc. brand, had protected more private land than anyone else in history (Saverin, 2014). In March 2017, following years of planning and Tompkins’ sudden death in a kayaking accident, McDivitt Tompkins and Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet launched a first of its kind, public-private conservation partnership in Chilean Patagonia. The partnership adds 10 million acres of national parklands to the public conservation system, SNASPE, including a joint donation of more than a million acres of Tompkins Conservation’s private parklands and 2.4 million acres of adjacent public lands (CONAF, 2017; MMA, 2017a). It also increases the level of protection on 6.6 million acres of neighboring forest and national reserves by reclassifying them as national parks.

These new parklands now form part of a regional conservation territory known as the Route of Parks, protecting a total of 28.4 million acres in 18 national parks (see Figure 3). This historic project constitutes the largest addition to SNASPE since 1969 and the largest private land donation ever received by a national government (CONAF, 2019). Also the largest philanthropic gift in Chilean history, it comes in a funding area where domestic philanthropy and state fiscal spending are markedly weak (participant observation, 14 October 2020). Yet, the donation was not without controversy. The Tompkins’ philanthropic activities in Chilean Patagonia have always been controversial, with local communities, Santiago’s political class, and

¹⁶ The Foundation’s in-country operation, Tompkins Conservation Chile, was renamed Rewilding Chile in August 2021.

national business elites united in questioning their true motives for owning so much land (Azócar, 2017; Franklin, 2021; Holmes, 2015c).¹⁷ While the donation repudiated a number of conspiracy theories about the Tompkins – including that they were working to establish a new Jewish state in Patagonia, or building a site to store nuclear waste, or plotting to seize the region’s freshwater resources (Interview 8, 23 February 2019) – public scrutiny of their actions endures. Some informants explained this as a consequence of Chile’s neoliberal development model, where foreigners’ monopolization of land for extraction is commonsense but foreigners’ monopolization of land for conservation is not (Interview 39b, 7 October 2019). Other informants explained this as a consequence of Chile lacking a culture of conservation philanthropy, suggesting that it justifies ongoing intervention from external BIPFs (Interview 15, 18 March 2019).

Importantly, the Route of Parks was designed and masterminded by Tompkins Conservation, not the state. It is perhaps more accurately understood as a private-public partnership, given that the Foundation proposed its major elements. This included identifying which public lands should be donated as ‘match,’ and how the project would be marketed as a state strategy for local economic development. Explaining the Foundation’s donation philosophy, a senior staffer said,

This is how we do it, we get a map and we go to the government. We say, ‘look... I have 220,000 acres here in the Chacabuco Valley, you have the Tamango Reserve with 70,000 acres and the Jeinimeni Reserve with 395,000 acres. Notice that here is some public land, and there is more public land, and over there is some military land. How about we donate everything and make a national park?’ That is how we work, we never donate alone. We go in with a proposal, including public lands of various types and our own donation. (Interview 58, 17 October 2019)

¹⁷ One explanation for the Tompkins’ hostile treatment in Chile, especially in the late 1990s during President Eduardo Frei’s tenure, was their positionality as foreigners attempting conservation philanthropy where it had never been attempted before. National business elites accused the Tompkins of threatening economic development by “putting a lock on the forest” (Interview 73, 2 December 2019), while local leaders accused them of dispossessing poor peasants – either by evicting those who were illegally occupying their land or coercing land sales from neighbors at below-market prices. These accusations, plus President Frei’s own antagonism toward the Tompkins, spurred a Congressional investigation, state surveillance of their phone calls and daily activities, and finally a legal agreement in 1997 temporarily prohibiting them from purchasing more land (Interview 58, 17 October 2019).

Along with land, Tompkins Conservation donated fixed park infrastructure and other capital assets valued at several hundred million dollars – including a boutique hotel, luxury rental cabins, restaurants, an organic farm, campgrounds, groomed trails, interpretive signage, visitor centers, a museum, vehicles, and equipment. It imposed just one condition: that the state protect these donated assets as national parks in perpetuity (MMA, 2017a). How do we make sense of this unique case of conservation philanthropy? Philanthrocapitalism and FPCF, though salient concepts for interpreting emerging conservation trends, do not adequately describe the Route of Parks. I propose the concepts ‘philanthro-environmentalism’ and ‘not-for-profit conservation finance’ instead, arguing that these describe a parallel set of conservation trends happening in Chile and elsewhere.

Philanthro-environmentalism

Philanthro-environmentalism combines a general philanthrocapitalist ethos with the traditional donation model, lauding business-minded philanthropy as more effective at conservation problem-solving than governments and NGOs without engaging financialization practices to get results. Philanthro-environmentalists bring “the networks, brand image, knowledge and language they acquired through making their fortunes in the business world to shape conservation politics and practices” (Jones, 2012, p. 251) via public-private partnerships with nation-states. They therefore display certain continuities and discontinuities with philanthrocapitalists. Both premise that philanthropic elites, by virtue of their economic status, hold proper authority to diagnose socio-environmental problems and prescribe the right solutions on behalf of society at large. This affects the kinds of projects that get funded, and where, privileging elite perspectives on what ultimately counts as socio-environmental progress (Cohen & Rosenman, 2020; Hay & Muller, 2014). Both shape conservation discourse, ideology, and

subject formation by importing capitalist rationalities of “efficiency, accountability, and quantifiability” (Tedesco, 2015, p. 15) into philanthropic projects – even when those projects are not overtly market-oriented. Both also justify their interventions through a politics of morality (McGoey, 2012), with philanthro-environmentalists claiming a moral responsibility to do something about biodiversity loss. Tompkins, for example, saw philanthropy as his way of paying rent for living on a planet increasingly under siege (Mark, 2019). Finally, both share deep ties to ‘extractive finance’ (Dempsey and Bigger, 2019) that are not easily effaced. As discrete afterlives of financial accumulation, philanthro-environmentalism and philanthrocapitalism put excess wealth to work in service of morally just causes, but wealth that often ironically derives from financial speculation, extractivism, or both.¹⁸

Philanthro-environmentalism is distinguished from philanthrocapitalism in several significant ways. First, it foregoes the use of newer financial instruments that “blend profit-making and charity” (Rosenman, 2018, p. 149) by continuing to employ the traditional donation model. The split is less around return on investment – philanthro-environmentalists also prize this, though they adopt a more expansive, extra-economic definition – than around the kinds of solutions sought. Whereas philanthrocapitalism focuses on market-based solutions to maximize the power and impact of philanthropic investments (Bishop & Green, 2008), philanthro-environmentalism focuses on political and technical solutions like legislative advocacy, policy reform, and scientific research to achieve those same ends. This correlates to a second distinguishing feature: the scale of intervention. Philanthrocapitalist projects often advocate bottom-up approaches like microfinance, targeting local communities and NGOs as new market

¹⁸ Historically, no single industry has produced more philanthropic wealth than the oil industry. Oil has literally fueled the conservation interventions of philanthropic heavyweights from the Rockefellers to the Mellons to the Pews.

subjects in charge of their own opportunity (Mitchell & Sparke, 2016). Philanthro-environmentalist projects exhibit a more top-down approach, however, targeting the state apparatus itself. For example, The Pew Charitable Trusts, a key partner of Tompkins Conservation in Chilean Patagonia, pursues projects that “lay the foundation for effective policy solutions” and “encourage responsive governments – at the local, state, national and international levels” (personal communication, 12 September 2019).¹⁹ In short, philanthro-environmentalists seek to discipline state conservation behavior by bankrolling structural changes in the political register, and they do not anticipate financial gain beyond customary tax deductions.

A third distinguishing feature concerns the motivation for charitable action. Philanthro-environmentalists desire to enact or defend specific nature imaginaries based on settler-colonial understandings of ‘terra nullius’ and ‘pristine nature’ that fetishize the landscape aesthetics of the prototypical frontier: vast expanses of alpine or montane ‘wilderness’ (Cronon, 1995; Denevan, 1992; Hendlin, 2014). These have helped legitimize more than a century of ‘fortress-style’ conservation, codifying as ecological best practice the spatial separation of humans from nature. The Tompkins have directed their charitable action toward projects and geographies that befit settler-colonial nature imaginaries: species rewilding and national park creation in remote South America. These projects uphold fortress-style logics of who and what ‘belongs’ in conservation spaces that are actively produced to appear remote, untouched, and sublime. Their specific interest in Chilean Patagonia can be explained by what Mendoza et al. (2017) call the

¹⁹ In Chilean Patagonia, The Pew Charitable Trusts focuses on improving the management standards of national parks and national reserves, creating new marine and terrestrial protected areas, and strengthening citizen participation through partnerships with NGOs, universities, and state agencies (Interview 49, 10 September 2019). It directs much of its funding toward scientific research and technical training for the region’s conservation actors through the Patagonia Mar y Tierra NGO network and the Austral Patagonia Program at the Universidad Austral de Chile. Pew has hired highly networked Chileans with extensive government experience to run its in-country programming.

‘Patagonian Imaginary,’ a master image of the region that coalesces “around transnational regimes of representational value pertaining to tourism, the outdoor industry, and environmentalism” (p. 95). As Chilean Patagonia becomes more integrated into the global green development project, it attracts increasing attention from donors who likewise wish to shape the region’s trajectory through conservation philanthropy.²⁰

Lastly, philanthro-environmentalism has roots in the philanthropic and environmental movements of the U.S. Progressive Era, which evolved both on account of and in reaction to industrial capitalism (Hays, 1969). Philanthro-environmentalists share this ambivalence toward capitalism, sometimes defending the value of conservation on economically instrumental grounds, other times arguing that nature is worth protecting because it is intrinsically valuable. While the Tompkins began emphasizing the economic benefits of conservation-based tourism when developing a public policy proposal for the Route of Parks, they had spent the previous two decades justifying their philanthropy through the dogma of deep ecology.²¹

Not-for-profit Conservation Finance (NFPCF): Project Finance for Permanence

Philanthro-environmentalists occupy an important position within conservation history.

In the United States, they donated land and cash for early park creation and pushed Congress to establish the National Park Service by 1916 – a governance model later replicated around the

²⁰ Douglas Tompkins’ interest in Patagonia began in the 1960s, when he first traveled there as a mountaineer (Franklin, 2021). He sited his early conservation projects in northern Chilean Patagonia because the land was less degraded, parcels were bigger, and prices were cheaper (Interview 73, 2 December 2019). Over time, the Tompkins have tapped their own personal and business networks for additional philanthropic funding and board leadership for their projects, including from Peter Buckley (former CEO of Esprit-Europe), Yvon Chouinard (founder of Patagonia, Inc.), and Rick Ridgeway (former VP of Environmental Affairs at Patagonia, Inc.). Chouinard and Ridgeway, close friends and climbing partners of Tompkins, also trace their commitment to protecting Patagonia to personal histories of adventure travel and mountaineering in the region.

²¹ Deep ecology is an environmental philosophy developed by Norwegian scholar Arne Naess that critiques society’s fixation on mega-technology and perpetual economic growth, and is integral to the Tompkins’ conservation ethic (Saverin, 2014). Their association with deep ecology has earned them significant and sustained critique by Chilean politicians, the media, and even the Catholic Church that endures today (Azócar, 2017; Interview 73, 2 December 2019).

globe. Over the last half-century, they have gifted a total of US\$700 million in the U.S. alone (Mackintosh, 2018). These gifts represent what I call ‘not-for-profit conservation finance’ (NFPCF), that is, funding for conservation that is neither profit-oriented nor interest-bearing and typically originates from public and philanthropic sources. Philanthro-environmentalists practice NFPCF, yet some donors are now innovating on the traditional donation model by importing Wall Street strategies that afford them greater control over how their gifts are managed and safeguarded. One example is Project Finance for Permanence (PFP). PFP was developed in the United States by former investment bankers and management consultants affiliated with the Linden Trust for Conservation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and Redstone Strategy Group (Linden et al., 2012). They also share connections to the Wall Street firms Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch, the global consultancy McKinsey & Company, and the BINGOs World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and The Nature Conservancy. PFP applies Wall Street’s strategy of project finance – used to coordinated complex and costly capital projects like airports and dams – to guarantee full and permanent funding for public conservation, addressing what private actors identify as a major limitation in current conservation practice: the tendency of national governments to create protected areas unsystematically with incomplete funding and an incomplete vision of permanence.

Under PFP, donors help states close the financial gap in their conservation systems in exchange for durable and measurable political commitments guaranteeing the perpetuity of these systems (WWF, 2018). The model depends on a fully private fund, fed by philanthropic capital and controlled by a third party, with the state regarded as one among many project stakeholders. As one informant noted, “it is a proposal from the private sector to the public sector, but the fund it not public-private, it is private” (Interview 58, 17 October 2019). PFP deals are typically

configured as trusts, and administered one of three ways: as endowment funds, where funding is provided upfront but only investment returns are disbursed; as sinking funds, where funding is provided upfront and disbursed completely over a predetermined time horizon; or as revolving funds, where funding is provided piecemeal and disbursed periodically (Redstone Strategy Group, 2011; WWF, 2015). This approach to conservation finance differs from other fully public or fully private approaches by brokering public-private partnerships between philanthropic donors and nation-states. PFP has been applied in six countries to date: Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru (Nance, 2016). Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts are now collaborating to implement the world's seventh PFP deal in Chilean Patagonia.

If philanthro-environmentalism better explains the behavior of Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts in Chile, then NFPCF better explains their chosen method. Project Finance for Permanence aims to produce more efficient conservation outcomes and subjects using a novel form of strings-attached philanthropy instead of returns-seeking finance. In this sense, PFP does not embody what Cohen et al. (2021) recently termed 'reparative accumulation,' where "the project of socio-ecological repair [is made] into a site for the extraction of financial rents" (p. 2). Yet, it endeavors to finance socio-ecological repair just the same by imposing its own form of elite-led 'solutionism' onto the public domain. The strategies and activities of these BIPFs reveal a crucial dimension of philanthropic conservation finance that must also be taken seriously: its increasing pursuit of political and policy returns.

4.4 The Route of Parks Fund: Protecting Patagonia Forever

Chile's PFP deal, the *Route of Parks Fund: Protecting Patagonia Forever*, will fundraise US\$65-85 million to help the state finance and manage 17 of the 18 national parks in Chilean

Patagonia.²² It was formally announced by President Sebastián Piñera in May 2019, just weeks after Tompkins Conservation finalized its donation.²³ In a press release from that day, McDivitt Tompkins called the PFP deal “a keystone to our commitment with Chile post-donation to ensure the well-being of Patagonia’s national parks and the local communities” (Tompkins Conservation, 2019b). The *Route of Parks Fund* will be administered as a sinking fund, with philanthropic spending gradually ramping down over a period of 15 years as state fiscal spending gradually ramps up. The deal will be strictly philanthropic, excluding additional funding sources that other PFP deals have included such as multilateral aid. Contributions are primarily expected from foreign donors and the Tompkins’ personal contacts, but domestic donors are also being targeted – a first for any PFP deal.²⁴

PFP follows Wall Street’s project finance model. Funding commitments are first solicited from donors, then conditioned by stakeholder agreements negotiated between donors and the state, and finally collected in a single, all-or-nothing ‘closing’ (Linden et al., 2012). Figure 6 describes the PFP process in greater depth. Chile’s PFP deal is unfolding in three phases: deal design, deal closing, and fund disbursement. Currently in phase one, the process is led by a transnational coalition including Tompkins Conservation, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the

²² In the original Route of Parks proposal, Tompkins Conservation mistakenly omitted Guamblín Island National Park and, astonishingly, state actors never corrected its error. According to one informant, when the Foundation was notified, senior staff replied that the project’s promotional materials were already printed and could not be changed (personal communication, 10 September 2019). To date, Guamblín Island National Park is missing from the Route of Parks’ official branding and the PFP deal. This illustrates the burgeoning influence of BIPFs over public conservation planning in Chile.

²³ An informant described President Piñera’s support for the PFP deal as such: any President who receives a donation as significant as this would not want it to fail on their watch (Interview 49, 10 September 2019). The PFP deal promises supplemental, upfront funding for a budgetary line item (conservation) the neoliberal Chilean state has never adequately financed.

²⁴ Domestic donations to environmental causes used to be taxed at a rate of up to 40% in Chile. Yet, in early 2022 Congress approved reforms to the Donations Law (No. 21.440) that eliminate this tax penalty and bestow tax benefits on donors who give to environmental causes, including the PFP. The Pew Charitable Trusts and Tompkins Conservation, through its defunct NGO Amigos de los Parques, lobbied hard for this legal reform.

Santiago-based certified B corporation Balloon Latam, in cooperation with WWF and the Chilean state. This coalition conforms to the PFP best practice of involving at minimum a high-capacity conservation NGO, an anchor funder (discussed below), and a national government (Redstone Strategy Group, 2011). Full details about the PFP deal will not be publicized until closing, which was originally projected for mid-2020 but delayed by the October 2019 political uprising and subsequent constitutional reform process, as well as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. One detail that is known, however, is that the PFP deal is being brokered at the highest scale of government – in the General Secretary of the Presidency, led by two advisers who are “basically, the right hand and left hand [of the President]” (Interview 47, 9 September 2019). This distinguishes it from other public-private partnerships, which are typically brokered by the ministries and not by the President directly.²⁵ By temporarily subsidizing national parklands in Chilean Patagonia, the *Route of Parks Fund* leverages philanthropic capital to very specific effect: incentivizing the state to improve its political and fiscal commitments to conservation through a ‘dollars for policy’ approach.

²⁵ Within the state, coordination of the PFP deal is highly centralized. Yet, much of the PFP deal is being coordinated outside the state. Balloon Latam is leading the community development component – a key feature of this deal – and The Pew Charitable Trusts is leading the parks management and sustainable financing components (Interview 61, 11 November 2019).




Figure 6: PFP Process Description (©Redstone Strategy Group, LLC)

Dollars for Policy

The *Route of Parks Fund* will be institutionalized in a non-governmental entity controlled by a mixed board of directors, including BIPF and state actors, that will supervise the state’s compliance with the stakeholder agreements over the life of the fund and disburse payments as it fulfills predetermined milestones in parks management, community development, and sustainable financing. As one informant noted, the fund “disburses over time per conditions that are, in general, based on performance. In fact, they often call it ‘pay for performance’” (Interview 47, 9 September 2019). This exposes the primary objective of Project Finance for Permanence as a NFPCF tool: disciplining state conservation behavior through philanthropy. I call this a ‘dollars for policy’ approach. According to the founding director of the *Route of Parks Fund*, PFP is “about securing permanence in action and deed from governments and using money as part of the leverage to make it happen” (quoted in Avery, 2019). More than a

supplemental funding source for public conservation, PFP is a powerful policy instrument compelling particular kinds of state action that reflect the priorities and preferences of transnational philanthro-environmentalists. PFP deals not only center philanthro-environmentalists' interests by design, they center philanthro-environmentalists' influence over public policymaking. Specific reforms happen not as an organic result of the national democratic process but because project stakeholders negotiate these reforms with select state actors as a prerequisite of deal closing.

In Chile, project stakeholders seek to reform the notoriously weak institutional capacities of the National Forestry Corporation (CONAF), which administers the public conservation system SNASPE. A senior staffer at The Pew Charitable Trusts observed:

It's the biggest issue, without a doubt. It's a park service, CONAF, that lacks the minimum financing to manage [its parks]. We have cases of paper parks. For example, the new Kawésqar National Park: in only the terrestrial part – 6.9 million acres, the size of Belgium, an entire country, with 3,000 islands – a park ranger visits four times a year but lives in Puerto Natales. Zero infrastructure, nothing. That is the reality. (Interview 49, 9 September 2019)

The PFP will mandate a set of conservation standards that CONAF currently lacks – including for marine-coastal management, threat monitoring and assessment, and community participation – while ensuring that each national park has an active and effective biodiversity management plan (Interview 46, 6 September 2019; Interview 61, 11 November 2019).²⁶ Given that CONAF will eventually assume full financial responsibility for the Route of Parks, donors are also using the PFP deal to implement permanent revenue-generating mechanisms for SNASPE. These include raising park entrance fees, expanding private concessions of park services and infrastructure, and potentially levying an airport tax on all foreign visitors flying into the country. Ironically, PFP donors may single-handedly achieve a policy goal that CONAF has repeatedly

²⁶ Despite being required by law, only 58% of Chile's terrestrial protected areas and 25% of marine protected areas have a biodiversity management plan (Petit et al., 2018).

tried and failed to achieve over its 50-year history: preventing the fiscal leakage of SNASPE's revenues. These revenues now flow directly to the National Treasury and CONAF must request their reallocation back to SNASPE through the state's annual budgetary process. PFP stakeholders want the state to guarantee "that the revenue generated by the protected areas remains in the protected areas by eliminating the decision-making that would allocate this revenue to other things that aren't protected areas" (Interview 61, 11 November 2019).

Beyond increasing SNASPE's revenue streams, donors seek to increase SNASPE's public appropriations from the state. Chile spends less on conservation than practically any other country, with SNASPE ranking ninth among the ten most underfunded conservation systems in the world (Rivera, 2019).²⁷ In Chilean Patagonia, where 90% of SNASPE's national parklands are concentrated, state spending on national parks averages just US\$5.1 million annually (Tompkins Conservation, 2019b). The *Route of Parks Fund* will use philanthropic resources to help close SNASPE's financing gap over the short-term, but once the sinking fund expires the state must maintain everything implemented under the deal. For example, as one informant noted, if 200 additional park rangers are hired over the 15-year period, "the state has to allocate more resources to ensure these new personnel are permanent" (Interview 46, 6 September 2019). Moreover, the *Route of Parks Fund* is designed to allow "donors the possibility of obtaining additional commitments and financial resources from the government" (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2019a) into the future, endowing these transnational philanthro-environmentalists with indefinite leverage over the Chilean state apparatus. The reshaping of public fiscal commitments to conservation is arguably the most consequential and enduring feature of PFP and its dollars

²⁷ A minimum level of conservation protection is estimated to cost US\$6 per hectare, while Chile spends just US\$1.50-2.00 per hectare (participant observation, 5 September 2019). This is far less than what many neighboring countries spend, including Argentina (US\$23/ha.), Costa Rica (US\$16/ha.), and Uruguay (US\$4/ha.), and nearly two orders of magnitude less than the United States spends (US\$92/ha.) (McKinsey & Company, 2018; Rivera, 2019).

for policy approach.

Donor Anxiety & Anchor Funders

The *Route of Parks Fund* reflects a growing anxiety that the state cannot properly or permanently steward Chilean Patagonia's expanding national parklands without ongoing intervention from the philanthropic sector. This anxiety is especially prevalent among the Tompkins' personal contacts who supported their private conservation projects and now fear their fate as state-owned national parks. "It's like the challenge of integrating West and East Germany when the Berlin Wall comes down" (participant observation, 5 September 2019), said one donor, comparing Tompkins Conservation to West Germany and CONAF to East Germany. Several donor friends convinced a reluctant McDivitt Tompkins that a PFP deal was necessary, warning "if you don't provide the money, which donors will contribute to take care of these parks, it's going to be a disaster" (participant observation, 5 September 2019). One friend in particular, Forrest Berkley, a philanthro-environmentalist and former investment banker, takes credit:

I was the person who browbeat, in her words, Kris Tompkins into supporting this initiative, to secure her legacy and Doug's legacy. And I was the first person to commit to make a major philanthropic contribution to this initiative. Why did I do this? Well, I did this for a couple of reasons. First, because under U.S. tax law, I can deduct my contribution from the income on which I have to pay taxes! [The audience laughs.] But more importantly, I want this project to succeed in this country, which has so much to offer of the natural world and so much to lose. (participant observation, 5 September 2019)

A PFP deal promised to quell mounting donor anxiety by offering a strings-attached, results-driven way of ensuring their philanthropic investments in the Route of Parks do not go to waste.

Berkley is a prototypical example of what the architects of Project Finance for Permanence call 'anchor funders' (Redstone Strategy Group, 2011): high-profile donors who play an outsized, catalytic role in a PFP deal, thereby exercising disproportionate power over it. In addition to contributing money, anchor funders lend their connections and credibility to attract contributions from peer donors and buy-in from the stakeholder state. Failure to identify at least one anchor funder before launching a PFP deal is considered a threat to its overall success

(WWF, 2015). In Chile, anchor funders like Berkley and The Pew Charitable Trusts are deeply involved in rolling out *The Route of Parks Fund*. According to one coalition member:

Anchor funders, people who contribute more money [and] have greater decision-making power... aspire to a higher level of control over the design of the [PFP] institution. This is something that is already happening with some anchor funders who are becoming more involved in the project, but it isn't more than that. They are not going to receive any money. (Interview 47, 9 September 2019)

This quote also reveals the primary motivation for pursuing a NFPCF mechanism like the *Route of Parks Fund*. Donors anticipate investment returns not in the form of profit but impact – in this case, on environmental protection in Chilean Patagonia. They watch their dollars transform into durable and measurable policy reforms, which the anchor funders have helped define, and which the state must deliver to receive ongoing payments from the sinking fund. Rather than fitting philanthrocapitalism's core logic of 'investing for impact' (Cohen & Rosenman, 2020) where philanthropic spending is increasingly conditioned by financial returns, Project Finance for Permanence illustrates philanthro-environmentalism's core logic of 'gifting for impact' where philanthropic spending is conditioned by political returns.

Despite its not-for-profit character, Project Finance for Permanence nonetheless projects capitalist rationalities of efficiency, accountability, and quantifiability onto philanthropic interventions and the state-level subjects of these philanthropic interventions. The *Route of Parks Fund*, while not an overtly market-oriented finance mechanism, leverages market ideals to discipline state conservation behavior as more metrics-based and entrepreneurial. Calling the fund a "very tasty carrot," Berkley also explained that it wields a heavy stick: "what the government needs to do is improve park revenues, and through other transfers, the government needs to grow its financial contributions to park operations" (participant observation, 5 September 2019). Furthermore, the *Route of Parks Fund's* dollars for policy approach disciplines traditional philanthropy's longstanding custom of open-ended philanthropy. Berkley, again,

explained:

How can a person who is being asked to donate to this process have some assurance that the money will actually be well-spent and the process will be well-managed? The key to that is to not make this open-ended philanthropy. The key is not to just hand the government and say, go at it, do what you want. The key, instead, is to have standards... And so, that is a way of holding the feet to the fire, as we say in American [sic], of the people who are actually spending the money, to make sure they spend it well. Because if they don't, the way the PFP process works is they don't get their allocation until they clean up their act. And that is not very common in U.S. philanthropy. This is very unusual, but it's a way of, in essence, trying to bring business practices to bear to improve government. (participant observation, 5 September 2019)

In Chile, the *Route of Parks Fund* is being driven by donor anxiety and a core group of anchor funders who aim to maximize the efficacy of donors' contributions so "the capital they invest will have the desired transformative effect" (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2019a). Yet, this begs the question: desired transformative effect for what and whom? Is the PFP deal ultimately about guaranteeing public protection of Chilean Patagonia, or guaranteeing donor confidence through a novel form of strings-attached philanthropy, and can it be both?

4.5 Philanthropy-State Relations in an Age of Biodiversity Crisis

Targeting policymaking as the primary site of philanthropic intervention, Project Finance for Permanence affords philanthro-environmentalists greater control over state conservation governance in the name of more efficiently addressing the biodiversity crisis. According to its architects, "By bringing in a large amount of funding from outside of the conservation region and well beyond that available to local parties, a PFP deal can... draw out new financial resources and commitments [from the state]" (Linden et al., 2012, p. 49), including changes to legal, regulatory, and fiscal regimes. This dollars for policy approach evinces what Mitchell and Sparke (2016) call the incentivization schemes of contemporary 'millennial philanthropy,' using "relatively short-term investments in an attempt to leverage long-term changes in programming" (p. 734). The *Route of Parks Fund* is by any standard a short-term investment, intended to yield politically significant changes to Chile's conservation programming that are not just long-term

but permanent. This represents agenda setting in the extreme: Wall Street's formula for all-or-nothing financial dealmaking is harnessed by philanthro-environmentalists as "a way of holding the [state's] feet to the fire" (participant observation, 5 September 2019). Such agenda setting has several implications for contemporary philanthropy-state relations.

First, it indicates that BIPFs like Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts are becoming more interventionist, both in terms of identifying which socio-environmental issues are 'problems' and prescribing the appropriate solutions that BINGOs and nation-states must implement with their money. Their interventions tend to favor very specific imaginaries of nature and conservation, reflecting the ideological and aesthetic preferences of philanthro-environmentalism. Describing why The Pew Charitable Trusts is working in Chilean Patagonia, one senior staffer said, we "decided a while ago to try to conserve relatively untouched, large spaces on the planet in the face of increasing biodiversity loss and erosion of natural heritage and one of these is [Chilean] Patagonia" (Interview 49, September 2019). Recent efforts to protect the region have mainly been driven by BIPFs, as one CONAF employee noted:

A certain level of international attention has managed to permeate the country's political authorities. If it had been up to us, from a technical perspective, [the Route of Parks] might not have been the best area in which to work. However, given the interest that exists there, from private financiers who contribute money, well, we have to capitalize on that interest. (Interview 46, 6 September 2019)

PPF is quickly becoming a best-practice intervention in part because it exemplifies 'fast policy' (Peck & Theodore, 2015): a mobile, out-of-the-box solution that can be rolled out globally and tailored to fit any number of local contexts. Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts embrace it for these reasons, arguing that it dares to contemplate what governments, BINGOs, and conservationists often do not: "the cold, hard possibilities for funding and protecting wildlands permanently" (participant observation, 5 September 2019). This has consequences for how modern conservation governance is conceptualized. Scholars have long

drawn an analytical distinction between BIPFs and BINGOs, taking for granted that BINGOs engage in on the ground, place-based projects and political advocacy while BIPFs simply cut the checks. The Chilean case troubles that distinction, showing how BIPFs themselves are starting to direct conservation projects and political advocacy, colonizing a space long dominated by BINGOs.

Second, the particular nature of agenda setting in both the Route of Parks project and *Route of Parks Fund* indicates a more profound attempt at philanthropic statecraft. These philanthro-environmentalists are not only influencing state policy, they are also privately producing public goods on the state's behalf. The Tompkins spent decades cultivating private conservation projects in Chilean Patagonia in the style of U.S. national parks, promising to one day deed these projects to the public domain. Their promise was fulfilled in 2017 when Tompkins Conservation made its historic donation and proposed the Route of Parks as a way of modeling a post-donation conservation standard to the state. The *Route of Parks Fund* gives teeth to this standard by leveraging philanthropic capital to reconfigure and rescale state conservation behavior through transnational stakeholder governance. Describing the purpose of the fund, a senior staffer at Tompkins Conservation said, "as you strengthen the parks, the state begins to get better and better. That's the idea" (Interview 58, 17 October 2019). This kind of philanthropic statecraft equates stronger parks with a stronger Chilean state, seeking to build capacity through gift conditionality much like how monetary lending seeks to build capacity through aid conditionality. Gift conditionality vests these philanthro-environmentalists with disproportionate authority to determine the purpose and objectives of state-owned protected areas as public goods, not least because the gift itself is a public good they made possible.²⁸ As with aid conditionality,

²⁸ In addition to the PFP deal, Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts continue to influence how conservation in Chilean Patagonia is managed as a public good through a series of partnerships with government

gift conditionality (re)inscribes uneven and neocolonial relations of power between BIPFs headquartered in the global North, governments in the global South, and their broader publics. Philanthropy-state relations thereby come to resemble creditor-state relations; the Chilean state engages these BIPFs as it would other international actors offering financial investment in exchange for governing concessions and structural reforms.

Third, philanthropic statecraft and agenda setting are yielding mixed results in Chile. Conservation and the biodiversity crisis are largely absent from the policy platforms of the country's major political parties, and from the legislative priorities of Congress and the Executive. The PFP deal compels the Chilean state apparatus to act on these, however, in ways it otherwise would not: increasing fiscal appropriations to SNASPE, ensuring park revenues stay in the parks, expanding parks personnel, and mandating biodiversity management plans in each national park. Local activists, scientists, and even some bureaucrats have long demanded such actions, yet a chronic lack of political will has created a governance vacuum that a transnational network of philanthro-environmentalists is now eager to fill. That this transnational network is compelling state action on its own, mostly from outside the body politic, is redolent of Harrison's (2004) concept of 'governance states' and his claim that a global set of external actors compete with state authorities along a sovereign frontier to influence national policymaking. While philanthropic statecraft and agenda setting may well yield positive results for conservation in Chile, the end does not justify the means. Philanthro-environmentalists' logic of gifting for impact is ultimately a logic of gifting for political power premised on the privilege of wealth and

ministries. For example, Tompkins Conservation assists CONAF with training park staff, concessioning park services, and running a species rewilding program (Aravena, 2018; Interview 46, 6 September 2019). Additionally, the Foundation retains use-rights to the Tompkins' former private residence and airstrip in Patagonia National Park for the next 30 years to host fundraising events and attract new transnational philanthropic support for CONAF (CONAF & Fundación Yendegaia, 2018a).

the circumvention of established channels of the national democratic process to deliver transformative policy reforms. In this way, the PFP deal sets a dubious precedent for modeling how philanthropic actors can expect to engage the state on conservation and perhaps other issues moving forward.

4.6 Conclusion

The Route of Parks of Chilean Patagonia draws attention to the public-private conservation partnerships aimed at addressing global biodiversity loss, and the rising prominence of BIPFs in these partnerships. Yet, as philanthropy comes to play a more prominent role in bankrolling biodiversity protection, this case also suggests that bankrolling is no longer enough for some donors. Philanthro-environmentalists increasingly seek to get their hands on the state apparatus itself, leveraging their money and influence to exact structural changes in the political register. This is a different objective than those emphasized in the philanthrocapitalism literature, but it reflects a growing trend of donors positioning themselves as policy activists (Callahan, 2017). A variety of philanthrocapitalism, philanthro-environmentalism asserts the necessity of deploying philanthropic capital to solve the governance failures associated with public conservation. It targets the state apparatus from the top-down, mixing the traditional donation model with Wall Street strategies that grant donors more control over the impact of their gifts. In Chile, Tompkins Conservation, The Pew Charitable Trusts, and other philanthro-environmentalists are using Project Finance for Permanence and its dollars for policy approach to secure full and permanent protection of the Route of Parks. An example of elite-led ‘solutionism,’ dollars-for-policy philanthropy is a novel and exaggerated form of strings-attached philanthropy that baldly privileges transnational donor power in state environmental decision-making. The uneven and neocolonial political dynamics of this, however, raise serious questions about the limits and

implications of solving public environmental problems with philanthropic capital.

Project Finance for Permanence subverts typical expectations of a FPCF mechanism and is therefore more appropriately understood as a mechanism of NFPCF. Chile's *Route of Parks Fund* provides a clear example of how NFPCF operates in practice. Neither the *Route of Parks Fund* nor its donors have profit-oriented ambitions. Instead, they are motivated by extra-economic ambitions like the desire to affect policy, hold political leaders accountable, and solve complex socio-environmental problems more efficiently. These are consistent with a logic of 'gifting for impact,' where a certain set of material results are expected from a donation even if financial gain is not. Nevertheless, the use of financial language to describe the *Route of Parks Fund* is highly intentional. Donations, while not technically investments, are treated as such to discipline state conservation behavior as more metrics-based and entrepreneurial, and philanthropic intervention is structured as a 'deal' whose all-or-nothing closing maximizes each donor's leverage over it (Linden et al., 2012). Ultimately, an imperative of return-on-investment manifests in the *Route of Parks Fund* through leverage. Philanthropic capital is always yoked to more-than-financial powers of discourse, ideology, subject formation, and morality; PFP leverages this capital to impose philanthro-environmentalists' more-than-financial powers onto the public domain. Project Finance for Permanence, and NFPCF more broadly, serve to clarify that conservation finance encompasses much more than the private, for-profit projects that have so far dominated scholarly analysis. Attending to other varieties of conservation finance – philanthropic, state-based, or hybrid – and the myriad ways in which the public, private, and third sectors articulate with one another through these varieties to confront the accelerating biodiversity crisis is an important task for future critical-geographical research.

CHAPTER 5: (Conclusion) Whither Conservation-as-Development?

In mid-September 2022, Yvon Chouinard, founder of Patagonia Inc., announced the latest in a long line of unorthodox business decisions: he was retiring at the age of 83, and instead of selling the \$3-billion company or taking it public, he decided to give it away. Ownership had been transferred to a trust and a non-profit organization “created to preserve the company’s independence and ensure that all of its profits – some \$100 million a year – are used to combat climate change and protect undeveloped land around the globe” (Gelles, 2022). For Chouinard, it was the only tenable option. Selling would have provided plenty of cash to finance favored causes, but it would not have guaranteed that the new owner maintain the company’s signature values or keep everyone employed. Taking it public would have subjected the company to the volatility of the stock market, not to mention the whims of shareholders. By giving the company away, he declared in an open letter posted to Patagonia’s website, “Earth is our only shareholder now” (Chouinard, 2022).

With this announcement, Chouinard joins his late friend Douglas Tompkins in committing an enormous personal fortune to help ‘save the planet.’ At the same time, the announcement draws public attention to the core themes of this dissertation: the contradictions of conservation and development under capitalism, and the ascending political power of environmental philanthropy. The actions of Chouinard, Tompkins, and other like-minded donors are fueling a growing discourse that coupling large-scale conservation with large-scale giving is indispensable to solving the biodiversity crisis. But is it? What would this mean, and how would this function in practice? My research has attempted to wrestle with such questions by thinking through one mega conservation initiative in Chile, interrogating the implications of mobilizing philanthropic capital and donor decision-making in state environmental governance.

Summary of Research Findings

This dissertation studies contemporary conservation and development programming, examining how it is rendered through processes of state environment-making that are increasingly influenced by transnational philanthropic elites. A PPP between the Chilean state and the U.S.-based philanthropic foundations Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts has yielded two linked projects, the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks, that together protect nearly 30 million acres of land in Chilean Patagonia. Through a logic of conservation-as-development, the projects disrupt a longstanding assumption among Chilean political and business elites that conservation and development can only exist in a zero-sum tradeoff. The projects also purport to transform Chilean Patagonia from a regional rangelands economy into an international conservation economy.

Utilizing a qualitative methodology informed by the distended case approach (Peck and Theodore, 2012), I argue that conservation-as-development in Chile is shaped by the participation and policy solutionism of a transnational network of *philanthro-environmentalists*, linked to a state apparatus now willing to substitute conservation for extraction as the master development plan in Chilean Patagonia – so long as it pays dividends. Yet, the Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects are still largely predicated on the commodity and financial strategies of extractive capitalism, and reflect the changing nature of philanthropy-state relations where high-profile donors seek to translate their wealth power into political power via measurable governance reforms. My research findings support this argument in three ways.

My analysis shows, first, that Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts attracted state buy-in for the PPP by conjuring a *conservation resource spectacle*. Chapter 2 explores how *big philanthropy* sold *big conservation* to policymakers as an inevitable success,

likening national parks to Chile's other resource endowments like copper or fish. Through the same resource-making techniques that define extractivism – resource legibility, resource potentiality, and resource futurity – the value and investability of national parks were made legible and consumible. These resource-making techniques establish perverse incentives for environmental protection, however: treating national parks as economic assets for the sake of furthering conservation and development in Chilean Patagonia will inevitably subject local landscapes and communities to deeper levels of market mediation and market rule. This risks undermining the very conservation and development successes that *big philanthropy* is selling.

Second, I find that state environment-making is constituted by, and constitutive of, both capital accumulation and political legitimation. Examining the creation of the Network of National Parks project, Chapter 3 analyses the administrative powers of Chile's Council of Ministers for Sustainability (CMS), and the intra-state disputes about the project's scope that ultimately ceded conservation territory in two national parks to the mining and salmon aquaculture industries. I argue that these disputes highlight fundamental cracks in the CMS power bloc, which produced particular practices and outcomes of *environmental strategic selectivity*. The balance of political class forces within the CMS pursued the interests of accumulation (development) over legitimation (conservation) when and where those interests existed – in Kawésqar and Patagonia National Parks – leveraging the power and authority of the state apparatus to justify this.

Third, I investigate the role of philanthropic capital in securing the permanence of this conservation PPP. Chapter 4 traces how *philanthro-environmentalists* are deploying a novel, not-for-profit conservation finance mechanism, Project Finance for Permanence, to exact from the state political and fiscal guarantees for the Route of Parks project. This involves what I call a

dollars for policy approach: targeting state policymaking in order to gain greater philanthropic control over public conservation governance. My analysis suggests that *big philanthropy* is becoming more interventionist, identifying which socio-environmental issues are ‘problems’ and how best to solve them. It also suggests that *big philanthropy* is performing a kind of philanthropic statecraft in Chile, seeking to build development capacity through gift conditionality in ways that are reminiscent of how the Bretton Woods institutions sought to build development capacity across the global South through aid conditionality. The uneven and neocolonial dynamics of Project Finance for Permanence raise serious questions about the limits and effects of solving public environmental problems with philanthropic capital.

As nation-states the world over contend with how best to confront the climate and biodiversity crises and summon more sustainable paradigms, these research findings are instructive. Chile, a country that defies easy categorization within the global North-South binary, is under enormous pressure to reimagine its position as an export-oriented commodities producer in a global economy undergoing rapid green transition. Conservation-as-development promises one alternative. Yet, the Chilean state’s approach to conservation-as-development remains constrained by underlying legal, regulatory, and fiscal structures that have shaped the country’s development trajectory since the Spanish colonial period and continue to do so today. These structures define the limits of possibility for state environment-making. Chile’s pursuit of extractivism is thus as much about the generational choices and investments of its ruling elites as it is about the powerful global discourses and macroeconomic forces that still reify resource exploitation as its national comparative advantage and preferred trade specialization (cf. Sheppard, 2005).

A key claim underwriting this conservation PPP, and the role of private and philanthropic

capital in conservation more generally, is that the root problem is a lack of cash; biodiversity loss could be solved simply “by throwing money into a pit until it is full” (Bigger et al., 2021, p. 89). The root problem, of course, is not cash but extractivism, reinforced by longstanding colonial-capitalist logics that treat nature like a cash machine. The Network of National Parks and Route of Parks projects are not materially extractive *per se*, yet they also treat nature like a cash machine. National parks are marketed as “a cold, hard asset,” yielding income streams to the state and private concessionaires from the capture of ground rent. As such, the projects mimic and reproduce the same (colonial-capitalist) rentier logics that characterize extractivism, even as they represent Chile’s most ambitious act of environmental protection to date. This should prompt a critical reflection about the appeal and feasibility of conservation-as-development as a green transition alternative. So long as conservation and development programming mirrors resource extractivism in these key ways it will be subject to similar ills. It is therefore difficult to imagine how a conservation PPP endorsing *extractivism without extraction* will deliver transformational change, in Chile or anywhere.

Contributions to the Literature

In exploring what a conservation PPP is and what it means for the Chilean state, Chilean society, and environmental philanthropy more broadly, this dissertation engages with debates in geography and related social science disciplines on resource-making, state-nature relations, and changing power geometries in conservation governance and conservation finance. It also interrogates the wide-ranging research on integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), making a novel intervention by studying the role of state and philanthropic actors in project design and implementation. Emerging from these engagements are several scholarly contributions.

The dissertation extends current conceptualizations of resource spectacle from nature exploitation to nature protection. Critical resource geographers identify spectacle as one among many resource-making techniques deployed to attract large, up-front investments into capital-intensive extractive projects from private actors, before the success of those projects can be measured. My research demonstrates that non-extractive projects like ICDPs also rely on large, up-front investments before their success can be measured: *big philanthropy* conjures a *conservation resource spectacle* to attract public spending for *big conservation*. Thus, extractive projects and ICDPs both require stakeholder buy-in and both sell success as a means to secure financing. Igoe's (2017) 'nature of spectacle' thesis contends that spectacle transforms protected nature into consumable commodities. My conceptualization of *conservation resource spectacle* clarifies that such transformations are facilitated by the same resource-making techniques used to exploit nature. This underscores a key finding in the political ecology literature regarding the growing convergence between conservation and extraction (Büscher et al., 2022; Enns et al., 2019; Le Billon, 2021).

The dissertation also contributes to recent efforts within geography to environmentalize capitalist state theory, showing how the double imperative of accumulation-legitimation also shapes state environment-making practices. Drawing on Bob Jessop's strategic relational approach, I develop the concept of *environmental strategic selectivity* to explain how and why the modern state "makes" environments: through uneven and sometimes contradictory actions reflecting the balance of power between competing social forces at any given conjuncture. This always-changing power balance tends to favor some political strategies and interests over others, and is produced at different levels of the state apparatus by different configurations of social forces in struggle – themselves responding to both human and non-human influences. In Chile,

the state exercises *environmental strategic selectivity* to reconcile its accumulation and legitimation functions, producing some environments for development and others for conservation. These environments are spatially co-produced and co-constitutive, existing in a relationship which I describe as the *dialectic of development and conservation*. This builds on Parenti's (2015) analysis of environment-making by linking the capitalist state's production of nature and space to its contradictory interests to both exploit and protect its territorialized environment.

Lastly, the dissertation broadens existing understandings of philanthrocapitalism and the financialization of conservation by identifying an emerging category of conservation finance: *philanthropic conservation finance*. Chile's Route of Parks project draws attention to the rise of conservation PPPs and, in particular, the growing prominence of philanthropists in these partnerships. As philanthropists come to play a greater role in bankrolling biodiversity, my research shows that for some donors bankrolling is no longer enough. *Philanthro-environmentalists* increasingly seek to get their hands on the state apparatus itself, leveraging their money and influence to compel policy reforms through an exaggerated form of strings-attached philanthropy that I call *dollars-for-policy*. In Chile, a transnational network of donors is using a novel philanthropic conservation finance mechanism known as Project Finance for Permanence to exact permanent fiscal and policy commitments from the state for the Route of Parks in exchange for short-term funding. Rather than exhibiting philanthrocapitalism's core logic of "investing for impact" (Cohen and Rosenman, 2020), where philanthropic spending is conditioned by financial returns, this illustrates philanthro-environmentalism's core logic of "gifting for impact," where philanthropic spending is conditioned by political returns. *Dollars-for-policy* philanthropy and Project Finance for Permanence help decenter the literature's current

fixation on private, for-profit conservation finance by highlighting the merits and importance of studying other varieties of conservation finance – philanthropic, state-based, or hybrid.

The larger implication of these scholarly contributions is that conservation PPPs featuring environmental philanthropy contain a fundamental flaw: they are modeled on charity instead of justice. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2020) argues, philanthropy “is the private allocation of stolen social wages.” That is, philanthropy is born from the structural inequalities of capitalism, then redistributed to address a fraction of those inequalities while ignoring or resisting calls to reorder the structure of capitalism toward more just ends. For environmental justice movements around the world, philanthropists’ involvement in large-scale conservation and development programming raises important questions not just about distributional justice (who wins and loses), but also procedural justice (who gets to decide) (Schlosberg, 2004).

Directions for Future Research

This dissertation traces how Tompkins Conservation and The Pew Charitable Trusts shape the uptake and roll-out of conservation-as-development in Chile. As such, it makes the case for taking seriously the role of philanthropists as environmental governance actors. Several recent pieces have made a similar case (Betsill et al., 2021; Blackwatters et al., 2022; Gruby et al., 2021), yet there remains a clear need for additional research on the increasing influence of powerful foundations and individual donors on environmental programming and policymaking at the local, national, and global scales. Likewise, there is a clear need for critical development scholars to study philanthropy’s claims of policy expertise on a range of sustainable development issues, including planetary health and climate change.

This dissertation also advances a political-economic agenda for studying conservation, development, and state environment-making relationally. I will continue to develop this agenda

in my future research, beginning with a new project that investigates the political economy of biodiversity (loss) in Chile. This will center the role of public finance in the relation between biodiversity and extraction, interrogating a process I call ‘ecologies of public finance’: how the modern capitalist state produces nature through its fiscal regime, simultaneously funding biodiversity conservation and subsidizing biodiversity loss across geographical scales. As a spatialized political authority and the territorial ‘place’ of nature, the state acts as both the guardian and vendor of public goods like biodiversity and natural resources. Analyzing its fiscal practices can reveal how and why tax revenues are funneled to support environmental protection on the one hand, as other fiscal investments are funneled to subsidize extraction on the other. Tensions between these are especially stark in resource-dependent countries like Chile, whose economies are based on the primary production sectors driving biodiversity loss.

A growing number of policymakers and private investors now frame biodiversity loss as a finance problem, warning that the so-called ‘biodiversity financing gap’ – the difference between the total cost of sustainably managing biodiversity and the actual amount spent by national governments and other sources – exceeds \$500 billion annually. They present profit-oriented finance capital as key to closing this gap, especially in the Global South. Yet, portrayal of private investment as the singular solution belies the fact that global spending on biodiversity conservation still overwhelmingly derives from public investment. At the same time, states spend five to six times more on subsidies and incentives for extractive industrial activities that degrade biodiversity. Thus, the assumption that big, public money does not exist is flawed – big, public money *does* exist but is often routed in ways that contribute to biodiversity loss directly or indirectly.

This new research proposes to move beyond dominant narratives of the biodiversity

financing gap, looking at the underlying causes and drivers of the biodiversity crisis. Following Bigger et al. (2021), I argue that ‘gap talk’ is insufficient. We ought to ask not just how the financing gap could be closed but also why a financing gap exists at all, who and what has contributed to it historically, and why it continues to widen. This requires attending to the broader political-economic processes that structure nature-society relations under capitalism. Political-economic analysis reveals the fundamentally social character of the biodiversity crisis, its deep roots in colonialism and extractivism, and the crucial mediating role of the state. My study of ecologies of public finance will thusly be informed by a theoretical framework bridging literatures on the geographical political economy of nature and conservation finance with emerging work on fiscal geographies.

Scholarship on the geographical political economy of nature demonstrates how capitalism is a thoroughly spatial and environmental project, refuting neoclassical assumptions of an economy that is somehow separate from the biophysical processes powering commodity production and social metabolism (Sheppard, 2016; Werner, 2021). Far from being a tabula rasa upon which economic forces freely act, nature “talks back” (Robbins, 2008, p. 209) through its complex and often uncooperative materiality (Bakker, 2004; Bumpus, 2011). Along with materiality, scholars foreground scale, geography, and social difference in understanding the commodification, marketization, and financialization of nature (Asiyanbi, 2018; Johnson, 2014). My research will push these insights in new directions by theorizing a geographical political economy of biodiversity (loss). I will consider how the capitalist project degrades biological diversity as an ‘absolute general law’ (Foster, 1992) through spatial processes of uneven geographical development (Harvey, 2006; Smith, 2008) and ecologically unequal exchange (Hornborg, 1998). Exploring what Coronil (1997) calls the ‘international division of nature,’ I

will trace the global political-economic forces (e.g. trade and extractivism) and domestic state practices (e.g. environmental regulation and the law) that systematically devalue Chile's biodiversity and natural resources as 'cheap' (Moore, 2015) and therefore degradable (Collard & Dempsey, 2017), while examining the implications for cross-scalar social and environmental (in)justice.

Although conservation finance connotes the raising of capital in general – public, private, or philanthropic – the geographical literature emphasizes the raising of profit-oriented private capital in conservation projects from investors, banks, and other financial intermediaries. Dempsey and Bigger (2019) call this 'for-profit conservation finance' (FPCF). FPCF involves converting protected nature into capitalized, tradable assets through market-based instruments. Scholars differ on whether and how FPCF is generating financial returns. While some frame conservation as a spectacular frontier for private capital (Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Sullivan, 2013), others note the spectacular failure of private capital to deliver on its promises and the halting global rollout of FPCF to date (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014; Dempsey & Suarez, 2016). Still others argue that FPCF's actually existing returns derive from activities that are neither strictly conservation nor necessarily financial (Kay, 2018; Silver & Campbell, 2018). Yet, this literature largely ignores the overriding role of public capital in conservation finance. There remains a pressing need to scrutinize the effects of public finance mechanisms on biodiversity outcomes, including how they can undercut the conservation gains achieved through public and private efforts alike.

By contrast, new work on fiscal geographies seeks to de-fetishize private finance by highlighting the role of public finance and monetary policy in shaping financial markets (August et al., in press; Kay & Tapp, 2021; Whiteside, 2021). It explores how government tax and

budgetary systems “produce distinctive geographies and modes of accumulation, allowing certain forms of financialization and investment while disincentivizing others” (Tapp & Kay, 2019, p. 574). States also set the conditions of possibility for financial accumulation through their tax codes – many of which either legally sanction or fail to sufficiently regulate tax evasion and avoidance (Aalbers, 2018). Scholars have only begun to question how fiscal geographies articulate with environmental governance (cf. Reyes, 2020), though Bigger et al. (2021) make important points about the cumulative effects of “inadequate tax regimes” (p. 30) on public budgets for implementing policies like the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. I will extend this incipient line of questioning to biodiversity governance in Chile, analyzing how state finance and fiscal policy – harmful subsidies, industrial policy, fiscal austerity, public debt, and low corporate tax rates – shape biodiversity loss. This also responds to a call from Dempsey et al. (2020) for ‘subsidy accountability’: country-specific analyses of what subsidies flow where, who benefits, and at what cost.

Given the state of current knowledge and the rapidly evolving nature of these literatures, this project is poised to make timely and meaningful contributions. It will integrate qualitative methods with geospatial analysis to trace the state logics, institutional practices, and fiscal investments governing the state’s approach to biodiversity (loss), awhile also examining how flows of public finance for conservation and extractive industry shape biodiversity outcomes over time and space. In many ways, this new research will be informed by and build on the main findings of my doctoral research. It will also extend a recurring theme in my fieldwork data that could not be directly addressed in the dissertation: fiscal policy in Chile deeply constrains conservation policy. Leveraging this theme, the project will pivot to new but related empirical terrain and engage with a different set of scholarly debates to conceptualize the relation between

biodiversity (loss) and the capitalist state through an ‘ecologies of public finance’ lens.

Coda

In his new documentary *My Imaginary Country*, Chilean filmmaker Patricio Guzmán argues that the social explosion (*el estallido social*) beginning in 2019 was fundamentally a feminist movement (Scott, 2022). Having lived through its earliest months while conducting this doctoral research, I would add that the social explosion was also fundamentally an environmental movement. As I argued in the Introduction, it erupted in reaction to the rapaciousness and indignities of the neoliberal development model – piloted for the first time in Chile a half-century ago. Such struggles against runaway capitalism, executed through what Routledge and Cumbers (2009) call ‘global justice networks,’ often seek to foreground the subjects and objects that capital routinely relegates to the “raggedy edges” (Sheppard, 2016) of the economy: women and non-human nature, among others.

Emerging from this particular struggle was an historic, year-long process to rewrite Chile’s Constitution. Voters mandated that the 155-member Constituent Convention would be composed entirely of laypeople, rather than politicians, while also mandating gender parity and seats for Indigenous peoples. An Indigenous Mapuche woman was elected President of the Convention. The final draft Constitution ran 170 pages and contained 388 articles enshrining rights for nature and animals, as well extending human rights to everything from healthcare, housing, and education, to internet access, sanitation, clean air, and water. It proposed what would have been “one of the world’s most expansive and transformational national charters” (Nicas, 2022). On September 4, 2022, however, it was roundly rejected by 62% of the voting-age population (voting was mandatory). The defeat of the draft Constitution voids the work of the Constituent Convention; it also leaves in force the 1980 Constitution written by General

Pinochet's military junta. In many ways, studying conservation, development, and state environment-making in Chile begins and ends with this document. Each is profoundly defined by it and will be so long as it endures.

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