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POLITICAL SELECTION IN LOCAL ELECTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM RURAL UGANDA

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Abstract

Political selection is crucial to the quality of governance. Yet our general knowledge of the individual characteristics that correlate with the political selection process is scant. Our paper contributes to this knowledge gap by collecting detailed data on the quality, perceptions, attitudes, and promises of all candidates involved in a recent local election in rural Uganda. Our context is unique - with two separate governing bodies for males and females. The paper demonstrates, that male and female political selection into these two parallel institutions share important similarities but also differ along several dimensions.

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1. Introduction

Political selection can be crucial to the quality of governance. Yet our general knowledge of the individual characteristics that determine who becomes a politician remains scant - primarily due to data limitations. Dal Bo and Finan (2018) emphasize how the quality of political candidates is typically measured by a few objective characteristics – aside from demographics (like age and gender), quality is usually measured by education, pre-office income levels and type of occupation. Even more challenging to capture are determinants of “valence” (Stokes 1963): attributes that the electorate care about beyond a candidate’s stated policy platform. Added to this, typically we do not have data on the unelected political candidates, or those who decided not to re-run for election (Dal Bo et al. 2017).

Our paper contributes to this knowledge gap by collecting detailed data on the quality, perceptions, attitudes, and promises of all candidates involved in a recent local election in rural Uganda. Our unique setting allows us to estimate which characteristics determine three different stages of the political selection process: (i) Who decides to become a politician?; (ii) Who decides to re-run for election?; and (iii) Who is elected?.

The context is unusual in that there are two elected governing local-bodies: one ruled by men and the other by women. We can follow the political selection into both of these institutions. Though relatively uncommon today, this type of dual-political system does have historical roots across many ethnic groups in Africa. The well-known position of the *Queen Mother* was prevalent among several pre-colonial monarchies (Lebeuf 1960, Coillard 1971, Kuper 1947, Signe 2011). The Queen Mothers had parallel leadership roles to men, with their own courts and councils. There are also, well known examples of a “dual sex political system”, such as the Igbo and Yoruba of Nigeria (Steady 2011). In this system, each sex managed its own affairs, had its own kinship institutions, age grades, and secret and title societies (Hafkin and Bay 1976, Okonjo 1976, Awe 1977).

In our context, these two separate governing bodies are a formal part of the decentralized system of local government. The paper demonstrates, that male and female political selection into these two parallel institutions share important similarities but also differ along several dimensions. In what follows, we begin with more details on the context in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data collection procedure and the empirical strategy. The estimation results are described in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2. Background and Context

2.1 Governance

Like many African countries, Uganda's immediate post-independence regime was a vibrant multiparty system, which unfortunately collapsed into a one-party state just after five years. Idi Amin's military coup in the 1970s led Ugandans to nine years of brutal dictatorship, sustained by military governors in almost all state positions. Under Amin's regime, the order of the day was suppression of free political expression, brutal murder of suspected political opponents and instilling fear amongst the population. People's rights were abused with impunity. In the early 1980s, the country suffered a guerrilla war fought by the National Resistance Movement (NRM), spearheaded by Yoweri Museveni, who remains the president of the country to this day.

Under Museveni's presidency, Uganda has experienced relative stability and economic growth. His presidency has been marred, however, by involvement in wars, civil conflicts, the suppression of political opposition and constitutional amendments scrapping presidential term and age limits, thus enabling the extension of his rule.

Museveni's capture of state power in 1986 ushered in the "no-party system". This limitation of political pluralism ended in 2005 with a referendum which legalized the existence of political parties and freed their activities. Still in 2016, Transparency International has rated Uganda as the 151st worst out of 176 countries in terms of government corruption.

Despite the political corruption associated with the federal government, the Ugandan decentralisation reform initiated in 1992 is exceptional among developing countries in terms of the scale and scope of the transfer of power and responsibilities to the local level. Since it came to power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, under the leadership of President Museveni, has been strongly committed to decentralisation. Local councils (called "resistance councils" at that time) played an important role for the NRM during and after its guerrilla warfare in the first half of the 1980s. These councils were meant to resist the incumbent government before the NRM came to power and to maintain social order and peace as well as secure democracy thereafter. Decentralised governance represented part of the political strategy of the new regime to install a new and revolutionary concept of democracy: a democracy that is participatory, grass-roots based, and popular.

The local government system is formed by a five-tier pyramidal structure, which consists of the village (LC1), parish (LC2), sub-county (LC3), county (LC4), and district (LC5) in rural areas. The political organ at all local levels is the council, whose members are elected in regular elections. Councillors either represent specific electoral areas or interest groups, namely women, youth, and disabled persons.

The context of our study is the village level (LC1), where there are two relevant local governing bodies. The first is the Village Executive Committee (VEC), whose leadership comprises the democratically elected chairperson (LCI chairperson) and ten other executive committee members.⁴ The second is the Village Women's Council (VWC), which is led by the democratically elected chairperson (who also serves as the Secretary for Women on the VEC) and four other female members: Vice Chairperson; Secretary; Publicity Secretary; Secretary for Finance.

There is an additional third institution: the Village Local Court (VLC). These courts are run by the members of the VEC. The Chairperson of the VLC is the elected chairperson of the VEC. The Vice-Chairperson of the VLC is a female member of the VEC. A quorum, required to hear a given court case, consists of five members from the VEC, whereby two must be women. The legal jurisdiction of the VLCs includes most non-criminal activities such as: debts; contracts; assaults or battery; conversion; damage to property; trespass; civil disputes; and the enforcement of customary law.

2.2 Elections

Regular elections have occurred at the district, county, and sub-county levels (LC3, LC4, and LC5) with relatively high voter turnout. At the more local level, i.e., the village and parish (LC1 and LC2), there have been no formal elections since 2002. That is, since the multiparty political system was put into place in 2005. New elections were scheduled for the first time, under the multiparty political system, in July 2018. These recent elections provided us with a unique opportunity to explore political selection in the context of introducing democratic multiparty local-level elections. While elections at the higher levels are conducted by

⁴ These include: Vice Chairperson (also Secretary for Children Welfare); General Secretary; Secretary for Information, Education and Mobilization; Secretary for Security; Secretary for Finance; Secretary for production and environmental protection; Secretary for Youths; Secretary for Women (also the Public Health Coordinator); Secretary for Persons with Disabilities Affairs; Secretary for the Council of Older Persons.

secret ballot, these recent local elections (LC1 and LC2) took place by lining up behind the candidate of choice. This voting procedure was introduced in 2014, when the Parliament passed *The Local Government Amendment Bill*. This election procedure is unusual by not unheard of in rural Africa. Referred to as *Mlolongo*, it originated in Kenya and has been used for several local elections in the Sudan.

To the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic research on this voting process. To understand better this procedure, on the election day of July 10, 2018, we collected observational data from a subset of 50 study villages. Field surveyors filled in a questionnaire primarily through observation. The collected data documented how the voting-by-lining procedure took place within each village. Whether the formal monitoring process and proper procedures were followed. Field surveyors collected information on how voters seem to express their preferences. They documented, for example, if there were any particular voting patterns by gender or ethnicity. We were interested to find out how candidates interacted with voters and whether women and men were treated equally. The tables below summarize the data collected from this observational study.

	Mean	S.D.
Election Officer Present	0.920	(0.274)
Party Officials Present	0.180	(0.388)
Police Officer Present	0.280	(0.454)
Voters' ID Verified	1.000	(0.000)
Verified by ID Card	0.525	(0.506)
Voting by lining up on time	0.324	(0.475)
Delay time (minutes)	43.400	(43.777)
Officer counted votes carefully	0.919	(0.277)
Officer signed summary form	0.878	(0.331)
Officer declared. election	0.920	(0.274)
Winner got most votes	0.973	(0.164)
Election fair	0.865	(0.347)
Winner nominated VEC members	1.000	(0.000)
Vote approved by show of hands	0.312	(0.468)
Vote approved by shouting loudest	0.604	(0.494)
Discussion around nominations	0.792	(0.410)

Table 1: Election Day Survey – Procedural Measures

Table 1 describes our enumerators reports on procedural measures followed on the election day. We see that, in general, the formalities were followed. In that, an election officer was almost always present and Voter IDs were verified. The average time delay, relative to the official start-time of the election was less than an hour (roughly 45 minutes). At the end of the election, votes were counted correctly and in almost all instances the winner was selected accordingly. Following the rules, the elected winner then nominated other members of the VEC, and their candidacy was discussed by the villagers and voted upon, either by a show of hands or by shouting the loudest.

	Mean	S.D.
Voters argue with voters	0.351	(0.484)
Voters forced to vote for candidates	0.000	(0.000)
Female voters abused	0.054	(0.229)
Female candidates abused	0.000	(0.000)
Election violence	0.216	(0.584)
Voters wait for others to line up	0.297	(0.463)
Voters call out to voters to line up	0.135	(0.347)
Voters Switched Lines	0.216	(0.417)
Candidates Called out to Voters	0.027	(0.164)
Candidates Argued with each other	0.054	(0.229)
Candidates Argued with Voters	0.108	(0.315)
Candidates Intimidated Voters	0.000	(0.000)

Table 2: Election Day Survey – Participant Interactions

Table 2 reports instead on the interactions across election participants. We see that there were indeed communications between candidates and voters but that it did not appear to be highly antagonistic. In only 10% of villages, did the enumerators report that candidates argued with voters and in no villages did it appear that candidates intentionally intimidated voters. On the other hand, in 35% of villages, voters argued with each other and some form violence around the elections erupted in 22% of villages.

Voters were also surveyed regarding their perceptions of the election. Table 3 reports our findings. We see that, although a majority (60%) prefer the secret ballot method compared to the lining-up method, they still felt free to vote for their preferred candidate. That said, they did worry that candidates knew who they voted for, and close to 25% of voters reported that they experienced problems after the election because of their vote. Voters also reported that villagers who did not vote, were likely avoiding the lining-up method.

	Mean	S.D.
Free to vote for preferred candidate	0.92	0.28
Choice affected by other voters	0.10	0.30
Properly informed about procedures	0.98	0.15
Election officer treated voters equally	0.95	0.23
Prefer Secret Ballot	0.60	0.49
Worried Candidates knew who voted for	0.36	0.48
Worried Political Party knew who voted for	0.06	0.23
Worried – Villagers voting for other Party know	0.06	0.23
Worried – Villagers from different tribe know	0.07	0.26
Worried – Villagers from different religion know	0.04	0.20
Worried – Relatives know	0.09	0.29
Problems after election because of vote	0.24	0.73
Voters did not vote because of lining up	0.70	0.46
People Vote by Ethnicity	0.16	0.36
People Vote for Political Party	0.26	0.44
People Vote by Religion	0.07	0.25

Table 3: Voter Perceptions

3. Empirical Strategy

Our goal in this paper is to identify key individual-level characteristics which correlate with different stages of the political selection process in our novel context. Our main empirical strategy is to estimate a series of regressions where the outcome variable is a set of individual-level characteristics and our key explanatory variables reflect the different stages of political selection. In particular, we estimate three sets of regressions, all characterized by the following equation.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta Z_i + \gamma X_i + \theta + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

Where Y_i denotes a set of individual-level candidate characteristics and X_i is a vector of individual-level control variables. The term θ represents a district-level fixed effect and ε_i is the regression disturbance term clustered at the sub-county level.

Who becomes a politician?

In our first specification, we compare outcomes across politicians and our sample of village members. In this case, $Z_i=1$ in equation (1) if an individual is contesting a chairperson position in the current election or was previously chairperson of either the VEC or VWC; $Z_i=0$ if an individual in our sample has never been or

wants to be on the VEC or VWC. We estimate (1) separately for males and females. Thus we are comparing male candidates for the chairperson position of the VEC with male villagers in one specification; and comparing female candidates for the chairperson position of the VWC with female villagers in another specification.⁵

Who becomes an incumbent?

In our second specification, we consider the sample of former VEC and VWC chairpersons, respectively, and compare those who decided to re-run in the current election and those who did not. So in these specifications: $Z_i=1$ in equation (1) if a former chairperson is a candidate in the current election; $Z_i=0$ if instead a former chairperson decides not to re-run for election. We again estimate (1) separately for males and females, i.e., over the set of previous chairpersons of the VEC and VWC respectively.

Who gets elected?

In our third specification, we consider the total sample of candidates in the current election and compare the winners with the losers. In this case, $Z_i=1$ in equation (1) if a candidate wins the election; and $Z_i=0$ if a candidate loses. As before, we estimate these regressions for the VEC and VWC elections separately.

4. Data Sample

Between February and May 2019, we surveyed: all candidates running in VEC and VWC chairperson elections; all past chairpersons of VEC and VWC; and 10 randomly selected households in a sample of 100 villages. For each household, we interviewed a man and woman. Our sample comprises 2300 individuals, with 1954 villagers and 341 politicians. Our sample of villages are randomly drawn from two districts in Uganda: Sheema located in the south-west of the country (within the Ankole sub-region); and Buyende located more centrally and towards the east of the country (within the Busoga sub-region).

Our surveys contain very detailed information on numerous dimensions of candidate quality. We group these characteristics into six different categories.

Objective Measures

To begin, we have a number of variables that speak to more standard “objective” measures of quality. These include demographics such as age, marital status, ethnicity, religion, number of children, and length of time lived in the village and are described in Table 4. We also include political party affiliation in this group of “demographic” measures. Other measures characterize their economic status like: educational attainment, occupation, and land ownership, described in Table 5.

⁵ There were too few female candidates running for the chairperson position of the VEC for estimation purposes, so we omit females all together for this comparison.

	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Age	47.07	15.20	43.46	14.90
Married	0.92	0.27	0.78	0.41
Children	2.27	2.30	3.55	2.40
HH Size	6.56	3.34	6.44	2.91
Newspaper	0.07	0.25	0.03	0.17
Radio	0.80	0.40	0.65	0.48
Mobile	0.78	0.41	0.56	0.50
Education	6.61	4.41	4.92	3.84
< 10 Years in Village	0.06	0.23	0.26	0.44
NRM Party	0.72	0.45	0.76	0.43
Church of Uganda	0.52	0.50	0.50	0.50
Catholic	0.23	0.42	0.21	0.41
Pentecostal	0.10	0.29	0.15	0.36
Muslim	0.14	0.34	0.12	0.32
Banyankole	0.46	0.50	0.48	0.50
Basoga	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46
Observations	1121		1174	

Table 4: Demographic Measures

Comparing males and females in our sample in Table 4, we see that men are more educated, more likely to listen to the radio and have access to a mobile phone. They are also more likely to be married and to have lived in the village longer. There are no significant gender disparities by political party, religion, or ethnicity. Regarding the economic characteristics in Table 5, women are more likely to come from households that are primarily cultivators and with larger land holdings. Likewise, they own more livestock and are more likely to grow cash crops. However, males come from wealthier households and also have higher personal wealth.

	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Cultivator	0.62	0.49	0.78	0.42
Land Own	1.98	6.36	2.46	6.38
Land Title	0.94	0.24	0.95	0.22
Land Relative	0.50	0.50	0.07	0.25
Livestock	0.31	0.46	0.60	0.49
Personal Livestock	0.33	0.47	0.56	0.50
Chickens	0.23	0.42	0.43	0.50
Personal Chickens	0.15	0.35	0.33	0.47
Cash Crops	0.19	0.39	0.28	0.45
Personal Cash Crops	0.17	0.38	0.22	0.41
HH Income	229.50	319.55	172.85	297.64
Personal Income	170.71	236.60	74.14	151.29
Observations	1121		1174	

Table 5: Economic Measures

Subjective Measures

Our next category of quality measures includes the responses to a series of subjective questions that pertain to gender attitudes and social capital. For gender attitudes, we asked a set of questions aimed at understanding the relative role of women in the household, in society, and in politics. From these questions, we construct four sets of indices which are all increasing in the positive treatment of women. The first index “Female Decisions” reflects positive female decision-making power in the household; “Female Economic” reflects positive societal attitudes towards women working and obtaining education; “Female Politics” is an index increasing in positive attitudes towards women’s direct involvement in governance. With regards to these pro-women attitudes, women place a larger weight on them than men, particularly with regards to their economic and political roles.

For, social capital related measures, we asked a series of the standard trust question in set of contexts and whether individuals belong to a Self-Help Group (SHG) in the village. We add to this category of subjective measures, questions that pertain to individual attitudes towards bribing and cheating. The constructed indices are increasing in less corruption, that is, respondents perceive that it is less likely that individuals pay or receive bribes in the village. In Table 6, we see that women are somewhat less likely to perceive corruption in the village, but men perceive higher trust levels.

	Males		Females	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Wife Decides	1.40	1.42	1.63	1.42
Wife Decides (PCA)	-0.13	1.65	0.15	1.64
No IPV	3.34	0.73	3.40	0.72
Female Decisions	9.59	2.43	9.92	2.44
Female Decisions (PCA)	-0.12	1.48	0.11	1.56
Female Economic	8.77	2.01	9.33	1.89
Female Economic (PCA)	-0.19	1.33	0.18	1.26
Female Politics	7.84	2.04	8.03	2.08
Female Politics (PCA)	-0.09	1.42	0.09	1.46
Not Paid Bribes	19.00	1.60	19.42	1.08
Not Paid Bribes (PCA)	-0.18	1.40	0.18	0.95
Bribes Unlikely	14.41	2.48	14.44	2.42
Bribes Unlikely (PCA)	-0.01	1.77	0.01	1.74
No Cheat Tax	2.75	0.49	2.83	0.40
Bribes Unacceptable	2.85	0.40	2.92	0.31
Trust	18.17	4.43	17.19	4.44
Trust (PCA)	0.24	2.13	-0.23	2.13
Belongs to SHG	0.77	0.42	0.77	0.42
Observations	1121		1174	

Table 6: Attitudinal Measures

Governance Measures

For all individuals surveyed we asked what they think are the biggest problems in the village that the local governing bodies have to deal with. Table 7 reports differences in these opinions by gender, where we can observe that there are significant differences. For men, the priorities are: infrastructure, education, health, water, poverty, agriculture, and security. For women, they are: sanitation, poverty, SHGs, and domestic conflicts.

	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Infrastructure	0.29	0.45	0.02	0.13
Education	0.29	0.45	0.07	0.26
Health	0.24	0.43	0.06	0.24
Sanitation	0.11	0.31	0.22	0.41
Water	0.64	0.48	0.10	0.31
Poverty	0.29	0.45	0.23	0.42
Agriculture	0.23	0.42	0.15	0.35
Security	0.37	0.48	0.05	0.22
Women's Rights	0.00	0.03	0.09	0.28
SHGs	0.06	0.24	0.54	0.50
Domestic Conflicts	0.06	0.25	0.69	0.46
Observations	1121		1174	

Table 7: Governance Measures

Political Experience

For all political candidates, we asked a series of questions which speak to their previous political experience. These include: running a self-help group, years on the previous LC1, whether they have had a position on the upper level government LC1 or LC3, any other position in governance, and whether they have represented a special interest group. We also asked whether they have been influential and involved in solving disputes. We also asked how they think a chairperson can be most effective, whether it is to obtain resources for the village, create SHGs, mobilize villagers, enforce the law, solve conflicts, or make sure all villagers obtain fair treatment in the LCC. Table 8 compares the responses across male and female politicians across these dimensions.

We see that male politicians see obtaining resources, mobilizing voters, law enforcement and fair treatment in the LCC has a larger priority than women. Women focus relatively more on creating SHGs. Regarding experience, female politicians have been more likely to have run an SHG and supported a special interest group. Male politicians are more likely to see themselves as influential.

	Males		Females	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Resources	0.50	0.50	0.36	0.48
SHGs	0.36	0.48	0.63	0.48
Mobilize	0.74	0.44	0.59	0.49
Enforce Law	0.25	0.43	0.07	0.26
Solve Conflict	0.59	0.49	0.56	0.50
Fair LCC	0.47	0.50	0.20	0.40
Ran SHG	0.64	0.48	0.83	0.37
Past LC2/LC3	0.12	0.33	0.17	0.37
Other Position	0.50	0.50	0.43	0.50
Interest Group	0.11	0.32	0.95	0.21
Solve Disputes	0.96	0.21	0.93	0.25
Solve Women Disputes	0.92	0.27	0.95	0.23
Influential	0.72	0.45	0.59	0.49
Observations	159		157	

Table 8: Political Experience

Political Aspirations

For all political candidates, we also asked a series of questions which speak to what we refer to as their political aspirations. These include, their primary reason for running for election and whether in the future they aspire to hold positions in the upper level governments (LC2/LC3). From Table 9, we see that male politicians hope to improve the lives of villagers, whereas females are more focused on women. A third of males aspire to a position in the upper levels of government, whereas close to 44% of women hope for positions in the corresponding female governing bodies. Males are more likely to have political party and ethnic-level political connections.

	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Political Connections	0.23	0.42	0.34	0.47
Ethnic Connections	0.75	0.43	0.69	0.46
Implement Policy	0.44	0.50	0.34	0.47
Improve Village	0.96	0.19	0.39	0.49
Improve Women	0.00	0.00	0.97	0.18
Member of LC2/LC3	0.04	0.21	0.08	0.27
Represent Party	0.15	0.36	0.03	0.16
Represent Group	0.04	0.19	0.98	0.14
Have Influence	0.95	0.22	0.99	0.08
Future LC2/LC3	0.30	0.46	0.19	0.39
Future Women LC2/LC3			0.44	0.50
Observations	159		157	

Table 9: Political Aspirations

Political Campaigns

A final set of questions were asked to all of the political candidates running in the recent election. These were focused on their campaigns like who nominated them and who supported them financially. Whether they themselves gave gifts to potential voters. Their perceptions on how the election was run, whether it was fair and if any conflict occurred. We also asked them about their campaign messages. We see from Table 10, that male politicians were more likely to receive campaign financing and support from their families and political parties. While campaigning, men were more likely to give gifts to voters. Solving problems of conflict, public good, and government programs were included in the campaign promises for men. For women, the messages were more targeted to women's issues but also public good provision. Male politicians faced more adversity during the election, where 25% felt pressure to not stand for election, and 36% thought there was some pressure of voters not to vote.

	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	Mean	S.D	Mean	S.D.
Received Money	0.31	0.46	0.03	0.16
Gave Gifts	0.22	0.42	0.03	0.18
Political Help	0.15	0.36	0.04	0.19
Family Help	0.46	0.50	0.17	0.37
Party Support	0.44	0.50	0.20	0.40
Party Money	0.28	0.45	0.13	0.34
Pressure to not run	0.25	0.43	0.13	0.34
Pressure to not vote	0.36	0.48	0.15	0.36
Fair Election	0.84	0.37	0.94	0.24
Election Conflict	0.33	0.47	0.04	0.19
Campaign Women	0.08	0.27	0.65	0.48
Campaign Gov.	0.66	0.48	0.53	0.50
Campaign Conflict	0.38	0.49	0.05	0.23
Campaign Public	0.69	0.47	0.20	0.40
Observations	147		115	

Table 10: Political Campaigns

5. Estimation Results

We present our estimation results of equation (1) by different categories of candidate quality measures as just described.

Objective Measures:

We begin with our set of what we refer to as objective measures. For this set of estimations, we regress each measure, for six different empirical specifications. The different specifications refer to the three different definitions of Z_i as defined in Section 3 for the analyses of the probabilities that an individual: (i) becomes a politician; (ii) becomes an incumbent; and (iii) becomes elected. We estimate these three specifications for males and female separately. For the below set of estimations, where objective individual characteristics are the outcomes of interest, we include only district fixed effects as controls.

Table 11 presents our first set of demographic characteristics. The top-panel reports the three sets of estimations for males, the lower panel is for females.

	Age	Married	Education	Newspaper	Radio	Mobile	Less Years	NRM Party
VEC - Candidate	4.806*** (1.347)	0.0749*** (0.0120)	1.504*** (0.266)	0.0627** (0.0294)	0.108*** (0.0255)	0.205*** (0.0181)	-0.0667*** (0.0161)	0.217*** (0.0494)
VEC - Incumbent	0.678 (2.948)	0 (.)	-0.0878 (1.245)	-0.0295 (0.0999)	0.0405 (0.164)	0.132 (0.114)	0 (.)	-0.0760** (0.0328)
VEC - Winner	3.124 (2.130)	0.0343* (0.0185)	0.232 (0.407)	-0.00415 (0.0443)	0.0268 (0.0525)	0.0618* (0.0348)	0 (.)	0.0660 (0.0550)
VWC - Candidate	3.831*** (1.099)	-0.00399 (0.0383)	2.257*** (0.244)	0.0239 (0.0187)	0.151*** (0.0201)	0.323*** (0.0267)	-0.193*** (0.0324)	0.238*** (0.0479)
VWC - Incumbent	-1.884 (1.560)	0.0504 (0.166)	0.202 (0.673)	0.0406 (0.0695)	0.0798 (0.0825)	0.126 (0.0743)	0 (.)	0.0182 (0.0460)
VWC - Winner	1.763 (3.140)	-0.0686 (0.0612)	-0.327 (0.343)	0.0613** (0.0285)	-0.131** (0.0558)	0.0571 (0.0543)	-0.0825 (0.118)	0.0842 (0.0625)

Table 11: Estimation Results - Demographic Measures

We see from the first and fourth rows in Table 11 that basic demographics are strong predictors of whether an individual decides to become a politician. For the VEC, male politicians are significantly older, more likely to be married, have more children, live in larger households, more highly educated, and knowledgeable in terms of newspaper readership and radio listening. They are also more likely to own a mobile phone, lived longer in the village, and belong to the main political party NRM. Female politicians are also from larger households, have more children and are significantly more educated, regularly listen to the radio, own a mobile phone, and lived longer in the village than the average female villager. Like the VEC candidates, they are also more likely to belong to the ruling party.

In contrast, we don't see many of these objective measures correlated with, conditional on being the previous chairperson (of either the VEC or VWC) deciding to re-run in the new election. The only exception is that incumbents to the VEC are less likely to belong to the NRM. Neither do many of these objective measures determine who wins an election. Though a few do. Winners of the VEC election, are more likely to be married and own a mobile phone. For VWC winners, they more likely to read a newspaper but less likely to listen to the radio.

Though not reported here, we also checked for a number of other demographics, like ethnicity and religion, although they were never significant correlates with political selection.

The next set of more economically focused objective characteristics are considered in Tables 12 and 13. These estimation results make clear how male political candidates to the VEC have significantly higher economic status, compared to male villagers. Politicians are from larger and wealthier households, and correspondingly are larger landowners, livestock owners, and cash crop producers. Similar patterns follow for female politicians. It is noteworthy, that for both male and female politicians, this higher economic status is not just at household level but also at the personal level.

	Children	HH Size	Cultivator	Land Own	Land Title	Land Relative
VEC - Candidate	3.111*** (0.370)	2.510*** (0.342)	0.142*** (0.0486)	4.701*** (1.110)	0.0439* (0.0215)	0.0345 (0.0423)
VEC - Incumbent	0.637 (0.628)	0.607 (0.726)	0.0683 (0.132)	1.922 (1.266)	0 (.)	-0.185 (0.166)
VEC - Winner	0.178 (0.394)	0.852 (0.558)	0.159** (0.0577)	3.553** (1.380)	0.0272 (0.0329)	-0.164* (0.0911)
VWC - Candidate	0.604*** (0.166)	1.190*** (0.240)	0.0299 (0.0306)	2.254* (1.188)	0.0501*** (0.0112)	0.427*** (0.0391)
VWC - Incumbent	0.255 (0.323)	0.815 (0.599)	-0.0154 (0.0862)	-1.908*** (0.659)	0.0238 (0.0253)	-0.326** (0.121)
VWC - Winner	-0.194 (0.416)	-0.115 (0.578)	-0.0120 (0.0949)	2.682 (2.094)	0 (.)	-0.0563 (0.136)

Table 12: Estimation Results – Economic Measures

Like with the demographic measures, we see that very few of these measures distinguish between politicians, that is whether they decide to re-run for elections (second and fifth rows of Tables 12 and 13, for males and females respectively) or whether they win the election (third and sixth rows). Though, there is some indication according to some of these measures (like land ownership, cash crop production, and overall household income), winners in the VEC election are economically better off than their competing candidates. We don't find this pattern amongst female politicians competing in the VWC election.

	Livestock	Personal Livestock	Chickens	Personal Chickens	Cash Crops	Personal Cash Crops	HH Income	Personal Income
VEC - Candidate	0.590*** (0.0380)	0.603*** (0.0328)	0.422*** (0.0498)	0.288*** (0.0436)	0.408*** (0.0712)	0.354*** (0.0730)	92.53*** (20.62)	57.01*** (13.97)
VEC - Incumbent	0.0557 (0.110)	0.194 (0.122)	0.178 (0.148)	0.0924 (0.151)	0.0306 (0.0945)	0.0237 (0.0810)	115.6 (98.66)	79.10 (63.63)
VEC - Winner	0.0399 (0.0879)	-0.00337 (0.0827)	0.176*** (0.0580)	0.00532 (0.0696)	0.126** (0.0476)	0.0862 (0.0571)	76.08* (37.09)	27.51 (31.60)
VWC - Candidate	0.0626** (0.0277)	0.127*** (0.0356)	0.0834* (0.0403)	0.0229 (0.0304)	0.133*** (0.0340)	0.0960*** (0.0280)	96.83*** (22.00)	22.96** (8.993)
VWC - Incumbent	0.105 (0.0961)	-0.0602 (0.0970)	0.0658 (0.142)	-0.0686 (0.129)	0.0182 (0.0912)	0.0196 (0.0844)	74.62 (83.58)	-9.510 (20.82)
VWC - Winner	-0.0883 (0.0923)	0.0258 (0.0758)	-0.0931 (0.0938)	-0.0821 (0.0953)	-0.0277 (0.129)	-0.00398 (0.139)	16.40 (39.12)	-3.663 (15.77)

Table 13: Estimation Results – Economic Measures

Subjective Measures

We now turn to our next set of individual characteristics that we classify as subjective measures, as described in Section 4. For this set of estimations, we regress each measure for the six different empirical specifications as before. We also include as controls, a set of baseline objective measures. These include: marital status, age, education, land ownership, religion, ethnicity, occupation, and political party affiliation. Our main results presented below are also robust to including a more extensive set of “objective” control measures, as well as excluding any individual level controls and including only district fixed effects. The implication, is that any significant finding on a significant correlation between a subjective measure and our probabilities of interest (becoming a politician, incumbent, or elected), are holding constant the objective measures of individuals.

Table 14 presents estimation results, where the outcome measures related to gender attitudes (as described in Table 6). From the first row of Table 14, we see that a few of these measures are salient for determining who becomes a politician. In particular, male candidates to the VEC are significantly more likely to report that they don’t justify IPV (under several contexts), and that they value women having equal economic and educational opportunities as men, relative to male villagers. These significant differences are over and above any educational and economic advantages, we found in Tables 12 and 13 for politicians, as these more objective measures are included as controls. Interestingly, similar patterns hold for female politicians. We see from the fourth row of Table 14, that candidates to the VWC are more likely to value women having equal economic and political rights relative to female villagers. Again, these significant differences in more subjective measures

are found after controlling for more objective differences across politicians and villagers. These pro-women attitudinal differences do not seem to determine differences amongst politicians, in terms of becoming an incumbent or getting elected. This is the case for both males and females.

	Wife Decides	Wife Decides (PCA)	No IPV	Female Decisions	Female Decisions (PCA)	Female Economic	Female Economic (PCA)	Female Politics	Female Politics (PCA)
VEC - Candidate	0.0689 (0.115)	0.0787 (0.132)	0.195*** (0.0500)	0.167 (0.201)	-0.0646 (0.130)	0.888*** (0.210)	0.570*** (0.135)	-0.0616 (0.175)	-0.0369 (0.113)
VEC - Incumbent	0.328 (0.414)	0.374 (0.478)	0.227 (0.174)	-0.435 (0.950)	-0.195 (0.598)	0.898 (0.640)	0.539 (0.424)	0.0184 (0.779)	0.0910 (0.556)
VEC - Winner	0.0515 (0.260)	0.0583 (0.300)	0.240* (0.124)	0.280 (0.335)	0.0679 (0.239)	0.487 (0.414)	0.265 (0.247)	-0.539 (0.375)	-0.238 (0.283)
VWC - Candidate	0.276 (0.169)	0.319 (0.196)	-0.0198 (0.0561)	0.226 (0.177)	-0.0011 (0.115)	0.586*** (0.136)	0.383*** (0.0858)	0.512*** (0.175)	0.556*** (0.118)
VWC - Incumbent	-0.226 (0.281)	-0.264 (0.324)	0.377*** (0.111)	0.138 (0.535)	-0.201 (0.409)	0.645 (0.458)	0.369 (0.276)	0.178 (0.635)	0.217 (0.438)
VWC - Winner	-0.565* (0.306)	-0.652* (0.354)	-0.136 (0.189)	-0.128 (0.683)	-0.0780 (0.383)	0.0872 (0.576)	0.0445 (0.385)	0.224 (0.500)	0.348 (0.419)

Table 14: Estimation Results – Gender Attitudes

Table 15 presents estimation results, where outcome measures are instead attitudes related to what we term loosely as social capital, related to trust or lack of corruption within the village. With regards to candidacy to the VEC, male politicians are more likely to report that bribes are uncommon compared to male villagers. They are also more likely to belong to a village SHG. We see that the very same subjective measures characterise female politicians compared to female villagers. Interestingly, other subjective measures determine whether a male politician decides to become an incumbent, in particular, they report higher levels of trust in the village (as computed by the index described in Table 6). This variable also determines the probability that they are elected, as does reporting that bribes are unlikely. By contrast, these measures do not determine incumbency or election rates for female politicians.

	Not Paid Bribes	Not Paid Bribes (PCA)	Bribes Unlikely	Bribes Unlikely (PCA)	No Cheat Tax	Bribes Not Accept	Trust	Trust (PCA)	Belongs to SHG
VEC - Candidate	-0.221 (0.154)	-0.202 (0.135)	1.258*** (0.167)	0.899*** (0.122)	0.0748 (0.0532)	0.0444 (0.0341)	0.202 (0.479)	0.101 (0.230)	0.151*** (0.0447)
VEC - Incumbent	0.578 (0.723)	0.655 (0.672)	0.517 (0.390)	0.391 (0.288)	0.173 (0.178)	-0.0451 (0.0291)	2.256*** (0.658)	1.108*** (0.319)	0.107 (0.0913)
VEC - Winner	0.0917 (0.386)	0.0944 (0.353)	0.616** (0.237)	0.418** (0.168)	0.0899 (0.0558)	0.00802 (0.0357)	2.492*** (0.313)	1.202*** (0.150)	-0.0272 (0.0290)
VWC - Candidate	-0.0141 (0.0636)	0.0243 (0.0549)	0.923*** (0.215)	0.661*** (0.152)	-0.0536 (0.0534)	-0.0389 (0.0421)	-0.502* (0.284)	-0.239* (0.137)	0.180*** (0.0481)
VWC - Incumbent	-0.271 (0.277)	-0.197 (0.222)	0.499 (0.334)	0.373 (0.237)	-0.00612 (0.0780)	-0.0664 (0.0903)	0.499 (0.804)	0.236 (0.388)	0.00200 (0.0319)
VWC - Winner	-0.0651 (0.162)	-0.0497 (0.144)	0.280 (0.417)	0.194 (0.297)	0.267 (0.167)	0.186 (0.158)	0.845 (1.075)	0.417 (0.509)	-0.0217 (0.0127)

Table 15: Estimation Results – Social Capital Measures

Governance Measures

As discussed in Section 4, we have two sets of measures to capture governance quality. The first captures priority areas, where individuals think the VEC or VWC should place their efforts. Tables 16 and 17 present the estimation results for these outcome measures for the three empirical specifications, for males and female separately.

	Infrastructure	Education	Health	Sanitation	Water	Poverty	Agriculture
VEC - Candidate	-0.197*** (0.0428)	0.152*** (0.0449)	0.164*** (0.0462)	0.136*** (0.0415)	0.0631 (0.0421)	0.0646 (0.0438)	0.131*** (0.0327)
VEC - Incumbent	0.0856 (0.0575)	0.669*** (0.0897)	0.497*** (0.0741)	0.224*** (0.0777)	0.656*** (0.0609)	0.353*** (0.0671)	0.363*** (0.0964)
VEC - Winner	0.0985** (0.0439)	0.0102 (0.0837)	0.204*** (0.0562)	-0.0892 (0.0808)	0.00494 (0.0773)	0.163** (0.0636)	-0.0227 (0.0665)
VWC - Candidate	0.0319 (0.0194)	0.259*** (0.0383)	0.167*** (0.0259)	0.0202 (0.0445)	0.232*** (0.0345)	0.127*** (0.0371)	0.138*** (0.0384)
VWC - Incumbent	0.0343 (0.0382)	0.500*** (0.0697)	0.335*** (0.0546)	0.446*** (0.0788)	0.402*** (0.103)	0.585*** (0.0691)	0.445*** (0.0795)
VWC - Winner	0.0135 (0.0690)	-0.0549 (0.116)	0.0749 (0.0838)	0.0713 (0.122)	-0.217** (0.0928)	0.0379 (0.0992)	0.149 (0.117)

Table 16: Estimation Results – Governance Priorities

Male politicians are significantly more likely to report the priority areas of: education; health; sanitation, water, poverty, agriculture, and self-help groups compared to male villagers and significantly less likely to prioritize infrastructure. Male incumbents to the VEC in turn, prioritize: education, health, sanitation, water, poverty, agriculture, security, and self-help groups compared to politicians who decided not to re-run. Of those who ran for election, the winners are more likely to prioritize infrastructure, health, and poverty, compared to candidates who lost the election.

For women, we see some similar patterns but also some differences. Difference include, that female candidates also prioritize infrastructure, security, and also women's rights relative to female villagers. By contrast, they prioritize domestic issues relatively less. Incumbents prioritize many of the same issues but also self-help groups and domestic issues, relative to politicians that decided not to re-run. Regarding who wins the election to the VWC, less focus on water and more focus on domestic issues is relevant.

	Security	Women's Rights	SHGs	Domestic Conflicts
VEC - Candidate	0.0622 (0.0596)	0.00603 (0.00612)	0.154*** (0.0446)	0.0180 (0.0278)
VEC - Incumbent	0.354*** (0.0655)	0.0246 (0.0332)	0.220** (0.0806)	0.0862 (0.0654)
VEC - Winner	0.0655 (0.104)	0.0133 (0.0135)	0.0724 (0.0722)	-0.0403 (0.0768)
VWC - Candidate	0.170*** (0.0531)	0.0820** (0.0313)	-0.196*** (0.0405)	-0.611*** (0.0438)
VWC - Incumbent	0.219** (0.0815)	0.299*** (0.0648)	0.608*** (0.0619)	0.288*** (0.0609)
VWC - Winner	-0.0234 (0.0869)	0.131 (0.0856)	-0.0755 (0.146)	0.194*** (0.0386)

Table 17: Estimation Results – Governance Priorities

A second set of governance outcomes was asked only of political candidates. So for these measures, we present only two empirical specifications, for males and female separately. These are described in Table 18. We see that differences of opinions along these dimensions determine the decision to re-run in the election, for both males and females. In particular, for males, those who decide to re-run for election are more likely to report that the best way for a chairperson to improve the lives of village members is to mobilize villagers and enforce the law. The male candidates who won the election were more likely to report that law enforcement and also fair treatment for all villagers in the local court were best practice.

For female candidates, those who decided to re-run for election also placed an emphasis on law enforcement, as well as the creation and running of self-help groups. Relative to those politicians that decided not to re-run, they were did not think the fair treatment of villagers in the local courts was as important. Winners emphasized law enforcement.

	Policies	Resources	SHGs	Mobilize	Enforce Law	Solve Conflict	Fair LCC
VEC - Incumbent	0.102 (0.175)	-0.0812 (0.189)	0.193 (0.141)	0.385*** (0.125)	0.318*** (0.0884)	0.129 (0.195)	-0.0691 (0.164)
VEC - Winner	0.0623 (0.118)	0.0632 (0.0791)	0.0918 (0.0813)	0.0969 (0.0791)	0.150* (0.0842)	0.0943 (0.103)	0.163* (0.0871)
VWC - Incumbent	0.0396 (0.116)	0.121 (0.0904)	0.284*** (0.0906)	0.222** (0.102)	0.0647 (0.0624)	-0.0511 (0.129)	-0.164* (0.0862)
VWC - Winner	-0.164 (0.130)	-0.0251 (0.0917)	0.0684 (0.111)	0.0863 (0.167)	0.0673* (0.0357)	0.00390 (0.134)	-0.0904 (0.0937)

Table 18: Estimation Results – Governance Objectives

Political Experience

Table 19 reports the estimation results for outcomes related to the political experience of candidates. For male politicians who decided to re-run for election, they had previously served fewer years on the VEC. They were more likely to have garnered improvements for a targeted group, were more likely to have been given monetary resources to support their candidacy from members of government (LC1 or higher) or a political party. They were also more likely to share the same ethnicity/tribe with the person who nominated/appointed them for the position. For the male candidates who won the VEC election, they were the ones who had spent less time in a previous position, they were less likely to have represented a targeted group (youths, women, disabled, elderly). They were also more likely to have run an SHG, and more likely to have been influential in resolving disputes (through the local village court or privately).

	Ran SHG	Years Served	Past LC2/LC3	Other Position	Interest Group	Target
VEC - Incumbent	-0.123 (0.110)	-5.210*** (1.656)	0.144 (0.107)	0.110 (0.113)	0.0193 (0.0220)	0.0946* (0.0490)
VEC - Winner	0.273** (0.0980)	-3.386** (1.603)	-0.0779 (0.0562)	0.0666 (0.0616)	-0.252*** (0.0722)	-0.0329 (0.0367)
VWC - Incumbent	0.0601 (0.0552)	-43.17 (46.80)	0.0234 (0.0835)	0.207* (0.109)	-0.0318 (0.0373)	0.0940 (0.114)
VWC - Winner	0.365*** (0.0962)	-2.280 (3.258)	0.150*** (0.0382)	0.154 (0.121)	0.456** (0.164)	0.318* (0.154)

Table 19: Estimation Results – Political Experience

For female candidates, women who decided to re-run for the VWC election were more likely to have held past positions. Those who won the election were more likely to have run an SHG, held a position on the LC2 or LC3, represented a targeted group, and been able to garner resources for that group. They have also been influential in solving disputes (overall and for women), and influential in services and also more likely to have received political resources for the candidacy.

	Solve Disputes	Solve Women Disputes	Influential	Political Resources	Fam. money	Political Connections	Ethnic Connections
VEC - Incumbent	0 (.)	0 (.)	0.0117 (0.105)	0.296*** (0.0834)	0.0177 (0.0199)	0.0740 (0.142)	0.351** (0.148)
VEC - Winner	0.162*** (0.0494)	0.229*** (0.0719)	0.473*** (0.103)	-0.0112 (0.0940)	0.0107 (0.0457)	-0.00309 (0.0844)	-0.0497 (0.0662)
VWC - Incumbent	0.0312 (0.0348)	0.0312 (0.0348)	0.108 (0.0788)	0 (.)	0.0302 (0.0224)	-0.0649 (0.0937)	0.0303 (0.0935)
VWC - Winner	0.307* (0.150)	0.324** (0.141)	0.300** (0.112)	0 (.)	0.0126 (0.00860)	0.165** (0.0738)	-0.0423 (0.0906)

Table 20: Estimation Results – Political Priorities

Political Aspirations

Table 21 presents estimation results for outcome measures related to the political aspirations of candidates. Male candidates who decided to re-run for election report to have been motivated for person benefits. Of those who got elected, their goals were to improve the lives all villagers, and they are more likely to report they have influence over members of the VEC. For female candidates, those who decided to re-run want to become members of the upper level governments (women or men). Those who won report related ambitions, personal benefits and future positions in the LC2 and LC3 at the VWC.

	Implement Policy	Improve Village	Improve Women	Represent Party	Personal Benefits	Represent Group	Have Influence
VEC - Incumbent	0.0250 (0.208)	0 (.)	0 (.)	-0.118 (0.154)	0.0488* (0.0244)	-0.0362 (0.0796)	0.0861 (0.0918)
VEC - Winner	-0.0772 (0.0684)	0.101* (0.0538)	0 (.)	-0.0595 (0.0672)	0.00270 (0.0338)	-0.00941 (0.0257)	0.0909*** (0.0287)
VWC - Incumbent	0.182 (0.120)	0.110 (0.104)	0.0570 (0.0393)	0.0140 (0.0789)	-0.0617 (0.0611)	0 (.)	0 (.)
VWC - Winner	0.143 (0.100)	-0.114 (0.176)	0.0326 (0.0355)	0.0191 (0.0166)	0.0858* (0.0429)	0.0221 (0.0532)	0.0502 (0.0488)

Table 21: Estimation Results – Political Aspiration

	Member of LC2/LC3	Future LC2/LC3	Future Women LC2/LC3
VEC - Incumbent	0.0318 (0.0408)	-0.176 (0.132)	
VEC - Winner	0.0505 (0.0429)	-0.012 (0.0887)	
VWC - Incumbent	0.141* (0.0761)	0.0657 (0.0927)	0.206 (0.134)
VWC - Winner	0.0631 (0.0552)	0.0747 (0.108)	0.184* (0.101)

Table 22: Estimation Results – Political Ambitions

Political Campaigns

Table 23 reports results for only candidates who ran in the recent election. The outcome measures describe their campaign during the election. The only estimation specification is to compare those who won the election compared to those who lost. For male winners, they were more likely to have received help from political connections. For female winners, they were more likely to report that they gave gifts, that the recent election was fairly run, and also that they were less likely to have campaigned on a public platform.

	Received Money	Gave Gifts	Political Help	Family Help	Party Support	Party Money	Pressure to not run
VEC - Winner	-0.0334 (0.0966)	-0.129 (0.0880)	0.101* (0.0515)	0.0643 (0.0810)	-0.0694 (0.0865)	-0.223** (0.0904)	0.00356 (0.0625)
VWC - Winner	0.0362* (0.0206)	0.0481* (0.0249)	0.0360 (0.0261)	-0.183 (0.110)	0.00840 (0.117)	-0.0429 (0.0628)	-0.0672 (0.104)


	Pressure to not vote	Fair Election	Election Conflict	Campaign Women	Campaign Gov.	Campaign Conflict	Campaign Public
VEC - Winner	0.0226 (0.0937)	0.101 (0.0601)	-0.0804 (0.0728)	-0.00380 (0.0539)	-0.0702 (0.0788)	-0.0709 (0.0896)	-0.0253 (0.0837)
VWC - Winner	0.152 (0.173)	0.200* (0.0973)	-0.0416 (0.0629)	0.127 (0.140)	0.184 (0.144)	-0.0319 (0.0711)	-0.175* (0.0870)


Table 23: Estimation Results – Political Campaigns

5.1 Lasso Estimation Results

The above estimation results demonstrate which specific candidate characteristics are significantly correlated with the political selection process. Our estimation strategy, was to consider a specific characteristic one at a time. An alternative empirical strategy is to instead use the LASSO (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator), which is a simple machine learning method that is useful in detecting robust predictors in the presence of multi-collinearity and measurement error. We do not really have a large enough sample to use this method but we do so for the candidate selection estimations, where we include our entire sample of individuals surveyed.

In these LASSO estimations we include all of our characteristics at once. The two figures below provide graphical representations of the key results for selecting which characteristics predict candidacy in the VEC and VWC respectively. In line with the univariate correlations, we see that similar objective, subjective and governance variables predict the decision to become a politician.





6. Conclusions

Political candidacy in our rural Ugandan context is strongly correlated with economic status, as measured by land ownership, cash crops, livestock, and income (household and personal). Likewise, political candidates are older, married, more educated, from larger households with more children, and lived in the village longer. They are also more likely to belong to SHGs and support the nationally dominating political party (NRM). Subjective measures in terms of positive gender attitudes and perceptions of lower corruption are also strongly correlated with candidacy. Most of these predictive correlations hold for both male and females, with some slight differences. Likewise, governance priorities are quite similar by gender, though there are some significant differences. For example, females are more focused on women’s rights and security. Our LASSO estimations confirm these overall patterns found for political candidacy.

Characteristics that distinguish across candidates and the selection process are not the objective demographic and economic ones, but instead the ones that reflect the opinions of candidates. Perceptions of positive trust are strongly correlated with incumbency for men and women. Governance priorities are important for both incumbency and eventually winning the election. Best practices are also very relevant. For male incumbents

and winners, law enforcement is a significant focus. For male and female incumbents, mobilizing villagers is important. Those who are elected are more likely to have run a SHG and are experienced in resolving disputes. Relative to males, females run for election with aspirations to eventually move into upper levels of government.

Our paper is able to highlight important correlates that characterise the political selection process in local governance in the rural context of a developing country. A core take-away is how crucial are measures beyond the more standard economic and demographic characteristics in determining the selection of politicians.

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