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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION: A CROSS-REGIONAL
ANALYSIS OF ALGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA

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A capstone project submitted for Graduation with University Honors

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ABSTRACT

The comparative literature on democratization commonly focuses on intra-regional analysis to study similar cases. Considering the diverse literature on democracy, the necessary variables for causality remain widely disputed. In political science, a growing body of scholarship has qualitatively analyzed the relationship between civil-military relations and democratization. This study aims to examine the observed variance in authoritarian durability. It analyzes the interactions between four independent variables and the observed effects on prospects of democratization in South Korea and Algeria. To set a strong foundation for a controlled comparison, the analysis utilizes case studies to increase the number of within case observations. Using a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), the study tests four hypotheses corresponding to the variables of interest—foreign aid, regime type, societal fragmentation, and military withdrawal. My findings indicate consistent support for military withdrawal and regime deterioration. By contrast, there is inconsistent support for foreign aid, regime type, and societal fragmentation. Overall, these findings suggest that future research should include on large-n quantitative analysis to address concerns with generalizability.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Political regimes have become increasingly multifaceted over time. The three waves of democratization and the Arab Spring show that some states progressed towards democracy but stagnated or experienced back sliding. Nevertheless, many have struggled to democratize for numerous reasons. For one, the definitional features of democracy— representation, accountability, equality participation, dignity, rationality, security, and freedom—are associated with social, political, and property rights (Alvarez et al.). Liberal-democratic governments ensure the representation of many diverse public interests, a fairer process of policymaking, and above all—political accountability (Manin, et al.). In a true functioning democracy, representation and accountability are ensured through the separation of powers, checks and balances, and periodic elections in representative democracies (Shane). In all, these features allow constituents and interest groups to lobby their governments to serve their interests. Other advantages may be demonstrated through economic and developmental gains. For instance, some economists and scholars have explored the theoretical notion of a “democratic advantage” (Oatley 2019). Such theory argues that democracies are better able to foster foreign economic relations and attract foreign direct investments that consequently contribute to domestic growth.

The goal of this study is to analyze the variance observed within authoritarian survival. First, I review the existing explanations in the democratization literature. In chapter three, the methodology and specifications are detailed. Chapter four and five provide structured case studies for South Korea and Algeria. In chapter six, I present my research findings pertaining to four tested hypotheses. Lastly, I conclude with an analysis of the relationship between this study’s four variables of interest: foreign aid, regime type, societal fragmentation, and military withdrawal.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Democratization: National and Transnational Explanations

The body of literature on democratization can be categorized under national level and transnational level explanations. National level theories focus on domestic interactions of factors and societal actors to explain democratization. A considerable number of small-n studies engaged in historical analyses to examine the progression of democratization within states over time. Through descriptive analysis, scholars demonstrate the influence of a state's colonial and institutional histories to institutional path dependence and authoritarian tendencies (Arceneaux 2020). Qualitative studies also examine structures of domestic economies, cultural societies, and political institutions. For instance, some scholars argue the incompatibility of oil-producing Muslim states. Statistical analyses have been used to show causality between national development and democracy. These studies link the liberalization of a state's domestic economy to the liberalization of politics and society. Furthermore, individual characteristics such as education levels have been associated with the facilitation of democratic ideas (Geddes 1989). Lastly, poverty and socio-economic inequality are associated with less capacity for change. At the same time, recent individual-level research shows that poverty and inequality are significant drivers of political grievance and regime instability.

In contrast, transnational explanations shift the focus to the relationship between international factors and democratic transitions. Transnationalists are generally interested in the effects of globalization. Quantitative researchers study how flows of trade, capital, and migration interact with democratic governance. Trade and capital flows can help import liberal ideas. For instance, foreign direct investments, offshoring, and subsidiaries can transfer certain ideals from industrialized democracies. Economic openness can also facilitate emigration, and recent studies

find a correlation with remittances and authoritarian destabilization (Escriba-Folch et al 2015). Transnationalists also find support for democratic dissemination through the “neighborhood effect” (Earnest 2006). Moreover, scholars posit that memberships to supranational organizations positively correlate to democratization. Many also find that transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) contribute to the diffusion of liberal ideas (Mainwaring).

The goal of discussing the vast array of national and transnational explanations is to show the diversity of their findings. Together, they comprise the most heavily studied and defended theories in different subfields of political science. However, these national and transnational hypotheses have become increasingly falsifiable against certain cases. The next subsection explores a less studied alternative to explaining democratization.

The Third Wave and the Arab Spring

Interestingly, democratization has occurred in waves. Huntington (1991) identifies three waves of democratization. The first and second waves refer to the democratization of countries in North America and Europe during the 19th century and after World War II. Several years after, the third wave of democratization began in Portugal and Spain and swept through countries in Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. Since Huntington, the third wave of democratization has been rigorously studied in regional analyses.

However, the lack of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remained puzzling to political scientists. Early, foundational comparative and case studies often attributed this absence to the incompatibility of Islam and democracy. At the same time, others associated authoritarianism in the region with the “oil curse”. An influx of intra-regional MENA studies emerged in response to the Arab Spring in 2010. The unexpected wave of mass popular

mobilizations swept through the region with demands for democratic changes (Bellin 2012). Beginning in Tunisia, the popular revolts successfully ousted the authoritarian government of Ben Ali. Mubarak's regime faced a similar demise in Egypt. Shortly, mass movements for political change spread throughout the region in Yemen, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Sudan (Bellin 2012). However, the outcome of the Arab Spring varied across countries. This variance demonstrated the durability of certain authoritarians against mass popular uprisings. In addition, Egypt's progress regressed just a few years later. The persistence of authoritarianism in MENA is one of the motivations of this study.

National and transnational approaches prove inconsistent in explaining the democratic puzzle in MENA. This is not to claim that these are incorrect or irrelevant explanations. However, these approaches often do not account for the state's coercive apparatus in their variables. The following sections develop this argument.

III. METHODS

The purpose of this research is to examine the process of democratization in two different contexts. By doing so, this qualitative study aims to provide an in-depth cross-regional comparative analysis of South Korea and Algeria. First, it establishes a strong foundation for comparison by starting with structured case study method. Then, this study uses a Most Different Systems Design (MDS) approach to present a structured, focused comparison of the cases. It analyzes four independent variables—regime type, military withdrawal, foreign aid, and societal fragmentation. By testing four hypotheses against two divergent cases, this research hopes to highlight the weight of the variables given different structural contexts. Furthermore, this study's focus on structural and socio-economic variables aims to shift the weight away from cultural explanations in comparative analysis. In short, causality cannot be explained by culture and religion. The varying importance of the four variables indicates that political change depends on the resources and opportunities available for different domestic actors, over time. To sum up, the main goal of this research is to analyze the variance in democratization in terms of four factors: authoritarian regime types, civil-military relations, receipts of foreign aid, and societal divisions. By doing so, it demonstrates the interaction between these variables in certain contexts.

The Research Puzzle

There are many important factors to consider when analyzing democratic transitions. Serra (year) posit several factors influence the process of transition which show a nonmonotonic path to democratization. Thus, the interactions of several different variables can explain divergent outcomes among similar cases. At the same time, variables can shed light to similar

outcomes observed in different cases. The national and transnational explanations discussed in the previous section often do not account for the phases of democratization. In other words, many treat democratic transition as a binary outcome. However, democratization is a sequential process, not an immediate outcome (Pion Berlin and Martinez 2017). Nor do these studies consider the interactions between different variables. For these reasons, the democratization scholarship can contribute to the body of literature with empirical analyses testing multi-level factors.

The study undertaken in this paper examines the variance in democratic transitions. The research is motivated by three phenomena and limitations in democratization. First, democratic transitions and subsequent regressions suggest that the mechanisms of authoritarian durability must be further studied. Second, research on globalization and democratization largely use statistical analysis which often opt to study a single main variable. The outcomes in democratic transitions range from authoritarian deterioration and breakdown to the installation of a democratic government (Lee 2015). At the same time, unconsolidated democracies are vulnerable to back sliding (Croissant et al 2013; Pion-Berlin and Martinez 2017; Lee 2015). Considering the variance seen in the third wave and the Arab Spring, divergent outcomes indicate that variables hold varying weights in different contexts. These topics constitute the motivations of this research.

Methods

The analysis of this research begins with structured case studies of South Korea and Algeria. Doing so allows for a focused comparison of observations found within the case studies. The merit of increasing within case observations addresses the problem of “too many variables,

too few cases” of small-n qualitative studies. Following the case studies, this paper tests four hypotheses using a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). MDSD works by teasing out the similarities in two different cases. This approach also prevents selection bias in cases. The contrast of contexts highlights the identified differences between the cases to prevent broad generalizations. Broad generalizations more commonly appear problematic in Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) studies (Landman). MSSD explains the outcome variable among similar cases by teasing out the differences relating to the variables of interest. This model has been used most commonly, however comparing different cases using MDSD can be just as effective. MDSD also fits more appropriately into a small-n study to avoid biases.

The methods include macro-causal analysis to identify both relevant differences and similarities across cases for hypothesis testing. In addition, this study attempts to integrate descriptive and comparative analyses with empirical methods used to assess topics in political economy. Specifically, it uses a pooled cross-section time series analysis to increase the number of observations of certain independent variables. This works by providing empirical data that is typically harder to extract using historical and descriptive analyses.

Empirical evidence and data are obtained from reputable sources, government websites, and scholarly journals and university press books. For example, data on foreign aid and government spending are taken from the World Bank, NGOs, Freedom House, and other government sources. Historical evidence is extracted from scholarly journals including the *Journal of Democracy*, *Comparative Politics*, the *Journal of North African Studies*, the *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, the *American Political Science Review*, *International Studies Quarterly*, and the *American Journal of Political Science*. Lastly, this research also utilized

evidence from scholarly books published by academic and university press. To prevent selection bias in data collection, information is verified against other sources when possible.

Research Design

The goal of this paper is to analyze the interaction of four different variables using a focused comparison of case studies. To examine and provide weight to this study's variables of interest, research specifications must be defined and outlined. This section defines the outcome variables, independent variables, and hypotheses undertaken in this research.

Democratization, the outcome variable, refers to the sequential democratic changes in the authoritarian state. Simply put, this study defines democratization as a sequential move towards democratic governance. Following Lee (2015), this study measures democratic change by observing authoritarian deterioration, breakdown, and installation. The author clarifies that installation may result in democratic transition or authoritarian re-installation. Deterioration refers to the instance wherein the autocratic incumbent is unable to cope with the policy agenda thereby creating an opening for opposition (Lee 2015: 19). Authoritarian breakdown refers to the marked discontinuity of the authoritarian regime. It conveys the regime's ineffective legitimizing principle. These two changes lead to the installation process which constitutes a binary outcome. Thus, installation can result into the installation of a democratic government or the re-installation of authoritarianism in the state.

Second, this study tests four hypotheses based on four independent variables: foreign aid, regime type, societal fragmentation, and military withdrawal. Simply put, the literature on regime transitions highlights these different variables, arguing the importance of each one separately. Regime transitions is an important process in democratization. The collapse of an

authoritarian creates an opening for the liberal opposition. To examine authoritarian stability, it is important to first consider factors separately before assessing how they interact with one another. The rest of this section provides the specification of the independent variables and hypotheses.

Foreign Aid

Scholars find that foreign aid can contribute to authoritarian legitimization by allowing autocrats to finance robust patronage systems and clientelist systems (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith; Ahmed 2012). By this notion, autocrats instrumentalize international support via foreign aid flows to expand patronage and clientelistic systems. Theoretically, foreign aid permits autocrats to widen their support base by purchasing the loyalty of elite opposition and civil society at large. The foreign aid variable is observed by examining foreign aid receipts aggregated under heads of state.

Foreign aid receipts come from industrialized countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Historical evidence suggests that established democracies such as the U.S. have at least contributed aid to authoritarian governments. If foreign aid receipts make authoritarian regimes more durable, then it suggests implications for future policy. To examine the relationship between foreign aid and autocratic stability, the study examines foreign aid data from the World Bank. Specifically, I am interested in how periods of rise and decline in aid correlates with authoritarian stability. Following Bueno de Mesquita and Smith and Ahmed (2012), I hypothesize that foreign aid receipts will stabilize authoritarian regimes that rely on patronage and clientelism to appease support base.

Regime Type

In this research, regime type refers to the structural organization of an authoritarian regime. The structure is defined by the concentration of authoritative power and how this is maintained. Some scholars have assessed the variance in authoritarian survival rates based on certain structural organization (Nordlinger 1977; Remmer 1989; Geddes 1999, Greitens 2016). They posit that regime type can explain why some authoritarians are more durable against certain exogenous or endogenous shocks. In general, studies on regime survival differentiate between civilian authoritarians and military authoritarians. Scholars seem to concur that military regimes are less likely to survive against shocks compared to civilian authoritarians (Nordlinger 1977). For civilian regimes, most find single party regimes survive longer than personalists by a significant difference (Geddes 1999).

Regime durability is associated with how effective a regime legitimizes its authoritarian principles. These strategies often include the use of repression, clientelism, cooptation, and coup-proofing (Nordlinger 1977; Remmer 1989; Geddes 1999; Quinlivan 1999; Greitens 2016; Arceneaux 2020). Geddes (1999) finds that military regimes, personalist regimes, and single party regimes survive an average of seven, nineteen, and thirty-five years, respectively (133). However, Remmer (1989) presents a different finding on the durability of military regimes. In short, the author finds that the stability of military regimes depends on its structural organization. Using historical analysis, Remmer categorizes military dictatorships in Latin America. The author finds military dictatorships with sultanistic and oligarchic structures to be the most durable with averages of 25.1 years and 16.3 years, respectively (38). In contrast, military regimes with monarchic and feudal structures are the least durable with respective averages of 6.9 years and 6.5 years.

Based on Geddes (1999) and Remmer (1989), this study measures regime types based on these categories: personalistic, single party, military sultanistic, military oligarchic, military monarchic, and military feudal. I use Geddes (1999) specifications to define personalistic, single party, and military regimes. Then, I use Remmer (1989) to define sub-categories of military regimes. To begin with, personalistic regimes concentrate authority and power in a single leader. The dictator may be a civilian or a military officer, however neither the political party or the military hold decision-making authority. Geddes finds that personalistic regimes are relatively immune to internal splits due to the dictator's provisions of patronage and other special privileges. However, the dictator's reliance on patronage renders the regime vulnerable to economic shocks that disturb the distribution of these provisions. In addition, personalistic regimes are vulnerable to the death of a dictator and violent overthrow.

On the other hand, single party regimes constitute collective ruling among a dominant party's elites. This type may be characterized by a persisting undisputed electoral victory of a single party. Although a single political party consistently dominates, other parties may still be permitted to compete. However, the electoral competition is largely unfair, rigged, or fraudulent. Opposition parties often lack resources to compete with the dominant party which holds the monopoly on government resources. Single party regimes rely on patronage systems and clientelist networks to co-opt opposition and widen its support base (Escriba-Folch et al 2015). For this reason, this type is most vulnerable to exogenous events rather than internal divisions (Geddes 1999).

According to Geddes (1999), military regimes distribute authoritative power within a group of military officers. She posits that the inevitability of political conflicts between these elites result in institutional factionalism in the military. Since the military is most interested in

the unity and cohesion of its institution, military regimes are inherently vulnerable to internal splits. In contrast, Remmer (1989) distinguishes between different types of military regimes which are associated with varying levels of durability. The distinction between military regimes depends on the regime's structural arrangements, which are characterized by the degree of government and military fusion and the concentration of authoritative power.

Sultanistic regimes concentrate authority to a single officer while also placing military personnel in government positions. Oligarchic regimes distribute authoritative power collegially and prevent the fusion of government and military roles. Monarchic regimes are characterized by a single dictator who separates the military from government roles. Lastly, feudal regimes are defined by collegial ruling among military elites and the fusion of military and government roles. The vulnerabilities of each type depend on their susceptibility to factional splits and countercoups. Remmer finds that inevitable disputes emerge with collegial rule and power-sharing among military elites which results in factional divides. The separation of military and government roles solves this problem. On the other hand, military regimes that concentrate authoritative power in a single officer risk the alienation of the military institution. Thus, the dictator must appease the military by providing officers with government positions. As such, Remmer (1989) provides empirical evidence supporting that sultanistic regimes survive longer than its counterparts on average.

Based on Geddes (1999), I expect single party regimes to be the most stable. To supplement this hypothesis with Remmer (1989), I expect that a sultanistic military regime will be stable but will not out-survive single party regimes. Since authoritarian regimes are not mutually exclusive, I anticipate that an amalgam of single party and sultanistic military regime

will prove most durable against destabilizing factors such as economic downturns and civil unrest.

Societal Fragmentation

Studies show that persisting societal divisions are negatively correlated with the effectiveness of collective mobilization against authoritarian incumbents (Escriba-Folch et al 2018). In other words, conflicts between social groups can prevent collective action. At the same time, scholars find that mass popular social movements are effective in demonstrating demands for political change (Bellin 2012). Considering this relationship, societal fragmentation should negatively affect the prospects of democratization.

This study measures the societal fragmentation variable based on signals such as ethnic conflicts, class divisions, and armed internal oppositions. Alternatively, observations of mass popular movements that bring social groups together indicates weak fragmentation. In addition, political fragmentation disfavors anti-regime opposition, particularly since it prevents the widening of their support bases (Escriba-Folch et al 2015 & 2018). Following this argument, I anticipate that societal fragmentation will prevent authoritarian deterioration and democratic transition.

Military Withdrawal

As previously discussed, literature on democracy has most focused on other factors besides civil-military relations. Meanwhile, civil-military relations scholarship has found that the military's withdrawal of support for the regime has been a determining factor of the regime's subsequent collapse or survival (Cook 2007; Bellin 2012; Lee 2015). For instance, Bellin examines the variations in the outcomes of authoritarian regime collapse in the countries that

experienced the Arab Spring. The study revealed that authoritarian survival depended on the military's decision to withdraw or to obey and repress civilian protesters.

Following Bellin, I hypothesize that military withdrawal will lead to authoritarian deterioration and breakdown. Observations of this variable are based on signals that indicate factionalism within the military, coup attempts, defection or "return to the barracks", and explicit disobedience. These signals are associated with the military's behavior in response to mass popular mobilizations and threats to its corporate interests. The military's corporate interests include autonomy over its affairs, budget, cohesion, and institutional survival. As such, the military may perceive threats in terms of budget reductions, intrusive civilian oversight, internal factionalism, and functional rivals (Huntington; Feaver; Finer; Quinlivan). These threats are associated with the military withdrawal variable.

Authoritarian regimes can also rely on coup-proofing strategies for survival. Quinlivan (1999) defines coup-proofing strategies as the exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties, the establishment of parallel militaries to counterbalance the regular military, the use of multiple security agencies to monitor opposition, and the use of material and financial rewards to secure loyalties. These strategies are observed in authoritarians in the Middle East, such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (Quinlivan 1999). Since these strategies are associated with lengthening authoritarian rule, I expect coup-proofing strategies such as ascriptive selection, counterbalancing, and patronage to be prevent military withdrawal.

Below, I provide the specifications (variables and hypotheses) of this research.

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables
<p>Authoritarian Deterioration</p> <p>Authoritarian Breakdown</p> <p>Authoritarian Installation</p> <p>Democratic Installation</p>	<p>Foreign Aid</p> <p>Regime Type</p> <p>Societal Fragmentation</p> <p>Military Withdrawal</p>

Hypotheses

Foreign Aid

[H1] Foreign aid receipts will increase the durability of authoritarians that rely on patronage and clientelism. Alternatively, the reduction of foreign aid should destabilize authoritarians and cause deterioration and breakdown.

Regime Type

[H2a] If the authoritarian government is ruled by single dominant party, it will be stable against endogenous shocks and most exogenous shocks. [H2b] However, an amalgam of a single party and sultanistic military regime will be more durable against the same destabilizing shocks.

Societal Fragmentation

[H3] Ethnic and class fragmentation will hinder collective action and prevent popular anti-regime movements. Thus, societal fragmentation should prevent democratization.

Military Withdrawal

[H4a] Threats to the military's corporate interests, particularly interference with its budget and autonomy, will result in military withdrawal. Military withdrawal will permit regime deterioration and breakdown in times of civil unrest. [H4b] Coup-proofing strategies such as patronage, ascriptive selection, and counterbalancing will prevent military withdrawal and deterioration will not occur.

Case Selection

The motivation behind my case selection is attributable to the abundance of regional research and relative scarcity of cross-regional studies in comparative politics and civil-military relations. In other words, research has largely focused on studying a group of countries in one region. Yet only a few have focused on examining democratization in cross-regional contexts. By selecting two countries from two different regions, East Asia and North Africa, this study attempts to marry the findings from regional scholars that focus on Asia and MENA.

The case selection of South Korea and Algeria is driven by their observable cross-regional differences. Historical analysis demonstrates differences in the cases' colonial histories, cultural diversity, globalization, and economic provisions. The Algerian population is comprised of ethnic groups: Arab-Algerian majority, Berbers, etc. (Freedom House). The state receives significant revenues from its robust oil reserves (OPEC). On the other hand, the South Korean population is not divided by ethnic majorities and minorities. It also imports considerable amounts of crude amongst other natural resources and basic commodities (The World Bank). However, the South Korean economy and society are considerably more developed than those of Algeria.

The democratization process diverged greatly among South Korea and Algeria. South Korea initiated democratic transition almost forty years after gaining independence from Japan. In contrast, prospects for democratization remain unclear for Algeria to this day. While South Korea is now a consolidated democracy, Algeria presents a democratic façade (Cook 2007). Surprisingly, Algeria failed to participate in the diffusion of mass anti-regime movements that ousted the authoritarian regime in neighboring Tunisia during the Arab Spring. Algerian government officials were quick to respond that Algeria became a democracy long before its neighbors following the formal liberalization of its economy and society in the 1980s (Quandt 1972).

Despite all these differences, South Korea and Algeria experienced authoritarianism and militarization following their independence from colonial powers. While democratization was permeated by military elites in both cases, their outcomes still diverged. In addition, within-case observations later in the paper reveal interesting variance concerning regime stability. This study comparatively analyzes the divergent cases by testing four hypotheses prevalent in political science sub-fields explaining democratization.

Both cases share a history of authoritarianism and militarization. In addition, there are observable social divisions and mass popular social mobilizations in both countries. Transnationally, South Korea and Algeria received foreign aid from industrialized countries to help finance economic development. The rest of this study shows South Korea and Algeria faced similar constraints in the process of transitioning in part by the degree of militarization. However, they diverged due to different resources and opportunities of domestic actors.

To set a foundation for a controlled comparison, this study begins with structured case studies of South Korea and Algeria. The case studies detail historical evidence derived from

government sources, scholarly journals, and university press books. Observations begin from the post-independent periods to democratic transition or current available data. Since this research is interested in authoritarian regimes, within case observations are differentiated by government administrations. The South Korean case study covers the 1940s to 1990s, and the Algeria case study covers 1960s to 2019. Chapter six details the results of the controlled comparison of the two cases. By testing my hypotheses, the study identifies how the four variables interact in certain contexts.

IV. SOUTH KOREA

Korea gained its independence from Japan in 1945 more than thirty years after the country was invaded in 1910. While the struggle for independence came to an end, the internal unrest continued up to the separation of North Korea and South Korea in the late 1940s. The persistence of war and violence gave the South Korean military an important role in the security of the nation. By the end of the Korean War, South Korea had become a military-dominated state.

Post-Independence & Syngman Rhee, 1948-1960

Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) was the first civilian president elected in South Korean history. To minimize political opponents and avoid factions within the officer corps, Rhee attempted to co-opt the military into his regime promoting loyal officers to key leadership positions. At the same time, Rhee used intelligence agencies to monitor the military. The political integration of the military and Rhee's use of intrusive methods to guarantee the institution's loyalty resulted into factional divides. Thus, when Rhee called on the military to repress civilian protests following his fraudulent electoral victory in the 1960 presidential election, the military refused (Yun 1997; Saxer 2002). Rhee was ultimately forced down from office, however the mass uprisings persisted due to corruption claims centered around the current government.

Rhee's instrumentalization of the military and security forces solidified the politicization of the South Korean coercive institutions, arguably initiating the "path dependency". After his presidency, a short-lived parliamentary system led by Premier Chang Myon could not contain the uprisings.

1961 Military Coup & Park Chung-hee, 1961-1979

Taking the civil unrest as an opportunity, a group of officers successfully staged a coup against the civilian government. Under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee, the officers

claimed the illegal coup as act to promote national security from external threats, political corruption, and to calm social instability (Croissant et al 2013: 60). Claiming political rule under a military junta, Park purged the old civilian and military loyalists.

In many ways, Park adopted an effective legitimizing principle. Famous for the extreme reform of the South Korean economy, Park legitimized his illegal assumption of power with an economic and social development program. Furthermore, Park retired from the military and held presidential elections in 1963, 1967, and 1971. Although Park claimed legitimate victory with democratic elections, the military's presence near the polls signaled an outcome of violence and repression with loss. To prevent the rise of internal and external opposition, Park instrumentalized the state's coercive forces to execute repressive security laws and repeated martial law. Particularly, there was heavily reliance on the military police, the Capital Garrison Command (CGC), the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), and the Defense Security Command (DSC) which were responsible for promoting government support among civil society and crushing labor-led uprisings (Croissant et al 2013).

Following his presidential victory in 1971, Park declared a state of emergency in an effort to expand his political control (Saxer 2002; Kwak 2012). He replaced the old Constitution with the Yushin System (Restoration) in 1972 which permitted presidents to run for six-year terms, repeatedly absent any limits. The South Korean government solidified its militarization under Park who strategically controlled the armed forces by appointing officers to cabinet positions and state enterprises. Specifically, retired officers were placed in key ministries, the National Assembly, and the Parliamentary Committees (Croissant et al: 61).

Perhaps one of the most intrusive strategies Park utilize to prolong his power was the indoctrination of South Koreans. Park's military regime controlled the population through

ensorship, media control, required military service and reserve duty, and the proliferation of military training in high schools and colleges. In addition to these strategies, Park created a paramilitary group Civil Defense Corps and Students Defense Corps and the Hanahoe faction (Group One) to guarantee continuous military support.

Hanahoe serves as a significant political military faction as will be later discussed. Under Park, the faction was comprised with top students recruited from the Korean Military Academy. As a caveat, most Hanahoe recruits were from Park's province Taegu-Kyongsang (TK). Its members received preferential treatment in promotions and mission assignments. Perceived as his most loyal faction, Park appointed Hanahoe members into key regime positions such as presidential secretariat, the military intelligence services, and as commanders of elite combat units (Croissant et al 2013).

In a multi-level coup, Park was unexpectedly assassinated by the KCIA in 1979. Under the new command of General Chun Doo-hwan, Park's appointed commander of the DSC, the previous military leaders were arrested and Hanahoe members subsequently filled the vacancies. Following Park's assassination, the new president, Choi Kyu-hah, ran a short-lived government as a military coup spearheaded by General Chun successfully overthrew him and declared a martial law in 1980. Arguably, Choi's mistake rests in appointing General Chun as the chief of the KCIA.

Chun Doo-hwan & the Continuation of Military Rule, 1980-1988

Chun began his dictatorial rule with a series of undemocratic reforms. To hamper the potential rise of social instability, Chun dissolved the legislature, banned political activity, and arrested thousands of political leaders and dissidents (Croissant et al 2013: 61). He replaced the KCIA with Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) and formally signed its separation

from the regular armed forces. Perhaps one of the stark differences of the Chun regime from the Park regime was its “quasi-civilianized government,” achieved by the co-optation of civilian politicians (Croissant et al: 62). Nevertheless, the military maintained political, economic, and regime dominance. Similar to Park, Chun relied on military intelligence and security forces to monitor potential opposition. The DSC permeated the National Assembly, the judicial courts, bureaucracy, and the media (Kwak 2012).

Chun also heavily relied on repressive strategies to control civil society. Yet the South Korean’s struggle for democratic reforms and rebellion against the military regimes took hold in the 1980s Kwangju Uprisings. The initial periods of anti-military protests were led by a few hundred university students who consequently suffered brutal repression from the military. Soon enough, the brutal repression of young South Koreans compelled more civilians to join the protests. It is estimated that the popular mobilization brought approximately 250,000 South Koreans to protest Chun’s rule in the city of Kwangju (Gwangju). With the support of the United States, the U.S.-South Korean allied forces were tasked to contain the social unrest. However, Chun commanded soldiers to repress the civilian protestors, resulting in casualties and encouraging more citizens to join. The popular uprisings soon became an armed civilian effort, and with the help of the media, the civilians prevailed and pushed the military out of Kwangju. However, the liberation of the city was short-lived as the military attacked civilians indiscriminately a few days later, ending the rebellion.

In short, the Kwangju uprisings could not directly bring about democratic transition against the South Korean military’s monopoly on violence. Yet the Kwangju massacre and the persistence of civil unrests further undermined Chun’s illegitimate presidency, forcing him to

step down in 1987. Nevertheless, the military domination was succeeded by Chun's co-conspirator in the 1979 military coup, Roh Tae-woo.

Roh Tae-woo, 1988-1993 & Democratic Reforms Under President Kim Young Sam (KYS), 1993-1998

Roh's unpopular succession was met with a wave of anti-military regime protests comprised of diverse groups—students, workers, and the middle class—all united as South Koreans. The military's response to these protests, however, was more complex than in the past. The inclusion of the middle class and U.S. pressure to initiate democratic reforms, the command to repress the civilian protestors created factional divides among the military elites (Croissant et al, 2013). The “Declaration of Democratization and Reforms” marked South Korea's transition to democracy. The democratic reforms included the 1987 Constitution which was approved by a plebiscite and direct elections for the presidency and the National Assembly.

Nevertheless, these reforms proved minimal as Roh remained victorious in the 1987 presidential election. The 1992 presidential elections were instrumental to South Korea's transition to democratic governance. The victory of the first civilian president in over three decades, Kim Young Sam, signaled the separation from military rule. KYS had been a long-term known dissident of the military regime. Although he aggressively reduced the military's influence in the South Korean government, KYS ensured to do so strategically by sequentially removing the military from political offices but initially allowing them to retain autonomy over their institutional affairs (Croissant et al 2013). Under KYS, cabinet positions held by military personnel were reduced from 20% to 5%. Former leaders of the military regime, Chun, and Roh faced trial for corruption charges.

V. ALGERIA

Algeria gained its independence from France in 1960s after being colonized since 1830. Due to the long period of colonial rule, the War of Independence was driven by the desire for sovereignty, nationalism, and Algerian identity. However, military actors interfered in politics and society prior to Algeria's War of Independence. At the heart of the fight for independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN) promoted itself as a proponent of sovereignty, democracy, and became Algeria's dominant party. The FLN comprised of a broad demography of Algerians and upheld the Algerian Arab-Islamic identity against the French colonial mentality. As such, the FLN and its leadership became deeply embedded in post-independent Algeria.

The FLN's success was in part due to its alliance with its armed wing, the Armee de Liberation National (ALN) which was later transformed as the Armee Nationale Populaire (ANP). Algeria's provisional government, the GPRA, was led by FLN leaders at the executive level. However, key cabinet and ministry positions were held by military commanders at the time of independence. Needless to say, Algeria's independence struggle is much more complex. At the beginning, the principle of civilian supremacy and military subordination was formalized by the Souman Conference (1956), Tripoli Program 1962, the Constitution 1963, and the Charter of Algiers (1964) (Cook 2007).

The fight for power and internal divisions within the FLN elites rendered the ALN as the "most cohesive institution in the country," with the help of Colonel Houari Boumediene (Cook 2007). As discussed later in this paper, Boumediene's central role in the military leadership ranks contributed to the politicization of the Algerian military. After becoming the Chief of Staff of the ALN in 1959, Boumediene demanded full control of the ALN. More specifically, he

demanded its full autonomy and separation from the FLN-led provisional government (Quandt 1972).

Post-Independence & Ahmed Ben Bella, 1962 to 1965

After Algeria gained its independence from France, FLN established a provisional government that initially struggled for power against Boumediene's armed forces. Since the ALN separated from the FLN, the once dominant party possessed no means to control the military. At the same time, Boumediene and the ALN lacked the legitimacy of civilian rule. Thus, Boumediene chose to compromise by placing his support for Ahmed Ben Bella, who consequently appointed Boumediene as his Minister of Defense (Cook 2007).

Algeria's 1963 Constitution was approved in a national referendum, electing Ben Bella as the first formal president of Algeria under a five-year term limit. As one of FLN's historic external leaders, Ben Bella was a popular candidate among the people and the ALN (Cook 2007; Entelis 2011). Nevertheless, Ben Bella still experienced internal opposition from guerilla leaders and political dissidents. With the help of General Boumediene, the former ALN was transformed into the ANP, which purged Ben Bella's opposition and other "politically difficult individuals" from the party (Cook 2007: 8).

Houari Boumediene 1965 to 1978

The 1965 military coup headed by Boumediene forced Ben Bella and the parliament out of power. The coup was justified as the military's effort to end corruption of the current regime. The National People's Assembly was replaced by the Revolutionary Council which was comprised by twenty-six military officers and tasked with an official mission to "manage the development of state structures" (Cook 2007). The Revolutionary Council, headed by Boumediene as its Chairman, governed Algeria from 1965 until the National Charter and the

1976 Constitution were formalized. In short, the new constitution solidified the military's role in the founding and development of the Algerian state. Moreover, it declared the FLN's political monopoly and Islam as the national religion of Algeria. After his presidential election in 1976, Boumediene attempted to reform the Algerian economy with programs of rapid industrialization. However, Boumediene's death in 1978 rendered his formal presidency short-lived.

Chadli Benjedid, 1979 to 1992

Following Boumediene's sudden death, Chadli Benjedid became the "compromise candidate" of the military. As a retired military commander, Benjedid retained close ties with the military. In 1979, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment to fill the prime minister vacancy. The result was a semi-presidential system. Although this seemingly reflects a move towards more democratic principles, it has different implications for authoritarian states with severe military influence. Pion-Berlin (2009) shows that the military can benefit from a dual chain of command. By this mechanism, the military can play off the president and the prime minister.

In the mid 1980s, a wave of riots and violent protests surged through Algeria in response to rising inflation and unemployment rate caused by the drop of oil and gas prices—Algeria's main commodity export. To appease the civil unrest, the regime established the 1989 Constitution removing the ban on political parties as well as the military's central role in national development from the constitution. As a result, over twenty new political parties were licensed. This included the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which won over half the vote in local elections in 1990. The growing popularity of the FIS became apparent to the regime leaders after the FIS won the first round of elections the following year. At this rate, many expected the FIS to win an absolute majority in the second round of elections.

However, a military coup intervened, preventing the FIS party's precedented victory in 1992. The coup forced President Benjedid to resign. In the process, Chadli also dissolved the parliament. The Higher State Council, chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf, filled this vacancy and declared a state of emergency. Almost immediately, the FIS was ordered to demobilize which initiates a long-term violent conflict with armed Islamic groups in Algeria (Volpi 2013).

Liamine Zeroual, 1994 to 1999.

Zeroual, a retired military general and former Defense Minister, became the appointed chairman of the Higher State Council. In 1995, he assumed presidency with a majority vote victory. A popular referendum in 1996 approved his proposed Constitutional reforms in 1996 with 85% of voters. In 1997, parliamentary elections were won by new Democratic National Rally followed by Movement of Society for Peace (moderate Islamic Party). Despite more liberal reforms, Zeroual suddenly announced his resignation in 1998. He formally resigned in 1999, two years prior to the end of his presidential term.

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Two Decades of Authoritarian Rule 1999 to 2019.

In the lead up to the presidential elections, all candidates abruptly withdrew which left Bouteflika unopposed in 1999. The six candidates who backed out on the eve of the election claimed reasoned their concerns over the fairness and transparency of the election. His administrated used cooptation and patronage to widen its support base. Bouteflika appeased and coopted other parties such as the Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society (MSP) and the National Democratic Rally (RND). A referendum held in 1999 approved his law on civil concord which pardoned armed Islamist groups of the FIS such as the AIS. However, Islamist attacks on civilians and security forces continue with casualties over 100,000 in 2000 since 1992.

Bouteflika was re-elected in 2004 and 2009, boasting victories with 84% and 90% of the votes (Volpi). In his second term, Bouteflika sought to reform the “judiciary, amending the retrograde 1984 family code that severely inhibited women’s rights, strengthened human rights, and restored the authority of the state” (Entelis 2011: 661). However, these reforms have not translated into liberalization and democratization de facto/ in practice. There is a persisting institutionalized division of civilian and military rulers that allows an autonomous military to influence politics (Entelis 2011). This was evidenced in 2008 when the National Assembly passed a series of constitutional amendments that permitted the prolong presidency of Bouteflika who suffered a stroke pass its legal limits allowing him to run and be elected for a third term in 2009 (661).

The domestic economy did not improve despite state subsidies and infrastructural investments afforded by Algeria’s oil revenues. U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford leaked to Washington that Algerians were striking nearly every week. The year before the Arab Spring, Algerian newspapers reported regular episodes of rioting in many parts of the country. However, the regime was maintained, nor was it ever threatened to collapse (Volpi 2013: 106). The deregulation of the state-subsidized economy resulted in rising prices and shortages of basic goods. Algerians saw that Tunisians were also having a crisis in 2010. Algeria’s free press media reported the subsequent rioting in poorer parts of Algiers and Oran as well as twenty other regions (Wilayat)P which reached the capital (Volpi 2013: 107). The 2011 riots reflected similar grievances of the 1988 unrest. However, two similar differences emerged. The FIS and Islamist groups were not nearly as active or brought large numbers, nor was the security forces respond as lethal.

The security forces did not target the suburbs as it did in 1988. Instead, they focused on key urban areas in Algiers. They protected the Parliament, the Senate, and other government buildings (Volpi 2013). This difference shows the possible adoption of a coup-proofing method. Rather than exacerbating protests with repressive attacks on civilians, the security forces used restrained force. This resulted in the lack of further protests regarding violent repression. The riots subsided after a few days when the government announced the reversal of price hikes of food imports.

VI. RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter presents a comparative analysis of South Korea and Algeria. It begins by testing the four hypotheses to examine the four independent variables: foreign aid, regime type, societal fragmentation, and military withdrawal. Then, I synthesize these findings to analyze the interactions of the independent variables given certain contexts. By synthesizing the findings, this study hopes to contribute to the existing literature by suggesting how this can affect MENA.

Comparative Analysis

Hypothesis 1: Foreign Aid

This hypothesis is interested in examining the effects of foreign aid receipts on authoritarian stability. In order to do so, annual foreign aid flows must be analyzed against the within-case observations from the previous two chapters. In other words, I examine the relationship between rise and decline of foreign aid flows and the stability of authoritarian regimes. Figure 1a shows foreign aid and official development assistance received by Algeria and South Korea from 1960 to 2016. The data was obtained from the World Bank. It aggregates loans, grants, and other types of development aid.




Figure 1a: Foreign Aid Receipts

The highest periods of foreign aid received is during the War for Independence, likely financed by the Soviet Union. Since Boumediene isolated the Algerian state, there is a noticeable decline during his rule. An unusual spike near 1976, but all relatively low afterwards. Zeroual's regime saw a relative rise in foreign aid, which declined with Bouteflika surprisingly. US-Algeria relations did not normalize until the late 1970s. This took hold after Boumediene who isolated Algeria from the Western world. Benjedid liberalized the economy to improve US relations. However, Algeria's traditional source of economic assistance was the Soviet Union. In 1990, Algeria received \$25.8 million in financial assistance and bought \$1 billion in imports from the US. The US hesitantly condemned the 1992 military coup. The authoritarian regime's commitment to liberalizing the economy to foreign trade explains lack of further condemnation from the US. South Korea received relatively stable amounts of foreign aid likely from the US

until the 1980s. Simply put, the data shows that foreign aid stopped flowing in after Park was assassinated and a coup was staged.




Figure 1b. Clientelism. Figure shows extent of clientelism in cases with confidence intervals. A score closest to zero indicates clientelism. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and employment opportunities. (Source: V-Dem).

Fortunately, V-Dem provides data and measures for clientelism. According to V-Dem’s scoring, Algeria has consistently use party clientelism with a mix of local collective. However, does this correspond with foreign aid receipts? To answer this, I survey the highest and lowest periods of foreign aid receipts and spending on clientelist programs. The study finds that periods where foreign aid receipts were highest corresponds to a lower score of clientelism for Algeria. Interestingly, the same can be observed in South Korea prior to its democratic transition in the late 1980s. The foreign aid variable supports the South Korean case. However, there are some factors to consider for Algeria since it has access to oil revenues. Studies show that authoritarians

in the Middle East finance patronage and clientelist networks with oil revenues. For instance, the spike of foreign aid to Algeria from the 1990s to 2000 weakly correlates to the decrease of clientelism evidenced by V-Dem data. On the other hand, it is possible that foreign aid receipts were used to finance patronage systems to co-opt the elite opposition. Nevertheless, this finding indicates that foreign aid may affect authoritarians and clientelism in non-oil producing and oil-producing states differently.

Hypothesis 2: Regime Type

My hypothesis on regime types seeks to examine the relationship between a regime's structures and its durability. To summarize, I anticipate that single party regimes and single party – sultanistic military hybrids are most durable against the death of a leader, internal opposition, and exogenous shocks. Table 2a categorizes authoritarian regimes by single party, personalist, and military rule. One potential limitation is not considering amalgams of pure types as in Geddes (1999). For instance, observations in the Algerian case can be appropriately categorized under single party -military. However, observations where the head of state was identified as a former military officer were placed under military regimes. If the “life-spans” of single party -military hybrids were aggregated, it would still yield an average of 10 years. Yet this calculation does not include any observations from South Korea, where a single party regime was absent. The calculated average for military – personalist (Boumediene, Park, Chun) is 13 years. It is important to note that these averages are potentially skewed due to a limited number of observations.

Table 2a

Regime Type	Single Party	Personalist	Military
Observations	Bouteflika (1999-2019)	Ben Bella (1962-65) Rhee (1948-60)	Boumediene (1965-78) Benjedid (1979-92) Zeroual (1994-99) Park (1961-79) Chun (1980-88) Roh (1988-83)
Avg. (years)	20	7.5	10.2

Following Remmer (1989), I examine observations of military regimes within cases. A total of six military regimes are observed. The Boumediene, Park, and Chun military regimes are categorized under sultanistic military regimes. In each regime, the dictators consolidated authoritative power and placed military elites in top government positions. However, only Park comes near to satisfying the twenty five-year average (Remmer 1989). Table 2b shows the categorization of military regimes with respective average survival rates. A limitation similar to Geddes (1999) potentially skews these findings. As Remmer (1989) notes, military regimes are most commonly characterized as hybrids of these types. Importantly, the structural organization of the military evolves over time to co-opt other elites or avoid internal factions. This study finds support for the durability of sultanistic regimes.

Table 2b

Type	Sultanistic	Oligarchic	Monarchic	Feudal
Observations	Park Boumediene	Chun	Benjedid Zeroual	Roh
Avg. (years)	15.5	8	8.5	5

Based on these findings, the regime type variable yields potentially weak support due to limited observations. However, there is support for hypothesis 2. Single party regimes and

sultanistic military regimes were found to be the most durable. Evidence from the Algerian case study shows that single party – sultanistic hybrids (Boumediene) are stable against exogenous and endogenous shocks. The domination of the FLN and the military did not collapse with Boumediene’s death. Algerian politics has been dominated by the National Liberation Front since gaining its independence. Although there were divisions within the party during the earlier stages of independence, all heads of state were endorsed by the party. Ultimately, the FLN and the Algerian military integrated political and repressive capabilities constituting the hybrid authoritarian regime.

However, the analysis shows that regime type variable cannot explain regime deterioration on its own. Abdelaziz Bouteflika held the longest presidential term at twenty years and Ahmed Ben Bella lies at the other end of the spectrum with the shortest presidential term of three years. In addition, the Boumediene, Benjedid, and Zeroual administrations demonstrate the access of military elites to leadership positions in government. The cooptation of these presidents under the FLN justifies their regimes’ single party - military hybrid classification. The Algerian case provides weak support for the regime type variable. Although the FLN has remained dominant throughout Algerian history, there is an observable variance in the durability of single-party rule.

The South Korean case also provides weak support for the regime type variable. Unlike Algeria, the presence of a competitive multiparty system is evidenced by historical analyses on South Korea. Three authoritarian governments were led by military officers— Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo. Park’s eighteen-year rule constitutes the longest authoritarian regime survival in South Korean history. By contrast, the Chun and Roh military regimes only lasted for eight and five years respectively. This finding supports Geddes (1999)

seven-year average survival for military regimes. In addition, Rhee’s civilian personalist dictatorship lasted for approximately twelve years, which is well below the nineteen-year average from Geddes (1999).

Hypothesis 3: Societal Fragmentation

The societal fragmentation variable seeks to examine the relationship between social divisions and authoritarian stability. As discussed earlier, fragmentation is associated with ineffective organization and mobilization of anti-regime protests. Figure 3 below shows regime opposition as an aggregate of opposition group size in Algeria and South Korea. V-Dem scores this measure with 4 (highest) indicating a large opposition group size.




Figure 3. Societal Fragmentation, Political. A score of four indicates a large opposition, greater than 30 percent of adult population (source: V-Dem).

First, a large opposition group should theoretically translate to regime deterioration. Second, it should indicate that social groups share a collective desire for some political change. Analysis partially supports this hypothesis: social mobilizations led to the deterioration of authoritarians such as Benjedid, Zeroual, Bouteflika, Rhee, and Chun. To determine whether or not societal fragmentation prevented effective mobilization, I examine periods of higher and lower political discontent against observations of small and large civil uprisings.

The Algerian case is marked by large, constant opposition. However, discontent did not destabilize Boumediene's regime. On the other hand, regime opposition rose higher during periods of economic downturns starting in the late 1980s. To manage this, the Benjedid administration removed the ban on other political parties, allowing the FIS to participate until it was later dissolved. The highest period of opposition translated in deterioration however a new authoritarian was often installed. Interestingly, the slight decline in opposition in Algeria occurred during the advent of the Arab Spring in Tunisia. This puzzling observation is discussed in relation to other variables later. Moreover, Algeria has been plagued with ethnic and political conflicts since its independence. The marginalization of the FIS and other Islamist groups led to persisting armed conflicts and high civilian casualties. The war on terrorism exacerbated the aversion against Islamist opposition groups. Some scholars have explained Algeria's silence during the Arab Spring as a consequence of the country's long history with internal violence. At the same time, others posit that Algeria was not exactly "silent" during the Arab Spring. Rather, it suffered from a lack of momentum due to distrust among various anti-regime opposition groups.

In South Korea, opposition group size was highest in the 1980s prior to the state's democratization. It decreased dramatically following the presidential appointment of KYS. As

discussed in the case study, South Koreans from different socio-economic groups participated in mass popular mobilizations that protested corruption of the Chun and Roh regimes. Prior incidents of civil protests were largely led by students and labor groups. By contrast, the civil mobilizations following the deadly Kwangju massacre in 1980 included participants from all socio-economic backgrounds. Particularly, the middle class began participating alongside university students and laborers. Existing literature seem to indicate that middle class participation is important in civil uprisings. This posed greater risks for repressing the protests with indiscriminate violence.

Overall, this study finds some support for the societal fragmentation variable. This is weak however because the presence of social divisions does not always prevent popular mobilization even though it negatively affects their numbers. Moreover, findings suggest that civil uprisings may be necessary but not sufficient to cause regime deterioration. Nevertheless, collective action is necessary for effective organization of anti-regime movements.

Hypothesis 4: Military Withdrawal

This study measures military withdrawal through signals such as defection or coup attempts. These signals are aggregated as the measure of military withdrawal. The outcome variable regime collapse is defined as the deterioration of a regime causing forced or voluntary resignation of the head of state. The variable other encompasses other causes of collapse such as natural death or democratic transition. Table 4a shows ten observations of regime collapse following the military's withdrawal of support. Out of all observations, only Boumediene's regime collapse was attributable to natural causes. Overall, this study finds support for the military withdrawal variable.

Table 4a

Collapse	Withdrawal	Others
Observation	Rhee 1960 Yun 1962 Ben Bella, 1965 Park, 1979 Choi 1980 Chun, 1988 Benjedid, 1992 Zeroual, 1999 Roh, 1993 Bouteflika, 2019	Boumediene, 1978

In Algerian, the military coup led by Boumediene ousted civilian president Ben Bella in 1965. Then, Benjedid who was the military’s “compromise choice” was forced down by a military coup in 1992. Zeroual's sudden resignation two years prior to the presidential election is also attributable to the loss of military support. In South Korea, Park’s successful coup attempt in 1961 prevented a democratically elected premier from assuming office. Then, Park’s assassination in 1979 and General Chun’s subsequent military coup in 1980 also show evidence of regime collapse due to military withdrawal. The collapse of Rhee’s civilian dictatorship shows that military support was necessary to manage the high political discontent following the fraudulent presidential election in 1960. The military’s unexpected refusal to quell the protests demonstrated the withdrawal of its support.

Military withdrawal contributed to the destabilization of authoritarian regimes in ten out of eleven regimes observed. The comparative analysis suggests that early instrumentalization of the military in politics contributed to the legitimization of its role as the guardian of the state. Popular civil uprisings create internal splits within the higher and lower ranks of the military. The decision whether to repress civilian protesters or not caused such divisions. Interestingly,

internal factions led to the military’s refusal to support the authoritarian regime. In all instances, the dictator was either ousted or resigned voluntarily.

In addition, threats to the military’s corporate interest support the study’s hypothesis on military withdrawal and authoritarian deterioration. This study uses data on military spending to measure the budget category of the military’s corporate interests. Figure 2a shows data on government expenditures on the military (military spending per GDP) in South Korea and Algeria from 1960 to 2016. Then, Figure 2b shows military spending as a percentage of government spending to provide additional information and serve as a contrast. Due to data limitations, this only covers the period from 1990 to 2016.




Figure 4a: Military spending, percent of GDP, 1960 to 2016 (data source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).




Figure 4b. Military spending as percent of total government expenditure, 1990-2016

The figures show Algerian military spending as percent of GDP gradually declined to the lowest point approaching 1992. In the same year, a military coup forced Benjedid to resign. The figure shows a noticeable rise in military spending after the 1992 coup. Following the 2008 recession, a continued gradual increase in military spending is observed. South Korea saw military spending fluctuate from the early 1960 to the 1980s. Due to limited data, this paper could not include data prior to the 1960s to assess Rhee. However, it suggests that military spending was as high as about 7 percent of South Korea’s GDP under Rhee. Interestingly, it decreased to about 4 to 6 percent under Park. Thus, it is plausible to assume that the decrease under Park led to dissatisfaction within the military elites and resulted to his unanticipated assassination in 1979. While there was a higher constant during Chun’s regime, the subsequent decline is seen around the mid 1980s.

Both Algeria and South Korea faced destabilizing external and internal threats. Externally, South Korea and Algeria have shared borders with formerly or currently hostile neighbors—North Korea and Morocco. Internally, Algeria struggled with armed terrorist groups (Al Qaeda). The FLN consistently faced persisting civil unrest with Islamist opposition armed groups. However, there is a clear constant decline and stabilization in South Korea's military spending that is not observed in Algeria. To examine whether or not the increase in military spending is appropriate to the threats faced in Algeria, this study accounts for any rise in domestic or international threats. If no significant external or internal threat are empirically observed, then this suggests that Zeroual and Bouteflika used appeasement methods via patronage systems ensure loyalty. Interestingly, the spike in military expenditures is seen near 2011 when the Arab Spring was happening.

On the other hand, findings suggest that coup-proofing mechanisms can lengthen authoritarian survival but not indefinitely. To assess this, this study measures for coup-proofing using data on armed forces personnel. Figure 2c shows data on armed forces personnel. This is measured based on the number of active-duty military personnel and paramilitary forces used to support or replace the military.




Figure 2c: Number of Armed Forces Personnel, 1985 to 2015

(source: International Institute for Strategic Studies)

Interestingly, data shows a gradual decrease in South Korea's military personnel. Since South Korea borders North Korea, it is important to note that the high number of personnel is justified. Nevertheless, the North Korean threat has not lessened but arguably increased due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, the decrease of forces suggests that South Korea is moving towards modernizing its armed forces appropriately. During Benjedid's regime, personnel was decreased to a low 126000 people in 1989. Algeria's personnel increased around the late 1990s. Interestingly, personnel reached a maximum of 334200 people in 2009 right before the advent of the Arab Spring in 2010. This suggests that the Bouteflika regime increased recruitment of personnel. This can be attributable to two reasons. Quinlivan (1999) posits that establishment of multiple security forces is a commonly used coup-proofing strategy. Thus, the increase in personnel demonstrates the regime's reliance on the armed forces to silence

dissenters, particularly following Bouteflika's unopposed electoral victory. Alternatively, the observable increase in personnel signals Bouteflika's reliance on appeasement strategies to ensure the military's loyalty. Overall, this study finds support for the military withdrawal variable.

VII. CONCLUSION

Relationships of Variables

In sum, this study finds consistent support for the military withdrawal variable and hypothesis. By contrast, foreign aid receipts, regime structures, and fragmentation variables did not perform consistently. This suggests that these variables were more significant under certain contexts. In other words, foreign aid receipts, favored regime structures, and absence of fragmentation may be necessary in some cases but not sufficient in all cases. As such, the goal of this section is to assess the weight of these variables under certain contexts.

First, the analysis undertaken in this study suggests that foreign aid receipts may stabilize authoritarians in non-oil producing countries. Particularly, South Korea under Park and Chun serve as case in point. Under Park, rapid industrialization was made possible by development aid from Japan. In many ways, Park's successful economic development program boosted the Korean economy. This was an effective legitimizing principle for his regime. Under Chun, U.S. aid and assistance contributed to the military's capacity to carry out indiscriminate attacks in the Kwangju massacre. Then, the subsequent threat to withdraw aid and support due to human rights abuses created divisions within the military elite. Ultimately, this forced Chun to step down.

Second, the structure of an authoritarian regime does not explain regime deterioration and breakdown. However, findings suggest that an authoritarian's legitimizing principle matters more. In some ways, these strategies are interrelated with regime type because certain regimes tend to rely more on specific coup prevention and appeasement strategies. For instance, the FLN relies on cooptation, patronage, multiple security forces, and ascriptive selection to maintain its support base. The Bouteflika regime expanded clientelist programs in response to domestic inflation and overall government dissatisfaction. Thus, this indicates that interference with patronage systems and clientelism can potentially destabilize a regime. However, Bouteflika's

proliferation of security forces worked to prevent deterioration. This is until explicit inability to speak or move was questioned by nationwide. As discussed earlier, the survival of the Park regime seems to hinge on his successful economic programs and militarization of the state. Overall, these findings simply show that legitimizing and appeasement strategies matter more than structural organization.

Third, fragmentation can effectively prevent mass mobilization. Importantly, this study suggests that pervasive distrust among societal groups can hurt the prospects of democratization. However, civilian protester casualties in Algeria and South Korea demonstrate that social mobilization does not always lead to regime deterioration. For instance, the slight decline in opposition size in Algeria right before the Arab Spring in Tunisia suggests the regime's use of coup prevention mechanisms. As it turns out, armed forces personnel was increased dramatically during this time.

Finally, analyses of the first three independent variables point to a key missing link: military withdrawal. This study found consistent support for the military withdrawal variable in all observations, except for Boumediene's death by natural causes. This shows that military support is a consistently necessary variable for authoritarian stability. The main question is—is military support sufficient? Empirical evidence from the authoritarian contexts in South Korea and Algeria shows that military support is sufficient and necessary. Arguably, this is attributable to the fact that authoritarians rely on the armed forces to quell rebellions.

In conclusion, authoritarian regimes are not always ousted by withdrawal of foreign aid, their structures, or anti-regime mobilizations. Military support, or the threat of repressive violence, can mitigate overall dissatisfaction caused by disturbances to clientelism caused by exogenous shocks or overall corruption charges. However, this conclusion seems to correlate more with

highly autocratic regimes. As such, this finding indicates that military's withdrawal from politics results in regime breakdown and democratic installation. This explains the process of democratization in South Korea and its absence in Algeria. As it stands, the current Algerian president Tebboune not only served under Bouteflika's authoritarian government but is known to have ties with military elites.

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