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Looking Good is Half the Battle:
How Occupational Gender Distributions Shape the Returns to Physical Attractiveness and Grooming in the U.S. Labor Market

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Sociology

by

Karolina Placek

Dissertation Committee:
Associate Professor Andrew Penner, Chair
Associate Professor Catherine Bolzendahl
Professor Matthew Huffman
Professor Judith Treas

2016

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My Father. This has always been for you.

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Looking Good is Half the Battle:
How Occupational Gender Distributions Shape the Returns to Physical Attractiveness and Grooming in the U.S. Labor Market

By

Karolina Placek

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Irvine, 2016

Associate Professor Andrew Penner, Chair

Data is drawn from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health and the 2000 U.S. Census in order to analyze how different dimensions of physical appearance and the gender distribution of workers within a given occupation influence earnings. Grooming was identified as the primary determinant of attractiveness, and higher levels of attractiveness and grooming were positively associated with earnings. Although the labor market returns to physical attractiveness and to personality attractiveness did not differ significantly by gender, women generated greater returns to grooming whereas men experienced some significant BMI-based premia.

This study uniquely shows that the returns to attractiveness and to grooming fluctuate not only according to an individual's gender identity, but also to the gender composition of their job. The returns to attractiveness differed between male-dominated, female-dominated, and gender egalitarian jobs - especially among women. Women within male-dominated jobs experienced income penalties for being unattractive or very

attractive. Thus, male-dominated occupations not only persist as ripe sites for the proliferation of gender-based and attractiveness-based inequalities, but they are the sole occupational context where the Beauty is Beastly Effect was detected. The Beauty is Beastly Effect did not similarly occur on the basis of grooming, nor did it impact men.

The returns to grooming varied across the three occupational gender distributions to a greater extent than the returns to attractiveness, and they did so in more complex ways. The returns to grooming varied more for women *within* each occupational context, but they varied more for men *between* the three contexts. Interestingly, sex-segregated occupations primarily impeded the grooming premia earned by very well groomed men. Overall, men and women may be more susceptible to income penalties for violating gendered appearance norms when they are employed in a "gender inappropriate" job.

Finally, in occupations where female and male workers were more equally represented, attractiveness penalties were no longer identified and there were also fewer gender differences in the returns to attractiveness and to grooming. These findings suggest that the continued efforts to diversify occupations can contribute towards eradicating gender-based and appearance-based labor market inequalities.

INTRODUCTION

Research Concepts

This research offers extensive analyses on how physical attractiveness shapes the earnings of men and women within the American labor market. Although decades worth of empirical investigations have consistently shown that attractive individuals are socially and institutionally privileged across a wide range of arenas, much less emphasis has been placed on how the labor market returns to attractiveness are influenced by identity categories - such as gender (Wong and Penner 2016) - or by occupational contexts (Deryugina 2013, Heilman and Stopeck 1985). Furthermore, the literature overwhelmingly concludes that "what is beautiful is good" (Dion, Berscheid and Walster 1972) in its contention that there is a wholesale beauty bias that bestows advantages onto attractive individuals relative to their less attractive counterparts. Few studies have examined how attractiveness may actually work against individuals - a phenomenon known as the “Beauty is Beastly Effect” (Heilman 1980) - and even fewer studies have analyzed these dynamics using nationally representative data.

I aim to address these limitations by utilizing a large-scale, content rich, and nationally representative dataset - the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (also known as “Add Health”) – alongside data from the 2000 U.S. Census in order to analyze how gender, occupational contexts, physical attractiveness, and other primary determinants of attractiveness shape the earnings of over 13,000 young adults across the United States. Add Health has offered unique opportunities for scholars to examine various aspects of physical attractiveness and how they influence a multitude of outcomes. Studies employing Add Health have confirmed that beauty premiums in earnings exist (Wong and Penner 2016) and

that they are quite hefty relative to the respondents' actual ability (Fletcher 2009). Furthermore, scholars have been able to assess how personality and grooming function as crucial determinants of attractiveness (Wong and Penner 2016), while also highlighting how employers discriminate based on these characteristics (Robins, Homer and French 2011).

Research Overview

Chapter 1 offers a Literature Review, which summarizes the scholarship on the returns to attractiveness, how attractiveness is evaluated, and the competing theoretical perspectives that have been proposed by biosociologists, psychologists, economists, and sociologists in order to explain why people generate rewards or penalties on the basis of attractiveness.

Utilizing the Add Health data, Chapter 2 provides introductory analyses which affirm the existence of a general beauty premium within the U.S. labor market, but found no support for the presence of a gendered beauty premium. Thus, relatively attractive and well groomed Americans do report higher earnings than their counterparts, but there were no significant gender differences detected in the returns to physical attractiveness or to personality attractiveness. On the other hand, grooming was identified as the primary determinant of attractiveness for both men and women, but women generated significantly greater premia for being well groomed or very well groomed. Finally, the returns to body mass index (BMI) were significantly higher for men, even though BMI was not nearly as strong of a determinant of attractiveness. These results challenge the central claims made by biosociologists and evolutionary psychologists, because they convey that grooming is a far greater determinant of attractiveness than purely physiological traits like BMI and height. Hence, sociological explanations may better account for the biases and disparate outcomes linked to appearance.

This project also elaborates on a contentious theme in the literature: the uncertainty regarding the directionality of attractiveness biases (Griffin and Langlois 2006). The findings indicate that beauty biases shape the general earnings of Americans in a bidirectional manner: some people are rewarded for being attractive and well groomed, while others are penalized for being unattractive and poorly groomed. However, the analyses in Chapter 3 demonstrate that the directionality of the biases is not static, but that it is shaped by occupational contexts.

Employing data from Add Health and the 2000 U.S. Census, Chapter 3 examines how occupational gender distributions influence the labor market returns to physical attractiveness. Historically, occupational sex-segregation has endured as one of the focal points within the research on gender and on inequality more broadly. However, when it comes to the labor market, it is not only the individual workers, but their jobs, that are explicitly gendered (Acker 1990). Although there were no significant gender differences in the returns to attractiveness, a different picture emerges once an individual's gender identity *and* the gender of their job are taken into account. When assessing the relationship between earnings, attractiveness, and occupational gender distributions, two significant income penalties were identified: those imposed on unattractive women and very attractive women within male-dominated jobs. The critical take-away findings are that occupational gender distributions primarily impact the returns to attractiveness for women, and that the Beauty is Beastly Effect only impedes the earnings of very attractive women within male-dominated jobs. Thus, working women are uniquely vulnerable to biases related to attractiveness, and they remain especially susceptible to gender-based and appearance-based discrimination in male-dominated professions. These results also underscore that occupational contexts shape the directionality of the attractiveness biases. Among women who work in male-dominated jobs, the bias is no longer bidirectional

(like it is at the aggregate level), but it is more consistent with negativity bias (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer et al. 2001). Indeed, the disadvantages associated with unattractiveness may outweigh any rewards linked with attractiveness, since women in male-dominated jobs were not only penalized for being unattractive, but for being very attractive.

Chapter 4 builds on the contributions of the preceding chapters by demonstrating that the returns to grooming also vary between male-dominated, female-dominated, and gender egalitarian occupations. However, these occupational gender distributions not only shape the returns to grooming to a greater extent than the returns to attractiveness, but they do so in much more complex ways. The returns to grooming varied more for women *within* each of the three occupational contexts, but they varied more for men *between* these contexts. Furthermore, sex-segregated occupations primarily impeded the attractiveness premia among women, but they mainly hindered the grooming premia generated by very well groomed men.

The analyses also show that in gender egalitarian occupations, the two attractiveness penalties were no longer present and that there were fewer gender differences in the returns to attractiveness and to grooming. Thus, the continued efforts to diversify occupational settings should help to reduce gender-based and appearance-based labor market inequalities. However, it is also imperative that we continue to adopt laws which more broadly prohibit employers from engaging in various forms of appearance-based discrimination, and that the courts begin to consider race-sex-class intersections within appearance discrimination cases.

Chapter 5 offers a more comprehensive summary of the results produced by this study, followed by a discussion of its social implications and limitations. It concludes by providing some recommendations for how future researchers should address some of the limitations of this study and more generally contribute to the literature on appearance-based inequalities.

CHAPTER 1:

Literature Review

Chapter 1 Overview

The first half of Chapter 1 begins with a Literature Review, which will provide a comprehensive overview of the academic literatures pertaining to physical attractiveness across a broad spectrum of social and biological sciences. Section I explores the so-called "beauty premium," and discusses why individuals experience disparate outcomes and earnings as a result of ascriptive characteristics – such as gender, race, and physical attractiveness. Section II will focus specifically on how physical attractiveness itself is perceived and evaluated. In order to understand why individuals experience incongruent rewards or penalties on the basis of physical attractiveness, Section III provides a summary of how various theoretical perspectives explain appearance biases and disparate outcomes.

LITERATURE REVIEW

I. The Returns to Physical Attractiveness

As an enduring and crucial issue in sociology, innumerable studies have explored how ascriptive characteristics and categories, such as gender and race, are linked to inequalities within the labor market and other institutions. Although ascriptive traits are often framed as being biologically based, many scholars have demonstrated that they are not only socially determined to a great extent, but that they are also inherently subjected to social ranking processes. Indeed, many traits that are often taken for granted as immutable and biologically

deterministic tend to factor prominently into the assessments of an individual's overall character, because they are tied to social contexts, perceptions, and stereotypes. In sum, individuals are armed with the ability to detect biological markers - which can convey characteristics such as one's sex or race – but it is critical to emphasize that these markers are intrinsically imbued with socially loaded meanings.

The core dilemma at hand is that physiological traits demand social interpretations, which ultimately results in inequality since these processes require socially ascertained categories to be ranked in an ordinal fashion. For this reason, a great deal of theorizing across the social sciences and various feminist perspectives posits that the meanings of an identity category are shared at the level of culture, and that the very existence of a category label leads to the potential for producing and sustaining inequalities (Butler 1990, Callero 2014, Foucault 1988). Hence, institutional inequalities are the byproduct of social processes, which subject individuals to the disparate values and treatments that are shaped by structures of power.

This is especially true for assessments of an individual's physical attractiveness – which are tied to social perceptions, to various axes of identity, to specific contexts, and ultimately, to a multitude of tangible outcomes. Indeed, the present study will demonstrate that various aspects of physical appearance – such as physical attractiveness, grooming, and body mass index – significantly impact the earnings of American workers. Furthermore, the results indicate that these labor market returns are not only shaped by identity categories - namely gender – but also by occupational contexts - such as the gender distribution within a given profession. Although the empirical examination of inequalities tied to gender, race, and class has a rich history within the social sciences, the role played by physical attractiveness has generated far less academic scrutiny - especially within the field of sociology.

Identity Categories & Income Inequalities

Historically, race- and sex-based differences have been attributed to biology (Allan 1869, Gould 1981) but more recent empirical work consistently implicates a social basis for inequality. The literature shows that via a distinctly social process, embodied characteristics can and do carry crucial consequences because these traits tend to be associated with an ascribed status. These ascribed statuses place individuals at an advantage or disadvantage based on how their physiological traits are socially interpreted, evaluated, and ranked within a given culture. For example, Bielby (2000) reports that the gender wage gap in median weekly earnings is about 25%. Other scholars have consistently shown that the persistence of the gender wage gap results primarily from men and women working in different types of jobs, but they are also careful to emphasize that occupations comprised predominantly of females pay less than occupations comprised mainly of males, even after controlling for educational achievements, skill levels, and working conditions (England 1992, England 2010, Kilbourne, England, Farkas et al. 1994, Petersen and Morgan 1995, Steinberg 2001, Treiman and Hartman 1981). Although wage penalties for working in female-dominated occupations can apply to both men and women in these professions, they contribute immensely to the gender wage gap because women are disproportionately represented in these occupations, which also happen to be socially devalued (Cohen and Huffman 2003, Zimmer 1988).

Similarly, decades of research have clearly demonstrated that general inequality - and wage disparities specifically - arise because men are valued over women, in the same vein in which white employees are more positively valued and compensated relative to workers of color. Indeed, racial wage gaps have also been detected, given that white workers earn 22% more than their black counterparts, and 32% more than Hispanic employees (Bielby 2000).

However, it is largely differences within the perceived value of the worker which translates into tangible inequalities, since they contribute to discrimination in hiring, job evaluations, salary negotiations, and income (Darity and Mason 1998, Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Marvelle and Greene 1980, Mobius and Rosenblat 2006). While society places a premium on both maleness and whiteness (Lipsitz 2006) - especially within the context of the workplace - sex and race are far from being the only characteristics that are considered in the assessment of an individual's value in the labor market. Similar processes drive a relatively understudied but nevertheless influential factor: physical attractiveness.

Attractiveness & Income Inequalities

In a parallel fashion to the operation of race and gender in producing inequality, society and its institutions also place a premium on attractiveness, so physiological characteristics often produce social and economic consequences because people value beauty (Dion et al. 1972). Physical attractiveness impacts a broad array of outcomes, including those related to one's personal income, family income, educational attainment, occupational prestige, and psychological well-being (Kwan and Trautner 2011). Indeed, previous research on the premiums and penalties associated with physical appearance confirm that attractive people are privileged across a wide range of arenas: they not only tend to live longer, healthier lives (Kim 2013) and experience higher rates of reproductive success (Pflüger, Oberzaucher, Katina et al. 2012) but they also have more power in social life, the work place, and other institutions such as politics (Berggren, Jordahl and Poutvaara 2006), education (Clifford and Walster 1973, Gordon, Crosnoe and Wang 2013, Umberson and Hughes 1987); marriage (Jæger 2011, Takeuchi 2006, Udry and Eckland 1984), the criminal justice system (Ahola,

Christianson and Hellström 2009, Blair, Judd and Chapleau 2004, Gunnell and Ceci 2010, Stewart 1984), and the labor market (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Wong and Penner 2016) - which is the focus of this research. Furthermore, Heilman and Stopeck (1985) reported that physical attractiveness plays a pivotal role across many stages of the labor market – such as pre-employment decisions, performance evaluations, and recommended personnel actions. In sum, attractive individuals tend to occupy higher socioeconomic outcomes, including housing tenure, employment status, and income (Benzeval, Green and Macintyre 2013).

These findings suggest that physical attractiveness is an important social stratifier, and that similar underlying dynamics are operative in the access and the treatment discrimination processes associated with it (Gordon et al. 2013). However, the assessments of - and the returns to - attractiveness do not merely exist in a vacuum: they intersect with many other identity categories in order to produce complex configurations of experiences and outcomes. As a social construct that is tied to complex institutional inequalities, Western ideals of physical attractiveness are inherently gendered, racialized, and classed. Before proceeding with any further discussion on the differential returns to attractiveness in the labor market, it is crucial to first outline what physical attractiveness means, and how it is evaluated by others.

II. What is “Beautiful”? Assessments & Determinants of Physical Attractiveness

Perhaps the biggest criticism and difficulty faced by scholars studying physical attractiveness lies in the question of what “beauty” really means. There is still a widely held assumption that individuals subscribe to different ideas about what is beautiful, as embodied by the axiom that "beauty lies in the eye of the beholder.” This maxim is not entirely mythical, given that beauty ideals and self-assessments of physical attractiveness have been shown to vary not only across individuals, but also across cultures (Ford and Beach 1951), countries (Morris 2014), local contexts (Swami and Tovée 2005), genders (Dermer and Thiel 1975, Nedelec and Beaver 2011), racial/ethnic groups (Craig 2002, Fikkan and Rothblum 2012, Hebl and Heatherton 1998, Nichter 2000), sexual orientations (Monaghan 2008, Myers, Taub, Morris et al. 1999, Siever 1994, Swami and Tovée 2008, Textor 1999), education levels (MacLaren and Kuh 2004), socioeconomic statuses (Armstrong, Hamilton, Armstrong et al. 2014, Kwan and Trautner 2009), and the relative scarcity of food and other resources (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006, Swami and Tovée 2005). Nevertheless, scholars have remained understandably invested in assessing the validity of this adage, because without any consensus in how attractiveness is evaluated, there can be no consistent effect of attractiveness on social assessments, interactions, behaviors, or outcomes (Langlois, Kalakanis, Rubenstein et al. 2000). Indeed, if physical attractiveness is subjective and illusive phenomenon that cannot be reliably evaluated or measured, how can it be scientifically and systematically studied?

The "eye of the beholder" proverb continues to be widely circulated, despite the fact that empirical research has taken great strides to negate the notion that attractiveness is evaluated and ranked in any abstract, individualized, or idiosyncratic manner. Meta-analyses focusing on attractiveness assessment consensus and reliability have been especially helpful

in grasping not only what people consider beautiful, but how attractiveness itself is evaluated. These studies have quantitatively evaluated the reliability coefficients of attractiveness judgments, finding that raters - especially within a given culture - report high levels of consensus when evaluating the attractiveness of others (Langlois et al. 2000) and that this high level of agreement holds up among adult raters from the U.S. and from Canada (Feingold 1992). More importantly, cross-cultural and cross-ethnic analyses found a strong consensus even among diverse groups of raters, suggesting that there possibly may be a universal standard by which attractiveness is judged - which seriously challenges the assumption that attractiveness assessments are culturally unique or merely represent media-induced standards (Langlois et al. 2000). Researchers have gone so far as to conclude that attractiveness is not only a universal concept, but that it is something that people can assess automatically in a brief glance by encoding cue information gleaned from sensory data (Locher, Unger, Sociedade et al. 1993, Olson and Marshuetz 2005), while other scholars emphasize that even machines can now learn and evaluate attractiveness in a similar capacity as human raters (Eisenthal, Dror and Ruppin 2006, Kagian, Dror, Leyvand et al. 2008).

Finally, the findings of these meta-analyses not only argue that assessments of beauty follow a universal standard, but some scholars have pushed the issue so far as to suspect that the taste for beauty has a biological origin. For example, research also shows that even infants prefer the same types of faces as adults (Etcoff 1999, Langlois, Roggman, Casey et al. 1987, Langlois, Roggman and Rieser-Danner 1990, Langlois, Ritter, Roggman et al. 1991). In sum, there is not only a striking consensus in how attractiveness is assessed, both within and between different ethnic groups and cultures, but there is also evidence to suggest that even infants evaluate attractiveness in a similar manner as adults. However, the greater concern is

that both infants and adults tend to prefer and privilege certain types of faces and bodies. Despite being deemed as “natural” or inevitable, these biases remain largely invisible relative to other forms of discrimination, but more so, they lead people to be subjected to different outcomes as a result of how their physical attributes are socially evaluated.

The literature across multiple domains within the social sciences have confirmed a remarkable amount of consensus in terms of how attractiveness is assessed, even across age, ethnic, cultural, and socio-economic groups. Hence, the “eye of the beholder” proverb appears to be less of an empirical fact and much more of a pleasantry, akin to a similar parable which concedes that “real beauty is on the inside.” Rather, the scholarship has clearly established that if we were to focus exclusively at the U.S., we could indeed pinpoint which specific traits are those that conform to the "universal standard" of beauty (Langlois et al. 2000) within this culture. So empirically, what exactly do we perceive to be beautiful in America today?

Contemporary American Ideals of Beauty

The literature on attractiveness has confirmed that we can expect somewhat of a universal standard when it comes to how Americans evaluate and rank the physical attractiveness of themselves and of others. Overall, it is well established that current Western norms of attractiveness can be understood primarily in terms of a Eurocentric, youthful, and gender-normative ideal (Bordo 1993, Chambers, Clark, Dantzler et al. 1994, Wolf 1991) which is heavily promoted by the mass media (Kilbourne 2010, Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006). Furthermore, these ideals have become more ubiquitous with the help of globalization, neoliberalism, postfeminism, and capitalism - as a result, the norms and discourses which dictate how people should look and act are mainly focused on Western ideals (Klazas 2015).

Scholarship exploring the traits associated with American beauty ideals have cited several key determinants – most notably those associated with facial symmetry, facial features, personality traits, grooming habits, race/ethnicity/skin tone, and various bodily attributes - such as height, weight, and BMI. Although attractiveness is generally linked with a plethora of social and institutional rewards for both men and women, many scholars argue that men place a greater emphasis on physical attractiveness than women do (Buss 1994, Feingold 1991, Nevid 1984, Saguy 2012, Siever 1994) and that women have more to potentially lose and to gain when it comes to their appearance.

Facial Symmetry

There has been a great deal of research which emphasizes the link between facial symmetry and attractiveness. Studies have shown that even small random deviations from perfect bilateral symmetry - known as "fluctuating asymmetries" (Van Valen 1962) - can negatively affect ratings on attractiveness (Mealey, Bridgstock and Townsend. 1999, Rhodes, Proffitt, Grady et al. 1998). Furthermore, symmetrical faces are associated with significantly higher ratings of attractiveness, health, and various positive personality traits, such as being more sociable, balanced, intelligent, lively, and confident (Fink, Neave, Manning et al. 2006).

Other researchers have argued that facial proportions are more important than overall symmetry by empirically testing "neoclassical canons" and the Fibonacci-derived concept of "golden ratios" (Schmid, Marx and Samal 2008). For example, Pallett and her colleagues (2010) reported that attractiveness is optimized when the individual's vertical distance between the eyes and the mouth is approximately 36% of the face's length, and the horizontal distance between the eyes is approximately 46% of the face’s width. Sociobiologists and

evolutionary psychologists in particular explain these preferences by evoking the "good genes hypothesis," which suggests that symmetrical, well-proportioned faces - and specific facial features - are privileged as attractive because they serve as proxies for reproductive fitness.

For instance, Thornhill and Gangestad (1999) note that fluctuating asymmetries are caused by mutations, pathogens, and toxins, so facial symmetry is privileged as attractive because it partially reflects an individual's developmental stability and genetic/phenotypic condition. Other scholars have noted that symmetrical faces are correlated with higher IQ's (Bates 2007) and with greater intelligence, information processing, and cognitive stability throughout the aging process (Penke, Bates, Gow et al. 2009). Interestingly, facial symmetry may be posited to be an indicator of developmental stability, but only 15% of human faces are essentially symmetrical (Adamson and Zavod 2006). This indicates that even from the sociobiological perspective, attractiveness is a privilege afforded to a select few.

Although the premises and scholarship offered by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists will be discussed in greater detail in the "Theoretical Perspectives" section of Chapter 1, their general argument is that certain physiological cues are interpreted as indicators of good health and reproductive fitness, and thus, their link to attractiveness represents an evolved product from our ancestral past which plays a role in our survival (Buss 1989, Buss 1994, Buss, Shackelford, Kirkpatrick et al. 2001, Ellis 1992, Ridley 1993). In sum, facial symmetry has been identified as a main determinant of attractiveness - so much so that a key scholar within this field - Daniel Hamermesh - emphasized that the effects of primping do not matter much, because "beauty is determined to a tremendous extent by the shape of your face, by its symmetry and how everything hangs together" (Jayson 2011).

Facial Features

In addition to facial symmetry, some specific facial features have also been positively correlated with favorable attractiveness ratings. However, there are some slight gender differences in these preferences. For example, sociobiologists have claimed that male subjects demonstrate a preference for women with specific facial features - such as full lips, a small nose, a small chin, prominent cheekbones, narrow cheeks, high eyebrows, shiny hair, a large smile, large eyes, and greater distance between the eyes (Adamson and Zavod 2006, Cunningham, Roberts, Barbee et al. 1995, Cunningham, Barbee and Philhower 2002, Cunningham 1986, Henss 1991). Cunningham and his colleagues (1995) concluded that these facial features function as "neonate cues" of youth and fertility, and that there tends to be little cross-cultural variation with respect to the male preference for these attributes. While discernable signs of youth and good health are universally considered to be attractive, these "neonate cues" of youthfulness are especially important for women, because age is principally salient for the assessment of women's attractiveness (Henss 1991).

Although observable indicators of youth, facial symmetry, and specific facial/bodily features are also important components for the assessment of men's attractiveness, the criteria for judging men are generally more varied and less rigid. Among males, attractiveness is also related to signs of strength, high status, and to attributes that signify possession - or likely acquisition - of resources (Buss 1994, Henss 1991, Hume and Montgomerie 2002). Braun and Bryan (2006) suggest that women seem to view personality, career choice, and intelligence as important indicators when they are evaluating the desirability of male subjects. Since heterosexual women overall tend to place less value on physical attractiveness and utilize more fluid and typically different criteria (Hume and Montgomerie 2002, Schmid et al. 2008),

there have been relatively fewer studies conducted on which types of facial features are deemed by women to be attractive among male subjects. This empirical imbalance may also be attributed to the fact that women engage in more beauty work than male counterparts and are the primary consumers of cosmetic products (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006) and thus, this line of research may receive more public interest and funding. For example, a recent study examining how cosmetic use influenced ratings of attractiveness, competence, likeability, and trustworthiness (Etcoff, Stock, Haley et al. 2011) generated some criticism when it was discovered that the project was funded by the cosmetics conglomerate, Proctor and Gamble.

Among the relatively fewer studies on the subject, several facial features have been correlated with attractiveness among males - such as a longer lower faces, abundant hair, and prominent cheekbones, jaws, and chins (Adamson and Zavod 2006, Scheib, Gangestad and Thornhill 1999, Schmid et al. 2008, Thornhill and Gangestad 1999). Like the bodily features discussed below and the facial symmetry discussed above, these favored facial features are posited to be indicators of higher levels of estrogen and testosterone, respectively (Penton-Voak and Perrett 2000). Hence, the literature on facial symmetry, facial features, and bodily features has been dominated by sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists who argue that universal preferences are biologically constituted and tied to evolutionary processes.

Bodily Features

In addition to facial symmetry and facial features, a great deal of the literature on attractiveness has focused on how bodily features and secondary sex characteristics operate as neonate/fertility cues or "hormone markers" (Thornhill and Gangestad 1999). Similar to the role played by specific facial features with regards to attractiveness evaluations, certain bodily

features have also been positively correlated with favorable attractiveness ratings for men and women. The majority of empirical projects exploring these gendered bodily preferences are yet again attributed to evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists, but sociologists have increasingly demonstrated interest in examining how culture, mass media, economics, discrimination, and power shape these appearance-based norms.

Women's attractiveness ratings are positively correlated with certain bodily attributes which are posited to provide reliable cues to a woman's reproductive value, including an hourglass figure (Gitter, Lomranz, Saxe et al. 1983), larger breasts (Gitter et al. 1983, Jasienska, Ziomkiewicz, Ellison et al. 2004), lower body mass index (Tovée, Maisey, Emery et al. 1999a, Tovée, Maisey, Vale et al. 1999b), lower waist-to-hip ratios (Furnham, Tan and McManus 1997, Jasienska et al. 2004, Wetsman and Marlowe 1999), longer leg-to-body ratios (Sorokowski and Pawlowski 2008, Swami, Einon and Furnham 2006) and average or slightly below average height (Nettle 2002).

On the other hand, men's attractiveness ratings tend to be positively correlated with greater heights (Ellis 1992, Nettle 2002), more muscularity (Frederick and Haselton 2007), slightly above average leg-to-body ratios (Sorokowski and Pawlowski 2008), lower waist-to-chest ratios (Swami and Tovée 2008), higher shoulder-to-hip ratios (Dijkstra and Buunk 2001), higher waist-to-hip ratios (Furnham et al. 1997), normal ranged body mass indices (Swami and Tovée 2008), and “inverted triangle shaped” torsos - characterized by a narrow waist along with a broad chest and shoulders (Braun and Bryan 2006, Tovée et al. 1999b).

Several interesting gender differences regarding bodily attributes should be further emphasized here. First and foremost, although research shows that women generally place less emphasis on physical attractiveness than men (Buss 1994, Feingold 1991, Nevid 1984,

Siever 1994), women place a greater emphasis on men's height (Nettle 2002). Another key difference can be seen in the research conducted by Tovée and his colleagues (1999b), which concluded that waist-to-chest ratios were among the strongest determinants of male attractiveness, but were not a significant among women. In addition, it is important to note that while waist-to-chest ratios mattered only for men, leg-to-torso ratios mattered more for women (Swami et al. 2006), even though there is a general preference for longer leg-to-torso ratios among both genders (Sorokowski and Pawlowski 2008).

One of the most critical gender differences can be seen in the role of weight and body mass index (BMI). In general, anti-fat bias continues to be widespread among both men and women (Lieberman, Tybur and Latner 2012) as well as among healthcare professionals (Strings 2015, Teachman and Brownell 2001). It also appears that between 2001 and 2013, implicit anti-fat biases decreased among obesity specialists but explicit biases increased - which underscores the current climate of pervasive anti-fat bias (Tomiyama, Finch, Belsky et al. 2015). Some studies report that the primary determinant of female attractiveness is BMI (Tovée et al. 1999a) – which accounts for up to 74% of the variance in women's attractiveness ratings and 12.7% of the variance in men's ratings (Tovée et al. 1999b). Furthermore, when Rothblum and her colleagues (1988) evaluated the impact of women's weight on job candidate desirability, the negative stereotyping of fat applicants was notably reduced when their level of attractiveness was controlled, which emphasizes that weight-related biases against women may be greatly due to the presumed negative effect on attractiveness.

There appears to be a persistent and significant double standard when it comes to BMI and weight: women are held to much higher standards of thinness and they are subjected to greater penalties in education, employment, healthcare, romantic relationships, marriage, and

media portrayals when they cannot conform to them (Fikkan and Rothblum 2012, Okunade, Hussey and Karakus 2009). Indeed, women are more adversely impacted by weight-based employment discrimination (Griffin 2007) and are 16 times more likely than men to report such discrimination (Roehling, Roehling and Pichler 2007). Conversely, obesity does not reduce the likelihood of employment or the hourly wages of men - as it does for women (Han, Norton and Stearns 2009) - and men may actually experience some weight-based wage premiums (Brown and Medoff 1989, Maranto and Stenoien 2000).

The roots of this double standard could simply be a reflection of the interrelated findings that men are not as stringently judged according to appearance, and that their attractiveness tends to be evaluated in a more fluid and complex manner. However, Saguy (2012) proposed three alternate explanations for this double standard, by noting that BMI may be a poorer proxy for hegemonic ideals of male attractiveness because they privilege muscular bodies (Pope, Phillips and Olivardia 2000), and BMI does not distinguish between muscle and fat (Flegal and Graubard 2009). Thirdly, Saguy (2012) proposes that women with greater body mass indices may violate gender norms which dictate that women should not "take up too much space" (Bordo 1993, Kilbourne 2010). Conversely, men are socialized to be dominant, imposing, and entitled to take up more space - gender norms which have only grown more salient since the 1960s in response to women's increasing socioeconomic equality (Katz 1999). Generally speaking, individuals who transgress gender norms often suffer serious social consequences across multiple domains, such as romantic relationships (Pfost and Fiore 1990) and the labor market (Cash, Gillen and Burns 1977, Dellinger and Williams 1997, Trautner and Kwan 2010, Wong and Penner 2016). More importantly, men's and women's conformity to hegemonic ideals of masculinity and femininity has a significant

impact on perceptions about physical attractiveness (Drogosz and Levy 1996, Gillen 1981). Hence, a woman may be evaluated more favorably for conforming to norms of femininity when her body takes up less space, and in turn, she may be seen as more attractive – whereas men would be seen as more attractive and gender conforming for taking up more space.

The body's physical shape and the distributions of weight play important roles in attractiveness assessments as well. For instance, perceptions of male attractiveness and health tend to be linked to an "android" fat distribution pattern - which is characterized by more fat deposited on the abdomen and upper body - whereas perceptions of female attractiveness are linked with a "gynoid" fat pattern - where more fat is deposited on the lower body (Braun and Bryan 2006, Singh 1994). The android pattern is more consistent with the “inverted triangle shaped torso” that was deemed to be a bodily determinant of attractiveness among men (Tovée et al. 1999b) while the gynoid pattern is reflective of the "hourglass" figure that men often prefer among women (Gitter et al. 1983). These bodily preferences have withstood empirical replication, and remain stable across genders, age groups, ethnicities and cultures.

Personality Traits

The relationship between personality traits and assessments of physical attractiveness is extremely complex. On one hand, attractiveness assessments are not only dependent on purely physical traits, but they also vary according to perceptions about an individual's personality (Gross and Crofton 1977). For example, Lewandowski and his colleagues (2007) reported that judgments of physical attractiveness and desirability as a friend or as a romantic partner increased after participants received desirable trait information (e.g. honest, funny, smart, polite, and helpful) versus no information, but decreased when participants received

undesirable trait information (e.g. cruel, unstable, unfair, and rude). Similar results were produced by a study that explored the link between attractiveness ratings and personality traits (Zhang, Kong, Zhong et al. 2014). Therefore, individuals are likely to receive more favorable attractiveness ratings if they are perceived to have positive personality traits, and vice versa.

On the other hand, individuals who are categorized as attractive are also believed to embody other positive traits, given that they tend to be evaluated as more altruistic (Cunningham 1986), sociable (Cunningham et al. 1995), cooperative (Mulford, Orbell, Shatto et al. 1998), persuasive (Palmer and Peterson 2016), sincere, considerate (Dion, Pak and Dion 1990), trustworthy (Webster and Driskell 1983, Wilson and Eckel 2006), competent (Jackson, Hunter and Hodge 1995), intelligent, mentally healthy, and socially skilled (Feingold 1992). One empirical analysis of the "beautiful is good" stereotype led the researchers to conclude that "people do judge a book by its cover, but a beautiful cover prompts a closer reading" along with more favorable impressions (Lorenzo, Biesanz and Human 2010). This phenomenon of assuming that "what is beautiful is good," is known as the "Halo Effect."

The Halo Effect can be conceptualized in three different ways. First and foremost, some scholars argue that attractiveness is not actually associated with any positive personality traits, and that these favorable attributions are often entirely baseless and based solely on bias. This explanation is described by Feingold's "Attractiveness Theory," which emphasizes that attractiveness and personality are statistically independent (1992), because the positive traits that are often attributed to attractive individuals are generally unfounded. On a similar note, attractiveness has also been significantly correlated with expectations that the individual would be more cooperative when working with others - an assumption which was also shown to be inaccurate (Mulford et al. 1998). Furthermore, some research suggests that physically

attractiveness is actually correlated with various unfavorable traits - such as increased narcissism (Holtzman and Strube 2010) and decreased altruism among attractive men - even though the opposite tends to be perceived (Price, Brown, Dukes et al. 2015).

A second explanation for the Halo Effect posits that any favorable personality attributions could be the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy or cumulative advantages accrued from preferential treatment. Indeed, attractive individuals are more likely to receive a greater share of attention and other resources, which may better enable them to cultivate these valued traits (Gordon et al. 2013). For instance, in addition to enjoying greater popularity (Krantz, Friedberg and Andrews 1985) and power in everyday interactions (Mulford et al. 1998), attractive people also tend to experience lower rates of peer victimization (Rosen, Underwood and Beron 2011), and are less likely to suffer negative consequences for deviant behaviors (Dijkstra, Lindenberg, Verhulst et al. 2009, Rosen and Underwood 2010). This view is consistent with theories of discrimination and with "Status Characteristics Theory," which suggests that expectations frame how someone is evaluated and treated in social interactions, and then form the basis for inequality in interaction (Umberson and Hughes 1987).

A good example of this is exemplified by the complementary findings that attractive individuals are not only *perceived* to be happier than less attractive counterparts (Dion et al. 1972), but that they actually *reported* higher levels of happiness (Hamermesh and Abrevaya 2013). However, any differences in happiness levels may be attributed to the fact that attractive people experience more favorable outcomes - such as higher earnings (Wong and Penner 2016) and wealthier spouses (Udry and Eckland 1984). This notion was confirmed by Hamermesh and Abrevaya (2013) - who noted that these differences in happiness were cut in half after controlling for marital, educational, and labor market outcomes. In sum, attractive

people may sometimes be happier, but they are not necessarily happier because they are attractive, but because they have enjoyed an array of advantages because they are attractive.

Finally, it is also possible that the Halo Effect works in a manner that is much less straightforward than what the bulk of the literature suggests. For example, some other scholars emphasize that perceptions about ability shape assessments of physical attractiveness much more than any objective indicators of attractiveness do, while also finding no evidence to support the notion that perceptions of physical attractiveness influence perceptions about ability (Felson and Bohrnstedt 1979).

Regardless of which perspective is utilized to understand the underpinnings of the Halo Effect, personality traits have a demonstrable impact on perceptions of attractiveness and vice versa – but they also influence the returns to attractiveness. For example, the most recent study on the subject found that the beauty premia in earnings were reduced by 25% when personality factors were controlled (Wong and Penner 2016). However, these measures of personality were not major determinants of attractiveness, since they only had a minimal impact on the returns to attractiveness once the effects of grooming were accounted for (Wong and Penner 2016). Another study found similar results, but concluded that personality traits had a greater impact on the beauty premia earned by American women (Robins et al. 2011). Overall, the literature suggests that personality factors influence the assessments and rewards related to attractiveness, and that the beauty premia are likely to be overestimated if personality measures are not included in regressions (Arunachalam and Shah 2012).

Grooming

One of the greatest difficulties that researchers face is trying to disentangle the effects of embodied physical attractiveness from the more performative aspects of appearance related to grooming. For example, Wong and Penner (2016) concluded that the labor market returns to attractiveness were significantly reduced when grooming effects were controlled, and that grooming accounted for nearly the entire beauty premia earned by women, and for nearly half of the beauty premia generated by men. These findings emphasize the relatively greater importance of appearance for women - especially within the context of the workplace - but also suggest that physical attractiveness can be cultivated to a large extent. There is a great deal of consensus among scholars that grooming is a significant determinant of attractiveness and that engaging in beauty work can yield rewards in the labor market. However, there is less agreement on the degree of the effect that grooming has on earnings. For example, Hamermesh and his colleagues (2002) reported that additional spending on cosmetics and clothing has a generally positive effect on a woman's perceived beauty, but that this effect is minimal to marginal because these "purchases pay back no more than 15% of additional unit of expenditure in the form of higher earnings." Furthermore, Das and Loach (2011) conversely claim that for women, increased time spent grooming negatively affected earnings, whereas it had a positive and large effect on men's earnings - especially among men of color.

Overall, the literature offers two competing frameworks for understanding the returns to grooming. One perspective suggests that individuals earn different returns depending on perceptions of how their grooming is related to occupational productivity while the other posits that people can be either penalized or rewarded on the basis of grooming because it signals positive or negative worker attributes. Perceptions about individuals are not only

colored by wholesale stereotypes and biases, but these perceptions and their consequences vary according to the organizational environment in which they are constituted. For example, women may have been negatively affected by heavy grooming because it signaled dishonesty, desperation, and insecurity, whereas minority men may have been unambiguously rewarded because heavy grooming countered negative stereotypes and gave them the means to "act white" (Das and Loach 2011, Fordham and Ogbu 1986). Thus, an individual's gender, race, and occupation factors influence the labor market returns to attractiveness and grooming.

The latter two conclusions stand in great contrast to the most recent findings on the subject by Wong and Penner (2016), along with many other results - such as Osborn's (1996) claim that the effect size of makeup use was virtually equivalent to those of structural facial features. Furthermore, in terms of job selection and evaluation, Boor and his colleagues (1983) found that attractiveness had some effect on female applicants, but professional demeanor by dress and grooming had more of a marked influence on both male and female applicants. The majority of findings seem to underscore Wolf's (1991) claim that beauty is more so a function of prescribed behaviors rather than embodied appearance. Overall, the literature overwhelmingly supports the notion that grooming is a major determinant of attractiveness, and that it is associated with positive outcomes across multiple domains.

Since grooming is posited to provide an important source of communication about workers, their values, social identities and personalities, certain productive personality traits are often inferred on the basis of grooming (Das and Loach 2011). Because grooming habits send these signals, and can thus lead to higher earnings, there has been growing resistance towards classifying grooming behaviors as the traditional non-market activities they were once considered to be. Instead, grooming is increasingly being framed as a rational investment

in one's reputation in the same way that certification signals quality, because it offers workers a way to augment their appearance in order to enhance the Beauty Effect (Das and Loach 2011). In some ways, the wholesale bias favoring well-groomed people operates similarly to the "what is beautiful is good" theory or the Halo Effect. For example, well-groomed people are perceived to be more compliant (French, Robins, Homer et al. 2009), mature, sincere, dependable, and agreeable (Paek 1986). Yet some scholars suggest that the financial rewards from grooming can be attributed to their enhancement of the Beauty Effect (Das and Loach 2011). However, also like attractiveness, grooming effects often do not operate uniformly.

Indeed, the literature overwhelmingly suggests the effects and outcomes linked to grooming are not only gendered, but they can also be linked to inequalities according to class, gender expression, and race/ethnicity. Western societies typically judge women for their physical appearance over their other qualities and the pressure to engage in beauty work is much higher for women than for men due to the higher stakes involved. Beauty work is defined as various appearance enhancing “practices individuals perform on themselves or others to elicit certain benefits from a specific social hierarchy" (Kwan and Trautner 2009). Unsurprisingly, these double standards tend to be internalized by millions of women, as documented by their relatively lower scores of self-esteem (Franzoi and Herzog 1987), and higher ratings on vanity physical concern, vanity achievement concern, vanity achievement view, and public self-consciousness (Workman and Lee 2011). Furthermore, eating disorders are far more prevalent among women (Hsu 1989), who also underwent 91% of the cosmetic surgeries that were performed in North America during 2007 (Heyes and Jones 2009).

In the past decade, marketers have succeeded at increasing the consumption of beauty products and services geared towards males (Barber 2008, Pope et al. 2000), who also benefit

from beauty work given that half of the attractiveness premia that they earn is linked to grooming (Wong and Penner 2016). However, the beauty work demands that are placed on men remain far from comparable to those of women due to gendered double standards (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006, Wolf 1991) and to sex-differentiated grooming policies (Conway 2007, Trautner and Kwan 2010) – but also because nearly all of the beauty premia accrued by women is linked to grooming (Wong and Penner 2016). Women continue to outnumber men in the amount of beauty products consumed, the number of cosmetic services pursued, and the time spent on grooming. Even more egregiously, women also pay higher prices for even smaller quantities of a given product – a marketing tactic described as "pinking it and shrinking it" (Taylor 2016). This phenomenon, known as the "Pink Tax," has generated increasing public awareness since the release of a recent report (2015) by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (NYCDCA). The severity of the Pink Tax's implications are compounded by the fact that women continue to earn less (Bielby 2000), while their use of beauty products and services continue to eclipse those of men.

Even more intriguingly, researchers have recently explored a trend known as the "Lipstick Effect," which offers further insights into the pressures that women face with regards to grooming. Although consumer spending generally declines during economic downturns, the market for women's cosmetics has consistently demonstrated itself to be relatively recession-proof. The explanations behind the Lipstick Effect vary. On one hand, some scholars like Nancy Upton, who specializes in consumer behaviors, believe that women may be resorting to more minor indulgences as quick "pick me ups" because they have to curb larger expenditures and want to "feel better through small, indulgent, hedonic consumption" (Salk 2009). However, other experts on the Lipstick Effect argue that recessionary cues

decrease the desire for most products, but increase women's desire for products that amplify their attractiveness to male mates with resources (Hill, Rodeheffer, Griskevicius et al. 2012). Statistically speaking, women are already negatively impacted by wage gaps (Bielby 2000) as well as by additional workplace biases based on weight (Fikkan and Rothblum 2012), physical attractiveness (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Wong and Penner 2016), and grooming (Dellinger and Williams 1997). It makes sense intuitively why some women may feel especially inclined to try their luck in the relationship market during an economic recession: their bleak labor market prospects may be even bleaker, and their returns within the marital market may be even more lucrative, since attractive women are more likely to secure partners with higher levels of education and income (Udry and Eckland 1984).

The underlying logics of the Lipstick Effect are also understandable given the interconnections between beauty work and the capitalist, neoliberal, and postfeminist logics which largely define American culture today. Drawing on ideals of the free market, capitalism, colorblindness, and individuality, neoliberalism describes a regime of social and economic policies that are characterized by diminished government intervention and increased emphasis placed on the individual. Neoliberal logics enshrine the notion that people should focus their effort on achieving goals personally, and that they should not feel sorry for themselves, blame exogenous structures, or implicate discrimination if they fall short.

Neoliberalism has gained traction amidst the declining collectivist logics that defined the Civil Rights and feminist movements of the 1960s, and are firmly linked to postfeminist ideologies. Postfeminism refers to “an expansive and distinctly contemporary capitalist engagement with media, merchandise, and consumption" (Banet-Weiser 2012) where women are socialized to engage in beauty work and self-surveillance mainly for personal gain – given

that they are framed as self-invested entrepreneurs that are dedicated to competition, relevancy, and self-branding (Klazas 2015). In many ways, women's progressing sexual liberation and socioeconomic independence has been tempered by the imposition of increasingly rigid beauty norms (Jeffreys 2005) and thinness standards (Katz 1999) – which further reinforce their marginalized position and perpetuate patriarchy (Brownmiller 1984).

Together, postfeminism and neoliberalism promote a consumer-driven hyper-feminine image that demands the ceaseless production, maintenance, and reinvention of the self in order to accomplish the "fairy tale ending" of career success, heterosexual marriage, and motherhood (Klazas 2015). Overall, American women today are inundated with social and structural demands to engage in beauty work and attempts to resist these pressures tend to be met with a great deal of negative outcomes. However, these inequalities are not typically seen as unjust, given that neoliberal logics dictate that a woman's "failures" with her appearance, career, or love life are solely her own fault, and that she can always solve her dilemmas by abiding to the mandates of the neoliberal market.

Indeed, women are expected to participate within the broader context of enterprise through compulsory engagements with self-help tools and interventions by experts in order to elicit external appearance changes which are claimed to promote an "I-feel-great-about-myself" attitude and enhance their career, love life, and class ascension (Klazas 2015). However, the individualistic emphasis of neoliberalism obscures the reality that women's adherence to beauty norms now functions not only as a self-sustaining iron cage, but as a major stratifying mechanism. The mandate that physical appearance can and should be managed cosmetically or surgically perpetuates a patriarchal system organized around other pervasive gender, class, racial/ethnic, and socioeconomic inequalities.

Beauty ideals deliberately privilege the most difficult traits to achieve during a given time or place, and their very definition as an "ideal" insinuates that it is virtually unachievable and must be perpetually pursued (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006). Thus, beauty ideals are perfectly suited for fueling consumption and for ensuring the continued oppression of women. For this reason, some scholars argue that due to power differentials, the "rewards" that women generate for "doing" femininity are trivial - especially compared to the much more substantial rewards that men earn for "doing" masculinity (Brownmiller 1984). Other scholars describe beauty work as a "gender strategy," where women compete with other women for (minimal) advantages, since they cannot similarly compete with men. Following this logic, women buy into and support their own oppression by engaging in beauty work, since the gender inequities that made this gender strategy necessary in the first place are never contested (Hamilton 2007). Thus, the competitive edge that beauty work offers women ironically reinforces patriarchy, obscures women's common oppression, and reinforces their relatively vulnerable positions in society (Brownmiller 1984). However, another dire concern is that beauty work creates and perpetuates hierarchies among women that are organized around class and race.

Beauty standards and regimens clearly contribute to gender inequality, but these ideals also carry additional and intersectional burdens associated with other axes of identity - such as socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity. Although beauty ideals contribute to women’s systematic oppression, it is crucial to note that they are created and maintained by elites (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006) and that they are also explicitly designed to offer prestige and advantages to an exclusive subset of individuals. Classed and gendered hierarchies are indeed perpetuated by the imposition of restrictive beauty norms on women and on the working/lower class (Ouellette and Hay 2008).

Less affluent women in particular experience multiplicative marginalities because they typically have less time, money, and resources to participate in the plethora of culturally mandated beauty regimes. Millions of women are financially strained as a result of the global beauty industry, which generates over $160 billion a year (Wade 2009). One's psychological, physical, temporal, and economic resources undeniably impact how easily and effectively they can adhere to beauty standards (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006) - and consequently reap the associated rewards. However, research has consistently shown that individuals - and especially women - who fail to conform to beauty norms are not only socially stigmatized and subjected to detrimental outcomes across multiple domains, but that these inequalities are to a large extent presumed to be their own fault as a result of the neoliberal imagination.

Grooming Policies in the Labor Market

The importance of grooming is especially salient for the returns to attractiveness within the labor market, because employers have a great deal of power when it comes to dictating how their employees should present themselves. A wide body of research examines how seemingly neutral organizational policies within the workplace create and reinforce stereotypes and inequalities based on various axes of identity - such as gender (Acker 1990, Britton 2000) - and employee appearance policies are a sterling example. Appearance policies represent another crucial component of organizational life which ultimately leads to disparate outcomes, because they are infused with ideas about beauty, femininity, and masculinity. By emphasizing standards of beauty which are associated with youth, whiteness, heterosexuality, and economic privilege, these policies compound other inequalities, and particularly those based on class, gender, race, physical ability, and sexual orientation (Rhode 2009).

Appearance policies in the U.S. labor market are not only explicitly gendered (Bartlett 1994, Rhode 2009), but they also include white and Protestant appearance standards; in turn, these policies can obscure or eliminate cultural and ethnic diversity as well as individual expression (Trautner and Kwan 2010).

Sex-specific dress and grooming codes have endured as a highly contentious and contested issue, especially within civil law, because they rely on and reproduce stereotypes and inequalities (Trautner and Kwan 2010). The dominant position advocated by scholars within this field is that sex-differentiated grooming policies are one of the most blatant remaining forms of sex bias, as they have thus far survived challenges under Title VII, which prohibits gender discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Conway 2007). Since there are no federal protections against discrimination that is based specifically on physical attractiveness (Dipboye 2005) or appearance, employees who wish to file claims against their employers must use other discrimination protections to make their case - and thus, Title VII has become the most often invoked piece of legislation (Trautner and Kwan 2010). To this day, employers continue to have a tremendous amount of discretion when it comes to establishing and enforcing appearance standards, namely because of two legal loopholes.

First, sex-specific grooming standards have often been upheld as legal because they fall outside the scope of Title VII, which only outlaws discrimination based on "immutable characteristics" - which the employee has no power to alter - such as sex, religion, or race/ethnicity (Bouchard 2006). Thus, seminal cases have upheld terminations where men refused to cut their hair (*Baker v. California Land Title Co., 1974*) or when women refused to wear makeup (*Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 2004*) by following the logic that hairstyle and makeup use are categorized as "mutable" traits.

A second legal loophole is that many discriminatory appearance policies can be exempted as legal due to the "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)" exception. Employers use the BFOQ exception to argue that the demands of a job require certain qualifications, and can therefore claim that sex-based or appearance-based discrimination are necessary for adequate job performance or for particular business operations (Bouchard 2006). Businesses are generally allowed to use their employees' appearance to achieve a particular ''image,'' and this ''tone setting'' or ''branding'' often results in different clothing requirements for male and female employees (Avery and Crain 2007, Bartlett, Harris and Rhode 2002). Generally speaking, employers can largely dictate whether a working body complies with an organization's overall image or the expectations they have of their employees' appearance (Trautner and Kwan 2010).

Even more problematically, workplace appearance policies tend to be based on "community norms," and they are generally upheld so long as they do not impose an "undue burden" (both terms tend to be quite vague). As Bartlett (1994) elegantly summarized, courts have rationalized dress and appearance requirements by reference to community norms, and based on these norms, courts may excuse appearance requirements they deem as either trivial in their impact on employees, or as neutral in that they are imposed on all employees, or otherwise as essential to the business' objectives. Not only is it easy for an employer to rationalize appearance policies on the basis that our society deems it as "normal" for the genders to look or to act a certain way, but it fuels a vicious cycle. Indeed, organizations and courts are likely to support community norms of appearance, which legitimates traditional ideas about femininity and masculinity - and reinforces stereotypes and inequalities in the process (Bartlett 1994, Bouchard 2006, Rhode 2009, Trautner and Kwan 2010).

However, employers and organizations are not limited to merely establishing norms of appearance and gender expression within the workplace – they also wield much greater power when it comes to policing the bodies of their workers. Employers not only dictate how employees should dress, style their hair, or wear their makeup – but even more egregiously, BFOQ mandates also enable employers to establish weight and height restrictions (Trautner and Kwan 2010) or to terminate an employee that gains weight - as documented by lawsuits filed against the Borgata Casino (Rhode 2010) and the Hooters restaurant chain (Barkacs and Barkacs 2011). As it stands in the United States, only the state of Michigan and six localities (Howard County, MD; San Francisco, CA.; Santa Cruz, CA.; Madison, WI.; Urbana, IL; and the District of Columbia) have adopted laws which more broadly prohibit employers from engaging in weight-based discriminatory practices (Huggins 2015, Rhode 2010).

In sum, grooming norms and beauty work impact the assessments of attractiveness and the wide array of advantages that conventionally attractive folks generate. BFOQ exceptions generally allow employers to evaluate applicants on the basis of appearance when they can show that it impacts their bottom line, and there are no legal protections in place which prohibit discrimination based on physical attractiveness. Furthermore, these standards and demands are disseminated across broader society, the media, and the workplace - where companies and employers are given a remarkable amount of discretion when it comes to regulating the appearance of their workers. However, as the next subsection will demonstrate, the evaluations and rewards associated with attractiveness and grooming are not only gendered and classed, but are also linked to intersectional inequalities on the basis of race/ethnicity.

Race/Ethnicity & Skin Tone

The relationship between race/ethnicity and physical attractiveness is highly complex not only due to the ways that it intersects with other axes of identity, but because of how it interacts with some of the major determinants of attractiveness - such as facial features, bodily features, personality traits, and grooming practices. All of these dynamics are further complicated by the enduring ideals and structures of white supremacy that continue to circulate within American society, which promote white, youthful, and thin beauty ideals (Bordo 1993, Chambers et al. 1994) that also permeate notions about gender, personality, and domesticity (Wolf 1991). Perhaps even more troublesome, these white supremacist framings of beauty are also evident in various expressions of internalized racism among women of color - such as the "pigmentocracy" documented amongst black Americans (Craig 2002) as well as by the continued popularity of skin lighteners (Glenn 2008), hair relaxing products, and hairpieces (Craig 2002, Robinson 2011).

Empirical research has reported that perceptions of physical attractiveness vary by skin tone (Hersch 2011, Hill 2002a, Hill 2002b), but also that this effect intersects with gender (Feliciano, Robnett and Komaie 2009, Lewis 2011). Biases and stereotypes organized around "racism" - an inter-ethnic hierarchy that expresses White superiority- and around "colorism" - a byproduct of racism which refers to an intra-ethnic hierarchy that expresses light ethnic superiority (Herring 2004) - both have their roots in American legacies of slavery (Robinson 2011). On a more global level, darker skin has historically been stigmatized as a cue for lower castes due to its association with the sun-exposure that results from participation in manual labor (Gillen and Bernstein 2015).

However, since the mid-20th century, tanned skin has grown to be considered attractive (Broadstock, Borland and Gason 1992, Frisby 2006) as a result of rearticulation processes which have reframed it as a status signal for a life of leisure and wealth (Gillen and Bernstein 2015, Keesling and Friedman 1987). This shift is also consistent with the notion that a beauty ideal encapsulates physical qualities that are the most difficult to achieve within a given time and place (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006). Such an assertion was supported by a study conducted by Frisby (2006) which determined that both white and black respondents found models with a light brown skin color to be more credible and attractive than models who were pale or dark skinned. While racialized ideals, assessments, and self-evaluations of attractiveness continue to privilege some individuals and groups relative to others in highly complex ways, this relationship reaches far beyond skin tone itself.

Overall, black and white respondents tend to differ more than other groups in terms of how they evaluate attractiveness in others (Cunningham et al. 1995) as well as in themselves (Jefferson and Stake 2009). Counter-hegemonic beauty ideals have been the most widely circulated among black Americans, which have valorized natural hair (Craig 2002), thicker bodies (Nichter 2000), and Afrocentric facial features (Chambers et al. 1994). Other scholars have concluded that black American women are less likely that their white counterparts to negatively judge bodies based on weight (Fikkan and Rothblum 2012, Hebl and Heatherton 1998), and that they are also less likely to idealize extreme slenderness in favor of being "fat in the right places" - namely, having large buttocks and breasts but a smaller stomach (Nichter 2000). Furthermore, this trend is not limited to black women, since black men also tend to be less sizeist than white men when evaluating women's attractiveness (Hebl and Turchin 2005).

While beauty ideals and assessments may differ the most among black and white Americans, that is not to say that other racial differences have not been documented. For example, another study conducted by Lynch and his colleagues (2007) found that adolescent Native American and Latina females were twice as likely than their white counterparts to report that they wanted a larger body size. Generally speaking, a notable amount of research indicates that white individuals – and white women especially - not only subscribe the most stringently to Western beauty ideals, but that they also internalize them to the greatest extent.

One possible explanation for these racial differences is that women of color may tend to be less dissatisfied with their weight and specific appearance features in part because they compare themselves less frequently to beauty figures that are depicted in the media (Jefferson and Stake 2009). Although women of color may be less likely to internalize Western beauty ideals than white women (Evans and McConnell 2003), this internalization process is strongly linked to women's body dissatisfaction across racial groups (Jefferson and Stake 2009).

The findings that white women experience the highest rates of bodily dissatisfaction (Evans and McConnell 2003, Rucker and Cash 1992), eating disorders (Striegel-Moore, Dohm, Kraemer et al. 2003), and plastic surgeries (Heyes and Jones 2009) have often been explained by the core tenants of "Social Comparison Theory" and “Reflected Appraisal Processes,” which posit that people are more likely to compare themselves to "similar others" (Milkie 2004). Thus, because women of color often do not consider mainstream standards to be relevant to themselves and perceive themselves to be excluded from the main reference group depicted in the media (Evans and McConnell 2003, Milkie 2004), they may also be more able to resist internalizing Western beauty ideals. Furthermore, black Americans have also been shown to counteract harmful social comparisons by engaging in self-protective

strategies (Crocker and Major 1989) - such as the "deidentification" from Americanized beauty norms (Hebl and Heatherton 1998, Kerr, Crocker and Broadnax 1995) as well as the cultural rearticulation processes which reframed black as beautiful (Craig 2002).

However, these racial differences also appear to be mediated a lot by acculturation processes. For example, black and Native-American women who were more accepting of white American culture and beauty ideals displayed more symptoms of anorexia and bulimia than those who were less accepting (Osvold and Sodowsky 1993). Similarly, black respondents who scored higher on measures related to "African self-consciousness" were more likely to describe Afrocentric facial features in a positive manner (Chambers et al. 1994). The links between acculturation, self-perceptions, and the internalization of beauty ideals may also be attributed to the concept of "double consciousness," which describes the difficulties that many black Americans face when it comes to unifying their black identity with their American identity. W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) initially coined the concept by noting that black Americans not only view themselves from their own perspective, but that the legacies of racism also impose onto them "this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others." As a result, black Americans may suffer from a damaged self-image which is shaped by the perceptions of - and treatment by- white people, as well as by stereotypes perpetuated by mainstream culture. The mass media's systematic underrepresentation of women of color and the use of controlling images are inherently damaging because they communicate harmful racialized messages about the social values of attractiveness and worth. However, this marginalization may either inhibit the degree that these women internalize Western beauty ideals, or it may conversely exacerbate negative self-perceptions as a result of double consciousness and marginalization.

One of the most significant protective strategies documented amongst black women is the "deidentification" from American ideals of thinness, which has been a critical resource because black women also tend to have higher body mass indices than women from other racial groups, along with the greatest rate of obesity of any subpopulation within the U.S. (Strings 2015). Furthermore, the benefits accrued by this protective tactic go far beyond the personal, emotional, and social - as it is posited to contribute to health-related advantages as well. This increased social-acceptance impedes some of the negative effects of weight bias because dissatisfaction with body weight appears to be a better predictor of health than actual weight, and because black women tend to be healthier than their comparatively heavy white counterparts (Muennig 2008, Muennig, Jia, Lee et al. 2008). Nevertheless, black women remain multiplicatively disadvantaged by the broader culture and institutions because American beauty norms romanticize Caucasian and thin ideals, but also because body mass index is a primary determinant of physical attractiveness among women (Tovée et al. 1999a).

However, the dynamics of the relationship between race/ethnicity and weight-related biases are highly complex, perhaps due to linkages with racialized and gendered cultural schemas. For example, Asian American girls experience even more weight-related penalties in education than white, Hispanic, or black women do (Okunade et al. 2009), which may be tied to stereotypes and controlling images of Asian American women as hyper-feminine, demure, passive, and submissive (Espiritu 1997, Pyke and Johnson 2003). In addition, white women are subjected to greater weight-related income penalties relative to black women - although this wage gap is partially explained by marital and occupational differences (Averett and Korenman 1999). However, research endeavors utilizing Add Health data have confirmed that higher body mass indices are correlated with lower ratings of physical attractiveness, but

that these appearance penalties were less severe for black women - which suggests that white women must conform to a narrower range of body sizes in order to be perceived as attractive (Ali, Rizzo and Heiland 2013, Richmond, Austin, Walls et al. 2012). More broadly, other scholars suggest that body mass has a much greater impact on the labor market and marital outcomes of white Americans than their black counterparts (Maralani and McKee 2014).

Even more remarkably, some studies suggest that fat black women do relatively well compared to thin black women - a finding which does not apply to women from other racial groups (Fikkan and Rothblum 2012). For example, Wade and DiMaria (2003) discovered that thinner white women yielded higher attractiveness, personality, and life success ratings than heavier white women, but the opposite pattern was found among black women - in part because heavier black women were evaluated more favorably on trustworthiness, parenting skills, friendliness, and mate potential. Findings such as these demonstrate that although thinness may generally be linked with attractiveness, it may not always be associated with positive personal qualities due to cultural schemas pertaining to race and gender (Fikkan and Rothblum 2012). The lesser penalties linked to weight discrimination amongst black women and the tendency to rate heavier black women more favorably may also be a reflection of the racial stereotype of black women as being large, strong, independent and nurturing of others, which is "derived from a discourse of enslaved women's deviance" (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2003) as well as from the historical use of controlling images such as the "mammy" (Collins 1990). However, these results by no means suggest that black women as a cohort are comparably better off than other groups of women.

Although these stereotypes may perhaps be beneficial within this very narrow context (weight discrimination), they systematically disadvantage black women in many other

domains - such the dating (Feliciano et al. 2009) and labor markets (Kennelly 1999). Furthermore, racial stereotypes may in turn contribute to stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson 1995) and self-fulfilling prophecies (Pyke and Johnson 2003) -while also obscuring the historical marginalization of black women and invalidating the experiences of black women who actually do experience body image distress or weight-based discrimination (Fikkan and Rothblum 2012, Neumark-Sztainer, Story and Faibisch 1998). Last but not least, many scholars emphasize that weight may imply relatively few additional penalties for black women solely because they are already penalized due to the intersecting inequalities linked to their gender and race, which simply overshadow discriminations attributable to body size (Averett and Korenman 1999, Fikkan and Rothblum 2012).

These multiplicative disadvantages experienced by black women are further underscored by research on the racial preferences of online daters. Studies on interracial dating and marriage offer a unique leverage on analyzing the relationship between racial attitudes and physical attractiveness, because racial attitudes are the most restrictive regarding intimate relationships, and many argue that interracial relationships are an effective indicator of increased integration and reduced social distance (Feliciano et al. 2009). Problematically, studies show that despite the fact that racial attitudes among whites have become increasingly tolerant of other racial groups (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo et al. 1997), only about 4% of white Americans marry non-white partners (Qian and Lichter 2007). However, perhaps the most salient finding that has been reported repeatedly is that black women and Asian men are perceived to be the least desirable romantic partners by online daters, and a great deal of these discriminations can be attributed to stereotypes based on both race and gender.

Empirical evidence continues to demonstrate that black women remain ranked as the least desirable potential dates among white, Asian, and Latino heterosexual men (Feliciano et al. 2009, Feliciano, Lee and Robnett 2011, Robnett and Feliciano 2011). On the other hand, female online daters were the most likely to exclude Asian men as potential romantic partners (Robnett and Feliciano 2011), which may be attributed to cultural schemas pertaining to gender and race (Feliciano et al. 2009) or due to biases based on height and/or build - which are especially salient determinants of attractiveness for males (Ellis 1992, Frederick and Haselton 2007, Nettle 2002). Findings like these underscore the criticality of incorporating intersectional lenses during the empirical analysis of attractiveness. The research on racial preferences among online daters negates the notion that black or Asian American individuals are deemed as undesirable across the board – Asian American women and black men suffer from far lower rates of exclusion - namely because the stereotypes associated with each of these groups do not undermine their respective gender schemas of femininity and masculinity.

Feliciano and her colleagues (2009) note that the exclusion of black women and Asian American men are consistent with scholarship which argues that the racialized cultural portrayals of black femininity and Asian masculinity are often far from the ideal. Both groups have historically suffered from the preponderance of controlling images within the media, which cast Asian American men as inferior, asexual, effeminate, and excluded from norms of hegemonic masculinity (Espiritu 1997), whereas black women have been framed as aggressive, unfeminine, impoverished, and promiscuous (Collins 1990). Therefore, black women and Asian American men experience a great deal of discrimination not merely based on aspects of appearance, but more so on how their appearance is socially interpreted. On one hand, we know that ratings of desirability and attractiveness decrease when an individual is

presumed to exhibit unfavorable personality traits (Gross and Crofton 1977, Lewandowski et al. 2007, Zhang et al. 2014). However, these two subpopulations are dually disadvantaged because these stereotyped traits also violate cultural gender schemas, and one's conformity to hegemonic ideals of masculinity and femininity has a significant impact on perceptions about one's attractiveness (Drogosz and Levy 1996, Gillen 1981) and suitability as a romantic partner (Pfost and Fiore 1990). Overall, the literature highlights the ways that sexism and racism continue to shape perceptions related to personality, to grooming, and to assessments of the facial and bodily attribute associated with physical attractiveness.

In addition to the aforementioned relationships between bodily attributes and perceptions of personality traits, some slight differences in facial structures and features across racial groups have also been identified by biosociologists, evolutionary psychologists, anthropologists, and forensic scientists. For example, skin color tends to be highly correlated with other phenotypic features, such as eye color, broadness of nose, fullness of lips, and hair texture (Thompson and Keith 2001). Arguably, the bulk of this line of research has tended to focus on how Afrocentric facial features compare to Eurocentric facial features. Generally, Afrocentric facial features include fuller lips, wider-set noses, darker skin tone, and courser hair - and these features have been shown to significantly influence perceptions and attitudes about individuals (Hagiwara, Kashy and Cesario 2012). Although Western beauty ideals privilege Eurocentric features such as small/narrow noses (Cunningham 1986) and long, straightened, or "good" hair (Bereczkei and Mesko 2006, Buss 1994, Robinson 2011) at the expense of devaluing Afrocentric facial features, the consequences are far beyond skin deep.

Afrocentric facial features are not only used to categorize individuals into different racial groups, but they also serve as cues which trigger racial stereotypes (Oliver, Jackson,

Moses et al. 2004) linked to criminality, poverty, and aggression (Blair, Judd, Sadler et al. 2002). More importantly, Afrocentric features have also been associated with unfavorable outcomes such as harsher criminal sentences (Blair et al. 2004) and the greater likelihood of being racially profiled by civilians and by police officers (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie et al. 2004). Given the much more severe stakes that are at hand, many black Americans have been socialized to devalue and minimize physical traits that are reflective of African ancestry by subscribing to grooming practices that embody white beauty paradigms (Robinson 2011).

Grooming practices intersect with race/ethnicity in several ways. Historically, women of color have had a complicated relationship with makeup because cosmetics companies have overwhelmingly developed products for consumers with lighter complexions. Although major cosmetic companies finally began to market products that were created for darker-skinned consumers during the 1990s (Grimes 2000), the industry remains largely skewed towards white women. In addition, a recent study of 8,402 American young adults determined that black respondents were less likely to diet than their white counterparts (Field, Aneja, Austin et al. 2007). However, despite racialized differences in cosmetic use/availability and in dieting habits, perhaps the greatest difference in grooming practices is attributed to hair.

Many scholars have emphasized that hair functions as a key racial identifier in the U.S., perhaps second only to skin color (Mercer 1987, Robinson 2011). Furthermore, as a crucial determinant of attractiveness (Bereczkei and Mesko 2006, Weitz 2004), hair is also gendered and racialized through male dominated and white supremacist beauty norms (Wolf 1991). Men tend to prefer women with long, straightened hair (Buss 1994, Cunningham et al. 1995, Mesko and Bereczkei 2004), and similarly, women prefer men with abundant hair (Adamson and Zavod 2006) over baldness (Muscarella and Cunningham 1996). The

privileging of long haired women and short (but thick) haired men reflect dominant gender schemas, and they are documented even among young children (Baktay-Korsós 2000) – which suggests that individuals internalize these preferences early on.

Evolutionary psychologists and biosociologists tend to argue that these hair preferences are valorized as attractive because they are posited to signal cues about an individual's health (Mesko and Bereczkei 2004). Indeed, some research does support the notion that hair growth and loss are related to nutrition, youth, stress, hormonal effects, and pheromone distributions (Grammer, Fink, Moller et al. 2003, Hinsz, Matz and Patience 2001, Muscarella and Cunningham 1996, Sinclair, Banfield and Dawber 1999).

However, these hair preferences are also largely attributed to sociological explanations because they are explicitly racialized and are also linked to perceptions about personality. For example, Bereczkei and Mesko (2006) found that men perceived women with long hair to be more motivated, intelligent, and independent. In addition to length, hair color is also linked to various stereotypes - such as the "dumb blonde" or the "temperamental redhead" (Weir and Fine-Davis 1989) - while brunette women are considered to be more capable and suitable as employment candidates (Kyle and Mahler 1996).

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that men tend to rate women with blonde hair as more attractive than women with other hair colors (Cunningham et al. 2002) - and this assertion is further supported by the prominence of blonde women in the mass media (Rich and Cash 1993) and by the economic returns to blondeness within the service industry (Johnston 2008, Lynn 2009). However, it is interesting to note that blondeness is explicitly racialized in ways that are much more complex than one would think. For example, some courts have permitted employers to bar black female employees from wearing dyed blonde

hair – which underscores that black women are expected to conform to "invisible" norms of white womanhood (e.g. straight hair) but must never venture too far into territory which is deemed “visibly white” (Greene 2011). All of these findings emphasize the notions that hair preferences are both socially and biologically constituted, but more so, that they are fundamentally racialized in ways which privilege people who are white and who have more resources to engage in grooming practices.

Bereczkei and Mesko (2006) suggest that the persistent valorization of women with long, straight hair can be traced back to Biblical and mythological stories all over the world. Indeed, empirical research confirms that straightened long hair continues to be idealized among white, Asian-American (Wagatsuma and Kleinke 1979), Latinx (Dávila 2001), and black respondents (Robinson 2011) - although there have been some historical instances when black women have attempted to resist (Craig 2002) the "straight hair rule" (Taylor 1999). Since maintaining long, straight hair is not only difficult, but also economically and temporally costly, it signals high investment and accrues higher social status (Bereczkei and Mesko 2006). However, the beauty ideal of straight and long hair places the greatest burden on Black American, Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Latina, African American and African women (Roberson-Dancy 2016), who typically have courser and curlier hair (Hagiwara et al. 2012). Thus, grooming norms may subjugate all women, but they effect women of color differently in many ways - even relative to their male counterparts.

For example, Craig (2002) argues that it is harder for black women to wear their hair “natural” than it is for black men, because it not only demands more time and "good hair," but also much more courage to wear it - since the "natural" is culturally coded as masculine, unattractive, radical, and rebellious - along with the fact that women’s appearance scrutinized

to a greater extent. The pressures placed on black women to straighten their hair are not only widely enforced socially and institutionally, but they often begin very early in life. This beauty regimen can begin as early as age 2 or 3 - a process which is facilitated by the explicit marketing of "kiddee perms" (Stilson and Rock 2009). Similarly, Craig (2002) emphasizes that historically, hair straightening has been an undeniable appearance norm that is regarded as "part of growing up" among black women, who often learn this grooming routine from their mothers (or other adult females in their lives) by the age of 7 or 8.

One of the most poignant examples of the societal policing of black women's hair was a controversy that occurred in the summer of 2014, which focused on a two year old girl named Blue Ivy Carter. A petition circulated on Change.org which aspired to "get the word out" to Blue Ivy's parents - pop culture icons Beyoncé and Jay-Z - "to properly care for Blue Ivy's hair" received thousands of signatures, although its creator later insisted it was a "joke" (Pesce and Monde 2014). It is wholly irrelevant whether the petition's supporters were sincere or "trolling." The incident made it clear that black women's hair continues to be a ripe site for public scrutiny, disdain, and discipline, and that the appearance of a two year old child is fair game as fodder for fueling this discourse. In addition to hair shaming, the petition tapped into issues pertaining to parenting skills – with some supporters noting that the state of Blue Ivy's hair was tantamount to child neglect and cruelty. The bullying appeared to be effective, given that Beyoncé was photographed buying a box of "kiddee perm" shortly after (Blagrove 2014). Last but not least, experiences like these reinforce the continued dependence on a toxic beauty regimen that often continues from childhood throughout the life course.

The processes involved in hair straightening are not only tremendously time consuming and costly, but they are also physiologically and psychologically damaging.

Relaxers straighten hair by transforming the basic structure of the hair shaft, and these products can cause hair loss, hair breakage, hair color changes, hair brittleness, scalp pain, eye problems, allergic reactions, headaches, skin thinning and burns - but regular use can also lead to long term side-effects, such as damage to the lungs and other internal organs (Etemesi 2007, Stilson and Rock 2009). Roughly 67% of the women surveyed by Etemesi (2007) suffered from one or more of these adverse effects, with hair loss and burns being the most prevalent. Due to the unpleasant side effects of relaxers, weaves and wigs have grown in popularity. Weaves now comprise 75% of the profits generated by hair products that target black women – and they cost between $3,500 to $18,000 per year - with many retailers offering layaway and subsidy plans (Stilson and Rock 2009). In sum, the maintenance of straight hair imposes steep burdens on many black women, along with their partners and families. Consequently, black women face a triple bind where they are either stigmatized for wearing their hair natural, ridiculed for "acting white," or castigated for being "high maintenance" when they relax their hair or wear weaves (Stilson and Rock 2009).

However, the fact still stands that black women experience tremendous pressure to straighten their hair from a multitude of sources. Interestingly, acculturation and assimilation seems to play a role not only in perceptions of bodily attributes and behaviors related to weight loss (Osvold and Sodowsky 1993), but also in grooming practices. For example, King and Niabaly (2013) found that African women were more likely to report that their decision to straighten their hair was influenced by the media or the community, whereas African American women reported that their family was the most influential factor. Qualitative research conducted by Rubin and her colleagues (2003) also explored how African American women were socialized by their family members to view hair straightening practices as

symbols of assimilation and upward mobility. However, all of these pressures are further exacerbated by hair-related appearance standards that circulate within the U.S. labor market, which have been routinely legitimized and reinforced by American courts.

As the "Grooming Policies in the U.S. Labor Market" section emphasized earlier in this Literature Review, employers have a great deal of discretion when it comes to establishing appearance standards, so long as they can argue that a given policy applies only to mutable traits, that it facilitates particular business objectives, and that it does not entail any disparate treatment which disadvantages members of a protected class (i.e. on the basis of gender, religion, or race). A few "natural" hairstyles, namely the Afro, are legally protected because hair texture is these cases were considered biologically constituted and immutable - a matter over which the individual has no choice (Caldwell 1991). However, other hair "styles" that have historically been worn by black women - such as braids, twists, and locks - have been categorized as mutable traits which employers have the right to discriminate against (Caldwell 1991, Greene 2011). Therefore, black women cannot be formally discriminated against in the workplace for wearing their hair "natural," but they often experience other stigmas for doing so (Craig 2002). On the other hand, black women can be formally sanctioned or terminated for wearing other traditional black hairstyles, because the courts have established that this rule is neutral in its application. The underlying logics of these rulings are that (1) these hairstyles are mutable traits because hair does not naturally grow in these ways; (2) employers can discriminate against *any* individual who wears their hair in braids, twists, or locks; and (3) these policies do not constitute a disparate treatment because they do not apply exclusively bar black women from wearing these hairstyles.

These logics are factually inaccurate and these legal precedents clearly impose disparate impacts. These rulings fail to recognize the relationship between these specific hairstyles and the culture of black women, and they incorrectly assume that black and white women are equally motivated to adopt hairstyles that have traditionally been worn by black women (Caldwell 1991). Although hairstyles influence how attractive women are perceived to be and how much money they earn, they carry a much deeper personal, emotional, social, professional, and political significance for black women (Caldwell 1991, Craig 2002, Roberson-Dancy 2016). Overall, the courts have failed to account for race-sex intersection within appearance discrimination lawsuits, so black women's issues "slip through the cracks" of legal protection, effectively masking the gender components of racism and the race components of sexism (Caldwell 1991). Case law has thus far overlooked the fact that unstraightened hair violates both beauty ideals and gender norms, which multiplicatively disadvantages black women. Black women can wear their hair "natural" - which is culturally coded as masculine and unattractive (Craig 2002) - and face social stigma, income penalties, and unfavorable assessments. Or they can straighten their hair and experience temporal costs, financial strains, physically damaging side-effects, other forms of social stigma, and the psychological traumas that accompany their attempts to embody white beauty paradigms. For all of these reasons, hair politics are evident in everything from workplace discrimination to its virtual absence in mainstream media, but they have significantly contributed to the oppression and division of black women for generations (Drayton 2016).

However, black women are not the only subpopulation that experiences unique burdens due to grooming policies. For example, Das and Loach (2011) reported that increased time spent grooming did not have much of an impact on women's earnings relative to men's,

but it had the strongest positive effect on the earnings of men of color. There are several explanations offered for these results, which are based on theories of time use and of social identity. Namely, men of color may benefit more from increased grooming because it is not as effortful and it is not considered as much of a demanded requisite (as is the case for women) but as a "bonus." The key mechanism that seems to be operating is that the enhanced Beauty Effect generated by men of color from increased grooming may be offsetting negative stereotypes and signaling positive traits like conscientiousness and agreeability (Das and Loach 2011). Conversely, women may not benefit as much because their increased grooming would constitute more effortful non-market time use and may also signal negative traits, such as being high-maintenance, insecure, or desperate to attract a male (Das and Loach 2011).

In sum, the literature shows that when it comes to the assessments and outcomes related to attractiveness, race/ethnicity intersects with other axes of identity and with the major determinants of attractiveness. These findings underscore the social dimensions of attractiveness and help us to disentangle why grooming is increasingly becoming recognized as a salient source of embodied capital. Although the assessments of attractiveness may be complex and intersectional, the literature shows that attractiveness ratings tend to display a remarkable degree of consensus not only among a diverse set of raters, but even among machines. Hence, there is good reason to believe that measurements of attractiveness in large-scale and nationally representative datasets like Add Health can be accepted as accurate representations of how attractive a given respondent is according to current cultural standards.

III. Theoretical Perspectives

The vast array of biases and premia which systematically favor physically attractive individuals focus on what the body looks like rather than what it is capable of doing, which solidifies attractiveness as a source of symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984). Consequently, many scholars – such as Haas and Gregory (2005) - argue that attractiveness is a form of social and human capital that is linked to social status. In a more radical framing of this view, Hakim (2010) emphasizes that due to the large imbalance between men and women in sexual interest over the life course, women are better placed to exploit their "erotic capital" - which functions as a fourth personal asset that is a critical addition to economic, cultural, and social capital. Claims like these are only bolstered by findings that men place more value on attractiveness than women do (Buss 1994, Feingold 1991, Nevid 1984, Saguy 2012, Siever 1994).

Yet, the accumulation of scholarship on this subject has proved to be a daunting endeavor from the start, with scholars striving not only to quantify the accompanying benefits, but to identify the specific mechanisms that explain the processes by which unequal outcomes are afforded to attractive individuals in the first place. Thus, the remainder of the Literature Review will provide a summary of the various theoretical perspectives which aim to explain why attractiveness is linked with systematic advantages across countless domains.

Economics: The Beauty Effect

Central to the literature is the unresolved dilemma of whether the returns to attractiveness reflect discriminatory labor market practices or whether they are emblematic of some aspect of productivity. Historically, there have been three prominent explanations offered for the beauty premium: productivity, employer-based discrimination, and customer-

based discrimination (Arunachalam and Shah 2012). The classic beauty premium argument posits that attractive employees may be relatively more productive because both clients and employers prefer to deal with attractive representatives (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). This phenomenon has come to be known as the "Beauty Effect." In fact, one longitudinal study of the returns to physical attractiveness among lawyers determined that "beauty is not merely correlated with but actually *causes* differences in earnings" (Biddle and Hamermesh 1998).

Empirical research on the Beauty Effect has demonstrated that attractiveness premia typically result from claims of productivity *and* from discrimination. Attractiveness may increase productivity because it can offer tangible advantages within the workplace. For example, clients not only prefer to interact more with attractive employees (Lemay, Clark and Greenberg 2010), but good looking workers also often earn heftier tips (Parrett 2015) and work more hours (Gehrsitz 2014). However, a productivity-based model of the beauty premium has been categorically rejected by some studies, due to the lack of variation detected in the beauty premium across occupations in which "looks matter" (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994) along with findings which suggest that the positive personality traits that are often attributed to attractive individuals are unfounded (Feingold 1992, Mulford et al. 1998). Furthermore, Arunachalam and Shah (2012) reported that even in the commercial sex sector - which arguably provides the purest assessment for whether or not the beauty premium is driven *solely* by productivity - the taste-based discrimination effects actually dominates the productivity effect. Overall, the productivity-based explanations offered by economists and other social scientists have not been able to sufficiently account for the returns to attractiveness, which indicates that social dynamics like discrimination play an essential role.

Psychology: The Halo Effect

Physical attractiveness offers a broad range of advantages, yet the patterns and underlying mechanisms which produce these privileges are highly complex and diffuse. However, the standard explanation that psychologists provide for the attractiveness premium is that there is not only a generalized bias that "what is beautiful is good," but that this bias facilitates a "Halo Effect" – where physically attractive individuals are also believed to possess more socially desirable personality traits (Dion et al. 1972). Due to these biases, people become stratified based on their appearance. Since its conception during the early 1970s, the "what is beautiful is good" theory has been supported in laboratory studies, field research, quantitative analyses, and meta-analyses within the fields of social psychology (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani et al. 1991, Langlois et al. 2000), organizational/industrial psychology (Hosoda, Stone-Romero and Coats 2003), and forensic psychology (Efran 1974).

There are two competing explanations for the Halo Effect, which include the "beauty as diagnostic" and "beauty as taste" perspectives (Mulford et al. 1998). The "beauty as diagnostic" hypothesis proposes that as an attribute, attractiveness might be used as a proxy or as a diagnostic for other positive attributes. Many studies propose that the inference of special ability intervenes between attractiveness and various attributions about target individuals, but there is often no obvious basis for that expectation (Mulford et al. 1998). In addition to favorable assumptions about ability, empirical research has demonstrated that a wide range of positive attributions are made about attractive people. Indeed, people often assume that attractive individuals are more trustworthy (Webster and Driskell 1983, Wilson and Eckel 2006), competent (Quereshi and Kay 1986), and intelligent (Jackson et al., 1995). In any case,

these are all particularly crucial traits in the context of the labor market, and they carry crucial consequences for occupational placement, evaluations, promotions, and earnings.

The "beauty as diagnostic" perspective is perhaps best assessed and understood through the coherent framework afforded by “Status Characteristics Theory.” Status Characteristics Theory proposes that expectations about others are organized in relatively stable structures and that, as a consequence, there will be a high correlation among expectations across diverse domains (Berger, Fisek, Norman et al. 1977). More specifically, Wagner and Berger (1997) argue that models of power and status capture the key idea that observable power and prestige behaviors are determined by an underlying structure and that inferences about the unobservable states in the structure are made on the basis of the behaviors which lead to their formation and are also determined by them. However, some empirical findings demonstrate that these expectations may not always prove to be true even if there seems to be a rational basis for them. For example, Mulford and his colleagues (1998) found that attractive individuals were presumed to be more cooperative – an assumption which had a stable social structure supporting the expectation (the notion that people are more keen to associate with attractive people) – yet this expectation was based on bias and quite decoupled from reality. Thus, the “beauty as diagnostic” perspective succumbs to some similar limitations as the productivity claims. These theoretical weaknesses underscore the fact that discrimination plays a significant role in both the Halo Effect and the Beauty Effect.

The "beauty as taste" hypothesis is more consistent with a perspective that implicates discrimination. It posits that attractiveness is a socially valued attribute, since it is perceived as a “taste” that is indulged independently of whatever pattern of behavior is expected from that individual (Mulford et al. 1998). Hence, the vast privileges afforded to attractive

individuals are a straightforward consequence of what people are socialized to value and to seek out. This standpoint is a far cry from the "beauty as diagnostic" view, which posits that attractiveness (one desirable attribute) is a diffuse status characteristic that generalizes to the expectation of some second desirable attribute, regardless of the context (Mulford et al. 1998).

Arguably, it is best to emphasize that attractiveness can actually play both a taste role *and* a diagnostic role. Being seen as attractive brings opportunities for productive exchange because people often associate such perceptions with the expectation of cooperative behavior, but that effect is compounded by the fact that many people enjoy interacting with attractive people (Mulford et al. 1998). Indeed, a study conducted by Lemay and his colleagues (2010) concluded that the respondents' attribution of desirable traits to attractive individuals was not merely a reflection of the "what is beautiful is good" stereotyping in action, but that it was more so a projection of their own heightened desires to bond with beautiful people.

Overall, social psychologists have tremendously contributed to the literature on physical attractiveness by elaborating on how the "beauty as diagnostic" and the "beauty as taste" perspectives contribute to the Halo Effect. However, both viewpoints fall short of offering any substantive insight into the possible origin of the widespread beauty bias. Furthermore, the remaining two theoretical perspectives offered by evolutionary psychology/ sociobiology and by sociology, also provide radically different views about why attractive individuals may experience substantial benefits relative to their less attractive counterparts.

Evolutionary Psychology & Biosociology: Sexual Selection & "Good Genes"

Evolutionary psychology and biosociology draw their perspectives from sociology, biology, anthropology, history, and psychology in order to offer additional accounts of the biases related to attractiveness. Broadly speaking, these perspectives view social behaviors and traits within the context of evolution, and explain attractiveness biases and appearance preferences within the context of "sexual selection" (Darwin 1871). They posit that as descendants of survivors, the preferences and practices organized around attractiveness are an evolved product from our ancestral past, which are advantageous for the continued survival of humans (Buss 1989, Buss 1994, Buss et al. 2001, Ellis 1992, Ridley 1993).

Biosociologists and evolutionary psychologists tend to look at mating preferences and strategies by evaluating their relation to biological fitness, attractiveness, fertility, and the related "neonate cues." Many of these scholars go as far as to suggest that the determinants of attractiveness are not merely the result of biased and culturally configured beauty ideals, but that they are logically supported by concrete realities. Some researchers have declared that attractive individuals are healthier (Shackelford and Larsen 1991), live longer lives (Kim 2013), secure attractive romantic partners (Takeuchi 2006), and display higher degrees of intelligence and status (Bates 2007, Kanazawa and Kovar 2004). More specifically, some of the specific determinants of attractiveness have been linked with higher rates of reproductive success among women (Pflüger et al. 2012), with superior sperm morphology/ motility among men (Soler, Núñez, Gutiérrez et al. 2003), and with greater intelligence, information processing, and cognitive stability throughout the aging process (Penke et al. 2009).

The contributions of biosociology and evolutionary psychology have been the most useful for comprehending the widespread consensus of what constitutes attractiveness, and

especially so when it comes to explaining why there are some relatively stable agreements across cultures. Hence, they are also particularly well suited for understanding why specific "neonate cues" are said to be "universally considered attractive" (Henss 1991). Indeed, if humans are evolutionarily primed and biologically predisposed to prefer certain physical attributes as a means of survival, it makes sense why there would be a remarkable degree of consensus about what attractiveness entails.

Furthermore, these perspectives can better account for phenomena such as the so-called "hormone theories" of attractiveness, which emphasize that assessments and preferences of attractiveness depend on an interaction between the displayed hormone markers of the target and the hormonal state of the viewer (Johnston, Hagel, Franklin et al. 2001). For example, biosociologists and evolutionary psychologists note that heterosexual women may be generally predisposed to prefer muscularity, fitness, and masculine features among males (Frederick and Haselton 2007), but they have also demonstrated that these preferences vary during a woman's menstrual cycle (DeBruine, Jones, Frederick et al. 2010, Feinberg, Jones, Law Smith et al. 2006, Jones, DeBruine, Perrett et al. 2008, Penton-Voak, Perrett, Castles et al. 1999), during pregnancy and contraception use (Alvergne and Lummaa 2010, Jones, Perrett, Little et al. 2005), and throughout the life course (Little, Saxton, Roberts et al. 2010). These findings give credence to the argument that physical attraction is constituted and influenced in part by biological factors and evolutionary processes.

Although biosociology and evolutionary psychology are indeed useful for explaining some aspects pertaining to how physical attractiveness is evaluated and why there tends to be a great deal of consensus involved, they nevertheless have their weaknesses. For example, these theoretical perspectives cannot account for some of differences in the perceptions about

attractiveness – which may at times vary across times, cultures, social groups, and individuals. They also do a poor job of explaining the widespread social and institutional biases which are based on one's level of physical attractiveness, and similarly, they cannot efficiently account for the differential outcomes that are associated with it. This is in part because these perspectives focus mainly on mating preferences and strategies, which largely ignores how attractiveness is treated within other contexts, such as the labor market. Finally, the theoretical frameworks and empirical results presented by the literatures within biosociology and evolutionary psychology are also contested on the grounds that they are functionalist, essentialist, and biologically deterministic. By framing the subject in predominantly biological terms, these perspectives tend to overlook how the preferences and returns to physical attractiveness are distinctly shaped by social dynamics - such as power, discrimination, and capitalist logics.

Sociology

Sociology offers some unique insights that are critical for understanding perceptions about what it means to be attractive, and for providing explanations for why individuals become stratified according to attractiveness. Furthermore, these perspectives fill in a lot of the gaps which cannot be explained by social psychologists, sociobiologists, evolutionary psychologists, or economists. By viewing beauty norms and their consequent inequalities as social constructions, we can more fully grasp why perceptions about beauty may vary across various contexts, and how it functions as a mechanism of stratification and embodied capital on its own as well as in conjunction with other stratifiers, like gender, race and class.

Sociologists have a rich tradition of emphasizing that the perceptions and outcomes tied to attractiveness are imbued with innumerable expressions of power. Beauty ideals may not be as static or universal as other theoretical perspectives suggest, nor are they inherited or biological predispositions. Power dynamics shape beauty ideals because they enshrine the traits that are the most difficult and unnatural to achieve in a given time or place - which allows them to function as a highly exclusive form of social status (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006, Swami and Tovée 2005) and embodied capital (Hakim 2010). Although some scholars argue that individuals who engage in beauty work are deluded "cultural dopes" who are buying into their own oppression (Brownmiller 1984), others suggest that they are actually rational decision makers who are agentically attempting to attain certain benefits from a specific social hierarchy (Bordo 1993, Davis 1995, Gimlin 2001, Trautner and Kwan 2010). Regardless of which view one subscribes to within this classic domination versus pleasure/free will dichotomy, attractiveness and beauty work are intrinsically connected to - and deeply embedded within – broader structures of inequality and power.

While beauty ideals may fluctuate because of power dynamics and the relative scarcity of resources, they can also shift as a result of historical events and social mobilization. For example, Craig (2002) agrees that beauty is best described as a culturally and historically specific set of attributes, but she has also noted instances when counterhegemonic beauty norms were circulated through cultural rearticulation processes during the Civil Rights era. In a similar vein, Katz (1999) suggests that the shrinking bodies and hypersexualization of women occurred alongside the "beefing up" of male figures are expressions of a backlash against women's socioeconomic progress since the 1970s. Indeed, women's advancements have been notably hampered by the concomitant imposition of increasingly rigid beauty

norms, which attempt to keep women in their place as subordinated bodies (Jeffreys 2005). Hence, the meanings of beauty may be established by powerful individuals and institutions, but they can also be shaped directly and indirectly through the mobilization of marginalized groups. In sum, beauty ideals do not exist in a vacuum, nor are they merely reflections of biological predilections. Rather, beauty norms and regimes embody and reinforce power in many complex ways: they are created and maintained by elites (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006), they contribute explicitly to the persistence of patriarchy, and they sustain classed and gendered hierarchies (Brownmiller 1984, Gimlin 2001, Ouellette and Hay 2008).

The dominating tendencies of beauty norms are also firmly linked to capitalist interests. Neoliberal, capitalist, patriarchal, and postfeminist logics compel individuals to engage in intricate regimes of beauty work, or to fail to do so at their own peril. Since beauty norms are framed as "ideals," they are never truly achievable - even for those who come closest to embodying them – and as a result, they are constantly pursued (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006). Furthermore, postfeminist culture valorizes consumer-driven ideals which demand the ceaseless maintenance of the self via self-help tools and expert interventions in order to enhance one's career, love life, and class ascension (Klazas, 2015). The framing of beauty as unachievable ideals which are imperative for success and dependent on consumption guarantees that women remain embedded in the capitalist neoliberal economy.

Americans are undeniably socialized to embrace Western beauty ideals and consumption practices, but these processes are far more pervasive and entrenched than merely being a straightforward expression of what individuals absorb from the media. Although the widespread "taste" for beauty and the "Halo Effect" of associating attractiveness with other positive attributions are both facilitated by cultural learning (Mulford et al. 1998, Wolf 1991),

these socialization processes are also intricately connected to other social hierarchies and stratification systems. For example, if physical attractiveness assessments are merely an immediate cognitive process which innately favors neonate cues of biological fitness and reproductive success, than why would preferences be organized around race? Why would the beauty ideals themselves be explicitly gendered, raced, and classed (Bordo 1993, Wolf 1991)? Why would there be some evidence that beauty norms and their impact are intersectional and fragmented rather than monolithic (Craig 2006)? Indeed, sociological perspectives that are focused on explanations related to power, discrimination, stratification, and schemas are indispensable when it comes to analyzing the assessments and outcomes of attractiveness. Therefore, it is concerning that the vast majority of the research on attractiveness has historically been ceded to economists, sociobiologists, and evolutionary psychologists. This research endeavor attempts to assist with addressing this limitation by drawing sociological concepts more explicitly into the empirical literatures related to physical attractiveness.

CHAPTER 2:

The General & Gendered Labor Market Returns to Attractiveness

Chapter 2 Overview

Chapter 2 offers introductory analyses which explore the existence of a general beauty premium within the U.S. labor market, and which elaborate on whether the returns to physical attractiveness are gendered or if they impact male and female workers similarly. The Literature Review contains an overview of the prior studies which assess whether there are significant labor market returns to attractiveness, and whether the beauty premia and penalties differ between men and women. The results yield some support for a general beauty premium because more physically attractive individuals earn higher incomes, but they indicate that there are no significant gender differences in the returns to physical attractiveness or to personality attractiveness. However, significant gender differences in the returns to grooming and to BMI were detected. Furthermore, the data shows that grooming is the primary determinant of attractiveness, but that it also plays a critical role in shaping its returns among American workers. These findings suggest that sociological perspectives are better suited for explaining the disparate labor market outcomes linked to attractiveness than the accounts offered by sociobiology or evolutionary psychology. Chapter 2 concludes with the Discussion section, which expands upon the results, explanations, and implications of the findings.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The General Beauty Premium in the U.S. Labor Market

The first logical step in a national-level study of the returns to attractiveness in the U.S. labor market would be to first assess whether or not any significant beauty premia or penalties actually exist in the first place. Thus, the first section of the analyses empirically investigates one straight-forward question: do better looking workers really earn significantly more than their less attractive counterparts? Since a wide-array of research has confirmed the Beauty Effect and detected the existence of beauty premia and penalties, I propose *Hypothesis 1: physical attractiveness will be positively associated with income.* This hypothesis is consistent with the notion that individuals will experience general attractiveness-related premia and penalties at the aggregate level.

The Gendered Beauty Premium

As a type of social, human, and embodied capital linked to status, generalized beauty premia have been confirmed by many empirical projects, including the present study. However, there is much less consensus as to whether or not there are gender differences in the labor market returns to attractiveness. Intuitively, women would seem to be more susceptible to sex discrimination, income inequality, appearance biases, and other unfavorable outcomes due to the general organizational features of the labor market (Acker 1990, Kanter 1977).

First and foremost, women are often concentrated within highly feminized and devalued occupations, while relatively few men work in nontraditional or integrated jobs (England 2010, Gutek and Cohen 1987). Furthermore, women who work in nontraditional

occupations often face a great deal of biases and barriers, whereas men who work in nontraditional occupations tend to experience a whole host of institutional rewards (Maume 1999, Williams 1992). For this reason, working women are described as being restrained by "glass ceilings" whereas working men are privileged by the greater social mobility offered via "glass escalators." Women systematically continue to be disadvantaged in hiring decisions (Kanter 1977, Rosen and Jerdee 1974), but this concentration of power within the workplace is further skewed considering that women are usually sequestered into lower paid occupations that are less technical, valued, and prestigious – and that they also tend to be under the charge of men (Cohen 2004, Fernandez and Mors 2008, Kanter 1977).

The literature overwhelmingly indicates that men are prone to discriminating in favor of attractive women (Kaplan 1978) and that they are more likely to judge members of the opposite sex on the basis of attractiveness (Buss 1994, Feingold 1991, Nevid 1984, Saguy 2012, Siever 1994). However, men are also more likely to hold positions of power within the workplace, where they can make pertinent decisions related to hiring, promoting, and establishing wages (Elliott and Smith 2004, Kanter 1977, Maume 1999). These characteristics are not only emblematic of a hetero-patriarchal society, but they reflect cultural schemas of gender which conflate attractiveness with the female gender role (Brownmiller 1984, Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006, Wolf 1991) and link dominance with the male gender role (Katz 1999). For all of these reasons, scholars like Hakim (2010) argue that women may be more keen to exploit their erotic capital as a critical asset - and it is indeed reasonable to deduce that physical attractiveness may figure more acutely into the access, treatment, and outcomes experienced by women in the workforce.

Attractiveness is widely considered to be a socially valued trait which generates general rewards regardless of gender. Although we may intuitively assume that the beauty bias impacts men and women differently, empirical research has revealed that this relationship is highly complex. The most recent study by Wong and Penner (2016) reported that there were no gender differences in the returns to attractiveness, and similarly, Heilman and Stopeck (1985) found that attractiveness was an asset regardless of job type or gender.

These conclusions stand in stark contrast to other works which claim that there are significant gender differences in the returns to attractiveness. For example, Hakim (2010) argues that beauty translates to power: it functions as a prime currency for women's social and economic success. Likewise, Jæger (2011) reported that females experience the most returns to attractiveness while males experience few, suggesting that beauty is a token of biological fitness for females more so than for males. Findings such as these are also consistent with the conclusion that physical attractiveness and its impact vary for men and women due to differing meanings of masculinity and femininity (Drogosz and Levy 1996).

In sum, empirical research has routinely reported that there is a general beauty premium within the U.S. labor market, but has yielded inconsistent results as to whether or not these returns are explicitly gendered. These empirical projects have produced four overarching conclusions: either that there are no gender differences in the returns to attractiveness (Wong and Penner 2016), that men experience greater returns to attractiveness than women do (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994), that females experience greater returns to attractiveness than men do (Hakim 2010, Jæger 2011), or that females generate some beauty premiums but that their male counterparts do not (French 2002, Kaplan 1978). However, it is

possible that these empirical inconsistencies are being driven in part by differences in the sample sizes, in the populations studied, and in the way that attractiveness was measured.

Drawing from the majority of the literatures which focus on gender, the returns to physical attractiveness, the central tenets of sociobiology/evolutionary psychology, and the organizational characteristics of the U.S. labor market, I propose a second hypothesis. *Hypothesis 2: there will be statistically significant gender differences in the returns to physical attractiveness, and women will experience greater beauty premia than men.* This hypothesis extends the notion that attractive workers not only earn a general beauty premium but that these returns to attractiveness will be explicitly gendered. Finally, it is imperative to note that the analyses from the first two hypotheses replicated the work recently presented by Wong and Penner (2016) but they provide a solid foundation for the rest of the project.

The Gendered Returns to Body Mass Index (BMI), Personality Attractiveness & Grooming

Since the concepts and analyses for the first two hypotheses have already been empirically tested with the Add Health data, I propose three additional hypotheses alongside some other supplemental analyses in order to elaborate further on the prior findings of other scholars such as Wong and Penner (2016). Since I predict that there will be gender differences in the labor market returns to physical attractiveness, I similarly hypothesize that there will be significant gender differences in the returns to three of its main determinants: body mass index (BMI), personality attractiveness, and grooming.

The Gendered Returns to Body Mass Index (BMI)

Scholars have emphasized that BMI is a major determinant of physical attractiveness, especially among women (Tovée et al. 1999a, Tovée et al. 1999b). Although BMI has been consistently shown to influence earnings, there are some disagreements about how these outcomes differ among men and women. For example, some studies suggest that both men and women with higher BMIs experience significant income penalties (Baum and Ford 2004), while others indicate that only women are penalized on the basis of BMI (Cawley, Grabka and Lillard 2005, Han et al. 2009). On the other hand, there is also some evidence that men actually earn weight-based premia (Brown and Medoff 1989, Maranto and Stenoien 2000).

Given the importance of BMI for attractiveness ratings and for earnings, it is peculiar that the studies which have utilized Add Health in order to examine the labor market returns to attractiveness have been limited in their analyses of BMI. Indeed, these studies have only operationalized BMI as a control variable (Robins et al. 2011) or included it in supplemental analyses that were not presented (Wong and Penner 2016). The Add Health data offers a unique opportunity to assess how BMI and gender interact in order to shape earnings, so I offer *Hypothesis 3: there will be significant gender differences in the returns to BMI, and men will experience greater BMI premia than women.* I anticipate this outcome because the literature more consistently reports that there is a negative association between the BMIs and earnings of women, while the results tend to be more mixed among men.

The Gendered Returns to Personality Attractiveness

The complex relationship between personality traits and attractiveness has been one of the longest enduring emphases within the literature. Indeed, perceptions about an individual's

personality shape assessments of their attractiveness and vice versa (Lewandowski et al. 2007, Zhang et al. 2014). Personality factors also influence occupational outcomes, such as earnings and job satisfaction (Mueller and Plug 2006, Sutin, Costa, Miech et al. 2009). Wong and Penner (2016) further concluded that personality traits impact the returns to attractiveness, although they were not primary determinants. In their analyses of the Add Health data, Robins and his colleagues (2011) also suggest that personality attractiveness accounts for a greater portion of the beauty premia earned by women. However, these studies have not examined the interaction effects between personality attractiveness and gender. Based on the prior findings, I propose *Hypothesis 4: there will be significant gender differences in the returns to personality attractiveness, and women will earn greater personality premia than men.*

The Gendered Returns to Grooming

Grooming has a demonstrable impact on earnings and it has been identified as a primary determinant of physical attractiveness and its labor market returns (Wong and Penner 2016). However, there have been conflicting findings as to whether men (Das and Loach 2011) or women (Robins et al. 2011, Wong and Penner 2016) generate greater economic advantages on the basis of grooming. Since the latter two studies concluded that grooming accounted for a greater portion of the beauty premia earned by female Add Health respondents relative to their male counterparts, I conclude by offering *Hypothesis 5: there will be significant gender differences in the returns to grooming, and women will experience greater grooming premia than men.* This hypothesis is also supported by the well documented claim that women experience more pressure to engage in beauty work (Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006, Wolf 1991).

METHODOLOGY

Data

To test the influence of attractiveness level on income, I analyze data from the fourth wave of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health ("Add Health"), which is a nationally-representative, longitudinal, cohort-designed, content-rich, and large-scale study of over 15,000 American adolescents. Add Health was selected because it provides data on physical attractiveness along with its major determinants – in addition to many other control variables which not only affect income but the assessments and returns associated with attractiveness.

Add Health uses face-to face interviews along with in-depth surveys to collect a vast array of information on the background, demographic, and labor market characteristics of respondents. Add Health's data collection began in 1994-1995, when the cohort was in grades 7-12. Three additional waves of data were collected, with the fourth and most recent wave occurring in 2007-2008, when the participants were aged 24-32. The fourth wave is especially important for this study it finally offers data on the respondents' incomes and occupations - which are some of the key variables. A cohort that is between the ages of 24-32 is also ideal for the purposes of these analyses because the narrow age range makes the respondents' more comparable in terms of both income and attractiveness. Finally, these analyses have been limited to the 13,443 respondents who were present in Wave IV and provided all of the relevant information on the test variables listed below.

Independent Variable

The key independent variable is the respondent's level of physical attractiveness, which is rated by a panel of 395 Add Health interviewers at the end of the face-to-face interview during Wave IV. Interviewers answer the prompt, "How physically attractive is the respondent?" using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1) very unattractive, (2) unattractive, (3) average, (4) attractive, and (5) very attractive. However, for purposes of these analyses, the attractiveness level for very unattractive (N=357) was collapsed with unattractive (N=557) into one group due to insufficient sample size. Hence, the variable for physical attractiveness categorized the respondents as either unattractive (6.81%), average (46.41%, the omitted category), attractive (37.39%), or very attractive (9.39%).

Dependent Variable

The key dependent variable is the natural log of the respondent's self-reported personal income before taxes, which was measured as an interval/ratio variable. By using the natural log of income, I can interpret the coefficients by estimating percentage differences when they are close to zero. Actual percentage differences can also be calculated by subtracting one from the exponentiated coefficient. For example, a coefficient of -0.05 would mean that a group earns nearly five percent less than the reference group (exp(-0.05)-1= -0.0488).

Control Variables

Although the key variables of interest are physical attractiveness level and annual income, these analyses also controlled for several other variables. In addition to gender, the control variables also include age, marital status, race, educational attainment, personality attractiveness, grooming, body mass index, and height. These variables have been included in the regression equations because prior research has noted that they influence earnings – along with perceptions of physical attractiveness and the returns to attractiveness, as elaborated upon below. Fixed effects for the respondent's occupation and for the Add Health interviewer that ranked the respondent according to physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness, and grooming are also included in the regression models.

Preliminary analyses (which are not included here) also contained controls for the income and educational achievements earned by the respondents' parents, since the results of prior studies suggest that these factors influence both the attractiveness ratings and the earnings of the respondents (Jæger 2011). However, these measures were not significant in any of the regression models and were therefore dropped from the analyses.

Interviewer Fixed Effects

The regression analyses also controlled for interviewer fixed effects by constructing dummy variables for each of the 395 interviewers from Add Health's Wave IV who were responsible for ranking the respondents on the basis of their physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness, and grooming. This control is important because prior research confirms that interviewer characteristics can influence the perceptions and the attractiveness ratings of their interviewees (Hill 2002b, Nedelec and Beaver 2011, Wong and Penner 2016).

Thus, the inclusion of interviewer fixed effects can help to account for baseline differences in the interviewers' likelihoods of rating participants as attractive or unattractive. These models can be conceived of as examining the relationship between income and physical attractiveness among the participants interviewed by each interviewer separately, and then averaging the effects across interviewers (Wong and Penner 2016). Controlling for interviewer effects is crucial because numerous studies show that a rater's traits - such as their race (Hebl and Heatherton 1998, Hill 2002b, Nichter 2000, Wong and Penner 2016), gender (Dermer and Thiel 1975, Nedelec and Beaver 2011, Townsend and Wasserman 1997, Townsend and Wasserman 1998), sexual orientation (Myers et al. 1999, Swami and Tovée 2008, Textor 1999), socioeconomic status (Armstrong et al. 2014), and physical attractiveness level (Dermer and Thiel 1975, Dipboye, Arvey and Terpstra 1977) - can influence perceptions about a target individual and how physical attractive they are considered to be.

Occupation Fixed Effects

The regression analyses in Chapter 2 also control for occupation fixed effects. Occupation was held constant by creating indicator variables for each of the 696 occupations that Add Health respondents reported as their current or most recently held profession. Occupation is typified by Add Health according to its Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code format, which is used by American federal agencies to classify employees into one of 840 detailed jobs according to their occupational definition. The SOC code is formatted as a six-digit number, with a hyphen between the second and third numbers, such as "11-9081." The first two digits refer to one of the 23 major groups or industries, and the next four digits represent the more detailed occupation within that industry (USBLS 2014).

Controlling for occupation is important because it has a major impact on earnings (Okamoto and England 1999, Weinberg 2004). More specifically for the purposes of this study, scholars have also demonstrated that individuals tend to sort into occupations that reward a certain attribute and veer away from occupations where related penalties exist (Arunachalam and Shah 2012, Harper 2000). Finally, there is also evidence that attractive people not only sort into occupations that require beauty as a job qualification, but also into jobs that also pay particularly well (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).

Control Variable Measures

In evaluating their relationship to income and physical attractiveness level, the control variables to be tested include the following:

Gender: Gender is also a crucial variable, especially since Hypotheses 2 through 5 aim to address whether or not the labor market returns to physical attractiveness, personality, and grooming significantly differ by gender. Furthermore, gender differences between earnings (Bielby 2000) and attractiveness assessments (Griffin 2007, Grogan 1999, Saguy 2012) have been widely documented. The respondents' gender was categorized according to whether the respondent currently self-identified as either male or female during the Wave IV survey. Unfortunately, this measure for the respondent's sex adhered to a binary categorization, so a dummy variable was created for whether a respondent self-identified as female (51.63%) or male (48.37%, the omitted category).

Age: The respondents' age was measured as a continuous interval/ratio variable ranging from 24-32, with a mean age of 28.97). This variable was constructed by subtracting the respondent's birth date from the date of their face-to-face interview during Wave IV. Age is often a crucial factor not only because it is related to increased work experience and earnings (Thornton, Rodgers and Brookshire 1997), but because it often operates as another axis of social bias and labor market discrimination (Roscigno, Mong, Byron et al. 2007). More importantly, age is negatively related to attractiveness, especially among women (Berman, O'Nan and Floyd 1981, Henss 1991, Mathes, Brennan, Haugen et al. 1985). However, age did not appear to have much of an impact on the returns to attractiveness - which may be due to the relatively narrow range of ages and incomes among the respondents.

Marital Status: Although research has indicated that marriage influences self-perceptions of physical attractiveness (Giesen 1989), some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that there is actually a "wedding ring effect" – where married individuals are considered by others to be more attractive (Dugatkin 2000). Furthermore, marriage has been linked to increased earnings, particularly among men (Korenman and Neumark 1991). Thus, a variable for the respondents' marital status was taken from the Wave IV survey question, "How many persons have you ever married?" with values ranging from 0 to 4. Among the respondents, 50.61% had never been married, whereas 45.47% had been married once. Very few respondents were married more than once: indeed, only 3.73% were married twice, 0.19% were married three times and 0.01% were married four times. Therefore, a dummy variable was constructed from these values to represent whether the respondent had never been married (50.61% - the omitted category) or had been married at least once (49.39%).

Race: A series of dummy variables for the respondents' self-reported race was taken from the survey portion of Add Health, indexing whether the respondent was non-Hispanic white (the omitted category), Latinx, Black, Native American, or Asian American/Pacific Islander. A variable for race was added as a control since earnings not only vary across racial groups (Bielby 2000), but because perceptions of attractiveness (Hebl and Heatherton 1998, Hill 2002a, Hill 2002b) vary by skin tone, as do the returns to grooming (Das and Loach 2011).

Educational Attainment: Not only is education level correlated with earnings (Deere and Vesovic 2006), but attractiveness influences teacher expectations, grades, pursuits in higher education (Clifford and Walster 1973, Gordon et al. 2013, Hernández-Julián and Peters 2016) and perceptions about intelligence (Feingold 1992, Fink et al. 2006). Therefore, a variable for educational attainment was comprised by a series of six dummy variables which represent the highest level of education currently completed by the respondent. These six categories include: less than high school, high school graduate (the omitted category), some college or vocational training, trade/vocational school graduate, college graduate, and more than college.

Personality Attractiveness: Research has consistently shown that attractiveness ratings vary according to perceptions about an individual's personality, and vice versa (Gross and Crofton 1977, Lewandowski et al. 2007, Zhang et al. 2014). In addition, personality traits impact labor market outcomes, like earnings (Mueller and Plug 2006, Sutin et al. 2009). The measure for personality attractiveness includes a series of dummy variables drawn from the interviewers' rating of the respondents' personality attractiveness during the Wave IV interview process. Similar to the measure of physical attractiveness, interviewers were asked to answer

“How attractive is the respondent's personality?” using a five-point Likert scale, which ranged from (1) “very unattractive,” (2) "unattractive," (3) "average" (the omitted category), (4) attractive, and (5) “very attractive.” Since only 2.68% were very unattractive and 2.24% were unattractive, these categories here were collapsed into one category ("unattractive") as well.

Grooming: Grooming is a major determinant of attractiveness (Osborn 1996, Wong and Penner 2016) which also generate returns within the U.S. labor market (Boor et al. 1983, Das and Loach 2011). Thus, a variable for grooming contained a series of dummy variables based on the interviewers’ rating of the respondents' level of grooming during the Wave IV interviews. Interviewers were asked “How well groomed is the respondent?” according to a five-point Likert scale, which ranged from (1) very poorly groomed, (2) poorly groomed, (3) average (the omitted category), (4) well groomed, and (5) very well-groomed. Since only 0.45% was rated as very poorly groomed, and only 4.23% were rated as poorly groomed, the two poorly groomed categories were also combined into one category ("poorly groomed").

Body Mass Index: A variable for the respondent’s current BMI was constructed from a Wave IV item which ranked the respondent’s specific BMI measurement according to six BMI classes. Respondents were categorized by their BMI as “underweight” (<18.5), “normal” (18.5-24), “overweight” (25-29), “obese I” (30-34), “obese II” (35-39), or “obese III” (40+). Since only 1.33% of the sample was classified as “underweight,” this group was collapsed with the “normal” category. In addition, the three categories of obese were combined into one group (“obese”). Thus, for the purposes of these analyses, the six categories measure was recoded into three groups: “normal,” “overweight,” and “obese.” Male respondents reported a

median BMI of 27.9, which was only slightly higher than the median BMI among females (27.2). This variable was a crucial addition because some studies claim that BMI is a primary determinant of women's attractiveness (Tovée et al. 1999a), and that it accounts for a large portion of the variance in the attractiveness ratings of women and men (Tovée et al. 1999b). Furthermore, weight-based institutional inequalities and income penalties are well documented (Fikkan and Rothblum 2012, Griffin 2007, Okunade et al. 2009).

Height: A measure for the respondent's current height was constructed from a Wave IV item that recorded the respondent's height in centimeters. These measurements were recoded into inches, which ranged from 48.0315 inches to 88.9764 inches. The mean and median heights were 67.0153 and 66.9291 (SD=3.9676). Height serves as another essential control variable since it has been described as a key indicator of reproductive success and a primary determinant of attractiveness among males (Ellis 1992, Frederick and Haselton 2007, Nettle 2002). Height has also has a demonstrable impact on labor market outcomes like earnings, especially for men (Judge and Cable 2004, Persico, Postlewaite and Silverman 2004).

Finally, it is crucial to include measures for height and BMI since BFOQ exceptions allow employers to set weight and/or height restrictions (Trautner and Kwan 2010) and to terminate employees that gain weight (Barkacs and Barkacs 2011). Furthermore, prior studies which have utilized Add Health data in order to examine attractiveness have not conducted any substantive analyses of body mass index (BMI) or height in their models. I have included these variables because these physical characteristics have been linked to evaluations of attractiveness and to earnings, but they are also less subjective measures of physical appearance, in part because they were not determined solely by the appraisal of interviewers.

Collinearity: Analyses were conducted to assess the degree of collinearity between variables. The greatest collinearities were detected between attractiveness and grooming (r = 0.452; covariance =0.253; vif= 1.26) – followed by attractiveness and BMI (r = -0.223; covariance = -0.216; vif =1.052), and grooming and BMI (r =-0.18; covariance = -0.171; vif=1.033). Thus, there was some collinearity between variables but not enough to warrant their exclusion.

Methods

All of the analyses conducted in the present study utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model the relationship between level of physical attractiveness and earned income by estimating the equation: $y_i = X_{ki}\beta_k + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_i$

In this regression equation, y_i represents the logged income for the respondent, i, X_{ki} are the k independent variables – which include the dummy variables for physical attractiveness and other control variables as applicable – and α_j represent the fixed effects for the j interviewers. I used the natural log of income as the key dependent variable not only because this methodology has been consistently carried out by prior studies on the subject, but since it also allows me to interpret the coefficients by estimating percentage differences.

Only a very small portion of the values from the variables utilized in these analyses were missing, and the majority of missing values were detected among the measures for occupation and income. Some prior analyses conducted here and also by Wong and Penner (2016) indicated that the results yielded from analyses with listwise deletions were virtually the same as the results when STATA's multiple imputation procedures were implemented. Thus, all missing values were treated with listwise deletions and no values were imputed.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

The Descriptive Statistics for the variables above and their distributions within the Add Health sample are presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1

TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	*Distribution*	*Variable*	*Distribution*
INCOME		**PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS**	
Median Income	$32,000	Unattractive	6.81%
Men's Median Income	$36,000	Average	46.41%
Women's Median Income	$28,900	Attractive	37.39%
		Very Attractive	9.39%
DEMOGRAPHICS			
Average Age	28.97	**PERSONALITY ATTRACTIVENESS**	
Male	48.4%	Unattractive	4.92%
Female	51.6%	Average	39.08%
		Attractive	40.83%
		Very Attractive	15.17%
MARITAL STATUS			
Never Married	50.6%		
Married (1-4 times)	49.4%		
		GROOMING	
		Poorly Groomed	4.68%
RACE		About average	49.71%
White	54.29%	Well Groomed	35.40%
Latino	15.56%	Very Well Groomed	10.21%
Black	21.13%		
Native American	2.53%		
Asian American/Pacific Islander	6.49%		
		BODY MASS INDEX (BMI)	
		Normal	32.99%
EDUCATION LEVEL		Overweight	30.42%
Less Than High School	6.64%	Obese	36.59%
High School Graduate	15.20%		
Some College/Trade School	38.28%		
Completed Trade School	6.31%		
Completed College	20.58%	**HEIGHT (INCHES)**	
More than College	12.99%	Mean Height	67.015
		Median Height	66.929

The General Returns to Physical Attractiveness in the U.S. Labor Market

All models predict the participants' logged income and include interviewer fixed effects. Table 1 above includes all of the relevant descriptive statistics for the respondents. Table 2 below depicts the OLS regression results for all respondents across the eight models. Model 1 predicts the participants' logged income in relation to physical attractiveness level, while including interviewer fixed effects only. In each subsequent model (Models 2-8), additional controls were included as applicable. Model 2 added controls for demographic characteristics (gender, age, and marital status). Model 3 includes controls for the respondent's self-identified race. Model 4 added a control for respondent's highest level of educational attainment. Model 5 controls for BMI and height. Model 6 and Model 7 control for personality attractiveness and for grooming, which enables the assessment of whether personality and grooming account for any portion of the returns to attractiveness - even after a wide variety of other characteristics have been controlled for. Finally, Model 8 includes occupation fixed effects in order to control for the impact on the respondent's occupation on their earnings. The respondents' level of physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness, and grooming were all ranked by the Add Health interviewers during the face-to-face interview portion of Wave IV. All of the other variables of interest were self-reported by the respondent during the survey portion.

Table 2

TABLE 2 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: ALL RESPONDENTS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
ATTRACTIVENESS ***(Average omitted)***								
Unattractive	**-.112**** (.038)	**-.078*** (.038)	**-.075*** (.037)	**-.066** (.037)	**-.066** (.037)	**-.059** (.038)	**-.012** (.039)	**.006** (.038)
Attractive	**.146***** (.020)	**.167***** (.020)	**.169***** (.020)	**.112***** (.019)	**.116***** (.019)	**.077***** (.021)	**.034** (.021)	**.025** (.021)
Very Attractive	**.224***** (.033)	**.275***** (.033)	**.278***** (.032)	**.189***** (.032)	**.198***** (.032)	**.142***** (.036)	**.055** (.036)	**.035** (.036)
GENDER ***(Male omitted)***		**-.342***** (.017)	**-.336***** (.017)	**-.393***** (.017)	**-.340***** (.023)	**-.344***** (.023)	**-.348***** (.023)	**-.205***** (.025)
AGE		**.038***** (.005)	**.039***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)	**.033***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.182***** (.018)	**.162***** (.018)	**.165***** (.017)	**.161***** (.017)	**.160***** (.017)	**.150***** (.017)	**.090***** (.017)
RACE (*White omitted)*								
Latino			**-.096***** (.030)	**-.006** (.029)	**.002** (.029)	**.0005** (.029)	**-.016** (.029)	**-.018** (.029)
Black			**-.206***** (.026)	**-.156***** (.025)	**-.162***** (.025)	**-.16***** (.025)	**-.171***** (.025)	**-.122***** (.025)
Native American			**-.190***** (.055)	**-.125*** (.054)	**-.129*** (.054)	**-.126*** (.054)	**-.119*** (.054)	**-.118*** (.052)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.094*** (.040)	**.050** (.039)	**.071** (.040)	**.071** (.040)	**.062** (.040)	**.031** (.039)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)								
Less Than High School				**-.287***** (.038)	**-.283***** (.038)	**-.281***** (.038)	**-.263***** (.038)	**-.183***** (.038)
Some College/Trade School				**.148***** (.025)	**.147***** (.025)	**.140***** (.025)	**.117***** (.025)	**.074***** (.025)
Finished Trade School				**.169***** (.039)	**.168***** (.039)	**.164***** (.039)	**.140***** (.039)	**.054** (.039)
College Graduate				**.531***** (.029)	**.529***** (.029)	**.518***** (.029)	**.473***** (.029)	**.312***** (.031)
More Than College				**.554***** (.033)	**.555***** (.033)	**.544***** (.033)	**.493***** (.033)	**.300***** (.038)
BMI ***(Normal omitted)***								
Overweight					**.066**** (.021)	**.065**** (.021)	**.067***** (.021)	**.055**** (.02)
Obese					**.061***** (.021)	**.056**** (.021)	**.077***** (.021)	**.077***** (.02)
HEIGHT					**.009***** (.003)	**.009**** (.003)	**.009**** (.003)	**.008**** (.003)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*								
Unattractive						**-.0006** (.048)	**-.008** (.048)	**-.008** (.045)
Attractive						**.090***** (.021)	**.057**** (.021)	**.046*** (.021)
Very Attractive						**.115***** (.032)	**.052** (.032)	**.031** (.032)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*								
Poorly Groomed							**-.279***** (.043)	**-.256***** (.043)
Well Groomed							**.148***** (.022)	**.112***** (.021)
Very Well Groomed							**.243***** (.036)	**.193***** (.036)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS								X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.54***	9.49***	9.52***	9.22***	8.57***	8.57***	8.57***	8.80***
R-SQUARED	.0840	.1237	.1299	.1787	.1800	.1814	.1893	.3086
*p= .05** *p= .01*** *p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*								

Model 1 - The Labor Market Returns to Physical Attractiveness

Model 1 predicts the respondents' logged income in relation to their attractiveness level, while including interviewer fixed effects, with no further controls included. Model 1 reflects the coefficients, with the omitted reference group reflecting the respondents ranked as "average" in physical attractiveness by the Add Health interviewers. Compared to average respondents, unattractive respondents earned 10.6% less (p=.003), but attractive respondents earned 15.7% more (p=.000), and very attractive respondents earned 25.1% more (p=.000). Therefore, there is a consistent positive linear relationship between physical attractiveness level and earnings. These results support Hypothesis 1: *unattractive respondents earn significantly lower incomes than respondents who were ranked as average in attractiveness, whereas attractive and very attractive respondents earn significantly higher incomes.*

Model 2 - The Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Demographic Characteristics

Model 2 predicts the participants' logged income in relation to attractiveness level, while including interviewer fixed effects, but now the analyses also incorporate controls for three major demographic characteristics: gender, age, and marital status. Comparing the results of Models 1 and 2, adding the controls for gender, age, and marital status did not diminish the relationship between income and attractiveness. In fact, the returns for being attractive or very attractive are slightly larger once demographic factors are controlled for, although the magnitude and significance of the penalties for being unattractive decrease. Compared to respondents of average attractiveness, attractive respondents now earn 18.2% more (p=.000) and very attractive respondents earn 31.7% more (p=.000) - up from 15.7% and 25.1%, respectively. On the other hand, unattractive respondents now only earn 7.5% less

than average respondents (p=.034). Overall, these results suggest that the labor market returns to attractiveness are not merely a function of differences in the demographic composition of who is ranked as attractive or unattractive. When comparing respondents who are similar in terms of these three demographic characteristics, attractiveness actually appears to matter more for wages than it does in the aggregated population depicted in Model 1. Finally, the coefficients for sex, age, and marital status remain statistically significant at the p=.000 level throughout all models, with minimal changes in their coefficients or standard errors.

Model 2 demonstrates that female respondents earn 29% less than male respondents, that married respondents earn 20% more than single respondents, and that each additional year in age corresponds with a 3.9% increase in earnings. These findings are consistent with what we should expect empirically - due not only to gender wage gaps (Bielby 2000) and to marriage wage gaps (Korenman and Neumark 1991) - but also because age tends to be positively correlated with earnings (Thornton et al. 1997). However, the finding that female Add Health respondents earn roughly 18.5% less than their male counterparts even with all controls in place is especially troublesome - not only due to the large magnitude and significance of the difference - but because the national wage gap is generally shown to be the smallest amongst this age group and it tends to increase across the life course (USBLS 2015). It is also possible that the women in this sample have much lower wages because this age group (24-32) is when American women typically have children (Mathews and Hamilton 2016). Therefore, a substantial portion of the female respondents may be working less, and they may also be disadvantaged by motherhood penalties (Correll, Benard and Paik 2007).

Model 3 – The Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Race

Race was a significant factor in Model 3, with all four racial groups demonstrating statistically significant income differences relative to white respondents. Although race significantly influenced the respondents' earnings, it did not substantially impact the returns to attractiveness. Compared to white respondents, Latinx respondents earned 9.2% less (p=.001), blacks respondents earned 18.6% less (p=.000), Native American respondents earned 17.3% less (p=.001), and Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders earned 9.9% more (p=.019). These results are also consistent with empirical studies which document the racial wage gap (Bielby 2000), as well as with those which note the relative similarities between the earnings of white and Asian American workers (Zeng and Xie 2004).

Model 4 - The Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Educational Completion

Model 4 predicts the participants' logged income in relation to attractiveness level, while including interviewer fixed effects, demographic controls, and controls for the respondent's highest level of education completed. For the first time in Table 2, we see that the returns to physical attractiveness begin to decrease when educational achievement is controlled. In Model 4, the penalties against unattractive respondents continue to diminish even more, but so do the rewards for attractive and very attractive respondents. Unattractive respondents now earn only 6.4% less (p=.064) than respondents of average attractiveness, and this difference is no longer statistically significant. However, despite notable decreases in magnitude, attractive and very attractive respondents still earn 11.9% (p=.000) and 20.8% more (p=.000), respectively.

However, educational achievement has an even greater impact on income more generally. The inclusion of this control variable had the second most demonstrable influence on the values of R-squared across all models, since it explained an additional ~5% of the variance in earnings. The fact that education level influences earnings as well as the returns to physical attractiveness further underscores some empirical findings. On one hand, research has shown that attractiveness is associated with better grades (Gordon et al. 2013) and higher levels of educational achievement (Hernández-Julián and Peters 2016). On the other hand, attractive individuals are considered to be more intelligent (Fink et al. 2006, Jackson et al. 1995), but intelligent people may also be perceived as more attractive (Paunonen 2006).

The coefficients for all levels of educational completion remain statically significant at the p=.000 level across all models and do not change much in their magnitude either. In addition, there is a positive ordinal relationship between higher educational completion and higher earnings, which indicates that each subsequent level of educational completion corresponds with greater incomes. Compared to high school graduates, respondents that did not complete high school earned 24.7% less, but respondents that completed some college/trade school earned 16.1% more, trade school graduates earned 18.4% more, college graduates earned 70.6% more, and respondents who went beyond college earned 74.9% more.

Finally, controlling for educational completion did not change the strength or significance of the coefficients for gender, age, and marital status but it diminished the bulk of the racial differences. Model 3 found statistically significant differences across all racial groups, but these differences now remain limited to Black and Native American respondents.

Model 5 - The Returns to Physical Attractiveness, Body Mass Index (BMI) & Height

Although BMI and height had a much greater influence on the returns to attractiveness when they were added to the regression model prior to the other control variables, they still had a minor impact on the returns to attractiveness and a major impact on general earnings. Therefore, it is advisable for future research endeavors to include these two measures when empirically analyzing outcomes associated with attractiveness. Interestingly, the earnings for attractive and very attractive respondents slightly increase when BMI and height are controlled for. When BMI and height are held constant, there was virtually zero effect on the returns for unattractive respondents, but attractive and very attractive respondents earned 12.3% (p=.000) and 21.8% more (p=.000) than average respondents. Although BMI and height do have some impact on the returns to attractiveness, this finding challenges findings which claim that BMI and height are primary determinates of physical attractiveness (Ellis 1992, Frederick and Haselton 2007, Tovée et al. 1999a). However, it is also possible that these effects are not as robust within the overall sample, because BMI is posited to matter more for women (Tovée et al. 1999b) whereas height should be a more salient characteristic among men (Nettle 2002). Thus, Table 4 and Table 5 below separately analyze the impacts of BMI and height on the returns to attractiveness generated by male and female respondents.

Nevertheless, the results demonstrate that BMI and height strongly impact the respondents' earnings more generally. Respondents not only earn an additional 0.09% more (p=.003) for each additional inch they are in height, but overweight respondents earn 6.8% more (p=.001) and obese respondents earn 6.3% more (p=.003) than their counterparts with a normal BMI classification. The coefficients for BMI and height also change very little in magnitude and significance across the remaining models.

These results support prior research endeavors which have confirmed that increased height is associated with greater earnings – namely among men (Judge and Cable 2004, Persico et al. 2004). However, the results pertaining to BMI may be a bit more complicated. Although there has been a notable degree of consensus that overweight and obese women experience significant salary penalties, it has been suggested that their male counterparts are either negatively impacted (Baum and Ford 2004) or suffer no economic consequences (Cawley et al. 2005) – while some studies even claim that men generate wage premiums for being overweight or obese (Maranto and Stenoien 2000). Therefore, assessing the labor market outcomes related to BMI and height will likely be more fruitful when we analyze its effect separately among the male and female respondents in Table 4 and Table 5.

Model 6 - The Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Personality Attractiveness

When controls for personality attractiveness were added, the penalties against unattractive respondents and the rewards for attractive and very attractive respondents further diminished. In Model 6, unattractive respondents earned only 5.7% less (p=.122) than average respondents, while attractive and very attractive respondents earned only 8% more (p=.000) and 15.3% more (p=.001). These findings further support the contention that personality traits do indeed influence perceptions and outcomes associated with physical attractiveness (Gross and Crofton 1977, Lewandowski et al. 2007, Wong and Penner 2016, Zhang et al. 2014), but they do not account for a substantial amount of the beauty premia.

However, respondents with attractive and very attractive personalities do appear to earn significantly higher incomes, which is consistent with other studies which suggest that personality traits can impact earnings (Sutin et al. 2009). Compared to respondents with an

average level of personality attractiveness, respondents with attractive and very attractive personalities earned 9.4% more (p=.000) and 12.2% more, respectively (p=.000). It is also important to note that controlling for personality attractiveness did not change the strength or significance of the coefficients for any of the other variables, including gender, age, marital status, race, educational completion, BMI, or height.

Model 7 - The Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Grooming

Finally, when controls for grooming were included in Model 7, all three grooming coefficients were large in magnitude and highly significant. On the other hand, all of the physical attractiveness coefficients were diminished to the extent that none remained statistically significant for the first and only time. The effects of grooming also markedly reduced the returns to personality attractiveness. However, controlling for grooming did not notably change the strength or significance of the coefficients for gender, age, marital status, race, education level, BMI, or height. Hence, grooming appears to be the most robust factor in terms of its influence on the labor market returns to attractiveness.

In the first model, which included no additional controls, unattractive respondents earned 10.6% less (p=.003), whereas attractive respondents earn 15.7% more (p=.000), and very attractive respondents earn 25.1% more (p=.000). By Model 6, attractive and very attractive respondents still earned 9.4% more (p=.000) and 12.2% more (p=.000). Once controls for grooming were introduced in Model 7, attractive and very attractive respondents only earned 3.5% more (p=.117) and 5.7% more (p=.141) – but these differences were no longer significant. In sum, grooming has reduced the returns to physical attractiveness by more than three-fourths since Model 1, and by more than half since Model 6.

Furthermore, grooming significantly impacted the respondents' earnings more broadly. Compared to respondents whose grooming was categorized by interviewers as average, poorly groomed respondents earned 24.3% less, whereas well-groomed respondents earned 16% more and very well groomed respondents earned 27.5% more, all at the p=.000 level. Hence, the returns to grooming are both large and significant – but more importantly, grooming accounts for the greatest portion of the labor market returns to attractiveness in addition to influencing perceptions about the respondents' personalities. Therefore, these findings contradict other research endeavors which have emphasized that grooming has a minimal to marginal effect on earnings (Hamermesh et al. 2002) and instead support the contention that grooming offers significant labor market returns (Wong and Penner 2016).

However, there have been some inconsistencies about the gender dynamics of the labor market returns to grooming. There are conflicts as to whether grooming has a stronger impact on the institutional outcomes of women (Dellinger and Williams 1997, Robins et al. 2011, Wong and Penner 2016) or men (Das and Loach 2011, French et al. 2009). Thus, it is critical to explore how gender shapes the returns to attractiveness and its major determinants, such as grooming, personality attractiveness, and BMI.

Model 8 - The Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Occupation Fixed Effects

Unsurprisingly, occupation has a very significant impact on earnings, and its inclusion in the analyses considerably improved the regression models, as this variable explained an additional 11.93% of the variance in annual income. Since adding a control for grooming significantly reduced the returns to attractiveness and personality attractiveness in Model 7, these coefficients changed very little when occupation was controlled for in Model 8.

However, adding occupation fixed effects notably reduced the earning gaps related to age, marital status, race, educational attainment, and sex. Females continued to earn 18.5% less (p=.000) than males, but the gender wage gap was nevertheless reduced by more than a third once occupation was held constant. Interestingly, the inclusion of occupation fixed effects had a minimal impact on the coefficients for BMI and to height.

Although the returns to grooming were considerably reduced in Model 8, all three grooming coefficients still remained large in magnitude and highly significant. Compared to respondents whose grooming was categorized by interviewers as average, poorly groomed respondents now earned 22.6% less, whereas well-groomed respondents earned 11.9% more and very well groomed respondents earned 27.5% more, all at the p=.000 level. In conclusion, the data has provided strong support for the existence of grooming-related premia.

Gender Dynamics of the Returns to Physical Attractiveness

To examine whether a gendered beauty premium exists, or if the effects of attractiveness significantly differ by gender, additional analyses in Table 3 below assessed the interaction effects between gender and physical attractiveness.

Table 3

TABLE 3 – RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS & GENDER INTERACTIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
ATTRACTIVENESS *(Average omitted)*				
Unattractive	**-.172***** (.053)	**-.142**** (.051)	**-.076** (.053)	**-.047** (.052)
Attractive	**.152***** (.028)	**.091***** (.027)	**.007** (.028)	**-.001** (.028)
Very Attractive	**.299***** (.049)	**.214***** (.047)	**.070** (.051)	**.048** (.050)
GENDER *(Male omitted)*	**-.356***** (.025)	**-.411***** (.025)	**-.369***** (.029)	**-.229***** (.030)
ATTRACTIVENESS x GENDER				
Unattractive x Gender	**.148*** (.071)	**.138*** (.068)	**.116** (.069)	**.101** (.067)
Attractive x Gender	**.035** (.038)	**.040** (.037)	**.047** (.037)	**.053** (.036)
Very Attractive x Gender	**-.048** (.063)	**-.040** (.060)	**-.027** (.060)	**-.015** (.059)
AGE		**.041***** (.005)	**.041***** (.005)	**.033***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.161***** (.017)	**.146***** (.017)	**.091***** (.017)
RACE (*White omitted)*				
Latino		**.0002** (.029)	**-.011** (.029)	**-.019** (.029)
Black		**-.152***** (.025)	**-.167***** (.025)	**-.122***** (.025)
Native American		**-.133*** (.054)	**-.128*** (.054)	**-.118*** (.053)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.051** (.039)	**.061** (.040)	**.030** (.039)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)				
Less Than High School		**-.283***** (.039)	**-.259***** (.039)	**-.185***** (.038)
Some College/Trade School		**.144***** (.025)	**.113***** (.025)	**.073**** (.025)
Finished Trade School		**.166***** (.039)	**.137***** (.039)	**.055** (.039)
College Graduate		**.523***** (.029)	**.465***** (.029)	**.311***** (.031)
More Than College		**.545***** (.033)	**.484***** (.033)	**.299***** (.038)
BMI (*Normal omitted)*				
Overweight			**.074***** (.021)	**.055**** (.02)
Obese			**.079***** (.021)	**.077***** (.02)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)	**.008**** (.003)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*				
Unattractive			**-.005** (.046)	**-.009** (.045)
Attractive			**.061**** (.022)	**.046*** (.021)
Very Attractive			**.055** (.033)	**.031** (.032)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*				
Poorly Groomed			**-.276***** (.043)	**-.256***** (.042)
Well Groomed			**.148***** (.022)	**.111***** (.021)
Very Well Groomed			**.244***** (.037)	**.191***** (.036)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS				X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.70***	9.22***	8.60***	8.81***
R-SQUARED	.1111	.1783	.1891	.3089
*p= .05** *p= .01*** *p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*				

As depicted in Table 3 above, male respondents generated some significant attractiveness penalties and premia only until other controls for physical appearance are introduced in Model 3. However, these returns do not significantly differ among female respondents, since none of the coefficients for the interaction term were statistically significant within any of the physical attractiveness levels. Supplemental F Tests with all controls included were also conducted, which indicate that the overall interaction effect itself was insignificant (p=.229). Since attractiveness penalties and premia do not significantly vary by gender, there was no support for Hypothesis 2 which anticipated that *there would be statistically significant differences in the returns to physical attractiveness, and that women would experience greater beauty premia than men.* Furthermore, the F Tests also show that unattractive women did not earn significantly less (p=.268) than women who were ranked as average, nor very attractive women (p=.457) earn significantly more. The only notable difference in these analyses was that physically attractive women earned somewhat more than women of average attractiveness, although this difference was only marginally significant (p=.061). Overall, the results outlined thus far in Chapter 2 conclude that attractive individuals may earn some general beauty premia, but found no support for the contention that the returns to attractiveness are gendered.

Nevertheless, to further explore how the effect of attractiveness and its major determinants influence the earnings of male and female respondents, the same regression models depicted in Table 2 above were also conducted separately by gender, as displayed in Table 4 (males) and Table 5 (females) below.

Table 4

TABLE 4 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: MALE RESPONDENTS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
ATTRACTIVENESS *(Average omitted)*									
Unattractive	**-.183*** (.052)	**-.145** (.051)	**-.141** (.051)	**-.129** (.050)	**-.129** (.050)	**-.134** (.050)	**-.127*** (.053)	**-.073** (.055)	**-.069** (.055)
Attractive	**.156*** (.028)	**.144*** (.027)	**.152*** (.027)	**.109*** (.027)	**.115*** (.027)	**.110*** (.027)	**.067*** (.029)	**.041** (.030)	**.039** (.030)
Very Attractive	**.329*** (.049)	**.353*** (.048)	**.376*** (.048)	**.305*** (.048)	**.312*** (.048)	**.300*** (.048)	**.237*** (.053)	**.176*** (.054)	**.145** (.055)
AGE		**.028*** (.007)	**.028*** (.007)	**.030*** (.007)	**.029*** (.007)	**.029*** (.007)	**.030*** (.007)	**.031*** (.007)	**.023*** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.354*** (.025)	**.331*** (.025)	**.334*** (.024)	**.322*** (.024)	**.319*** (.024)	**.318*** (.024)	**.308*** (.024)	**.247*** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*									
Latino			**-.121** (.040)	**-.060** (.039)	**-.072** (.039)	**-.050** (.040)	**-.052** (.040)	**-.068** (.040)	**-.047** (.040)
Black			**-.334*** (.036)	**-.288*** (.035)	**-.291*** (.035)	**-.286*** (.035)	**-.284*** (.035)	**-.294*** (.035)	**-.216*** (.036)
Native American			**-.234** (.076)	**-.186*** (.075)	**-.192** (.074)	**-.188** (.074)	**-.191** (.074)	**-.187** (.074)	**-.128** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.100** (.054)	**.048** (.053)	**.046** (.053)	**.075** (.054)	**.071** (.054)	**.064** (.053)	**.04** (.054)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)									
Less Than High School				**-.237*** (.047)	**-.231*** (.047)	**-.230*** (.047)	**-.229*** (.047)	**-.214*** (.047)	**-.168*** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.097** (.033)	**.096** (.033)	**.094** (.033)	**.086** (.033)	**.063** (.033)	**.016** (.033)
Finished Trade School				**.172*** (.054)	**.171** (.054)	**.172** (.054)	**.165** (.054)	**.147** (.054)	**.047** (.055)
College Graduate				**.401*** (.039)	**.403*** (.039)	**.400*** (.039)	**.386*** (.039)	**.347*** (.039)	**.207*** (.044)
More Than College				**.282*** (.048)	**.288*** (.048)	**.282*** (.048)	**.270*** (.048)	**.222*** (.048)	**.073** (.048)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*									
Overweight					**.109*** (.029)	**.111*** (.029)	**.111*** (.029)	**.102*** (.029)	**.072** (.029)
Obese					**.141*** (.029)	**.142*** (.029)	**.138*** (.029)	**.146*** (.029)	**.132*** (.029)
HEIGHT						**.012** (.004)	**.012** (.004)	**.012** (.004)	**.011** (.004)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*									
Unattractive							**-.001** (.062)	**.026** (.063)	**.042** (.063)
Attractive							**.099*** (.029)	**.076** (.030)	**.050** (.030)
Very Attractive							**.127** (.046)	**.077** (.047)	**.043** (.047)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*									
Poorly Groomed								**-.285*** (.055)	**-.271*** (.056)
Well Groomed								**.084** (.03)	**.056** (.03)
Very Well Groomed								**.209*** (.053)	**.148*** (.053)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS									X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.61***	9.66***	9.7***	9.48***	9.42***	8.56***	8.52***	8.55***	8.68***
R-SQUARED	.1206	.1562	.1710	.1987	.2020	.2032	.2050	.2115	.3607
*p= .05** p= .01** p= .001*** (Standard Errors in Parentheses)*									

Table 5

TABLE 5 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
ATTRACTIVENESS ***(Average omitted)***									
Unattractive	**-.010** (.054)	**-.003** (.053)	**-.003** (.053)	**-.005** (.051)	**-.004** (.051)	**-.003** (.051)	**.015** (.055)	**.051** (.056)	**.082** (.056)
Attractive	**.191***** (.029)	**.190***** (.029)	**.188***** (.029)	**.114***** (.028)	**.109***** (.029)	**.110***** (.029)	**.072*** (.030)	**.009** (.032)	**-.0006** (.032)
Very Attractive	**.243***** (.045)	**.253***** (.045)	**.249***** (.045)	**.142***** (.044)	**.135**** (.044)	**.135**** (.045)	**.082** (.050)	**-.033** (.052)	**-.030** (.052)
AGE		**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.041***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.015** (.026)	**.0002** (.026)	**.002** (.025)	**.001** (.025)	**.002** (.025)	**.0001** (.025)	**-.005** (.025)	**-.046** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*									
Latino			**-.079** (.044)	**.036** (.042)	**.037** (.042)	**.041** (.043)	**.041** (.043)	**.027** (.043)	**.027** (.042)
Black			**-.123***** (.038)	**-.070*** (.037)	**-.068** (.036)	**-.069** (.036)	**-.067** (.036)	**-.079*** (.036)	**-.044** (.036)
Native American			**-.198*** (.080)	**-.112** (.077)	**-.111** (.077)	**-.111** (.077)	**-.104** (.077)	**-.097** (.077)	**-.119** (.077)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.116** (.061)	**.098** (.058)	**.098** (.058)	**.103** (.059)	**.106** (.059)	**.098** (.059)	**.035** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)									
Less Than High School				**-.389***** (.064)	**-.389***** (.064)	**-.389***** (.064)	**-.384***** (.064)	**-.363***** (.064)	**-.216***** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.200***** (.039)	**.200***** (.039)	**.200***** (.039)	**.194***** (.039)	**.176***** (.039)	**.113**** (.039)
Finished Trade School				**.172***** (.057)	**.172***** (.057)	**.172**** (.057)	**.170**** (.057)	**.145**** (.057)	**.074** (.058)
College Graduate				**.657***** (.044)	**.657***** (.044)	**.656***** (.044)	**.644***** (.044)	**.600***** (.044)	**.398***** (.046)
More Than College				**.740***** (.047)	**.740***** (.047)	**.738***** (.047)	**.727***** (.047)	**.677***** (.048)	**.446***** (.055)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*									
Overweight					**.020** (.030)	**.021** (.031)	**.018** (.031)	**.035** (.031)	**.052** (.030)
Obese					**-.015** (.030)	**-.015** (.030)	**-.022** (.030)	**.017** (.030)	**.027** (.030)
HEIGHT						**.003** (.004)	**.002** (.004)	**.003** (.004)	**.004** (.004)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*									
Unattractive							**-.031** (.067)	**-.076** (.067)	**-.033** (.067)
Attractive							**.087**** (.031)	**.042** (.031)	**.041** (.031)
Very Attractive							**.11*** (.045)	**.029** (.046)	**.033** (.045)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*									
Poorly Groomed								**-.264***** (.067)	**-.258***** (.067)
Well Groomed								**.211***** (.031)	**.154***** (.031)
Very Well Groomed								**.296***** (.051)	**.212***** (.051)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS									X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.44***	8.95***	8.98***	8.57***	8.57***	8.40***	8.42***	8.41***	8.68***
R-SQUARED	.1118	.1187	.1220	.1974	.1976	.1976	.1989	.2089	.3467
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001*** (Standard Errors in Parentheses)*									

Model 1 - Gendered Returns to Physical Attractiveness

Model 1 predicts the respondents' logged income in relation to attractiveness level while including interviewer fixed effects, with no further controls. Compared to average males, unattractive men earned 16.7% less (p=.000), whereas attractive men earned 16.9% more (p=.000), and very attractive men earned 39% more (p=.000). Compared to average females, unattractive females earned 21% less (p=.845), whereas attractive females earned 21% more (p=.000), and very attractive females earned 27.5% more (p=.000). Overall, unattractive men appear to generate much larger and significant income penalties than unattractive women, but very attractive men are also rewarded much more substantially than their female counterparts. However, these gender differences in the returns to attractiveness may be in part explained by the greater earning power that men experience relative to women (Bielby 2000), and it is also possible that the female respondents are additionally subjected to motherhood penalties at this stage in their life-course (Correll et al. 2007, Mathews and Hamilton 2016). Indeed, additional analyses indicated that 54.53% of female respondents had at least one child, whereas only 43.13% of male respondents had at least one child.

Model 2 - Gendered Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Demographic Characteristics

Once demographic controls for gender, age, and marital status are introduced in Model 2, the penalties among unattractive respondents begin to reduce, the rewards for attractive respondents slightly decrease, but the rewards for very attractive respondents increase. Although this pattern held up among both female and male respondents, the magnitude and statistical significance of the penalties and rewards were still greater for males. In addition, by

glancing at the values for R-squared, we can see that these demographic variables explain more of the variance in men's earnings than in women's earnings.

Understandably, age significantly influenced the earnings of both male and female respondents despite the relatively narrow age range of the Add Health respondents (24-32). The coefficients for age remained relatively static in magnitude and significance (p=.000) across all models, but nevertheless point to some notable gender differences. Models 2-9 in Table 4 and Table 5 show that male respondents earn roughly 2-3% more (p=.001) for each year they ascend in age, whereas female respondents earn about 4-5% more (p=.000). Therefore, age has nearly twice the effect on earnings for females.

Marital status only significantly impacted the earnings of men, and these labor market returns to marriage remained large and highly significant across all models (p=.000). Models 2-9 from Table 4 demonstrate that male respondents who have been married at least once earned between 28% - 42.5% more (p=.000) than male respondents who have never been married. However, female respondents who have been married at least once earn between 4.5% less – 1.5% more than female respondents who have never been married, although none of these coefficients were ever significant. These results are consistent with prior findings that a marriage premium exists among men (Korenman and Neumark 1991), and perhaps also with research that has documented a "daddy bonus" among men with children (Hodges and Budig 2010) and motherhood penalties among working mothers (Correll et al. 2007).

As a side note, the effects of marriage and parenthood were explored in additional analyses that are included in the Appendix. The likelihoods of being married and having children both increase with physical attractiveness level, even with all controls in place. These results are consistent with other findings that attractive individuals are more likely to be

married (Jæger 2011) and to bear children (Kim 2013, Prokop and Fedor 2011). In terms of median earnings, men with no children earned $35,000 per year, which does not significantly differ from the earnings of fathers ($36,000). However, female respondents with no children earned a median salary of $35,000 but mothers earned strikingly less ($26,000). Overall, the data detected significant motherhood penalties, but the daddy bonus was no longer significant once all controls were included into the regression models. With all controls included, men with at least one child earned 2.2% more (p=.406) than men without children, whereas female respondents with at least one child earned 17.3% less (p=.000) than women without children. Finally, adding parenthood status to the models did not have much of an impact on the R-squared values, nor did it notably influence the returns to grooming or to attractiveness.

Model 3 - Gendered Returns to Physical Attractiveness & Race

When examining its effect on the wages and the returns to attractiveness, race appears to be a greater factor among men. The labor market returns to physical attractiveness only slightly decrease among women when race is introduced into the regression model, but the premia among attractive and very attractive men actually increase. However, race has a much more notable impact on the respondents' general earnings than on their beauty premia.

Compared to white men, Latinos earn 11.4% less (p=.002), blacks earn 28.4% less (p=.000), and Native Americans earn 20.9% less (p=.002). Compared to white women, Latinas earn 7.6% less (p=.073), blacks earn 11.6% less (p=.001), Native Americans earn 18% less (p=.013). There were no significant differences detected between the earnings of white and Asian American/Pacific Islander respondents. Black and Native American men continued to earn significantly less than white men until Model 7, but only black men earned

less once occupation was controlled for in Model 8. On the other hand, only black women continued to earn less than white women until Model 7, and no racial wage gaps were detected among women once occupation fixed effects were included. The coefficients for race were diminished the most once educational completion was added in Model 4, indicating that the returns to education can in part mediate the severity of the racial wage gaps imposed on men and women of color. This finding is especially bleak when we consider that American academic institutions continue to restrict the educational opportunities and resources available to people of color (Yosso, Parker, Solórzano et al. 2004). However, educational attainment does not account for all of the racial wage gap. These gender differences in the racial wage gaps are perhaps not so surprising, given that female respondents earned roughly 18.5% less than male respondents (p=.000) even with all controls in place, as shown in Table 2. Thus, it may be inappropriate to suggest that black women are somehow comparatively better off than black men, because it is likely they are uniquely disadvantaged by multiple marginalities and that the gender wage gaps may undercut some of the racial wage gaps.

Model 4 - Gendered Beauty Premiums & Educational Attainment

Once the respondents' highest level of educational completion is added to the model, the wage penalties among unattractive males is reduced slightly and the rewards for attractive and very attractive respondents begin to decrease substantially for the first time. Although controlling for educational attainment had a minimal impact the coefficients for age and marital status, it explains a notable portion of the racial wage gap for both men and women. The values for R-squared indicate that educational attainment explains more of the variance in

women's earnings than in men's earnings, and the coefficients in Model 8 demonstrate that educational attainment matters much less for men's earnings once occupation is controlled.

Nevertheless, educational attainment has a demonstrable impact on earnings. Compared to male high school graduates, men who did not complete high school earned 21.1% less (p=.000). On the other hand, men who finished some college or trade school earned 10.2% more (p=.004), and those who completed trade school earned 18.8% more (p=.001). Finally, college graduates earned 49.3% more (p=.000) and men who went beyond college earned 32.6% more (p=.000). Compared to female high school graduates, females that did not complete high school earned 32.2% less (p=.000). Females that completed some college or trade school earned 22.1% more (p=.000) and those that completed trade school earned 18.8% more (p=.003). Finally, females who completed college earned 92.9% more (p=.001) and those who went beyond college earned 109.6% more (p=.000).

Thus, Model 4 suggests that the highest level of educational completion has a more severe effect on earnings of women, which is especially pronounced among respondents who graduated from college or went beyond college. Interestingly, the relationship between earnings and educational achievement is not perfectly linear among men, given that men who completed college actually earned more than men who went beyond college. It is possible that this counterintuitive finding may be because male respondents who went beyond college may be experiencing short-term income losses due to enrollment in a graduate program. Yet this explanation cannot account for why women who went beyond college earned significantly higher wages than all other groups. However, it could be that the wage losses that women experience when pursuing higher education may not be as severe due to the gender wage gap.

Another staggering gender difference is apparent in the income returns to completing a Bachelor's degree or going beyond college. Compared to high school graduates, male college graduates only earn 23% more (p=.000), but female college graduates earn 48.9% more (p=.000) - which is more than double the effect. Going beyond college, men earn only 7.6% more (p=.202) than high school graduates, whereas women earn 56.2% more (p=.000) - which is more than six times the effect. Furthermore, these are the differences that exist when all controls are included in the regression analyses, so they were much more pronounced in earlier models. These findings are consistent with Baum and Ma's (2007) claim that the ratio of median earnings of Bachelor's degree recipients to the earnings of high school graduates is higher among females than males within this age group. However, it is also possible that this greater payoff of higher education among women may decrease over time as the gender wage gap continues to widen with age and earnings become more disparate (USBLS 2015).

Model 5 - Gendered Beauty Premiums & BMI

When BMI is controlled for in Model 5, the returns for attractive and very attractive men slightly increase, while the opposite effect occurs among women. These effects were much stronger if the BMI measure was included in the regression models before the other control variables. Overall, these results support the notion that BMI accounts for a portion of the returns to attractiveness earned by women (Tovée et al. 1999a, Tovée et al. 1999b), although it was not nearly as influential as these scholars suggest. However, when comparing male respondents who are similar in terms of their BMI classification, attractiveness appears to matter even more for wages. In sum, BMI may impact the earnings of male respondents, but these returns seem to operate rather independently from physical attractiveness itself.

Furthermore, BMI has a much greater effect on men's general earnings yet it seems to have no significant impact on women's earnings. None of the coefficients for BMI were significant among the female respondents in any of the models, which is surprising given that a great deal of research has reported that women systematically suffer from weight-related wage penalties (Cawley et al. 2005, Fikkan and Rothblum 2012, Han et al. 2009). However, this could merely be a consequence of the cohort-design and the more restricted earning potential among women within this relatively young age group.

The coefficients for BMI change very little and remain highly significant (p=.000) among male respondents. In Model 5, overweight men earned roughly 11% more (p=.000) than men with a normal BMI level, while obese men earned 15% more (p=.000). Even with all controls included in Model 9, overweight men earned 7.5% more (p=.010) than men with a normal BMI level, while obese men earned 14.1% more (p=.000). These findings challenge prior assertions that men are also subjected to weight-related income penalties (Baum and Ford 2004) or that men's earnings were not influenced by their BMI (Cawley et al. 2005). Rather, these results are more consistent with research endeavors that have identified weight-related wage premiums among men (Brown and Medoff 1989, Maranto and Stenoien 2000).

However, further analyses have also determined that these weight-related premiums exist across all BMI classifications above the normal range, which conflicts with Maranto and Stenoien's (2000) claim that men accrue wage premiums for being "overweight" or "mildly obese," but that they experience wage penalties at the very highest weight levels. Although the BMI measure primarily utilized in this study collapsed Add Health's three categories for obesity into a single category for obese, I also reran the regression models from Table 4 and Table 5 with the BMI categories of normal, overweight, obese I, obese II, and obese III.

Relative to respondents with a normal BMI, overweight male respondents earned 7.6% more (p=.012), obese I respondents earned 16.1% more (p=.000), obese II respondents earned 9.3% more (p=.050), and obese III respondents earned 13.7% more (p=.011) – even with all controls in place. These analyses are included in the Appendix, and they determined that men from all other BMI classification groups earn significantly more than men with a normal BMI, while challenging the notion that weight-based premia only exist up until men reach the highest BMI levels. However, these results also conversely demonstrate that women's earnings do not significant differ on the basis of BMI.

Finally, there were some significant gender differences in the income returns to BMI once an interaction term for gender and BMI was generated. The results of these interaction effects are depicted below in Table 6.

Table 6

TABLE 6 – RETURNS TO BMI: BMI & GENDER INTERACTIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
BMI *(Normal omitted)*				
Overweight	**.188***** (.031)	**.145***** (.030)	**.124***** (.030)	**.080**** (.029)
Obese	**.145***** (.031)	**.136***** (.030)	**.157***** (.030)	**.132***** (.029)
GENDER *(Male omitted)*	**-.137***** (.030)	**-.263***** (.030)	**-.265***** (.034)	**-.154***** (.034)
BMI x GENDER				
Overweight x Gender	**-.224***** (.044)	**-.141***** (.042)	**-.088*** (.042)	**-.042** (.041)
Obese x Gender	**-.306***** (.042)	**-.198***** (.040)	**-.148***** (.040)	**-.103**** (.039)
AGE		**.040***** (.005)	**.041***** (.005)	**.033***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.160***** (.018)	**.143***** (.017)	**.088***** (.017)
RACE (*White omitted)*				
Latino		**.001** (.029)	**-.011** (.029)	**-.019** (.029)
Black		**-.143***** (.025)	**-.161***** (.025)	**-.118***** (.025)
Native American		**-.136*** (.054)	**-.124*** (.054)	**-.115*** (.052)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.047** (.039)	**.061** (.039)	**.030** (.039)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)				
Less Than High School		**-.294***** (.039)	**-.259***** (.039)	**-.184***** (.038)
Some College/Trade School		**.150***** (.025)	**.113***** (.025)	**.073**** (.025)
Finished Trade School		**.167***** (.039)	**.135***** (.039)	**.054** (.039)
College Graduate		**.538***** (.029)	**.464***** (.029)	**.31***** (.031)
More Than College		**.563***** (.033)	**.482***** (.033)	**.297***** (.038)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)	**.008**** (.003)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*				
Unattractive			**-.015** (.038)	**.007** (.038)
Attractive			**.026** (.022)	**.022** (.021)
Very Attractive			**.038** (.037)	**.027** (.037)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*				
Unattractive			**-.006** (.046)	**-.009** (.045)
Attractive			**.062**** (.022)	**.047*** (.021)
Very Attractive			**.060** (.033)	**.034** (.032)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*				
Poorly Groomed			**-.273***** (.043)	**-.254***** (.042)
Well Groomed			**.145***** (.022)	**.110***** (.021)
Very Well Groomed			**.240***** (.036)	**.189***** (.036)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS				X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.61***	9.15***	8.54***	8.77***
R-SQUARED	.1069	.1765	.1897	.3090
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*				

The interaction terms in Table 6 above reflect the differences in the coefficients of BMI for men and women. The results in Model 1 indicate that the coefficient for overweight women was 20.1% less (p=.000) than that of their male counterparts, and that the coefficient for obese women was 26.4% less (p=.000) – demonstrating that obese women experience an income penalty of 14.9%. These interaction coefficients remain large and significant until occupation fixed effects are included in Model 4. With all controls accounted for, the coefficients among overweight women were no longer significantly less than those of their male counterparts (p=.304), but the payoff for obese women relative to obese men remained significantly less (p=.009). Indeed, obese women may earn 2.9% more than women with a normal BMI, but this difference is not only insignificant (p=.308), but it is far less than the 14% payoff that obese men experience relative to men with a normal BMI (p=.000).

An F Test demonstrated that the overall interaction effect was significant (p=.030), which indicates that male respondents earn significant premia for being overweight and especially so for being obese, and that as a group, these premia significantly differ by gender. Finally, with all controls included, overweight men earn 8% more (p=.006) than men with a normal BMI, whereas obese men earn 14% more (p=.000). Additional F Tests show that the earnings of women with a normal BMI do not significantly differ from those of overweight (p =.187) or obese women (p=.308). Thus, the findings strongly support Hypothesis 3, which surmised that *there would be statistically significant gender differences in the returns to BMI, and that men would experience greater BMI premia than women.*

Other studies using Add Health data have also determined that higher BMIs disadvantage women more than men in other ways, but that additional education, a more attractive personality, and better grooming partially offset these disadvantages (Carmalt,

Cawley, Joyner et al. 2008). However, analyses which drawn from the earlier waves of Add Health have concluded that overweight and obese female respondents were rated significantly lower in physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness, and grooming (Ali et al. 2013). Therefore, it is likely that BMI negatively impacts female respondents in a multitude of ways even though these disadvantages and penalties do not stand out so overtly in these analyses.

Overall, the returns to attractiveness that American men experience are less tied to BMI, which could merely be a reflection of the findings that men are not as stringently judged on the basis of their physical appearance, and that their attractiveness is often evaluated in a more fluid and complex manner. There are several other sociological explanations for these results. BMI may be a poorer proxy for mainstream male norms of attractiveness, which privilege muscular bodies (Pope et al. 2000), and BMI does not distinguish between muscle and fat (Flegal and Graubard 2009). In addition, having a higher BMI may actually place men closer to hegemonic norms of masculinity, since men are socialized to be dominant, imposing, and entitled to take up more space (Katz 1999) and it is these same traits that are built into the organizational structure and culture of the labor market (Acker 1990). Therefore, men with larger BMIs may be rewarded financially because their physical build may communicate signals about their gender conformity or may embody valued traits within the workplace.

However, the classic argument that sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists would evoke is that heavier heterosexual men would have to be more productive and resourceful financially in order to secure female mates. There is a considerable amount of research which indicates that people tend to attract romantic partners that are similar to themselves in terms of physical attractiveness level – a phenomenon referred to as the "matching hypothesis" (Takeuchi 2006). Since women tend to place more value on earning

potential (Sprecher, Sullivan and Hatfield 1994) and resource acquisition (Buss 1989) than physical attractiveness when seeking mates, some scholars would argue that heavier men may attempt to offset weight-related disadvantages by generating greater earnings. The notion that women "trade off" on attractiveness for resources has also been well documented (Waynforth 2001). Some scholars have also noted that these attractiveness 'trade-offs" are typically mediated through indicators of "socioeconomic attractiveness." More specifically, a recent study using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data to examine these trade-offs within the marriage market found that women can compensate up to two BMI units per each additional year of education, whereas men can compensate a 1.3 unit increase in BMI with a 1% increase in wages (Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque 2012).

On the other hand, economists would be more likely to cite explanations that are more consistent with the neoclassical time-use models. The typical position here would be that men who work full time and/or experience a great deal of work-related stress men may have less time to engage in a non-market activities (Becker 1965) – such as the preparation of healthy meals (Bauer, Hearst, Escoto et al. 2012). Higher BMIs have also been associated with higher earnings among Canadian men – a trend which may be attributed to the fact that their disposable incomes allow them to dine out and to drink alcohol more often (Dumas 2010). Whatever the reason, the data clearly demonstrates that among the male Add Health cohort, higher BMI levels are significantly associated with higher earnings, and that this pattern does not exist only up until a given tipping point, as some other studies have suggested.

Model 6 - Gendered Beauty Premiums & Height

Height had virtually no impact on women's beauty premia, nor did it significantly impact their general earnings. However, height slightly altered the returns to attractiveness among men, but it also influenced their earnings. Therefore, the data supports the notion that height may influence the perceptions and outcomes related to physical attractiveness among men (Ellis 1992, Nettle 2002), but they do not similarly support that height is a primary determinant. More specifically, each additional inch in height corresponds with an extra 1.15% more (p=.005) in earnings across all remaining models – although this effect is even stronger if introduced into the regression models before the other controls. While this may not seem very significant, it is important to note that the heights of the male respondents range from 48.425 inches to 88.977 inches - which suggests that some remarkable height-related wage gaps and premiums may be at play (Judge and Cable 2004, Persico et al. 2004).

Model 7 - Gendered Beauty Premiums & Personality Attractiveness

Personality attractiveness has a minor impact on the returns to physical attractiveness, but it appears to have a greater influence on earnings more generally. Regardless of gender, respondents were not significantly penalized for having unattractive personalities, but both male and female respondents with attractive and very attractive personalities generated significant rewards. Compared to male respondents deemed as average in personality attractiveness, males with attractive personalities earned 10.4% more (p=.001) and males with very attractive personalities earned 13.5% more (p=.006). Compared to females with average personality attractiveness, females with attractive personalities earned 9.1% more (p=.005) and females with very attractive personalities earned 11.6% more (p=.013).

More importantly, once personality attractiveness is controlled for in Model 7, the penalizations against unattractive males and the rewards for attractive and very attractive respondents decrease substantially. The beauty premia for very attractive women has now become wholly insignificant as well (p=.098) as well. This finding is consistent with the contention that personality traits have a greater impact on women's earnings and beauty premia than on men's (Robins et al. 2011). Furthermore, the data also supports previous findings that personality traits influence earnings (Sutin et al. 2009), perceptions of physical attractiveness (Lewandowski et al. 2007, Zhang et al. 2014), and the returns to attractiveness, although it is not a major determinant (Wong and Penner 2016).

In addition, there were some interesting findings pertaining to the income returns to personality attractiveness once an interaction term for gender and personality attractiveness was generated. The results of these interaction effects are depicted below in Table 7.

Table 7

TABLE 7 – RETURNS TO PERSONALITY ATTRACTIVENESS: PERSONALITY ATTRACTIVENESS & GENDER INTERACTIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
PERSONALITY ATTRACTIVENESS ***(Average omitted)***				
Unattractive	**-.082** (.061)	**-.074** (.059)	**-.022** (.060)	**-.028** (.060)
Attractive	**.188***** (.028)	**.124***** (.027)	**.055** (.028)	**.034** (.028)
Very Attractive	**.254***** (.041)	**.149***** (.040)	**.021** (.043)	**-.002** (.042)
GENDER ***(Male omitted)***	**-.368***** (.028)	**-.411***** (.028)	**-.363***** (.031)	**-.226***** (.032)
PERSONALITY ATTRACTIVENESS x GENDER				
Unattractive Personality x Gender	**.124** (.082)	**.082** (.080)	**.035** (.079)	**.041** (.078)
Attractive Personality x Gender	**.026** (.039)	**.011** (.037)	**.013** (.037)	**.025** (.036)
Very Attractive Personality x Gender	**.057** (.052)	**.063** (.051)	**.061** (.05)	**.061** (.049)
AGE		**.041***** (.005)	**.041***** (.005)	**.033***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.161***** (.017)	**.146***** (.017)	**.090***** (.017)
RACE (*White omitted)*				
Latino		**.001** (.029)	**-.010** (.029)	**-.018** (.029)
Black		**-.148***** (.025)	**-.169***** (.025)	**-.122***** (.025)
Native American		**-.131*** (.054)	**-.126*** (.054)	**-.116*** (.052)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.051** (.039)	**.063** (.040)	**.031** (.039)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)				
Less Than High School		**-.283***** (.039)	**-.258***** (.039)	**-.183***** (.038)
Some College/Trade School		**.139***** (.025)	**.114***** (.025)	**.074**** (.025)
Finished Trade School		**.162***** (.039)	**.136***** (.039)	**.054** (.039)
College Graduate		**.519***** (.029)	**.466***** (.029)	**.312***** (.031)
More Than College		**.543***** (.033)	**.485***** (.033)	**.300***** (.038)
BMI ***(Normal omitted)***				
Overweight			**.074***** (.021)	**.055**** (.020)
Obese			**.079***** (.021)	**.077***** (.020)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)	**.008**** (.003)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*				
Unattractive			**-.015** (.039)	**.007** (.038)
Attractive			**.031** (.022)	**.026** (.021)
Very Attractive			**.050** (.037)	**.035** (.036)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*				
Poorly Groomed			**-.277***** (.043)	**-.256***** (.042)
Well Groomed			**.148***** (.022)	**.112***** (.021)
Very Well Groomed			**.243***** (.037)	**.191***** (.036)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS				X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.68***	9.22***	8.59***	8.81***
R-SQUARED	.1118	.1781	.1889	.3087
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*				

As depicted in Table 7 above, none of the coefficients for this interaction term were statistically significant within any of the personality attractiveness levels. Men did not generate any significant premia or penalties on the basis of personality attractiveness, and these returns did not significantly differ by gender. An F Test also demonstrated that the overall interaction effect was insignificant (p=.650), indicating that personality attractiveness penalties and premia do not as a group vary by gender. Therefore, there was no support for Hypothesis 4 which anticipated that *there would be statistically significant gender differences in the returns to personality attractiveness, and that women would experience greater personality-based premia than men.*

Additional F Tests show that women with unattractive personalities did not earn significantly less (p=.830) than women who were ranked as average in personality attractiveness, nor did women with very attractive personalities earn more (p=.457). However, one significant difference was identified: women with attractive personalities earned more than women who were average in personality attractiveness (p=.034). Personality attractiveness may account for slightly more of the beauty premia earned by women (Robins et al. 2011), but women also experience a premium for attractive personalities relative to other women. In sum, personality attractiveness does not appear to have a strong impact on earnings, and their labor market returns do not differ by gender either.

Model 8 - Gendered Beauty Premiums & Grooming

Similar to the aggregated outcomes in Table 2, the biggest transformations in the attractiveness gradients occur when grooming is introduced to the regressions in Model 8. Up until this point, all three attractiveness coefficients for males had been statistically significant,

and attractive women also continued to earn significantly more than females of average attractiveness. However, one only attractiveness coefficient remains significant when grooming is held constant: very attractive males continue to earn roughly 19% more (p=.001) than men of average attractiveness. Since Model 7, the income penalty against unattractive men (p=.182) and the premia among attractive males both decreased by roughly 40% (p=.168) - neither of which remained significant. On the other hand, unattractive women now earn 5.2% more (p=.363) than average women, whereas attractive women earn nearly 1% more (p=.775) and very attractive women earn nearly 3% less (p=.527). Thus, the percentage changes in these coefficients range from a 135% decrease (among very attractive women) to a 273% increase (among unattractive women) once grooming is accounted for.

Grooming itself clearly has a demonstrable impact on the earnings of both male and female respondents as well. Compared to males characterized by an average level of grooming, poorly groomed males earn 24.8% less (p=.000), whereas well groomed males earn 8.8% more (p=.005), and very well groomed males earn 23.2% more (p=.000). Compared to females characterized by an average level of grooming, poorly groomed females earn 23.2% less (p=.000), whereas well groomed females earn 23.5% more (p=.000), and very well groomed females earn 34.4% more (p=.000). These findings indicate that male and female respondents experience similar penalizations for being poorly groomed, but females who are well groomed and very well groomed generate much greater rewards than their male counterparts.

Finally, there were also some significant gender differences in the income returns to grooming once an interaction term for gender and grooming was generated. The results of these interaction effects are depicted below in Table 8.

Table 8

TABLE 8 – RETURNS TO GROOMING: GROOMING & GENDER INTERACTIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Grooming *(Average omitted)*				
Poorly Groomed	**-.381***** (.055)	**-.275***** (.054)	**-.256***** (.055)	**-.241***** (.055)
Well Groomed	**.212***** (.028)	**.121***** (.028)	**.091**** (.029)	**.063*** (.029)
Very Well Groomed	**.368***** (.047)	**.214***** (.046)	**.175***** (.049)	**.125***** (.048)
GENDER *(Male omitted)*	**-.396***** (.024)	**-.441***** (.024)	**-.396***** (.028)	**-.248***** (.028)
GROOMING x GENDER				
Poorly Groomed x Gender	**-.032** (.083)	**-.042** (.080)	**-.054** (.080)	**-.036** (.079)
Well Groomed x Gender	**.094*** (.037)	**.100**** (.036)	**.112**** (.036)	**.094**** (.036)
Very Well Groomed x Gender	**.088** (.059)	**.109** (.057)	**.131*** (.057)	**.124*** (.056)
AGE		**.041***** (.005)	**.041***** (.005)	**.033***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.153***** (.017)	**.146***** (.017)	**.091***** (.017)
RACE (*White omitted)*				
Latino		**-.015** (.029)	**-.010** (.029)	**-.018** (.029)
Black		**-.158***** (.025)	**-.166***** (.025)	**-.121***** (.025)
Native American		**-.122*** (.054)	**-.125*** (.054)	**-.116*** (.052)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.039** (.039)	**.062** (.040)	**.030** (.039)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)				
Less Than High School		**-.268***** (.039)	**-.261***** (.039)	**-.185***** (.038)
Some College/Trade School		**.120***** (.025)	**.115***** (.025)	**.074**** (.025)
Finished Trade School		**.138***** (.039)	**.136***** (.039)	**.054** (.039)
College Graduate		**.475***** (.029)	**.468***** (.029)	**.313***** (.031)
More Than College		**.489***** (.033)	**.485***** (.033)	**.300***** (.038)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*				
Overweight			**.081***** (.021)	**.061**** (.020)
Obese			**.084***** (.021)	**.081***** (.020)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)	**.008**** (.003)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*				
Unattractive			**-.014** (.039)	**.007** (.039)
Attractive			**.029** (.022)	**.024** (.021)
Very Attractive			**.045** (.037)	**.031** (.036)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*				
Unattractive			**-.009** (.046)	**-.011** (.045)
Attractive			**.061**** (.022)	**.046*** (.021)
Very Attractive			**.053** (.033)	**.029** (.032)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS				X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.74***	9.29***	8.59***	8.81***
R-SQUARED	.1300	.1867	.1897	.3092
*p= .05** p= .01** p= .001*** (Standard Errors in Parentheses)*				

Table 8 demonstrates that men and women both experience significant penalties for being poorly groomed, but these penalties do not significantly differ by gender. It is not exactly surprising that poorly groomed women were not significantly worse off than poorly groomed men (p=.648), due to the similarity of their coefficients in Model 9 of Table 4 and Table 5. On the other hand, all respondents also earn significant premia for being well groomed or very well groomed, but both of these rewards are greater for women. The results indicate that even with all controls included, the payoff for women who are well groomed women is 9.9% greater (p=.008) than that of their male counterparts, whereas the coefficient for very well groomed women is 13.2% greater (p=.027).

An F Test further confirms that the labor market returns to grooming are significantly greater for women, given that the overall interaction effect (p=.015) demonstrates that the penalties and premia attributed to grooming as a group do jointly vary by gender. The supplemental F Tests also show that when all controls are included, poorly groomed women still earn 24.2% less (p=.000) than women who were ranked as average in grooming, whereas well groomed women earn 17% more (p=.000) and very well groomed women earn 28.3% more (p=.000). In sum, both male and female respondents earn significant penalties and premia on the basis of grooming, but the premia generated by well groomed and very well groomed female respondents are significantly higher. These findings challenge the claim that grooming has a greater impact on men's earnings (Das and Loach 2011) and are more consistent with Wong and Penner's (2016) assertion that grooming has a greater impact on women's labor market returns to physical attractiveness. However, these results also contribute to the literature by demonstrating that more generally, grooming matters significantly more for women's earnings than for men's earnings.

Model 9 - Gendered Beauty Premiums & Occupation Fixed effects

When occupation fixed effects are introduced to the regression models, the returns to attractiveness shift very minimally since Model 8, with exception for the statistically significant rewards generated by very attractive men. This cohort now earns only 15.6% more (p=.008) than their counterparts of average attractiveness, whereas they earned 19% more (p=.001) in the prior model. The earnings gaps attributed to age, marital status, education, and personality also decline considerably more among male respondents than among female respondents. However, men's returns to BMI and height remain highly significant and large in magnitude. Furthermore, occupation accounts for an additional 14.92% of the variance in men's earnings and 13.78% of the variance in women's earnings.

More importantly, introducing occupation fixed effects into the regression models notably reduces the magnitude of the impact that grooming has on earnings. However, controlling for occupational effects undercuts more of the returns to grooming among men, which is consistent with earlier finding that the returns to grooming are significantly higher for women. Nevertheless, grooming continues to have a demonstrable impact on the earnings of both male and female respondents, who remain penalized for being poorly groomed but earn significant premia for being well groomed and very well groomed. Thus, grooming may matter more in some professions relative to others (Robins et al. 2011), but it continues to strongly shape earnings even when the respondent's occupation is held constant. In conclusion, the findings demonstrate that grooming and other dimensions of physical appearance significantly influence earnings, and they also impact labor market outcomes in ways which cannot be sufficiently explained by occupational characteristics and requisites.

DISCUSSION

The analyses presented in Chapter 2 offer some support for Hypothesis 1 by confirming that at the national-level, there is a general beauty premium consistent with the Beauty Effect. Compared to an average respondent, unattractive respondents can be expected to earn 10.6% less (p=.003), whereas attractive respondents earn 15.7% more (p=.000), and very attractive respondents earn 25.1% more (p=.000). However, these results also support the conclusion that beauty premia are only significant when other personal traits – namely personality attractiveness and grooming - are not included (Robins et al. 2011). Indeed, the returns to attractiveness are primarily attributable to aspects of grooming, which appears to be the primary determinant of physical attractiveness and its labor market returns.

These findings also help to shed some light on a longstanding tension in the literature, which involves the concern over whether attractiveness is "good" or if unattractiveness is "bad" (Griffin and Langlois 2006). In elaborating on the potential directionality of the Beauty Effect, the findings provide evidence that both biases shape labor market outcomes in the U.S. Throughout the first few models depicted in Table 2, respondents ranked as average in physical attractiveness earn significantly more than unattractive respondents, but less than attractive and very attractive respondents. When grooming is introduced to the regressions in Model 7 of Table 2, a similar pattern of penalties and rewards are distributed on the basis of grooming. Furthermore, the significant returns to grooming persist even when occupation fixed effects were introduced in Model 8. Overall, within the relationship between physical appearance and annual earnings, it appears that what is attractive and well groomed is good *and* that what is unattractive and poorly groomed is bad. Hence, the labor market biases pertaining to physical appearance operate in a bidirectional manner.

It was crucial to begin this research endeavor by demonstrating that a general beauty premium does exist because this confirms right up front what research has long established: that there is a wholesale bias that what is beautiful is good (Dion et al. 1972) and that what is unattractive is bad (Griffin and Langlois 2006). As a result of these biases, the Beauty Effect in part contributes to better looking people earning more money. The fact that such results have been consistently confirmed over decades of time and across countries such as the U.S. (Wong and Penner 2016), Great Britain (Harper 2000), and Germany (Gehrsitz 2014) indicates that these disparities are in no way a coincidence or idiosyncrasy. Rather, we are witnessing how an ascriptive trait – attractiveness - produces tangible economic inequality.

In addition to confirming the existence of a general beauty premium across the U.S. workforce, it was also imperative to begin this research endeavor with an assessment as to whether or not these returns differ by gender. First and foremost, an assessment of whether or not there is a gendered beauty premium is essential because scholars have been unable to produce consistent results. The analyses presented here - as well as those documented by Wong and Penner (2016) - conclude that there are significant general returns to attractiveness in the U.S. labor market, but that these returns are not explicitly gendered. Hence, the data called for the rejection of Hypothesis 2, since there was no evidence that this general premium impacted men and women differently. However, this is perhaps not surprising since other aspects of physical appearance were notable determinants of attractiveness and its returns. These analyses further contribute to the literature by exploring whether other key determinants of physical attractiveness – BMI, personality attractiveness, and grooming – similarly demand penalties and premia within the labor market, along with ascertaining whether these returns significantly differ by gender.

The findings supported Hypothesis 3 by demonstrating that men that are categorized as overweight, obese I, obese II, and obese III all earn significantly more than men with a normal BMI classification, and that the premia generated by obese men is significantly greater than that of their female counterparts. Interestingly, BMI did not have much of an impact on the earnings of female respondents, which contradicts the bulk of the literature on the subject (Cawley et al. 2005, Fikkan and Rothblum 2012, Han et al. 2009), but this could also be attributed to the gender wage gap along with some of the limitations of Add Health's design (i.e. cohort based, narrow age range, and young respondents).

However, the results do not confirm Hypothesis 4. The returns to personality attractiveness did not significantly differ between male and female respondents, which may not be so surprising given that the returns to personality attractiveness were no longer significant once grooming and occupation fixed effects were introduced into the models.

On the other hand, grooming was not only determined to be a primary determinant of physical attractiveness and its labor market returns, but it continued to have a strong impact on the respondents' earnings net of occupation fixed effects. Furthermore, grooming accounts for a substantial portion of the labor market returns to physical attractiveness generated by men, but virtually all of those earned by women. Thus, it is also not so surprising that the returns to grooming are not only general - in that there are penalties for being poorly groomed and rewards for being well groomed or very well groomed – but that these returns are explicitly gendered. Although the penalties for being poorly groomed do not significantly differ between men and women – indicating a wholesale bias against poor grooming across the board– the payoff for being well groomed or very well groomed was significantly higher for women. This not only challenges the claim that increased time spent grooming has a

stronger impact on men's earnings (Das and Loach 2011), but it also empirically supports what feminists and gender scholars have been claiming for decades – that women experience greater pressures to engage in beauty work as a means of enhancing their expressions of femininity and exploiting their erotic capital (Bordo 1993, Brownmiller 1984, Hakim 2010, Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006, Wolf 1991).

Finally, additional analyses that are not shown here also explored several other interaction effects. The interaction effects between physical attractiveness and BMI (p=.679), and between physical attractiveness and grooming (p=.299) were insignificant. However, the interaction effects between physical attractiveness and personality attractiveness turned out to be significant (p=.049). When this interaction effect was regressed separately for male and female respondents, the results indicated that the interactions between personality attractiveness and physical attractiveness were far more robust among women (p=.011) than among men (p=.647). Although these analyses are beyond the scope of the present study, these preliminary findings offer some novel opportunities for future research to elaborate on.

There are several other important implications that can be teased out from these findings. On one hand, these results demonstrate that two purely physiological traits which were objectively measured - BMI and height - were not primary determinants of physical attractiveness or its returns. These findings undermine the chief arguments of biosociologists and evolutionary psychologists by showing that dimensions of physical attractiveness are much less tied to universal physiological cues of good genes or reproductive fitness (Ellis 1992, Nettle 2002, Tovée et al. 1999a, Tovée et al. 1999b). However, this conflicting finding may also be in part attributed to interviewer effects or the contexts of the assessment. For example, a great deal of the studies which assess physical attractiveness – especially within

the field of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology - either explicitly or implicitly ask the evaluators to judge how attractive someone is as a potential romantic partner. Furthermore, what individuals consider to be attractive can differ depending on whether they currently have a romantic partner, or if they are being asked about a target's suitability as a potential short-term, long-term mate, or parent (Confer, Perilloux and Buss 2010, Little, Jones, Penton-Voak et al. 2002, Perrett, Lee, Penton-Voak et al. 1998). Hence, it is possible that these analyses do not find physiological traits to be particularly salient determinants of attractiveness in part because of the design of Add Health's measures. The Add Health interviewers are not being asked about their preference for the respondent as a potential romantic partner, but are more so being asked to provide a global assessment of how attractive the respondent is by applying community norms of appearance. Therefore, these physiological traits which have long been posited as cues that reflect biological fitness may be much less relevant within this context. However, it could just as easily be argued that this makes the ratings by Add Health interviewers perhaps even less idiosyncratic or biased than those from other studies, given the lesser stakes and greater objectivity involved.

The fact that physiological cues have a much smaller impact on the labor market returns to physical attractiveness than the constructive practice of grooming also suggests that sociological perspectives may be ideally suited for understanding the assessments and returns to physical attractiveness. Indeed, physical attractiveness itself appears to be largely a social construction: it is not so much about what respondents have (in terms of physiological traits) but more so what they *do* with what they have. Furthermore, the findings here and by Wong and Penner (2016) both concluded that the controls for the parents' educations and incomes were largely inconsequential, which further underscores that the socioeconomic conditions

that a respondent was raised in also had a minimal impact on the results. Intuitively, one would assume that the socioeconomic standing of the respondent's parents would shape their attractiveness and other outcomes by influencing their prior healthcare, dental work, and dietary habits – as well as by cultivating their beauty practices (Armstrong et al. 2014). However, one's past seemed to matter very little, as it was much more about what the respondent currently had and how much they were willing to sacrifice in order to keep up with the existing appearance norms. These results are all consistent with the contemporary neoliberal perspectives of beauty, which suggest that attractiveness is accessible to everyone who consumes the right products, consults the best experts, and sustains incessant self-discipline (Klazas 2015).

On a final note, it is interesting that grooming matters significantly more for women, even though it is also a primary determinant of the returns to attractiveness earned by men. While physiological traits, such as BMI and height, may matter more for men's earnings and for their attractiveness rankings and returns, it may still be inappropriate to suggest that men's attractiveness is better explained by the perspectives of biosociology or evolutionary psychology. Indeed, the patterns exhibited by male respondents are also largely explained in sociological terms by evoking concepts of gender schemas. Regimes related to grooming, self-care, and fashion are not only much more rigidly imposed on women (Bordo 1993, Saltzberg and Chrisler 2006), but they are culturally stereotyped in ways which are associated with femininity or homosexuality to such a strong extent that concepts such as "metrosexuality" have become prominent within the contemporary lexicon (Coad 2008, Edwards 2003, Hall, Gough and Seymour-Smith 2012). More broadly, masculinity is also culturally framed as more natural, biologically-constituted, and base - whereas femininity

demands an additional performance via beauty work in order to offer a counterpoint through which men can define themselves (Brownmiller 1984). For these reasons, grooming may not be a trait that is as productive or valued among men as it is among women, in part because gender schemas place it in an abject practice relative to norms of American masculinity. In sum, this logic is remarkably similar to the explanations as to why higher BMIs are counterintuitively associated with higher earnings among males: men are ideally performing their gender by taking up more space and by grooming only to a socially appropriate extent. Individuals who conform to gender norms are generally rewarded with a whole host of relative advantages – a pattern which appears to also manifest itself within earnings. However, as the next two Chapters will demonstrate, the labor outcomes linked to gender and gender norms are not limited merely to physiological traits or to social expressions of the respondent's gender identity, but they also depend on the "gender" of the respondent's job.

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CHAPTER 3:

The Returns to Attractiveness & Occupational Gender Distributions

Chapter 3 Overview

Chapter 3 provides analyses that explore how the returns to attractiveness differ according to the gender identity of the respondent in addition to the "gender" of their job. The Literature Review section describes the "Beauty as Beastly Effect" and the "Lack of Fit Model," in addition to providing a comprehensive overview of the research regarding the dynamics of gender, attractiveness, and occupation within the U.S. labor market.

Data from Add Health and the 2000 U.S. Census are utilized in order to investigate how a respondents' gender identity in the context of the gender distributions within their profession influence their labor market returns to attractiveness. Although the results in Chapter 2 indicate that beauty premia do not operate in an explicitly gendered fashion, the analyses in Chapter 3 not only identified significant income penalties among unattractive women and very attractive women within male-dominated occupations, and also found that the rewards for attractiveness among women were much less pronounced within female-dominated occupations. Overall, the data suggests that occupational gender distributions impact the returns to attractiveness - especially for women - and that both of these penalties disappear in jobs with more gender-egalitarian distributions. Thus, occupational gender distributions not only serve as another context that significantly impacts the returns to attractiveness, but the Beauty is Beastly Effect also appears to hamper the earnings of women within male-dominated jobs. Chapter 3 concludes with the Discussion section, which summarizes the results, and comments on their explanations, implications, and contributions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Physical Attractiveness & the Gender Dynamics of the U.S. Labor Market

The analyses conducted in Chapter 2 affirmed a general beauty premium, but found no support for a gendered beauty premium operating in the U.S. labor market. The latter finding seems counterintuitive, not only because many studies have reported that females earn more returns to attractiveness (French 2002, Jæger 2011, Kaplan 1978), but also because of what we know about gender inequalities within the workplace more broadly. Many of the gender stereotypes and biases that have historically disadvantaged women also come into play when we observe the relationship between attractiveness, occupation, and income. Although the returns to attractiveness may impact men and women similarly, a great deal of research has noted that that women may uniquely face penalties not only for being plain or unattractive, but even for being *attractive* (Bieber 1988, Cash et al. 1977, Heilman and Saruwatari 1979, Heilman 1980, Heilman and Stopeck 1985, Johnson, Podratz, Dipboye et al. 2010).

It may be that beauty premia in the labor market are not organized around the gender of the individual employee per se, but more so, that they may vary according to the contextual features of employment, such as the "gender" of the employee's job. Occupational sex-segregation has long endured as a focal point within the research on gender, labor, and inequality. Innumerable research endeavors have focused on occupational sex segregation more generally (Bielby and Baron 1986, Okamoto and England 1999, Reskin 1993), with scholars either elaborating on the ghettoized and devalued "feminized" occupations (Cohen and Huffman 2003, Daniels 1987, England 2010, Williams 1992) or on the more powerful, prestigious, and well paid "masculine" occupations (Greenfeld, Greiner and Wood 1980,

Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs et al. 2004). However, one clear and crucial theme can be drawn out from the literature: when it comes to the labor market, it is not only the individual workers that are gendered, but also the occupations that they work in (Acker 1990, Beagan and Saunders 2005, Trautner and Kwan 2010). Therefore, both employees and occupations are explicitly gendered. Although the data has thus far failed to confirm that the returns to attractiveness in the U.S. apply differently to men and women, this may dramatically change once we take the individual's personal *and* occupational gender into account.

Scholars have demonstrated that attractive women are disadvantaged in "male-typed" occupations (Cash et al. 1977, Johnson et al. 2010), in managerial positions (Bieber 1988, Heilman and Saruwatari 1979, Heilman and Stopeck 1985), and in jobs where physical appearance is not important (Johnson et al. 2010, Podratz 2002) - a phenomenon known as the Beauty is Beastly Effect (Heilman and Saruwatari 1979). The general explanation for this sexist and counterintuitive bias is that attractive women may experience appearance-related discrimination within these contexts, because their beauty heightens perceptions about their femininity (Drogosz and Levy 1996, Gillen 1981, Heilman and Stopeck 1985) – which in turn enhances presumptions about their "lack of fit" for these positions (Heilman 1983).

No studies to date have explored how the concentrations of female versus male employees within a given profession (termed here as "occupational gender distributions") impact attractiveness premia and penalties. However, prior research on the Beauty is Beastly Effect, the Lack of Fit Model, and occupational sex segregation all seem to support the contention that occupational gender distributions indeed shape the labor market returns to physical attractiveness, especially among female workers.

The Beauty Is Beastly Effect & The Lack of Fit Model:

When What is "Beautiful" is Not Always What is "Good"

A litany of corrective works have flipped the overly broad "what is beautiful is good" scholarship onto its nose by demonstrating that for women, beauty can actually be "beastly" in instances when one's attractiveness enhances their presumed lack of person-job fit. This process refers to the "Lack of Fit Model," which posits that occupational sex bias results from an incongruity between the perceived attributes of an individual (which are often based on sex stereotypes) and the perceived nature of a job's requirements (Heilman 1983). Heilman and Stopeck (1985) further specify that the larger the perceived incongruity between the worker and the demands of the job, the more that failure is anticipated and the greater the resulting bias. The studies which have elaborated on the Beauty is Beastly Effect have been crucial in their ability to negate the wholesale generalizability afforded by the landmark "what is beautiful is good" theory by aptly showing that beauty can sometimes disadvantage women in the workplace. Furthermore, these studies underscore the "damned if you do and damned if you don't" element of physical attractiveness for women within the workplace by showing that beauty can actually function as a "double-edged sword" (Heilman and Saruwatari 1979). This Beauty is Beastly Effect is also a prime example of another persisting "double bind" that women face as the result of systematic gender oppression (Frye 1983, Ridgeway 2011).

Over the past forty years, an extensive amount of research has supported the "what is beautiful is good" theory by showing that attractive people are widely presumed to possess a "general goodness" as a result of the Halo Effect. However, attractive people also possess a "sex-typed goodness" (Cash et al. 1977) since ratings of attractiveness are also linked to perceptions of masculinity and femininity. Indeed, scholars have affirmed that attractive

women are regarded as more feminine than unattractive women, and that attractive men are regarded as more masculine than unattractive men – which occurs because attractiveness leads to an exaggeration of gender-related perceptions and attributes (Drogosz and Levy 1996, Gillen 1981, Heilman and Stopeck 1985). This presumed sex-typed goodness among attractive individuals carries dire implications for women's earnings and occupational success. This is because attractiveness among women is associated with heightened perceptions of femininity, which exacerbates the presumed lack of person-job fit, particularly in jobs that are more prestigious, powerful, and coded or typed as masculine (Heilman and Stopeck 1985).

Scholars have confirmed that heightened perceptions of femininity can be hazardous for working women because femininity is generally a devalued trait in the labor market (Cohen 2004, England and Folbre 2002). Even more problematically, heightened perceptions of femininity can exacerbate perceptions of a woman's lack of fit, since femininity is often inconsistent with the organizational and gendered features of occupations. On the other hand, physically attractive men are perceived as being more masculine (Drogosz and Levy 1996, Gillen 1981), but this does not lead to presumptions about lack of fit or to ensuing inequalities. This is because organizational logics, processes, and structures within the labor market are organized around images of men 's bodies and masculinity, and historically, there has been a tendency to frame the "universal worker" as one that is fundamentally male (Acker 1990). Hence, the heightened masculinity that is associated with attractive men is never incongruent with any aspect of the labor market - it is even highly valued and compensated within female-typed and female-dominated occupations (Williams 1992). Thus, the Lack of Fit Model has historically been applied more to women, and it has been used to theorize about some of the major gender disadvantages which still persist in the labor market today.

The Beauty Is Beastly Effect & Occupational Contexts

The Beauty is Beastly Effect has generated some concerning empirical support across studies which focus on sex-typed occupations, managerial positions, and jobs where attractiveness is either important or unimportant – in addition to other occupational contexts. Generally, the opportunities and biases that job candidates experience are shaped by their gender, gender presentation, physical attractiveness level, and perceptions about the sex-role traits of the occupation at hand. For example, Cash and his colleagues (1977) concluded that personnel decisions privilege attractive applicants unless they are seeking a job that is deemed as inappropriate for their sex - but they were careful to emphasize that these personnel decisions restrict women to a greater extent than men. Furthermore, attractive women were seen as less qualified and less likely to succeed in male-typed occupations than unattractive women, which meant that they were also less likely to be hired (Cash et al. 1977). More recent work by Johnson and her colleagues (2010) also concluded that attractive women were disadvantaged in "masculine sex-typed jobs," especially when physical appearance was not perceived as important for the position.

Further extending the research on the Beauty is Beastly Effect within sex-typed jobs, other scholars argue that attractive women may also be disadvantaged specifically within managerial positions. Research indicates that attractive women were only advantaged in non-managerial positions, whereas attractiveness was advantageous for men in managerial and in non-managerial positions (Bieber 1988, Heilman and Saruwatari 1979, Heilman and Stopeck 1985). However, this appearance-related discrimination within managerial positions is not limited to pre-employment decisions – such as job suitability, probability of success, or hiring recommendations - but they persist across all stages of employment - with inequalities also

accruing in evaluations, starting salaries, and long-term earnings. Attractive women are not only less likely to be recommended as suitable candidates for managerial positions, but even when they perform well, their success is more often attributed to bias or to luck rather than to skill or effort (Spencer and Taylor 1988). Frieze and her colleagues (1991) further elaborated on the issue by tracking the trajectories of MBA graduates within six careers (finance, general management, accounting, marketing/sales, data processing, and production/engineering) - noting that attractiveness among the males was associated with higher starting salaries and earnings over time, whereas attractiveness only impacted the longer-term earnings among females (who nevertheless persisted to earn less than their attractive male counterparts).

Although these studies examine the Beauty is Beastly Effect within the specific context of managerial positions, as opposed to a more generalized examination of "male-typed" or "male-coded" positions, it is important to note that the underlying mechanisms of the discrimination are similar. Attractive women are likely disadvantaged in managerial positions due to perceptions of lack of fit, because managerial positions are believed to require almost exclusively masculine skills (Schein 1975). There are also widely held beliefs that women are either inherently unequipped temperamentally for the rigors of managerial work (Bowman, Wortney and Greyser 1965) or that a great deal of emotional labor will be required from them in order to cope with the demands of the job (Acker 1990). In this sense, attractive women face barriers when pursuing careers in management because managerial positions are culturally and organizationally coded as "male-type" occupations.

Finally, the Beauty is Beastly Effect experienced by women in the workforce has also been identified among other occupational contexts. For instance, the labor market returns to attractiveness have generally been shown to be highly context-dependent and task-specific

(Deryugina 2013). Furthermore, Podratz (2002) also argues that the degree of importance attributed to physical appearance within a given job is actually a better predictor of the Beauty is Beastly Effect than a job's sex-type. This claim that attractive women are disadvantaged in jobs where looks are relatively unimportant (such as those which do not require interacting face-to-face with customers) has also received additional support (Johnson et al. 2010). Overall, the research has consistently shown that there are various occupational contexts which contribute to discrimination against women on the basis of physical attractiveness.

However, that is not to say that the Beauty is Beastly Effect has always been detected or that it inevitably occurs within these occupational contexts. Although many studies have identified the Beauty as Beastly Effect within managerial positions, other works have reported otherwise. For example, Marlowe and her colleagues (1996) found that there was a beauty bias in hiring decisions that routinely disadvantaged less attractive female managerial applicants, which was only slightly reduced when more experienced managers controlled personnel decisions. Another study found that attractiveness privileged both male and female managerial applicants - noting that sex and appearance had only a minor impact on hiring and salary decisions (Dipboye et al. 1977), whereas Spencer and Taylor (1988) uniquely concluded that attractiveness can actually be a liability for both male and female managers.

Nevertheless, the literature demonstrates that physical attractiveness can negatively impact women in the workforce when it comes to occupations where looks do not matter, in sex-typed jobs, in managerial positions, and in other contexts. In doing so, the literature outlines multiple contexts which fuel the Beauty is Beastly Effect and consistently shows that it is not just the gender identity of the worker, but also the various dynamics of gender within a given occupation that influence occupational outcomes related to physical attractiveness.

Based on the literature, it is logical to hypothesize that the returns to attractiveness will differ according to the individual's gender identity as well as the gender of their job. Since attractive women are disadvantaged within so-called "male-typed" occupations, it is also likely that similar patterns emerge more broadly in sex-segregated occupations – but especially those that are comprised predominantly of male workers. This is particularly plausible because the sex roles that are associated with the majority sex within a given occupation tend to become incorporated into the work roles themselves (Gutek and Cohen 1987). Therefore, when men comprise the majority of the workers within an occupation, it is reasonable to surmise that these jobs can also be described as "male-typed."

The Beauty is Beastly Effect & Occupational Gender Distributions

The sweeping sentiment that "what is beautiful is good" is not always good for working women, since what is seen as “good” depends on context, and because beauty can be a double-edged sword within certain occupational conditions. Women are multiplicatively disadvantaged by the general devaluation of women and "women's work" (Daniels 1987) as well as by the generalized presumptions about their lack of fitness for employment (especially within male-typed jobs). However, the research thus far has focused primarily on how beauty can be beastly for women within male-typed jobs or in managerial positions. No study to date has examined how occupational gender distributions shape the returns to attractiveness, nor have they examined whether the Beauty is Beastly Effect occurs in male-dominated jobs.

A large body of literature argues that gendered meanings attach themselves not just to individuals, but also to occupations, which in turn can produce substantial inequalities in the labor market. Indeed, gender shapes engagement in occupations, but occupations are also

means through which we construct gender (Beagan and Saunders 2005). Hence, individuals do not just work as people, they work as gendered people (Trautner and Kwan 2010), and the sex roles associated with the majority sex within a given occupation often become absorbed into the work roles themselves (Gutek and Cohen 1987). This contention is also congruent with the Lack of Fit Model, as it highlights that there are strong stereotypes and norms regulating occupational attainment in terms of which workers are deemed suitable for what jobs. While employers often reserve some jobs for men and others for women (Bielby and Baron 1986), people who transgress occupational gender norms often suffer serious consequences across many stages of employment (Cash et al. 1977, Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Trautner and Kwan 2010) as well as in other domains, like their love lives (Pfost and Fiore 1990). Thus, gender roles and group-level stereotypes prominently tap into and sway perceptions of person-job fit, but they also have measurable impacts one's job and income. In sum, cultural schemas (Epstein 2007), sex discrimination (Bielby and Baron 1986), homophilic reproduction processes (Kanter 1977), motherhood penalties (Correll et al. 2007), organizational logics (Acker 1990), and institutionalized closure practices (Tilly 1999, Weeden 2002) all contribute to the remarkable degree of sex-segregation and economic inequality that persists in the U.S. labor market today.

Sex-segregated occupations in particular are ripe environments for workplace inequality because sex becomes a much more salient trait in these contexts. Much of the literature on occupational gender distributions turn to concepts such as discrimination, stereotypes, trait salience (Heilman 1980, Heilman 1984) and the theory of tokenism (Kanter 1977), which can all help to explain why beauty can in fact be beastly for working women.

Even though the proportion of men and women in the labor force is approaching greater parity, particularly for younger cohorts of workers, men and women are generally confined to predominantly single-sex occupations (Williams 1992) because there is still a remarkable amount of occupational sex segregation (Bielby and Baron 1986). Occupational sex segregation is not only problematic because it contributes to - and often reinforces - stereotypes, discrimination, and the gender wage gap, but because any dominant group in an occupation will use their power to maintain a privileged position (Acker 1990, Reskin 1988). Furthermore, the sex roles associated with the primary sex typically become incorporated into the work roles (Gutek and Cohen 1987), which in turn reinforces a culture that is prone towards the tendencies of homophilic reproduction and social exclusion (Kanter 1977).

Skewed gender distributions within an occupation are also of serious concern because they can pit the dominant group against the outnumbered "tokens." The main assumption in this line of research is that any member of a token group within a work setting is likely to experience similar discriminatory treatment (Williams 1992). Hence, the scholarship on occupational sex segregation aims to identify corrective measures which reduce the harmful effects of tokenism and diversify these homosocial environments. A great deal of attention has been placed on the empirical possibilities offered by theories pertaining to trait salience.

Occupational Gender Distributions & Trait Salience

The research on trait salience suggests that when impressions are formed, many aspects of the individual compete for prominence, but the predominant characteristic in impression formation will be the trait that is “highly distinctive and therefore attention-getting” (Heilman 1984). Thus, sex becomes an especially salient characteristic in settings

where a given sex is underrepresented and tokenized. Generally, the literature on trait salience states that situational factors which decrease the salience of sex and increase the salience of other aspects of the individual can in turn reduce the probability that sex is singled out as a critical inferential reference point (Heilman 1980, Heilman 1984). Hence, various forms of discrimination and inequality within a given setting that emerge as a result of institutionalized tokenism can be alleviated by increasing the representation of the tokenized group.

More specifically, Heilman's (1980) analysis on applicant pools found that when the representation of women was above 25%, fewer feminine attributes were ascribed to female candidates, which put them at an advantage with respect to assessments of their potential and qualifications. Therefore, increasing the proportional representation of female candidates strongly impacted personnel evaluations and hiring decisions made about these applicants because they mediated the use of sex stereotypes in forming impressions. These findings imply that sex discrimination can be reduced by decreasing the salience of sex as a trait through its progressive non-distinctiveness afforded by the fuller representation of women.

Heilman's (1980) integral work extended, but was nevertheless consistent with, earlier research endeavors which also found that the proportional representation of women is a potent force in determining reactions to individual women (Kanter 1977, Taylor and Fiske 1978). In addition reducing the salience of sex as a critical point of reference within the impression formation process, increased diversity also inhibits the inclinations that organizations and its representatives have towards homophilic reproduction (Kanter 1977).

Since the impact of women's attractiveness within occupational contexts can function as a double-edged sword within male-typed positions, I argue that it may also be a liability or an asset depending on an individual's gender and occupational gender distribution. Although

the literature on the Beauty as Beastly Effect leads me primarily to anticipate that attractive women will be negatively impacted in male-dominated jobs – I suspect that the returns to attractiveness may also differ in female-dominated jobs. Regardless of which sex comprises the majority of the workers within a given occupation, tokenism, discrimination, and unequal outcomes should still theoretically emerge within these settings because sex remains an especially salient trait due to the disparate distributions of male and female workers.

Nevertheless, there are a great deal of organizational and environmental differences between the systematically devalued female-dominated occupations (Cohen and Huffman 2003, Daniels 1987, England 2010, Williams 1992) and the more prestigious, high status, and well compensated male-dominated occupations (Greenfeld et al. 1980, Heilman et al. 2004). Therefore, I predict that occupational sex-segregation will significantly shape the returns to physical attractiveness, namely for women, but I also anticipate some differences depending on whether the individual works in a male-dominated job or in a female-dominated job.

The Gendered Returns to Physical Attractiveness in Male-Dominated Occupations

Overall, the literature indicates that attractiveness among female workers is often penalized rather than rewarded in male-typed occupations, including managerial positions (Bieber 1988, Cash et al. 1977, Heilman and Saruwatari 1979, Heilman and Stopeck 1985, Johnson et al. 2010, Spencer and Taylor 1988). The rationale behind this form of sexist appearance discrimination is that a woman's beauty heightens perceptions about her femininity (Drogosz and Levy 1996, Gillen 1981) - which in turns facilitates presumptions about her lack of fit for the position (Heilman 1980, Heilman 1983). Hence, this bias results from an incongruity between her perceived attributes and the perceived nature of a job's

requirements, and it is the most robust when women seek out occupations that are prestigious, powerful, and coded as masculine (Heilman and Saruwatari 1979, Heilman 1980, Heilman 1983, Heilman and Stopeck 1985). However, because the sex roles that are associated with the majority sex within a given occupation become incorporated into the work roles (Gutek and Cohen 1987), I argue that male-dominated occupations can also be reasonably characterized as being "male-typed." Following the logics of the Beauty is Beastly Effect and the Lack of Fit Model, I propose *Hypothesis 1: attractive and very attractive women who work in male-dominated occupations will earn less than their counterparts who are characterized as average.*

For the purposes of this study, "male-dominated occupations" are defined as any occupation where less than 25% of the employees are women, according to national data released by the 2000 U.S. Census. I selected the representational threshold of 25% or less of a given gender when defining sex-segregated occupations because Heilman (1980) determined through laboratory experiments that sex discrimination became less salient when women represented more than 25% of the applicant pool for a managerial position. Heilman (1980) has directly acknowledged that her results would not be expected under all circumstances, and has further emphasized that the gender classification of the job is also a critical consideration. However, the established threshold of 25% was the only baseline occupational gender distribution that has been supported by empirical research on trait salience and occupations, so I have adapted it for the purposes of the analyses conducted in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

The Gendered Returns to Physical Attractiveness in Female-Dominated Occupations

Although the literature has exhaustively shown that occupational gender distributions can and do affect labor market opportunities, rewards, and penalties - especially for female workers, a few studies have shed some new light on the issue. For example, Ruffle and Shtudiner (2015) reported that attractive female job applicants were disadvantaged when human resource departments were comprised mainly of women, and they attributed this appearance-based discrimination to jealousy. These results are consistent with some other studies which note that women and men tend to be equally biased against women and are just as likely to judge people on the basis of their attractiveness (Dipboye et al. 1977, Schein 1975). However, these studies were relatively narrow in their contexts and they have notable limitations in their applicability and generalizability. Furthermore, these projects were restricted to assessing pre-employment decisions and cannot speak to any real labor market outcomes. Despite the conflicting results as to whether attractiveness is an asset or a liability depending on occupational contexts, the literature clearly shows that occupational gender distributions - and especially those indicative of sex-segregation and underrepresentation - can have a profound effect on the returns to attractiveness, and particularly so among women.

Even though the Beauty is Beastly Effect has only been documented in male-typed jobs, I nevertheless hypothesize that women may experience attractiveness penalties in both male-dominated and female-dominated occupations. Discrimination based on sex and on appearance should still be prevalent, since sex remains a very salient trait within these environments. Furthermore, the some studies support the notion that the women who overwhelmingly occupy these occupations may also discriminate against their female colleagues. Despite the overwhelming support for the general beauty premium and the lack of

literature on any systematic beauty penalties lobbied against attractive women in female-dominated occupations, I offer *Hypothesis 2: attractive and very attractive women who work in female-dominated jobs will earn significantly less than their average counterparts.*

Because the Beauty is Beastly Effect has been shown to exist almost exclusively among with women - with very few exceptions such as the study by Spencer and Taylor (1988) - I also propose *Hypothesis 3: attractive and very attractive males will always earn more than males who are characterized as average in attractiveness.* Hence, I anticipate that occupational gender distributions will contribute to the Beauty is Beastly Effect only among women workers, and more specifically, I expect that attractive and very attractive women will be subjected to penalties in both male-dominated and female-dominated jobs.

The Gendered Returns to Physical Attractiveness in Gender-Egalitarian Occupations

This study is built on the principle that sex-segregated occupations may be another context where the Beauty is Beastly Effect arises, based on the logic that sex is an especially salient trait of the workers within these environments. Since Heilman's (1980) work suggests that sex salience and discrimination can be reduced by diversifying the staff and thereby increasing the salience of other aspects of the workers, I anticipate that more egalitarian gender distributions within an occupation should mediate not only the lack of person-job fit associated with femininity in the workplace, but also the general sex roles and stereotypes that fuel this very assessment. Thus, more egalitarian occupational gender distributions should inhibit gender and appearance-based discrimination. Furthermore, I expect to see the general beauty premium operating more strongly within these jobs because the degree of gender

discrimination should be comparably less due to the decreased salience of sex. Hence, I offer *Hypothesis 4: no significant attractiveness penalties will be identified within gender-egalitarian occupations, and attractive and very attractive respondents within these professions will earn significantly more than their average counterparts.*

Finally, the literature strongly suggests that occupations and occupational roles are presumed to be just as gendered as the individual employees that occupy them. Furthermore, perceptions and assessments of physical attractiveness not only shape earnings, but they are shown to fluctuate according to occupational context. Therefore, my final hypothesis is more general. I propose *Hypothesis 5: as a group, the penalties and premia associated with physical attractiveness will significantly vary across the different types of occupational gender distributions.*

METHODOLOGY

Data

These analyses utilize the same dataset and variables that were outlined in Chapter 2. The independent variable is the respondent's physical attractiveness level, which was rated by Add Health interviewers. The key dependent variable is the natural log of the respondent's self-reported personal income before taxes. The control variables include gender, age, marital status, race, educational attainment, personality attractiveness, grooming, BMI classification, and height. Interviewer fixed effects were also included in the models. For more information on these variables and their measurements, please see the Data section from Chapter 2.

Finally, these analyses also incorporate a variable for the overall gender distribution within each respondent's occupation, rather than relying on the occupation fixed effects that were utilized in Chapter 2. Add Health reports the respondents' current or most recently held job, and this measure is typified in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) format. The SOC system is used by American federal agencies to classify employees into one of 840 detailed jobs according to their occupational definition. The SOC code is formatted as a six-digit number, with a hyphen between the second and third digits, such as "11-9081." The first two digits refer to one of the 23 "major" groups or industries, and the four digits following the hyphen represent the more detailed occupation within that industry (USBLS 2014).

The occupational gender distributions within each profession were obtained by merging the Add Health variable for the respondent's occupation with the 2000 U.S. Census data and then collapsing the means to get the percentage of female workers in each job (according to its SOC code). Dummy variables were then constructed in order to indicate whether the respondent worked in a male-dominated job (where females comprise less than 25% of the workforce), in a female-dominated job (where females comprise more than 75% of the workforce), or in a gender egalitarian job (where females comprise 45% to 55% of the workforce). Interaction effects were also evaluated by interacting these three occupational gender distributions with the physical attractiveness measure from Add Health.

Since the Wave IV data was collected in 2008, I also constructed the occupational gender distribution measures with data from the 2008 ACS. I initially hoped that the 2008 ACS data would procure a more accurate and updated account of the gender distributions across the 696 occupations than the data from the 2000 U.S. Census. However, the results yielded from the 2000 Census and from the 2008 ACS were nearly identical. This finding has

two important implications. On one hand, the minimal differences detected between the findings generated by these two datasets suggests that this measurement is a reliable variable for occupational gender distributions. It also offers further testament to the rigid nature of occupational sex segregation, given that there was very little change in the gender distributions of these professions between 2000 and 2008. Nevertheless, for purposes of these analyses, only the 2000 U.S. Census data on occupational gender distributions were utilized.

Methods

This study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model the relationship between level of physical attractiveness and earned income by estimating the equation:

$$y_i = X_{ki}\beta_k + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_i$$


In this regression equation, y_i represents logged income for the respondent, ***i***, X_{ki} are the ***k*** independent variables – including dummy variables for attractiveness and other control variables as applicable – and α_j represent the fixed effects for the ***j*** interviewers. All missing values were addressed by listwise deletions.

RESULTS

The Returns to Physical Attractiveness in Male-Dominated Occupations

Focusing on Add Health respondents employed within male-dominated occupations, Figure 1 below provides information about the median earnings according to gender and to attractiveness level.

Figure 1



Male-dominated professions include a wide range of managerial positions as well as some traditionally prestigious occupations, such as CEOs, architects, engineers, dentists, and various types of scientists (i.e. atmospheric, space, sound). Male-dominated jobs also tend to be those which require physical labor – including fire fighters, patrol officers, security guards, chefs, construction workers, material moving workers, logging workers, military personnel, and maintenance/installation/repair/production workers.

Nearly one quarter of the Add Health sample (23.58%) work in a male-dominated job that is sex-segregated to this high of a degree. The sex segregation within these jobs amongst the sample is even more staggering, since only 11.65% of the respondents who work in male-

dominated occupations are women. Overall, 43.46% of the men (N= 2,761) and 5.28% of women (N=364) in the sample work within these positions.

The median incomes for men and women within male-dominated jobs increase in a perfect ordinal fashion according to attractiveness level. However, the income penalty for being unattractive appears more pronounced for women, given that the median income for unattractive women is $16,000 - which is far less than the median income among very attractive women ($40,000). On the other hand, unattractive males earn a median annual income of $31,000 - which is only $7,000 less than the median earnings of very attractive male respondents ($38,000). Unsurprisingly, respondents employed in a male-dominated job earned more than respondents who were not employed in these jobs, and this effect is greater among women. Indeed, Table 10 and Table 11 below indicate that females who were employed in male-dominated jobs earned 32.3% more than females who were not (p=.000), whereas male earned only 20.1% more than males who were occupied in other professions (p=.000). Furthermore, there is a steep gender gap with respect to earnings, given that women who were employed in male-dominated jobs earned 23.3% less than their male counterparts (p=.000).

However, Tables 9 through 11 below offer more thorough portrayals of how male-dominated jobs shape the returns to attractiveness. Table 9 provides information about how the returns to attractiveness within male-dominated jobs jointly vary relative to all other occupational gender distributions. These analyses are also conducted separately for men in male-dominated jobs (Table 10) and for women in male-dominated jobs (Table 11).

Table 9

TABLE 9 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive	**-.090*** (.043)	**-.047** (.041)	**-.00002** (.043)
Attractive	**.157***** (.023)	**.117***** (.022)	**.036** (.024)
Very Attractive	**.262***** (.037)	**.208***** (.035)	**.070** (.040)
JOB < 25% FEMALE	**.315***** (.030)	**.264***** (.030)	**.266***** (.030)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB < 25% Female (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive	**-.091** (.084)	**-.095** (.080)	**-.063** (.079)
Attractive	**-.020** (.045)	**-.041** (.043)	**-.039** (.042)
Very Attractive	**-.095** (.079)	**-.109** (.075)	**-.107** (.075)
SEX		**-.306***** (.019)	**-.262***** (.025)
AGE		**.040***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.150***** (.018)	**.135***** (.018)
RACE (*White omitted)*			
Latino		**.005** (.029)	**-.007** (.029)
Black		**-.145***** (.026)	**-.160***** (.025)
Native American		**-.131*** (.054)	**-.126*** (.054)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.062** (.039)	**.071** (.040)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)			
Less Than High School		**-.290***** (.039)	**-.265***** (.039)
Some College/Trade School		**.175***** (.026)	**.143***** (.026)
Finished Trade School		**.178***** (.039)	**.147***** (.039)
College Graduate		**.570***** (.029)	**.512***** (.030)
More Than College		**.606***** (.033)	**.544***** (.034)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.009** (.046)
Attractive			**.059**** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.050** (.033)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed			**-.285***** (.043)
Well Groomed			**.153***** (.022)
Very Well Groomed			**.250***** (.037)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*			
Overweight			**.069***** (.021)
Obese I			**.078***** (.021)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.47***	9.12***	8.52***
R-SQUARED	.1007	.1877	.1988
*p= .05** p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*			

The interaction terms presented in Table 9 demonstrate that the returns to attractiveness generated by respondents employed in male-dominated occupations did not significantly differ relative to respondents that were not employed in these occupations. Furthermore, an F Test indicated that the overall interaction effect was insignificant (p=.455), which means that the income returns to physical attractiveness did not differ between the respondents in male-dominated occupations and respondents who worked in occupations with fewer men. Finally, the supplemental F Tests also emphasize that the earnings of unattractive, average, attractive, and very attractive respondents that worked within male-dominated occupations did not significantly differ from one another.

However, Table 10 and Table 11 below also replicated these analyses separately for men in male-dominated occupations and for women in male-dominated occupations to see whether these outcomes differ by gender. The regression tables which analyze these models separately by gender are also expanded across seven models (rather than the three models within the aggregated tables) in order to offer a more precise understanding of how certain variables shape the respondents' labor market returns to attractiveness.

Table 10

TABLE 10 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: MEN IN MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**-.197**** (.070)	**-.167*** (.070)	**-.169*** (.068)	**-.165*** (.067)	**-.159*** (.068)	**-.109** (.069)	**-.136** (.070)
Attractive	**.180***** (.036)	**.166***** (.036)	**.172***** (.035)	**.119***** (.035)	**.076*** (.037)	**.046** (.037)	**.045** (.038)
Very Attractive	**.403***** (.062)	**.414***** (.061)	**.445***** (.060)	**.362***** (.059)	**.300***** (.064)	**.231***** (.065)	**.218***** (.066)
JOB < 25% FEMALE	**.147***** (.035)	**.107**** (.034)	**.105**** (.034)	**.188***** (.034)	**.187***** (.034)	**.189***** (.034)	**.183***** (.034)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB < 25% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**.063** (.100)	**.081** (.098)	**.097** (.098)	**.113** (.096)	**.117** (.096)	**.132** (.095)	**.151** (.096)
Attractive	**-.041** (.053)	**-.036** (.052)	**-.03** (.052)	**-.025** (.051)	**-.021** (.051)	**-.018** (.051)	**-.025** (.051)
Very Attractive	**-.147** (.095)	**-.121** (.094)	**-.144** (.093)	**-.138** (.091)	**-.134** (.091)	**-.12** (.091)	**-.118** (.091)
AGE		**.025***** (.007)	**.025***** (.007)	**.026***** (.007)	**.027***** (.007)	**.028***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.35***** (.025)	**.326***** (.025)	**.323***** (.024)	**.322***** (.024)	**.311***** (.024)	**.293***** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.114**** (.040)	**-.043** (.040)	**-.046** (.040)	**-.060** (.040)	**-.055** (.041)
Black			**-.337***** (.036)	**-.278***** (.036)	**-.276***** (.036)	**-.284***** (.036)	**-.285***** (.036)
Native American			**-.228**** (.077)	**-.171*** (.075)	**-.174*** (.075)	**-.170*** (.075)	**-.177*** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.115*** (.054)	**.068** (.053)	**.065** (.053)	**.056** (.053)	**.076** (.054)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.243***** (.048)	**-.242***** (.048)	**-.226***** (.048)	**-.228***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.133***** (.033)	**.126***** (.033)	**.102**** (.033)	**.084*** (.034)
Finished Trade School				**.183***** (.055)	**.177***** (.055)	**.158**** (.054)	**.139**** (.054)
College Graduate				**.466***** (.040)	**.455***** (.040)	**.416***** (.040)	**.393***** (.040)
More Than College				**.369***** (.049)	**.358***** (.049)	**.311***** (.049)	**.282***** (.049)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**-.011** (.063)	**.014** (.063)	**.021** (.063)
Attractive					**.093**** (.029)	**.071*** (.030)	**.078*** (.030)
Very Attractive					**.121**** (.047)	**.074** (.048)	**.072** (.048)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed						**-.293***** (.056)	**-.297***** (.056)
Well Groomed						**.085**** (.030)	**.086**** (.030)
Very Well Groomed						**.203***** (.053)	**.215***** (.053)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*							
Overweight							**.096***** (.029)
Obese I							**.139***** (.029)
HEIGHT							**.012**** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.55***	9.69***	9.74***	9.46***	9.43***	9.46***	8.49***
R-SQUARED	.0819	.1607	.1758	.2092	.2108	.2175	.2216
*p= .05** p= .01** p= .001*** (Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

As Table 10 indicates, the returns to physical attractiveness generated by men who work within male-dominated occupations did not significantly differ in any of the attractiveness categories from the returns earned by men who did not work within male-dominated occupations. This was further confirmed by an F Test, which reported that the overall interaction effect was insignificant (p=.166). Male respondents that were employed within male-dominated occupations did not experience any significant rewards or penalties associated with physical attractiveness relative to their peers of average attractiveness. This contention was demonstrated by additional F Tests, which reported that attractive (p=.622) and very attractive males (p=.199) within male-dominated occupations did not earn significantly more than males within male-dominated occupations that were ranked as average, nor did their unattractive counterparts earn less (p=.839).

However, the returns to physical attractiveness did vary among women who worked within male-dominated occupations, and two unique penalty patterns were observed. Consistent with Figure 1's depictions of the median earnings, unattractive women who worked within male-occupations were significantly penalized – as documented in Table 11 below. The results suggest that the Beauty is Beastly Effect describes the earnings of very attractive women who worked within male-dominated occupations.

Table 11

TABLE 11 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: WOMEN IN MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**-.006** (.054)	**.003** (.054)	**.004** (.054)	**-.003** (.052)	**.013** (.055)	**.048** (.057)	**.067** (.058)
Attractive	**.188***** (.030)	**.188***** (.030)	**.185***** (.030)	**.115***** (.028)	**.082**** (.030)	**.008** (.032)	**.001** (.033)
Very Attractive	**.266***** (.046)	**.275***** (.046)	**.273***** (.046)	**.164***** (.044)	**.118*** (.049)	**-.014** (.049)	**-.022** (.054)
JOB < 25% FEMALE	**.157** (.084)	**.160** (.083)	**.163*** (.083)	**.254***** (.083)	**.257***** (.080)	**.267***** (.079)	**.280***** (.080)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB < 25% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**-.526*** (.236)	**-.564*** (.235)	**-.573*** (.235)	**-.510*** (.224)	**-.511*** (.224)	**-.467*** (.223)	**-.489*** (.223)
Attractive	**.143** (.121)	**.131** (.121)	**.126** (.121)	**.050** (.116)	**.048** (.116)	**.042** (.115)	**.012** (.116)
Very Attractive	**-.150** (.177)	**-.150** (.176)	**-.172** (.176)	**-.122** (.168)	**-.215** (.168)	**-.238** (.167)	**-.263** (.172)
AGE		**.051***** (.077)	**.051***** (.077)	**.051***** (.077)	**.050***** (.077)	**.050***** (.077)	**.049***** (.077)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.014** (.026)	**-.002** (.026)	**.002** (.025)	**.0005** (.025)	**.0005** (.025)	**-.009** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.076** (.044)	**.038** (.042)	**.038** (.042)	**.026** (.042)	**.031** (.043)
Black			**-.128***** (.037)	**-.075*** (.036)	**-.074*** (.036)	**-.080*** (.036)	**-.075*** (.036)
Native American			**-.195*** (.080)	**-.109** (.076)	**-.103** (.076)	**-.095** (.076)	**-.120** (.076)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.119*** (.060)	**.105** (.058)	**.108** (.058)	**.095** (.057)	**.096** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.371***** (.064)	**-.367***** (.064)	**-.347***** (.063)	**-.346***** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.208***** (.039)	**.203***** (.039)	**.183***** (.039)	**.188***** (.039)
Finished Trade School				**.182***** (.057)	**.180**** (.057)	**.153**** (.057)	**.155**** (.057)
College Graduate				**.667***** (.043)	**.657***** (.044)	**.606***** (.044)	**.608***** (.044)
More Than College				**.759***** (.047)	**.751***** (.047)	**.693***** (.047)	**.694***** (.047)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**-.024** (.066)	**-.072** (.067)	**-.073** (.067)
Attractive					**.083**** (.031)	**.039** (.031)	**.047** (.031)
Very Attractive					**.099*** (.044)	**.021** (.045)	**.025** (.046)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed						**-.265***** (.067)	**-.272***** (.067)
Well Groomed						**.217***** (.031)	**.218***** (.031)
Very Well Groomed						**.299***** (.051)	**.299***** (.051)
BMI (Normal omitted)							
Overweight							**.041** (.030)
Obese							**.023** (.030)
HEIGHT							**.002** (.051)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.41***	8.93***	8.96***	8.54***	8.54***	8.59***	8.47***
R-SQUARED	.1146	.1215	.1249	.2003	.2014	.2119	.2133
*p= .05** p= .01** p= .001*** (Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

Unlike their male counterparts, the returns to attractiveness generated by women in male-dominated professions did differ somewhat from the returns among women who did not work in these professions. Although an F test found that the overall interaction effect was only marginally significant (p=.063), the coefficient for unattractive women in male-dominated jobs was 38.7% less (p=.028) than that of unattractive women who worked in jobs that were not male-dominated. In addition, unattractive women in male-dominated jobs were also disadvantaged relative to their female peers of average attractiveness. Compared to women of average attractiveness who worked within male-dominated jobs, unattractive women earned 34.4% less (p= .055). These results offer the first empirical evidence that the returns to attractiveness are indeed shaped by the gender distributions within occupations.

In accordance with the Beauty Is Beastly Effect, these findings offer some support for Hypothesis 1, which anticipated that *attractive and very attractive women who worked in male-dominated occupations would earn less than their counterparts who were characterized as average*. On one hand, the earnings of attractive women within male-dominated occupations were virtually the same as the earnings of women in male-dominated professions who were ranked as average (p=.909). On the other hand, very attractive women earned 24.8% less than women within these professions who were average in attractiveness, and this difference was marginally significant (p=.096). This finding may seem peculiar because Figure 1 expressed that very attractive women within male-dominated occupations earned the highest median income, but this outcome appears to be driven in part by the influence of the control variables, in part by low-earning outliers among very attractive women and in part by high-earning outliers among women of average attractiveness.

However, unattractive women (N=23) and very attractive women (N=45) were both underrepresented within male-dominated occupations, which is not surprising given that women still remain largely excluded from these professions. To ensure that these results were not being driven by the small sample sizes, I estimated the models using 33% as the cutoff rather than 25% in order to increase the sample sizes. The results were similar, with very attractive women (N=67) earning 22.7% less than women within these jobs that are ranked as average (p=.066). Therefore, I do not believe that the results presented here on the Beauty is Beastly Effect are merely an artifact the small samples.[1]

The literature on the Beauty is Beastly Effect would suggest that very attractive women in male-dominated occupations may experience these income penalties because their attractiveness heightens perceptions about their femininity (Drogosz and Levy 1996), which in turn heightens perceptions about their lack of job fit and their general devaluation (England 2010, Heilman 1983). It is also possible that very attractive women are penalized because their attractiveness is amplifying negative gender stereotypes, or that it is otherwise signaling unfavorable messages about their productivity (Das and Loach 2011). The Beauty is Beastly Effect implies that unattractive women may be better off than very attractive women within male-dominated professions, but this does not appear to be the case. While these findings should be interpreted with some caution due to the low sample sizes, there are several other plausible explanations for these two penalties which adversely impact the earnings of women who occupy the opposite ends of the attractiveness spectrum.

[1] In male-dominated jobs where women comprised less than 33% of the workforce, unattractive women (N=43) no longer earned less than unattractive women within other jobs (p=.220), nor did they earn less than their female peers of average attractiveness (p=.383). This shift could have occurred because discrimination against unattractive women may be less severe as jobs become less concentrated with men, but it may also be attributed in part to the increase in sample size.

First and foremost, it is possible that these penalties are a reflection of the unique features of male-typed or male-dominated jobs, which have historically been regarded as the most high-paying, powerful, and prestigious occupations (Acker 1990). Since there is more money made or to be potentially made within these jobs, it is plausible that these features can perhaps account for why the greatest attractiveness-related penalties are detected within these jobs. This explanation is bolstered by the fact that female respondents who worked in male-dominated occupations earned a higher median income of $30,000 than women in female-dominated occupations ($26,000) or in gender egalitarian occupations ($24,000).

Another explanation may be that women who work in male-dominated jobs are the most rewarded for plainness or averageness. Indeed, some research suggests that average faces are actually considered the most attractive and desirable (Valentine, Darling and Donnelly 2004), due to generalized preferences for familiar stimuli and for features which signal genetic quality (Halberstadt and Rhodes 2003). Average and attractive women- who comprise the two middle levels of the physical attractiveness scale - may be advantaged in male-dominated jobs because their appearance is not only interpreted in ways which do not evoke unfavorable gender stereotypes or notions of their productivity, but also because they may actually be considered as the most attractive within these occupational contexts. In a sex-segregated workplace where sex is already an especially salient and attention-getting characteristic, women may be dually disadvantaged when they stand out in other ways – such as being too unattractive or too attractive.

Although men tend to discriminate in favor of attractive women (Kaplan 1978) – which can in part explain the income penalty among unattractive women, it is also possible that men within these occupational settings may also discriminate against attractive women.

For example, some studies have gathered empirical support for the longstanding stereotype that attractive women are a liability because they can be a distraction. The cognitive performance of heterosexual men has been shown to decrease when they interact with women or even when they anticipate that they will do so (Nauts, Metzmacher, Verwijmeren et al. 2012) - and this impairment is more severe when the woman involved is perceived as attractive (Karremans, Verwijmeren, Pronk et al. 2009). Within the "big boys clubs" of male-dominated occupations, attractive women may be excluded entirely because they are believed to hinder the productivity of the primarily male employees, or they may be sorted into professions such as secretaries or receptionists (Johnson et al. 2010) – where they function more as props than as respected colleagues.

These results contribute to the literature by being the first to demonstrate that occupational gender distributions shape the returns to attractiveness and that male-dominated occupations function as another context which can trigger the Beauty is Beastly Effect. However, they also elaborate further on the directionality of attractiveness biases, and offer some unique implications about how these biases may be influenced by occupational traits. There has been a longstanding tension in the literature pertaining to whether attractiveness is good, unattractiveness is bad, or if both of these biases are empirically valid. Scholars have made a strong case for the notion that the penalties experienced by unattractive people may actually outweigh any advantages generated by attractive individuals as a result of negativity bias. Indeed, Baumeister and his colleagues (2001) have noted that bad impressions and stereotypes are quicker to form, more impactful, more deeply processed, and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones. Furthermore, some studies suggest that more attention and processing resources are assigned to unattractiveness, which indicates that the disadvantages

associated with unattractiveness may be the primary expression of attractiveness-based biases (Griffin and Langlois 2006). The findings from Chapter 2 convey that both attractiveness biases operate more generally within the U.S. labor market. However, in the context of women's earnings within male-dominated jobs, the directionality of the attractiveness bias is tilted more sharply towards the "unattractiveness is bad" bias than it is towards the "beauty is good" bias. Indeed, being attractive is only advantageous to women within male-dominated occupations up until a certain degree, and then it can conversely become beastly.

There are several plausible accounts which could help to explain the prominence of this negativity bias and these penalties experienced by unattractive women. Overall, the literature consistently shows that men are prone to discriminating in favor of attractive women (Kaplan 1978), that they generally place a greater emphasis on attractiveness (Buss 1994, Feingold 1991, Nevid 1984, Saguy 2012, Siever 1994), and that they are also more likely to hold positions of power within the workplace (Elliott and Smith 2004, Kanter 1977, Maume 1999). As a result, unattractive women in male-dominated jobs are likely under the charge of men, who may penalize them for their failure to conform to beauty norms (Dellinger and Williams 1997) - which are also largely imposed and enforced by men more generally (Wolf 1991). In a similar vein, it is also possible that this penalty is motivated by the lack of sexual interest and the devaluation of unattractive women by male superiors, coworkers, or clients.

Perhaps a more likely account is that unattractive women in male-dominated jobs are multiplicatively disadvantaged not only by sexism and by appearance-related biases in general, but also due to more specific assumptions about their gender nonconformity. Women that are failing to do attractiveness appropriately according to cultural standards are perceived to be failing at doing femininity itself (Brownmiller 1984) – and neoliberal logics further

suggest that these women are to blame for their own shortcomings and whatever injustices are experienced as a result of them (Klazas 2015). Furthermore, any biases about gender deviance on the basis of their appearance may be additionally bolstered by negative perceptions and outcomes associated with the fact that many of these women work within jobs that are seen as "gender inappropriate" (Pfost and Fiore 1990). In sum, the penalties accrued by unattractive women within male-dominated jobs may result from the organizational structure of their occupation, from the widespread appearance biases that circulate at the societal level, from negative perceptions related to their gender nonconformity, and from their vulnerability in work settings where they are often outnumbered by – and under the charge of – men.

It is intriguing that the same occupational context gives rise to two opposing attractiveness penalty patterns, which adversely impact the earnings of unattractive and very attractive women within male-dominated jobs. However, these outcomes make sense when we recall not only the features of these professions, but also how trait salience operates within this context. Occupational sex-segregation facilitates gender inequality, given that negative biases and outcomes are more likely to emerge when women are underrepresented (Heilman 1980). While women are prone to marginalization within these jobs, unattractiveness may be a trait that is equally or more salient than sex itself is, which may contribute to these penalties.

It is also possible that these unattractive female respondents may be penalized because they are employed within jobs where looks matter whereas very attractive women may be penalized because looks do not matter so much within their occupation (Johnson et al. 2010, Podratz 2002). The degree to which beauty "matters" within a given occupation depends on the extent to which attractiveness is a productive aspect of the occupational duties (such as interacting with customers), the organizational features or environment of the position, and


the composition of the decision makers. Although more in-depth analyses are required to confirm this, it does appear that physical attractiveness may not be as important in the male-dominated occupations that were identified by this study – given that most of these jobs seem to involve a notable amount of physical labor and fewer interactions with clients.

Finally, since empirical research has shown that people tend to sort into occupations which reward a particular attribute and veer away from occupations where related penalties exist (Arunachalam and Shah 2012, Harper 2000), it could be that these respondents for whatever reason did not appropriately sort themselves into occupations where they avoid appearance-related penalties. It is also very reasonable to deduce that the social and economic advantages of working within male-dominated positions may offset or outweigh these attractiveness penalties. This explanation is indeed plausible, given that female respondents enjoy a 32.3% wage premium (p=.000) just for working within a male-dominated job – a payoff that is generally greater than any of the returns that would be generated on the basis of physical appearance. In any case, the upcoming analyses show some considerable differences in the general earnings and the returns to attractiveness that are generated by women within female-dominated occupations.

The Returns to Physical Attractiveness in Female-Dominated Occupations

Focusing on Add Health respondents employed within female-dominated occupations, Figure 2 below provides information about the median earnings according to gender and to attractiveness level.

Figure 2



Female-dominated professions include a wide range of positions which require social interactions, care work, and sales – such as social workers, teachers, librarians, nurses, occupational therapists, speech therapists, maids, cashiers, secretaries, product promoters, dental assistants, hosts/hostesses, and waiters/waitresses. While physical attractiveness may be a more important asset in these positions than in the male-dominated professions more generally, beauty may be a particularly productive aspect of several other the female-dominated occupations – including dancers, hairdressers, and makeup artists.

Compared to male-dominated jobs, roughly the same amount of Add Health respondents work in female-dominated jobs. While 23.08% of the respondents work in

female-dominated professions, this includes only 6.89% of the men (N= 438) but 37.99% of women (N= 2,621) within this sample. This means that roughly half of the sample work in a male-dominated job or in a female-dominated job.

The annual median income for respondents employed within female-dominated occupations ($26,000) is also notably less than the median earnings of their counterparts working within male-dominated professions ($37,500). The percentage of men working within female-dominated occupations (14.32%) is also higher than the percentage of women working within male-dominated occupations (11.65%). This is not surprising given the continued rigid exclusion of women within male-dominated occupations, and also because men in female-typed jobs uniquely procure advantages and glass escalators within these positions (Williams 1992). Hence, the gender wage gap is actually slightly more pronounced within female-dominated occupations than it is within male-dominated occupations, with female respondents earning roughly 25% less than their male counterparts (p=.000). This could also be related to the demographic composition of female-dominated occupations, given that women who are married, have children, or work part-time also tend to work in occupations with a higher percent female workers (Okamoto and England 1999). Overall, the descriptive findings illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are consistent with the key features which characterize sex-segregated professions that are primarily occupied by male and by female workers, respectively (Acker 1990, England 2010, Williams 1992).

Just as with male-dominated occupations, the median incomes for respondents of both genders also increase in a perfect ordinal fashion according to attractiveness level. One main difference is that the earning gaps between the respondents of different attractiveness levels are also much less pronounced than they were in male-dominated occupations. Unattractive

respondents of both genders do not appear to make much less than the median income, nor do their attractive or very attractive counterparts appear to make notably more. These findings, again, are likely due to the general devaluation and lower pay range within these professions.

However, the following regression analyses offer a more in-depth assessment of these patterns. Table 12 provides data about how the returns to attractiveness within female-dominated occupations jointly vary as a group relative to all other occupational gender distributions. These analyses are again also conducted separately for male respondents who worked in female-dominated occupations (Table 13) and for women who worked in female-dominated occupations (Table 14).

Table 12

TABLE 12 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: FEMALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive	**-.115** (.042)	**-.074** (.041)	**-.012** (.044)
Attractive	**.166***** (.023)	**.119***** (.022)	**.040** (.024)
Very Attractive	**.231***** (.037)	**.183***** (.036)	**.045** (.041)
JOB > 75% FEMALE	**-.290***** (.031)	**-.185***** (.031)	**-.187***** (.031)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB > 75% Female (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive	**.020** (.084)	**.028** (.080)	**.0006** (.080)
Attractive	**-.057** (.045)	**-.033** (.043)	**-.035** (.043)
Very Attractive	**-.0006** (.074)	**.008** (.070)	**.021** (.070)
SEX		**-.332***** (.018)	**-.288***** (.024)
AGE		**.040***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.158***** (.018)	**.143***** (.018)
RACE (*White omitted)*			
Latino		**.006** (.029)	**-.006** (.030)
Black		**-.153***** (.026)	**-.169***** (.025)
Native American		**-.127*** (.054)	**-.122*** (.054)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.053** (.039)	**.061** (.040)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)			
Less Than High School		**-.289***** (.039)	**-.265***** (.039)
Some College/Trade School		**.161***** (.026)	**.129***** (.026)
Finished Trade School		**.191***** (.040)	**.161***** (.040)
College Graduate		**.532***** (.029)	**.473***** (.030)
More Than College		**.566***** (.033)	**.504***** (.034)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.008** (.046)
Attractive			**.060**** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.049** (.033)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed			**-.290***** (.043)
Well Groomed			**.150***** (.022)
Very Well Groomed			**.246***** (.037)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*			
Overweight			**.071***** (.021)
Obese I			**.078***** (.021)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.61***	9.24***	8.63***
R-SQUARED	.1022	.1859	.1969
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*			

As Table 12 indicates, the returns to attractiveness generated by respondents within female-dominated occupations did not significantly differ from the returns earned by respondents who did not work within female-dominated occupations. Additional F tests found that the overall interaction effect was insignificant (p=.771), and that respondents who were employed within female-dominated occupations also did not seem to experience any significant rewards or penalties associated with physical attractiveness relative to other respondents within female-dominated professions.

Another key difference which stands out from these analyses is that respondents who worked within female-dominated occupations earned roughly 17% less (p=.000) than respondents who did not work within these professions – and this effect was much more pronounced among male respondents. As demonstrated in Table 13 and Table 14 below, men who worked in female-dominated occupations earned 25.1% less than men who did not work within these occupations (p=.000), whereas women who worked in female-dominated occupations only earned 11.3% less than women who worked in other types of occupations (p=.001). The findings thus far are consistent with the vast amount of literature, which demonstrates that occupations comprised mainly of male employees are systematically linked to higher earnings, whereas occupations comprised mainly of female employees tend to earn considerably less.

Table 13

TABLE 13 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: MEN IN FEMALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
ATTRACTIVENESS ***(Average omitted)***							
Unattractive	**-.166**** (.054)	**-.126*** (.053)	**-.117*** (.053)	**-.104*** (.052)	**-.097** (.055)	**-.038** (.056)	**-.054** (.057)
Attractive	**.165***** (.029)	**.154***** (.029)	**.162***** (.028)	**.116***** (.028)	**.075*** (.030)	**.047** (.031)	**.045** (.031)
Very Attractive	**.329***** (.051)	**.351***** (.050)	**.372***** (.050)	**.294***** (.050)	**.237***** (.054)	**.173**** (.054)	**.160**** (.056)
JOB > 75% FEMALE	**-.283***** (.068)	**-.237***** (.066)	**-.248***** (.066)	**-.294***** (.066)	**-.294***** (.065)	**-.298***** (.064)	**-.289***** (.064)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB > 75% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**.069** (.185)	**.031** (.182)	**-.015** (.180)	**-.002** (.177)	**-.017** (.177)	**-.035** (.176)	**-.071** (.178)
Attractive	**-.011** (.104)	**-.034** (.102)	**-.023** (.101)	**-.040** (.099)	**-.040** (.099)	**-.047** (.098)	**-.066** (.098)
Very Attractive	**.145** (.208)	**.162** (.203)	**.192** (.202)	**.189** (.198)	**.178** (.198)	**.171** (.197)	**.185** (.196)
AGE		**.026***** (.007)	**.025***** (.007)	**.027***** (.007)	**.028***** (.007)	**.029***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.352***** (.025)	**.328***** (.025)	**.329***** (.025)	**.328***** (.024)	**.317***** (.024)	**.299***** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.110**** (.040)	**-.040** (.040)	**-.043** (.040)	**-.058** (.040)	**-.053** (.041)
Black			**-.343***** (.036)	**-.292***** (.036)	**-.290***** (.036)	**-.298***** (.036)	**-.298***** (.036)
Native American			**-.221**** (.077)	**-.166*** (.074)	**-.168*** (.074)	**-.164*** (.074)	**-.169*** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.109*** (.054)	**.059** (.053)	**.055** (.053)	**.047** (.053)	**.065** (.054)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.240***** (.048)	**-.239***** (.048)	**-.223***** (.048)	**-.225***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.116***** (.033)	**.108***** (.033)	**.084*** (.033)	**.066*** (.033)
Finished Trade School				**.187***** (.055)	**.180***** (.055)	**.162**** (.055)	**.142**** (.054)
College Graduate				**.426***** (.039)	**.415***** (.039)	**.375***** (.040)	**.353***** (.040)
More Than College				**.328***** (.048)	**.318***** (.048)	**.269***** (.048)	**.243***** (.049)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**-.005** (.063)	**.019** (.063)	**.027** (.064)
Attractive					**.095***** (.029)	**.073*** (.030)	**.081**** (.030)
Very Attractive					**.118*** (.047)	**.071** (.047)	**.070** (.048)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed						**-.292***** (.056)	**-.297***** (.056)
Well Groomed						**.086**** (.030)	**.087**** (.030)
Very Well Groomed						**.200***** (.053)	**.213***** (.053)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*							
Overweight							**.096***** (.029)
Obese							**.142***** (.029)
HEIGHT							**.012**** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.63***	9.73***	9.79***	9.55***	9.51***	9.55***	8.57***
R-SQUARED	.1280	.1621	.1773	.2075	.2092	.2158	.2205
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

As Table 13 indicates, the returns to attractiveness generated by male respondents within female-dominated occupations also did not significantly differ from the returns earned by male respondents who did not work within female-dominated occupations. Supplemental F tests demonstrated that the overall interaction effect was insignificant (p=.611), and that male respondents who were employed within female-dominated occupations also did not experience many significant attractiveness rewards or penalties relative to other respondents within female-dominated professions. The only notable difference detected was that very attractive men who worked within female-dominated occupations earned 41.2% more than men of average attractiveness who worked in female-dominates occupations, but this finding was only marginally significant (p=.074). However, the returns to physical attractiveness also do not vary much among the female respondents who worked within female-dominated occupations either – as depicted below in Table 14.

Table 14

TABLE 14 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: WOMEN IN FEMALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**.005** (.065)	**.008** (.065)	**.011** (.065)	**-.009** (.062)	**.007** (.065)	**.050** (.066)	**.073** (.067)
Attractive	**.245***** (.036)	**.243***** (.036)	**.240***** (.036)	**.143***** (.035)	**.111*** (.036)	**.039** (.037)	**.028** (.038)
Very Attractive	**.271***** (.055)	**.280***** (.055)	**.275***** (.055)	**.148**** (.053)	**.103** (.056)	**-.031** (.059)	**-.044** (.061)
JOB > 75% FEMALE	**-.095*** (.039)	**-.097*** (.039)	**-.095*** (.039)	**-.110**** (.037)	**-.109**** (.037)	**-.111**** (.037)	**-.120***** (.037)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB>75% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**-.103** (.103)	**-.090** (.103)	**-.099** (.103)	**-.056** (.098)	**-.057** (.098)	**-.066** (.098)	**-.076** (.099)
Attractive	**-.129*** (.056)	**-.124*** (.056)	**-.126*** (.056)	**-.065** (.053)	**-.068** (.053)	**-.070** (.053)	**-.065** (.053)
Very Attractive	**-.047** (.087)	**-.046** (.086)	**-.043** (.086)	**-.005** (.083)	**.004** (.083)	**.007** (.082)	**.017** (.083)
AGE		**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.015** (.026)	**-.001** (.026)	**.002** (.025)	**.001** (.025)	**-.004** (.025)	**-.010** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.071** (.044)	**.040** (.042)	**.040** (.042)	**.027** (.042)	**.031** (.043)
Black			**-.128***** (.037)	**-.077*** (.036)	**-.076*** (.036)	**-.083*** (.036)	**-.077*** (.036)
Native American			**-.193*** (.079)	**-.105** (.076)	**-.099** (.076)	**-.090** (.076)	**-.118** (.076)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.119*** (.060)	**.106** (.058)	**.109** (.058)	**.096** (.057)	**.095** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.377***** (.064)	**-.372***** (.064)	**-.353***** (.063)	**-.353***** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.213***** (.039)	**.206***** (.039)	**.187***** (.039)	**.192***** (.039)
Finished Trade School				**.203***** (.057)	**.201***** (.057)	**.173**** (.057)	**.177**** (.057)
College Graduate				**.657***** (.043)	**.647***** (.044)	**.595***** (.044)	**.598***** (.044)
More Than College				**.751***** (.047)	**.742***** (.047)	**.683***** (.047)	**.686***** (.048)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**-.020** (.067)	**-.067** (.067)	**-.070** (.068)
Attractive					**.083**** (.031)	**.040** (.031)	**.048** (.031)
Very Attractive					**.101*** (.044)	**.024** (.045)	**.027** (.046)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed						**-.282***** (.067)	**-.288***** (.067)
Well Groomed						**.213***** (.031)	**.215***** (.031)
Very Well Groomed						**.295***** (.051)	**.296***** (.051)
BMI (Normal omitted)							
Overweight							**.048** (.031)
Obese							**.022** (.030)
HEIGHT							**.002** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.46***	8.99***	9.02***	8.61***	8.62***	8.66***	8.56***
R-SQUARED	.1182	.1249	.1282	.2015	.2026	.2132	.2150
*p= .05** p= .01*** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

As Table 14 above demonstrates, the returns to attractiveness generated by female respondents within female-dominated jobs only significantly differed from the returns earned by female respondents who did not work within female-dominated occupations until additional controls were included in the regression models. The supplemental F tests indicated that the overall interaction effect was insignificant (p=.543), but female respondents that were employed within female-dominated occupations also did not experience any significant rewards or penalties associated with attractiveness relative to other women within female-dominated professions. Since attractive women within female-dominated occupations earned 3.6% less (p=.418) while very attractive women earned 2.7% less (p=.714), the results do not offer support for Hypothesis 2, which posited that *attractive and very attractive women who worked in female-dominated occupations would earn significantly less than their counterparts who are characterized as average.* Hence, the Beauty is Beastly Effect is more likely to impede the earnings of attractive women within male-dominated occupations than the earnings of attractive women within female-dominated occupations.

The only notable difference detected in these analyses was that the income rewards for being attractive were significantly lower within female-dominated occupations than they were in occupations that were not female-dominated. More specifically, Model 3 in Table 14 indicates that the coefficient for attractiveness was 11.8% less (p=.024) within female-dominated occupations than it was for attractive women who worked within other occupations. However, this difference in the rewards to attractiveness lost its significance once the controls for educational attainment were included in Model 4 (p=.225), which implies that educational factors seem to account for this difference more than other factors do. To elaborate on this particular finding, it is plausible that attractive female respondents were

more likely to report higher levels of educational completion, but the data is unable to distinguish whether this was because the Add Health interviewers were prone towards rating the attractiveness of well educated women more favorably, or because attractive female respondents experienced cumulative advantages which facilitated their academic success. Both of these possible explanations have been documented by prior research.

Overall, it appears that physical attractiveness and/or the heightened femininity that is often associated with attractive females may not offer much of an advantage within occupations that are sex-segregated – regardless of whether they are heavily masculinized or feminized. Rather, the results thus far indicate that there may actually be some advantages for women who are ranked as average in their looks. The notion that plainness or averageness may be considered the most attractive (Valentine et al. 2004) due to a generalized preference for familiar stimuli (Halberstadt and Rhodes 2003) has been well documented. Any biases towards averageness within these contexts could be because attractiveness is not as crucial of an asset within these jobs (Johnson et al. 2010, Podratz 2002) or because it triggers negative gender stereotypes or perceptions about their productivity (Das and Loach 2011).

However, the logics for why plainness may be relatively advantageous within male-dominated and female-dominated occupations may also differ in some interesting ways. For example, attractiveness among women within male-dominated occupations may be less beneficial because both their sex and their appearance function as especially salient characteristics which make them prone to discrimination (Heilman 1984). It is also possible that attractive women may be perceived as a distraction within workplaces that are predominately male (Karremans et al. 2009). On the other hand, attractive women in female-dominated occupations may experience some negative outcomes as a result of jealousy and


female-on-female competition within settings that have high concentrations of female employees (Ruffle and Shtudiner 2015). Finally, it is plausible that the generalized preference for plainness may actually be bolstered when women are grouped together to a greater degree - which may be attributed to the "Cheerleader Effect" (Walker and Vul 2014). Indeed, this phenomenon that was popularized by Barney Stinson on the American sitcom "How I Met Your Mother" has been supported in some recent empirical studies. The logic of the Cheerleader Effect within this context would posit that within occupational environments comprised predominantly of women, average faces would become more attractive and that individual members within these workplaces would become more biased toward this "ensemble average" (Walker and Vul 2014). In sum, it is possible that averageness may have a more profound advantage than attractiveness in female-dominated occupational settings, and that being attractive may not accrue unique benefits because it is not as much of a salient, valued, productive, or "attention-getting" characteristic.

The analyses of this chapter will conclude with an assessment of how these patterns in the returns to attractiveness differ within "gender egalitarian" occupations that have relatively equal proportions of male and female employees.

The Returns to Physical Attractiveness in Gender Egalitarian Occupations

Focusing on Add Health respondents employed within gender egalitarian occupations, Figure 3 below provides information about the median earnings according to gender and to attractiveness level.

Figure 3



Roughly 9.59% of the Add Health respondents work in gender egalitarian jobs, which includes 10.18% of the men (N= 647) and 9.04% of the women (N= 624) from this sample. As expected, the gender distribution of the respondents are relatively similar within these professions. However, fewer respondents work in gender egalitarian jobs than in either male-dominated or female-dominated jobs, and the overall median annual income is the lowest. The lower sample size and annual earnings are likely because the way that gender egalitarian occupations are measured by this study have a range of 10 percent (45% to 55%), whereas the other two occupational categories have larger gradients (of 0% to 25% and 75% to 100%, respectively).

There are a few other interesting divergences within gender egalitarian occupations. The gender wage gap and physical attractiveness wage gaps appear to be larger than they are in female-dominated occupations, but smaller than in male-dominated occupations. There also seems to be a much more notable leap in the median incomes earned by respondents of average attractiveness relative to their attractive counterparts. Finally, for the first time, the median incomes do not increase in a perfectly ordinal fashion among women within these professions – since very attractive women actually earn less than attractive women.

Table 15 provides data about how the returns to attractiveness within gender egalitarian dominated occupations jointly vary as a group relative to all other types of occupations. These analyses are again also conducted separately for male respondents (Table 16) and for female respondents who worked in gender egalitarian occupations (Table 17).

Table 15

TABLE 15 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: GENDER EGALITARIAN OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive	**-.121**** (.040)	**-.076*** (.038)	**-.025** (.041)
Attractive	**.116***** (.021)	**.085***** (.020)	**.006** (.023)
Very Attractive	**.194***** (.035)	**.161***** (.033)	**.029** (.039)
JOB 45% -55% FEMALE	**-.344***** (.042)	**-.309***** (.040)	**-.300***** (.040)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB 45% - 55% Female (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive	**-.040** (.133)	**.006** (.126)	**.048** (.126)
Attractive	**.241***** (.066)	**.237***** (.062)	**.237***** (.062)
Very Attractive	**.249*** (.109)	**.248*** (.103)	**.228*** (.103)
SEX		**-.394***** (.017)	**-.349***** (.024)
AGE		**.040***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.153***** (.018)	**.139***** (.018)
RACE (*White omitted)*			
Latino		**-.001** (.029)	**-.011** (.03)
Black		**-.150***** (.026)	**-.164***** (.026)
Native American		**-.128*** (.054)	**-.123*** (.054)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.047** (.039)	**.058** (.04)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)			
Less Than High School		**-.281***** (.039)	**-.258***** (.039)
Some College/Trade School		**.147***** (.026)	**.116***** (.026)
Finished Trade School		**.158***** (.040)	**.129***** (.039)
College Graduate		**.523***** (.029)	**.464***** (.030)
More Than College		**.553***** (.033)	**.492***** (.034)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.010** (.046)
Attractive			**.059**** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.050** (.033)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed			**-.277***** (.043)
Well Groomed			**.146***** (.022)
Very Well Groomed			**.242***** (.037)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*			
Overweight			**.069***** (.021)
Obese I			**.073***** (.021)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.58***	9.26***	8.63***
R-SQUARED	.0918	.1848	.1952
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*			

Table 15 expresses that the returns to attractiveness generated by the Add Health respondents who worked within gender egalitarian professions did differ significantly from the returns generated by respondents who did not work in these professions. The coefficients for attractive and very attractive respondents in gender egalitarian jobs were respectively 26.7% greater (p=.000) and 25.6% greater (p=.026) than those generated by their counterparts who worked in other types of jobs. An F test reported that the overall interaction effect was highly significant (p=.001), which further confirms that the attractiveness penalties and premia as a group do jointly vary between gender egalitarian occupations and other types of occupational gender distributions.

In addition, unattractive respondents within gender egalitarian occupations did not earn significantly less than the respondents within these jobs that were ranked as average attractiveness (p=.815). However, compared to respondents of average attractiveness who worked within gender egalitarian jobs, attractive respondents within these professions earned 27.5% more (p=.000) whereas very attractive respondents earned 29.3% more (p=.011). These results offer the first empirical evidence that attractiveness penalties and premia are significantly shaped by the gender distributions within occupations. Therefore, these results not only offer additional evidence that gender distributions within an occupation can shape the returns to attractiveness, but they also some support for the contention that beauty premia would be the most pronounced within these occupations (which will be discussed in greater detail later in reference to Hypothesis 5).

Table 16

TABLE 16 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: MEN IN GENDER EGALITARIAN OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**-.171** (.054)	**-.132**** (.053)	**-.125*** (.053)	**-.108*** (.052)	**-.102** (.055)	**-.047** (.056)	**-.061** (.057)
Attractive	**.125***** (.029)	**.115***** (.029)	**.124***** (.029)	**.08**** (.028)	**.042** (.030)	**.015** (.031)	**.012** (.031)
Very Attractive	**.292***** (.052)	**.321***** (.051)	**.342***** (.050)	**.272***** (.050)	**.218***** (.055)	**.158**** (.056)	**.145***** (.057)
JOB 45% - 55% FEMALE	**-.450***** (.053)	**-.410***** (.053)	**-.388***** (.053)	**-.371***** (.050)	**-.368***** (.050)	**-.366***** (.050)	**-.347***** (.050)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB 45 % - 55% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**-.175** (.193)	**-.177** (.189)	**-.195** (.188)	**-.228** (.185)	**-.226** (.185)	**-.210** (.184)	**-.260** (.189)
Attractive	**.281***** (.087)	**.270**** (.086)	**.270**** (.085)	**.267***** (.084)	**.263***** (.084)	**.268***** (.083)	**.253**** (.083)
Very Attractive	**.380*** (.159)	**.313*** (.156)	**.325*** (.155)	**.296** (.153)	**.289** (.153)	**.290** (.152)	**.267** (.151)
AGE		**.025***** (.007)	**.025***** (.007)	**.027***** (.007)	**.027***** (.007)	**.028***** (.007)	**.030***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.347***** (.025)	**.324***** (.025)	**.328***** (.024)	**.327***** (.024)	**.317***** (.024)	**.300***** (.024)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.116**** (.040)	**-.050** (.040)	**-.052** (.040)	**-.066** (.040)	**-.059** (.040)
Black			**-.331***** (.036)	**-.282***** (.036)	**-.28***** (.036)	**-.288***** (.036)	**-.288***** (.036)
Native American			**-.222**** (.076)	**-.171*** (.075)	**-.173*** (.075)	**-.170*** (.075)	**-.182*** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.091** (.054)	**.041** (.053)	**.038** (.053)	**.029** (.053)	**.05** (.054)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.229***** (.048)	**-.228***** (.048)	**-.213***** (.048)	**-.215***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.106***** (.033)	**.099**** (.033)	**.076**** (.033)	**.059** (.033)
Finished Trade School				**.171**** (.055)	**.165**** (.055)	**.148**** (.054)	**.130**** (.054)
College Graduate				**.410***** (.039)	**.400***** (.039)	**.362***** (.040)	**.341***** (.040)
More Than College				**.300***** (.048)	**.290***** (.048)	**.243***** (.048)	**.218***** (.048)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**-.006** (.063)	**.019** (.063)	**.024** (.063)
Attractive					**.089**** (.029)	**.069*** (.030)	**.077*** (.030)
Very Attractive					**.111*** (.047)	**.067** (.047)	**.068** (.048)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed						**-.285***** (.056)	**-.285***** (.056)
Well Groomed						**.077**** (.03)	**.078**** (.03)
Very Well Groomed						**.190***** (.053)	**.202***** (.053)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*							
Overweight							**.096***** (.029)
Obese I							**.133***** (.029)
HEIGHT							**.012**** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.67***	9.79***	9.84***	9.60***	9.57***	9.60***	8.62***
R-SQUARED	.1358	.1688	.1828	.2105	.2120	.2180	.2220
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

Table 16 displays that the returns to attractiveness generated by male respondents who worked within gender egalitarian professions did differ significantly from the returns generated by the male respondents who did not work in these professions. The coefficients for attractive and very attractive male respondents in gender egalitarian jobs were respectively 28.8% greater (p=.002) and 30.6% greater (p=.077) than those generated by their counterparts who worked in other types of jobs. An F test found that the overall interaction effect was highly significant (p=.002), which offers more support for the notion that the attractiveness penalties and premia as a group do vary between men within gender egalitarian occupations and men within other occupations. Furthermore, unattractive men within gender egalitarian occupations earned only marginally less than the respondents within these jobs that were ranked as average in attractiveness (p=.081), while their attractive and very attractive counterparts respectively earned 30.3% more (p=.001) and 51% more (p=.005).

One of the most striking conclusions provided by these analyses was that employment within sex-segregated occupations did not have much of an impact on men's labor market returns to physical attractiveness. Tables 10, 13, and 16 also demonstrate that attractive and very attractive male respondents in male-dominated (Table 10), female-dominated (Table 13), and gender egalitarian occupations (Table 16) never earned significantly less than men of average attractiveness. Thus, the data supports Hypothesis 3, which surmised that *attractive and very attractive men would always earn more than men who were characterized as average in attractiveness.* Conclusively, the Beauty is Beastly Effect only appears to negatively impact the beauty premia generated by women within male-dominated jobs. This further challenges the claim that attractiveness can similarly be a liability among good looking men who work within male-typed occupations (Spencer and Taylor 1988).

Table 17

TABLE 17 - RETURNS TO PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS: WOMEN IN GENDER EGALITARIAN OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**-.043** (.056)	**-.036** (.056)	**-.038** (.055)	**-.043** (.053)	**-.027** (.057)	**.007** (.058)	**.025** (.059)
Attractive	**.175***** (.03)	**.174***** (.03)	**.171***** (.03)	**.099***** (.029)	**.066*** (.031)	**-.006** (.032)	**-.018** (.033)
Very Attractive	**.246***** (.047)	**.255***** (.047)	**.250***** (.047)	**.142**** (.045)	**.097*** (.049)	**-.035** (.052)	**-.048** (.054)
JOB 45% - 55%	**-.270***** (.064)	**-.270***** (.064)	**-.274***** (.064)	**-.213***** (.061)	**-.214***** (.061)	**-.204***** (.061)	**-.206***** (.061)
ATTRACTIVENESS x JOB 45% - 55% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive	**.129** (.173)	**.135** (.173)	**.151** (.173)	**.149** (.166)	**.149** (.165)	**.173** (.165)	**.181** (.17)
Attractive	**.190*** (.095)	**.193*** (.095)	**.201*** (.095)	**.182*** (.091)	**.186*** (.091)	**.180*** (.090)	**.208*** (.092)
Very Attractive	**.078** (.145)	**.098** (.144)	**.102** (.144)	**.083** (.138)	**.078** (.138)	**.074** (.137)	**.099** (.141)
AGE		**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.009** (.026)	**-.006** (.026)	**-.002** (.026)	**-.004** (.025)	**-.009** (.025)	**-.013** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.078** (.044)	**.035** (.042)	**.035** (.042)	**.022** (.042)	**.027** (.043)
Black			**-.128***** (.037)	**-.077*** (.036)	**-.075*** (.036)	**-.081*** (.036)	**-.076*** (.036)
Native American			**-.191*** (.080)	**-.104** (.076)	**-.098** (.076)	**-.090** (.076)	**-.115** (.077)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.121*** (.060)	**.108** (.058)	**.110** (.058)	**.098** (.057)	**.099** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.371***** (.064)	**-.366***** (.064)	**-.348***** (.064)	**-.349***** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.198***** (.039)	**.193***** (.039)	**.173***** (.039)	**.178***** (.039)
Finished Trade School				**.167**** (.057)	**.165**** (.057)	**.137*** (.057)	**.140*** (.057)
College Graduate				**.654***** (.044)	**.644***** (.044)	**.595***** (.044)	**.596***** (.044)
More Than College				**.744***** (.047)	**.735***** (.047)	**.677***** (.047)	**.678***** (.048)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**-.022** (.067)	**-.069** (.067)	**-.071** (.068)
Attractive					**.082**** (.031)	**.039** (.031)	**.047** (.031)
Very Attractive					**.101*** (.044)	**.024** (.045)	**.028** (.046)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed						**-.266***** (.067)	**-.274***** (.067)
Well Groomed						**.212***** (.031)	**.214***** (.031)
Very Well Groomed						**.295***** (.051)	**.296***** (.051)
BMI (Normal omitted)							
Overweight							**.045** (.031)
Obese							**.020** (.030)
HEIGHT							**.003** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.45***	8.96***	8.99***	8.57****	8.58***	8.62***	8.49***
R-SQUARED	.1152	.1220	.1254	.1990	.2001	.2103	.2116
*p= .05** *p= .01*** *p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

The returns to attractiveness earned by female respondents who worked within gender egalitarian professions did somewhat differ from the returns generated by the female respondents who did not work in these professions. Although an F Test found that the overall interaction effect was not significant (p=.115), the coefficient for attractive female respondents in gender egalitarian jobs was 23.1% greater (p=.024) than the coefficient for attractive women who worked in other types of jobs. Additional F Tests confirmed that attractive women within gender egalitarian occupations also earned 20.9% more than the respondents within these jobs that were ranked as average in attractiveness (p=.034).


Tables 15, 16, and 17 also offered support for Hypothesis 4, which anticipated that *no attractiveness penalties would be identified within gender-egalitarian jobs, and that attractive and very attractive respondents would earn more than their average counterparts.* Indeed, Table 15 shows that attractive and very attractive respondents in gender egalitarian jobs earned significantly more than respondents of average attractiveness who worked in gender egalitarian jobs. In addition, the payoff for being attractive or very attractive was also roughly 26% higher in gender egalitarian occupations relative to other occupations. Interestingly, gender egalitarian professions were the only occupational context examined which offered some significant attractiveness premia for both men and women.

However, Table 16 and Table 17 replicated these analyses separately by gender in order to confirm that women within gender egalitarian occupations were not subjected to any attractiveness penalties. Furthermore, we can see in Table 17 that the penalties experienced by unattractive women and very attractive women within male-dominated occupations, and the lower payoff for attractiveness experienced by women in female-dominated occupations are not evident in occupations with roughly equal percentages of female and male workers.

Finally, the analyses represented in Tables 9 through 17 provide strong support for Hypothesis 5, which posited that *attractiveness penalties and premia would significantly vary across the different types of occupational gender distributions*. Indeed, the returns to attractiveness among all respondents significantly differed between gender egalitarian jobs and all other occupations (p=.009), whereas the returns for women within male-dominated jobs also marginally differed from those of women within all other occupations (p=.060). However, there was even stronger evidence that the returns to attractiveness vary *within* these different types of occupational contexts as well – such as the finding that unattractive women and very attractive women within male-dominated jobs earned less than women within male-dominated jobs who were ranked as average in attractiveness.

Figure 4 below portrays the returns to attractiveness earned by male and female respondents within male-dominated, gender egalitarian, and female-dominated occupations (when all control variables are accounted for). These values represent the percentage differences in earnings for each attractiveness level, relative to their counterparts within the same occupational gender distribution that were deemed as "average" in physical attractiveness.

Figure 4



* p<.1
**p<.05
***p<.01
**** p<.001

Figure 4 underscores the key claim that the returns to attractiveness differ not only by the gender of the worker, but by the gender of the job. It also shows that women are penalized the most severely on the basis of attractiveness within male-dominated occupations – a pattern which does not extend to men. It is also interesting that the only notable beauty premium generated within female-dominated jobs was accrued by very attractive men (p=.074), which is reflective of the contention that men uniquely enjoy some advantages within feminized occupations (Williams 1992). Finally, these graphs clearly demonstrate that both male and female respondents earned the greatest beauty premia within gender egalitarian occupations.

DISCUSSION

The analyses in Chapter 3 build on prior research by examining the relationship between attractiveness, income, gender, and occupational gender distributions using a nationally-representative sample. The critical take-away finding was that occupational gender distributions can significantly shape the labor market returns to attractiveness - especially for women. The returns to attractiveness vary more among women both *between* the three occupational gender distributions, as well as *within* them. This result is particularly crucial, considering that the analyses in Chapter 2 found that there were no significant differences in the beauty premia generated by men and by women. In sum, one's personal gender identity does not significantly influence the returns to attractiveness, but the same cannot be said for the interaction between their personal gender and their occupational gender. These results also contribute more broadly to the literatures on the Beauty Effect, the Beauty is Beastly Effect, negativity bias, trait salience, sex-segregated jobs, and gender inequality.

While occupational gender distributions generally impact the returns to attractiveness, the contexts of occupational sex-segregation shape two very different forms of attractiveness penalties. Both penalties applied solely to women within male-dominated occupations, and they operated in completely opposing fashions by impeding the earnings of both unattractive and very attractive women. Therefore, the Beauty is Beastly Effect is not only evident within *male-typed* jobs (as suggested by a wide-range of scholarship), but this study also suggests that it exists within *male-dominated* jobs as well.

It is compelling in itself that significant attractiveness penalties were found only in male-dominated jobs, which have historically held a central role in the literature on gender inequality and occupations. However, there was also some evidence that the premia for being attractive was less prominent within female-dominated jobs. Hence, different contexts of occupational sex-segregation uniquely impact the returns to attractiveness among women. These findings are even more striking when we recall that men were never significantly penalized for being good looking, and that occupational gender distributions have less of an impact on men's returns to attractiveness both relative to their peers as well as to their counterparts within other types of jobs. Indeed, male respondents were never disadvantaged for being attractiveness, even in female-dominated jobs where their gender theoretically should have been a salient trait that was susceptible to discrimination. This finding further suggests that men are not as vulnerable to attractiveness-related biases and penalties (Heilman and Stopeck 1985), and that men are relatively advantaged in both male-dominated and female-dominated jobs (Williams 1992). It also challenges the claim that the Beauty is Beastly Effect adversely impacts men within the workplace (Spencer and Taylor 1988).

The results generally support four out of the five hypotheses, with the exception of Hypothesis 2, which anticipated that attractive and very attractive women in female-dominated jobs would earn less than their average counterparts. Although attractive women and very attractive women within female-dominated jobs did earn roughly 3% less than women within female-dominated jobs who were ranked as average, these differences were far from significant. However, the payoff for being attractive was lower for women within female-dominated occupations relative to other occupations – yet a substantial portion of this difference can be attributed to differences in educational attainment.

Historically, the Beauty is Beastly Effect has been examined in the contexts of male-typed occupations or specific positions, but no studies to date have examined how the gender distributions of workers within a given occupation facilitates the Beauty as Beastly Effect. Prior research has asserted that the sex roles associated with the majority sex within an occupation become incorporated into the work roles (Gutek and Cohen 1987), and that attractive women are negatively impacted in male-typed occupations (Cash et al. 1977, Heilman and Saruwatari 1979, Heilman and Stopeck 1985, Johnson et al. 2010) due to heightened perceptions about their lack of fit (Heilman 1983). Therefore, it is not surprising that the results indicate that if occupational sex-segregation in any way triggers the Beauty is Beastly Effect, it is within male-dominated jobs rather than in female-dominated jobs. What remains unclear is the degree to which the Beauty is Beastly Effect can be attributed to gender discrimination, perceptions of lack of fit, productivity differences, or the relative importance of attractiveness within the occupation at hand. Indeed, some preliminary analyses suggest that attractiveness may matter less in the types of professions that were male-dominated, because interacting with clients is not a key requirement in many of these positions.

These findings also elaborate on how occupational contexts can influence the directionality of the attractiveness bias. The results in Chapter 2 suggest that generally, the relationship between physical attractiveness and earnings within the U.S. labor market is bidirectional, meaning that "what is unattractive is bad," and that "what is beautiful is good." Conversely, we see that for women who work within male-dominated jobs, the disadvantages associated with unattractiveness may actually outweigh the rewards linked with attractiveness, since these women were also penalized for being very attractive.

In terms of broader implications, the two attractiveness-related penalties within male-dominated jobs were not detected in other occupations. As hypothesized, no attractiveness-related penalties were detected in jobs with a roughly equal representation of female workers, but these professions also offered significant beauty premia for both men and women. This finding further supports the contention that the saliency of sex as a characteristic is a situational factor that can impact the biased consequences of sex stereotypes in the workplace more generally, as well as the labor market returns to attractiveness specifically.

There are two explanations as to why gender egalitarian jobs may mediate negative stereotypes about women's attractiveness and other work-related attributes. On a more micro-level, gender egalitarian workplaces can reduce the probability that sex is singled out as the critical inferential reference point by directly decreasing the salience of sex as a characteristic and by indirectly increasing the salience of other aspects of the individual (Heilman 1980). In other words, women working in token or near-token conditions, are judged in a more negative and stereotypic manner. On a broader macro-level, gender egalitarian jobs can carry serious implications because the sex roles associated with the majority sex become incorporated into the work roles (Gutek and Cohen 1987). In this sense, gender egalitarian workplaces offer

unique leverage for dispelling some of the longstanding perceptions and outcomes which have been based on the logic that certain jobs are or ought to be reserved for men and for women (Bielby and Baron 1986). Indeed, when there is no longer a majority sex within an occupation, the work roles may no longer be perceived in ways which are explicitly gendered.

In conclusion, the gender distribution of an occupation can shape the returns to attractiveness in highly complex ways. These results underscore the notion that among women within sex-segregated occupations, attractiveness can function as a double-edged sword (Heilman and Saruwatari 1979) – and therefore, it serves as another example of a double bind that women face as a result of gender oppression (Frye 1983, Ridgeway 2011). Because both attractiveness and unattractiveness may be either an asset or a liability, women within sex-segregated occupations appear to generate the greatest rewards for averageness or plainness. The data indicates that one potential antidote to these attractiveness-related penalties appears to be the implementation of more equal representations of men and women within an occupation in order to eradicate sexist organizational logics and to increase the salience of other individual traits unrelated to gender.

CHAPTER 4:

The Returns to Grooming & Occupational Gender Distributions

Chapter 4 Overview

In order to extend on the findings from the previous two chapters, Chapter 4 offers analyses which examine how the returns to grooming differ according to the gender identity of the individual respondent in addition to the gender distribution of workers within their occupation. After elaborating on how occupational gender distributions may impact the returns to grooming among men and women, the Results section describes the gender differences within the grooming-related penalties and premia across male-dominated, female-dominated, and gender egalitarian occupations. Although working in sex-segregated occupations predominantly impacted the returns to attractiveness for women, occupational gender distributions shape the returns to grooming in much more complex ways. Rather, the results indicate that the returns for being very well groomed men were significantly diminished in both male-dominated and female-dominated occupations. Furthermore, it appears that the men's returns to grooming differ more *between* the three occupational contexts, whereas the women's returns to grooming differ more *within* each occupational context. Chapter 4 concludes with the Discussion section, which summarizes the results, along with their explanations and implications.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The analyses conducted in Chapter 2 determined that the physical attractiveness of American workers significantly impacts their earnings, and that these labor market returns depend most heavily on grooming. Although grooming was a primary determinant of attractiveness among both male and female respondents, it was also ascertained that the returns to grooming were significantly greater for women. Furthermore, the returns to physical attractiveness may have not significantly differed by gender, but more detailed examinations in Chapter 3 concluded that this may be because the gender of a respondent's occupation could be more important than their personal gender.

Since grooming is so deeply tied to physical attractiveness, and because the returns to grooming were determined to significantly differ by gender, I replicated the analyses conducted in Chapter 3 in order to examine how occupational gender distributions shape the labor market returns to grooming. Following the logics and empirical findings from prior studies - including those from the previous chapter - I propose several similar hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Very well groomed women who work in male-dominated occupations will earn less than their counterparts who are characterized as average in grooming.

Hypothesis 2: Very well groomed women who work in female-dominated occupations will earn less than women who are ranked as average in grooming.

These first two hypotheses are designed to assess whether the Beauty is Beastly Effect extends itself to dimensions related to grooming, and whether this phenomenon exists in both contexts of occupational sex-segregation.

Hypothesis 3: Well groomed or very well groomed men will always earn more than men who are characterized as average in grooming. This hypothesis is consistent with the notion that higher levels of attractiveness or grooming may be "beastly" within certain occupational contexts, but that this effect should only impede the earnings of female respondents.

Hypothesis 4: No significant grooming-related penalties will be identified within gender-egalitarian occupations, and well groomed and very well groomed respondents within these professions will earn more than their average counterparts.

Hypothesis 5: As a group, the penalties and premia associated with grooming will significantly vary across the different types of occupational gender distributions.

Since grooming had a greater impact on earnings than physical attractiveness itself, and because its labor market returns to grooming were found to be explicitly gendered, I offer *Hypothesis 6: the penalties and premia associated with grooming will vary across different types of occupational gender distributions to a greater extent than the penalties and premia associated with physical attractiveness.*

METHODOLOGY

Data

These analyses utilize the same dataset and variables that were outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The main independent variable is the respondent's physical attractiveness level, which was rated by Add Health interviewers. The key dependent variable is the natural log of the respondent's self-reported personal income. The control variables include gender, age, marital status, race, educational attainment, personality attractiveness, grooming, BMI classification, and height. Interviewer fixed effects were also included in the models. Finally, these analyses include a variable for the gender distribution of the respondent's job, which was created by merging the SOC code of their occupation with national data from the 2000 U.S. Census. For more information on why these variables were used and how they were measured, please see the Data sections from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

Tables 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, and 25 also include a control variable for the respondent's sexual orientation because of perceptions and biases which code well groomed men as gay – a phenomenon which will be discussed in greater detail throughout this Chapter. The measure for sexual orientation was obtained from a Wave IV survey item where respondents were asked to "choose the description that best fits how you think about yourself." The categories included "100% heterosexual," "mostly heterosexual, but somewhat attracted to the same sex," "bisexual, attracted to men and women equally," "mostly homosexual, but somewhat attracted to the opposite sex," "100% homosexual," or "not sexually attracted to either male or females." For the purposes of this study, the category for "not sexually attracted to either male or females" was omitted from analyses due to insufficient sample size (0.22%), while

the categories for "mostly heterosexual," "bisexual," and "mostly homosexual" were collapsed into a single group ("bisexual/sexually fluid"). Therefore, the six categories were limited to three categories for whether the respondent identified as heterosexual (86.52%), bisexual/sexually fluid (11.2%), or gay/lesbian (2.28%).

Methods

This study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model the relationship between physical attractiveness level and earnings by estimating the equation:

$$y_i = X_{ki}\beta_k + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_i$$


In this regression equation, y_i represents logged income for respondent, ***i,*** X_{ki} are the ***k*** independent variables – including dummy variables for attractiveness and other control variables as applicable – and α_j represent the fixed effects for the ***j*** interviewers.

RESULTS

The Returns to Grooming in Male-Dominated Occupations

Focusing on Add Health respondents employed within male-dominated occupations, Figure 5 below provides information about the median earnings according to gender and to grooming level.

Figure 5



Similar to the returns to attractiveness within male-dominated jobs, the median incomes increase in a perfect ordinal fashion as grooming level increases. However, the income penalty for being poorly groomed appears to be more pronounced for women, whereas the earnings of men and women who are well groomed or very well groomed seem much more similar. Overall, these returns do not differ much from the returns to attractiveness within male-dominated occupations, which were depicted in Figure 2.

However, Tables 18 through 20 below offer more thorough representations of how male-dominated jobs shape the returns to grooming. Table 18 depicts how the returns to grooming within male-dominated jobs vary relative to all other occupational gender distributions, whereas Table 19 and Table 20 respectively reflect these analyses separately by gender. The regression tables which analyze these models separately by gender are also

expanded across more models (rather than the three models shown in the aggregated tables) in order to offer a more precise view of how certain variables shape the returns to grooming. Therefore, Table 19 depicts the returns to grooming for men who work within in male-dominated occupations, whereas Table 20 portrays the returns to grooming for women who work within male-dominated occupations.

Table 18

TABLE 18 - RETURNS TO GROOMING: MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed	**-.430***** (.052)	**-.328***** (.050)	**-.319***** (.051)
Well Groomed	**.263***** (.023)	**.193***** (.022)	**.171***** (.024)
Very Well Groomed	**.439***** (.036)	**.318***** (.035)	**.290***** (.039)
JOB < 25% FEMALE	**.351***** (.028)	**.279***** (.028)	**.275***** (.028)
GROOMING x JOB < 25% Female (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed	**.064** (.090)	**.087** (.086)	**.101** (.086)
Well Groomed	**-.054** (.045)	**-.075** (.043)	**-.077** (.043)
Very Well Groomed	**-.193*** (.078)	**-.223**** (.078)	**-.228**** (.078)
SEX		**-.309***** (.019)	**-.251***** (.025)
AGE		**.040***** (.005)	**.039***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.141***** (.018)	**.130***** (.018)
RACE (*White omitted)*			
Latino		**-.013** (.029)	**-.011** (.029)
Black		**-.152***** (.025)	**-.164***** (.025)
Native American		**-.123*** (.054)	**-.125*** (.054)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.049** (.039)	**.067** (.040)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)			
Less Than High School		**.275***** (.039)	**.267***** (.039)
Some College/Trade School		**.150***** (.026)	**.148***** (.026)
Finished Trade School		**.151***** (.039)	**.150***** (.039)
College Graduate		**.520***** (.030)	**.514***** (.030)
More Than College		**.548***** (.034)	**.545***** (.034)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.011** (.039)
Attractive			**.025** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.043** (.037)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.015** (.046)
Attractive			**.059**** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.050** (.033)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*			
Overweight			**.071***** (.021)
Obese I			**.080***** (.021)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)
SEXUAL ORIENTATION *(Heterosexual omitted)*			
Bisexual/Sexually Fluid			**-.089***** (.026)
Gay			**-.071** (.056)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.48***	9.17***	8.54***
R-SQUARED	.1200	.1969	.2003
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*			

The returns to grooming generated by respondents who worked within male-dominated occupations significantly differed from to the returns earned by respondents who did not work within male-dominated occupations. An F Test indicated that the overall interaction effect was significant (p=.004), which further confirms that the returns to grooming within male-dominated occupations do jointly vary from the returns to grooming within occupations that are not male-dominated. More specifically, the payoff for being well groomed was 7.4% less (p=.072) in male-dominated occupations than in all other occupations, whereas the payoff for being very well groomed was 20.4% less (p=.002).

Supplemental F Tests suggest that respondents employed within male-dominated jobs also experienced some rewards and penalties associated with grooming relative to their peers. Compared to respondents within male-dominated occupations that were characterized as average in grooming, well groomed respondents earned 9.9% more (p=.017), whereas poorly groomed respondents within male-dominated occupations earned 19.6% less (p=.003). Despite differences within their median earnings – as depicted in Figure 5 - very well groomed respondents within male-dominated occupations did not earn significantly more than their average counterparts (p=.386). However, Table 19 and Table 20 below demonstrate that these differences in the returns to grooming both between and within occupations are being largely driven by male respondents.

Table 19

TABLE 19 - RETURNS TO GROOMING: MEN IN MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*								
Poorly Groomed	**-.486***** (.079)	**-.420***** (.077)	**-.421***** (.077)	**-.376***** (.076)	**-.348***** (.077)	**-.343***** (.077)	**-.359***** (.077)	**-.358***** (.077)
Well Groomed	**.242***** (.037)	**.231***** (.036)	**.236***** (.037)	**.167***** (.036)	**.136***** (.037)	**.120**** (.038)	**.122**** (.038)	**.120**** (.037)
Very Well Groomed	**.468***** (.058)	**.466***** (.057)	**.482***** (.057)	**.376***** (.057)	**.300***** (.060)	**.283***** (.061)	**.287***** (.061)	**.277***** (.061)
JOB < 25% FEMALE	**.182***** (.033)	**.152***** (.033)	**.152***** (.032)	**.219***** (.032)	**.214***** (.032)	**.214***** (.032)	**.209***** (.032)	**.207***** (.032)
GROOMING x JOB < 25% Female *(Average omitted)*								
Poorly Groomed	**.085** (.108)	**.047** (.106)	**.057** (.106)	**.102** (.104)	**.104** (.104)	**.098** (.104)	**.124** (.104)	**.124** (.103)
Well Groomed	**-.077** (.054)	**-.085** (.053)	**-.086** (.052)	**-.084** (.052)	**-.080** (.052)	**-.080** (.052)	**-.080** (.051)	**-.079** (.052)
Very Well Groomed	**-.195*** (.094)	**-.202*** (.093)	**-.208*** (.092)	**-.219*** (.091)	**-.202*** (.091)	**-.200*** (.091)	**-.196*** (.090)	**-.192*** (.091)
AGE		**.029***** (.007)	**.029***** (.007)	**.030***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.030***** (.007)	**.030***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.327***** (.025)	**.304***** (.025)	**.307***** (.024)	**.307***** (.024)	**.308***** (.024)	**.293***** (.025)	**.289***** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*								
Latino			**-.127**** (.040)	**-.061** (.040)	**-.063** (.040)	**-.063** (.041)	**-.058** (.041)	**-.061** (.040)
Black			**-.334***** (.036)	**-.281***** (.036)	**-.286***** (.036)	**-.284***** (.036)	**-.284***** (.036)	**-.288***** (.036)
Native American			**-.224**** (.077)	**-.176*** (.075)	**-.180*** (.075)	**-.181*** (.075)	**-.182*** (.075)	**-.183*** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.075** (.053)	**.041** (.053)	**.048** (.053)	**.046** (.053)	**.072** (.054)	**.063** (.054)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)								
Less Than High School				**-.239***** (.048)	**-.236***** (.048)	**-.236***** (.048)	**-.229***** (.048)	**-.228***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.094**** (.033)	**.095***** (.033)	**.091**** (.034)	**.088**** (.034)	**.090**** (.034)
Finished Trade School				**.142**** (.054)	**.145**** (.054)	**.142**** (.054)	**.142**** (.054)	**.142**** (.054)
College Graduate				**.406***** (.040)	**.402***** (.040)	**.398***** (.040)	**.394***** (.040)	**.400***** (.040)
More Than College				**.298***** (.049)	**.293***** (.049)	**.288***** (.049)	**.286***** (.049)	**.292***** (.049)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*								
Unattractive					**-.058** (.053)	**-.060** (.055)	**-.066** (.055)	**-.065** (.055)
Attractive					**.056*** (.028)	**.030** (.030)	**.033** (.030)	**.033** (.030)
Very Attractive					**.196***** (.051)	**.169**** (.054)	**.166**** (.055)	**.164**** (.055)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*								
Unattractive						**.022** (.064)	**.027** (.063)	**.028** (.063)
Attractive						**.080**** (.030)	**.078**** (.030)	**.077**** (.030)
Very Attractive						**.075** (.048)	**.071** (.048)	**.073** (.048)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*								
Overweight							**.099***** (.029)	**.095***** (.029)
Obese I							**.141***** (.029)	**.138***** (.029)
HEIGHT							**.012**** (.004)	**.011**** (.004)
SEXUAL ORIENTATION *(Heterosexual omitted)*								
Bisexual/Sexually Fluid								**-.222***** (.058)
Gay								**.011** (.073)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.58***	9.60***	9.66***	9.43***	9.40***	9.37***	8.48***	8.52***
R-SQUARED	.1430	.1739	.1884	.2144	.2169	.2179	.2221	.2241
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*								

The returns to grooming generated by male respondents who worked within male-dominated occupations do jointly differ from to the returns earned by male respondents who worked in other occupations, as indicated by an F Test (p=.039). The most prominent difference is that the payoff for being very well groomed was 17.5% less in male-dominated occupations than in it was in occupations that were not male-dominated (p=.034).

Supplemental F Tests also convey that male respondents employed within male-dominated occupations accrued some rewards and penalties associated with grooming relative to their peers. Compared to male respondents within male-dominated occupations that were characterized as average in grooming, very well groomed respondents earned 8.9% more (p=.034), whereas poorly groomed respondents within male-dominated occupations earned 20.9% less (p=.002). In sum, poorly groomed males within male-dominated occupations experienced significant income penalties compared to men who groomed themselves to an average extent, whereas very well groomed males earned a notable premium. The penalty for being poorly groomed was more than twice as much as the premium for being very well groomed. However, this premium that men generate for being very well groomed is considerably lower in male-dominated occupations than it is in other occupations.

Since prior research has confirmed that the time spent on grooming has a large positive effect on men's earnings (Das and Loach 2011) and that male-dominated jobs tend to pay the most (England 2010), it makes sense intuitively why poorly groomed men in these professions may experience significant income penalties. Yet, it is peculiar that the payoff for being very well groomed is substantially lower in jobs where the employees tend to earn the most. However, organizations that are comprised mainly of males not only have a long history of excluding women, but they have also been particularly homophobic (Burrell 1984).

Furthermore, men who engage in a fair share of beauty work are often stereotyped as effeminate or gay (Edwards 2003, Hall et al. 2012) – so either of these labels could be especially detrimental to men who work within male-dominated occupations.

For these reasons, a control for sexual orientation was included in Model 8 in order to assess whether the diminished returns for being very well groomed within male-dominated jobs could be attributed to homophobia. Since the various grooming coefficients in Model 7 and Model 8 were virtually identical, very well groomed males are not necessarily penalized on the basis of their actual sexual orientation – although they may be discriminated against on the basis of perceptions about their sexual orientation or their gender expression. However, the data does show that bisexual/sexually fluid males earn 19.9% less (p=.000) than heterosexual males, whereas gay males generally earn 1.1% more, although this difference is insignificant (p=.879). These results are consistent with claims that the wage gaps related to sexual orientation are more severe for bisexual men than for gay men (Carpenter 2005).

In sum, sexism and homophobia may be rampant in male-dominated jobs, but these ideals do not appear to impede the earnings of very well groomed men in these professions. Arguably, a neoclassical time-use perspective may be more suitable for framing this finding, because it would posit that men within male-dominated jobs may benefit from grooming less, because their time spent grooming is effortful and/or unproductive. Since these men occupy professions that offer higher earnings and prestige, preening may be counterproductive and thus negatively impact their earnings because they should have less time for non-market activities due to the high opportunity cost of their time (Becker 1965, Das and Loach 2011).

Interestingly, the returns to grooming varied much less for women who worked within male-dominated professions, as depicted below in Table 20.

Table 20

TABLE 20 – RETURNS TO GROOMING: WOMEN IN MALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**-.380*** ** (.069)	**-.382*** ** (.069)	**-.374*** ** (.069)	**-.269*** ** (.067)	**-.274*** ** (.069)	**-.270*** ** (.069)	**-.272*** ** (.069)
Well Groomed	**.323*** ** (.030)	**.319*** ** (.030)	**.317*** ** (.030)	**.217*** ** (.029)	**.217*** ** (.031)	**.210*** ** (.032)	**.213*** ** (.032)
Very Well Groomed	**.464*** ** (.047)	**.466*** ** (.047)	**.469*** ** (.047)	**.291*** ** (.046)	**.302*** ** (.051)	**.303*** ** (.052)	**.307*** ** (.052)
JOB < 25% FEMALE	**.159* ** (.078)	**.152* ** (.078)	**.156* ** (.078)	**.206** ** (.075)	**.207** ** (.075)	**.208** ** (.075)	**.205** ** (.075)
GROOMING x JOB < 25% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**-.166** (.259)	**-.178** (.258)	**-.181** (.258)	**-.074** (.248)	**-.074** (.248)	**-.081** (.248)	**-.080** (.248)
Well Groomed	**.117** (.122)	**.123** (.122)	**.111** (.121)	**.111** (.117)	**.110** (.117)	**.113** (.117)	**.117** (.117)
Very Well Groomed	**-.082** (.176)	**-.077** (.176)	**-.088** (.175)	**-.142** (.169)	**-.141** (.169)	**-.144** (.169)	**-.148** (.169)
AGE		**.050*** ** (.007)	**.050*** ** (.007)	**.050*** ** (.007)	**.050*** ** (.007)	**.049*** ** (.007)	**.049*** ** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**-.001** (.026)	**-.016** (.026)	**-.008** (.026)	**-.008** (.025)	**-.008** (.025)	**-.009** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.071** (.044)	**.032** (.043)	**.032** (.042)	**.031** (.042)	**.032** (.042)
Black			**-.122*** ** (.038)	**-.070* ** (.036)	**-.071* ** (.036)	**-.070* ** (.036)	**-.075* ** (.037)
Native American			**-.182* ** (.080)	**-.115** (.080)	**-.116** (.077)	**-.114** (.077)	**-.117** (.077)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.100** (.060)	**.086** (.060)	**.085** (.058)	**.086** (.058)	**.093** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.348*** ** (.064)	**-.348*** ** (.064)	**-.348*** ** (.064)	**-.347*** ** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.191*** ** (.040)	**.191*** ** (.040)	**.189*** ** (.040)	**.189*** ** (.040)
Finished Trade School				**.156** ** (.057)	**.156** ** (.057)	**.156** ** (.057)	**.156** ** (.057)
College Graduate				**.613*** ** (.044)	**.613*** ** (.044)	**.608*** ** (.044)	**.609*** ** (.044)
More Than College				**.699*** ** (.048)	**.698*** ** (.048)	**.696*** ** (.048)	**.697*** ** (.048)
ATTRACTIVENESS *(Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**.016** (.053)	**.043** (.056)	**.044** (.056)
Attractive					**.012** (.030)	**-.003** (.031)	**.0001** (.031)
Very Attractive					**-.031** (.049)	**-.045** (.052)	**-.038** (.052)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive						**-.074** (.068)	**-.073** (.068)
Attractive						**.049** (.031)	**.048** (.032)
Very Attractive						**.029** (.046)	**.027** (.046)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*							
Overweight							**.041** (.031)
Obese							**.023** (.03)
HEIGHT							**.002** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.45***	9.00***	9.03***	8.64***	8.64***	8.65***	8.48***
R-SQUARED	.1401	.1465	.1494	.2117	.2119	.2124	.2127
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001*** (Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

Unlike their male counterparts, the returns to grooming generated by women who worked within male-dominated occupations did not jointly differ from to the returns earned by women who did not work in other occupations, as indicated by the insignificant F Test (p=.455). Additional F Tests also determined that the only noteworthy difference was that female respondents employed within male-dominated jobs earned roughly 39% more than female respondents within male-dominated jobs who were characterized as average in grooming (p=.005). These results favor the rejection of Hypothesis 1, which anticipated that *very well groomed women who worked in male-dominated occupations would earn less than their counterparts who were ranked as average in grooming*. The analyses from Chapter 2 detected income penalties among unattractive and very attractive women who worked within male-dominated jobs, but these penalties do not similarly express themselves in the returns to grooming. Hence, the Beauty is Beastly Effect only impedes the earnings of women within these professions on the basis of physical attractiveness. Overall, women within male-dominated jobs are generally better off when they are either average or attractive, and when they are either well groomed or very well groomed.


The returns to grooming vary much more among men within male-dominated occupations, but there are two other interesting gender differences that can be teased out of these findings. On one hand, only men within male-dominated occupations experienced a significant penalty for being poorly groomed. Second, it is also intriguing that the returns for being very well groomed did not differ between women who worked in male-dominated occupations and women who worked in other occupations. Women who work within male-dominated occupations not only tend to work in more prestigious professions, but they earn 22.8% more (p=.006) than women who work in all other occupations.

Therefore, neoclassical time-use models would suggest that they should have less time to engage in non-market activities such as grooming, and that their time should be associated with a higher opportunity cost (Becker 1965). However, higher amounts of grooming do not appear to be as counterproductive for women within male-dominated occupations as they may be for their male counterparts. This could be due to the more stringent societal expectations that women engage in beauty work, or it may be attributed to the fact that the earnings of men within male-dominated professions tend to be more than 20% higher than those of their female counterparts (p=.000). Nevertheless, some even more compelling gender differences within the labor market returns to grooming emerge within female-dominated occupations.

The Returns to Grooming in Female-Dominated Occupations

Focusing on Add Health respondents employed within female-dominated occupations, Figure 6 below provides information about the median earnings according to gender and to grooming level.

Figure 6



Compared to Figure 2, which conveyed the returns to physical attractiveness within female-dominated occupations, the returns to grooming in Figure 6 not only vary to a greater degree, but earnings do not increase as uniformly. While very attractive men within female-dominated jobs earned more than attractive men, very well groomed men appear to earn less than well groomed men. Thus, grooming only seems to have a positive impact on men's earnings within these occupations up until a given threshold, and then it is no longer as advantageous. However, Tables 21 through 23 below offer more exhaustive representations of how female-dominated occupations shape the returns to grooming. Table 21 depicts how the returns to grooming within female-dominated jobs vary as a group relative to all other occupational gender distributions. These analyses are also conducted separately for men (Table 22) and for women (Table 23) within female-dominated occupations.

Table 21

TABLE 21 - RETURNS TO GROOMING: FEMALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed	**-.429***** (.047)	**-.316***** (.045)	**-.303***** (.047)
Well Groomed	**.241***** (.023)	**.177***** (.022)	**.151***** (.024)
Very Well Groomed	**.384***** (.037)	**.273***** (.036)	**.239***** (.040)
JOB > 75% FEMALE	**-.324***** (.030)	**-.199***** (.030)	**-.200***** (.029)
GROOMING x JOB > 75% Female (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed	**.124** (.112)	**.084** (.108)	**.078** (.108)
Well Groomed	**-.009** (.044)	**-.007** (.043)	**-.006** (.043)
Very Well Groomed	**-.012** (.069)	**.0005** (.066)	**.007** (.066)
SEX		**-.336***** (.018)	**-.276***** (.018)
AGE		**.041***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.149***** (.018)	**.137***** (.018)
RACE (*White omitted)*			
Latino		**-.011** (.029)	**-.008** (.03)
Black		**-.161***** (.025)	**-.173***** (.025)
Native American		**-.119*** (.054)	**-.121*** (.054)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.038** (.039)	**.056** (.040)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)			
Less Than High School		**-.271***** (.039)	**-.263***** (.039)
Some College/Trade School		**.133***** (.026)	**.132***** (.026)
Finished Trade School		**.163***** (.039)	**.162***** (.039)
College Graduate		**.480***** (.030)	**.474***** (.030)
More Than College		**.507***** (.033)	**.504***** (.033)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.008** (.039)
Attractive			**.031** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.050** (.038)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.009** (.046)
Attractive			**.061**** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.052** (.033)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*			
Overweight			**.071***** (.021)
Obese I			**.078***** (.021)
HEIGHT			**.008**** (.003)
SEXUAL ORIENTATION *(Heterosexual omitted)*			
Bisexual/Sexually Fluid			**-.096***** (.027)
Gay			**-.095** (.056)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.63***	9.29***	8.67***
R-SQUARED	.1197	.1942	.1978
*p= .05** p= .01*** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*			

The returns to grooming generated by respondents who worked within female-dominated occupations did not significantly differ in any of the grooming categories relative to the returns earned by respondents who did not work within female-dominated occupations. This was further confirmed by an F Test, which reported that the overall interaction effect was insignificant (p=.895). However, additional F Tests reported that respondents employed within female-dominated occupations did experience some notable rewards and penalties associated with grooming relative to their peers.

Compared to respondents within female-dominated occupations that were characterized as average in grooming, well groomed and very well groomed respondents respectively earned 15.6% more (p=.000) and 27.9% more (p=.000), whereas poorly groomed respondents within female-dominated occupations earned 20.1% less (p=.024). However, some other striking gender differences in the returns to grooming are evident when these analyses are conducted separately for male respondents (Table 22) and for female respondents (Table 23) that worked in female-dominated jobs.

Table 22

TABLE 22 – RETURNS TO GROOMING: MEN IN FEMALE-DOMINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
GROOMING *(Average omitted)*								
Poorly Groomed	**-.449***** (.056)	**-.401***** (.055)	**-.396***** (.055)	**-.328***** (.055)	**-.300***** (.057)	**-.298***** (.057)	**-.300***** (.057)	**-.299***** (.057)
Well Groomed	**.210***** (.030)	**.195***** (.031)	**.198***** (.029)	**.133***** (.031)	**.101**** (.031)	**.085**** (.031)	**.088**** (.031)	**.087**** (.031)
Very Well Groomed	**.413***** (.051)	**.412***** (.050)	**.425***** (.049)	**.32***** (.053)	**.245***** (.052)	**.229***** (.054)	**.235***** (.054)	**.226***** (.054)
JOB > 75% FEMALE	**-.262***** (.066)	**-.238***** (.064)	**-.252***** (.064)	**-.294***** (.063)	**-.287***** (.063)	**-.287***** (.063)	**-.276***** (.063)	**-.269***** (.063)
GROOMING x JOB > 75% Female *(Average omitted)*								
Poorly Groomed	**.228** (.268)	**.212** (.263)	**.199** (.261)	**.131** (.258)	**.137** (.257)	**.149** (.257)	**.128** (.257)	**.107** (.257)
Well Groomed	**-.059** (.102)	**-.030** (.100)	**-.015** (.099)	**-.006** (.098)	**-.006** (.098)	**-.008** (.098)	**-.023** (.098)	**-.026** (.098)
Very Well Groomed	**-.361*** (.169)	**-.340*** (.166)	**-.326*** (.164)	**-.281** (.162)	**-.292** (.162)	**-.294** (.162)	**-.297** (.162)	**-.305** (.162)
AGE		**.030***** (.007)	**.029***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.032***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.329***** (.025)	**.306***** (.025)	**.313***** (.024)	**.313***** (.024)	**.314***** (.024)	**.299**** (.025)	**.296***** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*								
Latino			**-.120**** (.040)	**-.053** (.040)	**-.055** (.040)	**-.055** (.040)	**-.051** (.041)	**-.054** (.041)
Black			**-.340***** (.036)	**-.295***** (.036)	**-.300***** (.036)	**-.298***** (.036)	**-.297***** (.036)	**-.301***** (.036)
Native American			**-.211**** (.076)	**-.164*** (.075)	**-.168*** (.075)	**-.169*** (.075)	**-.170*** (.075)	**-.172*** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.070** (.053)	**.034** (.053)	**.041** (.053)	**.040** (.053)	**.066** (.054)	**.057** (.054)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)								
Less Than High School				**-.235***** (.049)	**-.232***** (.048)	**-.232***** (.048)	**-.224***** (.048)	**-.223***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.071*** (.034)	**.073*** (.034)	**.069*** (.034)	**.066*** (.033)	**.068*** (.033)
Finished Trade School				**.142**** (.054)	**.146**** (.054)	**.142**** (.054)	**.142**** (.054)	**.141**** (.054)
College Graduate				**.362***** (.040)	**.359***** (.040)	**.354***** (.040)	**.352***** (.040)	**.358***** (.040)
More Than College				**.250***** (.049)	**.245***** (.048)	**.240***** (.048)	**.240***** (.049)	**.245***** (.049)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*								
Unattractive					**-.053** (.053)	**-.055** (.055)	**-.061** (.055)	**-.060** (.054)
Attractive					**.064*** (.028)	**.037** (.030)	**.041** (.030)	**.041** (.030)
Very Attractive					**.201***** (.051)	**.171**** (.055)	**.169**** (.055)	**.167**** (.055)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*								
Unattractive						**.024** (.064)	**.029** (.064)	**.029** (.063)
Attractive						**.084**** (.030)	**.081*** (.030)	**.081**** (.030)
Very Attractive						**.077** (.048)	**.073** (.048)	**.075** (.048)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*								
Overweight							**.098***** (.029)	**.094***** (.029)
Obese							**.142***** (.029)	**.139***** (.029)
HEIGHT							**.011**** (.004)	**.011**** (.004)
SEXUALITY *(Heterosexual omitted)*								
Bisexual/Sexually Fluid								**-.217***** (.058)
Gay								**.018** (.073)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.67***	9.68***	9.73***	9.54***	9.51***	9.47***	8.61***	8.64***
R-SQUARED	.1439	.1756	.1902	.2129	.2155	.2165	.2208	.2226
*p= .05** *p= .01*** *p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*								

The returns to grooming generated by male respondents within female-dominated jobs did not significantly differ from to the returns earned by male respondents who did not work within female-dominated jobs (p=.266). However, there was one key difference: the payoff for being very well groomed was 26.3% lower (p=.059) in female-dominated jobs than in jobs that were not female-dominated. Thus, the payoff for being very well groomed is much lower for men within both types of sex-segregated jobs - relative to other occupations – although the lowest payoff is in female-dominated jobs. The supplemental F Tests also indicate that men employed within male-dominated occupations did not experience any significant rewards or penalties on the basis of grooming compared to other men within female-dominated jobs.

Nevertheless, it is intriguing that very well groomed men in female-dominated jobs earned 7.6% *less* than the men within female-dominated jobs who were deemed as average in grooming. This finding partially supports the rejection of Hypothesis 3, which posited that *very well groomed men would always earn more than men who were characterized as average in grooming,* although this difference was insignificant (p=.621). This outcome is rather notable because the literature suggests that grooming not only has a positive impact on men's earnings (Wong and Penner 2016) but that the institutional returns to grooming may even be greater for men than for women (Das and Loach 2011, French et al. 2009).

Aside from this finding, the earnings of men who work in female-dominated occupations do not appear to be influenced much by the extent of their grooming practices, which contradicts the widespread consensus that grooming tends to have a positive effect on men's income. However, this could be because men earnings are already disadvantaged enough for working in a female-dominated occupation in the first place, since they earn roughly 23.8% less (p=.000) than men who do not work within these occupations.

A control for sexual orientation was included in Model 8 in order to assess whether any outcomes among very well groomed men in female-dominated jobs could be attributed to homophobia. Including this control was also important because there is some evidence that gay men are more likely than other men to work in female-typed jobs, either because they were tracked into these professions or because they value these workplaces for being less entrenched with hegemonic male heterosexual norms (Carmichael 1995, Ellis and Riggle 1996). Again, it is possible that these men may be discriminated against on the basis of the perceptions of their sexuality or gender rather than on the basis of their actual sexuality. While being well groomed is culturally associated with effeminacy and/or homosexuality, this dilemma is compounded by the fact that people often interpret gender expressions as a proxy for sexuality, since it tends to be a more crude and legible marker (Hamilton 2007). However, the coefficients remained largely similar after sexual orientation was accounted for, so very well groomed men do not appear to be overtly penalized on the basis of their sexuality.

This type of explanation is consistent with the theoretical concepts related to social identity, which are often evoked in order to evaluate earning disparities that are linked to grooming. Economic perspectives centered on social identity suggest that an employee's utility is enhanced when their social identity adheres to the behavioral prescriptions that are imposed on the employee's social category by a given organization (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Akerlof and Kranton 2005). More broadly, grooming practices can influence earnings because they signal social identity along with various stereotypes. For example, women who engage in a substantial amount of beauty work may experience decreases in their earnings because they are subjected to negative gender stereotypes, such as being perceived as desperate for the attention of men (Das and Loach 2011). Following from this perspective, by

being very well groomed, men who are employed within female-dominated occupations may experience income penalties as a result of being stereotyped as vain, as effeminate, as insufficiently masculine, or as gay (Cheong and Kaur 2015, Coad 2008, Edwards 2003, Hall et al. 2012). Unequal outcomes can ensue because the respondent's social identity is perceived as either violating behavioral prescriptions of masculinity or of heterosexuality – both of which are chief organizational features of the workplace (Acker 1990).

From this perspective, high engagement in beauty work may be devalued among men who work in female-dominated occupations, because it triggers unfavorable stereotypes or because it violates workplace norms, or because it is not a productive aspect of the job. However, the female-dominated jobs identified in the analyses appear to be professions where attractiveness and grooming should matter more. It is also possible that we are seeing another double jeopardy effect that operates in a similar manner as the penalty against unattractive women in male-dominated jobs. Perhaps very well groomed men in female-dominated jobs face some disadvantages not only because they violate appearance norms but because they work in "gender inappropriate" jobs (Cash et al. 1977, Pfost and Fiore 1990). Hence, men and women may be more likely to experience discrimination for violating a gendered appearance norm when their gender is also made salient as a result of occupational sex segregation.

Neoclassical time-use models would argue that being very well groomed may be detrimental to men within female-dominated jobs because their greater engagement in these non-market activities reduces their productivity and earnings, since they require time and effort (Becker 1965). Thus, very well groomed men within female-dominated jobs may earn less their average-groomed counterparts because their grooming regimes decrease their productivity or because their grooming practices are particularly effortful. However, it is also

plausible that these men spend more time grooming because the opportunity cost of their time is lower, and they have more time to dedicate to non-market activities to begin with.

While economic perspectives of social identity are useful for outlining how aspects of self-presentation can be an asset or a liability depending on an organization's behavioral prescriptions, they do not place enough of an emphasis on broader sociological frameworks such as discrimination and gender schemas. The behavioral prescriptions of the workplace are not neutral nor are they a straightforward expression of economic incentives. Historically, labor market organizations have been fundamentally and deliberately structured in ways which privilege workers that are male, heterosexual, and white (Acker 1990). Thus, very well groomed men may not be as well rewarded in sex-segregated jobs not merely because their gender expressions conflict with the specific behavioral prescriptions within their workplace, but because their workplace logics tap into a much broader patterns of social domination and control that circulate at the cultural level.

In sum, the payoff that men generate for being very well groomed is significantly reduced within both types of sex-segregated occupations, which may be explained by time-use/productivity models, by social identity perspectives, by occupational traits, or by sociological theories. However, neither of these patterns seem to be explained significantly by overt homophobia, although this may be in some part attributed to small sample sizes among gay and bisexual/sexually fluid respondents. Finally, women who work within female-dominated occupations are substantially rewarded for increased grooming, which further supports the notion that sociological explanations are perhaps better suited than neoclassical time-use models for understanding why the efforts of very well groomed men may be relatively devalued in some occupational contexts.

Table 23

TABLE 23 – RETURNS TO GROOMING: WOMEN IN FEMALE-D0MINATED OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**-.459***** (.080)	**-.460***** (.080)	**-.456***** (.080)	**-.323***** (.077)	**-.328***** (.079)	**-.325***** (.080)	**-.327***** (.080)
Well Groomed	**.359***** (.036)	**.356***** (.036)	**.353***** (.036)	**.243***** (.035)	**.242***** (.037)	**.236***** (.037)	**.239***** (.037)
Very Well Groomed	**.467***** (.055)	**.471***** (.055)	**.471***** (.055)	**.279***** (.053)	**.290***** (.058)	**.290***** (.059)	**.294***** (.059)
JOB > 75% FEMALE	**-.135***** (.037)	**-.133***** (.037)	**-.138***** (.037)	**-.132***** (.036)	**-.132***** (.035)	**-.132***** (.036)	**-.132***** (.036)
GROOMING x JOB > 75% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**.191** (.138)	**.188** (.138)	**.198** (.138)	**.130** (.133)	**.130** (.133)	**.133** (.133)	**.133** (.133)
Well Groomed	**-.088** (.055)	**-.087** (.055)	**-.086** (.055)	**-.060** (.053)	**-.060** (.053)	**-.061** (.053)	**-.062** (.053)
Very Well Groomed	**-.035** (.083)	**-.037** (.083)	**-.032** (.083)	**.009** (.080)	**.008** (.080)	**.010** (.078)	**.010** (.080)
AGE		**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.0007** (.026)	**-.014** (.026)	**-.003** (.025)	**-.007** (.025)	**-.008** (.025)	**-.009** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.068** (.044)	**.033** (.042)	**.032** (.042)	**.032** (.042)	**.033** (.043)
Black			**-.121***** (.038)	**-.071*** (.036)	**-.072*** (.036)	**-.072*** (.036)	**-.076*** (.036)
Native American			**-.180*** (.078)	**-.113** (.076)	**-.114** (.077)	**-.112** (.077)	**-.115** (.077)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.103** (.060)	**.090** (.058)	**.088** (.058)	**.089** (.058)	**.096** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.352***** (.064)	**-.352***** (.064)	**-.352***** (.064)	**-.351***** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.194***** (.039)	**.194***** (.039)	**.192***** (.039)	**.192***** (.039)
Finished Trade School				**.176**** (.058)	**.177**** (.058)	**.176**** (.058)	**.177**** (.058)
College Graduate				**.603***** (.044)	**.603***** (.044)	**.598***** (.044)	**.599***** (.044)
More Than College				**.688***** (.048)	**.687***** (.048)	**.685***** (.048)	**.686***** (.048)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**.017** (.053)	**.044** (.057)	**.045** (.057)
Attractive					**.016** (.030)	**.007** (.031)	**.004** (.032)
Very Attractive					**-.031** (.049)	**-.044** (.052)	**-.038** (.053)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive						**-.074** (.068)	**-.047** (.068)
Attractive						**.049** (.031)	**.048** (.031)
Very Attractive						**.028** (.046)	**.025** (.045)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*							
Overweight							**.047** (.031)
Obese							**.022** (.03)
HEIGHT							**.002** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.50***	9.06***	9.09***	8.70***	8.71***	8.71***	8.55***
R-SQUARED	.1448	.1511	.1540	.2141	.2143	.2149	.2152
*p= .05** p= .01*** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							


The returns to grooming generated by females who worked within female-dominated jobs did not significantly differ in any of the grooming categories relative to the returns earned by females who did not work within female-dominated jobs (p=.384). The only significant differences in the returns to grooming were detected *within* the female-dominated jobs. Compared to women in female-dominated jobs that were characterized as average in grooming, well groomed and very well groomed women respectively earned 19.4% more (p=.000) and 35.5% more (p=.000), whereas poorly groomed respondents within female-dominated jobs earned 17.6% less (p=.088). Therefore, women within these profession earn some substantial grooming premia that their male counterparts do not similarly enjoy.

Furthermore, these results also favor the rejection of Hypothesis 2, which posited that *very well groomed women who work in female-dominated jobss would earn less than their average counterparts.* This hypothesis was formulated around the possibility that the Beauty is Beastly Effect may occur in both male-dominated and female-dominated jobs, and that this phenomenon may be attributed to grooming practices as well as to physical attractiveness. Overall, the data demonstrates that the Beauty is Beastly Effect only impedes the earnings of women within male-dominated professions and that it does so solely on the basis of physical attractiveness - even though grooming is the primary determinant of physical attractiveness.

The Returns to Grooming in Gender Egalitarian Occupations

Focusing on Add Health respondents employed within gender egalitarian occupations, Figure 7 below provides information about the median earnings according to gender and to grooming level.

Figure 7



The returns to grooming within gender egalitarian occupations are relatively similar to the returns to attractiveness – although it appears that women within these professions earn a greater payoff on the basis of grooming. All earnings increase in an ordinal fashion, except that women who are well groomed and very well groomed earn roughly the same. Another key difference is that very well groomed men appear to earn more than their well groomed counterparts, which was not the case for men who worked in female-dominated occupations. However, the final set of tables - Table 24 Table 25, and Table 26 - provide more detailed representations of how gender egalitarian occupations shape the returns to grooming.

Table 24

TABLE 24 - RETURNS TO GROOMING: GENDER EGALITARIAN OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed	**-.373***** (.046)	**-.284***** (.044)	**-.269***** (.046)
Well Groomed	**.202***** (.021)	**.151***** (.021)	**.127***** (.022)
Very Well Groomed	**.344***** (.035)	**.255***** (.034)	**.225***** (.037)
JOB 45% - 55% FEMALE	**-.308***** (.041)	**-.277***** (.039)	**-.271***** (.039)
GROOMING x JOB 45% - 55% Female (*Average omitted)*			
Poorly Groomed	**-.114** (.132)	**-.068** (.126)	**-.069** (.126)
Well Groomed	**.225***** (.066)	**.218***** (.063)	**.215***** (.063)
Very Well Groomed	**.207*** (.104)	**.179** (.099)	**.163** (.099)
SEX		**-.399***** (.017)	**-.337***** (.024)
AGE		**.041***** (.005)	**.040***** (.005)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.146***** (.018)	**.135***** (.018)
RACE (*White omitted)*			
Latino		**-.017** (.029)	**-.013** (.03)
Black		**-.156***** (.025)	**-.168***** (.025)
Native American		**-.121*** (.054)	**-.122*** (.054)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander		**.033** (.039)	**.052** (.040)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)			
Less Than High School		**-.262***** (.039)	**-.254***** (.039)
Some College/Trade School		**.121***** (.026)	**.119***** (.026)
Finished Trade School		**.131***** (.039)	**.130***** (.039)
College Graduate		**.473***** (.030)	**.467***** (.030)
More Than College		**.495***** (.034)	**.492***** (.034)
ATTRACTIVENESS (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.015** (.039)
Attractive			**.027** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.047** (.038)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*			
Unattractive			**-.015** (.046)
Attractive			**.059**** (.022)
Very Attractive			**.051** (.033)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*			
Overweight			**.069***** (.021)
Obese I			**.074***** (.021)
HEIGHT			**.009**** (.003)
SEXUAL ORIENTATION *(Heterosexual omitted)*			
Bisexual/Sexually Fluid			**-.092***** (.027)
Gay			**-.097** (.056)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.58***	9.32***	8.67***
R-SQUARED	.1073	.1925	.1960
p= .05 p= .01** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*			

The returns to grooming generated by respondents within gender egalitarian jobs significantly differed from to the returns earned by respondents who worked in other occupations. More specifically, the payoff for being well groomed was 24% greater (p=.001) in gender egalitarian occupations than in all other occupations, while the payoff for being very well groomed was 17.7% greater – although this difference was only marginally significant (p=.099). An F Test indicated that the overall interaction effect was significant (p=.003), which further confirms that the returns to grooming within gender egalitarian occupations do jointly vary from the returns to grooming within occupations that are not gender egalitarian.

However, supplemental F Tests also found that the respondents in gender egalitarian jobs generated significant grooming penalties and rewards relative to their peers. Compared to respondents within gender egalitarian occupations that were characterized as average in grooming, well groomed respondents earned 40.8% more (p=.000) and very well groomed respondents earned 47.4% more (p=.000) - whereas poorly groomed respondents within gender egalitarian occupations earned 28.7% less (p=.005). Since grooming consistently has a large and positive effect on earnings, the returns to grooming within gender egalitarian occupations are the most reflective of how the labor market returns to grooming appear at the aggregate level, as depicted in the analyses from Chapter 2. However, unlike the returns to grooming within the two types of sex-segregated occupations, these differences both within and between occupations are no longer being driven primarily by the male respondents.

Table 25

TABLE 25 – RETURNS TO GROOMING: MEN IN GENDER EGALITARIAN OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**-.433***** (.058)	**-.393***** (.057)	**-.386***** (.057)	**-.322***** (.057)	**-.290***** (.059)	**-.288***** (.059)	**-.291***** (.059)
Well Groomed	**.164***** (.030)	**.154***** (.030)	**.161***** (.029)	**.100***** (.029)	**.071*** (.029)	**.056** (.031)	**.056** (.031)
Very Well Groomed	**.335***** (.051)	**.337***** (.050)	**.353***** (.049)	**.257***** (.050)	**.188***** (.050)	**.173***** (.054)	**.180***** (.054)
JOB 45% - 55% FEMALE	**-.438***** (.052)	**-.402***** (.051)	**-.379***** (.051)	**-.361***** (.051)	**-.357***** (.050)	**-.354***** (.050)	**-.349***** (.050)
GROOMING x JOB 45% - 55% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**.039** (.175)	**.075** (.172)	**.043** (.171)	**.027** (.169)	**.024** (.169)	**.024** (.169)	**.029** (.168)
Well Groomed	**.296***** (.091)	**.271**** (.091)	**.262**** (.089)	**.243**** (.088)	**.235**** (.087)	**.233**** (.087)	**.244**** (.087)
Very Well Groomed	**.399**** (.150)	**.389**** (.147)	**.375**** (.146)	**.327*** (.144)	**.311*** (.144)	**.303*** (.144)	**.292*** (.144)
AGE		**.029***** (.007)	**.029***** (.007)	**.030***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.030***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.328***** (.025)	**.306***** (.025)	**.314***** (.024)	**.314***** (.024)	**.314***** (.024)	**.301***** (.024)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.123**** (.040)	**-.062** (.040)	**-.064** (.040)	**-.064** (.040)	**-.059** (.041)
Black			**-.327***** (.036)	**-.282***** (.036)	**-.289***** (.036)	**-.286***** (.036)	**-.286***** (.036)
Native American			**-.222**** (.076)	**-.179*** (.075)	**-.183*** (.075)	**-.184*** (.075)	**-.185*** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.053** (.054)	**.018** (.053)	**.024** (.053)	**.023** (.053)	**.05** (.053)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.221***** (.048)	**-.218***** (.048)	**-.218***** (.048)	**-.211***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.066*** (.034)	**.067*** (.034)	**.064** (.034)	**.061** (.034)
Finished Trade School				**.128*** (.054)	**.132*** (.054)	**.129*** (.054)	**.129*** (.054)
College Graduate				**.351***** (.040)	**.347***** (.040)	**.343***** (.040)	**.341***** (.040)
More Than College				**.226***** (.049)	**.222***** (.048)	**.218***** (.049)	**.218***** (.048)
ATTRACTIVE (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**-.068** (.053)	**-.069** (.055)	**-.074** (.055)
Attractive					**.058*** (.028)	**.032** (.030)	**.035** (.030)
Very Attractive					**.200***** (.051)	**.172**** (.055)	**.168**** (.055)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive						**.019** (.064)	**.024** (.063)
Attractive						**.078**** (.03)	**.077**** (.03)
Very Attractive						**.072** (.048)	**.068** (.048)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*							
Overweight							**.100***** (.029)
Obese I							**.136***** (.029)
HEIGHT							**.012**** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.71***	9.73***	9.79***	9.60***	9.56***	9.53***	8.64***
R-SQUARED	.1485	.1796	.1930	.2138	.2164	.2174	.2214
*p= .05** p= .01** p= .001*** (Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

The returns to grooming procured by male respondents within gender egalitarian jobs jointly differed from to the returns earned by male respondents who did not work in gender egalitarian occupations (p=.016). More specifically, the payoff that men generated for being well groomed was 27.6% greater (p=.005) in gender egalitarian occupations than in all other occupations, while the payoff for being very well groomed was 33.9% greater (p=.042). These coefficient differences are remarkable when we recall that the payoff for being very well groomed was 17.5% less in male-dominated occupations than in it was in other occupations (p=.034), and 26.3% lower (p=.059) in female-dominated occupations. Hence, gender egalitarian workplaces not only appear to mediate some of the devaluating effects experienced by very well groomed men within both types of sex-segregated occupations, but they conversely reward this attribute to a much higher degree than other professions do. Furthermore, men within gender egalitarian occupations also benefit from the greatest rewards to grooming relative to their peers within the same professions.

Indeed, additional F Tests determined that male respondents in gender egalitarian jobs experienced some significant grooming rewards relative to other men within these professions. Compared to male respondents within gender egalitarian jobs that were ranked as average in grooming, well groomed and very well groomed male respondents within gender egalitarian jobs respectively earned 35% more (p=.000) and 60.3% more (p=.001). However, poorly groomed men within gender egalitarian occupations did not earn less than their average counterparts (p=.102). As the final analyses accompanying Table 26 below will demonstrate, male respondents within gender egalitarian jobs enjoy a greater payoff for grooming both between and within occupations, relative to their female counterparts.

Table 26

TABLE 26 – RETURNS TO GROOMING: WOMEN IN GENDER EGALITARIAN OCCUPATIONS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**-.363***** (.071)	**-.366***** (.071)	**-.358***** (.071)	**-.254***** (.069)	**-.258***** (.071)	**-.252***** (.072)	**-.253***** (.072)
Well Groomed	**.312***** (.030)	**.308***** (.030)	**.305***** (.030)	**.208***** (.029)	**.207***** (.031)	**.200***** (.032)	**.203***** (.032)
Very Well Groomed	**.457***** (.047)	**.459***** (.047)	**.461***** (.047)	**.282***** (.047)	**.293***** (.051)	**.294***** (.053)	**.298***** (.053)
JOB 45% - 55% FEMALE	**-.19**** (.062)	**-.189**** (.062)	**-.191**** (.062)	**-.144*** (.060)	**-.144*** (.060)	**-.145*** (.060)	**-.144*** (.060)
GROOMING x JOB 45% - 55% Female (*Average omitted)*							
Poorly Groomed	**-.143** (.194)	**-.138** (.194)	**-.142** (.194)	**-.110** (.187)	**-.111** (.187)	**-.122** (.187)	**-.124** (.187)
Well Groomed	**.136** (.096)	**.143** (.096)	**.154** (.096)	**.132** (.093)	**.133** (.093)	**.136** (.093)	**.134** (.093)
Very Well Groomed	**-.024** (.143)	**-.015** (.142)	**-.020** (.142)	**-.008** (.137)	**-.008** (.137)	**-.005** (.137)	**-.011** (.137)
AGE		**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.050***** (.007)	**.049***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**-.004** (.026)	**-.019** (.026)	**-.011** (.025)	**-.011** (.025)	**-.012** (.025)	**-.013** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*							
Latino			**-.075** (.044)	**.028** (.042)	**.027** (.042)	**.026** (.042)	**.028** (.042)
Black			**-.122***** (.038)	**-.071*** (.036)	**-.072*** (.036)	**-.072*** (.036)	**-.076*** (.037)
Native American			**-.176*** (.079)	**-.109** (.077)	**-.109** (.077)	**-.107** (.077)	**-.110** (.077)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.106** (.06)	**.093** (.058)	**.092** (.058)	**.093** (.058)	**.100** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)							
Less Than High School				**-.346***** (.064)	**-.346***** (.064)	**-.346***** (.064)	**-.345***** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.182***** (.040)	**.182***** (.040)	**.180***** (.040)	**.180***** (.040)
Finished Trade School				**.142*** (.058)	**.143*** (.058)	**.142*** (.058)	**.142*** (.058)
College Graduate				**.602***** (.044)	**.602***** (.044)	**.597***** (.044)	**.598***** (.044)
More Than College				**.682***** (.048)	**.681***** (.048)	**.678***** (.048)	**.679***** (.048)
ATTRACTIVENESS *(Average omitted)*							
Unattractive					**.013** (.054)	**.041** (.057)	**.042** (.057)
Attractive					**.013** (.030)	**-.002** (.031)	**.0006** (.032)
Very Attractive					**-.030** (.049)	**-.043** (.052)	**-.038** (.053)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*							
Unattractive						**-.076** (.068)	**-.075** (.068)
Attractive						**.048** (.031)	**.046** (.032)
Very Attractive						**.028** (.046)	**.025** (.046)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*							
Overweight							**.043** (.031)
Obese							**.020** (.031)
HEIGHT							**.003** (.004)
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.46***	9.01***	9.04***	8.66***	8.66***	8.67***	8.48***
R-SQUARED	.1405	.1469	.1498	.2104	.2105	.2111	.2114
*p= .05** p= .01*** p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*							

Unlike their male counterparts, the returns to grooming generated by women in gender egalitarian jobs did not differ from those earned by women who did not work in gender egalitarian jobs (p=.356). Furthermore, the payoff that women within gender egalitarian jobs accumulated for being well groomed or very well groomed was not significantly higher than the rewards secured by women who worked within other professions. However, women in gender egalitarian jobs experienced some significant grooming penalties and rewards relative to other women within these jobs. Compared to female respondents within gender egalitarian jobs that were ranked as average in grooming, well groomed and very well groomed women within gender egalitarian jobs respectively earned 40.1% more (p=.000) and 33.2% more (p=.034), whereas their poorly groomed counterparts earned 31.4% less (p=.033). Relative to their peers within gender egalitarian jobs, the rewards for being very well groomed were not only greater for men, but men were also not subjected to penalties for being poorly groomed.

In sum, the results depicted in Tables 24 through 26 generally support Hypothesis 4, which suggested that *no significant grooming-related penalties would be identified within gender-egalitarian jobs, and that well groomed and very well groomed respondents within these professions would earn more than their average counterparts.* At the aggregate level (Table 24), no significant grooming-related penalties were detected within gender egalitarian jobs, but poorly groomed women within gender egalitarian jobs earned 31.4% less (p=.033) than their average counterparts. However, both well groomed men and women within gender egalitarian jobs earned significantly higher incomes than their average counterparts.

The results represented in Tables 18 through 26 also confirm Hypothesis 5, which anticipated that *the returns grooming would significantly vary across the three different types of occupational gender distributions.* Compared to all other types of occupations, the returns

to grooming in male-dominated jobs (p=.004) and in gender egalitarian jobs (p=.003) significantly varied. More specifically, men's returns to grooming in male-dominated jobs (p=.039) and in gender egalitarian jobs (p=.016) also significantly varied relative to the grooming premia of men who worked in other types of jobs. Thus, significant differences in the grooming-related penalties and premia were found in four out of the nine tables.

Fewer differences were detected in the analyses conducted in Chapter 3, which ascertained that the returns to attractiveness only varied for all respondents within gender egalitarian jobs (p=.001), and for female respondents within male-dominated jobs (p=.063). Therefore, Hypothesis 6 was supported as well: *the returns to grooming varied more across the different types of occupational gender distributions than the returns to attractiveness.* I expected this to occur because grooming accounted for the greatest portion of the beauty premia and it had a greater impact on earnings than attractiveness itself. Furthermore, since the returns to grooming were explicitly gendered, I anticipated that they may be more influenced by the gender of the respondent's job. However, it appears that although the labor market returns to grooming may be significantly greater for women, the relative payoffs for grooming *between* different occupational gender distributions vary more for men. On the other hand, the returns to grooming vary more for women when we look at how the different types of occupational gender distributions impact earnings *within* each of the three contexts.

Finally, Figure 8 below depicts the returns to grooming generated by male and female respondents within male-dominated, gender egalitarian, and female-dominated occupations (when all control variables are accounted for). These values represent the percentage differences in earnings for each attractiveness level, relative to their counterparts within the same occupational gender distribution that were ranked as "average" in grooming.

Figure 8



* p<.1
**p<.05
***p<.01
**** p<.001

Figure 8 demonstrates that women's returns to grooming show more significant differences in earnings when we look at how grooming influences their earnings *within* each of the three occupational contexts. However, the patterns among women are also relatively stable, with well groomed and very well groomed women consistently earning roughly 17% to 40% more than their counterparts who were ranked as average in grooming.

Men's returns to being well groomed or very well groomed varied much more depending on whether they worked in a male-dominated, female-dominated, or gender egalitarian job. Thus, the returns to grooming differ more for male respondents when we compare the three contexts to one another than when we examine how grooming shapes earnings within each context. Furthermore, men within female-dominated jobs were the only cohort to earn less than their average-groomed counterparts for partaking in higher amounts of grooming. Men also accrued much lower premia for being very well groomed when they were employed in either a male-dominated occupation or a female-dominated occupation.

In gender egalitarian occupations, the returns to grooming were more consistent with what the results from Chapter 2 suggested – that higher levels of grooming would be associated with greater earnings. More importantly, gender egalitarian occupations also reported the fewest gender differences in the labor market returns to grooming.

DISCUSSION

Overall, these analyses demonstrate that the labor market returns to grooming not only differ by the gender of the respondent, but also according to the gender distribution of the respondent's job. Furthermore, the degree of sex-segregation within a given occupation shapes the returns to grooming in ways that are quite unique from the ways that they influence the returns to physical attractiveness. The analyses in Chapter 3 indicated that the returns to attractiveness varied more for women both between and within the three types of occupational gender distributions, and that sex-segregated occupations adversely impacted the beauty premia generated by women. Here, we see that the returns to grooming vary more for women *within* each of the three types of occupational gender distributions, but that they vary more for men *between* the three conditions. Interestingly, sex-segregated occupations also appeared to primarily impede the grooming premia that were generated by very well groomed men.

Against Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, the Beauty is Beastly Effect does not similarly extend itself to dimensions of grooming. Although very attractive women were marginally penalized within male-dominated occupations, there was no support for a corollary pattern which hampered the earnings of very well groomed women within these professions. Taken together, the analyses from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 suggest that women within male-dominated occupations have the best outcomes when they are average or attractive, and when they are well groomed or very well groomed. Furthermore, very well groomed women were also advantaged within female-dominated occupations, which indicates that high levels of grooming is not similarly "beastly" as attractiveness can be, nor is it a liability within either type of sex-segregated occupation. Rather, the results conclude that the Beauty is Beastly Effect only adversely impacts the earnings of very attractive women who work within male-

dominated occupations. This finding is noteworthy because grooming may be the primary determinant of physical attractiveness, but the data strongly supports the position that attractiveness and grooming shape earnings uniquely and independently of one another.

In a similar vein as the finding in Chapter 3 that attractive and very attractive men never earned less than their counterparts of average attractiveness, men were never significantly penalized for being very well groomed. However, the payoff for being very well groomed was significantly lower in both types of sex-segregated occupations, and very well groomed men did earn less than their counterparts who were ranked as average in grooming (although this difference was insignificant). Since unattractive women were penalized within male-dominated jobs, one possible interpretation is that men and women may be more likely to experience discrimination for violating a gendered appearance norm when their gender is also made especially salient as a result of their "gender inappropriate" choice of occupation.

In sum, occupational gender distributions not only shaped the penalties and premia attributed to grooming, but they did so in much more complex ways. Furthermore, the labor market returns to grooming varied across the three types of occupational gender distributions to a greater extent than the returns to attractiveness. Overall, the findings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 strongly support the contention that the returns to attractiveness and to grooming vary according to the gender of the individual as well as the gender of their occupation. Last but not least, these analyses show that there were far fewer gender differences in the returns to physical attractiveness and to grooming within gender egalitarian occupations, and that these returns were much more consistent with what we saw at the aggregate level in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 5:

Conclusion

Chapter 5 Overview

Chapter 5 begins with a Findings section, which provides a summary of the results – along with a discussion about their implications and their contributions to the literature. The Limitations section offers a dialogue about the numerous drawbacks associated with the datasets and the research design utilized by this project. I conclude with a section on the Recommendations For Future Research, which outlines various suggestions that scholars should consider in order to overcome the limitations of this study and to more generally enhance the literature on appearance and the role that it plays in labor market inequalities.

FINDINGS

Determinants of Physical Attractiveness

These analyses demonstrate that significant income rewards and penalties are attained by American workers on the basis of physical attractiveness and grooming, and that these returns operate in ways which are largely independent of one another. The greatest determinant of physical attractiveness and its returns appears to be grooming. This is particularly intriguing because grooming is arguably the most mutable aspect of physical appearance, and the most heavily policed by employers. It also underscores the notion that when it comes to physical attractiveness, what someone has may be much less important than

what they do with what they have. Thus, attractiveness to a large extent can be cultivated, but the time and resources that individuals have to dedicate to these efforts varies considerably.

While the data suggests that physiological traits - like BMI and height – and personal characteristics – such as personality attractiveness - do shape the earnings of American workers, these factors do not have much of an impact on the labor market returns to attractiveness. In sum, these findings indicate that sociological perspectives may be the most appropriate for understanding how appearance is evaluated and how it contributes to systematic inequalities within institutions such as the workplace. This consideration is crucial, given that the research on attractiveness has historically been dominated by biosociologists, evolutionary psychologists, and economists.

The Directionality of Attractiveness Biases

The results also elaborate on one of the least understood components within the literature on physical attractiveness: the directionality of the Beauty Effect (Griffin and Langlois 2006). When it comes to general earnings in the U.S. labor market, it appears that what is physically attractive and well groomed is good, *and* that what is unattractive and poorly groomed is bad. Hence, attractiveness bias does not operate as a unidirectional expression of the Beauty Effect, where attractive and well groomed workers are generally rewarded. The attractiveness bias is also not a straightforward manifestation of negativity bias, where unattractive or poorly groomed workers are merely penalized. A more accurate account is that both of these biases simultaneously shape the earnings of American workers.

However, some more detailed analyses indicate that the attractiveness biases within the U.S. labor market are not universally bidirectional, but that the directionality can vary

according to occupational contexts. For example, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that both unattractive women and very attractive women who work in male-dominated jobs suffered from some significant income penalties. Within this specific context, the directionality of the attractiveness biases is not bidirectional, but it is more consistent with negativity bias, because the disadvantages of being unattractive may likely trump any advantages for being attractive.

Differential Outcomes: Personal Gender & Occupational Gender

The data also illuminated some critical gender differences pertaining to physical attractiveness. While grooming accounts for the greatest portion of the physical attractiveness gradients in general, the returns to both physical attractiveness and personality attractiveness did not significantly differ by gender. However, the returns to grooming were significantly higher for women, whereas the returns to BMI were significantly greater for men.

The results also make the case for the position that the various returns attributed to different determinants of physical appearance are not merely shaped by the gender of the individual worker, but also by the gender of their job. Although occupational sex segregation has long been theoretically emphasized and empirically scrutinized as a major contributor to gender, race, and class inequalities, no study to date has examined how occupational gender distributions stratify individuals on the basis of physical attractiveness or grooming. The findings here suggest that sex-segregated occupations only subjected female respondents to income penalties on the basis of physical attractiveness, whereas they appear to impede the earnings of very well groomed male respondents. Although occupational gender distributions generally had a greater impact on the returns to attractiveness procured by women, the returns to grooming varied more for women *within* each of the three occupational contexts, but they

varied more for men *between* these contexts. Overall, these results underscore that grooming may be the primary determinant of physical attractiveness and its labor market returns, but they also emphasize that these two aspects of physical appearance shape earnings in ways that are highly complex and largely independent from one another.

Other empirical endeavors have increasingly opted to include indicator variables to control for occupation fixed effects (Wong and Penner 2016) or to account for certain traits of a given job - and particularly those where attractiveness is likely to enhance productivity (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Robins et al. 2011). This study emphasizes the importance of examining other occupational characteristics – such as the sex composition of workers within a given profession. In this sense, the gender composition of one's occupation may be just as crucial as their personal gender identity or their job's specific requirements when it comes to appearance-related outcomes. We also witnessed entirely different outcome patterns when we introduced analyses of occupational gender distributions. Indeed, the findings from Chapter 2 indicated that there were no gender differences in the returns to attractiveness, but that the returns to grooming were greater for women. However, once the occupational gender distributions of the respondent's job were accounted for, attractiveness appeared to matter more for the earnings of women, whereas the returns to grooming varied more among men.

Occupational Sex Segregation

The findings more generally express some critical implications about the nature of sex-segregated occupations. First and foremost, almost one-fourth of the respondents worked in occupations where women comprised less than 25% of the national workforce, while nearly another quarter of the respondents worked in occupations where women made up more than

75% of the workforce. It is not only alarming that 46.66% of the respondents worked in occupations that are still segregated to this remarkable of an extent, but that male-dominated occupations continue to exclude women to a much greater degree. Indeed, 43.46% of the male respondents and 5.28% of female respondents in the Add Health sample work within these positions. It is easy to see how occupational sex-segregation contributes further to inequality when we recall that the respondents who worked within the female-dominated occupations experienced a 17% to 18% wage penalty (p=.000), while respondents who worked within male-dominated occupations earned a wage premium of roughly 30% (p=.000). In addition, this study has also contributed to the literature on occupations by outlining which types of occupations remain female-dominated and male-dominated to this much of an extent.

However, sex-segregated occupations not only shape general earnings, but also the returns to both physical attractiveness and to grooming more specifically. Unsurprisingly, the primary attractiveness penalties were detected among both unattractive women and very attractive women within male-dominated occupations. These outcomes suggest that despite all of the progress made in desegregating and diversifying these organizations (England 2010), they nevertheless continue to be especially ripe sites for gender inequality within the workplace. Furthermore, we see that attractiveness can uniquely function as an asset or as a liability depending on occupational contexts, and that it acts as a double bind that suppresses the advancement of the oppressed gender category (Frye 1983, Ridgeway 2011).

On the other hand, neither men nor women suffered from any significant grooming-related penalties within sex-segregated jobs. However, these contexts drastically reduced the premia that were afforded to very well groomed men. This premia reduction was particularly pronounced within female-dominated jobs, which is peculiar since physical appearance

appears to matter more within these types of occupations. Although these results could potentially be linked to some other factors, these patterns nevertheless paint a broader picture about institutional inequalities which arise from perceptions about gender nonconformity. Overall, men and women may be more susceptible to income penalties for violating a gendered appearance norm when they are employed in a "gender inappropriate" job.

Since gender schemas frame femininity as a performance enacted via beauty work and frame masculinity as a natural or base state of being that is organized around independence, power, ruggedness, and dominance (Brownmiller 1984) – this framework is useful for understanding why unattractive women and highly preened males in particular may be perceived as gender deviants. It is also conceivable that these individuals may be dually disadvantaged, given that they not only challenge gendered appearance norms, but that they also work in "nontraditional" or "gender inappropriate" jobs. Indeed, the assortment of negative perceptions associated with gender nonconformity has been well documented, as have the ways in which it contributes to all sorts of unfavorable outcomes across various stages of employment (Cash et al. 1977, Trautner and Kwan 2010).

The Beauty is Beastly Effect

This study offers the first empirical evidence that male-dominated occupations are another context where the Beauty as Beastly Effect occurs. These findings further elaborate on the phenomenon by confirming that physical attractiveness is not similarly a liability for women who work within other occupational contexts, nor does it extend itself on the basis of grooming. Thus, very attractive women may be penalized within male-dominated jobs, but conversely, very well groomed women are substantially rewarded. This result is especially

intriguing because grooming is so deeply intertwined with physical attractiveness, and because greater amounts of grooming is believed to hinder productivity. Finally, the Beauty is Beastly Effect was detected solely among female workers, which does not support the claim that men can be similarly disadvantaged for being attractive (Spencer and Taylor 1988).

These analyses contribute to the abundance of research which shows that attractive women are disadvantaged within "male-typed" jobs (Cash et al. 1977, Johnson et al. 2010) because attractiveness enhances perceptions of their femininity and in turn, of their person-job lack of fit (Drogosz and Levy 1996, Heilman 1983, Heilman and Stopeck 1985). Perspectives centered on social identity would also posit that the Beauty is Beastly Effect emerges because being very attractive either communicates negative stereotypes about women (Das and Loach 2011), or because it clashes with the behavioral prescriptions set forth by their workplace (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, Akerlof and Kranton 2005). It is also possible that these women were employed in an occupation where averageness is preferred (Valentine et al. 2004) or where their attractiveness is relatively unimportant (Johnson et al. 2010, Podratz 2002).

In any case, this finding is not surprising given that the sex roles associated with the majority sex within an occupation tend to become incorporated into the work roles themselves (Gutek and Cohen 1987). In this sense, "male-typed" occupations may be conceptually synonymous with "male-dominated" jobs, but no studies until now have empirically operationalized occupational gender distributions in order to examine how they influence labor market returns to appearance. Finally, the fact that both unattractive and very attractive women are subjected to significant income penalties emphasizes that the disparate outcomes related to physical appearance are highly nuanced, and it complicates the efforts to come up with potential solutions when the problem at hand is so complex and multifaceted.

Solutions: Occupational Desegregation, Management & Legislation

Perhaps the clearest implication emerging from the data is that sex-skewed jobs uniquely impact both male and female workers on the basis of their physical attractiveness and grooming. While the attractiveness penalties are the most severe for women who work in male-dominated occupations, and grooming premia reductions are the most pronounced for men who work in female-dominated occupations. Yet neither of these patterns present themselves within jobs that have a roughly even distribution of male and female workers. Instead, the previously penalized traits become significantly rewarded within gender egalitarian jobs, and the returns to both attractiveness and to grooming differ the least between men and women. These findings support the notion that the continued efforts to desegregate and diversify occupations has the potential to reduce labor market inequalities and biases on the basis of physical appearance and gender, in addition to other axes of identity.

Organizations also benefit from the inclusion of more female managers. The inclusion of women into management positions been shown to "lift all boats" by reducing not only gender inequality among the non-managerial workers beneath them, but also the gender wage gaps (Cohen and Huffman 2007). Other benefits can be attained by increasing the number of women in management as well, given that female managers tend to utilize less oppressive and punishment-based persuasive strategies than their male counterparts (Harper and Hirokawa 1988). It is also advisable that more experienced managers exert greater control over personnel decisions, because this has been shown to reduce beauty biases in hiring decisions (Marlowe et al. 1996). To that aim, it would also be fruitful to implement training seminars and implicit bias tests which would educate employees, managers, and administrators about the Beauty Effect and appearance-related discrimination (Kwan and Trautner 2011).

While a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the efforts to diversify male-dominated or male-typed occupations, sex-skewed occupations more generally are breeding grounds for gender discrimination because gender becomes an especially salient characteristic in settings where a given sex is underrepresented and tokenized. Situational factors and policies which decrease the salience of sex and increase the salience of other aspects of the worker have been shown to reduce the probability that sex is singled out as a critical inferential reference point (Heilman 1980). Thus, equalizing the proportional representation of men and women can positively impact hiring decisions, employee evaluations, and promotional processes because they mediate the use of gender stereotypes in forming impressions and in making personnel decisions.

Although this study is limited to examining aspects of treatment discrimination, the results clearly demonstrate that male and female workers both experience some unique disadvantages within occupations where women comprise either less than 25% or more than 75% of the national workforce. The fact that so many American occupations remain sex-segregated to this high of a degree is greatly troublesome on its own, but the results show that these disadvantages are eradicated in gender egalitarian occupations, and that women and men earn more commensurate returns to both attractiveness and grooming within these settings.

Finally, it is also imperative that we continue to adopt laws which more broadly prohibit employers from engaging in various forms of appearance-based discrimination. As discussed in Chapter 1, employers have a tremendous amount of discretion when it comes to implementing workplace appearance policies not only due to BFOQ exceptions, but because they can generally discriminate on the basis of mutable traits. While it would take an incredible amount of time and effort to transform these precedents, it is advisable to begin by

continuing the efforts to adopt new laws which prevent employers from participating in specific types of appearance-based discrimination. As it stands, there are no laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of physical attractiveness (Dipboye 2005), and employers are still afforded a great deal of leeway when it comes to establishing sex-specific grooming standards and height and/or weight requirements (Trautner and Kwan 2010). However, the critical efforts over the past decade to implement local laws which explicitly bar weight-based bias (Huggins 2015, Rhode 2010) offer some hope that change is possible.

Last but not least, it would be imperative for changes within the American courts to occur, since the majority of appearance-based discrimination cases are addressed by lawsuits. These cases often evoke legislation such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act – but unfortunately, the courts typically reject the plaintiff's claims and uphold "community-based appearance norms" which reinforce traditional ideas about gender (Trautner and Kwan 2010). It is critical that courts begin to understand how workers can be uniquely burdened by appearance norms and to recognize how these norms are explicitly racialized, gendered, and classed. Contemporary appearance policies not only have the capacity to obscure or eliminate diversity as well as individual expression, but the courts have historically normalized and reinforced these norms by legitimating them through the law (Bartlett 1994, Bouchard 2006, Trautner and Kwan 2010). Finally, it would be crucial for the courts to abandon the single-axis approach that has historically been utilized in assessing appearance discrimination cases, and to instead adopt a perspective which examines race-sex-class intersections, so that the issues of specific marginalized groups no longer continue to "slip through the cracks" of legal protection (Caldwell 1991).

LIMITATIONS

Physical Attractiveness Measure

The primary limitation is that the variable for the respondents' physical attractiveness was acquired from a singular rating, and that these ratings may be biased based on the interviewer's characteristics or perceptions. For example, it is possible that interviewers may be biased to rate more affluent respondents in a more favorable manner. However, these attractiveness ratings can nevertheless be considered valid because they utilize the more consistent ratings afforded by interviewers rather than by the respondents' self-ratings (Feingold 1992), and especially since there is a strong cultural consensus of what is deemed attractive (Langlois et al. 2000). Furthermore, the most conservative fixed effects model possible was used in order to best control for any biases on the part of the interviewer.

The interviewer-rated physical attractiveness measure utilized by Add Health may also differ from other empirical measures of physical attractiveness as a result of its context. As previously discussed, it is possible that these analyses do not find physiological traits to be particularly salient determinants of attractiveness in part because of the design of Add Health's measure. The Add Health interviewers were not asked about their preference for the respondent as a potential romantic partner or employee, but were asked to provide a global assessment of how attractive the respondent was. Therefore, the physiological traits which function as cues of biological fitness may be much less relevant within this context. However, it is also reasonable to suggest that this context makes the measure less idiosyncratic or biased than those used by other studies, due to the lower stakes and greater objectivity involved.

Cohort Design

Due to its relatively narrow age range and time frame, other limitations are inherently linked to Add Health's cohort design. While its design offers advantages for observing earnings and attractiveness, because the respondents are more comparable in both of these regards, I am still limited to a narrow age range and time frame. Considering the importance of differences in initial earnings for later earnings (Gerhart 1990) - as the gender wage gap continues to widen with age (USBLS 2015) - these analyses still provide valuable insights into how attractiveness contributes to inequalities across the U.S. labor market.

Occupational Gender Distribution Measure

Some additional limitations arose in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, as a result of merging data from Add Health and the 2000 U.S. Census. Namely, the variable for occupational gender distributions relies on the percentages of men and women within a given occupation at the national level. While this measure offers a reliable indicator of how male-dominated or female-dominated a certain occupation may be within the U.S. labor market and the American consciousness, I am not able to ascertain what the exact gender distribution is within the workplace of each respondent. Therefore, it is possible that a respondent may work within an occupation that is categorized as “male-dominated” by the parameters of these analyses, but the actual composition of their workplace is comprised mainly of females.

This measurement for occupational gender distributions also cannot determine who ultimately makes organizational decisions about hiring, wages, evaluations, promotions, and terminations. However, gender-based discrimination is generally much more entrenched in sex-skewed occupations due to the increased salience of sex (Heilman 1980) - and a great deal

of research shows that the majority sex within an occupation become incorporated into the work roles (Gutek and Cohen 1987), and that either men or the majority sex also tends to be those in power (Kanter 1977). Furthermore, I believe these dummy variables were a valid proxy because they generated findings which were consistent with what we should expect empirically. For example, the results not only reported a wage premium within male-dominated jobs and a wage penalty in female-dominated jobs, but the percentages of women and men within these occupations were also reflective of what other studies have reported.

Finally, the sample sizes for certain cohorts (i.e. very attractive women within male-dominated occupations) were not ideal, although even the smallest cell sizes were still near a count of 30. Any cells with sample sizes within this small of a range were noted, and additional analyses also were conducted in order to see whether the results were still similar when the sample size increased (i.e. replicating analyses for male-dominated jobs where females comprised less than 33% of the workforce). Overall, this variable was a sufficient and valid proxy for examining the gender distributions of occupations throughout the U.S., and that this measurement offers a useful starting point for these novel analyses.

Treatment vs. Access Discrimination

This project only focuses on the treatment discrimination process, since it examines how physical appearance shapes annual earnings. I am unable to address any access discrimination processes, which have been widely documented in the literature. Therefore, it is possible that discrimination is more prevalent and severe in pre-employment processes such as hiring, but my data is limited to analyzing the economic outcomes for individuals who have already been employed within a given occupation.

On the other hand, I do have the advantages of studying actual outcomes with the use of a nationally-representative and reputable dataset, while many other studies are constrained by research designs which are not only limited by their small sample sizes, but are generally hypothetical in their scope. For example, a great deal of studies assess how attractiveness influences whether someone is more likely or less likely to be hypothetically hired for a position (Johnson et al. 2010) or to be favored as a romantic partner (Confer et al. 2010). However, these types of research endeavors have been fundamental for identifying and understanding the mechanisms which drive physical attractiveness biases and inequalities.

Mechanisms & Explanations

The datasets and research design utilized by this study are not able to pinpoint the mechanisms which drive the labor market inequalities that are linked to attractiveness and to its determinants. In other words, I cannot determine the extent to which any of the returns to attractiveness or grooming result from increased productivity, from discrimination, or from occupational sorting. Similarly, I cannot ascertain whether the Beauty is Beastly Effect occurs because it enhances perceptions of person-job fit, because it violates gender schemas, because of time-use considerations, because attractiveness is relatively unimportant within the job, or because of something else. In sum, I could only interpret the data and then describe how the findings may potentially be explained by the wide array of competing perspectives that have been proposed by other scholars. Therefore, qualitative, experimental, and mix-methods research designs have been indispensable to the literatures on physical appearance and attractiveness, and they will continue to enrich our understanding of these phenomena.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Attractiveness Ratings

There are a couple feasible recommendations for future research on physical appearance, which would also be able to address some of the limitations outlined above. Some studies have begun to explore how attractiveness itself is measured by datasets such as Add Health, and they have modified the interviewer fixed effects in order to assess whether ratings differ as a result of interviewer-level heterogeneity and non-random assignment (Ali et al. 2013, Wong and Penner 2016). Scholars have also examined how certain aspects of physical appearance, such as BMI, were correlated with interviewer-rated measures of physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness, and grooming (Ali et al. 2013). Future empirical endeavors should continue to utilize large-scale datasets in order to further explore these avenues, but it would also be possible to create an attractiveness variable which uses the mean value of the interviewer-rated and the self-reported measures of physical attractiveness, since both measures are provided by Add Health. It would also be interesting to assess how these two measures of attractiveness compare to one another, and to explore whether some groups tend to rate their own attractiveness more favorably or harshly than the interviewer.

It would be also be useful if there were more recent meta-analyses, such as Feingold's (1992) project, which provided interrater reliability analyses from 93 studies, and offered some insights on how ratings differ not only between numerous judges, but between the interviewer-rated and self-reported measures. Finally, it would be fruitful for scholars to continue examining how certain contexts shape assessments of physical attractiveness. For example, it was suggested that these findings may differ from those of other studies because

the Add Health interviewers were asked to provide a global assessment of how physically attractive the respondent was. Prior research has suggested that attractiveness ratings and preferences vary according to various contexts, such as whether a respondent was asked to rank a target's suitability as a potential short-term mate, long-term mate, or parent (Confer et al. 2010, Little et al. 2002, Perrett et al. 1998). These advancements would offer us a better understanding of how attractiveness ratings differ across raters, contexts, and measurements.

Role of Occupations

It is possible that some of the results reported by this study were influenced by specific occupational traits and/or occupational sorting mechanisms. Empirical research has shown that individuals sort into jobs that reward a particular attribute and veer away from jobs where related penalties exist (Arunachalam and Shah 2012, Harper 2000). More broadly, attractive people not only often sort into professions that require beauty as a job qualification, but into jobs that also pay particularly well (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). Following this logic, it is plausible that very attractive women within male-dominated jobs may have experienced some income penalties because they have been sorted into occupations where their looks are not important (Johnson et al. 2010, Podratz 2002). It is reasonable to suggest that physical appearance may matter less for productivity and wages within the male-dominated professions than within the female-dominated professions identified by this study, since they typically place less emphasis on tasks such as sales and customer service. However, it would also be useful to conduct more in-depth analyses on which types of professions are male-dominated and female-dominated, and to then explore how their occupational traits influence the labor market returns to both physical attractiveness and grooming.

Furthermore, because physical appearance may determine some other aspects of human capital formation which in turn affect labor market returns (Mocan and Tekin 2010) it is also possible that the variables for physical attractiveness and grooming were correlated with some unobserved productivity (Harper 2000). In this formulation, it is not attractiveness or grooming per se that directly affects earnings, but that these variables were serving as a proxy for other traits which also command a premium in the labor market. While the results of this study could have been influenced by some other unobserved productivity, research has confirmed that the factors related to productivity account for just a very small portion of the returns to attractiveness (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994) and that the taste-based discrimination effects dominate the productivity effects - even in occupations where looks should matter the most (Arunachalam and Shah 2012). Overall, the literature has been enriched by empirical efforts which have attempted to examine how the returns to attractiveness are influenced by occupational sorting (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994, Harper 2000) and specific occupational traits (Robins et al. 2011), and would benefit tremendously from these continued efforts.

Other Determinants of Physical Attractiveness

The findings offer strong support for the claim that occupational gender distributions shape the labor market returns to both physical attractiveness and to grooming in highly complex ways. Therefore, it would be interesting to determine how these occupational contexts influence the returns to other determinants of physical attractiveness – such as personality attractiveness, specific personality traits, BMI, or height. Indeed, supplementary analyses which are not included here have determined that the male respondents' labor market returns to BMI show some significant differences when we account for whether they are

employed in a male-dominated, female-dominated, or gender egalitarian occupation. For example, the payoff for being overweight among men within female-dominated occupations is 26.3% less (p=.007) than the payoff for being overweight in occupations that are not female-dominated, and these men also earn roughly 17% less (p=.086) than men within female-dominated jobs who had a normal BMI. This finding is notable when we recall from the aggregated analyses conducted in Chapter 2 that overweight men earned roughly 11% more (p=.000) than men with a normal BMI level, while obese men earned 15% more (p=.000). Overall, these results suggest that occupational gender distributions will significantly shape the returns to various aspects of physical appearance, and that they will do so in highly complex ways which operate independently of one another.

Occupational Gender Distributions

Although this study has developed and empirically tested some valid proxies for occupational gender distributions, there are three limitations of concern. This measurement cannot comment on the composition of the respondent's actual workplace, and it cannot ascertain which kinds of people make decisions related to hiring, salary, evaluations, promotions, and terminations within their profession. Workplace composition data should ideally include measures for how many employees are present within the respondent's workplace, and also offer estimates for the gender and racial composition of these employees and decision makers. Compiling these types of measures would enable scholars to explore how the returns to attractiveness (or its other determinants) are shaped by an individual's specific workplace composition and by who holds administrative power within that

organization. Furthermore, we could assess how the results differ when we use individualized occupational contexts rather than national level occupational gender distributions.

The third limitation of the occupational gender distribution variable pertains to the relatively small sample sizes of some of the cohorts studied. However, even the smallest cohorts were still near a count of roughly 30, and additional analyses were implemented in order to see whether the results differed when the sample size was increased. These findings would be strengthened by efforts which somehow replicate these analyses with larger sample sizes, or somehow conduct similar analyses with other large-scale datasets that include measures of physical attractiveness, such as the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study. It would also be advisable to repeat these analyses once the fifth wave of Add Health data is released.

Longitudinal & Large-Scale Datasets

While other scholars have managed to overcome some of the limitations associated with Add Health's cohort design by utilizing longitudinal datasets, they have nevertheless been hindered by other impediments. While other longitudinal datasets like National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) have variables – such as height and weight - which have been used as proxies for physical attractiveness (Loh 1993), Add Health uniquely offers measures on physical attractiveness, personality characteristics, and grooming. However, with the data collection for Wave V of Add Health scheduled to occur between 2016 and 2018, it would be possible to examine these labor market outcomes more precisely over time. Since Wave IV was the first to collect data on variables such as income and occupations, fruitful opportunities for research will become available as additional waves of Add Health are accessible to scholars.

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APPENDIX

Odds Ratios: Being Married At Least Once (with all controls included)

ATTRACTIVENESS LEVEL (Relative to Unattractive)	ODDS RATIO	Standard Error	P > |z|
Average	1.21	.112	.035
Attractive	1.31	.127	.005
Very Attractive	1.28	.151	.035

Log Likelihood = -8044.3851
Pseudo R^2= .1088

Odds Ratios: Having At Least One Child (with all controls included)

ATTRACTIVENESS LEVEL (Relative to Unattractive)	ODDS RATIO	Standard Error	P > |z|
Average	1.16	.120	.143
Attractive	1.26	.137	.033
Very Attractive	1.42	.188	.009

Log Likelihood = -6706.547
Pseudo R^2= .2566

Table 3 - Men's Returns to Physical Attractiveness with added control for Parenthood Status

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
ATTRACTIVENESS *(Average omitted)*										
Unattractive	**-.183***** (.052)	**-.145**** (.051)	**-.141**** (.051)	**-.129**** (.05)	**-.129**** (.05)	**-.134**** (.05)	**-.127*** (.053)	**-.073** (.055)	**-.069** (.055)	**-.069** (.055)
Attractive	**.156***** (.028)	**.144***** (.027)	**.152***** (.027)	**.109***** (.027)	**.115***** (.027)	**.11***** (.027)	**.067***** (.029)	**.041** (.03)	**.039** (.03)	**.039** (.03)
Very Attractive	**.329***** (.049)	**.353***** (.048)	**.376***** (.048)	**.305***** (.048)	**.312***** (.048)	**.3***** (.048)	**.237***** (.053)	**.176***** (.054)	**.145**** (.055)	**.145**** (.055)
AGE		**.028***** (.007)	**.028***** (.007)	**.03***** (.007)	**.029***** (.007)	**.029***** (.007)	**.03***** (.007)	**.031***** (.007)	**.023***** (.007)	**.022***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS **(*Single omitted)***		**.354***** (.025)	**.331***** (.025)	**.334***** (.024)	**.322***** (.024)	**.319***** (.024)	**.318***** (.024)	**.308***** (.024)	**.247***** (.025)	**.239***** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*										
Latino			**-.121**** (.04)	**-.06** (.039)	**-.072** (.039)	**-.05** (.04)	**-.052** (.04)	**-.068** (.04)	**-.047** (.04)	**-.048** (.04)
Black			**-.334***** (.036)	**-.288***** (.035)	**-.291***** (.035)	**-.286***** (.035)	**-.284***** (.035)	**-.294***** (.035)	**-.216***** (.036)	**-.22***** (.036)
Native American			**-.234**** (.076)	**-.186*** (.075)	**-.192**** (.074)	**-.188**** (.074)	**-.191**** (.074)	**-.187**** (.074)	**-.128** (.075)	**-.13** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.1** (.054)	**.048** (.053)	**.046** (.053)	**.075** (.054)	**.071** (.054)	**.064** (.053)	**.04** (.054)	**.04** (.054)
EDUCATION **(*High School Graduate omitted*)**										
Less Than High School				**-.237***** (.047)	**-.231***** (.047)	**-.23***** (.047)	**-.229***** (.047)	**-.214***** (.047)	**-.168***** (.048)	**-.169***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.097**** (.033)	**.096**** (.033)	**.094**** (.033)	**.086**** (.033)	**.063** (.033)	**.016** (.033)	**.017** (.033)
Finished Trade School				**.172***** (.054)	**.171**** (.054)	**.172**** (.054)	**.165**** (.054)	**.147**** (.054)	**.047** (.055)	**.047** (.055)
College Graduate				**.401***** (.039)	**.403***** (.039)	**.4***** (.039)	**.386***** (.039)	**.347***** (.039)	**.207***** (.044)	**.211***** (.044)
More Than College				**.282***** (.048)	**.288***** (.048)	**.282***** (.048)	**.27***** (.048)	**.222***** (.048)	**.073** (.048)	**.076** (.048)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*										
Overweight					**.109***** (.029)	**.111***** (.029)	**.111***** (.029)	**.102***** (.029)	**.072**** (.029)	**.072**** (.029)
Obese					**.141***** (.029)	**.142***** (.029)	**.138***** (.029)	**.146***** (.029)	**.132***** (.029)	**.131***** (.029)
HEIGHT						**.012**** (.004)	**.012**** (.004)	**.012**** (.004)	**.011**** (.004)	**.011**** (.004)
PERSONALITY **(*Average omitted)***										
Unattractive							**-.0009** (.062)	**.026** (.063)	**.042** (.063)	**.043** (.063)
Attractive							**.099***** (.029)	**.076**** (.03)	**.05** (.03)	**.05** (.03)
Very Attractive							**.127**** (.046)	**.077** (.047)	**.043** (.047)	**.043** (.047)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*										
Poorly Groomed								**-.285***** (.055)	**-.271***** (.056)	**-.272***** (.056)
Well Groomed								**.084**** (.03)	**.056** (.03)	**.057** (.03)
Very Well Groomed								**.209***** (.053)	**.148***** (.053)	**.15***** (.053)
PARENT ***(Non-Parent omitted)***										**.022** (.027)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS									X	X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.61***	9.66***	9.7***	9.48***	9.42***	8.56***	8.52***	8.55***	8.68***	8.7***
R-SQUARED	.1206	.1562	.1710	.1987	.2020	.2032	.2050	.2115	.3607	.3608
*p= .05** *p= .01*** *p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*										

Table 4 - Women's Returns to Physical Attractiveness with added control for Parenthood Status

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
ATTRACTIVENESS ***(Average omitted)***										
Unattractive	**-.01** (.054)	**-.003** (.053)	**-.003** (.053)	**-.005** (.051)	**-.004** (.051)	**-.003** (.051)	**.015** (.055)	**.051** (.056)	**.082** (.056)	**.072** (.056)
Attractive	**.191***** (.029)	**.190***** (.029)	**.188***** (.029)	**.114***** (.028)	**.109***** (.029)	**.11***** (.029)	**.072*** (.03)	**.009** (.032)	**-.0006** (.032)	**.001** (.032)
Very Attractive	**.243***** (.045)	**.253***** (.045)	**.249***** (.045)	**.142***** (.044)	**.135**** (.044)	**.135**** (.045)	**.082** (.05)	**-.033** (.052)	**-.03** (.052)	**-.024** (.052)
AGE		**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.05***** (.007)	**.041***** (.007)	**.046***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS **(*Single omitted*)**		**.015** (.026)	**.0002** (.026)	**.0021** (.025)	**.0014** (.025)	**.0017** (.025)	**.0001** (.025)	**-.005** (.025)	**-.046** (.025)	**.014** (.025)
RACE **(*White omitted*)**										
Latino			**-.079** (.044)	**.036** (.042)	**.037** (.042)	**.041** (.043)	**.041** (.043)	**.027** (.043)	**.027** (.042)	**.045** (.042)
Black			**-.123***** (.038)	**-.07*** (.037)	**-.068** (.036)	**-.069** (.036)	**-.067** (.036)	**-.079*** (.036)	**-.044** (.036)	**-.009** (.036)
Native American			**-.198*** (.08)	**-.112** (.077)	**-.111** (.077)	**-.111** (.077)	**-.104** (.077)	**-.097** (.077)	**-.119** (.077)	**-.102** (.077)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.116** (.061)	**.098** (.058)	**.098** (.058)	**.103** (.059)	**.106** (.059)	**.098** (.059)	**.035** (.059)	**.028** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)										
Less Than High School				**-.389***** (.064)	**-.389***** (.064)	**-.389***** (.064)	**-.384***** (.064)	**-.363***** (.064)	**-.216***** (.064)	**-.201**** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.2***** (.039)	**.2***** (.039)	**.2***** (.039)	**.194***** (.039)	**.176***** (.039)	**.113**** (.039)	**.11**** (.039)
Finished Trade School				**.172***** (.057)	**.172***** (.057)	**.172**** (.057)	**.17**** (.057)	**.145**** (.057)	**.074** (.058)	**.078** (.058)
College Graduate				**.657***** (.044)	**.657***** (.044)	**.656***** (.044)	**.644***** (.044)	**.6***** (.044)	**.398***** (.046)	**.352***** (.046)
More Than College				**.74***** (.047)	**.74***** (.047)	**.738***** (.047)	**.727***** (.047)	**.677***** (.048)	**.446***** (.055)	**.389***** (.055)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*										
Overweight					**.02** (.03)	**.021** (.031)	**.018** (.031)	**.035** (.031)	**.052** (.03)	**.059** (.03)
Obese					**-.015** (.03)	**-.015** (.03)	**-.022** (.03)	**.017** (.03)	**.027** (.03)	**.024** (.03)
HEIGHT						**.003** (.004)	**.002** (.004)	**.003** (.004)	**.004** (.004)	**.003** (.004)
PERSONALITY **(*Average omitted*)**										
Unattractive							**-.031** (.067)	**-.076** (.067)	**-.033** (.067)	**-.025** (.067)
Attractive							**.087**** (.031)	**.042** (.031)	**.041** (.031)	**.042** (.031)
Very Attractive							**.11*** (.045)	**.029** (.046)	**.033** (.045)	**.025** (.045)
GROOMING **(*Average omitted*)**										
Poorly Groomed								**-.264***** (.067)	**-.258***** (.067)	**-.254***** (.067)
Well Groomed								**.211***** (.031)	**.154***** (.031)	**.15***** (.031)
Very Well Groomed								**.296***** (.051)	**.212***** (.051)	**.193***** (.051)
PARENT ***(Non-Parent omitted)***										**-.19***** (.028)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS									X	X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.44***	8.95***	8.98***	8.57***	8.57***	8.4***	8.42***	8.41***	8.68***	8.61***
R-SQUARED	.1118	.1187	.1220	.1974	.1976	.1976	.1989	.2089	.3467	.3518
*p= .05** *p= .01**** *p= .001***** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*										

Table 3 - Men's Returns to Physical Attractiveness with all BMI Categories

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ATTRACTIVENESS ***(Average omitted)***					
Unattractive	**-.183***** (.052)	**-.145**** (.051)	**-.141**** (.051)	**-.129**** (.05)	**-.068** (.055)
Attractive	**.156***** (.028)	**.144***** (.027)	**.152***** (.027)	**.109***** (.027)	**.037** (.03)
Very Attractive	**.329***** (.049)	**.353***** (.048)	**.376***** (.048)	**.305***** (.048)	**.142**** (.055)
AGE		**.028***** (.007)	**.028***** (.007)	**.03***** (.007)	**.023***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.354***** (.025)	**.331***** (.025)	**.334***** (.024)	**.247***** (.024)
RACE (*White omitted)*					
Latino			**-.121**** (.04)	**-.06** (.039)	**-.046** (.04)
Black			**-.334***** (.036)	**-.288***** (.035)	**-.216***** (.036)
Native American			**-.234**** (.076)	**-.186*** (.075)	**-.127** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.1** (.054)	**.048** (.053)	**.042** (.054)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)					
Less Than High School				**-.237***** (.047)	**-.168***** (.048)
Some College/Trade School				**.097**** (.033)	**.016** (.034)
Finished Trade School				**.172***** (.054)	**.046** (.055)
College Graduate				**.401***** (.039)	**.207***** (.044)
More Than College				**.282***** (.048)	**.072** (.057)
BMI ***(Normal omitted)***					
Overweight					**.073*** (.029)
Obese I					**.149***** (.033)
Obese II					**.089*** (.046)
Obese III					**.128*** (.05)
HEIGHT					**.011**** (.004)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*					
Unattractive					**.042** (.063)
Attractive					**.05** (.03)
Very Attractive					**.044** (.048)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*					
Poorly Groomed					**-.27***** (.029)
Well Groomed					**.056** (.03)
Very Well Groomed					**.147**** (.053)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS					X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.61***	9.66***	9.7***	9.48***	8.67***
R-SQUARED	.1206	.1562	.1710	.1987	.3609
*p= .05** *p= .01*** *p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*					

Table 4 - Women's Returns to Physical Attractiveness with all BMI Categories

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
ATTRACTIVENESS ***(Average omitted)***					
Unattractive	**-.01** (.054)	**-.003** (.053)	**-.003** (.053)	**-.005** (.051)	**.079** (.056)
Attractive	**.191***** (.029)	**.190***** (.029)	**.188***** (.029)	**.114***** (.028)	**.0005** (.032)
Very Attractive	**.243***** (.045)	**.253***** (.045)	**.249***** (.045)	**.142***** (.044)	**-.029** (.052)
AGE		**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.051***** (.007)	**.041***** (.007)
MARITAL STATUS (*Single omitted)*		**.015** (.026)	**.0002** (.026)	**.0021** (.025)	**-.047** (.025)
RACE (*White omitted)*					
Latino			**-.079** (.044)	**.036** (.042)	**.028** (.042)
Black			**-.123***** (.038)	**-.07*** (.037)	**-.045** (.036)
Native American			**-.198*** (.08)	**-.112** (.077)	**-.121** (.075)
Asian-American/Pacific Islander			**.116** (.061)	**.098** (.058)	**.034** (.059)
EDUCATION (*High School Graduate omitted*)					
Less Than High School				**-.389***** (.064)	**-.216***** (.064)
Some College/Trade School				**.2***** (.039)	**.113**** (.039)
Finished Trade School				**.172***** (.057)	**.074** (.058)
College Graduate				**.657***** (.044)	**.398***** (.046)
More Than College				**.74***** (.047)	**.447***** (.055)
BMI *(Normal omitted)*					
Overweight					**.052** (.03)
Obese I					**.012** (.036)
Obese II					**.045** (.043)
Obese III					**.035** (.044)
HEIGHT					**.004** (.004)
PERSONALITY (*Average omitted)*					
Unattractive					**-.032** (.067)
Attractive					**.04** (.031)
Very Attractive					**.032** (.045)
GROOMING (*Average omitted)*					
Poorly Groomed					**-.26***** (.067)
Well Groomed					**.154***** (.031)
Very Well Groomed					**.212***** (.051)
OCCUPATION FIXED EFFECTS					X
INTERVIEWER FIXED EFFECTS	X	X	X	X	X
CONSTANT	10.44***	8.95***	8.98***	8.57***	8.68***
R-SQUARED	.1118	.1187	.1220	.1974	.3467
*p= .05** *p= .01*** *p= .001**** *(Standard Errors in Parentheses)*					