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What's the Meaning of 'This'?

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'This is a sea urchin', I declare while strolling the beach with a friend. What do I refer to by uttering the demonstrative pronoun 'this'? The object immediately before me, of course. As it happens on this occasion, the object in the sand at my feet. I may point at it to aid my hearer—or I may not. But now, if the meaning of the term is distinguished from the referent, what is the *meaning* of 'this', or of my utterance of 'this'? I think we can distinguish the meaning of 'this', or of its utterance, from its referent. And if we attend carefully to what meanings should be, we can see just what, after all, is the meaning of 'this'.

I. THE THEORY OF DEMONSTRATIVE SENSE (IN BRIEF)

Here in a nutshell is the theory I wish to put forth.

In the paradigm case, demonstrative reference is founded on perception: the referent of 'this' on a given occasion of utterance is the object to which the speaker is visually attending—and to which he may be pointing—as he says 'this'. Demonstrative reference is *direct*, then, in that it is determined by direct perceptual acquaintance and not by description. Of course, there are other uses of 'this', but let us focus on this central and, I think, paradigm use; we may look toward generalization after a careful study of this use.

The meaning or sense of 'this', as distinct from the referent, on a given occasion of utterance is the *content* of the speaker's perception of the referent on that occasion—or rather, a fundamental part of that content. The content of a thought or experience is an abstract entity that embodies the phenomenological structure of the thought or experience, particularly the mode of presentation of the object presented in the thought or experience. The fundamental content of a perception presents (embodies the form of presentation of) an object at a certain location before the perceiver. This content determines the

object of the perception, in a manner to be specified. And so, where the perceiver refers to that object by saying ‘this’, it determines the object referred to. Notice that perception is treated here as an intentional experience, and not merely as a causal interaction between a person and an object stimulating his sensory system; thus, the object “of” a perception is not determined by a causal relation of perceived to perceiver, except insofar as the content of a perception “says” the object is stimulating the perceiver’s senses.

The indicated sort of fundamental content in a perception I call an *acquainting sense*, as it “acquaints” the perceiver with the perceived. I have studied it elsewhere in pursuit of a theory of the intentionality of perception.¹ It is, I would propose, an intrinsically *demonstrative* sort of sense. By this I mean (in the main part) that where it is present in a given perception’s occurring on a given occasion, it picks out the object before the perceiver on that occasion; if present in another perception on another occasion, that very same sense would pick out the object before the subject of *that* perception on that occasion, very likely a different object. Acquainting senses are accordingly very different from descriptive senses, those expressible by definite descriptions (like ‘the last of the Caribs’).

The acquainting sense that determines the referent of ‘this’ on a given occasion of utterance includes two noteworthy elements, important for their role in communication. First, that acquainting sense includes a general structure of spatial and perspectival presentation, a structure which is shared by an acquainting sense in any case of demonstrative reference. The hearer knows this structure of sense and thereby knows generally where to look for the intended referent. Second, an acquainting sense includes an item of sense that merely presents the perceived object “itself”, that object “itself” which is determined by the full content. This item is what the speaker primarily expresses to the hearer and what the hearer primarily grasps of the acquainting sense, for all that is of interest to speaker and hearer in demonstrative reference—in contrast with reference by description—is a sense, as it were, of the referent “itself”.

We may call the preceding theory of demonstrative reference the Theory of Demonstrative Sense. It assumes certain results from the theory of perception, concerning the intentionality and content of perception. In effect I shall argue for this theory of demonstrative reference in three ways: directly, by letting it ride on its own intuitive force (see especially parts V and VI), by motivating its particular moves within a broadly Fregean and Husserlian semantics of sense and reference, drawing on results of Husserl and Kaplan, and by comparing and contrasting the theory with related theories by Husserl and Kaplan as well as some proposals by Perry and a Meinongian alternative by Castañeda.

The Theory of Demonstrative Sense runs in certain ways against several common views about demonstratives and sense:

- (i) that the demonstrative 'this' has a referent, on a given occasion of utterance, but does not have a sense;
- (ii) that the only kind of individual senses are definite-description senses (a hang-up of Frege's often carried over unto today);
- (iii) that senses are things including properties and propositions, as opposed to phenomenological contents;
- (iv) that the sense of 'this', if it has a sense, cannot vary with the occasion of utterance;
- (v) that the context of utterance, in particular a causal relation of speaker to referent, together perhaps with the invariant meaning of 'this', determines the referent of 'this' on a given occasion; and
- (vi) that reference is a matter of semantics, or perhaps systematic pragmatics, independent of intentionality theory.

II. A PROTO THEORY

As Husserl, Russell, and Kaplan have stressed, demonstrative reference is *direct*.² This means at least, negatively, that the referent is not determined by way of a description, by appeal to its qualitative properties. Positively, I think we should say, this means that the referent is determined by acquaintance, and consequently not by description.³ Does directness entail that demonstrative reference is not mediated by a meaning or sense in the broadly Fregean and Husserlian manner, and perhaps that it consists in a direct relation of uttered word to object? It does if, and only if, the only kind of meanings are descriptive meanings, the kind expressible by definite descriptions ('the Φ '). Kaplan's work on the logic of demonstratives shows powerfully how demonstratives differ from definite descriptions, in determination of reference and in meaning; John Perry has also argued artfully and effectively against descriptive meanings for demonstratives; and Husserl had already articulated peculiarities in the sense of demonstratives.⁴ I think it intuitively clear in any event that demon-

stratives do not express descriptive meanings, and a major thrust of this study is to sleuth about for other kinds of meanings invoked in demonstrative reference.

The referent of ‘this’ of course varies with the occasion of utterance. But if ‘this’ has a meaning, does its *meaning* vary with the occasion of utterance? On the one hand, it seems it must. For the referent of an expression is determined by—and so is a function of—its meaning: that is a basic principle of the Fregean and Husserlian doctrine of meaning and reference. But on the other hand, it seems the meaning of ‘this’ is well-fixed independently of the occasion of utterance—you can find it in a good dictionary. Well, it may be possible to have our cake and eat it too. We can honor both of these intuitive demands if we recognize *two types* of meaning for ‘this’: a *generic* meaning, which does not vary with the occasion of utterance, and on any occasion of utterance a *specific* meaning, which may vary with the occasion. An initial goal of our study will be to make out what these two types of meanings might be.

As a Proto Theory of the meaning of ‘this’, then, we adopt a broadly Fregean or Husserlian theory that distinguishes meaning from referent, but we posit for ‘this’ two types of meaning, a generic meaning and a specific meaning. This is a skeletal form of a semantics or pragmatics for demonstratives. Its structure was isolated by Husserl in 1900 and independently by Kaplan in the 1970’s.⁵ Seeking to specify what the generic and specific meanings of ‘this’ are, we may look for guidance to the theory of intentionality. For on Husserl’s and Frege’s view a meaning incorporates a “way of being given” or “mode of presentation” before consciousness,⁶ and in virtue thereof determines an object.

III. CONTENT AND OBJECT OF THOUGHT

Entities of very different ontological kinds have been considered “intensional” entities and assigned the roles of “meanings” in different semantic theories. Two principal kinds of meaning entities are those that play the roles of content and object of thought or consciousness. The distinction between content and object is found in varying versions—some more adequate than others—in nineteenth century philosophical logic and philosophical psychology, in the writings of Bolzano, Frege, Husserl, Twardowski, and Meinong.⁷ I shall outline what I think to be the most adequate version of the distinction, which may not be quite that held by any of the aforementioned thinkers.

Intentionality is that property of mental acts or attitudes or experiences that consists in being “of” or in some cases also “about” something. The *object* of a mental act is that of or about which the

subject is conscious in the act. It is sometimes said the act is “directed” toward the object, and it is sometimes said the subject “intends” (or is mentally pointing toward) the object. For instance, the object of an act of perception or imagination is that which the subject sees or imagines, say, Man O’War or Pegasus (but let us not linger over questions of the existence of the object of a mental act); and the object of an act of judging that Isadora Duncan was inspired is the proposition (or perhaps state of affairs) that Isadora Duncan was inspired, while Isadora Duncan is a partial or secondary object of the judgment, as is the property of being or having been inspired. The *content* of a mental act, by contrast with its object, is an abstract entity that embodies the phenomenological structure of the act, principally the “way” the object is “given” or “presented” in the act. The notion of content is most naturally introduced by examples motivating the distinction between content and object. Thus, two acts of imagining the morning star and imagining the evening star have the same object but have different contents, reflecting different modes of presentation of that object. And an act of judging that the morning star is a planet will have the same object, I would urge, as an act of judging that the evening star is a planet—namely, the proposition or state of affairs consisting in a certain heavenly body’s being a planet—though they will have different contents, reflecting different modes of presentation of that same state of affairs. (If it be doubted the propositions judged in these two acts are the same, then consider another example in Smith’s judging that a certain object visually before him is a sea urchin and Jones’ judging that a certain object is a sea urchin, in fact the same object Smith saw but visually presented to Jones from a different perspective, and perhaps looking somewhat different.)

On Husserl’s theory of intentionality, based on a version of the content/object distinction, the object of a mental act is determined by—and so is a function of—the act’s content. This is analogous to the Fregean and Husserlian theory of reference, holding that the referent of an expression is determined by its sense; for Husserl, the analogy is due to the fact that reference is founded on intention, that the referent of an expression in use is the object of the speaker’s thought and the sense is the content.⁸

Some important further principles in the Husserlian theory are that: contents are in principle sharable by different acts; different contents may determine the same object (as assumed in the above examples); and contents are complex entities with structural parts. Now, the Husserlian theory can be developed with entities of somewhat different ontological kind playing the role of contents. The most neutral view, held by the early Husserl, takes contents to be simply abstract phenomenological types instantiated in mental acts. A more

loaded view, apparently held by Frege and the seasoned Husserl, takes contents to be abstract particulars that embody phenomenological structures. Let us assume the latter view, if only because it seems familiar. (We return to the issue in part VIII.)

IV. CONTENT AND OBJECT IN SEMANTICS

Language expresses thought, saith the classical view. What kind of entities, then, are the “meanings” expressed in language? Are they the contents or the objects of thought? Both play a role in language, though many semantic phenomena can be treated systematically by appeal to only one or the other (and indeed truth-conditions can be systematized for extensional sentences without appeal to either of these kinds of entities, by appeal to “extensions” only).

Assuming the content/object distinction drawn above, we may form a natural intentionalist Content/Object Semantics in the following way. Let us call the objects of thought *intensions*, here meaning objects “intended” in thought, objects toward which thought is “directed”, rather than entities of an “intensional” nature (whatever that comes to). And let us call the contents of thought *senses*, following Husserl. Then we acknowledge two levels of “meaning” entities. With each term, predicate, and sentence (of English, addressing only extensional constructions) we associate both a *sense* and an *intension*, whose specific types are indicated in the following table:

| <i>Expression</i> | Term | Predicate | Sentence |
|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| <i>example</i> | ‘Isadora Duncan’ | ‘is inspired’ | ‘Isadora Duncan is inspired’ |
| <i>sense</i> | individual concept | general concept | thought |
| <i>intension</i> | individual | property | proposition or state of affairs |

Also associated with each expression is an extension of the usual sort (for terms an individual, for predicates a set of individuals, and for sentences a truth-value)—and if you wish an extension in each possible world. Notice that we take the intension of a term to be an individual. It would be in keeping with another tradition to take the intension of a definite description to be instead an individualized property (or something like that for Carnap), an “incomplete object” (for Meinong), or perhaps a amalgam of properties.⁹ But that would be improper here, because the intension is to be the object a speaker is thinking of in using a term, and when referring with a definite description one is thinking of an individual.¹⁰ Where definite descriptions refer to the same individual in different “ways”, the differences are marked here on the level of sense. Notice that “concepts” and “thoughts” are located on the level of contents, not objects, of consciousness.

It is natural to take the “referent” of an expression to be its intension in this semantical system, for what we “refer” to by using an expression is what we are thinking of or about in uttering the expression. It is customary to align referent with extension, but that is a legacy of another semantical system. In fact, certain familiar semantical systems are but fragments of the preceding Content/Object system. If we restrict the Content/Object system to the assignment of intensions to expressions, we have in effect Russell’s semantics (ignoring definite descriptions and focussing on proper names) or Meinong’s (ignoring questions of existence and again definite descriptions). Such a system Kaplan has aptly called the Naive Theory,¹¹ as it may well be the accepted view of the man and woman on the street. If we delete the level of intensions and admit extensions in the actual world only, we have Frege’s basic semantics. A semantical system close to the above may be that offered by C. I. Lewis, though Lewis did not begin with intentionality theory or the content/object distinction.¹²

The intentionalist semantics we’ve outlined is motivated by the dictum that language expresses thought. I have assumed a broad picture of the interrelations between semantics, speech-act theory, and intentionality theory as based on the content/object distinction.¹³ Broadly, speech acts include *inter alia* assertion. Thus, in saying ‘Isadora Duncan was inspiring’, a person is asserting the proposition that Isadora Duncan was inspiring. Underlying his speech act is his judgment or belief that Isadora Duncan was inspiring, whose content and object are respectively a certain thought and the indicated proposition. That thought the speaker expresses and, if communication is successful, conveys to his hearer. Thus, our semantics assigns to an expression as its sense and its intension just the content and the object of a speaker’s thought in uttering the expression in the standard way. Demonstratives, of course, call on the occasion of utterance in a systematic way, and therewith semantics is extended to pragmatics.

We may seem to have a needless proliferation of terminology on our hands. But what we have in fact is an overlapping of separated terminologies from semantic theory and intentionality theory. ‘Content’ and ‘object’ are terms designating roles in intentionality, whereas ‘sense’ and ‘intension’ designate roles in semantics, or in reference and assertion. The respective roles are now seen to be filled by the same entities, for which we already have yet other familiar terms designating their ontological kind, terms such as ‘concept’, ‘individual’, and ‘proposition’ or ‘state of affairs’.

Assuming the preceding Content/Object Semantics, let us now turn to the question of the “meaning” of ‘this’. Within the prescribed machinery, we seek the generic meaning of ‘this’ and on a given occasion of utterance its specific meaning.

V. THE GENERIC AND THE SPECIFIC SENSE OF 'THIS'

The object referred to by 'this' varies with the occasion of utterance. Thus, the intension associated with 'this' on a given occasion—the object “intended” and referred to—varies with the occasion. (Consequently, the proposition asserted by ‘This is Φ ’ on a given occasion—the intension of the sentence on that occasion—varies with the occasion.) Is there also associated with 'this' on any occasion of utterance a fixed intension, an entity on the level of the object of thought and reference that is involved on any occasion of utterance? Surely not.¹⁴ When we look for two types of meaning for 'this', one occasion-invariant and the other occasion-variant, we should be looking on the level of sense, or content. We can find an occasion-variant “meaning” on the level of intension and an occasion-invariant “meaning” on the level of sense. But we can also find—and with greater uniformity of theory—very plausible candidates for both generic and specific meanings of 'this' on the level of sense. What we would seek, then, are appropriate structures of intentional content invoked in demonstrative reference.

We have focussed on the use of 'this' to refer to an object visually before the speaker. As contents of thought or consciousness, senses embody modes of presentation of objects—referents—before thought or consciousness. The mode of presentation on which demonstrative reference is based, for the indicated use of 'this', is simply that of perception, or perceptual acquaintance. By uttering 'this' one refers to an object in one's current perceptual purview, and the structures of sense invoked by the utterance embody the mode of presentation of the object before the speaker's consciousness in perceptual acquaintance.

What, then, is the *generic sense* of 'this', that sense which is sought in a dictionary definition and which is invoked on any occasion of utterance of 'this'? The generic sense will be that sense which embodies the *generic* mode of presentation of the referent of 'this' on any occasion, a generic mode which is shared on varying occasions of utterance. And what is this generic mode of presentation? Well, it is the general way in which an object is given in perceptual acquaintance, in seeing an object: as singled out in a visual field, as located at a certain place in the spatial field presented.

This generic sense is really only a skeletal structure of sense or content that embodies the skeletal structure of visual presentation. In visual perception one is presented with an array of objects and with an array of colors variously distributed over those objects. Where one is focussed on a particular object, to which perhaps one would refer by saying 'this', that object is singled out from the field as the focus of attention. It is presented at a certain place in the visual field. Thus, the intentional structure incorporated in the generic sense is merely that of

a visual spatial field in which something at some specific place is singled out. The specific location in the field is left unspecified, since that will vary with the particular perception.

Now, Husserl described, in the content of a perception, a component he called an "X".¹⁵ The content includes predicate-senses, he held, prescribing properties the object is presented as having. But it also includes a component, an X, which presents the object "*simpliciter*" or "in abstraction from all predicates". This feature of perception is reflected in a separable X component in the content of a perception. Thus, if I see an object and some time later form a judgment about it, about that same object "itself", the content of my judgment includes the X in the content of my perception (rather than, in particular, a descriptive content).

The X seems to me a most important type of sense. It seems to be involved in any sort of "definite", or "*de re*", awareness and to be involved in any sort of "singular" reference such as is achieved by use of a proper name or a demonstrative. Indeed, I think we should say the *specific sense* of 'this' on a particular occasion of utterance is the X in the content of the speaker's perception of the object to which he refers by saying 'this'. The X in the content of a perception is an item of content or sense that stands for the object perceptually presented as before the subject on that particular occasion. Which object is presented, and so which object is presented by the X, depends in this way on the occasion of perception. (We pursue this important feature of perceptual content in the next part below.) Thus, the X in the perceptual content underlying an utterance of 'this' presents the particular object "itself" that is appropriately before the speaker on that occasion. And this is a most compelling candidate for the specific sense of 'this' on that occasion.

We now have a basic theory of the generic and specific senses of 'this': the generic sense is that phenomenological content which embodies the generic mode of presentation of an object in perceptual acquaintance, and the specific sense of 'this' on a particular occasion of utterance is the X in the content of the speaker's perception on the occasion of utterance, which embodies the form of presentation of the perceived object "itself". We may call this the Emend'd Husserlian Theory, as it is a simplification of the Edmund Husserlian theory, which I have studied elsewhere.¹⁶ The name of the former theory is a near anagram of the name of the latter because the former theory reads like the latter in most respects.

Ah, but there is more to the content of a perception than a generic sense and an X, and we must ask of its role in demonstrative reference. The full content of a perception embodies the presentation of an array of colors and objects distributed at various places in the presented

visual field. The content may typically prescribe the kind of object seen (I see this sea urchin strutting on the sand) or even its identity (I see Uncle Julius—no sea urchin but a real human being). In any perception of an object, though, the object is presented as located at a certain place before the perceiver, and it is in virtue of this part of the presentation that the perceiver is perceptually presented and acquainted with the object. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, the content of a perception is built around a basic component, a basic structure of content or sense, that simply prescribes an object located at a certain place before the perceiver. This type of content I have called an *acquainting* sense.¹⁷

The generic and specific senses of ‘this’ are evidently components of the acquainting sense in the speaker’s perception of the referent. The content that serves as generic sense of ‘this’ is a generic structure of content present in the acquainting content of any perception. And the X in the content of a perception is a separable component of the base acquainting component of the content; so the specific sense of ‘this’ on a given occasion of utterance, the X in the content of the speaker’s perception, is a component of the acquainting content of the speaker’s perception. Thus, both the generic sense of ‘this’ and the specific sense of ‘this’ on a given occasion of utterance are constituents of the acquainting sense in the content of the speaker’s perception.

But then why not simply say *the* sense of ‘this’, on a given occasion of utterance, is the speaker’s perceptual acquainting sense? We can distinguish two components of this sense, one occasion-invariant and the other occasion-variant, but isn’t our theory, the Emend’d Husserlian Theory, near-sighted and incomplete if it doesn’t recognize that these two senses are really constituents of a single sense that plays the basic role in demonstrative reference? Such a theory is the Theory of Demonstrative Sense, to which we now turn.

VI. DEMONSTRATIVE SENSES

On a broadly Fregean or Husserlian semantics, an important function of the sense of an expression is to determine the referent of the expression. But is the referent of ‘this’ on a given occasion determined by either its generic sense or its specific sense on that occasion? Evidently not. The generic sense cannot determine the referent, as it is too impoverished in content, too skeletal and indeterminate. And the specific sense, the X in the content of the speaker’s perception, does not in itself determine the referent. For the X is only a separable component of the acquainting sense of the perception, a token of the object determined somehow through the inner workings of the acquainting sense. I wish to propose that it is the acquainting sense in

the content of the speaker's perception that determines the referent of 'this' on a given occasion of utterance. But this "determination" takes some spelling out and requires some revision of the traditional, Fregean view of a sense's determining a referent.

When it is said the sense of an expression *determines* the referent, that is usually understood to mean or to imply that the referent is a function of the sense, or that the relation of senses to referents is many-one. Suppose we understand it so. Now, the referent of 'this' on a given occasion, I want to say, is determined by the acquainting sense of a speaker's perception. Thence, the referent is a function of the speaker's acquainting sense. And so the acquainting sense must vary with the referent. That is, whenever the referents are different on different occasions of utterance, the acquainting senses must be different. (It might even be suggested, further, that an acquainting sense is unique to an occasion of perception, or to a perception, somewhat as an individual essence is unique to an individual.)

But there is something wrong with this line of argument. For different perceptions may share the same acquainting sense and yet have different objects (I'll expand on this in a moment). So different utterances of 'this' may involve the same acquainting sense in different underlying perceptions and yet refer to different objects. Thus, the referent of 'this' on a given occasion, being the object of the speaker's perception on that occasion, cannot be a function of the speaker's acquainting sense. So it seems the referent cannot be *determined* by the speaker's acquainting sense.

Nonetheless, I do think that, in an appropriate sense, the referent is determined by the speaker's acquainting sense, even though it is not simply a function thereof. What then does this "determination" consist in, if not in a many-one relation between acquainting senses and objects? What needs examination is the relation between the acquainting sense of a perception and the object of the perception. That is a topic of intentionality theory, in its own right the topic of another essay.

What we must appreciate is the special character of the content of a perception. Acquainting senses are intrinsically *demonstrative* senses, senses that "point" to an object currently before one, that is, at a certain location before the person having a perception whose content is or includes the given acquainting sense. The demonstrative character of acquainting senses consists in two features to be explained: their *occasional* nature and their *perspectival* nature.

Phenomenologically indistinguishable experiences have the same content. Now, it seems clear that two perceptions may be phenomenologically indistinguishable, and so have the same acquainting sense, but yet have different objects because the perceptions occur on different occasions where different objects confront the respective

perceivers. This is a fundamental fact of the intentionality of perception, and it should prompt us to recognize a fundamental and perhaps surprising trait of acquainting senses. Namely, an acquainting sense picks out an object only when inhering in a particular act of perception. Specifically, when inhering in a particular perception it picks out, and so determines, the object appropriately before the given perceiver *on the occasion* of the given perception. By contrast, the concept or sense expressed by a definite description seems to do its work independently of the occasion of an act whose content it belongs to. For uniformity of theory we should probably say a descriptive sense too determines an object only when set in an act on a given occasion. But a descriptive sense will determine the same object in any act on any occasion, whereas an acquainting sense may determine different objects in different acts on different occasions. Thus, an acquainting sense is *occasional* in that the object it determines when inhering in an act occurring on a given occasion depends on that occasion. Acquainting senses, then, bring a complication to the “determination” of object by content, namely, relativity to an occasion of consciousness. (Parts VII and VIII pursue some ontological ramifications regarding this determination.)

An acquainting sense is also *perspectival* in that it appeals to a particular spatial perspective on the object it prescribes. Acquainting senses share the generic structure of spatial presentation oriented about the location of the perceiver’s body (especially his nose or a point between his eyes). But each particular acquainting sense singles out a specific location in the presented spatial field, at a certain distance in a certain direction from the location of the perceiver’s body, and it prescribes the object at that location on the occasion of the perception. In this consists the perspectival character of the acquainting sense.

Given our account of the demonstrative character of acquainting senses, we can now form a straightforward theory of the sense of ‘this’. On a given occasion of utterance, the sense of ‘this’ is simply the acquainting sense in the speaker’s perception of the referent. ‘This’ takes but one type of sense, an acquainting sense, which may vary with the occasion of utterance. And the acquainting sense it takes on a given occasion determines the referent on that occasion, in the manner discussed. It is this theory of demonstrative reference *via* acquainting sense we call the Theory of Demonstrative Sense, or of Demonstrative Reference *via* Demonstrative Sense.

Given this theory, what are we to make of the “generic” and “specific” senses of ‘this’ observed in the previous section? As observed, the proposed generic sense of ‘this’ and the proposed specific sense of ‘this’ on a given occasion of utterance are two constituents of the speaker’s acquainting sense on that occasion. Certainly these compo-

nents of the acquainting sense should be acknowledged by our theory. But moreover, they are worthy of special note because of their roles in communication.

It may be argued with some plausibility that the sense properly *expressed* by a speaker in saying 'this' on a given occasion is not the full acquainting sense in his underlying perception but only the X in that acquainting sense, for all the speaker seeks to get across to a hearer is a sense of the intended referent "itself" and neither descriptive nor perspectival content in his perception. The acquainting sense is then *presupposed* but not expressed by the speaker, and the proper specific sense, being that which is primarily expressed, is the X inhering in the speaker's perception, in its acquainting sense. Now, the hearer knows the X expressed is that in the acquainting sense in the speaker's perception. But the hearer cannot share that acquainting sense on the occasion of utterance, because he cannot then be precisely in the speaker's shoes and so cannot be having a perception presenting the referent (veridically) from the speaker's perspective. Communication *via* demonstratives is subtler, then, than the simple conveyance of a sense from speaker to hearer. Instead, the hearer must "triangulate" the speaker's acquainting sense and thereby grasp the sense expressed, the X in the speaker's acquainting sense. This he does by a survey of the scene of the occasion of perception, bearing in mind the generic character of perception, which is precisely the general structure of an acquainting sense recognized as the generic sense of 'this'.¹⁸

Our distinction of generic and specific senses for 'this' was originally motivated by intuitive tugs both toward a meaning that does not vary with the occasion of utterance and toward a meaning that does so vary. With the Demonstrative Sense theory we can now bring into sharper focus the pattern of variance of specific sense. Since the specific sense is the X in the speaker's acquainting sense, we ask: How does acquainting sense vary from one occasion of perception (and utterance) to the next, given the variation of object perceived (and referred to)? Well, different perceptions on different occasions may have different acquainting senses and have either the same object (viewed from different perspectives) or different objects. Or they may have the same acquainting sense and have either the same object or different objects (which appear the same). So there is no correlation between identity of object perceived (and referred to) and identity of acquainting sense *per se*. Now, the X in a perceptual content is supposed to stand for the object perceived (referred to) "itself", the object before the perceiver (speaker) on the occasion of perception. It sounds, then, as if the X must vary with the object perceived, as if the X's must differ if the objects differ on different occasions. But how can this be? Where the objects are different but the acquainting sense is the same, the X

must be the same; for the X is but a constituent of the acquainting sense. Indeed, where there is no phenomenological difference between perceptions in point of acquainting content, there is no phenomenological difference in point of the presented object “itself”. So the specific sense of ‘this’ does not vary one-to-one with the referent. The most we can say is that the X-inhering-in-the-speaker’s-perception—as it were, his passing, instantiated sense of the object before him—varies with the referent.

It has been a key observation that perceptions may be phenomenologically indistinguishable—and so may share the same acquainting sense—and yet have different objects. This observation was inspired by an observation of Kaplan’s, which relates to one by Putnam and with license runs as follows.¹⁹ A pair of twins, we may suppose, are in the very same psychological state when both say simultaneously, “I am the smarter”. To be exacting, we may suppose their assiduously fair parents gave them the very same upbringing, so that their inner diaries read exactly the same including their most recent respective entries. Then, in our terms, the twins are now expressing phenomenologically indistinguishable thoughts. Yet they are thinking of and referring to distinct persons: each is thinking of and speaking of himself. What Kaplan has observed is the occasional character of self-awareness and self-reference. It is tempting to conclude from the occasional character of perception or of self-awareness that the referent of ‘this’ or of ‘I’ is not determined by the phenomenological content of the speaker’s consciousness, or that the meaning of ‘this’ or ‘I’ isn’t “in the head”.²⁰ I have offered a theory to the contrary. I have sought to show how the occasional character of perception and of demonstrative reference can be articulated in a theory that preserves, with an important twist, the view that reference is determined by sense identified with phenomenological content. We turn now to some ontological issues raised by the theory of demonstrative sense.

VII. CONTEXT, SENSE, AND REFERENT

It is commonly said that the referent of ‘this’ is determined by, or is a function of, the context or occasion of utterance—together perhaps with the meaning of ‘this’. This claim can be ontologically misleading and must be unfolded with care.

Different perceptions, we observed, may have the same acquainting sense yet different objects, as the object perceived is the object before the perceiver on the occasion of perception. It is tempting to say in consequence that the object of a perception, while not a function of the perception’s acquainting sense, is a function of the occasion of

perception together with the acquainting sense. Yet that would seem to misrepresent the ontology of perceptual acquaintance. It is not that there are two entities—an acquainting sense and an occasion of perception—consociating to point out an object; rather, there is one entity, an acquainting sense, that serves to point out an object when it inheres in a perception occurring on a given occasion. A person is perceptually acquainted with an object before him on a given occasion insofar as his perceptual experience includes as content an acquainting sense that points out that object on that occasion. This is the quasi-Husserlian theory I would offer of perceptual acquaintance. But the intentional relation of perceiver to perceived is not a four-place relation mediated by two entities, an acquainting sense and an occasion. It is rather a three-place relation between subject and object mediated by an acquainting sense; the *occasion* is not a term in the relation but is rather the occasion *on which* the relation of perceptual acquaintance obtains. And thus, the occasion is not with the acquainting sense a co-determinant of the object perceived; it is rather the occasion on which the acquainting sense points out that object.

We now see more clearly the sense in which the referent of 'this' is "determined" by the speaker's perception's acquainting sense. The occasion of a person's uttering 'this' is also the occasion of his seeing the referent. The referent is determined by his acquainting sense not in itself but, so to speak, in his perception on that occasion. That is, the referent is determined by the speaker's acquainting sense insofar as that sense inheres in the speaker's perception on the occasion of utterance. The "determination" of the referent consists, then, in the relation that obtains on the occasion of utterance between the acquainting sense inhering in the speaker's perception and the referent.

Often it is said that the referent of 'this' is determined by the *context* of utterance, or by the context together with the meaning of 'this', evidently the generic meaning. This view, as it would seem to unfold, misrepresents in several respects the way demonstrative reference is determined. To begin, the "context" of an utterance of 'this' would seem to be the physical environment of the speaker at the time of utterance, whereas the "occasion" of an utterance properly includes more: the occasion is a passing situation in which a person is in a certain physical environment, is perceptually acquainted with an object in his environment, and refers to that object by saying 'this'. Now, it is not enough to say the referent is determined by the context of utterance, for that omits altogether the speaker's perception and its content. Nor is it enough to say the referent is determined by the context together with the acquainting sense, much less the generic sense of 'this'. For it is only because the acquainting sense inheres in the speaker's perception

on the occasion of utterance that the acquainting sense determines the referent. Indeed, without this the speaker does not perceive the referent, and it is precisely his perceptual acquaintance with the referent on which the reference is founded. Thus, the view that the referent is determined by the context together with the generic meaning of 'this' is flawed on three counts. First, it is not the generic meaning but the speaker's particular acquainting sense that is needed. Second, it is not the context of utterance but the occasion proper that is needed. Third, as already explained, it is not the abstract collation of occasion and acquainting sense, much less context and generic sense, that determines the reference, but rather the acquainting sense as inhering in the speaker's perception on that occasion.

The common theory of contextual determination might be broadly rendered so as to be compatible with the theory of demonstrative sense I have proposed, so that my theory is an ontological specification of the common theory. Yet I think the common theory is more commonly understood so as to be incompatible with my theory. I think it is commonly thought that what determines the referent on a given occasion of utterance of 'this' is something outside the speaker's thought or experience, something "outside his head", namely, the referent's being physically before the speaker. Indeed, the Causal Theory would hold that the referent is that object which is causally stimulating the speaker's sense organs on the occasion of utterance. But on my theory, demonstrative reference requires a *content* in the speaker's perception whose nature it is to point out an object that is before the perceiver on the occasion of the perception—and indeed, I would add, causally affecting his senses on that occasion. The mere excitation of a person's senses does not suffice for perceptual awareness or acquaintance, and only if a person is perceptually aware of an object can he refer to it by saying 'this'.

A formal semantics or pragmatics for demonstratives *may* be committed to saying the referent of 'this' on a given occasion is a function of the occasion plus the sense of 'this'. But in the final analysis the semantics or pragmatics should be cast in a form that reflects the proper ontology of demonstrative reference.²¹

VIII. THE ONTOLOGICAL TYPE OF SENSE

Senses, we have held, are contents of thought or experience. And demonstrative senses are contents of perception through which we are acquainted with objects in our environment. Demonstrative senses differ importantly from descriptive senses in being occasional: unlike a descriptive sense, a demonstrative sense may determine different objects when inhering in different experiences or judgments. But now,

what this occasional nature comes to depends on the ontological type or category of contents. It depends on what intentionality comes to given that type, what it is for a content or sense to “inhere” in an experience and what it is for a content inhering in an experience to “determine” an object.

On one theory, contents are phenomenological characters or types of mental acts or experiences. This is the view of the early Husserl in *Logical Investigations* (V, 16ff). A content “inheres” in an act, then, insofar as it is a character or type belonging to or instantiated in the act. And how is it that content determines object, that an act is directed toward an object through or by virtue of its content? By virtue of its essence, its phenomenological character or type, an act is directed in a certain “way” toward a certain object (if such object exists). Perhaps, on such a theory, intentionality becomes a primitive product of an act’s essence. At any rate, the occasional nature of perception requires that we add to this theory the allowance that different acts of perception may be directed toward different objects even though they be of the same phenomenological type or character.

A second theory takes contents to be a kind of abstract particulars. The content of an act is, if you will, a conceptual entity that “prescribes” an object in a certain “way” and insofar determines the object of the act. The content “inheres” in the act insofar as it is “entertained” by the subject in performing the act (which is not to say it is in any way an object of awareness in the act). This is the theory of the seasoned Husserl in *Ideas*.²² The occasional nature of perception adds a new twist to this theory with the claim that perceptions in which the same content is entertained may have different objects.

The final analysis of intentionality, then, depends on the ontological type of contents, and the occasional nature of perception adds a special wrinkle to the analysis. The theory of contents as phenomenological characters or types is the simpler, more neutral theory, since these types are acknowledged on either theory. On the other hand, the theory of contents as abstract particulars may offer greater ontological insight and buttresses our familiar talk of “ideas”, “concepts”, “thoughts”, etc. But we cannot settle on a theory of contents here; I have sketched these two theories only to flesh out a bit what is required of a more complete theory of acquainting sense. Whatever the type of contents should be, we must recognize the occasional nature of acquainting senses. The theory of contents as types or characters offers no resistance. However, the theory of contents as conceptual entities requires some revision in our traditional ways of thinking, for we are not accustomed to thinking of concepts as picking out different objects when entertained on different occasions. But of course it is our custom to think of concepts expressible by definite descriptions.

IX. DEMONSTRATIVES AND INDEXICALS

We've addressed only the use of 'this' to refer to an object of visual perception. How can the Theory of Demonstrative Sense be extended to other uses of 'this' and to 'I', 'now', 'here', etc.?

Other modes of perception than vision in which one is acquainted with an object have a different generic phenomenological content. Yet a similar analysis applies. In touch one is presented with an object with certain tactile qualities in a certain spatial location with respect to one's body and bodily parts. Embodying this generic mode of presentation is the generic content or sense of tactile acquaintance. In a concrete case of tactile perception, with the tactile details filled in (as well as the details of kinesthetic awareness of body attitude), the perception has a tactual, as opposed to a visual, acquainting sense. It is a demonstrative sense, being both occasional and perspectival; and it includes as components the generic tactual sense and an X presenting, on the given occasion, the touched object "itself". When I say, groping about in the dark, "Ah, this is the flashlight", my utterance of 'this' has a tactual demonstrative sense including a generic sense and an X.

Similarly, hearing an object—say, hearing the dog, whimpering to be let in—may have an auditory demonstrative sense, which may be invoked by saying 'this'. But the human sensory faculties are not all on a par. Taste and smell, and often hearing too, may not offer enough information to constitute perceptual acquaintance with an object at hand, or at nose or ear. Then the perceptual experience may still warrant a demonstrative reference: "What is that I smell? Is it sage?" But the phenomenological content will be very limited, and the prescribed object of awareness perhaps a mere "sense-datum". A proper analysis of demonstrative sense and reference in these cases will require a proper phenomenological analysis of these experiences and their intentionality, an analysis we cannot pursue here.

Terms like 'this', 'I', 'now', etc., whose referents are somehow "indicated" on the occasion of utterance, are collectively called "indexical" expressions, following C. S. Peirce.²³ Now, it has been proposed, by Kaplan and perhaps others, that "demonstratives" like 'this' differ importantly from "pure" indexicals like 'I'.²⁴ For the referent of 'this' is fixed in part by a "demonstration" of the referent: the speaker's pointing to the object perhaps and, as I would stress, the speaker's witnessing the referent. Whereas referring to oneself by saying 'I' requires no such demonstration: the speaker needn't point to himself, spread his arms in a theatrical display, or otherwise call attention to himself by bodily gesture. Nor, I think Kaplan and also Perry might hold,²⁵ need the speaker suffer a distinctive discrete experience of self-presentation. I do not wish to contest this interesting distinction, though I am not completely convinced of it. Granting it, I want to ask

how the Theory of Demonstrative Sense would be extended to cover pure indexicals like 'I'.

Consonant with the distinction, we might hold that the phenomenological content of self-acquaintance on which self-reference is founded is the same content in each instance of self-awareness. This content is an acquainting sense. Inhering in a particular act or state of self-awareness, it determines the subject himself. It coincides with the generic sense of 'I', as there is no more to the acquainting sense by way of content that plays a role in determining the subject. And it includes an X presenting in a given instance the person "himself". Since that same generic self-acquainting sense may pick out different persons when inhering in different states of self-awareness, it is an "occasional" sense, if you will, an *indexical* sense. But unlike a demonstrative sense, it involves no special "perspective" on oneself, as one is always at the "origin" of one's "life-world". Thus, we might say a pure indexical like 'I' has an indexical sense, where a demonstrative like 'this' has on any occasion of utterance a demonstrative sense. I would caution, however, that this result rests on phenomenological observations that I am not sure are accurate.

X. OTHER THEORIES OF THE MEANING OF 'THIS'

It will be helpful ever so briefly to compare and contrast the theory I have offered with certain related theories. The pioneering theories of Husserl and Kaplan, keenly felt in the motivation of my theory, command our comment, along with related proposals by John Perry. And our attention is due Hector-Neri Castañeda's intriguing theory, which can be seen as a parallel to my theory within a Meinongian, as opposed to my Husserlian, approach to intentionality.

Our Proto Theory distinguishing two types of meaning for 'this' was launched by Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* (1900-01).²⁶ Terms like 'this', 'I', 'now' Husserl called "essentially occasional expressions". Their constant and variant meanings he called respectively their "indicating" and "indicated" meanings. A bit of rational reconstruction finds these to be the generic and specific senses we observed earlier: the generic content of the speaker's perception and the X in the content of his perception. The result is what we called the Emend'd Husserlian Theory, a stepping stone to my Theory of Demonstrative Sense. Husserl did not, however, articulate the structure of content we called an acquainting sense (though no doubt the materials were at his disposal). Nor did he observe the occasional nature of the content of a perception, but he did observe its perspectival nature and the role thereof in demonstrative reference was charted by his disciple Aron Gurwitsch.²⁷ Most fundamentally, I have followed Husserl in seeking

the foundation of demonstrative reference in perception and in identifying meanings with phenomenological contents of thought or experience.

More recently, and independently, our Proto Theory has been sharply articulated in Kaplan's definitive logic of demonstratives (1972, 1977).²⁸ The constant and variant meanings of 'this' Kaplan calls "character" and "content". Formally, the *character* of 'this' is represented by the function that assigns to a given context (or occasion) of utterance a content, and the *content* in a given context is represented by the function that assigns to each possible world a fixed individual, the individual appropriately demonstrated in the given context. Now, these representations serve the technical pursuits of the theory, with impressive results indeed, but they do not tell us what character and content are or what are the roles of character and content in the speaker's awareness of the referent. For Kaplan, the content of 'this' in a given context is to be simply the *individual* demonstrated in that context, and the content of 'This is Φ ' in a context is to be the *singular proposition* of this individual's being Φ . It is perfectly open to Kaplan to hold that the "content" of 'this' is the object of the speaker's perception, and he does hold the "content" of 'This is Φ ' to be the object of the speaker's belief and assertion in saying 'This is Φ '. (Of course, Kaplan uses 'content' differently than we have.)

Notice that Kaplan's basic theory includes one less "meaning" entry for 'This is Φ ' than does the Emend'd Husserlian Theory. In addition to a generic sense perhaps like "character" and a singular proposition that is the object of the speaker's belief, the Husserlian theory assigns to 'This is Φ ' a phenomenological content consisting of an X and the predicate-sense " Φ ", a "singular thought", if you will. Kaplan assigns two types of "meaning": a character and a singular proposition (the object of the speaker's belief). Whereas the Husserlian theory assigns three types of "meaning" entities: a generic sense and a singular thought (both structures of the phenomenological content of the speaker's belief or judgment and properly called meanings or senses) and a singular proposition (the object of the speaker's belief). Recall that my observation of the occasional nature of demonstrative senses was inspired by an observation of Kaplan's; Kaplan's observation is a part not of his logic of demonstratives but of an "epistemology" of demonstrative reference—as I would put it, an account of the intentionality underlying demonstrative reference.

Kaplan hasn't clearly specified what "character" will be. To play in effect the part of Kaplan's "character", John Perry has proposed as the constant sense of 'this' what he calls its "role", the *rule* that assigns to an occasion of utterance a certain object, of course the object demonstrated on that occasion.²⁹ This proposal may suggest a rather different

approach to the meaning of 'this' than I have followed. The generic meaning of 'this' might be taken to be not a common content of the speaker's awareness of the referent, but a rule (or perhaps instead a concept) the *hearer* uses to ascertain the referent on the occasion of utterance. It seems to me, however, that such a view would be wrong-headed because it offers no part to generic meaning in the speaker's awareness of the referent.³⁰ To be sure, an account of the hearer's understanding of 'this' is needed; but the generic meaning of 'this' ought to find a natural place in the speaker's "intention" of the referent, and the "role" of 'this' seems to have no such place.

Perry himself, though, addressed the speaker's thinking in saying 'This is Φ '. The *sense* of 'This is Φ ' is its role, the rule assigning to an occasion of utterance the *thought* expressed on that occasion, which is the "information" expressed. "Sense" and "thought" are Perry's proposals for the two types of meaning assigned the sentence. And the speaker *apprehends* the thought *through* the sense, Perry holds. So the sense plays a mediating part in the speaker's consciousness. Now, it seems to me Perry has said just the right thing about perhaps the wrong entities. If thoughts as information are singular propositions or states of affairs, then indeed the speaker apprehends the "thought" consisting in the demonstrated object's being Φ . However, if thoughts as information are the Husserlian "singular thoughts" and so are a type of phenomenological contents, then they are not apprehended in asserting that "this is Φ ". For they are not objects but contents of assertion, which are apprehended only in phenomenological or semantic reflection. In any case, the "role" of 'This is Φ ' plays no proper part in the speaker's apprehending the proposition he asserts.

In spite of his proposal of senses as roles, I think Perry is headed toward a different theory. Supporting the Kaplanesque observation with deft examples, Perry holds that people may express different "thoughts"—or assert different propositions—on different occasions by uttering the same sentence 'This is Φ ' with the same fixed sense while said speakers are in the same psychological state. Thus, it is sense and not thought as information, Perry urges, that aligns with psychological state. Now, it seems to me that what Perry is heading for as sense is just the generic phenomenological content of thinking "This is Φ ", identified on the simplest view with phenomenological character or type. Then Perry would have just the theory put forth by Husserl in *Logical Investigations* but importantly enriched with the occasional nature of the content or "character" expressed by 'This is Φ ': a person intends, or apprehends, a singular state of affairs or proposition through a sense that just is the phenomenological character or type expressed by 'This is Φ '. Kaplan has been sympathetic to such a position (in discussion), and I understand Perry has subsequently moved toward such a position.

We turn finally to a fascinating theory put forth by Castañeda.³¹ This theory has a great advantage from my point of view, for it is developed in union with a theory of perception and its intentionality. Castañeda begins with a quasi-Meinongian ontology of objects and “guises”. A facet, or guise, is a bundle of properties formed into a sort of particular (as opposed to a complex property) akin to what Meinong called an “incompletely determined” object. An object—in particular, a physical object—is then a bundle of guises, the “consubstantiation” of those guises that cohere to form an object. Consciousness just is intentionality, for Castañeda, and his view of intentionality is also quasi-Meinongian: consciousness consists in a person’s being directed toward a guise. In particular, perception consists basically in a person’s apprehending a perceptual guise.³² “The *total* physical object is never before the consciousness of the perceiver”³³, so the proper object of a perception is always a finite facet or guise and never a physical object itself. Thus, a person sees a physical object only indirectly, as it were, insofar as he sees a perceptual guise belonging to the object. In effect, “content” and “object” of thought collapse, and sense and referent collapse. The meaning of a definite description “referring” to a physical object is a guise, and this is the proper referent of the term. The guise is distinct from the object but a facet thereof; and reference, like thought and perception, reaches the object only indirectly insofar as it reaches the guise.

For Castañeda, the meaning—or referent—of ‘this’ is a “demonstrative” guise, a perceptual guise formed from a “demonstrative” property specifying a spatiotemporal position in the speaker’s perceptual field. ‘This’ expresses a guise including

a demonstrative property that is in a guise core, namely, the property of being presented in some perceptual field. This generic property contains a blank, so to speak, that is to be filled in, or specified, once the perceptual field is selected. The determined properties expressed . . . are determined not only by the person who perceives and his/her position in physical spacetime, but also by a modality of perception, that is, whether the field is visual, or tactual, etc.³⁴

The determined property of being at a certain position in a certain perceptual field varies with the perception, and so the guise that is the meaning of ‘this’ varies with the utterance. (On this we expand in a moment.) But the generic property of which the determined property is a specification remains the same for different utterances.

Castañeda’s theory bears some salient similarities to the Emend’d Husserlian Theory. First, the meaning of ‘this’ on a given occasion is part of the “content” of the speaker’s perception of the referent, insofar as guises are a counterpart of the Husserlian notion of

phenomenological content. Second, the meaning of 'this' varies with the utterance but includes a generic meaning shared by different utterances. A salient difference is that the Husserlian view posits an X type of meaning in the content of a perception, which on my reconstruction is the specific meaning of 'this' on a given occasion, whereas Castañeda acknowledges no comparable item of "meaning". The notion of X seems to suggest that objects are presented as "substrata", though I think it does not require this, whereas objects for Castañeda are bundles of guises with no guise-structure resembling a substrate.

But does Castañeda's theory permit the important possibility that on different occasions people may refer to different objects by saying 'this' and yet express the same meaning? In Castañeda's framework, can people see and so refer to or express the same demonstrative guise on different occasions where it is a facet of, a guise belonging to, different physical objects? Evidently, no. Launching the paragraph from which we quoted, Castañeda says:

... each demonstrative expression acquires a full denotation or sense that varies from utterance to utterance, if it is used to refer to clearly different items in the same perceptual space, or to items in different perceptual spaces of the the same perceiver.

And what if different perceivers refer to or express items—demonstrative guises—in their respective perceptual fields? Then, I gather, they express different demonstrative guises, for a demonstrative guise is restricted to the perceptual field in which it occurs and different perceptions have different perceptual fields. This is how I understand Castañeda, though I am not sure he has committed himself on the point at issue. A perceptual field he conceives as a system of singular propositions or states of affairs involving demonstrative guises' exemplifying perceptual properties. Each field has its own spacetime, which is different from physical spacetime. Demonstrative guises are particulars occurring in perceptual fields. Since the spacetimes of different fields are disjoint, demonstrative guises in different fields are unconnected and so presumably they are distinct (though they might be facets of the same physical object). Now, different perceptions evidently have different perceptual fields: a single perceiver apprehends different fields at different times; and different perceivers apprehend different fields if only because they cannot be in the same place at the same time. And so the same demonstrative guise cannot be seen, and thence referred to or expressed, on different occasions.³⁵

Thus, Castañeda's theory does not recognize an "occasional" character in the demonstrative "content" of a perception, a character such that the same demonstrative content may be involved in perceptions of

distinct physical objects. This may well be appropriate since the demonstrative “content” of a perception is here a demonstrative “facet” of the physical object perceived (if the perception is veridical). What remains of occasionality in Castañeda’s framework is the possibility of a perfect isomorphism between the guises apprehended in different perceptions even though the guises are distinct and belong to different physical objects.

My differences with Castañeda’s theory are essentially my differences with the Meinongian approach to intentionality.³⁶ First, the Meinongian locates differences of phenomenological structure on the level of the *object* of thought rather than the level of *contents* of thought, as in the Husserlian approach I prefer. “Content” becomes, as it were, an aspect of the object rather than the act of thought. Similarly, a Naive or Russellian or Meinongian semantics marks differences of meaning on the level of referent where a Fregean or Husserlian semantics marks them on the level of sense (recall part IV). Second, for the strict Meinongian, consciousness really grasps only aspects of physical objects, “incomplete” objects or “guises” as you will, and not physical objects themselves. Thus, for Castañeda, perception and demonstrative reference take only demonstrative guises as their proper objects, where I would insist perception and demonstrative reference properly reach physical objects themselves. In response, Castañeda could say the guise perceived *is* the physical object (if the perception is veridical) and insofar perception reaches the object itself; the guise *is* the object in one sense of ‘is’ explicated as consubstantiation.³⁷ Thus, Castañeda fares better than Meinong on this score, provided Castañeda’s larger ontology is accepted. I would add that my intuitions run counter to some points in Castañeda’s ontology regarding identity, individuation, and individuals as bundles of guises, but these points are separable from the two preceding issues of intentionality.

It seems to me that, within the quasi-Meinongian ontology and intentionality theory Castañeda offers, Castañeda’s account of perception and demonstrative reference is accurately and perceptively drawn. His account recognizes demonstrative guises parallel to the demonstrative senses I described, as well as a generic demonstrative property parallel to the generic sense of ‘this’ I observed *à la* Husserl. It does not recognize a guise-element parallel to an X as a specific sense of ‘this’, but it is Castañeda’s considered ontology that precludes this element. Importantly, where I described an occasional character in demonstrative senses, Castañeda’s account does not recognize a parallel character of demonstrative guises; but probably it should not, taking an approach that seeks “meaning” on the level of referent and phenomenological structure on the level of objects of thought.

The Meinongian approach seems most implausible to me precisely for the case of perception, and therewith demonstrative reference. On Meinong's theory, as Findlay observed, "All reference to objects [or intention] is like a shot in the dark."³⁸ But perception is anything but a shot in the dark. Seeing an object in the clear light of day, one is aware of the object itself, though it be given perspectively and occasionally. Perception is *acquaintance par excellence*, and (*contra* Russell) we are acquainted with physical objects. Now, if Castañeda's position is acceptable, that the perceived guise *is* in a way the physical object to which it belongs, then in a way Castañeda's theory allows that perception is genuine acquaintance with physical objects (where veridical). And then his theory of perception and demonstrative reference works, as does the theory I have put forth. A preference will then be born of an assessment of simplicity, economy, etc.

I hope these comparative remarks have helped to locate in philosophical space the theory of demonstrative sense I have proposed and to indicate at strategic points why I think that theory is the way to go.³⁹

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NOTES

¹Cf. Smith [31] and [32].

²Cf. Husserl [18], VI, §5, p. 684; Kaplan [22], as well as lectures from 1971 on; and Russell [30], pp. 20 0-201.

³I draw on Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, as in Russell [27], but I assume with common sense that we are acquainted with physical objects. Both Husserl and Russell, as cited in note 2, stress that demonstrative reference requires perceptual acquaintance and does not appeal to description.

⁴Cf. Kaplan [20], [22]; Perry [25]; and Husserl [18], I §26, and VI, §5.

⁵See Husserl [18], I, §26, VI, §5; and Kaplan [20], [22]. Similar views are found in Stalnaker [36] and earlier in Cartwright [5].

⁶Cf. Frege [14], p. 57, and Husserl [18], V, §16ff, and Husserl [19], §§88ff, 130-131. On Husserl's account of meaning and reference see McIntyre and Smith [24] or Smith and McIntyre [34], Chapter IV.

⁷See Bolzano [2] on subjective idea (*Vorstellung*), objective idea, and object; Frege [14] on idea or presentation (*Vorstellung*), sense (*Sinn*), and referent (*Bedeutung*); and

Husserl [18] on act, content, and object, or Husserl [19] on act or *noesis*, *noema*, and object; Twardowski [37]; and on Meinong, Findlay [12], Chapter I.

⁸See Smith and McIntyre [35] for a brief account of the theory or [34], Chapters III and IV, for a more detailed account. The analogy is central to Dagfinn Føllesdal's interpretation of Husserl, basics of which appear in his [13].

⁹See Kaplan [21]; Findlay [12], Chapter III, on Meinong on incomplete objects; also, see my discussion in part X below of Castañeda's views.

¹⁰Castañeda urges the contrary view. Cf. part X below.

¹¹In lecture and discussion.

¹²Cf. Lewis [23], which however involves some differences from the framework I have outlined. Of course, a semantics like that of content and object might be extracted from Husserl [28], with some differences of detail perhaps.

¹³The picture is found in Husserl. Cf. Smith and McIntyre [34], Chapter IV, or [33].

¹⁴But see the discussion in part X of Castañeda [6].

¹⁵Cf. Husserl [29], §131.

¹⁶See Smith [32] for details.

¹⁷See Smith [32].

¹⁸Related problems lie behind Castañeda's observations about "indicators and quasi-indicators" in his [6], [7], and [8]. However, where my concerns are with demonstrative reference (where 'this' occurs outside belief contexts) and with the intentionality underlying such reference, Castañeda's concerns in those papers were with the formal-mode counterparts thereof in the behavior of "quasi-indicators" like 'he himself' in contexts like 'Hector believes this _____. It is difficult to extract from his remarks on quasi-indicators either a semantics or pragmatics for indexicals generally or a theory of intentionality for "indexical" judgments or assertions. Consequently, his [9] is most welcome, as it offers an overtly ontological theory of the intentionality of perception and indexical beliefs. That theory we discuss in part X below.

¹⁹Kaplan presented the observation in lecture and in discussion in 1976. It appears in his [22]. The same observation is made by Hilary Putnam in his [27] on p. 234 and is traced to lectures he gave in 1968 (see p. 233, footnote). Kaplan has reported in conversation that he came to the observation from his own direction independently. The observation and a like example, applied to perception as well as indexical reference, appears too in Clark [1973], p. 49, independently of Kaplan's and Putnam's observations.

²⁰Putnam has made essentially this point about the meaning of natural kind and substance terms, in which terms he finds an element of indexicality. Cf. his [22] and [27], especially pp. 223-227 and 229-235. In the latter on p. 234, he explicitly addresses this point to indexical words like 'I'. "For these words," he says (p. 234), "no one has ever suggested the traditional theory that 'intension determines extension.'" With very important qualifications, someone now has.

²¹Kaplan's formal machinery, which we discuss in part X below, might suggest an ontological view in conflict with what I have said, but I think it does not *require* any such view. The most forceful line of argument that seems to run contrary to my theory of demonstrative sense and to embody views like those I've criticized in this section, is Putnam's in his [27], especially pp. 219-235. However, I think Putnam's perceptive considerations do not *require* a theory contrary to mine (though he may disagree). I think I have shown how to accommodate Putnam's and Kaplan's observations within the traditional views that meanings are psychological or phenomenological contents (of an intersubjective sort) and that meanings determine reference even for indexical terms. Tyler Burge in his [3] urges a contextual analysis of *de re* beliefs that may seem committed to a view like those I've criticized here (as for beliefs expressible by use of indexical terms). But again, I think his considerations do not require a theory contrary to mine (though he may disagree).

²²Cf. Føllesdal [13], McIntyre and Smith [24], and Smith and McIntyre [34], Chapters III and IV.

²³For an account of Peirce's theory, see Burks [4].

²⁴Cf. Kaplan [22].

²⁵See the discussion in response to Frege on 'I' and privileged modes of self-presentation, in Perry [25] as well as Kaplan [22].

²⁶Again, the theory is found in Husserl [18], I, §26, and VI, §5. For a full study thereof, see Smith [31].

²⁷Cf. Gurwitsch [16].

²⁸Again, cf. Kaplan [20], [22]. My understanding of Kaplan's views has benefited also from several lectures I have heard him give on demonstratives.

²⁹My discussion of Perry's views here is based on Perry [25].

³⁰Husserl considered and rejected the hearer-oriented account in favor of the speaker-oriented account. See Husserl [18], VI, §5, and Smith [31] for comment thereon.

³¹My discussion of Castañeda's theory is based on his [9].

³²For simplicity let us treat intention for Castañeda as a relation between a person and a guise. Castañeda wants, though, to incorporate also features of the modal view of propositional attitudes that derives from Hintikka. Cf. Castañeda [9], pp. 333-336.

³³Castañeda [9], p. 300.

³⁴Castañeda [9], p. 321.

³⁵This summary of Castañeda's views is drawn from pp. 301-309 of his [9]. On p. 305 he postulates one visual space for each perceiver at each time; he does not explicitly say he means to require *distinct* visual spaces for any two perceiver-time pairs. Half a page later he says:

... each position *pt* in physical spacetime together with a perceiver at *pt* determines an internally organized visual space. This commitment leaves it open whether several perceivers can be located at the same position *pt*. This would be the case of a body with multiple personalities acting simultaneously.

Again, he does not explicitly require distinct visual fields for any two perceiver-position pairs. Now, visual fields are parts of reality and not in the mind, and they can overlap with physical reality and demonstrative guises can be facets of physical objects. It would be natural then to allow that different perceivers *could* be presented with the same visual field, including a given demonstrative particular, *if* they could be in the same place at the same time. But since, under normal circumstances at least, two perceivers cannot be in the same place at the same time, it would likewise be natural to assume they cannot then be presented with the same visual field. Thus, it seems different perceptions have different perceptual fields.

³⁶See Smith [33]. The contrast between the Husserlian and the Meinongian approaches to intentionality, representing the two principal approaches, is detailed in Smith and McIntyre [34].

³⁷Cf. Castañeda [9], pp. 322-323.

³⁸Findlay [12], p. 184.

³⁹Since this paper was written, Perry's influential paper "The Problem of the Essential Indexical", *Nous* 13 (1979), has appeared: Perry there moved toward the theory I herein projected for him. The theory I outlined here has been extended in some respects in my "Indexical Sense and Reference", *Synthese* 49 1 (1981).