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
Data Availability

The data associated with this publication are available at:
<https://belonging.berkeley.edu/2017-inclusiveness-index-raw-data-sets>

Measuring Global Inclusion and Marginality

2017

inclusiveness index



This report is published by the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley

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Supplemental Content

Additional info on methodology, case studies, maps, videos, infographics, and the entire data set is available at haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex. The full report and database are online at haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/islamophobia

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Introduction

Even more so than when we launched our inaugural Inclusiveness Index report in August 2016, there is a much greater and sharper appreciation of the role of inter-group dynamics in shaping the political, economic and cultural environments we inhabit. Fears of demographic and cultural change intersect with historical patterns of inter-group conflict to inflame fragile societies and engender political instability. To take but one example, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar has spiraled further into large-scale ethnic cleansing and forced displacement. Inclusion and exclusion, tribalism and fear of the “other” has become increasingly central to understanding our current moment.

After several years of incubation, we developed the [Haas Institute Inclusiveness Index](#) as a tool to holistically measure the degree of inclusivity or marginality experienced by different groups in different places. In particular, we look at gender, race/ethnicity, religion, disability, and sexual orientation as our primary social cleavages. We examine how nationstates and states within the United States fare in terms of inclusion both in relative and absolute terms.

Our [Inclusiveness Index](#) is uniquely focused on the degree of inclusion and marginality rather than a more general assessment of group-based well-being. Inclusivity entails greater access to power and public and private resources, and improves the way society views group members. Inclusivity is realized when historically or currently marginalized groups feel valued, when differences are respected, and when basic and fundamental needs and rights—relative to those societies' dominant groups—are met and recognized. Our Index focuses on social groups rather than individuals or even communities, as marginality often occurs as a result of group membership.

In addition to telling us something about how inclusive various societies are, the [Inclusiveness Index](#) serves as a diagnostic tool that helps us identify places and societies that are improving in terms of providing a more inclusive polity and set of institutions, and those places where societies are fracturing, and becoming more divided along these lines. The data tells the main story, but we also seek to surface stories and trends that lie beneath the data.

Thus, our “findings & themes” sections looks for patterns or stories that need to be told regarding inclusivity across the globe and within the United States. Last year, the global migration crisis was front and center. This year, we focus on the rise of ethno-nationalist political leaders and movements in terms of promoting a less inclusive set of stories and institutional arrangements.

As always, a word of caution: Our rankings are not the final word on inclusivity nor a definitive assessment of any national or state performance, but intended to spark a conversation and generate further inquiry into how and why some places, communities, and nations are more inclusive than others.

Additional information about this initiative, including past reports and complete downloadable data files, is available at [haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/ inclusivenessindex](https://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex).

Inclusiveness Indicators

Developing an index that is capable of measuring inclusivity and marginality across many of the full range of human differences is an immense challenge. Our Inclusiveness Index attempts to meet this challenge by selecting universal indicators that reflect group-based marginality in any context. In addition, the Inclusiveness Index relies on datasets for those indicators that can be measured across a range of social groupings.

In developing this Index, we were guided by the conviction that multi-factor indices paint a more vivid portrait of underlying structural conditions and forms of advantage and disadvantage experienced by marginalized groups than any single indicator, such as poverty or per capita GDP.

Single indicator metrics fail to capture the myriad of inputs that shape individual and group life chances.¹ As a multi-factor index that incorporates six core indicators of inclusivity, each indicator is given a pre-assigned weight within the Inclusiveness Index.

Another practical criterion for inclusion was that each indicator had to be scalable to the global level. Developing a global country ranking would not be possible if similar data sets did not exist for a sufficient number of countries to justify a global ranking. Not only are there a multiplicity of measures across nations for similar information, but some countries track and collect datasets that others do not. We were also limited by data sets that were commensurate or comparable across geographies and national boundaries.

Finally, we wanted our indicators to reflect cultural norms, policies, laws, and institutional practices rather than economic strength or tax base capacity. Otherwise, any measure or ranking of inclusivity risks becoming a function of national wealth. In our **Inclusiveness Index**, the poorest nations on the planet are capable of faring best in terms of inclusivity, while the wealthiest are capable of faring the worst. Insofar as possible, the indicators are non-economic, and not proxies for governmental expenditures or investments in human capital, but rather reflect legal and institutional regimes.

In reviewing the range of possible indicators for our **Inclusiveness Index**, we ultimately selected the following domains that we believe reflect the inclusivity or exclusion of marginalized populations. Within these domains, we selected indicators that measure how various demographic subgroups fare, including: gender, LGBTQ populations, people with disabilities, and racial, ethnic, and religious subgroups.

Outgroup Violence

Outgroup violence is a direct indicator of group marginalization and oppression. Disproportionate violence suffered by discrete social groups reflects animus towards those groups as well as group vulnerability. For example, in the United States, lynching of African Americans in the early twentieth century or assaults on LGBT people in more recent decades reflects both animus as well as vulnerability. This is also true internationally, where ethnic or religious conflict may result in violence and fatalities, with ethnic cleansing and genocide being an extreme expression.²

Political Representation

Political representation and the extent to which citizens are able to participate in governance is another strong indicator of group-based marginality or relative inclusion. In democratic societies, ethnic, racial, or religious majorities are capable of outvoting minority groups in electoral politics. This can result in under-representation of minority groups.

Similarly, if certain groups are marginalized within a society, even if they are not a numerical minority, we might also expect members of those groups to be under-represented in electoral politics. If members of certain groups, such as women or religious or racial minorities, are consistently under-represented in elected groups, that is often suggestive of marginality. Although there may be limited choices ideologically or between political affiliation and party membership in some nations, there may still be a choice among social group membership. Political representation among appointed representatives is less indicative of marginality than representation among elected representatives because, in the case of appointments, democratic majorities lack direct say.

Income Inequality

Group-level income inequality is a revealing indicator of group-based marginality. It not only reflects discrimination in the provision of educational resources, investment in human capital, and employment opportunities, but may also be indicative of discrimination in private markets and segregation in social networks.³ The degree of income inequality within a nation or state is not dependent upon the size of the economy or the wealth of a nation, but is rather a function of political institutions, cultural norms, and law.⁴ In other words, group-level income inequality does not depend on the size of the economic pie, but the distribution of that pie among groups.

Anti-Discrimination Laws

The presence of anti-discrimination laws protecting marginalized groups is another direct indicator of institutional inclusion. Examples of such laws include laws that prohibit government and private discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, disability, religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Explicit protections for marginalized populations and social groups through anti-discrimination laws reflect not only of a society's commitment to equality norms for minority or marginalized groups, but also the presence of a discriminatory problem requiring a policy and legal response. Enacting anti-discrimination laws is not an easy task, especially where a marginalized group is an unpopular minority or lacks political clout or

influence.⁵ Such laws often reflect broad consensus about the moral and practical necessity of enacting such protections.

Rates of Incarceration

Marginality and inclusivity are often most dramatically evident in a nation's use of criminal law enforcement and rates of incarceration. Criminal law reflects the cultural norms and values of the dominant group, and its enforcement through incarceration and other forms of criminal punishment are often inflected with social biases. Even in the absence of state oppression against minority or marginalized populations, incarceration rates may reflect cultural or social prejudices that disparately impact marginalized groups. Rates of incarceration more broadly reflect institutional and legal structures that impede inclusivity. Rates of incarceration vary dramatically from state to state domestically and country to country globally. Lower rates of incarceration are sometimes reflective of more inclusive cultural norms generally, and an emphasis on rehabilitation and reentry over retribution and punishment. Differential rates of incarceration across subgroups serve as an indirect measure of cultural perceptions of those subgroups and their relative social position within a society. For especially marginalized social groups, criminal law is a tool of social control that may result in higher rates of incarceration and punishment.

Immigration/Asylum Policies

Another indicator of a society's degree of inclusiveness and group-based marginality within it is the society or nation's immigration or asylum policies. These policies decisions are reflective of the values and perspectives of the society vis-à-vis the marginalized group, and how welcoming or tolerant the dominant group is of outgroups. As an example of exclusionary immigration policies, the United States infamously had Chinese Exclusion Acts, quotas on many ethnic and racial groups, and a blanket prohibition on African immigration shortly after its founding. Strains of nativism and xenophobia tend to not only reflect the openness of a society with respect to the immigrant group, but also the degree of inclusivity within a society.

Each of these indicators reveals something distinctive about a nation or state's inclusiveness. Finding data sources and measures for each indicator among many nations is a challenge, but not an impossibility. A complete list of measures used for each indicator and a description of sources is provided in the Appendix at the end of this report along with a more detailed explanation of the index calculation methodology.

Our Inclusiveness Index is a multi-factor index that is uniquely focused on the degree of inclusion and marginality rather than a more general assessment of well-being.

Multi-factor indices paint a more vivid portrait of underlying structural conditions and forms of advantage and disadvantage than single indicator approaches.


The goal of the Inclusiveness Index initiative is to identify policies, interventions, and other levers that have proven effective at ameliorating marginality and promoting inclusivity and equity.

global inclusiveness index




MAP 1

Global Inclusiveness Index Map



See the next page for rankings for the 120 countries that are scored as part of our 2017 Inclusiveness Index. Data is either missing or incomplete for 131 of countries, and are therefore omitted entirely from this year's index.

National index scores are particularly sensitive to individual indicator rankings. A very high or very low value on any given indicator may be responsible for the relative position of any given nation.



Global Inclusiveness Rankings 2017

COUNTRY NAME	SCALED SCORE*
Netherlands	100.00
Sweden	86.26
Norway	78.14
United Kingdom	68.88
Ireland	68.83
Denmark	66.54
Canada	66.37
Finland	66.30
Portugal	65.59
Germany	63.19
Belgium	60.55
Croatia	59.18
Australia	57.96
Estonia	56.72
Bolivia	56.38
Austria	55.79
Spain	55.07
Argentina	55.01
Czech Republic	54.23
South Africa	52.81
Japan	52.67
France	52.51
Italy	51.73
Switzerland	51.64
Albania	51.50
Ecuador	50.29
Serbia	50.14
Slovenia	50.01
Lithuania	49.33
Dominican Republic	49.04
Ethiopia	48.13
Fiji	47.95
Lesotho	47.82
Poland	47.74

COUNTRY NAME	SCALED SCORE*
Costa Rica	47.73
Uruguay	47.57
Tanzania	47.36
Paraguay	46.48
Cambodia	46.03
Mozambique	45.80
Madagascar	45.66
Mongolia	44.26
Senegal	44.17
Bosnia and Herzegovina	44.13
Namibia	44.10
Cyprus	43.58
Liberia	43.11
Philippines	42.90
Malawi	42.82
Burundi	42.63
Mauritius	42.34
Chile	41.57
Burkina Faso	41.13
Nicaragua	41.13
Hungary	41.08
Honduras	40.35
Colombia	40.28
Benin	39.28
Zambia	38.78
Azerbaijan	37.94
El Salvador	37.37
Togo	37.31
Cote d'Ivoire	37.04
Uganda	36.57
Latvia	36.39
Belarus	36.16



COUNTRY NAME	SCALED SCORE*
Greece	36.10
Mali	36.05
United States	35.53
Bulgaria	35.29
Sierra Leone	35.18
Zimbabwe	34.63
Ukraine	35.21
Kazakhstan	35.04
Mexico	34.97
Togo	34.80
Yemen	34.62
Peru	34.36
Slovakia	34.28
Mexico	33.69
Armenia	33.41
Chad	33.26
Romania	33.15
Papua New Guinea	32.71
Cameroon	31.05
Vietnam	30.26
Ukraine	29.70
Panama	29.16
Venezuela	29.08
Haiti	28.91
Nigeria	28.83
Bangladesh	28.47
Swaziland	28.46
Macedonia	28.34
Mauritania	28.15
East Timor	27.95
Niger	27.48
India	27.06

COUNTRY NAME	SCALED SCORE*
Brazil	26.80
China	25.88
Turkey	25.24
Indonesia	25.06
Tunisia	24.05
Central African Re- public	23.44
Sri Lanka	22.13
Thailand	22.03
Pakistan	21.47
Republic of Congo	21.40
Israel	21.23
Guatemala	19.74
Nepal	19.47
Kazakhstan	19.16
Georgia	18.87
Moldova	18.47
Guinea	18.24
Angola	17.45
Botswana	15.18
Kyrgyzstan	15.16
Tajikistan	10.45
Russia	9.69
Malaysia	8.93
Iran	3.82
Morocco	2.14
Sudan	1.18
Rwanda	0.00



*Raw scores for each indicator may be downloaded at haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

Observations on Changes

The **Inclusiveness Index** is a holistic measure of inclusivity. The scaled score is a composite measure based upon multiple indicators as well as relative performance. We seek, however, not only to assess how individual nations fare relative to one another, but how they perform relative to themselves over time. It is important not only to know how inclusive a nation is, but whether it become more inclusive or regressing. For the first time in this report, we are able to assess changes in performance from the 2016 Index. (For a full explanation of updated data sources and changes in methodology, please see Appendix C).

For the 2017 Index, we were only able to generate scores for 120 nations, compared to the 138 scores for the 2016 report. There were 23 nations from our 2016 report for which data was not available in 2017. But there were five nations for which data is now available that were not available for 2016. Many nations that have experienced the most extreme political or economic volatility are therefore absent from our index, as are many of those that have experienced the most severe forms of exclusion, such as Myanmar. Nonetheless, we observed a number of changes in the absolute and scaled scores within the Index based upon available data.

Overall, 56 of 120 nations remained in the same inclusiveness category. 22 nations improved one category (such as from low to moderate), while 28 fell one category. Six nations fell two categories (Nigeria, Vietnam, the United States, Indonesia, Israel, and Russia). One nation fell three categories (Thailand), from high to very low. More hopefully, two nations (Senegal and Latvia) rose two categories.

Global Themes and Findings

Ethno-Religious Nationalism Rising

One of the most troubling geopolitical trends over the last year has been the global rise of ethno-religious nationalism. In virtually every corner of the globe, nationalist demagogues and politicians have risen to the forefront of the political scene. More virulent than simply populists, these demagogues, and the nationalist movements that support them, are tinged with exclusionary appeals, and often target marginalized populations both within and outside their borders.

These ethno-nationalist movements and the demagogues that have risen to power or prominence with them are appearing on nearly every continent. The success of demagogic politicians all over the globe is an ominous political sign. In the West, these forces appear in the support for far-right parties in Europe and the Brexit vote, culminating in the surprising victory of Donald Trump to US presidency (see page 29 for more). In general, where demagogues have acquired power, they bring an autocratic style and an authoritarian policy agenda, including suppression of dissent, stifling of media, and a roll-back of democratic norms and the rule of law.

Europe

Although a non-binding referendum vote rather than a political campaign, the so-called “Brexit” vote held on June 23, 2016 is one of the most significant events in European Union history. The referendum asked the United Kingdom electorate whether the UK should remain a member of the European Union, a complex legal and economic union of nation-states committed to the free movement of labor and goods, and to applying a set of laws and rights protected by EU treaties. Ending a 44-year relationship with the EU, the UK ultimately voted by a slim 2 percent margin to leave the Union. The pro-“Brexit” vote was primarily led by the United Kingdom Independence Party, and its controversial leader, Nigel Farage


Critically, the Brexit vote revealed a polarized electorate. Supporters tended to be older, white, and more working class. Those that opposed the Brexit were younger, more racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse, and more urban. Pollsters found that high turnout among older white, working-class people residing in disadvantaged communities partly explained the result.⁶ Education was one of the most powerful predictors of the “leave” vote, with higher educated and more highly skilled voters voting to remain, and lower-skilled, lower-income areas more likely to vote to leave.⁷

Although mistrust of EU institutions and conventional politicians appear to have played a role, studies have further shown that concerns over immigration played a major role in motivating “leave” voters.⁸ Indeed, one of the messages of the pro-Brexit supporters was to “take back control of our borders.” It appears that anti-immigrant sentiment may have been especially appealing to communities that have been further disadvantaged in the post-industrial economy, and that these communities are both older and whiter, but also more resentful of immigration, both for economic and cultural reasons. The spate of anti-Muslim incidents studied after the vote also suggests that bigotry and fears of a cultural, racial or religious ‘other’ were additional motivating factors among the electorate.⁹

MAP 2

Resurgence of Far Right Parties in Europe

Parties with over 20 percent of the vote



The largest and most important election after Brexit was the French presidential election. After an initial vote, the two run-off candidates included Marine Le Pen, who represented the National Front, a far-right, anti-immigrant party. Ms. Le Pen garnered 21.3 percent of the vote in the initial round, giving her the second highest vote total, the highest vote total for a National Front candidate ever. In 2014, the National Front enjoyed breakthrough success, winning 25 percent of the vote in French EU elections—gaining seats in the European parliament¹⁰ and 27.7 percent of the vote in municipal elections in 2015.¹¹ In the second round of the 2017 Presidential election, however, Le Pen topped out at 33 percent of the vote, losing to Emanuel Macron.

Le Pen's support comes from a similar demographic segment as the Brexit supporters: largely white, rural, lower-income and disadvantaged by changes in the global economy. The anti-immigrant and anti-EU message appears to have appealed to those voters more, although it was similarly tinged with xenophobia and bigotry.

Another European demagogue, Geert Wilders, achieved record support but fell short in elections in the Netherlands held in May 2017.¹² His Party for Freedom party won just 13 percent of the vote, which was below expectations, compared to the success his party had in recent

years. Nonetheless, the party was projected to hold 20 out of 150 parliamentary seats, an increase of five seats. The party is not only anti-immigrant, but Geert Wilders has called for a ban on Muslims and the Quran. In addition, Geert Wilders has called himself the “Dutch Donald Trump.”

Poll watchers were alarmed in April of 2016 when Norbert Hofer and his Freedom Party won an astonishing 35.1 percent of the national vote in a first round of presidential election in Austria. Hofer and the Freedom Party, like the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, is virulently anti-immigrant and anti-EU. The Freedom Party manifesto calls for a return to identity, which many interpret in racial, ethnic, and religious terms. Ultimately, however, Hofer lost the run-off election by 0.3 percent in May.

In 2015, Poland’s Law and Justice Party won 38 percent of the vote in elections, giving the party a majority of seats in Parliament. The Party came to power promising to protect Poles from refugees and migrants from the Middle East and North Africa as well as keep them “safe from terrorism.”¹³ In a campaign speech, the head of the party roused fears of refugees by claiming that there are “already signs of emergence of diseases that are highly dangerous and have not been seen in Europe for a long time: cholera on the Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna. There is also talk about other, even more severe diseases.”¹⁴

Another European demagogue, Viktor Orban of Hungary, has led his Fidesz party to victory in successive national elections, with a decisive victory in European parliamentary elections in 2015. The Fidesz party is another anti-immigrant, anti-EU far-right party. Despite the fact that a European Court threatened sanctions and fines, Hungary refused its share of refugees and migrants under Orban’s leadership.¹⁵

Perhaps one of the most troubling demagogues is Turkey’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In June 2015 Erdogan’s AKP Party, which had governed Turkey since 2002, lost its parliamentary majority, winning just 40.9 percent of the vote. In August, following a hung parliament, Erdogan called for snap elections that November, shortly before launching the war against Kurdish separatists in Turkey. Playing to the nation’s fears and political chaos, Erdogan’s party managed to gain 49.5 percent of the vote, once again securing a majority of seats in the parliament. Many observers viewed Erdogan’s military tactics as an electoral strategy, which, by polarizing the Turkish electorate, helped reinforce his support.¹⁶ Most recently, Erdogan was the target of a failed military coup in the summer of 2016, and as a result promulgated a successful but highly controversial national referendum to expand and consolidate his power.

Africa

Like Erdogan, South African President Jacob Zuma has increasingly become demagogic against certain groups within South Africa’s diverse society by appealing to and stoking Zulu nationalism in order to maintain and consolidate political power. South Africa faced a critical moment during the end of Apartheid, and during the so-called Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) period, in which the new Constitution was being written. Forces within South African society, including white nationalists and black nationalists, often Zulu nationalists, had visions for society that were diametrically opposed.

Although South Africa features one of the most robust and inclusive Constitutions in the world, the political order is fraying. In particular, the current President Zuma has been ac-

cused of corruption and lavish personal enrichment.¹⁷ In 2016, even Winnie Mandela called for Zuma's resignation. After surviving these allegations, as well as four no-confidence votes in Parliament, Zuma has increasingly bolstered his political support by appealing to Zulu nationalists. Or, as one observer put it, "Zuma has skillfully used Zulu or African 'traditions' to cover-up poor personal choices, indiscretions and wrong behavior, and portrayed those who oppose such poor behavior of being opposed to African 'traditions' or 'culture.'¹⁸ The challenge for South Africa is that opposition parties are feared even more than Zuma since they are suspected of being Trojan horses for white nationalists; despite the challenges, Zuma's rule has led to widespread disillusionment, especially among black youth.

Asia

In Asia, perhaps the most prominent demagogue is Narendra Modi, the President of India. As a former governor of Gajurat province and leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party-coalition that witnessed the biggest parliamentary majority in a 2014 election, Modi has either led or fanned the flames of Hindu nationalism in India. According to Quartz' Harish Menon, "[Modi's] crafty packaging of right-wing Hindutva in developmental hyperbole during the campaign was dubbed dog-whistle communalism."¹⁹

As a result, there have been a rash of ethnic and religiously inspired attacks, including more than 700 outbreaks of communal violence in 2016 that killed 86 and injured 2,321 people.²⁰ In September 2015 Mohammad Akhlaq, a Muslim man, was lynched near the capital city of New Delhi, over rumors that he had killed a local cow and stored its meat in his refrigerator.²¹ And more recently in May, 19-year-old Mohammed Shalik was tied to a pole and beaten to death, after rumors circulated over a romantic relationship with a Hindu girl.²² Despite these incidences of vigilante violence, results from a recent Pew survey has found that nearly nine out of 10 Indians hold a favorable opinion of Modi—with more than two-thirds saying they are satisfied with the direction he is taking the country—just two years before he heads into a general election in 2020.²³

Another demagogue in Asia is Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte who, since taking office in 2016, has instituted a brutal campaign of violence against poor Filipinos accused of using or dealing drugs. Human rights groups say his extra-judicial war has left more than 13,000 people dead. Despite this stark reality, Duterte has remained popular because most people in the archipelago aren't directly affected by the drug war, which is largely waged in inner cities.²⁴ Some also suggest that Duterte's steady popularity is also attributed to his strong ties to Mindanao—Duterte's place of origin and the second largest Philippine island—representing Mindanaons who historically have felt marginalized by the Filipino government.

Conclusion

Appealing to discontent, economic conditions, demographic change, or a mixture of factors, fears and anxieties of marginalized peoples are being stoked by demagogues all over the world to secure or consolidate political power. Although not all have succeeded, enough have succeeded to illustrate the pattern, and there is always a danger of more arising in the future.

There are many specifics and particularities to these demagogues. In most cases, antiimmigrant and other exclusionary policies and appeals are at the core. As one observer notes, "In Europe and America, a common and effective response among reigning elites to unraveling national narratives and loss of legitimacy is fear-mongering against minorities and

immigrants—an insidious campaign that continuously feeds off the alienation and hostility it provokes.”²⁵ In Europe in particular, the stresses over the refugee and migration crisis, partly as a result of the chaos in the Middle East and the Syrian civil war, exacerbate this sentiment and create more fertile ground for right-wing demagogues, who use their power to also rail against the EU, whom they also blame.

But underlying these appeals are not simply fears of terrorism or Muslims, but economic grievance and insecurity as well. As Pankaj Mishra in his book *Age of Anger* claims, “More and more people feel the gap between the profligate promises of individual freedom and sovereignty, and the incapacity of their political and economic organizations to realize them.”²⁵

And a young citizen of Hungary put it this way: “What many Westerners may not realize is that we all expected our standard of living to rise to the level of at least that of Spain or Italy. This has not happened, and there is a genuine disappointment and resentment present in our society.”²⁶

The combined resentment, dashed expectations, economic malaise, and growing diversity has become a toxic brew all over the world. The demagogues not only pretend to have the solutions, but they ascribe blame for their nation’s problems on the “other.” The result is inevitably exclusionary policies against the “other,” and, often, violence or the tacit sanction of violence.

The Global Urban Crisis


Economic development, technological and environment change and other forces have reshaped human living patterns for millennia, but these changes have accelerated in recent centuries, especially with the advent of industrialization. By 1800, as few as 3 percent of the global population was estimated to live in cities and urban areas. By 1950, this number had risen to 30 percent. As of 2008, as many people were estimated to live in urban environments as not. Today, more than half of humanity is estimated to reside in cities.²⁷

Not only are there more people living in cities relative to the population, but we are seeing increasing returns to scale, with larger cities growing proportionally larger.²⁸ One sign of this is the emergence of mega-cities, or cities with more than 10 million residents. By 2025, China is projected to have two hundred cities of more than 1 million residents.²⁹ This is because the top tier of cities not only attract more capital, but because national economies are increasingly driven by specific industries that agglomerate in urban regions, with the largest and most dynamic regions attracting the most skilled workers and most capital.

Although the effects of industrialization and technological development on demographic change and urbanization are well known, more recent forces and developments are drawing more of humanity into the urban corridor. The 2016 Inclusiveness Index report examined the global migration and refugee crisis as one of the seminal events of the year and this period. The causes examined included climate change, military interventions, and ethno-religious conflict, among other forces.³⁰ These migratory waves and refugee crisis are also part of a larger trend of demographic change underpinned by larger structural forces. While many urban residents were drawn to cities in previous generations or centuries as part of industrialization or to ply trades or professional services, the changing economics of agriculture, land, and climate change are fostering a new set of urban crises.

Foremost among those crises are the growing numbers of people living in slums, concentrated poverty, and shantytowns, with inadequate or substandard housing, infrastructure, water and sanitation. Remarkably, this crisis appears to be global in scope, affecting developed, high-wealth and under-developed, poor countries alike. More than 840 million people today (1 in 10 people) are trapped in impoverished slums in fast-urbanizing regions.³¹ Governments in countries such as Brazil and China have visibly struggled over the past several years to accommodate rural migrants into urban areas. China has initiated a crackdown on migrants by demolishing makeshift communities, closing schools, and shutting off water.

People Living in Urban Areas



Fast Urbanizing Regions



**1 in 10 (840 million)
trapped in impoverished slums**

In the United States, the importance of knowledge economies and capital has meant a return to the urban core, and along with it, displacement and dislocation for the poor. In places such as South Africa or Brazil, it has meant that too many people are living in environments unable to serve their needs, let alone help them reach their full potential. The greatest projections for future urbanization will occur in Africa and in less urbanized parts of Asia.³²

As much as humanity now resides in urban environments, the greatest challenge may be to come. Richard Florida projects that the coming century will see the “greatest wave of urbanization in human history as another 7 or 8 billion people” move to cities.³³ Unfortunately, the infrastructure and housing needed to support these people has yet to be built, nor are plans adequate for retrofitting them. In places like the United States, it means that our highest growth regions must rapidly expand despite intense local opposition. In under developed nations it means that property laws, and other housing developments can accommodate the growth through legal means.

In summary, we are now living amidst a global urban crisis that is both exacerbating other crises and yet has the potential to solve many of them. One of the foremost challenges for humanity in the 21st century and beyond will be how to manage sustainable urbanization, and how to ensure that cities are not wholly stratified by wealth and income. The alternative will be a disastrous arrangement in which the concentrations of vanguard and high growth economies are open only to the most affluent and well-connected. To solve this problem will require solutions for managing and accommodating population growth in high-growth regions, which itself will entail a need to build sustainable and affordable housing with increasing densification, along with infrastructure and basic services. At the same time, cities are the key to solving many of the major problems confronting humanity, including environmental degradation, ameliorating the risk of climate change, and building inclusive economies.³⁴

Driving Displacement and Migration: Climate Change and Land Grabs

Our 2016 Inclusiveness Index report examined the global migration crisis. In this report, we focus on two drivers of displacement and migration. With the unpredictable consequences of climate change and coinciding conflicts over natural resources and land, a transformation in the prospects of global human sustainability is at hand.

On the one hand, rising sea levels, rising global green gas (GHG) emissions or CO₂, drought, and desertification present immediate and startling threats to life, particularly hundreds of millions of vulnerable people around the world. For example, many residents of island nation-states at risk of submersion are already migrating to other regions or to nearby countries as their livelihoods become ever more precarious. As of 2010, 3,000 residents from Tuvalu's 10,000 people migrated to New Zealand seeking protection.³⁵

On the other hand, the phenomenon of 'land grabs'—the acquisition of land away from traditional communities by global capital—constitutes a far more radical form of commodification of human heritage and threat to human sustainability. For example, conservative estimates suggest that at least 220 million hectares of arable lands have been leased or sold worldwide in recent years, out of which out 70 percent occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa.³⁶ Both phenomena are well underway and forcing millions of vulnerable individuals and communities around the world to vacate their natural habitat and communities and endure extremely challenging new realities.

Climate Change

Global warming—including rising sea levels, rising global CO₂, increasing incidents of drought, desertification, and widespread deforestation—poses immediate threats to the survival of millions of marginalized communities around the world, and long-term threats to ecosystems and worsen seasonal storms around the globe. Additionally, within the scientific community there is consensus that human activities over the past century, namely the burning of fossil fuels and thermal expansion, have released large amounts of CO₂ emissions into the atmosphere causing the earth's surface temperature to increase, and melting glaciers and polar ice caps in the process. Furthermore, there is a constant rise in CO₂ emissions that over the next several decades such increase could cause a significant collapse of Antarctica's ice, causing a sea level rise of more than a meter by 2100 and 15 meters by 2500.³⁷

SEA LEVELS

Research indicates that sea levels worldwide are rising at an annual rate of 0.13 inches (3.2 millimeters) a year, which is roughly twice the average speed of the past 80 years.³⁸ Among scientists, it is a common belief that even a small increase can have devastating effects on coastal habitats as seawater reaches farther inland. It can cause destructive erosion, flooding of wetlands, contamination of aquifers and agricultural soils, and lost habitat for fish, birds, and plants.³⁹

Consequences of Rising Sea Levels



BANGLADESH

- Projected to lose **17%** of land in **2050**
- Causing about **20 million** to seek refuge elsewhere



MALDIVES

- Could lose all of its **1,200 islands**

Furthermore, climate change consequences due to rising global CO₂ emissions are affecting several small island nations and coastal countries, and they must wrestle with the possibility of complete submersion. For instance, Bangladesh is likely to lose 17 percent of its land by 2050, causing about 20 million people to seek refuge elsewhere, and the nation of the Maldives could lose all of its 1,200 islands.⁴⁰ People worldwide who depend on the fishery industry are witnessing a decline in revenue as increasing fresh water from melted polar caps drive saltwater fish away and harm ocean ecosystems – if current rates of ocean water temperature continue to rise the ocean is projected to be too warm for coral reefs by 2050.⁴¹ Consequently, a meter increase in sea levels and a 10 percent intensification of storm surges could cause flooding for 31 million people in developing countries and would broaden the areas of exposure from 7 percent to 12.6 percent.⁴²


GLOBAL GREEN-GAS EMISSIONS

According the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the primary source of CO₂ is the burning of fossil fuels, in which four-fifths of global CO₂ emissions comes from energy production, industrial process, and transportation.⁴³ Furthermore, and due to unequal distribution of industry and wealth, the CO₂ emissions are neither equally produced by countries, nor evenly distributed globally. Furthermore, North America, Europe, and part of industrial Asia emit over 90 percent of global industrial CO₂. Moreover, historically countries of the Global North emitted far more global CO₂ than countries of the Global South, yet countries of the Global South are currently bearing the economic, political, and social burden of climate change consequences⁴⁴ (see map 'The World Largest Emitters').

MAP 3

The World's Largest Emitters

CO₂ Emissions 2014, expressed in thousand metric tons of carbon



Source: Tom Boden and Bob Andres, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Gregg Marland, Research Institute for Environment, Energy and Economics, Appalachian State University

For example, in 2007 the IPCC concluded that the region of East and Horn of Africa was anticipated to be impacted the most negatively by climate change in the future.⁴⁵ In late 2010 and throughout 2011, and due to severe droughts and civil strife, 'a mass exodus' of Somalis migrated to Kenya and Ethiopia. Currently, the region is experiencing prolonged droughts, desertification, flash floods, and land degradation, making livelihood sustainability a great challenge.⁴⁶

DROUGHT AND DESERTIFICATION

Many occurrences around the world confirm that the rising temperatures associated with climate change continue to aggravate and prolong hydrological and agricultural droughts. In the face of rising global CO₂ emissions, the warming climate is expected to lead to more precipitation falling as rain rather than snow, earlier snowmelt, and increased evaporation and transpiration, ultimately leading to people's failure to grow crops in many regions of the world.⁴⁷ Furthermore, such increasing frequency and intensity of droughts reduce the productivity of land and strain food sources, causing families to leave their homes in search of food and income. Climate change also contributes to desertification where a relatively dry land region becomes increasingly arid and bodies of water, vegetation, and wildlife can no longer thrive.⁴⁸

Desertification is threatening the livelihood of many communities by completely devastating the ecosystem and diminishing, if not eliminating, the productivity of land. For example, in China's Gobi Desert, the desert has been expanding at around 100,000 square miles per year, overtaking and drying previously arable grassland.⁴⁹ As a result, the Chinese government has moved hundreds of thousands of nomadic people out of their social and natural habitat to more habitable locations in neighboring cities.

Land Grabs

Since 2000, the recent phenomenon of large-scale land deals or land grabs present eminent threats to both food security and ecosystem sustainability. The actors acquiring most lands include countries reliant on food imports to feed their domestic populations by setting up farms or production in other countries and multi-national corporations seeking financial gains and new profits.

One victim of this is Ethiopia, where prior to entering lease agreements with foreign land acquirers (Karuturi Global of India), the government asserted ownership of collectively held lands. Many of those who exercised collective ownership of the land are now internally displaced persons who have not been compensated, and have not become recipients of promised economic benefits or jobs.⁵⁰

In the current land deal scenarios, land is acquired from or through the government, and often state governments facilitate the process of land grabs. The purchaser or lessee is either a foreign state, private corporation or investment firm seeking access to food commodities or financial returns through production of cash crops.⁵¹ Whether these firms are private equity firms or agricultural firms, they turn land for food and fuel production into a source for profit for the benefit of others. As a form of investment, profits and returns on land grow as a result of acquiring greater land for returns to scale or making existing land more productive. Increasing productivity can involve a host of multiple inputs including water and fertilizers. These acquirers can make great profit by increasing productivity of tracts of land that in the African agriculture sector, for example, have little to no capital intensive agricultural systems.

The justification for these acquisitions is greater production as part of a forthcoming “Green Revolution” for Africa. Given the experiences of India and China, there are reasons to be skeptical. For example, India’s “green revolution” has led to entrenched poverty and indebtedness of farmers, environmental degradation, soil erosion, water shortages and contamination and genetic erosion.⁵² Furthermore, given the scale and inevitable effects of land grabs, it is imperative to emphasize the economic, political, environmental, and social consequences that are negatively devastating local food systems, and intensifying dispossession of rural communities in many African countries. Moreover, the current upsurge of land grabs has exacerbated the African continent’s preexisting agricultural challenges and food insecurity, and threatens to make it a chronic feature of its sociopolitical system misguided by exclusionary development plans that exacerbate the marginality of vulnerable population and ecosystem wrapped in elusive green revolution.

Gender Inclusivity and Religious Minority Representation in Mauritius

In a time of growing ethno-nationalism and xenophobia globally, the Republic of Mauritius is swimming against the currents. Mauritius is an island nation in the Indian Ocean off the southeast coast of the African continent. In June 2015, the Mauritius General Assembly (parliament) unanimously approved the election of the first woman President of the republic, Ameenah Gurib, who is also a scientist and a Muslim. Muslims in Mauritius constitute only about 15.3 percent of the population.⁵³

Since 2014, Mauritius ranked in the upper middle (third) category of Social Progress Index⁵⁴; for example, in 2017, the country was ranked number 39 globally and ahead of all African countries respectively.⁵⁵ In doing so, Mauritius has achieved remarkable social progress by embracing courageous toward wider inclusivity by deliberately designing their social and economic policies to include Mauritian women and religious minority to access opportunity and representation, including, the highest office in the land. Mauritius' population is about 1.26 million (624,600 female/608,400 male) with a multiethnic make-up of people of African, Indian, Chinese and European origins.⁵⁶ Further, the Constitution of the country does not mention any official language, yet English and French considered the de facto national and common languages of the country.

What led Mauritius to pursue a different path for social progress than the rest of its neighbors and most of advanced and emerging economies as well? The answer is found in long-term public policies that Mauritius set forth since its independence in 1968 from the United Kingdom. Successive governments of Mauritius designed their development objectives toward advancing social and human capital in the country. Thus, it is not surprise that today Mauritians enjoy wide benefits to/of:

- **Education:** 95.7 percent of the children enrolled in secondary school.
- **Healthcare:** 13.5/1,000 is the child mortality rate.
- **Electricity:** 100 percent of the population has access to electricity.
- **Water:** 99.85 percent of the population has access to piped water, and 99.82 percent of rural communities has improved water source.
- **Gender equality:** 0.05 (1.0 is full equality) of gender parity distance in secondary school enrollment.
- **The rule of law and personal freedom:** Community safety net and personal safety ranked both high and scored 82.5 percent and 82.7 percent respectively.
- **Religious tolerance and freedom of religion:** 100 percent, scored 4 out of 4.⁵⁷

The experience of Mauritius demonstrates that inclusive policies and institutions can place nations on the path to greater equity and well-being for everyone.

Humanizing Refugees in Uganda


The civil war that broke out in South Sudan in 2013 led to the expulsion of 4.3 million South Sudanese forced from their homes. Out of this number, almost 2.13 million sought refuge in neighboring countries, and Uganda alone has hosted 1.06 million of the South Sudanese refugees (49.7 percent) since then. By end of 2016, Uganda is the fifth largest refugee host country in the world after Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Iran.⁵⁸ Further, in 2016, around 1.3 million refugees arrived to Uganda, which is more than the refugees who crossed the Mediterranean into Europe.⁵⁹

While we acknowledge the many challenging conditions facing South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, such as the settlements being based in the northern region of the country which is suffering from structural underdevelopment and poverty. Nonetheless, the government of Uganda, and its people, has set a positive example in welcoming and opening their doors to host large numbers of refugees—it is humanizing them. The government of Uganda, and through the Office of the Prime Minister, each South Sudanese refugee is offered a 30 square meter (98.5 square feet) plot of land on which they are allowed to build houses and cultivate crops, in addition to allowing refugees to work and move freely within the country.

united states inclusiveness index

MAP 3

United States Inclusiveness Map 2017



US Inclusiveness Rankings

STATE	SCALED SCORE*
Nevada	100.00
Hawaii	80.41
Maryland	79.56
California	74.08
Maine	68.12
Colorado	67.75
Vermont	67.74
Idaho	63.98
Oregon	63.57
Alaska	63.16
Rhode Island	61.65
Delaware	61.46
New Mexico	58.95
Illinois	57.70
New York	57.54
Washington	56.67
New Hampshire	54.99
Massachusetts	52.15
New Jersey	51.05
Nebraska	51.01
Georgia	50.56
Arizona	49.31
North Dakota	45.47
Virginia	45.41
Michigan	44.43

STATE	SCALED SCORE*
Utah	43.99
Connecticut	43.40
Minnesota	42.77
Iowa	41.35
Wisconsin	41.24
Arkansas	39.71
Florida	39.56
Ohio	36.89
Wyoming	35.65
Missouri	34.70
Indiana	32.01
South Carolina	32.00
Kentucky	30.35
Tennessee	30.02
Pennsylvania	29.85
North Carolina	29.76
Kansas	29.31
Montana	27.11
Texas	22.29
Oklahoma	21.99
Alabama	20.15
Mississippi	15.51
South Dakota	14.23
West Virginia	3.12
Louisiana	0.00

As with the global inclusiveness index, the score values are not scaled but developed using a z-scoring methodology. A description of indicators and methods can be found in the Appendix of this report. Raw scores can be found at: haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

Observations on Changes in the US

Political and economic instability are no less visible within the United States, as debates over the Medicare expansion, LGBTQ rights, and immigration, among other issues, flared over the past year. In our Index, 22 states did not change category designation, while data was unavailable for the District of Columbia in 2017.

Overall, ten states moved down one category and 11 moved up one category. The states that fell one category include: Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, and Washington. The states that rose one category include Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

Three states fell two categories (Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio), while one state rose two categories (Alaska).

One state fell three categories (West Virginia), from High to Very Low. Two states, on the other hand, rose three categories (Idaho and New Mexico).

US Finding & Themes

The Re-Emergence of White Nationalism

The 2016 Presidential Campaign marked a rupture in contemporary American mainstream politics. The candidacy of Donald Trump broke with contemporary norms by elevating to major party nominee a candidate who spoke in such explicit terms about racial, ethnic, and religious “others” while appealing to a white nationalist base. Following his election to the Presidency, white nationalist movements have grown in size and visibility, most conspicuously and ominously at a rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.

Following the 2012 Presidential election, the Republican Party commissioned a report that sought to uncover the reasons for its electoral defeat.⁶⁰ In the report, the authors concluded that one reason for the party’s loss was the lack of outreach to non-white communities. Specifically, it found that: “We need to campaign among Hispanic, black, Asian, and gay Americans and demonstrate we care about them, too. We must recruit more candidates who come from minority communities. But it is not just tone that counts. Policy always matters.”⁶¹

During the 2016 primary campaign, Donald Trump veered in the opposite direction. In announcing his presidential bid, on June 16, 2015, Donald Trump asserted that many immigrants from Latin America, and Mexico in particular, were criminal:⁶²

“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. [...] But I speak to border guards and they tell us what we’re getting. And it only makes common sense. It only makes common sense. They’re sending us not the right people. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably—probably—from the Middle East. But we don’t know. Because we have no protection and we have no competence, we don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got to stop and it’s got to stop fast.”

To solve this problem, he said that he would “build a wall” on the Mexican border of the United States to deter and prevent unauthorized immigration from Mexico and Latin America. Similarly, in December of that year, he called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”⁶³ This was on top of calling for greater surveillance of mosques, barring Syrian refugees from entering the country, and the possible creation of a database to track all Muslims in the country.⁶⁴

Mitt Romney, the 2012 Republican presidential nominee, condemned Donald Trump for “creat[ing] scapegoats of Muslims and Mexican immigrants,” as well as for “mock[ing] a disabled reporter,” decrying Donald Trump’s remarks as “one outrage after another.”⁶⁵ Speaker of the House of Representatives and then the putative Republican Party leader, Paul Ryan, denounced Donald Trump’s proposal to ban Muslims from entering the United States as anti-American, noting that freedom of religion and antidiscrimination are fundamental constitutional principles.⁶⁶

Despite these denunciations, Donald Trump secured the Republican Party nomination and won the Presidency in a contest with Hillary Clinton. Critically, he garnered extraordinary support from white voters and rural and exurban electorates in key Midwestern swing states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin.⁶⁷

Shortly after the election, far-right leader Richard Spencer spoke at a conference of several hundred in Washington DC celebrating the election result with a Nazi salute to President Trump.⁶⁸ “Hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory!” Spencer explained that his goal is “a new society, an ethno-state that would be a gathering point for all Europeans,” and has called for “peaceful ethnic cleansing.”⁶⁹ President-Elect Trump was criticized for giving an equivocal response, just as he had been for failing to distance himself from comments made by KKK leader David Duke some months before.⁷⁰

In August 2017, white nationalists, Neo-Nazis, and other far-right groups converged in a rally called “Unite the right” in Charlottesville, Virginia to protest the removal of confederate statues. Hundreds of white nationalist protesters showed up, and eventually clashed with antifa, black lives matter, and other counterprotesters. The result was a spasm of violence that resulted in the death of one protester, Heather Heyer, by a white nationalist by a vehicle ramming attack, and dozens of non-fatal injuries to others.

Following the rally, President Trump, once again, gave an equivocal response. Initially, instead of calling out and condemning the white nationalists, he decried “hatred, bigotry, and violence on many sides.” This was interpreted by many as created as a false equivalence between bigots and counter-protestors, and was applauded by Richard Spencer and others.⁷¹ A day later, the President tried to clarify his remarks, and explicitly condemned “KKK, neo-Nazis, white supremacists and other hate groups.” Yet another day later, he reiterated his point that there was “blame on both sides.” A week later, he seemed to side with the white nationalists aim of critiquing the removal of confederate statutes by saying “They’re trying to take away our culture, they’re trying to take away our history.”⁷²

In the end, candidate and now-President Trump, unique among major contemporary political figures, appeals to white nationalists groups and stokes explicit fears of Muslims, Mexicans, and other ethnic, religious, and racial minorities. The result has been an unprecedented emboldened and openness of hate groups in our society, who now claim to be ‘stepping out of the shadows’ and into the real world.

President Trump’s “Travels Bans”

On Friday, January 27, President Trump issued an extraordinary executive order (#13769) under the title “Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Entry into the United States.”⁷³ The scope and complexity of the order generated confusion among those charged with implementing it as well as the press and legal observers. In general, however, the order prohibited entry into the United States of both immigrants and lawful non-citizen residents (green card holders) from seven predominantly Muslim countries and suspended the US Refugee Admissions Program, of which Syrian refugees had been admitted under the previous administration. There were various exceptions provided, including a provision that would allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize refugee applications of religious minorities in the targeted countries.

Within days, a spate of challenges were brought across the nation. Over the next few weeks, federal judges in Brooklyn, Boston, Seattle and other cities issued stays, injunctions, and other forms of immediate relief. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a nationwide stay on February 9.⁷⁴ Rather than appeal that decision, the Trump administration issued a new executive order (#13780) on March 6 under the same header that superseded the previous order. This new order omitted the exception for religious minorities, clarified that lawful visa holders from the named countries would be permitted to enter the country, and removed Iraq from the list of prohibited countries, among other changes. Clearly unhappy with the changes, ostensibly designed to survive a Supreme Court challenge, the President described this second order as a “watered down, politically correct version.”⁷⁵

Once again, challenges were brought across the nation, and federal judges issued stays and other preliminary relief. Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in two separate cases, *International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump* and *Hawaii v. Trump*, affirmed various forms of injunctive relief. Consequently, the Trump administration appealed these cases to the United States Supreme Court.⁷⁶ On June 26, one of the final days of the Supreme Court’s term, the Court issued an order that lifted the stays issued by the lower court, but with some exceptions, including those applied to individuals by the lower courts thus far or individuals with a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.”⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a full review this fall. Challenges have been filed, and litigation is ongoing.

As we observed in our 2016 Inclusiveness Index Report, one measure of a nation’s “degree of inclusiveness” is that nation’s immigration or asylum policies. We explained that “[t]hese policies are reflective of the values and perspectives of the society vis-à-vis marginalized group[s], and how welcoming or tolerant the dominant group is of outgroups.”⁷⁸ In particular, nativist and xenophobic strains of opinion are sometimes embodied in immigration and refugee policies. Noting our nation’s poor history of exclusionary immigration policy, from the Chinese Exclusion Acts to the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1790, which restricted naturalization to “free white persons,” the United States has made tremendous progress in establishing non-discriminatory immigration and refugee policies.

Unfortunately, this new executive order is reminiscent of the United States’ legacy of racially and ethnically exclusionary immigration policies. As a candidate for president, Donald Trump called for a “Muslim ban,” and many regarded his orders as effectuating that intent.⁷⁹ Although facially neutral, the orders issued by President Trump target Muslims intentionally and through its natural operation. Statements made by President Trump during the Presidential campaign regarding his plans to implement such a policy, as well as statements by his surrogates, reveal a clear intent to target immigrants and refugees on the basis of religion. The

provision in the original order providing exception for “religious minorities” in predominantly Muslim countries most obviously reveals this intent, by providing Christian and other religious minorities residing in those countries special treatment. Although the orders did not apply to all predominantly Muslim countries, the context in which this policy arose and contemporaneous statements regarding it support the finding that the intent of the policy is to target a particular group on the basis of their religion.

The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all persons the “equal protection of laws.” Notably, this provision, unlike the Privileges and Immunities Clause of that same section, applies to all “persons,” not simply citizens. Therefore, individuals within the jurisdiction of the United States who are refused admissions to the United States under this order are being denied equal protection of laws in contravention of the United States Constitution.

Nation-states have the authority to develop procedures and rules for whom they decide to admit into their borders, but treating members of a group differently because of their identity or beliefs is antithetical to the United States constitution.

DACA and ICE

Though the Obama administration deported over 3 million immigrants—the most by any administration in history—immigration enforcement under the Trump administration possesses its own brand of dehumanizing brazenness. The rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the increase in workplace raids, and the further exclusion of undocumented immigrants in the public sphere are testament to the kind of othering we expect from this administration.

On September 5 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions penned a letter instructing Acting Secretary Elaine Duke to wind-down the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, known as DACA.⁸⁰ DACA is an executive order that allowed certain undocumented immigrants who arrived as children a reprieve from deportation for two years, work authorization, and a Social Security Number. The wind-down means that 800,000 DACA recipients⁸¹ will lose the presumptive protection from deportation and the ability to work. Furthermore, the rescission of DACA will force people who came out of the shadows back into those very shadows, rendering their bodies as illegal and subject to deportation. It is important to note the effect of the DACA rescission on the immigration policy discursive space: without DACA's attendant protections, those directly affected become politically indistinguishable from those already rendered illegal and thus outside the law's concern. DACA, far from its assumed role as a harbinger of more substantive policy change, seems to be the best yet dying hope for protecting millions of immigrants and their families.

Moving from this, one of the main concerns that DACA brings to focus concerns the lack of privacy protections for undocumented immigrants. For the approximately 800,000 DACA recipients, their information and that of their families are with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This is important because such information—including addresses and other sensitive identifying information—could be used against them in deportation proceedings and other enforcement actions. Though DHS has promised a set of rules regarding the sharing of such information, yet the DHS has moved to collect social media information on not only undocumented immigrants, but legal permanent residents and naturalized citizens.⁸² Thus, to the extent that all immigrants have a so-called “private sphere”, the collection of social media information presents a compromise to, if not a complete elimination of—an immigrant person's right to privacy. Further, taking away the privacy of undocumented immigrants pushes them to the margins and outside the scope of being included.

Developing the motif of enforcement through surveillance and marginalization that is the modus operandi of the Trump administration's immigration policy, we see that there is a renewed focus on well-known organs of immigration enforcement such as raids and detention. The Chief of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Tom Homan, has committed to increasing workplace raids; he forecasts a four- to five-fold increase in the number of workplace raids, and a renewed focus on exposing and punishing employers who employ undocumented immigrants.⁸³ This two-pronged enforcement effort further others undocumented immigrants by denying them allies in the workplace; by make it prohibitively costly for business owners to hire undocumented workers. However, we worry that the overwhelming focus will be on undocumented workers and the prevailing opinion that they are stealing jobs from American citizens. The Trump administration also has called for an end to the “Catch and Release” program. The program describes the process by which people caught at the border would be released while their asylum claims were in the process of adjudication. The Trump administration is committed to increasing the size

of existing detention centers along with building new ones.⁸⁴

Another critical plank to the Trump administration's enforcement platform is a commitment to hiring up to 15,000 ICE agents. In an August 2, 2017 *Washington Post* article, DHS officials note that there are deeply insufficient staffing models to handle the application pool (estimated at half a million) necessary to hire and adequately train a new corps of 15,000 agents.⁸⁵ Further, John F. Kelly (then the Secretary of Homeland Security and now Chief of Staff to President Trump) qualifies this goal by stating that an increase in ICE agents will not come at the cost of diminished training or professional standards.⁸⁶ Such an undertaking is also very expensive; Trump's first budget asks for \$300 million to hire 1,000 border security agents.⁸⁷

The rescission of DACA, the mooted increase in border enforcement personnel, and the policy-driven assault on sanctuary cities make abundantly clear that, in the case of undocumented immigrants, marginality is operationalized by making every aspect of life as unlivable as practically possible. The purpose of tactics such as workplace raids and targeted traffic stops is to make it clear to undocumented immigrant communities that there is no possibility to be safe in the public sphere. Further, to the extent that being undocumented in the United States means being denied access to certain functions of the administrative state, being marginalized through the imposition of illegal status, and ultimately affects how undocumented immigrants see themselves as people.

Conclusion

The 2017 Inclusiveness Index reflects improvements in data collection and methodology from our initial Index, largely in part to feedback from readers like yourself. With each iteration, we hope that our Index provides deeper insights into patterns of inclusion and exclusion for researchers, advocates and policymakers alike.

Please be sure to send us your suggestions, feedback, and ideas and visit our website at haasinstitute.berkeley.edu for more information about this initiative and our work.

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Appendix A: Methodology

The Inclusiveness Index is a comparative analysis, thus the index values are relative to other countries in global context, and to other states in the US context. The data described in the previous section is collected, cleaned and prepared for analysis. Each data value for any indicator is analyzed relative to other data values for the indicator based on how far each value is from the mean value.


This outcome of this “standardization” of data is known as z-score. A z-score is a statistical measure that quantifies the distance (measured in standard deviations) a data point is from the mean of a data set. The use of z scores allows data to be measured based on the relative distance of the data value from the data average for the entire dataset for one indicator. Z-score is calculated for all indicators in each dimension, and adjusted where higher values of indicators meant lack of inclusion (e.g. higher index values for

government restrictions on religion). The dimension z-score is the average of z-scores of each indicator within the dimension e.g. Z-score (By Race) = Average (Political representation by Race z-score, Income ratio of non-whites over non-Hispanic whites z-score, and over-representation of African Americans and Hispanics in criminal justice system z-score)

The Inclusiveness Index value is the average of all dimension z-scores. The level of inclusiveness (High to low) is determined by sorting the data in descending order and broken into quintiles. Thus, the countries or US states identified with “high” inclusiveness represent the top 20 percent of scores among respective geographies. Conversely, countries or US states identified with “low” inclusiveness represent the lowest scoring 20 percent of respective geographies.

Data Matrix

This matrix shows availability of data on various dimensions of inclusiveness for global and US communities.



Appendix B: Datasets and Indicators

This Appendix highlights the specific datasets and indicators used to calculate the Index as well as explain the methodology used in the calculations. The narrative below provides details of the indicators and datasets used to measure inclusiveness for each dimension and domain for global as well as US indices. The data matrix at the end of this narrative provides links to the datasets used in this analysis.

Complete datasets can be downloaded from haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/inclusivenessindex.

GENERAL POPULATION

Domain: Exposure to Out-group Violence

Indicator: Crime rate – Violent crime rate is used as an indicator for this domain

Global Data: Unavailable

US data: FBI's Uniform Crime Report provides data on violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft) for each state in the US Crime rate per 100,000 people in 2016 is used as the measure for this indicator

Domain: Political Representation

Indicator: None

Domain: Income Inequality

Indicator: Gini index - Income inequality is measured by Gini Index which compares the distribution of individual or household income to an equal distribution. A value of "0" signifies absolute equality whereas a value of "100" signifies absolute inequality.

Global data: Gini index is available through World Bank dataset. Gini index from 2006 onwards are used for this analysis and only 139 countries have data within this time period. The most recent Gini coefficient is used for this analysis..

US data: Gini index estimates are available for all states through ACS and Census. 2016 ACS 1-yr estimates are used for this project

Domain: Anti-Discrimination Laws

Indicator: None

Domain: Incarceration

Indicator: Rates of incarceration – Prison Policy Initiative publishes prison related data for each year based on reported and survey data for nation-states and US states. Data for the most recent year (2016) on rate of incarceration per 100,000 people, has been included in the calculations for Inclusiveness Index. Higher the value, worse is the level of inclusion.

Global data: Prison Policy Initiative used the most recent data available from the Institute for Criminal Policy Research's World Prison Brief on June 9th, 2016. The Institute chose to only include nations with a total population of at least 500,000 people. This data is available for 166 countries

US data: As per Prison Policy Institute, "for the 50 US states and the District of Columbia, incarceration rates per 100,000 total population included people in federal prison from that state, people in state prison in that state, and people in local jails in that state.

Domain: Immigration

Indicator: Refugees and asylees – Refugees, asylees and stateless people, if applicable, as a percentage of host population is used as an indicator. A higher ratio suggests higher level of inclusiveness for these people in the hosting state/nation-state. Likewise a lower ratios suggests lower levels of inclusion.

Global data: United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) collects data on number of refugees and asylum-seekers (people who have applied for refugee status which has not yet been determined) from the country of origin and the receiving country. Data for 2015 is aggregated for the host country and percentage of host country's population is calculated. This data is reported for 180 countries

US data: Bureau of population, Refugees and Migrants at the Department of State provides data on monthly and annual number of refugees received by the nation and by each state. The most recent data (2015) on number of refugees received by each state and ACS 1-yr estimates of population by state in 2015 transforms the data into our measure to render the data comparable across all states.

Data Sources: Global

This matrix shows the measure and data source for the global indicators for this study.

DOMAIN		DIMENSION					
		Country	Race	Gender	Sexual Orientation	Religion	Disability
Exposure to out-group violence	Indicator	Not used	Not available	Not available	Not available	Social Hostilities Index (SHI) - 2015	Not available
	Source					Pew Research Center http://tinyurl.com/z3w782	
Political representation	Indicator	Not used	Ethnic minorities political representation - 2014	Women in parliament - 2016	LGBT representatives in lower house - 2016	Not available	Not available
	Source		Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich http://tinyurl.com/zfhnz2e	World Bank http://tinyurl.com/hpgrude	UNC LGBTQ Representative and Rights Research Institute http://tinyurl.com/nt2h7gd		
Income inequality	Indicator	Gini index - Varies (most recent)	Not available	Female to male GNI per capita (PPP) - 2013	Not available	Not available	Not available
	Source	World Bank http://tinyurl.com/y6xhueq4		UNDP http://tinyurl.com/kpadfz ; http://tinyurl.com/n933egm			
Anti-Discrimination Laws	Indicator	Not available	Not available	Laws on domestic violence: Whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from domestic violence - 2014 Laws on rape: Whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from rape - 2014 Laws on sexual harassment: Whether the legal framework offers women legal protection from sexual harassment - 2014	LGB equality index - 2011	Government Restrictions Index (GRI) - 2015	Rank countries based on existing disability laws and signing of international treaties
	Source			OECD http://tinyurl.com/yad3jwzww	UNC LGBTQ Representative and Rights Research Institute http://tinyurl.com/nt2h7gd	Pew Research Center http://tinyurl.com/z3w782	Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund http://tinyurl.com/jvpa2q
Incarceration	Indicator	Incarceration per 100,000 people - 2016	Not available	Incarceration per 100,000 people - 2015	Not available	Not available	Not available
	Source	Prison Policy Initiative http://tinyurl.com/flw9up		Prison Policy Initiative http://tinyurl.com/zhsqbbz			
	Indicator	Refugees and asylees as a percentage of total population - 2015	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available

RACE

Domain: Exposure to Out-group Violence

Indicator: None

Domain: Political Representation

Indicator: Political representation by racial/ethnic groups - Data on political participation or representation by marginalized groups - racial or ethnic - could shed light on how inclusive a society is of its citizens. It would show if the power rests with some exclusive groups or has a level-playing field among all its population sub-groups. A higher percentage of elected representatives for these marginalized groups would contribute to higher inclusion of these groups in the society. Percentage of racial/ethnic minority groups represented in the government is used as a measure for this indicator. A higher percentage suggests higher levels of inclusion, and vice versa

Global data: International Conflict Research (ICR) Group at Swiss Federal Institute of Technology at Zurich provides Ethnic Power Relations Core Dataset

2014 “identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from 1946 to 2013. It includes annual data on over 800 groups and codes the degree to which their representatives held executive-level state power—from total control of the government to overt political discrimination.” The countries included in this dataset are the ones which had a population of 500,000 or above in 1990. The measure for this indicator is the proportion of population of groups which are categorized as “Powerless”, “Discriminated” or “Self-excluded.” For more information on ICR’s data and methodology, please refer to their website <http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/epr>. Data is available for 159 countries

US data: National Conference of State Legislators provides public data on percentage of elected state legislators who belong to major racial categories for the year 2015. Data is aggregated to represent all non-white state legislators as a single category.

Domain: Income Inequality

Data Sources: United States

This matrix shows the measure and data source for the US indicators for this study.

DOMAIN	DIMENSION					
	States	Race	Gender	Sexual Orientation	Religion	Disability
Exposure to out-group violence	Indicator	Violent Crime rate per 100,000 - 2016	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
	Source	FBI Uniform Crime Report http://tinyurl.com/y7paxcda				
Political representation	Indicator	Not available	Percentage of non-White State legislatures - 2015	Proportion of female US senators, representatives and state legislatures - 2017	List of state legislators who belong to LGBT community - 2016	Not available
	Source		National conference of state legislators http://tinyurl.com/zw73bc4	Center for American Women and Politics http://tinyurl.com/272jm7c	UNC LGBTQ Representative and Rights Research Institute http://tinyurl.com/ha0azms	
Income inequality	Indicator	Gini Index - 2016	Non-Whites to non-Hispanic Whites per capita income ratio - 2016	Female to male median income ratio - 2016	Not available	Median earnings in the past 12 months by disability status by sex for the civilian non-institutionalized population 16 years and above with earnings - 2016;
	Source	ACS 1-yr estimates www.census.gov	ACS 1-yr estimates www.census.gov	ACS 1-yr estimates www.census.gov		ACS 1-yr estimates www.census.gov
Anti-Discrimination Laws	Indicator	Not available	Not available	Not available	Equality Index based on LGBT rights	Anti-Sharia bills introduced and inacted - 2010-2016
	Source				Equaldex http://www.equaldex.com/	HIFIS Research
Incarceration	Indicator	Rates of incarceration (per 100,000 people) - 2016	Ratio of over-representation - 2015	Rates of incarceration (per 100,000 people) - 2015	Not available	Not available
	Source	Prison Policy Initiative http://tinyurl.com/f7w6up	Prison Policy Initiative http://tinyurl.com/y7daxmsv	Prison Policy Initiative http://tinyurl.com/zhsqbbz		
Immigration	Indicator	Refugees and asylees as a percentage of total population - 2016	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
	Source	Refugee Processing Center http://tinyurl.com/j6expv , www.census.gov				

Indicator: Income ratio - Income ratio of racial/ethnic groups in relation to the dominant group(s) is used as a measure for this indicator. A higher ratio suggests greater economic inclusion of racial/ethnic groups.

Global data: Unavailable

US data: Using 2016 ACS 1-yr estimates, per capita income is calculated for non-whites and non-Hispanic whites. Ratio of these two per capita incomes is used as the measure for this indicator

Domain: Anti-Discrimination Laws

Indicator: None

Domain: Incarceration

Indicator: Ratio of over-representation – Over-representation of racial/ethnic minorities in criminal justice system suggests that the structure is more biased towards penalizing these minorities, and is thus less inclusive for these groups.

Global data: Unavailable

US data: Prison Policy Initiative provides data on incarcerated and non-incarcerated population by race for all

counties within the US This data also reports ratio of over-representation of incarcerated population by race for all counties. For this indicator, data for year 2015 is aggregated up to the state, and over-representation is calculated for African Americans and Hispanics.

Domain: Immigration

Indicator: None

GENDER

Domain: Exposure to Out-group Violence

Indicator: None

Domain: Political Representation

Indicator: Elected women lawmakers - Percentage of elected representatives who are women is the measure of this indicator. The focus of this indicator is on elected representatives rather than nominated.

Global data: World Bank reports multi-year data on proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments as a percentage. Data is available for 193 countries. Thus data on women in lower house of parliament

as a percentage of total available seats has been used in these calculations.

US data: Percentage of women state legislatures for each state is available at Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University, and is used as a measure for this indicator.

Domain: Income Inequality

Indicator: Female to male income ratio. As a measure of income inequality, gender based income difference is a reflection of group-based marginality along gender lines. A higher value of the ratio means less income gap by gender, indicating more inclusive society for women.

Global data: UNDP estimated GNI per capita at PPP for each gender deriving “from the ratio of female to male wage, female and male shares of economically active population and GNI (in 2011 purchasing power parity terms).” UNDP, in its technical notes, informs that “Because disaggregated income data are not available, data are crudely estimated.” However, due to unavailability of any other dataset, this data has been used to calculate female to male ratio. Data is available for 178 countries only, and has been used in the analysis.

US data: 2016 ACS 1-year estimates on median income by gender is used to calculate the ratio for each state within conterminous US, Alaska and Hawaii.

Domain: Anti-Discrimination Laws

Indicator: Laws against gender violence—Prevailing laws against gender-based violence is used as the indicator.

Global data: Laws on Domestic Violence, Rape and Sexual Harassment: This dataset from OECD provides index values for 160 countries on each of the three violence categories for 2014. Average index value for the three indices is used as the measure for this indicator

US data: Unavailable

Domain: Incarceration

Indicator: Rates of incarceration. Rates of incarceration (per 100,000 people) is used as the measure for this indicator.

Global data: Prison Policy Initiative provided data on incarceration rates for women. This data is available for 166 countries

US data: Prison Policy Initiative provided data on incarceration rates for women which is used as a measure for this indicator

Domain: Immigration

Indicator: None

SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Domain: Exposure to Out-group Violence

Indicator: None

Domain: Political Representation

Indicator: Elected LGBT lawmakers - Percentage of elected representatives who belong to the LGBTQ community is the measure of this indicator. The focus of this indicator is on elected representatives rather than nominated.

Global data: Curriculum in Global Studies, UNC 'LGBT Representation and Rights Research' Initiative reports LGBT members in lower house of parliament for 38 countries. Their research is quite extensive so it is safe to assume that other countries do not have political representation for LGBT community. Using IPU data for number of available seats in lower house of parliament, proportion of LGBT MPs is calculated for 203 countries to include it in the index.

US data: Global Studies@UNC provides data on number of elected representatives who belong to the LGBT community.

Domain: Income Inequality

Indicator: None

Domain: Anti-Discrimination Laws

Indicator: Laws against discrimination for LGBT community.

Global data: Curriculum in Global Studies at UNC's LGBT Representation and Rights provide data on equality index that their researchers developed. This index is an equality index for LGB communities “based on existing laws in each country that do not discriminate or incite violence against LGBT communities.” LGB index is available for 192 countries and is used as the measure for this indicator.

US data: Equaldex is a collaborative LGBT knowledge base built through crowdsourcing. They provide an equality index for each state in the US based on existing LGBT rights in that state. This index is used as the measure for this indicator.

Domain: Incarceration

Indicator: None

Domain: Immigration

Indicator: None

RELIGION

Domain: Exposure to Out-group Violence

Indicator: Religious bias motivated violence

Global data: Social Hostilities Index (SHI): Pew-Templeton's Global Religious Futures project reports data on religious-based information for 197 countries for 2015. As per their website SHI measures, on a 10-point scale, acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. This includes mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI includes 13 measures of social hostilities.

US data: None

Domain: Political Representation

Indicator: None

Domain: Income Inequality

Indicator: None

Domain: Anti-Discrimination Laws

Indicator: Laws against discrimination for LGBT community.

Global data: Government Restrictions Index (GRI): Pew-Templeton's Global Religious Futures project reports data on religious-based information for 197 countries for 2015. As per their website, GRI measures—on a 10-point scale—government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices. The GRI is comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups.

US data: Haas Institute researchers have created a database of all anti-Sharia bills introduced and enacted by the lawmakers in each state. Number of bills introduced, and percentage of bills enacted are used as two measures for this indicator. We believe that using this measure would act as a proxy for the pattern of discrimination against all religious minorities.

Domain: Incarceration

Indicator: None

Domain: Immigration

Indicator: None

DISABILITY

Domain: Exposure to Out-group Violence

Indicator: None

Domain: Political Representation

Indicator: None

Domain: Income Inequality

Indicator: Income ratio—Ratio of income earned by people with disabilities with respect to per capita income earned by able bodied people would be the measure for this indicator

Global data: Unavailable

US data: Using 2016 ACS 1-yr estimates, median earnings by people with disability as a ratio of median earnings by people with no disability is calculated as the measure for this indicator.

Domain: Anti-Discrimination Laws

Indicator: Laws against discrimination of disable people

Global data: UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD) proposed a treaty for all member countries to sign “to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.” Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, a non-profit organization, provides a list of countries which have signed CRPD and/or have existing laws protecting the rights of disable people, was used. The data was coded as following:

- Countries which have signed CRPD and have more than two laws protecting the rights of people with disability: 3
- Countries which have signed CRPD and have two or fewer laws protecting the rights of people with disability: 2
- Countries which have signed CRPD but have no reported laws on disability: 1
- Countries that have not signed CRPD and have no reported laws on disability: -1

US data: Unavailable

Domain: Incarceration

Indicator: None

Domain: Immigration

Indicator: None

Appendix C: Methodological Changes

We launched the inaugural Inclusiveness Index report in 2016 after several years of research, development, problem solving, and data collection and analysis. We put great thought and care into the formulation of our Index, its refinement, and sought out feedback from colleagues and peers. Although we anticipated that an index of this scope and scale would undergo refinement from year to year, as new data sources and measures become available, better indicators are identified and incorporated, and our methodology is refined to better capture our conception of “inclusiveness.” Accordingly, every year we will publish a section of the report that describes changes to the calculation of the Index, new data sources, measures, and indicators, as well as removal or elimination of any data sources, measures or indicators.

Methodological Changes

As is so often the case, not long after launch, members of our team suggested an alternative, and possibly better way of calculating the index scores. To explain the methodological changes, recall that the Index is constructed by cross referencing five dimensions of human difference in 5-6 domains (“dimensions v. domains”).

For “dimensions,” we look at race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and (dis)ability. But we measure group marginality along these dimensions by looking at specific “domains” in which othering occurs. Specifically, those “domains” examined rates of outgroup violence and incarceration, the political representation of those groups in elected bodies, degrees of income inequality, the presence of anti-discrimination laws protecting those groups, and, at the national level, national immigration and refugee policies, and their degree of openness, towards those groups.

In our inaugural index, we calculated the final scores by summing the scores of each of the domains. So we aggregated the subgroup score within each domain. This means that the domain score for political representation, for example, reflected the total score for each subgroup. So, if a country fared poorly on gender political representation, that would lower its final score in that domain. But if that or any country had strong representation of religious minorities in national assemblies, then that would raise its score in that domain.

The final nation-state value or ranking was thus a product of the average of the domain scores, which themselves incorporated the sub-group dimension scores within each

domain. Since we believed that these domains were the core areas that reflecting “inclusiveness” or group-based marginality, this methodological approach was intuitive and followed from our analysis.

However, sometime late last year, one of our team members suggested that we try to calculate the Index score using the opposite approach. Instead of averaging the domain scores for the final nation-state score, we could average dimension scores instead, with each domain composing the total dimension score. Thus, instead of aggregating all of the sub-group (“dimension”) scores within domains, the domain scores could be aggregated within each dimension. Although conceptually counter-intuitive, after experimenting with this approach, we believe that this approach provides a superior final nation-state score that better approximates our conception of inclusiveness and group-based marginality. It is yet a reminder that experimentalism is a core part of social science.

Since this produces fairly radical changes in the relative positions and rankings of nation-states and states within the United States, we have updated the 2016 Inclusiveness Index report with this new methodology. The original report is still available on the Inclusiveness Index project webpage, but one of the important functions of this report is to be able to compare nation and state movement within the Index from year to year. In order to do this effectively, it is important to employ a similar methodology. Thus, the comparisons made in this report between the 2016 and 2017 scores are made in relation to the revised 2016 Index.

New Indicators or Measures

Global

- **Laws on Domestic Violence, Rape and Sexual Harrassment:** This dataset from OECD provides index values for all countries on each of the three violence categories for 2014. This index value is used as the measure for this indicator
- **Women’s Incarceration Rates:** This data from Prison Policy Initiative provides incarceration rates for women per 100,000 population in 2015
- **Social Hostilities Index (SHI) and Government Restrictions Index (GRI):** Pew-Templeton’s Global Religious Futures project reports data on religious-based information for 197 countries for 2015. The

description below is verbatim from their website (<http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/explorer/about-grf-data>)

The **Social Hostilities Index (SHI)** measures—on a 10-point scale—acts of religious hostility by private individuals, organizations and social groups. This includes mob or sectarian violence, harassment over attire for religious reasons and other religion-related intimidation or abuse. The SHI includes 13 measures of social hostilities.

The **Government Restrictions Index (GRI)** measures—on a 10-point scale—government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs or practices. The GRI is comprised of 20 measures of restrictions, including efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversions, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups.

United States

- **Crime Rate:** FBI's Uniform Crime Report provides data on violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft) for each state in the U.S. Crime rate per 100,000 people in 2016 is used as the measure for this indicator
- **Non-White State Legislatures:** This indicator finds data on National Conference of State Legislatures website. Percentage of state legislatures who are non-white in 2015 is used as the measure for this indicator.
- **Incarceration by Race:** Prison Policy Initiative provides data on incarcerated and non-incarcerated population by race for all counties within the US. This data also reports ratio of over-representation of incarcerated population by race for all counties. For this indicator, data for year 2015 is aggregated up to the state, and over-representation is calculated for African Americans and Hispanics.
- **Incarceration by gender:** Rates of incarceration by gender per 100,000 people in 2015 is extracted from Prison Policy Initiative
- **State Legislatures from LGBT community:** Percentage of elected state legislatures is the measure used for this indicator. UNC's LGBTQ Representation and Rights Research Institute provides this data for the year 2016.
- **Equality Index:** Equaldex is a collaborative LGBT knowledge base built through crowdsourcing. They

provide an equality index for each state in the US based on existing LGBT rights in that state. This index is used as the measure for this indicator

- **Income inequality by disability:** Median earnings by people with disability as a ratio of median earnings by people with no disability is used as the measure for this indicator

New Data Sources

Below are new sources we have used this year for existing indicators or measures.

Global

- OECD Gender Data
- Pew Research Center's Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project

United States

- FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR)
- National Conference of State Legislatures
- Equaldex

The Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society brings together researchers, community stakeholders, and policymakers to identify and challenge the barriers to an inclusive, just, and sustainable society in order to create transformative change.