IS UC RIVERSIDE “REDLINED? INEQUALITY IN THE DECLINE OF CALIFORNIA STATE INVESTMENT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SYSTEM

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A capstone project submitted for Graduation with University Honors

Month 05, 2023

University Honors
University of California, Riverside

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ABSTRACT

Over the last several years, the metaphor of "redlining" has gained currency on the University of California (UC) Riverside campus as a method of explaining perceived disparities in the funding of the UC system, which has had to adapt to declining California state support and investment over the last 40 years through the diversification of revenue streams towards private donors and partnerships, raising tuition and fees, and increasing enrollment of out-of-state and international students. While California introduced the "rebenching" financial policy in 2016, which weighs each UC student (undergraduate, graduate, and medical) according to their relative cost of education to rectify the discrepancies between the 8 campuses under the policy, it fails to address the institutional wealth and prestige that certain campuses do not readily benefit from. The purpose of this mixed methods study is to identify whether each UC campus, particularly UC Riverside, is readily equipped to make up the difference in state funding. The research questions for this study were guided by quantitative analysis of declining state investment and markers of prestige, corroborated by qualitative content analysis and semi-structured, in-depth interviews with purposefully sampled faculty at UC Riverside (n = 10) grouped by understanding of UCOP policies and sociological perceptions of inequality. Analysis of the findings indicates that there are structural inequalities among campuses, but are better reflected by differences in institutional wealth and prestige. Discussion is contextualized by implications for the future and the responsibility of California in upholding its end of the Master Plan for Higher Education.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dr. Steven Brint. I am deeply grateful to you for your invaluable guidance and support throughout the entire duration of this project. Your passion for research and exploration has been contagious. Thank you for not only instilling my newfound love for research and exploration, but for your constant encouragement - and some much needed criticism and picking my brain! - when I needed it most. The world of research is easy to get lost in, and your guidance through the seemingly endless troves of information in the world made this project not only manageable, but also really fun. I am humbled to complete my first project, especially of this scale, under your supervision. I am truly grateful for your mentorship and the trust you placed in me throughout this journey. This project would not have been possible without you.

Mom and Dad: you have always been my biggest supporters and I frankly don't know what I would have done without you. Mom: thanks for putting up with my daily calls just to hear your voice, even if we talk about nothing, and my streams of TikTok videos of cute animals and babies that I send to you at 1am to de-stress. Dad: thank you for being so open and honest with your life and your experiences. You were the first to get a college degree, but you knew you were not the last. The support and love both of you have given me in my undergraduate studies kept me going when I felt as if I hit a wall in my junior year and wasn't sure if I even initially wanted to do the Honors capstone. Seeing it come to fruition has removed my doubts and reinforced my confidence. I love you!

I would also like to thank the UC Riverside School of Education writing support department, particularly Eric Davidson. Eric, although you may consider it "just doing your job," I want to emphasize the profound impact you had on me and my work. Our meetings held me

accountable and provided me with the necessary structure and guidance to successfully complete this project. Your commitment to helping students like me goes beyond mere professional obligation; it demonstrates your genuine dedication to fostering growth and development. Your patience and understanding created a safe space for me to express my ideas and ask questions about my writing and how to best implement my advisor's comments without hesitation. Watching this project transform from a mere concept to a tangible, full-length paper has given me immense satisfaction and joy.

Finally, thank you to the friends and family who have been a constant source of support and encouragement throughout my academic journey, even if your names were not specifically mentioned in this section. I am grateful for the laughter, the shared memories, and the support and love that have made my undergraduate studies all the more meaningful. Even though distance may separate us physically, I have always felt your presence and support. Thank you for being an integral part of my journey, and for contributing to my academic and personal growth.

Introduction and Purpose Statement

The University of California (UC) system is historically white, but UC Riverside sticks out as having one of the most diverse student bodies, and claims to offer the most social mobility to its undergraduate students (Warren, 2022). Many UC Riverside students are first-generation and/or come from a low socioeconomic status (SES), and are afforded the opportunity to transcend their social class of origin with a degree from the university. However, concerns have been raised that UC Riverside is being underfunded as well as "redlined", or denied access to resources on the basis of the socioeconomic status of its student body. This view was evident in the "Stop Redlining UCR" rallies that took place during the Fall 2021 quarter, sparked by the eponymous faculty-penned open letter to UC President Michael V. Drake (Newfield, 2021). Rallying students and faculty alike have raised that this implication is problematic due to the large proportion of Black and Latino, first generation, and low-income students on campus. They demanded that this discrimination end and even be reversed as a matter of equity.

The purpose of this study is to explore the funding patterns of the University of California system as well as any potential disparities in funding between UC Riverside and the other campuses in the system in the context of California's "rebenching" formula for the UC system. I begin with an overview of UC funding since the adoption of the "re-benching" formula in 2016-17. I then move on to bring data to bear on three research questions. I have collected extensive data from UC Riverside and the University of California, including financial statements, letters concerning the budget, documents from the University of California Office of the President (UCOP), budget summaries, and interviews with faculty members. Based on these data, I expect to find that the apparent equality in the funding formula masks inequalities in such elements of the budget as out-of-state tuition fees and endowment income, leading to an “unfairness” of wealth distribution. Wealth can be defined literally (financially), historically, and culturally, such as with perception of a particular UC campus’s prestige. This is rooted in Pierre Bourdieu’s work on the forms of capital and social reproduction, which suggests that prestige, wealth, and sociocultural capital is preserved and reproduced across generations (Bourdieu, 1986). Whether or not the “redlining” metaphor rings true, the inequalities present in the UC system have considerable implications for each campus.

The guiding research questions for this study are:

1. How do faculty understandings of the budget align with actual UCOP policies?
2. How have changes to the California state budget shifted the revenue patterns at each UC campus? and
3. What features of the UC budget are equally distributed among the campuses, which features are unequally distributed between the wealthier and poorer campuses, and which features are redistributed from the wealthier to the poorer campuses? And
4. What are the consequences of each campus having to generate its own revenue?

Methodology

The answers to these research questions are informed by both qualitative and quantitative methods and understandings. As such, each research question is directed by different research methods that align with each question's purpose in this study.

The first research question, "*How do faculty understandings of the budget align with actual UCOP policies?*", is guided by in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Ten participants were purposefully sampled from UC Riverside staff and faculty in various departments across campus based on their experience with the finances and budget at UC Riverside to engage with their perspectives and opinions on the "Stop Redlining UCR" open letter to UC President Michael V. Drake. Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to an hour, and consisted of open-ended questions asking about faculty and staff experiences, opinions, and thoughts regarding the budget at UC Riverside and in the UC system as a whole. Such questions proved to be advantageous in allowing the participants to freely express their ideas. The open-ended nature allowed for follow-up questions and comments as well as additional conversation concerning the topic(s) at hand, which provides reflexivity on behalf of the researcher to effectively interpret and understand the participants' opinions and unique experiences. This method also provided the opportunity to isolate participants' understandings of the campus and system budgets solely to the "redlining" movement at UC Riverside. A grounded theory approach was used to assess and identify recurring themes and ideas across participants, and participants were then sorted into groups based on their perspectives and their attributions of inequality with reference to the "redlining" metaphor and its effectiveness.

The second and third research questions, "*How have changes to the California state budget shifted the revenue patterns at each UC campus?*" and "*What features of the UC budget* *are equally distributed among the campuses, which features are unequally distributed between the wealthier and poorer campuses, and which features are redistributed from the wealthier to the poorer campuses?*", were chosen based on the availability of financial data gathered from UCOP for California state budget expenditures and allocations for each UC campus. Data was gathered from all UC campuses (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Davis, Irvine, Riverside, San Diego, Santa Cruz, Santa Barbara; N = 8). UCSF and UCM were excluded due to differences in their funding allocations from UCOP and the State of California (Regents of the University of California, 2021). I have used the year 1978 as a dividing point in the budget time series. It was at this point that UC could no longer depend on robust support from the State to keep tuition fees low and equivalent across the system. Pointing to a specific trend or a particular policy in the past, such as Proposition 13 (1978), allows changes to the state's expenditures on the UC system to be adequately defined. Significance of allocation differences since the implementation of Proposition 13 will be assessed with a 2 tailed t-test of the average of the academic fiscal years 1980-1990 and 2011-2021 (controlling for inflation) using a 95% confidence interval (at α = 0.05) to evaluate the extent of what John A. Douglass (2015) refers to as "state disinvestment" in the UC system, or an overall decrease in higher education spending by the state of California. The 2011-2021 academic fiscal years also provide insight into how these campus budgets have grown further apart following the Great Recession in 2008. This analysis will then consider the reasons why campus budgets have become more different from one another to compensate for a loss in state funding. UC Riverside will be compared to its sister campuses under the re-benching financial policy in context of campus endowments and other economic opportunities in the private sector with an analysis of variance (ANOVA).

The third research question, “*What are the consequences of each campus having to generate its own revenue?*”, is the guiding question for overall discussion of the literature, including the history of the UC system and its funding patterns and policies, and the results gathered from faculty and staff interviews as well as from the analysis of financial data. Discussion will contextualize these findings with factors such as: prestige, reputation, and wealth, as well as other streams of revenue, such as philanthropy and endowments at each particular UC campus. The usage of a mixed methods approach in this study enables the integration and comparison of my findings and allows for each question to corroborate and/or expand upon one another.

History of UC Funding Before Re-benching

California Master Plan for Higher Education

California provides State General Funds as a significant portion of the budget for UC, as outlined in the California Master Plan for Higher Education, or simply the Master Plan. The Master Plan, which was developed in 1960 with the help of UC President Clark Kerr, establishes the role of the UC system as a premier research institution with a mandate to provide undergraduate education for the top one-eighth of California high school graduates, as well as graduate and professional education (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018). The Master Plan also lays out guidelines for budget allocation to ensure that the UC system is able to meet its mandate and provide high-quality education to students.

While the Master Plan plays a crucial role in shaping the budget of the UC system, the state's budget allocation for UC is determined through the annual budget process, which is led by the governor and the state legislature, whose roles in UC administration and governance are embedded in the California state constitution (Master Plan Survey Team, 1960). In general, the state's budget allocation for UC is intended to support the core mission of the university system as outlined in the Master Plan, which includes undergraduate education, graduate and professional education, and research. Funding from the state is typically used to support the university's core operations, such as instruction, student services, and facility maintenance, and is also intended to help keep tuition and fees affordable for students (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018). Through the 1960s, then-UC President Clark Kerr worked with the 18 members of the UC Board of Regents, the governing board for the UC system, which are appointed by the California governor for 12-year terms (Regents of the University of California, 2023), to allocate state funds for each UC campus to ensure all campuses' respective growth and prosperity in line with the Master Plan. In recent years, however, the state's funding for UC has not always kept pace with the university's growing expenses, and is also subject to external factors such as the state's budget and economic performance, as well as political priorities of the state legislature (Douglass, 2015).

Assessing State "Disinvestment" in UC

The relationship between the agents within UC campuses, such as students, staff, and faculty, and those in California state government, which include the UC Board of Regents, is a contentious one, and can arguably be traced to Ronald Reagan's term as California governor (1967-1975), which was not only marked by his push for fiscal conservatism (encompassing the reduction of government spending and taxation), but also his initial push against UC as a social institution, including his 1966 campaign speech with promises to "clean up the mess at Berkeley" in reference to the counterculture movement and on-campus protests against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. These initiatives ultimately culminated in the firing of UC President Clark Kerr - the main architect behind the Master Plan - in 1967 (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018). The neoliberal approach to California's network of higher education institutions, ultimately culminating in "state disinvestment" of UC (Douglass, 2015), began with Reagan's governorship and continued under Jerry Brown's administration.

Proposition 13, or "The People's Initiative to Limit Property Taxation", passed in 1978. This proposition was spearheaded by two anti-tax activists, Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, who advocated that property taxes were increasing at an unsustainable rate and that government spending needed to be curtailed under Jerry Brown's term. Proposition 13 placed a 2% yearly cap on property tax increases (Constitution of California, 1978), which led to a significant reduction in revenue for local governments and public services provided by the state, such as education (Kaplan, 2010). Before the law was passed, California provided a significant portion of the funding for the UC system, with the state contributing just over 40% of UC's overall budget in the 1970s (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018). However, with the reduction in education revenue caused by Proposition 13, the state's investment in UC began to decline. While there have been policy changes and trends since the passage of Proposition 13 that cannot be captured in a single "line of best fit" - some beneficial to UC and some not - the rise of fiscal conservatism that brought the "tax revolt" of Proposition 13 certainly complicated the mutualistic relationship between UC and California itself (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018).

A 2-tailed *t*-test was conducted using the 10-year average of state appropriations for UC Riverside for the 1980-1990 (N = 8) and 2011-2021 (N = 10) academic years utilizing the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) database, adjusted for inflation in 2021 dollars (see Figure 1). There is a significant decrease in state appropriations for UC Riverside from 1980-1990 academic years (M = 168733464.88, SD = 64570311.95) compared to 2011-2021 academic years (M = 11583574.36, SD = 1206609.48), $t(17) = 7.63345$, $p < .001$. Note that this significant decrease in funding is in policy context in the 10 academic years immediately after Proposition 13 (1976-1977) through to the 10 years preceding academic year 2021-22; as such, it does not account for other external factors such as the immediate effects of the 2008 recession, where California cut 20% of its already meager budget dedicated to supporting UC, and California state dollars currently make up around 10% of UC's operating budget - a stark decrease from the 40% it made up in the 1970s (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018).

The Re-benching Formula

Prior to implementing the re-benching policy, UC relied on a traditional funding framework. Under this model, each campus received a fixed allocation of state funds, which was determined primarily based on historical funding levels rather than specific campus needs (Regents of the University of California, 2021). However, this model had several limitations. It did not account for the varying costs and demands of different campuses, leading to inequities in resource distribution. Additionally, some campuses with higher enrollment or specialized programs faced challenges in meeting their funding needs, while others with lower enrollment or fewer specialized programs had funds that exceeded their requirements (Regents of the University of California, 2021).

UC operates under a flagship model, where certain campuses, notably UC Berkeley, UCLA, and UC San Diego, are often considered the flagship campuses due to their historical reputation, research output, and prestigious academic programs. The other UC campuses, including UC Riverside, should ideally be relatively equal to one another within this model. While the flagship campuses may enjoy certain advantages in terms of resources, funding, and reputation, it is crucial to ensure that the remaining campuses are not left behind or subjected to unequal treatment. To address these disparities and promote greater equity, the UC Board of Regents introduced the re-benching policy. The motivation behind this policy was to establish a more balanced funding framework that would allocate resources based on campus-specific needs, rather than historical funding patterns, to ensure that each campus has the necessary resources to provide quality education and services to its students. The Board of Regents argued that the policy would align funding allocations with the actual costs and demands of each campus, allowing for a fairer and more efficient use of state funds (Regents of the University of California, 2021).

The Board believed that the re-benching policy would enhance transparency, accountability, and fairness in resource allocation across the UC system. By reallocating resources according to specific campus needs, the policy aimed to equalize state subsidies across all undergraduate students to ensure that all campuses had the opportunity to provide a high-quality education to their students (Regents of the University of California, 2021). In the 2016-2017 academic year, the “re-benching” formula for state subsidies succeeded the previous, esoteric funding formula. In the 2019-2020 academic year, it was estimated to be $8,000 per undergraduate student per academic year that each university would receive from the California government under the new re-benching approach (Regents of the University of California, 2021).

Redistributive Elements in the Budget

The tuition that UC receives is distributed differently from state subsidies, particularly in the context of financial aid. The tuition charge as of 2022-23 was $11,928 (UC Office of the President, 2022). Approximately one-third of this amount is redistributed in financial aid. The tuition model that the UC system uses is “progressive” and involves reinvestment of in-state tuition into financial aid. As such, around $700 million in tuition dollars was distributed to lower-SES students through financial aid in 2022-23 (University of California, 2023). Lower income students also have access to state-distributed Cal Grants and federally-distributed Pell Grants (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018).

The caveat is that this progressive tuition model only applies for tuition fees received from in-state undergraduate students; campuses are permitted to keep tuition received from out-of-state undergraduates for themselves. This compromise was developed as a result of “state disinvestment”, which encouraged the campuses to look for revenue from international and out-of-state students and to charge higher tuition fees to these students (Douglass, 2015; Morphew & Baker, 2007). UC campuses that benefit more from this financial policy include those that attract more out-of-state students, such as UC Berkeley, UC Los Angeles, and UC Irvine. These campuses have greater perceptions of “prestige” associated with their names. Prestige factors include, but are not limited to: desirability of location and geography of the campus, branding elements (such as NCAA-sanctioned athletics programs), Nobel laureates on a campus’s faculty, and donors and endowments. Additionally, campuses have the flexibility of setting their own fees for graduate programs, such as Berkeley’s Haas School of Business and UC Riverside’s Anderson Graduate School of Management, which may imply the existence of market forces in determining prestige of any particular campus or program.

Thus, the campus budgets contain elements that are distributed equally per student across the system (State General Funds), elements that are redistributed from campuses that attract more affluent students to those that attract more low-income students (one-third of tuition revenues); and elements that are distributed unequally in favor of the wealthier and more prestigious campuses (out-of-state tuition and professional school fees).

Inequalities in the Budget That Favor Wealthier Campuses

UC has had to adapt to a new reality of reduced state funding by becoming more self-sufficient and entrepreneurial in order to continue to provide a high-quality education to its students. This shift reflects broader trends towards marketization and privatization of higher education, where universities are increasingly seen as businesses that compete for students and resources (Stice, 2021). Perhaps the biggest question following the diversification of funding and revenue sources for UC over the last three decades is whether each campus is equally equipped to make up this established difference in funding. While the re-benching policy aims to correct any potential gaps through the equalization of State General Funds per student across all 8 UC campuses that are included in this policy, it falls short of correcting the discrepancies that are present as a result of institutional wealth and prestige.

In response to the demonstrated decrease of state funding, UC took three major steps to try to mitigate the negative impact of reduced state appropriations: increasing enrollment of out-of-state and international students, implementing new revenue streams such as funding from endowments, and encouraging campuses to enroll graduate students due to the new re-benching allocations.

Non-Resident Students

UC has implemented a strategy to increase the enrollment of non-resident students in recent years, or out-of-state and international students. This shift in enrollment patterns is due in part to the financial benefits that come with higher tuition and fees charged to non-resident students, who pay higher tuition and fees compared to in-state students. Beginning in 2007-2008, UC allowed each campus to keep all nonresident supplemental tuition for themselves as a means of “meeting their enrollment targets for nonresident students” as they provide a “net financial benefit to the University" (Regents of the University of California, 2021). The reliance on tuition and fees to generate revenue resulted in various tuition increases over the last four decades, with one of the most notable being in 2009 following the Great Recession (Zumeta, 2009). The estimated cost of in-state tuition and on-campus housing for the 2022-2023 academic year is $38,504, while the cost for nonresident students is $69,530, which is more than double the cost for in-state students (University of California, 2023). The financial rationale behind this shift in enrollment patterns is straightforward: non-resident students can be charged more, generating a significant revenue stream for the university. Additionally, by increasing enrollment from non-resident students, the UC system also expands its reach to a broader pool of potential students, increasing the diversity of the student body, and enhancing its academic reputation on a global scale.

UC enrollment demographics for the 2021-22 academic year reveal a disparity in nonresident student enrollment across different UC campuses. At UC Riverside, nonresident students comprised only 3.8% of the incoming undergraduate class. At UC Irvine, however, this figure stood at 20%, and at UCLA, UC Berkeley, and UC San Diego, it was around 25% (University of California, 2023). The higher enrollment of nonresident students at some campuses is partly due to the higher caps for nonresident enrollment allowed at these campuses. A policy established in 2017 limited nonresident enrollment at UC Santa Barbara, UC Davis, UC Santa Cruz, UC Riverside, and UC Merced to 18% in an attempt to rectify this issue (University of California, 2021). However, the campuses where nonresident enrollment already exceeded 18% in that 2017-2018 academic year (e.g. UCLA, UC Berkeley, UC San Diego, and UC Irvine) were allowed to maintain their proportions from that year rather than being forced to decrease nonresident enrollment below 18%.

The revenue disparity caused by the enrollment of out-of-state students creates a predicament for campuses that do not attract as many nonresident students such as UC Riverside. Prestige of a particular campus can be influenced by metrics such as news rankings (e.g. *Time* and *U.S. News*), which increase the visibility of a UC campus and its programs to prospective nonresident applicants. On *U.S. News*' "Best National University Rankings" web page, UC Berkeley and UC Los Angeles are both ranked #20 while UC Riverside is ranked #89 (U.S. News, 2023). Additionally, UC Berkeley's departments of engineering, business, and computer science rank in the top 10 of their respective *U.S. News* 2023 lists, while UC Riverside's engineering department ranks #87 and their business and computer science departments are unranked (U.S. News, 2023). UC Riverside's lack of top 10 departments nationally, as well as having less faculty overall with prominent citations, grants, and patents to their name contributes to the campus's prestige, and therefore to its lack of revenue generation relative to other, more prestigious campuses in the system.

This strategy has generated criticism from some who argue that it has led to reduced opportunities for in-state students, who may be passed over in favor of out-of-state and international students who can pay higher tuition fees. Governor Jerry Brown argued against increasing nonresident enrollment for UC prior to the 2015-2016 academic year, arguing that, "The University of California is created by the people of California… it's good to have some [nonresident students], but I don't think that should be a financial mechanism. It should be more [about] the intellectual environment of the school", asserting that this approach prioritizes financial gain over equal access to education for California residents (Koseff, 2015).

Endowments

Endowments are another form of external revenue that is intended to be a form of investment in the university. They are typically heavily regulated and designated for specific purposes, such as for a new building or a faculty chair position. The UC system has an endowment pool currently valued at $18.2 billion (Kozlowski, 2022), but the levels of endowment at each particular campus varies greatly depending on their prestige. UC Berkeley and UCLA received significantly higher private support in the 2021-2022 academic year of $757,234,834 and $762,449,549 respectively, compared to UC Riverside's private support of $28,993,665 (see Figure 2). In fact, UC Riverside's private support ranks last for the 2021-2022 academic year, with UC Santa Cruz's $50,095,061 support and UC Santa Barbara's $98,946,953 support lightly above UC Riverside's (UC Office of the President Institutional Advancement and Communications, 2022). This may imply a potential lack of robust development programs at the three campuses that received less than $100 million in private support, and could potentially be explained by decisions made by campus leadership and the offices of advancement.

Graduate and Professional Enrollment in the Context of Rebenching

In addition to the undergraduate enrollment disparities, there are also stark differences in the graduate student populations among the UC campuses. The number of master's students and doctoral students in specific fields, such as nursing and medical programs, vary between campuses and can further contribute to funding inequalities. UC Berkeley has a significantly larger graduate student population compared to UC Riverside, with 12,828 enrolled in graduate programs at Berkeley versus 3,906 at Riverside in 2022-23 academic year (IPEDS, 2023). After accounting for the size difference in both campuses' student bodies, graduate students at UC Berkeley make up 28.31% of the whole student body, while graduate students at UC Riverside only make up 14.57%. The difference in weighting between academic master's students (weighted at 1.0) and academic doctoral students (weighted at 2.5) also plays a role in funding disparities, as different levels of education receive different amounts of funding through the re-benching policy (Regents of the University of California, 2021).

In addition to the differences in graduate student populations, the re-benching policy also favors certain UC campuses that have specific programs not available at others. For instance, health sciences students are weighted at 5.0 under the re-benching policy (Regents of the University of California, 2021). While UC Riverside has a medical school, UC Irvine has both a medical school and a nursing school, both of which are weighted at 5 times that of academic master's students for enrollment in these programs. However, not all UC campuses have medical or nursing schools, which is a potential marker of inequality for campuses that can not benefit from these schools using state funding. Only three UC campuses under the re-benching policy - Davis, Irvine, and Los Angeles - have nursing schools (University of California Health, 2023), and a sizable proportion of systemwide revenue (35%) comes from campus medical centers (University of California, 2020).

The lack of centralized funding for graduate programs and professional schools means that campuses increasingly rely more on graduate enrollment, especially at campuses with medical and nursing schools, to support these programs. This can result in unequal access to resources and opportunities for graduate students at campuses that do not enroll a proportionate amount of graduate students, such as UC Riverside, UC Santa Cruz, and UC Santa Barbara, as the state dollars per academic master's, doctoral, and medical students is distributed based on headcount. While the re-benching policy attempts to allocate funding based on enrollment and other factors, it may not fully address these disparities.

Differences in Revenues Across UC Campuses

To investigate the differentiation in total campus revenues since the Great Recession, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. ANOVA is a statistical technique used to compare means across multiple groups, allowing for the identification of significant differences. The analysis compared the total revenues of all eight UC campuses under the re-benching formula for the 10-year period from 2011-2021. The analysis aims to determine whether there has been significant variation in total revenues across the campuses and assess the statistical significance of budget differentiation using an ANOVA approach. The necessary data for the analysis ("Total all revenues and other additions") were collected from IPEDS for each academic year from 2011 to 2021, and statistical software (SPSS) was employed to perform the ANOVA. Understanding the patterns and trends in revenue differentiation is vital for evaluating the financial dynamics within the UC system and identifying potential areas of concern or inequity.

The ANOVA for all 8 campuses yielded compelling results, indicating significant revenue differentiation among the UC campuses over the 2011-2021 period at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(7, 80) = 51.9752$, $p < 0.001$]. When removing the flagship campuses of Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Diego, there is still a significant difference in revenue for the ANOVA conducted for the five other campuses at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(4,50) = 39.1319$, $p < 0.001$] (see Figure 3). These findings suggest that the total campus revenues allocated to each UC campus have experienced significant variation over the specified timeframe. The ANOVA provides statistical evidence of the differentiation in campus budgets, indicating that the diversification of revenue is not evenly distributed across the UC system. The campuses with larger endowments have the advantage of generating vastly increased revenues from interest on those endowments, enabling them to pursue market opportunities for additional wealth and prestige that may not be as readily available to campuses with smaller endowments. This disparity highlights the importance of addressing financial inequities that persist despite re-benching and promoting a more equitable distribution of resources among UC campuses.

Faculty Understandings of UC Budget With Regards to "Stop Redlining UCR"

The "Stop Redlining UCR" movement was a student and faculty-led campaign at the University of California, Riverside that aimed to address perceived systemic neglect of the university by UCOP. It was spurred by the open letter of the same name addressed to UC President Michael V. Drake in February 2021 as a result of an 11% budget cut to UC Riverside's College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences (Newfield, 2021). The letter highlights the paradox of UC Riverside ranking highest in social mobility (often used in marketing campaigns by both the university and UC to promote the university), yet receiving less funding than other UC campuses to support its undergraduate student body. The letter also argues that while UC Riverside receive $8,500 per student[1], UCLA receives $11,500 per student, and the Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, and San Diego campuses receive $10,000 per student, as something that the re-benching policy cannot fix on its own:

> We applaud the recent "re-benching" decision that will bring the funding of UCR and other under-funded campuses to within 95 percent of the systemwide per-student average by 2024. But as with redlined neighborhoods, the damage to UCR's resources from decades of neglect cannot be reversed simply by bringing our support from the system up to an amount that is only slightly below average rather than grossly below average, nor will the phased-in implementation of this plan help us avoid devastation in the present moment. […] In a time of long-overdue attention to the destruction wreaked by systemic racism in the US, it should finally be clear that UCR's students deserve a fully equal investment from the UC system, including support to correct for years of economic marginalization. It's time to stop redlining UCR (Newfield, 2021).

[1] "Student" in the context of the letter takes the average of all state dollars received for both undergraduate and graduate students and is likely intended to reflect the differences in graduate student populations at more prestigious campuses.

In this particular context, "redlining" is used metaphorically to describe the perceived neglect of UC Riverside and the effects it has on the undergraduate population, which is mostly composed of people of color, nontraditional (including first-generation) and transfer students, and commuters, and suggests that UC Riverside has been neglected and underfunded by the University of California system and the state of California, leading to a lack of resources and support for its students, faculty, and staff (Newfield, 2021). The movement argues that this neglect has had a disproportionate impact on the marginalized communities at UC Riverside and has perpetuated structural inequalities within the UC system. The letter points to a range of issues that stem from this perceived neglect, including inadequate infrastructure, limited access to academic and career resources, and insufficient mental health support. The "Stop Redlining UCR" movement has additionally called for greater transparency and accountability from UCOP regarding funding allocation, as well as increased investment in UC Riverside to address the needs and challenges faced by its diverse student population (Newfield, 2021).

This study used semi-structured interviews conducted both in-person and via video call (duration of 30 minutes to 1 hour) to gather data from a purposeful sample of ten faculty and academic staff at UC Riverside. Participants were chosen based on their experiences on various administrative committees at the university and were asked open-ended questions about their ideas and experiences regarding the "redlining" metaphor. This includes their interactions with students, other faculty, and academic staff, and any barriers they encountered in providing education or services to students. Interviews were not transcribed or recorded, but I took detailed field notes with each interview. I used a grounded theory approach to analyze the interview data, focusing on identifying patterns and themes that emerged from participants' opinions, experiences, and ideas (Strauss & Glaser, 1967).

Through my analysis of the interview data I identified two distinct groups that emerged based on their experiences and perspectives: (1) those who viewed systemic inequality in the funding patterns in the UC system through a structural perspective, which encompasses the relationship between institutions (such as each UC campus to UCOP) as agents; and (2) those who viewed it through a symbolic perspective, or assigning subjective meaning to objects, processes, ideas, and concepts in their everyday life (Blumer, 1969).

The Structural Approach

The first group, comprising approximately half of the participants, viewed inequality among the campuses as a structural issue that is influenced by institutional and economic factors. These factors include historical legacies, location, the ability (or lack thereof) of UC Riverside to attract and recruit international and out-of-state students, and the success of faculty in securing research grants:

> "We aren't in a particularly wealthy part of the state. We don't have a lot of history with [wealthy] students. Being a commuter school may hurt the reputation as well, it caters mostly to students in the Inland Empire - I think it's around 60% commuters. How well connected are these students with their peers and faculty? Do they feel connected enough to the university to donate as alumni?" (assistant professor in social sciences).
>
> "Prestige is a huge factor, as is the politics of legacy. It's impossible for UC Riverside to undercut the prestige of Berkeley or Los Angeles at this stage. They have more mature and more diverse streams of revenue, which amplify these inequalities" (full professor in natural sciences).

Many participants in this group were more likely to have served on administrative or financial committees. One participant in particular noted that their background in economics may have helped them achieve a more well-rounded understanding of the budget:

> "I had to put together a lot of budgets [for my department]. Of course, there is still lots of learning on the job, but many people do not have a full exposure and may not be prepared in the same way I was. They also may not know what the needs may be, and they may not be the biggest ones [...] the squeaky wheel gets the grease, as they say" (full professor in social sciences).

Participants were also likely to either not have heard of the "redlining" metaphor:

> "I have not heard that particular term, but I am aware of concerns about revenue" (full professor in social sciences).
>
> "I didn't hear that term used initially, but I've heard it at some faculty meetings recently. People were just concerned that we're getting less than our fair share" (full professor in natural sciences),

or they were likely to disagree with the term on a literal ground, such as feeling that the term does not accurately or adequately describe the reality of the situation:

> "It's a noble cause, but I think some people may conflate the budget and how it is spent with the money we actually receive. They are two somewhat independent things. It should be more about the money we get and if we're actually being shafted by UCOP" (assistant professor in natural sciences).
>
> "It may be easier to describe us as a smaller school rather than actually being 'redlined'. I think it's growing pains more than anything else as we want to expand to 30,000 students by 2030 - that's a big ask" (full professor in natural sciences).

Participants in the structural group were eager to acknowledge the various moving parts in the systemwide UC budget that can make it difficult to adjust to growth of the system as a whole, and that every UC campus has struggled with finances in different aspects of their budget and funding since the COVID-19 pandemic. They also often discussed the "redlining" metaphor as a legitimate argument in favor of equal funding, but attributed it to structural causes (e.g. UC Riverside being built in 1954 vs. UC Berkeley being built in 1868) that are separate from the makeup of UC Riverside's undergraduate student body.

The Symbolic Approach

The second group of participants, in contrast, emphasized the symbolic factors that contribute to the difference in funding. These factors include interactions among faculty and students as well as perceptions of quality, reputation, and status. Participants in this group were more likely to agree with the "redlining" metaphor for its evocative nature, particularly in that it calls attention to the lack of funding that UC Riverside receives relative to other campuses in the system. They were additionally less likely to have participated in committees concerning systemwide and university budgets, and ascribed many of their teaching and working experiences to this perceived "redlining".

Participants in this group often recalled stories of undergraduate students not being able to meet with their advisors, register for the classes they needed to graduate due to physical space constraints and impacting, or difficulties that students faced finishing their assignments on time as a means of situating UC Riverside as a campus with "unique challenges" that they often perceived as a result of UCOP's neglect. It was frequently proposed that this may be due to UC Riverside's location in the Inland Empire, which one participant noted "carries less prestige than its sister campus 40 miles away in Irvine, which is built around a traditionally white business network":

> "The majority of our undergraduate population is made up of people of color, non-traditional students, and commuters who face unique challenges compared to other campuses. Many of them work full-time outside of class and take my evening classes, care for family members in and outside of their home, or have children, which makes access to resources on campus that much more important" (lecturer in social sciences).

Additionally, participants in this group more readily discussed the inequalities that are present in students' home lives that were revealed through online teaching (e.g. through Zoom classes) during the COVID-19 pandemic, such as inability to access a computer or the Internet:

> "Many of these difficulties were largely invisible prior to the pandemic […] My colleagues and I feel the need to care for our student community when we hear about and see these challenges, but we are unable to support them. I can't point them to the [laptop loaning] program when they live more than 300 miles away from campus and they don't have reliable Internet access at home. I frequently saw children running around in the background on Zoom [...] and I realized how much of a window I had into my students' home lives" (full professor in humanities).

Participants were also keen to discuss a variety of topics and issues that they saw as pertinent to this perceived "redlining", including lack of classroom availability, structural concerns in their buildings, classrooms, and offices (such as in the Arts building and Sproul Hall), and "poor support from UCR administration [...] there is no accountability" (full professor in humanities). Because participants were less likely to be familiar with the campus budget or UCOP policies, it is probable that they attributed "redlining" to things that they interacted with on an everyday basis out of familiarity with their environment.

Similarities and Discussion

In spite of these theoretical differences, both groups shared one common idea: regardless of whether or not participants agreed with the usage of the term "redlining", whether in a literal or metaphorical sense, all participants agreed that there was some degree of inequality with funding in the UC system, and that these elements of inequality could be particularly pronounced at UC Riverside. Most participants across both groups attributed this inequality to institutional prestige, particularly with regards to UC Riverside's location in the Inland Empire. Additionally, all participants noted that UC Riverside serves many first-generation and non-traditional students, as well as students from under-privileged and under-represented backgrounds, and concluded that the campus needs more money to provide for and help fund these student populations in their pursuit of a high-quality public education:

> "UC Riverside serves lots of first-generation students and those with underprivileged backgrounds with challenges [...] We need more money to help fund these students" (full professor in natural sciences, from structural group).

> "Commitment to re-benching is a good first step, but assessing what the needs are of a student population on a needs-based system according to who we're serving would be ideal. [There should be] a focus on equity rather than equality" (full professor in humanities, from symbolic group).

Participants in the second group emphasized the symbolic factors that contribute to the difference in funding, including perceptions of quality, reputation, and status. They viewed the “redlining” metaphor as a way to call attention to the lack of funding that UC Riverside receives relative to other campuses in the system:

> “We serve primarily students from the Inland Empire who are overwhelmingly students of color and first-generation. The dollars simply don’t match. There is a lack of reappropriation and redistribution of funds based on our needs and who we serve” (assistant professor in humanities, from symbolic group).

It is plausible that some of these participants may ascribe issues within the campus, such as poor facilities and access to resources, to the “redlining” of UC Riverside itself, when it could likely be better described by shortsightedness by UC administration in implementation of these financial policies that prioritize privatization of university funding. This can be seen as a potential limitation of the symbolic perspective, as it may lead to overlooking other underlying causes of disparities in funding and resources. However, the symbolic factors identified by this group of participants may not be entirely divorced from the structural factors identified by the first group of participants. The perception of quality and reputation of UC Riverside may be influenced by historical legacies, location, and the ability to attract and recruit international and out-of-state students, all of which were identified as structural factors by the first group of participants. In this sense, the symbolic perspective and the structural perspective may be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

While the redlining metaphor may be a powerful and evocative way to draw attention to disparities in funding, particularly for participants in the symbolic group, it is important to also consider other contributing factors that may not be immediately apparent. It is not clear that these issues are a direct result of “redlining” by UCOP. It is also not clear that if there was ever “redlining” that UC Riverside was the only campus affected by such a phenomenon. In reality, before re-benching was implemented, UC Santa Barbara received the lowest weighted state subsidies per student at $4,000. UC Riverside received around $5,600 per student, ranking 4th among all eight campuses (Regents of the University of California, 2021). As such, UC Santa Barbara actually benefits more from the re-benching policy than UC Riverside does due to its previous lower allocation of state subsidies per student.

Similarly, administrative decisions at UC Riverside may have prioritized other areas of the university's operations over facilities and resources for faculty, staff, and students, leading to a perception of neglect or disrepair. Those in the symbolic group argued that facilities and resources may not have been updated or expanded at the same rate as student enrollment, leading to issues such as, but not limited to: overcrowding, lack of physical classroom space, and poor availability of student housing. This may be wholly independent from the state dollars that UC Riverside receives, and could possibly be reflected by campus budget and expenditure priorities and decisions.

One potential contributing factor to the perceived deficiencies in UC Riverside's facilities and resources from participants in the symbolic group could be a decrease in funding from the state over time. As state funding for public universities has decreased in recent years, campuses like UC Riverside have been forced to rely more heavily on private donations and endowments to fund their operations. The letter argues that "re-benching isn't enough", but it becomes clear upon further consideration that the underlying issue is actually not the now-equalized distribution of state funds. Rather, it is about the necessary 11% budget cuts that had to be made in 2021 because of low year-to-year financial reserves and low annual revenue, and thus we go back to UC Riverside's non-tuition, non-state subsidies revenue, which is sorely lagging behind its sister campuses.

UC is a complex environment in which parts of the budget are not only equalized across campuses, but also redistributed to less-advantaged campuses. However, parts of the budget as well as the appropriation(s) of these parts, are unequal in ways that advantage the wealthier campuses. This evidently creates a cycle where wealthier and more prestigious campuses are able to attract larger donations and endowments, while less prestigious campuses like UC Riverside struggle to attract similar levels of support.

Theoretical Framework

The structural inequalities present in UC can be examined through a structural lens, drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu's theories of prestige and social reproduction. Bourdieu (1986) argues that social inequality is not solely based on individual attributes, but rather shaped by the distribution of resources and power within society. Applying this perspective to the UC system shows that the flagship campuses with established prestige, such as UC Berkeley, UCLA, and UC San Diego, are more likely to continue prospering, while campuses lacking historical prestige, such as UC Riverside, UC Santa Cruz, and UC Santa Barbara, face barriers in their pursuit of resources and revenue. Prestige plays a crucial role in the perpetuation of inequality within the UC system. The campuses that have already attained prestigious status attract greater attention, resources, and support from endowments and private donations. This reinforces their advantage and enables them to maintain their elevated positions. Conversely, campuses lacking in historical prestige struggle to attract comparable levels of external funding, perpetuating their relative disadvantage in terms of resources and opportunities.

Furthermore, Bourdieu's theory of social reproduction highlights how the unequal distribution of resources not only becomes self-perpetuating, but also exacerbates the disparities among lower-tier campuses. The campuses that possess prestige and accumulated capital are better equipped to attract resources, establish strong academic programs, and maintain a favorable reputation among prospective applicants and donors. The campuses with established prestige continue to attract and generate revenue, as well as benefit from accumulated capital, to reinforce their elevated positions. This further solidifies their advantage, creating a cycle where their existing prestige begets additional resources, while campuses without such advantages struggle to escape the stratification among their non-flagship sister campuses. Meanwhile, campuses without the same level of prestige face ongoing challenges in attracting donors and nonresident students to generate revenue, hindering their ability to address the needs of their diverse student populations (Mitchell, Leachman, and Masterson, 2016).

Utilizing Bourdieu's theories deconstructs the structural factors that contribute to inequality in the UC system. They additionally emphasize the importance of challenging the existing hierarchies that prioritize prestige and accumulated capital. Rather than perpetuating the disparities among campuses, there is a need to advocate for equal support for institutions that do not possess the same level of historical prestige. The acknowledgment of these disparities allows for the creation of a more equitable higher education system that levels the non-flagship campuses in the UC system without detracting from the opportunities and resources that are readily available at flagship campuses. This approach calls for recognizing the challenges with revenue generation faced by campuses such as UC Riverside, UC Santa Cruz, and UC Santa Barbara, and providing them with the necessary resources and support to overcome these obstacles.

Looking to the Future & Policy Alternatives

This section highlights important findings from the exploratory research on the Stop Redlining UCR movement and its implications for policy and practice in the University of California system. One key finding is that while the UC system has mechanisms in place for equalizing and redistributing parts of the budget across campuses, there are still significant inequalities in the allocation and appropriation of funds that advantage wealthier campuses over less-advantaged ones like UC Riverside. These findings have important implications for policymakers and administrators, highlighting the need for greater transparency and equality in funding allocation and a more equitable distribution of resources towards lower-tier campuses to ensure that all students across all UC campuses have access to the resources and opportunities they need to succeed in higher education.

The state's demonstrated failure to adequately fund the UC system and adhere to the principles of the California Master Plan for Higher Education is a critical issue that cannot be ignored. The state has historically played a significant role in providing funding for higher education, but in recent years, it has significantly reduced its financial support for the UC system. This has forced individual campuses to prioritize nonresident tuition, endowments, and graduate student enrollment to cover their budget shortfalls, which has resulted in demonstrably significant disparities in resource allocation and campus budgets across the UC system. By cutting funding and forcing individual campuses to diversify their revenue streams, the state is effectively abdicating its responsibility to provide equitable access to higher education for all Californians. It is worth noting, however, that this issue is not exclusive to California. State university systems such as those in New England, namely Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, rely more heavily on tuition than state support (McIntyre, 2022). The trend of state disinvestment in California may be representative of the larger problem of nationwide funding cuts for higher education across 32 states since 2008 (Flannery, 2022).

The current UC funding model has created significant disparities in access and opportunity, with some campuses, such as UC Riverside, struggling to meet the needs of their diverse student populations due to inadequate funding. In light of these challenges, it is critical that policymakers and other stakeholders prioritize addressing the systemic issues that are undermining the California Master Plan for Higher Education. UC Berkeley, UC Los Angeles, and UC San Diego are here to stay as flagship campuses in the UC system, and it is expected that the level of prestige associated with these three campuses will continue to remain higher than the other five UC campuses, which should theoretically be more or less equal to one another. However, the revenues at the other, non-flagship campuses under re-benching remain significantly unequal. Rectifying this inequality in revenue requires a concerted effort to increase state funding for the other campuses, as well as a focus on investing in campuses that are most in need of additional support. Without such action, it will be increasingly difficult for the UC system to fulfill its mandate to provide high-quality, affordable, and accessible education to all Californians.

The lack of state funding has placed additional financial burdens on the non-flagship campuses within the UC system. The re-benching policy, which still has issues related to prestige of graduate and professional programs, relies on state dollars that "have not been forthcoming" and cannot replace what UC Riverside is not gaining through non-resident tuition (Burawoy, 2021). As a result, UC Riverside cannot simply rely on non-resident tuition and endowments to make up for the funding shortfall. This remains a concern as the difference between total revenues for all UC campuses under the re-benching policy after the Great Recession is significantly different from one campus to another. Another important policy issue to consider is current California governor Gavin Newsom's proposed investment in state funding for UC after the COVID-19 pandemic and budget shortfalls. This investment resulted in a 2.6% increase in funding per student for the 2022-2023 academic year. In 2021-2022, funding per student was $30,549, and the proposed amount for 2022-2023 was $33,868 (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2022), which is promising for non-flagship campuses in need of state support.

The Inland Empire Rising Fund, proposed by California State Assemblymember Jose Medina (D-Riverside), seeks to provide more financial support to the UC Riverside campus and other universities in the Inland Empire region. This fund, along with other taxation measures proposed by Medina, represents a shift away from relying solely on the state government for funding and towards a more diversified approach to generating revenue for UC campuses (Horseman, 2022). However, while well-intended, this is a stopgap fix that does not address the fundamental inequalities in the current funding model related to campus prestige. While some argue that, under a neoliberal approach, campuses with accumulated capital and prestige should be able to maintain their advantages (Gamsu, 2022), this process would perpetuate existing inequalities between non-flagship campuses and undermine the mission of the UC system to provide equal access to quality education. Instead, it is important to address the systemic issues within the UC budget that allow for unequal distribution of resources and to advocate for greater transparency and accountability in funding allocation. This may require rethinking the California state budget to ensure that all UC campuses should be provided with comparable resources, opportunities, and support to promote level and equitable outcomes for their diverse student populations. By embracing this principle, UC and the State of California can work towards fostering a more inclusive, balanced, and effective higher education environment that recognizes the value and potential of all its campuses, including the non-flagship campuses.

Future Research Considerations

In considering future research directions, a pertinent question emerges regarding the extent to which each UC campus bears the sole responsibility of generating its own revenue. It is worth exploring the factors that contribute to the inability of less prestigious campuses to generate revenue through avenues such as endowments and nonresident tuition. This may entail examining the efficacy of each campus's office of advancement and their marketing strategies in attracting prospective applicants and donors. While beyond the scope of this paper, investigating these aspects could shed light on the underlying reasons behind revenue disparities within the UC system. Future research could delve into the implications of funding diversification and its impact on equity, examining how different funding models shape the accessibility and affordability of education across campuses. Additionally, exploring alternative funding mechanisms or policy approaches that promote greater equity in resource allocation could offer valuable insights for addressing funding disparities and ensuring a more equitable higher education landscape.

Another potential consideration for future research is the investigation of the connections and similarities between the UC system and other state university systems operating under the flagship model, such as the University of Massachusetts (UMass) and the State University of New York (SUNY) systems. While this study has a focus on qualitative analysis based on faculty experiences within UC Riverside, it is essential to acknowledge that divergent experiences may emerge in other state systems due to their unique historical, political, and economic factors. Conducting qualitative studies within the UMass or SUNY systems, for example, would provide valuable insights into how state disinvestment challenges influence faculty experiences and campus revenues in different contexts.

Given California's significant population and the UC system's prominent position in the national higher education landscape, exploring the divergent perspectives by faculty in relation to state disinvestment can offer a framework that is transferable to other state university systems operating under a similar model. This broader exploration will provide further clarity on the factors influencing funding disparities, resource allocation, and the experiences of faculty, students, and other stakeholders in these systems. Ultimately, this research will inform policy and practice in higher education, contributing to efforts aimed at promoting equity, access, and excellence in universities across different contexts.

Limitations

This study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. These limitations include the following:

1. Lack of assessment of professional school fees and market forces: The analysis conducted in this study focuses on total campus revenues and their differentiation over time, and discusses graduate student tuition and professional school fees in the context of the re-benching policy. However, it does not specifically examine the impact of professional school fees or the influence of market forces on revenue generation. Professional schools, such as business schools or law schools, often have their own fee structures and revenue sources that can significantly impact a campus's overall budget. The omission of these factors may limit the comprehensive understanding of revenue differentials across campuses.
2. Methodological limitations: The use of ANOVA to compare total campus revenues over a specific time period provides valuable insights into budget differentiation. However, it is important to note that ANOVA has certain assumptions and limitations. The validity of the results relies on the assumption of independence between observations and the homogeneity of variances across groups. Violations of these assumptions could potentially affect the accuracy and generalizability of the findings.
3. Data availability and reliability: The study relies on publicly available financial data from the UC system. While efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data, there may be limitations and inconsistencies inherent in the dataset. Data for 1981, 1982, and 1983 academic years is not available through IPEDS. Additionally, the data may not capture all relevant aspects of campus budgets and revenues, including specific sources

of income and expenditures. These limitations may impact the comprehensiveness and precision of the analysis.

4. Generalizability: The findings of this study are based on a specific time period and a limited number of campuses. The analysis focuses on the period from 2011 to 2021 in an effort to capture the diversification of revenue following the 2008 recession and includes the eight campuses under the re-benching formula. Financial dynamics and revenue patterns may vary across different time periods and among campuses not included in the analysis. Caution should therefore be exercised when generalizing the findings beyond the scope of this study.

Future research could address these limitations by incorporating exploration of professional school fees on a campus level, considering individual policy contexts in specific years within such time frames, and utilizing more comprehensive datasets to provide a more nuanced understanding of revenue differentiation among campuses.

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APPENDIX

Figure 1: 10-year average of state appropriations for UC Riverside for the 1980-1990 and 2011-2021 academic years, adjusted for inflation in 2021 dollars.

1980-1990 academic years		2011-2021 academic years	
1980	$148,384,855	2011	$12,435,475
1984	$153,285,705	2012	$9,158,458
1985	$182,932,343	2013	$10,047,514
1986	$198,555,732	2014	$11,332,767
1987	$12,785,433	2015	$11,719,469
1988	$218,212,335	2016	$12,828,926
1989	$214,940,219	2017	$12,989,137
1990	$220,771,097	2018	$12,502,472
		2019	$12,279,962
		2020	$11,948,138
		2021	$10,177,000

(IPEDS, 2023).

Figure 2: Total private support to Regents and Campus Foundations for FY 2021-2022:

UC Los Angeles	$762,449,549
UC Berkeley	$757,234,834
UC San Diego	$390,221,500
UC Irvine	$253,583,916
UC Davis	$198,420,555
UC Santa Barbara	$98,946,953
UC Santa Cruz	$50,095,061
UC Riverside	$28,993,665

(UC Office of the President Institutional Advancement and Communications, 2022).

Figure 3: Total all revenues and other additions for the eight campuses under the re-benching policy from 2011-2021.

Year/Campus	Berkeley	UCLA	UCSD	UCSB	UCR	Davis	Irvine	Santa Cruz
2011	2654381000	5362259000	3516077000	862794000	712021000	3382947000	2188305000	688399000
2012	2577583000	5822294000	3616766000	868165000	698574000	3439480000	2241589000	657371000
2013	2363062000	5828265000	3751681000	892010000	731574000	3641391000	2360370000	630183000
2014	2695502000	6121488000	3817786000	1016052000	879034000	3831101000	2833362000	712039000
2015	2845717000	6630992000	4442592000	998909000	872159000	4081222000	2562418000	752032000
2016	2659305000	6952147000	4314109000	1120834000	858077000	4416744000	2917043000	821538000
2017	2726006000	7501416000	4905727000	1195923000	949625000	4697236000	3028245000	831439000
2018	3057546000	7721696000	5394020000	1139739000	1006705000	4868046000	3383961000	934222000
2019	3031707000	8557823000	1292739000	5915505000	977957000	5129384000	3474603000	860913000
2020	3148693000	9111445000	6164228000	1249725000	1195701000	5666765000	3718029000	1027062000
2021	3074704000	10352422000	6655521000	1249657000	1170146000	6131045000	4325347000	848226000

(IPEDS, 2023).