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Enacting the Nation: German Economic Coordination from Berlin to Tokyo to Calcutta,
1871-1914

THESIS

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in European Thought and Culture

by

Daniel Vig

Thesis Committee:
Assistant Professor Philip Broadbent, Chair
Associate Professor Kai Evers
Associate Professor James Robertson

2026

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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University of California, Irvine, 2026

Assistant Professor Philip Broadbent, Chair

This paper reconstructs a triangulated intellectual and institutional circuit linking Berlin, Tokyo, and Calcutta between 1871 and 1914, arguing that a German-derived repertoire of national economic coordination traveled across imperial and colonial contexts as a portable anti-colonial resource. It introduces the analytical category *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* (“economic community”) to name what German political economy offered late-developing and subordinated societies: an economy imagined not as a neutral field of exchange but as a nationally organised, communally grounded, and administratively coordinated order. Rooted in Friedrich List and the German Historical School, this model fused economic coordination with a moralised rhetoric of national belonging and was rendered portable through university networks, constitutional templates, military advisory missions, and the prestige of German administrative science.

The paper advances three correctives to existing scholarship. Against Pankaj Mishra’s reception-centered account of Tsushima as a civilizational rupture, it recovers the specific institutional repertoire Japan was understood to have enacted. Against Kris Manjappa’s bilateral Germany-India framing, it positions Japan as the demonstrating node that transformed a theoretical critique into a demonstrated historical possibility. Against accounts treating Indian Listian thought as derivative, it shows that economic nationalists including Ranade, Dutt, and Naoroji had assembled the theoretical core of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* before 1905.

Tracing the model's assembly in Bismarckian Germany, its selective enactment in Meiji Japan, and its mediated reception in Indian swadeshi practice, this paper distinguishes the state-centered formations of Germany and Japan from the civil-society *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* Indian nationalists were forced to construct under conditions of blocked sovereignty. Japan's victory at Tsushima proved national economic coordination achievable outside European tutelage. Germany's extra-colonial imperial significance, the paper concludes, lay less in its formal colonial footprint than in the portable logic of national economic organisation it modeled.

INTRODUCTION

As dawn broke over the Tsushima Strait in May 1905, Japan's navy prepared to strike a blow that would echo across the colonial world. The Japanese Imperial Navy, commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, decisively destroyed Russia's Baltic Fleet, an armada that had sailed over 18,000 nautical miles in an attempt to reassert tsarist authority in East Asia.¹ For the first time in a modern naval conflict, a non-European power had not merely resisted but overpowered a major European empire. The battle's reverberations reached far beyond the strait. A young Jawaharlal Nehru, traveling through England by train, "waited eagerly for the papers for fresh news daily [on the conflict]" and "mused of Indian Freedom and Asiatic freedom from the thralldom of Europe."² In South Africa, Mohandas Gandhi grasped the moment's deeper significance, observing that the roots of Japanese victory had spread so far and wide that it was impossible yet to visualize all the fruit they would put forth.³ When C. F. Andrews described the "sudden rise of the spirit of nationality" that Tsushima had accelerated, he named Japan "the great outstanding example" and set that example explicitly beside the rise of "Prussia and Germany."⁴ Tsushima marked the beginning of something else: a moment that unsettled the presumed hierarchy of civilisations and forced contemporaries to imagine that the racial order of empire might not be immutable. What made this possible, however, was not the battle alone. Japan's victory was the public demonstration of a decades-long project of national construction, one built, in decisive part, from a German repertoire of statecraft and economic coordination.

¹ For the battle of Tsushima, see Constantine Pleshakov, *The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima* (London: Hachette, 2008).

² Jawaharlal Nehru, *Autobiography* (1936; repr., New Delhi, 1989), 16.

³ Mohandas Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 4 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1960), 470.

⁴ C. F. Andrews, *The Renaissance in India: Its Missionary Aspect* (London: Church Missionary Society, 1912), 13-14.

This paper traces that less visible story. Indian economic nationalists already possessed an argument against the free-trade order that bound their economy; what Japan's enactment of a German-derived repertoire of national coordination did was transform that argument from a theoretical claim into a demonstrated historical possibility.

The scholarship that has grown up around Tsushima's political reverberations has transformed the study of anti-colonial thought. Two bodies of work in particular have shaped the terrain this paper enters. Pankaj Mishra's *From the Ruins of Empire* recovered the emotional and intellectual registers in which Asian thinkers absorbed the shock of European imperialism, showing how Tsushima ignited anti-colonial imaginations from Bengal to Istanbul and placing a generation of intellectuals, Liang Qichao, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, within a shared horizon of resistance.⁵ Against an older historiography that had treated Asian nationalism as derivative or reactive, Mishra demonstrated that the intellectual responses to imperialism formed a coherent world of their own, with Japan functioning as the central exhibit of what was possible outside European tutelage. Kris Manjapra's *Age of Entanglement* moved the analysis further by tracing the circuits of intellectual exchange between Germany and India, recovering a substantive tradition of Indian engagement with German thought, in science, economics, and political philosophy, that had been largely invisible to both nationalist and colonial historiography.⁶ Together, these works have remade the field of global history. Yet both leave only partly resolved the structural problem this paper takes up, how German models of national coordination reached India, for reasons that deserve examination.

⁵ Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).

⁶ Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals across Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

Two absences in particular deserve attention. First, the reception centered framework that gives Mishra's account of Tsushima as a civilizational rupture has not been matched by an equivalent account of what Japan was understood to have done, institutionally and conceptually, that made its demonstration legible as something more than a single victory: as the enactment of a transferable system of national economic coordination. Mishra shows that Japan mattered enormously to Indian and Asian observers; he does not recover the particular repertoire that Japan had enacted and that Tsushima certified as historically effective. The result is an account of effects without adequate causes: Tsushima as a civilizational rupture, but not as the public demonstration of a specific model of national construction. The institutional formation that made Tsushima possible, decades of borrowing in administrative law, military organisation, and political economy, is apparent in his account, but this paper shows the degree to which that formation was specifically German in character. Second, Manjappa's recovery of the Germany-India intellectual circuit, indispensable as it is, routes German ideas directly into Indian nationalist thought without adequately accounting for Japan as the demonstrating node through which that repertoire had been enacted, transformed, and made historically credible.⁷ To narrate the circuit as bilateral, Berlin to Calcutta, is to miss the specific work that Japanese demonstration performed. The German model arrived already enacted and demonstrated, filtered through a prism that both bent and clarified what it transmitted.

Without the full triangulated circuit, three things collapse: Japan's modernisation into a bilateral borrowing story; Indian economic nationalism into a purely indigenous or British-reactive formation; and Germany's significance into its formal colonial footprint, which was, as Conrad has argued, only one part of a far more encompassing global reach.⁸ What the

⁷ Ibid., 5, 41-55, 148-149.

⁸ Sebastian Conrad, "Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 4 (2013): 545.

triangulated account restores is the portability of a German-derived repertoire of national development, available as an anti-colonial resource precisely because of the structural position it occupied against the free-trade orthodoxy underwriting British imperial dominance.^{9,10}

This paper uses the term *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* ("economic community") as a category of analysis rather than one drawn from the historical record. The actors examined here did not use the word; it is a term of art deployed to name a pattern that ran across three national contexts but was never consolidated into a single doctrine by those who enacted it.¹¹ It names the positive content that German political economy could seem to offer to late-developing or subordinated societies: an economy imagined less as a neutral field of exchange than as a nationally organised, communally grounded, and administratively coordinated order. Friedrich List gave the clearest early formulation of this position.¹² In *The National System of Political Economy*, he

⁹ The argument is not blind to its central irony. List's own *National System* treats colonisation as a constitutive feature of normal nationhood: a fully developed nation, he writes, should direct "any surplus of productive power to colonisation, and to the subjection of barbarous nations," and he explicitly urged Prussia to acquire German colonies in Australasia. Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. G. A. Matile (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1856), 326, 378. The same body of thought would, in the decades after the period this paper examines, help underwrite Japan's own imperial expansion across East Asia. That its categories nonetheless furnished colonised Indian observers with an anti-colonial vocabulary is not a contradiction the argument must explain away but a feature of how intellectual repertoires travel: detachable from the intentions of their originators and available for redirection toward opposed ends.

¹⁰ "Free-trade orthodoxy" here names the classical liberal doctrine descending from Adam Smith and consolidated by his nineteenth-century successors: the position that unimpeded exchange across borders, governed by comparative advantage, maximised collective welfare, and that tariffs and state coordination of economic life were distortions of a naturally harmonious order. It is precisely this doctrine that List set himself against. He named it the "cosmopolite" or "school" theory and argued that it mistook the conditions of an already-industrialised nation for universal economic law; prescribed to latecomers, it functioned as the means by which the dominant commercial power preserved its advantage. Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. G. A. Matile (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1856), 99-100, 199-201. The "orthodoxy" this paper invokes is therefore Smith's framework as it had hardened by the mid-nineteenth century into the operative ideology of British commercial policy and the doctrinal justification for the imperial trading system within which India was subordinated.

¹¹ The choice of a German term is deliberate; the repertoire this paper traces originates in German political economy and travels outward from it. A German analytical label keeps that genealogy visible in a way an English coinage would obscure. *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* also captures, in a single word, the fusion of economic coordination (*Wirtschaft*) and national-communal belonging (*Gemeinschaft*) that defines the model, a fusion English renders only periphrastically.

¹² "German political economy" is used here as a retrospective shorthand for a tradition that, in List's lifetime, had no unified national state to which it corresponded. List published *Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie* in 1841, three decades before unification; his "nation" was an aspiration and an argument, not an existing polity. The term thus designates a body of thought, Listian and later Historical School economics, oriented toward a German nation that did not yet exist, which is precisely what made it portable to other societies seeking to imagine national economic order in advance of, or in tension with, the states they inhabited.

distinguished "political or national" economy from "cosmopolite economy," insisting that the latter mistook the interests of already powerful commercial nations for universal law.¹³ He did not reject commerce in the abstract. Rather, he argued that under actually existing conditions of unequal development, free trade advantaged the already industrialised and disarmed those still trying to build productive capacity.¹⁴ A "great nation," he therefore wrote, should make the "national or internal association of productive powers" the principal object of policy.¹⁵

List supplies the content but not a usable name for it, and the available analytical terms each fail in a specific way. "Developmental state" is anachronistic, carrying the weight of post-1945 East Asian political economy; "illiberalism" captures only the negation, the order's refusal of laissez-faire, rather than its positive content; "national economy" sits too close to List's own vocabulary to function as an independent analytical category.¹⁶ *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* earns its place by naming what was positive in the German model as others received it, not merely what it refused but what it offered: the promise that an economy could be organised as a coordinated national community. That the term was absent from the historical record is part of its analytic utility. It marks a practice coherent enough to be recognisable across three national contexts, yet never consolidated into a single doctrine by those who enacted it.

The term also names two structurally distinct formations that the argument must hold apart. Germany and Japan built state-centered *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*: coordinated fiscal policy, a standardised legal apparatus, and nationally direct industrial investment, underwritten by a moralised rhetoric of labor and national belonging. India's nationalists, denied any of those

¹³ Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. G. A. Matile (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1856), 191-195.

¹⁴ Ibid, 200-201.

¹⁵ Ibid, 242.

¹⁶ For "developmental state" see Johnson, Chalmers. Preface to MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982. For "Illiberalism" as "ex negativo" see Marlene Laruelle, "Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction," *East European Politics* 38, no. 2 (2022): 310.

sovereign instruments, and were forced to attempt something structurally different: a civil-society *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, built through the moral energies of national solidarity and circuits of indigenous production and technical education, under conditions of blocked sovereignty in which the state itself remained in imperial hands. It is this difference that makes India so illuminating. The Indian case shows what the German model looked like when its proponents lacked the very instrument, the centralising, interventionist state, that had been central to it in Germany and Japan. That a state-centered model could be taken up and adapted by a movement without state power tells us a great deal about its global reach.

The argument proceeds by way of three correctives to the existing literature. First, it recovers Japan as the demonstrating node in the circuit rather than its necessary conduit. Indian economic nationalists possessed a direct engagement with List and the German Historical School that predated Tsushima; Japan's role was to turn an existing theoretical critique into a demonstrated historical possibility. Second, it recovers the positive content of the German model rather than defining it negatively. India's economic nationalist tradition had arrived at Listian categories through both the experience of colonial deindustrialisation and direct engagement with German political economy, which made the German repertoire immediately legible once it was refracted through Japan. Reformers in China, Korea, and the Ottoman lands engaged German models too, but in India the prior Listian critique was unusually developed, so that Japanese demonstration met an argument already fully formed. Third, it treats the three cases as structurally interconnected. The Bengal-Tokyo exchange was specific and documented; swadeshi's attempt to build productive capacity and national solidarity from civil society, bypassing the imperial state entirely, shows the German model being adapted under conditions its originators never faced, and it is that adaptation that earns India its place in the circuit.

This paper understands nationalisation and globalisation as having developed in close relation, as Sebastian Conrad has argued each was constitutive of the other rather than its precondition. The pressures of global integration were precisely what drove states to coordinate their economies and define the national communities in whose name that coordination would be conducted.¹⁷ The argument proceeds in three stages; first tracing the assembly of the German model and the positive content of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*; then examining its selective enactment in Meiji Japan and what that enactment made possible at Tsushima; and finally tracing its mediated reception in Indian economic nationalism and swadeshi practice, recovering a structured field in which Berlin, Tokyo, and Calcutta were linked by a common problem: how modern power might be organized nationally without surrender to an Anglo-liberal imperial order.

¹⁷ Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, trans. Sorch O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2–3; see also 67–68.

Part 1: The German Model and the Assembly of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*

Germany in the two decades after 1871 offered observers across the industrialising and colonised world not simply an example of rapid development but something more precise: a demonstrated method for organising national power under conditions of global economic integration. The method's defining feature was that it did not require surrendering to liberal orthodoxy, which was the dominant Anglo-British doctrine that free markets and open trade were universal goods, a principle that served already-industrialised powers far better than latecomers still building productive capacity. What traveled, was less the form of German institutions than the logic animating them and that distinction matters, because it explains the model's portability. A logic that treated the economy as a nationally organised, administratively coordinated, and communally grounded order. That logic is what this paper designates *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. This section traces its assembly, piece by piece, out of the conjuncture where global circulations, of grain, migrants, microbes, and newspapers, met the state's effort to define and police a national economy. Its assembly was the cumulative product of a political settlement, a cultural politics of labor, and an administrative apparatus that, taken together, made the economy thinkable as a national project to be coordinated and defended.¹⁸

The intellectual roots of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* reach back to List in the 1840s and the German Historical School of the following decades; what 1879 supplied was their consolidation into durable policy. Bismarck's reintroduction of protective tariffs answered a specific crisis, collapsing agricultural prices, rural depopulation, and the widely perceived "flight from the

¹⁸ Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, trans. Sorch O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2-3; David Blackbourn, *Germany in the World: A Global History, 1500-2000* (New York: Liveright, 2023), 296-297, 302-306; Sebastian Conrad and Klaus Mühlhahn, "Global Mobility and Nationalism," in *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s*, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 183.

land", but it also constituted something more durable: a settlement that bound agrarian and industrial constituencies to a central state promising order and status amid global market exposure.¹⁹ The resulting coalition, the *Sammlungspolitik* (Policy of Concentration) of "iron and rye", was internally contradictory, agrarian landlords wanted cheap industrial goods while industrials wanted cheap food for their workers, and the two sides quarreled constantly over specific tariff schedules and export priorities.²⁰ But its contradictions were contained within a shared ideological commitment that forms the first layer of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*: the proposition that economic life was properly subject to national coordination and could not safely be surrendered to the mechanisms of the world market. Bismarck made that premise explicit before the Reichstag in May 1879: Germany had become "the dumping-ground for the production of foreign countries," and the appropriate response was to "close our doors and erect some barriers" in order to "reserve for German industries at least the home market."²¹ That proposition was not new. A generation earlier, Friedrich List had supplied the theoretical warrant: "cosmopolite economy", the liberal doctrine of free trade as universal benefit, mistook the interests of already powerful commercial nations for universal law. For a nation still building its productive capacity, free trade was not a neutral principle but a trap set by the industrialised. The appropriate object of policy, List insisted, was "the national or internal association of productive powers": the deliberate orientation of national economic life toward collective development.²² After 1879, Germany enacted that proposition institutionally, transforming it from a theoretical claim into a political practice with organized constituencies behind it.

¹⁹ David Blackbourn, *Germany in the World: A Global History, 1500–2000* (New York: Liveright, 2023), 302–303.

²⁰ Ibid, 302–303; Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, trans. Sorchá O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45.

²¹ Otto von Bismarck, speech before the Reichstag, 2 May 1879, in *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 4. Legislaturperiode, II. Session 1879, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1879), 297.

²² Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. G. A. Matile (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1856), 189–194, 242.

What gave Germany's post-1879 protectionist settlement its staying power, and what gave *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* its specifically communal rather than merely statist character was a broader discourse that embedded protection within a cultural politics of labor, virtue, and national belonging. A generation of social thinkers, Ferdinand Tönnies foremost among them, had framed the central anxiety of industrial modernity as a conflict between organic community (*Gemeinschaft*) and impersonal contractual society (*Gesellschaft*): between forms of life rooted in mutual obligation and shared territory, and forms organized by exchange and juridical abstraction.²³ This distinction furnished the moral infrastructure of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*. The "cult of rural labor" that recurred across agrarian, military, and nationalist circles throughout the 1890s drew directly on *Gemeinschaft* idioms: agricultural work was positioned as the moral reservoir of national strength and soldierly virtue, not merely an economic input to be priced by global markets. As the *Konservative Korrespondent* declared in February 1900, the rural population "forms an irreplaceable basis not only for our German army but for the entire national power of the Volk."²⁴ Read alongside the tariff politics of the same decade, such declarations were not mere sentiment: they justified a range of policies, agrarian subsidies, controls on rural-urban migration, resistance to global grain imports, that actively sought to keep the countryside productive and socially coherent in the face of falling freight rates and world-market competition.²⁵ It is this fusion of economic coordination and communal moral claim, the *Wirtschaft* bound to the *Gemeinschaft* that the compound term is designed to capture.

The administrative machinery that completed this assembly extended well beyond tariff policy into the regulation of labor, movement, and public health. German bureaucracies were

²³ Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Leipzig: Fues's Verlag, 1887).

²⁴ *Konservative Korrespondent*, 27 February 1900, quoted in Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, 15.

²⁵ Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, trans. Sorcha O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 15, 203-204; David Blackbourn, *Germany in the World: A Global History, 1500–2000* (New York: Liveright, 2023), 302-303.

particularly ambitious in the provision and reach of these instruments, and in the 1890s this administrative energy was focused with unusual intensity on the problem of mobile labor. The Central Office for Field Workers framed the surge of cross-border seasonal migration as a crisis of national order; an employers' representative expressed the ambition that new tools of identification would allow authorities to differentiate workers cleanly "on the basis of their nationality."²⁶ Crucially, this sorting project was not confined to policing categories. Conrad has shown how bacteriological language, metaphors of "invasion," and "contamination," linked social hygiene to controls on mobility, fusing labor regulation, health inspection, and residency permitting into a single administrative workflow.²⁷ The result was *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* at the level of daily governance: labor was treated as a bounded, nationally regulated resource whose management was simultaneously an economic, medical, and moral project.

Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft named the shared logic already operative across these otherwise disparate administrative domains.

The outward dimension of Wilhelmine policy, naval bills, colonial experiments, and *Weltpolitik rhetoric*, is best understood as the geopolitical extension of this same logic. Bernhard von Bülow supplied the formula in the *Reichstag* on 6 December 1897: Germany demanded its "place in the sun".²⁸ The sentence converted the accumulated anxieties of global economic exposure, the same anxieties driving agrarian protection and labor regulation, into a claim of national entitlement. Naval policy and tariff protection formed a single argumentative chain: to survive in an imperial world structured by British commercial dominance, Germany had to

²⁶ Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, trans. Sorchá O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 200-201.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 184-187.

²⁸ Bernhard von Bülow, "Speech in the Reichstag" (December 6, 1897), in *Bernhard von Bülow on Germany's "Place in the Sun"* (1897), German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), accessed May 25, 2026, <https://germanhistorydocs.org/en/wilhelmine-germany-and-the-first-world-war-1890-1918/bernhard-von-buelow-on-germanys-place-in-the-sun-1897>.

coordinate internally and arm externally.²⁹ Yet Conrad has shown that Germany's formal colonial possessions were only one part of a far more encompassing global arena of imperial activity.³⁰ What mattered was the structural position, a late-developing power whose institutions carried a different ideological charge for those facing British hegemony from below

By the 1880s and 1890s, this domestic assemblage had acquired the institutional channels through which it became legible and portable abroad. As Fritz Ringer demonstrated, Germany's qualifying state examinations and university credentialing functioned as an infrastructure of bureaucratic reproduction, producing the jurists, technical specialists, and administrators a coordinating state required.³¹ The prestige attached to German administrative science and public law reinforced this pipeline. The Prussian constitution of 1850 circulated as a working template for constitutional designers across the industrializing world who required a framework strong enough to centralize authority without conceding the parliamentary supremacy that the British model carried as an inseparable condition. German military advisory missions constituted a third institutional channel, and the most operationally direct of the three, since they involved personnel physically reorganising foreign institutions rather than models being selectively adopted at a distance. Colmar von der Goltz, dispatched to the Ottoman Empire in 1883 and remaining as chief adviser until 1895, reorganized the Turkish army on Prussian lines, producing a generation of Ottoman officers trained in German staff methods, divisional organization, and the doctrine of national mobilization he had codified in *Das Volk in Waffen* (1883).³² In Japan,

²⁹ Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, trans. Sorcha O'Hagan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 44-45

³⁰ Sebastian Conrad, "Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 4 (2013): 545.

³¹ Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 22, 34.

³² Gencer Özcan, "The Prussian Impact on Turkey's Military during the Republican Era," in *Abdülhamid II and His Legacy: Studies in Honour of F. A. K. Yasamee*, ed. Ş. Tufan Buzpınar and Gökhan Çetinsaya (Istanbul: The Isis Press, n.d.), 231-232, 237-238; F. A. K. Yasamee, "Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 9, no. 2 (1998): 91-128. For the doctrine itself, see Colmar von der Goltz, *The*

Major Jakob Meckel arrived at the Army Staff College in 1885, sent by Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke in response to a direct Japanese request, and in three years restructured the Imperial Japanese Army into a divisional system modeled on Prussian organization, replacing earlier French influences with Clausewitzian doctrine and staff-college pedagogy.³³ What these missions exported was something immediately actionable: the techniques of command, the habit of staff work, and the institutional grammar through which a national military force could be made legible to, and directed by, a central state. Taken together, university exports, constitutional templates, military advisory missions, and the prestige of German administrative science, these channels transformed *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* from a cluster of practices assembled under specific German conditions into a recognizable and portable method. By the time Japan's Iwakura statesmen returned from their tour of Europe asking which institutional forms would confer recognized modernity, that method was already visible and selectable. It is Japan's selective enactment of it, and the demonstration that enactment made possible, that Part 2 examines.

Nation in Arms, trans. Philip A. Ashworth (London: W. H. Allen, 1887), 1-5; originally published as *Das Volk in Waffen* (Berlin: R. v. Decker, 1883).

³³ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 397-398.

Part 2: Japan and the Enactment of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*

Japan entered the nineteenth century as a fragmented domainal polity whose encounter with Western imperial power exposed the structural weaknesses of its decentralized Tokugawa order with unusual precision. The so-called unequal treaties that followed Commodore Perry's arrival, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States in 1858, and its immediate replicas with Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Russia, placed Japan under what amounted to a probationary regime of conditional sovereignty.³⁴ They established treaty ports where foreign merchants could reside and trade beyond Japanese jurisdiction. They fixed import duties at an artificially low uniform rate that stripped Tokyo of tariff autonomy, and introduced extraterritoriality, placing all foreign nationals under their own consular courts and beyond the reach of Japanese law. These arrangements, standard across the semi-colonial architecture of the nineteenth-century world economy, reduced Japan's standing in international law to acknowledgment without equality.³⁵ These states recognized Japan as a sovereign state, yet one whose equality was contingent on institutional proof of modernity. As Mark Ravina has shown, Meiji leaders understood this probationary condition with clarity, only a visibly modern state, equipped with a national tax system, a conscript army, and a unified legal code, would earn the treaty revision that genuine sovereignty required.³⁶

The Iwakura Embassy, dispatched abroad in 1871, went seeking an answer to the question: what forms of institutional organisation would be recognized as modern by the powers that held Japan's sovereignty hostage? It is against that question that Germany's specific appeal

³⁴ Ibid., 279, 283-285.

³⁵ Ibid., 271, 427, 429.

³⁶ Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 136-137, 142, 167.

must be understood. Britain offered parliamentary supremacy and common-law jurisprudence anchored in party politics.³⁷ France offered a civil code tied to republican claims. Germany, by contrast, offered something more immediately usable to a state facing the problem that Japan faced: a non-liberal repertoire of coordination, administrative law, police administration, General Staff methods, and a Prussian constitutional frame, that could be selectively lifted without importing competitive parliamentary politics.³⁸ As Roger Hackett has shown, Japanese Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo's borrowings crystallised most clearly in the paired fields of conscription and local self-government. Prussian village self-government became the template for Japan's town and village law, and Yamagata later explained simply that "the German system was adopted as the model because it was the most suitable", because, as Hackett makes explicit, "conscription and local self-government were clearly related: both represented service to the state; both bound the people to the central government, strengthening unity and contributing to stability."³⁹ Germany offered techniques for binding a recently unified polity to its center, which was precisely the problem Meiji Japan needed to solve.

The assembly of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* in Japan proceeded through the Meiji state building legitimacy through the technical means of governance. The land-tax conversion between 1873 and 1878 replaced in-kind rice dues with a cash levy tied to titled ownership and nationally standardized assessment, giving Tokyo a regularized and synchronized revenue stream for the first time across the entire archipelago.⁴⁰ Conscription, announced in 1872, operated on the same register of administrative legibility: its durable innovation was routine registration and

³⁷ Kenneth B. Pyle, "Advantages of Followership: German Economics and Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890–1925," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1974): 131–32.

³⁸ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 391, 397, 399–401, 423.

³⁹ Roger F. Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 109–111.

⁴⁰ Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 179–180.

classification across former status lines, rendering the population measurable as potential soldiers and taxpayers simultaneously.⁴¹ The adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1873 aligned fiscal, military, and educational cycles to a common temporal grid, converting the management of time itself into a tool of national coordination.⁴² Taken together, these reforms constituted the first layer of Japan's *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* that is an apparatus through which land, bodies, time, and obligations could be rendered comparable, calculable, and administrable from the center. Jürgen Osterhammel's observation that it was in the nineteenth century that "societies measured themselves for the first time and archived the results" captures this shift precisely. What was distinctive about Japan was the speed and intensity with which these techniques were imported and grafted onto a recently domainal polity under the pressure of semi-colonial exposure.⁴³

The administrative apparatus required a corresponding moral grammar to function as genuine *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* rather than mere bureaucratic extraction. That grammar was supplied by the Imperial Rescript on Education, promulgated on 30 October 1890, which translated the *Gesellschaft* logic of the new administrative order into the idiom of *Gemeinschaft* obligation: it rooted the national community in ancestral continuity, aligned filial, civic, and national loyalties along a single vertical axis from household to Emperor, and declared that Japan's moral foundations rested on the "accumulation of virtue generation after generation."⁴⁴ The economists who carried this vocabulary back to Japan had been trained at the center of its production. Kanai Noburu spent 1888-1889 studying under Gustav von Schmoller at Berlin; Tokuzo Fukuda completed his doctoral dissertation under Lujo Brentano at Munich under the

⁴¹ Ibid., 147-148, 180; Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 366-367.

⁴² Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 155-156.

⁴³ Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 29.

⁴⁴ *Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo)*, October 30, 1890, trans. Shizuya Sato.

title *Die gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung* in Japan. Both returned to a social-scientific culture already organized to receive what they brought back.⁴⁵ As Andrew Barshay has shown, Japanese social science under the influence of Prussian-style *Staatslehre* placed greater normative weight on the local analogue for *Gemeinschaft* (*kyodotai*), while its counterpart *Gesellschaft* (*shakai*) "had virtually pathological connotations" associated by the 1890s with the foreign commercial order whose terms Japan was still contesting.⁴⁶ What the Rescript accomplished for Japan's *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* was, in short, what the discourse of *Gemeinschaft* and the "cult of rural labor" had accomplished for Germany's: it gave administrative coordination its communal moral warrant, binding the economy, the army, and the household within a single idiom of organic national obligation.

The German institutional presence in Japan's administrative construction was direct and documented. In 1890, the German envoy Friedrich von Holleben reported to Chancellor Caprivi on the work of Albert Mosse, a jurist who had served as adviser on legislation and administration since 1886. Mosse, Holleben wrote, had played "a distinguished role" in the constitution of 11 February 1889 and related organic laws, that the new municipal statute and the impending district and provincial ordinances "derived largely from his work," and that "to no small degree Japanese public life, in its fundamentals, is taking shape according to a German model."⁴⁷ The dispatch noted that Mosse "always safeguarded the interests of the Japanese state" even as he advanced German interests where possible, an acknowledgement, from both sides, that the exchange was the transfer of administrative methods.⁴⁸ That distinction is worth holding onto.

⁴⁵ Erik Grimmer-Solem, "German Social Science, Meiji Conservatism, and the Peculiarities of Japanese History," *Journal of World History* 16, no. 2 (2005): 206-208; Tokuzo Fukuda, *Die gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Japan* (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1900).

⁴⁶ Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 40, 177.

⁴⁷ Friedrich von Holleben (Imperial German Legation, Tokyo) to Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, Tokyo, 13 April 1890, report on Albert Mosse, adviser on legislation and administration: author's translation from the German transcript.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

The German administrative repertoire was portable precisely because it did not require ideological conversion: Prussian drafting conventions, examination systems, and statistical bureaus could be transplanted and operated independently of the nationalist creed that had originally animated them. The communal moral vision was not absent from what travelled, the Rescript shows it being deliberately reconstructed in Japan, but it was reconstructed locally. What moved most readily across borders was a practice: a set of techniques for organising a national economy under a coordinating state, which each receiving society then supplied with its own moral grammar. Mosse's advisory mission was one channel for this transfer; the Humboldtian research university was another, reproducible infrastructure of state capacity whose seminar-based training and faculty embedded in government commissions produced the administrators who could codify law, run statistical bureaus, and train the next cohort to do the same. What traveled from Germany, in short, was less a creed than a set of institutional habits through which competence reproduced itself.

Industrial policy completed this institutional framework. The Meiji state built and operated model factories, the Yokosuka shipyard and the Tomioka silk-reeling plant, both launched in early 1870s, were operated as deliberate pedagogical regimes designed to demonstrate techniques, develop workforces, and generate transferable industrial knowledge before the state withdrew and transferred these enterprises to private hands.⁴⁹ The sequence was strategic, the state entered industries where private capital lacked the capacity to go, built the technical and organizational foundations, and then retreated. This was closer in logic to the Bismarckian model of coordinated national interest, in which the state actively shaped which industries would develop and on what terms, than to the liberal self-regulating market that

⁴⁹ Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 178-179; Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 374-376.

British imperial policy prescribed for its colonial territories, which foreclosed precisely the kind of protected industrial development Japan was pursuing.

Technology transfer followed the same logic: the Meiji government hired foreign specialists on finite-term contracts whose explicit purpose was knowledge absorption. The foreign expert was not a permanent fixture but a temporary scaffold: once Japanese counterparts had absorbed the relevant techniques into domestic institutions, the contract expired and the knowledge remained.⁵⁰ The recovery of tariff autonomy, achieved in full only in 1911 when the last unequal commercial treaties were revised, added the final instrument to this framework: with customs repatriated, Japan could use the border as it had used procurement and production, to protect nascent sectors and signal that market competition would henceforth operate within bounds set by national coordination rather than by the terms imposed through the unequal treaties.⁵¹ Japan had, in this sense, assembled the full repertoire of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*: an economy whose productive powers were legible to the state, defensible at the border, and capable of being directed toward national ends.

What had been built through decades of counting, scheduling, drilling, and inspection was translated into power at sea in 1905. The point is how a style of coordination, bureaucratic, industrial, military, could be demonstrated as a working system and read as a transferable model at once. Lord Curzon captured the external reception with precision, fearing that "the reverberations of that victory have gone like a thunderclap through the whispering galleries of the East": as proof that modern capacity could be assembled outside Anglo-liberal tutelage.⁵²

What contemporary observers across Asia registered was not a constitutional blueprint or a

⁵⁰ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 320, 477-478.

⁵¹ James E. Hoare "Extraterritoriality in Japan, 1858-1899." *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 3d ser., vol. 18 (July 1983). 72.

⁵² Lord Curzon, quoted in Rotem Kowner, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Routledge, 2006), 20.

cartography of empire, but a method, bureaucracy and staff-work, police and administrative law, the moral elevation of national work, and a repatriated tariff as a tool of coordination. The distinction matters because blueprints require sovereignty to implement and methods do not. Those observing Japan from positions of colonial subordination could not replicate its constitution, its navy, or its tariff schedule, but they could read the underlying logic of national economic coordination as something potentially separable from the specific political conditions under which Japan had enacted it. The method was extractable even where the institutional form was not. Germany had assembled that repertoire; Japan had enacted and demonstrated it. The circuit now ran toward India, where the same structural problem, how to organize economic life nationally under conditions of imperial subordination, had already generated its own theoretical tradition. It is to that mediated reception, and to the specific work that Japanese demonstration performed for a body of thought already present, that the next part of this paper turns.

Part 3: India and the Mediated Reception of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*

India presents the most revealing case for the argument of this paper, because it shows the German model being taken up where its central instrument, the coordinating state, was wholly absent. Where Germany had assembled national economic coordination from a position of competitive power, and where Japan had built it under the pressure of semi-colonial exposure but ultimately recovered the sovereign instruments, tariff autonomy, legal jurisdiction, administrative self-direction, required to enforce it, India was administered as the very centerpiece of British free-trade imperialism with no sovereign tools whatsoever. That structural position imposed a corresponding institutional constraint. Germany and Japan had built state-centered *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*: coordinated fiscal policy, a standardized legal apparatus, and nationally directed industrial investment, deployed to organize the productive powers of the nation from above. India's nationalists, denied access to those instruments entirely, were compelled to construct something structurally different: a civil-society *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, assembled through the moral energies of national solidarity, the deliberate development of indigenous productive capacity, and circuits of technical education that worked around and might eventually outlast an imperial state that could neither be directed toward national ends nor dismantled.

The contrast in legitimising ideology could not have been sharper. German and Japanese economic nationalism held that the state's highest obligation was to develop the productive powers of the nation; British imperial rule rested on a fundamentally different premise. When Lord Curzon addressed the Guildhall in July 1904, he characterised British governance as bringing "peace and order and good government" to nearly a fifth of the human race, a civilising mission whose measure was administrative justice, and whose implicit corollary was that Indians

required stewardship of their own economic life.⁵³ Trade was governed by tariffs fixed in London, not Calcutta. Legal authority over commerce and labor rested with an imperial administration. The economy had been integrated at an all-India scale, censuses, railways, and fiscal administration had produced India as a single legible field, but that scale had been assembled in the service of imperial accumulation rather than for national development.⁵⁴ What was missing, therefore, was authorship: the capacity to direct, in List's terms, the "national or internal association of productive powers" toward national rather than colonial ends.⁵⁵

That critique was the work of a generation directly and self-consciously engaged with the German tradition, and it had taken explicitly Listian form well before Tsushima confirmed its premises historically. Romesh Chunder Dutt's systematic reconstruction of India's economic history under British rule documented how colonial policy had arrested Indian manufacturing, reducing the subcontinent to a producer of raw materials for British industry while opening its markets to British manufactures under tariff schedules that India's own administration could not alter.⁵⁶ Dadabhai Naoroji's drain theory translated the same structural insight into fiscal terms: salaries, remittances, public debt servicing, and unrequited exports constituted a continuous hemorrhage of wealth from a bounded Indian economy toward Britain, a transfer made possible precisely by the absence of national control over the terms of economic exchange.⁵⁷ Mahadev Govind Ranade went furthest in making the Listian framework explicit, and did so from the outset of his economic writing. In "Indian Political Economy," the opening essay of his *Essays*

⁵³ Lord Curzon of Kedleston, *Speeches on India, Delivered While in England in July–August, 1904* (London, 1904), 5.

⁵⁴ Manu Goswami, "From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, no. 4 (1998): 611–614.

⁵⁵ Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy*, trans. G. A. Matile (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1856), 242.

⁵⁶ Romesh Chunder Dutt, *The Economic History of India under Early British Rule* (1902; repr., New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), x–xi

⁵⁷ Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901), 38, 252–254, 335–336.

on *Indian Economics*, he argued that colonial free trade presented the doctrines of the English school as “absolutely and demonstrably true” for “all time and place whatever,” suppressing the structural asymmetry between metropole and dependency that made the doctrine anything but neutral.⁵⁸ The corrective he invoked was explicitly German: it was “the writings of List,” he argued, that “gave the fullest expression to this rebellion against the orthodox creed”, the insistence that the permanent interests of nations were not always in harmony with the immediate benefit of individuals, and that national well-being could not be reduced to aggregate exchange value alone.⁵⁹ He extended the argument through the German Historical School directly, citing Roscher, Hildebrand, Wagner, and others, and concluded that “Universalism and Perpetualism in Economic Doctrine are both unscientific and untrue”, a judgment applied without reservation to India’s colonial condition.⁶⁰ “India,” he concluded, “may fairly claim the benefit of the experience and practice of these self-governing communities” in departing from free-trade orthodoxy.⁶¹ The Listian framework spread well beyond Ranade’s essays. *The Dawn and Dawn Society’s Magazine* in February 1910 invoked List by name and at length on the deliberate deindustrialisation of India through English prohibition and prohibitive duties, drawing the comparative lesson explicitly: the methods of “protecting and encouraging her own manufactures are freely and liberally resorted to by Germany and only in a lesser degree by Japan.”⁶² The swadeshi pledge itself was cast in Listian terms, the voluntary purchase of Indian goods described as what “may, if adhered to, in time do duty for a legal protective tariff,” civil society filling the gap that colonial fiscal policy refused to close.⁶³ By the time Tsushima was fought,

⁵⁸ M. G. Ranade, *Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches*, 2nd ed. (Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co., 1906), 2-3.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 21-22.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶² "Crying Need for Industrial Swadeshi," *The Dawn and Dawn Society's Magazine* 6 (February 1910): 7.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 8.

Indian economic nationalism had therefore assembled, through direct and sustained engagement with the German tradition, the theoretical core of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*: the argument that an economy administered for colonial accumulation had to be reclaimed as a national field, communally grounded and directed toward collective development.

Japan's victory changed the standing of this argument. It did not supply the critique, which Indian nationalists already possessed, but it proved the critique correct in practice: Tsushima showed that coordination could produce decisive modern power, that the structural position India occupied need not be permanent, and that the Listian critique already assembled was achievable outside European tutelage. Manu Goswami has shown that Japan became “one of the most commonly invoked examples of an organic national society and economy” within swadeshi discourse, figuring especially after 1905 as proof that industrial development, state coordination, and cultural self-possession need not be mutually exclusive.⁶⁴

The degree to which Indian observers identified this achievement as specifically German in its institutional genealogy varied, and that variation deserves precision. Some contemporaries made the connection explicit: C. F. Andrews placed Japan, “the great outstanding example” of national consolidation, directly alongside the rise of “Prussia and Germany,” reading the Japanese achievement as an instance of a recognisable pattern of national coordination that India could understand comparatively.⁶⁵ But these were among the more analytically explicit voices. For most Indian nationalist observers, what registered was not the Prussian parentage of Japanese institutional form, the Japanese navy itself drew heavily on British models, and Tōgō Heihachirō

⁶⁴ Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 254

⁶⁵ C. F. Andrews, *The Renaissance in India: Its Missionary Aspect* (London: Church Missionary Society, 1912), 13-14.

had trained at Greenwich, but the demonstrated portability of coordinating logic itself: proof that modern capacity could be assembled outside Anglo-liberal tutelage.

The Bengal-Tokyo exchange through which this recognition became practical was specific and documented. Okakura Kakuzō's *Ideals of the East*, one of the founding texts of Pan-Asian intellectual solidarity, was written while Okakura resided in Calcutta at the invitation of the circle around Swami Vivekananda, an intellectual collaboration that placed Indian and Japanese thinkers in direct dialogue about the cultural and economic dimensions of anti-colonial modernity.⁶⁶ In 1906, the Indian Association for the Advancement of Scientific and Industrial Education sent forty-four students to Japan.⁶⁷ The Bengal Pottery Works, founded by Satyasundar Dev in 1904, grew from apprenticeships in Tokyo and Berlin.⁶⁸ These circuits mattered because they allowed Indian reformers to acquire industrial knowledge and institutional practices outside the channels of British imperial education, to learn the arts of modern organisation, in the formulation of one swadeshi author in 1908, from Japan as “a teacher in the continent of Asia,” without reproducing the colonial dependency that European tutelage would have entailed.⁶⁹ The German model arrived in India already enacted but filtered through a Japanese example that had converted a theoretical critique into a demonstrated historical possibility, achievable under conditions of subordination.

Swadeshi was the attempt to translate this convergent theoretical and comparative inheritance into institutional practice under conditions that made direct replication of the German or Japanese state model impossible. What made it distinctive was that it tried to instantiate *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* through the deliberate construction of habits, institutions, and

⁶⁶ Kakuzō Okakura, *The Ideals of the East* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1904),

⁶⁷ Kris Manjappa, “Knowledgeable Internationalism and the Swadeshi Movement, 1903–1921,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 42 (2012): 57.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

knowledge circuits that bypassed the imperial state entirely. Germany had built national economic coordination through a central state wielding tariffs, administrative law, and coordinated industrial policy. Japan had done the same, selectively and under pressure, over four decades of Meiji institution-building. India's nationalists possessed none of those sovereign instruments. The tariff remained in imperial hands; the legal and administrative apparatus served British accumulation; the state could not be directed toward national ends because Indians did not control it. Swadeshi therefore attempted to do from civil society what Germany and Japan had done through state power: to build the productive capacity and technical knowledge of a national economy through indigenous education, national industry, and the reorganization of consumption around collective obligation. Bipin Chandra Pal made the sovereign ambition explicit: the moment India achieved swaraj, it would do "what every nation or almost every nation has done", imposing "a heavy prohibitive protective tariff upon every inch of textile fabric that comes from Manchester." The tariff autonomy Pal invoked was precisely what Germany had exercised since 1879 and what Japan would only recover through treaty revision in 1911.⁷⁰

The limits of swadeshi's achievement confirmed rather than undermined its structural logic. The movement could organize the moral energies of national solidarity and generate circuits of indigenous production and technical education, but it could not replicate the administrative machinery that had made *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* governable in Germany and Japan: the coordinated fiscal policy, the standardized legal apparatus, the nationally directed industrial investment. What it could do, and what swadeshi's constructive wing attempted with real seriousness, was build the institutions and cadres that a future national state would require: technical schools, indigenous enterprises, and knowledge networks that could survive imperial

⁷⁰ Manu Goswami, "From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, no. 4 (1998): 629-630

administration and outlast it.⁷¹ The incomplete character of that project was a function of its structural position. Civil-society *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* was the form that coordinating national aspiration necessarily took when the state itself was not available to be coordinated.

⁷¹ For swadeshi's constructive institutions, technical schools, indigenous enterprises, and transnational knowledge networks, see Kris Manjappa, "Knowledgeable Internationalism and the Swadeshi Movement, 1903–1921," *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 42 (October 2012): 55–58, 61; Manu Goswami, "From Swadeshi to Swaraj: Nation, Economy, Territory in Colonial South Asia, 1870 to 1907," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40, no. 4 (October 1998): 627–629.

Conclusion

Three bodies of scholarship are changed by recovering the triangulated circuit this paper has traced. The first is the study of anti-colonial economic nationalism. The standard account has tended to treat the Listian dimensions of Indian economic nationalism as either derivative or incidental, a theoretical borrowing that preceded any demonstrated proof of concept. What the reconstruction offered here shows is that the theoretical tradition was both more explicitly German in its intellectual genealogy and more consequentially transformed by the Japanese example than that account allows. The Listian critique assembled by Ranade, Dutt, and Naoroji was a theoretically grounded engagement with the most serious contemporary challenge to liberal political economy; and swadeshi's attempt to build national economic capacity from civil society was not a failure of political imagination but the most coherent institutional response available to nationalists who possessed the theory of *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft* without the state through which to enact it. Recognising that coherence, and the structural constraints that bounded it, changes what needs explaining in the history of Indian economic nationalism: not why it failed to replicate the German or Japanese state model, but why it succeeded as well as it did in generating the intellectual and institutional foundations on which a sovereign India would eventually build.

The second revision concerns Japan's role in Asian political imagination. Mishra's *From the Ruins of Empire* recovered the emotional and intellectual register in which Asian thinkers absorbed the shock of Tsushima, demonstrating how powerfully Japan functioned as evidence that the European civilizational hierarchy was not immutable. What the triangulated account adds is an account of what, institutionally and conceptually, Japan was understood to have

demonstrated. Japanese modernity was not a self-generated achievement; it was the enacted and demonstrated form of a German-derived repertoire of national coordination, selectively appropriated under the specific pressures of semi-colonial exposure and transformed in the process of enactment. Tsushima's significance for observers in Bengal and beyond was therefore not simply that a non-European power had defeated a European empire; it was that a specific logic of national organization, an economy made legible to the state, defensible at the border, and capable of being directed toward national ends, had been shown to work outside European tutelage. That logic, and not the constitutional or naval specifics of Japanese modernity, was what traveled. Understanding Japan's role in Asian political imagination requires recovering the institutional grammar that the shock of Tsushima made legible, and the prior German assembly that had generated that grammar.

The third revision concerns Germany's extra-colonial imperial significance. Conrad has shown that Germany's formal colonial possessions were only one part of a far broader arena of imperial activity, and that Germany's global significance cannot be read off its formal colonial footprint alone. This paper has demonstrated what that reach consisted of and how it traveled. *Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, the coordinated, communally grounded, administratively directed national economy, was not exported through German colonial administration, which was limited, peripheral, and largely invisible to the actors this paper has traced. It was exported through university networks, constitutional models, where these were adopted, as in Japan, military advisory missions, and the prestige of German administrative science. These channels operated unevenly: the constitutional template took direct institutional form in Japan but reached India chiefly as economic doctrine rather than as a constitutional model, since Indian nationalists drew on List and the Historical School rather than on the Prussian constitution as such. It traveled

onward through Japanese demonstration to reach Indian thought at the precise moment when Indian nationalism most required a demonstrated alternative to the Anglo-liberal model it was contesting. Germany's extra-colonial imperial significance lay in what it modeled: a form of national economic organisation whose portability proved greater, not despite its abstraction from colonial rule, but precisely because of it.