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Mercurial Masculinities: Indigenous and Chinese Laborers  
in the Early Colonial Philippines

DISSERTATION

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by

Stefanie Joy Lira

Dissertation Committee:  
Associate Professor Rachel O'Toole, Chair  
Associate Professor Renée Raphael  
Professor Jennifer Terry  
Professor Heidi Tinsman

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my inay.

To the woman who carried me from our inang bayan,  
across an ocean,  
salamat sa lahat.

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## NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY & GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Throughout the work, I employ multiple terms with political and historical responsibility. First, I only employ the term “Indian” or “*indio*” as the legal category Spanish officials invoked to categorize indigenous men. I use the terms indigenous and “indigenous Philippine” to describe the peoples of the Philippines as, historically, the Philippine peoples had not yet banded together in an independence movement to claim “Filipino” as their national identity. Where the documents reflect the region of the indigenous actors, I employ their provincial names (ex: Mambulaoan, Silangan, etc.). Like the term “*indio*,” the treatment of the term “Filipino” in the early colonial period still belonged to Spanish colonial officials.

Similarly, I use “*sangley*” with caution. Like the term “*indio*,” Spanish officials used the term “*sangley*” as a legal category. However, when Spanish men often paired “*sangley*” with racialized terms (ex: “lascivious sangley”), it is difficult to underestimate the racialization of the term over time.

Audiencia – Highest tribunal of the Philippines

Barangay – Indigenous township

Barangueño – Fellow townspeople

Cabeza de barangay – Indigenous colonial official of a barangay

Cedula – Local law, also crown-authorized identification cards for colonial residents

Cortes de madera (shortened: corte) – The lumberyards

Datu – The indigenous leader of a barangay, pre-conquest

Extramuros – The lands outside of Manila’s city walls

Governor General – The governmental executive of the Spanish colonial Philippines

Intramuros – The territories within Manila’s city walls

Oídor – A judge in the Audiencia

Parián – The segregated city for Chinese subjects, in Extramuros Manila

Principales – Colonial position title interchangeable with Cabeza de barangay

Procurador General – The Attorney General of the Philippines

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## VITA

### Stefanie Joy Lira

- 2020 Ph.D. in History, University of California at Irvine
- 2020 Teaching Assistant, Department of History, University of California at Irvine
- 2019 Gender & Sexuality Studies Instructor, University of California at Irvine
- 2018 History Instructor, Santa Ana College
- 2017-18 Graduate Student Researcher, “Engaging Humanities Project: Afterlives of Martial Law,” University of California, Humanities Research Institute and Visual Communication
- 2016 Graduate Feminist Emphasis, University of California, Irvine
- 2016 Humanities Out There Program, University of California, Irvine  
PBS SoCal/ KOCE-TV Archive Intern
- 2014 M.A. in World History, University of California, Irvine
- 2010 BA., in History, California State University of Long Beach
- 2016-18 Teaching Assistant, Department of Gender and Sexuality Studies  
University of California, Irvine
- 2015 Teaching Assistant, Department of History, University of California at Irvine

### FIELD OF STUDY

Race and Gender in Latin America and the World



## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Mercurial Masculinities: Indigenous and Chinese Laborers  
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Stefanie Joy Lira

Doctor of Philosophy in History

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Professor Rachel O'Toole, Chair

In the Philippines from 1640 to 1750, Spanish authorities feared that they would lose control of the Pacific colony to its multiracial resident populations. Essential to imperial fear was a fundamental misunderstanding of racial and gender dynamics within colonial labor spaces. Imperial officials discursively constructed laboring populations as “lazy *indios*” and Chinese “infidels”; such men were potential enemies of empire who outnumbered Spanish residents and incited disorder. This dissertation examines imperial correspondence, labor laws, and colonial reports to highlight the processes, discursive and material, through which Spanish imperial authorities conceptualized race and masculinity in the markets, the lumberyards, the mines, and the haciendas of the colonial Philippines. I argue that in the century prior to the Bourbon Reforms, colonial authorities – confronted with the challenge of making the local Philippine economy more efficient– consistently recalibrated their assumptions on racial formations to ultimately convince themselves that some races, and some men, could be redeemed from the category of “enemies of the

empire.” Moving from racial formations situated within the binaries of Spanish and non-Spanish, imperial officials progressively reimagined race and masculinity through the lenses of religion, scientific intellect, and economic practicality. As they toiled in colonial labor regimes, indigenous and Chinese men mirrored racialized and gendered assimilation for their Spanish superiors while simultaneously building their own networks of economic and sociopolitical power.

## INTRODUCTION

In 1754, the Governor General of the Philippines, Marquis de Obando, decreed that in the archipelago, “metal was precious to human life.” Obando revived an almost stagnant mining industry by offering skilled positions such as metalsmiths and ore experts to Chinese men, or “*sangleys*.”<sup>1</sup> Although the Spanish Empire had maintained colonial dominance in the Philippines since 1571, past mining operations in the Philippines were unable to match the metals’ output, nor the labor force of the Americas.<sup>2</sup> The Spaniard Obando dismissed the labor of indigenous men who held ancestral knowledge of the gold mines along Northern and Southern Luzon’s “gold routes.”<sup>3</sup> Why would Obando and many other Spanish authorities entrust Chinese over indigenous experts with the weighty responsibility of economizing mining operations; an industry that was, arguably, the most lucrative enterprise in producing wealth for the Spanish Empire?<sup>4</sup> In the site of the colonial Philippines, who could prove themselves as experts of their fields, and to whom was expertise proven?

In the century preceding the Bourbon Reforms in the Philippines, Spanish authorities expressed a persistent fear that they would lose control of the Pacific colony. As administrators of the imperial labor regime, Spanish men were expected to commandeer

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<sup>1</sup> Archivo General de las Indias (AGI), *Audiencia de Filipinas*, Legajo (Leg.) 270, “In a letter dated April 10, 1753,” (1754), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Linda Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines* (University of Hawai’i Press: Honolulu, 2009), 4-5 and William Henry Scott, *The Discovery of the Igorots: Spanish Contacts with the Pagans of Northern Luzon* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1974), 4.

<sup>3</sup> Luciano P.R. Santiago, “Pomp, Pageantry, and Gold: The Eight Spanish Villas in the Philippines (1565-1887),” *Philippine Quarterly* 33 No. ½ (2005): 59.

<sup>4</sup> Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’: The Origin of World Trade in 1571,” *Journal of World History* 6, No. 2 (1995): 206.

labor populations with a steady hand.<sup>5</sup> Yet, imperial authorities' fundamental misunderstanding of racial and gender dynamics within Philippine labor spaces incited their own overwhelming anxieties on how to manage laborers. Already outnumbered by non-Spanish men, Spanish officials conceptualized allegedly "lazy *indios*" and "infidel Chinese" men as suspicious enemies of empire. I examine imperial correspondence, labor laws, expulsion edicts, and documentation on legal cases and rebellions that belie labor issues to highlight the processes, discursive and material, through which Spanish imperial authorities conceptualized race and masculinity in the markets, manufacturing sites, the mines, and the haciendas of the colonial Philippines. I argue that in the century preceding the Bourbon Reforms, colonial authorities, through trial and error, recalibrated their assumptions on race and masculinity in response to the needs of the colonial economy. In instances fraught with contradictions, Spanish authorities, clergy, and private *vecinos* (Spanish subjects of the crown) struggled over the meanings of indigenous and Chinese racial formations, invoking specific racial constructs to suit their own economic or religious ends. In their consonances, however, Spanish authorities progressively reimagined Philippine colonial laborers' racial and masculine assimilation through the criteria of religious expression, aptitude for expertise, and economic value to the empire. Despite their variegated understandings of non-Spanish racial formations, Spanish officials still put racialized ideas into *practice* as they standardized labor practices and codified labor laws which ultimately structured racial hierarchies in colonial Philippine labor sites.

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<sup>5</sup> Steve J. Stern, *The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, and Power in Late Colonial Mexico* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 161.

The present study focuses on the period from 1640 to 1750 in the colonial Philippines.<sup>6</sup> I trace the transformation of Spanish authorities' racializations of colonial laborers from the early period of colonization, the seventeenth century, through the onset of the Bourbon Reforms. The study of indigenous and Chinese laborers' racial formations necessitates a close study of this crucial time in the Philippine economy; Philippinist historians mark the eighteenth century as a "watershed" moment as the Bourbon Reforms drew the "native" economies (the separate indigenous and Chinese economies) of the Philippines closer to a wider "Western" global economy.<sup>7</sup> The approach of the Bourbon Reforms placed increasing demands on colonial Philippine labor regimes in the eighteenth century. The Spanish crown's controversial succession from Habsburg to Bourbon rule in the Iberian Peninsula affected Spain's colonies as Spanish reformers embarked upon innovative forms of statecraft. In order to economize Atlantic and Pacific trades plagued by smuggling enterprises and weakened by Spain's trade deals with France (a consequence of the War of the Spanish Succession in Europe), the Bourbon Reforms ushered in a wave of governmental transformations which included a balancing of powers between secular and religious authorities and the economizing of colonial industries.<sup>8</sup> In the Philippines, historians have argued that the Bourbon reformers began the implementations of their

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<sup>6</sup> The bulk of the studies in my dissertation focus on the Philippine island of Luzon. Luzon encompasses mountain ranges in the highlands rich with minerals, major ports and bustling markets, as well as the colonial (and current) metropolitan capital of Manila. The geographic center of Manila produced the most colonial data on labor as the majority of colonial decisions moved from Madrid to Manila.

<sup>7</sup> Renato Constantino, *A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 56-57 and Edgar Wickberg, *The Chinese Philippine Life, 1850-1898* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2001), 20-21.

<sup>8</sup> Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, eds. *The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713-1796* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1-4: The dying Habsburg monarch's decision to crown his French grandson Philip of Anjou the King of Spain launched a thirteen-year war between those who opposed Philip of Anjou (the British, Dutch, and Portuguese) and the Spanish and French crowns. Although Philip won the regency, the Treaty of Utrecht forced the young king to renounce claims to the French throne and lose Spanish claims on European territories.

programs in earnest as early as 1712 in the Philippines.<sup>9</sup> This project is particularly concerned with the inchoate Bourbon measures on the Philippine colonial economy which began in the late seventeenth century and intensified in the eighteenth century. I focus on how imperial officials discursively framed their attempts to profit as much labor from Philippine toiling residents as well as the material effects of labor exploitation. In certain instances, imperial officials aligned with Bourbon practices pushed for stricter checks on clerical land abuses (as argued in Chapter Five's *Las Sementeras*) to the benefit of indigenous villages. In other instances, imperial officials built more robust policing measures to monitor Chinese merchants' profits as they exited the colony via remittance channels (reflected in the Chinese expulsion policies of Chapter Two). In most of the cases in the following chapters, the transitions issued by Bourbon Era reformers shaped the Spanish Empire's need for laborers. And in response, both Chinese and indigenous laborers cleverly adapted to their evolving circumstances.

I examine the intertwined relationships between colonial residents of the Philippines, specifically the interactions between indigenous Philippine and Chinese laborers and Spanish officials. "*Indios*" (the Spanish legal category for Philippine men) or men I term "indigenous" as they were the original inhabitants of the Philippines, are at the center of my dissertation as the undervalued laborers most exploited by the Spanish Empire. Although these indigenous men sometimes hailed from different provinces and islands, they related to their own native waterways, forests, and agricultural fields in ways that facilitated subversive labor relationships with their indigenous superiors; ways of

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<sup>9</sup> Aaron Alejandro Olivas, "Loyalty and Disloyalty to the Bourbon Dynasty in Spanish America and the Philippines During the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1715)," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 2013, UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations.

laboring that were unaccounted for and unregulated by Spanish authorities. The Chinese men who labored alongside indigenous men likely migrated without their wives and families from the Fujian province of Minnan in China. Pushed to migration as a result of scarce arable farmlands in Fujian, Chinese sojourners either traveled to the Philippines as temporary laborers and merchants, conducting seasonal trading (to avoid Southeast Asian monsoons) and returning to their homelands or migrated to major Chinese settlements like the *Parián* where they bound themselves to indigenous Philippine women, had families, and established successful businesses in a myriad of trades.<sup>10</sup> Spanish men, filled with revulsion for the non-Catholic Chinese but still fascinated by their prowess as merchants, occupy the third category of men I highlight in my dissertation. The Spanish men who ventured to the Philippine colony came from diverse classes and trades; they journeyed to become soldiers, missionaries, bureaucrats, and merchants.<sup>11</sup> My dissertation explores the accounts from those authorities responsible for controlling and enacting laws in labor spaces: *oidores* (judges) of the Manila *Audiencia*, local *alcaldes mayores* (local chief magistrates), lawyers, clergymen, Governor Generals (government executives), and other powerful *vecinos* (Spanish subjects). This set of oftentimes elite and monied Spanish authorities fit the mold of the “merchant-bureaucrat” Spanish colonist; such men who pursued both wealth and political office in the Spanish Philippines.<sup>12</sup> It is no wonder that

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<sup>10</sup> Richard T. Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila* (Boston: Brill, 2010), 17, 24, 32-33 and John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 124: Chinese men migrated to the Spanish Philippines as “tailors, shoemakers, blacksmiths, silversmiths, sculptors, locksmiths, painters, masons, weavers, and in short all the craftsmen of the country.”

<sup>11</sup> Catherine Tracy Goode, “Merchant-Bureaucrats, Unwritten Contracts, and Fraud in the Manila Galleon Trade,” in *Corruption in the Iberian Empires: Greed, Custom, and Colonial Networks*, ed. Christoph Rosenmüller (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2017), 172-173 and Stephanie Mawson, “Convicts or Conquistadores? Spanish Soldiers in the Seventeenth-Century Pacific,” *Past and Present* no. 232 (2016): 88-91.

<sup>12</sup> Mark A. Burkholder and D.S. Chandler, “Creole Appointments and the Sale of *Audiencia* Positions in the Spanish Empire Under the Early Bourbons, 1701-1750,” in *Administrators of Empire*, ed. Mark A. Burkholder (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1998), 73 and Goode, “Merchant-Bureaucrats,” 173-174.

through their cumulative discourses, these Spanish authorities crafted racial formations in order to justify the laws that governed colonial Philippine labor sites *and* benefitted their own economic enterprises.

### Claims

I focus on the ways – discursive and codified by law – in which Spanish imperial officials structured racial hierarchies in the colonial Philippines. By constructing harmful racial formations rooted in indolence and by crafting exploitative material working conditions, Spanish authorities consistently subjugated indigenous laborers to the bottom of the hierarchy. Although Spanish men grudgingly admired the commercial prowess of Chinese merchants and experts, authorities questioned their religious devotion and imperial loyalties and did not deem Chinese men fit to ascend as commanders of labor sites; the position Spanish authorities solely reserved for themselves. By examining labor spaces, or sites where imperial officials compelled indigenous and Chinese laborers to toil and profit for the Spanish empire, I highlight how the interactions between multiracial colonial men preoccupied the minds, pens, and pockets of Spanish officials; how in the crafting of their racial hierarchy, Spanish officials defined non-Spanish races and even more clearly what it meant to be a Spaniard in the Philippines.

Temporally, I situate my study in the early modern period when pre-Enlightenment notions of race had not yet cemented into measurable forms of scientific racism. Therefore, the race-making I center in this study does not reflect the “biological” classifications of post-Enlightenment race-making: wherein imperialist-informed scientists developed theories on *biological* racial difference. I still contend, however, that imperial actors vigorously and diligently produced knowledges about race-making. In the early modern



period, Spanish officials compiled observations on the natural world. Such knowledges would eventually contribute to the burgeoning field of scientific study. I assert that academics must also incorporate colonial knowledges of racial difference in this European scientific discourse. In the colonies, Spanish men dictated what counted as profitable “knowledge” and what did not; and, more importantly, which people could harness useful expertise.

Most importantly, I argue that indigenous and Chinese men understood the racial hierarchies to which they were tethered and navigated such hierarchies with finesse. While the world racism built in the early modern Spanish Empire was certainly one of structural and colonial dominance as argued by Daniel Nemser, my project examines how colonial actors adapted to such circumstances.<sup>13</sup> Colonial laborers were not passive members of the labor regime. Instead, I argue indigenous and Chinese men explored colonial spaces for “rival geographies,” or “mobility in the face of constraint” as they confronted Spanish impulses to “reduce” them to settling into Spanish towns.<sup>14</sup> Chinese men structured gambling networks and amassed the support of local clergy and private Spanish *vecinos* as a bulwark to protect themselves from accusations of mutiny and infidelity to the Catholic faith. And lastly, even if the Spanish masculine traits of religious expression, aptitude for expertise, and the demonstration of economic worth as vassals retained their value as indigenous and Chinese men’s colonial currency of assimilation, both indigenous and Chinese men understood that mirroring these traits superficially worked to their

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<sup>13</sup> Daniel Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race: Concentration and Biopolitics in Colonial Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017), 5.

<sup>14</sup> Stephanie Camp, *Closer to Freedom: Enslaved Women and Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 5.

advantage. Ultimately, my dissertation asserts that human agency in the colonial Philippines did, indeed persist.

### Interventions

I argue, first, that racial formations, a heavily mutable social category in the early modern world, structured *racism* (a system of possession and dispossession) in the labor sites of the colonial Philippines. Omi and Winant define racial formations as the “process of race making” that is a “sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and destroyed.”<sup>15</sup> As racial formations are not simply constructions, but rather deployed and activated in response to the material conditions of a given society, I take up Omi and Winant’s tool to emphasize the historicity of early modern Philippine racial formations. Imperial authorities’ racial ideologies rarely focused solely on the “race” or “nation” of their diverse publics and imperial officials’ documents reflect this very complexity. Colonial actors inflected racial discourse – ideologies which justified the implementation of crown policies – with other factors, namely gender, religion, family lineage, age, and regional belonging in the creation of class inequality.<sup>16</sup>

I build on the works of María Elena Martínez and Daniel Nemser who have argued that while race as a biological category of social organization did not yet come to fruition in the early modern period, the study of racism as a complex system of violence against particular groups of people should not be wholly eschewed by scholars of colonial Latin America.<sup>17</sup> Examining how imperial authorities used racial formations to make racism

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<sup>15</sup> Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 108.

<sup>16</sup> María Elena Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 13: Martínez notes the significance of religion in early modern race-making and urges those of us who study this period to use the word race “with caution... [concepts of *limpieza de sangre*] were strongly connected to lineage and intersected with religion.”

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 11 and Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 10.

function is, indeed, generative as such studies reveal the Spanish imperial project's governmental logics. In the historiography of the colonial Philippines, few scholars have conducted studies of racism in the early modern period. Damon Woods scratched the surface in his work on the role of *Limpieza de Sangre* (cleanliness of blood) as the discriminatory logic behind the racial exclusion of Filipino clergy in the Mendicant Orders.<sup>18</sup> Similar to Woods, I name the system of dispossession within the colonial Philippines precisely as it functioned: racism. The present work contributes to the historiography on racial relations between Spanish, Chinese, and indigenous Philippine men in the early modern Philippines by asserting that the *function* of early modern race making laid in its potential to create material inequity via institutional processes.<sup>19</sup>

In order to study racial formations and racism in the early modern Philippines, we must examine racial formations as they relate to one another. In other words, my project attends to how Spanish imperial authorities rarely used racial formations as sole archetypes, but rather weaponized them most potently in relation to one another. This dissertation does not focus on any single racial formation, but rather examines the relationality *between* indigenous Philippine and Chinese laborers. In the historiography of the colonial Philippines, historians have researched Philippine OR Chinese actors. Scholars have paid little attention to the relationships between Philippine and Chinese colonial actors except in the cases where mestiza mothers (part Chinese, part Filipino/a) married

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<sup>18</sup> Damon Woods, "Racial Exclusion in the Mendicant Orders from Spain to the Philippines," *UCLA Historical Journal* 11 (1991): 70.

<sup>19</sup> Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*, 7 and Tamar Herzog, *Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 2; Martínez's analysis of the genealogy between *limpieza de sangre* and the casta system coupled with Tamar Herzog's work on *vecinidad* as a site of exception and inclusion/exclusion produce a fertile ground from which I draw from and contribute to. Racism, in its most potent form, was and is a practice of inclusion/ exclusion and the source of material inequities among different groups.

into moneyed Chinese families in the 1850s.<sup>20</sup> Recent scholarship has highlighted relationships between Chinese and Philippine peoples with more complexity, namely the studies of Ruth de Llobet and Joshua Kueh who examined the racial relationships of Chinese and Philippine men as they contended with political turmoil and the building up of social and economic networks, respectively.<sup>21</sup> Historians of colonial Latin America, however, have offered relational studies on race in New Spain and colonial South America, broadly. Rachel O'Toole, Yanna Yannakakis, and Norah Jaffary have highlighted the ways in which black, indigenous, and *criollo* (New Spain-born Spanish) men understood and contended with colonial racial hierarchies, few studies of the colonial Philippines have produced similar work. Studies that highlight the relationality between racial formations have revealed how the logics and contradictions of Spanish-authored racial formations imbricated together to produce and support the racial status of the Spanish colonial site's apex predator: the heterosexual, elite, Spanish landowning patriarch.<sup>22</sup> Like O'Toole, Yannakakis, and Jaffary, it is this component of racial relationality that, I assert, makes racial hierarchies so strong. An examination of the interstitial relationships between Philippine, Chinese, and Spanish colonial actors demonstrates the race-making project of imperial authorities: that imperial officials profited greatly by leveraging the labor requirements of indigenous and Chinese laborers against one another. I reveal that imperial authorities' ideations that indigenous men were inept and that Chinese men were

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<sup>20</sup> Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila*, 5, Wickberg, *The Chinese Philippine Life*, 32 and Joshua Kueh. "Adaptive Strategies of Parián Chinese," *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 61, no. 3 (2013): 362–84.

<sup>21</sup> Ruth de Llobet, "Chinese Mestizo and Natives' Disputes in Manila and the 1812 Constitution: Old Privileges and New Political Realities (1813-15)," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 45, no. 2 (2014): 215 and Kueh, "Adaptive Strategies," 364.

<sup>22</sup> Rachel O'Toole, *Bound Lives: Africans, Indians, and the Making of Race in Colonial Peru* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 3, and Yanna Yannakakis, *The Art of Being In-Between: Native Intermediaries, Indian Identity, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 36 and Norah Jaffary, *Gender, Religion, and Race in the Colonization of the Americas* (Burlington: The Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 3.

skilled, yet dangerous “Others” were integral to the racial labor hierarchies that enriched imperial coffers.

By centering the relationality of racial formations in the Spanish colonial Philippines, this work disrupts the historiographies of race in Spanish Colonial Studies. In calling attention to how Spanish authorities racialized indigenous and Chinese colonial actors within the Spanish Empire, I complicate colonial Latin Americanists’ conceptual model of Transatlantic racial formations: African-enslaved or African-descent peoples, indigenous “Indians,” white Spaniards, and their offspring (in the form of *casta system*).<sup>23</sup> I compel Critical Race scholars interested in the early modern Spanish world to re-imagine the transportability of Iberian racial hierarchies across the Spanish Empire.<sup>24</sup> The inclusion of Philippine and Chinese Asian racial formations means that scholars must conduct a broader study of race and interrogate the spectrum of blackness and whiteness scholars have so often conceptualized in Spanish colonial sites.<sup>25</sup> More practically, by examining indigenous and Chinese actors in the Spanish colonial Philippines, I reveal the ways in which imperial authorities were severely confounded by their attempts to categorize and tame indigenous Philippine and Chinese laborers. Spanish men relied heavily on their ethnological assumption that Chinese men were “barbarous,” discriminating against men

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<sup>23</sup> Historians of early colonial Latin America have centered their studies on the majority populations of black enslaved, “Indian,” and Spanish peoples: Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 6, Jaffary, *Gender, Religion, and Race*, 5, Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*, 8. However, studies have increased on Asian colonial actors in the later colonial and independence periods of Latin America, see: Kathleen López, *Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013) and Caroline S. Hau, *The Chinese Question: Ethnicity, Nation, and Region in and Beyond the Philippines* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> Eva Maria Mehl, *Forced Migration in the Spanish Pacific World: From Mexico to the Philippines, 1765-1811* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) and Tatiana Seijas, *Asian Slaves in Colonial Mexico: From Chinos to Indians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): Mehl and Seijas both produce beautiful works on the movement of multiracial peoples across the Pacific Ocean. Such works are excellent starting points to examining the movement and limitations of colonial racial formations across imperial locations.

<sup>25</sup> Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” *Nepantla: Views from the South* 1, no. 3 (2000): 534.

they perceived as “infidels.”<sup>26</sup> However, such characterizations could not explain away Spanish authorities’ fascination and veiled admiration of Chinese colonial actors.

In the early modern period, Spanish imperial authorities conceptualized race as deeply entwined with gendered characterizations. To delineate the threads of racial discourse in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Philippines, it is imperative to incorporate a lens for what Steve Stern calls the “gender and color-class” privilege of the Spanish colonial world.<sup>27</sup> Throughout the current project, I specify the class, religion, and sometimes the age backgrounds of colonial actors; all of which were significant factors in determining the economic, social, and political position of indigenous and Chinese laborers. In order to endeavor towards a robust analytic of race by which we might grasp at the full shape of race/ racism at any time or place, scholars must take up an intersectional analysis.

Where scholars of gender and race in colonial sites have contributed much to the literature on the twin oppressions of gender and race, the scholarship of the early modern Philippines must benefit from similar intersectional analyses on the intricacies of colonial oppression. Stern’s work along with the studies of Ann Laura Stoler, Barbara Watson Andaya, and Vicente Rafael have collectively asserted that gendered characterizations were crucial to imperial officials as they shaped racial formations in colonial spaces.<sup>28</sup> Scholars of

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<sup>26</sup> Serge Gruzinski, *The Eagle and the Dragon: Globalization and European Dreams of Conquest in China and America in Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014): Serge Gruzinski contends that in the imaginations of exploratory pillagers and imperial pirates “the invention of Asia was inseparable from the invention of the Americas.” The East, specifically China, represented a hard stop in the colonizing efforts of Spain and Portugal. Where Gruzinski focuses on European Empire bridging a full colonization of the East, my work concentrates such a gargantuan analysis of East-West relations to the interactions between colonial actors and Chinese laborers (laborers who were separated from the larger Chinese state). For more on the European ethnological invention of Eastern versus Western civilizations, see also: Anthony Pagden, *European Encounters and the New World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) and James Muldoon, *The Americas in the Spanish World Order: The Justification for Conquest in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).

<sup>27</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 13.

<sup>28</sup> Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 6, Barbara Andaya Watson, *The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia*

the colonial Philippines have produced few works which center a race and gender analytic in their studies. Carolyn Brewer's work on gender in the early colonial Philippine church argued that gender was a crucial mechanism through which the Catholic Church infiltrated indigenous, *babaylan* (shamaness, pre-colonial) spaces. However, Brewer did not use the term "race," nor did she frame racism as the system of oppression that operated in the Catholic Church even as she examined the ways in which religious officials sutured the *babaylan's* gendered power to harmful, misogynistic racialized traits.<sup>29</sup>

Similar to Stern and Stoler, I argue that in the investigation of imperial officials' designs for oppression (racism as a system, patriarchy, early modern notions of Catholic purity, etc.), a study of race cannot be disentangled from gender. The analysis of race and gender provides for a robust interrogation of racial formations that allow us to discern the fine nuances in Spanish men's racializations of Chinese and indigenous Philippine men. Spanish colonial notions with which historians of the Philippines are familiar – that Spanish men described "indio" men as lazy and averse to labor and Chinese men as "barbaric" because they lacked Christian values and would be eternally circumspect – must be examined in relational terms, but specifically gendered relational terms. These same officials then codified labor policies to reflect their beliefs: Spanish officials reprimanded indigenous "indolent" laborers *because* they were bad patriarchs (by Spanish standards), or the colony needed to expel "lascivious" Chinese men *because* these Chinese men corrupted "innocent Christian natives." An intersectional framework that analyzes the convergences

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(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 104 and Vicente L. Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule* (Duke University Press, 1993), 84.

<sup>29</sup> Carolyn Brewer, *Shamanism, Catholicism and Gender Relations in Colonial Philippines, 1521-1685* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 7.

of race, gender, and class exposes the colonial logics of Spanish authorities as they endeavored to experiment with race-thinking in the archipelago.

Finally, “Mercurial Masculinities” contends that the knowledges or expertise(s) associated with specialized forms of labor were fundamentally bound up in the colonial race-making project. Within the halls of crown-funded imperial institutions like the *Casa de Contratación* (the House of Trade of the Indies), Spanish learned men produced an array of knowledges to make more efficient the methods of cosmographers, ships’ pilots, ships’ architects, metalsmiths, and other professional fields. In this colonial metropole, imperial officials molded multiple ideologies of domination to manage colonial populations. Scholars of colonial knowledge production in the early modern Spanish world have contributed a body of work analyzing the fundamental role of the expert as the authority on colonial knowledges. Eric M. Ash and Arndt Brendecke’s works both focus on the intellectual bases and imperial networks (support from the Spanish imperial court and officials) that shored up the position of the expert as an elite, authoritative early modern official.<sup>30</sup> Where Ash and Brendecke demonstrated the processes of developing the expert, Antonio Barrera-Osorio and Peter Dear excitedly highlighted the expert’s site of legitimacy, the *Casa de Contratación* and the creation of the “experiment,” as the sites that produced cultures of scientific empiricism that would signal the beginnings of Europe’s Scientific Revolution.<sup>31</sup> All scholars concurred that “expertise” and “experience” were the two criteria men wielded in order to be legible in demonstrating authority within Spanish imperial institutions.

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<sup>30</sup> Arndt Brendecke, *The Empirical Empire: Spanish Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge* (Boston: Walter DeGruyter GmbH, 2016), 89 and Eric H. Ash, “Introduction: Expertise and the Early Modern State,” *Osiris* 25 (2010): 3.

<sup>31</sup> Antonio Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature: The Spanish American Empire and the Early Scientific Revolution* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 2 and Peter Dear, *Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 6, 149-50.



My work diverges from the historiography of “the expert” in the early modern world in one key way: I assert that the trans-imperial system of colonial knowledge production was complicit in the creation of racial hierarchies in the colonial Philippines. Unlike the works of Brendecke and Ash, I locate the position of the “expert” in the early modern Philippines not simply as a colonial authority, but as a uniquely *Spanish* colonial authority. Colonial professionals put to use the valuable lessons learned from imperial institutions and crafted themselves as “expert” authorities. These experts, then, implemented labor practices in Philippine labor sites that benefitted Spanish experts immensely at the expense of indigenous laborers and (sometimes) at the expense of Chinese laborers. I assert that by championing European-authored specialized knowledges as the golden standard of labor expertise, imperial officials dictated which epistemologies (indigenous Philippine, Chinese, or otherwise) registered as *useful* or *useless*. My study’s focus more closely mirrors that of Matthew Crawford whose work examined the conflicts between Spanish imperial and Andean ways of knowing. Crawford succinctly states: “Even as [imperial authorities] sought to marginalize indigenous, African, mixed race, and creole peoples in colonial societies, Europeans remained dependent upon those peoples.”<sup>32</sup> The creation of labor hierarchies, then, was not simply a form of filling *repartimiento* requirements (indigenous and Chinese compulsory labor in service of the Spanish crown), but rather an enterprise in constructing racial formations rooted in European value judgments of diverse ways of knowing and labor-specific skillsets. Where Colonial Latin Americanist Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra conducted a similar study of knowledge production and race in colonial Latin

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<sup>32</sup> Matthew James Crawford, *The Andean Wonder Drug: Cinchona Bark and Imperial Science in the Spanish Atlantic, 1630-1800* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), 41.

America, I examine the Philippines as a space of crucial intellectual experimentation in the Spanish empire's race-making project.<sup>33</sup> Imperial authorities in the Philippines engaged with the vast network of early-Bourbon colonial knowledge production. Throughout my dissertation, I highlight that imperial officials' global experiences and knowledges gathered from the Iberian Peninsula, the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, and other colonial expeditions shaped these Spanish men as they presided over the colonial government in Manila. Confronted with alternative mining and shipbuilding knowledges from Philippine colonial actors, imperial officials tested their ostensibly "superior" European expertise against that of the Philippine laborer and the Chinese merchant and miner.

### Methodologies

In the present study, I read colonial documents to parse out and interrogate imperial officials' multiple voices within the chorus of opinion that was the colonial discourse of the early modern Philippines. I use Patricia Seed's practical definition of colonial discourse: the "language [,] the rhetoric, figures of speech, and discursive formations" committed to memory by imperial administrators and in rare cases, by indigenous colonial subjects themselves."<sup>34</sup> I apply a discursive approach not only to discern unique and contradictory logics in the uses of racial formations (as a discursive framework), but also because the wide array of imperial documentation on labor demands as much. My dissertation draws from analogous, quotidian imperial documents to demonstrate how imperial authorities structured systems based on discriminatory racist

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<sup>33</sup> Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "New World, New Stars: Patriotic Astrology and the Invention of the Amerindian and Creole Bodies in Colonial Spanish America, 1600-1650," in *Nature, Empire, and Nation: Explorations of the History of Science in the Iberian World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006): Where Cañizares-Esguerra has conducted similar work in the Colonial Spanish America, my study focuses on imperial labor sites of the far-Pacific colony of the Philippines.

<sup>34</sup> Patricia Seed, "Review Essays: Colonial and Postcolonial Discourse," *Latin American Research Review* 26, No. 3 (1991): 183.

practices. In these documents, colonial authorities wrote to one another (or to the King) petitioning for material support, requesting exceptions from taxes and other disruptive labor laws, or demanding the creation of laws that would boost Spanish men's economic projects. While there emerged no single, cohesive institution that formed a unitary racist practice – rather a messy overlap of multiple instructions: the *Audiencia*, Catholic clergy, individual *Casa*-trained “experts”, and other secular authorities – imperial officials consistently dealt in the currency of discursive racial formations. To tackle such a diverse set of documents, I required a robust discursive analytic as I traced the avenues by which Spanish men struggled over the meanings of their racial and gendered constructs of indigenous and Chinese men.

The stakes for implementing a discursive analytic were high since I ultimately argue that imperial officials implemented their colonial discourse of race and gendered formations into racist labor laws, thereby structuring a unique form of racism which privileged certain East Asian men over indigenous Philippine actors in the crown's pursuits for economic security. To execute a discursive analysis still rooted in a material historicity, I applied Mrinalini Sinha's theoretical framework on colonial race relations. Sinha argued that the discursive models that shaped colonial racism(s) should not universalize colonial race relations, but rather that such relations “were constantly rearticulated in response to changes in material conditions.”<sup>35</sup> Instead of highlighting the harmful constructions of indigenous and Chinese colonial actors as standalone mythologies, my dissertation locates and also *demonstrates* how Spanish men utilized indigenous and Chinese racial formations

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<sup>35</sup> Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995): 14, 18-19.

in their attempts to pass laws and justify racist labor practices. More exciting are the instances where authorities faced obstacles in the trafficking of racial formations – like the need to deport “licentious” Chinese merchants – as Bourbon reformers posed formidable contestations in the interest of making the Philippine economy more efficient.

In examining colonial discourse, I also endeavor to understand the discursive politics of exclusion and inclusion. Like María Elena Martínez and Tamar Herzog in their studies on the role of Spanish imperial institutions in the creation of material inequality, I, too, employ a discursive analysis in conjunction with a study of imperial institutions in order to reveal the praxis of racism in the colonial Philippines. Martínez traced the ways in which imperial administrations used *limpieza de sangre* (cleanliness of blood and, therefore, access to Spanishness) to certify access to economic and political privilege; a system that ultimately transformed into the *casta* system (a system with real life, legal and economic repercussions for those whose bloodlines reflected varying degrees of indigeneity and blackness). Similarly, by reviewing defenses and claims to *vecinidad* (access to Spanish citizenship and rights), Herzog explored the discursive and practical usage of terms such as *vecinidad* and *naturaleza* (a person’s relationship to the crown and their community) in claiming entitlements as *vecinos*. For all non-peninsular Spaniards, *vecinidad* was ultimately a process of inclusion and exclusion to certain rights and entitlements.<sup>36</sup> In the same vein as Martínez and Herzog, the aim of this dissertation is to highlight the early beginnings of the severe race-class disparities that would later manifest in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century colonial life. And like Martínez and Herzog, I contribute my study to a body of work that seeks to understand the myriad forms of

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<sup>36</sup> Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*, 11 and Herzog, *Defining Nations*, 2.

imperial violence; how imperial logics choose to cripple some, while nurturing others in a system that cultivated the early seeds of racism in the colonial Philippines.

Navigating the transformations of discursive construct alone cannot explain the durability of racial formations in the early modern Philippines. In order to nuance and make intelligible the potency of multiple threads of racial and gendered constructs, I take up Critical Race scholar Stuart Hall's methodology on hegemony:

The object of analysis is therefore not the single stream of "dominant ideas" into which everything and everyone has been absorbed, but rather the analysis of ideology as differentiated terrain, of the different discursive currents, their points of juncture and break and the relations of power between them: in short, an ideological complex, ensemble or discursive formation. The question is "how these ideological currents are diffused and why in the process of diffusion they fracture along certain lines and in certain directions."<sup>37</sup>

Hall's use of Antonio Gramsci's work on hegemony as a methodological tool guided my reading of the differentiated terrain of Spanish-authored racial formations. My work discerns the ways in which particular racial formations co-existed, but more importantly why particular racial formations, when they collided, still maintained their robust usage. In the mines, Spanish officials characterized indigenous miners as inept laborers needful of crown guidance because the miners would suffer attacks by militaristic Igorot warriors. Spanish officials employed both injurious racial formations of indigenous men for specific ends: to secure crown monies and permissions to dominate mining operations in the Philippines. Rather than contribute a narrative study of Iberian whiteness' success over Chinese and indigenous brownness, I produce a work that elaborates upon the purposeful and sometimes accidental fissures throughout Spanish imperial officers' racial formations. I

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<sup>37</sup> Stuart Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity" *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10, no. 2 (1986): 22.

also highlight the responses of non-Spanish men and Spanish men alike as they struggled with the meanings of racial formations: the indigenous laborer's adeptness at maneuvering around local repartimiento laws, the Chinese merchant's professions of religious devotion to the Catholic faith, and the Spanish man's repeated realizations that the empire ultimately functioned on the backs of untamable miners, lumber workers, bread makers, peasants, vagabonds, gamblers, and rabble-rousers.

The theoretical framework of hegemony is specifically useful in accomplishing a raced and gendered analysis of the early modern Philippines. I work with a lens that seeks out the possibility of multiple masculinities. Although Spanish men authored derisive indigenous and Chinese racial formations and structured such formations into systems of dispossession, I disagree with anthropologist Maila Stevens' contention that Spanish colonialism saw colonized men completely "unmanned."<sup>38</sup> On the contrary, I argue that colonial sites teemed with demonstrations of multiple forms of masculine performance. I incorporate the methods of historian Thomas Klubock in his work on hegemonic masculinity in the present work.<sup>39</sup> Specifically, I contend that the hegemony – the site of contention between dominant and subversive ideologies – of the Spanish imperial officers did not eclipse nor consume indigenous Philippine or Chinese masculinity. My analysis of colonial discourse necessitates a hegemonic analysis. Not only did Spanish authorities debate over the valences of non-Spanish racial formations, but indigenous and Chinese men also negotiated the intrusion of Spanish masculine ideals. The collision of masculinities

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<sup>38</sup> Maila Stevens, "Gendering Asia After Modernity," in *Gendered Inequalities in Asia: Configuring, Contesting and Recognizing Women and Men*, ed. Helle Rydstrom (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), 32.

<sup>39</sup> Thomas Klubock, *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904-1951* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 5-7.

produced yet another “terrain of struggle” over the meanings of masculine expertise and knowledge and within the implementation or evasion of labor laws. As I argue throughout my dissertation, subaltern masculinities did, indeed, bloom in the shadow of colonization. In chapter two, through their own savvy, Chinese bakers secured relationships with powerful vecinos and clergy to shore up Chinese men’s credibility as “decent” colonial neighbors. In chapters four and five, indigenous men outwardly performed Iberian values of dutiful vassalage and prostration to the cross while simultaneously securing alliances with other indigenous local leaders through their labor and their will to revolt. By examining the discourse and interactions between Spanish, Chinese, and indigenous men as a series of relations negotiating the hegemonic standard of Spanish masculinity, I produce a study of how colonial actors demonstrated their masculinity in the highly racialized and gendered world of the colonial Philippines.

### Archives and Sources

In tracking the transformations of Spanish authorities’ racial discourse over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, I procured sources from the *Archivo General de las Indias* in Seville that, primarily, illuminated justifications for racist local labor laws and practices. I sourced most of the documentation from the AGI’s records on the *Real Audiencia of Manila*, the repository for the islands’ documents on governmental and oftentimes civilian legal disputes, correspondence, and laws. From the diverse *Audiencia* records, I sought any and all public disputes, legal cases, laws, and correspondence on labor issues within the colonial Philippines. In Chinese Expulsion Orders, I highlight how imperial authorities perceived Chinese merchants as racial and gendered others; transgressors to Spanish men and, purportedly, transgressors to vulnerable indigenous

laborers. I investigate local laws and imperial correspondence throughout the dissertation, foregrounding imperial officials' attempts to manage productive economic enterprises by pitting indigenous Philippine and Chinese laborers against one another in the mines, the gambling houses, and virtually within every other colonial site. The examination of legal cases is also central to this dissertation. Legal cases involving labor sites illustrate the abusive working conditions of indigenous and Chinese laborers while revealing the racialized fears of everyday Spanish *vecinos* (upstanding, oftentimes moneyed Spanish subjects) as evidenced by *vecino* testimonies. Finally, I analyze documents on agrarian rebellions to unpack the complicated clash between imperial hegemonic and "subversive" indigenous masculinities as demonstrated in the 1745 dispute over access to agrarian lands.

Because of the nature of the AGI as a collection of imperial documentation, I faced three major obstacles in fleshing out the vibrant laborers who contended with colonial racism. The authors of imperial documents were undoubtedly agents of empire: literate Spanish men who ranged from middling professions to the most esteemed governmental positions in the royal government of Manila.<sup>40</sup> Spanish male authors explicated their economic interests and racial and gendered anxieties clearly. However, the archive of labor issues that I constructed from their Spanish officials' experiences reflects notable absences in colonial labor sites, namely the lack of local sources, the lacuna of women's labor, and the inability to examine evidence of how indigenous and Chinese men understood their own position in the racial hierarchy. Without local sources like the notarial records with which Jane Mangan worked in her study on laboring women in colonial Perú, my dissertation

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<sup>40</sup> Burkholder, *Administrators of Empire*, xvi.



could not grasp the impact of Philippine women's paid labor and social reproduction on the borders of Philippine mines, lumberyards, and in the markets.<sup>41</sup> My evidentiary base – documents focused primarily on male laborers – undeniably shaped my decision to study how colonial masculinities surfaced in relationships between colonial men. In the Philippines where Spanish officials withheld access to mass literacy from indigenous men, imperial documentation rarely accounted for the writings of indigenous and Chinese men. Although chapter five grasps at how indigenous men understood themselves in the colonial Philippines through their own statements, the dissertation could not tap into the range of indigenous laborers' experiences as it has with the preoccupations of Spanish imperial authorities.

### Chapter Summaries

Chapter One, "The masculine façade of empire: Chinese Merchants, Buyeros & Infidels" examines imperial authorities' ultimate fear: That Chinese merchants maintained primacy in commerce within the colonial order. Secular authorities and clergy debated whether or not their anxieties about Chinese merchants' success eclipsed their need for Chinese trade in the imperial correspondence leading up to the 1750 Chinese Expulsion Order. Spanish officials assuaged their fears by implementing local laws and imitating imperial inquiries into Chinese merchant-dominated trades. I argue that imperial authorities continuously backtracked on much of their original, vitriol-laden laws and expulsion orders in favor of more lenient approaches to surveilling Chinese men. Imperial officers vigilantly policed Chinese merchants' movements because "*sangleys*" kept the

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<sup>41</sup> Jane Mangan, *Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 15.

colonial economy afloat. This delicate balancing act; a “one step forward, two steps back” approach, revealed both their intense distrust of Chinese men and their undeniable reliance on Chinese men’s expert trading abilities.

Chapter Two focuses on the labor site of the provisioning economies in the colonial Philippine world. In “Bread & Wood: Exclusionary Expertise in Colonial Philippine Provisional Economies” I examine the industries which sustained the wealth of Spain’s colonies (and the investments of the growing elite in New Spain): the safe passage of the galleon trade. The onus was on Spanish authorities and indigenous and Chinese laborers to keep the galleons moving efficiently across the Pacific Ocean. In this chapter I ask: How did the labor spaces that supported the bare bones of the colonial economy – the trades that fed Spanish officials and built the galleons – function? I argue that in the perspective of Spanish officials, the Spanish “expert” was a central figure in the commandeering of the colonial economy’s labor forces. More importantly, I contend that in the regimes of the provisional economy, Spanish authorities foreclosed the role of the “intelligent expert” to indigenous men through two methods: by ensuring the persistence of exploitative working conditions and by discursively measuring indigenous laborers by European/ Iberian metrics of expertise, intelligence, and personal experience. By examining laws in the *corte de maderas* (lumberyards) and documentation on a Chinese *panadero* (baker) uprising, I examine the discursive distance Spanish experts constructed between their own “expertise,” the skills of Chinese men, and the abilities of the indigenous laborer.

In Chapter Three, “Testing their metal”: Gauging Masculinity in the Mines,” I highlight the very clear, racialized labor hierarchy in the mining sector. In their efforts to manage the multiracial laborers in the mines of the colonial Philippines, Spanish imperial

authorities structured a strict labor hierarchy. Imperial officials cemented themselves atop the hierarchy, as scientific experts of ore and as knightly defenders of their mines. Below them, Spaniards demanded that Chinese laborers work skilled positions such as land surveyors and metalsmiths. At the bottom of this hierarchy were indigenous laborers; those who required force to labor for the benefit of the empire. In this chapter, I examine accounts of failure and success in operating the mines at Paracale, Camarines Norte and I analyze petitions for *mercedes* (exemptions from crown laws), and cases of abuse in the mines. My argument is two-fold: First, I contend that imperial officials conceptualized racial difference as inextricable to the Spanish masculine ability to grasp “scientific” intelligence. Second, I argue that imperial officials perceived this intelligence in Chinese and not indigenous laborers. Spanish authorities then turned racial *stereotypes* into racist *practice* by choosing Chinese laborers for skilled work, while foreclosing any opportunities for skilled labor to indigenous men.

Chapter Four diverges from clearly delineated labor sites to public spaces wherein imperial officials attempted to discipline Chinese and indigenous men into productive laborers. In “ ‘Inclined to total freedom’: Vagabonds and Gamblers in *las calles*”, I re-focus my analysis to Spanish imperial authorities’ attempts at racializing non-Spanish men in public spaces outside of the mines, the market, the bakery, and the *cortes de madera*; a space I call *las calles* (“the streets”). In these peripheral labor sites, Spanish officials enacted laws – laws which codified their gendered racial formations – to confront the insurmountable obstacles of gambling and vagabondery that stifled their efforts to commandeer indigenous Philippine and Chinese laborers. I argue that Spanish officials’ conceptualizations of Spanish authorities’ incorruptibility, Chinese men’s

untrustworthiness, and Philippine laborers' laziness were instrumental in the Spanish imperial race making process.

In Chapter Five, "Ang aming lupa': Collective Resistance in Las Sementeras" I center *cabezas de barangay* (heads of villages) and their aptitude for public and private rebellion within the agricultural fields. Because of the nature of the *repartimiento* (the compulsory labor draft secured in the project of conquest), agricultural laborers consisted of indigenous men and women. On farms across the Philippines, indigenous peoples labored both for the sustenance of Empire and sometimes for their own secret liberation. In this chapter, I examine the discursive strategies of the Tagalog (and specifically the Silangan) men who wrote directly to Spanish imperial officials in the 1745 Agrarian Rebellion. Through their collective demands, authored in Tagalog, *cabezas de barangay* (indigenous town leaders) demanded land protections and defense against religious abuses, with almost redundant declarations of Christianity throughout their statements. The events in "Las Sementeras" disrupt the confidence of imperial officials who assumed that the Spanish masculine values of piety and vassalage indigenous men mirrored were enough to secure imperial pardon. I argue that while indigenous men demonstrated acceptable Iberian masculine norms, under the surface they galvanized and created collective cohesion through an indigenous bond-building ritual of the *sandugo* (blood pact). By practicing dual strategies, Tagalog men secured a promising outcome to the Silangan rebellion.

## Chapter 1

### The Masculine Facade of Empire: Chinese Merchants, Buyeros, and Neophytes

As early as the Chinese Expulsion Edict of 1603, Spanish imperial authorities contended with the problem of surveilling the resident Chinese population in the colonial Philippines. In the following century, Spanish authorities stemmed the over-population of certain races by executing policies ranging from expulsions and massacres to constructing racial hierarchies in labor sites. Like other colonial actors, Chinese men defended themselves from the constant policing and harassment of the imperial apparatus by publicly expressing their devotion to the Catholic faith.<sup>42</sup> By examining the racialized and gendered discourse surrounding the laws Spanish authorities created in response to their fears, this chapter offers a two-fold argument. First, I assert that Spanish authorities executed their policing policies in fits and starts, ultimately “walking back” their racist, vitriol-laden laws. In particular, I argue that the slipshod implementation of the 1750 Chinese Expulsion Edict was not accidental. Imperial officials understood that the Philippine colonial economy hinged upon the Chinese merchant-powered economy and that implementing full expulsions of Chinese merchants would severely hinder the Spanish colonial project. Second, I argue that Spanish men’s fears of colonial Chinese residents were not only racialized, but deeply gendered. In their codification of racist policies, Spanish men, too, wrote into law their own gendered anxieties regarding homosocial relationships.

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<sup>42</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 16.

Spanish colonial governance, then, reflected the contradictory opinions of the men who authored imperial policies; policies that were protean and ultimately unpredictable.

Scholars of the Spanish colonial Philippines agree that Sino-Spanish imperial policies reflected Spanish authorities' deep anxieties regarding the Chinese colonials of the Philippines.<sup>43</sup> This chapter analyzes the three major fears that preoccupied the minds and pens of Spanish authorities regarding Chinese merchants. First, I explain the ways in which Spanish authorities responded to their fear that Chinese merchants could amass enough socioeconomic power to control the colonial market. I contend that such fears spurred local authorities to create racial hierarchies to monitor market activities. I then explore how imperial officers perceived the relationship between their own Spanish empire and the fictional, composite conceptualization of a Chinese Empire. Imperial officials anguished over losing the Spanish empire's monies to Chinese merchants, guilds, and to the larger "Chinese nation." By narrowing our focus to one specific trade, the trade of *buyo* (an substance akin to chewing tobacco), I demonstrate how Spanish officials quelled their anxieties over Chinese merchants' "thieving" remittance economy by attempting to control the Chinese *buyero* merchants. Lastly, I analyze imperial authorities' fear that Chinese men would disrupt the Spanish crown's incredibly important evangelizing mission by corrupting indigenous men with anti-Catholic behaviors, beliefs, and sentiments. Spanish authorities' "duty" to protect their indigenous colonial actors compelled their disproportionate response to such fears: an all-out expulsion of non-Catholic Chinese men.

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<sup>43</sup> Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 124, Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines*, 11-12, and Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 9.

Spanish men wove their own colonial fears throughout local laws, imperial inquiries, and imperial correspondence. By examining Spanish authorities' racialized fear of the Chinese merchant – and the subsequent imperial policies that resulted from such fears– I center imperial race-making as an integral mechanism in Spanish colonial governance.

In analyzing the Spanish-authored discursive figure of the Chinese merchant, I complicate the historiographies of colonial Latin America and the colonial Philippines which have overwhelmingly focused on the broader philosophical or economic convergence between western and eastern civilizations and economies in the early modern world. Scholars of colonial Latin America have studied the Chinese in the Philippine colony either broadly (such as philosophical studies on Iberian philosophers coming to grips with East Asian civilizations) or within the framework of an ethnic minority of economic migrants and immigrants adapting to Spanish colonial conditions.<sup>44</sup> Scholars of the Spanish colonial Philippines have more so studied the Chinese as a coherent minority group evolving towards a sense of Chinese nationalism within the confines of Philippine borders.<sup>45</sup> In both historiographical circles, scholars agreed that Iberian men constructed a monolithic, civilization entirely aberrant from Christian Europe. To conform to Spanish

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<sup>44</sup> Gruzinski, *The Eagle and the Dragon: Globalization and European Dreams of Conquest in China and America in Sixteenth Century* and Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): Gruzinski draws a broad strokes account of Iberian (mis)understandings regarding Eastern Asian empires. Such Iberian misconceptions on China contributed to their failed attempts at cementing a substantial colony (outside of Macau). In Pagden's work, he contributed an intellectual history of Iberian discourses regarding civilizations. Where Spanish theorists believed Chinese (or East Asian) civilizations to be somewhat "advanced", Spanish men could not uncouple Christianity and civilization, thus marking Chinese civilization as "barbaric." Kueh, "Adaptive Strategies," 362–84, Llobet, "Chinese Mestizo and Natives' Disputes," 3, and Guillermo Ruiz-Stovel, "Chinese Merchants, Silver Galleons, and Ethnic Violence in Spanish Manila, 1603-1686," *México y la Cuenca del Pacífico* 36 (2009): Microhistorical studies like those of Kueh, Llobet, and Ruiz-Stovel engage with exchanges between individual colonial actors; interactions that would produce complex kin-making practices, political disputes, and wide-scale massacres. However, neither Kueh, Llobet, nor Ruiz-Stovel address colonial racial discrimination in relation to gendered characterizations.

<sup>45</sup> Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos* and Wickberg, *The Chinese Philippine Life*: Wickberg and later Chu concentrated on broader studies of the kinship and trade network practices of Chinese merchants in the later colonial period as a backdrop to the rise of Chinese nationalism within the Philippines.

conceptions of European civilization and to secure subjecthood within the Spanish colony, individual Chinese men performed acts of Catholicism (baptism, wearing scapularies, etc.).

I contribute to the scholarly conversation on Chinese merchants in the Spanish Empire by focusing on colonial fear as a major determinant in the relationship between Chinese and Spanish colonial actors. Scholars of colonization and gender have argued that imperial men's fears of the colonial "Other's" sexuality – heterosexual and homosexual fantasies and practices as well as any number of perceived "sexual deviancies" – shaped imperial policies on physical segregation policies, miscegenation, and even labor policies.<sup>46</sup> My study aligns its conclusions with such arguments. In the verbiage of local colonial laws, imperial inquiries, and imperial correspondence from 1640 to 1750, imperial authorities characterized Chinese men with *gendered* Orientalist traits such as proclivities towards "[homosexual] sensuality," "licentiousness," uncontained "greed," and "disloyalty" to the Spanish crown. In short, Spanish officials conceptualized the Christianization of Chinese men in feminine/ masculine terms; specifically concluding that Chinese men could never reach the upper echelon of Iberian masculinity. I contend that imperial authorities' intense fascination with Chinese men's prowess in commerce – in how Chinese merchants navigated trading networks, and even in their successful attempts at evading Spanish authorities – reveals imperial actors' economic investment in male Chinese merchants. Even as imperial authorities vigorously condemned Chinese male residents as effeminate "Others", imperial authorities persistently made exceptions for Chinese merchant men's participation in the colonial economy.

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<sup>46</sup> Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century*, Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 6, and Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*.



## Imperial Surveillance

Although China's geographic proximity to the Philippines provided the crown the opportunity to evangelize the "Far East," imperial administrators still feared what they perceived as China's unbridled imperial greed.<sup>47</sup> In 1618 *Procurador general* (Attorney General) of the Philippines Martin Castaño explained as much to the Royal Government in Manila. He believed that Spain could act as a trade intermediary between Japan and China by taking advantage of the "deadly enmity" between the two countries. Castaño highlighted the importance of Chinese merchants who traded "between both kingdoms [and] move between these coasts with very large profits." However, when he petitioned the Royal Government to begin negotiations with China during the Hispano-Dutch War (1566-1648), he warned that if Spain did not act quickly they would miss the opportunity of acting as a business intermediary between China and Japan. Castaño attributed the fickleness of the trade deal to the disloyalty of East Asian men, expressing that "those of barbarian nations are not forced [together] by religion, kinship, or friendship and they are always looking to be a part of another nation that will provide [them] with more [financial gains]."<sup>48</sup> Even in the midst of war with a *European* enemy, Castaño's priorities reflected that of a shrewd Spanish entrepreneur: to urge the council to break up trade between Japan and China and seize the financial gains from that relationship, but to still be wary of East Asian men as

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<sup>47</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 4.

<sup>48</sup> Archivo General de Indias (AGI), *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Legajo (Leg.) 27, Numero (Num.) 107, "Peticiónes de Martin Castaño," (1618), 1-2.

people of their “nation” were fundamentally driven by greed.<sup>49</sup> Over the next century, Spanish authorities would continue to imitate Castaño’s early economic concerns.

Spanish officials were suspicious of how Chinese merchants deftly maintained trade relationships and, more broadly, of the socioeconomic power Chinese merchants could wield through their trade networks. The Chinese merchant presence in the islands was impressive. As early as the 1570s the Chinese were “indispensable to the urban economy as tailors, shoemakers, blacksmiths, silversmiths, sculptors, locksmiths, painters, masons, weavers, and in short all the craftsmen of the country.”<sup>50</sup> Moreover, Chinese men exhibited an unparalleled aptitude for trade as merchants and voyaging tradesmen.<sup>51</sup> Imperial officials assuaged their fear of the Chinese merchant’s socioeconomic power and influence by implementing three forms of control to monitor trade relationships. First, Spanish officials monitored the socioeconomic power of monied Chinese merchants in political spaces. Second, Spanish authorities policed the landholdings of Chinese merchants to inhibit their economic growth. Lastly, Spanish officials established a racial hierarchy to prevent graft. Spanish bureaucrats in the larger Spanish Empire employed racial hierarchies to police colonial markets.<sup>52</sup> However, in the context of the distant colonial Philippines, Spanish officials were confounded as they competed against the successes of East Asian merchants.<sup>53</sup> Spanish men expressed their anxieties over economic failure in their attempts to control the market. At best, imperial officials feared that they might be

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<sup>49</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 7: Castaño’s concerns over financial matters reflects the economic impulse of the Spanish crown in its reasoning for colonizing the Philippines.

<sup>50</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 124.

<sup>51</sup> Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos*, 57.

<sup>52</sup> Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 13.

<sup>53</sup> Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos*, 57: “Spaniards’ policy toward the Chinese was that of vacillation.”

overshadowed in their own colonial economy and, at worst, that Chinese merchants could gain enough power to incite a rebellion for control over Manila.

Imperial officers were keenly aware of the power Chinese merchants possessed in the political economy of Manila and advocated for the mitigation of their political influence. *Procurador General* Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, suspicious of Chinese political hegemony, railed against the “sale of offices” such as those of local *escribanos* (notaries) and *alguaciles* (constables). While the sale of local political offices (governorships and other lesser political positions) was not unique to the colonial Philippines as scholars have noted that the sale of offices occurred throughout colonial Latin America “during times of fiscal crisis” for the crown, Coronel linked the unsavory political practice specifically to monied Chinese men.<sup>54</sup> He demanded that local *sangleys* (a legal term and epithet for “Chinese”) were no longer allowed to sell these offices “as they are often sold amongst [their] friends.” Chinese merchants would sell offices to one another, extend the sale of the offices, and sometimes even remain in their purchased positions for life. The *Procurador* requested that all appointed positions could not be extended to “life terms.”<sup>55</sup> In attempting to impose time limits on positions of political power, Coronel made clear two issues: first, that Chinese men perpetrated corrupt political practices as the status quo in Manila and second, that Spanish officials could no longer tolerate such practices.

In the context of the colonial Philippines – a feudal colonial site wherein colonizers extracted labor and wealth from indigenous lands and people (as well as trafficked,

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<sup>54</sup> Jenny Guardado, “Office-Selling, Corruption, and Long-Term Development in Peru,” *American Political Science Review* 112, No. 4 (2018), 2.

<sup>55</sup> Archivo General de Indias (AGI), *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Legajo (Leg.) 27, Numero (Num.) 117, “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre venta de oficios a chinos,” (1619), 1-2.

enslaved peoples) – the successful ownership of land could well become a lucrative enterprise for those shrewd enough to manage the colonial land taxes and the labor required to till the soil.<sup>56</sup> Spanish imperial officials worriedly observed the practice of landed Chinese merchants securing financial relationships with Manila’s elite from afar. In his petition to the royal government of Manila regarding the living arrangements of *sangleys* in the Parian (the Chinese ghetto outside of Manila’s fortified city walls), Governor General of the Philippines Don Fernando de Silva attempted to curtail this method of building socioeconomic power. In the Parian, the monies made from land rent had become so lucrative that *sangleys* had “made friends with and won the favor and support of powerful people.” De Silva warned Manileño politicians to be observant of the Chinese latifundia, expressing his concern that the landlords had hoarded so much wealth that they were able to live off of the profits of the rent, “making it their main income.”<sup>57</sup> The Philippines’ most powerful imperial official anguished over the political economy of colonial Manila as he perceived the economic successes of Chinese landlords as imminent political successes.

Seventeenth-century imperial officials saw lawmaking as a means to slow the rise of Chinese men’s socioeconomic power by limiting Chinese men’s entry into the archipelago. Chinese merchants generated the flow of monies into the colonial market, despite their commercial prowess (and perhaps, *because* of it), imperial authorities still considered Chinese merchants a “great danger” to the colony. In his 1636 petition to the government of Manila on “the danger of the Chinese,” *Procurador General* of Manila (the Philippine

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<sup>56</sup> Patricia Seed, *American Pentimento: The Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 87 and Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 28-30.

<sup>57</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 27, Num. 148, “Petición de la ciudad de Manila sobre Parian de *sangleys*,” (1632), 1-2.

representative in the Spanish Court) Don Juan Grau y Monfalcón urged the city to halt the entry of new Chinese *and* Japanese into the islands.<sup>58</sup> Monfalcón provided a specific number in order to impress upon the crown the urgency of this populous Chinese: “The city has... more than thirty thousand sangleys and Japanese who come from their lands to the city to till the fields and [work in] other trades.” The Attorney General also invoked previous revolts, likely the 1603 Chinese-led revolt against Spanish tyranny in Manila. Regardless of their necessary labor, the Spanish official aligned the motives of past Chinese “insurgents,” with those of new migrants. Because of what Gray y Monfalcon perceived as the spectre of revolt, he urged the city officials to halt the distribution of *cedulas* (individual identification cards) which granted Chinese and Japanese boat entry into the islands.<sup>59</sup> The general fear of being bested by Chinese merchants and their powerful networks of “friends” would only be exacerbated by the larger reality that Spanish authorities could be outnumbered.

Authorities executed imperial acts, policing Chinese populations in response to the entry of new migrants and the Chinese community’s growing political and financial power. Because Spanish officials pinpointed the racial makeup of the Chinese – as disloyal, financially successful, and politically competitive men – as the reasoning for their economic policies, Spanish authorities called for a separation of the races to control trade in the Parian. In a letter from the office of King Ferdinand VI to the soon-to-be Governor General of the Philippines Don Pedro Manuel de Arandía Santisteban, the King offered a lengthy diatribe against the “vicious” sangleys of Manila. Immediately following his vitriolic speech,

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<sup>58</sup> Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 125: Japanese sojourners, in much smaller numbers, sought regular trade with residents of the Philippine entrepot until the Tokugawa government’s ban on Japanese travel in 1639.

<sup>59</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 27, Num. 207, “Petición de la ciudad de manila sobre peligro de chinos y japoneses,” (1636), 1.

the King pronounced that more eyes were required in reviewing the distribution of supplies and munitions to the Parian Chinese. The King explained that all supplies must “run by the hands of Spanish *mestizos* and Indians” before they reached the hands of the Chinese. The King believed that employing different races of people to manage colonial rations would prevent graft.<sup>60</sup> From the perspective of the imperial seat of power, apparently only Chinese merchants were inclined to commit graft, as the King did not reprimand “Spanish *mestizos*” nor “Indians” in his new edict.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spanish imperial officials both needed Chinese merchants to power the colonial economy and enthusiastically vilified their presence in the colony. Chinese men made great financial gains within a backdrop of waves of Spanish anti-Chinese sentiments. But acts of imperial violence need not be executed at the end of an arquebus. Colonial violence took the form of Spanish men’s constant suspicion of Chinese men, which spurred the implementation of local laws to monitor the markets and monies of Chinese merchants. While Chinese men could do little to avoid the surveilling eye of the empire, examining their plight reveals the immeasurable impact Spanish race-making had on imperial policy. And in the case of the Chinese buyo merchants, Spanish authorities repeatedly transgressed the line between racist language and racist practice.

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<sup>60</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 351, “Copia de reales cédulas e informes de la Contaduría,” (1752), 5.

## Buyo and the Buyer

“Buyo [is] the food of the natives *and* the foreigners.”

- Gaspar De La Torre<sup>61</sup>

From the Spanish Empire’s first invasion of the Philippines, merchants trafficked buyo/ bonga, the Southeast Asian equivalent of chewing tobacco, along the many shores of the Philippine Islands. In this section, I contend that Spanish officials associated buyo with Chinese men’s “natural” inclinations for immoral, non-Catholic behavior. In the documentation on controlling the trade of *buyo*, Spanish men exposed their contradictory views on Chinese buyo merchants. Imperial authorities vacillated between distrust and admiration of the merchant, expressing that the true evil of the Chinese man was tied to his “race” as a power-hungry, greedy, peddler of the vice “*buyo/bonga*.” In the minds of imperial authorities, buyo represented the Chinese merchant’s non-Catholic qualities as alluring, lascivious, and ultimately unstoppable. Imperial authorities articulated a fear of losing crown monies to individual Chinese merchants, to Chinese *gremios* (trade guilds), and more broadly to the Chinese nation – monies that passed through the hands of the Chinese *buyero* (buyo merchant and sometimes buyo grower). The imperial solution, at least at the local level was to ease Spanish men’s anxiety of financial loss by instituting prohibitive laws and ramping up imperial surveillance of the traffic of buyo. Manila authorities were so fascinated with the networks of the Chinese *buyo* trade, at some point dispensing informants to understand the power structure of the unsavory trade. By

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<sup>61</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 445, Num. 5 “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre el restablecimiento del estanco del buyo,” (1741), 9: Emphasis mine.

controlling buyo, then, Spanish officials could control the uncontrollable: the daring Chinese merchant.

The practice of chewing buyo/ bonga in the Philippines is ancient and its use is widespread in Southeast Asia.<sup>62</sup> Spanish colonization intensified the impact of *buyo* on the Philippines and its frequent visitors, turning buyo into a widely grown and traded commodity.<sup>63</sup> Originally a deeply spiritual and meaningful substance to indigenous Philippine men and women, after colonization buyo would later become emblematic of upper-class finery.<sup>64</sup> Prepared buyo, which includes the small bonga fruit splashed with quicklime powder and encased in the plant's leaf, was consumed by "natives and Spaniards, by seculars and religious, by men and women... commonly and habitually [used] that morning and night, in parties and visits, or alone at home, their greatest treat and delight consists of buyo, served on heavily gilded and prettily adorned plates and salvers, as they do chocolate in New Spain."<sup>65</sup> The resulting juice would dye the teeth of the person chewing the buyo, producing "red spittle, as if their teeth had been smashed."<sup>66</sup>

The implementation of the Bourbon Reforms in Spain's colonies drastically shifted the crown's interest in the buyo trade. Similar to the attempts at monopolizing the fruits of tobacco production in colonial México, the Philippine colonial administration focused on

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<sup>62</sup> S.S. Strickland, "Anthropological perspectives on the use of areca nut," *Addiction Biology* 7 (2002): 92.

<sup>63</sup> Christine Doran, "Spanish and Mestizo Women of Manila," *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 41, no. 3 (1993): 275: Buyo was so widely used that foreign visitors to Manila would comment on its use among the upper-class gentry, specifically the women, of Manila & AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 2, "Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo," (1714), 35.

<sup>64</sup> Fernando N. Zialcita, "State Formation, Colonialism, and National Identity in Vietnam and the Philippines," *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society* 23, no. 2 (1995): 91 & 101 and Herminia Q. Ménez, "Agyu and the Skyworld: The Philippine Folk Epic and Multicultural Education," *Amerasia Journal* 13, no. 1 (1986): 137.

<sup>65</sup> Doran, "Spanish and Mestizo Women of Manila," 275 & 278: As told by Spanish soldier, lawyer, and colonial official Antonio de Morga.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 279.



economizing the buyo trade as a cash crop (to be sold in Philippine markets) thereby reexamining its fiscal significance to the colony.<sup>67</sup> The imperial treasury enriched itself by charging licenses to sell buyo – on land and at sea – and from collecting fines from ships pilots who had not yet secured proper buyo selling licenses.<sup>68</sup> The financial importance of buyo would only increase after 1815 when the Philippines lost the *situado* (the galleon monies remitted to the Philippines by the Mexican Viceroyalty). The colonial government quickly issued a state monopoly on the betel nut in order to create a more self-sustaining colony.<sup>69</sup>

#### Early Spanish Discourse on Buyera/os

Spanish imperial officers did not initially target Chinese men as buyo merchants. Early discourse on buyo merchants centered on Spanish men’s admiration of Japanese buyo merchants in Dilao (a town located on the borders of Manila). In a letter on the “miserable state of affairs” in Manila, the author asked the royal government of Spain to create *cedulas* (local laws) on a number of issues, namely the creation of a more substantial pathway to proselytization in Japan. Reporting back to Madrid, Manila-based priests created a seminary to learn the Japanese language so that they could execute two tasks: to conduct missionary trips to Japan and to learn more about the growth and sale of *buyo*.<sup>70</sup> Similar to Spanish colonial officers’ goals in the Philippines, both religious and secular actors desired to convert and profit from their imperialistic efforts in Japan.

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<sup>67</sup> Susan Deans-Smith, *Bureaucrats, Planters, and Workers: The Making of the Tobacco Monopoly in Bourbon Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), xiii.

<sup>68</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 2, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1714), 8.

<sup>69</sup> Greg Bankoff, “Redefining Criminality: Gambling and Financial Expediency in the Colonial Philippines, 1764-1898,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 22, no. 2 (1991): 279.

<sup>70</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 27, Num. 234, “Carta de la ciudad de Manila sobre mal estado de la tierra,” (1638), 4.

Within Manila's walls, officials could only track the traffic of buyo through limiting its trade to specific Japanese merchants. In a letter written to Manila's local council, the author requested that city officials declare that only Japanese men traffic buyo because "many Japanese in the port of Dilao in Laguna del Bay" who already carted around the substance. The author clarified the request, adding that "not even the Spanish or foreigners [can trade buyo] or else they will be penalized."<sup>71</sup> By making public to local officials that only the Japanese of Dilao could trade buyo, the imperial policing eye directed its focus to anyone not of Japanese descent, thus incentivizing Spanish officials to penalize non-Japanese buyo traders. However, the discursive focus on Japanese buyo traders was not one of racial malice, but of admiration as imperial authorities sanctioned only Japanese sales of buyo. The material reality – that Japanese merchants in the port of Dilao were expert traders of buyo in the mid-seventeenth century – influenced Spanish officials' favoritism of the Japanese buyeros even while implementing local prohibitive buyo laws.

As Spanish authorities patrolled (and ultimately sanctioned) Japanese buyeros, the empire's servants policed women buyeras with a similar gusto. Contextualized within the larger Spanish imperial surveillance apparatus, crown authorities in the Philippines policed colonial women's public movements as business owners and traders as they did in colonial Quito.<sup>72</sup> The local government targeted the estate of widowed *encomendera* (plantation owner) Doña Leonor de Andrada Montero, a successful, but curiously profitable buyo crop production site. Attempting to profit off of the widow's crops, the local government aimed to tax the traffic of her buyo by placing surveillance patrols "at the mouth of the Lumban

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<sup>71</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 190, Num. 2, "Autos sobre el estanco del buyo, bonga y tabaco, 1638," (1667), 2.

<sup>72</sup> Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 59 84-89 and Kimberly Gauderman, *Women's Lives in Colonial Quito: Gender, Law, and Economy in Spanish America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 93.

River” and its surrounding roads where Montero’s plantation disseminated the buyo via boat. On her estate, authorities also uncovered what they called the “Indian” practice of siloing buyo. Rather than paying their tribute as soon as they harvested the buyo, indigenous tillers on Montero’s land would store the buyo. Authorities explained that “greed” motivated indigenous buyo tillers who would try to sell the buyo at higher prices.<sup>73</sup> An astute commercial practice on the part of the buyo farmers, Spanish authorities articulated a fear of market competition of “greedy” buyero producers. The government mandate also monitored the siloing operation up the Lumaban River. Whether or not the local government sought out Montero or it mandated the patrols at the Doña’s behest is unclear. What is clear is that Montero, an encomendera and proprietor of a buyo plantation made so much profit off the substance that she attracted the attention of the local government. In the end, Governor General Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera y Gaviria would eventually grant Montero sole rights to sell buyo in her immediate area – a small experiment for the government’s plans of implementing an *estanco* (a state monopoly) on the precious betel plant.<sup>74</sup>

The policing eye of the Spanish imperial apparatus was not limited to the countryside. Imperial authorities also surveilled an all-woman buyera commune in the heart of Manila. In a diatribe against the ills of buyo trafficking, an imperial official recommended that local officials sell buyo to only women buyeras.<sup>75</sup> The same records mention a legal case brought by a commune of women buyeras against an *asentista* (trade

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<sup>73</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 190, Num. 2, “Autos sobre el estanco del buyo, bonga y tabaco,” (1638), 3: It is unclear who exactly initiated the correspondence, but the final letter was written by the King’s Secretary, Don Gabriel de Ocaña, y Alarcon.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>75</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, “Autos sobre el estanco del buyo, bonga y tabaco,” (1736), 31.

license holder and person in charge of supplies) of the buyo trade and field master Juan de León. This commune, comprised of “*indias, mestizas, sangleyes, y criollas*” (Indians, mixed Philippine, Chinese, and colonial-born Spanish women) demanded that De Leon halt the practice of exclusively allowing Sangley men to sell buyo in Cavite.<sup>76</sup> Similar to the earlier edict sanctioning Japanese buyero merchants (and no other race) as Dilao’s sole buyeros, local officials attempted to ascertain – and police – who among the population successfully profited from the buyo trade. How might a women’s only *buyera* commune register as a site worthy of colonial surveillance? Such an operation would not be unknown to the colonial administrator as women-dominated business operations also operated in colonial markets throughout colonial Latin America.<sup>77</sup> Rather than characterize women traders as “public women” who might have transgressed gender roles, Spanish officials ensured that the women’s commune continue to reap the profits of their sales. A far cry from Spanish officials’ treatment of Chinese buyeros.

From the early seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth-century, Spanish authorities created a discourse in response to the material conditions of the buyo trade. If Spanish authorities believed that Dilao Japanese buyeros or women buyeras trafficked buyo well, then Spanish lawmakers would accommodate the successful trade. Spanish officials shifted their discourse on buyo as the Bourbon Reforms reached the archipelago and once imperial authorities zeroed in on the savviness of Chinese buyeros. Like the efforts to create a monopoly from the tobacco trade in New Spain where the “heavy hand of Bourbon fiscalism [was] guided by financial desperation,” colonial authorities strategized

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>77</sup> Mangan, *Trading Roles*, 134.

innovative ways to economize colonial industries.<sup>78</sup> The buyo monopoly would, indeed, contribute to the larger profit gains of the Spanish Empire in the Philippines. Rather than argue whether or not Bourbon policies spurred racist rhetoric to gain control over the buyo market or vice versa, I contend that the Bourbon Reforms' influence on fiscal economization and Spanish men's own racist ideologies converged. Spanish imperial authorities produced laws that crystallized Sinophobic racist rhetoric into colonial governance. Imperial authorities conflated the toxic, addictive characteristics of buyo with essentialized racial characteristics of Chinese men. In response to the fear that Chinese buyers could likely spread the toxic plant (as well as their own toxic influence), imperial officials urged the Manila government to reprimand and vigilantly police local Chinese buyers. By conflating buyo's attributes with those of Chinese men – and simultaneously attempting to control the traffic of the herb – imperial officers attempted to control the Chinese merchant himself. These accounts also illustrate how the same officials backtracked on their prohibitory laws against Chinese buyers, favoring more lenient approaches to the trade. Again, Spanish men grappled with the colony's material reality: Chinese merchants reigned supreme in the Philippine market.

In 1739, a council of imperial authorities representing the Parian, learned men who occupied judicial offices, legal scholars, and other interested private parties convened to discuss the establishment of a Philippine *buyo* monopoly. In the spirit of the Bourbon Reforms, the *buyo* council reflected the money-making impulses of the Spanish crown which sought to make each colonial possession more self-sufficient.<sup>79</sup> The buyo council

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<sup>78</sup> Deans-Smith, *Bureaucrats, Planters, and Workers*, xv.

<sup>79</sup> Russell K. Skowronek, "The Spanish Philippines: Archaeological Perspectives on Colonial Economics and Society," *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 2, no. 1 (1998): 49.

targeted a Chinese *gremio* (trade guild) of buyers within the *Alcaicería* (silk market) of the Chinese Parian as the most powerful buyers in Manila.<sup>80</sup> Sangley and Sangley mestizos piloted the eleven ships that trafficked buyo to Laguna del Bay and “all other places.” According to the *alcalde mayor* of the *Parián*, Antonio Romero Lopez de Arbizu, the crews who disembarked from these ships became “arbitrators of... [buyo’s] expense and even [its] price.”<sup>81</sup> In order to commence the process of creating a buyo monopoly, the council demanded that the Manila government establish a crown position for an *asentista* with the power to buy the herb “in cash” and determine the price on behalf of the empire.<sup>82</sup>

In their goal to economize the buyo trade, the Spanish buyo council began to structure a surveillance apparatus which contributed to the racialization of buyo as a sinful, Chinese substance and trade. Individuals from the council characterized both the substance and the Chinese *gremio* leaders as unlawful. Arbizu stated that the eleven leaders of the *gremio* “should not be called ringleaders, but eleven *atracadores* (robbers).”<sup>83</sup> Alcalde Arbizu perceived the merchants as robbers because of their ability to create an expansive network of buyo stores in addition to other trade operations (related to produce). Fiscal Lawyer Domingo Neyra elaborated on the same quality of viciousness and illegality, but regarding the nature of buyo itself.<sup>84</sup> Citing the “many sins” that arose from “the competition of men and women of different qualities... as seen in the testimonies of criminal cases” surrounding the herb, Neyra believed that buyo was comparable to pulque

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<sup>80</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 1, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1739), 26.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 27 & 32: “If we do not establish a monopoly, the sangleys and mestizos will buy it [buyo]... and spread it in the capital and the surrounding areas.”

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 31, as recommended by *Licenciado* Domingo Neyra, *Fiscal Abogado* (lawyer of the Royal Estrados and a Professor at the University of the Society of Jesus).

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>84</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 445, Num. 5, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre el restablecimiento del estanco del buyo,” (1738), 3.

in New Spain and coca in Peru, substances that “by their nature... are not intrinsically bad” but whose sale should be monitored by the royal government. Moreover, Neyra explained that the cause of buyo’s rampant spread and sinfulness could be attributed to one culprit: the sangleys.<sup>85</sup> Wedged between mundane conversation on buyo’s fluctuating prices was Neyra’s perception that buyo’s unlawfulness was also rooted in the unlawfulness and opulence of Chinese merchants. Crown rhetoric on buyo no longer focused on the simple sanctioning of certain groups over others to sell the herb. Spanish officials re-imagined buyo as naturally sinful and, more importantly, conceptualized Chinese merchants as the root cause of the herb’s spread.

Imperial officials associated buyo with the potential to incite excessive behavior and framed Chinese buyo merchants as a race inclined to “excess.” Buyo councilmember, Royal Accountant, and *Oídor* Don Pablo Francisco Rodriguez de Berdocido emphasized such gluttonous tendencies as he asked the council to focus on the figure of the buyo merchant. Berdocido conceptualized the buyero as undeniably Chinese, a man from a race of people who were “*vicious* infidels in their *sensuality*, and even in more enormous and abominable excesses... [of which are] not decent to say [aloud].”<sup>86</sup> The *Oídor* equated buyo with Chinese men and Chinese men with sexual excess. In contrast, within the framework of early modern European archetypes of masculinity, civilized men were supposed to conduct themselves with moderation in all behaviors.<sup>87</sup> By transgressing early modern Christian sexual norms, Berdocido believed that the Chinese buyo merchants represented the polar

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 28 & 30 and AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 11, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1738), 1: “the natives [say buyo] remove[s] hunger and thirst, brought into the mouth and the same [was] said [of] coca supposed by the Indians [and] Peruvians.”

<sup>86</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 11, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1740), 60: Emphasis mine.

<sup>87</sup> Todd W. Reeser, *Moderating Masculinity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 15.

opposite of the upright, moderate European man.<sup>88</sup> *Oídor* and Chair of Civil Law of Santo Tomas University, Don Francisco Fernandez Thoribio perceived a way to stop the influence of the Chinese buyero. He explained that the real problem lay in the Chinese buyers' freedom to sell buyo which allowed them to commit "offenses [against] God."<sup>89</sup> Thoribio agreed with the European colonialist logic that "the moderate man is the one who deserves to rule over the [immoderate] other."<sup>90</sup> Both the herb and the person who trafficked the substance needed to be ruled.

For Spanish authorities, the Chinese buyero's predilection for excess further transgressed European masculine religious norms. Self-possessed Spanish officials were expected to adhere to moderation as doing so would reduce the temptations to sin. In other words, excess spelled discord for the upright, Christian man.<sup>91</sup> Imagining buyo and moderation together was inconceivable, especially to the lawyer Neyra. Neyra explained that buyo was trafficked so freely in the province of Laguna del Bay because there were "no ministers to denounce [the sangley peddlers]."<sup>92</sup> Rather than expecting the local constables to police what was ostensibly a secular offense, Neyra entrusted priests to interfere in the trade issue. His belief that priests should moonlight as buyo police was not entirely unexpected as Neyra also elaborated that buyo was the source of "spiritual ruin" and "evils" for the indigenous inhabitants of the Philippines; otherwise known as the "*gente poca*

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<sup>88</sup> Jaffary, *Gender, Religion, and Race*, 5.

<sup>89</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 1, "Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo," (1740), 68.

<sup>90</sup> Reeser, *Moderating Masculinity*, 226.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.



*católica y viciosa.*” The only way to prevent the spiritual downfall of Philippine colonials was to disallow Sangleys the “free sale” of buyo.<sup>93</sup>

Councilmembers’ public denouncements against Chinese buyeros and their aptitude for selling a drug that inclined its users to “spiritual ruin” stemmed from their larger fear of losing crown monies to an imagined Chinese “nation.” Neyra believed that the only people who benefitted from the buyo trade were Chinese and Chinese mestizos who “swelled their money bags” with buyo profits. The lawyer Neyra, fed up by the loss of imperial monies to Chinese buyeros, told the council that the Sangleys alone “should not be allowed to enjoy this money.”<sup>94</sup> He devised a plan to understand the scope of buyo profits by following Chinese buyeros’ money trails. The concerned councilmember sent Laoguiqua, a “Sangley asentista” to inform on other Chinese buyeros. Neyra directed Laoguiqua to report back to the buyo council with information on the practices and pricing of buyo from different harvesters.<sup>95</sup>

Other members of the buyo council elaborated on Neyra’s fear that the Spanish crown was losing monies to the Chinese; specifically, that Chinese buyeros created a stealth remittance economy sending funds from the Philippines back to China. Neyra warned that local authorities should be vigilant and not allow “these infidel sangleys” to “extract the king’s silver... for China.”<sup>96</sup> Neyra was adamant that any fees, taxes, or profits flowing into and out of the Philippines belonged to King Philip V. Any currency that did not fill the royal coffers slipped through the hands of imperial authorities. *Oídor* and Chair of Civil Law of

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 30 & AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 11, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1740), 55, “people that are a little Catholic and vicious.”

<sup>94</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 1, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1739), 23.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 50.

<sup>96</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 11, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1740), 55.

Santo Tomas University Thoribio agreed. Thoribio explained that because the royal government was not intervening in the buyo operations of the foreigner sangleys, “so exorbitant [were the] gains they send to China... sent to that kingdom... every day.”<sup>97</sup> Neyra, always thinking ahead, planned for the future monies the royal government could eventually gain if they monopolized the sale of buyo. The lawyer stated that the profits would go to armament expenses against the Moros (the Muslim Philippine peoples from Mindanao) who surrounded and threatened the islands. With a well-funded defense, the Spanish Empire could “protect the Indians” and encourage them to work towards “public utility... as seen in the mines, which compel them to work so that there is more achievement, opulence, and silver.”<sup>98</sup> In Neyra’s eyes, only the Spanish Empire could enjoy the spoils of decadence, profit, and excess.

The buyo council’s emphatic debates which included imperial authorities representing the Parian, learned men from the judicial offices of Manila, legal scholars, and other interested private parties reveal that imperial authorities perceived Chinese merchants as their main competitors for the buyo trade. Neyra urged imperial authorities to enact an *estanco* (monopoly) on buyo because doing so would protect the “Indian harvesters” who were supposedly being deceived by Chinese buyo merchants.<sup>99</sup> The *Oidor* Berdocido insisted that the *estanco* would not adversely affect indigenous men because ten of the eleven ships that trafficked buyo were piloted by Chinese men.<sup>100</sup> Imperial actors gave little shrift to the idea that indigenous provincial harvesters might have worked

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<sup>97</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 1, “Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo,” (1740), 67.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

alongside Chinese merchants in the sale of buyo. It might not have been coincidental that like the practice of Doña Leonor de Andrada Montero's indigenous buyeros, Chinese merchants also siloed buyo.<sup>101</sup> Neyra clamored to put a stop to the Chinese merchant's "power... to hide [buyo] and to feign shortages as they have done with cocoa [in Peru]."<sup>102</sup> Thoribio added that the practice of siloing buyo worked in the Chinese merchant's favor because they sat on the buyo and sold the crop only when the prices went up. Astute marketeers, Chinese traffickers had twenty-two stores in the Parian to hide the buyo and wait for more lucrative prices.<sup>103</sup>

The buyo council's construction of the fearsome Chinese buyero proved somewhat fruitful. The Royal Council of Manila agreed with the council's reports and enacted local laws to curb Chinese buyeros. One law restricted the entry into the Philippines of ships or any "vessels" that did not have a Spanish title to sell buyo. The lawyer Neyra's financial wishes came true: The monies from the sale of the new licenses would be used to pay the bureaucrats of the "buyo ministry" in charge of enacting buyo trade laws. Another law stated that Chinese merchants in Laguna del Bay could no longer accept payments "in kind" ("in clothes or other goods"). While the practice of paying for tributes and other goods in kind was common in the colonial Philippines (and the larger Spanish Empire), imperial officials needed the buyo trade's profits to be trackable through Spanish currencies.<sup>104</sup> By converting all sales of buyo into a system payable through *reales* (royals, Spanish

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<sup>101</sup> AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 190, Num. 2, "Autos sobre el estanco del buyo, bonga y tabaco," (1638), 3: It is unclear who exactly initiated the correspondence, but the final letter was written by the King's Secretary, Don Gabriel de Ocaña, y Alarcon.

<sup>102</sup> AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 1, "Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo," (1740), 33.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>104</sup> Seed, *American Pentimento*, 77-81: aided colonial actors who could not produce enough surplus monies in *reales* (royals, Spanish colonial currency).

currency), the buyo ministry began the quest to track crown silver – and keep the silver within the Philippine colony and out of a Chinese remittance economy – in earnest.<sup>105</sup>

Overall, Neyra, Berdocido, Thoribio and the other councilmembers proposed these laws to disrupt the operations of the ten or eleven Chinese ships' captains, individual Chinese buyo merchants, and the larger Chinese gremio who trafficked buyo. However, we shall see that imperial actors would easily backpedal on their earlier pronouncements of buyo's (and the Chinese merchant's) "evil" characteristics.

Considering the vitriol levied at buyo and the Chinese merchant, one would surmise that the estanco on buyo would elevate to a full ban on the product. After all, the buyo, according to Spanish authorities, could have led to the spiritual ruin of the Spanish Empire's "cherished" indigenous vassals. But the case of buyo, and that of the Chinese merchant, did not end in this fashion. Instead, *another* council of concerned *vecinos* (Spanish residents) decided that the ten or eleven ship's captains – who officials earlier referred to as "robbers" – should, indeed continue trafficking buyo to Manila. The only stipulation would be that imperial authorities would prohibit other ships from the trade.<sup>106</sup> Municipal Manila residents did not come to this decision because buyo was no longer excessive and dangerous. In fact, colonial authorities still decried the high volume of "men, and women, Spaniards, Indians, mestizos, and... more in this city and in the *Extramuros* (area outside of Manila's walls)" that "offend god" with their many lawsuits. Officials remained outraged because the buyero traders "take more than what they need to take

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<sup>105</sup> AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 218, Num. 1, "Expedientes sobre los estancos del vino y del buyo," (1740), 66, 71: Laws 2a and 3a.

<sup>106</sup> AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 445, Num. 5, "Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre el restablecimiento del estanco del buyo," (1741), 23: From the notary Domingo Cortes de Arquiza.

advantage of what they can earn... [in buyo's] resale."<sup>107</sup> Both the legal issues and the practice of siloing buyo was still persistent.

Imperial authorities' discourse on buyo was strikingly similar to their utterances regarding the Chinese merchant. If imperial actors could control the unruly traffic of buyo, they believed they could also control the Chinese merchant. But imperial officers could not actualize their hateful speech into strict prohibitive laws. Like many interactions between Chinese merchants and the Spanish Empire, imperial officials' early attempts to establish a monopoly on buyo resulted in the empire backpedaling on their harsh words.<sup>108</sup> Regardless of how much buyo, its traders, and its users "offended god", imperial authorities needed the buyo ships and the Chinese merchants to stimulate the colonial economy. Their economic rationale served them well: by 1780 buyo's incomes, combined with tobacco and wine, would exceed 728,000 pesos.<sup>109</sup> The contradictory actions of Spanish imperial authorities – deeply hating Chinese men, but undoubtedly needing these same merchants in order to sustain trade in the Pacific colony – became much more complicated once the Catholic Church entered the frame.

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 18: The larger council consisted of: Pedro Gonzales de Rivero, Mattheo de Zumalde, Antonio de Otero Bermudez, Joseph Antonio de Memije y Quiros, Juan Baptista de Uriarte, Francisco Gonzalez de Quixano, Juan Manuel de Barreda, Luis de Santistevan, Antonio Gonzales de QuirNo, Agustin Garcia de Seares, Pedro Ortuno de Leon, Francisco Rodriguez de Pedroso.

<sup>108</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 12, Ruiz-Stovel, "Chinese Merchants," 53, and Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century," *Journal of World History* 13 no. 2 (2002): 393.

<sup>109</sup> Luis Alonso, "Financing the Empire: The Nature of the Tax System in the Philippines, 1565-1804," *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 51, no. 1 (2003): 87.

## The Expulsion Order of 1750

“[The Philippines] is a fabulous thing. No other door has opened in the world where so many souls have come to know the Catholic faith.”<sup>110</sup>

– 1618, *Procurador General*, Martin Castaño

Similar to the experience of the Chinese buyo laws, the 1750 Expulsion continued the Spanish Empire’s impuissance towards policing Chinese merchants. Unlike the previous Spanish-authored massacres and expulsions that threatened Spanish rule in the Philippine islands, imperial officials issued the Expulsion of 1750 to protect indigenous Catholic vassals by limiting the number of non-Catholic Chinese men in the archipelago.<sup>111</sup> The expulsion act reveals the cacophony of disagreements that characterized the procedures leading up to and during the execution of the expulsion. By offering expulsion as an answer to Spanish men’s fear of losing the islands to “spiritual ruin”, imperial officials appeased their own fears of “saving” indigenous Philippine peoples from non-Catholic beliefs and practices. Most importantly, for imperial authorities the expulsion was a means to convince themselves that they, indeed, could control the economic force that was the Chinese merchant. They could not.

### Racial Wickedness & Weakness

During the first secular meeting on the proposed expulsion, Royal Official and Secretary of the Council of the Indies Don Fernando Triviño’s derisive characterization of non-Catholic Chinese set the stage for the imperial discourse surrounding the issue of

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<sup>110</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 27, Num. 107, “Peticiones de Martin Castaño sobre enviar socorro a Filipinas,” (1618), 1.

<sup>111</sup> Ruiz-Stovel, “Chinese Merchants,” 47-48, Jose Eugenio Borao, “The Massacre of 1603: Chinese Perception of the Spaniards in the Philippines,” *Itinerario* 23 no. 1 (1998): 22-39.

expulsion. The Royal Secretary, mandated that imperial officials target non-Catholic Chinese peoples because they were “idolaters, atheists (the crime most unpleasant to the Lord), and [because of] the damage they cause the Catholic faith.”<sup>112</sup> Triviño’s derisive description of non-Catholic Chinese centered not on their inability to embrace a Spanish, Catholic god, but on their inability to worship any god at all. Triviño chose his words very carefully when he continued with the sins of “infidel” Chinese by including another immutable trait: non-Catholic Chinese were naturally disloyal and treacherous.<sup>113</sup> In his portrayal of non-Catholic Chinese as disrespectful of a Catholic god *and* as both naturally untrustworthy, Triviño constructed a racial other that could not exist among “peaceful” Spanish vassals. His language convinced the other participants. Although the imperial officials involved in the meeting had some disagreements, they agreed that it would be most “convenient in honoring God” to expel the sangleyes.<sup>114</sup>

Imperial officials used European concepts of early modern medicine to bolster their claims that “infidel” Chinese residents of the Philippines were racially weak and morally repugnant. In Governor General Pedro Manuel de Arandía Santisteban’s letter to Zenon de Somodevilla (Marquis of Ensenada and the Prime Minister of the Spanish Navy) requesting military armaments, Arandia invoked the Galenic theory of the body’s humors as a metaphor for non-Catholic Chinese in the Philippines. The Governor General explained:

When one [type of person] resides to oppose [the other], the other cannot compete, and by natural order is replaced as in the human body. The part of

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<sup>112</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 309.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 310.

<sup>114</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 9: Wickberg has argued that expelling racial “Others” as a form of religious cleansing was a common practice and a legacy from the *Reconquista* of Spain.

the corrupt humors, as [a] precise compound to the body's nourishment and vitality, that only [when] the body is sick, when in that abundance [the imbalanced, corrupt humors] come to vitiate [against the body].<sup>115</sup>

The Governor General's invocation of medical science in 1753 was not at all linked to our post-Enlightenment assignation of the term. Its most likely equivalent is the Renaissance conceptualization of the term, bound up within European "theological and philosophical branches of knowledge." Citing Todd W. Reeser's examination of early modern masculinity, we are reminded that lettered Renaissance thinkers differentiated European men from Amerindians in their relationship to western morals and intellectualism: "If a temperate European man abandons the "science" of philosophy ... he exhibits a highly "savage" virtue and comes to resemble the New World native."<sup>116</sup> Arandía's explanation that Chinese men would "vitate" – meaning to spoil or impair the quality of the body – reflected the many ways in which he believed the Philippine colony was in a particular kind of *racialized* danger. First, Arandia may have perceived that the corrupt humors – substances in the body – present in the Philippine body politic were simply out of balance and ill. For the Governor General, the only cure would be to restore the natural equilibrium of Chinese and indigenous Philippine populations via crown expulsion. To vitiate could have also meant that the passions of the Chinese races outweighed those of the Philippine races. Such uncontrollable passions emerged from an imbalance of the humors. If the body was diseased, the imbalance of the humors could alter

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<sup>115</sup> "Carta de Pedro Manuel de Arandia sobre expulsión de los sangleyes," AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 386, Num. 3 (1753): 11.

<sup>116</sup> Reeser, *Moderating Masculinity*, 15-16.



bodily organs and the “spirits” or souls formed within the body. So, if Chinese and Philippine peoples represented competing humors, the very spiritual fabric of the Philippines could be altered by corrupt humors.<sup>117</sup> Lastly, to vitiate would imply a gendered transformation of the body; or in Arandía’s case, the metaphorical body of the Philippines. Each of the four humors represented temperatures: black bile was cold and dry, yellow bile was hot and dry, phlegm was cold and moist, and blood was hot and moist. Any disturbances in a body’s temperature could change the gender of a given body. Because Galenic theory operated out of an early modern one-sex model, gender transmutation was possible because women were simply colder versions of the warmer, more perfect male form.<sup>118</sup> Vitiating would then become a transformation of the Philippines from the body of a perfect male form, into a lesser, feminine body. For the Governor General, the “bad Catholicism” Chinese men practiced would deeply endanger the health of the colony and the peoples within it. So much was at risk if Arandia and other officials allowed Chinese men to corrupt the humors of the Philippines. The only cure was to “fix the root” of the country by removing the bad humor and, thusly, non-Catholic Chinese men.<sup>119</sup>

Arandía’s use of European medical metaphors was not out of place. Twice in his own correspondence Triviño also referred to Chinese men’s influence on the Philippine “Indians” as an “infestation.” Triviño finally remarked that those in the councils deliberating on the execution of the expulsion order must see the Chinese presence on the

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<sup>117</sup> Konstantinos Kalachanis and Ioannis E. Michailidis, “The Hippocratic View on Humors and Human Temperament,” *European Journal of Social Behaviour* 2, no. 2 (2015): 1-5 and Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man*, 13.

<sup>118</sup> Reeser, *Moderating Masculinity*, 24.

<sup>119</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 386, Num. 3, “Carta de Pedro Manuel de Arandia sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1753), 11.

island as a “contagion.”<sup>120</sup> Like Arandia, the Secretary of the Indies understood that the only way to eradicate the “infestation” was by executing an expulsion order.

Imperial officers unsurprisingly rooted the discursive construction of the “infidel” Chinese man – ungodly and likened to a pest – in the Chinese merchant’s success in trade. Triviño most succinctly called such success “the decadence of their trade.”<sup>121</sup> Not unlike Neyra and Berdocido’s jealousies regarding Chinese buyers, Triviño, could not separate his disdain for the racial composition of Chinese men and his own fascination at Chinese men’s financial success. Triviño believed that Chinese men had a “natural inclination” for “usury, false religion, politics” and “deception.” Likely drawing from popular Spanish ethnographic notions of European civilizational superiority, Triviño framed East Asian men as capable of amassing luxurious wealth, but because of their “lack” of a Christian moral foundation, Chinese men were ultimately “barbarous” and flawed.<sup>122</sup> Not only did Triviño understand Chinese proclivities as uniquely immoral, he explained that such behaviors were rooted in selfishness as Chinese men “stagnate[d] provisions for their own selves... [participating in] continuous theft, deception and fraud [in their dealings].”<sup>123</sup> Triviño assumed that Chinese men amassed wealth because of their preternatural “inclination” towards morally bereft business practices. As a Spanish official, Triviño characterized the integral role of the Chinese merchants in the colonial economy as one of predation. Triviño explained that Chinese merchants achieved affluence “through luck” by impoverishing both “the natives and the Spanish.”<sup>124</sup> By using “luck” as the determinant of Chinese merchants’

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<sup>120</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 303, 309, 310.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 310.

<sup>122</sup> Muldoon, *The Americas in the Spanish World Order*, 67-68 & 71.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 311.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 310.

success, Triviño ignored the difficult and dangerous business practices of Chinese merchants; that the business networks Chinese men operated within were not structured by happenstance, but rather painstakingly created through kinship and gremio networks.<sup>125</sup> Instead, Spanish imperial officials employed the metaphors of early modern science to skew the imperial image of the Chinese merchant as inherently corrupt.

### Spiritual Ruin

Spanish imperial officials believed that the non-Catholic quality of the Chinese peoples endangered the most fragile of the King's vassals in the Philippines: indigenous men and women. The convening council on the expulsion order conceptualized Chinese populations as such because of the council's numerous "consultations with theologians" beginning in 1686. The investigations revealed that indigenous men learned "superstitions, sins against nature, and drunkenness" from "infidel" Chinese men.<sup>126</sup> As the council negotiated how to approach a solution to "infidel" Chinese influences on Philippine residents, Triviño noted that in his correspondence with the previous Archbishop of the Metropolitan Church of Manila, Don Carlos Bermudez de Castro, the Archbishop singled out the "sangleys" as particularly non-Catholic. During the Holy Jubilee in 1729 Castro boasted about the number of people who joined the public celebrations watching the procession of patron saints. Although by the eighteenth century, many Catholic Chinese residents lived in Manila, the clergyman stated that, "He himself did not see a *sangley* attending any of the innumerable [processions] in the city [of Manila]."<sup>127</sup> Because of their "poor" display of reverence at a public procession – a method of worship popularized not only in the

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<sup>125</sup> Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos*, 59 and Kueh, "Adaptive Strategies," 364.

<sup>126</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, "Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes," (1744), 303.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 306 and Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 124.

Philippines, but widespread throughout the early modern Catholic world – Castro stated that the “[sangleys] Christianity was suspicious” and that “all sane men” should know that the “[sangleys] received the Catholic Faith to keep up [their image], [to] marry, and to enjoy all the goods of the islands.”<sup>128</sup> The very likely probability that Castro could not differentiate indigenous peoples from Chinese mestizos (and from Chinese men) by sight alone at the boisterous Jubilee celebration aside, the religious correspondence provides evidence that Chinese men’s non-Catholic nature could convince the ecclesiastical council of Manila.

When imperial officers, both in and outside of the council, expressed concern about the comingling of indigenous and Chinese peoples they emphasized the detrimental corporeal and gendered consequences of indigenous-Chinese relations. Unlike Triviño and Arandía’s earlier medical metaphors that Chinese men were inclined to excess and should be treated as a contagion, councilmembers employed warnings against indigenous-Chinese relationships: Chinese men would use unconvincing Catholicism to gain proximity to indigenous men and ultimately harm the crown’s indigenous vassals. Arandia claimed that because of Chinese men’s “barbarous resolution”, they had inflicted bodily harm on indigenous peoples with “revenge”, bloodying the heads of native vassals with “the greatest resentment.”<sup>129</sup> Invoking the crown’s patriarchal responsibility of shielding their vassals from harm, Arandia promised that if imperial officials did not “give due protection” to indigenous men and women, then they would “perish from the Chinese.”<sup>130</sup> The account,

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 307 and Reynaldo Clemenña Ileta, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 2003), 11-22.

<sup>129</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 386, Num. 3, “Carta de Pedro Manuel de Arandia sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1753), 12.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. and Seed, *American Pentimento*, 76 and Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 9.

purposefully graphic in nature, detailed the real bodily harm indigenous vassals had supposedly suffered at the hands of Chinese men. Such a rhetorical tool increased the urgency of imperial officials prompting the expulsion order.

Imperial officials expressed more than concern over Chinese-“Indian” relations, especially sexual contact. In his litany of reasons for the 1750 expulsion, Triviño declared his anxiety that “Indian” women “due to their poverty and misery mix[ed] with [the sangleys].”<sup>131</sup> Protecting the sexual behaviors of “Indian” women was not only a part of the individual patriarchal Spanish man’s mission, but an integral method of the wider Spanish colonial project.<sup>132</sup> It was not necessarily the presumed predatory nature of Chinese men who would take advantage of a woman’s “poverty and misery” that was entirely to blame for these relations, it was the fault of “Indian” women. In Edward Behrend-Martínez’ work on sexual relationships with Spanish women and foreigners within Spain, he noted that “for early-modern Spaniards a sexual relationship with a foreign man must always have been a questionable decision because so little was really known of a foreigner: would he be a good Christian, could he be honourable?”<sup>133</sup> Extending such logic into an early modern Spanish colony, is not farfetched. As Spanish officials continued to frame individual Chinese men as well as the entire Chinese civilization as eternally “Other” and therefore foreign, then how could an honorable Spanish man allow continued sexual contact between a “foreign” Chinese man and the indigenous women to whom they were obligated to protect?

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<sup>131</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 308.

<sup>132</sup> Brewer, “*Shamanism, Catholicism and Gender*,” xviii., Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 91, Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 12, and McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 5.

<sup>133</sup> Edward Behrend-Martínez, “Spain Violated: Foreign Men in Spain’s Heartland,” *European Review of History* 22, no. 4 (2015): 580 & 588.

If heterosexual contact between “Indian” women and Chinese men worried men like Triviño, then the homosexual relations between the races would deeply unsettle the racial-gendered hierarchy in the islands. And such relations supposedly existed in the Philippine colony according to Spanish officials. Triviño argued that the relationships between Chinese and “Indian” men must be monitored because through such homosocial connections “sangleys” maintain relationships of “servitude, lasciviousness, and sodomy” with “Indian” men. “Sangleys” could not help themselves because they were “inclined” to such behaviors.<sup>134</sup> Although Richard T. Chu documented the practice of homosexual relationships in China’s Fujian province, the home province for many migrant and immigrant Chinese, Triviño does not cite any specific instances of homosexuality.<sup>135</sup> Rather, the imperial official constructs a looming threat of continued sexual servitude between indigenous and Chinese men. Michael J. Horswell demonstrated that Spanish authorities in the colonial Andes employed sodomy an incredibly effective metaphorical tool to wield moral superiority over other races in the process of colonization. If sodomy was practiced between indigenous and Chinese men, Catholic Spanish officials and clergymen should eradicate its practice vis-à-vis the religious conversion of the errant subjects.<sup>136</sup> Unlike indigenous Andeans, however, in the realm of the colonial Pacific, Chinese men were not redeemable vassals. In the eyes of imperial officers, Chinese men were a “contagion” and conversion was no longer a viable route to peaceful coexistence. Expulsion could be the only way.

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<sup>134</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 310.

<sup>135</sup> Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos*, 48.

<sup>136</sup> Michael J. Horswell, *Decolonizing the Sodomite: Queer Tropes of Sexuality in Colonial Andean Culture* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 69.

## A Divided Front: Moderate Proposals

Even amidst the chorus of racial epithets leveled at Chinese men, imperial officials offered tempered approaches to the expulsion option. In the documented debates on the 1750 Expulsion and its execution, imperial officials exhibited what Chu called a Spanish policy of “vacillation” in their treatment of Chinese men.<sup>137</sup> A testament to the empire’s inability to manage the “problem” of the Chinese merchant, Spanish men expressed a deep revulsion for Chinese men while simultaneously requesting more delicate expulsion methods. If non-Catholic Chinese merchants truly were “harmful and detrimental to the native Indians, who are sheep, and the [sangleys] are butchers and voracious wolves,” then a full expulsion would not be out of the question.<sup>138</sup> But a handful of unnamed imperial officials disagreed and offered up their list of “medios propuestos” or moderate proposals to the expulsion. Maintaining the colonial economy was the driving factor behind their proposals. The local economy needed the profit from Chinese men and pursuing a full expulsion was unnecessary; imperial officials could get by with increased surveillance.

Authors of the *medios propuestos* argued that increased surveillance, not a full expulsion, was the answer to imperial officials and vecinos’ concerns regarding Chinese residents in the Philippines. The authors asserted that the Chinese gremios should fall under Spanish oversight and the imperial government could appoint a minister to monitor the gremios. In contrast, the Manileño authors did not consider the “sangleys” who tilled the fields as a threat because they had done “little harm” to indigenous and Spanish vassals. From the perspective of the authors of these proposals, rural Chinese should continue

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<sup>137</sup> Chu, *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos*, 56.

<sup>138</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 34, “Carta de Arizala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1750), 17.

farming for the larger empire.<sup>139</sup> The authors targeted specific trades that men already incorporated into the empire should take over. Spanish men were to take over the trades of silversmithing (usually the realm of mestizos) and carpentry, while grape growing should go to the “Indians.”<sup>140</sup> Lastly, all of the sangleys who lived in the provinces should be moved to the cities so surveillance could be managed more easily.<sup>141</sup> If anyone violated these moderate proposals, the anonymous authors urged the imperial government to fine that person \$1,000 pesos and remove their bureaucratic titles.<sup>142</sup> By moving the races into different roles and by increasing the policing eye of the empire, the authors of the moderate proposals attempted to deter a full expulsion.

Although the authors made clear that Chinese men were critical to the financial health of the islands, but they still bartered in a currency that would be accepted by imperial officials: the currency of racial formations. Unlike Triviño and the archbishop, the authors were not anxious about protecting native vassals because the “natives [would] take care of themselves [and would] refrain from [the] excess that idleness provokes.”<sup>143</sup> In the case of Chinese men, “the entry of new sangleys” was not necessary and with barring new Chinese, the existing “sangleys” would “naturally” become “extinguished” and “purified.” Chinese peoples were to be “reduced” to the towns of Binondo and Santa Cruz where they are already “married and rooted.”<sup>144</sup> In three sentences, the authors of the moderate proposals constructed a neat narrative that used legible racial formations to appease imperial officials in their fears of the Chinese man. First, the authors highlighted the

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<sup>139</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Medios propuestos para la expulsión de los sangleys,” (1744), 319.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 320.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 319.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 322: “office” has been used as either their local civic role, or their economic trade.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 319.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 320.



“excess” of indigenous men because they were inherently “lazy.” By characterizing indigenous men as already inclined to excess, the authors absolved Chinese men of influencing indigenous men with their own racial tendencies for excess. Second, the natural assimilation of colonization, or “purification”, would eventually eradicate the poor qualities of the “sangleys.” In the logic of Iberian early modern patriarchy, Spanish men would have believed that marriage with Catholic Filipina women would root the Chinese man – very much a foreign person in the islands – into Spanish customs.<sup>145</sup> Tethering the “untethered sexuality” of a Chinese man to a Filipina woman would certainly appease the patriarchal order of the Spanish colonial Philippines.<sup>146</sup>

#### A Divided Front: The Archbishop and the Governor General

Secular and religious imperial authorities’ opinions on the implementation of the expulsion order were as disjointed as the councilmembers’ approaches. Granted with the most power in the implementation of the expulsion order, Archbishop Pedro José Manuel Martínez de Arízala wrote to Governor General Don Francisco Jose de Obando about some problems he perceived in the expulsion process.<sup>147</sup> Arízala reminded Obando to “keep in mind the royal order” so that “appropriate measures” to begin the expulsion could be taken as soon as possible. The archbishop made clear that he was not accusing Obando of “neglecting” the order, but the archbishop wanted an explanation as to why the latest four ships that arrived in Philippine ports from China held 1,742 men when they should have only held 30 men per ship. He reminded Obando again that Chinese men should not be allowed to penetrate the provinces because they were “rational, dangerous

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<sup>145</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 18.

<sup>146</sup> Behrend-Martinez, “Spain violated,” 579.

<sup>147</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 34, “Carta de Arizala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1750), 19.

ants.”<sup>148</sup> Although Obando’s response to Arízala was not included in the correspondence, it was popularly known that Obando was an economically shrewd Governor General. He was determined to create a profitable colonial economy (using Chinese labor) despite the expulsion order.<sup>149</sup> While Arízala did not directly name the errors in his letter as Obando’s shortcomings specifically, it is clear that the archbishop had misgivings regarding its implementation.

Despite the archbishop and the Governor General’s disagreements, imperial officers endeavored to execute the original expulsion edict intact. The individual directives included in the order provided guidelines on its dissemination and execution. First, the order needed to be published in the languages of all of the surrounding provinces (and in Chinese characters) of the *Parián* and Cavite. The order then outlined the primary means of keeping Chinese outside of the most fragile colonial center, Manila: by limiting the number of Chinese in the *Parián* to 6,000.<sup>150</sup> The *gobernadorcillo* (local, likely native authorities) of the *Parián* was ordered to intimate the order to all Chinese ships captains who sailed between China and the Philippines.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, all arrivals and departures of Chinese ships should be timed around the “*Fería*” (the market fair) and the monsoon season. Imperial authorities were to order “sangleys” to return to their lands in the same number that they arrived.<sup>152</sup> The last section of the individual directives involved the physical segregation of Chinese peoples. One directive called to physically segregate the residences

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<sup>148</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 97, Num. 39, “Consulta sobre expulsion de Sangleyes,” (1751), 17.

<sup>149</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “Sobre Labores de Minas de hierro de provincial de Camarines,” (1754): In a decree dated April 10, 1753 and Maria Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo, “Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy: Mining,” *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 13, no. 4 (1965):766: Obando was particularly interested in ramping up imperial mining operations to profit the royal treasury.

<sup>150</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 305.

<sup>151</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 34, “Carta de Arizala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1750), 3, 13, & 8.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 312.

of Christian Chinese from non-Christian Chinese; these areas were to be “fenced [off] and guarded.”<sup>153</sup> The “Sangleys” were also to be penalized in the workplace, forcibly removed from the positions of silversmiths and from the sawmills.<sup>154</sup> After the meeting convened, imperial officials published the laws and town criers fixed the edicts to town squares. From 1750, the lawmakers outlined a 6-month grace period, after which non-licensed Chinese peoples were to be counted and picked up for forcible removal from Manila.<sup>155</sup>

The convening councils placed the onus of the expulsion of non-Catholic Chinese on imperial officers. Still, Chinese colonials had to *prove* their Catholicism to imperial officers. Imperial authorities’ verbiage on exactly how Chinese peoples could identify themselves as good Catholics was muddled. Before his tenure as Governor General, Don Pedro Manuel de Arandia claimed that the Chinese who stayed behind would have to be “subjected to Catholic rule.”<sup>156</sup> Arandia stated that all Chinese men should know that “if you are Catholic, declare it, or [else] go [back to China].”<sup>157</sup> The council uttered similar ambiguous language, demanding that “sangleys” must show a “firm demonstration of staying in the faith”<sup>158</sup> In a letter from the archbishop, he spoke directly to Chinese men: “If you are Christian, reduce yourself to the religion and show the true signs [of the faith].”<sup>159</sup> Not necessarily a unique practice, proving the faith depended upon the judge – or the religious authority – present.<sup>160</sup> Some authorities believed simply wearing a religious scapulary was not enough

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 311.

<sup>154</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 34, “Carta de Arizala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1750), 9.

<sup>155</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 314.

<sup>156</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 386, Num. 3, “Carta de Pedro Manuel de Arandia sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1753), 10.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>158</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 304.

<sup>159</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 34, “Carta de Arizala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1750), 10.

<sup>160</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 16-17.

to prove piety. It is not farfetched to assume that the Chinese residing in the Parian faced precarious conditions as men consistently forced to prove their faith.

Where the parameters for expressing the faith were unclear, the laws segregating Catholic “sangleys” were explicit. New “sangley” converts were not allowed to live near the “infidels in the Parian” and all “infidels” were to be expelled “except the children or the grandchildren... who were born, baptized, educated and settled in conversion.”<sup>161</sup> Imperial authorities aimed to enforce a method of segregation rooted in their own unique form of religious-secular governance, a practice of race-making through space, or what Daniel Nemser calls “the racialization processes that began with the Spanish colonial project [as] routed through a politics of space.”<sup>162</sup> The creation of the Parian was evidence of this racialized spatialization, a segregated place for Chinese peoples always “within firing range of the guns of the fortress.”<sup>163</sup> Moreover, imperial officials might have wanted to stem a Chinese migration pattern they perceived, where Chinese merchants, after establishing baptism, would move to the provinces “away from the close surveillance of Manila officials.”<sup>164</sup> Breaking the segregation law came with fearsome consequences. The local government was instructed to punish Catholic Chinese who abused their relationships with “Indians.” The council also demanded that the imperial government should dole out punishments to those Chinese who had committed “crimes against our religion” by holding the sangleys in prison cells before expelling them.<sup>165</sup> For those expelled, their properties

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<sup>161</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 306.

<sup>162</sup> Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 4-5.

<sup>163</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 145.

<sup>164</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 16.

<sup>165</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 305.

would be auctioned off to Christian “sangleys” two years after the execution of the expulsion order.<sup>166</sup>

## Conclusion

“Caution is the daughter of providence.”<sup>167</sup>  
– 1752, The Second Council on implementing the Expulsion Order

The expulsion order did very little to stifle the flow of Chinese merchants into the islands. Two years after the expulsion, a second council came together to oversee the implementation of the order. This new council noted that ships continued to flow into the islands’ shores from China.<sup>168</sup> Indeed, the first four ships that arrived in 1752 held more than seven hundred “infidel sangleys.”<sup>169</sup> From these and other arrivals, the council assumed that some of the “infidel” Chinese might be hiding “on the beaches and on the islands” of the Philippines.<sup>170</sup> For all intents and purposes the Expulsion of 1750 – the brainchild of bickering secular and religious authorities – did not accomplish its grandiose goals. In 1752, the second council complained that the “sangleys” should have been expelled by now. Expelled Chinese still found refuge in Manila and the provinces of Ylocos and Pangasinan.<sup>171</sup> Whether the execution of the order weakened because of the deafening dissent – the “interpellations” – from colonial profiteers or because the Spanish could not

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 305, & 314.

<sup>167</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 97, Num. 39, “Consulta sobre expulsión de Sangleyes,” (1752), 15: Imperial officials: Don Estevan Joseph de María, Don Thomas Geraldino (Spanish Director of the South Sea Company), Don Francisco Fernandez Molinillo, Don Antonio Jacinto Xomay, Don Juan Vazquez de Agüero (Auditor, Council of the Indies), Don Phelipe de Arco (Auditor, Council of the Indies & Marquis of Val Delirios).

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 21.

control the migration of peoples who had traded in the Philippines long before Spanish “conquest”, it was clear that migrating Chinese men and merchants simply could not be stopped.<sup>172</sup>

For imperial officers, creating and implementing the expulsion order meant walking a very fine line between losing imperial monies within the Pacific colony and across the larger Spanish empire. The authors of the moderate proposals, Governor-General Obando, and other likeminded financiers must have asked themselves and the executors of the order: was the expulsion worth it? Before the expulsion, Triviño estimated that the yearly loss in rents would be around \$25,000 pesos, but such losses could be made up for in the sale of trade and migration licenses (to migrant Chinese). In addition, the loss in property payments would be leveled off with the creation of the proposed buyo monopoly.<sup>173</sup> Along with the promises of forecasted wins and losses, Archbishop Arízala ordered that those who violated any aspect of the expulsion act would have to pay a five hundred peso fine.<sup>174</sup> The archbishop also demanded that ships captains immediately stop the practice of “allow[ing] poor sangleys on board [like those] who infest the islands.” If a captain were caught allowing poor Chinese men on board, “the ship captain [was ordered to] pay one hundred pesos for each [poor] sangley over the [allotted] limit.”<sup>175</sup>

What Triviño and his council did not plan for in their financial calculations were the repercussions from delaying the implementation of the edict. Fearing that imperial officials in the Philippines were not executing the order to its fullest, concerned imperial officials

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<sup>172</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 3.

<sup>173</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 334, L. 15, “Orden de formar junta sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1744), 309 & 313.

<sup>174</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 34, “Carta de Arizala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1750), 8.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

influenced the Viceroy of New Spain to hold the *situado* (the galleon monies remitted to the Philippines by the Mexican Viceroyalty) hostage. The Viceroy forbade any “commerce or individuals” that moved between New Spain and the Philippines for fear of the influence which “infidel” Chinese might have on New Spain.<sup>176</sup>

The obstacles preventing the full execution of the order were not only limited to the reality that Chinese men ignored the expulsion order, but that Chinese men of “questionable” quality continued to make their way onto Manila-bound ships. In Joseph Arevalo Tionsay’s case against the royal treasury demanding a return of remitted license monies unfairly accounted for by the *Asentista* (person in charge of dispensation) of licenses.<sup>177</sup> Tionsay, a Christian “Sangley” and the man in charge of paying for the licenses of visiting Chinese, and Don Francisco Antonio de Figueroa, Secretary of the Superior Government and War, exchanged records enumerating the “types” of Chinese men who boarded the incoming ships from China. On the ship of a Don Joseph Loqua, 414 men were expelled in 1751 and of that number, 49 men were “*de mal vivir, y desbarbados* (of bad life and beardless)” and 80 were “useful.”<sup>178</sup> While the lists did not elaborate upon the significance of the word “usefulness”, it is likely that, just like Arízala, imperial officials related utility to a Chinese man’s perceived earning power.<sup>179</sup> In practical terms, the signifier of beardlessness might have been a way to physically distinguish the men of “bad life” from the rest of the “sangleys.” However, physical differentiation between bearded and clean-shaven Chinese men was the only physical marker offered up by Figueroa. In

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<sup>176</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 386, Num. 3, “Carta de Pedro Manuel de Arandia sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1753), 9.

<sup>177</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 60, “Carta de Pedro Martínez de Arízala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1752), 13.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>179</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 34, “Carta de Arízala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes,” (1750), 11.

Horswell's study on Spanish colonial masculinity, he invoked beardedness as an early modern Spanish symbol of masculine vigor. It may not be coincidental that the men of bad life also lacked beards and were inversely "useless" (in juxtaposition to the useful 80 Chinese men).<sup>180</sup> The other ships in the early 1750s also held similar mixes of "types" of men. On a ship that carried Chinese men shipwrecked from the coast of the Mariveles in Bataan, "sangley" scribe Juan Francisco Quiangco noted that of the 400+ "sangleys", 350 were "useful" *pangaseros* (Tagalog word for steelworker), barbers, shopkeepers, and fishermen. Some of the men on the ship were fresh from the stockade because they were *chinchorros* (gossips). In Juan Antonio Silang's records, his ship held "useful" barbers, fishermen, and cooks, but also held 24 "idlers."<sup>181</sup>

What could the new council do to prevent the entry of "bad sangleys"? Officials already determined that incoming ships of Chinese men harbored both laborers "beneficial" to the financial health of the islands *and* "useless" Chinese men. The council insisted that they would have to conduct regular meetings because financiers and other interested parties continued to harass the council with "continuous interpellations." The council blamed themselves and other imperial officers for not "collecting" enough "infidel sangleys from the Parian, who traffic and pollute" the islands. The council had also continued to dispense visiting licenses to sangleys even though this practice was expressly unauthorized.<sup>182</sup> The new council invented other modes of patrol: a separate trade area in Fort Santiago for "sangleys" to trade with the Spanish where the Chinese would be heavily guarded and prohibited from entering the cities and the rivers (because their ships might

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<sup>180</sup> Horswell, *Decolonizing the Sodomite*, 41-51.

<sup>181</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 292, Num. 60, "Carta de Pedro Martínez de Arizala sobre expulsión de los sangleyes," (1752), 19.

<sup>182</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 97, Num. 39, "Consulta sobre expulsión de Sangleyes," (1752), 9.



have canons to fire upon Manila). The council feared that if the upkeep of the expulsion order carried on the way it had, that the city would “be full of sangleys and there might be an uprising. The troops are already divided because some go to Samboanga to battle the King of Jolo.”<sup>183</sup> The council was well aware that the perceived enemies of Spain were everywhere, and the Spanish military could only do so much.

Imperial approaches to Chinese merchants vacillated from intense hatred to tempered acceptance. Even if both racial and gendered beliefs sharply clashed, imperial officers could not stop the success of the Chinese merchants or their constant flight into the islands. Even in its most odious form, producing gendered and racial discourse about the wickedness of Chinese merchants did little to change the material reality that Chinese trade migration was deeply rooted in the Philippines. What the colonial discourse leaves behind is less a portrait of the Chinese merchant as a thieving caricature, but a portrait of the average imperial officer: a man mired in conflicting opinions, discourses, and anxieties about the unrelenting success of the Chinese merchant.

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 15 & 18.

## Chapter 2

### Bread & Wood: Exclusionary “Expertise” in Philippine Provisional Economies

When scholars write about the Philippines within the wider Spanish Empire, the topic of the galleon trade is king. For many colonial Latin Americanists, Imperial Spain depended upon the Pacific colony to link New Spain’s galleon trade to the Philippine entrepôt where Chinese merchants moved Latin American silver into China’s “silver sink.”<sup>184</sup> In other words, the wealth of colonial Latin America and the investments of the growing elite in New Spain rode on the safe passage of galleon ships.<sup>185</sup> In the Philippines, Spanish authorities and indigenous and Chinese laborers shouldered a tremendous responsibility in ensuring that Spain’s galleons moved efficiently across the Pacific Ocean.<sup>186</sup> Expert lumbermen and bakers of bread sustained the archipelago’s colonial provisioning economy that powered Spanish trans-imperial commerce. In this chapter I ask: How did laborers fare within the local economy of the Philippines? I contend that in provisioning regimes, Spanish authorities foreclosed the role of the intelligent expert to indigenous men based upon European metrics of expertise, intelligence, and the authority of personal experience. I examine two crucial sites: the Manila bakeries that fed Spanish colonial officials in Manila and the lumberyards, the *corte de maderas*, that produced the wood for galleon ships. By examining the discursive and material forms by which Spanish “experts” and “intelligent” men disadvantaged indigenous laborers, I reveal how expertise

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<sup>184</sup> Katharine Bjork, “The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and the Manila Trade, 1571-1815,” *Journal of World History* 9, no. 1 (1998): 39; Flynn and Giráldez, “Cycles of Silver,” 393; Dennis O. Flynn & Arturo Giráldez, “Silk for Silver: Manila-Macao Trade in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century,” *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 44, no. 1 (1996): 53; Flynn & Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon,’” 206.

<sup>185</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization* 102.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

was not an option for indigenous men based on European criteria (intelligence, experience, and authority). Through such criteria, the imperial labor apparatus ensured that the role of the expert was an unattainable position for the indigenous laborer.

I examine the centrality of the expert in the colonial Philippines in two key ways. In the first section, “Excluding Indigenous Men From Expertise,” I focus on the qualities that defined the expert: the authority of personal experience and demonstrations of intelligence. The wielding of experience in the early modern Iberian world was multivalent. A person with the personal authority of “experience” mastered empirical knowledge by building a history of working in any given craft or trade. Developed from an Aristotelian concept of the nature of experience, personal authority meant that opinions offered by an expert bore significant weight: “The more authoritative the source, the more probable the statement. Experience and social accreditation were never sharply distinguished.”<sup>187</sup> In the early modern Spanish Empire, experts contributed to a deeply seated imperial “epistemic culture” wherein Spanish authorities cultivated certain values and methods to “collect, circulate, and certify knowledge” about their colonial possessions.<sup>188</sup> Scholars Antonio Barrera-Osorio and Arndt Brendecke have evaluated the expert’s entanglements with the early modern Spanish state as the crown funded “expert” knowledges in order to ascertain, catalog, and profit off of their colonies’ resources. Both Barrera-Osorio and Brendecke concentrate on the figure of the expert as the “experienced” European man whose opinions helped develop the building blocks of scientific experimentation.<sup>189</sup> I argue that imperial officials racialized the criteria of the authority of personal experience and demonstrations

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<sup>187</sup> Dear, *Discipline and Experience*, 23 and 91.

<sup>188</sup> Crawford, *The Andean Wonder Drug*, 8.

<sup>189</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 2 and Brendecke, *The Empirical Empire*, 9.

of intelligence. Imperial authorities' conceptualization of the "expert" performed a crucial function in the colonial Philippines: To legitimize European experts (and European knowledges) by excluding indigenous expertise (and indigenous knowledges). Imperial officials used racialized discourses to disqualify indigenous laborers from ever becoming experts. Not only did Spanish officials discursively construct the "inexpert Indian," Spanish bakery and *corte* officials created oppressive labor conditions – characterized by physical assault, exploitation, and usury – that all but guaranteed indigenous laborers never achieve the personal authority to become experts.

In "An Expert's Power," I juxtapose an analysis of an imperial legal case against Chinese *panaderos* (bakers) alongside Spanish officers' expectations of the expert in the *corte*, or lumberyard, to emphasize the importance of experts in the colonial Philippines. By understanding what experts *could* do in provisioning economies, I make clear the obstacles indigenous laborers faced in becoming experts. I assert that the Spanish imperial formulation of expertise and intelligence was inextricably bound up in the production of Spanish racial formations of the colonial "Other." Spanish imperial officials wielded the forms of expertise and intelligence not only to amass wealth, but also to gatekeep indigenous men of the Philippines from rising to positions of expertise.

Spanish officials both depended on Chinese and indigenous labor and knowledges, but confined Chinese and indigenous laborers within racial and gendered hierarchies. In practical terms, Spanish authorities relied on Chinese bakers to feed European resident populations. These same authorities kept galleon ships afloat through the forced labor of indigenous timber cutters and shipbuilders. However, I also explore the possibility that the act of dismissal – the Spanish authorities' denial of indigenous expertise – was crucial to

the Spanish imperial actor's relationship of dependence upon non-Spanish "Others." Spanish men, after all, needed to "demean their inferiors" in order to exert masculine authority within colonial spaces.<sup>190</sup> In other words, the dismissal of indigenous and Chinese expertise served another purpose: to maintain Spanish hegemonic masculinity by endowing only Spanish men with the capacity for intelligence and the authority of personal experience. Within colonial labor sites, Spanish men were invested in maintaining a racial hierarchy predicated upon expertise. How else would they be able to shore up Iberian masculine authority if not by wielding unquestioned control over "a multiracial order founded on the fusion of dependent labor with a social dialectic of honor-degradation[?]"<sup>191</sup>

### A Colonial Provisioning Economy

Imperial officials required distinct forms of labor to ensure that bakeries and lumberyards produced necessary goods for the Pacific economy. In the bakery, Spanish authorities understood that flour-making required specialists, or *peritos*, who processed and transported wheat. The mostly Chinese bakers, *panaderos*, operated their bakeries as small, urban store-fronts. The *panaderos* employed - without coercion - a myriad of mostly indigenous *sirvientes* (baker's attendants) and *molenderos* (wheat grinders).<sup>192</sup> While the working conditions for the Chinese bakers afforded them daily interaction with the *criados* (servants) of powerful people in Manila, the Chinese bakers allowed Spanish men to physically abuse the bakery's indigenous *sirvientes* and *molenderos*, as we shall see.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 161-162.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>192</sup> Archivo General de Indias (AGI), *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Legajo (Leg.) 69, "Traslado de los autos sustanciados por el oidor Pedro Sebastián de Bolívar y Mena contra los sangleyes panaderos que se declararon por nulos con testimonio de las nulidades, vicios y defectos de ellos," (1687), 1.

<sup>193</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 6., "Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina," (1688), 5.

Likewise, the majority of indigenous lumberyard laborers worked in such onerous and deadly conditions that they revolted in 1614 and 1649.<sup>194</sup> In the *corte*, expertise was measured by a man's capacity to direct a large number of coerced laborers to complete a wide array of labor-intensive tasks.<sup>195</sup> Spanish officials required experts who could command the labor of men some who spoke a wide array of dialects from Tagalog regions, others who Pampangan-speakers from province of Cavite, and still others from the provinces of Leyte, Samar, and Bicol. Critical intermediaries to the imperial economic success, these experts demonstrated "both shrewdness and gentleness of character."<sup>196</sup>

Bakeries and lumberyards were radically distinct work places, but both spaces were crucial to the maintenance of the Spanish imperial project. Spanish officials in the Philippines sustained themselves on Chinese panaderos' bread. As in Latin America, Spanish colonists stopped at nothing to transport, grow, and subsist on "Old World" foods.<sup>197</sup> Spanish officials so depended upon bread, their cultural staple food, that they called it "the nerve of the republic."<sup>198</sup> As bread nourished the bodies of colonial officials, indigenous laborers chopped Philippine woods to construct the galleon trade; otherwise known as "the economic and spiritual life-line of the Philippines."<sup>199</sup> The stakes for maintaining such vital trades were certainly high for Spanish imperial authorities.

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<sup>194</sup> Greg Bankoff, "Deep Forestry: Shapers of the Philippine Forests," *Environmental History* 18 (2013): 538.

<sup>195</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Número (Num.) 33, "Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre cortes de madera," (1688), 5.

<sup>196</sup> William J. McCarthy, "The Yards at Cavite: Shipbuilding in the Early Colonial Philippines," *International Journal of Maritime History* 8, no. 2 (1995): 157 and AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, "Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre cortes de madera," (1736), 2.

<sup>197</sup> Rebecca Earle, *The Body of the Conquistador: Food, Race, and the Colonial Experience in Spanish America, 1492-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3, Martha Bell, "Wheat is the nerve of the whole republic: spatial histories of a European crop in colonial Lima, Peru, 1535-1705," *Journal of Historical Geography* 59 (2018): 50, and Susan D. deFrance, "Diet and Provisioning in the High Andes: A Spanish Colonial Settlement on the Outskirts of Potosí, Bolivia," *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 7, no. 2 (2003): 101.

<sup>198</sup> Bell, "Wheat is the nerve," 41.

<sup>199</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 42.

Because of Spanish officials' dependency, the policing of bakeries provides particular insight regarding how Spanish colonial authorities racially categorized Chinese laborers. In 1686, imperial officers documented extensively during their investigation of the controversial Manila *panadero* uprising. On May second of the same year, a burst of violence spurred Spanish paranoia regarding the Chinese panaderos of Manila. A group of "vagabond" sangleys (Chinese men) killed two senior constables and wounded two ministers. Captain General of the Philippines, Don Gabriel de Curuzelaegui explained that the Chinese men's violence was, indeed, precedented since the Chinese in the Philippines had "struggled in an uproar" against the Spanish imperial government.<sup>200</sup> When other constables investigated the scene of a dispersed group of Chinese men, they found "twelve different gangs of sangleys with katanas and *broqueles* (curved swords and small defensive shields made of wood and cork)."<sup>201</sup> After quieting the band of Chinese aggressors in the Parian (the segregated Chinese "ghetto" outside of Manila's walls), twenty-five Spanish soldiers on horseback followed a separate band of the rabble-rousers in the mountain area of Malibay. According to Curuzelaegui, the constables found the bands of Chinese men laughing, holding a variety of bladed weapons "called bambues, bacacasez, and bolos which are like machetes." In response, the constables killed eleven Chinese men and returned to stake their severed heads in front of the Parian.<sup>202</sup> In Manila constables hanged the remaining living aggressors, and Curuzelaegui decided to swiftly send as many vagabond Chinese men "without office" (unemployed) back to China. During their interrogation of the last of the aggressors (and before the public hangings), Curuzelaegui stated that the

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<sup>200</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 3, Num. 172, "Consulta sobre sublevación de los sangleys," (1686), 4.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., 5.

uprising began in the town of Cavite and spread into the Chinese communities in Manila. In the estimations of Spanish officials, the panaderos were both necessary and feared. Spanish residents needed the panaderos to produce Manila's necessary bread supply and they feared the panaderos as they could disrupt the social and economic health of the Spanish colonial Philippines.<sup>203</sup>

In contrast to the rich records of the *panadero* rebellion, strict rules and extensive regulations characterize the evidence base for my examination of the *corte de maderas*. I examine imperial correspondence from the Governor General of the Philippines that outlined the rules of conduct for all laborers in the *corte*.<sup>204</sup> Spanish imperial officials needed wood for basic needs such as the construction and general upkeep of imperial buildings that were incredibly prone to uncontrollable fires.<sup>205</sup> Defense and galleon construction, however, demanded the most wood (and, by extension, the most labor). As the Spanish prepared for the Pacific front of the Hispano-Dutch War (1568–1648), *corte* laborers suffered from “ruthless exploitation”; a sacrifice that kept Manila from falling to the Dutch.<sup>206</sup> During the entirety of Spain's colonial occupation of the Philippines, Spanish officials depended upon a constant production of newly cut timber for the means of defense from foreign aggressors and internal enemies, particularly the Moro (Muslim) raiders of Mindanao.<sup>207</sup> Without the *corte*, the Spanish empire's control of the Philippines would surely slip to non-Spanish opponents, both foreign and from within.

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>204</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 1.

<sup>205</sup> Bankoff, “Deep Forestry,” 537, Greg Bankoff, “The Tree as the Enemy of Man: Changing Attitudes to the Forests of the Philippines,” *Philippines Studies* 52, No. 3 (2004): 322, and Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 130.

<sup>206</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 13.

<sup>207</sup> Bankoff, “Deep Forestry,” 537.



## Excluding Indigenous Men from Expertise

Whether in bread, lumber production, or shipbuilding, Spanish imperial officials disqualified indigenous men from achieving “expertise” by creating onerous working conditions. Such barriers impeded indigenous men’s ability to develop the personal authority of experience. In service of the Spanish empire, expert shipbuilders, pilots, and navigators matriculated through esteemed bureaucratic institutions like the *Casa de Contratación* (the imperial administration that oversaw commerce and fleets between Spain and the Indies) where they cultivated their personal experience “within a theoretical framework to be useful” to the colonial project.<sup>208</sup> Although the *Casa* produced many experts, formal education in an imperial institution was not the main requisite in becoming an expert.<sup>209</sup> In the Spanish Empire, the most likely process by which a commoner might gain expertise was through “apprenticeship and by joining artisan guilds.<sup>210</sup> Although the bakeries in the *panadero* uprising were not affiliated with a guild in the documents, bakers in the broader Spanish Empire built prestige and networks of power through bakers’ guilds.<sup>211</sup> For both artisanal and scientific experts, the truism “experience is the mother of the arts” reigned supreme.<sup>212</sup> In conjunction with the time spent learning a trade or craft, an expert needed to demonstrate personal authority in their field; the kind of authority and self-possession built from years of refining one’s skills. What personal experience, then, could indigenous men gain within an oppressive labor system? I contend that the Spanish

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<sup>208</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 79.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 20 & 37.

<sup>210</sup> Bell, “Wheat is the nerve,” 50 and Susan Verdi Webster, “Masters of the Trade: Native Artisans, Guilds, and the Construction of Colonial Quito,” *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 68, no. 1 (2009): 10.

<sup>211</sup> Bell, “Wheat is the nerve,” 50 and John C. Super, “Pan, alimentación y política en Querétaro en la última década del siglo XVIII,” *Historia Mexicana* 30, no. 2 (1980): 267.

<sup>212</sup> Luis Sanchez, *Tesoro de la lengua Castellana o Española* (Madrid: Biblioteca de la Universidad de Sevilla, 1611), 377.

imperial labor system guaranteed indigenous men could not gain any substantive or meaningful personal experience to become early modern “experts.”<sup>213</sup>

Categorized as “Indian” within the Spanish empire, *criados*, or servants, were disqualified as expert witnesses in the *panadero* case. In order to present valuable knowledge and to act as a reliable witness (including as a specialist in one’s field) in the early modern world, one had to demonstrate mastery over their trade, craft, or industry.<sup>214</sup> By definition, indigenous *criados* – like the unnamed *criado* of Spanish *vecino* General Don Juan de Morales and *criados* Joseph Batoy and Nicolas Lacisna – were deemed masters of no one and skill-less. The imperial officials’ pursuit of the *criados*’ testimonies reflected as much. When local officials claimed that the Chinese panaderos of Manila conspired together to poison the bread supply of the city with broken glass and plates, they called upon the *criados* to provide their testimonies.<sup>215</sup> However, for each testimony, the court documents cited the *criados*’ roles as witnesses after the fact: each *criado* matched their master’s testimonies to the letter. When asked if the *criados* saw the broken glass and plates inside of the bread, the indigenous servants explained that first their masters fished out the shards from the bread, then showed the servants the pieces.<sup>216</sup> Placing greater significance on the Spanish *vecinos*’ testimonies over their *criados* aligned with the greater Spanish legal assumption that “the testimony of six Indians was not worth that of ‘one

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<sup>213</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 62 & 79, Bredecke, *The Empirical Empire*, 277.

<sup>214</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 52-53, 67 and Dear, *Discipline and Experience*, 228.

<sup>215</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” (1688), 1.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, 163, 167, 304, 762: Mentioned in the confession of Diego Calderón Ynco, Christian Sangley, mentioned in the testimony of Simon Lianco, Sangley *Panadero*, mentioned in the testimony of Joseph Batoy/ Vanto, native of Aklan, *criado* of Bolivar, and in the testimony of Nicolas Lacsina, native of Macabebe, Pampanga.

proper witness.”<sup>217</sup> However, their social position as *criados*, crossed with their legal categorization as “Indian” made becoming expert witnesses all but impossible in the colonial center of Manila.<sup>218</sup> As we will later see, expert witnesses played a distinctive role in solving the *panadero* case. However, it was certainly not the testimonies of *criados* that Spanish judicial authorities would count as “expert.”

The Spanish colonial actor’s denial of personal authority did not stop in the courtroom. In the Manila bakery, Spanish men flogged and humiliated indigenous bakery “servant” laborers. Indigenous Philippine bakers likely employed the same training for specialized bakery labor as their New Spain counterparts. *Panaderos* trained bread workers in “a guildlike hierarchy with *maestros* at the top followed by *oficiales* (journeymen), *medio-oficiales* (sub-journeymen), and apprentices who were usually young boys.”<sup>219</sup> In the *panadero* case, a Spanish interrogator asked a Manileño *molendero* (wheat miller) Julio Ladyen to account for the indigenous *sirvientes* (“servants” or likely apprentices who labored within the “guildlike” hierarchy) who were present on the day of the tainted bread sales. Ladyen noted that the daily operations of the bakery usually included “six Pangasinenses (men from Pangasinan), two who are kneaders that help knead, the *sangleys* who are in charge (who bake the bread), and four (wheat) grinders. From these six... only Ladyen and Francisco Casangcap remained (that day).” When asked where the other four missing Pangasinenses might have been that particular day, Ladyen responded, “The other four were absent because the Spaniards that assist[ed] in the bakery

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<sup>217</sup> Charles Cutter, *The Legal Cultures of Northern New Spain, 1700-1810* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 117: The opinion of Spanish jurist Juan de Solórzano Pereira.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, 118: Cutter points out that on the fringes of the Spanish Empire – away from colonial city centers – the Spanish legal system would sometimes weigh indigenous legal testimonies with more seriousness.

<sup>219</sup> Robert Weis, *Bakers and Basques: A Social History of Bread in Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012), 70.

treated [the four absent Pangasinenses] badly and “whipped them.”<sup>220</sup> Ladyen revealed the common practice of flogging within the colonial baking arts. Oftentimes “lowly” bakers’ apprentices would loan themselves into servitude under debt agreements with bakery proprietors. In such a system, “a vicious cycle of ingrained antagonism” existed wherein “employers treated bakers like prisoners, locking them up and regularly whipping them.”<sup>221</sup> What kind of personal experience, then, could indigenous *molenderos* – a trade that would, in the early modern European world, be classified as an artisan craft – offer in their own workplaces if Spanish men could freely and without consequence whip them to the point of workplace absence? The issue at hand is not simply that indigenous people experienced physical abuse from their colonial overlords (a practice rampant in the Philippines) but rather to contextualize how constant beatings, systematized through a colonial labor regime, foreclosed the possibility for indigenous men to gain the personal authority required to become an early modern expert.<sup>222</sup> Spanish men with whips ensured that the four Pangasinenses’ personal experience in their trade would not be one of authority, but of humiliation.

If Spanish officials undervalued the expert testimony indigenous *criados*, the Spanish lawyers defending the Chinese *panaderos* emphasized an unreputable kind of expertise: the criminal proclivities of indigenous laborers. Litigator Urbano de Medina recognized that the Spanish *vecinos* did not purchase the bread with their own hands, but that their *criados* went to the markets on the *vecinos*’ behalf. Medina re-focused the blame

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<sup>220</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” (1687), 224: In the testimony of Julio Ladyen, “*tratan mal y dan de vejucos.*”

<sup>221</sup> Weis, *Bakers and Basques*, 17.

<sup>222</sup> José S. Arcilla, “Slavery, Flogging and Other Moral Cases in 17<sup>th</sup> Century Philippines,” *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 20, no. 3 (1972): 403 and 406.

from the Chinese panaderos to the *vecinos' criados*, “who, as vile people... they were the ones who threw the pieces of glass and dishes.” Medina attempted to further implicate the indigenous criados by claiming that the *criados'* actions were “carried by the voices that came from Cavite.”<sup>223</sup> For the already paranoid and frightened Spanish officials, Medina’s supposition that the tainted bread was connected to the May 2<sup>nd</sup> uprising meant that a wider conspiracy against Manila’s prominent *vecinos* was at play. Forced to repeat their *amo's* testimony, bereft of the authority of personal experience, and allegedly tied to a conspiracy against Manila’s elite, the *criados'* positionality as indigenous servants to Spanish *amos* placed them in a precarious position. Litigators from both sides of the case either manipulated or targeted the indigenous servants as men whose only authority could be tied to their *amos*, or as men who could only harbor “vile” ambitions towards Spanish men. In both cases, indigenous servants lacked the personal authority to prove themselves innocent in court.

#### Passivity & Self-determination in the *Corte*

If experts were required to hold a modicum of personal authority in order to produce valuable knowledge for the imperial project, I assert that those who lacked personal authority in their trade or craft were disqualified from the realm of expertise.<sup>224</sup> In the labor site of the *corte*, indigenous lumbermen and shipbuilders could not achieve the authority of personal experience in the face of constant exploitation and injurious usury at the hands of Spanish officials. Indigenous laborers required so much protection from *corte* corporals’ exploitation that Governor General Don Fernando Valdes Tamón (1729-1739)

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<sup>223</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” (1686), 323-324: In the petition of Urbano de Medina.

<sup>224</sup> Dear, *Discipline and Experience*, 91, 149-150, 228.

reprimanded the *corte* officials' numerous abuses against the indigenous laborers. Tamón wrote a stern letter outlining twenty new rules of conduct for all *corte* officials, priests, and laborers in order to protect the indigenous laborers. The Governor General meant for the orders to reduce the “detriment” done to the Royal Treasury as well as to reduce the abuses done to indigenous laborers of the *corte*.<sup>225</sup> Tamón understood that in order to efficiently funnel raw materials to keep the galleon trade afloat, he needed to both maintain order over Spanish *corte* officials as well as uphold expected Spanish hegemonic command over the indigenous and Chinese *corte* laborers. In addition to the Tamón letter, petitions on requesting specialized laborers and yearly Governor General letters updating the crown on the status of operations in Manila revealed abuses of indigenous men. Indigenous laborers, then, suffered under a double oppression: they labored under the cruel and onerous work conditions of the *corte* and, because of the climate of the *corte* officials' exploitation, the dispossession of personal authority required to become an expert.

For the respected Spanish official, the deft management of one's laborers was within the purview of his duty as a masculine authority in a colonial space.<sup>226</sup> However, Spanish officials easily moved from simply commandeering labor to exploiting laborers. The *corte's* *alcalde mayores* (local mayors) created oppressive labor conditions for indigenous shipbuilders; the most skilled labor at the *corte*. In a *procurador general's* (legal officer of Manila) petition to search for reliable shipbuilders, the *procurador* highlighted the *alcaldes mayores'* abuses of indigenous laborers. He explained that the practice of “abusing” *corte* laborers – the *procurador* did not elaborate on exactly which abuses occurred – was so

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<sup>225</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 1.

<sup>226</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 161-162.

rampant that the *alcaldes* began to call upon their own relatives and other “powerful people” to come and exploit the *corte* laborers.<sup>227</sup> Rather than valuing indigenous shipbuilders’ unique skillsets or expert knowledge, *alcaldes mayores* dismissed indigenous expertise and profited off of the intense exploitation of indigenous men in the *corte*.

Even when indigenous men successfully demonstrated personal experience in their native waterways as sailors and ship pilots and in the shipyards as shipbuilders, Spanish authorities disqualified local experts in favor of European experts. Imperial searches for “examined and experienced” pilots insisted that ship pilots could only be European experts, using European instruments and the sciences of European navigation. Even without formal education, Europeans could still claim expertise. Spanish ship pilots were often illiterate, and education alone did not confer “experience” to a European ship pilot. The common denominator between a Casa-trained ship pilot and an “experienced” ship pilot in the Spanish colonial schema was their background as Spanish men.<sup>228</sup> In Manila, organizations of Spanish *vecinos*, concerned about the “miserable” state of the Philippines and its lack of galleon ship pilots, issued a request for ship pilots from Spain. In order to entice expert pilots, the Manila *vecinos* offered empty crown lands filled with tribute-paying indigenous laborers.<sup>229</sup> Instead of investing in the indigenous artisans and ships pilots who, according to Combés, held a wealth of knowledge, Spanish *vecinos* required European experts. The *vecinos* offered indigenous laborers not as expert authorities on sailing, but as prizes to the real experts. Rather than recognize the indigenous expertise of Philippine ship pilots,

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<sup>227</sup>AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 27, Num. 122, “Petición sobre agravios de fabricantes de navíos,” (1621), 1, Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 145: the “abuses” the *procurador* mentioned likely included the widely-known practices of enforcing “hard labor and ill treatment” that made compulsory *polo* labor in the *corte* so notorious.

<sup>228</sup> Brendecke, *The Empirical Empire*, 194.

<sup>229</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 28, Num. 61, “Carta de la ciudad de Manila sobre miseria de la tierra,” (1658), 2.

imperial actors offered the labor of indigenous men as prizes to Spanish experts eager to serve the crown.

By creating (and consistently highlighting) the dichotomy of the Spanish “person of intelligence” and the pusillanimous “Indian” – a racialized flaw – Tamón made incongruent the “Indian” and the expert. In his litany of laws Tamón consistently framed indigenous laborers as naturally weak and, because of this personal weakness, needed the guidance of commanding, balanced European experts. In his search for a *corte* judicial authority Tamón needed a “type of person of intelligence.” Such intelligence would not only be rooted in Spanish legal knowledge, but in the ability to treat *corte* laborers with gentleness because the authority should know about “the pusillanimity of the natives.”<sup>230</sup> The Governor General’s construction of Philippine “Indians” as weak reflected the broader Spanish cultural notion that “Indians” of conquered nations were to be “obedient, submissive, subdued, humble, servile, and yielding.”<sup>231</sup> In his law he codified that indigenous *corte* laborers could not have command over themselves in the same way that intelligent men might; and that intelligent men, men suited to expertise, must approach pusillanimous men with both generosity and condescendence.

Like in the legal care of the *corte* laborers, Tamón only entrusted the physical health of indigenous laborers to Spanish experts as he denied the healing expertise of native practitioners. He requested their own European-trained doctors replace indigenous healers to countervail the practices of inadequate native healing. Tamón claimed that because “the

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<sup>230</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 2, Brendecke, *The Empirical Empire*, 128: In Brendecke’s examination of King Carlos I’s use of “person of intelligence”, Brendecke outlines the criterion of the ability of people with intelligence “to live in political communities and be brought to the Christian faith.”

<sup>231</sup> Seed, *American Pentimento*, 81.



natives [were] accustomed” to the use *albolarios* (*sic* *herbolarios*, herbalists) or *mediquillos* (undocumented doctor, sometimes used pejoratively as a quack doctor), [the *corte* needed] “an intelligent one” [to become the *corte* physician].<sup>232</sup> According to the Spanish official, European medical experts, then, were not only superior to indigenous physicians but Spanish experts were required to draw indigenous peoples away from supposedly ineffective and unscientific indigenous *herbolarios* and *mediquillos*. Tamón did not elaborate on what kind of training an “intelligent one” needed to attend to the ills of the *corte*, but we can surmise that personal experience was a requirement for an expert doctor within the Spanish colonial site.<sup>233</sup> By highlighting the intelligence of the prospective *corte* doctor and the indigenous “quack” doctor, Tamón continued to enforce the discursive division between the allegedly unintelligent indigenous man and the intelligent Spanish medical expert.<sup>234</sup> Worse yet, his law affirmed the institutionalization of valuing Spanish over indigenous physicians in the *corte*.<sup>235</sup>

Tamón’s laws not only reveal his own conceptualizations of inexpert indigeneity, they also offer us a glimpse into the particular oppressive conditions under which *corte* laborers toiled. As *corte* corporals created conditions of abuse by overworking and underfeeding indigenous laborers, I contend they also actively disallowed any potential for *corte* laborers to gain personal authority, “a quality of expertise.”<sup>236</sup> In his laws Tamón prohibited the abusive practice of forcing indigenous laborers to cut wood in the forests from “four o’clock in the morning... [and] return[ing] at nine o’clock at night.” Moreover,

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<sup>232</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 5-6: “Porque será preciso atender a la curación de los enfermos estando los naturales... Se nombrará *uno inteligente*.”

<sup>233</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 13.

<sup>234</sup> Earle, *The Body of the Conquistador*, 40.

<sup>235</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 5-6.

<sup>236</sup> Dear, *Discipline and Experience*, 91.

Tamón explained that *corte* officials forced indigenous laborers to work so arduously that clerical overseers had to ensure that *corte* laborers receive “two hours of rest for their meals” per day; rest they were not granted before the issuance of Tamón’s laws.<sup>237</sup> The positionality of indigenous woodcutters, prone to exploitation by their Spanish superiors, was not conducive to the cultivation of their own personal authority. Not unlike the indigenous *servientes* in the bakery, the very subjectivity of indigenous labor came with it a likelihood of labor abuse and exploitation.

In conjunction with the physical labor of the *corte*, monetary abuses exacerbated the already precarious position of indigenous laborers, distancing them from the kind of self-possession and authority required to assume the role of an expert in the *corte*. Tamón railed against officials’ practices of monetary abuses against *corte* laborers. He first focused on the rampant practice of burdening indigenous laborers with unnecessary *gabelas* (taxes); a “pernicious” practice Tamón aimed to “uproot.”<sup>238</sup> The practice, “introduced [by] corporals and their officers” forced indigenous laborers to “contribute one, two, or more reales because they did not immediately go to work” and for other petty grievances. If we consider the notoriety of the *corte*’s conditions– that foremen either withheld indigenous laborers’ pay or did not deliver payment at all – it is not farfetched to assert that the practice of *gabelas* would impoverish or entirely indebt *corte* laborers. Tamón, then, was not far off when he opined that he was answering the “cry of the poor”; cries heard from the “defrauded” laborers. Tamón matched the gravity of the destructive practice with the severity of his penalty: If any *corte* officials “permit or disguise” their *gabelas* in the future,

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<sup>237</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 7.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

they would be subject to fines of up to four times the amount of the original gabelas.<sup>239</sup> Not only were indigenous woodcutters malnourished and overworked, they were also taxed into poverty by Spanish *corte* corporals.

*Corte* officials further created conditions for exploitation by constraining indigenous laborers with *opa* debts. Officials developed the *opa* debt system through the labor compulsion process. After *cabezas de barangay* (indigenous village heads) provided *corte* officials with their *barangay's* (town) list of laborers, the officials were then in charge of ensuring that all of the laborers on the *cabeza's* list completed work in the *corte*. If a villager wanted to avoid the arduous labor in the *corte de maderas*, *corte* officials and corporals would entice the villager to pay, in *reales*, an "*opa*" allowing the villager to avoid the *repartimiento* requirement. The practice of *opas*, however, entirely indebted villagers to *corte* officials, forcing them into terms of prolonged, high-interest repayment to *corte* corporals. Tamón demanded the immediate halting of *opados* and shifted the power of vetting labor lists to *corte* clerics and the *cabezas de barangay*.<sup>240</sup> Under multiple forms of physical abuse and financial indebtedness, indigenous laborers had little opportunity to foster any form of personal authority, and thus expertise, in the abusive labor space of the *corte de maderas*.

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., 3.

## **An Expert's Power**

In the first section of this chapter, I revealed how early modern European men required personal experience, intelligence, and command of oneself in order claim the status of an expert. I also exposed the myriad ways in which Spanish authorities created barriers to “expertise” for indigenous men. In this section, I center the ways in which experts were deciders in the bakeries as well as the *corte de maderas*. I examine the influence of experts’ authority by highlighting their power and responsibilities as men of intelligence. In a practical sense, Spanish men’s opinions initiated actionable changes and reforms. Discursively, Spanish officials created a hierarchical distance between themselves as Spanish experts and the indigenous laborer. In the bakery, experts decided the outcome of the *panadero* case. I, again, offer the *panadero* lawsuit as a case study; a glimpse into the early modern colonial Philippines where the word of the influential expert reigned supreme. In the *corte*, the power of experts rested in Spanish men’s ability to demonstrate “intelligence” as they commandeered indigenous labor. In Tamón’s search for expert officials in the *corte*, he and other Spanish officials created discursive (and material) distance between the *corte* expert and the indigenous laborer, all the while ignoring the capabilities of skilled indigenous lumbermen.

### An Expert's Power in the *Panadero* Case

Because the *panaderos*’ enterprise of breadmaking was so intricate – dealing with foreign sources of wheat, the milling and baking process, etc. – Spanish litigators called upon and weighed heavily the testimonies of the wheat and baker “experts.” In their defense of the accused Chinese *panaderos*, the litigators needed to clear the names of multiple Chinese *cabezillas* (heads) of the bakeries. If the experts on the *panaderos*’ side

could convince the court that stone wheat milling instruments unmoored (stone) grit into the flour, then the courts could prove the *panaderos'* innocence; it was not “glass and broken plates” in Manila’s bread supply, it was the accidental remainders of the milling process. The Spanish Christoval Pedroche, the Dominican vicar of the Parían and the most vocal of the wheat milling experts, insisted that “naturally, [when] wheat is milled, stones come out when grinding [the wheat].” In the court proceedings, notaries and officials referred to Christoval as a *perito* (expert) and “a person that has good experience with the matter” (“*una persona que esta bien experimentado en la materia*”) of wheat and wheat milling.<sup>241</sup> The Spanish expert opined that it would *not* be surprising to find “small pebbles” in bread flour that was milled from stone-grinding instruments.<sup>242</sup> In their appeals to other imperial officials – men familiar with the currency of “experience” in the composition of an expert – court officials throughout the case would continue to refer to Christoval’s evidence.<sup>243</sup> It is telling that the court denied taking down the testimonies of other Chinese bakers as “expert” testimonies. Instead, these *panaderos'* were questioned about the whereabouts of indigenous *criados*.<sup>244</sup> The litigators on behalf of the *panaderos* likely understood complex web of race and class dynamics in Spanish legal cultures that would weigh a Spanish *perito's* evidence over the word of a non-Spanish *panadero*.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>241</sup>AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” 1686, 331: The testimony of Christoval Pedroche “*del orden de predicadores del señor santo domingo y vicario del parían de los sangleyes extramuros.*”

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” (1686), 322-325 and AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Testimonio de los autos hechos sobre los artículos de la residencia de Juan de Vargas Hurtado,” (1687), 554.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., 163, 167: In the testimonies of panaderos Diego Calderón Ynco and Simon Lianco.

<sup>245</sup> Cutter, *The Legal Cultures of Northern New Spain*, 5, 117, and M.C. Mirow, *Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 54-55.

Joseph Tello de Gusman, Spanish litigator on behalf of the Spanish vecinos, matched Christoval's expert opinion with his very own expert's wise words. Like Christoval, Gusman chose a Spanish authority to stand as his expert. He called to the stand an unnamed *oídor* who was a "careful [man who] has had experience in flour and pastry." The *oídor* agreed with Christoval's statement that, sometimes, small stones could unmoor from the milling devices. However, the *oídor*, who was "scrupulous" in his findings, determined that in the case of the Chinese *panaderos*, the grit produced in the bread did not come from stones.<sup>246</sup> Immediately after providing this evidence, Gusman demanded that the courts punish the Chinese *panaderos* with death that would correspond with the such a heavy crime.<sup>247</sup> If the confessions could not produce a guilty testimony, Gusman insisted that the prisoners suffer under rightful torture.<sup>248</sup> By offering his expert opinion in a Spanish court of law, Gusman was not only asked for the facts, but to formulate his own opinion on the facts presented to him.<sup>249</sup> That Gusman as a *perito*, whose testimony the court would have taken quite seriously, offered his very own sentence for the *panaderos* spoke to the high tensions of the *panadero* case. I suggest that the immediacy with which Gusman urged violence (as righteous "justice") against the Chinese *panaderos* after claiming expert evidence is telling of how convincing Gusman believed his "expertise" to be in the *panadero* case.

Similar to the *corte*, Spanish litigators on both sides called upon expert physicians to assess the potential physical damage of consuming "glass and plates." Early modern medical practitioners were often called upon as experts in colonial court cases and their

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<sup>246</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, "Testimonio de los autos hechos sobre los artículos de la residencia de Juan de Vargas Hurtado," (1687), 638: Petition by Joseph Tello de Gusman, "escribano receptor de la real *Audiencia* y promotor fiscal."

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Brendecke, *The Empirical Empire*, 134 and 140.

testimonies, like the expert testimonies of the bakers, bore significant weight with court officials.<sup>250</sup> Both sides of the case drew attention to the corporeal damages “glass and plates” could cause to the digestive system. The court requested the expertise of master of the art of the apothecary and apothecary of the royal hospital (“*maestro del arte de botticario y administrador de la bottica del hospital real*”) Marcos de Cardenas to explain the bodily processes of consuming broken glass and plates. The Spanish expert witness explained that ground glass was “deadly poison” if consumed. If the body responded to the consumption with vomit, the act of vomiting would result in “violent cutting” of the throat and mouth through “purging.” Cardenas also warned of the act of “cutting” that would occur through “the back end” (“*la parte posterior*”) of the body, if the *vecino* completely digested the glass and plates.<sup>251</sup> If the act of consumption did not result in death, a damaged stomach signaled other bodily ramifications in the medical theory of humoralism as “the stomach assumed a position of particular importance in early modern regimes of mental and physical health.”<sup>252</sup> Those arguing for the *panaderos*’ defense could not deny the evidence in Cardenas’ statement as he was a respected medical expert at a renowned royal medical institution. Instead, Andres de Torres, the litigator on behalf of the *panaderos*’, used the medical testimony to buttress his own claims. First, litigator Andres de Torres argued that the bread did not have “broken glass and plates” baked into it because the other witnesses of the case did not report any bodily damage (as described by

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<sup>250</sup> Zeb Tortorici, “Sexual Violence, Predatory Masculinity, and Medical Testimony in New Spain,” *Osiris* 30, no. 1 (2015): 274.

<sup>251</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Testimonio de los autos hechos sobre los artículos de la residencia de Juan de Vargas Hurtado,” (1687), 519: Declaration of “*Br Marcos de Cardenas Maestro del arte de botticario y administrador de la bottica del hospital real.*”

<sup>252</sup> Earle, *The Body of the Conquistador*, 28.

Cardenas).<sup>253</sup> The other litigator on behalf of the Chinese *panaderos*, Urbano de Medina, also invoked the testimony of his own “doctors” when explaining that all of the witnesses who consumed the bread reported that they had “no wounds.”<sup>254</sup> Matching one another in expert witnesses, the litigators on both sides of the case understood that the deployment of experts would make or break the cases they built.

So convincing was the Spanish expert evidence on behalf of the Chinese *panaderos* that before the sentencing of the case, the courts released a few Chinese bakery *cabezillas* into the care of a *cabildo* (municipal council) official. Crown official Doctor Don Estevan Lorenzo de la Fuente y Alanis argued that because the *panadero* case had halted the baking of bread and created a “deficiency in the bread of the republic”, that a few *cabezillas* should be released into the care of the trust-worthy official, Captain Don Joseph de Cervantes Altamirano, *cabildo* scribe, so that the Chinese *panaderos* could continue their work.<sup>255</sup> However, such a decision should not be surprising. In the context of the early modern Spanish empire, humoralist doctors connected the consumption of Old World foods to the inherent physical makeup of health, European bodies. Experts on the human body believed that without European foods, the body had the potential to degenerate. Even “healthy people could be harmed by an abrupt alteration in diet... [because] the human body was... in a state of continual flux.”<sup>256</sup> The Spanish *vecino* public relied on Chinese *panaderos* to produce their necessary foodstuff. The Chinese *panaderos* – vilified by Spanish *vecinos*,

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<sup>253</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Testimonio de los autos hechos sobre los artículos de la residencia de Juan de Vargas Hurtado,” (1687), 675: Petition by Andres de Torres “*procurador de causa de la real Audiencia, Defensor nombrado en la causa que de oficio de la real justiciar sea fulminado contra los sangleyes cabezillas.*”

<sup>254</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” (1686), 321, 323.

<sup>255</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Testimonio de los autos hechos sobre los artículos de la residencia de Juan de Vargas Hurtado,” (1687), 533: Decree by Doctor Don Estevan Lorenzo de la Fuente y Alanis.

<sup>256</sup> Earle, *The Body of the Conquistador*, 2, 22-23, 29.



their expertise as bakers ignored by Spanish officials on both sides of the courtroom – were a necessary labor force in the production of European foods. Even a potential Chinese *panadero* insurrection would not stop the Spanish officials from eating their bread.

In the early modern Spanish Empire, experts wielded considerable power. In the *panadero* case, Spanish expertise decided the outcome of the case. The words of a Spanish expert concluded the lengthy trial. In the first attempts at the proceedings, the royal officials claimed that the first round of testimonies did not come from “experts in the art of baking” (“*peritos en el arte de panadería*”), so the testimonies were nullified.<sup>257</sup> The royal officials who executed the final sentence explained that the second round of testimonies proved the Chinese panaderos were, indeed, innocent, because the testimonies given came from “experts” who had been “examined and experienced” in the art of baking. Only those with the “experience of grinding wheat” with stone implements would know that the flour might produce “a few iron picks” and “grit.”<sup>258</sup> In the *panadero* case, the royal courts believed so deeply in the counsel of the expert that they threw out the previous testimonies. With the new expert witnesses’ insight, the courts absolved the Chinese panaderos of the crimes against the Spanish vecinos of Manila. The courts returned all of the confiscated materials from the Chinese panaderos and their servants and acquitted all of the parties involved of any wrongdoing.<sup>259</sup>

I have argued that the *panadero* case revealed the centrality of the expert, not just as a source of knowledge in the Spanish courtroom, but as a uniquely “experienced” Spanish

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<sup>257</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Testimonio de los autos hechos sobre los artículos de la residencia de Juan de Vargas Hurtado,” (1686), 730, 861.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., 730, 862-863.

male expert in a multiracial colonial world. But beneath the surface, Spanish authorities understood that Chinese panaderos honed their own unique form of expertise: the building of relationships with influential *vecinos* via debt networks. The *panaderos'* litigator, Urbano de Medina, explained that despite the paranoid calls that prompted the people of Manila to “cry out and attribute this [event; the grit found in the bread] to a general conspiracy,” Manileño *vecinos* should still trust the Chinese panaderos.<sup>260</sup> He explained that the *panaderos* built strong relationships with respectable people and received “Good treatment and affection from the Spaniards and people of this city who, in the case, lent them money. This reason alone should vanish any [other] presumptions of guilt.”<sup>261</sup> In order to prove the panaderos’ innocence, Medina brought to light a common lending practice that went both ways in the colonial Philippines, wherein Chinese men built widespread debtor/ creditor relationships with Chinese, indigenous Philippine, and Spanish men alike.<sup>262</sup> Medina’s assumption is further demonstrated by the support of respectable experts like the priest Christoval who vouched for Chinese *panadero* Manuel’s character. Christoval stated that when he found out about the alleged “glass and broken plates” in the city’s bread supply, he presumed that it was the “[indigenous] servants or villains” who threw the glass into the bread. He appealed to the court that Manuel was married and was “always quiet and of a good life” (“*siempre quieto y de buen vivir*”).<sup>263</sup> Christoval may not have gone as far as naming Chinese panaderos “experts” in the bakery, but it was in Chinese panaderos’ deftness at building networks with powerful people that they secured their own freedom.

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<sup>260</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” (1686), 320.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid. 326.

<sup>262</sup> Kueh, “Adaptive Strategies,” 364.

<sup>263</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 69, “Traslado de los autos sobre defectos en la causa criminal contra los sangleyes panaderos sobre el maleficio del pan cocido y harina,” (1686), 331.

### A Responsible, Intelligent Expert in the *Corte de maderas*

In the *corte*, the expert's authority as an "intelligent" man, and arguably as a masculine authority, came from his ability to manage *corte* laborers. Tamón depended upon *corte* officials to police laborers' criminal behavior as he explained that *corte* "captain and lieutenants" be "the type of people of intelligence" who could authoritatively monitor and stamp out any illegal *corte* dealings. The Governor General elaborated on the quality of intelligence he expected from his *corte* captains and lieutenants: "Intelligent" men were to approach indigenous laborers with "the greatest gentleness" so as to not impress upon the already strained laborers "excessive rigors."<sup>264</sup> For Tamón, a *corte* Spanish authority needed to maintain a balanced approach to governance: intelligent enough to monitor proceedings, yet level-headed enough as to not further brutalize the already exhausted *corte* labor force. The Spanish officer aligned his expectations with the general expectations of elite Spanish colonial authorities, wherein "male honor rested on cultural displays of forcefulness" yet still required a measure of "social decorum."<sup>265</sup> Where Tamón demanded personal authority from *corte* officials, he characterized indigenous laborers as needful of a "gentle" hand. Indigenous laborers were, indeed, overworked. But Tamón glossed over the culprit behind the exploitation: other Spanish *corte* officials.

For Tamón, *corte* experts like carpenters and *ahiladores* (lumbermen who lined up cuts of wood) were responsible for any mistakes on the sawmill floor. Like the *corte* lieutenants and captains, men in skilled positions were expected to demonstrate "intelligence," but were also expected to bear the faults of their subordinates. If indigenous

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<sup>264</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, "Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera," (1736), 2.

<sup>265</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 161-162.

laborers committed mistakes, Tamón held the few carpenters and *ahiladores* responsible. In the cases that indigenous *corte* laborers cut wood that did not correspond to the measurements expected, the *corte* officials were to take the mistake on as their own. Accurately producing wood cuts to the exact specifications of *corte* officials was essential to Tamón as he had to guarantee that the strength of ship wood could withstand the Pacific voyage; if indigenous laborers did not cut the wood meticulously, the wood pieces produced would be “useless.” Rather than blaming indigenous laborers – men who Tamón perceived were unskilled and could not know any better – Tamón insisted that all errors from the cuts of wood be laid upon the Cavite carpenters and *ahiladores* because they were “intelligent” ones who “knew the woods” well.<sup>266</sup> I surmise that Tamón attempted to train carpenters and *ahiladores* – men in the middling managerial positions – in the Spanish masculine practice bearing responsibility for their colonial dependents.<sup>267</sup>

Under the constant pressure of repairing and rebuilding galleons, Tamón relied upon intelligent Spanish authorities to monitor woodcutters. More revealing, I argue, is that Tamón differentiated between skilled and unskilled woodcutters; a trade usually reserved for indigenous men. Tamón was well aware that indigenous woodcutters had their own kind of “experience” as sawers in their native forests. In his laws, Tamón anticipated that the *corte* might employ unqualified laborers. He expected his intelligent Spanish authorities to dole out punishment to those who were, by definition of their previous trades, not skilled enough for the *corte*. He requested that indigenous men with the title of “servants, cooks, and clerks” should not be allowed to work in the *corte* because

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<sup>266</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 16.

<sup>267</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 161-162.

“the cut decreases with their inexperienced labor.” Tamón emphasized that the inefficient labor of would-be *corte* laborers (ex-servants, ex-cooks, and ex-clerks) actually increased the work of surrounding laborers. The Governor General went as far as incentivizing the stoppage of allowing “inexperienced labor” in the lumberyards, giving five hundred pesos to the “whistleblower” and penalizing those officials who allowed the practice with a thousand-peso fine (depositing five hundred pesos of the penalty into the community fund, the *caja de comunidad*, of the nearby towns).<sup>268</sup> Tamón’s concerns over *corte* inefficiency is even more pronounced in his declaration on illegal wood-carting. Tamón urged that the *corte* corporals “with the best care and vigilance” stamp out the “pernicious” practice of unapproved laborers carting the lumber off of the *corte* premises. In the interest of the royal estate, handling the cut wood could not be entrusted to just any person “of any quality.”<sup>269</sup> In the writing of these laws I assert that the Governor General was forced to come to terms with maintaining a delicate balance: disciplining the *corte* to produce maximum efficiency as the lumberyards powered the galleon trade while still maintaining Spanish hegemonic masculine authority over multiracial *corte* laborers.

In his laws, Tamón denounced Spanish officials’ abuses at the *corte*. His disdain, however, did not prevent Tamón from structuring a punitive racial hierarchy in the *corte*, further creating a personal experience of abuse for indigenous laborers. In his assessment of penalties to those who broke his rules, Tamón strongly condemned “looting officers, managers, carpenters, and others” who overtly exploited *corte* laborers. Tamón, however, established a racial hierarchy of monetary fines. “If they are Spaniards, they [will] pay a

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<sup>268</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, “Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera,” (1736), 11.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

penalty of one hundred pesos... If he were an Indian, a creole, a mestizo, and [someone from] another nation... [their] penalty [is] to serve three years with a ration but without salary in the royal galley.”<sup>270</sup> Tamón’s penalty hierarchy had two repercussions. First, the *corte* labor regime locked indigenous *repartimiento* laborers in a cycle of unpaid, onerous, and brutal labor. Tamón elaborated upon these realities as he constructed indigenous laborers in the *corte* as innocents constantly in need of protection. By characterizing indigenous laborers as naïve and lacking awareness, Tamón simultaneously erased personal authority and personal experience from *corte* workers. Tamón’s characterization of needful *corte* laborers, his racial formation, was not enough. The Governor General deployed the “Indian” laborer racial formation by enacting a law that would rob any non-Spanish (including indigenous men) of their meager salaries. While the laborer would still receive a “ration,” that amount would likely range anywhere from fifteen *gantas* (2 cups) to half a *celemín* (4 pints) a rice per month.<sup>271</sup> Under Tamón, I assert that overworking and underpaying *corte* laborers hardly stopped. Second, the Governor General’s penalty system worked as a harm reduction tactic. His system of laws ensured that wayward, yet “intelligent” Spanish officials need not concern themselves too much with the fatal labor regimes they imposed upon indigenous laborers. Spanish *corte* officials must only worry about sporadic monetary deductions from their personal treasuries, already gaining consistent sums of money from illegally indebting and exploiting indigenous laborers.

In 1748, the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, Doctor Juan de Arechederra reported to the crown that he found a shipsmith who could complete the construction of a large sixty-gun

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<sup>270</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>271</sup> Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 144-145.

ship “to perfection.” Antonio Mazo, a “Christian Sangley”, would save the crown many pesos as he was an “intelligent” shipsmith.<sup>272</sup> Where Tamón remained virtually silent on the existence of Chinese laborers in the *corte*, it is clear that Chinese men like Mazo labored alongside Spanish *corte* officials and indigenous laborers. Why would a Spanish official characterize a non-Spaniard as “intelligent”? It is to this question that I will turn in the following chapter.

## Conclusion

In the colony’s provisional economies, indigenous laborers toiled in the bakeries that nourished Spanish *vecinos* and in the *cortés de maderas* that produced valuable galleon woods. Within this imperial labor system, Spanish officials guaranteed that indigenous laborers’ lowly social positions would remain static. I have highlighted how experts and intelligent men shaped the labor spaces of the Philippine colonial economy. However, the role of the expert was uniquely reserved for Spanish men. By defining expertise as a man’s capacity to demonstrate the authority of personal experience and intelligence, while simultaneously ignoring indigenous expertise and structuring oppressive labor regimes for indigenous men, Spanish men guaranteed that only they alone could become the colony’s experts.

More importantly, I offer that the interactions between Spanish authorities and indigenous laborers was more than a collision of incongruent epistemologies, knowledges, or ways of knowing. The colonial collision resulted in Spanish officials’ consistent devaluing

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<sup>272</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg., 450, Num. 21, “Duplicado de carta de Juan de Arechederra sobre tributos de Pangasinan,” (1748), 1.

and de-legitimizing of indigenous labor and knowledges in favor of the sacred word of the European “expert.” Both discursively and materially, imperial authorities exploited indigenous men, ensuring that self-possession and personal authority (prerequisites for expertise) were always out the indigenous laborer’s reach.



## Chapter 3

### “Testing their metal”: Gauging Masculinity in the Mines

In their efforts to manage the multiracial laborers in the mines of the colonial Philippines, Spanish imperial authorities structured a strict labor hierarchy. As “experts” of ore, imperial officials cemented themselves atop the hierarchy. Below them, Spaniards demanded that Chinese laborers work skilled positions as land surveyors and metalsmiths. At the bottom of this hierarchy were indigenous laborers; those who imperial officials compelled to labor for the benefit of the Empire. Similar to the rest of the Spanish Empire, imperial experts asserted themselves as uniquely equipped with the knowledges needed to efficiently extract natural resources; knowledges that indigenous actors supposedly lacked.<sup>273</sup> In this chapter, I examine accounts of failure and success in operating the iron and gold mines of Paracale in the province of Camarines Norte. I analyze petitions and *mercedes* (or mercies, exemptions from crown laws), as well as cases of abuse in the mines to argue that imperial officials conceptualized racial difference in its relation to Spanish masculine abilities of grasping “intelligence” and paternal, martial strength. I also argue that imperial officials perceived “intelligence” in Chinese skilled mine workers while undervaluing indigenous laborers. Spanish authorities turned racial *stereotypes* into racist *practice* by choosing Chinese laborers for skilled work, while foreclosing any opportunities for skilled labor to indigenous men.

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<sup>273</sup> Crawford, *The Andean Wonder Drug*, 7: Crawford highlights the intellectual battle between Iberian knowledges and indigenous knowledges on the extraction of quina in Peru. In similar instances, European actors struggled with indigenous men on the best knowledges and practices to extract, use, and manufacture the natural resource of quina.

By employing a discursive analysis of race and gender in the mines, I aim to distinguish the fine grain differences in Spanish authorities' perceptions of indigenous and Chinese masculinities. I focus on how imperial authorities understood mining expertise – the knowledge one needed to authoritatively survey land, use foundry technologies, and gauge the quality of metals – through the lens of the Spanish gender ideal of “intelligence.” Taking the imperial documentation on mining as a cohesive colonial discourse, I argue that imperial authorities discursively created two figures: The efficient, productive Chinese man and the lazy “Indian.” Imperial actors further cemented these figures into a material reality by bestowing Chinese men with work as foundry melters and metalsmiths, while continuously abusing, ignoring, and undervaluing indigenous laborers. By contributing a work that highlights Spanish, indigenous, and Chinese contentions over the meanings of colonial masculinity, I avoid the pitfalls of naturalizing types of labor as “masculine” or “feminine.” I uphold Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt’s feminist critique of mining in which she argues that mining labor is not an inherently masculine endeavor, as women also participated in the productivity of the mines.<sup>274</sup> Women mine laborers certainly existed in the gold mines of Paracale; Paracaleña women labored as the *principal* metal “washers” who reduced chunks of gold to powder.<sup>275</sup> Moving away from the assumption that mining is a naturally masculine activity is helpful particularly in the context of colonial Philippine mines; a site wherein no one form of hegemonic masculinity prevailed as indigenous, Chinese, and Spanish laborers ascribed to their own gendered norms.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, “Digging women: towards a new agenda for feminist critiques of mining,” *Gender, Place & Culture* 12, no. 2 (2012): 197.

<sup>275</sup> Diaz-Trechuelo, “Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy,” 794.

<sup>276</sup> Klubock, *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile’s El Teniente Copper Mine, 1940-1951*, 6.

I study imperial correspondence, petitions, and mercies rich with Spanish authorities' gendered and racial anxieties to demonstrate the ways in which racial formations established the need for crown assistance in the world of Philippine mining. Local authorities created petitions and mercies with their audience, imperial bureaucrats of the Royal Government of Manila and the imperial governments of New Spain and Seville, in mind. The authors of the *gracia* petitions I examine requested the creation of mining laws while authors of mercies asked for "special awards" to benefit the mining industry from the King. In the wider Spanish empire, vassals submitted these "enduring, precedent-forming" *gracia* petitions to the crown in order to "yield edicts of privilege that included grants of Indian tribute, pensions, preeminences, pardons, crown offices, and other royal prerogatives."<sup>277</sup> In the Philippine mining world, the "special awards" Spanish men requested came in the form of demanding exemptions from laws.<sup>278</sup> Thus, the colonial discourse Chapter Three examines is filled with prostrations to royal authority as well as florid language that Spanish officials imbued with desperation and need.<sup>279</sup> Petition and mercy requests exposed Spanish men's concerns about the challenges of encouraging indigenous laborers to commit to productive labor and mine proprietors' need to avoid burdensome taxation. However, as Spanish authorities and mine proprietors begged for the crown's resources, they also revealed their own apprehensions about indigenous and Chinese racial formations in colonial Philippine mines.

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<sup>277</sup> Adrian Masters, "A Thousand Invisible Architects: Vassals, the Petition, and Response System, and the Creation of Spanish Imperial Caste Legislation," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 98, no. 3 (2018): 382.

<sup>278</sup> Jorge Cañizares Esguerra, "Bartolome Inga's Mining Technologies: Indians, Science, and Cyphered Secrecy, and Modernity in the New World," *History and Technology* 34, no. 1 (2018): 64-65: Cañizares has argued that *gracia* petitions are "where the history of science and technology in colonial Spanish America ought to be found."

<sup>279</sup> Patricia Seed, "Review Essays," 183.

In the first part of the chapter, I contend that authors of petitions and mercies convinced royal officials to comply with their requests by highlighting two figures: the poor, needy Indian who was “defenseless” in the face of *Moros* and innocent of how to mine precious metals and the “intelligent Chinese miner.” In creating requests to the crown, authors of petitions and mercies paved ways to protect their mining investments. Discursively, Spanish authorities shored up the “needy native” trope; this racial formation added weight to their petitions and mercies. I then examine the ways in which Spanish authorities put the tropes of the intelligent Chinese miner, the needy indigenous laborer, and the masculine, martial Spaniard into practice in everyday mining operations. By recruiting Chinese migrant labor over indigenous labor, by undervaluing indigenous labor, and by bestowing Spanish mining proprietors with excessive rights to violence and coercion of indigenous laborers, Spanish-authored racial formations solidify into racialized labor hierarchies. In the concluding section of the chapter, I revisit the iron mines of Paracale and its legacy of abuse in order to complicate imperial actors’ racialized, discursive creations.

### The Importance of Mining Iron

The importance of mining iron was inestimable to Spanish officials in the fairly new, and incredibly distant Philippine colony. Although local traders imported iron from China and Borneo, the sheer number of pesos spent on cultivating the iron mines demonstrates how important the manufacture of iron was to the Spanish Empire.<sup>280</sup> Less important than

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<sup>280</sup> Diaz-Trechuelo, “Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy,” 764: We know very little about how Spanish miners ran the iron mines of Paracale. Maria Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo’s article is the closest analysis we have on the matter. Diaz-Trechuelo provides us with a neat narrative of Spanish mining efforts from 1750 to 1800. I further flesh out Diaz-Trechuelo’s article by highlighting the imperial authorities’ anxieties about operating the mines. It is in their hesitations,

mining minerals to match the kind of mass production in the kingdoms of Peru and New Spain, mining projects in the Philippines were small-scale. Iron production was crucial to the colonial economy; iron was needed for the creation of smaller tools to mine gold and for the creation of handheld weapons.<sup>281</sup> Imperial authorities were well aware of the mineral richness of the Philippines, so much so that they were constantly anxious about imperial takeovers by “foreign nations” who sought to profit from the colony’s mines.<sup>282</sup>

More importantly, the production of iron sustained the smooth operation of Spain’s lucrative galleon trade. In his letter to the Spanish crown, Governor General of the Philippines, Diego de Salcedo requested permission to commence trade with Cambodia in search for “iron and anchors.” Requests for trade with surrounding kingdoms was, at the time, only legally permitted via special license from the crown. Salcedo requested the special license as there existed “a great, irreparable lack of anchors” in the islands in 1666. The Philippines – a colony far removed from Spain’s Americas and Spain itself – was a deeply valuable stopover point for Spain’s galleon trade, not only as a site for the trade of New Spain and China’s goods, but also as a repair station for the galleons.<sup>283</sup> The iron anchors were a necessity to the Philippine galleon trade that brought Spain and its colonies so much wealth.

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their calls for assistance, and their general exasperation over the lack of resources that we can glean their racializations of masculinity through labor.

<sup>281</sup> Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 47, 57.

<sup>282</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “Sobre Labores de Minas de hierro de provincial de Camarines,” (1754), 1.

<sup>283</sup> McCarthy, “The Yards at Cavite,” 150.

## Discursive Constructions in Petitions and Mercies

Spanish officials and mine proprietors deployed the discursive figures of the “needy Indian,” the “intelligent Chinese miner,” and the masculine “Spanish expert,” in petitions and mercy requests. I contend that Spanish men’s conceptualization of the racial “Other” was inextricable to Spanish assumptions on inferior forms of masculinity.<sup>284</sup> If the indigenous Paracaleño man was perpetually in need of guidance, it would be the Spanish man’s responsibility to provide that discipline. Backed by the sword and the cross, Spanish noblemen did not need to question their masculinity as colonial officials, clergymen, and moneyed proprietors.<sup>285</sup> In their eyes, the “Other’s” masculinity could not match that of the Spanish authority. Instead, the “Other’s” masculinity hinged on his capacity for productive labor in service to the Spaniard and the crown.

### The Iron Mines

“It is obvious to our majesty that there are neither Spaniards nor natives in these islands who understand it if not the Sangleys.”<sup>286</sup>

– 1754, Francisco José de Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Francisco Xavier Salgado on iron manufacturing in Paracale

Under the administration of the same Diego de Salcedo and the *alcalde mayor* of Camarines province, Andres de Rojas, the first efforts at mass mining iron in Paracale

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<sup>284</sup> Horswell, *Decolonizing the Sodomite*, 2: My argument builds off of Horswell’s work on third gender Andeans under Spanish colonization in which he links Iberian claims to cultural superiority over indigenous cultures to Iberian men’s conceptions of hegemonic masculinity.

<sup>285</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 162: In Stern’s study on gender relations in colonial Mexico, Stern studies how Mexican men contended with the Spanish man’s gender ideals which were linked to a “color-class privilege” wielded by Spanish noblemen.

<sup>286</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a letter dated January 15, 1754,” (1754), 3.

commenced in 1663. Rojas requested the assistance of a Spanish mining engineer named Captain Don Gil Carol. The imperial officer who authored the letter authorizing Gil Carol's arrival to Manila focused on two major points. First, Spanish officials in 1664 could not find anyone who was well practiced in the faculties and foundry of iron in all of the islands of the Philippines. Second, that the Paracale iron mines needed a person "of care, science, and [of] experience."<sup>287</sup> In the Iberian sentiment, "*un hombre de ciencia*," or a man of science, demonstrated a deep knowledge of a given scientific art – "the certain knowledge of a subject for its cause" – with good intention and conscience.<sup>288</sup> In the mind of the imperial official, the man who assumed the position of mining engineer needed to exhibit the masculine traits of the ideal scientific man: authority of European philosophy in the face of "native savagery." So, it could only be Gil Carol, "newly come from Spain", with the capacity for science; a man who was most certainly "a person of *intelligence* and practice in the foundry [of iron]" who could make the Paracale iron mines profitable.<sup>289</sup>

Almost a century later, imperial officials still wielded the qualifier of European intellect as they gauged men's utility to the Paracale iron mines and, overall, to the Spanish Empire. In the 1750s, Governor General Francisco José de Obando (1750-1754) and Paracale ironworks financier Francisco Xavier Salgado highlighted the iron master and Discalced Augustinian Fray Sebastian de San Vicente's as a man who was undoubtedly "*inteligente*."<sup>290</sup> The quality of intelligence and mastery over artisanal crafts like metallurgy remained masculine traits for Spanish men. However, in the same breath, the ever-

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<sup>287</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated in 1664," 2: Translation: "*de cuidado, ciencia, y experiencia*."

<sup>288</sup> *Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española*, 280.

<sup>289</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated in 1664," 2.

<sup>290</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In letters dated April 10, April 11, May 8 1754," (1754), 3 and AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated in November of 1755," (1756), 2.

resourceful servant to the crown, enthusiastically supported the Friar's wish to begin the importation of "infidel" Chinese labor.<sup>291</sup> In Obando's journey to exploit the mineral wealth of the Philippines, he would come to grant Chinese men access to the coveted categorization of "intelligence."

Obando credited the two iron masters "of the Chinese nation," along with the "intelligent" Salgado (the mine's financier), Fray Sebastian, and the three Spaniards who demarcated and took samples of ore with the success of the Royal Ironworks of Camarines.<sup>292</sup> Obando, as well as Fray Sebastian, made clear that the infidel Chinese laborers were valuable to the mining project because of their keen abilities in determining the strength of Paracale iron. On their return voyage from Paracale, the Chinese iron masters informed Fray Sebastian that, "according to their *intelligence* [the Paracale iron] is better than the... [kind] they work in China."<sup>293</sup> The "infidel" Chinese would eventually hand over the samples to Fray Sebastian, who opined that Paracale iron was "good, sweet, and competent for whichever works [necessary]."<sup>294</sup> In their role as iron experts – men who added value to the crown's dwindling iron mines – Obando and Sebastian endowed Chinese iron laborers with the capacity for intelligence.

That Obando and Sebastian saw intelligence in Chinese men is all the more significant in their realizations that infidel Chinese and learned Spanish men could actually share similarities with one another. From Obando's epiphany that the "six infidel sangleys"

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<sup>291</sup> Diaz-Trechuelo, "Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy," 766: Governor General Obando's administration was, apparently, very intuitive when it came to cultivating trade and developing resources in the Philippines. "The Marquis of Obando, whose administration (1750-1754) was so outstanding in whatever pertained to the development of the rich resources of the Archipelago, realized the abandoned state of the Mambulao mines."

<sup>292</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated November 21, 1755," (1756), 1.

<sup>293</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated May 8, 1754," (1754), 1.

<sup>294</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated November 21, 1755," (1756), 1.



were slowly demonstrating themselves to be “intelligent” to his observation that two Chinese surveyors were “likewise” as knowledgeable in the factory of iron as Fray Sebastian who was “intelligent in the knowledge of the stones,” Obando racialized Chinese men in proximity to Spanish men through the masculine trait of “intelligence.”<sup>295</sup> For imperial authorities, understanding oneself in relation to the colonized “Other” was a process of producing the colonial subject. In other words, “it is not the colonialist Self or the colonized Other, but the disturbing distance in-between that constitutes the figure of colonial otherness.”<sup>296</sup> Obando collapsed the “distance in-between” Fray Sebastian and the Chinese laborers, and re-formulates the Chinese man’s otherness to somewhat, but not entirely, resemble Spanish masculinity.

In most of the instances where Obando, Salgado, or Fray Sebastian mentioned the indigenous Paracaleño mine laborer, they spoke of him comparatively and measured him against the intellectual capacity of Chinese miners. In his pleas to the Manila government for the exemption to recruit Chinese laborers under the expulsion order, Obando highlighted that the ironworks must make do with the Chinese “foreigners” because there was a “lack of intelligent subjects on these islands.”<sup>297</sup> Obando referred to particular unproductive mining laborers he called *vagamundos* (vagabonds) who either refused to work or performed poorly at the mines.<sup>298</sup> Although the Paracaleños toiled in the mines, in the eyes of the imperial officials, the qualities of the indigenous labor did not match those of the sangley.<sup>299</sup> Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado awaited the dispatch of their

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<sup>295</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In letters dated April 11th and May 8th, 1754,” (1754), 3.

<sup>296</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 44-45.

<sup>297</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “Sobre Labores de Minas de hierro de provincial de Camarines,” (1754), f. 110.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 143.

requests to the Manila government and complained that in relation to the sangleys, “there was no copy of skilled natives” in the factory of iron.<sup>300</sup> One might wonder if the Paracaleños participated in the same convincing ruse as their Igorot counterparts who dwelled in Luzon’s Northern Cordillera mountains; men who would purposely abandon their mines to avoid interacting with the Spaniards (and eventually conscription into mining labor).<sup>301</sup> The tactic would not be farfetched as Salgado, recounting his experience with the Paracale mines, noted that the iron he had received from trading with the “natives of the [Paracale] region” was, indeed, good iron.<sup>302</sup> What we do know from Obando, Salgado, and Fray Sebastian, is that they chose to give skilled foundry work to Chinese laborers over indigenous Paracaleños. They made this decision repeatedly throughout their accounts of the mining operations at Paracale, because they were convinced that Chinese *expertise* and Chinese intelligence bested the intellects of Paracaleño men.<sup>303</sup>

### Gold: A Glittering Lure

“Book 4, Title 20: The correct opinion then seems to be, that the property of the mines remains vested in the crown, and that as the sovereign cannot work them on his own account, *he has given his subjects a partial interest in them*, under various restrictions, and subject to various liabilities.”<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid., f. 169.

<sup>301</sup> Scott, *The Discovery*, 6, 35.

<sup>302</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “Sobre Labores de Minas de hierro de provincial de Camarines,” (1754), f. 209.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.: Salgado lamented “without enjoying [Chinese] expertise” under the expulsion acts, “the natives learn to work the iron.”

<sup>304</sup> Don Francisco Xavier de Gamboa, *Commentaries on the Mining Ordinances of Spain: Dedicated to His Catholic Majesty, Charles III, Vol. 1* (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown & Green, Paternoster-Row, 1830), 24. (Translated by Richard Heathfield, Esquire).

During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Spanish Empire did not mine gold at the same rate as iron in Camarines Norte. It was not until the 1750s that ship's pilot Don Francisco Xavier Estorgo Gallegos declared ownership of the gold mines of Paracale.<sup>305</sup> For conquistadores under the Spanish empire, gold was a major driving force into the exploration of the rugged colonies.<sup>306</sup> Some historians have gone as far to claim that if gold were mined in the Philippines to the same degree as it was in the Americas, the character of Spanish migration to the archipelago would have increased dramatically.<sup>307</sup> When colonizer-miners did attempt to mine the most mineral-rich mountains in Igorot territory, they were met with violent resistance, the abandonment of mines, and even death.<sup>308</sup> Although the mines at Paracale did not incur the same human losses as the mines in Igorot territory, the Mambuloans at Paracale did contend with the danger of *Moro* piracy. Despite these dangers, Estorgo staked claim to Paracale's gold mines.

Under Spanish mining laws, Estorgo cemented his position as the owner of five gold mining sites in Paracale. Like the iron miners of Paracale, Estorgo wrote convincingly that the purpose of gold mining was to benefit the service of the Spanish Crown and to also work towards the *buen común* (common good) of Paracale. In his request to gain ownership of the mine, Estorgo claimed that the 1635 Spanish law was created to protect him as a miner; a miner who should "enjoy all of the privileges" of the law. Estorgo's

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<sup>305</sup> Diaz-Trechuelo, "Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy," 791.

<sup>306</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a decree dated April 10, 1753, (1754), 3: In regards to the iron mines, Obando was immensely interested in the possibility for developing mines so lucrative that they would be appealing to more Spanish investment and to ultimately make it "convenient to work and populate [the islands] with Spaniards."

<sup>307</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 105-6 and M.N. Pearson, "The Spanish 'Impact' on the Philippines, 1565-1770," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 12, no. 2 (1969): 175: The actual Spanish presence in the Philippines was always low in number – in comparison to the Spanish presence in Latin America – throughout the 377-year occupation of the islands.

<sup>308</sup> Scott, *The Discovery*, 6, 9-10, 99.

request was granted by the royal government of Manila. If it was not because of his own persuasive language, the rights to the mine were likely approved because Estorgo fully committed to paying the royal fifth (or the *quinto*) of gold to the crown. The royal fifth was a customary law that all miners had to commit to a 20% payment to the crown drawn from the profits of all metals and commodities (including slaves) acquired as subjects during the process of mining to the Spanish crown.<sup>309</sup> Estorgo happily obliged to the fifth if it meant he could have the gold mines.

In his petitions to the crown, Estorgo portrayed himself as a commanding protector of his mines; he saw himself as an authority committed to the manly pursuit of defense against enemy *Moro* raiders.<sup>310</sup> Much of Estorgo's requests to the royal government in Manila centered on building, equipping, and manning a fort to protect his gold mines from the *Moros* (indigenous Muslims) of Mindanao. In order to face the widely-feared martial strength of the *Moros*, the former ship pilot drew from a uniquely European, masculine source of strength. In the early modern period, the ideal "dominant masculine subject" drew his authority from Renaissance humanism's archetypal man of "arms and letters." Estorgo assumed the role of the former as protector of his mines.<sup>311</sup> In a series of letters to Governor General Arandia, Estorgo requested that the royal government of Manila dub him "*el castellano de la fuerza*" (the warden of the fort) so that he could take charge of the fort's operations. Recognizing the prestige of this position, the notary described the pageantry of Estorgo's swearing in ceremony in full detail:

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<sup>309</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, "In a letter dated October 3, 1754," (1756), 1.

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>311</sup> Horswell, *Decolonizing the Sodomite*, 2: Horswell also qualifies that this trope was cemented specifically in Iberian ideology.

“Le recibió juramento que lo hizo de fidelidad a dios nuestro señor y a una señal de cruz conforme a derecho y so cargo del prometió como buen vasallo defender aquella fuerza a *ley de caballero* de cualquiera invasión o asalto que la quieran dar en cuyo hecho *prometió perder antes la vida que el desamparo de ella*, y que en lucimiento de las armas españolas que tanto venera hará cuanta defensa le sea correspondiente sin innovación alguna.”<sup>312</sup>

[Translation] He [Estorgo] received an oath that he made with fidelity to God our Lord and the sign of the cross according to the law and under charge of the promise like a good vassal to defend that fort by the knight’s law from any invasion or assault that they want to give in whose deed he promised to lose his life before abandoning the fort, and that the veneration of the Spanish weapons that he venerates so much will make whatever corresponding defense without any innovation.”

In the context of the ritual ceremony of knighting a man, Estorgo’s utterances do not seem incredibly dramatic. The letter’s recipient, Arandia, however, believed them to be. In approving Estorgo’s title, Arandia simply outlined: “I condescended to his request... without any cost to the Royal Herald.”<sup>313</sup> As a former ship’s captain who likely admired the elaborate ritual of admiralship, Estorgo might have clamored for such an important title. The knighting ritual for ships’ admirals were remarkably similar to that of knighting men

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<sup>312</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated December 30, 1754,” (1756), 3.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid.

on land. The admiral “also shared the attributes of good knight: skill in war, valor, generosity with booty and ability to keep the loyalty of his men.”<sup>314</sup> Whatever Estorgo’s previous aspirations may have been, in his stead as a mine proprietor he believed himself to be endowed with the masculine traits similar to that of a knight. He also believed that the masculine, martial qualities of the knight would be the source of his success in overcoming the *Moros*.

In the opinion of Spanish officials, the *Moros* suffered from every immoderation possible. Spaniards believed *Moros* to be overly cruel in war and likely cannibalistic; traits of “barbarism,” such as these disqualified them as potential vassals and, ultimately, as potential Spanish men.<sup>315</sup> But unlike Obando who financed the iron mines, Estorgo perceived the quality of martial manliness as a positive attribute in other indigenous men. In his request for soldiers to man the iron mines at Paracale, Estorgo demanded that the mines needed eight Spanish and six Pampangan soldiers “with salaries that they earn here [to be] without prejudice to the natives because they gladly go to work.”<sup>316</sup> At the very least, Estorgo *monetarily* valued the worth of Spanish soldiers on par with the worth of Pampangan warriors. For the Spaniard Estorgo, the Pampangan could never be fully Spanish, but the indigenous man’s military skill brought him close enough.

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<sup>314</sup> Jennifer L. Green, “The Development of Maritime Law in Medieval Spain: The Case of Castile and the Siete Partidas” *The Historian* 58, no. 3 (1996): 579.

<sup>315</sup> Constantino, *A History of the Philippines*, 26, Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence*, 33, Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 137-140, and Reeser, *Moderating Masculinity*, 14-15, 222.

<sup>316</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated on July 14, 1756,” (1756, 4: “*con los sueldos que aquí ganan sin perjuicio de los naturales porque estos concurrirán gustosos a el trabajo.*”

## Turning Discourse into Practice: Operating Iron and Gold Mines

Spanish authorities, still trafficking in the racial formations they constructed in petitions and mercies, used the same logics to structure racial hierarchies for mining laborers in the colonial Philippine iron and gold mines. Authorities in the iron mines of Paracale took the trope of the “needy Indian” a step further by offering up the Chinese laborer as the savior of both the unskilled Paracaleño and Spanish mining operations in the Philippines overall. Spanish authorities rooted this racial hierarchy in Chinese men’s – and not indigenous Paracaleños’ – capacity to think with “intelligence” when laboring for the empire.<sup>317</sup> In the gold mines, Estorgo combined his personal monies with crown monies to structure a military fort to defend his mines, thus fulfilling his masculine desires to defend his domains. Armed with approval from the Governor General, Estorgo demanded martial and mining labor, material support, and the cooperation of indigenous leaders to fulfill his fantasies as “warden of the fort.” Spanish authorities in the iron and gold mines’ race-making project and gendered ideations, then, were deeply entwined with the crown’s colonizing (and money making) impulses in the Philippines.

### Racialized Labor Hierarchies in the Iron Mines

In the Governor General Marquis de Obando’s pursuit to renew colonists’ interest in the mineral excavation of the islands, the Bourbon Reformer sought a team of Spanish and

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<sup>317</sup> Walter Mignolo, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, & Colonization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 33-34, seen in Bernardo de Aldrete’s, *Origenes de la lengua castellana* (1606): Less concerned with masculinity, in his canonical study on Renaissance humanism’s darker, colonial legacy, Walter Mignolo highlighted the “civilizing” influence of lettered cultures – specifically that of Castilian Spain – on cultures that lacked written scripts. Mignolo studied Spanish writer Bernardo de Aldrete’s claim that Spain, because it was a “lettered” culture, was uniquely positioned to dominate over its colonial possessions as its lettered culture. “The Amerindians... not only lacked any kind of letters, and consequently *science* and literature as well, but also the civility that in Aldrete’s mind went together with letters.”<sup>317</sup> It is with the latter concept, the capacity for understanding science, that mine proprietors and imperial officers wielded masculine authority over laborers.

Chinese experts to survey the iron mining lands.<sup>318</sup> Obando sent Discalced Augustinian Fray Sebastian de San Vicente (an iron mining expert) and requested “six other infidel *sangleys* (Chinese men) residing in the *Alcaicería* within the *Parían* of *Extramuros* (the segregated Chinese city outside of the walled city of Manila)” to survey the mines of Paracale. After “having volunteered” for this position, the *sangleys* would then travel to the site of Mambulao in Paracale. Fearing the alleged *Moro* attacks that supposedly afflicted the site of Mambulao, Obando paid for a garrison to accompany the mining reconnaissance team.<sup>319</sup>

In Obando’s preference for Chinese men as skilled iron workers and by granting permission to Chinese iron maestros to forge iron by their own standards, the Governor General made the racial formation of the “intelligent miner” into a material reality. As traders and “master founders” of the Paracale ironworks, Spanish officials preferred Chinese laborers.<sup>320</sup> The Obando administration released multiple decrees to mine the many metals that “abound[ed] in these colonies.” However, Obando explained that because “metal was precious to human life,” the mining industry required specialized laborers. The shrewd Governor General stipulated in his decrees that the metal’s mining would not be left “to chance... [the manufacture of iron would] *depend* on the introduction and trade of the Chinese Sangleys.”<sup>321</sup> Obando so preferred Chinese labor that when the ailing, asthmatic Fray Sebastian could not make the trip to Mambulao, Obando instead sent for two *maestros* (iron masters) from China, and three Spaniards. His use of the term *maestro*

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<sup>318</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a decree dated April 10, 1753,” (1754), 1 and Diaz-Trechuelo, “Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy,” 766.

<sup>319</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a decree dated April 10, 1753,” (1754), 1.

<sup>320</sup> Diaz-Trechuelo, “Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy,” 766.

<sup>321</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a letter dated April 10, 1753,” (1754), 2 (emphasis mine).



is telling. The early modern definition of *maestro* drew its prestige from the European medieval history of artisanry, wherein the maestro was “well-taught in any branch of knowledge, discipline, or art.” Moreover, maestros were so imbued with authority that they were expected to teach apprentices.<sup>322</sup> Obando, then, not only demanded Chinese experts of iron to labor for the crown, he likely expected that they would someday educate other Chinese or Spanish men in the ways of extraction. Obando tasked the multiracial crew with bringing different portions of stone (likely iron ore, stone-encased iron) back to Manila.<sup>323</sup> In the Governor General’s eyes, the “*sangleys*” executed Spanish orders to perfection. On the surveying crew’s return voyage, the Chinese iron masters located three sites ripe for exploitation. Writing from Manila, Fray Sebastian seconded their survey. Obando then ordered the *sangleys* “to melt the [iron] in their own way.”<sup>324</sup>

Even the 1755 expulsion order to rid the Philippines of “infidel (non-Catholic) *sangleys*” could not stop Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado in their plans to secure Chinese iron experts to work the mines.<sup>325</sup> By way of shady dealings and legal footwork, Salgado initiated an import of Chinese pagan labor that was not sanctioned by the Governor General. Royal officials anxiously corresponded to one another in their fight to import Chinese mining labor. In an effort to appease colonial officials’ fears, Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado drafted certain conditions for their labor requests. Most of their

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<sup>322</sup> Cristiano Zanetti, *Janello Torriani and the Spanish Empire: A Vitruvian Artisan at the Dawn of the Scientific Revolution* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 110.

<sup>323</sup> Diaz-Trechuelo, “Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy,” 766.

<sup>324</sup> AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a letter dated May 18, 1753,” (1754), 1.

<sup>325</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 160, Num. 21, “Expediente sobre *sangleyes* tras la expulsión,” (1757), 1.

conditions centered on controlling the interactions between indigenous and Chinese laborers.<sup>326</sup>

So powerful were Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado's desires to employ Chinese iron masters that they added a stipulation to their directions on how to run the iron mines; the Spanish men demanded a *carte blanche* approach to "*sangleys*" recruitment for the iron mines. Defying the 1755 expulsion order, the proprietors of the Mambulao mine stated: "*even if they are sangleys I must be granted ample license to be able to have them without distinction of quality, or nation... to provide for this superior government all the necessary aid for the conservation, and advancement of this [iron] manufacture.*" The desperate, yet demanding tone of the condition, in particular the request for ample license to recruit *sangleys* without any limitation to their nation or "quality", suggests that Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado's mine operations could not move forward without "skillful" Chinese mining laborers.<sup>327</sup> Salgado's request that the *sangleys* could be of any quality refers to the Iberian concept of "*calidad*" as a barometer of logic and authority. A man of good quality would exhibit such traits, however Salgado's request for Chinese men of any quality further substantiates his desperation. He needed any Chinese man *regardless of* whether or not he could demonstrate *calidad*.<sup>328</sup> Salgado, the owner of the Mambulao mines, put his money where his mouth was. Combining his funds with a request for more treasury funds, the mining operations projected thousands of pesos in licensing in order to

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<sup>326</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated January 15, 1754," (1754): "I must be granted the persons I ask for this factory with the restriction of the infidel sangleyes, and however this may be during the conclusion of the expulsion, in which time the natives that are considered not necessarily indispensable in any way" and Diaz-Trechuelo, "Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy," 771.

<sup>327</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated January 15, 1754," (1754), 1: All conditions were awaiting approval from: Pedro Calderón Henríquez, Francisco Henríquez de Villacorta, Fernando Davila Joachim Mexino de Riviera, Miguel Antonio de Santistevan, Manuel Suarez Lopez, and Francisco Antonio Figueroa.

<sup>328</sup> *Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española*, 175.

bypass the expulsion order.<sup>329</sup> In economizing mining operations the Bourbon-era industrialist, Salgado, indeed lived up to Obando's compliments that Salgado was "well known for his efforts to develop industry, and to promote those mechanical arts that are most beneficial to the public."<sup>330</sup>

Despite all of the ink Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado spilled on acquiring Chinese miners, we know that the Spanish men were also concerned with indigenous laborers. However, Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado's preoccupations regarding Mambuloan mining laborers reflected the racial formation of "Indian neediness." Mambuloan native labor, though undervalued in comparison to Chinese labor, still garnered attention from imperial authorities in the form of protective laws. While Mambuloans in the 1660s may have spent long stints without pay in the past, Mambuloan miners in the 1750s were – allegedly – granted protections as laborers dedicated to the Royal Ironworks.<sup>331</sup> Condition eleven stated that "the natives, and the people who occupy themselves in the [iron] factories and garrison [in protecting the mines] must be exempted from *polos* and *servicios personales*."<sup>332</sup> At least by edict, Mambuloans were not doubly oppressed by their work in the mines and by the mandatory Spanish imperial labor requirement of the *polos* and *servicios personales*; requirements that often sapped entire towns of male labor. Although the mine's proprietors did not invest thousands of pesos into

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<sup>329</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated January 15, 1754," (1754), 1.

<sup>330</sup> Salvador P. Escoto, "Francisco Xavier Salgado, Civil Servant and Pioneer Industrialist in Eighteenth Century Philippines," *Southeast Asian Studies* 36, no. 3 (1998): 273.

<sup>331</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, "Sobre Labores de Minas de hierro de provincial de Camarines," (1754), 2 and AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Número (Num.), "Expediente sobre minas de Paracale," (1756), 8: Spanish mine owners poured funds into constructing mining operations from the ground up. The Spanish iron expert Gil Carol enumerated the costs of running the mine at precisely 2,367 pesos. Carol was specifically concerned with paying mining laborers their back pay. From November of 1664 to February of 1665, the largely indigenous and few Chinese men who "attended" to the "metals, casting, and other effects" worked "without relief" of their wages. The delayed payment was supposed to cover the laborers' food and the materials they needed to cast the iron.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 91.

acquiring Mambuloan labor, they believed that protective orders would ultimately serve “the natives” of the islands.<sup>333</sup>

Spanish men did, indeed, benefit from the labor the Mambuloans who had long lived in Paracale and understood their home terrains. Mine owners that had come before Obando, Salgado, and Fray Sebastian’s time struggled with the harsh environment in Paracale. Humid, high temperatures could badly damage built wooden structures like the houses that sheltered the ironworks’ casting implements. In 1692 the prior owner of Paracale’s iron mines Don Jose Rojo Briones complained that his “mines have lots of metals,” but in order cultivate the iron, he needed “to construct walls” for the “blacksmith’s shop.” The house he had “was battered and [the site of the mines were] depopulated.”<sup>334</sup> Briones sourced stronger wood from Mambulaoan *principal* (local official) of Paracale Don Thomas Dimatampi.<sup>335</sup> To elicit sympathy from local imperial authorities Briones’ griped that, “we take out different amounts of iron of very poor quality. Not as good as the raw iron from China – the problem seems to be the instruments [of extraction].”<sup>336</sup> By royal decree, the local treasury granted Briones funds to acquire wood. Briones sent the *principal* Dimatampi and the Governor of Paracale, also known as “Governor of the Ladinos”, Don Joseph Madera to pick up the decree on Briones’ behalf.<sup>337</sup> It seems that not very long before Obando’s administration, Spanish men also relied on indigenous labor.

In Obando’s time, however, the Governor General, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado expressed that in the Paracale iron mines, Chinese labor sufficed where indigenous

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<sup>333</sup> Ibid.

<sup>334</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a letter dated November 11, 1692,” (1754), 1.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid.

<sup>336</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a letter dated November 10, 1692,” (1754), 1.

<sup>337</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “In a letter dated August 29, 1696,” (1754), 1.

laborers' work did not. Obando noted that the Mambuloans in charge of feeding the mine surveyors could not even hold onto their agricultural bounty. Obando was forced to ask for more money from Salgado, the financier behind the Paracale ironworks, because "the natives... lost all the rice harvest without being able to catch a grain."<sup>338</sup>

In the stipulations they authored on Chinese miner recruitment, Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado's expressed their intense awareness – and possibly personal fears – of the racial tensions that would arise from mixing Chinese and Mambuloan labor populations. Condition eight included one nuanced statement on the admission of Chinese men: that the immigrant workers could not be men of "bad living, vagabonds, nor gamblers."<sup>339</sup> This condition might simply be connected to the early modern Spanish distaste for gambling as a time-wasting, unproductive, unmanageable pastime.<sup>340</sup> But, paired with a condition that closely followed, that declared that the "unfaithful sangleys" were not allowed to afflict or bother "the natives (volunteers, not obligated) who attended the work of the mines" with taxes that the natives could not handle, the portrait of Chinese and indigenous laborers' relationship is a bit clearer. Still portraying indigenous Mambuloans as "Indians" needful of crown protection, Obando, Fray Sebastian, Salgado asked the Royal Government in Manila to protect indigenous Mambuloans against Chinese miners' gambling vice and the potential debt/debtor relationships between indigenous Filipinos and Chinese miners. The condition also outlined the punishment for offending Chinese miners: the royal government would impose "very severe" and the "most rigorous"

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<sup>338</sup> AGI, *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Leg. 270, "In a letter dated November 13, 1753," (1754), 2.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>340</sup> Enrique García Santo-Tomás, "Outside Bets: Disciplining Gamblers in Early Modern Spain," *Hispanic Review* 77, no. 1 (2009): 149 and Albert Chan, "Chinese-Philippine Relations in the Late Sixteenth Century to 1603," *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 26, no. 1 & 2 (1978): 71-72.

of penalties upon offenders. The condition further stated that all of the Mambuloan miners were to be paid “in table and own hand” (cash) in the same fashion as the province (of Camarines) usually paid their miners.<sup>341</sup> For the mines to run efficiently, and above board, the Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado needed to assure the royal government in Manila that Chinese-Mambuloan interactions would be closely monitored. More significant for the Spanish trio, I argue, was maintaining the strict racial hierarchy they created; the three men guaranteed the smooth running of mining operations that suited their own financial interests.

### Defending Gold Mine Operations

Don Francisco Xavier Estorgo Gallegos put his own racialized imaginary of “*castellano de la fuerza*,” fighter of the *Moros*, to use in the gold mines of Paracale as he endeavored to construct a fort near his mines. But Estorgo did not operate and defend his mines alone. The Spaniard not only depended on indigenous labor to operate his gold mines, he also relied upon indigenous men’s soldiering prowess. If we follow Estorgo’s process of establishing the gold mines –surveying the land and then ensuring the safety of the gold mines by way of militarization – we can get a glimpse of how indigenous residents fit into his mining operations. Estorgo commandeered indigenous Paracaleño laborers and leaders to participate in his fantasy of the knightly Spanish protector of the “*indios*.”

Estorgo ensured that his mining operations reflected his position as head military official by pouring his own funds into the construction of a fort that would be defended by a well-equipped garrison. The great distance of Estorgo’s gold mines in Paracale to a point of

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<sup>341</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, f. 124 and 187 and excerpts from AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “A letter dated January 22, 1754,” (1754), 2.

transport on the coast was “of [a] considerable consideration” and this obstacle was only exacerbated by the constant presence of the *Moros*.<sup>342</sup> Estorgo convinced himself and Arandia that they needed to construct a fort in Paracale to protect the gold mines from alleged *Moro* attacks. Estorgo’s fort would be made of stone and would be armed with Spanish and Pampangan soldiers. He went as far as to take the brunt of the financial expense in the creation of the fort.<sup>343</sup> Spanish imperial authorities in Manila agreed with Estorgo’s request and decreed to offer the use moneys from the royal treasury to finance the creation of the stronghold.<sup>344</sup>

Estorgo successfully persuaded Manila officials to not only endow him with his masculine honorific, but to also bestow upon him an array of rights to violence in the name of protecting the indigenous Paracaleños. With the gold mines’ profits generated and the monies funneled in the form of the royal fifth, “the people and the inhabitants of my hacienda” would be kept safe with his majesty’s “fortification” and “bullets.” Estorgo further professed his fidelity in the “most honorable and vigorous defense” of his mines (and the crown’s share of profits).<sup>345</sup> Governor General Arandia seconded Estorgo’s position and compelled Estorgo to protect all of the *vecinos* (neighbors), the natives, the *españoles* (the Spanish), and all dwellers (of Paracale).<sup>346</sup> In order to protect the fort, Arandia went a step further and bestowed Estorgo “full power” to enforce any order that had to do with garrison construction. If the orders incurred any “disobedience” from the fort construction or mining laborers, Estorgo could use however much power was

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<sup>342</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated January 12, 1757,” (1756), 1.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid. and AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In letters dated October 3, 1754,” (1756), 1.

<sup>344</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated December 2, 1754,” (1756), 1.

<sup>345</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated February 15, 1755,” (1756), 1.

<sup>346</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated January 12, 1755,” (1756), 1.

“required and necessary” in taming dissent.<sup>347</sup> Arandia granted Estorgo the right to arm the garrison with all artillery, weapons, and people necessary to protect the Estorgo and the crown’s gold.<sup>348</sup>

Estorgo even relied upon *gobernadorcillos* (local, likely native authorities) to safeguard against potential land usurpation of the gold mines in the proprietor’s absence. The *gobernadorcillo* of Paracale (at the mining sites of Lipata, Cacatugan, and Galpajo) as well as the *gobernadorcillo* of Lipa outlined the borders of ownership between Estorgo and the mines of *mestizos* Juan de la Serna and Joseph Aguirre. On the site of Galpajo, the *gobernadorcillo* noted that the gold veins laid through a sacred site; “a small plain near a saint[ly place] that the ancients opened at the foot of a *bonga* tree.”<sup>349</sup> As if mowing down a “saintly place” for Paracaleños was not enough for Estorgo, he demanded that in his absence the indigenous leaders should still protect his mines from fellow Paracaleños who wished to protect the uprooting of their sacred site.<sup>350</sup>

Although Estorgo was a mine proprietor, he operated as if his title as the “warden” afforded him the same array of powers over indigenous leaders as a Spanish military leader in combat. Stephanie Mawson’s study on indigenous soldiers revealed how during the Hispano-Dutch War Spanish military leaders exploited the labor of indigenous soldiers and residents near forts, forcing them to perform “backbreaking labor” as carters and rowers who delivered goods via waterway.<sup>351</sup> While Estorgo did not necessarily submit local *gobernadorcillos* to such painstaking work, he did rely on them to complete the daunting

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<sup>347</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated January 12, 1755,” (1756), 1.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

<sup>349</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a decree dated August 14, 1754,” (1756), 1.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>351</sup> Stephanie Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire: Indigenous Soldiers and Contingent Loyalty, 1600-1700,” *Ethnohistory* 63, no. 2 (2016): 400.



tasks of assessing mountainous terrains, delineating the mines' borders, and structuring an operation to move metals freely from Paracale to the coasts for shipment (to other trading centers). Estorgo and his representative Don Dionicio Munos sent a "free order to the mayor of Paracale and to the governors of the towns" to "report" to him or his "representative" in order to "take possession of [the mines] without delay."<sup>352</sup> Estorgo might have placed such an urgent obligation on the *gobernadorcillos* as other miners owned adjacent sites around Estorgo's claims.<sup>353</sup> Paracale's *gobernadorcillos* met Estorgo's requests which were backed by the royal officials in Manila. Governor General Arandia, noted that both Estorgo and Munos should benefit from "the towns, the people, *especially* the *gobernadorcillos* of the site of Paracale" who should "give them... the help and favor... that they ask for." In exchange, Arandia demanded that Estorgo and Munos pay the natives and other people... the amount of their work in table and own hand" in the manner of the province of Paracale.<sup>354</sup> With the might of the Manila government behind them, Estorgo and Munos put the *gobernadorcillos* to work.

Although Estorgo did not force everyday Paracaleños to labor as carters of gold or rowers, he was still able to exploit the mines nearby residents by demanding material support from the Paracaleños. Estorgo worked verbiage into his declaration of the gold mines to include the following carte blanche terms: "To further facilitate this discovery [of the mines] that it be inserted in the said order that... the mayor of the province like all the other justices and governors of the territories [when and] where I will arrive, or where my representative [Munos] will arrive, they will provide us with food, provisions, and

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<sup>352</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, "In a letter dated January 8, 1755," (1756), 1.

<sup>353</sup> Diaz-Trechuelo, "Eighteenth Century Philippine Economy," 791.

<sup>354</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, "In a decree dated August 14, 1754," (1756), 1: Emphasis mine.

everything else that is necessary.” Estorgo and Munos promised they would still pay money “in table and own hand”, but this would, of course, occur after the pair took whatever mining profits they wished from the Paracaleños.<sup>355</sup> Indigenous Paracaleños did, indeed, labor for Estorgo’s mines as surveyors, soldiers, and providers of social reproduction.

While we cannot access the written words of the Paracaleños in Estorgo’s gold mines nor the Chinese iron workers’ writings on their own plight, we do, however, have access to the imperial documents that lay bare the anxieties, fears, and concerns of Spanish officials as they attempted to preserve their financial interests. Estorgo’s case is a testament to such fears. The “warden of the fort” believed himself to be a masculine Spanish authority, fearless in the face of *Moro* fighters. Spanish authorities like Estorgo contributed to a colonial discourse with their petitions and mercies, requests for crown assistance, and reports of mining successes and failures in which they trafficked in the currency of racial formations; Spanish men used gendered and racialized tropes they knew would be well-received by their superiors. Imperial authorities, then, shared an understanding of “types” of men: unskilled vs. skilled, intelligent vs. helpless, and martial vs. defenseless. These racial formations dictated the codification of laws, and the permission of mercies. In other words, the success mining operations hinged on the persuasive effect of gendered and racialized discourse.

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<sup>355</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 155, Num. 8, “In a letter dated January 8, 1755,” (1756), 1.

## Conclusion: A Legacy of Abuse

The miner mentioned earlier, Joseph Rojo Briones, left a violent legacy thirty years before Fray Sebastian ever stepped foot on Paracale's soil. Understanding this context – the conditions under which indigenous miners labored – gives us a clearer glimpse of how indigenous miners dealt with a double-edged sword of being simultaneously undervalued *and* needed by Spanish mine proprietors. More importantly, by re-examining the iron mine's past, I unpack the discursive construction of the “lazy, needful Indian” to reveal the complex half-truths in the racist trope. In the eyes of lawmakers, mine proprietors, and other officials, indigenous laborers were not intelligent enough to perform skilled work but also too susceptible to exploitation.<sup>356</sup> In Obando, Fray Sebastian, and Salgado's stipulations on Chinese miner recruitment, the Spanish men deployed the “exploited native” trope in order to supposedly protect Paracaleños from non-Catholic Chinese men.<sup>357</sup> Indigenous miners were, indeed, exploited. But it was other Spaniards who did the exploiting.

In 1710 the Royal *Audiencia* of Madrid closed a case investigating the Spanish mine proprietor, Briones', many abuses. The first of these abuses was Briones' role in obstructing the word of God. So appalled at Briones' actions, the Royal Bishopric of Nueva Caceres's head clergymen submitted a testimony to the Royal *Audiencia* “wondering how burdensome the mine was to the Indians so that the many molestations [they suffer] that they did not achieve the mass nor the spiritual doctrine.” What is worse is that the

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<sup>356</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 881, “Copias de Reales *Cedulas*, 1600-1783,” (1668), 1: *Cedula* from 1668, In this *cedula*, the author requested to extend the mercy of the royal fifth tax, especially because much of the gold extracted by the Indians was not accounted for when they sold it to the Spaniards. This gap in accounting was at the expense of the indigenous miner, who upon extracting and submitting their *taels* of gold would realize they came up short for payments of tribute or taxation.

<sup>357</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, f. 124 and 187 and excerpts from AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 270, “A letter dated January 22, 1754,” (1754), 2.

Mambuloans “were fleeing to the mountains and becoming *cimarrones*... running away from the work of the mine.” The clergyman lamented that the absence of Mambuloans caused a “great diminution of the tributes” so much so that the “Indians of the immediate [neighboring] villages detracted” as well.<sup>358</sup> Briones, entrusted with the solemn responsibility of carrying out the *repartimiento* (tribute-based labor requirement of indigenous peoples) to Paracaleños, instead angered the church by causing Paracaleños to flee into the mountains. Most notable of Briones’ offenses, in the eyes of the Reverend, was the fact that “the nearest town to the mine is a days’ distance from the road” which further disrupted the Paracaleños’ ability to hear mass.<sup>359</sup>

Briones not only endangered the souls of the Paracaleños, he abused their physical bodies as well. Don Francisco de Gueruelo, an *oídor* (judge) of the Royal *Audiencia* sent to collect more information on the Reverend’s inquiry, noted that Briones commanded his officials to “whip some Indian men and Indian women.” Briones also kept the *gobernadorcillo* in the pillory, where he beat him as well. Following this spate of violence, Briones “ordered his officers to seize them (the Paracaleños) and their property... and imprisoned them in the castle of Santiago” located in Mambulao.<sup>360</sup>

Turning the colonial violence that ensued into an economic formula, as men of intelligence who employed racial formations to bolster their enterprises were wont to do, the royal investigators and adviser, former Governor General Domingo Zabáburu de Echevarri, highlighted that the many spiritual and physical violences done to Paracaleños far outweighed the financial return of the mines. The prosecutors were all in favor of

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<sup>358</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 129, Num. 123, “Carta del conde de Lizárraga sobre mina de José Rojo de Briones,” (1710), 4-5.

<sup>359</sup> Ibid.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid.

ensuring that Briones paid for his many sins. Firstly, Briones had not paid the royal fifth tax to the crown for most of his tenure as the mine's proprietor. Second, the mines did not produce wealth for the Royal Treasury.<sup>361</sup> So, all parties found Briones guilty and charged him to pay 300 pesos: 100 to the Royal Chamber and 200 "to be shared among the towns where the Indians were vexed."

I argue that Briones' abuses at the iron mines present us with a valuable point: that the "vagamundos" who Obando, Salgado, and Fray Sebastian's claimed "lack[ed] intelligence" worked the Paracale mines within the context of Briones' violent legacy. Citing a law enacted by the previous Governor General, the Reverend of Nueva Caceres repeatedly highlighted that *vagamundos* should work the mines in place of the indigenous Paracaleños.<sup>362</sup> The Reverend's request was granted. If *vagamundos* continued to work the iron mines from 1710 until 1750, it is likely that the "natives" and "Indians" cited in all of Obando, Salgado, and Fray Sebastian's letters were not indigenous Mambuloans or Paracaleños, but wandering indigenous men. The indigenous Paracaleños who would have a wealth of mining knowledge, would be exempt from mining labor as a result of the *vagamundo* law. Obando, Salgado, and Fray Sebastian would have mischaracterized natives' "lack of intelligence" because wandering *vagamundo* laborers would simply be unfamiliar with mining practices, as they were born and lived their lives away from the iron mines.

In addition to Obando, Salgado, and Fray Sebastian's mischaracterizations, Briones himself may have poorly portrayed his relationship to Mambuloan *principal* Don Thomas

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<sup>361</sup> Ibid., "[The mines] not having introduced in the Royal Treasury more than seven *taes* of gold, four *reales*, and ten *granos* of 18 *quilates* by the law since 13 September 1696 in that [year] we began the labor of the mine until the 3<sup>rd</sup> of November 1703."

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., "Only the *vagamundos*, not in the *padrones* (tributary lists), should work [the mines]."

Dimatampi. In Matthew Crawford's work on Andean quina, he describes a meeting between an expert botanist Charles Marie de la Condamine and an Andean quina tree bark collector Fernando de la Vega. Crawford explained that in his reports, La Condamine cast the much-experienced Vega "as merely a laborer" thus "marginalizing the role of Andeans in the broader enterprise of knowing New World nature."<sup>363</sup> Similar to La Condamine's glossing over of Vega's indigenous knowledge, it would not be farfetched to question Briones' characterization of *principal* Dimatampi, the "wood gatherer" of Mambulao.

Lastly, the most salient issue is the legacy of Briones' violence in the town of Mambulao and its neighboring villages within the province of Paracale. From 1696 to 1710, Paracaleño men and women suffered under the mine proprietor's repeated violence. The exhaustion from working in the mines decreased the population of Mambuloans and neighboring Paracaleños. Even the lawyer who represented Briones' stated that he did not think that the iron mines should be barred from *all* Spaniards, but that they should take heed of the damages the Paracaleños suffered in the Briones mine. In living memory, Paracaleños could still imagine the violence, the robbery, and the tearing apart of families at the behest of a mine owner. It is not implausible that indigenous Paracaleño mine laborers did, indeed, commit to tactics of foot dragging, or simply presented themselves as ignorant to the mining technologies of the foundry.<sup>364</sup>

In the grand scheme of mining operations in Paracale, indigenous men paid the price. If they were not exploited and beaten, they were overlooked by mine proprietors for skilled positions. By rooting European metallurgical intelligence as the metric for mining

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<sup>363</sup> Crawford, *The Andean Wonder Drug*, 39.

<sup>364</sup> Scott, *The Discovery*, 6, 35 and James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 34-35.

skills, Spanish authorities and the mining proprietors of Paracale structured their racial hierarchy – the expert Spaniard at the top followed by the intelligent Chinese ironsmith and the “lazy *indio*” at the bottom – through the passage of local laws and the maintenance of labor recruitment practices. The racial formation of the indigenous mining laborer is embedded in the imperial historical record and without the contextualizing account of the Briones mine, historians might well assume that Paracaleños were unskilled, unintelligent, and perpetually in need of crown support: Arguably the most enduring abuse produced from the colonial Philippine mines.

## Chapter 4

### “Inclined to total freedom”: Vagabonds and Gamblers in *las calles*

In 1726, an unnamed “Indian from Tabuco” attempted to dodge the sacrament of Catholic confession – a practice all too common in the Camarines Sur province – and was caught by the local priest, Father Torrubia.<sup>365</sup> The priest reported the case of the “vagabond” to Don Phelipe de Molina, Bishop Elect of the Nueva Caceres province, in hopes of re-opening the padrón, or tribute lists and census that enumerated the labor and tax obligations of indigenous vassals in Camarines Sur. Torrubia realized that the unnamed “Indian,” by avoiding confession, also evaded paying tribute and working his *repartimiento* requirement, the compulsory labor required of every indigenous male subject in Spanish colonies.<sup>366</sup> In this chapter, I illuminate how Spanish imperial authorities racialized non-Spanish men in public spaces outside of the mines, the market, the bakery, and the *cortés de madera*; a space I call *las calles* or “the streets.” The Bishop Elect perceived that the “Indian from Tabuco” lived in the non-laboring spaces that lay outside of the surveilling eye of Spanish imperial authorities. *Las calles*, then, existed as the colonial commons not yet enclosed by the Spanish imperial project.<sup>367</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> Archivo General de las Indias (AGI), *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Legajo (Leg.) 446, Número (Num.) 1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1726), 68.

<sup>366</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 99: The Spanish Empire enforced the *repartimiento* – a labor draft – upon all of its indigenous colonial inhabitants. In the Philippines, the draft was also called “*polos y servicios*.”

<sup>367</sup> Silvia Federici, *Beyond Marx: Theorising the Global Labour Relations of the Twenty-First Century* (Boston: Brill, 2014), 47, 94: Federici marks the time of the moment of massive vagabondage within European borders in the 1790s, explaining that, “Massive population-growth, coupled with the enclosure of common land, the monetization of rural social relations, and the commercialization of agricultural production, brought forth a vast landless surplus-population, highly mobile, and desperate for work and sustenance,” however she still locates the advent of early modern Europe’s primitive accumulation efforts – and thus the mass enclosure of the commons – within the colonies. Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 70-70: To bring the work of feudal enclosure to the Spanish colonial project required a nuanced examination of the negative and productive forms of power colonial authorities employed in wrangling vagabond laborers. For colonial México and for the colonial Philippines, vagabonds were not solely physically coerced into mandatory labor projects.



Centering marginal spaces bordering labor sites reveals how Spanish imperial authorities faced practically insurmountable obstacles in their attempts to discipline (and to ultimately racialize) indigenous Philippine and Chinese laborers. The “Indian from Tabuco” and others who refused to work proved that as late as the eighteenth century, Spanish colonial regulations dictating “reducing” native populations into Spanish-mapped towns were ineffective. More than simply not functioning, the repeated offenses and royal reprimands reveal how imperial authorities perceived two principle local practices as obstacles to their imperial directive of disciplining laborers: gambling and vagabondery. In other words, the documents reveal to us how indigenous and Chinese gamblers and vagabonds foiled Spanish attempts to commandeer their labor. In this chapter, I argue that Spanish officials’ conceptualizations of Spanish authorities’ incorruptibility, Chinese men’s untrustworthiness, and Philippine laborers’ laziness were instrumental in Spanish imperial race-making processes. In response to what imperial authorities perceived to be uncontrolled gambling and widespread vagabondery, Spanish men urged the creation of gambling and tribute laws. Substantiating their requests to the crown with harmful racial formations – racializations that would be legible to crown authorities – imperial authorities were able to justify the passage of their laws and mercies.

The threat of untamable racial formations within unsurveilled sites in colonial society compelled imperial officials to focus heavily on the public activities of gambling, vagabondery, and free labor. In gambling sites, imperial authorities endeavored to control and to profit from the colonial economy by collecting gambling taxes as well as by shaping

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Spanish authorities combined forces with the clergy to inflict the “productive” power of Catholic proselytization and indoctrination to further discipline laborers.

indigenous men into reliable laborers. In their attempts to create order out of the chaos of rampant gambling, Spanish authorities framed games of chance as both a sinful pastime and a serious distraction for indigenous Philippine laborers while legislating against and punishing laborers who gambled in excess.<sup>368</sup> I examine the mercy requests and resulting appeals that would allow the Philippine Governor Generals to tax the *baratos* (fees charged by gambling halls and tips) of the “sangleys” (Chinese men). I contend that Spanish authorities, while demanding more control over the gambling economy, simultaneously constructed a Spanish masculinity endowed with the ability to: gamble without temptation, monitor the funds from gambling, and still maintain their status as good Christian vassals to the crown. Imperial officials’ conceptualization of themselves as uncorruptible Spanish men followed the logics of early modern Spanish intellectuals and *arbitristas* (political philosophers) who understood gambling as a necessary evil, a sporting pastime, and as a type of “therapy” for Spanish elites.<sup>369</sup> Only privileged, level-headed men who could afford “the perils of chance” could partake in gambling, and by clinging to this racialization of the Spanish self, imperial authorities granted themselves the duty of controlling the legal incomes from gambling activities.<sup>370</sup>

Vagabondery, too, created obstacles to the successful maintenance of the Spanish imperial labor regime. I argue that indigenous men’s practices of vagabondery and free labor created “rival geographies” within the Philippine colony. Wandering, unregistered indigenous laborers found ways to be mobile in colonial spaces, against the directives and

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<sup>368</sup> Greg Bankoff, “Redefining Criminality,” 277: Bankoff’s highlights that as late as the 19<sup>th</sup>-century, Spanish royal orders had to dictate a cessation of gambling (among artisans and laborers) during daylight hours, ostensibly to cease gambling activities during times set aside for labor. As will be discussed later in this chapter, imperial officials established laws limiting gambling near labor spaces, particularly the *cortes* de madera, as early as 1736.

<sup>369</sup> Santo-Tomás, “Outside Bets,” 150, 157.

<sup>370</sup> Santo-Tomás, “Outside Bets,” 161.

laws of colonial authorities.<sup>371</sup> Spanish officials leveraged the racial formation of the unruly vagabond in order to re-open the padrón. They justified their claims for a colony-wide reducción of indigenous Philippine men in financial terms: the crown could discipline laborers from the pool of newly sedentary populations. Spanish officers systematized a process to open *padrones* or tribute census lists in order to keep track of vagabonds. My analysis of imperial correspondence related to the creation of mercies and laws reveals that in their attempts to monitor vagabonds, imperial officials vacillated between characterizations of “Indian” men as either disdainful of work or clever enough to evade the repartimiento. I highlight the practice of vagabondery as a crucial site in the race making of the “lazy Indian,” but also as evidence of pre-conquest labor practices which persisted as late as the eighteenth century.<sup>372</sup>

In the historiographies of gambling and vagabondery in the Philippines (and broadly, the Spanish Empire) I center the analysis of race in Spanish authorities’ construction of the colonial Other. In his work on the Spanish Empire’s criminalization of gambling in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Philippines Greg Bankoff only mentions race in his explanation that the “majority of those arrested for gambling offences were Filipino or Chinese,” but he does not push for a more robust explanation as to why Spanish authorities pursued the two races in their attempts to control gambling abuses.<sup>373</sup> Kristie Flannery’s recent work contextualizes Spanish colonial debates over gambling within larger debates over further segregating Chinese peoples away from Spanish vecinos and

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<sup>371</sup> Camp, *Closer to Freedom*, 5.

<sup>372</sup> Sir John Bowring, LL.D., F.R.S., *A Visit to the Philippine Islands* (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1859), 311 and Fedor Jagor, *Travel in the Philippines* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1875), 153.

<sup>373</sup> Bankoff, “Redefining Criminality,” 271.

indigenous subjects.<sup>374</sup> Where Flannery focuses on the ways in which Spanish officials prioritized the conversion of indigenous subjects in their racialization of and rationale for Chinese segregation, I draw attention to the economic importance of allowing the practice of gambling to persist. Spanish authorities were, indeed, concerned with the salvation of new indigenous Catholics. However, as Spanish men attempted to restrict gambling in areas bordering labor spaces, they also prioritized the re-molding of “idle” indigenous men into productive laborers. Moreover, my work emphasizes how Spanish officials conceptualized themselves as uniquely capable of playing games of chance without falling into racializations of unruliness, addictiveness, or moral repugnance. Imperial authorities reserved those offensive traits for Chinese gamblers. My study, then, centers the relationality between racial formations, rather than focusing on Spanish men’s racialization of Chinese men alone.

I build on the literature of vagabonds in New Spain as I center the processes of Spanish men’s racialization of the indigenous Philippine “vagabond” and free laborer. Where Eva Maria Mehl’s study analyzes the movement of convicts and idlers (vagabonds) from New Spain into the Philippines, she does not examine the racialization of prisoner vagabonds in the colonial setting.<sup>375</sup> Daniel Nemser’s study of *mestizo* (half Spanish, half “Indian”) vagabonds in New Spain offers an exciting study of vagabonds as the inevitable

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<sup>374</sup> Kristie Flannery, “Prohibited Games, Prohibited People: Race, Gambling, and Segregation in Early modern Manila,” *Newberry Essays in Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 8 (2014): 86, 91.

<sup>375</sup> Mehl, *Forced Migration in the Spanish Pacific World: From Mexico to the Philippines, 1765-1811* and Stephanie Mawson, “Unruly Plebeians and the Forzado System: Convict Transportation between New Spain and the Philippines During the Seventeenth Century,” *Revista de Indias* LXXIII, no. 259 (2013) both contend with the movement of colonial Mexican convicts into the Philippines as a terrifying form of punishment. In Bruce Cruikshank’s “A Puzzle About Padrones Tribute in the Eighteenth-Century Spanish Philippines,” *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 59, no. 2 (2011): Cruikshank mentions vagabonds in their attempts to evade the tribute, but does little to theorize their discursive construction as “Indian vagabonds.”

outcome of the violent enclosure of feudal lands.<sup>376</sup> Nemser also complicates the Marxist approach to analyzing vagabonds by arguing that racialization was inherent in the Spanish colonial figuring of the colonial vagabond. However, my work diverges from Nemser in its subject of study. Nemser centers on the Spanish colonial *mestizo* vagabond as a figure in the Spanish Empire that was defined by his proximity to Spanishness.<sup>377</sup> Controlling the movements of *mestizo* vagabond children was not a matter of controlling indigenous children, but trying to corral part-Spanish children into their proper place in colonial society. Nemser explains that “the problem [was] not that the children [were] wandering the countryside, entirely disconnected from human society, but that they [were] integrated into the wrong social formation” by virtue of their whiteness.<sup>378</sup> Rather than focus on *mestizos*, my study examines indigenous vagabonds and free laborers. Spanish authorities patrolled these indigenous men not because of their proximity to whiteness (as they were not proximate at all), but because of their supposedly “inherent” racial inclination for unrootedness; a direct challenge to the Spanish way of living a religious and political life “reduced” into organized towns. Imperial authorities’ characterizations of gamblers and vagabonds were never simply conceived of as offenders of God or the crown, but rather as racializations uniquely sutured onto specific “types” of non-Spanish men.

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<sup>376</sup> Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 70.

<sup>377</sup> Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 71.

<sup>378</sup> Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 74.

## Gambling for Imperial Profit

In the imperial correspondence on resuming the *baratos* gambling tax, Spanish officials constructed a hierarchy of racial formations centering themselves as the racial authority; they portrayed themselves as incorruptible, exacting, and uniquely masculine moral authorities. The racial formation of elite Spanishness – authored by men who occupied the highest imperial position in the Philippines as Governor Generals – was central to the logic behind the *baratos* resumption because Spanish authorities claimed that they alone could monitor gambling without suffering the moral costs of playing games of chance. Imperial authorities convinced the king that it was in the crown’s best interest for Spanish men to police non-Catholic, Chinese, and indigenous gamblers who were allegedly uniquely susceptible to gambling addiction and immoral behavior. More revealing, I assert, are the ways in which imperial authorities simultaneously demanded gambling monies to fund labor projects and denounced indigenous gamblers as morally bereft idlers who refused to become disciplined laborers.

Philippine Governor Generals needed the approval of the Spanish crown in order to tax the *baratos* monies. As early as 1654, Governor General Sabiniano Manrique de Lara framed the empire’s need for the *baratos* funds as a saving grace for the colonial economy. Lara requested that the imperial government continue the lapsed practice of taxing the *baratos* monies from “sangleys” in order to fund the fortification of the city of Manila against foreign attacks.<sup>379</sup> He argued that his predecessors benefitted from the *baratos* monies especially as the many publics of Manila thronged the streets to gamble in “sanglely”

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<sup>379</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, “Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes,” (1654), 1: Lara was mostly concerned with the *baratos* from sangleys residing in the *alcaicería* (silk district) of the *Parián* in *extramuros* Manila.

gambling houses and in public spaces on the first full moon of the lunar new year (as was Chinese tradition).<sup>380</sup> The shrewd Governor General blamed the man formerly in his position, Don Diego Fajardo, for ending the *baratos* collecting practice and noted that for the past few years there had been “serious damage” to the royal treasury.<sup>381</sup> Lara projected that the renewed *baratos* tax would result in profits of “three to four thousand pesos” based on the Chinese gambling house owners’ profits of “more than sixteen thousand pesos.”<sup>382</sup> A royal tax from gambling would specifically fund the imperial economic enterprises of the “metalsmithing works” as well as the construction of buildings and forts.<sup>383</sup> Any leftover monies would go back into the Governors’ salaries that had long been depleted since both the previous and current Governors had to pay for “aid to the coasts [to support military efforts against Muslim raids]” out of their own pockets. Lara appealed to King Philip IV’s concern for his vassals by explaining that the rest of the funds could support religious institutions, “hospitals, [and] colleges that your majesty has here for [the] children and orphans [of] poor widows of [the] generals, admirals, and captains who have died in your majesty’s service.”<sup>384</sup> Lara made it crystal clear that the Spanish colonial economy would thrive if the king allowed his devoted officials to encourage the flow of gambling monies.

For Lara, the taxing of *baratos* monies and the encouragement of gambling in the Philippines could accomplish two important goals. First, the *baratos* monies would fund a missionary project that would impress upon the world the Spanish king’s prestige. In his

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<sup>380</sup> Ibid.

<sup>381</sup> Ibid.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid., 3 and 54.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid., 37 and 54.

<sup>384</sup> Ibid., 4.

correspondence with King Philip IV, Lara established himself as the conduit through which the king governed the Philippine islands. Lara explained to the king that he attended, “personally to all the services of your majesty and with the ostentation and grandeur that a Governor who represents the person of your majesty in such remote provinces.”<sup>385</sup> By conceptualizing himself as a representative of the Spanish king in the Philippines and reminding the king of the fact, Lara reflected the early modern political culture of the Spanish imperial hierarchy. In the larger Spanish Empire, the occupant of the highest governmental position of the viceroy was to “have and exercise the same power, influence, and jurisdiction as the king who appoints them.”<sup>386</sup> In the Philippine colony the most comparable official position to the viceroy would belong to Governor General de Lara. The kingly servant Lara further linked his devotion to the crown in his rationale regarding the need for *baratos* monies. The Governor General explained that in the years when the *baratos* taxes were suspended, he funded four hundred pesos to support a missionary expedition of four Franciscans who attempted to reach the Kingdom of China, “to conserve and increase the faith.” Overall, Lara declared that he had spent more than one thousand pesos in his attempts to increase the Catholic faith on behalf of the King.<sup>387</sup> In his role as the king’s representative in the Philippines, Lara exerted the utmost efforts in expanding the Catholic faith (yet another directive to viceroys generally, but to Governor Generals in the Philippines). In his correspondence with the king, the Governor General positioned himself as a deserving crown servant who was enthusiastically accomplishing his goals as the

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<sup>385</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>386</sup> Alejandro Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 25.

<sup>387</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, “Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes,” (1654), 4.



king's representative. Because of his devotion, Lara believed he deserved to be compensated with *baratos monies*.<sup>388</sup>

Lara also conveyed to the king that gambling (the source of the *baratos* tax) was a harmless pastime for Spanish men, specifically for the Governor Generals of the Philippines. The Governor General insisted that all of his predecessors aside from Don Diego “enjoyed these [gambling] games [and the *baratos monies*].” He assured the king that for Spanish representatives of the crown, gambling did not result in “calamities... but... [in] great comforts and conveniences.”<sup>389</sup> In his reasoning, the Governor General understood that the moral question of endorsing a gambling tax would stifle the passage of the *baratos* tax law. Lara wanted to assure the crown that the position of the Governor General – a position held only by Spanish men of noble birth, wealth, and privilege – could withstand the temptations of gambling and should be able to enjoy the wealth that came with taxing gambling halls.

The wider Spanish Empire's debates over gambling mirrored the Philippine discourse regarding gambling's capacity to entice players to sin. In his correspondence with the Manila *Audiencia*, King Philip IV added depth to Lara's presumption that Spanish Governor Generals had the moral authority to deflect any moral problems that came with gambling. The King was assured that “the religious allowed [the gambling celebrations of the first full moon of the lunar new year] and in the past the *baratos*... [were] distributed between my governors and [other] servants [of the crown].”<sup>390</sup> King Philip continued to explain that while all of the elements of “the Catholic Church” might not have actually

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<sup>388</sup> Cañeque, *The King's Living Image*, 18.

<sup>389</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, “Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes,” (1654), 3.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

supported the *baratos* monies, “the Dominican Order” approved of the *baratos* tax, indicating that other religious orders did as well.<sup>391</sup> If the King were to give his approval that his most trustworthy governmental arm in the distant Philippine colony might involve themselves in the collection of gambling monies, he required ironclad evidence that the church would not disapprove of such maneuvers.<sup>392</sup> In the context of the larger Spanish Empire, King Philip’s need for ecclesiastical assurances to resume the *barato* tax was warranted. Only a few years earlier, the bishop of Puebla de Los Ángeles in New Spain publicly disagreed with the secular government’s role in profiting from the vice of gambling. The Puebla bishop “instructed his pastors even though the state had its own reasons to be more lenient toward gaming, Christians should not assume that everything the state allowed was morally licit or edifying.”<sup>393</sup> The Mexican ecclesiastical authority was not necessarily perturbed by a few games of chance here or there, but rather the potential of the games to be “abused if taken to excess, played at improper times, or if they led to sinful behaviors (such as avarice, sloth, feuds, and brawling.)”<sup>394</sup>

The Archbishop of Manila, Miguel de Poblete Casasola, supported Lara in the debates to resume the *baratos* tax. First, the Archbishop attempted to convey to the king the importance of Lara’s *baratos* tax proposal by focusing on the Spanish official’s sparkling reputation. Casasola stood character witness for his secular peer as he emphasized the “care, disinterest [of obtaining personal wealth], and cleanliness” of Lara’s character.<sup>395</sup> Not

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<sup>391</sup> Ibid.

<sup>392</sup> Santo-Tomás, “Outside Bets,” 152: Clergymen in peninsular Spain had long disputed the legality of gambling and how legal gambling might conflict with The Council of Trent’s decrees on “rest and recreation.”

<sup>393</sup> Andrew A. Cashner, “Playing Cards at the Eucharistic Table: Music, Theology, and Society in a Corpus Christi Villancico from Colonial Mexico, 1628,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 18 (2014): 397.

<sup>394</sup> Cashner, “Playing Cards,” 396.

<sup>395</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, “Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes,” (1654), 67.

only was Lara a man of good moral fiber, Casasola claimed that Lara spent his own fortune on imperial directives. He financed imperial visits to the cortés de madera and to the Cavite shipyards, helped fund a cathedral in Manila, and “dispatch[ed] two [imprisoned] Portuguese [from Macan]”, while “[visiting] the surrounding kingdoms of Siam, Tumquin (Tonkin), Macasar (Makassar), and China with whom it [was] necessary to send a gift to preserve the authority of the Governor... [who] represents [your majesty] in these remote kingdoms.”<sup>396</sup> And, because Lara so honorably served King Philip, Casasola argued that it was “necessary to avail to use some emoluments such as the games of [the] sangleys... [as] there are no others [like them].”<sup>397</sup> Unlike Palafox who cautioned against the government’s encouragement of gambling, Casasola emphasized that Governor Generals like Lara only sanctioned gambling because they depleted their personal fortunes in their “zealous and pure” service to the King.<sup>398</sup> In the eyes of Manila’s Archbishop, the righteous Spanish official embodied in Lara’s example, continuously concerned with representing the king and languishing in poverty in order to execute the missions whims of the crown, could not be corrupted by the temptations of gambling. Instead, gambling in the Philippines helped to further the Crown’s interests by securing funds for the crown proving that Lara demonstrated zeal and purity to the crown *and* the cross.

Lara framed himself as a uniquely moral Governor General, a man who held the esteem of the Catholic Church, and as a Spanish authority with an aptitude for economic precision. In the early modern colonial world, preciseness and pragmatism were central

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<sup>396</sup> Ibid.

<sup>397</sup> Ibid.

<sup>398</sup> Ibid.

tenets in the European conceptualization of elite masculinity.<sup>399</sup> Lara further substantiated the Archbishop's claim that the Governor General was disinterested in wealth (and more interested in maintaining meticulous order in the Philippines) by boasting that without his personally financed visits to the *cortés de madera* (over the past eight months), the repairs to [imperial] ships, ports, and buildings would never have been completed. Such achievements were executed only "[with] so *precise* [a]... person of the [office] of the Governor... [without whose] assistance, nothing is done."<sup>400</sup> By wielding the trait of preciseness in service to the Spanish crown, Lara demonstrated himself to be an indispensable figure to the king, but also, I argue, a masculine, scientific official maintaining imperial operations on the outskirts of the Spanish empire.

To bolster their claims that the church supported the *baratos* tax, ally of the *baratos* tax law and former Governor General Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera enlisted the support of moral "experts." As I have argued, the figure of the expert was widely respected among Spanish officials as a masculine, specifically European authority. He explained that, "All [of] my Governor predecessors... having [been counseled by] many... theologians, as I have... [gambling] can be done with good conscience."<sup>401</sup> By enlisting such expertise, the advice from men learned in the laws and morals of the Catholic Church, Corcuera understood that the weight of the Governor Generals' recommendations would be received by the king with more gravity. And because theologians encouraged Corcuera that gambling could be done

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<sup>399</sup> Reeser, *Moderating Masculinity*, 16: Practicality and "immoderation" were central tenets in the early modern formulation of the ideal European masculinity.

<sup>400</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, "Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes," (1654), 2. Unfortunately the same could not be said of the appeal from Governor General Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera. Corcuera needed *baratos* to help finance the expenses of a ne'er do well nephew whom Corcuera had married off to a rich woman in Peru: Ibid., 43.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid., 42.

without detriment to one's conscience, Corcuera felt no shame in walking the streets for "ten days [and] more to gamble... in this way [and with the *baratos monies*]... [to] distribute alms."<sup>402</sup>

When compared to Spanish authorities' treatment of non-Catholic gamblers, I contend that Spanish men argued for their own unique moral impermeability as Spanish Catholic gamblers. In an *Audiencia* decree of 1638, *oidores* (councilors) approved of public gambling for the five days after the first full moon. The rest of the days following, if gambling resumed, imperial officials urged that authorities should "excuse [the games as a] superstition of the gentiles."<sup>403</sup> In other words, according to church and imperial officials of Manila, the impulse and act of gambling for non-Catholics came from superstition, while Spanish Catholic Governor Generals gambled "with good conscience." Furthermore, when contextualized within the Philippines where imperial authorities conceptualized the inner nature of colonial gentiles as particularly sinful, superstitious, and distinctly NOT European, the *oidores* ensured that their permissions could be specifically directed to the majority population who celebrated the lunar new year: Chinese men.<sup>404</sup>

Corcuera centered his personal experience as an economic expert to the crown as further proof that officials should collect and enjoy the fruits of the *baratos* tax. Governor Corcuera recalled his experiences in colonial Panama in his attempts to convince the King to allow the collection of *baratos*. Although not necessarily collecting *baratos* from "sangleys," Corcuera recalled the "*baratos* from gambling of the [Panamanian] Indians"

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<sup>402</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>403</sup> Ibid., 22

<sup>404</sup> Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 107: Rafael argues that religious authorities differentiated non-Spanish "doctrines and customs" from "abuses and superstitions" as "the latter features... had to be weeded out... the priests made their observance sinful."

which also produced substantial income for alms and charity.<sup>405</sup> Corcuera reminded the King that he had served a long time in his majesty's service, "26 months in Panama and the Philippine islands" and in all of that time he was able to collect "taxes and emoluments more than fifteen thousand pesos." Corcuera's rhetorical emphasis on his combined Governor General terms and the hefty peso amount he directed to the royal coffers signaled to the King that not only did Corcuera know how to efficiently collect gambling taxes, but that his personal experience – his expert knowledge as a civil servant to the King – warranted the King's serious consideration. Corcuera not only strengthened his own political position but contributed to the circulation and the production of bureaucratic knowledge precisely when King Philip IV debated the resumption of collecting *baratos* taxes.<sup>406</sup> Corcuera's evidence that included personal experience were likely legible and credible to the King; crown experts circulated through the Atlantic (and, now, the Pacific) world and "an empirical culture" developed among "artisans and royal officials" who were tasked monitor and govern imperial posts.<sup>407</sup>

In his final statement of complaint and self-effacement, Governor General Corcuera insisted he had not taken much in terms of salary; not even enough to pay his servants. However, his predecessor in Panama "took more than one hundred thousand pesos."<sup>408</sup> By wielding one's "personal experience" in official dealings, Spanish authorities participated in producing a "key element in the collection of knowledge" within the wider Spanish Empire

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<sup>405</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, "Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes," (1654), 42.

<sup>406</sup> Ibid.

<sup>407</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 62.

<sup>408</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, "Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes," (1654), 42.

while simultaneously proving themselves to be the sole masculine proprietors of expertise.<sup>409</sup>

### Spanish authorities racialize Chinese men

Where elite Spanish authorities racialized themselves as morally principled and disciplined enough to gamble (and to oversee *baratos* taxes), they characterized Chinese gamblers as an uncontrollable and potentially violent gambling population. In two 1636 letters ordering the execution of local laws concerning Chinese populations Juan Grau y Monfalcón, claimed that the yearly Easter games of chance were so “continuous” that they brought “in a heavy number of [sangleys]” into town centers. As a result, Monfalcón explained that his office was forced to impose licenses for Chinese men to stay in the islands in the amounts of eight pesos and seven tomines and upwards of eleven reales to Chinese men who ventured outside of the *Parián*.<sup>410</sup> For Monfalcón, neither the license profits, or the *baratos* tax profits, were not enough to justify “sangleys” residence in Manila. If imperial officials could not keep the number of sangleys down to six thousand, Monfalcón warned that he would petition the King to institute a cessation of *all* gambling, including the lucrative Easter games.<sup>411</sup> Monfalcón’s reasoning was simple: he needed to protect the Spanish vecinos of Manila against future “sangleys uprisings”; offenses Monfalcón believed would surely occur again.<sup>412</sup> Although the *Procurador General’s* insistence that Manila Chinese populations were naturally martial and unruly reflected Spanish colonial residents’ larger fear of Chinese uprisings, his assumption that large groups of gambling Chinese

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<sup>409</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 30.

<sup>410</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 28, Num. 25, “Petición de Juan Grau sobre sublevación de sangleyes,” (1636), 1.

<sup>411</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

might be uncontrollable reveals the Spanish official's harmful racialization of non-Spanish gamblers.<sup>413</sup>

The Procurator General was not only concerned with what crowds of Chinese gamblers might instigate within their own circles. As he policed gambling practices, Monfalcón uncovered the private gambling relationships between Spanish and Chinese men. In another 1636 letter he chastised *Parián* clergy for mingling with Chinese gamblers. He insisted that the *baratos* taxes produced numerous “inconveniences.” Monfalcón begged the King to issue a local law to ban gambling exchanges between Spanish ministers and Chinese gamblers. “In the *Parián*, there can be no gambling houses nor [will] it [be] allowed to play *even in the house of any parish minister.*”<sup>414</sup> Considering the *Procurador General's* indifference towards the license and *baratos* taxes, he was likely not driven by avarice as he did not lament the loss of monies from private exchanges with parish ministers and Chinese gamblers.

I offer another scenario: What if Monfalcón perceived budding relationships, hidden from imperial surveillance, between the *Parián's* parish ministers and its Chinese gambling hall owners? Such a claim would not be unfounded, given Chinese men's adeptness at maintaining debt and kinship networks with Chinese, indigenous Philippine, and Spanish men alike in the *Parián*.<sup>415</sup> *Parián* Chinese maintained extensive networks, oftentimes pursuing powerful patrons in their searches for their children's godfathers and godmothers.<sup>416</sup> And like the powerful networks Chinese panaderos built with powerful

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<sup>413</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 10.

<sup>414</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 27, Num. 208, “Petición de la ciudad de Manila sobre juego en el *parián* de sangleyes,” (1636), 1: Emphasis mine.

<sup>415</sup> Kueh, “Adaptive Strategies,” 364.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid.*, 366.



Spanish *vecinos*, Chinese debt networks issued in both directions, both loaning to and borrowing from Spanish subjects.<sup>417</sup> If Chinese gamblers formed debt relationships with parish clergy, Monfalcón felt the need to put a stop to it. Monfalcón might have been concerned over the relationship between parish ministers and Chinese gamblers if indigenous Philippine men took notice of such inter-racial camaraderie. In the port of Cavite, a provincial governor reprimanded Cavite's town surgeon, the Spanish Doctor Manuel Villaverde, for regularly (and in view of the public) partaking in games of *monte*. The governor explained that Villaverde's behavior caused ruin to the "local men from the surrounding towns, but also, and this is worse, losing the little respect remaining to Europeans in the eyes of the native inhabitants and mestizos."<sup>418</sup> In such a case, the *Procurador General* anguished over both the control of the underground gambling economy and the respect of the crown's indigenous vassals.

As Spanish authorities strategized ways to secure the resumption of the *baratos'* tax, the *Audiencia* peddled a powerful, highly legible myth to the king: that resuming the collection of gambling taxes would pave the way for Catholic Spain to Catholicize the "east." First, the *Audiencia* reminded the king that the very important islands of the Philippines – a colony in desperate need of *baratos* taxes – held so many "people whom [the King] cared for." Lara then explained that the "Chinese, sangleys, and [those of] other nations [were] perceived as foreign and censured [by] Don Diego's government. Lara cautioned the king that the Philippine colony was, indeed, multiracial, and in order to keep peaceful racial relations with the Chinese populations in particular, the king should avoid punishing

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<sup>417</sup> I highlight Chinese *panaderos'* networks with Spanish *vecinos* in Chapter 4, "Bread & Wood: Exclusionary "Expertise" in Colonial Philippine Provisional Economies."

<sup>418</sup> Bankoff, "Redefining Criminality," 270.

Chinese gamblers and instead pave the way for profiting from the mostly-Chinese run games of chance. The current Governor General then gently warned the King that he should not continue Fajardo's practice of ignoring the *baratos* tax: "A King as powerful and as sovereign as your Majesty *would* use the *baratos* monies for fortifications and artillery casting."<sup>419</sup> The *Audiencia's* appeal to the King's concern for his Philippine vassals coupled with Lara's clever implication that a self-possessed, financially knowledgeable King would not treat the Chinese – wards of a lucrative gambling economy – as foreigners urged King Philip IV to reassess the resumption of the *baratos* tax.<sup>420</sup>

The Manila *Audiencia*, not only concerned with Chinese residents in the Philippines, urged the king to consider Spain's reputation as an imperial power within Asia broadly. The colonial authorities cleverly linked the king's vanity to the approval of state-sanctioned *baratos* collections. They explained that the king should dispense the *baratos* monies so that Manila's authorities could repair the ruinous fortifications of the Philippines. The *Audiencia* insisted that the crumbling city was "in sight of so many nations and some very opulent as the Chinese are, and the Japanese, it is necessary to show the greatness of veneration of the name of your majesty. The governors [should] behave with the brilliance and authority of what they represent because these [Eastern] kingdoms *pay much attention to externalities*."<sup>421</sup> As Serge Gruzinski explains, early modern Iberian scholars and officials reified a monolithic "East" by producing volumes of expert anthropological and ethnological studies on East Asian civilizations.<sup>422</sup> As imperial officials who shaped early

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<sup>419</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, "Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes," (1654), 4 & 64: "[las islas filipinas] se hallan a la vista de tantas naciones y algunos muy opulentas como son los chinos, y japonés."

<sup>420</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>421</sup> Ibid., 64: Emphasis mine.

<sup>422</sup> Gruzinski, *The Eagle and the Dragon*, 40.

modern European racial ideologies regarding East Asian empires, the *Audiencia* perceived the need to reflect the King's visage in the form of a regal Manila; the capital city should match the same envious "externalities" of those metropolises of Japan and China. The *Audiencia* relayed to the King a legible crown approach to the "East" that would allow the Spanish Empire to eventually spread the Catholic faith into China and Japan.<sup>423</sup> By cajoling the King into fretting over the crown's reputation in the Philippine colony, the *Audiencia* connected the *baratos* monies to the Spanish Empire's potentially successful diplomatic relationship with the Chinese and Japanese kingdoms. The tactics of Lara and the *Audiencia* worked: by September 24, 1654, the King reinstated the collection of *baratos* monies.<sup>424</sup>

### Protecting the "Indian"

Vexed with concern over collecting the *baratos* monies – and whether its contribution would repair Manila's fortifications *and* fund the continuation of the empire's state monopoly on buyo – imperial authorities framed their monetary concerns as a philanthropic, civic duty to protect the indigenous vassals of the Philippines. In the process, imperial officials racialized indigenous Philippine men as economically inept and eternally poor.<sup>425</sup> Both Fajardo and Archbishop Casasola begged the King to resume the state monopoly on buyo, not to benefit the coffers of imperial officials, but to benefit the "Indian" buyo farmers and merchants. Fajardo called the refusal of the previous Governor Generals to institute the monopoly as "a most odious manner and a disservice to your majesty [in these islands]." In separate letters, both the Governor General and Casasola compelled the

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<sup>423</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, "Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes," (1654), 64.

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>425</sup> In Chapter 2, "The Masculine Facade of Empire: Chinese Merchants, Buyeros, and Neophytes": Similar to the lawyer Neyra's racialization of the "Indian" consumers of buyo and the exploited "Indian harvesters," Fajardo and Casasola also characterized indigenous buyero merchants as needful, miserable crown subjects.

King to tax the *baratos* so that the state could provide “remedy to the natives and to many poor people who cart buyo around and sell it for sustenance, without this resource, [there] will be... many other damages and inconveniences experienced [by the natives].”<sup>426</sup> In Fajardo and Casasola’s pleas, they argued that the only way that the “natives and poor people” could be less burdened would be if the state owned a monopoly on the widely-used substance. Indigenous Philippine buyo growers and merchants made little money “cart[ing] around” buyo, but their inefficient forms of production made the “Indians” impoverished. And the imperial government of Manila could only build a robust governmental monopoly with the new influx of *baratos* monies. Casasola cemented his belief that a buyo monopoly would ease the suffering of the King’s vassals. The buyo monopoly (financed by the *baratos* monies) would “be of great service to your majesty and the wellbeing of these islands to put them [the islands and its inhabitants] [into] perpetual silence.”<sup>427</sup>

Even as Fajardo and Casasola emphasized the neediness of indigenous vassals, they racialized “Indian” and Chinese men alike as inherently sinful. And apparently, such sinful behavior could negatively influence Spanish vecinos. In his previous post as Governor General, Corcuera extracted twelve thousand pesos from the Philippine buyo monopoly.<sup>428</sup> In the ex-Governor General’s final rundown of the many projects the *baratos* monies might fund, Corcuera noted that the monies could be used to further segregate the different races of Manila. He explained that with the *baratos* moneys the government could, “[rebuild] the fortification and remove the [Spanish] vecinos from condemnation of [the] public sins of

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<sup>426</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 22, Num. 10, “Expediente sobre los *baratos* de los juegos de sangleyes,” (1654), 47 & 68.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

the Chinese and Indians.<sup>429</sup> Corcuera's characterization of the two races of peoples, "Chinese and Indians," as the only groups that sinned in public is particularly egregious as he declared his own gambling practices as quite public and prolific. Moreover, Corcuera's statement suggested that Spanish vecinos would not conduct public sins and that they must be physically removed from any proximity to the sinful Chinese and Indian. If imperial officials did not act fast, they might expose the Spanish vecinos of Manila to further immoral contamination.

Ultimately, King Philip V would condemn the many erroneous gambling practices caused by the *baratos* taxation. Years later, still, the Crown would recognize, codify (via *cedula*), and characterize indigenous Philippine men as unruly, sinful gamblers. In a directive implemented by Archbishop Juan de Arechederra, the King aimed to "reform the inhabitants of their customs" because their "excesses of the games of cards, dice, and other games of luck" created imponderable damages." The King's list of his vassals' sins was long. He named gambling as "this terrible occupation" and "pernicious vice" that created "many idle people of restless life," "depraved customs," "biggest inconveniences," "the most atrocious crimes," "oaths, blasphemies, deaths, and losses of honor and haciendas that also originate riots, and unrest that disturb the public stillness, and unleash, or break the bonds of union, and the tranquility of families, and of peoples."<sup>430</sup> In comparison to the ways in which Governor Generals framed their own gambling habits, the king's conceptualization of "Indians" certainly portrayed indigenous gamblers as uniquely inclined to immorality.

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<sup>429</sup> Ibid., 37, Flannery, "Prohibited Games, Prohibited People," 86: Flannery provides a thorough investigation of the connection between Spanish efforts to segregate Chinese populations and Chinese residents' supposedly infamous gambling practices.

<sup>430</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 455, Num. 9, "Duplicado de carta de Juan de Arechederra sobre juegos de envite," (1745), 2 & 7.

The idea that the king's indigenous vassals were separated from their families and rioted on vecinos' haciendas would be unnerving enough for the monarch. But the King found himself equally enraged at his vecinos' behavior. The King demanded the cessation of *baratos* collections:

Do not allow any of the aforementioned ministers to play games in their homes of any amount, however limited, or to play any other game, as well as their wives, relatives, or servants, *even on the pretext of taking alms for hospitals, and other pious works*; and for those who commit this crime reprehend them correctly, and punish until (if necessary) to suspend them *ex officio*.<sup>431</sup>

The King heard that the sins of excessive gambling also affected "some ecclesiastics."<sup>432</sup> Monfalcón's fears of *Parián* parish ministers and Chinese gamblers intermingling clearly came to fruition in a manner most detrimental to the piety and morality of secular and religious officials alike. Of course, the king made exceptions: "gambling must not be allowed, nor tolerated, *except for* those licit and pure games fun and entertainment in the homes of *personas principales* (important people) and with the limitations and exceptions they indicate." Coupling the damages committed by imperial officials in their attempts to control the gambling economy via the *baratos* tax with the "Indian" gamblers' atrocities, it would behoove the king to implement a full ban on the games of chance. Instead, the king granted special privileges to certain important vecinos, writing into law that Spanish men

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<sup>431</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid., 4.

were still somehow better equipped to handle the temptations of gambling than other non-Spanish colonial actors.

Monitoring the gambling vice, imperial authorities claimed that its most damaging effects on indigenous men was the vice's potential to interfere with indigenous laborers' work ethic. In the *cortés de madera* imperial officers created laws to ban gambling so that laborers would more dutifully commit to imperial works. *Corte* imperial officials stated that no "cards, dice, roosters, chopsticks, other games of chance" be allowed on the grounds of the *cortés*. The labor law stated that the games "destroy[ed] the natives." During working hours, indigenous laborers had too much "fun in the game, do not attend to work" and then "return to their homes, not even [with] the clothes they brought out [that day] on them." In the *corte*, gambling supposedly destroyed the natives. The *corte* officials, however, did not emphasize any of the moral or religious corruptions King Philip V mentioned, but rather the practical, economic obstacles of gambling "native" laborers who did not "attend to work." Although the logic behind reprimanding indigenous gamblers varied, both the king and *corte* officials agreed on one certainty: to racialize indigenous men as needful of discipline.

The law demanded that *corte* corporals remain "vigilant" in the *corte*, but also to recognize that on some days where the lumbermen did not have work "games of honest fun and licit entertainment between public parties" were allowed.<sup>433</sup> Similar to the manner in which King Philip V approached exceptional gambling of important persons, the *corte* officials realized they would not be able to completely stamp out the oftentimes disruptive

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<sup>433</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 384, Num. 33, "Carta de Valdés Tamón sobre *cortes* de madera," (1736), 14.

vice. Seemingly, the imperial prerogative expressed that a happy worker was a good worker.

## Vagabonds

Like the imperial officials who shored up their own Spanish racial superiority as moral, principled Spanish men who could monitor *baratos* monies without corruption, secular and church officials also used racial formations to justify the re-opening of the *padrón* (the official list of tribute-paying populations). In this section, I argue that Spanish authorities characterized indigenous men as lazy and ungovernable in order to reduce vagabond populations into settled towns. In the imperial correspondence on the *padrón*, two major officials emerged as the arbiters of the tribute: parish priests and *cabezas de barangay*. I examine the parish priests' rationale of "reducing" families and enlisting *cabezas* to reduce vagabonds into town life. "Reducción" was critical to the larger Spanish colonial project because in the act of settling populations into towns, Spanish authorities could surveil neophyte indigenous peoples and collect consistent tribute.<sup>434</sup> In the case of the vagabond, the *padrón* correspondence reveals the importance of the *reducción* as it "served as an access point where Spanish capital could tap directly into *repartimiento* labor."<sup>435</sup> In the early eighteenth-century Philippines, imperial authorities anguished over how vagabonds hindered reduction efforts. Although imperial officials would win the fight for re-opening the *padrón*, this section also asserts that imperial officials' efforts of surveilling vagabonds fell short. I demonstrate how the *padrón* debate correspondence

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<sup>434</sup> Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 87-89.

<sup>435</sup> Nemser, *Infrastructures of Race*, 58.



revealed that *cabezas de barangay* maintained pre-conquest labor relationships with alleged “vagabonds.” Similar to the underground Chinese gambling networks, the parish priests tasked to police vagabonds did not succeed in taming every colonial actor in the early modern Philippines.

### Racializing Vagabonds, Disciplining Vagabonds

While parish priests attended to the spiritual health of their Philippine flocks by dispensing sacraments (primarily baptism, confession, etc.), they also worked to eradicate vagabondery by rooting vagabond men to indigenous women who resided in towns. In other words, the clergy encouraging indigenous men and women to marry and to create settled families. One of the mechanisms by which the church accounted for indigenous families was by legitimizing indigenous marriages. In 1710, the Archbishop of Manila enforced the parish priests’ dispensation of legitimate marriages to neophytes. Archbishop Francisco de la Cuesta expressed disappointment at the goings on of the “new missions” where so many indigenous women had become pregnant out of wedlock. De la Cuesta encouraged other priests to disrupt the practice of indigenous women and men who were permitted to “love” one another in a “disorderly” manner. The priest made his prohibition of sex without marriage clear in his statement that disorderly love caused “remarkable damage” to “Indian” souls.<sup>436</sup> This first edict might have legalized neophyte marriage but did not interrupt the prevalence of bigamy among vagabonds. The Bishop Elect of Nueva Caceres, Don Phelipe de Molina, lamented the prevalence of vagabond bigamy in his letter of request to re-open the padrón. Molina claimed that because priests did not keep updated confession and tribute lists, indigenous men married twice in their lives; wedding their

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<sup>436</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 290, Num. 32, “Carta de Francisco de la Cuesta sobre matrimonios de neófitos,” (1710), 1.

“consorts” during the lifetime of their legitimate wives.<sup>437</sup> By targeting vagabonds as bigamists, the clergy aimed to remedy two major wrongs. First, the new padrones would end the offensive practice of bigamy which de-stabilized the offender’s original family. Second, rooting vagabonds to families would strengthen men’s position as a steadier patriarch, otherwise known as the only familial force who could stem their wife’s natural proclivity for “moral depravity,” a crucial tenet in the colonial Catholic Church’s outlook on the genders.<sup>438</sup> The re-opening of the padrón would update the priests’ lists so that they could monitor the movement – and marriages – of indigenous men.

The concerns of the clergy in overseeing families aided secular officials’ efforts in re-opening the *padrón*. Molina wrote to the king that so many vagabonds practiced bigamy. To remedy the issue of bigamy, Molina insisted that the law re-opening the padrón should include an edict stipulating that if indigenous men chose to move from town to town, “the married [men] must carry their women and family with them to the town where they move.” If the men refused, the parish priests were charged with evicting the vagabond from his parish.<sup>439</sup> Molina was certain that this rule – codified in the secular law of re-opening the padron – would prevent indigenous men and women from further living in “*amancebado* (“shacked up”).”<sup>440</sup> Molina’s concern over unwed men and women living together was certainly not an isolated anxiety in the Spanish legal world as laws defining the term vagrant, a legal category on par with the vagabond, came to include men who

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<sup>437</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1730), 81.

<sup>438</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 114.

<sup>439</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>440</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

participated in *amancebados*, thereafter defined as “those who maintained a long-term illicit sexual affair that involved cohabitation.”<sup>441</sup>

The process of “fixing” families into sites for imperial policing was not only a practical endeavor for imperial officials and clergy, it was also a task driven by Spanish men’s need to assimilate indigenous peoples into an Iberian, gendered family formation. Vicente Rafael argued that the process of *reducción* “convert[ed] the colonized into arbitrary elements that could be made to fit into a divinely sanctioned order characterized by the hierarchization of all signs and things in the world.”<sup>442</sup> For local parish priest Thomas Ortiz, that formulation was to “create” indigenous families into early modern, gendered formations. Ortiz, who ran a parish in Antipolo, ordered that the open *padrón*’s listings of indigenous men’s houses must include “children, slaves, servants” so that “[the indigenous vagabonds] for no reason, [shall be] dismembered from their homes and families. The tributaries will always be with their families or houses.”<sup>443</sup> Ortiz went one step further and argued that, in the future, no indigenous man should be allowed “to build houses, retired [in] hidden places.”<sup>444</sup> When they introduced alternative, Spanish forms of coerced labor and settling, imperial officials and clergy also hoped to sever communal and collective ties and, arguably, collective *barangay* kinship networks.<sup>445</sup>

Although parish priests amassed considerable power as spiritual leaders, in the *barangays*, *cabezas de barangay* wielded authority as indigenous leaders and the main

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<sup>441</sup> Mehl, *Forced Migration in the Spanish Pacific World*, 137.

<sup>442</sup> Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 90.

<sup>443</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1730), 10.

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>445</sup> Elizabeth U. Eviota, *The Political Economy of Gender: Women and the Sexual Division of Labour in the Philippines* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 33-46 and Brewer, 40.

“counters” of tribute. *Cabezas* acted as the primary go-betweens between local parish priests and indigenous *barangueños* (townsfolk). Throughout the padrón correspondence (which centered on the provinces of Camarines, Tayabas, and Albay), clergy explained that the role of the *cabezas*, like the role of caciques in the larger empire, was to register inhabitants according to particular colonial “castes” (the *mestizos*, *criollos* and *morenos*) in the imperial tributary and confession lists. The clergy also tasked the *cabezas* with the duty of surveilling vagamundos in their *barangay*.<sup>446</sup>

According to Molina, *barangueños* practiced “rest” cycles that posed an obstacle to the *cabezas* of Camarines, Tayabas, and Albay in their efforts to compile tributary and confession list. The bishop explained that the *cabezas* were unable to aid in the funneling of “Indians” into the confessional box.<sup>447</sup> The provincial minister of the town of San Francisco echoed similar sentiments: that indigenous men would “hide themselves” during “a type of Lent” they created for themselves where they did not confess nor pay tribute.<sup>448</sup> Clergy defined tribute and confession-dodgers as *vagamundos* (vagabonds). Such “potential” *polos y servicios* (*repartimiento*) laborers confounded the clergy and the *cabezas* de *barangay*: “no *cabeza* wants to take care of those subjects who are not very sure for their collection.”<sup>449</sup> In addition to the Lenten practices of vagabonds, the bishop found inexcusable flaws in the confession practices of the three provinces. The *cabezas* would only encourage indigenous men to confess when they could pay tribute. In this complicated process, the *cabeza* gave an indigenous man a *cedula* (an identification card) and the

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<sup>446</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1741), 1.

<sup>447</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>448</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>449</sup> *Ibid.*

“Indian” would take the *cedula* to confession. The ministers claimed that a number of “Indians” did not receive *cedulas* from their *cabezas de barangay* and could, therefore, not confess to the parish priest.<sup>450</sup>

The clergy framed the re-opening of the padron as a saving grace for the heavily burdened *cabezas*. If he could not find the people listed on confession or tribute lists, the *cabezas* had to search for them “from town to town.”<sup>451</sup> If the indigenous leader could not locate his tributaries, he paid the expenses of the “multitude of vagabonds” up front.<sup>452</sup> In the worst case scenario, the *cabezas* served time in the dungeon for lack of payment (of his *barangueños*) or for his inability to locate his town’s vagabonds.<sup>453</sup> The clergy believed, however, that there was a remedy for the *cabezas*’ turmoil. By re-opening the padrón, the indigenous leaders would embark upon mass census-taking that would “group together in haciendas” so that “all [“Indians”] would be known to the *cabezas* de barangays of their nations” in order to collect “repartimientos of servicios personales (personal labor drafts).”<sup>454</sup> If the indigenous leaders agreed to implementing the open padrón then the clergy would offer 3% of the newly collected tribute monies to the *cabezas* de *barangay*.<sup>455</sup> Don Felipe de Molina also offered labor exemptions for all *cabezas* de *barangay* and their first born sons.<sup>456</sup>

However Molina and other clergy dressed up and incentivized the role of the tribute-counting *cabeza*, the reality remained: the indigenous leaders occupied a volatile

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<sup>450</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>454</sup> Ibid., 31 & 114.

<sup>455</sup> Ibid.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid., 114.

and degrading role. As intermediaries between religious imperial authorities and *barangueños*, the indigenous tribute counters and vagabond hunters bore the punishments of failing either party.<sup>457</sup> Moreover, the process of delivering tribute lists and tributes to Spanish overseers was what Patricia Seed called an act of “ritual humiliation.” Local indigenous leaders had to navigate compelling the labor and goods of their *barangueños* in an “intended lesson in shame [and] inferiority” in service of the Spanish crown.<sup>458</sup> *Cabezas* were once *datus*; powerful warrior-leaders of their barangays.<sup>459</sup> However, *cabezas* in the early modern world delivered their *barangueños*’ monies and goods to Spanish officials who likely perceived *cabezas* as leaders of “conquered peoples [who] and to pay tribute in a ritual humiliation... [as they] personally hand[ed] over the tribute as an intended lesson in shame inferiority, and military submission.”<sup>460</sup>

Attempting to create a united front in the counting of vagabonds, Molina enlisted the *cabeza de barangay* to corral vagabonds. Surprisingly, however, clergy characterized the itinerant men not just as lost Christian souls, but as lost labor.<sup>461</sup> Friar Joseph del Espiritu Santo urged that all “Indian” “roving” must be “curbed” so that vagabonds could partake in the “repartimientos for the royal services.”<sup>462</sup> He noticed that among the provinces surrounding Tayabas, Camarines, and Albay the *cabezas* had already experienced an “inequality [of number] for the[ir] *repartimientos* and *polos y servicios*” due to the current

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<sup>457</sup> Yannakakis, *The Art of Being In-Between*, 161.

<sup>458</sup> Seed, *American Pentimento*, 81.

<sup>459</sup> Raphael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 139 and Constantino, *A History of the Philippines*, 52.

<sup>460</sup> Seed, *American Pentimento*, 81-82: Seventeenth-century Spanish political thinker Juan Solórzano Pereira explained the act of paying tribute as the indigenous spoils of a war won by the Spanish conquerors.

<sup>461</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1741), 26 and 33: Friar Joseph del Espiritu Santo, Provincial Minister of the town of San Francisco claimed that locating vagabonds became particularly tricky when the men would hide in the mountains.

<sup>462</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

practice of the “closed” (unrevised) padrón list.<sup>463</sup> Molina further specified del Espiritu Santo’s claim. The towns of Parañaque and Meycauayan had recently experienced a severe shortage in lime and stone workers. The bishop also claimed that laborers were needed to fulfill the royal works of re-constructing the royal hospital and the Santa Potenciana school, as well as attending to the royal metal smelters, and the salt beds.<sup>464</sup> With the implementation of an open padrón, vagabonds could be turned into disciplined laborers. Even after the re-opening of the padrón, religious authorities created a safety net for leftover laborers: if any vagabonds wandered into a town unregistered after the opening of the padrón, they would face “rigorous punishment.”<sup>465</sup> Like the *corte* officials concerned with gambling lumbermen, the clergy grasped the economic impact of lost labor potential in an untapped labor force.

The church fathers racialized the unemployed vagabond as an “irrational Indian” whose refusal to confess and pay tribute slowed the success of the colonial project. Bishop Molina offered his unambiguous assertion as he explained why ostensibly unintelligent “Indians” refused to confess:

The Indian is *not so useful that he reaches these metaphysics*, and he only knows, that because the father says he does confess, the mayor charges the tribute, and if the father did not say it, [the Indian] will not be charged. And [it is all] the more useful to make him understand why he does not withdraw from

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<sup>463</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>464</sup> Ibid., 77 & 34.

<sup>465</sup> Ibid., 9.

confession. The precision that exists between confessing and paying tribute, that he will respond with the fact: if I do not confess, I do not pay tribute.<sup>466</sup>

Orlando Betancor defines the early modern usage of “metaphysics” as the scientific approach in which humans had the unique capacity to transform the raw, natural world, but Betancor also argues that the Spanish Empire used this “natural law” to justify its conquest of the Americas.<sup>467</sup> Like the unrefined matter of the earth, Spanish authorities were entitled to shape and direct the imperfect, “highly flawed” colonial peoples of the colonies.<sup>468</sup> In Molina’s opinion, “Indians” could not understand the importance of confession in their own metaphysical transformation towards what Spanish political thinkers called “a civilized and political life,” or a life reduced into Iberian, crown-governed polities.<sup>469</sup> The bishop racialized vagabonds for refusing entry into a political life by using Spanish-authored ethnological assumptions on “Indian” civilizations. In Molina’s opinion, a vagabond was simply incapable of understanding that his own development as a Catholic vassal could be used as a metric of the Spanish crown’s success in the colonies.

Some clergymen linked the irrationality of the “Indians” (and, loosely, to all vagabonds) to their love of freedom of movement. An Antipolo priest, Friar Joseph Hernandez, argued that it was, indeed, impossible to reduce all “Indians.” “You cannot move [what is] natural of Indians... or put to them [the] rational politics [of reduction].” Friar Hernandez called the lives of “Indians” an “illicit way of life” as they often picked up

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<sup>466</sup> Ibid., 64.

<sup>467</sup> Orlando Betancor, *The Matter of Empire: Metaphysics and Mining in Colonial Peru* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), 1.

<sup>468</sup> Ibid., 4 & 8.

<sup>469</sup> Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish American Social and Political Theory, 1513-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 26.



their belongings and took refuge in the mountains.<sup>470</sup> Friar del Espiritu Santo agreed. He explained that a “vagabond Indian” “by their nature... [were] chained to herding [about].”<sup>471</sup> If we employ the early modern metaphysical framework, it is critical to note that Hernandez, del Espiritu Santo, and Molina understood their indigenous congregations as malleable subjects. Vagabondery, however, confounded plans of the masterful, ruling force (the crown and the cross).<sup>472</sup> Molina expressed such sentiments in 1726, lamenting that “it is so difficult, or impossible to reduce [the] natives... [to] live a rational life, and rational politics... it is difficult or impossible to change their own nature or put them to subjection [as they are] inclined to all freedom.”<sup>473</sup>

The clergy employed the racial formation of the “irrational” Indian in their demands to re-open the padron to great success. In 1738, imperial officials made Molina and the local clergy’s dream come true as they re-opened the padrón.<sup>474</sup>

### Free Indians, Free Laborers

Although the racial formations of the “irrational Indian” moved the crown to re-open the padrones, I argue that the clerical discourse reveals significant cracks in imperial surveillance. I contend that the alleged vagabonds did not evade counts because of an inherent, racial irrationality, but rather because itinerant men worked with *cabezas* in special labor relationships. Untethered indigenous men labored for *cabezas* of their choosing as they eluded parish priests. Like the experiences of Europeans in the Americas,

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<sup>470</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 19.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid., 28-29.

<sup>472</sup> Betancor, *The Matter of Empire*, 8-9.

<sup>473</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 73 & 26.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid., 1.

parish priests who attempted to reduce indigenous Philippine peoples “had to negotiate the structures and institutions of Indian political economies.”<sup>475</sup> Indigenous men knew their lands, their allegiances, and their rulers far better than their colonial caretakers. It was with these knowledges that vagabonds acted as “free Indians” and “free laborers.”

Imperial officials undoubtedly grasped that indigenous men labored outside of crown-sanctioned labor regimes. Friar del Espiritu explained that vagabonds’ movements caused a “great confusion.” He revealed that vagabonds roved freely “because they desire[d] [to be] with a parish minister or with a town captain (*capitán del pueblo*) [of another town, and]... escape to register in [that] town.”<sup>476</sup> Vagabondery, then, was not simply a form of avoiding the church or tribute, but rather choosing to worship under different priests or choosing to work for different indigenous rulers. Moreover, the Molina explained the extent to which indigenous men roved during their Lenten custom of dropping off of tribute lists and moving from town to town undetected by the church: “An Indian step[s] forward (and it is very common)... and [he] goes to the “monte” (mountains) to hunt, goes to the sea, to the sea to make salt, or to the coasts, and [to the] beaches to catch sigay (shells of small snails), shellfish, or [other] shells, or to a (farm) field where he is hidden.”

Molina conveyed two salient points about vagabonds’ movements. First, that itinerant indigenous men had an intimate knowledge of their lands and how to successfully slip away from the view of parish priests. When the vagabond “steps forward,” “goes to the

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<sup>475</sup> Julianna Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the “Borderlands” of the Early Southwest,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (2011): 9.

<sup>476</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 29.

monte,” and then hides in the farms, the priest is describing the “free Indian’s” relationship to the land. “Free Indians,” did not simply slip away from Spanish towns marked on clean, orderly Spanish maps. Itinerant men demonstrated a relationship of territoriality – a relationship with the land represented by “territorial principles (as evinced in subsistence practice, language and cognition, oral tradition)” – in their absconding efforts.<sup>477</sup> Molina offers us a glimpse into how itinerant men practiced freedom of movement. Second, the bishop describes for us the numerous places the “Indian” roved, but more importantly, he reminds us of the types of labor in which the alleged vagabond partook.<sup>478</sup> The question is no longer about whether or not the indigenous vagabond avoided paying their tribute (which, at this time, was offered in cash or kind), but whether or not the “Indian” exerted his free will as an un-reduced, un-counted indigenous vassal to labor in the name of the crown or in the name of another *cabeza de barangay*.

The bishop, aware of the clandestine labor relationships, explained that the free laborers were called *timaguas* (*timawa*). I contend that by using the *timawa* characterization, the bishop signaled to indigenous men’s continuation of the pre-conquest labor relationship between the *timawa-datu*. The bishop explained that vagabonds were free “Indians” who had the inclination to “live and dwell” wherever they willed. He elaborated that such vagabonds oftentimes were of “the inferior ones [Indians] among them, who [are] vulgarly called *Timaguas* (*Timawa*).”<sup>479</sup> Prior to Spanish invasion, the *timawa* belonged to a feudal warrior class who served their *datus* (indigenous leaders)

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<sup>477</sup> Barr, “Geographies of Power,” 10.

<sup>478</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 64.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid., 81.

directly as noble military men. The *timawa* also “rendered agricultural and maritime labor to the *datu*.”<sup>480</sup> However, after Spanish invasion, imperial authorities flattened the meaning of *Timawa* simply to “freemen.”<sup>481</sup> While scholars agree that many *datu*s took the position of *cabezas de barangay*, less is known about colonial afterlife of the *datu*’s relations with the *timawa* class.<sup>482</sup> It is likely that the bonds of service between the *datu* and *timawa* developed into the labor relationship between the *cabeza* and the “vagabond.” Rather than offer their military fealty to their Paranaqueño, Camarinan, or Albayan leaders, the *timawa* now offered their labor in service of their chosen *cabezas de barangay*.<sup>483</sup>

The *cabezas*, apparently, enjoyed the fruits of *timawa* labor and refused to tell imperial officials about their labor arrangements with the “vagabonds.” Molina claimed that “even if” the *Timawa* “vagabond” returned to his town of origin, “he [would] give three, or four *reales* to the *cabeza*, or offer himself, and forces himself to serve as a *mananguete* (a person who collects coconut or tuba) to remove tuba, or [become] a farmer in his [*cabeza*’s] *sementera* (fields).”<sup>484</sup> Molina’s use of the term “forces himself to serve” points to a coercive labor agreement. However, that the bishop characterized the relationship as an exchange of services rather than money (i.e. selling oneself to absolve a debt) conveys the likelihood that the *cabeza*-vagabond labor relationship was less coercive and more communal. In the pre-colonial past, when “free” *timawas* helped their *datu*s, they did so as “a service rendered in consideration for [the *datu*’s own service to the [*barangay*].” Indeed,

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<sup>480</sup> Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 142-143.

<sup>481</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 15.

<sup>482</sup> Constantino, *A History of the Philippines*, 5 and Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 119-120.

<sup>483</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 29.

<sup>484</sup> Tuba is wine made from coconuts.

the bishop argued that the mutual relationship between indigenous men required attention from the crown in the form of the re-opening of the *padrón*: “the *cabeza*, [because] of his [*timawa*’s] interest and service, is silent and does not warn the minister [of the missing confessant]. [Then] there is no confession, nor tribute to his majesty. [This practice is] well experienced [by me].”<sup>485</sup> Regardless of whether the *cabeza* simply preferred to keep his prestige by housing many dependents or if the *cabeza* did, indeed, care for his *timawa*, one thing was certain: that the labor relationship between the “free Indian” and the *cabeza* did not serve the Spanish crown.<sup>486</sup>

The clergy resented the *cabeza-timawa* relationships and further racialized the vagabonds as silver-tongued cheats and a waste of potential labor. The indigenous labor relations, ungovernable by secular and religious imperial authorities alike, compelled Molina to hurl numerous epithets at the “Indian” populations of Tayabas, Camarines, and Albay. In his description of the payment and barter customs between the Timawa and the *cabeza*, Molina described the “Indians as many philosophers” in their ability to evade the tribute and the confessional box.<sup>487</sup> On one hand, Molina might have given the “vagabonds” some credit as they applied their own “philosophy” to lying by omission (and absconding to work with the *cabeza* of their choosing). However, his characterization of their ability to “philosophize” was likely steeped in sarcasm as his next statement centered on the “Indians” as “barren thieves” who “[go] against God and against the King.”<sup>488</sup> The bishop also called the cadre of “vagabonds” who avoided confession: “poor cheats, scoundrels, and

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<sup>485</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 65.

<sup>486</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 20: The popularity of a *datu* could often be inflated by his gaining more dependents.

<sup>487</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 65.

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid.*

braggarts.”<sup>489</sup> The language the bishop employed in his characterization of “vagabonds” who avoided confession – “thieves, cheats, scoundrels” – is telling of the clergyman’s concern that able-bodied laborers should not work in the service of non-imperial officials.

Indigenous actors including the *cabezas de barangay* and their *barangueños* defended the practice of “vagabond”-*cabeza* labor relations by deflecting the *padrón* issues onto the priests. Facing what Molina called “an invincible ignorance of persons of such a [large] number”, he relayed to crown officials that the indigenous labor agreements were more akin to *timawa* “enslavement... because the [*timawa*] were freed from confession, and tribute” rather than a joint compact.<sup>490</sup> To counter such claims among his own townspeople, the *cabezas* “charged [the fathers] with ambition” in the priests’ attempts to fabricate more names on the confessional (and thus, the tributary) lists for the crown. Molina was anguished by the idea that “the father lost his credit” in the eyes of the *barangay*.<sup>491</sup> In his commitment to re-opening the *padrón* and re-directing the vagabonds back to imperial labor circuits, Molina “removed eleven [vagabonds] from the tyrannical power of only two *principales* (another term for *cabezas de barangay*).” The bishop accused the *principales* of hiding “vagabonds” “in their works, [the *principales*] collected [vagabond] tributes, [and] because the [vagabonds] are enslaved with their children.”<sup>492</sup> As the *cabezas* kept their dependents’ families close by – a common practice in pre-colonial baranganic relations – it should be noted that the *cabezas* also flustered the clergy’s plans of forcing indigenous men and women into Iberian family formations. Moreover, by using “slavery” to

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<sup>489</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid.

<sup>491</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>492</sup> Ibid., 67.

describe baranganic dependent relationships, Molina contributed to a larger Spanish discourse of confusion as Spaniards before and after Molina conflated slavery with pre-conquest dependent-*datu* relationships.<sup>493</sup> Setting aside Molina's misnomer, he revealed what angered him most: that the *principales* had the audacity to reserve their own *barangueños'* labor for themselves.

## Conclusion

In *las calles*, Spanish imperial officials faced complications both in their endeavors to profit from the Chinese gambling economy and in their goals to "fix" an itinerant labor force. And while imperial authorities weaponized racializations of Spanishness, Chineseness, and indigeneity to create fiscal and bureaucratic laws, the more significant issue was what the racial discourse revealed: that even as late as the eighteenth century, the Spanish Empire failed at taming economies and laborers. "Sangley" gambling halls collected the vast majority of wealth from gamblers (whether from powerful Governor Generals to the lumbermen of Cavite) and "vagabond" *timawa* insisted on serving whomever they wanted, whenever they pleased. The fable of the "Indian from Tabuco" is a perfect example of the concerns of imperial authorities. The "vagabond" and potential laborer constantly lied to the priest about having a myriad of illnesses and then lied about being "reserved" for labor (Father Torrubia checked the *reserva* lists and this man was not listed). Ultimately, the "vagabond" admitted his lies. Father Torrubia believed the "Indian" was committing a great "*bellaco*" or wickedness. The "Indian" avoided paying tribute and

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<sup>493</sup> Constantino, *A History of the Philippines*, 31-33.

going to confession, living in “total freedom”; an offense to the efforts of the crown authorities who so diligently worked to civilize him.

Like the Tabucano, I choose a different path in representing his story. Instead of hiding from imperial officers, he swam and picked sigay from the sea. He hunted in the lush mountains. And he toiled for a *datu* worthy of his labor, in their ancestral farmlands.<sup>494</sup>

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<sup>494</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 446, Num.1, “Duplicados de carta de Gaspar de la Torre sobre cuenta abierta por padrón de habitantes,” (1725), 68.



## Chapter 5

### “Ang aming lupa”: Masculine Strategies of Resistance in the 1745 Agrarian Rebellion

In 1745, six *principales* (indigenous local leaders) from the hacienda town of Silang initiated an agrarian rebellion. With their collectively written statement they demanded that the Jesuits, the Dominicans, and the Augustinian recolects re-draw their estate lines and, subsequently, return any usurped lands back to Silangan residents. Over the next few years, the neighboring towns of Cavite, Tondo, and Bulacan took up similar causes, with “rebels” calling for an array of demands ranging from the return of ancestral lands to better apportionment for the food rations of indigenous families. In this chapter, I highlight those very first Silangans’ Tagalog-authored statements. By situating the Silangans’ demands within the broader context of Spanish imperial authorities’ race-making project, I offer an alternative analysis to historians who have interpreted the rebellion as either a proto-Independence struggle or a cut-and-dry dispute over land.<sup>495</sup> By examining the Silangans’ discursive strategies I argue that the Silangans knew how to appeal to Spanish authorities by demonstrating a robust, functioning knowledge of the Spanish masculine ideals of piety and vassalage. The Silangans, however, did not solely rely on Spanish performances of masculinity. I contend that Silangan men and other leaders from the towns surrounding Cavite could only successfully galvanize and maintain collective cohesion by non-Spanish means of bond-building. By recognizing that the Silangans practiced a uniquely Philippine, masculinized form of alliance-building, I ultimately assert that the Silangans conceptualized

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<sup>495</sup> Nicholas P. Cushner, *Landed Estates in the Colonial Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) and Fernando Palanco Aguado, “The Tagalog Revolts of 1745 According to Spanish Primary Sources,” *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 58 nos. 1 & 2 (2010): 65-66.

their position as leaders of men much more complexly than the Spanish racial projections I have examined so far in my current dissertation. It would be the multitudinous quality of Silangan strategies – both extra- and intramural – that secured a promising conclusion to the Silangan rebellion.

In this chapter, I offer a foil to the previous four chapters as I highlight the words and actions of Tagalog men rather than depend entirely upon Spanish authorities' writings. More importantly, I draw attention to the shortcomings of Spanish authorities' attempts at shaping "Indian" racial types. From the mid-seventeenth to the early eighteenth century, imperial officials, clergymen, and *vecinos* perceived indigenous men as malleable, but ultimately as the eternal "Other." Spanish authorities heavily invested in their own race-making project depicted indigenous men as requiring constant surveillance because of their status as naive neophytes, as men exploited in the lumberyards by usurious gabelas (taxes) levied by Chinese or Spanish *corte* officials, as unscientific and unintelligent miners, and as protecting wayward laborers easily succumbed to the Chinese "pernicious vice" of gambling. The words and actions of the Silangan men did, indeed, mirror some Spanish ideations of race. The *principales* avowed themselves as pious, self-possessed, and diligent subjects; they performed displays of vassal subjecthood made valuable only through the lens of European masculinity. However, by arguing that the Silangans wielded this racialized, gendered discourse as *one* strategy among many (including an intramural, precolonial blood pact), I assert that indigenous men both grasped the utility of colonial

mimicry, but also shaped their own racial and gendered identities by practicing the *sandugo*.<sup>496</sup>

In my examination of the Tagalog-authored Silangan statements, I argue that Tagalog men subversively practiced a racial identity that complicated the Spanish-authored racial formations of indigenous men as meek, religious vassals. Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O'Hara explained that colonial racial identity was a "term and a concept that is best understood through *practices*."<sup>497</sup> Within the context of colonial Latin America, Fisher and O'Hara describe the presence of racial formations as a double-sided set of practices. Race as a social identity "involved both categorization and self-understanding, both crafting and interpreting, both processes that were external and internal to the historical actors involved in them."<sup>498</sup> In the previous four chapters I dissected the external modes of race-making in the form of the racial and gendered constructions of Chinese and indigenous male laborers authored by external instructions and actors. "Ang aming lupa" highlights the other, internal set of race-making processes. Silangan men constructed their own racial and gendered identity via two practices: first, by echoing Spanish imperial racial constructions back to their creators (Spanish authorities) and second, by practicing an intramural form of masculine relationship building via the *sandugo* pact. If a racial "Other" in colonial Latin America produced their identity through a set of practices, this chapter asks: What, then, was the racial identity of the Silangan patriarch? How did the men who effectively


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<sup>496</sup> Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 85-86: Bhabha describes the phenomenon of 'colonial mimicry' as "the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge." Where Bhabha recognized projection of colonial mimicry from the colonizer to the colonized, I extend his theory to the reversal of the roles. The "reformed, recognizable Other" of the indigenous Philippine subject grasped colonial mimicry as a process of recognition, affirmation, and performance of the colonizer's racialized anxieties.

<sup>497</sup> Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O'Hara, eds. *Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 21.

<sup>498</sup> *Ibid.*, 20

mimicked Spanish-created racial constructions simultaneously (and secretly) build alliances through indigenous fraternal blood pacts? In the act of colonial mimicry, Tagalog men reaffirmed the racialized and gendered expectations of Spanish men who could only perceive colonial subjects as “‘partial’ presence[s].”<sup>499</sup> In their collective bonds, did Silangan men make themselves whole? Were the Silangans dutiful Christian vassals, a collective of tightly-bonded, “insurrectionist” warriors, or both?



Map of Tagalog towns mentioned in the documents

As a result of the first actions in Silang in February 1745, the peoples of the surrounding towns of Indang, Kawit, Bacoor, Las Piñas, and Parañaque agitated for the return of their lands. The Silangans and their neighbors – Tagalogs from the area of southern Luzon – participated in acts that ranged from vandalization to violent and fatal confrontations to make their demands heard.<sup>500</sup> Spanish authorities attempted to quell the

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<sup>499</sup> Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 86.

<sup>500</sup> Aguado, “The Tagalog Revolts of 1745,” 49-65.

uprisings as indigenous men's efforts spread to San Mateo, Bulacán, Balayán, Taal, and Rosario, first deploying General Juan Bautista Uriarte. When Uriarte could not stop the aggressions of the Tagalog insurrectionists, the secular government sent General Pedro Calderón y Henríquez to negotiate with the Tagalog *principales*. The scale of the 1745 rebellion spanned the entire southern coasts of Luzon and thus, the significance of analyzing the first incendiary events at Silang cannot be overstated. The peoples of Silang – a town beleaguered by exploitative *alcaldes mayores* (mostly Spanish-born regional mayors), the memory (and continued fear) of Chinese-led rebellion, and European-delivered smallpox epidemics – monitored the longstanding disputes over land against the local religious orders. Dating back to the end of the sixteenth century, Silangans, Kawiteños, and San Mateans litigated against Jesuit landholders for illegally usurped ancestral lands. Invoking the return of lands “owned, cultivated, and worked on since time immemorial”, Silangans and San Mateans grasped the legal languages that religious and secular imperial authorities would recognize in land adjudications.<sup>501</sup> Over a century of legal rulings ensued with secular imperial authorities granting land-measurement directives to remedy usurped lands sometimes in favor of the Tagalogs and other times against their favor. The final straw for the Silangans occurred when representatives of the Jesuit estate sent Chinese builders to erect a warehouse on lands that Silangans believed to be theirs.<sup>502</sup> The six Silangan *principales* drafted a collective statement, and the agrarian disputes would erupt into a full-scale rebellion of the Tagalog region.

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<sup>501</sup> Seed, *American Pentimento*, 87.

<sup>502</sup> Aguado, “The Tagalog Revolts of 1745,” 52.

The major works on the rebellion appropriately contextualizes the rebellion's events within the long history of religious estates while other historians conceive that the 1745 rebellion was a proto-Independence struggle for land.<sup>503</sup> Nicholas Cushner's work on the 1745 rebellion placed the Tagalogs' actions at the climax of a drama that had elapsed since Spain colonized the Philippines in 1571; what historian Renato Constantino otherwise termed as the Philippine clergy's long history of land grabbing from indigenous peoples.<sup>504</sup> Rather than focusing solely on the events of the rebellion as mass agitations for land and land alone as Cushner and historian Fernando Palanco Aguado argues, I instead focus on the Silangans' various strategies to appeal to Spanish authorities while still preserving indigenous masculine strength. By focusing on Silang – the site which produced the largest volume of indigenous-authored documentation – we can examine how the Silangans' consistently demanded the return of their lands in racialized, gendered language legible to Spanish authorities. I also posit that the Tagalog documents reflect the possibility of a *sandugo* executed away from outsiders' eyes; that the *sandugo* further evidenced that Tagalog men practiced complex racial and gendered identities outside of the guise of Spanish men.

By couching the 1745 agrarian rebellion within the Spanish Empire's eighteenth-century rebellions, I center the significance of early modern race-making in imperial authorities' logics as they quelled colonial resistance and insurrection. Unlike the historiography of the Túpac Amaru rebellion in Peru, scholars of the 1745 Tagalog

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<sup>503</sup> Cushner, *Landed Estates*, 23, 45, 56, Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr., "The passing of rice spirits: cosmology, technology, and gender relations in the colonial Philippines," in eds. Ooi Keat Gin, Hoang Anh Tuan in *Early Modern Southeast Asia, 1350-1800* (Abdington: Routledge, 2015), 258, and John A. Larkin, "Philippine History Reconsidered: A Socioeconomic Perspective," *The American Historical Review* 87, no. 3 (1982): 609.

<sup>504</sup> Cushner, *Landed Estates*, 1-4 and Constantino, *A History of the Philippines*, 77.

rebellion have not yet analyzed the Bourbon Reforms' infringements on colonial peasant moral economies (and the ways in which such economies were complexly bound up in racial, gendered, and class issues).<sup>505</sup> Scholars of the 1745 rebellion, instead, focus on the slow burn of the rebellion's violent acts.<sup>506</sup> Only recently has Aguado offered a comprehensive assessment of the 1745 rebellion highlighting the role of Bourbon policies in secular colonial officials' decisions to methodically re-measure lands as well as the Bourbon influence in officials' decisions to side with the Silangans against the religious orders.<sup>507</sup> Similar to governance in the rest of the Spanish Empire, the Bourbon Reforms in the Philippines affected more than the crown's interest in financial expediency.<sup>508</sup> Bourbon-era governance shaped social policies ranging from attempts to discipline itinerant populations to a race-making project that coalesced in the *casta* system in New Spain.<sup>509</sup> Where the Philippines did not codify such a rigid racial hierarchy, I argue that imperial officials still endeavored to construct raced and gendered non-Spanish archetypes. I offer an intervention: that for Spanish officials and indigenous men, the Philippine colony functioned as a laboratory for the Spanish empire's highly contested and constantly negotiated race-making project. Within the Tagalog-authored statements, Silangans demonstrated an extensive knowledge of Spanish men's racial and gendered constructions

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<sup>505</sup> Charles F. Walker, *The Túpac Amaru Rebellion* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 13, Serge Serulnikov and David Frye, *Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Túpac Amaru* (Durham, Duke University Press, 2013), 19, and Ward Stavig, *The World of Túpac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), xxii.

<sup>506</sup> Cushner, *Landed Estates*, 23, 45, 56, Aguilar, Jr., "The passing of rice spirits," 258, and Larkin, "Philippine History Reconsidered," 609.

<sup>507</sup> Aguado, "The Tagalog Revolts of 1745," 65-66.

<sup>508</sup> Alonso, "Financing the Empire, 87 and Cushner, *Landed Estates*, 56.

<sup>509</sup> Eva Maria Mehl, "Mexican Recruits and Vagrants in Late Eighteenth-Century Philippines: Empire, Social order, and Bourbon Reforms in the Spanish Pacific World," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 94, no. 4 (2014), Ilona Katzew, *Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), and Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions*.

of “the Filipino.” By centering Tagalog men’s ability to perform meek masculinity – such as prostration before the cross and “*indio*” misery only salvageable by the crown – I reveal how the Silangans counterbalanced the seemingly “violent” agitations of their Tagalog counterparts and their own *barangueños*. And by successfully parroting back to colonial officials permissible masculine, racial archetypes, the Silangans secured a legal pardon (from wrongdoing) for their townsfolk.

### **Mirroring Meekness: Dutiful Subjects of the Crown**

In their statements, Tagalog *Principales* discursively performed masculine traits legible to Spanish officials in what David Tavárez terms “racial identification processes.”<sup>510</sup> For Tavárez, Spanish colonial race dynamics required a dialectical interplay between institutions that “read” race and individuals who strategized their own performances of colonial identity. By projecting back Spanish men’s expectations of them, Silangans appeased Spanish men’s racial anxieties in order to gain a verdict that would work in their favor. The Tagalog villagers demonstrated two key masculine traits: the masculine traits of financial moderation – first as miserable deserving subjects, then as responsible patriarchs of their families – and Catholic piety. As I have argued in this dissertation, these were traits Spanish officials deemed desirable within racial “Others.” Similar to the case of the abused Pangasinan bakers or the Paracaleño subjects needful of crown-initiated mining operations, the trope of the “miserable Indian” bore weight in the eyes of Spanish officials who tamed the 1745 rebellion. Moreover, Spanish authorities aimed to engrain a

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<sup>510</sup> David Tavárez, “Legally Indian: Inquisitorial Readings of Indigenous Identity in New Spain” in Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O’Hara, eds. *Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 83.



patriarchal ordering of family relations in indigenous households as they did in arguing for the marriage of “sangleys” to indigenous women to Catholicize and safeguard them from expulsion or the rooting of vagabonds to settled villages through Christian marriage. Performing the vassal’s meekness and piety for Pedro Calderón y Henrriquez, the final Spanish authority in charge with quelling the uprisings, proved fruitful. Calderón perceived such performances as legible – affirming the racial identification process in play – and worthy of a pardon of wrongdoing. I contend that through the Tagalogs’ demonstrations of financial moderation and Catholic piety, they further affirmed the respect of sympathetic Augustinian friars and the most decisive authority of all: Calderón himself.

In their collectively-authored statements, Joseph De La Vega, Francisco Santos de Medina, Ygnacio Marcelo, Juan Lopez de Montoya, Andres Pulido, and Francisco Gonzales linked their fight to a racial trope all too familiar to the Spanish readers of their documents: the miserable, “Indian” tributary. The Silangans stated, “We do not have lands or hope. We do not have lands to pay tribute.”<sup>511</sup> Contextualized within the Spanish colonial culture of shame, “Indians” as tribute-payers occupied a unique category of feudal degradation. The position of the “Indian”, as Patricia Seed outlined, “Like other conquered peoples, had to pay tribute in a ritual humiliation... [an] intended lesson in shame, inferiority, and military submission.”<sup>512</sup> By linking their lack of financial prospects to their status of hopeless misery as “Indian” men, the Silangans expressed their inability to enrich the crown’s coffers while affirming racial traits already recognizable to Spanish decision-makers.

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<sup>511</sup> Archivo General de las Indias (AGI), *Audiencia* de Filipinas, Legajo (Leg.) 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” 28 April 1745, 1.

<sup>512</sup> Seed, *American Pentimento*, 81-82.

In their second set of statements, the Silangans explained that the neighboring estancia's land usurpations prohibited the townsfolk from their tribute and labor obligations as vassals. When "the religious" and the neighboring Malabon estancia infringed upon Silangan borders, the men claimed that "all of [the surrounding estates] have taken land from our people." The Silangans opined that the usurpation of land "most afflicts our hearts and discomforts [us]... finding us without land for sowings, with which we can serve [to] the King, our Lord, with the tribute, the personal services (the personal service labor offered to Spanish vecinos and the church), and the other obligations."<sup>513</sup> The statement executes a double move, discursively. First, the *principales* offered themselves as responsible vassals who would gladly aid in enriching the crown, but were unable to because their workable lands were taken from them. Second, the Silangans frame themselves as ready agrarian laborers who were despondent at their lack of production. Elizabeth A. Leffeldt has theorized that in the Iberian early modern world, Spanish popular opinion favored "honorable" Spaniards who participated in the "virtuous work" of sowing land.<sup>514</sup> Although their labor (and their tribute) as indigenous men was compulsory, the Silangans grounded their feelings of "discomfort" and "afflicted hearts" in their inability to labor as field workers, thus speaking directly to the honorable farmer trope. If Spanish authorities did not mediate the issues between the religious and the Silangans, then the colonial authorities were just as complicit in robbing Silangan men of their contributions to the crown coffers.

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<sup>513</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Número (Num.) 1, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," undated statement, 1227.

<sup>514</sup> Elizabeth A. Leffeldt, "Ideal Men: Masculinity and Decline in Seventeenth-Century Spain," *Renaissance Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008): 473.

The Silangans also emphasized that the lion's share of monies they acquired through their agrarian labor went to the crown. The stakes of further land grabs would not only diminish crown lands, but also the life expectancy of the crown's own precious vassals. The Silangans pleaded to the "understanding of our Lordship" to understand their town's "total misery" as a result of the neighboring orders and estate's "snatching" of their lands.<sup>515</sup> They explained that what little lands they had produced "what we tax to the King, our Lord, the payment of personal services, and with what we carry our obligations."<sup>516</sup> For as long as the neighboring religious and private estates kept the Silangans away from their land, the townspeople would come up short in meeting their most basic of crown obligations along with their most basic of subsistence income. The Silangans closed this portion of their statement with a direct question to the Spanish authorities: "We do not have to die from hunger... We do not have [a way] to look [for] where the food is each day [in our lands]. With what [else] can we live?"<sup>517</sup> The Silangans tapped into the most precious-held beliefs of Spanish officials: that the Spanish Empire could only be mighty and just if its officials could properly protect and act as stewards for their colonial subjects.<sup>518</sup>

The *principales'* last plea further sutured their own miserable state to the highest Spanish office's sacred obligation to protect his vassals: the Silangans appealed directly to the king himself. The Silangans first portrayed themselves as under incredible stress: "[We do not need to see] with our own eyes these misfortunes, disasters, and deaths... and no

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<sup>515</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num.) 1, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," undated statement, 1228.

<sup>516</sup> Ibid.

<sup>517</sup> Ibid.

<sup>518</sup> Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 158: In addition to my own analysis of Spanish men's depictions of "needy" indigenous miners, Rafael astutely explains the phenomenon of neediness in relation to the Spanish conquest's goals of evangelization as follows: "The natives' need for 'protection' grew out of the grandiose and enduring fiction that they [the natives] needed to be converted."

less heavy, that [the land usurpers] water our own lands with our blood.” The *principales* then linked their precarious state to the will of the king. “Therefore,” the Silangans stated, “we always cry for our Lordship in the presence of God, and for our miseries, and we appeal to our Lordship for [a] fate[ful] tribunal for the humiliation that [the land usurpers] cause us.”<sup>519</sup> Such a representation of themselves as miserable “Indian” subjects would no doubt be legible to Spanish authorities who, for a century of colonization, had conceptualized “Indian” men as needful colonials.<sup>520</sup> Spanish authorities constructed the “miserable indio” as meek; this quality of meekness justified their own position as colonial masters and caretakers. By flatly appealing to the king, the Silangans presented themselves as overburdened subjects of the crown.

In their anticipation of the verdict, the Silangans sent another statement on behalf of “boong bayan” (the entire town) of Silang. The statement highlighted their relationship both to the crown’s vassals, but also as obedient vassals in their own right. In a similar vein as representing themselves as dutiful laborers for the crown and as “miserable indios”, the Silangans explained that they would patiently await the just decision of the royal court. “If the verdict comes out against us, then we will cease [and] be silent in total peace as we are servants of the vassals who know our Lord and King Don Felipe (God keep him).”<sup>521</sup> By

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<sup>519</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Numero (Num.) 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1228.

<sup>520</sup> Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*, 26: Pagden assesses the popular strains of thought in Spain regarding the possibility of indigenous peoples to have access to the right to dominium, the “faculty and a right that a (man) has over anything, to use it for his own benefit by any means that are permitted by law.” Spanish thinkers conceptualized “Indians” as uniquely “needy.” For Spanish authorities, abandoning “Indian communities” to their own devices would, in fact, be sinful because doing so would rob indigenous peoples of the “gift” of Christianity and “political living.”

<sup>521</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (8 May 1745), 109: A letter written by men and *principales* of Silang: Nicolas de León, Miguel de Palencia, Francisco de Toledo, Lázaro Ramos, Francisco de Loyola, Francisco Solís, Pedro de Jestos Bautista, Manuel Perez Dijon, Julián Pasqual, Juan Dimaranan, Felipe Ávila Puerte, Ygnacio Balahadya, Felipe Ramos, Ygnacio Xavier, Pedro de los Santos, Andres Gallardo, Ygnacio Mariano,

approximating themselves as servants to the King's vassals, the Silangans demonstrated their knowledge of the colonial status quo. However, by rhetorically locating themselves within a larger colonial hierarchy, and as still-obedient supporters of the King's subordinates, the Silangans continued to link their ability to remain peaceable to their obligation as servants to the crown. The Silangan men and *principales* (indigenous town leaders) then positioned themselves as vassals or at the very least, vassal-adjacent: "And [as] always... the vassals, [we] do not take up any weapon ever... except [against] the enemy of the royal crown, the King our Lord and by command of [our] master."<sup>522</sup> In this summary of statements, not only did the Silangans connect themselves to the King as vassal-servants, but as peaceable, dutiful vassals themselves. Not only did the Silangans perceive themselves to be worthy of their own land, but worthy of martially protecting the King's name against any of his enemies.

The *principales* presented themselves as financially responsible protectors through a second discursive construct: the masculine patriarch. The Silangan authors deftly appealed not to just any Spanish patriarch, but to those decision-makers who occupied the seat of colonial power, or Spanish authorities in Metropolitan Manila. The *principales* compared their rural circumstances to those of Spanish city-dwellers by likening themselves to "the *vecinos* of Manila" who "in these times," struggled with nothing, like they did.<sup>523</sup> By using the *vecino's* struggles "in these times" as a point of comparison, the Silangan patriarchs conveyed the much more dire conditions of rural indigenous life without land.

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Julio Manuel de Victas, Pedro de la Cruz, Branc de Borja, Joseph Morales, Jugo Gonzales, Marcos Madalang, Ygnaso de los Santos, Manuel de Sevillano, Miguel Thedoro, Carlos Poblete, and Lucas Bagong Bayan.

<sup>522</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," (14 May 1745), 143.

<sup>523</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," undated letter, 353.

Unlike urban dwellers who might find work in the bustling Manila markets, Silangans were “poor people who have nothing [to] expect [from] our fields. If we lose [the land], the only thing we can [expect] is absolute poverty.”<sup>524</sup> More significantly, in the appeal to urban sensibilities, the *principales* bet on the likely possibility that those who would decide on the penalties for the rebellion’s aggressors would be *vecinos*. Such an assumption was correct. In the Spanish colonial world, *vecinos* participated in political life, as they “responded to a special criterion of ‘honor’ or seniority, and belonged to a “civilized” community.”<sup>525</sup> Thus, in their written statements, rural Silangan men illuminated their untenable situation to Spanish men with the power to influence the outcome of the rebellion.

In order to claim the position of patriarch, the Silangan authors framed the need for the return of their lands in affective terms that would be familiar to male Spanish authorities. Elizabeth Eviota described the transformation of the Filipino man under Spanish colonial rule as a man once engaged in communalistic familial relations to a man linked to a more patriarchal role. Spanish imperial authorities gave his labor more weight: “as individuals and to men’s activities; men became heads of household units which paid tribute and male... labour was drawn into colonial activities and given recognition by colonial power[s].”<sup>526</sup> Silangan men seemed to understand their role as patriarchs well. They claimed because of the recent land usurpation, the Silangan menfolk had to “idle day in and day out” for their livelihood. Their idling – a reference to their position as idlers or unemployed men – meant that they could not provide for their families as effective male

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<sup>524</sup> Ibid. and Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 97-98: Phelan describes the economic dependency of the religious estates in the suburbs as their wealth funded the opulent metropolis of Manila. More importantly, he points to the fact that Filipinos still participated in the mostly Chinese-run urban trades.

<sup>525</sup> Herzog, *Defining Nations*, 6-7.

<sup>526</sup> Eviota, *The Political Economy of Gender*, 38.

patriarchs; as men whose labor bonds to the land were deeply changed by the political economy of colonization.<sup>527</sup> As the Silangans explained, without access to fields “we are worried in our *duty* to our wives and children.”<sup>528</sup> The mark of a poor farmer and provider in the colonial Philippines, then, meant the total failure of Silangan men to provide for the most basic needs for their families. Moreover, the *principales* explained to the Spanish readers who would read their statements that allowing the continued usurpation of Silangan lands would mean certain death for Silangan families. The only livelihood they knew and could rely upon was in “[the life] of farming, which [was their] only fund of money, where [they] supply [their] life.”<sup>529</sup> Silangan men, thus, urged Spanish men to recognize that, they were heads of their households. They pleaded to the Spanish authorities – likely patriarchs themselves – to answer their cries for help: “It is not necessary for us [the town of Silang] to die of hunger.”<sup>530</sup> The Silangans made their statement clear: without land, there is no life.

Silangan men’s concerns mirrored the concerns of Spanish patriarchs as Silangans expressed their financial obligations to provide for their wives. The *principales* framed the loss of lands and loss of life as a deeply offensive act against their wives, or a “sin against [their] wives.”<sup>531</sup> Broader gendered expectations in the Spanish colonial system dictated that while wives shaped their lives around the needs of their husbands, their husbands needed to provide one crucial form of support to his wife: financial security.<sup>532</sup> Such a

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<sup>527</sup> Ibid., 44: “land became more closely tied to men because men initiated the labour process (as male vassals), giving them effective control of the land.”

<sup>528</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated letter, 353: Emphasis mine.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid.

<sup>531</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated letter, 353.

<sup>532</sup> Eviota, *The Political Economy of Gender*, 61.

statement would be legible both to Spanish and “Hispanicized” Tagalog patriarchs as partners who owed certain, honor-based protections to his wife. Silangan men cleverly related the duty of financial stability to the religious formulation of guilt and sin; an exchange of discursive currency that would register with the Spanish recipients of the Silangans’ statement.

Dealing in the language of patriarchy, the *principales* understood their role as providers for their families. In the context of the Spanish colonial world, Spanish men conceptualized masculine social prestige as undeniably related to the patriarch’s ability to protect his family’s honor.<sup>533</sup> Not only were men in the Spanish colonial world expected to provide the practical protections of food and shelter for their families, they were also required to shield their family’s honor; a social currency that reflected his own “personal virtue” and “social precedence.”<sup>534</sup> The Silangan authors blamed their failure to care for the vulnerable women in their families on their lack of lands. “[Our poverty] will serve as a path for the offenses [done to] our women and [others] will despise the honor of our *hijas doncellas*.”<sup>535</sup> The careful use of the Spanish words “*hijas doncellas*” is multivalent. Silangans, in this sentence, code-switched from Tagalog to employ the only Spanish words in the document of “*hijas doncellas*,” adolescent virginal maidens who retain their virtue because of cloister in a patriarchal home.<sup>536</sup> The six *principales* invoked the “*hijas doncellas*” to remind imperial officials that, Silangans too bore the Spanish colonial cultural burden of protecting the honor of daughters. The Silangans, like Spanish men, fostered a

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<sup>533</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 16.

<sup>534</sup> *Ibid.*, 14 and 16.

<sup>535</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1228.

<sup>536</sup> *Tesoro de la lengua Castellana o Española*, 327.



“sense of shame” and a “sensitivity to moral duty and reputation... to screen [their daughters] from... inviting opprobrium.”<sup>537</sup> The *principales* were keenly aware that they could translate their problems as “Indian” patriarchs to the Spanish male authorities who would read their statements. Furthermore, Spanish colonial societal constraints required indigenous husbands to teach values to their children.<sup>538</sup> By highlighting how the ongoing poverty degraded both their women and, more importantly, their hijas doncellas, Silangan men made legible their calls for the return of their lands. Future impoverishment – materially and more importantly, morally – could only be avoided if Spanish authorities corrected the Dominicans’ land usurpations.

Silangans closed their statement by emphasizing their misery. The authors assured the Spanish recipients of their statement that Silangan families would meet their fatal end if the Spanish authorities ignored the town’s appeals. The men asserted that their hearts were “afflicted” because “before our eyes our women and children die of hunger.”<sup>539</sup> The Silangan authors implored the Spanish authorities to reflect deeply on the Silangan families’ slow deaths. That only a “heart of stone, or [an] inexorable [one] would not be moved and not cry to see the miseries that we [Silangans] must suffer.”<sup>540</sup> What kind of Spanish official could deny their duty to save crown subjects from certain death? In their own words, the Silangans’ suffering, starvation, affronts to family honor, and their inability to serve the crown was intimately connected to their lands. “[If] they take away our lands, [they] take our lives.”<sup>541</sup>

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<sup>537</sup> Stern, *The Secret History of Gender*, 15.

<sup>538</sup> Eviota, *The Political Economy of Gender*, 61.

<sup>539</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1228

<sup>540</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>541</sup> *Ibid.*

The Silangans' discursive performance of Catholic piety was as crucial to their overall demonstration of dutiful, financially responsible vassals. The Tagalogs chose alliances carefully and still demanded the guidance of the imperial system's most ideologically-powerful arm in the Philippines: the Catholic church. In the very first Silangan-authored statement to Spanish officials, the six men asserted that they needed their lands so they could subsist and continue to "live our holy faith [to] our mother The Church, and also [to] our King Phelipe (may God keep him)."<sup>542</sup> I contend that in their interactions with Spanish authorities, Silangan men wielded performative Catholicism for their Spanish audiences. Silangan men understood that through such demonstrations, Spanish officials would recognize Silangan claims as just because such claims came from Catholic men. I refer specifically to the exchanges between the Jesuit recollect Pedro de San Lucas and the Tagalogs gathered at the Tagalog town of Latag. Juan Bautista Uriarte (the first general in charge of the rebellion) sent the Jesuit to Latag to keep the lines of communication open. Men from the towns of Indang, Silang, Kawit, Bacoor, Las Piñas, and Parañaque greeted San Lucas and his companions. Although the Tagalogs stood firm in their demands and convinced the Jesuit and his companions of their martial might, the collective gathering's expressions of prostration to the Jesuit convinced San Lucas that peace was still in reach.

After a brief introduction to the Tagalog *principales* and sentinels surrounding him, the Jesuit San Lucas received the responses he sought. The Tagalogs assembled at Latag wanted peace and said that they were "ready to receive it."<sup>543</sup> The Tagalogs explained that

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<sup>542</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," (28 April 1745), 1.

<sup>543</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," (6 May 1745), 100: A letter written by an exempt person.

their peace had one caveat: “return us the lands that are ours and they [the Spanish authorities] will see how we will be at peace.”<sup>544</sup> While the Tagalogs, armed and in full force, stood firm by their demands, they still mirrored a peaceable obsequiousness to San Lucas and his traveling party. The soldiers kept in line with the wider Spanish conceptualization of performative Catholicism as evidence of submission; they specifically demonstrated to Spanish authorities the assimilative capacity of converting to Catholicism which “somehow made those who accepted [the faith] easier to control.”<sup>545</sup> The Tagalog leaders expressed that they did “Not want to do wrong or kill any father, or a person born [of the faith], because we are Christians, because killing friars is [an act] of Moorish men and Indians who do not have faith in Jesus Christ. We are all children of Christ here.”<sup>546</sup> The words the Tagalogs uttered placated San Lucas, not just because they clearly explained their goals of non-aggression, but because the comforting words were *familiar* words. The Tagalogs’ words pleased San Lucas because the Tagalogs had ostensibly internalized anti-Muslim racial formations; the anti-Muslim legacy of Reconquista-era ideas Spanish ideologues projected onto the indigenous Muslims of the southern Philippines since Spain’s first contact with the archipelago.<sup>547</sup> Although the men in Latag refused to surrender their claims to Tagalog lands, the men still affirmed their religiosity (and quietude) in direct opposition to the feared racial formation of the martial Muslim man. The Tagalogs sealed

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<sup>544</sup> Ibid.

<sup>545</sup> Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life*, 15.

<sup>546</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (6 May 1745), 99: A letter written by an exempt person.

<sup>547</sup> Phelan, *The Hispanization*, 137-144.

their respect for the Spanish authorities with a farewell embrace wherein almost all Tagalogs present kissed the hands of San Lucas.<sup>548</sup>

### A Pardon Secured: The Silangans Earn a Favorable Outcome

In their last appeal to Spanish authorities, the Silangans refined their demands. Rather than offer a short letter of apology, the Silangans outlined their unconditional surrender and apology to Uriarte's replacement, Pedro Henrriquez Calderón . I argue that the Silangans secured Calderón 's pardon by prostrating themselves as "miserable" crown subjects. In their letter, they demonstrated their utility to the crown as subjects who wanted to support the empire with their labor. The Silangans positioned themselves as indigenous men who desperately *lacked* all of the material conditions that could someday shape them into respectable men (by Spanish imperial standards). In this discursive move, the Silangans implicated Calderón in their hopes for a better Silang; which would be a town made bountiful by access to their ancestral lands. And it worked.

As an esteemed Spanish official, Pedro Calderón understood the archetypes of Spanish masculinity. Regardless of whether or not he believed the Silangans could ever meet the standards by which Spanish men excelled, Calderón moved through the Philippine colonial world with Spanish gendered and racializations that inflected his perceptions of Spanish and indigenous men alike. In Calderón 's search for Spanish martial support, he articulated the position through Spanish masculine archetypes. "[We are looking for] a man of war... [to find] a person of intelligence and experience... [We will] make a military junta of practical men to determine the number of sufficient soldiers to

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<sup>548</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," (6 May 1745), 101: A letter written by an exempt person.

pacify Silang.”<sup>549</sup> The kind of man to fill Calderón ’s position needed to be intelligent, experienced, and practical; such traits were expected from moderate, strong, masculine Spanish officials.<sup>550</sup> Calderón counted himself among the colonial hierarchy’s cream of the crop. He expressed such sentiments in his description of his own fiscal sacrifices as he attempted to end the uprising at Silang. He did not “stop at any expense” nor did he stop “spending the money” of his own children.<sup>551</sup> Arguably in the same vein as the same Silangans he was sent to pacify, Calderón framed his commitment to the crown as a dedicated civil servant to his financial misery.

In their final statement, the Silangans continued to demonstrate respect for the crown (as vassals) and Catholic piety, except something had changed. Rather than offer humble piety alone, the Silangans combined their performed Catholicism with remorse for their uprising. Again, the tactic of framing themselves as miserable subjects of the crown held sway in their justifications for forgiveness. The Silangans prostrated and humbled themselves to the “King, our natural Lord.”<sup>552</sup> Moreover, they claimed that the King would take swift action against the land usurpations if he could only see the “misfortunes” the neighboring estates caused; the King would “take pity... because their estates surround our town on the east, the west, and the south.”<sup>553</sup> The Silangans wanted the King to know that the estates, religious and non-religious alike, swallowed up the Silangan lands and left the town cornered. It was for this reason and this reason alone that the Silangans rose up. In a

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<sup>549</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>550</sup> Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 45 & 62, Bredecke, *The Empirical Empire*, 173 and Reeser, *Moderating Masculinity*, 15-19.

<sup>551</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (6 May 1745), 204: A letter written by an exempt person.

<sup>552</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1227.

<sup>553</sup> Ibid.

performance of prostration to the King, the Silangans repented in their explanation that they did not know “[the rebellion’s] seriousness.” The Silangans asked for “mercy and forgiveness” and prayed “to not continue in the investigation of the main motive of this disturbance.”<sup>554</sup> The Silangans portrayed a harrowing sequence of events to Calderón . Because they lived in such misfortune, they had to rise up to protect their lands. As subjects “ignorant” of the consequences, they asked their King for a sentence suited for their supposedly well-meaning uprising.

Although the Silangans asked for Calderón and the crown to intervene on their behalf to prevent further land usurpations, the Silangans also performed Catholic piety in their final statement. The Silangans conveyed to Calderón and the other Spanish officials who read their correspondence that – as good crown subjects – the townsfolk still very much required the guidance of the Catholic Church. “Consider it the great understanding of our Lordship to comprehend our total misery by reason of [the surrounding estates’] having snatched (speaking with due respect) our lands, which are the only channel of divine piety for our [spiritual] maintenance.”<sup>555</sup> By connecting themselves to the Silangan lands, and then tying the lands to the procurement of the Catholic faith, the Silangans conceptualized the need for their land attachment as their only hope at enjoying the bounties of spiritual stewardship. The Silangans threw themselves at the mercy of Calderón and the King as miserable, pious, indigenous vassals in torment. “We pray to our Lordship not to segregate us from our former jurisdiction of Cavite, for what pertains to our spiritual administration.”<sup>556</sup> The Silangans’ appealed to the King as Catholics who begged to stay

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<sup>554</sup> Ibid.

<sup>555</sup> Ibid., 1228.

<sup>556</sup> Ibid.

within the clang of the church bells, however I contend that through their request they also spoke to the monarch as vassals to their King. Within the realm of the Spanish colonial world, “Catholicism was a central value in Spanish culture, and the close association of Church and State made acceptance of the Faith in a Spanish country a kind of swearing of allegiance to the monarch.” If the Silangans could have any hope at becoming good Christians *and* productive crown vassals, it would only be by the guidance of the Catholic Church and the compassion of Calderón and the crown.

To understand Calderón’s pardon in the context of Spanish conceptualizations of indigenous men is to understand the significance of the Silangan statements’ influence on Calderón’s decisions regarding the final verdict. In his pardon, Calderón responded recognized the Silangans’ claims that their pious townspeople lived in total misery. He pacified the uprising in Silang by imposing laws on the College of Santo Tomas (the major hacienda which occupied Silangan lands) “to strengthen the restitution of rents, and fruits received of the lands.”<sup>557</sup> Calderón suspended, lessened rents, and called for the re-measuring of the lands surrounding Silang, and he pardoned the Silangans of their wrongdoing.<sup>558</sup> Calderón expressed concern over the myriad ways in which he might remedy the land situation at Silang “without embarrassing the people of Silang” any further.<sup>559</sup> Rather than writing an objective verdict that simply corrected past injustices, Calderón framed his pardon around protecting the Silangans. He incorporated a sentiment that sprang from the Silangans’ own self-portrayals as miserable and needy crown subjects.

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<sup>557</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1229.

<sup>558</sup> Ibid.

<sup>559</sup> Ibid., 1230.

The ways in which Calderón portrayed the Silangans offer us insight into how the Silangans' own self-portrayals undoubtedly influenced his final verdict on the land measurements. Although Calderón did not provide an unconditional return of land in his verdict. He called for the initiation of land measurements. Calderón asked the pilots in charge of measuring the land to measure the lands "with adjustment to [Silangan] titles, to the satisfaction of the people of Silang, and at their expense."<sup>560</sup> Calderón's determination was not a decisive win for the Silangans by any stretch, but at the very least Calderón commenced legal processes of oversight that would discourage the surrounding estates in their land usurpations. Calderón, speaking back to the Silangans' self-characterizations as miserable subjects, proclaimed that with the new measurements the Silangans "[will] shout, "They will remain happy even if they lose their land!"<sup>561</sup> Calderón believed the Silangans in their claims of meekness if he thought the crown government could further tax the townspeople and they would express gratitude if the results of the land measurements favored the surrounding estates. In this instance, the Silangans' portrayals of themselves as miserable subjects produced an unpredictable response in Calderón: a feeling that the crown may throw the Silangans scraps and the beggarly, ignorant townspeople will be grateful.

Despite Calderón's lukewarm edict on the land measurements, he still believed that crown authorities should intercede on behalf of the Silangans. Calderón understood the strength of the religious orders in the Spanish colonies. In the previous case that the Silangans had, through the courts, waged against the Dominican estates, the Dominicans

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<sup>560</sup> Ibid., 1229.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid.



won more land. Even in these instances, Calderón expressed concern about collecting rents from those “powerful litigants,” the Dominicans.<sup>562</sup> Because of the history of “difficult” relations between the Dominicans and Spanish secular authorities in the Tagalog region, Calderón asked that Spanish authorities remain vigilant. After all, Calderón claimed that it was with so much “pusillanimity and rusticity” that the “Indians entrusted [the secular authorities with their] reintegration [into peaceful living].”<sup>563</sup> The Silangans’ successful expressions of the racial archetype of the timid and needy “Indian” of the countryside clearly resounded with Calderón as the official portrayed the dynamics in Silang as a David (the “pusillanimous” Silangans) and Goliath (the gargantuan religious orders) story. Such a depiction shaped Calderón’s final decision to urge secular authorities to support the timid and provincial Silangans. Calderón closed his statement on the pacification and final verdicts with a firm warning to all parties involved: “No one would dare to alter anything of the aforementioned.”<sup>564</sup>

### **Positing a *Sandugo*: Practicing Indigenous Masculine Identity**

In study on the 1745 Agrarian Rebellion, Aguado surmised that the bonds of collective dissent the Tagalogs fostered against the religious orders must have come from the local parish priest’s teachings of the Spanish comedy *Fuenteovejuna*; the performance piece which centered a parable about collective culpability in the face of admonition.<sup>565</sup> I offer an alternative explanation: I root the inception of the Tagalogs’ multi-town, multi-

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<sup>562</sup> Ibid.

<sup>563</sup> Ibid.

<sup>564</sup> Ibid., 1230.

<sup>565</sup> Aguado, “The Tagalog Revolts of 1745,” 57.

*barangay*, cross-class collective unity in the ancient practice of *sandugo* (blood pacts). As Anthropologist of Southeast Asia Laura Lee Junker explained, the practice of “institutionalized peace pacts or blood oaths established a social and political relationship [of] reciprocal exchange... Thus, these ritualized exchanges were significant in building and maintaining political coalitions, however ephemeral.”<sup>566</sup> I argue that through a *sandugo* the Tagalogs of the 1745 rebellion pursued two essential strategies. Through the practical sociopolitical ritual, the Tagalog *principales* employed a practical means of maintaining military alliances. However, as raced and gendered leaders, the Tagalog men performed a precolonial, indigenous, masculine form of bond-building. I argue that the Tagalogs challenged Spanish men’s racialized and gendered projections of the timid, servile “Indian” vassal. Utilizing the model of racial identity in practice, it is crucial for us to recognize that Spanish colonial documents only registered a fraction of indigenous peoples’ racial practices. Colonial Latin Americanists Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O’Hara conceptualized colonial race as a multi-faceted relationship of performance and legibility, specifically that the individual’s performance of race, or race’s “social dimension does not deny the importance of other private (even subconscious) aspects (of identity) formed a priori through socialization.”<sup>567</sup> In the instance of the *sandugo*, I claim that the private, intramural pact proved functional as a tactic for social cohesion and immeasurably significant in subverting the racial and gendered fictions of Spanish authorities.

Without access to documentation on the Tagalogs’ acts of shedding, mixing, and then drinking one another’s blood, I contend that we must instead contextualize the

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<sup>566</sup> Laura Lee Junker, *Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 301-302.

<sup>567</sup> Fisher and O’Hara, *Imperial Subjects*, 8.

statements and actions of the Tagalogs within the three sociopolitical outcomes of a *sandugo* pact. A *sandugo* cemented bonds that prevent betrayal and increase solidarity among the parties involved.<sup>568</sup> Second, a *sandugo* ensured that indigenous Philippine men would bond together through times of “war and peace.” And third and most important, *sandugo* bonds secured a blood-based familial relationship with its pact members.<sup>569</sup> Although the Tagalogs performed a racialized and gendered meekness for Spanish men in order to appease Spanish authorities’ concerns about rebellion, the *principales* owed their ability to remain a united front to the masculine practices of their ancestors.

Parties entering a *sandugo* pact hoped to create a “relationship with supernatural sanctions... to prevent betrayal and to increase the solidarity of the bond.”<sup>570</sup> In their dealings with Uriarte, the first general in charge of taming the rebellion, the Tagalogs demonstrated the same unyielding commitment to one another as denoted in a *sandugo* pact. When Uriarte read his peace terms to a gathering of Tagalog leaders, he realized that the leaders were led by a man named Don Bernardo Manahan “whom all the Indians call their lawyer.”<sup>571</sup> As Uriarte read, the Tagalogs deferred to Manahan’s reactions.<sup>572</sup> When Uriarte realized that the unity of the Tagalogs would be difficult to break, he drew out the men “one by one” to ask them if they complied with his new orders to remain peaceable. The following interaction surprised Uriarte and initiated a walk-out of the Tagalog leaders. Each of the “39 Indians” left the meeting after they gave each other “a signal that is

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<sup>568</sup> Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr. “The Pacto de Sangre in the Late Nineteenth Century Nationalist Emplotment of Philippine History,” *Philippine Studies: Historiographical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 58, nos.1 & 2 (2010): 86-87.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid.

<sup>570</sup> Aguilar Jr., “The Pacto de Sangre,” 86.

<sup>571</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (18 May 1745), 152: A relación and testimony by Sergeant Major Don Juan Agustin de Lascano, Don Miguel de Lavayen (a Spaniard), Nicolas Severino & Miguel de Asaban (deputy ministers of the city of Manila), Joseph Manuel de Gamboa (Scribe), and six mestizos.

<sup>572</sup> Ibid.

commonly called 'the eye'.<sup>573</sup> The group collectively rejected Uriarte's orders to cease and desist all resistance activities based on a secret signal executed under the watchful eye of Manahan. Uriarte, frustrated at their united dissent, noted that none of the "Indians" present obeyed his order. True to form in honoring bonds of unbreakable solidarity, the Tagalog leaders refused to betray one another despite Uriarte's attempts at "dividing and conquering" leaders of the towns of Bacoor, Indang, Cavite, and Silang.

The Tagalogs' devotion to cross-town solidarity was so strong that they refused to betray one another even in the face of certain punishment. In the Silangans' statement, the authors refused to single out any person or group of people as the subversive initiators of the rebellions. The Silangans claimed that they did "not know that [this rebellion] had started from a particular person, [but] that the main motive is from the common one (motive) of all the people. And the reason, and the motive, that has dragged [us into this] is one born of misfortunes, and miseries... from the Dominicans who have taken our lands."<sup>574</sup> The Silangans linked their rebellion together through the common shared experience of poverty that resulted from land usurpations. The *sandugo* bonds of hardship and the collective goal of re-gaining access to their land drove the Silangans' faith and commitment to one another. Moreover, when Uriarte reported his recommendations to the Royal *Audiencia*, he was dismayed that "some *principales* are not separating themselves from the mutineers."<sup>575</sup> The *principales* of the five towns demonstrated an unwavering solidarity to one another and to their mission even in the face of the toilworn military general.

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<sup>573</sup> Ibid.

<sup>574</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," undated statement, 1227.

<sup>575</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, "Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos," A statement by Admiral Don Juan Bautista de Uriarte to the Royal *Audiencia*, (20 May 1745), 200.

For the Tagalogs, sustaining the *sandugo* against betrayal meant both preventing townspeople from siding with royal authorities and fully devoting themselves to the unconditional return of Tagalog lands. A *sandugo* created an alliance so strong that “a violation of such a ‘friendship’ oath [was] tantamount to a betrayal of God and, at the same time, leav[ing] the violating individual or group vulnerable to a curse by spirits causing sickness, death, or other severe misfortune.”<sup>576</sup> The Tagalogs added murder to the list of “misfortunes” that one might incur if they betrayed the *sandugo*. When the Tagalog leaders refused to sign onto Uriarte’s terms of “peace”, the men explained that they could not obey such terms because they had “written a deed” with other men from the town of Bacoor (another Tagalog town). Through this agreement (undocumented in the Tagalogs’ statements) the Tagalog leaders “mutually agreed” to kill those who shirked their responsibilities and skipped Uriarte’s litigation proceedings.<sup>577</sup> I assert that only an agreement such as a *sandugo* pact – one that linked individuals through blood, “the essence of life” – could warrant the Bacooranos’ brutal spilling of blood as a consequence for betrayal.<sup>578</sup>

Even the subtle cracks in Tagalog solidarity can tell us about the intense loyalty *sandugo*-bonded Tagalogs fostered for one another. Among the Tagalog “rebels”, unequal relationships did, indeed, coalesce. Within *sandugo* pacts, ranked leaders emerged in a hierarchical relationship because most pacts began between two pledged authorities; men who pledged into a *sandugo* required two dyads (equal-ranked individuals). The more

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<sup>576</sup> Junker, *Raiding, Trading, and Feasting*, 301.

<sup>577</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (18 May 1745), 153: A relación and testimony by Sergeant Major Don Juan Agustin de Lascano, Don Miguel de Lavayen (a Spaniard), Nicolas Severino & Miguel de Asaban (deputy ministers of the city of Manila), Joseph Manuel de Gamboa (Scribe), and six mestizos.

<sup>578</sup> Aguilar Jr., “The Pacto de Sangre,” 87.

seasoned *principales* and *cabezas de barangay* (indigenous town heads) demonstrated these ranks in their rebuke of the “*mangabata*” (the youth) leaders. In the altercation with Uriarte, a contingent of “*mangabata*” stayed behind with Uriarte. Confused by this break in ranks, the others in Uriarte’s party asked an older *principal* why the *mangabata* remained. The *principal* explained that they were “*binata*.” A Spanish observer in the same party defined *binata* as “polo or plebeian” in the Spanish language (however, translated into Tagalog as “the youth”).<sup>579</sup> The *mangabata* then met with another older “*alcalde mayor* [who had] an evil Indian face and brave, flat eyes.”<sup>580</sup> An argument ensued and the *mangabata* returned “with no statement, with angry eyes made of fire, [and] with much petulance.”<sup>581</sup> In this instance, I surmise that the “brave-eyed” *principal* reprimanded the *mangabata* for breaking rank in what should have been a decision between the likely older, dyadic *sandugo* leaders. I contextualize the *mangabata* and other *principales* actions within the *sandugo* framework: most *sandugo* pacts were local in nature and the conditions of such pacts were oftentimes not binding for “other members of the community only to the extent of the pact holder’s effective authority.”<sup>582</sup> Within such a framework, the “brave-eyed” *principal*’s castigatory action solicited by the *mangabatas*’ impulsive reactions to Uriarte’s tactics follows a sound logic. Additionally, the *mangabatas*’ adherence to elder respect in the form of conceding to the older *principal*’s wishes aligned with the precolonial Philippine sociocultural norm of revering one’s elders.<sup>583</sup> The same *principal* later

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<sup>579</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (18 May 1745), 152: A relación and testimony by Sergeant Major Don Juan Agustin de Lascano, Don Miguel de Lavayen (a Spaniard), Nicolas Severino & Miguel de Asaban (deputy ministers of the city of Manila), Joseph Manuel de Gamboa (Scribe), and six mestizos.

<sup>580</sup> Ibid.

<sup>581</sup> Ibid.

<sup>582</sup> Aguilar Jr., “The Pacto de Sangre,” 86.

<sup>583</sup> Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), 7.

explained to the Spanish observers and authorities: “[The *mangabata*] thought the land case was resolved [because they do not know] God or justice.”<sup>584</sup>

The existence of the *sandugo* pact is made even more likely by the rapid spread of the Tagalog armed might. Like the most famous *sandugo* pact in Philippine History – the blood oath-swearing of the revolutionary Katipunan against the Spanish in 1892 – most Philippine men enacted precolonial blood oaths as a “likely a strategy of negotiating one’s way through the thickets of conflict and warfare, to ensure that one had a friend who would fight alongside him against an enemy.”<sup>585</sup> It was those same martial solidarities that so galled Uriarte: “The uprising at Silang has perverted other towns of the region with its bad example.”<sup>586</sup> Although the men at Silang had yet to raise their arms to any Spanish authorities (as would be the case in the town of San Mateo), Uriarte blamed Silang as the originator of the “tumultuous plague.”<sup>587</sup> He reported that “other towns have conspired to take up arms with aggression of serious and enormous crimes (also against the mayor of Tondo, the [people of the] jurisdiction of which threw and killed him).”<sup>588</sup> Although Uriarte referred to the unfounded rumor that the mayor of Balayán had been killed by insurgent Balayáños, he associated the Silangan rebellion with acts of murder elsewhere in the Tagalog region. Where Uriarte understood the spread of armed resistance as a series of Silangan-authored conspiracies against imperial order, I assert that only a *sandugo* could have united and sustained such a wide swath of peoples into martial action across the entire Tagalog region.

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<sup>584</sup> Ibid., 153.

<sup>585</sup> Aguilar Jr., “The Pacto de Sangre,” 87.

<sup>586</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” A statement by Admiral Don Juan Bautista de Uriarte to the Royal *Audiencia*, (20 May 1745), 200.

<sup>587</sup> Ibid.

<sup>588</sup> Ibid.

Through the mixing of blood, a *sandugo* pact transformed its pact-members into siblings.<sup>589</sup> I contend that we may trace the newly-formed siblinghood through how the Tagalogs linked their ancestry, through the *principal-barangueño* relationship, and through the affective ties Tagalogs exhibited in their writings. In their statements, the Tagalogs presented themselves as members of their “bayan” (country).<sup>590</sup> Damon L. Woods hypothesized that the Tagalogs’ usage of “bayan” reflected the Tagalogs’ conceptions that the term “bayan” functioned as a “preserver of memory.” The Silangans described their lands as territories “of an ancient type, from the beginning even when we were not Christians.”<sup>591</sup> The Tagalogs used “bayan” as a rhetorical device which encapsulated their relationship to the land and their collective ancestral relationship to each other. If the bonds of solidarity and rebellion extended past the town of Silang, then the bayan’s memory belonged not just to Silang, but to all of the Tagalogs. The Silangans further solidified their relationship to the land as not one solely of ownership, but of land tenure: “There are those [of us] who worked there who did not have a lot of money, who did not pay rent to any farm, because it was the land of the people, and for resting [the land] they left... being that the[se are the] old ways of the natives of Silang.”<sup>592</sup> The Silangans, in concert with the rest of the Tagalogs, conceptualized their ancestry as linked to one another not only because of where they resided, but because of how they related to the land. The surrounding estates’ land usurpation – the building of stone churches that “ate”

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<sup>589</sup> Aguilar Jr., “The Pacto de Sangre,” 87-88.

<sup>590</sup> The usage of bayan extended past the notion of the bayan of the Philippines, but more specifically included “bayan of Silang”, “bayan of Biñan,” “bayan of Indang,” etc.

<sup>591</sup> Damon L. Woods, “The Evolution of Bayan” in Priscelina Patajo-Legasto’s *Philippine Studies: Have We Gone Beyond St. Louis?*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2010), 41-42 and AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1227.

<sup>592</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1228.



their lands – not only severed the Tagalogs’ modern-day relationship to the land, but also the Tagalogs’ relationship to their ancestors.<sup>593</sup> The Tagalogs’ decision to forge a *sandugo*, then, must have occurred as both necessary and natural. The male leaders created a bond constructed from kin who shared an ancestral *bayan*.

Hierarchical relationships within the *sandugo* (as evidenced by the situation with the *mangabata*) did not adversely impact Tagalog *principales*’ concern for the collective wellbeing of their *barangueños*. Such care signified that the *principales* drew from indigenous, masculine forms of leadership; they rooted their own practices of governance in a manner that contradicted Spanish racial and gendered stereotypes of the uncivilized “indio.” Silangan *principal* Andres Dimalapitan demonstrated as much when he expressed concern for his townspeople: “My natives have no land to work. The land is usurped. Some [haciendas] take more land than is contained in the deeds of sale.”<sup>594</sup> The *principal* articulated his relationship to his *barangueños* as one of dependence through “my”, a determiner of ownership. With a focus on Dimalapitan’s role as the leader of the Silangans throughout the rebellion, I contend that the *principal* occupied the role of the Southeast Asian archetype of “a man of prowess,” otherwise known as a masculine leader who had the “inordinate ability to attract and mobilize a network of loyal followers for ritual, agricultural, commercial, or military purposes.”<sup>595</sup> Dimalapitan’s abilities to both secure a *sandugo* pact with other Tagalog *principales* and to lead “his natives” as a man of prowess meant that he symbolized for his “network of dependence... a surplus of spiritual energy, as

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<sup>593</sup> Ibid.

<sup>594</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (1745) 512: Declaration of Andres Dimalapitan, Emphasis mine.

<sup>595</sup> Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism*, 14.

evidenced by their ability to promote a series of beneficial reciprocal exchanges between the earth and the cosmos.”<sup>596</sup> The *principal* further proved that he would provide land for his *barangueño* dependents, further consolidating his power as their leader. He demanded that the crown assure Silangans’ security through public deeds of ceasing land aggressions and through a “paper of insurance” that would be proof of the Silangans’ “land return.”<sup>597</sup>

Dimalapitan’s performance of indigenous masculine power which, I argue, demonstrated his own identity as an indigenous patriarch, refuted popular Spanish notions of precolonial “Indian” communities as “illegitimate polities.” Spanish humanist writer Bishop Vasco de Quiroga articulated the concept as follows: “the societies of ‘Indians’ were... communities run by war-lords... operating only for the private gain of their rulers, while the cephalous villages (known as *cabezas*) displayed no collective interests in ‘the common good rather than that of the particular man’.”<sup>598</sup> The common Spanish perception of precolonial “Indian leaders” as barbarous and self-serving does not hold true in the instance of Dimalapitan and his *barangay*. Instead, Andres Dimalapitan practiced an indigenous masculine identity as a man of prowess, and as a steward of Silang; he rooted his style of care after the Philippine sociocultural norm of chiefhood.<sup>599</sup>

Indigenous Philippine men entered into the *sandugo*, and became siblings through the exchange of blood, as a means to secure reciprocal relationships of mutual assistance. I theorize that the Tagalogs’ endowed their statements – their unique pact forged from the experiences of poverty and colonial oppression as explained by the Tagalog *principales* –

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<sup>596</sup> Ibid.

<sup>597</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” A testimony by Andres Dimalapitan, (6 May 1745), 95 and The second proposal made by the Silangans, (7 May 1745), 102.

<sup>598</sup> Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination*, 26: Pagden discusses Spanish men’s concern over “illegitimate polities” in his assessment on “Indians” rights to dominium.

<sup>599</sup> Constantino, *A History of the Philippines*, 31.

with the same affective utterances that reflected the cognatic kinship borne from a *sandugo* pact.<sup>600</sup> In a statement of solidarity to the town of Silang, eighty men from Indang expressed their anger over the memory of a man unnecessarily beaten by a Spanish official; what the Indangans comprehended as a heinous Spanish infringement on the colonial moral economy. A *medidor piloto* (measuring pilot) visited the outskirts of Indang with the “*alcalde de crimen*” of the Royal *Audiencia* during one of the land measurement processes preceding the rebellion. The Indangan leaders claimed that the *alcalde* urged a local priest to publicly beat an Indangan *cabeza de barangay* “without any reason.” The Indangan leaders were embittered and angered by the memory of this offense: “Ay tiniis naming boong bayan, lalo rin a kaniyang mga cabalangai” ([what was done to us] our whole bayan had to bear, especially his fellow *barangueños*).<sup>601</sup> The *cabeza de barangay* and, by extension, his *ka-barangay* felt deeply the brunt of colonial abuse and through this experience the *bayan* of Indang offered their solidarity to the Silangans. The Indangans made clear that they, too, felt the effects of colonial oppression. The eighty men from Indang extended an emotional declaration of solidarity to Silang: “Let us remember, also, that those from Silang, [are] our kin, our siblings, their evil deeds are our evil deeds.”<sup>602</sup> The Indangans steadfastly awaited the Spanish imperial system’s judgement on crimes the Indangans themselves did not even commit. In locating themselves as complicit to the offenses of their siblings, the Indangans gestured to the creation of a sibling relationship that would be functional in a *sandugo* pact. The “blood ceremony was a ritual of sworn

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<sup>600</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 261, Num. 1, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated statement, 1227.

<sup>601</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 259, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” undated letter from eighty men from Indang, 354.

<sup>602</sup> AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 258, “Autos relativos a la sublevación de los pueblos tagalos,” (9 May 1745), 115: Letter from eighty men from Indang.

siblinghood... which... created an indissoluble friendship.”<sup>603</sup> The eighty Indangan men perceived their Silangan counterparts as brothers and sisters worthy of sacrifice. Such a relationship represented the truest familial bond that a *sandugo* could ever produce.

## **Conclusion**

The Silangans who incited and sustained their rebellion in 1745 wielded multiple discursive strategies to secure the best possible outcome from the secular Spanish authorities. The authors of the Tagalog statements revealed more than their collective wishes for the return of their unjustly usurped lands. These indigenous men demonstrated an intimate working knowledge of how to present themselves to Spanish authorities; indigenous men made these performances legible through their complex understanding of Spanish masculine ideals. The Tagalogs portrayed themselves to Spanish authorities as pious men, as financially responsible patriarchs, and as productive vassals to the crown. Through their performances of docile indigenous masculinity, the Tagalogs made their “Indian misery” legible to Spanish authorities like Pedro Calderón .

However, I have argued that under the surface, the Tagalogs deployed a *sandugo* pact. Tagalog leaders practiced a powerful indigenous, masculine act of cohesion in order to unite the Tagalog towns. The blood pact forged bonds that confounded Spanish officials and linked indigenous men from disparate places to fight the same fight. I have argued that the *sandugo* pact, most significantly, existed as a foil to the degrading racial and gendered tropes created in Spanish authorities’ imaginations. By demonstrating their own unique, Tagalog identities as fraternal warriors in a *sandugo* pact, the Tagalogs practiced a racial

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<sup>603</sup> Aguilar, 8 “The Pacto de Sangre,” 8.

identity incongruent with Spanish masculine norms. The significance of the Tagalogs' extension of cognatic kinship across villages cannot be overstated within the context of deepening Spanish colonization in the Southeast Asian Philippines. Ethnically and sociologically speaking, "the ideal of personal and continuing reciprocity which grew out of concepts of kinship lay at the heart of the Southeast Asian polity, and it could well be argued that whatever 'structure' can be discerned in most early kingdoms was ultimately based on the bonds of family."<sup>604</sup>

Was the racial identity of the Silangan and Tagalog patriarchs one of meek "Indian" vassals or one of precolonial, indigenous warriorhood? I assert that the Tagalog men could only practice a successful collective resistance by drawing from every strategy their colonial conditions offered them. The patriarchs left behind traces of their multiple forms of masculine resistance in the archive's tomes; the legacy of their battle for "yung lupa nila."<sup>605</sup>

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<sup>604</sup> Junker, *Raiding, Trading, and Feasting*, 131.

<sup>605</sup> Translation: "The legacy of the battle for *their* land."

## CONCLUSION

I have argued that in the early colonial Philippines, Spanish imperial authorities created labor regimes that reflected a racial hierarchy of their own design. Positioning themselves at the apex of the colonial racial hierarchy, Spanish men measured indigenous and Chinese laborers' racial and masculine acceptability by their ability to demonstrate devotion to the Catholic faith, their aptitude for "expertise", and their economic value to the crown. Such racializations, however, were not constructed in a vacuum. Spanish men responded to the needs of the colonial economy as they racialized colonial laborers. The slow approach of Bourbon-era reforms (and reformers) complicated and at times sharpened racial tensions between Spanish colonial overlords and colonial laborers. As the fiscal demands of the crown expanded, Spanish men molded their racial formations in consonance and sometimes in contradiction to the needs of the colonial economy. To conserve the monies generated by Chinese merchants, Spanish officials chose not to entirely exile Chinese populations in favor of a staggered expulsion process with many exemptions to stay expulsion for upright Catholic Chinese subjects. To milk the most out of their tributaries, Spanish officials patrolled the streets in search for indigenous vagabonds and recoiled in defeat when they could not harness indigenous men's labor. In the years preceding the Bourbon Reforms, the relationship between Spanish men's racializations and the new demands of the economy was dialectical. And, like the larger colonial project in the Philippines, the dialectic was volatile in nature.

Spanish officials constructed the racialized figures of the diligent, yet dangerous Chinese merchant and laborer and the "lazy", "undisciplined" "Indian" in colonial labor sites, but the particularities of such constructions were malleable and often up for debate.

Spanish officials of all stripes – esteemed Governor Generals, local parish priests, and private *vecinos* alike – produced, maintained, and disputed the meanings of their racializations. Spanish colonial actors softened or exaggerated the harmful qualities of indigenous and Chinese men as the Españoles sought to profit from the sweat of colonial laborers. Meanwhile, Chinese and indigenous colonial laborers challenged these racial constructions. Through the parchment cracks – in trade petitions and laws, immigration and expulsion laws and the attendant correspondence debating such laws, imperial correspondence on trade, imperial reports on the status of the Philippines, subjects’ petitions for imperial monies, legal cases within labor sites, labor laws, petitions to acquire laborers, mercedes (exemptions from crown laws), letters and petitions to better police tribute payers, and documentation on rebellions – colonial laborers claimed their own stakes as masculine laborers. Chinese and indigenous men proved their manhood and their resourcefulness as laborers to Spanish officials by professing their commitment to the Catholic faith, laboring as ore experts in the mines, and enthusiastically offering themselves as valuable tributaries to the crown.

A discursive analysis of Philippine imperial documentation has allowed me to center the relationship between the construction of early modern, discursive racial formations and the implementation of racist labor practices. Tracing the movement and the rationale behind deploying racial formations has afforded us a comprehensive glimpse of the effectiveness and legibility of Spanish-authored racial types. In the case of policing *buyeros*, Spanish officials convinced trade councils that the (figure of) the “dangerous infidel” Chinese *buyero* would corrupt simple, neophyte indigenous men and women. Although their attempts to contain the successes of the Chinese merchant were ultimately

unsuccessful, the repeated reference to harmful racial formations dominated the debates. A discursive analysis also illuminated the successful application of racist labor practices. In the mines, Spanish authorities ensured that industrious Chinese ore experts retained skilled positions while insisting that indigenous men were too “poor and miserable” to efficiently mine iron and gold. In their attempts to secure the passage of labor laws, Spanish officials understood that racial formations needed to form the bedrock of any given regulation or unofficial practice in colonial labor spaces.

Against injurious racial formations, Spanish men measured racial redemption through non-Spanish laborers’ ability to perform expertise, Catholicism, and economic practicality. The repercussions of binding indigenous and Chinese men to such criteria were far-reaching and lasting in the Philippines. In the bakery, the lumberyards, and the mines Spanish authorities demanded experts that drew their knowledge from European conceptualizations of science; the sciences being, in the early modern period, an ideological constellation of natural knowledges and philosophy that formed the bedrock for the Scientific Revolution. Armed with experiential best practices, Spanish authorities were expected to be level-headed enough to commandeer Chinese and indigenous labor. In their use of expertise – the quality of wielding one’s experience and personal authority – Spanish men enacted a double violence against colonial laboring men. First, the colonial project introduced an inherently imbalanced power dynamic that brutally subjected colonized residents to foreign rule. By design, subjugation on an imperial scale was reflected in labor relations, where Spanish actors structured oppressive labor conditions; the onerous conditions of the indigenous laborer were not conducive to indigenous men’s cultivation of personal authority. Second, Spanish men enabled a discursive politics of exclusion,



ensuring that only a select few could reach the European standard of expertise. In most cases, solely Spanish men became experts. Chinese men could prove themselves experts through the mastery of artisanal practices like metallurgy. In the eyes of Spanish officials, however, indigenous men were virtually incapable of expertise. By constructing the racial formations of the European expert and the “lazy Indian”, Spanish men condemned indigenous men to unskilled, underpaid, labor positions fraught with danger.

For indigenous and Chinese laborers, religious deference, too, succeeded as a strategy for masculine and racial legibility in the colonial Philippines. For Spanish religious authorities, Chinese men’s professions of faith and enthusiasm for embracing Catholic life – marrying Catholic women and “reduction” into towns based within earshot of the chapel bells – at best made Chinese men upright subjects worthy of living in the Spanish Philippines and at worse rendered their existence as a “neutralized” threat to Spanish Catholic hegemony. As stewards of “Indian” subjects, Spanish officials expressed patience with indigenous men in their development as neophyte Catholics. It was the encounter between the two, the indigenous man and the Chinese man, that most preoccupied the minds of Spanish men. Spanish clergy, private *vecinos*, and secular authorities vigorously debated over the terms under which indigenous and Chinese men should interact in their roles as laborers, as consumers of one another’s merchant goods, and even as fellow subjects to the Spanish crown. In the early modern Philippines, religious devotion to the Catholic faith unfolded as a litmus test of assimilation into Spanish religious *and* political life.

In what was presumably most related to the thrust of Bourbon-era priorities, Spanish men valued and gendered masculine the non-Spanish laborer’s ability to

demonstrate their economic utility to the Spanish crown. Indigenous labor powered the colonial economy, however when Bourbon-era reformers sought to make more efficient labor regimes by re-counting tributary lists, they faced significant obstacles in taming indigenous men into disciplined laborers. Where Spanish men projected an idle disposition upon indigenous laborers, indigenous men cleverly mirrored themselves similarly as vassals who lamented their inability to contribute to crown coffers because of religious orders' land grabs of indigenous ancestral lands. In their treatment of Chinese merchants and laborers, Spanish authorities towed a fine line between desperately needing Chinese men's market prowess and ejecting Chinese populations from the colony entirely for fear of Chinese economic dominance. Both confounded by and fascinated with Chinese merchants, Spanish men fixated on the figure of the Chinese merchant and inflected their analyses of Sino-Spanish trade relations with jealousy and deeply gendered religious condemnations of Chinese neophytes. Spanish colonial violence against Chinese men did, indeed, meet its limits as the Spanish colonial economy could not survive without the expertise of Chinese laborers and merchants. For Spanish officials in the mid-eighteenth century, the question of economic efficiency was the key site of struggle within colonial Philippine labor spaces. And ultimately, the success of Chinese or indigenous men in labor spaces depended upon their ability to convince Spanish authorities of their invaluable contributions to the Spanish Treasury.

I have argued that in the early modern Philippines, racial formations operated as racist systems of dispossession within labor spaces. Because my study examines the creation of structural racism, it is not enough to focus on imperial officials' conceptualizations of race alone. Race and racism are actualized when they are

implemented as series of policies that ultimately produce material inequity. Indigenous laborers understood this system of dispossession all too well. Within the Spanish imperial labor regime – in the bakeries, the mines, or the fields – Spanish officials structured oppressive labor conditions by marking indigenous bodies with whips, with overwork, and with lowly, arduous labor positions. By using racial formations as the basis of racist labor practices, Spanish officials in the early modern Philippines attempted to protect their sole privilege of amassing colonial wealth.

Moreover, racist labor systems did not operate within a binary formation of whiteness versus all other colonial races. In other words, Spanish officials did not solely disadvantage either “Indian” *or* Chinese laborers. The logics of racial formations could not function as such in the multiracial colonial Philippines. Racial formations operated most robustly when leveraged against other racial formations. In order to convince other Spanish officials of the need to expel Chinese men in 1750, secular officials dangled the possibility of losing so many newly Catholic indigenous souls to the influences of the predatory Chinese “infidel.” Spanish authorities demanded the permission of Chinese migrant miners into the Philippines during times of restrictive immigration policy precisely because Spanish men highlighted the indigenous man’s “indolence” and their general inability to exploit iron and gold mines competently. In the early modern Philippines and, arguably, in every analysis of racial formations, scholars should examine the relationality of races and how this relationality props up larger racist systems of material inequity.

In my dissertation I have also contended that the construction of racial formations in the early modern colonial world must be examined as a site of struggle made all the more complex by gendered oppressions. Examining race as a significant form of oppression

in a Spanish colonial site in the 1640s to 1750s requires a gender analytic, as race in the early modern period was not yet a biological marker, but rather a constellation of meaningful identities: birth origin, religious background, and gender performance. In the documents, Spanish men made clear that they perceived race as intimately bound up with gender ideologies. More specifically, Spanish officials, private subjects, and clergy characterized non-Spanish men's racial character as determined by his ability to wield masculine strength (albeit "masculine" by the Iberian definitions of "the expert"). In their efforts to shore up Iberian masculinity, Spanish authorities demonstrated that they could exhibit control over large, "dependent" labor populations. Moreover, Spanish men conceptualized indigenous and Chinese masculinity through their ability to act as resourceful patriarchs to their families, submitting to a sense of duty to the ultimate "fathers" in the Spanish colonies: the crown and the cross. For non-Spanish men who exhibited alternative masculinities, imperial authorities imposed harmful characterizations of indolent "Indians" or lustful Chinese "sodomites." In their efforts to produce colonial racial formations, Spanish men heavily relied upon gender tropes calibrated by assimilation to the Catholic faith and economic utility to the crown.

While the current dissertation offers an expansive analysis of race making in multiple labor spaces, I implore scholars to integrate Chinese-authored sources into their archival materials for future studies. Few of the Spanish-authored sources at the *Archivo General de Indias* (AGI) contained Chinese-authored accounts that might reveal Chinese laborers' own conceptualizations of race relations, masculinity, and their place within the colonial labor regime. What more could we learn from the Chinese merchants, miners, and bakers who wrote about their experiences as integral laborers within the Spanish colonial

Philippines? I imagine that historians of early modern Chinese Filipinos might contribute exciting research on the ways in which Chinese laborers labored alongside indigenous men while struggling with Spanish men's racial formations.

This dissertation could not analyze the fraught relationships between indigenous men forced into labor drafts and the families they left behind. Linda Newson's quantitative analysis of colonization's demographic impact reveals that labor drafts decimated entire villages of fathers and sons. A comprehensive study of *barangay* families who were left behind during the *polos y servicios* drafts – the drafts that sent young boys and men far from their provincial homes – would illuminate not only the new roles women had to fill in order to keep their towns afloat, but also how grandmothers, mothers, wives, and daughters understood their own relationship within colonial gender paradigms. Archival materials may be scarce, but studies like Jane Mangan's work on merchant women in Peru provide a research model that would be conducive to studying women's lives in the colonial Philippines. Scouring notary and church records could lead historians of the Philippines that much closer to elucidating how the *repartimiento* violently interrupted and shaped indigenous Philippine family dynamics and gender norms.

"Mercurial Masculinities" has centered the Spanish-authored gendered racial formations and unsafe, exploitative working conditions indigenous and Chinese laborers struggled against. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spanish imperial authorities constructed the figures of the "lazy Indian" and the "dangerous" Chinese man with logic and purpose: to seat themselves as Spanish experts atop an ostensibly efficient labor hierarchy of their own making. In the coming centuries, Chinese men would structure robust guilds and debt and godparentage networks in order to consolidate strong

relationships with elite Spanish and indigenous men alike. Indigenous men would continue to labor while Filipino elites would gain access to some colonial wealth. And in the eighteenth and nineteenth century so many members of the *Ilustrados*, the intellectual vanguard of the Philippine Independence movement, would proudly claim Chinese and provincial Filipino ancestries. However, the figures of the disposable Filipino worker and the importable Chinese worker have remained standard tropes in the Philippines. From the Spanish and U.S. colonizations to the current government, the legacy of, and unjust material inequity produced by, colonial racial labor regimes still haunts “ang aming lupa.”

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