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Authors

Kubrin, CE

Kim, YA

Hipp, JR

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Institutional Completeness and Crime Rates in Immigrant Neighborhoods

Charis E. Kubrin¹, Young-An Kim¹, and John R. Hipp¹

¹Department of Criminology, Law and Society, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA [GOI]

Corresponding Author:

Charis E. Kubrin, Department of Criminology, Law and Society, University of California, Irvine, Social Ecology II, Room 3379, Irvine, CA 92697, USA. Email: ckubrin@uci.edu

Abstract

[C1]Objectives

A growing body of research finds that immigration has a null or negative association with neighborhood crime rates. We build on this important literature by investigating the extent to which one theory, institutional completeness theory, may help explain lower crime rates in immigrant communities across the Southern California region. Specifically, we test whether ~~the~~ two key measures of institutional completeness—the presence of immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations in the community and the presence and diversity of immigrant/ethnic businesses in the community—account for lower crime rates in some immigrant communities. *Method:* Compiling a tract-level data set utilizing various data sources, we estimate negative binomial regression models predicting violent and property crime levels that include measures of institutional completeness while controlling for a range of neighborhood correlates of crime. We also account for possible endogeneity by estimating instrumental variable models. *Results:* The results reveal very limited support for institutional completeness theory. *Conclusions:* Several possible explanations for these findings are discussed.

Keywords

immigration, communities and crime, institutional completeness theory

Over the past two decades, studies investigating the immigration–crime link have proliferated. In particular, researchers have extensively investigated how immigration and crime are associated at the neighborhood level (Akins, Rumbaut, and Stansfield 2009; Chavez and Griffiths 2009; Desmond and Kubrin 2009; Feldmeyer and

Steffensmeier 2009; Graif and Sampson 2009; Kubrin and Ishizawa 2012; Lee and Martinez 2002; Lee et al. 2001^[AQ2]; MacDonald, Hipp, and Gill 2013; Martinez, Stowell, and Cancino 2008; Martinez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Martinez, Lee, and Nielsen 2004; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Nielsen and Martinez 2009; Stowell and Martinez 2007, 2009; Velez 2009). Unlike other areas of research, the consistency in findings across these studies is striking. Overwhelmingly, studies show that immigration and crime do not go hand in hand and that immigration to an area may actually decrease crime rates, contrary to popular perception. A recently published meta-analysis confirms this assessment. Examining over 540 effect size estimates from more than 50 U.S.-based macrolevel studies published between 1994 and 2014, Ousey and Kubrin (2018) find that, overall, the immigration–crime association is negative—but very weak. Indeed, significant negative effects were found to be 2.5 times as common as significant positive effects, but null effects were by far the most common result reported in prior studies.

Less understood, however, are the intervening mechanisms that may account for lower crime rates in immigrant neighborhoods (Kubrin and Desmond 2015). Also, relatively less understood is what differences may exist across immigrant neighborhoods and how such differences are associated with community crime rates, despite the fact that researchers have long argued “more attention should be given to the social organization of ethnic communities, particularly to the wide variation which exists among them in this respect” (Breton 1964:193; see also Bursik 2006:29; Kubrin, Hipp and Kim 2016). This point is especially relevant in light of extensive theorizing about certain kinds of immigrant communities, particularly ethnic enclaves. Definitions vary, however, an ethnic enclave is defined as an area “characterized by a concentration of businesses owned and operated by immigrants from the same country of origin, or their direct descendants” (Bohon 2001:4). Research on ethnic enclaves suggests that these communities offer several benefits for immigrants such as social networks, jobs, information, and support for entrepreneurial activities that help accelerate upward mobility (Portes and Rumbaut 2014; Waters and Esbach 1995; Wilson and Portes 1980; Zhou 2010).

As is obvious from the definition, a key dimension of this type of immigrant community relates to the formal organizational structure of the neighborhood, which is the focal point of a related theory, institutional completeness theory. First outlined by Breton (1964), institutional completeness theory recognizes that ethnic communities can vary enormously in their social organization. At one extreme, there is the community that exists essentially in a network of interpersonal relations. Members of a certain ethnic group seek each other’s companionship, and friendship groups and cliques are formed. But beyond this informal network, no formal organization may exist. According to Breton (1964:194), the immigrant who is a member of such a group will establish ~~her~~ institutional affiliations in the native community since ~~their~~~~her~~ ethnic group has little or no

organization of its own **AO3**. At the other extreme are institutionally complete communities, which have developed a more formal structure and contain ethnic organizations of various sorts including business, religious, educational, political, and recreational. Some have organized welfare and mutual aid societies and operate their own radio station or publish their own newspapers and periodicals. In this extreme case, the ethnic community is able to perform the services required by its members, and residents need not seek to have their needs fulfilled elsewhere. Of course “Between the two extremes much variation can be observed in the amount and complexity of community organizations; the degree of institutional completeness in fact shows variations from one ethnic group to another” (Breton 1964:194).

Studies of institutional completeness have examined the implications for ethnic identification and assimilation (Goldenberg and Haines 1992:309)—both of which likely matter a great deal for crime, the focus of this study. Examining immigrant neighborhoods across the Southern California landscape, we investigate the extent to which institutional completeness may account for lower crime rates in some immigrant communities, in line with theoretical arguments. In particular, we examine two key measures of institutional completeness—the presence of immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations in the community and the presence and diversity of immigrant/ethnic businesses in the community. We investigate the extent to which these measures of institutional completeness are associated with lower crime rates after controlling for a range of neighborhood correlates of crime and after accounting for spatial effects. We also account for possible endogeneity in these institutional completeness measures by estimating instrumental variable models.

A proper understanding of institutional completeness requires situating the theory in a broader discussion of ethnic enclaves since the two are closely related. For this reason, we begin with a brief discussion of the literature on ethnic enclaves followed by a more detailed discussion of institutional completeness theory and its relevance for understanding crime rates in immigrant communities.

Ethnic Enclaves as Broader Context

For decades, the stereotypical path for immigrants had been defined as one of assimilation. Assimilation theory stressed the necessity of acculturation for social and economic progress and subsequent rewards received by immigrants and their descendants for shedding their ethnic identities. Researchers are increasingly acknowledging, however, that there are different modes of structural incorporation (Portes and Manning 1986; Portes and Manning 2005). The immigrant or ethnic enclave is one of them.¹ Central to this claim is the belief that immigrants and their descendants do not necessarily “melt” into the mainstream and furthermore, that many seem not to

want to do so preferring instead to preserve their distinct ethnic identities (Greeley 1971; Portes and Manning 2005:48; see also Glazer and Moynihan 1970). Historical and contemporary examples—the Jews in Manhattan, Japanese on the West Coast, Koreans in Los Angeles, and Cubans in Miami—offer evidence of sizable immigrant groups that did not follow the stereotypical pattern of assimilation. Common to these examples was the economic success of the first generation even in the absence of extensive acculturation (all groups fought to preserve their cultural identity and internal solidarity).

The term “ethnic enclave” is often vaguely defined and used interchangeably with that of “immigrant neighborhood” to refer to a place where foreign-born and native-born racial and ethnic minorities predominate (Zhou 2014). Yet a principal characteristic of this structure, the enclave, is a dense network of diversified ethnic enterprises, populated largely by co-ethnic workers (Hum 2002:279; Portes and Jensen 1992:418; Wilson and Portes 1980), that provide goods and services both for the ethnic community itself and for the general market (Portes and Manning 2005). Importantly, the enclave is concentrated and spatially identifiable. This “ethnic business concentration” (Portes and Jensen 1992:418) occurs for several reasons including business’s need for proximity to the ethnic market which they serve; proximity to each other which facilitates exchange of information, access to credit, and other supportive activities; and proximity to ethnic labor supplies on which they crucially depend (Portes and Manning 2005:63). These characteristics most clearly differentiate an enclave from the assortment of restaurants and shops commonly established by other immigrant minorities to cater to their needs (Portes and Manning 2005:57).²

Ethnic enclaves offer immigrants an avenue for economic advancement (Portes and Jensen 1992:419). The enclave hypothesis tells a story of a network of small enterprises that offer employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy to recent immigrants and to those who speak little English. This network creates entrepreneurial opportunities for the newcomers, opportunities that are absent elsewhere (Portes and Jensen 1992:420). By providing a space for co-ethnics to create potentially beneficial relations, ethnic enclaves assist members in achieving economic mobility. In other words, enclaves create an alternative labor market that is ethnic-specific and does not demand social and cultural skills of the host country. By eliminating language and cultural barriers, enclave economies employ a greater proportion of co-ethnics and speed the incorporation of new immigrants into a bustling economy. By increasing employment opportunities and facilitating upward mobility, ethnic enclaves facilitate the success of some immigrant groups.³

Yet advantages other than economic mobility may accrue to residents in ethnic enclaves. The most fundamental concept within the enclave hypothesis is that of social capital, which lays the foundation for the establishment of migrant networks and the

advantages associated with them (Massey 1999). As immigrants tend to cluster in close geographic spaces, they develop migrant networks or systems of interpersonal relations through which participants can exchange valuable resources and knowledge. Immigrants can capitalize on social interactions by transforming information into tangible resources, thereby lowering the costs of migration. Information exchanged may include knowledge of employment opportunities, affordable housing, government assistance programs, and helpful nongovernmental organizations [AQ4]. Thus, by stimulating social connections, ethnic enclaves generate a pool of intangible resources that help to promote the economic and social development of its members (Massey 1999).

Of course, there is recognition that not all ethnic enclaves are created equal. One important feature of differentiation relates to levels of institutional completeness (Breton 1964), the focus of the discussion below.

Institutional Completeness and Ethnic Communities

Ever since its introduction in 1964 by Raymond Breton, the concept of institutional completeness has played an important role in the study of ethnic communities (Goldenberg and Haines 1992). In Breton's original formulation, the concept was used to explain the integration of immigrants into the receiving country, which is theorized to occur through the formation of informal social networks of companionship ties (e.g., visiting friends and meeting socially with coworkers). When an immigrant is "transplanted from one country to another, he has to reconstruct his interpersonal 'field'. He will rebuild in a new community a network of personal affiliations" (Breton 1964:194) [C2]. To satisfy other needs like finding a job, immigrants must rely on existing social institutions. Thus, according to Breton, the social organization of the receiving community is a crucial factor bearing on the absorption of immigrants—as crucial a factor as are immigrants' backgrounds and motivations (Goldenberg and Haines 1992).

In the case of ethnic communities of immigrants, Breton's primary focus, integration is believed to be a function of the degree of institutional completeness of these communities. The higher the degree of institutional completeness of an ethnic community, the more institutional services (e.g., religious, educational, political, national, professional, welfare and mutual aid, and communication) the community can provide for its members and, therefore, the greater its capacity to attract immigrants within its social boundaries (Goldenberg and Haines 1992:303–304). Breton initially underscored religious, educational, and welfare institutions as essential, while Joy (1972) later emphasized the importance of economic and political institutions as well (see also Driedger and Church 1974:31).

Notably, Breton conceptualized institutional completeness as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. Institutional completeness would be at its extreme whenever the ethnic

community could perform all the services required by its members. Members would never have to make use of native institutions for the satisfaction of their needs such as education, work, food and clothing, medical care, or social assistance. Of course, Breton (1964:194) acknowledged that very few, if any, ethnic communities showed full institutional completeness, something that remains true today.

Breton (1964) was primarily interested in determining if the ethnic community to which an immigrant belongs determines, to a certain degree, the composition of their interpersonal network. Conducting surveys and interviews in (randomly sampled) census tracts in the city of Montreal, Breton constructed a measure of institutional completeness by combining into an index information on the number of churches, welfare organizations, newspapers, and periodicals in each ethnic community. In line with his expectations, Breton found that neighborhood organizations strengthen ethnic identity; the degree of institutional completeness of an immigrant's ethnic community, he found, is one of the main factors in determining the composition of their personal relations.

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The presence of formal organizations in the ethnic community sets out forces that have the effect of keeping the social relations of the immigrants within its boundaries. It tends to minimize out-group contacts. The communities showing the highest degree of institutional completeness have a much greater proportion of their members with most of their personal relations within the ethnic group. (Breton 1964:196)

Breton also discovered that ethnic institutions affected social relations not only for those who participated in them but also for those who did not.

These and findings from similar studies (e.g., Driedger and Church 1974) suggest that institutionally complete immigrant communities have a unique social organization and that enclave economies, in general, can have important noneconomic effects on community building. For starters, local businesses consolidate local social structures, serving as a crucial material basis for community development. Local businesses create social spaces for institutions and individuals to interact. According to Zhou (2014) who studied the formation of ethnic resources and social capital in Chinatown and Koreatown, co-ethnic members converge in their enclave on a regular basis to patronize ethnic businesses and turn these businesses into unique spaces in which residents meet and socialize with one another and build social ties. Large and upscale restaurants, she finds, are often used for social activities such as wedding banquets, community fund-raising events, and meetings run by ethnic institutions and nonprofit organizations. The point here is that "...once a formal structure has developed it has the effect of reinforcing the cohesiveness of already existing networks and of expanding these networks" (Breton 1964:202).

Likewise, according to Zhou (2014), ethnic businesses—intertwined with ethnic social structures—constitute a magnet for attracting the return and organizational involvement

of suburban middle-class co-ethnics. In immigrant and/or racial and ethnic minority inner-city neighborhoods, many local social structures have been diminished with the out-migration of the middle class to the suburbs following deindustrialization, leaving the “truly disadvantaged” (Wilson 1987) socially isolated and trapped in conditions of concentrated disadvantage. Zhou (2014) maintains, however, that not all inner-city immigrant neighborhoods are predestined to this fate, once more pointing to Chinatown and Koreatown where the presence of nonresident middle-class co-ethnics is significant due to a large segment of the enclave economy catering to the middle class (rather than only to local residents who live there). The combination of dense and diverse businesses in these institutionally complete communities has thus created a unique site that draws a middle-class clientele—suburban middle-class co-ethnics along with professionals of multiethnic backgrounds, urban yuppies, and tourists. The reappearance of the middle class, in turn, has created new consumer demands that stimulate ever new entrepreneurial investments in businesses of varying types as well as further developments in local social structures.

Consequences for Neighborhood Crime Rates

So what does all of this mean for neighborhood crime rates? What these findings suggest is that the institutions of an ethnic community are the origin of much social life in which the residents of that community get involved and, as a consequence, become tied together in a cohesive interpersonal network (Breton 1964:197; see also Baureiss 1981:101). This interpersonal network, in turn, can generate informal social control—an important neighborhood crime-fighting element. As Driedger and Church (1974:31) argue based on their analysis of institutional completeness in Winnipeg, Canada, “...when a minority can develop a social system of its own with control over its institutions, then the social interaction patterns of the group will take place largely within the system; such patterns will lead to the creation and maintenance of boundaries and control over systemic linkage.”

These arguments are consistent with social disorganization theory, which is concerned with explaining the spatial distribution of crime across neighborhoods. According to the theory, neighborhood characteristics can lead to social disorganization; social disorganization, in turn, can cause crime. Social disorganization refers to the inability of a community to realize the common values of its members and maintain effective social controls: “Social disorganization exists in the first instance when the structure and culture of a community are incapable of implementing and expressing the values of its own residents” (Kornhauser 1978:63). A common value among neighborhood residents is the desire for a crime-free community. In essence, then, socially disorganized neighborhoods are ineffective in combating crime.

Socially organized communities are characterized by solidarity or an internal consensus on essential norms and values (e.g., residents want and value the same things); cohesion or a strong bond among neighbors (e.g., residents know and like one another); and integration, with social interaction occurring on a regular basis (e.g., residents spend time with one another). Conversely, disorganized communities have little solidarity among residents and lack social cohesion or integration. Perhaps the greatest difference between socially organized and disorganized neighborhoods is the levels of informal social control. Informal social control is defined as the scope of collective intervention that the community directs toward local problems, including crime (Kornhauser 1978; Shaw and McKay 1969[AQ5]). According to the theory, socially disorganized neighborhoods have lower levels of informal social control and thus experience higher crime rates. Applying insights from the earlier discussion on ethnic enclaves and institutionally complete neighborhoods, social disorganization theory would predict that communities characterized by high levels of institutional completeness are likely to enjoy lower crime rates primarily because residents of these communities develop strong ties and social networks, which help to generate informal social control and curb crime.

Yet there is another reason that crime rates may be lower in immigrant neighborhoods that have high levels of institutional completeness. A key observation from the literature is that the individual-level link between immigrants and crime appears to wane across generations. That is, while research reveals that immigrants are less crime-prone than their native-born counterparts (Bersani 2014; Butcher and Piehl 1998:654[AQ6]; Hagan and Palloni 1999:629; MacDonald and Saunders 2012; Martinez and Lee 2000; Martinez 2002; McCord 1995; Olson et al. 2009; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005; Tonry 1997), studies also report that the children of immigrants who are born in the United States exhibit higher crime rates than their parents (Lopez and Miller 2011; Morenoff and Astor 2006:36; Rumbaut et al. 2006:72; Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005; Taft 1933; Zhou and Bankston 1998[AQ7]) and that assimilated immigrants have higher rates of criminal involvement compared to unassimilated immigrants (Alvarez-Rivera, Nobles, and Lersch 2014; Bersani, Loughran, and Piquero 2014; Morenoff and Astor 2006:47; Zhou and Bankston 2006:124). These findings have led scholars to describe an “assimilation paradox” (Rumbaut and Ewing 2007[AQ8]:2) where the crime problem reflects “not the foreign born but their children” (Tonry 1997:20). It may be the case that strong ties between co-ethnics in institutionally complete neighborhoods temper assimilation levels among residents, thus keeping crime rates lower in these communities compared to communities that are less institutionally complete.

This discussion raises several important research questions: Which neighborhood factors may be associated with variability in crime rates across immigrant

neighborhoods? In particular, how is institutional completeness associated with crime rates in immigrant communities? Do institutionally complete neighborhoods have lower rates of crime compared to less institutionally complete neighborhoods? The aim of the current study is to address these research questions. Using data from immigrant neighborhoods in Southern California, we construct unique measures of institutional completeness and test whether they help explain why some immigrant neighborhoods have higher rates of crime than others. By combining rich data sets capturing local businesses and organizations present in immigrant neighborhoods with Census data on the composition of residents in immigrant neighborhoods, we are able to examine these issues [\[AQ9\]](#).

Data and Method

Research Context

Our focus is on Southern California, a large and growing region that contains three metropolitan statistical areas: Los Angeles–Long Beach–Santa Ana, the second largest metro area in the United States (12.8 million population); Riverside–San Bernardino–Ontario, the 12th largest (4.2 million population); and San Diego–Carlsbad–San Marcos, the 17th largest (3.1 million population). The region we examine includes five counties (Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and San Diego) and 341 cities and minor civil divisions.

The Southern California region is an ideal setting for this study because it is a growing region with over 20 million persons, is racially and ethnically heterogeneous, and continues to receive a large inflow of immigrants. In the first half of the twentieth century, White migrants were dominant in Southern California but beginning around the 1960s, immigration to the region increased substantially with migrants coming from a diverse array of countries. Today, Southern California is home to the largest concentrations of Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Iranians, and other nationalities outside of their respective countries of origins (Rumbaut 2008:197). Southern California is also home to sizable populations of Armenians, Arabs, mainland Chinese, Hondurans, Indians, Laotians, and Russian and Israeli Jews (Rumbaut 2008:197) [\[AQ10\]](#).

Data

In this study, we combine data from the National Center of Charitable Statistics (NCCS), Reference USA business data, the Census 2009–2013 American Community Survey (ACS) five-year estimates, and official crime data reported by police departments. Similar to [Driedger and Church \(1974\)](#), we focus specifically on immigrant neighborhoods, which are defined based on the following criteria (note that the majority of immigrants in the region are Asian or Latino): (1) At least 50 percent of the residents are immigrants, or (2)

at least 30 percent of the residents are either Asian or Latino immigrants, or (3) there is a mix of Asian or Latino residents in general along with Asian or Latino immigrants. This latter criterion captures neighborhoods where there is a mix of first generation (immigrants) along with second or additional generation persons, which is consistent with the institutional completeness and ethnic enclave literatures that often posit the presence of second and additional generations in these neighborhoods. This criterion was assessed as follows: First, we multiplied the proportion Latino and the proportion Latino immigrants in the neighborhood; second, we multiplied the proportion Asian and the proportion Asian immigrants in the neighborhood. If the value of either of these was greater than .9, the neighborhood was classified as an immigrant neighborhood. Thus, for example, if a neighborhood was comprised of just 10 percent Asian immigrants, it would need to be 90 percent Asian (thus, 80 percent nonimmigrant Asians) to qualify. Or if a neighborhood was 20 percent Asian immigrants, it would need to be 45 percent Asian (thus, 25 percent nonimmigrant Asians) to qualify. As such, this criterion captures neighborhoods with some immigrants from a group but a substantial presence of second and additional generation members of the group. In our study ~~of immigrant neighborhoods~~, we utilize census tracts as our unit of analysis, given that they approximate neighborhoods and because the Census does not provide detailed information on immigrants at units smaller than tracts. Our study area constituted all cities in the region for which we had crime data. Applying these criteria, among the 3,408 tracts in the study area with crime data and at least 100 residents, 1,612 (or 47.3 percent of tracts) were classified as immigrant neighborhoods. Based on our criteria, our sample tracts have an average of 42.4 percent immigrants, with a range of 16.6 percent to 76.8 percent (see [Table 1](#)).

Table 1. Summary Statistics.

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Crime				
Violent crime (three year average)	18.99	26.64	0	733.33
Property crime (three year average)	69.52	68.17	0	757.67
Local business measures				
Proportion of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses	0.23	0.13	0	0.79
Number of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses	14.47	17.78	0	278
Diversity of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses	7.00	4.34	0	21

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Voluntary organizations (logged)				
Ethnic/immigrant	0.142	0.318	0	2.079
Human Services	0.462	0.532	0	3.584
International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security	0.119	0.291	0	2.639
Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy	0.039	0.167	0	1.792
Arts, Culture, and Humanities	0.394	0.522	0	3.374
Education	0.713	0.624	0	3.599
Employment, Job Related	0.120	0.306	0	2.639
Indicators of no voluntary organizations				
Ethnic/immigrant	0.820	0.384	0	1
Human Services	0.384	0.486	0	1
International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security	0.751	0.433	0	1
Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy	0.901	0.299	0	1
Arts, Culture, and Humanities	0.444	0.497	0	1
Education	0.209	0.406	0	1
Employment, Job Related	0.751	0.433	0	1
Controls				
Percent speak English poorly among those speaking a foreign language	21.28	9.89	1.17	68.45
Population density	14.18	11.39	0.00	102.57
Percent 125% of poverty	22.83	11.96	0.79	90.48
Percent occupied	93.62	4.51	54.36	100.00
Percent owners	43.90	24.14	0.00	98.59
Percent age 15-29	24.70	4.85	7.30	77.26
Percent Black	6.30	9.06	0.00	59.17
Immigrant group heterogeneity	0.48	0.20	0.03	0.80
Retail/service business	33.92	50.11	0	1126

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Spatially lagged (5 miles)				
Percent poverty	20.77	7.37	2.97	38.56
Percent occupied	93.52	2.74	57.88	97.71
Percent owners	45.88	15.85	11.14	88.82
Percent age 15–29	24.18	3.00	0.00	39.23
Percent Black	7.02	7.70	0.06	44.44
Sampling criteria measures				
Percent immigrants	42.38	10.52	16.62	76.82
Percent Latino	64.48	23.36	1.51	100
Percent Asian	13.42	17.32	0	86.62

Note: Sample size is 1,612 tracts.

Dependent Variables

The outcome variables are three-year average counts of violent and property crime obtained from the Southern California Crime Study. As part of this larger project, researchers contacted all police agencies in the Southern California region and requested address-level incident crime data for the years 2005–2012. The crime data obtained cover roughly 84 percent of the region's population. In the current study, we classified violent crime as the sum of the counts of homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery while property crime is the sum of the counts of burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny. Crime incidents for 2010, 2011, and 2012 were geocoded for each city separately to latitude–longitude point locations using ArcGIS 10.2, and subsequently aggregated to tracts. The average geocoding match rate was 97.2 percent across the cities, with the lowest value at 91.4 percent.

Independent Variables

The main independent variables of this study intended to reflect neighborhood levels of institutional completeness are (1) measures of the *presence* of immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations in the community and (2) measures of the *presence* and *diversity* of immigrant/ethnic businesses in the community. These measures represent an improvement over measures used in prior studies, most of which do not account for organizational or business diversity. Roberts and Boldt (1979) [\[AQ11\]](#) and Baureiss (1981), in particular, have criticized the enumerative approach which Breton and others have used to operationalize the concept of institutional completeness. While they do not deny the value of counting the number of ethnic institutions, they argue that the nature

of these institutions must also be considered (see also [Goldenberg and Haines 1992:302](#)). Our measures reflect both the presence and diversity of immigrant/ethnic organizations and businesses.

Regarding the first measure, [Breton \(1964\)](#) emphasized the importance of including a measure of voluntary organizations in any study of institutional completeness, noting “they are not only numerous but also very significant in the social life of any ethnic community” (p. 195)—even as he himself did not include such a measure in his own work. To construct this measure, we utilized NCCS data. The NCCS data source contains information on tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. The data include information, for example, on an organization’s address, activities/operations. We geocoded all nonprofit organizations that were present in 2011 using Arc GIS 10.2 and aggregated the number of such organizations to tracts. We classified these organizations as ethnic/immigrant organizations if the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities codes indicate that they are organizations of Ethnic/Immigrant Centers and Services, Cultural and Ethnic Awareness, Civil Rights, Advocacy for Specific Groups, and Minority Rights.⁴ We also included six other categories of general organizations that might help immigrants: Human Services; International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security; Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy; Arts, Culture, and Humanities; Education; and Employment, Job Related. For each category, we created two variables: (1) the number of organizations (log transformed) and (2) a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of organizations in the tract, given prior evidence that the presence of just a single organization can have a strong effect ([Breton 1964](#)). Indeed, as [Breton \(1964\)](#) found in his seminal work, “What most differentiates one community from another in its capacity to control the social integration of its members is not so much its having many formal organizations as having some as opposed to none at all” (p. 201).

In terms of immigrant ethnic businesses, we utilized Reference USA business data in 2011, which include information on addresses of businesses, types of businesses by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, number of employees, year of establishment, business revenues, and so on. We geocoded addresses of businesses to latitude–longitude points using ArcGIS 10.2 and then aggregated to tracts. Creating our variables of interest was a multistage process. First, we needed to classify businesses. In the context of institutional completeness theory, we were interested in classifying whether businesses are (1) *consumer facing* (they provide goods and services to residents), (2) *locally owned* (not part of larger corporations), and (3) *ethnically owned* (owned by co-ethnics of the dominant immigrant group in the neighborhood).

To do this, first, we used the NAICS codes to classify businesses into 31 types of *consumer-facing businesses* that [Kane, Hipp, and Kim \(2017\)](#) classified based on their tendency to serve consumers by providing goods or services (see Appendix for the list of

31 business types). Second, to assess *locally owned businesses* (as opposed to ownership by a larger corporation), we considered three different attributes in the Reference USA data: (1) whether a business facility is a franchise or not; (2) whether a facility is a headquarter, branch, or neither; and (3) whether a facility is a publicly traded company, branch of a publicly traded company, or private company. The third attribute is based on an assumption that most local businesses tend not to be publicly traded. Combining these criteria together, a business facility is identified as locally owned and run if it is not categorized as a franchise, is neither a headquarter nor a branch, and is a private company. And third, to assess *ethnically owned businesses*, we used information on the business owner name. We focused on the dominant ethnic group, given [Zhou's \(2014\)](#) argument that when multiple ethnic communities simultaneously exist in an immigrant neighborhood, the one with a sizeable enclave economy tends to gain the upper hand in asserting its prominence and ethnic identity in the neighborhood. We defined the seven dominant immigrant groups in the Southern California region based upon population counts as immigrants from Mexico, China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong), Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Armenia, and El Salvador (other groups had much smaller population presence). Next, to determine whether a business is owned by a member of one of these groups, we collected information on the surname of the listed owner. We used the website <http://forebears.io/surnames> to classify the country that a surname is most frequently found and then we designated the company's owner to be from this country. If the surname is most commonly from one of the countries of our primary immigrant groups, we classify this as an *ethnically owned business*. There is certainly some measurement error with this approach; nonetheless, when we created maps based on the location of businesses owned by particular ethnicities using this approach, there appeared to be considerable face validity with our knowledge of these neighborhoods. For example, well-known Latino areas such as **E**ast Los Angeles and the transitioning **S**outh Los Angeles area were detected on these maps, and likewise the well-known Asian enclaves of the San Gabriel Valley and northern Orange County were quite apparent.

Using these classified businesses, we then constructed our business measures of interest to capture institutional completeness. Because there is no one accepted method for measuring the presence and diversity of ethnic businesses in neighborhoods, we employed three different strategies. First, to capture the possibility that the simple presence of more ethnically owned businesses can have a positive effect for neighborhoods, we constructed a measure of the *number of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses* ([Zhou 2014](#)). Alternatively, it may be that the relative presence of ethnically owned businesses among all consumer-facing businesses is more critical than the simple count of them. In light of this, we also constructed a measure of the *proportion of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses* among all local

consumer-facing businesses in the neighborhood. Third, scholars, including Roberts and Boldt (1979) and Baureiss (1981), have criticized the simple enumerative approach and instead advocate an approach that accounts for the varied services of these businesses. As one example, Zhou (2014) explicitly operationalized the diversity of ethnic businesses in an area. We therefore also constructed a measure of the *diversity of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses* in the neighborhood. This measure was constructed by creating indicators of whether there is an ethnically owned local business in the tract for each of the 31 consumer-facing business types and then summing these dichotomous variables (1 = presence and 0 = absence) for each neighborhood. In light of the theoretical discussion above, we test the following two hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1:** Tracts with more immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations will have lower violent and property crime rates.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Tracts with a greater presence and diversity of immigrant/ethnic businesses will have lower violent and property crime rates.

To account for additional structural characteristics of neighborhoods, we included several measures from the 2009–2013 ACS five-year estimates. To capture socioeconomic status, which can impact levels of social disorganization and therefore crime levels (Krivo and Peterson 1996; Warner and Rountree 1997), we used *percent at or below 125 percent of the poverty level*. We account for the presence of racial minorities with *percent Black*. Residential stability can also impact the social disorganization of a neighborhood (Gyimah-Brempong 2001; Krivo and Peterson 1996), and we capture it with *percent homeowners*. To measure vacant units, which can provide crime opportunities (Boessen and Hipp 2015), we include the *percent occupied units*. To account for the mixing of immigrant groups (Zhou 2014), we constructed a measure of *immigrant group heterogeneity* computed as a Herfindahl index of the five largest immigrant groups in the tract. Thus, a neighborhood in which only one immigrant group is dominant will have a very small value on this measure, whereas one in which there are five immigrant groups equally represented will have a high value. We capture the effects of assimilation of the immigrants in neighborhoods by including the *percent who speak English poorly among those speaking a foreign language* (Gostjev and Nielsen 2017). A measure of the *percent aged 15–29* captures those in the most crime-prone years. We included a measure of *population density* to control for possible crime reducing/enhancing effects of population size. Finally, given that commercial areas can provide crime opportunities given that they bring together motivated offenders and suitable targets (Hipp 2010), we included a measure of the *number of retail/service business establishments* from the Reference USA data.

The summary statistics for all variables used in the analyses are shown in Table 1. Among our measures of ethnic businesses, we see that the average immigrant tract in our

sample has 14.5 ethnic local businesses with a standard deviation of nearly 18. The proportion of ethnic businesses among local businesses is .23 and ranges from 0 to .79. Our measure of diversity of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses shows an average number of 7 (out of 31 types) in tracts, with a maximum of 21 types present. For our measure of ethnic/immigrant voluntary organizations, 82 percent of tracts have none, 14 percent have one, and 3.2 percent have more than one. Among the other voluntary organization types, 10 percent of tracts have at least one civil rights organization, 25 percent have at least one employment or international organization, 56 percent have arts organizations, 62 percent have human services, and 79 percent have education organizations.

Analytic Strategy

Given that the outcome variables in this study are violent and property crime counts, we estimated negative binomial regression models. We included tract population as the exposure variable, which makes the outcomes interpretable as crime rates (Osgood 2000 [AQ12]). To account for the spatial dependence of areas in relation to the distribution of crime, we included spatially lagged independent variables in the models. These measures were created based on an inverse distance decay function with a cutoff at 5 miles around each tract (beyond which the areas have a value of 0 in the *W* matrix). The resulting spatial weights matrix (*W*) is row standardized. This matrix is multiplied by the matrix of values in the tracts for the variables of interest (percent poverty, percent occupied units, percent homeowners, percent aged 15–29, and percent Black). There was no evidence of multicollinearity in our models: The only measures with variance inflation factors above 3 were the measures of the number of ethnic/immigrant organizations, and the 0/1 measure of their presence, but models estimated excluding one or the other of these variables yielded very similar results to those presented.

One potential concern related to the analysis is that there may be endogeneity between our measures of immigrant concentration and levels of crime. That is, neighborhoods with higher levels of crime may disproportionately attract or repulse immigrant group organizations, which could bias our results. We account for this by following prior research in this area (MacDonald, Hipp, and McGill 2013) and estimating instrumental variable models to account for possible endogeneity. In light of the fact that neighborhood institutions are relatively stable, we argue that plausible instrumental variables are measures of these institutions 10 years prior (2000). Thus, we instrument each of the voluntary organization variables (both the count and the indicator variable of no organizations) and each of the three ethnic business measures by its comparable measure in 2000. The first-stage equations therefore include the variables in the structural model, as well as all of the instrumental variables, to predict each of these voluntary organization

or ethnic business measures. The predicted values from these first-stage equations were obtained and included in our final models.⁵

Results

Effects of Voluntary Organizations

We begin with the violent crime models (see [Table 2](#)) and focus on the effects of the voluntary organizations measures. As shown in model 1 in [Table 2](#), the presence of ethnic/immigrant voluntary organizations—a key measure of institutional completeness—is unrelated to the violent crime rate, contrary to theoretical predictions. This is the case for both the logged count of ethnic/immigrant organizations and for the indicator variable capturing neighborhoods with one or more of these organizations. This suggests that these types of organizations do not explain variability in violent crime rates across immigrant communities, at least in the Southern California region.

Table 2. Organizations in Immigrant Neighborhood and Crime.

	Violent Crime		Property Crime	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Voluntary organizations (logged)				
Ethnic/immigrant	-0.274 -(1.32)	-0.0082 -(0.03)	-0.332 -(1.89) [†]	-0.055 -(0.28)
Human Services	0.068 (1.17)	-0.2467 -(3.37)**	0.052 (1.09)	-0.123 -(2.06)*
International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security	-0.304 -(2.79)**	-0.1451 -(1.15)	-0.077 -(0.87)	-0.102 -(0.96)
Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy	0.486 (2.74)**	0.0559 (0.28)	0.448 (3.01)**	-0.179 -(1.07)
Arts, Culture, and Humanities	-0.031 -(0.47)	0.0979 (1.27)	-0.152 -(2.81)**	0.016 (0.25)
Education	0.016 (0.34)	0.0506 (0.91)	0.046 (1.24)	0.051 (1.12)
Employment, Job Related	0.167 (1.78) [†]	0.1203 (1.12)	0.061 (0.79)	0.047 (0.52)
Indicators of one or more voluntary organizations				
Ethnic/immigrant	0.162 (0.98)	-0.019 -(0.09)	0.259 (1.86) [†]	0.038 (0.23)
Human Services	-0.211 -(3.55)**	0.082 (1.00)	-0.036 -(0.73)	0.184 (2.73)**

	Violent Crime		Property Crime	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security	0.160 (2.33)*	0.079 (1.01)	0.033 (0.58)	0.044 (0.67)
Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy	-0.437 -(4.51)**	-0.195 -(1.77) [†]	-0.318 -(3.95)**	0.042 (0.46)
Arts, Culture, and Humanities	0.105 (1.75) [†]	-0.045 -(0.61)	0.114 (2.28)*	-0.085 -(1.40)
Education	0.175 (2.82)**	0.174 (2.03)*	0.056 (1.09)	0.083 (1.16)
Employment, Job Related	-0.096 -(1.49)	-0.029 -(0.38)	-0.061 -(1.14)	-0.044 -(0.68)
Controls				
Percent speak English poorly among those speaking a foreign language	0.020 (5.90)**	0.0183 (5.32)**	-0.009 -(3.41)**	-0.010 -(3.51)**
Population density	-0.004 -(1.36)	-0.0032 -(1.14)	-0.018 -(8.52)**	-0.017 -(8.13)**
Percent 125 percent of poverty	0.005 (1.72) [†]	0.0038 (1.31)	-0.003 -(1.29)	-0.004 -(1.55)
Percent occupied	-0.015 -(2.85)**	-0.0179 -(3.28)**	-0.002 -(0.45)	-0.004 -(0.93)
Percent owners	-0.003 -(1.55)	-0.0028 -(1.69) [†]	-0.006 -(4.58)**	-0.006 -(4.65)**
Percent age 15–29	0.008 (1.47)	0.0092 (1.76) [†]	-0.004 -(1.10)	-0.004 -(0.93)
Percent Black	0.017 (4.06)**	0.0167 (3.97)**	0.004 (1.01)	0.003 (0.78)
Immigrant group heterogeneity	-0.962 -(7.97)**	-1.0239 -(8.27)**	-0.468 -(4.63)**	-0.500 -(4.87)**
Number of Retail/service businesses	0.005 (8.00)**	0.0049 (7.79)**	0.006 (12.43)**	0.007 (12.17)**
Spatially lagged (5 miles)				
Percent poverty	0.014 (1.91) [†]	0.0169 (2.35)*	0.001 (0.23)	0.000 (0.08)
Percent occupied	0.032 (3.70)**	0.0356 (4.00)**	-0.007 -(0.98)	-0.003 -(0.44)

	Violent Crime		Property Crime	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Percent owners	0.011 (3.75)**	0.0112 (3.85)**	0.008 (3.27)**	0.008 (3.19)**
Percent age 15-29	-0.003 -(0.21)	-0.0083 -(0.60)	0.056 (5.21)**	0.055 (5.01)**
Percent Black	0.028 (5.31)**	0.0270 (5.12)**	0.008 (1.80) [†]	0.008 (1.73) [†]
Intercept	-8.668 -(10.18)**	-8.4930 -(9.53)**	-4.426 -(6.82)**	-4.338 -(6.46)**
N	1,612	1,611	1,612	1,611
Pseudo R ²	.054	.052	.045	.044
AIC	12,120.7	12,144.5	15,971.1	15,974.4
BIC	12,282.3	12,306.0	16,132.6	16,135.9

Note: *T* values in parentheses. Models 1 and 3 = original models; models 2 and 4 = instrumental variable models.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

** $p < .01$ (two-tailed test).

[†] $p < .05$ (one-tailed test).

Some of the other organization types do, however, exhibit statistically significant effects. For organizations providing human services, or those providing civil rights, the presence of a single such organization in an immigrant neighborhood is associated with 19 percent and 35 percent less violent crime, respectively ($\exp(-.211) - 1 = -.19$; $\exp(-.437) - 1 = -.354$) [\[AQ13\]](#). Additional organizations providing human services, however, are not related to violent crime levels, whereas additional organizations providing civil rights are surprisingly associated with increased violent crime levels (about 21 percent more violence for each organization). We also find that whereas the presence of a single organization focused on international issues is associated with about 13 percent lower violent crime rates (given that the interpretation requires combining the positive indicator variable, .160, with the negative logged variable, $-.304$), each additional such organization is associated with about 30 percent less violence. Surprisingly, the simple *presence* of an organization providing education services is associated with higher violent crime levels in immigrant neighborhoods, contrary to expectations. At first glance, many of these findings seem puzzling; however, recent research on the impact of local organizations on community crime rates reveal similar unexpected findings ([Wo 2014](#)), a point we return to in the study's conclusion.

In model 2, we estimated the same model for violent crime but accounted for endogeneity by substituting our instrumented organization variables in the model. We find that the positive relationship between civil rights organizations and violence has been reduced to near 0 and becomes nonsignificant when we account for endogeneity. This implies that these civil rights organizations are more likely to locate into immigrant neighborhoods with higher levels of violence than neighborhoods with low levels of violence. We also find that there is now a negative relationship between the number of human services organizations and violence in these neighborhoods (about 25 percent less violence for each organization), once accounting for endogeneity. Given that in the prior model not accounting for endogeneity, we only detected this negative relationship for the placement of a single human services organization and not additional ones, it would appear that these types of organizations tend to locate in immigrant neighborhoods with higher levels of violence and several human services organizations. Only for the *presence* of a single organization providing education services do we still detect the positive relationship with violent crime in immigrant neighborhoods, contrary to expectations.

Turning to the property crime results in model 3 of [Table 2](#), we find that it is only the presence of *multiple* ethnic/immigrant voluntary organizations that is significantly associated with lower property crime rates. Whereas the presence of a single ethnic/immigrant organization is associated with 30 percent greater property crime rate, the presence of each additional ethnic/immigrant organization is associated with about 4 percent less property crime rates (see also [Figure 1](#)). Thus, there is only minimal support for institutional completeness theory for this measure. Regarding the nonimmigrant-related voluntary organization measures, we find that when there are two or more organizations focusing on arts, culture, and humanities, there is a reduced level of property crime (14 percent less for each such organization). In contrast, the presence of two or more civil rights organizations is associated with higher property crime rates (about 15 percent more for each organization). The presence of other organization types does not seem to be related to property crime rates in immigrant neighborhoods.

Figure 1. Marginal relationship between various voluntary organization types and property crime.

In model 4, we again estimate the property crime model, but use our instrumented variables to account for endogeneity. Similar to the violent crime results, we find that after accounting for endogeneity, the positive relationship for civil rights organizations in the initial model has now been entirely eliminated and the nonsignificant relationship for human services organizations is now negative when there are multiple such organizations. Thus, a single human services organization is associated with 10 percent more property crime compared to a neighborhood with none of these organizations, but each additional such organization is associated with about 4 percent less property crime. We also find that the negative relationships for ethnic/immigrant organizations and arts, culture, and humanities organizations have been reduced to nonsignificance after accounting for endogeneity, suggesting that these organizations may have a tendency to locate in relatively lower property crime neighborhoods.

Regarding the control variables, we observe that whereas immigrant neighborhoods in which a higher percentage of residents speak English poorly have higher violent crime rates, they also have lower property crime rates. Neighborhoods that have greater mixing of the dominant immigrant groups have lower violent and property crime rates, which is in contrast to some existing empirical evidence [regarding immigrant mixing](#) (Graif and Sampson 2009). Immigrant neighborhoods with a higher vacancy rate, or a higher percentage Black, have higher violent crime rates. And finally, the presence of more retail/service businesses is associated with more violent and property crime in immigrant neighborhoods, consistent with an opportunity perspective.

Effects of Co-ethnic Business Structure

We next turn to our measures of the co-ethnic business structure of the neighborhood shown in [Table 3](#) (these models include all variables in the models in [Table 2](#)). We add the variable capturing the proportion of ethnic to total local businesses in model 1 of panel A. Once more contrary to the predictions of institutional completeness theory, we find this measure has an unexpected positive relationship with violent crime. Specifically, a 1 standard deviation increase in this ratio is associated with 13.7 percent more violent crime ($\exp(.958 \times .13) - 1 = .137$). We detect an even stronger positive relationship in the model

using the instrumented variable: A 1 standard deviation increase in this measure is associated with 18.7 percent more violent crime ($\exp(1.277 \times .131) - 1 = .187$).

Table 3. Business Measures and Crime in Immigrant Neighborhood. [\[AQ14\]](#)

	Panel A: Violent Crime						Panel B: Property Crime					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Original	IVs	Original	IVs	Original	IVs	Original	IVs	Original	IVs	Original	IVs
Business measures	0.958 (5.74)**	1.277 (5.93)**	0.006 (3.12)**	0.013 4.528*	0.036 (5.90)**	0.046 (6.21)**	0.289 (2.06)*	0.355 1.963*	0.002 (1.07)	0.003 1.162	0.020 (3.73)**	0.023 .203**
Intercept	-8.144 -(9.53)**	-7.762 -8.668	-8.322 -(9.71)**	-7.791 -8.723	-8.322 -(9.71)**	-8.367 -(9.86)**	-4.334 -(6.67)**	-4.146 -6.178**	-4.325 -(6.60)**	-4.13 -6.106**	-4.306 -(6.68)**	-4.217 -6.338**
N	1,611	1,610	1,612	1,610	1,612	1,610	1,611	1,610	1,612	1,610	1,612	1,610
Pseudo R ²	.057	.055	.055	.054	.057	.055	.045	.044	.045	.044	.046	.045
AIC	12,083.7	12,101.4	12,112.3	12,115.5	12,088.3	12,098.2	15,959.5	15,961.27	15,971.9	15,963.77	15,959.2	15,954.9
BIC	12,250.6	12,268.3	12,279.3	12,282.5	12,255.2	12,265.1	16,126.4	16,128.17	16,138.8	16,130.67	16,126.2	16,121.8

Note: *T*-values in parentheses. Model 1 = proportion of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses; model 2 = number of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses; model 3 = diversity of ethnically owned local consumer-facing businesses. Control variables are included but not shown in all models. IVs = instrumental variables.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

** $p < .01$ (two-tailed test).

† $p < .05$ (one-tailed test).

In model 2, we include an alternative measure that captures the total number of ethnic local businesses. The findings show that a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of ethnic local businesses is associated with 11.1 percent more violent crime in immigrant communities ($\exp(.006 \times 17.78) - 1 = .111$), again providing evidence that runs contrary to what institutional completeness theory would predict. Once more the effect for this measure is even stronger in the instrumented model, as a 1 standard deviation increase is associated with 26 percent more violence in immigrant neighborhoods.

In model 3, we include our measure that captures the diversity of business types present for ethnic local businesses and we find that it, too, is associated with more violent crime; a 1 standard deviation increase in the presence of different types of ethnic businesses is associated with 17 percent more violent crime ($\exp(.036 \times 4.34) - 1 = .17$). The effect is slightly stronger (22.1 percent) in the instrumented model. In sum then, we find no evidence that any of our measures of institutional completeness are associated with lower violent crime rates, contrary to our hypotheses.

In the property crime models in [Table 3](#), we again sequentially include our three measures of the ethnic business environment. In model 1 of panel B, we see no evidence that neighborhoods with a higher proportion of ethnic to total local businesses have lower property crime rates—rather, they appear to have higher property crime rates, again running counter to the predictions of institutional completeness theory. A 1 standard deviation increase in this measure is associated with 3.9 percent more property crime in the initial model and 4.9 percent more property crime in the instrumented model. Similarly, in model 2, when we include an alternative measure of institutional completeness—total ethnic local businesses—we once more find no evidence that neighborhoods with more of these businesses have lower property crime rates, as would be expected. In model 3, we include an alternative measure of institutional completeness—the diversity of business types run by ethnics—and we find that this measure is associated with *higher* property crime rates. A 1 standard deviation increase in this proportion is associated with 8.9 percent more property crime in the initial model and 9.1 percent more property crime in the instrumented model. In sum, in both the violent and property crime models, we find no evidence that any of these three ethnic business measures are related to lower crime rates in immigrant neighborhoods.

Sensitivity Analyses

We performed various sensitivity analyses (beyond our instrumented models) to assess the robustness of the results. First, there may be concern that the results are somehow affected by the measures we have included as control variables in the models. We assessed this by estimating models in which we included only the variable of interest in the model by itself. This yields four models for violent crime: one each for the three business variables and one for the immigrant organizations variable. We estimated four analogous models for property crime. The pattern of results was very similar to those of our presented models, indicating that the findings are not a function of the specific control variables used. Specifically, the three ethnic business measures had a very similar magnitude relationship with violent crime in these bivariate models as in the full models, and they had even stronger positive relationships in the property crime models with coefficients double the size of those in the full models. The ethnic immigrant voluntary organization variable remained statistically insignificant.

Second, given that we constructed our sample of neighborhoods based on a specific set of criteria related to race, ethnicity, and immigrant status, we assessed whether constructing samples based on just one of those criteria would affect the results. In particular, we constructed subsamples in which the only criterion was one of the three criteria enumerated earlier: (1) at least 50 percent of the residents are immigrants, (2) at least 30 percent of the residents are either Asian or Latino residents, and (3) a mix of Asian or Latino residents in general along with Asian or Latino immigrants. The results from these analyses were very similar across samples. Specifically, the ethnic/immigrant voluntary organizations still did not exhibit a statistically significant negative relationship in the models and had effects even closer to 0 in samples 1 and 2. The three local ethnic business measures had slightly larger positive effects in sample 2 for the violent crime models but slightly smaller parameters in the property crime models; the other samples yielded similar-sized parameter estimates. Thus, we see no evidence that the results are driven by how we have defined our sample.

Discussion

Over the past 20 years, research on the immigration–crime relationship across place has grown considerably, especially research at the neighborhood level. As noted earlier, studies consistently find that immigration and crime are either negatively related or not related at all, contrary to public opinion (Ousey and Kubrin 2018). The current study builds on this body of literature by investigating the extent to which one prominent theory, institutional completeness theory, may be informative for understanding why some immigrant neighborhoods have higher crime rates than others. Analyzing a diverse sample of immigrant neighborhoods in Southern California, we examined two key measures of institutional completeness—the presence of immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations in the community and the presence and diversity of immigrant/ethnic businesses in the community—and investigated the extent to which both are associated with lower crime rates after controlling for a range of neighborhood correlates of crime, accounting for spatial effects, and accounting for endogeneity with instrumental variable models.

The findings of our study reveal extremely limited support for institutional completeness theory. On the one hand, consistent with the theory's predictions, we found modest evidence that immigrant neighborhoods with greater numbers of immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations experienced lower property crime rates, all else equal. The findings trended in the same direction for the relationship between immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations and violent crime, although the coefficients did not reach statistical significance. However, even these weak findings for the immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations for the property crime outcome evaporated in the instrumental variable models, implying that this measure may simply be capturing a

selection effect. The other, more general, measures of voluntary organizations in the community also showed modest effects on both violent and property crime rates. In the instrumental variable models, only a greater presence of human services organizations was associated with reduced violent and property crime rates, whereas the other organization types did not exhibit significant relationships. The results of the initial models not accounting for such selection effects were more mixed, consistent with findings from previous research on the role of local organizations in communities. For example, Wo, Hipp, and Boessen (2016) found that the effectiveness of organizations for preventing crime differs across organization types, with some types being more effective in the earlier years of their existence, whereas other types only starting to become more effective after several years of existence. Wo and his colleagues also found that certain organizations are associated with more crime, which they posited may be due to their crime generator tendencies, given that they attract persons to a location to utilize the services.

Returning to the issue of limited support for institutional completeness theory, on the other hand, and inconsistent with the theory's predictions, we find that immigrant neighborhoods with more immigrant/ethnic-run local businesses have *higher* violent and property crime rates. This finding is robust, given that we used a variety of approaches to capture the business landscape, measuring both the presence and diversity of immigrant/ethnic-run businesses, and found that, regardless of approach, the relationship is consistently positive. It was not just that ethnic-run local businesses and crime are unrelated in immigrant neighborhoods, rather increased numbers of these businesses lead to more crime in immigrant communities. What may explain this counterintuitive finding? We explored a number of possibilities.

First, one might argue that rather than represent a measure of institutional completeness, our ethnic local business measures simply reflect the degree and diversity of retail establishments present in the community. In light of several theoretical arguments including a land-use perspective grounded in environmental criminology and routine activities theory, and given a substantial literature in criminology revealing a strong link between retail establishments and crime (Kubrin and Hipp 2016), it should come as no surprise that business establishments—regardless of who owns and runs them—generate more crime in the community, all else equal. However, recall that our analysis, in fact, controls for the overall number of retail/service businesses in the community so this explanation can be ruled out. In essence, we find that local ethnic businesses are associated with crime even after controlling for the presence of retail establishments in the community, which suggests that local ethnic businesses matter above and beyond their “retail nature.”

A second explanation for these findings concerns how we measured local ethnic businesses in our study. Recall that because this information is not readily available, we had to discern whether a business was ethnically/immigrant-owned using several available sources. Specifically, we defined the seven dominant immigrant groups in the Southern California region based upon population counts (Mexico, China, Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Armenia, and El Salvador). We then determined whether a given business is owned by a member of one of these groups using information on the surname of the listed owner and the website (<http://forebears.io/surnames>) to classify the country that a surname is most frequently found. We then designated the company's owner to be from this country. If the surname was most commonly from one of the countries of our primary immigrant groups, we classified the business as an ethnically owned business. As we noted earlier, there is certainly some measurement error with this approach. However, upon reflection, this measurement error might help explain a null relationship between local ethnic-run businesses and crime in immigrant communities but cannot explain why the relationship, in the end, was positive. Beyond this measurement issue, however, it is noteworthy that the dominant immigrant groups identified in our study, which reflect immigration patterns specific to the Southern California region, resemble very little the immigrant/ethnic groups studied by Breton (1964) and others, leaving one to question whether differences in study samples may have impacted support for the theory.

A third possible explanation is that whereas institutional completeness theory focuses on cohesion *within* a neighborhood—what some have referred to as bonding social capital—what may be more important are ties *across* neighborhoods—or bridging social capital (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Putnam 2000). This notion of bridging social capital may bring resources to a neighborhood, reflecting what Bursik and Grasmick (1993) called public social control. Thus, the theory's emphasis on how institutionally complete neighborhoods provide beneficial economic and social opportunities to their residents may overlook the occasional need for outside resources to address crime control. In short, the translation of this perspective to social disorganization theory of neighborhoods may overlook the possible limitations of an internal neighborhood focus.

Yet another possible explanation for these findings centers on how neighborhoods are operationalized in the current study—as census tracts. We chose census tracts as our unit of analysis because the Census does not provide detailed information on immigrants at units smaller than tracts. Still, there are long-standing criticisms associated with using census tracts as approximations of neighborhoods. In light of this, we performed a robustness check by following the approach of Hipp and Boessen (2013) and creating one-fourth mile and one-half mile egohoods of the key measures. An advantage of egohoods is that they are overlapping units that do not depend on arbitrary boundaries, as is the case with census tracts. A disadvantage with this approach, however, is that it required us to impute the immigrant population data from tracts to the blocks within the tracts (in

order to be aggregated up to the egohood level), which rests on various assumptions. Nonetheless, we found that the results from these ancillary models using egohoods were very similar to those presented here. In fact, if anything, the counterintuitive effects for immigrant businesses were actually somewhat stronger in the egohood models. This explanation can be ruled out.

A final explanation turns our attention to the dependent variables in the study—violent and property crime rates. Perhaps more immigrant/ethnic-run businesses in the community do not so much reflect higher levels of institutional completeness but rather represent “more attractive” crime targets to potential offenders. That is, for potential criminal offenders, ethnic businesses represent easy property crime targets and their owners and co-ethnic workers represent easy violent crime targets. For example, research in Los Angeles revealed that whereas there are strong within-group tendencies for the crimes of aggravated assault and homicide, Latinos were far more likely to be victims of robbery regardless of the race/ethnicity of the offender (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009). If this finding is relevant here, upon disaggregating the violent and property crime rates into their individual crime types and rerunning the analyses, we would expect to find a strong positive relationship between immigrant/ethnic-run businesses and burglary (but not larceny or auto-theft) and between immigrant/ethnic-run businesses and robbery (but not homicide or aggravated assault). However, after running the models, we found that this was not the case as these ancillary models demonstrated the same positive relationship between immigrant businesses and each specific crime type. In essence, at this point, we have no clear cut answer for why the results do not seem to support the main hypotheses associated with institutional completeness theory.

Regardless of what may account for the findings reported in the study, it is crucial to remember that our findings should be interpreted in the context of the study’s weaknesses. Perhaps the greatest weakness relates to our measures of institutional completeness. Going back to the original definition, an institutionally complete neighborhood is one that, in the extreme, is able to perform the services required by its members and where residents need not seek to have their needs fulfilled elsewhere. In this respect, the institutionally complete neighborhood is likely to contain immigrant/ethnic organizations of all sorts including business, religious, educational, political, and recreational. The measures we used in our study reflect two dimensions of these, immigrant/ethnic voluntary organizations and immigrant/ethnic local businesses, excluding the others because of data limitations. Perhaps a more comprehensive measure of institutional completeness, for example, one that collectively captures the broad range of institutions just noted, might yield different findings. This is a question definitely worth exploring. At the same time, we note that every study of institutional completeness, in one way or another, has been limited in the measures included. Driedger and Church (1974), for example, only examined churches, voluntary organizations, and schools while Breton

(1964) himself used an imperfect measure that included only churches, welfare organizations, and newspapers/periodicals. To be fair, Breton (1964) acknowledged that “because all spheres of social activity are not covered it is possible only to approximate the level of institutional completeness of each ethnic group” (p. 195). We apply the same caveat here and urge researchers to incorporate as many dimensions of institutional completeness as possible in future studies. Future studies should also consider what alternative explanations beyond institutional completeness theory may help us understand why some immigrant communities have higher rates of crime than other immigrant communities.

Appendix

Table A1. Thirty-one Consumer-facing Businesses Categories Grouped into Nine Broader Categories.

Retail categories

- General merchandise retailing
- Apparel retailing
- Specialty retailing
- Personal products retailing
- Home products retailing

Food and entertainment categories

- Full-service restaurants
- Groceries
- Specialty food
- Limited service food and beverage
- Movie theaters
- Recreational facilities and instruction

Alcohol categories

- Drinking places (alcoholic beverages)
- Beer, wine, and liquor stores
- Convenience stores

Personal service categories

- Laundry
 - Hair care services
 - Repair services
-

Other personal services

Education and social services

Elementary and secondary schools

Childcare services

Other learning

Religious organizations

Social service organizations

Financial services

Deposit-taking institutions

Personal financial

Health care

Drug stores

Health-care provider offices

Hospitals

Medical laboratories

Automobiles

Auto services

Gas stations

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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Notes

1. There is a long-standing debate in the literature regarding the particular choice of name to describe this mode of incorporation (see [Waldinger 1993](#)). While the details of the debate are beyond the scope of the present study, it is notable that the name has changed; what was an “immigrant enclave” economy in 1980 became an “ethnic enclave” shortly thereafter and has remained so ever since ([Waldinger 1993:447](#)) [\[AQ15\]](#).

2. Portes and Manning (2005; see Table 3) offer a detailed typology of modes of incorporation, including immigrant enclaves, that vary substantially in terms of the size of the immigrant population, the level of spatial concentration, the class composition, mobility opportunities, institutional diversification of the ethnic community, participation in ethnic organizations, and knowledge of host country language, among others.
3. Here, it is critical to acknowledge contrasting theoretical claims regarding the enclave hypothesis. Employment in ethnic firms, some suggest, may be exploitative, leading to lower net earnings among workers and lower returns to their human capital (Portes and Jensen 1992:419).
4. These categories are based on National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) codes, a classification system used by the NCCS that delineates different types of nonprofit organizations according to their activities and operations. Each voluntary organization is assigned a single NTEE code. For more details, see <http://nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm>.
5. Typically, the standard errors in the second-stage equation are slightly adjusted to account for the more complicated residual term in this equation when estimating this second-stage equation as ordinary least squares. However, this is not feasible here given that our second-stage equations are estimated as negative binomial regression models. Nonetheless, prior evidence shows that the consequences of this for the standard errors are very minor (Mroz et al. 1999).

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Author Biographies

[AQ1]

GENERAL QUERIES

Needs further review, add comment

[GQ1]

Please confirm that all author information, including names, affiliations, sequence, and contact details, is correct.

Comment: Can you please change the institutional affiliation of Young-An Kim to College of Criminology & Criminal Justice, Florida State University?

[GQ2]

Please confirm that the Funding and Conflict of Interest statements are accurate.

Accepted

[GQ3]

Please confirm you have reviewed this proof to your satisfaction and understand this is your final opportunity for review prior to publication.

Accepted

AUTHOR QUERIES

[AQ2] 1	Please provide complete reference details for Lee et al. 2001 or allow us to delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment Comment: Delete citation.
[AQ3] 1	Per style, gender bias is to be avoided. Please check throughout the article and edit as necessary.	Answered within text
[AQ4] 1	NGOs has been spelled out as nongovernmental organizations. Please approve.	Accepted
[AQ5] 1	Please provide complete reference details for Shaw and McKay 1969 or allow us to delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment Comment: Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry McKay. 1969 [1942] <u>Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas</u> . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[AQ6] 1	"Butcher and Piehl 1998b" has been changed to "Butcher and Piehl 1998" to match the reference list. Please approve.	Accepted
[AQ7] 1	Please provide complete reference details for Zhou and Bankston 1998 or allow us to delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment Comment: This citation can be deleted.
[AQ8] 1	Please provide complete reference details for Rumbaut and Ewing 2007 or allow us to delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment Comment: Rumbaut, Ruben G., and Walter A. Ewing. 2007. <u>The Myth of Immigrant Criminality and the Paradox of</u>

Assimilation: Incarceration Rates among Native and Foreign-Born Men. Washington, D.C.: Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Law Foundation.

[AQ9] Please confirm whether "Census" could be
1 changed to "census" throughout the article.

Needs further review, add comment

Comment: It should be Census throughout.

[AQ1] Please provide complete reference details for
0 Rumbaut 2008 or allow us to delete the citation.

Needs further review, add comment

Comment: Rumbaut, Ruben G. 2008. "The Coming of the Second Generation: Immigration and Ethnic Mobility in Southern California." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 620:196-236.

[AQ1] Please provide complete reference details for
1 Roberts and Boldt (1979) or allow us to delete the citation.

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[AQ1] Please provide complete reference details for
2 Osgood 2000 or allow us to delete the citation.

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[AQ1 3]	<u>Per style, square brackets are used as parentheses within parentheses. Please confirm whether this could be changed in “(exp(–.211) – 1 = –.19, etc....”</u>	<u>Accepted</u>
[AQ1 4]	<u>Please provide first column head for Tables 1–3.</u>	<u>Needs further review, add comment</u> <u>Comment: "Variable"</u>
[AQ1 5]	<u>Please note that Note 1 moved to text (as it has only funding and corresponding author details) and the subsequent notes are renumbered to maintain sequential order. Please check and approve.</u>	<u>Accepted</u>
[AQ1 6]	<u>Please provide editor name(s) and publisher name for reference “Martinez, Ramiro and Matthew T. Lee. 2000. “On Immigration and Crime.” Pp. 485-524 in Criminal Justice 2000: The Nature of Crime: Continuity and Change. Vol. 1. Washington DC.”</u>	<u>Needs further review, add comment</u> <u>Comment: This is a report issued by the National Institute of Justice so there is no editor or publisher name. Here is the actual publication:</u> <u>https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02j.pdf</u>
[AQ1 7]	<u>Please provide appropriate page number for reference “Massey, Douglas S. 1999. “Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis.” Pp. X-X in The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, edited by Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.”</u>	<u>Needs further review, add comment</u> <u>Comment: Pp. 34-52</u>
[AQ1 8]	<u>Please provide in-text citation for reference “Portes, Alejandro and Kenneth Wilson. 1980. “Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor</u>	<u>Needs further review, add comment</u> <u>Comment: If not found in article text, please delete.</u>

Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami.”
American Journal of Sociology 86:295-319.”

Please provide volume number for reference
[AQ1 9] “Portes, Alejandro and Robert D. Manning. 1986.
“The Immigrant Enclave: Theory and Empirical
Examples. Competitive Ethnic Relations 47-68.”

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Comment: in Competitive Ethnic
Relations edited by Susan Olzak and
Joane Nagel. Academic Press.

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reference “Zhou, Min. 2014. “The Formation of
Ethnic Resources and Social Capital in Immigrant
[AQ2 0] Neighborhoods: Chinatown and Koreatown in Los
Angeles.”
([http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/uploa](http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/2014-02-12%20Min%20Zhou%20paper.pdf)
d_documents/2014-02-
12%20Min%20Zhou%20paper.pdf).”

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“Zhou, Min and Carl L. Bankston. 2006.
“Delinquency and Acculturation in the Twenty-
[AQ2 1] First Century: A Decade’s Change in a Vietnamese
American Community.” in Immigration and Crime:
Race, Ethnicity, and Violence, edited by Ramiro
Martinez and Abel Valenzuela. New York: New
York University.”

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Comment: Pp. 117-139

[AQ1 1] Please provide a 2- to 3-sentence bio for each
author.

Needs further review, add comment

Comment: Charis E. Kubrin is Professor of
Criminology, Law & Society at the
University of California, Irvine. She has
published extensively in the area of
neighborhoods and crime, and in
particular, on the immigration-crime link.

COMMENTS

[\[Comment 1\]](#) Is this supposed to be like the other headings in the abstract (e.g., Method, Results, Conclusions)?

[\[Comment 2\]](#) I am leaving the pronouns in this sentence because they are part of a direct quote.

[\[Comment 2\]](#) I am leaving the pronouns in this sentence because they are part of a direct quote.

[\[Comment 3\]](#) Do we need to put an colon here?

[\[Comment 4\]](#) Young-An Kim's affiliation should be: College of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA