

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

**The Struggle for “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice”:  
(Re)Imagining citizenship(s) and University Citizenship Education in Egypt**

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Education

by

Jason Nunzio Dorio

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## **ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION**

The Struggle for “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice”:  
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Doctor of Philosophy in Education

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

Professor Carlos A. Torres, Chair

Situated within the context of the January 25 Egyptian Revolution and the subsequent socio-political transitions, this dissertation focuses on the experiences of 24 university students and educators in Egypt, particularly emphasizing meanings and actions of participatory citizenship and citizenship education. Through a hermeneutic phenomenological qualitative approach, I explore how the experiences of the January 25 Egyptian Revolution and subsequent events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and educators in Egypt; To what extent does university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship; and How do university students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education?

I conclude that participants learn what it means to be a citizen from various sources, and practice those ideas in multiple spaces. The Revolution and subsequent socio-political events, in

combination with other influences, have significantly impacted the perceptions of participatory citizenship for participants. And despite a number of challenges to participatory citizenship, the Revolution and subsequent socio-political events provided a critical pedagogical workshop where participatory citizenship was learned and practiced.

The Revolution and subsequent events have also impacted teacher attitudes and pedagogies. The participants reveal a connection between social and political events and their perceptions and experiences of teaching and learning, and perceive teaching and learning as a political act of citizenship.

Furthermore, participants perceive the university as important site where students can be change agents, where critical thinking is valued and promoted, where the university is seen as an essential part of the public sphere, where student empowerment is nurtured, and as a space where relevant pedagogy, peace education and the construction of good humans can occur. To enhance university citizenship education in Egypt, participants call on universities to focus on faculty and student development, civic engagement programs and international opportunities.

The dissertation of Jason Nunzio Dorio is approved.

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2016

## **DEDICATIONS**

This dissertation is dedicated to those in Egypt who have sacrificed everything in the struggle for social justice and active citizenship.

To AGD and ZKD, may we strive for a world filled with love.

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Dorio, Jason (2016). Perceptions of participatory citizenship within the contentious aftermath of the January 25 Egyptian Revolution: Influences, spaces, and challenges. [Invited paper presentation] Panel on *Perspectives from Africa and the Middle East*, International Research Conference on Global Citizenship Education hosted by the UNESCO Chair in Global Learning and Global Citizenship Education, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, February 8, 2016.

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Torres, Carlos and Dorio, Jason (2015). Dos and Donts of Global Citizenship Education. *Adult Education and Development Edition 82/2015*. <http://www.dvv-international.de/en/adult-education-and-development/editions/aed-822015-global-citizenship-education/articles/the-dos-and-donts-of-global-citizenship-education/>

Dorio, Jason (forthcoming). Pedagogy of Transition: Understanding university student movements in transitional Egypt. In Rowhea Elmesky and Carol Camp Yeakey (eds.) *The Power of Resistance: Youth Alienation and Education in Egypt*. WA, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.

Dorio, Jason (2015). You are the future of Egypt. [Invited Guest Lecture] English Access Micro-scholarship Program (ACCESS) in Egypt. Cairo, Egypt, March 21, 2015.

Dorio, Jason (2015). Citizenship Education and Universities in Egypt: Striving to enhance human development through civic and political engagement. [Paper Presentation] Panel on *Education, Citizenship, and Civil Society: Case Studies for MENA Region*, The American University in Cairo (AUC) 21<sup>st</sup> Annual Research Conference, Middle East and North African Region: Post-2015 Development Agenda, Cairo, Egypt, March 17, 2015.

Dorio, Jason (2014). Reading Pedagogy of the Oppressed through dialogue. [Guest Lecture] *Social Foundations of Education* course at the Graduate School of Education, the American University in Cairo, Egypt, November 2, 2014.

# CHAPTER 1: FROM CALIFORNIA TO CAIRO: A PERSONAL INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 A Biographical Trajectory

When I share with people my research interests in Egypt, I am often faced with such puzzling and humorous questions as: do you have family there; are you Egyptian; are you Arab; how long have you been a Muslim; are you Persian;<sup>1</sup> and are you from there? I am not sure if it is my somewhat ethnically ambiguous phenotypes (as a colleague once described), or a common misunderstanding that a researcher must have a family or heritage connection to the research topic that provokes people to pose these questions. However, this brings-up an important question for researchers: to what extent does a researcher's identity (ethnic, gender, religious, geographical, ideological, etc.) have to align with her/his research topic? In addition, why is a first generation Italian-American, genetically Catholic,<sup>2</sup> from Los Angeles interested in researching Egypt? As part of the critical hermeneutic phenomenological methodological approach (See [Chapter 5](#)), making explicit the researcher's personal knowledge, biases, and preconceptions are an important part of the process of an interpretive inquiry (Lopez and Willis, 2004). To address these questions, in the first section I will explore my personal biographical trajectory related to my research interests in examining citizenship and education in Egypt. The second section provides the readers with a chapter synopsis, briefly explaining the content and purpose of the subsequent chapters in this dissertation.

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<sup>1</sup> There is a large Persian community in Los Angeles, especially within the cities near the UCLA campus.

<sup>2</sup> Meaning this is the religion that my parents gave me.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Said is most known for his work *Orientalism* (1994) as well as his stance on Palestinian causes. Muhammed Asad (born Leopold Weiss in 1900) was raised in a Jewish household in the then Austria-Hungarian Empire (in present day Ukraine). He converted to Islam and became significantly involved in the politics in Saudi Arabia and in the creation of the state of Pakistan. His seminal works include *The Road to Mecca* (2000) and *Islam at the Crossroads* (2007).

<sup>4</sup> Meaning this is the religion that my parents gave me with Islam is to use Muslim (one who submits to Islam)

The positionality of a researcher can bring important insight into the personal experiences, passions, access, and ideologies that greatly inform and shape research interests. The fact that I am a U.S. American white, heterosexual, able, male of European descent, and product of an elite American public university positions me as privileged person within the dominant local and global structures of gender, race and ethnicity, class, sexuality, and “Westernity.” I believe the importance of privilege is to first be self-reflective and recognize the various forms of privileges that one possesses. And second, with privilege comes responsibility. Therefore, what is done with privilege is of great significance. With the opportunities that I was presented, I developed the desire to educate myself as well as others towards learning about, as well as challenging, oppressive and violent individual and social structures of privilege that advantage a few while disenfranchising and marginalizing most. Consequently, my connection to Egypt transcends a pure ideological justification to one that focuses on fostering critical understanding and mutual respect across cultures, empirical analysis and explanations to make recommendations for change, and a commitment towards social justice. Just like a researcher from a particular group should not be relegated to only researching her/his own group, I hope my trajectory and my dissertation can give some credence to the argument that a researcher does not have to be from a particular group to conduct quality, critical, and social justice orientated research. I maintain that it is in the reflexivity, preparedness, rigorousness, approaches, methods, theories, alliances, and applications of data that makes researchers capable of producing ethical, critical and quality research, rather than narrowly connecting quality research to a researcher’s backgrounds. Listening to, and actively engaging in, the grievances, struggles, and hopes of Egyptian people, combined with a critical self-examination are essential part of this research. By focusing my research on the lives and

experiences of Egyptians during this historical and tumultuous era, I can begin to understand the multiple forms of subjugation as well as empowerment that not only led to the 2011 uprising, but continues to shape citizenship and new ideas about the future of Egypt.

The question about the origins of my interests in Egypt is something that I have been seriously reflecting on since my master's degree. It's a long story, but basically as a child I had a fascination with ancient civilizations, especially ancient Egypt and ancient Mesopotamia. Honestly, it was a very superficial and uncritical understanding of the region. It was not until I entered college and started working on my undergraduate degree in history that I started to recognize the complexities and diversity of North Africa and southwest Asia. During that time, I became interested in U.S. foreign policy after World War II and began to recognize some of the rhetoric wrapped in patriotism that was used to justify foreign intervention and wars conducted by the U.S. government. Further, I was taking classes on multiculturalism and ethnic studies and reading works from various critical scholars. These classes help me to uncover how the demonization of "the Other" was used to justify and mobilize support for domestic and foreign policies and even violence against groups, which often contradicted the values of democracy and human rights championed by American politicians.

When the events of September 11, 2001 occurred, a number of my co-patriots, who were also in their early twenties, decided that the best way to address the emotional, personal, and symbolic devastation that occurred on that day was to enlist in the military. I, however, was in a different camp. Rather than feeding into the hatred, violent retribution, and fear of the "Muslim other," I squelched my shock of that day by researching the cultures, religions, and histories of the region that was infamously associated with terrorism (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009; Gelvin, 2011; Rogan, 2009). I learned how to decode literature, research, rhetoric, and media that often

presented generalizations, stereotypes, and monolithic images of a region that is a kaleidoscope of diversity. I was living in the hysteria of post-9/11 America and being bombarded with a “clash of civilizations” worldview that was filled with narrow and violent rationales used to demonize and marginalize Arabs and Muslims, and to justify war, violence, and neoimperialism in the region known as the Middle East (Ali, 2002). From my viewpoint, the “othering” and divisive discourses that were directed toward “the Middle Eastern Other,” were similar to the hateful discourses and “politics of the Other” used against particular racial, ethnic, and religious groups and in general against people of color throughout American history. Learning to critically analyze local and global social, political, cultural, and economic events that have occurred during the post-9/11 period have greatly impacted my worldview.

I began to seek out scholars that critiqued the monolithic and essentialist images and representations of Islam as inherently violent and questioned perceptions that labeled Arabs as uncivilized (Abou El Fadl, 2005; Armstrong, 2002; Armstrong, 2006; Aslan, 2006; Esposito, 2002; Esposito, 2010; Karabell, 2008). The great works of Edward Said and Muhammad Asad,<sup>3</sup> helped me to unpack my own Euro and American centric views and assisted in the development of what I see as a critical and complex ongoing understanding of Islam, Muslims, Arabs, and the region commonly referred to as the Middle East. I started to research the histories and societies of Arabs and Muslims (Cole, 2009; Rogan, 2009; Zogby, 2010). I read about Islam, focusing on different facets and schools of thought of the religion. I realized that although there is a diversity of Islamic law and philosophy and that the practice of Islam is significantly related to its political and socio-historical context as well as particular interpretations, Islam has been simplistically

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<sup>3</sup> Edward Said is most known for his work *Orientalism* (1994) as well as his stance on Palestinian causes. Muhammed Asad (born Leopold Weiss in 1900) was raised in a Jewish household in the then Austria-Hungarian Empire (in present day Ukraine). He converted to Islam and became significantly involved in the politics in Saudi Arabia and in the creation of the state of Pakistan. His seminal works include *The Road to Mecca* (2000) and *Islam at the Crossroads* (2007).

generalized and attacked by Western scholars, politicians, and media pundits for centuries—an attack that if similarly directed at Christian or Jewish groups would be considered sacrosanct. This is not to discount the real crisis of terrorist groups utilizing violent interpretations of Islam that affects all of us. However, terrorism does not represent the complexity and greatness of Islam and Muslims and should not be taken as the only image of global Islam.

I also began to understand the commonalities among the three Abrahamic traditions, and learned that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share many moral, ethical, historical, and ethnic fibers, but their commonalities are greatly overshadowed by political interpretations and provincial worldviews of their true virtues (Dussel, 2000). I also learned about the knowledge and sciences that Arab and Muslim scholars have preserved and elaborated upon, and then diffused throughout the European Continent, sparking the Renaissance and Enlightenment (Morgan, 2007). Unfortunately, Arab and Muslim scholars are rarely recognized, given credit, or connected to the development of Western Civilization; rather, they are seen antithetical to it (Bulliet, 2004). The more I researched, the more questions, as well as more open perspectives, I developed. I learned about European colonialism, and how foreign influences have greatly stifled the economic, political, and social development of Arab and Muslim countries (Mitchell, 1991), and how “the Middle Eastern Other” was created to compare and showcase the “greatness and advancement” of Europeans. In *Orientalism*, Edward Said (1994) argues that various European scholars and academics from the 18<sup>th</sup> century and continuing into the 20<sup>th</sup> century have viewed Arabs, Muslims, and Islam through a lens of Orientalism. Through this worldview, Arabs and Muslims are described as uncivilized, religiously fanatical, violent, tyrannical, misogynistic, and the women are all oppressed. European politicians and academics used these distortions to bifurcate the world, justify colonialism and hegemony, and demonize non-European peoples as

culturally backwards, who lack foundations for democracy and women's empowerment. In addition, I read about the external influences over the region continuing into the current era of globalization through international governing organizations (IGOs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Harrigan & El-Said, 2009; Sayed, 2006). Moreover, I also began to question some of the American policies that have significantly shaped the region, and participated in my first protest, which was against the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The consciousness I gained from learning about the region greatly solidified during my first visit to Egypt and subsequent visits to other Arab and Muslim countries. Before my first trip to Egypt in 2006 (this was my first trip to the region), I was warned by friends and family (some who had never even left the United States) not to go to Egypt. They cautioned: "You will be converted to Muslim;"<sup>4</sup> "you will get your head chopped off;" "you'll probably be recruited by Al Qaeda;" or "watch out for hijackers." They did not realize that at that time millions of tourists visited Egypt each year and returned to their home countries safely.<sup>5</sup> Their narrow understanding of the region prevented my friends and family from seeing the complexities of a multifaceted Egyptian society. To their defense, the catch phrases of terrorism, Al Qaeda, and, more recently, ISIS, are usually the only representations of the region and of Islam that many non-Muslim Americans are exposed to, typically receiving this information from mainstream media sources. Lost are the life narratives of "ordinary" Arabs and Muslims who should be seen as fellow humans rather than existential enemies. This grossly narrow understanding of the peoples and cultures of Arab and Muslim majority countries is the exact reason that I wanted to travel to Egypt and gain a deeper insight into the lives of Egyptian people. I needed to counter the racist

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<sup>4</sup> A common mistake of those who are not familiar with Islam is to use Muslim (one who submits to Islam) in place of Islam (the word Islam, literally meaning "submission" derived from the root word of "peace" or *salam*).

<sup>5</sup> According to the World Bank, from 2006-2010, Egypt received 8.6 million and 14 million tourists, respectively. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.ARVL?page=1>

and essentialist thinking surrounding me by building interconnections through real-life experiences. I spent two weeks in Egypt before traveling to other countries and had a wonderful time. Needless to say, I survived, but my experience in Egypt left a lasting impression. During my trip, I learned about the harsh social divide, witnessed the high levels of poverty, and discovered the government restrictions placed on political and civic participation. Although as a white male from the United States, it was difficult for Egyptians to open-up to me about politics, there was a simmering sense of among some of the youth that I met that the future will somehow be better, *inshallah*.<sup>6</sup> My experiences traveling only increased the insatiable affinity for learning more about Egypt and the surrounding region.

Upon my return, I attained a long-term substitute teaching position teaching middle school history and also decided to pursue a master's degree in education. I used my travel experiences and knowledge of the region to challenge my young students' perceptions of Islam, who were often unacceptably misinformed by their parents and peers, and through the media. No doubt it was a challenging feat. It was also during this time that I began to develop my critical consciousness (to use Paulo Freire's term). As two American wars were being fought in Muslim majority countries, and the saber rattling and aggressive posturing by the U.S. government and U.S. mainstream media outlets against a third Muslim country, Iran, increased, I also increased in my level of critical understanding of the U.S. government's often contradictory involvement in the region. On the one hand, the U.S. government supports authoritarian regimes in the region. On the other hand, Washington maintains a discourse of democracy and human rights. Apparently, the U.S. government only advocates democracy and human rights in other countries when those ideals align with their strategic national interests (Brownlee, 2012; Chomsky, 1999; Gardner, 2009; Gardner, 2011; Khalidi, 2009; Ross &

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<sup>6</sup> *Inshallah* translates from Arabic into English as roughly God willing.

Makovsky, 2010). The Egyptian government at that time was the second largest recipient of U.S., mostly military, aid.

In 2009, the aftermath of the global economic crisis led educational policy officials to advocate for hiring freezes in Los Angeles Unified School District, where I wanted to attain a full-time teaching position. Unable to find a full-time teaching job, I decided to apply to doctoral programs. Fortunately, I was admitted into UCLA in the fall of 2010 with the intent to develop a secondary school curriculum and teaching methodology entitled critical pedagogy of North Africa and Southwest Asia. In addition to Ph.D. coursework, I also began to take formal courses in Arabic because, as the saying goes, language is the soul of a culture. Then uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt occurred. As I watched the very emotional and dramatic images on 24-hour global news channels unfold live, I was deeply impacted by the events, which persuaded me to reflect on my research focus and change the direction of my research. I knew that if I were to truly develop a curriculum on the region and educate American students about the social, political, and economic complexities of the region, I would have to first spend a significant amount of time in the region. This direction would be a way to empirically understand the nuances and complexity of an Arab and Muslim-majority society. With my previous travels and knowledge of Egypt, it felt like a natural connection. Additionally, I felt that any research on education in Egypt must be situated within the current social, political, and economic changes that are taking place—even though my dissertation committee was very apprehensive about American students conducting social science research during a revolution.

The new direction of conducting qualitative research in Egypt granted me the opportunity and platform to hopefully be recognized as someone who is not only knowledgeable on education and citizenship in Egypt, but someone who can bridge ideological, religious, and

geographical divides. Subsequently, my research can be a means of aligning with and amplifying the voices of Egyptians who are struggling for their own organic forms of democracy and human rights that are often suppressed by governments that are militarily and political supported by the U.S. government. Additionally, as a U.S. citizen, it is a way to critique and be critical of the U.S. support for governments and policies in the North Africa and Southwest Asia that routinely suppress democratic and human rights. For example, as a U.S. taxpayer it is disconcerting to know that during protests of 2011 in Egypt, protesters were shot at with tear gas canisters labeled “made in the USA.” This dissertation project is also a way to counter the rhetoric and research that is founded upon Islamophobic and neo-orientalistic paradigms.<sup>7</sup> These mindsets have far too long guided failed foreign policies, misunderstandings, and incited violence against Arabs and Muslims. With the goal of creating critical awareness about the region for American students, I hope that this project and future research can present a more nuanced, multifaceted, and human representation of Egyptian citizens that counters the rise of Islamophobic and often demonized and stereotyped representations of Arab and Muslims that are prevalent in the United States.

To conclude this section, my personal trajectory has led me to develop a critical and social justice mindset necessary to pursue a dissertation that not only empirically analyzes and explains citizenship and education during a tumultuous time in Egypt, but also provides a

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<sup>7</sup> After the tragic attacks of 9/11, the reinvigoration of misunderstanding and even hatred of Islam and Muslims began. Islamophobia is “an irrational distrust, fear or rejection of Islam and those who are (perceived as) Muslims (Van Driel, 2004, p. x). Esposito and Kalin (2011) conceptualize Islamophobia as “hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetrated by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims. It results in exclusion, discrimination, and false presumptions/stereotypes” (p.xxii-xxiii). As a continuation of Orientalism, I view Islamophobia as an ideological formation: “understanding Islamophobia as an ideological formation within the context of American Empire allows us to remove it from the hands of ‘culture’ or from the myth of a single creator or progenitor, whether it be a person, organization or community (Sheehi, 2011, p. 37). So the current demonization of Muslims and Islam, once again justifies a system of control that gives content to empire, thereby galvanizing justification for invasion, intervention, occupation, surveillance, and torture. It becomes a form of control where, without its justification, the system loses its legitimacy. However, it seems to contradict and violate the core principles of human rights, religious freedom, civil liberties, and social justice.

platform to make recommendations for educational change, while promoting dignity and mutual respect across cultures. My trajectory has brought me from California to Cairo, granting me the fortunate opportunity to make lasting friendships in Egypt. In addition, I have established a significant academic network that greatly assisted in my dissertation, and will provide an important foundation for future research, collaborations, as well as inspiration. And for the purposes of this document, my personal trajectory has greatly shaped my theoretical understanding, methodological approach, and contextualization of findings that will be explored in detail within the following chapters.

## **1.2 Chapter Synopses**

**Chapter 2:** This chapter is divided into six sections that present a general modern background to the legacies of citizenship and education in Egypt.

**Chapter 3:** In this chapter, I provide the reader with a chronology of socio-political events occurring in Egypt during the January 25, 2011 revolution and its aftermath. I attempt to build a context to situate the study, familiarize the readers with recent social, political and economic events, while merging the various events with justifications that provide overall rationales for the dissertation. I will describe characteristics of the January 25 revolution that not only make the revolution noteworthy but also provide a backdrop to the revolution and explain its significance for the present study. Furthermore, I argue that focusing qualitative research on the perceptions and experiences of “ordinary citizens” during this volatile era can help to uncover and amplify the enduring struggles as well as glimmer of hopes that are connected to the revolution and dedicated towards transforming Egyptian society. Additionally, I postulate that the current political transition in Egypt, the seeming raise in citizenship consciousness ignited by the revolution, and the interest in citizenship issues in Arab states, provide a unique historical

opportunity for analyzing how perceptions of citizenship have been impacted by the Revolution and the extent to which participation and education are transforming under a new state. Finally, a rationale for focusing on university students and educators is presented and grounded in the understanding that universities play an integral and often contentious role within state-society relationships and are acutely connected to the social, political, and economic context in which they are located.

**Chapter 4:** In this chapter I present the theoretical framing for the dissertation. It is divided into sections devoted to theories, explanations and research connected to the sociological subfields of a political sociology of citizenship and a political sociology of education and focuses on the two main concepts of participatory citizenship and citizenship education. The research is guided by the understanding that there are tensions between theoretical citizenship, legal citizenship, and the social, political, and economic realities for citizens and other individuals within a state. Viewing citizenship as the way people learn, think and act to transform the relationships between citizens vis-à-vis other citizens, individuals, society, the state, as well as their transnational configurations, I present two main theoretical arguments. First, a broad lens or continuum of participatory citizenship is needed to explore the multifaceted forms and spaces participatory citizenship in Egypt. And second, from the premise that education is inherently political, I argue citizenship education has many sources, processes, and tensions, and specific forms such as a critical pedagogy of citizenship education, should be a valued theoretical lens and policy foundation in education and beyond. The chapter concludes with presenting relevant research pertaining to these topics.

**Chapter 5:** This chapter is dedicated to providing a clarification on how, through the complexity of the researcher's epistemological approaches to social research, starting with the

authentic voice of participants of knowledge combined with the continuously act of self-reflection, the present methodology was formulated and applied. First, I outline a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology, as well as its limitations, and argue that these limitations can be addressed and enhanced through critical social theory. Second, I briefly explore my positionality and experiences as a researcher at the American University in Cairo (AUC). Third, in two sections I cover the specific research methods used during my fieldwork at AUC, including descriptions, selection techniques, and the interview process of participants. Finally, I chart how I thematically read the data and the steps I took to write the chapters on research findings utilizing *sandwiched anecdotes* writing techniques.

**Chapter 6:** This is the first findings chapter. I used the interviews of eight participants to answer the first research question: to what extent have the experiences of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution and subsequent socio-political events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and educators in Egypt? In this chapter, I use qualitative data to explore themes related to influences, spaces, and challenges of participatory citizenship within the contentious aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution. I conclude that participants learn what it means to be a citizen from various sources and practice those ideas in multiple spaces. The revolution and subsequent socio-political events, in combination with other influences, have significantly impacted the perceptions of participatory citizenship for participants. And despite a number of challenges to participatory citizenship, for participants, the revolution and subsequent socio-political events provided a critical pedagogical workshop where participatory citizenship was learned and practiced.

**Chapter 7:** The second findings chapter is guided by the question: to what extent does university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship? In

this chapter, I present the experiential trajectories of two educators and the ways they perceive their actions of participatory citizenship through their teaching. The January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution and subsequent events appear to have impacted not only their understandings as a citizen but has also influenced their attitudes and pedagogies as teachers. The participants reveal a connection between social and political events and their perceptions and experiences of teaching and learning. The chapter concludes with a summary of how teaching and learning can be a political act of citizenship.

**Chapter 8:** This, the last findings chapter, attempts to answer the final research question: how do university students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education? The data presented was gathered from the experiences and perceptions of the all university students and educators who participated in this research. The first section focuses on the perceptions of role of university citizenship education. Participants perceive the university as important site where students can be change agents, where critical thinking is valued and promoted, where the university is seen as an essential part of the public sphere, where student empowerment is nurtured, and as a space where relevant pedagogy, peace education and the construction of good humans can occur. The second section presents practical ways private and public universities can enhance citizenship education on campuses from the perceptions of university students and educators. To enhance university citizenship education participants called on universities to focus on faculty and student development, civic engagement programs and international opportunities.

**Chapter 9:** This is the concluding chapter, which is organized into three parts: a summary and discussions of findings, the limitations of this research, and ideas for future research.

## CHAPTER 2: LEGACIES OF CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION IN EGYPT

The Arab uprisings (commonly and inappropriately labeled the “Arab Spring”)<sup>8</sup> beginning in Tunisia in December 2010 have been a remarkably historical and turbulent era characterized by waves of uprisings, revolutions and civil wars manifesting throughout a majority of the twenty-two member states of the League of Arab States.<sup>9</sup> In Egypt, on January 25, 2011, it took only eighteen days for a broad-based coalition of pro-democracy demonstrations and strikes in public spaces such as *Midan al-Tahrir* (Tahrir Square—Liberation Square) to significantly challenge the long-standing authoritarian regime, which provoked the military to take over political power from President Hosni Mubarak who held the office for nearly 30 years. The January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution was characterized by a popular mass uprising against a political system that was dominated by the military and one-party rule, maintained by an extensive state security mechanism, and based upon an economy driven by crony capitalism (Mitchell, 1999). Egyptians

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<sup>8</sup> Gelvin (2015) critiques the term “Arab Spring.” In terms of the calendar, it is wrong: the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt took place in the winter. The term “spring” usually is associated with renewal and joy. Aside from the possibility of Tunisia, it is still a long way to go towards addressing the discontent that manifested during the uprising. Many places including Syria, Libya and Yemen have seen much violence far from renewal, joy, and the positive connotations of “spring.” Also, the term implies a temporary struggle, misleading observers to assume that the contention over and pursuit of political, economic, and social rights within the Arab world could be accomplished and resolved within a single season. Furthermore, the term was previously used in 2005 by some conservative commentators to describe the events occurring in the region after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Bush’s “Freedom Agenda.” These included elections in Iraq, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon after the withdrawal of Syrian troops, promise of municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, and the granting of women’s suffrage in Kuwait. During this time, Hosni Mubarak also announced that he would have the cleanest elections in Egyptian history. However, during that time the first Arab Spring failed to materialize and fizzled out. Gelvin (2015) argues, “Considering the track record of *that* Arab Spring, why would anyone want to burden the Arab uprisings with this title?” (p. 37).

<sup>9</sup> The Arab League is an international assembly of states generally unified by the predominant language of Arabic with goals of building partnership and integration between the various states. These states include Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria (recently suspended), Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Palestine.

*en masse* transformed the culture of fear into public opposition against state repression of civil and political rights and against a number of economic inequalities that have existed in Egypt for decades. In the aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution, the nature of the Egyptian state and the question of what it means to be a citizen is still unsettled (El Fegiery, 2014a; El Fegiery, 2014b). Subsequently, the socio-political turmoil that Egypt is facing has spilt into institutions including Egyptian universities providing a valuable location to situate a dissertation that qualitatively explores the perceptions and practices of participatory citizenship and citizenship education for university students and educators within the context of a revolutionary era in Egypt.

Utilizing qualitative methods associated with the research methodology of a critical hermeneutical phenomenology (Van Manen, 2014), I spent 8 months (August 2014 to March 2015) in Cairo, Egypt conducting dissertation fieldwork.<sup>10</sup> Through the lens of participatory citizenship and citizenship education, this dissertation is guided by three main research questions:

- (1) In what ways have the experiences of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution and subsequent socio-political events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and educators in Egypt;
- (2) To what extent do university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship; and
- (3) How do students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education? This chapter is divided into sections that present a general modern background to the legacies of citizenship and education in Egypt.

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<sup>10</sup> A description of the methods and methodology used will be presented in Chapter 5.

## 2.1 Legacies of Citizenship and Education in Egypt

To Egyptians, with good reason, Egypt is often referred to as the “mother of the world” (*Um al Dunya*). To outsiders, the overwhelming attention that Egypt receives is often related to its rich ancient historical legacy. Images of pyramids, mummies, sphinxes, and pharaohs dominate popular foreign perceptions of Egypt. However, for most Egyptians, the ancient past is greatly overshadowed by the social, political, and economic difficulties of modern-day Egypt. The January 25 Egyptian Revolution and subsequent uprisings and socio-political events have shattered misconceptions about Egypt and brought a renewed scholarship and interest in the politics, social agency, and contemporary issues facing the most populous and one of the most socially, culturally, intellectually, militarily, and politically influential Arab states. Additionally, the current transitional and tension-filled political era also brings to the foreground the traditionally contested national character of the Egyptian state. Arabic, Islamic, Coptic, African, Mediterranean, European, and, more recently, global elements have all contributed to contention surrounding the perceptions of Egyptian citizenship. Therefore, citizenship takes on a particular complex and energetic character in Egypt.

The Arab Republic of Egypt is the most populous Arab country, with a population exceeding 90 million.<sup>11</sup> Most of the population are ethnically Arab, with Bedouin and Nubian making up a small minority. The majority of the population lives in urban cities and along narrow strips of land that outlines the Nile River. Although Egypt is a Muslim-majority country, with approximately 90 percent being Sunni Muslim, nearly 10 percent of Egyptians are Coptic Christian, the largest Christian minority in the Middle East.

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<sup>11</sup> *Al Ahrām*, November 30, 2015, Egypt’s total population to reach 98 million by next week: CAPMAS, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/172196.aspx>

As one of the cradles of ancient civilization, Egypt is geographically situated in the northeast corner of the continent of Africa and has long-been an important site for the diffusion of trade and ideas connecting Africa, Asia, and Europe. Its strategic location has not only played an important role in the diffusion and reception of knowledge throughout the three continents, but has also been a site of domination for many imperial powers. Additionally, Egypt has also undergone over two centuries of state and institution building, which is longer than most states in the region. Nonetheless, Egypt has been at the epicenter of ideological, cultural, and geopolitical currents in the Arab region.

Egypt has a long and rich legacy as a beacon of education and higher learning that can be traced back to the Pharaonic and Hellenistic periods (Cochran, 2008; Lulat, 2005). From the *per-ankh* and *Book of Instruction* of Pharaonic Egypt and the Bibliotheca Alexandria established by the Ptolemies, to al-Ahazar University (972 C.E.) and the many *madarasas* (type of seminary or “college” for Islamic sciences) established during the times of the Abbasid, Fatimid and Ayyubid dynasties and continued into Mamluk rule (Hefner, 2007), Egypt offers numerous examples and descriptions of ancient and medieval systems and institutions of education that has significantly impacted its social and political landscape. To delve into Egypt’s glorious educational past exceeds the scope and purpose of this section. The purpose of this section is to provide readers with a general background to the modern (1517 to 2011) legacies of citizenship and education in Egypt.

### **2.1.1 Mehmet Ali, nascent citizenship and the making of modern education**

As an Ottoman province conquered in 1517, Egypt became a neglected province of the Empire. The diversion of European trade routes from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coupled with artisans and scholars flocking to Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) to seek the patronage of

the Ottoman sultans, created a “brain drain” away from traditional centers of learning that were established during previous Muslim dynasties in Egypt. Under early Ottoman rule of Egypt, power struggles between Ottoman governors and Mamluk leaders led to famines, civil disorder, and an overall impoverishment of Egypt. For example, Goldschmidt (2004) explains that Cairo, Islam’s greatest commercial and cultural center, was turned into “a backwater of the Ottoman Empire” (p. 11). It was not until the administration of Mohammed Bey Abu al-Dhahab starting in 1760, which strengthened Egypt’s independent administration and sparked Egypt’s modern development. Abu al-Dhahab and his extensive *awaqf* (endowments) fostered an intellectual renaissance centered on al-Azhar (Creelius, 1991). Notable scholars included Hasan al-Attar (theologian, philosopher, and logician), Murtada al-Zabidi (Arabic linguistics) and Abd al-Rahman Al-Jabarti (biographer and historian of contemporary events) studied and contributed to the intellectual, political, and religious community of Egypt at the time.

In the wake of the French invasion of Egypt led by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 and competing Mamluk factions, the Ottoman officer Mehmet Ali Pasha (Muhammad Ali, r. 1805-1848)<sup>12</sup> assumed power as the Ottoman pasha of Egypt. Often credited as the founder of modern Egypt, Mehmet Ali not only built a strong national army, but also constructed an impressive educational system. In 1837 he founded the central Ministry of Education, which established and controlled state educational institutions in military training, engineering, medicine, and civil administration (Hefner, 2007). He also created study-abroad opportunities for youth to study in Europe (Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 26). As a process of defensive developmentalism against European encroachment (Gelvin, 2011), Ali build up a modern state with strong armed forces,

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<sup>12</sup> In Arabic his name is Muhammad Ali, in Turkish it is Mehmet Ali. The Albanian born Ottoman officer spoke mainly Turkish, therefore, for this research, I will use Mehmet Ali. He and his heirs established an autonomous dynastic rule over Egypt, first as Ottoman governors, then, after World War I, as kings, which lasted until 1953 (Gelvin, 2011).

and a school system was created to provide the required educated manpower to fill the army and civil bureaucracy. However, by the end of his reign many schools began to close and enrollments shrank as Egyptian youth realized the connection between education and service in the Egyptian military. In addition, this period is marked by Egyptian frustration over capitulations and dual courts for Westerners living and working in Egypt.<sup>13</sup> The combination of the increased levels of educated Egyptians with the encroachment of Europeans, while still being under the tutelage of the Ottoman Empire fostered an environment where nascent concepts of Egyptian citizenship and Egyptian nationality emerged.

Khedive Isma'il Pasha (r.1863-1879), grandson of Mehmet Ali, inadvertently fostered a social and political environment that incited Egyptian nationalism and nationalist movements. Ismail financed the earliest daily newspaper, set up government schools, founded the Egyptian Museum and the National Library, convoked the first representative assembly in 1866, and established the Mixed Courts in 1876 (Goldshmidt, 2004, p. 37). In addition, after 10 years of construction under a French company, the inauguration of the newly completed Suez Canal occurred in 1869. In an attempt to address the Egyptian financial crisis and debt owed to Europe used to fund development projects, the Khedive agreed to the 1877 Dual Financial Control, where Britain and France had control of Egyptian state revenues and state spending on public works, education, and the military. Educated Egyptians became increasingly critical of British and French intervention in their country's economy and government, which eventually led to Egypt's first nationalist movement, led by Colonel Ahmad Urabi, campaigning under the slogan, "Egypt for Egyptians" (Cole, 1999). Goldshmidt (2004) argues, "The rudimentary journals, schools, parliaments, and law courts combined to nurture a new class of educated Egyptians

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<sup>13</sup> Capitulations are part of international treaties where Westerners in Egypt, including Greeks, Italians, native Armenians, and Jews, were exempt from the jurisdiction of local laws (they had their own court system) or the obligation to pay any local taxes.

whose occupations called for an articulate response to what was happening in their country” (p. 37). Moreover, Starrett (1998) adds “even before formal European control over the country was established in 1876, Egyptian intellectuals educated abroad began to imagine schooling as a means of producing model citizens and a model society” (pp.23-24). In addition to Egyptian nationalism, in the late Ottoman period, intellectuals such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani espoused ideas of pan-Islamism and argued that the whole of the Islamic *ummah* (community), through unity, can provide the means to counteract European political, cultural, and economic intrusion.

### **2.1.2 British colonization and education**

The Urabi Revolt (1879-1882) became the impetus and justification for the British occupation to safeguard their interests in Egypt—the security of the Suez Canal, the repayment of Egyptian government debts, and the safety of European residents in Egypt (British troops remained in Egypt even after the Free Officers military coup in 1952 and did not leave Egypt until after the 1956 Suez Crisis). When the British Empire took control over Egypt in 1882, Hefner (2007) states that the imperial policy was “not to educate too many Egyptians” because the British experience in India demonstrated that education beyond primary levels “only heightened native restlessness” (pp. 17-18).

In an attempt to control and to create submissive subjects through limiting the education of the “restless Egyptian natives,” there were a number of British imperial policies implemented to support the program of de-educating Egyptians. First, Egyptian bureaucracy was cut, therefore reducing the need for educated Egyptians. Second, schools were shut down and reduced in size. Third, British rulers never spent more than three percent of the Egyptian government budget on education (Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 59). Fourth, English replaced French as the language of instruction. Furthermore, the British opposed the use of Arabic at all levels and claimed that it

was unsuited to the teaching of the natural sciences and other “modern” subjects. Fifth, curriculum, textbooks, and syllabi expressed the superiority of the imperial culture. The British colonial order penetrated and colonized local discourse through its textbooks, schoolteachers, universities, newspapers, novels and magazines (Mitchell, 1991, p. 171).

Although colonialism was packaged as generously bringing the benefits of European civilization to end tyranny and chaos (Arif, 2002), schools similar to the barracks were limited in their ability to foster colonial discipline and control over many Egyptians. In response, various educational institutions became the epicenters of intellectual and political movements for those Egyptians challenging British rule, demanding dissenting visions of Egyptian citizenship. To this point, in his comprehensive work, *Colonizing Egypt*, Timothy Mitchell (1991) argues:

This colonising process never fully succeeded, for there always remained regions of resistance and voice of rejection. The schools, universities and the press, like the military barracks, were always liable to become centers of some kind of revolt, turning the colonisers’ methods of instruction and discipline into the means of organized opposition (Hence the rise after the First World War of disciplinary political movements opposed to European occupation, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, whose leaders were almost invariably school teachers). (p. 171)

Therefore, the colonial educational pedagogies, sites, and institutions used to suppress, delegitimize, control, manipulate and subvert Egyptians, were refashioned and reimaged as tools of resistance and dissent opposing British imperial rule through which Egyptian nationalism and citizenship developed.

### **2.1.3 Egyptian nationalism and education (1919 to 1952)**

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and especially after World War I when Egypt formally became a British protectorate, a generation of thinkers and leaders emerged that expanded Egypt’s intellectual horizons and began important discussions on Egyptian citizenship. British imperialism led to

Egyptian resistance and the fomentation of Egyptian territorial identity and dissemination of a national myth that would trace “Egyptianness” backward to antiquity (Gelvin, 2011, p. 95).

Egyptian nationalism was propelled by the struggle for full independence from British occupation. Egyptian nationalism affirmed European concepts of nation and state, founded upon notions that the state deserves primary loyalty of its citizens and citizenship rights are to be enjoyed by all people. It sought parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. For nationalists, Egyptian national identity took precedence over Arab and religious identity and was derived by stressing Egypt’s glorious and ancient Pharaonic past—a concept that attracted both Muslims and Copts. Moreover, as a movement led by Egyptian elite, the concern for independence was emphasized over addressing social and economic issues. Nationalist ideas were spread by leaders who established private schools, night schools for workers, through various publications and the forming of labor unions (Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 62).

The Egyptian nationalist movement drove the revolution of 1919. Although the nationalist movement was building in Egypt for decades, the banning of public opposition to British rule during World War I and the British exiling of Sa‘d Zaghlul’s delegation (*Wafd*) delaying the Wafd’s participation in the Paris Peace Conference was the catalyst for strikes, demonstrations, and riots. In 1922, Egypt was declared independent, but Britain placed a number of conditions on the country’s independence. A constitution was accepted with a constitutional monarchy, parliamentary elections took place, and political parties such the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutional Party undertook the work to spread a new Egyptian vision of liberal democratic society.

Although schools and universities in Egypt were what Starrett (1998) has described as “cradles of nationalist sentiment” that consequently led to student participation in strikes and

demonstrations, Egypt's educational needs were great following the 1919 Revolution (p. 58). One important goal was that "education in Egypt had to develop competent, literature citizens who were loyal to Egypt," necessary to support the nationalist agenda (Cochran, 2008, p. 52). Therefore, the state-controlled education system endeavored to unify the educational structure and worked to "provide an alternative Egypt-centered national identity" (El-Nagar & Krugly-Smolka, 2009, p. 44). The 1923 Constitution mandated free and compulsory primary education, the state budget for education more than doubled, and expansions of schools and enrollment occurred (Cochran, 2008, pp. 52-66). In addition, four of Egypt's most populous and prestigious universities were established during this period. The private King Fouad the First University (renamed Egyptian University and later Cairo University in 1952) founded in 1908 was transformed into a full-fledged public university in 1925 (Reid, 1990). Alexandria University was founded in 1942, Ain Shams University (located in Cairo) in 1950, and the American University in Cairo (a foreign private institution) was founded in 1919 by Presbyterian missionaries from the United States (Sharkey, 2008). Moreover, courses in civics education and civic syllabuses were introduced to foster a sense of nationalism through the understanding that Egypt remained an independent entity despite successive foreign invasions and domination (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1995). During this time, education in Egypt was being viewed as a citizen right, as the then minister of education and prominent Egyptian intellectual Taha Husayn declared, education is akin to "water and air, the right of every citizen" (Sayed, 2006, p. 27). However, as Megahed et al. (2010) argue, "while the system experienced significant quantitative expansion, questions of quality and relevance remained" (p. 3).

As Egyptians became disenchanted with the Wafd party, the Parliament's failures at addressing increasing social and economic problems, the Monarchy's control over Egyptian

politics, and continued British imperial interference, they began to search for other formations of citizenship leading to the construction of other movements. For example, a communist party emerged in Egypt. The success of the Russian Revolution, a loss of faith in parliamentary democracy, resurgence in labor activism, and the legalization of unions during World War II generated Egyptian interests in communism. Additionally, student movements held a considerable presence in Egypt during this time. As universities and schools became a hotbed for activism driven by new ideologies, there were a number of significant student uprisings that centered on issues of the persistence of British influence over Egyptian politics and the presence of British military, most notably in 1935-1936 and in 1946 (Abdalla, 2008; Nasser, 2014).

Although women participated in nationalist movements, women, especially upper-class women, were frustrated with the limited level of involvement in social and public life and the denial of their citizenship rights. Huda Sha'rawi and the Egyptian Feminists Union called for women's suffrage, reforms to marriage laws and access to education. Sha'rawi argued:

The denial of political rights to half of the Egyptian public, which did not participate in the drafting of the Constitution, could not vote in elections or occupy prosecutorial positions led the members...to focus attention on the need to reform (the conditions of) women and the reform of the nation (as quoted in Hatem, 2000, p. 42).

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded by teacher Hasan al-Banna, gained widespread appeal by spreading the belief that in order to restore Egypt to its social and political greatness, there must be a reestablishment of Islam as a guiding force in national life and citizenship. The Brotherhood's popularity drew on Egyptian disillusionment (especially from marginalized communities) with the European ideas and institutions, including parliamentary democracy and liberalism, and foreign influence penetrating Egyptian politics, culture and economics. The Brotherhood's organizing strategies including establishing schools, providing welfare and social services to marginalized committees and forging ties with labor movements, cut-across social

classes and successfully blended with their message of social justice, economic well-being and political harmony as an Islamic social ethos. The Brotherhood called for an interpretation of Islam compatible with the needs of a modern society and the “reimplementation of the *shari‘ah*, arguing that the ills from which Egypt suffered could be traced to the replacement of Quranic principles by secular legal and political institutions” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 199).

To conclude, Egyptian Nationalism dominated politics in Egypt until the complete British military withdrawal in 1956. Although Egyptian nationalism was a formidable movement, it was not a coherent system of ideas for a political program, reflected the interests of mainly elites, and was severely strained by the incompleteness of Egyptian independence, which led to other ideas and movements—regarding the nature and identity of state-society constructions—to gain a social and political foothold. Discussing Egypt’s liberal age, Cochran (2008) concludes, “The old order had proved itself unfit to govern Egypt, in educational policy and every other way. The final result was the 1952 revolution” (p. 66).

#### **2.1.4 Arab socialism and education (1952 to 1970)**

The 1952 coup d’état by the Free Officers Movement, a group of junior military officers, ushered in revolutionary political and economic changes throughout Egyptian society. The Free Officers, through the Revolutionary Command Council, abolished the monarchy and ousted King Farouk, dissolved Parliament, abrogated the 1923 Constitution, banned all political parties and declared Egypt a republic. Major agrarian reform as well as nationalization of most industries and massive projects of state-led development defined post-1952 Egypt. During the presidency of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, the enterprise of centrally planned economics and state-driven development was grounded within a particular form of citizenship, Arab socialism.

Arab socialism was the key feature of Egyptian citizenship during the Nasser presidency.

Arab socialism blended Arab nationalism with an Egyptian interpretation of socialism. It was a concept of citizenship that attempted to unite those who are Arab, both Christian and Muslim, across imperially defined borders, by language, history, and culture within a political unity, which was viewed as necessary to defend against foreign powers. It was a cultural reorientation that situated Egypt as the center of Arabism and the pan-Arab movement. To support the political aspirations of Arab nationalism, state socialism was seen as a vital economic system to expand state ownership and management of the means of production and bring about social justice after centuries of imperial influence and control of Egypt. Cleveland and Bunton (2009) argue that the economic policies were a strategic means to provide modernization, development, and progress for Egypt, more than ideological commitments to Marxist socialism (p. 316). Additionally, religion was not excluded from Arab socialism, but was viewed by Nasser as an important civilization framework for his project (Osman, 2010, p. 51). For example, Nasser used Islamic institutions such as al-Azhar University to legitimize government policies and ideologies (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 321). As Goldschmidt (2004) argues, in predominantly Muslim states, such as Egypt, “socialism is rarely used in the purely Marxian sense, for Muslims can never deny the primacy of the one God above mundane material interests, nor can they accept a historical dynamic based on a struggle between classes” (p. 134). Arab socialism provided the ideological and economic foundations for a new form of Egyptian citizenship that was a revolutionary attempt at redefining Egyptian cultural and political identity as well as the relationship between state and Egyptian citizen.

There are a number of noteworthy events and programs that can exemplify Arab socialism and how its popularity and status manifested in Egypt. First, the nationalization of the Suez Canal and Nasser’s triumph over the 1956 Tripartite Aggression by Britain, France, and

Israel provided an early boost for his project of Arab socialism. Second, the 1956 Constitution, for the first time in Egyptian constitutional history, emphasized the Arab-ness of Egypt. It declared that Egypt was an Arab state, Egyptian people were part of the Arab nation, and Arabic was the official language, which establish for Egyptian citizens a clear ethnic and linguistic identity (Hatem, 2000). Furthermore, although Islam was declared the official religion of the state, Copts, and Muslims, in the eyes of the law were the view as the same, with equal rights and duties. Additionally, the 1956 Constitution mandated that education, healthcare and work were rights of Egyptian citizens and it is the role of the state provided such services. Third, in 1958 the unification between Egypt and Syria was established into a single state, the United Arab Republic (UAR). Although the creation of the UAR was a major accomplishment for Nasser and Arab unity, allowing Egypt to export their model of development to Syria, the UAR only lasted three years. The breakup of the UAR was a defeat for Nasser and Arab socialism, and forced Nasser to focus on domestic projects. Fourth, in 1962 Nasser unveiled the Charter for National Action, under the revolutionary banner of “freedom, socialism, and unity,” which explained the ideological foundations of Arab socialism and attempted to create mass support from citizens for new national policies. Fifth, a mass-based single party, the Arab Socialist Union, was established to train cadres of young Egyptians. Sixth, the 1964 provisional constitution proclaimed that 50 percent of the delegates to the national assembly had to be workers and peasants. Seventh, with regards to gender relations, although the Nasser government was cautious about transforming issues of family law, during this time, women were granted the right to vote, could serve in the national assembly, and had access to public sector employment. And last, a number of domestic policies and programs such as the construction of the Aswan Dam, the reduction of allowable landholdings, various social welfare projects, and government subsidies for basic food and

household items and housing became the realization and practical expression of Arab socialism for Egyptian citizens. One major manifestation of Arab socialism was transformation to the Egyptian education system, which stood at the center of the overall plan for Egypt's development.

The expansion and nationalization of education in Egypt during this period had two main goals: First, to provide Egyptian students with the scientific and technical knowledge and skills necessary for the state-driven development of their country. Second, to promote patriotism and political loyalty to the state and emphasize Arab unity and identity through the learning and teaching of Arabic language. Cochran (2008) explains:

[Arab] socialism became the framework for governing and was reflected in the education system...Administration was centralized, curriculum was standardized, enrollment escalated and technical education was emphasized. All were designed to promote the development of Egyptian patriotism through education of the masses. (pp. 67-68)

Furthermore, as Cleveland and Bunton (2009) argue, "the government's goal was not only to boost the literacy rate but also to give schoolchildren a proper indoctrination in the basics of socialism and nationalism" (p. 320). Therefore, during the Nasser years the primary focus was on the expansion and administration of public education. Quality education that promoted active citizenship was either overlooked or undermined in its content and pedagogy by the strains of swollen enrollment and the growing bureaucracy of education.

In primary and secondary schools, investment and enrollment rates substantially increased. For example, between 1952 and 1962 primary school enrollment went from 1 million to over 3 million, and total educational expenditure from 1953 to 1965 was an estimated three times the entire education expenditure during the seventy years of British occupation from 1882 to 1952 (Abdalla, 2008, p. 102; Cochran, 2008, p. 68). However, the rise in enrollment rates exceeded the government's ability to build schools, train teachers leading to overcrowded

classrooms and imbalanced student-teacher ratios. Furthermore, secondary education was severely restricted in its mission, vision, and content, giving more attention to technical and vocational education. Following the 1952 coup, schools continued to nurture an environment that discouraged students' participation, questioning and independent thought, however to a lesser extent than during colonialism (Baraka, 2008).

For universities, the goal was to have students acquire skills needed to manage a nationalized economy (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 320). The Egyptian government pursued policies that attempted to persuade students to enroll in scientific and technical fields. The state abolished tuition fees for postsecondary and higher education institutions, opened several new universities in the various governorates, and Nasser enacted the famous 1961 Public Employment Guarantee Scheme, which guaranteed a public sector employment for all university graduates. By the end of the 1960s, these policies led to the number of university students nearly doubling. Additionally, university autonomy was “virtually obliterated” as the state exerted political authority over internal administrative operation through various legal decrees (Lulat, 2005, p. 132). Nonetheless, similar to Egyptian schools, the universities in Egypt faced overcrowded classrooms and a limited supply of instructors and professors, books, and laboratory equipment. Furthermore, university students faced limited employment opportunities and low-paying state employment, and for students enrolled in arts, law, and commerce the employment prospects were often even more grim. Abdalla (2008) describes Egyptian universities at this time as a “laboratory for spawning government employees” and “certainly not where intellectuals are born and bred” (p. 114). Thus, the universities were not a place where formal citizenship education could thrive. However, the conditions on campuses, the deterioration in the quality of higher education, the state control over institutional autonomy, and

the surplus of university graduates led to a swelling of discontent on the part of Egyptian university students that (as will be presented below) indirectly fueled a surge in political acts of citizenship by student activists and student movements.

Rather than educating Egyptians for participatory citizenship, the priority for schools and universities was to provide technical education for the largest number of students. There was little room, time, resources, or even interest in quality and active citizenship education. In fact, the expansion in school capacities was prioritized over the quality of education during this period. Baraka (2008) argued, “Students lacked opportunities to learn more of citizenship and political values because of inflated classrooms and increased number of students. Consequently, educators gave less attention to citizenship education” (pp. 6-7). However, schools and universities did attempt to provide content to support the Arab socialist vision of the Egyptian state and society. For example, following the creation of 1958 United Arab Republic with Syria, new courses on ‘Arab society’ entered the curriculum and a new series of history textbooks was published for schools. It aimed at covering the modern and contemporary history of the Arabs including Egypt. The authors of these books paid increasingly more attention to Egypt’s historical ties with and role in the Arab region (Mayer, 1988). Additionally, as part of the national curriculum for universities, students were required to take classes on Arab Society, Revolution and Socialism aimed at providing a better understanding of Egypt’s social and economic problems. Although the new university courses associated with the national curriculum aimed at providing a better understanding of Egypt’s social and economic problems, they “failed to provide any objective analysis,” which can also be connected to the government producing “very limited speculative, analytical, and critical theory in the fields of political science, economics, sociology and moral philosophy” (Abdalla, 2008, p. 118). In sum, during the Nasser

years, as the government enacted state policies to support its vision of Arab socialism through the nationalization of schools and universities, education was used as a tool to enhance and expand human capital, bolster the loyalty and obedience of Egyptians, and to legitimize the political project of the state, rather than to empower active citizens. To the point, Abdalla (2008) states, “educational practices within the schools and the universities served to support the pattern of passive non-participatory political life among educated Egyptian. Education practices emphasized the authority of the teacher, rote learning, formal curricula, strict uniformity, discipline, and routine” (p. 117).

Following the 1952 Free Officers coup, Arab socialism became the dominant citizenship ideology in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, shaping the social, economic and political landscape of postcolonial states in the region. The revolutionary transformations occurred during the Nasser years, reverberate in Egypt to this day. Nasser formulated an Egyptian government that gave the presidency strong executive powers, with the national assembly being relegated to a “consultative body that rubber stamped legislation originating with the president” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 319). The ruling bargain was established in Egypt,<sup>14</sup> where citizens would receive economic benefits in return for their unwavering support of the state. As Gelvin (2011) explains, “through centrally planned economies and unopposed state power,” the Egyptian government “used economic incentives to gain the compliance of their citizens and reward those sectors of society the government claimed to represent” (p. 250). Therefore, during this time the rise of the police state emerged, where Egyptian jails were filled with communists, leftists, Islamists, Muslim Brotherhood dissidents, and those opposed to the state. The bold ideas of Arab

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<sup>14</sup> *Ruling bargain* is a term political scientists use to explain a government providing its citizens with economic prosperity (*social and economic rights*). Economic benefits are used to placate citizenry, and therefore took precedent to and were given in exchange for political participation, free elections, and government accountability (*political and civil rights*) (Angrist, 2013, p. 22).

socialism transcend the social and educational realities for many Egyptians. For example, the defeat of Egypt by Israel in the June 1967 War struck a fatal blow to the popularity of Nasser and Arab socialism. Following the defeat 1967, student discontentment with the educational situation and stagnant employment opportunities erupted when met with this national humiliation. For the first time, university students protested against Nasser, demanding strict punishments for military leaders responsible for the devastation of 1967, which propelled student activism and public criticism against political and university issues (Abdalla, 2008, pp. 149-175). Commenting on the devastation of the 1967 War being connected to the waning appeal of Nasser's Arab socialism, President Sadat said, "Nasser did not die on 28 September, 1970, but on 5 June, 1967" (Osman, 2010, p. 64). The void in citizenship left by the limitations of Arab socialism in combination with other social, economic and political factors, led to the rise in popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist movements during the Sadat era.

### **2.1.5 *Al-Infatah*, Islamism, and education (1970 to 1981)**

Anwar al-Sadat ascended to the presidency after the death of Nasser. He inherited difficult social and economic problems, continued confrontation with Israel that led to a draining military budget, and the loss of potential revenue from limited tourism, closing of the Suez Canal and minimal foreign investments. However, Sadat's quasi-victory over Israel in the October 1973 War restored Egypt's international creditability and was a political triumph domestically. Riding on his national popularity following 1973, Sadat enacted a number of economic and political policies attempting to liberalize Egypt. However, Sadat's *al-Infatah* (the opening up) appeared to have exacerbated social and economic issues rather than resolving them. Mass discontent with the growing disparities following the implementation of *al-Infatah* and anger around the terms of

Egypt's 1979 peace with Israel coalesced with a resurgence of Islamists opposition that rose to a crescendo on October 1981 with the assassination of Sadat.

Sadat wanted to restructure the Egyptian economy by dismantling parts of the socialist system introduced by Nasser. He was looking to reduce the crippling military budget and liberalize the economy so Egypt could be an “open door” for business, trade, commerce and high finance, which was also crucial in gaining the support of the United States. In 1974 Sadat proposed *al-Infitah* (the opening up); a broad range of proposals designed to encourage local and foreign investment, promote private ventures, reduce restrictions on imports, ease policies for buying and selling land, and overall promote freer trade with market economies. It was a transition to a mixed economy, providing incentives for foreign investments and private enterprise while maintaining state welfare programs. Some of the outcomes of al-Infitah included the return of foreign banks, the increase of private foreign investments mainly from Arab states and Iran, and a construction and real-estate boom especially around Cairo and Alexandria, specifically with the building of tourist hotels and resorts, and luxury villas and apartments.

Conversely, al-Infitah aggravated social and economic problems for many Egyptians. Liberalization failed to attract large investors with hard currencies from the United States, Europe or Japan. Furthermore, the beneficiaries of al-Infitah were mainly Egyptian elite with ties to the Sadat regime. Thus, corruption was associated with the allocation of permits and contracts, which the government still maintained great control. Osman (2010) explains, “The awarding of the newly cordoned land, the allocation of tenders and contracts, the issue of licenses and approvals, and the provisioning of financing—all were controlled and managed by the government and its different vehicles, with conspicuous roles for the different security apparatuses” (p. 12). The increase levels in corruption were connected to investments made more

for self-enrichment than developments that would benefit the broader society. Most of the investments went into urban land, new villas, apartments, and tourist ventures, and less often in such beneficial enterprises as factories. Furthermore, much money was spent on imported expensive luxury items such as foreign cars (Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 170). At the same time, there was also a decline in the status and value of public sector employment. Private sector workers and businesses gained more from al-Infatih than public sector employees. Swollen bureaucracies, stemming from the government's promise to employ every university graduate, coupled with price inflations that devalued salaries and eroded purchasing power for government workers (e.g., teachers, professors, doctors, nurses, etc.), led to the decline of the allure and benefits for state employment. These factors persuaded the move of the most talented university graduates to the private sector or to pursue employment abroad. In search of higher wages, Egyptian professionals such as engineers, doctors, teachers as well as peasants immigrated to mostly wealthier Arab states. From 1974 to 1985, more than three million Egyptians emigrated to the Gulf countries, majority settling in Saudi Arabia (Osman, 2010, p. 80). Goldschmidt (2004) describes the long term problems associated Egyptians emigration: "Emigration was a short-term benefit, but in the long run it separated families and created new income disparities and shortages of skilled workers and famers" (p. 170).

In addition to the liberalization of economic policies, al-Infatih was associated with social and political liberalization. The 1971 Constitution offers and mandates the ideal Egyptian citizen and their relationship to state;<sup>15</sup> for example, "The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic state based on citizenship" (Article 1); "All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal rights and duties without discrimination between them due to race, ethnic origin, language, religion or

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<sup>15</sup> Arab Republic of Egypt (amended 2007). The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971 <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf>

creed” (Article 40); “Individual liberty is a natural right and shall not be touched (Article 41); “Freedom of opinion is guaranteed” unless in a state of emergency or in time of war (Article 48); and “participation in public life is a national duty” (Article 62). El Nagar and Krugly-Smoska (2009) argue that the 1971 Constitution “represents an important social evolution in Egypt” (p. 46). Additionally, Sadat dissolved the Arab Socialist Union into the government organization called the National Democratic Party, which was the main party (if not the only political party with “real” power) until after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak. Sadat also allowed independents and a few other parties to participate in parliamentary elections. Additionally, freedoms of the press also increased. However, legitimate political opposition and pluralism was severely restricted.

The aim of political liberalization was to encourage foreign and domestic capital investment in Egypt and was influenced by “economic priorities rather than a desire for genuine democratization” (El Nagar & Krugly-Smolkska, 2009, p. 45). Sadat retained strong executive powers during his presidency and actually restricted political opposition and public dissent. For example, in January 1980, to control opposition after the 1977 bread riots (to be discussed below) and popular criticism following the Camp David Accords with Israel, Sadat enacted, through a national referendum, the so-called “Law of Shame.” The law prohibited public discontent, the forming illegal organizations, or criticism against the government. It targeted leftists and Nasserites and prohibited Egyptians from advocating atheism and class conflict, negating divine teaching, or setting a bad example for Egyptian youth. Penalties included arrests, limits on civil rights, and confiscation of property. The Law of Shame has been described as “muzzle” for political opponents, which has remained in effect since it was declared (Goldschmidt, 2004, p. 176). Another tactic used by Sadat to silence opposition was mass

arrests. In September 1981, a month before his assassination, Sadat ordered the biggest roundup of his opponents, arresting more than 1000 people. Osman (2010) argues, “Sadat imagined al-Infatih as laying the seeds of a democratic, capitalist, Western-oriented Egypt. But not during his period in office; he was, of course, to remain an absolute leader” (p. 118).

Popular criticism from various segments (Nasserites, leftists, Islamists, labor, students, and the poor) against the Egyptian government increased throughout this period. For most Egyptians, al-Infatih was "a bitter disappointment" (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 378). Policies during this time favored the wealthy with few benefits to the broader Egyptian population. Those who profited from economic liberalization were connected to the regime and ostentatiously displayed their wealth. Ironically, al-Infatih fostered income disparities that have been condemned by the Arab socialist a decade earlier. The limitations of al-Infatih policies and the discrepancies in wealth led to mass dissatisfaction. The most extreme incident was the 1977 bread riots.<sup>16</sup> The riots followed Egypt's adherence to the IMF's recommendations at economic structural adjustments. The IMF advised the Egyptian government to cut basic subsidies (bread, rice, sugar, teach cooking oil, kerosene, etc.) in return to quality for international loans. In January 1977, without giving advance notice, Sadat reduced some food and fuel items and canceled others. Riots in Cairo and Alexandria followed: buildings were looted and burned, the army was called in to restore order, and over a hundred people were killed during the three days. Sadat was forced to restore all subsidies. Explaining Egyptian discontent with al-Infatih, Goldschmidt (2004) asserts, “People protested against infatih not because it was liberal, but

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<sup>16</sup> The 1977 “bread riots” were the largest riots Egypt has seen since the dissolution of the monarchy and the institution of the republic in 1952. On December 1967, Egypt negotiated a \$450 million credit line with the IMF, and allowed Egypt to postpone \$12 billion in foreign debt. In return Egypt cut \$123 million in commodity supports and \$64 million from direct subsidies. In the two days of bloody rioting, approximately 100 protesters died and 1,200 were arrested (Gelvin, 2015, p. 18).

because it increased inequality” (p. 173). The discontent with the Sadat regime and his policies also stimulated the resurgence of Islamist movements in Egypt.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Islam increasingly became a political tool and divinity-based vision of citizenship in Egypt and other Muslim majority states. Islamist groups used religious symbols and rhetoric, Islamic law, and moral values rooted in Islam to counter the failures of foreign models of development and modernization that generated both a popular disillusionment with external ideologies of citizenship, and the desire to strive for internally Islamic models of social and political order. Cleveland and Bunton (2009) concisely elaborate on the spread of Islamist movements:

The driving force behind the Islamic resurgence was not a rejection of change; rather, it was a rejection of the Middle East’s dependence on Western and other alien models of development. The Islamic resurgence was also motivated by a rejection of the assumptions on which Western development theories were based. These theories equated modernization with secularization and suggested that societies would become modern only as they freed themselves from their traditional religious faiths. The Western experience in which church and state became separated and society became generally secular was posited as the only viable path to true modernity. But to many Muslims who reflected on the course of their modern history, this path had not only been force on them it had failed. (p. 441)

The quote highlights that failures in society are perceived by Islamists to be connected to Western models of modernity. Islamists counter these models with their own social and political visions of the future that are wrapped in the Islamic models of the good and just society.

In Egypt, failures to solve pressing social and economic problems through the adoption of foreign models of development created a growing sense of popular disillusionment with external ideologies. The rise of Islamism in this period coincided with a decline in Egyptian liberalism and Arab socialism, leaving a void in national citizenship discourse. Nasser’s Arab socialism led to the creation of a bloated bureaucracy and inefficient systems, and it did not prevent the humiliating 1967 defeat of Egypt. Additionally, as mentioned above, Sadat’s policies of al-

Intifah did not improve social and economic conditions. Osman (2010) observes, “in less than a decade the civic nature of the Egyptian state of the 1950s and 1960s was replaced by a quasi-Islamic one; and a liberal public atmosphere and discourse became predominately religious and conservative” (p. 81). Another policy that added to the spread of Islamism in Egypt was Sadat’s effort to confront his leftist and Nasserite opposition by siding with religious forces. Sadat adopted a number of policies that encouraged religious discourses and principles to influence society and allowed groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to expand and flourish.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, emigration to Saudi Arabia can also be linked to the spread of Wahhabi (Muslim puritanical movement that calls for a strict interpretation and adherence to the Quran and hadith) beliefs to Egyptians. Overall, Egyptian Muslim citizens were searching for an “Islamic-inspired solution to the economic hardships, social malaise, and cultural alienation for which the secular state was held responsible” (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 448). Moreover, given the complexity of Egyptian history and society and the multiple interpretations and schools of thought of Islam, it is important to understand that Islamism is not a single, unified movement. It is better understood in the plural, in the heterogeneity of its reality, and should be conceptualized as Islamism(s) or Islamist movement(s). Osman (2010) explains:

The Islamic movement was everything to everyone: an alternative social provider to the poor masses; an angry platform for the disillusioned youth; a loud trumpet-call announcing ‘a return to the pure religion’ to those seeking an identity; a ‘progressive, moderate religious platform’ for the affluent and liberal; an increasingly civic interlocutor with Egyptian Christians and the West—and at the extremes, a violent vehicle for rejectionists and radicals. (p. 111)

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<sup>17</sup> Osman (2010) lists the connections between Sadat and the spread of Islamic forces in Egypt: (1) He released thousands of leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood from jail; (2) He allowed the Brotherhood’s newspaper al-Dawaa (the Call) to be reissued; (3) Sadat also assumed the mantle of Islam referring to himself as ‘guardian of the faith’ and emphasizing his first name was ‘Mohamed;’ (4) He promoted and expanded religious schools and increased the budget of Al-Azhar; (5) Sadat declared sharia law (Islamic jurisprudence) as the principal source of the Egyptian constitution, etc. (p. 81).

Therefore, the Islamists groups in Egypt had utilized different strategies to gain support, different means to further their causes, and espoused different visions of the role of Islam with regards to politics, society and citizenship.

In addition to tapping into a growing discontentment among Egyptians regarding their social and economic realities, the resurgence of Islamists groups can also be attributed to them adopting effective strategies of messaging and mobilization. One exemplarily group is the Muslim Brotherhood. During this period, the Muslim Brotherhood represented the moderate, centrist Islamist political movement. They bridged the gap between traditional religious thinking and the waves of modernity that were imported to Egypt. After Sadat released many leaders, many of whom held long-term sentences, from jail,<sup>18</sup> the Brotherhood resumed their organizational activities, including publishing their well-circulated periodical called *al-Da'wa* (the Call). Some members ran as independents and won seats in the parliament. In other activities, the Muslim Brotherhood also became successful at recruiting student and faculty members from university campuses. They gained control of student unions, syndicates, and other academic and professional organizations including those connected to physicians, lawyers, and engineers. However, most of their success came from their work with volunteer organizations engaged in various social services. Osman (2010) argues, “The factor that really cemented the Brotherhood’s social re-emergence, and founded the Islamic movement’s social base, was its highly efficient services infrastructure” (p. 84). Furthermore, Osman (2010) synthesizes, “At a time when the socio-economic consequences of al-infitah were eroding the regime’s legitimacy, the Brotherhood was positioning itself to the majority of Egyptians as ‘the provider,’ a role the

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<sup>18</sup> They were released by Sadat to counter-balance the more threatening leftists and Nasserites opposition, and under the condition that they would not form a political party.

regime was incapable of fulfilling” (p. 84). Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood strategically filled the social and ideological void that the Egyptian government was unable to fill.

While the Muslim Brotherhood was a popular, public and moderate Islamist group that grew in acceptance, there were fringe, underground and militant organizations they also grab the attention of a small segment of the Egyptian population. Militant groups such as Shabab Muhammad, al-Jama’*a* al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah wanted a violent revolutionary overthrow of the Sadat regime, replacing it with a government committed to a rigid interpretation of Islam and the restoration of their version of the *shari’ah*. These groups also conducted a number of terrorist attacks during this time. Goldschmidt (2004) summarizes the draw of militant groups: “The disparities between rich and poor, Westernized and traditional Egyptians, and Sadat’s promises and social reality fueled the militancy of the Muslim movements” (p. 182). Moreover, people who made up the membership were mostly university educated and became disenchanted with and disenfranchised in Sadat’s Egypt and sought an alternative state-society relationship using their version of Islam, through the means of violence and tactics of terrorism. Cleveland and Bunton (2009) found that “militant groups were dominated by individuals with university experience who were driven by a mixture of religious belief, social despair, and economic deprivation” (p. 382). One of the commonalities between the Muslim Brotherhood and the militant groups is that they struck a chord with Egyptian youth’s disillusionment with educational conditions and diminishing future employment prospects and utilized the university and other institutions of education as fertile sites for recruitment, spreading certain believes, shaping social environments on campus, and influencing student movements and organizations.

During the Sadat years, education was still mandated as a right guaranteed by the state (Article 18, 1971 Constitution). However, the quality of government provided education was still limited. Challenges faced by Egyptian schools and universities during the Nasser years were only exacerbated under the Sadat government. Population increases expanded enrollments and placed continued demands on the government's ability to provide quality education. In universities, student enrollment increased and new universities were established. For example, 400,000 university students enrolled in 1976-1977 (Cochran, 2008, p. 87). Moreover, there was another expansion of universities throughout the governorates. But, understaffed and overcrowded conditions, and dismal educational standards continued. A major concern during this period, and continuing into the Mubarak presidency, was that graduates from secondary schools and universities, regardless of skill were guaranteed low-paying, stagnant government jobs and placed wherever the government needed them. Describing the dismal future employment opportunities for students, Cochran (2008) states, "Obtaining a university education in the 1980s required persistence, enduring harsh environments and listening to overworked teachers. Once all the effort had been made, the resulting knowledge and skills were questionable, at best" (p. 89). Consequently, any commitment to citizenship education was severely hampered by the continued challenges afflicting school and university campuses. School curricula and textbooks asserted values of unity among Middle East countries, victory against Israel, values of peace and dialogue, and patriotism and loyalty to Egypt (Baraka, 2008, p. 7). Although the Ministry of Education at this time did recognize the need to update Egyptian education including content and pedagogy (Megahed et al., 2010), pedagogy in general continued to be dominated by teacher-centered approaches and most forms of formal citizenship education was relegated to rote memorization and civic knowledge assessed through standardized examinations.

During this period, some notable educational phenomena took place. Al-Infitah and the increasing cooperation between the United States and Egypt brought the flow of U.S. funding to various development and education programs. For example, USAID began providing development projects to Egypt in 1975, including programs for the educational sector. Additionally, the cooperation with the United States began to have a small impact of Egyptian universities in the realm of textbooks, U.S.-inspired research agendas, scholarly exchanges, and student culture (Lulat, 2005, p. 135). The opening up of Egypt's educational sector also brought the rise of foreign language schools. Parents who could afford these schools saw the value in sending their children to a foreign school and speaking a foreign language, which was perceived by Egyptians to be connected to better income opportunities. However, there were a few issues with the foreign schools. First, the government had limited control or regulation over any types of educational quality, standards or certifications. Second, the foreign schools did not always have a concern for Egyptian issues and limited in their ability to nurture Egyptian citizenship. Egyptian students were taught through a curriculum designed for another country's educational system, which promoted values, culture, language and skills associated with that country. Furthermore, Egyptian students were often prepared for life and employment abroad. To the point, Cochran (2008) argues, foreign schools do not educate "Egyptians to have concern for the poor, with whom they shared few common values, language or social status" (pp. 78-79). Last, foreign schools created another obstacle for decent employment sought by government schools' graduates. As competition for private sector employment grew, graduates of foreign language schools were often employed by private businesses, which placed graduates from public schools at a disadvantage. Therefore, "the growth of foreign-funded private enterprise led to a resurgence in the popularity of private foreign language schools and the "foreign ruler – Egyptian poor

dichotomy” (Cochran, 1986, p. 54). The rise of foreign language schools, the competition on receiving high marks on class tests and national examinations, and limits to the quality of government education gave rise to the phenomenon of private lessons in Egypt. Moreover, teacher and instructor salaries, large classes sizes, and shortened school days were all incentives for teachers to participate in the rapidly expanding industry of private tutoring. Beginning in this period and continuing to present-day, families spend an enormous amount of income and energy securing private lessons for their children to make sure that they pass their classes and score well on exams (Herrera & Torres, 2006, pp. 14-15).

A relevant phenomenon that occurred within education, and was a reflection of the broader society and politics during this period, was the ideological transformations to student activism and movements. In the early 1970s, leftists and Nasserite students led student activism and movements on university campuses. Significant student dissent in 1972 and early 1973 was directed against Sadat’s lack of resolve with Israel demanding the liberation of the occupied Palestinian territories and calling for the democratization of the Egyptian political system (Abdalla, 2008). However, later in the decade, student dissatisfaction with political and educational issues was expressed in the formation of Islamic associations. When leftist and Nasserite movements were banned, joining Islamic groups became a way for students to oppose conditions on campus as well as to critique the regime. Islamic student associations gained control of most of student organizations in Egyptian universities. The success was in part because of their ability to identify the unsuitable conditions of campus life and propose changes within an Islamic reference. For example, because of overcrowded classrooms, groups demanded separate classrooms for male and female students, arguing that within overcrowded classrooms, female students were subjected to harassment. Moreover, these groups demanded segregated

stairwells, encouraged the adoption of Muslim attire such as beards for men and the wearing of hijab for women, wanted to ban alcohol and Western music performance from campuses, and formed off-campus study groups. For Muslim students attending a university in large cities far away from home, Islamic groups on campus offered a sense of belonging. Cleveland and Bunton (2009) sum up the attraction to Islamic groups for students: “In drawing attention to the intolerable conditions on the university campuses and the bleak futures of university graduates, and in proposing to change those circumstance by the Islamizaiton of society, the Islamic student organizations touched a raw nerve and became a potent opposition force” (p. 446). At a time when employment opportunities were stagnant at best, provoking indignation toward Sadat’s regime, Islamic student groups provided services and acceptable social settings in which young Muslims could network and socialize, and offered a form of hope and means to change society.

Sadat’s al-Infatih chipped away at Egypt’s ruling bargain and significantly undermined the legitimacy of the Egyptian regime. Explaining the disturbance to the ruling bargain, Osman (2010) argues, “Only the people’s consent, their approval to be ruled, was the basis for governing. Al-Infatih cracked that basis. The regime appeared to have abandoned this solidarity with the poor (a founding principle of the 1952 revolution) and to have allied itself with the rich. This had fatal political consequences” (p. 127). On October 6, 1981, while observing a military parade commemorating the eighth anniversary of the October 1973 War, Sadat was assassinated by members of militant groups. Sadat’s vice president Hosni Mubarak ascended to the presidency one week later and would remain in power for thirty years—until he was ousted by a mass-popular uprising beginning January 25, 2011.

#### **2.1.6 Authoritarianism and citizenship education (1981 to 2011)**

When Hosni Mubarak became president of Egypt in October 1981 after the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian “deep state” was already entrenched by his predecessors.<sup>19</sup> Since 1952, successive governments established a particular ruling bargain with Egyptian citizens that shaped citizenship and education in Egypt. What evolved over time was a corrupt authoritarian republic favoring networks of patronage, crony capitalism and loyalty to a single-party political system over active civic and political participation.

Under Mubarak, the Egyptian political system had all the hallmarks of a constitutional and democratic political system—a parliament and a president, both elected by the people, and a judiciary able to ensure that the law is applied equitably and fairly. However, the security state and Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) created many obstacles to political participation and civic society groups in Egypt. The Egyptian political system was maintained through a highly centralized arrangement of security. When Mubarak became president, he re-imposed the state of emergency law,<sup>20</sup> which remained in place until after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. The emergency law granted Mubarak immense presidential powers and infringed on the constitutional rights of Egyptians (including controlling political and civic participation), creating a widespread sense of apathy toward politics in Egypt. To enforce these laws, approximately one million Egyptians made up the security apparatus, from interior ministry

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<sup>19</sup> The deep state of Egypt can be described as a clientelistic, authoritarian system, which worked to the advantage of corrupt business leaders, of the intelligence and police services, of members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, and of the armed forces, which channeled patronage, relatively unscathed from the corrupt regime holding vast economic and political power (Teti & Gervasio, 2012, p. 102). This corrupt system made life intolerable for ordinary Egyptians and has created many obstacles to the current political transition after the January 25, 2011 Revolution.

<sup>20</sup> The emergency law was initially adopted after the 1967 War with Israel, temporarily suspended in 1980, but was reinstated after Sadat’s assassination on October 6, 1981. It was replaced after 2007 by Article 179 on terrorism, which vested the security with the powers to arrest citizens, search their houses, and monitor their correspondence and phone calls without court order, in violation of other articles of the constitution that protect personal freedoms. The laws governing political parties, syndicates, and associations in Egypt are designed to restrict participation (Gohar, 2008, pp. 189-190).

bureaucrats to agents in the field and common snitches.<sup>21</sup> This extensive security apparatus monitored and harassed opposition figures and groups in order to defend the status quo and Mubarak's dominance. In addition to the formal state security apparatus, *balataga* (local hoodlums, literally hatchet men) were commonly hired and used to beat, torture, and sexually assault those in violation of the government, which created an environment of fear. The law also provided the bases for a parallel system of military and security courts the regime used to deal with its opponents.

Although multiple parties including the New Wafd party, Socialists Labor Party, National Progressive Unionists party and the Muslim Brotherhood were eventually allowed to compete in various elections, the NDP dominated legal participation. Many leaders from opposition parties and groups were routinely arrested, especially before various elections. In addition, the NDP rigged elections, prevented people from voting, or forced people to vote for candidates in order to maintain their dominance (Brown et al., 2013, p. 221). Moreover, even though there were tens of thousands of NGOs and other civil society groups working in Egypt, the Egyptian state placed heavy restrictions and increased intrusion into civic participation (Carapico, 2013). The tactics used to suppress political opposition created an environment that not only disenfranchised political challengers, but also, in general, disillusioned the Egyptian public towards participating in formal politics and political parties.

However, in keeping with the ruling bargain, the assumption at time was that economic reform (economic rights) had to precede any political reform, especially in the face of any real or imagined threat of opening up the ballot boxes to Islamist groups. Yet, within an environment that favored corruption and crony capitalism, economic reform failed to materialize into increased economic or

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<sup>21</sup> Joel Beinin discusses the extent to Egypt's security apparatus under Mubarak. Beinin, J. (2011). Egypt at the tipping? January 31, 2011, *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from [http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/31/egyptat\\_the\\_tipping\\_point](http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/31/egyptat_the_tipping_point).

social rights, and the Mubarak government eventually defaulted on the ruling bargain. Mubarak continued policies of economic liberalization that were established under Sadat with his economic reforms of *al-Infitah* (opening up). The trend towards neoliberal economic policies,<sup>22</sup> such as privatization, was combined with state planning that propelled a system of crony capitalism, where the state apparatus was used to grant loans and contracts to those loyal clients of the Mubarak regime (El-Mahdi & Marfleet, 2009, pp. 2-4).

Mitchell (1999) argues that the state channeled public resources away from agriculture, industry and underlying problems of training and employment to subsidize well connected financiers and entrepreneurs whose actions lacked accountability and, therefore, they were unable to discipline. This eventually led to monopolies and oligopolies increasing their hold over many sectors of the Egyptian economy. These conglomerates frequently produced goods and services only affordable to a small minority of Egyptians, while real wages in the industrial sector dropped, per capita household consumption declined, and Egyptians living below the poverty line increased, especially for those in rural, agricultural areas. For instance, in 2005, 18.5 percent of Egyptians (over 15 million people) lived on an income of less than \$2 a day.<sup>23</sup> El-Mahdi and Marfleet (2009) argue that these estimates were at best conservative, excluding the tens of millions who lived at or just above the official poverty line, and “who are profoundly affected by increase in the price of food and fuel and/or by problems of supply” (p. 5). In addition, as the government reduced social spending on public sector employment, there was

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<sup>22</sup> Neoliberalism can be described as a reassertion of classical liberal economic principles, championed such economists as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, in which restructuring of national economies takes place on the basis of the supremacy of the market, deregulation, and the retreat of the state from social affairs. Neoliberalism favors the policies and process of free-marked based private interests over social institutions, where profit becomes the driving goal. Harvey (2005) explains that neoliberalism is a “theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” (p. 2).

<sup>23</sup> Statistics on Egypt can be at 2014 World Bank Country Development Indicators, Arab Republic of Egypt, retrieved from [http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic#cp\\_wdi](http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic#cp_wdi)

also a slow in the available jobs for Egyptian migrants seeking employment in Gulf countries thereby reducing remittances to families in Egypt. To complicate the situation, the demand for affordable housing and arable land increased, as land was being utilized for gated communities and high-scale developments as well as to grow export-orientated cash-crops.

The economic policies implemented by Mubarak also exacerbated other socio-economic issues plaguing Egyptians, including the demographic “youth bulge” taking place in Egypt. Chaaban (2009) compiled statistical data that demonstrated the size of the youth population in Arab countries including Egypt, and the extent of their exclusion from participating effectively in economic, social, and political life. A 2006 national census reported that 40 percent of the Egyptian population was between the ages of 10-29. Using global data from multiple agencies, Chaaban (2009) found that tertiary education enrolment rates were at 33 percent of the youth population of Egypt in 2004, but that rate dropped to 28.5 percent in 2008. Further, unemployment rates for Egyptian youth were 33.5 percent in 2006, not including the high rates of underemployment. Chaaban (2009) also highlighted the gender imbalance in the enrolment of higher education and employment in Egypt. The author found that 25.8 percent of females aged 15-24 were not in the labor force *and* not in school, compared to the male figure of only 12.2 percent. Overall, the economic conditions for Egyptians were dire, forcing many to focus on everyday survival rather than partaking within the structures of formal political participation.

The demand for education created by the extraordinary size of the Egyptian youth population only compounded the quality of education that schools and universities in Egypt could provide. Although Mubarak and ministers of education recognized the need to reform the education system at multiple levels, reforms were limited and priority was still placed on access to education rather than quality. One such reform attempt was to recognize the value of

citizenship education. For example, in 1981 Law No. 139 increased the compulsory numbers of years of schooling from six to nine years, and article 16 justifies compulsory education with the need “to prepare the individual to be a productive citizen in their environment and community” (El-Nagar & Krugly-Smolka, 2009, p. 46). In 1996, the Ministry of Education (MOE) published *Implementing Egypt’s Educational Reform Strategy*. The MOE’s *Reform Strategy* pursued educational reform in a “democratic framework,” necessary for students:

Necessary for students, through all stages of the educational ladder be exposed to different types of learning tools and materials, and taught necessary democratic skills, such as debate, tolerance for other opinions, *critical analysis* and *thinking*, and the significance of *participating in decision making*. Practicing democracy and functioning in democratic systems is therefore one of the priorities for schools and educational institutions. (MOE, 1996, p. 22)

Additionally, in the early 2000s a number of national conferences on education were held, focusing on supporting national unity, development of Egyptian identity throughout the educational processes, strengthening students’ sense of belonging, and integrating democratic values (MOE, 2003). The Ministry of Education in 2003 also published eight core principles for teaching citizenship education:

- 1) civic education (duties and rights);
- 2) life skills (ability to negotiate, to cooperate, tolerance of others, and diversity in opinions);
- 3) government system (democracy, constitution, People’s Council, elections, citizens’ role in elections);
- 4) preserving heritage (Arab and Egyptian heritage, Islamic and Coptic heritage, Arab and Egyptian values and traditions);
- 5) Egypt’s relations with other countries (on the Arab level, the Islamic level, the African level, and the global level);
- 6) non-government organizations ( conditions to establish NGOs, the role of NGOs);
- 7) Arab organizations and institutions (League of Arab States, Arab Common Market, Islamic Conference Organization, African Unity Organization; and
- 8) international organization and institutions (United Nations, World Health Organization, and International Labor Organization) (Baraka, 2008, p. 11).

In 2006, Mubarak set up a cabinet committee to establish citizenship education through non-formal organizations such as the

media and NGOs, and civic education became a frequent issue in parliamentary discussion and presidential speeches, and a topic of mass media programs (Baraka, 2008). In 2008, as a perceived part of providing quality education, the MOE also published a set of goals to “achieve a qualitative shift in education, and to raise and improve the quality of the educational process.” Two of the goals were related to citizenship education. The first goal sought to “sow in students the spirit of tolerance, the sense of belonging, moral and religious values, dialogue ethics and citizenship,” and the second underscored to “build active citizens and effective participants in a constantly changing global society” (MOE, 2008, pp.7-8). Also in 2008, the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of State for Scientific Research laid out “six basic axes for the development of higher education and scientific research,” including “deepening the spirit of belongingness and love for the country, based on conscious realization of a balance between rights and duties” (MOHE, 2008, p. 16). In light of these policies, new themes, such as citizenship and civic rights, human rights, globalization, children and women’s rights, political awareness, the role of non-government organizations, and the meaning of democracy, were being included in curricula and textbooks throughout schools and universities (Baraka, 2008, p. 7). However, the inclusion of approaches to citizenship education in education reform during this period poses two questions. First, why did the Egyptian government promote citizenship education as part of their national agenda and, second, to what extent was citizenship education in Egypt successfully implemented?

There are two reasons for the promotion of citizenship education by the Egyptian government. First, an education that promotes the NDP’s vision of national loyalty and participatory citizenship specifically, and quality education in general, was seen as in the interest of national security. Sayed (2006) explains that in most speeches on education, “President Mubarak links educational reform to national security, espousing the broader definition of national security that encompasses political,

economic, as well as military dimensions” (p. 27). Education as a matter of national security can be understood in relation to the eruption of militant Islamists groups conducting terror attacks directed at the Egyptian tourist sites and assassinations of political and intellectual figures during the 1990s (including an attempted assassination against Mubarak during a trip to Ethiopia in 1997). One estimate sheds light on the wide scale violence and instability in Egypt at the time, from 1992 to 1999 approximately one thousand people were killed and twenty thousand arrested (Sayed, 2006, p. 32). Therefore, education was touted as “one of the government’s major counter-offensive in the struggle with extremism in the long run” (Cook, 2000, p. 32). Although attempts at citizenship education were being promoted as part of the government’s approach to policy, pedagogical and curriculum reform and as part of the “counter-offensive” against militant ideologies, it appears that the focus was more on restrictive education policies that seemed to de-legitimize any attempts by the government to promote ideas of democracy and active citizenship through education. Cook (2000) describes the means through which the government in the 1990s attempted to control schools and universities—as part of the government’s broad goal of national security. Thousands of teachers were expelled or transferred to remote schools for being suspected extremists. Additionally, in 1992 the MOE stationed the state security apparatus on university campuses to identify faculty members and students who might be connected to extremist groups. Moreover, in 1994 the People’s Assembly passed Law No. 142, which limited the independence of the universities by allowing the government to determine who should fill university positions such as presidents, deans and members of promotions committees (Cook, 2000, p. 44). The MOE also attempted to enact policies in schools and universities against male students growing beards or wearing *gallabiyyas* (traditional clothing) and against women wearing the *niqab* (face and body coverings) and the *hijab* (head scarf), a controversial issue that still persists throughout Egyptian public universities today.

The second reason for the promotion of citizenship education in Egypt can be connected to the Mubarak regime's turn towards neoliberal policies and the influx foreign private donors to education. On the one hand, to increase a sense of national identity, citizenship education was one way the government confronted growing forces of globalization. For example, a MOE (2000) policy document stated:

The potential dominance of technology over culture and civilization will necessitate strenuous efforts to deepen the values of loyalty and belonging among Egyptian citizens, to affirm Egyptian identity and reinforce all which pertains to our civilization and cultural heritage; thus, we cannot discard ethical values such as appreciation of beauty, happiness, peace and stability originating from family life or noble human values such as friendship, respect for others. (MOE, 2000, p. 114)

On the other hand, the development and discourses of education, such as citizenship education, were promoted through the influx of bilateral and international agencies that pressured the Egyptian government towards education reform (Ginsburg & Megahed, 2008; Ginsburg & Megahed, 2011; Megahed et al., 2010; Sayed, 2006). Increasing privatization of the education sector was viewed one way to alleviate some of the challenges faced by government schools and universities in Egypt. Correspondingly, the number of private schools and universities increase in Egypt. For example, in the 1990s, six private universities were opened in Egypt. Additionally, bilateral organizations such USAID and international organizations such as the World Bank provided and implemented various education projects in Egypt—educational endeavors whose goals included the development of citizenship skills and knowledge for Egyptians.

Although they may have been driven by noble educational discourses—discourses that spread to policy makers and practitioners—the educational endeavors by foreign and private education agencies were limited in their extent to not only address some of the troubles to education but to strengthen citizenship education in Egypt. With regards to private universities

and the spread of citizenship education, a 2003 report by UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in the Arab States concluded:

There is as yet no evidence that these new universities have succeeded in lifting the strain and alleviating the pressure on the higher education system in the region. Nor is there any evidence, with few exceptions, that they have provided students with more diversity or are succeeding to meet the needs of students, society, the labor market and the requirements of the global economy. (UNESCO, 2003, p. 7)

Therefore, in addition to being partial in their ability to meet the needs of labor market, private universities in Egypt and other Arab states, according to UNESCO, provided little evidence of delivering social needs, such education for participatory citizenship, community development and the social responsibilities of educational institutions. Herrera (2006) argues, “With the market-driven privatization of higher education, certain principles once embedded in the educational endeavor such as citizenship building, ethics, community responsibly, are apparently being replace to a large degree by individual interest and economic rationality” (p. 418). Therefore, individual interests and market-based benefits drive models of private higher education in Egypt are emphasized more than by the development of active citizens.

As for foreign directed educational programs, the development of quality and citizenship education appears also to be limited. Researching the impact of the USAID/Egypt’s Basic Education Program 1981 to 1989, Megahed et al. (2010) found that focus of the program was on school construction, instructional materials, and developing the organizational structure of the MOE, and limited attention was given to pedagogy and teacher training and issues of quality (Megahed et al., 2010, p. 4). Additionally, research on the topic conducted by Cochran (2008) concluded that education programs in Egypt implement by USAID and the World Bank “have been consistent in their failure to improve education in Egypt...The only continued outcome after thirty years of investment of over one billion dollars in World Bank loans and over one billion USAID dollars is continued escalation of social, education and economic crises” (p. 139).

During the Mubarak years, a disconnect existed between discourses of citizenship education and actual implementation within the classroom and the school site. From its inception, citizenship education was driven by an agenda that sought to either combat militant ideologies or to deflect the encroachment of global ideas democracy and human rights—both challenged the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. Thus, formal citizenship education was not grounded in inclusive policy that included student, teacher and school site contributions. Schools and universities were seen as a potential threat to national security and “in dire need of ideological and other forms of surveillance and control” (Herrera, 2008, p. 361). Therefore, citizenship education was more about top-down policies, whose focus was more on the control of students and placating international donors, than it was concerned with democratization and providing the skills, knowledge and values necessary to foster participatory citizens. It perpetuated loyalty, obedience, and passive citizenship creating an apathetic political and civic environment, failing to empower student-citizens and teacher-citizens. Furthermore, the restrictive educational conditions (overcrowded classrooms, over worked faculty members, extensive security apparatus, lack of institutional autonomy, and lack of updated libraries and facilities, etc.) greatly inhibited critical citizenship education. As El-Nagar and Krugly-Smolka (2009) argue, “The political, economic and social factors do not offer a suitable opportunity for teaching citizenship in Egypt. There is still a gap between the meaning of citizenship education in the traditional liberal democracies and the political, economic and social reality in Egypt” (p. 52). Furthermore, Baraka (2008) concluded four main reasons for the limitations of citizenship education in Egypt: (1) a centralized management of school curricula and policies excludes the views and participation of other educational actors; (2) the MOE divisions are overwhelmed with overlapping responsibilities; (3) the meaning and purpose of citizenship education is not fully understood, viewed not important or contested by many educators and practitioners; and (4) the most significant limitation is “due a political

environment that struggles for more democratization” (p. 15). With schools and universities not providing an adequate platform for citizenship education, Egyptians began to look towards other spaces to develop their skills and knowledge of participatory citizenship, and to voice their discontentment with the political, social and economic conditions under Mubarak regime. Many Egyptians became empowered as citizens through the various oppositional movements that were emerging.

The political disenfranchisement and disillusionment with formal political participation and the discontentment with the economic conditions forced Egyptian citizens during the later period of Mubarak’s presidency to use social movements as a tool to strive for a citizenship that publically fights for social, economic, and political rights—taking their grievances to the streets. There was a rise of oppositional movements in the first decade of the 2000s that challenged the policies and legitimacy of Mubarak. In 2000-2002, there were the social and political mobilizations in solidarity with the second Palestinian intifada as well as against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Beinun and Vairel (2011) explain these were “the first in a series of movements that gradually, in uncertainty, forced open public political space” (p. 247). In 2004-2005, the Egyptian Movement for Change known by its slogan, *Kefaya!* (Enough!), gathered a coalition of support to rally against issues of corruption, Mubarak’s campaign for a fifth term during the 2005 presidential elections, the state of emergency, and the possibility of transferring power to Mubarak’s son Gamal. The Kefaya movement broke down taboos of directly criticizing the president and his family, and as El-Mahdi (2009) describes, was “a consortium of new activists who breathed life into Egyptian politics” (p. 92). In 2004, the March 9 movement was formed by Egyptian professors who demanded institutional autonomy, the elimination of infringements on academic freedoms, and an end to state security apparatus on university campus. In 2006, a significant protest campaign to support the independence of the judiciary who

refused to certify the 2005 elections transpired. Recounting the mobilization for the independence of the judiciary, El-Mahdi (2009) explains that this was “an unprecedented development in which dissent came from within the core structures of the state itself” (p. 99). In an attempt to support labor strikes in the textile city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra the April 6 Youth Movement was formed in 2008. Although the strike was brutally suppressed by state security, the April 6 Movement played a vital role in mobilizations of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. Additionally, during this time the strength of the worker’s movements increased. From 2004 to 2008, there were approximately 1.7 million protesters participating in various strikes, public gatherings, sit-ins and demonstrations, and the overall number of various forms of protests increased from 114 in 1998 to 2,623 in 2008 (Beinin, 2011, pp. 187-191). Police torture and brutality was also a potent issue that Egyptians mobilized against. The popular “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page was created in 2010 to commemorate the death of Khaled Mohammed Said, a 28 year-old Alexandrian who was a victim of police brutality. The Facebook page and online photos of his corpse encouraged support for vigils and protests against police violence. Lesch (2014) argues, “The growing concern about (and direct experience of) police brutality by Egyptians from all walks of life, and their enhanced willingness to risk speaking out, were crucial in preparing the ground for the 25 January Revolution” (p. 37). The pre-January 25, 2011 movements provided Egyptian citizens with a vehicle to voice their discontentment and to demand various social, political and economic rights. After decades of fearing dissent, the movements cracked opened the Egyptian public sphere, empowered citizens with momentum and strategies, delegitimized the authoritarian regime and set the stage for mass support for protests occurring on January 25, 2011.

To conclude this chapter, Egypt provides an important case for analyzing the relationship between citizenship and education, especially during times of social and political transition and upheaval. The chapter highlights the connections between the development of citizenship rights and social struggle. Moreover, it demonstrates that citizenship is an evolving social process that takes on different forms and is used as a means of power to accept, contest, or transform the relationships between state and citizen and between citizens themselves. The chapter also showcases the relationship between education, citizenship and politics, exemplifying that education is a microcosm of politics and society and the education can be a tool used to influence ideas and practices of citizenship. Furthermore, it also shows the skills, knowledge and virtues of citizenship is not only fostered through formal government institutions, but citizen agency and empowerment can also be nurtured through non-formal educational sites such as social movements. The legacies of citizenship and education and the struggle for various forms citizenship to address social, political and economic issues that was presented in this section will echo throughout this dissertation as it does throughout Egyptian society.

### **CHAPTER 3: REIMAGINING CITIZENSHIP THROUGH REVOLUTION AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN EGYPT: THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT IN EGYPT (JANUARY 2011 TO JUNE 2015)**

The January 25, 2011 Egyptian Revolution was driven, to a large extent, by the indignation and democratic aspirations of a broad-based coalition of Egyptian people. The chants of “*aish, horreya, adala egtema’eya*” (bread, freedom, social justice) embodied the pursuit for an Egypt that is governed in a more equitable manner, demanding greater dignity and opportunities for Egyptian citizens to civically, politically, and economically participate in the future development of their country. Egyptian citizens broke down barriers of fear and publically demonstrated their discontent with the Mubarak regime and demanded “down with the regime.” However, subsequent instability and a second Revolution (some refer to it as a popular coup) have revealed contention and contentious politics (Beinin & Vairel, 2011; Korany & El-Mahdi, 2014; Lynch, 2014; Tarrow, 2011)<sup>24</sup> surrounding emerging models, concepts, and policies of citizenship and the future identity of the Egyptian state (CIHRS, 2014; El Fegiery, 2014a; El Fegiery, 2014b; El Fegiery & Saad, 2013; Freedom House, 2015; HRW, 2014; HRW, 2015; U.S. Dept. of State, 2014; U.S. Dept. of State, 2015; Saad & El Fegiery, 2014).

In this chapter, I attempt to build a context to situate the study, familiarize the readers with recent social, political and economic events, while merging the various events with justifications that provide overall rationales for the dissertation. First, I present a chronology of socio-political events occurring in Egypt during the January 25, 2011 Revolution ([Section 3.1](#)) and its aftermath ([Section 3.2](#)). Then in [Section 3.3](#), I describe six characteristics that not only make the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution noteworthy but also provide a backdrop to the revolution and

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<sup>24</sup> Tarrow (2011) defines contentious politics occurring “when ordinary people—often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in the public mood—join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents...contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives to take action for actors who lack resources on their own” (p. 6).

explain its significance for the present study. Moreover, in [Section 3.4](#), I argue that focusing qualitative research on the perceptions and experiences of “ordinary citizens” during this volatile and fluid era can help to uncover and amplify the enduring struggles as well as glimmer of hopes that are dedicated towards transforming Egyptian society. In [Section 3.5](#), I argue that the current political transition in Egypt, the seemingly raise in citizenship consciousness provides, and the interest in citizenship issues in Arab states, provide a unique historical opportunity for analyzing how perceptions of citizenship have been impacted by the Revolution and the extent to which participation and education are transforming under a new state. In [Section 3.6](#), I provide a rationale for focusing on university students and educators that is grounded in the understanding that universities play an integral and often contentious role within state-society relationships and are acutely connected to the social, political and economic context in which they are located.

### **3.1 January 25, 2011 Egyptian Revolution: Chronology of Key Events<sup>25</sup>**

In January 2011, Egyptian activists begin to call for demonstrations against police brutality, poverty, unemployment, corruption and long-term rule of President Hosni Mubarak. On January 25, Egyptians protested on the national holiday to mark Police Day. While protesters initially focused in downtown Cairo, protests soon spread throughout the country. Activists label this the “Day of Rage.” The demonstrators chanted: “Bread, freedom, social justice,” “Raise your head up you’re Egyptian,” and “The people want to topple the regime.” Some of the demands from activists included the stepping down of Mubarak, the cancellation of the emergency law, the dissolution of the Parliament and the Shura council, as well as economic demands, such as increasing the minimum wage and more job opportunities for the unemployed. The next day,

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<sup>25</sup> This section is assembled from various research and news reports on the January 25, 2011 Egyptian Revolution, most notably, El-Ghobashy (2012), Fahmy, Al Tobgy, and El Baz (2011), Gelvin (2015), Irshad (2012), Korany and El-Mahdi (2014), and Sowers and Toensing (2012).

protests continue amidst clashes between police and protesters. On January 27, as the protests continue throughout the country, Mohamed El Baradei, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 2005 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, arrives in Tahrir Square to join the protesters announcing that he is willing to lead the transition. Social media services disrupted.

January 28 is known as the “Friday of Rage.” The day is marked by a number of violent injuries and deaths, as well as a number of arson fires. The government attempted to suppress mobilization of a new wave of protesters after Friday prayers by shutting down mobile phones and Internet services. Additionally, the metro in Cairo was shut down. The Egyptian army was deployed to major protests sites including Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria, but did not yet intervene between police and protesters. The Muslim Brotherhood also for the first time formally announced its participation in the protests. In Cairo, the day’s events were underscored by “The Battle of the Kasr El Nile Bridge,” where on a bridge over the Nile, protests squared off with riot-gear clad police officers armed with clubs and tear gas and backed by riot tanks.

The next day, on January 29, shortly after midnight, Mubarak announced that he had dissolved his cabinet and for the first time during his nearly thirty years in power, appointed a vice president, Omar Suleiman, the chief of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service. However, Mubarak refused to step-down. The chaos in the country ensued. Conflicting reports of prisoners were released by the interior ministry and by protesters, which forced some Egyptians to not only reconsider joining protests but to also organize neighborhood watches to protect their homes and business. The famous Cairo Museum was surrounded by the Egyptian military after reports of looters breaking in and stealing antiquities. Adjacent to the museum, the building of the National Democratic Party (NDP), the party headquarters of Mubarak, was set ablaze by

protesters. Many foreign embassies, including the U.S. embassy, advised its citizens to leave the country as soon as possible. For the next couple of days, protesters defied military-imposed curfew as thousands swelled and supported the entrenched ranks in public spaces, like Tahrir Square in Cairo, seizing autonomy and authority from the police and the government.

On February 1, Mubarak announced he would not run for reelection, called for a peaceful transition, for constitutional reforms, particularly Articles 76 and 77 (restrictions on independent candidates and unrestricted presidential term limits, respectively), to improve economic opportunities and decrease poverty, and to improve police relations with citizens, making numerous condescending references to the Egyptian people as his children.<sup>26</sup> The next day, clashes between anti-government and pro-Mubarak protesters escalated around the country and turned violent. Mostly notably, the bizarre, so-called “Battle of the Camel” occurred. This event was marked by pro-Mubarak thugs riding on camels and horses armed with swords, sticks, and whips, charging into protesters around the streets of Tahrir Square.<sup>27</sup>

As the country entered the eleventh day of mass protests on February 4, hundreds of thousands gathered in Tahrir Square for what has been called the “Day of Departure,” urging Mubarak to step-down. Tents have been constructed in Tahrir Square by harden protesters. On February 7, in an attempt to ease the masses, the government approves a 15 percent raise in salaries and pensions. State authorities release political activist Wael Ghonim, the founder of the popular Facebook page “We are Khalid Said” and Google executive, after his arrest on January 27. Later that night Ghonim appeared in an emotional and inspirational interview on Egyptian television.

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<sup>26</sup> For a full transcription of the speech by Matthew Shaffer, see <http://www.nationalreview.com/developing/258629/transcript-mubaraks-speech-matthew-shaffer>

<sup>27</sup> *Al Ahrām*, February 2, 2012, Egypt’s ‘Battle of the Camel’: The day the tide turned. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/33470.aspx>

On February 9, tens of thousands of workers and labor unions from various public and private sectors participated in a nation-wide strike (Gelvin, 2015, pp. 61-62). The next day on February 10, in his third speech since the uprising began, “from the father to his sons and daughters” Mubarak announces constitutional reforms, free elections, and delegated presidential powers to the vice president, but did not resign.<sup>28</sup>

On February 11, 2011, in a speech delivered by recently appointed vice president Omar Suleiman, Suleiman announced that after nearly 30 years in office (from October 14, 1981 to February 11, 2011), “President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step-down from the office of president of the republic and has charged to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) (led by General Mohamed Hussein Tantawi) to administer the affairs of the country. May God help everybody.”<sup>29</sup> People celebrated in Tahrir Square and throughout the country until the early morning.

### **3.2 Chronology of Four Post-2011 Transitional Periods**

The following section presents four transitional periods in Egypt, chronologically offering key socio-political events that occurred from February 11, 2011 to June 2015. The chronologies will help build the socio-political context of the study and setup additional problem statements at the end of this chapter.

#### **3.2.1 Period I: Socio-political transitions and SCAF (February 11, 2011 to June 30, 2012)**

**February 12 to 13, 2011:** The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF) dissolves the 2010 Parliament and suspends constitution. Protesters begin to clean the streets. Protests against any symbol of the former Mubarak regime continue for months around Egypt.

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<sup>28</sup>For full transcription of speech by Federal Document Clearing House, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021005290\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021005290_pf.html)

<sup>29</sup>For full transcription of speech, see <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12-suleiman-speech-text.html>

SCAF promises to hand over power to elected, civilian government and pledges that Egypt is committed to all international treaties. SCAF also begins to arrest and place travel bans on several of the country's former ministers, in addition to making several attempts to remove protesters and encampment from Tahrir Square. Police and other public sector workers and bank employees hold protests throughout major cities.

**February 14, 2011:** SCAF issues "Communiqué No. 5:" calling for national solidarity, criticizes strikes, and urges workers to revive economy.<sup>30</sup>

**March 3, 2011:** SCAF appoints former transportation minister Essam Sharaf as prime minister.

**March 9, 2011:** The military and civilians attempt to dispel protesters occupying Tahrir Square. Hundreds of activists are arrested, "including nearly twenty women who are subjected to strip searches, virginity tests, threats of prostitution charges, and physical torture."<sup>31</sup>

**March 19 to 21, 2011:** The first constitutional referendum after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution was held. The amendments were approved by 77.2 percent (14.1 million voters, 41 percent turnout).

**March 23, 2011:** The Egyptian cabinet and SCAF approved a law criminalizing protests and established imprisonment and fines for protests, strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins.<sup>32</sup>

**March 28, 2011:** Activist Maikel Nabil is arrested and later sentenced three years in military prison for writing a blog-post criticizing the military.

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<sup>30</sup> *Al Arabiya News*, February 14, 2011, Egypt army urges unity, criticizes strikes, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/14/137510.html>

<sup>31</sup> Ghazala Irshad (Summer 2012). Egypt's Political Transition. *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*. <http://www.thecaireview.com/timelines/timelines-egypts-political-transition/>

<sup>32</sup> *Human Rights Watch*, March 25, 2011, Egypt: Revoke Ban on Strikes, Demonstrations, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/25/egypt-revoke-ban-strikes-demonstrations>

**March 30, 2011:** SCAF unilaterally issues a 63-article provisional constitution declaration establishing new rules for the formation of the Constituent Assembly, reserving a privileged role for itself and assuming greater legislative and executive powers.<sup>33</sup>

**April 8, 2011:** Mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square are held to pressure SCAF and prosecute Mubarak and members of the old regime. Protesters are violently dispersed by military and police.

**April 16, 2011:** The former ruling party of Mubarak, the National Democracy Party (NDP) is dissolved by an Egyptian high court.

**May 24, 2011:** Former President Mubarak is charged with abuses of public office and with killing of protesters.

**May 27, 2011:** During what has been called the “Second Day of Rage,” protesters demand the continuation of the Revolution and its demands.

**June 6, 2011:** The political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party is declared legal.

**Late June 2011:** SCAF issues “Communiqué No. 69,” accusing the April 6 Youth Movement of being funded from foreign sources and for creating a rift between the people and the army.<sup>34</sup>

**July 8, 2011:** Hundreds of thousands of protesters in Tahrir Square and around Egypt stage demonstrations and sit-ins and demand immediate trials on members of former regime, punishment for the killing of peaceful protesters and against the rule of SCAF.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> *Mada Masr*, January 13, 2014, Egypt’s winding path toward a new constitution, <http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/egypt's-winding-path-toward-new-constitutio>

<sup>34</sup> *Al Ahram*, August 29, 2011, Egypt’s Supreme Military Council: Promises, kept, broken, deferred, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/19934.aspx>; also see *Masress*, June 28, 2011, News Analysis: A revolution in peril, <http://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/27261>

<sup>35</sup> *Al Ahram*, July 8, 2011, Live updates: A blow by blow account of Egypt’s ‘Friday of Determination.’ <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/15863.aspx>

**July 13, 2011:** SCAF delays parliamentary elections until November. Mass protests erupt in Tahrir Square and in front of parliament building.

**July 23, 2011:** A march from Tahrir Square to the Ministry of Defense took place to protest continued demands of justice for the actions of the former regime.

**July 29, 2011:** There was an initial protest action entitled “the Friday of popular will and united front.” However, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist parties held massive demonstrations against SCAF for overstepping constitutional conditions, in addition to advocating for the implementation of Islamic Law, towards “the Islamic identity of the nation.” These demonstrations overshadowed the revolutionary groups that participated and demanded an end to military trials, justice for the martyrs of the revolution, swift trials and punishment for former Mubarak-era officials, and minimum wage for workers.<sup>36</sup> The event was later dubbed by the media “Kandahar Friday,” referring to the city in Afghanistan that became a haven for conservative Islamism.<sup>37</sup>

**August 1, 2011:** The military clears a month-long sit-in in Tahrir Square by force.

**August 3, 2011:** The trials begin for ousted president Mubarak, his former interior minister, and six police officers charged with killing of protesters during the January and February. Additionally, Mubarak and his two sons are held on corruption charges.

**September 9, 2011:** SCAF extends and activates the Emergency Law. The reactivation of the Emergency Law came after protesters stormed the Israeli embassy building, bringing down the Israeli flag, and forced Israeli ambassador to flee to Israel. The clashes between

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<sup>36</sup> *Al Ahrām*, July 28, 2011, Egypt’s Islamists and Secularists avoid confrontation and joined hands for yet another Friday of protest, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/17498/Egypt/0/Egypt-0/Egypt-0-Islamists-and-Secularists-avoid-confrontati.aspx>

<sup>37</sup> *Al Ahrām*, January 24, 2013, Mastering the art of revolution, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/1157/31/Mastering-the-art-of-revolution.aspx>

protesters and the police and the army further resulted in killing three and injuring 1,049 including policemen.<sup>38</sup>

**October 9, 2011:** What became to be known as the *Maspero Massacre* occurred. Dozens of protesters were killed and hundreds injured when the army attempted to crackdown on activists protesting against the demolition of a Coptic Church.<sup>39</sup>

**November 18, 2011:** Nearly a week of violent battles between protesters and the police ensued on Mohamed Mahmoud Street, which is connected to Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo.<sup>40</sup> More than forty people were killed and over 1,500 injured by rubber bullets, tear gas, and police batons.

**November 21, 2011:** The Egyptian cabinet led by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf resigns after events of Mohamed Mahmoud Street.

**November 25, 2011:** Mass protests in Tahrir Square were held calling for SCAF to step down. SCAF replaces Sharaf with Kamal El-Ganzouri, former prime minister under Mubarak.

**November 28, 2011 to February 15, 2012:** The first multi-stage parliamentary elections are held. The Muslim Brotherhood wins almost half of the seats. The Salafi Islamists take a quarter of seats. Liberal, independent, and secular politicians take remaining seats. Voter turnout is 59 percent.

**Mid-December 2011:** Mass protests continued in Tahrir Square, Egyptian cabinet building in downtown Cairo, and Qasr Al-Aini Street. The protests culminate in a “million man” march protest to commemorate the martyrs of the revolution and to rally against the latest

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<sup>38</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, September 12, 2011, Legal experts say amending, extending emergency law illegal, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/09/12/legal-experts-say-amending-extending-emergency-law-illegal/>

<sup>39</sup> *Al Ahram*, October 10, 2011, Maspero injury toll rises to 329: Health ministry, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/23789.aspx>

<sup>40</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 19, 2012, Remembering Mohamed Mahmoud: The good, the bad, and the Brotherhood. <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/11/19/remembering-mohamed-mahmoud-the-good-the-bad-and-the-brotherhood/>

army crackdown on demonstrators. Most significant, was the brutal military attacks and abuses on women protesters.<sup>41</sup> In the aftermath of the images of the military treatment of female protesters, one of the biggest demonstrations for women's rights in modern Egyptian history took place on December 20.<sup>42</sup>

## 2012

**January 14, 2012:** Mohamed El Baradei withdraws from the presidential race.

**January 16, 2012:** Egypt requests \$3.2billion IMF loan to support economy amid political turmoil.

**January 23, 2012:** Egypt's first democratically elected parliament convenes.

**January 25, 2012:** To mark the one-year anniversary of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, hundreds of thousands protested against SCAF and demanded justice for the martyrs of the revolution.

**February 1, 2012:** Over 70 people are killed in riots after a soccer match in Port Said stadium.

**March 28, 2012:** Members of parliament connected to liberal, secular, and Coptic parties walk out of the newly elected Parliament, accusing Islamist MPs of monopolizing the selection process for the 100-member constituent assembly.

**April 10, 2012:** The Supreme Administrative Court suspends the constituent assembly after ruling its formation questionable due to having an Islamist majority.<sup>43</sup>

**April 14, 2014:** The Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC) disqualified ten potential candidates from upcoming presidential elections, most notably Omar Suleiman

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<sup>41</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, December 15, 2012, Cabinet clashes remembered, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/15/cabinet-clashes/>; also see Reuters, December 21, 2011, Attack on Egyptian women protesters spark uproar, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-women-idUSTRE7BK1BX20111221>

<sup>42</sup> *Al Ahrām*, December 20, 2011, 10,000 Egyptian women march against military violence and rule, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/29824.aspx>

<sup>43</sup> *Al Ahrām*, April 10, 2012, Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court suspends embattled Constituent Assembly, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/38936.aspx>

(former Chief of Egyptian Intelligence and Mubarak's former vice president), Salafist preacher Hazem Abu-Ismaïl, and Muslim Brotherhood candidate Khairat Al-Shater, who was replaced by Mohammed Morsi.

**May 23 to 24, 2012:** The first round of the democratic presidential elections took place between thirteen candidates (46.4 percent voter turnout). Run-off presidential elections are held on June 16 to 17 between The Freedom and Justice candidate (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood) Mohammed Morsi (24.8 percent) and former prime minister under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafik (23.7 percent).

**May 31, 2012:** SCAF chooses not to extend Egypt's Emergency Law that has been in effect in Egypt since 1981.<sup>44</sup>

**June 2, 2012:** Ousted President Hosni Mubarak and former Interior Minister, Habib Al-Adly, are sentenced to life in prison for neglecting to prevent deaths of prisoners. Mubarak's sons and senior aides to Interior Minister acquitted of various charges.

**June 8, 2012:** A new constitutional assembly is formed with 100 people. On June 12, 57 members of the parliament walked out during the voting of the constitutional assembly.<sup>45</sup>

**June 13 to 14, 2012:** The Justice Ministry issues a decree authorizing military police and intelligence officers to arrest civilians.<sup>46</sup> The Supreme Constitutional Court invalidates elements of the parliamentary election, dissolving the lower house of the Parliament. Assembly speaker Saad Al-Katatni attempts to convene the Parliament anyway, but the

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<sup>44</sup> *Egypt Independent*, May 31, 2012, State of emergency ends, military council say will not renew, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/883806>

<sup>45</sup> *Mada Masr*

<sup>46</sup> *Al Ahram*, June 13, 2012, Egypt military intelligence, police authorized to arrest civilians, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/44786.aspx>

military orders entrances to the building locked and stations troops around the perimeter.<sup>47</sup>

**June 15 to 18, 2012:** SCAF issues an addendum to interim constitutional decree that limits presidential powers, grants itself broad powers over the new government's legislation, the national budget, and military affairs, without any oversight of its own activities.<sup>48</sup>

**June 24, 2012:** The Freedom and Justice candidate (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood), Mohamed Morsi, defeats Ahmed Shafik (former prime minister under Mubarak) with 51.7 percent of the vote (51 percent voter turnout) and is declared the winner of the presidential election.

**June 30, 2012** Mohamed Morsi is sworn in as president.

### **3.2.2 Period II: Socio-political transitions and President Mohamed Morsi (June 30, 2012 to July 3, 2013)**

**July 8, 2012:** President Morsi issues first presidential decree demanding reinstatement of the dissolved lower house of parliament (the People's Assembly). However, the Supreme Constitutional Court freezes Morsi's decree on July 10.

**June 26, 2012:** Second constituent assembly convenes.<sup>49</sup>

**August 2, 2012:** New prime minister, Hisham Qandil appoints cabinet dominated by former Mubarak officials, technocrats and Islamists, excluding secular and liberal figures.

**August 8, 2012:** Egyptian military announced "Operation Eagle" aimed at security of the Sinai Peninsula, is now engaged with combat missions against Sinai-based militants.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Egypt Independent, Note #44.

<sup>48</sup> *Al Ahram*, June 18, 2012, English text of SCAF amended Egypt Constitutional Declaration, <http://english.ahram.org/News/45350.aspx>

<sup>49</sup> *Al Ahram*, June 27, 2012, Egypt's constituent assembly convenes Tuesday with future still in doubt, <http://english.ahram.org/News/46274.aspx>

<sup>50</sup> *Al Ahram*, August 8, 2012, 'Operation Eagle' will not stop until Sinai is terror-free: Egypt's military, <http://english.ahram.org/News/49956.aspx>

**August 12, 2012:** President Morsi removes military leadership including Field Marshal Tantawi, and replacing Tantawi with Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. The same decree reversed the constitutional declaration issued by SCAF in March and the addendum in June.<sup>51</sup>

**October 10, 2012:** Egyptian court acquits several Mubarak era officials accused of killing protesters during the February 2011 “Battle of the Camel.”

**October 12, 2012:** Protesters gather to mark the first 100 days of Morsi’s presidency named “Accountability Friday,” pushing for the realization of revolutionary demands.

**November 19, 2012:** Thousands march in Cairo to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the clashes of Mohamed Mahmoud Street.

**November 22, 2012:** President Morsi announces constitutional decree granting him greater presidential powers, including presidential decisions given immunity from judicial review, preventing courts from dissolving panel-drafting constitution.<sup>52</sup> The actions by Morsi are condemned by opposition, and spark popular protests. Clashes between supporters and opponents of President Morsi erupt throughout Egypt.

**November 24, 2012:** A number of judges declare a strike until President Morsi’s decree is upturned.

**November 27 to 30, 2012:** Thousands march to protest Morsi’s “November Constitutional decree.”

**November 29, 2012:** Constitutional assembly voted on new constitution draft. Islamist members dominate the assembly, after a number of non-Islamist resigns criticizing the

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<sup>51</sup> *Al Ahrām*, June 28, 2013, Egypt’s President Morsi in power: A Timeline (Part I), <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/74427.aspx>

<sup>52</sup> *Al Ahrām*, November 22, 2012, English text of Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspx>

monopolizing of Islamist in drafting process. Secular, liberal, Coptic and other religious minority groups, oppose this draft.

**December 1, 2012:** President Morsi declares that national referendum on constitution will be held on December 15.

**December 4 to 14, 2012:** Hundreds of thousands march on Cairo's Heliopolis Presidential Palace to demand the postponement of constitutional referendum until a national consensus is reached. Bloody clashes between protesters and Morsi supporters occur. Regional offices of the Muslim Brotherhood are torched across Egypt.<sup>53</sup> On December 6-7, 2012, President Morsi calls for national dialogue. The National Salvation Front (NSF), a loose coalition of opposition parties and movements, reject the call and anti-Morsi protesting continues throughout the country.<sup>54</sup> On December 8, 2012, Morsi holds a national dialogue, but NSF opposition does not attend. President Morsi rescinds his controversial decree of being above judicial review, but maintains date for national referendum.

**December 15 to 22, 2012:** Egyptians vote to approve on draft constitution with 63.8 percent in favor (32.9 percent turnout). The new constitution is formally approved on December 25, 2012.

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<sup>53</sup> *Al Ahrām*, December 6, 2012, Presidential Palace Clashes: The aftermath, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/06/presidential-palace-clashes-the-aftermath/>

<sup>54</sup> *Al Ahrām*, Note # 26

## 2013

**January 25 to 26, 2013:** To commemorate the two-year anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, combined with protests over the decision in the Port Said soccer riot trial, massive protests in Tahrir Square and Port Said, chanting President Morsi to step down.<sup>55</sup>

**January 27, 2013:** In reaction to more than a month of consistent protests and violence, President Morsi calls for state of emergency and curfews in the cities of Port Said, Suez, and Ismailia for one month. For a second time, he also calls for national dialogue, but parties in the National Salvation Front decline.<sup>56</sup>

**March 12, 2013:** Egypt rejects U.S. \$750 million IMF (International Monetary Fund) rescue loan.

**March 2013:** Egypt is plagued with fuel and electricity shortages.

**April 10, 2013:** Bassem Youssef, popular Egyptian satirist, some call the “Jon Stewart of Egypt,” received arrest warrant for “insulting the president and Islam.”

**April 28, 2013:** *Tamarod* (Rebel) movement is established, which is collecting signatures calling for no confidence of President Morsi, his removal and early presidential elections. The goal of the campaign is to collect more signatures to counter the 13.2 million votes won in the presidential run-off election in June.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, January 25, 2013, Cairo protests: Updates, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/01/25/cairo-protests-roundup/>. Also see *Daily News Egypt*, January 26, 2013, Unprecedented violence in Port Said, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/01/26/unprecedented-violence-in-port-said/>

<sup>56</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, January 27, 2013, Morsy announces state of emergency in three cities, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/01/27/morsy-announces-state-of-emergency-in-three-cities/>

<sup>57</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, April 28, 2013, No-confidence petition launched against Morsi, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/28/no-confidence-petition-launched-against-morsi/>

**May 3, 2013:** U.S. government rewards Morsi's government with \$250 million in aid in exchange for pledges of political and economic stabilization.<sup>58</sup> Since the election of President Morsi, Egypt witnesses a continuous depreciation of its currency, foreign reserves, and revenues from major sectors including tourism, while poverty rates and food and fuel shortages increase.<sup>59</sup>

**June 16, 2013:** President Morsi appoints 16 new governors, of whom, 13 are Islamist allies.

**June 28 to 30, 2013:** Millions of Egyptians protests against Morsi. Demonstrations are held around the Presidential Palace in Heliopolis suburb of Cairo, as well as 10 other locations.

**June 30, 2013:** One-year anniversary of Morsi as president. Millions of protesters, led by the *Tamarod* movement, gathered to demand Morsi's resignation.

**July 1, 2013:** Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces, Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi gives President Morsi 48 hours to resolves issues with opposition.<sup>60</sup>

**July 2, 2013:** President Morsi delivers a televised speech, vows to remain in office, insisting his constitutional and democratic legitimacy, and calls on the Army to withdraw its warning.<sup>61</sup>

**July 3, 2013:** Field Marshall al-Sisi announces the removal of Morsi, installing Adly Mansour (Constitutional Court Chief Justice) as the interim president, suspending 2012

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<sup>58</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, March 4, 2013, Kerry rewards Egypt \$250m for Morsi's reforms, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/03/04/kerry-rewards-egypt-250m-for-morsis-reforms/>

<sup>59</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, September 20, 2014, Egypt's economy over three years of turmoil, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/09/20/egypts-economy-three-years-turmoil/>

<sup>60</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, July 1, 2013, Army sets 48-hour ultimatum, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/01/army-sets-48-hour-ultimatum/>

<sup>61</sup> *Al Ahram*, July 3, 2013, Egypt's Morsi defies calls to step down, offers opposition partial concessions, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75538.aspx>

constitution, and dissolving Parliament.<sup>62</sup> Al-Sisi also unveiled the political “road map” for the future of Egypt, including a new constitution, and presidential and parliamentary elections.<sup>63</sup>

### **3.2.3 Period III: Socio-political transitions and Interim President Adly Mansour (July 3, 2013 to June 3, 2014)**

**July 8, 2013:** Soldiers fire on Morsi supporters outside a military facility in Cairo, killing over 50 people and injuring hundreds. Mansour sets timeline for amending the constitution, electing a new president and parliament by mid-February. The Muslim Brotherhood boycotts the process.

**July 16, 2013:** Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi and other ministers are sworn into the interim cabinet.

**July 24, 2013:** In attempt to gain a public mandate to continue the coup, Minister of Defense General al-Sisi calls for mass demonstrations on Friday, July 26 to confront violence and terrorism, as well as show support for the military-backed interim government.<sup>64</sup>

**July 26, 2013:** Thousands of pro-military groups demonstrate. In addition, counter demonstrations occur, and violent clashes between pro-Morsi groups and security forces, and between pro-Morsi groups and those groups for the military erupt (Friday night during Ramadan).<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, July 4, 2013, Morsi Ousted, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/04/morsi-ousted/>

<sup>63</sup> Al Ahram, July 3, 2013, Egypt military unveils transitional roadmap, <http://english.ahram.org/News/75631.aspx>

<sup>64</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, July 24, 2013, Al-Sisi calls for green light to fight “terrorism.” <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/24/al-sisi-calls-for-green-light-to-fight-terrorism/>

<sup>65</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, July 26, 2013, Thousands march to presidential palace “against violence and terrorism,” <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/26/thousands-march-to-presidential-palace-against-violence-and-terrorism/>. Also see *Daily New Egypt*, July 27, 2013, Rabaa clashes spark outrage, debate over casualties, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/27/rabaa-clashes-spark-outrage-debate-over-casualties/>

**June 27, 2013:** Anti-Coup Alliance is formed. Also known as the National Coalition for

Supporting Legitimacy. This group is a coalition of 40 Islamists parties and groups that support the democratic legitimacy of Morsi, reject violence and oppose political figures associated with the former Mubarak regime.<sup>66</sup>

**August 14, 2013** is known as “Black Wednesday” and has been called “the bloodiest single day

since the Revolution.”<sup>67</sup> Hundreds of Morsi supporters are killed when security forces

forcefully disperse protesters in Cairo. Subsequent political violence ensues. In

retaliation, government buildings, churches and police stations are torched. Black

Wednesday is most known for the events that took place in the *Rabaa al-Adawiya* and *al-*

*Nahda* Squares, where the killing of between 817 to more than 1,000 people, thousands

are injuring many more, and hundreds are arrested occurred (HRW, 2014, p. 6). Interim

President Mansour declares state of emergency; curfew is imposed on 12 of the 27

governorates. Some place the blame on the Muslim Brotherhood, while others blame the

heavy-handed tactics of the military.<sup>68</sup>

**August 16, 2013:** “Day of Rage” called by anti-coup protesters. Over 173 killed, over 1,113

injured, and over a thousand people arrested throughout Egypt, most notably in Ramses

Square.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> *Al Ahrām*, June 29, 2013, Egypt Islamist coalition urges opposition to break from Mubarak regime figures, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/75211.aspx>

<sup>67</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, August 14, 2013, Live updates: Pro-Morsi sit-ins dispersed, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/08/14/live-updates-pro-morsi-sit-ins-dispersed/>

<sup>68</sup> *Al Ahrām*, August 14, 2013, Egyptian president declares state of emergency, curfew amid deadly violence, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/79000/Egypt/0/Egyptian-president-declares-state-of-emergency.-cu.aspx>

<sup>69</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, August 17, 2013, Deadly clashes in Ramses Square, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/08/17/deadly-clashes-in-ramses-square/>

**August 19, 2013:** Militant violence in Sinai escalates. Over the subsequent months, shootings, bombings, and suicide attacks against security installations, officials, and troops increase.<sup>70</sup>

**August 2013:** Sectarian violence escalates, as Coptic churches, businesses, and property are attacked. Researchers from the Egyptian Centre for Public Policy Studies (ECPPS) describe August 2013 as the worst month of sectarian violence in modern Egyptian history.<sup>71</sup>

**August 28, 2013:** The Cabinet approves economic stimulus package of nearly 30 billion Egyptian pounds (approx. \$4 billion) to be used towards infrastructure-related projects.<sup>72</sup>

**September 1, 2013:** Constituent Assembly is announced and tasked with amending the suspended 2012 constitution.

**September 5, 2013:** Minister of Interior Mohamed Ibrahim survives an assassination attempt.

**September 23, 2013:** The Muslim Brotherhood is banned by Egyptian court, and leaders are arrested, and assets are confiscated.<sup>73</sup>

**September 24, 2013:** In an attempt to build a coalition amongst revolutionaries that are anti-military and anti-Brotherhood, Revolution Path Front (also called Road of the

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<sup>70</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, August 19, 2013, 25 Soldiers executed in Sinai, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/08/19/25-soldiers-executed-in-sinai/>. Also see *Daily News Egypt*, November 21, 2013, Sinai car-bomb casualties died ‘confronting terrorism’: Al-Sisi, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/11/21/sinai-car-bomb-casualties-died-confronting-terrorism-al-sisi/>

<sup>71</sup> *Al Ahrām*, September 24, 2013, August sectarian attacks largest in Egypt history: NGO, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/82403.aspx>, also see *Daily News Egypt*, September 25, 2013, NGO documents violence against Copts, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/25/ngo-documents-violence-against-copts/>

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, *Daily News Egypt*, September 20, 2014, see note # 34.

<sup>73</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, September 23, 2013, Muslim Brotherhood’s Organization banned, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/23/muslim-brotherhoods-association-activity-banned/>

Revolution) is established.<sup>74</sup> It includes members from the April 6 Youth Movement, the Revolutionary Socialists, and the Strong Egypt Party.

**September 2013:** Egypt witnesses a 69.7 percent drop in tourist arrivals.<sup>75</sup>

**October 6, 2013:** Pro-Morsi demonstrations lead to violent clashes with security forces in Cairo.<sup>76</sup>

**October 9, 2013:** The United States suspends delivery of “certain large-scale military systems (tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets) and cash assistance” to the Egyptian government, demonstrating Washington’s disapproval of the crackdown and the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>77</sup>

**October 23, 2013:** A second movement is formed attempting to bridge political and ideologies divides. The National Partnership Current is launched to bring together advocates of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution and the June 30 uprising against Morsi.<sup>78</sup>

**November 4, 2013:** Ousted president Morsi appears in court on charges of inciting violence, the first of several court cases.

**November 17, 2013:** Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Mabrouk Abu Khatab is assassinated outside of his home.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> *Al Ahram*, September 23, 2013, New anti-Military, anti-Brotherhood front to be launched Tuesday. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/82294.aspx>

<sup>75</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 30, 2013, Tourist arrivals drop 69.7% in September: CAPMAS, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/11/30/tourist-arrivals-drops-by-69-7-in-september-capmas/>

<sup>76</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, October 6, 2013, Clashes erupt throughout Cairo on 6 October anniversary, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/10/06/clashes-erupt-throughout-cairo-on-6-october-anniversary/>

<sup>77</sup> *U.S. Department of State*, October 9, 2013, U.S. Assistance to Egypt, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215258.htm>

<sup>78</sup> *Al Ahram*, October, 23, 2013, New political movement to unite advocates of Egypt’s two revolts, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/84595.aspx>

<sup>79</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 18, 2013, Homeland Security officer gunned down in Nasr City, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/11/18/homeland-security-officer-assassinated-in-nasr-city/>

**November 24 2013:** Interim President Adly Mansour authorizes Law 107, the so-called “Protest Law,” which places harsh restrictions on the rights of public assembly, greatly hampering pro-Morsi groups as well as secular and leftists public actions.<sup>80</sup>

**November 26, 2013:** Protesters associated with a group called No Military Trials for Civilians are arrested during demonstrations against the new Protest Law and military trials of civilians in front of the Shura Council building in Cairo.<sup>81</sup>

**December 22, 2013:** Co-founders of the April 6 Youth Movement, Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel, and political activist and blogger Ahmed Douma are sentenced to three years of prison under the Protest Law.<sup>82</sup>

**December 24, 2013:** The Cabinet announces a second economic stimulus package of 30 billion Egyptian pounds (approx. \$4.36 billion) directed towards development projects.<sup>83</sup>

**December 25, 2013:** The Cabinet designates the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization.<sup>84</sup>

**December 29, 2013:** Three *Al Jazeera* journalists are arrested, Mohamed Fadel Fahmy (Canadian), Peter Greste (Australian), and Baher Mohamed (Egyptian). On June 23, 2014, they are found guilty of aiding a terrorist organization, and are not released until February 2015.

## 2014

**January 14, 2014:** Constitutional referendum of the 2012 Constitution. 98.1 percent voter approval with less than 38.6 percent turnout rate. Article 230 mandates that presidential

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<sup>80</sup> *Al Ahram*, November 25, 2013, Full English translation of Egypt’s new protest law, <http://english.ahram.org/News/87375.aspx>. Also see, *Human Rights Watch*, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law>

<sup>81</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 26, 2013, NoMilTrials protest dispersed; prominent activists detained, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/11/26/nomiltrials-protest-dispersed-prominent-activists-detained/>

<sup>82</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, December 22, 2013, Three years in prison for activists, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/12/22/three-years-in-prison-for-activists/>

<sup>83</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, September 20, 2014, see note # 34

<sup>84</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, December 25, 2013, Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization: Cabinet, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/12/25/muslim-brotherhood-terrorist-organisation-cabinet/>

and parliamentary elections take place not more than 90 days after the ratification of the Constitution.

**January 24, 2014:** Four bombs targeting police explode in central Cairo, killing six people and injuring dozens.

**January 25, 2014:** On the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, celebrations in Tahrir Square took place, but also violent clashes between pro-military supporters, opponents, and security forces clash occur. A string of bombings targeting police in Cairo and Giza occur.<sup>85</sup>

**January 26, 2014:** Sinai-based militant group *Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis* (Supporters of Jerusalem) escalates violent attacks. Since the overthrow of Mubarak in February 2011, the group has claimed responsibility for attacks on gas pipelines in the Sinai, bomb attacks in the Greater Cairo area, assassination attempts, the shooting down of a military helicopter and bombing of a tour bus.<sup>86</sup>

**February 23, 2014:** Prime Minister Hazem El-BeRAWI resigns, and Interim president Adly Mansour appoints Ibrahim Mehleb as Prime Minister.

**February 27, 2014:** Interim President Mansour issues a presidential decree reconstituting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).<sup>87</sup>

**March 2014:** CAPMAS, Egypt's national statistics agency, announces that tourism to Egypt dropped 32 percent and tourism revenues dropped by over 40 percent from the previous year (Tourism represents 11 percent of Egypt's GDP).<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, January 26, 2014, Update: At least 49 killed, 247 wounded and over 1000 arrested in 25 January anniversary, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/01/26/update-at-least-49-killed-247-wounded-and-over-1000-arrested-in-25-january-anniversary/>

<sup>86</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, February 18, 2014, Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis claim Taba bus bombing, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/02/18/ansar-beit-al-maqdis-claim-tab-a-bus-bombing/>

<sup>87</sup> Al Ahram, February 27, 2014, Egypt's President Mansour reconstitutes Supreme Council of the Armed Forces <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/95446/Egypt/Politics-/Egyp-t-President-Mansour-reconstitutes-Supreme-Cou.aspx>

**March 24, 2014:** Mass trial death sentences for over 500 Muslim Brotherhood by Egyptian court. After review, the death sentences are reduced to 37. On April 28, 2014, an Egyptian court sentences to death the Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader and 682 other members over violence and killing of policemen.<sup>89</sup>

**March 26, 2014:** Al-Sisi announces he has resigned from the military and will run for president.

**April 28, 2014:** April 6 Youth Movement is banned by the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters.<sup>90</sup>

**May 26 to 28, 2014:** The second presidential election is held a little more than three years after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak.

**June 3, 2014:** Al-Sisi is announced as the winner with 96.9 percent of the vote (47.45 percent voter turnout and fewer than 1.4 million invalid ballots casted) against the left-leaning Egyptian Popular Current party candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi (3.09 percent).

**June 5, 2014:** Before leaving office, Interim president Adly Mansour, passes laws on tax hikes on the rich, parliamentary elections, and penalties for sexual harassment and littering.<sup>91</sup>

**June 8, 2014:** Al-Sisi sworn in as president for a four-year term.

### **3.2.4 Period IV: Socio-political transitions and President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi (June 3, 2014 to June 2015)<sup>92</sup>**

**June 11, 2014:** Activist Alaa Abdel Fattah, along with 24 co-defendants, is sentenced by a court on charges of violating the so-called Protest Law.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> *Al Ahram*, May 13, 2014, Tourist visits to Egypt drop 32% in March, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/101185.aspx>

<sup>89</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, April 29, 2014, Global condemnation of Minya mass death sentences, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/04/29/global-condemnation-minya-mass-death-sentences/>

<sup>90</sup> *Al Ahram*, April 28, 2014, Egypt court bans April 6 over espionage claims, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/99998.aspx>

<sup>91</sup> *Al Ahram*, June 5, 2014, President Mansour leaves office with a legislative bang, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/103023.aspx>

<sup>92</sup> The chronology ends on June 2015 to coincide with the official end of my appointment as Scholar without Stipend at the American University in Cairo, and with the academic year of the Egyptian universities.

<sup>93</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, June 30, 2014, One Year of Crackdowns, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/30/one-year-crackdowns/>

**June 17, 2014:** Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb forms a new cabinet.

**June 30, 2014:** On the first anniversary of the June 30 uprising, President al-Sisi vows that Egypt will “correct the religious discourse.”<sup>94</sup>

**July 1 2014:** President al-Sisi officially forms the *Tahya Masr* (Love Live Egypt) Fund. This initiative was established to encourage Egyptians to donate money to provide funding for public projects.<sup>95</sup> Al-Sisi declares that he would donate half of his salary and half of his wealth and property to the fund.

**August 5, 2014:** President al-Sisi announces the construction of a new parallel lane to the Suez Canal. To fund the new project, public bonds were on sold on September 4. It took only eight days to raise nearly LE 61 billion Egyptian Pounds (USD \$8 billion) from sales of the bonds.<sup>96</sup>

**August 9, 2014:** Supreme Administrative Court dissolves the Freedom and Justice Party, the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>97</sup>

**August 14, 2014:** Protests mark the first anniversary of deadly dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins. According to *Democracy Index*, the month of August witnessed almost one protest per hour.<sup>98</sup>

**September 12, 2014:** Protesters align with prisoners and activists on hunger strikes. The campaign is called “Battle of empty stomachs,” which demands the release of political

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<sup>94</sup> Al Ahram June, 30, 2014, Egypt protected Islam from extremism on 30 June: El-Sisi, <http://english.ahram.org/News/105151.aspx>

<sup>95</sup> *Aswat Masriya*, August 5, 2014, Sisi insists Egyptians “will pay” for the Tahya Misr fund, <http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=0905b29d-78ba-4583-90fa-58ff46e8ed3c>

<sup>96</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, September 16, 2014, Suez Canal certificates sold out: CBE, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/09/16/suez-canal-certificates-sold-cbe/>

<sup>97</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, August 9, 2014, Top Egypt court dissolves FJP, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/08/09/top-egypt-court-dissolves-fjp/>

<sup>98</sup> *Aswat Masriya*, September 13, 2014, Almost one protest per hour in August: Democracy Index, <http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=a4093135-cf1d-4937-9c09-b0848cd2bc1d>

prisoners and end to the Protest Law.<sup>99</sup>

**October 11, 2014:** After postponing the academic year for public universities for over a month and banning politics and protests on campuses, clashes between students and security personnel erupt on several campuses.<sup>100</sup>

**October 24, 2014:** 3-month state of emergency is declared on parts of Northern Sinai, after militant group *Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis* conducted deadly attacks against Egyptian soldiers.<sup>101</sup>

**Early November 2014:** The Sinai-based militant group, pledges allegiances to *Daesh* (ISIS).<sup>102</sup>

**November 10, 2014:** During a meeting with a delegation of American business leaders, Al-Sisi indicates that parliamentary elections will take place before the end of March 2015.<sup>103</sup>

**November 10, 2014:** Formal registration period ended for NGOs active in Egypt. Ministry of Social Solidarity issues a bill in July that controls activity of NGOs, including sources of funding and the issuing of permits for international organizations working in Egypt.<sup>104</sup>

**November 28, 2014:** Islamists groups call for a Muslim Youth Uprising, against military rule and secular movements, absent of Islamic law and to preserve Egypt's "Muslim Identity."<sup>105</sup> However, supporters of the call fail to show up in significant numbers.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, September 12, 2014, Number of hunger strikers in and out of prisons reaches 143: AHRI, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/09/12/number-hunger-strikers-prisons-reaches-143-anhri/>

<sup>100</sup> *Al Ahrām*, October 12, 2014, Students call for protests amid tense atmosphere on Egypt's campuses <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/112877.aspx>

<sup>101</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, October 24, 2014, State of Emergency declared in parts of North Sinai after attack kills 31 soldiers, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/113857.aspx>

<sup>102</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 10, 2014, Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis pledge allegiance to 'Islamic State.' <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/10/ansar-beit-al-maqdis-pledge-allegiance-islamic-state/>

<sup>103</sup> *Al Ahrām*, November 10, 2014, Parliamentary polls to be held before end of March, says El-Sisi, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/115213.aspx>

<sup>104</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 9, 2014, NGO registration extension period ends under ministry's recently drafted bill, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/09/ngo-registration-extension-period-ends-ministrys-recently-drafted-bill/>

<sup>105</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 24, 2014, Egypt's Islamist movements divided over calls for 28 November uprising, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/24/egypts-islamist-movements-divided-calls-28->

**November 30, 2014:** Egyptian court dismisses murder charges against ousted president Hosni Mubarak and acquits Mubarak's security chief over the killing of protesters during the Egyptian Revolution.

**November 2014:** Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) finds that November saw a surge in protests in Egypt.<sup>107</sup>

**December 3, 2014:** The Ministry of Interior places travel restrictions for Egyptians aged 18-40 requiring them to attain state security authorization prior to traveling to Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya and Sudan.<sup>108</sup>

**December 5, 2014:** The Minister of Planning and Administrative Reform announces new civil service law that forbids government employees from talking about politics at work.<sup>109</sup>

**December 14, 2014:** U.S. Congress approves resumption of full military aid to Egypt.<sup>110</sup> In late December, Washington shipped ten Apache helicopters to the Egyptian military.

**December 16, 2014:** Egypt is ranked second worst country in the world for number of journalist arrested by Reporters Without Borders.<sup>111</sup>

**December 21, 2014:** The assistant to the Minister of Interior says more than 10,000 people were

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[november-uprising/](#) . Also see *Al Ahrām*, Egypt gears up for Friday of 'Islamic Revolution' protests, November 28, 2014, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/116611.aspx>

<sup>106</sup> *Al Ahrām*, November 28, 2014, Egypt's 'Islamic revolution' protests fail to draw crowd, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/116696.aspx>. Also see, *The Cairo Post*, November 29, 2014, Salafist Front says Nov.28 'failure,' 'let down' by other Islamic current, <http://thecairopost.com/news/129891/news/salafist-front-says-nov-28-failure-let-down-by-other-islamic-currents>

<sup>107</sup> *Egypt Independent*, December 8, 2014, ANHRI: November saw a remarkable surge in protests, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/anhri-november-saw-remarkable-surge-protests>

<sup>108</sup> *Aswat Masriya*, December 3, 2014, Egyptians face institutionalized travel restrictions, <http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=1a321580-662c-40bd-ad14-bc60815ea8d2>

<sup>109</sup> *Egypt Independent*, December 5, 2014, New law forbids government employees to talk politics at work, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/new-law-forbids-government-employees-talk-politics-work>

<sup>110</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, December 14, 2014, Resumption of military aid in Egypt part of U.S. spending bill, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/12/14/resumption-military-aid-egypt-part-us-spending-bill-2015/>

<sup>111</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, December 16, 2014, Egypt second in the world for arrested journalists: Reporters Without Borders, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/12/16/egypt-second-world-arrested-journalists-reporters-without-borders/>

arrested in 2014 for ‘rioting’ and ‘terrorism.’<sup>112</sup>

## 2015

**January 1, 2015:** In a televised appearance, President al-Sisi calls for a ‘religious revolution,’ calling for a renewal of discourse that is “in tune with the times” with the purpose of “fighting extremist religious thought.”<sup>113</sup>

**January 25 2015:** The fourth anniversary of the revolution brings protests throughout Egypt. Dozens of people are killed, including activist Shaimaa al-Sabbagh (shot by police during protests on the 24<sup>th</sup>), hundreds are injured, and over five hundred are arrested. Protesters battle with police and military forces. The most notable clashes occur in Matariya, a neighborhood northeast of Cairo.<sup>114</sup> Protests continue for several days.

**January 26, 2015:** The Egyptian pound weakens.<sup>115</sup>

**January 28, 2015:** The Tamarod movement rejected from forming a political party.<sup>116</sup>

**January 30, 2015:** Attacks by militants in Northern Sinai increase.<sup>117</sup>

**February 7, 2015:** Al-Sisi swears in 17 new governors.

**February 8, 2015:** Around 30 people are killed as security forces violently disperse crowds of fans at a soccer match in Cairo Ultras.

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<sup>112</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, December 21, 2014, Over 10,000 people arrested for ‘rioting’ and ‘terrorism’ in 2014, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/12/21/10000-people-arrested-rioting-terrorism-2014/>

<sup>113</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, January 13, 2015, Calls for a religious revolution, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/13/calls-religious-revolution/>

<sup>114</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, The Republic of Matariya, January 26, 2015, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/26/republic-matariya/>. Also see, *Daily News Egypt*, January 26, 2015, Accusations, denials over abuses of authority by security forces on 25 January anniversary, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/26/accusations-denials-abuses-authority-security-forces-25-january-anniversary/>

<sup>115</sup> *Egypt Independent*, January 26, 2015, CBE: Egypt’s pound weakens to new low of LE7.31 per dollar, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/cbe-egypt-s-pound-weakens-new-low-le743-dollar>

<sup>116</sup> *Aswat Masriya*, January 28, 2015, Court approves former army general’s request to form party, rejects Tamarod movement’s, <http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=467fa302-a10a-46e2-a621-1947a9a06600>

<sup>117</sup> *Al Ahrām*, January 30, 2015, UPDATE 5: At least 26 killed, more than 100 wounded in North Sinai rocket attack, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/121728.aspx>

**February 16, 2015:** In coordination with the Libyan air force, Egypt’s military begins conducting air strikes against groups aligned with *Daesh* (ISIS) in Libya. The air strikes are said to be a response to twenty Coptic Egyptians migrant workers being kidnapped and beheadings by Daesh affiliated groups in Libya.<sup>118</sup> The offensive in Libya comes less than a week after Putin visits Egypt to enhance military and economic relations. Additionally, Egypt also finalizes a purchase of 24 Rafale fighter jets, a naval frigate, and related military equipment from France totaling \$5.70 billion.<sup>119</sup>

**February 24, 2015:** President al-Sisi approves the “terrorist entities” law, Law 8/2015.<sup>120</sup> On November 26, 2014 the Egyptian cabinet approved the bill. The State Council approved the bill on December 8, 2014. The law defines ‘terrorist entities, and implements penalties by criminal court for such groups.<sup>121</sup> Another anti-terrorism law was signed by al-Sisi on August 15, 2015. The controversial Law 94/2015, “Law on Combating Terrorism,” gives the president the right to “take all the necessary measures to maintain security and order in case of an impending threat” and consists of 54 articles pertaining to terrorists groups and terrorist acts.<sup>122</sup>

**March 1, 2015:** Parliamentary elections originally scheduled for March 21 are suspended. The Electoral Districts Law that set the procedures for the elections is ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which allows the Supreme Electoral Commission to

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<sup>118</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, February 16, 2015 Egypt strikes Islamic State in Libya  
<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/02/16/egypt-strikes-islamic-state-libya/>

<sup>119</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, February 15, 2015, Egypt seeks to ‘diversify’ weapon providers: Experts,  
<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/02/15/egypt-seeks-diversify-weapons-providers-experts/>

<sup>120</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, February 24, 2015, President approves ‘terrorist entities’ law,  
<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/02/24/president-approves-terrorist-entities-law/>

<sup>121</sup> *Al Ahram*, November 27, 2014, Egypt cabinet approves new ‘terrorist entity’ law,  
<http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/116565.aspx>

<sup>122</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, August 17, 2015, New anti-terrorism law passed despite criticism,  
<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/08/17/new-anti-terrorism-law-passed-despite-criticism/>

postpone elections pending amendments to the districts law.<sup>123</sup> Parliamentary elections are not held until October and November 2015.

**March 3 to 6, 2015:** A string of small, crude bomb blasts targeting businesses, government buildings and police officers occur throughout Cairo.<sup>124</sup>

**March 8, 2015:** The Court of Urgent Matters hears a lawsuit to designate April 6 Youth Movement as a terrorist organization. On April 20, the Court ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over the lawsuit.<sup>125</sup>

**March 13 to 15, 2015:** In a strategy to help boost Egyptian battered economy, Egypt hosts an Economic Conference to attract international investors to boost economy. The Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) entitled “Egypt the Future” is held in Sharm el-Sheikh and attended by approximately 2000 delegates from 112 nations, more than 25 companies, many heads of state, and various prominent political and economic leaders from around the world. During the three-day conference many memoranda of understandings, agreements, and deals on energy, transportation, trade, ICT, and various development projects are signed and agreed upon. After two days of the conference, 18 agreements are set estimated to be worth \$85.8 billion. The largest deal is signed with BP in Egyptian gas fields with a Russian company with an investment of \$12 billion. Turkey, Iran, Israel are not invited to the conference. Qatar is invited and representatives attend.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> *Al Ahram*, March 1, 2015, Egypt parliamentary elections postponed as constituencies law ruled unconstitutional, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/124175.aspx>

<sup>124</sup> *Al Ahram*, March 3, 2015, Matariya small bombs “targeted” Vodafone Mobinil stores: Prosecutors, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/124344.aspx>. Also see, *Al Ahram* March 6, 2015, six minor blasts hit Cairo and Giza on Friday, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/124603.aspx>

<sup>125</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, April 20, 2015, Court cites “lack of jurisdiction in 6 April terrorist designation case,” <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/04/20/court-cites-lack-of-jurisdiction-in-6-april-terrorist-designation-case/>

<sup>126</sup> *Al Ahram*, March 15, 2015, Time is crucial, we need to move fast: Egypt’s Sisi tells EEDC, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/125289.aspx>

One of the significant announcements presented during the conference is a new administrative capital city to be built east of Cairo, including a theme park, large green spaces, an airport, solar farms, electric trains, government buildings, embassies, and universities. The new capital city would be approximately 700 square kilometers in area and could be home to 5 million people. The initial phase is estimated at a cost of \$45 billion, with total costs projected at \$300 billion. It would be located halfway between Cairo and Suez Canal, and is said that it will alleviate the current overcrowding of Cairo. An agreement to build the city is signed with a company from UAE to be completed in 5 to 7 years. Critiques call it wasteful and unsustainable.<sup>127</sup> Another significant unveiling during the conference is Egypt's new development agenda. The *Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt's Vision in 2030* presents four main goals for Egypt's 15-year development plan including economic development, market competitiveness, human development, and citizens' happiness.<sup>128</sup>

**March 26, 2015:** Egypt's military participates in a Saudi-led and U.S. backed joint regional military operation against Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen.<sup>129</sup>

**April 21, 2015:** Ousted president Mohamed Morsi is sentenced to 20 years in prison and linked to the 2012 killing of protesters.

**April 26, 2015:** Anti-harassment campaign, "I Saw Harassment," gains recognition for producing reports on various forms of sexual harassment occurring throughout Egyptian society.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> *Egypt Independent*, March 19, 2015, What can \$300 billion buy in Egypt? A new capital or a pipedream, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/what-can-300-billion-buy-egypt-new-capital-or-pipedream>

<sup>128</sup> Government of Egypt (2015). *Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt's Vision 2030*. The Government of Egypt. <http://www.mop.gov.eg/Vision1.pdf>

<sup>129</sup> *Al Ahrām*, March 26, 2015, Egypt navy and air force taking part in military intervention in Yemen: Presidency, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/126179.aspx>

**May 9, 2015:** A Cairo court sentences Mubarak and his two sons to three years in prison on corruption charges.

**May 31, 2015:** Egypt's National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) reports that from June 2013 to end of 2014 over 2,600 civilians, security forces, and members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood have been killed.<sup>131</sup>

**June 2, 2015:** Political parties organize an online petition to abolish the protests law.<sup>132</sup>

**June 3, 2015:** Reports of forced disappearances increase.<sup>133</sup>

**June 29, 2015:** Prosecutor-General Hisham Barakat and three members of the public are killed in a suspected Islamist car bombing in Cairo. Additionally, dozens of terrorist attacks occur during the second anniversary of the June 30<sup>th</sup> ousting of former President Morsi.<sup>134</sup>

### 3.3 The Significance of the Egyptian Revolution

Why is the January 25, 2011 Revolution significant? I take the position that the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution was not a spontaneous event triggered solely by uprisings in Tunisia and the use of new technology, but manifested as an accumulative process that built up over several decades of various forms of activism and social movements against state repression, political and economic

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<sup>130</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, April 26, 2015, Sexual harassment in university campuses 'endemic': I Saw Harassment, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/04/26/sexual-harassment-in-university-campuses-endemic-i-saw-harassment/>. Also see, *Daily News Egypt*, September 28, 2015, 447 verbal, physical sexual harassment incidents in Eid, including by security: Report, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/09/28/447-verbal-physical-sexual-harassment-incidents-in-eid-including-by-security-report/>

<sup>131</sup> *Al Ahram*, May 31, 2015, Egypt's NCHR says 2600 killed since Morsi's ouster, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/131616.aspx>

<sup>132</sup> *Al Ahram*, June 2, 2015, Egypt's opposition parties organize petition to abolish protest law, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/131774.aspx>

<sup>133</sup> *Egypt Independent*, June 3, 2015, UPDATE: Activists urge citizens to report mysterious arrests as soon as possible, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/update-activists-urge-citizens-report-mysterious-arrests-soon-possible>. Also see *Daily News Egypt*, June 5, 2015, Clear escalation in enforced disappearances: Activists, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/06/05/clear-escalation-in-enforced-disappearances-activists/>

<sup>134</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, July 5, 2015, 32 terrorist attacks in 5 days over 30 June Anniversary: RCSS, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/07/05/32-terrorist-attacks-in-5-days-over-30-june-anniversary-rcss/>

corruption, economic mismanagement, social injustices, and police brutality (Abdelrahman, 2015). Although there are theoretical arguments over the legitimacy of the term *revolution* when referring to the mass uprising of January and February 2011 in Egypt, I shall utilize the term *revolution* because political leaders, media commentators, and academics commonly use the term. Moreover, during my four visits to Egypt after the January 25, 2011, every Egyptian that I have spoken with on the topic has used the term *January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution* (or *25<sup>th</sup> of January Revolution*). Additionally, both the 2012 and 2014 Egyptian Constitutions use the term *revolution*. And last, I will rely on the definition provided by Goodwin (2001): "Revolutions entail not only mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic and/or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power" (p. 9). That being said, some Western scholars have been more cautious about using the term *revolution* when describing the socio-political events in Egypt occurring after January 2011. They tend to base the term *revolution* on formal politics and prematurely assess the transitional failures of the recent events in Egypt based upon what Korani and El-Mahdi (2014) have labeled as "the reductivist, mainstream lens of democratic transition," which overlooks the specific societal context of the uprisings and the history of contentious politics in the country (p. 15). For example, Warkotsch (2012) cautions:

The transitional process has so far shown very little prospect of turning into a full blown social revolution, in that there has been very little economic and social change, and in fact it may even be argued that the nature of the political process so far has turned out to be rather conservative in its effects on social and economic conditions, especially for the long (and still) politically marginalized masses. What is more, even though nobody can deny the momentousness of the achievement of bringing down Husni Mubarak, with part of the elite that served as one of the pillars of the previous regime—the army—in power, and amidst an increasing crackdown on protesters and civil society, the application of even the narrowest concept of political revolution is at the very least questionable. (p. 5)

Although Warkotsch (2012) is correct in her observation of the political process being “rather conservative in its effects on social and economic conditions,” and the “crackdown on protesters and civil society,” there are three flaws with measuring the success of mass uprisings using this logic.

First, the focus for assessment should not only be on formal political structures and the power elite. There have been some researchers (Bayat, 2013; Beinin & Vairel, 2011; El-Mahdi & Marfleet, 2009; Korany & El-Mahdi, 2014; Osman, 2010) who appropriately focus their analyses of social and political change through contentious politics, rising activism, and various social movements, specifically identifying major rifts in Egypt society. However, a majority of academic specialists on the Arab world have focused their research on analyzing formal politics and the persistence of authoritarianism.<sup>135</sup> If the Egyptian Revolution has taught us anything, it is that focusing on formal politics and the persistence of undemocratic rulers is what caused most scholars in the field of Middle East Studies to be surprised or caught off guard when the Arab uprisings began to topple and threaten Arab leaders (Gause, 2011). Therefore, I take the position that rather than reducing the analysis of the impacts of the revolution and overemphasizing the politics of the elite, my research focuses on the politics from below, looking at the changes within and the actions from the citizens themselves. Therefore, I follow the structure-agency approach that is argued by Korany and El-Mahdi (2014): “the events of 2011 compel us to look at politics from below instead of primarily from above” and the “complex web of state-society relations that is an integral aspect of politics in this region” (p. 2).

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<sup>135</sup> *Agence Global*, June 29, 2009, Why Do Arabs Not Revolt? <http://www.agenceglobal.com/index.php?show=article&Tid=2046>. Another example is Bellin (2004) The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 36(2), pp. 139-157.

Second, it is too early to gauge for certain the successes of the socio-political events in Egypt beginning in 2011. Mass social and political transformations do not occur overnight. Revolutionary changes are a process often marked by years if not decades of continuous struggle and counterrevolutionary obstacles. When discussing the question of judging the significance of the Arab uprisings, Middle East historian James Gelvin (2015) reminds us, “the French Revolution began in 1789 with the storming of the Bastille and ended in 1799 with the coronation of Napoleon as emperor” (p. 184). Therefore, rather than judging and measuring the broad social, political, and economic significance of January 25, I believe the significance should be refocused to look at what makes the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution unique and worthy to contextualize qualitative research that focuses on citizenship and education.

Third, measurements of the success and failures of the revolution rarely take into consideration the educational ramifications of social struggle and revolution. As will be presented in [Section 3.5](#), as well as argued in [Chapter 6](#), there is a process of learning that accompanies and is intertwined with revolutions. Experiences in social struggle can be a transformative educational endeavor, teaching and empowering the subject to think and act as a citizen. The way people learn about the actions of citizenship during a revolution and the nurturing of their agency as citizens is one of the focuses of study and should be included in any measurements of the Egyptian Revolution.

Egyptians have had several notable uprisings in modern history—in 1882, 1919, 1952, 1977. The January 25, 2011 Revolution, however, has some distinct characteristics. Expanding upon and problematizing the unique features of the Revolution presented by Shahin (2012), I will describe six characteristics that not only make the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution noteworthy but also provide a backdrop and significance for the present study. First, there were an incredibly

large number of protesters who participated in demonstrations throughout the 18 days, especially after January 28, when a wave of demonstrations swept Egyptian cities after the government disrupted Internet and mobile sites and services. Estimates of Egyptian protesters involved are between 7 to 15 million.<sup>136</sup> A scholar of social movements stated, “Exact figures may never be known but this much is clear: it was one of the largest outpourings of mass civil resistance in human history.”<sup>137</sup>

Second, Shahin argues that one of the features of the Revolution was its predominantly peaceful nature. It is true that groups who organized demonstrations, such as the April 6 Youth Movement (*Haraket Shabab 6 April*), did employ nonviolent protest tactics, and there are famous images of protesters who shouted “*Salmiyya, salmiyya!*” (“Peaceful, peaceful”) when faced with lines of police and soldiers. However, it would be mythical and dishonorable to those who were killed to claim that the Egyptian Revolution was completely peaceful. The myth of a peaceful revolution neglects the nearly 900 people who died and more than 6,000 people injured during the 18 days.<sup>138</sup> One protester remembered, “They started tear gassing us right away so we threw stones at them, which they threw back.”<sup>139</sup> Another protester who lost his brother during the Revolution stated, “28 January was an extremely violent day... We paid a dear price for this revolution, and it wouldn’t have succeeded otherwise.”<sup>140</sup> Additionally, arson and other forms of destruction occurred to a number of buildings and vehicles throughout Egypt.

A third feature of the Revolution is how a rather leaderless nature manifested.

Shahin (2012) wrote, “The revolution had no leading figure, group, vanguard, or movement. It

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<sup>136</sup> David Cortright, Glimpses of the Revolution in Egypt, *Peace Policy*, July 6, 2011, <http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2011/07/06/glimpses-of-the-revolution/>

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> The Guardian, March 14, 2013, Egyptian police ‘killed almost 900 protesters in 2011 in Cairo,’ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/14/egypt-leaked-report-blames-police-900-deaths-2011>

<sup>139</sup> Egyptian Independent, January 24, 2012, Was the Egyptian revolution non-violent?, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/616836>

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

did not follow the traditional pattern of leadership that relies on hierarchical structures. Instead, it was the work of various groups and organizations, with no one claiming a principal role” (p. 48). However, several groups can be identified who built loose coalitions that called for protests on January 25 and contributed greatly to the mobilization of the Revolution. The April 6 Youth Movement, the followers of the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” founded by Wael Ghonim, the youth wings of the Muslim Brotherhood, labor organizers, Mohamed ElBaradei, former IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) chief and noble peace prize winner, and various political parties are seen as main groups and actors leading the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. The loose coalition of leaders that emerged during the Revolution soon splintered, which, with the entrenched political power of the Egyptian military, presented obstacles for political transition following the ousting of Mubarak.

Fourth, the types of organizing are another unique feature of the Revolution. Much attention has been placed on the role of social media in the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. Some commentators have dubbed the Revolution as “The Twitter Revolution” or “The Facebook Revolution.” Charles Hirschkind, in a 2011 *Jadaliyya* article, stressed the importance of the blogosphere in the buildup to the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution.<sup>141</sup> He states that blog sites provide a political space where activists can unite across various political and religious ideologies, coordinating and mobilizing demonstrations and strikes. Furthermore, Hirschkind cites the use of social networking in the mobilization of the *Kefaya* movement in 2004 and the labor strike in *Mahalla al-Kubra* on April 6, 2008. Although these events were crucial to mobilization of activism in Egypt prior to January 25, these events did not materialize into any significant political transformations. The *Kefaya* movement fizzled out, and the strike in Mahalla

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<sup>141</sup> Charles Hirschkind, *Jadaliyya*, February 9, 2011, From the Blogosphere to the Street: The Role of Social Media in the Egyptian Uprising, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/599/from-the-blogosphere-to-the-street-the-role-of-soc>

was brutally repressed. Therefore, I argue that overemphasizing the role of social media fails to capture the real-life participation of those actors who actually went through great sacrifices to organize and voice their grievances against the regime.

Linda Herrera, in a 2011 *Jadaliyya* article, states Twitter and Facebook did not create the revolution, but were tools of the uprising in Egypt. She argues, “Facebook is no more responsible for Egypt’s revolution than Gutenberg’s printing press...was responsible for the Protestant Reformation.”<sup>142</sup> Therefore, because people are not passive recipients of media, the importance should be placed on how the current “Generation 2.0,” significantly different than the older generation, successfully used social media for mobilization. The failures of the Green Movement in Iran, the April 6 Youth movement in Mahalla, and the early March 2011 social networking protests in Damascus, proved that the use of social media does not automatically create a revolutionary situation. It is how the people utilize this technology effectively in accordance with a variety of other protest tactics and strategies, which are then mixed with a host of unpredictable events that can lead to the revolutionary moment.

I argue the uniqueness of the organizing strategies utilized during the Egyptian Revolution is that it is an early model of 21<sup>st</sup> century contentious politics that successfully blends social media with grassroots organizing on a mass scale. Although social networking is important today, I caution the novelty of over-emphasizing the role of social networking, which can divert analysts to overlook the structural and individual conditions—weighing incentives and risks—that have provoked people to risk their lives to persuade power elites for reform and revolutionary change. Social networking is but the newest tool in a repertoire of contentious politics and active citizenship, and must be employed along with other tactics necessary to

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<sup>142</sup> Linda Herrera, *Jadaliyya*, February 12, 2011, Egypt’s Revolution 2.0: The Facebook Factor, [http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/612/egypts-revolution-2.0\\_the-facebook-factor](http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/612/egypts-revolution-2.0_the-facebook-factor)

capture the public imagination. Exaggerating its role, excludes human agency—the key to active citizenship—in the process of making history.

For example, the organizing around Tahrir Square provides a useful case of blending technology with real-life tactics and actions. Shahin (2012) explains, with help of modern technologies such as the Internet and social media, groups in Egypt “organized protests, articulated demands, and turned Tahrir Square into a “mini-state” that provided food and supplies, health services, defense and security, media and communications, and entertainment for the millions of participating protestors” (p. 48). In the center of the Tahrir Square, citizen-protestors took control over a public space formerly monopolized by the state; they setup tents maintaining a presence and civic authority even months after the ousting of Mubarak (Sadiki, 2011). Teach-ins and debates were organized in the Square. Music was sung. Coptic and Muslim demonstrators protected each other during prayers. Food was routinely brought in and collectively shared. Various areas were coordinated, where people could get their news, find jackets and clothing, recycling and trash sections, libraries, and participate in various workshops. The surrounding streets leading to the Square became arteries where clashes between protesters and the police and army transpired. Protesters acting as security guards were stationed at the vital entrances where they would check and pat-down people for weapons coming into the square. The walls above these streets were transformed into revolutionary art galleries where artists captured images, events, and slogans of the revolution and painted their frustrations with the ruling regime. Cafes and mechanic garages were turned into makeshift field hospitals where doctors and medical professionals volunteered their expertise caring for the wounded and terminally injured. Some people described this as the “Republic of Tahrir,” a self-sustaining revolutionary entity. It was a highly political and collectivized public space rarely seen in Egypt,

where camaraderie and collective consciousness thrived. The January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution provided a model for 21<sup>st</sup> century revolution and mass social movements. It was space rife with material—rather than virtual—examples of participatory citizenship that deepened the intrinsic value of active and critical citizenship in Egypt.

A fifth feature of the Revolution was its classless nature and the way it “engendered an extraordinary aura of tolerance, acceptance, and pluralism, values that were absent for long periods of Mubarak’s rule” (Shahin, 2012, p. 49). Based upon their experiences in the demonstrations, many Egyptians I interviewed confirmed this feature of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. During her participation in protests in Tahrir Square, Student SH, a graduate student I interviewed, described how the Revolution cut across social and economic classes:

But it’s true those 18 days were just crazy and really inspiring simply because everyone started to see ‘others.’ And how even if I have money, this [the revolution] is important, our country is important. Me being Egyptian, you being Egyptian is something that we have as a strength. So let’s use that commonality and do something. And even if it failed or was flawed in many ways, it doesn’t matter. That was inspiring just because there was nothing else tying those people together, at all. There was a guy who was wearing like sandals and a ripped up shirt and lived in the slums, standing next to a woman who lives in Zamalek [a wealthy area in Cairo], who has four cats and spoke only French. They were sitting next to each other and talking, simply because they were Egyptian citizens nothing else. That was enough to get millions of people on the streets, and that is pretty cool. Because I never seen that in my life time anywhere else in the world. So that’s inspiring.

In another interview, Ahmed, an instructor, shared his experiences in Tahrir and highlighted the tolerance and diversity across various classes and religions:

The streets were full of people around Tahrir and all the people were very happy and they were celebrating. Different people, different groups, different beliefs, I could tell by how they looked and were talking to them. Rich and poor, Christians and Muslims, those with beards, like Islamists maybe, and without, veiled and unveiled, everybody together. Those with special needs, all together in Tahrir. And that moment was amazing.

Although middle class youth called for the Revolution, they were joined by less privileged classes, as well as by Copts, Muslims, labor groups, women, people with various political

ideologies, and rural and urban citizens. It was a rare space where Egyptians transcended their differences, and provided an atmosphere referred to as the “Spirit of Tahrir.”

A sixth and last unique feature is that the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution and Tahrir Square became a template for subsequent uprisings and revolutions across the world. Following the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, protesters claimed they were inspired by Tahrir Square and social movements adopted a number of similar tactics that were used in Egypt. Gelvin (2015) summarizes some of the similarities with the various occupy movements:

There is the age profile of the protesters, their use of social media to mobilize and inform, their democratic structure, their tactic of laying claim to public space as a demonstration of empowerment, and their refusal to accept the status quo. Furthermore, all the protests targeted, directly or indirectly, the neoliberalization of the protesters’ lives, from the privatization of public space and austerity measures imposed by a government to the way the free market has driven up housing costs and the widening disparity in wealth between “the 1 percent” and “the 99 percent.” (p. 183)

Although the similarities of tactics adopted by protesters in Tahrir Square and the occupy movements that followed are notable, there must be a recognition that significant differences do exist. Grievances and demands, the target and focus of protesters’ anger, the social status of participants, the use of violent and nonviolent tactics, the longevity and persistence of the protesters, and the reaction by the state are all some of the differences between protests in Tahrir Square and those protests that followed around the world (Gelvin, 2015). The important point is that it appears that late 2010 and throughout 2011 marked a watershed moment for a globally connected and digitally literate generation of young people—faced with a multitude of problems and frustrated with their respective political leaders and systems—who were inspired by global events and built social movements to critique local circumstances in an effort to create alternative social, political, and economic models of democracy and social justice, as evidence by the uprisings in other Arab states, the *Indignados* in Spain and other anti-austerity protests in Greece and throughout the rest of Europe, to student protests against privatizing the public

university system in Chile and the year-long student-strike in the province of Quebec, Canada, not to mention the pro-labor rallies in Wisconsin, Occupy Wall Street in Zuccotti Park, and Occupy encampments throughout the United States. The phenomenon of activism through social movements that used similar tactics as those witnessed in Tahrir Square was so globally prevalent that it prompted *Time* magazine to nominate “The Protester” as the 2011 Person of the Year (*Time*, December 26, 2011).<sup>143</sup> Consequently, the heightened level of activism in social movements—especially of the youth—should not only be viewed as an indication of overwhelming global systemic failures, or as mere spectacle (Kellner, 2012). Through their uprisings and revolutions, citizens “have reenergized the notions of public empowerment, citizenship, and dignity at a moment when many across the world feel the social contract between citizen and state is broken” (Laiq, 2013, p. 3) Optimistically, this reinvigorated active and critical citizenry should be embraced as a shaking off of cynicism, apathy and as burgeoning social phenomena that are endeavoring to contest social, political, and economic norms that are no longer viable or sustainable throughout the post-2008 global financial crisis world. In Egypt, however, recent socio-political developments have presented major obstacles for activists and revolutionary movements.

### **3.4 The Waning Historical Era in Egypt?**

The five years since the January 25, 2011 Revolution, some commentators have suggested the Revolution has come full circle. The national unity and optimism towards social justice and democracy that generally characterized the Egyptian Revolution and was epitomized

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<sup>143</sup> Since 1927, *Time* Magazine has chosen prominent and sometimes controversial figures that symbolize the current events of the day. Although American and Euro-centric, the list of Person of the Year reads like a “*who’s who* in world history” and includes some of the most influential figures throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Centuries, most notably Mahatma Gandhi, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, Queen Elizabeth II, Mohammed Mossadegh, and Martin Luther King, Jr., to name a few.

by mass demonstrations in public spaces such as Tahrir Square has now been replaced with a great social rift torn by political and ideological divisiveness, social breakdown, economic uncertainties, political repression and bouts of violence over the emerging models and concepts of Egyptian citizenship and the future identity of the Egyptian state (CIHRS, 2014; El Fegiery & Saad, 2013; El Fegiery, 2014a; El Fegiery, 2014b; Freedom House, 2015; HRW, 2014; HRW, 2015; U.S. Dept. of State, 2014; U.S. Dept. of State, 2015; Saad & El Fegiery, 2014).

Egypt has been governed by four different political leaders, and had experienced a second mass uprising provoked by the *Tamarod* (rebellion) movement. In June 30, 2013, the mass support for *Tamarod* movement led to a coup d'état of Egypt's first democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi (member of the Muslim Brotherhood).<sup>144</sup> Currently, Egypt is under the executive leadership of another president from the military, President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. Furthermore, Egyptians are suffering from voter fatigue having been called to polls to vote for three constitutional referendums, three houses of parliament and two presidents. Thus, Egyptians have had a total of eight elections, with multiple phases and runoffs.<sup>145</sup> The social and political instability has also contributed to a flailing Egyptian economy. For example, Gelvin (2015) explains that by the spring of 2013:

Foreign reserves had plummeted, the value of Egyptian currency declined 10 percent, and tourism—which before the uprising had contributed 11 percent to the national economy—had hit rock bottom. In May fuel shortages, which resulted in long lines at gasoline stations, electricity blackouts, and higher food prices, provoked widespread anger.” (p. 77)

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<sup>144</sup> While some have described the ousting of Morsi as a coup d'état (Gevlin, 2015), others have described this event as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Revolution. This has been a majority source of recent contention in Egypt. The mass protests on June 30, 2013 (Some Egyptians have described this event as their 2<sup>nd</sup> Revolution), subsequently led to the military taking over the government on July 3, ousting the democratically elected president and suspending the 2012 constitution. Taking to Egyptians about this event I have identified three positions. Those in Egypt that support the events, or who are pro-military often refer to the military take as the June 30 Revolution. While those that are against the events, or who are pro-Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood refer to the events as a coup. In addition, there are those that describe the events as a popular coup.

<sup>145</sup> *Mada Masr*, October 31, 2015, Elections commission: There have been lower turnouts, <http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/elections-commission-there-have-been-lower-turnouts>

Additionally, the government designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and the banning of its political wing the Freedom and Justice Party along with the decreeing of protest and anti-terror laws have led to harsh state repression of freedoms of assembly, speech, and association.<sup>146</sup> These measures have not only been directed at members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, but secular, leftist, student, and labor activists who have been publically critical of government and military policies have also been targeted. As Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 have demonstrated, the period after the deposing of President Morsi has been marked by tighter regulations on NGOs and media outlets, mass arrests and detention, forced disappearances, due process violations, mass death sentences, and increased reports of in-custody torture and deaths. The security situation in Egypt has also deteriorated, especially in northern Sinai. Armed groups have attacked security sites as well as targeting tourists and ordinary citizens. An Egyptian insurgent group, *Ansar Beit al-Maqdis*, has increased their militant attacks and announced allegiance with the extremist group *Daesh* (also known as ISIS). In general, the events since July 2013 have led to a socio-political atmosphere of intense political polarization between pro-Muslim Brotherhood supporters, pro-military supporters, and those who critique the rule of the Brotherhood but are also critical of how the military has brutally suppressed the Brotherhood and is repressing political and social rights. However, the rather socio-political despondency, the politicization of religious and secular identities and the polarization of sectarianism discredit the daily efforts and participation of citizens, distracts from more critical issues of citizenship, and disguises the far more vital attempts to address the pressing social and economic challenges

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<sup>146</sup> Egypt Independent, December 12, 2015, Egypt ranks as world's 2<sup>nd</sup> worst jailer of journalists, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/2463415>

confronting all Egyptians. Speaking to the recent empowerment, momentum, and transformations of Egyptian citizenry, Asef Bayat eloquently states:

This new regime has to govern a citizenry that has been significantly transformed. Large segments of the urban and rural poor, industrial labor, an impoverished middle classes, marginalized youth and women, have experienced, however briefly, rare moments of feeling free, engaged in unfettered spaces of self-realization, local self-rule, and collective effervescence. As a consequence, some of the most entrenched hierarchies were challenged. Women's extraordinary public presence threatened patriarchal sensibilities, and their public harassment produced one of the most genuine movements in the nation's recent history. Revolutionary youths charged their elders with apathy and complicity, at the same time that they gained the respect and recognition of the older generation for their own remarkable activism and sacrifice. Workers demanded accountability from their bosses, students from their mentors, and citizens from the moral and political authorities. There were times when communal solidarity resurrected ingeniously in the midst of well-organized sectarian bloodshed. These subaltern citizens all lived through revolutionary moments in which what was right seemed wrong, and what wrong seemed right.<sup>147</sup>

The statement by Bayat underscores the view that in the face of the current socio-political climate in Egypt, the extraordinary tangible and intangible transformations of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution that nurtured an Egyptian consciousness cannot be un-learned and un-remembered and can be the impetus for citizens to continue to reimagine and struggle for a just and good society. Additionally, it must be understood that the recent upheaval in Egypt does not reflect a cultural inaptitude towards democracy, but it might possibly represent a long and complex road toward Egyptian models of democracy, human rights, social justice, and participatory citizenship.

Therefore, I argue, a dissertation that emphasizes the beleaguered Egyptian citizenry is just as valuable as one that obsessively focuses on formal politics and the political elite. As Abdelhalim (2015) argues, "Citizenship is not a political decision from above but a societal process" (p. 63). Thus, another focus of this research is on what Lust (2011) has described as the

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<sup>147</sup> Asef Bayat, *Mada Masr*, January 25, 2015, Revolution and despair, <http://www.madamasr.com/opinion/revolution-and-despair>

“micro transitions” of the Arab uprisings. These can be seen as the “politics” that occur outside of the confined spaces of formal politics and institutions, and, conversely, how students and educators are reimagining spaces—such as formal education—traditionally monopolized by the state. Research that focuses on citizenship and education in Egypt can begin to unravel the theoretical relationships between revolutions and citizenship and also provide valuable empirical insight into the individual and collective projects of citizenship building occurring within the current historical era in Egypt. Focusing qualitative research on the perceptions and experiences of “ordinary citizens” during this volatile and fluid era can help to uncover and amplify the enduring struggles as well as glimmer of hopes that are dedicated towards transforming Egyptian society that are often overshadowed by the Orientalist trap of concentrating research on authoritarianism, sectarian violence, political Islam, religious extremism, and terrorism.

### **3.5 Revolution and Citizenship**

In the aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, there are new dynamics between citizens and the state, and it is imperative that empirical research explore such dynamics. Within the volatile socio-political context after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, there is no doubt what it means to be an Egyptian citizen and the role of the Egyptian state is still in flux. Although the recently ratified 2014 Constitution mandates that the new Egyptian state be formed as a “democratic republic based on citizenship and the rule of law,” the extent, practices, and implementation of citizenship is yet to be determined in Egypt.<sup>148</sup> As Brown et al. (2013) argue, the Egyptian state is currently in a “process of redefining itself,” as the competition for the authority of state between the economically powerful military, Islamist groups, bureaucracy, an entrenched set of patronage networks established by the NDP, and the protesters is still unresolved (p. 224). Furthermore, the

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<sup>148</sup> Article 1 of the 2014 Arab Republic of Egypt Constitution. English translation retrieved from <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf>.

current turmoil has forced many observers to describe tensions in transition as an “identity crisis” occurring in Egyptian society.<sup>149</sup> Thus, I argue that the dynamic socio-political circumstances in Egypt can be seen as a historical pattern where revolution and conflict has the possibility of sparking the growth—albeit tumultuous—of citizenship(s). The extent of that growth and nature of the citizenship in Egypt is the broad focus of this research.

For example, connecting social struggle and citizenship Turner (1990) argues “it is important to put a particular emphasis on the notion of social struggles as the central motor of the drive of citizenship” (p. 193). Analyzing the French Revolution, Brubaker (1989) maintains, “Revolution, in short, invented not only the nation-state but the modern institution and ideology of national citizenship. Neither, of course, was invented ex nihilo” (p. 30). Therefore, revolutions lead to growth of ideologies and policies that greatly impact the aspirations, practices, and social norms of citizenship. However, I must caution that I do not view the growth of participatory citizenship in Egypt as a foregone conclusion or materializing in a linear, prophetic and teleological process. As Mahmoud, one of the graduate students I interviewed, stated “After the Revolution, we take one step forward and three steps back.” Nonetheless, there are some notable changes at least in the realm of consciousness-raising as well as forms of social and political participation that must be empirically and qualitatively explored.

To illustrate, in a recent quantitative study analyzing political participation in Egypt, Refaei (2015) concluded, “The revolution of January 2011 has changed the concept of political participation in Egypt and encouraged people to take part at both formal and informal levels. Whilst the former still enjoys greater levels of support than the latter, it is important to note that

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<sup>149</sup> *Foreign Policy*, September 19, 2011, Egypt’s Identity Crisis, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/19/egypts-identity-crisis/>; *CNN*, August 7, 2013, Egypt’s Identity Crisis, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/07/egypts-identity-crisis/>; *The Washington Post*, August 16, 2013, Egypt’s Identity Crisis, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-identity-crisis/2013/08/16/70d1459c-0524-11e3-88d6-d5795fab4637\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-identity-crisis/2013/08/16/70d1459c-0524-11e3-88d6-d5795fab4637_story.html);

just as concepts and means of political participation evolve over time so can citizens' perceptions of them" (p. 21). The quote underscores the transformations of Egyptian citizens since the Revolution, while simultaneously highlighting the continued difficulties of participation with the realm of formal politics. Additionally, the well-known Egyptian novelist and political commenter Alaa Al Aswany proposes, "A revolution is not just a political act, it is a major humanitarian evolution. People are one thing before a revolution and another after they take to the streets and protest; it is always this way."<sup>150</sup> Al Aswany points again to the transformations that occur to citizens during the revolution.

Consequently, the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution and the broader Arab uprisings have demanded a renewed interest into questions of what does it mean to be a citizen, and how can, and how do, people exercise their rights as citizens. These questions of citizenship are defining political, social, economic and intellectual discourses throughout the region. For example, there have been many recent conferences dedicated to the topic of citizenship in the Arab world (see [Appendix I](#)). Additionally, citizenship pertaining to various areas such as the nature of the Egyptian state, participation as a national duty, and education is mandated within the 2014 Egyptian Constitution. Moreover, the Egyptian government has featured the rather ambiguous term of *citizens happiness* as one of four main goals within its 2030 development agenda entitled *Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt's Vision 2030*, launched in March 2015, during the Egypt Economic Development Conference in Sharm al-Sheikh.<sup>151</sup> These developments are some of the small illustrations of the growing demand to develop deeper insight into the theories, realities, and struggles of citizenship within Arab states.

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<sup>150</sup> Al Ahram, October 22, 2013, Al-Aswany weaves threads through Egypt's Revolutions, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/84488.aspx>

<sup>151</sup> Government of Egypt (2015). Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt's Vision 2030. The Government of Egypt. <http://www.mop.gov.eg/Vision1.pdf>

As a result, the current political transition in Egypt, the seemingly rise in citizenship consciousness provides, and the interests in citizenship issues in Arab states, all provide a unique historical opportunity for analyzing how perceptions of citizenship have been impacted by the Revolution and the extent to which participation and education are transforming under a new state. Thus, during times of tremendous political and social transition and tension, such as that occurring in Egypt, participatory citizenship and citizenship education, to a varying extent, get redefined and renegotiated to either accommodate or suppress emerging actors within a renewed political system. Focusing on university students and educators, this dissertation is devoted to gain deeper insight into perceptions and actions of citizenship and citizenship education contextualized within the current socio-political transitions and tensions.

### **3.6 Why Focus on Universities?**

As the precarious and dynamic socio-political transition and tension in Egypt materialize, and Egyptian youth and educators seriously consider the kind of state they want and their relationships to it as well as to their fellow citizens, this debate has inevitably spilt over into the fundamental institutions of the Egyptian state, most notably Egyptian universities. The rationale for focusing on university students and educators is grounded in the understanding that universities play an integral and often contentious role within state-society relationships and are acutely connected to the social, political and economic context in which they are located. Therefore, universities become a microcosm that reflect as well as contribute to broader social, political, cultural and economic phenomena occurring throughout society at-large. Moreover, universities have an important role, as well as responsibility, to foster the skills and values necessary for a new era of Egyptian citizenship.

In Egypt, universities have traditionally produced leaders that have been instrumental in influencing citizenship discourse and policies (Reid, 1990). Universities have not only been important sites for developing multiple forms of citizenship, but have also been battlegrounds of the contention that arises out of divergent ideologies which greatly shape the understanding and practice of citizenship (Abdalla, 2008; Herrera, 2006; Mazawi, 2005; Megahed & Lack, 2011). The universities have been sites for centralizing state power through securing political support from the upwardly mobile middle classes (Mazawi, 2005). Thus, the university as a contentious institution has been used by the state as a tool to condone, promote and/or suppress various forms and practices of citizenship through mechanisms of control such as broad university policies, hiring and promotions, controlling curriculum and research projects, and regulations of student organizations to name a few. Furthermore, when factoring in the significant youth bulge (Chaaban, 2009) that Egypt is currently experiencing, universities and other institutions of higher education have an extraordinary role in harnessing the talent, creativity, and productivity of Egyptian youth. Therefore, not only are Egyptian universities vital locations for analyzing university student and educator perceptions of participatory citizenship and citizenship education, but can also provide researchers with microcosms for observing the turbulent era occurring throughout the larger Egyptian society.

However, there has been a significant amount of research that calls into question the recent role of Egyptian universities cultivating citizenship participation. For instance, as a result of the centralized control over campus-life during the period prior to the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, universities played a rather diminished role as sites that foster the skills and knowledge necessary for the construction of democratic citizenship (Herrera, 2010; Herrera, 2012; Shehata, 2008; Sika, 2012). To a large extent, formal political and educational institutions were replaced by

informal organizations, such as NGOs and civil society groups (Gerhart Center, 2011), virtual social networks (Ghonim, 2012; Herrera, 2012; Herrera, 2014), and social movements (Beinin & Vairel, 2011; El-Mahdi, 2009; Lesch, 2014) where Egyptian youth gained civic and political engagement skills, knowledge, and experience—essentially a non-formal practice of citizenship education.

However, in the aftermath of the ousting of Mubarak, reports (British Council, 2013; Khaled, 2013; Levy, 2011; Lindsey, 2012; Lynch & Mahmoud, 2013; Soliman, 2012) have indicated that universities have increasingly become reinvigorated sites where young people discuss, mobilize, and even clash about grievances related to their universities as well as issues faced by the broader Egyptian society. I argue that the rise of student activism can be an indicator of the university as reinvigorated site for the growth of citizenship in Egypt after the Revolution. At the time of writing and in the wake of the ousting of former President Morsi, there appears to be a surge in student activism and unrest on university campuses. For example, a recent report by *The Economist Intelligence Unit* found that during the 2013 fall semester alone there were 1,122 student protests carried out at universities and schools in Egypt.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, policies by the state have been directed at reigning-in various forms of student activism, which I argue would only be implemented by the state if these forms of activism were seen as posing a direct social or political threat. Subsequently, the dynamic changes in Egypt's political leadership and the government's emphasis on combating terrorism and dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood, its supporters, and activist who are openly critical of government, have coincided with national and university policies attempting to suppress student activism and student movements throughout Egypt. In the wake of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, it appears Egyptian

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<sup>152</sup> The findings of The Economist Intelligence Unit report were posted in the *Middle East Monitor*, December 15, 2013, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/8824>, and in the *University World News*, December 20, 2013, <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20131219170724565>.

students are testing the boundaries of participatory citizenship and are attempting to carve out spaces of agency where their grievances about political and educational issues are brought to the forefront.

Consequently, with the above sections of rationales and justifications in mind situated within the chronology of the socio-political context in Egypt, empirical research is needed to explore the following questions: to what extent have the experiences of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution and subsequent socio-political events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and educators in Egypt; to what extent do university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship; and how do students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education?

## **CHAPTER 4: THE DIALECTIC DANCE BETWEEN SUBJECT AND CITIZEN IN EGYPT: THE CONTINUUM OF PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM**

Theory can be a tool to help researchers understand the epistemological groundings of both themselves and their participants. The range of methods and theories that define the broad field of comparative international education grants the flexibility needed to examine the dynamics of power and complexities of emerging perceptions and practices of citizenship and citizenship education during the current turbulent period in Egypt.

The theoretical framework will be divided into sections devoted to specific theories connected to the sociological subfields of a political sociology of citizenship and a political sociology of education focusing on the two main concepts of participatory citizenship and citizenship education. I will explore the theoretical and real-life tensions in participatory citizenship and citizenship education and how they are contextualized within Egypt.

### **4.1 What is Citizenship? Exploring the Ellipsoid that is Citizenship**

Citizenship is a contested terrain. An insightful analogy provided by Gianluca P. Parolin (2009), a comparative law professor from the American University in Cairo, describes citizenship “as an ellipsoid, its main intersection points can be expressed in terms of membership, rights, participation or status, variously considered from the legal, philosophical, political or sociological planes. When the models of each focus change, the entire figure reshapes” (p. 19). This quote underscores the complexities and multiple viewpoints of analyzing citizenship, and alludes to the fact that from ancient philosophers to present day scholars, politicians, activists, and ordinary citizens, many have debated, negotiated, and even fought over the multifaceted and contested terrain of citizenship.

It is first important to point out that in any given society there are distinctions between the legal status of citizens connected to a particular nation-state and those civic virtues and social responsibilities that are individually or collectively held and practiced.<sup>153</sup> This research is guided by the understanding that there are tensions between theoretical citizenship, legal citizenship, and the social, political, and economic realities for citizens and other individuals within a state. The position transcends arguments and problematics of citizenship based solely upon *jus sanguinis* (right of blood or parents are citizens) and *jus soli* (territorial right or born within a country). Whereas legal notions of citizenship often refer to personal status and rights a citizen is beholden, which includes a combination of rights, duties and privileges that all legal members of a particular nation-state supposedly possess. Civic virtues of citizenship usually refer to the ethical responsibilities of a ‘good citizen,’ shaped and informed by various social forces that are sometimes at odds with formal and legal citizenship. Civic virtues vary throughout communities and are historically and structurally contextualized, usually based upon the material conditions of a particular person or group and their relationships to and within the state. I view citizenship in what Veugelers (2011a) has described as a deepening of the concept of citizenship, meaning, citizenship is “no longer exclusively relates to the political level, but also extends to the social and the cultural levels and even to the interpersonal level—how people live together,” emphasizing a strong relationship between the moral and the political (p. 211).

Citizenship is often presented as comprising of three elements: membership, rights, and participation within the nation-state (Bellamy, 2008). Simply stated, “Citizenship, at least

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<sup>153</sup> For example, in liberal virtue theory, Galson (1991) proposes four groups of civic virtues required for responsible citizenship: (i) general virtues: courage, law-abidingness, loyalty; (ii) social virtues: independence, open-mindedness; (iii) economic virtues: work ethic, capacity to delay self-gratification, adaptability to economic and technological change; and (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of other, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, willingness to engage in public discourse (pp. 221-224).

theoretically, confers membership, identity, values, and rights of participation and assumes a body of common political knowledge” (Knight Abowitz & Harnish, 2006, p. 653). *Membership* in a political community is concerned with identity and who is considered a citizen, conferring membership in a polity while excluding those who are not members. Various means of exclusions of citizenship have been based upon race, ethnicity, gender, religion, political ideologies, levels of property ownership, and education, for example. Associated with membership in the polity are those who receive collective benefits and *rights*. These rights are based upon negotiated standards of decency and civic virtues that regulate social relations, and provide the ability for individuals to make claims against others, including governments, when rights are abused. The duty to uphold, as well as expand, citizenship rights is related to *participation* in a community’s social, political, and economic processes. Participation is a person’s involvement in civic and political life, which can range from voting, standing for office, volunteerism and service to the community, to public dissention and opposition to public policies and/or political leaders. Participation can take the form of involvement in party politics, civil society and community groups, as well as social movements. Thus, participation is connected with multiple forms of social and political agency. In addition, although most social science fields outside of education often overlook the various ways people learn about citizenship, citizenship can also be distinguished as a form of knowledge, commonly referred to as *citizenship education*. Citizenship education is generally connected to various educational processes of nurturing citizenship. From this perspective, citizenship education as a form of citizenship knowledge and development can pertain to formal, informal, as well as nonformal educational endeavors intended to bestow civic knowledge, skills, and virtues necessary to transform youth into informed, responsible, and participatory citizens (Torres, 1998).

The four elements of citizenship mentioned above—membership, rights, participation, and education—are connected to the perpetual problematics of the social contract.<sup>154</sup> Thus, this research is framed by the general range of problems linked to relationships between state and citizen (the social contract), and among citizens themselves. Specifically, I view citizenship as the way people learn, think and act to transform the relationships between citizens vis-à-vis other citizens, individuals, society, the state, as well as their transnational configurations. I argue that citizenship should be understood as a social practice and knowledge that extends beyond legal and social norms into the realms of morality and being political. Citizenship is an idea that is realized when set into practice by a set of social, political, economic, and civic actions. Citizenship is a way of life and a process. Moreover, citizenship should be viewed as an unfinished project, a continual struggle that people strive for and that every generation must renegotiate and reimagine its meanings. Citizenship is the hope, the pursuit, the struggle, and the dialectic dance between the subject and the citizen, the active and passive citizen, the exclusive and inclusive society, and the repressive and just regime. This study will focus specifically on two elements of citizenship: participatory citizenship and citizenship education in Egypt. Thus, during times of tremendous political and social transition, such as that occurring in Egypt, participatory citizenship and citizenship education, to a varying extent, get redefined and renegotiated to either accommodate or suppress emerging citizen-actors within a renewed political system and society.

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<sup>154</sup> In his treatises on *The Social Contract*, Jean Jacques Rousseau originally elucidates various facets of the legitimacy of the formation and the authority of the state over the individual, or the social contract. Rousseau explains, “The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” He continues, “Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole... Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State” [http://www.ucc.ie/archive/hdsp/Rousseau\\_contrat-social.pdf](http://www.ucc.ie/archive/hdsp/Rousseau_contrat-social.pdf)

#### **4.1.1 Political sociology of citizenship and the dialectics of citizenship**

This research is grounded in theories connected to the sociological subfield of a political sociology of citizenship. Political sociology addresses the intersection between politics (power, contention, and social change) and social life (historical and material structures and interests, subjectivity, and ideas). Political sociologists ask how social factors shape, enable, and change power, structures, and political processes, and, in turn, the ways in which social factors are shaped by these structures and process (Faulks, 2000; Neuman, 2006). When citizenship is conceptualized in political sociology, it is viewed as both an ideological tool used to maintain the legitimacy of the political system and other power structures, as well as a subversive means to dissent against the structures and policies of the polity. Butenschon (2000) explains that the politics of citizenship can be “an analytical gateway to the insight into the dynamics of regime formation in that country and its *raison d’etat*, its *state-idea*” (p. 6). This approach to citizenship studies and the nature of various forms power is of particular relevance to Egypt, where the purpose of state power seems to be an unresolved question, and a reinvigorated, although waning, sense of active citizenship is occurring.

When approaching citizenship as a social role and a relational asset, a complex framework is needed to reveal and appreciate citizenship as it relates to state-society relationships. The trajectory of modern critical dialectic social analysis can be derived from the Hegelian-Marxist framework of the dialectical-historical philosophy used to study the interactive context between humans and their society (Torres, 2009). In dialectic theory, the individual as a social actor both creates and is created by the social environment. Neither the individual nor society is given priority in analysis. The two are inextricably interwoven, so that reference to one must by implication mean reference to the other. Social actors can also be represented by larger groups of influential power, such as the state, universities, NGOs, unions, grass roots

organizations, social movements, and transnational agencies. The dialectical analytical framework of citizenship centers on process, negotiation, tensions, and contentions of citizenship. The dialectics of citizenship “focuses the analyst’s gaze away from fixed and static phenomena onto the dynamics and tensions that result between given extremes and ideal types” (Reiter, 2013, p. 34). It is based upon the foundation that citizenship and the development of citizenship is *not* founded upon an “inexorable historical teleology” (Kivisto & Faist, 2007. p. 17) as T. H. Marshall (1950) has proposed, but rather consists of dynamic processes and outcomes of social struggle.

For the purposes of this study, the dialectics of citizenship will be situated within the politics of participation and the politics of education in Egypt. It will focus on interwoven thematic dialectic tensions of citizenship. There is a focus on theories of the state and the various perspectives of citizenship that frame the relationship, structures, and context of the following dialectic tensions of citizenship. These tensions include the struggle between *substantive* and *formal (legal)* citizenship. This speaks to the tensions between empirical and normative citizenship. In other words, what citizenship actually is and citizenship should be. This tension is also related to the dialectic of *inclusive* and *exclusive* citizenship members, rights, participation, and education. As Reiter (2013) states, “citizenship and exclusion are indeed intimately connected, or even mutually constitutive, and hence casually entwined” (p. 36). Therefore, there will be a focus on the dialectic of *active* and *passive* citizenship. The expansion (inclusion) of citizenship is typically related to the intended and unintended consequences of collective civic and political participation, social struggle and political violence, as well as the everyday acts of citizenship. From this view, *active citizenship* is crucial. More than a formal or legal definition of political membership, *active citizenship*, generally speaking, refers to a strong commitment to

social responsibility and social change, but can also refer to an active commitment to uphold systems of power. On the other hand, *passive citizenship* is a top-down form of citizenship, “cultivated by the state in terms of a limited number of entitlements and rights for citizens” (Turner, 2000, p. 44). Passive citizenship can also describe a withdrawal of the acts of citizenship. Emphasizing these dialectic citizenship tensions are important because, in the context of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution and the socio-political aftermath, tensions abound. When facing rapid developments, as well as significant setbacks, to the expansion of citizenship rights, membership, and participation, it is important not create static binaries between the tensions of citizenship.

#### **4.2 Beyond Marshallian Citizenship: Theories of the State and Perspectives of Citizenship**

Any analysis of the relationship between politics, “being political,” citizenship, and education must take into consideration the nature of the state in which institutions of citizenship policy exist. Torres (2009) defines the *state*, “as the totality of the political authority in a given society” representing:

The basic pact of domination that exists between social classes or factions of the dominant classes and the norms that guarantee its domination over the subordinate group, at the same time the state is a self-regulating administrative system, an organization that produces a system of selective and self-regulating rules. (p. 9)

Subsequently, the state often uses the tools and mechanisms at its disposal, particularly systems of laws, distribution of goods and services, education, media, as well as security agencies and a monopoly of violence to legitimize its power and justify its official form of citizenship.

However, the institutionalization of certain citizenship rights within a state’s judicial framework often produces tensions between social rights that are national and more universal claims of citizenship (e.g., human rights) (Turner, 2000).

#### 4.2.1 Marshallian perspective of citizenship

In *Citizenship and Social Class*, T. H. Marshall (1950) charts the trajectory of civil, political and social citizenship over three consecutive centuries of struggle for citizenship in England. *Civil citizenship*, concerning civil law, arose in the late seventeenth century and expanded through nineteenth century, and encompassed a range of social and economic activities, including freedom of property rights; freedom of exchange of goods, services, and labor; the liberties of thought; rights to justice; and freedoms of speech and faith. These rights were also associated with institutions of civil and criminal courts. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, *political citizenship* concerning political rights were established, including the right to vote and the freedom to stand for elections. *Social citizenship* was adopted at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and was associated with social rights to public education, health care, and other social services connected to the liberal welfare state.<sup>155</sup> For Marshall, social rights enabled disadvantaged classes to enter the mainstream of society and effectively exercise their civil and political rights in capitalist societies. Overtime, these rights were gradually extended to other groups.

Although the concepts of civil, political, and social citizenships were important conceptual developments, many scholars concerned with citizenship studies have offered various critiques of the Marshallian perspective of citizenship. Mann (1987) argues that Marshall's model of citizenship was Anglophonic based entirely on Great Britain, failing to include other models of citizenship. Others critique the rather passive and evolutionary nature of Marshallian citizenship. For example, Isin and Turner (2002) explain, "The modern conception of citizenship

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<sup>155</sup>The liberal welfare state model was based upon Keynesian economic policies reflecting state intervention into its economy. These policies supported the 'welfare state,' also referred to as 'embedded liberalism,' where state-led planning of high-wage employment, an expansion of the social sectors (including education), and some instances of state ownership of key sectors, all together deployed to dampen the effects of the business cycle and ensure relative full employment (Harvey, 2005, p. 10-12).

as merely a status held under the authority of a state has been contested and broadened to include various political and social struggles of recognition and redistribution as instances of claim-making, and hence, by extension, of citizenship” (p. 2). Still others criticize the restrictive nature of Marshallian citizenship that focuses on an individual who is male, adult, and Anglo-Saxon and its failure to take into consideration the structural obstacles related to gender, race, and ethnicity (Torres, 1998). The following sections expand upon the critiques of Marshallian citizenship and include the relationship between the state, citizenship, and social change.

#### **4.2.2 Towards comparative and active models of citizenship**

A main critique of Marshallian citizenship is that it is based solely on an Anglophile state model. Focusing on class conflict and the expansion of citizenship, Mann (1987) identifies five additional models arguing they are determined by strategies of the ruling class. These include the liberal (United States), reformist (Britain), authoritarian monarchist (Germany and Japan), fascist (1930s and 1940s Germany and Italy), and authoritarian socialist (Soviet Union). Mann (1987) argues, “There has been no single best of way of institutionalizing class conflict in industrial society, but at least five potentially durable forms of institutionalized conflict and mixes of citizen rights” (p. 340). Moreover, Meijer (2014a) argues “Mann’s emphasis on “politics of citizenship of the elite can be regarded as a forerunner of the Middle Eastern ‘authoritarian resilience’ theories, which also concentrate on top-down citizenship policy, directed ‘from above’” (p. 632).

From another perspective, Turner (2000) incorporates radical working classes within the nation-state and critiques Mann’s model that focuses on the ruling class and top-down strategies of citizenship. Turner (2000) argues:

Active citizenship, which is not handed down from above but grasped from below by radical social movements, may be revolutionary; for example in the French and American

Revolutions, they developed a form of citizenship that was grasped from below by popular struggle and by popular social movements. (p. 44)

This conflict model of citizenship argues that those who are excluded, when active and mobilized, can influence the direction and model of the state. Turner extends his model of citizenship and offers a “Three-Dimensional Typology of Citizenship.” The first dimension is the *active* versus *passive* models. Top-down models of citizenship cultivate passive citizenship where the state provides limited number of rights and freedoms. On the other hand, active citizenship is “more than a formal or legal definition of political membership. It involves a civic culture within which there is a strong sense of moral obligation and commitment to society” (Turner, 2000, p. 43). The second dimension deals with moral status of public versus private arena. Active citizenship is connected with a clear and decisive notion of the value of the public over the private. The focus on the private arena aligns more with Weber’s plebiscite political system, where political leadership is limited in accountability to its electorate, strong leadership, and political participation is limited to casting a vote to select leaders and does not assume active engagement in politics. The third dimension is the distinction between *universalism* versus *particularism*. This tension concerns the problematics and politics of membership around race and/or ethnicity as well as other sociological categories. Additionally, it concerns the relationship between solidarity and scarcity, where citizenship policies are used as a way to exclude or include groups. Turner (2000) suggests:

Citizenship is a form of civil religion that binds separate and anomic individuals together into a single community; in short, against the conflictual impulse of a class society, citizenship creates a foundation of modern solidarity, but it does so as an insurance scheme that distributes welfare to its citizens. (p. 45)

However, citizenship can also be a powerful mechanism for exclusion when based upon particular dimensions (e.g., racism, nativism, sexism, particular religious beliefs etc.). The distribution of state services, state institutions, and the monopoly of violence that the state

possesses can be driven by particularistic citizenship, which can lead to the exclusion of citizens and citizens' rights. With the above in mind, how did authoritarian states such as Egypt develop and what were they various roles of citizenship rights?

### **4.3 Authoritarian States and Citizenship in North Africa and Southwest Asia**

For centuries scholars in the west have attempted to explain the persistence of authoritarian rule in North Africa and Southwest Asia (NASWA). Western scholars from Montesquieu to Marx have used the term “oriental despotism” to seemingly differentiate the despotism in Europe and in “Asiatic communities,” and explain that in “the Orient” strong despots were needed to manage and maintain large irrigation and water projects (Wittfogel, 1957). As a result, in the hydraulic society,<sup>156</sup> state control over means of production and cultivated land generated a need for despotism, which led to the promotion of theoretical universal ties to despotism for Asiatic communities. However, some have critiqued these Eurocentric interpretations of the rise of despotism, arguing that social change is not determined by economic transformations alone and includes ideological and political forces, and that there was no single condition driving the rise of complex ancient societies, but numerous interrelated factors such as social organization, craft specialization, and surplus (Adams, 1981). Moreover, criticizing the concept of oriental despotism in general, and Pharaonic tyranny in Egypt specifically, Gamal Hamdan, distinguished Egyptian geographer, argues:

Tyranny or despotism, whether it is Oriental or non-Oriental, is not determined by a riverine environment, whether it is the Nile or not, and abuses of tyranny have no relation with irrigation agriculture and the geography of the river. Therefore, we should seek all causes of tyranny outside geography, outside the river, but in history of Egypt itself. (Hamdan, as quoted in Nagasawa, 2006, p. 313)

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<sup>156</sup> Hydraulic society is a term used to describe a civilization that developed around the manage of a river system.

Hamdan argues for the political-historical development explaining the rise of despotism in Egypt.

The orientalist and Eurocentric interpretations of the region have therefore produced the theory of Middle Eastern and Arab “exceptionalism.” Bellin (2004) identifies shortsighted explanations that justify the robustness of authoritarianism and the failure of democratization. First, a weak and ineffective civil society exists. Second, state controlled economies and rent-fueled opportunities undermine countervailing power to the state. Third, poverty and illiteracy rates are too high. Fourth, countries in the region are geographically remote from epicenters of democratization. Last, there is something culturally inherent to Islam that appears to be inhospitable to democracy (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 2003). Bellin (2004) summarizes these explanations, “in short, the Middle East and North Africa lack the prerequisites of democratization. The lack of a strong civil society, a market-driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture explains the region’s failure to democratize” (p. 141). However, other regions have similar demographics and weak civil society, geographic remoteness from democratic epicenters, and religious beliefs at one time thought to be incompatible with democracy, yet these alleged prerequisites to democracy have not prevented states in South America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia from transitions to democracies (Bellin, 2004). Consequently, scholars have largely overlooked internal sources of political transformation such as social movements, political economies and group interests (Bayat, 2013, p. 3).

In North Africa and Southwest Asia, authoritarianism is not homogenous and takes different forms. While some researchers categorize authoritarian rule into two variants, monarchies and republics (Angrist, 2013), Gelvin (2015) presents a more nuanced understanding

to characterizing authoritarianism in light of the Arab uprisings. For example, Gelvin identifies strong relatively homogenous states (Tunisia and Egypt), weak states (Yemen and Libya), coup-proofed states (Bahrain and Syria), and the monarchies (Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates). The form of authoritarian state and specific historical-political developments can be viewed as an important determinant shaping ideas and actions of citizenship. To assume that people in Arab and Muslim societies are genetically and culturally predisposed to or are better off under authoritarian regimes, while democracy is a natural right for people in other societies, is to assume that Arabs and Muslims are somewhat less deserving, less capable, and less genetically inclined to democracy and, therefore, less human and civilized than people in other societies. The following section charts the historical-political developments that led to authoritarianism in Egypt.

#### **4.3.1 The authoritarian ruling bargain**

Many political scientists have described the Egyptian state under Mubarak as an *authoritarian state*. Brown et al. (2013) define the Egyptian state during Mubarak's rule as centralized executive authoritarianism, where "all of the state's chains of command, communication, and implementation led to and from the president's office. The ministries and state bureaucracy were predicated on centralized autocratic logics in their operation as well" (p. 221). Angrist (2013) designates the Egyptian state as an authoritarian republic:

Led by presidents whose terms in office are conferred by elections. Elections are not free or fair, but they are held, usually at regular intervals, both for the chief executive positions and for national parliaments. Political power emanates from preponderant political parties that are headed by the president, are backed by the military, and have access to large amounts of state revenues. (p. 8)

Although currently the direction and nature of the Egyptian state is in much debate, turmoil, and is still undecided, the legacy of authoritarianism still persists throughout its state bureaucracies

and apparatuses. Some have commented on the pervasive and stubborn nature of authoritarianism, referring the current ‘deep state’<sup>157</sup> of Egypt (El Amrani, 2012; Teti and Gervasio, 2012). Furthermore, Brown et al. (2013) conclude, “the internal hierarchies and lines of power within the state apparatus emerged intact despite the disruptions that the popular mobilization initially caused in 2011” (p. 211). Time will only tell how long the legacy of the authoritarian state will permeate throughout Egyptian institutions. This section briefly illustrates the development of the authoritarian state in Egypt and its connection to Egyptian social contract or ruling bargain.

Beginning in the 1950s, many countries in the Arab world gained their independence from former European imperial powers, which led to an opportunity for newly independent governments to adopt ruling bargains with their populations. Ruling bargains, which can also be described as “benefits for compliance,” were social benefits that governments provided in return for political support, compliance, and legitimacy from their populations. Under the ruling bargain, Arab governments began to play a major role in the state economy by accelerating economic development, allocating funds to public sectors, and nationalizing strategic industries. Governments also began to provide an array of social benefits including, employment guarantees, healthcare, and education. In addition, Arab governments subsidized housing and consumer goods such as food and petroleum products.

Gelvin (2015) explains there are three reasons why Arab states adopted the ruling bargain. First, the United States encouraged Arab governments to play an active role in the economic development of their country. In the context of the Cold War between the United

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<sup>157</sup> The deep state of Egypt can be described as a clientelistic, authoritarian system which worked to the advantage of corrupt business leaders, of the intelligence and police services, of members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, and of the armed forces, which channeled patronage, relatively unscathed from the corrupt regime holding vast economic and political power (Teti and Gervasio, 2012, p. 102). This corrupt system made life intolerable for ordinary Egyptians and has created many obstacles to the current political transition.

States and the Soviet Union, the U.S. viewed rapid economic development as a deterrent against Soviet influence and control in the region. Second, international monetary organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) promoted Keynesian economic models that called for strong government intervention into the economy. The WB and IMF provided loans for economic development and ensured monetary stability, respectively. The global reach of these institutions greatly influenced domestic Arab economic policy by ascribing centralization, economic growth, and employment as important functions of the state. Last, the “logic of de-colonialization” (Gelvin, 2015, p. 13) dictated that Arab governments, which had no control over their economies during the colonial period, must make-up for lost time by building a strong national economy and redistribute national wealth.

In Egypt, for example, when Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the Free Officers Movement took control and established an Egyptian republic in 1952, drastic reforms were implemented and the ruling bargain in Egypt began. Under Nasser, the state was the engine of the economy, owning a variety of industries, and guaranteeing government jobs to all graduates of the higher education system. The Nasser government also nationalized the Suez Canal, gained possession of properties of resident aliens, and carried out massive land redistribution programs. The government also received a \$42.5 million development loan from the IMF and eventually received \$700 million from the United States. Most of the ruling bargain was paid through “rent,” which were monies, other than taxation, that the state acquired. Egypt received funding from the Suez Canal shipping fees, financial support from oil-producing Arab States, and other foreign investors. The Nasser government used these monies to provide social services to Egyptians in exchange for compliance in the legitimation of the Egyptian republic. The Egyptian citizenry would forgo their political and civil rights in exchange for social rights (e.g., food and

housing subsidies, health care, and education). However, in the subsequent decades the Egyptian ruling bargain began to be dismantled.

Beginning in the 1970s, there were three main reasons why the Arab States attempted to renegotiate the ruling bargain. First, oil prices began to decrease, and those oil-producing states were unable to offer the same level of financial support to non-oil producing states. Second, states such as Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco had heavily borrowed from the international community, accumulating large amounts of foreign debt. States continued to borrow in order to service existing debt, and to maintain the ruling bargain. This established a “Mediterranean debt crescent” that plagued states from Turkey to Morocco. Third, there was an international shift in economic paradigms, from the Keynesian model of strong state intervention to the market-driven approach of neoliberalism.

Arab governments were thus forced to reduce their end of the ruling bargain. States begin to cut public expenditures, liberalize trade, balance budgets, remove price controls, deregulated business, and privatized traditionally public-held industries. Subsidies on consumer goods went from general subsidies to targeted subsidies only for the extremely poor. Basically, the ruling bargain that the Arab governments and their populations had negotiated during the post-colonial period had been shredded, even though governments still demanded compliance. As a result, governments increased the use of heavy-handed tactics and assembled large security apparatuses to restrict civil liberties, infringed on due process, placed strict controls on the media, created cumbersome restrictions on political and civic participation to control their overall populations and oppositions groups. The government reductions of subsidies and the adoption of neoliberal policies not only dismantled the ruling bargain, but also caused disastrous effects for citizens who desperately relied on the public sector.

Populations within Arab states became frustrated with the attempted renegotiation of the ruling bargain as their daily situation rapidly deteriorated. The application of the neoliberal policies in the Arab World led to a series IMF Bread Riots that flared-up across the region in the late 1970s and a zero percent growth rate during the “lost decade” of the 1980s. The policies of privatization not only reduced public benefits, limited jobs and decreased wages, but also led to a system of “crony capitalism.” As a result, those with connections to the ruling elite received government loans and bids, and were able to control major portions of a particular sector. In Egypt for example, a friend of Gamal Mubarak (former president Hosni Mubarak’s son) controlled over 60 percent of Egyptian steel production. In Syria, the cousin of Bashar al-Assad owned 55 percent of a telecommunications company whose network covers the whole country. Therefore, as reforms based upon neoliberal policies continued to threaten the ruling bargain, Arab governments became equated with social injustice and corruption. This section focused on the promise of the ruling bargain between Arab governments and their populations that has been significantly dismantled in the past four decades by the adoption of neoliberal policies and rampant corruption. The attempted renegotiation of the ruling bargain by Arab governments ultimately led to their vulnerability and an environment where public protests against the government and the demanding of citizenship rights resonated with a critical mass.

#### **4.4 Participatory Citizenship**

*Participatory citizenship* is based upon the theory that in democratic societies political and civic participation is needed in order to foster the preservation of membership, rights, and participation of citizens. Participatory citizenship can also be the basis on which people build their rights to seek justice and to demand active participation within their societies, assuming greater civic and political participation and increased awareness of the social, political, and economic issues

facing local and national communities. The extent, processes, and actors of participatory citizenship are all relative to particular individuals and structural challenges. Resources, the nature of the political system, and *citizenship education* and skills can all influence the form and intensity of civic engagement and political participation. The section is devoted to exploring the subject-citizen dialectic, the relationship between citizenship and contentious politics, and a framework that broadens the forms and spaces of participatory citizenship in Egypt.

#### **4.4.1 Emerging citizenship and the subject-citizen dialectic**

To begin the discussion on participatory citizenship, the subject-citizen dialectic must first be explored. Ideal *citizens* can be viewed as free, autonomous persons, being an active and equal in civil and political life, whereas *subjects* are “persons subjected to ruler’s will. Subjects are not autonomous partners engaging in civil life. They are part of the landscape of the ruler’s estate” (Tétreault, 2000, p. 72). Contrasting the “integrated” citizen with the “adaptive” subject, Freire (2008) is beneficial in explaining the citizen-subject dialectic and the role of internal-external sovereignty. Freire begins by explaining the role of humans in and with the world as not passive or limited to the biological forces. Humans, unlike animals, possess a “creative dimension” where they “can intervene in reality in order to change it.” Thus a citizen “acquires experience, creating and recreating, integrating themselves into their context, responding to its challenges” (Freire, 2008, p. 4). The integrated person is person a citizen; the adaptive person is a subject, “adaptation representing at most a weak form of self-defense” (Freire, 2008, p. 4). For Freire, in order to survive, the subject, incapable of changing reality, is forced to adapt to the oppressive environment through a submerged reality and a passive existence—a dehumanizing reality. However, citizens, as integrated persons, “attempt to overcome the factors, which make them accommodate or adjust, in a struggle—constantly threatened by oppression—to attain their full

humanity” (Freire, 2008, p. 4). As citizens attempt to possess sovereignty over their social and political environment, they “relate to their world by responding to the challenges of the environment, they begin to dynamize, to master, and to humanize reality” (Freire, 2008, p. 4). Subsequently, the integrated person (the citizen) is a person who is actively striving for full humanity. As the closed society containing subjects who are submerged in reality breaks open, citizens emerge. Freire (2008) explains, “No longer mere spectators, they uncross their arms, renounce expectancy, and demand intervention. No longer satisfied to watch, they want to participate. This participation disturbs the privileged elite, who band together in self-defense” (p. 11).

There is a notable transition from the subject to the citizen. Therefore, it can be said that citizenship, “represents a transition from the person/subject, the subservient, acquiescent individual, to the participating individual who participates in the making of social life in all its manifestations” (Manna, 1995, p. 91). In relation to the state, the subject is passive, obedient, and loyal; the subject’s reality is submerged in the structures of power ascribed and forced onto the subject by the state. On the other hand, a citizen has thoughtful agency in life. The citizen creates spaces in which citizens actively participate, creates forms of participation, acts through lenses of social responsibility, and often strives for self, community, and state transformation. The actions associated with being a citizen transcend any legal status a citizen may possess. The legal status does not have to do with justice, but is connected with the power over subject. However, the acts of citizenship have to do with justice as a citizen as well as praxis of citizenship. In the Freirean consciousness, praxis is the symbiotic relationship between knowledge (critical awareness of social, economic, and political conditions) and action (Freire, 2007). With reference to enacting citizenship, both knowledge and action are needed to supplant subjecthood with citizenship.

In the case of Egypt, beginning with Nasser—under the banner of security and through monopolizing both legitimate and illegitimate power—successive regimes significantly controlled the party system, civil society, and the government. This created various forms of exclusion for many Egyptians, which manifested into a culture of fear and a submerged citizenship—equating to subjecthood for many Egyptians. As Abdelhalim (2015) explains, “Citizenship of subjugation was the direct result of the physical humiliation and contempt of the Egyptian mind by state authorities” (p. 61). However, especially during the last decade of Mubarak’s rule (see [Section 2.1.6](#)), the constant feeling of exclusion combined with access to education and external knowledge, new influential social groups of citizens emerged that possessed an awareness of social, political and economic availabilities as well as their inequalities as subjects. Egyptians challenged their subjecthood by reimagining spaces and forms of citizenship. They countered their submerged realities with a critical consciousness of active citizenship. However, the internal and external contention surrounding citizenship and the quest for humanity is still ongoing in Egypt.

#### **4.4.2 Citizenship and Contentious politics**

The dialectic between the subject and the citizen is played out through contentious politics. The Arab uprisings brought to the foreground interests in contentious politics as the source of social and political change. Bryan Turner describes the notion of “active and passive citizenry” and the importance of “struggle,” arguing that particular social struggles are a driver of citizenship, naming this *citizenship from below* (Turner, 1990). In this way, contentious politics and citizenship rights and participation are linked, and the dialectics between *passive* and *active*, *demobilization* and *mobilization* and *depoliticization* and *politicization* makes for dynamic models of participation (Meijer, 2014).

*In Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Sidney Tarrow

(2011), an authority on contentious politics, explains:

Contentious politics occurs when ordinary people—often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood—join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents...Contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives to take action for actors who lack resources on their own. People content through known repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations at their margins (p. 6).

Tarrow (2011) highlights the political constraints and opportunities that motivate citizens to take action.

Generally, collective action becomes contentious when citizens “lack regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 7). Additionally, Tarrow (2011) suggests that citizens utilize various repertoires of contention, or forms of collective action. Collective action can be brief or sustained, humdrum or dramatic, institutionalized or disruptive. Moreover, Tarrow (2011) argues that collective action in the form of social movements is “the only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate their claims against better-equipped opponents or powerful states” (pp. 7-8). However, Asef Bayat (2013) cautions on the politics of contention that appears as a reaction to changes in political constraints and opportunities, especially within states North Africa and Southwest Asia (NASWA).

Bayat (2013) suggests that contentious collective actions occurring in NASWA does not develop just “anywhere and anytime.” Contentious collective actions in NASWA demand a political opportunity such as “when the political authorities and the mechanisms of control are undermined by...a political or an economic crisis, international pressure, or infighting within the ruling elites” (Bayat, 2013, p. 10). In general, under ordinary conditions, authoritarian regimes in

the region have expressed little tolerance for sustained dissent. Moreover, Bayat (2013) argues that in the absence of “free activities” and in light of the repression against those citizens that are “political” and engaging in contentious politics, citizens are forced “to exit the political scene at least temporarily, or to go underground,” in turn subversive groups are more likely to “spearhead undemocratic practices” (p. 11). He also proposes to look at the everyday acts that citizens in the region can participate in, in order to subvert and dissent authoritarian control. Bayat (2013) advances a theory—that I would describe as contentious citizenship—that “interlocks activism with the practice of everyday life” (p. 11). There is an importance placed on the forms and spaces of participatory citizenship and recognition that “authoritarian rule routinely impede contentious collective actions and organized movements” and is “also unrealistic to expect a civil society to be in a constant state of vigor, vitality and collective struggle” (Bayat, 2013, p. 315). There is an emphasis on the “art of presence” for ordinary citizens and how participatory citizenship may be enacted to “recondition the established political elites and refashion state institutions into their sensibilities,” which in the long term can be connected to organized social movement activism (Bayat, 2013, p. 315). Consequently, participatory citizenship can be a dynamic lens of citizenship that explores the actions of citizens used to disrupt social norms, demand rights and inclusion, and build foundations for broader social change.

#### **4.4.3 Broadening the forms of participatory citizenship**

The Egyptian Revolution brought to attention new and unconventional forms of agency and participatory citizenship in Egypt. Thus, I argue in this section that a broad lens of participatory citizenship is needed to explore the multifaceted ways Egyptian citizens are participating in society. There first must be an acknowledgment that an active-passive dialectic exists within participatory citizenship. While, active participation often calls for an actual involvement by

individuals and groups in the governing process affecting their lives. Passive participation is concern with a lack of action, which is “a form of answer or of evaluating the social contract at a given time, a form of acceptance of the status quo” (Neaga, 2010, p. 251). However, active citizenship can also be viewed as a citizen who is not only participating in her/his duties but also upholds structures of society. As Banks (2008) explains, active citizens are involved with “actions beyond voting to actualize existing laws and conventions,” and “may participate in demonstrations or make public speeches regarding conventional issues and reforms. Rather than challenging the existing social and political structures, these actions are designed to support and maintain the structures” (p. 136). Thus, there must be a distinction between active citizenship and activist citizenship. Isin (2008) postulates, “We contrast *activist citizens* with *active citizens* who act out already written scripts. While activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene, active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created. While activist citizens are creative, active citizens are not” (p. 38). Isin’s *activist citizenship* is more aligned to what Banks (2008) typifies as *transformative citizenship*, involved with “civic actions designed to actualize values and moral principles and ideals beyond those of existing laws and conventions. Transformative citizens take action to promote social justice even when their actions violate, challenge, or dismantle existing laws, conventions, or structures” (p. 136). Other scholars have also described this form of citizenship as *critical citizenship* (Castro, 2013; Dejaechere & Tudball, 2007; Johnson & Morris, 2010). To the point, Mohanty and Tandon (2006) argue that participatory citizenship is about:

Altering the existing relationship between the state and its vulnerable citizenry; it is also about constructing new relationship between the powerless and the dominant... Participatory citizenship is both a discourse and a set of practice about the inclusion of the excluded groups. It is about their agency, articulation and mobilization in their attempt to change existing relationship and turn their overwhelming exclusionary citizenship experience into an inclusive one. (p. 10)

Basically, I am arguing that there must be a more nuanced understanding of the various forms of participatory citizenship in Egypt.

To assist in this endeavor, I will utilize Neaga's (2010) typology of participatory citizenship to highlight some of the nuanced behavior of acts of participatory citizens. Neaga (2010) advances six types of citizen: (1) The *incorporated citizen* is part of the elite or perceives to be, actively supports the interest of the ruling party, and belongs to sources of power rather than oppositional forces. The incorporated citizen has trust in leaders, and operates selflessly as benefits by the very fact of being part of the political system in power. (2) The *deferential citizen* is non-participative, accepts the authority of the existing elites, but does not internalize the goals of the party or the state. The deferential citizen is easily manipulated, trusting that the leaders work to the advantage of the citizen. This type of citizen will vote but, for the most, part leaves political participation in the hands of the elites. (3) The *marginal citizen* is disenfranchised, detached, and alienated from the system due to lack of material resources and power. The marginal citizen rarely votes and participation is oriented towards family and friends. (4) The *active citizen* participates in various political activities and is interested in other members of the community. Often the active citizen is in conflict with the establishment's elite and participates as part of oppositional parties or movements. Active citizens may belong to a party or to an organization and to a certain extent are radical, reformist, and altruist. (5) The *cynic citizen* is similar to the active citizen, as far as opposition to the establishment, but does not participate and lacks public confidence. And although very critical, the cynic citizen is rather passive. (6) The *opportunistic citizen* makes decisions concerning the fulfillment of short-term material interests. The opportunistic citizen is more of a free-rider and participates only when having a direct interest (pp. 251-252). Although these types of citizens are by no way exhaustive or neatly bound

into mutually exclusive categories with rigid borders, they provide insight in to the dynamic ways citizens participate.

Bayat (2013) offers a broader approach to participatory citizenship without losing the political project of citizenship. Describing active citizenry, he states that there must be a “sustained presence of individuals, groups, and movements in every available social space, whether institutional or informal, collective or individual, where they assert their rights and fulfill their responsibilities” (p. 313). Moreover, Bayat (2013) connects the acts of citizens in their daily lives to social change arguing that citizens can:

Generate change in society through active citizenship in their immediate domains: children at home and at schools, students in colleges, teachers in classrooms, workers in factories, the poor in their neighborhoods, athletes in stadiums, artists through their art, intellectuals through media, women at home and as public actors. (p. 314)

The “immediate domains” and how ordinary citizens are transforming various spaces and subverting authoritarian rule are the focus on this dissertation.

#### **4.4.4 The politics of spaces and participatory citizenship**

Observers of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution have commented on the important notion of the politics of space or spaces of citizenship (El-Taraboulsi, 2011; Mandiraci, Bulus, & Fakoussa, 2014; Sadiki, 2011; Sadiki, 2015). It can be said that all space under authoritarian control claimed by the rulers is state space, not public space. However, during the Revolution “protesters contested regime monopoly over control, use, manipulation of, and claim over space” (Sadiki, 2011, p. 21). The revolution in Egypt brought a reimaged and embolden public sphere. In basic sociological terms, there are three general social spaces that exist in society where citizens can participate. It should be noted that these spaces are fluid, overlap and tend to vary between state to state, and between communities. *Formal spaces* usually consist of formal political institution as well as state educational institutions, among other examples. *Nonformal spaces* may include community

organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, volunteer groups, and charities. Also nonformal spaces may include participating in social movements. *Informal spaces* include spaces related to the family, work, and the media. However, I would like to deepen the understanding of spaces of citizenship.

Social space can be described in the broad inclusive sense as a site of “political gathering for citizens—a physical and ideological space of encounter, one that comprises historical, cultural and social dimensions” (El-Taraboulsi, 2011, p. 7). Moreover, public space can be defined as “a set of learning conditions where people come together to speak, to engage in dialogue, to share their stories, and to struggle together within social relations that strengthen rather than weaken possibilities for active citizenship” (Giroux, 2009, p. 456). The definition by Giroux emphasizes the learning and dialogical dimensions of public spaces encompassing within a collective struggle. In Egypt during the Revolution, researchers cited the importance of spaces of citizenship. El-Taraboulsi (2011) found that spaces in Egypt led the forging of a collective consciousness manifested to mass solidarity; Virtual and physical spaces were not isolated from each other but seeped into one another; Spaces were used to express and enact emergent forms (both ideational and practical levels) of citizenship; and Spaces were used to voice citizens’ Egyptianness and put it into action. Of course, public places such as Tahrir Square have become a sight of participatory citizenship in Egypt (so much so that the Egyptian military is permanently stationed at and around the square), but there are spaces of participatory citizenship such as university campuses and classrooms that can also be considered a significant space of citizenship. Therefore, Mandiraci, Bulus, & Fakoussa (2014) discussing spaces and participation after the Arab uprisings appropriately observe:

The boundaries of what is traditionally conceptualized as “political” or “political actors” need to be expanded in order to incorporate social actors who are alienated from the political system. . . . Any space where social interaction occurs—be it a market square, a mosque or a wedding—can become a form of participation. . . . In more authoritarian settings, these spaces of interaction turn into important tools for individuals to engage in the process of public opinion forming. (p. 9)

Thus spaces of citizenship, “any spaces,” can be used as a space for participatory citizenship and can be connected to what Bayat (2013) has phrased the “art of presence.” Bayat (2013) argues that citizens in the region “cannot spearhead a democratic shift unless they master the art of presence—the skill and stamina to assert collective will in spite of all odds by circumventing constraints, utilizing what is possible, and discovering new space within which to make themselves heard, seen, felt, and realized” (p. 313). He continues by explaining the strategic benefits of active citizenship by ordinary citizenship within everyday spaces contrasted with social movements, “Authoritarian regimes may be able to suppress organized movements or silence collective resistance. But they are limited when it comes to stifling an entire society, the mass of ordinary citizens in their daily lives” (p. 313). Therefore, I argue that participatory citizenship can take place in the ordinary as well as the dramatic-historical spaces where citizenship emerges and can be practiced.

#### **4.4.5 Participatory citizenship in Egypt: Beyond the state, family, and religion**

The right to participate, in all of its various forms, has been increasingly endorsed and promoted through global and regional institutions and has theoretically become a global norm.

Participation, as endorsed by Egypt as signatory to various international agreements, is covered throughout the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<sup>158</sup> specifically recognized in

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<sup>158</sup> See the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>.

Article 25 of the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration,<sup>159</sup> and is explicitly stated in Article 11 of the 2009 African Union Youth Charter; “every young person should have the right to participate in all spheres of society.”<sup>160</sup> Additionally, active and responsible participation is highlighted in 2014 *E-9 Statement on Education Beyond 2015*.<sup>161</sup> Furthermore, participatory citizenship is featured in the 2014 Egyptian Constitution as well as in Egypt’s 2030 development agenda. However, as Parolin (2009) reminds us, “exploring citizenship in the Arab world requires first a disentanglement from all those ideas, images and suggestions that have settled into the concept in the course of European political thought” (p. 25). Therefore, it should be acknowledged the legality of participatory citizenship in Egypt does not reflect the social reality participatory citizenship.

The Egyptian state has significantly defined and controlled participatory citizenship.

Regarding the Egyptian context, Refaei (2015) states:

One must bear in mind the overall low levels of political awareness and participation and limited means available for citizens to engage informally in the political process or influence government decision-making. In a society where voices of dissent have rarely been tolerated, it is interesting to note that dissenting views are often only associated with informal means of political engagement, whereas in some other countries formal channels serve the same purpose. (pp. 5-6)

The authoritarianism of successive regimes that ruled over Egypt since the 1950s created low levels of political participation, repressed opposition forces, distorted perceptions of citizenship and participation and created an overall culture of fear and apathy of political awareness.

Therefore, prior to the Revolution it has been said that political rights and civil liberties have been deeply defined and controlled by the state apparatus, limiting the extent of participation of

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<sup>159</sup> See the UN Millennium Declaration at <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>

<sup>160</sup> See the African Union Youth Charter at [http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN\\_YOUTH\\_CHARTER.pdf](http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_YOUTH_CHARTER.pdf)

<sup>161</sup> See E-9 Ministerial Review (2014) Joint E-9 Statement on Education Beyond 2015 (Islamabad Statement). <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002311/231100E.pdf>

its citizens.<sup>162</sup>

In addition to the state, participatory citizenship in Egypt has been also influenced by the family and religion (Parolin, 2009). Families have been a significant influence on citizenship as well as a space for citizenship participation. Parolin (2009) concluded that “Kin affiliation is a resilient and vital feature of Arab society, in spite of all the endeavors of the religious communities, and later the nation-states, to do away with it” (p. 116). Additionally, in the 2014 Constitution, Article 10 states, “The family is the nucleus of society, and is founded on religion, morality, and patriotism. The State shall ensure its cohesion, stability and the establishment of its values.” Taking care of one’s family is an important aspect of participatory citizenship in Egypt. Loyalty and obligations to one’s family often take precedent over loyalty and obligations to the state. Furthermore, families in general and parents specifically have greatly influenced the direction and life choices of Egyptian youth, and the forms of participatory citizenship, especially girls and women. As will be discussed in [Chapter 6](#), some participants shared that their parents did not want them to protests or bring any disgrace or problems to their family during the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. Therefore, it can be argued that families often promote passive, incorporated, or marginal forms of citizenship.

Connected to the family is the role of religion. Religion has shaped the spaces and forms of citizenship in Egypt. Specifically, the role of Islam and its various interpretations have influenced perceptions of citizenship. Islamic citizenship can be broadly defined as how Muslims reconcile religious principles and practices while simultaneously being citizens of the nation-

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<sup>162</sup> *Political rights* generally refer to norms such as free and fair elections for the chief executive and the legislature; the ability of citizens to organize in multiple political parties and compete in elections free from interference by the military, religious, or other powerful groups; the absence of discrimination against cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups; and transparent, accountable, non-corrupt government. *Civil liberties* can be described as freedom of expression and belief, freedom of association and organization, the rule of law, and individual rights (Angrist, 2013, p. 6).

state. With over 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide, it would be misleading to apply a monolithic understanding of Islamic citizenship across nation-states, just like it would be misrepresentative to simplify the beliefs and practices of all Muslims. The civic virtues and practices of citizenship within the largest Muslim majority country of Indonesia are therefore different than those virtues and practices of citizenship in Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, or of the Muslim-Americans in the United States. However, whether Coptic or Muslim, religion does play a significant role in defining the cultural, social, and legal systems of Egypt and should be considered in any analysis on citizenship in Egypt.

Similar of all world religions, Islam is multi-vocal, “containing some doctrines and practices that are potentially harmful, and others that are potentially beneficial to the emergence of democracy” (Stepan & Roberston, 2003, p. 40). Although Islam developed prior to the rise of the modern-nation state, there are notions of rights, individualism, and egalitarianism within the tenants of Islam. The Arabic word for citizenship is *muwatanah* and for citizen or “fellow countryman” is *muwatin*, a noun derived from the root word *watan*.<sup>163</sup> *Watan*, which is a pre-Islamic Arabic word, refers to one’s place of residence, or homeland (Faour and Muasher, 2011; Manna, 1995, Parolin, 2009). However, *muwatin* does not immediately entail the idea of a status and rights enjoyed by the subject, but rather the simple distinction between the national and the foreigner (Parolin, 2009, p. 25). In addition, scholars (Abou El Fadl, 2005; Manna, 1995; Moussalli, 2001; Parolin, 2009) have generally highlighted doctrines in Islam that guide an Islamic citizenship these include: “there shall be no compulsion in matters of religion” (Qur’an 2:256); protection for *Al Dhimma* (the People of the Book: Christians and Jews); Islamic concepts of *shura* (consultation), *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), and *ijma* (consensus); *Ummah* (a community or nation); and one of the five pillars of Islam is the compulsory principle of *Zakat*

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(giving to the poor and needy). However, it should be understood that these principles developed and were implemented within a specific social and political environment in Arabia, spread throughout the world, and currently manifest within the social, political, and economic particularities and interpretations of Muslim communities and states. To this point, Starrett (1998) cautions against what he calls the “objectification of Islam,” the attempt to domesticate and identify “a precise set of beliefs, values, and practices which are assumed to constitute a normative and timeless ‘Islam’” (p. 8).

In Egypt, the discourse and concepts of Islamic citizenship have been greatly shaped by both the Egyptian state and by Islamist groups,<sup>164</sup> most notably the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian state has attempted to use state institutions such as al-Azhar University to appropriate a particular religious discourse that aligns with state ideologies of Islam and citizenship, and ultimately control (Zeghal, 2007). Additionally, Islamist groups have utilized Islam to promote their own versions of citizenship. For example, Gelvin (2012b) explores the increases of human rights and democratic rhetoric and norms in the Arab world and their effects on political Islam. Gelvin explains that, in the wake of September 11, 2001 and especially after the Arab uprisings, Islamists groups have incorporated and have been responsive to the growing wave of human rights, social justice, and democratic rhetoric occurring throughout the broader Arab world. Therefore, it would be problematic to isolate concrete Islamic principles to be used to construct a homogenous Islamic citizenship. Rather, it is more appropriate to analyze the multifaceted ways certain individuals, groups, and states use Islam to construct and practice their own versions of citizenship that can be related to the distribution of power.

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<sup>164</sup> Islamism can be generally defined as a movement to express Islam politically. Scott (2010) explains that Islamism is a “belief that Islam is an all-embracing ideology for the state...it holds that Islam needs to be expressed politically. Political Islam calls for a reversal of Western-based secularization and for the unity of religion and state. [However] Islamists include a wide range of thinkers who have differing attitudes about what kind of political systems would result, including whether the system would be democratic and, if so, in what way” (pp. 6-7).

In addition to the power that the state, the family and religion has on perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship in Egypt, in this framework—especially in the wake of the Revolution—I recognize that there are other significant influences, forms, and spaces of participation that occur outside the officially sanctioned realm of these institutions. Therefore, a more nuanced understanding of participation is needed when analyzing participatory citizenship in Egypt. As mentioned above, Bayat (2013), for instance, examines agency and participation of the ordinary people in Egypt,<sup>165</sup> and how through everyday acts of defiance, being excellent at what you do, and the “art of presence,” citizens are redefining participation. In addition, conducting research on youth participation and civic engagement in North Africa, researchers from UNICEF (2011) identify youth participation extending beyond the family into ranging from participating in school and participation within the public arena (community, national, and emergencies). Moreover, Alhamad (2008) argues that in Egypt, “political participation goes beyond the formal realm and that the subtle, seemingly nonpolitical actions by citizens carry considerable political meaning. Such participation often takes place through loosely based, informal vehicles, many of which serve multiple purposes—social, political, occupational—and are often indigenous to the region” (p. 36).

Immediately after the Revolution political participation and civic engagement witnessed a relative openness of the public sphere in Egypt. Escalating suppression of political opportunities and systematic crack down on civil liberties and freedoms seems that participation is once again relegated to the nonformal and informal spheres.<sup>166</sup> Furthermore, I want to problematize the

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<sup>165</sup> Bayat (2013) defines the ordinary people in Egypt as “the subaltern, the urban dispossessed, Muslim women, the globalizing youth, and other urban grass roots” groups who strive to affect change in Egypt by “refusing to exit the social and political stage controlled by the authoritarian state, their moral authority, and neoliberal economies, these groups discover and generate new spaces within which they can voice their dissent and assert their presence in pursuit of bettering their lives” (p. x).

<sup>166</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, October 17, 2015, Youth Political Participation in Egypt.  
<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/10/17/youth-political-participation-in-egypt/>

hegemonic role that the state, family, and religion play in shaping and controlling ideas and actions of citizenship. Although the state, family, and religion have played (and will continue to play) a significant role in shaping ideas of citizenship in Egypt, empirical research towards a more multivariate understanding of how citizenship is learned and practiced is needed. Within the realities of the changing Egyptian state, participation in Egypt can include but is not limited to voting, community service, and participation in civil society groups, actively participating in the wellbeing of family members, individual activism, and participation in social movements. A broad-view of participatory citizenship in Egypt is needed in order to reveal the potential range of local interpretations of spaces and forms of participation. Participatory citizenship exists on a *continuum of participation*, from those participation policies authorized and taught by the Egyptian state to more alternative modes of participation that seek to challenge participation norms and carve out spaces of expanding civic and political participation.

#### **4.5 Theories of Political Sociology of Education**

The second main theoretical focus examines the role of the university in fostering citizenship knowledge and will be framed by theories linked to the subfield of political sociology of education. The overriding theory of the political sociology of education is the interwoven relationship between politics and education. For critical researchers, the constant ideological and material struggles between subordinate and dominant groups are a central theme in education research. Systems and processes of education, inherently connected to wider structures of power, are then important sites to examine the reproduction of as well as the resistance to and the countering of power. Sadovnik (2001) suggests that for “conflict sociologists,” schools are analogous to a “social battlefield where students struggle against teachers, teachers against administrators, and so on” (p. 52). It is in the critical framework, where not only the dynamics of

power and resistance can be observed, but where the voices and actions of those in the struggle for social change can be amplified. Thus, this research is based upon the assumption that education and politics are interrelated. As articulated within the above sections, citizenship can be an ideological tool used to maintain the legitimacy of the political system. The state attempts to maintain power and legitimacy by promoting a particular citizenship vision or in a coercive way by censoring or suppressing the dissenting ‘subversive’ views of citizenship. This framework is concerned with the relationship between educational institutions, social actors of education, and state power throughout the prism of citizenship in Egypt. Herrera and Torres (2006) argue that a “critical sociology of Arab education can serve to inform educators, reformers, policy-makers, and diverse publics towards a greater understanding of issues relating to social justice, participation, and democracy, and also their antitheses, injustice, passivity, and authoritarianism” (p. 3). In his chapter on *Critical Theory and Political Sociology of Education*, Carlos Alberto Torres (2009) explores some of the many theoretical features of a political sociology of education.<sup>167</sup> The two such theoretical features of a political sociology of education that will guide this research are the *politicity of education* and *theories of the state and education*.

#### **4.5.1 Politicity of the university**

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<sup>167</sup> According to Torres (2009), a political sociology of education has many features including its structural historical analysis focus; its emphasis on the political focus of educational practices and policies; its reliance on theories of the state as a theoretical backbone; its critique of instrumental rationalization as the only feasible, practical, and cost-effective way to adequate means to ends; its focus on the politicity of education and educational policy formation as its theoretical and practical leitmotif; its concern for multicentered (but not decentered) notions of power (and hence interest and privilege); and finally the attempt to frame the research questions, theoretical rationale, and policy implications in terms of the importance of ideology and the scholarship of class, race, gender, and the state in comparative perspective (Torres, 2009, pp. 41-61).

The perspective that the very essence of education is inherently political greatly informs this research. Thus, education cannot be neutral, it is this *politicity of education* that is both “the reproduction of the dominant ideology and its unmasking” (Freire, 1998, p. 91). In other words, within the university—as in other institutions of education—there is a constant struggle between forms of resistance and forms of domination. Consequently, the university as site of inquiry is an institution at the dialectic nexus of individual and group agency and structures of power and reproduction. To the point, Paulo Freire eloquently states:

The system believes that it obtains from education one of the fundamental instruments for the reproduction of its power, and so dialectically, necessarily, must create its antagonist; its antagonistic opposite, as a revolutionary task, belongs to us. (Paulo Freire conversation with Escobar et al. 1994, p. 31)

Therefore, the importance of situating the university in this dialectic nature is that it provides a lens used to observe vital insights reflecting society’s liberating and regressive processes of citizenship, as well as their dialectic existence. For example, Rhoads and Liu (2008) conclude that the university is both a target of social reform and an agent of social reform. Meaning, groups attempt to shape the nature of the university by promoting their own versions of university initiatives. Simultaneously, groups working from within the university can project certain social reforms upon the broader society.

Theorists have long situated politics and the political as being deeply intertwined within institutions of education in Egypt (Abdalla, 2008; Gorman, 2003; Herrera & Torres, 2006; Herrera, 2008; Ibrahim, 2010; Starrett, 1998). For example, Naguib (2006) emphasizes the complex social processes that occur between the culture of formal institutions of education in Egypt and the culture and politics of the macro-society, stating that the “microculture of the school reflects a microcosm of society and an element of social production” (p. 54). The university, which contains students who usually have longer experiences of subjection and

participation in multiple forms of power, privilege, or subordination than primary and secondary students, can be a significant location to examine the contested terrain of citizenship between the students, faculty, administrators, as well as the broader society. On the one hand, the university as a site of political, social, and ideological struggle can mimic authoritative dimensions of larger society. On the other hand, the university can be an arena for bridging the academic to the masses, perceived as a “robust vehicle” for promoting critical thinking, public participation and democratic citizenship necessary to counter the neoliberal university model that values the interests of financial capital and the logic of profit-making (Giroux, 2002, p. 427). Thus, during times of political unrest, uprisings and revolutions, the contentious role of the university, both engaging and suppressing resistance, can be a valuable site of examination not only providing the researcher with a microcosm for understanding the circumstances of the broader society, but offers the narratives of those individuals who are simultaneously citizens and members of the university. Furthermore, the universities in Egypt can be a potential site to unearth emerging constructions of citizenship knowledge and action beyond its current conventional existence in Egyptian society.

#### **4.5.2 Theories of the state and education: The persistence of authoritarianism**

Any analysis of the relationship between politics and education, must take into consideration that nature of the state in which institutions of education exist. Michael Apple (2003) poignantly explains:

Formal schooling by and large is organized and controlled by the government. This means that by its very nature the entire schooling process—how it is paid for, what goals it seeks to attain and how these goals will be measured, who has power over it, what textbooks are approved, who does well in schools and who does not, who has the right to ask and answer these questions, and so on—is by definition political. Thus, as inherently part of a set of political institutions, the educational system will constantly be in the middle of crucial struggles over the meaning of democracy, over definitions of legitimate

authority and culture, and over who should benefit the most from government policies and practices. (p. 1)

Thus, this theory examines the nature of state power and authority through the university policies and programs that the state maintains, implements, and/or prohibits. These public policies of education have material implications for social actors of education and the broader society, which may lead to the project a particular version of society and citizenship.

The unsettled nature of the Egyptian state, and the legacy of centralized power over university policies and pedagogies, particularly those regarding ideologies of citizenship are important foci of this research. The former Egyptian student activist turned political scientist, Admed Abdalla, provides an insightful reminder of the relationship between education and the state, “the question of university democracy has always been intertwined with that of democracy in the country at large” (2008, p. 230).

#### ***4.5.2.1 The challenges of authoritarian structured universities***

Prior to the Revolution, many researchers have examined some of the challenges facing universities in Egypt (Cupito & Langsten, 2011; Herrera, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Megahed, 2010; Said, 2003; Shann, 1992; UNHDR, 2010). Egypt’s public universities are governed by the Supreme Council of Universities (SCU), which is chaired by the Minister of Higher Education (MOHE). This centralized body oversees the administrations of all post-secondary educational, technical, and vocational institutions. There are 25 public universities (including Al-Azhar, and 11 that have been founded since 2000), 16 private universities, 51 state technical vocation institutions, and over 80 private institutions.<sup>168</sup> Public institutions are very

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<sup>168</sup> Rose, M. (2014) *Education in North Africa*. Hammamet Conference. British Council. [http://www.britishcouncil.tn/sites/default/files/education\\_in\\_north\\_africa\\_-\\_hammamet\\_conference\\_2014.pdf](http://www.britishcouncil.tn/sites/default/files/education_in_north_africa_-_hammamet_conference_2014.pdf) (p. 27-31).

large, for instance Cairo University has over 200,000 students,<sup>169</sup> Alexandria University approximately 175,000, and Ain Shams (also in Cairo) 171,000 (Rose, 2014). All major decisions concerning admission levels and standards, definitions of programs and curricula, creation of new academic positions for the recruitment and appointment of faculty, the allocation of resources, and the establishment of academic standards, and their assessment are made by MOHE through the SCU (Shann, 1992). Although the SCU allocates resources for Egyptian institutions of higher education, the budget for universities are determined by Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance. The MOHE plays a minor role in the budgeting process, and individual institutions and faculties have very limited autonomy over internal reallocation of resources among budget categories (Said, 2003).

The highly centralized bureaucratic structures of the Egyptian university system have presented obstacles to developing high professional standards for academics. Limited financial resources, second-rate equipment, deteriorating infrastructure and facilities, low salaries, limited scholarships, and few international scholarly exchanges provide strong disincentives for academics (Herrera, 2006). In addition, high faculty-to-student ratios and the lack of academic freedom force many academics to search for positions abroad (especially in the Gulf countries), in private institutions, or in the private sector.<sup>170</sup> This environment also fostered a culture of corruption among some faculty, who would charge for private lessons essential to pass courses, and force students to purchase personal cliff notes before final exams (El Masry, 2013).

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<sup>169</sup> See Shanghai Rankings, <http://www.shanghairanking.com/World-University-Rankings/Cairo-University.html>

<sup>170</sup> Herrera (2006) found, that “the lack of political stability, compounded by restrictions on academic freedom, bleak economic opportunities, military conflict, and social and political instability, represent some of the more salient reason why the region as a whole continuously loses many of its valuable human resources to brain drain” (p. 416).

The youth bulge in Egypt adds to the challenges of a centralized university system. According to the 2010 UNDP Report, from 1997-2007 the number of university students doubled.<sup>171</sup> In 2010, there were approximately 2.6 million post-secondary students in Egypt, with an expected increase of about 3 percent a year. This high student demand puts a huge strain on the human resources as well as the infrastructure of Egyptian universities. In addition, the Report stated that the youth unemployment for higher education graduates was 25.6 percent in 2008-2009. Employment was especially difficult for graduates with degrees in social sciences, humanities, and arts. As a result, for many students, lecture-centered pedagogies, enormous class enrollments, inadequate facilities, centralized educational administration, restrictions on student organizing,<sup>172</sup> and low employability creates great disillusionment.

Complicating these issues was the fact that under the former President Mubarak, the Ministry of Interior installed state police units throughout university campuses to monitor all student, faculty and administrator activity. Lindsey (2012) explains:

Deans and presidents were vetted by the intelligence services and appointed based on their political loyalty to the regime. For professors and administrators, cultivating relations with the regime and the ruling party and showing loyalty to the system was one way to secure advancement and small professional perks... All appointments, conferences, invitations to visiting speakers, and travel to academic events abroad required a security clearance.<sup>173</sup>

Politically motivated and security-orientated administrations and state police also frequently hampered academic life in areas such as, student admissions, faculty and student research,

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<sup>171</sup> Women's participation in fields such as education, humanities, and arts are much higher than their male counterparts, the overall enrollment of women for 2006-2007 remains lower than that of men, especially in poorer governorates of Egypt (Megahed, 2010).

<sup>172</sup> In 2007, former President Mubarak issued university bylaws that regulated student affairs, and gave administrators the right to forbid students from running in university elections (Osman, 2011).

<sup>173</sup> Lindsey states that that police units comprised of National security and the domestic intelligence service interfered in all aspects of university operation, from faculty promotions to student elections, and forbade all forms of campus activism. In November 2008, the Egyptian court ruled that the presence of Ministry of Interior units on the campus violated the principle of universities' independence. Although the ruling only applies to Cairo University, it was never followed or implemented by any of Egypt's universities (Osman, 2010, pp. 193-194).

student conduct, and choice of curricular materials (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Clearly, the blatant presence of state security monitoring all activity on university campuses greatly hindered any significant civic and political participation by students and faculty that may have been critical of the Mubarak regime or the university itself.<sup>174</sup> Additionally, as stated in Chapter 1, the challenges faced by universities in Egypt are significant impediments to implementing any broad-based citizenship education programs and policies.

#### 4.6 Tensions of Citizenship Education

It is well established that various forms and levels of education have been given the duty and promise by national governments of fostering knowledge, skills and virtues necessary for youth to become valuable citizens participating in the construction of the ‘good society’ (Hillygus, 2005; Schulz et. al., 2010; Torney-Purta, 2002). However, critics have argued that historically, the instrumental rationality of citizenship education, with few exceptions, has been to develop a submissive citizenry in order to maintain and reproduce particular economic, social and political structures of society (Giroux, 1980). Therefore, a considerable tension exists between civic education that “can be used as a tool for maintaining the status quo” and citizenship education towards “empowering individuals and groups to struggle for emancipatory change” (Schugurensky & Myers, 2003, p. 1).

Citizenship education (CE) usually contains three dimensions of learning: civic knowledge, civic skills, and civic virtues. *Civic knowledge* entails basic concepts and structures

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<sup>174</sup> There were student and faculty protests on Egypt’s campuses during the 2003 American invasion of Iraq as well as various protests in the support of the Palestinians. Furthermore, faculty members created the underground March 9 Professors Movement for the Independence of Egyptian Universities in 2004. The March 9 was named after the date in Egyptian Academic history, when in 1932, the president of Cairo University threatened to resign to protest the government’s decision to fire one of his deans. This group of professors have opposed state security on campuses, and sought greater academic freedoms, better pay and working conditions, and support students’ rights to demonstrate (Elsadda, 2006). Student and professors also joined the *Kifaya* (Enough!) movement demonstrations in 2005, which were a series of mass anti-Mubarak protests.

associated with the practice of democracy such as elections, majority rule, rights and duties of citizens, constitutional law, and civil society. *Civic skills* refer to the intellectual and participatory proficiencies that guide the ethics and actions of citizens. And *civic virtues* usually focus on civility, self-discipline, compassion, tolerance and respect. However, there is a range in the pedagogy and content used to implement citizenship education.

At one end is *civic education*, which focuses on objective knowledge and patriotism. It emphasizes understanding of government structures and functions, formal political institutions, concepts, and processes of civic life, where voting is the most important form of citizen participation. Civic education is based on formal education, didactic pedagogies, with little opportunity for student interaction and initiative. This education is also referred to as education *about* citizenship (Kerr, 1999). Schugurensky and Myers (2003) state that from this perspective, “good citizens are conceptualized as good producers, good consumers, and good patriots” (p. 2). Civic education presents an education that should accept existing social structures, develop moral character and ensure social cohesion, greatly leading to social control, loyalty and obedience and to what Banks (2008) describes as *legal* and *minimal citizens*.

On the other end, there is *citizenship education*. It focuses on knowledge and understanding, and on opportunities for participation and engagement in both political and civil society, towards *active* and *transformative citizens* (Banks, 2008). It is concerned with the wider range of ways that citizens interact with and shape their communities and societies. It can facilitate understanding of rights and injustice and strive for student involvement in advocacy and/or civic engagement and political action. Active citizenship education is based on a mixture of formal and informal approaches; it is participatory and inclusive, and encourages investigation, debate, and critical thinking. It is also referred to as education *through* citizenship

(Kerr, 1999). From this perspective, “good citizens are conceptualized as compassionate, politically engaged, concerned for social justice and the environment, tolerant of others, willing and able to dialogue, and active participants in public life” (Schugurensky & Myers, 2003, p. 2).

Veugelers (2011a) conducted a notable study that distinguishes between three types of citizenship education: adaptive, individualizing and critical democratic citizenship. The *adaptive* type of citizenship education tries to adapt people to existing social and political power relations, without taking a critical stance. It focuses on teacher-centered pedagogy, and emphasizes the reproduction of fixed knowledge, with strict adherence to authority and discipline. The *individualistic* type of citizenship education embraces personal autonomy of the individual and neglects social relationships to other people. Pedagogical approaches focus on personal autonomy, selection, competition, and individual performance. Knowledge in this type of citizenship education is seen as an individual construction. The *critical-democratic* type of citizenship education focuses on building social relationships, diversity, and democracy and tries to stimulate an active and critical engagement of citizens. The pedagogical practices empathize dialogue, diversity, critical reflection, analysis of power relationships, and social action. Knowledge is viewed through social-constructivist models. Veugelers (2011a) concludes “developing citizenship is not a linear process from passive to active, but that citizenship can have different meanings and socio-political orientations” (p. 213). Veugelers highlights the various meanings and orientations of CE. Therefore, any framework that includes citizenship education must provide a more nuanced understanding.

Thus from various perspectives, civic education and some forms of citizenship education can be criticized for contributing to producing, on the one hand, passive, apathetic, consumer-driven, and/or possessive individualistic citizens. On the other, civic education can produce

overly patriotic and narrowly nationalistic citizens leading to citizens who favor exclusionary, ethno-nationalistic and xenophobic visions for society. Furthermore, since schools are fundamentally undemocratic institutions, unless schools provide students with opportunities to have a voice in the decision making process, it is difficult for such environments to instill in students the virtues, commitment, and skills necessary for citizenship education to have a proper impact. However, it is too simplistic to suggest that X school produces X citizen, a more complex and nuanced approach to the pedagogical subject and reproduction should be taken (Morrow & Torres, 1995).

Formal institutions of education within the nation state are not the sole place where youth can acquire citizenship knowledge and skills. Citizenship education can occur in formal (school), non-formal (community-based), as well as informal (family, media) spaces of learning and education. Thus there are many agents of political socialization. Political socialization, as an important element of CE, can be explained as the means and processes connected to the acquisition of political knowledge, perceptions, and behaviors greatly shaping citizenship. Political socialization can be the ways political and social systems are legitimized, reproduced, as well as challenged. The agents of political socialization commonly include family, schools and universities, peers, mass media, political leaders, state institutions, institutions of religion, social movements etc. However, a main premise of this chapter (which will be supported by data in Chapter 6) is that experiencing major political and social events such as revolutions should also be acknowledged as formative agents of political socialization and CE.

By problematizing citizenship education and agents of political socialization away from functionalist perspectives, researchers can at least theoretically carve out spaces where momentous political and social events, such as the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution, can

become a significant pedagogical catalyst for raising the consciousness and participation of citizens in Egypt. The following presents a few ways that I problematize conventional understandings of citizenship education. First, youth as a pedagogical subject are not merely objects waiting to be filled with political knowledge, but co-construct their political knowledge, perceptions, and behaviors with agents of political socialization (Freire, 2007). Second, citizenship is not merely a package of rights that may or may not be exercised at the prudence of the citizen (such as the right to vote). It is a kind of freedom—a capacity that involves a particular set of knowledge, skills, virtues, networks, and resources. Citizenship is not a material item to be bought or sold that one chooses to own and use; it is a process towards the good society and the just state. It is a kind of social being that through struggle one can cultivate and pursue. Third, political socialization is strongly dominated by the state through formal institutions. Thus, there are often tensions between the values and identities students possess and those pedagogies and values promulgated through citizenship education that is fostered by the state. That is not to say that political socialization, which promotes oppositional ideas and practices, does not occur within formal institutions such as public schools and universities. The important point is that the monopoly of citizenship education controlled by the state often creates struggles and contentious citizenship between the “official knowledge” of citizenship education projected by the state and citizenship knowledge and actions supported by dissenting and oppositional groups (Apple, 1993). Therefore, there is a constant struggle over the various models of citizenship between the various agents and among pedagogical subjects themselves.

Forth, on university campuses, citizenship education is not relegated to the formal classroom setting. Citizenship education can manifest through multi-dimensions on university campuses. There are four general agents of citizenship education on university campuses that can

have an impact on the citizen knowledge, skills and virtues of students: (1) The obvious agents are content and pedagogy. What a professor or instructor teaches, how the content is being taught, and other materials such as literature, texts, and media associated with the class can all impact perceptions of citizenship. (2) Participating in extracurricular activities such as student unions, volunteering and charity student groups, model United Nations and other simulated political institutions, attending conferences and workshops, study abroad programs, as well as a variety of other student-led organizations can shape ideas and practices about citizenship. (3) Personnel on campus such as professors, instructors, administrators, and many others can contribute to citizenship education. (4) Last, is the social aspect of the university such as relationships to peers, colleagues and other nonemployees of the university can have an impression on student perceptions of citizenship. Consequently, the university becomes a site with multilayered spaces and multivocal perceptions of citizenship education.

Finally, in the current era of globalization, agents of political socialization are not restricted to the borders of the nation-state. Accordingly, knowledge, skills, and virtues—more so than ever before—can be readily exchanged through the transnational mobility and migration of people, the Internet, social media networks, and global cable news channels, which may challenge, uphold, or compliment citizenship education within the nation-state. Thus, against the backdrop of national and global contentious models of citizenship, schools and universities have either the option to continue to support fading and narrowly focused forms of citizenship education, or maintain legitimacy by fostering a new rationality for a widening culturally relevant citizenship education.

#### **4.6.1 Critical pedagogy and citizenship education**

Critical pedagogy can be viewed a more radically democratic and subversive form of citizenship

education. Critical pedagogy is derived from the pedagogy advanced by Paulo Freire most notably in his seminal work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. For Freire, liberation is the human vocation. It is the achievable duty of the oppressed to become historical subjects in the transformation of a submerged reality. A reality that is opaque by a culture of silence and a fear of freedom. The oppressor, who self-dehumanized through the conscious and unconscious dehumanization of the oppressed, employs a specific form of education, the banking concept of education. This system of education situates the teacher at the center of power and the student on the periphery. The teacher, as the oppressor, deposits pre-set information to the passive, empty objects of the student-depositories. Void of creativity, reflection, action, and personal experience, the student patiently and passively receives, memorizes, and repeats the prescribed information. In restricting the ability of the oppressed to critical analyze their own situation to consciously act to transform their world, this form of education justifies, maintains, and perpetuates structures of oppression. Describing banking education Freire (2007) writes, "it attempts to control thinking and action, leads women and men to adjust to the world, and inhibits their creative power" (p. 77).

To counter the banking models of education, which is intertwined with oppressive social realities, Freire advocates a problem-posing education. The problem-posing education promotes what Freire (2007) terms in Portuguese *conscientizacao*. *Conscientizacao* "refers to learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality" (p. 35). Thus, education must begin by first blurring the dichotomous relationship of the teacher-student contradiction. The blurring of roles occurs when students and teachers use dialogue, thereby becoming critical co-investigators unmasking their world. For Freire, dialogue must include love, humility, faith, mutual trust, hope, and critical thinking.

Taken alone, these conditions are important to citizenship in any society, but together they can have profound and, Freire would say, revolutionary impacts toward a more liberated society. It is through dialogue that teacher and students create knowledge. Knowledge, rather than mechanistic, static information, should be "a medium evoking critical reflection of both teacher and students" (Freire, 2007, p. 80). As they constantly unveil reality, "they become jointly responsible for a process in which all grows" (Freire, 2007, p. 80). In the struggle to regain their humanity, students co-author (in solidarity with each other and the teacher) and find ownership in a problem-posing education that is relevant to the oppressive issues in their reality. Thus, through a pedagogy that can provide the possibility of praxis, "the action and reflection of men and women upon their world in order to transform it" (Freire, 2007, p. 79), education is transformed into an invaluable comrade of the oppressed in their human vocation of liberation.

Henry Giroux expands upon Freirean pedagogy and developments some general themes of critical pedagogy that can be useful in understanding more critical democratic models of citizenship education. Giroux (2004) explains:

Critical pedagogy as a process of democratization suggests constructing new locations of struggle, vocabularies, and subject positions that allow people in a wide variety of public spheres to become more than they are now, to question what it is they have become within existing institutional and social formations, and to give some thought to what it might mean to transform existing relations of subordination and oppression. (p. 35)

Through a process of critical questioning and critical imagination of "what it might mean to transform existing relations," critical pedagogy can provide educators and students with the tools to development more engaging and relevant citizenship education (Giroux, 2004, p.35).

However, from the start it must be understood that critical pedagogy cannot be standardized and transferred from one context to the next. Critical pedagogy thus must begin from the experiences of those within that particular context. As Giroux (2004) argues, "Pedagogy can never be treated as a fixed set of principles and practices that can be applied indiscriminately across a variety of

pedagogical sites” (p. 37). That being said, Giroux (2004) does provide some general insight into what critical pedagogy might look like.

Critical pedagogy is an educational process that empowers learners to question existing social structures and formations while symbiotically constructing new localities “for people to become more than they are now.” The educational endeavor of critical pedagogy is centered more on issues of politics and power and less on the language of technique and methodology. Critical pedagogy emphasizes a critical reflexivity that connects learning to everyday life, understanding the connections between power and knowledge. Critical pedagogy links learning to social change in a wide variety of social sites, thus it is a political intervention in the world making visible alternative models of radical democratic relations. Associated with a political intervention, is the task of “regenerating both a renewed sense of social and political agency and a critical subversion of dominant power itself (Giroux, 2004, p. 33). As mentioned above, pedagogy must always be contextually defined, “allowing it to respond specifically to the conditions, formations, and problems that arise in various sites in which education takes place” (Giroux, 2004, p. 37). Moreover, there should be a rejection of the notions of neutrality and apolitical-ness, while fostering a language of critique and transformation. I would argue the overall goal of critical pedagogy is to illuminate the critical consciousness in learners. Therefore, with regards to citizenship education, critical pedagogy can, “reinvigorate the relationship between democracy, ethics, and political agency by expanding both the meaning of the pedagogical as a political practices while at the same time making the political more pedagogical” (Giroux, 2004, p. 33).

#### **4.7 Why University Citizenship Education in Egypt?**

Within the context of the reverberations of the Arab uprisings, *citizenship education* takes on a

particular importance that has led various authors to encourage the growth of social and cultural responsibilities necessary to support democratic changes in the Arab world (Hibbard and Layton, 2010; Yilmaz, 2012). For example, in a comprehensive study on citizenship education with Arab states, Faour and Muasher (2011) argue that in light of the Arab uprisings students need to learn “what it means to be citizens who learn how to think, seek and produce knowledge, question, and innovated rather than be subjects of the state who are taught what to think and how to behave” (p. 1). However, the value of citizenship education in Arab institutions of higher education have been recognized by policy makers in Arab states for some time. For example, in 1998, the *Beirut Declaration on Higher Education in Arab States for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* was presented by ministers of education and policy makers in the region including representatives from Egypt. As part of the 1998 UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education in the Twenty-first Century: Vision and Action, the declaration laid out various commitments by Egyptian and Arab authorities towards improving the overall quality of higher education. In addition to a number of very noteworthy goals for higher education in the region, The declaration acknowledged the connection between higher education and active citizenship:

Higher education is essential for any country to achieve sustainable and global development. It is also essential for the enhancement of citizens' participation in public life, for social mobility, and for the achievement of harmony, justice, and just and comprehensive peace, at both internal and international levels, on the basis of the respect for human rights, active participation of citizens, and mutual respect. (UNESCO, 1998, p. 44)

Despite the declaration and commendable goals to improve the qualitative of higher education, as discussed in Chapter 2, higher education in Arab states in general and in Egypt specifically witnessed an increase in student enrolment, insufficient investment in infrastructure, with understaffed and overcrowded classrooms that generally produced graduates that not only were ill-equipped for the region’s job market, but limited in their political literacy and abilities to

politically and civically participate being encumbered by authoritarian control.

In Egypt, scholars have called on implementing critical citizenship education at all levels of education (Bali, 2013; El-Mikawy, 2012; Faour, 2011). Muhammad Faour highlights three rationales for citizenship education.<sup>175</sup> First, citizenship education attempts to consolidate democracy, which thrives only in cultures that accept diversity and different viewpoints, tolerates dissent, and regards truths as relative. Second, citizenship education generally includes values central to human development (freedom, women's rights, democratic governance). Last, citizenship education promotes 21<sup>st</sup> century skills, such as problem solving, critical thinking, consensus building, collaboration, creativity, and communication. Moreover reports have called for the need to “rebuild universities and higher education in the region,” specifically to not only supply “the skills and knowledge needed to reconstruct shattered economic and physical infrastructure, but also by supporting the restoration of collapsed governance and fostering social cohesion” (Barakat & Milton, 2015, p. 1).

Research has shown in the aftermath of the revolution, instructors and faculty members have been using their university classrooms as a reinvigorated site for active citizenship education. For example, Waly (2013) conducted life-history interviews with two university English as a Foreign Language (EFL) teachers—one from a public university and one from private university. The revolution brought changes in their teaching styles and beliefs. For the teachers, the revolution reinforced “good” and student-centered teaching practices, “to train students to be active participants” within their communities (Waly, 2013, p. 10). There was freedom for the teachers to discuss politics and controversial topics. There was a greater sense of teacher empowerment, wanting to be involved with bureaucratic processes and initiatives to

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<sup>175</sup> Faour, M. (2013). Education for citizenship in the Arab World: Key to social transformation. Keynote, *Education for Citizenship in the Arab World*, The AUC Graduate School of Education, Cairo, Egypt, December 3, 2013, [http://www.aucegypt.edu/GSE/Documents/EdforCitizenshipDec2013\(1\).pdf](http://www.aucegypt.edu/GSE/Documents/EdforCitizenshipDec2013(1).pdf).

strengthen programs. Additionally, the teachers felt a greater concern for political reform over education reform because they felt political reform would lead to educational reform. Therefore, the political and social events associated with the revolution had an impact on the way the teachers view the whole learning and teaching process. Waly (2013) concluded that after the revolution, both instructors “claimed to have more confidently and extensively adopted a teaching style that revolves around equality and freedom of choice and expression” (p. 13).

Reflecting on her personal experiences as an associate professor in the English Department and in the Faculty of Education at Alexandria University during the aftermath of the Revolution, additional research was conducted by Sharobeem (2015). She described how the revolution affected content and pedagogy, creation of new courses, and new activities on campus. In her classes, she connected topics and literature to the current revolutionary events, she raised debates and controversial issues (pertaining to women, religion, human rights and social justice) focused on ideas of diversity, tolerance, promoted critical thinking, and introduced critical scholars such as Edward Said and Noam Chomsky to her students. Moreover, she invited “forbidden” guest speakers to campus, such as oppositional Egyptian novelists and journalist. She also served on the committee that coordinated the first-time election of the dean. Describing the current campus climate and her commitment to her model of citizenship education

Sharobeem (2015) states:

As a result of the chaos that followed the fall of the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] regime, there is an attempt to indirectly prohibit politics on the university campuses. However, some university professors and students have learned to cherish their agency and are determined to never relinquish the rights they earned from their two revolutions. As a result, political issues must continue to be raised in the classroom, and students must be made aware of how politics can impose itself on the study and analysis of literature. We, the teachers and students, continue to refer to our two revolutions in our department’s courses. (p. 120)

In addition to university professors and instructors attempting to carve out spaces of

citizenship education with their students, the Egyptian government has been at least in rhetoric committed to concepts of citizenship education for universities in Egypt. For example, after the Revolution, education that builds active citizens has been featured in national development programs and international agreements. In the 2014 Constitution, Article 19 states, “Every citizen has the right to education. The goals of education are to build the Egyptian character, preserve the national identity, root the scientific method of thinking, develop talents and promote innovation, establish cultural and spiritual values, and found the concepts of citizenship, tolerance, and non-discrimination.” Article 21 states, “The state shall guarantee the independence of universities and scientific and linguistic academies, and provide university education in accordance with international quality standards,” and Article 24 states, “Universities shall teach human rights and professional values and ethics of the various academic disciplines.” These constitutional commitments to citizenship education for universities, although vague, provide the legal foundations for implementing important reforms for quality education for active citizenship.

Another national example is the *Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt’s Vision 2030* announced March 2015. One of the goals is to place ten Egyptian universities on the list of the top 500 universities in the world. Therefore, the strategy is to promote models of the global university in Egypt, which often endorse visions and programs for active participatory citizenship. The Strategy also states that by 2030 there will be an education system that “contributes to building an integrated personality that is encouraged to reach its potential, producing an individual that is confident, enlightened, creative, responsible, pluralistic, and able to interact competitively with regional and international entities.” Moreover, the Strategy has entire section on emphasizing social justice that will be “guaranteed through a high degree of

societal homogeneity, emphasizing citizens' rights in participation based on efficiency, performance and rule of law.” For these 2030 strategies to be realized and sustained, individual universities, educators and students will have to play a major role defining and implementing relevant programs and policies and devising new paths for active citizenship education.

An example of international agreements that are committed to citizenship education in Egypt is the *Arab Regional Roadmap for Education 2030*.<sup>176</sup> As an Arab member state, Egypt has adopted the UNESCO Education 2030 Framework for Action in December 2015 during the First Arab Regional Meeting on Education 2030 held in Cairo. The Education 2030 Agenda is inspired by:

A humanistic vision of education and development based on human rights and dignity, social justice, protection, cultural diversity, and shared responsibility and accountability. It is underpinned by the principle that education is a public good, a fundamental human right and a basis for guaranteeing the realization of other rights. It is essential for peace, human fulfillment and sustainable development. (UNESCO, 2015, p. v)

The agreement lays out some of the challenges that Arab states face on achieving educational development goals such as Education for All. But reiterates the importance of providing quality education for “preventing and mitigating the impact of conflict in order to ensure access to quality education for internally displaced persons and refugee communities.” Moreover, the Roadmap is committed to upholding UNESCO Target 4.7, which states:

All learners acquire knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development

Although the Roadmap proposes very ambitious goals for promoting the knowledge and skills necessary for such developments as conflict resolution, global citizenship and sustainable

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<sup>176</sup> UNESCO. (December 2015). *Arab Regional Roadmap for Education 2030*, <http://www.arabcampaignforeducation.org/functions.php?action=files&table=files&ID=310>

development, and when combined with the 2014 Constitution and Egypt's 2030 national strategy that promotes concepts and discourses of citizenship education, in my view, these construct a significant mandate for educators and students alike in Egypt to move towards developing pedagogies, programs, and policies for active citizenship education.

#### **4.7.1 University activism after January 25, 2011**

In the aftermath of the Revolution, Egyptian students have been testing the boundaries of participatory citizenship and are attempting to carve out spaces of agency where their grievances about political, social, and educational issues can be brought to the forefront. Considering the remnants of the authoritarian structured university system and the overt oppression by state security forces on campus, there is little surprise that in the aftermath of Mubarak's ouster there has been a blossoming of activism and demands of all kinds on campus. Although it is still too early to determine the full influence that university activism is having on Egyptian higher education, some preliminary analyzes can be presented about the grievances, early successes, and continued struggles can be made about university activism.

Based upon content analysis of data collected from Egyptian and university-centered Internet news site, I identified five general themes of grievances of university activists during the political leadership of SCAF (February 11, 2011 to June 30, 2012). First, activists demonstrated on campuses as well as in front of government buildings calling for the removal of administrators and officials from the Ministry of Higher Education who were accused of corruption and closely associated with the former regime. Second, activists demanded the removal of the state police on campus. Third, there were protests that favored better working conditions for faculty members and graduate student teaching assistance. Increases to pay, academic freedoms, and establishing independent academic unions were some of the reforms

espoused. Fourth, activists demanded new national university laws and student bylaws. These laws would regulate future elections of university presidents and deans and would govern student union elections and activity on campus, respectively. Last, protests were occasionally against SCAF, calling for an immediate transfer to civilian rule. As with the complex nature of political activism and protests, these themes of grievances and demands are not mutually exclusive. Activists blended grievances while utilizing various protest repertoires to voice their demands.

For example, a month after the Revolution in March 2011, the March 9 Movement led a university faculty strike, calling for better pay and working conditions (Kohstall, March, 14 2011). A second action by the March 9 Movement, alongside a number of student organizations and a local non-governmental organization called the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression, organized demonstrations in July 2011 to demand that elections be held (prior to the start of the new fall semester) to replace current university presidents and deans associated with the former regime (*Al Ahrām*, July 26, 2011). This action eventually forced ten of the nineteen presidents of Egypt universities to resign, leading to presidential elections in October 2011. However, protests by students and faculty continued after majority of the former presidents and deans that were selected by the Mubarak regime got reelected or reinstated. Demonstrators also contended that the new law regulating academic elections only concerns the election of 140 out of 4,000 university staff nationwide (Halawa, November 9, 2011).

In the context of student movements, during the first days of the spring semester following the Revolution, students held protests outside the office of the President of Cairo University (Khaled, March 13, 2011). This action coincided with the creation the Revolution's Student Union. The pro-reform student organization, consisting of students from five public universities and three private universities, had connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, the April

6 Movement, and the Justice and Freedom Movement. It advocated for free student union elections, free quality education, and the dismantling of a university law, which requires all university presidents and deans to be appointed by the Minister of Higher Education (Khaled, 2011). At the American University in Cairo (AUC), a private foreign university, the administration agreed to reduce the increases in student tuition fees to no more than 2.3 percent per year (initially proposed at 7 percent) after students organized demonstrations to protest the increases (Egypt Independent, January 10, 2012). In February 2012, to coincide with the one-year anniversary of the Revolution and to mourn the deaths of those were killed during a deadly soccer riot in Port Said, students called for a general strike. The students demanded SCAF to step down and hand over power to an elected civilian authority. This action was supported by many student unions, located in more than twenty public and private universities throughout Egypt (Khaled, February 19, 2012).

The same month that the first democratic election to nominate Egypt's president was held, there were also mass demonstrations of university activists targeting the Ministry of Higher Education and the Parliament in Cairo. In May 2012, Mohamed al-Nashar, the former president of Helwan University and member of Mubarak's former National Democratic Party, was appointed Minister of Higher Education—making him the fifth higher education minister since the Revolution (Khaled, May 18, 2012). Protesting the lack of university reform, al-Nashar's connection to the former regime, and his suggestions of reinstating state police on campus, activists held a mock funeral in front of the Parliament building in Cairo carrying a coffin labeled "higher education" (Khaled, May 18, 2012). During this action, faculty and students also advocated for increases in faculty salaries, a new national university law drafted with full participation of the academic community, new student bylaws drafted by students themselves,

and elimination to waste, corruption, and privatization (Lindsey, 2012). Although most of the university activism during this period were nonviolent in nature and allowed by university officials and SCAF, it should be noted that there were a few exceptions.<sup>177</sup>

Compared with the repressive environment throughout university campuses prior to the Revolution, activists have been able to achieve some noticeable, albeit incomplete, gains. In March 2011, the SCU dissolved all student unions (members had been selected by administrators). Free elections for student unions were finally allowed in April 2012. However, campuses witnessed mass protests as critics argued that no new bylaws had been adopted, meaning the elections were still regulated under the laws implemented under Mubarak (AFT, 2012). Also occurring in March 2011, was the SCU's removal of campus police affiliated with the Ministry of Interior. Evidently, some students still report seeing those same officers on campus in civilian clothing, sparking continued fear among students (Osman, 2011). A few universities also began to incorporate topics about the Revolution into the curricula, and organized events and art projects focusing on the Revolution. For example, at AUC, topics pertaining to the Revolution were incorporated into classroom discussions, public symposiums on the uprisings and Egypt's future were hosted on campus, and students and faculty launched a project to collect primary documentation of how members of the AUC community experienced the Revolution (Crary, May 16, 2011). Visitors to AUC can see large murals, constructed out of individual photos of the Revolution, which make larger iconic images of the Revolution. In any event, the general struggle for individual university and broader structural reforms that was

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<sup>177</sup> In March 2011, students at Cairo University demanded the resignation of the Dean of Media Faculties Sami Abdel Aziz citing his connection to former regime. The student eventually barricaded him and other university officials in an office for hours. In response, the military forces disbanded the students with cattle prods and stun-guns (Levy, 2011; Lindsey, 2012).

witnessed during university activism under SACF continues into the current era of civilian governmental control of Egypt.

Although the first democratically elected President of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, was in office for just over a year (June 30, 2012 to July 3, 2013), he pledged to change the authoritarian system of higher education. Specifically, President Morsi who received a Ph.D. in engineering from the University of Southern California and who taught at USC and California State University, Northridge, had pledged to increase governmental spending on higher education research, establish more financial and bureaucratic autonomy for universities, as well as curb restrictions on student activism (Sawahel, June 27, 2012). For many in the university, those promises were too slow in their implementation. University activism as a reinvigorated tool used to voice the grievances of professors and students, continued to be directed at both institutional and national levels. For example, at the institutional level there were protests against the segregation of female and male students in the medical school (Mansoura University), demands to enact new student bylaws (German University in Cairo), and at AUC, the students locked down and occupied the campus to promote university workers' rights and prevent tuition hikes (Soliman, September 25, 2012).

At the national level, in October 2012, student movements condemned the MOHE and Egyptian Student Union (ESU) backed national bylaws that regulate student elections, university activities and student organizing. Activists from many universities who opposed the new national bylaws stated that the drafting lacked transparency, and that the document contains ambiguous articles and hinders student organizing (Leila, October 25, 2012). Others pointed to the bylaws as being too political aligned with those ESU members who have ties to the former ruling Freedom

and Justice Party (the now banned political wing of Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood)<sup>178</sup> (El Shamoubi, October 27, 2012).

On June 30, 2013, many students participated in the *Tamarod* (rebellion) movement that organized a mass protests against President Morsi. Tamarod claimed to have collected twenty-two million signatures on their petition to recall Morsi. Critics challenged his attempts at strengthen the position of president as well as his ineptitude of addressing Egypt's deteriorating social and economic issues. The lack of formal political experience that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood revealed, was only complicated by bureaucrats, politicians, and military officials connected to the old regime who were unwilling to compromise with Morsi. While some have described the ousting of Morsi as a coup d'état (Gevlin, 2015), others have described this event as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Revolution. Nonetheless, the military took over the government on July 3, ousting the democratically elected president and suspending the 2012 constitution.

The interim president, Adly Mansour, backed by the military rule under the leadership of General Fattah El-Sisi has used disproportionate violent force (namely, the Rabaa massacres) in an attempt to disband the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters who have protested in the streets of Egypt. Overall, the defining characteristic of university activism under Morsi's presidency, was the increased tension between those activists espousing more Islamist versions of the university and those opposed, reflecting broader political trends.<sup>179</sup>

The politicization of religious and secular identities and the polarization of sectarianism discredit democratic efforts and glosses over more critical issues of citizenship, and disguises the

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<sup>178</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist movement whose origins date to the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century and has been, at times, brutally suppressed by the former authoritarian Egyptian regime, as well as allegedly being connected to violent extremists. Most members tend to be religiously conservative, and their successful mobilization has often stemmed from providing social services in areas and sectors that the Egyptian state neglected (Brown, 2012).

<sup>179</sup> It is important to note that there is a complexity to the alleged dichotomy between Islamist and secularist. Both Herrera (2012) and Dabashi (2012) call for blurring of these identities, and stress the need to formulate new vocabulary to overcome the false secular-Islamist divide.

far more vital task of national dialogue and reconciliation necessary to address the pressing political, social, economic, and educational challenges confronting all Egyptians.

At the time of publication and in the wake of the ousting of former President Morsi, there appears to be a surge in student activism. For instance, a report by the *Economist Intelligence Unit* found that, during the 2013 fall semester alone, there were 1,122 student protests carried out at universities and schools in Egypt.<sup>180</sup> Subsequently, the dynamic changes in Egypt's political leadership and the emphasis on combating terrorism and dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters have coincided with national and university policies attempting to suppress student activism and student movements throughout Egypt.

The 2013-2014 academic year began with the Supreme Council for Universities issuing a decision to grant private security guards on university campuses the right to arrest students (Al Ahram, September 5, 2013). In November 2013, the Interim President Adly Mansour (July 4, 2013 to June 8, 2014) authorized Law 107: the so-called "Protest Law," which places harsh restrictions on the rights of public assembly, greatly hampering pro-Morsi groups as well as secular and leftists public actions. The Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization and its political party Freedom and Justice Party banned. Following the enactment of the Protest Law, in December of 2013 the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters banned all student protests on university campuses unless first authorized by the presidents of the university. In January 2014, during an emergency meeting, the Minister of Higher Education, Dr. Hossam Eissa and the Supreme Council of Universities agreed to a new article giving university presidents the authority to fully suspend students involved in "terrorist and disruptive acts" (Mada Masr, January 5, 2014). The new article was preceded by a boycott of final exams by the newly formed

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<sup>180</sup> The findings of the Economist Intelligence Unit report were posted in the *Middle East Monitor*, December 15, 2013, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/8824>.

student movement, Students Against the Coup (SAC). SAC is led by students affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood and who oppose the military-backed interim government. The academic year witnessed violent clashes between students and security forces, with 94 students expelled, 48 students arrested and 16 students killed inside university campuses (Youssef, September 29, 2014).

In the wake of the election of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and during the beginning of the 2014-2015 academic year, policies aimed at thwarting forms of student activism increased. As fears of continued mass student dissent carrying over from the previous academic year, the beginning of the 2014 academic year for public universities was postponed by one month to October. Security measures and the presence of private security swelled on campus, specifically the Falcon security agency was hired to secure 15 of Egypt's universities (Elmeshad, September, 20, 2014). A significant development was the policy of political parties and political-related activities banned from public university campuses (Mokbel, September 12, 2014). At time of writing, the 2014-2015 academic year has been plagued with continued repression of student activism, violent clashes between students and security agencies, mass arrests and suspensions, suppressions of academic freedoms, explosives devices being found as well as exploding on campuses, and a number of students being killed. Consequently, empirical research—from the voices of university students and educators—are needed to analyze the perceptions of participatory citizenship and the role of the universities in citizenship education.

#### **4.8 Research on Citizenship Education in Egypt**

The overwhelming majority of research that connects education and citizenship in Egypt focuses exclusively on primary and secondary education (Baraka, 2008; El-Nagar & Krugly-Smolka, 2009; Faour, 2013; Faour & Muasher, 2011; Zaalouk, 2006). For example, Baraka

(2008) utilized a content analysis of public school curricula during the three political eras of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, and conducted a focus group of teachers and educational leaders from the Ministry of Education (MOE) to explore citizenship education (CE) in Egypt. Based on the study, Baraka concluded, “the notion of citizenship education in Egyptian public schools will remain simply ink on paper” (p. 15). Her less than optimistic conclusion was derived from the data that found that the MOE framework on citizenship education was not clear for teachers, and the focus group participants held very diverse views on the concept of citizenship within education. The conceptual framework adopted by the MOE also does not stress the importance of human and political rights either in instruction, or in the hidden or written curricula. Consequently, the eight core principles of citizenship education issued by the MOE were inadequately reflected in textbooks. More than any concepts of citizenship, tourism and an emphasis on tourist attractions were highly represented throughout Egyptian textbooks. Furthermore, teachers avoided talking about political issues in class, because students were more interested in math, science, and physics. She cites a centralized management system of school curricula, overlapping responsibilities between MOE divisions, lack of clarity and division over the meaning of citizenship education among educational practitioners, and the overall political environment as the four limitations to citizenship education in Egypt.

Similar to Baraka’s conclusion, El-Nagar and Krugly-Smolska (2009) conclude, “there is a gap between the meaning of citizenship education and the political, economic and social reality in Egypt” (p. 52). Conducting a historical analysis of citizenship education from the early development of the modern Egyptian state under Mehmet Ali up to Mubarak, the authors find that although there is an awareness of the importance of preparing good citizens for a democratic

society in Egypt, the curriculum, teachers' preparation, and educational administration present problems to fully implementing citizenship education.

A more recent study conducted by Faour and Muasher (2011) found that there are three challenges of citizenship education in Egypt as well as other Arab countries. First, within the highly centralized education system, authoritarian educational management ran by incompetent and corrupt officials create obstacles to new initiatives in citizenship education. In addition, the shortage, status, and qualifications of teachers can hinder citizenship education reform efforts. Second, the impact of globalization as well as a host of socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors within the domestic context will greatly shaped the content and direction of citizenship education programs. Last, in the face of scarce financial resources, the difficulties to secure funds to initiate and maintain citizenship education programs present considerable challenges. Although the problems associated with a centralized educational system, the quality of teachers and teacher training, and the domestic political constraints were all listed as limitations to citizenship education in the two previous studies, Faour and Muasher (2011) also include funding and processes of globalization as challenges facing citizenship education programs in Egypt.

The studies above only represent a sample of some of the research and literature on citizenship and education as it pertains to primary and secondary education in Egypt. Although these studies recognize "schools can play a significant role in the process of socio-political development" (Baraka, 2008, p. 1), which is an important perspective for the present study, they primarily focus on citizenship education and definitions of citizenship by analyzing the educational policies and practices of the state and educational institutions. They do not address how students themselves perceive citizenship, and they lack any observations of how

students practice citizenship. As Herrera (2010) argues, in Egypt “youth themselves are rarely consulted about their struggles for a lifestyle and livelihoods or about the type of citizens they are or aspire to be” (p. 127).

#### **4.8.1 Research on citizenship and the university in Egypt**

Prior to the 2011 Revolution, research was conducted that analyzed perceptions and practices of democratic citizenship among Egyptian university students. Sika (2010) compares democratic attitudes and behavior of students attending public universities versus those attending private universities in Egypt. She analyzed courses and political science programs at Future University (FU) (new private university), The American University in Cairo (AUC) (the oldest foreign university in Egypt), and Cairo University (CU) (the oldest public university). She studied the availability of student groups and unions on each campus, as well as conducting surveys that measured the democratic attitudes and behaviors of sophomore and junior students attending the three universities. The surveys presented questions pertaining to students’ attitudes regarding religious and gender equality, individual liberty and tolerance towards others. Questions were also related to political behavior such as voting in campus elections and membership in student organizations and campus associations. Sika (2010) found that AUC students tend to have more democratic political attitudes and behavior. She concluded “the political science curriculum along with the core curriculum at AUC, have positive outputs on students’ democratic attitudes and behavior” (p. 692). On the other hand, for both FU and CU, Sika (2010) concluded, “the non-exposure of these students to different thoughts and philosophies from around the world, makes it difficult for them to attain more democratic attitudes especially regarding religious equality, individual freedom and tolerance” (p. 693). Moreover, students from FU and CU showed more apathetic concerning political engagement.

For the purposes of the present study, the research by Sika (2010) is noteworthy because it frames Egyptian students as civic and political actors situated within their respective universities, it attempts to gauge democratic attitudes and behavior based upon data collected from the student responses, and it demonstrates the difference between curricula in various universities. However, it is also noteworthy for some problems related to the methods and analysis of the study. First, surveys as a sole method fail to capture the nuances of peoples' attitudes and behaviors. The inability to ask follow-up questions and to probe the answers of participants limits a deep and complex understanding of civic and political participation. Second, the social class of participants was not factored into the explanation for some of the differences in the data. There is a strong possibility that students from AUC (a very elite university) may have the financial security necessary to afford them the time to participate in campus groups. Students from more marginalized groups may have to maintain part-time jobs or might be more occupied with family obligations that can detract from time needed to participate in school groups and activities.

Third, the study presents a narrow view of political participation that was only based upon voting behavior and membership in student organizations. Other research (Shehata, 2008), demonstrates that youth political participation in Egypt occurred outside the realm of formal politics. Narrowly defining political participation represents a common problem in researching civic and political participation within authoritarian political systems. Youniss, Barber, and Billen (2013) present a scathing critique of research in Egypt that gauges youth civic and political participation premised only, for example, on voting or following current political news. These presumptions of political participation are based upon Western societies that have established democracies in which voters are recruited and the media are unfettered from

government control. The authors ask the critical questions, “what valued did voting have if the results of elections were preordained? And why would young people follow news controlled and knowingly censored by the state?” (p. 8). Therefore, the authors stress the importance of uncovering opportunities and resources available, to gain a more realistic portrait of youth’s potential for civic and political engagements. “If one wants to estimate the political potential of Egyptian youth, one first has to understand and measure the resources and opportunities from which political behavior could arise” (Youniss, Barber, & Billen, 2013, p. 8).

In later work published after the Revolution, Sika (2012) studies youth political mobilization by political parties compared to actual levels of political participation in Egypt. Within this study, Sika emphasizes the differences within youth political engagement in Egypt. On the one hand, there is the type of political engagement, she explains, that is based on activities of private citizens to influence the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take. On the other hand, political engagement can be driven by a duty to participate in public affairs in one’s own country. Although she seems to expand her definition of political participation and admits youth political engagement did occur within the informal spaces before the Revolution, she states, “youth movements were rather the exception than the rule” (p. 197). However, more recent research on youth and participatory citizenship in Egypt is focused within the informal arenas.

#### **4.8.2 Research on participatory citizenship outside of the university**

Most of the research that focuses on citizenship is situated in informal and nonformal spaces and networks outside of the university. Shehata (2008) focuses on participatory citizenship and youth activism, and charts youth activism in Egypt during the twentieth century. More specifically, she describes the characteristics of the wave of youth anti-government activism within the decade

prior to the 2011 Revolution. First, these groups were highly critical of the regime, demanding radical reforms. Second, although these groups espoused democracy, human rights, and social justice, they represented a broad spectrum of dissent and did not tend to have any ideological inclinations. Thus, a third characteristic was that they were inclusive and able to mobilized youth from a variety of political and socio-economic backgrounds. Fourth, Islamist youth played a secondary role in these movements. Fifth, they utilized a range of information technology and social networking tools to organize, mobilize and critic the state. Rather than engaging in the formal political channels, such as through established political parties, or parliamentary and presidential elections, the final characteristic is that the actions of these groups primarily occurred outside of Egyptian universities and other traditional place of operation.

Aligning with Shehata's (2008) characteristics of youth activism, the research conducted by the Gerhart Center (2011) analyzes the use of public space by youth in Egypt during the 2011 Revolution. Collective spaces such as Tahrir Square were momentous sites for fostering participatory citizenship among Egyptian youth. Their research emphasizes the contributions by youth involved in civil society groups, social media networks, and various works of public art, which not only built up a tremendous political force against Mubarak, but also instilled within each of them a sense of civic engagement towards a collective consciousness (Gerhart Center, 2011, p. 11). However, research conducted six months prior to the June 30, 2013 uprisings describes a quite different picture of youth civic and political engagement in Egypt.

In research co-conducted by the British Council in Egypt and the Gerhart Center at AUC found pronounced divisions between youth activist in Egypt (British Council, 2013). Their research found that Egyptian youth has splintered into four groups: Islamists, liberals, *felool* (those affiliated with the old regime), and the 'couch party' (those who completely disassociated

themselves from the political and activist scene) (British Council, 2013, p. 5). To address these divisions and defuse another potential powder keg, the researchers recommend policy and representation focusing on Egyptian youth; building trust between generations, media outlets, and genders; and support existing formal and informal structures of youth civic engagement (p. 19).

In a more recent qualitative study on youth activism, Laiq (2013) conducted over 150 hours of interviews with seventy youth activists, with various political and religious orientations, in Egypt and Tunisia during fieldwork in 2012. Laiq (2013) found that many activists prioritize the idea of citizenship as both a duty and a responsibility, and are heavily invested in the idea of civic duty and engagement. Laiq (2013) identifies several discourses shared by the youth activists:

The main current of youth discourse addresses the issues of political and economic reform. Youth are keen to move away from old authoritarian politics. They are particularly focused on issues relating to the “deep state”—individuals and institutions from the former regime that remain in positions of influence. In both Egypt and Tunisia, youth narratives focus on the fight for economic rights, civil liberties, and human rights. They aspire to challenge that power of the deep state, particularly the long arm of its media and the brutality of its security services.” (p. 35)

However, in the aftermath of the revolution ideological polarization fragments and dilutes activism and led to a number of challenges for activists. Laiq (2013) describes the situation of activism in Egypt and Tunisia as “returning it to a pre-revolutionary mode of action in which youth fought for single issues, each from a different corner, Such an approach reduces the power of their grander narrative related to revolutionary change” (p. 36). Despite structural and financial constraints faced by the activists, Laiq (2013) is quite optimistic when assessing the impact of the revolutions on participatory citizenship; he foresees “the repertoire of the revolutions is likely to provide a great stock of material for political action and civic engagement for decades to come” (p. 36). Research is needed to uncover the ways activists as well as

ordinary citizens in Egypt learn and practice their citizenship in relations with universities campuses.

Additional qualitative research examines the role that informal and nonformal spaces play in developing horizontal and globally informed citizenship ideas and skills for Egyptian youth. Through longitudinal (from 2006-2011) biographical interviews with Egyptian youth (ages 16-30), Herrera (2012) examines how the everyday lives of youth and “their Internet use has been shaping their citizenship dispositions, or their awareness about society and their place within it” (p. 340). She found that “neither schools nor universities seem capable of preparing Arab youth to deal effectively with the challenges the new age poses, whether with regard to securing livelihoods, confronting issues relating of economic insecurity and social justice, or participating in the political system in meaningful ways” (p. 338). Even though Herrera stresses the significance of informal and virtual spaces that Egyptian youth have used towards building agency and empowerment, she still recognizes the importance of formal education in developing critical citizenship during Egypt’s “critical juncture.” She argues, “to best support citizenship of this wired generation in their pursuit of deep democracy, educational systems—informally and formally—must provide the conceptual, methodological, and critical tools necessary to understand how power and counter-power operate” (p. 349). However, I argue that in the aftermath of the June 30 uprising, with recent rise of university student activism additional research needs explore the formal spaces of participatory citizenship, and more emerging nature of youth citizenship and formations of citizenship education.

There is no doubt that the above studies provide a significant illustration of youth civic and political participation in Egypt. They provide data from the perspectives of Egyptian youth themselves, and, justifiably, the focus of these studies were concerned with youth participatory

citizenship within the informal and nonformal structures of Egyptian society. However, within the rapidly unfolding social and political transition in Egypt, and within the recent rise in student activism throughout the universities in Egypt, research on the perceptions and practices of participatory citizenship must situate youth as simultaneously students and citizens. Research must account for the range and emerging perceptions of participatory citizenship collected from the voices of students themselves. Research must also examine the extent that universities foster citizenship knowledge, having the possibilities of complementing or conflicting with students' perceptions of participatory citizenship. Therefore, this research is guided by the perspective that Egyptian universities are renewed important spaces that have the potential of providing insight into the border social and political struggle for defining the nature of participatory citizenship and citizenship education within turbulent revolutionary era in Egypt. The following chapter provides a detailed overview of the methodology and methods assembled for this dissertation.

## **CHAPTER 5: ‘LEARN TO THINK FROM THEIR LIVES AND TO ACT ON WHAT THEY LEARNED’: TOWARDS A CRITICAL HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY ON CITIZENSHIP IN EGYPT**

What is the purpose of research? While every researcher should engage with this existential and empirical question, one chapter within a dissertation manuscript can only scratch the surface in appropriately addressing the epistemological and ontological arguments, complexities, and underpinnings of such an important but loaded question. I am reminded of Sandra Harding’s (2004) feminist epistemological standpoint focusing on positionality and members of dominant groups conducting research, and I paraphrase: learn to think from their lives and to act on what they learned (“their” can refer to students, research participants, marginalized groups, and the other). With this adage as a guiding illustration of this chapter, the following sections explore a variety of issues, literature and topics broadly related to the opening question and specifically sketching the methodology and methods utilized for this specific dissertation project.

An important feature of qualitative research is the focus of research on the meaning and understanding of a phenomenon, which is richly descriptive, inductively and rigorously designed, and the researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and data analysis (Creswell, 2008; Merriam, 2009). While the issue of subjectivity—in both quantitative and qualitative research—greatly shapes research design, data collection, and analysis, it is imperative that an exploration of a researcher’s methodology be presented prior to explaining the methods in any form of social science research. Rust (2003) explains that methodology consists of the worldview connected to the epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of the researcher and the project, while methods are the ways of collecting data and analyzing and interpreting that data. With many interpretations, approaches, and influences, phenomenological-based research presents very porous boundaries for young scholars to demarcate. As Tarrozzi

and Mortari (2010) argue, “There is no place for phenomenological orthodoxy, or for so-called purism” (p. 9). It is from this premise that I apply hermeneutic phenomenology as a research methodology associated with particular research methods for the purposes of this present study.

This chapter is dedicated to providing a clarification on how, through the complexity of the researcher’s epistemological approaches to social research, starting with the authentic voice of participants of knowledge combined with the continuously act of self-reflection, the present methodology was formulated and applied. [Section 5.1](#) will first outline a hermeneutic phenomenological methodology as well as its limitations, which can be addressed and enhanced through critical social theory, investigated in the following subsection. [Section 5.2](#) is dedicated to briefly exploring my positionality and experiences as a researcher at the American University in Cairo (AUC). The next two sections cover the specific research methods used during my fieldwork at AUC. [Section 5.3](#) describes the use of hermeneutic phenomenological interviews as well as sketching the selection and characteristics of the interviews and participants. [Section 5.4](#) describes close observations as an addition to phenomenological interviews. The chapter then describes techniques used to collect data through fieldwork journaling and from relevant documents. The final section, [Section 5.5](#), is devoted to charting how I thematically read the data and the steps I took to write the chapters on research findings utilizing *sandwiched anecdotes* writing techniques.

### **5.1 Hermeneutic Phenomenology**

*Phenomenology* as a research methodology is often described as studying the meanings of lived experience, and *hermeneutics* as studying the processes of interpretation and meaning. Therefore, as a research methodology, I understand hermeneutic phenomenology as the study of meanings of lived experience of—and—within social worlds, co-reflected through the subjective

interpretations of both the researcher and the participants. It is a methodological approach that is both descriptive and interpretive. As Van Manen (1990) explains, hermeneutic phenomenology “is a descriptive (phenomenological) methodology because it wants to be attentive to how things appear, it wants to let things speak for themselves; it is an interpretive (hermeneutic) methodology because it claims that there are no such things as uninterpreted phenomena” (p. 180). Consequently, hermeneutic phenomenology “aims at gaining a deeper understanding of the nature or meaning of our everyday experiences” (Van Manen, 1990, p. 9).

As a qualitative research methodology in the field of education, hermeneutic phenomenology diverges from other qualitative research methods, and also from traditional phenomenological approaches. To the point, in addition to providing depth and richness of meanings of lived experience of students, teachers, and educators, “it rejects the claim of some phenomenological methods that ideal “essences” of experience or consciousness can be isolated outside of the researcher’s cultural and historical location” (Henriksson & Friesen, 2012, p. 1). Furthermore, explaining contemporary hermeneutic phenomenological approaches, Kakkori (2009) clarifies:

Modern hermeneutics neither recognizes nor aims at recognizing this kind of universal essence. Hermeneutics is concerned with the understanding and interpretation of our being in the world and how our different ways of being in the world are connected to our understanding of things. (p. 26)

The importance of this methodology for this research is that there is a focus on the participants’ interpretations of citizenship, experiences of citizenship, and citizenship education within their socio-political context of the Egyptian Revolution.

Phenomenologists are then concerned with understanding social phenomena and the range of experiencing a phenomenon from the perspectives of people involved. Van der Mescht (2004) explains that phenomenologist “focus on how participants ‘language’ the physical,

emotional and intellectual *being-in-the-world*' (p. 3). Therefore, rather than subscribing to a positivist understanding of reality being stable, measurable and existing "out there," phenomenologists understand that reality is socially constructed and interpretive, and often co-construct knowledge with their participants, having the prospect for more critical and empowering research (Merriam, 2009, pp. 8-9).

Some researchers attempt to situate phenomenology as a "middle path" between research epistemologies. For example, Tarozzi and Mortari (2010) explain that phenomenology is between the two antithetical extremes:

On the one hand, a neo-positivist objectivism that a-critically assumes the existence of objects in the world and believes in the possibility of discovering universal laws that govern them; and on the other hand, a postmodern subjectivism, skeptical and relativistic, that denies the possibility of a rigorous thinking about the world, and thwarts the urges to investigate the phenomena beyond their discursive construction. (p. 22)

But just how much focus is placed upon the subjectivity of the individual vis-à-vis her/his social world? There has been a trend away from foundational phenomenologist such as Edmund Husserl (1970), who offered a descriptive and transcendental tradition of phenomenology that necessitates researchers to transcend subjectivity, believing that a universal essence exists and represents the true nature of the phenomenon. Additionally, Husserl articulates a very radical autonomy of human behavior, whose influence on environment and culture greatly outweighs its cultural, social, economic and political constraints. Contemporary phenomenologists, however, have tended to be more aligned with Martin Heidegger's (1962) interpretive or hermeneutic tradition. Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is founded on the premise that humans cannot abstract themselves from the world in which they live. Humans are free to make choices, but are circumscribed by specific conditions and therefore freedom is not absolute (Lopez and Willis, 2004). For Heidegger, descriptive categories based on participants' narratives of their perceived world are stressed, as well as describing how participants' meanings of experiences

influence the choices they make. In addition, in the tradition of Heidegger, the role of the researcher is significant, blending the meanings of both researcher and participant, rather than the impossible task of suspending the researcher's subjectivities.

The inclusion of a phenomenology of social structures and inter-subjectivity under the framework of sociological phenomenology is of particular importance to this study. Alfred Schutz (1973), who made significant contributions to the field of phenomenological sociology and although was greatly influenced by Husserl's phenomenology, departs profoundly from Husserl's approach of upholding "the individual in 'radical abstraction' and searching for 'pure mind' of the abstract laws of consciousness (Ajiboye, 2012, p. 21). The main contribution from Schutz is the examination of how a community of "we" is constructed and the ways that individuals organize and connect meaning to their social world through experiential access to other individuals. Not a purely individual process, human action for Schutz consists of establishing or interpreting meanings through inter-subjective relationships with the social world. Schutz's analysis of social life is also concerned with the structures of the social world as it is experienced by individuals within it, and how that experience is itself socially constructed and organized. For Schutz, the most important part of social reality is "the creation and maintenance of inter-subjectivity—that is a common subjective world among pluralities of interacting individuals" (Ajiboye, 2012, p. 22).

However, critics of Schutz suggest that his phenomenological perspective places an overemphasis on the individual. Crossley (1996) argues, "Schutz seems to adopt an 'individualist' perspective and thereby loses sight of the way 'the community' itself functions as a system, perpetuating itself through space and time" (p. 98). Furthermore, Overgaard and Zahavi (2009) explain that "Schutz's phenomenological perspective thus emphasizes that the

primary object of sociology is not institutions, market conjunctures, social classes or structures of power, but *human beings*, that is, acting and experiencing individuals, considered in their myriad relations to others, but also with an eye to their own, meaning-constituting subjective lives” (p. 101). The critiques of Schutz can lend themselves to broader limitations of the hermeneutic phenomenological approach.

Although a hermeneutic phenomenological approach is a quite valuable methodology for unearthing the rather complex and highly contextualized nature of participants’ perceptions and practices of participatory citizenship and citizenship education and its relationship to the university, I recognize that it is partial, and overstates the focus of individual constructions of social reality. Therefore, I argue that hermeneutic phenomenology, as a research methodology does not go far enough to grasp and recognize the objective structures of power dynamics within social reality. When attempting to uncover meanings and actions of citizenship, a deeper understanding of the experiences of violence, injustice, and oppression as well as resistance or challenges to power structures especially during times of revolution should be of the utmost importance. To underscore how hermeneutic phenomenologists overstate the role of the individual, Van Manen (2014) describes hermeneutic phenomenology as “a mode of musing, reflective questioning, and being obsessed with sources and meanings of lived meaning” and is “a inceptual search for meaning of prereflective experience” (p. 27). Being “obsessed with sources and meanings of lived meaning” may have the tendencies to stray researchers away from and overlook structural forces and the dynamics of power throughout society and the way power influences social interpretation creating in some a false consciousness. Another example is how, when defending phenomenology against empiricist conception of reality, Tarozzi and Mortani (2010) state the purpose of phenomenology is to “Prioritize lived experience, rather than aspiring

to a full explanation” (p. 20). I would agree that prioritizing lived experience is an important aspect of hermeneutic phenomenology and a seemingly “natural” way to humanize research and to share narratives. However, lived experiences should also be accompanied by and situated within—by no means a “full explanation” or generalized account of objective reality—the critically contextualized social, political, economic, and educational structures of the social world of participants. Furthermore, although Schutz came close to recognizing the intersubjectivity of social agents and their social worlds, his analysis lingers in the realm of consciousness, and “not interested in the physical interaction of people but in the way they grasp each other’s consciousness, the manner in which they relate to one another inter-subjectivity” (Ajiboye, 2012, p. 19). Additionally, Schutz regards concepts such as ‘power structure’ sort of intellectual shorthand, and considers structures of power “presuppose experiencing, interpreting and acting individuals” (Overgaard & Zahavi, 2009, p. 101). However, stating that power structures presuppose individual interpretations and experiences can again lead to a-critical analyses of the social world and may devalue the importance that power structures have in shaping and influencing interpretations. Thus, I argue that the “playing field” of social reality should be leveled by acknowledging that the interpretations and experiences of individuals *and* descriptions of power structures have equal—albeit complex and nuanced—weight in social research. I further argue that including critical social theory within the methodology for this study can not only fill the epistemological and ontological gap in objective social reality conventionally generated by hermeneutic phenomenology, but can enhance the status of hermeneutic phenomenology within the realm of research for social justice.

### **5.1.1 Social reality at the nexus of subjectivity and structure: Blurring the tensions between critical social theory and hermeneutic phenomenology**

How can critical theory enhance hermeneutic phenomenology? First, it is necessary to briefly

elucidate the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of critical theory. Critical theory has its origins within the Institute for Social Research (*Institut für Sozialforschung*), also known as the Frankfurt School in Germany during the 1920s. Often connected to foundational theorists such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin, Fromm, and Habermas, *critical theory* originated as an effort to reconstruct the logic and method of Marxism in order to develop a Marxism relevant to emerging twentieth-century capitalism, linking cultural and ideological analysis with economic-based examination that attempted to explain the subtle and explicit mechanisms used to forestall the socialist revolution anticipated by Marx (Agger, 1991). Today, the influential legacy of critical theory and its expansion as a bedrock for critical social research can be seen in the field of education and by the contributions made by such notable scholars as Friere, Gramsci, Apple, Giroux, hooks, and many others (scholars, which are, no doubt, significantly influential to my own intellectual development). Broadly speaking, critical theorists are committed to and optimistic about changing social reality, empowering marginal groups to act for social change, and constructing alternatives to current injustices and oppression that occur through society.

Similar to hermeneutic phenomenology, there is no unitary critical theory (Kellner, 1989). It is safe to say that both approaches to social research have various strands and traditions. Based upon previous research by critical theorists (Kellner, 2003; Rexhepi & Torres, 2011; Tierney & Rhoads, 1993; Torres, 2009), I will outline some key aspects of critical theory applicable to my research methodology. First, critical theory is based upon critiques of positivistic understanding of social reality. As a negative philosophy, challenging the tenets of positivism, critical theory “helps to deconstruct the premises of common-sense as contradictory and building hegemony à la Gramsci” (Rexhepi & Torres, 2011, p. 687). For the purpose of this

research, a model of critique to uncover and challenge not only the false premise of reducing social reality to predictable and measurable qualities, but also the normative standards, assumptions, and sanctioned ideas and practices that citizenship is based upon in Egypt is valuable. Second, the role that power plays in society is a focal point for critical theory. As Tierney and Rhoads (1993) explain, “understanding human action is contingent upon understanding the role that power plays in structuring subjectivity” (p. 321). The role of power is also deeply connected to the third aspect of critical theory, the role of culture. Culture-making institutions such as education, media, religion and many others greatly inform hegemony and common-sense interpretations and actions of citizenship.

Fourth, there is also an emphasis on marginalized groups. In addition to economic marginalization, there are forms of oppression and hierarchies in society connected to gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status and many other categories. In Egypt, youth (especially youth activists) and citizens affiliated with particular political parties and ideologies (especially those oppositional to the government) have been the target of various forms of repression by the government in the period after the January 25, 2011 Egyptian Revolution. As the focus of my research is on universities, students and educators, especially those particularly vocal and espousing certain political ideologies, connected to oppositional or banned political parties could be seen as one of many marginalized groups in Egyptian society. Many students and professors have been repressed through surveillance, restrictions on academic promotion and freedoms, restrictions on freedoms of speech and assembly, arrests, exiles, explosions, or disappearances throughout Egypt after the Revolution. Last, critical theory places an emphasis on empowerment and social action. Critical theory views humans as historical beings, making and shaping history. Freire (2007) describes the historicity of humans as the

“human vocation,” necessary to cultivate a consciousness that could break the dehumanizing and blinding shackles of violence and oppression (p. 44). As an essential part of my research, I focus on the actions of participants and how they are using their ideas of citizenship to create awareness and build individual and institutional structures that challenge the status quo in Egypt. The actions of citizens are of course connected to a more nuanced conception of participatory citizenship and to theories of resistance and social movements. In addition, this aspect of critical theory compels research to be pursued for the purpose of changing the world, rather than simply and a-critically describing particular phenomena through individual interpretations. Relevant to this aspect, [Chapter 9](#) will provide a discussion on how the present study contributes to or informs further research, empowers citizens, as well as argues for models of citizenship education that fosters actively engage citizens. It should be noted that these five aspects of critical theory cannot be seen as mutually exclusive but are better understood when they are interconnected.

With the above aspects of critical theory in mind and with the challenge put forward by both Kellner (2003) and Rexhepi and Torres (2011) to work towards “A Critical Theory of Education for the New Millennium” and to “Reimagine Critical Theory,” respectively, critical theory can therefore enhance hermeneutic phenomenology in two main ways. First, both critical theory and hermeneutic phenomenology seeks to understand the experiences and interpretations of individuals. However, critical theory extends this analysis and situates those experiences within structures of power and cultural constraints, using critical lenses to interpret the subjective experiences of the participants. Second, while both critical theory and hermeneutic phenomenology strive to analyze and describe how knowledge is created through subjective interpretations, critical theory is committed to seeking how that knowledge is then used for

action and social change by both the participant and the researcher.

Blurring the tensions between hermeneutic phenomenology and critical social theory has the possibility for a social research methodology that positions knowledge of the social world as a complex, synergetic amalgamation of subjective construction and objective social structures. Individual subjectivity does not exist in isolation of the social world or social relationships, and social structures cannot exist void of social construction that legitimate or challenge their existence. There are structures of power, oppression, and ideology in society that participants must objectively navigate, experience and make meaning of. Therefore, a more complex and social justice orientated approach to hermeneutic phenomenology is needed.

But how do participants make sense of their experiences within the social world? Meaning-making is not something that instinctively accompanies a social experience, but is shaped by reflection upon that experience connecting to ranges in the lucidity of consciousness. As Schutz (1973) explains, “Meaning is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging without our stream of consciousness but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with the reflective attitude” (p. 210). While phenomenologists focus intensively on the interpretation of the experience, I argue the significance of that meaning-making is not only on how experiencing the social world is interpreted and is situated within the power structures, but also on how it is then applied into the social world of a participant. Therefore, I explain *meaning* as a form of intervention and action within a subject’s social reality similar to what Freire (2007) describes as “praxis.” As such, it is imperative for hermeneutic phenomenologist to not only contextualize and situate the participants’ interpretations within the structures of their social world, but also their actions. As Tarozzi and Mortari (2010) argue when subjects are embodied in their world, “their visions of reality are so

meaningful and revealing of the social reality that we, as researcher, intend to explore” (p. 19).

For instance, how a participant experiences, understands, and interprets an event such as a revolution is based upon their social relationships (which in turn are based upon family, friends, gender, social and economic class, ethnicity/race, religious and political affiliations, and so on) and knowledge of events (forms and levels of education and personal historical experiences with the institutions of the state, as well as with revolutionary groups). Constructed upon those relationships and knowledge(s), the participant is co-creating her/his subjectivity about and with the revolution; in the creation of that subjectivity the participant is co-participating in the revolution—actively siding with revolutionary forces, with counter-revolutionary forces, or flip-flopping back-and-forth. As the participant continuously reevaluates her/his construction and interpretation of the social world, it is a multidimensional mix of interpretation, action and unfolding objective events. This point can be highlighted by the complex trajectory one of the participants in my study, Ahmed (whose perceptions and experiences will be further explored in [Chapter 7](#)).

At first, the Egyptian Revolution did not make sense to him, and his friends told him that he should not go to the demonstrations against the police that quickly manifested as mass demonstrations against the former President Mubarak. He was very confused about the demonstrations, hearing conflicting reports from the media and from his neighbors. He then hated what was going on, and as fires and violence occurred he became sympathetic to the former President Mubarak. Once Mubarak was ousted, Ahmed’s mother persuaded him to join in the celebrations. When he finally got to Tahrir Square and saw for himself what the protesters actually went through for their struggle, he joined a political group and participated in various protests during the tumultuous aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. Now, years after the

Revolution, he feels that it is too dangerous to protest, formal politics have failed to offer him any representation, and therefore he finds solace in being politically and socially aware and is committed to social change through his teaching and community work with underprivileged youth—actions he never really considered or partook in prior to the Revolution.

Within Ahmed's dialectic relationship with the Revolution, he co-created the revolution [he went from opposing to supporting the revolutionary forces based upon the ideologies permeating around him] and the revolution co-created his subjective constructions [he wanted to be aware and inform himself about social and political issues] as well as objective conditions [state repression and violence against protesters and revolutionary groups forced Ahmed out of the realm of formal political change to work for social change through more nonformal and acceptable spaces such as in his teaching and his community work] of social reality. This is just a brief example of how it is imperative for hermeneutical phenomenologists to broaden their scope—ontologically and empirically—and include research of social structures that the experiences and subjectivities of participants exist. Critical social theory informing hermeneutic phenomenology can be a way to accomplish this by strengthening and providing a more comprehensive research methodology when exploring the lives of participants.

In opposition to some, I maintain that people do not objectively experience social reality in the same way, nor is society a complete social construction. The intersectional constructs of class, gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship and immigration status, sexual orientation, and other variables for analysis so dear to sociologists, shapes subjective understandings and experiences of objective realities, existing within a perpetual dialectic. Thus, social reality exists in a blurred nexus of objective realities and subjective understandings and experiences.

For the purposes of this research, if critical social theory focuses on objective realities and false consciousness also being connected to real material ramifications, and hermeneutic phenomenology refers to descriptive interpretations of reality, then a critical hermeneutic phenomenology refers to the descriptive interpretations of objective reality and how people attempt to accept or transform their objective realities. This methodological approach, epistemologically and ontologically focuses on power and transformation as it relates to hermeneutic phenomenological experiences and perceptions and actions of citizens during times of revolutionary change. This methodological approach is grounded in the premise that the data collected from the interviews of the participants cannot be separated from their social and historical context represented by the data collected from various forms of observations, which is vital when conducting qualitative research. This brings up the issue and the role of the researcher, how does one differentiate between what is subjective and what is objective? Specific, personalized, and reflective narratives from the participant's unique insight of a given experience, which I call micro-narratives, can delineate subjective interpretations. While objective interpretations, the macro-narratives can be the patterns and triangulations that emerge between interpretations of participants that also align with the interpretations from the multiple forms of observations conducted by the researcher regarding specific social structures. I generally focus on how participants describe and interpret their ideas and experiences of citizenship and how they navigate and struggle with the perceived objective oppressive structures in Egyptian universities and society. Furthermore, based upon their interpretations of objective reality and their perceptions of what it means to be a citizen, attention in this research is given to how are Egyptians accepting or transforming the current state of their communities. Critical hermeneutic phenomenology is therefore a valuable methodology for unearthing the rather

complex and highly contextualized nature of participants' perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship and its relationship to structures of power and citizenship ideologies within the university and throughout Egyptian society during a socially, politically, and economically turbulent moment in Egypt. The purpose of using a critical hermeneutic phenomenological approach for the present study is to provide specific and deep understandings of participatory citizenship in Egypt and how citizenship may be related to experiences and meaning-making contextualized within the material realities of authoritarianism and neo-authoritarianism within universities as well as throughout the broader Egyptian society—an approach that, from my knowledge, is not common among research methodologies focusing on educational research in Egypt but is in the lineage and inspiration of the brilliant and vanguard contributors within the important book *Cultures of Arab Schooling: Critical Ethnographies from Egypt* (Herrera & Torres, 2006).

## **5.2 Researching at the American University in Cairo**

As a “Scholar without Stipend” affiliated with the Graduate School of Education (GSE) at the American University in Cairo (AUC), I spent eight months (August 2014 to March 2015) in Cairo, Egypt conducting interviews on the campus of AUC. AUC is a nonprofit private foreign university established by American Presbyterian missionaries in 1919 (Sharkey, 2008, p. 149-178). Today the mission of AUC states:

The American University in Cairo (AUC) is a premier English-language institution of higher learning. The university is committed to teaching and research of the highest caliber, and offers exceptional liberal arts and professional education in a cross-cultural environment. AUC builds a culture of leadership, lifelong learning, continuing education and service among its graduates, and is dedicated to making significant contributions to Egypt and the international community in diverse fields. Chartered and accredited in the United States and Egypt, it is an independent, not-for-profit, equal-opportunity

institution. AUC upholds the principles of academic freedom and is dedicated to excellence.<sup>181</sup>

The 2014-2015 profile of AUC is as follows:<sup>182</sup> There are 7,034 total students, of which 5,627 are undergraduate students. Egyptian nationals constitute 94 percent of the student population, while the remaining are international students from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Germany and Libya (top countries represented) in total representing 52 countries. The female student population makes up 54 percent. The top three secondary certificates of incoming students are American diploma (39%), International General Certificate of Secondary Education, IGSE (32 %) and *Thanawiya Amma* (national secondary certificate) science (9 percent). Thus it could be deduced that approximately 71 percent of the incoming students graduated from a private secondary school that provided internationally recognized certificates, which in turn can be interpreted as the family of the students had the resources to afford these relatively expensive schools, situating the general student body in a higher economic class than most national universities. AUC offers 36 undergraduate programs, 44 master's programs, two Ph.D. programs, and a school for continuing students. The top three popular undergraduate majors are Mechanical Engineering, Business Administration, and Construction Engineering. The top three popular graduate programs are Business Administration, International and Comparative Education, and Public Administration. Egyptian nationals constitute 51 percent of the faculty members, while American faculty members make up 29 percent and 20 percent are categorized as other. There are 49 percent non-tenure track faculty members, 28 percent tenured and 23 percent on tenure track positions, with a 1:12 student-teacher ratio. AUC also houses a vast

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<sup>181</sup> AUC Office of Data Analytics and Institutional Research (2014). *AUC Profile 2014-2015*. [https://documents.aucegypt.edu/docs/research\\_IR\\_Research/Profile\\_2014\\_2015.pdf](https://documents.aucegypt.edu/docs/research_IR_Research/Profile_2014_2015.pdf)

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

library collection, hosts 13 research centers, 6 professional training services, and has two campus locations (one in downtown Cairo and one in new Cairo).

The purposeful sampling of AUC as the research site for this study is multifaceted. First, as the oldest private foreign university in Egypt (founded in 1919), and as the top-ranked university in Egypt and in the Arab World, AUC has traditionally produced leaders as well as political, economic, and social elites who have significantly shaped opinions and policies about citizenship (Murphy, 1987). Second, the university regularly hosts graduate students, faculty, and administrators from public universities who attend professional development workshops, conferences, and courses and pursue advanced degrees. Thus, AUC was a valuable site to network with students and academics from other universities, especially public universities who were concerned with issues of participatory citizenship and citizenship education. This point is important because of both the UCLA IRB ([Appendix II](#)) and the AUC IRB ([Appendix III](#)) mandated that all of my interviews be conducted within the campus of AUC; thereby restricting my formal research-based interaction with participants to within the gates of AUC. Further, the Egyptian governmental agency CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics), which authorizes and monitors research within the country, restricted me (and most foreigners) from conducting qualitative research outside of AUC. Third, since the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, this elite educational institution has not been immune from student activism and student and worker protests, and thus provided an important environment to examine the tensions and emerging understandings and practices of participatory citizenship. Early in the Revolution, there were also reports of state security snipers posted on the rooftops of AUC's Tahrir campus

and protesters battling with the snipers on campus.<sup>183</sup> Last, AUC was also selected as a research site based upon convenience (Patton, 2002) and access. AUC has already negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with my home institution the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Additionally, in the June 2012 and again in May 2014 I had the opportunity to conduct preliminary research on the campus of AUC. Moreover, I have established a considerable network of students, faculty, and administrators associated with AUC.

It must be noted that after I completed my fieldwork at AUC, the university was the focus of negative international attention. In February 2016, the tortured dead body of an international researcher associated with AUC was found outside of Cairo. Giulio Regeni, a 28 year-old Italian national and Ph.D. candidate from Cambridge University, had the same affiliation with AUC as myself, Scholar Without Stipend, but he was associated with the Political Science Department and researching informal labor organizations with street vendors in Cairo.<sup>184</sup> Regeni was missing for a month before his body was discovered. As investigations by the Egyptian and Italian governments are underway, motives and explanations of his murder remain unknown. Regeni's murder is a horrendous event that not only highlights the current dangers of conducting critical research in Egypt for foreigners and citizens alike, but also hits close to home adding a certain weight as well as clarity for me personally as an international researcher in Egypt.

In Egyptian society there are many critics of AUC, condemning it for being an elitist American institution filled with privileged students who are more focused on leaving Egypt than are committed to addressing issues within Egypt. In February 14, 2015, I attended the AUC Mid-

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<sup>183</sup> *Caravan* (March 6, 2011) WEB EXCLUSIVE: AUC President says use of Tahrir campus to fire on protestees 'illegal and unauthorized,' <https://academic.aucegypt.edu/caravan/story/web-exclusive-auc-president-says-use-tahrir-campus-fire-protestees-illegal-and-unauthorized>

<sup>184</sup> Mada Masr (February 25, 2016) AUC remembers Giulio Regeni, protests university's position on his murder, <http://www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/auc-remembers-giulio-regeni-protests-universitys-position-his-murder>

Year Commencement for graduate students. During the commencement speech, political science graduate student, Basma ElEtreby, countered these critics, and argued, “It is not the amount of money our parents have invested in us, and it is certainly not the image we show to the outside world. It is the life we lead and the path we choose that defines us. It is the value-added that you bring to this world that matters and lasts...Being born with privileges we didn’t earn makes us pivotal catalysts for a better world.” The commitment by AUC students and educators to work for a better Egypt and a better world is the AUC that I know. I feel honored to have been a part of this unique critical space in Egypt.

Harding (2004) advocates for a critically reflexive process to research, bringing to light the positionality and subjectivity of the researcher, as well as the collaboration with participants as “agents of knowledge rather than objects of knowledge.” In feminist standpoint epistemology, this project requires learning to “listen attentively” to the Other; “educating oneself about histories, achievement, preferred social relations, and hopes, critical examination of the dominant institutional beliefs and practices, and critical self-examination to discover how one unwittingly participates in generating disadvantage to groups” (Harding, 2004, p. 135). While the “project” of educating myself was introduced in [Chapter 1](#), the following section briefly discusses some of my experiences in Egypt and my role as a researcher vis-à-vis participants and the Egyptian society.

Although I was not an insider (I was not an AUC graduate student, a professor, or an Egyptian), I felt I was well received as a “scholar without stipend” from the GSE community. During the first week of school, GSE had a social-mixer and the Dean formally introduced me to the school. From that point on, I felt very comfortable and well accepted at GSE and throughout the campus of AUC. As confessed by one of the students, “We all love you by the way.

Although you are American, and you have been there your whole life, but still there is kind of blood relationship between you and us. Because you have a Mediterranean touch so this makes a difference.” I believe she was referring to the fact that my father was born in Sicily,<sup>185</sup> and my family has instilled some cultural sensibilities and understandings that can also be found in Egyptian cultures.

Nevertheless, GSE provided me with a desk in an open-office in the GSE building that was frequented by students, professors, and staff. I was usually on campus three to four days a week and viewed my role not solely as a researcher, but I wanted to be an added value to GSE and AUC. I would mentor graduate students and brainstorm about their thesis projects, review their class papers, share literature and research articles, and had discussions about current events. I also had various meetings with GSE professors and professors from other fields. Additionally, I audited three education courses and filled-in as a temporary instructor for GSE classes when professors were sick. I attended various university-wide and GSE events, including the mid-year graduate student commencement, GCE thesis presentations, and various other university-wide social events. During my time at AUC, I also presented at annual conference on human development in the MENA region.

What was my positionality as a researcher? In models of social justice research there is a trend towards participatory action research (PAR). Cahill (2007) offers an approach to PAR, not as a technique but as a negotiated process and commitment to working with communities. First, PAR places a considerable amount of emphasis on ethical principles of research, committed to

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<sup>185</sup> Sicily is the largest island in the Mediterranean Ocean. Strategically located in the middle of the Mediterranean, throughout history Sicily has been colonized and controlled by most of the major Mediterranean powers, sharing many culinary, artistic, architectural, and linguistic commonalities with many Mediterranean countries, including Egypt. Additionally, Arabs and Muslims formed the Emirate of Sicily (circa 831 to 1072) lasting for over two hundred years. Even after the fall of the Emirate, under the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, Arabic-speaking Muslims formed majority of the island’s population and left lasting Arab and Muslim cultural influences in Sicily (Chiarelli, 2011).

opposing any forms of physical and emotional harm and exploitation of participants and communities participating, which surpasses top-down abstract models of ethics regulated by the IRB. Second, a primacy is placed upon relationships and fostering closeness between the researcher and collaborators. Third, through an ethics of care, researchers of PAR work *with* communities to create conditions for social change to be used by the community at their own devices. I would also add a fourth descriptor of PAR, which emphasizes co-creating research with participants, where the design of the research focuses on the engagement of participants in the research process (Blodgett et al., 2011). Thus, participants are co-researchers in the research project. Cahill explains, “PAR is a response to exploitative research practices of outsiders who have used communities as laboratories,” and “particularly communities of color, have rarely benefited from the results of studies conducted” (Cahill, 2007, p. 362).

While I view my positionality as a researcher who deeply followed (and follows) the first two processes of PAR, observed a commitment to genuine ethical principles to research and fostered a close relationship with participants, I would not say that I worked directly with communities to create conditions for social change. Although I believe in individuals and groups in their abilities as agents of social change and support the revolutionary currents manifesting in Egypt over the past four years, my particular positionality as a foreigner as well as my strict IRB limited me in my ability to work with communities for social change. I did spend a considerable amount of time on the campus of AUC in the classrooms, talking with undergraduate and graduate students, and was not particularly involved with any campus or outside student groups. I discussed my research design and interview questions with many students and educators and adhered to their suggestions. Additionally, many of my colleagues in Egypt did significantly help me to network and get access to potential research participants. However, I did not actually have

them co-create or be co-researchers within the research process. Therefore, it would be a stretch to categorize my research as participatory action research. That being said, many of the participants were engaged in activities concerning social change in Egypt. Although, I was not directly involved, side-by-side, with those participants in social change, I like to believe that getting to know people through explaining my research and sitting down with people during interviews or during more informal conversations, helped to foster a form of self-reflection and recognition that their work was important. For example, when discussing ideas about citizenship, about the revolution and the future of Egypt, one participant commented, “I never really thought about that question before, thank you for insight and allowing me to share!” Others stated that “it is nice to know that people in the world care about my work.” Many other participants had similar responses. I like to think that my research carved out a safe-space where participants could share their ideas, struggles, frustrations, successes, and hopes about social change in Egypt.

That being said, I made it a point that before interviewing a participant I usually had an in-person-meeting or over the phone conversation explaining my research; always providing a space for potential participants to ask any questions about the research or about myself. Even though all but three interviews (I had a colleague assist in the interview translation) were conducted in English, I wanted to practice and increase my comprehension of Arabic, specifically Egyptian Arabic, so I hired an Arabic tutor who forced me to engage in conversations in Arabic throughout my day. I wanted the participants to feel comfortable around me and feel that I was not solely here to collect data and leave. I wanted to establish lasting friendships, build important networks of colleagues, and giveback to Egypt in any way that I can.

### **5.3 Hermeneutic Phenomenological Interviews**

A principal method of data collection used in this study is the *semi-structured hermeneutic phenomenological interview* (Creswell, 1998; Groenewald, 2004; Van Manen, 2014). In general, Merriam (2009) states, “interviewing is necessary when we cannot observe behavior, feelings, or how people interpret the world around them” (p. 88). In qualitative research, there is a range of interview structures. Highly structured interviews tend to be standardized by using predetermined wording and order of questions, more akin to an oral survey. The rigid format of structured interviews does not allow the researcher access to the deep perspectives and understandings of the phenomena at hand and social world of the participants. Instead researchers “get reactions” to the “preconceived notions of the world” that they created within their highly structured interview guides (Merriam, 2009, p. 90). Semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, while upholding the rigor of social science methods, do not adhere to predetermined wording but allows for flexibility in asking of questions and covering topics, as well as allowing a space for and recognizing the importance of the inclusion of anticipated and unanticipated follow-up questions and probing questions. Therefore, the hermeneutic phenomenological interview “first of all serves the very specific purpose of exploring and gathering experiential narrative material, stories, or anecdotes that may serve as a resource for phenomenological reflection and thus develop a richer and deeper understanding of a human phenomenon” (Van Manen, 2014, p. 314). Consequently, semi-structured questions were designed to elicit experiential accounts that are rich and detailed, focusing on participant’s experiences and interpretations related to participatory citizenship and citizenship education, main theoretical concepts discussed in detail in [Chapter 4](#).

[Appendices IV](#) and [V](#) have a sample of the semi-structured interview guides. The guide in Appendix IV was used during interviews with university students, while Appendix V was

used with educators. The reason for the difference in interview was based upon different roles within the universities and varying levels of familiarity with concepts. The guides list specific questions that are arranged in two themes. The first interview theme includes questions connected to “perceptions of participatory citizenship,” which directly relates to my broad research questions 1 and 2: In what ways have the experiences of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution and subsequent socio-political events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and educators in Egypt; and To what extent do university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship?

The second theme includes questions connected to “perceptions of the role of the university in fostering citizenship,” which directly relates to research question 3: How do students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education? Although the interview guide has a list of specific questions, the flexibility of a semi-structured interview allowed me to explore concrete experiences and rich stories of particular situations and events (Van Manen, 2014) shared by participants that were unpredicted and unanticipated yet still relevant to the broad research questions.

Regardless of how familiar the researcher is with the participants, qualitative interviews are very awkward conversations. The researcher conventionally holds the tempo, direction, topic and length of interviews. In each interview I attempted to address this power dynamic by employing a few techniques to foster a more natural conversation, which I believe can lead to a more fruitful and insightful interview. As mentioned in the above section, prior to each interview I made it a point to talk at some length with each participant to make them feel more comfortable with sharing their experiences as well as increasing their trust of a foreign researcher. After each participant read and agreed to the IRB consent ([Appendix VI](#), [Appendix VII](#), and [Appendix VIII](#))

form and consenting to the interview being digitally recorded (note that 6 participants did not consent to be digitally recorded but did consent to the interview), I would remind myself that the participant “has the floor,” my job in this role is to foster the participants’ reflection by asking relevant questions and follow-up questions, and not to control the conversation by talking too much, interrupting their flow of speech and thought, or make the conversation more awkward by not talking at all or by appearing not to be listening. I told myself, I have to also remain receptive and attentive to what they are saying. I did this in two ways: first, I maintained positive body language and eye contact; second, I wrote down follow-up questions on my notepad without it appearing that I am paying more attention to taking notes than to listening (this was very difficult to do when the participant did not want to be digitally recorded). Then I would ask those follow-up questions when the time was appropriate, attempting not to interrupt a story or anecdote by interjecting with a follow-up question. When I asked a question, I allowed some time for the participant to comprehend, evaluate, and reflect-upon (and even translate) that question, which I think is especially necessary when conducting interviews in a participant’s second or third language. When I noticed that the participant was struggling with the question or was in deep thought about the question, I tried not to interject too soon to rephrase or explain the question in more detail.

As for the process of asking questions, I took the approach of “scaffolding” questions to build up their comfort level. To begin the conversation, I would ask the participant if they had any questions for me. Most of them did not have any questions because most of the inquiries about my research or about myself were addressed in our pre-interview conversation. Next, I would ask them about what universities they attended, what field of study they were in, where did they live and work—questions mostly related to their general background. Then, I would

usually start with the topic of citizenship and continue into deeper questions such as, what was your favorite and worst memory of the Revolution? Eventually, I would move into the topic of education and the university and use a similar scaffolding technique of asking questions. I would end each interview by asking them if they had any questions for me, or anything they would like to add or clarify, and would greatly thank them for this experience and sharing their time and stories with them. I would also say, “Contact me at any time if you want to share anything else, or if you know someone who would be interested in sitting down for an interview at AUC” (snowball sampling technique, which will be explained within the next section).

Of course, each participant is different and has her/his own styles of communication. For those participants who were more brief in their answers, to explore those answers in-depth, I would ask them to please give me a concrete or real-life example of what they just said. For those participants who drifted out on tangents, if it was relevant to the overall research questions, or if I felt they were really passionate about this topic, I allowed them to venture into their narratives. Under the auspices of creating a safe and comfortable interview environment, I rarely interjected when participants went off topic. My argument for that approach was at the moment of the interview I may have overlooked the value of the long-winded anecdote, but later it might appear crucial to that person’s interview or to my analysis. Fortunately, an overwhelming majority of the participants were very eager and open to share their ideas, stories, and experiences with me—for that, I am truly grateful!

Twenty-four interviews were conducted on the campus of AUC within a private room located in the university library or within a participant’s private office. To protect the confidentiality and rights of each participant, participants were given a consent form in English ([Appendix VI](#)) and Arabic ([Appendix VII](#)) approved through the UCLA Institutional Review

Broad (IRB) as well as the IRB system at the AUC ([Appendix VIII](#)) prior to committing to any interview. Participants were informed of my research study, of their voluntary roles as participants, and that any information they share will be labeled with a pseudonym not their real name and identity.

The length of each interview ranged from 20 to 95 minutes. I attempted to record each interview using the digital recording program on my smart phone. However, some participants indicated that they wanted to participate but did not want to be recorded. Therefore, six interviews were not digitally recorded (data from interviews were collected by taking written notes), while the remaining 18 interviews were collected using a digital recording device. All but three of the interviews were carried-out in English. The three interviews not conducted in English were conducted in Arabic and I relied on one of my Egyptian colleague who is multilingual and who is a language teacher to translate during the three interviews. Admittedly, the interviews conducted using an Arabic translator greatly limited my interaction and follow-up questioning with the participant. However, the participants were able to share a few interesting stories, experiences, and perspectives during the interviews. During interviews conducted predominantly in English, when participants slipped-in Arabic words or phrases, I translated the Arabic words myself using my working knowledge of Egyptian Arabic. All interviews were fully transcribed and cataloged using a pseudonym of the participant and interview date.

### **5.3.1 Participants**

Interviews took place with 24 university students and educators (educators refer to professors, instructors, and/or researchers in a university or educational institutions). [Appendix IX](#) has a list of table pertaining to the demographics of participants. The purpose of these two groups are that university students construct part of the elite social, political, cultural, and

economic classes and are the future leaders of Egypt who may have an important impact on the development of citizenship within Egyptian society. Similarly, educators, whether teaching in formal or nonformal spaces or within research capacities, can have significant impacts upon the lives of their students, schools, and communities. To be transparent, most of the participants were teachers, in the field of education, or were familiar with educational issues within Egypt. The reasoning behind selecting those connected to education was because they are more knowledgeable about topics of this study and my network of colleagues in Egypt are mainly educators and associated in various ways to the field of education.

I employed two forms of purposeful sampling strategies to locate participants. The overall logic of purposeful sampling is to select *information-rich* cases or *key actors*, from which the researcher “can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry” (Patton, 2002, p. 230). First, the selection of specific university student and educator participants to interview was guided by *maximal variation sampling*. As a purposeful sampling strategy, maximal variation sampling is when a “researcher samples cases or individuals that differ on some characteristics or trait (e.g., different age groups)” (Creswell, 2008, p. 214). The justification of maximal variation sampling used to select interview participants is twofold. First, although limited to the campus of AUC, my intent was to locate widely varying instances of perceptions and practices of citizenship in Egypt. Thus, as Patton (2002) states, “any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared dimensions of a setting or phenomenon” (p. 234). Second, because my research is focused on citizenship and citizenship education in Egypt, the main criterion was that all participants had to be Egyptian citizens.<sup>186</sup> Although, the focus is on

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<sup>186</sup> Even though focusing on residents from other countries such as refugees and undocumented people under the framework of citizenship formation and education in Egypt is a valuable and definitely a pressing topic for

Egyptian citizens, ranges of identities were represented. Specifically, these groups included, identities connected to gender (4 men, 20 women), age (20-60), socio-economic status (a few came from more humble backgrounds, while most stated they were from the middle class), regional experiences (some grew up inside Cairo, some in cities outside Cairo, and some abroad), religious affiliations and positions (Sunni, Coptic, Christian, Sufi, and Atheist), education level (undergraduate, graduate, and Ph.D. were included), fields of study (Education, Engineering, Economics, Health, History, Language Arts, Mathematics, Medicine, and Political Science), and participants represented experiences from both public universities (Ain Shams, Alexandria, Cairo, and Mansura) and private universities (AUC, British University in Cairo, German University in Cairo, and Misr International University). Again these are exhibited within [Appendix IX](#).

Second, in order to locate additional participants and expand my pool of potential participants, I used *snowball sampling*. Snowball sampling is a technique of “expanding the sample by asking one participant to recommend others for interviewing” (Creswell, 2008, p. 217). As another form of purposeful sampling, the technique of snowball sampling slightly differs from maximum variation sampling. While maximum variation sampling involves a strategy where the researcher directly and deliberately searches and selects participants based upon a variation of identities, differences, and experiences, the strategy of snowball sampling entails asking current participants as well as colleagues to refer the researcher to other potential participants. This strategy was utilized in two ways. First, through my network of colleagues and professors in Egypt, I inquired about students and educators that might be interested in participating in this study that have knowledge and experience writing about, researching, and

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future research, for the current dissertation their inclusion would have added another layer of complexity that overstretches the scope of this current dissertation.

actively engaged in Egyptian citizenship and education. Second, I asked each participant at the end of the interview to forward my contact information, IRB consent form, and research description to any person who they thought might be willing to participate in this research.

It should be noted that conventional social research based upon positivism interprets the reliability of a study resting solely upon its repeatability. Although this study is relevant, it is not representative, and its findings cannot be extrapolated to a larger set of the population that provides the basis for generalizations. Regardless of the range of identities of participants, a qualitative study, by nature, is not designed to assemble statistically large sample sizes. Therefore, the findings in this study only represent the experiences and narratives of the participants and the researcher and cannot account for the multifaceted and complicated experiences of all Egyptians. Even though the narratives presented may be familiar to some Egyptians, for many in Egypt, daily survival takes precedence over any conscious forms of participatory citizenship.

#### **5.4 Close Observations**

In critical hermeneutic phenomenology, the researcher's interpretations are an important part of the research study. Although this methodology includes interviews, the experiences and observations of the researcher cannot be detached from the research. In addition to hermeneutic phenomenological interviews, I conducted and expanded upon what Van Manen (2014) has described as "close observations." In contrast to more behavioral or experimental observational techniques, close observations attempt "to break through the distance often created by observational methods. The best way to enter a person's life world is to participate in it" (Van Manen, 2014, p. 318). He continues, "close observations involve an attitude of assuming a relation that is as close as possible while retaining a hermeneutic alertness to situations that

allows us to constantly step back and reflect on the meanings of those situations. It is similar to the attitude of the fiction writer or novelist who is always on the lookout for stories to tell, incidents to remember” (Van Manen, 2014, p. 318). In order to have an “attitude of assuming a relation,” there must be a strong sense and practice of self-reflexivity about my actions and surroundings. At AUC, I tried to be a participant and an observer simultaneously, maintaining a level of reflexivity needed for research while guarding against unethical acts of manipulation, deceptiveness, and falseness within social situations. There are two purposes for incorporating close observations into this study: first, close observations are necessary to provide the social, political, economic, and educational context of the dynamic transition in Egypt; second, to triangulate the data collected from the interviews. The following two sub-sections describe the data collection techniques used in close observations.

#### **5.4.1 Descriptive and reflective fieldwork journal**

During my time on the campus of AUC (as stated above), I attended many public events; had many conversations with students, faculty, workers, and administrators; attended class sessions and conferences; and even covered a few graduate level classes for absent professors. I used a fieldwork journal to capture some of my experiences and reflections during fieldwork at AUC. A *fieldwork journal* (Merriam, 2009, p. 136) is used to collect *field notes*, or the written accounts of observations. Additionally, the journal was used as an introspective and reflective record of my questions, ideas, and comments that arose during the observations. Although I used an observation protocol (see [Appendix X](#)) to guide specific observations usually focusing on the daily lives of students on campus, paying specific attention to activities, interactions, and conversations pertaining to participatory citizenship and citizenship education, I used a journal more as a reflection on my daily experiences. It was space where I could reflect on the day’s

events as they impacted me personally, my research, the participants, AUC and the broader Egyptian society. I used it to pose questions connected to the development of research as well as a space to work through some of my assumptions and biases. I would take notes using a note-taking program on my mobile, and then at night I would use those notes and type, in narrative form, my observations and reflections using a Word Doc on my secure laptop. The journal consists of 30 pages containing 53 entries from September 6, 2014 to March 24, 2015.

#### **5.4.2 Data from documents**

To gather data from what was occurring throughout the country and what I was observing off campus, I collected data from online local daily Egyptian news sources and relevant reports. I was directed by the Egyptian governmental agency that administers research (CAPMAS: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) not to conduct human research outside the campus of AUC. Therefore, in combination with observations and interviews, data was collected from relevant documents. The term document can refer to a wide range of written, visual, digital, and physical material relevant to citizenship and education in Egypt. Merriam (2009) states that documents are a “ready-made source of data easily accessible to the imaginative and resourceful investigator, and are less intrusive than interviews and observations” (p. 139).

The first types of document are *popular culture documents*, or news reports from Internet-based Egyptian news sites. Each day I tried to start the day by reading the daily Egyptian online news sites in English. I focused on stories that were relevant to citizenship and education in Egypt. I copied and pasted the interesting story and organized them into one of four categories (“the university,” “politics,” “society,” or “the economy”) each day. These stories not only helped me to build a context for my study ([Chapter 3](#)), but also kept me widely informed, which greatly assisted me when conducting the interviews and participants would discuss current

events. I focused on five major English online news sites listed below. These sites were selected based upon their daily publication of news, functionality of their website, their variety political slants, and their popularity with Arabic and English reading audiences. Here are the five news sites that I used, including their mission statements:

- 1) *Daily News Egypt* ([www.dailynewsegypt.com](http://www.dailynewsegypt.com)): “Egypt’s only Daily Independent Newspaper in English. Daily News Egypt is a completely independent news provider for Egypt and the wider MENA region. Working with local Arabic sources we provide the English-speaking world with an insight into breaking news, in print and online every day of the week. We aim to build our reputation for honest and reliable reporting, to make us a point of reference on Egyptian current affairs for readers all over the world. The newspaper originally launched in 2005. Business News for Press, Publishing and Distribution Company, owner of the daily financial newspaper *Alborsa*, obtained the rights to *Daily News Egypt* in May 2012, in order to reinvest in the paper and return it to the pinnacle of English language news publishing in Egypt. We provide news articles on politics, business, opinion, lifestyle, culture as well as investigative features, tourism articles and interviews. Our team of journalists, editors, photographers and designers are all committed to a high standard of impartial journalism.”
- 2) *Ahram online* ([www.english.ahram.org.eg](http://www.english.ahram.org.eg)): This is a state-run newspaper. “*Ahram Online* is the English-language news web site published by Al-Ahram Establishment, Egypt’s largest news organization, and the publisher of the Middle East’s oldest newspaper: the daily *Al-Ahram*, in publication since 1875. *Ahram Online* was launched 26 November 2010.”

- 3) *Egypt Independent* ([www.egyptindependent.com](http://www.egyptindependent.com)): “Egypt Independent is the sister English-language publication of Al-Masry Al-Youm daily, the country's flagship independent paper. Born in 2009 as a news website, Egypt Independent has been providing Egypt and the world with high-quality, in-depth content about the political, economic, social and cultural landscape of the country. In 2011, Egypt's year of revolutionary change, Egypt Independent launched a weekly print edition that serves as an insightful digest of the country's dynamic times.”
- 4) *Aswat Masriya English* ([www.en.aswatmasriya.com/news/](http://www.en.aswatmasriya.com/news/)): “Aswat Masriya English, the sister site of Aswat Masriya, which provides news and information about the general scene in Egypt. The websites are part of a Thomson Reuters Foundation initiative to enhance democracy through strengthening the media in Egypt. Along with a programme of training courses for journalists, it is hoped that the sites will promote democracy in Egypt by providing independent, balanced and accurate news and information to journalists and the public in this critical phase in Egypt's history. Aswat Masriya has set content partnership agreements with prominent Egyptian media institutions like Al-Ahram newspaper and Al-Shorouk Newspaper.”
- 5) *The Cairo Post* ([www.thecairopost.com](http://www.thecairopost.com)): “To provide breaking news and quality, in-depth reporting on Egypt that is easily accessible and understandable to a global audience. The Cairo Post was launched in October 2013 with the aim of becoming the trusted source for news and information about Egypt and the Middle East for a global, multicultural audience. Published by Youm7, Egypt's most-read news website, The Cairo Post aims to offer in-depth analysis and minute-by-minute updates on breaking news, combining local knowledge with international perspective. The Cairo Post is committed

to objectivity, quality, and maintaining the highest standards of journalism.”

The second type of documents that was collected are *public records*. These documents consist of program documents, manuals, reports, as well as information from webpages. I collected a number of reports produced by Egyptian and international civil society groups and government agencies, which cover topics including human rights, political participation, as well as various issues relevant to higher education in Egypt.

## **5.5 The Blueprint: Thematic Analysis and Writing of Data from Interviews and Documents**

So what did I do with all of this data? It is vital for the sanity and success of dissertation candidates and researchers alike to implement and maintain a rigorous, valid, transparent, systematic yet flexible blueprint to guide the stages of dissertation analysis and writing. The following section generally describes how the data collected from the interviews, reflective journal entries, and various documents were analyzed and then written up. It briefly outlines how I read the data and what I looked for within the data. Secondly, I describe how the data was presented and why I selected these writing techniques.

### **5.5.1 How did I read the texts and what did I look for?**

It is no doubt a daunting task to sift through and make sense of piles of data from 8 months' worth of interviews, journal entries, and documents collected during fieldwork. Thus a framework for data analysis cannot only minimize the feelings of being overwhelmed with data, but provides a level of reliability that the results are consistent given the data collected (Merriam, 2009, p. 221). The analytical reading of data for this study was guided by Max Van Manen's approaches to theme analysis for hermeneutic phenomenological research. Van Manen (2014) refers to thematic analysis as “the process of recovering structures of meanings that are

embodied and dramatized in human experience represented in a text” (p. 319). He continues by describing the process of analyzing texts as “complex and creative,” filled with “invention, discovery, and disclosure” (p. 320). For the purposes of this research, thematic analysis was used to assist in the reading of texts to gain deeper insight into the perspectives and experiences of participants as well as various documents concerning the research topics of citizenship, participatory citizenship and citizenship education within the context of transitional Egypt. It is a technique, a strategy for making meaning of the texts, producing enough visibility to locate patterns within and across texts, which offers insights into description, interpretation, and comprehension of human action. The following section introduces Van Manen’s approaches to theme analysis, followed by how I adopted and expanded his approaches for the use in my research analysis.

Van Manen (2014) outlines the process of thematic analysis for hermeneutic phenomenological research, including the different ways of extrapolating various levels of meaning from the text. First, the researcher conducts a thematic reading of the transcript, organizing the transcript into a shorter anecdote or multiple anecdotes.<sup>187</sup> Next, what Van Manen describes as a “themaitzation” of the anecdote occurs. As a way to identify thematic expressions, phrases, and/or narratives, the anecdote is submitted into one or all levels of *wholistic*, *selective*, or *detailed* thematizations (pp. 320-322):

1. **Wholistic reading:** Van Manen uses the term *wholistic* to describe a “wide reading” of a passage. The anecdote is taken as a whole, and the main significance emerges as the reader reads the anecdote in its entirety. The meaning of the whole anecdote is expressed

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<sup>187</sup> While Van Manen uses the term *anecdote* to describe a narrative or verbatim passage from the text, other researchers prefer to use the term *vignette*. I see these two terms as interchangeable and will be explained in more detail within the next section on writing.

or labeled in a phrase. The phrase can be a direct quote or statement from the anecdote or title that the researcher creates.

2. **Selective reading:** After reading the text several times, particularly revealing or essential statements and phrases of the phenomenon are highlighted. Erickson (2004) would describe this as a “bottom-up” approach. These are the poignant quotes and phrases that stand out within the anecdote. Van Manen refers to these as “rhetorical gems,” that are much smaller than the anecdote located in the wholistic reading.
3. **Detailed reading:** The researcher looks at every sentence or sentence clusters, or line-by-line reading of the anecdote guided by the question, what does this sentence say about the experience of phenomena?

Last, the themes found in the various reading approaches can now be used for phenomenological writing of the final report.

For the purposes of this study, I rearranged the order of Van Manen’s theme analysis of texts. With my three research questions as a guide to keep me focused when the amount of data became overwhelming,<sup>188</sup> I first started with the *selective reading* approach. Using highlighting functions Microsoft Word, I highlighted quotes, phrases, and statements that, at first glance, appeared to be relevant to a research question. These relevant passages would be labeled with In Vivo (Saldana, 2013, p. 4), which are direct quotes and phrases taken directly from what the participant said. Additionally, I would highlight passages and label them with interpretive phrases, ideas, or questions that I generated.

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<sup>188</sup> (1) In what ways have the experiences of the January 25th Egyptian Revolution and subsequent events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and educators in Egypt; (2) To what extent do university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship; and (3) How do students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education?

Then after a second reading, I took chunks of combined selective reading excerpts and formulated them into a larger vignette that could be expressed under a single *wholistic phrase* for a particular participant. The wholistic anecdotes are much larger than the quotes, phrases, or statements gained from the selective approach. The wholistic anecdotes usually contain a number of quotes, phrases, or statements and are valued for the whole meaning of participant's narrative related to a research topic and question. Additionally, they are valued for their narrative structure including a beginning, middle, and end. Exemplified in [Chapter 7](#), anecdotes were labeled by In Vivo or direct quotes. The wholistic phrases included: "*The Revolution, when it happened, it got me angry*" and "*The beauty of the Revolution.*" For this example, the anecdotes of these two phrases address the first two research questions.

In the Van Manenian process, the last approach is a *detailed reading* of the data. However, I did not see the value of conducting a line-by-line close reading of each sentence and interpreting the meaning of each sentence as Van Manen proposes. This approach seemed too time consuming with less value to my study than the other approaches. The detailed reading approach would be more suitably applied if the researcher were to sit down with the participant, and together the researcher and participant would conduct a line-by-line co-reading of each sentence. Instead, I opted to conduct what I call a *particular reading* of the texts. I started with a phrase, such as "definitions of citizenship," or "forms of participatory citizenship." Alternatively, I would also ask the text questions, for example, "How has the participant's conception and actions of citizenship changed after the Revolution?" or "What is the relationship between higher education and citizenship?" I used these phrases and questions as a template or magnifying glass to analyze each transcript with the goal of magnifying and unearthing the particular quotes,

statements or anecdotes associated with the phrase I am searching for or the question that I am asking. This is similar to what Erickson (2004) labels as a “top-down” approach to analysis.

For the data collected from the documents I applied the selective and particular reading approaches. After I finished analyzing all the interviews, having created a long list of wholistic (Van Manen, 2014) phrases encompassing anecdotes from the interviews, I scoured the data collected from news sites and relevant documents and strategically located statements and/phrases that would corroborate, challenge, or generally relate and fit within the wholistic phrases from the interviews. Additionally, I used particular phrases and questions to see how they were addressed within the documents. The quotes, phrases, and statements from the documents that were gathered through the two reading approaches were inserted in various positions and for various purposes with the anecdotes collected from the interviews during the writing process.

### **5.5.2 The authentic balance: Sandwiched anecdotes in hermeneutic phenomenological research writing from anecdotes and interpretation**

In qualitative research writing, there is a tension between presenting the particular voice of participants—through direct quotes and anecdotes—and the appropriate amount of descriptive and interpretive commentary from the researcher. On the one hand, ethical and integrity driven research must include the authentic voice of the participants. On the other, data cannot speak for itself; there is always a researcher setting up and interpreting what is being said and guiding the reader to what is important. Thus, the researcher must find the authentic balance between the voice of participants and making sense and meaning out of that voice. In the final section of this chapter, I briefly explain the importance and various uses of anecdotes. Then, I layout the framework I used for sandwiched anecdotes in hermeneutic phenomenological research writing.

Stories are the oldest and most common way humans make sense of each other and the world around. Conveyed through a familiar mode that interconnects the storyteller with the audience, stories strike at a primordial cord of human experiences regarding love, loss, struggle, perseverance, redemption, hope, happiness, and humor to say the least. Stories are the means by which most of the world's religions are conveyed and passed down. Stories move people to create and destroy society. The story is a fundamental human tool; they are what make us human. Therefore, it seems only natural to have *stories*—or to use the Van Manen term, *anecdotes*—at the heart of social research writing.

In social science research, hypothetical stories portraying fictional characters in particular circumstances have been commonly used as research methods to collect data and elicit and prompt responses from interviewees. However, anecdotes (or vignettes) can also be a strategy for presenting research (Blodgett et al., 2011; Spalding & Phillips, 2007). Not to be confused with the notion of evidence resting merely on anecdotal substantiation, anecdotes as data constitute first person accounts of a lived experience, having the power to effectively explain phenomena in a way that strongly delivers an empirical nearness, vividness, and presence of an experience.

The structure of the anecdote is a very short or simple story, describes a single incident, begins close to the central moment of the experience, includes concrete details, contains several quotes, closes quickly after the climax, and often has an effective last line (Van Manen, 2014 p. 252). Anecdotes can be collected through a variety of methods, including interviews, observations, personal experiences, related literature, written accounts, or what Van Manen describes as imagined accounts (photographs, artwork, poetry, etc.) (p. 251).

Researchers (Blodgett et al., 2011; Spalding & Phillips, 2007) have identified three general types of presenting anecdotes in research writing: the *portrait*, which represents an

individual character and experiences; the *snapshot*, which provides a descriptive account of what was observed in a situation; and the *composite*, which depicts a mix of experiences amalgamated into a single all-encompassing narrative. But, how are anecdotes used in phenomenological writing?

Phenomenological writing interweaves elements of descriptive, analytical, reflective and interpretive writing techniques and foci. It is the means by which researchers combined various forms of collected data with interpretations and related literature to present for a given audience. Van Manen (2014) explains phenomenological writing practices:

1. Heuristic: Instills wonder, beginning with a question guiding the writing. “The wondering tone of heuristic questions lingers and echoes throughout an increasingly full-fledged phenomenological text” (Van Manen, 2014 p. 376).
2. Experiential: The lived experience material.
3. Thematic: Experiential descriptions.
4. Insight cultivating: Including relevant theories, sources, and literature.
5. Vocative: Occurs throughout and is a type of reflective writing. “Phenomenologically powerful anecdotes, examples, fragments, selective material from literature, art, and mythology may be tactfully and eloquently integrated and sutured into the text” (Van Manen, 2014, p. 377).
6. Interpretive: is “inceptual” writing, which “articulates deeper, perhaps speculative, and sometimes suspending insights about the human condition and the meaning of life” (Van Manen, 2014 p. 378).

After the thematic reading that was explained in the previous section, anecdotes were cleaned up to make them presentable to the guidelines of academic dissertation writing. While

some accounts needed very little editing because some people are natural storytellers, others needed to be focused into a version that contained a general narrative structure with a beginning, middle and end. I tried to be as genuine as possible to the text, attempting to maintain the authentic voice of the participant and the document.

The prepared anecdotes were then presented within amalgamated research writing practices. I merged elements of the phenomenological writing practices of Van Manen with the three types of anecdotes (portrait, snapshot, and composite) to create a research writing technique called *sandwiched* writing of anecdotes. This is a writing technique used to layer various elements of research writing including analysis, orientating and contextual information, theoretical and relevant literature, anecdotes, and interpretation into one narrative focused report. I worked on and developed this technique while participating in research methods course at UCLA. *Sandwiched vignettes* is an accepted term that was used in the *ED 222C Data Reduction and Analysis* course facilitated by Dr. Kathryn Anderson-Levitt in Spring 2015. Although I was not able to find any specific literature on this specific term, I found it very useful for presenting anecdotes and modified its use in this dissertation writing. As the name indicates, like a sandwich, this approach to writing anecdotes contains multiple layers of ingredients combined and delivered in such manner that not only the consumption of the material is easily taken in, but the combination of ingredients enhances each individual ingredient, thus enriching the participant's anecdote. The basic form and elements of a sandwiched anecdote and the placement of various collected data that I operated for this research is as follows:

1. Analytic point: Guided by a question and/theory. What is the point? Why is the researcher excited about this anecdote? What is the reader supposed to pay attention to?

Can confirm or counter literature/theories. [Guided by main research question or theoretical positioning]

2. Orienting info (context): Context of the people, interview, and/or event/policy. What does the reader need to understand? [Interpretation, observations from journal, documents]
3. Excerpt/Anecdote: This is the edited version of the anecdote. It can also be a smaller In Vivo quote or phrase. [Interviews]
4. Analytic commentary: Interpretation of the anecdote. Including reinstatement of the original analytic point, directing the reader to specific line or words, and how it connects with other data, theories, and/or literature. [Research question, interpretation and theory]

This was the general format that I followed during the final writing phase. For most of the presentation of findings, the anecdotes were broken down into sub-anecdotes and then excerpts from the selective reading approach were used as orienting information to set up or explain each anecdote, discuss themes, and conclude each anecdote, including data analyzed from the conceptual analysis of documents. I felt that it was easier for readers to follow if orienting information included before and after the sub-anecdotes, rather than following strictly to the Van Manenian process of large sections of anecdotes followed by large sections of phenomenological writings. Overall I found that this layered approach to research writing seamlessly blended research questions, theories and literature, narrative of the anecdote, contextual situations, and interpretation that oriented the reader, preserved the voice of the participant and the interpretations of the researcher, while engaging the reader in a familiar anecdote form. The following three chapters (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) present the findings from the data and are offered in various forms of sandwiched anecdotes.

## **CHAPTER 6: REVOLUTION AS A CRITICAL PEDAGOGICAL WORKSHOP: INFLUENCES, SPACES, AND CHALLENGES OF PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP WITHIN THE CONTENTIOUS AFTERMATH OF THE JANUARY 25 EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION**

This chapter is grounded in the notion that revolutionary change can provide a process of learning. Paulo Freire (1996) argues, “Citizenship is a social invention that demands a certain political knowledge, a knowledge born of the struggle for and reflection on citizenship. The struggle for citizenship generates a knowledge indispensable for its invention” (p. 113). When learning is considered outside the realm of the classroom and into everyday life, it provides the basis for understanding how revolutionary processes and social and political movements can be a moral and political education that teaches and shapes the way people think and act as citizens. I maintain that revolutionary transitions, such as the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution, can be a critical pedagogical workshop, where citizens engage with new forms of political intervention and resistance, critically reflecting upon consciousness-raising events, and experimenting with relationships between agency and power. In the context of revolutionary processes, “critical pedagogy would take on the task of regenerating both sense of social and political agency and a critical subversion of dominant power itself” (Giroux, 2004, p. 33).

It is from the premise of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution as a critical pedagogical workshop that I ask the first research question, to what extent has the experiences of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution and subsequent socio-political events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and educators in Egypt? To address this question, qualitative data collected from eight participants and various documents are used to explore themes related to influences, spaces, and challenges of participatory citizenship within the contentious aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution. Participants learn what it

means to be a citizen from various sources and how to practice those ideas in multiple spaces. Moreover, the Revolution and subsequent socio-political events, in combination with other influences, have significantly impacted the perceptions of participatory citizenship for participants. However, participants currently face a number of challenges to participatory citizenship in Egypt.

### **6.1 Participant Profiles and Perspectives of Citizenship**

I selected the eight participants as a sample of the 24 participants for four reasons. First, I selected two participants that represent each category of participant (student, researcher, professor, and instructor). Second, the sample represents a range of citizenship perspectives from active and critical to more passive, and a range of ideas about the revolution. For example, Sofia states she “wishes the Revolution didn’t happen,” while Mahmoud said the “Revolution significantly impacted [his] understanding of citizenship.” Third, the sample represents a range of identities including age, gender, religious belief, political ideological perspective, field of study, and experience in public and private universities. And last, the sample was selected for deep levels of experiential insight into related topics.

There are four items to consider regarding the profiles of participants. First, all participants are Egyptian citizens. Second, it is important to note the connection between biography and perspectives and actions of citizenship. Third, to conceal the identity of participants and maintain confidentiality, all of the names are pseudonyms and all of the geographical places and universities they are associated with are intentionally left vague (e.g., public university, private foreign university, North America). Last, I include religious identity because American academics are obsessed with using the lens of religion to analyze Arab

communities. Additionally, including religious identity shows the range of participants interviewed, and literature demonstrates that religion plays an important role in influencing perceptions of citizenship in the Arab world (Parolin, 2009). The following are the profiles of participants:

*Sofia.* Sofia is in her early twenties, a Coptic Christian, and is in her senior year of her undergraduate studies in economics at a private foreign university. Sofia grew up in a Gulf country and returned to Cairo to pursue higher education. After graduation, she plans to work for a multinational company or begin a graduate program, as she states, “hopefully abroad.”

Sofia’s definition of citizenship focuses on loyalty. She states, “To be an Egyptian citizen is to be loyal to Egypt...I consider myself an Egyptian citizen because I am very loyal to Egypt.”

Loyalty for Sofia means defending the image of Egypt. To the point, she declares:

If somebody, an outsider came to me and told me that Egypt is no longer good, it has no future, as an Egyptian citizen, I need to defend that. I need to be loyal to my country no matter where it is going, and I must have hope in it.

Regardless of her loyalty to Egypt, she admits that within the aftermath of the Revolution, it is difficult to remain hopeful. She ponders, “I might be losing that hope.” The losing of hope, which may be responsible for Sofia’s eagerness to look for work and education abroad, sets up a seeming tension between her willingness to look for work and education abroad and her later responses condemning Egyptians who are critical of Egypt:

When I meet people [abroad], who are Egyptian citizens, they still have the passport but they are, they just gave up on Egypt and they publically criticize it. I do not consider them Egyptian citizens anymore.

Apparently for Sofia, Egyptians must remain loyal to Egypt no matter the circumstances. From her perspective, Egyptians with animosity towards Egypt, especially those living abroad, should not be considered citizens. Additionally, as I will demonstrate within the thematic findings

below, Sofia represents a rather passive understanding and practice of citizenship and views the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution as having negatively impacted her life.

**Mahmoud.** Mahmoud is in his late twenties and currently working on a master's degree in public policy from a private foreign university. His combined undergrad degree was in political science and history from the same university. Mahmoud is Muslim and comes from a military family. He has a complex understanding of citizenship that includes ideas of pluralism, equality, opportunity, rights, and freedoms. Mahmoud explains:

Citizenship is a social contract that reinforces the idea of pluralism, and giving the incentive for many people—in millions—to actually be able to advance and grow and to become better individuals and families. For me it also reinforces the idea that the social contract should be based on equal opportunity for everyone. So everyone should first get access to education, health, and all the basic rights. Of course there will be competition, after getting the same opportunity. Politically speaking it is of course all sorts of freedoms...I want every citizen to have the right to voice their opinion, to have a say in the public sphere, giving everyone a voice.

However, Mahmoud realizes the limitations of his idealistic understanding of citizenship within the Egyptian context. Mahmoud critically explains the complex relationship of the ruling bargain in Egypt between the ruling military and the rights of Egyptian citizens, arguing, “It is a deeply rooted idea that needs to change.” Mahmoud states:

The reality is Egypt is a paternalistic society. It is pretty much dominated by the military men, even socially and culturally. People believe the military is the only establishment that is keeping the country safe and it has been there for ages. It [the belief that the military is the only political option] is something that needs a lot of planning and communication and education. It is a deeply rooted idea that needs to change. But this is reality. So a lot of people give up their rights because they think by doing that they will get safety and peace, which is definitely not the case. So our citizenship is being practically robbed by the military.

Mahmoud's perceptions point to two tensions. The first is the tension between ideal citizenship, or a form of citizenship that he is struggling for, and the reality of social, political, and cultural constraints of citizenship in Egypt. The second, more obvious tension is between Mahmoud's critical stance towards the military and his familiar connections to the military. Surprisingly he

shared that his family agrees with his perspective.

Mahmoud represents activist citizenship. He is active in formal and non-formal politics on and off campus. During his undergraduate degree he was the president of the student union. Currently, he leads an NGO that uses technology to improve education, increase political awareness and fights poverty. Mahmoud is also a director of an organization that pressures politics and society for what he describes as “the goals of the Revolution.” Additionally, he is a co-founder of a group that campaigns for basic rights of citizens. After the interview, I was informed that his education-based NGO was closed down due to harsh financial restriction placed upon on civil society by the government. This was a devastating blow for Mahmoud and his hope not only for the future of Egypt, but also for his commitment to practicing his ideal citizenship.

*Deena.* Deena is in her mid-twenties and a Ph.D. student from a public university in Cairo. Currently, she is conducting fieldwork research on student activism and student movements in Egypt. Deena is Coptic Christian, who received both her undergraduate and master’s degrees in political science from the same public university. Deena’s interpretation of citizenship stresses rights and duties, while upholding ideas of equality and anti-discrimination under the law, the state and its institutions. Answering the question what does citizenship mean to her, she states:

I have certain rights guaranteed by law and I have certain duties as a citizen. And that the law, the state, and its institutions see me as an Egyptian citizen, and do not see my gender, religion, or where I come from, or my social background.

Deena presents an interesting story because she has a deep understanding of citizenship and activism, but her recognized practice of citizenship has been in the form of voting. She has not participated in any community campaigns or public demonstration, even though she believes they are a “true form of citizenship.” However, she does view her research as a form of

practicing citizenship.

**Maha.** Maha is in her early thirties and is from the Delta region, where she received an undergraduate degree in English literature from a public university. After completing her bachelor's degree, she moved to Cairo and received a master's in education from a private foreign university. Currently, Maha works at a research and resource center for student development and outreach at the same private foreign university. She also volunteers with youth groups in marginalized communities in Cairo.

Maha's perception of citizenship focuses on involvement and awareness in social and political life to bring about positive change, as well as ideas of co-existence. She states:

For me citizenship is actually the involvement of the individual, in whatever country, to be really involved in the social life, in the political life. To really stir or bring about change, positive change and to be able to have enough knowledge to change or adapt deep-rooted wrong perceptions of how we as citizens should co-exist with each other.

Maintaining her ideas of active citizen involvement, she shares that there are opportunities to participate in community service, but they are limited in their approaches and impacts.

Additionally, similar to Mahmoud, she acknowledges the limitations for citizens "to be actively engaged in the decision making and taking processes on the political scene here in Egypt," and recognizes the need to change that. Maha also stresses an awareness or consciousness of being a citizen. She states, "actually, to realize your role as a citizen, means to know your duties towards your country, as well as your rights from your country/government." Maha's case is significant because she not only brings a critical understanding of citizenship merging awareness and social and political engagement, but also has a passion for helping and improving the life of disenfranchised and underserved youth and children. Additionally, Maha brings a positive spirituality to citizenship (to be discussed below), which I believe helps her stay motivated and hopeful as a citizen.

**Karima.** Karima is in her early forties, Muslim, and is a professor of education from a private foreign university. She also holds another professor position at a public university in Cairo. Karima is from Cairo, completed her undergrad and master's degree in education from a public university and received her Ph.D. in education from a university in North America. Karima's definition of citizenship emphasizes loyalty and responsibilities through one's honest and hard work. She also includes ideas of tolerance across classes and genders, and the balance between rights and responsibilities. Karima explains citizenship includes:

Proudness, of course, and to give to the country. I tend to look at it from the perspective of my responsibility to my nation, more than what I expect from the state. So, being a loyal citizen means to be honest in my work, to work hard, to always try to give to others, to improve myself, to more competent. And you can talk about insure social justice, which is a big term, but in this case under the notion of being responsible means to address these issues as much as you could through your own work. And to be tolerant towards others, poor, rich, men, women... It is definitely the balance between rights and responsibilities toward one's nation and the world.

Although Karima includes the world in her idea of citizenship, she emphasizes that citizenship needs to be grounded in the nation. Similar to Sofia, Karima has a strong sense of loyalty to Egypt, but Karima specifies the loyalty as part of her work and responsibility, rather than simply defending Egypt. As will be presented below, Karima shares negative experiences within the aftermath of the revolution with Sofia. Additionally, different from any other participants, Karima includes her role as a "good mother" as being a part of a responsible citizen.

**Mariam.** Mariam is in her late thirties, Muslim, and is an assistant professor of journalism at a private foreign university. Although she was born and grew up in a Gulf country, she shared that she has Egyptian citizenship and declares, "I am still Egyptian." To explain her Egyptian-ness, she says:

It is because my family, by extension, they are Egyptian. They speak Egyptian; they don't speak [the dialect of the Gulf country]. We eat Egyptian food. We watch Egyptian movies and TV shows. When we lived in [the Gulf country] we went to Egypt every

summer. So growing up this is how I felt what citizenship meant to me. You may be distant, but by heart, you are close to where your family comes from.

Mariam attended an Egyptian private university for her undergrad degree in communications, but went abroad to North America to pursue a graduate degree in journalism. Although she did not plan on staying past the completion of her graduate program, she remained in North America for six years. During that time, she secured a job in journalism and ended-up reporting on the Egyptian revolution for a foreign media service.

At first, Mariam, similar to Karima, stresses *jus soli*, the geographically and national dimensions of citizenship. She states:

The first thing that comes to mind about citizenship, that you were physically born in that spot of the world. For me, citizenship is, well if you born in that country you get that citizenship, you became a citizen. That is the first idea that I get.

Mariam then includes the importance of service in citizenship, and connects being Egyptian with helping. She shares, “Of course there is way more to being a citizen than where you were born... When you help, you feel more Egyptian. You feel like you have a say in something.” Mariam also recognizes the complexity of perceptions of citizenship. She acknowledges that it is an “evolving thing,” and that there are “various factors that come in play,” such as people’s families, experiences, travel, and the country that one lives in. Mariam states:

I think our perceptions of citizenship for each person is really different. It’s hard that everyone sees citizenship one way or another. And I think it is also an evolving thing for each person. And it involves how they grew up, where they grew up, where they were born, how their family raised them, and what experiences they had in their lives, did they travel or did they not travel, and the country itself. There are a lot of factors that come into play, when it comes to defining citizenship...because each person has their own way of thinking about it.

Furthermore, Mariam contextualized the problems of citizenship within the Egyptian context and compares them to her experiences in North America. She explains:

I don’t think a lot of Egyptians have the time to think about the way they see citizenship. They are too consumed with the everyday problems and life that they do not have the

time about the way they see their relationship with where they come from and what citizenship is to them. They don't have time to do that. I found that in [North America], because of the nature of the place, and the pace, you have a lot of time to contemplate, meditate, walk, and think and spend time with yourself.

Mariam points to the concept of time as being an important factor on people's ability to reflect on citizenship.

*Ahmed.* Ahmed's profile will be thoroughly presented in the next chapter.

*Nadia.* Nadia's profile will be thoroughly presented in the next chapter.

## **6.2 Thematic Findings**

To construct and support the following themes, I use In Vivo codes (Saldana, 2013, p. 4) excerpts from a hermeneutic phenomenological thematic analysis (Van Manen, 2014, pp. 319-323) of the data. The excerpts from each participant's perceptions of experiences are combined with the perceptions of other participants, in addition to relevant literature and brief interpretations, which combine to formulate each theme. The perceptions are organized in thematic sections including perceptions before the Revolution, impacts of the Revolution on perceptions of citizenship, influences on perceptions of citizenship, spaces of participation, and challenges to participatory citizenship.

### **6.2.1 Before the Revolution**

Participants shared their perspectives connected to struggles of participatory citizenship prior to the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. Although previous research has been devoted to exploring various forms of participation and activism prior to the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution (Bayat, 2010, Beinín & Vairel, 2011, El-Mahdi & Marfleet, 2009, Osman, 2010), the participants provide experiential insight into the complexities and limits of participatory citizenship in Egyptian society before the Revolution.

*Lack of knowledge.* According to the participants, before the revolution there was a lack of knowledge regarding how to politically and civically participate in Egypt. Participants explained that people's daily concerns took precedent over any form of participation as an Egyptian citizen. Additionally, the participants attributed the lack of knowledge to the failures in an educational system that did not offer active citizenship education. For example, Mariam complained that in general people in Egypt lacked based knowledge of Egyptian politics and politicians, and that the focus of politics was solely on ousted President Mubarak. She states:

A lot of people didn't even know the name of the prime minister, we only knew the president, because he was the face that we saw for many years. I remember I used to complain about that, before the Revolution. I was not involved in politics, but at least I knew some information because I read and kept informed...I used to say, I feel that everyone is so ignorant, they don't even know the name of the prime minister, they don't know the parties, they don't vote. How are we going to be better if we are not involved in politics...I remembered at the time, a lot of people my age did not know anything about politics in Egypt or elsewhere.

Mariam continues and explains that people are too consumed with their daily lives and are overwhelmed with "daily struggles" to be concerned about political involvement and politics (a theme that also comes up in current challenges to participatory citizenship).

When participants were interested in participating in formal politics or volunteer work, they felt that they did not know how to participate. Maha states, "I didn't know how, but I always wanted to participate in a political party or maybe in like community service." Maha cites the lack of participation know-how to limitations within the education that the government provided. She argues, "Our government education does not promote this part [being an active citizen] of life as students." Similarly, Mariam states, "We were programmed by our education or something not to be involved in politics." The limited knowledge about political and civic participation prior to the revolution, was not only connected to education and people's

overwhelming concerns with daily struggles, but also to different social and political mechanisms that restricted various forms of participation for Egyptian citizens.

***Culture of fear.*** The lack of knowledge regarding participation may be connected to a deeper culture of fear that tended to permeate Egyptian society before the revolution and made people hesitant about social and political participation, especially actions that were or could be misconstrued as being critical of the Mubarak regime and its policies. It was difficult for people to ask other people, especially strangers, about how and where to politically or civically participate. People feared government surveillance, detention, beatings and harassments by police, or social and workplace retributions (Osman, 2010). The internalization of this culture of fear stemmed greatly from a fear of whom that person might tell, which often prevented or restricted people from having constructive conversations about politics and crucial issues outside of their homes. Maha shared, “Before the Revolution people were like very scared of even having causal conversations about what’s going on in the country.” She shared that there was a sense that people were frustrated with Mubarak especially closer to the Revolution, but “there was the fear of talking openly with other people that you don’t know.”

***Government corruption.*** Participants also described the blatant corruption that existed in Egypt prior to the Revolution. This corruption created a sense of hopelessness that nothing could be done, and a distrust in the system that forced many Egyptians to retract from political and civic life. Maha shared that the last 15 years of the Mubarak regime “were horrible. The gangs around him ruled the country. The country was ruled by his sons, not him.” Deena also pointed to corruption in the country. She shares her experiences voting in the 2010 Parliamentary elections:

It was the first time that I had the right to vote and I saw the corruption and the electoral fraud. When I was voting the lady who was giving my ballot told me to vote for this

person who was in the NDP [the now-banned political party of Mubarak]. So I didn't feel that my vote really counted.

Similar to Deena, participants felt that formal politics was not an option for social change. Their voice was not being heard in the formal political arena, so it was not worth pursuing in the time of Mubarak.

***Lack of economic opportunities.*** The lack of economic opportunities available to young people in Egypt prior to the revolution forced many to look for educational and employment opportunities outside of Egypt. For example, Mariam describes her thought process behind moving to North America to pursue a graduate degree:

I just wanted better opportunities in life in terms of career. Despite all of the problems that Egypt was going through the past decades, I was really attached by heart to Egypt. It was heartbreaking to leave, but I had to because I had the opportunity and I had to give it a shot, and see where it would take me.

Although Mariam has now returned to Egypt after six years living abroad, the sentiment of looking for economic opportunities outside of Egypt still persists amongst many young people. Limited economic opportunities may prevent citizens from contributing to their local and national communities and may force them to participate abroad. Nonetheless, economic issues such as unemployment and under-unemployment became a rallying point for the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution.

### **6.2.2 Impacts of the Revolution on perceptions of citizenship**

It was difficult to separate the following themes, as the participants shared them in an interconnected way. Overall, the themes confirm that for the participants, the January 25, 2011 Revolution had a significant impact of their perceptions and actions of citizenship.

***Upsurge in participation.*** After the revolution, all participants explained that there was an upsurge in participation and a willingness to be engaged the political and civic life in Egypt.

People felt like they needed to be politically and socially engaged, to work for a better Egypt. For example, Ahmed (who will be introduced in the next chapter) felt that the revolution motivated him to “do something more.” He states, “I wanted to do something, to feel some self-worth, to do some good. I felt that I was created to do more than being someone who eats, drinks, studies, finds a job, gets married and have children.”

Sofia states that the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution initially made her happy because she felt “disappointed” that Egypt’s natural resources were not being used to their potential, and if the community and government were “well prepared and engaged,” this could have an effect of the development of Egypt. Sofia believes that revolution could be a chance for people in Egypt “to do something.”

Mahmoud describes the revolution as a motivator for him to be involved in Egypt. He states the revolution “was one of the biggest motivations for me to go out there and study and being involved. It was a huge, huge...It gave everyone a huge leap of faith in the country.”

Deena describes Egyptians had more public presence and taking ownership of the streets. She explains:

The whole year after 2011, people started to feel like they owned the streets. I personally did not participate in the cleaning campaigns where people were cleaning the streets...I felt that this was true citizenship, because people felt that they truly belonged to this country, to this state.

Similar to Deena’s perspective of people “feel like they owned the streets,” Maha explains that people were present and had a presence in Egypt. The notion of “presence” aligns with what Bayat (2013) described as the “art of presence.” Maha shares, “when the Revolution happened we were here. We were actively and physically engaged in the political and social life in Egypt, and we were also actively online like on Facebook, twitter and all of these new technologies.” This quote alludes to the various forms of participation that were occurring in

Egypt after the revolution in the political, social, and virtual spaces. Additionally, Maha mentions that, “we [Egyptian youth] were promised by elderly government figures that there would be more youth participation in the political scene in Egypt. So we were excited and ready for that.”

Mariam stated that she moved back to Egypt from North America in part because of the revolution. She wanted to be involved in a group that would contribute to Egyptian society. Mariam also said that she met a few Egyptians living abroad “who actually moved back to be active. And some of them moved back because of the revolution.” To summarize, for the participants, at least initially, the Revolution regenerated their social and political agency.

***Greater sense of belonging.*** For many participants, the Revolution instilled a greater sense of belonging and appreciation for Egypt. For example, after voting in the first constitutional referendum in March 2011, Deena states:

I remembered when I came home after voting, I posted on Facebook, ‘Today is the first day Egyptians can call themselves citizens.’ I felt that for the first time voting actually means something. So after January 25<sup>th</sup> I felt that I was a citizen.

Karima also felt this deeper connection to Egypt. She states that there was an increase “to the level of my feelings of belonging and being an Egyptian.” It made her recognize the “importance of having a nation to belong to,” and made her feel that Egypt was her home and country.

Similarly, Mariam explains, “The Revolution in Egypt played a part in my perception of citizenship.” Watching the Revolution unfold while she was living in another country made

Mariam want to be a part of the change that was happening. She states:

At the time, I felt that I wanted to be part of it. I wanted to be physically in Egypt. I was dying to be here. So I don’t know if you call that citizenship or what? I felt that I wanted be here and be a part of that important changes in the Egypt that is my country as well.

The Revolution nurtured a greater sense of belonging for the participants which can be connected to the upsurge in wanting to politically and civically participate as well as encouraged a need a to

become more socially and politically aware. The renewed commitment to participate was intertwined with a greater identity to the country.

***Greater sense of social and political awareness.*** Participants shared that they experienced a thirst for knowledge about politics and social issues following the Revolution. For the participants, the Revolution fostered a desire for a greater sense of awareness. For example, Mahmoud states the Revolution was “a motivation to study and learn more.” Mariam describes a sudden attention given to politics, society, and international issues, “So, suddenly there was interest in politics. Suddenly there was interest in knowing about what’s happening, politically and socially speaking. And of course the world’s involvement in it.” For most participants in the study, the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution appears to have nurtured a political and social consciousness motivating them to learn more while becoming more actively engaged in forms of participatory citizenship in Egypt.

***Greater sense of hope.*** Participants revealed that they experienced a feeling of hope after the Revolution, and that many things seemed possible. Mahmoud states after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, “you have so much hope...It gave everyone a huge leap of faith in the country.” Focusing on the youth, Maha connects hope and optimism with making Egypt a better place:

When the first Revolution happened, we, the youth of Egypt, felt completely inspired and had this huge hope and very optimistic about the future and we were very enthusiastic and were ready to do whatever it takes to make this country a better place where we can live.

Participants believed not only in their country, but had hope that they can do something, that is was now possible that they can participate in some way to make Egypt better. For instance, Mariam declares, “Because of the Revolution, we now see that we [Egyptians] can do something.” The hope and optimism that participants had for Egypt, also extended to a deeper sense of community and connection with other Egyptians.

***Greater sense of community.*** Participants felt that they were unified with other Egyptians, even those with very different backgrounds from themselves. There was a willingness to listen to other people with different worldviews and there were public spaces where connections and dialogue could occur. For example, Mahmoud shared his story of traveling around Egypt to different governorates after the Revolution working on mobilizing support for a new political party, as well as working with a social movement. He explains that after the Revolution, there were opportunities to organize and have freedom of association. He states he was able to see the “real Egypt.” For Mahmoud, “Egypt is not Cairo;” it is much more. Traveling through the different governorates granted him the opportunity to meet many different people with different mind-sets. Mahmoud describes his experiences meeting and seriously talking with other Egyptians as a “great eye-opener,” that made his perception of Egypt “completely different.”

To conclude this section, for participants, the above findings within the themes demonstrate the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution had a significant impact on their perspectives of participatory citizenship. However, for many participants, the greater sense of community and willingness to listen to different points of view, the sense of hope and optimism, the desire to be aware, the sense of belonging, and the upsurge of political and social participation described have been significantly challenged within the socio-political aftermath of the Revolution. The current challenges to participatory citizenship that participants discussed will be presented in a later section ([6.2.5](#)). While this section is dedicated to presenting the findings that support the argument that the Revolution had momentous impacts to participants’ perceptions of citizenship, the next section is devoted to complicating this argument by including competing influences on perceptions of citizenship.

### 6.2.3 Influences on perceptions of citizenship

It would be false to assume that the sole source of influence for citizenship education and perspectives of participatory citizenship in Egypt for the past five years was the January 25, 2011 Revolution. Although the Revolution was a life-changing event from many participants, in addition to the January 25, 2011 Revolution, the participants describe various other influences on their perceptions of citizenship. Although this is not an exhaustive list of all the possible influences on Egyptian perceptions of citizenship, the following themes are representative of the experiences of the participants in this study. Furthermore, the narratives in this section point to the complex nature and ongoing process of how, where, and from whom people learn and develop ideas and actions of citizenship. Additionally, based upon the themes presented in this section, there is recognition that perceptions of citizenship are not relegated to the being shaped by formal classroom experiences alone. People learn about and are influenced by various educational experiences as they dialectically navigate—being shaped and shaping—spaces of formal (the university), non-formal (educational institutions outside formal systems) and informal citizenship education (family, friends, coworkers, the media) (Coombs et al., 1973).

***Family.*** Some participants declared that their families had important impact on their perceptions of citizenship. Participants shared that their families, and parents specifically, taught them how to be thankful of what of they have and not waste, treat other people with respect, how to give to the less fortunate, and many other basic moral foundations of citizenship virtues. For example, Nadia (who will be introduced in the next chapter) explains that her grandparents lived during a time of war in a neighbor Arab country and they knew depravation, persecution, and hardships. Through those experiences, her grandparents learned more tolerant and uplifting beliefs that they passed down to her father, who in turn passed down what she describes as “ideologies of equality, of freedom, of expressing yourself.” Nadia says she always tries to

practice these “ideologies.” Additionally, some participants comment on how open-minded their families are and they can discuss politics with them without any tensions or issues. Mahmoud, who says, “Unlike most military families, we agree on politics,” goes so far as to suggest that “I hate to say it, but they [his parents] could be influenced by my own ideas.”

Contradicting these perceptions, there are many participants who state that, especially in the wake of the June 30, 2013 uprising and the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi, there are tensions between the political beliefs and ideas of that they hold and those of their family members. Although Sofia feels that she is not constrained in her discussions of politics with her parents, she states, “I feel that other Egyptian girls or guys who are in my age might feel that they cannot talk about political issues because they would get blacklisted and want to avoid that.” Likewise, Maha admits that she cannot talk openly about politics with her parents anymore. She points to a generational divide that is occurring throughout Egypt. Maha explains that the “elderly” have “deep-rooted, decayed ideas” about how they understand youth. She declares, “There is a split between us and our parents at home.” Corroborating this generational divide between children and parents, Mariam’s following narrative points to how her and her father disagree on many levels:

Even though I try to be neutral, you are human, sometimes you are subjective, sometimes you are leaning towards one side, and you might defend it, and it turns into an intense conversation. And also, we are so different in terms of our worldviews and even in our understandings of religion. The way I see Islam, is very different than the way he sees Islam, even though he is my dad. The way I see Egypt, is way different than the way he see it. The way I see politics or how countries should be run are very different than the way he see it. I try not to be involved in conversations, and when I do, I listen and I’ll nod as if I agree with what he is saying, but deep down maybe I don’t. So I try to avoid that confrontation because it just leads to nowhere.

The idea of avoiding parental confrontation and self-censoring by participants can also be seen in the broader Egyptian society. Deena expounded that there was a popular saying that was circulating in Cairo during the events of Mohamed Mahmoud Street in November 2011. The

saying went, “Egyptian youth are not afraid to face the police in Tahrir Square, but they are afraid of telling their parents they are going to demonstrations.” Furthermore, Deena brilliantly sums up the issue of generational divide in Egypt and complicates the issue by including power and gender dynamics into the conversation:

I think that there are also so many power relations within the family. So I think that there is a clear generational conflict. And especially for women, the relationship with the father and the parents in general, it is not usually a safe space with love and understanding where people can talk about...I would think that people who cannot talk about politics cannot talk about other things like their love-life, their friends, their hopes, or what they do...theoretically the family is the cornerstone of Egyptian society, but I think you can find other spaces that are much more free, and much more safe than the family. Of course it depends on the family.

In summation, for some participants, family can have an important influence on the perceptions of citizenship. For others, there are stronger sources of citizenship education that are found outside of the family. Therefore, family influence on perceptions of citizenship may not be that straightforward, especially during times of great political and social turmoil.

**Formal Education.** Formal education (schools and universities) can be viewed as one mechanism—at the disposal of the state—used to influence the perceptions and practices of citizenship. Although many participants generally criticized the higher education system in Egypt, all the participants in this chapter attributed their education as an influence on their perceptions of citizenship. Participants cite specific courses they took, professors they had, and authors they were exposed to, which had a significant influence on their ideas of citizenship. Participants felt they were “lucky” for having a certain teacher or pursuing a particular field that fostered an awareness of citizenship problems as well as a deep insight into more active models of citizenship. For example, Deena who attended a public university discussed the influence her university experience had on her development of citizenship ideas, but cautions that her experience cannot be generalized. Deena states:

So for me I can say, my awareness of my citizenship was elaborated during the years of being a student. [However] I am not sure if this can be generalized. It is related to the very specific field of study that I did, and I am not sure that it goes for everyone. It really depends on which teacher you get, and how much attention you pay to your studies. Also, I had my friends who attended [public university], who were really interested in politics, who would talk and discuss about different problems and different solutions. So yeah, I can say that my citizenship was formed at [public university], but I am not sure if this could be a generalized experience.

In the quote, Deena also emphasizes her friends, “who were really interested in politics,” that contributed the development of her “awareness of citizenship.” Therefore, the peer group that a person maintains and the social aspect of formal education—specifically within universities—is another important component that can greatly influence perceptions of citizenship. On the one hand, participants cite their involvement in formal student clubs, such as Model African Union and Student Union, and other clubs dedicated more towards charity work and service learning as crucial to their growth of citizenship. While on the other hand, participants such as Deena reference more informal groups of peers discussing critical issues between classes impacting their ideas of citizenship. Nonetheless, whether receiving a banking model (Freire, 2007) of citizenship education or more active models of citizenship education, formal education has an important influence on perceptions of citizenship.

**Gender.** For some participants, being a woman in Egypt forced them to learn about and challenge social norms around gender roles, which ultimately influenced their perceptions of citizenship. Nadia provides important insight in her gender influencing her perceptions of citizenship. Nadia shares that as a girl, she had “negative things” occur in her life that inspired her to want to change her life. She states, “I always wanted things to change in my life,” and explains that as a woman, in Egypt and in her community, there are “certain boundaries or taboos.” Nadia continues, “I questioned why do they exist. And why is it that way.” Her

experiences as a woman in Egypt motivated her to learn about relevant topics from various feminists' perspectives. Nadia states:

I started to read a lot—we have a lot of Egyptian feminists—to hear what their point of view was. But I always wanted to formulate my own point of view to come up with my own ideas, so I like to read...So I kept reading, but from other people from around the world and to see how things are.

Nadia's desire to learn more about feminists' perspectives in Egypt and elsewhere and wanting to formulate her own opinion on the subject has manifested into her involvement working with women's groups in marginalized communities in Cairo.

***Religion and spirituality.*** Some participants shared their perceptions of religious faith, as an inspiration for participatory citizenship. Religion can motivate citizens to be altruistically engaged in their communities and teach them a morality of caring and community service. For example, Maha states:

So growing up, I had this passion that I really want to help people. I started to develop these ideals on different levels like, if we are talking from a religious point of view, eventually Allah will judge everyone against their actions.

Religion can also create an introspective and self-reflection that is vital to appreciate what ones has, and to develop empathy, which also can encourage a greater sense of agency. To continue with Maha:

When I am riding the bus, and I see someone with impaired sight or something, it hits me what are you complaining about, you have eyes and can see, Hamdullah [thank God]. Allah gave you this. So then I take it from there, I have two arms, I have two legs. Hamdullah, I'm healthy, I have parents, I have a house. Lots of people don't have these things. So I start to think what do I have and what other people do not have, and I take it from there to act, to be involved.

Additionally, as mentioned within the section on her profile, Maha uses her faith as a way to cope with the social and political difficulties she is experiencing. She explains that no matter how hectic and overwhelming things get in her life, or when she hears about her friends getting arrested, she always feels better and can better deal with the stress after she prays. For

participants like Maha, whether Coptic or Muslim, religion appears to be a positive motivating influence that shapes ideas and actions of citizenship. However, in the section on challenges, Maha discusses some of her issues with the religious establishment in Egypt.

***Traveling.*** International and domestic travel can have an impact on people's perceptions of citizenship. As shared in the previous sections on impacts of the Revolution, Mahmoud was able to travel around Egypt and claimed, "Egypt is not this, it's not Cairo." Through travel, Mahmoud was able to see for himself the diversity within what he calls the "real Egypt," which not only gave him a deeper connection to his country, but also gave him a broader sense of his country, which was important to his work in political campaigns as well as his work in the educational NGO.

For participants, international travel provided first-hand experiences of how other societies are organized and how citizens engage with their communities and their government. Deena explains, "having lived abroad for a while makes me see how different people practice citizenship and define their relationships with the state." Similarly, Mariam shares her story as an international student in a Western country:

My perception of citizenship also changed when I left. When I was in [said country], it was a confusing time for me. I was having trouble defining citizenship, and what is home and where is home. Because as an immigrant, if you are a permanent resident, you are treated as a citizen. You get all the rights, free education, free health care and the social rights. When I joined the master's program, I paid like any other [citizen], not like an international student. The only difference I felt was the voting. I did not have the right to vote. But when I first moved there, I didn't know the politicians anyway, I didn't know the parties anyway, so for me I didn't feel excluded. But I know a lot of immigrants who cared about politics, wanted to vote but they couldn't. But anything else in life, I was treated as a [national citizen], I was seen as a [national citizen].

After initially feeling confused about her citizenship identity, she eventually felt that she was "treated" and "seen" as a national citizen. Although Mariam did not have political rights, the social benefits of citizenship that she received were so strong they made her feel included and

accepted as a national citizen. For reflective and observant travelers, more than tourist, traveling may provide comparative possibilities for ideas and actions of citizenship. Travel can provoke people to think: if *they* can do it, maybe *we* can do it too, or maybe *our* government and societies can work in a similar manner.

#### **6.2.4 Spaces of participation**

A critical dimension of the Arab uprisings has been citizens claim over and creation of public space, seeking to “remake both the moral and the physical worlds in which they want to thrive as free citizens. (Sadiki, 2015 p. 4) Spaces of participation are dialectically interwoven with influences on participation. As participants contribute to and are actively involved in various spaces of participation, they learn from and are influenced by their experiences within those various spaces. The following section summarizes the multiple ways participants practice their ideas of citizenship. Participants describe their experiences participating in various formal, non-formal and informal spaces in Egypt.

*Participation in formal spaces.* Participants discuss their involvement in formal politics. Voting in elections and referendums was a common activity. Additionally, participants talked about participating in party politics, such as volunteering and attending strategy sessions for new parties. For instance, Mahmoud shared his work on nascent lobbying and advocacy campaigns, building and mobilizing support for policy alternatives. However, as will be discussed in the following section on challenges, participants cite the limitations of participating in formal Egyptian formal politics.

Participants pointed to the lack of a parliament (Egypt did not have a Parliament from July 2013 to January 2016), the frenzied political environment of the continuous emerging and disbanding of political parties and alliances, election fraud, and frequent elections causing voter

fatigue all complicating participation in formal politics. Therefore, many participants share their skepticism and frustration of pursuing formal politics for any significant reform. For instance, Deena argues, “Sometimes voting does not really have an influence, so I would say that demonstrations and sit-ins are another way of practicing citizenship.” Furthermore, many participants share the sentiment that is presented by Ahmed (see the next chapter), “I do not have anybody to represent me.”

***Participation in non-formal spaces.*** There are many activities that the participants were engaged with in non-formal groups. Participation in local and international NGOs, local religious charity organizations, and student clubs were the most common activities that participants were involved with. They view participating in these non-formal spaces as a part of the way they practice citizenship. Additionally, participants shared their involvement in social movements and various forms of activism that included various public actions such as protests, demonstrations, and sit-ins. Many of the participants were involved with groups whose activities centered on education projects and working with “street children,” disenfranchised youth, and girls and women. Mahmoud co-created an online educational platform to promote critical thinking, community building, and civic engagement. However, even within the non-formal spaces many participants share their experiences with various challenges to participating in these spaces (see Section [6.2.5](#)).

***Participation in informal spaces.*** Participants discussed practicing their ideas of citizenship by opening up discussions with their family and friends, through their work, and through social media. Bayat (2013) would describe these spaces as “immediate domains.” Many participants cite the importance of having a conversation with people about politics and current issues as a way they participate as a citizen. Mariam describes these conversations as the “little

ways” she participates. For Deena, she includes political conversations with her family and friends and posting information on social media. When asked to explain the ways she participates as a citizen, Deena shares, “I think the idea of taking an active interest in what’s happening in Egypt and having a say in the political transformation and talking about politics with my family and friends, and posting things on Facebook.” Similarly, Sofia portrays conversations as “small actions” of citizenship and prefers conversations rather than more public demonstrations of sharing a person’s opinion. She states an important form of participation is “just discussing” politics with people. Sofia continues:

I don’t think you really need to show people what you are doing. But just discussing with people your opinions, being aware of what’s going on in the country, and having discussions with other people about that topic is civic engagement enough. Because I know that such small actions actually have impacts, and I think that’s enough for civic engagement, I don’t think it has to go further than that.

Mariam and Karima exemplify more active forms of participating within informal spaces. In addition to her teaching, Mariam views her work as a journalist as a form of participation. She explains, “So I turned my need for being part of the change, through journalism and by working on stories on Egypt...So I feel that I help by covering the events through my work.” Karima includes in her ideas of participating as a citizen, her work as a professor and her duties a mother and providing any assistance to her students and to her family. Additionally, Karima explains the need to confront people in public if they are acting irresponsible. She explains:

It hurts me, for example to see people throw garbage in the streets. Or don’t act responsibly when they drive in the streets. Sometimes you see individuals interact with each other in a way that I would say, for example, you find an adult and a child in streets. Sometimes I would intervene if I saw this adult person, would harm the child, if the child is working in a shop. Or fights between a man and woman.

This section shows that in the contentious aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution, participants are engaged as citizens in a variety of formal, non-formal and informal spaces. Participants are attempting to redefine space through their perceptions of citizenship. An

important theme that will be the focus of [Chapter 7](#) is that participants perceive teaching and learning as a political act of citizenship. However, the following section points the various challenges that the participants currently experience as they attempt to participate as citizens within social, political and economic turmoil throughout Egypt.

### **6.2.5 ‘Swimming against the stream’: Challenges to participatory citizenship within the socio-political aftermath of January 25, 2011 Egypt**

In the five years since the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution and the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has been faced with many social, political and economic events that severely challenged the growth and sustainability of participatory citizenship.<sup>189</sup> In this section, the themes connected to individual, as well as broad, challenges that participants face are illuminated. Based upon the narratives of the participants, in this section I explore the dialectic tensions between micro (individual) and macro (systemic) challenges to and transformations of participatory citizenship in Egypt. For instance, a quote from Maha exemplifies this tension:

We always talk about start with yourself and the others will follow, and then you are going to make a change. But actually, I think we’re kind romanticizing this by...But people think it is because maybe the youth are lazy, they are not doing anything. But actually it is extremely challenging because we are kind of swimming against the stream. Everyone is heading one way, everyday someone is killed, there are bombings, there are all of these things, and then the job market is very tight right now. And most of our intellectuals became very well known for leaving this country. Yet at the same time, a lot of us don’t want to leave this country. We really want to help. But it overwhelms you to the extent that it negatively affects you and how you feel about yourself and how you feel about this country.

In the quote, Maha alludes to the dilemma between attempting to transform oneself or transform the system. Her point is that it is difficult to change oneself when one feels overwhelmed by the system to begin with, especially when people around you and people you look up to are opting to

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<sup>189</sup> For a timeline of events, see Section 3.2 in Chapter 3.

leave the country. She feels that Egyptians are “swimming against the stream,” referring to the struggle of social and political changes within the aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution.

Complicating where individual and social change needs to occur, some participants argue that participatory citizenship in Egypt is further constrained by two general ideological groups vying for power: secularists versus Islamists. However, a deeper analysis can point contention between two specific groups the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. Although these competing forces dominant politics in Egypt, the socio-political situation in Egypt is more complicated than the contentious politics between two competing ideologies. For example, Mariam says we can divide Egyptians after June 30<sup>th</sup> into three main groups. The first group:

are the people very happy with the current President [al-Sisi]. They are happy with them because they want stability. They see any more conversations on what happened as something that hinders the stability. They have seen how differences in political ideologies have created a gap among people, instead of unify it has widened the gap. So they are done with this, they want everyone to move forward. So they are very defensive with any criticism of the current power, the current government.

She continues and explains the second group:

are the people who are not happy with the current government, who feel that what happened on June 30 is a coup and not a Revolution, and that there is no democracy, and people should do something about it instead of just watching silently. Some are passionate to protest, while others are just hoping.

And the third group are the people “that are happy with June 30 but not happy with the current government at the same time.” The important point about Mariam’s observation is that it blurs the commonly held dichotomy in Egyptian society looking at politics only between two groups; pro-al-Sisi (the first group) and pro-Muslim Brotherhood (the second group). She includes another group (the third group) who are critical of both the direction of the country during Morsi’s presidency and also equally critical of the direction under the military and al-Sisi. However, although typologies are useful, there must be an acknowledgement that humans are more complex than being relegated to three ideological types, and it is often difficult to them fit

neatly within defined boundaries. There are many groups in Egypt competing for power and many ideologies fueling these groups, with schisms within in each of these groups as well (Albrecht, 2013).<sup>190</sup> But, from the pragmatic vantage point, the contentious politics between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood consumes most of the political discourse and general shapes formal politics even among new emergent actors such as some Egyptian youth (Laiq, 2013). Nonetheless, I argue that a more nuanced, multi-layered approach to exploring and analyzing the challenges of participatory citizenship in Egypt is needed.

To begin there must be a contextualized of themes related to the challenges of participatory citizenship. Rather than keeping to the bifurcated narrative of the military versus the Muslim Brotherhood, it might be more productive to situate citizenship within shifting discourses and perspectives of challenges, regardless of political ideologies, which can be seen as commonly held experiences that all participants face and share. Participants shared their general frustrations, their experiences of instability, and their cautious optimism.

***Frustration.*** Participants share their frustration with the aftermath of the Revolution and the past five years in Egypt. Participants felt they are “back to square one” and living in “pre-January 25 Egypt” admitting “there is more of a frustration now in this country.” The description of frustration is a far cry from the optimism, hope, and sense of belonging and community that many participants portrayed within the themes of [Section 6.2.2](#) on the impacts of the Revolution on perceptions of citizenship. Focusing his frustrations with the political system Mahmoud explains:

We are back to the pre-25 January days in lots of ways if not worst. I believe this regime pretty much wants to be totalitarian. Or heading towards a state structure that wants to be involved in every single aspect of life, including sports and arts. It could be because of their mere stupidity, the fact that they never read a history lesson in their life. I always keep saying they are pushing the fast-forward button of the Mubarak era. Instead of doing

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<sup>190</sup> For further discussion on the tensions of citizenship discourse, see Chapter 7.

it in 30 years, they want to do it in three. Which of course for me, I think it will be unsustainable, inshallah [God willing], to their demise. Yeah these really sad days. A lot of my friends are in jail. I am not as fierce as before to simply put it. I am not actually moving out of the country, but I've been thinking about it. Which is something that never crossed my mind before, even before 2011. Because before 2011, things were not shaken up. Ok Egypt is always going to be like that and nothing will change. But after 2011, you have so much hope and now you are back again to that. So it is depressing a lot of people.

Mahmoud's frustration is with what he describes as a regime that "wants to be totalitarian" controlling "every single aspect of life." He also describes the evolution after the Revolution from being hopeful to currently living in "sad days" watching his friend be sent to jail or move out of the country.

***Instability.*** While participants such as Mahmoud question the political progress made after the Revolution, some participants question the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution to begin with and cite the instability and lack of security in its aftermath. The narratives from Sofia and Karima can elucidate this discourse.

For Sofia, she first focuses on the individual level of how the Revolution has affected her. Although when the Revolution occurred she was happy, pointing to some possibilities, she says that she soon realized she was "much more constrained" in what she can do. Her parents are reluctant for her to leave the house and use a taxi after the Revolution. She explains that the Revolution actually took her freedom away, "So I feel that although we were striving for freedom, the instability that we got due to this Revolution, has actually took my freedom away from me."

She then extends the problems of instability to impacting the quality of life in Egypt, focusing her evidence on failures in social services and a flailing economy. She explains:

The quality of living in Egypt has gone down. There are water and electricity shortages. It is very disturbing how the quality of life really went down. There are a lot of people who lost their jobs...it is just sad to see this.

Impacts to the quality of life and issues pertaining to safety for a young woman has provoked Sofia's parents to encourage her to leave Egypt, to which she fully agrees. Sofia argues, "I don't feel safe anymore, and that has constrained my freedom in Egypt." For Sofia, the instability in the aftermath of the Revolution, which has greatly constrained her freedom, has forced Sofia to be very critical of the Revolution, confessing that it has had a negative impact on her life and wishes that it had never happened. Sofia shares:

And in the end, it doesn't feel like we [Egyptians] got what we wanted from the Revolution. So although I am paying a lot of costs, I am not getting what I wanted to get. It's definitely a negative impact, sometimes I feel, I wish that January 25<sup>th</sup> never happened. It would have made my life easier.

Sofia's rather negative image of the Revolution compared to some of the other participants may be connected to her rather narrow understanding of citizenship, which focuses exclusively on loyalty. It may also account for her rather passive approach to participatory citizenship. For instance, she divulged that she is "not a person who is deep into political engagement, definitely not." Furthermore, she said she demonstrated in the June 30 uprising, "to kick out the Muslim Brotherhood," but admitted that her participation in the protests would not have mattered because she believes "it would have happened whether I went in the street and demonstrated or not."

Karima stresses the importance of stability and security during post-revolution transitions, especially for the most financially vulnerable. She states:

Insuring stability and security of a nation, does not mean to be keeping with the status quo, not at all, it is the opposite. You need security and stability in order to make the changes that you hoped for without having victims of that change. Usually the first victims are the poor, unfortunately in any nation. With the Revolution the groups that were harmed were people who are in low or middle class groups. They suffered a lot these past years, because if they relied on the daily economic activities in the streets, where they can collect money here and there. It was very hard even for them to do that. If they are taxi drivers, or if they have a market, Egyptians were very worried about their money. So we also had this economic recession and many people got badly harmed [financially] if they worked in tourism.

Similar to Sofia, Karima brought issues of economic instability that impacted the lives of many Egyptians. Karima continues and discusses her feelings about the social and political events during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi. Karima observed a transition from optimism after the Revolution to a sense of concern and worry about the direction of the country during the political leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although she reflects and says she might have talked about change and the need for Mubarak to leave if the interview was conducted before the Revolution, now her ideas on revolution are completely different. She witnessed people “harming the country,” spending nights were she would “just cry” because everything felt different to her. Karima shares:

For the first time in my life, I missed home while being at home. I am in Egypt and I’m missing Egypt?! It is much easier when I am not in Egypt to miss Egypt. But to be in Egypt, and to miss Egypt...these are the same streets, the same buildings, but it feels totally different. Even people walking in the streets, they looked different. And the inspiration I saw directly after the Revolution, disappeared. People were very overwhelmed and sad, and the whole kinds of optimism disappeared. You feel like there was this...everyone was really worried about tomorrow, where we were heading.

She even thought the situation in Egypt was “close” to becoming a volatile and war-torn state similar to “Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan.”

Karima justifies and supports the military coup of July 3, 2013 that ousted President Morsi. She defends the role of the military and the support it received from the Egyptian people explaining, “we believe the military supported us.” She further criticizes foreigners who critique the Egyptian military’s involvement stating, “people outside Egypt don’t understand much why we supported the military.” She defends her view by explaining they were not living in Egypt at that time, and expresses how “scary” it was and how “terrible” it was for those who were not members of the Muslim Brotherhood or believed in what they believed in.

*Cautious optimism.* Although often exasperated by some of the current challenges to participatory citizenship, some participants recognize those limitations, yet they persevere. They still remain optimistic and finding glimmers of hope, while pursuing viable, alternative and more “safe” forms of participation. For example, Mahmoud is faced by many challenges to participatory citizenship (which will be explained further below), but he remains optimistic.

Mahmoud says:

So for Egypt I am optimistic, although I sound like I am not, but I am optimistic in the medium term, medium term being 8-10 years, that we have a generation of ten year-olds and twelve-year-olds that saw actual freedom. That saw how that challenging the existing paradigms and challenging the establishment is not impossible and the establishment can be shaken-up and those old ideas and those old guards can be out of power. So I have a lot of faith in that. I have a lot of faith in the change-agents. A lot of people would say that the Revolution has failed. I see it as a cumulative and communicative process, so it's a cycle. We learned the lesson, we lost the battle, but we will eventually win the war.

Mahmoud's optimism is fueled by his observations of what he calls a paradigm shift in the younger generation. This motivates him to coordinate online educational platforms to help teach critical thinking and other valuable citizenship skills to the future “change-agents” in Egypt.

For Maha, she is eager to participate in making a change in Egypt. However, she sees the current limitations of working in the formal realm of politics. Therefore, she opts for participating in the social realm, focusing her work within non-formal spaces such as volunteering with marginalized youth in poverty-stricken areas in Cairo. Maha explains:

What I see is that we are more interested in making a change on a social level of this country. We help the street children, with new development and educational projects and work in the slum areas. We go to those areas to help children read and write. And that's how I participate. But politically, it's going to take another Revolution.

In the aftermath the Revolution and June 30, 2013, for the participants, the three discourses of frustration, instability, and cautious optimism have been greatly shaped by the challenges to participatory citizenship.

### 6.2.5.1 Challenges to participatory citizenship

The following challenges have an adverse influence on participatory citizenship in Egypt. The themes presented below do not showcase all of the possible challenges to participatory citizenship in Egypt, but provide a good overview of the overlapping challenges that are experienced by the participants involved in this study.

**Violence and arrests.** Participants shared their stories of friends being arrested or killed, and recounted various violent events that occurred after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. For the participants, these events have severely impacted their willingness to participate, especially regarding public actions and being openly critical against government policies. Pointing to the violence and the repression of dissent, Maha states, “So here after years of the Revolution we are back to square one. Not only square one, but also its like square zero. It is, as The Revolution has never happened. People, especially young people, are being killed on a daily basis.”

Mahmoud points to the infamous so-called “Protest Law” that restricts public protests for those who do not have prior government approval and recounts the arrests of his friends:

A couple of my friends have been jailed for three years, just because they went on a demonstration holding signs against the Protest law. They are now in jail because of that. I have seen lots of my friends and colleagues who used to be with me in the [political party that he belonged to]. I mean one of them just went to a police station trying to defend another friend who was in prison and was taken without trail or any charges, and we don’t know where he is even today. So stuff like that keeps happening throughout the last year and you keep feeling that the counter-revolution is winning more ground, and they’re winning and winning. And also this is blessed by lots of people. There is nothing worse than a dictatorship with societal support; it’s really, really bad.

In the quote, Mahmoud alludes to limitations on freedom of assembly, freedom of due process, as well as the issue of force disappearances.<sup>191</sup> He also suggests that “counter-revolution” is

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<sup>191</sup> See CIHRS (2015). *The Arab Spring on Trail: Human Rights in the Arab Region 2014*, <http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/The-Arab-Spring-on-Trial.pdf>; *Daily News Egypt*, July 6, 2015, ‘Human rights a hindrance for stability’: AOHR-UK tackles Egyptian policies, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/07/06/human-rights-a-hindrance-for-stability-aohr-uk-tackles-egyptian->

winning, which he views as Egyptians condoning these limitations of freedoms when he says, “this is blessed by lots of people.” He further describes the current political entity as a dictatorship and states “There is nothing worse than a dictatorship with societal support.”

Deena also points to the difficulties with being openly critical and having to face the responses by the state. She suggests that the violence against protesters is connected to the lack of value that the state places on Egyptian citizens and citizenship, which started not too long after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. Deena states:

I think the problem with citizenship, started even before. For example, it started with the events of Mohamed Mahmoud and then Port Said. I started to feel that it doesn't really matter if you are an Egyptian citizen. You don't have value, you're not valued by the state, it [citizenship] is not protected by the government. If seventy young people go to a football match and die there, and if the state could continue after this event, it means citizenship means nothing. So it continues after June 30 [2013] and the massacre of Rabaa. With the state killing 1,400 people with the blessings of other people of the population.

The arrests and violence that participants describe can be seen as a tool used by the state to rein in and repress the upsurge in participation that followed the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution.

**Disengagement.** In the face of daily social, political, and economic struggles and a news cycle filled with traumatic events, participants discuss retracting from forms of participation and disconnecting from being aware of current events. In order to maintain their sanity and motivation necessary to participate, participants shared that sometimes they just take days off from watching the news or engaging with social media. This disengagement helps them to cope

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[policies/](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/egypt); HRW (January, 2015). *World Report 2015: Egypt*, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/egypt>; HRW (June, 2015). *Egypt: Year of Abuses Under al-Sisi*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/08/egypt-year-abuses-under-al-sisi>; and U.S. Depart. Of State (2014). *Egypt 2014 Human Rights Report*, <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2014&dliid=236596>; U.S. Depart. Of State (May 12, 2015). Department of State Report to Congress: Egypt May 12, 2015, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/files/live/sites/almonitor/files/documents/2015/Egypt%20Waiver%20May%202015%20FMF-IMET-FMF.pdf>

with the violence and instability that they feel they are barraged with after the Revolution. For instance, Maha says, “Sometimes I decide not to think about the bad things that happen in this country. Sometimes I decide not to read the news for a week.” The physiological and emotional fatigue that Maha and many other participants face forces them to disconnect from taking an interest in current domestic and international events—an awareness that is crucial to participatory citizenship. But when this disconnection is combined with other challenges, it may lead to sustain periods of disengagement with participatory citizenship and a turn towards a more insular focus. Thus, disengagement becomes a coping mechanism during turbulent times. However, disengagement may cause a risk of redirecting the concern and action that is given to addressing broader social, political, and economic issues, towards a restricted participatory citizenship that is driven solely by the self-interest, and becomes narrowly defined by the needs oneself or one’s family; lost are the broader social needs.

***Relegated to virtual participation.*** With state violence and arrests directed at activists and protesters, many participants stress that their participatory citizenship has been relegated to social media and spaces of virtual participation. For instances, Maha explains that after June 30, 2013 and the obvious ideological split in the country between pro-military and pro-Muslim Brotherhood, “youth tried to push forward and to remain actively and physically engaged.” However, the increasing crack down on public actions “pushed back the youth to be active online, rather than physically active.” Social media and the Internet has been more of a safe space for participants to mobilize support for various awareness campaigns and protest actions, sharing of news, research, and information, as well as providing a forum for debates. For example, Mahmoud says that after June 30, 2013 he sees himself and his friends and colleagues going back into what he describes as a “bubble.” Pointing to the increasing isolation and

disengagement (as discussed above) from participatory citizenship, which Mahmoud reveals, “I hate to see myself going back to my own bubble.” He continues, “Again we are back to a virtual space being the only public space available to vent and share ideas. Even this kind of activity is not as easy as before.” Mahmoud details that he uses social media and the Internet as a “public space,” and a platform to “vent” current frustrations and “share ideas.” However, he suggests an increasing difficulty of using social media as a space for activism when he says, “Even this kind of activity is not as easy as before.” Mahmoud was referring to the many accounts in Egypt of online-activists being arrested and anti-government websites, blogs, and social media pages being shut down.<sup>192</sup>

**Religion.** Participants discuss constraints placed upon them by religious institutions and leaders. They feel that religious leaders prohibit a critical reflection of their faith and religious practices. For instance, Maha who has a deep and critical understanding of Islam and views her belief in Allah as a vital way to spiritually help her and others navigate the hectic and violent social world, and to provide social justice where she can. She critiques the *Shayukh* [plural of Sheikh, religious leaders] for their interpretation of the religious texts and for their failure of explaining religious practices in a meaningful way. Maha says the Shayukh explains and justifies beliefs and practices with, “Oh this is for Allah.” She says that strict adherence to the Shayukh makes people in Egypt act obedient and are afraid to question the religious establishment. Maha argues:

People here are afraid, especially of the Shayukh [religious leaders], they say this is what the religion says. Okay that is fine, but think about what the text says. I have complete faith in Allah and everything, but they [the Shayukh] are afraid to even open up a discussion with you and conversation with you. For example, we have five prayers a day, there were 50 and then they were reduced to 5, and then so I asked the Sheikh, why do

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<sup>192</sup> Freedom House (2015). *Freedom on the Net 2015: Egypt*.  
[https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202015\\_Egypt.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202015_Egypt.pdf)

we pray? He would say oh it's for Allah. Okay, but what's in it for me? Why do I pray? They should tell you that when you pray you feel lighter, like when you have a burning, all the things that you actually feel when you pray. No, they don't. They are like oh it's for Allah.

Maha does not accept Shayukh's ambiguous justification for beliefs and practices as simply being the will of God. She is looking for a deeper, more meaningful interpretation of religion, which focuses on religious validations for addressing issues of child and youth poverty and the struggle for a better society. However, the religious leadership that Maha describes as "intimidating you not to think about any [social and political issues] in this country" and the lack of reflective dialogue can place restrictions on various forms of participation, especially those that challenge social norms and the authority of the religious establishment.

For religious minorities in Egypt, participants cite a similar occurrence but equating restrictions of political engagement with individual self-silencing rather than pointing to failures in religious leadership. Some participants talk about the "psychological constraints" that are self-inflicted for Coptic Christians. For example, Sofia explains:

My perspective also as a Coptic might even be further constrained, because as Copt talking about religion and politics is very constrained. We always feel threaten that if we talk about religion or politics something may happen to us. It is just because we have been raised with that mentally, you just feel a constraint when talking about or discussing politics. I think the psychological constraint, which has been passed down from our families, is what is really constraining our political engagement.

As a Coptic Christian, Sofia feels that her religious identity has really constrained her political engagement. Fearing of social and family reprisal, her perspective is that political engagement "is something that is not common" in her family.

***Family constraints.*** As introduced in a previous section on influences on perceptions of citizenship, some participants discuss how families can become an obstacle for being socially and politically active. For example, Sofia explains the uneasiness to actively and openly

participate as something that has been passed down through generations in her family. She explains:

During my grandfather's time, when Abd al-Nasser was the president, you couldn't really talk about politics, there was the threat of going to jail. Then Anwar Sadat came along, he jailed all the Muslim Brotherhood. During my era, Hosni Mubarak came along and the constraints weren't, like you couldn't really see them, there are political constraints, but they're invisible due to the fact that my dad and my grandfather went through them, they knew the threats, so we were raised that there are threats, which are passed down. As a child, we knew there was a threat to even discussing political issues in public here. So that kind of created a constraint to our political engagement, even though it is not published or it's not really mentioned, but our parents taught us that. Also in the community itself, you could see that. Nobody talks about that. Even though the constraints aren't really written down, if you know what I mean, but they are there, psychologically and emotionally.

For Sofia and some participants, there is an unwritten rule that is passed down and commonly understood within families that is too dangerous to politically or even civically participate in Egyptian society. The family embeds a real or imagined threat against forms of participatory citizenship for younger members, which in-turn discourages younger members from actively participating as a citizen in Egyptian society. Therefore, as discussed previously, during the revolution when Egyptians were inspired to participate, participants shared that this created generational tensions between the long-held beliefs of older family members maintaining the more limited social norms of participating and younger family members seeking more active and public forms of participatory citizenship.

***Fear of change.*** Participants say they are observing a phenomenon of people fearing change. For example, Mahmoud explains:

People are very fearful and they don't know what's better. They don't know the alternative; they can't see a better alternative. So they were completely out of their comfort zone during the three years after the Revolution. They didn't know a better reality, so they just wanted to go back to what they actually know. They knew it was really bad for them, but no one offered any opportunities, but they wanted to go back to that because "at least we are having a job, at least there is stability, at least we knew what was going to happen tomorrow or the next day."

Mahmoud suggests people in Egypt cannot imagine an “alternative” or “better reality,” so they want to “go back to what they actually know.” Mahmoud explains that people want to go back to the stability during the days under Mubarak and military rule, so they accept a political system that limits freedoms, human rights, and other ideals of the revolution. Mahmoud continues:

People can't imagine this new reality and how it's going to help them. So they felt threaten by the Revolution, which did cause people to be violent and lash out. Of course it was fueled by narratives in the media, as war against the Revolution by the religious establishment and maybe the business community, the military, and whatnot. But at the end of the day, our counter-narrative was also self-defeating. So this is something we need to definitely work on. Any change-agent... We all know that the first reaction to change is resistance. Even myself, I always do that. Maybe we have more tolerance than others, but we always have resistance to any change. So if we want real change we have to make the people want it. So all of our slogans were “down with the regime, down with the regime,” and no one was able to create an alternative. Of course it is not easy, and it is easier said than done. But again that's the only way. If there are no alternatives, people will not go forward. And that is why we only have two alternatives, it's the military or the religious establishment, and they are just switching roles. Or doing temporary partnership together, that's how it is. So a truly civic, truly empowered people or movement or change agents have not yet created this alternative.

Mahmoud explains that media, religious establishment, the business community and the military, whose narratives called for a “war against the Revolution,” which was combined with people's inability to imagine a new reality and therefore felt threaten by the Revolution, fueled the fear of change. Mahmoud complicates the idea of fear of change by admitting that the people were not presented with a viable model for “real change” after the revolution, and that the first response to change is always “resistance.” While the fear of change appears to present a challenge for active participatory citizenship in Egypt, deceptively limiting people's political choices to only two alternatives “military or the religious establishment,” Mahmoud advocates for the necessity of “truly civic, truly empowered people” to challenge the fear of change and create an alternative. However, he realizes “it is easier said than done.”

**Restrictions on civil society.** There have been increased restrictions for local and international NGOs working in Egypt.<sup>193</sup> Many NGOs faced closure and prosecution for not adhering to Law 84 of 2002 Law on Associations and Community Foundations, recently being enforced by the new Ministry of Social Solidarity. The law gives power to Egyptian authorities to close organizations, block funding, freeze assets, confiscate property, and reject governing bodies of any organization. Under this restrictive environment, international and local organizations were forced to close. For example, in October 2014, the Carter Center, which was co-founded by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and opened its Egypt office after the January 25, 2011 Revolution to monitor elections, was forced to close. Explaining this move, President Carter stated:

The current environment in Egypt is not conducive to genuine democratic elections and civic participation. I hope that Egyptian authorities will reverse recent steps that limit the rights of association and assembly and restrict operations of Egyptian civil society groups.<sup>194</sup>

Additionally, The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), after 20 years in Egypt was forced to move its regional and international programs to Tunisia. In a press release, CIHRS stated the move was decided:

In light of the ongoing threats to human rights organizations and the declaration of war on civil society...Of all the Arab and non-Arab countries where the CIHRS is registered, Egypt is the only one where human rights organizations face such pressures and threats.<sup>195</sup>

Some of the participants discuss the problems associated with working in and establishing a NGO in Egypt. Mariam was working with a friend from Gaza who was a director

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<sup>193</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, November 9, 2014, NGO registration extension period ends under ministry's recently drafted bill, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/09/ngo-registration-extension-period-ends-ministrys-recently-drafted-bill/>

<sup>194</sup> *The Carter Center*, October 15, 2014, Carter Center Closes Egypt Office; Calls for Stronger Protections for Democratic Rights and Freedoms. <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-101514.html>

<sup>195</sup> *The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies*, December 9, 2014, After 20 years: CIHRS moves its regional and international programs outside Egypt. <http://www.cihrs.org/?p=10298&lang=en>

of a program associated with an international organization that helped to educate children in Palestine. They were in planning discussions with local communities to create an education programs for girls in a rural area of Egypt. However, the realization of the difficulties to establish such project was too overwhelming, Mariam states, “But of course it is not easy to start a non-profit organization here. There are a lot political problems regarding it. There has been a long history of fighting between the government and NGOs.” After over six months of attempting to go through the proper channels to legitimize the program, Mariam and her colleague capitulated to the pressures, bureaucracies and political hurdles and abandoned the education program.

***Sexual harassment and gender discrimination.*** All participants, including male participants, shared themes of sexual harassment and gender discrimination in Egyptian society. Some participants attempt to address these issues by creating a research agenda to better understand gender discrimination and gender inequities within education. Others bring up sexual harassment and gender discrimination in their formal classrooms, and some make it part of the curriculum within non-formal educational programs for disenfranchised communities. However, the phenomena of sexual harassment and gender discrimination can be a significant deterrence for women to actively, civically, and politically participate in Egyptian society. Many participants see the reduction in sexual harassment and gender discrimination as a major goal and hope for future of Egypt.

Mariam shares her “disappointment” in Egyptians who sexually harass women or condone such violations. She suggests their behavior is a reflection of the larger society. Sofia equates sexual harassment with an issue of public safety and quality of life. She states there is an issue of safety in Egypt, “especially when it comes to harassment.” Sofia continues:

I don't understand why harassment is prevalent in Egypt. So one thing I really hope for in Egypt is that people are safe and especially with the perspective of harassment. But to

do that I feel there is a lot of things Egypt needs to fulfill first, which might be education and changing...making people more open-minded. That is a big hope. But I feel that no matter how economically developed we are, if people don't feel safe in the streets, and if people, especially girls, are harassed repeatedly in the streets, then the quality of life in Egypt isn't that good. This aspect really affects quality of life.

Nadia views sexual harassment and gender discrimination as an issue of women's rights in Egypt. She hopes to one day to be able to leave her house without fear of harassment, without "thinking twice" about how she is dressed, or "constantly worrying" about whatever action she does "might cause a problem" with some guy. Nadia feels that, as a woman in Egyptian society, she is not free. She believes that she should have the same rights and should be equal as the men her same age. Nadia states:

What I really hope is that as a female I am free in Egypt. I am free to express myself, to do what I want. Again, I do understand that freedom comes with a price, and it is not that I want to do what I want; it is not in the negative way. But at least give me my right to do things. Again I am not talking about the law, because I have very strong issues with the law. The law always favors the guy and I hate that. I want, at least in my community, in my family where I am able to be equal, to be equal. But still I am not really equal. I tell myself, that of course you can do what you want. You are just as equal as guys my age.

In this passage, Nadia points out that Egyptian law is patriarchal and favors men, but would settle for breaking down social norms and wishes she could be treated as equal in her family and her community.

***Between survival and citizenship.*** Many participants also discuss the extreme poverty in the country and its impact of civic and political participation. Neaga's (2010) concept of "marginalized citizen" is useful here. This begs the question, how can ideas and actions of citizenship be relevant when the struggle for daily survival takes precedence over forms of citizenship and national identity? Mariam shares a powerful insight into the tension between survival and citizenship and the importance of economic citizenship within the Egyptian context:

I find even myself constantly doing something or struggling with something. I don't have time to think about anything, to sit down and reflect on my life, or what's happening around me. That is a major problem. And that is why I feel that people's perceptions of

citizenship, they don't know what it is actually, because of all the factors that come into play and maybe they are confused. Many people are struggling financially. So what you have to do to eat, or what you have to do for your family is more important than what you have to do for your country. Sometimes that is the driving force [of participatory citizenship] for Egyptians.

The quote by Mariam underscores the importance of factoring in daily survival as a significant challenge for participatory citizenship in Egypt. Mariam continues:

So a lot of Egyptians who were involved in the protests, to make this country a better place, they went to the streets not for the future of the country, but because they want bread, they want to be able to eat. So sometimes these people don't have their definition of citizenship, it is not defined or it is limited to how much money they are making or to the bread on their plates, rather than "I belong to this country or I am doing this for my country." What is important is to secure their food is important, like Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Once they get past shelter and food, now they can think about self-indulgence or things like that.

Bread or *aish* (in Arabic) is the first word in a popular chant during the revolution, "Bread, freedom, social justice!" (*aish, hurriyya, adala igtimaiyya*). For Mariam, she uses the word *bread* to signify hunger and poverty and to justify the involvement of protesters during the Egyptian Revolution. The concept of bread is also a reverberation from the 1977 riots in Egypt against IMF adopted policies. Mariam suggests that protesters wanted bread, "not for the future of the country" but because they "want to be able to eat." In the following passage, Mariam continues to use the bread metaphor to explain the desperation associated with unemployment and hunger that can drive people leave to Egypt:

Most Egyptian students who go to public schools are struggling financially, so they have a problem with defining citizenship, because for them all they care about is finding money to be able to eat, to be able to go to work without having to use public transit, without having to deal with public hospitals, and that's all they care about here. And when they can't find that here, they want to leave, they want to travel abroad. And they will do anything to travel. And for them, citizenship means going where the money is, going to a place where the money is. For them, home is where they can make money. Because some people do struggle, and if we are talking about majority of Egyptians who are struggling financially, citizenship is where the jobs are. Sometimes life is money, not even citizenship for them. Life is bread. If they don't have bread they are willing to die for bread. That is why every year hundreds of Egyptians die in the Mediterranean Sea trying to travel to Europe. They risk their lives and they know a lot of people who die, yet they

still do this. To live illegally in a country where they would not be able to leave, or travel back-and-forth and go back to Egypt to visit their families. Imagine, they are willing to live forever in a place illegally to get money.

In the last passage, Mariam emphasizes the importance of economic citizenship and how the struggle for bread and a job forces Egyptians to go “where the money is,” because “citizenship is where the jobs are.” She equates the struggle for economic citizenship with the issue of emigration, and the desperation that leads Egyptians to face certain death attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea and face the struggle living “illegally” in Europe. In this light, the struggle for food and employment supersedes forms of active participatory citizenship. However, it should be noted that Mariam’s perception comes from a place of privilege. Although there are many struggles faced by disenfranchised classes in Egypt, this should not mean that they should not have a say in their development as citizens, or that they cannot formulate their own struggles for active citizenship.

**Emigration.** To contextualize the ideas of emigration espoused by participants, Egypt is within the top 20 countries worldwide with the highest number of emigrants. For example, in 2013 there were 3.4 million emigrants from Egypt, and in 2015 \$20.4 billion worth of remittances were sent to Egypt.<sup>196</sup> In a recent study conducted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 87 percent of Egyptians surveyed said they emigrated for economic reasons, and 61 percent do not plan to return to Egypt.<sup>197</sup> While emigration from Egypt for economic opportunity has long been a common theme, in the aftermath of the

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<sup>196</sup> KNOMAD (2016). *Migration and Remittances: Factbook 2016 (Third Edition)*. World Bank Group. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf>

<sup>197</sup> *Daily News Egypt*, January 19, 2016, 40% of emigrants leave Egypt to improve living conditions, 13 percent to find jobs: CAPMAS, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2016/01/19/40-of-emigrants-leave-egypt-to-improve-living-conditions-13-to-find-jobs-capmas/>

revolution, according to some of the participants, frustration and fear within the socio-political environment has provoked some Egyptians to focus on leaving the country.

For example, Ahmed states, “Although the political status is very disappointing and made me lose my, not my sense of belonging, but made me feel very disappointed and upset that I want to leave the country.” Mahmoud shares a similar sentiment:

Lots of my friends are out of the country right now. Some to permanent emigration, some to work, some doing grad studies just to be out of the country. I am considering the same thing. I am doing my applications. Of course, in terms of career planning, I can wait for a couple of years, but I just want to be out of here, you know.

Sofia says that her parents want her to move abroad, “With January 25 my parents aren’t accepting with me staying in Egypt. I need to move. And I love Egypt, I don’t want to leave Egypt.”

The phenomenon of emigration for socio-political reasons seems to be across class and age divides. For instance, Mariam discusses her father:

That’s why a lot of people across different social-classes, even ones that I know who are financially doing okay, they want to leave mainly because of financial reasons. Some people want to leave now because of political reasons. Until the Revolution it was financial, now people want to leave because of what is happening politically. Even my dad said, who is retiring soon... So I asked him, dad you have two homes, one in Egypt and one in [Western country], you have children in Egypt and [Western country], so which one will you pick when you retire? He said, “until the June 30 events, I was planning to live in Egypt. After June 30, I decided to go live in [Western country]; I don’t want to live in Egypt.” Of course, he was referring to the killing of people in Raaba. It was those killings that were too much, and there is a lot of work to be done. He said, “I am too old; there is nothing I can do. So I rather live peacefully in a place where people aren’t getting killed.”

Discussing her research with student activism in Egypt, Deena similarly shares with Mariam the idea that emigration cuts across various groups in Egypt. When asked what is the most interest finding that has come out of your research thus far, Deena shares:

Most of the students want to leave and travel abroad, for good. They want to leave Egypt as fast as they can. I can’t say that I am shocked, but I expected that the people who are committed politically would be more willing to stay. But that is the most common thing

for both boys and girls, from different social backgrounds, from different universities, from different degrees of relations to politics, they all wanted to leave.

Deena was aware about the common practice of emigration, but she thought that people who are more “committed politically would be more willing to stay.” However, she complicates this trend of emigration after the Revolution and separates the discourse of leaving with the actual act of moving abroad. Deena argues:

I am not sure talking about emigration means real emigration. They say they want to leave, but practically it is different. And what I found interesting is that despite their will to emigrate, they will keep on working in whatever they are doing. For now, I don't think it affects their current model of citizenship. And I think there are so many young people with different social backgrounds, and different ideas and different wills to work, so even if we have a huge wave of emigration it will not affect the others.

Emigration is an important phenomenon in Egypt. For decades, people view leaving Egypt as a means for better economic prospects, while some to pursue educational opportunities. Within the socio-political aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, it appears that some Egyptians are leaving Egypt for political reasons. Whether emigration out of Egypt is achieved or only imagined by people, striving for a life outside of Egypt has the possibility of redirecting the focus away from social and political agency of citizenship practiced within local and national communities.

**Formal education.** For participants, education is seen dialectically as both an obstacle to and deliverer of participatory citizenship. Although the perceptions of challenges faced by Egyptian public and private universities have been discussed in Chapter 4, this section provides a brief overview of how the participants perceive formal education presenting a challenge to active citizenship education and participatory citizenship. For example, Ahmed discusses the need for schools in Egypt to address the high rates of illiteracy and the lack of more critical forms of citizenship education. Describing the common trend in Egyptian schools and universities of

overreliance on pedagogy that centers on regurgitation and rote memorization, which is analogous to Freire's (2007) banking model of education, Sofia shares:

I need to memorize a lot of things, but it is not challenging to the intellectual thought. There is no thought in it. They don't teach students how to think. They just teach students how to apply without thinking. It is sad, it's really sad.

Focusing on her experiences at the university, Deena describes universities as “restrictive places” where the “government is trying to limit student freedoms.” Similarly, the Karima explains the universities “really need to make structural changes” and “need to open up the system.”

To conclude this section on the challenges to participatory citizenship, when taken individually each of these themes could be a deterrent for any citizen who is motivated to actively engaging in the social and political life of Egypt. However, when taken together, the combined forces provide a recipe for cynicism, apathy, blind obedience, as well as the quest for more violent ideologies and approaches to social and political actions.

### **6.3 Characteristics of a Critical Pedagogical Workshop for Participatory Citizenship in Egypt**

So, how have the experiences of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution and subsequent events impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for university students and academics in Egypt? The empirical findings from the participants demonstrate that the experiences of the Revolution and its aftermath significantly impacted the perceptions and actions of participatory citizenship for participants. The current socio-political era in Egypt appears to be raising the consciousness of citizens in Egypt. The experiences of the participants demonstrate a form of Freirean praxis of citizenship in Egypt. Paulo Freire explains that in order to transform oppressive realities, humans must confront reality critically, by simultaneously

reflecting and acting upon their world (Freire, 2007). For Freire, critical pedagogy is deeply intertwined with praxis, a reflection and action upon the world to transform it. As Freire states, “discovery cannot be purely intellectual but must involve action; nor can it be limited to mere activism, but must include serious reflection: only then will it be a praxis” (Freire, 2007, p. 65). Participants are reflecting about the situation around them and taking action by attempting to transform the world around them. In a complex combination with other influencers, such as family and formal education etc., the Revolution and subsequent events can be seen as a source for critical awareness where people learn about and practice reimagined forms of participatory citizenship. The reflective narratives shared by the participants can provide an outline for some characteristics of the Revolution and subsequent socio-political events as a critical pedagogical workshop for participatory citizenship.

First, for the participants, the Revolution helped to foster an upsurge in participation, a greater sense of belonging, a greater sense of social and political awareness, a greater sense of hope, and a greater sense of community as an Egyptian citizen. Second in addition to the Revolution, there are competing influences of citizenship education extending beyond the realm of formal education into family, gender, religion and spirituality, and traveling. Although these are just some of the teachers of ideas and actions surrounding citizenship, this complexity goes beyond previous studies that focus the analysis of citizenship identity in the Arab world exclusively on kin, religion, and the state (Parolin, 2009). Third, the new or renewed identity as an Egyptian citizen and the knowledge about social and political issues encouraged the participants to transform their reimagined ideas and identity of citizenship into actions, participating in multiple spaces including formal, non-formal, and informal spaces. Therefore, broadening the understandings of spaces of citizenship in Egypt. Fourth, currently, within the

context of the contentious aftermath, as participants waver between the discourses of frustration, instability and cautious optimism, participants experience many challenges to participatory citizenship. Violence and arrests, disengagement, relegated to virtual participation, religion, family constraints, a fear of change, restrictions on civil society, sexual harassment and gender discrimination, the tension between survival and citizenship emigration, and limitations of formal education all contribute to create major impediments to participatory citizenship in Egypt. Last, the narratives of participants showed that perceptions of citizenship are dynamic. They evolve or retract with struggle, and how the participant dialectically navigates and interprets her/his social world impacts that perception, which points the unfinished nature of citizenship that every generation has to reimage and reinvent. It shows that citizenship is dynamic, possessing ebb and flow characteristics. Therefore, in the face of these numerous challenges, participants are attempting to address these issues and create awareness as part of their commitment to education. In the next chapter, I will focus on how participants perceive teaching and learning as a political act of citizenship.

## **CHAPTER 7: TEACHING AND LEARNING AS A POLITICAL ACT OF CITIZENSHIP: PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZEN-EDUCATORS ON THE PEDAGOGY OF TRANSITION IN EGYPT**

Teaching and learning can be a political act of consciousness raisings for developing the praxis necessary for participatory citizenship and social change (Freire, 2005). Rather than focusing on the accumulation of technical knowledge of teaching, the premise of this chapter is that teachers grow and gain a deep critical consciousness through social and political experiences and active engagement as citizens within their classrooms as well as society. This chapter is guided by the question: To what extent does university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship?

For the educators interviewed, one of the significant ways they perceive their actions of participatory citizenship is through their teaching. The January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution and subsequent events appear to have impacted not only their understandings as a citizen but has influenced their attitudes and pedagogies as a teacher. The participants reveal a connection between social and political events and their perceptions and experiences of teaching and learning.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first two sections, [7.1](#) and [7.2](#), I utilize the themes (before the revolution, after the revolution, and influences of citizenship) that were presented in the previous chapter to explore the perceptions of two participants, Ahmed and Nadia. Their experiential perceptions are analyzed and presented using the more narrative form of “sandwiched anecdotes” that were explained in [Chapter 5](#). While attempting to uphold their authentic voices shared during the interviews, the sections follow the trajectory of Ahmed and Nadia and how they learn about and practice citizenship after the Revolution. The phenomenological hermeneutic experiences of Ahmed and Nadia were selected for three reasons: (1) they share a deep insight into their experiences, thereby providing interesting cases;

(2) I had an opportunity to observe their classrooms and pedagogical styles; and (3) in addition to their initial interview, I was fortunate to have multiple on-the-record conversations with the two of them regarding such themes as politics, education, and citizenship.

[Section 7.3](#) showcases various themes of critical pedagogies for active citizenship that Ahmed and Nadia express and apply with their students and within their classrooms. The last section, [7.4](#), concludes the chapter by summarizing how teaching and learning can be a political act of citizenship.

### **7.1 ‘The Beauty of the Revolution’: Ahmed**

Ahmed is in his mid-thirties, Muslim, and from Cairo. He has a bachelor’s degree in language arts from a public university and is currently a graduate student enrolled in a master’s of education program at a private foreign university. Ahmed is an English language instructor at the same private foreign university and also teaches and manages teachers at a community center that teaches English, citizenship education, and technology to underserved teenagers.

The discourses that are prevalent in Ahmed’s understanding of citizenship includes citizenship being related to rights and duties, citizenship that is in constant flux, and citizenship that extends beyond the local and national community. Ahmed states, as “a citizen I have rights and duties, in my society and in humanity at large. I have duties and rights towards my community and the whole world...My definition of citizenship will always be in change. It is not static.” However, Ahmed does struggle with his understanding of citizenship, which is exemplified by discussing the tension between citizenship and authoritarianism. Ahmed asks the question, “Can citizenship coexist with political oppression? That is a huge thing. I don’t believe they can coexist. Because when political oppression exists, it affects everything in society.” Despite Ahmed’s realization of political oppression, he was inspired by experiences during the

revolution, which had a great impact on his understandings and actions of citizenship. Ahmed shared that his experiences during the Revolution in combination with his educational experiences, specifically his graduate program, have significantly shaped his ideas of citizenship.

Ahmed states:

Actually when I think of myself before the Revolution and also before doing the master's, I would say that education and the Revolution they helped me to have a more comprehensive and developed definition of citizenship.

The anecdote below highlights how the experiences of revolution gradually helped Ahmed to not only connect with seeing himself and identifying as Egyptian citizen and a greater sense of belonging, but his experiences also helped to instill a sense of agency to try to “make a better Egypt” through his various forms of participatory citizenship and his teaching.

***Before the Revolution.*** Prior to the January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution, Ahmed did not feel connected to Egypt as a citizen. Although Ahmed always viewed his teaching as a service “helping the community,” that service was driven by the need to help students have better job opportunities, rather than teaching them to be active citizenship. Ahmed explains:

Before the Revolution I can't say that I was even aware [what it means to be a citizen]. Before the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution...I didn't feel that I was a citizen and I couldn't frame it in this way. I just felt that I'm in a place. Going to work, earning my living and that's it. Working as a teacher...I felt that that I was helping the community, because I was teaching English. It would help my students have jobs and have a better future. Maybe that would help the progress of the whole country...but still the idea that I am a citizen or I can call myself a citizen I never felt. I could not say I am an Egyptian citizen. I never felt like that.

For Ahmed, there was a lack of knowledge about being a citizen and ways to participate. To Ahmed, Egypt was just a “place” where he goes to work and earns a living and “that's it.” The sense of belonging, the sense of community or of having duties and having rights that generally characterizes citizenship were “never felt” by Ahmed before the Revolution. However, as Ahmed states in another excerpt, “When the 25<sup>th</sup> [Referring to the January 25, 2011, Egyptian

Revolution] came, that was an eye-opener!” The following sub-anecdote showcases his transition from not feeling that he was a citizen to a sense of confusion about the dynamic developments of the Revolution.

***Confusion during the Revolution.*** This sub-anecdote describes the often-confusing trajectory of Ahmed’s experiences during the Revolution ending with the awakening Ahmed had during his first day that he visited Tahrir Square after Mubarak was ousted.

On the 25<sup>th</sup> people were calling for protests. And I wanted to go, but then I had people telling me “why are you going, this doesn’t make sense; you don’t need to go.” So I listened to all of the people around me telling me this bullshit and then I stayed at home. I was the only one within my circle who wanted to really go and join. This showed that I had the passion to be a part of it. The last years before the Revolution, things go so worst that people were dying at bread queues. There were also other incidents of deaths by police. It was so bad and the corruption became so noticeable.

For Ahmed, the Revolution was a confusing time. Initially he recognized the corruption, deaths, and lack of economic opportunities that plagued Egypt before the Revolution and was sympathetic to the protesters in Tahrir. However, his circle of friends persuaded him not to take part in the protest. As events unfolded Ahmed become more confused about joining the protests:

Then the Friday, Day of Wrath [January 28, 2011], I saw it on TV...It was a strange moment. Then the media started the war. They said prisoners were set free. And then you got so worried about your neighborhood and thinking of the thousands of prisoners that were on your street. So we had to have committees that would protect the streets. But I remember seeing on TV people saying, “still if prisoners were on the street we are not leaving Tahrir. Some of us will stay to protect the neighborhoods and some of us will stay in Tahrir.” The persistence that they had was strange for me. I got so confused. I was in a state of confusion.

Then I heard rumors that people in Tahrir were taking money [to protest]. And I found even my neighbors repeating the same thing saying, “my friend is in Tahrir and he is taking 100 pounds for the day.” When you hear it not only from media, but also from people that was also confusing.

On the one hand you have people saying “these people in Tahrir are traitors, and they are taking money, and the country is falling.” And you have the other camp saying, “no this regime should be toppled; it should be ousted right away.” So I was in such a state of confusion to the extent that I sympathized with Mubarak when he gave his famous speech.

Subsequently the fear of prisoners roaming the streets and the alleged bribes paid to protestors, promulgated by the media, and the violence and destruction made Ahmed “sympathize with Mubarak” and dissuaded him from participating in any demonstrations. However, the commitment and the “persistence” of the protesters in Tahrir was confusing for Ahmed. He appeared to struggle with an internal tension between protesting and not protesting. As the events of the Revolution unfolded, the confusion that Ahmed was facing increased.

Then the Battle of the Camel [February 2, 2011] happened. I didn't know what was going on. When you see Egyptians killing each other, in a strange scene where you have horses and camels running over people in Tahrir. After the Battle of the Camel, Cairo was on fire, and this [media] guy said, 'This is not the Cairo that I love.' When he said that and I saw Cairo on fire, I got emotional and I hated everything that was happening. I felt that my city and my country were on fire. Like it's going to hell.

Even my mom was so worried about us...she refused that we would be part of anything. She felt that she was going to die or have heart attack if we just started to discuss anything or started to talk about things. She got in such a medical condition, that she had to take medication because she was so afraid of what she saw on TV.

With the city that he loves on fire and unrecognizable, he felt like the city was “going to hell,” and he wanted stability. The confusion and disappointment in the developments that Ahmed felt was exacerbated by his mother's medical issues, which ultimately deterred him from joining the protests and prevented him from discussing current events at home. However, the overall confusion and obstacles that Ahmed initially faced were soon eclipsed by a newly found appreciation for the Revolution and greater connection to Egypt.

*Influences.* The following excerpts show how although initially his peers and the illness of his mother greatly dissuaded Ahmed from joining the protests before the ousting of Mubarak, his mother was actually excited about Mubarak's departure and persuaded him to go the demonstrations. Moreover, actually witnessing Tahrir firsthand and participating within the streets of Tahrir, not relying on the opinions of his friends, the media, or his neighbors,

transformed his perception about the Revolution and eventually (in the following excerpts) transformed his sense of belonging, agency and community as an Egyptian citizen. Ahmed shares:

On the day when Mubarak was ousted [February 11, 2011], I found my mother crying happily. She was jumping and she said Mubarak left, Mubarak's ousted. Let's go to the street! I was surprised. She kept all of this inside her all of these days, because she was afraid for us to be a part of it...But when it happened, she couldn't believe it.

So we went right away to the streets joining and you'll find all the streets full of people around Tahrir and all the people were very happy and they were celebrating. Different people, different groups, different beliefs. Rich and poor, Christians and Muslims, those with beards, like Islamists maybe, and without, veiled and unveiled, everybody together. Those with special needs and those without, all together in Tahrir. And that moment was amazing.

Then I saw with my eyes the field hospitals, and I saw the people who slept the nights in the streets. That was the happiest moment in my life. That was what I need help seeing. The beauty of the Revolution and all of that. It's amazing. The happiest day was when Mubarak was ousted, that day was amazing.

With his mom's surprising support of the Revolution and her persuasiveness to go out into the streets after the ousting of Mubarak, Ahmed got to finally experience the "beauty of the Revolution" firsthand, which he needed "help seeing." He witnessed the unity of the Egyptian people, the sacrifices people had made through the endless protests sleeping on the streets during the winter as well as the makeshift "field hospitals" that took care of the injured and killed revolutionaries. It was "the happiest moment" in Ahmed's life. However, "the beauty of the revolution" soon took an ironic twist.

*After the Revolution.* After the Revolution, when SCAF took control of Egypt's government,<sup>198</sup> Ahmed was willing to give the military leadership a chance to change the situation in Egypt. He states:

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<sup>198</sup> The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), headed by Field Marshal Tantawi, ruled Egypt from the ousting of Mubarak on February 11, 2011, to June 30, 2012, when Mohamed Morsi was elected President.

Then I waited, because I believed that now the Supreme Council would take over and things will change. So I was that person that thought, okay the Supreme Council took over and we don't need to be in the streets...But then I found that I was fooled again. Because nothing happened, and all that I heard was just talk. So I started going to the streets from then on. Because now, the picture's clear. I don't have any more confusion. Since then, I was on the streets.

Although Ahmed was willing to support SCAF, the social, political, and economic changes that they were promised by SCAF failed to materialize quick enough for Ahmed. The lack of change in Egypt promised by SCAF appeared to bring some clarity to Ahmed's position. He felt that he was fooled by SCAF and decided to once again join the protests and be "on the streets," participating in various demonstrations and movements. Additionally, actively being involved in protests, which not only ultimately gave him a newfound connection to Egypt, but also help him to recognize his work for social change in Egypt through education. Currently, amidst the restrictions placed on various forms of social and political participation (e.g., the Protest Law, governmental controls on civil society, etc.), Ahmed views education—over participating in formal politics—as a more viable path for social change.

Overall, the revolution helped Ahmed to grow as a citizen. Similar with other participants, Ahmed participated in various avenues and had a greater sense of belonging, of social and political awareness, of hope and of community. The following sub-anecdote encapsulates Ahmed's experiences during the revolution and highlights the impacts of the revolution on his understanding and actions of citizenship:

The revolution gave me the chance to unite with other Egyptians, to make change happen, to see the intensity of our social problems, to evaluate my perception for the whole surrounding that I did not think of before the revolution. Yeah, being part of the marches, protests, watching political problems extensively, talking to other people and trying to understand their viewpoints. I think it was a journey of self-learning; I was deprived of politics throughout my whole life and I decided to take an intensive course [metaphorically]. I guess that was the case with many.

And even being a part of politics that was also totally new. And having the power to change that was also new because I never felt it, and I never even thought about it [before]. It wasn't something to think about it before... I started to feel that I'm a citizen after the Revolution. I started to feel that I was citizen when I heard people say, "raise your head up, you are Egyptian." And then I started thinking and started to even feel proud that I am Egyptian. I am proud because people are changing things, and they have the power to change, and they own the country, it's theirs and they have rights, and they have duties, and all of that. So that all happened after the Revolution...

The "beauty of the Revolution" for Ahmed was unity he felt with other Egyptians and being part of the political scene, understanding others view points and going through "a journey of self-learning," all things he was deprived of before the Revolution. Chants such as "Raise your head, you're Egyptian" helped him to unite with his country and made him feel proud he was an Egyptian citizen. He has recognized the power that people have to make changes in their country, and as citizens they have rights and duties.

Despite many recognizing barriers to various forms of participatory citizenship (as discussed in [Chapter 6](#)), especially in the realm of formal politics, Ahmed is currently connecting his experiences and growth during the revolution to his role as a teacher and within the educational arena. Ahmed states:

Now, I practice citizenship by educating myself more and more. I watch political or serious programs whenever I get a chance. I broaden my academic knowledge by reading a lot in the field of education and see how I can come up with practical solutions in our classrooms, schools and universities to some of our problems. The social can make a change in the country, but it will take like more time to reach the political change I am aiming at, but it is possible.

Ahmed views his role as a citizen is to not only educate himself in pertinent social and political issues, but also to attempt to address those issues through education. Additionally, he sees himself and his students as agents of change and perceives his role as a teacher not only as a duty to his country, but how he actively practices citizenship.

## 7.2 ‘The Revolution, When It Happened, It Got Me Angry’: Nadia

Nadia is in her late 20s and currently a graduate student in an education program at a foreign private university. After receiving a bachelor degree in computer science from another foreign private university, she was convinced by a professor to become an instructor for undergraduate students at the same university where she is pursuing her master’s degree. Although she was born in Cairo and, therefore, retains the legal rights of an Egyptian citizen, her family migrated from a neighboring Arab country, which creates an interesting tension for her during the Revolution. Nadia is also a practicing Christian.

Nadia admits that what it means to be a citizen “is a hard question” and that citizenship may have “many definitions.” Along with a discourse of the complexity of citizenship, Nadia includes the discourses of belonging, rights and agency, and the quest for a better society. Nadia states:

I feel that a person that belongs to a place, wants to improve that place, wants the best for that place, because it is my place. And I have the right to speak out and say that I want something because it is my place. It is the feeling of, I belong. I belong and I have rights and I have a voice, and I am able to voice it and I am able to want what is best for this place.

Similar to Ahmed, Nadia stresses the importance of rights and a duty to works towards “what is best for this place.” Interestingly, Nadia does not use the term country, nation, or community, but situates her conception of citizenship being connected and belong to “a place,” which may be linked to her connection to her parents’ countries. In contrast, Ahmed, who is ethnically and legally Egyptian, also described his perceptions of Egypt as being some “a place.” Moreover, Nadia may be using the term “place” to signify a more universal understanding of citizenship that where you are in the world you have rights and duties to “improve” it.

### **7.2.1 Before the Revolution**

Growing up in Cairo, Nadia and her family maintained their cultural and ethnic heritage by speaking English, French, and their Arab dialect, and surrounding themselves by a community of family and friends from their country of origin. Attending international primary and secondary schools, she never thought of herself as an Egyptian; she identified more with her home community. But, it was never really an issue until she started her university career. During her time at a private university, Nadia was exposed to and forced to socialize in Egyptian Arabic, very distinctive from her home dialect of Arabic. Nadia shared:

People there [the university] didn't speak English all the time, so I had to speak in Arabic. Then I realized my Arabic is different. Even in my community, the church, the club, or wherever we go, it is always, almost the same. It is a very closed community, which I never liked, and my parents never forced it on me, so when I decided never to go back again they were okay with that. That is why it was contradicting, because I was never raised...I could never say Egypt belonged to me, and I never said I belong to Egypt.

Before the Revolution Nadia felt that she was an outsider. She spent very little time on campus, refused to make friends or attend social events, and never participated in community service or civic engagement activities outside her cultural and ethnic community. She never felt that she was an Egyptian citizen, "I could never say Egypt belonged to me, and I never said I belong to Egypt."

### **7.2.2 During the Revolution and influences**

The Revolution has drastically challenged not only her sense of belonging but also her commitment to Egypt. She explains:

I didn't even know the Revolution happened, until 24 hours after it happened. When the Revolution happened in Egypt...I was like it's just fine let it happen, but then when it affected me personally, it affected people that I loved, and people passed-away. Literally, I had no idea, and I was like oh wow. It [The Revolution] was a slap in my face. I was like, I belong here, why didn't I think of it. It really made me to rethink everything, rethink my ideology, rethink my perception of myself in this place [Egypt].

Because I started to understand the system better, the Revolution, when it happened, it got me angry. It got me very angry at myself, because I didn't know about it. And then at the people that were opposing what was happening, because I felt that it was their right. But again it was their right; I never said it was my right until later on, when I felt that if my brother was getting into the army then I am a part of this.

For Nadia, the Revolution was an unexpected and abrupt event, as she described a “slap in my face.” She now feels a sense of belonging; “I belong here.” This new sense of belonging sparked by the Revolution forced her to rethink her ideologies and perceptions as an Egyptian, especially now that her brother got conscripted into the army. She further shared that the Revolution has forced her to learn about and follow Egyptian politics and current events: “to understand the system better.”

Admittedly, the Revolution was not the sole event that led to her reevaluating previous understandings of what it means to be an Egyptian citizen. The conscription of her brother and people she loved died from police violence while protesting also reinforced her newfound identity as an Egyptian citizenship. Consequently, Nadia felt she now had a role to play in Egyptian society and shared many personal stories and people who had helped her to realize her present relationship to Egypt.

Currently, while working on her master's degree, she is a university instructor teaching critical thinking and writing classes to undergraduate students at a private university. She points to her role as a teacher as important part of her participatory citizenship and newfound sense of belonging and duty to Egypt. In addition to being an instructor at the university, she is committed to volunteering with groups working to empower girls and women in underserved areas in Cairo.

Comparing these sub-anecdotes to the one explaining her perceptions before the Revolution, Nadia has grown a deeper connection to Egypt and, through her growth; she is committed to changing the life of her students as well as marginalized communities. The overall anecdote provides evidence to the argument that the Revolution was a pivotal event for Nadia in

the process of a deeper relationship with her Egyptian identity and a greater commitment to an active Egyptian citizenship. Similar to Ahmed, the Revolution, in combination with other influences such as experiences with family, friends, and education, was not the sole event that fostered a re-imagining of citizenship for Nadia. Many participants interviewed shared similar stories of how the political and social struggles of the revolution have greatly shaped their convictions of what it means to be an Egyptian citizen and how to actively practice those convictions for the social, political, and educational betterment of Egypt. The revolution appears to be an important catalyst for participants identifying as an Egyptian citizen and promoting a sense of duty to actively participate as a citizen in various spaces, thus participatory citizenship. However, as presented in the previous chapter the Ahmed and Nadia face challenges to their participatory citizenship.

### **7.2.3 Comparing perceptions of current challenges to participatory citizenship**

In the face of rising state repressions of freedoms of speech and assembly, on and off university campuses, as well as the postponement of parliamentary elections,<sup>199</sup> the dynamic socio-political situation in Egypt has the potential to degenerate into restrictive and apathetic environments similar to the era preceding the Revolution. Five years after the Revolution, both Ahmed and Nadia shared their frustrations to current challenges to participatory citizenship.

Ahmed feels that he does not have anybody to represent him politically and “it is very difficult to voice concerns or to be part of any political entity.” Furthermore, he commented “the political status is very disappointing and made me feel very disappointed and upset that I wanted to leave the country.” The frustrations felt towards the unstable developments within the formal political arena in Egypt was common among participants as was their desire to leave the country.

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<sup>199</sup> The 2011-2012 Egyptian parliament was dissolved in July 3, 2013. Elections for a new parliament were not held until October to December 2015. The Parliament convened in January 2016.

Ahmed's initial euphoria and hopefulness of the Revolution now has turned to cautious opportunism, and has forced Ahmed to focus more on "trying to make a change in some social aspects" such as in his classrooms and with community organizations, away from more formal political participation, hoping in "the long run" it will lead to political changes.

The challenges shared by Nadia highlight gender issues and the struggle for the rights of women in Egyptian society. Nadia feels that even though she believes she is equal to men, she states, "in society I am not really equal." One of her hopes is "as a female that I am free. I am free to express myself, to do what I want." She shared that she wants to be free to dress how she wants and to be able to walk in public without the fear of being harassed. Nadia attempts to create awareness about gender issues through discussions and various assignments with her students.

Although strained by social and political challenges, the new or renewed identity as an Egyptian and knowledge about politics and issues encouraged both Ahmed and Nadia to persevere and participate in various forms as an Egyptian citizen. However, their forms of participatory citizenship differed slightly. While Ahmed participate in protests, social movements, formal politics, as well as in community programs. Nadia tends to participate more in community groups. Where they aligned was in their commitment to teaching as form of participatory citizenship.

### **7.3 Critical Pedagogies for Active Citizenship**

Participants were empowered by their transformative experiences during the revolution and incorporate their roles and pedagogies as teachers within their new active understandings of participatory citizenship.

### 7.3.1 Education for social change

Ahmed and Nadia value formal and nonformal education as an important tool for social change in Egypt. Citizenship education for Ahmed and Nadia is a way to still actively engage as citizens in Egyptian society, while attempting to circumvent participating in formal Egyptian politics and some of the current challenges to participatory citizenship in Egypt.

*Education over formal politics.* Ahmed and Nadia perceive education as a way for people to become active citizens who can change the social realities of their country. They share a current frustration with formal politics to bring about significant social change and view teaching and education as something that is possible for the type of citizenship and social change that they are striving towards. For instance, Ahmed states:

Education and focusing on social issues can make a change in the country, even though it will take more time to reach the political change I am aiming at, but it is possible. So I am going for the possible.

For Ahmed, education that focuses on social issues is something he perceives as “possible” for social change. The reason that Ahmed views education as something that this is possible for social change may be connected to his perceptions of formal politics not being able to represent his concerns. Additionally, he perceives that there are dangers associated with public actions of protests or participating in oppositional politics. Ahmed shares:

If I go to the streets and protest, I will get caught by the Protest Law. Now, we have to get permission before any protest. And the media will forge a war, right away, against anybody who protests or anything seen as against the government will be criticized severely. It is very difficult for myself to voice my concerns or to be part of any political entity....Some of my friends have been tracked, and followed. Some have been questioned by the police. Maybe they track them to make sure that they do not tackle political issues in their programs.

In the quote, Ahmed highlights the current hazards and limitations of protesting and the difficulties of being a part of any oppositional political entity. Within the current socio-political

turmoil, rather than participating in political parties and accepting the formal political system, both Ahmed and Nadia share that teaching is a “safer way” for them to be actively engaged in shaped ideas about participating in the Egyptian society.

Ahmed and Nadia share a perception that education, and a specific form of critical citizenship education can transform society. Ahmed states:

Knowledge is power. The real capital is when you have educated people. So they will be exposed to other thoughts that will help them to have a more comprehensive understanding of the world, and maybe that will help them make the changes necessary for their country.

Ahmed equates knowledge to power and states that exposure to “other thoughts” can help people have a “more comprehensive understanding of the world,” which in turn may assist people towards active participatory citizenship necessary for social change.

Correspondingly, Nadia shares her experiences in formal education and how they “opened up” a “new perspective” within her. She was exposed to “new ideas” and “new ideologies” that she “never heard of before.” It is for this reason that Nadia perceives education as a space and tool where she can “make a difference.” Nadia states:

Education is the root of everything. Yes it is about culture, it is about the people, but if I want to change society I know that this is my strong point, this is where I can stand, I can make a difference in this. If I want to change my country, I can change my country through education.

Rather than turning to formal politics to strive for social change, Nadia perceives education and her role as a teacher as a means of active citizenship that she can use to influence her students and, in turn, change her country. However, it must be acknowledged that the educational system in Egypt—especially before the revolution—from primary through higher education, has been highly criticized by students, teachers, professors and researchers alike (see [Chapter 4](#)) for creating a public that is passive, obedient, and can generally be described as unaware subjects

rather than citizens. This begs the question, what type of teaching can be viewed as a political act of citizenship?

### **7.3.2 Reflection**

There are several reflective characteristics that both Ahmed and Nadia demonstrate as teachers. First, there is a self-realization of how they grew as citizens from before the revolution and connect it to their role as a teacher. Second, there is an understanding of incompleteness as a citizen and teacher. They strive to better their craft and continue to find ways they can give back and participate in their classes and communities. Third, they are open to new ideas, even if they challenge their previous understandings. There is also a conscious effort to learn from various sources. Therefore, they can be described as life-long learners. Most importantly, they recognize the knowledge and the learning they gain from their students. Fourth, they use their privilege to strive for social justice and challenge structures of oppression. Fifth, they provide opportunities for their students to reflect upon and evaluate lessons and the over-all class or programs. Last, as they reflect upon social and political issues in Egypt, they attempt to incorporate the conversational topics into their lessons.

### **7.3.3 Student-centered and problem-posing education**

Ahmed and Nadia attempt to challenge conventional teacher-centered and rote-memorization pedagogies by creating student-centered and problem-posing lessons. They usually begin a lesson by posing a question and showing a photo or some form of media that is relevant to the lives of their students. For example, during one lesson in Ahmed's nonformal program for underserved teenagers, the topic was trash and pollution in Cairo. After showing shocking but familiar photos of pollution in Cairo, Ahmed had students share their personal stories of how trash and pollution had personally impacted their lives. Then the students created a presentation

on ways they and their families could reduce pollution, by recycling and other sustainable acts within their households and neighborhoods. Additionally, within his English language class at a private university, Ahmed discussed issues of child poverty, orphans in Cairo, and failed state policies. The class visited an orphanage and established volunteer service learning opportunities for his students.

Examples from Nadia can also shed light on additional critical pedagogies for active citizenship. In Nadia's writing class she often has focused discussions and writing assignments on the causes of the revolution and future social and political developments of Egypt. One lesson was entitled, "Where were you?" For this lesson, Nadia asked students to reflect—first via class discussions, and then within a writing assignment—upon their about personal experiences of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. Additionally, she introduced topics of women's rights and sexual harassment with her mostly all male undergrad class. Nadia explains:

We were talking about women's' rights in Egypt. And I have only 4 girls in my class and there are 17 students, so I let the girls share their experiences of them walking down the street. And the boys were shocked, they didn't even know that this really happened. They were like "Oh it happens to other people not to us, we're different." And I was like, "No, it happens to us too." And they were like, "No, no, no, no. You're exaggerating." Then I give them a very simple example: I want to get something just down the street, right near my house, and it is only 10 pm. And I ask the guys, "Would you think twice before leaving the house?" They said, "No." Then I ask the girls, and they all said, "Definitely." And the boys were like, "What, why?" And I said because this is what you don't know, it has to do with awareness, with understanding, with being exposed.

Although some of the male students question the validity of the female students' experiences, suggesting that sexual harassment and sexism only occurs to other people (read people from lower classes), Nadia continues to challenge their ignorance by posing a simple but poignant question about what women considered before leaving the house at night. The form of student-centered and problem-posing pedagogies that Ahmed and Nadia employ, greatly counter

pedagogical norms in Egypt and provide a space for where the voices of Egyptian youth are appreciated.

*Dialogue.* Within their pedagogies, Ahmed and Nadia favor more dialogical methods over teacher-centered methods to engage students. “Class conversations” and student-led dialogue are common activities used by both Ahmed and Nadia to provide a safe space for students to bring into the classroom their experiences and knowledge(s), and used as a tool to incite student participation. Unlike, teacher-centered lectures and multiple choice assessments, dialogue is used as a means to show the differences in opinions, experiences, and beliefs, and to show that the world is not only black or white, but actually many shades of grey. For Ahmed and Nadia, it can also be used as a means to problem solve between different students, for team-building exercises, conflict resolution and to foster empathy for others. Dialogue is also significant for the development of questioning common knowledge and social norms.

However, the most important aspect of dialogue is listening. Listening, especially from the teacher, is something that many Egyptian youth are not familiar with. Within conventional educational and social experiences and spaces, students are the listeners. Although after the revolution Egyptian youth are attempting to carve out spaces of empowerment and resistance, it is rare to find spaces within Egyptian society where youth can actively have their voices heard (Laiq, 2013). However, for Ahmed and Nadia, listening to students was also connected to respectfully and empirically challenging students’ experiences and options to problematize worldviews.

Both Ahmed and Nadia created classroom environments where a considerable amount of time of was devoted to dialogue and listening to the experiences and opinions of students concerning various controversial social and political topics and themes (women’s rights,

challenging government policies, comparing religious beliefs, ways youth can participate in society, etc.). Listening is important because actively listening to students can empower students by validating their experiences and opinions. Additionally, using research and other experiences to challenge students' experiences and opinions can help them compare their experiences to others, can help them reflect upon their own situations, and can assist them to disrupted false social understandings or narrow and harmful ideologies.

***Student agency.*** With the newly found empowerment as citizens and the realization of their agency that was gained through the multifaceted experiences of the revolution, Ahmed and Nadia attempt to empower their students. Ahmed and Nadia strive to foster agency in their students to participate as active citizens in their communities and be a “part of society.” For example, Ahmed states, “I believe that helping my students become critical thinkers, active citizens who confident, courageous, and knowledgeable will lead to a great change in society.” Ahmed connects his role as a teacher with helping to develop “active citizens.” Furthermore, he connects critical thinking, confidence, courage, knowledge with active citizenship and social change. Similarly, Nadia stresses the importance of connecting her role as a teacher with cultivating a sense of connection to Egypt and a commitment to participate for her students.

Nadia states:

So a lot of them [her students] are not connected to their country. A lot of them do not know their rights. A lot of them are just focused on how to get out of here [emigration] and there is always negative feelings and thoughts that they have. They think that this [Egypt] is the worst place to be. Yes, this is the worst place to be, but you have a role to do here. They don't understand that they have a role to do.

Nadia comments on Egypt being “the worst place to be,” which may be a sentiment of her students, but it also shows her own frustrations with the multifaceted issues facing Egyptian society. While many students at the university are focusing on emigrating out of Egypt, Nadia attempts to foster within them a sense of belonging, an awareness of their rights, and helping

them to understand they have a role to play in the future of Egypt. Regardless of the current turmoil, Nadia still believes that her and her students have “a role” in Egyptian society.

*Creating awareness.* Part of empowering students is an attempt by Ahmed and Nadia to create awareness, or, at the very least, a curiosity about social and political issues that may lead to action. Ahmed explains that he views his actions of citizenship as:

Educating, teaching people, and helping them to be more aware of their identities and the identities of others, of various issues, of their part in their communities and all of that. In the long run, it will help them be a part of and change the political system.

The quote points to Ahmed’s understanding of his role as a citizen-educator that is founded about creating awareness with and for his students about the self as well as about others, about pressing social and political issues, and about student agency within their communities. Ahmed further believes this type of citizenship education can “change the political system” in “the long run.”

Nadia highlights her role as a citizen-educator as striving to promote more individual transformation. Nadia declares:

So, I cannot change the world, but at least I can change the life of my students. At least when I am in class, we do talk about rights, we do talk about freedom. I always make it a point to talk about these things. To open up their perspectives and their perceptions of certain things. And to listen to what they have to say.

Nadia admits that she “cannot change the world,” but she “can change the life” of her students. Nadia explains that student transformations can occur by “talking” (dialogue) about “rights,” “freedoms,” and opening up her students’ “perspectives” and “perceptions.” Additionally, she stresses the need to “listen” to what her students “have to say.” For both Ahmed and Nadia, creating awareness can be a very powerful tool of teaching for individual and social change, when it is combined with fostering a sense of self-worth and agency.

*Focus on marginalized and underserved groups.* Whether teaching with marginalized and underserved groups, or teaching about the issues and struggles that particular groups face, Ahmed and Nadia appear to view their role as teacher to serve traditionally marginalized and underserved people in Egyptian society. At the private university, Ahmed uses themes in the classes he teaches that often focus on using the privilege of his students to contribute to the better of the lives others. In addition to his instructor role at the university, Ahmed works with an educational program that provides educational opportunities for marginalized and underserved teenagers. Ahmed explains that he tries to provide the same level of quality and critical education to the marginalized teenagers he works with. Ahmed states, “I hope I can provide the same type of teaching with the marginalized and underprivileged, since they are not given the chance to get a real education, and they form the majority of the population.” Ahmed realizes the severity of poverty in Egypt and how it is connected to access of quality education.

For Nadia, the struggles of girls and women are common theme in her writing classes at the university. Additionally, she is involved in various programs that assist girls and women living in underserved areas of Cairo. Nadia explains:

I help out in the slums to teach children. We have programs that talk about hygiene, or plan activities in the summer. Or sometimes I work with charity groups to help collect money of certain causes. Or I hold cloth drives, especially in the winter. We work a lot with kids in the recycling area, in the Zabbaleen [garbage collectors] area. Working with orphans and girls, I go a lot to visit them and see what they need. We would have women’s group were we talk about experiences and just to be able to share is powerful. But we provide information about accessing certain items and services.

Nadia is engaged with multiple forms of charity, volunteering and teaching to marginalized groups.

#### **7.4 Teaching and Learning as a Political Act of Citizenship**

Using the experiences of Ahmed and Nadia, this chapter explored the question:

To what extent does university students and educators in Egypt perceive their actions of participatory citizenship? The trajectory of Ahmed and Nadia, through their social and political experiences of the revolution, has shaped their understanding of citizenship and their role as a citizen-educator. They both view their role as a teacher both in the formal university setting as well as within the marginalized communities as an important part of a political act of citizenship.

The anecdotes of Ahmed and Nadia demonstrate that being political is not relegated to formal politics and political parties, but can also be related to teaching and learning. Ahmed and Nadia connected their ideas of citizenship and being political, which have been significantly transformed by the socio-political events within the aftermath of the revolution, to their roles as teachers. They view education as an important tool for social change. They see their role as a teacher as means to transform society, where they intend to foster in their students an active citizenship that includes critical thinking, an awareness of issues, and a commitment to better their society. Moreover, the empowerment that learner-centered teaching pedagogies, class discussions about politics and controversial topics, and creating new spaces of questioning and resistance that Ahmed and Nadia demonstrated corroborates the findings of recent qualitative research on university instructors and professors in Egypt conducted after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution (Sharobeem, 2015; Waly, 2013).

The critical pedagogies for active citizenship that Ahmed and Nadia strive for include reflection, student-centered and problem-posing education, dialogue, student agency, and creating awareness, and it focuses on marginalized and underserved groups. These types of pedagogies can be seen as a form of resistance against traditional and conventional forms of teaching. By empowering students to question, learn about controversial social and political issues, and to actively engage in their communities, the pedagogies practiced by Ahmed and

Nadia can be seen a way to disrupt state- and society-sanctioned forms of citizenship education. The sustainability, support, and expansion of critical citizenship education and teaching as a political act of citizenship in Egypt are deeply enmeshed within the existing institutions and are subject to the political situation of the country at large. This begs the question, how do students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education? Guided by this question, [Chapter 8](#) focuses on the perceptions and experiences of participants regarding the pedagogies, programs and policies for university citizenship education in Egypt.

## **CHAPTER 8: UNIVERSITIES FOR ‘BREAD, FREEDOM, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE’: TOWARD PEDAGOGIES, PROGRAMS, AND POLICIES FOR CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN EGYPT**

The premise of this chapter is that universities have an obligation to capitalize on this unique period of raised consciousness, empowered citizens, and willingness on behalf of young people to participate in the betterment of Egyptian society. The chapter attempts to answer the final research question: How do university students and educators conceive the current role of the university in fostering citizenship education? The data presented was gathered from the experiences and perceptions of the all university students and educators who participated in this research. I organized the sections in hermeneutic phenomenological thematic fashion (Van Manen, 2014). The [first section](#) focuses on the perceptions of role of university citizenship education. The [second section](#) presents practical ways private and public universities can enhance citizenship education on campuses from the perceptions of university students and educators. The [third section](#) presents some analysis of providing university citizenship education in Egypt. It should be noted that each university and each university faculty in Egypt has its own unique strengths and challenges. The following chapter provides insight into the perceptions of university citizenship education from those students and educator who have experience in public and private universities in Egypt. The perceptions of participants represent their experiences and by no means represent all possible university experiences in Egypt, but provide valuable qualitative vision into the promises of active university citizenship education.

### **8.1 Perceptions of the Role of Universities as a Site for Citizenship Education**

During the interviews, participants identified, through various personal experiences, a number of challenges facing public and private universities in Egypt. However, rather than focusing on the challenges of the universities, which I have discussed in previous chapters and have been the

focus of much previous research, I want to present the perceptions of the role of universities fostering citizenship education. The participants emphasized a number of important elements in university citizenship education in Egypt. To begin, most participants regard the university as more than the functionalist understanding of viewing students as human capital preparing students for the labor market. Additionally, they criticize neoliberal models of the university that structure education as a commodity and consider students as consumers of the product of education. In this section, I will present various themes that participants viewed as essential for university citizenship education in Egypt including constructing change agents, the importance of critical thinking, the university as a public sphere, student empowerment, relevant pedagogy, peace education, and citizenship education for creating good humans.

### **8.1.1 Change agents**

Participants perceive universities as means to foster active citizenship and students as change agents. They discuss the importance of people who go out into their communities and into the world and make a difference. Mahmoud, a graduate student, states universities should be seen as:

A tool for understanding your rights and obligations as a citizen and defending them, and even gaining more in the public sphere. So higher education is a very fluid process for me that should not be highly structured but should be geared to enabling generations of active citizens that innovate and are pretty much are social entrepreneurs in the broader sense, in the sense that they are change agents.

Mahmoud focuses on the ways universities help students to understand rights and obligations and as a means to defend those rights through building the university as a “public sphere” (which will be discussed below). For Mahmoud, universities should foster students to become “change agents.”

Keeping with the notion of change, Karima, a professor, perceives universities as contributing to “social transformations” and construction of citizens. She shares:

I think when we, who are serving in higher education, really believe in universities contributing to social transformation as a collective group, we will be able to change it in a way that would fulfill those purposes. It's more than transmitting knowledge or skills, but how you would construct citizens through these institutions of higher education to go to the society and help to transform it socially, culturally, and hopefully economically as well. Because we do have a lot of cultural challenges, as well as social challenges, and definitely economic challenges. Students tend to think of higher education, and I would say some colleagues as well, just in relation to the labor market. So we need to give them the knowledge and skills and they would be a productive citizen. But productivity goes beyond, just doing your job and go home. It is about building this new consciousness after the Revolution, how to do that inside higher education institutions with your own students, and develop them as agents of change, and then they will go out into the society and do that in their work place, with their families, with their friends. And then if we succeed in doing that, they will be competent workers AND good citizens.

Karima discusses her role as professor and asks how do we (as professors) go beyond producing “productive citizens” in our students to build a “new consciousness” that helps to develop students as “agents of change.”

Another professor, Professor PC, suggests, “higher education is all about creating citizens.” She continues and describes the general focus on the job market and the lack of linking education to citizenship and ethics:

[Universities] are often seen by people as a way to prepare students for the job market, and it probably succeeds at that. But I think definitely it is not enough. Because I think a lot of people do perceive it at preparing people for the job market, they could focus on teaching engineering and not think about the citizenship implications of doing that.

For example, there are very few discussions on workers' rights for...they [engineering students] probably take like one course on economics in the engineering, and they probably feel like it's not an important course. In business, yes they take a course on ethics, but do they discuss ethics of advertising, every time they mention advertising and marketing? I don't know, I don't think so. I did computer science as an undergrad here [private foreign university], there was nothing in the way of preparing you for citizenship. We had a very small part of talking about ethics and it was about copyright. We didn't even discuss things like Open Source and why copyright might be unfair. It wasn't a questioning type of discussion of ethics and it wasn't about changing society.

Professor PC cites the limited inclusion of citizenship education in fields such as engineering and business as well as absence of enthusiasm and support for the inclusion of citizenship education.

Overall, participants view the university as a vital site where the construction of students as change agents occurs.

### **8.1.2 Critical thinking**

Participants emphasize the importance of universities teaching critical thinking and students learning how to question. Professor PC specifies the purpose and forms of critical thinking necessary to foster “better citizens.” She states:

The key thing, for higher education is to open students’ mind to be able to question everything. And then that will make them better citizens. And their critical thinking isn’t just about defending their own views, but also questioning their own biases and understanding of their own selves and questioning in order to reach something constructive.

Professor PC stresses a purposeful critical thinking that is more than “defending” one’s “own views.” It should teach students to be self-reflective and “question their own biases” and to understand themselves better as well as to build something—“, “to reach something constructive.”

Instructor IA also connects critical thinking with action and provides an experiential example of her ideas of citizenship education. She explains:

What I hope for is that people think critically about the situation around them, and try to actively change it if they don’t like it; to enhance society. Not to believe everything that is being told whether it is by supposedly the religious leaders, or by me, or by their mom and dad. So they look at the facts and see whether they are facts or seem like facts. And if they don’t like what they are seeing do something about it. Don’t just wait there and say well it’s not my problem someone has to fix it for me, because no one will. So that’s what I’m trying to do.

Instructor IA wants citizens to question, think about and act to change the situation around them. Even if that information is coming from their parents or religious leaders, students should critically analyze what she calls the “facts,” then take responsibility for change. Professor IA continues and provides an example of how she approaches citizenship education:

So last year I had my students watch an environmental video about what happens to their plastic bottles in landfills and bodies of waters and oceans. And one student came to me this year when she saw me and said, 'look I bought one of the refillable ones.' I don't buy plastic bottled waters anymore. And that's a small change, and that made me proud. This is what I'm hoping for types of citizenship education.

For participants, part of their vision of university citizenship education is implementing critical thinking. Critical thinking is not just an intellectual exercise but must be connected to action and transformation. For participants critical thinking is way students can challenge their own assumptions as well as social norms enforced by authorities. It is a means and processes to change society. Critical thinking becomes a way and a crucial element in the university fostering active citizenship.

### **8.1.3 Public sphere**

Participants also shared that the university should be understood and utilized as an important part of the public sphere. It is a space where people from different backgrounds and beliefs come together to dialogue in order to construct new social systems and address social issues. As Mahmoud stated above, the universities can be spaces where students learn about, as well as practice, demand, and strengthen, citizen's rights. Researcher RA describes universities as spaces that supposed to provide "a 101-crashcourse on how to became an active political citizen in your society." However, she discusses the transformations of that space as becoming driven away from a democratic and subversive space to a space that has become more defined by global elites and quest for skills compatible with the global economy. First RA connects universities to critical thinking. She states:

The university for me is definitely a process to which you are exposed to these critical voices, and a time in your life where you can reflect on your past and your formation, and view it critically and think about the different problems that you faced and how to move forward.

Then she connects critical thinking and the universities with being a space for dissent and active citizenship. RA shares:

Also, in the 20th Century the universities have been the cornerstone of dissent and movements. So I think it is a space where you actually explore and exercise yourself for the first time maybe, basic principles of organizing, political organization like distrusting leaflets and gathering people. It is supposed to be a 101-crashcourse on how to become an active political citizen in your society.

Moreover, she discusses the changes that have occurring in general on university campuses and how the university missions went from more of a public sphere to more elite notion of access to global economy:

But, unfortunately the trend since the end of the 1960s and 1970s, world-wide, has been to erase that from university campuses and turn universities into like really elite spaces where people can learn more skills about Microsoft or McDonalds so they can join it. There is a myth that you can be the CEO of these companies.

For participants, the university should be an important part of the public sphere. The university is a site where students interact, learn from and mobilize across different social divides. More than a space for social mobilization and access to the global economic system, the university should be an important space where not only knowledge about active citizenship is developed and gained, but where citizenship skills are acquired and citizenship actions are practiced and emanate from.

#### **8.1.4 Student empowerment**

Participants believe that the university should be an institution that empowers student not an institution that frustrates or increases their expectations and sets them up for disappointment.

Participants shared that it is imperative that the university is a place where students can develop self-worth, actively participate in various aspects of the university, and have an overall voice.

Instructor IA exclaims that she wants universities “to ready students to actually have a voice on

campus and in society.” Similarly, connecting student empowerment in the university with citizen empowerment throughout society, Ahmed states:

So our problems can be solved if people have ownership of the country. If students feel they have rights and they have duties, if this is being taught and practiced at universities, if they are free to found clubs and practice in community service work or do service learning at universities, if universities become a place for new ideas that help like knowledge creation, rather than a knowledge consumption. The universities are a place where all this can happen.

Student empowerment is a significant part of university citizenship education for participants and will be discussed further within [Section 8.2.2](#) on student development.

### **8.1.5 Relevant pedagogy**

Participants shared that universities must also provide relevant education that extends beyond the job market and into applicable pedagogy to fully participant with Egyptian communities and other social and political realms. They are advocating for a citizenship education that is relevant to the current social, political and economic struggles of Egypt. For example, Professor PC relies on Martha Nussbaum’s (2000) capability theory when explaining the process of teaching students to be critical with a particular context. PC suggests:

Martha Nussbaum has something she calls *combined capability*. She states it is not enough that someone has the capability, but there are also external circumstances that affect someone’s capability to go ahead and express that capability. So if you teach students to be critical, but you don’t teach them how to be critical in a caustic environment like we have right now, then they won’t be able to use it. So it is all these things together.

Professor PC stresses need to provide an education that is relevant to the lives of students as well as the society that the university is situated within. For example, Maha, a researcher working in a student development center at a private foreign university, shares her experiences trying to merge academic life and non-academic student life:

So what we are trying to do in our office is to bridge the gap between the academic part of students’ life on campus and the non-academic part of student life on campus to

promote student participation in different activities on and off campus. Universities need to equip students with the basic skills and knowledge of how to be a good citizen, a good active citizen, and second a good employee. That is how I see how universities should be.

It is not enough to simply provide pedagogies, programs and policy for citizenship education.

The participants suggest that university citizenship education must be relevant to the lives of students, to their communities, and to Egypt. Thus, by implication, relevant pedagogy must include students in the design and implementation of university citizenship education—an important part of student empowerment. Failure to realize student involvement in the planning of university citizenship education dooms the program from inception.

#### **8.1.6 Peace education**

A university citizenship education that includes a strong commitment to peace education, promoting values of empathy and altruism, ethics, and social responsibility, was a significant theme that participants emphasized. Graduate Student SD states that universities must promote “peace education” and create “peaceful citizens.” SD explains peace education as should “respect the practices of religions and the practices of our rights.” She observes that to a limited extent this is taught at the upper secondary school level (11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades), but its pedagogy is centered on standardized examinations. Additionally, SD proclaims at the university level “no one takes these courses.” SD states any type of citizenship education generally “stops at the university.” Moreover, she says citizenship education emphasizing peace education is not generally being taught within her particular public university, or, at the very least, by only a handful of professors within a few faculties.

Graduate Student SA explains her interpretation of peace education. She includes the content and methodology of peace education:

Peace education is basically described by the name. So it's about educating for peace or towards peace. And for me this happens as any education or pedagogy through content

and methodology. The content is more about understanding yourself, the other, and your surroundings, the environment. And the methodology is through discovery, inquiry and action.

SA suggests peace education should promote a content that seeks to understand the self, the other and the social and political environment. Additionally, she states the pedagogy should be delivered through “discovery, inquiry and action.” Connected to relevant pedagogy, SA explains:

The methodology of peace education should always be about respecting the learning path and the learning styles of the learner. And, respecting the learning process and learning environment. So you just try to create a learning environment with learners and guide the learner through it.

SA concludes any type of university citizenship education must include elements of peace education.

Researcher Maha discusses peace education and suggest that it should not begin at the university level. She states:

From K-12 there should be a basic citizen education introducing ideas of civic engagement, problem solving, creative and critical thinking, how to be a good citizen, how to co-exist with other people from different cultures, with different religions, different backgrounds, different ideologies. Then when students go to college they put this education into practice through classes that specify citizenship education for specific fields and through various activities on campus such as student clubs and organizations.

Maha proposed a layered and cumulative approach to citizenship education emphasizing peace education and understanding of the other similar to SA.

Participants suggest that peace education must also be connected to creating empathetic and altruistic citizens. RC argues the universities should be “Creating people who can act for causes and not being self-centered too much. And should give to the community because they are not living alone.” She continues:

Students shouldn't focus on how people perceive them, but how they perceive themselves. Not in an egotistic way, but in a self-reflective way. Not to be self-centered, and the world is centered around me, but also to know that you have competencies and goals, and you have to work on these goals. Not because you have to be the best in the

world, but because someone in the world needs your help. You know what I mean? It is very hard to achieve, but we have to try.

For RC, empathy should be linked to developing self-reflection and the realization that “someone in the world needs your help.”

Ahmed, an instructor featured in [Chapter 7](#), when discussing the ideas of citizenship education, he tells a story of infusing ethics into the learning of the scientists. Ahmed shares:

I attended a lecture at a mosque once, I don't have the details of the specific sayings, it was before the Revolution, and the sheik was discussing the global era of Islam. He said students learned ethics, politeness, and decency first, for years, and then they learned science. So that's what they start with, with behavior and values, with others and themselves. When they are done with this, they move to the scientific part and focus on science. So when they become scientists, their science would help humanity rather than just doing things that might harm or not be helpful. This is what I heard from him, talking about decency and ethics, with oneself, society, and god. Yeah, this might need some reading. But when you think about it, actually the opposite is happening now. Now our focus is on the market, money, inventions, technology, and so on, and that's it. Thinking that this is the best. Thinking that this is what'll help the country.

In Ahmed's account he promotes a science that “would help humanity” over a science that might “harm” humanity. Moreover, the story sheds light on how education is more focused on the market and money rather than decency and ethics, which Ahmed views as important part of citizenship education.

Another aspect of peace education is promoting the social responsibility of the university and of students. Researcher Maha explains that universities definitely have a responsibility to society. She argues that the first mission of the university is social responsibility. Maha explains:

Universities already took it upon themselves that they are educating the youth of this country, community or whatever. So I think this is a social responsibility itself. If I took responsibility of raising you for instance, I took social responsibility of you. It goes without saying. I do not need to make it clear, that okay I have a social responsibility towards you because I am raising you. So stating the obvious is really what irritates me in this country because it is never obvious. It's obvious to you, me, and some people on this campus, but it is never obvious to most people.

Maha argues that the social responsibility of universities is obvious but not to everyone.

Therefore, she continues and suggests the need to increase the connections through projects between her university and the community:

So yes, I think there should be more engagement through promoting, supporting, and initiating more developmental, social, educational, projects around. Like if we are here at [private foreign university], so we should be responsible for promoting for social and developmental projects for urban areas in Cairo.

To summarize, participants viewed peace education as a cornerstone of citizenship education. Peace education should begin in earlier levels of schooling and then be integrated into various fields within the university. Additionally, participants incorporate into their peace education principles of empathy, ethics, and social responsibility.

### **8.1.7 Good humans**

Associating the mission of the university with developing global citizenship has been a recent focus for university students, professors, and policy makers throughout the world (Rhoads & Szelényi, 2011). A few participants discussed ideas of citizenship education being related to creating what I would describe as global citizens. This pertained to the university's responsibility of fostering students that are good humans anywhere they are living or working. It is connected to a social practice that extends outside the realm of nation-state into being a good human regardless of geography or locality. For example, Researcher RC problematizes the idea of citizenship and focuses more on the actions of individual. RC states:

For me as a believer, when God created us, was there anything that was called a citizen? Regardless of whatever type human you are, we should aspire to be just a good human being throughout our lives.

We are putting so much emphasis on a geographical location or the place, too much emphasis, and forget about the person and their actions. We are placing too much emphasis on being attached to Egypt, without being good to Egypt and society. I am not sure really if universities should foster citizens... For me, when I first came to Cairo I really had so many objections to the lifestyles. Everyone that I met asked are you Cairen,

I emphasize I am not from Cairo, I am from Mansoura, you know. The characteristics of Cairo like consumerism, flashiness, and even nightclubs do not represent me. Is this the type of citizenship I am supposed to strive for? Again we have to define what is a citizen. Then it's an opinion; it's a human opinion.

In the quote, RC was discussing a particular type of elite cosmopolitanism that is common in many major urban capitals throughout the world. She did not want partake in some of the vices of metropolis living, so she rejects this type of citizenship. However, she did not mention the other active citizens of Cairo who were working towards social transformations. For RC, universities should not be providing citizenship education but an education that transcends national borders. For RC, the idea of the universities nurturing good humans is not connected to getting a good job or attaining a certain middle class lifestyles; it is based in religious altruism and has to do more with “being good to Egypt” or wherever you are (an interesting topic that no doubt needs future research).

In closing this section, participants envision university citizenship education in Egypt being connected to the university creating change agents, the importance of critical thinking, the university as a public sphere, student empowerment, relevant pedagogy, peace education, and the construction of good humans. These aspects of the university citizenship education should not be seen as mutually exclusive but must be understood as interdependent. But, how would these be practically implemented within the universities? The following section presents some of the ways that participants perceive university citizenship education being implemented.

## **8.2 Pedagogies, Programs, and Policies for University Citizenship Education**

Participants discuss many practical suggestions pertaining to enhancing university citizenship education. This section highlights four notable elements of university citizenship education,

namely faculty development, student development, commitment to civic engagement, and international opportunities.

### **8.2.1 Faculty development**

To enhance university citizenship education, participants discuss the need for faculty members to update courses, syllabi and research. For example, Graduate Student SD argues:

Professors should update their curriculum and lectures with new terms and research. Offer new courses about civic education; it should only be offered at the secondary school levels. At universities, we need to discuss concepts and practices of freedom and rebellion.

Similarly, Professor Mariam suggest the need to upgrade syllabi and also argues that professors from various fields must work to include assignments and projects that facilitate civic engagement and service learning into their syllabi. She states, “If professors can incorporate projects into their syllabus, helping people, making a change through civic engagement, it might on, a smaller scale, change things.” Moreover, Graduate Student SG also suggests that faculty members should promote “critical thinking.” For example, she suggests, “watching documentaries about the Revolution” which can be accompanied by “promoting ways of constructing the ideas of the revolution.” The classroom can be a space “where students can express their opinions”

Another element identified to enhance faculty development of university citizenship education is using the classroom space as a site to discuss and dialogue certain issues and actions of citizenship. Professor PC states:

Maybe faculty needs more support in discussing the difficulties of bringing in citizenship issues into the classroom...it is a difficult line to cross. I think a lot of professors and instructors just decide, “it is not my specialty, I don’t know how to do it, I am not going to do it.” On the other hand, you have the other side where people are very strong with a certain view, and then the students get really annoyed like you are trying to indoctrinate them into that position, and that is problematic, too. How much and when should a university involve itself with the details of classroom topics of discussion?

Although Professor PC advocates for faculty members to use the classroom as a space to discuss relevant issues, she argues it is “a difficulty line” between creating that space and not trying to “indoctrinate” the students. She then poses a difficult question of institutional control versus professor and classroom autonomy: “How much and when should a university involve itself with the details of classroom topics of discussion?”

Graduate Student SI pleads that professors from various fields need to include morality and ethics into their lectures and syllabi. She states:

They [professors] need some lectures on morals, and speaking on the benefits of having some kind of values, and practicing those values in our communities. Unfortunately, sadly, I have to confess that people are lost here [in Egypt]. You know the fact that we have been exposed to bloodshed for a very long time, I feel that people now don't care about each other. They don't feel for the sadness of a mother who lost her child, or a wife who lost her husband. The fact that he is from the Muslim Brotherhood or he's from the military, or he's from the police, doesn't give an excuse for him being killed. There is no law on earth or even in any religion that makes bloodshed sometime normal, or something that can take place anytime. The university can provide some guidance on issues of morals.

SI connects the need for “lectures on morals” to address the increased violence in Egyptian society and what she perceives as the blatant acceptance of that violence. She views the university as a source for “guidance on issues of morals.”

Some participants argue that universities need to support innovated research that integrates citizenship education and social justice into various fields. On the topic, Graduate Student SD encourages upgrading university research for social concerns. She states that universities need “to establish and set a high standard of scientific research and logic that are driven by some of the ideals of the Revolution.”

Many participants share the tensions that exist between students and professors. Participants shared common stories of professors being too busy to talk with students after class, students yielding to unprofessional demands of professors in order to receive good grades, or

professors being perceived as unapproachable. What participants suggest is a rebuilding of relationships between students and professors.

Participants also cite many examples of positive relationships and practices between students and professors. An example of just a small way to reestablishing a positive and equal relationship between students and professors is from instructor Nadia. She explains she likes to “keep an open channel of communication” with her students. She says she is there to facilitate their growth not to hamper it or to fail them. She says she tries to disrupt the student-professor hierarchy. Nadia shares, “I don’t even let them call me doctor or professor. They call me Nadia because, why not? It just breaks this barrier between us.” Nadia says her overall approach does not make the students respect her less but actually empowers them to be more open with her, which she says leads to more class participation and a deeper relationship with her students.

The number of university students and the overcrowded classrooms, especially in the public universities, would severely constrain any faculty development for citizenship education. Instructor ID recommends that at Ain Shams (public university) “a place to start would be to reduce the number of students per class.” She continues with a question, “How can you learn in a hall of a thousand students?” There is no doubt that the question of high student enrollment and overcrowded classrooms must be at the center of any university citizenship education policy. Overall, participants view faculty development as an important piece of enhancing university citizenship education. They advocated for citizenship education providing the foundation for updating syllabi, creating new courses, and integrating it into research for various fields including the “hard sciences.” Enriching the relationships between students and professors are also seen as an important step to developing stronger university citizenship education.

### 8.2.2 Student development

One of the main focuses of enhancing university citizenship education for participants is student development. Participants propose various aspects of student development such as providing spaces for student empowerment, and providing access to and quality of student-led organizations.

The idea of providing a university space for students to dialogue, to imagine, and to participate in decision-making was common among participants. Graduate Student SF suggests universities need to “have spaces where students can express their opinions. Whether its protests, art, politics...it should be allowed.” Professor PC adds that:

Universities should provide students with the encouragement and opportunity to imagine citizenship in different ways that it isn't just voting, just advocacy. To see that there is different ways of doing it, that it is okay to choose a different path than what you are used to people hearing about.

With regards to governance, Instructor IA argues for a strong involvement and presence of students within the various decision-making processes of the university. IA argues:

Citizenship education must be about encouraging critical thinking, actually listening to the students, involving students in the decision process. Students are not involved. Everything is done up there, and we have to follow blindly. So I want students to be actively involved and they should have a say in what they study, how they study it, and the policies that you are asking me to follow. You're asking me to attend, why should I attend? Students should be involved in the decision making process not just at the universities, but at the national level. I think the Parliament is a joke. So if you want to hear citizens, listen to the people on the street, not the ones in the Parliament. I want higher education to ready students to actually have a voice.

Instructor IA connects student involvement in university decision-making processes with student involvement at the national level, suggesting the universities must “ready students to actually have a voice” in society.

Participants also shared the need for greater student involvement and participation in student groups and organizations. There are a lot of benefits for student participating in student

clubs and organizations, they can provide a space where students imagine, dialogue and practice citizenship. Students can gain knowledge and skills necessary for an active citizen from participating in student-led organizations. However, as an important part of university citizenship education there are some issues that participants suggest must be addressed.

Access to student clubs and organizations needs to be addressed. Instructor IC explains the conundrum of student access to student clubs:

So maybe better access and increase the number of clubs, activities, or programs for students to join. Yes, better access. Because sometimes I talk with my students and they tell me they “we have to go through a strict interview process to join this program and this club.” You are supposed to be learning and living the whole [college] experience, so they should allow for a large number. So there are a lot of subprograms for example, so everyone who wants to join should be able to join. Not just limiting the experience to who can speak the best. Because students need to have this enriching experience, they want to change society and make a difference. Some of them they want to gain this skill, but they don’t have the skills to get in in the first place. So how can they gain it if they are not accepted into the student clubs?

And what criteria do you choose? Because the ones that are carrying out the interviews just joined the club a semester earlier. I ask my students, what kind of questions were you asked. And one told me they asked “sell this pen in a few sentences” or “give me a creative idea for”...like cliché questions. How do you judge this?

I think student groups need some kind rules on acceptance of applicants. Even maybe to get some credit or something extra, so that the value of it is increased. Maybe it [student participation] could be connected to grades, since we are grade oriented. Because they need to get interested in it, they need to be encouraged. Some students just enter the university and focus on the grades and knowledge, and just focus on the major, and they don’t have time for anything else. They are afraid that if they join one of these activities they might lose grades, or it might affect negatively their performance.

For example, at [private foreign university], they don’t have space to carry out these activities and for sure it will negatively affect their academic achievement. Because it will conflict with the time needed to succeed in their classes.

Access to clubs is an issue for students. She also proposes offering university or class credit for student participating in particular student-led organizations to counteract the time constraints placed on students from their academic responsibilities. Additionally, she suggests the university or clubs offering interview workshop to assist students with the interview process.

Professor PC also describes the importance as well as dilemmas of student organizations.

PC explains:

So doing things like Model Union Nations, you learn to debate and research, and work with other people. But you can go through an experience like MUN and learn nothing. You can just have fun with your friends, or could do very minimal research; you can just go and debate for the sake of debate, without thinking about conflict resolution. You could through it and not question the UN as a structure and the injustices of some of the things that they have there.

Or you can get lucky and be one of those people who does question a little bit more. And same with all sorts of student activities, you could go through one of the charity type actives and think that you have done your job. But if you are doing it really well you start to think about sustainable development and not just charity. And if you start doing these activities early on, by the time you graduate you have matured in that sense, and hopefully when you graduate you continue. But if you are, like a lot of people, and think you need to focus on your studies and your studies don't led you to any of that, because you don't have to do it in your studies. And then you start doing it as a graduate, to have something on your C.V., you don't have enough time to develop and mature, you don't have time to become a leader in one of these organizations.

Professor PC stresses the importance of combining student activities with a critical consciousness of participating. It is not enough that students participate, but what do they learn from participating, and how they participate is an important issue when discussing student organizations as part of university citizenship education.

Participants also emphasize the need for student groups to connect and build more partnerships between groups on campus and between campuses. Mahmoud explains:

I would definitely work more on creating connections between different student groups. I know it is a very old idea, but it really works. If you create those connections and networks and make them really strong, then you create leaders as much as you can everywhere. Then the groups can work together on fighting for a common idea, towards a common issue. I think this is very much sustainable, on an intellectual and resistance format. So creating this resistance rhetoric and creating those movements on the ground and community organizing would be much better on the student level if we keep those connections happening. Which is something the state is definitely aware of and they deliberately fight, through rules, laws, procedures, and security presence. I have a friend who is working on a paper, entitled "School as a Tool of State Isolation."

Mahmoud highlights the need to create links between student groups, which he views as necessary to address a common issue. However, he suggests that the state is aware of such mobilizing tactics and “deliberately fights” against such connections.

Student development for citizenship education can contain many elements. The participants focused on the importance of creating spaces for student empowerment and enhancing the access, experiences, and effectiveness of student organizations. One element of university citizenship education that connects with both faculty development and student development is civic engagement.

### **8.2.3 Civic engagement and community service learning**

Many participants discuss the importance of including civic engagement and community based learning programs as part of university citizenship education. For example, Professor PC states, “civic engagement, and going into communities and things like that you start to understand that there are people in your country who are different than you, and that develops you as a citizen a lot better.” For Professor PC, civic engagement can help understanding diversity, which in turn can be important part of the self-reflection process of citizenship building. Additionally, Professor PC suggest:

I think a lot of the extra-curricular activities open the door for active citizenship. So there is a lot of literature on how even apolitical civic engagement can improve students’ confidence in their efficacy as citizens. So when they do become political they have the skills, capacity, and the social capital to organize, and work with people and move forward. That to me is what worked for me. I am not a particularly political person. But I did a lot of that kind of activity in school, and as soon as I graduated I did a lot of grassroots work.

PC is arguing the even apolitical civic engagement can provide the “skills, capacity and the social capital to organize, and work with people.” She states that, eventually, these activities may lead to more critical and active forms of citizenship.

Maha discusses the need to get students for the private foreign university where she is employed to participate in civic engagement programs. Maha states:

We should be speaking to students about civic engagement. So some universities have made this or are working towards making this a requirement. Where you cannot graduate unless you serve a certain amount of hours of community service, and not community service in the 5th settlement or Tagamaa [a rich, elite area of Cairo] of course, but community service to get exposed to other people—not only slum areas, but also rural areas maybe in Cairo, Upper Egypt, or the Delta. So you get them out of their bubble. Because some people they don't know that these people exist. There is an Egypt director, Khalid Youssef, is doing documentaries on the slum areas. Some friends and students I work with think he is exaggerated and were like, “no, no this doesn't exist. No way it's not like that, we don't have that here in Egypt.” Then I tell them, “Honey you haven't seen it, I can show you around.” And they do not know this exist! So this could be one thing that is unacceptable.

For Maha, civic engagement is one way that students from private foreign universities can “get out of their bubble” and not only experience other communities in Egypt but contribute to helping communities as well.

Graduate Student SI views civic engagement as an essential way that students for public university students can be empowered and take ownership within their communities. SI states:

In my experience, public university students, if they were involved in initiatives and had funds or grants to do some projects, they would feel more for the people. So they will be keen about improving the conditions that they are living in, having a say, and would appreciate the opportunities that they are given. They will be capable, and be aware of the places that deserve intervention of something. So why not through service learning? Why not?

While the participants advocate for the benefits of increasing civic engagement opportunities on public and private universities, access to civic engagement is not enough. Some argue that civic engagement programs also must monitored so that students follow through and complete the programs. Professor PC shares:

The other issue is when universities provide more opportunities for some community-based or extra-curricular activity, they must make sure that students go through that. It is not enough to assume that they have an option. Because a lot of the program options at [private foreign university], if you calculate them properly for engineers, especially, they could skip it. So they could do an engineering internship instead of a community-based course, they can do a thesis instead of a capstone. They got more options now, they keep changing the program, so it's getting better, but it is more difficult. And maybe the advising should get better in that sense.

To assist with students' participation and continuation of civic engagement programs, Professor PC suggests that counseling and/or advisors help with the sustainability of student participant in civic engagement groups.

#### **8.2.4 International opportunities**

Study abroad programs, international internships, and conferences were discussed as important ways to incorporate into university citizenship education. Many participants support the increasing the availability for university students to participate in various international experiences. Professor PC illustrates the significance of international experiences with reference to intercultural dialogue:

A lot of the programs that seem to help students a lot better are activities where they get chances for intercultural dialogue and that...the interesting thing about intercultural dialogue as a way to develop critical thinking is that it is...by doing this cross cultural dialogue with someone from a totally different culture, it sort of helps you understand people who are different than you and your own culture. Because it doesn't feel as confrontational in that sense. But, then you come back here and question your own biases and start to understand the other even though the other is of your own nationality, or your own religion maybe even.

Professor Mariam advocates for international exchange programs. She states:

I think universities should incorporate programs like exchange programs with other universities around the world. I find that the students that I had who went away for a semester let's say in Germany, they came back with an open-mind. I'm talking about academic as well as well as internships. The world is becoming more and more interconnected. Yeah they can see everything virtually... And I speaking not just at [her university], but I hope that there are programs across all universities in Egypt that have connections with somehow other universities, or other institutions abroad. I find that it makes a difference with students when they travel abroad. Because they feel more proud

about being Egyptian. Because when they stay, it is human nature, you take things for granted. When they travel they have two or three months of an identity crisis, and then they realize I'm Egyptian. I introduce myself as an Egyptian, I eat Egyptian foods, I compare their lives to my Egyptian heritage. So they realize that they are Egyptians. Sometimes we don't realize it and think oh we are all Egyptians here, but when you travel people ask you where are you from and you say we are from Egypt, and you start to feel home sick, you are away from your family. So you develop an appreciation for Egypt. Also they learn new skills abroad. When students return to Egypt they can apply the new found appreciation and skills to Egyptian communities. And international students learn new skills here. So it is a two-way benefit.

Student SH emphasizes the need for access to internships abroad:

Yeah, I think that we have some study abroad opportunities, but I also think that it is important to do internships, like for the summer. So some students do internships here, but it is not a culture like in some places in the U.S. where you work every summer, when you are in high school even. Students don't work here, they still live with their parents, and they definitely don't work over the summer and most of them don't work in college. For them actually going into the workforce is brand new. I think it is important for them to actually work, but I think it will be cool for them to work and do an internship abroad. Because that is the time, it's a short time and their family is already probably sending them somewhere, and it would be a good opportunity for them to see the workforce outside, to see if they even like it. Because a lot of kids think that the rest of the world is so much better than Egypt, it is not necessarily, it depends. But it is not the be-all-end-all to just leave, it is not necessarily true. So I would say try it.

Some people, most of my friends and most people when they leave, they miss Egypt so much; that is more important to me. Because this place somehow fosters a deep love of the country. If nothing else, I may not be patriotic in terms of a country and nation-state. I don't like these ideas of nation-states, I think they do more bad than good. But I have a deep connection to this place to the point when I will miss it deeply, I am excited when I come back; I always feel disconnected from it. And it is not just me; its most people that I know.

If students went abroad, a lot of students would actually discover that no, "I actually want to be in Egypt." I am bringing in the work thing simple because I think it is important to see not just the studying, because you can study abroad and just take electives or just party, because the social aspect is important too, I think it is a good experience, but actually working and actually really dealing with real life things, sometimes it is really helpful to do it in an international environment. Or being in a place where you have students from all over the world.

Similar to Professor Mariam, Student SH connects international travel with fostering an appreciation for Egypt. SH specifically stresses the importance of gaining workplace experience and advocates for international internships.

Student SH continues and includes the importance of students attending conferences. SH

explains:

Conferences are a really good way of how [the private foreign university she attends] builds networks and develops more active citizens. It is a bonding experience, people from all over the world. And as soon as someone has a friend from somewhere else, they can immediately say, “You know it’s not necessarily like that, I know someone from there.” It is an important reference for people to have, and because a lot of Egyptians don’t meet people from different nationalities they don’t have those references. So when they talk in school, in high school or even in college, all they know is their own world. So when they talk about something, “all Americans are like this.” They have no idea, because they don’t even know one single person. Like in the U.S., once you meet a Muslim and they are not a terrorist, if nothing else it does one tiny thing to your brain, and you are like, “Oh wait, I don’t know how to compute this.” But it is true, you need to have a personal relationship with someone to really break a lot of those stereotypes.

Egyptians in general, the kids that I was teaching in 11 Grade, I introduced them to an exchange program with a Danish high school. It was the first time for these kids to travel outside. I went with three girls. Three girls were all that the school could afford, and then they expanded the program the following years. It was the first time they were out of the country. It was the first time for the them meeting someone completely different than them. It was Scandinavia, it was cold, it was so weird and different. But within one week, you could see the girls completely change. That is something you could do with just an international experience. That’s crazy to me. [Her university] gives so many of those opportunities for students, to study abroad for a year, a semester, a summer, go to conferences, you can write papers that can go abroad into international competitions.

Additionally, participants stressed the necessity to modify international opportunities for specifically for Egyptian students. Student SH argues:

I don’t think there is enough international programs tailored to Egyptians. Even when you talk to parents, unless they grew up abroad, most parents would say the U.S. is too far. They can study abroad in Europe, but we can’t afford the U.S., it’s too far, they don’t have any family there, we’re not going to send them there. It is all these little things. It makes sense, these family issues prevents students from going abroad. And there could be more compromises. We need to think a bit more creatively of how to get kids to do things outside of Egypt or even within Egypt, where the service learning needs to be promoted better. This needs to be happening that makes it more attractive.

Whether study abroad programs, internships, or conferences, participants linked international opportunities, specific to Egyptian university students, with active university citizenship education.

To summarize this section, there is a long list of recommendations towards active universities by those interviewed. Participants focused on faculty and student development, civic engagement programs, and international opportunities. Overall, notable recommendations embraced calls for incorporating citizenship-based knowledge and skills throughout the curricula in all faculties; fostering meaningful and equal student-professor and student-counselor relationships; upgrade the quality of teaching, labs, and libraries; enhance inclusive and safe spaces for student dialogue of critical issues (inside and outside the classroom); increase the number and accessibility of inclusive clubs/programs that focus on civic and political empowerment and social entrepreneurship; increase social and academic partnerships with surrounding communities, especially the underprivileged; fostering social and academic partnerships across universities and other educational institutions; provide travel opportunities (nationally and internationally) for study, internships, and conferences; and promoting social justice orientated research that address social, political, and economic issues in Egypt and beyond. The realization of active citizenship education should be seen as part of a large project to rebuild Egyptian state and society with the aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution. To the point, Professor Mariam offers an analogy:

So it's like everyone needs to be working at this point, students, professors, universities, government, NGOs, and private business need to be working and be involved. This is the time when everyone need to working together to help this country be better. Just like Germany did after the World War II, everybody start working with their hands, rebuilding the country.

### **8.3 Towards Universities for 'Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice'**

The participants demonstrate a moral and political will to reform universities towards adopting democratic and active models of citizenship education. They perceive the university as important site where students can be change agents, where critical thinking is valued and promoted, where

the university is seen as an essential part of the public sphere, where student empowerment is nurtured, and as a space where relevant pedagogy, peace education and the construction of good humans can occur. To accomplish enhancing university citizenship education, participants called on universities to focus on faculty and student development, civic engagement programs and international opportunities. However, it should be understood that sustainable models of active citizenship education must take into consider two important elements, a comprehensive implementation of citizenship education throughout the whole university and social and political change connected to the broader Egyptian society.

First, participants stress the importance of having comprehensive citizenship education throughout the entire university. Instructor Ahmed describes at length the comprehensiveness of implementing university citizenship education:

For citizenship education, the culture of the whole university needs to be included in this change. For example, like the rights of those with special needs, how are they addressed at the university? Even if I don't have special needs, but I walk and see that special needs are considered, that shows me that all citizens are considered and they are respected. And that reflects on my behavior outside the university.

So it is the culture of the whole place, like the facilities. Like, the library and the opened hours of the library and whether they suit the needs of the students, and how they are being helped at the library. The cleanliness of the bathrooms, the cleanliness of the worship places. The facilities that give a chance for people to worship regardless of their religion, is it catered to or not? The spaces where the students can practice sports or practice their hobbies or establish their clubs. The process of permissions, how long does it take to establish something? The elections within the university, how are they monitored, how are they practiced? How are top students being celebrated, and how also are underachievers are being helped? The projects that are initiated from the university to help the community and the society, the times of meeting the deans and the presidents of the university, how many times do the students meet them? Do they get a chance to meet them or not? What food is available, and whether is healthy or not, and whether it is affordable or not?

It is in the culture of the university; I need to see in the whole university. And of course it should be part of the subjects being taught within the university. So it has to be within class and throughout the campus and university at large. Because it is not something to be preached, it is something to be practiced and negotiated by all the members of the

university and then it will be internalized, and then it will be practiced outside the university campus.

Although I believe that the sustainability of university citizenship education rests in the ability to be comprehensive and change “the culture of the university,” such reforms would face many challenges namely funding and budgetary constraints.

In addition to recognizing the comprehensiveness of the implementation of citizenship education, it must be understood that universities are a reflection of the broader society. Therefore any university citizenship education reforms cannot in isolation of changes to the broader social and political systems. Instructor Khalid reminds us:

You can't find a solution for the universities, without finding a solution for the whole system and the whole community actually. We should have hope and have a project for our whole country.

Additionally, Researcher Deena shed light on the issues of authoritarian structured educational system and university autonomy and how it needs to be reformed prior to the realization of active citizenship education on university campuses. Researcher Deena explains:

First the autonomy of the university needs to be guaranteed. The university needs to be an independent place that is free from police presence, free from bureaucratic complications. The students should be allowed to move freely, to express themselves, and to form organizations. It is these organizations, whether political or nonpolitical that forms citizenship. The student organizations should be not only permitted, but supported, which is not at all the case, especially after June 30. Even the mothers or the families are being subject to server bureaucratic restrictions. I think these organizations should be allowed.

When discussing university citizenship education, students and educators must struggle with the question, can active university citizenship education truly be realized and exist within an authoritarian context?

In the face of such challenges, if university policy makers, administrators, professors, and students do not address the problems of the universities comprehensively, cohesively, and creatively, Egyptian universities may be faced with severe consequences. On the one hand,

universities unwilling to create spaces of dialogue and empowerment, failing to recognize their role of fostering and embracing active student-citizens, while attempting to alienate and oppress nonviolent forms of student activism run the risk of pushing student movements underground towards increasingly radical ideologies and violent tactics that may amplify instability and drastically hinder the overall safety and quality of education. While on the other, if the situation and the climate of fear persist, universities are in jeopardy of developing apathetic, passive, and uncritical student-citizenry plagued with ambitions of leaving Egypt and apprehensive about bettering Egyptian society. Neither the former nor the latter bodes well to uphold the January 25<sup>th</sup> ideals of “bread, freedom and social justice,” Egyptian democracy, the stability of Egypt or for the advancement of universities as vital institutions in the future development of youth as critically engaged Egyptian citizens.

## CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to summarize the findings and condense the learning(s) of this dissertation, to present the constraints of the research, and to provide an agenda for future research.

### 9.1 What Did I Learn? Summarizing the Findings

In [Chapter 6](#), I revealed that for participants the revolution significantly impacted perceptions and actions of citizenship. The data from the participants showed that the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution helped to foster an upsurge in participation, a greater sense of belonging, a greater sense of social and political awareness, a greater sense of hope, and a greater sense of community as an Egyptian citizen. In addition to the experiences during the Revolution and its aftermath, there are competing influences of citizenship education extending beyond the realm of formal education into family, gender, religion and spirituality, and traveling. Although these are just some of the “teachers” or sources of ideas and actions surrounding citizenship, this complexity goes beyond previous studies that focus the analysis of citizenship identity in the Arab world exclusively on kin/family, religion, and the state (Parolin, 2009).

The concept of active citizenship is difficult to achieve under authoritarian regime, and more so in states with limited democratic experiences. The January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian Revolution was an attempt to shake off the chains of the past for Egyptian subjects towards an Egyptian citizenship. The new or renewed identity as an Egyptian citizen and the knowledge about social and political issues encouraged the participants to transform their reimagined ideas and identity of citizenship into actions. The participants shared that they are participating as citizens in multiple physical spaces including formal, non-formal, and informal spaces. Participation

extends beyond the often narrowly defined boundaries of participation espoused by state, the family, or religion, but the experiences of the Revolution demonstrated a disruption in traditional and conventional forms of participatory citizenship in Egypt. The experiences of participants called for a broadening of the understandings of physical and rhetorical spaces of citizenship in Egypt. However, currently within the context of the contentious aftermath, as participants waver between the discourses of frustration, instability, and cautious optimism, participants are faced with many challenges to participatory citizenship. Violence and arrests, disengagement, relegation to virtual participation, religion, family constraints, a fear of change, restrictions on civil society, sexual harassment and gender discrimination, the tension between survival and citizenship, emigration, and limitations of formal education all contribute to create major impediments to participatory citizenship in Egypt.

The narratives of participants showed that perceptions of citizenship are dynamic. Perceptions of citizenship evolve or retract with struggle. How a participant dialectically navigates and interprets her/his social world impacts that perception, which points to the unfinished nature of citizenship—a vibrant socio-political moral concept that every generation must reimagine and reinvent through various forms of social struggle. It shows that citizenship is a dynamic process possessing ebb and flow characteristics. Therefore, in the face of these numerous challenges, participants are attempting to address these issues and create awareness as part of their commitment to education.

In [Chapter 7](#), through the voices of Ahmed and Nadia, I identify how their social and political experiences of the revolution shaped their understanding of citizenship and their role as nurturers of citizens and citizen-educators. They view their role as a teacher both in the formal

university setting as well as within nonformal educational spaces as an important part of a political act of citizenship in Egypt.

The lived experiences of Ahmed and Nadia demonstrate that being political is not relegated to formal politics and political parties, but can also be related to teaching and learning. Ahmed and Nadia connects their ideas of citizenship and being political, which has been significantly transformed by the socio-political events within the aftermath of the revolution, to their roles as teachers. They view education as an important tool for social change. They see their role as a teacher as means to transform society, where they intend to foster in their students an active citizenship that includes critical thinking, an awareness of issues, and a commitment to better society. Moreover, the empowerment as teachers, learner-centered teaching pedagogies, class discussions about politics and controversial topics, and creating new spaces of questioning and resistance that Ahmed and Nadia demonstrated corroborates with recent qualitative research on university instructors and professors in Egypt conducted after the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution (Sharobeem, 2015; Waly, 2013).

The critical pedagogies for active citizenship that Ahmed and Nadia strive for includes reflection, student-centered and problem-posing education, dialogue, student agency, creating awareness and focuses on marginalized and underserved groups. These types of pedagogies can be seen as a form of resistance against traditional and conventional forms of teaching. By empowering students to question, learn about controversial social and political issues, and to actively participate in community engagement, the pedagogies practiced by Ahmed and Nadia can be seen a way to disrupt the official curriculum of citizenship education, meaning state and society sanctioned forms of citizenship education. This begs the question, if critical citizenship education and teaching as political act of citizenship in Egypt are deeply enmeshed within the

institutions they exist in and therefore are subject to the political situation of the country at large, what factors can lead to the sustainability, support and expansion of critical citizenship education in Egypt?

As I demonstrated in [Chapter 8](#), the participants express a moral and political will to reform universities towards adopting democratic and active models of citizenship education. They perceive the university as important site where students can be change agents. They interpret change agents as someone working in the broader society as well as inside the university. Moreover, they view the university as a space where critical thinking is valued, promoted, and acted upon, where the university is seen as an essential part of the public sphere, where student empowerment is nurtured, and as a space where relevant pedagogy, peace education and the construction of good humans can occur. To accomplish enhancing university citizenship education participants called on universities to focus on faculty and student development, civic engagement programs and international opportunities. However, it should be understood that sustainable models of active citizenship education must take into consider two important elements, a comprehensive university-wide implementation of citizenship education, and social and political change connected to the broader Egyptian society. As I said before, quoting Abdalla (2008), “the question of university democracy has always been intertwined with that of democracy in the country at large” (p. 230).

In the face of such challenges, if university policy makers, administrators, professors, and students do not address the problems of the universities comprehensively, cohesively, and creatively, Egyptian public and private universities may be faced with severe consequences. On the one hand, universities unwilling to create spaces of student dialogue and empowerment, failing to recognize their roles of fostering active student-citizens and embracing social

responsibility, while attempting to alienate and oppress nonviolent forms of student activism, run the risk of pushing student movements underground towards increasingly radical ideologies and violent tactics that may amplify instability and drastically hinder the overall safety and quality of education. While on the other, if the situation and the climate of fear persist, universities are in jeopardy of developing apathetic, passive, and uncritical student-citizenry plagued with ambitions of leaving Egypt and apprehensive about bettering Egyptian society. Neither the former nor the latter bodes well to uphold the January 25<sup>th</sup> ideals of “bread, freedom and social justice,” Egyptian democracy, the stability of Egypt, or for the advancement of universities as vital institutions in the future development of youth as critically engaged Egyptian citizens.

## **9.2 Constraints**

During my research I faced a number of constraints that must be addressed. This section will focus on AUC and privilege, the field of education, women participants, and language as all issues of constraints to my dissertation.

### **9.2.1 The focus on AUC and privilege**

To begin, the instability in Egypt, although provided a unique historical moment to situate a study on participatory citizenship and citizenship education, presented constraints as well as opportunities to my study. As a result of security concerns, my dissertation committee, the UCLA IRB, the Egyptian government, and the AUC IRB all mandated that I only conduct research on the campus of AUC. Therefore, an argument can be made that AUC is a unique space within Egyptian society that is not representative of public universities in Egypt and contains a number of privileged people that are not representative of the general Egyptian society. To this argument, I would state the design of the study is not meant to provide broad generalizations but rather deep insight into relevant and specific experiences of participants in

Egypt. However, that does not mean that the participants did not have experiences outside of AUC. On the contrary, many of the participants did have experiences in public institutions and some did come from humbler backgrounds or from communities outside of Cairo. Additionally, having privilege does not automatically mean that a person is less attentive to issues of social justice and therefore more supportive of authoritarianism. The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire calls the awareness and willingness to divest oneself of privilege “class suicide.” Essentially, many participants have become traitors to their own self-interests. They are using their privileged positions to help change Egyptian society—not because they believe they deserve to be in a position to help, but because they are in the process of actualizing their social responsibility as a renewed active citizen. As mentioned in [Chapter 5](#), it is what is done with that privilege that is important. And in my experience most of the participants and many people that I met that were associated with AUC did have a great concern for social change in Egypt and used their privilege and resources, as a mark of social responsibility, towards altruism and bettering various communities in Egypt rather than being driven by selfish, materialistic, Western, and individualistic motives that are usually associated with AUCians. Moreover, some participants I would even classify as more radical in their politics and ideas about social change.

Although the research was relegated to AUC, the study was not an institutional case study per se. The study was an exploration of people and their experiential perceptions of universities. As a result of not having access to other institutions and not wanting to fall into the trap of only focusing on “privileged” private foreign universities, I still wanted to focus on the experiences of Egyptians from public universities. Thus I did have access to people who had experiences in other institutions. Therefore, it was my intent to include participants who did have multiple experiences in both public and private institutions. As will be discussed in [Section 9.3](#),

future research may be directed and providing an in-depth institutional study of AUC and/or other universities in Egypt with regards to university citizenship education.

### **9.2.2 Field of education**

Another constraint of the dissertation is my overreliance on participants connected to the field of education. As a result of my network of colleagues and my specific research interests and design, I have sought out participants who have had experiences teaching or are familiar with educational issues. Consequently, I must admit that the dissertation may have produced different insight into ideas of citizenship and citizenship education if the study was focused on participants in the fields of the “hard sciences.” Therefore, future research should focus on other fields as well as other institutional connections. However, I still maintain that the participants involved did provide a relevant and interesting segment of Egyptian society offering valuable insight into perceptions citizenship and citizenship education in Egypt.

### **9.2.3 Women Participants**

Detractors may also argue about the overreliance on the perceptions of women. It is true that only four out of the 24 participants were male (as a result of technical difficulties, I did, unfortunately, lose a digital interview of one male participant and was unable to reschedule another interview). My focus on the perceptions of women participants has to do with being affiliated with the Graduate School of Education and the predominance of women educators in the program, as well as the overwhelming visibility of women in the field of education in Egypt as a whole. Therefore, an argument can be presented about relying on too many female participants. To this argument, I would counter and say that the interviews that I did conduct with male students and educators did provide a deep insight into the male perspective—the interview of Ahmed is a prime example. Moreover, in a patriarchal society and a patriarchal

world, where the experiences and perspectives of men are often favored over those of women—considering the narratives of women participants that were deeply committed to challenging social and state norms about citizenship—centering research on a majority of women participants can be seen as a fresh and insightful approach to social and educational research in Egypt. On the other hand, from the lens of violence and terrorism, one could argue—especially those in the business of the U.S. Global War on Terror—research must focus on those “angry Arab-Muslim” men that are more susceptible than women to join militant groups and therefore should be the focus of research in the region. To this argument, I would counter and state that rather than focusing on why men in the region join militant groups and how to stop them, there should be a focus on men (and women) who are striving for social change without ascribing to narrow religious ideologies and adopting violent tactics. Rather than falling into the orientalist trap of reproducing the rhetoric of the evil, fanatical, anti-west, terrorist Arab-Muslim man, the narratives of active citizens should then be held-up as models exemplifying the local/indigenous democratic leaders and movements, which in turn has the possibility of mobilizing and inspiring future change agents in Egypt and beyond.

#### **9.2.4 Language**

The question of language and the limited use of Arabic in the study is definitely a constraint. There is no doubt that conducting this study in Arabic may have produced Arabic concepts and themes of citizenship and citizenship education that would have had the potential of providing a greater understanding into perceptions of citizenship in Egypt. Moreover, the mastery of Arabic is something I am committed to expanding upon for future research and teaching in Egypt and other Arab contexts. The use of a translator during the three semi-structured interviews is an approach that I would not attempt again and something that I would not advise other researchers.

The lag in timing between the three parties (the researcher, the translator, and the participant) drastically impacts the natural flow and depth of an interview. That being said, I am certain that the use of English did not prevent participants from opening up and sharing their deep and personal experiences. To begin, the participants would be considered elites and therefore the interviews were conducted in the hegemonic language of many elites in Egypt: English. Therefore, all participants did have a mastery of academic English that greatly contributed to providing insightful details when responding to interview questions and probes. Participants shared a number of very controversial and emotional stories with this English speaking foreign researcher. Keep in mind, these were interviews that were conducted after only having very limited previous interaction with the participant beforehand—a brief phone call and/or email preceded an interview. To my surprise, I found that majority of the participants were more than willing to partake in deep conversations with a stranger. During the interviews, some participants would cry while retelling a story of a friend or family member who was killed or is in prison, or how they persevered and grew during the Revolution and its aftermath. Additionally, one participant shared that he is an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood and said “you can use my real name and write it in bold lettering. I don’t care if the government finds out. They are already watching me anyways.” I would argue that the use of a participant’s mother tongue is very important to qualitative research and can provide a depth and complexity that may not be found when using a second or third language. However, if L2 or L3 the second or third language is used for research, the mastery level of those languages must be taken into consideration, and, most importantly, the researcher must establish a high level of trust with participants and create a safe space for participants to share insightful narratives. The issue of language is an item to work on for my future research.

### **9.3 Agenda for Future Research**

The final section is organized into three foci of future research that is then guided by some notable research questions, which shapes an agenda for future research.

#### **9.3.1 Local/national issues**

Considering the current study as well as the unsettled and contentious nature of the Egyptian state and Egyptian citizenship following the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, additional research should focus on other segments and demographics of Egyptian society beyond the realm of AUC.

Citizenship and education studies centering on individuals and groups outside of the university can provide a broader insight into such empirical and theoretical issues of how people perceive citizenship and the ways people learn and practice citizenship, and the influences of social struggle on perceptions and actions of citizenship. Potential questions may include to what extent does ethnic minorities (e.g., Nubian, Bedouin), people from rural communities, the urban poor, and refugees perceive citizenship and participatory citizenship in Egypt, and how can ideas and actions of citizenship be relevant when the struggle for daily survival takes precedence over forms of citizenship and national identity for many people in Egypt?

Within the aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution, additional research can focus on other formal and nonformal institutions of citizen building. Important inquiries concerning the question of university citizenship education may include how do university students and educators throughout the various Egyptian governorates perceive university citizenship education; what are the main challenges to implementing university citizenship education pedagogies, policies, and programs in Egypt; and what are the various discourses of university citizenship education; and what are some of the best-practices of university citizenship education

throughout Egypt? In the Freirean sense, critical pedagogy cannot be standardized and transferred from one context to the next. Critical pedagogy, thus, must begin from the experiences of those within that particular context and be connected to participatory action research design. Therefore, within the current political environment in Egypt, to what extent are students and educators creating indigenized (localized) critical pedagogy towards critical and active citizenship(s)? Additional empirical research can focus on student activism and student movements. Some research questions may include the following: what are the pedagogical implications—how do students learn about ideas and actions of citizenship—of participating in student and social movements, and what are some of the grievances, tactics, symbols, struggles and success of student activism and student movements in Egypt? A vital focus on citizenship education research can also be applied to the role of local and international NGOs and other forms of nonformal education. Such research questions may include the following: to what extent do various NGOs in Egypt teach and educate about active citizenship in Egypt; how do NGOs merge their individual missions and visions with broader themes of citizenship; and what are some of the main obstacles to and best-practices of citizenship building for NGOs in Egypt?

### **9.3.2 Regional issues**

In the context and aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the question of citizenship is at the forefront of education and other policy issues in many Arab states and worldwide with UNESCO GEFI (Global Education First Initiative). To get a regional and comparative view of issues of participatory citizenship and citizenship education, research similar to the present study should be conducted in other Arab contexts beyond Egypt. Questions such as how is participatory citizenship and university citizenship education perceived in contexts of other Arab states, and how do these cases compare with the Egyptian context can guide future research.

Moreover, future research on citizenship and education must be situated within the context of the upsurge of refugee migration (from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other war-torn areas) to Arab states and throughout the Mediterranean. As the recent influx of refugees to neighboring states and other movements of people worldwide have demonstrated, societies and educational systems are not isolated and immune from events that occur outside its borders. Social institutions, such as universities, must be prepared to understand and address various global issues and crises. Research grounded in the field of comparative and international education can provide much-needed consideration to how issues of conflict resolution, diversity, refugee crises, and human rights are being addressed within universities and nonformal institutes in Arab and Mediterranean states, and the ways educators and teachers create safe, empowering spaces for students from diverse backgrounds to dialogue and act upon their experiences and knowledge of socio-political events to build coalitions with communities and address various local and global issues towards sustained movements for social change.

### **9.3.3 Global issues**

A growing educational phenomenon advocated by multinational institutions, such as UNESCO, is global citizenship education. Future research in the field comparative and international education must address the question and influence of global citizenship education within formal and nonformal educational institutions of Egypt and other Arab states. For example, as part of the national development plan entitled *Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt's Vision 2030*, the Egyptian government is looking to improve the status of ten universities to be within the top 500 international rankings of universities. Considerable attention needs to be given to the programs, pedagogies, and policies devoted to this policy shift. Research questions may include the following: in what ways is the quest to establish international rankings for Egyptian

universities driven by models of world-class universities or models of global universities (Torres, 2015); how do Egyptian educators perceive global citizenship education; and what are the variations, challenges, and best-practices to global citizenship education in Egypt? Additionally, I have observed a number of important educational exchanges and partnerships between universities in Egypt and institutions around the world. A mapping of some these connections may provide a useful exercise to strengthen already established links or forging new and broader partnership between Egyptian institutions within Egypt and with institutions abroad.

The concept of global citizenship and global citizenship education must be contextualized and grounded within an Egyptian framework. For instance, a research question can be posed, how can grassroots, local, and indigenous paradigms and actions connected to bottom-up models of global ways-of-knowing compare with and enhance top-down models of global citizenship education promoted by global actors? How can citizenship education and specifically global citizenship education create awareness and address dilemmas of the region including peace and stability, extremism as well as other issues. Additionally, multi-country studies can investigate such questions as to what extent does global citizenship education add value to national citizenship; what variations exist among countries in the understanding, definition, practice and implementation of global citizenship education, specifically focusing on controversial issues connected to global citizenship education; how are students and educators approaching and engaging (understanding, appreciating, criticizing and/or neglecting) in global citizenship education; and what needs to be done by local actors (civil society, social movements, youth groups), national actors (government agencies), and global actors (UNESCO) to support and promote a critical global citizenship education?

In conclusion, citizenship in Egypt, like the region of North Africa and Southwest Asia, is not a monolith. It is more similar to a kaleidoscope, with a myriad of diversity and dynamism. It would be ignorant to suggest that what Egypt, North Africa and Southwest Asia, and the religion of Islam have to offer the world is terrorism and violence. The January 25<sup>th</sup> Egyptian revolution shattered misconceptions and more importantly has inspired a reimagined ethos of citizenship grounded ideas of “bread, freedom and social justice.” The Revolution planted the seeds of active citizenship. People want and are actively working—under increasing repression—towards social, political, and educational change.

In the shadow of the revolution and counter-revolution, Egypt may be in a phase of what Antonio Gramsci has described as a “war of position.” Gramsci (2007) explains, the war of position “is resistance to domination with culture, rather than physical might, as its foundation” (p. 168). As the “war of maneuver,” frontal attack and direct confrontation against state, begins to fade and the counter-revolution suffocates open resistance, the long process of the war of position has begun. It is within the social institutions where power and hegemony are entrenched and reproduced. Therefore, it is within these institutions where power and hegemony must be contested and changed. The war of position is a process where alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources are slowly built within existing state structures. The universities in Egypt have been important sites where both the war of maneuver and war of position have taken place. They have been a space where the meanings and values of citizenship have become the object of struggle. After witnessing and experiencing the dangers of direct dissent, it appears that participants in this study are using various forms of formal and nonformal education in their war(s) of position. Although overwhelmed with a need for social and political stability, for many participants the classroom and the campus becomes an essential space when struggles

surroundings ideas and principles of citizenship persist. Having been significantly inspired by the Revolution, the participants dare to dream that another Egypt is possible.

## APPENDICES

### **Appendix I: Examples of Conferences Dedicated to the Topic of Citizenship in the Arab World and the Mena Region after the Arab Uprisings**

Some examples of conferences dedicated to the topic of citizenship in the Arab world and the MENA region after the Arab uprisings include: The December 2011 UNICEF conference, part of the North Africa Development Forum, held in Tunis, Tunisia entitled *Youth, Actors of Development*, which focused on themes related to youth political and civic participation; In March 2012, The European Commission and the Council of Europe hosted a seminar entitled *Empowerment of youth organizations and youth-led civil society in the South-Mediterranean framework* in Malta. In July 2012 there was a conference hosted by Education Above All (a Doha based policy research and advocacy organization concerned with protecting the right to education during insecurity and conflict) in Doha, Qatar, entitled *Education for Global Citizenship*; In August 2012, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the League of Arab States hosted the symposium “*Arab Spring: Youth participation for the promotion of peace, human rights and fundamental freedoms*” in Tunis, Tunisia.

In March 2013, a conference was held in Heliopolis, Egypt, entailed *Citizenship and Minorities Under the Rule of the Muslim Brotherhood* hosted by the Middle East Freedom Forum; In June 2013, a two-day conference was held in Kuwait City, titled *The Education of Future Citizens: key Challenges Facing Arab Countries*. This event which was hosted by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace-Carnegie Middle East Center, brought together hundreds of international and regional scholars from various fields; and In November 2013, the Council of Europe and European Commission in the framework of the EU-CoE youth-partnership and Arab States

Regional office of UNFPA coordinated a seminar on *Youth and Citizenship: Focus on youth participation* in Amman, Jordan. In December 2013, there was a conference hosted by the AUC Graduate School of Education as part of their Education for Transformation Forum. The conference was titled *Education for Citizenship in the Arab World*, and featured a keynote address by Muhammad Faour, senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon.

In March 2014, as part of the EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF) the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in close cooperation with the Robert Bosch Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hosted the *Citizenship and Political Participation in the Mediterranean Region* in Istanbul, Turkey. In May 2014 also on the campus of AUC, the Graduate School of Education hosted lectures and open discussion by Carlos Alberto Torres. One lecture was entitled *Citizenship Education: The Dialectics of the Global Local Dialogue for the 21st Century*.

In March 2015, I was accepted to paper presentation “Citizenship Education and Universities in Egypt: Striving to enhance human development through civic and political engagement” within a panel entitled *Education, Citizenship, and Civil Society: Case Studies for MENA Region*, The American University in Cairo (AUC) 21<sup>st</sup> Annual Research Conference, *Middle East and North African Region: Post-2015 Development Agenda*, Cairo. Under the joint patronage of Grand Imam Sheikh Ahmad Al Tayyeb and Minister of Education of Egypt H.E Dr. Moheb AL Rafie, KAICIID and UNESCO co-organized a *Conference on Global Citizenship Education (GCE) in the Arab States* in Cairo in April 2015. In December 2015, under the UN Secretary-General’s Global Initiative on Education, the UN organized the *MENA Regional Youth*

*Advocacy Workshop on GCED* in Amman, Jordan. In April 2016 a conference was held at the American University of Beirut, entitled *The Civic Role of Arab Universities*.

## Appendix II: UCLA IRB Approval



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M-IRB: (310) 825-5344

### APPROVAL NOTICE New Study

<b>DATE:</b>	7/9/2014
<b>TO:</b>	JASON DORIO EDUCATION
<b>FROM:</b>	TODD FRANKE, PhD Chair, NGIRB
<b>RE:</b>	IRB#14-000805 'Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice:' Reimagining citizenship(s) in Egypt Version: May 23, 2014

The UCLA Institutional Review Board (UCLA IRB) has approved the above-referenced study. UCLA's Federalwide Assurance (FWA) with Department of Health and Human Services is FWA00004642 ( IRB00000174).

#### Submission and Review Information

Type of Review	Expedited Review
Approval Date	7/9/2014
Expiration Date of the Study	7/8/2015

#### Regulatory Determinations

<p>-- <b>Expedited Review Categories 5 and 7</b> - The UCLA IRB determined that the research meets the requirements for expedited review per 45 CFR 46.110 categories 5 and 7.</p> <p>-- <b>Waiver of Signed Informed Consent</b> - The UCLA IRB waived the requirement for signed informed consent for participation under 45 CFR 46.117(c)(2).</p>
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#### Documents Reviewed included, but were not limited to:

Document Name	Document Version #
<a href="#">14-000805 - Participant Recruitment Script.docx.pdf</a>	0.01
<a href="#">14-000805 - Dorio Study InformationSheet Arabic.docx.pdf</a>	0.01

## Appendix III: AUC IRB Approval

CASE #2013-2014-158



To: Jason Dorio  
Cc: Dena Riad & Salma Serry  
From: Atta Gebril, Chair of the IRB  
Date: August 4 , 2014  
Re: Approval of study

---

This is to inform you that I reviewed your research proposal entitled "Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice: Reimagining citizenship(s) in Egypt," and determined that it required consultation with the IRB under the "expedited" heading. The proposal used appropriate procedures to minimize risks to human subjects and that adequate provision was made for confidentiality and data anonymity of participants in any published record. I believe you will also make adequate provision for obtaining informed consent of the participants.

Please note that IRB approval does not automatically ensure approval by CAPMAS, an Egyptian government agency responsible for approving some types of off-campus research. CAPMAS issues are handled at AUC by the office of the University Counsellor, Dr. Amr Salama. The IRB is not in a position to offer any opinion on CAPMAS issues, and takes no responsibility for obtaining CAPMAS approval.

This approval is valid for only one year. In case you have not finished data collection within a year, you need to apply for an extension.

Thank you and good luck.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Atta Gebril" with a stylized flourish at the end.

Dr. Atta Gebril  
IRB chair, The American University in Cairo  
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## Appendix IV: Student Interview Guide/Themes

### Perceptions of participatory citizenship

1. In your opinion, how do you define civic participation/engagement?
2. Have you ever taken part in any civic participation? [Provide one specific example, what group(s) did you work with? What duties/jobs/activities do you perform? How often do you usually participate in this group/activity?]
3. How you define political participation?
4. Have you ever participated in any political rally, protest, or have you voted? [Provide specific examples of each]
5. How did you develop or learn about these definitions of civic and political participation? [What are your inspirations?]
6. As an Egyptian, what do you feel are your social responsibilities?
7. To what extent does your family and/or friends support your definitions of civic/ political participation?
8. How has the Egyptian Revolution (Jan 25, 2011 and the events on June 30, 2013) shaped your perceptions of civic and political participation in Egypt? What ideas and practices were different prior to the Revolution [provide example]
9. What does the word citizenship mean to you? [Can this definition be used to explain Egyptian citizenship?]
10. How do you practice your ideas of citizenship?
11. An important chant of the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution was *Aish, Horreya, Adala Egtema'eya* (Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice), can you explain what each of those terms mean to you? [To what extent have these ideals been achieved in Egypt?]
12. What are some of the major concerns facing the Egypt today?
13. What are your aspirations and hope for the future of Egypt?

### Perceptions of the role of university in fostering citizenship

1. What is your educational background and career goals? Age group? Why did you select that school?

2. In your opinion, what is the purpose(s) of higher education?
4. Have you participated in any on-campus activities? [Provide specific example]
5. In what ways does your university foster your definition and practices of participation and citizenship that you mentioned earlier? To what extent have you learned about participation and citizenship from your university? [Undergrad and/or Grad. Schools]
6. What university courses have you taken, what conferences and programs have you attended, or what student elections have participated in that aligns with your ideas and practices about participation and citizenship?
7. Problems facing Egyptian universities? [Example]
8. What type of citizens does the university produce?
9. What are your perspectives of the recent and continued student activism and protests on university campuses?

## **Appendix V: EDUCATOR INTERVIEW GUIDE/THEMES**

### **Perceptions of participatory citizenship**

1. What is your role/position in the university?
2. What courses do you usually teach? What research projects or programs are you currently involved with?
3. In your opinion, what does it mean to be an Egyptian citizen today? How do you feel you practice your ideas of citizenship?
4. How has the Revolution and recent events impacted your perception of Egyptian citizenship?
5. What ways do you include your ideas of citizenship within the course you teach and with students?
6. Have experienced any tensions between your ideas about citizenship and some of the students' ideas? Provide examples

### **Perceptions of the role of university in fostering citizenship**

1. What is the purpose(s) of higher education?
2. In your opinion, should the university be an institution that instills students with ideas and skills about citizenship? [Why? If so, how should the university achieve accomplish this?]
3. What are some of the main elements of citizenship that this university promotes?
4. How does the university foster citizenship (specific programs, courses, and organizations does the university offer to foster Egyptian citizenship)?
5. Have you experienced any resistance or tension between your ideas about citizenship in Egypt and the citizenship that the university fosters? If so, can you provide some examples?
6. In your opinion, in what ways has the Egyptian Revolution influenced student perceptions of participation and citizenship? [Please describe student perceptions and practice prior to the Revolution.]
7. How has the rise in student activism/student movements influenced student perceptions of citizenship?
8. Can you describe any differences between how your university fosters participation and

citizenship compared with other Egyptian universities?

9. What are some of the ways that you think students should best practice citizenship in Egypt? Does the university support these practices?
10. In your opinion, to what extent has the rise in student political and civic engagement and student activism shaped university curriculum and teaching practices?
11. Does the university have any social responsibilities to local, national, and global communities? If so what are these responsibilities?

## Appendix VI: UCLA IRB Consent Form English

### UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES STUDY INFORMATION SHEET

#### *'Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice: Reimagining citizenship(s) in Egypt*

**Jason Dorio**, PhD Candidate (Principal Investigator) the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Scholar Without Stipend, the Graduate School of Education at the American University in Cairo; and **Dr. Carlos Alberto Torres** (Faculty Sponsor), the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) are conducting a research study.

You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you are a university student or an academic in Egypt. Your participation in this research study is voluntary.

#### **Why is this study being done?**

The study is designed to explore the perspectives of university students and academics on what it means to be an Egyptian citizen. In addition, the study will examine the role of the university in promoting citizenship education.

#### **What will happen if I take part in this research study?**

If you volunteer to participate in this study, the researcher will ask you to do the following:

- Participate in a interview, conducted in the library or on a private office on the campus of the American University in Cairo
- Answer interview *questions about your ideas of citizenship as an Egyptian citizen*
- Answer interview *questions about your university experiences, and the relationship between universities and citizenship*
- Please note this is a non-experimental study

#### **How long will I be in the research study?**

Participation in the interview will take a total of about thirty minutes and will be based upon your schedule and flexibility. The study may involve a follow-up interview of equal length before June 2015, again based upon your schedule and flexibility. Follow-up interview may be conducted to clarify responses from initial interview.

#### **Are there any potential risks or discomforts that I can expect from this study?**

There are no anticipated risks or discomforts from participating in this study

#### **Are there any potential benefits if I participate?**

You will not directly benefit from you participation in the research.

The results of the research may provide some insight into the emerging ideas and actions of citizenship in Egypt. Additionally, the results may help understand the relationship between university and the development of citizens.

**Will I be paid for participating?**

- You will not receive any form of payment for your participation

**Will information about me and my participation be kept confidential?**

Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can identify you will remain confidential. It will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law.

Confidentiality will be maintained by means of:

- Any information gathered from your interview will be given a pseudonym
- All data will be collected in a small notebook labeled with a pseudonym
- Data will be stored in locked program within my private laptop
- No other person will have access to this data

**What are my rights if I take part in this study?**

- You can choose whether or not you want to be in this study, and you may withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any time.
- Whatever decision you make, there will be no penalty to you, and no loss of benefits to which you were otherwise entitled.
- You may refuse to answer any questions that you do not want to answer and still remain in the study.

**Who can I contact if I have questions about this study?**

- **The research team:**  
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the research, you can talk to the one of the researchers. Please contact:

Jason Dorio (Principal Investigator)  
[Jdorio65@hotmail.com](mailto:Jdorio65@hotmail.com)

Dr. Carlos Alberto Torres (Faculty Sponsor)  
[catnovoa@aol.com](mailto:catnovoa@aol.com)

- **UCLA Office of the Human Research Protection Program (OHRPP):**  
If you have questions about your rights while taking part in this study, or you have concerns or suggestions and you want to talk to someone other than the researchers about the study, please call the OHRPP at (310) 825-7122 or write to:

UCLA Office of the Human Research Protection Program  
11000 Kinross Avenue, Suite 211, Box 951694  
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1694

## Appendix VII: UCLA IRB Consent Form Arabic

معلومات دراسية عن البحث

والحرية والعدالة الاجتماعية

### اعادة تصور المواطنة المصرية

جيسون دوريو :الباحث الرئيسي للدكتوراه فى التربية والتعليم ودراسة المعلومات بكلية الدراسات العليا بجامعة كاليفورنيا لوس أنجلوس ,و ايضا الباحث بمنحة (بدون راتب) فى الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة . تحت اشراف د.كارلوس ألبرتو توريس البروفيسور بكلية الدراسات العليا بجامعة كاليفورنيا لوس أنجلوس

وقد تم اختيارك كمشارك محتمل فى الدراسة لأنك طالب جامعى أو أكاديمى فمصر.مشاركتك فى هذه الدراسة البحثية طوعية

البحثية الدراسة هذه فى جىرى ماذا ؟

تم تصميم الدراسة لاستكشاف وجهات نظر طلاب الجامعات والأكاديميين فى أن يكون المواطن مصرياً ,وايضا ستبحث دور الجامعة فى تعزيز المواطنة

الدراسة فى شاركت إذا سيحدث ماذا؟

إذا كنت ترغب فى المشاركة فى الدراسة ,فإن الباحث سيطلب منك ما يلى  
-المشاركة فى مقابلة ستجرى فى المكتبة أو مكتب خاص فى الجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة  
ستدور أسئلة المقابلة عن افكاركم كموطن مصرى عن المواطنة  
ستدور أسئلة المقابلة عن تجربتك الجامعية ,والعلاقة بين الجامعة والمواطنة

الدراسة تستغرقها التى الزمنية الفترة هى ما؟

زمن المقابلة حوالى ثلاثين دقيقة, وستتم المقابلة بناء على الجدول الزمنى الخاص بك. وقد تتضمن مقابلة اخرى متابعة قبل شهر يونيو ٢٠١٥ , مرة أخرى ستتم المقابلة بناء على الجدول الزمنى الخاص بك

المشاركة هذه من محتملة مخاطر أية هناك هل؟

لا توجد اى مخاطر او مضايقات

المشاركة هذه من محتملة فوائد أية هناك هل؟

قد توفر نتائج البحث بعض التبصر فى الافكار عن المواطنة المصرية,وايضا ستساعد فى فهم العلاقة بين الجامعة وتطوير المواطنين

المشاركة هذه من مادي مقابل هناك هل؟

لن تتلقى اى مقابل مادي

المشاركات بمعلومات الاحتفاظ سيتم كيف؟

جميع المعلومات التى سيتم الحصول عليها فى المقابلة ستعطى اسماً مستعار. سيتم تخزين المعلومات فى برامج مؤمنة. لا . يستطيع اى شخص الوصول للمعلومات الا الباحث جيسون

الدراسة في كمشارك حقوقي هي ما؟

لك كامل الحرية في المشاركة او عدم المشاركة او الانسحاب او التوقف في اى وقت تريد  
لك كامل الحرية في رفض اجابة اى سؤال

اذا كان لديك اى استفسار او سؤال تستطيع الاتصال ب\*

الباحث: جيسون دوريو

[Jdorio65@hotmail.com](mailto:Jdorio65@hotmail.com)

د.كارلوس ألبرتو توريس

[catnova@aol.com](mailto:catnova@aol.com)

مكتب جامعة كاليفورنيا لبرنامج بحوث وقاية الانسان

اذا كان لديك اسئلة حول حقوقك بينما تشارك في الدراسة، أو لديك اى مخاوف أو مقترحات وتريد التحدث مع شخص آخر يرجى  
الاتصال

٧١٢٢٨٢٥٣١٠

أو الكتابة الى مكتب

**UCLA**

برنامج بحوث وقاية الانسان

11000951694 جادة كينروس، جناح 211،

لوس انجلوس

**CA90095-1694**

## Appendix VIII: AUC IRB Consent Form



### Documentation of Informed Consent for Participation in Research Study

**Project Title:** 'Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice:' Reimagining citizenship(s) in Egypt

You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the research is to *explore the perspectives of university students and academics on what it means to be an Egyptian citizen and examine the role of the university in promoting citizenship education*. The expected duration of your participation is 30 minutes or longer for an interview and will be based upon your schedule and flexibility. The study may involve a follow-up interview of equal length before June 2015, again based upon your schedule and flexibility. The findings may be published and/or presented.

**Principal Investigator:**

Jason Dorio  
PhD Candidate, Social Science and Comparative Education Division,  
Graduate School of Education and Information Studies;  
University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA)  
Scholar without Stipend, AUC Graduate School of Education  
Email: [jndorio@aucegypt.edu](mailto:jndorio@aucegypt.edu); [jdorio65@hotmail.com](mailto:jdorio65@hotmail.com)

**UCLA Faculty Sponsor:**

Dr. Carlos Alberto Torres  
Distinguished Professor of Education and  
Associate Dean for Global Programs  
Graduate School of Education and Information Studies  
University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA)  
[catnova@aol.com](mailto:catnova@aol.com)

**AUC Faculty Sponsor:**

Dr. Nagwa Megahed  
Associate Professor of Education,  
Graduate School of Education  
American University in Cairo (AUC)  
[nmegahed@aucegypt.edu](mailto:nmegahed@aucegypt.edu)

The procedures of the research will be as follows; I will ask you a series of opened-ended questions related to your perceptions of citizenship as well as your university experiences, and the relationship between universities and citizenship. You are free to answer any and all questions the way you want to answer them. Additional, you have the right to refuse to answer any question and may withdraw any information as well as your participation at any time. Your participation will be confidential and anonymous.

Please note this is a non-experimental study.

- \*There will not be certain risks or discomforts associated with this research.
- \*There will not be benefits to you from this research.
- \*The information you provide for purposes of this research is confidential. No other person will have access to this data.
- \* Any questions about the research and your rights please free to contact the principal investigator, Jason Dorio ([jndorio@aucegypt.edu](mailto:jndorio@aucegypt.edu)).
- \*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or the loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
- \* Reading this sheet provides orally consent to participate in this research study.

## Appendix IX: Demographics of Participants

### Position of Participant

POSITION	TOTAL
Student (S)	<b>10 (2 undergrads, 7 graduates, and 1 Ph.D.)</b>
Professor (P)	<b>4</b>
Researcher (R)	<b>4</b>
Instructor/graduate students (I)	<b>6</b>

### Type of Interview

TYPE OF INTERVIEW	TALLY	TOTAL
Digital	S, S, S, S, S, S, P, P, P, R, R, R, I, I, I, I and I	<b>18</b>
Written	S, S, S, S, P, and I	<b>6</b>

### Gender of Participants

GENDER	TALLY	TOTAL
Men	S, S, I, and I	<b>4</b>
Women	S, S, S, S, S, S, S, P, P, P, P, R, R, R, R, I, I, I, and	<b>20</b>

### Age Range

AGE RANGE	TALLY	TOTAL
18 to 20	S and S	<b>2</b>
21 to 25	S	<b>1</b>
26 to 30	S, R, I, I, and I	<b>5</b>
31 to 35	S,S, S, S, R, R, R, I, I, I,	<b>10</b>
36 to 40	S, S, P	<b>3</b>
41 to 45	P	<b>1</b>
46 to 50	0	<b>0</b>
51 to 55	P	<b>1</b>
56 to 60	P	<b>1</b>

### **Religious Affiliation**

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION	TALLY	TOTAL
Muslim	S, S, S, S, S, S, S, P, P, P, P, R, R, I, I, I, I, and I	<b>18</b>
Sufi	S	<b>1</b>
Coptic	S, R, and R	<b>3</b>
Christian	I	<b>1</b>
Atheist	S	<b>1</b>

### **Interview Length**

INTERVIEW LENGTH	TALLY	TOTAL
Less than 30 min.	S, S, S, I, and I	<b>5</b>
Between 30 and 60 min.	S, S, S, P, P, P, R, R, R, R, I, and I	<b>12</b>
Between 60 and 90 min.	S, S, S, P, I, and I	<b>6</b>
Greater than 90 min.	S	<b>1</b>

### **Fields of Study Represented**

#### FIELDS OF STUDY

Computer Programming  
Economics  
Education  
Engineering  
Fine Arts  
Health  
History  
International Relations  
Journalism  
Language Arts  
Math  
Medicine  
Middle East Studies  
Pharmacy  
Political Science  
Public Policy  
Middle East Studies

### **Institutions Represented**

INSTITUTION

Public

**Ain Shams**

**Alexandria**

**Cairo University**

**Mansoura**

Private

**American University in**

**Cairo (AUC)**

**Misr International**

**University (MIU)**

**British University in**

**Egypt (BUE)**

**German University in**

**Cairo (GUC)**

Abroad

**Europe**

**North America**

## Appendix X: Observation Protocol

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_

Location \_\_\_\_\_

Title of interaction/event/activity \_\_\_\_\_

**1. The physical setting** (What is the physical environment like? What is the context? What kinds of behavior is the setting designed for?)

**2. The participants** (Describe who is in the scene, how many people, and their roles? What is bringing these people together? Who is not here? What are the relevant characteristics of the participants? What are some of the patterns and frequency of interactions?)

**3. Activities and interactions** (What is going on? Is there a definable sequence of activities? How do the people interact with the activity and with one another? How are people and activities connected? What are the norms or rules that structure the activities and interactions? What is the length of activity? Is this a typical activity, or unusual?)

**4. Conversation** (What is the content of conversations in this setting? Who speaks to whom? Who listens?)

**5. Observer Comments** (What are my thoughts? Where am I located? What do I say and do?)

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