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Myōan Eisai and Conceptions of Zen Morality:  
The Role of Eisai's Chinese Sources in the Formation of Japanese Zen  
Precept Discourse

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the  
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Asian Languages and Cultures

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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The focus of this dissertation is Myōan Eisai, considered by scholarship as the founder of the Rinzai Zen lineage in Japan. This work aims to answer two interrelated questions: what is Eisai's Zen? and how does Eisai's Zen relate to other schools of Buddhism? Through an analysis of Eisai's texts composed following his return from his second trip to China in 1187, I illustrate the link between Eisai's understanding of Zen and the practice of morality in Buddhism; moreover this dissertation shows clearly that, for Eisai, Zen is compatible with both Tendai and the study of the precepts. This work analyzes the Eisai's use of doctrinal debates found in Chinese sources to argue for the introduction of Zen to Japan. Through this analysis, we see how Eisai views

Zen, based on his experience in Chinese monasteries, not as a distinct group of practitioners rebelling against traditional forms of practice, but rather as a return to fundamental Buddhist positions concerning the importance of morality and its relationship to meditative practices.

The conclusions reached in this dissertation have doctrinal, historical and philosophical implications. Doctrinally and historically, this work brings into focus the origins of Zen in Japan and its relationship with other schools; we see how a comprehensive textual analysis of Eisai's Chinese sources highlights the key relationship between Zen and morality, and how this relationship relates to Buddhist practice. Philosophically, this work provides an example of a new methodological approach to comparative philosophical problems in Buddhism, and reveals potential areas of interest for a revival in comparative studies of Buddhist ethics.

The dissertation of Dermott Joseph Walsh is approved.

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## **Vita**

Dermott Joseph Walsh received a BA in Philosophy from Trinity College Dublin in 2003, and an MA in Japanese Studies from Leiden University, the Netherlands in 2009. His main research interests focus on the beginnings of Zen in Japan, with particular emphasis on morality and its relationship to meditative practices. Other interests include the evolution of precept discourse in Chinese Buddhism, the practical impact of meditative practices, and comparative philosophy of ethics.

## Introduction

The focus of this study, Myōan Eisai 明菴榮西 (a.k.a Yōsai; 1141–1215), defies the neat sectarian categorizations that are often retroactively applied to Kamakura period 鎌倉時代 (1185–1333) religious figures. Without question, the image of Eisai as "founding ancestor" of the Rinzai 臨濟 (C. Línjì) lineage of Zen 禪 (C. Chán) remains the dominant popular conception. The scholarly search for the most appropriate understanding of Eisai's life and thought reveals several other images: that of an esoteric ritual master with close links with the ecclesiastical and political hierarchy, a conservative who supports traditional Buddhist practices, a vinaya advocate, a radical who risks persecution by his own school and the government, a scholar with copious textual knowledge, a practical man who undergoes perilous trips to China and founds temples in remote areas. All of these images have some basis in the facts of Eisai's life and thought.

This dissertation seeks to clarify some of the above images. In particular, I focus on Eisai's work following his return from China in 1191. The texts under consideration focus on morality, emphasizing the value of vinaya practices and how vinaya relates to bodhisattva morality. The motivating question for this work is not "Who is Myōan Eisai?" but rather "What is Eisai's understanding of Zen and how does it relate to his general conception of morality in Buddhism?" In answering this question, I analyze Eisai's texts with particular emphasis on his use of Chinese Tiāntái 天台 (J. Tendai) sources. Eisai uses Tiāntái sources to argue for Zen practice as a

means to reintroduce the vinaya to Japanese Tendai, which abandoned the vinaya ordination and associated moral practices over three hundred years previously. My goal is to explain Eisai's doctrinal positions concerning the status, function and practice of morality in Zen Buddhism. For Eisai, Zen is key for understanding the relationship between the mind (C. *xīn* 心; J. *shin*) and morality (C. *jiè* 戒; J. *kai*), and thus, given that for Eisai Mind is the core element of Buddhism, Zen provides a means to relate the Mind to moral action. In order to explain why Eisai considers Zen as representing morality, and the importance of this issue, I analyze the following four aspects of his thought: (i) What is Eisai's general understanding of the role of morality in Buddhism? (ii) How does this understanding relate to Zen, and how does Eisai argue for his position? This question illustrates how Zen evolved in the Japanese context and the impact of Chinese sources on this evolution; (iii) In order to understand more clearly Eisai's position, I wish to draw attention to lesser known texts in his corpus; (iv) as a long-term philosophical goal, I wish to use Eisai's analysis as a starting point to establish a philosophical basis to reassess contemporary problems in comparative ethics such as the gap between moral theory and moral practice.<sup>1</sup>

This study will clarify a series of important issues related to both Eisai and the broader context of Kamakura Buddhism. How was Zen initially received in Kamakura Japan? How much influence did Chinese monasticism have on Japanese images of Zen? What is the nature of the interaction between Zen and Tendai in Eisai's work and in terms of his legacy? What of the

relationship between Zen and the vinaya school (C. Lǜzōng 律宗; J. Risshū) in both the Chinese and Japanese contexts, and how does this relate to Eisai's work? Have we understood clearly the significance of Eisai's textual corpus? Answering these questions clarifies how and why Zen arrived in Japan, and explains why traditional scholarly conceptions of Kamakura Buddhism require reassessment. For example, training in Buddhist studies still treats China and Japan as largely isolated units of study. Eisai's introduction of Zen to Japan highlights how the East Asian Buddhist cultural sphere is both historically and doctrinally much more connected than divisions along national boundaries would have us believe.

A second key issue relates to sectarianism, a problem primarily in Japanese accounts of Zen history. As I will show below, while scholars are aware that sectarian distinctions, often originating in the Tokugawa period 徳川時代 (1600–1868), were retroactively applied to key Kamakura period religious figures, the influence of this tendency remains apparent in both Japanese and English language scholarship.

This dissertation highlights how for Eisai such sectarian distinctions are virtually meaningless; much of Eisai's work moves beyond the boundaries of Tendai scholasticism, especially in his later career. This is also true of contemporary Buddhist figures in Eisai's circle. Eisai's thought moves freely between Chán/Zen, Tiāntái/Tendai, Lǚ/Ritsu and esoteric sources. The eclectic nature of Eisai's interests explains why scholars, often trained in specific national and sectarian traditions, struggle to provide a complete picture of his

work. This also helps explain why Eisai does not figure prominently in scholarly accounts of Kamakura period Buddhism in general. The study of Kamakura period Buddhism has until recently been dominated by models that encourage scholars to overlook Eisai's impact. As I explain below, challenging these models results in a reevaluation of Eisai's impact on Kamakura period Japanese Buddhism.

### **1. Models for the Study of Kamakura Buddhism**

Major changes to the Japanese social and political landscape occurred during the Kamakura period. This represents the defining historical characterization of the era. Similar upheavals occurred in the arena of religious life and practice. Initially, scholarly explanations of Kamakura period Buddhism adopted a "Reformation" model based on Euro-American historiographical interpretations of historical phenomena based on G.W.F Hegel's (1770–1831) conception of historical progress in his *Philosophy of History*. This model assumes (i) that there will be a reaction to dominant paradigms, a thesis challenged by an antithesis, resulting in a synthesis, and (ii) the thesis-antithesis concept requires world historical individuals as the catalyst for conflict and subsequent change. Hegel's interpretation of historical processes seemed to explain the circumstances and subsequent impact of the European Christian Reformation, and was later applied to the Kamakura period.

With the application of the Reformation model to Kamakura Japan, the preceding Nara period 奈良時代 (710–794) and its Buddhist establishment appears in opposition to the "great thinkers" of the Buddhist reformation:

Dōgen 道元 (1200–1253), Shinran 親鸞 (1173–1262) and Nichiren 日蓮 (1222–1282), who challenged conservative authority and established their own distinct groups in opposition to the stifling conservatism of the Nara schools.<sup>2</sup>

This Reformation model had a negative effect on images of Eisai. While Kokan Shiren's 虎關師鍊 (1278–1346) *Genkō shakusho* 元亨釋書 (B. 32, N. 173) painted Eisai as the founding ancestor of Rinzai Zen, Eisai's failure to break definitively with Nara Buddhism by mixing Zen with Tendai esotericism (J. *taimitsu* 台蜜) meant he did not fit as successfully with the Kamakura period Reformation model as figures such as Dōgen. Eisai was cast as a conservative who, while interested in Zen, did not have the originality or radicalism of his counterparts. Eisai's role in this model was reduced to a bridge between the "Old" Nara schools, and the "New" Kamakura reformers.

The Reformation model is now defunct due to Kuroda Toshio's 黒田俊雄 (1926–1993) *Kenmitsu taisei* 顯密体制 (exoteric-esoteric system) theory. *Kenmitsu taisei* is itself an offshoot of a larger theory known as *kenmon taisei* 権門体制 (system of power structures). Despite new paradigms emerging, Kuroda's system remains the dominant methodological approach applied to Kamakura period Buddhism.

The *Kenmon taisei* theory posits three power blocs in medieval Japan: the court and its nobles, the warrior aristocracy, and the religious bloc. The latter consists of politically and economically important temple-shrine complexes such as Kōfukuji 興福寺, Enryakuji 延暦寺 and Tōdaiji 東大寺. These three blocs share overlapping interests in terms of social, economic and

political influence. This influence is visible in the large temple complexes of the period which garnered economic and political capital through various activities such as managing estates (J. *shōen* 莊園). Adolphson (2000, 241–242) points out that while temples may have viewed themselves as part of a *Kenmon* system, they did not constitute a single cohesive entity capable of existing on a par with the court and the warrior aristocracy as suggested by the theory.

Kuroda characterizes the Buddhist groups and their relationship with the *Kenmon* via his *kenmitsu* 顯密 model. *kenmitsu* 顯密 refers to exoteric and esoteric Buddhist teachings. Kuroda and his supporters suggest that esotericism in particular allowed religious groups to garner power and influence within the *kenmon* by performing a variety of protective rituals. Taira (1996, 440), despite broadly supporting Kuroda's interpretation, points to vagueness concerning the actual meaning of *kenmitsu* in Kuroda's writings. In one sense, it can refer to the system in place amongst the eight *kenmitsu* schools (J. *hasshū* 八宗), the six schools of Nara Buddhism and the Tendai and Shingon 眞言 schools. In another sense, it refers to the relationship between these schools and other centers of power, where esoteric rites and rituals (J. *Mikkyō* 密教) were the most effective means for Buddhists to access *kenmon* power.

The above is a brief summary of Kuroda's theory. Kuroda continued to refine his ideas throughout his career, resulting in numerous adjustments to the key concepts and the interpretation of how they relate to each other. The main

implication of Kuroda's theory is clear: the *kenmitsu* model remained dominant well into the Kamakura period, invalidating the previous Reformation model. Kuroda's model also expanded the range of materials that scholars could profitably consult, as one could find evidence of the *kenmitsu taisai* theory in a range of cultural and literary contexts, as well as in political life (Taira 1996, 434). This theory also explains the close relationship between Buddhism and the state that is evident in the medieval period. The perceived efficacy of esoteric ritual linked Buddhist clerics to the welfare of the state, expressed in Japanese as *ōbō-buppō* 王法佛法, the mutual interdependence of the secular and Buddhist law. Kuroda's theory is also applicable beyond monastic Buddhism to the broader world of spirits and ghosts which were a part of the medieval mindset.

Kuroda's theory is not without its critics. Dobbins (1996, 230) for example suggests that Kuroda tends to extrapolate broad conclusions from individual pieces of evidence. Taira (1996, 446) also admits that Kuroda's thought is difficult to follow, although this is partly due to Kuroda's willingness to refine his ideas in response to criticism and contrary evidence.

My problem with Kuroda's theory expands on Dobbins critique. If one analyzes data in terms of the systems one is already predisposed to believe this data represents, then it's entirely possible to interpret all data in terms of that system. For example, in a distant future time, a historian of U.S. history working with limited resources could conclude that the tax system is the most important aspect of U.S. history and explains all other elements. Our future

historian would rightly see that a large number of U.S. Presidents campaigned on the issue of taxation, that the system was periodically changed, and was a source of near constant political and social debate. Indeed, the tax system was so important that during a given time frame every year, citizens and non-citizens alike waded through a labyrinthine morass of technical paperwork in order to file tax returns to a specially designated government bureau. Despite all this apparent evidence, our historian would be incorrect to conclude that the system of taxation and related issues are the defining and most important feature of twentieth century American political life. This would be a mistake because (i) even though the historian could draw connections between the system of taxation and other systems, these connections are not significant because connections exist between any two systems in a given cultural and historical context, and (ii) taxation was not the major concern for the vast number of citizens living in the society at the time.

The above is not designed to caricature Kuroda's theory, but rather highlights in contemporary terms some of the logical problems concerning what conclusions we can extrapolate from which types of evidence. Taira presents a corollary to the above by citing one of Kuroda's lectures given at Kyoto University in 1978 discussing the issue of *hijiri* 聖, wandering ascetics or priests who may or may not maintain institutional affiliations.<sup>3</sup> Taira (1996, 436) quotes kuroda who states that the *hijiri* comprised a distinct system that existed in an organic relationship with the *kenmitsu taisei*, which, in turn, “supported the vitality of the *hijin* by alternately expelling and reabsorbing

them.” Here we can apply Occam's Razor: if something cannot be explained in terms of a given system, rather than postulate a new “system outside of the system”, better simply to acknowledge that the postulated system, Kuroda's theory, cannot explain all that it claims to explain.

Eisai's position within the *kenmitsu taisei* highlights how the breadth of the theory is simultaneously an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, Eisai's early career as a *taimitsu* specialist with ecclesiastical rank and links to political power seem to fit Kuroda's theory. There is also Eisai's post 1191 work to consider, where Eisai is at odds with the Tendai establishment over vinaya practice, emphasizing Zen and morality, forging links with the Risshū and other Tendai monks who share his opinions concerning vinaya, such as Shunjō 俊苒 (1166–1227). As I will present below, Eisai provides a good example of how one figure can exemplify both the *kenmitsu taisei* model and other related conceptions of Kamakura Buddhism.

Historians do not need to abandon Kuroda's idea of *kenmitsu taisei* completely, but should understand its methodological and practical limits. Kuroda's theory is not a complete explanation of Kamakura period religious life. Competing theories aim to fill some of the spaces that Kuroda's theory cannot reach. Matsuo Kenji 松尾剛次 (1954-) in his *History of Japanese Buddhism* (2007) suggests one such alternative model. Matsuo explains the emergence of new religious groups in the Kamakura period with reference to the status of monastics. Matsuo suggests there are "official" monks (J. *kansō* 官僧) whose ordination lineages and affiliations place them within Kuroda's

*kenmitsu* system; and "unofficial" or "reclusive" monks (J. *tonseisō* 遁世僧), monks who received ordinations on unofficial precept platforms, and thus are outside the system (Matsuo 2007, 44–71). Monks are also termed unofficial if their activities fall outside the range of the usual activities of official monks. Usually, a *kansō* would be considered a monk who performs at official ceremonies and offers prayers for the good of the Emperor. The *tonseisō* or unofficial monks participated in a range of activities, such as preaching to the poor, healing and tending to the sick, and fundraising. An example of one such monk is Nōnin 能忍 (d.u.), of the "Bodhidharma school" (J. Darumashū 達磨宗). Nōnin was a contemporary of Eisai who also sought to introduce Zen to Japan. This model is especially applicable to early Japanese Zen, as Zen emerged largely through unofficial channels via individual monastics.

The limited scope of Matsuo's model in comparison to Kuroda suggests it works best when dealing with issues such as the *hijiri* who function outside Kuroda's systematic framework. Despite its limitations, Matsuo's model also works in conjunction with the cultic centers model advocated by James Dobbins. Dobbins (1998, 29) model is an adjusted version of Kuroda's theory. Dobbins theory accounts for the major flaw of Matsuo's model, how do Matsuo's monks relate to institutions that are not *kenmon* institutions?

The relationship between Dobbins' cultic centers resembles a series of concentric circles, with the key temple-shrine complexes that constitute the *kenmon* at the center. The significance of the cultic center decreases the further one moves from the center. While this idea is certainly interesting, Dobbins

fails to elaborate on how it might be applied; indeed Dobbins acknowledges (1998, 38) that the broader its application, the less convincing the theory appears, as it could conceivably be applied to almost any temple or shrine, regardless of how small or insignificant. One may also legitimately ask: why must we assume that every cultic center has some kind of relation to the *Kenmon* institutions at the center?

Dobbins' model has certain advantages when applied to an urban landscape such as Kyoto 京都. Rather than ask how do temples relate to the *kenmon*, we can ask instead how do temples and shrines relate to other institutions within their geographical sphere of influence. The three large medieval monastic complexes in what we now call south Kyoto, Sennyūji 泉涌寺, Tōfukuji 東福寺 and Tōji 東寺, provide a good example. Despite three major centers all in close proximity, these temples are some distance from the key *Kenmon* temples of Enryakuji 延暦寺 in Shiga prefecture 滋賀県 and Kōfukuji and Tōdaiji in Nara 奈良. It is worth asking what is the nature of the interaction between non *kenmon* temples? For example, did the presence of Tōfukuji nearby prompt Dōgen to leave Kōshōji 興聖寺? Temples sharing a particular area may compete for patronage and resources, but also may cooperate. What is the nature of cooperation, if any, between these smaller complexes? Moreover, how does this model work if temples in the same lineage are geographically distant? Eisai here provides a good example. Having founded temples in Kyoto, Kamakura and Kyūshū 九州 in Southern Japan, are these temples related to the *kenmon*, to each other via Eisai, through

Eisai's links with local power, or through a lineage affiliation?

Eisai is a problematic figure for all three theories. Until his second trip to China in 1191, Eisai is firmly positioned within Kuroda's *kenmitsu taisai* rubric, a ritual expert with close links to institutional hierarchy. After Eisai's return from China in 1191 he seems to fit with Matsuo and Dobbins conceptions, with Eisai appearing almost as a renegade monk, although one who still courted the political power of the Kamakura shogunate. Following a period where his views were under close scrutiny by the Tendai establishment, Eisai seems to have succeeded in gaining a certain amount of independence. He is even granted permission by the Emperor to found his own temple, Kenninji 建仁寺 in 1202. Eisai transitions from an official monk working within the *kenmon* power structures, to become an unofficial monk, arguing for the reintroduction of the vinaya and seeking to expand Buddhist practices outside of monasteries to the laity. With this in mind, perhaps the final framework considered below is the most appropriate means to explain Eisai's role in Kamakura Buddhism.

The final framework under consideration is Ōtsuka's *zen-kyō-ritsu* model (2003, 2009). Ōtsuka's position, much like both Dobbins and Matsuo, is not designed to completely replace Kuroda's theory; rather Ōtsuka focuses on the emerging links between the Zen school, Risshū and Pure Land (J. *Jōdo shū* 浄土宗). This theory resembles Matsuo and Dobbins by focusing on "unofficial" monks outside of the *Kenmon*. Ōtsuka argues that Kuroda's theory does not do justice to the three above named schools, dismissing them as

either reformers or heretics. Ōtsuka also suggests that Kamakura Buddhism is best understood in terms of Sòng period China 宋代 (960–1279) and its influence (Ōtsuka 2003, 1478). This helps balance Kuroda's almost total reliance on domestic factors in explaining the structure of Kamakura Buddhism. Ōtsuka cites several sources from the period referring to *zenritsu* 禪律 monks (2003, 1479; 2009, 37–39), which shows that monks who followed both Zen and ritsu practices existed as a distinct group outside the *kenmon* and *kenmitsu* systems (Ōtsuka 2003, 1482).

A key aspect of Ōtsuka's theory is the introduction of Chinese monastic practices to Japan. Ōtsuka credits Eisai (2003, 1476) as the first monk to introduce what he calls the *zen-kyō-ritsu* 禪教律 framework from Sòng China. This form of monastic practice developed around a system of subtemples (C. *sìyuàn* 寺院; J. *Ji'in*), each one associated with a particular practice (Ōtsuka 2003, 1496; 2009, 42). Eisai introduced this system on his return from China. Subtemple designations such as *zen-in* 禪院 and *ritsu-in* 律院 refer to practices rather than sectarian affiliation, and there is no need to assume these practices are exclusive. For example, at Tōdaiji, the subtemple Kaidan-in 戒壇院 mixed *ritsu* and Kegon (C. Huáyán 華嚴), while at Sennyūji, a temple associated with Shunjō, who is a key figure in Ōtsuka's framework, *ritsu* mixed with Tendai (Ōtsuka 2009, 55), where Tendai represents the "teaching" element (J. *kyō* 教) of *zen-kyō-ritsu*. Other important figures in Ōtsuka's framework along with Eisai and Shunjō are Chōgen 重源 (1121–1206), Enni 圓爾 (a.k.a Bennen 辯圓; 1202–1280) and Dōgen. Ōtsuka pays particular

attention to Shunjō and his temple Sennyūji as it incorporates the three elements of precept study, Pure Land and Zen (2009, 42). Ōtsuka emphasizes the idea of *kengaku* 兼学, studying two or more sects, which was common at the time of Eisai, but was left behind with the development of sectarian consciousness (Ōtsuka 2009, 45).

Ōtsuka's model emphasizes figures like Eisai who introduced Sòng style monasticism to Japan and the relationship between emerging schools. Linking Zen with *ritsu* schools in medieval Japan is one of the cornerstones of this dissertation. Nonetheless, one key problem for Ōtsuka is the nature of the link between Chinese monastic practices and their Japanese versions. There are two key issues: (i) does this framework accurately represent the nature of Sòng period monasticism and, (ii) if we answer in the positive, a second question remains as to the impact of indigenous Japanese thought on this model. While Ōtsuka is comprehensive in answering the former question, the latter question requires further analysis.

Ōtsuka's model emphasizes the impact of Chinese monastic norms on Japanese monastic visitors. In particular, the Chinese emphasis on morality and the precepts seems to have encouraged Japanese monastics to implement this culture in their own monasteries. It is my contention that Eisai while emphasizing *zenritsu*, was also keenly aware of the importance of *kyō*, or the teaching aspect. For Eisai, this element refers to Tiāntái. The current work is designed to lay the ground work in a comprehensive fashion for further discussion of the importance of Ōtsuka's model, with the focus on Tiāntái texts

and their influence a key caveat. Nonetheless, this model helps explain the development not only of Zen practices regarding monastic discipline, cleanliness, food and clothing, but also highlights the closeness in meditative practices between Zen and *ritsu* groups. I analyze in Chapter Three how Eisai utilizes Chán texts to draw a link between Chán/ Zen and vinaya practices. For Eisai, the origin of Zen morality is in vinaya practice.

## **2. Eisai: Life and Context**

An epistemological gap exists between our modern scholarly sense of biography, and the materials scholars use to create the biographies of premodern religious figures. Such biographies are always creations, as they require a piecing together of available material from a variety of sources. These source materials are never "biographical" in the sense that satisfies modern scholarly expectations, resembling instead what might best be termed "hagiography." In some senses, we resemble a researcher from the future, trying to understand how computers work with only a typewriter as a model. Both machines make words appear when you tap a set of buttons, but this resemblance in form should not lead us assume the function of both machines is the same. What appears to us as viable biographical information may well be purely hagiographic, and vice-versa. We cannot excise the hagiographic in order to find the biographical, they are too tightly woven together. This is not to dismiss the value of recreating the biographies of premodern religious figures, but sounds a note of caution concerning our expectations.

The source for Eisai's autobiography is the *Kaihen kyōshu ketsu* 改變教

主決. This text forms the basis of Mano's (2014, 30–66) extensive reconstruction of Eisai's life.<sup>4</sup> The other key source is Kokan Shiren's *Genkō shakusho*. Neither text can provide us with historical certainty, but rather presents images and interpretations that help us piece together a sense of who Eisai may have been.

Eisai was born at Kibitsu-no-miya shrine 吉備津宮 in modern-day Okayama 岡山 prefecture. Eisai entered religious life at the age of fourteen and was ordained in the “perfect sudden precepts” (J. *endonkai* 圓頓戒) of the Tendai school on Mount Hiei 比叡山 (Ishida 1986a, 294).<sup>5</sup> The relationship between the perfect sudden precepts and other aspects of Buddhist morality would become a bone of contention between Eisai and the Tendai hierarchy. Eisai's subsequent activities center around the esoteric tradition of Tendai. References to Eisai in premodern sources attest to his expertise in this area. The official chronicle of the Kamakura shogunate, the *Azuma Kagami* 吾妻鏡, refers to Eisai's role as in performing esoteric rituals (Collcutt 1981, 309, note 26; Mano 2014, 62). The *Keiran shūyō shū* 溪嵐拾葉集, a fourteenth century compendium of *taimitsu*, references Eisai's esoteric Yōjō-ryū 葉上流 lineage which he established following his return from his first trip to China in 1168 (T no. 2410, 76.0504b27).

Eisai's first trip to China occurred in 1168. The *Eisai nitto engi* 榮西入唐緣起 provides an account of his travels.<sup>6</sup> Eisai travelled with another Japanese monk, Chōgen, and stayed at Wànnián sì 万年寺 on Mt. Tiāntái 天台山. There is no indication that Eisai's motivation was to study Zen. While

there is no extant catalogue of the texts Eisai brought back to Japan, the *Kaihen kyōshu ketsu* recounts that he returned with sixty fascicles of Sòng period Tiāntái commentarial literature (Mano 2014, 57). On his return to Japan, Eisai's institutional activities widen. He moved to Kyūshū in southern Japan where he founded small temples and forged links with a number of Chinese merchants. In terms of his thought, Eisai composed several texts on esoteric themes, such as *Oral Transmission of the Womb [Mandala]* (J. *taikuketsu* 胎口訣), *Essentials of Being free from Affliction* (J. *shutten taikō* 出纏大綱) and *Expository Notes on the Mind of Awakening* (J. *bodaishin bekki* 菩提心別記). Eisai's work in this period relied heavily on the Tendai exegete Annen 安然 (841–u.), and much of Eisai's analysis of esoteric doctrine and practice in this period of his career mirrors Annen's positions.

We do not know precisely why Eisai conceived of a second trip to China in 1187, although as we shall see in Chapter One, the most likely explanation is his concern for the status of Japanese monastic practice and the impact of the “Age of the Degenerate Latter Dharma” (C. *mòfǎ* 末法; J. *mappō*). It seems unlikely that Eisai went to China looking specifically for instruction in Chán. Initially, Eisai intended travelling to India in emulation of Yìjìng 義淨 (J. Gijō; 635–713). Our best guess from Eisai's texts is that he went in search of “original” Buddhism, although it is also possible he was hoping to find true relics of the Buddha (Mano 2014, 75). Due to the Mongol threat, the Chinese authorities refused him permission to travel. With this bureaucratic mishap, Eisai decided to stay in China for the subsequent four years, where his

thought, and his place in Japanese Buddhist history, would change dramatically.

Eisai met his Chán teacher while at Jǐngdé temple 景德寺 on Mount Tiāntóng 天童山. Xū'ān Huáichǎng 虛庵懷敞 (d.u.), a member of the Huánglóng 黃龍 (J. Kōryū) school of Línjǐ Chán transmitted his lineage to Eisai, who subsequently became the first Japanese monk to bring this lineage to Japan, where it would form the basis for the subsequent development of the Rinzai school. From Huáichǎng Eisai received not only a Zen lineage, but also a bodhisattva precepts ordination and a Four-Part vinaya (C. *Sifēnlǜ* 四分律; J. *Shibun ritsu*) ordination. Over three hundred years previously the Japanese Tendai school had abandoned the Four-Part Vinaya, hence upon his return Eisai's interest in vinaya and its significance for Buddhist practice becomes a key point of contention. The issue of how Eisai conceives of the vinaya, bodhisattva and esoteric precepts is the key element I explore in this work. We do not have reliable sources that inform us of the precise teachings bestowed by Xū'ān Huáichǎng on Eisai, although most likely the observance of morality was a key issue.

On his return from China in 1191 Eisai was forbidden to travel to Kyoto and instead stayed in Kyūshū.<sup>7</sup> Scholarship agrees that this timeframe, from 1191 to his death in 1215, is key in Eisai's life. During this period, he composes his most influential works: (i) *Essentials of Monastic Life* (J. *Shukke taikō* 出家大綱; 1195); (ii) *A Treatise Promoting Zen for the Protection of the State* (J. *Kōzen gokokuron* 興禪護國論; 1198); (iii) *Tract Encouraging Pure*

*Morality* (J. *saikai kanjin mon* 齋戒勸進文; 1204); (iv) *Entreaty for the Restoration of the Buddhist Law in Japan* (J. *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* 日本佛法中興願; 1204) and, (iv) *An Account of the Health Benefits of Drinking Tea* (J. *Kissa yōjōki* 喫茶養生記; 1211). In 1201 Eisai became the chief fundraiser (J. *kanjin shiki* 勸進職) at Tōdaiji and also established Jufuku temple 寿福寺 in Kamakura with the patronage of the shogunate. In 1202 the Imperial government granted Eisai permission to construct Kenninji in Kyoto, with construction completed two years later in 1204. Concerning Eisai's death, there are competing accounts, one from the *Azuma Kagami* and the other based on the *Genkō shakusho*. Mano argues for the former (2014, 64), which states that Eisai passed on the fifth day of the sixth month at Jufukiji in Kamakura.

### **3. Images of Eisai in Scholarship**

One of the key questions for scholarship is where does Eisai stand in terms of affiliation and the key aspects of his work? Esoteric Buddhism, Tendai, Zen and vinaya all feature prominently in Eisai's work. The answer to this question determines the stance scholars take concerning which aspects of Eisai's thought is most important. I will divide the field into three broad groups: (i) scholars emphasizing morality and the precepts, focusing largely on Eisai's post 1191 work; this group may also highlight the Zen aspect or the influence of Tendai precept discourse; (ii) those who emphasize esoteric Buddhism, focusing largely on pre 1187 work, and (iii) those who emphasize Zen via an analysis of Eisai's relationship with other figures and his legacy. All three

elements are present in Eisai's work, although it is difficult to analyze all of them together given the diversity of Eisai's interests. Hence there is a tendency for scholars to emphasize one aspect over others.

The first group is firmly established within Japanese scholarship. Tsunoda (1954, 636) for example notes that despite the importance of both Zen and esoteric Buddhism in Eisai's post 1191 works, Eisai is clearly placing emphasis on the precepts. Information from premodern sources tend to confirm this opinion. Tsunoda points to the *Nandanshū* 難談集 which calls Eisai “the one who maintains and revives purity” (J. *jissai chūkō nari* 持齊中興なり), and the *Shasekishū* 沙石集, a *setsuwa* collection compiled by Mujū Ichien 無住一圓 (1226–1312), refers to Eisai as the “one who studies morality and discipline, and who maintains correct deportment” (J. *kairitsu wo manashi, kaigi wo mamori* 戒律を學し, 威儀を守); Tsunoda 1954, 636). Tsunoda concludes his analysis by suggesting that Eisai is best seen as the protector of conservative Buddhism, rather than as the founder of a new sect of Rinzai Zen. He points to Eisai's student, Enni as a more appropriate founding figure for Japanese Rinzai.

Scholarship emphasizing morality faces a number of issues. First, emphasizing precepts in terms of ordination, rather than moral practice skews our understanding of Eisai's thought. Second, there are issues with the authenticity of some of the texts attributed to Eisai concerning ordinations; for example Kubota (1984, 753) uses the *Bodhisattva Ordination ceremony of the Brahmā net sūtra* (J. *Bonmōkyō bosatsukai sahō* 梵網經菩薩戒作法) for his

analysis. There is no evidence that Eisai wrote this text or that it reflects his thought. The final major problem for these scholars is the difficulty in explaining how Eisai moves so drastically from esoteric Buddhism to emphasis on vinaya precepts on his return from China. Explaining the relationship between Eisai's pre China and post China emphasis is a starting point for scholars who emphasize the esoteric element in Eisai's work.

Scholars who emphasize the esoteric aspect of Eisai's work suggest that if one can establish that Eisai never really left *taimitsu* behind him, then the narrative changes in terms of how we understand Eisai and the link between esotericism and exoteric precepts such as the vinaya. Scholarship emphasizing *taimitsu* often supports this perspective. Mano (2012, 827) points to Taga Munehara and Yanagida Seizan as two Japanese scholars who have insisted on esotericism as being a key aspect of Eisai's work, although the latter did not conduct extensive scholarship concerning *taimitsu*. Mano, in both a Japanese language article (2012, 644) and his dissertation (2014, 150–189) points to the influence of Tendai *taimitsu* exegete Annen on Eisai. Yoneda Mariko (2016) also strongly emphasizes the esoteric aspect of Eisai's thought. Yoneda argues that Eisai is attempting to reintroduce Zen to Tendai partially due to the link between Zen and *taimitsu*.

There are certainly very strong reasons to suggest that Eisai did not abandon esoteric practices once he had encountered Zen. One of the most formidable arguments employed by scholars who emphasize esotericism references Eisai's lineage which openly mixes Zen with esoteric practices. The

*Saseki shū* refers to Eisai's Dharma heir Eichō 榮朝 (a.k.a. Shakuen 釋圓, 1165–1247) as both an esoteric master and as a monk who received a vinaya ordination (Yamaguchi 1992, 266).

The importance of esotericism in Eisai cannot be ignored. The key question is how does Eisai's career in esotericism relate to his post 1191 work on morality? There is also the question of the relationship with Zen. Both questions remain open. The major weakness of this position is the relative lack of impact of Eisai's esoteric corpus. Eisai's work on *taimitsu* is essentially in line with Annen, and therefore lacking in doctrinal originality. Also, pointing to Eisai's lineage is not necessarily an argument in favor of Eisai's continued emphasis on esotericism following his return from China in 1191. Eisai's lineage may not have needed to integrate esotericism and vinaya in a coherent doctrinal system; rather one can view the two aspects as integrated through a system of practice. What is distinct and interesting about Eisai's texts post 1191 is the argumentative stance Eisai takes, and his attempts to create an argument concerning morality are what allow us to consider these texts both doctrinally and philosophically, to analyze how Eisai conceives the function of morality within a Buddhist system of training.

The last group of scholars are those who consider Zen of primary importance in Eisai's thought and the key aspect of his legacy.<sup>8</sup> There are two positions on the topic of Eisai's relationship to Zen. Is Zen the most important influence on Eisai's life and thought? The evidence suggests the contrary. If the position is claiming that Zen is the most significant element of Eisai's

legacy, this is true in a historical sense. Eisai became known to scholarship as a Zen master, and without the image constructed on his behalf by others, we may not have come to know his teachings at all. Furuta (1960, 410) represents the position that Zen is most important in Eisai's works, although he links this with morality, referring to Eisai's Zen as "the Zen of maintaining morality and discipline" (J. *jikai jiritsu shugi no zen* 持戒持律主義の繹). Furuta's affiliation with the Rinzai school is also characteristic of scholars who emphasize Zen in Eisai's works. Sueki (2010–2012, 106–107) suggests that Eisai is a representative figure for early Zen in Japan. Sueki also suggests that Zen as portrayed in Eisai's works does not emphasize many of elements we have come to expect in Zen, such as meditative practice using *kōan* 公案 (C. *gōng'àn*).

Regarding Sueki's point, Eisai references two *kōan* collections in *Kōzen gokokuron* (fasc. 2, p.113–114), both of which occur in Gate Seven which extols the benefit of Zen practice. The two texts are *The Blue Cliff Record* (C. *Bìyán lù* 碧巖錄; J. *Hekigan roku*), *The Treasury of the True Eye of the Dharma* (C. *Zhèngfǎyǎn zàng* 正法眼藏; J. *Shōbōgenzō*) by Dàhui Zōngǎo 大慧宗杲 (J. Daie Shūkō, a.k.a. Daieor Sōkō; 1089–1163). Eisai also cites the *Record of the Transmission of the Lamp in the Jindge Era* (C. *Jīngdé chuándēnglù* 景德傳燈錄; J. *Keitoku dentōroku*) by Dàojuán 道源 (J. Dōgen; d.u.), a key text establishing the identity of the Chán school. These references do not advocate *kōan* practice, but do use *kōan* texts to illustrate the Chán/Zen school's basis in non-duality, and encourages an awareness of emptiness in

everyday activities.

Tokiwa (2004, 207) emphasizes the traditional approach to Buddhism which Eisai considers characteristic of Zen. This provides an interesting contrast with Eisai's treatment of Nōnin, founder of the Darumashū and also proscribed by the Japanese government. According to Tokiwa, Eisai's motivation for attacking Nōnin was the latter's perceived denial of the three disciplines (C. *sānxué* 三學; J. *sangaku*) of morality (C. *jiè* 戒; J. *kai*), meditation (C. *dìng* 定; J. *jō*) and wisdom (C. *huì* 慧; J. *e*). Tokiwa (2005, 51) also suggests that Eisai intended to found a distinct school of Zen that would eventually become independent of Tendai. Tokiwa's opinion does not reflect the scholarly consensus. Ishida (1986a, 294) represents the standard interpretation of Eisai's view as Zen established within the Tendai school; this opinion is also shared by Furuta (1986, 610). Advocates of the importance of Eisai as Zen master also face questions concerning the nature of practice at Kenninji. Ishida (1986a, 295) points to the halls for Tendai esoteric practice at Kenninji to illustrate his point that Eisai never sought institutional independence from Tendai. The fact of Kenninji having halls for the practice of esoteric rites does not necessarily provide evidence in the manner in which subsequent scholars have suggested, as this assumes that esoteric Buddhism and Zen have no overlap, and are two distinct forms of Buddhism, or perhaps forms of Buddhist practice. An analysis of Eisai's lineage and its hallmark combined practice of Zen and esotericism suggests the issue of Kenninji may be overstated. Nonetheless, the case of the establishment of Kenninji does

provide us with a basis from which to draw some tentative conclusions. Under Eisai, monastic life emphasized the practice of morality. Kenninji did not have a monks' hall where monastics both slept and meditated, a feature which would come to be considered a hallmark of a Zen monastery in line with contemporary Chinese models. Kenninji is significant for the fact that it remained a Tendai affiliated temple with an abbot ordained in the Nanshan vinaya lineage (C. Nánshān zōng 南山宗; J. Nansen shū), with this lineage also passed onto his successor Myōzen 明全 (1184–1225; Bodiford 1993, 169). This situation changed in 1265 when Lánxī Dào lóng 蘭溪道隆 (J. Rankei Dōryū; c. 1213–1278) converted the temple to Rinzai temple (*Zengaku daijiten*, 296d–297a).

My decision to focus on the four texts concerning morality Eisai wrote on his return from China fills a lacuna in English language scholarship. These texts focus on doctrinal issues concerning morality, and show the overwhelming influence of Chinese Tīāntái precept discourse. This is, in my opinion, the most important aspect of Eisai's thought, and his legacy: the introduction of Zen as a means to improve morality and discipline. This issue is the central theme of the four texts under discussion in this dissertation.

#### **4. Eisai's Texts**

The texts under discussion span a period of between twelve and fourteen years. The dating for *Shukke taikō* is debateable, but the dates for *Kōzen gokokuron* (1198), *Saikai kanjin mon* (1204) and *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* (1204) are relatively accepted, albeit not without certain caveats discussed

below. Eisai's final text, which is not under discussion here, *Kissa yōjōki*, is dated 1211.

*Shukke taikō* has been largely ignored by English language scholars, with the exception of Bodiford (2002, 318–319). Japanese language scholarship has taken more account of the text, in particular the work of Tsunoda (1954), but in general scholarship focuses on *Kōzen gokokuron*.

The dating of *Shukke taikō* is problematic. According to the preface Eisai began composing *Shukke taikō* during his second visit to Sòng China from 1187–1191, and completed it on his return. Thus explains why the text is often dated to 1192 (Mano 2012, 829). Taga (1965, 257) points to a discrepancy between the preface and the postscript of the earliest current version of the text from 1789.<sup>9</sup> The preface accords with the body of the text and suggests Eisai started the work while in China and completed it in 1195, with the postscript dated to 1200. The dating of *Shukke taikō* is significant because of its relationship to Eisai's next and most famous composition, *Kōzen gokokuron*. The accepted date for the completion of *Kōzen gokokuron* is 1198, leading Taga (1965, 257) to suggest that *Kōzen gokokuron* and *Shukke taikō* are roughly contemporaneous. One interesting repercussion of the dating of the postscript is that Eisai seems to have edited the text after releasing *Kōzen gokokuron*, perhaps in response to its reception by the Tendai establishment. In broad terms, the key difference between *Shukke taikō* and *Kōzen gokokuron* is the former is an "insider" text designed for Eisai's monastic audience, while *Kōzen gokokuron* was a response to attempts to proscribe the Zen school by

the establishment.

The composition and history of *Kōzen gokokuron* is also open to dispute. Both Imaeda (1985) and Fujita (2014) emphasize the very real possibility of *Kōzen gokokuron* having been substantially edited during the Tokugawa period. Imaeda's bases his main argument (1985, 1336–1339) on a comparative study of the account of Eisai in the preface to *Kōzen gokokuron* and Kokan Shiren's *Genkō shakusho*. The author concludes that the *Genkō shakusho* is the source material for the *Kōzen gokokuron* preface. Fujita emphasizes the role of Kōhō Tōshun 高峰東暎 (1736–1801) in popularizing *Kōzen gokokuron*. Fujita notes that (2014, 29) Kenninji released the first version of *Kōzen gokokuron* in 1666. This version was replete with numerous errors and was difficult to understand, meaning the text made little impact. Kōhō was the abbot of the Kenninji subtemple Ryōsoku-in 兩足院. He also released another text by Eisai, *Clarifying the meaning of Perfect One Mind Morality* (J. *endon issinkai wakai* 円頓一心戒和解) in 1761. This latter text is now generally considered by scholarship as not a genuine Eisai composition (Mano 2014, 234).<sup>10</sup> In 1778 Kōhō released a version of *Kōzen gokokuron*, with his commentary on the text released posthumously in 1813 (Fujita 2014, 30). Fujita also suggests that *Kōzen gokokuron* underwent editing during the Tokugawa period.

There are certainly problems surrounding the authenticity of the current version of *Kōzen gokokuron*. Much of the scholarly debate surrounds the foreword and the note to the foreword, both included in the Taishō edition. The

Ichikawa et. al. edited edition (1972) does not include the preface. This dissertation cites the Ichikawa critical edition. Kōhō provides a note to the foreword which he claims to have discovered among the notebooks of Nansō Ryōsaku 南叟朔所 (d.u).<sup>11</sup> The difficulty in answering such questions, and Kōhō's prior publication of *endon isshinkai wakai* indicates the need for caution. From the contrary perspective, one may highlight the consistency of content between *Shukke taikō* and *Kōzen gokokuron* as a means to measure their authenticity as genuine works of Eisai. Whether or not the works remained unaltered by subsequent editors also seems unlikely.

*Saikai kanjin mon* and *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* are both dated 1204. The former appears in the same manuscript edition as the 1798 copy of *Shukke taikō*. The only mention of *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* in textual sources prior to the Tokugawa period is at the end of *Saikai kanjin mon*. Imaeda in the same article discussed above, argues that *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* is not a genuine text of Eisai. He presents several pieces of evidence. He points to the text itself, which states erroneously that Eisai received the purple robe or *shie* 紫衣 (C. *zǐyī*) from the Imperial court (Imaeda 1985, 1333).

While Imaeda presents a strong argument, he does not provide conclusive evidence that the text is not a genuine Eisai composition. In terms of content, the theme of *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* shows a certain parallelism with *Saikai kanjin mon*. The latter focuses on use of bodhisattva precepts for the laity, with particular emphasis on the role of ritual purity gained through abstaining from food at certain times and for certain periods (C. *zhāijiè* 齋戒;

J. *saikai*), rendered subsequently as "pure morality". *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* on the other hand addresses the Imperial court and suggests that if monastics maintain the vinaya precepts especially those concerning sexual morality (C. *chíjiè fàn xíng* 持戒梵行; J. *jikai bongyō*) then Japan will flourish in various ways. In this sense, both texts are reflective of Eisai's viewpoint during this period as understood through *Shukke taikō* and *Kōzen gokokuron*.

Overall, these four texts present a relatively consistent and clear articulation of Eisai's ideas concerning normative morality in Buddhist practice. The question we must turn to now is how Eisai fits in with broader scholarly conceptions concerning Kamakura period Buddhism.

## **5. On Translation and Analytic Philosophy of Language**

A key term in this dissertation is *kai* 戒 (C. *jiè*). Compounds containing the term are sometimes translated more broadly as "morality"; the word "precept" suggests a context limited to observing particular moral rules and regulations. Philosophically, *kai* is what I call, drawing on Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), a "sedimented concept", where structures of meaning accumulate around concepts and conceptual frameworks, which are then handed down to subsequent generations.<sup>12</sup> One could argue that any concept in Buddhist texts is sedimented; the key point for us is that the equivalent English translation for the term has become sedimented, often leading to a mistaken conception of what the term implies. The English term "precepts" provides a good example. The term "precept" from the Latin *praeceptum* meaning "maxim" or "injunction", translates *kairitsu* 戒律 (C. *jièlǜ*). Tsuchihashi (1967, 120) points

out that the Sino-Japanese term is, in the Indian context, effectively split into its component glyphs and cannot be applied as a translation for *vinaya* even in the Indian sense; rather, it is only applicable as a compound in the Chinese context. The sense that "precepts" is a correct translation of the term *kairitsu* assume a theory of translation that regards one to one correspondence between words across languages as possible.

The major critique of the idea of a one-to-one correspondence between words translated from one language to another was famously attacked in the work of W.V.O. Quine (1908–2000), in particular his “indeterminacy of translation” thesis. Below is Quine's account of the theory from his most famous work, *Word and Object*:

Manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. In countless places they will diverge in giving, as their respective translations of a sentence of the one language, sentences of the other language which stand to each other in no plausible sort of equivalence, however loose (Quine 1960, 27).

Regardless of what kind of empirical evidence we garner in favor of one set of translation standards over another, there are no objective means of judging one version "correct" and another "incorrect", as there is nothing for translations to be right or wrong about (Quine 1960, 73).

Quine's theory is extremely complex, and to analyze further how his

critique of translation fits with the larger model would bring us too far afield. What we can draw from Quine is the sense that consistently translating a term from one language into another and assuming this is objectively correct misunderstands both the nature of language and how language relates to reality. Such one to one correspondence between languages, and between language and reality does not exist. Eisai provides a good example here; translating *kai* as "precepts", or indeed as "morality" in all circumstances would result in Eisai's making contradictory statements in his texts concerning the relationship between vinaya and bodhisattva morality. In such a scenario we would be foisting contradiction on Eisai where most likely none exists. The idea that there is a correspondences between words, their translations into another language, and objects, or concepts, "in the world" is an untenable philosophical position.

Philosophers have formulated numerous responses to Quine's thesis. Once such contemporary response by Ranganathan attempts to move the focus away from the relationship between language and reality and instead to the relationship between language and texts. Ranganathan (2007, 10–11) proposes a "text-type" theory, which may appear familiar to Buddhist studies scholars:

The error is the assumption that all texts, regardless of type, are to be translated in the same fashion...I would like to forward a textual account of meaning and translation. According to this theory, translation is a relationship between texts, not languages, their vocabulary or sentences abstractly conceived. The criteria of

equivalence in translation are relative to “text-types.” Each text-type specifies what might be called text-type features, which must be preserved in any successful translation. Thus, the type of equivalence sought between originals and translations is not the same in all cases, nor is it a complete equivalence of every feature of the two texts.

Rather, equivalence is relativized to the type of text under consideration. If we add the insight that meaning is what is preserved in translation—the insight that justifies the ordinary presumption that genuine translations are semantically equivalent to their originals - we arrive at a text-type conception of semantics (henceforth TTS), according to which the criteria of translational equivalence relative to text-types specify constellations of meanings.

This sounds very familiar to Buddhist studies scholars, who would argue that this is already standard procedure; we divide texts according to different sectarian affiliations, and then according to function, i.e. ritual manuals, meditation manuals, precept texts, Tendai texts, esoteric texts and so on. Is this enough to avoid the implications of the “indeterminacy of translation” thesis?

The fact that Buddhist studies is still in the grip of Quine's critique also explains the flaw in Ranganathan's theory, at least from a Buddhist studies translation perspective. This model does not provide us with an answer as to how to treat words and their meaning, let alone how to identify which text type a certain text belongs to; indeed, the very act of identifying the text type rests upon translation, so we are back to the beginning again. Eisai's text

*Shukke taikō*: a text written by a Tendai *taimitsu* expert, later considered a Zen master, that concerns vinaya practice in the monastic setting. Which text type is appropriate in this instance? It seems like that choice will determine the nature of the translation, and the indeterminacy highlighted by Quine remains: we are still assuming a correspondence between word and object, and object and "Truth" that, according to Quine, not only does not exist, but cannot exist.

This dissertation adopts a translation methodology that attempts to sidestep some of the problems of Quine's indeterminacy thesis by arguing that translation should focus on coherence, rather than verification of an accurate correspondence between words and reality. Text types play a part in a coherence theory, but are not the only criteria. The theory used in this work is an adaptation of the work of Rudolph Carnap (1891–1970), and his concept of "linguistic frameworks". George provides a neat summary of the significance of this idea in Carnap's works:

They [linguistic frameworks] correspond to (or just amount to) different meanings that can be bestowed on words. Correlatively, these frameworks legitimate different principles of inference, and so different conceptions of justification. Within each linguistic framework, a particular conception of rationality reigns.

Carnap distinguishes sharply between such choices of framework and choices made within a framework. The latter, framework internal choices, are subject to rational assessment according to the laws of reason of the framework in question. The

former, by contrast, are framework-external choices and so by hypothesis not governed by any strictures of reason .... Framework-external deliberations are not guided by any rules of justification, indeed, it is even misleading to describe what is involved in such choices as deliberation. Carnap calls the kinds of considerations that play a role in a choice of framework "pragmatic", and he insists on distinguishing them from the "theoretical" reasons one might have for choosing a hypothesis within a framework (George 2002, 2).

Carnap's theory is no less complex than Quine's above. Here, we are adopting the most useful elements to our current purposes. In Buddhist studies, it is useful to adapt an altered sense of these linguistic frameworks as a translation methodology. This methodology could also be paired with Ranganathan's text types theory.

When one considers Eisai, one may choose a Zen master, in which case they will translate with an eye on these implications; there is also the esoteric framework; my framework is a trans-sectarian Eisai, in line with Ōtsuka's model outlined above, with a focus on the relationship between Tendai, Zen and *ritsu*. Eisai sees Zen and its emphasis on morality as a means to revitalize the practice of Buddhism in Japan, and by extension the Tendai school. The idea of linguistic frame works suggests that one does not necessarily need to justify which framework one chooses. All three of the above mentioned frameworks regarding Eisai are equally valid. Regardless of the framework external choice, the key point is that the framework internal choices, in terms

of translation and interpretative analysis, are coherent. It is via the coherence of the internal frameworks analysis that one can judge the validity of the interpretation, rather than through attempting to argue that the analysis or translations presented do not correspond to an objectively "correct" interpretation. As O'Grady (1999, 1025) puts it, these linguistic frameworks are: "specially constructed to clarify a specific area. This framework serves as an explication, as an artificial model built to sharpen and clarify issues". The framework adopted here functions in the same manner, clarifying where the distinctions lie between different forms of morality in Eisai's work, the doctrinal and philosophical ramifications involved for Eisai in making such distinctions, and the impact of this type of analysis on Eisai's doctrinal and philosophical legacy.

This framework assumes no correspondence between word and object, but rather emphasizes that coherence in translation is the most philosophically justified means of moving forward with translations of Eisai's texts. The external framework in particular allows the translator to use the most pragmatic translation without the need to justify her choice with reference to an impossible criterion of "Truth".

## **6. Philosophical Structure and Significance**

This work has four chapters: on soteriology, on ritual, on practice and on doctrine. I will outline in detail the contents of these chapters in the subsequent section; for now, I wish to explain the philosophical relevance of this structure. By "philosophical relevance" I am referring to how philosophers

in the Western tradition tend to approach issues in Buddhist ethics, and how this dissertation aims to move this field forward. Comparative philosophical analysis of Buddhism and Euro-American philosophy has a checkered past of misunderstandings and misappropriations, and the areas of morality and ethics are no exception. The four chapters presented here provide an outline of four aspects of Buddhist moral discourse often overlooked in Western philosophical scholarship on Buddhist ethical and moral norms.

English language scholarship has tended to focus solely on moral concepts in isolation. This conceptual isolation lends itself to mapping concepts from one tradition onto another, usually Western philosophical concepts are "mapped" onto Buddhist ideas. This trend in scholarship is found at all levels of expertise, and leads to numerous misunderstandings. For example, Keown (1992) argues for Buddhism as representing a form of virtue ethics; Goodman (2008) adopts the same methodology, but instead argues for Buddhist ethics as a form of consequentialism. He takes this position further suggesting that dialogue between Buddhist and Western ethics could enrich both traditions if "we Westerners can find some way of understanding, in our terms, what kind of ethical theory Buddhism might involve" (Goodman 2008, 17). The tendency to "map" Western arguments and concepts onto Buddhist texts is problematic and implies that if Western concepts do not fit with Buddhist concerns, this is because Buddhism is simply not concerned with ethics at all. Gowans for example suggests that Buddhism does not concern itself with ethics in the same manner as the Western tradition (2015, 55).

Similarly, Barnhart (2012, 33) argues that Buddhism "...may be about ethics, but not completely or not in a philosophically interesting sense".

There are two distinct problems with the above approach, one concerns Buddhist doctrine, and the other is methodological. Regarding the former, Perrett (1987, 81) has correctly observed that key debates in Western ethical contexts, such as debates concerning egoistic prudential action and altruistic action, or deontology and consequentialism, are less prominent in Buddhism due to the doctrines of Non-Self (C. *wúwǒ* 無我; J. *muga*) and karma. The fundamental distinctions in core concepts between Buddhist and Western ethical traditions suggests that the concept mapping model is difficult to sustain. The origins of this approach have similarly been called into question. Arguably, this view emerged through an "othering" of Asian culture (Zhang and Wu 2007, 234), but it is also possible that the problem is in fact methodological. Heim, who identifies the problem as the "holistic approach" elaborates on its meaning:

The methodology involves mining of the textual sources for passages that support the Western ethical theory that the author advances. The resulting selection of passages is construed as representing the "moral core" or the "unity" of Buddhism's ethical theory. This methodology belies Buddhist traditions' own ethical theorizing, their distinctively different ways of asking questions about morality and morality agency, and the highly textured and heterogeneous nature of the vast assortment of thinkers that fly under the banner of "Buddhism". Moreover, by

treating ethics primarily in terms of dilemma-based problem solving rather than, say, explorations of moral psychology, the possibilities for engaging deeply the ways that Buddhists themselves set up formal moral reflection are preempted (Heim 2009, 352).

Heim is not ruling out cross-cultural philosophical problems; rather she suggests that the method of identifying significant philosophical questions requires reconsideration.

As pointed out by Heim above, dilemma based arguments that are central to Western philosophical traditions of moral discourse tend to assume a neutral moral subject, an "everyman" in some sense, where philosophical analysis assumes that the choices and motivations of the subject first takes place in an abstract realm of rationality or feeling, which are then subject to logical critique. Buddhist soteriology as outlined in this work explains why this approach to Buddhist morality will not work. Buddhist path structure (C. *shèngdào* 勝道; J. *shōdō*) plays a major role in determining both moral expectations and capacities for each individual. This is particularly true in certain forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism that focus on stages on the bodhisattva path. Statements concerning morality in Buddhist texts can rarely be taken as normative for the entire range of Buddhist practitioners. Eisai's belief in the latter age of the degenerate Dharma also provides a good example of why this tendency to generalization must be avoided.

The link between ritual and morality is another area where the expectations philosophers have when analyzing Buddhist moral discourse

require reassessment. In Western philosophical systems, ritual is simply excluded; in Buddhism, ritual and morality are closely linked, and one cannot make philosophical statements about the former unless one understands the role of the latter. Makransky (2000, 54) is one of the few philosophical commentators who recognize the significance of this connection: "Ritual also serves as means to empower and deepen philosophical inquiry and meditation. We do well not to forget the unique power of Buddhist ritual to include the many (not only the elite) in the most profound dimensions of Buddhist ethical understanding, formation, and expression." Chapter Two brings this relationship into focus, and clarifies the nature of the relationship between abstract moral theory and concrete moral practice and ritual.

Chapter Three also addresses another key problem with applying Western philosophical presuppositions to Buddhist moral discourse, the emphasis on theory over practice. In the Buddhist context, practice is very important, to the point that it is a worthwhile method in analyzing Buddhist concepts to always ask oneself how this concept would appear in a practical Buddhist context. The practical context is also important in presenting one of the key aspects of Buddhist morality often overlooked in English language studies, and indeed within the Western philosophical tradition more broadly, the role of the physical and the physical body. This is particularly important with reference to the vinaya, where proficiency in this form of moral practice manifests itself in a physical sense, through the idea of "deportment" (C. *lǐyì* 律儀; J. *ritsugi*). The purity which arises through moral discipline manifests in

a physical fashion, inner virtue transforms the outer physical body. With the notable exception of Mrozik (2007), who analyzes the idea of the bodhisattva body in Mahāyāna, this aspect of Buddhist morality has been largely overlooked.

Chapter Four on doctrine analyzes philosophical arguments concerning the nature of morality in doctrinal terms. This chapter is placed last to emphasize that this discussion relies on the previous three chapters in order to fully contextualize the nature of Eisai's thought, before providing a more traditional philosophical analysis.

The structure of this work helps provide a comprehensive analysis of Eisai's discourse on morality. This structure also functions on a larger methodological scale by highlighting and correcting conceptual difficulties Western philosophers often face when trying to provide philosophically accurate and penetrating studies of Buddhist ethics.

## **7. Overview of the Chapters**

As outlined above, there are philosophical reasons for structuring the work in this fashion. There are also reasons internal to Eisai's textual arguments for emphasizing the four aspects of soteriology, ritual, practice and doctrine.

These four elements form the basis of Eisai's arguments for the introduction of Zen as a means to reform monastic practice.

Chapter One emphasizes the importance of soteriology, in particular the idea of a "Latter age of the degenerate Dharma". Eisai shared with many of his Kamakura period Buddhist contemporaries the idea that Japan had entered this

degenerate age, and therefore the concept is central to Eisai's entire argument concerning the introduction of Zen to Japan. Chapter One illustrates how Eisai uses Tiāntái texts discussing the idea of a degenerate latter age to justify the introduction of Zen as a remedy. Eisai's argument focuses on Tiāntái interpretations of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* (C. *Nièpán jīng* 涅槃經; J. *Nehan kyō*), with particular emphasis on the concept *furitsu danjō* 扶律談常 (C. *fúlǜ táncháng*), where *furitsu* 扶律 refers to monastic discipline in the latter age, with *danjō* 談常 representing the contents of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* and eternal abiding of the Buddha. Eisai argues that Zen not only represents monastic discipline in terms of vinaya practice, but also suggests that Zen meditation (C. *zuòchán* 坐禪 J. *zazen*) is the best form of practice during the latter age. Eisai justifies both ideas doctrinally with reference to Tiāntái sources. Most likely, Eisai's experience of the Chinese monastic system is the basis for these arguments.

Chapter Two deals with the idea of "abstract morality" (C. *lǐjiè* 理戒; J. *rikai*) or "morality in principle". This term contrasts with "concrete morality" (C. *shìjiè* 事戒 J. *jikai*), often referred to as "morality in deed" which is the topic of Chapter Three. This terminology has its origins in Zhìyǐ's 智顓 (J. Chigi; 538–597) *Móhē zhǐguān* 摩訶止觀 (J. *Maka shikan*). Abstract morality refers to the upholding of morality "in principle"; in other words, one contemplates the mind in various meditative states, which allows one to access the mind and transcend the world of the senses. Concrete morality on the other hand refers to the upkeep of the precepts, usually referring to vinaya

precepts of body and speech. The following passage, from Swanson's translation of the *Móhē zhǐguān* explains the difference. In this section, Swanson adopts a slightly different terminology, referring to "precepts in principle" and "precepts in deed":

If [the ten categories of precepts are discussed] distinctly, the three degrees of [upholding] the precepts in deed 事戒 are called "the precepts", but these precepts are still defiled and are not [able to allow people] to change and to transcend [this world]. The three degrees of [upholding] the precepts as principle 理戒 are called the "vehicles". These vehicles are undefiled and are able [to allow people] to change and transcend [this world and attain Buddhahood] (Swanson 2018, 611).

若就別義，事戒三品名之爲戒，戒即有漏不動不出。理戒三品名之爲乘，乘是無漏，能動能出 (T no. 1911, 46.0039a09–a10).

Morality in principle refers to how meditative practices result in an overarching understanding of moral principles, an awareness of how to practice morality that is based on the mind as principle (C. *lǐ* 理; J. *ri*). For Eisai, the relationship between emptiness and morality is a key issue, especially in the latter age of the degenerate Dharma. In Chapter Two, I highlight the evolution of this idea of abstract morality in Tiāntái, and discuss how Eisai uses Tiāntái sources, especially Zhànrán 湛然 (J. Tannen; 711–782) to argue in favor of the importance of concrete morality in the form of vinaya regulations. Eisai's argument here is controversial in the Japanese context

because, as noted above, the Japanese Tendai school used an ordination that emphasized abstract morality to ordain all monastics. Eisai's argument is that such an ordination is appropriate only for advanced practitioners.

Chapter Three presents the other side of the coin, Eisai's arguments in favor of concrete morality as the basis for monastic practice. This chapter highlights two key aspects of Eisai's legacy, his introduction of the *Pure Rules for Chán Monasteries* (C. *Chányuàn qīngguī* 禪苑清規; J. *Zen'en shingi*) to a Japanese audience, and the importance of *Shukke taikō*, arguably the first "Zen" text authored in Japan. This chapter introduces two of the key elements of Eisai's emphasis on concrete morality, concerning food and fasting (C. *zhāijiè* 齋戒; J. *saikai*), and regarding sexual morality and celibacy (C. *chijiè fànxíng* 持戒梵行; J. *jikai bongyō*). While this chapter highlights how important Zen is to Eisai's conception of morality, I also introduce Eisai's interest in Vinaya experts, particularly Yìjìng and Dào xuān 道宣 (J. *Dōsen*; 596–667). The chapter ends with a discussion of how Eisai understands the nature of the relationship between concrete morality and Zen meditation, and how his conception overlaps with Dào xuān's discussion of meditation and morality.

Chapter Four provides an analysis of Eisai's doctrinal arguments concerning the nature of the relationship between vinaya morality and bodhisattva morality as represented in the bodhisattva precepts (C. *púsà jiè* 菩薩戒; J. *bosatsu kai*). This chapter is left until last because it incorporates elements from previous chapters. I explain Eisai's understanding of both

vinaya and bodhisattva precepts. Eisai's conception of the bodhisattva precepts is particularly important for understanding how Eisai understands the relationship between concrete and abstract morality. Eisai argues that the degenerate latter age requires a new conception of the relationship between abstract and concrete morality, and highlights the role of Zen in reconfiguring this relationship. This chapter also helps to contextualize Eisai's understanding of this relationship by comparing his ideas on the issue with Dōgen who, despite having also studied Chán in China, holds views diametrically opposed to Eisai's.

Ultimately, these chapters weave together several aspects of Eisai's thought and analyze both a wide gamut of topics, and sources from a broad number of schools and traditions. This dissertation provides one means to categorize and clarify the disparate elements of Eisai's arguments concerning the nature of Zen and its relationship to the practice of morality.

## 1. Soteriological Context to Eisai's Discourse on Morality

### The Concept of the Latter Age of the Degenerate Dharma

The concept of the "latter age of the degenerate Dharma" appears in numerous Buddhist texts across a variety of traditions and cultural contexts. For Kamakura period Japanese Buddhists, the sense that Japan was in the midst of the latter age became an accepted truism for figures such as Eisai. The degenerate latter age also provided Buddhists in Japan with a means to explain the gap between the historical reality they were experiencing and normative Buddhist expectations. Hence, this discourse not only offered an explanation for the tumultuous social and political climate of the period, but also promised potential solutions based on Buddhist principles.

In Buddhist doctrinal accounts of the degenerate latter age and its affects, a key aspect is the role played by Buddhist clerics and monastics. While the degenerate age negatively effects the ability of Buddhist practitioners to uphold the moral precepts, it is also conversely true that successfully practicing morality provides a significant bulwark against its impact.

All four of Eisai's texts under consideration here, *Shukke taikō*, *Kōzen gokokuron*, *saikai kanjinbun* and *Nippon buppō chūkōgan* deal with the problems posed by the combination of the impact of the degenerate latter age and the abandonment of the vinaya precepts by the Japanese Tendai school. Eisai responds to this unique set of circumstances by explaining how Zen links the two most important practices for mitigating the effects of the degenerate

latter age, observing the vinaya precepts and the practice of meditation in the Zen school (C. *zuòchán* 坐禪; J. *zazen*).

Despite latter age discourse serving as a primary rationale for Eisai's introduction of Zen to Japan, scholarship has largely overlooked this element of his work. Blum (2006, 41-42) for example, in his overview of latter age discourse in medieval Japan spends less than a page on Eisai. Stone (1985A, 37) meanwhile, in a lengthy paper on the same topic, says the following:

In the final analysis, Eisai's approach to the *mappō* doctrine did not go much beyond a rebuttal of those points of the Pure Land teaching inimical to Zen, while at the same time borrowing Pure Land rhetoric to assert that Zen is an "easy practice" and "suited to all people's capacities." *Mappō* was not the subject on which he expended his most creative thought. Of far greater interest here are the views of Dōgen, who dismissed the entire three-period concept as a provisional teachings.

This chapter will attempt to remedy the problematic statements from the above passage in a number of ways: by explaining the importance of latter age discourse for Eisai's overall project and by highlighting his use of *Tiāntái* doctrine to justify the value of Zen in this specific context.

### **1. The Concept of the Latter Age**

Broadly speaking, the idea of a degenerate latter age refers to the final period of a cycle of four, where the teachings of Buddhism become increasingly more difficult to understand and practice, in proportion to the historical distance

from the Buddha Śākyamuni.<sup>13</sup> The first period of the cycle is the period of "Correct Dharma" (C. *zhèngfǎ* 正法; J. *shōbō*) where the teachings of Śākyamuni Buddha are correctly remembered and practiced. This period lasts for either five hundred or one thousand years. The subsequent one thousand years, the age of the "Semblance Dharma" (C. *xiàngfǎ* 像法; J. *zōhō*), is when the corruption of the teachings begins. The degenerate latter age lasts for longer periods of up to ten thousand years, and refers to a time where the practice of Buddhism is, to varying degrees, negatively affected. It is also possible to postulate a fourth period as the time when the teachings disappear. The origin of the idea of a latter age is often associated with monastic morality. For example, the following excerpt from the vinaya commentary the *Treatise on the Source of the Vinaya* (C. *Pínimǔ lùn* 毘尼母論; J. *Binimo ron*; T no. 1463) makes clear that the latter age as a soteriological problem has its roots in the decision to allow women to enter the monastic orders:

Due to this [ordination of women] the teaching of the Tathāgata's dharma has been in gradual decline moment after moment. It is as if a cart's wheels stopped turning, with forward motion exhausted. The reason that the correct dharma became hidden is the fault of Ānanda for beseeching the Tathāgata to allow women to ordain in the order. The Correct Dharma should have continued in the world, but was exhausted after one thousand years.

從是如來法, 念念中漸滅. 如車輪轉已, 隨轉時有盡. 正法所以隱, 阿難之愆咎. 爲女人出家, 勸請調御師. 正法應住世, 滿足於

千年 (T 24.818c15–c19).

The text suggests that the decision to allow women into religious life in some sense compromised the moral purity of the order. Nonetheless, the concept of a latter age is not limited to issues surrounding gender. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* for example abounds in references to "evil monks" (C. *èsēng* 惡僧; J. *akusō*) of the latter age (Blum 2013, 96, 113, 184) who fail to follow vinaya practices and whose behavior leads to the corruption and eventual dissolution of the monastic orders. As we will see in Chapter Three, in his presentation of his position concerning the vinaya, Eisai similarly recounts a number of first hand experiences of moral and regulatory laxity within the monastic community. Issues such as consuming food at inappropriate times and the use of alcohol at Tendai monastic institutions must have contrasted starkly with the Vinaya observing monks Eisai encountered at the state sponsored Sòng period Chán monasteries.

Buddhaghōṣa (C. Fóyīn 佛音; J. Button. 5th c.) further links the latter age to the precepts in his vinaya commentary *The All-pleasing: A Commentary on the Rules of Discipline* (C. *Shànjiàn lǜ pípóshā* 善見律毘婆沙; J. *Zenkenritsu bibasha*; T no.1462). Eisai quotes a portion of this text (T 24.796c) in his own account of the origins of the latter age in *Kōzen gokokuron* (fasc. 1, p. 102–103). The content largely agrees with the above cited section of the *Treatise on the Source of the Vinaya*. Buddhaghōṣa also explains that the establishment of the eight *garudhammās* (C. *bā jìngfǎ* 八敬法; J. *hachi kyōhō*) extended the period of the Correct Dharma from five

hundred to one thousand years. These rules establish the superiority of monks over nuns in all contexts. This reference to Buddhaghosa's commentary suggests that Eisai is attempting to clarify the origins of latter age discourse in Vinaya and related commentarial literature. This perspective mirrors the sense of Eisai's broader project that attempts to establish the authority of Indian conceptions of descriptive moral practice in the context of East Asian Mahāyāna monasticism. The link between the vinaya precepts and the latter age is crucial in this regard.

Eisai's analysis of the most effective means to combat the influence of the degenerate latter age goes beyond merely advocating for a return to the use of vinaya precepts; his position is much more complex and has its origins in questions surrounding the chronology of the latter age. The general scholarly consensus concerning Eisai's chronology of the latter age is as follows: Correct Dharma lasts for 500 years from 950 to 450 B.C.E., while the Semblance Dharma lasts 1,000 years from 451 B.C.E. to 551 C.E. The age of the Latter Dharma is five sets of five hundred years with the following chronology: the age of liberation by many means (J. *gedatsu kengo* 解脱堅固) from 552 C.E to 1052 C.E.; the age when Zen flourishes (J. *zenjō kengo* 禪定堅固) from 1053 to 1553; the age when scholarship flourishes (J. *dokuju tamon kengo* 讀誦多聞堅固) 1554 to 2054; the age when construction of temples flourishes (J. *tazō tōji kengo* 多造塔寺堅固) from 2055 to 2555 and finally, the age when disputes flourish (J. *tōsō kengo* 鬭爭堅固) from 2556 to 3056 (Tokiwa 2005, 216, note 32).

Applying this chronology, the Kamakura period equates to the age when Zen flourishes. The issue becomes more complicated by Eisai's reference to the chronology outlined by the Chinese Tiāntái exegete Zhànrán. In *Kōzen gokokuron* (fasc. 1, p. 102), Eisai supports the latter age chronology found in Zhànrán's *Notes to [Zhiyi's] Commentary on the Marvelous Lotus* (C. *Fǎhuā wénjù jì* 法華文句記; J. *Hokke mongu ki*; T no. 1719). Zhànrán's account is a combination of the material found in the *Treatise on the Source of the Vinaya* and the *Great Collection Sūtra* (C. *Dàjíjīng* 大集經; J. *Daijikyō*), two of the most commonly cited sources for chronologies of the latter age:

If the *Treatise on the Source of the Vinaya* is accurate, there are said to be five [periods] of one hundred years one after another: the first period is of liberation by many means; the second period is the period of seated meditation; the third period is upholding the precepts; the fourth period is the period of chanting the scriptures, and the final period is that of donations. It is said that after this period of five hundred years will be the final one hundred years; however, other people say according to the *Great Collection Sūtra*, there are five, five hundred year periods. Up to the fourth period they are the same as what I have already recounted. The fifth period of five hundred years is the period of disputes. Only the fifth period of five hundred years is called the period of dispute. It is then said that after these five hundred years, there is the last five hundred years. If we follow this treatise, these five hundred years resemble the Correct Dharma, although the

sentences quoted from the text are slightly obscure. In this way, the five, five hundred year periods are temporarily established, and the latter age is not without mysterious spiritual benefit; by relying on the Great Vehicle its teaching can be spread during this time, therefore it is said "five hundred." Because within these three periods of time, there is nothing that is not the Buddha's response to the stimulus [provided by sentient beings].

若準毘尼母論, 直列五百云, 第一百年解脫堅固, 第二百年禪定堅固, 第三百年持戒堅固, 第四百年多聞堅固, 第五百年布施堅固. 言後五百最後百耳. 有人云, 準大集有五五百. 第一乃至第四同前. 唯第五五百云, 鬪諍堅固, 言後五百者, 最後五百也. 若單論五百猶在正法, 雖出論文其理稍塞. 然五五百且從一往, 末法之初冥利不無, 且據大教可流行時, 故云五百. 故序等三莫非感應. (T 34.0157b10–b19).

The outline Zhànrán provides from the two sūtras and Eisai's reference to this text does not necessarily mean he is following Zhànrán's preferred outline of the chronology and the naming of the distinct periods. Both the chronology outlined in the *Great Collection sūtra* and the *Treatise on the Source of the Vinaya* would place Kamakura Japan in the period where Zen flourishes (J. *zenjō kengo* 禪定堅固), although it is also important to note that Eisai will take this period to refer to the school he encountered in China (C. *Chánzōng* 禪宗; J. *Zenshū*), whereas the sources quoted are referring more generally to meditative practices (C. *chándìng* 禪定; J. *zenjō*). It is also worth noting that

the outline in the *Treatise on the Source of the Vinaya* regards the period that follows the age of Zen as the period of the precepts (J. *tokkai kengo* 持戒堅固).

This chronology would seem more appropriate for Eisai's vision of Zen as a precept revival movement, but without concrete outlines in Eisai's texts concerning the exact chronology and periodization he is using, it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty exactly how he envisaged the chronology of the latter age. While Eisai's understanding of latter age discourse draws heavily on Tiantai literature, he also draws from the tradition of Vinaya commentary. For example, in *Shukke taikō* Eisai uses extensive citations from Yijing to explain not only the nature of certain practices found in the vinaya, but also to emphasize more broadly the nature of the relationship between morality and emptiness. Eisai also utilizes Dàoxuān and his work regarding the relationship between meditation, vinaya and morality more broadly for Mahāyāna practitioners.

For Dàoxuān, the Buddha appeared in the world primarily to propagate the precepts, and therefore if the precepts go out of existence, so does the Saṃgha, thus signalling the end of Buddhism as a whole (Totsugu 2014, 11). In his commentary on the vinaya, *A Summary and Explanation of the Supplementary Observances of the Four Part Vinaya* (C. *Sifēnlǜ shānfán bǔquè xíngshì chāo* 四分律刪繁補闕行事鈔; J. *Shibunritsu sanpan hoketsu jigyo jisho*) Dàoxuān says:

How do we know that the Correct Dharma abides for a long time? the Buddha answered, if the monks respect the Buddha's teaching and [observe] Saṃgha discipline, then the Correct Dharma will not vanish. Otherwise it will disappear.

四分云何得知正法久住。佛言：若比丘敬佛法僧戒。以是故正法不滅。反上則滅 (T no. 1804, 40.133a08–a10).

Dàoxuān's concern regarding the link between the latter age and the precepts is also visible in his *Morality of the Pure Mind Contemplating Phenomena* (C. *Jìngxīn jièguān fǎ* 淨心戒觀法; J. *jōshin kaikan hō*; T no. 1893). This text is particularly interesting as it advocates a form of practice that one may regard as Mainstream Buddhist: monitoring bodily conduct and then moving into mindfulness practices as a means to begin mental cultivation. This form of practice, explained in more detail later in this work, reflect Eisai's sense of why Zen is the best practice during the latter age. Given Eisai's extensive interest in vinaya commentary it may seem surprising that Eisai does not simply follow Dàoxuān and advocate the precepts as the best means to combat the pernicious effects of the latter age. Eisai, while emphasizing the precepts, identifies *zazen* as the key practice for the latter age. The reasons for this position are contextual, as Eisai attempts to present an argument for the relationship between the Zen school and the practice of vinaya morality during the latter that will be acceptable to the Tendai establishment.

## 2. Eisai and Tiāntái Conceptions of the Latter Age

The final text composed by Eisai before his second trip to China in 1187 was *Oral Transmission on the Treatise Concerning the Awakening of Bodhicitta in the Shingon school* (J. *Kongōchōshū bodaishinron kuketsu* 金剛頂宗菩提心論口決; T no. 2293). This text focuses on esoteric Buddhism, but also provides a sense of what motivated Eisai to travel once again to China:

During the turbid age of *Mappō*, those of ordinary mind who seek the wisdom of the Buddha are grief-stricken regarding this degeneration, and seek to visit India and China...in these latter days, those who undertake [the practice of] emptiness frequently violate the discipline" (濁世澆末法, 凡心探佛智特哀陵遲欲訪三國...末葉受虛多犯制 (T 70.0029a06–a09).

This passage suggests that Eisai saw the problem of the latter age as linked with the practical problem of reconciling the doctrine of emptiness (C. *kōng* 空; j. *kū*) with associated antinomian tendencies which prioritize wisdom as emptiness over concrete morality. Eisai does not dispute the association between immoral behavior and the latter age. In the introduction to *Shukke taikō*, Eisai suggests rather Tiāntái taxonomy, in particular the idea of the "four types of teaching according to the capacity of the audience" (C. *huà fǎ sì jiào* 化法四教; J. *ke hō shi kyō*), can solve the problem of precept practice, and links this framework to Zen.

The first set of teachings refer to the tripiṭaka teachings (C. *sānzàng jiào* 三藏教; J. *sanzō kyō*); then the "shared teaching" (C. *tōngjiào* 通教; J. *tsūkyō*)

held in common by all three vehicles of the auditors, solitary realizers and bodhisattvas. The "distinct teaching" (C. *biéjiào* 別教; J. *bekkyō*) distinguishes Mahāyāna teachings aimed at bodhisattvas from Lesser Vehicle teachings. The final teaching is known as the perfect teachings for bodhisattvas that are universal (C. *yuánjiào* 圓教; J. *enkyō*), preached in the *Lotus sūtra* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*.

This taxonomy clearly establishes a normative hierarchy, with Tiāntái "perfect teachings" at the apex. While the perfect teachings represent the most effective form of practice, their accessibility depends upon individual capacities and circumstances. The latter age is one such circumstance when, Eisai argues, the perfect teachings are not suitable. Eisai views Zen as representative of the shared teaching, and as the most suitable form of practice during the latter age. This taxonomy also creates an interesting sense of the primacy of the *Lotus sūtra* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*, both of which represent the perfect teachings. The importance of the *Lotus sūtra* in its relationship to latter age discourse goes back almost to the beginning of the Tiāntái tradition. Huisī 慧思 (J. Eshi; 515–577), the second patriarch of Tiāntái, is one of the earliest known figures in Chinese Buddhism to elaborate on this idea. According to Stevenson and Kanno (2006, 208):

We know from the text of the *Tract on the Vow* that Huisī was one of the first people in Chinese Buddhist history to show signs of a crisis mentality concerning the "Decline of the dharma" (*mòfǎ* 末法) or what we call the impending destruction of the Buddha's teaching. This

fourfold course or practice of ease and bliss expounded in the course of ease and bliss chapter of the *Lotus sūtra* is none other than a method for propagating the sutra during the latter evil age of the decline of the Dharma. Consequently, what led Huisī to turn his eye to the fourfold course of ease and bliss was the fact that it had a close bearing on the decline of Dharma mindset.<sup>14</sup>

Huisī's interest in the latter age also extends beyond the above text, and includes one of his most famous works, *The Meaning of the Course of Ease and Bliss in the Lotus sūtra* (C. *Fǎhuá jīng ānlèxíng yì* 法華經安樂行義; J. *Hokke kyō anrakugyō gi*; T no. 1926). This chapter focuses on methods used by bodhisattvas to preach the *Lotus sūtra* during the latter age. Huisī is also notable in that his textual source for the latter age predates what would become the standard source for latter age chronology. Traditionally, Buddhists attempting to calculate the dates and duration of the different periods have referred to the latter age chronology found in the *Candragarbha-vaipulya-sūtra* (C. *yuèzàngfēn* 月藏分; J. *getsuzōbun*) section of the *Great Collection Sūtra*. Huisī's interpretation of the latter age is based instead on the *Most Wonderful Victorious Samādhi Sūtra* (C. *Zuimiào shèngdìng jīng* 最妙勝定經; J. *Saimyōshō jōgyō*).

What both these texts share is the idea that the latter age can be linked to the problem of clerical corruption (Stevenson and Kanno 2006, 27, note 44). The issue of clerical corruption and monastic discipline is also a major concern for Eisai, and his answer to the problem resembles closely Huisī's

position: during the latter age, one must practice the three learnings of morality, meditative concentration and wisdom. Of this trio, meditative concentration is key, as it enhances the other two elements simply by the fact of *dhyāna* being practiced.

Eisai's reference to Huisī's *Approaches to the Dharma Gate of Easeful Samādhi* (C. *zhūfǎ wúzhēng sānmèi fǎmén* 諸法無諍三昧法門; J. *shohō musō zanmai hōmon*; T no. 1923, 46.630a14–a18) occurs in Gate Nine (J. *dai kyū* 第九) of *Kōzen gokokuron*, entitled "Information from India and China" (J. *daikoku setsuwamon* 大國說話門, fasc. 3, p. 119) and emphasizes meditative concentration as a key practice in a contentious and adversarial age. Eisai then suggests those who seek to ban Eisai's teachings are most likely going to incur the kind of offense Huisī speaks of:

If one is praised as having great wisdom, and yet slanders all those who practice *dhyāna*, even if one were to kill the sentient beings in the three thousand worlds, the offense so incurred (by slandering those who practice *dhyāna*) would be even greater. Those dishonorable people who seek to obstruct my work incur this offense through their own actions. Moreover, these people are of no benefit to the Imperial court. It is deplorable that I am considered the fundamental cause of this.

若人稱有大智慧，輕毀一切坐禪人，如殺三千世界人，其罪甚重過於斯(文)。斲人妨者，自得此罪。亦為朝家無以益也。予悞為其根源，可悲乎 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 121).<sup>15</sup>

Eisai aligns himself with Huisī by advocating *dhyāna* as the best means to mitigate the negative impact of the latter age. We can also sense from the passage that facing official opposition from the court and the Tendai establishment served to galvanize Eisai in his attempts to provide the means for Japanese Buddhism to overcome the pernicious influence of the latter age. The fact that Eisai would choose to cite a passage from Huisī with such extreme rhetoric is also indicative of the fervor of Eisai's mindset regarding these issues.

Eisai's sense of his own mission is also prominent in the following passage which occurs just prior to Eisai's citing of Huisī. Here Eisai explains his motives, and the problems he faces as he attempts to provide a means for Japanese Buddhism to sustain itself during the latter age:

Therefore, considering the physical topography [of Japan], my worry concerning the latter age the current is like consoling a young child; carrying in my heart the way of the patriarchs, I wish to revive what was been abandoned. Māra's evil conditions obstruct my work, and there are even Buddhists who have aroused a mind of jealousy which seek to impede me.

因茲思地勢, 慮末世, 憐稚子, 懷祖道, 欲興其廢亡. 而有種種魔緣而妨之, 或有佛子, 起嫉妬心, 因以廢之 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 121).

The reference to physical topography (J. *chisei* 地勢) may well refer to the prophecy in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* concerning the Dharma

flourishing in the Northeast, which Eisai cites (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 120). This passage suggests that five hundred years after the nirvāṇa of the Buddha, a scripture will emerge that helps the Buddha's work flourish in the direction of the Northeast (T no. 220, 06.0539 a29–b01). The role of this prophecy will be analyzed in more detail below. A second point to note is the term "way of the patriarchs" (C. *zǔdào* 祖道; J. *sodō*). This term does not appear in the classical Tiantai sources commonly used by Eisai and is more prominent in Chan literature. This suggests that Zen is the most effective type of practice for the latter period. The final statement concerning those who are seeking to impede his work suggests further the messianic element to Eisai's attempt to introduce Zen to Japan as a means to counteract the latter age.

Eisai links the importance of *dhyāna* practice in the latter age and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra* prophecy in the following passage:

This being the case, this land is a superior place, where the Buddha Dharma spreads in all directions. By seriously cultivating the practice of Zen, one thus pleases the Tathāgata and should attain the reward of [this] practice. There are those who argue about the decline of the Buddha Dharma in India and China. Simply by patiently cultivating Non Self, one then facilitates the flourishing of the Buddha Dharma in this land. Regarding the Buddha Dharma, the *Sutra on the Excellence of Donating the Lamp* says: "In Buddhism there are four types of marvelous and good Dharmas, first morality, second is Zen, third Wisdom, and fourth the mind without defilements. Within these

four, we can rank meditative concentration first, as it includes all the others [within itself]. The *Móhē zhǐguān*: "The *Zuìmào shèngdìng jīng* says, there are four grave acts and five heinous crimes, without meditative concentration, what is left behind [the other three Dharmas] cannot save you." To erase one's negative karmic seeds, one must sit in Zen, the creation of good is also a designation of the power of this Zen practice. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā sūtra* says: "Even though the three vehicles have different spheres of practice, one must rely on the power of non-discriminative mental cultivation". Therefore, even though the eight schools [of Japanese Buddhism] have different spheres of practice, to reach the sphere of realization, it is essential to apply Zen [meditation]. This also applies to the practice of invoking and chanting the name of Amida; one who does not practice Zen, cannot establish Karma that bears fruit in the next life.

然則此地是勝境，佛法流布之方，慤懃鄭重參禪，則如來當隨喜，証果亦必有也。汝等莫論天竺唐土，佛法興與廢。只能修無我忍，亦能興我國之佛法也。佛法者，施燈經云，佛有四種勝妙善法，一者戒，二者禪，三者般若，四者無濁心文。其中，禪定第一，包一切故也。天台宗止觀云，妙勝定云，四重五逆，除禪定，餘無能救文。滅罪必藉禪也，生善復可假禪力也。大智度論云，三乘行處雖異，必藉無念禪定力。然則八宗之行處雖區別，至証位必應用禪。乃至稱名念佛之行，非禪者不成順次業也 (*Kōzen gokokuron* fasc. 3, p. 120–121).

This citation contains two key points. The first is the statement that Japan is

not doomed in a soteriological sense. Eisai himself witnessed the vitality of practice in Chinese monasteries despite the dawning of the latter age.

Therefore, it is possible from Eisai's perspective that latter age discourse can in fact be used as a means to promote Buddhism in Japan, as indicated through the prophecy, and also as suggested in Eisai's texts *Kōzen gokokuron* and *Nihon buppō chūkō ganmon*.

Eisai refers to the distinction between meditation and chanting the name of the Buddha with reference to Pure Land teachings. The key point to note for now is the priority of mental cultivation over the precepts as the practice for the latter age. In some senses, what Eisai is pointing to is the moral import of mental cultivation. He points out that the application of Zen to each practice is essential from a karmic perspective. Because Zen refers to the nature of mind at the point of undertaking each practice, without the proper concentrative attention the practice itself, regardless of the outer form, can become corrupted. Eisai bases this position on the work of Zhìyǐ.

### **3. The Influence of Zhìyǐ**

Given his exalted status within the Tīāntái tradition, it is not surprising that Zhìyǐ exercised a profound impact on Eisai's thought. Regarding the issue of the latter age, Zhìyǐ's perspective is an obvious precursor to Eisai's arguments. A key aspect of Zhìyǐ's discourse is the idea that Mainstream practices are more suitable for the latter age. Eisai introduces the importance of the latter age and the precepts in relation to Zhìyǐ in the preface to *Shukke taikō* (p.1):

Now that the latter five hundred years has begun, the number of people who study morality must increase. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* has a prophecy that the Dharma will flourish [in the northeast] during this time [of the latter age]; the same applies to the spreading of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra's* teachings. Does this not refer to today's Japan? This is also the case for those who practice the *Lotus sūtra* four easeful practices and the *Samādhi* of Zhìyǐ's *Móhē zhǐguān*. It is essential in this age to follow the Buddha's words on "promoting moral discipline by preaching the permanency [of Nirvāṇa].

後五百最初學戒之人間出。般若弘經當於此時涅槃興法豈非今日。  
又法華 四行得境止觀三昧方行者也。並是今時之要佛自記耳扶律說常。

Significantly, at the beginning of the first text composed following his return from China, Eisai references the three central sūtras of the Tiantai tradition: *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* and the *Lotus sūtra*. It is also significant that he references specifically the section of the *Lotus sūtra* discussed above in relation to Huisi, the "course of ease and bliss". In the case of each of the three sūtras cited by Eisai, he stresses their relationship to latter age discourse. Finally, by referencing Zhìyǐ's *Móhē zhǐguān*, Eisai makes it clear to his audience that he remains within the tradition of Tiantai scholasticism as he attempts to introduce Zen to the monastic environment.

Of the texts cited above, Zhìyǐ's *Móhē zhǐguān* is the least pertinent to the question of the latter age. The text does not provide any detailed analysis

of the problem. Other works in Zhìyǐ's corpus do discuss the issue in more depth. In *The Four Bases of Mindfulness* (C. *sìniànchù* 四念處; J. *shinenjo*); for example, Zhìyǐ states that during the latter age people ought to follow the auditor path (T no. 1918, 46.0558 c02). Similarly, in *The Doctrine of the Four Teachings* (C. *Sìjiào yì* 四教義; J. *Shikyō gi*; T no. 1929) Zhìyǐ explains the ten conditions by means of which followers may enter the Mahāyāna. This passage is significant as he stresses the role of meditative concentration and its link with upholding morality:

The eighth [condition] is the refutation of the latter age through [practicing] *zuòchán*. Internally [realizing] emptiness with clear intelligence that is wise and enlightens others. Or, like a saint, to refute the evil practice of the precepts, such as eating dung and going naked. This is called the Great Vehicle, or also "precept maintaining *zuòchán*". This is the same as what was attained by Uddaka Rāmaputta and Udraka Rāmaputra, the cultivation of emptiness [leading to] pure practice. The ninth condition is the cause that leads one to the doctrinal study of the one school [Tiāntái]. [The] good distinguish between the ardent and flowing discourse that is internal and external; [resulting in] a sagely consciousness which [observes] the arising and perishing of doctrinal teachings. The tenth condition is the study of *zuòchán* in the one school. To discriminate and be completely devoid of both internal and external errors, [and] to have a thorough and penetrating knowledge of the meditative practices of both the Greater and Lesser

Vehicles. Through [this mechanism] of selecting [the True] and rejecting [the false] one attains entry into the True and Correct Buddha way.

八爲破末世坐禪. 內證豁虛解慧開發, 或同尼捷破戒行惡, 食糞裸形謂是大乘, 或復持戒坐禪. 同彼鬱頭藍弗是且空修梵行也. 九爲令今一家義學. 善別內外猛浪之說, 明識大聖枯榮教門. 十爲令一家坐學. 別識一切內外邪非, 精通大小乘觀. 取捨得真正入佛道也 (T 46.0732b23–b29).

There are three aspects of this citation that are very close to Eisai's conception of the role of *zazen* during the latter age. The first element is *zazen* as an antidote to evil practices during the latter age; the second is the link between emptiness, meditation and morality resulting in "precept maintaining *zuòchán*" (C. *chíjiè zuòchán* 持戒坐禪; J. *tokkai zazen*). The nature of this link a key topic in both *Shukke taikō* and *Kōzen gokokuron*. The third key element is the link between the correct practice of emptiness and "pure practice" (C. *fànxíng* 梵行; J. *bongyō*), another form of morality concerned especially with celibacy, which Eisai stresses in *Kōzen gokokuron*. It is interesting also that Zhiyi emphasizes the role of meditation in establishing precepts, a standard discourse in Indian Buddhist texts, especially in the Abhidharma traditions. This link is also central to Eisai's argument.

Zhanran's interpretation of this section of the text is found in his commentary *Zhǐguān fǔxíng zhuàn hóngjué* 止觀輔行傳弘決 (J. *Shikan bukyōden guketsu*). He says the following: "The eighth element is the direct

experience of *zuòchán* during the latter age, to distinguish between right and wrong [forms of] emptiness (八示末代坐禪內證邪正空別; T no. 1912, 46. 0339b13). Eisai identified failing to understand the correct relationship between emptiness and morality as a key problem during the latter age. For Eisai, the answer to the problem of the latter age is found precisely in *tokkai zazen* 持戒坐禪, "precept maintaining Zen". It seems likely that Eisai's conception of how morality relates to meditation resembles Zhìyǐ's understanding of how meditation facilitates the emergence and upkeep of moral precepts. Zhìyǐ argues that during correct meditation it is not possible to violate the precepts as one's body and mind are by necessity free from evil. These precepts are called the "morality that accompanies meditation" (C. *dìng gōng jiè* 定共戒; J. *jō gū kai*). The nature of the relationship between morality and meditation is outlined in the following excerpt from Zhìyǐ's *Móhē zhǐguān*:

If you are able in this way to contemplate the seven evil physical and verbal acts as pure, like space, this means that you uphold the legalistic precepts in three ways: [1] with no fault; [2] with no breaking; [3] with no rupturing [of moral conduct]. To destroy all evil notions and perception is to [4] uphold the precepts without mixing [thoughts of breaking the precepts without actually doing so]. To not be confused by [the ongoing process of] the four phases [of thoughts] is to [5] uphold the precepts that accompany dhyana concentration [to realize that ultimately] the four phases do not arise is to [6] to uphold the

precepts that accompany [attainment of] the path. To discriminate the various four phases without becoming mired [in these distinctions] is to [7] uphold the precepts without attachment. To discriminate the four phases unerringly is to [8] to uphold the precepts that are praised as wise [conduct]. To know the four phases as encompassing all dharmas is [9] mastery in upholding the Mahāyāna precepts. To be aware of the four positive qualities [of permanence, bliss, selfhood and purity] of the four phases is to [10] uphold the ultimate precepts (Swanson 2018, 361).

能如是觀身口七支淨, 若虛空是持, 不缺不破不穿三種律儀戒. 破四運 諸惡覺觀, 即持不雜戒也. 不為四運所亂, 即持定共戒也. 四運心不起, 即持道共戒也. 分別種種四運無滯, 即持無著戒也. 分別四運不謬, 即持智所讚戒也. 知四運攝一切法, 即持大乘自在戒也. 識四運四德, 即持究竟戒 (T 46.0017a03–a09).

It seems that the first three of the ten levels refers to the precepts of Mainstream Buddhism. From the fifth level the link between meditative concentration and morality becomes the central element. The link is made between morality and the meditation on the "four phases" (C. *sìyùn xīn* 四運心; J. *shiun jin*). This meditative method is outlined by Zhiyi in his *Explanation of the Samādhi of Being Fully Aware of your Thoughts from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutra in 25,000 lines* (C. *Shì móhē Bōrě bōluómì jīng juéyì sānmèi* 釋摩訶般若波羅蜜經覺意三昧; J. *Shaku mahanya haramitsu kyō kakui zanmai*; T no. 1922) and consists of analyzing each thought in terms

of four phases: "pre thought" (C. *wèiniàn* 未念; J. *minen*), its imminent arising (C. *yùniàn* 欲念; J. *yokunen*) its realization (C. *zhèngniàn* 正念; J. *shōnen*) its passing away (C. *yǐniàn* 已念; J. *inen*). By applying this method of meditative concentration the individual can progress further to the last four levels, where one integrates the perfection of wisdom and the Mahāyāna bodhisattva precepts, before reaching the final level and the realization of the "ultimate precepts" (C. *jiù yìjiè* 究意戒; J. *kyū i kai*). It is not quite clear what these "ultimate precepts" refer to, although it could be aversion of the "body of morality" (C. *jiètǐ* 戒體; J. *kaitai*), the subject of the next chapter. Many of Eisai's references to Zhìyǐ are designed to garner a certain amount of authority for his position as presented in *Kōzen gokokuron*. Nonetheless, it seems clear that both in terms of the chronology for the latter age and in terms of the best doctrinal and practical response, Eisai is very much relying on his extensive background in Tiāntái doctrine.

Eisai uses Tiāntái doctrinal and taxonomical categories to formulate a response that utilizes a variety of different elements from the Tiāntái framework. Eisai places mental cultivation at the center of the picture, but also uses the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* to link the idea of meditation to the importance of the vinaya precepts as a form of "techniques" (C. *fāngbiàn* 方便; J. *hōben*). In particular, Eisai uses the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* idea of "The eternity of Nirvāṇa that supplements morality" (C. *fúlǜ táncáng* 扶律談常; J. *furitsu danjō*). This principle will form the basis of Eisai's response, not just to the latter age, but to what he conceives of as the degeneracy of Buddhism in

Japan during his lifetime.

#### 4. Zen and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*

A key aspect of Eisai's response to the latter age is his use of the term *furitsu danjō*. Eisai's use of this concept has received no substantial scholarly attention, despite its importance in his post 1191 works. This terminology is not original to Eisai, and relates to standard Tiāntái interpretations of the contents of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*.<sup>16</sup> This sūtra is considered equal in purport to the *Lotus sūtra*, both of which represent the perfect teachings (C. *yuánjiào* 圓教; J. *enkyō*). Dividing the characters into two parts, *furitsu* 扶律 represents the addition of encouraging monastic discipline, with special reference to the latter age, while *danjō* 談常 refers to the Buddha as eternally abiding. Eisai argues that Zen specifically fulfills the idea of *furitsu danjō* as understood through the contents of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*.

The importance of *furitsu danjō* is evident from the first lines of *Shukke taikō* when Eisai introduces the term. In terms of its explication, Eisai once again relies on Zhànrán's exegesis. The following section concludes a long citation from Zhànrán's *Explanation of the Hidden Meaning of the Lotus* (C. *Fǎhuā xuányì shìqīān* 法華玄義釋籤; J. *Hokke gengi shakusen*. T no. 1717, 33.0858b21–b25):

Both the remarks which appear before and after the previous reference to the Great sūtra [*Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*] are pointing to the teaching that supplements the precepts and speaks of what is unchanging. In the latter age [of the Dharma], there are monks who break the precepts,

and even go so far as [to claim] there is no vehicle or discipline, and lose the life of eternal abiding. Through reliance on this sūtra and its teaching that supplements the precepts and speaks of what is unchanging, the complete vehicle and discipline is provided...

以彼經部前後諸文, 皆扶說常. 若末代中, 諸惡比丘破戒, 乃至並無乘戒, 失常住命. 賴由此經扶律說常, 乘戒具足 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc.1, p.101).

Zhànrán interprets the precepts that are being supported as those of the vinaya. This fits with the conception of the dull faculties of latter age practitioners, and therefore the more advanced practices may be beyond them. The vinaya may constitute the lowest level of Zhiyi's ranking of the precepts, but these precepts remain a critical aspect for those reviving Buddhism during the latter day period. In his own practice, Zhànrán followed the vinaya and taught his students to do likewise (Tonegawa 1977). When Zhànrán speaks of what is unchanging, he is most likely referring to the nature of the Buddha, who remains in the world even after his Nirvāṇa.

Another key citation concerning the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* and its efficacy during the latter age is again taken from Zhànrán, this time from the *Meaning and Examples of the [Great] Calming and Contemplation* (C. *zhǐguān yìlì* 止觀義例; J. *shikan girei*; T no. 1913, 46.0447b04–b07):

We need the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* because, although everyone is the various vehicles relies on the *Lotus sūtra* and returns to one real truth, people of the latter day who are dull witted will see their own practice

fall flat should they lack support. Only their own practice and support from the ground of their own being together can cause them to proceed further. The Buddha in transformation himself looked upon death as the end of a lifetime of activities. How much more so with our latter day world, where practice will not advance without support? Therefore the sūtra expounded the eternity of nirvāṇa as the true support for morality, and by means of this true reality is revealed.

用涅槃者, 雖依法華咸歸一實, 末代根鈍, 若無扶助, 則正行傾覆。正助相添, 方能遠運。佛化尚以涅槃為壽。況末代修行, 非助不前。故扶律說常, 以顯實相 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc.1, p.101).

Eisai is here making a case that *furitsu*, the precepts that support monastic discipline as per the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*, are in fact none other than the morality of the Zen school. Linking the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* and Zen allows Eisai to solve two key issues: he can argue for the renewed use of the vinaya precepts, albeit an altered version of these rules as presented in the *Chányuàn qīngguī* 禪苑清規 (J. *Zen'en shingi*), and he can argue that Zen, via these rules, is the most appropriate response to the latter age according to Tendai's own taxonomy.<sup>17</sup> This position is solidified by another citation from Zhànrán, this time from the *Supplement Transmitting the Meaning of Great Calming and Contemplation* (C. *Zhǐguān fǔxíng zhuàn hóngjué* 止觀輔行傳弘決; J. *Shikan bukuyōden guketsu*; T no. 1912, 46.0345b21–22): "once again, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* is especially meant for the latter day world as it contains an explanation of expedient techniques" (然復涅槃偏被, 末代便說).

*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc.1, p.101). That Eisai is relating Zen to the latter day world, and suggesting that the Zen codes of discipline are useful in fulfilling the sense of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* as a support for morality in the latter day world is clear from the following passage:

We know that all three sūtras - the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, the *Lotus sūtra* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* - expound the essentials of self concentration in seated posture and the contemplations based on it that were intended for the latter age. If the generations of the latter age lacked the capacities and opportunity for attaining awakening, the Buddha would not have expounded them. Since this is not the case, the practice flourishes in the great land of Sòng [China]. Only out of ignorance do some people in the world believe that Buddhism, based on the Buddha's teachings, has been extinguished. But they are wrong, as you will see in the ninth gate"

然則案般若法華涅槃三經。皆說末世坐禪觀行之法要。若末代可無機緣者，佛不可說此等也。是以大宋國盛行之。不知之者，以為佛法滅相，非也。巨細注第九門 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 1, p.102).

As we have seen above, Eisai bases his confidence on a prophecy in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* that Buddhism will flourish in the northwestern direction, which he takes to mean East Asia. The fact that Buddhism was flourishing in China suggests that there is a means to overcome the effects of the latter age. The "ninth gate" Eisai refers to here is the section in *Kōzen gokokuron* where Eisai summarizes the basics of Sòng period monastic

practice as found in the *Chányuàn qīngguī*. Eisai offers this as proof that Buddhism, despite the difficulties of the latter age, can still flourish if the right conditions are implemented.

### **Conclusion**

Eisai's position on the nature of the latter age and the most effective means to overcome it are rooted in Tendai doctrine. Through this analysis, we can see clearly how Eisai tries to fit Zen into Tendai doctrinal frameworks. This calls into question one of the major scholarly conceptions concerning Eisai and the relationship between Zen and Pure Land. The historical reality that both Eisai and Hōnen were subject to similar mistrust by the government in Kyoto and the Tendai hierarchy, and their apparent advocacy of one practice as the best means to overcome the problems of the latter age has prompted scholars (Furuta 1960, 1986; Kikufuji 1973) to pair them together as Stone does above. As the above analysis highlights, to characterize Eisai as promoting one practice, that of *zazen*, is to misrepresent his position; on the contrary, we may say that the contrast with Hōnen is precisely that Eisai does not suggest a single practice as the best method during the latter age. It may be better to see Hōnen and Eisai as having a dialogue concerning normative Tendai practices for the latter age, rather than as advocating sectarian positions concerning Zen and Pure Land.<sup>18</sup>

## 2. The Relationship between Ritual and Morality

### Eisai and Abstract Morality

A key aspect of this analysis of Eisai is the relationship between what I term "concrete morality" (J. *jikai* 事戒) and "abstract morality" (J. *rikai* 理戒). As noted in the introduction, this distinction is based on the work of Zhiyi and played a key role in the development of Tiāntái doctrine. A good example of abstract morality is the "perfect sudden precepts" (J. *endonkai* 圓頓戒) used in Tendai ordinations during Eisai's time. This chapter begins by highlighting the textual origins and evolution of abstract precepts in the traditions germane to the development of Eisai's ideas concerning the subject, with particular emphasis on the idea of "the body of morality", often translated as the "essence of the precepts" (C. *jiètǐ* 戒體; J. *kaitai*).<sup>19</sup> This analysis highlights one of the central issues regarding the relationship between morality and the ordination ritual, the distinction between what I term the "practical function" of the precepts conferred in the ceremony, and the "ritual moral empowerment" implied by these precepts.<sup>20</sup> In China, the ritual moral empowerment of the bodhisattva precepts was rarely used independently to replace the practical function of vinaya, maintaining a balance between abstract and concrete practice, a balance that resembles what Eisai and Tendai sources refer to as *jikai* and *rikai*. Eisai draws on the work of Chinese Tiāntái exegetes to elaborate upon the doctrinal and ethical implications of *jikai* and *rikai* stances regarding morality, in particular the important balance required between abstract morality which can be used to both expand and deepen an

existing ethical practice, and the relevance of concrete descriptive ethics that can guide the majority of monastic practitioners. Therefore Eisai's argument, that abstract precepts should not be used as a basis for monastic life, seems rather mundane in the context of Chinese Tiāntái, but takes on more significance in the Japanese context, where abstract precept ordinations, such as the *endonkai* and the "one mind precept" (C. *yixinjie* 一心戒; J. *isshinkai*) had become the norm.<sup>21</sup> As this chapter will show, Eisai viewed ordinations based on ritual empowerment over concrete rules as the primary cause of the decline of monastic discipline in Japan, a position that seems to have evolved while he was in China. Nonetheless, Eisai maintained certain elements of abstract precept ordinations, with particular emphasis on the idea of self-ordination, which is hinted at in both Tiāntái and Chán texts. In order to understand the origins of abstract precepts, we must first analyze briefly how this idea evolved in Chinese sources relevant to Eisai.

### **1. Abstract Precepts in Tiāntái: Zhìyǐ on the Bodhisattva Precepts**

While in the *Móhē zhǐguān* Zhìyǐ does not discuss the nature of the bodhisattva precepts in any great depth, his commentary on the *Lotus sūtra* entitled *The Hidden Meaning of Marvelous Dharma of the Lotus Sūtra* (C. *Miaofa lianhuajing xuanyi* 妙法蓮華經玄義; J. *Myōhō renga kyō gengi*; T no. 1716), and the *Commentary on the Meaning of the Bodhisattva Precepts* (C. *Púsàjiè yìshū* 菩薩戒義疏; J. *Bosatsukai gisho*; T no. 1811) both contain extensive analysis of the bodhisattva precepts and their relation to the broader system of Tiāntái praxis.

The first text we will examine is the *Miaofa lianhua jing xuanyi*. Within Zhiyi's corpus this commentary is considered one of the three foremost texts in the Tiāntái tradition.<sup>22</sup> Below Zhiyi explains the relationship between bodhisattva morality and the morality of solitary realizers, also known as *pratyekabuddhas* (C. *yuánjué* 緣覺; J. *engaku*). While Zhiyi does not discuss *jièti* directly, his discussion of the nature of the bodhisattva precepts sets the tone for subsequent interpretations:

So now let us ask, what is bodhisattva morality? Let us suppose one answers by saying: bodhisattva morality is the same as those in the *Tripitaka* and the Shared teachings, but there should still be a separate bodhisattva congregation. But since these congregations [auditors, solitary realizers and bodhisattvas] do not have different [sets of] precepts, how would they be distinguishable? Furthermore, if we explain clearly that there are bodhisattva precepts, how would they be distinguished from those of the solitary realizers? Now if we explain that the *Tripitaka* and the three vehicles are not separate congregations, it does not make sense that there would be separate morality intended for bodhisattvas and solitary realizers.

今問是何等菩薩戒, 彼若答言是藏通等菩薩戒者. 應別有菩薩衆, 衆既不別戒何得異. 又若別明菩薩戒, 何等別是緣覺戒. 今明三藏三乘無別衆, 不得別有菩薩緣覺之戒也 (T no. 1716, 33.0717c24–27).

Here we see Zhiyi establishing what we might regard as the shared teaching of morality (C. *tōngjiè* 通戒; J. *tsūkai*). This form of morality relates to concrete

observances of moral rules, especially those of the vinaya, that are applicable to followers of all three vehicles, bodhisattvas, solitary realizers (C. *yuánjué* 緣覺; J. *engaku*) and auditors (C. *shēngwèn* 聲聞; J. *shōmon*).

Zhiyi then establishes that, although there are many forms of morality, they can all be understood through the context of Mahāyāna:

Those that study the vinaya are also training in the practice of the Greater Vehicle; this training in these Greater Vehicle practices is equivalent to the ultimate truth of the Greater Vehicle. [This Truth] is luminous, it is not blue or yellow or red or white. The three refuges, the five lay precepts, the ten virtuous acts and the two hundred and fifty precepts [of the Four-Part Vinaya] are all the Great Vehicle. How could there be coarse morality distinct from sublime morality? This morality is already identical to sublime morality, and beings are likewise. In reality, you are I are identical to this principle. It is called the "absolute and sublime morality".

毘尼學者即大乘學式叉。式叉即是大乘第一義。光非青非黃非赤白。三歸五戒十善二百五十皆是摩訶衍。豈有麤戒隔於妙戒，戒既即妙人亦復然。汝實我子即此義也。是名絕待妙戒 (T 33.0718 a03–a07).

This passage echoes many of Eisai's ideas concerning the relationship between the functional, practical elements of morality and their more abstract elements based on moral empowerment through ritual. This citation provides evidence that for Zhiyi followers of the Mahāyāna must not discard the vinaya but should rather approach it with a Mahāyāna mindset. Conversely, Zhiyi

establishes the formless nature of the ultimate principle of Mahāyāna (C. *dàshèng dìyī yì* 大乘第一義; J. *daijō daiichigi*) which cannot be identified in terms of physical marks. By associating this ultimate formless principle with morality, Zhìyǐ establishes a means by which morality more broadly is conceived as formless, or as a corollary to formless *prajñā* (C. *bōrě* 般若; J. *hannya*).

The second text by Zhìyǐ presented here, his *Púsàjiè yìshū*, is a key work in terms of linking Zhìyǐ's interpretation of abstract precepts with Zhànrán.<sup>23</sup> There are debates surrounding whether this text should be attributed to Zhìyǐ or his student Guàndǐng 灌頂 (J. Kanjō; 561–632).<sup>24</sup> This text nonetheless represents a certain change in Zhìyǐ's thinking on the topic of abstract precepts:

Next, there are two types of contemplative practices that lead to two types of good. Beginning with the "body of morality", what does not arise and yet is already arisen, is identical in nature, unconditioned and with non-apparent spiritual form. Sūtras and śāstras debate what is and what is not. One sūtra says: all is completely nonexistent and unconditioned.<sup>25</sup> Human beings dependently arise due to the provisional combination of form and mind, thoughts of good and evil fundamentally depend on mind, and one should not discriminate between coarse forms of good and evil. Vowing not to create evil [in the mind] constitutes accepting the moral precepts. The *Yīngluò jīng* says: the morality of both noble and ignorant beings is entirely

embodied by mind. The mind is inexhaustible, meaning morality too is inexhaustible. Whether one says verbal teachings constitute the body of morality, or truth constitutes the body of morality, or that vows constitute the body of morality, there is no distinction [in so far as all of them] are unconditioned.

次明止行二善。初戒體者，不起而已起即性無作假色。經論說互諍論有無，一云都無無作。色心假合共成衆生，善惡本由心起，不應別有頑善頑惡。誓不為惡即名受戒。瓔珞經云：一切聖凡戒盡以心為體，心無盡故戒亦無盡。或言教為戒體。或云真諦為戒體。或言願為戒體，無別無作 (T no. 1811, 40.0565c29-a06).<sup>26</sup>

The link between meditative practices and morality, a central aspect of Eisai's argument, is emphasized in this passage by the phrase "two types of contemplative practices that lead to two types of good" (C. *zhǐxíng èrshàn* 止行二善; J. *shigyō nizen*). These two forms of good are a formulation specific to Tiāntái. This refers to concrete good actions (C. *shìshàn* 事善; J. *jizen*) that manifest in the world (Nakamura 2002, 678d) and the goodness that comes from insight into emptiness (C. *lǐshàn* 理善; J. *rizen*). It is this latter formulation that Zhìyǐ analyzes in this passage. Here morality is linked directly with the nature of the mind, unconditioned and with non-apparent spiritual form that attaches to the body (C. *wúzuò jiǎsè* 無作假色; J. *musa keshiki*), which also means that in the moral sphere physical activity is subordinated to mental activity. Despite its being non-apparent to the senses, this body of morality also has a physical dimension. Here we see how the

increasingly abstract formulations of the concept of morality is linked to the issue of emptiness. This is emphasized by the reference to the *Yīngluò jīng* 瓔珞經 (T 40.0566a05–a07). The reference to this text is significant as it provides the formula for ordination with the three pure precepts (C. *sānjùjìngjiè* 三聚淨戒; J. *sanjujōkai*) that confers the *jièǐ* without including the vinaya (Groner 2014,108). As we shall see below, this text will also be central for Eisai's interpretation of the bodhisattva precepts, in particular his understanding of the role of self ordination.<sup>27</sup>

Regarding the evolution of abstract morality in Tiāntái, while Zhìyǐ is clearly a key figure, in terms of direct influence on Eisai and Japanese Tendai it may well be argued that the work of Zhànrán and Míngkuàng is more significant. The former is the biggest influence from classical Tiāntái on Eisai, while the latter helped provide the rationale for Saichō's decision to abandon the vinaya ordination. Therefore it is appropriate to examine the views of Zhànrán and Míngkuàng in conjunction with each other.

## **2. Abstract Precepts in Tiāntái: Zhànrán and Míngkuàng**

The development of abstract precepts in Tiāntái becomes an issue of debate with the work of Zhànrán and Míngkuàng 明曠 (J. Myōkō; d.u.). Zhànrán's views are often those most in line with Eisai's. As mentioned above, Zhànrán was known to promote use of the vinaya amongst his followers, and tends to adopt a position that concrete practices that promote *jikai* are more fundamental for most practitioners than morality based on the contemplation of principle that constitutes *rikai*.<sup>28</sup>

Zhànrán does discuss *jiè'tí* in his *Fǎhuā xuányì shìqīān* 法華玄義釋籤 (T no. 1717). The following section discusses the distinction between morality as principle and morality as concrete observances:

For those who wish to attain the morality of the True Dharma, go beyond "Greater" or "Lesser" and attain meditation, wisdom and so on. Follow in accordance with those who have undertaken to the limit the noble practices of bodhisattva morality. There are two types [of morality]: first there is the natural moral law (*pārājikas*); secondly there are the precepts followed to avoid criticism from the secular world. The sūtra explains that by following these precepts completely one is [considered] pure by society. The arrangement of these minor moral rules and vows, prevents various wrong forms of awareness from arising, [thus] illuminating the body of morality as mind. Distancing oneself from wrong forms of awareness is thus called purified awareness; which is thus called [morality that] arises spontaneously from meditative concentration. Given that, it is said to be the wisdom that arises naturally through one's practice of meditative concentration.

得正法戒者, 通於大小及定慧等. 從受得戒邊戒聖行攝. 又有二種. 一者性戒, 二者息世譏嫌戒. 經文, 釋譏嫌戒具如梵網. 列諸輕戒及諸願等, 非諸惡覺等者, 戒體是覺. 離惡覺故名覺清淨故名定共既云發得根本 (T 33.0872b19–b24).

There are two key points that are relevant to Eisai's discourse; one is the sense

that the distinctions between the vehicles are not a valid basis upon which to establish practices, especially concerning morality. There is also a connection between the body of morality and the pure mind, a connection which can be accessed via meditative concentration. This fits what Eisai's conception of Zen seems to be, the idea of purifying the mind through meditation leading to a new form of moral awareness. It is important to note as we shall see in Chapters Three and Four, that for Eisai this awareness has to be cultivated through practice (C. *xiūxíng* 修行; J. *shugyō*), including Vinaya precept practice. Zhànrán has highlighted this same link between what might be called rules governing correct external deportment appropriate to monastics (C. *lǜyí* 律儀; J. *ritsugi*) and meditative practices that clarify the luminosity of the mind. These practices in conjunction lead to the emergence of *jiètǐ*. These kinds of arguments are central to Eisai's critique of the Tendai *endonkai* ordination.

Zhànrán is perhaps Eisai's most important source regarding these arguments in favor of concrete observances. In his commentary *Explaining and Propagating the Great Practices of [Zhiyi's] Mòhē zhǐguān* (C. *Zhǐguān fǔxíng zhuàn hóngjué* 止觀輔行傳弘決; J. *Shikan bukyōden guketsu*; T no. 1912). The citation below is prefaced by Zhànrán's account of how the body of morality appears to the practitioners of the Lesser Vehicle (T 46.0254b21–b27). He then moves on to explain the issue regarding Mahāyāna practitioners, and insists that the practice of vinaya is also necessary for monastic bodhisattvas:

If one first adheres to the Great Vehicle and afterwards become a monastic, if one intends on being counted amongst the great monastics and one who does not lose the true bodhisattva teachings, one must subsequently accept the rules of discipline. Only by attaining within oneself complete purity of body and speech through avoiding wrongdoing [as explained in] the rules of discipline, can [one attain] the unconditioned body of morality, and avoid relapsing into the disease [of ignorance]. The cause of nirvāṇa is the complete sets of five and seven categories of precepts, which themselves are the rules of restraint of the home leaving bodhisattva.

若先受大後方出家, 欲在大比丘數而不失菩薩法者, 則更受律儀。但於一切發得身口清淨防非律儀, 無作戒體不復發也。故涅槃中五篇七聚並是出家菩薩律儀 (T 46.0254b27-c01).

This section again makes clear that for Zhànrán formless precepts such as the body of morality, are in fact linked very closely with concrete rules, thus suggesting a close similarity with Eisai's position: one realizes the precepts in principle, or abstract precepts only through the practice of the concrete precepts that govern daily activity of speech and body. This stance certainly runs contrary to the idea that one can begin by ordaining monastics with abstract precepts. Nevertheless, this was not the final statement on the issue in terms of Tiāntái exegesis, as the figure of Míngkuàng would have a profound influence, especially on Saichō and his rationale for introducing new separate bodhisattva precept ordination ceremonies without reference to the vinaya (C.

*biéshòu* 別受; J. *betsuju*). This ordination ceremony refers to distinct Tendai ordinations with the *endonkai* which do not include the precepts of the vinaya (Nakamura 2002, 1122c).

Míngkuàng's *Supplement to the Tiantai Commentary on the Bodhisattva Precepts* (C. *Tiāntái púsàjiè shū* 天台菩薩戒疏; J. *Tentai bosatsukai sho*; T no. 1812) is one of the most important texts on bodhisattva precepts in East Asia, largely because of its influence on Saichō. Míngkuàng's analysis places emphasis on the importance of abstract morality:

The morality of ordinary beings and noble [bodhisattvas] is entirely embodied by mind. The mind cannot be exhausted, and thus morality also cannot be exhausted. Many Greater Vehicle scriptures do not mention the three categories of pure precepts. These are not the same as the auditor's rules of restraint; the body of morality should be taken as neither form nor mind.

一切凡聖戒盡以心為體。心無盡故戒亦無盡。諸經無第三聚。不同聲聞律儀，非色非心以為戒體 (T 40.0581a23–a26).

This short passage makes clear that Vinaya, at least in terms of its ritual efficacy, is subsumed beneath a broader sense of morality that is offered through an ordination with the three categories of pure precepts. It points to a rationale that explains why the "body of morality" is the central concept in ordination, and is also a more thoroughgoing Mahāyāna interpretation, as the phrase "neither form nor mind" (C. *fēisè fēixīn* 非色非心; J. *hishiki hishin*) points to a denial of provisional form. Later in the same work, Míngkuàng

states the following:

Ultimate truth is uncreated, and thus cannot be green or other colors.

The *Lotus sūtra* says: knowing that the Dharma lacks any constant nature, the seed of Buddhahood accords with dependent arising, therefore I teach the One Vehicle.<sup>29</sup> The body of morality is inexhaustible, therefore it is said to be luminous. This body of morality of both noble [bodhisattvas] and ignorant [humans] is non-dual, therefore all members of the Great Assembly are recommended to uphold, recite and study this sūtra.

Question: Previously you interpreted the body of morality as the mind of reality, but now you say it is not mind, how can it be both?

The true reality of mind is not the same as coarse obstructions, therefore it is said to be without form. It is not the same as undertaking to discriminate between deluded thoughts, therefore it is said to be distinct from mind. It is not the existence of the six paths, nor the non-existence of the two vehicles. and therefore it is said to be neither existent nor non-existent. This principle spans both beginning and end, and therefore it is said to be neither a cause nor a result. Based on aberrant discernment of distinctions, it is therefore not [such things].

Based on the root of enlightenment it is the same as mind and both aspects are affirmed, neither identical nor detached; the sublime resides within this marvelous Mind of true reality. Rejecting completely both existence and non-existence is the body of morality.

實理無作故非青等。妙經云，知法常無性，佛種從緣起，是故說一乘。戒體無盡故云光光。此之戒體凡聖一如，故勸大眾受持誦學。問，上釋戒體云實相心，今言非心如何得同。答實相之心不同頑礙故云非色。不同受等妄情分別故云非心。不同六道之有，不同二乘之無，故云非有非無。理互始終故云非因非果。從迷辨異是故云非，從悟本同心等俱是，不即不離妙在其中妙心實相。從悟本同心等俱是，不即不離妙在其中妙心實相。雙非一切以為戒體 (T 40.0587a29–b09)。

In his analysis of this topic, Groner (2000, 231–235) outlines a number of implications of Míngkuàng's stance concerning the precepts in general and also concerning the particular issue of *jiètǐ*. The major implication is that Míngkuàng provides a course of reasoning which would facilitate Saichō's subsequent abandonment of the vinaya by excluding the vinaya from the collection of three pure precepts as per the *Yīngluò jīng*, and also suggesting that the vinaya were simply an administrative method for establishing monkhood. Groner suggests (2000, 235) that Míngkuàng in fact elevates the status of the precepts through his discourse; rather than seeing the precepts as a preparatory practice, instead they are placed on a par with meditation and wisdom.

For Eisai the problem with this analysis is the question: how is the practice of morality distinguished from meditation and wisdom without concrete observances? Rather than elevate morality to the same status as meditation and wisdom, by identifying morality with a realization of emptiness gained through meditative practices, Míngkuàng essentially

removes the need for concrete observances altogether, and morality loses its content. This is precisely the problem Eisai will attempt to address based on his experience of Chinese Chán. It is interesting that the perspective on the precepts outlined by Míngkuàng above seems to find corollaries in certain Chán texts, such as with the "formless precepts" (C. *wúxiàngjiè* 無相戒; J. *musōkai*) of the *Platform sūtra* (C. *Liùzǔ tánjīng* 六祖壇經; J. *Rokuso dangyō*) and the *Lìdài fǎbǎo jì* 歷代法寶記 (J. *Rekidai hōbō ki*), a key text for the short lived Bǎotáng 保唐 (J. *hōtō*) school of Chán that was composed around the same time as Míngkuàng's text, in 774 CE.<sup>30</sup> The fact that Eisai uses his experience of Chán to argue against such interpretations such help orientate us to the important distinction between the Chán rhetoric of formlessness and a focus on the mind, with Chán monastic practice and its emphasis on concrete observances.

### **3. Eisai on Abstract Morality**

As Mano (2011) has illustrated, Eisai's concern with morality does not begin when he returns from China in 1191. Prior to his trip, Eisai's views on the issue of precepts and morality were in line with Annen, an influential *taimitsu* exegete.<sup>31</sup> Annen argued that the esoteric *samaya* precepts (C. *sānmèiyé jiè* 三昧耶戒; J. *samaiya kai*) were the most important set of precepts. From this basis, he argued that the concrete moral rules of the vinaya and the *Brahmā Net sūtra* should be subordinated to esoteric precepts and the *Lotus sūtra* (Groner 1990, 262–64).

In his final text composed before leaving for China, *Oral Transmission*

*on the Awakening of bodhicitta in the Adamantine Peak Teaching* (J. *Kongōchō shū bodaishinron kuketsu* 金剛頂宗菩提心論口決; T no. 2293), Eisai presents a position which follows Annen's interpretation of the precepts and their relation to *bodhicitta* (J. *bodaishin* 菩提心), dividing the concept into three aspects: practice and vow (J. *gyōgan* 行願), ultimate Truth (J. *shōgi* 勝義) and meditative absorption (J. *samaji* 三摩地; i.e., *samādhi*; Mano 2011, 643).<sup>32</sup> In this sense then Eisai is following standard exegetical formations; and is following on from the implications of Annen's position outlined above concerning the idea that the *samaya* precepts are most important. This interpretation of the precepts as a form of ritual empowerment that collapses the path structure into an immediate realization of Buddhahood, or indeed the endowment of certain powers or knowledge that makes the precepts, especially those of the vinaya, an expedient, continued to have an impact on Eisai. We have seen already how Eisai argues that the vinaya is an expedient to be utilized during the latter age. On his return from China, he makes clear his opposition to ordination with any form of abstract precepts.

Eisai was active during a period when Japanese Tendai had committed itself to ordaining all monastics with the *endonkai*. This ceremony represents the pinnacle of the Tendai schools fourfold teachings for separate audiences (J. *kehō shikyō* 化法四教) and represents the Perfect teachings (J. *enkyō* 圓教) of the Universal Bodhisattvas as represented in the *Lotus sūtra* and *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*. This ordination essentially bestows the power of the perfect teaching on the ordinand. While there are technical differences in

terminology and origin, the function of this abstract precept ordination ceremony remains the same as the body of morality, where the ordinand is bestowed with the perfect mind which is luminous and quiescent, and therefore has been endowed with the principle of reality (J. *shinri* 眞理), which is essentially the same as Buddhahood in potentiality. The *endonkai* is a purely Mahāyāna ordination, and is not mixed with any vinaya morality. The *endonkai* is considered the causal condition (J. *in'i* 因位) which leads to the result of direct realization of Buddhahood (J. *kai* 果位) through the attainment of the three learnings in one; therefore, the traditional path structure collapses, and the result is the statement that "ordination is equivalent to Buddhahood" (J. *jukai soku jōbutsu* 受戒即成佛; Kagamishima 1985b, 30).<sup>33</sup> Such an ordination, be it the *endonkai*, the formless precepts of the *Platform sūtra*, or the body of morality all subvert the need to practice concrete moral precepts after one has undergone the ordination ritual. This direct realization of wisdom or mind is said to arise spontaneously within the mind of the ordinand through the power of the ritual. The rhetorical power of such ordinations and their link with the doctrine of sudden and perfect Enlightenment is difficult to argue against; nonetheless, Eisai presents the latter age as the context in which such ordinations can no longer be deemed suitable, and thereby Japanese monasticism must revert to concrete proscriptive practices as a means to realize these states of perfect wisdom. Morality must be cultivated, rather than endowed. This explains why Eisai in his post 1191 works appears to be against all forms of what Ishida (1986a, 301) calls "originally existent morality" (J.

*honnukai* 本有戒).

Eisai's most sustained critique of this form of ordination is found in *Kōzen gokokuron* and provides an explanation of much of Eisai's thinking concerning the practical realities of precept practice that led him to visit China for the second time. In *Kōzen gokokuron* Eisai writes the following concerning originally existent precepts, which calls to mind the different positions of Míngkuàng and Zhànrán on the issue:

The *Móhē zhǐguān* says: "all causes and conditions that arise thusly, sinking [in saṃsāra] and floating [in nirvāṇa] are not identical. How can one criticize this position by saying "one attains the way through abstract morality", of what use is "concrete morality"?...In the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* it says: "relaxed does not refer to relaxed morality, but rather refers to being relaxed with vehicles [salvation]". This passage refers to the four possibilities [regarding the relationship between morality and wisdom] and those who are relaxed regarding both, and are hence cultivating primarily Wisdom. It does not endorse the idea of being relaxed with the application of morality... Zhànrán's *Zhǐguān fǔxíng zhuàn hóngjué* states: "how can one accept the breaking of moral rules and still call it the Buddha Vehicle?" This sentence means that even if one applies oneself urgently to Wisdom, it is not possible to be called a follower of the Buddha Dharma if one breaks the moral rules. How much more does this apply to the follower of the Zen school, which does not begin with hope for karmic benefit

in the future, that does not suggest a benefit the day after tomorrow, but rather see pure precepts as skillful techniques that pull out the poisoned arrow right in front of your eyes, to attain in this life a marvelous Awakening.

天台宗止觀云: 凡如来因果差降, 昇沈非一. 云何難言, 理戒得道, 何用事戒哉...大經云: 戒緩不名緩, 乘緩名爲緩文. 此文四句中, 約乘戒俱緩之人, 如此云也. 非好而可戒緩... 弘決云: 豈容破戒稱爲佛乘. 如此文者, 乘若雖急, 破戒即不可名爲仏乘云也. 況此禪宗者, 不始望長遠之果, 不敢期後日之益, 以淨戒爲方便. 拔眼前之毒箭, 期即生之妙悟也 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p.116).

Eisai is here addressing the perspective that an individual may cultivate wisdom at the expense of concrete morality. Eisai is attempting to place in context the idea that wisdom can be pursued at the expense of morality by pointing to the different capacities of various beings; although he does not mention it in this passage, the latter age and its associated problems for Buddhist practitioners provides a context to this discourse. Eisai's reference to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* is derived from Zhiyi's *Móhē zhǐguān* (T no. 1911, 46.0039b08) in the section concerning the second aspect, the issue of the four different approaches to the relationship between morality and emptiness, where the second option concerns those who are lax in morality but proficient in the vehicles that lead to emptiness (C. *shèngjí jièhuǎn* 乘急戒緩; J. *jōkyū kaigan*); Zhiyi refers to this position as keeping the precepts through a continual meditative practice (C. *zhuān shǒu lǐjiè guānxíng xiāngxù* 專守理戒

觀行相續; T 46.0039a26). Eisai uses Zhànrán's *Zhǐguān fǔxíng zhuàn hóngjué* to counteract the sense that laxity in morality can be considered an option if one is inclined against the practice. Zhìyǐ actually states that one should choose the practice one is best suited to one's inclination (於諸乘中何乘最強, 強者先牽; T 46.0039a28).

Zhànrán on the other hand interprets Zhìyǐ more in line with Eisai's own thinking, that the Tendai school itself, despite the rhetoric of abstract morality, has in fact always followed the idea of concrete observances as the basis of morality. Eisai finishes with reference to the role of Zen, highlighting its emphasis on the role of concrete morality in terms of attempting to realize enlightenment as soon as possible; in other words concrete moral actions should not only be considered an aspect of practice for those with lesser abilities.

Eisai's citing of Zhànrán's work on the relationship between abstract and concrete precepts is a key aspect to his entire discourse. Therefore, it is worth citing the entire passage from Zhànrán in full, and comparing it to the relevant analysis in Zhìyǐ:

Question: Since you have clarified the way of the Mahāyāna, why it is necessary to observe Lesser [vehicle] rules when the ten types of beings who have attained morality is clear? Answer: Just as the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* encourages adhering to rules, so it is [with morality]. The Lesser [vehicle precepts] are skillful techniques; consequently both the monastic bodhisattva and the auditors know the

same six rules of harmony and [gain] the same ten benefits. It is the six perfections and the four universal vows of the bodhisattvas that are different from auditor practice. For lay bodhisattvas the three refuges and the five precepts are together enough to formulate the aim of enlightenment; how much more will the eighty thousand duties of the bodhisattvas [as stated in the] *Brahmā Net sūtra* [lead to enlightenment]. The seven types of practitioners together aid each other in traversing the five destinies. How can one accept the breaking of moral rules and still call it the Buddha Vehicle? Therefore one must examine the fourfold relationship between precepts and wisdom.

The natural law of morality is examined below in terms of the three learnings [of] being, existence and the unconditioned. Those who receive unconditioned [precepts] as their first [set of precepts], the natural law of morality is not attained, because there is no non-existent unconditioned morality [to be obtained]. If one undertakes the precepts as outlined clearly below, then one attains morality, which is identical to both the conditioned and the unconditioned. This is because a crime that is wrong in itself is, in addition, contrary to what is unconditioned.

Monastics who are equal [in maintaining] morality [will achieve] the unconditioned in a future life; this is because the merit they have accumulated is equal to [achieving the realization] of emptiness.

問: 今明衍門何須小檢而明十種得戒人耶. 答: 如涅槃中處處扶律,

今此亦爾。小爲方便, 故知出家菩薩六和十利與聲聞同。六度四弘異於小行。若在家菩薩三歸五戒咸趣菩提, 況復梵網八萬威儀。七衆並資五道通被。豈容破戒稱爲佛乘。故以乘戒四句對簡。性戒下料簡三學無作有無。初戒無作者, 若受戒下明受得戒即有無作, 故性罪之上加違無作。出家等戒無作別生是故持則功等虛空 (T no. 1912, 46.0254a08–a18).

Both Eisai and Zhànrán refer to the four methods of conceptualizing the relationship between vehicles and morality (*C. jièchéng sì jù* 戒乘四句; *J. kaijō shiku*), although Zhànrán changes the characters around to read 乘戒四句. The basic premise is that this relationship is understood as a tetralemma.<sup>34</sup>

In the *Móhē zhǐguān* (T no. 1911, 46.0039a10) Zhiyǐ discusses this issue in detail with reference to the practice of morality in the vehicles, with the best option of the four to uphold morality diligently both in deed, or through concrete actions (*jikai*), and in principle, or abstractly through contemplation (*rikai*): "Diligently practicing both morality in principle and in deed is the best practice, which is not possible if there is laxity" (事理俱持諸行中最故不可緩也; T 46.0039a23–a24). The key aspect is the second option, to be proficient in the vehicles but lax in morality (*C. shèngjí jièhuǎn* 乘急戒緩; *J. jōkyū kaigan*). This debate is the most pertinent to Eisai's position, and is where Eisai favors Zhànrán's interpretation over Zhiyǐ. Zhiyǐ considers the second option, of diligence in the vehicles but laxity in morality, to be preferable to the alternative where morality is prioritized, as the latter will eventually fall into the three evil destinies when their karmic fruits have been exhausted (T

46.0039b18). Zhànrán argues clearly against this at the end of the passage, where he equates the merit of upholding morality to that of achieving emptiness (持則功等虛空).

Eisai seems to follow this overall sense from Zhànrán's thought concerning the relationship between emptiness and morality with concrete deeds at its basis. As we see from the following passage, Eisai repeats the idea concerning the attainment of benefit in future lives. Eisai also adds his own flavor to the argument, suggesting that Zen presents the model to follow for benefit in this life, reiterating the importance of the relationship between morality and meditation that is central to his advocacy of Zen within the Tendai context:

The *Sūtra of bodhisattva morality* says: "bodhisattvas practice meditative concentration, and achieve bliss in this life, both body and mind attain tranquility; this is called self benefit. Due to the stillness of body and mind, they do not produce further afflictions for sentient beings. This is called benefitting others". What is referred to here is the benefit that accrues in future lives. This is what is indicated by all Great Vehicle schools. The school [Zen] we are talking about is different to these, it does not have this problem. Before one's eyes this school excises the power of demons, it seeks to emulate the practices of the Tathāgatas. The *Sūtra of bodhisattva morality* says: "when the Buddha sits in meditative concentration, not even demons may disturb him." One who refers to the phrase "being relaxed towards morality

while practicing assiduously wisdom will meet a Buddha in this lifetime," who consider breaking the precepts a form of good, will be no different to one who carries a nugget of gold while dying of hunger. 善戒經云: 菩薩修禪定, 現世受樂. 身心寂靜, 是名自利. 身心靜故, 不惱衆生, 是名利他. 今所言, 皆約來世報. 是皆大乘諸宗之旨. 即又異此宗意, 不可爲難也. 此宗是眼前割魔羅, 欲与如來行等也. 善戒經云: 佛在禪定, 不得伺便文. 其憑戒緩乘急值佛世之文, 好破戒者, 何異齋持金寶餓死哉 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p.116).

Eisai suggests in this passage that even from the perspective of realized emptiness, one cannot consider breaking the precepts beneficial. Hence Eisai is presenting a position that relies on the moral nature of meditation, and is attempting to deemphasize the relationship between meditation and wisdom which later comes to be characteristic of Zen, and the link between ordination and the sudden realization of wisdom, as suggested with abstract precept ordination ceremonies such as the *endonkai*.

The above section has shown clearly how Eisai establishes precedent for his attempt to separate the ritual moral empowerment aspect of the ordination from the practical function through the work of Zhànrán. As we will see in Chapter Three, his argument is not purely a negative critique of abstract precepts such as the *endonkai*; he also discusses the practical benefits of concrete observances, although he largely turns to Vinaya school to provide a rationale for that position. Eisai's understanding of bodhisattva precepts is also not purely a deconstruction. Eisai may well be responsible for a major

doctrinal innovation that occurred outside of the Tendai school, the introduction of self-ordination that includes the vinaya ordination, a method that was used by what came to be known as the Shingon ritsu 真言律 school half a century after Eisai's death.

#### 4. Eisai on Bodhisattva Precepts and Self-Ordination

Eisai regards *Yīngluò jīng* and the *Fànwǎng jīng* as the source of Mahāyāna morality. In the following citation he makes the point clear:

In the Greater vehicle, the rules of discipline are based on the *Fànwǎng jīng* and the *Yīngluò jīng*. This discipline is different from the deportment of the lesser vehicle. Internally [cultivate] the heart of great compassion, and a gentle demeanor; outwardly practice austerities to demonstrate how to be a field of merit [for all living beings].

大乘郎梵網瓔珞等菩薩律儀也。其律儀則異小乘威儀也。內薰大悲表柔輒之相外住苦行示福田之儀 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 24).

The "internal" aspect represented by the glyph 內 refers to internal spiritual cultivation, while the glyph 外 refers to external physical actions. This represents Eisai's "internally Mahāyāna, externally vinaya" format which will become characteristic of his form of Zen practice. The references to the *Fànwǎng jīng* and the *Yīngluò jīng* are also significant. As stated above, both texts provide a rationale for self-ordination (C. *zìshì shòujiè* 自誓受戒; J. *jisei jukai*); whereas the twenty-third minor precepts of the *Fànwǎng jīng* allows for self-ordination with the bodhisattva precepts, the *Yīngluò jīng* provides a formula facilitating self-ordination with the three categories of pure precepts

representing the body of morality that does not include the vinaya (T no. 1485, 24.1020c01). While it is tempting to see this as Eisai aligning himself with a certain abstract understanding of Mahāyāna morality as found especially in the *Yīngluò jīng*, he immediately defuses such an interpretation by subsequently referencing Asaṅga (C. *Wúzhào* 無著; J. *Mujaku*; 4th C.) and the eighth fascicle of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (C. *Púsà dìchí jīng* 菩薩地持經; J. *Bosatsu jiji kyō*. T no. 1581, 30.0932c11).<sup>35</sup> This text also allows for self-ordination, but is typically understood as only being effective once one has already undergone the vinaya ceremony (Adamek, 2007, 70).

Eisai clearly supports the idea of self-ordination, and is one of the first to explicitly outline the method by which one can undertake the ritual:

Moreover, as it says in the morality of *Brahmā's Net*, the four groups of Buddhist disciples together hear and undertake the vows. If this is the case, in the age of the Degenerate Latter Dharma the Buddha's teachings are dying out, if within one thousand *li* a teacher who can administer the precepts cannot be found, a single person whose karmic recompense has developed through learning and [has thus] aroused the mind of Supreme Enlightenment, can officially give up their father, mother and wife, and shaves their head and face, goes before a statue of the Buddha and bodhisattvas and undergoes self-ordination, and receives an auspicious mark in this lifetime. How can such a person not be called a bodhisattva monk?

況梵網菩薩戒者, 四部共聽自誓受。若爾末世佛法絕後千里內無能

授戒之師時, 一人任宿習發無上菩提之心, 郎捨父母妻, 自剃頭除鬚之者, 於佛菩薩形像前自誓受戒, 郎得好相之輩. 豈不名菩薩比丘哉 (Shukke taikō, p. 13–14).

Eisai cites three texts as the source for bodhisattva morality: the *Fànwǎng jīng* (T no. 1484, 24.1006c05), the *Yīngluò jīng* and the *Púsà dìchí jīng*. All of which refer to the possibility of self-ordination. The *Fànwǎng jīng* allows for self-ordination once one has received the appropriate a vision or sign that certifies that one has received the ordination (Yamabe, 2005). In the *Yīngluò jīng*, the self-ordination is considered the lowest form. The *Yīngluò jīng* suggests that the vinaya is not included, while the *Púsà dìchí jīng* suggests self-ordination can only be done after receiving the vinaya. The *Fànwǎng jīng* is interesting because the issue is that one can receive the bodhisattva precepts and thus become, as Eisai says, a bodhisattva monk. For Eisai, the idea of a bodhisattva monk includes the vinaya, and therefore it seems possible to argue that the self-ordination with the *Fànwǎng jīng* precepts also includes a vinaya ordination. Eisai then suggests that Saichō was following a similar understanding of the bodhisattva precepts that entails the precepts of the vinaya being folded within the bodhisattva precepts. Finally Eisai suggests that this was in fact Saichō's intention:

And was it not the case that the eighty thousand (aspects of) conduct of the *Fànwǎng jīng*, includes the five, eight, ten and two hundred and fifty precepts of the Lesser vehicle? It is the case [that it includes them]. And was it not the case that Dengyō Daishi (Saichō) also had

such an intention, but it is difficult now to clearly see it.

或又梵網八萬威儀中何不撮五戒八戒十戒二百五十戒哉。又有傳教大師元意不可顯示歟 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 14).

With this in mind, it seems clear that Eisai is suggesting that self-ordination can also include the vinaya, a move that opened the way for the ordination procedure used in the *Shingon ritsu* movement several decades after Eisai's death.<sup>36</sup>

It is noteworthy that Eisai includes the passage on self-ordination in *Shukke taikō*, written for his monastic audience, and not in *Kōzen gokokuron*, written for the Tendai establishment. The latter text does include a reference to the *Śūraṅgama sūtra* (C. *Shōulèngyán jīng* 首楞嚴經; J. *Shuryōgon kyō*; T no. 945), a key text in the Zen school. In his citation from this text, Eisai lays out the issue of receiving a sign from the Buddha that resembles the account found in the *Fànwǎng jīng*. In this context the sign refers to the arousing of the mind of Enlightenment, and is linked to maintaining the four forms of restraint (C. *sìzhǒng lǜyí* 四種律儀; J. *shishu ritsugi*; T 19.0133a08), which amounts to avoiding the four *pārājika* offenses, while chanting the "*dhāraṇī* of the white canopy" (C. *bāndáluó* 般怛羅; J. *hantara*) a *dhāraṇī* associated with the protection of the state and which Eisai invokes to illustrate precisely this function. Once the ritual has been completed for the required twenty-one days. The passage ends with: "Practice like this for twenty-one days, and I will reveal myself to you, I will be in your presence, and will lay my hands on your head and uplift your spirit, and you will experience an opening into

awakening" (經三七日, 我自現身, 至其人前, 摩頂安慰, 令其開悟; *Kōzen gokokuron* fasc.1, p. 100–101; *Śūramgama sūtra* T 19.0133a19–a29).<sup>37</sup> What Eisai presents here are key aspects of Zen from his perspective: that it has protective powers, that these protective powers depend upon the morality of the practitioner, and that through Zen, one can access the Buddha directly, in a manner similar to the self-ordination precept ceremony associated with the *Fànwǎng jīng* that Eisai outlined in *Shukke taikō*.<sup>38</sup>

A second aspect of Eisai's work relevant to the issue of ordination is his concern with the issue of the repentance ritual, a key element of much Tiāntái discourse that appears prominently from the *Móhē zhǐguān* onwards.<sup>39</sup> As Kubota has pointed out (1984, 750), repentance rituals were almost certainly a part of the *endonkai* ordination, especially with reference to the seven heinous acts (C. *qīni* 七逆; J. *shichigyaku*) and eight difficulties that completely transgress morality (C. *bānán yīqiè fànjiè* 八難一切犯戒; J. *hachinan issai bonkai*). In *Kōzen gokokuron* Eisai deals with the question of how Zen understands the issue of repentance (C. *chànhuǐ* 懺悔; J. *zange*) and seems to suggest that ordination can be conferred on all those who see the moral benefit in Zen meditative practices:

Question: if this is the case, can those who have transgressed morality, once they have repented, again obtain meditative concentration or not?

Answer: The *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* says: "repentance constitutes the second purification". The *Essentials of Chán Practice* says: "if one is [following] the Great Vehicle, then it is possible to cease all thoughts,

this is identical to true repentance". Obstacles will be removed and this gives rise to morality. Thereby one achieves meditative concentration". The *Móhē zhǐguān* says: "The *Sūtra Meditating on Samantabhadra Bodhisattva* says: to sit correctly and mindful of true reality, this is called the first repentance." The *Sūtra on the wondrous Supreme dhyāna* says: "those who commit the four grave offenses and the five heinous acts, except for through meditative concentration, they cannot be saved." The *Mahāvaiṣṭya-sūtra* says: [taking] the three refuges, the five precepts and the two hundred and fifty precepts [of the vinaya] in this, is repentance. If they [do this], it is impossible that they will be reborn." Thus, in this [Zen] lineage, morality is primary, and Zen constitutes the ultimate. If one breaks the moral code, repentance will stop evil, and thereby one can be called a practitioner of Zen.

問曰, 若爾者, 破戒人生悔心, 後還得禪否. 答曰, 大涅槃經云, 懺悔名爲第二清淨文. 修禪要決云, 若大乘中, 但能息心, 卽眞懺悔故. 障滅戒生, 故得禪定文. 天台止觀云, 普賢觀云, 端坐念實相, 是名第一懺. 妙勝定云, 四重五逆, 若除禪定, 餘無能救文. 方等云, 三歸五戒, 二百五十戒, 如是懺悔. 若不還生, 無有是處文. 是故此宗, 以戒爲初, 以禪爲究. 若破戒者, 悔心止惡, 則號禪人也 (*Kōzen gokokuron* fasc.1, p. 106).<sup>40</sup>

In terms of understanding repentance Eisai is clearly linking Zen to Tendai. The emphasis here is on the moral qualities of meditative concentration, and the basis of repentance lying in the mind of the practitioner. The reference to

the *Essentials of Chán Practice* (C. *xiūchán yàojué* 修禪要訣; J. *xiūzen yōketsu*; X no. 1222) is notable. According to Tokiwa (2005, 200), this text is a translation of an Indian text and dates from the seventh century, therefore calling into question whether the reference to *Chán* 禪 in the text refers to the Chán school. Eisai is drawing a clear link here between the precepts that emerge through meditation and the importance of repentance. In *Shukke taikō*; Eisai also point out that he and his followers undertake the fortnightly confessional ceremony based on the forty eight minor rules of the *Fànwǎng jīng* (*Shukke taikō*, p.25).

### **Conclusion**

Eisai's position in opposition to ordinations with abstract morality as the normative procedure is doctrinally nuanced, and provides a sense of the range of his scholastic erudition. It also sets the scene for what I argue is one of his key compromises with the Tendai establishment: that the vinaya ordination did not have to be reintroduced, but that vinaya practices could be introduced via the Zen school. Thus, Eisai finds an ingenious solution to issues surrounding the relationship between ritual moral empowerment and practical function. Eisai simply divorces the two components from each other, making the practical function line up in tandem with standard doctrinal practices, where the cultivation of concrete morality is at the very least a required course of practice for beginners. Zen allows him the latitude to expand this as a more developed practice by linking concrete morality with meditation, a position which also happens to be in line with the highest ranking in Zhìyǐ's

understanding of the precepts. Eisai emphasizes the Chinese precedents he witnessed as standard normative ordinations received by monastics. Eisai's reasoning seems obvious to us: ordaining an individual with abstract precepts, rather than providing set guidelines for practice, requires challenging levels of moral imagination, coupled with a steadfast and consistent attitude towards practice. This is perhaps too much to expect of inexperienced or under motivated monastics. Nonetheless, Eisai's critique of the *endonkai* ordination may well be the most politically sensitive aspect of Eisai's work concerning the precepts, and it is understandable that he wishes to tread lightly. It is also possible to argue that for Eisai the most important aspect is the practice of morality (C. *jièxíng* 戒行; J. *kaigyō*) rather than its ritual aspect. The issue of the practical elements of vinaya and Zen observance is the subject of Chapter Three.

### 3. The Practical Content of Zen Morality

#### The Vinaya and Pure Rules in Eisai's Zen

Eisai's main concerns appear to be practical: how best to improve the level of discipline in the Japanese monastic environment. The obvious answer is to reinstate the vinaya precepts. Eisai, as has been shown in the previous chapter on ritual and ordination, did not consider this necessary. What has to be reinstated is the practice of the vinaya, stripped of its ritual and institutional connotations. For Eisai, the easiest means by which to solve the problem is to establish pure rules (C. *qīngguī* 清規; J. *shingi*) as the standard for what the Tendai school refer to as "concrete" observances of the precepts" (C. *shìjiè* 事戒; J. *jikai*).

This points to a key role Eisai plays in the history of Japanese Buddhism as the first to introduce the standard text for pure rules used in Chinese monasteries, the *Chányuàn qīngguī* 禪苑清規 compiled by Chánglú Zōngzé (J. Chōro Sōsaku 長蘆宗頤) in 1101–1103. This text played a central role in the development of subsequent forms of Zen, in particular the formation of Sōtō Zen 曹洞宗 under Dōgen, whose use of pure rules became a trademark of his practice.

This chapter emphasizes the influence Chinese Vinaya scholarship on Eisai's understanding of the precepts, and how he applies this scholarship to solve practical matters of discipline within the Japanese monastic context. Two key terms, *saikai* 齋戒 and *jikai bongyō* 持戒梵行, serve to provide a framework of concrete observances that serve both to bolster the individual

practitioner, be they lay or monastic, the broader monastic community, and the nation at large.

### **1. Zen and Vinaya in *Shukke taikō***

Both *Shukke taikō* and *Kōzen gokokuron*, despite differences in the target audience, cover many of the same topics. While the importance of morality and monastic discipline are emphasized in both texts, *Shukke taikō* contains a large amount of material concerning practical issues of monastic life, while *Kōzen gokokuron* lays emphasis on doctrinal justifications for such practices. Given that *Shukke taikō* is directed towards a monastic audience, it is unsurprising that Eisai includes a large amount of details from the vinaya in this text. *Kōzen gokokuron* is Eisai's attempt to convince the Tendai establishment of the value of Zen. Through elaborating on the nature and function of the category of pure rules, Eisai argues that monastic discipline can be improved, and that the establishment of concrete practices based on pure rules will also benefit the state. Eisai's discussion of concrete morality relies mainly on Zen and vinaya school texts. This contrasts with his discussion of the ordination ritual where he relies exclusively on Tiāntái sources. While Yìjìng and Dào xuān are both cited in each text, the content of *Shukke taikō* relies heavily on both Yìjìng's own works and his translations of vinaya texts; *Kōzen gokokuron*, on the other hand, relies more on Dào xuān, whose position on taking the vinaya ordination with a Mahāyāna mindset was a major influence on Eisai.

Dàoxuān's understanding of the relationship between morality and mental cultivation, and his summary of vinaya practices, which would eventually form the bulk of the *Chányuàn qīngguī*, are also key elements of Dàoxuān's work that appears in Eisai's texts.

Parts one and two of *Shukke taikō* relies heavily on Yijing, in particular his *Record of Buddhist Practices Sent Home from the Southern Seas* (C. *Nánhǎi jìguī nèifǎ chuán* 南海寄歸內法傳; J. *Nankai kiki naihō den*; T no. 2125). The general orientation of Yijing's outlook on Buddhist practice clearly had a profound effect on Eisai, to the point that he attempted to emulate Yijing's perilous journey to India in the hope of reestablishing correct vinaya practices in Japan, before residing in China for four years having been denied travel permission by the Chinese authorities. The extensive number of citations Eisai includes from the *Nánhǎi jìguī nèifǎ chuán* led Taga (1965, 259–260) to suggest *Shukke taikō* can be considered the first work introducing Yijing's text to a Japanese audience. Yijing's influence is also clearly visible in Eisai's arguments concerning the importance of relating concrete morality to emptiness; in this context, Eisai cites Yijing in both *Shukke taikō* and *Kōzen gokokuron*.

Dàoxuān shared with both Yijing and Eisai a concern with the status of monastic discipline and a sense that there must be a return to the Indian roots of Buddhism (Satō 1973, 59). One of the key terms for Dàoxuān is *fàn xíng* 梵行 (J. *bongyō*). The word *fàn xíng* is the Chinese translation for the Sanskrit term *brahmacaryā*, and refers to the practices a student Brahmin undergoes

during his training (Nakamura 2002, 1544c). The Chinese character *fàn* 梵 is used to translate the term "Brahmin". The English rendering "pure practices" relates to the importance of purity for Brahmin rituals. Nakamura (2002, 869d) regards the term *qīngjìng xíng* 清淨行 (J. *shōjō gyō*), which translates directly as "pure practices", as a synonym for *fānxíng* 梵行. In the Buddhist context, this term relates most often to sexual morality, especially amongst monastics (Satō 1973, 62; Nakamura 2002, 1397d). Eisai uses the term in this context.<sup>41</sup> Eisai's references to *jikai bongyō* are drawn from the *Chányuàn qīngguī*. There are a number of possible alternatives to this translation, depending on the context. In the context of Eisai's work, he seems to be using the compound to emphasize the vows of celibacy as being the most important in the monastic context. The term *jikai* refers to maintaining a particular set of precepts. This is not the sense of the term in Eisai. For Eisai, to maintain morality is to have a bodhisattva mindset that appreciates the need for both forms of morality, concrete practices such as the vinaya and pure rules, and the contemplation of principle or abstract precepts. The term *bongyō* 梵行 is used to refer to the specific rules of discipline concerning sexual morality. Eisai's use of the term suggests that these precepts must be followed if one wishes to maintain morality more generally.

The link between meditation and morality is another element of Eisai's work, and refers to Indian models, in this case to Abhidharma texts. For example, the *Samyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-sāstra* (C. *Zá āpítán xīnlùn* 雜阿毘曇心論; J. *Zō abidon shinron*) a Sarvāstivādan text translated into Chinese in

the fifth century, contains an example of how the relationship between meditation and morality is conceived, using the term *chánjiè* 禪戒 (J. *zenkai*). Dessein (1999, Vol. 3, 361) treats this term as a Chinese rendering of the Sanskrit *dhyāna-saṃvara* and renders it into English as the "moral precept of trance" (Dessein, 1999, Vol. 1, 158). The sense of this term is that meditative concentration provides a protection and support for morality.<sup>42</sup>

In summary, there are said to be three forms of unconditioned morality.

The rules of restraint are included in this. Three forms can be known.

Question: what are these three? Answer: the one [type] that is

untainted, that arises in meditation, and is a morality that depends upon

the practice of the vinaya. This untainted morality and the Path are of

the same effect, and are attained concomitantly, [regardless of] whether

one can be said to be a new or accomplished [practitioner]. What

arises in meditation, the morality that emerges, arises in meditation and

effects of this arise concomitantly: correct speech, correct action and

correct livelihood.

無作戒略說有三種者。無作戒若律儀所攝。略說當知三種。問何者

是。答無漏及禪生依別解脫戒。彼無漏戒與道一果道俱行，謂學無

學。禪生者，彼禪戒與禪一果禪俱行，正語正業正命 (T no. 1552, 28.

0889a28-b02).<sup>43</sup>

The term *zenkai* 禪戒 is key for Eisai. Eisai seems to have been the first

Japanese Buddhist to use the term *zenkai*; it does not appear in the works of

Dōgen (Kagamishima 1967, 267). Eisai's reference to *zenkai* is outlined below:

For example, imitating those who do not follow the precepts and abandon religious practice, or following those who are defiled and empty of original nature. These are the teachings that are completely mistaken and have lost the main point. This is to harbor deep animosity and be in conflict with the truth. This is to be beaten by water and bound by fire. It is like one who tries to catch a fish by climbing a tree. This is, namely, the evil of those who do not practice. moreover, to abandon the Zen precepts, is to be one who cannot have truth or wisdom. The vinaya master Dào Xuān said: "He who already does not practice meditative *samādhi*, will for a long period have a heart that is contrary to truth and wisdom. [if] one does not observe the various good precepts, one will not be able to attain the superior practices. In this way, those of great virtue in both past and present have in fact come to serve as excellent fields [of merit] for this age."

或做無礙, 放捨修行, 或隨結使, 而恃本性空. 並是迷宗失旨, 背湛乖真. 敲冰而索火. 緣木以求魚者也. 此即惡於無行人也. 況捐禪戒非真智之人也. 道宣律師云, 夫以不修禪那三昧, 長乖真智之心, 不習諸善律儀, 難以成其勝行. 是以古今大德, 實爲世之良田 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 2, p. 108).

Eisai has two senses of *zenkai* in mind: one sense is simply morality as understood in the Zen school, and the precepts administered in that school.

The second sense resembles the sense outlined in the passage from the *Samyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra*, that the morality of restraint, the vinaya, and the morality realized through meditative attainment have a symbiotic relationship: practitioners use rules of restraint to quiet the mind; this facilitates the emergence of the meditative state which will lead to the realization of the rules of restraint that is unconditioned. The key link between meditation and morality is, for Eisai, the work of Dào xuān, whose work on the nature of the vinaya and the relationship to meditation had a strong influence on Eisai's thought. The influence of Dào xuān's vinaya commentaries on the content of the *Chányuàn qīngguī*, a link which Western scholars have only recently become cognizant of through the work of Yifa (2002), is a second factor linking him to Eisai's Zen.<sup>44</sup> A key text in this context is Dào xuān's vinaya commentary *A Summary of the Supplementary Observances in the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya* (C. *Sìfēnlǜ shānfán bǔquè xíngshì chāo* 四分律刪繁補闕行事鈔; J. *Shibunritsu sanpan hoketsu jigyo jishō*; T no. 1804).

Indeed, this link is where Eisai acts as a key juncture between Chinese and Japanese cultural contexts. Dào xuān's doctrinal explication of the relationship between vinaya and the Mahāyāna, and his understanding of the relationship between moral discipline and seated meditation are both at the core of Eisai's thought. Dào xuān is similarly concerned about the relationship between morality and emptiness, but also presents certain criticisms of the emerging Chán school in this regard (Chen 2002, 342; T no. 2060, 50.0597 b05–b18).<sup>45</sup> Dào xuān's critique notwithstanding, the historical closeness of the

relationship between the nascent Chán school in the early stages of its development and vinaya school practices has been analyzed by Kōjima (1981–1982). He suggests that in China, the idea of a distinct Chán "school" (C. *zōng* 宗; J. *shū*) with its own sectarian identity began in the Táng period 唐代 (618–907) with monastics who dedicated themselves to practice in the meditation hall in monasteries that traditionally focused on vinaya studies.<sup>46</sup> This overlap continues in the Japanese context, as analyzed by Nakao (1982, 209), who uses the term "two schools of Zen and Vinaya" (J. *zenritsu nishū* 禅律二宗) to characterize the closeness of this relationship. Nakao sees this relationship as represented through the link between Eisai and Shunjō, another Tendai figure who studied in China, and who upon returning to Japan advocated the importance of the vinaya. These two schools are also the means by which Sòng period monastic practice was absorbed into Japanese Buddhism.

Nakao's analysis introduces the problem of how we interpret and translate the term *shū*. The term has a number of different connotations that need to be distinguished according to context. It can refer, *inter alia*, to government sanctioned forms of Buddhism, to sectarian identity in opposition to other groups formed through Tokugawa period historical revisionism, also to practitioners within a larger monastic context who seek to gain a degree of expertise in the practice or study of certain elements of Buddhism. It is this latter sense of *shū* which I believe Nakao is referring to, and reflects Kōjima's understanding above of how the study of *Chán*, in the sense of a certain form of meditation that could be considered a primary practice for certain

monastics, and vinaya became intertwined in the Chinese context. For similar reasons the term "school" is a more apt English rendering than the word "sect", as sect implies a strict sense of affiliation to one particular group. This sense of rigid sectarian consciousness did not become prominent in Japanese Buddhism until the Tokugawa period (Mohr, 1994). Eisai uses the term *shū* to refer to two of the senses referred to above, that Zen is a *shū* which does not preclude the study of other Tendai doctrines, and this *shū* be recognized as an official form of government sanctioned Buddhist practice.

Kōjima (1982, 634) points out that by the Southern Sòng (1127–1279) the government officially recognized the designations *chányuàn* 禪院 (J. *zen'in*), *lǜyuàn* 律院 (J. *ritsuin*) and *jiàoyuàn* 教院 (J. *kyōin*). The doctrinal basis of these distinctions between meditation, discipline and teachings/doctrine are long standing and predate the institutionalization of these categories in Chinese monasticism. These distinctions served both a practical and political purpose. In terms of monastic life, it is clear, as evidenced by Eisai's experience in China, that all three aspects were incorporated in the monastic curriculum. The designation *chányuàn* simply referred to the lineage of the abbot in the public monastery system, and did not refer specifically to the key practices of that particular monastery. By the Southern Sòng, Tiāntái and Huáyán 華嚴 (J. *kegon*) lineage holders were also granted public monastery status with the designation "teaching monastery" (C. *jiàoyuàn* 教院; J. *kyōin*), with the Vinaya school added later (Schlütter 2010, 45).

This Sòng period model of "meditation, teachings and discipline" (C. *chánjiàolǜ* 禪教律; J. *zen-kyō-ritsu*) is a major part of Ōtsuka's (2003) analysis of the broader context of Kamakura period Japanese Buddhism, and presents a meaningful diversification of Kuroda Toshio's *Kenmitsu taisei* model. Both Ōtsuka and kōjima see Eisai as an advocate for this system more broadly, and the link between Zen and *ritsu* more specifically. In 1201, when Eisai takes charge of fund raising activities (J. *kanjin shoku* 勸進職) at Tōdaiji, those wishing to practice Zen were sequestered at Kaidan-in, the cloister usually associated with Risshū studies (kōjima 1982, 634). Eisai's role as an advocate of this model of monastic practice does not imply the need to alter existing Tendai ordination procedures, at least in terms of reintroducing a vinaya ordination, as the *zen-kyō-ritsu* model assumes Tendai represents the teachings (J. *kyō* 教). Critically, this form of monastic organization does not necessarily require a distinct vinaya ordination, as the Zen school itself, through the *chányuàn qīngguī*, also includes the study of the vinaya. Eisai's Kenninji in Kyoto used this monastic system, although Eisai himself had received a vinaya ordination in China. It also appears that Eisai encouraged at least one of his students, Chōgen, to institute this system at his own temple kongō sanmi-in 金剛三昧院 on Mount Kōya 高野山 (Ōtsuka 2003, 1484-1485).

Not only do these schools share largely similar ideas at this point in time regarding the importance of monastic discipline and its relationship to meditative practices implying not only that pure rules and vinaya are linked,

but also that these two schools essentially grew out from one another in the Chinese context and that knowledge of vinaya spread in Kamakura Japan through interaction with Chán monks. While the exact nature of these relationships remain to be clarified, and indeed may be lost to the scholar altogether in some cases, it is clear that Eisai's key motivation in bringing Zen to Japan was the need to reconfigure Japanese monastic practice in light of his experience of Chinese monasticism.

## **2. *Shukke taikō* and the Crisis of Monastic Discipline**

One of Eisai's primary goals in *Shukke taikō* is to reintroduce knowledge of the vinaya to the Japanese monastic context. The decision by the Tendai school over three hundred years earlier to abandon vinaya ordinations presents Eisai with a fundamental problem. Eisai argues that observing precepts as literal moral prescriptions is the key form of Buddhist practice during *Mappō*. The prevailing Tendai ordinations as discussed in the previous chapter, utilized only abstract interpretations of the bodhisattva precepts, and contained no such concrete rules. This opposition between concrete observance of the precepts and abstract interpretations was a major feature of Tendai precept discourse, and was often framed in terms of the vinaya as representing external, concrete rules and bodhisattva precepts as representing moral qualities understood abstractly (Bodiford 2005a, 11–12); in other words, one does not follow the bodhisattva precepts as a descriptive set of rules, but rather considers the bodhisattva precepts as representative of a certain broader perspective on morality which provides ideal behavioral models without necessarily

providing a determinate sets of rules that cover a wide variety of circumstances.

If one considers the demands an abstract interpretation of the precepts places on the novice practitioner, then one can understand why Eisai is concerned about the details of practice. The kind of ritual empowerment offered by the *endonkai* ordination seems very difficult to realize without a basis in proper conduct. *Rikai* is often linked to an understanding of the precepts as contemplative principle and hence suggests a progression from the concrete to the abstract, where the rigor of the precept practices actually require meditative concentration (C. *chánjiè* 禪戒; J. *zenkai*) at all times in order to be maintained. Similarly, the image of Buddhism espoused by Eisai requires a mastery over minute concrete precept practices as preparation for mental cultivation. One could summarize Eisai's standpoint as that of classical Indian Buddhism in a Mahāyāna context.

Eisai attempts to reconfigure contemporary ordination practice by establishing a *jikai* interpretation of the precepts based on doctrinal arguments that mirror traditional conceptions of Buddhist path structure (C. *dàodì* 道諦; J. *dōtai*). One accepts the precepts, and must uphold them fully in order to move to the next step, which is the "wisdom to ascertain the cessation of suffering" (C. *mièkǔ zhìhuì* 滅苦智慧; J. *kuchi chie*) acquired through mental cultivation. This knowledge is born of meditative concentration, as outlined in the following passage:

It is said in the *Yijào jīng*: "by relying on these precepts as a cause, one can obtain the various states of meditative absorption, otherwise known as the wisdom that extinguishes suffering. Thus it is known, without the power of Zen, it will be difficult to overcome the various types of evil..The *Yijào jīng* says: "Relying on morality gives rise to concentration, which in turn gives rise to wisdom".

遺教經云,「依因此戒,得生諸禪定,及滅苦智慧.是知非禪力者,一切惡難破乎...遺教經云,依戒生禪生慧 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 1, p.106).

Eisai sees this reversion back to a traditional path structure as a provisional means to negate the effects of *Mappō*, with morality as the basis. Hence Furuta (1964, 20) refers to Eisai's basic standpoint as "the principle of upholding morality and discipline" (*J. jikai jiritsu shugi* 持戒持律主義).

*Shukke taikō* is an attempt to reestablish the fundamentals of Buddhist morality as concrete observance of the precepts: Eisai makes this point clearly in the following passage:

We must understand that the Dharma is the marvelous deportment of the Buddha. A person who understands this principle and embodies this deportment is called a follower of Buddhism. If one follows the prescriptions concerning deportment as outlined here, one can gain the benefit of being saved from the latter age.

當知佛法者,佛妙儀也.知其義辯其理行其儀之人方云佛法者也.因茲粗示其儀則以濟末世耳 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 1-2).

Eisai's emphasis on Yìjìng's *Nánhǎi jìguī nèifǎ chuán* is his attempt to provide a base level of knowledge of what practices are important, both historically in terms of how such practices are related to the origins of the order of monastics with the Buddha himself, and in terms of how proper conduct can lead to a transformation of everyday consciousness. This is an element of practice that resonates with Zen: how outer deportment becomes the benchmark for determining inner realization, an aspect which is especially important considering that the Zen school claims the status of living Buddha for its most advanced practitioners.

Thus Eisai paves the way for his explanation of matters of monastic discipline, with a particular emphasis on robes and appropriate eating customs. Both issues are extremely important in Zen: passing the robe to a disciple in Zen (C. *chuányī* 傳衣; J. *denne*) represents the transmission of the Dharma lineage from teacher to student. Issues surrounding food, including its production, preparation and consumption also play a key role in Zen monastic practice. Eisai's use of Yìjìng is thus an attempt to reintroduce knowledge of basic vinaya regulations to Japan, as the *Nánhǎi jìguī nèifǎ chuán* consists largely of translations from the *Mūla-sarvāstivāda-vinaya* (C. *Yǒubù Lǜ* 有部律; J. *Ubu Ritsu*). Eisai refers material from this vinaya text, most likely gleaned from Yìjìng, in the following passage concerning the nature of monastic decorum concerning food:

Concerning the five appropriate foods (for monastics): first is flour, then rice, rice with bean flour, meat, and sweet cakes. Also included

are the five types of edible [snacks] are: plant roots, stalks, leafs, flowers and fruits. If one has already eaten the five appropriate foods one should not then eat the five snacks. If, however, having eaten the five snacks one then intends to eat the five appropriate foods, then there is no violation.

五正食, 一麩, 二飯, 三麥豆飯. 四肉, 五餅. 及五嚼, 食 一根, 二莖, 三葉, 四華五果. 若食前五正食已畢, 不可食後五嚼食, 若先食後五嚼食, 尚前五正食隨意食之無罪 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 10).

Eisai highlights the importance of proper etiquette surrounding food with references to both the vinaya and the practices he encountered in Chinese monasteries. Eisai explains that the Buddha allows for the eating of rice gruel in the morning, provided the gruel is not thick enough to write a letter on its surface. If the gruel is thick enough to write a letter on the surface than it constitutes a precept violation. Eisai continues by explaining the issues concerning the correct timing of consumption of a small meal in the morning and another meal before midday. Eisai emphasizes that these procedures are both normative in the sense of being the best available practices based on vinaya textual sources, but also descriptive, in that they are being followed in the monastic context: "these days, these are the correct procedures concerning food practiced in the Zen cloisters of the Sòng" (此頃大宋國禪院食正其是也; *Shukke taikō*, p.10).

Eisai's account of the monastic discipline he encountered in China contrasts sharply with the passage below, where he outlines a number of

infractions he experienced in Japan. The detailed emphasis on such matters contrasts sharply with the state of Japanese monastic discipline outlined by Eisai on the following page:

Some people say, they have heard it is permissible to eat meat. Such a thing was never said. To eat in this way as one who has taken the Mahāyāna precepts is not considered appropriate conduct. If I had not outlined these texts, the people of this land would not have known about the two types of food. The above passages [and their prohibitions] are followed in their entirety by the Lesser Vehicle; thus [violations] result in a loss of reliance on the Buddha and his practices. I have simply wanted to make known the substance of the doctrine of the two types of foods. It is also possible that in these times someone will say: "those who have not yet eaten, it is acceptable to eat after midday". I regret terribly the fact that in the past, I myself have spoken in this way. From now on, this cannot be considered correct teaching. At the time when the Buddha was living, both the Buddha and his disciples would sometimes not have meals at all. This was because midday had past. Amongst my own disciples who are maintaining pure morality, if there are those who have adopted this bad habit, this is not unintentional and should be cautioned against. Also, in the past among my own students who are maintaining pure morality, many have broken the prohibition against alcohol, and many repent of drinking. 有人謂, 可聽食耶. 此事無其謂. 今大乘戒人食否有斟酌. 若不出此

文者, 此土之人不知二食故. 出本文一向用之則有小乘依行之失. 今只令知二食之體也. 可得之此頃或人云未食者, 雖過中可食之. 此事予昔, 如此謂之悔故. 今後莫謂是法. 佛在世時佛并諸, 比丘或有失食, 皆是過中之故也. 予門弟持齋者, 在此惡儀. 不如不爲焉可慎. 予昔教持戒者, 多破教斷酒者, 多飲悔哉 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 11).

Taga (1965, 266–267) points to Tendai sources from the period which justify alcohol use during the winter months on Mount Hiei as a means to keep warm. Alcohol was also commonly used as an offering to the gods. Eisai is here pointing to a more systemic problem, not simply moral laxity among monastics, but also ignorance of even basic vinaya prohibitions. It is also worth noting that he implicates himself also in this type of behavior. Eisai makes it clear that his purpose is to shed knowledge of the texts and practices, to allow for the possibility of a revival of precept practice. The practical realities of monastic life, and issues concerning everyday conduct around clothing and food in particular, are clearly central concerns for Eisai; nonetheless, Eisai cannot argue for the superiority of the vinaya as concrete observances and stay within the boundaries of Tendai orthodoxy. Eisai is thus faced with a problem: how to argue for concrete observance of the precepts while maintaining the superiority of an abstract interpretation of the bodhisattva precepts over the vinaya. To solve this dilemma, Eisai redefines the relationship between the two sets of precepts by placing them into a new framework of "pure morality".

### 3. Pure Morality: Food and Fasting in Eisai's Works

"Pure morality" (C. *zhāijiè*; J. *saikai* 齋戒) is the central concept in *Shukke taikō*. The glyph 齋 is translated as "abstinence", linked to purification, especially concerning food and fasting rituals that result in religious purification. Therefore a more complete translation of *saikai* 齋戒 is "abstinence which purifies morality". For the sake of brevity, I will use the translation "pure morality" with the above elements implied.

The term *saikai* in Buddhist texts is most often associated with lay morality. Nakamura (2002, 1434b) relates the term to the upkeep of the eight precepts (C. *bājiè* 八戒; J. *hachikai*) which can be taken by both laity and novice monastics. Iwamoto (1988, 85) also suggests a synonym for *saikai* associated with lay practice of morality, such as *kinjū* 近住 (C. *jìnzhù*). This emphasis on lay morality is not the only sense of the term, as noted by Iwamoto (1988, 588) the Chinese use of the term extended beyond the traditional association with lay observances and came to represent both physical and mental purification in the monastic and lay context. Nakamura (2002, 1434b) also suggests a link between *saikai* and pure rules, in particular concerning purity surrounding food.

Examples of Chinese translations of Abhidharma texts where the term *saikai* 齋戒 appears provide evidence of the three key elements that constitute this concept: the relationship to food, lay observances and ritual purity.

For example, in Vasubandhu's (C. *Shìqīn* 世親; J. *Seshin*, d.u)

*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (C. *Āpídámó jùshè lùn* 阿毘達磨俱舍論; J.

*Abidatsuma kusha ron*; T no. 1558), translated by Xuánzàng 玄奘 (J. Genjō; 602–664) in the early 650's, there are several references to *saikai*. For example, the fifteenth day of every month is designated as the day when monarchs and those of higher caste fast and bathe themselves ritually in order to purify themselves (T 29.0064c04–c05). Later, the text deals with the issue of food. In a discussion of the "eight limbs of pure morality" (C. *zhāijiè bāzhī* 齋戒八支; J. *saikai hasshi*) Vasubandhu says: "not eating at inappropriate times is both abstinence and a limb of abstinence" (離非時食是齋亦齋支; T 29. 0075c10). He then outlines that the eighth day of every half month (C. *bànyuè bāri* 半月八日; J. *hangetsu hachinichi*; T 29.0080c13), in other words the eighth, eighteen and twenty eighth days, as when lay people should "seek to undergo the eight limbs and become established in pure morality" (求受八支近住齋戒; T 29.0080c14). The relationship of *saikai* to days of fasting for lay people who are observing the eight lay precepts is also presented in the *Fànwǎng jīng* as the "six days of purification" (C. *liù zhāirì* 六齋日; J. *roku sainichi*), with the days specified as the eighth, fourteenth, fifteenth, twenty-third, twenty-ninth, and thirtieth days of a month, where one strictly observes all eight lay precepts, and includes rules against eating after noon and eating animal flesh. Also outlined are the three months of purity, where one fasts for the entire month. These are the first, fifth and ninth months and are known as "three months where one practices purity" (C. *niánsāncháng zhāiyuè* 年三長齋月; J. *nensanchō saigetsu*; T no. 1484, 24.1007b01).

The term *saikai*, despite its central importance in *Shukke taikō*, does not appear in the text of *Kōzen gokokuron*. The term appears in the foreword of the Taishō edition. Kōhō Tōshun explains in a note to the foreword, also included in the Taishō edition that while the authorship of this foreword cannot be verified, he found it in a notebook belonging to Nansō Ryōsaku 南叟朔所 (d.u).<sup>47</sup> The text says that Eisai: "focused on maintaining pure morality, and was steadfast in his observance of the rules of discipline" (專持齋戒, 殊精律儀; T no. 2543, 80.0001a14–a15). The reason for this is the intended purpose of the respective texts: the emphasis on monastic practice in *Shukke taikō* contrasts with the more public orientation of *Kōzen gokokuron*. As we shall see below, the centrality of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* in *Kōzen gokokuron* may well render the inclusion of *saikai* discourse redundant, as Eisai attempts to provide a link between moral discipline among the monks, instilled through the observance of pure rules, and the imperial law.

According to *Shukke taikō* (p. 3) there are two ways of maintaining pure morality: through following the observances on clothing and food (J. *ejiki* 衣食); and observing correct "practice and deportment" (J. *gyōgi* 行儀). The term *gyōgi* is then further defined, *gyō* refers to "morality" (J. *kai* 戒) while *gi* means the "prevention of evil" (J. *ritsu* 律). Thus "practice and deportment" (J. *gyōgi* 行儀) is equivalent to "morality and discipline" or the precepts (J. *kairitsu* 戒律). Eisai has maintained the distinction between morality and preventing evil at the core of the *jikai/rikai* distinction, but has subsumed it beneath another category. Hence, the concrete actions one undertakes in

order to maintain pure morality incorporate both sets of precepts: "within morality there are two types, the morality of the *bhikṣu* and of the Bodhisattva. Regarding discipline, there are two types, secular and religious" (戒有二, 比丘戒, 菩薩戒. 律有二, 俗律, 道律; *Shukke taikō*, p. 3). The rest of the text is a means to explain how one does this: through a series of observances both physical, relating to vinaya regulations, and attitudinal, relating to the bodhisattva precepts. While the bodhisattva precepts are superior, if one does not uphold them alongside the vinaya, then one has broken pure morality. This implies that the most important element of monastic life is not which set of precepts one observes at any given time, but rather the quality of both mental and bodily action while undertaking and maintaining discipline within the everyday life of the monastery. One might suggest, this is what Eisai means when he talks about observing the vinaya with a bodhisattva mindset of wisdom and compassion.

Eisai's division of *ritsu* into "secular discipline" (*J. zokuritsu* 俗律), and "discipline of the way" (*J. dōritsu* 道律) is somewhat curious, and at odds with standard interpretations of the term *ritsu* as relating to monastic discipline (Imai 1991, 2–3). Ōtsuka (2009, 152–153) notes that Eisai's understanding of *saikai* may be broader than the eight lay precepts, and also includes aspects of vinaya regulations that could also be applied to lay life, such as the manner in which one brushes one's teeth and other hygienic routines. Eisai may be influenced by Yijing's interpretation of the "abridged teaching" (*C. lüèjiào* 略教; *J. ryakukyō*) regarding vinaya regulations. Eisai supports the principle that

certain vinaya regulations can change according to local conditions, for example regarding the use of certain items of clothing in different climates (*Shukke taikō*, p.5). He also supports Yijing over Dàoxuān in arguing that the killing of the silkworm in the making of silk does not constitute an offense, nor is it sufficient reason to ban the use of silk (*Shukke taikō*, p. 7).<sup>48</sup> Eisai may well be opening up the possibility of using Zen pure rules as a form of vinaya which accords with the cultural context. It also suggests that maintaining pure morality is not a slavish adherence to regulations, but requires a certain criticality on behalf of the practitioner.<sup>49</sup>

An aspect of Eisai's post 1191 work that is often overlooked is his growing awareness of the role of the laity. This is significant as Eisai becomes increasingly alienated from the Tendai establishment post 1200, and becomes more focused on issues surrounding the spread of Buddhism, such as the founding and restoration of temples. The well known story of Eisai raising a temple bell from the Kamo river in Kyoto and installing it at his temple Kenninji, whether apocryphal or not, speaks to the sense of Eisai growing into a recognizable public figure amongst the laity.

*Saikai* is the concept which Eisai sees as most applicable for lay practitioners. Although his 1204 text *Tract Encouraging the Maintenance of Pure Morality* (J. *saikai kanjin mon* 齋戒勸進文), appended to the 1789 edition of *Shukke taikō*, is not directed exclusively at laity, it does present a traditional picture of lay practice as precept centered. Eisai begins with themes associated with lay practice, such as the value of having been born in a human

body and having the opportunity to encounter the Dharma: "over billions and billions of eons it is difficult to acquire a human body, and it takes birth after birth, age after age, to encounter the Buddha Dharma." (億億萬劫人身難受, 生生世世佛法值; *Saikai kanjin mon*, p. 26). He then cautions against the effects of evil acts (J. *iaku* 爲惡) that produce bad karmic effects. Eisai sets himself up, as is common when preaching to lay people, as a chaste monk who follows the precepts, referring to himself as "one who modestly practices correct conduct" (J. *setsu bongyō* 竊梵行), where the term *bongyō* 梵行 generally refers to sexual morality. Eisai then continues with an outline of the means by which laity can also benefit themselves and others through the practice of morality; rather than the typical eight lay precepts Eisai advocates lay practice based on the bodhisattva precepts, which, in this case, refers to concrete upkeep of bodhisattva precepts:

"Abstinence" means not eating, "morality" refers to bodhisattva morality... Now, what I am promoting is not [the morality] of the *bhikṣus*, which benefits only them, [but rather] salvation for each and every being. The Buddha says; "those who do not pay attention to pure morality are not my disciples" ...For lay people I pray also that [this practice] will lead to salvation. Not to mention, it is also the case for monastic practitioners.

夫齋者, 不非時食也. 戒者菩薩戒也...所勸者是非爲小比丘利潤. 皆以爲各各解脫至要也. 佛言, 不念齋戒非我弟子...在俗家尚可欣求. 何況出家道人哉 (*Saikai kanjin mon*, p. 26–27).

Eisai's expectations for lay practice resemble the citations from Vasubandhu above, relating largely to food and its relation to ritual purity. Monitoring the food one consumes and eating only at certain times on given days forms a basis for the production of merit: "for lay people [observe] the six days of purity per month, and the three months of purity in agreement with the Dharma and the four groups of Buddhist disciples will be rewarded with the Buddha's blessings" (在家六齋年三爲如法, 四部弟子報佛恩者也; *Saikai kanjin mon*, p. 26). Holding to these fasts is thus an accessible practice that can purify one's karma (Ōtsuka 2009, 153). Eisai links the upkeep of morality to broader benefit: in the previous citation, all forms of Buddhist practitioners benefit; as we analyze below, in both *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* and *Kōzen gokokuron* vinaya observance by monastics is beneficial to the state. As we shall see in Chapter Four, while monastic vinaya observance benefits the state and constitutes the practice of concrete morality, monastic observance of the bodhisattva precepts is viewed by Eisai more abstractly, as centering largely around "compassion that benefits others" (C. *cībēi lita* 慈悲利他; J. *jihi rita*), which does not imply a list of prescriptive practices but rather a general mindset.

The increasing emphasis on laity and their relationship with the precepts also constitutes one of several aspects linking Eisai with later vinaya reformers, such as Eizon 叡尊 (1201–1290) and Kakujiō 覺盛 (1194–1249). As we have seen previously, Eisai also advocates the idea of self-ordination with the bodhisattva precepts as a means to confer also vinaya ordination.

Nonetheless, for laity Eisai advocates a slightly different form of practice, the bodhisattva precepts as concrete observances. Eisai's interest in lay practice and ordination has not been fully acknowledged, and constitutes one of the more radical elements of his work.

#### **4. The Practical Importance of Pure Rules**

Eisai's use of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* 禪苑清規 (X no. 1245) is one of the most notable aspects of his work. It seems likely that Eisai is the first Japanese Buddhist to cite this text, although further details concerning how he acquired the text and the version he used are not available. The text was compiled by Chánglú Zōngzé in 1101–1103. Eisai's role as a pioneer in the introduction of pure rules has been acknowledged by scholarship (Ishida 1986a, 312–313; Yifa 2002, 38) but nonetheless the issue remains understudied. It seems clear that Eisai had access to a copy of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* during his time in China. Less certain is whether or not he also had access to a text appended to the *Chányuàn qīngguī* in certain editions, the *Instructions for Zazen* (C. *Zuòchányí* 坐禪儀; J. *Zazengi*). The question of whether or not Eisai cites the *Zuòchányí* from a version appended to the *Chányuàn qīngguī* or from portions of the *Zuòchányí* cited in a different text, the *Overview of the Tripitaka* (C. *Dàzàng yīlǎn jí* 大藏一覽集; J. *Daizō ichiran shū*) is a key issue in attempts to date the earliest version of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* and how it relates to the *Zuòchányí*.<sup>50</sup>

The function of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* for Eisai can be divided into three distinct elements: (i) it is used to justify the use of dual precepts; (ii) it is

used as a means to introduce vinaya practices without the requirement of an ordination, hence aiding discipline on a practical level without the unrealistic requirement of undertaking a vinaya ordination; (iii) the *Instructions for Zazen*. This text is associated with the *Chányuàn qīngguī*, and as shown above is appended to certain editions. It provides a link between meditation and precept study that is characteristic of Eisai's Zen.<sup>51</sup> All three are, according to Eisai, characteristics of the Zen school, and provide evidence as to why Zen should be adopted by the Imperial government; as by maintaining the precepts the Zen school can attain one of its key goals, to help protect the state (Ishida 1986a, 312).

Dual ordination with both the vinaya and the bodhisattva precepts has always been, by and large, the standard practice in Chinese monasticism. In this context, Yifa explains the function of pure rules as providing a more readily understandable version of the vinaya that incorporates elements of Chinese social, cultural and ritual norms, as well as issues of administration peculiar to the Chinese context (Yifa 2005, 125; Shiina 2004, 147). This is linked to the textual origins of the work, which relies heavily on the vinaya commentaries of Dào xuān (Yifa 2002, 27), themselves designed to aid novices who may have found vinaya regulations too cumbersome and difficult to memorize (Totsugu 2014, 12).<sup>52</sup>

The text of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* emphasizes both sets of precepts, a position Eisai will use to his advantage when he presents his doctrinal arguments for dual precept use in *Kōzen gokokuron*. Certainly, the emphasis

the Zen school places on morality is central to Eisai's presentation of the importance of Zen. He quotes directly from the *Chányuàn qīngguī* (X 64. 0523a17) in order to make this point: "...the practice of Zen makes the precepts primary. Unless one is completely distanced from all wrong doing, how can one attain awakening and become a patriarch?" (參禪問道, 戒律爲先. 既非離過防非, 何以成佛作祖; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 1, p. 100).<sup>53</sup> Yet despite the emphasis on the upkeep of the precepts and the relationship between the *Chányuàn qīngguī* and the Chinese Vinaya school, no formal ordination procedure is outlined in the text itself, suggesting that this ritual element was still seen as the role of the Vinaya school (Yifa 2002, 50-51).

Pure rules thus allows Eisai to sidestep a major problem, the argument for reintroducing a vinaya ordination *en masse* in the Tendai school. My suggestion in this work is that Eisai is arguing for the establishment of Zen largely because it includes within it the Pure Rules that essentially require daily adherence to the vinaya without necessarily requiring the reintroduction of a distinct vinaya ordination ritual.

Eisai's interest in the idea of pure rules is also relevant to one of the key dichotomies in his work. As we have seen, the term *saikai* appears as a key aspect of moral practice in both *Shukke taikō* and *saikai kanjin mon*. Significantly, this term does not appear in either *Kōzen gokokuron* or in *Nihon buppō chūkō gan*. In relation to pure rules, the aspect of practice Eisai wishes to emphasize is "Maintaining Morality and Pure Practice" or *jikai bongyō*.

The term *jikai bongyō* does not appear in the text of the *Chányuàn*

*qīngguī*.<sup>54</sup> In this context, *jikai* 持戒 means to maintain morality; the term *bongyō* 梵行, as noted above in discussing *Dàoxuān*, often linked to issues surrounding sexual morality in the monastic context. The origin of the term in the Sanskrit *brahma-caryā* indicates that its original meaning referred to the practices of Brahmins during their ritual practices (Nakamura 2002, 1544c). The term is extremely common and can be found across an extensive range of canonical sources.<sup>55</sup>

Eisai's most significant use of the term *jikai bongyō* occurs in section eight of fascicle three: "Establishing a separate catalogue [of rules] for the Zen school; this consists of following the pure rules for Zen monasteries and the conventions seen practiced China" (禪宗支目門者, 按禪苑清規並大國見行式; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p.117). This section is Eisai's summary of the key points of the *Chányuàn qīngguī*. The first use of *jikai bongyō* occurs in *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p.117–118 and references the first two sections of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* entitled "Receiving the Precepts" (C. *shòujiè* 受戒; J. *jukai*) and "Observing the Precepts" (C. *hùjiè* 護戒; J. *gokai*; X 63.523a17–b16). Eisai uses the term here to refer to the dual use of vinaya and bodhisattva precepts, and thus will be dealt with in Chapter Four. ,

The next reference to *jikai bongyō* occurs in number five in Eisai's summary, "Rules for Correct Activity" (C. *xíngyí* 行儀; J. *gyōgi*; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 118). Here, Eisai mentions both elements, referring to monks abstaining from food for long periods and those maintaining the precepts and pure morality as both following the words of the Buddha.

In this section Eisai writes: "It is said, monks who observe the rule concerning not eating after noon, who observe restraint and fast, who maintain morality and pure practice, such monks are fully in line with the words of the Buddha". (謂僧長齋節食, 持戒梵行, 悉順佛語而已; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 118). Again, here Eisai stresses the importance of concrete observances in the monastic context, and makes a reference back to early Buddhism and a sense of the Buddha as an exemplar of moral purity.

The case for the importance of the terms *saikai* and *jikai bongyō* becomes stronger when we analyze another text from 1204, where the term *bongyō jikai* appears: *Entreaty for the Restoration of the Buddha Dharma in Japan* (*J. Nihon buppō chūkō gan* 日本仏法中興願). The contents of this text are exactly parallel to *saikai kanjin mon*; while the latter advocates *saikai*, care concerning the preparation and consumption of food as a key practice for laity, *Nihon buppō chūkō gan* furthers the link found in *Kōzen gokokuron* between the observance of the precepts by monastics and the benefits accrued for the Imperial family:

It is my hope that through this teaching, to establish compassionate blessings and the intelligent prudence of benefit for self and for others, and to entice the sramana, to persuade and encourage the monastics, to uphold the pure practice of maintaining the precepts, through this resurgence of the Buddhist Dharma, the Imperial Law can be upheld. 望講, 慈恩住自利利他賢慮, 誘進沙門勸勵比丘, 令修梵行持戒律者, 佛法再興, 王法永固乎 (*Nihon buppō chūkō gan*, p. 582).

By placing *Nihon buppō chūkōgan* and *saikai kanjin mon* side by side, we can suggest that Eisai, at least by 1204, had decided that *saikai* would refer primarily to the laity, while *jikai bongyō* is the responsibility of monastics. Both are terms that reference concrete practice.

### **Conclusion**

Eisai's conception of Buddhism as reverting back to the origins of moral practice as represented by the figure of the Buddha is a key element to his conception of how Japan can overcome the degenerate latter age. The emphasis on practical morality is perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Eisai's conception of Zen; rather than emphasis kōan or other factors that may be seen as distinctively Zen, Eisai instead emphasizes its orthodox nature, how Zen fits with a traditional conception of the Buddhist path structure of the three learnings and associated practices. The link between Zen and Pure Rules also provides Eisai an excellent rationale for arguing in favor of Zen as a method to reintroduce vinaya practice to the Japanese monastic system. Eisai is also keen to stress the benefit vinaya practice has for the state. With Zen at the center, Eisai extends his argument for the introduction of vinaya practices to include doctrinal debates surrounding the relationship between vinaya and bodhisattva precepts, once again relying on classical Tiāntái exegesis. The nature of Eisai's arguments concerning how vinaya and bodhisattva precepts relate to each other is the subject of the following chapter.

#### 4. Doctrine and Moral Practice

##### Eisai's Zen and the Relationship between Vinaya and Bodhisattva Precepts

This chapter serves two functions: to explain Eisai's understanding of the relationship between the vinaya and the bodhisattva precepts; and to outline how his understanding of the precepts relates to what we might call "Eisai's Zen". Eisai's understanding of Zen lacks many elements which are often considered fundamental to the school. Eisai does not discuss *gōng'àn* practice in any detail; given that Schlütter (2010, 111) identifies the eleventh century as being the point at which the assigning of *gōng'àn* practice to students for the sake of meditative practice leading to enlightenment experiences had become commonplace, it appears that Eisai was in China around the cusp of a transition in monastic practice, from a very traditional emphasis on each aspect of the three learnings, to a more distinctively *gōng'àn* based Chán practice.

Eisai's understanding of the precepts was arguably the most controversial aspect of his teaching from the perspective of his contemporaries. Nonetheless, the arguments Eisai uses in explaining the necessity for dual practice of the vinaya and bodhisattva precepts are strikingly orthodox. For Eisai, what is more important is the manner of presenting his argument to the Tendai school in a manner that was conciliatory rather than confrontational concerning the reintroduction of the vinaya.

This chapter will begin by providing a general overview of the nature of vinaya morality in terms of its adaptability to the cultural context, and will analyze a number of passages from *Shukke taikō*. Following from this, the role of Dào xuān in the development of Eisai's doctrinal approach to precepts and the relationship to meditation. Doctrinally, Dào xuān revolutionizes the relationship by providing a systematic analysis of the vinaya in Mahāyāna terms, a perspective used by Eisai to validate his experience in China of vinaya practice in a Mahāyāna context. Dào xuān also adheres to a sense of Buddhist practice as trans-sectarian, which is similarly reflected in Eisai's work. This wide-ranging conception of Buddhism will be explained further as we analyze Eisai's approach to interpreting the relationship between Mahāyāna bodhisattva precepts and the vinaya. The final part of this chapter will examine the roots of Eisai's concept of Zen practice.

### **1. Eisai and the Nature of the Vinaya**

The evolution of Mahāyāna forms of moral technology related to bodhisattva soteriology and associated sets of precepts presented Chinese Buddhism with a new set of interpretative and practical problems that lay outside the purview of Indian precedents. For Chinese Buddhists were dealing with two sets of questions: how does the vinaya relate to bodhisattva precepts, and can the vinaya prescriptions be altered to suit the Chinese context despite its canonical status? The vinaya in the Indian context is, as seen in Chapter Two, considered essential for establishing monastic status, for providing a basis for moral practice, and is also ritually important in terms of transmitting

the "body of morality" to the ordinand. Therefore, arguments concerning the nature of vinaya rules relate to several central tenets of monastic Buddhism

Several Indian texts, such as the *Yogâcârabhūmi śāstra* (C. *Yúqié lùn* 瑜伽論; J. *Yugaron*) by Asaṅga clarifies the nature of the relationship between the vinaya and the bodhisattva precepts. The nature of this relationship begins to change with the emerging importance from the fifth century onwards of Chinese apocryphal texts such as the *Yīngluò jīng*. As discussed in Chapter Two, a move to lessen the importance of the vinaya in comparison to the bodhisattva precepts in the ritual context opened the door to potentially de-emphasizing the vinaya in a manner not seen in Indian texts. Despite this movement, dual practice of the vinaya in conjunction with the bodhisattva precepts remained the norm in Chinese Buddhist monasteries. Three key questions emerged from this context: (i) can the vinaya be altered; (ii) should the vinaya be altered, and finally (iii) if alterations are permitted, what kinds of alterations are acceptable?

Such issues were of major concern for both Dào xuān and Yì jīng (Heirman 2008), whose work both heavily influenced Eisai's discussion of the topic. The question of the vinaya and its nature is a key discussion in Eisai's *Shukke taikō*. Eisai shows an interest in all three issues surrounding the vinaya outlined above. One of the main points of concern for Eisai in *Shukke taikō* is whether or not clothing needs to be standardized, or whether in fact a monastic can wear clothes that are not mentioned in the vinaya. Eisai's treatment of this issue, as with his understanding of the precepts surrounding food, rely heavily

on Yijing. In the following passage Eisai combines two passages from Yijing together, the latter part of the citation concerning the *libō* (J. *ryūban* 立播), an undergarment worn in colder climates, is drawn from T no. 2125, 54.0214 b27, while the remainder is drawn from T no. 2125, 54.0214a26–29:

There are monks who wear an abundance of clothes and go to the western regions, where people laugh at them to the point of embarrassment. They tear off these clothes that are unacceptable to wear. This is because the clothes they are wearing go against the rules laid down by the Buddha. If one remains silent and does not explain this, those who wish to know [these rules] will have no means to do so. Also, there is evidence that the Buddha himself, during harsh winters, gave permission to wear the *libō*. *libō* is a translation from the Sanskrit. In Chinese it is called "cloth wrapped around the hips".

有著至西方皆共笑懷旺 裂充雜用, 此即皆非法衣服也. 若默而不說, 欲知者無由. 又其寒鄉冬中佛聽俗衣用立播之服. 立播者梵語也.

此云裹腹衣 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 5).

This passage suggests that Eisai is taking an ultra conservative approach to the idea of changing the rules of the vinaya. Unless the robes are mentioned in the texts, they should not be used. The canonical source for the legitimacy of the *ryūban* as a winter garment is from the Sarvastivāda vinaya (C. *gēnběn sàpó Duōbùlùshè* 根本薩婆多部律攝; J. *konpon satsuba Taburitsushō*): "If one wears a hat, boots, or an item discretely around the waist such as a *ryūban*, then one is an upholder of the Law and has not incurred an offense" (若爲作

帽富羅, 或腰條立播密而持去者無犯; T no. 1458, 24.0560a21–22).

Eisai suggests that wearing this item depends upon the nature of the climate, and that monastics in the Indian lowlands do not wear the *ryūban*, but that it is allowed in the Himalayan regions (*Shukke taikō*, p. 5).

Eisai's argument is not entirely consistent in this respect. While it initially seems that his argument would exclude any rules that are not demonstrably part of the vinaya, or at least connected to the Buddha via classical texts, it is nonetheless the case that Eisai's position is not entirely consistent. For example, in *Kōzen gokokuron* the example of the *ryūban* is also used, although here Eisai's approach seems less fundamentalist:

In Central India, monks wear an unlined garment throughout the year; elsewhere it is different. In China and Japan monks wear lay garments, yet what they have attained in terms of the efficacy [of their religious practice] is the same. Excluding the three garments, all other items refer to lay garments. The lay garments prohibited for monastics were robes with two shoulders covered, [robes] with long sleeves and other such items. In cold districts practitioners are permitted to wear the *ryūban* which in Chinese is called "cloth wrapped around the hips". The cold in Japan is not the same as that of the Himalayan regions, where snow falls even in June. Both Xuánzàng and Yījīng recount this. Nonetheless, in China, Huisī realized the fivefold stage of practice, and [purification] of the six sense organs, while Kōgei surprised also heavenly beings and devas [with his realizations]. These figures all

wore lay garments. While they did not adhere to the correct deportment in terms of failing to uncover their right shoulders, they nonetheless practiced the precepts perfectly, and this explains why they attained such excellent benefits.

謂中印度以單衣終年, 余方不你. 唐土日本著俗服, 而得既同, 靈驗不異矣. 除三衣之余, 是俗服也. 謂佛制止俗服, 謂連脊筒袖等是也. 但寒鄉有立播衣之聖開, 此言裹腹衣. 我國之寒, 不可同雪梵衍那國. 彼國六月雪飛, 然而只著裹腹衣. 玄奘義淨, 皆見知之. 然而東土南岳天台, 證五品六根, 皇慶延殷. 驚天人地神. 是皆身著俗, 非偏袒右肩之威儀, 而戒行全備, 有如是之勝利也 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 120).<sup>56</sup>

This passage seems to directly contradict the passage above from *Shukke taikō*. Rather than having to find scriptural justification for the wearing of specific forms of lay garments, Eisai instead suggests that the precepts are still being maintained, and the level of attainment acquired confirms this. Hence, one does not need to adhere exactly to these precepts as they appear in vinaya texts. This interpretation is more in line with Dào xuān's understanding of the precepts from a Mahāyāna perspective.

How can we explain this difference between the ideas expressed in *Kōzen gokokuron* and *Shukke taikō*? Once again, the most obvious means of explaining the discrepancy is to refer to the audience and function of each text. *Shukke taikō* is addressed to monastics and so it seems clear that Eisai is concerned most here with increasing basic knowledge of the vinaya and

explaining why it is important for monastics. *Kōzen gokokuron* cannot take the same position, as this would suggest Eisai is trying to convince the Tendai establishment to reintroduce the vinaya. As I have argued above (See Chapter Three), in fact Eisai is more likely trying to advocate for pure rules as a Zen vinaya that has been adapted to fit the East Asian context; hence it makes sense that in *Kōzen gokokuron* Eisai advocates for a more functionalist approach to the rules, where custom and context can allow for flexibility.

With the above passages, we see two distinct positions regarding the vinaya and whether or not it has to be followed exactly as outlined in the classical vinaya texts. The passage from *Shukke taikō* seems to suggest that alterations in vinaya practice only appear distinct from what the Buddha taught, and if one investigates more thoroughly, one will see that the Buddha has already accounted for the relevant contexts and possibilities. The passage from *Kōzen gokokuron* suggests a much more open interpretative position, where the practice of the precepts (J. *kaigyō* 戒行) is not necessarily linked to a literal adherence to rules concerning clothing, as proven by the attainments of the figures referenced by Eisai. In other words, the latter interpretation seems to open up the possibility that Pure Rules texts could be a viable option for a Mahāyāna vinaya.

The issue of the nature of monastic clothing is also subject to a similar type of analysis. Eisai's position on the materials that can be used is also subject to the nature of the cultural and geographical context. He points out in *Shukke taikō* (p.7) that monastic robes in China use silk as a raw material, as it

is easy to obtain; yet in Japan, where silk is hard to obtain, hemp is used instead for the construction of the monastic robes. Here again, Eisai is pointing out that the context is as important as the literal proscription laid down in the texts.

Implicit in such critiques of following the rules of the vinaya in a literal fashion is the sense that the soteriological goal associated with vinaya practices, that of *arhatship*, is limited in scope and reference. Nonetheless, the practical benefit of the vinaya rules requires a method to incorporate them under a rubric that is acceptable to Mahāyāna practitioners. This is precisely the context in which Dào xuān operates. Dào xuān seeks to provide means of reconciling vinaya practice in a Mahāyāna context. His emphasis on the primacy of the precepts is seen from the Mahāyāna perspective of engendering faith in the broader goals of Buddhism by establishing correct moral practices (Satō 1973, 59). As we have seen, Eisai's intention to reintroduce the precepts to Japan travels along the same lines. Given the distinct cultural and climatic differences between China and India, the question of how one could be a monastic while operating with a sense of the vinaya tailored to the cultural context outside of India becomes a problem; added to this the idea that the vinaya constitutes lesser vehicle practices, means that Eisai finds himself dealing with a set of problems similar to those that characterize Dào xuān's position.<sup>57</sup> Dào xuān's emphasis and interpretation of vinaya in the Mahāyāna context played a key role on the development of Eisai's thought concerning precepts and how they relate to other aspects of the Buddhist path.

## 2. A Comparison of Dào xuān and Eisai's Zen

We have already accounted for the influence of Dào xuān's vinaya commentaries on Eisai, and how vinaya is linked with Zen morality, specifically through the role played by the *Chányuàn qīngguī* in Eisai's discourse. Dào xuān also provides a basis from which Eisai can formulate a position that holds the vinaya as a Mahāyāna practice. The importance of Dào xuān goes further than this; Eisai uses Dào xuān as a basis for two further sets of issues: the issue relating to the potential misuse of meditational practices if not guided by the precepts (Chen 2002, 342), a topic where Yijing's work is also referenced by Eisai; and the subsequent exposition of the relationship between morality and meditation in terms of practice. While Eisai holds closer to the general perspective of the Tiāntái tradition that meditation is the key practice, especially during the latter age, he nonetheless also has to argue that the relationship to the precepts is primary. Therefore, while Eisai does not agree entirely with Dào xuān's position, the overlap is substantial enough that Eisai's understanding of Zen practice bears resemblance to how Dào xuān conceives of the study of morality and meditation, and the broader relationship between the three learnings as the focus of Buddhist practice.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Dào xuān places morality as the primary form of Buddhist practice, and this is especially so during the latter age, while also holding the idea that meditative practices are only useful in the context of the first two ages, while the last age should be preserved for the practice of the vinaya precepts (Chen 2002, 336). The overlap between Eisai's

vision of Buddhist practice as the three learnings and the nature of their relationship can be seen very clearly in Dào xuān. The broader implications of the importance of the vinaya and the relationship to meditation is discussed in Dào xuān's *Morality that Purifies the Mind Through Contemplation of Phenomena* (C. *Jìngxīn jièguān fǎ* 淨心戒觀法; J. *jōshin kaikan hō*. T no. 1893). Many of the themes that are characteristic of Eisai's position are found in this text. Three elements of the text mirror Eisai's conception of Buddhism: the emphasis on the importance and nature of moral conduct, with specific emphasis on the area of daily conduct and purity concerning food and sexual morality; the importance of the three learnings working in conjunction as part of the Buddhist path. This leads to the final similarity, the link between morality and meditation which is a cornerstone of traditional Buddhist practice.

Regarding the practice of morality, we have seen in Chapter Three how Eisai's stance as presented in *Shukke taikō* could easily be called "orthodox Buddhism". He is "orthodox" in the sense that he believes, at least partially and under certain circumstances, that the three trainings interact with each other, and are of equal importance. Dào xuān holds a similar position. Certainly the stress placed on concrete morality, presented in a context that emphasizes also the broader soteriological benefits of holding strictly to such practices, suggests the influence of Dào xuān on Eisai. For example, in the following citation Dào xuān outlines his basic stance on the role of morality, a passage reminiscent of Eisai's opening preface in *Shukke taikō*:

How, at the time when the Most Honored One appeared in the world, did all the celestial beings attain the Noble Path? To place in order of study: do not pass over the study of vinaya; it is a method to enter the Way. For five years study morality, nightly cultivate meditative practices, a concentrated mind protects [the mind] from cognitive activities. Abide calmly in the forest, do not amass leftover food, have few desires and understand the shame [in breaking the precepts]. With the one mind, wholeheartedly contemplate impermanence and impurity. Distance yourself from various forms of intellectual restlessness, and be undisturbed. Behavior and conduct always leads to purification without any appearance of evil. First inquire with the intellect, then by means of these good [karmic] causes you can enter fully the path of the Buddha. If you wholeheartedly rely on the words written here, you can obtain what is called a pure mind.

何因世尊在世時悉得聖道及生天中? 依次而學, 不越毘尼, 入道有方. 五年習戒夜則修定攝心守境. 安處林野不畜餘食, 少欲慚愧. 一心諦觀無常不淨. 離諸調戲意不散亂. 舉動進止恒令淨潔無惡姿容. 先意問訊, 以是善緣悉得道迹. 汝能一心依此學者名為淨心 (T 45. 0821c07–c13).

Here we see several aspects similar to Eisai's stance on the vinaya. First, the vinaya is an important practice. Clearly Eisai attributes the success of Chán as directly related to strict observance of the vinaya regulations. Similarly, as shown in Chapter One, Eisai sees the precepts as a gateway to practice,

especially in the latter age. Both Eisai and Dào xuān stress the direct relationship between purity and the nature of deportment and daily conduct. This passage also introduces us to the nature of practice as conceived by Dào xuān, incorporating the three learnings. For Eisai, as for Dào xuān, the idea of perfection of wisdom constitutes the third gate, and equally has a key relationship with both precepts and meditation. Both authors take the position of stressing that the idea of emptiness in no way negates any form of morality, either vinaya morality or bodhisattva precepts, although the relationship of wisdom is stronger with the latter conception of morality than the former.

The issue of the three learnings working in conjunction as part of the Buddhist path is generally considered to be the conservative aspect of Eisai's teachings. More importantly, this form of Buddhist practice reflects the kind of practice that Eisai experienced at Chinese Sòng period Chán monasteries, suggesting Chán itself had come to embody the conservative position. This position reflects very clearly in the below citation from Dào xuān:

See within yourself, even a little, your endowment of Buddha Nature, so you too can drink the sweet nectar of *prajñā*. Cleanse yourself of obscurations and clinging afflictions, gradually eliminating them to reveal the Pure Mind. The mind, if purified, causes sentient beings to be pure, sentient beings thus purified are the Buddha realm. First eliminating afflictions causes pure morality to emerge. Once established, this morality constitutes complete concentration [which] reverts to purity. By means of pure morality and pure concentration,

pure wisdom emerges. Wisdom thus purified as already shown, highlights the origins of the [idea of Self]; because it [wisdom] has these characteristics, it is called creating pure mind... First remove the coarse defilements that are the origin of bad karma; knowing the illness and the medicine, maintain the mind and speak with care.

見汝身中少分佛性, 汝可飲服般若甘露. 洗蕩蓋纏漸顯淨心. 心若清淨令眾生界淨, 眾生既淨則佛土淨. 始除煩惱令戒清淨戒既完具定復清淨. 以戒定淨令智慧淨. 智既淨已顯自身源, 有此義故名為淨心...先除麤染根本惡業, 知病知藥守心慎口(T 45.0819c12–c19).

We shall see below that not only is this position very close to Eisai, it also resembles what we know of Táng period Chán Buddhism in the Northern school. It is also worth noting the reference to Pure Land practices here, and established form of practice for both Chán and Eisai. This also bears similarity to Eisai's position concerning the best means of integrating Pure Land practices into Zen practice as outlined in Chapter One, where he adopts the position of practicing the non-discursive *nembutsu* (J. *mugon nembutsu* 無言念佛) as a supplemental practice.

The final mode of interest is hinted at in the above passage, the link between precepts and meditation, a link which, although Eisai endorses the Tendai version that suggests that meditative practice is the beginning of the process under usual circumstances, his model nonetheless still assumes that the same relationship between precepts and meditation exists as it does in Dào xuān's model:

What kind of practice is referred to as "not deceiving the Buddha?" If one cultivates the three gates to liberation, emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness without being attached to them, one only contemplates analytically that conventional reality is illusory and corrupt, as in a fantasy or a dream, not a single thing is real. Mastering this type of contemplation one cultivates morality, meditative concentration and wisdom. If in this way you are one who cultivates the practice of distancing yourself from marks, this is called not deceiving the Buddha. Because one does not deceive the Buddha, one gains the equality of all dharmas, Dharma eye is clarified, and one is able to purify the noetic hindrances without attachment to either emptiness or existence. This is called purifying the mind.

何者修道名不誑佛？若人修空無相無願三解脫門亦不生著。唯觀世諦虛妄顛倒，如幻如夢無有一實。成此觀門修戒定慧...如是離相修者名不誑佛。不誑佛故得平等法，法眼明朗能淨智障，不著空有，名為淨心 (T 45.0823b07–b14).<sup>58</sup>

A key aspect of the link between the precepts and meditation is the role of *Prajñāpāramitā* or "Perfection of Wisdom" scriptures (C. *Bōrē* 般若; J. *Hannya*), which are central in both Tendai and Zen. Here too we see that emptiness becomes the soteriological goal associated with wisdom, accompanying compassion as the key aspect of the precepts, embodied in the bodhisattva precepts, and finally the practice of seated meditation to clear the Mind as the practice most often associated with meditation. For Eisai a true

understanding of emptiness is always linked with the precepts, and failing to do so is one of the major problems afflicting Japanese Buddhism. In order to solve such problems, Eisai presents an account of the relationship between the vinaya and the bodhisattva precepts developed from contact with a large range of doctrinal traditions across both Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, and including Zen, Tendai and Ritsu sources.

### **3. Eisai on Vinaya and Bodhisattva Morality**

Eisai's understanding of the relationship between vinaya and bodhisattva precepts is based on the Tiāntái taxonomy of the "shared teaching" (C. *tōngjiào* 通教; J. *tsūgyō*). In the Chinese context, his position regarding the precepts is unproblematic, as he illustrates with copious citations from the Tiāntái tradition. In the Japanese context his position is more open to dispute; in the following citation from *Shukke taikō* we see how Eisai attempts to reconcile the Tendai abandonment of the vinaya and replacing it with a bodhisattva precept ordination, with his own position that the teachings of the precepts are a shared tradition. The key reference is to the the *Verse of the Shared Morality of the Seven Buddhas* (C. *Qīfó tōngjiè jié* 七佛通戒偈; J. *Shichibutsu tsūkai ge*). This verse has a long history within Buddhist texts and suggests practicing Mainstream and Mahāyāna precepts together as "shared morality". Eisai here is responding to an unnamed critique who suggests the shared morality of the seven Buddhas is voided by the Saichō's establishment of "Separate Bodhisattva precept" (J. *bestuju bosatsu kai* 別授菩薩戒) ordinations independent of the vinaya:

Concerning the *sūtras*, *vinaya* and *śāstras*, in accordance with these teachings, one must make a firm decision to practice with one's body and mind and follow in the footsteps of the Buddha in such manner. In *The Verse of the Shared Morality of the Seven Buddhas* it says: "Desist from evil deeds, practice acts of goodness, purify your mind, this is the teaching of all Buddhas"... How is it possible that one can become a monastic according to the Buddhist law and yet not follow the precepts?

經律論, 隨其教, 決擇身心繼佛跡亦, 復如是矣. 七佛通戒云: "諸惡莫作, 諸善奉行, 自淨其意, 是諸佛教" ... 何依佛法乍出家, 不從佛誠哉 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 2).<sup>59</sup>

This seemingly straightforward reference to what we might call a standard conception of Buddhism in fact masks a number of doctrinal issues that are central to Eisai's argument. Eisai is not only arguing for the legitimacy of shared precepts, but also stresses the importance of the vinaya precepts when he refers to the "firm decision to practice with body and mind" (*J. ketchaku shinjin* 決擇身心); the reference to following in the footsteps of the Buddha echoes the preface where Eisai emphasizes proper deportment (*J. igi* 威儀) as a key element.

Eisai also has to respond to the claim that Saichō's "Separate Bodhisattva precept" ordination that confers monastic status without the need for a vinaya ordination, is in fact opposed to the idea of shared morality. Eisai's situation is made more complicated by the fact that he hints that the

standard Tendai ordination at the time, the *endonkai*, should not be used as a general ordination for monastics (*Shukke taikō*, p. 20).

There are two key elements to Eisai's answer. The first is to suggest that Saichō was aware of the impending age of *Mappō*, and therefore used separate bodhisattva precept ordinations to ensure knowledge of the precepts would be maintained:

What fault could there be in Saichō's establishment of Separate Bodhisattva precept ordinations? If our Great Master had not established the Separate Bodhisattva precept ordination, by what means could people in this land have maintained the discipline during degenerate age of the latter Dharma? What else could have caused them to receive and observe this morality?

傳教大師別授菩薩戒有何過失哉。我大師，若不建立別授菩薩戒者，此土末代無持律人，因何結戒緣哉 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 20).

Saichō did argue for new forms of Buddhist practice based on the impending dawn of *Mappō*, although he did not provide a concrete chronology for when this would occur (Groner 2000, 173–174). In *Kōzen gokokuron* (fasc. 1, p. 106–107) Eisai cites *The Candle of the Latter Dharma* (*J. Mappō tōmyōki* 末法燈明記) as his source for Saichō's ideas concerning *Mappō*.<sup>60</sup> Here Eisai argues that the central pretext of the *Mappō tōmyōki*, that the precepts cannot be maintained during *Mappō*, refers only to the vinaya, not the bodhisattva precepts, thus suggesting once again that Saichō's stance towards the vinaya was due to soteriological expediency.

Second, based on the *Brahmā Net Sūtra*, Eisai argues that during ordination with the bodhisattva precepts one also receives the vinaya as part of the "three collections of pure precepts" (J. *sanju jōkai* 三聚淨戒). Eisai combines this argument with his support for self-ordination as found in the *Brahmā Net Sūtra* (T no. 24, 1006c5–18), suggesting this allows the precepts to spread even during *Mappō* when appropriate teachers and witnesses for vinaya ordinations cannot be found. He argues that this was Saichō's "original intention, although it does not readily reveal itself" (又有傳教大師元意, 不可顯示歟; *Shukke taikō*, p. 21).

Eisai argues for concrete observance of the precepts, and subsequently links the vinaya to the bodhisattva precepts via his interpretation of the three categories of pure precepts. Nonetheless, as we shall see below, Eisai also holds that the bodhisattva precepts are both abstract and superior to the vinaya from a soteriological perspective. Zen is a key element of Eisai's argument, and allows him to hold this position regarding the bodhisattva precepts while still arguing in favor of concrete observances.

As outlined above, Eisai's perspective on the doctrinal origins of bodhisattva precepts are relatively uncontroversial, with the *Brahmā Net Sūtra* as his primary source. So how does Eisai conceive of the relationship between the precepts? He argues that while the Mahāyāna perspective of the bodhisattva precepts are superior, observing both sets together is the only means to mitigate *Mappō* and its effects. The following passage presents Eisai's argument for the superiority of the bodhisattva conception of morality:

By means of auditor practice one can attain Nirvāṇa. One cannot, however, attain supreme enlightenment. If the bodhisattva regresses back into the auditor vehicle it is called the “death of the bodhisattva”. Thereby, one does not adopt the spirit [of the Lesser vehicle], but only their morality. During *Mappō* most practitioners are inclined towards the Mahāyāna, but in order to be free from error and avoid transgressions, one must study both vehicles.

以自調自證實際涅槃. 但未到無上菩提. 菩薩若退墮二乘地, 則名菩薩死也. 然則今者, 不取其清, 只取其戒. 謂末代道人多趣大乘, 故以離過防非為要以同應學之 (*Shukke taikō*, p. 19).<sup>61</sup>

Eisai's argument is based on the idea that the soteriological limitations of relying on the vinaya, the sense that the auditor is seeking a limited personal form of enlightenment, is not reflected in the precepts themselves if one approaches them with a Mahāyāna attitude of compassion (*J. jihi* 慈悲) and wisdom (*J. hannya* 般若), based on the idea of wisdom that understands the world as emptiness as found in the Perfection of Wisdom literature. Eisai suggests in the above passage that *Mappō* requires certain concessions, particularly the need for concrete observances of minor rules, but without reverting to the inferior mentality of a Hīnayānist. The idea that the attitude one takes towards the precepts determines their status is also found in Zhànrán, from whom Eisai quotes verbatim to illustrate his point:

In morality there is no "Greater" or "Lesser", this depends upon the expectation in the mind of the ordinand. Thus, the middle way does not

only concern emptiness and the provisional but also the concrete [observance] of restraint; this then, is what is called, maintaining the complete precepts.

戒無大小, 由受者心期. 是則中道遍入空假及事律儀, 方得名為具足持戒 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 113).<sup>62</sup>

As we shall see below, Eisai also cites Dào xuān to make a similar point.

These references serve to establish the orthodoxy of his position, and compare favorably to the content of his own argument which suggests that Zen can transcend the distinctions between the two groups of precepts.

Eisai then recasts the idea of external concrete observances (*jikai*) and internal abstract morality (*rikai*) as two elements of Zen: "externally the *Nirvāṇa sūtra* encourages discipline, combined internally with *prajñā* is none other than the Zen school" (外打涅槃扶律, 內併般若智慧, 蓋是禪宗也; *Kōzen gokokuron*, preface, p. 99). He provides another variation on this theme later in the text: "externally discipline and decorum prevent errors, while internally great compassion benefits others, this is called the Zen school, this is called the teachings of the Buddha" (外律儀防非, 內慈悲利他, 謂之禪宗, 謂之佛法也; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 2, p. 107). Thus the idea that Zen applies to both sets of precepts is the key function of the entire school: "by means of morality, one establishes the school" (以戒律為宗; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 1, p.106).

In linking Zen with the bodhisattva precepts, Eisai uses two terms commonly found throughout Mahāyāna discourse, *prajñā* interpreted via the

Perfection of Wisdom sūtras, and "compassion that benefits others" (*J. jīhi rita* 慈悲利他). Eisai does not elaborate any further on how to understand wisdom in relation to the bodhisattva precepts. He does suggest in *Shukke taikō* that morally it implies transcending the idea of concrete judgments between right and wrong as empty (*Shukke taikō*, p. 20). Such a view of bodhisattva precepts as wisdom based on a realization of emptiness and compassion means these precepts must be linked to concrete prescriptions to avoid falling into antinomianism. Hence the distinction between internally maintaining Mahāyāna precepts while externally maintaining those of the vinaya is a key point for Eisai. Here he draws on the ideas of Dào xuān:

The original intention of the Buddha was to teach by means of the instruction on avoiding evil and preventing wrongdoing. Regarding maintaining or violating the precepts in any given situation, by grasping the meaning and cultivating accordingly, are not [the vehicles] unopposed? Vinaya master Dào xuān says: "some say I am a follower of the Greater Vehicle, I do not need to conduct myself according to the teachings of the Lesser Vehicle." This is internally betraying the mind of the bodhisattva, and externally lacking the conduct of the auditors. Accordingly, excluding one who knows well the Dharma and is an accomplished teacher, who can possibly discern this?

佛法本意，唯避惡防非，以為旨也。其持犯開遮，得意修之，並無妨礙。道宣律師云，或云，我是大乘之人，不要行小乘法。此則內乖菩薩

之心. 外闕聲聞之行. 自非知法達士, 孰能鑑之者哉 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 116).<sup>63</sup>

Eisai has established the role of Zen within precept discourse: it accords with a basic structure of externally upholding concrete observances through the rules of restraint while internally holding an abstract understanding of the bodhisattva precepts understood via Zen as *prajñā* and "compassion that benefits others". The new Zen framework helps Eisai justify the dual use of both sets of precepts, but there remains a risk that abstract concepts of the bodhisattva precepts as wisdom based on understanding emptiness (*rikai*) will provide a pretext to avoid following the concrete prescriptions of the vinaya. Eisai is well aware of such antinomian dangers:

If foolish people such as those described above, mistakenly advocate emptiness but cannot uphold morality, this is heterodoxy, these are Māra's subjects. In the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* Śākyamuni says: "these followers of Māra are not my disciples". For this reason, Zen strongly encourages the maintaining the precepts; such diligence throughout one's lifetime will bring tremendous benefits. One should not, by way of a shallow understanding, speak of long and short [and other such relative conceptions]. If arguments concerning worldly issues bring about no benefit whatsoever, then doctrinal disputes concerning the relative merits of the Greater and Lesser Vehicle are also completely lacking in benefit. The perfect interfusion [of all elements of the Path] is unconditioned and unmoving. To orally expound such teachings [on

emptiness] without realizing it in one's heart, is equivalent to a thirsty man who, despite speaking of the soothing coolness of water, cannot find any means to drink it.

如是凡夫愚癡之人, 妄說空義, 不能持戒者, 是外道類. 或是魔民也. 大涅槃經云: 是魔眷屬, 非我弟子文. 是故此宗, 強勸持戒, 一生可辦期現益也, 莫以淺智說長說短. 若世間談論, 實無所益. 教法諍論, 若大若小, 皆無所益. 乃至圓融無作, 口說而心不會, 如渴乏者, 談美味冷水, 而不入口喉矣 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 117).

As highlighted in previous chapters, Eisai's motivation for his trip to China seems to have been motivated by the issue of emptiness and its relation to moral practice. As outlined in Chapter One, this is a common theme in Yijing's work; as we shall analyze below, it is also a theme in Zhiyi.

Tokiwa (2004, 217) argues that Eisai's hostility towards the idea of "originally existent precepts" is based is reflected in the above, and argues that Eisai instead seeks to circumvent the distinction between principle (J. *ri* 理) and practice (J. *ji* 事) that lies at the center of the idea of originally existent precepts and is instead reconfigured by Eisai into the six mysterious practices of Tendai (C. *liù miào mén* 六妙門; J. *roku myōmon*), especially the fourth part, "contemplative practices" (C. *guān mén* 觀門; J. *Kanmon*) which is distinguished from a scholarly approach, and implies a vision of the Buddha at all times. Through this element we can also see how it is possible for Eisai to still incorporate Pure Land practices, such as visualizing the Buddha and the Buddha lands, without advocating Hōnen's idea of *nembutsu*. While this

analysis seems to stretch the boundaries of what we can attribute to Eisai's texts, it nonetheless suggests, as I do below, that re-defining the distinction between *rikai* and *jikai* is a major point for Eisai's analysis; as is his concern with the correct form of Buddhist practice over the issue of sectarian affiliation.

Eisai also uses the *Chányuàn qīngguī* as a basis for his understanding of how the Zen school understands the relationship between the different sets of precepts, which is contained in section eight of fascicle three: "Establishing a separate catalogue [of rules] for the Zen school; this consists of following the pure rules for Zen monasteries and the conventions seen practiced in the great kingdoms" (禪宗支目門者, 按禪苑清規並大國見行式; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 117). This section is Eisai's summary of the key points of the *Chányuàn qīngguī* and the section below refers to the first two sections of the first fascicle of that text, entitled "Receiving the precepts" (*jukai* 受戒) and "observing the precepts" (J. *gokai* 護戒; X 0523a17– b16):

Second, concerning receiving the precepts, it is said Greater Vehicle morality and the Lesser Vehicle morality reside within human feelings, but both reside in the the feeling of Mahāyāna compassion that benefits all sentient beings. This teaching does not prioritize the precepts of either the Greater or Lesser [vehicle]; only maintaining morality and pure practice is prized...Third, concerning maintaining the precepts, it says: even if one claims to have received the precepts, if one does not maintain them and breaks them, it is no different from obtaining and

then breaking a precious jewel. Because of this, the two hundred and fifty precepts of the monastic, and the three categories of bodhisattva [pure precepts], the ten grave precepts and the forty-eight minor precepts need to be maintained unrelentingly.

二受戒. 謂大乘戒, 小乘戒, 在人情, 但存大悲利生之情耳. 今此宗不撰戒之大小, 偏尚持戒梵行矣. 三護戒. 謂雖受戒. 不護而破, 何異得寶珠而打破哉. 是故比丘二百五十戒. 菩薩三聚 十重四十八輕戒. 堅固護持 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p.117–118).

This passage is one of the most frequently quoted from Eisai's works. Ishida's analysis (1986, 302–303) represents a standard interpretation. The phrase "exists within human feelings" (J. *zai ninjō* 在人情) allows for an equality within the two forms of morality, and suggests an overlap with the work of Zhànrán and Dào xuān as outlined above, which also corresponds to Eisai's views concerning the relationship between the vinaya and bodhisattva morality. The character *jō* 情 represents a commonality between the vinaya Mahāyāna morality. The primary difference between the two forms of morality is that the sentiment expressed within the Mahāyāna is more universally applicable to the human mind. Therefore, the distinction between Mahāyāna morality and vinaya morality depends upon the inclination of the practitioner, resting on which set of practices are most suitable. Morality in and of itself has value; in particular, *jikai bongyō*, which is the practice of celibacy, is primary in both conceptions of morality. The passage suggests that *jikai bongyō* is central to both forms of morality, in the same manner as *saikai*. Both terms

entail a *jikai* structure, in other words, they must be conceived of as concrete practices in order to be effective.

In *Shukke taikō* Eisai suggests that the idea of the Mahāyāna precepts is more suitable for the latter degenerate age of the Dharma, but that nonetheless, the vinaya ordinations are useful in helping monastics avoid minor infractions during daily life:

Thirdly, what are referred to as the two [sets] of vinaya are: the precepts of the *bhikṣu*, the complete precepts of the auditors, and the collection of the *Four-Part Vinaya* ...Together, these are the ground of study for the lesser vehicle. Through self regulation and self salvation they can actualize Nirvāṇa. This does not reach the level of unsurpassed [Nirvāṇa]...Therefore, now, one should not acquire the spirit [of these precepts], only the precepts themselves. It is said, during the latter age, those who practice the way of the greater vehicle are numerous; hence, in order to avoid mistakes and prevent wrongdoing, it is necessary to study both [the Lesser and Greater vehicle precepts].

第三、二戒法者,比丘戒者,聲聞具足戒,四分律藏,說是也...竝是小乘學處也。自調自度證實際涅槃。但未到無上...然則今者,不取其情,只取其戒。謂,末代道人多趣大乘,故以離過防非為要以同應學之 (*Shukke taikō*, 20–21).

Eisai points to the fact that the Rinza lineage was one of three things he gained in China, the other two being the *Four-Part Vinaya* ordination and the

Bodhisattva precepts, further emphasizing the difference between what he learned in China and the current practice on Hiei. With this in mind, it is no surprise that Eisai rejects the idea that observing the *Four-Part Vinaya* entails breaking the Bodhisattva precepts.<sup>64</sup> Eisai suggests that monks outwardly observe the rules of the vinaya, while inwardly adopting the cultivation of compassion associated with the Bodhisattva precepts (Ishida 1986a, 302; *Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 3, p. 116).

This view of Eisai's is not dissimilar to the ideas concerning the precepts that were prevalent in Chinese Tiantai, in particular the views held by Zhiyi and Zhànrán. Both figures accepted that the Mahāyāna practitioner could observe the precepts of the *Four-Part Vinaya* with a Mahāyāna mind. This was called the "Reveal and Harmonize" (C. *kāihui* 開會; J. *kaie*) interpretation, as both forms of precepts, at their roots, were designed to lead the practitioner to Buddhahood (Groner 2000, 199). We can see how Eisai, in contrast to the standard Tendai interpretation of the day, is also making a case for a similar style of interpretation. As pointed out by Benn (2007, 114), this stance resembles the vow to be reborn in the Pure Land; this vow is more powerful than specific rules of morality. As discussed in Chapter Two, regarding the work of Míngkuàng, this position can also lead to the conclusion that distinct aspects of discipline as provided by the vinaya may be cast aside in certain circumstances. Thus we can see an interesting strategy from Eisai; he is in fact using the same sources used by those advocating a more abstract interpretation of the precepts (*rikai*) to advocate for an a more concrete

observance (*jikai*).

The above outlines Eisai's position on the nature of the precepts. Dōgen directly challenges this position, and argues that such a stance is antithetical to both the tradition of Chinese Chán and a Mahāyāna understanding of morality.

#### **4. Eisai and Dōgen on Morality**

Whether or not Dōgen specifically took issue with Eisai's view of the precepts is open to debate. Bodiford's analysis of their conflicting views (1993, 168–170) suggests that there may have been some influence. Bodiford outlines five characteristics of their respective stances, and points out that in each of the five, there are conflicting views. Kagamishima (1985b, 33, note 4) has gone further and claimed that Dōgen's *Bendōwa* 辨道話 is his direct answer to Eisai's stance in on the precepts in *Kōzen gokokuron*. It seems reasonable to assume some amount of influence, given the historical context of shared practice between Eisai and Dōgen. Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that at least one book of *Shōbōgenzō*, *On The Thirty Seven Factors of Enlightenment* (J. *Sanjūshichihon bodai bunpō* 三十七品菩提分法, DZZ, Bk. 60, 1: 130–151), was written as a direct response to some of Eisai's claims concerning the precepts.

Specifically, Dōgen and Eisai disagree concerning two fundamental issues: the authority of the *Four-Part Vinaya*, and the idea of the precepts as the basis of practice. Dōgen rejects outright the idea that the *Four-Part Vinaya* should be practiced by Mahāyāna monks; rather, he presents his own precept ordination ceremony which is devoid of all reference to Indian vinaya texts.

Similarly, Dōgen rejects the idea that the precepts are the basis of Buddhist practice, and instead claims not only that *zazen* 坐禪 is the main activity of Buddhism, but also that it encapsulates all others. Dōgen stressed that all three aspects of Buddhist learning, precepts, meditation and wisdom, were found simultaneously within *zazen*; moreover, he claimed that none of the Chinese monks he encountered taught Eisai's doctrine (Bodiford 1993, 169).

The obvious contrasts between the ideas of Eisai and Dōgen on the precepts belie the fact that they share certain overlapping lineages. It is generally accepted that Dōgen received the Bodhisattva precepts as an *endonkai* ordination on Hiei. He also received the Huánglóng lineage Eisai brought back from China from Myōzen. Before going to China, Dōgen was also ordained with the Bodhisattva precepts by Myōzen (Kagamishima, 1985a, 23). Dōgen claimed to have received both the *Caódòng* 曹洞 (J. *Sōtō*) lineage and the precepts in sixteen articles from Rújìng 如淨 (J. Nyojō; 1162–1227). Both claims are controversial. Dōgen seemingly never received a *Four-Part Vinaya* ordination, despite that fact that receiving these precepts, followed by the Bodhisattva precepts, was standard practice at the time in China. It seems that Rújìng also followed this accepted practice (Ishida 1986b, 323)

The key difference between Eisai and Dōgen relates to their interpretation of the idea that accepting the vinaya precepts entails breaking the Bodhisattva precepts. In the following citation, Dōgen's views are in exact contrast to Eisai:

Śākyamuni Buddha said: "The various auditors, they have yet to attain Right Livelihood." Therefore, the teachings, practice, and realizations of the auditors are still not Right Livelihood. Nevertheless, recently there are common [scholars] who say: "We should not separate the auditors from the Bodhisattvas, but should use also their precepts and regulations of conduct." Using the rules of the lesser vehicle auditors, they pass judgement upon the way of the bodhisattvas, its rules, deportment and conduct. As Śākyamuni Buddha said, "An auditor keeping the precepts is a Bodhisattva breaking the precepts."

Therefore, what an auditor considers keeping the precepts, if viewed from the perspective of the Bodhisattva, is the breaking of the auditor precepts. Meditation and wisdom are also like this. For example, the quality of the precept not to kill living creatures; while it appears that for an auditor and a bodhisattva there is no difference, there is certainly a difference between them. We can refer to it in the same way as the discourse that states the vast separation between heaven and earth.

How could it thus be the case that true meaning of the correct transmission of the dharma of the Buddhas and patriarchs, from teacher to student, could possibly be the same as that of the auditors?

釋迦牟尼佛言，諸聲聞人，未得正命。しかあればすなはち，聲聞の教行證，いまだ正命にあらざるなり。しかあるを，近日庸流いはく，聲聞，菩薩を分別すべからず，その威儀，戒律ともにもちるるべし，といひて，小乗聲聞の法をもて，大乘菩薩法の威儀，進止を

判ず。釈迦牟尼佛言、聲聞持戒、菩薩破戒。しかあれば、聲聞の持戒とおもへる、もし菩薩戒に比望するがごときは、聲聞戒みな破戒なり。自余の定慧も、またかくのごとし。たとひ不殺生等の相、おのづから聲聞と菩薩にあひにたりとも、かならず別なるべきなり。天地懸隔の論におよぶべからざるなり。いはんや仏祖正伝の宗旨と諸聲聞と、ひとしからんや (DZZ, *Sanjūshichihon bodai bunpō*, Bk. 60, 1: 148–149).

These "common scholars" may well be a reference to Eisai. This section clearly seems to be an unfair characterization of Eisai's position. Nowhere does Eisai appear to be "passing judgment" upon the Bodhisattva precepts, unless Dōgen is referring to Eisai's rejection of the *endonkai*. As we have seen, both Dōgen and Eisai can call upon scriptural authority to justify their positions, but Dōgen has gone a step further by directly quoting Śākyamuni. Interestingly, Dōgen's own precept ordination procedure, as expounded in *Shōbōgenzō*, is both seemingly idiosyncratic and lacking in scriptural authority.

Dōgen's ideas concerning the precepts are outlined in a number of different books of the *Shōbōgenzō*; here we will look at two of them, *On Leaving Home* (*Shukke* 出家, DZZ Bk. 75; 2: 259–264) and *On Accepting the Precepts* (*Jukai* 受戒, DZZ Bk. 2; 2: 294–299).<sup>65</sup>

In *Jukai*, Dōgen outlines the precepts in sixteen articles he claims to have received from Rujing. Within these sixteen articles there are three distinct sets of precepts: The Three Refuges (J. *san'e* 三依) of the Buddha, the

Dharma and the Sangha; the Three Pure Precepts and the Ten Major Precepts of the *Brahmā Net Sutra* (J. *jū jūkai* 十重戒).<sup>66</sup> For Dōgen, after one has left home, there is no need to take the 250 precepts of the *bhikṣu* (J. *biku* 比丘).<sup>67</sup> There is no evidence of these three sets of precepts appearing together as a set ordination procedure in either Chinese or Japanese texts. Tendai ordinations on Hiei tended to incorporate the three refuges and the three pure precepts, but these sets of precepts are taken separately from the Bodhisattva precepts. Despite exhaustive historical investigation (Bodiford 1993, 170–171; Ishida 1986b, 326), there remains little consensus as to the origin of this grouping of sixteen article precepts.

These precepts in sixteen articles represent a similar problem as that which faced Saichō's successors: they are not detailed enough to provide rules of behavior for monastics. With this in mind, Dōgen supplements the sixteen precepts with his insistence on the importance of the *Rules of the Pure Community* (J. *Shingi* 清規). This is evidenced by the fact that large portions of the text of *Jukai* consists of quotations from Báizhàng 百丈 (J. Hyakujō; 720–814).<sup>68</sup> The manner of ordination as described in the text is relatively standard, with perhaps the only exception being the fact that the ordinand is represented as answering positively three times the question of the preceptor, rather than remaining silent. First the ordinand accepts the three refuges, then the three pure precepts, and finally the ten major precepts of the *Brahmā Net Sutra*. The following is what Dōgen says concerning the precepts:

In India and China, whenever a Buddha or Ancestor passed on transmission of the Buddhas, certainly the first act of entering the Dharma will be to accept the precepts. If one does not take the precepts, one cannot be called a disciple of the Buddha. Nor can one be called an offspring of the Ancestors. Being free from error and avoiding wrong doing is the same as practicing the way of Zen. The phrase "the precepts have been made foremost" is the same as the collections of teachings of the True Dharma Eye.

西天東地, 仏祖相伝しきたれるところ, かならず入法の最初に受戒あり. 戒をうけざれば, いまだ諸仏の弟子にあらず, 祖師の兒孫にあらざるなり. 離過防非を參禪問道とせるがゆゆなり. 戒律爲先の言, すでにまさしく正法眼藏なり (DZZ, *Jukai*, Bk. 2, 2: 295).

This passage is very much in tune with Eisai's views on the precepts. There is room to interpret the phrase *sanzen mondō* 參禪問道, which could be translated as "the way of seated meditation", in which case it would be more in line with our expectations of Dōgen. Such an interpretation would be forcing a non-standard reading onto the text; the phrase *sanzen mondō*, and the accompanying *kairitsu i sen* 戒律爲先 (J. *sanzen mondō kairitsu i sen* 參禪問道戒律爲先) is a quote from Báizhàng's *Rules of the Pure Community* (C. *Chìxiū Bǎizhàng qīngguī* 勅修百丈清規; J. *Chokushu Hyakujō shōki*; T no. 2025, 1138c10). It is also quoted by Eisai at the beginning of *Kōzen gokokuron* (fasc.1, p. 99).

This is not Dōgen`s only statement on the matter. In *On Leaving Home* (*Shukke* 出家), he states the following:

In general, supreme enlightenment is completely fulfilled at the time of becoming a monastic and accepting the precepts. If there were no such day when we leave home, there would be no way to achieve complete enlightenment. Therefore, we thus ponder the day when we leave home, and the day of supreme enlightenment can be realized. We pick out the day on which we realize supreme enlightenment, and it is the day we leave home. Everything is topsy-turvy, and this is the turning of the marvelous wheel of the Dharma. Leaving home thus helps prevent innumerable sentient beings from regressing from their Supreme Enlightenment. You should know, it is by leaving home and taking the precepts that one can improve yourself by benefitting others, and how one can prevent unexcelled and complete enlightenment becoming regressive and inactive.

おほよそ無上菩提は、出家受戒のとき満足するなり。出家の日にあらざれば成満せず。しかあればすなはち、出家之日を拈來して、成無上菩提の日を現成せり、成無上菩提の日を拈出する、出家の日なり。この出家の翻筋斗する、轉妙法輪なり。この出家、すなはち無數有情をして無上菩提を不退轉ならしむるなり。しるべし、自利利他ここに満足して、阿耨菩提不退不轉なるは、出家受戒なり (DZZ, *Shukke*, Bk. 75, 2: 261).

Here we have a section that is more representative of Dōgen's ideas. The suggestion is that the "unexcelled and complete enlightenment" (J. *anoku bodai* 阿耨菩提) is attained on the day of taking the precepts. This is almost certainly a reference to the idea of the *endonkai*, or perhaps the *busshōkai*, where the ordinand realizes Buddhahood solely through accepting the precepts. This is in contrast to Eisai, who suggests that the precepts are just the foundation; in Dōgen there is the idea of the three learnings as being one, and that all are realized in the moment of accepting the precepts. This represents a fundamental difference between Dōgen and Eisai.

### **Conclusion**

What can we conclude about Eisai's Zen, its origins, context and practice, from the above discussion? Looking to the past and the variety of influences on Eisai, we have already pinpointed the vinaya tradition of Dào xuān and Yījīng. Of course, the influence of the Tīāntái tradition is also obvious and undeniable. There is also an intriguing possibility that Eisai is also reflecting practices prominent in the Northern school of Chinese Chán. In particular, Eisai appears to be (i) advocating what we might term "gradual" meditation practices; (ii) These practices are linked heavily with the vinaya. Both elements seem to be characteristic of the Northern school. Further research could certainly shed light on this relationship.<sup>69</sup>

## **Conclusion**

### *Clarifying Images of Eisai*

This dissertation has sought to provide a clearer image of Eisai during the period where he argued for the introduction of Zen to the Japanese monastic environment. Eisai's arguments are based not on sectarianism or a sense of Zen being distinct and superior to existing teachings, but is rather an effort to explain how Zen reflects traditional models of monastic practice and discipline.

The four goals of this work were as follows: (i) to present an analysis of Eisai's understanding of morality; (ii) to relate this understanding of morality clearly to Zen, thus reshaping our understanding of how Zen evolved in the Japanese context and the impact of Chinese sources on this evolution; (iii) to expand scholarly focus on Eisai's work towards lesser known texts; (iv) as a long term goal, using Eisai's analysis as a starting point to establish a comparative philosophical basis for a functioning practical morality that bridges the gap between moral theory and moral practice. Below I will examine each of these four elements in turn.

What is Eisai's understanding of morality as analyzed in this dissertation? Eisai emphasizes the physical element of morality, what I have termed concrete morality. Particularly important are the four aspects of sexual abstinence, fasting or moderation concerning food, cleanliness and correct deportment especially concerning garments. Keeping the precepts in principle, what I have termed abstract morality, or the upkeep of the precepts which

occurs naturally during meditation, should be used in conjunction with the physical element. Eisai's emphasis on the physical aspects, and the detailed explanations Eisai provides concerning the correct procedures involved, suggest that the physical aspect of moral practice was not standard behavior in Japanese Tendai monasteries during Eisai's time. Eisai mentions the issue of alcohol use in monasteries and improper regulations surrounding food as prime examples of failures in discipline. His emphasis on sexual morality, especially for monastics, suggests this was also a problem in the monastic context. Eisai's position should not surprise us; not only is it in line with traditional understandings of the function of morality in Buddhism, it also aligns with models from moral psychology. Especially for a less advanced practitioner, to follow an abstract principle of morality and learning to apply such principles to relevant moral situations requires much more moral fortitude and imagination than simply following a list of concrete rules. It seems clear that Eisai regards the goal of vinaya and Zen pure rules as precisely to provide the relevant training in breaking habitual patterns of thought and action before moving on to meditative practices where abstract moral principles come into play. This is particularly important in the context of the degenerate latter age, when Buddhism must maintain its core moral principles as a bulwark against extinction. Nonetheless, one gets the sense from the sources Eisai uses that he may also be of the belief that concrete morality was necessary at any stage of progression. The fact that Eisai can

draw on Chán, Tiāntái and Lùzōng sources illustrates that his view is shared across sectarian boundaries.

For Eisai Zen is the most applicable practice in the context of promoting morality. This is one of the key points of this dissertation: for Eisai, Zen is closer to a practice than it is to our sense of a sect or faction. In terms of the *zen-kyō-ritsu* system Eisai experienced in China and sought to transplant to Japan, Zen represents two of the three aspects, with Tendai representing the teaching element (J. *kyō*). This dissertation has explained how Eisai viewed Zen as an aspect of Tendai. Subsequent research may well focus on the evolution of Japanese Zen in terms of how distinctions emerged between their position and Tendai.

Eisai's work on Zen and morality also begs the question of his influence on subsequent relationships between Zen, Tendai and Risshū figures in the latter part of the Kamakura period. It also calls into question images of Zen in both scholarly and popular imaginations. Certainly, Sòng period monastic life as presented by Eisai is in stark contrast to conceptions of antinomian Chán masters focusing on the rhetoric of sudden enlightenment. Outside of scholarship, it is also important for my contemporary lay Zen practitioners to cast aside the misconception of Zen as a radical iconoclastic individualism that offers a reprieve from oppressive moral prohibitions. This dissertation has shown how and why such conceptions are both inaccurate historically and also counterproductive to genuine Zen practice, as conceived by Eisai, which

requires an understanding of concrete proscriptions based on physical morality in order to be fully effective.

Regarding the third focus of this dissertation, the introduction of lesser known texts in Eisai's corpus, the main focus was *Shukke taikō*. This text is hugely significant in terms of both Eisai's career and the broader context of Zen in Japan. Eisai explicitly links Zen practice with vinaya, and discusses almost exclusively morality rather than meditation. Translations from this text are especially prominent in Chapter Three, concerning practice, as the text is heavily orientated towards monastic practitioners. Just as Dàoxuān's vinaya commentaries formed the basis of Zen pure rules, Eisai similarly introduces the vinaya to Tendai monastics through his use of Yijìng in *Shukke taikō*. Given the fact that Eisai began composing *Shukke taikō* while still in China highlights his sense of admiration for a system where concrete morality surrounding food, dress and cleanliness were paramount. It seems clear, however, that *Shukke taikō* exercised a greater influence on individuals and groups associated with the Risshū. Tracing this influence is a task for future scholarship on Eisai. One intriguing potential link is via *Shukke taikō* and the introduction of self-ordination procedures that potentially also include the vinaya. It is possible to trace Eisai's influence through to the Shingon ritsu movement of Eizon and Kakujō which began with a self-ordination procedure which included the vinaya.

Also introduced in this work were *Saikai kanjin mon* and *Nihon buppō chūkō gan*. Both texts highlight aspects of physical morality: for laity, fasting

is encouraged, while for monastics sexual morality is key. Eisai's emphasis on laity in *Saikai kanjin mon* is another element linking him to figures like Shunjō and later the Shingon ritsu movement. This understudied aspect of his work challenges the image of Eisai as a conservative monastic with links to political power. His emphasis on lay practice, and his association of lay practice with Zen, is another legacy which becomes clearer in the subsequent development of Risshū and *ritsu* related figures such as Eizon who performed mass lay ordinations, rather than in Japanese Zen, which became centered on monastic life.

The next elements to consider are the philosophical implications of this work. Eisai emphasizes four aspects of physical morality: fasting, sexual abstinence, cleanliness and deportment concerning clothing. Only one of these, sexual morality, is considered an ethical issue in the Western sense of the term. Similarly, linking such physical actions to meditative activities, forming a basis for abstract morality, also lies outside of what Western philosophy would consider ethical considerations. This suggests that Western philosophy needs to consider morality in broader terms, understanding that behavior of any form, physical, mental or verbal, can have morally relevant repercussions. Clearly, the term "morality" in the Western philosophical tradition is also a Husserlian sedimented concept that requires new boundaries.

One area where comparative moral philosophy could find common ground is through Buddhism and the field of moral phenomenology, which attempts to clarify the moral content of mental states. Nonetheless, certain

barriers to the enterprise of comparative moral philosophy remain. For example, the range of what the term "morality" represents in Western philosophy is too narrow in most cases. As this dissertation shows, the role of morality in Buddhism is open to philosophical explanation. The Western philosopher must realize that Buddhist morality is a philosophical system that prioritizes practice over theory: the practice of morality is where the further theoretical elements originate, whereas the modern Western tradition assumes that theory is the philosophical starting point. This explains why Western philosophy struggles to provide moral theories that have widespread practical effectiveness. This was not always the case. As Hadot (1995) shows in his analysis of Classical Greek and Roman philosophy, philosophers aligned with schools such as the Cynics and the Stoics focused on practical issues combined with what Hadot calls "spiritual exercises". The method of philosophical analysis favored by Hadot suggests that a fresh approach to comparative Western-Buddhist philosophy is possible, especially with a deeper technical understanding of Buddhist moral paradigms.

The final philosophical issue raised in this dissertation was the issue of translation. Moving forward, my hope is that Buddhist studies scholars take into consideration issues not only concerning terminological accuracy but also philosophical paradigms of translation and language. To date, Buddhist studies scholars seeking to incorporate Western philosophical frameworks and methodologies have focused exclusively on the Continental tradition of philosophy, especially modern French and German philosophy. This is, in my

opinion, a mistake. Philosophers such as Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and Michel Foucault (1926–1984) are embedded in a European philosophical culture that draws heavily upon Eurocentric norms in order to provide philosophical insight. Much of their thought is specifically designed to solve problems in the European tradition. In my opinion, the more logical, rigorous and precise methodology of Analytic philosophy is more useful to Buddhist studies scholars, and is especially applicable in the area of translation.

Attempts by Analytic philosophers to solve problems of meaning, translation, language and its relationship to the outside world is an area of overlap between Buddhist textual scholarship and Philosophy which has yet to be appreciated or understood comprehensively, and which could be very beneficial for future scholars and translators of Buddhist texts. This dissertation has at least attempted to suggest how this avenue of communication could be useful.

There are a number of interesting potential future studies that could evolve out of the discussion in this work. The overlap between Zen, Tendai and vinaya in the context of Kamakura period Buddhism is an intriguing field for further research. This work has attempted to simply clear some of the ground in preparation. Clearly, Eisai's lineage will play a central role in this analysis. Unfortunately, Eisai's lineage has not been studied in any great depth, and thus it remains difficult to accurately assess the impact of Eisai's legacy. A second aspect, related to the above, is how do the disparate elements of Eisai's own career cohere together? How do we explain how esoteric

Buddhism and vinaya interact in Eisai's understanding of Buddhism? Again, further research on Eisai's lineage can provide clues to help potentially answer this question. This dissertation suggests that the Tendai context to Eisai's thought will be of crucial importance in terms of clarifying this issue.

Another pivotal area of scholarship that requires further assessment is the role of Tokugawa period scholastics in creating the image of Eisai as Zen master and founder of the Rinzai sect. From a doctrinal perspective, one of the key (mis) interpretations of Eisai and his thought centers around the idea of *zenkai*, and how the term came to represent abstract morality when in fact Eisai's original intention was the opposite. A second element regarding institutional issues, is the role of Kōhō Tōshun in propagating Eisai's writings. How much influence did Kōhō wield on the creation of images of Eisai in the Tokugawa period? What role did Kōhō's four-volume commentary on *Kōzen gokokuron* have on the reception of the text, and perhaps even the creation of the text? Such questions may be difficult to answer, but nonetheless are worth investigating. This issue is linked to another key aspect of Eisai scholarship that remains open to exploration, how the institutional history of Kenninji impacted upon the creation of Eisai's lineage.

A final aspect of future research that may shed light on images of Eisai, real or imagined, is the role of Eisai apocrypha. Scholarship has made little attempt to clarify the authorship of a number of texts attributed to Eisai by Rinzai sectarian interests but which do not belong to his corpus. Texts such as *Procedures for undergoing Bodhisattva Precept Ordination (J. ju bosatsu kai*

*sahō* 受菩薩戒作法) and *The Perfect Sudden Threefold Precepts of the One Mind* (J. *endon sanju isshinkai* 円頓三聚一心戒) are considered Eisai apocrypha, but despite the disputed authorship, there is little work available on the actual authors of the texts. One of the major exceptions is the work of Mano (2014, 236), who argues that one of the texts above, *endon sanju isshinkai*, was most likely authored by what Mano refers to as the Precepts group (J. *kaike* 戒家) which he uses a synonym for the Tendai Kurodani lineage (J. *kurodani ryū* 黒谷流). While Mano's work is pioneering in this sense, it is also clear that his hypothesis is unconvincing, with more concrete evidence required in order to create a more compelling argument. Nonetheless, that these texts were produced and attributed to Eisai, coupled with the fact of the content, which is in stark contrast to Eisai's stance on abstract morality and the role of the vinaya, suggests that an analysis of these texts may well be fruitful in terms of understanding more clearly Eisai's influence on the contemporary religious landscape.

## Notes

1. Regarding this philosophical goal, my feeling is that Buddhist understandings of ethics and morality may help to solve many of the major ethical problems facing Western philosophy, especially in terms applying ethical theories to everyday circumstances. The overlap between philosophy, spiritual practice and ethics is the focus of the French philosopher Pierre Hadot (1995).

One may argue that I am constructing a new image for Eisai, that of "philosopher". Goethe's famous suggestion that "great scholars are seldom great philosophers" may well apply here to Eisai. I am not attempting to recast Eisai as a philosopher, but rather seek to draw attention to the nature of his arguments concerning morality. Many of these arguments reflect issues that are central in Euro-American philosophical discussions. This dissertation hopes to provide enough context in terms of Buddhist doctrine to allow philosophers to see how a genuine comparative approach to ethical problems that avoids typical Eurocentric philosophical bias is both possible and useful.

2. The six Nara schools, transmitted to Japan from China are: Kusha 俱舍, Jōjitsu 成實, Ritsu 律宗, Hossō 法相, Sanron 三論 and Kegon 華嚴.
3. The term *hijiri* 聖 is complex, and its meaning can change depending on the textual and chronological context. The definition provided here is general, and does not exhaust the range of potential definitions for the term.

4. Mano focuses heavily on Eisai's biography, and his account forms the basis of my account here. My aim here is to review the most salient points rather than present a similarly detailed account.
5. The meaning of the term *endonkai* and the nature of this ordination is discussed in Chapter Two.
6. A copy of the text is held at Ryōsoku-in 兩足院, a subtemple of Kenninji.
7. The actual proclamation against Eisai is found in the Kamakura period chronicle the *hyakurensō* 百鍊抄. Furuta (1986, 611) reproduces the text.
8. This position is often disputed by the scholars who emphasize the esoteric element. Yoneda (2016, 72) suggests Kokan Shiren's influence led scholars away from esotericism towards Zen.
9. A manuscript dated from 1789 is held in the library at Komazawa University in Tokyo. A copy of this version of the text was the source for the citations used in this work.
10. Mano (2014, 234–235) has suggested that this text may well have been authored by a monk in the Tendai Kurodani lineage (J. kurodani ryū 黒谷流), also known as the Precepts group (J. *kaike* 戒家).
11. See Chapter Three, note eight, for more information on this issue.
12. Husserl initially conceived of this idea with reference to the evolution of the sciences. In *The Origin of Geometry* Husserl says: "For all of them [sciences] have the mobility of sedimented traditions that are worked

upon, again and again, by the activity of producing new structures of meaning and handing them down. Existing in this way, they exist enduringly through time, since all new acquisitions are in turn sedimented and become working materials. Everywhere the problems, the clarifying investigations, the insight of principle are historical. ...". p. 368-369. *The Origin of Geometry* is contained in the English language edition of *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, translated by David Carr.

13. The fourth part of the cycle refers to the extinction of the teachings of Buddhism.
14. There are doubts surrounding the authenticity of *Tract on the Vow* (*C. lishi yuànwén* 立誓願文; *J. ryūsei ganmon*). See Stevenson and Kanno 2006.
15. In the Ichikawa edition of *Kōzen gokokuron*, which is the accepted scholarly version used in this work, the sentence reads 如此, instead of 如殺, as I have rendered it here, and which is in accordance with the Taishō edition at T no. 2543, 80.0016c15. Eisai has also abbreviated the passage from its format in the Taishō edition. See T no. 1929, 46.630a14–a18.
16. See Nakamura 2002, 1470b for a definition of the term.
17. I expand on this hypothesis in subsequent chapters. The role of pure rules in Eisai's work has been overlooked by scholarship. I will argue that Eisai's encounter with this text provides a rationale for a "Mahāyāna vinaya" as a compromise position to present to the Tendai establishment.

18. Furuta (1960, 409) points to evidence that Eisai also practiced the *nembutsu*; also we can assume he encountered the practice in Chinese monasteries, given fact that Chinese monks arriving in Tokugawa Japan, the Ōbaku 黃檗宗, practiced both in tandem. Furuta also suggests (1960, 413) that Eisai may well have instituted certain Pure Land related practices at Kenninji.
19. I have decided against the standard translation of *jiètǐ* 戒體 as "essence of the precepts". Firstly, the idea of the precepts having an "essence" is problematic, in particular when writing for an English language audience. "Essence" is a term with a long and complex history of sedimented meanings within the Western philosophical tradition, and thus entails misleading connotations. Similarly, the term "precepts" as a translation for *jiè* 戒 in this context is also troublesome. As a translation for the Sanskrit *prātimokṣa-saṃvara*, the term "essence of the precepts" may make more sense, as the precepts of the vinaya, the individual rules of moral conduct are where the "essence" can be said to "reside"; in the case of bodhisattva precept ordinations, it is not the individual rules themselves that have any power; rather it is a more general term to describe being granted an abstract sense a moral perfection which the ordinand then has to find a means to activate. Hence "body of morality", where "body" refers not just to the bodily deportment required to illustrate mastery of the moral system, but also in the sense of a "totality" of all Buddhist morality. This suggests that the *jiètǐ* 戒體 provides a both the totality of morality in the abstract,

and the means to put it into practice through correct physical and mental moral action. In his definition of the term Kroll (2015, 449) points to particular elements associated with the character *tǐ* 體, including definition two as "good form in conduct, formality, ritual" and definition 2 (b) as "embody, incarnate, incorporate", and definition 2 (c) "to put into practice or effect". Definition 4 also states "put oneself in the place of others; be considerate of, make allowances for". The tendency for translators to use "essence" for *tǐ* 體 is due to the "essence and function" (C. *tǐyòng* 體用) dichotomy that is considered an aspect of Chinese philosophical analysis and the sinification of Buddhism and is mentioned by Kroll (2015, 449) in definition 2 (a). While there are good philosophical and doctrinal reasons why the "essence and function" terminology could also be relevant, I have decided to leave this aside for now.

20. Bodiford (2005a, 2–3) describes what I am calling "ritual moral empowerment" as "an inner moral fortitude associated with the religious goals of Buddhism". Once the proper rituals are undergone, the ordinand can then see the precepts as manifestations of their spiritual quest.
21. This interpretation of the precepts is often associated with the Japanese Tendai scholar Kōjō 光定 (779–854), but has, as we shall see, certain precedents also in Chinese Buddhism.

22. The other two key texts are the *Móhē zhǐguān* and *An Explanation of the Marvelous Dharma of the Lotus Sūtra* (C. *Miàofǎ liánhuá jīng wénjù* 妙法蓮華經文句; J. *Myōhō renge kyō mongu*; T no. 1718).
23. Zhànrán may well have also been formulating his ideas concerning the body of morality in response to the work of Yogācāra scholar Fǎzàng 法藏 (J. Hōzō; 643–712), whose *Commentary to the Code of the Bodhisattva Precepts in the Brahmā Net Sūtra* (C. *Fanwangjīng pusa jieben shu* 梵網經菩薩戒本疏; J. *Bonmōkyō bosatsu kaihō sho*; T no. 1813) contains extensive discussions of the body of morality (See T 40.0607 c19–c28). Fǎzàng incorporates the idea of the body of morality into the broader Yogācāra system, and suggests that this precept is formless and thus is a purely mental factor; hence *jiètǐ* is equated with the formless mind. This interpretation also had a profound impact on subsequent Tiāntái exegetes such as Míngkuàng 明曠 (J. Myōkō; d.u.). For broader information concerning the life and work of Fǎzàng see Chen (2007).
24. Groner (2000, 225–226) provides an excellent summary of the nature of the debate in Japanese scholarship concerning this issue. Groner also points out that this text marks a change in Zhìyǐ's discussion of *jiètǐ*, where it changes from being purely mental to having a physical aspect. The perceived changes to Zhìyǐ's understanding of *jiètǐ* is one potential argument in favor of the thesis that the text represents more the views Guàndǐng of than Zhìyǐ.

25. The most likely source for this term is Bǎoliàng's 寶亮 (J. Hōryō; 444–509,) commentary on the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*, *Dàbān nièpán jīng jíjiě* 大般涅槃經集解 (J. *Dai hatsu nehangyō shūge*). At T no. 1763, 37.0580b19–20 this commentary says: "If the mind does not create evil, this is identical to morality. Having heard this eloquent explanation, [one realizes] the morality that is completely nonexistent and unconditioned (若心不作惡即是戒。聞此說便言都無無作戒).
26. In her analysis of the text, Lin (2011, 111–112) highlights the two sets of textual genealogies for bodhisattva precepts outlined by Zhìyǐ. First, the *Brahmā Net sūtra*, associated with the *Sūtra on Original Acts that Serve as Necklaces for the Bodhisattvas* (C. *Pusa yingluobenye jing* 菩薩瓔珞本業經; J. *Bosatsu yōraku hongō kyō*; T no. 1485). Secondly, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi sūtra* (C. *Pusa dichì jing* 菩薩地持經; J. *Bosatsu jiji kyō*), which is technically a *śāstra* associated with the Yogācāra School. Both scriptures are concerned not only with moral conduct but also with the consciousness of the bodhisattva at various stages of advancement.
27. It is also possible that Eisai was influenced in this regard by the *Śūraṅgama sūtra* (C. *Shǒulèngyán jīng* 首楞嚴經; J. *Shuryōgon kyō*) as we shall highlight below. This *sūtra* has a close historical affinity with the Zen school.
28. In the Tiāntái context this debate is extremely complex. Since the focus of this work is Eisai, I am focusing largely on the issues mentioned directly

in his texts.

29. The Taishō version reads: 諸佛兩足尊, 知法常無性, 佛種從緣起是故說一乘 (T no. 262, 09.0009b08–b09).

30. The relationship between Chán and abstract precepts has often been posited in terms of the role of the *Platform sūtra*. The following passage from the *Lidài fǎbǎo jì* is also significant in this regard:

“Discipline” is what is called overcoming the object. “Morality” is what is called that which is not blue, yellow, red or white. [it is] without form and without mind. This is the “body of morality”. It is the original nature of beings coming to completion. It is the original purity. 律是調伏之義. 戒是非青黃赤白. 非色非心. 是戒體. 戒是衆生本. 衆生本來圓滿. 本來清淨 (T no. 51, 0194b08–b10).

This text has a striking resemblance to the work of Míngkuàng, and is a clear articulation of the idea of how the body of morality relates to Buddha Nature. This passage also adds further evidence to the notion that the middle of the eighth century constitutes a high point in terms of the evolution of precept related doctrinal innovations. Whether or not Adamek (2007, 293) is correct in her assertion that the demise of the Bǎotáng school was linked to their attempts to implement formless precepts as an aspect of monastic discipline remains to be investigated further.

31. The influence of Annen on the development of abstract precepts and the impact on monastic discipline, in particular his *Detailed explanation of the*

*universal Bodhisattva Precepts Ordination* (J. *Futsūju bosatsukai kōshaku* 普通授菩薩戒広釈) has been analyzed by Groner (1990).

32. It is worth noting, as Mano does (2011, 643) that Eisai does not use the term *bodaishin kai* 菩提心戒 in the text. This term is synonymous with the *samaya* precepts.
33. Kagamishima (1985a, 149) notes that while the formless precepts of the *Platform sūtra* and the *endonkai* have certain similarities, it is unlikely that there is any overlap in terms of the evolution of the idea. I agree, and suggest there is ample evidence to suggest the *endonkai* evolved largely from within the Tiāntái/Tendai traditions.
34. The four options are: (i) Proficient in both vehicle and morality (C. *shèngjiè jùjī* 乘戒俱急; J. *jōkai gukyū*); (ii) Proficient in the vehicle but lax in morality (C. *shèngjí jièhuǎn* 乘急戒緩; J. *jōkyū kaigan*); (iii) Proficient in morality but lax in the vehicles (C. *jiè jí chéng huǎn* 戒急乘緩; J. *kai kō jōkan*) and (iv) Lax in both vehicles and morality (C. *shèngjiè jùhuǎn* 乘戒俱緩; J. *jōkai gukan*). For further details see Swanson (2018, 611).
35. It is not entirely clear which portion of the text exactly Eisai is referencing.
36. It is not difficult to factor Eisai into Quinter's (2015) account on the origins and practices of Shingon ritsu school. Adding Eisai into the context of this work in my opinion actually strengthens Quinter's overall argument.

37. The entire passage reads as follows:

The *Shōulèngyán jīng* says: The Buddha said to Ānanda, keep the four restraints, bright like glistening frost, and recite with single minded concentration the *dhāraṇī* of the white canopy. It is required to choose as your teacher one who is pure in morality. Wear new and clean clothes, burn incense and abide quietly in solitude. Recite [this] *dhāraṇī* one hundred and eight times while holding the Buddha in your mind. Afterwards, create a place where one can reside and establish a seat of enlightenment may be achieved. Quickly and directly seek the attainment of the powers [related to the *dhāraṇī*], and while occupying the seat of enlightenment, give rise to the aspiration for enlightenment. Cleanse one's body as you enter and exit, and during the six periods of the day circumambulate the Buddha's statue. Practice constantly like this without sleep. Practice like this for twenty-one days, and I will reveal myself to you, I will be in your presence, and will lay my hands on your head and uplift your spirit, and you will experience an opening into awakening.

楞嚴經云，佛言阿難，持此四種律儀，皎如冰霜，一心誦我般怛羅呪。要當選持戒清淨者，以為其師。著新淨衣，燃香閑居，誦此心佛所說神呪一百八遍。然後結界，建立道場，求於悉地，速得現前。於道場中，發菩提願，出入澡浴，六時行道，如是不寐。經三七日，我自現身，至其人前，摩頂安慰，令其開悟 (*Kōzen gokokuron*, fasc. 1, p. 100–

101; T no. 945, 19.0133a19–a29).

38. It is also significant that Eisai does not cite Zhànrán's ordination manual for the bodhisattva precepts, *shòu púsàjiè yí* 授菩薩戒儀 (J. *ju bosatsukai gi*. X no. 1086).
39. In the context of Eisai, Kubota (1984) has dealt with the issue in depth, but his analysis deals primarily with texts that are either considered apocrypha within Eisai's corpus or are not relevant to this time period.
40. The three texts cited above are: (i) *Sūtra Meditating on Samantabhadra Bodhisattva* (C. *Pǔxián guān jīng* 普賢觀經; J. *Fugenkan kyō*); (ii) *Sūtra on the wondrous Supreme dhyāna* (C. *Zuìmào shèngdìng jīng* 妙勝定經; J. *Saimyōshō jōgyō*); (iii) *Mahāvaiṣṭya-sūtra* (C. *Dàfāngděng jīng* 大方等經; J. *Daihōdō kyō*).
41. As mentioned in the introduction, such terms are particularly difficult to translate. There are of course multiple potential alternatives to the rendering s offered here.
42. There are a number of synonyms with the same meaning "morality which emerges in meditation", for example: *ding gong jiè* 定共戒 (J. *jō gū kai*), *jìnglǜ lǜyí* 靜慮律儀 (J. *jōryo ritsugi*) and *chán lǜyí* 禪律儀 (J. *zen ritsugi*).
43. The translation above is my own, and largely agrees with Dessein (1999, Vol. 1, 158), with only some small distinctions in vocabulary choice.

44. It seems possible that Eisai may well have been aware of Dào xuān's influence on the *Chányuàn qīngguī*.
45. Chen (2002, 342) has translated the passage in full.
46. These monasteries are not vinaya monasteries in the sense of how the term came to be understood in the Sòng. The designation "vinaya monastery" in the early Sòng referred to hereditary monasteries where the abbacy was passed down from abbot to disciple, thus ensuring continuity of lineage and control within the monastery. As the system of government sponsored public monasteries emerged, many were affiliated with Chán. Schlütter (2010, 45) points out that in Sòng period texts hereditary monasteries becoming public monasteries is often described as a vinaya monastery becoming Chán. Later, the vinaya schools were also granted their own public monasteries.
47. Nansō Ryōsaku's dates are unknown, but was identified by Kōhō Tōshun as having lived around two hundred years after Eisai, and was a disciple of Zuigan Ryōsei 瑞岩朔惺 (d.u), who is considered the seventh generation of Eisai's lineage. Kōhō Tōshun explains that he travelled to China to study Zen from 1449–1451 but nothing is known about his subsequent activities (T no. 2543, 80.0001c26–c29).
48. For a detailed account of these debates in the Chinese context, see Heirman 2008. Chen (2014, 163) points out that for Dào xuān the silk worm is actually the property of the monastery.

49. Eisai's interest in Yijing is itself an interesting aspect of his thought.  
 kawaguchi (1974, 324) notes references to Yijing in Sòng period  
 biographies are not extensive and do not mention his vinaya translations.  
 kawaguchi suggests that this is due to the influence of Dào xuān's Nánshān  
 南山 (J. Nansen) lineage and its support of the Dharmaguptaka vinaya (C.  
 Fǎzàng bù 法藏部; J. Hōzō bu)
50. See Yifa (2002, 108–110). While this is a fascinating discussion,  
 elaborating on this issue is beyond the scope of the current work.
51. The first of these three will be discussed in Chapter Four.
52. Yifa (2005, 124–25) points out that often the Pure Rules contain word for  
 word reproductions of vinaya rules. The two most important figures in  
 terms of influence on the text are Dào xuān and Dào'ān 道安 (J. Dōan;  
 312–385).
53. The Taishō version of *Kōzen gokokuron* (T no. 2543, 80.0002b27) has the  
 following quote from the preface to the *Chányuàn qīngguī* inserted into the  
 text: "The *Chányuàn qīngguī* says: After receiving the precepts, you must  
 protect them. It is better to die with the Law, then to live without it" (禪苑  
 清規云: 受戒之後, 常應守護. 寧有法死, 不無法生) (X 63.0523b04).
54. The term *bongyō* (C. *fànxíng* 梵行) appears in the text only twice, at X 63  
 .0530a11 and 0534c04.
55. Eisai's formulation adding the two terms together to create *jikai bongyō* is  
 much less common. Interestingly Nakamura (2002, 623d) when explaining

the term makes reference not to Eisai, but to Dōgen's *Bendōwa* 辨道話. The term appears in three texts in the Taishō canon which all have varying degrees of links with Eisai. In the *Ten Recitations Vinaya* of the Sarvāstivāda school (C. *Shisòng lǜ* 十誦律; J. *Jūjuritsu*. T no.1435. 23.0017a22–b17) *jikai bongyō* is discussed in the context of sexual morality. While Eisai does not reference this vinaya directly, given its links to Yijing it is possible Eisai was familiar with this text. The term also appears in Zhìyǐ's *Miàofǎ liánhuá jīng wénjù* 妙法蓮華經文句 (J. *Myōhō renga kyō mongu*; T no. 1718, 34.0090a17), a text with which Eisai was familiar. The reference reads: "In the past, [those who] maintain morality and pure practice, also manifest untainted [good] (昔持戒梵行共顯無漏; T 34.0090a17).

56. Huisī 慧思 (515–577, J. Eshi), the second patriarch of Tiāntái, whose influence on Eisai was discussed in Chapter One. Kōgei 皇慶 (977–1049), was a Tendai monk who specialized in Esoteric practice. Kōgei figures prominently in the *Collection of Forty notebooks concerning Esotericism* (J. *Shijūchō ketsu* 四十帖決; T no. 2408).

57. See Satō 1973, 62, for an outline of Dào xuān's position.

58. Chen 2002, has provided an in-depth account of Dào xuān's understanding of the relationship of precepts and meditation based on the account found in his "Treatise on Studying *dhyāna*" (C. *xíchán lùn*; J. *shūzen ron* 習禪論). This text contains what Chen takes to be criticism of proto-Chán type

figures who make claims to spiritual powers despite having little or no scriptural learning, and who practice meditation without regard for the precepts.

59. This verse is often associated with *the Nirvāṇa sūtra*, and parts of the verse appear in numerous texts throughout the canon. It also appears in its complete form in two texts which influenced Eisai, Zhànrán's *Explication of the Profound Meaning of the Lotus* (C. *Fǎhuā xuányì shìqiān* 法華玄義釋籤; J. *Hokke gengi shakusen*) and Dào xuān's *Summary of the Multiple Supplementary Observances of the Four Part Vinaya* (C. *Sìfēnlǜ shānfán bǔquè xíngshì chāo* 四分律刪繁補闕行事鈔; J. *Shibunritsu sanpan hoketsu jigyo jishō*). For a definition of the term, see Nakamura (2002, 676b).
60. For a brief overview of sources concerning the discussions of the text and its authenticity, see Groner (2000, 173–174, note 24).
61. For the scriptural origins of the term "death of the bodhisattva" (C. *púsà sǐ* 菩薩死; J. *bostatsu shi*). See Groner (2000, 216).
62. This is a direct quote from Zhànrán's *Annotations on the "Great Calming and Contemplation" as a Means to its Propagation* (C. *Zhǐguān fǔxíng zhuàn hóngjué* 止觀輔行傳弘決; J. *Shikan bukyōden guketsu*, T no. 46. 0255a10–a12). Significantly, this section of text also discusses methods by which one can maintain "pure self restraint" (C. *qīngjìng jiè* 清淨戒; J. *shōjō kai*). Discourse on purity is central in Eisai's thought, as will be

illustrated in the next section. For an overview of Zhànrán's views on the precepts, see Groner (2000, 228–229).

63. The passage ends with a reference to Dào xuān's *Instructions for New Monks on conduct and Maintaining Restraint* (C. *jiàojiè xīnxué bǐqiū xíng hù lǜyí* 教誡新學比丘行護律儀; J. *kyōkai shingaku biku gyōgo ritsugi*, T no. 45, 869.b04–06).
64. For the scriptural origins, see Bodiford 1993, 271, note 43.
65. The text *Jukai* is Book 2 of the 12 fascicle version of the *Shōbōgenzō*
66. Significantly, the forty-eight minor precepts of the *Brahmā Net Sutra* are not included.
67. Ishida suggests tentatively that this is a new interpretation of Rújìng, but that the sixteen articles themselves are not actually present in any of Rújìng's works (Ishida 1986b, 328, 331).
68. I have decided that Dōgen's view of pure rules and how it compares to Eisai is actually a topic for a separate study. What is clear is that Eisai's position seems more consistent with the original purpose of pure rules as supplements to, rather than replacements for, the vinaya. These pure rules were not meant to be statements of independence by the Chan schools, and themselves were based largely on vinaya literature (Poceski 2003, 34, 39). Saichō's abandonment of the vinaya remained a problem for centuries within Tendai, with attempts as late as the seventeenth century to reinstate it (Groner 2000, 197). For further information on the relationship between

these precepts and the pure rules, see Ishida (1986b, 344–345). Ishida (1986b, 353) further points to the influence of Báizhàng 百丈 (720–814) on the text *Jukai*. What Ishida calls Dōgen's "Mahāyāna" interpretation of *shingi* to suit Japanese monastic life (Ishida 1986b, 359) requires further in-depth consideration.

69. Bielefeldt (1994) has analyzed Enni's 圓爾 *Guide to Seated Meditation* (J. *Zazenron* 坐禪論) which arguably provides a further clear link between Northern school type practices and Eisai's understanding of Zen.

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