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The Settler Complex: An Introduction

Patrick Wolfe

Settlers generally have a lot to say about work, sacrifice, and earning things the hard way. The refrain is familiar, the implication constant: We deserve what we have—or, more pointedly: We have a right to this land. This right is of the settlers' own dispensation, a vernacular Lockeanism drawn loosely from the handbook of supremacist apologetics that Robert Williams has termed the discourses of conquest.¹ This all-weather rationale for dispossession is so thoroughgoing that the subject and object of the colonial claim become indistinguishable. As the settler takes over the territory, so does the territory take over the settler—hence the distinctive vascular condition of having the land run in one's blood. Land is settler colonialism's irreducible essence in ways that go well beyond real estate. Its seizure is not merely a change of ownership but a genesis, the onset of a whole new way of being—for both parties. Settlers are not born. They are made in the dispossessing, a ceaseless obligation that has to be maintained across the generations if the Natives are not to come back. Along with the land, then, come identity, selfhood, family, belonging, all the qualities that make us fight. Thus the frequency with which settlers assert their industry is not surprising. The stakes could not be higher. The repetition is compulsive. It bespeaks a primal anxiety. The settler work imperative may or may not be Protestant, and it may or may not be ethical, but it is always exculpatory.

Considering the emphasis that settlers place on individual diligence, the extent to which they rely on the efforts of others is striking. When colonists first arrive, they generally try to persuade the Natives to work for them. With the exception of some

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industries, however (such as Andean mining for the Spanish, Aboriginal labor in the Australian cattle industry, and, of course, sexual servitude), this option is typically abandoned before very long. In principle, it is not good policy to incur reliance on a population that one is simultaneously seeking to eliminate, nor to promote the survival of the bearers of sovereignties that exceed the settler import. In practice, the possibilities for escape are favorable for enslaved Natives whose coercion is taking place in the midst of a surrounding network of support systems. Moreover, unlike Africans, whose proximity to Europe meant that they had shared Europe's diseases for centuries, Natives succumbed in large numbers to the exotic pestilences that settlers introduced.² For reasons such as these, Natives were generally held unsuitable for colonial labor, duly becoming lazy, dishonest, and unreliable in the settler scheme of things.³

It is noteworthy that their putative incapacity for work did not actually reside in any qualities that inhered in Natives themselves. Rather, it was geographic. Natives were deemed unsuitable for work to the extent that they remained in their own country. Move them somewhere else, and they could become good workers on the spot, as in the case of the "blackbirded" Fijians whose stringent exploitation has been recounted by Tracey Banivanua Mar.⁴ Disparaged at home as irredeemable cannibals who needed to be replaced by indentured South Asians, these Natives turned out to be well suited for labor on Queensland sugar plantations, where they were transported so that settlers could avoid reliance on local Aboriginal people. Analogously, Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville, founder of New Orleans, advised the French crown to exchange local Natives for Africans enslaved on Caribbean plantations, his reason being that, while the Indians could hardly run away from the islands, once the Africans had arrived in Louisiana their propensity to escape would be countered by fear of the surrounding Indians.⁵ The capacity or incapacity for colonial labor is site-specific.

Ubiquitously, therefore, settlers bring their labor with them, usually already coerced, whether as slaves, convicts, indenturees, *Mizrahim*, or other subordinated categories (in some times and places, being Irish would do). The upshot is plurality, the goal of settler dominion being pursued by means of a range of suppressive and divisive strategies that are typically framed in the idiom of race.⁶ Moreover, settlers not only rely on the labor of variously colonized groups of immigrants, but also acquire territory that has previously been improved by Natives, whether through agriculture (whereby Natives endowed Europe with corn, tobacco, tomatoes, and other produce), through fire-farming (producing grasslands), through fish management (which Lindsey Schneider discusses below), through restraining predation (whereby the buffalo and, in their place, cattle prospered), or through any number of other technologies. In the case of Palestine, settlers acquired not only crops and orchards but, as in the earlier case of Ireland, whole cities.⁷ The land that settlers seize is already value-added. There is no such thing as wilderness, which typically testifies to depopulation.⁸

Settlers' dependence on the work of others engenders complexity—most obviously, demographic complexity, itself a reflection of imperialism's global interconnectedness, but also the discursive and psychological complexities that are involved in the construction and maintenance of viable settler subjecthoods. To invoke Raymond Williams, settler colonialism promotes distinctive structures of feeling, affective predispositions,

and ways of being in the world that accompany the continuing dispossession of Native peoples in ways that oblige our analyses to move beyond the formal instrumentalities of statecraft, law-making, economic accumulation, and policy formation.⁹ As Beenash Jafri's investigation of settler desire illustrates, colonial subjectivities are inescapably bound up in the wider field of identity politics, ultimately in the intense classificatory contestation over positionality: who is a settler and who a Native? Far from being obvious, this apparently statistical distinction becomes the primary battleground of post-frontier settler social relations, its clamor penetrating the most intimate reaches of individual consciousness. We should beware of viewing demography as simply a matter of raw numbers, as many demographers assume. The numbers are not raw. They are the outcome of differentiating processes that assign human subjects to social categories. Differentiation is an intensely conflictual matter. As noted, the stakes are high. If the one-drop rule applying to Black people in the United States were applied to Aboriginal people in Australia, Australia could become an Aboriginal nation overnight. In declaring that the sovereign decides who is to be included and who excluded, therefore, Carl Schmitt was only telling part of the story.¹⁰ Assimilation does not merely include (and, thereby, reciprocally exclude). It positively produces the occupants of those categories in the first place. To breed White is to make anew. Assimilation reverses the republican formula: rather than the people constituting the government, the government constitutes the people.

The policing of social divisions is rendered all the more fraught in a context of settler expansion, which occurs both territorially and demographically. Settler hegemony is challenged by the demanding presence of large numbers of recently arrived immigrants, still undomesticated to new-world civic norms. Edmund Morgan described how slavery enabled the founding fathers to preempt the problems that a discontented "giddy multitude" of poor Whites would have posed for civic order in colonial Virginia. It was not just that slaveholding was inconsistent, or coincided by accident, with the universal ideals expressed in the rights of man. It was not just that the founding fathers were hypocrites. Rather, slavery was preconditional to the liberal-democratic principles that the leaders of the revolution enunciated—no Black bondage, no White liberty.¹¹ For all its virtues, however, Morgan's analysis largely failed to spell out the contribution that Natives were obliged to make to the development of settler democracy. It has taken Aziz Rana, nearly four decades on, to explore how the "essential connection between liberty and subordination" required the dispossession of Indigenous people just as foundationally as it did the enslavement of Africans.¹² Quite apart from the inherently expansive character of capitalist accumulation and the sleepless cupidity of speculators, both of which conduced to the ever-mobile frontier of Native dispossession—and, in turn, to the constant need for more immigrants to work the ever-expanding national estate—settler democracy required a constant supply of new territory with which to satisfy the proprietary aspirations of its burgeoning population, aspirations which, after all, had brought most of them to the country in the first place. As it remorselessly ground on, the permanent but ever-moving frontier war brought together every dimension of settler selfhood: the material discourse of economic advancement, the national discourse of militarism, the ideological discourse

of democratic theory, and the psychological discourse of settler subject-formation participating inseparably in the process of Native dispossession. In Rana's dense encapsulation, "If the republican goals of economic independence and freedom as self-rule necessitated territorial expansion, they also required enough people to work the land and to participate in projects of [Native] conquest."¹³

Morgan was by no means alone in understating Native dispossession in relation to slavery. Measured against the prominence of African American studies, in which the topics of slavery and Jim Crow predominate (even, it seems to me, in relation to civil rights), the place that Native American studies occupies in the contemporary US academy is at best marginal.¹⁴ The point is not to discount the importance of Black history. That is obvious and unquestionable. It is to deplore the relative devaluation of Native history. There is no competition. One history of persecution does not diminish another. Both have taken place. Both are foundational to the development of US society and its trademark democratic institutions. Both live on in the present. Certainly, the Indian population is smaller (and, in many cases, out of sight on reservations), but that is the whole point. The Jewish population of Germany is small as well, but nobody suggests that this makes the history of Jews in Germany relatively unimportant. Condescension is the scholarly face of the ongoing elimination of Native American people. The core project still to be adequately foregrounded and resourced in US history is the redressive inquiry into how it came to be, and has continued to be, that Indians are marginal and largely invisible in their own land. Failing the proper promotion of this project, US history simply belongs to the victors.

We cannot appreciate the centrality of Native history if we artificially isolate it from its wider sociohistorical context, quarantining it in scholarly specialization. A thing can only be central to something wider than itself. Thus settler-colonial studies should not ratify the pedagogical fragmentation of US (or any other) history into a plethora of disconnected sub-disciplines whose mutual distancing serves to obscure the systemic concertedness of the whole.¹⁵ Settler-colonial studies must not allow itself to become Native studies under another name. Disdaining unseemly comparative evaluations—"which is worse?"—between (to stay with the US case) Indian dispossession and Black slavery, we should delineate their mutuality. To do so, we do not have to look very far. Take, for example, two of the highest-profile topics in Native American studies and African American studies respectively, typically taught in separate courses at college level: the Jackson-era Indian removals and plantation slavery in the Deep South. The emperor's-new-clothes response should come as no surprise: Indian removal and plantation slavery were two sides of the same coin. As Ronald Takaki needed no more than a sentence to explain: "In order to make way for White settlement and the expansion of both cotton cultivation and the market, some 70,000 Choctaws, Creeks, Cherokees, Seminoles, and Chickasaws were uprooted and deprived of their lands, and hundreds of thousands of blacks were moved into the Southwest to work the soil as slaves."¹⁶ This scenario is classically Lockean. Private property, as John Locke famously provided, accrued from the admixture of labor and land, an entailment that was faithfully color-coded in the Deep South, where the

application of Black people's labor to Red people's land produced the White man's property, a primitive accumulation if ever there was one.

Accordingly, we should recognize both societies, Native and enslaved, as colonized—in different ways but to the same end. The two were of antithetical yet complementary value to settler society. Whereas Black people were valuable commodities, Indians got in the way of settler expansion. Though politically excluded, therefore, slaves were carefully—albeit not kindly—preserved, to the extent that their numbers continued to grow after slave imports were finally halted in 1808. In the Indian case, by contrast, no effort was spared to eliminate them, by whatever means should prove available (which varied according to context).¹⁷ The consequences of this antithetical complementarity have been maintained into the long run, manifesting today in the demographic disparity whereby Indians continue to find themselves marginalized. These consequences are by no means confined to the academy. Politically, they entail a difference—which, while inessential, has on occasion proved obstructive—between Native interests and those of African Americans. For example, when Black people in the USA campaigned for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, much of their political program centered on the demand to be treated equally with Whites. At the same time, however, treating Indians the same as Whites—which is to say, assimilating them into mainstream society—was a settler-colonial strategy that the Native American political movement, in common with the Aboriginal political movement in Australia, was striving to resist. The politics of the head count is inimical to Native sovereignty.¹⁸

A major implication for antiracist collaboration is the need to recognize the shared provenance of such differences in the White man's imposition of the colonial rule of private property. Yes, some Indians were involved in Black slavery, and, yes, some Blacks participated in Indian dispossession, but neither Indians nor Blacks were responsible for instigating these systemic crimes. The liberal discomfort occasioned by the occurrence of tensions between Indians and Blacks reflects a universalism that takes for granted a pastiche of differences—colors, races, minorities, ethnicities—on a multicultural canvas that levels the varied histories that produced these differences in the first place. Historically analyzed, these apparent conflicts of sectional interest emerge as traces of the complementary roles—in this case, territorial expropriation and chattel slavery—into which different conquered populations have been coerced by colonial settlers. These distinct modes of coercion together subtended the overarching system of Euro-American settler colonialism, so solidarities should be framed at this more encompassing level.¹⁹ For an activist scholarship to hope to make a difference, it has to inscribe both the variety distinguishing colonized people's historical experiences and their overarching complementarity. To this end, there could hardly be a better place to start than race.

As Matthew Jacobson and others have shown, the demographic hothouse that was US society in the expansive nineteenth century engendered classificatory convolutions as White authorities strove to preserve Anglo-Protestant hegemony in the face of the ever-shifting balance of populations that large-scale immigration was bringing about. At various stages, the boundaries of whiteness were stretched to accommodate "Hindus" and even—despite the steady exclusion of the Chinese—some Japanese (though not, of course, for long).²⁰ If David Roediger and Noel Ignatieff are to be

believed, those singularly unlikely Blacks, the Irish, were rendered White some time around the middle of the nineteenth century.²¹ As I have noted elsewhere, in the wake of Black emancipation (state by state in the North,) the racial category “mulatto” was abandoned along with the juridical category “free black.”²² In the Native case, the end of the US frontier ushered in a new mode of programmatic whitening in the form of the blood-quantum calculus that initially attended the Dawes-era allotting of reservation land.²³ Comparably, in Australia, generations of Aboriginal children were stolen for whiteness, while, in Palestine/Israel, in the wake of the *nakba*, Mizrahi Arabs, some of them Palestinian, were obliged to relinquish their Arabness and become second-class Jews.²⁴ There is nothing insubstantial or superstructural about identity politics, which culminates and reproduces colonial subordination into the present. Race is a trace of history.

Given the variety of historical experiences that underlie different regimes of race, a plural formula would be more rigorous, if less felicitous: races are traces of histories. By now, we all appreciate that race (the master category) is a cultural construction, but that cannot be an end to the matter. Rather than a conclusion, the banal fact that race is culturally constructed constitutes a set of questions: how are races constructed, under what circumstances, and in whose interests? In the case of blackness in the United States, for example, it seems that the racial category is one thing on which colonizer and colonized can agree. For the purposes of White supremacy, a rigorous policing of the boundary between White and Black sanitizes the White stock, while, from Black people’s point of view, “passing” is antisocial behavior; maintenance of the color line keeps up community numbers. For Black Australians, however—who are Indigenous rather than descended from an enslaved population—to pass as White is to submit to official assimilation policies which, for over a century, have sought to eliminate Aborigines from the demographic reckoning, and which have included strategies that fall squarely within the terms of the UN Convention on Genocide.²⁵ In Aboriginal people’s case, the disagreement between colonizer and colonized is a life-or-death matter, as it is for Native people in the United States. Thus empirical regimes of race not only vary, but also serve a variety of collective interests, not necessarily those of the colonizer alone. Conversely, the promotion of racialized identities from below does not necessarily further the interests of the colonized. When insurgent classifications misguidedly seek to promote unworkable solidarities through obfuscating or homogenizing away the different historical experiences that underlie ethnoracial specificity, they recapitulate assimilationism (which, after all, is an erasure of difference). Understandable though its motivation is, therefore—and quite apart from its dubious reliance on phenotype—the “people of color” classification falls into this trap. Less understandable are incoherent generalities such as the so-called “global commons,” which seem designed to open the doors of subaltern solidarity to privileged professionals.²⁶ Whatever their motivations, however, in their blindness to history the undifferentiated categories risk encouraging discord rather than solidarity. Paradoxical as it may seem, to homogenize is to divide—which leaves White people doing the ruling.

This is not to say that the answer is simple heterogeneity. Assimilation is multiply deceptive. In the guise of multiculturalism, a semblance of heterogeneity not only

sustains a subtler privileging of whiteness, as the work of Ghassan Hage has shown.²⁷ Where Native people are concerned, it effaces their specificity within a welter of undifferentiated (and generally trivialized) “differences.” Natives are not just another tile in the multicultural mosaic. On the introduction of multiculturalism, the fact of assimilation does not change, merely the surface contours of the settler matrix into which the irritant of Native people’s uniquely originary status is to be dissolved.

The antidote to multiculturalism’s leveling effect is history, an inherently geographic history at that. The simplest definition of Indigenous people, after all, is that they are the only ones who have not come from somewhere else. In US cities, these transnational somewhere-elses find approximate reconfiguration in the ethnic zoning of residential neighborhoods, where geography recapitulates the myriad historical departures whose convergence makes up the settler present, patchily undoing imperialism’s global complexity at the local level. This collection addresses that complexity, in particular Natives’ place within it—or, more strictly, alongside it. Race and place are inextricable. As is well known, for example, in the US South the defining feature of an “uppity black”—which is to say, a candidate for lynching—was a failure to know his place, while “Wetback” recalls a history of crossing over. In Australia, the settler euphemism for the massacring of Aboriginal people was an intrinsically spatial metaphor: dispersal.²⁸ In anti-Semitic parlance, Jews somehow managed to combine confinement to the Pale of Settlement—or, locally, to the ghetto—with universal wandering. As Ben Silverstein quotes apartheid-era South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster: “If I were to wake up one morning and find myself a black man, the only major difference would be geographical.”²⁹ Thus we might adapt Mary Douglas’s timeless insight that dirt is matter out of place to the human domain: race denotes certain peoples as being out of place, rendering historically migratory populations inherently dirty, as we see in the ubiquitous linkage of race and hygiene.³⁰

The remedy for a people being out of place is, after all, ethnic cleansing. But it strains even settler credulity to assert that Natives have come from somewhere else. What is more, the strain shows through, as in the frisson that the stock icons of Indigenous tradition provoke in settler consciousness, with its alienated envy of Indigenous spirituality. This is nowhere more apparent than in the commodification of Australian Aboriginal art, an industry that offers settlers thirsting for meaning an opportunity to join the dots. In the discourse that I term repressive authenticity, settlers’ eagerness to connect with an unalloyed pristine Aboriginality is a dream—not the Dreamtime so celebrated in that discourse, but a dream in the strict Freudian sense of the fulfillment of a wish: the wish to undo the uncomfortable reality of invasion.³¹ In the outcome, the miraculous bilocationism of a jaded European spirituality is reversed. Rather than the saintly capacity for the same person to be in two places at once, settler ideology conjures up a strange condensation whereby two populations can apparently occupy the same locality without encroaching on each other. This is achieved by means of a misplaced de-concretizing of the Indigenous party, which figures as an ethereal cohabitant that does not actually take up space. Though co-present in place, this otherworldly partner belongs in a different time (Johannes Fabian’s “denial of coevalness”).³² It belongs in the time before the frontier, an Edenic fantasy in which the innocence that counts is on

the settler's part rather than the Native's.³³ Hence settler states' apparently contradictory appropriation of stereotypical signifiers of Indigenous tradition: dot paintings on airplanes, Indian chiefs on nickels, and so on. Hence also the consternation arising when Aboriginal artists have the temerity to lapse into a realism that makes the miseries of dispossession recognizable.³⁴ As an Australian minister for the arts commented to Jon Altman, who was attempting to lobby him on behalf of Aboriginal artists: "There's two things I like about Aboriginal art. It's colorful, and it's non-political."³⁵

In the form of the Native, White supremacism confronts a threat that stymies its spatially constructed racial categories. When they attempted to deport colored aliens from the White man's paradise in the South Pacific, the architects of the White Australia Policy had to deal with the fact that there existed no external homeland to which Aboriginal people could plausibly be assigned.³⁶ Natives were out of place for the reason that they were so stubbornly in place. The remedy was assimilation, which was adopted as the internal correlate to deportation. If they could not be banished somewhere else, they would have to be banished inwards. In the absence of the ability to resort to Negro colonization—sending them back to Africa—Aborigines could not be sent anywhere in particular.³⁷ Dispersal has no destination. The outcome was a discursive split whereby authentic Aboriginality was conceded a vague locale whose principal characteristic was its remoteness from White settlement, while those scheduled for assimilation, Indigenous people who existed within the areas of White settlement, especially urban ones, forfeited their authenticity. In the settler romance with savagery, nobility is a function of distance.

The split between reverence for a rarefied construction of Native tradition and discomfort in the presence of empirical Aboriginality is a symptom of a settler-nationalist double bind that I have noted previously: "On the one hand, settler society required the practical elimination of the Natives in order to establish itself on their territory. On the symbolic level, however, settler society subsequently sought to recuperate Indigeneity in order to express its difference—and, accordingly, its independence—from the mother country."³⁸ This problem for statecraft has a psychological counterpart. In the contradictory tension involved in simultaneously desiring and rejecting the Native, ambivalence emerges as a primary settler affect. Tinged with inferiority-anxiety, this ambivalence is sharpened by an exilic nostalgia for the homeland that coexists rather awkwardly with the new-world patriotism of much settler discourse—apparent, for example, in the extolling of Whiteness as a legacy of Saxon descent.³⁹ The primal quality of this affective double bind sheds some light on the barbarity characterizing settlers' treatment of colonized populations. As Douglas also noted, cleansing is a response to danger, to the existential threat that dirt poses to purity.⁴⁰

Thus it is not helpful to assume an epistemological divide between imperial institutions and individual predispositions, since the two work through each other. As Maya Mikdashi notes, "ideological and political commitments are, deep down, affective states."⁴¹ In my view, the most successful theoretical expression of this conformity is still (*pace* Michel Foucault) Louis Althusser's much-misused concept of interpellation, which located individuals' consent to the ideological workings of the capitalist state in the primary mechanisms of identity-formation. Interpellation does not create subjects.

It reminds us that we already are subjects, an endless ideological refurbishing that confounds the rationality of choice.⁴² For all its strengths, however, Althusser's account was unsatisfactorily ideational. It identified the psychological level at which ideology addresses its message, but not the compulsive quality of its appeal. In his evocative studies of ritual and drama, modes of experience that take us deep into the affective realm, Victor Turner touched on the multifarious ways in which, to use his incisive formulation, ideology makes the obligatory desirable.⁴³ As Ann Stoler showed us, desire animates the day-to-day workings of the colonial project.⁴⁴ There could hardly be more telling evocations of the mutuality binding the global architecture of imperial formations to the stirrings of individual consciousness than Mikdashi's and Jafri's otherwise quite different accounts of settler-colonial complexity.⁴⁵

Growing up in exile in Beirut, a focal center of the Palestine diaspora, Mikdashi was only too aware of Palestinian dispossession. Only later in life did she learn that, in addition to incorporating the last site of European settler colonialism, the Arab world, her inheritance also incorporated one of the first.⁴⁶ Mikdashi is both Lebanese and Ojibwe. The imbalance between the twin poles of her identity sprang from a depressingly familiar settler interpellation: a certain shamefacedness about being Indian. Settler colonialism, she observes, "is an inherited silence where your memories are supposed to be." Refreshingly, her eventual enlightenment resulted from her grandfather's increasing assertion of their shared Native ancestry. But colonialism is a messy business. Its reverberations continue to trouble even a rehabilitated consciousness. The centuries, the ocean, and the miles separating the invasion of Ojibwe from the invasion of Palestine dissolve into a concerted dilemma: "Why," Mikdashi asks herself, "do I feel the ongoing *nakba* (the catastrophe) that was (and is) the settling of the United States when I have not paid its price? . . . In the United States, settler colonialism has been so complete and so successful, that the world has forgotten that South Africa, Canada, Australia, and Israel are all reproductions of the triumphant American model."⁴⁷

As a structure rather than an event, invasion strives to consolidate itself in the domesticated setting of the post-frontier era, where it seeks to recede into invisibility. In this regard, an against-all-odds strength (which Palestinians call "*sumoud*," or steadfastness) is an unintended consequence of the sustained outrage being perpetrated against Palestine in the modern world. With Israel terminally bogged down in the frontier stage of dispossession, and no sign of the forked-tongue programs of assimilation that have so complicated the avenues for Native resistance in post-frontier settler states, the Palestinian predicament may be more urgent but it is also simpler. Moreover, in contrast to the initial dispossession of Native peoples in North America and Australasia, Israel's activities are being conducted in the open-access era of the cell phone and Internet, a situation that poses obvious dangers for a supportive global hegemony that secures compliance through appeals to freedom and equality. In this and other regards, therefore—and contrary to current appearances—Palestinians have strategic advantages that augur well for the future. This hopeful scenario has major implications for other Native peoples as well. Our growing recognition that Zionism is settler colonialism pure and simple (which Palestinians have known all along) not only illuminates the unacceptability of Israel's behavior. It also illuminates the

unacceptability of settler colonialism per se. Freedom and democracy for Palestine can be of collateral benefit for Natives in other places as well.

In common with Mikdash's reflections, though through a very different lens, Jafri's discussion brings imperial articulations home to roost in individual affect. There could be no barer expression of the founding settler-colonial binarism than the eternal polarity of cowboys and Indians. When Lewis Henry Morgan, railroad entrepreneur and pioneer of kinship studies, thought that his investigations had shown that Native Americans were displaced Dravidians who had emigrated from South India some time in the mists of antiquity, he seized the opportunity to upstage Columbus. In calling Native Americans Indians, it now turned out, Columbus had accidentally been right all along: "By a singular coincidence error was truth" (!)⁴⁸ But even Morgan might have been hard-pressed to imagine a *cowboy* who was really "Indian" (i.e., South Asian). A problem for Jafri's central character(s), nerdy Nick and his manly alter ego Guru, is that everyone else finds it hard to imagine an Indian cowboy too. Jafri's insightful foray into the charged interplay of cosmopolitan male desiring that this deceptively profound allegory conjures up presupposes imperialism's global division of labor. Guru/Nick is in the wrong colony. India is (was) a franchise colony, a place that Englishmen visited rather than settled, their motive being exploitation rather than elimination. For a colonized subject in the passive sense to cross oceans and become a colonizing subject in the active sense—a brown cowboy—is multiply anomalous in ways that go well beyond accidents of nomenclature. Jafri's astutely chosen saga should bring home to us the full extent of the imperial networks over which White men have presided. As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have documented, Whiteness is a global production, self-consciously fostered by a network of imperialist politicians whose collaboration transcended national boundaries.⁴⁹ It is a commonplace that the White man's burden was borne by Natives, but we should keep in mind that the object of Kipling's legendary appeal was not pith-helmeted Englishmen perspiring away in the tropics but newly post-frontier Americans, whom he was urging to move on to the Philippines: "Take up the White Man's burden / Ye dare not stoop to less / Nor call too loud on Freedom / To cloak your weariness."⁵⁰ This vicarious exhortation, relayed to Americans by a man who epitomized the British raj (and who appreciated the rhetorical value of freedom), dramatizes the transnational reach of a White-imperial subjecthood that was impervious to distinctions of metropolis and periphery. Where there were White men, there was superiority—an imperial conceit that served to secure popular acquiescence at home as much as it hardened settler resolve on the frontier. Our investigations into the affective dimensions of settler colonialism should be no less global in their scope than our investigations into the economic and political dimensions. As Jafri's protagonist himself urges, "head out east, Indian cowboy!"⁵¹ Horace Greeley meets Herman Hesse. Ever the twain shall do so.

Nor should our investigations into the transferred burden of settler-colonial productivity be confined to the quantifiable realm of physical labor, central though that is. His eye attuned to the ruses of colonial transference, Isaiah Wilner returns to Franz Boas's much-perused memoirs of his experiences with the Kwakwaka'wakw people of Vancouver Island, an encounter that was formative for Boas's enunciation

of the humane epistemology of cultural relativism, which ultimately undid the evolutionist inequities of scientific racism. Understood as a gift of Boas, however, cultural relativism begs the Maussian question of reciprocity: what had the Natives done to warrant this largesse? The ethnographic answer is simple: they had just been there, to be observed and eventually theorized over, presumably somewhere else. Indeed, if Natives had proactively intervened in Boas's deliberations, it might have jeopardized the scientific impartiality of participant observation. In contrast to this conventional image of mute anthropological subjection, Wilner finds that Boas's own recollections secrete a diametrically different division of theoretical labor. Rather than Boas occupying an Archimedean elevation from which he could situate the Kwakwaka'wakw *weltanschauung* in relation to others, it was Boas himself who got relativized—or, as Wilner mordantly puts it, civilized—by the Kwakwaka'wakw.⁵² Under the influence of a Kwakwaka'wakw intellectual, the bilingual cultural broker George Hunt (also known as ᠠᠵᠢᠴᠣᠭᠤᠯᠠ, Qōmoqōē, and Nō'ᠯᠠᠭᠠᠯᠠᠯᠠ,) Wilner argues, Boas was converted from a divisive relativism that focused on difference to a dynamic universalism that focused on the diversity that makes up human unity, a perspectival shift that would largely be lost on Boas's disciplinary acolytes as cultural relativism became institutionalized in twentieth-century US anthropology departments. Despite its attenuated transmission, however, Boas's perspective was to have a profound impact on Western thought, transforming the nineteenth-century ethnocentrism of German romanticism, Boas's natal inheritance, into the twentieth-century pluralism of the liberal academy. Or so the story runs, in a received account that could have been penned by Kipling himself. In practice, as Wilner insists, the burden of agency was the other way round. Rather than mutely exemplifying cultural relativism, the Kwakwaka'wakw had formulated the perspective in the first place, subsequently enlisting Boas to channel their insight to the wider world, a “global potlatch” that has produced a “wealth of thought” for international society. In this work of ethnographic ventriloquism, for all of Boas's strategically invaluable positioning, the part he performed was the familiar subaltern role of bearer.⁵³ The gift came from the Kwakwaka'wakw, still awaiting reciprocation. Wilner's conclusion is appropriately redressive: “It is never too late to return the feast.”⁵⁴

The transference of colonial agency extends so far that, not content with claiming the Native's efforts as its own, settler ideology even holds those efforts against the Native. Colonialism is a historical process through which both parties become transformed. In the settler case, this transformation is self-justifying. Settlers are defined by change, optimistically represented as progress. By contrast, change on the Native's part figures, again Edenically, as a fall from grace, the grace of authenticity. The double bind that settler ambivalence imposes on the Native penalizes compliance, inviting Natives to rise to the level of colonial civility while rewarding those who are seen to do so with the reproach of mimicry. The fact that settlers owe their advancement to their engagement with Natives is the first casualty of this discourse, which holds the two parties out as independently self-generating. Dependency theory's core insight, which remains valuable despite the baroque elaborations of world-systems theory, was that colonialism is a relationship: one party develops at the expense of the other.⁵⁵ A consequence of the settler solipsism that denies this relationship, claiming White privilege

as the seal of an inherent and spontaneously generated superiority, is that the very modernity that resulted from colonization becomes barred to its primary producers. In a world premised on novelty, Natives innovate at their peril.

Thus Jean Dennison's untroubled presentation of ribbon work as an Osage thing to do is a piece of scholarly direct action, putting the refusal of colonial categories into immediate intellectual practice. And why not? Contradictions, as she observes, citing Philip Deloria, only manifest when expectations have been breached: "Expectations, in other words, serve as a fundamental tool of settlement, limiting the kinds of spaces American Indians are comfortably able to inhabit."⁵⁶ Osage stitchers initially acquired their ribbons the same way Europeans acquired their furs, through colonial exchanges. As British hatmakers were turning these furs into palace guardsmen's ceremonial busbies, Osage were also making something culturally distinctive from the fruits of the colonial encounter. "In picking up the pieces of fabric," Dennison asserts, "both those torn apart by the colonial process and those created by it, and stitching them into their own original patterns, Osage people have artfully formed the tangled ribbons of colonialism into their own statements of Osage sovereignty."⁵⁷ The invocation of sovereignty is not incidental. In domesticating colonial produce to Osage ways, ribbon work provides Dennison with an active metaphor for the tense political engagements in which she and other Osage have been participating for the past few years, a politics whose entangled sovereignty, Kevin Bruyneel's "third space," sidesteps the reproaches of derivativeness and contradiction.⁵⁸ Indian sovereignty is a pragmatic business. In your scholarship as much as in your stitching or your constitution-writing, just do it.

The idea that Natives cannot legitimately deploy a modernity that is the proper preserve of White people becomes even more insidious when other colonized groups are involved. We have already seen how the Indian cowboy was in the wrong colony. What of the Native rapper?—Red skin, Black mask? Here, the continuing reverberations of colonial histories are particularly visceral. As Eminem showed, albeit exceptionally proving the rule, Whites can rap—well, almost. In his case, coming from a trailer park provided a compensation of sorts for his lack of blackness. Put historically, this is to say that having a lumpenproletariat present can almost make up for not having had an enslaved past. Class can almost furnish absolution from race. In the case of Whites and Blacks, the historical basis for the racial division that Eminem partly compromised is straightforwardly Cartesian: White is to Black as governance is to labor and, accordingly—or ultimately—as mind is to body (hence the disruptive impact of rap's uncompromising intellectualism). What, then, of Natives' historical relationship to rap (or, more widely, to hip-hop)? As observed, the high value that settler society placed on slave physicality antithetically complemented the logic of elimination as it applied to Native people, whose physicality was reciprocally negated. As the one-drop rule demonstrates, an irony of the Jim Crow-era policing of White racial purity was that it made Black blood fearsomely strong. By contrast, blood quantum subverts the integrity of Native bloodlines, which it seeks to eliminate. While hip-hop accords with the historical accommodation of an unruly Black virility, therefore, its appropriation by Natives threatens to undo the vanishing of the Vanishing Indian—which is presumably one of the reasons for their appropriating

it. Hip-hop is everywhere, impervious to the confining spatialities of reservation or ghetto. As Amsterdam quotes MC Red Cloud, “You know no matter where you’re at, whether you’re in Los Angeles or whether you’re in freaking Saskatoon, a train will run through your town covered in graffiti and that’s hip hop.”⁵⁹ Part participation, part observation (you can’t write like this without being part of hip-hop), Amsterdam’s chapter deftly repudiates the Scylla that hip-hop that isn’t Black can only be derivative, while simultaneously brushing off the Charybdis of an arthritically frozen concept of Native tradition (itself a symptom of Edenic thinking). Amsterdam adapts Derrida to proclaim that taking on heritage is an act of reverent rebellion: an individual honors elements of a past, but defies the limitations of “tradition” by claiming hip-hop as an expression of Native heritage, defying categorization as resistance or accommodation, allowing an individual the utility and mobility of choice, strategy, and play.⁶⁰

Amsterdam is not the only writer in this collection to emphasize cultural survival. In our different ways, we all do. There is good reason for this. Indigenous people in settler colonies confront challenges that go beyond Kipling. For them, the issue is not so much the transferral of agency as its very possibility, the possibility of life itself. As observed, settlers’ primary goal is not to exploit the Natives but to replace them. In the Appalachians, as Stephen Pearson recounts, this replacement is taken to the limit in a kind of retrospective identity theft. Citing Lorenzo Veracini, Pearson terms this usurpation “self-indigenization.”⁶¹ Like its Israeli counterpart, Appalachian self-indigenization does not rest content with denying the Native presence. It even denies that there ever was one, extolling settlers as not just native to the region, an accident of individual births, but as the Natives of the region—a collective claim to historical priority. This barefacedly counterfactual claim is blithely immune to rebuttal; as Pearson notes, the very name “Appalachian” was involuntarily furnished by the Apalachee people. Perhaps more surprising—given the misleading singularity attaching to Cherokee removal in settler historiography—is the fact that even White American schoolchildren know how Natives came to leave Appalachia (whether or not they acknowledge how many stayed behind.) For all its bizarreness, however, we should not see the Appalachian case as isolated. Rather, as Pearson is careful to note, the case shows how “even in late settler colonies Native presence remains an unsettling factor challenging the legitimacy of ongoing settler occupancy.”⁶² The point recalls the dot-painted Qantas jets. As colonial fragments of the mother country, settler societies characteristically resort to appropriating Indigenous symbolism in order to consecrate the tie they seek to forge between their foreign blood and the local soil. Pearson’s remarkable saga of mass impersonation may represent an extreme, but the settler anxiety that it symptomatizes is a more general phenomenon.

The complexities of colonial transference mean that there can be no fixed meanings and no innocent narratives. In the wrong hands, the right message can backfire. Moreover, as observed, insurgent categories can misguide. Adria Imada meticulously pulls apart the multiplicity of discordant messages that jostle under the surface of the palimpsest (her word) of Hawai’i’s most famous song.⁶³ It was written by Lili’uokalani, who would go on to become the last queen of Hawai’i. She would be overthrown in 1893, and the Hawaiian monarchy terminated, by a small group of US planters and

missionaries, acting under the warrant of the unconstitutional “Bayonet Constitution” and backed up by soldiers sent ashore from the USS *Boston*. Despite some diplomatic vacillation in the immediate aftermath of this coup—in the course of which President Grover Cleveland stated that the provisional government the settler clique had set up “owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States”—the so-called “Republic of Hawaii” (no glottal stop) was recognized by the State Department as soon as it proclaimed itself, fittingly enough on July 4, 1894.⁶⁴ Following these events, Lili‘uokalani became a living symbol of the violated Hawaiian monarchy and, by extension, of Kanaka Maoli’s violated sovereignty as a whole. On this basis, it might be expected that her metonymic song, “Aloha ‘Oe,” would come to constitute a Hawaiian “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika” or “Va, Pensiero,” an anthem of rebellion to be sung at the risk of official retaliation. Yet, as Imada absorbingly describes, it rapidly became *de rigeur* for the song to be played to American tourists as they disembarked in Honolulu, while, in the United States, it became the most published Hawaiian song of the twentieth century: “a musical standard, beloved by Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians alike, that has been resurrected, remixed, rearranged, and performed by the likes of Elvis Presley . . . and Johnny Cash.”⁶⁵ Moreover, the song’s marketing to US audiences was not simply a desublimatory misappropriation through which its political significance was erased, since it was even wrongly represented as having been written while Lili‘uokalani was in prison (she actually experienced house—or palace—arrest) after the coup. Through all this, however, the song could still—in the right hands—provide an avenue for the expression of what Imada calls “anticolonial and counter-colonial desires” on the part of the peripatetic Hawaiian National[ist] Band.⁶⁶ The song is not over, and its conflicting melodies linger on.

Lili‘uokalani’s centrality to Kanaka Maoli politics notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that, following the unification of Hawai‘i under King Kamehameh I in 1810, its rulers had in many respects molded Hawaiian political institutions in conformity to Western colonial models. This is not to dismiss the Hawaiian monarchy as an archipelagic version of settler-conceived bureaucracies like the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islanders Commission, or the Palestine Authority (in this respect, the relevant analog is the Office of Hawaiian Affairs). It is merely to note, once again, the practical constraints that closeness to great power imposes on the exercise of Indigenous sovereignties. Natives have learned to bide their time. In common with settler colonialism as a whole, a total institution whose labyrinthine penetration of the deepest reaches of social life is abundantly illustrated in this collection, the constraining of Indigenous sovereignties is not restricted to the formal domains of settler-state institutions. My earliest experience of Australian popular politics was through the Aboriginal land rights movement. To my embarrassment today, it took me some time to realize that land rights and environmentalism were not synonymous. My category-error was encouraged by a lapel badge distributed by the White-run section of the movement that I joined—which, I have to admit, I wore with pride for a good while—that proclaimed the slogan: “Land Rights, not uranium.” The prospect of there being land rights *and* uranium was beyond the imagining of this politics, which smugly saw itself as fighting for Aborigines’ right to do what the campaigners thought they should do. The point is not, of course, to advocate the mining of uranium. It is

to stress that colonialism is not a matter of good guys and bad guys. On the contrary, its most injurious effects more often than not flow from collaborations, compromises, good intentions, and, once again, misguided insurgencies (with friends like these. . .).⁶⁷ As Indian political groups' interchanges with the civil rights movement showed, we cannot assume easy coalitions or make solidarities conditional on equivalence. Two of the essays in this collection address this crucial issue in relation to two separate but strategically proximate arenas of oppositional discourse, environmentalism and Queer.

Lindsey Schneider starts from the premise—no less overlooked for being obvious—that land is not just land. Rather, the abstraction that we (including, as she makes clear, scholars of settler colonialism) call “land” is a generalization encompassing any number of particular *places*, each with its own properties, character, and, accordingly, responses to human intervention.⁶⁸ To characterize the impact of settler colonialism in any given site of its operations, the human dimension should not be bracketed off from the particularities of the ecological setting in and with which it formatively interacts. The reproof that Schneider administers, albeit sympathetically, is salutary: Insofar as settler-colonial studies works with a generic, context-neutral notion of land, it risks reproducing the prefabricated abstract grids that settlers notoriously impose on Native peoples' homelands. The epistemological stocktaking that this challenge requires is fundamental. Schneider's own response is to consult Indigenous ways of knowing that have not lost sight of the immediacy of place. To this end, her chapter seeks “to decentralize the human and interrogate the ways in which settler colonialism shapes the land itself by engaging with Indigenous epistemologies that take seriously notions of place, relationship with the land, and the spatially located lifeways of nonhuman beings.”⁶⁹ Nonhuman beings have not been accorded a great deal of existential credibility in disenchanted instrumental paradigms that objectify animals as stock, pests, or objects of environmental management. As Schneider revealingly unravels the complexities of one local situation, the management of salmon runs on the Columbia river, the monolithic concept of nature that informs place-unspecific conservation programs—in this case for the conservation of sea lions—produces a situation in which fish ladders, intended to enable salmon to return to their spawning grounds despite the changes that settler industries have made to their river, actually function as salmon traps for bloated sea lions, who reap an unhunted harvest of effortless feasting. The circumscribed policy deals over sea-lion culls that emerge from negotiations between governmental and environmental agencies are drawn up without reference to locally responsive Native management techniques, which coincide with sea lion-unfriendly practices in the conservationists' global gazette. Here, too, the implications of homogeneity are problematic.

In common with Schneider, but by way of a different trajectory, Cameron Greensmith and Sulaimon Giwa trouble an oppositional politics whose congruence with anticolonial discourse should not be taken for granted. Following the productive lead of Scott Morgensen, Greensmith and Giwa interrogate the settler-colonial orientation of Queer politics in contemporary Toronto.⁷⁰ They find that Two-Spirit people, Queer Natives whose compound identifications one might expect (indeed hope) to be companionably received in Queer circles, instead experience a degree of racism

that is reminiscent of heteropatriarchal society. To quote from their abstract, which neatly distills the findings of their multifaceted investigation, “contemporary Queer politics in Canada rely on the eroticization of Two-Spirit subjectivities, Queer settler violence, and the production of (White) Queer narratives of belonging that simultaneously promote the inclusion and erasure of Indigenous presence.”⁷¹ As Queer activists themselves, Greensmith and Giwa are well-positioned to derive positive implications from their otherwise depressing findings, which they translate into in-house policy recommendations that they urge on the Queer movement in Toronto (and, by extension, elsewhere.) A further respect in which their analysis resonates with Schneider’s critique of instrumental epistemologies, or so it seems to me, is methodological. In my view, Greensmith and Giwa’s distinctive methodology, an unusual combination of social-scientific survey and interpretive hermeneutics, engages with the immediacy of particular experiences. By conventional survey standards their sample is laughably small, but this does not bother them in the least. Their concern is semantic and qualitative. As Schneider calls for attention to the specificities of different places, so do they concentrate on evoking and giving voice to the experiential nuances of individual Two-Spirit people’s encounters with Queer-movement racism. It is a humane epistemology, attuned to particularity and diversity.

Settler colonialism is not a monolith. It manifests unevenly and regionally, producing divisions among Natives as much as it does among settlers. No matter how common their interests, Natives do not respond unanimously. There should be no need to paper over the cracks, as if a proper response to othering is to join ranks and mirror the colonial refusal to differentiate. John Peacock, a Dakota historian, found his scholarship at odds with the priorities of two of his elders, Dr. Clifford Canku and Rev. Michael Simon, when it came to conveying historical information to an internal Dakota audience.⁷² Significantly, the problem had not arisen in the outside world of the settler academy, where Peacock had freely presented his perspective in the company of his elders. Dr. Canku and Rev. Simon have translated some fifty letters, written by Dakota prisoners of war imprisoned at Fort McClellan, Iowa, during the Dakota-US War of 1862, from the original Dakota into English. They commissioned Peacock to contribute an introduction to their published collection of translations.⁷³ When he presented his proposed introduction, they asked him to cut the historical account and only comment on issues of translation. It is not my place to comment on Peacock’s reflections on the implications of his elders’ disinclination to publish his history in the context of the continuing trauma that the extreme of colonial violence unleashed in 1862 constitutes for Dakota people. Suffice it to say that his candid account not only exemplifies but participates in the ongoing complexity of the settler-colonial present.

To introduce a collection of letters written from the bowels of conquest by Dakota partisans, mainly Christian converts facing public execution in the near future, Peacock sought to set the record straight, evenhandedly situating the letters in the historical context in which they had been written.⁷⁴ As Dipesh Chakrabarty has pointed out, however, the mere act of writing history in such a way, regardless of content or purpose, is a European thing to do.⁷⁵ Chakrabarty could have been reading Dr. Canku. When I emailed the two elders asking them to confirm that they had no objection to

Peacock's essay being published in this collection, part of Dr. Canku's reply (which was positive) read: "what we wish to go into the introduction section of our book is that we object to the re-hashing of Euro-american history . . . we suggested to Dr Peacock . . . to share our Dakota knowledge about protocol [which] is beyond the pages of the Dakota Prison letters. Example: explanation of foundations, kinship terms, social and spiritual relationships/realities, etc."⁷⁶ In sum, then (and leaving myself aside), despite their different ways of doing it, all the personages in this story were attempting to alleviate the effects of settler colonialism on Dakota people. Regardless of their adherence to a Christianity once evangelized by White men, the prisoners were about to die defending their people against colonial invasion. Peacock sought to set the record straight in the hope of contributing to Dakotas' ongoing quest for closure over the still-deadly fallout from their *nakba*. In their turn, his elders acted as custodians of an autonomously Dakota world that continues (with *sumoud*, we might say) to survive the bowels of conquest. Despite all the differences distinguishing their responses, therefore, each of the Natives in this story shares a fundamental historical commonality: they have all been dealing with the reality of being colonized. As the chapters in the second volume of this collection will explore, beneath the complex surface of the harsh world of settler colonialism, a primordial binarism prevails. Only settlers enjoy the option of political detachment. Impartiality is a conqueror's luxury.

How to put all this complexity into words? Between them, the articles that follow do an extraordinary job, one that I feel extremely privileged to be able to present. Nonetheless, words have their inescapable limits. Why else do people make art and music? In his astounding exercise in "thinking-feeling," which could be the only way to end this collection, Ken Whalen moves between words and pictures to project the jumble that is memory, here the impossibly overworked memory of a landscape of trauma as it is randomly sliced and reconfigured in the flashes of roadside montage that drivers experience as they pass along the US National Park Service's "Trail of Tears National Historic Trail."⁷⁷ But words are not enough. Experience Whalen's confronting montage, a visual journey into the turbulence and darkness at the heart of the settler complex.

NOTES

1. Robert A. Williams, Jr., *The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

2. David E. Stannard, *American Holocaust: The Conquest of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 57–146; Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since 1492* (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1987).

3. See Syed Hussein Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Images of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and Its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

4. Tracey Banivanua Mar, *Violence and Colonial Dialogue: The Australia-Pacific Labor Trade* (Honolulu: Hawai'i University Press, 2007).

5. Joe Gray Taylor, *Negro Slavery in Louisiana* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1963), 5. For comparable examples from British North America, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., *In the Matter*

of Color. *Race and the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

6. Patrick Wolfe, "Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race," *American Historical Review* 106 (2001).

7. According to official Israeli estimates, more than 85 percent of Palestinian villages were "abandoned" in the 1948 *nakba*, 218 villages being listed as destroyed. Figures summarized in Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley, CA: U.C. Berkeley Institute of International Studies, 1983), 122–25. "Of the 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and the beginning of 1953, 350 were on absentee [Palestinian] property. In 1954, more than one third of Israel's Jewish Population lived on absentee property and nearly a third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) settled in urban areas abandoned by Arabs. They left whole cities like Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Ramleh, Basan, Majdal; 388 towns and villages and large parts of 94 other cities and towns, containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel." Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1958), 143.

8. See also Marcia Langton, "What Do We Mean By Wilderness? Wilderness and Terra Nullius in Australian Art," *The Sydney Papers* (Sydney: The Sydney Institute, summer 1996). Being unpopulated (or "ready-settled") rather than depopulated, Antarctica presents a significant exception, though not one that has placed the continent beyond the reach of settler colonialism. For discussion, see Patrick Wolfe, "Race and the Trace of History: For Henry Reynolds," in *Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and Culture*, ed. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 286–88.

9. Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Raymond Williams, *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (London: Verso, 1980). Beenash Jafri, "Desire, Settler Colonialism, and the Racialized Cowboy," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 37, no. 2 (2013): 73–86. Subsequent references to authors in this collection will be cited "AICRJ 37:2 (2013)."

10. Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 9–10.

11. Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Norton, 1975).

12. Aziz Rana, *The Two Faces of American Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), quote at 23.

13. Rana, *Two Faces of American Freedom*, 116.

14. This non-rigorous conclusion is derived from a personal perusal of graduate dissertation topics in the history departments at Harvard, Stanford, and UCLA, together with an informal quantitative survey of the topics addressed in articles and book reviews from 1990 through 2011 in *American Historical Review*, *Journal of American History*, and (I am sorry to report) *Radical History Review*. The position of Kanaka Maoli (or Native Hawaiian) history at the University of Hawai'i is different. In this as in other regards, Native Hawaiian issues should be distinguished from Native American and Alaskan ones.

15. Here as in other regards, Edward Said already had it—in this case in the critique of area studies. See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Routledge: London, 1978), 53, 275–76.

16. Ronald T. Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 79. "Southwest" because, in the 1830s—though increasingly less so—the nation's western boundary was effectively the Mississippi.

17. For the more "genteel" or juridical/bureaucratic modalities of Indian elimination that were adopted in the wake of the frontier, see Patrick Wolfe, "After the Frontier: Separation and Absorption in US Indian Policy," *settler colonial studies* 1 (2011): 13–50. Indian population figures hit the lowest

number they would ever record in the 1890s, at the height of the Dawes-era allotment program. See Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival*, 133.

18. In a depressing irony, however, White-style racial majoritarianism can be imported in order to condemn people who have been part of your community for centuries and have nowhere else to go. The discriminatory distinction between Indians and Blacks is not confined to US mainstream cultural discourse, being used to legitimate majority-community racism directed against Black Indians in some tribes, whether or not they are descended from one-time “freed” men and women. On Black Indians, see the essays collected by James F. Brooks in his *Confounding the Color Line: The Indian-Black Experience in North America* (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 2002); Tiya Miles, *Ties That Bind: The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom* (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 2005); Circe Sturm, *Becoming Indian: The Struggle over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-first Century* (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2010); and Jack D. Forbes’s benchmark *Africans and Native Americans: The Language of Race and the Evolution of Red-Black Peoples* (Urbana, IL: Illinois University Press, 1988).

19. Those who have been kind enough to read my work may recognize some sentences from the last two paragraphs, which are closely adapted (though not completely verbatim) from my “After the Frontier,” 39–40. Other sentences and turns of phrase that I have previously used are also dotted through the present article. This is partly by choice—to signal connections between what I am writing here and wider concerns of which some readers may be aware—but it also occurs in the course of trying to build up a comparative account, which (or so I find) is a cumulative procedure. Earlier analyses keep acquiring wider implications, so I cannot see any alternative to rehearsing to them to explain the new or expanded perspective. At least they appear here in different connections to their earlier ones.

20. Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

21. David R. Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White. The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Noel Ignatieff, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

22. Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” 879.

23. T. J. Morgan, “What Is An Indian?,” in *Sixty First Annual Report*, Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Washington, DC, 1892), 34. Kent Carter, “Snakes & Scribes: The Dawes Commission and the Enrollment of the Creeks,” *Prologue Magazine* (National Archives) 29, no. 1 (Spring 1997); Paul Spruhan, “A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935,” *South Dakota Law Review* 51 (2006): 32; Circe Dawn Sturm, *Blood Politics: Race, Culture, and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma* (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 2002); Wolfe, “After the Frontier.” For a Hawaiian analog, see J. Kehaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

24. Ella Shohat, “Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims,” *Social Text* 19/20 (1988); Ella Shohat, *Taboo Memories, Diasporic Voices* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Yehouda Shenhav, *The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Sami Shalom Chetrit, *Intra-Jewish Conflict in Israel: White Jews, Black Jews* (London: Routledge, 2010); Patrick Wolfe, “New Jews for Old: Settler State Formation and the Impossibility of Zionism. In Memory of Edward W. Said,” *Arena Journal* 37/38 (2012). *Nakba* is an Arabic term meaning “catastrophe.” Palestinians and others use it to refer to the ethnic cleansing that accompanied the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. See Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006).

25. National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Australia,) *Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of*

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children and their Families (Canberra: Australian Government Printer, 1997); Anna Haebich, *Broken Circles: Fragmenting Indigenous Families 1800–2000* (Fremantle, Australia: Fremantle Press, 2000). For official Australian policies that fall within the terms of the international definition of genocide, see Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8 (2006): 401.

26. For an example of this kind of conceptual incoherence, see Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright, “Decolonizing Resistance, Challenging Colonial States,” *Social Justice* 35, no. 3 (2008).

27. Ghassan Hage, *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society* (Annandale, Australia: Pluto Press, 1998); Ghassan Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society* (Annandale, Australia: Pluto Press, 2003).

28. Classic accounts include James Boyce, *Van Diemen’s Land* (Collingwood, Australia: Black Inc., 2008); Bruce Elder, *Blood on the Wattle: Massacres and Maltreatment of Australia Aborigines since 1788* (Sydney: Child and Associates, 1988); Roger Milliss, *Waterloo Creek: The Australia Day Massacre of 1838, George Gipps and the British Conquest of New South Wales* (Ringwood, Australia: McPhee Gribble/Penguin, 1992).

29. Quoted in Ben Silverstein and Patrick Wolfe, “Ideology,” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Imperial Histories*, ed. Philippa Levine and John Marriott (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 484. (I would love to claim this find but, alas, it’s one of Ben’s.)

30. Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

31. Patrick Wolfe, “Nation and Miscegenation: Discursive Continuity in the Post-Mabo Era,” *Social Analysis* 34 (1994); Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event* (London: Cassell, 1999), 179–190. For settler discourse on the Dreamtime, see Wolfe, “On Being Woken Up: The Dreamtime in Anthropology and in Australian Settler Culture,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 33 (1991).

32. On the basis of the Catholic analog, we might rechristen the denial of coevalness—which, face it, is somewhat short on felicity—“heterotemporality.” See Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

33. Wolfe, “On Being Woken Up,” 214.

34. Though even then subversive Indigenous artworks rapidly lose their sting in the repressive gentility of the white cube (the problem is also, of course, a more general one). Consider the Ramingining display that greets visitors to the Australian National Gallery in Canberra. In 1988, as their contribution to the Sydney Biennale, an official commemoration of two hundred years of White settlement, the Ramingining people of Arnhem Land sent two hundred ceremonially decorated bark coffins. The installation was subsequently moved to the Canberra gallery. It is hard to imagine how it might have resisted domestication to White-Australian aesthetic culture in surroundings such as these.

35. Personal communication. Thank you, Jon.

36. Stefanie Affeldt, “A Paroxysm of Whiteness: ‘White’ Labour, ‘White’ Nation and ‘White’ Sugar in Australia,” in *Wages of Whiteness and Racist Symbolic Capital*, ed. Wulf D. Hund, Jeremy Krikler, and David R. Roediger (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 99–131. Myra Willard, *History of the White Australia Policy to 1920* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1923) remains worth consulting.

37. For the American Colonization Movement, see Eric Burin, *Slavery and the Peculiar Solution: A History of the American Colonization Society* (Gainesville, FL: Florida University Press, 2005); Emma J. Lapsanskey-Werner and Margaret Hope Bacon, eds., *Back to Africa: Benjamin Coates and the Colonization Movement in America 1848–1880* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 2005); P. J. Staudenraus, *The African Colonization Movement, 1816–1865* (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1961). In this connection, it might be acknowledged that the idea of colonization could receive Black endorsement, both at the time (Paul Cuffe, John B. Russwurm) and later (Marcus Garvey).

38. Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," 389. Capitalization added.

39. Rana, *Two Faces of American Freedom*, 70. The classic account is Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). A prominent example of this phenomenon is the dressing up as Indians that preceded the Boston Tea Party.

40. This is summed up in her title. Douglas, *Purity and Danger*.

41. Maya Mikdash, "What Is Settler Colonialism? (for Leo Delano Ames Jr.)," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 23–34.

42. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," in his *Essays on Ideology* (London: Verso, 1976), 1–60.

43. Victor W. Turner, *The Drums of Affliction: A Study of Religious Processes among the Ndembu of Zambia* (London: Hutchinson/International African Institute, 1968), esp. 19.

44. Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996).

45. Mikdash, "What Is Settler Colonialism?"; and Beenash Jafri, "Desire, Settler Colonialism," 73–86.

46. The English invasion of Ireland, which was authorized by Adrian IV, the only English pope, preceded Columbus by more than three centuries.

47. Mikdash, "What Is Settler Colonialism?," 27, 29.

48. Lewis Henry Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1871), 508. For Morgan, see Thomas R. Trautmann, *Lewis Henry Morgan and the Invention of Kinship* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).

49. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

50. Henry Labouchère's anticolonial poem "The Brown Man's Burden" was written in 1899. See Ernest Crosby, *The Real White Man's Burden* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1902), 32–35. Hubert Henry Harrison's Harlem Renaissance poem, "The Black Man's Burden: A Reply to Rudyard Kipling" ("Take up the Black Man's burden / Send forth the worst ye breed / And bind our sons in shackles / To serve your selfish greed") was published in New York in 1920 in his *When Africa Awakes: The "Inside Story" of the Stirrings and Strivings of the New Negro in the Western World*, <http://www.expo98.msu.edu/people/Harrison.htm>.

51. Jafri, "Desire, Settler Colonialism, and the Racialized Cowboy," 82.

52. Isaiah Lorado Wilner, "A Global Potlatch: Identifying the Indigenous Influence on Western Thought," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 87–114.

53. This is a durable theme. I first used the term *ethnographic ventriloquism* in 1992, for an Australian audience. See Patrick Wolfe, "Reluctant Invaders" (review), *Meanjin* 2 (1992): 338. See also Patrick Wolfe, "Should the Subaltern Dream? 'Australian Aborigines' and the Problem of Ethnographic Ventriloquism," in *Cultures of Scholarship*, ed. Sally Humphreys (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1997,) 57–96.

54. Wilner, "A Global Potlatch," 104.

55. For dependency theory, see Suzanne Bodenhemier, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society* 2 (May 1971); Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review* 60 (May 1970); Patrick Wolfe, "History and Theory: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism," *American Historical Review* 102 (1997): 393–97.

56. Jean Dennison, "Stitching Osage Governance into the Future," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 116–27.
57. *Ibid.*, 117.
58. Kevin Bruyneel, *The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of US-Indigenous Relations* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2007).
59. Lauren Jessica Amsterdam, "All the Eagles and the Ravens in the House Say *Yeab*: (Ab)original Hip-Hop, Heritage, and Love," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 53–72.
60. Jacques Derrida, "Choosing One's Heritage," in *For What Tomorrow: A Dialogue with Elisabeth Roudinesco* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 8. Amsterdam, e-mail to author.
61. Stephen Pearson, "'The Last Bastion of Colonialism': Appalachian Settler Colonialism and Self-Indigenization," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 165–84.
62. *Ibid.*, 168.
63. Adria L. Imada, "'Aloha 'Oe': Settler-Colonial Nostalgia and the Genealogy of a Love Song," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 35–52.
64. Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 129–39, Cleveland quote on 134; Michael Dougherty, *To Steal a Kingdom* (Waimanalo, HI: Island Style, 1992).
65. Imada, "Aloha 'Oe," 35.
66. *Ibid.*, 42.
67. Concerning good intentions, see Patrick Wolfe, "Against the Intentional Fallacy: Legocentrism and Continuity in the Rhetoric of Indian Dispossession," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 36, no. 1 (2012).
68. Lindsey Schneider, "'There's Something in the Water': Salmon Runs and Settler Colonialism on the Columbia River," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 149–63.
69. *Ibid.*, 150.
70. Cameron Greensmith and Sulaimon Giwa, "Challenging Settler Colonialism in Contemporary Queer Politics: Settler Homonationalism, Pride Toronto, and Two-Spirit Subjectivities," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 129–48.
71. Cameron Greensmith and Sulaimon Giwa, "Challenging Settler Colonialism in Contemporary Queer Politics (abstract)," *American Indian Studies Center*, <http://www.books.aisc.ucla.edu/abstracts/37.2.GREENSMITHGIWA.pdf>.
72. John Peacock, "An Account of the Dakota-US War of 1862 as Sacred Text: Why My Dakota Elders Value Spiritual Closure over Scholarly 'Balance,'" *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 185–206.
73. Clifford Canku and Michael Simon, eds. and trans., *The Dakota Prisoner of War Letters* (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2013).
74. Peacock, "An Account of the Dakota-US War of 1862 as Sacred Text," 185–206.
75. Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts?," *Representations* 37 (1992): 213. See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 27–46.
76. Clifford Canku, e-mail to Patrick Wolfe, September 11, 2012.
77. Ken Whalen, "Driving with the Driven: A Re(-)view of the Trail of Tears in the Roadside Montage," *AICRJ* 37:2 (2013): 207–32.